9 files changed, 56263 insertions, 0 deletions

diff --git a/.gitattributes b/.gitattributes
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..6833f05
--- /dev/null
+++ b/.gitattributes
@@ -0,0 +1,3 @@
+* text=auto
+*.txt text
+*.md text
diff --git a/14988-8.txt b/14988-8.txt
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..3769865
--- /dev/null
+++ b/14988-8.txt
@@ -0,0 +1,18517 @@
+Project Gutenberg's Cicero's Tusculan Disputations, by Marcus Tullius Cicero
+
+This eBook is for the use of anyone anywhere at no cost and with
+almost no restrictions whatsoever.  You may copy it, give it away or
+re-use it under the terms of the Project Gutenberg License included
+with this eBook or online at www.gutenberg.org
+
+
+Title: Cicero's Tusculan Disputations
+       Also, Treatises On The Nature Of The Gods, And On The Commonwealth
+
+Author: Marcus Tullius Cicero
+
+Release Date: February 9, 2005 [EBook #14988]
+
+Language: English and Latin
+
+Character set encoding: ISO-8859-1
+
+*** START OF THIS PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK CICERO'S TUSCULAN DISPUTATIONS ***
+
+
+
+
+Produced by Ted Garvin, Hagen von Eitzen and the PG Online Distributed
+Proofreading Team.
+
+
+
+
+
+CICERO'S TUSCULAN DISPUTATIONS;
+
+
+
+
+ALSO, TREATISES ON
+
+THE NATURE OF THE GODS,
+
+AND ON
+
+THE COMMONWEALTH.
+
+
+
+
+
+LITERALLY TRANSLATED, CHIEFLY BY
+C. D. YONGE.
+
+
+NEW YORK:
+HARPER & BROTHERS, PUBLISHERS,
+FRANKLIN SQUARE.
+1877.
+
+
+HARPER'S NEW CLASSICAL LIBRARY.
+
+
+COMPRISING LITERAL TRANSLATIONS OF
+
+
+  CÆSAR.
+  VIRGIL.
+  SALLUST.
+  HORACE.
+  CICERO'S ORATIONS.
+  CICERO'S OFFICES &c.
+  CICERO ON ORATORY AND ORATORS.
+  CICERO'S TUSCULAN DISPUTATIONS, the Republic, and the Nature of the Gods.
+  TERENCE.
+  TACITUS.
+  LIVY. 2 Vols.
+  JUVENAL.
+  XENOPHON.
+  HOMER'S ILIAD.
+  HOMER'S ODYSSEY.
+  HERODOTUS.
+  DEMOSTHENES. 2 Vols.
+  THUCIDIDES.
+  ÆSCHYLUS.
+  SOPHOCLES.
+  EURIPIDES. 2 Vols.
+  PLATO. [SELECT DIALOGUES.]
+
+
+12mo, Cloth, $1.50 per Volume.
+
+
+HARPER & BROTHERS _will send either of the above works by mail, postage
+prepaid, to any part of the United States, on receipt of the price_.
+
+
+
+
+
+
+NOTE.
+
+
+The greater portion of the Republic was previously translated by
+Francis Barham, Esq., and published in 1841. Although ably performed,
+it was not sufficiently close for the purpose of the "CLASSICAL
+LIBRARY," and was therefore placed in the hands of the present editor
+for revision, as well as for collation with recent texts. This has
+occasioned material alterations and additions.
+
+The treatise "On the Nature of the Gods" is a revision of that usually
+ascribed to the celebrated Benjamin Franklin.
+
+
+
+
+
+
+CONTENTS.
+
+
+_Tusculan Disputations_
+
+_On the Nature of the Gods_
+
+_On the Commonwealth_
+
+
+
+
+
+
+THE TUSCULAN DISPUTATIONS.
+
+INTRODUCTION.
+
+
+In the year A.U.C. 708, and the sixty-second year of Cicero's age, his
+daughter, Tullia, died in childbed; and her loss afflicted Cicero to
+such a degree that he abandoned all public business, and, leaving the
+city, retired to Asterra, which was a country house that he had near
+Antium; where, after a while, he devoted himself to philosophical
+studies, and, besides other works, he published his Treatise de
+Finibus, and also this treatise called the Tusculan Disputations, of
+which Middleton gives this concise description:
+
+"The first book teaches us how to contemn the terrors of death, and to
+look upon it as a blessing rather than an evil;
+
+"The second, to support pain and affliction with a manly fortitude;
+
+"The third, to appease all our complaints and uneasinesses under the
+accidents of life;
+
+"The fourth, to moderate all our other passions;
+
+"And the fifth explains the sufficiency of virtue to make men happy."
+
+It was his custom in the opportunities of his leisure to take some
+friends with him into the country, where, instead of amusing themselves
+with idle sports or feasts, their diversions were wholly speculative,
+tending to improve the mind and enlarge the understanding. In this
+manner he now spent five days at his Tusculan villa in discussing with
+his friends the several questions just mentioned. For, after employing
+the mornings in declaiming and rhetorical exercises, they used to
+retire in the afternoon into a gallery, called the Academy, which he
+had built for the purpose of philosophical conferences, where, after
+the manner of the Greeks, he held a school, as they called it, and
+invited the company to call for any subject that they desired to hear
+explained, which being proposed accordingly by some of the audience
+became immediately the argument of that day's debate. These five
+conferences, or dialogues, he collected afterward into writing in the
+very words and manner in which they really passed; and published them
+under the title of his Tusculan Disputations, from the name of the
+villa in which they were held.
+
+       *       *       *       *       *
+
+
+
+
+BOOK I.
+
+ON THE CONTEMPT OF DEATH.
+
+
+I. At a time when I had entirely, or to a great degree, released myself
+from my labors as an advocate, and from my duties as a senator, I had
+recourse again, Brutus, principally by your advice, to those studies
+which never had been out of my mind, although neglected at times, and
+which after a long interval I resumed; and now, since the principles
+and rules of all arts which relate to living well depend on the study
+of wisdom, which is called philosophy, I have thought it an employment
+worthy of me to illustrate them in the Latin tongue, not because
+philosophy could not be understood in the Greek language, or by the
+teaching of Greek masters; but it has always been my opinion that our
+countrymen have, in some instances, made wiser discoveries than the
+Greeks, with reference to those subjects which they have considered
+worthy of devoting their attention to, and in others have improved upon
+their discoveries, so that in one way or other we surpass them on every
+point; for, with regard to the manners and habits of private life, and
+family and domestic affairs, we certainly manage them with more
+elegance, and better than they did; and as to our republic, that our
+ancestors have, beyond all dispute, formed on better customs and laws.
+What shall I say of our military affairs; in which our ancestors have
+been most eminent in valor, and still more so in discipline? As to
+those things which are attained not by study, but nature, neither
+Greece, nor any nation, is comparable to us; for what people has
+displayed such gravity, such steadiness, such greatness of soul,
+probity, faith--such distinguished virtue of every kind, as to be equal
+to our ancestors. In learning, indeed, and all kinds of literature,
+Greece did excel us, and it was easy to do so where there was no
+competition; for while among the Greeks the poets were the most ancient
+species of learned men--since Homer and Hesiod lived before the
+foundation of Rome, and Archilochus[1] was a contemporary of
+Romulus--we received poetry much later. For it was about five hundred
+and ten years after the building of Rome before Livius[2] published a
+play in the consulship of C. Claudius, the son of Cæcus, and M.
+Tuditanus, a year before the birth of Ennius, who was older than
+Plautus and Nævius.
+
+II. It was, therefore, late before poets were either known or received
+among us; though we find in Cato de Originibus that the guests used, at
+their entertainments, to sing the praises of famous men to the sound of
+the flute; but a speech of Cato's shows this kind of poetry to have
+been in no great esteem, as he censures Marcus Nobilior for carrying
+poets with him into his province; for that consul, as we know, carried
+Ennius with him into Ætolia. Therefore the less esteem poets were in,
+the less were those studies pursued; though even then those who did
+display the greatest abilities that way were not very inferior to the
+Greeks. Do we imagine that if it had been considered commendable in
+Fabius,[3] a man of the highest rank, to paint, we should not have had
+many Polycleti and Parrhasii? Honor nourishes art, and glory is the
+spur with all to studies; while those studies are always neglected in
+every nation which are looked upon disparagingly. The Greeks held skill
+in vocal and instrumental music as a very important accomplishment, and
+therefore it is recorded of Epaminondas, who, in my opinion, was the
+greatest man among the Greeks, that he played excellently on the flute;
+and Themistocles, some years before, was deemed ignorant because at an
+entertainment he declined the lyre when it was offered to him. For this
+reason musicians flourished in Greece; music was a general study; and
+whoever was unacquainted with it was not considered as fully instructed
+in learning. Geometry was in high esteem with them, therefore none were
+more honorable than mathematicians. But we have confined this art to
+bare measuring and calculating.
+
+III. But, on the contrary, we early entertained an esteem for the
+orator; though he was not at first a man of learning, but only quick at
+speaking: in subsequent times he became learned; for it is reported
+that Galba, Africanus, and Lælius were men of learning; and that even
+Cato, who preceded them in point of time, was a studious man: then
+succeeded the Lepidi, Carbo, and Gracchi, and so many great orators
+after them, down to our own times, that we were very little, if at all,
+inferior to the Greeks. Philosophy has been at a low ebb even to this
+present time, and has had no assistance from our own language, and so
+now I have undertaken to raise and illustrate it, in order that, as I
+have been of service to my countrymen, when employed on public affairs,
+I may, if possible, be so likewise in my retirement; and in this I must
+take the more pains, because there are already many books in the Latin
+language which are said to be written inaccurately, having been
+composed by excellent men, only not of sufficient learning; for,
+indeed, it is possible that a man may think well, and yet not be able
+to express his thoughts elegantly; but for any one to publish thoughts
+which he can neither arrange skilfully nor illustrate so as to
+entertain his reader, is an unpardonable abuse of letters and
+retirement: they, therefore, read their books to one another, and no
+one ever takes them up but those who wish to have the same license for
+careless writing allowed to themselves. Wherefore, if oratory has
+acquired any reputation from my industry, I shall take the more pains
+to open the fountains of philosophy, from which all my eloquence has
+taken its rise.
+
+IV. But, as Aristotle,[4] a man of the greatest genius, and of the most
+various knowledge, being excited by the glory of the rhetorician
+Isocrates,[5] commenced teaching young men to speak, and joined
+philosophy with eloquence: so it is my design not to lay aside my
+former study of oratory, and yet to employ myself at the same time in
+this greater and more fruitful art; for I have always thought that to
+be able to speak copiously and elegantly on the most important
+questions was the most perfect philosophy. And I have so diligently
+applied myself to this pursuit, that I have already ventured to have a
+school like the Greeks. And lately when you left us, having many of my
+friends about me, I attempted at my Tusculan villa what I could do in
+that way; for as I formerly used to practise declaiming, which nobody
+continued longer than myself, so this is now to be the declamation of
+my old age. I desired any one to propose a question which he wished to
+have discussed, and then I argued that point either sitting or walking;
+and so I have compiled the scholæ, as the Greeks call them, of five
+days, in as many books. We proceeded in this manner: when he who had
+proposed the subject for discussion had said what he thought proper, I
+spoke against him; for this is, you know, the old and Socratic method
+of arguing against another's opinion; for Socrates thought that thus
+the truth would more easily be arrived at. But to give you a better
+notion of our disputations, I will not barely send you an account of
+them, but represent them to you as they were carried on; therefore let
+the introduction be thus:
+
+V. _A._ To me death seems to be an evil.
+
+_M._ What, to those who are already dead? or to those who must die?
+
+_A._ To both.
+
+_M._ It is a misery, then, because an evil?
+
+_A._ Certainly.
+
+_M._ Then those who have already died, and those who have still got to
+die, are both miserable?
+
+_A._ So it appears to me.
+
+_M._ Then all are miserable?
+
+_A._ Every one.
+
+_M._ And, indeed, if you wish to be consistent, all that are already
+born, or ever shall be, are not only miserable, but always will be so;
+for should you maintain those only to be miserable, you would not
+except any one living, for all must die; but there should be an end of
+misery in death. But seeing that the dead are miserable, we are born to
+eternal misery, for they must of consequence be miserable who died a
+hundred thousand years ago; or rather, all that have ever been born.
+
+_A._ So, indeed, I think.
+
+_M._ Tell me, I beseech you, are you afraid of the three-headed
+Cerberus in the shades below, and the roaring waves of Cocytus, and the
+passage over Acheron, and Tantalus expiring with thirst, while the
+water touches his chin; and Sisyphus,
+
+    Who sweats with arduous toil in vain
+    The steepy summit of the mount to gain?
+
+Perhaps, too, you dread the inexorable judges, Minos and Rhadamanthus;
+before whom neither L. Crassus nor M. Antonius can defend you; and
+where, since the cause lies before Grecian judges, you will not even be
+able to employ Demosthenes; but you must plead for yourself before a
+very great assembly. These things perhaps you dread, and therefore look
+on death as an eternal evil.
+
+VI. _A._ Do you take me to be so imbecile as to give credit to such
+things?
+
+_M._ What, do you not believe them?
+
+_A._ Not in the least.
+
+_M._ I am sorry to hear that.
+
+_A._ Why, I beg?
+
+_M._ Because I could have been very eloquent in speaking against them.
+
+_A._ And who could not on such a subject? or what trouble is it to
+refute these monstrous inventions of the poets and painters?[6]
+
+_M._ And yet you have books of philosophers full of arguments against
+these.
+
+_A._ A great waste of time, truly! for who is so weak as to be
+concerned about them?
+
+_M._ If, then, there is no one miserable in the infernal regions, there
+can be no one there at all.
+
+_A._ I am altogether of that opinion.
+
+_M._ Where, then, are those you call miserable? or what place do they
+inhabit? For, if they exist at all, they must be somewhere.
+
+_A._ I, indeed, am of opinion that they are nowhere.
+
+_M._ Then they have no existence at all.
+
+_A._ Even so, and yet they are miserable for this very reason, that
+they have no existence.
+
+_M._ I had rather now have you afraid of Cerberus than speak thus
+inaccurately.
+
+_A._ In what respect?
+
+_M._ Because you admit him to exist whose existence you deny with the
+same breath. Where now is your sagacity? When you say any one is
+miserable, you say that he who does not exist, does exist.
+
+_A._ I am not so absurd as to say that.
+
+_M._ What is it that you do say, then?
+
+_A._ I say, for instance, that Marcus Crassus is miserable in being
+deprived of such great riches as his by death; that Cn. Pompey is
+miserable in being taken from such glory and honor; and, in short, that
+all are miserable who are deprived of this light of life.
+
+_M._ You have returned to the same point, for to be miserable implies
+an existence; but you just now denied that the dead had any existence:
+if, then, they have not, they can be nothing; and if so, they are not
+even miserable.
+
+_A._ Perhaps I do not express what I mean, for I look upon this very
+circumstance, not to exist after having existed, to be very miserable.
+
+_M._ What, more so than not to have existed at all? Therefore, those
+who are not yet born are miserable because they are not; and we
+ourselves, if we are to be miserable after death, were miserable before
+we were born: but I do not remember that I was miserable before I was
+born; and I should be glad to know, if your memory is better, what you
+recollect of yourself before you were born.
+
+VII. _A._ You are pleasant: as if I had said that those men are
+miserable who are not born, and not that they are so who are dead.
+
+_M._ You say, then, that they are so?
+
+_A._ Yes; I say that because they no longer exist after having existed
+they are miserable.
+
+_M._ You do not perceive that you are asserting contradictions; for
+what is a greater contradiction, than that that should be not only
+miserable, but should have any existence at all, which does not exist?
+When you go out at the Capene gate and see the tombs of the Calatini,
+the Scipios, Servilii, and Metelli, do you look on them as miserable?
+
+_A._ Because you press me with a word, henceforward I will not say they
+are miserable absolutely, but miserable on this account, because they
+have no existence.
+
+_M._ You do not say, then, "M. Crassus is miserable," but only
+"Miserable M. Crassus."
+
+_A._ Exactly so.
+
+_M._ As if it did not follow that whatever you speak of in that manner
+either is or is not. Are you not acquainted with the first principles
+of logic? For this is the first thing they lay down, Whatever is
+asserted (for that is the best way that occurs to me, at the moment, of
+rendering the Greek term [Greek: axiôma]; if I can think of a more
+accurate expression hereafter, I will use it), is asserted as being
+either true or false. When, therefore, you say, "Miserable M. Crassus,"
+you either say this, "M. Crassus is miserable," so that some judgment
+may be made whether it is true or false, or you say nothing at all.
+
+_A._ Well, then, I now own that the dead are not miserable, since you
+have drawn from me a concession that they who do not exist at all can
+not be miserable. What then? We that are alive, are we not wretched,
+seeing we must die? for what is there agreeable in life, when we must
+night and day reflect that, at some time or other, we must die?
+
+VIII. _M._ Do you not, then, perceive how great is the evil from which
+you have delivered human nature?
+
+_A._ By what means?
+
+_M._ Because, if to die were miserable to the dead, to live would be a
+kind of infinite and eternal misery. Now, however, I see a goal, and
+when I have reached it, there is nothing more to be feared; but you
+seem to me to follow the opinion of Epicharmus,[7] a man of some
+discernment, and sharp enough for a Sicilian.
+
+_A._ What opinion? for I do not recollect it.
+
+_M._ I will tell you if I can in Latin; for you know I am no more used
+to bring in Latin sentences in a Greek discourse than Greek in a Latin
+one.
+
+_A._ And that is right enough. But what is that opinion of Epicharmus?
+
+_M._
+    I would not die, but yet
+    Am not concerned that I shall be dead.
+
+_A._ I now recollect the Greek; but since you have obliged me to grant
+that the dead are not miserable, proceed to convince me that it is not
+miserable to be under a necessity of dying.
+
+_M._ That is easy enough; but I have greater things in hand.
+
+_A._ How comes that to be so easy? And what are those things of more
+consequence?
+
+_M._ Thus: because, if there is no evil after death, then even death
+itself can be none; for that which immediately succeeds that is a state
+where you grant that there is no evil: so that even to be obliged to
+die can be no evil, for that is only the being obliged to arrive at a
+place where we allow that no evil is.
+
+_A._ I beg you will be more explicit on this point, for these subtle
+arguments force me sooner to admissions than to conviction. But what
+are those more important things about which you say that you are
+occupied?
+
+_M._ To teach you, if I can, that death is not only no evil, but a
+good.
+
+_A._ I do not insist on that, but should be glad to hear you argue it,
+for even though you should not prove your point, yet you will prove
+that death is no evil. But I will not interrupt you; I would rather
+hear a continued discourse.
+
+_M._ What, if I should ask you a question, would you not answer?
+
+_A._ That would look like pride; but I would rather you should not ask
+but where necessity requires.
+
+IX. _M._ I will comply with your wishes, and explain as well as I can
+what you require; but not with any idea that, like the Pythian Apollo,
+what I say must needs be certain and indisputable, but as a mere man,
+endeavoring to arrive at probabilities by conjecture, for I have no
+ground to proceed further on than probability. Those men may call their
+statements indisputable who assert that what they say can be perceived
+by the senses, and who proclaim themselves philosophers by profession.
+
+_A._ Do as you please: We are ready to hear you.
+
+_M._ The first thing, then, is to inquire what death, which seems to be
+so well understood, really is; for some imagine death to be the
+departure of the soul from the body; others think that there is no such
+departure, but that soul and body perish together, and that the soul is
+extinguished with the body. Of those who think that the soul does
+depart from the body, some believe in its immediate dissolution; others
+fancy that it continues to exist for a time; and others believe that it
+lasts forever. There is great dispute even what the soul is, where it
+is, and whence it is derived: with some, the heart itself (_cor_) seems
+to be the soul, hence the expressions, _excordes_, _vecordes_,
+_concordes;_ and that prudent Nasica, who was twice consul, was called
+Corculus, _i.e._, wise-heart; and Ælius Sextus is described as
+_Egregie_ cordatus _homo, catus Æliu' Sextus_--that great
+_wise-hearted_ man, sage Ælius. Empedocles imagines the blood, which is
+suffused over the heart, to be the soul; to others, a certain part of
+the brain seems to be the throne of the soul; others neither allow the
+heart itself, nor any portion of the brain, to be the soul, but think
+either that the heart is the seat and abode of the soul, or else that
+the brain is so. Some would have the soul, or spirit, to be the
+_anima_, as our schools generally agree; and indeed the name signifies
+as much, for we use the expressions _animam agere_, to live; _animam
+efflare_, to expire; _animosi_, men of spirit; _bene animati_, men of
+right feeling; _exanimi sententia_, according to our real opinion; and
+the very word _animus_ is derived from _anima_. Again, the soul seems
+to Zeno the Stoic to be fire.
+
+X. But what I have said as to the heart, the blood, the brain, air, or
+fire being the soul, are common opinions: the others are only
+entertained by individuals; and, indeed, there were many among the
+ancients who held singular opinions on this subject, of whom the latest
+was Aristoxenus, a man who was both a musician and a philosopher. He
+maintained a certain straining of the body, like what is called harmony
+in music, to be the soul, and believed that, from the figure and nature
+of the whole body, various motions are excited, as sounds are from an
+instrument. He adhered steadily to his system, and yet he said
+something, the nature of which, whatever it was, had been detailed and
+explained a great while before by Plato. Xenocrates denied that the
+soul had any figure, or anything like a body; but said it was a number,
+the power of which, as Pythagoras had fancied, some ages before, was
+the greatest in nature: his master, Plato, imagined a threefold soul, a
+dominant portion of which--that is to say, reason--he had lodged in the
+head, as in a tower; and the other two parts--namely, anger and
+desire--he made subservient to this one, and allotted them distinct
+abodes, placing anger in the breast, and desire under the præcordia.
+But Dicæarchus, in that discourse of some learned disputants, held at
+Corinth, which he details to us in three books--in the first book
+introduces many speakers; and in the other two he introduces a certain
+Pherecrates, an old man of Phthia, who, as he said, was descended from
+Deucalion; asserting, that there is in fact no such thing at all as a
+soul, but that it is a name without a meaning; and that it is idle to
+use the expression "animals," or "animated beings;" that neither men
+nor beasts have minds or souls, but that all that power by which we act
+or perceive is equally infused into every living creature, and is
+inseparable from the body, for if it were not, it would be nothing; nor
+is there anything whatever really existing except body, which is a
+single and simple thing, so fashioned as to live and have its
+sensations in consequence of the regulations of nature. Aristotle, a
+man superior to all others, both in genius and industry (I always
+except Plato), after having embraced these four known sorts of
+principles, from which all things deduce their origin, imagines that
+there is a certain fifth nature, from whence comes the soul; for to
+think, to foresee, to learn, to teach, to invent anything, and many
+other attributes of the same kind, such as to remember, to love, to
+hate, to desire, to fear, to be pleased or displeased--these, and
+others like them, exist, he thinks, in none of those first four kinds:
+on such account he adds a fifth kind, which has no name, and so by a
+new name he calls the soul [Greek: endelecheia], as if it were a
+certain continued and perpetual motion.
+
+XI. If I have not forgotten anything unintentionally, these are the
+principal opinions concerning the soul. I have omitted Democritus, a
+very great man indeed, but one who deduces the soul from the fortuitous
+concourse of small, light, and round substances; for, if you believe
+men of his school, there is nothing which a crowd of atoms cannot
+effect. Which of these opinions is true, some God must determine. It is
+an important question for us, Which has the most appearance of truth?
+Shall we, then, prefer determining between them, or shall we return to
+our subject?
+
+_A._ I could wish both, if possible; but it is difficult to mix them:
+therefore, if without a discussion of them we can get rid of the fears
+of death, let us proceed to do so; but if this is not to be done
+without explaining the question about souls, let us have that now, and
+the other at another time.
+
+_M._ I take that plan to be the best, which I perceive you are inclined
+to; for reason will demonstrate that, whichever of the opinions which I
+have stated is true, it must follow, then, that death cannot be an
+evil; or that it must rather be something desirable; for if either the
+heart, or the blood, or the brain, is the soul, then certainly the
+soul, being corporeal, must perish with the rest of the body; if it is
+air, it will perhaps be dissolved; if it is fire, it will be
+extinguished; if it is Aristoxenus's harmony, it will be put out of
+tune. What shall I say of Dicæarchus, who denies that there is any
+soul? In all these opinions, there is nothing to affect any one after
+death; for all feeling is lost with life, and where there is no
+sensation, nothing can interfere to affect us. The opinions of others
+do indeed bring us hope; if it is any pleasure to you to think that
+souls, after they leave the body, may go to heaven as to a permanent
+home.
+
+_A._ I have great pleasure in that thought, and it is what I most
+desire; and even if it should not be so, I should still be very willing
+to believe it.
+
+_M._ What occasion have you, then, for my assistance? Am I superior to
+Plato in eloquence? Turn over carefully his book that treats of the
+soul; you will have there all that you can want.
+
+_A._ I have, indeed, done that, and often; but, I know not how it comes
+to pass, I agree with it while I am reading it; but when I have laid
+down the book, and begin to reflect with myself on the immortality of
+the soul, all that agreement vanishes.
+
+_M._ How comes that? Do you admit this--that souls either exist after
+death, or else that they also perish at the moment of death?
+
+_A._ I agree to that. And if they do exist, I admit that they are
+happy; but if they perish, I cannot suppose them to be unhappy,
+because, in fact, they have no existence at all. You drove me to that
+concession but just now.
+
+_M._ How, then, can you, or why do you, assert that you think that
+death is an evil, when it either makes us happy, in the case of the
+soul continuing to exist, or, at all events, not unhappy, in the case
+of our becoming destitute of all sensation?
+
+XII. _A._ Explain, therefore, if it is not troublesome to you, first,
+if you can, that souls do exist after death; secondly, should you fail
+in that (and it is a very difficult thing to establish), that death is
+free from all evil; for I am not without my fears that this itself is
+an evil: I do not mean the immediate deprivation of sense, but the fact
+that we shall hereafter suffer deprivation.
+
+_M._ I have the best authority in support of the opinion you desire to
+have established, which ought, and generally has, great weight in all
+cases. And, first, I have all antiquity on that side, which the more
+near it is to its origin and divine descent, the more clearly, perhaps,
+on that account, did it discern the truth in these matters. This very
+doctrine, then, was adopted by all those ancients whom Ennius calls in
+the Sabine tongue Casci; namely, that in death there was a sensation,
+and that, when men departed this life, they were not so entirely
+destroyed as to perish absolutely. And this may appear from many other
+circumstances, and especially from the pontifical rites and funeral
+obsequies, which men of the greatest genius would not have been so
+solicitous about, and would not have guarded from any injury by such
+severe laws, but from a firm persuasion that death was not so entire a
+destruction as wholly to abolish and destroy everything, but rather a
+kind of transmigration, as it were, and change of life, which was, in
+the case of illustrious men and women, usually a guide to heaven, while
+in that of others it was still confined to the earth, but in such a
+manner as still to exist. From this, and the sentiments of the Romans,
+
+    In heaven Romulus with Gods now lives,
+
+as Ennius saith, agreeing with the common belief; hence, too, Hercules
+is considered so great and propitious a God among the Greeks, and from
+them he was introduced among us, and his worship has extended even to
+the very ocean itself. This is how it was that Bacchus was deified, the
+offspring of Semele; and from the same illustrious fame we receive
+Castor and Pollux as Gods, who are reported not only to have helped the
+Romans to victory in their battles, but to have been the messengers of
+their success. What shall we say of Ino, the daughter of Cadmus? Is she
+not called Leucothea by the Greeks, and Matuta by us? Nay, more; is not
+the whole of heaven (not to dwell on particulars) almost filled with
+the offspring of men?
+
+Should I attempt to search into antiquity, and produce from thence what
+the Greek writers have asserted, it would appear that even those who
+are called their principal Gods were taken from among men up into
+heaven.
+
+XIII. Examine the sepulchres of those which are shown in Greece;
+recollect, for you have been initiated, what lessons are taught in the
+mysteries; then will you perceive how extensive this doctrine is. But
+they who were not acquainted with natural philosophy (for it did not
+begin to be in vogue till many years later) had no higher belief than
+what natural reason could give them; they were not acquainted with the
+principles and causes of things; they were often induced by certain
+visions, and those generally in the night, to think that those men who
+had departed from this life were still alive. And this may further be
+brought as an irrefragable argument for us to believe that there are
+Gods--that there never was any nation so barbarous, nor any people in
+the world so savage, as to be without some notion of Gods. Many have
+wrong notions of the Gods, for that is the nature and ordinary
+consequence of bad customs, yet all allow that there is a certain
+divine nature and energy. Nor does this proceed from the conversation
+of men, or the agreement of philosophers; it is not an opinion
+established by institutions or by laws; but, no doubt, in every case
+the consent of all nations is to be looked on as a law of nature. Who
+is there, then, that does not lament the loss of his friends,
+principally from imagining them deprived of the conveniences of life?
+Take away this opinion, and you remove with it all grief; for no one is
+afflicted merely on account of a loss sustained by himself. Perhaps we
+may be sorry, and grieve a little; but that bitter lamentation and
+those mournful tears have their origin in our apprehensions that he
+whom we loved is deprived of all the advantages of life, and is
+sensible of his loss. And we are led to this opinion by nature, without
+any arguments or any instruction.
+
+XIV. But the greatest proof of all is, that nature herself gives a
+silent judgment in favor of the immortality of the soul, inasmuch as
+all are anxious, and that to a great degree, about the things which
+concern futurity:
+
+    One plants what future ages shall enjoy,
+
+as Statius saith in his Synephebi. What is his object in doing so,
+except that he is interested in posterity? Shall the industrious
+husbandman, then, plant trees the fruit of which he shall never see?
+And shall not the great man found laws, institutions, and a republic?
+What does the procreation of children imply, and our care to continue
+our names, and our adoptions, and our scrupulous exactness in drawing
+up wills, and the inscriptions on monuments, and panegyrics, but that
+our thoughts run on futurity? There is no doubt but a judgment may be
+formed of nature in general, from looking at each nature in its most
+perfect specimens; and what is a more perfect specimen of a man than
+those are who look on themselves as born for the assistance, the
+protection, and the preservation of others? Hercules has gone to
+heaven; he never would have gone thither had he not, while among men,
+made that road for himself. These things are of old date, and have,
+besides, the sanction of universal religion.
+
+XV. What will you say? What do you imagine that so many and such great
+men of our republic, who have sacrificed their lives for its good,
+expected? Do you believe that they thought that their names should not
+continue beyond their lives? None ever encountered death for their
+country but under a firm persuasion of immortality! Themistocles might
+have lived at his ease; so might Epaminondas; and, not to look abroad
+and among the ancients for instances, so might I myself. But, somehow
+or other there clings to our minds a certain presage of future ages;
+and this both exists most firmly, and appears most clearly, in men of
+the loftiest genius and greatest souls. Take away this, and who would
+be so mad as to spend his life amidst toils and dangers? I speak of
+those in power. What are the poet's views but to be ennobled after
+death? What else is the object of these lines,
+
+    Behold old Ennius here, who erst
+    Thy fathers' great exploits rehearsed?
+
+He is challenging the reward of glory from those men whose ancestors he
+himself had ennobled by his poetry. And in the same spirit he says, in
+another passage,
+
+    Let none with tears my funeral grace, for I
+    Claim from my works an immortality.
+
+Why do I mention poets? The very mechanics are desirous of fame after
+death. Why did Phidias include a likeness of himself in the shield of
+Minerva, when he was not allowed to inscribe his name on it? What do
+our philosophers think on the subject? Do not they put their names to
+those very books which they write on the contempt of glory? If, then,
+universal consent is the voice of nature, and if it is the general
+opinion everywhere that those who have quitted this life are still
+interested in something, we also must subscribe to that opinion. And if
+we think that men of the greatest abilities and virtues see most
+clearly into the power of nature, because they themselves are her most
+perfect work, it is very probable that, as every great man is
+especially anxious to benefit posterity, there is something of which he
+himself will be sensible after death.
+
+XVI. But as we are led by nature to think there are Gods, and as we
+discover, by reason, of what description they are, so, by the consent
+of all nations, we are induced to believe that our souls survive; but
+where their habitation is, and of what character they eventually are,
+must be learned from reason. The want of any certain reason on which to
+argue has given rise to the idea of the shades below, and to those
+fears which you seem, not without reason, to despise; for as our bodies
+fall to the ground, and are covered with earth (_humus_), from whence
+we derive the expression to be interred (_humari_), that has occasioned
+men to imagine that the dead continue, during the remainder of their
+existence, under ground; which opinion has drawn after it many errors,
+which the poets have increased; for the theatre, being frequented by a
+large crowd, among which are women and children, is wont to be greatly
+affected on hearing such pompous verses as these,
+
+    Lo! here I am, who scarce could gain this place,
+    Through stony mountains and a dreary waste;
+    Through cliffs, whose sharpen'd stones tremendous hung,
+    Where dreadful darkness spread itself around.
+
+And the error prevailed so much, though indeed at present it seems to
+me to be removed, that although men knew that the bodies of the dead
+had been burned, yet they conceived such things to be done in the
+infernal regions as could not be executed or imagined without a body;
+for they could not conceive how disembodied souls could exist; and,
+therefore, they looked out for some shape or figure. This was the
+origin of all that account of the dead in Homer. This was the idea that
+caused my friend Appius to frame his Necromancy; and this is how there
+got about that idea of the lake of Avernus, in my neighborhood,
+
+    From whence the souls of undistinguish'd shape,
+    Clad in thick shade, rush from the open gate
+    Of Acheron, vain phantoms of the dead.
+
+And they must needs have these appearances speak, which is not possible
+without a tongue, and a palate, and jaws, and without the help of lungs
+and sides, and without some shape or figure; for they could see nothing
+by their mind alone--they referred all to their eyes. To withdraw the
+mind from sensual objects, and abstract our thoughts from what we are
+accustomed to, is an attribute of great genius. I am persuaded, indeed,
+that there were many such men in former ages; but Pherecydes[8] the
+Syrian is the first on record who said that the souls of men were
+immortal, and he was a philosopher of great antiquity, in the reign of
+my namesake Tullius. His disciple Pythagoras greatly confirmed this
+opinion, who came into Italy in the reign of Tarquin the Proud; and all
+that country which is called Great Greece was occupied by his school,
+and he himself was held in high honor, and had the greatest authority;
+and the Pythagorean sect was for many ages after in such great credit,
+that all learning was believed to be confined to that name.
+
+XVII. But I return to the ancients. They scarcely ever gave any reason
+for their opinion but what could be explained by numbers or
+definitions. It is reported of Plato that he came into Italy to make
+himself acquainted with the Pythagoreans; and that when there, among
+others, he made an acquaintance with Archytas[9] and Timæus,[10] and
+learned from them all the tenets of the Pythagoreans; and that he not
+only was of the same opinion with Pythagoras concerning the immortality
+of the soul, but that he also brought reasons in support of it; which,
+if you have nothing to say against it, I will pass over, and say no
+more at present about all this hope of immortality.
+
+_A._ What, will you leave me when you have raised my expectations so
+high? I had rather, so help me Hercules! be mistaken with Plato, whom I
+know how much you esteem, and whom I admire myself, from what you say
+of him, than be in the right with those others.
+
+_M._ I commend you; for, indeed, I could myself willingly be mistaken
+in his company. Do we, then, doubt, as we do in other cases (though I
+think here is very little room for doubt in this case, for the
+mathematicians prove the facts to us), that the earth is placed in the
+midst of the world, being, as it were, a sort of point, which they call
+a [Greek: kentron], surrounded by the whole heavens; and that such is
+the nature of the four principles which are the generating causes of
+all things, that they have equally divided among them the constituents
+of all bodies; moreover, that earthy and humid bodies are carried at
+equal angles by their own weight and ponderosity into the earth and
+sea; that the other two parts consist, one of fire, and the other of
+air? As the two former are carried by their gravity and weight into the
+middle region of the world, so these, on the other hand, ascend by
+right lines into the celestial regions, either because, owing to their
+intrinsic nature, they are always endeavoring to reach the highest
+place, or else because lighter bodies are naturally repelled by
+heavier; and as this is notoriously the case, it must evidently follow
+that souls, when once they have departed from the body, whether they
+are animal (by which term I mean capable of breathing) or of the nature
+of fire, must mount upward. But if the soul is some number, as some
+people assert, speaking with more subtlety than clearness, or if it is
+that fifth nature, for which it would be more correct to say that we
+have not given a name to than that we do not correctly understand
+it--still it is too pure and perfect not to go to a great distance from
+the earth. Something of this sort, then, we must believe the soul to
+be, that we may not commit the folly of thinking that so active a
+principle lies immerged in the heart or brain; or, as Empedocles would
+have it, in the blood.
+
+XVIII. We will pass over Dicæarchus,[11] with his contemporary and
+fellow-disciple Aristoxenus,[12] both indeed men of learning. One of
+them seems never even to have been affected with grief, as he could not
+perceive that he had a soul; while the other is so pleased with his
+musical compositions that he endeavors to show an analogy betwixt them
+and souls. Now, we may understand harmony to arise from the intervals
+of sounds, whose various compositions occasion many harmonies; but I do
+not see how a disposition of members, and the figure of a body without
+a soul, can occasion harmony. He had better, learned as he is, leave
+these speculations to his master Aristotle, and follow his own trade as
+a musician. Good advice is given him in that Greek proverb,
+
+    Apply your talents where you best are skill'd.
+
+I will have nothing at all to do with that fortuitous concourse of
+individual light and round bodies, notwithstanding Democritus insists
+on their being warm and having breath, that is to say, life. But this
+soul, which is compounded of either of the four principles from which
+we assert that all things are derived, is of inflamed air, as seems
+particularly to have been the opinion of Panætius, and must necessarily
+mount upward; for air and fire have no tendency downward, but always
+ascend; so should they be dissipated that must be at some distance from
+the earth; but should they remain, and preserve their original state,
+it is clearer still that they must be carried heavenward, and this
+gross and concrete air, which is nearest the earth, must be divided and
+broken by them; for the soul is warmer, or rather hotter, than that
+air, which I just now called gross and concrete: and this may be made
+evident from this consideration--that our bodies, being compounded of
+the earthy class of principles, grow warm by the heat of the soul.
+
+XIX. We may add, that the soul can the more easily escape from this
+air, which I have often named, and break through it, because nothing is
+swifter than the soul; no swiftness is comparable to the swiftness of
+the soul, which, should it remain uncorrupt and without alteration,
+must necessarily be carried on with such velocity as to penetrate and
+divide all this atmosphere, where clouds, and rain, and winds are
+formed, which, in consequence of the exhalations from the earth, is
+moist and dark: but, when the soul has once got above this region, and
+falls in with, and recognizes, a nature like its own, it then rests
+upon fires composed of a combination of thin air and a moderate solar
+heat, and does not aim at any higher flight; for then, after it has
+attained a lightness and heat resembling its own, it moves no more, but
+remains steady, being balanced, as it were, between two equal weights.
+That, then, is its natural seat where it has penetrated to something
+like itself, and where, wanting nothing further, it may be supported
+and maintained by the same aliment which nourishes and maintains the
+stars.
+
+Now, as we are usually incited to all sorts of desires by the stimulus
+of the body, and the more so as we endeavor to rival those who are in
+possession of what we long for, we shall certainly be happy when, being
+emancipated from that body, we at the same time get rid of these
+desires and this rivalry. And that which we do at present, when,
+dismissing all other cares, we curiously examine and look into
+anything, we shall then do with greater freedom; and we shall employ
+ourselves entirely in the contemplation and examination of things;
+because there is naturally in our minds a certain insatiable desire to
+know the truth, and the very region itself where we shall arrive, as it
+gives us a more intuitive and easy knowledge of celestial things, will
+raise our desires after knowledge. For it was this beauty of the
+heavens, as seen even here upon earth, which gave birth to that
+national and hereditary philosophy (as Theophrastus calls it), which
+was thus excited to a desire of knowledge. But those persons will in a
+most especial degree enjoy this philosophy, who, while they were only
+inhabitants of this world and enveloped in darkness, were still
+desirous of looking into these things with the eye of their mind.
+
+XX. For if those men now think that they have attained something who
+have seen the mouth of the Pontus, and those straits which were passed
+by the ship called Argo, because,
+
+    From Argos she did chosen men convey,
+    Bound to fetch back the Golden Fleece, their prey;
+
+or those who have seen the straits of the ocean,
+
+    Where the swift waves divide the neighboring shores
+    Of Europe, and of Afric;
+
+what kind of sight do you imagine that will be when the whole earth is
+laid open to our view? and that, too, not only in its position, form,
+and boundaries, nor those parts of it only which are habitable, but
+those also that lie uncultivated, through the extremities of heat and
+cold to which they are exposed; for not even now is it with our eyes
+that we view what we see, for the body itself has no senses; but (as
+the naturalists, ay, and even the physicians assure us, who have opened
+our bodies, and examined them) there are certain perforated channels
+from the seat of the soul to the eyes, ears, and nose; so that
+frequently, when either prevented by meditation, or the force of some
+bodily disorder, we neither hear nor see, though our eyes and ears are
+open and in good condition; so that we may easily apprehend that it is
+the soul itself which sees and hears, and not those parts which are, as
+it were, but windows to the soul, by means of which, however, she can
+perceive nothing, unless she is on the spot, and exerts herself. How
+shall we account for the fact that by the same power of thinking we
+comprehend the most different things--as color, taste, heat, smell, and
+sound--which the soul could never know by her five messengers, unless
+every thing were referred to her, and she were the sole judge of all?
+And we shall certainly discover these things in a more clear and
+perfect degree when the soul is disengaged from the body, and has
+arrived at that goal to which nature leads her; for at present,
+notwithstanding nature has contrived, with the greatest skill, those
+channels which lead from the body to the soul, yet are they, in some
+way or other, stopped up with earthy and concrete bodies; but when we
+shall be nothing but soul, then nothing will interfere to prevent our
+seeing everything in its real substance and in its true character.
+
+XXI. It is true, I might expatiate, did the subject require it, on the
+many and various objects with which the soul will be entertained in
+those heavenly regions; when I reflect on which, I am apt to wonder at
+the boldness of some philosophers, who are so struck with admiration at
+the knowledge of nature as to thank, in an exulting manner, the first
+inventor and teacher of natural philosophy, and to reverence him as a
+God; for they declare that they have been delivered by his means from
+the greatest tyrants, a perpetual terror, and a fear that molested them
+by night and day. What is this dread--this fear? What old woman is
+there so weak as to fear these things, which you, forsooth, had you not
+been acquainted with natural philosophy, would stand in awe of?
+
+    The hallow'd roofs of Acheron, the dread
+    Of Orcus, the pale regions of the dead.
+
+And does it become a philosopher to boast that he is not afraid of
+these things, and that he has discovered them to be false? And from
+this we may perceive how acute these men were by nature, who, if they
+had been left without any instruction, would have believed in these
+things. But now they have certainly made a very fine acquisition in
+learning that when the day of their death arrives, they will perish
+entirely. And if that really is the case--for I say nothing either
+way--what is there agreeable or glorious in it? Not that I see any
+reason why the opinion of Pythagoras and Plato may not be true; but
+even although Plato were to have assigned no reason for his opinion
+(observe how much I esteem the man), the weight of his authority would
+have borne me down; but he has brought so many reasons, that he appears
+to me to have endeavored to convince others, and certainly to have
+convinced himself.
+
+XXII. But there are many who labor on the other side of the question,
+and condemn souls to death, as if they were criminals capitally
+convicted; nor have they any other reason to allege why the immortality
+of the soul appears to them to be incredible, except that they are not
+able to conceive what sort of thing the soul can be when disentangled
+from the body; just as if they could really form a correct idea as to
+what sort of thing it is, even when it is in the body; what its form,
+and size, and abode are; so that were they able to have a full view of
+all that is now hidden from them in a living body, they have no idea
+whether the soul would be discernible by them, or whether it is of so
+fine a texture that it would escape their sight. Let those consider
+this, who say that they are unable to form any idea of the soul without
+the body, and then they will see whether they can form any adequate
+idea of what it is when it is in the body. For my own part, when I
+reflect on the nature of the soul, it appears to me a far more
+perplexing and obscure question to determine what is its character
+while it is in the body--a place which, as it were, does not belong to
+it--than to imagine what it is when it leaves it, and has arrived at
+the free æther, which is, if I may so say, its proper, its own
+habitation. For unless we are to say that we cannot apprehend the
+character or nature of anything which we have never seen, we certainly
+may be able to form some notion of God, and of the divine soul when
+released from the body. Dicæarchus, indeed, and Aristoxenus, because it
+was hard to understand the existence and substance and nature of the
+soul, asserted that there was no such thing as a soul at all. It is,
+indeed, the most difficult thing imaginable to discern the soul by the
+soul. And this, doubtless, is the meaning of the precept of Apollo,
+which advises every one to know himself. For I do not apprehend the
+meaning of the God to have been that we should understand our members,
+our stature, and form; for we are not merely bodies; nor, when I say
+these things to you, am I addressing myself to your body: when,
+therefore, he says, "Know yourself," he says this, "Inform yourself of
+the nature of your soul;" for the body is but a kind of vessel, or
+receptacle of the soul, and whatever your soul does is your own act. To
+know the soul, then, unless it had been divine, would not have been a
+precept of such excellent wisdom as to be attributed to a God; but even
+though the soul should not know of what nature itself is, will you say
+that it does not even perceive that it exists at all, or that it has
+motion? On which is founded that reason of Plato's, which is explained
+by Socrates in the Phædrus, and inserted by me, in my sixth book of the
+Republic.
+
+XXIII. "That which is always moved is eternal; but that which gives
+motion to something else, and is moved itself by some external cause,
+when that motion ceases, must necessarily cease to exist. That,
+therefore, alone, which is self-moved, because it is never forsaken by
+itself, can never cease to be moved. Besides, it is the beginning and
+principle of motion to everything else; but whatever is a principle has
+no beginning, for all things arise from that principle, and it cannot
+itself owe its rise to anything else; for then it would not be a
+principle did it proceed from anything else. But if it has no
+beginning, it never will have any end; for a principle which is once
+extinguished cannot itself be restored by anything else, nor can it
+produce anything else from itself; inasmuch as all things must
+necessarily arise from some first cause. And thus it comes about that
+the first principle of motion must arise from that thing which is
+itself moved by itself; and that can neither have a beginning nor an
+end of its existence, for otherwise the whole heaven and earth would be
+overset, and all nature would stand still, and not be able to acquire
+any force by the impulse of which it might be first set in motion.
+Seeing, then, that it is clear that whatever moves itself is eternal,
+can there be any doubt that the soul is so? For everything is inanimate
+which is moved by an external force; but everything which is animate is
+moved by an interior force, which also belongs to itself. For this is
+the peculiar nature and power of the soul; and if the soul be the only
+thing in the whole world which has the power of self-motion, then
+certainly it never had a beginning, and therefore it is eternal."
+
+Now, should all the lower order of philosophers (for so I think they
+may be called who dissent from Plato and Socrates and that school)
+unite their force, they never would be able to explain anything so
+elegantly as this, nor even to understand how ingeniously this
+conclusion is drawn. The soul, then, perceives itself to have motion,
+and at the same time that it gets that perception, it is sensible that
+it derives that motion from its own power, and not from the agency of
+another; and it is impossible that it should ever forsake itself. And
+these premises compel you to allow its eternity, unless you have
+something to say against them.
+
+_A._ I should myself be very well pleased not to have even a thought
+arise in my mind against them, so much am I inclined to that opinion.
+
+XXIV. _M._ Well, then, I appeal to you, if the arguments which prove
+that there is something divine in the souls of men are not equally
+strong? But if I could account for the origin of these divine
+properties, then I might also be able to explain how they might cease
+to exist; for I think I can account for the manner in which the blood,
+and bile, and phlegm, and bones, and nerves, and veins, and all the
+limbs, and the shape of the whole body, were put together and made; ay,
+and even as to the soul itself, were there nothing more in it than a
+principle of life, then the life of a man might be put upon the same
+footing as that of a vine or any other tree, and accounted for as
+caused by nature; for these things, as we say, live. Besides, if
+desires and aversions were all that belonged to the soul, it would have
+them only in common with the beasts; but it has, in the first place,
+memory, and that, too, so infinite as to recollect an absolute
+countless number of circumstances, which Plato will have to be a
+recollection of a former life; for in that book which is inscribed
+Menon, Socrates asks a child some questions in geometry, with reference
+to measuring a square; his answers are such as a child would make, and
+yet the questions are so easy, that while answering them, one by one,
+he comes to the same point as if he had learned geometry. From whence
+Socrates would infer that learning is nothing more than recollection;
+and this topic he explains more accurately in the discourse which he
+held the very day he died; for he there asserts that, any one, who
+seeming to be entirely illiterate, is yet able to answer a question
+well that is proposed to him, does in so doing manifestly show that he
+is not learning it then, but recollecting it by his memory. Nor is it
+to be accounted for in any other way, how children come to have notions
+of so many and such important things as are implanted, and, as it were,
+sealed up, in their minds (which the Greeks call [Greek: ennoiai]),
+unless the soul, before it entered the body, had been well stored with
+knowledge. And as it had no existence at all (for this is the
+invariable doctrine of Plato, who will not admit anything to have a
+real existence which has a beginning and an end, and who thinks that
+that alone does really exist which is of such a character as what he
+calls [Greek: eidea], and we species), therefore, being shut up in the
+body, it could not while in the body discover what it knows; but it
+knew it before, and brought the knowledge with it, so that we are no
+longer surprised at its extensive and multifarious knowledge. Nor does
+the soul clearly discover its ideas at its first resort to this abode
+to which it is so unaccustomed, and which is in so disturbed a state;
+but after having refreshed and recollected itself, it then by its
+memory recovers them; and, therefore, to learn implies nothing more
+than to recollect. But I am in a particular manner surprised at memory.
+For what is that faculty by which we remember? what is its force? what
+its nature? I am not inquiring how great a memory Simonides[13] may be
+said to have had, or Theodectes,[14] or that Cineas[15] who was sent to
+Rome as ambassador from Pyrrhus; or, in more modern times,
+Charmadas;[16] or, very lately, Metrodorus[17] the Scepsian, or our own
+contemporary Hortensius[18]: I am speaking of ordinary memory, and
+especially of those men who are employed in any important study or art,
+the great capacity of whose minds it is hard to estimate, such numbers
+of things do they remember.
+
+XXV. Should you ask what this leads to, I think we may understand what
+that power is, and whence we have it. It certainly proceeds neither
+from the heart, nor from the blood, nor from the brain, nor from atoms;
+whether it be air or fire, I know not, nor am I, as those men are,
+ashamed, in cases where I am ignorant, to own that I am so. If in any
+other obscure matter I were able to assert anything positively, then I
+would swear that the soul, be it air or fire, is divine. Just think, I
+beseech you: can you imagine this wonderful power of memory to be sown
+in or to be a part of the composition of the earth, or of this dark and
+gloomy atmosphere? Though you cannot apprehend what it is, yet you see
+what kind of thing it is, or if you do not quite see that, yet you
+certainly see how great it is. What, then? Shall we imagine that there
+is a kind of measure in the soul, into which, as into a vessel, all
+that we remember is poured? That indeed is absurd; for how shall we
+form any idea of the bottom, or of the shape or fashion of such a soul
+as that? And, again, how are we to conceive how much it is able to
+contain? Shall we imagine the soul to receive impressions like wax, and
+memory to be marks of the impressions made on the soul? What are the
+characters of the words, what of the facts themselves? and what, again,
+is that prodigious greatness which can give rise to impressions of so
+many things? What, lastly, is that power which investigates secret
+things, and is called invention and contrivance? Does that man seem to
+be compounded of this earthly, mortal, and perishing nature who first
+invented names for everything; which, if you will believe Pythagoras,
+is the highest pitch of wisdom? or he who collected the dispersed
+inhabitants of the world, and united them in the bonds of social life?
+or he who confined the sounds of the voice, which used to seem
+infinite, to the marks of a few letters? or he who first observed the
+courses of the planets, their progressive motions, their laws? These
+were all great men. But they were greater still who invented food, and
+raiment, and houses; who introduced civilization among us, and armed us
+against the wild beasts; by whom we were made sociable and polished,
+and so proceeded from the necessaries of life to its embellishments.
+For we have provided great entertainments for the ears by inventing and
+modulating the variety and nature of sounds; we have learned to survey
+the stars, not only those that are fixed, but also those which are
+improperly called wandering; and the man who has acquainted himself
+with all their revolutions and motions is fairly considered to have a
+soul resembling the soul of that Being who has created those stars in
+the heavens: for when Archimedes described in a sphere the motions of
+the moon, sun, and five planets, he did the very same thing as Plato's
+God, in his Timæus, who made the world, causing one revolution to
+adjust motions differing as much as possible in their slowness and
+velocity. Now, allowing that what we see in the world could not be
+effected without a God, Archimedes could not have imitated the same
+motions in his sphere without a divine soul.
+
+XXVI. To me, indeed, it appears that even those studies which are more
+common and in greater esteem are not without some divine energy: so
+that I do not consider that a poet can produce a serious and sublime
+poem without some divine impulse working on his mind; nor do I think
+that eloquence, abounding with sonorous words and fruitful sentences,
+can flow thus without something beyond mere human power. But as to
+philosophy, that is the parent of all the arts: what can we call that
+but, as Plato says, a gift, or, as I express it, an invention, of the
+Gods? This it was which first taught us the worship of the Gods; and
+then led us on to justice, which arises from the human race being
+formed into society; and after that it imbued us with modesty and
+elevation of soul. This it was which dispersed darkness from our souls,
+as it is dispelled from our eyes, enabling us to see all things that
+are above or below, the beginning, end, and middle of everything. I am
+convinced entirely that that which could effect so many and such great
+things must be a divine power. For what is memory of words and
+circumstances? What, too, is invention? Surely they are things than
+which nothing greater can be conceived in a God! For I do not imagine
+the Gods to be delighted with nectar and ambrosia, or with Juventas
+presenting them with a cup; nor do I put any faith in Homer, who says
+that Ganymede was carried away by the Gods on account of his beauty, in
+order to give Jupiter his wine. Too weak reasons for doing Laomedon
+such injury! These were mere inventions of Homer, who gave his Gods the
+imperfections of men. I would rather that he had given men the
+perfections of the Gods! those perfections, I mean, of uninterrupted
+health, wisdom, invention, memory. Therefore the soul (which is, as I
+say, divine) is, as Euripides more boldly expresses it, a God. And
+thus, if the divinity be air or fire, the soul of man is the same; for
+as that celestial nature has nothing earthly or humid about it, in like
+manner the soul of man is also free from both these qualities: but if
+it is of that fifth kind of nature, first introduced by Aristotle, then
+both Gods and souls are of the same.
+
+XXVII. As this is my opinion, I have explained it in these very words,
+in my book on Consolation.[19] The origin of the soul of man is not to
+be found upon earth, for there is nothing in the soul of a mixed or
+concrete nature, or that has any appearance of being formed or made out
+of the earth; nothing even humid, or airy, or fiery. For what is there
+in natures of that kind which has the power of memory, understanding,
+or thought? which can recollect the past, foresee the future, and
+comprehend the present? for these capabilities are confined to divine
+beings; nor can we discover any source from which men could derive
+them, but from God. There is therefore a peculiar nature and power in
+the soul, distinct from those natures which are more known and familiar
+to us. Whatever, then, that is which thinks, and which has
+understanding, and volition, and a principle of life, is heavenly and
+divine, and on that account must necessarily be eternal; nor can God
+himself, who is known to us, be conceived to be anything else except a
+soul free and unembarrassed, distinct from all mortal concretion,
+acquainted with everything, and giving motion to everything, and itself
+endued with perpetual motion.
+
+XXVIII. Of this kind and nature is the intellect of man. Where, then,
+is this intellect seated, and of what character is it? where is your
+own, and what is its character? Are you able to tell? If I have not
+faculties for knowing all that I could desire to know, will you not
+even allow me to make use of those which I have? The soul has not
+sufficient capacity to comprehend itself; yet, the soul, like the eye,
+though it has no distinct view of itself, sees other things: it does
+not see (which is of least consequence) its own shape; perhaps not,
+though it possibly may; but we will pass that by: but it certainly sees
+that it has vigor, sagacity, memory, motion, and velocity; these are
+all great, divine, eternal properties. What its appearance is, or where
+it dwells, it is not necessary even to inquire. As when we behold,
+first of all, the beauty and brilliant appearance of the heavens;
+secondly, the vast velocity of its revolutions, beyond power of our
+imagination to conceive; then the vicissitudes of nights and days, the
+fourfold division of the seasons, so well adapted to the ripening of
+the fruits of the earth, and the temperature of our bodies: and after
+that we look up to the sun, the moderator and governor of all these
+things; and view the moon, by the increase and decrease of its light,
+marking, as it were, and appointing our holy days; and see the five
+planets, borne on in the same circle, divided into twelve parts,
+preserving the same course with the greatest regularity, but with
+utterly dissimilar motions among themselves; and the nightly appearance
+of the heaven, adorned on all sides with stars; then, the globe of the
+earth, raised above the sea, and placed in the centre of the universe,
+inhabited and cultivated in its two opposite extremities, one of which,
+the place of our habitation, is situated towards the north pole, under
+the seven stars:
+
+    Where the cold northern blasts, with horrid sound,
+    Harden to ice the snowy cover'd ground;
+
+the other, towards the south pole, is unknown to us, but is called by
+the Greeks [Greek: antichthona]: the other parts are uncultivated,
+because they are either frozen with cold, or burned up with heat; but
+where we dwell, it never fails, in its season,
+
+    To yield a placid sky, to bid the trees
+    Assume the lively verdure of their leaves:
+    The vine to bud, and, joyful, in its shoots,
+    Foretell the approaching vintage of its fruits:
+    The ripen'd corn to sing, while all around
+    Full riv'lets glide; and flowers deck the ground:
+
+then the multitude of cattle, fit part for food, part for tilling the
+ground, others for carrying us, or for clothing us; and man himself,
+made, as it were, on purpose to contemplate the heavens and the Gods,
+and to pay adoration to them: lastly, the whole earth, and wide
+extending seas, given to man's use. When we view these and numberless
+other things, can we doubt that they have some being who presides over
+them, or has made them (if, indeed, they have been made, as is the
+opinion of Plato, or if, as Aristotle thinks, they are eternal), or who
+at all events is the regulator of so immense a fabric and so great a
+blessing to men? Thus, though you see not the soul of man, as you see
+not the Deity, yet, as by the contemplation of his works you are led to
+acknowledge a God, so you must own the divine power of the soul, from
+its remembering things, from its invention, from the quickness of its
+motion, and from all the beauty of virtue. Where, then, is it seated,
+you will say?
+
+XXIX. In my opinion, it is seated in the head, and I can bring you
+reasons for my adopting that opinion. At present, let the soul reside
+where it will, you certainly have one in you. Should you ask what its
+nature is? It has one peculiarly its own; but admitting it to consist
+of fire, or air, it does not affect the present question. Only observe
+this, that as you are convinced there is a God, though you are ignorant
+where he resides, and what shape he is of; in like manner you ought to
+feel assured that you have a soul, though you cannot satisfy yourself
+of the place of its residence, nor its form. In our knowledge of the
+soul, unless we are grossly ignorant of natural philosophy, we cannot
+but be satisfied that it has nothing but what is simple, unmixed,
+uncompounded, and single; and if this is admitted, then it cannot be
+separated, nor divided, nor dispersed, nor parted, and therefore it
+cannot perish; for to perish implies a parting-asunder, a division, a
+disunion, of those parts which, while it subsisted, were held together
+by some band. And it was because he was influenced by these and similar
+reasons that Socrates neither looked out for anybody to plead for him
+when he was accused, nor begged any favor from his judges, but
+maintained a manly freedom, which was the effect not of pride, but of
+the true greatness of his soul; and on the last day of his life he held
+a long discourse on this subject; and a few days before, when he might
+have been easily freed from his confinement, he refused to be so; and
+when he had almost actually hold of that deadly cup, he spoke with the
+air of a man not forced to die, but ascending into heaven.
+
+XXX. For so indeed he thought himself, and thus he spoke: "That there
+were two ways, and that the souls of men, at their departure from the
+body, took different roads; for those which were polluted with vices
+that are common to men, and which had given themselves up entirely to
+unclean desires, and had become so blinded by them as to have
+habituated themselves to all manner of debauchery and profligacy, or to
+have laid detestable schemes for the ruin of their country, took a road
+wide of that which led to the assembly of the Gods; but they who had
+preserved themselves upright and chaste, and free from the slightest
+contagion of the body, and had always kept themselves as far as
+possible at a distance from it, and while on earth had proposed to
+themselves as a model the life of the Gods, found the return to those
+beings from whom they had come an easy one." Therefore, he argues, that
+all good and wise men should take example from the swans, who are
+considered sacred to Apollo, not without reason, but particularly
+because they seem to have received the gift of divination from him, by
+which, foreseeing how happy it is to die, they leave this world with
+singing and joy. Nor can any one doubt of this, unless it happens to us
+who think with care and anxiety about the soul (as is often the case
+with those who look earnestly at the setting sun), to lose the sight of
+it entirely; and so the mind's eye, viewing itself, sometimes grows
+dull, and for that reason we become remiss in our contemplation. Thus
+our reasoning is borne about, harassed with doubts and anxieties, not
+knowing how to proceed, but measuring back again those dangerous tracts
+which it has passed, like a boat tossed about on the boundless ocean.
+But these reflections are of long standing, and borrowed from the
+Greeks. But Cato left this world in such a manner as if he were
+delighted that he had found an opportunity of dying; for that God who
+presides in us forbids our departure hence without his leave. But when
+God himself has given us a just cause, as formerly he did to Socrates,
+and lately to Cato, and often to many others--in such a case, certainly
+every man of sense would gladly exchange this darkness for that light:
+not that he would forcibly break from the chains that held him, for
+that would be against the law; but, like a man released from prison by
+a magistrate or some lawful authority, so he too would walk away, being
+released and discharged by God. For the whole life of a philosopher is,
+as the same philosopher says, a meditation on death.
+
+XXXI. For what else is it that we do, when we call off our minds from
+pleasure, that is to say, from our attention to the body, from the
+managing our domestic estate, which is a sort of handmaid and servant
+of the body, or from duties of a public nature, or from all other
+serious business whatever? What else is it, I say, that we do, but
+invite the soul to reflect on itself? oblige it to converse with
+itself, and, as far as possible, break off its acquaintance with the
+body? Now, to separate the soul from the body, is to learn to die, and
+nothing else whatever. Wherefore take my advice; and let us meditate on
+this, and separate ourselves as far as possible from the body, that is
+to say, let us accustom ourselves to die. This will be enjoying a life
+like that of heaven even while we remain on earth; and when we are
+carried thither and released from these bonds, our souls will make
+their progress with more rapidity; for the spirit which has always been
+fettered by the bonds of the body, even when it is disengaged, advances
+more slowly, just as those do who have worn actual fetters for many
+years: but when we have arrived at this emancipation from the bonds of
+the body, then indeed we shall begin to live, for this present life is
+really death, which I could say a good deal in lamentation for if I
+chose.
+
+_A._ You have lamented it sufficiently in your book on Consolation; and
+when I read that, there is nothing which I desire more than to leave
+these things; but that desire is increased a great deal by what I have
+just heard.
+
+_M._ The time will come, and that soon, and with equal certainty,
+whether you hang back or press forward; for time flies. But death is so
+far from being an evil, as it lately appeared to you, that I am
+inclined to suspect, not that there is no other thing which is an evil
+to man, but rather that there is nothing else which is a real good to
+him; if, at least, it is true that we become thereby either Gods
+ourselves, or companions of the Gods. However, this is not of so much
+consequence, as there are some of us here who will not allow this. But
+I will not leave off discussing this point till I have convinced you
+that death can, upon no consideration whatever, be an evil.
+
+_A._ How can it, after what I now know?
+
+_M._ Do you ask how it can? There are crowds of arguers who contradict
+this; and those not only Epicureans, whom I regard very little, but,
+somehow or other, almost every man of letters; and, above all, my
+favorite Dicæarchus is very strenuous in opposing the immortality of
+the soul: for he has written three books, which are entitled Lesbiacs,
+because the discourse was held at Mitylene, in which he seeks to prove
+that souls are mortal. The Stoics, on the other hand, allow us as long
+a time for enjoyment as the life of a raven; they allow the soul to
+exist a great while, but are against its eternity.
+
+XXXII. Are you willing to hear then why, even allowing this, death
+cannot be an evil.
+
+_A._ As you please; but no one shall drive me from my belief in
+mortality.
+
+_M._ I commend you, indeed, for that; though we should not be too
+confident in our belief of anything; for we are frequently disturbed by
+some subtle conclusion. We give way and change our opinions even in
+things that are more evident than this; for in this there certainly is
+some obscurity. Therefore, should anything of this kind happen, it is
+well to be on our guard.
+
+_A._ You are right in that; but I will provide against any accident.
+
+_M._ Have you any objection to our dismissing our friends the
+Stoics--those, I mean, who allow that the souls exist after they have
+left the body, but yet deny that they exist forever?
+
+_A._ We certainly may dismiss the consideration of those men who admit
+that which is the most difficult point in the whole question, namely,
+that a soul can exist independently of the body, and yet refuse to
+grant that which is not only very easy to believe, but which is even
+the natural consequence of the concession which they have made--that if
+they can exist for a length of time; they most likely do so forever.
+
+_M._ You take it right; that is the very thing. Shall we give,
+therefore, any credit to Pauæstius, when he dissents from his master,
+Plato? whom he everywhere calls divine, the wisest, the holiest of men,
+the Homer of philosophers, and whom he opposes in nothing except this
+single opinion of the soul's immortality: for he maintains what nobody
+denies, that everything which has been generated will perish, and that
+even souls are generated, which he thinks appears from their
+resemblance to those of the men who begot them; for that likeness is as
+apparent in the turn of their minds as in their bodies. But he brings
+another reason--that there is nothing which is sensible of pain which
+is not also liable to disease; but whatever is liable to disease must
+be liable to death. The soul is sensible of pain, therefore it is
+liable to perish.
+
+XXXIII. These arguments may be refuted; for they proceed from his not
+knowing that, while discussing the subject of the immortality of the
+soul, he is speaking of the intellect, which is free from all turbid
+motion; but not of those parts of the mind in which those disorders,
+anger and lust, have their seat, and which he whom he is opposing, when
+he argues thus, imagines to be distinct and separate from the mind. Now
+this resemblance is more remarkable in beasts, whose souls are void of
+reason. But the likeness in men consists more in the configuration of
+the bodies: and it is of no little consequence in what bodies the soul
+is lodged; for there are many things which depend on the body that give
+an edge to the soul, many which blunt it. Aristotle, indeed, says that
+all men of great genius are melancholy; so that I should not have been
+displeased to have been somewhat duller than I am. He instances many,
+and, as if it were matter of fact, brings his reasons for it. But if
+the power of those things that proceed from the body be so great as to
+influence the mind (for they are the things, whatever they are, that
+occasion this likeness), still that does not necessarily prove why a
+similitude of souls should be generated. I say nothing about cases of
+unlikeness. I wish Panætius could be here: he lived with Africanus. I
+would inquire of him which of his family the nephew of Africanus's
+brother was like? Possibly he may in person have resembled his father;
+but in his manners he was so like every profligate, abandoned man, that
+it was impossible to be more so. Whom did the grandson of P. Crassus,
+that wise and eloquent and most distinguished man, resemble? Or the
+relations and sons of many other excellent men, whose names there is no
+occasion to mention? But what are we doing? Have we forgotten that our
+purpose was, when we had sufficiently spoken on the subject of the
+immortality of the soul, to prove that, even if the soul did perish,
+there would be, even then, no evil in death?
+
+_A._ I remembered it very well; but I had no dislike to your digressing
+a little from your original design, while you were talking of the
+soul's immortality.
+
+_M._ I perceive you have sublime thoughts, and are eager to mount up to
+heaven.
+
+XXXIV. I am not without hopes myself that such may be our fate. But
+admit what they assert--that the soul does not continue to exist after
+death.
+
+_A._ Should it be so, I see that we are then deprived of the hopes of a
+happier life.
+
+_M._ But what is there of evil in that opinion? For let the soul perish
+as the body: is there any pain, or indeed any feeling at all, in the
+body after death? No one, indeed asserts that; though Epicurus charges
+Democritus with saying so; but the disciples of Democritus deny it. No
+sense, therefore, remains in the soul; for the soul is nowhere. Where,
+then, is the evil? for there is nothing but these two things. Is it
+because the mere separation of the soul and body cannot be effected
+without pain? But even should that be granted, how small a pain must
+that be! Yet I think that it is false, and that it is very often
+unaccompanied by any sensation at all, and sometimes even attended with
+pleasure; but certainly the whole must be very trifling, whatever it
+is, for it is instantaneous. What makes us uneasy, or rather gives us
+pain, is the leaving all the good things of life. But just consider if
+I might not more properly say, leaving the evils of life; only there is
+no reason for my now occupying myself in bewailing the life of man, and
+yet I might, with very good reason. But what occasion is there, when
+what I am laboring to prove is that no one is miserable after death, to
+make life more miserable by lamenting over it? I have done that in the
+book which I wrote, in order to comfort myself as well as I could. If,
+then, our inquiry is after truth, death withdraws us from evil, not
+from good. This subject is indeed so copiously handled by Hegesias, the
+Cyrenaic philosopher, that he is said to have been forbidden by Ptolemy
+from delivering his lectures in the schools, because some who heard him
+made away with themselves. There is, too, an epigram of Callimachus[20]
+on Cleombrotus of Ambracia, who, without any misfortune having befallen
+him, as he says, threw himself from a wall into the sea, after he had
+read a book of Plato's. The book I mentioned of that Hegesias is called
+[Greek: Apokarterterôn], or "A Man who starves himself," in which a man
+is represented as killing himself by starvation, till he is prevented
+by his friends, in reply to whom he reckons up all the miseries of
+human life. I might do the same, though not so fully as he, who thinks
+it not worth any man's while to live. I pass over others. Was it even
+worth my while to live, for, had I died before I was deprived of the
+comforts of my own family, and of the honors which I received for my
+public services, would not death have taken me from the evils of life
+rather than from its blessings?
+
+XXXV. Mention, therefore, some one, who never knew distress; who never
+received any blow from fortune. The great Metellus had four
+distinguished sons; but Priam had fifty, seventeen of whom were born to
+him by his lawful wife. Fortune had the same power over both, though
+she exercised it but on one; for Metellus was laid on his funeral pile
+by a great company of sons and daughters, grandsons, and
+granddaughters; but Priam fell by the hand of an enemy, after having
+fled to the altar, and having seen himself deprived of all his numerous
+progeny. Had he died before the death of his sons and the ruin of his
+kingdom,
+
+    With all his mighty wealth elate,
+    Under rich canopies of state;
+
+would he then have been taken from good or from evil? It would indeed,
+at that time, have appeared that he was being taken away from good; yet
+surely it would have turned out advantageous for him; nor should we
+have had these mournful verses,
+
+    Lo! these all perish'd in one flaming pile;
+    The foe old Priam did of life beguile,
+    And with his blood, thy altar, Jove, defile.
+
+As if anything better could have happened to him at that time than to
+lose his life in that manner; but yet, if it had befallen him sooner,
+it would have prevented all those consequences; but even as it was, it
+released him from any further sense of them. The case of our friend
+Pompey[21] was something better: once, when he had been very ill at
+Naples, the Neapolitans, on his recovery, put crowns on their heads, as
+did those of Puteoli; the people flocked from the country to
+congratulate him--it is a Grecian custom, and a foolish one; still it
+is a sign of good fortune. But the question is, had he died, would he
+have been taken from good, or from evil? Certainly from evil. He would
+not have been engaged in a war with his father-in-law;[22] he would not
+have taken up arms before he was prepared; he would not have left his
+own house, nor fled from Italy; he would not, after the loss of his
+army, have fallen unarmed into the hands of slaves, and been put to
+death by them; his children would not have been destroyed; nor would
+his whole fortune have come into the possession of the conquerors. Did
+not he, then, who, if he had died at that time, would have died in all
+his glory, owe all the great and terrible misfortunes into which he
+subsequently fell to the prolongation of his life at that time?
+
+XXXVI. These calamities are avoided by death, for even though they
+should never happen, there is a possibility that they may; but it never
+occurs to a man that such a disaster may befall him himself. Every one
+hopes to be as happy as Metellus: as if the number of the happy
+exceeded that of the miserable; or as if there were any certainty in
+human affairs; or, again, as if there were more rational foundation for
+hope than fear. But should we grant them even this, that men are by
+death deprived of good things; would it follow that the dead are
+therefore in need of the good things of life, and are miserable on that
+account? Certainly they must necessarily say so. Can he who does not
+exist be in need of anything? To be in need of has a melancholy sound,
+because it in effect amounts to this--he had, but he has not; he
+regrets, he looks back upon, he wants. Such are, I suppose, the
+distresses of one who is in need of. Is he deprived of eyes? to be
+blind is misery. Is he destitute of children? not to have them is
+misery. These considerations apply to the living, but the dead are
+neither in need of the blessings of life, nor of life itself. But when
+I am speaking of the dead, I am speaking of those who have no
+existence. But would any one say of us, who do exist, that we want
+horns or wings? Certainly not. Should it be asked, why not? the answer
+would be, that not to have what neither custom nor nature has fitted
+you for would not imply a want of them, even though you were sensible
+that you had them not. This argument should be pressed over and over
+again, after that point has once been established, which, if souls are
+mortal, there can be no dispute about--I mean, that the destruction of
+them by death is so entire as to remove even the least suspicion of any
+sense remaining. When, therefore, this point is once well grounded and
+established, we must correctly define what the term to want means; that
+there may be no mistake in the word. To want, then, signifies this: to
+be without that which you would be glad to have; for inclination for a
+thing is implied in the word want, excepting when we use the word in an
+entirely different sense, as we do when we say that a fever is wanting
+to any one. For it admits of a different interpretation, when you are
+without a certain thing, and are sensible that you are without it, but
+yet can easily dispense with having it. "To want," then, is an
+expression which you cannot apply to the dead; nor is the mere fact of
+wanting something necessarily lamentable. The proper expression ought
+to be, "that they want a good," and that is an evil.
+
+But a living man does not want a good, unless he is distressed without
+it; and yet, we can easily understand how any man alive can be without
+a kingdom. But this cannot be predicated of you with any accuracy: it
+might have been asserted of Tarquin, when he was driven from his
+kingdom. But when such an expression is used respecting the dead, it is
+absolutely unintelligible. For to want implies to be sensible; but the
+dead are insensible: therefore, the dead can be in no want.
+
+XXXVII. But what occasion is there to philosophize here in a matter
+with which we see that philosophy is but little concerned? How often
+have not only our generals but whole armies, rushed on certain death!
+But if it had been a thing to be feared, L. Brutus would never have
+fallen in fight, to prevent the return of that tyrant whom he had
+expelled; nor would Decius the father have been slain in fighting with
+the Latins; nor would his son, when engaged with the Etruscans, nor his
+grandson with Pyrrhus have exposed themselves to the enemy's darts.
+Spain would never have seen, in one campaign, the Scipios fall fighting
+for their country; nor would the plains of Cannæ have witnessed the
+death of Paulus and Geminus, or Venusia that of Marcellus; nor would
+the Latins have beheld the death of Albinus, nor the Leucanians that of
+Gracchus. But are any of these miserable now? Nay, they were not so
+even at the first moment after they had breathed their last; nor can
+any one be miserable after he has lost all sensation. Oh, but the mere
+circumstance of being without sensation is miserable. It might be so if
+being without sensation were the same thing as wanting it; but as it is
+evident there can be nothing of any kind in that which has no
+existence, what can there be afflicting to that which can neither feel
+want nor be sensible of anything? We might be said to have repeated
+this over too often, only that here lies all that the soul shudders at
+from the fear of death. For whoever can clearly apprehend that which is
+as manifest as the light--that when both soul and body are consumed,
+and there is a total destruction, then that which was an animal becomes
+nothing--will clearly see that there is no difference between a
+Hippocentaur, which never had existence, and King Agamemnon, and that
+M. Camillus is no more concerned about this present civil war than I
+was at the sacking of Rome, when he was living.
+
+XXXVIII. Why, then, should Camillus be affected with the thoughts of
+these things happening three hundred and fifty years after his time?
+And why should I be uneasy it I were to expect that some nation might
+possess itself of this city ten thousand years hence? Because so great
+is our regard for our country, as not to be measured by our own
+feeling, but by its own actual safety.
+
+Death, then, which threatens us daily from a thousand accidents, and
+which, by reason of the shortness of life, can never be far off, does
+not deter a wise man from making such provision for his country and his
+family as he hopes may last forever; and from regarding posterity, of
+which he can never have any real perception, as belonging to himself.
+Wherefore a man may act for eternity, even though he be persuaded that
+his soul is mortal; not, indeed, from a desire of glory, which he will
+be insensible of, but from a principle of virtue, which glory will
+inevitably attend, though that is not his object. The process, indeed,
+of nature is this: that just in the same manner as our birth was the
+beginning of things with us, so death will be the end; and as we were
+noways concerned with anything before we were born, so neither shall we
+be after we are dead. And in this state of things where can the evil
+be, since death has no connection with either the living or the dead?
+The one have no existence at all, the other are not yet affected by it.
+They who make the least of death consider it as having a great
+resemblance to sleep; as if any one would choose to live ninety years
+on condition that, at the expiration of sixty, he should sleep out the
+remainder. The very swine would not accept of life on those terms, much
+less I. Endymion, indeed, if you listen to fables, slept once on a time
+on Latmus, a mountain of Caria, and for such a length of time that I
+imagine he is not as yet awake. Do you think that he is concerned at
+the Moon's being in difficulties, though it was by her that he was
+thrown into that sleep, in order that she might kiss him while
+sleeping. For what should he be concerned for who has not even any
+sensation? You look on sleep as an image of death, and you take that on
+you daily; and have you, then, any doubt that there is no sensation in
+death, when you see there is none in sleep, which is its near
+resemblance?
+
+XXXIX. Away, then, with those follies, which are little better than the
+old women's dreams, such as that it is miserable to die before our
+time. What time do you mean? That of nature? But she has only lent you
+life, as she might lend you money, without fixing any certain time for
+its repayment. Have you any grounds of complaint, then, that she
+recalls it at her pleasure? for you received it on these terms. They
+that complain thus allow that if a young child dies, the survivors
+ought to bear his loss with equanimity; that if an infant in the cradle
+dies, they ought not even to utter a complaint; and yet nature has been
+more severe with them in demanding back what she gave. They answer by
+saying that such have not tasted the sweets of life; while the other
+had begun to conceive hopes of great happiness, and, indeed, had begun
+to realize them. Men judge better in other things, and allow a part to
+be preferable to none. Why do they not admit the same estimate in life?
+Though Callimachus does not speak amiss in saying that more tears had
+flowed from Priam than his son; yet they are thought happier who die
+after they have reached old age. It would be hard to say why; for I do
+not apprehend that any one, if a longer life were granted to him, would
+find it happier. There is nothing more agreeable to a man than
+prudence, which old age most certainly bestows on a man, though it may
+strip him of everything else. But what age is long, or what is there at
+all long to a man? Does not
+
+    Old age, though unregarded, still attend
+    On childhood's pastimes, as the cares of men?
+
+But because there is nothing beyond old age, we call that long: all
+these things are said to be long or short, according to the proportion
+of time they were given us for. Artistotle saith there is a kind of
+insect near the river Hypanis, which runs from a certain part of Europe
+into the Pontus, whose life consists but of one day; those that die at
+the eighth hour die in full age; those who die when the sun sets are
+very old, especially when the days are at the longest. Compare our
+longest life with eternity, and we shall be found almost as short-lived
+as those little animals.
+
+XL. Let us, then, despise all these follies--for what softer name can I
+give to such levities?--and let us lay the foundation of our happiness
+in the strength and greatness of our minds, in a contempt and disregard
+of all earthly things, and in the practice of every virtue. For at
+present we are enervated by the softness of our imaginations, so that,
+should we leave this world before the promises of our fortune-tellers
+are made good to us, we should think ourselves deprived of some great
+advantages, and seem disappointed and forlorn. But if, through life, we
+are in continual suspense, still expecting, still desiring, and are in
+continual pain and torture, good Gods! how pleasant must that journey
+be which ends in security and ease! How pleased am I with Theramenes!
+Of how exalted a soul does he appear! For, although we never read of
+him without tears, yet that illustrious man is not to be lamented in
+his death, who, when he had been imprisoned by the command of the
+thirty tyrants, drank off, at one draught, as if he had been thirsty,
+the poisoned cup, and threw the remainder out of it with such force
+that it sounded as it fell; and then, on hearing the sound of the
+drops, he said, with a smile, "I drink this to the most excellent
+Critias," who had been his most bitter enemy; for it is customary among
+the Greeks, at their banquets, to name the person to whom they intend
+to deliver the cup. This celebrated man was pleasant to the last, even
+when he had received the poison into his bowels, and truly foretold the
+death of that man whom he named when he drank the poison, and that
+death soon followed. Who that thinks death an evil could approve of the
+evenness of temper in this great man at the instant of dying? Socrates
+came, a few years after, to the same prison and the same cup by as
+great iniquity on the part of his judges as the tyrants displayed when
+they executed Theramenes. What a speech is that which Plato makes him
+deliver before his judges, after they had condemned him to death!
+
+XLI. "I am not without hopes, O judges, that it is a favorable
+circumstance for me that I am condemned to die; for one of these two
+things must necessarily happen--either that death will deprive me
+entirely of all sense, or else that, by dying, I shall go from hence
+into some other place; wherefore, if all sense is utterly extinguished,
+and if death is like that sleep which sometimes is so undisturbed as to
+be even without the visions of dreams--in that case, O ye good Gods!
+what gain is it to die? or what length of days can be imagined which
+would be preferable to such a night? And if the constant course of
+future time is to resemble that night, who is happier than I am? But if
+on the other hand, what is said be true, namely, that death is but a
+removal to those regions where the souls of the departed dwell, then
+that state must be more happy still to have escaped from those who call
+themselves judges, and to appear before such as are truly so--Minos,
+Rhadamanthus, Æacus, Triptolemus--and to meet with those who have lived
+with justice and probity![23] Can this change of abode appear otherwise
+than great to you? What bounds can you set to the value of conversing
+with Orpheus, and Musæus, and Homer, and Hesiod? I would even, were it
+possible, willingly die often, in order to prove the certainty of what
+I speak of. What delight must it be to meet with Palamedes, and Ajax,
+and others, who have been betrayed by the iniquity of their judges!
+Then, also, should I experience the wisdom of even that king of kings,
+who led his vast troops to Troy, and the prudence of Ulysses and
+Sisyphus: nor should I then be condemned for prosecuting my inquiries
+on such subjects in the same way in which I have done here on earth.
+And even you, my judges, you, I mean, who have voted for my acquittal,
+do not you fear death, for nothing bad can befall a good man, whether
+he be alive or dead; nor are his concerns ever overlooked by the Gods;
+nor in my case either has this befallen me by chance; and I have
+nothing to charge those men with who accused or condemned me but the
+fact that they believed that they were doing me harm." In this manner
+he proceeded. There is no part of his speech which I admire more than
+his last words: "But it is time," says he, "for me now to go hence,
+that I may die; and for you, that you may continue to live. Which
+condition of the two is the best, the immortal Gods know; but I do not
+believe that any mortal man does."
+
+XLII. Surely I would rather have had this man's soul than all the
+fortunes of those who sat in judgment on him; although that very thing
+which he says no one except the Gods know, namely, whether life or
+death is most preferable, he knows himself, for he had previously
+stated his opinion on it; but he maintained to the last that favorite
+maxim of his, of affirming nothing. And let us, too, adhere to this
+rule of not thinking anything an evil which is a general provision of
+nature; and let us assure ourselves, that if death is an evil, it is an
+eternal evil, for death seems to be the end of a miserable life; but if
+death is a misery, there can be no end of that. But why do I mention
+Socrates, or Theramenes, men distinguished by the glory of virtue and
+wisdom? when a certain Lacedæmomian, whose name is not so much as
+known, held death in such contempt, that, when led to it by the ephori,
+he bore a cheerful and pleasant countenance; and, when he was asked by
+one of his enemies whether he despised the laws of Lycurgus, "On the
+contrary," answered he, "I am greatly obliged to him, for he has
+amerced me in a fine which I can pay without borrowing, or taking up
+money at interest." This was a man worthy of Sparta. And I am almost
+persuaded of his innocence because of the greatness of his soul. Our
+own city has produced many such. But why should I name generals, and
+other men of high rank, when Cato could write that legions have marched
+with alacrity to that place from whence they never expected to return?
+With no less greatness of soul fell the Lacedæmonians at Thermopylæ, on
+whom Simonides wrote the following epitaph:
+
+    Go, stranger, tell the Spartans, here we lie,
+    Who to support their laws durst boldly die.[24]
+
+What was it that Leonidas, their general, said to them? "March on with
+courage, my Lacedæmonians. To-night, perhaps, we shall sup in the
+regions below." This was a brave nation while the laws of Lycurgus were
+in force. One of them, when a Persian had said to him in conversation,
+"We shall hide the sun from your sight by the number of our arrows and
+darts," replied, "We shall fight, then in the shade." Do I talk of
+their men? How great was that Lacedæmonian woman, who had sent her son
+to battle, and when she heard that he was slain, said, "I bore him for
+that purpose, that you might have a man who durst die for his country!"
+However, it is a matter of notoriety that the Spartans were bold and
+hardy, for the discipline of a republic has great influence.
+
+XLIII. What, then, have we not reason to admire Theodorus the Cyrenean,
+a philosopher of no small distinction, who, when Lysimachus threatened
+to crucify him, bade him keep those menaces for his courtiers? "To
+Theodorus it makes no difference whether he rot in the air or
+underground." By which saying of the philosopher I am reminded to say
+something of the custom of funerals and sepulture, and of funeral
+ceremonies, which is, indeed, not a difficult subject, especially if we
+recollect what has been before said about insensibility. The opinion of
+Socrates respecting this matter is clearly stated in the book which
+treats of his death, of which we have already said so much; for when he
+had discussed the immortality of the soul, and when the time of his
+dying was approaching rapidly, being asked by Criton how he would be
+buried, "I have taken a great deal of pains," saith he, "my friends, to
+no purpose, for I have not convinced our Criton that I shall fly from
+hence, and leave no part of me behind. Notwithstanding, Criton, if you
+can overtake me, wheresoever you get hold of me, bury me as you please:
+but believe me, none of you will be able to catch me when I have flown
+away from hence." That was excellently said, inasmuch as he allows his
+friend to do as he pleased, and yet shows his indifference about
+anything of this kind. Diogenes was rougher, though of the same
+opinion; but in his character of a Cynic he expressed himself in a
+somewhat harsher manner; he ordered himself to be thrown anywhere
+without being buried. And when his friends replied, "What! to the birds
+and beasts?" "By no means," saith he; "place my staff near me, that I
+may drive them away." "How can you do that," they answer, "for you will
+not perceive them?" "How am I then injured by being torn by those
+animals, if I have no sensation?" Anaxagoras, when he was at the point
+of death at Lampsacus, and was asked by his friends, whether, if
+anything should happen to him, he would not choose to be carried to
+Clazomenæ, his country, made this excellent answer, "There is," says
+he, "no occasion for that, for all places are at an equal distance from
+the infernal regions." There is one thing to be observed with respect
+to the whole subject of burial, that it relates to the body, whether
+the soul live or die. Now, with regard to the body, it is clear that,
+whether the soul live or die, that has no sensation.
+
+XLIV. But all things are full of errors. Achilles drags Hector, tied to
+his chariot; he thinks, I suppose, he tears his flesh, and that Hector
+feels the pain of it; therefore, he avenges himself on him, as he
+imagines. But Hecuba bewails this as a sore misfortune:
+
+    I saw (a dreadful sight) great Hector slain,
+    Dragg'd at Achilles' car along the plain.
+
+What Hector? or how long will he be Hector? Accius is better in this,
+and Achilles, too, is sometimes reasonable:
+
+    I Hector's body to his sire convey'd,
+    Hector I sent to the infernal shade.
+
+It was not Hector that you dragged along, but a body that had been
+Hector's. Here another starts from underground, and will not suffer his
+mother to sleep:
+
+    To thee I call, my once-loved parent, hear,
+    Nor longer with thy sleep relieve thy care;
+    Thine eye which pities not is closed--arise;
+    Ling'ring I wait the unpaid obsequies.
+
+When these verses are sung with a slow and melancholy tune, so as to
+affect the whole theatre with sadness, one can scarce help thinking
+those unhappy that are unburied:
+
+    Ere the devouring dogs and hungry vultures...
+
+He is afraid he shall not have the use of his limbs so well if they are
+torn to pieces, but is under no such apprehensions if they are burned:
+
+    Nor leave my naked bones, my poor remains,
+    To shameful violence and bloody stains.
+
+I do not understand what he could fear who could pour forth such
+excellent verses to the sound of the flute. We must, therefore, adhere
+to this, that nothing is to be regarded after we are dead, though many
+people revenge themselves on their dead enemies. Thyestes pours forth
+several curses in some good lines of Ennius, praying, first of all,
+that Atreus may perish by a shipwreck, which is certainly a very
+terrible thing, for such a death is not free from very grievous
+sensations. Then follow these unmeaning expressions:
+
+                                         May
+    On the sharp rock his mangled carcass lie,
+    His entrails torn, to hungry birds a prey!
+    May he convulsive writhe his bleeding side,
+    And with his clotted gore the stones be dyed!
+
+The rocks themselves were not more destitute of feeling than he who was
+hanging to them by his side; though Thyestes imagines he is wishing him
+the greatest torture. It would be torture, indeed, if he were sensible;
+but as he is not, it can be none; then how very unmeaning is this:
+
+    Let him, still hovering o'er the Stygian wave,
+    Ne'er reach the body's peaceful port, the grave!
+
+You see under what mistaken notions all this is said. He imagines the
+body has its haven, and that the dead are at rest in their graves.
+Pelops was greatly to blame in not having informed and taught his son
+what regard was due to everything.
+
+XLV. But what occasion is there to animadvert on the opinions of
+individuals, when we may observe whole nations to fall into all sorts
+of errors? The Egyptians embalm their dead, and keep them in their
+houses; the Persians dress them over with wax, and then bury them, that
+they may preserve their bodies as long as possible. It is customary
+with the Magi to bury none of their order, unless they have been first
+torn by wild beasts. In Hyrcania, the people maintain dogs for the
+public use; the nobles have their own--and we know that they have a
+good breed of dogs; but every one, according to his ability, provides
+himself with some, in order to be torn by them; and they hold that to
+be the best kind of interment. Chrysippus, who is curious in all kinds
+of historical facts, has collected many other things of this kind; but
+some of them are so offensive as not to admit of being related. All
+that has been said of burying is not worth our regard with respect to
+ourselves, though it is not to be neglected as to our friends, provided
+we are thoroughly aware that the dead are insensible. But the living,
+indeed, should consider what is due to custom and opinion; only they
+should at the same time consider that the dead are noways interested in
+it. But death truly is then met with the greatest tranquillity when the
+dying man can comfort himself with his own praise. No one dies too soon
+who has finished the course of perfect virtue. I myself have known many
+occasions when I have seemed in danger of immediate death; oh! how I
+wish it had come to me! for I have gained nothing by the delay. I had
+gone over and over again the duties of life; nothing remained but to
+contend with fortune. If reason, then, cannot sufficiently fortify us
+to enable us to feel a contempt for death, at all events let our past
+life prove that we have lived long enough, and even longer than was
+necessary; for notwithstanding the deprivation of sense, the dead are
+not without that good which peculiarly belongs to them, namely, the
+praise and glory which they have acquired, even though they are not
+sensible of it. For although there be nothing in glory to make it
+desirable, yet it follows virtue as its shadow; and the genuine
+judgment of the multitude on good men, if ever they form any, is more
+to their own praise than of any real advantage to the dead. Yet I
+cannot say, however it may be received, that Lycurgus and Solon have no
+glory from their laws, and from the political constitution which they
+established in their country; or that Themistocles and Epaminondas have
+not glory from their martial virtue.
+
+XLVI. For Neptune shall sooner bury Salamis itself with his waters than
+the memory of the trophies gained there; and the Boeotian Leuctra shall
+perish sooner than the glory of that great battle. And longer still
+shall fame be before it deserts Curius, and Fabricius, and Calatinus,
+and the two Scipios, and the two Africani, and Maximus, and Marcellus,
+and Paulus, and Cato, and Lælius, and numberless other heroes; and
+whoever has caught any resemblance of them, not estimating it by common
+fame, but by the real applause of good men, may with confidence, when
+the occasion requires, approach death, on which we are sure that even
+if the chief good is not continued, at least no evil is. Such a man
+would even wish to die while in prosperity; for all the favors that
+could be heaped on him would not be so agreeable to him as the loss of
+them would be painful. That speech of the Lacedæmonian seems to have
+the same meaning, who, when Diagoras the Rhodian, who had himself been
+a conqueror at the Olympic games, saw two of his own sons conquerors
+there on the same day, approached the old man, and, congratulating him,
+said, "You should die now, Diagoras, for no greater happiness can
+possibly await you." The Greeks look on these as great things; perhaps
+they think too highly of them, or, rather, they did so then. And so he
+who said this to Diagoras, looking on it as something very glorious,
+that three men out of one family should have been conquerors there,
+thought it could answer no purpose to him to continue any longer in
+life, where he could only be exposed to a reverse of fortune.
+
+I might have given you a sufficient answer, as it seems to me, on this
+point, in a few words, as you had allowed the dead were not exposed to
+any positive evil; but I have spoken at greater length on the subject
+for this reason, because this is our greatest consolation in the losing
+and bewailing of our friends. For we ought to bear with moderation any
+grief which arises from ourselves, or is endured on our own account,
+lest we should seem to be too much influenced by self-love. But should
+we suspect our departed friends to be under those evils, which they are
+generally imagined to be, and to be sensible of them, then such a
+suspicion would give us intolerable pain; and accordingly I wished, for
+my own sake, to pluck up this opinion by the roots, and on that account
+I have been perhaps somewhat more prolix than was necessary.
+
+XLVII. _A._ More prolix than was necessary? Certainty not, in my
+opinion. For I was induced, by the former part of your speech, to wish
+to die; but, by the latter, sometimes not to be unwilling, and at
+others to be wholly indifferent about it. But the effect of your whole
+argument is, that I am convinced that death ought not to be classed
+among the evils.
+
+_M._ Do you, then, expect that I am to give you a regular peroration,
+like the rhetoricians, or shall I forego that art?
+
+_A._ I would not have you give over an art which you have set off to
+such advantage; and you were in the right to do so, for, to speak the
+truth, it also has set you off. But what is that peroration? For I
+should be glad to hear it, whatever it is.
+
+_M._ It is customary, in the schools, to produce the opinions of the
+immortal Gods on death; nor are these opinions the fruits of the
+imagination alone of the lecturers, but they have the authority of
+Herodotus and many others. Cleobis and Biton are the first they
+mention, sons of the Argive priestess; the story is a well-known one.
+As it was necessary that she should be drawn in a chariot to a certain
+annual sacrifice, which was solemnized at a temple some considerable
+distance from the town, and the cattle that were to draw the chariot
+had not arrived, those two young men whom I have just mentioned,
+pulling off their garments, and anointing their bodies with oil,
+harnessed themselves to the yoke. And in this manner the priestess was
+conveyed to the temple; and when the chariot had arrived at the proper
+place, she is said to have entreated the Goddess to bestow on them, as
+a reward for their piety, the greatest gift that a God could confer on
+man. And the young men, after having feasted with their mother, fell
+asleep; and in the morning they were found dead. Trophonius and
+Agamedes are said to have put up the same petition, for they, having
+built a temple to Apollo at Delphi, offered supplications to the God,
+and desired of him some extraordinary reward for their care and labor,
+particularizing nothing, but asking for whatever was best for men.
+Accordingly, Apollo signified to them that he would bestow it on them
+in three days, and on the third day at daybreak they were found dead.
+And so they say that this was a formal decision pronounced by that God
+to whom the rest of the deities have assigned the province of divining
+with an accuracy superior to that of all the rest.
+
+XLVIII. There is also a story told of Silenus, who, when taken prisoner
+by Midas, is said to have made him this present for his ransom--namely,
+that he informed him[25] that never to have been born was by far the
+greatest blessing that could happen to man; and that the next best
+thing was to die very soon; which very opinion Euripides makes use of
+in his Cresphontes, saying,
+
+    When man is born, 'tis fit, with solemn show,
+    We speak our sense of his approaching woe;
+    With other gestures and a different eye,
+    Proclaim our pleasure when he's bid to die.[26]
+
+There is something like this in Crantor's Consolation; for he says that
+Terinæsus of Elysia, when he was bitterly lamenting the loss of his
+son, came to a place of divination to be informed why he was visited
+with so great affliction, and received in his tablet these three
+verses:
+
+    Thou fool, to murmur at Euthynous' death!
+    The blooming youth to fate resigns his breath:
+    The fate, whereon your happiness depends,
+    At once the parent and the son befriends.[27]
+
+On these and similar authorities they affirm that the question has been
+determined by the Gods. Nay, more; Alcidamas, an ancient rhetorician of
+the very highest reputation, wrote even in praise of death, which he
+endeavored to establish by an enumeration of the evils of life; and his
+Dissertation has a great deal of eloquence in it; but he was
+unacquainted with the more refined arguments of the philosophers. By
+the orators, indeed, to die for our country is always considered not
+only as glorious, but even as happy: they go back as far as
+Erechtheus,[28] whose very daughters underwent death, for the safety of
+their fellow-citizens: they instance Codrus, who threw himself into the
+midst of his enemies, dressed like a common man, that his royal robes
+might not betray him, because the oracle had declared the Athenians
+conquerors, if their king was slain. Menoeceus[29] is not overlooked by
+them, who, in compliance with the injunctions of an oracle, freely shed
+his blood for his country. Iphigenia ordered herself to be conveyed to
+Aulis, to be sacrificed, that her blood might be the cause of spilling
+that of her enemies.
+
+XLIX. From hence they proceed to instances of a fresher date. Harmodius
+and Aristogiton are in everybody's mouth; the memory of Leonidas the
+Lacedæmonian and Epaminondas the Theban is as fresh as ever. Those
+philosophers were not acquainted with the many instances in our
+country--to give a list of whom would take up too much time--who, we
+see, considered death desirable as long as it was accompanied with
+honor. But, notwithstanding this is the correct view of the case, we
+must use much persuasion, speak as if we were endued with some higher
+authority, in order to bring men to begin to wish to die, or cease to
+be afraid of death. For if that last day does not occasion an entire
+extinction, but a change of abode only, what can be more desirable? And
+if it, on the other hand, destroys, and absolutely puts an end to us,
+what can be preferable to the having a deep sleep fall on us, in the
+midst of the fatigues of life, and being thus overtaken, to sleep to
+eternity? And, should this really be the case, then Ennius's language
+is more consistent with wisdom than Solon's; for our Ennius says,
+
+    Let none bestow upon my passing bier
+    One needless sigh or unavailing tear.
+
+But the wise Solon says,
+
+    Let me not unlamented die, but o'er my bier
+    Burst forth the tender sigh, the friendly tear.[30]
+
+But let us, if indeed it should be our fate to know the time which is
+appointed by the Gods for us to die, prepare ourselves for it with a
+cheerful and grateful mind, thinking ourselves like men who are
+delivered from a jail, and released from their fetters, for the purpose
+of going back to our eternal habitation, which may be more emphatically
+called our own; or else to be divested of all sense and trouble. If, on
+the other hand, we should have no notice given us of this decree, yet
+let us cultivate such a disposition as to look on that formidable hour
+of death as happy for us, though shocking to our friends; and let us
+never imagine anything to be an evil which is an appointment of the
+immortal Gods, or of nature, the common parent of all. For it is not by
+hazard or without design that we have been born and situated as we
+have. On the contrary, beyond all doubt there is a certain power which
+consults the happiness of human nature; and this would neither have
+produced nor provided for a being which, after having gone through the
+labors of life, was to fall into eternal misery by death. Let us rather
+infer that we have a retreat and haven prepared for us, which I wish we
+could crowd all sail and arrive at; but though the winds should not
+serve, and we should be driven back, yet we shall to a certainty arrive
+at that point eventually, though somewhat later. But how can that be
+miserable for one which all must of necessity undergo? I have given you
+a peroration, that you might not think I had overlooked or neglected
+anything.
+
+_A._ I am persuaded you have not; and, indeed, that peroration has
+confirmed me.
+
+_M._ I am glad it has had that effect. But it is now time to consult
+our health. To-morrow, and all the time we continue in this Tusculan
+villa, let us consider this subject; and especially those portions of
+it which may ease our pain, alleviate our fears, and lessen our
+desires, which is the greatest advantage we can reap from the whole of
+philosophy.
+
+       *       *       *       *       *
+
+
+
+
+BOOK II.
+
+ON BEARING PAIN.
+
+
+I. Neoptolemus, in Ennius, indeed, says that the study of philosophy
+was expedient for him; but that it required limiting to a few subjects,
+for that to give himself up entirely to it was what he did not approve
+of. And for my part, Brutus, I am perfectly persuaded that it is
+expedient for me to philosophize; for what can I do better, especially
+as I have no regular occupation? But I am not for limiting my
+philosophy to a few subjects, as he does; for philosophy is a matter in
+which it is difficult to acquire a little knowledge without acquainting
+yourself with many, or all its branches, nor can you well take a few
+subjects without selecting them out of a great number; nor can any one,
+who has acquired the knowledge of a few points, avoid endeavoring with
+the same eagerness to understand more. But still, in a busy life, and
+in one mainly occupied with military matters, such as that of
+Neoptolemus was at that time, even that limited degree of acquaintance
+with philosophy may be of great use, and may yield fruit, not perhaps
+so plentiful as a thorough knowledge of the whole of philosophy, but
+yet such as in some degree may at times deliver us from the dominion of
+our desires, our sorrows, and our fears; just as the effect of that
+discussion which we lately maintained in my Tusculan villa seemed to be
+that a great contempt of death was engendered, which contempt is of no
+small efficacy towards delivering the mind from fear; for whoever
+dreads what cannot be avoided can by no means live with a quiet and
+tranquil mind. But he who is under no fear of death, not only because
+it is a thing absolutely inevitable but also because he is persuaded
+that death itself hath nothing terrible in it, provides himself with a
+very great resource towards a happy life. However, I am not tolerant
+that many will argue strenuously against us; and, indeed, that is a
+thing which can never be avoided, except by abstaining from writing at
+all. For if my Orations, which were addressed to the judgment and
+approbation of the people (for that is a popular art, and the object of
+oratory is popular applause), have been criticised by some people who
+are inclined to withhold their praise from everything but what they are
+persuaded they can attain to themselves, and who limit their ideas of
+good speaking by the hopes which they conceive of what they themselves
+may attain to, and who declare, when they are overwhelmed with a flow
+of words and sentences, that they prefer the utmost poverty of thought
+and expression to that plenty and copiousness (from which arose the
+Attic kind of oratory, which they who professed it were strangers to,
+though they have now been some time silenced, and laughed out of the
+very courts of justice), what may I not expect, when at present I
+cannot have the least countenance from the people by whom I used to be
+upheld before? For philosophy is satisfied with a few judges, and of
+her own accord industriously avoids the multitude, who are jealous of
+it, and utterly displeased with it; so that, should any one undertake
+to cry down the whole of it, he would have the people on his side;
+while, if he should attack that school which I particularly profess, he
+would have great assistance from those of the other philosophers.
+
+II. But I have answered the detractors of philosophy in general, in my
+Hortensius. And what I had to say in favor of the Academics, is, I
+think, explained with sufficient accuracy in my four books of the
+Academic Question.
+
+But yet I am so far from desiring that no one should write against me,
+that it is what I most earnestly wish; for philosophy would never have
+been in such esteem in Greece itself, if it had not been for the
+strength which it acquired from the contentions and disputations of the
+most learned men; and therefore I recommend all men who have abilities
+to follow my advice to snatch this art also from declining Greece, and
+to transport it to this city; as our ancestors by their study and
+industry have imported all their other arts which were worth having.
+Thus the praise of oratory, raised from a low degree, is arrived at
+such perfection that it must now decline, and, as is the nature of all
+things, verge to its dissolution in a very short time. Let philosophy,
+then, derive its birth in Latin language from this time, and let us
+lend it our assistance, and bear patiently to be contradicted and
+refuted; and although those men may dislike such treatment who are
+bound and devoted to certain predetermined opinions, and are under such
+obligations to maintain them that they are forced, for the sake of
+consistency, to adhere to them even though they do not themselves
+wholly approve of them; we, on the other hand, who pursue only
+probabilities, and who cannot go beyond that which seems really likely,
+can confute others without obstinacy, and are prepared to be confuted
+ourselves without resentment. Besides, if these studies are ever
+brought home to us, we shall not want even Greek libraries, in which
+there is an infinite number of books, by reason of the multitude of
+authors among them; for it is a common practice with many to repeat the
+same things which have been written by others, which serves no purpose
+but to stuff their shelves; and this will be our case, too, if many
+apply themselves to this study.
+
+III. But let us excite those, if possible, who have had a liberal
+education, and are masters of an elegant style, and who philosophize
+with reason and method.
+
+For there is a certain class of them who would willingly be called
+philosophers, whose books in our language are said to be numerous, and
+which I do not despise; for, indeed, I never read them: but still,
+because the authors themselves declare that they write without any
+regularity, or method, or elegance, or ornament, I do not care to read
+what must be so void of entertainment. There is no one in the least
+acquainted with literature who does not know the style and sentiments
+of that school; wherefore, since they are at no pains to express
+themselves well, I do not see why they should be read by anybody except
+by one another. Let them read them, if they please, who are of the same
+opinions; for in the same manner as all men read Plato and the other
+Socratics, with those who sprung from them, even those who do not agree
+with their opinions, or are very indifferent about them; but scarcely
+any one except their own disciples take Epicurus or Metrodorus into
+their hands; so they alone read these Latin books who think that the
+arguments contained in them are sound. But, in my opinion, whatever is
+published should be recommended to the reading of every man of
+learning; and though we may not succeed in this ourselves, yet
+nevertheless we must be sensible that this ought to be the aim of every
+writer. And on this account I have always been pleased with the custom
+of the Peripatetics and Academics, of disputing on both sides of the
+question; not solely from its being the only method of discovering what
+is probable on every subject, but also because it affords the greatest
+scope for practising eloquence; a method that Aristotle first made use
+of, and afterward all the Aristotelians; and in our own memory Plilo,
+whom we have often heard, appointed one time to treat of the precepts
+of the rhetoricians, and another for philosophical discussion, to which
+custom I was brought to conform by my friends at my Tusculum; and
+accordingly our leisure time was spent in this manner. And therefore,
+as yesterday before noon we applied ourselves to speaking, and in the
+afternoon went down into the Academy, the discussions which were held
+there I have acquainted you with, not in the manner of a narration, but
+in almost the very same words which were employed in the debate.
+
+IV. The discourse, then, was introduced in this manner while we were
+walking, and it was commenced by some such an opening as this:
+
+_A._ It is not to be expressed how much I was delighted, or rather
+edified, by your discourse of yesterday. For although I am conscious to
+myself that I have never been too fond of life, yet at times, when I
+have considered that there would be an end to this life, and that I
+must some time or other part with all its good things, a certain dread
+and uneasiness used to intrude itself on my thoughts; but now, believe
+me, I am so freed from that kind of uneasiness that there is nothing
+that I think less worth any regard.
+
+_M._ I am not at all surprised at that, for it is the effect of
+philosophy, which is the medicine of our souls; it banishes all
+groundless apprehensions, frees us from desires, and drives away fears:
+but it has not the same influence over all men; it is of very great
+influence when it falls in with a disposition well adapted to it. For
+not only does Fortune, as the old proverb says, assist the bold, but
+reason does so in a still greater degree; for it, by certain precepts,
+as it were, strengthens even courage itself. You were born naturally
+great and soaring, and with a contempt for all things which pertain to
+man alone; therefore a discourse against death took easy possession of
+a brave soul. But do you imagine that these same arguments have any
+force with those very persons who have invented, and canvassed, and
+published them, excepting indeed some very few particular persons? For
+how few philosophers will you meet with whose life and manners are
+conformable to the dictates of reason! who look on their profession,
+not as a means of displaying their learning, but as a rule for their
+own practice! who follow their own precepts, and comply with their own
+decrees! You may see some of such levity and such vanity, that it would
+have been better for them to have been ignorant; some covetous of
+money, some others eager for glory, many slaves to their lusts; so that
+their discourses and their actions are most strangely at variance; than
+which nothing in my opinion can be more unbecoming: for just as if one
+who professed to teach grammar should speak with impropriety, or a
+master of music sing out of tune, such conduct has the worst appearance
+in these men, because they blunder in the very particular with which
+they profess that they are well acquainted. So a philosopher who errs
+in the conduct of his life is the more infamous because he is erring in
+the very thing which he pretends to teach, and, while he lays down
+rules to regulate life by, is irregular in his own life.
+
+V. _A._ Should this be the case, is it not to be feared that you are
+dressing up philosophy in false colors? For what stronger argument can
+there be that it is of little use than that some very profound
+philosophers live in a discreditable manner?
+
+_M._ That, indeed, is no argument at all, for as all the fields which
+are cultivated are not fruitful (and this sentiment of Accius is false,
+and asserted without any foundation,
+
+    The ground you sow on is of small avail;
+    To yield a crop good seed can never fail),
+
+it is not every mind which has been properly cultivated that produces
+fruit; and, to go on with the comparison, as a field, although it may
+be naturally fruitful, cannot produce a crop without dressing, so
+neither can the mind without education; such is the weakness of either
+without the other. Whereas philosophy is the culture of the mind: this
+it is which plucks up vices by the roots; prepares the mind for the
+receiving of seeds; commits them to it, or, as I may say, sows them, in
+the hope that, when come to maturity, they may produce a plentiful
+harvest. Let us proceed, then, as we began. Say, if you please, what
+shall be the subject of our disputation.
+
+_A._ I look on pain to be the greatest of all evils.
+
+_M._ What, even greater than infamy?
+
+_A._ I dare not indeed assert that; and I blush to think I am so soon
+driven from my ground.
+
+_M._ You would have had greater reason for blushing had you persevered
+in it; for what is so unbecoming--what can appear worse to you, than
+disgrace, wickedness, immorality? To avoid which, what pain is there
+which we ought not (I will not say to avoid shirking, but even) of our
+own accord to encounter, and undergo, and even to court?
+
+_A._ I am entirely of that opinion; but, notwithstanding that pain is
+not the greatest evil, yet surely it is an evil.
+
+_M._ Do you perceive, then, how much of the terror of pain you have
+given up on a small hint?
+
+_A._ I see that plainly; but I should be glad to give up more of it.
+
+_M._ I will endeavor to make you do so; but it is a great undertaking,
+and I must have a disposition on your part which is not inclined to
+offer any obstacles.
+
+_A._ You shall have such: for as I behaved yesterday, so now I will
+follow reason wherever she leads.
+
+VI. _M._ First, then, I will speak of the weakness of many
+philosophers, and those, too, of various sects; the head of whom, both
+in authority and antiquity, was Aristippus, the pupil of Socrates, who
+hesitated not to say that pain was the greatest of all evils. And after
+him Epicurus easily gave in to this effeminate and enervated doctrine.
+After him Hieronymus the Rhodian said, that to be without pain was the
+chief good, so great an evil did pain appear to him to be. The rest,
+with the exceptions of Zeno, Aristo, Pyrrho, were pretty much of the
+same opinion that you were of just now--that it was indeed an evil, but
+that there were many worse. When, then, nature herself, and a certain
+generous feeling of virtue, at once prevents you from persisting in the
+assertion that pain is the chief evil, and when you were driven from
+such an opinion when disgrace was contrasted with pain, shall
+philosophy, the preceptress of life, cling to this idea for so many
+ages? What duty of life, what praise, what reputation, would be of such
+consequence that a man should be desirous of gaining it at the expense
+of submitting to bodily pain, when he has persuaded himself that pain
+is the greatest evil? On the other side, what disgrace, what ignominy,
+would he not submit to that he might avoid pain, when persuaded that it
+was the greatest of evils? Besides, what person, if it be only true
+that pain is the greatest of evils, is not miserable, not only when he
+actually feels pain, but also whenever he is aware that it may befall
+him. And who is there whom pain may not befall? So that it is clear
+that there is absolutely no one who can possibly be happy. Metrodorus,
+indeed, thinks that man perfectly happy whose body is free from all
+disorders, and who has an assurance that it will always continue so;
+but who is there who can be assured of that?
+
+VII. But Epicurus, indeed, says such things that it should seem that
+his design was only to make people laugh; for he affirms somewhere that
+if a wise man were to be burned or put to the torture--you expect,
+perhaps, that he is going to say he would bear it, he would support
+himself under it with resolution, he would not yield to it (and that by
+Hercules! would be very commendable, and worthy of that very Hercules
+whom I have just invoked): but even this will not satisfy Epicurus,
+that robust and hardy man! No; his wise man, even if he were in
+Phalaris's bull, would say, How sweet it is! how little do I regard it!
+What, sweet? Is it not sufficient, if it is not disagreeable? But those
+very men who deny pain to be an evil are not in the habit of saying
+that it is agreeable to any one to be tormented; they rather say that
+it is cruel, or hard to bear, afflicting, unnatural, but still not an
+evil: while this man who says that it is the only evil, and the very
+worst of all evils, yet thinks that a wise man would pronounce it
+sweet. I do not require of you to speak of pain in the same words which
+Epicurus uses--a man, as you know, devoted to pleasure: he may make no
+difference, if he pleases, between Phalaris's bull and his own bed; but
+I cannot allow the wise man to be so indifferent about pain. If he
+bears it with courage, it is sufficient: that he should rejoice in it,
+I do not expect; for pain is, beyond all question, sharp, bitter,
+against nature, hard to submit to and to bear. Observe Philoctetes: We
+may allow him to lament, for he saw Hercules himself groaning loudly
+through extremity of pain on Mount Oeta. The arrows with which Hercules
+presented him were then no consolation to him, when
+
+    The viper's bite, impregnating his veins
+    With poison, rack'd him with its bitter pains.
+
+And therefore he cries out, desiring help, and wishing to die,
+
+    Oh that some friendly hand its aid would lend,
+    My body from this rock's vast height to send
+    Into the briny deep! I'm all on fire,
+    And by this fatal wound must soon expire.
+
+It is hard to say that the man who was obliged to cry out in this
+manner was not oppressed with evil, and great evil too.
+
+VIII. But let us observe Hercules himself, who was subdued by pain at
+the very time when he was on the point of attaining immortality by
+death. What words does Sophocles here put in his mouth, in his
+Trachiniæ? who, when Deianira had put upon him a tunic dyed in the
+centaur's blood, and it stuck to his entrails, says,
+
+    What tortures I endure no words can tell,
+    Far greater these, than those which erst befell
+    From the dire terror of thy consort, Jove--
+    E'en stern Eurystheus' dire command above;
+    This of thy daughter, Oeneus, is the fruit,
+    Beguiling me with her envenom'd suit,
+    Whose close embrace doth on my entrails prey,
+    Consuming life; my lungs forbid to play;
+    The blood forsakes my veins; my manly heart
+    Forgets to beat; enervated, each part
+    Neglects its office, while my fatal doom
+    Proceeds ignobly from the weaver's loom.
+    The hand of foe ne'er hurt me, nor the fierce
+    Giant issuing from his parent earth.
+    Ne'er could the Centaur such a blow enforce,
+    No barbarous foe, nor all the Grecian force;
+    This arm no savage people could withstand,
+    Whose realms I traversed to reform the land.
+    Thus, though I ever bore a manly heart,
+    I fall a victim to a woman's art.
+IX. Assist, my son, if thou that name dost hear,
+    My groans preferring to thy mother's tear:
+    Convey her here, if, in thy pious heart,
+    Thy mother shares not an unequal part:
+    Proceed, be bold, thy father's fate bemoan,
+    Nations will join, you will not weep alone.
+    Oh, what a sight is this same briny source,
+    Unknown before, through all my labors' course!
+    That virtue, which could brave each toil but late,
+    With woman's weakness now bewails its fate.
+    Approach, my son; behold thy father laid,
+    A wither'd carcass that implores thy aid;
+    Let all behold: and thou, imperious Jove,
+    On me direct thy lightning from above:
+    Now all its force the poison doth assume,
+    And my burnt entrails with its flame consume.
+    Crestfallen, unembraced, I now let fall
+    Listless, those hands that lately conquer'd all;
+    When the Nemæan lion own'd their force,
+    And he indignant fell a breathless corse;
+    The serpent slew, of the Lernean lake,
+    As did the Hydra of its force partake:
+    By this, too, fell the Erymanthian boar:
+    E'en Cerberus did his weak strength deplore.
+    This sinewy arm did overcome with ease
+    That dragon, guardian of the Golden Fleece.
+    My many conquests let some others trace;
+    It's mine to say, I never knew disgrace.[31]
+
+Can we then, despise pain, when we see Hercules himself giving vent to
+his expressions of agony with such impatience?
+
+X. Let us see what Æschylus says, who was not only a poet but a
+Pythagorean philosopher also, for that is the account which you have
+received of him; how doth he make Prometheus bear the pain he suffered
+for the Lemnian theft, when he clandestinely stole away the celestial
+fire, and bestowed it on men, and was severely punished by Jupiter for
+the theft. Fastened to Mount Caucasus, he speaks thus:
+
+    Thou heav'n-born race of Titans here fast bound,
+    Behold thy brother! As the sailors sound
+    With care the bottom, and their ships confine
+    To some safe shore, with anchor and with line;
+    So, by Jove's dread decree, the God of fire
+    Confines me here the victim of Jove's ire.
+    With baneful art his dire machine he shapes;
+    From such a God what mortal e'er escapes?
+    When each third day shall triumph o'er the night,
+    Then doth the vulture, with his talons light,
+    Seize on my entrails; which, in rav'nous guise,
+    He preys on! then with wing extended flies
+    Aloft, and brushes with his plumes the gore:
+    But when dire Jove my liver doth restore,
+    Back he returns impetuous to his prey,
+    Clapping his wings, he cuts th' ethereal way.
+    Thus do I nourish with my blood this pest,
+    Confined my arms, unable to contest;
+    Entreating only that in pity Jove
+    Would take my life, and this cursed plague remove.
+    But endless ages past unheard my moan,
+    Sooner shall drops dissolve this very stone.[32]
+
+And therefore it scarcely seems possible to avoid calling a man who is
+suffering, miserable; and if he is miserable, then pain is an evil.
+
+XI. _A._ Hitherto you are on my side; I will see to that by-and-by;
+and, in the mean while, whence are those verses? I do not remember
+them.
+
+_M._ I will inform you, for you are in the right to ask. Do you see
+that I have much leisure?
+
+_A._ What, then?
+
+_M._ I imagine, when you were at Athens, you attended frequently at the
+schools of the philosophers.
+
+_A._ Yes, and with great pleasure.
+
+_M._ You observed, then, that though none of them at that time were
+very eloquent, yet they used to mix verses with their harangues.
+
+_A._ Yes, and particularly Dionysius the Stoic used to employ a great
+many.
+
+_M._ You say right; but they were quoted without any appropriateness or
+elegance. But our friend Philo used to give a few select lines and well
+adapted; and in imitation of him, ever since I took a fancy to this
+kind of elderly declamation, I have been very fond of quoting our
+poets; and where I cannot be supplied from them, I translate from the
+Greek, that the Latin language may not want any kind of ornament in
+this kind of disputation.
+
+But, do you not see how much harm is done by poets? They introduce the
+bravest men lamenting over their misfortunes: they soften our minds;
+and they are, besides, so entertaining, that we do not only read them,
+but get them by heart. Thus the influence of the poets is added to our
+want of discipline at home, and our tender and delicate manner of
+living, so that between them they have deprived virtue of all its vigor
+and energy. Plato, therefore, was right in banishing them from his
+commonwealth, where he required the best morals, and the best form of
+government. But we, who have all our learning from Greece, read and
+learn these works of theirs from our childhood; and look on this as a
+liberal and learned education.
+
+XII. But why are we angry with the poets? We may find some
+philosophers, those masters of virtue, who have taught that pain was
+the greatest of evils. But you, young man, when you said but just now
+that it appeared so to you, upon being asked by me what appeared
+greater than infamy, gave up that opinion at a word. Suppose I ask
+Epicurus the same question. He will answer that a trifling degree of
+pain is a greater evil than the greatest infamy; for that there is no
+evil in infamy itself, unless attended with pain. What pain, then,
+attends Epicurus, when he says that very thing, that pain is the
+greatest evil! And yet nothing can be a greater disgrace to a
+philosopher than to talk thus. Therefore, you allowed enough when you
+admitted that infamy appeared to you to be a greater evil than pain.
+And if you abide by this admission, you will see how far pain should be
+resisted; and that our inquiry should be not so much whether pain be an
+evil, as how the mind may be fortified for resisting it. The Stoics
+infer from some petty quibbling arguments that it is no evil, as if the
+dispute were about a word, and not about the thing itself. Why do you
+impose upon me, Zeno? For when you deny what appears very dreadful to
+me to be an evil, I am deceived, and am at a loss to know why that
+which appears to me to be a most miserable thing should be no evil. The
+answer is, that nothing is an evil but what is base and vicious. You
+return to your trifling, for you do not remove what made me uneasy. I
+know that pain is not vice--you need not inform me of that: but show me
+that it makes no difference to me whether I am in pain or not. It has
+never anything to do, say you, with a happy life, for that depends upon
+virtue alone; but yet pain is to be avoided. If I ask, why? It is
+disagreeable, against nature, hard to bear, woful and afflicting.
+
+XIII. Here are many words to express that by so many different forms
+which we call by the single word evil. You are defining pain, instead
+of removing it, when you say, it is disagreeable, unnatural, scarcely
+possible to be endured or borne, nor are you wrong in saying so: but
+the man who vaunts himself in such a manner should not give way in his
+conduct, if it be true that nothing is good but what is honest, and
+nothing evil but what is disgraceful. This would be wishing, not
+proving. This argument is a better one, and has more truth in it--that
+all things which Nature abhors are to be looked upon as evil; that
+those which she approves of are to be considered as good: for when this
+is admitted, and the dispute about words removed, that which they with
+reason embrace, and which we call honest, right, becoming, and
+sometimes include under the general name of virtue, appears so far
+superior to everything else that all other things which are looked upon
+as the gifts of fortune, or the good things of the body, seem trifling
+and insignificant; and no evil whatever, nor all the collective body of
+evils together, appears to be compared to the evil of infamy.
+Wherefore, if, as you granted in the beginning, infamy is worse than
+pain, pain is certainly nothing; for while it appears to you base and
+unmanly to groan, cry out, lament, or faint under pain; while you
+cherish notions of probity, dignity, honor, and, keeping your eye on
+them, refrain yourself, pain will certainly yield to virtue, and, by
+the influence of imagination, will lose its whole force.--For you must
+either admit that there is no such thing as virtue, or you must despise
+every kind of pain. Will you allow of such a virtue as prudence,
+without which no virtue whatever can even be conceived? What, then?
+Will that suffer you to labor and take pains to no purpose? Will
+temperance permit you to do anything to excess? Will it be possible for
+justice to be maintained by one who through the force of pain discovers
+secrets, or betrays his confederates, or deserts many duties of life?
+Will you act in a manner consistently with courage, and its attendants,
+greatness of soul, resolution, patience, and contempt for all worldly
+things? Can you hear yourself called a great man when you lie
+grovelling, dejected, and deploring your condition with a lamentable
+voice; no one would call you even a man while in such a condition. You
+must therefore either abandon all pretensions to courage, or else pain
+must be put out of the question.
+
+XIV. You know very well that, even though part of your Corinthian
+furniture were gone, the remainder might be safe without that; but if
+you lose one virtue (though virtue in reality cannot be lost), still
+if, I say, you should acknowledge that you were deficient in one, you
+would be stripped of all. Can you, then, call yourself a brave man, of
+a great soul, endued with patience and steadiness above the frowns of
+fortune? or Philoctetes? for I choose to instance him, rather than
+yourself, for he certainly was not a brave man, who lay in his bed,
+which was watered with his tears,
+
+    Whose groans, bewailings, and whose bitter cries,
+    With grief incessant rent the very skies.
+
+I do not deny pain to be pain--for were that the case, in what would
+courage consist?--but I say it should be assuaged by patience, if there
+be such a thing as patience: if there be no such thing, why do we speak
+so in praise of philosophy? or why do we glory in its name? Does pain
+annoy us? Let it sting us to the heart: if you are without defensive
+armor, bare your throat to it; but if you are secured by Vulcanian
+armor, that is to say by resolution, resist it. Should you fail to do
+so, that guardian of your honor, your courage, will forsake and leave
+you.--By the laws of Lycurgus, and by those which were given to the
+Cretans by Jupiter, or which Minos established under the direction of
+Jupiter, as the poets say, the youths of the State are trained by the
+practice of hunting, running, enduring hunger and thirst, cold and
+heat. The boys at Sparta are scourged so at the altars that blood
+follows the lash in abundance; nay, sometimes, as I used to hear when I
+was there, they are whipped even to death; and yet not one of them was
+ever heard to cry out, or so much as groan. What, then? Shall men not
+be able to bear what boys do? and shall custom have such great force,
+and reason none at all?
+
+XV. There is some difference between labor and pain; they border upon
+one another, but still there is a certain difference between them.
+Labor is a certain exercise of the mind or body, in some employment or
+undertaking of serious trouble and importance; but pain is a sharp
+motion in the body, disagreeable to our senses.--Both these feelings,
+the Greeks, whose language is more copious than ours, express by the
+common name of [Greek: Ponos]: therefore they call industrious men
+painstaking, or, rather, fond of labor; we, more conveniently, call
+them laborious; for laboring is one thing, and enduring pain another.
+You see, O Greece! your barrenness of words, sometimes, though you
+think you are always so rich in them. I say, then, that there is a
+difference between laboring and being in pain. When Caius Marius had an
+operation performed for a swelling in his thigh, he felt pain; when he
+headed his troops in a very hot season, he labored. Yet these two
+feelings bear some resemblance to one another; for the accustoming
+ourselves to labor makes the endurance of pain more easy to us. And it
+was because they were influenced by this reason that the founders of
+the Grecian form of government provided that the bodies of their youth
+should be strengthened by labor, which custom the Spartans transferred
+even to their women, who in other cities lived more delicately, keeping
+within the walls of their houses; but it was otherwise with the
+Spartans.
+
+    The Spartan women, with a manly air,
+    Fatigues and dangers with their husbands share;
+    They in fantastic sports have no delight,
+    Partners with them in exercise and fight.
+
+And in these laborious exercises pain interferes sometimes. They are
+thrown down, receive blows, have bad falls, and are bruised, and the
+labor itself produces a sort of callousness to pain.
+
+XVI. As to military service (I speak of our own, not of that of the
+Spartans, for they used to march slowly to the sound of the flute, and
+scarce a word of command was given without an anapæst), you may see, in
+the first place, whence the very name of an army (_exercitus_[33]) is
+derived; and, secondly, how great the labor is of an army on its march:
+then consider that they carry more than a fortnight's provision, and
+whatever else they may want; that they carry the burden of the
+stakes,[34] for as to shield, sword, or helmet, they look on them as no
+more encumbrance than their own limbs, for they say that arms are the
+limbs of a soldier, and those, indeed, they carry so commodiously that,
+when there is occasion, they throw down their burdens, and use their
+arms as readily as their limbs. Why need I mention the exercises of the
+legions? And how great the labor is which is undergone in the running,
+encounters, shouts! Hence it is that their minds are worked up to make
+so light of wounds in action. Take a soldier of equal bravery, but
+undisciplined, and he will seem a woman. Why is it that there is this
+sensible difference between a raw recruit and a veteran soldier? The
+age of the young soldiers is for the most part in their favor; but it
+is practice only that enables men to bear labor and despise wounds.
+Moreover, we often see, when the wounded are carried off the field, the
+raw, untried soldier, though but slightly wounded, cries out most
+shamefully; but the more brave, experienced veteran only inquires for
+some one to dress his wounds, and says,
+
+    Patroclus, to thy aid I must appeal
+    Ere worse ensue, my bleeding wounds to heal;
+    The sons of Æsculapius are employ'd,
+    No room for me, so many are annoy'd.
+
+XVII. This is certainly Eurypylus himself. What an experienced
+man!--While his friend is continually enlarging on his misfortunes, you
+may observe that he is so far from weeping that he even assigns a
+reason why he should bear his wounds with patience.
+
+    Who at his enemy a stroke directs,
+    His sword to light upon himself expects.
+
+Patroclus, I suppose, will lead him off to his chamber to bind up his
+wounds, at least if he be a man: but not a word of that; he only
+inquires how the battle went:
+
+    Say how the Argives bear themselves in fight?
+
+And yet no words can show the truth as well as those, your deeds and
+visible sufferings.
+
+    Peace! and my wounds bind up;
+
+but though Eurypylus could bear these afflictions, Æsopus could not,
+
+    Where Hector's fortune press'd our yielding troops;
+
+and he explains the rest, though in pain. So unbounded is military
+glory in a brave man! Shall, then, a veteran soldier be able to behave
+in this manner, and shall a wise and learned man not be able? Surely
+the latter might be able to bear pain better, and in no small degree
+either. At present, however, I am confining myself to what is
+engendered by practice and discipline. I am not yet come to speak of
+reason and philosophy. You may often hear of old women living without
+victuals for three or four days; but take away a wrestler's provisions
+but for one day, and he will implore the aid of Jupiter Olympius, the
+very God for whom he exercises himself: he will cry out that he cannot
+endure it. Great is the force of custom! Sportsmen will continue whole
+nights in the snow; they will bear being almost frozen upon the
+mountains. From practice boxers will not so much as utter a groan,
+however bruised by the cestus. But what do you think of those to whom a
+victory in the Olympic games seemed almost on a par with the ancient
+consulships of the Roman people? What wounds will the gladiators bear,
+who are either barbarians, or the very dregs of mankind! How do they,
+who are trained to it, prefer being wounded to basely avoiding it! How
+often do they prove that they consider nothing but the giving
+satisfaction to their masters or to the people! for when covered with
+wounds, they send to their masters to learn their pleasure: if it is
+their will, they are ready to lie down and die. What gladiator, of even
+moderate reputation, ever gave a sigh? who ever turned pale? who ever
+disgraced himself either in the actual combat, or even when about to
+die? who that had been defeated ever drew in his neck to avoid the
+stroke of death? So great is the force of practice, deliberation, and
+custom! Shall this, then, be done by
+
+    A Samnite rascal, worthy of his trade;
+
+and shall a man born to glory have so soft a part in his soul as not to
+be able to fortify it by reason and reflection? The sight of the
+gladiators' combats is by some looked on as cruel and inhuman, and I do
+not know, as it is at present managed, but it may be so; but when the
+guilty fought, we might receive by our ears perhaps (but certainly by
+our eyes we could not) better training to harden us against pain and
+death.
+
+XVIII. I have now said enough about the effects of exercise, custom,
+and careful meditation. Proceed we now to consider the force of reason,
+unless you have something to reply to what has been said.
+
+_A._ That I should interrupt you! By no means; for your discourse has
+brought me over to your opinion. Let the Stoics, then, think it their
+business to determine whether pain be an evil or not, while they
+endeavor to show by some strained and trifling conclusions, which are
+nothing to the purpose, that pain is no evil. My opinion is, that
+whatever it is, it is not so great as it appears; and I say, that men
+are influenced to a great extent by some false representations and
+appearance of it, and that all which is really felt is capable of being
+endured. Where shall I begin, then? Shall I superficially go over what
+I said before, that my discourse may have a greater scope?
+
+This, then, is agreed upon by all, and not only by learned men, but
+also by the unlearned, that it becomes the brave and magnanimous--those
+that have patience and a spirit above this world--not to give way to
+pain. Nor has there ever been any one who did not commend a man who
+bore it in this manner. That, then, which is expected from a brave man,
+and is commended when it is seen, it must surely be base in any one to
+be afraid of at its approach, or not to bear when it comes. But I would
+have you consider whether, as all the right affections of the soul are
+classed under the name of virtues, the truth is that this is not
+properly the name of them all, but that they all have their name from
+that leading virtue which is superior to all the rest: for the name
+"virtue" comes from _vir_, a man, and courage is the peculiar
+distinction of a man: and this virtue has two principal duties, to
+despise death and pain. We must, then, exert these, if we would be men
+of virtue, or, rather, if we would be men, because virtue (_virtus_)
+takes its very name from _vir_, man.
+
+XIX. You may inquire, perhaps, how? And such an inquiry is not amiss,
+for philosophy is ready with her assistance. Epicurus offers himself to
+you, a man far from a bad--or, I should rather say, a very good man: he
+advises no more than he knows. "Despise pain," says he. Who is it saith
+this? Is it the same man who calls pain the greatest of all evils? It
+is not, indeed, very consistent in him. Let us hear what he says: "If
+the pain is excessive, it must needs be short." I must have that over
+again, for I do not apprehend what you mean exactly by "excessive" or
+"short." That is excessive than which nothing can be greater; that is
+short than which nothing is shorter. I do not regard the greatness of
+any pain from which, by reason of the shortness of its continuance, I
+shall be delivered almost before it reaches me. But if the pain be as
+great as that of Philoctetes, it will appear great indeed to me, but
+yet not the greatest that I am capable of bearing; for the pain is
+confined to my foot. But my eye may pain me, I may have a pain in the
+head, or sides, or lungs, or in every part of me. It is far, then, from
+being excessive. Therefore, says he, pain of a long continuance has
+more pleasure in it than uneasiness. Now, I cannot bring myself to say
+so great a man talks nonsense; but I imagine he is laughing at us. My
+opinion is that the greatest pain (I say the greatest, though it may be
+ten atoms less than another) is not therefore short, because acute. I
+could name to you a great many good men who have been tormented many
+years with the acutest pains of the gout. But this cautious man doth
+not determine the measure of that greatness or of duration, so as to
+enable us to know what he calls excessive with regard to pain, or short
+with respect to its continuance. Let us pass him by, then, as one who
+says just nothing at all; and let us force him to acknowledge,
+notwithstanding he might behave himself somewhat boldly under his colic
+and his strangury, that no remedy against pain can be had from him who
+looks on pain as the greatest of all evils. We must apply, then, for
+relief elsewhere, and nowhere better (if we seek for what is most
+consistent with itself) than to those who place the chief good in
+honesty, and the greatest evil in infamy. You dare not so much as
+groan, or discover the least uneasiness in their company, for virtue
+itself speaks to you through them.
+
+XX. Will you, when you may observe children at Lacedæmon, and young men
+at Olympia, and barbarians in the amphitheatre, receive the severest
+wounds, and bear them without once opening their mouths--will you, I
+say, if any pain should by chance attack you, cry out like a woman?
+Will you not rather bear it with resolution and constancy? and not cry,
+It is intolerable; nature cannot bear it! I hear what you say: Boys
+bear this because they are led thereto by glory; some bear it through
+shame, many through fear, and yet are we afraid that nature cannot bear
+what is borne by many, and in such different circumstances? Nature not
+only bears it, but challenges it, for there is nothing with her
+preferable, nothing which she desires more than credit, and reputation,
+and praise, and honor, and glory. I choose here to describe this one
+thing under many names, and I have used many that you may have the
+clearer idea of it; for what I mean to say is, that whatever is
+desirable of itself, proceeding from virtue, or placed in virtue, and
+commendable on its own account (which I would rather agree to call the
+only good than deny it to be the chief good) is what men should prefer
+above all things. And as we declare this to be the case with respect to
+honesty, so we speak in the contrary manner of infamy; nothing is so
+odious, so detestable, nothing so unworthy of a man. And if you are
+thoroughly convinced of this (for, at the beginning of this discourse,
+you allowed that there appeared to you more evil in infamy than in
+pain), it follows that you ought to have the command over yourself,
+though I scarcely know how this expression may seem an accurate one,
+which appears to represent man as made up of two natures, so that one
+should be in command and the other be subject to it.
+
+XXI. Yet this division does not proceed from ignorance; for the soul
+admits of a twofold division, one of which partakes of reason, the
+other is without it. When, therefore, we are ordered to give a law to
+ourselves, the meaning is, that reason should restrain our rashness.
+There is in the soul of every man something naturally soft, low,
+enervated in a manner, and languid. Were there nothing besides this,
+men would be the greatest of monsters; but there is present to every
+man reason, which presides over and gives laws to all; which, by
+improving itself, and making continual advances, becomes perfect
+virtue. It behooves a man, then, to take care that reason shall have
+the command over that part which is bound to practise obedience. In
+what manner? you will say. Why, as a master has over his slave, a
+general over his army, a father over his son. If that part of the soul
+which I have called soft behaves disgracefully, if it gives itself up
+to lamentations and womanish tears, then let it be restrained, and
+committed to the care of friends and relations, for we often see those
+persons brought to order by shame whom no reasons can influence.
+Therefore, we should confine those feelings, like our servants, in safe
+custody, and almost with chains. But those who have more resolution,
+and yet are not utterly immovable, we should encourage with our
+exhortations, as we would good soldiers, to recollect themselves, and
+maintain their honor. That wisest man of all Greece, in the Niptræ,
+does not lament too much over his wounds, or, rather, he is moderate in
+his grief:
+
+    Move slow, my friends; your hasty speed refrain,
+    Lest by your motion you increase my pain.
+
+Pacuvius is better in this than Sophocles, for in the one Ulysses
+bemoans his wounds too vehemently; for the very people who carried him
+after he was wounded, though his grief was moderate, yet, considering
+the dignity of the man, did not scruple to say,
+
+    And thou, Ulysses, long to war inured,
+    Thy wounds, though great, too feebly hast endured.
+
+The wise poet understood that custom was no contemptible instructor how
+to bear pain. But the same hero complains with more decency, though in
+great pain:
+
+    Assist, support me, never leave me so;
+    Unbind my wounds, oh! execrable woe!
+
+He begins to give way, but instantly checks himself:
+
+    Away! begone! but cover first the sore;
+    For your rude hands but make my pains the more.
+
+Do you observe how he constrains himself? not that his bodily pains
+were less, but because he checks the anguish of his mind. Therefore, in
+the conclusion of the Niptræ, he blames others, even when he himself is
+dying:
+
+    Complaints of fortune may become the man,
+    None but a woman will thus weeping stand.
+
+And so that soft place in his soul obeys his reason, just as an abashed
+soldier does his stern commander.
+
+XXII. The man, then, in whom absolute wisdom exists (such a man,
+indeed, we have never as yet seen, but the philosophers have described
+in their writings what sort of man he will be, if he should exist);
+such a man, or at least that perfect and absolute reason which exists
+in him, will have the same authority over the inferior part as a good
+parent has over his dutiful children: he will bring it to obey his nod
+without any trouble or difficulty. He will rouse himself, prepare and
+arm himself, to oppose pain as he would an enemy. If you inquire what
+arms he will provide himself with, they will be contention,
+encouragement, discourse with himself. He will say thus to himself:
+Take care that you are guilty of nothing base, languid, or unmanly. He
+will turn over in his mind all the different kinds of honor. Zeno of
+Elea will occur to him, who suffered everything rather than betray his
+confederates in the design of putting an end to the tyranny. He will
+reflect on Anaxarchus, the pupil of Democritus, who, having fallen into
+the hands of Nicocreon, King of Cyprus, without the least entreaty for
+mercy or refusal, submitted to every kind of torture. Calanus the
+Indian will occur to him, an ignorant man and a barbarian, born at the
+foot of Mount Caucasus, who committed himself to the flames by his own
+free, voluntary act. But we, if we have the toothache, or a pain in the
+foot, or if the body be anyways affected, cannot bear it. For our
+sentiments of pain as well as pleasure are so trifling and effeminate,
+we are so enervated and relaxed by luxuries, that we cannot bear the
+sting of a bee without crying out. But Caius Marius, a plain
+countryman, but of a manly soul, when he had an operation performed on
+him, as I mentioned above, at first refused to be tied down; and he is
+the first instance of any one's having had an operation performed on
+him without being tied down. Why, then, did others bear it afterward?
+Why, from the force of example. You see, then, that pain exists more in
+opinion than in nature; and yet the same Marius gave a proof that there
+is something very sharp in pain for he would not submit to have the
+other thigh cut. So that he bore his pain with resolution as a man;
+but, like a reasonable person, he was not willing to undergo any
+greater pain without some necessary reason. The whole, then, consists
+in this--that you should have command over yourself. I have already
+told you what kind of command this is; and by considering what is most
+consistent with patience, fortitude, and greatness of soul, a man not
+only restrains himself, but, somehow or other, mitigates even pain
+itself.
+
+XXIII. Even as in a battle the dastardly and timorous soldier throws
+away his shield on the first appearance of an enemy, and runs as fast
+as he can, and on that account loses his life sometimes, though he has
+never received even one wound, when he who stands his ground has
+nothing of the sort happen to him, so they who cannot bear the
+appearance of pain throw themselves away, and give themselves up to
+affliction and dismay. But they that oppose it, often come off more
+than a match for it. For the body has a certain resemblance to the
+soul: as burdens are more easily borne the more the body is exerted,
+while they crush us if we give way, so the soul by exerting itself
+resists the whole weight that would oppress it; but if it yields, it is
+so pressed that it cannot support itself. And if we consider things
+truly, the soul should exert itself in every pursuit, for that is the
+only security for its doing its duty. But this should be principally
+regarded in pain, that we must not do anything timidly, or dastardly,
+or basely, or slavishly, or effeminately, and, above all things, we
+must dismiss and avoid that Philoctetean sort of outcry. A man is
+allowed sometimes to groan, but yet seldom; but it is not permissible
+even in a woman to howl; for such a noise as this is forbidden, by the
+twelve tables, to be used even at funerals. Nor does a wise or brave
+man ever groan, unless when he exerts himself to give his resolution
+greater force, as they who run in the stadium make as much noise as
+they can. The wrestlers, too, do the same when they are training; and
+the boxers, when they aim a blow with the cestus at their adversary,
+give a groan, not because they are in pain, or from a sinking of their
+spirits, but because their whole body is put upon the stretch by the
+throwing-out of these groans, and the blow comes the stronger.
+
+XXIV. What! they who would speak louder than ordinary are they
+satisfied with working their jaws, sides, or tongue or stretching the
+common organs of speech and utterance? The whole body and every muscle
+is at full stretch if I may be allowed the expression; every nerve is
+exerted to assist their voice. I have actually seen the knees of Marcus
+Antonius touch the ground when he was speaking with vehemence for
+himself, with relation to the Varian law. For, as the engines you throw
+stones or darts with throw them out with the greater force the more
+they are strained and drawn back; so it is in speaking, running, or
+boxing--the more people strain themselves, the greater their force.
+Since, therefore, this exertion has so much influence--if in a moment
+of pain groans help to strengthen the mind, let us use them; but if
+they be groans of lamentation, if they be the expression of weakness or
+abjectness, or unmanly weeping, then I should scarcely call him a man
+who yielded to them. For even supposing that such groaning could give
+any ease, it still should be considered whether it were consistent with
+a brave and resolute man. But if it does not ease our pain, why should
+we debase ourselves to no purpose? For what is more unbecoming in a man
+than to cry like a woman? But this precept which is laid down with
+respect to pain is not confined to it. We should apply this exertion of
+the soul to everything else. Is anger inflamed? is lust excited? we
+must have recourse to the same citadel, and apply to the same arms. But
+since it is pain which we are at present discussing, we will let the
+other subjects alone. To bear pain, then, sedately and calmly, it is of
+great use to consider with all our soul, as the saying is, how noble it
+is to do so, for we are naturally desirous (as I said before, but it
+cannot be too often repeated) and very much inclined to what is
+honorable, of which, if we discover but the least glimpse, there is
+nothing which we are not prepared to undergo and suffer to attain it.
+From this impulse of our minds, this desire for genuine glory and
+honorable conduct, it is that such dangers are supported in war, and
+that brave men are not sensible of their wounds in action, or, if they
+are sensible of them, prefer death to the departing but the least step
+from their honor. The Decii saw the shining swords of their enemies
+when they were rushing into the battle. But the honorable character and
+the glory of the death which they were seeking made all fear of death
+of little weight. Do you imagine that Epaminondas groaned when he
+perceived that his life was flowing out with his blood? No; for he left
+his country triumphing over the Lacedæmonians, whereas he had found it
+in subjection to them. These are the comforts, these are the things
+that assuage the greatest pain.
+
+XXV. You may ask, How the case is in peace? What is to be done at home?
+How we are to behave in bed? You bring me back to the philosophers, who
+seldom go to war. Among these, Dionysius of Heraclea, a man certainly
+of no resolution, having learned fortitude of Zeno, quitted it on being
+in pain; for, being tormented with a pain in his kidneys, in bewailing
+himself he cried out that those things were false which he had formerly
+conceived of pain. And when his fellow-disciple, Cleanthes, asked him
+why he had changed his opinion, he answered, "That the case of any man
+who had applied so much time to philosophy, and yet was unable to bear
+pain, might be a sufficient proof that pain is an evil; that he himself
+had spent many years at philosophy, and yet could not bear pain: it
+followed, therefore, that pain was an evil." It is reported that
+Cleanthes on that struck his foot on the ground, and repeated a verse
+out of the Epigonæ:
+
+    Amphiaraus, hear'st thou this below?
+
+He meant Zeno: he was sorry the other had degenerated from him.
+
+But it was not so with our friend Posidonius, whom I have often seen
+myself; and I will tell you what Pompey used to say of him: that when
+he came to Rhodes, after his departure from Syria, he had a great
+desire to hear Posidonius, but was informed that he was very ill of a
+severe fit of the gout; yet he had great inclination to pay a visit to
+so famous a philosopher. Accordingly, when he had seen him, and paid
+his compliments, and had spoken with great respect of him, he said he
+was very sorry that he could not hear him lecture. "But indeed you
+may," replied the other, "nor will I suffer any bodily pain to occasion
+so great a man to visit me in vain." On this Pompey relates that, as he
+lay on his bed, he disputed with great dignity and fluency on this very
+subject: that nothing was good but what was honest; and that in his
+paroxysms he would often say, "Pain, it is to no purpose;
+notwithstanding you are troublesome, I will never acknowledge you an
+evil." And in general all celebrated and notorious afflictions become
+endurable by disregarding them.
+
+XXVI. Do we not observe that where those exercises called gymnastic are
+in esteem, those who enter the lists never concern themselves about
+dangers? that where the praise of riding and hunting is highly
+esteemed, they who practice these arts decline no pain? What shall I
+say of our own ambitious pursuits or desire of honors? What fire have
+not candidates run through to gain a single vote? Therefore Africanus
+had always in his hands Xenophon, the pupil of Socrates, being
+particularly pleased with his saying, that the same labors were not
+equally heavy to the general and to the common man, because the honor
+itself made the labor lighter to the general. But yet, so it happens,
+that even with the illiterate vulgar an idea of honor is of great
+influence, though they cannot understand what it is. They are led by
+report and common opinion to look on that as honorable which has the
+general voice. Not that I would have you, should the multitude be ever
+so fond of you, rely on their judgment, nor approve of everything which
+they think right: you must use your own judgment. If you are satisfied
+with yourself when you have approved of what is right, you will not
+only have the mastery over yourself (which I recommended to you just
+now), but over everybody, and everything. Lay this down, then, as a
+rule, that a great capacity, and lofty elevation of soul, which
+distinguishes itself most by despising and looking down with contempt
+on pain, is the most excellent of all things, and the more so if it
+does not depend on the people and does not aim at applause, but derives
+its satisfaction from itself. Besides, to me, indeed, everything seems
+the more commendable the less the people are courted, and the fewer
+eyes there are to see it. Not that you should avoid the public, for
+every generous action loves the public view; yet no theatre for virtue
+is equal to a consciousness of it.
+
+XXVII. And let this be principally considered: that this bearing of
+pain, which I have often said is to be strengthened by an exertion of
+the soul, should be the same in everything. For you meet with many who,
+through a desire of victory, or for glory, or to maintain their rights,
+or their liberty, have boldly received wounds, and borne themselves up
+under them; and yet those very same persons, by relaxing that
+intenseness of their minds, were unequal to bearing the pain of a
+disease; for they did not support themselves under their former
+sufferings by reason or philosophy, but by inclination and glory.
+Therefore some barbarians and savage people are able to fight very
+stoutly with the sword, but cannot bear sickness like men; but the
+Grecians, men of no great courage, but as wise as human nature will
+admit of, cannot look an enemy in the face, yet the same will bear to
+be visited with sickness tolerably, and with a sufficiently manly
+spirit; and the Cimbrians and Celtiberians are very alert in battle,
+but bemoan themselves in sickness. For nothing can be consistent which
+has not reason for its foundation. But when you see those who are led
+by inclination or opinion, not retarded by pain in their pursuits, nor
+hindered by it from succeeding in them, you may conclude, either that
+pain is no evil, or that, notwithstanding you may choose to call an
+evil whatever is disagreeable and contrary to nature, yet it is so very
+trifling an evil that it may so effectually be got the better of by
+virtue as quite to disappear. And I would have you think of this night
+and day; for this argument will spread itself, and take up more room
+some time or other, and not be confined to pain alone; for if the
+motives to all our actions are to avoid disgrace and acquire honor, we
+may not only despise the stings of pain, but the storms of fortune,
+especially if we have recourse to that retreat which was pointed out in
+our yesterday's discussion; for, as if some God had advised a man who
+was pursued by pirates to throw himself overboard, saying, "There is
+something at hand to receive you; either a dolphin will take you up, as
+it did Arion of Methymna; or those horses sent by Neptune to Pelops
+(who are said to have carried chariots so rapidly as to be borne up by
+the waves) will receive you, and convey you wherever you please. Cast
+away all fear." So, though your pains be ever so sharp and
+disagreeable, if the case is not such that it is worth your while to
+endure them, you see whither you may betake yourself. I think this will
+do for the present. But perhaps you still abide by your opinion.
+
+_A._ Not in the least, indeed; and I hope I am freed by these two days'
+discourses from the fear of two things that I greatly dreaded.
+
+_M._ To-morrow, then, for rhetoric, as we were saying. But I see we
+must not drop our philosophy.
+
+_A._ No, indeed; we will have the one in the forenoon, and this at the
+usual time.
+
+_M._ It shall be so, and I will comply with your very laudable
+inclinations.
+
+       *       *       *       *       *
+
+
+
+
+BOOK III.
+
+ON GRIEF OF MIND.
+
+
+I. What reason shall I assign, O Brutus, why, as we consist of mind and
+body, the art of curing and preserving the body should be so much
+sought after, and the invention of it, as being so useful, should be
+ascribed to the immortal Gods; but the medicine of the mind should not
+have been so much the object of inquiry while it was unknown, nor so
+much attended to and cultivated after its discovery, nor so well
+received or approved of by some, and accounted actually disagreeable,
+and looked upon with an envious eye by many? Is it because we, by means
+of the mind, judge of the pains and disorders of the body, but do not,
+by means of the body, arrive at any perception of the disorders of the
+mind? Hence it comes that the mind only judges of itself when that very
+faculty by which it is judged is in a bad state. Had nature given us
+faculties for discerning and viewing herself, and could we go through
+life by keeping our eye on her--our best guide--there would be no
+reason certainly why any one should be in want of philosophy or
+learning; but, as it is, she has furnished us only with some feeble
+rays of light, which we immediately extinguish so completely by evil
+habits and erroneous opinions that the light of nature is nowhere
+visible. The seeds of virtues are natural to our constitutions, and,
+were they suffered to come to maturity, would naturally conduct us to a
+happy life; but now, as soon as we are born and received into the
+world, we are instantly familiarized with all kinds of depravity and
+perversity of opinions; so that we may be said almost to suck in error
+with our nurse's milk. When we return to our parents, and are put into
+the hands of tutors and governors, we are imbued with so many errors
+that truth gives place to falsehood, and nature herself to established
+opinion.
+
+II. To these we may add the poets; who, on account of the appearance
+they exhibit of learning and wisdom, are heard, read, and got by heart,
+and make a deep impression on our minds. But when to these are added
+the people, who are, as it were, one great body of instructors, and the
+multitude, who declare unanimously for what is wrong, then are we
+altogether overwhelmed with bad opinions, and revolt entirely from
+nature; so that they seem to deprive us of our best guide who have
+decided that there is nothing better for man, nothing more worthy of
+being desired by him, nothing more excellent, than honors and commands,
+and a high reputation with the people; which indeed every excellent man
+aims at; but while he pursues that only true honor which nature has in
+view above all other objects, he finds himself busied in arrant
+trifles, and in pursuit of no conspicuous form of virtue, but only some
+shadowy representation of glory. For glory is a real and express
+substance, not a mere shadow. It consists in the united praise of good
+men, the free voice of those who form a true judgment of pre-eminent
+virtue; it is, as it were, the very echo of virtue; and being generally
+the attendant on laudable actions, should not be slighted by good men.
+But popular fame, which would pretend to imitate it, is hasty and
+inconsiderate, and generally commends wicked and immoral actions, and
+throws discredit upon the appearance and beauty of honesty by assuming
+a resemblance of it. And it is owing to their not being able to
+discover the difference between them that some men ignorant of real
+excellence, and in what it consists, have been the destruction of their
+country and of themselves. And thus the best men have erred, not so
+much in their intentions as by a mistaken conduct. What? is no cure to
+be attempted to be applied to those who are carried away by the love of
+money, or the lust of pleasures, by which they are rendered little
+short of madmen, which is the case of all weak people? or is it because
+the disorders of the mind are less dangerous than those of the body? or
+because the body will admit of a cure, while there is no medicine
+whatever for the mind?
+
+III. But there are more disorders of the mind than of the body, and
+they are of a more dangerous nature; for these very disorders are the
+more offensive because they belong to the mind and disturb it; and the
+mind, when disordered, is, as Ennius says, in a constant error: it can
+neither bear nor endure anything, and is under the perpetual influence
+of desires. Now, what disorders can be worse to the body than these two
+distempers of the mind (for I overlook others), weakness and desire?
+But how, indeed, can it be maintained that the mind cannot prescribe
+for itself, when she it is who has invented the medicines for the body,
+when, with regard to bodily cures, constitution and nature have a great
+share, nor do all who suffer themselves to be cured find that effect
+instantly; but those minds which are disposed to be cured, and submit
+to the precepts of the wise, may undoubtedly recover a healthy state?
+Philosophy is certainly the medicine of the soul, whose assistance we
+do not seek from abroad, as in bodily disorders, but we ourselves are
+bound to exert our utmost energy and power in order to effect our cure.
+But as to philosophy in general, I have, I think, in my Hortensius,
+sufficiently spoken of the credit and attention which it deserves:
+since that, indeed, I have been continually either disputing or writing
+on its most material branches; and I have laid down in these books all
+the discussions which took place between myself and my particular
+friends at my Tusculan villa. But as I have spoken in the two former of
+pain and death, this book shall be devoted to the account of the third
+day of our disputations.
+
+We came down into the Academy when the day was already declining
+towards afternoon, and I asked one of those who were present to propose
+a subject for us to discourse on; and then the business was carried on
+in this manner:
+
+IV. _A._ My opinion is, that a wise man is subject to grief.
+
+_M._ What, and to the other perturbations of mind, as fears, lusts,
+anger? For these are pretty much like what the Greeks call [Greek:
+pathê]. I might call them diseases, and that would be a literal
+translation, but it is not agreeable to our way of speaking. For envy,
+delight, and pleasure are all called by the Greeks diseases, being
+affections of the mind not in subordination to reason; but we, I think,
+are right in calling the same motions of a disturbed soul
+perturbations, and in very seldom using the term diseases; though,
+perhaps, it appears otherwise to you.
+
+_A._ I am of your opinion.
+
+_M._ And do you think a wise man subject to these?
+
+_A._ Entirely, I think.
+
+_M._ Then that boasted wisdom is but of small account, if it differs so
+little from madness?
+
+_A._ What? does every commotion of the mind seem to you to be madness?
+
+_M._ Not to me only; but I apprehend, though I have often been
+surprised at it, that it appeared so to our ancestors many ages before
+Socrates; from whom is derived all that philosophy which relates to
+life and morals.
+
+_A._ How so?
+
+_M._ Because the name madness[35] implies a sickness of the mind and
+disease; that is to say, an unsoundness and an unhealthiness of mind,
+which they call madness. But the philosophers call all perturbations of
+the soul diseases, and their opinion is that no fool is ever free from
+these; but all that are diseased are unsound; and the minds of all
+fools are diseased; therefore all fools are mad. For they held that
+soundness of the mind depends on a certain tranquillity and steadiness;
+and a mind which was destitute of these qualities they called insane,
+because soundness was inconsistent with a perturbed mind just as much
+as with a disordered body.
+
+V. Nor were they less ingenious in calling the state of the soul devoid
+of the light of the mind, "a being out of one's mind," "a being beside
+one's self." From whence we may understand that they who gave these
+names to things were of the same opinion with Socrates, that all silly
+people were unsound, which the Stoics have carefully preserved as being
+derived from him; for whatever mind is distempered (and, as I just now
+said, the philosophers call all perturbed motions of the mind
+distempers) is no more sound than a body is when in a fit of sickness.
+Hence it is that wisdom is the soundness of the mind, folly a sort of
+unsoundness, which is insanity, or a being out of one's mind: and these
+are much better expressed by the Latin words than the Greek, which you
+will find the case also in many other topics. But we will discuss that
+point elsewhere: let us now attend to our present subject. The very
+meaning of the word describes the whole thing about which we are
+inquiring, both as to its substance and character. For we must
+necessarily understand by "sound" those whose minds are under no
+perturbation from any motion as if it were a disease. They who are
+differently affected we must necessarily call "unsound." So that
+nothing is better than what is usual in Latin, to say that they who are
+run away with by their lust or anger have quitted the command over
+themselves; though anger includes lust, for anger is defined to be the
+lust of revenge. They, then, who are said not to be masters of
+themselves, are said to be so because they are not under the government
+of reason, to which is assigned by nature the power over the whole
+soul. Why the Greeks should call this mania, I do not easily apprehend;
+but we define it much better than they, for we distinguish this madness
+(_insania_), which, being allied to folly, is more extensive, from what
+we call _furor_, or raving. The Greeks, indeed, would do so too, but
+they have no one word that will express it: what we call _furor_, they
+call [Greek: melancholia], as if the reason were affected only by a
+black bile, and not disturbed as often by a violent rage, or fear, or
+grief. Thus we say Athamas, Alcmæon, Ajax, and Orestes were raving
+(_furere_); because a person affected in this manner was not allowed by
+the Twelve Tables to have the management of his own affairs; therefore
+the words are not, if he is mad (_insanus_), but if he begins to be
+raving (_furiosus_). For they looked upon madness to be an unsettled
+humor that proceeded from not being of sound mind; yet such a person
+might perform his ordinary duties, and discharge the usual and
+customary requirements of life: but they considered one that was raving
+as afflicted with a total blindness of the mind, which, notwithstanding
+it is allowed to be greater than madness, is nevertheless of such a
+nature that a wise man may be subject to raving (_furor_), but cannot
+possibly be afflicted by insanity (_insania_). But this is another
+question: let us now return to our original subject.
+
+VI. I think you said that it was your opinion that a wise man was
+liable to grief.
+
+_A._ And so, indeed, I think.
+
+_M._ It is natural enough to think so, for we are not the offspring of
+flints; but we have by nature something soft and tender in our souls,
+which may be put into a violent motion by grief, as by a storm; nor did
+that Crantor, who was one of the most distinguished men that our
+Academy has ever produced, say this amiss: "I am by no means of their
+opinion who talk so much in praise of I know not what insensibility,
+which neither can exist, nor ought to exist. "I would choose," says he,
+"never to be ill; but should I be so, still I should choose to retain
+my sensation, whether there was to be an amputation or any other
+separation of anything from my body. For that insensibility cannot be
+but at the expense of some unnatural ferocity of mind, or stupor of
+body." But let us consider whether to talk in this manner be not
+allowing that we are weak, and yielding to our softness.
+Notwithstanding, let us be hardy enough, not only to lop off every arm
+of our miseries, but even to pluck up every fibre of their roots. Yet
+still something, perhaps, may be left behind, so deep does folly strike
+its roots: but whatever may be left it will be no more than is
+necessary. But let us be persuaded of this, that unless the mind be in
+a sound state, which philosophy alone can effect, there can be no end
+of our miseries. Wherefore, as we began, let us submit ourselves to it
+for a cure; we shall be cured if we choose to be. I shall advance
+something further. I shall not treat of grief alone, though that indeed
+is the principal thing; but, as I originally proposed, of every
+perturbation of the mind, as I termed it; disorder, as the Greeks call
+it: and first, with your leave, I shall treat it in the manner of the
+Stoics, whose method is to reduce their arguments into a very small
+space; afterward I shall enlarge more in my own way.
+
+VII. A man of courage is also full of faith. I do not use the word
+confident, because, owing to an erroneous custom of speaking, that word
+has come to be used in a bad sense, though it is derived from
+confiding, which is commendable. But he who is full of faith is
+certainly under no fear; for there is an inconsistency between faith
+and fear. Now, whoever is subject to grief is subject to fear; for
+whatever things we grieve at when present we dread when hanging over us
+and approaching. Thus it comes about that grief is inconsistent with
+courage: it is very probable, therefore, that whoever is subject to
+grief is also liable to fear, and to a broken kind of spirits and
+sinking. Now, whenever these befall a man, he is in a servile state,
+and must own that he is overpowered; for whoever admits these feelings,
+must admit timidity and cowardice. But these cannot enter into the mind
+of a man of courage; neither, therefore, can grief: but the man of
+courage is the only wise man; therefore grief cannot befall the wise
+man. It is, besides, necessary that whoever is brave should be a man of
+great soul; that whoever is a man of a great soul should be invincible;
+whoever is invincible looks down with contempt on all things here, and
+considers them, beneath him. But no one can despise those things on
+account of which he may be affected with grief; from whence it follows
+that a wise man is never affected with grief: for all wise men are
+brave; therefore a wise man is not subject to grief. And as the eye,
+when disordered, is not in a good condition for performing its office
+properly; and as the other parts, and the whole body itself, when
+unsettled, cannot perform their office and business; so the mind, when
+disordered, is but ill-fitted to perform its duty. The office of the
+mind is to use its reason well; but the mind of a wise man is always in
+condition to make the best use of his reason, and therefore is never
+out of order. But grief is a disorder of the mind; therefore a wise man
+will be always free from it.
+
+VIII. And from these considerations we may get at a very probable
+definition of the temperate man, whom the Greeks call [Greek: sôphrôn]:
+and they call that virtue [Greek: sôphrosynên], which I at one time
+call temperance, at another time moderation, and sometimes even
+modesty; but I do not know whether that virtue may not be properly
+called frugality, which has a more confined meaning with the Greeks;
+for they call frugal men [Greek: chrêsimous], which implies only that
+they are useful; but our name has a more extensive meaning: for all
+abstinence, all innocency (which the Greeks have no ordinary name for,
+though they might use the word [Greek: ablabeia], for innocency is that
+disposition of mind which would offend no one) and several other
+virtues are comprehended under frugality; but if this quality were of
+less importance, and confined in as small a compass as some imagine,
+the surname of Piso[36] would not have been in so great esteem. But as
+we allow him not the name of a frugal man (_frugi_), who either quits
+his post through fear, which is cowardice; or who reserves to his own
+use what was privately committed to his keeping, which is injustice; or
+who fails in his military undertakings through rashness, which is
+folly--for that reason the word frugality takes in these three virtues
+of fortitude, justice, and prudence, though it is indeed common to all
+virtues, for they are all connected and knit together. Let us allow,
+then, frugality itself to be another and fourth virtue; for its
+peculiar property seems to be, to govern and appease all tendencies to
+too eager a desire after anything, to restrain lust, and to preserve a
+decent steadiness in everything. The vice in contrast to this is called
+prodigality (_nequitia_). Frugality, I imagine, is derived from the
+word _fruge_, the best thing which the earth produces; _nequitia_ is
+derived (though this is perhaps rather more strained; still, let us try
+it; we shall only be thought to have been trifling if there is nothing
+in what we say) from the fact of everything being to no purpose
+(_nequicquam_) in such a man; from which circumstance he is called also
+_Nihil_, nothing. Whoever is frugal, then, or, if it is more agreeable
+to you, whoever is moderate and temperate, such a one must of course be
+consistent; whoever is consistent, must be quiet; the quiet man must be
+free from all perturbation, therefore from grief likewise: and these
+are the properties of a wise man; therefore a wise man must be free
+from grief.
+
+IX. So that Dionysius of Heraclea is right when, upon this complaint of
+Achilles in Homer,
+
+    Well hast thou spoke, but at the tyrant's name
+    My rage rekindles, and my soul's in flame:
+    'Tis just resentment, and becomes the brave,
+    Disgraced, dishonor'd like the vilest slave[37]--
+
+he reasons thus: Is the hand as it should be, when it is affected with
+a swelling? or is it possible for any other member of the body, when
+swollen or enlarged, to be in any other than a disordered state? Must
+not the mind, then, when it is puffed up, or distended, be out of
+order? But the mind of a wise man is always free from every kind of
+disorder: it never swells, never is puffed up; but the mind when in
+anger is in a different state. A wise man, therefore, is never angry;
+for when he is angry, he lusts after something; for whoever is angry
+naturally has a longing desire to give all the pain he can to the
+person who he thinks has injured him; and whoever has this earnest
+desire must necessarily be much pleased with the accomplishment of his
+wishes; hence he is delighted with his neighbor's misery; and as a wise
+man is not capable of such feelings as these, he is therefore not
+capable of anger. But should a wise man be subject to grief, he may
+likewise be subject to anger; for as he is free from anger, he must
+likewise be free from grief. Again, could a wise man be subject to
+grief, he might also be liable to pity, or even might be open to a
+disposition towards envy (_invidentia_); I do not say to envy
+(_invidia_), for that can only exist by the very act of envying: but we
+may fairly form the word _invidentia_ from _invidendo_, and so avoid
+the doubtful name _invidia;_ for this word is probably derived from
+_in_ and _video_, looking too closely into another's fortune; as it is
+said in the Melanippus,
+
+    Who envies me the flower of my children?
+
+where the Latin is _invidit florem._ It may appear not good Latin, but
+it is very well put by Accius; for as _video_ governs an accusative
+case, so it is more correct to say _invideo florem_ than _flori._ We
+are debarred from saying so by common usage. The poet stood in his own
+right, and expressed himself with more freedom.
+
+X. Therefore compassion and envy are consistent in the same man; for
+whoever is uneasy at any one's adversity is also uneasy at another's
+prosperity: as Theophrastus, while he laments the death of his
+companion Callisthenes, is at the same time disturbed at the success of
+Alexander; and therefore he says that Callisthenes met with man of the
+greatest power and good fortune, but one who did not know how to make
+use of his good fortune. And as pity is an uneasiness which arises from
+the misfortunes of another, so envy is an uneasiness that proceeds from
+the good success of another: therefore whoever is capable of pity is
+capable of envy. But a wise man is incapable of envy, and consequently
+incapable of pity. But were a wise man used to grieve, to pity also
+would be familiar to him; therefore to grieve is a feeling which cannot
+affect a wise man. Now, though these reasonings of the Stoics, and
+their conclusions, are rather strained and distorted, and ought to be
+expressed in a less stringent and narrow manner, yet great stress is to
+be laid on the opinions of those men who have a peculiarly bold and
+manly turn of thought and sentiment. For our friends the Peripatetics,
+notwithstanding all their erudition, gravity, and fluency of language,
+do not satisfy me about the moderation of these disorders and diseases
+of the soul which they insist upon; for every evil, though moderate, is
+in its nature great. But our object is to make out that the wise man is
+free from all evil; for as the body is unsound if it is ever so
+slightly affected, so the mind under any moderate disorder loses its
+soundness; therefore the Romans have, with their usual accuracy of
+expression, called trouble, and anguish, and vexation, on account of
+the analogy between a troubled mind and a diseased body, disorders. The
+Greeks call all perturbation of mind by pretty nearly the same name;
+for they name every turbid motion of the soul [Greek: pathos], that is
+to say, a distemper. But we have given them a more proper name; for a
+disorder of the mind is very like a disease of the body. But lust does
+not resemble sickness; neither does immoderate joy, which is an elated
+and exulting pleasure of the mind. Fear, too, is not very like a
+distemper, though it is akin to grief of mind, but properly, as is also
+the case with sickness of the body, so too sickness of mind has no name
+separated from pain. And therefore I must explain the origin of this
+pain, that is to say, the cause that occasions this grief in the mind,
+as if it were a sickness of the body. For as physicians think they have
+found out the cure when they have discovered the cause of the
+distemper, so we shall discover the method of curing melancholy when
+the cause of it is found out.
+
+XI. The whole cause, then, is in opinion; and this observation applies
+not to this grief alone, but to every other disorder of the mind, which
+are of four sorts, but consisting of many parts. For as every disorder
+or perturbation is a motion of the mind, either devoid of reason, or in
+despite of reason, or in disobedience to reason, and as that motion is
+excited by an opinion of either good or evil; these four perturbations
+are divided equally into two parts: for two of them proceed from an
+opinion of good, one of which is an exulting pleasure, that is to say,
+a joy elated beyond measure, arising from an opinion of some present
+great good; the other is a desire which may fairly be called even a
+lust, and is an immoderate inclination after some conceived great good
+without any obedience to reason. Therefore these two kinds, the
+exulting pleasure and the lust, have their rise from an opinion of
+good, as the other two, fear and grief, have from an opinion of evil.
+For fear is an opinion of some great evil impending over us, and grief
+is an opinion of some great evil present; and, indeed, it is a freshly
+conceived opinion of an evil so great that to grieve at it seems right:
+it is of that kind that he who is uneasy at it thinks he has good
+reason to be so. Now we should exert, our utmost efforts to oppose
+these perturbations--which are, as it were, so many furies let loose
+upon us and urged on by folly--if we are desirous to pass this share of
+life that is allotted to us with ease and satisfaction. But of the
+other feelings I shall speak elsewhere: our business at present is to
+drive away grief if we can, for that shall be the object of our present
+discussion, since you have said that it was your opinion that a wise
+man might be subject to grief, which I can by no means allow of; for it
+is a frightful, miserable, and detestable thing, which we should fly
+from with our utmost efforts--with all our sails and oars, as I may
+say.
+
+XII. That descendant of Tantalus, how does he appear to you--he who
+sprung from Pelops, who formerly stole Hippodamia from her
+father-in-law, King Oenomaus, and married her by force?--he who was
+descended from Jupiter himself, how broken-hearted and dispirited does
+he not seem!
+
+    Stand off, my friends, nor come within my shade,
+    That no pollutions your sound hearts pervade,
+    So foul a stain my body doth partake.
+
+Will you condemn yourself, Thyestes, and deprive yourself of life, on
+account of the greatness of another's crime? What do you think of that
+son of Phoebus? Do you not look upon him as unworthy of his own
+father's light?
+
+    Hollow his eyes, his body worn away,
+    His furrow'd cheeks his frequent tears betray;
+    His beard neglected, and his hoary hairs
+    Rough and uncomb'd, bespeak his bitter cares.
+
+O foolish Æetes! these are evils which you yourself have been the cause
+of, and are not occasioned by any accidents with which chance has
+visited you; and you behaved as you did, even after you had been inured
+to your distress, and after the first swelling of the mind had
+subsided!--whereas grief consists (as I shall show) in the notion of
+some recent evil--but your grief, it is very plain, proceeded from the
+loss of your kingdom, not of your daughter, for you hated her, and
+perhaps with reason, but you could not calmly bear to part with your
+kingdom. But surely it is an impudent grief which preys upon a man for
+not being able to command those that are free. Dionysius, it is true,
+the tyrant of Syracuse, when driven from his country, taught a school
+at Corinth; so incapable was he of living without some authority. But
+what could be more impudent than Tarquin, who made war upon those who
+could not bear his tyranny; and, when he could not recover his kingdom
+by the aid of the forces of the Veientians and the Latins, is said to
+have betaken himself to Cuma, and to have died in that city of old age
+and grief!
+
+XIII. Do you, then, think that it can befall a wise man to be oppressed
+with grief, that is to say, with misery? for, as all perturbation is
+misery, grief is the rack itself. Lust is attended with heat, exulting
+joy with levity, fear with meanness, but grief with something greater
+than these; it consumes, torments, afflicts, and disgraces a man; it
+tears him, preys upon his mind, and utterly destroys him: if we do not
+so divest ourselves of it as to throw it completely off, we cannot be
+free from misery. And it is clear that there must be grief where
+anything has the appearance of a present sore and oppressing evil.
+Epicurus is of opinion that grief arises naturally from the imagination
+of any evil; so that whosoever is eye-witness of any great misfortune,
+if he conceives that the like may possibly befall himself, becomes sad
+instantly from such an idea. The Cyrenaics think that grief is not
+engendered by every kind of evil, but only by unexpected, unforeseen
+evil; and that circumstance is, indeed, of no small effect on the
+heightening of grief; for whatsoever comes of a sudden appears more
+formidable. Hence these lines are deservedly commended:
+
+    I knew my son, when first he drew his breath,
+    Destined by fate to an untimely death;
+    And when I sent him to defend the Greeks,
+    War was his business, not your sportive freaks.
+
+XIV. Therefore, this ruminating beforehand upon future evils which you
+see at a distance makes their approach more tolerable; and on this
+account what Euripides makes Theseus say is much commended. You will
+give me leave to translate them, as is usual with me:
+
+    I treasured up what some learn'd sage did tell,
+    And on my future misery did dwell;
+    I thought of bitter death, of being drove
+    Far from my home by exile, and I strove
+    With every evil to possess my mind,
+    That, when they came, I the less care might find.[38]
+
+But Euripides says that of himself, which Theseus said he had heard
+from some learned man, for the poet had been a pupil of Anaxagoras,
+who, as they relate, on hearing of the death of his son, said, "I knew
+that my son was mortal;" which speech seems to intimate that such
+things afflict those men who have not thought on them before.
+Therefore, there is no doubt but that all those things which are
+considered evils are the heavier from not being foreseen. Though,
+notwithstanding this is not the only circumstance which occasions the
+greatest grief, still, as the mind, by foreseeing and preparing for it,
+has great power to make all grief the less, a man should at all times
+consider all the events that may befall him in this life; and certainly
+the excellence and divine nature of wisdom consists in taking a near
+view of, and gaining a thorough acquaintance with, all human affairs,
+in not being surprised when anything happens, and in thinking, before
+the event, that there is nothing but what may come to pass.
+
+                      Wherefore ev'ry man,
+    When his affairs go on most swimmingly,
+    E'en then it most behooves to arm himself
+    Against the coming storm: loss, danger, exile,
+    Returning ever, let him look to meet;
+    His son in fault, wife dead, or daughter sick;
+    All common accidents, and may have happen'd
+    That nothing shall seem new or strange. But if
+    Aught has fall'n out beyond his hopes, all that
+    Let him account clear gain.[39]
+
+XV. Therefore, as Terence has so well expressed what he borrowed from
+philosophy, shall not we, from whose fountains he drew it, say the same
+thing in a better manner, and abide by it with more steadiness? Hence
+came that steady countenance, which, according to Xantippe, her husband
+Socrates always had; so that she said that she never observed any
+difference in his looks when he went out and when he came home. Yet the
+look of that old Roman, M. Crassus, who, as Lucilius says, never smiled
+but once in his lifetime, was not of this kind, but placid and serene,
+for so we are told. He, indeed, might well have had the same look at
+all times who never changed his mind, from which the countenance
+derives its expression. So that I am ready to borrow of the Cyrenaics
+those arms against the accidents and events of life by means of which,
+by long premeditation, they break the force of all approaching evils;
+and at the same time I think that those very evils themselves arise
+more from opinion than nature, for if they were real, no forecast could
+make them lighter. But I shall speak more particularly on these matters
+after I have first considered Epicurus's opinion, who thinks that all
+people must necessarily be uneasy who believe themselves to be in any
+evils, let them be either foreseen and expected, or habitual to them;
+for with him evils are not the less by reason of their continuance, nor
+the lighter for having been foreseen; and it is folly to ruminate on
+evils to come, or such as, perhaps, never may come: every evil is
+disagreeable enough when it does come; but he who is constantly
+considering that some evil may befall him is loading himself with a
+perpetual evil; and even should such evil never light on him, he
+voluntarily takes upon himself unnecessary misery, so that he is under
+constant uneasiness, whether he actually suffers any evil, or only
+thinks of it. But he makes the alleviation of grief depend on two
+things--a ceasing to think on evil, and a turning to the contemplation
+of pleasure. For he thinks that the mind may possibly be under the
+power of reason, and follow her directions: he forbids us, therefore,
+to mind trouble, and calls us off from sorrowful reflections; he throws
+a mist over our eyes to hinder us from the contemplation of misery.
+Having sounded a retreat from this statement, he drives our thoughts on
+again, and encourages them to view and engage the whole mind in the
+various pleasures with which he thinks the life of a wise man abounds,
+either from reflecting on the past, or from the hope of what is to
+come. I have said these things in my own way; the Epicureans have
+theirs. However, let us examine what they say; how they say it is of
+little consequence.
+
+XVI. In the first place, they are wrong in forbidding men to
+premeditate on futurity and blaming their wish to do so; for there is
+nothing that breaks the edge of grief and lightens it more than
+considering, during one's whole life, that there is nothing which it is
+impossible should happen, or than, considering what human nature is, on
+what conditions life was given, and how we may comply with them. The
+effect of which is that we are always grieving, but that we never do
+so; for whoever reflects on the nature of things, the various turns of
+life, and the weakness of human nature, grieves, indeed, at that
+reflection; but while so grieving he is, above all other times,
+behaving as a wise man, for he gains these two things by it: one, that
+while he is considering the state of human nature he is performing the
+especial duties of philosophy, and is provided with a triple medicine
+against adversity--in the first place, because he has long reflected
+that such things might befall him, and this reflection by itself
+contributes much towards lessening and weakening all misfortunes; and,
+secondly, because he is persuaded that we should bear all the accidents
+which can happen to man with the feelings and spirit of a man; and,
+lastly, because he considers that what is blamable is the only evil.
+But it is not your fault that something has happened to you which it
+was impossible for man to avoid. For that withdrawing of our thoughts
+which he recommends when he calls us off from contemplating our
+misfortunes is an imaginary action; for it is not in our power to
+dissemble or to forget those evils which lie heavy on us; they tear,
+vex, and sting us--they burn us up, and leave no breathing time. And do
+you order us to forget them (for such forgetfulness is contrary to
+nature), and at the same time deprive us of the only assistance which
+nature affords, the being accustomed to them? For that, though it is
+but a slow medicine (I mean that which is brought by lapse of time), is
+still a very effectual one. You order me to employ my thoughts on
+something good, and forget my misfortunes. You would say something
+worthy a great philosopher if you thought those things good which are
+best suited to the dignity of human nature.
+
+XVII. Should Pythagoras, Socrates, or Plato say to me, Why are you
+dejected or sad? Why do you faint, and yield to fortune, which,
+perhaps, may have power to harass and disturb you, but should not quite
+unman you? There is great power in the virtues; rouse them, if they
+chance to droop. Take fortitude for your guide, which will give you
+such spirits that you will despise everything that can befall man, and
+look on it as a trifle. Add to this temperance, which is moderation,
+and which was just now called frugality, which will not suffer you to
+do anything base or bad--for what is worse or baser than an effeminate
+man? Not even justice will suffer you to act in this manner, though she
+seems to have the least weight in this affair; but still,
+notwithstanding, even she will inform you that you are doubly unjust
+when you both require what does not belong to you, inasmuch as though
+you who have been born mortal demand to be placed in the condition of
+the immortals, and at the same time you take it much to heart that you
+are to restore what was lent you. What answer will you make to
+prudence, who informs you that she is a virtue sufficient of herself
+both to teach you a good life and also to secure you a happy one? And,
+indeed, if she were fettered by external circumstances, and dependent
+on others, and if she did not originate in herself and return to
+herself, and also embrace everything in herself, so as to seek no
+adventitious aid from any quarter, I cannot imagine why she should
+appear deserving of such lofty panegyrics, or of being sought after
+with such excessive eagerness. Now, Epicurus, if you call me back to
+such goods as these, I will obey you, and follow you, and use you as my
+guide, and even forget, as you order me, all my misfortunes; and I will
+do this the more readily from a persuasion that they are not to be
+ranked among evils at all. But you are for bringing my thoughts over to
+pleasure. What pleasures? Pleasures of the body, I imagine, or such as
+are recollected or imagined on account of the body. Is this all? Do I
+explain your opinion rightly? for your disciples are used to deny that
+we understand at all what Epicurus means. This is what he says, and
+what that subtle fellow, old Zeno, who is one of the sharpest of them,
+used, when I was attending lectures at Athens, to enforce and talk so
+loudly of; saying that he alone was happy who could enjoy present
+pleasure, and who was at the same time persuaded that he should enjoy
+it without pain, either during the whole or the greatest part of his
+life; or if, should any pain interfere, if it was very sharp, then it
+must be short; should it be of longer continuance, it would have more
+of what was sweet than bitter in it; that whosoever reflected on these
+things would be happy, especially if satisfied with the good things
+which he had already enjoyed, and if he were without fear of death or
+of the Gods.
+
+XVIII. You have here a representation of a happy life according to
+Epicurus, in the words of Zeno, so that there is no room for
+contradiction in any point. What, then? Can the proposing and thinking
+of such a life make Thyestes's grief the less, or Æetes's, of whom I
+spoke above, or Telamon's, who was driven from his country to penury
+and banishment? in wonder at whom men exclaimed thus:
+
+    Is this the man surpassing glory raised?
+    Is this that Telamon so highly praised
+    By wondering Greece, at whose sight, like the sun,
+    All others with diminish'd lustre shone?
+
+Now, should any one, as the same author says, find his spirits sink
+with the loss of his fortune, he must apply to those grave philosophers
+of antiquity for relief, and not to these voluptuaries: for what great
+abundance of good do they promise? Suppose that we allow that to be
+without pain is the chief good? Yet that is not called pleasure. But it
+is not necessary at present to go through the whole: the question is,
+to what point are we to advance in order to abate our grief? Grant that
+to be in pain is the greatest evil: whosoever, then, has proceeded so
+far as not to be in pain, is he, therefore, in immediate possession of
+the greatest good? Why, Epicurus, do we use any evasions, and not allow
+in our own words the same feeling to be pleasure which you are used to
+boast of with such assurance? Are these your words or not? This is what
+you say in that book which contains all the doctrine of your school;
+for I will perform on this occasion the office of a translator, lest
+any one should imagine that I am inventing anything. Thus you speak:
+"Nor can I form any notion of the chief good, abstracted from those
+pleasures which are perceived by taste, or from what depends on hearing
+music, or abstracted from ideas raised by external objects visible to
+the eye, or by agreeable motions, or from those other pleasures which
+are perceived by the whole man by means of any of his senses; nor can
+it possibly be said that the pleasures of the mind are excited only by
+what is good, for I have perceived men's minds to be pleased with the
+hopes of enjoying those things which I mentioned above, and with the
+idea that it should enjoy them without any interruption from pain." And
+these are his exact words, so that any one may understand what were the
+pleasures with which Epicurus was acquainted. Then he speaks thus, a
+little lower down: "I have often inquired of those who have been called
+wise men what would be the remaining good if they should exclude from
+consideration all these pleasures, unless they meant to give us nothing
+but words. I could never learn anything from them; and unless they
+choose that all virtue and wisdom should vanish and come to nothing,
+they must say with me that the only road to happiness lies through
+those pleasures which I mentioned above." What follows is much the
+same, and his whole book on the chief good everywhere abounds with the
+same opinions. Will you, then, invite Telamon to this kind of life to
+ease his grief? And should you observe any one of your friends under
+affliction, would you rather prescribe him a sturgeon than a treatise
+of Socrates? or advise him to listen to the music of a water organ
+rather than to Plato? or lay before him the beauty and variety of some
+garden, put a nosegay to his nose, burn perfumes before him, and bid
+him crown himself with a garland of roses and woodbines? Should you add
+one thing more, you would certainly wipe out all his grief.
+
+XIX. Epicurus must admit these arguments, or he must take out of his
+book what I just now said was a literal translation; or, rather, he
+must destroy his whole book, for it is crammed full of pleasures. We
+must inquire, then, how we can ease him of his grief who speaks in this
+manner:
+
+    My present state proceeds from fortune's stings;
+    By birth I boast of a descent from kings;
+    Hence may you see from what a noble height
+    I'm sunk by fortune to this abject plight.
+
+What! to ease his grief, must we mix him a cup of sweet wine, or
+something of that kind? Lo! the same poet presents us with another
+sentiment somewhere else:
+
+    I, Hector, once so great, now claim your aid.
+
+We should assist her, for she looks out for help:
+
+    Where shall I now apply, where seek support?
+    Where hence betake me, or to whom resort?"
+    No means remain of comfort or of joy,
+    In flames my palace, and in ruins Troy;
+    Each wall, so late superb, deformed nods,
+    And not an altar's left t' appease the Gods.
+
+You know what should follow, and particularly this:
+
+    Of father, country, and of friends bereft,
+    Not one of all these sumptuous temples left;
+    Which, while the fortune of our house did stand,
+    With rich wrought ceilings spoke the artist's hand.
+
+O excellent poet! though despised by those who sing the verses of
+Euphorion. He is sensible that all things which come on a sudden are
+harder to be borne. Therefore, when he had set off the riches of Priam
+to the best advantage, which had the appearance of a long continuance,
+what does he add?
+
+    Lo! these all perish'd in one blazing pile;
+    The foe old Priam of his life beguiled,
+    And with his blood, thy altar, Jove, defiled.
+
+Admirable poetry! There is something mournful in the subject, as well
+as in the words and measure. We must drive away this grief of hers: how
+is that to be done? Shall we lay her on a bed of down; introduce a
+singer; shall we burn cedar, or present here with some pleasant liquor,
+and provide her something to eat? Are these the good things which
+remove the most afflicting grief? For you but just now said you knew of
+no other good. I should agree with Epicurus that we ought to be called
+off from grief to contemplate good things, if we could only agree upon
+what was good.
+
+XX. It may be said, What! do you imagine Epicurus really meant this,
+and that he maintained anything so sensual? Indeed I do not imagine so,
+for I am sensible that he has uttered many excellent things and
+sentiments, and delivered maxims of great weight. Therefore, as I said
+before, I am speaking of his acuteness, not of his morals. Though he
+should hold those pleasures in contempt which he just now commended,
+yet I must remember wherein he places the chief good. For he was not
+contented with barely saying this, but he has explained what he meant:
+he says that taste, and embraces, and sports, and music, and those
+forms which affect the eyes with pleasure, are the chief good. Have I
+invented this? have I misrepresented him? I should be glad to be
+confuted; for what am I endeavoring at but to clear up truth in every
+question? Well, but the same man says that pleasure is at its height
+where pain ceases, and that to be free from all pain is the very
+greatest pleasure. Here are three very great mistakes in a very few
+words. One is, that he contradicts himself; for, but just now, he could
+not imagine anything good unless the senses were in a manner tickled
+with some pleasure; but now he says that to be free from pain is the
+highest pleasure. Can any one contradict himself more? The next mistake
+is, that where there is naturally a threefold division--the first, to
+be pleased; next, to be in pain; the last, to be affected neither by
+pleasure nor pain--he imagines the first and the last to be the same,
+and makes no difference between pleasure and a cessation of pain. The
+last mistake he falls into in common with some others, which is this:
+that as virtue is the most desirable thing, and as philosophy has been
+investigated with a view to the attainment of it, he has separated the
+chief good from virtue. But he commends virtue, and that frequently;
+and indeed C. Gracchus, when he had made the largest distributions of
+the public money, and had exhausted the treasury, nevertheless spoke
+much of defending the treasury. What signifies what men say when we see
+what they do? That Piso, who was surnamed Frugal, had always harangued
+against the law that was proposed for distributing the corn; but when
+it had passed, though a man of consular dignity, he came to receive the
+corn. Gracchus observed Piso standing in the court, and asked him, in
+the hearing of the people, how it was consistent for him to take corn
+by a law he had himself opposed. "It was," said he, "against your
+distributing my goods to every man as you thought proper; but, as you
+do so, I claim my share." Did not this grave and wise man sufficiently
+show that the public revenue was dissipated by the Sempronian law? Read
+Gracchus's speeches, and you will pronounce him the advocate of the
+treasury. Epicurus denies that any one can live pleasantly who does not
+lead a life of virtue; he denies that fortune has any power over a wise
+man; he prefers a spare diet to great plenty, and maintains that a wise
+man is always happy. All these things become a philosopher to say, but
+they are not consistent with pleasure. But the reply is, that he doth
+not mean _that_ pleasure: let him mean any pleasure, it must be such a
+one as makes no part of virtue. But suppose we are mistaken as to his
+pleasure; are we so, too, as to his pain? I maintain, therefore, the
+impropriety of language which that man uses, when talking of virtue,
+who would measure every great evil by pain.
+
+XXI. And indeed the Epicureans, those best of men--for there is no
+order of men more innocent--complain that I take great pains to inveigh
+against Epicurus. We are rivals, I suppose, for some honor or
+distinction. I place the chief good in the mind, he in the body; I in
+virtue, he in pleasure; and the Epicureans are up in arms, and implore
+the assistance of their neighbors, and many are ready to fly to their
+aid. But as for my part, I declare that I am very indifferent about the
+matter, and that I consider the whole discussion which they are so
+anxious about at an end. For what! is the contention about the Punic
+war? on which very subject, though M. Cato and L. Lentulus were of
+different opinions, still there was no difference between them. But
+these men behave with too much heat, especially as the opinions which
+they would uphold are no very spirited ones, and such as they dare not
+plead for either in the senate or before the assembly of the people, or
+before the army or the censors. But, however, I will argue with them
+another time, and with such a disposition that no quarrel shall arise
+between us; for I shall be ready to yield to their opinions when
+founded on truth. Only I must give them this advice: That were it ever
+so true, that a wise man regards nothing but the body, or, to express
+myself with more decency, never does anything except what is expedient,
+and views all things with exclusive reference to his own advantage, as
+such things are not very commendable, they should confine them to their
+own breasts, and leave off talking with that parade of them.
+
+XXII. What remains is the opinion of the Cyrenaics, who think that men
+grieve when anything happens unexpectedly. And that is indeed, as I
+said before, a great aggravation of a misfortune; and I know that it
+appeared so to Chrysippus--"Whatever falls out unexpected is so much
+the heavier." But the whole question does not turn on this; though the
+sudden approach of an enemy sometimes occasions more confusion than it
+would if you had expected him, and a sudden storm at sea throws the
+sailors into a greater fright than one which they have foreseen; and it
+is the same in many other cases. But when you carefully consider the
+nature of what was expected, you will find nothing more than that all
+things which come on a sudden appear greater; and this upon two
+accounts: first of all, because you have not time to consider how great
+the accident is; and, secondly, because you are probably persuaded that
+you could have guarded against it had you foreseen if, and therefore
+the misfortune, having been seemingly encountered by your own fault,
+makes your grief the greater. That it is so, time evinces; which, as it
+advances, brings with it so much mitigation that though the same
+misfortunes continue, the grief not only becomes the less, but in some
+cases is entirely removed. Many Carthaginians were slaves at Rome, and
+many Macedonians, when Perseus their king was taken prisoner. I saw,
+too, when I was a young man, some Corinthians in the Peloponnesus. They
+might all have lamented with Andromache,
+
+    All these I saw......;
+
+but they had perhaps given over lamenting themselves, for by their
+countenances, and speech, and other gestures you might have taken them
+for Argives or Sicyonians. And I myself was more concerned at the
+ruined walls of Corinth than the Corinthians themselves were, whose
+minds by frequent reflection and time had become callous to such
+sights. I have read a book of Clitomachus, which he sent to his
+fellow-citizens who were prisoners, to comfort them after the
+destruction of Carthage. There is in it a treatise written by
+Carneades, which, as Clitomachus says, he had inserted into his book;
+the subject was, "That it appeared probable that a wise man would
+grieve at the state of subjection of his country," and all the
+arguments which Carneades used against this proposition are set down in
+the book. There the philosopher applies such a strong medicine to a
+fresh grief as would be quite unnecessary in one of any continuance;
+nor, if this very book had been sent to the captives some years after,
+would it have found any wounds to cure, but only scars; for grief, by a
+gentle progress and slow degrees, wears away imperceptibly. Not that
+the circumstances which gave rise to it are altered, or can be, but
+that custom teaches what reason should--that those things which before
+seemed to be of some consequence are of no such great importance, after
+all.
+
+XXIII. It may be said, What occasion is there to apply to reason, or to
+any sort of consolation such as we generally make use of, to mitigate
+the grief of the afflicted? For we have this argument always at hand,
+that nothing ought to appear unexpected. But how will any one be
+enabled to bear his misfortunes the better by knowing that it is
+unavoidable that such things should happen to man? Saying this
+subtracts nothing from the sum of the grief: it only asserts that
+nothing has fallen out but what might have been anticipated; and yet
+this manner of speaking has some little consolation in it, though I
+apprehend not a great deal. Therefore those unlooked-for things have
+not so much force as to give rise to all our grief; the blow perhaps
+may fall the heavier, but whatever happens does not appear the greater
+on that account. No, it is the fact of its having happened lately, and
+not of its having befallen us unexpectedly, that makes it seem the
+greater. There are two ways, then, of discerning the truth, not only of
+things that seem evil, but of those that have the appearance of good.
+For we either inquire into the nature of the thing, of what
+description, and magnitude, and importance it is--as sometimes with
+regard to poverty, the burden of which we may lighten when by our
+disputations we show how few things nature requires, and of what a
+trifling kind they are--or, without any subtle arguing, we refer them
+to examples, as here we instance a Socrates, there a Diogenes, and then
+again that line in Cæcilius,
+
+    Wisdom is oft conceal'd in mean attire.
+
+For as poverty is of equal weight with all, what reason can be given
+why what was borne by Fabricius should be spoken of by any one else as
+unsupportable when it falls upon themselves? Of a piece with this is
+that other way of comforting, which consists in pointing out that
+nothing has happened but what is common to human nature; for this
+argument doth not only inform us what human nature is, but implies that
+all things are tolerable which others have borne and are bearing.
+
+XXIV. Is poverty the subject? They tell you of many who have submitted
+to it with patience. Is it the contempt of honors? They acquaint you
+with some who never enjoyed any, and were the happier for it; and of
+those who have preferred a private retired life to public employment,
+mentioning their names with respect; they tell you of the verse[40] of
+that most powerful king who praises an old man, and pronounces him
+happy because he was unknown to fame and seemed likely to arrive at the
+hour of death in obscurity and without notice. Thus, too, they have
+examples for those who are deprived of their children: they who are
+under any great grief are comforted by instances of like affliction;
+and thus the endurance of every misfortune is rendered more easy by the
+fact of others having undergone the same, and the fate of others causes
+what has happened to appear less important than it has been previously
+thought, and reflection thus discovers to us how much opinion had
+imposed on us. And this is what the Telamon declares, "I, when my son
+was born," etc.; and thus Theseus, "I on my future misery did dwell;"
+and Anaxagoras, "I knew my son was mortal." All these men, by
+frequently reflecting on human affairs, had discovered that they were
+by no means to be estimated by the opinion of the multitude; and,
+indeed, it seems to me to be pretty much the same case with those who
+consider beforehand as with those who derive their remedies from time,
+excepting that a kind of reason cures the one, and the other remedy is
+provided by nature; by which we discover (and this contains the whole
+marrow of the matter) that what was imagined to be the greatest evil is
+by no means so great as to defeat the happiness of life. And the effect
+of this is, that the blow is greater by reason of its not having been
+foreseen, and not, as they suppose, that when similar misfortunes
+befall two different people, that man only is affected with grief whom
+this calamity has befallen unexpectedly. So that some persons, under
+the oppression of grief, are said to have borne it actually worse for
+hearing of this common condition of man, that we are born under such
+conditions as render it impossible for a man to be exempt from all
+evil.
+
+XXV. For this reason Carneades, as I see our friend Antiochus writes,
+used to blame Chrysippus for commending these verses of Euripides:
+
+    Man, doom'd to care, to pain, disease, and strife,
+    Walks his short journey thro' the vale of life:
+    Watchful attends the cradle and the grave,
+    And passing generations longs to save:
+    Last, dies himself: yet wherefore should we mourn?
+    For man must to his kindred dust return;
+    Submit to the destroying hand of fate,
+    As ripen'd ears the harvest-sickle wait.[41]
+
+He would not allow a speech of this kind to avail at all to the cure of
+our grief, for he said it was a lamentable case itself that we were
+fallen into the hands of such a cruel fate; and that a speech like
+that, preaching up comfort from the misfortunes of another, was a
+comfort adapted only to those of a malevolent disposition. But to me it
+appears far otherwise; for the necessity of bearing what is the common
+condition of humanity forbids your resisting the will of the Gods, and
+reminds you that you are a man, which reflection greatly alleviates
+grief; and the enumeration of these examples is not produced with a
+view to please those of a malevolent disposition, but in order that any
+one in affliction may be induced to bear what he observes many others
+have previously borne with tranquillity and moderation. For they who
+are falling to pieces, and cannot hold together through the greatness
+of their grief, should be supported by all kinds of assistance. From
+whence Chrysippus thinks that grief is called [Greek: lypê], as it were
+[Greek: lysis], that is to say, a dissolution of the whole man--the
+whole of which I think may be pulled up by the roots by explaining, as
+I said at the beginning, the cause of grief; for it is nothing else but
+an opinion and judgment formed of a present acute evil. And thus any
+bodily pain, let it be ever so grievous, may be endurable where any
+hopes are proposed of some considerable good; and we receive such
+consolation from a virtuous and illustrious life that they who lead
+such lives are seldom attacked by grief, or but slightly affected by
+it.
+
+XXVI. But as besides this opinion of great evil there is this other
+added also--that we ought to lament what has happened, that it is right
+so to do, and part of our duty, then is brought about that terrible
+disorder of mind, grief. And it is to this opinion that we owe all
+those various and horrid kinds of lamentation, that neglect of our
+persons, that womanish tearing of our cheeks, that striking on our
+thighs, breasts, and heads. Thus Agamemnon, in Homer and in Accius,
+
+    Tears in his grief his uncomb'd locks;[42]
+
+from whence comes that pleasant saying of Bion, that the foolish king
+in his sorrow tore away the hairs of his head, imagining that his grief
+would be alleviated by baldness. But men do all these things from being
+persuaded that they ought to do so. And thus Æschines inveighs against
+Demosthenes for sacrificing within seven days after the death of his
+daughter. But with what eloquence, with what fluency, does he attack
+him! what sentiments does he collect! what words does he hurl against
+him! You may see by this that an orator may do anything; but nobody
+would approve of such license if it were not that we have an idea
+innate in our minds that every good man ought to lament the loss of a
+relation as bitterly as possible. And it is owing to this that some
+men, when in sorrow, betake themselves to deserts, as Homer says of
+Bellerophon:
+
+                   Distracted in his mind,
+    Forsook by heaven, forsaking human kind,
+    Wide o'er the Aleïan field he chose to stray,
+    A long, forlorn, uncomfortable way![43]
+
+And thus Niobe is feigned to have been turned into stone, from her
+never speaking, I suppose, in her grief. But they imagine Hecuba to
+have been converted into a bitch, from her rage and bitterness of mind.
+There are others who love to converse with solitude itself when in
+grief, as the nurse in Ennius,
+
+    Fain would I to the heavens find earth relate
+    Medea's ceaseless woes and cruel fate.[44]
+
+XXVII. Now all these things are done in grief, from a persuasion of
+their truth and propriety and necessity; and it is plain that those who
+behave thus do so from a conviction of its being their duty; for should
+these mourners by chance drop their grief, and either act or speak for
+a moment in a more calm or cheerful manner, they presently check
+themselves and return to their lamentations again, and blame themselves
+for having been guilty of any intermissions from their grief; and
+parents and masters generally correct children not by words only, but
+by blows, if they show any levity by either word or deed when the
+family is under affliction, and, as it were, oblige them to be
+sorrowful. What! does it not appear, when you have ceased to mourn, and
+have discovered that your grief has been ineffectual, that the whole of
+that mourning was voluntary on your part? What does that man say in
+Terence who punishes himself, the Self-tormentor?
+
+    I think I do my son less harm, O Chremes,
+    As long as I myself am miserable.
+
+He determines to be miserable: and can any one determine on anything
+against his will?
+
+    I well might think that I deserved all evil.
+
+He would think he deserved any misfortune were he otherwise than
+miserable! Therefore, you see, the evil is in opinion, not in nature.
+How is it when some things do of themselves prevent your grieving at
+them? as in Homer, so many died and were buried daily that they had not
+leisure to grieve: where you find these lines--
+
+    The great, the bold, by thousands daily fall,
+    And endless were the grief to weep for all.
+    Eternal sorrows what avails to shed?
+    Greece honors not with solemn fasts the dead:
+    Enough when death demands the brave to pay
+    The tribute of a melancholy day.
+    One chief with patience to the grave resign'd,
+    Our care devolves on others left behind.[45]
+
+Therefore it is in our own power to lay aside grief upon occasion; and
+is there any opportunity (seeing the thing is in our own power) that we
+should let slip of getting rid of care and grief? It was plain that the
+friends of Cnæus Pompeius, when they saw him fainting under his wounds,
+at the very moment of that most miserable and bitter sight were under
+great uneasiness how they themselves, surrounded by the enemy as they
+were, should escape, and were employed in nothing but encouraging the
+rowers and aiding their escape; but when they reached Tyre, they began
+to grieve and lament over him. Therefore, as fear with them, prevailed
+over grief, cannot reason and true philosophy have the same effect with
+a wise man?
+
+XXVIII. But what is there more effectual to dispel grief than the
+discovery that it answers no purpose, and has been undergone to no
+account? Therefore, if we can get rid of it, we need never have been
+subject to it. It must be acknowledged, then, that men take up grief
+wilfully and knowingly; and this appears from the patience of those
+who, after they have been exercised in afflictions and are better able
+to bear whatever befalls them, suppose themselves hardened against
+fortune; as that person in Euripides,
+
+    Had this the first essay of fortune been,
+    And I no storms thro' all my life had seen,
+    Wild as a colt I'd broke from reason's sway;
+    But frequent griefs have taught me to obey.[46]
+
+As, then, the frequent bearing of misery makes grief the lighter, we
+must necessarily perceive that the cause and original of it does not
+lie in the calamity itself. Your principal philosophers, or lovers of
+wisdom, though they have not yet arrived at perfect wisdom, are not
+they sensible that they are in the greatest evil? For they are foolish,
+and foolishness is the greatest of all evils, and yet they lament not.
+How shall we account for this? Because opinion is not fixed upon that
+kind of evil, it is not our opinion that it is right, meet, and our
+duty to be uneasy because we are not all wise men. Whereas this opinion
+is strongly affixed to that uneasiness where mourning is concerned,
+which is the greatest of all grief. Therefore Aristotle, when he blames
+some ancient philosophers for imagining that by their genius they had
+brought philosophy to the highest perfection, says, they must be either
+extremely foolish or extremely vain; but that he himself could see that
+great improvements had been made therein in a few years, and that
+philosophy would in a little time arrive at perfection. And
+Theophrastus is reported to have reproached nature at his death for
+giving to stags and crows so long a life, which was of no use to them,
+but allowing only so short a span to men, to whom length of days would
+have been of the greatest use; for if the life of man could have been
+lengthened, it would have been able to provide itself with all kinds of
+learning, and with arts in the greatest perfection. He lamented,
+therefore, that he was dying just when he had begun to discover these.
+What! does not every grave and distinguished philosopher acknowledge
+himself ignorant of many things, and confess that there are many things
+which he must learn over and over again? And yet, though these men are
+sensible that they are standing still in the very midway of folly, than
+which nothing can be worse, they are under no great affliction, because
+no opinion that it is their duty to lament is ever mingled with this
+knowledge. What shall we say of those who think it unbecoming in a man
+to grieve? among whom we may reckon Q. Maximus, when he buried his son
+that had been consul, and L. Paulus, who lost two sons within a few
+days of one another. Of the same opinion was M. Cato, who lost his son
+just after he had been elected prætor, and many others, whose names I
+have collected in my book on Consolation. Now what made these men so
+easy, but their persuasion that grief and lamentation was not becoming
+in a man? Therefore, as some give themselves up to grief from an
+opinion that it is right so to do, they refrained themselves, from an
+opinion that it was discreditable; from which we may infer that grief
+is owing more to opinion than nature.
+
+XXIX. It may be said, on the other side, Who is so mad as to grieve of
+his own accord? Pain proceeds from nature, which you must submit to,
+say they, agreeably to what even your own Crantor teaches, for it
+presses and gains upon you unavoidably, and cannot possibly be
+resisted. So that the very same Oileus, in Sophocles, who had before
+comforted Telamon on the death of Ajax, on hearing of the death of his
+own son, is broken-hearted. On this alteration of his mind we have
+these lines:
+
+    Show me the man so well by wisdom taught
+    That what he charges to another's fault,
+    When like affliction doth himself betide,
+    True to his own wise counsel will abide.[47]
+
+Now, when they urge these things, their endeavor is to prove that
+nature is absolutely and wholly irresistible; and yet the same people
+allow that we take greater grief on ourselves than nature requires.
+What madness is it, then, in us to require the same from others? But
+there are many reasons for our taking grief on us. The first is from
+the opinion of some evil, on the discovery and certainty of which grief
+comes of course. Besides, many people are persuaded that they are doing
+something very acceptable to the dead when they lament bitterly over
+them. To these may be added a kind of womanish superstition, in
+imagining that when they have been stricken by the afflictions sent by
+the Gods, to acknowledge themselves afflicted and humbled by them is
+the readiest way of appeasing them. But most men appear to be unaware
+what contradictions these things are full of. They commend those who
+die calmly, but they blame those who can bear the loss of another with
+the same calmness, as if it were possible that it should be true, as is
+occasionally said in love speeches, that any one can love another more
+than himself. There is, indeed, something excellent in this, and, if
+you examine it, something no less just than true, that we love those
+who ought to be most dear to us as well as we love ourselves; but to
+love them more than ourselves is absolutely impossible; nor is it
+desirable in friendship that I should love my friend more than myself,
+or that he should love me so; for this would occasion much confusion in
+life, and break in upon all the duties of it.
+
+XXX. But we will speak of this another time: at present it is
+sufficient not to attribute our misery to the loss of our friends, nor
+to love them more than, if they themselves could be sensible of our
+conduct, they would approve of, or at least not more than we do
+ourselves. Now as to what they say, that some are not at all appeased
+by our consolations; and, moreover, as to what they add, that the
+comforters themselves acknowledge they are miserable when fortune
+varies the attack and falls on them--in both these cases the solution
+is easy: for the fault here is not in nature, but in our own folly; and
+much may be said against folly. But men who do not admit of consolation
+seem to bespeak misery for themselves; and they who cannot bear their
+misfortunes with that temper which they recommend to others are not
+more faulty in this particular than most other persons; for we see that
+covetous men find fault with others who are covetous, as do the
+vainglorious with those who appear too wholly devoted to the pursuit of
+glory. For it is the peculiar characteristic of folly to perceive the
+vices of others, but to forget its own. But since we find that grief is
+removed by length of time, we have the greatest proof that the strength
+of it depends not merely on time, but on the daily consideration of it.
+For if the cause continues the same, and the man be the same, how can
+there be any alteration in the grief, if there is no change in what
+occasioned the grief, nor in him who grieves? Therefore it is from
+daily reflecting that there is no real evil in the circumstance for
+which you grieve, and not from the length of time, that you procure a
+remedy for your grief.
+
+XXXI. Here some people talk of moderate grief; but if such be natural,
+what occasion is there for consolation? for nature herself will
+determine, the measure of it: but if it depends on and is caused by
+opinion, the whole opinion should be destroyed. I think that it has
+been sufficiently said, that grief arises from an opinion of some
+present evil, which includes this belief, that it is incumbent on us to
+grieve. To this definition Zeno has added, very justly, that the
+opinion of this present evil should be recent. Now this word recent
+they explain thus: those are not the only recent things which happened
+a little while ago; but as long as there shall be any force, or vigor,
+or freshness in that imagined evil, so long it is entitled to the name
+of recent. Take the case of Artemisia, the wife of Mausolus, King of
+Caria, who made that noble sepulchre at Halicarnassus; while she lived,
+she lived in grief, and died of it, being worn out by it, for that
+opinion was always recent with her: but you cannot call that recent
+which has already begun to decay through time. Now the duty of a
+comforter is, to remove grief entirely, to quiet it, or draw it off as
+much as you can, or else to keep it under, and prevent its spreading
+any further, and to divert one's attention to other matters. There are
+some who think, with Cleanthes, that the only duty of a comforter is to
+prove that what one is lamenting is by no means an evil. Others, as the
+Peripatetics, prefer urging that the evil is not great. Others, with
+Epicurus, seek to divert your attention from the evil to good: some
+think it sufficient to show that nothing has happened but what you had
+reason to expect; and this is the practice of the Cyrenaics. But
+Chrysippus thinks that the main thing in comforting is, to remove the
+opinion from the person who is grieving, that to grieve is his bounden
+duty. There are others who bring together all these various kinds of
+consolations, for people are differently affected; as I have done
+myself in my book on Consolation; for as my own mind was much
+disordered, I have attempted in that book to discover every method of
+cure. But the proper season is as much to be attended to in the cure of
+the mind as of the body; as Prometheus in Æschylus, on its being said
+to him,
+
+    I think, Prometheus, you this tenet hold,
+    That all men's reason should their rage control?
+
+answers,
+
+    Yes, when one reason properly applies;
+    Ill-timed advice will make the storm but rise.[48]
+
+XXXII. But the principal medicine to be applied in consolation is, to
+maintain either that it is no evil at all, or a very inconsiderable
+one: the next best to that is, to speak of the common condition of
+life, having a view, if possible, to the state of the person whom you
+comfort particularly. The third is, that it is folly to wear one's self
+out with grief which can avail nothing. For the comfort of Cleanthes is
+suitable only for a wise man, who is in no need of any comfort at all;
+for could you persuade one in grief that nothing is an evil but what is
+base, you would not only cure him of grief, but folly. But the time for
+such precepts is not well chosen. Besides, Cleanthes does not seem to
+me sufficiently aware that affliction may very often proceed from that
+very thing which he himself allows to be the greatest misfortune. For
+what shall we say? When Socrates had convinced Alcibiades, as we are
+told, that he had no distinctive qualifications as a man different from
+other people, and that, in fact, there was no difference between him,
+though a man of the highest rank, and a porter; and when Alcibiades
+became uneasy at this, and entreated Socrates, with tears in his eyes,
+to make him a man of virtue, and to cure him of that mean position;
+what shall we say to this, Cleanthes? Was there no evil in what
+afflicted Alcibiades thus? What strange things does Lycon say? who,
+making light of grief, says that it arises from trifles, from things
+that affect our fortune or bodies, not from the evils of the mind.
+What, then? did not the grief of Alcibiades proceed from the defects
+and evils of the mind? I have already said enough of Epicurus's
+consolation.
+
+XXXIII. Nor is that consolation much to be relied on, though it is
+frequently practised, and sometimes has some effect, namely, "That you
+are not alone in this." It has its effect, as I said, but not always,
+nor with every person, for some reject it; but much depends on the
+application of it; for you ought rather to show, not how men in general
+have been affected with such evils, but how men of sense have borne
+them. As to Chrysippus's method, it is certainly founded in truth; but
+it is difficult to apply it in time of distress. It is a work of no
+small difficulty to persuade a person in affliction that he grieves
+merely because he thinks it right so to do. Certainly, then, as in
+pleadings we do not state all cases alike (if I may adopt the language
+of lawyers for a moment), but adapt what we have to say to the time, to
+the nature of the subject under debate, and to the person; so, too, in
+alleviating grief, regard should be had to what kind of cure the party
+to be comforted can admit of. But, somehow or other, we have rambled
+from what you originally proposed. For your question was concerning a
+wise man, with whom nothing can have the appearance of evil that is not
+dishonorable; or at least, anything else would seem so small an evil
+that by his wisdom he would so overmatch it as to make it wholly
+disappear; and such a man makes no addition to his grief through
+opinion, and never conceives it right to torment himself above measure,
+nor to wear himself out with grief, which is the meanest thing
+imaginable. Reason, however, it seems, has demonstrated (though it was
+not directly our object at the moment to inquire whether anything can
+be called an evil except what is base) that it is in our power to
+discern that all the evil which there is in affliction has nothing
+natural in it, but is contracted by our own voluntary judgment of it,
+and the error of opinion.
+
+XXXIV. But the kind of affliction of which I have treated is that which
+is the greatest; in order that when we have once got rid of that, it
+may appear a business of less consequence to look after remedies for
+the others. For there are certain things which are usually said about
+poverty; and also certain statements ordinarily applied to retired and
+undistinguished life. There are particular treatises on banishment, on
+the ruin of one's country, on slavery, on weakness, on blindness, and
+on every incident that can come under the name of an evil. The Greeks
+divide these into different treatises and distinct books; but they do
+it for the sake of employment: not but that all such discussions are
+full of entertainment. And yet, as physicians, in curing the whole
+body, attend to even the most insignificant part of the body which is
+at all disordered, so does philosophy act, after it has removed grief
+in general; still, if any other deficiency exists--should poverty bite,
+should ignominy sting, should banishment bring a dark cloud over us, or
+should any of those things which I have just mentioned appear, there is
+for each its appropriate consolation, which you shall hear whenever you
+please. But we must have recourse again to the same original principle,
+that a wise man is free from all sorrow, because it is vain, because it
+answers no purpose, because it is not founded in nature, but on opinion
+and prejudice, and is engendered by a kind of invitation to grieve,
+when once men have imagined that it is their duty to do so. When, then,
+we have subtracted what is altogether voluntary, that mournful
+uneasiness will be removed; yet some little anxiety, some slight
+pricking, will still remain. They may indeed call this natural,
+provided they give it not that horrid, solemn, melancholy name of
+grief, which can by no means consist with wisdom. But how various and
+how bitter are the roots of grief! Whatever they are, I propose, after
+having felled the trunk, to destroy them all; even if it should be
+necessary, by allotting a separate dissertation to each, for I have
+leisure enough to do so, whatever time it may take up. But the
+principle of every uneasiness is the same, though they may appear under
+different names. For envy is an uneasiness; so are emulation,
+detraction, anguish, sorrow, sadness, tribulation, lamentation,
+vexation, grief, trouble, affliction, and despair. The Stoics define
+all these different feelings; and all those words which I have
+mentioned belong to different things, and do not, as they seem, express
+the same ideas; but they are to a certain extent distinct, as I shall
+make appear perhaps in another place. These are those fibres of the
+roots which, as I said at first, must be traced back and cut off and
+destroyed, so that not one shall remain. You say it is a great and
+difficult undertaking: who denies it? But what is there of any
+excellency which has not its difficulty? Yet philosophy undertakes to
+effect it, provided we admit its superintendence. But enough of this.
+The other books, whenever you please, shall be ready for you here or
+anywhere else.
+
+       *       *       *       *       *
+
+
+
+
+BOOK IV.
+
+On other perturbations of the mind.
+
+
+I. I have often wondered, Brutus, on many occasions, at the ingenuity
+and virtues of our countrymen; but nothing has surprised me more than
+their development in those studies, which, though they came somewhat
+late to us, have been transported into this city from Greece. For the
+system of auspices, and religious ceremonies, and courts of justice,
+and appeals to the people, the senate, the establishment of an army of
+cavalry and infantry, and the whole military discipline, were
+instituted as early as the foundation of the city by royal authority,
+partly too by laws, not without the assistance of the Gods. Then with
+what a surprising and incredible progress did our ancestors advance
+towards all kind of excellence, when once the republic was freed from
+the regal power! Not that this is a proper occasion to treat of the
+manners and customs of our ancestors, or of the discipline and
+constitution of the city; for I have elsewhere, particularly in the six
+books I wrote on the Republic, given a sufficiently accurate account of
+them. But while I am on this subject, and considering the study of
+philosophy, I meet with many reasons to imagine that those studies were
+brought to us from abroad, and not merely imported, but preserved and
+improved; for they had Pythagoras, a man of consummate wisdom and
+nobleness of character, in a manner, before their eyes, who was in
+Italy at the time that Lucius Brutus, the illustrious founder of your
+nobility, delivered his country from tyranny. As the doctrine of
+Pythagoras spread itself on all sides, it seems probable to me that it
+reached this city; and this is not only probable of itself, but it does
+really appear to have been the case from many remains of it. For who
+can imagine that, when it flourished so much in that part of Italy
+which was called Magna Græcia, and in some of the largest and most
+powerful cities, in which, first the name of Pythagoras, and then that
+of those men who were afterward his followers, was in so high esteem;
+who can imagine, I say, that our people could shut their ears to what
+was said by such learned men? Besides, it is even my opinion that it
+was the great esteem in which the Pythagoreans were held, that gave
+rise to that opinion among those who came after him, that King Numa was
+a Pythagorean. For, being acquainted with the doctrine and principles
+of Pythagoras, and having heard from their ancestors that this king was
+a very wise and just man, and not being able to distinguish accurately
+between times and periods that were so remote, they inferred, from his
+being so eminent for his wisdom, that he had been a pupil of
+Pythagoras.
+
+II. So far we proceed on conjecture. As to the vestiges of the
+Pythagoreans, though I might collect many, I shall use but a few;
+because they have no connection with our present purpose. For, as it is
+reported to have been a custom with them to deliver certain precepts in
+a more abstruse manner in verse, and to bring their minds from severe
+thought to a more composed state by songs and musical instruments; so
+Cato, a writer of the very highest authority, says in his Origins, that
+it was customary with our ancestors for the guests at their
+entertainments, every one in his turn, to celebrate the praises and
+virtues of illustrious men in song to the sound of the flute; from
+whence it is clear that poems and songs were then composed for the
+voice. And, indeed, it is also clear that poetry was in fashion from
+the laws of the Twelve Tables, wherein it is provided that no song
+should be made to the injury of another. Another argument of the
+erudition of those times is, that they played on instruments before the
+shrines of their Gods, and at the entertainments of their magistrates;
+but that custom was peculiar to the sect I am speaking of. To me,
+indeed, that poem of Appius Cæcus, which Panætius commends so much in a
+certain letter of his which is addressed to Quintus Tubero, has all the
+marks of a Pythagorean author. We have many things derived from the
+Pythagoreans in our customs, which I pass over, that we may not seem to
+have learned that elsewhere which we look upon ourselves as the
+inventors of. But to return to our purpose. How many great poets as
+well as orators have sprung up among us! and in what a short time! so
+that it is evident that our people could arrive at any learning as soon
+as they had an inclination for it. But of other studies I shall speak
+elsewhere if there is occasion, as I have already often done.
+
+III. The study of philosophy is certainly of long standing with us; but
+yet I do not find that I can give you the names of any philosopher
+before the age of Lælius and Scipio, in whose younger days we find that
+Diogenes the Stoic, and Carneades the Academic, were sent as
+ambassadors by the Athenians to our senate. And as these had never been
+concerned in public affairs, and one of them was a Cyrenean, the other
+a Babylonian, they certainly would never have been forced from their
+studies, nor chosen for that employment, unless the study of philosophy
+had been in vogue with some of the great men at that time; who, though
+they might employ their pens on other subjects--some on civil law,
+others on oratory, others on the history of former times--yet promoted
+this most extensive of all arts, the principle of living well, even
+more by their life than by their writings. So that of that true and
+elegant philosophy (which was derived from Socrates, and is still
+preserved by the Peripatetics and by the Stoics, though they express
+themselves differently in their disputes with the Academics) there are
+few or no Latin records; whether this proceeds from the importance of
+the thing itself, or from men's being otherwise employed, or from their
+concluding that the capacity of the people was not equal to the
+apprehension of them. But, during this silence, C. Amafinius arose and
+took upon himself to speak; on the publishing of whose writings the
+people were moved, and enlisted themselves chiefly under this sect,
+either because the doctrine was more easily understood, or because they
+were invited thereto by the pleasing thoughts of amusement, or that,
+because there was nothing better, they laid hold of what was offered
+them. And after Amafinius, when many of the same sentiments had written
+much about them, the Pythagoreans spread over all Italy: but that these
+doctrines should be so easily understood and approved of by the
+unlearned is a great proof that they were not written with any great
+subtlety, and they think their establishment to be owing to this.
+
+IV. But let every one defend his own opinion, for every one is at
+liberty to choose what he likes: I shall keep to my old custom; and,
+being under no restraint from the laws of any particular school, which
+in philosophy every one must necessarily confine himself to, I shall
+always inquire what has the most probability in every question, and
+this system, which I have often practised on other occasions, I have
+adhered closely to in my Tusculan Disputations. Therefore, as I have
+acquainted you with the disputations of the three former days, this
+book shall conclude the discussion of the fourth day. When we had come
+down into the Academy, as we had done the former days, the business was
+carried on thus:
+
+_M._ Let any one say, who pleases, what he would wish to have
+discussed.
+
+_A._ I do not think a wise man can possibly be free from every
+perturbation of mind.
+
+_M._ He seemed by yesterday's discourse to be free from grief; unless
+you agreed with us only to avoid taking up time.
+
+_A._ Not at all on that account, for I was extremely satisfied with
+your discourse.
+
+_M._ You do not think, then, that a wise man is subject to grief?
+
+_A._ No, by no means.
+
+_M._ But if that cannot disorder the mind of a wise man, nothing else
+can. For what--can such a man be disturbed by fear? Fear proceeds from
+the same things when absent which occasion grief when present. Take
+away grief, then, and you remove fear.
+
+The two remaining perturbations are, a joy elate above measure, and
+lust; and if a wise man is not subject to these, his mind will be
+always at rest.
+
+_A._ I am entirely of that opinion.
+
+_M._ Which, then, shall we do? Shall I immediately crowd all my sails?
+or shall I make use of my oars, as if I were just endeavoring to get
+clear of the harbor?
+
+_A._ What is it that you mean, for I do not exactly comprehend you?
+
+V. _M._ Because, Chrysippus and the Stoics, when they discuss the
+perturbations of the mind, make great part of their debate to consist
+in definitions and distinctions; while they employ but few words on the
+subject of curing the mind, and preventing it from being disordered.
+Whereas the Peripatetics bring a great many things to promote the cure
+of it, but have no regard to their thorny partitions and definitions.
+My question, then, was, whether I should instantly unfold the sails of
+my eloquence, or be content for a while to make less way with the oars
+of logic?
+
+_A._ Let it be so; for by the employment of both these means the
+subject of our inquiry will be more thoroughly discussed.
+
+_M._ It is certainly the better way; and should anything be too
+obscure, you may examine that afterward.
+
+_A._ I will do so; but those very obscure points you will, as usual,
+deliver with more clearness than the Greeks.
+
+_M._ I will, indeed, endeavor to do so; but it well requires great
+attention, lest, by losing one word, the whole should escape you. What
+the Greeks call [Greek: pathê] we choose to name perturbations (or
+disorders) rather than diseases; in explaining which, I shall follow,
+first, that very old description of Pythagoras, and afterward that of
+Plato; for they both divide the mind into two parts, and make one of
+these partake of reason, and the other they represent without it. In
+that which partakes of reason they place tranquillity, that is to say,
+a placid and undisturbed constancy; to the other they assign the turbid
+motions of anger and desire, which are contrary and opposite to reason.
+Let this, then, be our principle, the spring of all our reasonings. But
+notwithstanding, I shall use the partitions and definitions of the
+Stoics in describing these perturbations; who seem to me to have shown
+very great acuteness on this question.
+
+VI. Zeno's definition, then, is this: "A perturbation" (which he calls
+a [Greek: pathos]) "is a commotion of the mind repugnant to reason, and
+against nature." Some of them define it even more briefly, saying that
+a perturbation is a somewhat too vehement appetite; but by too vehement
+they mean an appetite that recedes further from the constancy of
+nature. But they would have the divisions of perturbations to arise
+from two imagined goods, and from two imagined evils; and thus they
+become four: from the good proceed lust and joy--joy having reference
+to some present good, and lust to some future one. They suppose fear
+and grief to proceed from evils: fear from something future, grief from
+something present; for whatever things are dreaded as approaching
+always occasion grief when present. But joy and lust depend on the
+opinion of good; as lust, being inflamed and provoked, is carried on
+eagerly towards what has the appearance of good; and joy is transported
+and exults on obtaining what was desired: for we naturally pursue those
+things that have the appearance of good, and avoid the contrary.
+Wherefore, as soon as anything that has the appearance of good presents
+itself, nature incites us to endeavor to obtain it. Now, where this
+strong desire is consistent and founded on prudence, it is by the
+Stoics called [Greek: boulêsis], and the name which we give it is
+volition; and this they allow to none but their wise man, and define it
+thus: Volition is a reasonable desire; but whatever is incited too
+violently in opposition to reason, that is a lust, or an unbridled
+desire, which is discoverable in all fools. And, therefore, when we are
+affected so as to be placed in any good condition, we are moved in two
+ways; for when the mind is moved in a placid and calm motion,
+consistent with reason, that is called joy; but when it exults with a
+vain, wanton exultation, or immoderate joy, then that feeling may be
+called immoderate ecstasy or transport, which they define to be an
+elation of the mind without reason. And as we naturally desire good
+things, so in like manner we naturally seek to avoid what is evil; and
+this avoidance of which, if conducted in accordance with reason, is
+called caution; and this the wise man alone is supposed to have: but
+that caution which is not under the guidance of reason, but is attended
+with a base and low dejection, is called fear. Fear is, therefore,
+caution destitute of reason. But a wise man is not affected by any
+present evil; while the grief of a fool proceeds from being affected
+with an imaginary evil, by which his mind is contracted and sunk, since
+it is not under the dominion of reason. This, then, is the first
+definition, which makes grief to consist in a shrinking of the mind
+contrary to the dictates of reason. Thus, there are four perturbations,
+and but three calm rational emotions; for grief has no exact opposite.
+
+VII. But they insist upon it that all perturbations depend on opinion
+and judgment; therefore they define them more strictly, in order not
+only the better to show how blamable they are, but to discover how much
+they are in our power. Grief, then, is a recent opinion of some present
+evil, in which it seems to be right that the mind should shrink and be
+dejected. Joy is a recent opinion of a present good, in which it seems
+to be right that the mind should be elated. Fear is an opinion of an
+impending evil which we apprehend will be intolerable. Lust is an
+opinion of a good to come, which would be of advantage were it already
+come, and present with us. But however I have named the judgments and
+opinions of perturbations, their meaning is, not that merely the
+perturbations consist in them, but that the effects likewise of these
+perturbations do so; as grief occasions a kind of painful pricking, and
+fear engenders a recoil or sudden abandonment of the mind, joy gives
+rise to a profuse mirth, while lust is the parent of an unbridled habit
+of coveting. But that imagination, which I have included in all the
+above definitions, they would have to consist in assenting without
+warrantable grounds. Now, every perturbation has many subordinate parts
+annexed to it of the same kind. Grief is attended with enviousness
+(_invidentia_)--I use that word for instruction's sake, though it is
+not so common; because envy (_invidia_) takes in not only the person
+who envies, but the person, too, who is envied--emulation, detraction,
+pity, vexation, mourning, sadness, tribulation, sorrow, lamentation,
+solicitude, disquiet of mind, pain, despair, and many other similar
+feelings are so too. Under fear are comprehended sloth, shame, terror,
+cowardice, fainting, confusion, astonishment. In pleasure they
+comprehend malevolence--that is, pleased at another's
+misfortune--delight, boastfulness, and the like. To lust they associate
+anger, fury, hatred, enmity, discord, wants, desire, and other feelings
+of that kind.
+
+But they define these in this manner:
+
+VIII. Enviousness (_invidentia_), they say, is a grief arising from the
+prosperous circumstances of another, which are in no degree injurious
+to the person who envies; for where any one grieves at the prosperity
+of another, by which he is injured, such a one is not properly said to
+envy--as when Agamemnon grieves at Hector's success; but where any one,
+who is in no way hurt by the prosperity of another, is in pain at his
+success, such a one envies indeed. Now the name "emulation" is taken in
+a double sense, so that the same word may stand for praise and
+dispraise: for the imitation of virtue is called emulation (however,
+that sense of it I shall have no occasion for here, for that carries
+praise with it); but emulation is also a term applied to grief at
+another's enjoying what I desired to have, and am without. Detraction
+(and I mean by that, jealousy) is a grief even at another's enjoying
+what I had a great inclination for. Pity is a grief at the misery of
+another who suffers wrongfully; for no one is moved by pity at the
+punishment of a parricide or of a betrayer of his country. Vexation is
+a pressing grief. Mourning is a grief at the bitter death of one who
+was dear to you. Sadness is a grief attended with tears. Tribulation is
+a painful grief. Sorrow, an excruciating grief. Lamentation, a grief
+where we loudly bewail ourselves. Solicitude, a pensive grief. Trouble,
+a continued grief. Affliction, a grief that harasses the body. Despair,
+a grief that excludes all hope of better things to come. But those
+feelings which are included under fear, they define thus: There is
+sloth, which is a dread of some ensuing labor; shame and terror, which
+affect the body--hence blushing attends shame; a paleness, and tremor,
+and chattering of the teeth attend terror--cowardice, which is an
+apprehension of some approaching evil; dread, a fear that unhinges the
+mind, whence comes that line of Ennius,
+
+    Then dread discharged all wisdom from my mind;
+
+fainting is the associate and constant attendant on dread; confusion, a
+fear that drives away all thought; alarm, a continued fear.
+
+IX. The different species into which they divide pleasure come under
+this description; so that malevolence is a pleasure in the misfortunes
+of another, without any advantage to yourself; delight, a pleasure that
+soothes the mind by agreeable impressions on the ear. What is said of
+the ear may be applied to the sight, to the touch, smell, and taste.
+All feelings of this kind are a sort of melting pleasure that dissolves
+the mind. Boastfulness is a pleasure that consists in making an
+appearance, and setting off yourself with insolence.--The subordinate
+species of lust they define in this manner: Anger is a lust of
+punishing any one who, as we imagine, has injured us without cause.
+Heat is anger just forming and beginning to exist, which the Greeks
+call [Greek: thymôsis]. Hatred is a settled anger. Enmity is anger
+waiting for an opportunity of revenge. Discord is a sharper anger
+conceived deeply in the mind and heart. Want an insatiable lust. Regret
+is when one eagerly wishes to see a person who is absent. Now here they
+have a distinction; so that with them regret is a lust conceived on
+hearing of certain things reported of some one, or of many, which the
+Greeks call [Greek: katêgorêmata], or predicaments; as that they are in
+possession of riches and honors: but want is a lust for those very
+honors and riches. But these definers make intemperance the fountain of
+all these perturbations; which is an absolute revolt from the mind and
+right reason--a state so averse to all rules of reason that the
+appetites of the mind can by no means be governed and restrained. As,
+therefore, temperance appeases these desires, making them obey right
+reason, and maintains the well-weighed judgments of the mind, so
+intemperance, which is in opposition to this, inflames, confounds, and
+puts every state of the mind into a violent motion. Thus, grief and
+fear, and every other perturbation of the mind, have their rise from
+intemperance.
+
+X. Just as distempers and sickness are bred in the body from the
+corruption of the blood, and the too great abundance of phlegm and
+bile, so the mind is deprived of its health, and disordered with
+sickness, from a confusion of depraved opinions that are in opposition
+to one another. From these perturbations arise, first, diseases, which
+they call [Greek: nosêmata]; and also those feelings which are in
+opposition to these diseases, and which admit certain faulty distastes
+or loathings; then come sicknesses, which are called [Greek:
+arrhôstêmata] by the Stoics, and these two have their opposite
+aversions. Here the Stoics, especially Chrysippus, give themselves
+unnecessary trouble to show the analogy which the diseases of the mind
+have to those of the body: but, overlooking all that they say as of
+little consequence, I shall treat only of the thing itself. Let us,
+then, understand perturbation to imply a restlessness from the variety
+and confusion of contradictory opinions; and that when this heat and
+disturbance of the mind is of any standing, and has taken up its
+residence, as it were, in the veins and marrow, then commence diseases
+and sickness, and those aversions which are in opposition to these
+diseases and sicknesses.
+
+XI. What I say here may be distinguished in thought, though they are in
+fact the same; inasmuch as they both have their rise from lust and joy.
+For should money be the object of our desire, and should we not
+instantly apply to reason, as if it were a kind of Socratic medicine to
+heal this desire, the evil glides into our veins, and cleaves to our
+bowels, and from thence proceeds a distemper or sickness, which, when
+it is of any continuance, is incurable, and the name of this disease is
+covetousness. It is the same with other diseases; as the desire of
+glory, a passion for women, to which the Greeks give the name of
+[Greek: philogyneia]: and thus all other diseases and sicknesses are
+generated. But those feelings which are the contrary of these are
+supposed to have fear for their foundation, as a hatred of women, such
+as is displayed in the Woman-hater of Atilius; or the hatred of the
+whole human species, as Timon is reported to have done, whom they call
+the Misanthrope. Of the same kind is inhospitality. And all these
+diseases proceed from a certain dread of such things as they hate and
+avoid. But they define sickness of mind to be an overweening opinion,
+and that fixed and deeply implanted in the heart, of something as very
+desirable which is by no means so. What proceeds from aversion, they
+define thus: a vehement idea of something to be avoided, deeply
+implanted, and inherent in our minds, when there is no reason for
+avoiding it; and this kind of opinion is a deliberate belief that one
+understands things of which one is wholly ignorant. Now, sickness of
+the mind has all these subordinate divisions: avarice, ambition,
+fondness for women, obstinacy, gluttony, drunkenness, covetousness, and
+other similar vices. But avarice is a violent opinion about money, as
+if it were vehemently to be desired and sought after, which opinion is
+deeply implanted and inherent in our minds; and the definition of all
+the other similar feelings resembles these. But the definitions of
+aversions are of this sort: inhospitality is a vehement opinion, deeply
+implanted and inherent in your mind, that you should avoid a stranger.
+Thus, too, the hatred of women, like that felt by Hippolytus, is
+defined; and the hatred of the human species like that displayed by
+Timon.
+
+XII. But to come to the analogy of the state of body and mind, which I
+shall sometimes make use of, though more sparingly than the Stoics.
+Some men are more inclined to particular disorders than others; and,
+therefore, we say that some people are rheumatic, others dropsical, not
+because they are so at present, but because they are often so: some are
+inclined to fear, others to some other perturbation. Thus in some there
+is a continual anxiety, owing to which they are anxious; in some a
+hastiness of temper, which differs from anger, as anxiety differs from
+anguish: for all are not anxious who are sometimes vexed, nor are they
+who are anxious always uneasy in that manner: as there is a difference
+between being drunk and drunkenness; and it is one thing to be a lover,
+another to be given to women. And this disposition of particular people
+to particular disorders is very common: for it relates to all
+perturbations; it appears in many vices, though it has no name. Some
+are, therefore, said to be envious, malevolent, spiteful, fearful,
+pitiful, from a propensity to those perturbations, not from their being
+always carried away by them. Now this propensity to these particular
+disorders may be called a sickness from analogy with the body; meaning,
+that is to say, nothing more than a propensity towards sickness. But
+with regard to whatever is good, as some are more inclined to different
+good qualities than others, we may call this a facility or tendency:
+this tendency to evil is a proclivity or inclination to falling; but
+where anything is neither good nor bad, it may have the former name.
+
+XIII. Even as there may be, with respect to the body, a disease, a
+sickness, and a defect, so it is with the mind. They call that a
+disease where the whole body is corrupted; they call that sickness
+where a disease is attended with a weakness, and that a defect where
+the parts of the body are not well compacted together; from whence it
+follows that the members are misshapen, crooked, and deformed. So that
+these two, a disease and sickness, proceed from a violent concussion
+and perturbation of the health of the whole body; but a defect
+discovers itself even when the body is in perfect health. But a disease
+of the mind is distinguishable only in thought from a sickness. But a
+viciousness is a habit or affection discordant and inconsistent with
+itself through life. Thus it happens that, in the one case, a disease
+and sickness may arise from a corruption of opinions; in the other
+case, the consequence may be inconstancy and inconsistency. For every
+vice of the mind does not imply a disunion of parts; as is the case
+with those who are not far from being wise men. With them there is that
+affection which is inconsistent with itself while it is foolish; but it
+is not distorted, nor depraved. But diseases and sicknesses are parts
+of viciousness; but it is a question whether perturbations are parts of
+the same, for vices are permanent affections: perturbations are such as
+are restless; so that they cannot be parts of permanent ones. As there
+is some analogy between the nature of the body and mind in evil, so is
+there in good; for the distinctions of the body are beauty, strength,
+health, firmness, quickness of motion: the same may be said of the
+mind. The body is said to be in a good state when all those things on
+which health depends are consistent: the same may be said of the mind
+when its judgments and opinions are not at variance with one another.
+And this union is the virtue of the mind, which, according to some
+people, is temperance itself; others make it consist in an obedience to
+the precepts of temperance, and a compliance with them, not allowing it
+to be any distinct species of itself. But, be it one or the other, it
+is to be found only in a wise man. But there is a certain soundness of
+mind, which even a fool may have, when the perturbation of his mind is
+removed by the care and management of his physicians. And as what is
+called beauty arises from an exact proportion of the limbs, together
+with a certain sweetness of complexion, so the beauty of the mind
+consists in an equality and constancy of opinions and judgments, joined
+to a certain firmness and stability, pursuing virtue, or containing
+within itself the very essence of virtue. Besides, we give the very
+same names to the faculties of the mind as we do to the powers of the
+body, the nerves, and other powers of action. Thus the velocity of the
+body is called swiftness: a praise which we ascribe to the mind, from
+its running over in its thoughts so many things in so short a time.
+
+XIV. Herein, indeed, the mind and body are unlike: that though the mind
+when in perfect health may be visited by sickness, as the body may, yet
+the body may be disordered without our fault; the mind cannot. For all
+the disorders and perturbations of the mind proceed from a neglect of
+reason; these disorders, therefore, are confined to men: the beasts are
+not subject to such perturbations, though they act sometimes as if they
+had reason. There is a difference, too, between ingenious and dull men;
+the ingenious, like the Corinthian brass, which is long before it
+receives rust, are longer before they fall into these perturbations,
+and are recovered sooner: the case is different with the dull. Nor does
+the mind of an ingenious man fall into every kind of perturbation, for
+it never yields to any that are brutish and savage; and some of their
+perturbations have at first even the appearance of humanity, as mercy,
+grief, and fear. But the sicknesses and diseases of the mind are
+thought to be harder to eradicate than those leading vices which are in
+opposition to virtues; for vices may be removed, though the diseases of
+the mind should continue, which diseases are not cured with that
+expedition with which vices are removed. I have now acquainted you with
+the arguments which the Stoics put forth with such exactness; which
+they call logic, from their close arguing: and since my discourse has
+got clear of these rocks, I will proceed with the remainder of it,
+provided I have been sufficiently clear in what I have already said,
+considering the obscurity of the subject I have treated.
+
+_A._ Clear enough; but should there be occasion for a more exact
+inquiry, I shall take another opportunity of asking you. I expect you
+now to hoist your sails, as you just now called them, and proceed on
+your course.
+
+XV. _M._ Since I have spoken before of virtue in other places, and
+shall often have occasion to speak again (for a great many questions
+that relate to life and manners arise from the spring of virtue); and
+since, as I say, virtue consists in a settled and uniform affection of
+mind, making those persons praiseworthy who are possessed of her, she
+herself also, independent of anything else, without regard to any
+advantage, must be praiseworthy; for from her proceed good
+inclinations, opinions, actions, and the whole of right reason; though
+virtue may be defined in a few words to be right reason itself. The
+opposite to this is viciousness (for so I choose to translate what the
+Greeks call [Greek: kakia], rather than by perverseness; for
+perverseness is the name of a particular vice; but viciousness includes
+all), from whence arise those perturbations which, as I just now said,
+are turbid and violent motions of the mind, repugnant to reason, and
+enemies in a high degree to the peace of the mind and a tranquil life,
+for they introduce piercing and anxious cares, and afflict and
+debilitate the mind through fear; they violently inflame our hearts
+with exaggerated appetite, which is in reality an impotence of mind,
+utterly irreconcilable with temperance and moderation, which we
+sometimes call desire, and sometimes lust, and which, should it even
+attain the object of its wishes, immediately becomes so elated that it
+loses all its resolution, and knows not what to pursue; so that he was
+in the right who said "that exaggerated pleasure was the very greatest
+of mistakes." Virtue, then, alone can effect the cure of these evils.
+
+XVI. For what is not only more miserable, but more base and sordid,
+than a man afflicted, weakened, and oppressed with grief? And little
+short of this misery is one who dreads some approaching evil, and who,
+through faintheartedness, is under continual suspense. The poets, to
+express the greatness of this evil, imagine a stone to hang over the
+head of Tantalus, as a punishment for his wickedness, his pride, and
+his boasting. And this is the common punishment of folly; for there
+hangs over the head of every one whose mind revolts from reason some
+similar fear. And as these perturbations of the mind, grief and fear,
+are of a most wasting nature, so those two others, though of a more
+merry cast (I mean lust, which is always coveting something with
+eagerness, and empty mirth, which is an exulting joy), differ very
+little from madness. Hence you may understand what sort of person he is
+whom we call at one time moderate, at another modest or temperate, at
+another constant and virtuous; while sometimes we include all these
+names in the word frugality, as the crown of all; for if that word did
+not include all virtues, it would never have been proverbial to say
+that a frugal man does everything rightly. But when the Stoics apply
+this saying to their wise man, they seem to exalt him too much, and to
+speak of him with too much admiration.
+
+XVII. Whoever, then, through moderation and constancy, is at rest in
+his mind, and in calm possession of himself, so as neither to pine with
+care, nor be dejected with fear, nor to be inflamed with desire,
+coveting something greedily, nor relaxed by extravagant mirth--such a
+man is that identical wise man whom we are inquiring for: he is the
+happy man, to whom nothing in this life seems intolerable enough to
+depress him; nothing exquisite enough to transport him unduly. For what
+is there in this life that can appear great to him who has acquainted
+himself with eternity and the utmost extent of the universe? For what
+is there in human knowledge, or the short span of this life, that can
+appear great to a wise man? whose mind is always so upon its guard that
+nothing can befall him which is unforeseen, nothing which is
+unexpected, nothing, in short, which is new. Such a man takes so exact
+a survey on all sides of him, that he always knows the proper place and
+spot to live in free from all the troubles and annoyances of life, and
+encounters every accident that fortune can bring upon him with a
+becoming calmness. Whoever conducts himself in this manner will be free
+from grief, and from every other perturbation; and a mind free from
+these feelings renders men completely happy; whereas a mind disordered
+and drawn off from right and unerring reason loses at once, not only
+its resolution, but its health.--Therefore the thoughts and
+declarations of the Peripatetics are soft and effeminate, for they say
+that the mind must necessarily be agitated, but at the same time they
+lay down certain bounds beyond which that agitation is not to proceed.
+And do you set bounds to vice? or is it no vice to disobey reason? Does
+not reason sufficiently declare that there is no real good which you
+should desire too ardently, or the possession of which you should allow
+to transport you? and that there is no evil that should be able to
+overwhelm you, or the suspicion of which should distract you? and that
+all these things assume too melancholy or too cheerful an appearance
+through our own error? But if fools find this error lessened by time,
+so that, though the cause remains the same, they are not affected, in
+the same manner, after some time, as they were at first, why, surely a
+wise man ought not to be influenced at all by it. But what are those
+degrees by which we are to limit it? Let us fix these degrees in grief,
+a difficult subject, and one much canvassed.--Fannius writes that P.
+Rutilius took it much to heart that his brother was refused the
+consulship; but he seems to have been too much affected by this
+disappointment, for it was the occasion of his death: he ought,
+therefore, to have borne it with more moderation. But let us suppose
+that while he was bearing this with moderation, the death of his
+children had intervened; here would have started a fresh grief, which,
+admitting it to be moderate in itself, yet still must have been a great
+addition to the other. Now, to these let us add some acute pains of
+body, the loss of his fortune, blindness, banishment. Supposing, then,
+each separate misfortune to occasion a separate additional grief, the
+whole would be too great to be supportable.
+
+XVIII. The man who attempts to set bounds to vice acts like one who
+should throw himself headlong from Leucate, persuaded that he could
+stop himself whenever he pleased. Now, as that is impossible, so a
+perturbed and disordered mind cannot restrain itself, and stop where it
+pleases. Certainly whatever is bad in its increase is bad in its birth.
+Now grief and all other perturbations are doubtless baneful in their
+progress, and have, therefore, no small share of evil at the beginning;
+for they go on of themselves when once they depart from reason, for
+every weakness is self-indulgent, and indiscreetly launches out, and
+does not know where to stop. So that it makes no difference whether you
+approve of moderate perturbations of mind, or of moderate injustice,
+moderate cowardice, and moderate intemperance; for whoever prescribes
+bounds to vice admits a part of it, which, as it is odious of itself,
+becomes the more so as it stands on slippery ground, and, being once
+set forward, glides on headlong, and cannot by any means be stopped.
+
+XIX. Why should I say more? Why should I add that the Peripatetics say
+that these perturbations, which we insist upon it should be extirpated,
+are not only natural, but were given to men by nature for a good
+purpose? They usually talk in this manner. In the first place, they say
+much in praise of anger; they call it the whetstone of courage, and
+they say that angry men exert themselves most against an enemy or
+against a bad citizen: that those reasons are of little weight which
+are the motives of men who think thus, as--it is a just war; it becomes
+us to fight for our laws, our liberties, our country: they will allow
+no force to these arguments unless our courage is warmed by anger.--Nor
+do they confine their argument to warriors; but their opinion is that
+no one can issue any rigid commands without some bitterness and anger.
+In short, they have no notion of an orator either accusing or even
+defending a client without he is spurred on by anger. And though this
+anger should not be real, still they think his words and gestures ought
+to wear the appearance of it, so that the action of the orator may
+excite the anger of his hearer. And they deny that any man has ever
+been seen who does not know what it is to be angry; and they name what
+we call lenity by the bad appellation of indolence. Nor do they commend
+only this lust (for anger is, as I defined it above, the lust of
+revenge), but they maintain that kind of lust or desire to be given us
+by nature for very good purposes, saying that no one can execute
+anything well but what he is in earnest about. Themistocles used to
+walk in the public places in the night because he could not sleep; and
+when asked the reason, his answer was, that Miltiades's trophies kept
+him awake. Who has not heard how Demosthenes used to watch, who said
+that it gave him pain if any mechanic was up in a morning at his work
+before him? Lastly, they urge that some of the greatest philosophers
+would never have made that progress in their studies without some
+ardent desire spurring them on.--We are informed that Pythagoras,
+Democritus, and Plato visited the remotest parts of the world; for they
+thought that they ought to go wherever anything was to be learned. Now,
+it is not conceivable that these things could be effected by anything
+but by the greatest ardor of mind.
+
+XX. They say that even grief, which we have already said ought to be
+avoided as a monstrous and fierce beast, was appointed by nature, not
+without some good purpose, in order that men should lament when they
+had committed a fault, well knowing they had exposed themselves to
+correction, rebuke, and ignominy; for they think that those who can
+bear ignominy and infamy without pain have acquired a complete impunity
+for all sorts of crimes; for with them reproach is a stronger check
+than conscience. From whence we have that scene in Afranius borrowed
+from common life; for when the abandoned son saith, "Wretched that I
+am!" the severe father replies,
+
+    Let him but grieve, no matter what the cause.
+
+And they say the other divisions of sorrow have their use; that pity
+incites us to hasten to the assistance of others, and to alleviate the
+calamities of men who have undeservedly fallen into them; that even
+envy and detraction are not without their use, as when a man sees that
+another person has attained what he cannot, or observes another to be
+equally successful with himself; that he who should take away fear
+would take away all industry in life, which those men exert in the
+greatest degree who are afraid of the laws and of the magistrates, who
+dread poverty, ignominy, death, and pain. But while they argue thus,
+they allow indeed of these feelings being retrenched, though they deny
+that they either can or should be plucked up by the roots; so that
+their opinion is that mediocrity is best in everything. When they
+reason in this manner, what think you--is what they say worth attending
+to or not?
+
+_A._ I think it is. I wait, therefore, to hear what you will say in
+reply to them.
+
+XXI. _M._ Perhaps I may find something to say; but I will make this
+observation first: do you take notice with what modesty the Academics
+behave themselves? for they speak plainly to the purpose. The
+Peripatetics are answered by the Stoics; they have my leave to fight it
+out, who think myself no otherwise concerned than to inquire for what
+may seem to be most probable. Our present business is, then, to see if
+we can meet with anything in this question which is the probable, for
+beyond such approximation to truth as that human nature cannot proceed.
+The definition of a perturbation, as Zeno, I think, has rightly
+determined it, is thus: That a perturbation is a commotion of the mind
+against nature, in opposition to right reason; or, more briefly, thus,
+that a perturbation is a somewhat too vehement appetite; and when he
+says somewhat too vehement, he means such as is at a greater distance
+from the constant course of nature. What can I say to these
+definitions? The greater part of them we have from those who dispute
+with sagacity and acuteness: some of them expressions, indeed, such as
+the "ardors of the mind," and "the whetstones of virtue," savoring of
+the pomp of rhetoricians. As to the question, if a brave man can
+maintain his courage without becoming angry, it may be questioned with
+regard to the gladiators; though we often observe much resolution even
+in them: they meet, converse, they make objections and demands, they
+agree about terms, so that they seem calm rather than angry. But let us
+admit a man of the name of Placideianus, who was one of that trade, to
+be in such a mind, as Lucilius relates of him,
+
+    If for his blood you thirst, the task be mine;
+    His laurels at my feet he shall resign;
+    Not but I know, before I reach his heart,
+    First on myself a wound he will impart.
+    I hate the man; enraged I fight, and straight
+    In action we had been, but that I wait
+    Till each his sword had fitted to his hand.
+    My rage I scarce can keep within command.
+
+XXII. But we see Ajax in Homer advancing to meet Hector in battle
+cheerfully, without any of this boisterous wrath. For he had no sooner
+taken up his arms than the first step which he made inspired his
+associates with joy, his enemies with fear; so that even Hector, as he
+is represented by Homer,[49] trembling, condemned himself for having
+challenged him to fight. Yet these heroes conversed together, calmly
+and quietly, before they engaged; nor did they show any anger or
+outrageous behavior during the combat. Nor do I imagine that Torquatus,
+the first who obtained this surname, was in a rage when he plundered
+the Gaul of his collar; or that Marcellus's courage at Clastidium was
+only owing to his anger. I could almost swear that Africanus, with whom
+we are better acquainted, from our recollection of him being more
+recent, was noways inflamed by anger when he covered Alienus Pelignus
+with his shield, and drove his sword into the enemy's breast. There may
+be some doubt of L. Brutus, whether he was not influenced by
+extraordinary hatred of the tyrant, so as to attack Aruns with more
+than usual rashness; for I observe that they mutually killed each other
+in close fight. Why, then, do you call in the assistance of anger?
+Would courage, unless it began to get furious, lose its energy? What!
+do you imagine that Hercules, whom the very courage which you would try
+to represent as anger raised to heaven, was angry when he engaged the
+Erymanthian boar, or the Nemæan lion? Or was Theseus in a passion when
+he seized on the horns of the Marathonian bull? Take care how you make
+courage to depend in the least on rage. For anger is altogether
+irrational, and that is not courage which is void of reason.
+
+XXIII. We ought to hold all things here in contempt; death is to be
+looked on with indifference; pains and labors must be considered as
+easily supportable. And when these sentiments are established on
+judgment and conviction, then will that stout and firm courage take
+place; unless you attribute to anger whatever is done with vehemence,
+alacrity, and spirit. To me, indeed, that very Scipio[50] who was chief
+priest, that favorer of the saying of the Stoics, "That no private man
+could be a wise man," does not seem to be angry with Tiberius Gracchus,
+even when he left the consul in a hesitating frame of mind, and, though
+a private man himself, commanded, with the authority of a consul, that
+all who meant well to the republic should follow him. I do not know
+whether I have done anything in the republic that has the appearance of
+courage; but if I have, I certainly did not do it in wrath. Doth
+anything come nearer madness than anger? And indeed Ennius has well
+defined it as the beginning of madness. The changing color, the
+alteration of our voice, the look of our eyes, our manner of fetching
+our breath, the little command we have over our words and actions, how
+little do all these things indicate a sound mind! What can make a worse
+appearance than Homer's Achilles, or Agamemnon, during the quarrel? And
+as to Ajax, anger drove him into downright madness, and was the
+occasion of his death. Courage, therefore, does not want the assistance
+of anger; it is sufficiently provided, armed, and prepared of itself.
+We may as well say that drunkenness or madness is of service to
+courage, because those who are mad or drunk often do a great many
+things with unusual vehemence. Ajax was always brave; but still he was
+most brave when he was in that state of frenzy:
+
+    The greatest feat that Ajax e'er achieved
+    Was, when his single arm the Greeks relieved.
+    Quitting the field; urged on by rising rage,
+    Forced the declining troops again t'engage.
+
+Shall we say, then, that madness has its use?
+
+XXIV. Examine the definitions of courage: you will find it does not
+require the assistance of passion. Courage is, then, an affection of
+mind that endures all things, being itself in proper subjection to the
+highest of all laws; or it may be called a firm maintenance of judgment
+in supporting or repelling everything that has a formidable appearance,
+or a knowledge of what is formidable or otherwise, and maintaining
+invariably a stable judgment of all such things, so as to bear them or
+despise them; or, in fewer words, according to Chrysippus (for the
+above definitions are Sphærus's, a man of the first ability as a
+layer-down of definitions, as the Stoics think. But they are all pretty
+much alike: they give us only common notions, some one way, and some
+another). But what is Chrysippus's definition? Fortitude, says he, is
+the knowledge of all things that are bearable, or an affection of the
+mind which bears and supports everything in obedience to the chief law
+of reason without fear. Now, though we should attack these men in the
+same manner as Carneades used to do, I fear they are the only real
+philosophers; for which of these definitions is there which does not
+explain that obscure and intricate notion of courage which every man
+conceives within himself? And when it is thus explained, what can a
+warrior, a commander, or an orator want more? And no one can think that
+they will be unable to behave themselves courageously without anger.
+What! do not even the Stoics, who maintain that all fools are mad, make
+the same inferences? for, take away perturbations, especially a
+hastiness of temper, and they will appear to talk very absurdly. But
+what they assert is this: they say that all fools are mad, as all
+dunghills stink; not that they always do so, but stir them, and you
+will perceive it. And in like manner, a warm-tempered man is not always
+in a passion; but provoke him, and you will see him run mad. Now, that
+very warlike anger, which is of such service in war, what is the use of
+it to him when he is at home with his wife, children, and family? Is
+there, then, anything that a disturbed mind can do better than one
+which is calm and steady? Or can any one be angry without a
+perturbation of mind? Our people, then, were in the right, who, as all
+vices depend on our manners, and nothing is worse than a passionate
+disposition, called angry men the only morose men.[51]
+
+XXV. Anger is in no wise becoming in an orator, though it is not amiss
+to affect it. Do you imagine that I am angry when in pleading I use any
+extraordinary vehemence and sharpness? What! when I write out my
+speeches after all is over and past, am I then angry while writing? Or
+do you think Æsopus was ever angry when he acted, or Accius was so when
+he wrote? Those men, indeed, act very well, but the orator acts better
+than the player, provided he be really an orator; but, then, they carry
+it on without passion, and with a composed mind. But what wantonness is
+it to commend lust! You produce Themistocles and Demosthenes; to these
+you add Pythagoras, Democritus, and Plato. What! do you then call
+studies lust? But these studies of the most excellent and admirable
+things, such as those were which you bring forward on all occasions,
+ought to be composed and tranquil; and what kind of philosophers are
+they who commend grief, than which nothing is more detestable? Afranius
+has said much to this purpose:
+
+    Let him but grieve, no matter what the cause.
+
+But he spoke this of a debauched and dissolute youth. But we are
+inquiring into the conduct of a constant and wise man. We may even
+allow a centurion or standard-bearer to be angry, or any others, whom,
+not to explain too far the mysteries of the rhetoricians, I shall not
+mention here; for to touch the passions, where reason cannot be come
+at, may have its use; but my inquiry, as I often repeat, is about a
+wise man.
+
+XXVI. But even envy, detraction, pity, have their use. Why should you
+pity rather than assist, if it is in your power to do so? Is it because
+you cannot be liberal without pity? We should not take sorrows on
+ourselves upon another's account; but we ought to relieve others of
+their grief if we can. But to detract from another's reputation, or to
+rival him with that vicious emulation which resembles an enmity, of
+what use can that conduct be? Now, envy implies being uneasy at
+another's good because one does not enjoy it one's self; but detraction
+is the being uneasy at another's good, merely because he enjoys it. How
+can it be right that you should voluntarily grieve, rather than take
+the trouble of acquiring what you want to have? for it is madness in
+the highest degree to desire to be the only one that has any particular
+happiness. But who can with correctness speak in praise of a mediocrity
+of evils? Can any one in whom there is lust or desire be otherwise than
+libidinous or desirous? or can a man who is occupied by anger avoid
+being angry? or can one who is exposed to any vexation escape being
+vexed? or if he is under the influence of fear, must he not be fearful?
+Do we look, then, on the libidinous, the angry, the anxious, and the
+timid man, as persons of wisdom, of excellence? of which I could speak
+very copiously and diffusely, but I wish to be as concise as possible.
+And so I will merely say that wisdom is an acquaintance with all divine
+and human affairs, and a knowledge of the cause of everything. Hence it
+is that it imitates what is divine, and looks upon all human concerns
+as inferior to virtue. Did you, then, say that it was your opinion that
+such a man was as naturally liable to perturbation as the sea is
+exposed to winds? What is there that can discompose such gravity and
+constancy? Anything sudden or unforeseen? How can anything of this kind
+befall one to whom nothing is sudden and unforeseen that can happen to
+man? Now, as to their saying that redundancies should be pared off, and
+only what is natural remain, what, I pray you, can be natural which may
+be too exuberant?
+
+XXVII. All these assertions proceed from the roots of errors, which
+must be entirely plucked up and destroyed, not pared and amputated. But
+as I suspect that your inquiry is not so much respecting the wise man
+as concerning yourself (for you allow that he is free from all
+perturbations, and you would willingly be so too yourself), let us see
+what remedies there are which may be applied by philosophy to the
+diseases of the mind. There is certainly some remedy; nor has nature
+been so unkind to the human race as to have discovered so many things
+salutary to the body, and none which are medicinal to the mind. She has
+even been kinder to the mind than to the body; inasmuch as you must
+seek abroad for the assistance which the body requires, while the mind
+has all that it requires within itself. But in proportion as the
+excellency of the mind is of a higher and more divine nature, the more
+diligence does it require; and therefore reason, when it is well
+applied, discovers what is best, but when it is neglected, it becomes
+involved in many errors. I shall apply, then, all my discourse to you;
+for though you pretend to be inquiring about the wise man, your inquiry
+may possibly be about yourself. Various, then, are the cures of those
+perturbations which I have expounded, for every disorder is not to be
+appeased the same way. One medicine must be applied to the man who
+mourns, another to the pitiful, another to the person who envies; for
+there is this difference to be maintained in all the four
+perturbations: we are to consider whether our discourse had better be
+directed to perturbations in general, which are a contempt of reason,
+or a somewhat too vehement appetite; or whether it would be better
+applied to particular descriptions, as, for instance, to fear, lust,
+and the rest, and whether it appears preferable to endeavor to remove
+that which has occasioned the grief, or rather to attempt wholly to
+eradicate every kind of grief. As, should any one grieve that he is
+poor, the question is, Would you maintain poverty to be no evil, or
+would you contend that a man ought not to grieve at anything? Certainly
+this last is the best course; for should you not convince him with
+regard to poverty, you must allow him to grieve; but if you remove
+grief by particular arguments, such as I used yesterday, the evil of
+poverty is in some manner removed.
+
+XXVIII. But any perturbation of the mind of this sort may be, as it
+were, wiped away by the method of appeasing the mind, if you succeed in
+showing that there is no good in that which has given rise to joy and
+lust, nor any evil in that which has occasioned fear or grief. But
+certainly the most effectual cure is to be achieved by showing that all
+perturbations are of themselves vicious, and have nothing natural or
+necessary in them. As we see, grief itself is easily softened when we
+charge those who grieve with weakness and an effeminate mind; or when
+we commend the gravity and constancy of those who bear calmly whatever
+befalls them here, as accidents to which all men are liable; and,
+indeed, this is generally the feeling of those who look on these as
+real evils, but yet think they should be borne with resignation. One
+imagines pleasure to be a good, another money; and yet the one may be
+called off from intemperance, the other from covetousness. The other
+method and address, which, at the same time that it removes the false
+opinion, withdraws the disorder, has more subtlety in it; but it seldom
+succeeds, and is not applicable to vulgar minds, for there are some
+diseases which that medicine can by no means remove. For, should any
+one be uneasy because he is without virtue, without courage, destitute
+of a sense of duty or honesty, his anxiety proceeds from a real evil;
+and yet we must apply another method of cure to him, and such a one as
+all the philosophers, however they may differ about other things, agree
+in. For they must necessarily agree in this, that commotions of the
+mind in opposition to right reason are vicious; and that even admitting
+those things to be evils which occasion fear or grief, and those to be
+goods which provoke desire or joy, yet that very commotion itself is
+vicious; for we mean by the expressions magnanimous and brave, one who
+is resolute, sedate, grave, and superior to everything in this life;
+but one who either grieves, or fears, or covets, or is transported with
+passion, cannot come under that denomination; for these things are
+consistent only with those who look on the things of this world as
+things with which their minds are unequal to contend.
+
+XXIX. Wherefore, as I before said, the philosophers have all one method
+of cure, so that we need say nothing about what sort of thing that is
+which disturbs the mind, but we must speak only concerning the
+perturbation itself. Thus, first, with regard to desire itself, when
+the business is only to remove that, the inquiry is not to be, whether
+that thing be good or evil which provokes lust, but the lust itself is
+to be removed; so that whether whatever is honest is the chief good, or
+whether it consists in pleasure, or in both these things together, or
+in the other three kinds of goods, yet should there be in any one too
+vehement an appetite for even virtue itself, the whole discourse should
+be directed to the deterring him from that vehemence. But human nature,
+when placed in a conspicuous point of view, gives us every argument for
+appeasing the mind, and, to make this the more distinct, the laws and
+conditions of life should be explained in our discourse. Therefore, it
+was not without reason that Socrates is reported, when Euripides was
+exhibiting his play called Orestes, to have repeated the first three
+verses of that tragedy--
+
+    What tragic story men can mournful tell,
+    Whate'er from fate or from the gods befell,
+    That human nature can support--[52]
+
+But, in order to persuade those to whom any misfortune has happened
+that they can and ought to bear it, it is very useful to set before
+them an enumeration of other persons who have borne similar calamities.
+Indeed, the method of appeasing grief was explained in my dispute of
+yesterday, and in my book on Consolation, which I wrote in the midst of
+my own grief; for I was not myself so wise a man as to be insensible to
+grief, and I used this, notwithstanding Chrysippus's advice to the
+contrary, who is against applying a medicine to the agitations of the
+mind while they are fresh; but I did it, and committed a violence on
+nature, that the greatness of my grief might give way to the greatness
+of the medicine.
+
+XXX. But fear borders upon grief, of which I have already said enough;
+but I must say a little more on that. Now, as grief proceeds from what
+is present, so does fear from future evil; so that some have said that
+fear is a certain part of grief: others have called fear the harbinger
+of trouble, which, as it were, introduces the ensuing evil. Now, the
+reasons that make what is present supportable, make what is to come
+very contemptible; for, with regard to both, we should take care to do
+nothing low or grovelling, soft or effeminate, mean or abject. But,
+notwithstanding we should speak of the inconstancy, imbecility, and
+levity of fear itself, yet it is of very great service to speak
+contemptuously of those very things of which we are afraid. So that it
+fell out very well, whether it was by accident or design, that I
+disputed the first and second day on death and pain--the two things
+that are the most dreaded: now, if what I then said was approved of, we
+are in a great degree freed from fear. And this is sufficient, as far
+as regards the opinion of evils.
+
+XXXI. Proceed we now to what are goods--that is to say, to joy and
+desire. To me, indeed, one thing alone seems to embrace the question of
+all that relates to the perturbations of the mind--the fact, namely,
+that all perturbations are in our own power; that they are taken up
+upon opinion, and are voluntary. This error, then, must be got rid of;
+this opinion must be removed; and, as with regard to imagined evils, we
+are to make them more supportable, so with respect to goods, we are to
+lessen the violent effects of those things which are called great and
+joyous. But one thing is to be observed, that equally relates both to
+good and evil: that, should it be difficult to persuade any one that
+none of those things which disturb the mind are to be looked on as good
+or evil, yet a different cure is to be applied to different feelings;
+and the malevolent person is to be corrected by one way of reasoning,
+the lover by another, the anxious man by another, and the fearful by
+another: and it would be easy for any one who pursues the best approved
+method of reasoning, with regard to good and evil, to maintain that no
+fool can be affected with joy, as he never can have anything good. But,
+at present, my discourse proceeds upon the common received notions.
+Let, then, honors, riches, pleasures, and the rest be the very good
+things which they are imagined to be; yet a too elevated and exulting
+joy on the possession of them is unbecoming; just as, though it might
+be allowable to laugh, to giggle would be indecent. Thus, a mind
+enlarged by joy is as blamable as a contraction of it by grief; and
+eager longing is a sign of as much levity in desiring as immoderate joy
+is in possessing; and, as those who are too dejected are said to be
+effeminate, so they who are too elated with joy are properly called
+volatile; and as feeling envy is a part of grief, and the being pleased
+with another's misfortune is a kind of joy, both these feelings are
+usually corrected by showing the wildness and insensibility of them:
+and as it becomes a man to be cautious, but it is unbecoming in him to
+be fearful, so to be pleased is proper, but to be joyful improper. I
+have, in order that I might be the better understood, distinguished
+pleasure from joy. I have already said above, that a contraction of the
+mind can never be right, but that an elation of it may; for the joy of
+Hector in Nævius is one thing--
+
+    'Tis joy indeed to hear my praises sung
+    By you, who are the theme of honor's tongue--
+
+but that of the character in Trabea another: "The kind procuress,
+allured by my money, will observe my nod, will watch my desires, and
+study my will. If I but move the door with my little finger, instantly
+it flies open; and if Chrysis should unexpectedly discover me, she will
+run with joy to meet me, and throw herself into my arms."
+
+Now he will tell you how excellent he thinks this:
+
+    Not even fortune herself is so fortunate.
+
+XXXII. Any one who attends the least to the subject will be convinced
+how unbecoming this joy is. And as they are very shameful who are
+immoderately delighted with the enjoyment of venereal pleasures, so are
+they very scandalous who lust vehemently after them. And all that which
+is commonly called love (and, believe me, I can find out no other name
+to call it by) is of such a trivial nature that nothing, I think, is to
+be compared to it: of which Cæcilius says,
+
+    I hold the man of every sense bereaved
+    Who grants not Love to be of Gods the chief:
+    Whose mighty power whate'er is good effects,
+    Who gives to each his beauty and defects:
+    Hence, health and sickness; wit and folly, hence,
+    The God that love and hatred doth dispense!
+
+An excellent corrector of life this same poetry, which thinks that
+love, the promoter of debauchery and vanity, should have a place in the
+council of the Gods! I am speaking of comedy, which could not subsist
+at all without our approving of these debaucheries. But what said that
+chief of the Argonauts in tragedy?
+
+    My life I owe to honor less than love.
+
+What, then, are we to say of this love of Medea?--what a train of
+miseries did it occasion! And yet the same woman has the assurance to
+say to her father, in another poet, that she had a husband
+
+    Dearer by love than ever fathers were.
+
+XXXIII. However, we may allow the poets to trifle, in whose fables we
+see Jupiter himself engaged in these debaucheries: but let us apply to
+the masters of virtue--the philosophers who deny love to be anything
+carnal; and in this they differ from Epicurus, who, I think, is not
+much mistaken. For what is that love of friendship? How comes it that
+no one is in love with a deformed young man, or a handsome old one? I
+am of opinion that this love of men had its rise from the Gymnastics of
+the Greeks, where these kinds of loves are admissible and permitted;
+therefore Ennius spoke well:
+
+    The censure of this crime to those is due
+    Who naked bodies first exposed to view.
+
+Now, supposing them chaste, which I think is hardly possible, they are
+uneasy and distressed, and the more so because they contain and refrain
+themselves. But, to pass over the love of women, where nature has
+allowed more liberty, who can misunderstand the poets in their rape of
+Ganymede, or not apprehend what Laius says, and what he desires, in
+Euripides? Lastly, what have the principal poets and the most learned
+men published of themselves in their poems and songs? What doth Alcæus,
+who was distinguished in his own republic for his bravery, write on the
+love of young men? And as for Anacreon's poetry, it is wholly on love.
+But Ibycus of Rhegium appears, from his writings, to have had this love
+stronger on him than all the rest.
+
+XXXIV. Now we see that the loves of all these writers were entirely
+libidinous. There have arisen also some among us philosophers (and
+Plato is at the head of them, whom Dicæarchus blames not without
+reason) who have countenanced love. The Stoics, in truth, say, not only
+that their wise man may be a lover, but they even define love itself as
+an endeavor to originate friendship out of the appearance of beauty.
+Now, provided there is any one in the nature of things without desire,
+without care, without a sigh, such a one may be a lover; for he is free
+from all lust: but I have nothing to say to him, as it is lust of which
+I am now speaking. But should there be any love--as there certainly
+is--which is but little, or perhaps not at all, short of madness, such
+as his is in the Leucadia--
+
+    Should there be any God whose care I am--
+
+it is incumbent on all the Gods to see that he enjoys his amorous
+pleasure.
+
+    Wretch that I am!
+
+Nothing is more true, and he says very appropriately,
+
+    What, are you sane, who at this rate lament?
+
+He seems even to his friends to be out of his senses: then how tragical
+he becomes!
+
+    Thy aid, divine Apollo, I implore,
+    And thine, dread ruler of the wat'ry store!
+    Oh! all ye winds, assist me!
+
+He thinks that the whole world ought to apply itself to help his love:
+he excludes Venus alone, as unkind to him.
+
+    Thy aid, O Venus, why should I invoke?
+
+He thinks Venus too much employed in her own lust to have regard to
+anything else, as if he himself had not said and committed these
+shameful things from lust.
+
+XXXV. Now, the cure for one who is affected in this manner is to show
+how light, how contemptible, how very trifling he is in what he
+desires; how he may turn his affections to another object, or
+accomplish his desires by some other means; or else to persuade him
+that he may entirely disregard it: sometimes he is to be led away to
+objects of another kind, to study, business, or other different
+engagements and concerns: very often the cure is effected by change of
+place, as sick people, that have not recovered their strength, are
+benefited by change of air. Some people think an old love may be driven
+out by a new one, as one nail drives out another: but, above all
+things, the man thus afflicted should be advised what madness love is:
+for of all the perturbations of the mind, there is not one which is
+more vehement; for (without charging it with rapes, debaucheries,
+adultery, or even incest, the baseness of any of these being very
+blamable; not, I say, to mention these) the very perturbation of the
+mind in love is base of itself, for, to pass over all its acts of
+downright madness, what weakness do not those very things which are
+looked upon as indifferent argue?
+
+    Affronts and jealousies, jars, squabbles, wars,
+    Then peace again. The man who seeks to fix
+    These restless feelings, and to subjugate
+    Them to some regular law, is just as wise
+    As one who'd try to lay down rules by which
+    Men should go mad.[53]
+
+Now, is not this inconstancy and mutability of mind enough to deter any
+one by its own deformity? We are to demonstrate, as was said of every
+perturbation, that there are no such feelings which do not consist
+entirely of opinion and judgment, and are not owing to ourselves. For
+if love were natural, all would be in love, and always so, and all love
+the same object; nor would one be deterred by shame, another by
+reflection, another by satiety.
+
+XXXVI. Anger, too, when it disturbs the mind any time, leaves no room
+to doubt its being madness: by the instigation of which we see such
+contention as this between brothers:
+
+    Where was there ever impudence like thine?
+    Who on thy malice ever could refine?[54]
+
+You know what follows: for abuses are thrown out by these brothers with
+great bitterness in every other verse; so that you may easily know them
+for the sons of Atreus, of that Atreus who invented a new punishment
+for his brother:
+
+    I who his cruel heart to gall am bent,
+    Some new, unheard-of torment must invent.
+
+Now, what were these inventions? Hear Thyestes:
+
+    My impious brother fain would have me eat
+    My children, and thus serves them up for meat.
+
+To what length now will not anger go? even as far as madness. Therefore
+we say, properly enough, that angry men have given up their power, that
+is, they are out of the power of advice, reason, and understanding; for
+these ought to have power over the whole mind. Now, you should put
+those out of the way whom they endeavor to attack till they have
+recollected themselves; but what does recollection here imply but
+getting together again the dispersed parts of their mind into their
+proper place? or else you must beg and entreat them, if they have the
+means of revenge, to defer it to another opportunity, till their anger
+cools. But the expression of cooling implies, certainly, that there was
+a heat raised in their minds in opposition to reason; from which
+consideration that saying of Archytas is commended, who being somewhat
+provoked at his steward, "How would I have treated you," said he, "if I
+had not been in a passion?"
+
+XXXVII. Where, then, are they who say that anger has its use? Can
+madness be of any use? But still it is natural. Can anything be natural
+that is against reason? or how is it, if anger is natural, that one
+person is more inclined to anger than another? or that the lust of
+revenge should cease before it has revenged itself? or that any one
+should repent of what he had done in a passion? as we see that
+Alexander the king did, who could scarcely keep his hands from himself,
+when he had killed his favorite Clytus, so great was his compunction.
+Now who that is acquainted with these instances can doubt that this
+motion of the mind is altogether in opinion and voluntary? for who can
+doubt that disorders of the mind, such as covetousness and a desire of
+glory, arise from a great estimation of those things by which the mind
+is disordered? from whence we may understand that every perturbation of
+the mind is founded in opinion. And if boldness--that is to say, a firm
+assurance of mind--is a kind of knowledge and serious opinion not
+hastily taken up, then diffidence is a fear of an expected and
+impending evil; and if hope is an expectation of good, fear must, of
+course, be an expectation of evil. Thus fear and other perturbations
+are evils. Therefore, as constancy proceeds from knowledge, so does
+perturbation from error. Now, they who are said to be naturally
+inclined to anger, or to pity, or to envy, or to any feeling of this
+kind, their minds are constitutionally, as it were, in bad health; yet
+they are curable, as the disposition of Socrates is said to have been;
+for when Zopyrus, who professed to know the character of every one from
+his person, had heaped a great many vices on him in a public assembly,
+he was laughed at by others, who could perceive no such vices in
+Socrates; but Socrates kept him in countenance by declaring that such
+vices were natural to him, but that he had got the better of them by
+his reason. Therefore, as any one who has the appearance of the best
+constitution may yet appear to be naturally rather inclined to some
+particular disorder, so different minds may be more particularly
+inclined to different diseases. But as to those men who are said to be
+vicious, not by nature, but their own fault, their vices proceed from
+wrong opinions of good and bad things, so that one is more prone than
+another to different motions and perturbations. But, just as it is in
+the case of the body, an inveterate disease is harder to be got rid of
+than a sudden disorder; and it is more easy to cure a fresh tumor in
+the eyes than to remove a defluxion of any continuance.
+
+XXXVIII. But as the cause of perturbations is now discovered, for all
+of them arise from the judgment or opinion, or volition, I shall put an
+end to this discourse. But we ought to be assured, since the boundaries
+of good and evil are now discovered, as far as they are discoverable by
+man, that nothing can be desired of philosophy greater or more useful
+than the discussions which we have held these four days. For besides
+instilling a contempt of death, and relieving pain so as to enable men
+to bear it, we have added the appeasing of grief, than which there is
+no greater evil to man. For though every perturbation of mind is
+grievous, and differs but little from madness, yet we are used to say
+of others when they are under any perturbation, as of fear, joy, or
+desire, that they are agitated and disturbed; but of those who give
+themselves up to grief, that they are miserable, afflicted, wretched,
+unhappy. So that it doth not seem to be by accident, but with reason
+proposed by you, that I should discuss grief, and the other
+perturbations separately; for there lies the spring and head of all our
+miseries; but the cure of grief, and of other disorders, is one and the
+same in that they are all voluntary, and founded on opinion; we take
+them on ourselves because it seems right so to do. Philosophy
+undertakes to eradicate this error, as the root of all our evils: let
+us therefore surrender ourselves to be instructed by it, and suffer
+ourselves to be cured; for while these evils have possession of us, we
+not only cannot be happy, but cannot be right in our minds. We must
+either deny that reason can effect anything, while, on the other hand,
+nothing can be done right without reason, or else, since philosophy
+depends on the deductions of reason, we must seek from her, if we would
+be good or happy, every help and assistance for living well and
+happily.
+
+
+
+
+BOOK V.
+
+WHETHER VIRTUE ALONE BE SUFFICIENT FOR A HAPPY LIFE.
+
+
+I. This fifth day, Brutus, shall put an end to our Tusculan
+Disputations: on which day we discussed your favorite subject. For I
+perceive from that book which you wrote for me with the greatest
+accuracy, as well as from your frequent conversation, that you are
+clearly of this opinion, that virtue is of itself sufficient for a
+happy life: and though it may be difficult to prove this, on account of
+the many various strokes of fortune, yet it is a truth of such a nature
+that we should endeavor to facilitate the proof of it. For among all
+the topics of philosophy, there is not one of more dignity or
+importance. For as the first philosophers must have had some inducement
+to neglect everything for the search of the best state of life: surely,
+the inducement must have been the hope of living happily, which
+impelled them to devote so much care and pains to that study. Now, if
+virtue was discovered and carried to perfection by them, and if virtue
+is a sufficient security for a happy life, who can avoid thinking the
+work of philosophizing excellently recommended by them, and undertaken
+by me? But if virtue, as being subject to such various and uncertain
+accidents, were but the slave of fortune, and were not of sufficient
+ability to support herself, I am afraid that it would seem desirable
+rather to offer up prayers, than to rely on our own confidence in
+virtue as the foundation for our hope of a happy life. And, indeed,
+when I reflect on those troubles with which I have been so severely
+exercised by fortune, I begin to distrust this opinion; and sometimes
+even to dread the weakness and frailty of human nature, for I am afraid
+lest, when nature had given us infirm bodies, and had joined to them
+incurable diseases and intolerable pains, she perhaps also gave us
+minds participating in these bodily pains, and harassed also with
+troubles and uneasinesses, peculiarly their own. But here I correct
+myself for forming my judgment of the power of virtue more from the
+weakness of others, or of myself perhaps, than from virtue itself: for
+she herself (provided there is such a thing as virtue; and your uncle
+Brutus has removed all doubt of it) has everything that can befall
+mankind in subjection to her; and by disregarding such things, she is
+far removed from being at all concerned at human accidents; and, being
+free from every imperfection, she thinks that nothing which is external
+to herself can concern her. But we, who increase every approaching evil
+by our fear, and every present one by our grief, choose rather to
+condemn the nature of things than our own errors.
+
+II. But the amendment of this fault, and of all our other vices and
+offences, is to be sought for in philosophy: and as my own inclination
+and desire led me, from my earliest youth upward, to seek her
+protection, so, under my present misfortunes, I have had recourse to
+the same port from whence I set out, after having been tossed by a
+violent tempest. O Philosophy, thou guide of life! thou discoverer of
+virtue and expeller of vices! what had not only I myself, but the whole
+life of man, been without you? To you it is that we owe the origin of
+cities; you it was who called together the dispersed race of men into
+social life; you united them together, first, by placing them near one
+another, then by marriages, and lastly, by the communication of speech
+and languages. You have been the inventress of laws; you have been our
+instructress in morals and discipline; to you we fly for refuge; from
+you we implore assistance; and as I formerly submitted to you in a
+great degree, so now I surrender up myself entirely to you. For one day
+spent well, and agreeably to your precepts, is preferable to an
+eternity of error. Whose assistance, then, can be of more service to me
+than yours, when you have bestowed on us tranquillity of life, and
+removed the fear of death? But Philosophy is so far from being praised
+as much as she has deserved by mankind, that she is wholly neglected by
+most men, and actually evil spoken of by many. Can any person speak ill
+of the parent of life, and dare to pollute himself thus with parricide,
+and be so impiously ungrateful as to accuse her whom he ought to
+reverence, even were he less able to appreciate the advantages which he
+might derive from her? But this error, I imagine, and this darkness has
+spread itself over the minds of ignorant men, from their not being able
+to look so far back, and from their not imagining that those men by
+whom human life was first improved were philosophers; for though we see
+philosophy to have been of long standing, yet the name must be
+acknowledged to be but modern.
+
+III. But, indeed, who can dispute the antiquity of philosophy, either
+in fact or name? For it acquired this excellent name from the ancients,
+by the knowledge of the origin and causes of everything, both divine
+and human. Thus those seven [Greek: Sophoi], as they were considered
+and called by the Greeks, have always been esteemed and called wise men
+by us; and thus Lycurgus many ages before, in whose time, before the
+building of this city, Homer is said to have lived, as well as Ulysses
+and Nestor in the heroic ages, are all handed down to us by tradition
+as having really been what they were called, wise men; nor would it
+have been said that Atlas supported the heavens, or that Prometheus was
+bound to Caucasus, nor would Cepheus, with his wife, his son-in-law,
+and his daughter have been enrolled among the constellations, but that
+their more than human knowledge of the heavenly bodies had transferred
+their names into an erroneous fable. From whence all who occupied
+themselves in the contemplation of nature were both considered and
+called wise men; and that name of theirs continued to the age of
+Pythagoras, who is reported to have gone to Phlius, as we find it
+stated by Heraclides Ponticus, a very learned man, and a pupil of
+Plato, and to have discoursed very learnedly and copiously on certain
+subjects with Leon, prince of the Phliasii; and when Leon, admiring his
+ingenuity and eloquence, asked him what art he particularly professed,
+his answer was, that he was acquainted with no art, but that he was a
+philosopher. Leon, surprised at the novelty of the name, inquired what
+he meant by the name of philosopher, and in what philosophers differed
+from other men; on which Pythagoras replied, "That the life of man
+seemed to him to resemble those games which were celebrated with the
+greatest possible variety of sports and the general concourse of all
+Greece. For as in those games there were some persons whose object was
+glory and the honor of a crown, to be attained by the performance of
+bodily exercises, so others were led thither by the gain of buying and
+selling, and mere views of profit; but there was likewise one class of
+persons, and they were by far the best, whose aim was neither applause
+nor profit, but who came merely as spectators through curiosity, to
+observe what was done, and to see in what manner things were carried on
+there. And thus, said he, we come from another life and nature unto
+this one, just as men come out of some other city, to some much
+frequented mart; some being slaves to glory, others to money; and there
+are some few who, taking no account of anything else, earnestly look
+into the nature of things; and these men call themselves studious of
+wisdom, that is, philosophers: and as there it is the most reputable
+occupation of all to be a looker-on without making any acquisition, so
+in life, the contemplating things, and acquainting one's self with
+them, greatly exceeds every other pursuit of life."
+
+IV. Nor was Pythagoras the inventor only of the name, but he enlarged
+also the thing itself, and, when he came into Italy after this
+conversation at Phlius, he adorned that Greece, which is called Great
+Greece, both privately and publicly, with the most excellent
+institutions and arts; but of his school and system I shall, perhaps,
+find another opportunity to speak. But numbers and motions, and the
+beginning and end of all things, were the subjects of the ancient
+philosophy down to Socrates, who was a pupil of Archelaus, who had been
+the disciple of Anaxagoras. These made diligent inquiry into the
+magnitude of the stars, their distances, courses, and all that relates
+to the heavens. But Socrates was the first who brought down philosophy
+from the heavens, placed it in cities, introduced it into families, and
+obliged it to examine into life and morals, and good and evil. And his
+different methods of discussing questions, together with the variety of
+his topics, and the greatness of his abilities, being immortalized by
+the memory and writings of Plato, gave rise to many sects of
+philosophers of different sentiments, of all which I have principally
+adhered to that one which, in my opinion, Socrates himself followed;
+and argue so as to conceal my own opinion, while I deliver others from
+their errors, and so discover what has the greatest appearance of
+probability in every question. And the custom Carneades adopted with
+great copiousness and acuteness, and I myself have often given in to it
+on many occasions elsewhere, and in this manner, too, I disputed
+lately, in my Tusculan villa; indeed, I have sent you a book of the
+four former days' discussions; but the fifth day, when we had seated
+ourselves as before, what we were to dispute on was proposed thus:
+
+V. _A._ I do not think virtue can possibly be sufficient for a happy
+life.
+
+_M._ But my friend Brutus thinks so, whose judgment, with submission, I
+greatly prefer to yours.
+
+_A._ I make no doubt of it; but your regard for him is not the business
+now: the question is now, what is the real character of that quality of
+which I have declared my opinion. I wish you to dispute on that.
+
+_M._ What! do you deny that virtue can possibly be sufficient for a
+happy life?
+
+_A._ It is what I entirely deny.
+
+_M._ What! is not virtue sufficient to enable us to live as we ought,
+honestly, commendably, or, in fine, to live well?
+
+_A._ Certainly sufficient.
+
+_M._ Can you, then, help calling any one miserable who lives ill? or
+will you deny that any one who you allow lives well must inevitably
+live happily?
+
+_A._ Why may I not? for a man may be upright in his life, honest,
+praiseworthy, even in the midst of torments, and therefore live well.
+Provided you understand what I mean by well; for when I say well, I
+mean with constancy, and dignity, and wisdom, and courage; for a man
+may display all these qualities on the rack; but yet the rack is
+inconsistent with a happy life.
+
+_M._ What, then? is your happy life left on the outside of the prison,
+while constancy, dignity, wisdom, and the other virtues, are
+surrendered up to the executioner, and bear punishment and pain without
+reluctance?
+
+_A._ You must look out for something new if you would do any good.
+These things have very little effect on me, not merely from their being
+common, but principally because, like certain light wines that will not
+bear water, these arguments of the Stoics are pleasanter to taste than
+to swallow. As when that assemblage of virtues is committed to the
+rack, it raises so reverend a spectacle before our eyes that happiness
+seems to hasten on towards them, and not to suffer them to be deserted
+by her. But when you take your attention off from this picture and
+these images of the virtues to the truth and the reality, what remains
+without disguise is, the question whether any one can be happy in
+torment? Wherefore let us now examine that point, and not be under any
+apprehensions, lest the virtues should expostulate, and complain that
+they are forsaken by happiness. For if prudence is connected with every
+virtue, then prudence itself discovers this, that all good men are not
+therefore happy; and she recollects many things of Marcus Atilius[55],
+Quintus Cæpio[56], Marcus Aquilius[57]; and prudence herself, if these
+representations are more agreeable to you than the things themselves,
+restrains happiness when it is endeavoring to throw itself into
+torments, and denies that it has any connection with pain and torture.
+
+VI. _M._ I can easily bear with your behaving in this manner, though it
+is not fair in you to prescribe to me how you would have me carry on
+this discussion. But I ask you if I have effected anything or nothing
+in the preceding days?
+
+_A._ Yes; something was done, some little matter indeed.
+
+_M._ But if that is the case, this question is settled, and almost put
+an end to.
+
+_A._ How so?
+
+_M._ Because turbulent motions and violent agitations of the mind, when
+it is raised and elated by a rash impulse, getting the better of
+reason, leave no room for a happy life. For who that fears either pain
+or death, the one of which is always present, the other always
+impending, can be otherwise than miserable? Now, supposing the same
+person--which is often the case--to be afraid of poverty, ignominy,
+infamy, or weakness, or blindness, or, lastly, slavery, which doth not
+only befall individual men, but often even the most powerful nations;
+now can any one under the apprehension of these evils be happy? What
+shall we say of him who not only dreads these evils as impending, but
+actually feels and bears them at present? Let us unite in the same
+person banishment, mourning, the loss of children; now, how can any one
+who is broken down and rendered sick in body and mind by such
+affliction be otherwise than very miserable indeed? What reason, again,
+can there be why a man should not rightly enough be called miserable
+whom we see inflamed and raging with lust, coveting everything with an
+insatiable desire, and, in proportion as he derives more pleasure from
+anything, thirsting the more violently after them? And as to a man
+vainly elated, exulting with an empty joy, and boasting of himself
+without reason, is not he so much the more miserable in proportion as
+he thinks himself happier? Therefore, as these men are miserable, so,
+on the other hand, those are happy who are alarmed by no fears, wasted
+by no griefs, provoked by no lusts, melted by no languid pleasures that
+arise from vain and exulting joys. We look on the sea as calm when not
+the least breath of air disturbs its waves; and, in like manner, the
+placid and quiet state of the mind is discovered when unmoved by any
+perturbation. Now, if there be any one who holds the power of fortune,
+and everything human, everything that can possibly befall any man, as
+supportable, so as to be out of the reach of fear or anxiety, and if
+such a man covets nothing, and is lifted up by no vain joy of mind,
+what can prevent his being happy? And if these are the effects of
+virtue, why cannot virtue itself make men happy?
+
+VII. _A._ But the other of these two propositions is undeniable, that
+they who are under no apprehensions, who are noways uneasy, who covet
+nothing, who are lifted up by no vain joy, are happy: and therefore I
+grant you that. But as for the other, that is not now in a fit state
+for discussion; for it has been proved by your former arguments that a
+wise man is free from every perturbation of mind.
+
+_M._ Doubtless, then, the dispute is over; for the question appears to
+have been entirely exhausted.
+
+_A._ I think, indeed, that that is almost the case.
+
+_M._ But yet that is more usually the case with the mathematicians than
+philosophers. For when the geometricians teach anything, if what they
+have before taught relates to their present subject, they take that for
+granted which has been already proved, and explain only what they had
+not written on before. But the philosophers, whatever subject they have
+in hand, get together everything that relates to it, notwithstanding
+they may have dilated on it somewhere else. Were not that the case, why
+should the Stoics say so much on that question, Whether virtue was
+abundantly sufficient to a happy life? when it would have been answer
+enough that they had before taught that nothing was good but what was
+honorable; for, as this had been proved, the consequence must be that
+virtue was sufficient to a happy life; and each premise may be made to
+follow from the admission of the other, so that if it be admitted that
+virtue is sufficient to secure a happy life, it may also be inferred
+that nothing is good except what is honorable. They, however, do not
+proceed in this manner; for they would separate books about what is
+honorable, and what is the chief good; and when they have demonstrated
+from the one that virtue has power enough to make life happy, yet they
+treat this point separately; for everything, and especially a subject
+of such great consequence, should be supported by arguments and
+exhortations which belong to that alone. For you should have a care how
+you imagine philosophy to have uttered anything more noble, or that she
+has promised anything more fruitful or of greater consequence, for,
+good Gods! doth she not engage that she will render him who submits to
+her laws so accomplished as to be always armed against fortune, and to
+have every assurance within himself of living well and happily--that he
+shall, in short, be forever happy? But let us see what she will
+perform? In the mean while, I look upon it as a great thing that she
+has even made such a promise. For Xerxes, who was loaded with all the
+rewards and gifts of fortune, not satisfied with his armies of horse
+and foot, nor the multitude of his ships, nor his infinite treasure of
+gold, offered a reward to any one who could find out a new pleasure;
+and yet, when it was discovered, he was not satisfied with it; nor can
+there ever be an end to lust. I wish we could engage any one by a
+reward to produce something the better to establish us in this belief.
+
+VIII. _A._ I wish that, indeed, myself; but I want a little
+information. For I allow that in what you have stated the one
+proposition is the consequence of the other; that as, if what is
+honorable be the only good, it must follow that a happy life is the
+effect of virtue: so that if a happy life consists in virtue, nothing
+can be good but virtue. But your friend Brutus, on the authority of
+Aristo and Antiochus, does not see this; for he thinks the case would
+be the same even if there were anything good besides virtue.
+
+_M._ What, then? do you imagine that I am going to argue against
+Brutus?
+
+_A._ You may do what you please; for it is not for me to prescribe what
+you shall do.
+
+_M._ How these things agree together shall be examined somewhere else;
+for I frequently discussed that point with Antiochus, and lately with
+Aristo, when, during the period of my command as general, I was lodging
+with him at Athens. For to me it seemed that no one could possibly be
+happy under any evil; but a wise man might be afflicted with evil, if
+there are any things arising from body or fortune deserving the name of
+evils. These things were said, which Antiochus has inserted in his
+books in many places--that virtue itself was sufficient to make life
+happy, but yet not perfectly happy; and that many things derive their
+names from the predominant portion of them, though they do not include
+everything, as strength, health, riches, honor, and glory: which
+qualities are determined by their kind, not their number. Thus a happy
+life is so called from its being so in a great degree, even though it
+should fall short in some point. To clear this up is not absolutely
+necessary at present, though it seems to be said without any great
+consistency; for I cannot imagine what is wanting to one that is happy
+to make him happier, for if anything be wanting to him, he cannot be so
+much as happy; and as to what they say, that everything is named and
+estimated from its predominant portion, that may be admitted in some
+things. But when they allow three kinds of evils--when any one is
+oppressed with every imaginable evil of two kinds, being afflicted with
+adverse fortune, and having at the same time his body worn out and
+harassed with all sorts of pains--shall we say that such a one is but
+little short of a happy life, to say nothing about the happiest
+possible life?
+
+IX. This is the point which Theophrastus was unable to maintain; for
+after he had once laid down the position that stripes, torments,
+tortures, the ruin of one's country, banishment, the loss of children,
+had great influence on men's living miserably and unhappily, he durst
+not any longer use any high and lofty expressions when he was so low
+and abject in his opinion. How right he was is not the question; he
+certainly was consistent. Therefore, I am not for objecting to
+consequences where the premises are admitted. But this most elegant and
+learned of all the philosophers is not taken to task very severely when
+he asserts his three kinds of good; but he is attacked by every one for
+that book which he wrote on a happy life, in which book he has many
+arguments why one who is tortured and racked cannot be happy. For in
+that book he is supposed to say that a man who is placed on the wheel
+(that is a kind of torture in use among the Greeks) cannot attain to a
+completely happy life. He nowhere, indeed, says so absolutely; but what
+he says amounts to the same thing. Can I, then, find fault with him,
+after having allowed that pains of the body are evils, that the ruin of
+a man's fortunes is an evil, if he should say that every good man is
+not happy, when all those things which he reckons as evils may befall a
+good man? The same Theophrastus is found fault with by all the books
+and schools of the philosophers for commending that sentence in his
+Callisthenes,
+
+    Fortune, not wisdom, rules the life of man.
+
+They say never did philosopher assert anything so languid. They are
+right, indeed, in that; but I do not apprehend anything could be more
+consistent, for if there are so many good things that depend on the
+body, and so many foreign to it that depend on chance and fortune, is
+it inconsistent to say that fortune, which governs everything, both
+what is foreign and what belongs to the body, has greater power than
+counsel. Or would we rather imitate Epicurus? who is often excellent in
+many things which he speaks, but quite indifferent how consistent he
+may be, or how much to the purpose he is speaking. He commends spare
+diet, and in that he speaks as a philosopher; but it is for Socrates or
+Antisthenes to say so, and not for one who confines all good to
+pleasure. He denies that any one can live pleasantly unless he lives
+honestly, wisely, and justly. Nothing is more dignified than this
+assertion, nothing more becoming a philosopher, had he not measured
+this very expression of living honestly, justly, and wisely by
+pleasure. What could be better than to assert that fortune interferes
+but little with a wise man? But does he talk thus, who, after he has
+said that pain is the greatest evil, or the only evil, might himself be
+afflicted with the sharpest pains all over his body, even at the time
+he is vaunting himself the most against fortune? And this very thing,
+too, Metrodorus has said, but in better language: "I have anticipated
+you, Fortune; I have caught you, and cut off every access, so that you
+cannot possibly reach me." This would be excellent in the mouth of
+Aristo the Chian, or Zeno the Stoic, who held nothing to be an evil but
+what was base; but for you, Metrodorus, to anticipate the approaches of
+fortune, who confine all that is good to your bowels and marrow--for
+you to say so, who define the chief good by a strong constitution of
+body, and well-assured hope of its continuance--for you to cut off
+every access of fortune! Why, you may instantly be deprived of that
+good. Yet the simple are taken with these propositions, and a vast
+crowd is led away by such sentences to become their followers.
+
+X. But it is the duty of one who would argue accurately to consider not
+what is said, but what is said consistently. As in that very opinion
+which we have adopted in this discussion, namely, that every good man
+is always happy, it is clear what I mean by good men: I call those both
+wise and good men who are provided and adorned with every virtue. Let
+us see, then, who are to be called happy. I imagine, indeed, that those
+men are to be called so who are possessed of good without any alloy of
+evil; nor is there any other notion connected with the word that
+expresses happiness but an absolute enjoyment of good without any evil.
+Virtue cannot attain this, if there is anything good besides itself.
+For a crowd of evils would present themselves, if we were to allow
+poverty, obscurity, humility, solitude, the loss of friends, acute
+pains of the body, the loss of health, weakness, blindness, the ruin of
+one's country, banishment, slavery, to be evils; for a wise man may be
+afflicted by all these evils, numerous and important as they are, and
+many others also may be added, for they are brought on by chance, which
+may attack a wise man; but if these things are evils, who can maintain
+that a wise man is always happy when all these evils may light on him
+at the same time? I therefore do not easily agree with my friend
+Brutus, nor with our common masters, nor those ancient ones, Aristotle,
+Speusippus, Xenocrates, Polemon, who reckon all that I have mentioned
+above as evils, and yet they say that a wise man is always happy; nor
+can I allow them, because they are charmed with this beautiful and
+illustrious title, which would very well become Pythagoras, Socrates,
+and Plato, to persuade my mind that strength, health, beauty, riches,
+honors, power, with the beauty of which they are ravished, are
+contemptible, and that all those things which are the opposites of
+these are not to be regarded. Then might they declare openly, with a
+loud voice, that neither the attacks of fortune, nor the opinion of the
+multitude, nor pain, nor poverty, occasions them any apprehensions; and
+that they have everything within themselves, and that there is nothing
+whatever which they consider as good but what is within their own
+power. Nor can I by any means allow the same person who falls into the
+vulgar opinion of good and evil to make use of these expressions, which
+can only become a great and exalted man. Struck with which glory, up
+starts Epicurus, who, with submission to the Gods, thinks a wise man
+always happy. He is much charmed with the dignity of this opinion, but
+he never would have owned that, had he attended to himself; for what is
+there more inconsistent than for one who could say that pain was the
+greatest or the only evil to think also that a wise man can possibly
+say in the midst of his torture, How sweet is this! We are not,
+therefore, to form our judgment of philosophers from detached
+sentences, but from their consistency with themselves, and their
+ordinary manner of talking.
+
+XI. _A._ You compel me to be of your opinion; but have a care that you
+are not inconsistent yourself.
+
+_M._ In what respect?
+
+_A._ Because I have lately read your fourth book on Good and Evil: and
+in that you appeared to me, while disputing against Cato, to be
+endeavoring to show, which in my opinion means to prove, that Zeno and
+the Peripatetics differ only about some new words; but if we allow
+that, what reason can there be, if it follows from the arguments of
+Zeno that virtue contains all that is necessary to a happy life, that
+the Peripatetics should not be at liberty to say the same? For, in my
+opinion, regard should be had to the thing, not to words.
+
+_M._ What! you would convict me from my own words, and bring against me
+what I had said or written elsewhere. You may act in that manner with
+those who dispute by established rules. We live from hand to mouth, and
+say anything that strikes our mind with probability, so that we are the
+only people who are really at liberty. But, since I just now spoke of
+consistency, I do not think the inquiry in this place is, if the
+opinion of Zeno and his pupil Aristo be true that nothing is good but
+what is honorable; but, admitting that, then, whether the whole of a
+happy life can be rested on virtue alone. Wherefore, if we certainly
+grant Brutus this, that a wise man is always happy, how consistent he
+is, is his own business; for who, indeed, is more worthy than himself
+of the glory of that opinion? Still, we may maintain that such a man is
+more happy than any one else.
+
+XII. Though Zeno the Cittiæan, a stranger and an inconsiderable coiner
+of words, appears to have insinuated himself into the old philosophy;
+still, the prevalence of this opinion is due to the authority of Plato,
+who often makes use of this expression, "That nothing but virtue can be
+entitled to the name of good," agreeably to what Socrates says in
+Plato's Gorgias; for it is there related that when some one asked him
+if he did not think Archelaus the son of Perdiccas, who was then looked
+upon as a most fortunate person, a very happy man, "I do not know,"
+replied he, "for I never conversed with him." "What! is there no other
+way you can know it by?" "None at all." "You cannot, then, pronounce of
+the great king of the Persians whether he is happy or not?" "How can I,
+when I do not know how learned or how good a man he is?" "What! do you
+imagine that a happy life depends on that?" "My opinion entirely is,
+that good men are happy, and the wicked miserable." "Is Archelaus,
+then, miserable?" "Certainly, if unjust." Now, does it not appear to
+you that he is here placing the whole of a happy life in virtue alone?
+But what does the same man say in his funeral oration? "For," saith he,
+"whoever has everything that relates to a happy life so entirely
+dependent on himself as not to be connected with the good or bad
+fortune of another, and not to be affected by, or made in any degree
+uncertain by, what befalls another; and whoever is such a one has
+acquired the best rule of living; he is that moderate, that brave, that
+wise man, who submits to the gain and loss of everything, and
+especially of his children, and obeys that old precept; for he will
+never be too joyful or too sad, because he depends entirely upon
+himself."
+
+XIII. From Plato, therefore, all my discourse shall be deduced, as if
+from some sacred and hallowed fountain. Whence can I, then, more
+properly begin than from Nature, the parent of all? For whatsoever she
+produces (I am not speaking only of animals, but even of those things
+which have sprung from the earth in such a manner as to rest on their
+own roots) she designed it to be perfect in its respective kind. So
+that among trees and vines, and those lower plants and trees which
+cannot advance themselves high above the earth, some are evergreen,
+others are stripped of their leaves in winter, and, warmed by the
+spring season, put them out afresh, and there are none of them but what
+are so quickened by a certain interior motion, and their own seeds
+enclosed in every one, so as to yield flowers, fruit, or berries, that
+all may have every perfection that belongs to it; provided no violence
+prevents it. But the force of Nature itself may be more easily
+discovered in animals, as she has bestowed sense on them. For some
+animals she has taught to swim, and designed to be inhabitants of the
+water; others she has enabled to fly, and has willed that they should
+enjoy the boundless air; some others she has made to creep, others to
+walk. Again, of these very animals, some are solitary, some gregarious,
+some wild, others tame, some hidden and buried beneath the earth, and
+every one of these maintains the law of nature, confining itself to
+what was bestowed on it, and unable to change its manner of life. And
+as every animal has from nature something that distinguishes it, which
+every one maintains and never quits; so man has something far more
+excellent, though everything is said to be excellent by comparison. But
+the human mind, being derived from the divine reason, can be compared
+with nothing but with the Deity itself, if I may be allowed the
+expression. This, then, if it is improved, and when its perception is
+so preserved as not to be blinded by errors, becomes a perfect
+understanding, that is to say, absolute reason, which is the very same
+as virtue. And if everything is happy which wants nothing, and is
+complete and perfect in its kind, and that is the peculiar lot of
+virtue, certainly all who are possessed of virtue are happy. And in
+this I agree with Brutus, and also with Aristotle, Xenocrates,
+Speusippus, Polemon.
+
+XIV. To me such are the only men who appear completely happy; for what
+can he want to a complete happy life who relies on his own good
+qualities, or how can he be happy who does not rely on them? But he who
+makes a threefold division of goods must necessarily be diffident, for
+how can he depend on having a sound body, or that his fortune shall
+continue? But no one can be happy without an immovable, fixed, and
+permanent good. What, then, is this opinion of theirs? So that I think
+that saying of the Spartan may be applied to them, who, on some
+merchant's boasting before him that he had despatched ships to every
+maritime coast, replied that a fortune which depended on ropes was not
+very desirable. Can there be any doubt that whatever may be lost cannot
+be properly classed in the number of those things which complete a
+happy life? for of all that constitutes a happy life, nothing will
+admit of withering, or growing old, or wearing out, or decaying; for
+whoever is apprehensive of any loss of these things cannot be happy:
+the happy man should be safe, well fenced, well fortified, out of the
+reach of all annoyance, not like a man under trifling apprehensions,
+but free from all such. As he is not called innocent who but slightly
+offends, but he who offends not at all, so it is he alone who is to be
+considered without fear who is free from all fear, not he who is but in
+little fear. For what else is courage but an affection of mind that is
+ready to undergo perils, and patient in the endurance of pain and labor
+without any alloy of fear? Now, this certainly could not be the case if
+there were anything else good but what depended on honesty alone. But
+how can any one be in possession of that desirable and much-coveted
+security (for I now call a freedom from anxiety a security, on which
+freedom a happy life depends) who has, or may have, a multitude of
+evils attending him? How can he be brave and undaunted, and hold
+everything as trifles which can befall a man? for so a wise man should
+do, unless he be one who thinks that everything depends on himself.
+Could the Lacedæmonians without this, when Philip threatened to prevent
+all their attempts, have asked him if he could prevent their killing
+themselves? Is it not easier, then, to find one man of such a spirit as
+we are inquiring after, than to meet with a whole city of such men?
+Now, if to this courage I am speaking of we add temperance, that it may
+govern all our feelings and agitations, what can be wanting to complete
+his happiness who is secured by his courage from uneasiness and fear,
+and is prevented from immoderate desires and immoderate insolence of
+joy by temperance? I could easily show that virtue is able to produce
+these effects, but that I have explained on the foregoing days.
+
+XV. But as the perturbations of the mind make life miserable, and
+tranquillity renders it happy; and as these perturbations are of two
+sorts, grief and fear, proceeding from imagined evils, and as
+immoderate joy and lust arise from a mistake about what is good, and as
+all these feelings are in opposition to reason and counsel; when you
+see a man at ease, quite free and disengaged from such troublesome
+commotions, which are so much at variance with one another, can you
+hesitate to pronounce such a one a happy man? Now, the wise man is
+always in such a disposition; therefore the wise man is always happy.
+Besides, every good is pleasant; whatever is pleasant may be boasted
+and talked of; whatever may be boasted of is glorious; but whatever is
+glorious is certainly laudable, and whatever is laudable doubtless,
+also, honorable: whatever, then, is good is honorable (but the things
+which they reckon as goods they themselves do not call honorable);
+therefore what is honorable alone is good. Hence it follows that a
+happy life is comprised in honesty alone. Such things, then, are not to
+be called or considered goods, when a man may enjoy an abundance of
+them, and yet be most miserable. Is there any doubt but that a man who
+enjoys the best health, and who has strength and beauty, and his senses
+flourishing in their utmost quickness and perfection--suppose him
+likewise, if you please, nimble and active, nay, give him riches,
+honors, authority, power, glory--now, I say, should this person, who is
+in possession of all these, be unjust, intemperate, timid, stupid, or
+an idiot--could you hesitate to call such a one miserable? What, then,
+are those goods in the possession of which you may be very miserable?
+Let us see if a happy life is not made up of parts of the same nature,
+as a heap implies a quantity of grain of the same kind. And if this be
+once admitted, happiness must be compounded of different good things,
+which alone are honorable; if there is any mixture of things of another
+sort with these, nothing honorable can proceed from such a composition:
+now, take away honesty, and how can you imagine anything happy? For
+whatever is good is desirable on that account; whatever is desirable
+must certainly be approved of; whatever you approve of must be looked
+on as acceptable and welcome. You must consequently impute dignity to
+this; and if so, it must necessarily be laudable: therefore, everything
+that is laudable is good. Hence it follows that what is honorable is
+the only good. And should we not look upon it in this light, there will
+be a great many things which we must call good.
+
+XVI. I forbear to mention riches, which, as any one, let him be ever so
+unworthy, may have them, I do not reckon among goods; for what is good
+is not attainable by all. I pass over notoriety and popular fame,
+raised by the united voice of knaves and fools. Even things which are
+absolute nothings may be called goods; such as white teeth, handsome
+eyes, a good complexion, and what was commended by Euryclea, when she
+was washing Ulysses's feet, the softness of his skin and the mildness
+of his discourse. If you look on these as goods, what greater encomiums
+can the gravity of a philosopher be entitled to than the wild opinion
+of the vulgar and the thoughtless crowd? The Stoics give the name of
+excellent and choice to what the others call good: they call them so,
+indeed; but they do not allow them to complete a happy life. But these
+others think that there is no life happy without them; or, admitting it
+to be happy, they deny it to be the most happy. But our opinion is,
+that it is the most happy; and we prove it from that conclusion of
+Socrates. For thus that author of philosophy argued: that as the
+disposition of a man's mind is, so is the man; such as the man is, such
+will be his discourse; his actions will correspond with his discourse,
+and his life with his actions. But the disposition of a good man's mind
+is laudable; the life, therefore, of a good man is laudable; it is
+honorable, therefore, because laudable; the unavoidable conclusion from
+which is that the life of good men is happy. For, good Gods! did I not
+make it appear, by my former arguments--or was I only amusing myself
+and killing time in what I then said?--that the mind of a wise man was
+always free from every hasty motion which I call a perturbation, and
+that the most undisturbed peace always reigned in his breast? A man,
+then, who is temperate and consistent, free from fear or grief, and
+uninfluenced by any immoderate joy or desire, cannot be otherwise than
+happy; but a wise man is always so, therefore he is always happy.
+Moreover, how can a good man avoid referring all his actions and all
+his feelings to the one standard of whether or not it is laudable? But
+he does refer everything to the object of living happily: it follows,
+then, that a happy life is laudable; but nothing is laudable without
+virtue: a happy life, then, is the consequence of virtue. And this is
+the unavoidable conclusion to be drawn from these arguments.
+
+XVII. A wicked life has nothing which we ought to speak of or glory in;
+nor has that life which is neither happy nor miserable. But there is a
+kind of life that admits of being spoken of, and gloried in, and
+boasted of, as Epaminondas saith,
+
+    The wings of Sparta's pride my counsels clipp'd.
+
+And Africanus boasts,
+
+    Who, from beyond Mæotis to the place
+    Where the sun rises, deeds like mine can trace?
+
+If, then, there is such a thing as a happy life, it is to be gloried
+in, spoken of, and commended by the person who enjoys it; for there is
+nothing excepting that which can be spoken of or gloried in; and when
+that is once admitted, you know what follows. Now, unless an honorable
+life is a happy life, there must, of course, be something preferable to
+a happy life; for that which is honorable all men will certainly grant
+to be preferable to anything else. And thus there will be something
+better than a happy life: but what can be more absurd than such an
+assertion? What! when they grant vice to be effectual to the rendering
+life miserable, must they not admit that there is a corresponding power
+in virtue to make life happy? For contraries follow from contraries.
+And here I ask what weight they think there is in the balance of
+Critolaus, who having put the goods of the mind into one scale, and the
+goods of the body and other external advantages into the other, thought
+the goods of the mind outweighed the others so far that they would
+require the whole earth and sea to equalize the scale.
+
+XVIII. What hinders Critolaus, then, or that gravest of philosophers,
+Xenocrates (who raises virtue so high, and who lessens and depreciates
+everything else), from not only placing a happy life, but the happiest
+possible life, in virtue? And, indeed, if this were not the case,
+virtue would be absolutely lost. For whoever is subject to grief must
+necessarily be subject to fear too, for fear is an uneasy apprehension
+of future grief; and whoever is subject to fear is liable to dread,
+timidity, consternation, cowardice. Therefore, such a person may, some
+time or other, be defeated, and not think himself concerned with that
+precept of Atreus,
+
+    And let men so conduct themselves in life,
+    As to be always strangers to defeat.
+
+But such a man, as I have said, will be defeated; and not only
+defeated, but made a slave of. But we would have virtue always free,
+always invincible; and were it not so, there would be an end of virtue.
+But if virtue has in herself all that is necessary for a good life, she
+is certainly sufficient for happiness: virtue is certainly sufficient,
+too, for our living with courage; if with courage, then with a
+magnanimous spirit, and indeed so as never to be under any fear, and
+thus to be always invincible. Hence it follows that there can be
+nothing to be repented of, no wants, no lets or hinderances. Thus all
+things will be prosperous, perfect, and as you would have them, and,
+consequently, happy; but virtue is sufficient for living with courage,
+and therefore virtue is able by herself to make life happy. For as
+folly, even when possessed of what it desires, never thinks it has
+acquired enough, so wisdom is always satisfied with the present, and
+never repents on her own account.
+
+XIX. Look but on the single consulship of Lælius, and that, too, after
+having been set aside (though when a wise and good man like him is
+outvoted, the people are disappointed of a good consul, rather than be
+disappointed by a vain people); but the point is, would you prefer,
+were it in your power, to be once such a consul as Lælius, or be
+elected four times, like Cinna? I have no doubt in the world what
+answer you will make, and it is on that account I put the question to
+you.
+
+I would not ask every one this question; for some one perhaps might
+answer that he would not only prefer four consulates to one, but even
+one day of Cinna's life to whole ages of many famous men. Lælius would
+have suffered had he but touched any one with his finger; but Cinna
+ordered the head of his colleague consul, Cn. Octavius, to be struck
+off; and put to death P. Crassus[58], and L. Cæsar[59], those excellent
+men, so renowned both at home and abroad; and even M. Antonius[60], the
+greatest orator whom I ever heard; and C. Cæsar, who seems to me to
+have been the pattern of humanity, politeness, sweetness of temper, and
+wit. Could he, then, be happy who occasioned the death of these men? So
+far from it, that he seems to be miserable, not only for having
+performed these actions, but also for acting in such a manner that it
+was lawful for him to do it, though it is unlawful for any one to do
+wicked actions; but this proceeds from inaccuracy, of speech, for we
+call whatever a man is allowed to do lawful. Was not Marius happier, I
+pray you, when he shared the glory of the victory gained over the
+Cimbrians with his colleague Catulus (who was almost another Lælius;
+for I look upon the two men as very like one another), than when,
+conqueror in the civil war, he in a passion answered the friends of
+Catulus, who were interceding for him, "Let him die?" And this answer
+he gave, not once only, but often. But in such a case, he was happier
+who submitted to that barbarous decree than he who issued it. And it is
+better to receive an injury than to do one; and so it was better to
+advance a little to meet that death that was making its approaches, as
+Catulus did, than, like Marius, to sully the glory of six consulships,
+and disgrace his latter days, by the death of such a man.
+
+XX. Dionysius exercised his tyranny over the Syracusans thirty-eight
+years, being but twenty-five years old when he seized on the
+government. How beautiful and how wealthy a city did he oppress with
+slavery! And yet we have it from good authority that he was remarkably
+temperate in his manner of living, that he was very active and
+energetic in carrying on business, but naturally mischievous and
+unjust; from which description every one who diligently inquires into
+truth must inevitably see that he was very miserable. Neither did he
+attain what he so greatly desired, even when he was persuaded that he
+had unlimited power; for, notwithstanding he was of a good family and
+reputable parents (though that is contested by some authors), and had a
+very large acquaintance of intimate friends and relations, and also
+some youths attached to him by ties of love after the fashion of the
+Greeks, he could not trust any one of them, but committed the guard of
+his person to slaves, whom he had selected from rich men's families and
+made free, and to strangers and barbarians. And thus, through an unjust
+desire of governing, he in a manner shut himself up in a prison.
+Besides, he would not trust his throat to a barber, but had his
+daughters taught to shave; so that these royal virgins were forced to
+descend to the base and slavish employment of shaving the head and
+beard of their father. Nor would he trust even them, when they were
+grown up, with a razor; but contrived how they might burn off the hair
+of his head and beard with red-hot nutshells. And as to his two wives,
+Aristomache, his countrywoman, and Doris of Locris, he never visited
+them at night before everything had been well searched and examined.
+And as he had surrounded the place where his bed was with a broad
+ditch, and made a way over it with a wooden bridge, he drew that bridge
+over after shutting his bedchamber door. And as he did not dare to
+stand on the ordinary pulpits from which they usually harangued the
+people, he generally addressed them from a high tower. And it is said
+that when he was disposed to play at ball--for he delighted much in
+it--and had pulled off his clothes, he used to give his sword into the
+keeping of a young man whom he was very fond of. On this, one of his
+intimates said pleasantly, "You certainly trust your life with him;"
+and as the young man happened to smile at this, he ordered them both to
+be slain, the one for showing how he might be taken off, the other for
+approving of what had been said by smiling. But he was so concerned at
+what he had done that nothing affected him more during his whole life;
+for he had slain one to whom he was extremely partial. Thus do weak
+men's desires pull them different ways, and while they indulge one,
+they act counter to another.
+
+XXI. This tyrant, however, showed himself how happy he really was; for
+once, when Damocles, one of his flatterers, was dilating in
+conversation on his forces, his wealth, the greatness of his power, the
+plenty he enjoyed, the grandeur of his royal palaces, and maintaining
+that no one was ever happier, "Have you an inclination," said he,
+"Damocles, as this kind of life pleases you, to have a taste of it
+yourself, and to make a trial of the good fortune that attends me?" And
+when he said that he should like it extremely, Dionysius ordered him to
+be laid on a bed of gold with the most beautiful covering, embroidered
+and wrought with the most exquisite work, and he dressed out a great
+many sideboards with silver and embossed gold. He then ordered some
+youths, distinguished for their handsome persons, to wait at his table,
+and to observe his nod, in order to serve him with what he wanted.
+There were ointments and garlands; perfumes were burned; tables
+provided with the most exquisite meats. Damocles thought himself very
+happy. In the midst of this apparatus, Dionysius ordered a bright sword
+to be let down from the ceiling, suspended by a single horse-hair, so
+as to hang over the head of that happy man. After which he neither cast
+his eye on those handsome waiters, nor on the well-wrought plate; nor
+touched any of the provisions: presently the garlands fell to pieces.
+At last he entreated the tyrant to give him leave to go, for that now
+he had no desire to be happy[61]. Does not Dionysius, then, seem to
+have declared there can be no happiness for one who is under constant
+apprehensions? But it was not now in his power to return to justice,
+and restore his citizens their rights and privileges; for, by the
+indiscretion of youth, he had engaged in so many wrong steps and
+committed such extravagances, that, had he attempted to have returned
+to a right way of thinking, he must have endangered his life.
+
+XXII. Yet, how desirous he was of friendship, though at the same time
+he dreaded the treachery of friends, appears from the story of those
+two Pythagoreans: one of these had been security for his friend, who
+was condemned to die; the other, to release his security, presented
+himself at the time appointed for his dying: "I wish," said Dionysius,"
+you would admit me as the third in your friendship." What misery was it
+for him to be deprived of acquaintance, of company at his table, and of
+the freedom of conversation! especially for one who was a man of
+learning, and from his childhood acquainted with liberal arts, very
+fond of music, and himself a tragic poet--how good a one is not to the
+purpose, for I know not how it is, but in this way, more than any
+other, every one thinks his own performances excellent. I never as yet
+knew any poet (and I was very intimate with Aquinius), who did not
+appear to himself to be very admirable. The case is this: you are
+pleased with your own works; I like mine. But to return to Dionysius.
+He debarred himself from all civil and polite conversation, and spent
+his life among fugitives, bondmen, and barbarians; for he was persuaded
+that no one could be his friend who was worthy of liberty, or had the
+least desire of being free.
+
+XXIII. Shall I not, then, prefer the life of Plato and Archytas,
+manifestly wise and learned men, to his, than which nothing can
+possibly be more horrid, or miserable, or detestable?
+
+I will present you with an humble and obscure mathematician of the same
+city, called Archimedes, who lived many years after; whose tomb,
+overgrown with shrubs and briers, I in my quæstorship discovered, when
+the Syracusans knew nothing of it, and even denied that there was any
+such thing remaining; for I remembered some verses, which I had been
+informed were engraved on his monument, and these set forth that on the
+top of the tomb there was placed a sphere with a cylinder. When I had
+carefully examined all the monuments (for there are a great many tombs
+at the gate Achradinæ), I observed a small column standing out a little
+above the briers, with the figure of a sphere and a cylinder upon it;
+whereupon I immediately said to the Syracusans--for there were some of
+their principal men with me there--that I imagined that was what I was
+inquiring for. Several men, being sent in with scythes, cleared the
+way, and made an opening for us. When we could get at it, and were come
+near to the front of the pedestal, I found the inscription, though the
+latter parts of all the verses were effaced almost half away. Thus one
+of the noblest cities of Greece, and one which at one time likewise had
+been very celebrated for learning, had known nothing of the monument of
+its greatest genius, if it had not been discovered to them by a native
+of Arpinum. But to return to the subject from which I have been
+digressing. Who is there in the least degree acquainted with the Muses,
+that is, with liberal knowledge, or that deals at all in learning, who
+would not choose to be this mathematician rather than that tyrant? If
+we look into their methods of living and their employments, we shall
+find the mind of the one strengthened and improved with tracing the
+deductions of reason, amused with his own ingenuity, which is the one
+most delicious food of the mind; the thoughts of the other engaged in
+continual murders and injuries, in constant fears by night and by day.
+Now imagine a Democritus, a Pythagoras, and an Anaxagoras; what
+kingdom, what riches, would you prefer to their studies and amusements?
+For you must necessarily look for that excellence which we are seeking
+for in that which is the most perfect part of man; but what is there
+better in man than a sagacious and good mind? The enjoyment, therefore,
+of that good which proceeds from that sagacious mind can alone make us
+happy; but virtue is the good of the mind: it follows, therefore, that
+a happy life depends on virtue. Hence proceed all things that are
+beautiful, honorable, and excellent, as I said above (but this point
+must, I think, be treated of more at large), and they are well stored
+with joys. For, as it is clear that a happy life consists in perpetual
+and unexhausted pleasures, it follows, too, that a happy life must
+arise from honesty.
+
+XXIV. But that what I propose to demonstrate to you may not rest on
+mere words only, I must set before you the picture of something, as it
+were, living and moving in the world, that may dispose us more for the
+improvement of the understanding and real knowledge. Let us, then,
+pitch upon some man perfectly acquainted with the most excellent arts;
+let us present him for awhile to our own thoughts, and figure him to
+our own imaginations. In the first place, he must necessarily be of an
+extraordinary capacity; for virtue is not easily connected with dull
+minds. Secondly, he must have a great desire of discovering truth, from
+whence will arise that threefold production of the mind; one of which
+depends on knowing things, and explaining nature; the other, in
+defining what we ought to desire and what to avoid; the third, in
+judging of consequences and impossibilities, in which consists both
+subtlety in disputing and also clearness of judgment. Now, with what
+pleasure must the mind of a wise man be affected which continually
+dwells in the midst of such cares and occupations as these, when he
+views the revolutions and motions of the whole world, and sees those
+innumerable stars in the heavens, which, though fixed in their places,
+have yet one motion in common with the whole universe, and observes the
+seven other stars, some higher, some lower, each maintaining their own
+course, while their motions, though wandering, have certain defined and
+appointed spaces to run through! the sight of which doubtless urged and
+encouraged those ancient philosophers to exercise their investigating
+spirit on many other things. Hence arose an inquiry after the
+beginnings, and, as it were, seeds from which all things were produced
+and composed; what was the origin of every kind of thing, whether
+animate or inanimate, articulately speaking or mute; what occasioned
+their beginning and end, and by what alteration and change one thing
+was converted into another; whence the earth originated, and by what
+weights it was balanced; by what caverns the seas were supplied; by
+what gravity all things being carried down tend always to the middle of
+the world, which in any round body is the lowest place.
+
+XXV. A mind employed on such subjects, and which night and day
+contemplates them, contains in itself that precept of the Delphic God,
+so as to "know itself," and to perceive its connection with the divine
+reason, from whence it is filled with an insatiable joy. For
+reflections on the power and nature of the Gods raise in us a desire of
+imitating their eternity. Nor does the mind, that sees the necessary
+dependences and connections that one cause has with another, think it
+possible that it should be itself confined to the shortness of this
+life. Those causes, though they proceed from eternity to eternity, are
+governed by reason and understanding. And he who beholds them and
+examines them, or rather he whose view takes in all the parts and
+boundaries of things, with what tranquillity of mind does he look on
+all human affairs, and on all that is nearer him! Hence proceeds the
+knowledge of virtue; hence arise the kinds and species of virtues;
+hence are discovered those things which nature regards as the bounds
+and extremities of good and evil; by this it is discovered to what all
+duties ought to be referred, and which is the most eligible manner of
+life. And when these and similar points have been investigated, the
+principal consequence which is deduced from them, and that which is our
+main object in this discussion, is the establishment of the point, that
+virtue is of itself sufficient to a happy life.
+
+The third qualification of our wise man is the next to be considered,
+which goes through and spreads itself over every part of wisdom; it is
+that whereby we define each particular thing, distinguish the genus
+from its species, connect consequences, draw just conclusions, and
+distinguish truth from falsehood, which is the very art and science of
+disputing; which is not only of the greatest use in the examination of
+what passes in the world, but is likewise the most rational
+entertainment, and that which is most becoming to true wisdom. Such are
+its effects in retirement. Now, let our wise man be considered as
+protecting the republic; what can be more excellent than such a
+character? By his prudence he will discover the true interests of his
+fellow-citizens; by his justice he will be prevented from applying what
+belongs to the public to his own use; and, in short, he will be ever
+governed by all the virtues, which are many and various. To these let
+us add the advantage of his friendships; in which the learned reckon
+not only a natural harmony and agreement of sentiments throughout the
+conduct of life, but the utmost pleasure and satisfaction in conversing
+and passing our time constantly with one another. What can be wanting
+to such a life as this to make it more happy than it is? Fortune
+herself must yield to a life stored with such joys. Now, if it be a
+happiness to rejoice in such goods of the mind, that is to say, in such
+virtues, and if all wise men enjoy thoroughly these pleasures, it must
+necessarily be granted that all such are happy.
+
+XXVI. _A._ What, when in torments and on the rack?
+
+_M._ Do you imagine I am speaking of him as laid on roses and violets?
+Is it allowable even for Epicurus (who only puts on the appearance of
+being a philosopher, and who himself assumed that name for himself) to
+say (though, as matters stand, I commend him for his saying) that a
+wise man might at all times cry out, though he be burned, tortured, cut
+to pieces, "How little I regard it!" Shall this be said by one who
+defines all evil as pain, and measures every good by pleasure; who
+could ridicule whatever we call either honorable or base, and could
+declare of us that we were employed about words, and uttering mere
+empty sounds; and that nothing is to be regarded by us but as it is
+perceived to be smooth or rough by the body? What! shall such a man as
+this, as I said, whose understanding is little superior to the beasts',
+be at liberty to forget himself; and not only to despise fortune, when
+the whole of his good and evil is in the power of fortune, but to say
+that he is happy in the most racking torture, when he had actually
+declared pain to be not only the greatest evil, but the only one? Nor
+did he take any trouble to provide himself with those remedies which
+might have enabled him to bear pain, such as firmness of mind, a shame
+of doing anything base, exercise, and the habit of patience, precepts
+of courage, and a manly hardiness; but he says that he supports himself
+on the single recollection of past pleasures, as if any one, when the
+weather was so hot as that he was scarcely able to bear it, should
+comfort himself by recollecting that he was once in my country,
+Arpinum, where he was surrounded on every side by cooling streams. For
+I do not apprehend how past pleasures can allay present evils. But when
+he says that a wise man is always happy who would have no right to say
+so if he were consistent with himself, what may they not do who allow
+nothing to be desirable, nothing to be looked on as good but what is
+honorable? Let, then, the Peripatetics and Old Academics follow my
+example, and at length leave off muttering to themselves; and openly
+and with a clear voice let them be bold to say that a happy life may
+not be inconsistent with the agonies of Phalaris's bull.
+
+XXVII. But to dismiss the subtleties of the Stoics, which I am sensible
+I have employed more than was necessary, let us admit of three kinds of
+goods; and let them really be kinds of goods, provided no regard is had
+to the body and to external circumstances, as entitled to the
+appellation of good in any other sense than because we are obliged to
+use them: but let those other divine goods spread themselves far in
+every direction, and reach the very heavens. Why, then, may I not call
+him happy, nay, the happiest of men, who has attained them? Shall a
+wise man be afraid of pain? which is, indeed, the greatest enemy to our
+opinion. For I am persuaded that we are prepared and fortified
+sufficiently, by the disputations of the foregoing days, against our
+own death or that of our friends, against grief, and the other
+perturbations of the mind. But pain seems to be the sharpest adversary
+of virtue; that it is which menaces us with burning torches; that it is
+which threatens to crush our fortitude, and greatness of mind, and
+patience. Shall virtue, then, yield to this? Shall the happy life of a
+wise and consistent man succumb to this? Good. Gods! how base would
+this be! Spartan boys will bear to have their bodies torn by rods
+without uttering a groan. I myself have seen at Lacedæmon troops of
+young men, with incredible earnestness contending together with their
+hands and feet, with their teeth and nails, nay, even ready to expire,
+rather than own themselves conquered. Is any country of barbarians more
+uncivilized or desolate than India? Yet they have among them some that
+are held for wise men, who never wear any clothes all their life long,
+and who bear the snow of Caucasus, and the piercing cold of winter,
+without any pain; and who if they come in contact with fire endure
+being burned without a groan. The women, too, in India, on the death of
+their husbands have a regular contest, and apply to the judge to have
+it determined which of them was best beloved by him; for it is
+customary there for one man to have many wives. She in whose favor it
+is determined exults greatly, and being attended by her relations, is
+laid on the funeral pile with her husband; the others, who are
+postponed, walk away very much dejected. Custom can never be superior
+to nature, for nature is never to be got the better of. But our minds
+are infected by sloth and idleness, and luxury, and languor, and
+indolence: we have enervated them by opinions and bad customs. Who is
+there who is unacquainted with the customs of the Egyptians? Their
+minds being tainted by pernicious opinions, they are ready to bear any
+torture rather than hurt an ibis, a snake, a cat, a dog, or a
+crocodile; and should any one inadvertently have hurt any of these
+animals, he will submit to any punishment. I am speaking of men only.
+As to the beasts, do they not bear cold and hunger, running about in
+woods, and on mountains and deserts? Will they not fight for their
+young ones till they are wounded? Are they afraid of any attacks or
+blows? I mention not what the ambitious will suffer for honor's sake,
+or those who are desirous of praise on account of glory, or lovers to
+gratify their lust. Life is full of such instances.
+
+XXVIII. But let us not dwell too much on these questions, but rather
+let us return to our subject. I say, and say again, that happiness will
+submit even to be tormented; and that in pursuit of justice, and
+temperance, and still more especially and principally fortitude, and
+greatness of soul, and patience, it will not stop short at sight of the
+executioner; and when all other virtues proceed calmly to the torture,
+that one will never halt, as I said, on the outside and threshold of
+the prison; for what can be baser, what can carry a worse appearance,
+than to be left alone, separated from those beautiful attendants? Not,
+however, that this is by any means possible; for neither can the
+virtues hold together without happiness, nor happiness without the
+virtues; so that they will not suffer her to desert them, but will
+carry her along with them, to whatever torments, to whatever pain they
+are led. For it is the peculiar quality of a wise man to do nothing
+that he may repent of, nothing against his inclination, but always to
+act nobly, with constancy, gravity, and honesty; to depend on nothing
+as certainty; to wonder at nothing, when it falls out, as if it
+appeared strange and unexpected to him; to be independent of every one,
+and abide by his own opinion. For my part, I cannot form an idea of
+anything happier than this. The conclusion of the Stoics is indeed
+easy; for since they are persuaded that the end of good is to live
+agreeably to nature, and to be consistent with that--as a wise man
+should do so, not only because it is his duty, but because it is in his
+power--it must, of course, follow that whoever has the chief good in
+his power has his happiness so too. And thus the life of a wise man is
+always happy. You have here what I think may be confidently said of a
+happy life; and as things now stand, very truly also, unless you can
+advance something better.
+
+XXIX. _A._ Indeed I cannot; but I should be glad to prevail on you,
+unless it is troublesome (as you are under no confinement from
+obligations to any particular sect, but gather from all of them
+whatever strikes you most as having the appearance of probability), as
+you just now seemed to advise the Peripatetics and the Old Academy
+boldly to speak out without reserve, "that wise men are always the
+happiest"--I should be glad to hear how you think it consistent for
+them to say so, when you have said so much against that opinion, and
+the conclusions of the Stoics.
+
+_M._ I will make use, then, of that liberty which no one has the
+privilege of using in philosophy but those of our school, whose
+discourses determine nothing, but take in everything, leaving them
+unsupported by the authority of any particular person, to be judged of
+by others, according to their weight. And as you seem desirous of
+knowing how it is that, notwithstanding the different opinions of
+philosophers with regard to the ends of goods, virtue has still
+sufficient security for the effecting of a happy life--which security,
+as we are informed, Carneades used indeed to dispute against; but he
+disputed as against the Stoics, whose opinions he combated with great
+zeal and vehemence. I, however, shall handle the question with more
+temper; for if the Stoics have rightly settled the _ends_ of goods, the
+affair is at an end; for a wise man must necessarily be always happy.
+But let us examine, if we can, the particular opinions of the others,
+that so this excellent decision, if I may so call it, in favor of a
+happy life, may be agreeable to the opinions and discipline of all.
+
+XXX. These, then, are the opinions, as I think, that are held and
+defended--the first four are simple ones: "that nothing is good but
+what is honest," according to the Stoics; "nothing good but pleasure,"
+as Epicurus maintains; "nothing good but a freedom from pain," as
+Hieronymus[62] asserts; "nothing good but an enjoyment of the
+principal, or all, or the greatest goods of nature," as Carneades
+maintained against the Stoics--these are simple, the others are mixed
+propositions. Then there are three kinds of goods: the greatest being
+those of the mind; the next best those of the body; the third are
+external goods, as the Peripatetics call them, and the Old Academics
+differ very little from them. Dinomachus[63] and Callipho[64] have
+coupled pleasure with honesty; but Diodorus[65] the Peripatetic has
+joined indolence to honesty. These are the opinions that have some
+footing; for those of Aristo,[66] Pyrrho,[67] Herillus,[68] and of some
+others, are quite out of date. Now let us see what weight these men
+have in them, excepting the Stoics, whose opinion I think I have
+sufficiently defended; and indeed I have explained what the
+Peripatetics have to say; excepting that Theophrastus, and those who
+followed him, dread and abhor pain in too weak a manner. The others may
+go on to exaggerate the gravity and dignity of virtue, as usual; and
+then, after they have extolled it to the skies, with the usual
+extravagance of good orators, it is easy to reduce the other topics to
+nothing by comparison, and to hold them up to contempt. They who think
+that praise deserves to be sought after, even at the expense of pain,
+are not at liberty to deny those men to be happy who have obtained it.
+Though they may be under some evils, yet this name of happy has a very
+wide application.
+
+XXXI. For even as trading is said to be lucrative, and farming
+advantageous, not because the one never meets with any loss, nor the
+other with any damage from the inclemency of the weather, but because
+they succeed in general; so life may be properly called happy, not from
+its being entirely made up of good things, but because it abounds with
+these to a great and considerable degree. By this way of reasoning,
+then, a happy life may attend virtue even to the moment of execution;
+nay, may descend with her into Phalaris's bull, according to Aristotle,
+Xenocrates, Speusippus, Polemon; and will not be gained over by any
+allurements to forsake her. Of the same opinion will Calliphon and
+Diodorus be; for they are both of them such friends to virtue as to
+think that all things should be discarded and far removed that are
+incompatible with it. The rest seem to be more hampered with these
+doctrines, but yet they get clear of them; such as Epicurus,
+Hieronymus, and whoever else thinks it worth while to defend the
+deserted Carneades: for there is not one of them who does not think the
+mind to be judge of those goods, and able sufficiently to instruct him
+how to despise what has the appearance only of good or evil. For what
+seems to you to be the case with Epicurus is the case also with
+Hieronymus and Carneades, and, indeed, with all the rest of them; for
+who is there who is not sufficiently prepared against death and pain? I
+will begin, with your leave, with him whom we call soft and voluptuous.
+What! does he seem, to you to be afraid of death or pain when he calls
+the day of his death happy; and who, when he is afflicted by the
+greatest pains, silences them all by recollecting arguments of his own
+discovering? And this is not done in such a manner as to give room for
+imagining that he talks thus wildly from some sudden impulse; but his
+opinion of death is, that on the dissolution of the animal all sense is
+lost; and what is deprived of sense is, as he thinks, what we have no
+concern at all with. And as to pain, too, he has certain rules to
+follow then: if it be great, the comfort is that it must be short; if
+it be of long continuance, then it must be supportable. What, then? Do
+those grandiloquent gentlemen state anything better than Epicurus in
+opposition to these two things which distress us the most? And as to
+other things, do not Epicurus and the rest of the philosophers seem
+sufficiently prepared? Who is there who does not dread poverty? And yet
+no true philosopher ever can dread it.
+
+XXXII. But with how little is this man himself satisfied! No one has
+said more on frugality. For when a man is far removed from those things
+which occasion a desire of money, from love, ambition, or other daily
+extravagance, why should he be fond of money, or concern himself at all
+about it? Could the Scythian Anacharsis[69] disregard money, and shall
+not our philosophers be able to do so? We are informed of an epistle of
+his in these words: "Anacharsis to Hanno, greeting. My clothing is the
+same as that with which the Scythians cover themselves; the hardness of
+my feet supplies the want of shoes; the ground is my bed, hunger my
+sauce, my food milk, cheese, and flesh. So you may come to me as to a
+man in want of nothing. But as to those presents you take so much
+pleasure in, you may dispose of them to your own citizens, or to the
+immortal Gods." And almost all philosophers, of all schools, excepting
+those who are warped from right reason by a vicious disposition, might
+have been of this same opinion. Socrates, when on one occasion he saw a
+great quantity of gold and silver carried in a procession, cried out,
+"How many things are there which I do not want!" Xenocrates, when some
+ambassadors from Alexander had brought him fifty talents, which was a
+very large sum of money in those times, especially at Athens, carried
+the ambassadors to sup in the Academy, and placed just a sufficiency
+before them, without any apparatus. When they asked him, the next day,
+to whom he wished the money which they had for him to be paid: "What!"
+said he, "did you not perceive by our slight repast of yesterday that I
+had no occasion for money?" But when he perceived that they were
+somewhat dejected, he accepted of thirty minas, that he might not seem
+to treat with disrespect the king's generosity. But Diogenes took a
+greater liberty, like a Cynic, when Alexander asked him if he wanted
+anything: "Just at present," said he, "I wish that you would stand a
+little out of the line between me and the sun," for Alexander was
+hindering him from sunning himself. And, indeed, this very man used to
+maintain how much he surpassed the Persian king in his manner of life
+and fortune; for that he himself was in want of nothing, while the
+other never had enough; and that he had no inclination for those
+pleasures of which the other could never get enough to satisfy himself;
+and that the other could never obtain his.
+
+XXXIII. You see, I imagine, how Epicurus has divided his kinds of
+desires, not very acutely perhaps, but yet usefully: saying that they
+are "partly natural and necessary; partly natural, but not necessary;
+partly neither. That those which are necessary may be supplied almost
+for nothing; for that the things which nature requires are easily
+obtained." As to the second kind of desires, his opinion is that any
+one may easily either enjoy or go without them. And with regard to the
+third, since they are utterly frivolous, being neither allied to
+necessity nor nature, he thinks that they should be entirely rooted
+out. On this topic a great many arguments are adduced by the
+Epicureans; and those pleasures which they do not despise in a body,
+they disparage one by one, and seem rather for lessening the number of
+them; for as to wanton pleasures, on which subject they say a great
+deal, these, say they, are easy, common, and within any one's reach;
+and they think that if nature requires them, they are not to be
+estimated by birth, condition, or rank, but by shape, age, and person:
+and that it is by no means difficult to refrain from them, should
+health, duty, or reputation require it; but that pleasures of this kind
+may be desirable, where they are attended with no inconvenience, but
+can never be of any use. And the assertions which Epicurus makes with
+respect to the whole of pleasure are such as show his opinion to be
+that pleasure is always desirable, and to be pursued merely because it
+is pleasure; and for the same reason pain is to be avoided, because it
+is pain. So that a wise man will always adopt such a system of
+counterbalancing as to do himself the justice to avoid pleasure, should
+pain ensue from it in too great a proportion; and will submit to pain,
+provided the effects of it are to produce a greater pleasure: so that
+all pleasurable things, though the corporeal senses are the judges of
+them, are still to be referred to the mind, on which account the body
+rejoices while it perceives a present pleasure; but that the mind not
+only perceives the present as well as the body, but foresees it while
+it is coming, and even when it is past will not let it quite slip away.
+So that a wise man enjoys a continual series of pleasures, uniting the
+expectation of future pleasure to the recollection of what he has
+already tasted. The like notions are applied by them to high living;
+and the magnificence and expensiveness of entertainments are
+deprecated, because nature is satisfied at a small expense.
+
+XXXIV. For who does not see this, that an appetite is the best sauce?
+When Darius, in his flight from the enemy, had drunk some water which
+was muddy and tainted with dead bodies, he declared that he had never
+drunk anything more pleasant; the fact was, that he had never drunk
+before when he was thirsty. Nor had Ptolemy ever eaten when he was
+hungry; for as he was travelling over Egypt, his company not keeping up
+with him, he had some coarse bread presented him in a cottage, upon
+which he said, "Nothing ever seemed to him pleasanter than that bread."
+They relate, too, of Socrates, that, once when he was walking very fast
+till the evening, on his being asked why he did so, his reply was that
+he was purchasing an appetite by walking, that he might sup the better.
+And do we not see what the Lacedæmonians provide in their Phiditia?
+where the tyrant Dionysius supped, but told them he did not at all like
+that black broth, which was their principal dish; on which he who
+dressed it said, "It was no wonder, for it wanted seasoning." Dionysius
+asked what that seasoning was; to which it was replied, "Fatigue in
+hunting, sweating, a race on the banks of Eurotas, hunger and thirst,"
+for these are the seasonings to the Lacedæmonian banquets. And this may
+not only be conceived from the custom of men, but from the beasts, who
+are satisfied with anything that is thrown before them, provided it is
+not unnatural, and they seek no farther. Some entire cities, taught by
+custom, delight in parsimony, as I said but just now of the
+Lacedæmonians. Xenophon has given an account of the Persian diet, who
+never, as he saith, use anything but cresses with their bread; not but
+that, should nature require anything more agreeable, many things might
+be easily supplied by the ground, and plants in great abundance, and of
+incomparable sweetness. Add to this strength and health, as the
+consequence of this abstemious way of living. Now, compare with this
+those who sweat and belch, being crammed with eating, like fatted oxen;
+then will you perceive that they who pursue pleasure most attain it
+least; and that the pleasure of eating lies not in satiety, but
+appetite.
+
+XXXV. They report of Timotheus, a famous man at Athens, and the head of
+the city, that having supped with Plato, and being extremely delighted
+with his entertainment, on seeing him the next day, he said, "Your
+suppers are not only agreeable while I partake of them, but the next
+day also." Besides, the understanding is impaired when we are full with
+overeating and drinking. There is an excellent epistle of Plato to
+Dion's relations, in which there occurs as nearly as possible these
+words: "When I came there, that happy life so much talked of, devoted
+to Italian and Syracusan entertainments, was noways agreeable to me; to
+be crammed twice a day, and never to have the night to yourself, and
+the other things which are the accompaniments of this kind of life, by
+which a man will never be made the wiser, but will be rendered much
+less temperate; for it must be an extraordinary disposition that can be
+temperate in such circumstances." How, then, can a life be pleasant
+without prudence and temperance? Hence you discover the mistake of
+Sardanapalus, the wealthiest king of the Assyrians, who ordered it to
+be engraved on his tomb,
+
+    I still have what in food I did exhaust;
+    But what I left, though excellent, is lost.
+
+"What less than this," says Aristotle, "could be inscribed on the tomb,
+not of a king, but an ox?" He said that he possessed those things when
+dead, which, in his lifetime, he could have no longer than while he was
+enjoying them. Why, then, are riches desired? And wherein doth poverty
+prevent us from being happy? In the want, I imagine, of statues,
+pictures, and diversions. But if any one is delighted with these
+things, have not the poor people the enjoyment of them more than they
+who are the owners of them in the greatest abundance? For we have great
+numbers of them displayed publicly in our city. And whatever store of
+them private people have, they cannot have a great number, and they but
+seldom see them, only when they go to their country seats; and some of
+them must be stung to the heart when they consider how they came by
+them. The day would fail me, should I be inclined to defend the cause
+of poverty. The thing is manifest; and nature daily informs us how few
+things there are, and how trifling they are, of which she really stands
+in need.
+
+XXXVI. Let us inquire, then, if obscurity, the want of power, or even
+the being unpopular, can prevent a wise man from being happy. Observe
+if popular favor, and this glory which they are so fond of, be not
+attended with more uneasiness than pleasure. Our friend Demosthenes was
+certainly very weak in declaring himself pleased with the whisper of a
+woman who was carrying water, as is the custom in Greece, and who
+whispered to another, "That is he--that is Demosthenes." What could be
+weaker than this? and yet what an orator he was! But although he had
+learned to speak to others, he had conversed but little with himself.
+We may perceive, therefore, that popular glory is not desirable of
+itself; nor is obscurity to be dreaded. "I came to Athens," saith
+Democritus, "and there was no one there that knew me:" this was a
+moderate and grave man who could glory in his obscurity. Shall
+musicians compose their tunes to their own tastes? and shall a
+philosopher, master of a much better art, seek to ascertain, not what
+is most true, but what will please the people? Can anything be more
+absurd than to despise the vulgar as mere unpolished mechanics, taken
+singly, and to think them of consequence when collected into a body?
+These wise men would contemn our ambitious pursuits and our vanities,
+and would reject all the honors which the people could voluntarily
+offer to them; but we know not how to despise them till we begin to
+repent of having accepted them. There is an anecdote related by
+Heraclitus, the natural philosopher, of Hermodorus, the chief of the
+Ephesians, that he said "that all the Ephesians ought to be punished
+with death for saying, when they had expelled Hermodorus out of their
+city, that they would have no one among them better than another; but
+that if there were any such, he might go elsewhere to some other
+people." Is not this the case with the people everywhere? Do they not
+hate every virtue that distinguishes itself? What! was not Aristides (I
+had rather instance in the Greeks than ourselves) banished his country
+for being eminently just? What troubles, then, are they free from who
+have no connection whatever with the people? What is more agreeable
+than a learned retirement? I speak of that learning which makes us
+acquainted with the boundless extent of nature and the universe, and
+which even while we remain in this world discovers to us both heaven,
+earth, and sea.
+
+XXXVII. If, then, honor and riches have no value, what is there else to
+be afraid of? Banishment, I suppose; which is looked on as the greatest
+evil. Now, if the evil of banishment proceeds not from ourselves, but
+from the froward disposition of the people, I have just now declared
+how contemptible it is. But if to leave one's country be miserable, the
+provinces are full of miserable men, very few of the settlers in which
+ever return to their country again. But exiles are deprived of their
+property! What, then! has there not been enough said on bearing
+poverty? But with regard to banishment, if we examine the nature of
+things, not the ignominy of the name, how little does it differ from
+constant travelling! in which some of the most famous philosophers have
+spent their whole life, as Xenocrates, Crantor, Arcesilas, Lacydes,
+Aristotle, Theophrastus, Zeno, Cleanthes, Chrysippus, Antipater,
+Carneades, Panætius, Clitomachus, Philo, Antiochus, Posidonius, and
+innumerable others, who from their first setting-out never returned
+home again. Now, what ignominy can a wise man be affected with (for it
+is of such a one that I am speaking) who can be guilty of nothing which
+deserves it? for there is no occasion to comfort one who is banished
+for his deserts. Lastly, they can easily reconcile themselves to every
+accident who measure all their objects and pursuits in life by the
+standard of pleasure; so that in whatever place that is supplied, there
+they may live happily. Thus what Teucer said may be applied to every
+case:
+
+    "Wherever I am happy is my country."
+
+Socrates, indeed, when he was asked where he belonged to, replied, "The
+world;" for he looked upon himself as a citizen and inhabitant of the
+whole world. How was it with T. Altibutius? Did he not follow his
+philosophical studies with the greatest satisfaction at Athens,
+although he was banished? which, however, would not have happened to
+him if he had obeyed the laws of Epicurus and lived peaceably in the
+republic. In what was Epicurus happier, living in his own country, than
+Metrodorus, who lived at Athens? Or did Plato's happiness exceed that
+of Xenocrates, or Polemo, or Arcesilas? Or is that city to be valued
+much that banishes all her good and wise men? Demaratus, the father of
+our King Tarquin, not being able to bear the tyrant Cypselus, fled from
+Corinth to Tarquinii, settled there, and had children. Was it, then, an
+unwise act in him to prefer the liberty of banishment to slavery at
+home?
+
+XXXVIII. Besides the emotions of the mind, all griefs and anxieties are
+assuaged by forgetting them, and turning our thoughts to pleasure.
+Therefore, it was not without reason that Epicurus presumed to say that
+a wise man abounds with good things, because he may always have his
+pleasures; from whence it follows, as he thinks, that that point is
+gained which is the subject of our present inquiry, that a wise man is
+always happy. What! though he should be deprived of the senses of
+seeing and hearing? Yes; for he holds those things very cheap. For, in
+the first place, what are the pleasures of which we are deprived by
+that dreadful thing, blindness? For though they allow other pleasures
+to be confined to the senses, yet the things which are perceived by the
+sight do not depend wholly on the pleasure the eyes receive; as is the
+case when we taste, smell, touch, or hear; for, in respect of all these
+senses, the organs themselves are the seat of pleasure; but it is not
+so with the eyes. For it is the mind which is entertained by what we
+see; but the mind may be entertained in many ways, even though we could
+not see at all. I am speaking of a learned and a wise man, with whom to
+think is to live. But thinking in the case of a wise man does not
+altogether require the use of his eyes in his investigations; for if
+night does not strip him of his happiness, why should blindness, which
+resembles night, have that effect? For the reply of Antipater the
+Cyrenaic to some women who bewailed his being blind, though it is a
+little too obscene, is not without its significance. "What do you
+mean?" saith he; "do you think the night can furnish no pleasure?" And
+we find by his magistracies and his actions that old Appius,[70] too,
+who was blind for many years, was not prevented from doing whatever was
+required of him with respect either to the republic or his own affairs.
+It is said that C. Drusus's house was crowded with clients. When they
+whose business it was could not see how to conduct themselves, they
+applied to a blind guide.
+
+XXXIX. When I was a boy, Cn. Aufidius, a blind man, who had served the
+office of prætor, not only gave his opinion in the Senate, and was
+ready to assist his friends, but wrote a Greek history, and had a
+considerable acquaintance with literature. Diodorus the Stoic was
+blind, and lived many years at my house. He, indeed, which is scarcely
+credible, besides applying himself more than usual to philosophy, and
+playing on the flute, agreeably to the custom of the Pythagoreans, and
+having books read to him night and day, in all which he did not want
+eyes, contrived to teach geometry, which, one would think, could hardly
+be done without the assistance of eyes, telling his scholars how and
+where to draw every line. They relate of Asclepiades, a native of
+Eretria, and no obscure philosopher, when some one asked him what
+inconvenience he suffered from his blindness, that his reply was, "He
+was at the expense of another servant." So that, as the most extreme
+poverty may be borne if you please, as is daily the case with some in
+Greece, so blindness may easily be borne, provided you have the support
+of good health in other respects. Democritus was so blind he could not
+distinguish white from black; but he knew the difference between good
+and evil, just and unjust, honorable and base, the useful and useless,
+great and small. Thus one may live happily without distinguishing
+colors; but without acquainting yourself with things, you cannot; and
+this man was of opinion that the intense application of the mind was
+taken off by the objects that presented themselves to the eye; and
+while others often could not see what was before their feet, he
+travelled through all infinity. It is reported also that Homer[71] was
+blind, but we observe his painting as well as his poetry. What country,
+what coast, what part of Greece, what military attacks, what
+dispositions of battle, what array, what ship, what motions of men and
+animals, can be mentioned which he has not described in such a manner
+as to enable us to see what he could not see himself? What, then! can
+we imagine that Homer, or any other learned man, has ever been in want
+of pleasure and entertainment for his mind? Were it not so, would
+Anaxagoras, or this very Democritus, have left their estates and
+patrimonies, and given themselves up to the pursuit of acquiring this
+divine pleasure? It is thus that the poets who have represented
+Tiresias the Augur as a wise man and blind never exhibit him as
+bewailing his blindness. And Homer, too, after he had described
+Polyphemus as a monster and a wild man, represents him talking with his
+ram, and speaking of his good fortune, inasmuch as he could go wherever
+he pleased and touch what he would. And so far he was right, for that
+Cyclops was a being of not much more understanding than his ram.
+
+XL. Now, as to the evil of being deaf. M. Crassus was a little thick of
+hearing; but it was more uneasiness to him that he heard himself ill
+spoken of, though, in my opinion, he did not deserve it. Our Epicureans
+cannot understand Greek, nor the Greeks Latin: now, they are deaf
+reciprocally as to each other's language, and we are all truly deaf
+with regard to those innumerable languages which we do not understand.
+They do not hear the voice of the harper; but, then, they do not hear
+the grating of a saw when it is setting, or the grunting of a hog when
+his throat is being cut, nor the roaring of the sea when they are
+desirous of rest. And if they should chance to be fond of singing, they
+ought, in the first place, to consider that many wise men lived happily
+before music was discovered; besides, they may have more pleasure in
+reading verses than in hearing them sung. Then, as I before referred
+the blind to the pleasures of hearing, so I may the deaf to the
+pleasures of sight: moreover, whoever can converse with himself doth
+not need the conversation of another. But suppose all these misfortunes
+to meet in one person: suppose him blind and deaf--let him be afflicted
+with the sharpest pains of body, which, in the first place, generally
+of themselves make an end of him; still, should they continue so long,
+and the pain be so exquisite, that we should be unable to assign any
+reason for our being so afflicted--still, why, good Gods! should we be
+under any difficulty? For there is a retreat at hand: death is that
+retreat--a shelter where we shall forever be insensible. Theodorus said
+to Lysimachus, who threatened him with death, "It is a great matter,
+indeed, for you to have acquired the power of a Spanish fly!" When
+Perses entreated Paulus not to lead him in triumph, "That is a matter
+which you have in your own power," said Paulus. I said many things
+about death in our first day's disputation, when death was the subject;
+and not a little the next day, when I treated of pain; which things if
+you recollect, there can be no danger of your looking upon death as
+undesirable, or, at least, it will not be dreadful.
+
+That custom which is common among the Grecians at their banquets
+should, in my opinion, be observed in life: Drink, say they, or leave
+the company; and rightly enough; for a guest should either enjoy the
+pleasure of drinking with others, or else not stay till he meets with
+affronts from those that are in liquor. Thus, those injuries of fortune
+which you cannot bear you should flee from.
+
+XLI. This is the very same which is said by Epicurus and Hieronymus.
+Now, if those philosophers, whose opinion it is that virtue has no
+power of itself, and who say that the conduct which we denominate
+honorable and laudable is really nothing, and is only an empty
+circumstance set off with an unmeaning sound, can nevertheless maintain
+that a wise man is always happy, what, think you, may be done by the
+Socratic and Platonic philosophers? Some of these allow such
+superiority to the goods of the mind as quite to eclipse what concerns
+the body and all external circumstances. But others do not admit these
+to be goods; they make everything depend on the mind: whose disputes
+Carneades used, as a sort of honorary arbitrator, to determine. For, as
+what seemed goods to the Peripatetics were allowed to be advantages by
+the Stoics, and as the Peripatetics allowed no more to riches, good
+health; and other things of that sort than the Stoics, when these
+things were considered according to their reality, and not by mere
+names, his opinion was that there was no ground for disagreeing.
+Therefore, let the philosophers of other schools see how they can
+establish this point also. It is very agreeable to me that they make
+some professions worthy of being uttered by the mouth of a philosopher
+with regard to a wise man's having always the means of living happily.
+
+XLII. But as we are to depart in the morning, let us remember these
+five days' discussions; though, indeed, I think I shall commit them to
+writing: for how can I better employ the leisure which I have, of
+whatever kind it is, and whatever it be owing to? And I will send these
+five books also to my friend Brutus, by whom I was not only incited to
+write on philosophy, but, I may say, provoked. And by so doing it is
+not easy to say what service I may be of to others. At all events, in
+my own various and acute afflictions, which surround me on all sides, I
+cannot find any better comfort for myself.
+
+
+
+
+
+
+THE NATURE OF THE GODS.
+
+       *       *       *       *       *
+
+
+
+
+BOOK I.
+
+
+I. There are many things in philosophy, my dear Brutus, which are not
+as yet fully explained to us, and particularly (as you very well know)
+that most obscure and difficult question concerning the Nature of the
+Gods, so extremely necessary both towards a knowledge of the human mind
+and the practice of true religion: concerning which the opinions of men
+are so various, and so different from each other, as to lead strongly
+to the inference that ignorance[72] is the cause, or origin, of
+philosophy, and that the Academic philosophers have been prudent in
+refusing their assent to things uncertain: for what is more unbecoming
+to a wise man than to judge rashly? or what rashness is so unworthy of
+the gravity and stability of a philosopher as either to maintain false
+opinions, or, without the least hesitation, to support and defend what
+he has not thoroughly examined and does not clearly comprehend?
+
+In the question now before us, the greater part of mankind have united
+to acknowledge that which is most probable, and which we are all by
+nature led to suppose, namely, that there are Gods. Protagoras[73]
+doubted whether there were any. Diagoras the Melian and Theodorus of
+Cyrene entirely believed there were no such beings. But they who have
+affirmed that there are Gods, have expressed such a variety of
+sentiments on the subject, and the disagreement between them is so
+great, that it would be tiresome to enumerate their opinions; for they
+give us many statements respecting the forms of the Gods, and their
+places of abode, and the employment of their lives. And these are
+matters on which the philosophers differ with the most exceeding
+earnestness. But the most considerable part of the dispute is, whether
+they are wholly inactive, totally unemployed, and free from all care
+and administration of affairs; or, on the contrary, whether all things
+were made and constituted by them from the beginning; and whether they
+will continue to be actuated and governed by them to eternity. This is
+one of the greatest points in debate; and unless this is decided,
+mankind must necessarily remain in the greatest of errors, and ignorant
+of what is most important to be known.
+
+II. For there are some philosophers, both ancient and modern, who have
+conceived that the Gods take not the least cognizance of human affairs.
+But if their doctrine be true, of what avail is piety, sanctity, or
+religion? for these are feelings and marks of devotion which are
+offered to the Gods by men with uprightness and holiness, on the ground
+that men are the objects of the attention of the Gods, and that many
+benefits are conferred by the immortal Gods on the human race. But if
+the Gods have neither the power nor the inclination to help us; if they
+take no care of us, and pay no regard to our actions; and if there is
+no single advantage which can possibly accrue to the life of man; then
+what reason can we have to pay any adoration, or any honors, or to
+prefer any prayers to them? Piety, like the other virtues, cannot have
+any connection with vain show or dissimulation; and without piety,
+neither sanctity nor religion can be supported; the total subversion of
+which must be attended with great confusion and disturbance in life.
+
+I do not even know, if we cast off piety towards the Gods, but that
+faith, and all the associations of human life, and that most excellent
+of all virtues, justice, may perish with it.
+
+There are other philosophers, and those, too, very great and
+illustrious men, who conceive the whole world to be directed and
+governed by the will and wisdom of the Gods; nor do they stop here, but
+conceive likewise that the Deities consult and provide for the
+preservation of mankind. For they think that the fruits, and the
+produce of the earth, and the seasons, and the variety of weather, and
+the change of climates, by which all the productions of the earth are
+brought to maturity, are designed by the immortal Gods for the use of
+man. They instance many other things, which shall be related in these
+books; and which would almost induce us to believe that the immortal
+Gods had made them all expressly and solely for the benefit and
+advantage of men. Against these opinions Carneades has advanced so much
+that what he has said should excite a desire in men who are not
+naturally slothful to search after truth; for there is no subject on
+which the learned as well as the unlearned differ so strenuously as in
+this; and since their opinions are so various, and so repugnant one to
+another, it is possible that none of them may be, and absolutely
+impossible that more than one should be, right.
+
+III. Now, in a cause like this, I may be able to pacify well-meaning
+opposers, and to confute invidious censurers, so as to induce the
+latter to repent of their unreasonable contradiction, and the former to
+be glad to learn; for they who admonish one in a friendly spirit should
+be instructed, they who attack one like enemies should be repelled. But
+I observe that the several books which I have lately published[74] have
+occasioned much noise and various discourse about them; some people
+wondering what the reason has been why I have applied myself so
+suddenly to the study of philosophy, and others desirous of knowing
+what my opinion is on such subjects. I likewise perceive that many
+people wonder at my following that philosophy[75] chiefly which seems
+to take away the light, and to bury and envelop things in a kind of
+artificial night, and that I should so unexpectedly have taken up the
+defence of a school that has been long neglected and forsaken. But it
+is a mistake to suppose that this application to philosophical studies
+has been sudden on my part. I have applied myself to them from my
+youth, at no small expense of time and trouble; and I have been in the
+habit of philosophizing a great deal when I least seemed to think about
+it; for the truth of which I appeal to my orations, which are filled
+with quotations from philosophers, and to my intimacy with those very
+learned men who frequented my house and conversed daily with me,
+particularly Diodorus, Philo, Antiochus, and Posidonius,[76] under whom
+I was bred; and if all the precepts of philosophy are to have reference
+to the conduct of life, I am inclined to think that I have advanced,
+both in public and private affairs, only such principles as may be
+supported by reason and authority.
+
+IV. But if any one should ask what has induced me, in the decline of
+life, to write on these subjects, nothing is more easily answered; for
+when I found myself entirely disengaged from business, and the
+commonwealth reduced to the necessity of being governed by the
+direction and care of one man,[77] I thought it becoming, for the sake
+of the public, to instruct my countrymen in philosophy, and that it
+would be of importance, and much to the honor and commendation of our
+city, to have such great and excellent subjects introduced in the Latin
+tongue. I the less repent of my undertaking, since I plainly see that I
+have excited in many a desire, not only of learning, but of writing;
+for we have had several Romans well grounded in the learning of the
+Greeks who were unable to communicate to their countrymen what they had
+learned, because they looked upon it as impossible to express that in
+Latin which they had received from the Greeks. In this point I think I
+have succeeded so well that what I have done is not, even in
+copiousness of expression, inferior to that language.
+
+Another inducement to it was a melancholy disposition of mind, and the
+great and heavy oppression of fortune that was upon me; from which, if
+I could have found any surer remedy, I would not have sought relief in
+this pursuit. But I could procure ease by no means better than by not
+only applying myself to books, but by devoting myself to the
+examination of the whole body of philosophy. And every part and branch
+of this is readily discovered when every question is propounded in
+writing; for there is such an admirable continuation and series of
+things that each seems connected with the other, and all appear linked
+together and united.
+
+V. Now, those men who desire to know my own private opinion on every
+particular subject have more curiosity than is necessary. For the force
+of reason in disputation is to be sought after rather than authority,
+since the authority of the teacher is often a disadvantage to those who
+are willing to learn; as they refuse to use their own judgment, and
+rely implicitly on him whom they make choice of for a preceptor. Nor
+could I ever approve this custom of the Pythagoreans, who, when they
+affirmed anything in disputation, and were asked why it was so, used to
+give this answer: "He himself has said it;" and this "he himself," it
+seems, was Pythagoras. Such was the force of prejudice and opinion that
+his authority was to prevail even without argument or reason.
+
+They who wonder at my being a follower of this sect in particular may
+find a satisfactory answer in my four books of Academical Questions.
+But I deny that I have undertaken the protection of what is neglected
+and forsaken; for the opinions of men do not die with them, though they
+may perhaps want the author's explanation. This manner of
+philosophizing, of disputing all things and assuming nothing certainly,
+was begun by Socrates, revived by Arcesilaus, confirmed by Carneades,
+and has descended, with all its power, even to the present age; but I
+am informed that it is now almost exploded even in Greece. However, I
+do not impute that to any fault in the institution of the Academy, but
+to the negligence of mankind. If it is difficult to know all the
+doctrines of any one sect, how much more is it to know those of every
+sect! which, however, must necessarily be known to those who resolve,
+for the sake of discovering truth, to dispute for or against all
+philosophers without partiality.
+
+I do not profess myself to be master of this difficult and noble
+faculty; but I do assert that I have endeavored to make myself so; and
+it is impossible that they who choose this manner of philosophizing
+should not meet at least with something worthy their pursuit. I have
+spoken more fully on this head in another place. But as some are too
+slow of apprehension, and some too careless, men stand in perpetual
+need of caution. For we are not people who believe that there is
+nothing whatever which is true; but we say that some falsehoods are so
+blended with all truths, and have so great a resemblance to them, that
+there is no certain rule for judging of or assenting to propositions;
+from which this maxim also follows, that many things are probable,
+which, though they are not evident to the senses, have still so
+persuasive and beautiful an aspect that a wise man chooses to direct
+his conduct by them.
+
+VI. Now, to free myself from the reproach of partiality, I propose to
+lay before you the opinions of various philosophers concerning the
+nature of the Gods, by which means all men may judge which of them are
+consistent with truth; and if all agree together, or if any one shall
+be found to have discovered what may be absolutely called truth, I will
+then give up the Academy as vain and arrogant. So I may cry out, in the
+words of Statius, in the Synephebi,
+
+     Ye Gods, I call upon, require, pray, beseech, entreat, and
+     implore the attention of my countrymen all, both young and
+     old;
+
+yet not on so trifling an occasion as when the person in the play
+complains that,
+
+     In this city we have discovered a most flagrant iniquity:
+     here is a professed courtesan, who refuses money from her
+     lover;
+
+but that they may attend, know, and consider what sentiments they ought
+to preserve concerning religion, piety, sanctity, ceremonies, faith,
+oaths, temples, shrines, and solemn sacrifices; what they ought to
+think of the auspices over which I preside;[78] for all these have
+relation to the present question. The manifest disagreement among the
+most learned on this subject creates doubts in those who imagine they
+have some certain knowledge of the subject.
+
+Which fact I have often taken notice of elsewhere, and I did so more
+especially at the discussion that was held at my friend C. Cotta's
+concerning the immortal Gods, and which was carried on with the
+greatest care, accuracy, and precision; for coming to him at the time
+of the Latin holidays,[79] according to his own invitation and message
+from him, I found him sitting in his study,[80] and in a discourse with
+C. Velleius, the senator, who was then reputed by the Epicureans the
+ablest of our countrymen. Q. Lucilius Balbus was likewise there, a
+great proficient in the doctrine of the Stoics, and esteemed equal to
+the most eminent of the Greeks in that part of knowledge. As soon as
+Cotta saw me, You are come, says he, very seasonably; for I am having a
+dispute with Velleius on an important subject, which, considering the
+nature of your studies, is not improper for you to join in.
+
+VII. Indeed, says I, I think I am come very seasonably, as you say; for
+here are three chiefs of three principal sects met together. If M.
+Piso[81] was present, no sect of philosophy that is in any esteem would
+want an advocate. If Antiochus's book, replies Cotta, which he lately
+sent to Balbus, says true, you have no occasion to wish for your friend
+Piso; for Antiochus is of the opinion that the Stoics do not differ
+from the Peripatetics in fact, though they do in words; and I should be
+glad to know what you think of that book, Balbus. I? says he. I wonder
+that Antiochus, a man of the clearest apprehension, should not see what
+a vast difference there is between the Stoics, who distinguish the
+honest and the profitable, not only in name, but absolutely in kind,
+and the Peripatetics, who blend the honest with the profitable in such
+a manner that they differ only in degrees and proportion, and not in
+kind. This is not a little difference in words, but a great one in
+things; but of this hereafter. Now, if you think fit, let us return to
+what we began with.
+
+With all my heart, says Cotta. But that this visitor (looking at me),
+who is just come in, may not be ignorant of what we are upon, I will
+inform him that we were discoursing on the nature of the Gods;
+concerning which, as it is a subject that always appeared very obscure
+to me, I prevailed on Velleius to give us the sentiments of Epicurus.
+Therefore, continues he, if it is not troublesome, Velleius, repeat
+what you have already stated to us. I will, says he, though this
+new-comer will be no advocate for me, but for you; for you have both,
+adds he, with a smile, learned from the same Philo to be certain of
+nothing.[82] What we have learned from him, replied I, Cotta will
+discover; but I would not have you think I am come as an assistant to
+him, but as an auditor, with an impartial and unbiassed mind, and not
+bound by any obligation to defend any particular principle, whether I
+like or dislike it.
+
+VIII. After this, Velleius, with the confidence peculiar to his sect,
+dreading nothing so much as to seem to doubt of anything, began as if
+he had just then descended from the council of the Gods, and Epicurus's
+intervals of worlds. Do not attend, says he, to these idle and
+imaginary tales; nor to the operator and builder of the World, the God
+of Plato's Timæus; nor to the old prophetic dame, the [Greek: Pronoia]
+of the Stoics, which the Latins call Providence; nor to that round,
+that burning, revolving deity, the World, endowed with sense and
+understanding; the prodigies and wonders, not of inquisitive
+philosophers, but of dreamers!
+
+For with what eyes of the mind was your Plato able to see that
+workhouse of such stupendous toil, in which he makes the world to be
+modelled and built by God? What materials, what tools, what bars, what
+machines, what servants, were employed in so vast a work? How could the
+air, fire, water, and earth pay obedience and submit to the will of the
+architect? From whence arose those five forms,[83] of which the rest
+were composed, so aptly contributing to frame the mind and produce the
+senses? It is tedious to go through all, as they are of such a sort
+that they look more like things to be desired than to be discovered.
+
+But, what is more remarkable, he gives us a world which has been not
+only created, but, if I may so say, in a manner formed with hands, and
+yet he says it is eternal. Do you conceive him to have the least skill
+in natural philosophy who is capable of thinking anything to be
+everlasting that had a beginning? For what can possibly ever have been
+put together which cannot be dissolved again? Or what is there that had
+a beginning which will not have an end? If your Providence, Lucilius,
+is the same as Plato's God, I ask you, as before, who were the
+assistants, what were the engines, what was the plan and preparation of
+the whole work? If it is not the same, then why did she make the world
+mortal, and not everlasting, like Plato's God?
+
+IX. But I would demand of you both, why these world-builders started up
+so suddenly, and lay dormant for so many ages? For we are not to
+conclude that, if there was no world, there were therefore no ages. I
+do not now speak of such ages as are finished by a certain number of
+days and nights in annual courses; for I acknowledge that those could
+not be without the revolution of the world; but there was a certain
+eternity from infinite time, not measured by any circumscription of
+seasons; but how that was in space we cannot understand, because we
+cannot possibly have even the slightest idea of time before time was. I
+desire, therefore, to know, Balbus, why this Providence of yours was
+idle for such an immense space of time? Did she avoid labor? But that
+could have no effect on the Deity; nor could there be any labor, since
+all nature, air, fire, earth, and water would obey the divine essence.
+What was it that incited the Deity to act the part of an ædile, to
+illuminate and decorate the world? If it was in order that God might be
+the better accommodated in his habitation, then he must have been
+dwelling an infinite length of time before in darkness as in a dungeon.
+But do we imagine that he was afterward delighted with that variety
+with which we see the heaven and earth adorned? What entertainment
+could that be to the Deity? If it was any, he would not have been
+without it so long.
+
+Or were these things made, as you almost assert, by God for the sake of
+men? Was it for the wise? If so, then this great design was adopted for
+the sake of a very small number. Or for the sake of fools? First of
+all, there was no reason why God should consult the advantage of the
+wicked; and, further, what could be his object in doing so, since all
+fools are, without doubt, the most miserable of men, chiefly because
+they are fools? For what can we pronounce more deplorable than folly?
+Besides, there are many inconveniences in life which the wise can learn
+to think lightly of by dwelling rather on the advantages which they
+receive; but which fools are unable to avoid when they are coming, or
+to bear when they are come.
+
+X. They who affirm the world to be an animated and intelligent being
+have by no means discovered the nature of the mind, nor are able to
+conceive in what form that essence can exist; but of that I shall speak
+more hereafter. At present I must express my surprise at the weakness
+of those who endeavor to make it out to be not only animated and
+immortal, but likewise happy, and round, because Plato says that is the
+most beautiful form; whereas I think a cylinder, a square, a cone, or a
+pyramid more beautiful. But what life do they attribute to that round
+Deity? Truly it is a being whirled about with a celerity to which
+nothing can be even conceived by the imagination as equal; nor can I
+imagine how a settled mind and happy life can consist in such motion,
+the least degree of which would be troublesome to us. Why, therefore,
+should it not be considered troublesome also to the Deity? For the
+earth itself, as it is part of the world, is part also of the Deity. We
+see vast tracts of land barren and uninhabitable; some, because they
+are scorched by the too near approach of the sun; others, because they
+are bound up with frost and snow, through the great distance which the
+sun is from them. Therefore, if the world is a Deity, as these are
+parts of the world, some of the Deity's limbs must be said to be
+scorched, and some frozen.
+
+These are your doctrines, Lucilius; but what those of others are I will
+endeavor to ascertain by tracing them back from the earliest of ancient
+philosophers. Thales the Milesian, who first inquired after such
+subjects, asserted water to be the origin of things, and that God was
+that mind which formed all things from water. If the Gods can exist
+without corporeal sense, and if there can be a mind without a body, why
+did he annex a mind to water?
+
+It was Anaximander's opinion that the Gods were born; that after a
+great length of time they died; and that they are innumerable worlds.
+But what conception can we possibly have of a Deity who is not eternal?
+
+Anaximenes, after him, taught that the air is God, and that he was
+generated, and that he is immense, infinite, and always in motion; as
+if air, which has no form, could possibly be God; for the Deity must
+necessarily be not only of some form or other, but of the most
+beautiful form. Besides, is not everything that had a beginning subject
+to mortality?
+
+XI. Anaxagoras, who received his learning from Anaximenes, was the
+first who affirmed the system and disposition of all things to be
+contrived and perfected by the power and reason of an infinite mind; in
+which infinity he did not perceive that there could be no conjunction
+of sense and motion, nor any sense in the least degree, where nature
+herself could feel no impulse. If he would have this mind to be a sort
+of animal, then there must be some more internal principle from whence
+that animal should receive its appellation. But what can be more
+internal than the mind? Let it, therefore, be clothed with an external
+body. But this is not agreeable to his doctrine; but we are utterly
+unable to conceive how a pure simple mind can exist without any
+substance annexed to it.
+
+Alcmæon of Crotona, in attributing a divinity to the sun, the moon, and
+the rest of the stars, and also to the mind, did not perceive that he
+was ascribing immortality to mortal beings.
+
+Pythagoras, who supposed the Deity to be one soul, mixing with and
+pervading all nature, from which our souls are taken, did not consider
+that the Deity himself must, in consequence of this doctrine, be maimed
+and torn with the rending every human soul from it; nor that, when the
+human mind is afflicted (as is the case in many instances), that part
+of the Deity must likewise be afflicted, which cannot be. If the human
+mind were a Deity, how could it be ignorant of any thing? Besides, how
+could that Deity, if it is nothing but soul, be mixed with, or infused
+into, the world?
+
+Then Xenophanes, who said that everything in the world which had any
+existence, with the addition of intellect, was God, is as liable to
+exception as the rest, especially in relation to the infinity of it, in
+which there can be nothing sentient, nothing composite.
+
+Parmenides formed a conceit to himself of something circular like a
+crown. (He names it Stephane.) It is an orb of constant light and heat
+around the heavens; this he calls God; in which there is no room to
+imagine any divine form or sense. And he uttered many other absurdities
+on the same subject; for he ascribed a divinity to war, to discord, to
+lust, and other passions of the same kind, which are destroyed by
+disease, or sleep, or oblivion, or age. The same honor he gives to the
+stars; but I shall forbear making any objections to his system here,
+having already done it in another place.
+
+XII. Empedocles, who erred in many things, is most grossly mistaken in
+his notion of the Gods. He lays down four natures[84] as divine, from
+which he thinks that all things were made. Yet it is evident that they
+have a beginning, that they decay, and that they are void of all sense.
+
+Protagoras did not seem to have any idea of the real nature of the
+Gods; for he acknowledged that he was altogether ignorant whether there
+are or are not any, or what they are.
+
+What shall I say of Democritus, who classes our images of objects, and
+their orbs, in the number of the Gods; as he does that principle
+through which those images appear and have their influence? He deifies
+likewise our knowledge and understanding. Is he not involved in a very
+great error? And because nothing continues always in the same state, he
+denies that anything is everlasting, does he not thereby entirely
+destroy the Deity, and make it impossible to form any opinion of him?
+
+Diogenes of Apollonia looks upon the air to be a Deity. But what sense
+can the air have? or what divine form can be attributed to it?
+
+It would be tedious to show the uncertainty of Plato's opinion; for, in
+his Timæus, he denies the propriety of asserting that there is one
+great father or creator of the world; and, in his book of Laws, he
+thinks we ought not to make too strict an inquiry into the nature of
+the Deity. And as for his statement when he asserts that God is a being
+without any body--what the Greeks call [Greek: asômatos]--it is
+certainly quite unintelligible how that theory can possibly be true;
+for such a God must then necessarily be destitute of sense, prudence,
+and pleasure; all which things are comprehended in our notion of the
+Gods. He likewise asserts in his Timæus, and in his Laws, that the
+world, the heavens, the stars, the mind, and those Gods which are
+delivered down to us from our ancestors, constitute the Deity. These
+opinions, taken separately, are apparently false; and, together, are
+directly inconsistent with each other.
+
+Xenophon has committed almost the same mistakes, but in fewer words. In
+those sayings which he has related of Socrates, he introduces him
+disputing the lawfulness of inquiring into the form of the Deity, and
+makes him assert the sun and the mind to be Deities: he represents him
+likewise as affirming the being of one God only, and at another time of
+many; which are errors of almost the same kind which I before took
+notice of in Plato.
+
+XIII. Antisthenes, in his book called the Natural Philosopher, says
+that there are many national and one natural Deity; but by this saying
+he destroys the power and nature of the Gods. Speusippus is not much
+less in the wrong; who, following his uncle Plato, says that a certain
+incorporeal power governs everything; by which he endeavors to root out
+of our minds the knowledge of the Gods.
+
+Aristotle, in his third book of Philosophy, confounds many things
+together, as the rest have done; but he does not differ from his master
+Plato. At one time he attributes all divinity to the mind, at another
+he asserts that the world is God. Soon afterward he makes some other
+essence preside over the world, and gives it those faculties by which,
+with certain revolutions, he may govern and preserve the motion of it.
+Then he asserts the heat of the firmament to be God; not perceiving the
+firmament to be part of the world, which in another place he had
+described as God. How can that divine sense of the firmament be
+preserved in so rapid a motion? And where do the multitude of Gods
+dwell, if heaven itself is a Deity? But when this philosopher says that
+God is without a body, he makes him an irrational and insensible being.
+Besides, how can the world move itself, if it wants a body? Or how, if
+it is in perpetual self-motion, can it be easy and happy?
+
+Xenocrates, his fellow-pupil, does not appear much wiser on this head,
+for in his books concerning the nature of the Gods no divine form is
+described; but he says the number of them is eight. Five are moving
+planets;[85] the sixth is contained in all the fixed stars; which,
+dispersed, are so many several members, but, considered together, are
+one single Deity; the seventh is the sun; and the eighth the moon. But
+in what sense they can possibly be happy is not easy to be understood.
+
+From the same school of Plato, Heraclides of Pontus stuffed his books
+with puerile tales. Sometimes he thinks the world a Deity, at other
+times the mind. He attributes divinity likewise to the wandering stars.
+He deprives the Deity of sense, and makes his form mutable; and, in the
+same book again, he makes earth and heaven Deities.
+
+The unsteadiness of Theophrastus is equally intolerable. At one time he
+attributes a divine prerogative to the mind; at another, to the
+firmament; at another, to the stars and celestial constellations.
+
+Nor is his disciple Strato, who is called the naturalist, any more
+worthy to be regarded; for he thinks that the divine power is diffused
+through nature, which is the cause of birth, increase, and diminution,
+but that it has no sense nor form.
+
+XIV. Zeno (to come to your sect, Balbus) thinks the law of nature to be
+the divinity, and that it has the power to force us to what is right,
+and to restrain us from what is wrong. How this law can be an animated
+being I cannot conceive; but that God is so we would certainly
+maintain. The same person says, in another place, that the sky is God;
+but can we possibly conceive that God is a being insensible, deaf to
+our prayers, our wishes, and our vows, and wholly unconnected with us?
+In other books he thinks there is a certain rational essence pervading
+all nature, indued with divine efficacy. He attributes the same power
+to the stars, to the years, to the months, and to the seasons. In his
+interpretation of Hesiod's Theogony,[86] he entirely destroys the
+established notions of the Gods; for he excludes Jupiter, Juno, and
+Vesta, and those esteemed divine, from the number of them; but his
+doctrine is that these are names which by some kind of allusion are
+given to mute and inanimate beings. The sentiments of his disciple
+Aristo are not less erroneous. He thought it impossible to conceive the
+form of the Deity, and asserts that the Gods are destitute of sense;
+and he is entirely dubious whether the Deity is an animated being or
+not.
+
+Cleanthes, who next comes under my notice, a disciple of Zeno at the
+same time with Aristo, in one place says that the world is God; in
+another, he attributes divinity to the mind and spirit of universal
+nature; then he asserts that the most remote, the highest, the
+all-surrounding, the all-enclosing and embracing heat, which is called
+the sky, is most certainly the Deity. In the books he wrote against
+pleasure, in which he seems to be raving, he imagines the Gods to have
+a certain form and shape; then he ascribes all divinity to the stars;
+and, lastly, he thinks nothing more divine than reason. So that this
+God, whom we know mentally and in the speculations of our minds, from
+which traces we receive our impression, has at last actually no visible
+form at all.
+
+XV. Persæus, another disciple of Zeno, says that they who have made
+discoveries advantageous to the life of man should be esteemed as Gods;
+and the very things, he says, which are healthful and beneficial have
+derived their names from those of the Gods; so that he thinks it not
+sufficient to call them the discoveries of Gods, but he urges that they
+themselves should be deemed divine. What can be more absurd than to
+ascribe divine honors to sordid and deformed things; or to place among
+the Gods men who are dead and mixed with the dust, to whose memory all
+the respect that could be paid would be but mourning for their loss?
+
+Chrysippus, who is looked upon as the most subtle interpreter of the
+dreams of the Stoics, has mustered up a numerous band of unknown Gods;
+and so unknown that we are not able to form any idea about them, though
+our mind seems capable of framing any image to itself in its thoughts.
+For he says that the divine power is placed in reason, and in the
+spirit and mind of universal nature; that the world, with a universal
+effusion of its spirit, is God; that the superior part of that spirit,
+which is the mind and reason, is the great principle of nature,
+containing and preserving the chain of all things; that the divinity is
+the power of fate, and the necessity of future events. He deifies fire
+also, and what I before called the ethereal spirit, and those elements
+which naturally proceed from it--water, earth, and air. He attributes
+divinity to the sun, moon, stars, and universal space, the grand
+container of all things, and to those men likewise who have obtained
+immortality. He maintains the sky to be what men call Jupiter; the air,
+which pervades the sea, to be Neptune; and the earth, Ceres. In like
+manner he goes through the names of the other Deities. He says that
+Jupiter is that immutable and eternal law which guides and directs us
+in our manners; and this he calls fatal necessity, the everlasting
+verity of future events. But none of these are of such a nature as to
+seem to carry any indication of divine virtue in them. These are the
+doctrines contained in his first book of the Nature of the Gods. In the
+second, he endeavors to accommodate the fables of Orpheus, Musæus,
+Hesiod, and Homer to what he has advanced in the first, in order that
+the most ancient poets, who never dreamed of these things, may seem to
+have been Stoics. Diogenes the Babylonian was a follower of the
+doctrine of Chrysippus; and in that book which he wrote, entitled "A
+Treatise concerning Minerva," he separates the account of Jupiter's
+bringing-forth, and the birth of that virgin, from the fabulous, and
+reduces it to a natural construction.
+
+XVI. Thus far have I been rather exposing the dreams of dotards than
+giving the opinions of philosophers. Not much more absurd than these
+are the fables of the poets, who owe all their power of doing harm to
+the sweetness of their language; who have represented the Gods as
+enraged with anger and inflamed with lust; who have brought before our
+eyes their wars, battles, combats, wounds; their hatreds, dissensions,
+discords, births, deaths, complaints, and lamentations; their
+indulgences in all kinds of intemperance; their adulteries; their
+chains; their amours with mortals, and mortals begotten by immortals.
+To these idle and ridiculous flights of the poets we may add the
+prodigious stories invented by the Magi, and by the Egyptians also,
+which were of the same nature, together with the extravagant notions of
+the multitude at all times, who, from total ignorance of the truth, are
+always fluctuating in uncertainty.
+
+Now, whoever reflects on the rashness and absurdity of these tenets
+must inevitably entertain the highest respect and veneration for
+Epicurus, and perhaps even rank him in the number of those beings who
+are the subject of this dispute; for he alone first founded the idea of
+the existence of the Gods on the impression which nature herself hath
+made on the minds of all men. For what nation, what people are there,
+who have not, without any learning, a natural idea, or prenotion, of a
+Deity? Epicurus calls this [Greek: prolêpsis]; that is, an antecedent
+conception of the fact in the mind, without which nothing can be
+understood, inquired after, or discoursed on; the force and advantage
+of which reasoning we receive from that celestial volume of Epicurus
+concerning the Rule and Judgment of Things.
+
+XVII. Here, then, you see the foundation of this question clearly laid;
+for since it is the constant and universal opinion of mankind,
+independent of education, custom, or law, that there are Gods, it must
+necessarily follow that this knowledge is implanted in our minds, or,
+rather, innate in us. That opinion respecting which there is a general
+agreement in universal nature must infallibly be true; therefore it
+must be allowed that there are Gods; for in this we have the
+concurrence, not only of almost all philosophers, but likewise of the
+ignorant and illiterate. It must be also confessed that the point is
+established that we have naturally this idea, as I said before, or
+prenotion, of the existence of the Gods. As new things require new
+names, so that prenotion was called [Greek: prolêpsis] by Epicurus; an
+appellation never used before. On the same principle of reasoning, we
+think that the Gods are happy and immortal; for that nature which hath
+assured us that there are Gods has likewise imprinted in our minds the
+knowledge of their immortality and felicity; and if so, what Epicurus
+hath declared in these words is true: "That which is eternally happy
+cannot be burdened with any labor itself, nor can it impose any labor
+on another; nor can it be influenced by resentment or favor: because
+things which are liable to such feelings must be weak and frail." We
+have said enough to prove that we should worship the Gods with piety,
+and without superstition, if that were the only question.
+
+For the superior and excellent nature of the Gods requires a pious
+adoration from men, because it is possessed of immortality and the most
+exalted felicity; for whatever excels has a right to veneration, and
+all fear of the power and anger of the Gods should be banished; for we
+must understand that anger and affection are inconsistent with the
+nature of a happy and immortal being. These apprehensions being
+removed, no dread of the superior powers remains. To confirm this
+opinion, our curiosity leads us to inquire into the form and life and
+action of the intellect and spirit of the Deity.
+
+XVIII. With regard to his form, we are directed partly by nature and
+partly by reason. All men are told by nature that none but a human form
+can be ascribed to the Gods; for under what other image did it ever
+appear to any one either sleeping or waking? and, without having
+recourse to our first notions,[87] reason itself declares the same; for
+as it is easy to conceive that the most excellent nature, either
+because of its happiness or immortality, should be the most beautiful,
+what composition of limbs, what conformation of lineaments, what form,
+what aspect, can be more beautiful than the human? Your sect, Lucilius
+(not like my friend Cotta, who sometimes says one thing and sometimes
+another), when they represent the divine art and workmanship in the
+human body, are used to describe how very completely each member is
+formed, not only for convenience, but also for beauty. Therefore, if
+the human form excels that of all other animal beings, as God himself
+is an animated being, he must surely be of that form which is the most
+beautiful. Besides, the Gods are granted to be perfectly happy; and
+nobody can be happy without virtue, nor can virtue exist where reason
+is not; and reason can reside in none but the human form; the Gods,
+therefore, must be acknowledged to be of human form; yet that form is
+not body, but something like body; nor does it contain any blood, but
+something like blood. Though these distinctions were more acutely
+devised and more artfully expressed by Epicurus than any common
+capacity can comprehend; yet, depending on your understanding, I shall
+be more brief on the subject than otherwise I should be. Epicurus, who
+not only discovered and understood the occult and almost hidden secrets
+of nature, but explained them with ease, teaches that the power and
+nature of the Gods is not to be discerned by the senses, but by the
+mind; nor are they to be considered as bodies of any solidity, or
+reducible to number, like those things which, because of their
+firmness, he calls [Greek: Steremnia];[88] but as images, perceived by
+similitude and transition. As infinite kinds of those images result
+from innumerable individuals, and centre in the Gods, our minds and
+understanding are directed towards and fixed with the greatest delight
+on them, in order to comprehend what that happy and eternal essence is.
+
+XIX. Surely the mighty power of the Infinite Being is most worthy our
+great and earnest contemplation; the nature of which we must
+necessarily understand to be such that everything in it is made to
+correspond completely to some other answering part. This is called by
+Epicurus [Greek: isonomia]; that is to say, an equal distribution or
+even disposition of things. From hence he draws this inference, that,
+as there is such a vast multitude of mortals, there cannot be a less
+number of immortals; and if those which perish are innumerable, those
+which are preserved ought also to be countless. Your sect, Balbus,
+frequently ask us how the Gods live, and how they pass their time?
+Their life is the most happy, and the most abounding with all kinds of
+blessings, which can be conceived. They do nothing. They are
+embarrassed with no business; nor do they perform any work. They
+rejoice in the possession of their own wisdom and virtue. They are
+satisfied that they shall ever enjoy the fulness of eternal pleasures.
+
+XX. Such a Deity may properly be called happy; but yours is a most
+laborious God. For let us suppose the world a Deity--what can be a more
+uneasy state than, without the least cessation, to be whirled about the
+axle-tree of heaven with a surprising celerity? But nothing can be
+happy that is not at ease. Or let us suppose a Deity residing in the
+world, who directs and governs it, who preserves the courses of the
+stars, the changes of the seasons, and the vicissitudes and orders of
+things, surveying the earth and the sea, and accommodating them to the
+advantage and necessities of man. Truly this Deity is embarrassed with
+a very troublesome and laborious office. We make a happy life to
+consist in a tranquillity of mind, a perfect freedom from care, and an
+exemption from all employment. The philosopher from whom we received
+all our knowledge has taught us that the world was made by nature; that
+there was no occasion for a workhouse to frame it in; and that, though
+you deny the possibility of such a work without divine skill, it is so
+easy to her, that she has made, does make, and will make innumerable
+worlds. But, because you do not conceive that nature is able to produce
+such effects without some rational aid, you are forced, like the tragic
+poets, when you cannot wind up your argument in any other way, to have
+recourse to a Deity, whose assistance you would not seek, if you could
+view that vast and unbounded magnitude of regions in all parts; where
+the mind, extending and spreading itself, travels so far and wide that
+it can find no end, no extremity to stop at. In this immensity of
+breadth, length, and height, a most boundless company of innumerable
+atoms are fluttering about, which, notwithstanding the interposition of
+a void space, meet and cohere, and continue clinging to one another;
+and by this union these modifications and forms of things arise, which,
+in your opinions, could not possibly be made without the help of
+bellows and anvils. Thus you have imposed on us an eternal master, whom
+we must dread day and night. For who can be free from fear of a Deity
+who foresees, regards, and takes notice of everything; one who thinks
+all things his own; a curious, ever-busy God?
+
+Hence first arose your [Greek: Heimarmenê], as you call it, your fatal
+necessity; so that, whatever happens, you affirm that it flows from an
+eternal chain and continuance of causes. Of what value is this
+philosophy, which, like old women and illiterate men, attributes
+everything to fate? Then follows your [Greek: mantikê], in Latin called
+_divinatio_, divination; which, if we would listen to you, would plunge
+us into such superstition that we should fall down and worship your
+inspectors into sacrifices, your augurs, your soothsayers, your
+prophets, and your fortune-tellers.
+
+Epicurus having freed us from these terrors and restored us to liberty,
+we have no dread of those beings whom we have reason to think entirely
+free from all trouble themselves, and who do not impose any on others.
+We pay our adoration, indeed, with piety and reverence to that essence
+which is above all excellence and perfection. But I fear my zeal for
+this doctrine has made me too prolix. However, I could not easily leave
+so eminent and important a subject unfinished, though I must confess I
+should rather endeavor to hear than speak so long.
+
+XXI. Cotta, with his usual courtesy, then began. Velleius, says he,
+were it not for something which you have advanced, I should have
+remained silent; for I have often observed, as I did just now upon
+hearing you, that I cannot so easily conceive why a proposition is true
+as why it is false. Should you ask me what I take the nature of the
+Gods to be, I should perhaps make no answer. But if you should ask
+whether I think it to be of that nature which you have described, I
+should answer that I was as far as possible from agreeing with you.
+However, before I enter on the subject of your discourse and what you
+have advanced upon it, I will give you my opinion of yourself. Your
+intimate friend, L. Crassus, has been often heard by me to say that you
+were beyond all question superior to all our learned Romans; and that
+few Epicureans in Greece were to be compared to you. But as I knew what
+a wonderful esteem he had for you, I imagined that might make him the
+more lavish in commendation of you. Now, however, though I do not
+choose to praise any one when present, yet I must confess that I think
+you have delivered your thoughts clearly on an obscure and very
+intricate subject; that you are not only copious in your sentiments,
+but more elegant in your language than your sect generally are. When I
+was at Athens, I went often to hear Zeno, by the advice of Philo, who
+used to call him the chief of the Epicureans; partly, probably, in
+order to judge more easily how completely those principles could be
+refuted after I had heard them stated by the most learned of the
+Epicureans. And, indeed, he did not speak in any ordinary manner; but,
+like you, with clearness, gravity, and elegance; yet what frequently
+gave me great uneasiness when I heard him, as it did while I attended
+to you, was to see so excellent a genius falling into such frivolous
+(excuse my freedom), not to say foolish, doctrines. However, I shall
+not at present offer anything better; for, as I said before, we can in
+most subjects, especially in physics, sooner discover what is not true
+than what is.
+
+XXII. If you should ask me what God is, or what his character and
+nature are, I should follow the example of Simonides, who, when Hiero
+the tyrant proposed the same question to him, desired a day to consider
+of it. When he required his answer the next day, Simonides begged two
+days more; and as he kept constantly desiring double the number which
+he had required before instead of giving his answer, Hiero, with
+surprise, asked him his meaning in doing so: "Because," says he, "the
+longer I meditate on it, the more obscure it appears to me." Simonides,
+who was not only a delightful poet, but reputed a wise and learned man
+in other branches of knowledge, found, I suppose, so many acute and
+refined arguments occurring to him, that he was doubtful which was the
+truest, and therefore despaired of discovering any truth.
+
+But does your Epicurus (for I had rather contend with him than with
+you) say anything that is worthy the name of philosophy, or even of
+common-sense?
+
+In the question concerning the nature of the Gods, his first inquiry
+is, whether there are Gods or not. It would be dangerous, I believe, to
+take the negative side before a public auditory; but it is very safe in
+a discourse of this kind, and in this company. I, who am a priest, and
+who think that religions and ceremonies ought sacredly to be
+maintained, am certainly desirous to have the existence of the Gods,
+which is the principal point in debate, not only fixed in opinion, but
+proved to a demonstration; for many notions flow into and disturb the
+mind which sometimes seem to convince us that there are none. But see
+how candidly I will behave to you: as I shall not touch upon those
+tenets you hold in common with other philosophers, consequently I shall
+not dispute the existence of the Gods, for that doctrine is agreeable
+to almost all men, and to myself in particular; but I am still at
+liberty to find fault with the reasons you give for it, which I think
+are very insufficient.
+
+XXIII. You have said that the general assent of men of all nations and
+all degrees is an argument strong enough to induce us to acknowledge
+the being of the Gods. This is not only a weak, but a false, argument;
+for, first of all, how do you know the opinions of all nations? I
+really believe there are many people so savage that they have no
+thoughts of a Deity. What think you of Diagoras, who was called the
+atheist; and of Theodorus after him? Did not they plainly deny the very
+essence of a Deity? Protagoras of Abdera, whom you just now mentioned,
+the greatest sophist of his age, was banished by order of the Athenians
+from their city and territories, and his books were publicly burned,
+because these words were in the beginning of his treatise concerning
+the Gods: "I am unable to arrive at any knowledge whether there are, or
+are not, any Gods." This treatment of him, I imagine, restrained many
+from professing their disbelief of a Deity, since the doubt of it only
+could not escape punishment. What shall we say of the sacrilegious, the
+impious, and the perjured? If Tubulus Lucius, Lupus, or Carbo the son
+of Neptune, as Lucilius says, had believed that there were Gods, would
+either of them have carried his perjuries and impieties to such excess?
+Your reasoning, therefore, to confirm your assertion is not so
+conclusive as you think it is. But as this is the manner in which other
+philosophers have argued on the same subject, I will take no further
+notice of it at present; I rather choose to proceed to what is properly
+your own.
+
+I allow that there are Gods. Instruct me, then, concerning their
+origin; inform me where they are, what sort of body, what mind, they
+have, and what is their course of life; for these I am desirous of
+knowing. You attribute the most absolute power and efficacy to atoms.
+Out of them you pretend that everything is made. But there are no
+atoms, for there is nothing without body; every place is occupied by
+body, therefore there can be no such thing as a vacuum or an atom.
+
+XXIV. I advance these principles of the naturalists without knowing
+whether they are true or false; yet they are more like truth than those
+statements of yours; for they are the absurdities in which Democritus,
+or before him Leucippus, used to indulge, saying that there are certain
+light corpuscles--some smooth, some rough, some round, some square,
+some crooked and bent as bows--which by a fortuitous concourse made
+heaven and earth, without the influence of any natural power. This
+opinion, C. Velleius, you have brought down to these our times; and you
+would sooner be deprived of the greatest advantages of life than of
+that authority; for before you were acquainted with those tenets, you
+thought that you ought to profess yourself an Epicurean; so that it was
+necessary that you should either embrace these absurdities or lose the
+philosophical character which you had taken upon you; and what could
+bribe you to renounce the Epicurean opinion? Nothing, you say, can
+prevail on you to forsake the truth and the sure means of a happy life.
+But is that the truth? for I shall not contest your happy life, which
+you think the Deity himself does not enjoy unless he languishes in
+idleness. But where is truth? Is it in your innumerable worlds, some of
+which are rising, some falling, at every moment of time? Or is it in
+your atomical corpuscles, which form such excellent works without the
+direction of any natural power or reason? But I was forgetting my
+liberality, which I had promised to exert in your case, and exceeding
+the bounds which I at first proposed to myself. Granting, then,
+everything to be made of atoms, what advantage is that to your
+argument? For we are searching after the nature of the Gods; and
+allowing them to be made of atoms, they cannot be eternal, because
+whatever is made of atoms must have had a beginning: if so, there were
+no Gods till there was this beginning; and if the Gods have had a
+beginning, they must necessarily have an end, as you have before
+contended when you were discussing Plato's world. Where, then, is your
+beatitude and immortality, in which two words you say that God is
+expressed, the endeavor to prove which reduces you to the greatest
+perplexities? For you said that God had no body, but something like
+body; and no blood, but something like blood.
+
+XXV. It is a frequent practice among you, when you assert anything that
+has no resemblance to truth, and wish to avoid reprehension, to advance
+something else which is absolutely and utterly impossible, in order
+that it may seem to your adversaries better to grant that point which
+has been a matter of doubt than to keep on pertinaciously contradicting
+you on every point: like Epicurus, who, when he found that if his atoms
+were allowed to descend by their own weight, our actions could not be
+in our own power, because their motions would be certain and necessary,
+invented an expedient, which escaped Democritus, to avoid necessity. He
+says that when the atoms descend by their own weight and gravity, they
+move a little obliquely. Surely, to make such an assertion as this is
+what one ought more to be ashamed of than the acknowledging ourselves
+unable to defend the proposition. His practice is the same against the
+logicians, who say that in all propositions in which yes or no is
+required, one of them must be true; he was afraid that if this were
+granted, then, in such a proposition as "Epicurus will be alive or dead
+to-morrow," either one or the other must necessarily be admitted;
+therefore he absolutely denied the necessity of yes or no. Can anything
+show stupidity in a greater degree? Zeno,[89] being pressed by
+Arcesilas, who pronounced all things to be false which are perceived by
+the senses, said that some things were false, but not all. Epicurus was
+afraid that if any one thing seen should be false, nothing could be
+true; and therefore he asserted all the senses to be infallible
+directors of truth. Nothing can be more rash than this; for by
+endeavoring to repel a light stroke, he receives a heavy blow. On the
+subject of the nature of the Gods, he falls into the same errors. While
+he would avoid the concretion of individual bodies, lest death and
+dissolution should be the consequence, he denies that the Gods have
+body, but says they have something like body; and says they have no
+blood, but something like blood.
+
+XXVI. It seems an unaccountable thing how one soothsayer can refrain
+from laughing when he sees another. It is yet a greater wonder that you
+can refrain from laughing among yourselves. It is no body, but
+something like body! I could understand this if it were applied to
+statues made of wax or clay; but in regard to the Deity, I am not able
+to discover what is meant by a quasi-body or quasi-blood. Nor indeed
+are you, Velleius, though you will not confess so much. For those
+precepts are delivered to you as dictates which Epicurus carelessly
+blundered out; for he boasted, as we see in his writings, that he had
+no instructor, which I could easily believe without his public
+declaration of it, for the same reason that I could believe the master
+of a very bad edifice if he were to boast that he had no architect but
+himself: for there is nothing of the Academy, nothing of the Lyceum, in
+his doctrine; nothing but puerilities. He might have been a pupil of
+Xenocrates. O ye immortal Gods, what a teacher was he! And there are
+those who believe that he actually was his pupil; but he says
+otherwise, and I shall give more credit to his word than to another's.
+He confesses that he was a pupil of a certain disciple of Plato, one
+Pamphilus, at Samos; for he lived there when he was young, with his
+father and his brothers. His father, Neocles, was a farmer in those
+parts; but as the farm, I suppose, was not sufficient to maintain him,
+he turned school-master; yet Epicurus treats this Platonic philosopher
+with wonderful contempt, so fearful was he that it should be thought he
+had ever had any instruction. But it is well known he had been a pupil
+of Nausiphanes, the follower of Democritus; and since he could not deny
+it, he loaded him with insults in abundance. If he never heard a
+lecture on these Democritean principles, what lectures did he ever
+hear? What is there in Epicurus's physics that is not taken from
+Democritus? For though he altered some things, as what I mentioned
+before of the oblique motions of the atoms, yet most of his doctrines
+are the same; his atoms--his vacuum--his images--infinity of
+space--innumerable worlds, their rise and decay--and almost every part
+of natural learning that he treats of.
+
+Now, do you understand what is meant by quasi-body and quasi-blood? For
+I not only acknowledge that you are a better judge of it than I am, but
+I can bear it without envy. If any sentiments, indeed, are communicated
+without obscurity, what is there that Velleius can understand and Cotta
+not? I know what body is, and what blood is; but I cannot possibly find
+out the meaning of quasi-body and quasi-blood. Not that you
+intentionally conceal your principles from me, as Pythagoras did his
+from those who were not his disciples; or that you are intentionally
+obscure, like Heraclitus. But the truth is (which I may venture to say
+in this company), you do not understand them yourself.
+
+XXVII. This, I perceive, is what you contend for, that the Gods have a
+certain figure that has nothing concrete, nothing solid, nothing of
+express substance, nothing prominent in it; but that it is pure,
+smooth, and transparent. Let us suppose the same with the Venus of Cos,
+which is not a body, but the representation of a body; nor is the red,
+which is drawn there and mixed with the white, real blood, but a
+certain resemblance of blood; so in Epicurus's Deity there is no real
+substance, but the resemblance of substance.
+
+Let me take for granted that which is perfectly unintelligible; then
+tell me what are the lineaments and figures of these sketched-out
+Deities. Here you have plenty of arguments by which you would show the
+Gods to be in human form. The first is, that our minds are so
+anticipated and prepossessed, that whenever we think of a Deity the
+human shape occurs to us. The next is, that as the divine nature excels
+all things, so it ought to be of the most beautiful form, and there is
+no form more beautiful than the human; and the third is, that reason
+cannot reside in any other shape.
+
+First, let us consider each argument separately. You seem to me to
+assume a principle, despotically I may say, that has no manner of
+probability in it. Who was ever so blind, in contemplating these
+subjects, as not to see that the Gods were represented in human form,
+either by the particular advice of wise men, who thought by those means
+the more easily to turn the minds of the ignorant from a depravity of
+manners to the worship of the Gods; or through superstition, which was
+the cause of their believing that when they were paying adoration to
+these images they were approaching the Gods themselves. These conceits
+were not a little improved by the poets, painters, and artificers; for
+it would not have been very easy to represent the Gods planning and
+executing any work in another form, and perhaps this opinion arose from
+the idea which mankind have of their own beauty. But do not you, who
+are so great an adept in physics, see what a soothing flatterer, what a
+sort of procuress, nature is to herself? Do you think there is any
+creature on the land or in the sea that is not highly delighted with
+its own form? If it were not so, why would not a bull become enamored
+of a mare, or a horse of a cow? Do you believe an eagle, a lion, or a
+dolphin prefers any shape to its own? If nature, therefore, has
+instructed us in the same manner, that nothing is more beautiful than
+man, what wonder is it that we, for that reason, should imagine the
+Gods are of the human form? Do you suppose if beasts were endowed with
+reason that every one would not give the prize of beauty to his own
+species?
+
+XXVIII. Yet, by Hercules (I speak as I think)! though I am fond enough
+of myself, I dare not say that I excel in beauty that bull which
+carried Europa. For the question here is not concerning our genius and
+elocution, but our species and figure. If we could make and assume to
+ourselves any form, would you be unwilling to resemble the sea-triton
+as he is painted supported swimming on sea-monsters whose bodies are
+partly human? Here I touch on a difficult point; for so great is the
+force of nature that there is no man who would not choose to be like a
+man, nor, indeed, any ant that would not be like an ant. But like what
+man? For how few can pretend to beauty! When I was at Athens, the whole
+flock of youths afforded scarcely one. You laugh, I see; but what I
+tell you is the truth. Nay, to us who, after the examples of ancient
+philosophers, delight in boys, defects are often pleasing. Alcæus was
+charmed with a wart on a boy's knuckle; but a wart is a blemish on the
+body; yet it seemed a beauty to him. Q. Catulus, my friend and
+colleague's father, was enamored with your fellow-citizen Roscius, on
+whom he wrote these verses:
+
+    As once I stood to hail the rising day,
+      Roscius appearing on the left I spied:
+    Forgive me, Gods, if I presume to say
+      The mortal's beauty with th' immortal vied.
+
+Roscius more beautiful than a God! yet he was then, as he now is,
+squint-eyed. But what signifies that, if his defects were beauties to
+Catulus?
+
+XXIX. I return to the Gods. Can we suppose any of them to be
+squint-eyed, or even to have a cast in the eye? Have they any warts?
+Are any of them hook-nosed, flap-eared, beetle-browed, or jolt-headed,
+as some of us are? Or are they free from imperfections? Let us grant
+you that. Are they all alike in the face? For if they are many, then
+one must necessarily be more beautiful than another, and then there
+must be some Deity not absolutely most beautiful. Or if their faces are
+all alike, there would be an Academy[90] in heaven; for if one God does
+not differ from another, there is no possibility of knowing or
+distinguishing them.
+
+What if your assertion, Velleius, proves absolutely false, that no form
+occurs to us, in our contemplations on the Deity, but the human? Will
+you, notwithstanding that, persist in the defence of such an absurdity?
+Supposing that form occurs to us, as you say it does, and we know
+Jupiter, Juno, Minerva, Neptune, Vulcan, Apollo, and the other Deities,
+by the countenance which painters and statuaries have given them, and
+not only by their countenances, but by their decorations, their age,
+and attire; yet the Egyptians, the Syrians, and almost all barbarous
+nations,[91] are without such distinctions. You may see a greater
+regard paid by them to certain beasts than by us to the most sacred
+temples and images of the Gods; for many shrines have been rifled, and
+images of the Deities have been carried from their most sacred places
+by us; but we never heard that an Egyptian offered any violence to a
+crocodile, an ibis, or a cat. What do you think, then? Do not the
+Egyptians esteem their sacred bull, their Apis, as a Deity? Yes, by
+Hercules! as certainly as you do our protectress Juno, whom you never
+behold, even in your dreams, without a goat-skin, a spear, a shield,
+and broad sandals. But the Grecian Juno of Argos and the Roman Juno are
+not represented in this manner; so that the Grecians, the Lanuvinians,
+and we, ascribe different forms to Juno; and our Capitoline Jupiter is
+not the same with the Jupiter Ammon of the Africans.
+
+XXX. Therefore, ought not a natural philosopher--that is, an inquirer
+into the secrets of nature--to be ashamed of seeking a testimony to
+truth from minds prepossessed by custom? According to the rule you have
+laid down, it may be said that Jupiter is always bearded, Apollo always
+beardless; that Minerva has gray and Neptune azure eyes; and, indeed,
+we must then honor that Vulcan at Athens, made by Alcamenes, whose
+lameness through his thin robes appears to be no deformity. Shall we,
+therefore, receive a lame Deity because we have such an account of him?
+
+Consider, likewise, that the Gods go by what names we give them. Now,
+in the first place, they have as many names as men have languages; for
+Vulcan is not called Vulcan in Italy, Africa, or Spain, as you are
+called Velleius in all countries. Besides, the Gods are innumerable,
+though the list of their names is of no great length even in the
+records of our priests. Have they no names? You must necessarily
+confess, indeed, they have none; for what occasion is there for
+different names if their persons are alike?
+
+How much more laudable would it be, Velleius, to acknowledge that you
+do not know what you do not know than to follow a man whom you must
+despise! Do you think the Deity is like either me or you? You do not
+really think he is like either of us. What is to be done, then? Shall I
+call the sun, the moon, or the sky a Deity? If so, they are
+consequently happy. But what pleasures can they enjoy? And they are
+wise too. But how can wisdom reside in such shapes? These are your own
+principles. Therefore, if they are not of human form, as I have proved,
+and if you cannot persuade yourself that they are of any other, why are
+you cautious of denying absolutely the being of any Gods? You dare not
+deny it--which is very prudent in you, though here you are not afraid
+of the people, but of the Gods themselves. I have known Epicureans who
+reverence[92] even the least images of the Gods, though I perceive it
+to be the opinion of some that Epicurus, through fear of offending
+against the Athenian laws, has allowed a Deity in words and destroyed
+him in fact; so in those his select and short sentences, which are
+called by you [Greek: kyriai doxai],[93] this, I think, is the first:
+"That being which is happy and immortal is not burdened with any labor,
+and does not impose any on any one else."
+
+XXXI. In his statement of this sentence, some think that he avoided
+speaking clearly on purpose, though it was manifestly without design.
+But they judge ill of a man who had not the least art. It is doubtful
+whether he means that there is any being happy and immortal, or that if
+there is any being happy, he must likewise be immortal. They do not
+consider that he speaks here, indeed, ambiguously; but in many other
+places both he and Metrodorus explain themselves as clearly as you have
+done. But he believed there are Gods; nor have I ever seen any one who
+was more exceedingly afraid of what he declared ought to be no objects
+of fear, namely, death and the Gods, with the apprehensions of which
+the common rank of people are very little affected; but he says that
+the minds of all mortals are terrified by them. Many thousands of men
+commit robberies in the face of death; others rifle all the temples
+they can get into: such as these, no doubt, must be greatly terrified,
+the one by the fears of death, and the others by the fear of the Gods.
+
+But since you dare not (for I am now addressing my discourse to
+Epicurus himself) absolutely deny the existence of the Gods, what
+hinders you from ascribing a divine nature to the sun, the world, or
+some eternal mind? I never, says he, saw wisdom and a rational soul in
+any but a human form. What! did you ever observe anything like the sun,
+the moon, or the five moving planets? The sun, terminating his course
+in two extreme parts of one circle,[94] finishes his annual
+revolutions. The moon, receiving her light from the sun, completes the
+same course in the space of a month.[95] The five planets in the same
+circle, some nearer, others more remote from the earth, begin the same
+courses together, and finish them in different spaces of time. Did you
+ever observe anything like this, Epicurus? So that, according to you,
+there can be neither sun, moon, nor stars, because nothing can exist
+but what we have touched or seen.[96] What! have you ever seen the
+Deity himself? Why else do you believe there is any? If this doctrine
+prevails, we must reject all that history relates or reason discovers;
+and the people who inhabit inland countries must not believe there is
+such a thing as the sea. This is so narrow a way of thinking that if
+you had been born in Seriphus, and never had been from out of that
+island, where you had frequently been in the habit of seeing little
+hares and foxes, you would not, therefore, believe that there are such
+beasts as lions and panthers; and if any one should describe an
+elephant to you, you would think that he designed to laugh at you.
+
+XXXII. You indeed, Velleius, have concluded your argument, not after
+the manner of your own sect, but of the logicians, to which your people
+are utter strangers. You have taken it for granted that the Gods are
+happy. I allow it. You say that without virtue no one can be happy. I
+willingly concur with you in this also. You likewise say that virtue
+cannot reside where reason is not. That I must necessarily allow. You
+add, moreover, that reason cannot exist but in a human form. Who, do
+you think, will admit that? If it were true, what occasion was there to
+come so gradually to it? And to what purpose? You might have answered
+it on your own authority. I perceive your gradations from happiness to
+virtue, and from virtue to reason; but how do you come from reason to
+human form? There, indeed, you do not descend by degrees, but
+precipitately.
+
+Nor can I conceive why Epicurus should rather say the Gods are like men
+than that men are like the Gods. You ask what is the difference; for,
+say you, if this is like that, that is like this. I grant it; but this
+I assert, that the Gods could not take their form from men; for the
+Gods always existed, and never had a beginning, if they are to exist
+eternally; but men had a beginning: therefore that form, of which the
+immortal Gods are, must have had existence before mankind;
+consequently, the Gods should not be said to be of human form, but our
+form should be called divine. However, let this be as you will. I now
+inquire how this extraordinary good fortune came about; for you deny
+that reason had any share in the formation of things. But still, what
+was this extraordinary fortune? Whence proceeded that happy concourse
+of atoms which gave so sudden a rise to men in the form of Gods? Are we
+to suppose the divine seed fell from heaven upon earth, and that men
+sprung up in the likeness of their celestial sires? I wish you would
+assert it; for I should not be unwilling to acknowledge my relation to
+the Gods. But you say nothing like it; no, our resemblance to the Gods,
+it seems, was by chance. Must I now seek for arguments to refute this
+doctrine seriously? I wish I could as easily discover what is true as I
+can overthrow what is false.
+
+XXXIII. You have enumerated with so ready a memory, and so copiously,
+the opinions of philosophers, from Thales the Milesian, concerning the
+nature of the Gods, that I am surprised to see so much learning in a
+Roman. But do you think they were all madmen who thought that a Deity
+could by some possibility exist without hands and feet? Does not even
+this consideration have weight with you when you consider what is the
+use and advantage of limbs in men, and lead you to admit that the Gods
+have no need of them? What necessity can there be of feet, without
+walking; or of hands, if there is nothing to be grasped? The same may
+be asked of the other parts of the body, in which nothing is vain,
+nothing useless, nothing superfluous; therefore we may infer that no
+art can imitate the skill of nature. Shall the Deity, then, have a
+tongue, and not speak--teeth, palate, and jaws, though he will have no
+use for them? Shall the members which nature has given to the body for
+the sake of generation be useless to the Deity? Nor would the internal
+parts be less superfluous than the external. What comeliness is there
+in the heart, the lungs, the liver, and the rest of them, abstracted
+from their use? I mention these because you place them in the Deity on
+account of the beauty of the human form.
+
+Depending on these dreams, not only Epicurus, Metrodorus, and Hermachus
+declaimed against Pythagoras, Plato, and Empedocles, but that little
+harlot Leontium presumed to write against Theophrastus: indeed, she had
+a neat Attic style; but yet, to think of her arguing against
+Theophrastus! So much did the garden of Epicurus[97] abound with these
+liberties, and, indeed, you are always complaining against them. Zeno
+wrangled. Why need I mention Albutius? Nothing could be more elegant or
+humane than Phædrus; yet a sharp expression would disgust the old man.
+Epicurus treated Aristotle with great contumely. He foully slandered
+Phædo, the disciple of Socrates. He pelted Timocrates, the brother of
+his companion Metrodorus, with whole volumes, because he disagreed with
+him in some trifling point of philosophy. He was ungrateful even to
+Democritus, whose follower he was; and his master Nausiphanes, from
+whom he learned nothing, had no better treatment from him.
+
+XXXIV. Zeno gave abusive language not only to those who were then
+living, as Apollodorus, Syllus, and the rest, but he called Socrates,
+who was the father of philosophy, the Attic buffoon, using the Latin
+word _Scurra_. He never called Chrysippus by any name but Chesippus.
+And you yourself a little before, when you were numbering up a senate,
+as we may call them, of philosophers, scrupled not to say that the most
+eminent men talked like foolish, visionary dotards. Certainly,
+therefore, if they have all erred in regard to the nature of the Gods,
+it is to be feared there are no such beings. What you deliver on that
+head are all whimsical notions, and not worthy the consideration even
+of old women. For you do not seem to be in the least aware what a task
+you draw on yourselves, if you should prevail on us to grant that the
+same form is common to Gods and men. The Deity would then require the
+same trouble in dressing, and the same care of the body, that mankind
+does. He must walk, run, lie down, lean, sit, hold, speak, and
+discourse. You need not be told the consequence of making the Gods male
+and female.
+
+Therefore I cannot sufficiently wonder how this chief of yours came to
+entertain these strange opinions. But you constantly insist on the
+certainty of this tenet, that the Deity is both happy and immortal.
+Supposing he is so, would his happiness be less perfect if he had not
+two feet? Or cannot that blessedness or beatitude--call it which you
+will (they are both harsh terms, but we must mollify them by use)--can
+it not, I say, exist in that sun, or in this world, or in some eternal
+mind that has not human shape or limbs? All you say against it is, that
+you never saw any happiness in the sun or the world. What, then? Did
+you ever see any world but this? No, you will say. Why, therefore, do
+you presume to assert that there are not only six hundred thousand
+worlds, but that they are innumerable? Reason tells you so. Will not
+reason tell you likewise that as, in our inquiries into the most
+excellent nature, we find none but the divine nature can be happy and
+eternal, so the same divine nature surpasses us in excellence of mind;
+and as in mind, so in body? Why, therefore, as we are inferior in all
+other respects, should we be equal in form? For human virtue approaches
+nearer to the divinity than human form.
+
+XXXV. To return to the subject I was upon. What can be more childish
+than to assert that there are no such creatures as are generated in the
+Red Sea or in India? The most curious inquirer cannot arrive at the
+knowledge of all those creatures which inhabit the earth, sea, fens,
+and rivers; and shall we deny the existence of them because we never
+saw them? That similitude which you are so very fond of is nothing to
+the purpose. Is not a dog like a wolf? And, as Ennius says,
+
+    The monkey, filthiest beast, how like to man!
+
+Yet they differ in nature. No beast has more sagacity than an elephant;
+yet where can you find any of a larger size? I am speaking here of
+beasts. But among men, do we not see a disparity of manners in persons
+very much alike, and a similitude of manners in persons unlike? If this
+sort of argument were once to prevail, Velleius, observe what it would
+lead to. You have laid it down as certain that reason cannot possibly
+reside in any but the human form. Another may affirm that it can exist
+in none but a terrestrial being; in none but a being that is born, that
+grows up, and receives instruction, and that consists of a soul, and an
+infirm and perishable body; in short, in none but a mortal man. But if
+you decline those opinions, why should a single form disturb you? You
+perceive that man is possessed of reason and understanding, with all
+the infirmities which I have mentioned interwoven with his being;
+abstracted from which, you nevertheless know God, you say, if the
+lineaments do but remain. This is not talking considerately, but at a
+venture; for surely you did not think what an encumbrance anything
+superfluous or useless is, not only in a man, but a tree. How
+troublesome it is to have a finger too much! And why so? Because
+neither use nor ornament requires more than five; but your Deity has
+not only a finger more than he wants, but a head, a neck, shoulders,
+sides, a paunch, back, hams, hands, feet, thighs, and legs. Are these
+parts necessary to immortality? Are they conducive to the existence of
+the Deity? Is the face itself of use? One would rather say so of the
+brain, the heart, the lights, and the liver; for these are the seats of
+life. The features of the face contribute nothing to the preservation
+of it.
+
+XXXVI. You censured those who, beholding those excellent and stupendous
+works, the world, and its respective parts--the heaven, the earth, the
+seas--and the splendor with which they are adorned; who, contemplating
+the sun, moon, and stars; and who, observing the maturity and changes
+of the seasons, and vicissitudes of times, inferred from thence that
+there must be some excellent and eminent essence that originally made,
+and still moves, directs, and governs them. Suppose they should mistake
+in their conjecture, yet I see what they aim at. But what is that great
+and noble work which appears to you to be the effect of a divine mind,
+and from which you conclude that there are Gods? "I have," say you, "a
+certain information of a Deity imprinted in my mind." Of a bearded
+Jupiter, I suppose, and a helmeted Minerva.
+
+But do you really imagine them to be such? How much better are the
+notions of the ignorant vulgar, who not only believe the Deities have
+members like ours, but that they make use of them; and therefore they
+assign them a bow and arrows, a spear, a shield, a trident, and
+lightning; and though they do not behold the actions of the Gods, yet
+they cannot entertain a thought of a Deity doing nothing. The Egyptians
+(so much ridiculed) held no beasts to be sacred, except on account of
+some advantage which they had received from them. The ibis, a very
+large bird, with strong legs and a horny long beak, destroys a great
+number of serpents. These birds keep Egypt from pestilential diseases
+by killing and devouring the flying serpents brought from the deserts
+of Lybia by the south-west wind, which prevents the mischief that may
+attend their biting while alive, or any infection when dead. I could
+speak of the advantage of the ichneumon, the crocodile, and the cat;
+but I am unwilling to be tedious; yet I will conclude with observing
+that the barbarians paid divine honors to beasts because of the
+benefits they received from them; whereas your Gods not only confer no
+benefit, but are idle, and do no single act of any description
+whatever.
+
+XXXVII. "They have nothing to do," your teacher says. Epicurus truly,
+like indolent boys, thinks nothing preferable to idleness; yet those
+very boys, when they have a holiday, entertain themselves in some
+sportive exercise. But we are to suppose the Deity in such an inactive
+state that if he should move we may justly fear he would be no longer
+happy. This doctrine divests the Gods of motion and operation; besides,
+it encourages men to be lazy, as they are by this taught to believe
+that the least labor is incompatible even with divine felicity.
+
+But let it be as you would have it, that the Deity is in the form and
+image of a man. Where is his abode? Where is his habitation? Where is
+the place where he is to be found? What is his course of life? And what
+is it that constitutes the happiness which you assert that he enjoys?
+For it seems necessary that a being who is to be happy must use and
+enjoy what belongs to him. And with regard to place, even those natures
+which are inanimate have each their proper stations assigned to them:
+so that the earth is the lowest; then water is next above the earth;
+the air is above the water; and fire has the highest situation of all
+allotted to it. Some creatures inhabit the earth, some the water, and
+some, of an amphibious nature, live in both. There are some, also,
+which are thought to be born in fire, and which often appear fluttering
+in burning furnaces.
+
+In the first place, therefore, I ask you, Where is the habitation of
+your Deity? Secondly, What motive is it that stirs him from his place,
+supposing he ever moves? And, lastly, since it is peculiar to animated
+beings to have an inclination to something that is agreeable to their
+several natures, what is it that the Deity affects, and to what purpose
+does he exert the motion of his mind and reason? In short, how is he
+happy? how eternal? Whichever of these points you touch upon, I am
+afraid you will come lamely off. For there is never a proper end to
+reasoning which proceeds on a false foundation; for you asserted
+likewise that the form of the Deity is perceptible by the mind, but not
+by sense; that it is neither solid, nor invariable in number; that it
+is to be discerned by similitude and transition, and that a constant
+supply of images is perpetually flowing on from innumerable atoms, on
+which our minds are intent; so that we from that conclude that divine
+nature to be happy and everlasting.
+
+XXXVIII. What, in the name of those Deities concerning whom we are now
+disputing, is the meaning of all this? For if they exist only in
+thought, and have no solidity nor substance, what difference can there
+be between thinking of a Hippocentaur and thinking of a Deity? Other
+philosophers call every such conformation of the mind a vain motion;
+but you term it "the approach and entrance of images into the mind."
+Thus, when I imagine that I behold T. Gracchus haranguing the people in
+the Capitol, and collecting their suffrages concerning M. Octavius, I
+call that a vain motion of the mind: but you affirm that the images of
+Gracchus and Octavius are present, which are only conveyed to my mind
+when they have arrived at the Capitol. The case is the same, you say,
+in regard to the Deity, with the frequent representation of which the
+mind is so affected that from thence it may be clearly understood that
+the Gods[98] are happy and eternal.
+
+Let it be granted that there are images by which the mind is affected,
+yet it is only a certain form that occurs; and why must that form be
+pronounced happy? why eternal? But what are those images you talk of,
+or whence do they proceed? This loose manner of arguing is taken from
+Democritus; but he is reproved by many people for it; nor can you
+derive any conclusions from it: the whole system is weak and imperfect.
+For what can be more improbable than that the images of Homer,
+Archilochus, Romulus, Numa, Pythagoras, and Plato should come into my
+mind, and yet not in the form in which they existed? How, therefore,
+can they be those persons? And whose images are they? Aristotle tells
+us that there never was such a person as Orpheus the poet;[99] and it
+is said that the verse called Orphic verse was the invention of
+Cercops, a Pythagorean; yet Orpheus, that is to say, the image of him,
+as you will have it, often runs in my head. What is the reason that I
+entertain one idea of the figure of the same person, and you another?
+Why do we image to ourselves such things as never had any existence,
+and which never can have, such as Scyllas and Chimæras? Why do we frame
+ideas of men, countries, and cities which we never saw? How is it that
+the very first moment that I choose I can form representations of them
+in my mind? How is it that they come to me, even in my sleep, without
+being called or sought after?
+
+XXXIX. The whole affair, Velleius, is ridiculous. You do not impose
+images on our eyes only, but on our minds. Such is the privilege which
+you have assumed of talking nonsense with impunity. But there is, you
+say, a transition of images flowing on in great crowds in such a way
+that out of many some one at least must be perceived! I should be
+ashamed of my incapacity to understand this if you, who assert it,
+could comprehend it yourselves; for how do you prove that these images
+are continued in uninterrupted motion? Or, if uninterrupted, still how
+do you prove them to be eternal? There is a constant supply, you say,
+of innumerable atoms. But must they, for that reason, be all eternal?
+To elude this, you have recourse to equilibration (for so, with your
+leave, I will call your [Greek: Isonomia]),[100] and say that as there
+is a sort of nature mortal, so there must also be a sort which is
+immortal. By the same rule, as there are men mortal, there are men
+immortal; and as some arise from the earth, some must arise from the
+water also; and as there are causes which destroy, there must likewise
+be causes which preserve. Be it as you say; but let those causes
+preserve which have existence themselves. I cannot conceive these your
+Gods to have any. But how does all this face of things arise from
+atomic corpuscles? Were there any such atoms (as there are not), they
+might perhaps impel one another, and be jumbled together in their
+motion; but they could never be able to impart form, or figure, or
+color, or animation, so that you by no means demonstrate the
+immortality of your Deity.
+
+XL. Let us now inquire into his happiness. It is certain that without
+virtue there can be no happiness; but virtue consists in action: now
+your Deity does nothing; therefore he is void of virtue, and
+consequently cannot be happy. What sort of life does he lead? He has a
+constant supply, you say, of good things, without any intermixture of
+bad. What are those good things? Sensual pleasures, no doubt; for you
+know no delight of the mind but what arises from the body, and returns
+to it. I do not suppose, Velleius, that you are like some of the
+Epicureans, who are ashamed of those expressions of Epicurus,[101] in
+which he openly avows that he has no idea of any good separate from
+wanton and obscene pleasures, which, without a blush, he names
+distinctly. What food, therefore, what drink, what variety of music or
+flowers, what kind of pleasures of touch, what odors, will you offer to
+the Gods to fill them with pleasures? The poets indeed provide them
+with banquets of nectar and ambrosia, and a Hebe or a Ganymede to serve
+up the cup. But what is it, Epicurus, that you do for them? For I do
+not see from whence your Deity should have those things, nor how he
+could use them. Therefore the nature of man is better constituted for a
+happy life than the nature of the Gods, because men enjoy various kinds
+of pleasures; but you look on all those pleasures as superficial which
+delight the senses only by a titillation, as Epicurus calls it. Where
+is to be the end of this trifling? Even Philo, who followed the
+Academy, could not bear to hear the soft and luscious delights of the
+Epicureans despised; for with his admirable memory he perfectly
+remembered and used to repeat many sentences of Epicurus in the very
+words in which they were written. He likewise used to quote many, which
+were more gross, from Metrodorus, the sage colleague of Epicurus, who
+blamed his brother Timocrates because he would not allow that
+everything which had any reference to a happy life was to be measured
+by the belly; nor has he said this once only, but often. You grant what
+I say, I perceive; for you know it to be true. I can produce the books,
+if you should deny it; but I am not now reproving you for referring all
+things to the standard of pleasure: that is another question. What I am
+now showing is, that your Gods are destitute of pleasure; and
+therefore, according to your own manner of reasoning, they are not
+happy.
+
+XLI. But they are free from pain. Is that sufficient for beings who are
+supposed to enjoy all good things and the most supreme felicity? The
+Deity, they say, is constantly meditating on his own happiness, for he
+has no other idea which can possibly occupy his mind. Consider a
+little; reflect what a figure the Deity would make if he were to be
+idly thinking of nothing through all eternity but "It is very well with
+me, and I am happy;" nor do I see why this happy Deity should not fear
+being destroyed, since, without any intermission, he is driven and
+agitated by an everlasting incursion of atoms, and since images are
+constantly floating off from him. Your Deity, therefore, is neither
+happy nor eternal.
+
+Epicurus, it seems, has written books concerning sanctity and piety
+towards the Gods. But how does he speak on these subjects? You would
+say that you were listening to Coruncanius or Scævola, the
+high-priests, and not to a man who tore up all religion by the roots,
+and who overthrew the temples and altars of the immortal Gods; not,
+indeed, with hands, like Xerxes, but with arguments; for what reason is
+there for your saying that men ought to worship the Gods, when the Gods
+not only do not regard men, but are entirely careless of everything,
+and absolutely do nothing at all?
+
+But they are, you say, of so glorious and excellent a nature that a
+wise man is induced by their excellence to adore them. Can there be any
+glory or excellence in that nature which only contemplates its own
+happiness, and neither will do, nor does, nor ever did anything?
+Besides, what piety is due to a being from whom you receive nothing? Or
+how can you, or any one else, be indebted to him who bestows no
+benefits? For piety is only justice towards the Gods; but what right
+have they to it, when there is no communication whatever between the
+Gods and men? And sanctity is the knowledge of how we ought to worship
+them; but I do not understand why they are to be worshipped, if we are
+neither to receive nor expect any good from them.
+
+XLII. And why should we worship them from an admiration only of that
+nature in which we can behold nothing excellent? and as for that
+freedom from superstition, which you are in the habit of boasting of so
+much, it is easy to be free from that feeling when you have renounced
+all belief in the power of the Gods; unless, indeed, you imagine that
+Diagoras or Theodorus, who absolutely denied the being of the Gods,
+could possibly be superstitious. I do not suppose that even Protagoras
+could, who doubted whether there were Gods or not. The opinions of
+these philosophers are not only destructive of superstition, which
+arises from a vain fear of the Gods, but of religion also, which
+consists in a pious adoration of them.
+
+What think you of those who have asserted that the whole doctrine
+concerning the immortal Gods was the invention of politicians, whose
+view was to govern that part of the community by religion which reason
+could not influence? Are not their opinions subversive of all religion?
+Or what religion did Prodicus the Chian leave to men, who held that
+everything beneficial to human life should be numbered among the Gods?
+Were not they likewise void of religion who taught that the Deities, at
+present the object of our prayers and adoration, were valiant,
+illustrious, and mighty men who arose to divinity after death?
+Euhemerus, whom our Ennius translated, and followed more than other
+authors, has particularly advanced this doctrine, and treated of the
+deaths and burials of the Gods; can he, then, be said to have confirmed
+religion, or, rather, to have totally subverted it? I shall say nothing
+of that sacred and august Eleusina, into whose mysteries the most
+distant nations were initiated, nor of the solemnities in Samothrace,
+or in Lemnos, secretly resorted to by night, and surrounded by thick
+and shady groves; which, if they were properly explained, and reduced
+to reasonable principles, would rather explain the nature of things
+than discover the knowledge of the Gods.
+
+XLIII. Even that great man Democritus, from whose fountains Epicurus
+watered his little garden, seems to me to be very inferior to his usual
+acuteness when speaking about the nature of the Gods. For at one time
+he thinks that there are images endowed with divinity, inherent in the
+universality of things; at another, that the principles and minds
+contained in the universe are Gods; then he attributes divinity to
+animated images, employing themselves in doing us good or harm; and,
+lastly, he speaks of certain images of such vast extent that they
+encompass the whole outside of the universe; all which opinions are
+more worthy of the country[102] of Democritus than of Democritus
+himself; for who can frame in his mind any ideas of such images? who
+can admire them? who can think they merit a religious adoration?
+
+But Epicurus, when he divests the Gods of the power of doing good,
+extirpates all religion from the minds of men; for though he says the
+divine nature is the best and the most excellent of all natures, he
+will not allow it to be susceptible of any benevolence, by which he
+destroys the chief and peculiar attribute of the most perfect being.
+For what is better and more excellent than goodness and beneficence? To
+refuse your Gods that quality is to say that no man is any object of
+their favor, and no Gods either; that they neither love nor esteem any
+one; in short, that they not only give themselves no trouble about us,
+but even look on each other with the greatest indifference.
+
+XLIV. How much more reasonable is the doctrine of the Stoics, whom you
+censure? It is one of their maxims that the wise are friends to the
+wise, though unknown to each other; for as nothing is more amiable than
+virtue, he who possesses it is worthy our love, to whatever country he
+belongs. But what evils do your principles bring, when you make good
+actions and benevolence the marks of imbecility! For, not to mention
+the power and nature of the Gods, you hold that even men, if they had
+no need of mutual assistance, would be neither courteous nor
+beneficent. Is there no natural charity in the dispositions of good
+men? The very name of love, from which friendship is derived, is dear
+to men;[103] and if friendship is to centre in our own advantage only,
+without regard to him whom we esteem a friend, it cannot be called
+friendship, but a sort of traffic for our own profit. Pastures, lands,
+and herds of cattle are valued in the same manner on account of the
+profit we gather from them; but charity and friendship expect no
+return. How much more reason have we to think that the Gods, who want
+nothing, should love each other, and employ themselves about us! If it
+were not so, why should we pray to or adore them? Why do the priests
+preside over the altars, and the augurs over the auspices? What have we
+to ask of the Gods, and why do we prefer our vows to them?
+
+But Epicurus, you say, has written a book concerning sanctity. A
+trifling performance by a man whose wit is not so remarkable in it, as
+the unrestrained license of writing which he has permitted himself; for
+what sanctity can there be if the Gods take no care of human affairs?
+Or how can that nature be called animated which neither regards nor
+performs anything? Therefore our friend Posidonius has well observed,
+in his fifth book of the Nature of the Gods, that Epicurus believed
+there were no Gods, and that what he had said about the immortal Gods
+was only said from a desire to avoid unpopularity. He could not be so
+weak as to imagine that the Deity has only the outward features of a
+simple mortal, without any real solidity; that he has all the members
+of a man, without the least power to use them--a certain unsubstantial
+pellucid being, neither favorable nor beneficial to any one, neither
+regarding nor doing anything. There can be no such being in nature; and
+as Epicurus said this plainly, he allows the Gods in words, and
+destroys them in fact; and if the Deity is truly such a being that he
+shows no favor, no benevolence to mankind, away with him! For why
+should I entreat him to be propitious? He can be propitious to none,
+since, as you say, all his favor and benevolence are the effects of
+imbecility.
+
+       *       *       *       *       *
+
+
+
+
+BOOK II.
+
+
+I. When Cotta had thus concluded, Velleius replied: I certainly was
+inconsiderate to engage in argument with an Academician who is likewise
+a rhetorician. I should not have feared an Academician without
+eloquence, nor a rhetorician without that philosophy, however eloquent
+he might be; for I am never puzzled by an empty flow of words, nor by
+the most subtle reasonings delivered without any grace of oratory. But
+you, Cotta, have excelled in both. You only wanted the assembly and the
+judges. However, enough of this at present. Now, let us hear what
+Lucilius has to say, if it is agreeable to him.
+
+I had much rather, says Balbus, hear Cotta resume his discourse, and
+demonstrate the true Gods with the same eloquence which he made use of
+to explode the false; for, on such a subject, the loose, unsettled
+doctrine of the Academy does not become a philosopher, a priest, a
+Cotta, whose opinions should be, like those we hold, firm and certain.
+Epicurus has been more than sufficiently refuted; but I would willingly
+hear your own sentiments, Cotta.
+
+Do you forget, replies Cotta, what I at first said--that it is easier
+for me, especially on this point, to explain what opinions those are
+which I do not hold, rather than what those are which I do? Nay, even
+if I did feel some certainty on any particular point, yet, after having
+been so diffuse myself already, I would prefer now hearing you speak in
+your turn. I submit, says Balbus, and will be as brief as I possibly
+can; for as you have confuted the errors of Epicurus, my part in the
+dispute will be the shorter. Our sect divide the whole question
+concerning the immortal Gods into four parts. First, they prove that
+there are Gods; secondly, of what character and nature they are;
+thirdly, that the universe is governed by them; and, lastly, that they
+exercise a superintendence over human affairs. But in this present
+discussion let us confine ourselves to the first two articles, and
+defer the third and fourth till another opportunity, as they require
+more time to discuss. By no means, says Cotta, for we have time enough
+on our hands; besides that, we are now discussing a subject which
+should be preferred even to serious business.
+
+II. The first point, then, says Lucilius, I think needs no discourse to
+prove it; for what can be so plain and evident, when we behold the
+heavens and contemplate the celestial bodies, as the existence of some
+supreme, divine intelligence, by which all these things are governed?
+Were it otherwise, Ennius would not, with a universal approbation, have
+said,
+
+    Look up to the refulgent heaven above,
+    Which all men call, unanimously, Jove.
+
+This is Jupiter, the governor of the world, who rules all things with
+his nod, and is, as the same Ennius adds,
+
+    ----of Gods and men the sire,[104]
+
+an omnipresent and omnipotent God. And if any one doubts this, I really
+do not understand why the same man may not also doubt whether there is
+a sun or not. For what can possibly be more evident than this? And if
+it were not a truth universally impressed on the minds of men, the
+belief in it would never have been so firm; nor would it have been, as
+it is, increased by length of years, nor would it have gathered
+strength and stability through every age. And, in truth, we see that
+other opinions, being false and groundless, have already fallen into
+oblivion by lapse of time. Who now believes in Hippocentaurs and
+Chimæras? Or what old woman is now to be found so weak and ignorant as
+to stand in fear of those infernal monsters which once so terrified
+mankind? For time destroys the fictions of error and opinion, while it
+confirms the determinations of nature and of truth. And therefore it is
+that, both among us and among other nations, sacred institutions and
+the divine worship of the Gods have been strengthened and improved from
+time to time. And this is not to be imputed to chance or folly, but to
+the frequent appearance of the Gods themselves. In the war with the
+Latins, when A. Posthumius, the dictator, attacked Octavius Mamilius,
+the Tusculan, at Regillus, Castor and Pollux were seen fighting in our
+army on horseback; and since that the same offspring of Tyndarus gave
+notice of the defeat of Perses; for as P. Vatienus, the grandfather of
+the present young man of that name, was coming in the night to Rome
+from his government of Reate, two young men on white horses appeared to
+him, and told him that King[105] Perses was that day taken prisoner.
+This news he carried to the senate, who immediately threw him into
+prison for speaking inconsiderately on a state affair; but when it was
+confirmed by letters from Paullus, he was recompensed by the senate
+with land and immunities.[106] Nor do we forget when the Locrians
+defeated the people of Crotone, in a great battle on the banks of the
+river Sagra, that it was known the same day at the Olympic Games. The
+voices of the Fauns have been often heard, and Deities have appeared in
+forms so visible that they have compelled every one who is not
+senseless, or hardened in impiety, to confess the presence of the Gods.
+
+III. What do predictions and foreknowledge of future events indicate,
+but that such future events are shown, pointed out, portended, and
+foretold to men? From whence they are called omens, signs, portents,
+prodigies. But though we should esteem fabulous what is said of
+Mopsus,[107] Tiresias,[108] Amphiaraus,[109] Calchas,[110] and
+Helenus[111] (who would not have been delivered down to us as augurs
+even in fable if their art had been despised), may we not be
+sufficiently apprised of the power of the Gods by domestic examples?
+Will not the temerity of P. Claudius, in the first Punic war, affect
+us? who, when the poultry were let out of the coop and would not feed,
+ordered them to be thrown into the water, and, joking even upon the
+Gods, said, with a sneer, "Let them drink, since they will not eat;"
+which piece of ridicule, being followed by a victory over his fleet,
+cost him many tears, and brought great calamity on the Roman people.
+Did not his colleague Junius, in the same war, lose his fleet in a
+tempest by disregarding the auspices? Claudius, therefore, was
+condemned by the people, and Junius killed himself. Coelius says that
+P. Flaminius, from his neglect of religion, fell at Thrasimenus; a loss
+which the public severely felt. By these instances of calamity we may
+be assured that Rome owes her grandeur and success to the conduct of
+those who were tenacious of their religious duties; and if we compare
+ourselves to our neighbors, we shall find that we are infinitely
+distinguished above foreign nations by our zeal for religious
+ceremonies, though in other things we may be only equal to them, and in
+other respects even inferior to them.
+
+Ought we to contemn Attius Navius's staff, with which he divided the
+regions of the vine to find his sow?[112] I should despise it, if I
+were not aware that King Hostilius had carried on most important wars
+in deference to his auguries; but by the negligence of our nobility the
+discipline of the augury is now omitted, the truth of the auspices
+despised, and only a mere form observed; so that the most important
+affairs of the commonwealth, even the wars, on which the public safety
+depends, are conducted without any auspices; the Peremnia[113] are
+discussed; no part of the Acumina[114] performed; no select men are
+called to witness to the military testaments;[115] our generals now
+begin their wars as soon as they have arranged the Auspicia. The force
+of religion was so great among our ancestors that some of their
+commanders have, with their faces veiled, and with the solemn, formal
+expressions of religion, sacrificed themselves to the immortal Gods to
+save their country.[116] I could mention many of the Sibylline
+prophecies, and many answers of the haruspices, to confirm those
+things, which ought not to be doubted.
+
+IV. For example: our augurs and the Etrurian haruspices saw the truth
+of their art established when P. Scipio and C. Figulus were consuls;
+for as Tiberius Gracchus, who was a second time consul, wished to
+proceed to a fresh election, the first Rogator,[117] as he was
+collecting the suffrages, fell down dead on the spot. Gracchus
+nevertheless went on with the assembly, but perceiving that this
+accident had a religious influence on the people, he brought the affair
+before the senate. The senate thought fit to refer it to those who
+usually took cognizance of such things. The haruspices were called, and
+declared that the man who had acted as Rogator of the assembly had no
+right to do so; to which, as I have heard my father say, he replied
+with great warmth, Have I no right, who am consul, and augur, and
+favored by the Auspicia? And shall you, who are Tuscans and Barbarians,
+pretend that you have authority over the Roman Auspicia, and a right to
+give judgment in matters respecting the formality of our assemblies?
+Therefore, he then commanded them to withdraw; but not long afterward
+he wrote from his province[118] to the college of augurs, acknowledging
+that in reading the books[119] he remembered that he had illegally
+chosen a place for his tent in the gardens of Scipio, and had afterward
+entered the Pomoerium, in order to hold a senate, but that in repassing
+the same Pomoerium he had forgotten to take the auspices; and that,
+therefore, the consuls had been created informally. The augurs laid the
+case before the senate. The senate decreed that they should resign
+their charge, and so they accordingly abdicated. What greater example
+need we seek for? The wisest, perhaps the most excellent of men, chose
+to confess his fault, which he might have concealed, rather than leave
+the public the least atom of religious guilt; and the consuls chose to
+quit the highest office in the State, rather than fill it for a moment
+in defiance of religion. How great is the reputation of the augurs!
+
+And is not the art of the soothsayers divine? And must not every one
+who sees what innumerable instances of the same kind there are confess
+the existence of the Gods? For they who have interpreters must
+certainly exist themselves; now, there are interpreters of the Gods;
+therefore we must allow there are Gods. But it may be said, perhaps,
+that all predictions are not accomplished. We may as well conclude
+there is no art of physic, because all sick persons do not recover. The
+Gods show us signs of future events; if we are occasionally deceived in
+the results, it is not to be imputed to the nature of the Gods, but to
+the conjectures of men. All nations agree that there are Gods; the
+opinion is innate, and, as it were, engraved in the minds of all men.
+The only point in dispute among us is, what they are.
+
+V. Their existence no one denies. Cleanthes, one of our sect, imputes
+the way in which the idea of the Gods is implanted in the minds of men
+to four causes. The first is that which I just now mentioned--the
+foreknowledge of future things. The second is the great advantages
+which we enjoy from the temperature of the air, the fertility of the
+earth, and the abundance of various benefits of other kinds. The third
+cause is deduced from the terror with which the mind is affected by
+thunder, tempests, storms, snow, hail, devastation, pestilence,
+earthquakes often attended with hideous noises, showers of stones, and
+rain like drops of blood; by rocks and sudden openings of the earth; by
+monstrous births of men and beasts; by meteors in the air, and blazing
+stars, by the Greeks called _cometæ_, by us _crinitæ_, the appearance
+of which, in the late Octavian war,[120] were foreboders of great
+calamities; by two suns, which, as I have heard my father say, happened
+in the consulate of Tuditanus and Aquillius, and in which year also
+another sun (P. Africanus) was extinguished. These things terrified
+mankind, and raised in them a firm belief of the existence of some
+celestial and divine power.
+
+His fourth cause, and that the strongest, is drawn from the regularity
+of the motion and revolution of the heavens, the distinctness, variety,
+beauty, and order of the sun, moon, and all the stars, the appearance
+only of which is sufficient to convince us they are not the effects of
+chance; as when we enter into a house, or school, or court, and observe
+the exact order, discipline, and method of it, we cannot suppose that
+it is so regulated without a cause, but must conclude that there is
+some one who commands, and to whom obedience is paid. It is quite
+impossible for us to avoid thinking that the wonderful motions,
+revolutions, and order of those many and great bodies, no part of which
+is impaired by the countless and infinite succession of ages, must be
+governed and directed by some supreme intelligent being.
+
+VI. Chrysippus, indeed, had a very penetrating genius; yet such is the
+doctrine which he delivers, that he seems rather to have been
+instructed by nature than to owe it to any discovery of his own. "If,"
+says he, "there is anything in the universe which no human reason,
+ability, or power can make, the being who produced it must certainly be
+preferable to man. Now, celestial bodies, and all those things which
+proceed in any eternal order, cannot be made by man; the being who made
+them is therefore preferable to man. What, then, is that being but a
+God? If there be no such thing as a Deity, what is there better than
+man, since he only is possessed of reason, the most excellent of all
+things? But it is a foolish piece of vanity in man to think there is
+nothing preferable to him. There is, therefore, something preferable;
+consequently, there is certainly a God."
+
+When you behold a large and beautiful house, surely no one can persuade
+you it was built for mice and weasels, though you do not see the
+master; and would it not, therefore, be most manifest folly to imagine
+that a world so magnificently adorned, with such an immense variety of
+celestial bodies of such exquisite beauty, and that the vast sizes and
+magnitude of the sea and land were intended as the abode of man, and
+not as the mansion of the immortal Gods? Do we not also plainly see
+this, that all the most elevated regions are the best, and that the
+earth is the lowest region, and is surrounded with the grossest air? so
+that as we perceive that in some cities and countries the capacities of
+men are naturally duller, from the thickness of the climate, so mankind
+in general are affected by the heaviness of the air which surrounds the
+earth, the grossest region of the world.
+
+Yet even from this inferior intelligence of man we may discover the
+existence of some intelligent agent that is divine, and wiser than
+ourselves; for, as Socrates says in Xenophon, from whence had man his
+portion of understanding? And, indeed, if any one were to push his
+inquiries about the moisture and heat which is diffused through the
+human body, and the earthy kind of solidity existing in our entrails,
+and that soul by which we breathe, and to ask whence we derived them,
+it would be plain that we have received one thing from the earth,
+another from liquid, another from fire, and another from that air which
+we inhale every time that we breathe.
+
+VII. But where did we find that which excels all these things--I mean
+reason, or (if you please, in other terms) the mind, understanding,
+thought, prudence; and from whence did we receive it? Shall the world
+be possessed of every other perfection, and be destitute of this one,
+which is the most important and valuable of all? But certainly there is
+nothing better, or more excellent, or more beautiful than the world;
+and not only there is nothing better, but we cannot even conceive
+anything superior to it; and if reason and wisdom are the greatest of
+all perfections, they must necessarily be a part of what we all allow
+to be the most excellent.
+
+Who is not compelled to admit the truth of what I assert by that
+agreeable, uniform, and continued agreement of things in the universe?
+Could the earth at one season be adorned with flowers, at another be
+covered with snow? Or, if such a number of things regulated their own
+changes, could the approach and retreat of the sun in the summer and
+winter solstices be so regularly known and calculated? Could the flux
+and reflux of the sea and the height of the tides be affected by the
+increase or wane of the moon? Could the different courses of the stars
+be preserved by the uniform movement of the whole heaven? Could these
+things subsist, I say, in such a harmony of all the parts of the
+universe without the continued influence of a divine spirit?
+
+If these points are handled in a free and copious manner, as I purpose
+to do, they will be less liable to the cavils of the Academics; but the
+narrow, confined way in which Zeno reasoned upon them laid them more
+open to objection; for as running streams are seldom or never tainted,
+while standing waters easily grow corrupt, so a fluency of expression
+washes away the censures of the caviller, while the narrow limits of a
+discourse which is too concise is almost defenceless; for the arguments
+which I am enlarging upon are thus briefly laid down by Zeno:
+
+VIII. "That which reasons is superior to that which does not; nothing
+is superior to the world; the world, therefore, reasons." By the same
+rule the world may be proved to be wise, happy, and eternal; for the
+possession of all these qualities is superior to the want of them; and
+nothing is superior to the world; the inevitable consequence of which
+argument is, that the world, therefore, is a Deity. He goes on: "No
+part of anything void of sense is capable of perception; some parts of
+the world have perception; the world, therefore, has sense." He
+proceeds, and pursues the argument closely. "Nothing," says he, "that
+is destitute itself of life and reason can generate a being possessed
+of life and reason; but the world does generate beings possessed of
+life and reason; the world, therefore, is not itself destitute of life
+and reason."
+
+He concludes his argument in his usual manner with a simile: "If
+well-tuned pipes should spring out of the olive, would you have the
+slightest doubt that there was in the olive-tree itself some kind of
+skill and knowledge? Or if the plane-tree could produce harmonious
+lutes, surely you would infer, on the same principle, that music was
+contained in the plane-tree. Why, then, should we not believe the world
+is a living and wise being, since it produces living and wise beings
+out of itself?"
+
+IX. But as I have been insensibly led into a length of discourse beyond
+my first design (for I said that, as the existence of the Gods was
+evident to all, there was no need of any long oration to prove it), I
+will demonstrate it by reasons deduced from the nature of things. For
+it is a fact that all beings which take nourishment and increase
+contain in themselves a power of natural heat, without which they could
+neither be nourished nor increase. For everything which is of a warm
+and fiery character is agitated and stirred up by its own motion. But
+that which is nourished and grows is influenced by a certain regular
+and equable motion. And as long as this motion remains in us, so long
+does sense and life remain; but the moment that it abates and is
+extinguished, we ourselves decay and perish.
+
+By arguments like these, Cleanthes shows how great is the power of heat
+in all bodies. He observes that there is no food so gross as not to be
+digested in a night and a day; and that even in the excrementitious
+parts, which nature rejects, there remains a heat. The veins and
+arteries seem, by their continual quivering, to resemble the agitation
+of fire; and it has often been observed when the heart of an animal is
+just plucked from the body that it palpitates with such visible motion
+as to resemble the rapidity of fire. Everything, therefore, that has
+life, whether it be animal or vegetable, owes that life to the heat
+inherent in it; it is this nature of heat which contains in itself the
+vital power which extends throughout the whole world. This will appear
+more clearly on a more close explanation of this fiery quality, which
+pervades all things.
+
+Every division, then, of the world (and I shall touch upon the most
+considerable) is sustained by heat; and first it may be observed in
+earthly substances that fire is produced from stones by striking or
+rubbing one against another; that "the warm earth smokes"[121] when
+just turned up, and that water is drawn warm from well-springs; and
+this is most especially the case in the winter season, because there is
+a great quantity of heat contained in the caverns of the earth; and
+this becomes more dense in the winter, and on that account confines
+more closely the innate heat which is discoverable in the earth.
+
+X. It would require a long dissertation, and many reasons would require
+to be adduced, to show that all the seeds which the earth conceives,
+and all those which it contains having been generated from itself, and
+fixed in roots and trunks, derive all their origin and increase from
+the temperature and regulation of heat. And that even every liquor has
+a mixture of heat in it is plainly demonstrated by the effusion of
+water; for it would not congeal by cold, nor become solid, as ice or
+snow, and return again to its natural state, if it were not that, when
+heat is applied to it, it again becomes liquefied and dissolved, and so
+diffuses itself. Therefore, by northern and other cold winds it is
+frozen and hardened, and in turn it dissolves and melts again by heat.
+The seas likewise, we find, when agitated by winds, grow warm, so that
+from this fact we may understand that there is heat included in that
+vast body of water; for we cannot imagine it to be external and
+adventitious heat, but such as is stirred up by agitation from the deep
+recesses of the seas; and the same thing takes place with respect to
+our bodies, which grow warm with motion and exercise.
+
+And the very air itself, which indeed is the coldest element, is by no
+means void of heat; for there is a great quantity, arising from the
+exhalations of water, which appears to be a sort of steam occasioned by
+its internal heat, like that of boiling liquors. The fourth part of the
+universe is entirely fire, and is the source of the salutary and vital
+heat which is found in the rest. From hence we may conclude that, as
+all parts of the world are sustained by heat, the world itself also has
+such a great length of time subsisted from the same cause; and so much
+the more, because we ought to understand that that hot and fiery
+principle is so diffused over universal nature that there is contained
+in it a power and cause of generation and procreation, from which all
+animate beings, and all those creatures of the vegetable world, the
+roots of which are contained in the earth, must inevitably derive their
+origin and their increase.
+
+XI. It is nature, consequently, that continues and preserves the world,
+and that, too, a nature which is not destitute of sense and reason; for
+in every essence that is not simple, but composed of several parts,
+there must be some predominant quality--as, for instance, the mind in
+man, and in beasts something resembling it, from which arise all the
+appetites and desires for anything. As for trees, and all the vegetable
+produce of the earth, it is thought to be in their roots. I call that
+the predominant quality,[122] which the Greeks call [Greek:
+hêgemonikon]; which must and ought to be the most excellent quality,
+wherever it is found. That, therefore, in which the prevailing quality
+of all nature resides must be the most excellent of all things, and
+most worthy of the power and pre-eminence over all things.
+
+Now, we see that there is nothing in being that is not a part of the
+universe; and as there are sense and reason in the parts of it, there
+must therefore be these qualities, and these, too, in a more energetic
+and powerful degree, in that part in which the predominant quality of
+the world is found. The world, therefore, must necessarily be possessed
+of wisdom; and that element, which embraces all things, must excel in
+perfection of reason. The world, therefore, is a God, and the whole
+power of the world is contained in that divine element.
+
+The heat also of the world is more pure, clear, and lively, and,
+consequently, better adapted to move the senses than the heat allotted
+to us; and it vivifies and preserves all things within the compass of
+our knowledge.
+
+It is absurd, therefore, to say that the world, which is endued with a
+perfect, free, pure, spirituous, and active heat, is not sensitive,
+since by this heat men and beasts are preserved, and move, and think;
+more especially since this heat of the world is itself the sole
+principle of agitation, and has no external impulse, but is moved
+spontaneously; for what can be more powerful than the world, which
+moves and raises that heat by which it subsists?
+
+XII. For let us listen to Plato, who is regarded as a God among
+philosophers. He says that there are two sorts of motion, one innate
+and the other external; and that that which is moved spontaneously is
+more divine than that which is moved by another power. This self-motion
+he places in the mind alone, and concludes that the first principle of
+motion is derived from the mind. Therefore, since all motion arises
+from the heat of the world, and that heat is not moved by the effect of
+any external impulse, but of its own accord, it must necessarily be a
+mind; from whence it follows that the world is animated.
+
+On such reasoning is founded this opinion, that the world is possessed
+of understanding, because it certainly has more perfections in itself
+than any other nature; for as there is no part of our bodies so
+considerable as the whole of us, so it is clear that there is no
+particular portion of the universe equal in magnitude to the whole of
+it; from whence it follows that wisdom must be an attribute of the
+world; otherwise man, who is a part of it, and possessed of reason,
+would be superior to the entire world.
+
+And thus, if we proceed from the first rude, unfinished natures to the
+most superior and perfect ones, we shall inevitably come at last to the
+nature of the Gods. For, in the first place, we observe that those
+vegetables which are produced out of the earth are supported by nature,
+and she gives them no further supply than is sufficient to preserve
+them by nourishing them and making them grow. To beasts she has given
+sense and motion, and a faculty which directs them to what is
+wholesome, and prompts them to shun what is noxious to them. On man she
+has conferred a greater portion of her favor; inasmuch as she has added
+reason, by which he is enabled to command his passions, to moderate
+some, and to subdue others.
+
+XIII. In the fourth and highest degree are those beings which are
+naturally wise and good, who from the first moment of their existence
+are possessed of right and consistent reason, which we must consider
+superior to man and deserving to be attributed to a God; that is to
+say, to the world, in which it is inevitable that that perfect and
+complete reason should be inherent. Nor is it possible that it should
+be said with justice that there is any arrangement of things in which
+there cannot be something entire and perfect. For as in a vine or in
+beasts we see that nature, if not prevented by some superior violence,
+proceeds by her own appropriate path to her destined end; and as in
+painting, architecture, and the other arts there is a point of
+perfection which is attainable, and occasionally attained, so it is
+even much more necessary that in universal nature there must be some
+complete and perfect result arrived at. Many external accidents may
+happen to all other natures which may impede their progress to
+perfection, but nothing can hinder universal nature, because she is
+herself the ruler and governor of all other natures. That, therefore,
+must be the fourth and most elevated degree to which no other power can
+approach.
+
+But this degree is that on which the nature of all things is placed;
+and since she is possessed of this, and she presides over all things,
+and is subject to no possible impediment, the world must necessarily be
+an intelligent and even a wise being. But how marvellously great is the
+ignorance of those men who dispute the perfection of that nature which
+encircles all things; or who, allowing it to be infinitely perfect, yet
+deny it to be, in the first place, animated, then reasonable, and,
+lastly, prudent and wise! For how without these qualities could it be
+infinitely perfect? If it were like vegetables, or even like beasts,
+there would be no more reason for thinking it extremely good than
+extremely bad; and if it were possessed of reason, and had not wisdom
+from the beginning, the world would be in a worse condition than man;
+for man may grow wise, but the world, if it were destitute of wisdom
+through an infinite space of time past, could never acquire it. Thus it
+would be worse than man. But as that is absurd to imagine, the world
+must be esteemed wise from all eternity, and consequently a Deity:
+since there is nothing existing that is not defective, except the
+universe, which is well provided, and fully complete and perfect in all
+its numbers and parts.
+
+XIV. For Chrysippus says, very acutely, that as the case is made for
+the buckler, and the scabbard for the sword, so all things, except the
+universe, were made for the sake of something else. As, for instance,
+all those crops and fruits which the earth produces were made for the
+sake of animals, and animals for man; as, the horse for carrying, the
+ox for the plough, the dog for hunting and for a guard. But man himself
+was born to contemplate and imitate the world, being in no wise
+perfect, but, if I may so express myself, a particle of perfection; but
+the world, as it comprehends all, and as nothing exists that is not
+contained in it, is entirely perfect. In what, therefore, can it be
+defective, since it is perfect? It cannot want understanding and
+reason, for they are the most desirable of all qualities. The same
+Chrysippus observes also, by the use of similitudes, that everything in
+its kind, when arrived at maturity and perfection, is superior to that
+which is not--as, a horse to a colt, a dog to a puppy, and a man to a
+boy--so whatever is best in the whole universe must exist in some
+complete and perfect being. But nothing is more perfect than the world,
+and nothing better than virtue. Virtue, therefore, is an attribute of
+the world. But human nature is not perfect, and nevertheless virtue is
+produced in it: with how much greater reason, then, do we conceive it
+to be inherent in the world! Therefore the world has virtue, and it is
+also wise, and consequently a Deity.
+
+XV. The divinity of the world being now clearly perceived, we must
+acknowledge the same divinity to be likewise in the stars, which are
+formed from the lightest and purest part of the ether, without a
+mixture of any other matter; and, being altogether hot and transparent,
+we may justly say they have life, sense, and understanding. And
+Cleanthes thinks that it may be established by the evidence of two of
+our senses--feeling and seeing--that they are entirely fiery bodies;
+for the heat and brightness of the sun far exceed any other fire,
+inasmuch as it enlightens the whole universe, covering such a vast
+extent of space, and its power is such that we perceive that it not
+only warms, but often even burns: neither of which it could do if it
+were not of a fiery quality. Since, then, says he, the sun is a fiery
+body, and is nourished by the vapors of the ocean (for no fire can
+continue without some sustenance), it must be either like that fire
+which we use to warm us and dress our food, or like that which is
+contained in the bodies of animals.
+
+And this fire, which the convenience of life requires, is the devourer
+and consumer of everything, and throws into confusion and destroys
+whatever it reaches. On the contrary, the corporeal heat is full of
+life, and salutary; and vivifies, preserves, cherishes, increases, and
+sustains all things, and is productive of sense; therefore, says he,
+there can be no doubt which of these fires the sun is like, since it
+causes all things in their respective kinds to flourish and arrive to
+maturity; and as the fire of the sun is like that which is contained in
+the bodies of animated beings, the sun itself must likewise be
+animated, and so must the other stars also, which arise out of the
+celestial ardor that we call the sky, or firmament.
+
+As, then, some animals are generated in the earth, some in the water,
+and some in the air, Aristotle[123] thinks it ridiculous to imagine
+that no animal is formed in that part of the universe which is the most
+capable to produce them. But the stars are situated in the ethereal
+space; and as this is an element the most subtle, whose motion is
+continual, and whose force does not decay, it follows, of necessity,
+that every animated being which is produced in it must be endowed with
+the quickest sense and the swiftest motion. The stars, therefore, being
+there generated, it is a natural inference to suppose them endued with
+such a degree of sense and understanding as places them in the rank of
+Gods.
+
+XVI. For it may be observed that they who inhabit countries of a pure,
+clear air have a quicker apprehension and a readier genius than those
+who live in a thick, foggy climate. It is thought likewise that the
+nature of a man's diet has an effect on the mind; therefore it is
+probable that the stars are possessed of an excellent understanding,
+inasmuch as they are situated in the ethereal part of the universe, and
+are nourished by the vapors of the earth and sea, which are purified by
+their long passage to the heavens. But the invariable order and regular
+motion of the stars plainly manifest their sense and understanding; for
+all motion which seems to be conducted with reason and harmony supposes
+an intelligent principle, that does not act blindly, or inconsistently,
+or at random. And this regularity and consistent course of the stars
+from all eternity indicates not any natural order, for it is pregnant
+with sound reason, not fortune (for fortune, being a friend to change,
+despises consistency). It follows, therefore, that they move
+spontaneously by their own sense and divinity.
+
+Aristotle also deserves high commendation for his observation that
+everything that moves is either put in motion by natural impulse, or by
+some external force, or of its own accord; and that the sun, and moon,
+and all the stars move; but that those things which are moved by
+natural impulse are either borne downward by their weight, or upward by
+their lightness; neither of which things could be the case with the
+stars, because they move in a regular circle and orbit. Nor can it be
+said that there is some superior force which causes the stars to be
+moved in a manner contrary to nature. For what superior force can there
+be? It follows, therefore, that their motion must be voluntary. And
+whoever is convinced of this must discover not only great ignorance,
+but great impiety likewise, if he denies the existence of the Gods; nor
+is the difference great whether a man denies their existence, or
+deprives them of all design and action; for whatever is wholly inactive
+seems to me not to exist at all. Their existence, therefore, appears so
+plain that I can scarcely think that man in his senses who denies it.
+
+XVII. It now remains that we consider what is the character of the
+Gods. Nothing is more difficult than to divert our thoughts and
+judgment from the information of our corporeal sight, and the view of
+objects which our eyes are accustomed to; and it is this difficulty
+which has had such an influence on the unlearned, and on
+philosophers[124] also who resembled the unlearned multitude, that they
+have been unable to form any idea of the immortal Gods except under the
+clothing of the human figure; the weakness of which opinion Cotta has
+so well confuted that I need not add my thoughts upon it. But as the
+previous idea which we have of the Deity comprehends two things--first
+of all, that he is an animated being; secondly, that there is nothing
+in all nature superior to him--I do not see what can be more consistent
+with this idea and preconception than to attribute a mind and divinity
+to the world,[125] the most excellent of all beings.
+
+Epicurus may be as merry with this notion as he pleases; a man not the
+best qualified for a joker, as not having the wit and sense of his
+country.[126] Let him say that a voluble round Deity is to him
+incomprehensible; yet he shall never dissuade me from a principle which
+he himself approves, for he is of opinion there are Gods when he allows
+that there must be a nature excellently perfect. But it is certain that
+the world is most excellently perfect: nor is it to be doubted that
+whatever has life, sense, reason, and understanding must excel that
+which is destitute of these things. It follows, then, that the world
+has life, sense, reason, and understanding, and is consequently a
+Deity. But this shall soon be made more manifest by the operation of
+these very things which the world causes.
+
+XVIII. In the mean while, Velleius, let me entreat you not to be always
+saying that we are utterly destitute of every sort of learning. The
+cone, you say, the cylinder, and the pyramid, are more beautiful to you
+than the sphere. This is to have different eyes from other men. But
+suppose they are more beautiful to the sight only, which does not
+appear to me, for I can see nothing more beautiful than that figure
+which contains all others, and which has nothing rough in it, nothing
+offensive, nothing cut into angles, nothing broken, nothing swelling,
+and nothing hollow; yet as there are two forms most esteemed,[127] the
+globe in solids (for so the Greek word [Greek: sphaira], I think,
+should be construed), and the circle, or orb, in planes (in Greek,
+[Greek: kyklos]); and as they only have an exact similitude of parts in
+which every extreme is equally distant from the centre, what can we
+imagine in nature to be more just and proper? But if you have never
+raked into this learned dust[128] to find out these things, surely, at
+all events, you natural philosophers must know that equality of motion
+and invariable order could not be preserved in any other figure.
+Nothing, therefore, can be more illiterate than to assert, as you are
+in the habit of doing, that it is doubtful whether the world is round
+or not, because it may possibly be of another shape, and that there are
+innumerable worlds of different forms; which Epicurus, if he ever had
+learned that two and two are equal to four, would not have said. But
+while he judges of what is best by his palate, he does not look up to
+the "palace of heaven," as Ennius calls it.
+
+XIX. For as there are two sorts of stars,[129] one kind of which
+measure their journey from east to west by immutable stages, never in
+the least varying from their usual course, while the other completes a
+double revolution with an equally constant regularity; from each of
+these facts we demonstrate the volubility of the world (which could not
+possibly take place in any but a globular form) and the circular orbits
+of the stars. And first of all the sun, which has the chief rank among
+all the stars, is moved in such a manner that it fills the whole earth
+with its light, and illuminates alternately one part of the earth,
+while it leaves the other in darkness. The shadow of the earth
+interposing causes night; and the intervals of night are equal to those
+of day. And it is the regular approaches and retreats of the sun from
+which arise the regulated degrees of cold and heat. His annual circuit
+is in three hundred and sixty-five days, and nearly six hours
+more.[130] At one time he bends his course to the north, at another to
+the south, and thus produces summer and winter, with the other two
+seasons, one of which succeeds the decline of winter, and the other
+that of summer. And so to these four changes of the seasons we
+attribute the origin and cause of all the productions both of sea and
+land.
+
+The moon completes the same course every month which the sun does in a
+year. The nearer she approaches to the sun, the dimmer light does she
+yield, and when most remote from it she shines with the fullest
+brilliancy; nor are her figure and form only changed in her wane, but
+her situation likewise, which is sometimes in the north and sometimes
+in the south. By this course she has a sort of summer and winter
+solstices; and by her influence she contributes to the nourishment and
+increase of animated beings, and to the ripeness and maturity of all
+vegetables.
+
+XX. But most worthy our admiration is the motion of those five stars
+which are falsely called wandering stars; for they cannot be said to
+wander which keep from all eternity their approaches and retreats, and
+have all the rest of their motions, in one regular constant and
+established order. What is yet more wonderful in these stars which we
+are speaking of is that sometimes they appear, and sometimes they
+disappear; sometimes they advance towards the sun, and sometimes they
+retreat; sometimes they precede him, and sometimes follow him;
+sometimes they move faster, sometimes slower, and sometimes they do not
+stir in the least, but for a while stand still. From these unequal
+motions of the planets, mathematicians have called that the "great
+year"[131] in which the sun, moon, and five wandering stars, having
+finished their revolutions, are found in their original situation. In
+how long a time this is effected is much disputed, but it must be a
+certain and definite period. For the planet Saturn (called by the
+Greeks [Greek: Phainon]), which is farthest from the earth, finishes
+his course in about thirty years; and in his course there is something
+very singular, for sometimes he moves before the sun, sometimes he
+keeps behind it; at one time lying hidden in the night, at another
+again appearing in the morning; and ever performing the same motions in
+the same space of time without any alteration, so as to be for infinite
+ages regular in these courses. Beneath this planet, and nearer the
+earth, is Jupiter, called [Greek: Phaethôn], which passes the same
+orbit of the twelve signs[132] in twelve years, and goes through
+exactly the same variety in its course that the star of Saturn does.
+Next to Jupiter is the planet Mars (in Greek, [Greek: Pyroeis]), which
+finishes its revolution through the same orbit as the two previously
+mentioned,[133] in twenty-four months, wanting six days, as I imagine.
+Below this is Mercury (called by the Greeks [Greek: Stilbôn]), which
+performs the same course in little less than a year, and is never
+farther distant from the sun than the space of one sign, whether it
+precedes or follows it. The lowest of the five planets, and nearest the
+earth, is that of Venus (called in Greek [Greek: Phôsphoros]). Before
+the rising of the sun, it is called the morning-star, and after the
+setting, the evening-star. It has the same revolution through the
+zodiac, both as to latitude and longitude, with the other planets, in a
+year, and never is more than two[134] signs from the sun, whether it
+precedes or follows it.
+
+XXI. I cannot, therefore, conceive that this constant course of the
+planets, this just agreement in such various motions through all
+eternity, can be preserved without a mind, reason, and consideration;
+and since we may perceive these qualities in the stars, we cannot but
+place them in the rank of Gods. Those which are called the fixed stars
+have the same indications of reason and prudence. Their motion is
+daily, regular, and constant. They do not move with the sky, nor have
+they an adhesion to the firmament, as they who are ignorant of natural
+philosophy affirm. For the sky, which is thin, transparent, and
+suffused with an equal heat, does not seem by its nature to have power
+to whirl about the stars, or to be proper to contain them. The fixed
+stars, therefore, have their own sphere, separate and free from any
+conjunction with the sky. Their perpetual courses, with that admirable
+and incredible regularity of theirs, so plainly declare a divine power
+and mind to be in them, that he who cannot perceive that they are also
+endowed with divine power must be incapable of all perception whatever.
+
+In the heavens, therefore, there is nothing fortuitous, unadvised,
+inconstant, or variable: all there is order, truth, reason, and
+constancy; and all the things which are destitute of these qualities
+are counterfeit, deceitful, and erroneous, and have their residence
+about the earth[135] beneath the moon, the lowest of all the planets.
+He, therefore, who believes that this admirable order and almost
+incredible regularity of the heavenly bodies, by which the preservation
+and entire safety of all things is secured, is destitute of
+intelligence, must be considered to be himself wholly destitute of all
+intellect whatever.
+
+I think, then, I shall not deceive myself in maintaining this dispute
+upon the principle of Zeno, who went the farthest in his search after
+truth.
+
+XXII. Zeno, then, defines nature to be "an artificial fire, proceeding
+in a regular way to generation;" for he thinks that to create and beget
+are especial properties of art, and that whatever may be wrought by the
+hands of our artificers is much more skilfully performed by nature,
+that is, by this artificial fire, which is the master of all other
+arts.
+
+According to this manner of reasoning, every particular nature is
+artificial, as it operates agreeably to a certain method peculiar to
+itself; but that universal nature which embraces all things is said by
+Zeno to be not only artificial, but absolutely the artificer, ever
+thinking and providing all things useful and proper; and as every
+particular nature owes its rise and increase to its own proper seed, so
+universal nature has all her motions voluntary, has affections and
+desires (by the Greeks called [Greek: hormas]) productive of actions
+agreeable to them, like us, who have sense and understanding to direct
+us. Such, then, is the intelligence of the universe; for which reason
+it may be properly termed prudence or providence (in Greek, [Greek:
+pronoia]), since her chiefest care and employment is to provide all
+things fit for its duration, that it may want nothing, and, above all,
+that it may be adorned with all perfection of beauty and ornament.
+
+XXIII. Thus far have I spoken concerning the universe, and also of the
+stars; from whence it is apparent that there is almost an infinite
+number of Gods, always in action, but without labor or fatigue; for
+they are not composed of veins, nerves, and bones; their food and drink
+are not such as cause humors too gross or too subtle; nor are their
+bodies such as to be subject to the fear of falls or blows, or in
+danger of diseases from a weariness of limbs. Epicurus, to secure his
+Gods from such accidents, has made them only outlines of Deities, void
+of action; but our Gods being of the most beautiful form, and situated
+in the purest region of the heavens, dispose and rule their course in
+such a manner that they seem to contribute to the support and
+preservation of all things.
+
+Besides these, there are many other natures which have with reason been
+deified by the wisest Grecians, and by our ancestors, in consideration
+of the benefits derived from them; for they were persuaded that
+whatever was of great utility to human kind must proceed from divine
+goodness, and the name of the Deity was applied to that which the Deity
+produced, as when we call corn Ceres, and wine Bacchus; whence that
+saying of Terence,[136]
+
+    Without Ceres and Bacchus, Venus starves.
+
+And any quality, also, in which there was any singular virtue was
+nominated a Deity, such as Faith and Wisdom, which are placed among the
+divinities in the Capitol; the last by Æmilius Scaurus, but Faith was
+consecrated before by Atilius Calatinus. You see the temple of Virtue
+and that of Honor repaired by M. Marcellus, erected formerly, in the
+Ligurian war, by Q. Maximus. Need I mention those dedicated to Help,
+Safety, Concord, Liberty, and Victory, which have been called Deities,
+because their efficacy has been so great that it could not have
+proceeded from any but from some divine power? In like manner are the
+names of Cupid, Voluptas, and of Lubentine Venus consecrated, though
+they were things vicious and not natural, whatever Velleius may think
+to the contrary, for they frequently stimulate nature in too violent a
+manner. Everything, then, from which any great utility proceeded was
+deified; and, indeed, the names I have just now mentioned are
+declaratory of the particular virtue of each Deity.
+
+XXIV. It has been a general custom likewise, that men who have done
+important service to the public should be exalted to heaven by fame and
+universal consent. Thus Hercules, Castor and Pollux, Æsculapius, and
+Liber became Gods (I mean Liber[137] the son of Semele, and not
+him[138] whom our ancestors consecrated in such state and solemnity
+with Ceres and Libera; the difference in which may be seen in our
+Mysteries.[139] But because the offsprings of our bodies are called
+"Liberi" (children), therefore the offsprings of Ceres are called Liber
+and Libera (Libera[140] is the feminine, and Liber the masculine); thus
+likewise Romulus, or Quirinus--for they are thought to be the
+same--became a God.
+
+They are justly esteemed as Deities, since their souls subsist and
+enjoy eternity, from whence they are perfect and immortal beings.
+
+There is another reason, too, and that founded on natural philosophy,
+which has greatly contributed to the number of Deities; namely, the
+custom of representing in human form a crowd of Gods who have supplied
+the poets with fables, and filled mankind with all sorts of
+superstition. Zeno has treated of this subject, but it has been
+discussed more at length by Cleanthes and Chrysippus. All Greece was of
+opinion that Coelum was castrated by his son Saturn,[141] and that
+Saturn was chained by his son Jupiter. In these impious fables, a
+physical and not inelegant meaning is contained; for they would denote
+that the celestial, most exalted, and ethereal nature--that is, the
+fiery nature, which produces all things by itself--is destitute of that
+part of the body which is necessary for the act of generation by
+conjunction with another.
+
+XXV. By Saturn they mean that which comprehends the course and
+revolution of times and seasons; the Greek name for which Deity implies
+as much, for he is called [Greek: Kronos,] which is the same with
+[Greek: Chronos], that is, a "space of time." But he is called Saturn,
+because he is filled (_saturatur_) with years; and he is usually
+feigned to have devoured his children, because time, ever insatiable,
+consumes the rolling years; but to restrain him from immoderate haste,
+Jupiter has confined him to the course of the stars, which are as
+chains to him. Jupiter (that is, _juvans pater_) signifies a "helping
+father," whom, by changing the cases, we call Jove,[142] _a juvando_.
+The poets call him "father of Gods and men;"[143] and our ancestors
+"the most good, the most great;" and as there is something more
+glorious in itself, and more agreeable to others, to be good (that is,
+beneficent) than to be great, the title of "most good" precedes that of
+"most great." This, then, is he whom Ennius means in the following
+passage, before quoted--
+
+    Look up to the refulgent heaven above,
+    Which all men call, unanimously, Jove:
+
+which is more plainly expressed than in this other passage[144] of the
+same poet--
+
+    On whose account I'll curse that flood of light,
+    Whate'er it is above that shines so bright.
+
+Our augurs also mean the same, when, for the "thundering and lightning
+heaven," they say the "thundering and lightning Jove." Euripides, among
+many excellent things, has this:
+
+    The vast, expanded, boundless sky behold,
+    See it with soft embrace the earth enfold;
+    This own the chief of Deities above,
+    And this acknowledge by the name of Jove.
+
+XXVI. The air, according to the Stoics, which is between the sea and
+the heaven, is consecrated by the name of Juno, and is called the
+sister and wife of Jove, because it resembles the sky, and is in close
+conjunction with it. They have made it feminine, because there is
+nothing softer. But I believe it is called Juno, _a juvando_ (from
+helping).
+
+To make three separate kingdoms, by fable, there remained yet the water
+and the earth. The dominion of the sea is given, therefore, to Neptune,
+a brother, as he is called, of Jove; whose name, Neptunus--as
+_Portunus, a portu_, from a port--is derived _a nando_ (from swimming),
+the first letters being a little changed. The sovereignty and power
+over the earth is the portion of a God, to whom we, as well as the
+Greeks, have given a name that denotes riches (in Latin, _Dis_; in
+Greek, [Greek: Ploutôn]), because all things arise from the earth and
+return to it. He forced away Proserpine (in Greek called [Greek:
+Persephonê]), by which the poets mean the "seed of corn," from whence
+comes their fiction of Ceres, the mother of Proserpine, seeking for her
+daughter, who was hidden from her. She is called Ceres, which is the
+same as Geres--_a gerendis frugibus_[145]--"from bearing fruit," the
+first letter of the word being altered after the manner of the Greeks,
+for by them she is called [Greek: Dêmêtêr], the same as [Greek:
+Gêmêtêr].[146] Again, he (_qui magna vorteret_) "who brings about
+mighty changes" is called Mavors; and Minerva is so called because
+(_minueret_, or _minaretur_) she diminishes or menaces.
+
+XXVII. And as the beginnings and endings of all things are of the
+greatest importance, therefore they would have their sacrifices to
+begin with Janus.[147] His name is derived _ab eundo_, from passing;
+from whence thorough passages are called _jani_, and the outward doors
+of common houses are called _januæ_. The name of Vesta is, from the
+Greeks, the same with their [Greek: Hestia]. Her province is over
+altars and hearths; and in the name of this Goddess, who is the keeper
+of all things within, prayers and sacrifices are concluded. The _Dii
+Penates_, "household Gods," have some affinity with this power, and are
+so called either from _penus_, "all kind of human provisions," or
+because _penitus insident_ (they reside within), from which, by the
+poets, they are called _penetrales_ also. Apollo, a Greek name, is
+called _Sol_, the sun; and Diana, _Luna_, the moon. The sun (_sol_) is
+so named either because he is _solus_ (alone), so eminent above all the
+stars; or because he obscures all the stars, and appears alone as soon
+as he rises. _Luna_, the moon, is so called _a lucendo_ (from shining);
+she bears the name also of Lucina: and as in Greece the women in labor
+invoke Diana Lucifera, so here they invoke Juno Lucina. She is likewise
+called Diana _omnivaga_, not _a venando_ (from hunting), but because
+she is reckoned one of the seven stars that seem to wander.[148] She is
+called Diana because she makes a kind of day of the night;[149] and
+presides over births, because the delivery is effected sometimes in
+seven, or at most in nine, courses of the moon; which, because they
+make _mensa spatia_ (measured spaces), are called _menses_ (months).
+This occasioned a pleasant observation of Timæus (as he has many).
+Having said in his history that "the same night in which Alexander was
+born, the temple of Diana at Ephesus was burned down," he adds, "It is
+not in the least to be wondered at, because Diana, being willing to
+assist at the labor of Olympias,[150] was absent from home." But to
+this Goddess, because _ad res omnes veniret_--"she has an influence
+upon all things"--we have given the appellation of Venus,[151] from
+whom the word _venustas_ (beauty) is rather derived than Venus from
+_venustas_.
+
+XXVIII. Do you not see, therefore, how, from the productions of nature
+and the useful inventions of men, have arisen fictitious and imaginary
+Deities, which have been the foundation of false opinions, pernicious
+errors, and wretched superstitions? For we know how the different forms
+of the Gods--their ages, apparel, ornaments; their pedigrees,
+marriages, relations, and everything belonging to them--are adapted to
+human weakness and represented with our passions; with lust, sorrow,
+and anger, according to fabulous history: they have had wars and
+combats, not only, as Homer relates, when they have interested
+themselves in two different armies, but when they have fought battles
+in their own defence against the Titans and giants. These stories, of
+the greatest weakness and levity, are related and believed with the
+most implicit folly.
+
+But, rejecting these fables with contempt, a Deity is diffused in every
+part of nature; in earth under the name of Ceres, in the sea under the
+name of Neptune, in other parts under other names. Yet whatever they
+are, and whatever characters and dispositions they have, and whatever
+name custom has given them, we are bound to worship and adore them. The
+best, the chastest, the most sacred and pious worship of the Gods is to
+reverence them always with a pure, perfect, and unpolluted mind and
+voice; for our ancestors, as well as the philosophers, have separated
+superstition from religion. They who prayed whole days and sacrificed,
+that their children might survive them (_ut superstites essent_), were
+called superstitious, which word became afterward more general; but
+they who diligently perused, and, as we may say, read or practised over
+again, all the duties relating to the worship of the Gods, were called
+_religiosi_--religious, from _relegendo_--"reading over again, or
+practising;" as _elegantes_, elegant, _ex eligendo_, "from choosing,
+making a good choice;" _diligentes_, diligent, _ex diligendo_, "from
+attending on what we love;" _intelligentes_, intelligent, from
+understanding--for the signification is derived in the same manner.
+Thus are the words superstitious and religious understood; the one
+being a term of reproach, the other of commendation. I think I have now
+sufficiently demonstrated that there are Gods, and what they are.
+
+XXIX. I am now to show that the world is governed by the providence of
+the Gods. This is an important point, which you Academics endeavor to
+confound; and, indeed, the whole contest is with you, Cotta; for your
+sect, Velleius, know very little of what is said on different subjects
+by other schools. You read and have a taste only for your own books,
+and condemn all others without examination. For instance, when you
+mentioned yesterday[152] that prophetic old dame [Greek: Pronoia],
+Providence, invented by the Stoics, you were led into that error by
+imagining that Providence was made by them to be a particular Deity
+that governs the whole universe, whereas it is only spoken in a short
+manner; as when it is said "The commonwealth of Athens is governed by
+the council," it is meant "of the Areopagus;"[153] so when we say "The
+world is governed by providence," we mean "by the providence of the
+Gods." To express ourselves, therefore, more fully and clearly, we say,
+"The world is governed by the providence of the Gods." Be not,
+therefore, lavish of your railleries, of which your sect has little to
+spare: if I may advise you, do not attempt it. It does not become you,
+it is not your talent, nor is it in your power. This is not applied to
+you in particular who have the education and politeness of a Roman, but
+to all your sect in general, and especially to your leader[154]--a man
+unpolished, illiterate, insulting, without wit, without reputation,
+without elegance.
+
+XXX. I assert, then, that the universe, with all its parts, was
+originally constituted, and has, without any cessation, been ever
+governed by the providence of the Gods. This argument we Stoics
+commonly divide into three parts; the first of which is, that the
+existence of the Gods being once known, it must follow that the world
+is governed by their wisdom; the second, that as everything is under
+the direction of an intelligent nature, which has produced that
+beautiful order in the world, it is evident that it is formed from
+animating principles; the third is deduced from those glorious works
+which we behold in the heavens and the earth.
+
+First, then, we must either deny the existence of the Gods (as
+Democritus and Epicurus by their doctrine of images in some sort do),
+or, if we acknowledge that there are Gods, we must believe they are
+employed, and that, too, in something excellent. Now, nothing is so
+excellent as the administration of the universe. The universe,
+therefore, is governed by the wisdom of the Gods. Otherwise, we must
+imagine that there is some cause superior to the Deity, whether it be a
+nature inanimate, or a necessity agitated by a mighty force, that
+produces those beautiful works which we behold. The nature of the Gods
+would then be neither supreme nor excellent, if you subject it to that
+necessity or to that nature, by which you would make the heaven, the
+earth, and the seas to be governed. But there is nothing superior to
+the Deity; the world, therefore, must be governed by him: consequently,
+the Deity is under no obedience or subjection to nature, but does
+himself rule over all nature. In effect, if we allow the Gods have
+understanding, we allow also their providence, which regards the most
+important things; for, can they be ignorant of those important things,
+and how they are to be conducted and preserved, or do they want power
+to sustain and direct them? Ignorance is inconsistent with the nature
+of the Gods, and imbecility is repugnant to their majesty. From whence
+it follows, as we assert, that the world is governed by the providence
+of the Gods.
+
+XXXI. But supposing, which is incontestable, that there are Gods, they
+must be animated, and not only animated, but endowed with
+reason--united, as we may say, in a civil agreement and society, and
+governing together one universe, as a republic or city. Thus the same
+reason, the same verity, the same law, which ordains good and prohibits
+evil, exists in the Gods as it does in men. From them, consequently, we
+have prudence and understanding, for which reason our ancestors erected
+temples to the Mind, Faith, Virtue, and Concord. Shall we not then
+allow the Gods to have these perfections, since we worship the sacred
+and august images of them? But if understanding, faith, virtue, and
+concord reside in human kind, how could they come on earth, unless from
+heaven? And if we are possessed of wisdom, reason, and prudence, the
+Gods must have the same qualities in a greater degree; and not only
+have them, but employ them in the best and greatest works. The universe
+is the best and greatest work; therefore it must be governed by the
+wisdom and providence of the Gods.
+
+Lastly, as we have sufficiently shown that those glorious and luminous
+bodies which we behold are Deities--I mean the sun, the moon, the fixed
+and wandering stars, the firmament, and the world itself, and those
+other things also which have any singular virtue, and are of any great
+utility to human kind--it follows that all things are governed by
+providence and a divine mind. But enough has been said on the first
+part.
+
+XXXII. It is now incumbent on me to prove that all things are subjected
+to nature, and most beautifully directed by her. But, first of all, it
+is proper to explain precisely what that nature is, in order to come to
+the more easy understanding of what I would demonstrate. Some think
+that nature is a certain irrational power exciting in bodies the
+necessary motions. Others, that it is an intelligent power, acting by
+order and method, designing some end in every cause, and always aiming
+at that end, whose works express such skill as no art, no hand, can
+imitate; for, they say, such is the virtue of its seed, that, however
+small it is, if it falls into a place proper for its reception, and
+meets with matter conducive to its nourishment and increase, it forms
+and produces everything in its respective kind; either vegetables,
+which receive their nourishment from their roots; or animals, endowed
+with motion, sense, appetite, and abilities to beget their likeness.
+
+Some apply the word nature to everything; as Epicurus does, who
+acknowledges no cause, but atoms, a vacuum, and their accidents. But
+when we[155] say that nature forms and governs the world, we do not
+apply it to a clod of earth, or piece of stone, or anything of that
+sort, whose parts have not the necessary cohesion,[156] but to a tree,
+in which there is not the appearance of chance, but of order and a
+resemblance of art.
+
+XXXIII. But if the art of nature gives life and increase to vegetables,
+without doubt it supports the earth itself; for, being impregnated with
+seeds, she produces every kind of vegetable, and embracing their roots,
+she nourishes and increases them; while, in her turn, she receives her
+nourishment from the other elements, and by her exhalations gives
+proper sustenance to the air, the sky, and all the superior bodies. If
+nature gives vigor and support to the earth, by the same reason she has
+an influence over the rest of the world; for as the earth gives
+nourishment to vegetables, so the air is the preservation of animals.
+The air sees with us, hears with us, and utters sounds with us; without
+it, there would be no seeing, hearing, or sounding. It even moves with
+us; for wherever we go, whatever motion we make, it seems to retire and
+give place to us.
+
+That which inclines to the centre, that which rises from it to the
+surface, and that which rolls about the centre, constitute the
+universal world, and make one entire nature; and as there are four
+sorts of bodies, the continuance of nature is caused by their
+reciprocal changes; for the water arises from the earth, the air from
+the water, and the fire from the air; and, reversing this order, the
+air arises from fire, the water from the air, and from the water the
+earth, the lowest of the four elements, of which all beings are formed.
+Thus by their continual motions backward and forward, upward and
+downward, the conjunction of the several parts of the universe is
+preserved; a union which, in the beauty we now behold it, must be
+eternal, or at least of a very long duration, and almost for an
+infinite space of time; and, whichever it is, the universe must of
+consequence be governed by nature. For what art of navigating fleets,
+or of marshalling an army, and--to instance the produce of nature--what
+vine, what tree, what animated form and conformation of their members,
+give us so great an indication of skill as appears in the universe?
+Therefore we must either deny that there is the least trace of an
+intelligent nature, or acknowledge that the world is governed by it.
+But since the universe contains all particular beings, as well as their
+seeds, can we say that it is not itself governed by nature? That would
+be the same as saying that the teeth and the beard of man are the work
+of nature, but that the man himself is not. Thus the effect would be
+understood to be greater than the cause.
+
+XXXIV. Now, the universe sows, as I may say, plants, produces, raises,
+nourishes, and preserves what nature administers, as members and parts
+of itself. If nature, therefore, governs them, she must also govern the
+universe. And, lastly, in nature's administration there is nothing
+faulty. She produced the best possible effect out of those elements
+which existed. Let any one show how it could have been better. But that
+can never be; and whoever attempts to mend it will either make it
+worse, or aim at impossibilities.
+
+But if all the parts of the universe are so constituted that nothing
+could be better for use or beauty, let us consider whether this is the
+effect of chance, or whether, in such a state they could possibly
+cohere, but by the direction of wisdom and divine providence. Nature,
+therefore, cannot be void of reason, if art can bring nothing to
+perfection without it, and if the works of nature exceed those of art.
+How is it consistent with common-sense that when you view an image or a
+picture, you imagine it is wrought by art; when you behold afar off a
+ship under sail, you judge it is steered by reason and art; when you
+see a dial or water-clock,[157] you believe the hours are shown by art,
+and not by chance; and yet that you should imagine that the universe,
+which contains all arts and the artificers, can be void of reason and
+understanding?
+
+But if that sphere which was lately made by our friend Posidonius, the
+regular revolutions of which show the course of the sun, moon, and five
+wandering stars, as it is every day and night performed, were carried
+into Scythia or Britain, who, in those barbarous countries, would doubt
+that that sphere had been made so perfect by the exertion of reason?
+
+XXXV. Yet these people[158] doubt whether the universe, from whence all
+things arise and are made, is not the effect of chance, or some
+necessity, rather than the work of reason and a divine mind. According
+to them, Archimedes shows more knowledge in representing the motions of
+the celestial globe than nature does in causing them, though the copy
+is so infinitely beneath the original. The shepherd in Attius,[159] who
+had never seen a ship, when he perceived from a mountain afar off the
+divine vessel of the Argonauts, surprised and frighted at this new
+object, expressed himself in this manner:
+
+    What horrid bulk is that before my eyes,
+    Which o'er the deep with noise and vigor flies?
+    It turns the whirlpools up, its force so strong,
+    And drives the billows as it rolls along.
+    The ocean's violence it fiercely braves;
+    Runs furious on, and throws about the waves.
+    Swiftly impetuous in its course, and loud,
+    Like the dire bursting of a show'ry cloud;
+    Or, like a rock, forced by the winds and rain,
+    Now whirl'd aloft, then plunged into the main.
+    But hold! perhaps the Earth and Neptune jar,
+    And fiercely wage an elemental war;
+    Or Triton with his trident has o'erthrown
+    His den, and loosen'd from the roots the stone;
+    The rocky fragment, from the bottom torn,
+    Is lifted up, and on the surface borne.
+
+At first he is in suspense at the sight of this unknown object; but on
+seeing the young mariners, and hearing their singing, he says,
+
+    Like sportive dolphins, with their snouts they roar;[160]
+
+and afterward goes on,
+
+    Loud in my ears methinks their voices ring,
+    As if I heard the God Sylvanus sing.
+
+As at first view the shepherd thinks he sees something inanimate and
+insensible, but afterward, judging by more trustworthy indications, he
+begins to figure to himself what it is; so philosophers, if they are
+surprised at first at the sight of the universe, ought, when they have
+considered the regular, uniform, and immutable motions of it, to
+conceive that there is some Being that is not only an inhabitant of
+this celestial and divine mansion, but a ruler and a governor, as
+architect of this mighty fabric.
+
+XXXVI. Now, in my opinion, they[161] do not seem to have even the least
+suspicion that the heavens and earth afford anything marvellous. For,
+in the first place, the earth is situated in the middle part of the
+universe, and is surrounded on all sides by the air, which we breathe,
+and which is called "aer,"[162] which, indeed, is a Greek word; but by
+constant use it is well understood by our countrymen, for, indeed, it
+is employed as a Latin word. The air is encompassed by the boundless
+ether (sky), which consists of the fires above. This word we borrow
+also, for we use _æther_ in Latin as well as _aer;_ though Pacuvius
+thus expresses it,
+
+                       --This, of which I speak,
+    In Latin's _coelum_, _æther_ call'd in Greek.
+
+As though he were not a Greek into whose mouth he puts this sentence;
+but he is speaking in Latin, though we listen as if he were speaking
+Greek; for, as he says elsewhere,
+
+    His speech discovers him a Grecian born.
+
+But to return to more important matters. In the sky innumerable fiery
+stars exist, of which the sun is the chief, enlightening all with his
+refulgent splendor, and being by many degrees larger than the whole
+earth; and this multitude of vast fires are so far from hurting the
+earth, and things terrestrial, that they are of benefit to them;
+whereas, if they were moved from their stations, we should inevitably
+be burned through the want of a proper moderation and temperature of
+heat.
+
+XXXVII. Is it possible for any man to behold these things, and yet
+imagine that certain solid and individual bodies move by their natural
+force and gravitation, and that a world so beautifully adorned was made
+by their fortuitous concourse? He who believes this may as well believe
+that if a great quantity of the one-and-twenty letters, composed either
+of gold or any other matter, were thrown upon the ground, they would
+fall into such order as legibly to form the Annals of Ennius. I doubt
+whether fortune could make a single verse of them. How, therefore, can
+these people assert that the world was made by the fortuitous concourse
+of atoms, which have no color, no quality--which the Greeks call
+[Greek: poiotês], no sense? or that there are innumerable worlds, some
+rising and some perishing, in every moment of time? But if a concourse
+of atoms can make a world, why not a porch, a temple, a house, a city,
+which are works of less labor and difficulty?
+
+Certainly those men talk so idly and inconsiderately concerning this
+lower world that they appear to me never to have contemplated the
+wonderful magnificence of the heavens; which is the next topic for our
+consideration.
+
+Well, then, did Aristotle[163] observe: "If there were men whose
+habitations had been always underground, in great and commodious
+houses, adorned with statues and pictures, furnished with everything
+which they who are reputed happy abound with; and if, without stirring
+from thence, they should be informed of a certain divine power and
+majesty, and, after some time, the earth should open, and they should
+quit their dark abode to come to us, where they should immediately
+behold the earth, the seas, the heavens; should consider the vast
+extent of the clouds and force of the winds; should see the sun, and
+observe his grandeur and beauty, and also his generative power,
+inasmuch as day is occasioned by the diffusion of his light through the
+sky; and when night has obscured the earth, they should contemplate the
+heavens bespangled and adorned with stars, the surprising variety of
+the moon in her increase and wane, the rising and setting of all the
+stars, and the inviolable regularity of their courses; when," says he,
+"they should see these things, they would undoubtedly conclude that
+there are Gods, and that these are their mighty works."
+
+XXXVIII. Thus far Aristotle. Let us imagine, also, as great darkness as
+was formerly occasioned by the irruption of the fires of Mount Ætna,
+which are said to have obscured the adjacent countries for two days to
+such a degree that no man could recognize his fellow; but on the third,
+when the sun appeared, they seemed to be risen from the dead. Now, if
+we should be suddenly brought from a state of eternal darkness to see
+the light, how beautiful would the heavens seem! But our minds have
+become used to it from the daily practice and habituation of our eyes,
+nor do we take the trouble to search into the principles of what is
+always in view; as if the novelty, rather than the importance, of
+things ought to excite us to investigate their causes.
+
+Is he worthy to be called a man who attributes to chance, not to an
+intelligent cause, the constant motion of the heavens, the regular
+courses of the stars, the agreeable proportion and connection of all
+things, conducted with so much reason that our intellect itself is
+unable to estimate it rightly? When we see machines move artificially,
+as a sphere, a clock, or the like, do we doubt whether they are the
+productions of reason? And when we behold the heavens moving with a
+prodigious celerity, and causing an annual succession of the different
+seasons of the year, which vivify and preserve all things, can we doubt
+that this world is directed, I will not say only by reason, but by
+reason most excellent and divine? For without troubling ourselves with
+too refined a subtlety of discussion, we may use our eyes to
+contemplate the beauty of those things which we assert have been
+arranged by divine providence.
+
+XXXIX. First, let us examine the earth, whose situation is in the
+middle of the universe,[164] solid, round, and conglobular by its
+natural tendency; clothed with flowers, herbs, trees, and fruits; the
+whole in multitudes incredible, and with a variety suitable to every
+taste: let us consider the ever-cool and running springs, the clear
+waters of the rivers, the verdure of their banks, the hollow depths of
+caves, the cragginess of rocks, the heights of impending mountains, and
+the boundless extent of plains, the hidden veins of gold and silver,
+and the infinite quarries of marble.
+
+What and how various are the kinds of animals, tame or wild? The
+flights and notes of birds? How do the beasts live in the fields and in
+the forests? What shall I say of men, who, being appointed, as we may
+say, to cultivate the earth, do not suffer its fertility to be choked
+with weeds, nor the ferocity of beasts to make it desolate; who, by the
+houses and cities which they build, adorn the fields, the isles, and
+the shores? If we could view these objects with the naked eye, as we
+can by the contemplation of the mind, nobody, at such a sight, would
+doubt there was a divine intelligence.
+
+But how beautiful is the sea! How pleasant to see the extent of it!
+What a multitude and variety of islands! How delightful are the coasts!
+What numbers and what diversity of inhabitants does it contain; some
+within the bosom of it, some floating on the surface, and others by
+their shells cleaving to the rocks! While the sea itself, approaching
+to the land, sports so closely to its shores that those two elements
+appear to be but one.
+
+Next above the sea is the air, diversified by day and night: when
+rarefied, it possesses the higher region; when condensed, it turns into
+clouds, and with the waters which it gathers enriches the earth by the
+rain. Its agitation produces the winds. It causes heat and cold
+according to the different seasons. It sustains birds in their flight;
+and, being inhaled, nourishes and preserves all animated beings.
+
+XL. Add to these, which alone remaineth to be mentioned, the firmament
+of heaven, a region the farthest from our abodes, which surrounds and
+contains all things. It is likewise called ether, or sky, the extreme
+bounds and limits of the universe, in which the stars perform their
+appointed courses in a most wonderful manner; among which, the sun,
+whose magnitude far surpasses the earth, makes his revolution round it,
+and by his rising and setting causes day and night; sometimes coming
+near towards the earth, and sometimes going from it, he every year
+makes two contrary reversions[165] from the extreme point of its
+course. In his retreat the earth seems locked up in sadness; in his
+return it appears exhilarated with the heavens. The moon, which, as
+mathematicians demonstrate, is bigger than half the earth, makes her
+revolutions through the same spaces[166] as the sun; but at one time
+approaching, and at another receding from, the sun, she diffuses the
+light which she has borrowed from him over the whole earth, and has
+herself also many various changes in her appearance. When she is found
+under the sun, and opposite to it, the brightness of her rays is lost;
+but when the earth directly interposes between the moon and sun, the
+moon is totally eclipsed. The other wandering stars have their courses
+round the earth in the same spaces,[167] and rise and set in the same
+manner; their motions are sometimes quick, sometimes slow, and often
+they stand still. There is nothing more wonderful, nothing more
+beautiful. There is a vast number of fixed stars, distinguished by the
+names of certain figures, to which we find they have some resemblance.
+
+XLI. I will here, says Balbus, looking at me, make use of the verses
+which, when you were young, you translated from Aratus,[168] and which,
+because they are in Latin, gave me so much delight that I have many of
+them still in my memory. As then, we daily see, without any change or
+variation,
+
+                                     --the rest[169]
+    Swiftly pursue the course to which they're bound;
+    And with the heavens the days and nights go round;
+
+the contemplation of which, to a mind desirous of observing the
+constancy of nature, is inexhaustible.
+
+    The extreme top of either point is call'd
+    The pole.[170]
+
+About this the two [Greek: Arktoi] are turned, which never set;
+
+    Of these, the Greeks one Cynosura call,
+    The other Helice.[171]
+
+The brightest stars,[172] indeed, of Helice are discernible all night,
+
+    Which are by us Septentriones call'd.
+
+Cynosura moves about the same pole, with a like number of stars, and
+ranged in the same order:
+
+    This[173] the Phoenicians choose to make their guide
+    When on the ocean in the night they ride.
+    Adorned with stars of more refulgent light,
+    The other[174] shines, and first appears at night.
+    Though this is small, sailors its use have found;
+    More inward is its course, and short its round.
+
+XLII. The aspect of those stars is the more admirable, because,
+
+    The Dragon grim between them bends his way,
+    As through the winding banks the currents stray,
+    And up and down in sinuous bending rolls.[175]
+
+His whole form is excellent; but the shape of his head and the ardor of
+his eyes are most remarkable.
+
+    Various the stars which deck his glittering head;
+    His temples are with double glory spread;
+    From his fierce eyes two fervid lights afar
+    Flash, and his chin shines with one radiant star;
+    Bow'd is his head; and his round neck he bends,
+    And to the tail of Helice[176] extends.
+
+The rest of the Dragon's body we see[177] at every hour in the night.
+
+    Here[178] suddenly the head a little hides
+    Itself, where all its parts, which are in sight,
+    And those unseen in the same place unite.
+
+Near to this head
+
+    Is placed the figure of a man that moves
+    Weary and sad,
+
+which the Greeks
+
+    Engonasis do call, because he's borne[179]
+    About with bended knee. Near him is placed
+    The crown with a refulgent lustre graced.
+
+This indeed is at his back; but Anguitenens (the Snake-holder) is near
+his head:[180]
+
+    The Greeks him Ophiuchus call, renown'd
+    The name. He strongly grasps the serpent round
+    With both his hands; himself the serpent folds
+    Beneath his breast, and round his middle holds;
+    Yet gravely he, bright shining in the skies,
+    Moves on, and treads on Nepa's[181] breast and eyes.
+
+The Septentriones[182] are followed by--
+
+    Arctophylax,[183] that's said to be the same
+    Which we Boötes call, who has the name,
+    Because he drives the Greater Bear along
+    Yoked to a wain.
+
+Besides, in Boötes,
+
+    A star of glittering rays about his waist,
+    Arcturus called, a name renown'd, is placed.[184]
+
+Beneath which is
+
+    The Virgin of illustrious form, whose hand
+    Holds a bright spike.
+
+XLIII. And truly these signs are so regularly disposed that a divine
+wisdom evidently appears in them:
+
+    Beneath the Bear's[185] head have the Twins their seat,
+    Under his chest the Crab, beneath his feet
+    The mighty Lion darts a trembling flame.[186]
+
+The Charioteer
+
+    On the left side of Gemini we see,[187]
+    And at his head behold fierce Helice;
+    On his left shoulder the bright Goat appears.
+
+But to proceed--
+
+    This is indeed a great and glorious star,
+    On th' other side the Kids, inferior far,
+    Yield but a slender light to mortal eyes.
+
+Under his feet
+
+    The horned bull,[188] with sturdy limbs, is placed:
+
+his head is spangled with a number of stars;
+
+    These by the Greeks are called the Hyades,
+
+from raining; for [Greek: hyein] is to rain: therefore they are
+injudiciously called _Suculæ_ by our people, as if they had their name
+from [Greek: hys], a sow, and not from [Greek: hyô].
+
+Behind the Lesser Bear, Cepheus[189] follows with extended hands,
+
+    For close behind the Lesser Bear he comes.
+
+Before him goes
+
+    Cassiopea[190] with a faintish light;
+    But near her moves (fair and illustrious sight!)
+    Andromeda,[191] who, with an eager pace,
+    Seems to avoid her parent's mournful face.[192]
+    With glittering mane the Horse[193] now seems to tread,
+    So near he comes, on her refulgent head;
+    With a fair star, that close to him appears,
+    A double form[194] and but one light he wears;
+    By which he seems ambitious in the sky
+    An everlasting knot of stars to tie.
+    Near him the Ram, with wreathed horns, is placed;
+
+by whom
+
+    The Fishes[195] are; of which one seems to haste
+    Somewhat before the other, to the blast
+    Of the north wind exposed.
+
+XLIV. Perseus is described as placed at the feet of Andromeda:
+
+    And him the sharp blasts of the north wind beat.
+    Near his left knee, but dim their light, their seat
+    The small Pleiades[196] maintain. We find,
+    Not far from them, the Lyre[197] but slightly join'd.
+    Next is the winged Bird,[198] that seems to fly
+    Beneath the spacious covering of the sky.
+
+Near the head of the Horse[199] lies the right hand of Aquarius, then
+all Aquarius himself.[200]
+
+    Then Capricorn, with half the form of beast,
+    Breathes chill and piercing colds from his strong breast,
+    And in a spacious circle takes his round;
+    When him, while in the winter solstice bound,
+    The sun has visited with constant light,
+    He turns his course, and shorter makes the night.[201]
+
+Not far from hence is seen
+
+    The Scorpion[202] rising lofty from below;
+    By him the Archer,[203] with his bended bow;
+    Near him the Bird, with gaudy feathers spread;
+    And the fierce Eagle[204] hovers o'er his head.
+
+Next comes the Dolphin;[205]
+
+    Then bright Orion,[206] who obliquely moves;
+
+he is followed by
+
+    The fervent Dog,[207] bright with refulgent stars:
+
+next the Hare follows[208]
+
+    Unwearied in his course. At the Dog's tail
+    Argo[209] moves on, and moving seems to sail;
+    O'er her the Ram and Fishes have their place;[210]
+    The illustrious vessel touches, in her pace,
+    The river's banks;[211]
+
+which you may see winding and extending itself to a great length.
+
+    The Fetters[212] at the Fishes' tails are hung.
+    By Nepa's[213] head behold the Altar stand,[214]
+    Which by the breath of southern winds is fann'd;
+
+near which the Centaur[215]
+
+    Hastens his mingled parts to join beneath
+    The Serpent,[216] there extending his right hand,
+    To where you see the monstrous Scorpion stand,
+    Which he at the bright Altar fiercely slays.
+    Here on her lower parts see Hydra[217] raise
+    Herself;
+
+whose bulk is very far extended.
+
+    Amid the winding of her body's placed
+    The shining Goblet;[218] and the glossy Crow[219]
+    Plunges his beak into her parts below.
+    Antecanis beneath the Twins is seen,
+    Call'd Procyon by the Greeks.[220]
+
+Can any one in his senses imagine that this disposition of the stars,
+and this heaven so beautifully adorned, could ever have been formed by
+a fortuitous concourse of atoms? Or what other nature, being destitute
+of intellect and reason, could possibly have produced these effects,
+which not only required reason to bring them about, but the very
+character of which could not be understood and appreciated without the
+most strenuous exertions of well-directed reason?
+
+XLV. But our admiration is not limited to the objects here described.
+What is most wonderful is that the world is so durable, and so
+perfectly made for lasting that it is not to be impaired by time; for
+all its parts tend equally to the centre, and are bound together by a
+sort of chain, which surrounds the elements. This chain is nature,
+which being diffused through the universe, and performing all things
+with judgment and reason, attracts the extremities to the centre.
+
+If, then, the world is round, and if on that account all its parts,
+being of equal dimensions and relative proportions, mutually support
+and are supported by one another, it must follow that as all the parts
+incline to the centre (for that is the lowest place of a globe) there
+is nothing whatever which can put a stop to that propensity in the case
+of such great weights. For the same reason, though the sea is higher
+than the earth, yet because it has the like tendency, it is collected
+everywhere, equally concentres, and never overflows, and is never
+wasted.
+
+The air, which is contiguous, ascends by its lightness, but diffuses
+itself through the whole; therefore it is by nature joined and united
+to the sea, and at the same time borne by the same power towards the
+heaven, by the thinness and heat of which it is so tempered as to be
+made proper to supply life and wholesome air for the support of
+animated beings. This is encompassed by the highest region of the
+heavens, which is called the sky, which is joined to the extremity of
+the air, but retains its own heat pure and unmixed.
+
+XLVI. The stars have their revolutions in the sky, and are continued by
+the tendency of all parts towards the centre. Their duration is
+perpetuated by their form and figure, for they are round; which form,
+as I think has been before observed, is the least liable to injury; and
+as they are composed of fire, they are fed by the vapors which are
+exhaled by the sun from the earth, the sea, and other waters; but when
+these vapors have nourished and refreshed the stars, and the whole sky,
+they are sent back to be exhaled again; so that very little is lost or
+consumed by the fire of the stars and the flame of the sky. Hence we
+Stoics conclude--which Panætius[221] is said to have doubted of--that
+the whole world at last would be consumed by a general conflagration,
+when, all moisture being exhausted, neither the earth could have any
+nourishment, nor the air return again, since water, of which it is
+formed, would then be all consumed; so that only fire would subsist;
+and from this fire, which is an animating power and a Deity, a new
+world would arise and be re-established in the same beauty.
+
+I should be sorry to appear to you to dwell too long upon this subject
+of the stars, and more especially upon that of the planets, whose
+motions, though different, make a very just agreement. Saturn, the
+highest, chills; Mars, placed in the middle, burns; while Jupiter,
+interposing, moderates their excess, both of light and heat. The two
+planets beneath Mars[222] obey the sun. The sun himself fills the whole
+universe with his own genial light; and the moon, illuminated by him,
+influences conception, birth, and maturity. And who is there who is not
+moved by this union of things, and by this concurrence of nature
+agreeing together, as it were, for the safety of the world? And yet I
+feel sure that none of these reflections have ever been made by these
+men.
+
+XLVII. Let us proceed from celestial to terrestrial things. What is
+there in them which does not prove the principle of an intelligent
+nature? First, as to vegetables; they have roots to sustain their
+stems, and to draw from the earth a nourishing moisture to support the
+vital principle which those roots contain. They are clothed with a rind
+or bark, to secure them more thoroughly from heat and cold. The vines
+we see take hold on props with their tendrils, as if with hands, and
+raise themselves as if they were animated; it is even said that they
+shun cabbages and coleworts, as noxious and pestilential to them, and,
+if planted by them, will not touch any part.
+
+But what a vast variety is there of animals! and how wonderfully is
+every kind adapted to preserve itself! Some are covered with hides,
+some clothed with fleeces, and some guarded with bristles; some are
+sheltered with feathers, some with scales; some are armed with horns,
+and some are furnished with wings to escape from danger. Nature hath
+also liberally and plentifully provided for all animals their proper
+food. I could expatiate on the judicious and curious formation and
+disposition of their bodies for the reception and digestion of it, for
+all their interior parts are so framed and disposed that there is
+nothing superfluous, nothing that is not necessary for the preservation
+of life. Besides, nature has also given these beasts appetite and
+sense; in order that by the one they may be excited to procure
+sufficient sustenance, and by the other they may distinguish what is
+noxious from what is salutary. Some animals seek their food walking,
+some creeping, some flying, and some swimming; some take it with their
+mouth and teeth; some seize it with their claws, and some with their
+beaks; some suck, some graze, some bolt it whole, and some chew it.
+Some are so low that they can with ease take such food as is to be
+found on the ground; but the taller, as geese, swans, cranes, and
+camels, are assisted by a length of neck. To the elephant is given a
+hand,[223] without which, from his unwieldiness of body, he would
+scarce have any means of attaining food.
+
+XLVIII. But to those beasts which live by preying on others, nature has
+given either strength or swiftness. On some animals she has even
+bestowed artifice and cunning; as on spiders, some of which weave a
+sort of net to entrap and destroy whatever falls into it, others sit on
+the watch unobserved to fall on their prey and devour it. The naker--by
+the Greeks called _Pinna_--has a kind of confederacy with the prawn for
+procuring food. It has two large shells open, into which when the
+little fishes swim, the naker, having notice given by the bite of the
+prawn, closes them immediately. Thus, these little animals, though of
+different kinds, seek their food in common; in which it is matter of
+wonder whether they associate by any agreement, or are naturally joined
+together from their beginning.
+
+There is some cause to admire also the provision of nature in the case
+of those aquatic animals which are generated on land, such as
+crocodiles, river-tortoises, and a certain kind of serpents, which seek
+the water as soon as they are able to drag themselves along. We
+frequently put duck-eggs under hens, by which, as by their true
+mothers, the ducklings are at first hatched and nourished; but when
+they see the water, they forsake them and run to it, as to their
+natural abode: so strong is the impression of nature in animals for
+their own preservation.
+
+XLIX. I have read that there is a bird called Platalea (the shoveller),
+that lives by watching those fowls which dive into the sea for their
+prey, and when they return with it, he squeezes their heads with his
+beak till they drop it, and then seizes on it himself. It is said
+likewise that he is in the habit of filling his stomach with
+shell-fish, and when they are digested by the heat which exists in the
+stomach, they cast them up, and then pick out what is proper
+nourishment. The sea-frogs, they say, are wont to cover themselves with
+sand, and moving near the water, the fishes strike at them, as at a
+bait, and are themselves taken and devoured by the frogs. Between the
+kite and the crow there is a kind of natural war, and wherever the one
+finds the eggs of the other, he breaks them.
+
+But who is there who can avoid being struck with wonder at that which
+has been noticed by Aristotle, who has enriched us with so many
+valuable remarks? When the cranes[224] pass the sea in search of warmer
+climes, they fly in the form of a triangle. By the first angle they
+repel the resisting air; on each side, their wings serve as oars to
+facilitate their flight; and the basis of their triangle is assisted by
+the wind in their stern. Those which are behind rest their necks and
+heads on those which precede; and as the leader has not the same
+relief, because he has none to lean upon, he at length flies behind
+that he may also rest, while one of those which have been eased
+succeeds him, and through the whole flight each regularly takes his
+turn.
+
+I could produce many instances of this kind; but these may suffice. Let
+us now proceed to things more familiar to us. The care of beasts for
+their own preservation, their circumspection while feeding, and their
+manner of taking rest in their lairs, are generally known, but still
+they are greatly to be admired.
+
+L. Dogs cure themselves by a vomit, the Egyptian ibis by a purge; from
+whence physicians have lately--I mean but few ages since--greatly
+improved their art. It is reported that panthers, which in barbarous
+countries are taken with poisoned flesh, have a certain remedy[225]
+that preserves them from dying; and that in Crete, the wild goats, when
+they are wounded with poisoned arrows, seek for an herb called dittany,
+which, when they have tasted, the arrows (they say) drop from their
+bodies. It is said also that deer, before they fawn, purge themselves
+with a little herb called hartswort.[226] Beasts, when they receive any
+hurt, or fear it, have recourse to their natural arms: the bull to his
+horns, the boar to his tusks, and the lion to his teeth. Some take to
+flight, others hide themselves; the cuttle-fish vomits[227] blood; the
+cramp-fish benumbs; and there are many animals that, by their
+intolerable stink, oblige their pursuers to retire.
+
+LI. But that the beauty of the world might be eternal, great care has
+been taken by the providence of the Gods to perpetuate the different
+kinds of animals, and vegetables, and trees, and all those things which
+sink deep into the earth, and are contained in it by their roots and
+trunks; in order to which every individual has within itself such
+fertile seed that many are generated from one; and in vegetables this
+seed is enclosed in the heart of their fruit, but in such abundance
+that men may plentifully feed on it, and the earth be always replanted.
+
+With regard to animals, do we not see how aptly they are formed for the
+propagation of their species? Nature for this end created some males
+and some females. Their parts are perfectly framed for generation, and
+they have a wonderful propensity to copulation. When the seed has
+fallen on the matrix, it draws almost all the nourishment to itself, by
+which the foetus is formed; but as soon as it is discharged from
+thence, if it is an animal that is nourished by milk, almost all the
+food of the mother turns into milk, and the animal, without any
+direction but by the pure instinct of nature, immediately hunts for the
+teat, and is there fed with plenty. What makes it evidently appear that
+there is nothing in this fortuitous, but the work of a wise and
+foreseeing nature, is, that those females which bring forth many young,
+as sows and bitches, have many teats, and those which bear a small
+number have but few. What tenderness do beasts show in preserving and
+raising up their young till they are able to defend themselves! They
+say, indeed, that fish, when they have spawned, leave their eggs; but
+the water easily supports them, and produces the young fry in
+abundance.
+
+LII. It is said, likewise, that tortoises and crocodiles, when they
+have laid their eggs on the land, only cover them with earth, and then
+leave them, so that their young are hatched and brought up without
+assistance; but fowls and other birds seek for quiet places to lay in,
+where they build their nests in the softest manner, for the surest
+preservation of their eggs; which, when they have hatched, they defend
+from the cold by the warmth of their wings, or screen them from the
+sultry heat of the sun. When their young begin to be able to use their
+wings, they attend and instruct them; and then their cares are at an
+end.
+
+Human art and industry are indeed necessary towards the preservation
+and improvement of certain animals and vegetables; for there are
+several of both kinds which would perish without that assistance. There
+are likewise innumerable facilities (being different in different
+places) supplied to man to aid him in his civilization, and in
+procuring abundantly what he requires. The Nile waters Egypt, and after
+having overflowed and covered it the whole summer, it retires, and
+leaves the fields softened and manured for the reception of seed. The
+Euphrates fertilizes Mesopotamia, into which, as we may say, it carries
+yearly new fields.[228] The Indus, which is the largest of all
+rivers,[229] not only improves and cultivates the ground, but sows it
+also; for it is said to carry with it a great quantity of grain. I
+could mention many other countries remarkable for something singular,
+and many fields, which are, in their own natures, exceedingly fertile.
+
+LIII. But how bountiful is nature that has provided for us such an
+abundance of various and delicious food; and this varying with the
+different seasons, so that we may be constantly pleased with change,
+and satisfied with abundance! How seasonable and useful to man, to
+beasts, and even to vegetables, are the Etesian winds[230] she has
+bestowed, which moderate intemperate heat, and render navigation more
+sure and speedy! Many things must be omitted on a subject so
+copious--and still a great deal must be said--for it is impossible to
+relate the great utility of rivers, the flux and reflux of the sea, the
+mountains clothed with grass and trees, the salt-pits remote from the
+sea-coasts, the earth replete with salutary medicines, or, in short,
+the innumerable designs of nature necessary for sustenance and the
+enjoyment of life. We must not forget the vicissitudes of day and
+night, ordained for the health of animated beings, giving them a time
+to labor and a time to rest. Thus, if we every way examine the
+universe, it is apparent, from the greatest reason, that the whole is
+admirably governed by a divine providence for the safety and
+preservation of all beings.
+
+If it should be asked for whose sake this mighty fabric was raised,
+shall we say for trees and other vegetables, which, though destitute of
+sense, are supported by nature? That would be absurd. Is it for beasts?
+Nothing can be less probable than that the Gods should have taken such
+pains for beings void of speech and understanding. For whom, then, will
+any one presume to say that the world was made? Undoubtedly for
+reasonable beings; these are the Gods and men, who are certainly the
+most perfect of all beings, as nothing is equal to reason. It is
+therefore credible that the universe, and all things in it, were made
+for the Gods and for men.
+
+But we may yet more easily comprehend that the Gods have taken great
+care of the interests and welfare of men, if we examine thoroughly into
+the structure of the body, and the form and perfection of human nature.
+There are three things absolutely necessary for the support of life--to
+eat, to drink, and to breathe. For these operations the mouth is most
+aptly framed, which, by the assistance of the nostrils, draws in the
+more air.
+
+LIV. The teeth are there placed to divide and grind the food.[231] The
+fore-teeth, being sharp and opposite to each other, cut it asunder, and
+the hind-teeth (called the grinders) chew it, in which office the
+tongue seems to assist. At the root of the tongue is the gullet, which
+receives whatever is swallowed: it touches the tonsils on each side,
+and terminates at the interior extremity of the palate. When, by the
+motions of the tongue, the food is forced into this passage, it
+descends, and those parts of the gullet which are below it are dilated,
+and those above are contracted. There is another passage, called by
+physicians the rough artery,[232] which reaches to the lungs, for the
+entrance and return of the air we breathe; and as its orifice is joined
+to the roots of the tongue a little above the part to which the gullet
+is annexed, it is furnished with a sort of coverlid,[233] lest, by the
+accidental falling of any food into it, the respiration should be
+stopped.
+
+As the stomach, which is beneath the gullet, receives the meat and
+drink, so the lungs and the heart draw in the air from without. The
+stomach is wonderfully composed, consisting almost wholly of nerves; it
+abounds with membranes and fibres, and detains what it receives,
+whether solid or liquid, till it is altered and digested. It sometimes
+contracts, sometimes dilates. It blends and mixes the food together, so
+that it is easily concocted and digested by its force of heat, and by
+the animal spirits is distributed into the other parts of the body.
+
+LV. As to the lungs, they are of a soft and spongy substance, which
+renders them the most commodious for respiration; they alternately
+dilate and contract to receive and return the air, that what is the
+chief animal sustenance may be always fresh. The juice,[234] by which
+we are nourished, being separated from the rest of the food, passes the
+stomach and intestines to the liver, through open and direct passages,
+which lead from the mesentery to the gates of the liver (for so they
+call those vessels at the entrance of it). There are other passages
+from thence, through which the food has its course when it has passed
+the liver. When the bile, and those humors which proceed from the
+kidneys, are separated from the food, the remaining part turns to
+blood, and flows to those vessels at the entrance of the liver to which
+all the passages adjoin. The chyle, being conveyed from this place
+through them into the vessel called the hollow vein, is mixed together,
+and, being already digested and distilled, passes into the heart; and
+from the heart it is communicated through a great number of veins to
+every part of the body.
+
+It is not difficult to describe how the gross remains are detruded by
+the motion of the intestines, which contract and dilate; but that must
+be declined, as too indelicate for discourse. Let us rather explain
+that other wonder of nature, the air, which is drawn into the lungs,
+receives heat both by that already in and by the coagitation of the
+lungs; one part is turned back by respiration, and the other is
+received into a place called the ventricle of the heart.[235] There is
+another ventricle like it annexed to the heart, into which the blood
+flows from the liver through the hollow vein. Thus by one ventricle the
+blood is diffused to the extremities through the veins, and by the
+other the breath is communicated through the arteries; and there are
+such numbers of both dispersed through the whole body that they
+manifest a divine art.
+
+Why need I speak of the bones, those supports of the body, whose joints
+are so wonderfully contrived for stability, and to render the limbs
+complete with regard to motion and to every action of the body? Or need
+I mention the nerves, by which the limbs are governed--their many
+interweavings, and their proceeding from the heart,[236] from whence,
+like the veins and arteries, they have their origin, and are
+distributed through the whole corporeal frame?
+
+LVI. To this skill of nature, and this care of providence, so diligent
+and so ingenious, many reflections may be added, which show what
+valuable things the Deity has bestowed on man. He has made us of a
+stature tall and upright, in order that we might behold the heavens,
+and so arrive at the knowledge of the Gods; for men are not simply to
+dwell here as inhabitants of the earth, but to be, as it were,
+spectators of the heavens and the stars, which is a privilege not
+granted to any other kind of animated beings. The senses, which are the
+interpreters and messengers of things, are placed in the head, as in a
+tower, and wonderfully situated for their proper uses; for the eyes,
+being in the highest part, have the office of sentinels, in discovering
+to us objects; and the ears are conveniently placed in a high part of
+the person, being appointed to receive sound, which naturally ascends.
+The nostrils have the like situation, because all scent likewise
+ascends; and they have, with great reason, a near vicinity to the
+mouth, because they assist us in judging of meat and drink. The taste,
+which is to distinguish the quality of what we take; is in that part of
+the mouth where nature has laid open a passage for what we eat and
+drink. But the touch is equally diffused through the whole body, that
+we may not receive any blows, or the too rigid attacks of cold and
+heat, without feeling them. And as in building the architect averts
+from the eyes and nose of the master those things which must
+necessarily be offensive, so has nature removed far from our senses
+what is of the same kind in the human body.
+
+LVII. What artificer but nature, whose direction is incomparable, could
+have exhibited so much ingenuity in the formation of the senses? In the
+first place, she has covered and invested the eyes with the finest
+membranes, which she hath made transparent, that we may see through
+them, and firm in their texture, to preserve the eyes. She has made
+them slippery and movable, that they might avoid what would offend
+them, and easily direct the sight wherever they will. The actual organ
+of sight, which is called the pupil, is so small that it can easily
+shun whatever might be hurtful to it. The eyelids, which are their
+coverings, are soft and smooth, that they may not injure the eyes; and
+are made to shut at the apprehension of any accident, or to open at
+pleasure; and these movements nature has ordained to be made in an
+instant: they are fortified with a sort of palisade of hairs, to keep
+off what may be noxious to them when open, and to be a fence to their
+repose when sleep closes them, and allows them to rest as if they were
+wrapped up in a case. Besides, they are commodiously hidden and
+defended by eminences on every side; for on the upper part the eyebrows
+turn aside the perspiration which falls from the head and forehead; the
+cheeks beneath rise a little, so as to protect them on the lower side;
+and the nose is placed between them as a wall of separation.
+
+The hearing is always open, for that is a sense of which we are in need
+even while we are sleeping; and the moment that any sound is admitted
+by it we are awakened even from sleep. It has a winding passage, lest
+anything should slip into it, as it might if it were straight and
+simple. Nature also hath taken the same precaution in making there a
+viscous humor, that if any little creatures should endeavor to creep
+in, they might stick in it as in bird-lime. The ears (by which we mean
+the outward part) are made prominent, to cover and preserve the
+hearing, lest the sound should be dissipated and escape before the
+sense is affected. Their entrances are hard and horny, and their form
+winding, because bodies of this kind better return and increase the
+sound. This appears in the harp, lute, or horn;[237] and from all
+tortuous and enclosed places sounds are returned stronger.
+
+The nostrils, in like manner, are ever open, because we have a
+continual use for them; and their entrances also are rather narrow,
+lest anything noxious should enter them; and they have always a
+humidity necessary for the repelling dust and many other extraneous
+bodies. The taste, having the mouth for an enclosure, is admirably
+situated, both in regard to the use we make of it and to its security.
+
+LVIII. Besides, every human sense is much more exquisite than those of
+brutes; for our eyes, in those arts which come under their judgment,
+distinguish with great nicety; as in painting, sculpture, engraving,
+and in the gesture and motion of bodies. They understand the beauty,
+proportion, and, as I may so term it, the becomingness of colors and
+figures; they distinguish things of greater importance, even virtues
+and vices; they know whether a man is angry or calm, cheerful or sad,
+courageous or cowardly, bold or timorous.
+
+The judgment of the ears is not less admirably and scientifically
+contrived with regard to vocal and instrumental music. They distinguish
+the variety of sounds, the measure, the stops, the different sorts of
+voices, the treble and the base, the soft and the harsh, the sharp and
+the flat, of which human ears only are capable to judge. There is
+likewise great judgment in the smell, the taste, and the touch; to
+indulge and gratify which senses more arts have been invented than I
+could wish: it is apparent to what excess we have arrived in the
+composition of our perfumes, the preparation of our food, and the
+enjoyment of corporeal pleasures.
+
+LIX. Again, he who does not perceive the soul and mind of man, his
+reason, prudence, and discernment, to be the work of a divine
+providence, seems himself to be destitute of those faculties. While I
+am on this subject, Cotta, I wish I had your eloquence: how would you
+illustrate so fine a subject! You would show the great extent of the
+understanding; how we collect our ideas, and join those which follow to
+those which precede; establish principles, draw consequences, define
+things separately, and comprehend them with accuracy; from whence you
+demonstrate how great is the power of intelligence and knowledge, which
+is such that even God himself has no qualities more admirable. How
+valuable (though you Academics despise and even deny that we have it)
+is our knowledge of exterior objects, from the perception of the senses
+joined to the application of the mind; by which we see in what relation
+one thing stands to another, and by the aid of which we have invented
+those arts which are necessary for the support and pleasure of life.
+How charming is eloquence! How divine that mistress of the universe, as
+you call it! It teaches us what we were ignorant of, and makes us
+capable of teaching what we have learned. By this we exhort others; by
+this we persuade them; by this we comfort the afflicted; by this we
+deliver the affrighted from their fear; by this we moderate excessive
+joy; by this we assuage the passions of lust and anger. This it is
+which bound men by the chains of right and law, formed the bonds of
+civil society, and made us quit a wild and savage life.
+
+And it will appear incredible, unless you carefully observe the facts,
+how complete the work of nature is in giving us the use of speech; for,
+first of all, there is an artery from the lungs to the bottom of the
+mouth, through which the voice, having its original principle in the
+mind, is transmitted. Then the tongue is placed in the mouth, bounded
+by the teeth. It softens and modulates the voice, which would otherwise
+be confusedly uttered; and, by pushing it to the teeth and other parts
+of the mouth, makes the sound distinct and articulate. We Stoics,
+therefore, compare the tongue to the bow of an instrument, the teeth to
+the strings, and the nostrils to the sounding-board.
+
+LX. But how commodious are the hands which nature has given to man, and
+how beautifully do they minister to many arts! For, such is the
+flexibility of the joints, that our fingers are closed and opened
+without any difficulty. With their help, the hand is formed for
+painting, carving, and engraving; for playing on stringed instruments,
+and on the pipe. These are matters of pleasure. There are also works of
+necessity, such as tilling the ground, building houses, making cloth
+and habits, and working in brass and iron. It is the business of the
+mind to invent, the senses to perceive, and the hands to execute; so
+that if we have buildings, if we are clothed, if we live in safety, if
+we have cities, walls, habitations, and temples, it is to the hands we
+owe them.
+
+By our labor, that is, by our hands, variety and plenty of food are
+provided; for, without culture, many fruits, which serve either for
+present or future consumption, would not be produced; besides, we feed
+on flesh, fish, and fowl, catching some, and bringing up others. We
+subdue four-footed beasts for our carriage, whose speed and strength
+supply our slowness and inability. On some we put burdens, on others
+yokes. We convert the sagacity of the elephant and the quick scent of
+the dog to our own advantage. Out of the caverns of the earth we dig
+iron, a thing entirely necessary for the cultivation of the ground. We
+discover the hidden veins of copper, silver, and gold, advantageous for
+our use and beautiful as ornaments. We cut down trees, and use every
+kind of wild and cultivated timber, not only to make fire to warm us
+and dress our meat, but also for building, that we may have houses to
+defend us from the heat and cold. With timber likewise we build ships,
+which bring us from all parts every commodity of life. We are the only
+animals who, from our knowledge of navigation, can manage what nature
+has made the most violent--the sea and the winds. Thus we obtain from
+the ocean great numbers of profitable things. We are the absolute
+masters of what the earth produces. We enjoy the mountains and the
+plains. The rivers and the lakes are ours. We sow the seed, and plant
+the trees. We fertilize the earth by overflowing it. We stop, direct,
+and turn the rivers: in short, by our hands we endeavor, by our various
+operations in this world, to make, as it were, another nature.
+
+LXI. But what shall I say of human reason? Has it not even entered the
+heavens? Man alone of all animals has observed the courses of the
+stars, their risings and settings. By man the day, the month, the year,
+is determined. He foresees the eclipses of the sun and moon, and
+foretells them to futurity, marking their greatness, duration, and
+precise time. From the contemplation of these things the mind extracts
+the knowledge of the Gods--a knowledge which produces piety, with which
+is connected justice, and all the other virtues; from which arises a
+life of felicity, inferior to that of the Gods in no single particular,
+except in immortality, which is not absolutely necessary to happy
+living. In explaining these things, I think that I have sufficiently
+demonstrated the superiority of man to other animated beings; from
+whence we should infer that neither the form and position of his limbs
+nor that strength of mind and understanding could possibly be the
+effect of chance.
+
+LXII. I am now to prove, by way of conclusion, that every thing in this
+world of use to us was made designedly for us.
+
+First of all, the universe was made for the Gods and men, and all
+things therein were prepared and provided for our service. For the
+world is the common habitation or city of the Gods and men; for they
+are the only reasonable beings: they alone live by justice and law. As,
+therefore, it must be presumed the cities of Athens and Lacedæmon were
+built for the Athenians and Lacedæmonians, and as everything there is
+said to belong to those people, so everything in the universe may with
+propriety be said to belong to the Gods and men, and to them alone.
+
+In the next place, though the revolutions of the sun, moon, and all the
+stars are necessary for the cohesion of the universe, yet may they be
+considered also as objects designed for the view and contemplation of
+man. There is no sight less apt to satiate the eye, none more
+beautiful, or more worthy to employ our reason and penetration. By
+measuring their courses we find the different seasons, their durations
+and vicissitudes, which, if they are known to men alone, we must
+believe were made only for their sake.
+
+Does the earth bring forth fruit and grain in such excessive abundance
+and variety for men or for brutes? The plentiful and exhilarating fruit
+of the vine and the olive-tree are entirely useless to beasts. They
+know not the time for sowing, tilling, or for reaping in season and
+gathering in the fruits of the earth, or for laying up and preserving
+their stores. Man alone has the care and advantage of these things.
+
+LXIII. Thus, as the lute and the pipe were made for those, and those
+only, who are capable of playing on them, so it must be allowed that
+the produce of the earth was designed for those only who make use of
+them; and though some beasts may rob us of a small part, it does not
+follow that the earth produced it also for them. Men do not store up
+corn for mice and ants, but for their wives, their children, and their
+families. Beasts, therefore, as I said before, possess it by stealth,
+but their masters openly and freely. It is for us, therefore, that
+nature hath provided this abundance. Can there be any doubt that this
+plenty and variety of fruit, which delight not only the taste, but the
+smell and sight, was by nature intended for men only? Beasts are so far
+from being partakers of this design, that we see that even they
+themselves were made for man; for of what utility would sheep be,
+unless for their wool, which, when dressed and woven, serves us for
+clothing? For they are not capable of anything, not even of procuring
+their own food, without the care and assistance of man. The fidelity of
+the dog, his affectionate fawning on his master, his aversion to
+strangers, his sagacity in finding game, and his vivacity in pursuit of
+it, what do these qualities denote but that he was created for our use?
+Why need I mention oxen? We perceive that their backs were not formed
+for carrying burdens, but their necks were naturally made for the yoke,
+and their strong broad shoulders to draw the plough. In the Golden Age,
+which poets speak of, they were so greatly beneficial to the husbandman
+in tilling the fallow ground that no violence was ever offered them,
+and it was even thought a crime to eat them:
+
+    The Iron Age began the fatal trade
+    Of blood, and hammer'd the destructive blade;
+    Then men began to make the ox to bleed,
+    And on the tamed and docile beast to feed[238].
+
+LXIV. It would take a long time to relate the advantages which we
+receive from mules and asses, which undoubtedly were designed for our
+use. What is the swine good for but to eat? whose life, Chrysippus
+says, was given it but as salt[239] to keep it from putrefying; and as
+it is proper food for man, nature hath made no animal more fruitful.
+What a multitude of birds and fishes are taken by the art and
+contrivance of man only, and which are so delicious to our taste that
+one would be tempted sometimes to believe that this Providence which
+watches over us was an Epicurean! Though we think there are some
+birds--the alites and oscines[240], as our augurs call them--which were
+made merely to foretell events.
+
+The large savage beasts we take by hunting, partly for food, partly to
+exercise ourselves in imitation of martial discipline, and to use those
+we can tame and instruct, as elephants, or to extract remedies for our
+diseases and wounds, as we do from certain roots and herbs, the virtues
+of which are known by long use and experience. Represent to yourself
+the whole earth and seas as if before your eyes. You will see the vast
+and fertile plains, the thick, shady mountains, the immense pasturage
+for cattle, and ships sailing over the deep with incredible celerity;
+nor are our discoveries only on the face of the earth, but in its
+secret recesses there are many useful things, which being made for man,
+by man alone are discovered.
+
+LXV. Another, and in my opinion the strongest, proof that the
+providence of the Gods takes care of us is divination, which both of
+you, perhaps, will attack; you, Cotta, because Carneades took pleasure
+in inveighing against the Stoics; and you, Velleius, because there is
+nothing Epicurus ridicules so much as the prediction of events. Yet the
+truth of divination appears in many places, on many occasions, often in
+private, but particularly in public concerns. We receive many
+intimations from the foresight and presages of augurs and auspices;
+from oracles, prophecies, dreams, and prodigies; and it often happens
+that by these means events have proved happy to men, and imminent
+dangers have been avoided. This knowledge, therefore--call it either a
+kind of transport, or an art, or a natural faculty--is certainly found
+only in men, and is a gift from the immortal Gods. If these proofs,
+when taken separately, should make no impression upon your mind, yet,
+when collected together, they must certainly affect you.
+
+Besides, the Gods not only provide for mankind universally, but for
+particular men. You may bring this universality to gradually a smaller
+number, and again you may reduce that smaller number to individuals.
+
+LXVI. For if the reasons which I have given prove to all of us that the
+Gods take care of all men, in every country, in every part of the world
+separate from our continent, they take care of those who dwell on the
+same land with us, from east to west; and if they regard those who
+inhabit this kind of great island, which we call the globe of the
+earth, they have the like regard for those who possess the parts of
+this island--Europe, Asia, and Africa; and therefore they favor the
+parts of these parts, as Rome, Athens, Sparta, and Rhodes; and
+particular men of these cities, separate from the whole; as Curius,
+Fabricius, Coruncanius, in the war with Pyrrhus; in the first Punic
+war, Calatinus, Duillius, Metellus, Lutatius; in the second, Maximus,
+Marcellus, Africanus; after these, Paullus, Gracchus, Cato; and in our
+fathers' times, Scipio, Lælius. Rome also and Greece have produced many
+illustrious men, who we cannot believe were so without the assistance
+of the Deity; which is the reason that the poets, Homer in particular,
+joined their chief heroes--Ulysses, Agamemnon, Diomedes, Achilles--to
+certain Deities, as companions in their adventures and dangers.
+Besides, the frequent appearances of the Gods, as I have before
+mentioned, demonstrate their regard for cities and particular men. This
+is also apparent indeed from the foreknowledge of events, which we
+receive either sleeping or waking. We are likewise forewarned of many
+things by the entrails of victims, by presages, and many other means,
+which have been long observed with such exactness as to produce an art
+of divination.
+
+There never, therefore, was a great man without divine inspiration. If
+a storm should damage the corn or vineyard of a person, or any accident
+should deprive him of some conveniences of life, we should not judge
+from thence that the Deity hates or neglects him. The Gods take care of
+great things, and disregard the small. But to truly great men all
+things ever happen prosperously; as has been sufficiently asserted and
+proved by us Stoics, as well as by Socrates, the prince of
+philosophers, in his discourses on the infinite advantages arising from
+virtue.
+
+LXVII. This is almost the whole that hath occurred to my mind on the
+nature of the Gods, and what I thought proper to advance. Do you,
+Cotta, if I may advise, defend the same cause. Remember that in Rome
+you keep the first rank; remember that you are Pontifex; and as your
+school is at liberty to argue on which side you please[241], do you
+rather take mine, and reason on it with that eloquence which you
+acquired by your rhetorical exercises, and which the Academy improved;
+for it is a pernicious and impious custom to argue against the Gods,
+whether it be done seriously, or only in pretence and out of sport.
+
+       *       *       *       *       *
+
+
+
+
+BOOK III.
+
+
+I. When Balbus had ended this discourse, then Cotta, with a smile,
+rejoined, You direct me too late which side to defend; for during the
+course of your argument I was revolving in my mind what objections to
+make to what you were saying, not so much for the sake of opposition,
+as of obliging you to explain what I did not perfectly comprehend; and
+as every one may use his own judgment, it is scarcely possible for me
+to think in every instance exactly what you wish.
+
+You have no idea, O Cotta, said Velleius, how impatient I am to hear
+what you have to say. For since our friend Balbus was highly delighted
+with your discourse against Epicurus, I ought in my turn to be
+solicitous to hear what you can say against the Stoics; and I therefore
+will give you my best attention, for I believe you are, as usual, well
+prepared for the engagement.
+
+I wish, by Hercules! I were, replies Cotta; for it is more difficult to
+dispute with Lucilius than it was with you. Why so? says Velleius.
+Because, replies Cotta, your Epicurus, in my opinion, does not contend
+strongly for the Gods: he only, for the sake of avoiding any
+unpopularity or punishment, is afraid to deny their existence; for when
+he asserts that the Gods are wholly inactive and regardless of
+everything, and that they have limbs like ours, but make no use of
+them, he seems to jest with us, and to think it sufficient if he allows
+that there are beings of any kind happy and eternal. But with regard to
+Balbus, I suppose you observed how many things were said by him, which,
+however false they may be, yet have a perfect coherence and connection;
+therefore, my design, as I said, in opposing him, is not so much to
+confute his principles as to induce him to explain what I do not
+clearly understand: for which reason, Balbus, I will give you the
+choice, either to answer me every particular as I go on, or permit me
+to proceed without interruption. If you want any explanation, replies
+Balbus, I would rather you would propose your doubts singly; but if
+your intention is rather to confute me than to seek instruction for
+yourself, it shall be as you please; I will either answer you
+immediately on every point, or stay till you have finished your
+discourse.
+
+II. Very well, says Cotta; then let us proceed as our conversation
+shall direct. But before I enter on the subject, I have a word to say
+concerning myself; for I am greatly influenced by your authority, and
+your exhortation at the conclusion of your discourse, when you desired
+me to remember that I was Cotta and Pontifex; by which I presume you
+intimated that I should defend the sacred rites and religion and
+ceremonies which we received from our ancestors. Most undoubtedly I
+always have, and always shall defend them, nor shall the arguments
+either of the learned or unlearned ever remove the opinions which I
+have imbibed from them concerning the worship of the immortal Gods. In
+matters of religion I submit to the rules of the high-priests, T.
+Coruncanius, P. Scipio, and P. Scævola; not to the sentiments of Zeno,
+Cleanthes, or Chrysippus; and I pay a greater regard to what C. Lælius,
+one of our augurs and wise men, has written concerning religion, in
+that noble oration of his, than to the most eminent of the Stoics: and
+as the whole religion of the Romans at first consisted in sacrifices
+and divination by birds, to which have since been added predictions, if
+the interpreters[242] of the Sibylline oracle or the aruspices have
+foretold any event from portents and prodigies, I have ever thought
+that there was no point of all these holy things which deserved to be
+despised. I have been even persuaded that Romulus, by instituting
+divination, and Numa, by establishing sacrifices, laid the foundation
+of Rome, which undoubtedly would never have risen to such a height of
+grandeur if the Gods had not been made propitious by this worship.
+These, Balbus, are my sentiments both as a priest and as Cotta. But you
+must bring me to your opinion by the force of your reason: for I have a
+right to demand from you, as a philosopher, a reason for the religion
+which you would have me embrace. But I must believe the religion of our
+ancestors without any proof.
+
+III. What proof, says Balbus, do you require of me? You have proposed,
+says Cotta, four articles. First of all, you undertook to prove that
+there "are Gods;" secondly, "of what kind and character they are;"
+thirdly, that "the universe is governed by them;" lastly, that "they
+provide for the welfare of mankind in particular." Thus, if I remember
+rightly, you divided your discourse. Exactly so, replies Balbus; but
+let us see what you require.
+
+Let us examine, says Cotta, every proposition. The first one--that
+there are Gods--is never contested but by the most impious of men; nay,
+though it can never be rooted out of my mind, yet I believe it on the
+authority of our ancestors, and not on the proofs which you have
+brought. Why do you expect a proof from me, says Balbus, if you
+thoroughly believe it? Because, says Cotta, I come to this discussion
+as if I had never thought of the Gods, or heard anything concerning
+them. Take me as a disciple wholly ignorant and unbiassed, and prove to
+me all the points which I ask.
+
+Begin, then, replies Balbus. I would first know, says Cotta, why you
+have been so long in proving the existence of the Gods, which you said
+was a point so very evident to all, that there was no need of any
+proof? In that, answers Balbus, I have followed your example, whom I
+have often observed, when pleading in the Forum, to load the judge with
+all the arguments which the nature of your cause would permit. This
+also is the practice of philosophers, and I have a right to follow it.
+Besides, you may as well ask me why I look upon you with two eyes,
+since I can see you with one.
+
+IV. You shall judge, then, yourself, says Cotta, if this is a very just
+comparison; for, when I plead, I do not dwell upon any point agreed to
+be self-evident, because long reasoning only serves to confound the
+clearest matters; besides, though I might take this method in pleading,
+yet I should not make use of it in such a discourse as this, which
+requires the nicest distinction. And with regard to your making use of
+one eye only when you look on me, there is no reason for it, since
+together they have the same view; and since nature, to which you
+attribute wisdom, has been pleased to give us two passages by which we
+receive light. But the truth is, that it was because you did not think
+that the existence of the Gods was so evident as you could wish that
+you therefore brought so many proofs. It was sufficient for me to
+believe it on the tradition of our ancestors; and since you disregard
+authorities, and appeal to reason, permit my reason to defend them
+against yours. The proofs on which you found the existence of the Gods
+tend only to render a proposition doubtful that, in my opinion, is not
+so; I have not only retained in my memory the whole of these proofs,
+but even the order in which you proposed them. The first was, that when
+we lift up our eyes towards the heavens, we immediately conceive that
+there is some divinity that governs those celestial bodies; on which
+you quoted this passage--
+
+    Look up to the refulgent heaven above,
+    Which all men call, unanimously, Jove;
+
+intimating that we should invoke that as Jupiter, rather than our
+Capitoline Jove[243], or that it is evident to the whole world that
+those bodies are Gods which Velleius and many others do not place even
+in the rank of animated beings.
+
+Another strong proof, in your opinion, was that the belief of the
+existence of the Gods was universal, and that mankind was daily more
+and more convinced of it. What! should an affair of such importance be
+left to the decision of fools, who, by your sect especially, are called
+madmen?
+
+V. But the Gods have appeared to us, as to Posthumius at the Lake
+Regillus, and to Vatienus in the Salarian Way: something you mentioned,
+too, I know not what, of a battle of the Locrians at Sagra. Do you
+believe that the Tyndaridæ, as you called them; that is, men sprung
+from men, and who were buried in Lacedæmon, as we learn from Homer, who
+lived in the next age--do you believe, I say, that they appeared to
+Vatienus on the road mounted on white horses, without any servant to
+attend them, to tell the victory of the Romans to a country fellow
+rather than to M. Cato, who was at that time the chief person of the
+senate? Do you take that print of a horse's hoof which is now to be
+seen on a stone at Regillus to be made by Castor's horse? Should you
+not believe, what is probable, that the souls of eminent men, such as
+the Tyndaridæ, are divine and immortal, rather than that those bodies
+which had been reduced to ashes should mount on horses, and fight in an
+army? If you say that was possible, you ought to show how it is so, and
+not amuse us with fabulous old women's stories.
+
+Do you take these for fabulous stories? says Balbus. Is not the temple,
+built by Posthumius in honor of Castor and Pollux, to be seen in the
+Forum? Is not the decree of the senate concerning Vatienus still
+subsisting? As to the affair of Sagra, it is a common proverb among the
+Greeks; when they would affirm anything strongly, they say "It is as
+certain as what passed at Sagra." Ought not such authorities to move
+you? You oppose me, replies Cotta, with stories, but I ask reasons of
+you[244]. * * *
+
+VI. We are now to speak of predictions. No one can avoid what is to
+come, and, indeed, it is commonly useless to know it; for it is a
+miserable case to be afflicted to no purpose, and not to have even the
+last, the common comfort, hope, which, according to your principles,
+none can have; for you say that fate governs all things, and call that
+fate which has been true from all eternity. What advantage, then, is
+the knowledge of futurity to us, or how does it assist us to guard
+against impending evils, since it will come inevitably?
+
+But whence comes that divination? To whom is owing that knowledge from
+the entrails of beasts? Who first made observations from the voice of
+the crow? Who invented the Lots?[245] Not that I give no credit to
+these things, or that I despise Attius Navius's staff, which you
+mentioned; but I ought to be informed how these things are understood
+by philosophers, especially as the diviners are often wrong in their
+conjectures. But physicians, you say, are likewise often mistaken. What
+comparison can there be between divination, of the origin of which we
+are ignorant, and physic, which proceeds on principles intelligible to
+every one? You believe that the Decii,[246] in devoting themselves to
+death, appeased the Gods. How great, then, was the iniquity of the Gods
+that they could not be appeased but at the price of such noble blood!
+That was the stratagem of generals such as the Greeks call [Greek:
+stratêgêma], and it was a stratagem worthy such illustrious leaders,
+who consulted the public good even at the expense of their lives: they
+conceived rightly, what indeed happened, that if the general rode
+furiously upon the enemy, the whole army would follow his example. As
+to the voice of the Fauns, I never heard it. If you assure me that you
+have, I shall believe you, though I really know not what a Faun is.
+
+VII. I do not, then, O Balbus, from anything that you have said,
+perceive as yet that it is proved that there are Gods. I believe it,
+indeed, but not from any arguments of the Stoics. Cleanthes, you have
+said, attributes the idea that men have of the Gods to four causes. In
+the first place (as I have already sufficiently mentioned), to a
+foreknowledge of future events; secondly, to tempests, and other shocks
+of nature; thirdly, to the utility and plenty of things we enjoy;
+fourthly, to the invariable order of the stars and the heavens. The
+arguments drawn from foreknowledge I have already answered. With regard
+to tempests in the air, the sea, and the earth, I own that many people
+are affrighted by them, and imagine that the immortal Gods are the
+authors of them.
+
+But the question is, not whether there are people who believe that
+there are Gods, but whether there are Gods or not. As to the two other
+causes of Cleanthes, one of which is derived from the great abundance
+of desirable things which we enjoy, the other from the invariable order
+of the seasons and the heavens, I shall treat on them when I answer
+your discourse concerning the providence of the Gods--a point, Balbus,
+upon which you have spoken at great length. I shall likewise defer till
+then examining the argument which you attribute to Chrysippus, that "if
+there is in nature anything which surpasses the power of man to
+produce, there must consequently be some being better than man." I
+shall also postpone, till we come to that part of my argument, your
+comparison of the world to a fine house, your observations on the
+proportion and harmony of the universe, and those smart, short reasons
+of Zeno which you quote; and I shall examine at the same time your
+reasons drawn from natural philosophy, concerning that fiery force and
+that vital heat which you regard as the principle of all things; and I
+will investigate, in its proper place, all that you advanced the other
+day on the existence of the Gods, and on the sense and understanding
+which you attributed to the sun, the moon, and all the stars; and I
+shall ask you this question over and over again, By what proofs are you
+convinced yourself there are Gods?
+
+VIII. I thought, says Balbus, that I had brought ample proofs to
+establish this point. But such is your manner of opposing, that, when
+you seem on the point of interrogating me, and when I am preparing to
+answer, you suddenly divert the discourse, and give me no opportunity
+to reply to you; and thus those most important points concerning
+divination and fate are neglected which we Stoics have thoroughly
+examined, but which your school has only slightly touched upon. But
+they are not thought essential to the question in hand; therefore, if
+you think proper, do not confuse them together, that we in this
+discussion may come to a clear explanation of the subject of our
+present inquiry.
+
+Very well, says Cotta. Since, then, you have divided the whole question
+into four parts, and I have said all that I had to say on the first, I
+will take the second into consideration; in which, when you attempted
+to show what the character of the Gods was, you seemed to me rather to
+prove that there are none; for you said that it was the greatest
+difficulty to draw our minds from the prepossessions of the eyes; but
+that as nothing is more excellent than the Deity, you did not doubt
+that the world was God, because there is nothing better in nature than
+the world, and so we may reasonably think it animated, or, rather,
+perceive it in our minds as clearly as if it were obvious to our eyes.
+
+Now, in what sense do you say there is nothing better than the world?
+If you mean that there is nothing more beautiful, I agree with you;
+that there is nothing more adapted to our wants, I likewise agree with
+you: but if you mean that nothing is wiser than the world, I am by no
+means of your opinion. Not that I find it difficult to conceive
+anything in my mind independent of my eyes; on the contrary, the more I
+separate my mind from my eyes, the less I am able to comprehend your
+opinion.
+
+IX. Nothing is better than the world, you say. Nor is there, indeed,
+anything on earth better than the city of Rome; do you think,
+therefore, that our city has a mind; that it thinks and reasons; or
+that this most beautiful city, being void of sense, is not preferable
+to an ant, because an ant has sense, understanding, reason, and memory?
+You should consider, Balbus, what ought to be allowed you, and not
+advance things because they please you.
+
+For that old, concise, and, as it seemed to you, acute syllogism of
+Zeno has been all which you have so much enlarged upon in handling this
+topic: "That which reasons is superior to that which does not; nothing
+is superior to the world; therefore the world reasons." If you would
+prove also that the world can very well read a book, follow the example
+of Zeno, and say, "That which can read is better than that which
+cannot; nothing is better than the world; the world therefore can
+read." After the same manner you may prove the world to be an orator, a
+mathematician, a musician--that it possesses all sciences, and, in
+short, is a philosopher. You have often said that God made all things,
+and that no cause can produce an effect unlike itself. From hence it
+will follow, not only that the world is animated, and is wise, but also
+plays upon the fiddle and the flute, because it produces men who play
+on those instruments. Zeno, therefore, the chief of your sect, advances
+no argument sufficient to induce us to think that the world reasons,
+or, indeed, that it is animated at all, and consequently none to think
+it a Deity; though it may be said that there is nothing superior to it,
+as there is nothing more beautiful, nothing more useful to us, nothing
+more adorned, and nothing more regular in its motions. But if the
+world, considered as one great whole, is not God, you should not surely
+deify, as you have done, that infinite multitude of stars which only
+form a part of it, and which so delight you with the regularity of
+their eternal courses; not but that there is something truly wonderful
+and incredible in their regularity; but this regularity of motion,
+Balbus, may as well be ascribed to a natural as to a divine cause.
+
+X. What can be more regular than the flux and reflux of the Euripus at
+Chalcis, the Sicilian sea, and the violence of the ocean in those
+parts[247]
+
+                        where the rapid tide
+    Does Europe from the Libyan coast divide?
+
+The same appears on the Spanish and British coasts. Must we conclude
+that some Deity appoints and directs these ebbings and flowings to
+certain fixed times? Consider, I pray, if everything which is regular
+in its motion is deemed divine, whether it will not follow that tertian
+and quartan agues must likewise be so, as their returns have the
+greatest regularity. These effects are to be explained by reason; but,
+because you are unable to assign any, you have recourse to a Deity as
+your last refuge.
+
+The arguments of Chrysippus appeared to you of great weight; a man
+undoubtedly of great quickness and subtlety (I call those quick who
+have a sprightly turn of thought, and those subtle whose minds are
+seasoned by use as their hands are by labor): "If," says he, "there is
+anything which is beyond the power of man to produce, the being who
+produces it is better than man. Man is unable to make what is in the
+world; the being, therefore, that could do it is superior to man. What
+being is there but a God superior to man? Therefore there is a God."
+
+These arguments are founded on the same erroneous principles as Zeno's,
+for he does not define what is meant by being better or more excellent,
+or distinguish between an intelligent cause and a natural cause.
+Chrysippus adds, "If there are no Gods, there is nothing better than
+man; but we cannot, without the highest arrogance, have this idea of
+ourselves." Let us grant that it is arrogance in man to think himself
+better than the world; but to comprehend that he has understanding and
+reason, and that in Orion and Canicula there is neither, is no
+arrogance, but an indication of good sense. "Since we suppose,"
+continues he, "when we see a beautiful house, that it was built for the
+master, and not for mice, we should likewise judge that the world is
+the mansion of the Gods." Yes, if I believed that the Gods built the
+world; but not if, as I believe, and intend to prove, it is the work of
+nature.
+
+XI. Socrates, in Xenophon, asks, "Whence had man his understanding, if
+there was none in the world?" And I ask, Whence had we speech, harmony,
+singing; unless we think it is the sun conversing with the moon when
+she approaches near it, or that the world forms an harmonious concert,
+as Pythagoras imagines? This, Balbus, is the effect of nature; not of
+that nature which proceeds artificially, as Zeno says, and the
+character of which I shall presently examine into, but a nature which,
+by its own proper motions and mutations, modifies everything.
+
+For I readily agree to what you said about the harmony and general
+agreement of nature, which you pronounced to be firmly bound and united
+together, as it were, by ties of blood; but I do not approve of what
+you added, that "it could not possibly be so, unless it were so united
+by one divine spirit." On the contrary, the whole subsists by the power
+of nature, independently of the Gods, and there is a kind of sympathy
+(as the Greeks call it) which joins together all the parts of the
+universe; and the greater that is in its own power, the less is it
+necessary to have recourse to a divine intelligence.
+
+XII. But how will you get rid of the objections which Carneades made?
+"If," says he, "there is no body immortal, there is none eternal; but
+there is no body immortal, nor even indivisible, or that cannot be
+separated and disunited; and as every animal is in its nature passive,
+so there is not one which is not subject to the impressions of
+extraneous bodies; none, that is to say, which can avoid the necessity
+of enduring and suffering: and if every animal is mortal, there is none
+immortal; so, likewise, if every animal may be cut up and divided,
+there is none indivisible, none eternal, but all are liable to be
+affected by, and compelled to submit to, external power. Every animal,
+therefore, is necessarily mortal, dissoluble, and divisible."
+
+For as there is no wax, no silver, no brass which cannot be converted
+into something else, whatever is composed of wax, or silver, or brass
+may cease to be what it is. By the same reason, if all the elements are
+mutable, every body is mutable.
+
+Now, according to your doctrine, all the elements are mutable; all
+bodies, therefore, are mutable. But if there were any body immortal,
+then all bodies would not be mutable. Every body, then, is mortal; for
+every body is either water, air, fire, or earth, or composed of the
+four elements together, or of some of them. Now, there is not one of
+all these elements that does not perish; for earthly bodies are
+fragile: water is so soft that the least shock will separate its parts,
+and fire and air yield to the least impulse, and are subject to
+dissolution; besides, any of these elements perish when converted into
+another nature, as when water is formed from earth, the air from water,
+and the sky from air, and when they change in the same manner back
+again. Therefore, if there is nothing but what is perishable in the
+composition of all animals, there is no animal eternal.
+
+XIII. But, not to insist on these arguments, there is no animal to be
+found that had not a beginning, and will not have an end; for every
+animal being sensitive, they are consequently all sensible of cold and
+heat, sweet and bitter; nor can they have pleasing sensations without
+being subject to the contrary. As, therefore, they receive pleasure,
+they likewise receive pain; and whatever being is subject to pain must
+necessarily be subject to death. It must be allowed, therefore, that
+every animal is mortal.
+
+Besides, a being that is not sensible of pleasure or pain cannot have
+the essence of an animal; if, then, on the one hand, every animal must
+be sensible of pleasure and pain, and if, on the other, every being
+that has these sensations cannot be immortal, we may conclude that as
+there is no animal insensible, there is none immortal. Besides, there
+is no animal without inclination and aversion--an inclination to that
+which is agreeable to nature, and an aversion to the contrary: there
+are in the case of every animal some things which they covet, and
+others they reject. What they reject are repugnant to their nature, and
+consequently would destroy them. Every animal, therefore, is inevitably
+subject to be destroyed. There are innumerable arguments to prove that
+whatever is sensitive is perishable; for cold, heat, pleasure, pain,
+and all that affects the sense, when they become excessive, cause
+destruction. Since, then, there is no animal that is not sensitive,
+there is none immortal.
+
+XIV. The substance of an animal is either simple or compound; simple,
+if it is composed only of earth, of fire, of air, or of water (and of
+such a sort of being we can form no idea); compound, if it is formed of
+different elements, which have each their proper situation, and have a
+natural tendency to it--this element tending towards the highest parts,
+that towards the lowest, and another towards the middle. This
+conjunction may for some time subsist, but not forever; for every
+element must return to its first situation. No animal, therefore, is
+eternal.
+
+But your school, Balbus, allows fire only to be the sole active
+principle; an opinion which I believe you derive from Heraclitus, whom
+some men understand in one sense, some in another: but since he seems
+unwilling to be understood, we will pass him by. You Stoics, then, say
+that fire is the universal principle of all things; that all living
+bodies cease to live on the extinction of that heat; and that
+throughout all nature whatever is sensible of that heat lives and
+flourishes. Now, I cannot conceive that bodies should perish for want
+of heat, rather than for want of moisture or air, especially as they
+even die through excess of heat; so that the life of animals does not
+depend more on fire than on the other elements.
+
+However, air and water have this quality in common with fire and heat.
+But let us see to what this tends. If I am not mistaken, you believe
+that in all nature there is nothing but fire, which is self-animated.
+Why fire rather than air, of which the life of animals consists, and
+which is called from thence _anima_,[248] the soul? But how is it that
+you take it for granted that life is nothing but fire? It seems more
+probable that it is a compound of fire and air. But if fire is
+self-animated, unmixed with any other element, it must be sensitive,
+because it renders our bodies sensitive; and the same objection which I
+just now made will arise, that whatever is sensitive must necessarily
+be susceptible of pleasure and pain, and whatever is sensible of pain
+is likewise subject to the approach of death; therefore you cannot
+prove fire to be eternal.
+
+You Stoics hold that all fire has need of nourishment, without which it
+cannot possibly subsist; that the sun, moon, and all the stars are fed
+either with fresh or salt waters; and the reason that Cleanthes gives
+why the sun is retrograde, and does not go beyond the tropics in the
+summer or winter, is that he may not be too far from his sustenance.
+This I shall fully examine hereafter; but at present we may conclude
+that whatever may cease to be cannot of its own nature be eternal; that
+if fire wants sustenance, it will cease to be, and that, therefore,
+fire is not of its own nature eternal.
+
+XV. After all, what kind of a Deity must that be who is not graced with
+one single virtue, if we should succeed in forming this idea of such a
+one? Must we not attribute prudence to a Deity? a virtue which consists
+in the knowledge of things good, bad, and indifferent. Yet what need
+has a being for the discernment of good and ill who neither has nor can
+have any ill? Of what use is reason to him? of what use is
+understanding? We men, indeed, find them useful to aid us in finding
+out things which are obscure by those which are clear to us; but
+nothing can be obscure to a Deity. As to justice, which gives to every
+one his own, it is not the concern of the Gods; since that virtue,
+according to your doctrine, received its birth from men and from civil
+society. Temperance consists in abstinence from corporeal pleasures,
+and if such abstinence hath a place in heaven, so also must the
+pleasures abstained from. Lastly, if fortitude is ascribed to the
+Deity, how does it appear? In afflictions, in labor, in danger? None of
+these things can affect a God. How, then, can we conceive this to be a
+Deity that makes no use of reason, and is not endowed with any virtue?
+
+However, when I consider what is advanced by the Stoics, my contempt
+for the ignorant multitude vanishes. For these are their divinities.
+The Syrians worshipped a fish. The Egyptians consecrated beasts of
+almost every kind. The Greeks deified many men; as Alabandus[249] at
+Alabandæ, Tenes at Tenedos; and all Greece pay divine honors to
+Leucothea (who was before called Ino), to her son Palæmon, to Hercules,
+to Æsculapius, and to the Tyndaridæ; our own people to Romulus, and to
+many others, who, as citizens newly admitted into the ancient body,
+they imagine have been received into heaven.
+
+These are the Gods of the illiterate.
+
+XVI. What are the notions of you philosophers? In what respect are they
+superior to these ideas? I shall pass them over; for they are certainly
+very admirable. Let the world, then, be a Deity, for that, I conceive,
+is what you mean by
+
+              The refulgent heaven above,
+    Which all men call, unanimously, Jove.
+
+But why are we to add many more Gods? What a multitude of them there
+is! At least, it seems so to me; for every constellation, according to
+you, is a Deity: to some you give the name of beasts, as the goat, the
+scorpion, the bull, the lion; to others the names of inanimate things,
+as the ship, the altar, the crown.
+
+But supposing these were to be allowed, how can the rest be granted, or
+even so much as understood? When we call corn Ceres, and wine Bacchus,
+we make use of the common manner of speaking; but do you think any one
+so mad as to believe that his food is a Deity? With regard to those
+who, you say, from having been men became Gods, I should be very
+willing to learn of you, either how it was possible formerly, or, if it
+had ever been, why is it not so now? I do not conceive, as things are
+at present, how Hercules,
+
+    Burn'd with fiery torches on Mount Oeta,
+
+as Accius says, should rise, with the flames,
+
+    To the eternal mansions of his father.
+
+Besides, Homer also says that Ulysses[250] met him in the shades below,
+among the other dead.
+
+But yet I should be glad to know which Hercules we should chiefly
+worship; for they who have searched into those histories, which are but
+little known, tell us of several. The most ancient is he who fought
+with Apollo about the Tripos of Delphi, and is son of Jupiter and
+Lisyto; and of the most ancient Jupiters too, for we find many Jupiters
+also in the Grecian chronicles. The second is the Egyptian Hercules,
+and is believed to be the son of Nilus, and to be the author of the
+Phrygian characters. The third, to whom they offered sacrifices, is one
+of the Idæi Dactyli.[251] The fourth is the son of Jupiter and Asteria,
+the sister of Latona, chiefly honored by the Tyrians, who pretend that
+Carthago[252] is his daughter. The fifth, called Belus, is worshipped
+in India. The sixth is the son of Alcmena by Jupiter; but by the third
+Jupiter, for there are many Jupiters, as you shall soon see.
+
+XVII. Since this examination has led me so far, I will convince you
+that in matters of religion I have learned more from the pontifical
+rites, the customs of our ancestors, and the vessels of Numa,[253]
+which Lælius mentions in his little Golden Oration, than from all the
+learning of the Stoics; for tell me, if I were a disciple of your
+school, what answer could I make to these questions? If there are Gods,
+are nymphs also Goddesses? If they are Goddesses, are Pans and Satyrs
+in the same rank? But they are not; consequently, nymphs are not
+Goddesses. Yet they have temples publicly dedicated to them. What do
+you conclude from thence? Others who have temples are not therefore
+Gods. But let us go on. You call Jupiter and Neptune Gods; their
+brother Pluto, then, is one; and if so, those rivers also are Deities
+which they say flow in the infernal regions--Acheron, Cocytus,
+Pyriphlegethon; Charon also, and Cerberus, are Gods; but that cannot be
+allowed; nor can Pluto be placed among the Deities. What, then, will
+you say of his brothers?
+
+Thus reasons Carneades; not with any design to destroy the existence of
+the Gods (for what would less become a philosopher?), but to convince
+us that on that matter the Stoics have said nothing plausible. If,
+then, Jupiter and Neptune are Gods, adds he, can that divinity be
+denied to their father Saturn, who is principally worshipped throughout
+the West? If Saturn is a God, then must his father, Coelus, be one too,
+and so must the parents of Coelus, which are the Sky and Day, as also
+their brothers and sisters, which by ancient genealogists are thus
+named: Love, Deceit, Fear, Labor, Envy, Fate, Old Age, Death, Darkness,
+Misery, Lamentation, Favor, Fraud, Obstinacy, the Destinies, the
+Hesperides, and Dreams; all which are the offspring of Erebus and
+Night. These monstrous Deities, therefore, must be received, or else
+those from whom they sprung must be disallowed.
+
+XVIII. If you say that Apollo, Vulcan, Mercury, and the rest of that
+sort are Gods, can you doubt the divinity of Hercules and Æsculapius,
+Bacchus, Castor and Pollux? These are worshipped as much as those, and
+even more in some places. Therefore they must be numbered among the
+Gods, though on the mother's side they are only of mortal race.
+Aristæus, who is said to have been the son of Apollo, and to have found
+out the art of making oil from the olive; Theseus, the son of Neptune;
+and the rest whose fathers were Deities, shall they not be placed in
+the number of the Gods? But what think you of those whose mothers were
+Goddesses? They surely have a better title to divinity; for, in the
+civil law, as he is a freeman who is born of a freewoman, so, in the
+law of nature, he whose mother is a Goddess must be a God. The isle
+Astypalæa religiously honor Achilles; and if he is a Deity, Orpheus and
+Rhesus are so, who were born of one of the Muses; unless, perhaps,
+there may be a privilege belonging to sea marriages which land
+marriages have not. Orpheus and Rhesus are nowhere worshipped; and if
+they are therefore not Gods, because they are nowhere worshipped as
+such, how can the others be Deities? You, Balbus, seemed to agree with
+me that the honors which they received were not from their being
+regarded as immortals, but as men richly endued with virtue.
+
+But if you think Latona a Goddess, how can you avoid admitting Hecate
+to be one also, who was the daughter of Asteria, Latona's sister?
+Certainly she is one, if we may judge by the altars erected to her in
+Greece. And if Hecate is a Goddess, how can you refuse that rank to the
+Eumenides? for they also have a temple at Athens, and, if I understand
+right, the Romans have consecrated a grove to them. The Furies, too,
+whom we look upon as the inspectors into and scourges of impiety, I
+suppose, must have their divinity too. As you hold that there is some
+divinity presides over every human affair, there is one who presides
+over the travail of matrons, whose name, _Natio_, is derived _a
+nascentibus_, from nativities, and to whom we used to sacrifice in our
+processions in the fields of Ardæa; but if she is a Deity, we must
+likewise acknowledge all those you mentioned, Honor, Faith, Intellect,
+Concord; by the same rule also, Hope, Juno, Moneta,[254] and every idle
+phantom, every child of our imagination, are Deities. But as this
+consequence is quite inadmissible, do not you either defend the cause
+from which it flows.
+
+XIX. What say you to this? If these are Deities, which we worship and
+regard as such, why are not Serapis and Isis[255] placed in the same
+rank? And if they are admitted, what reason have we to reject the Gods
+of the barbarians? Thus we should deify oxen, horses, the ibis, hawks,
+asps, crocodiles, fishes, dogs, wolves, cats, and many other beasts. If
+we go back to the source of this superstition, we must equally condemn
+all the Deities from which they proceed. Shall Ino, whom the Greeks
+call Leucothea, and we Matuta, be reputed a Goddess, because she was
+the daughter of Cadmus, and shall that title be refused to Circe and
+Pasiphae,[256] who had the sun for their father, and Perseis, daughter
+of the Ocean, for their mother? It is true, Circe has divine honors
+paid her by our colony of Circæum; therefore you call her a Goddess;
+but what will you say of Medea, the granddaughter of the Sun and the
+Ocean, and daughter of Æetes and Idyia? What will you say of her
+brother Absyrtus, whom Pacuvius calls Ægialeus, though the other name
+is more frequent in the writings of the ancients? If you did not deify
+one as well as the other, what will become of Ino? for all these
+Deities have the same origin.
+
+Shall Amphiaraus and Tryphonius be called Gods? Our publicans, when
+some lands in Boeotia were exempted from the tax, as belonging to the
+immortal Gods, denied that any were immortal who had been men. But if
+you deify these, Erechtheus surely is a God, whose temple and priest we
+have seen at Athens. And can you, then, refuse to acknowledge also
+Codrus, and many others who shed their blood for the preservation of
+their country? And if it is not allowable to consider all these men as
+Gods, then, certainly, probabilities are not in favor of our
+acknowledging the _Divinity_ of those previously mentioned beings from
+whom these have proceeded.
+
+It is easy to observe, likewise, that if in many countries people have
+paid divine honors to the memory of those who have signalized their
+courage, it was done in order to animate others to practise virtue, and
+to expose themselves the more willingly to dangers in their country's
+cause. From this motive the Athenians have deified Erechtheus and his
+daughters, and have erected also a temple, called Leocorion, to the
+daughters of Leus.[257] Alabandus is more honored in the city which he
+founded than any of the more illustrious Deities; from thence
+Stratonicus had a pleasant turn--as he had many--when he was troubled
+with an impertinent fellow who insisted that Alabandus was a God, but
+that Hercules was not; "Very well," says he, "then let the anger of
+Alabandus fall upon me, and that of Hercules upon you."
+
+XX. Do you not consider, Balbus, to what lengths your arguments for the
+divinity of the heaven and the stars will carry you? You deify the sun
+and the moon, which the Greeks take to be Apollo and Diana. If the moon
+is a Deity, the morning-star, the other planets, and all the fixed
+stars are also Deities; and why shall not the rainbow be placed in that
+number? for it is so wonderfully beautiful that it is justly said to be
+the daughter of Thaumas.[258] But if you deify the rainbow, what regard
+will you pay to the clouds? for the colors which appear in the bow are
+only formed of the clouds, one of which is said to have brought forth
+the Centaurs; and if you deify the clouds, you cannot pay less regard
+to the seasons, which the Roman people have really consecrated.
+Tempests, showers, storms, and whirlwinds must then be Deities. It is
+certain, at least, that our captains used to sacrifice a victim to the
+waves before they embarked on any voyage.
+
+As you deify the earth under the name of Ceres,[259] because, as you
+said, she bears fruits (_a gerendo_), and the ocean under that of
+Neptune, rivers and fountains have the same right. Thus we see that
+Maso, the conqueror of Corsica, dedicated a temple to a fountain, and
+the names of the Tiber, Spino, Almo, Nodinus, and other neighboring
+rivers are in the prayers[260] of the augurs. Therefore, either the
+number of such Deities will be infinite, or we must admit none of them,
+and wholly disapprove of such an endless series of superstition.
+
+XXI. None of all these assertions, then, are to be admitted. I must
+proceed now, Balbus, to answer those who say that, with regard to those
+deified mortals, so religiously and devoutly reverenced, the public
+opinion should have the force of reality. To begin, then: they who are
+called theologists say that there are three Jupiters; the first and
+second of whom were born in Arcadia; one of whom was the son of Æther,
+and father of Proserpine and Bacchus; the other the son of Coelus, and
+father of Minerva, who is called the Goddess and inventress of war; the
+third one born of Saturn in the isle of Crete,[261] where his sepulchre
+is shown. The sons of Jupiter ([Greek: Dioskouroi]) also, among the
+Greeks, have many names; first, the three who at Athens have the title
+of Anactes,[262] Tritopatreus, Eubuleus, and Dionysus, sons of the most
+ancient king Jupiter and Proserpine; the next are Castor and Pollux,
+sons of the third Jupiter and Leda; and, lastly, three others, by some
+called Alco,[263] Melampus, and Tmolus, sons of Atreus, the son of
+Pelops.
+
+As to the Muses, there were at first four--Thelxiope, Aoede, Arche, and
+Melete--daughters of the second Jupiter; afterward there were nine,
+daughters of the third Jupiter and Mnemosyne; there were also nine
+others, having the same appellations, born of Pierus and Antiopa, by
+the poets usually called Pierides and Pieriæ. Though _Sol_ (the sun) is
+so called, you say, because he is _solus_ (single); yet how many suns
+do theologists mention? There is one, the son of Jupiter and grandson
+of Æther; another, the son of Hyperion; a third, who, the Egyptians
+say, was of the city Heliopolis, sprung from Vulcan, the son of Nilus;
+a fourth is said to have been born at Rhodes of Acantho, in the times
+of the heroes, and was the grandfather of Jalysus, Camirus, and Lindus;
+a fifth, of whom, it is pretended, Aretes and Circe were born at
+Colchis.
+
+XXII. There are likewise several Vulcans. The first (who had of Minerva
+that Apollo whom the ancient historians call the tutelary God of
+Athens) was the son of Coelus; the second, whom the Egyptians call
+Opas,[264] and whom they looked upon as the protector of Egypt, is the
+son of Nilus; the third, who is said to have been the master of the
+forges at Lemnos, was the son of the third Jupiter and of Juno; the
+fourth, who possessed the islands near Sicily called Vulcaniæ,[265] was
+the son of Menalius. One Mercury had Coelus for his father and Dies for
+his mother; another, who is said to dwell in a cavern, and is the same
+as Trophonius, is the son of Valens and Phoronis. A third, of whom, and
+of Penelope, Pan was the offspring, is the son of the third Jupiter and
+Maia. A fourth, whom the Egyptians think it a crime to name, is the son
+of Nilus. A fifth, whom we call, in their language, Thoth, as with them
+the first month of the year is called, is he whom the people of
+Pheneum[266] worship, and who is said to have killed Argus, to have
+fled for it into Egypt, and to have given laws and learning to the
+Egyptians. The first of the Æsculapii, the God of Arcadia, who is said
+to have invented the probe and to have been the first person who taught
+men to use bandages for wounds, is the son of Apollo. The second, who
+was killed with thunder, and is said to be buried in Cynosura,[267] is
+the brother of the second Mercury. The third, who is said to have found
+out the art of purging the stomach, and of drawing teeth, is the son of
+Arsippus and Arsinoe; and in Arcadia there is shown his tomb, and the
+wood which is consecrated to him, near the river Lusium.
+
+XXIII. I have already spoken of the most ancient of the Apollos, who is
+the son of Vulcan, and tutelar God of Athens. There is another, son of
+Corybas, and native of Crete, for which island he is said to have
+contended with Jupiter himself. A third, who came from the regions of
+the Hyperborei[268] to Delphi, is the son of the third Jupiter and of
+Latona. A fourth was of Arcadia, whom the Arcadians called Nomio,[269]
+because they regarded him as their legislator. There are likewise many
+Dianas. The first, who is thought to be the mother of the winged Cupid,
+is the daughter of Jupiter and Proserpine. The second, who is more
+known, is daughter of the third Jupiter and of Latona. The third, whom
+the Greeks often call by her father's name, is the daughter of
+Upis[270] and Glauce. There are many also of the Dionysi. The first was
+the son of Jupiter and Proserpine. The second, who is said to have
+killed Nysa, was the son of Nilus. The third, who reigned in Asia, and
+for whom the Sabazia[271] were instituted, was the son of Caprius. The
+fourth, for whom they celebrate the Orphic festivals, sprung from
+Jupiter and Luna. The fifth, who is supposed to have instituted the
+Trieterides, was the son of Nysus and Thyone.
+
+The first Venus, who has a temple at Elis, was the daughter of Coelus
+and Dies. The second arose out of the froth of the sea, and became, by
+Mercury, the mother of the second Cupid. The third, the daughter of
+Jupiter and Diana, was married to Vulcan, but is said to have had
+Anteros by Mars. The fourth was a Syrian, born of Tyro, who is called
+Astarte, and is said to have been married to Adonis. I have already
+mentioned one Minerva, mother of Apollo. Another, who is worshipped at
+Sais, a city in Egypt, sprung from Nilus. The third, whom I have also
+mentioned, was daughter of Jupiter. The fourth, sprung from Jupiter and
+Coryphe, the daughter of the Ocean; the Arcadians call her Coria, and
+make her the inventress of chariots. A fifth, whom they paint with
+wings at her heels, was daughter of Pallas, and is said to have killed
+her father for endeavoring to violate her chastity. The first Cupid is
+said to be the son of Mercury and the first Diana; the second, of
+Mercury and the second Venus; the third, who is the same as Anteros, of
+Mars and the third Venus.
+
+All these opinions arise from old stories that were spread in Greece;
+the belief in which, Balbus, you well know, ought to be stopped, lest
+religion should suffer. But you Stoics, so far from refuting them, even
+give them authority by the mysterious sense which you pretend to find
+in them. Can you, then, think, after this plain refutation, that there
+is need to employ more subtle reasonings? But to return from this
+digression.
+
+XXIV. We see that the mind, faith, hope, virtue, honor, victory,
+health, concord, and things of such kind, are purely natural, and have
+nothing of divinity in them; for either they are inherent in us, as the
+mind, faith, hope, virtue, and concord are; or else they are to be
+desired, as honor, health, and victory. I know indeed that they are
+useful to us, and see that statues have been religiously erected for
+them; but as to their divinity, I shall begin to believe it when you
+have proved it for certain. Of this kind I may particularly mention
+Fortune, which is allowed to be ever inseparable from inconstancy and
+temerity, which are certainly qualities unworthy of a divine being.
+
+But what delight do you take in the explication of fables, and in the
+etymology of names?--that Coelus was castrated by his son, and that
+Saturn was bound in chains by his son! By your defence of these and
+such like fictions you would make the authors of them appear not only
+not to be madmen, but to have been even very wise. But the pains which
+you take with your etymologies deserve our pity. That Saturn is so
+called because _se saturat annis_, he is full of years; Mavors, Mars,
+because _magna vortit_, he brings about mighty changes; Minerva,
+because _minuit_, she diminishes, or because _minatur_, she threatens;
+Venus, because _venit ad omnia_, she comes to all; Ceres, _a gerendo_,
+from bearing. How dangerous is this method! for there are many names
+would puzzle you. From what would you derive Vejupiter and Vulcan?
+Though, indeed, if you can derive Neptune _a nando_, from swimming, in
+which you seem to me to flounder about yourself more than Neptune, you
+may easily find the origin of all names, since it is founded only upon
+the conformity of some one letter. Zeno first, and after him Cleanthes
+and Chrysippus, are put to the unnecessary trouble of explaining mere
+fables, and giving reasons for the several appellations of every Deity;
+which is really owning that those whom we call Gods are not the
+representations of deities, but natural things, and that to judge
+otherwise is an error.
+
+XXV. Yet this error has so much prevailed that even pernicious things
+have not only the title of divinity ascribed to them, but have also
+sacrifices offered to them; for Fever has a temple on the Palatine
+hill, and Orbona another near that of the Lares, and we see on the
+Esquiline hill an altar consecrated to Ill-fortune. Let all such errors
+be banished from philosophy, if we would advance, in our dispute
+concerning the immortal Gods, nothing unworthy of immortal beings. I
+know myself what I ought to believe; which is far different from what
+you have said. You take Neptune for an intelligence pervading the sea.
+You have the same opinion of Ceres with regard to the earth. I cannot,
+I own, find out, or in the least conjecture, what that intelligence of
+the sea or the earth is. To learn, therefore, the existence of the
+Gods, and of what description and character they are, I must apply
+elsewhere, not to the Stoics.
+
+Let us proceed to the two other parts of our dispute: first, "whether
+there is a divine providence which governs the world;" and lastly,
+"whether that providence particularly regards mankind;" for these are
+the remaining propositions of your discourse; and I think that, if you
+approve of it, we should examine these more accurately. With all my
+heart, says Velleius, for I readily agree to what you have hitherto
+said, and expect still greater things from you.
+
+I am unwilling to interrupt you, says Balbus to Cotta, but we shall
+take another opportunity, and I shall effectually convince you.
+But[272] * * *
+
+XXVI.
+    Shall I adore, and bend the suppliant knee,
+    Who scorn their power and doubt their deity?
+
+Does not Niobe here seem to reason, and by that reasoning to bring all
+her misfortunes upon herself? But what a subtle expression is the
+following!
+
+    On strength of will alone depends success;
+
+a maxim capable of leading us into all that is bad.
+
+    Though I'm confined, his malice yet is vain,
+    His tortured heart shall answer pain for pain;
+    His ruin soothe my soul with soft content,
+    Lighten my chains, and welcome banishment!
+
+This, now, is reason; that reason which you say the divine goodness has
+denied to the brute creation, kindly to bestow it on men alone. How
+great, how immense the favor! Observe the same Medea flying from her
+father and her country:
+
+    The guilty wretch from her pursuer flies.
+    By her own hands the young Absyrtus slain,
+    His mangled limbs she scatters o'er the plain,
+    That the fond sire might sink beneath his woe,
+    And she to parricide her safety owe.
+
+Reflection, as well as wickedness, must have been necessary to the
+preparation of such a fact; and did he too, who prepared that fatal
+repast for his brother, do it without reflection?
+
+    Revenge as great as Atreus' injury
+    Shall sink his soul and crown his misery.
+
+XXVII. Did not Thyestes himself, not content with having defiled his
+brother's bed (of which Atreus with great justice thus complains,
+
+    When faithless comforts, in the lewd embrace,
+    With vile adultery stain a royal race,
+    The blood thus mix'd in fouler currents flows,
+    Taints the rich soil, and breeds unnumber'd woes)--
+
+did he not, I say, by that adultery, aim at the possession of the
+crown? Atreus thus continues:
+
+    A lamb, fair gift of heaven, with golden fleece,
+    Promised in vain to fix my crown in peace;
+    But base Thyestes, eager for the prey,
+    Crept to my bed, and stole the gem away.
+
+Do you not perceive that Thyestes must have had a share of reason
+proportionable to the greatness of his crimes--such crimes as are not
+only represented to us on the stage, but such as we see committed, nay,
+often exceeded, in the common course of life? The private houses of
+individual citizens, the public courts, the senate, the camp, our
+allies, our provinces, all agree that reason is the author of all the
+ill, as well as of all the good, which is done; that it makes few act
+well, and that but seldom, but many act ill, and that frequently; and
+that, in short, the Gods would have shown greater benevolence in
+denying us any reason at all than in sending us that which is
+accompanied with so much mischief; for as wine is seldom wholesome, but
+often hurtful in diseases, we think it more prudent to deny it to the
+patient than to run the risk of so uncertain a remedy; so I do not know
+whether it would not be better for mankind to be deprived of wit,
+thought, and penetration, or what we call reason, since it is a thing
+pernicious to many and very useful to few, than to have it bestowed
+upon them with so much liberality and in such abundance. But if the
+divine will has really consulted the good of man in this gift of
+reason, the good of those men only was consulted on whom a
+well-regulated one is bestowed: how few those are, if any, is very
+apparent. We cannot admit, therefore, that the Gods consulted the good
+of a few only; the conclusion must be that they consulted the good of
+none.
+
+XXVIII. You answer that the ill use which a great part of mankind make
+of reason no more takes away the goodness of the Gods, who bestow it as
+a present of the greatest benefit to them, than the ill use which
+children make of their patrimony diminishes the obligation which they
+have to their parents for it. We grant you this; but where is the
+similitude? It was far from Deianira's design to injure Hercules when
+she made him a present of the shirt dipped in the blood of the
+Centaurs. Nor was it a regard to the welfare of Jason of Pheræ that
+influenced the man who with his sword opened his imposthume, which the
+physicians had in vain attempted to cure. For it has often happened
+that people have served a man whom they intended to injure, and have
+injured one whom they designed to serve; so that the effect of the gift
+is by no means always a proof of the intention of the giver; neither
+does the benefit which may accrue from it prove that it came from the
+hands of a benefactor. For, in short, what debauchery, what avarice,
+what crime among men is there which does not owe its birth to thought
+and reflection, that is, to reason? For all opinion is reason: right
+reason, if men's thoughts are conformable to truth; wrong reason, if
+they are not. The Gods only give us the mere faculty of reason, if we
+have any; the use or abuse of it depends entirely upon ourselves; so
+that the comparison is not just between the present of reason given us
+by the Gods, and a patrimony left to a son by his father; for, after
+all, if the injury of mankind had been the end proposed by the Gods,
+what could they have given them more pernicious than reason? for what
+seed could there be of injustice, intemperance, and cowardice, if
+reason were not laid as the foundation of these vices?
+
+XXIX. I mentioned just now Medea and Atreus, persons celebrated in
+heroic poems, who had used this reason only for the contrivance and
+practice of the most flagitious crimes; but even the trifling
+characters which appear in comedies supply us with the like instances
+of this reasoning faculty; for example, does not he, in the Eunuch,
+reason with some subtlety?--
+
+    What, then, must I resolve upon?
+    She turn'd me out-of-doors; she sends for me back again;
+    Shall I go? no, not if she were to beg it of me.
+
+Another, in the Twins, making no scruple of opposing a received maxim,
+after the manner of the Academics, asserts that when a man is in love
+and in want, it is pleasant
+
+    To have a father covetous, crabbed, and passionate,
+    Who has no love or affection for his children.
+
+This unaccountable opinion he strengthens thus:
+
+    You may defraud him of his profits, or forge letters in his name,
+    Or fright him by your servant into compliance;
+    And what you take from such an old hunks,
+    How much more pleasantly do you spend it!
+
+On the contrary, he says that an easy, generous father is an
+inconvenience to a son in love; for, says he,
+
+    I can't tell how to abuse so good, so prudent a parent,
+    Who always foreruns my desires, and meets me purse in hand,
+    To support me in my pleasures: this easy goodness and generosity
+    Quite defeat all my frauds, tricks, and stratagems.[273]
+
+What are these frauds, tricks, and stratagems but the effects of
+reason? O excellent gift of the Gods! Without this Phormio could not
+have said,
+
+    Find me out the old man: I have something hatching for him in my head.
+
+XXX. But let us pass from the stage to the bar. The prætor[274] takes
+his seat. To judge whom? The man who set fire to our archives. How
+secretly was that villany conducted! Q. Sosius, an illustrious Roman
+knight, of the Picene field,[275] confessed the fact. Who else is to be
+tried? He who forged the public registers--Alenus, an artful fellow,
+who counterfeited the handwriting of the six officers.[276] Let us call
+to mind other trials: that on the subject of the gold of Tolosa, or the
+conspiracy of Jugurtha. Let us trace back the informations laid against
+Tubulus for bribery in his judicial office; and, since that, the
+proceedings of the tribune Peduceus concerning the incest of the
+vestals. Let us reflect upon the trials which daily happen for
+assassinations, poisonings, embezzlement of public money, frauds in
+wills, against which we have a new law; then that action against the
+advisers or assisters of any theft; the many laws concerning frauds in
+guardianship, breaches of trust in partnerships and commissions in
+trade, and other violations of faith in buying, selling, borrowing, or
+lending; the public decree on a private affair by the Lætorian
+Law;[277] and, lastly, that scourge of all dishonesty, the law against
+fraud, proposed by our friend Aquillius; that sort of fraud, he says,
+by which one thing is pretended and another done. Can we, then, think
+that this plentiful fountain of evil sprung from the immortal Gods? If
+they have given reason to man, they have likewise given him subtlety,
+for subtlety is only a deceitful manner of applying reason to do
+mischief. To them likewise we must owe deceit, and every other crime,
+which, without the help of reason, would neither have been thought of
+nor committed. As the old woman wished
+
+    That to the fir which on Mount Pelion grew
+    The axe had ne'er been laid,[278]
+
+so we should wish that the Gods had never bestowed this ability on man,
+the abuse of which is so general that the small number of those who
+make a good use of it are often oppressed by those who make a bad use
+of it; so that it seems to be given rather to help vice than to promote
+virtue among us.
+
+XXXI. This, you insist on it, is the fault of man, and not of the Gods.
+But should we not laugh at a physician or pilot, though they are weak
+mortals, if they were to lay the blame of their ill success on the
+violence of the disease or the fury of the tempest? Had there not been
+danger, we should say, who would have applied to you? This reasoning
+has still greater force against the Deity. The fault, you say, is in
+man, if he commits crimes. But why was not man endued with a reason
+incapable of producing any crimes? How could the Gods err? When we
+leave our effects to our children, it is in hopes that they may be well
+bestowed; in which we may be deceived, but how can the Deity be
+deceived? As Phoebus when he trusted his chariot to his son Phaëthon,
+or as Neptune when he indulged his son Theseus in granting him three
+wishes, the consequence of which was the destruction of Hippolitus?
+These are poetical fictions; but truth, and not fables, ought to
+proceed from philosophers. Yet if those poetical Deities had foreseen
+that their indulgence would have proved fatal to their sons, they must
+have been thought blamable for it.
+
+Aristo of Chios used often to say that the philosophers do hurt to such
+of their disciples as take their good doctrine in a wrong sense; thus
+the lectures of Aristippus might produce debauchees, and those of Zeno
+pedants. If this be true, it were better that philosophers should be
+silent than that their disciples should be corrupted by a
+misapprehension of their master's meaning; so if reason, which was
+bestowed on mankind by the Gods with a good design, tends only to make
+men more subtle and fraudulent, it had been better for them never to
+have received it. There could be no excuse for a physician who
+prescribes wine to a patient, knowing that he will drink it and
+immediately expire. Your Providence is no less blamable in giving
+reason to man, who, it foresaw, would make a bad use of it. Will you
+say that it did not foresee it? Nothing could please me more than such
+an acknowledgment. But you dare not. I know what a sublime idea you
+entertain of her.
+
+XXXII. But to conclude. If folly, by the unanimous consent of
+philosophers, is allowed to be the greatest of all evils, and if no one
+ever attained to true wisdom, we, whom they say the immortal Gods take
+care of, are consequently in a state of the utmost misery. For that
+nobody is well, or that nobody can be well, is in effect the same
+thing; and, in my opinion, that no man is truly wise, or that no man
+can be truly wise, is likewise the same thing. But I will insist no
+further on so self-evident a point. Telamon in one verse decides the
+question. If, says he, there is a Divine Providence,
+
+    Good men would be happy, bad men miserable.
+
+But it is not so. If the Gods had regarded mankind, they should have
+made them all virtuous; but if they did not regard the welfare of all
+mankind, at least they ought to have provided for the happiness of the
+virtuous. Why, therefore, was the Carthaginian in Spain suffered to
+destroy those best and bravest men, the two Scipios? Why did
+Maximus[279] lose his son, the consul? Why did Hannibal kill Marcellus?
+Why did Cannæ deprive us of Paulus? Why was the body of Regulus
+delivered up to the cruelty of the Carthaginians? Why was not Africanus
+protected from violence in his own house? To these, and many more
+ancient instances, let us add some of later date. Why is Rutilius, my
+uncle, a man of the greatest virtue and learning, now in banishment?
+Why was my own friend and companion Drusus assassinated in his own
+house? Why was Scævola, the high-priest, that pattern of moderation and
+prudence, massacred before the statue of Vesta? Why, before that, were
+so many illustrious citizens put to death by Cinna? Why had Marius, the
+most perfidious of men, the power to cause the death of Catulus, a man
+of the greatest dignity? But there would be no end of enumerating
+examples of good men made miserable and wicked men prosperous. Why did
+that Marius live to an old age, and die so happily at his own house in
+his seventh consulship? Why was that inhuman wretch Cinna permitted to
+enjoy so long a reign?
+
+XXXIII. He, indeed, met with deserved punishment at last. But would it
+not have been better that these inhumanities had been prevented than
+that the author of them should be punished afterward? Varius, a most
+impious wretch, was tortured and put to death. If this was his
+punishment for the murdering Drusus by the sword, and Metellus by
+poison, would it not have been better to have preserved their lives
+than to have their deaths avenged on Varius? Dionysius was thirty-eight
+years a tyrant over the most opulent and flourishing city; and, before
+him, how many years did Pisistratus tyrannize in the very flower of
+Greece! Phalaris and Apollodorus met with the fate they deserved, but
+not till after they had tortured and put to death multitudes. Many
+robbers have been executed; but the number of those who have suffered
+for their crimes is short of those whom they have robbed and murdered.
+Anaxarchus,[280] a scholar of Democritus, was cut to pieces by command
+of the tyrant of Cyprus; and Zeno of Elea[281] ended his life in
+tortures. What shall I say of Socrates,[282] whose death, as often as I
+read of it in Plato, draws fresh tears from my eyes? If, therefore, the
+Gods really see everything that happens to men, you must acknowledge
+they make no distinction between the good and the bad.
+
+XXXIV. Diogenes the Cynic used to say of Harpalus, one of the most
+fortunate villains of his time, that the constant prosperity of such a
+man was a kind of witness against the Gods. Dionysius, of whom we have
+before spoken, after he had pillaged the temple of Proserpine at
+Locris, set sail for Syracuse, and, having a fair wind during his
+voyage, said, with a smile, "See, my friends, what favorable winds the
+immortal Gods bestow upon church-robbers." Encouraged by this
+prosperous event, he proceeded in his impiety. When he landed at
+Peloponnesus, he went into the temple of Jupiter Olympius, and disrobed
+his statue of a golden mantle of great weight, an ornament which the
+tyrant Gelo[283] had given out of the spoils of the Carthaginians, and
+at the same time, in a jesting manner, he said "that a golden mantle
+was too heavy in summer and too cold in winter;" and then, throwing a
+woollen cloak over the statue, added, "This will serve for all
+seasons." At another time, he ordered the golden beard of Æsculapius of
+Epidaurus to be taken away, saying that "it was absurd for the son to
+have a beard, when his father had none." He likewise robbed the temples
+of the silver tables, which, according to the ancient custom of Greece,
+bore this inscription, "To the good Gods," saying "he was willing to
+make use of their goodness;" and, without the least scruple, took away
+the little golden emblems of victory, the cups and coronets, which were
+in the stretched-out hands of the statues, saying "he did not take, but
+receive them; for it would be folly not to accept good things from the
+Gods, to whom we are constantly praying for favors, when they stretch
+out their hands towards us." And, last of all, all the things which he
+had thus pillaged from the temples were, by his order, brought to the
+market-place and sold by the common crier; and, after he had received
+the money for them, he commanded every purchaser to restore what he had
+bought, within a limited time, to the temples from whence they came.
+Thus to his impiety towards the Gods he added injustice to man.
+
+XXXV. Yet neither did Olympian Jove strike him with his thunder, nor
+did Æsculapius cause him to die by tedious diseases and a lingering
+death. He died in his bed, had funeral honors[284] paid to him, and
+left his power, which he had wickedly obtained, as a just and lawful
+inheritance to his son.
+
+It is not without concern that I maintain a doctrine which seems to
+authorize evil, and which might probably give a sanction to it, if
+conscience, without any divine assistance, did not point out, in the
+clearest manner, the difference between virtue and vice. Without
+conscience man is contemptible. For as no family or state can be
+supposed to be formed with any reason or discipline if there are no
+rewards for good actions nor punishment for crimes, so we cannot
+believe that a Divine Providence regulates the world if there is no
+distinction between the honest and the wicked.
+
+But the Gods, you say, neglect trifling things: the little fields or
+vineyards of particular men are not worthy their attention; and if
+blasts or hail destroy their product, Jupiter does not regard it, nor
+do kings extend their care to the lower offices of government. This
+argument might have some weight if, in bringing Rutilius as an
+instance, I had only complained of the loss of his farm at Formiæ; but
+I spoke of a personal misfortune, his banishment.[285]
+
+XXXVI. All men agree that external benefits, such as vineyards, corn,
+olives, plenty of fruit and grain, and, in short, every convenience and
+property of life, are derived from the Gods; and, indeed, with reason,
+since by our virtue we claim applause, and in virtue we justly glory,
+which we could have no right to do if it was the gift of the Gods, and
+not a personal merit. When we are honored with new dignities, or
+blessed with increase of riches; when we are favored by fortune beyond
+our expectation, or luckily delivered from any approaching evil, we
+return thanks for it to the Gods, and assume no praise to ourselves.
+But who ever thanked the Gods that he was a good man? We thank them,
+indeed, for riches, health, and honor. For these we invoke the all-good
+and all-powerful Jupiter; but not for wisdom, temperance, and justice.
+No one ever offered a tenth of his estate to Hercules to be made wise.
+It is reported, indeed, of Pythagoras that he sacrificed an ox to the
+Muses upon having made some new discovery in geometry;[286] but, for my
+part, I cannot believe it, because he refused to sacrifice even to
+Apollo at Delos, lest he should defile the altar with blood. But to
+return. It is universally agreed that good fortune we must ask of the
+Gods, but wisdom must arise from ourselves; and though temples have
+been consecrated to the Mind, to Virtue, and to Faith, yet that does
+not contradict their being inherent in us. In regard to hope, safety,
+assistance, and victory, we must rely upon the Gods for them; from
+whence it follows, as Diogenes said, that the prosperity of the wicked
+destroys the idea of a Divine Providence.
+
+XXXVII. But good men have sometimes success. They have so; but we
+cannot, with any show of reason, attribute that success to the Gods.
+Diagoras, who is called the atheist, being at Samothrace, one of his
+friends showed him several pictures[287] of people who had endured very
+dangerous storms; "See," says he, "you who deny a providence, how many
+have been saved by their prayers to the Gods." "Ay," says Diagoras, "I
+see those who were saved, but where are those painted who were
+shipwrecked?" At another time, he himself was in a storm, when the
+sailors, being greatly alarmed, told him they justly deserved that
+misfortune for admitting him into their ship; when he, pointing to
+others under the like distress, asked them "if they believed Diagoras
+was also aboard those ships?" In short, with regard to good or bad
+fortune, it matters not what you are, or how you have lived. The Gods,
+like kings, regard not everything. What similitude is there between
+them? If kings neglect anything, want of knowledge may be pleaded in
+their defence; but ignorance cannot be brought as an excuse for the
+Gods.
+
+XXXVIII. Your manner of justifying them is somewhat extraordinary, when
+you say that if a wicked man dies without suffering for his crimes, the
+Gods inflict a punishment on his children, his children's children, and
+all his posterity. O wonderful equity of the Gods! What city would
+endure the maker of a law which should condemn a son or a grandson for
+a crime committed by the father or the grandfather?
+
+    Shall Tantalus' unhappy offspring know
+    No end, no close, of this long scene of woe?
+    When will the dire reward of guilt be o'er,
+    And Myrtilus demand revenge no more?[288]
+
+Whether the poets have corrupted the Stoics, or the Stoics given
+authority to the poets, I cannot easily determine. Both alike are to be
+condemned. If those persons whose names have been branded in the
+satires of Hipponax or Archilochus[289] were driven to despair, it did
+not proceed from the Gods, but had its origin in their own minds. When
+we see Ægistus and Paris lost in the heat of an impure passion, why are
+we to attribute it to a Deity, when the crime, as it were, speaks for
+itself? I believe that those who recover from illness are more indebted
+to the care of Hippocrates than to the power of Æsculapius; that Sparta
+received her laws from Lycurgus[290] rather than from Apollo; that
+those eyes of the maritime coast, Corinth and Carthage, were plucked
+out, the one by Critolaus, the other by Hasdrubal, without the
+assistance of any divine anger, since you yourselves confess that a
+Deity cannot possibly be angry on any provocation.
+
+XXXIX. But could not the Deity have assisted and preserved those
+eminent cities? Undoubtedly he could; for, according to your doctrine,
+his power is infinite, and without the least labor; and as nothing but
+the will is necessary to the motion of our bodies, so the divine will
+of the Gods, with the like ease, can create, move, and change all
+things. This you hold, not from a mere phantom of superstition, but on
+natural and settled principles of reason; for matter, you say, of which
+all things are composed and consist, is susceptible of all forms and
+changes, and there is nothing which cannot be, or cease to be, in an
+instant; and that Divine Providence has the command and disposal of
+this universal matter, and consequently can, in any part of the
+universe, do whatever she pleases: from whence I conclude that this
+Providence either knows not the extent of her power, or neglects human
+affairs, or cannot judge what is best for us. Providence, you say, does
+not extend her care to particular men; there is no wonder in that,
+since she does not extend it to cities, or even to nations, or people.
+If, therefore, she neglects whole nations, is it not very probable that
+she neglects all mankind? But how can you assert that the Gods do not
+enter into all the little circumstances of life, and yet hold that they
+distribute dreams among men? Since you believe in dreams, it is your
+part to solve this difficulty. Besides, you say we ought to call upon
+the Gods. Those who call upon the Gods are individuals. Divine
+Providence, therefore, regards individuals, which consequently proves
+that they are more at leisure than you imagine. Let us suppose the
+Divine Providence to be greatly busied; that it causes the revolutions
+of the heavens, supports the earth, and rules the seas; why does it
+suffer so many Gods to be unemployed? Why is not the superintendence of
+human affairs given to some of those idle Deities which you say are
+innumerable?
+
+This is the purport of what I had to say concerning "the Nature of the
+Gods;" not with a design to destroy their existence, but merely to show
+what an obscure point it is, and with what difficulties an explanation
+of it is attended.
+
+XL. Balbus, observing that Cotta had finished his discourse--You have
+been very severe, says he, against a Divine Providence, a doctrine
+established by the Stoics with piety and wisdom; but, as it grows too
+late, I shall defer my answer to another day. Our argument is of the
+greatest importance; it concerns our altars,[291] our hearths, our
+temples, nay, even the walls of our city, which you priests hold
+sacred; you, who by religion defend Rome better than she is defended by
+her ramparts. This is a cause which, while I have life, I think I
+cannot abandon without impiety.
+
+There is nothing, replied Cotta, which I desire more than to be
+confuted. I have not pretended to decide this point, but to give you my
+private sentiments upon it; and am very sensible of your great
+superiority in argument. No doubt of it, says Velleius; we have much to
+fear from one who believes that our dreams are sent from Jupiter,
+which, though they are of little weight, are yet of more importance
+than the discourse of the Stoics concerning the nature of the Gods. The
+conversation ended here, and we parted. Velleius judged that the
+arguments of Cotta were truest; but those of Balbus seemed to me to
+have the greater probability.[292]
+
+
+
+
+
+
+ON THE COMMONWEALTH.
+
+       *       *       *       *       *
+
+
+
+
+PREFACE BY THE EDITOR.
+
+
+This work was one of Cicero's earlier treatises, though one of those
+which was most admired by his contemporaries, and one of which he
+himself was most proud. It was composed 54 B.C. It was originally in
+two books: then it was altered and enlarged into nine, and finally
+reduced to six. With the exception of the dream of Scipio, in the last
+book, the whole treatise was lost till the year 1822, when the
+librarian of the Vatican discovered a portion of them among the
+palimpsests in that library. What he discovered is translated here; but
+it is in a most imperfect and mutilated state.
+
+The form selected was that of a dialogue, in imitation of those of
+Plato; and the several conferences were supposed to have taken place
+during the Latin holidays, 129 B.C., in the consulship of Caius
+Sempronius, Tuditanus, and Marcus Aquilius. The speakers are Scipio
+Africanus the younger, in whose garden the scene is laid; Caius Lælius;
+Lucius Furius Philus; Marcus Manilius; Spurius Mummius, the brother of
+the taker of Corinth, a Stoic; Quintus Ælius Tubero, a nephew of
+Africanus; Publius Rutilius Rufus; Quintus Mucius Scævola, the tutor of
+Cicero; and Caius Fannius, who was absent, however, on the second day
+of the conference.
+
+In the first book, the first thirty-three pages are wanting, and there
+are chasms amounting to thirty-eight pages more. In this book Scipio
+asserts the superiority of an active over a speculative career; and
+after analyzing and comparing the monarchical, aristocratic, and
+democratic forms of government, gives a preference to the first;
+although his idea of a perfect constitution would be one compounded of
+three kinds in due proportion.
+
+There are a few chasms in the earlier part of the second book, and the
+latter part of it is wholly lost. In it Scipio was led on to give an
+account of the rise and progress of the Roman Constitution, from which
+he passed on to the examination of the great moral obligations which
+are the foundations of all political union.
+
+Of the remaining books we have only a few disjointed fragments, with
+the exception, as has been before mentioned, of the dream of Scipio in
+the sixth.
+
+       *       *       *       *       *
+
+
+
+
+INTRODUCTION TO THE FIRST BOOK,
+
+BY THE ORIGINAL TRANSLATOR.
+
+
+   Cicero introduces his subject by showing that men were not born
+     for the mere abstract study of philosophy, but that the study
+     of philosophic truth should always be made as practical as
+     possible, and applicable to the great interests of
+     philanthropy and patriotism. Cicero endeavors to show the
+     benefit of mingling the contemplative or philosophic with the
+     political and active life, according to that maxim of
+     Plato--"Happy is the nation whose philosophers are kings, and
+     whose kings are philosophers."
+
+   This kind of introduction was the more necessary because many
+     of the ancient philosophers, too warmly attached to
+     transcendental metaphysics and sequestered speculations, had
+     affirmed that true philosophers ought not to interest
+     themselves in the management of public affairs. Thus, as M.
+     Villemain observes, it was a maxim of the Epicureans,
+     "Sapiens ne accedat ad rempublicam" (Let no wise man meddle
+     in politics). The Pythagoreans had enforced the same
+     principle with more gravity. Aristotle examines the question
+     on both sides, and concludes in favor of active life. Among
+     Aristotle's disciples, a writer, singularly elegant and pure,
+     had maintained the pre-eminence of the contemplative life
+     over the political or active one, in a work which Cicero
+     cites with admiration, and to which he seems to have applied
+     for relief whenever he felt harassed and discouraged in
+     public business. But here this great man was interested by
+     the subject he discusses, and by the whole course of his
+     experience and conduct, to refute the dogmas of that
+     pusillanimous sophistry and selfish indulgence by bringing
+     forward the most glorious examples and achievements of
+     patriotism. In this strain he had doubtless commenced his
+     exordium, and in this strain we find him continuing it at the
+     point in which the palimpsest becomes legible. He then
+     proceeds to introduce his illustrious interlocutors, and
+     leads them at first to discourse on the astronomical laws
+     that regulate the revolutions of our planet. From this, by a
+     very graceful and beautiful transition, he passes on to the
+     consideration of the best forms of political constitutions
+     that had prevailed in different nations, and those modes of
+     government which had produced the greatest benefits in the
+     commonwealths of antiquity.
+
+   This first book is, in fact, a splendid epitome of the
+     political science of the age of Cicero, and probably the most
+     eloquent plea in favor of mixed monarchy to be found in all
+     literature.
+
+       *       *       *       *       *
+
+
+
+
+BOOK I.
+
+
+I. [Without the virtue of patriotism], neither Caius Duilius, nor Aulus
+Atilius,[293] nor Lucius Metellus, could have delivered Rome by their
+courage from the terror of Carthage; nor could the two Scipios, when
+the fire of the second Punic War was kindled, have quenched it in their
+blood; nor, when it revived in greater force, could either Quintus
+Maximus[294] have enervated it, or Marcus Marcellus have crushed it;
+nor, when it was repulsed from the gates of our own city, would Scipio
+have confined it within the walls of our enemies.
+
+But Cato, at first a new and unknown man, whom all we who aspire to the
+same honors consider as a pattern to lead us on to industry and virtue,
+was undoubtedly at liberty to enjoy his repose at Tusculum, a most
+salubrious and convenient retreat. But he, mad as some people think
+him, though no necessity compelled him, preferred being tossed about
+amidst the tempestuous waves of politics, even till extreme old age, to
+living with all imaginable luxury in that tranquillity and relaxation.
+I omit innumerable men who have separately devoted themselves to the
+protection of our Commonwealth; and those whose lives are within the
+memory of the present generation I will not mention, lest any one
+should complain that I had invidiously forgotten himself or some one of
+his family. This only I insist on--that so great is the necessity of
+this virtue which nature has implanted in man, and so great is the
+desire to defend the common safety of our country, that its energy has
+continually overcome all the blandishments of pleasure and repose.
+
+II. Nor is it sufficient to possess this virtue as if it were some kind
+of art, unless we put it in practice. An art, indeed, though not
+exercised, may still be retained in knowledge; but virtue consists
+wholly in its proper use and action. Now, the noblest use of virtue is
+the government of the Commonwealth, and the carrying-out in real
+action, not in words only, of all those identical theories which those
+philosophers discuss at every corner. For nothing is spoken by
+philosophers, so far as they speak correctly and honorably, which has
+not been discovered and confirmed by those persons who have been the
+founders of the laws of states. For whence comes piety, or from whom
+has religion been derived? Whence comes law, either that of nations, or
+that which is called the civil law? Whence comes justice, faith,
+equity? Whence modesty, continence, the horror of baseness, the desire
+of praise and renown? Whence fortitude in labors and perils? Doubtless,
+from those who have instilled some of these moral principles into men
+by education, and confirmed others by custom, and sanctioned others by
+laws.
+
+Moreover, it is reported of Xenocrates, one of the sublimest
+philosophers, that when some one asked him what his disciples learned,
+he replied, "To do that of their own accord which they might be
+compelled to do by law." That citizen, therefore, who obliges all men
+to those virtuous actions, by the authority of laws and penalties, to
+which the philosophers can scarcely persuade a few by the force of
+their eloquence, is certainly to be preferred to the sagest of the
+doctors who spend their lives in such discussions. For which of their
+exquisite orations is so admirable as to be entitled to be preferred to
+a well-constituted government, public justice, and good customs?
+Certainly, just as I think that magnificent and imperious cities (as
+Ennius says) are superior to castles and villages, so I imagine that
+those who regulate such cities by their counsel and authority are far
+preferable, with respect to real wisdom, to men who are unacquainted
+with any kind of political knowledge. And since we are strongly
+prompted to augment the prosperity of the human race, and since we do
+endeavor by our counsels and exertions to render the life of man safer
+and wealthier, and since we are incited to this blessing by the spur of
+nature herself, let us hold on that course which has always been
+pursued by all the best men, and not listen for a moment to the signals
+of those who sound a retreat so loudly that they sometimes call back
+even those who have made considerable progress.
+
+III. These reasons, so certain and so evident, are opposed by those
+who, on the other side, argue that the labors which must necessarily be
+sustained in maintaining the Commonwealth form but a slight impediment
+to the vigilant and industrious, and are only a contemptible obstacle
+in such important affairs, and even in common studies, offices, and
+employments. They add the peril of life, that base fear of death, which
+has ever been opposed by brave men, to whom it appears far more
+miserable to die by the decay of nature and old age than to be allowed
+an opportunity of gallantly sacrificing that life for their country
+which must otherwise be yielded up to nature.
+
+On this point, however, our antagonists esteem themselves copious and
+eloquent when they collect all the calamities of heroic men, and the
+injuries inflicted on them by their ungrateful countrymen. For on this
+subject they bring forward those notable examples among the Greeks; and
+tell us that Miltiades, the vanquisher and conqueror of the Persians,
+before even those wounds were healed which he had received in that most
+glorious victory, wasted away in the chains of his fellow-citizens that
+life which had been preserved from the weapons of the enemy. They cite
+Themistocles, expelled and proscribed by the country which he had
+rescued, and forced to flee, not to the Grecian ports which he had
+preserved, but to the bosom of the barbarous power which he had
+defeated. There is, indeed, no deficiency of examples to illustrate the
+levity and cruelty of the Athenians to their noblest citizens--examples
+which, originating and multiplying among them, are said at different
+times to have abounded in our own most august empire. For we are told:
+of the exile of Camillus, the disgrace of Ahala, the unpopularity of
+Nasica, the expulsion of Lænas,[295] the condemnation of Opimius, the
+flight of Metellus, the cruel destruction of Caius Marius, the massacre
+of our chieftains, and the many atrocious crimes which followed. My own
+history is by no means free from such calamities; and I imagine that
+when they recollect that by my counsel and perils they were preserved
+in life and liberty, they are led by that consideration to bewail my
+misfortunes more deeply and affectionately. But I cannot tell why those
+who sail over the seas for the sake of knowledge and experience [should
+wonder at seeing still greater hazards braved in the service of the
+Commonwealth].
+
+IV. [Since], on my quitting the consulship, I swore in the assembly of
+the Roman people, who re-echoed my words, that I had saved the
+Commonwealth, I console myself with this remembrance for all my cares,
+troubles, and injuries. Although my misfortune had more of honor than
+misfortune, and more of glory than disaster; and I derive greater
+pleasure from the regrets of good men than sorrow from the exultation
+of the worthless. But even if it had happened otherwise, how could I
+have complained, as nothing befell me which was either unforeseen, or
+more painful than I expected, as a return for my illustrious actions?
+For I was one who, though it was in my power to reap more profit from
+leisure than most men, on account of the diversified sweetness of my
+studies, in which I had lived from boyhood--or, if any public calamity
+had happened, to have borne no more than an equal share with the rest
+of my countrymen in the misfortune--I nevertheless did not hesitate to
+oppose myself to the most formidable tempests and torrents of sedition,
+for the sake of saving my countrymen, and at my own proper danger to
+secure the common safety of all the rest. For our country did not beget
+and educate us with the expectation of receiving no support, as I may
+call it, from us; nor for the purpose of consulting nothing but our
+convenience, to supply us with a secure refuge for idleness and a
+tranquil spot for rest; but rather with a view of turning to her own
+advantage the nobler portion of our genius, heart, and counsel; giving
+us back for our private service only what she can spare from the public
+interests.
+
+V. Those apologies, therefore, in which men take refuge as an excuse
+for their devoting themselves with more plausibility to mere inactivity
+do certainly not deserve to be listened to; when, for instance, they
+tell us that those who meddle with public affairs are generally
+good-for-nothing men, with whom it is discreditable to be compared, and
+miserable and dangerous to contend, especially when the multitude is in
+an excited state. On which account it is not the part of a wise man to
+take the reins, since he cannot restrain the insane and unregulated
+movements of the common people. Nor is it becoming to a man of liberal
+birth, say they, thus to contend with such vile and unrefined
+antagonists, or to subject one's self to the lashings of contumely, or
+to put one's self in the way of injuries which ought not to be borne by
+a wise man. As if to a virtuous, brave, and magnanimous man there could
+be a juster reason for seeking the government than this--to avoid being
+subjected to worthless men, and to prevent the Commonwealth from being
+torn to pieces by them; when, even if they were then desirous to save
+her, they would not have the power.
+
+VI. But this restriction who can approve, which would interdict the
+wise man from taking any share in the government beyond such as the
+occasion and necessity may compel him to? As if any greater necessity
+could possibly happen to any man than happened to me. In which, how
+could I have acted if I had not been consul at the time? and how could
+I have been a consul unless I had maintained that course of life from
+my childhood which raised me from the order of knights, in which I was
+born, to the very highest station? You cannot produce _extempore_, and
+just when you please, the power of assisting a commonwealth, although
+it may be severely pressed by dangers, unless you have attained the
+position which enables you legally to do so. And what most surprises me
+in the discourses of learned men, is to hear those persons who confess
+themselves incapable of steering the vessel of the State in smooth seas
+(which, indeed, they never learned, and never cared to know) profess
+themselves ready to assume the helm amidst the fiercest tempests. For
+those men are accustomed to say openly, and indeed to boast greatly,
+that they have never learned, and have never taken the least pains to
+explain, the principles of either establishing or maintaining a
+commonwealth; and they look on this practical science as one which
+belongs not to men of learning and wisdom, but to those who have made
+it their especial study. How, then, can it be reasonable for such men
+to promise their assistance to the State, when they shall be compelled
+to it by necessity, while they are ignorant how to govern the republic
+when no necessity presses upon it, which is a much more easy task?
+Indeed, though it were true that the wise man loves not to thrust
+himself of his own accord into the administration of public affairs,
+but that if circumstances oblige him to it, then he does not refuse the
+office, yet I think that this science of civil legislation should in no
+wise be neglected by the philosopher, because all resources ought to be
+ready to his hand, which he knows not how soon he may be called on to
+use.
+
+VII. I have spoken thus at large for this reason, because in this work
+I have proposed to myself and undertaken a discussion on the government
+of a state; and in order to render it useful, I was bound, in the first
+place, to do away with this pusillanimous hesitation to mingle in
+public affairs. If there be any, therefore, who are too much influenced
+by the authority of the philosophers, let them consider the subject for
+a moment, and be guided by the opinions of those men whose authority
+and credit are greatest among learned men; whom I look upon, though
+some of them have not personally governed any state, as men who have
+nevertheless discharged a kind of office in the republic, inasmuch as
+they have made many investigations into, and left many writings
+concerning, state affairs. As to those whom the Greeks entitle the
+Seven Wise Men, I find that they almost all lived in the middle of
+public business. Nor, indeed, is there anything in which human virtue
+can more closely resemble the divine powers than in establishing new
+states, or in preserving those already established.
+
+VIII. And concerning these affairs, since it has been our good fortune
+to achieve something worthy of memorial in the government of our
+country, and also to have acquired some facility of explaining the
+powers and resources of politics, we can treat of this subject with the
+weight of personal experience and the habit of instruction and
+illustration. Whereas before us many have been skilful in theory,
+though no exploits of theirs are recorded; and many others have been
+men of consideration in action, but unfamiliar with the arts of
+exposition. Nor, indeed, is it at all our intention to establish a new
+and self-invented system of government; but our purpose is rather to
+recall to memory a discussion of the most illustrious men of their age
+in our Commonwealth, which you and I, in our youth, when at Smyrna,
+heard mentioned by Publius Rutilius Rufus, who reported to us a
+conference of many days in which, in my opinion, there was nothing
+omitted that could throw light on political affairs.
+
+IX. For when, in the year of the consulship of Tuditanus and Aquilius,
+Scipio Africanus, the son of Paulus Æmilius, formed the project of
+spending the Latin holidays at his country-seat, where his most
+intimate friends had promised him frequent visits during this season of
+relaxation, on the first morning of the festival, his nephew, Quintus
+Tubero, made his appearance; and when Scipio had greeted him heartily
+and embraced him--How is it, my dear Tubero, said he, that I see you so
+early? For these holidays must afford you a capital opportunity of
+pursuing your favorite studies. Ah! replied Tubero, I can study my
+books at any time, for they are always disengaged; but it is a great
+privilege, my Scipio, to find you at leisure, especially in this
+restless period of public affairs. You certainly have found me so, said
+Scipio, but, to speak truth, I am rather relaxing from business than
+from study. Nay, said Tubero, you must try to relax from your studies
+too, for here are several of us, as we have appointed, all ready, if it
+suits your convenience, to aid you in getting through this leisure time
+of yours. I am very willing to consent, answered Scipio, and we may be
+able to compare notes respecting the several topics that interest us.
+
+X. Be it so, said Tubero; and since you invite me to discussion, and
+present the opportunity, let us first examine, before any one else
+arrives, what can be the nature of the parhelion, or double sun, which
+was mentioned in the senate. Those that affirm they witnessed this
+prodigy are neither few nor unworthy of credit, so that there is more
+reason for investigation than incredulity.[296]
+
+Ah! said Scipio, I wish we had our friend Panætius with us, who is fond
+of investigating all things of this kind, but especially all celestial
+phenomena. As for my opinion, Tubero, for I always tell you just what I
+think, I hardly agree in these subjects with that friend of mine,
+since, respecting things of which we can scarcely form a conjecture as
+to their character, he is as positive as if he had seen them with his
+own eyes and felt them with his own hands. And I cannot but the more
+admire the wisdom of Socrates, who discarded all anxiety respecting
+things of this kind, and affirmed that these inquiries concerning the
+secrets of nature were either above the efforts of human reason, or
+were absolutely of no consequence at all to human life.
+
+But, then, my Africanus, replied Tubero, of what credit is the
+tradition which states that Socrates rejected all these physical
+investigations, and confined his whole attention to men and manners?
+For, with respect to him what better authority can we cite than Plato?
+in many passages of whose works Socrates speaks in such a manner that
+even when he is discussing morals, and virtues, and even public affairs
+and politics, he endeavors to interweave, after the fashion of
+Pythagoras, the doctrines of arithmetic, geometry, and harmonic
+proportions with them.
+
+That is true, replied Scipio; but you are aware, I believe, that Plato,
+after the death of Socrates, was induced to visit Egypt by his love of
+science, and that after that he proceeded to Italy and Sicily, from his
+desire of understanding the Pythagorean dogmas; that he conversed much
+with Archytas of Tarentum and Timæus of Locris; that he collected the
+works of Philolaus; and that, finding in these places the renown of
+Pythagoras flourishing, he addicted himself exceedingly to the
+disciples of Pythagoras, and their studies; therefore, as he loved
+Socrates with his whole heart, and wished to attribute all great
+discoveries to him, he interwove the Socratic elegance and subtlety of
+eloquence with somewhat of the obscurity of Pythagoras, and with that
+notorious gravity of his diversified arts.
+
+XI. When Scipio had spoken thus, he suddenly saw Lucius Furius
+approaching, and saluting him, and embracing him most affectionately,
+he gave him a seat on his own couch. And as soon as Publius Rutilius,
+the worthy reporter of the conference to us, had arrived, when we had
+saluted him, he placed him by the side of Tubero. Then said Furius,
+What is it that you are about? Has our entrance at all interrupted any
+conversation of yours? By no means, said Scipio, for you yourself too
+are in the habit of investigating carefully the subject which Tubero
+was a little before proposing to examine; and our friend Rutilius, even
+under the walls of Numantia, was in the habit at times of conversing
+with me on questions of the same kind. What, then, was the subject of
+your discussion? said Philus. We were talking, said Scipio, of the
+double suns that recently appeared, and I wish, Philus, to hear what
+you think of them.
+
+XII. Just as he was speaking, a boy announced that Lælius was coming to
+call on him, and that he had already left his house. Then Scipio,
+putting on his sandals and robes, immediately went forth from his
+chamber, and when he had walked a little time in the portico, he met
+Lælius, and welcomed him and those that accompanied him, namely,
+Spurius Mummius, to whom he was greatly attached, and C. Fannius and
+Quintus Scævola, sons-in-law of Lælius, two very intelligent young men,
+and now of the quæstorian age.[297]
+
+When he had saluted them all, he returned through the portico, placing
+Lælius in the middle; for there was in their friendship a sort of law
+of reciprocal courtesy, so that in the camp Lælius paid Scipio almost
+divine honors, on account of his eminent renown in war and in private
+life; in his turn Scipio reverenced Lælius, even as a father, because
+he was older than himself.
+
+Then after they had exchanged a few words, as they walked up and down,
+Scipio, to whom their visit was extremely welcome and agreeable, wished
+to assemble them in a sunny corner of the gardens, because it was still
+winter; and when they had agreed to this, there came in another friend,
+a learned man, much beloved and esteemed by all of them, M. Manilius,
+who, after having been most warmly welcomed by Scipio and the rest,
+seated himself next to Lælius.
+
+XIII. Then Philus, commencing the conversation, said: It does not
+appear to me that the presence of our new guests need alter the subject
+of our discussion, but only that it should induce us to treat it more
+philosophically, and in a manner more worthy of our increased audience.
+What do you allude to? said Lælius; or what was the discussion we broke
+in upon? Scipio was asking me, replied Philus, what I thought of the
+parhelion, or mock sun, whose recent apparition was so strongly
+attested.
+
+_Lælius._ Do you say then, my Philus, that we have sufficiently
+examined those questions which concern our own houses and the
+Commonwealth, that we begin to investigate the celestial mysteries?
+
+And Philus replied: Do you think, then, that it does not concern our
+houses to know what happens in that vast home which is not included in
+walls of human fabrication, but which embraces the entire universe--a
+home which the Gods share with us, as the common country of all
+intelligent beings? Especially when, if we are ignorant of these
+things, there are also many great practical truths which result from
+them, and which bear directly on the welfare of our race, of which we
+must be also ignorant. And here I can speak for myself, as well as for
+you, Lælius, and all men who are ambitious of wisdom, that the
+knowledge and consideration of the facts of nature are by themselves
+very delightful.
+
+_Lælius._ I have no objection to the discussion, especially as it is
+holiday-time with us. But cannot we have the pleasure of hearing you
+resume it, or are we come too late?
+
+_Philus_. We have not yet commenced the discussion, and since the
+question remains entire and unbroken, I shall have the greatest
+pleasure, my Lælius, in handing over the argument to you.
+
+_Lælius._ No, I had much rather hear you, unless, indeed, Manilius
+thinks himself able to compromise the suit between the two suns, that
+they may possess heaven as joint sovereigns without intruding on each
+other's empire.
+
+Then Manilius said: Are you going, Lælius, to ridicule a science in
+which, in the first place, I myself excel; and, secondly, without which
+no one can distinguish what is his own, and what is another's? But to
+return to the point. Let us now at present listen to Philus, who seems
+to me to have started a greater question than any of those that have
+engaged the attention of either Publius Mucius or myself.
+
+XIV. Then Philus said: I am not about to bring you anything new, or
+anything which has been thought over or discovered by me myself. But I
+recollect that Caius Sulpicius Gallus, who was a man of profound
+learning, as you are aware, when this same thing was reported to have
+taken place in his time, while he was staying in the house of Marcus
+Marcellus, who had been his colleague in the consulship, asked to see a
+celestial globe which Marcellus's grandfather had saved after the
+capture of Syracuse from that magnificent and opulent city, without
+bringing to his own home any other memorial out of so great a booty;
+which I had often heard mentioned on account of the great fame of
+Archimedes; but its appearance, however, did not seem to me
+particularly striking. For that other is more elegant in form, and more
+generally known, which was made by the same Archimedes, and deposited
+by the same Marcellus in the Temple of Virtue at Rome. But as soon as
+Gallus had begun to explain, in a most scientific manner, the principle
+of this machine, I felt that the Sicilian geometrician must have
+possessed a genius superior to anything we usually conceive to belong
+to our nature. For Gallus assured us that that other solid and compact
+globe was a very ancient invention, and that the first model had been
+originally made by Thales of Miletus. That afterward Eudoxus of Cnidus,
+a disciple of Plato, had traced on its surface the stars that appear in
+the sky, and that many years subsequently, borrowing from Eudoxus this
+beautiful design and representation, Aratus had illustrated it in his
+verses, not by any science of astronomy, but by the ornament of poetic
+description. He added that the figure of the globe, which displayed the
+motions of the sun and moon, and the five planets, or wandering stars,
+could not be represented by the primitive solid globe; and that in this
+the invention of Archimedes was admirable, because he had calculated
+how a single revolution should maintain unequal and diversified
+progressions in dissimilar motions. In fact, when Gallus moved this
+globe, we observed that the moon succeeded the sun by as many turns of
+the wheel in the machine as days in the heavens. From whence it
+resulted that the progress of the sun was marked as in the heavens, and
+that the moon touched the point where she is obscured by the earth's
+shadow at the instant the sun appears opposite.[298] * * *
+
+XV. * * *[299] I had myself a great affection for this Gallus, and I
+know that he was very much beloved and esteemed by my father Paulus. I
+recollect that when I was very young, when my father, as consul,
+commanded in Macedonia, and we were in the camp, our army was seized
+with a pious terror, because suddenly, in a clear night, the bright and
+full moon became eclipsed. And Gallus, who was then our lieutenant, the
+year before that in which he was elected consul, hesitated not, next
+morning, to state in the camp that it was no prodigy, and that the
+phenomenon which had then appeared would always appear at certain
+periods, when the sun was so placed that he could not affect the moon
+with his light.
+
+But do you mean, said Tubero, that he dared to speak thus to men almost
+entirely uneducated and ignorant?
+
+_Scipio._ He did, and with great * * * for his opinion was no result of
+insolent ostentation, nor was his language unbecoming the dignity of so
+wise a man: indeed, he performed a very noble action in thus freeing
+his countrymen from the terrors of an idle superstition.
+
+XVI. And they relate that in a similar way, in the great war in which
+the Athenians and Lacedæmonians contended with such violent resentment,
+the famous Pericles, the first man of his country in credit, eloquence,
+and political genius, observing the Athenians overwhelmed with an
+excessive alarm during an eclipse of the sun which caused a sudden
+darkness, told them, what he had learned in the school of Anaxagoras,
+that these phenomena necessarily happened at precise and regular
+periods when the body of the moon was interposed between the sun and
+the earth, and that if they happened not before every new moon, still
+they could not possibly happen except at the exact time of the new
+moon. And when he had proved this truth by his reasonings, he freed the
+people from their alarms; for at that period the doctrine was new and
+unfamiliar that the sun was accustomed to be eclipsed by the
+interposition of the moon, which fact they say that Thales of Miletus
+was the first to discover. Afterward my friend Ennius appears to have
+been acquainted with the same theory, who, writing about 350[300] years
+after the foundation of Rome, says, "In the nones of June the sun was
+covered by the moon and night." The calculations in the astronomical
+art have attained such perfection that from that day, thus described to
+us by Ennius and recorded in the pontifical registers, the anterior
+eclipses of the sun have been computed as far back as the nones of July
+in the reign of Romulus, when that eclipse took place, in the obscurity
+of which it was affirmed that Virtue bore Romulus to heaven, in spite
+of the perishable nature which carried him off by the common fate of
+humanity.
+
+XVII. Then said Tubero: Do not you think, Scipio, that this
+astronomical science, which every day proves so useful, just now
+appeared in a different light to you,[301] * * * which the rest may
+see. Moreover, who can think anything in human affairs of brilliant
+importance who has penetrated this starry empire of the gods? Or who
+can think anything connected with mankind long who has learned to
+estimate the nature of eternity? or glorious who is aware of the
+insignificance of the size of the earth, even in its whole extent, and
+especially in the portion which men inhabit? And when we consider that
+almost imperceptible point which we ourselves occupy unknown to the
+majority of nations, can we still hope that our name and reputation can
+be widely circulated? And then our estates and edifices, our cattle,
+and the enormous treasures of our gold and silver, can they be esteemed
+or denominated as desirable goods by him who observes their perishable
+profit, and their contemptible use, and their uncertain domination,
+often falling into the possession of the very worst men? How happy,
+then, ought we to esteem that man who alone has it in his power, not by
+the law of the Romans, but by the privilege of philosophers, to enjoy
+all things as his own; not by any civil bond, but by the common right
+of nature, which denies that anything can really be possessed by any
+one but him who understands its true nature and use; who reckons our
+dictatorships and consulships rather in the rank of necessary offices
+than desirable employments, and thinks they must be endured rather as
+acquittances of our debt to our country than sought for the sake of
+emolument or glory--the man, in short, who can apply to himself the
+sentence which Cato tells us my ancestor Africanus loved to repeat,
+"that he was never so busy as when he did nothing, and never less
+solitary than when alone."
+
+For who can believe that Dionysius, when after every possible effort he
+ravished from his fellow-citizens their liberty, had performed a nobler
+work than Archimedes, when, without appearing to be doing anything, he
+manufactured the globe which we have just been describing? Who does not
+see that those men are in reality more solitary who, in the midst of a
+crowd, find no one with whom they can converse congenially than those
+who, without witnesses, hold communion with themselves, and enter into
+the secret counsels of the sagest philosophers, while they delight
+themselves in their writings and discoveries? And who would think any
+one richer than the man who is in want of nothing which nature
+requires; or more powerful than he who has attained all that she has
+need of; or happier than he who is free from all mental perturbation;
+or more secure in future than he who carries all his property in
+himself, which is thus secured from shipwreck? And what power, what
+magistracy, what royalty, can be preferred to a wisdom which, looking
+down on all terrestrial objects as low and transitory things,
+incessantly directs its attention to eternal and immutable verities,
+and which is persuaded that though others are called men, none are
+really so but those who are refined by the appropriate acts of
+humanity?
+
+In this sense an expression of Plato or some other philosopher appears
+to me exceedingly elegant, who, when a tempest had driven his ship on
+an unknown country and a desolate shore, during the alarms with which
+their ignorance of the region inspired his companions, observed, they
+say, geometrical figures traced in the sand, on which he immediately
+told them to be of good cheer, for he had observed the indications of
+Man. A conjecture he deduced, not from the cultivation of the soil
+which he beheld, but from the symbols of science. For this reason,
+Tubero, learning and learned men, and these your favorite studies, have
+always particularly pleased me.
+
+XVIII. Then Lælius replied: I cannot venture, Scipio, to answer your
+arguments, or to [maintain the discussion either against] you, Philus,
+or Manilius.[302] * * *
+
+We had a friend in Tubero's father's family, who in these respects may
+serve him as a model.
+
+     Sextus so wise, and ever on his guard.
+
+Wise and cautious indeed he was, as Ennius justly describes him--not
+because he searched for what he could never find, but because he knew
+how to answer those who prayed for deliverance from cares and
+difficulties. It is he who, reasoning against the astronomical studies
+of Gallus, used frequently to repeat these words of Achilles in the
+Iphigenia[303]:
+
+    They note the astrologic signs of heaven,
+    Whene'er the goats or scorpions of great Jove,
+    Or other monstrous names of brutal forms,
+    Rise in the zodiac; but not one regards
+    The sensible facts of earth, on which we tread,
+    While gazing on the starry prodigies.
+
+He used, however, to say (and I have often listened to him with
+pleasure) that for his part he thought that Zethus, in the piece of
+Pacuvius, was too inimical to learning. He much preferred the
+Neoptolemus of Ennius, who professes himself desirous of philosophizing
+only in moderation; for that he did not think it right to be wholly
+devoted to it. But though the studies of the Greeks have so many charms
+for you, there are others, perhaps, nobler and more extensive, which we
+may be better able to apply to the service of real life, and even to
+political affairs. As to these abstract sciences, their utility, if
+they possess any, lies principally in exciting and stimulating the
+abilities of youth, so that they more easily acquire more important
+accomplishments.
+
+XIX. Then Tubero said: I do not mean to disagree with you, Lælius; but,
+pray, what do you call more important studies?
+
+_Lælius._ I will tell you frankly, though perhaps you will think
+lightly of my opinion, since you appeared so eager in interrogating
+Scipio respecting the celestial phenomena; but I happen to think that
+those things which are every day before our eyes are more particularly
+deserving of our attention. Why should the child of Paulus Æmilius, the
+nephew of Æmilius, the descendant of such a noble family and so
+glorious a republic, inquire how there can be two suns in heaven, and
+not ask how there can be two senates in one Commonwealth, and, as it
+were, two distinct peoples? For, as you see, the death of Tiberius
+Gracchus, and the whole system of his tribuneship, has divided one
+people into two parties. But the slanderers and the enemies of Scipio,
+encouraged by P. Crassus and Appius Claudius, maintained, after the
+death of these two chiefs, a division of nearly half the senate, under
+the influence of Metellus and Mucius. Nor would they permit the
+man[304] who alone could have been of service to help us out of our
+difficulties during the movement of the Latins and their allies towards
+rebellion, violating all our treaties in the presence of factious
+triumvirs, and creating every day some fresh intrigue, to the
+disturbance of the worthier and wealthier citizens. This is the reason,
+young men, if you will listen to me, why you should regard this new sun
+with less alarm; for, whether it does exist, or whether it does not
+exist, it is, as you see, quite harmless to us. As to the manner of its
+existence, we can know little or nothing; and even if we obtained the
+most perfect understanding of it, this knowledge would make us but
+little wiser or happier. But that there should exist a united people
+and a united senate is a thing which actually may be brought about, and
+it will be a great evil if it is not; and that it does not exist at
+present we are aware; and we see that if it can be effected, our lives
+will be both better and happier.
+
+XX. Then Mucius said: What, then, do you consider, my Lælius, should be
+our best arguments in endeavoring to bring about the object of your
+wishes?
+
+_Lælius._ Those sciences and arts which teach us how we may be most
+useful to the State; for I consider that the most glorious office of
+wisdom, and the noblest proof and business of virtue. In order,
+therefore, that we may consecrate these holidays as much as possible to
+conversations which may be profitable to the Commonwealth, let us beg
+Scipio to explain to us what in his estimation appears to be the best
+form of government. Then let us pass on to other points, the knowledge
+of which may lead us, as I hope, to sound political views, and unfold
+the causes of the dangers which now threaten us.
+
+XXI. When Philus, Manilius, and Mummius had all expressed their great
+approbation of this idea[305] * * * I have ventured [to open our
+discussion] in this way, not only because it is but just that on State
+politics the chief man in the State should be the principal speaker,
+but also because I recollect that you, Scipio, were formerly very much
+in the habit of conversing with Panætius and Polybius, two Greeks,
+exceedingly learned in political questions, and that you are master of
+many arguments by which you prove that by far the best condition of
+government is that which our ancestors have handed down to us. And as
+you, therefore, are familiar with this subject, if you will explain to
+us your views respecting the general principles of a state (I speak for
+my friends as well as myself), we shall feel exceedingly obliged to
+you.
+
+XXII. Then Scipio said: I must acknowledge that there is no subject of
+meditation to which my mind naturally turns with more ardor and
+intensity than this very one which Lælius has proposed to us. And,
+indeed, as I see that in every profession, every artist who would
+distinguish himself, thinks of, and aims at, and labors for no other
+object but that of attaining perfection in his art, should not I, whose
+main business, according to the example of my father and my ancestors,
+is the advancement and right administration of government, be
+confessing myself more indolent than any common mechanic if I were to
+bestow on this noblest of sciences less attention and labor than they
+devote to their insignificant trades? However, I am neither entirely
+satisfied with the decisions which the greatest and wisest men of
+Greece have left us; nor, on the other hand, do I venture to prefer my
+own opinions to theirs. Therefore, I must request you not to consider
+me either entirely ignorant of the Grecian literature, nor yet
+disposed, especially in political questions, to yield it the
+pre-eminence over our own; but rather to regard me as a true-born
+Roman, not illiberally instructed by the care of my father, and
+inflamed with the desire of knowledge, even from my boyhood, but still
+even more familiar with domestic precepts and practices than the
+literature of books.
+
+XXIII. On this Philus said: I have no doubt, my Scipio, that no one is
+superior to you in natural genius, and that you are very far superior
+to every one in the practical experience of national government and of
+important business. We are also acquainted with the course which your
+studies have at all times taken; and if, as you say, you have given so
+much attention to this science and art of politics, we cannot be too
+much obliged to Lælius for introducing the subject: for I trust that
+what we shall hear from you will be far more useful and available than
+all the writings put together which the Greeks have written for us.
+
+Then Scipio replied: You are raising a very high expectation of my
+discourse, such as is a most oppressive burden to a man who is required
+to discuss grave subjects.
+
+And Philus said: Although that may be a difficulty, my Scipio, still
+you will be sure to conquer it, as you always do; nor is there any
+danger of eloquence failing you, when you begin to speak on the affairs
+of a commonwealth.
+
+XXIV. Then Scipio proceeded: I will do what you wish, as far as I can;
+and I shall enter into the discussion under favor of that rule which, I
+think, should be adopted by all persons in disputations of this kind,
+if they wish to avoid being misunderstood; namely, that when men have
+agreed respecting the proper name of the matter under discussion, it
+should be stated what that name exactly means, and what it legitimately
+includes. And when that point is settled, then it is fit to enter on
+the discussion; for it will never be possible to arrive at an
+understanding of what the character of the subject of the discussion
+is, unless one first understands exactly what it is. Since, then, our
+investigations relate to a commonwealth, we must first examine what
+this name properly signifies.
+
+And when Lælius had intimated his approbation of this course, Scipio
+continued:
+
+I shall not adopt, said he, in so clear and simple a manner that system
+of discussion which goes back to first principles; as learned men often
+do in this sort of discussion, so as to go back to the first meeting of
+male and female, and then to the first birth and formation of the first
+family, and define over and over again what there is in words, and in
+how many manners each thing is stated. For, as I am speaking to men of
+prudence, who have acted with the greatest glory in the Commonwealth,
+both in peace and war, I will take care not to allow the subject of the
+discussion itself to be clearer than my explanation of it. Nor have I
+undertaken this task with the design of examining all its minuter
+points, like a school-master; nor will I promise you in the following
+discourse not to omit any single particular.
+
+Then Lælius said: For my part, I am impatient for exactly that kind of
+disquisition which you promise us.
+
+XXV. Well, then, said Africanus, a commonwealth is a constitution of
+the entire people. But the people is not every association of men,
+however congregated, but the association of the entire number, bound
+together by the compact of justice, and the communication of utility.
+The first cause of this association is not so much the weakness of man
+as a certain spirit of congregation which naturally belongs to him. For
+the human race is not a race of isolated individuals, wandering and
+solitary; but it is so constituted that even in the affluence of all
+things [and without any need of reciprocal assistance, it spontaneously
+seeks society].
+
+XXVI. [It is necessary to presuppose] these original seeds, as it were,
+since we cannot discover any primary establishment of the other
+virtues, or even of a commonwealth itself. These unions, then, formed
+by the principle which I have mentioned, established their headquarters
+originally in certain central positions, for the convenience of the
+whole population; and having fortified them by natural and artificial
+means, they called this collection of houses a city or town,
+distinguished by temples and public squares. Every people, therefore,
+which consists of such an association of the entire multitude as I have
+described, every city which consists of an assemblage of the people,
+and every commonwealth which embraces every member of these
+associations, must be regulated by a certain authority, in order to be
+permanent.
+
+This intelligent authority should always refer itself to that grand
+first principle which established the Commonwealth. It must be
+deposited in the hands of one supreme person, or intrusted to the
+administration of certain delegated rulers, or undertaken by the whole
+multitude. When the direction of all depends on one person, we call
+this individual a king, and this form of political constitution a
+kingdom. When it is in the power of privileged delegates, the State is
+said to be ruled by an aristocracy; and when the people are all in all,
+they call it a democracy, or popular constitution. And if the tie of
+social affection, which originally united men in political associations
+for the sake of public interest, maintains its force, each of these
+forms of government is, I will not say perfect, nor, in my opinion,
+essentially good, but tolerable, and such that one may accidentally be
+better than another: either a just and wise king, or a selection of the
+most eminent citizens, or even the populace itself (though this is the
+least commendable form), may, if there be no interference of crime and
+cupidity, form a constitution sufficiently secure.
+
+XXVII. But in a monarchy the other members of the State are often too
+much deprived of public counsel and jurisdiction; and under the rule of
+an aristocracy the multitude can hardly possess its due share of
+liberty, since it is allowed no share in the public deliberation, and
+no power. And when all things are carried by a democracy, although it
+be just and moderate, yet its very equality is a culpable levelling,
+inasmuch as it allows no gradations of rank. Therefore, even if Cyrus,
+the King of the Persians, was a most righteous and wise monarch, I
+should still think that the interest of the people (for this is, as I
+have said before, the same as the Commonwealth) could not be very
+effectually promoted when all things depended on the beck and nod of
+one individual. And though at present the people of Marseilles, our
+clients, are governed with the greatest justice by elected magistrates
+of the highest rank, still there is always in this condition of the
+people a certain appearance of servitude; and when the Athenians, at a
+certain period, having demolished their Areopagus, conducted all public
+affairs by the acts and decrees of the democracy alone, their State, as
+it no longer contained a distinct gradation of ranks, was no longer
+able to retain its original fair appearance.
+
+XXVIII. I have reasoned thus on the three forms of government, not
+looking on them in their disorganized and confused conditions, but in
+their proper and regular administration. These three particular forms,
+however, contained in themselves, from the first, the faults and
+defects I have mentioned; but they have also other dangerous vices, for
+there is not one of these three forms of government which has not a
+precipitous and slippery passage down to some proximate abuse. For,
+after thinking of that endurable, or, as you will have it, most amiable
+king, Cyrus--to name him in preference to any one else--then, to
+produce a change in our minds, we behold the barbarous Phalaris, that
+model of tyranny, to which the monarchical authority is easily abused
+by a facile and natural inclination. And, in like manner, along-side of
+the wise aristocracy of Marseilles, we might exhibit the oligarchical
+faction of the thirty tyrants which once existed at Athens. And, not to
+seek for other instances, among the same Athenians, we can show you
+that when unlimited power was cast into the hands of the people, it
+inflamed the fury of the multitude, and aggravated that universal
+license which ruined their State.[306] * * *
+
+XXIX. The worst condition of things sometimes results from a confusion
+of those factious tyrannies into which kings, aristocrats, and
+democrats are apt to degenerate. For thus, from these diverse elements,
+there occasionally arises (as I have said before) a new kind of
+government. And wonderful indeed are the revolutions and periodical
+returns in natural constitutions of such alternations and vicissitudes,
+which it is the part of the wise politician to investigate with the
+closest attention. But to calculate their approach, and to join to this
+foresight the skill which moderates the course of events, and retains
+in a steady hand the reins of that authority which safely conducts the
+people through all the dangers to which they expose themselves, is the
+work of a most illustrious citizen, and of almost divine genius.
+
+There is a fourth kind of government, therefore, which, in my opinion,
+is preferable to all these: it is that mixed and moderate government
+which is composed of the three particular forms which I have already
+noticed.
+
+XXX. _Lælius._ I am not ignorant, Scipio, that such is your opinion,
+for I have often heard you say so. But I do not the less desire, if it
+is not giving you too much trouble, to hear which you consider the best
+of these three forms of commonwealths. For it may be of some use in
+considering[307] * * *
+
+XXXI. * * * And each commonwealth corresponds to the nature and will of
+him who governs it. Therefore, in no other constitution than that in
+which the people exercise sovereign power has liberty any sure abode,
+than which there certainly is no more desirable blessing. And if it be
+not equally established for every one, it is not even liberty at all.
+And how can there be this character of equality, I do not say under a
+monarchy, where slavery is least disguised or doubtful, but even in
+those constitutions in which the people are free indeed in words, for
+they give their suffrages, they elect officers, they are canvassed and
+solicited for magistracies; but yet they only grant those things which
+they are obliged to grant whether they will or not, and which are not
+really in their free power, though others ask them for them? For they
+are not themselves admitted to the government, to the exercise of
+public authority, or to offices of select judges, which are permitted
+to those only of ancient families and large fortunes. But in a free
+people, as among the Rhodians and Athenians, there is no citizen
+who[308] * * *
+
+XXXII. * * * No sooner is one man, or several, elevated by wealth and
+power, than they say that * * * arise from their pride and arrogance,
+when the idle and the timid give way, and bow down to the insolence of
+riches. But if the people knew how to maintain its rights, then they
+say that nothing could be more glorious and prosperous than democracy;
+inasmuch as they themselves would be the sovereign dispensers of laws,
+judgments, war, peace, public treaties, and, finally, of the fortune
+and life of each individual citizen; and this condition of things is
+the only one which, in their opinion, can be really called a
+commonwealth, that is to say, a constitution of the people. It is on
+this principle that, according to them, a people often vindicates its
+liberty from the domination of kings and nobles; while, on the other
+hand, kings are not sought for among free peoples, nor are the power
+and wealth of aristocracies. They deny, moreover, that it is fair to
+reject this general constitution of freemen, on account of the vices of
+the unbridled populace; but that if the people be united and inclined,
+and directs all its efforts to the safety and freedom of the community,
+nothing can be stronger or more unchangeable; and they assert that this
+necessary union is easily obtained in a republic so constituted that
+the good of all classes is the same; while the conflicting interests
+that prevail in other constitutions inevitably produce dissensions;
+therefore, say they, when the senate had the ascendency, the republic
+had no stability; and when kings possess the power, this blessing is
+still more rare, since, as Ennius expresses it,
+
+    In kingdoms there's no faith, and little love.
+
+Wherefore, since the law is the bond of civil society, and the justice
+of the law equal, by what rule can the association of citizens be held
+together, if the condition of the citizens be not equal? For if the
+fortunes of men cannot be reduced to this equality--if genius cannot be
+equally the property of all--rights, at least, should be equal among
+those who are citizens of the same republic. For what is a republic but
+an association of rights?[309] * * *
+
+XXXIII. But as to the other political constitutions, these democratical
+advocates do not think they are worthy of being distinguished by the
+name which they claim. For why, say they, should we apply the name of
+king, the title of Jupiter the Beneficent, and not rather the title of
+tyrant, to a man ambitious of sole authority and power, lording it over
+a degraded multitude? For a tyrant may be as merciful as a king may be
+oppressive; so that the whole difference to the people is, whether they
+serve an indulgent master or a cruel one, since serve some one they
+must. But how could Sparta, at the period of the boasted superiority of
+her political institution, obtain a constant enjoyment of just and
+virtuous kings, when they necessarily received an hereditary monarch,
+good, bad, or indifferent, because he happened to be of the blood
+royal? As to aristocrats, Who will endure, say they, that men should
+distinguish themselves by such a title, and that not by the voice of
+the people, but by their own votes? For how is such a one judged to be
+best either in learning, sciences, or arts?[310] * * *
+
+XXXIV. * * * If it does so by hap-hazard, it will be as easily upset as
+a vessel if the pilot were chosen by lot from among the passengers. But
+if a people, being free, chooses those to whom it can trust
+itself--and, if it desires its own preservation, it will always choose
+the noblest--then certainly it is in the counsels of the aristocracy
+that the safety of the State consists, especially as nature has not
+only appointed that these superior men should excel the inferior sort
+in high virtue and courage, but has inspired the people also with the
+desire of obedience towards these, their natural lords. But they say
+this aristocratical State is destroyed by the depraved opinions of men,
+who, through ignorance of virtue (which, as it belongs to few, can be
+discerned and appreciated by few), imagine that not only rich and
+powerful men, but also those who are nobly born, are necessarily the
+best. And so when, through this popular error, the riches, and not the
+virtue, of a few men has taken possession of the State, these chiefs
+obstinately retain the title of nobles, though they want the essence of
+nobility. For riches, fame, and power, without wisdom and a just method
+of regulating ourselves and commanding others, are full of discredit
+and insolent arrogance; nor is there any kind of government more
+deformed than that in which the wealthiest are regarded as the noblest.
+
+But when virtue governs the Commonwealth, what can be more glorious?
+When he who commands the rest is himself enslaved by no lust or
+passion; when he himself exhibits all the virtues to which he incites
+and educates the citizens; when he imposes no law on the people which
+he does not himself observe, but presents his life as a living law to
+his fellow-countrymen; if a single individual could thus suffice for
+all, there would be no need of more; and if the community could find a
+chief ruler thus worthy of all their suffrages, none would require
+elected magistrates.
+
+It was the difficulty of forming plans which transferred the government
+from a king into the hands of many; and the error and temerity of the
+people likewise transferred it from the hands of the many into those of
+the few. Thus, between the weakness of the monarch and the rashness of
+the multitude, the aristocrats have occupied the middle place, than
+which nothing can be better arranged; and while they superintend the
+public interest, the people necessarily enjoy the greatest possible
+prosperity, being free from all care and anxiety, having intrusted
+their security to others, who ought sedulously to defend it, and not
+allow the people to suspect that their advantage is neglected by their
+rulers.
+
+For as to that equality of rights which democracies so loudly boast of,
+it can never be maintained; for the people themselves, so dissolute and
+so unbridled, are always inclined to flatter a number of demagogues;
+and there is in them a very great partiality for certain men and
+dignities, so that their equality, so called, becomes most unfair and
+iniquitous. For as equal honor is given to the most noble and the most
+infamous, some of whom must exist in every State, then the equity which
+they eulogize becomes most inequitable--an evil which never can happen
+in those states which are governed by aristocracies. These reasonings,
+my Lælius, and some others of the same kind, are usually brought
+forward by those that so highly extol this form of political
+constitution.
+
+XXXV. Then Lælius said: But you have not told us, Scipio, which of
+these three forms of government you yourself most approve.
+
+_Scipio._ You are right to shape your question, which of the three I
+most approve, for there is not one of them which I approve at all by
+itself, since, as I told you, I prefer that government which is mixed
+and composed of all these forms, to any one of them taken separately.
+But if I must confine myself to one of these particular forms simply
+and exclusively, I must confess I prefer the royal one, and praise that
+as the first and best. In this, which I here choose to call the
+primitive form of government, I find the title of father attached to
+that of king, to express that he watches over the citizens as over his
+children, and endeavors rather to preserve them in freedom than reduce
+them to slavery. So that it is more advantageous for those who are
+insignificant in property and capacity to be supported by the care of
+one excellent and eminently powerful man. The nobles here present
+themselves, who profess that they can do all this in much better style;
+for they say that there is much more wisdom in many than in one, and at
+least as much faith and equity. And, last of all, come the people, who
+cry with a loud voice that they will render obedience neither to the
+one nor the few; that even to brute beasts nothing is so dear as
+liberty; and that all men who serve either kings or nobles are deprived
+of it. Thus, the kings attract us by affection, the nobles by talent,
+the people by liberty; and in the comparison it is hard to choose the
+best.
+
+_Lælius._ I think so too, but yet it is impossible to despatch the
+other branches of the question, if you leave this primary point
+undetermined.
+
+XXXVI. _Scipio._ We must then, I suppose, imitate Aratus, who, when he
+prepared himself to treat of great things, thought himself in duty
+bound to begin with Jupiter.
+
+_Lælius._ Wherefore Jupiter? and what is there in this discussion which
+resembles that poem?
+
+_Scipio._ Why, it serves to teach us that we cannot better commence our
+investigations than by invoking him whom, with one voice, both learned
+and unlearned extol as the universal king of all gods and men.
+
+How so? said Lælius.
+
+Do you, then, asked Scipio, believe in nothing which is not before your
+eyes? whether these ideas have been established by the chiefs of states
+for the benefit of society, that there might be believed to exist one
+Universal Monarch in heaven, at whose nod (as Homer expresses it) all
+Olympus trembles, and that he might be accounted both king and father
+of all creatures; for there is great authority, and there are many
+witnesses, if you choose to call all many, who attest that all nations
+have unanimously recognized, by the decrees of their chiefs, that
+nothing is better than a king, since they think that all the Gods are
+governed by the divine power of one sovereign; or if we suspect that
+this opinion rests on the error of the ignorant, and should be classed
+among the fables, let us listen to those universal testimonies of
+erudite men, who have, as it were, seen with their eyes those things to
+the knowledge of which we can hardly attain by report.
+
+What men do you mean? said Lælius.
+
+Those, replied Scipio, who, by the investigation of nature, have
+arrived at the opinion that the whole universe [is animated] by a
+single Mind[311]. * * *
+
+XXXVII. But if you please, my Lælius, I will bring forward evidences
+which are neither too ancient nor in any respect barbarous.
+
+Those, said Lælius, are what I want.
+
+_Scipio._ You are aware that it is now not four centuries since this
+city of ours has been without kings.
+
+_Lælius._ You are correct; it is less than four centuries.
+
+_Scipio._ Well, then, what are four centuries in the age of a state or
+city? is it a long time?
+
+_Lælius._ It hardly amounts to the age of maturity.
+
+_Scipio._ You say truly; and yet not four centuries have elapsed since
+there was a king in Rome.
+
+_Lælius._ And he was a proud king.
+
+_Scipio._ But who was his predecessor?
+
+_Lælius._ He was an admirably just one; and, indeed, we must bestow the
+same praise on all his predecessors as far back as Romulus, who reigned
+about six centuries ago.
+
+_Scipio._ Even he, then, is not very ancient.
+
+_Lælius._ No; he reigned when Greece was already becoming old.
+
+_Scipio._ Agreed. Was Romulus, then, think you, king of a barbarous
+people?
+
+_Lælius._ Why, as to that, if we were to follow the example of the
+Greeks, who say that all people are either Greeks or barbarians, I am
+afraid that we must confess that he was a king of barbarians; but if
+this name belongs rather to manners than to languages, then I believe
+the Greeks were just as barbarous as the Romans.
+
+Then Scipio said: But with respect to the present question, we do not
+so much need to inquire into the nation as into the disposition. For if
+intelligent men, at a period so little remote, desired the government
+of kings, you will confess that I am producing authorities that are
+neither antiquated, rude, nor insignificant.
+
+XXXVIII. Then Lælius said: I see, Scipio, that you are very
+sufficiently provided with authorities; but with me, as with every fair
+judge, authorities are worth less than arguments.
+
+Scipio replied: Then, Lælius, you shall yourself make use of an
+argument derived from your own senses.
+
+_Lælius._ What senses do you mean?
+
+_Scipio._ The feelings which you experience when at any time you happen
+to feel angry with any one.
+
+_Lælius._ That happens rather oftener than I could wish.
+
+_Scipio._ Well, then, when you are angry, do you permit your anger to
+triumph over your judgment?
+
+No, by Hercules! said Lælius; I imitate the famous Archytas of
+Tarentum, who, when he came to his villa, and found all its
+arrangements were contrary to his orders, said to his steward, "Ah! you
+unlucky scoundrel, I would flog you to death, if it were not that I am
+in a rage with you."
+
+Capital, said Scipio. Archytas, then, regarded unreasonable anger as a
+kind of sedition and rebellion of nature which he sought to appease by
+reflection. And so, if we examine avarice, the ambition of power or of
+glory, or the lusts of concupiscence and licentiousness, we shall find
+a certain conscience in the mind of man, which, like a king, sways by
+the force of counsel all the inferior faculties and propensities; and
+this, in truth, is the noblest portion of our nature; for when
+conscience reigns, it allows no resting-place to lust, violence, or
+temerity.
+
+_Lælius._ You have spoken the truth.
+
+_Scipio._ Well, then, does a mind thus governed and regulated meet your
+approbation?
+
+_Lælius._ More than anything upon earth.
+
+_Scipio._ Then you would not approve that the evil passions, which are
+innumerable, should expel conscience, and that lusts and animal
+propensities should assume an ascendency over us?
+
+_Lælius._ For my part, I can conceive nothing more wretched than a mind
+thus degraded, or a man animated by a soul so licentious.
+
+_Scipio._ You desire, then, that all the faculties of the mind should
+submit to a ruling power, and that conscience should reign over them
+all?
+
+_Lælius._ Certainly, that is my wish.
+
+_Scipio._ How, then, can you doubt what opinion to form on the subject
+of the Commonwealth? in which, if the State is thrown into many hands,
+it is very plain that there will be no presiding authority; for if
+power be not united, it soon comes to nothing.
+
+XXXIX. Then Lælius asked: But what difference is there, I should like
+to know, between the one and the many, if justice exists equally in
+many?
+
+And Scipio said: Since I see, my Lælius, that the authorities I have
+adduced have no great influence on you, I must continue to employ you
+yourself as my witness in proof of what I am saying.
+
+In what way, said Lælius, are you going to make me again support your
+argument?
+
+_Scipio._ Why, thus: I recollect, when we were lately at Formiæ, that
+you told your servants repeatedly to obey the orders of more than one
+master only.
+
+_Lælius._ To be sure, those of my steward.
+
+_Scipio._ What do you at home? Do you commit your affairs to the hands
+of many persons?
+
+_Lælius._ No, I trust them to myself alone.
+
+_Scipio._ Well, in your whole establishment, is there any other master
+but yourself?
+
+_Lælius._ Not one.
+
+_Scipio._ Then I think you must grant me that, as respects the State,
+the government of single individuals, provided they are just, is
+superior to any other.
+
+_Lælius._ You have conducted me to this conclusion, and I entertain
+very nearly that opinion.
+
+XL. And Scipio said: You would still further agree with me, my Lælius,
+if, omitting the common comparisons, that one pilot is better fitted to
+steer a ship, and a physician to treat an invalid, provided they be
+competent men in their respective professions, than many could be, I
+should come at once to more illustrious examples.
+
+_Lælius._ What examples do you mean?
+
+_Scipio._ Do not you observe that it was the cruelty and pride of one
+single Tarquin only that made the title of king unpopular among the
+Romans?
+
+_Lælius._ Yes, I acknowledge that.
+
+_Scipio._ You are also aware of this fact, on which I think I shall
+debate in the course of the coming discussion, that after the expulsion
+of King Tarquin, the people was transported by a wonderful excess of
+liberty. Then innocent men were driven into banishment; then the
+estates of many individuals were pillaged, consulships were made
+annual, public authorities were overawed by mobs, popular appeals took
+place in all cases imaginable; then secessions of the lower orders
+ensued, and, lastly, those proceedings which tended to place all powers
+in the hands of the populace.
+
+_Lælius._ I must confess this is all too true.
+
+All these things now, said Scipio, happened during periods of peace and
+tranquillity, for license is wont to prevail when there is little to
+fear, as in a calm voyage or a trifling disease. But as we observe the
+voyager and the invalid implore the aid of some one competent director,
+as soon as the sea grows stormy and the disease alarming, so our nation
+in peace and security commands, threatens, resists, appeals from, and
+insults its magistrates, but in war obeys them as strictly as kings;
+for public safety is, after all, rather more valuable than popular
+license. And in the most serious wars, our countrymen have even chosen
+the entire command to be deposited in the hands of some single chief,
+without a colleague; the very name of which magistrate indicates the
+absolute character of his power. For though he is evidently called
+dictator because he is appointed (dicitur), yet do we still observe
+him, my Lælius, in our sacred books entitled Magister Populi (the
+master of the people).
+
+This is certainly the case, said Lælius.
+
+Our ancestors, therefore, said Scipio, acted wisely.[312] * * *
+
+XLI. When the people is deprived of a just king, as Ennius says, after
+the death of one of the best of monarchs,
+
+    They hold his memory dear, and, in the warmth
+    Of their discourse, they cry, O Romulus!
+    O prince divine, sprung from the might of Mars
+    To be thy country's guardian! O our sire!
+    Be our protector still, O heaven-begot!
+
+Not heroes, nor lords alone, did they call those whom they lawfully
+obeyed; nor merely as kings did they proclaim them; but they pronounced
+them their country's guardians, their fathers, and their Gods. Nor,
+indeed, without cause, for they added,
+
+    Thou, Prince, hast brought us to the gates of light.
+
+And truly they believed that life and honor and glory had arisen to
+them from the justice of their king. The same good-will would doubtless
+have remained in their descendants, if the same virtues had been
+preserved on the throne; but, as you see, by the injustice of one man
+the whole of that kind of constitution fell into ruin.
+
+I see it indeed, said Lælius, and I long to know the history of these
+political revolutions both in our own Commonwealth and in every other.
+
+XLII. And Scipio said: When I shall have explained my opinion
+respecting the form of government which I prefer, I shall be able to
+speak to you more accurately respecting the revolutions of states,
+though I think that such will not take place so easily in the mixed
+form of government which I recommend. With respect, however, to
+absolute monarchy, it presents an inherent and invincible tendency to
+revolution. No sooner does a king begin to be unjust than this entire
+form of government is demolished, and he at once becomes a tyrant,
+which is the worst of all governments, and one very closely related to
+monarchy. If this State falls into the hands of the nobles, which is
+the usual course of events, it becomes an aristocracy, or the second of
+the three kinds of constitutions which I have described; for it is, as
+it were, a royal--that is to say, a paternal--council of the chief men
+of the State consulting for the public benefit. Or if the people by
+itself has expelled or slain a tyrant, it is moderate in its conduct as
+long as it has sense and wisdom, and while it rejoices in its exploit,
+and applies itself to maintaining the constitution which it has
+established. But if ever the people has raised its forces against a
+just king and robbed him of his throne, or, as has frequently happened,
+has tasted the blood of its legitimate nobles, and subjected the whole
+Commonwealth to its own license, you can imagine no flood or
+conflagration so terrible, or any whose violence is harder to appease
+than this unbridled insolence of the populace.
+
+XLIII. Then we see realized that which Plato so vividly describes, if I
+can but express it in our language. It is by no means easy to do it
+justice in translation: however, I will try.
+
+When, says Plato, the insatiate jaws of the populace are fired with the
+thirst of liberty, and when the people, urged on by evil ministers,
+drains in its thirst the cup, not of tempered liberty, but unmitigated
+license, then the magistrates and chiefs, if they are not utterly
+subservient and remiss, and shameless promoters of the popular
+licentiousness, are pursued, incriminated, accused, and cried down
+under the title of despots and tyrants. I dare say you recollect the
+passage.
+
+Yes, said Lælius, it is familiar to me.
+
+_Scipio._ Plato thus proceeds: Then those who feel in duty bound to
+obey the chiefs of the State are persecuted by the insensate populace,
+who call them voluntary slaves. But those who, though invested with
+magistracies, wish to be considered on an equality with private
+individuals, and those private individuals who labor to abolish all
+distinctions between their own class and the magistrates, are extolled
+with acclamations and overwhelmed with honors, so that it inevitably
+happens in a commonwealth thus revolutionized that liberalism abounds
+in all directions, due authority is found wanting even in private
+families, and misrule seems to extend even to the animals that witness
+it. Then the father fears the son, and the son neglects the father. All
+modesty is banished; they become far too liberal for that. No
+difference is made between the citizen and the alien; the master dreads
+and cajoles his scholars, and the scholars despise their masters. The
+young men assume the gravity of sages, and sages must stoop to the
+follies of children, lest they should be hated and oppressed by them.
+The very slaves even are under but little restraint; wives boast the
+same rights as their husbands; dogs, horses, and asses are emancipated
+in this outrageous excess of freedom, and run about so violently that
+they frighten the passengers from the road. At length the termination
+of all this infinite licentiousness is, that the minds of the citizens
+become so fastidious and effeminate, that when they observe even the
+slightest exertion of authority they grow angry and seditious, and thus
+the laws begin to be neglected, so that the people are absolutely
+without any master at all.
+
+Then Lælius said: You have very accurately rendered the opinions which
+he expressed.
+
+XLIV. _Scipio._ Now, to return to the argument of my discourse. It
+appears that this extreme license, which is the only liberty in the
+eyes of the vulgar, is, according to Plato, such that from it as a sort
+of root tyrants naturally arise and spring up. For as the excessive
+power of an aristocracy occasions the destruction of the nobles, so
+this excessive liberalism of democracies brings after it the slavery of
+the people. Thus we find in the weather, the soil, and the animal
+constitution the most favorable conditions are sometimes suddenly
+converted by their excess into the contrary, and this fact is
+especially observable in political governments; and this excessive
+liberty soon brings the people collectively and individually to an
+excessive servitude. For, as I said, this extreme liberty easily
+introduces the reign of tyranny, the severest of all unjust slaveries.
+In fact, from the midst of this unbridled and capricious populace, they
+elect some one as a leader in opposition to their afflicted and
+expelled nobles: some new chief, forsooth, audacious and impure, often
+insolently persecuting those who have deserved well of the State, and
+ready to gratify the populace at his neighbor's expense as well as his
+own. Then, since the private condition is naturally exposed to fears
+and alarms, the people invest him with many powers, and these are
+continued in his hands. Such men, like Pisistratus of Athens, will soon
+find an excuse for surrounding themselves with body-guards, and they
+will conclude by becoming tyrants over the very persons who raised them
+to dignity. If such despots perish by the vengeance of the better
+citizens, as is generally the case, the constitution is re-established;
+but if they fall by the hands of bold insurgents, then the same faction
+succeeds them, which is only another species of tyranny. And the same
+revolution arises from the fair system of aristocracy when any
+corruption has betrayed the nobles from the path of rectitude. Thus the
+power is like the ball which is flung from hand to hand: it passes from
+kings to tyrants, from tyrants to the aristocracy, from them to
+democracy, and from these back again to tyrants and to factions; and
+thus the same kind of government is seldom long maintained.
+
+XLV. Since these are the facts of experience, royalty is, in my
+opinion, very far preferable to the three other kinds of political
+constitutions. But it is itself inferior to that which is composed of
+an equal mixture of the three best forms of government, united and
+modified by one another. I wish to establish in a commonwealth a royal
+and pre-eminent chief. Another portion of power should be deposited in
+the hands of the aristocracy, and certain things should be reserved to
+the judgment and wish of the multitude. This constitution, in the first
+place, possesses that great equality without which men cannot long
+maintain their freedom; secondly, it offers a great stability, while
+the particular separate and isolated forms easily fall into their
+contraries; so that a king is succeeded by a despot, an aristocracy by
+a faction, a democracy by a mob and confusion; and all these forms are
+frequently sacrificed to new revolutions. In this united and mixed
+constitution, however, similar disasters cannot happen without the
+greatest vices in public men. For there can be little to occasion
+revolution in a state in which every person is firmly established in
+his appropriate rank, and there are but few modes of corruption into
+which we can fall.
+
+XLVI. But I fear, Lælius, and you, my amiable and learned friends, that
+if I were to dwell any longer on this argument, my words would seem
+rather like the lessons of a master, and not like the free conversation
+of one who is uniting with you in the consideration of truth. I shall
+therefore pass on to those things which are familiar to all, and which
+I have long studied. And in these matters I believe, I feel, and I
+affirm that of all governments there is none which, either in its
+entire constitution or the distribution of its parts, or in the
+discipline of its manners, is comparable to that which our fathers
+received from our earliest ancestors, and which they have handed down
+to us. And since you wish to hear from me a development of this
+constitution, with which you are all acquainted, I shall endeavor to
+explain its true character and excellence. Thus keeping my eye fixed on
+the model of our Roman Commonwealth, I shall endeavor to accommodate to
+it all that I have to say on the best form of government. And by
+treating the subject in this way, I think I shall be able to accomplish
+most satisfactorily the task which Lælius has imposed on me.
+
+XLVII. _Lælius._ It is a task most properly and peculiarly your own, my
+Scipio; for who can speak so well as you either on the subject of the
+institutions of our ancestors, since you yourself are descended from
+most illustrious ancestors, or on that of the best form of a
+constitution which, if we possess (though at this moment we do not,
+still), when we do possess such a thing, who will be more flourishing
+in it than you? or on that of providing counsels for the future, as
+you, who, by dispelling two mighty perils from our city, have provided
+for its safety forever?
+
+
+FRAGMENTS.
+
+
+XLVIII. As our country is the source of the greatest benefits, and is a
+parent dearer than those who have given us life, we owe her still
+warmer gratitude than belongs to our human relations. * * *
+
+Nor would Carthage have continued to flourish during six centuries
+without wisdom and good institutions. * * *
+
+In truth, says Cicero, although the reasonings of those men may contain
+most abundant fountains of science and virtue; still, if we compare
+them with the achievements and complete actions of statesmen, they will
+seem not to have been of so much service in the actual business of men
+as of amusement for their leisure.
+
+       *       *       *       *       *
+
+
+
+
+INTRODUCTION TO THE SECOND BOOK,
+
+BY THE ORIGINAL TRANSLATOR.
+
+
+   In this second book of his Commonwealth, Cicero gives us a
+     spirited and eloquent review of the history and successive
+     developments of the Roman constitution. He bestows the
+     warmest praises on its early kings, points out the great
+     advantages which had resulted from its primitive monarchical
+     system, and explains how that system had been gradually
+     broken up. In order to prove the importance of reviving it,
+     he gives a glowing picture of the evils and disasters that
+     had befallen the Roman State in consequence of that
+     overcharge of democratic folly and violence which had
+     gradually gained an alarming preponderance, and describes,
+     with a kind of prophetic sagacity, the fruit of his political
+     experience, the subsequent revolutions of the Roman State,
+     which such a state of things would necessarily bring about.
+
+
+
+
+BOOK II.
+
+
+I. [When, therefore, he observed all his friends kindled with the
+de]sire of hearing him, Scipio thus opened the discussion. I will
+commence, said Scipio, with a sentiment of old Cato, whom, as you know,
+I singularly loved and exceedingly admired, and to whom, in compliance
+with the judgment of both my parents, and also by my own desire, I was
+entirely devoted during my youth; of whose discourse, indeed, I could
+never have enough, so much experience did he possess as a statesman
+respecting the republic which he had so long governed, both in peace
+and war, with so much success. There was also an admirable propriety in
+his style of conversation, in which wit was tempered with gravity; a
+wonderful aptitude for acquiring, and at the same time communicating,
+information; and his life was in perfect correspondence and unison with
+his language. He used to say that the government of Rome was superior
+to that of other states for this reason, because in nearly all of them
+there had been single individuals, each of whom had regulated their
+commonwealth according to their own laws and their own ordinances. So
+Minos had done in Crete, and Lycurgus in Sparta; and in Athens, which
+experienced so many revolutions, first Theseus, then Draco, then Solon,
+then Clisthenes, afterward many others; and, lastly, when it was almost
+lifeless and quite prostrate, that great and wise man, Demetrius
+Phalereus, supported it. But our Roman constitution, on the contrary,
+did not spring from the genius of one individual, but from that of
+many; and it was established, not in the lifetime of one man, but in
+the course of several ages and centuries. For, added he, there never
+yet existed any genius so vast and comprehensive as to allow nothing at
+any time to escape its attention; and all the geniuses in the world
+united in a single mind could never, within the limits of a single
+life, exert a foresight sufficiently extensive to embrace and harmonize
+all, without the aid of experience and practice.
+
+Thus, according to Cato's usual habit, I now ascend in my discourse to
+the "origin of the people," for I like to adopt the expression of Cato.
+I shall also more easily execute my proposed task if I thus exhibit to
+you our political constitution in its infancy, progress, and maturity,
+now so firm and fully established, than if, after the example of
+Socrates in the books of Plato, I were to delineate a mere imaginary
+republic.
+
+II. When all had signified their approbation, Scipio resumed: What
+commencement of a political constitution can we conceive more
+brilliant, or more universally known, than the foundation of Rome by
+the hand of Romulus? And he was the son of Mars: for we may grant this
+much to the common report existing among men, especially as it is not
+merely ancient, but one also which has been wisely maintained by our
+ancestors, in order that those who have done great service to
+communities may enjoy the reputation of having received from the Gods,
+not only their genius, but their very birth.
+
+It is related, then, that soon after the birth of Romulus and his
+brother Remus, Amulius, King of Alba, fearing that they might one day
+undermine his authority, ordered that they should be exposed on the
+banks of the Tiber; and that in this situation the infant Romulus was
+suckled by a wild beast; that he was afterward educated by the
+shepherds, and brought up in the rough way of living and labors of the
+countrymen; and that he acquired, when he grew up, such superiority
+over the rest by the vigor of his body and the courage of his soul,
+that all the people who at that time inhabited the plains in the midst
+of which Rome now stands, tranquilly and willingly submitted to his
+government. And when he had made himself the chief of those bands, to
+come from fables to facts, he took Alba Longa, a powerful and strong
+city at that time, and slew its king, Amulius.
+
+III. Having acquired this glory, he conceived the design (as they tell
+us) of founding a new city and establishing a new state. As respected
+the site of his new city, a point which requires the greatest foresight
+in him who would lay the foundation of a durable commonwealth, he chose
+the most convenient possible position. For he did not advance too near
+the sea, which he might easily have done with the forces under his
+command, either by entering the territory of the Rutuli and Aborigines,
+or by founding his citadel at the mouth of the Tiber, where many years
+after Ancus Martius established a colony. But Romulus, with admirable
+genius and foresight, observed and perceived that sites very near the
+sea are not the most favorable positions for cities which would attain
+a durable prosperity and dominion. And this, first, because maritime
+cities are always exposed, not only to many attacks, but to perils they
+cannot provide against. For the continued land gives notice, by many
+indications, not only of any regular approaches, but also of any sudden
+surprises of an enemy, and announces them beforehand by the mere sound.
+There is no adversary who, on an inland territory, can arrive so
+swiftly as to prevent our knowing not only his existence, but his
+character too, and where he comes from. But a maritime and naval enemy
+can fall upon a town on the sea-coast before any one suspects that he
+is about to come; and when he does come, nothing exterior indicates who
+he is, or whence he comes, or what he wishes; nor can it even be
+determined and distinguished on all occasions whether he is a friend or
+a foe.
+
+IV. But maritime cities are likewise naturally exposed to corrupt
+influences, and revolutions of manners. Their civilization is more or
+less adulterated by new languages and customs, and they import not only
+foreign merchandise, but foreign fashions, to such a degree that
+nothing can continue unalloyed in the national institutions. Those who
+inhabit these maritime towns do not remain in their native place, but
+are urged afar from their homes by winged hope and speculation. And
+even when they do not desert their country in person, still their minds
+are always expatiating and voyaging round the world.
+
+Nor, indeed, was there any cause which more deeply undermined Corinth
+and Carthage, and at last overthrew them both, than this wandering and
+dispersion of their citizens, whom the passion of commerce and
+navigation had induced to abandon the cultivation of their lands and
+their attention to military pursuits.
+
+The proximity of the sea likewise administers to maritime cities a
+multitude of pernicious incentives to luxury, which are either acquired
+by victory or imported by commerce; and the very agreeableness of their
+position nourishes many expensive and deceitful gratifications of the
+passions. And what I have spoken of Corinth may be applied, for aught I
+know, without incorrectness to the whole of Greece. For the
+Peloponnesus itself is almost wholly on the sea-coast; nor, besides the
+Phliasians, are there any whose lands do not touch the sea; and beyond
+the Peloponnesus, the Ænianes, the Dorians, and the Dolopes are the
+only inland people. Why should I speak of the Grecian islands, which,
+girded by the waves, seem all afloat, as it were, together with the
+institutions and manners of their cities? And these things, I have
+before noticed, do not respect ancient Greece only; for which of all
+those colonies which have been led from Greece into Asia, Thracia,
+Italy, Sicily, and Africa, with the single exception of Magnesia, is
+there that is not washed by the sea? Thus it seems as if a sort of
+Grecian coast had been annexed to territories of the barbarians. For
+among the barbarians themselves none were heretofore a maritime people,
+if we except the Carthaginians and Etruscans; one for the sake of
+commerce, the other of pillage. And this is one evident reason of the
+calamities and revolutions of Greece, because she became infected with
+the vices which belong to maritime cities, which I just now briefly
+enumerated. But yet, notwithstanding these vices, they have one great
+advantage, and one which is of universal application, namely, that
+there is a great facility for new inhabitants flocking to them. And,
+again, that the inhabitants are enabled to export and send abroad the
+produce of their native lands to any nation they please, which offers
+them a market for their goods.
+
+V. By what divine wisdom, then, could Romulus embrace all the benefits
+that could belong to maritime cities, and at the same time avoid the
+dangers to which they are exposed, except, as he did, by building his
+city on the bank of an inexhaustible river, whose equal current
+discharges itself into the sea by a vast mouth, so that the city could
+receive all it wanted from the sea, and discharge its superabundant
+commodities by the same channel? And in the same river a communication
+is found by which it not only receives from the sea all the productions
+necessary to the conveniences and elegances of life, but those also
+which are brought from the inland districts. So that Romulus seems to
+me to have divined and anticipated that this city would one day become
+the centre and abode of a powerful and opulent empire; for there is no
+other part of Italy in which a city could be situated so as to be able
+to maintain so wide a dominion with so much ease.
+
+VI. As to the natural fortifications of Rome, who is so negligent and
+unobservant as not to have them depicted and deeply stamped on his
+memory? Such is the plan and direction of the walls, which, by the
+prudence of Romulus and his royal successors, are bounded on all sides
+by steep and rugged hills; and the only aperture between the Esquiline
+and Quirinal mountains is enclosed by a formidable rampart, and
+surrounded by an immense fosse. And as for our fortified citadel, it is
+so secured by a precipitous barrier and enclosure of rocks, that, even
+in that horrible attack and invasion of the Gauls, it remained
+impregnable and inviolable. Moreover, the site which he selected had
+also an abundance of fountains, and was healthy, though it was in the
+midst of a pestilential region; for there are hills which at once
+create a current of fresh air, and fling an agreeable shade over the
+valleys.
+
+VII. These things he effected with wonderful rapidity, and thus
+established the city, which, from his own name Romulus, he determined
+to call Rome. And in order to strengthen his new city, he conceived a
+design, singular enough, and even a little rude, yet worthy of a great
+man, and of a genius which discerned far away in futurity the means of
+strengthening his power and his people. The young Sabine females of
+honorable birth who had come to Rome, attracted by the public games and
+spectacles which Romulus then, for the first time, established as
+annual games in the circus, were suddenly carried off at the feast of
+Consus[313] by his orders, and were given in marriage to the men of the
+noblest families in Rome. And when, on this account, the Sabines had
+declared war against Rome, the issue of the battle being doubtful and
+undecided, Romulus made an alliance with Tatius, King of the Sabines,
+at the intercession of the matrons themselves who had been carried off.
+By this compact he admitted the Sabines into the city, gave them a
+participation in the religious ceremonies, and divided his power with
+their king.
+
+VIII. But after the death of Tatius, the entire government was again
+vested in the hands of Romulus, although, besides making Tatius his own
+partner, he had also elected some of the chiefs of the Sabines into the
+royal council, who on account of their affectionate regard for the
+people were called _patres_, or fathers. He also divided the people
+into three tribes, called after the name of Tatius, and his own name,
+and that of Locumo, who had fallen as his ally in the Sabine war; and
+also into thirty curiæ, designated by the names of those Sabine
+virgins, who, after being carried off at the festivals, generously
+offered themselves as the mediators of peace and coalition.
+
+But though these orders were established in the life of Tatius, yet,
+after his death, Romulus reigned with still greater power by the
+counsel and authority of the senate.
+
+IX. In this respect he approved and adopted the principle which
+Lycurgus but little before had applied to the government of Lacedæmon;
+namely, that the monarchical authority and the royal power operate best
+in the government of states when to this supreme authority is joined
+the influence of the noblest of the citizens.
+
+Therefore, thus supported, and, as it were, propped up by this council
+or senate, Romulus conducted many wars with the neighboring nations in
+a most successful manner; and while he refused to take any portion of
+the booty to his own palace, he did not cease to enrich the citizens.
+He also cherished the greatest respect for that institution of
+hierarchical and ecclesiastical ordinances which we still retain to the
+great benefit of the Commonwealth; for in the very commencement of his
+government he founded the city with religious rites, and in the
+institution of all public establishments he was equally careful in
+attending to these sacred ceremonials, and associated with himself on
+these occasions priests that were selected from each of the tribes. He
+also enacted that the nobles should act as patrons and protectors to
+the inferior citizens, their natural clients and dependants, in their
+respective districts, a measure the utility of which I shall afterward
+notice.--The judicial punishments were mostly fines of sheep and oxen;
+for the property of the people at that time consisted in their fields
+and cattle, and this circumstance has given rise to the expressions
+which still designate real and personal wealth. Thus the people were
+kept in order rather by mulctations than by bodily inflictions.
+
+X. After Romulus had thus reigned thirty-seven years, and established
+these two great supports of government, the hierarchy and the senate,
+having disappeared in a sudden eclipse of the sun, he was thought
+worthy of being added to the number of the Gods--an honor which no
+mortal man ever was able to attain to but by a glorious pre-eminence of
+virtue. And this circumstance was the more to be admired in the case of
+Romulus because most of the great men that have been deified were so
+exalted to celestial dignities by the people, in periods very little
+enlightened, when fiction was easy and ignorance went hand-in-hand with
+credulity. But with respect to Romulus we know that he lived less than
+six centuries ago, at a time when science and literature were already
+advanced, and had got rid of many of the ancient errors that had
+prevailed among less civilized peoples. For if, as we consider proved
+by the Grecian annals, Rome was founded in the seventh Olympiad, the
+life of Romulus was contemporary with that period in which Greece
+already abounded in poets and musicians--an age when fables, except
+those concerning ancient matters, received little credit.
+
+For, one hundred and eight years after the promulgation of the laws of
+Lycurgus, the first Olympiad was established, which indeed, through a
+mistake of names, some authors have supposed constituted, by Lycurgus
+likewise. And Homer himself, according to the best computation, lived
+about thirty years before the time of Lycurgus. We must conclude,
+therefore, that Homer flourished very many years before the date of
+Romulus. So that, as men had now become learned, and as the times
+themselves were not destitute of knowledge, there was not much room
+left for the success of mere fictions. Antiquity indeed has received
+fables that have at times been sufficiently improbable: but this epoch,
+which was already so cultivated, disdaining every fiction that was
+impossible, rejected[314] * * * We may therefore, perhaps, attach some
+credit to this story of Romulus's immortality, since human life was at
+that time experienced, cultivated, and instructed. And doubtless there
+was in him such energy of genius and virtue that it is not altogether
+impossible to believe the report of Proculus Julius, the husbandman, of
+that glorification having befallen Romulus which for many ages we have
+denied to less illustrious men. At all events, Proculus is reported to
+have stated in the council, at the instigation of the senators, who
+wished to free themselves from all suspicion of having been accessaries
+to the death of Romulus, that he had seen him on that hill which is now
+called the Quirinal, and that he had commanded him to inform the people
+that they should build him a temple on that same hill, and offer him
+sacrifices under the name of Quirinus.
+
+XI. You see, therefore, that the genius of this great man did not
+merely establish the constitution of a new people, and then leave them,
+as it were, crying in their cradle; but he still continued to
+superintend their education till they had arrived at an adult and
+wellnigh a mature age.
+
+Then Lælius said: We now see, my Scipio, what you meant when you said
+that you would adopt a new method of discussing the science of
+government, different from any found in the writings of the Greeks. For
+that prime master of philosophy, whom none ever surpassed in eloquence,
+I mean Plato, chose an open plain on which to build an imaginary city
+after his own taste--a city admirably conceived, as none can deny, but
+remote enough from the real life and manners of men. Others, without
+proposing to themselves any model or type of government whatever, have
+argued on the constitutions and forms of states. You, on the contrary,
+appear to be about to unite these two methods; for, as far as you have
+gone, you seem to prefer attributing to others your discoveries, rather
+than start new theories under your own name and authority, as Socrates
+has done in the writings of Plato. Thus, in speaking of the site of
+Rome, you refer to a systematic policy, to the acts of Romulus, which
+were many of them the result of necessity or chance; and you do not
+allow your discourse to run riot over many states, but you fix and
+concentrate it on our own Commonwealth. Proceed, then, in the course
+you have adopted; for I see that you intend to examine our other kings,
+in your pursuit of a perfect republic, as it were.
+
+XII. Therefore, said Scipio, when that senate of Romulus which was
+composed of the nobles, whom the king himself respected so highly that
+he designated them _patres_, or fathers, and their children patricians,
+attempted after the death of Romulus to conduct the government without
+a king, the people would not suffer it, but, amidst their regret for
+Romulus, desisted not from demanding a fresh monarch. The nobles then
+prudently resolved to establish an interregnum--a new political form,
+unknown to other nations. It was not without its use, however, since,
+during the interval which elapsed before the definitive nomination of
+the new king, the State was not left without a ruler, nor subjected too
+long to the same governor, nor exposed to the fear lest some one, in
+consequence of the prolonged enjoyment of power, should become more
+unwilling to lay it aside, or more powerful if he wished to secure it
+permanently for himself. At which time this new nation discovered a
+political provision which had escaped the Spartan Lycurgus, who
+conceived that the monarch ought not to be elective--if indeed it is
+true that this depended on Lycurgus--but that it was better for the
+Lacedæmonians to acknowledge as their sovereign the next heir of the
+race of Hercules, whoever he might be: but our Romans, rude as they
+were, saw the importance of appointing a king, not for his family, but
+for his virtue and experience.
+
+XIII. And fame having recognized these eminent qualities in Numa
+Pompilius, the Roman people, without partiality for their own citizens,
+committed itself, by the counsel of the senators, to a king of foreign
+origin, and summoned this Sabine from the city of Cures to Rome, that
+he might reign over them. Numa, although the people had proclaimed him
+king in their Comitia Curiata, did nevertheless himself pass a Lex
+Curiata respecting his own authority; and observing that the
+institutions of Romulus had too much excited the military propensities
+of the people, he judged it expedient to recall them from this habit of
+warfare by other employments.
+
+XIV. And, in the first place, he divided severally among the citizens
+the lands which Romulus had conquered, and taught them that even
+without the aid of pillage and devastation they could, by the
+cultivation of their own territories, procure themselves all kinds of
+commodities. And he inspired them with the love of peace and
+tranquillity, in which faith and justice are likeliest to flourish, and
+extended the most powerful protection to the people in the cultivation
+of their fields and the enjoyment of their produce. Pompilius likewise
+having created hierarchical institutions of the highest class, added
+two augurs to the old number. He intrusted the superintendence of the
+sacred rites to five pontiffs, selected from the body of the nobles;
+and by those laws which we still preserve on our monuments he
+mitigated, by religious ceremonials, the minds that had been too long
+inflamed by military enthusiasm and enterprise.
+
+He also established the Flamines and the Salian priests and the Vestal
+Virgins, and regulated all departments of our ecclesiastical policy
+with the most pious care. In the ordinance of sacrifices, he wished
+that the ceremonial should be very arduous and the expenditure very
+light. He thus appointed many observances, whose knowledge is extremely
+important, and whose expense far from burdensome. Thus in religious
+worship he added devotion and removed costliness. He was also the first
+to introduce markets, games, and the other usual methods of assembling
+and uniting men. By these establishments, he inclined to benevolence
+and amiability spirits whom the passion for war had rendered savage and
+ferocious. Having thus reigned in the greatest peace and concord
+thirty-nine years--for in dates we mainly follow our Polybius, than
+whom no one ever gave more attention to the investigation of the
+history of the times--he departed this life, having corroborated the
+two grand principles of political stability, religion and clemency.
+
+XV. When Scipio had concluded these remarks, Is it not, said Manilius,
+a true tradition which is current, that our king Numa was a disciple of
+Pythagoras himself, or that at least he was a Pythagorean in his
+doctrines? For I have often heard this from my elders, and we know that
+it is the popular opinion; but it does not seem to be clearly proved by
+the testimony of our public annals.
+
+Then Scipio replied: The supposition is false, my Manilius; it is not
+merely a fiction, but a ridiculous and bungling one too; and we should
+not tolerate those statements, even in fiction, relating to facts which
+not only did not happen, but which never could have happened. For it
+was not till the fourth year of the reign of Tarquinius Superbus that
+Pythagoras is ascertained to have come to Sybaris, Crotona, and this
+part of Italy. And the sixty-second Olympiad is the common date of the
+elevation of Tarquin to the throne, and of the arrival of Pythagoras.
+From which it appears, when we calculate the duration of the reigns of
+the kings, that about one hundred and forty years must have elapsed
+after the death of Numa before Pythagoras first arrived in Italy. And
+this fact, in the minds of men who have carefully studied the annals of
+time, has never been at all doubted.
+
+O ye immortal Gods! said Manilius, how deep and how inveterate is this
+error in the minds of men! However, it costs me no effort to concede
+that our Roman sciences were not imported from beyond the seas, but
+that they sprung from our own indigenous and domestic virtues.
+
+XVI. You will become still more convinced of this fact, said Africanus,
+when tracing the progress of our Commonwealth as it became gradually
+developed to its best and maturest condition. And you will find yet
+further occasion to admire the wisdom of our ancestors on this very
+account, since you will perceive, that even those things which they
+borrowed from foreigners received a much higher improvement among us
+than they possessed in the countries from whence they were imported
+among us; and you will learn that the Roman people was aggrandized, not
+by chance or hazard, but rather by counsel and discipline, to which
+fortune indeed was by no means unfavorable.
+
+XVII. After the death of King Pompilius, the people, after a short
+period of interregnum, chose Tullus Hostilius for their king, in the
+Comitia Curiata; and Tullus, after Numa's example, consulted the people
+in their curias to procure a sanction for his government. His
+excellence chiefly appeared in his military glory and great
+achievements in war. He likewise, out of his military spoils,
+constructed and decorated the House of Comitia and the Senate-house. He
+also settled the ceremonies of the proclamation of hostilities, and
+consecrated their righteous institution by the religious sanction of
+the Fetial priests, so that every war which was not duly announced and
+declared might be adjudged illegal, unjust, and impious. And observe
+how wisely our kings at that time perceived that certain rights ought
+to be allowed to the people, of which we shall have a good deal to say
+hereafter. Tullus did not even assume the ensigns of royalty without
+the approbation of the people; and when he appointed twelve lictors,
+with their axes to go before him[315] * * *
+
+XVIII. * * * [_Manilius_.] This Commonwealth of Rome, which you are so
+eloquently describing, did not creep towards perfection; it rather flew
+at once to the maturity of its grandeur.
+
+[_Scipio._] After Tullus, Ancus Martius, a descendant of Numa by his
+daughter, was appointed king by the people. He also procured the
+passing of a law[316] through the Comitia Curiata respecting his
+government. This king having conquered the Latins, admitted them to the
+rights of citizens of Rome. He added to the city the Aventine and
+Cælian hills; he distributed the lands he had taken in war; he bestowed
+on the public all the maritime forests he had acquired; and he built
+the city Ostia, at the mouth of the Tiber, and colonized it. When he
+had thus reigned twenty-three years, he died.
+
+Then said Lælius: Doubtless this king deserves our praises, but the
+Roman history is obscure. We possess, indeed, the name of this
+monarch's mother, but we know nothing of his father.
+
+It is so, said Scipio; but in those ages little more than the names of
+the kings were recorded.
+
+XIX. For the first time at this period, Rome appears to have become
+more learned by the study of foreign literature; for it was no longer a
+little rivulet, flowing from Greece towards the walls of our city, but
+an overflowing river of Grecian sciences and arts. This is generally
+attributed to Demaratus, a Corinthian, the first man of his country in
+reputation, honor, and wealth; who, not being able to bear the
+despotism of Cypselus, tyrant of Corinth, fled with large treasures,
+and arrived at Tarquinii, the most flourishing city in Etruria. There,
+understanding that the domination of Cypselus was thoroughly
+established, he, like a free and bold-hearted man, renounced his
+country, and was admitted into the number of the citizens of Tarquinii,
+and fixed his residence in that city. And having married a woman of the
+city, he instructed his two sons, according to the method of Greek
+education, in all kinds of sciences and arts.[317] * * *
+
+XX. * * * [One of these sons] was easily admitted to the rights of
+citizenship at Rome; and on account of his accomplished manners and
+learning, he became a favorite of our king Ancus to such a degree that
+he was a partner in all his counsels, and was looked upon almost as his
+associate in the government. He, besides, possessed wonderful
+affability, and was very kind in assistance, support, protection, and
+even gifts of money, to the citizens.
+
+When, therefore, Ancus died, the people by their unanimous suffrages
+chose for their king this Lucius Tarquinius (for he had thus
+transformed the Greek name of his family, that he might seem in all
+respects to imitate the customs of his adopted countrymen). And when
+he, too, had procured the passing of a law respecting his authority, he
+commenced his reign by doubling the original number of the senators.
+The ancient senators he called patricians of the major families
+(_patres majorum gentium_), and he asked their votes first; and those
+new senators whom he himself had added, he entitled patricians of minor
+families. After this, he established the order of knights, on the plan
+which we maintain to this day. He would not, however, change the
+denomination of the Tatian, Rhamnensian, and Lucerian orders, though he
+wished to do so, because Attus Nævius, an augur of the highest
+reputation, would not sanction it. And, indeed, I am aware that the
+Corinthians were remarkably attentive to provide for the maintenance
+and good condition of their cavalry by taxes levied on the inheritance
+of widows and orphans. To the first equestrian orders Lucius also added
+new ones, composing a body of three hundred knights. And this number he
+doubled, after having conquered the Æquicoli, a large and ferocious
+people, and dangerous enemies of the Roman State. Having likewise
+repulsed from our walls an invasion of the Sabines, he routed them by
+the aid of his cavalry, and subdued them. He also was the first person
+who instituted the grand games which are now called the Roman Games. He
+fulfilled his vow to build a temple to the all-good and all-powerful
+Jupiter in the Capitol--a vow which he made during a battle in the
+Sabine war--and died after a reign of thirty-eight years.
+
+XXI. Then Lælius said: All that you have been relating corroborates the
+saying of Cato, that the constitution of the Roman Commonwealth is not
+the work of one man, or one age; for we can clearly see what a great
+progress in excellent and useful institutions was continued under each
+successive king. But we are now arrived at the reign of a monarch who
+appears to me to have been of all our kings he who had the greatest
+foresight in matters of political government.
+
+So it appears to me, said Scipio; for after Tarquinius Priscus comes
+Servius Sulpicius, who was the first who is reported to have reigned
+without an order from the people. He is supposed to have been the son
+of a female slave at Tarquinii, by one of the soldiers or clients of
+King Priscus; and as he was educated among the servants of this prince,
+and waiting on him at table, the king soon observed the fire of his
+genius, which shone forth even from his childhood, so skilful was he in
+all his words and actions. Therefore, Tarquin, whose own children were
+then very young, so loved Servius that he was very commonly believed to
+be his own son, and he instructed him with the greatest care in all the
+sciences with which he was acquainted, according to the most exact
+discipline of the Greeks.
+
+But when Tarquin had perished by the plots of the sons of Ancus, and
+Servius (as I have said) had begun to reign, not by the order, but yet
+with the good-will and consent, of the citizens--because, as it was
+falsely reported that Priscus was recovering from his wounds, Servius,
+arrayed in the royal robes, delivered judgment, freed the debtors at
+his own expense, and, exhibiting the greatest affability, announced
+that he delivered judgment at the command of Priscus--he did not commit
+himself to the senate; but, after Priscus was buried, he consulted the
+people respecting his authority, and, being authorized by them to
+assume the dominion, he procured a law to be passed through the Comitia
+Curiata, confirming his government.
+
+He then, in the first place, avenged the injuries of the Etruscans by
+arms. After which[318] * * *
+
+XXII. * * * he enrolled eighteen centuries of knights of the first
+order. Afterward, having created a great number of knights from the
+common mass of the people, he divided the rest of the people into five
+classes, distinguishing between the seniors and the juniors. These he
+so constituted as to place the suffrages, not in the hands of the
+multitude, but in the power of the men of property. And he took care to
+make it a rule of ours, as it ought to be in every government, that the
+greatest number should not have the greatest weight. You are well
+acquainted with this institution, otherwise I would explain it to you;
+but you are familiar with the whole system, and know how the centuries
+of knights, with six suffrages, and the first class, comprising eighty
+centuries, besides one other century which was allotted to the
+artificers, on account of their utility to the State, produce
+eighty-nine centuries. If to these there are added twelve
+centuries--for that is the number of the centuries of the knights which
+remain[319]--the entire force of the State is summed up; and the
+arrangement is such that the remaining and far more numerous multitude,
+which is distributed through the ninety-six last centuries, is not
+deprived of a right of suffrage, which would be an arrogant measure;
+nor, on the other hand, permitted to exert too great a preponderance in
+the government, which would be dangerous.
+
+In this arrangement, Servius was very cautious in his choice of terms
+and denominations. He called the rich _assidui_, because they afforded
+pecuniary succor[320] to the State. As to those whoso fortune did not
+exceed 1500 pence, or those who had nothing but their labor, he called
+them _proletarii_ classes, as if the State should expect from them a
+hardy progeny[321] and population.
+
+Even a single one of the ninety-six last centuries contained
+numerically more citizens than the entire first class. Thus, no one was
+excluded from his right of voting, yet the preponderance of votes was
+secured to those who had the deepest stake in the welfare of the State.
+Moreover, with reference to the accensi, velati, trumpeters,
+hornblowers, proletarii[322] * * *
+
+XXIII. * * * That that republic is arranged in the best manner which,
+being composed in due proportions of those three elements, the
+monarchical, the aristocratical, and the democratic, does not by
+punishment irritate a fierce and savage mind. * * * [A similar
+institution prevailed at Carthage], which was sixty-five years more
+ancient than Rome, since it was founded thirty-nine years before the
+first Olympiad; and that most ancient law-giver Lycurgus made nearly
+the same arrangements. Thus the system of regular subordination, and
+this mixture of the three principal forms of government, appear to me
+common alike to us and them. But there is a peculiar advantage in our
+Commonwealth, than which nothing can be more excellent, which I shall
+endeavor to describe as accurately as possible, because it is of such a
+character that nothing analogous can be discovered in ancient states;
+for these political elements which I have noticed were so united in the
+constitutions of Rome, of Sparta, and of Carthage, that they were not
+counterbalanced by any modifying power. For in a state in which one man
+is invested with a perpetual domination, especially of the monarchical
+character, although there be a senate in it, as there was in Rome under
+the kings, and in Sparta, by the laws of Lycurgus, or even where the
+people exercise a sort of jurisdiction, as they used in the days of our
+monarchy, the title of king must still be pre-eminent; nor can such a
+state avoid being, and being called, a kingdom. And this kind of
+government is especially subject to frequent revolutions, because the
+fault of a single individual is sufficient to precipitate it into the
+most pernicious disasters.
+
+In itself, however, royalty is not only not a reprehensible form of
+government, but I do not know whether it is not far preferable to all
+other simple constitutions, if I approved of any simple constitution
+whatever. But this preference applies to royalty so long only as it
+maintains its appropriate character; and this character provides that
+one individual's perpetual power, and justice, and universal wisdom
+should regulate the safety, equality, and tranquillity of the whole
+people. But many privileges must be wanting to communities that live
+under a king; and, in the first place, liberty, which does not consist
+in slavery to a just master, but in slavery to no master at all[323]
+* * *
+
+XXIV. * * * [Let us now pass on to the reign of the seventh and last
+king of Rome, Tarquinius Superbus.] And even this unjust and cruel
+master had good fortune for his companion for some time in all his
+enterprises. For he subdued all Latium; he captured Suessa Pometia, a
+powerful and wealthy city, and, becoming possessed of an immense spoil
+of gold and silver, he accomplished his father's vow by the building of
+the Capitol. He established colonies, and, faithful to the institutions
+of those from whom he sprung, he sent magnificent presents, as tokens
+of gratitude for his victories, to Apollo at Delphi.
+
+XXV. Here begins the revolution of our political system of government,
+and I must beg your attention to its natural course and progression.
+For the grand point of political science, the object of our discourses,
+is to know the march and the deviations of governments, that when we
+are acquainted with the particular courses and inclinations of
+constitutions, we may be able to restrain them from their fatal
+tendencies, or to oppose adequate obstacles to their decline and fall.
+
+For this Tarquinius Superbus, of whom I am speaking, being first of all
+stained with the blood of his admirable predecessor on the throne,
+could not be a man of sound conscience and mind; and as he feared
+himself the severest punishment for his enormous crime, he sought his
+protection in making himself feared. Then, in the glory of his
+victories and his treasures, he exulted in insolent pride, and could
+neither regulate his own manners nor the passions of the members of his
+family.
+
+When, therefore, his eldest son had offered violence to Lucretia,
+daughter of Tricipitinus and wife of Collatinus, and this chaste and
+noble lady had stabbed herself to death on account of the injury she
+could not survive--then a man eminent for his genius and virtue, Lucius
+Brutus, dashed from his fellow-citizens this unjust yoke of odious
+servitude; and though he was but a private man, he sustained the
+government of the entire Commonwealth, and was the first that taught
+the people in this State that no one was a private man when the
+preservation of our liberties was concerned. Beneath his authority and
+command our city rose against tyranny, and, stirred by the recent grief
+of the father and relatives of Lucretia, and with the recollections of
+Tarquin's haughtiness, and the numberless crimes of himself and his
+sons, they pronounced sentence of banishment against him and his
+children, and the whole race of the Tarquins.
+
+XXVI. Do you not observe, then, how the king sometimes degenerates into
+the despot, and how, by the fault of one individual, a form of
+government originally good is abused to the worst of purposes? Here is
+a specimen of that despot over the people whom the Greeks denominate a
+tyrant. For, according to them, a king is he who, like a father,
+consults the interests of his people, and who preserves those whom he
+is set over in the very best condition of life. This indeed is, as I
+have said, an excellent form of government, yet still liable, and, as
+it were, inclined, to a pernicious abuse. For as soon as a king assumes
+an unjust and despotic power, he instantly becomes a tyrant, than which
+nothing baser or fouler, than which no imaginable animal can be more
+detestable to gods or men; for though in form a man, he surpasses the
+most savage monsters in ferocious cruelty. For who can justly call him
+a human being, who admits not between himself and his
+fellow-countrymen, between himself and the whole human race, any
+communication of justice, any association of kindness? But we shall
+find some fitter occasion of speaking of the evils of tyranny when the
+subject itself prompts us to declare against them who, even in a state
+already liberated, have affected these despotic insolencies.
+
+XXVII. Such is the first origin and rise of a tyrant. For this was the
+name by which the Greeks choose to designate an unjust king; and by the
+title king our Romans universally understand every man who exercises
+over the people a perpetual and undivided domination. Thus Spurius
+Cassius, and Marcus Manlius, and Spurius Mælius, are said to have
+wished to seize upon the kingly power, and lately [Tiberius Gracchus
+incurred the same accusation].[324] * * *
+
+XXVIII. * * * [Lycurgus, in Sparta, formed, under the name of Elders,]
+a small council consisting of twenty-eight members only; to these he
+allotted the supreme legislative authority, while the king held the
+supreme executive authority. Our Romans, emulating his example, and
+translating his terms, entitled those whom he had called Elders,
+Senators, which, as we have said, was done by Romulus in reference to
+the elect patricians. In this constitution, however, the power, the
+influence, and name of the king is still pre-eminent. You may
+distribute, indeed, some show of power to the people, as Lycurgus and
+Romulus did, but you inflame them, with the thirst of liberty by
+allowing them even the slightest taste of its sweetness; and still
+their hearts will be overcast with alarm lest their king, as often
+happens, should become unjust. The prosperity of the people, therefore,
+can be little better than fragile, when placed at the disposal of any
+one individual, and subjected to his will and caprices.
+
+XXIX. Thus the first example, prototype, and original of tyranny has
+been discovered by us in the history of our own Roman State,
+religiously founded by Romulus, without applying to the theoretical
+Commonwealth which, according to Plato's recital, Socrates was
+accustomed to describe in his peripatetic dialogues. We have observed
+Tarquin, not by the usurpation of any new power, but by the unjust
+abuse of the power which he already possessed, overturn the whole
+system of our monarchical constitution.
+
+Let us oppose to this example of the tyrant another, a virtuous
+king--wise, experienced, and well informed respecting the true interest
+and dignity of the citizens--a guardian, as it were, and superintendent
+of the Commonwealth; for that is a proper name for every ruler and
+governor of a state. And take you care to recognize such a man when you
+meet him, for he is the man who, by counsel and exertion, can best
+protect the nation. And as the name of this man has not yet been often
+mentioned in our discourse, and as the character of such a man must be
+often alluded to in our future conversations, [I shall take an early
+opportunity of describing it.][325] * * *
+
+XXX. * * * [Plato has chosen to suppose a territory and establishments
+of citizens, whose fortunes] were precisely equal. And he has given us
+a description of a city, rather to be desired than expected; and he has
+made out not such a one as can really exist, but one in which the
+principles of political affairs may be discerned. But for me, if I can
+in any way accomplish it, while I adopt the same general principles as
+Plato, I am seeking to reduce them to experience and practice, not in
+the shadow and picture of a state, but in a real and actual
+Commonwealth, of unrivalled amplitude and power; in order to be able to
+point out, with the most graphic precision, the causes of every
+political good and social evil.
+
+For after Rome had flourished more than two hundred and forty years
+under her kings and interreges, and after Tarquin was sent into
+banishment, the Roman people conceived as much detestation of the name
+of king as they had once experienced regret at the death, or rather
+disappearance, of Romulus. Therefore, as in the first instance they
+could hardly bear the idea of losing a king, so in the latter, after
+the expulsion of Tarquin, they could not endure to hear the name of a
+king.[326] * * *
+
+XXXI. * * * Therefore, when that admirable constitution of Romulus had
+lasted steadily about two hundred and forty years. * * * The whole of
+that law was abolished. In this humor, our ancestors banished
+Collatinus, in spite of his innocence, because of the suspicion that
+attached to his family, and all the rest of the Tarquins, on account of
+the unpopularity of their name. In the same humor, Valerius Publicola
+was the first to lower the fasces before the people, when he spoke in
+the assembly of the people. He also had the materials of his house
+conveyed to the foot of Mount Velia, having observed that the
+commencement of his edifice on the summit of this hill, where King
+Tullius had once dwelt, excited the suspicions of the people.
+
+It was the same man, who in this respect pre-eminently deserved the
+name of Publicola, who carried in favor of the people the first law
+received in the Comitia Centuriata, that no magistrate should sentence
+to death or scourging a Roman citizen who appealed from his authority
+to the people. And the pontifical books attest that the right of appeal
+had existed, even against the decision of the kings. Our augural books
+affirm the same thing. And the Twelve Tables prove, by a multitude of
+laws, that there was a right of appeal from every judgment and penalty.
+Besides, the historical fact that the decemviri who compiled the laws
+were created with the privilege of judging without appeal, sufficiently
+proves that the other magistrates had not the same power. And a
+consular law, passed by Lucius Valerius Politus and Marcus Horatius
+Barbatus, men justly popular for promoting union and concord, enacted
+that no magistrate should thenceforth be appointed with authority to
+judge without appeal; and the Portian laws, the work of three citizens
+of the name of Portius, as you are aware, added nothing new to this
+edict but a penal sanction.
+
+Therefore Publicola, having promulgated this law in favor of appeal to
+the people, immediately ordered the axes to be removed from the fasces,
+which the lictors carried before the consuls, and the next day
+appointed Spurius Lucretius for his colleague. And as the new consul
+was the oldest of the two, Publicola ordered his lictors to pass over
+to him; and he was the first to establish the rule, that each of the
+consuls should be preceded by the lictors in alternate months, that
+there should be no greater appearance of imperial insignia among the
+free people than they had witnessed in the days of their kings. Thus,
+in my opinion, he proved himself no ordinary man, as, by so granting
+the people a moderate degree of liberty, he more easily maintained the
+authority of the nobles.
+
+Nor is it without reason that I have related to you these ancient and
+almost obsolete events; but I wished to adduce my instances of men and
+circumstances from illustrious persons and times, as it is to such
+events that the rest of my discourse will be directed.
+
+XXXII. At that period, then, the senate preserved the Commonwealth in
+such a condition that though the people were really free, yet few acts
+were passed by the people, but almost all, on the contrary, by the
+authority, customs, and traditions of the senate. And over all the
+consuls exercised a power--in time, indeed, only annual, but in nature
+and prerogative completely royal.
+
+The consuls maintained, with the greatest energy, that rule which so
+much conduces to the power of our nobles and great men, that the acts
+of the commons of the people shall not be binding, unless the authority
+of the patricians has approved them. About the same period, and
+scarcely ten years after the first consuls, we find the appointment of
+the dictator in the person of Titus Lartius. And this new kind of
+power--namely, the dictatorship--appears exceedingly similar to the
+monarchical royalty. All his power, however, was vested in the supreme
+authority of the senate, to which the people deferred; and in these
+times great exploits were performed in war by brave men invested with
+the supreme command, whether dictators or consuls.
+
+XXXIII. But as the nature of things necessarily brought it to pass that
+the people, once freed from its kings, should arrogate to itself more
+and more authority, we observe that after a short interval of only
+sixteen years, in the consulship of Postumus Cominius and Spurius
+Cassius, they attained their object; an event explicable, perhaps, on
+no distinct principle, but, nevertheless, in a manner independent of
+any distinct principle. For recollect what I said in commencing our
+discourse, that if there exists not in the State a just distribution
+and subordination of rights, offices, and prerogatives, so as to give
+sufficient domination to the chiefs, sufficient authority to the
+counsel of the senators, and sufficient liberty to the people, this
+form of the government cannot be durable.
+
+For when the excessive debts of the citizens had thrown the State into
+disorder, the people first retired to Mount Sacer, and next occupied
+Mount Aventine. And even the rigid discipline of Lycurgus could not
+maintain those restraints in the case of the Greeks. For in Sparta
+itself, under the reign of Theopompus, the five magistrates whom they
+term Ephori, and in Crete ten whom they entitle Cosmi, were established
+in opposition to the royal power, just as tribunes were added among us
+to counterbalance the consular authority.
+
+XXXIV. There might have been a method, indeed, by which our ancestors
+could have been relieved from the pressure of debt, a method with which
+Solon the Athenian, who lived at no very distant period before, was
+acquainted, and which our senate did not neglect when, in the
+indignation which the odious avarice of one individual excited, all the
+bonds of the citizens were cancelled, and the right of arrest for a
+while suspended. In the same way, when the plebeians were oppressed by
+the weight of the expenses occasioned by public misfortunes, a cure and
+remedy were sought for the sake of public security. The senate,
+however, having forgotten their former decision, gave an advantage to
+the democracy; for, by the creation of two tribunes to appease the
+sedition of the people, the power and authority of the senate were
+diminished; which, however, still remained dignified and august,
+inasmuch as it was still composed of the wisest and bravest men, who
+protected their country both with their arms and with their counsels;
+whose authority was exceedingly strong and flourishing, because in
+honor they were as much before their fellow-citizens as they were
+inferior in luxuriousness, and, as a general rule, not superior to them
+in wealth. And their public virtues were the more agreeable to the
+people, because even in private matters they were ready to serve every
+citizen, by their exertions, their counsels, and their liberality.
+
+XXXV. Such was the situation of the Commonwealth when the quæstor
+impeached Spurius Cassius of being so much emboldened by the excessive
+favor of the people as to endeavor to make himself master of
+monarchical power. And, as you have heard, his own father, having said
+that he had found that his son was really guilty of this crime,
+condemned him to death at the instance of the people. About fifty-four
+years after the first consulate, Spurius Tarpeius and Aulus Aternius
+very much gratified the people by proposing, in the Comitia Centuriata,
+the substitution of fines instead of corporal punishments. Twenty years
+afterward, Lucius Papirius and Publius Pinarius, the censors, having by
+a strict levy of fines confiscated to the State the entire flocks and
+herds of many private individuals, a light tax on the cattle was
+substituted for the law of fines in the consulship of Caius Julius and
+Publius Papirius.
+
+XXXVI. But, some years previous to this, at a period when the senate
+possessed the supreme influence, and the people were submissive and
+obedient, a new system was adopted. At that time both the consuls and
+tribunes of the people abdicated their magistracies, and the decemviri
+were appointed, who were invested with great authority, from which
+there was no appeal whatever, so as to exercise the chief domination,
+and to compile the laws. After having composed, with much wisdom and
+equity, the Ten Tables of laws, they nominated as their successors in
+the ensuing year other decemviri, whose good faith and justice do not
+deserve equal praise. One member of this college, however, merits our
+highest commendation. I allude to Caius Julius, who declared respecting
+the nobleman Lucius Sestius, in whose chamber a dead body had been
+exhumed under his own eyes, that though as decemvir he held the highest
+power without appeal, he still required bail, because he was unwilling
+to neglect that admirable law which permitted no court but the Comitia
+Centuriata to pronounce final sentence on the life of a Roman citizen.
+
+XXXVII. A third year followed under the authority of the same
+decemvirs, and still they were not disposed to appoint their
+successors. In a situation of the Commonwealth like this, which, as I
+have often repeated, could not be durable, because it had not an equal
+operation with respect to all the ranks of the citizens, the whole
+public power was lodged in the hands of the chiefs and decemvirs of the
+highest nobility, without the counterbalancing authority of the
+tribunes of the people, without the sanction of any other magistracies,
+and without appeal to the people in the case of a sentence of death or
+scourging.
+
+Thus, out of the injustice of these men, there was suddenly produced a
+great revolution, which changed the entire condition of the government,
+or they added two tables of very tyrannical laws, and though
+matrimonial alliances had always been permitted, even with foreigners,
+they forbade, by the most abominable and inhuman edict, that any
+marriages should take place between the nobles and the commons--an
+order which was afterward abrogated by the decree of Canuleius.
+Besides, they introduced into all their political measures corruption,
+cruelty, and avarice. And indeed the story is well known, and
+celebrated in many literary compositions, that a certain Decimus
+Virginius was obliged, on account of the libidinous violence of one of
+these decemvirs, to stab his virgin daughter in the midst of the forum.
+Then, when he in his desperation had fled to the Roman army which was
+encamped on Mount Algidum, the soldiers abandoned the war in which they
+were engaged, and took possession of the Sacred Mount, as they had done
+before on a similar occasion, and next invested Mount Aventine in their
+arms.[327] Our ancestors knew how to prove most thoroughly, and to
+retain most wisely. * * *
+
+XXXVIII. And when Scipio had spoken in this manner, and all his friends
+were awaiting in silence the rest of his discourse, then said Tubero:
+Since these men who are older than I, my Scipio, make no fresh demands
+on you, I shall take the liberty to tell you what I particularly wish
+you would explain in your subsequent remarks.
+
+Do so, said Scipio, and I shall be glad to hear.
+
+Then Tubero said: You appear to me to have spoken a panegyric on our
+Commonwealth of Rome exclusively, though Lælius requested your views
+not only of the government of our own State, but of the policy of
+states in general. I have not, therefore, yet sufficiently learned from
+your discourse, with respect to that mixed form of government you most
+approve, by what discipline, moral and legal, we may be best able to
+establish and maintain it.
+
+XXXIX. Africanus replied: I think that we shall soon find an occasion
+better adapted to the discussion you have proposed, respecting the
+constitution and conservatism of states. As to the best form of
+government, I think on this point I have sufficiently answered the
+question of Lælius. For in answering him, I, in the first place,
+specifically noticed the three simple forms of government--monarchy,
+aristocracy, and democracy; and the three vicious constitutions
+contrary to them, into which they often degenerate; and I said that
+none of these forms, taken separately, was absolutely good; but I
+described as preferable to either of them that mixed government which
+is composed of a proper amalgamation of these simple ingredients. If I
+have since depicted our own Roman constitution as an example, it was
+not in order to define the very best form of government, for that may
+be understood without an example; but I wished, in the exhibition of a
+mighty commonwealth actually in existence, to render distinct and
+visible what reason and discourse would vainly attempt to display
+without the assistance of experimental illustration. Yet, if you still
+require me to describe the best form of government, independent of all
+particular examples, we must consult that exactly proportioned and
+graduated image of government which nature herself presents to her
+investigators. Since you * * * this model of a city and people[328]
+* * *
+
+XL. * * * which I also am searching for, and which I am anxious to
+arrive at.
+
+_Lælius._ You mean the model that would be approved by the truly
+accomplished politician?
+
+_Scipio._ The same.
+
+_Lælius._ You have plenty of fair patterns even now before you, if you
+would but begin with yourself.
+
+Then Scipio said: I wish I could find even one such, even in the entire
+senate. For he is really a wise politician who, as we have often seen
+in Africa, while seated on a huge and unsightly elephant, can guide and
+rule the monster, and turn him whichever way he likes by a slight
+admonition, without any actual exertion.
+
+_Lælius._ I recollect, and when I was your lieutenant I often saw, one
+of these drivers.
+
+_Scipio._ Thus an Indian or Carthaginian regulates one of these huge
+animals, and renders him docile and familiar with human manners. But
+the genius which resides in the mind of man, by whatever name it may be
+called, is required to rein and tame a monster far more multiform and
+intractable, whenever it can accomplish it, which indeed is seldom. It
+is necessary to hold in with a strong hand that ferocious[329] * * *
+
+XLI. * * * [beast, denominated the mob, which thirsts after blood] to
+such a degree that it can scarcely be sated with the most hideous
+massacres of men. * * *
+
+     But to a man who is greedy, and grasping, and lustful, and
+     fond of wallowing in voluptuousness.
+
+     The fourth kind of anxiety is that which is prone to mourning
+     and melancholy, and which is constantly worrying itself.
+
+          [_The next paragraph, "Esse autem angores," etc.,
+          is wholly unintelligible without the context._]
+
+     As an unskilful charioteer is dragged from his chariot,
+     covered with dirt, bruised, and lacerated.
+
+     The excitements of men's minds are like a chariot, with
+     horses harnessed to it; in the proper management of which,
+     the chief duty of the driver consists in knowing his road:
+     and if he keeps the road, then, however rapidly he proceeds,
+     he will encounter no obstacles; but if he quits the proper
+     track, then, although he may be going gently and slowly, he
+     will either be perplexed on rugged ground, or fall over some
+     steep place, or at least he will be carried where he has no
+     need to go.[330]
+
+XLII. * * * can be said.
+
+Then Lælius said: I now see the sort of politician you require, on whom
+you would impose the office and task of government, which is what I
+wished to understand.
+
+He must be an almost unique specimen, said Africanus, for the task
+which I set him comprises all others. He must never cease from
+cultivating and studying himself, that he may excite others to imitate
+him, and become, through the splendor of his talents and enterprises, a
+living mirror to his countrymen. For as in flutes and harps, and in all
+vocal performances, a certain unison and harmony must be preserved
+amidst the distinctive tones, which cannot be broken or violated
+without offending experienced ears; and as this concord and delicious
+harmony is produced by the exact gradation and modulation of dissimilar
+notes; even so, by means of the just apportionment of the highest,
+middle, and lower classes, the State is maintained in concord and peace
+by the harmonic subordination of its discordant elements: and thus,
+that which is by musicians called harmony in song answers and
+corresponds to what we call concord in the State--concord, the
+strongest and loveliest bond of security in every commonwealth, being
+always accompanied by justice and equity.
+
+     XLIII. And after this, when Scipio had discussed with
+     considerable breadth of principle and felicity of
+     illustration the great advantage that justice is to a state,
+     and the great injury which would arise if it were wanting,
+     Pilus, one of those who were present at the discussion, took
+     up the matter and demanded that this question should be
+     argued more carefully, and that something more should be said
+     about justice, on account of a sentiment that was now
+     obtaining among people in general, that political affairs
+     could not be wholly carried on without some disregard of
+     justice.
+
+XLIV. * * * to be full of justice.
+
+Then Scipio replied: I certainly think so. And I declare to you that I
+consider that all I have spoken respecting the government of the State
+is worth nothing, and that it will be useless to proceed further,
+unless I can prove that it is a false assertion that political business
+cannot be conducted without injustice and corruption; and, on the other
+hand, establish as a most indisputable fact that without the strictest
+justice no government whatever can last long.
+
+But, with your permission, we have had discussion enough for the day.
+The rest--and much remains for our consideration--we will defer till
+to-morrow. When they had all agreed to this, the debate of the day was
+closed.
+
+       *       *       *       *       *
+
+
+
+
+INTRODUCTION TO THE THIRD BOOK,
+
+BY THE ORIGINAL TRANSLATOR.
+
+
+   Cicero here enters on the grand question of Political Justice,
+     and endeavors to evince throughout the absolute verity of
+     that inestimable proverb, "Honesty is the best policy," in
+     all public as well as in all private affairs. St. Augustine,
+     in his City of God, has given the following analysis of this
+     magnificent disquisition:
+
+   "In the third book of Cicero's Commonwealth" (says he) "the
+     question of Political Justice is most earnestly discussed.
+     Philus is appointed to support, as well as he can, the
+     sophistical arguments of those who think that political
+     government cannot be carried on without the aid of injustice
+     and chicanery. He denies holding any such opinion himself;
+     yet, in order to exhibit the truth more vividly through the
+     force of contrast, he pleads with the utmost ingenuity the
+     cause of injustice against justice; and endeavors to show, by
+     plausible examples and specious dialectics, that injustice is
+     as useful to a statesman as justice would be injurious. Then
+     Lælius, at the general request, takes up the plea for
+     justice, and maintains with all his eloquence that nothing
+     could be so ruinous to states as injustice and dishonesty,
+     and that without a supreme justice, no political government
+     could expect a long duration. This point being sufficiently
+     proved, Scipio returns to the principal discussion. He
+     reproduces and enforces the short definition that he had
+     given of a commonwealth--that it consisted in the welfare of
+     the entire people, by which word 'people' he does not mean
+     the mob, but the community, bound together by the sense of
+     common rights and mutual benefits. He notices how important
+     such just definitions are in all debates whatever, and draws
+     this conclusion from the preceding arguments--that the
+     Commonwealth is the common welfare whenever it is swayed with
+     justice and wisdom, whether it be subordinated to a king, an
+     aristocracy, or a democracy. But if the king be unjust, and
+     so becomes a tyrant; and the aristocracy unjust, which makes
+     them a faction; or the democrats unjust, and so degenerate
+     into revolutionists and destructives--then not only the
+     Commonwealth is corrupted, but in fact annihilated. For it
+     can be no longer the common welfare when a tyrant or a
+     faction abuse it; and the people itself is no longer the
+     people when it becomes unjust, since it is no longer a
+     community associated by a sense of right and utility,
+     according to the definition."--_Aug. Civ. Dei._ 3-21.
+
+   This book is of the utmost importance to statesmen, as it
+     serves to neutralize the sophistries of Machiavelli, which
+     are still repeated in many cabinets.
+
+
+
+
+BOOK III.
+
+
+I. * * *[331] Cicero, in the third book of his treatise On a
+Commonwealth, says that nature has treated man less like a mother than
+a step-dame, for she has cast him into mortal life with a body naked,
+fragile, and infirm, and with a mind agitated by troubles, depressed by
+fears, broken by labors, and exposed to passions. In this mind,
+however, there lies hidden, and, as it were, buried, a certain divine
+spark of genius and intellect.
+
+Though man is born a frail and powerless being, nevertheless he is safe
+from all animals destitute of voice; and at the same time those other
+animals of greater strength, although they bravely endure the violence
+of weather, cannot be safe from man. And the result is, that reason
+does more for man than nature does for brutes; since, in the latter,
+neither the greatness of their strength nor the firmness of their
+bodies can save them from being oppressed by us, and made subject to
+our power. * * *
+
+Plato returned thanks to nature that he had been born a man.
+
+II. * * * aiding our slowness by carriages, and when it had taught men
+to utter the elementary and confused sounds of unpolished expression,
+articulated and distinguished them into their proper classes, and, as
+their appropriate signs, attached certain words to certain things, and
+thus associated, by the most delightful bond of speech, the once
+divided races of men.
+
+And by a similar intelligence, the inflections of the voice, which
+appeared infinite, are, by the discovery of a few alphabetic
+characters, all designated and expressed; by which we maintain converse
+with our absent friends, by which also indications of our wishes and
+monuments of past events are preserved. Then came the use of numbers--a
+thing necessary to human life, and at the same time immutable and
+eternal; a science which first urged us to raise our views to heaven,
+and not gaze without an object on the motions of the stars, and the
+distribution of days and nights.
+
+III. * * *[332] [Then appeared the sages of philosophy], whose minds
+took a higher flight, and who were able to conceive and to execute
+designs worthy of the gifts of the Gods. Wherefore let those men who
+have left us sublime essays on the principles of living be regarded as
+great men--which indeed they are--as learned men, as masters of truth
+and virtue; provided that these principles of civil government, this
+system of governing people, whether it be a thing discovered by men who
+have lived amidst a variety of political events, or one discussed
+amidst their opportunities of literary tranquillity, is remembered to
+be, as indeed it is, a thing by no means to be despised, being one
+which causes in first-rate minds, as we not unfrequently see, an
+incredible and almost divine virtue. And when to these high faculties
+of soul, received from nature and expanded by social institutions, a
+politician adds learning and extensive information concerning things in
+general, like those illustrious personages who conduct the dialogue in
+the present treatise, none will refuse to confess the superiority of
+such persons to all others; for, in fact, what can be more admirable
+than the study and practice of the grand affairs of state, united to a
+literary taste and a familiarity with the liberal arts? or what can we
+imagine more perfect than a Scipio, a Lælius, or a Philus, who, not to
+omit anything which belonged to the most perfect excellence of the
+greatest men, joined to the examples of our ancestors and the
+traditions of our countrymen the foreign philosophy of Socrates?
+
+Wherefore he who had both the desire and the power to acquaint himself
+thoroughly both with the customs and the learning of his ancestors
+appears to me to have attained to the very highest glory and honor. But
+if we cannot combine both, and are compelled to select one of these two
+paths to wisdom--though to some people the tranquil life spent in the
+research of literature and arts may appear to be the most happy and
+delectable--yet, doubtless, the science of politics is more laudable
+and illustrious, for in this political field of exertion our greatest
+men have reaped their honors, like the invincible Curius,
+
+    Whom neither gold nor iron could subdue.
+
+IV. * * *[333] that wisdom existed still. There existed this general
+difference between these two classes, that among the one the
+development of the principles of nature is the subject of their study
+and eloquence, and among the other national laws and institutions form
+the principal topics of investigation.
+
+In honor of our country, we may assert that she has produced within
+herself a great number, I will not say of sages (since philosophy is so
+jealous of this name), but of men worthy of the highest celebrity,
+because by them the precepts and discoveries of the sages have been
+carried out into actual practice. And, moreover, though there have
+existed, and still do exist, many great and glorious empires, yet since
+the noblest masterpiece of genius in the world is the establishment of
+a state and commonwealth which shall be a lasting one, even if we
+reckon but a single legislator for each empire, the number of these
+excellent men will appear very numerous. To be convinced of this, we
+have only to turn our eyes on any nation of Italy, Latium, the Sabines,
+the Volscians, the Samnites, or the Etrurians, and then direct our
+attention to that mighty nation of the Greeks, and then to the
+Assyrians, Persians, and Carthaginians, and[334] * * *
+
+V. * * * [Scipio and his friends having again assembled, Scipio spoke
+as follows: In our last conversation, I promised to prove that honesty
+is the best policy in all states and commonwealths whatsoever. But if I
+am to plead in favor of strict honesty and justice in all public
+affairs, no less than in private, I must request Philus, or some one
+else, to take up the advocacy of the other side; the truth will then
+become more manifest, from the collision of opposite arguments, as we
+see every day exemplified at the Bar.]
+
+And Philus replied: In good truth, you have allotted me a very
+creditable cause when you wish me to undertake the defence of vice.
+
+Perhaps, said Lælius, you are afraid, lest, in reproducing the ordinary
+objections made to justice in politics, you should seem to express your
+own sentiments; though you are universally respected as an almost
+unique example of the ancient probity and good faith; nor is it unknown
+how familiar you are with the lawyer-like habit of disputing on both
+sides of a question, because you think that this is the best way of
+getting at the truth.
+
+And Philus said: Very well; I obey you, and wilfully, with my eyes
+open, I will undertake this dirty business; because, since those who
+seek for gold do not flinch at the sight of the mud, so we who are
+searching for justice, which is far more precious than gold, are bound
+to shrink from no annoyance. And I wish, as I am about to make use of
+the antagonist arguments of a foreigner, I might also employ a foreign
+language. The pleas, therefore, now to be urged by Lucius Furius Philus
+are those [once employed by] the Greek Carneades, a man who was
+accustomed to express whatever [served his turn].[335] * * *[336]Let it
+be understood, therefore, that I by no means express my own sentiments,
+but those of Carneades, in order that you may refute this philosopher,
+who was wont to turn the best causes into joke, through the mere
+wantonness of wit.
+
+     VI. He was a philosopher of the Academic School; and if any
+     one is ignorant of his great power, and eloquence, and
+     acuteness in arguing, he may learn it from the mention made
+     of him by Cicero or by Lucilius, when Neptune, discoursing on
+     a very difficult subject, declares that it cannot be
+     explained, not even if hell were to restore Carneades himself
+     for the purpose. This philosopher, having been sent by the
+     Athenians to Rome as an ambassador, discussed the subject of
+     justice very amply in the hearing of Galba and Cato the
+     Censor, who were the greatest orators of the day. And the
+     next day he overturned all his arguments by others of a
+     contrary tendency, and disparaged justice, which the day
+     before he had extolled; speaking not indeed with the gravity
+     of a philosopher whose wisdom ought to be steady, and whose
+     opinions unchangeable, but in a kind of rhetorical exercise
+     of arguing on each side--a practice which he was accustomed
+     to adopt, in order to be able to refute others who were
+     asserting anything. The arguments by which he disparaged
+     justice are mentioned by Lucius Furius in Cicero; I suppose,
+     since he was discussing the Commonwealth, in order to
+     introduce a defence and panegyric of that quality without
+     which he did not think a commonwealth could be administered.
+     But Carneades, in order to refute Aristotle and Plato, the
+     advocates of justice, collected in his first argument
+     everything that was in the habit of being advanced on behalf
+     of justice, in order afterward to be able to overturn it, as
+     he did.
+
+     VII. Many philosophers indeed, and especially Plato and
+     Aristotle, have spoken a great deal of justice, inculcating
+     that virtue, and extolling it with the highest praise, as
+     giving to every one what belongs to him, as preserving equity
+     in all things, and urging that while the other virtues are,
+     as it were, silent and shut up, justice is the only one which
+     is not absorbed in considerations of self-interest, and which
+     is not secret, but finds its whole field for exercise
+     out-of-doors, and is desirous of doing good and serving as
+     many people as possible; as if, forsooth, justice ought to
+     exist in judges only, and in men invested with a certain
+     authority, and not in every one! But there is no one, not
+     even a man of the lowest class, or a beggar, who is destitute
+     of opportunities of displaying justice. But because these
+     philosophers knew not what its essence was, or whence it
+     proceeded, or what its employment was, they attributed that
+     first of all virtues, which is the common good of all men, to
+     a few only, and asserted that it aimed at no advantage of its
+     own, but was anxious only for that of others. So it was well
+     that Carneades, a man of the greatest genius and acuteness,
+     refuted their assertions, and overthrew that justice which
+     had no firm foundation; not because he thought justice itself
+     deserving of blame, but in order to show that those its
+     defenders had brought forward no trustworthy or strong
+     arguments in its behalf.
+
+     Justice looks out-of-doors, and is prominent and conspicuous
+     in its whole essence.
+
+     Which virtue, beyond all others, wholly devotes and dedicates
+     itself to the advantage of others.
+
+VIII. * * * Both to discover and maintain. While the other, Aristotle,
+has filled four large volumes with a discussion on abstract justice.
+For I did not expect anything grand or magnificent from Chrysippus,
+who, after his usual fashion, examines everything rather by the
+signification of words than the reality of things. But it was surely
+worthy of those heroes of philosophy to ennoble by their genius a
+virtue so eminently beneficent and liberal, which everywhere exalts the
+social interests above the selfish, and teaches us to love others
+rather than ourselves. It was worthy of their genius, we say, to
+elevate this virtue to a divine throne, not far from that of Wisdom.
+And certainly they neither wanted the will to accomplish this (for what
+else could be the cause of their writing on the subject, or what could
+have been their design?) nor the genius, in which they excelled all
+men. But the weakness of their cause was too great for either their
+intention or their eloquence to make it popular. In fact, this justice
+on which we reason is a civil right, but no natural one; for if it were
+natural and universal, then justice and injustice would be recognized
+similarly by all men, just as the heat and cold, sweetness and
+bitterness.
+
+IX. Now, if any one, carried in that chariot of winged serpents of
+which the poet Pacuvius makes mention, could take his flight over all
+nations and cities, and accurately observe their proceedings, he would
+see that the sense of justice and right varies in different regions. In
+the first place, he would behold among the unchangeable people of
+Egypt, which preserves in its archives the memory of so many ages and
+events, a bull adored as a Deity, under the name of Apis, and a
+multitude of other monsters, and all kinds of animals admitted by the
+same nation into the number of the Gods.
+
+In the next place, he would see in Greece, as among ourselves,
+magnificent temples consecrated by images in human form, which the
+Persians regarded as impious; and it is affirmed that the sole motive
+of Xerxes for commanding the conflagration of the Athenian temples was
+the belief that it was a superstitious sacrilege to keep confined
+within narrow walls the Gods, whose proper home was the entire
+universe. But afterward Philip, in his hostile projects against the
+Persians, and Alexander, who carried them into execution, alleged this
+plea for war, that they were desirous to avenge the temples of Greece,
+which the Greeks had thought proper never to rebuild, that this
+monument of the impiety of the Persians might always remain before the
+eyes of their posterity.
+
+How many--such as the inhabitants of Taurica along the Euxine Sea; as
+the King of Egypt, Busiris; as the Gauls and the Carthaginians--have
+thought it exceedingly pious and agreeable to the Gods to sacrifice
+men! And, besides, the customs of life are so various that the Cretans
+and Ætolians regard robbery as honorable. And the Lacedæmonians say
+that their territory extends to all places which they can touch with a
+lance. The Athenians had a custom of swearing, by a public
+proclamation, that all the lands which produced olives and corn were
+their own. The Gauls consider it a base employment to raise corn by
+agricultural labor, and go with arms in their hands, and mow down the
+harvests of neighboring peoples. But we ourselves, the most equitable
+of all nations, who, in order to raise the value of our vines and
+olives, do not permit the races beyond the Alps to cultivate either
+vineyards or oliveyards, are said in this matter to act with prudence,
+but not with justice. You see, then, that wisdom and policy are not
+always the same as equity. And Lycurgus, that famous inventor of a most
+admirable jurisprudence and most wholesome laws, gave the lands of the
+rich to be cultivated by the common people, who were reduced to
+slavery.
+
+X. If I were to describe the diverse kinds of laws, institutions,
+manners, and customs, not only as they vary in the numerous nations,
+but as they vary likewise in single cities--in this one of ours, for
+example--I could prove that they have had a thousand revolutions. For
+instance, that eminent expositor of our laws who sits in the present
+company--I mean Manilius--if you were to consult him relative to the
+legacies and inheritances of women, he would tell you that the present
+law is quite different from that he was accustomed to plead in his
+youth, before the Voconian enactment came into force--an edict which
+was passed in favor of the interests of the men, but which is evidently
+full of injustice with regard to women. For why should a woman be
+disabled from inheriting property? Why can a vestal virgin become an
+heir, while her mother cannot? And why, admitting that it is necessary
+to set some limit to the wealth of women, should Crassus's daughter, if
+she be his only child, inherit thousands without offending the law,
+while my daughter can only receive a small share in a bequest.[337]
+* * *
+
+XI. * * * [If this justice were natural, innate, and universal, all men
+would admit the same] law and right, and the same men would not enact
+different laws at different times. If a just man and a virtuous man is
+bound to obey the laws, I ask, what laws do you mean? Do you intend all
+the laws indifferently? But neither does virtue permit this inconstancy
+in moral obligation, nor is such a variation compatible with natural
+conscience. The laws are, therefore, based not on our sense of justice,
+but on our fear of punishment. There is, therefore, no natural justice;
+and hence it follows that men cannot be just by nature.
+
+Are men, then, to say that variations indeed do exist in the laws, but
+that men who are virtuous through natural conscience follow that which
+is really justice, and not a mere semblance and disguise, and that it
+is the distinguishing characteristic of the truly just and virtuous man
+to render every one his due rights? Are we, then, to attribute the
+first of these characteristics to animals? For not only men of moderate
+abilities, but even first-rate sages and philosophers, as Pythagoras
+and Empedocles, declare that all kinds of living creatures have a right
+to the same justice. They declare that inexpiable penalties impend over
+those who have done violence to any animal whatsoever. It is,
+therefore, a crime to injure an animal, and the perpetrator of such
+crime[338] * * *
+
+     XII. For when he[339] inquired of a pirate by what right he
+     dared to infest the sea with his little brigantine: "By the
+     same right," he replied, "which is your warrant for
+     conquering the world." * * *
+
+Wisdom and prudence instruct us by all means to increase our power,
+riches, and estates. For by what means could this same Alexander, that
+illustrious general, who extended his empire over all Asia, without
+violating the property of other men, have acquired such universal
+dominion, enjoyed so many pleasures, such great power, and reigned
+without bound or limit?
+
+But justice commands us to have mercy upon all men, to consult the
+interests of the whole human race, to give to every one his due, and
+injure no sacred, public, or foreign rights, and to forbear touching
+what does not belong to us. What is the result, then? If you obey the
+dictates of wisdom, then wealth, power, riches, honors, provinces, and
+kingdoms, from all classes, peoples, and nations, are to be aimed at.
+
+However, as we are discussing public matters, those examples are more
+illustrious which refer to what is done publicly. And since the
+question between justice and policy applies equally to private and
+public affairs, I think it well to speak of the wisdom of the people. I
+will not, however, mention other nations, but come at once to our own
+Roman people, whom Africanus, in his discourse yesterday, traced from
+the cradle, and whose empire now embraces the whole world. Justice
+is[340] * * *
+
+     XIII. How far utility is at variance with justice we may
+     learn from the Roman people itself, which, declaring war by
+     means of the fecials, and committing injustice with all legal
+     formality, always coveting and laying violent hands on the
+     property of others, acquired the possession of the whole
+     world.
+
+     What is the advantage of one's own country but the
+     disadvantage of another state or nation, by extending one's
+     dominions by territories evidently wrested from others,
+     increasing one's power, improving one's revenues, etc.?
+     Therefore, whoever has obtained these advantages for his
+     country--that is to say, whoever has overthrown cities,
+     subdued nations, and by these means filled the treasury with
+     money, taken lands, and enriched his fellow-citizens--such a
+     man is extolled to the skies; is believed to be endowed with
+     consummate and perfect virtue; and this mistake is fallen
+     into not only by the populace and the ignorant, but by
+     philosophers, who even give rules for injustice.
+
+XIV. * * * For all those who have the right of life and death over the
+people are in fact tyrants; but they prefer being called by the title
+of king, which belongs to the all-good Jupiter. But when certain men,
+by favor of wealth, birth, or any other means, get possession of the
+entire government, it is a faction; but they choose to denominate
+themselves an aristocracy. If the people gets the upper hand, and rules
+everything after its capricious will, they call it liberty, but it is
+in fact license. And when every man is a guard upon his neighbor, and
+every class is a guard upon every other class, then because no one
+trusts in his own strength, a kind of compact is formed between the
+great and the little, from whence arises that mixed kind of government
+which Scipio has been commending. Thus justice, according to these
+facts, is not the daughter of nature or conscience, but of human
+imbecility. For when it becomes necessary to choose between these three
+predicaments, either to do wrong without retribution, or to do wrong
+with retribution, or to do no wrong at all, it is best to do wrong with
+impunity; next, neither to do wrong nor to suffer for it; but nothing
+is more wretched than to struggle incessantly between the wrong we
+inflict and that we receive. Therefore, he who attains to that first
+end[341] * * *
+
+     XV. This was the sum of the argument of Carneades: that men
+     had established laws among themselves from considerations of
+     advantage, varying them according to their different customs,
+     and altering them often so as to adapt them to the times; but
+     that there was no such thing as natural law; that all men and
+     all other animals are led to their own advantage by the
+     guidance of nature; that there is no such thing as justice,
+     or, if there be, that it is extreme folly, since a man would
+     injure himself while consulting the interests of others. And
+     he added these arguments, that all nations who were
+     flourishing and dominant, and even the Romans themselves, who
+     were the masters of the whole world, if they wished to be
+     just--that is to say, if they restored all that belonged to
+     others--would have to return to their cottages, and to lie
+     down in want and misery.
+
+Except, perhaps, of the Arcadians and Athenians, who, I presume,
+dreading that this great act of retribution might one day arrive,
+pretend that they were sprung from the earth, like so many field-mice.
+
+XVI. In reply to these statements, the following arguments are often
+adduced by those who are not unskilful in discussions, and who, in this
+question, have all the greater weight of authority, because, when we
+inquire, Who is a good man?--understanding by that term a frank and
+single-minded man--we have little need of captious casuists, quibblers,
+and slanderers. For those men assert that the wise man does not seek
+virtue because of the personal gratification which the practice of
+justice and beneficence procures him, but rather because the life of
+the good man is free from fear, care, solicitude, and peril; while, on
+the other hand, the wicked always feel in their souls a certain
+suspicion, and always behold before their eyes images of judgment and
+punishment. Do not you think, therefore, that there is any benefit, or
+that there is any advantage which can be procured by injustice,
+precious enough to counterbalance the constant pressure of remorse, and
+the haunting consciousness that retribution awaits the sinner, and
+hangs over his devoted head.[342] * * *
+
+XVII. [Our philosophers, therefore, put a case. Suppose, say they, two
+men, one of whom is an excellent and admirable person, of high honor
+and remarkable integrity; the latter is distinguished by nothing but
+his vice and audacity. And suppose that their city has so mistaken
+their characters as to imagine the good man to be a scandalous,
+impious, and audacious criminal, and to esteem the wicked man, on the
+contrary, as a pattern of probity and fidelity. On account of this
+error of their fellow-citizens, the good man is arrested and tormented,
+his hands are cut off, his eyes are plucked out, he is condemned,
+bound, burned, exterminated, reduced to want, and to the last appears
+to all men to be most deservedly the most miserable of men. On the
+other hand, the flagitious wretch is exalted, worshipped, loved by all,
+and honors, offices, riches, and emoluments are all conferred on him,
+and he shall be reckoned by his fellow-citizens the best and worthiest
+of mortals, and in the highest degree deserving of all manner of
+prosperity. Yet, for all this, who is so mad as to doubt which of these
+two men he would rather be?
+
+XVIII. What happens among individuals happens also among nations. There
+is no state so absurd and ridiculous as not to prefer unjust dominion
+to just subordination. I need not go far for examples. During my own
+consulship, when you were my fellow-counsellors, we consulted
+respecting the treaty of Numantia. No one was ignorant that Quintus
+Pompey had signed a treaty, and that Mancinus had done the same. The
+latter, being a virtuous man, supported the proposition which I laid
+before the people, after the decree of the senate. The former, on the
+other side, opposed it vehemently. If modesty, probity, or faith had
+been regarded, Mancinus would have carried his point; but in reason,
+counsel, and prudence, Pompey surpassed him. Whether[343] * * *
+
+XIX. If a man should have a faithless slave, or an unwholesome house,
+with whose defect he alone was acquainted, and he advertised them for
+sale, would he state the fact that his servant was infected with
+knavery, and his house with malaria, or would he conceal these
+objections from the buyer? If he stated those facts, he would be
+honest, no doubt, because he would deceive nobody; but still he would
+be thought a fool, because he would either get very little for his
+property, or else fail to sell it at all. By concealing these defects,
+on the other hand, he will be called a shrewd man--as one who has taken
+care of his own interest; but he will be a rogue, notwithstanding,
+because he will be deceiving his neighbors. Again, let us suppose that
+one man meets another, who sells gold and silver, conceiving them to be
+copper or lead; shall he hold his peace that he may make a capital
+bargain, or correct the mistake, and purchase at a fair rate? He would
+evidently be a fool in the world's opinion if he preferred the latter.
+
+XX. It is justice, beyond all question, neither to commit murder nor
+robbery. What, then, would your just man do, if, in a case of
+shipwreck, he saw a weaker man than himself get possession of a plank?
+Would he not thrust him off, get hold of the timber himself, and escape
+by his exertions, especially as no human witness could be present in
+the mid-sea? If he acted like a wise man of the world, he would
+certainly do so, for to act in any other way would cost him his life.
+If, on the other hand, he prefers death to inflicting unjustifiable
+injury on his neighbor, he will be an eminently honorable and just man,
+but not the less a fool, because he saved another's life at the expense
+of his own. Again, if in case of a defeat and rout, when the enemy were
+pressing in the rear, this just man should find a wounded comrade
+mounted on a horse, shall he respect his right at the risk of being
+killed himself, or shall he fling him from the horse in order to
+preserve his own life from the pursuers? If he does so, he is a wise
+man, but at the same time a wicked one; if he does not, he is admirably
+just, but at the same time stupid.
+
+XXI. _Scipio._ I might reply at great length to these sophistical
+objections of Philus, if it were not, my Lælius, that all our friends
+are no less anxious than myself to hear you take a leading part in the
+present debate, especially as you promised yesterday that you would
+plead at large on my side of the argument. If you cannot spare time for
+this, at any rate do not desert us; we all ask it of you.
+
+_Lælius._ This Carneades ought not to be even listened to by our young
+men. I think all the while that I am hearing him that he must be a very
+impure person; if he be not, as I would fain believe, his discourse is
+not less pernicious.
+
+XXII.[344] True law is right reason conformable to nature, universal,
+unchangeable, eternal, whose commands urge us to duty, and whose
+prohibitions restrain us from evil. Whether it enjoins or forbids, the
+good respect its injunctions, and the wicked treat them with
+indifference. This law cannot be contradicted by any other law, and is
+not liable either to derogation or abrogation. Neither the senate nor
+the people can give us any dispensation for not obeying this universal
+law of justice. It needs no other expositor and interpreter than our
+own conscience. It is not one thing at Rome, and another at Athens; one
+thing to-day, and another to-morrow; but in all times and nations this
+universal law must forever reign, eternal and imperishable. It is the
+sovereign master and emperor of all beings. God himself is its author,
+its promulgator, its enforcer. And he who does not obey it flies from
+himself, and does violence to the very nature of man. And by so doing
+he will endure the severest penalties even if he avoid the other evils
+which are usually accounted punishments.
+
+     XXIII. I am aware that in the third book of Cicero's treatise
+     on the Commonwealth (unless I am mistaken) it is argued that
+     no war is ever undertaken by a well-regulated commonwealth
+     unless it be one either for the sake of keeping faith, or for
+     safety; and what he means by a war for safety, and what
+     safety he wishes us to understand, he points out in another
+     passage, where he says, "But private men often escape from
+     these penalties, which even the most stupid persons
+     feel--want, exile, imprisonment, and stripes--by embracing
+     the opportunity of a speedy death; but to states death itself
+     is a penalty, though it appears to deliver individuals from
+     punishment. For a state ought to be established so as to be
+     eternal: therefore, there is no natural decease for a state,
+     as there is for a man, in whose case death is not only
+     inevitable, but often even desirable; but when a state is put
+     an end to, it is destroyed, extinguished. It is in some
+     degree, to compare small things with great, as if this whole
+     world were to perish and fall to pieces."
+
+     In his treatise on the Commonwealth, Cicero says those wars
+     are unjust which are undertaken without reason. Again, after
+     a few sentences, he adds, No war is considered just unless it
+     be formally announced and declared, and unless it be to
+     obtain restitution of what has been taken away.
+
+     But our nation, by defending its allies, has now become the
+     master of all the whole world.
+
+     XXIV. Also, in that same treatise on the Commonwealth, he
+     argues most strenuously and vigorously in the cause of
+     justice against injustice. And since, when a little time
+     before the part of injustice was upheld against justice, and
+     the doctrine was urged that a republic could not prosper and
+     flourish except by injustice, this was put forward as the
+     strongest argument, that it was unjust for men to serve other
+     men as their masters; but that unless a dominant state, such
+     as a great republic, acted on this injustice, it could not
+     govern its provinces; answer was made on behalf of justice,
+     that it was just that it should be so, because slavery is
+     advantageous to such men, and their interests are consulted
+     by a right course of conduct--that is, by the license of
+     doing injury being taken from the wicked--and they will fare
+     better when subjugated, because when not subjugated they
+     fared worse: and to confirm this reasoning, a noble instance,
+     taken, as it were, from nature, was added, and it was said,
+     Why, then, does God govern man, and why does the mind govern
+     the body, and reason govern lust, and the other vicious parts
+     of the mind?
+
+     XXV. Hear what Tully says more plainly still in the third
+     book of his treatise on the Commonwealth, when discussing the
+     reasons for government. Do we not, says he, see that nature
+     herself has given the power of dominion to everything that is
+     best, to the extreme advantage of what is subjected to it?
+     Why, then, does God govern man, and why does the mind govern
+     the body, and reason govern lust and passion and the other
+     vicious parts of the same mind? Listen thus far; for
+     presently he adds, But still there are dissimilarities to be
+     recognized in governing and in obeying. For as the mind is
+     said to govern the body, and also to govern lust, still it
+     governs the body as a king governs his subjects, or a parent
+     his children; but it governs lust as a master governs his
+     slaves, because it restrains and breaks it. The authority of
+     kings, of generals, of magistrates, of fathers, and of
+     nations, rules their subjects and allies as the mind rules
+     bodies; but masters control their slaves, as the best part of
+     the mind--that is to say, wisdom--controls the vicious and
+     weak parts of itself, such as lust, passion, and the other
+     perturbations.
+
+     For there is a kind of unjust slavery when those belong to
+     some one else who might be their own masters; but when those
+     are slaves who cannot govern themselves, there is no injury
+     done.
+
+     XXVI. If, says Carneades, you were to know that an asp was
+     lying hidden anywhere, and that some one who did not know it
+     was going to sit upon it, whose death would be a gain to you,
+     you would act wickedly if you did not warn him not to sit
+     down. Still, you would not be liable to punishment; for who
+     could prove that you had known? But we are bringing forward
+     too many instances; for it is plain that unless equity, good
+     faith, and justice proceed from nature, and if all these
+     things are referred to interest, a good man cannot be found.
+     And on these topics a great deal is said by Lælius in our
+     treatise on the Republic.
+
+     If, as we are reminded by you, we have spoken well in that
+     treatise, when we said that nothing is good excepting what is
+     honorable, and nothing bad excepting what is disgraceful.
+     * * *
+
+     XXVII. I am glad that you approve of the doctrine that the
+     affection borne to our children is implanted by nature;
+     indeed, if it be not, there can be no conection between man
+     and man which has its origin in nature. And if there be not,
+     then there is an end of all society in life. May it turn out
+     well, says Carneades, speaking shamelessly, but still more
+     sensibly than my friend Lucius or Patro: for, as they refer
+     everything to themselves, do they think that anything is ever
+     done for the sake of another? And when they say that a man
+     ought to be good, in order to avoid misfortune, not because
+     it is right by nature, they do not perceive that they are
+     speaking of a cunning man, not of a good one. But these
+     arguments are argued, I think, in those books by praising
+     which you have given me spirits.
+
+     In which I agree that an anxious and hazardous justice is not
+     that of a wise man.
+
+     XXVIII. And again, in Cicero, that same advocate of justice,
+     Lælius, says, Virtue is clearly eager for honor, nor has she
+     any other reward; which, however, she accepts easily, and
+     exacts without bitterness. And in another place the same
+     Lælius says:
+
+When a man is inspired by virtue such as this, what bribes can you
+offer him, what treasures, what thrones, what empires? He considers
+these but mortal goods, and esteems his own divine. And if the
+ingratitude of the people, and the envy of his competitors, or the
+violence of powerful enemies, despoil his virtue of its earthly
+recompense, he still enjoys a thousand consolations in the approbation
+of conscience, and sustains himself by contemplating the beauty of
+moral rectitude.
+
+XXIX. * * * This virtue, in order to be true, must be universal.
+Tiberius Gracchus continued faithful to his fellow-citizens, but he
+violated the rights and treaties guaranteed to our allies and the Latin
+peoples. But if this habit of arbitrary violence begins to extend
+itself further, and perverts our authority, leading it from right to
+violence, so that those who had voluntarily obeyed us are only
+restrained by fear, then, although we, during our days, may escape the
+peril, yet am I solicitous respecting the safety of our posterity and
+the immortality of the Commonwealth itself, which, doubtless, might
+become perpetual and invincible if our people would maintain their
+ancient institutions and manners.
+
+XXX. When Lælius had ceased to speak, all those that were present
+expressed the extreme pleasure they found in his discourse. But Scipio,
+more affected than the rest, and ravished with the delight of sympathy,
+exclaimed: You have pleaded, my Lælius, many causes with an eloquence
+superior to that of Servius Galba, our colleague, whom you used during
+his life to prefer to all others, even to the Attic orators [and never
+did I hear you speak with more energy than to-day, while pleading the
+cause of justice][345] * * *
+
+     * * * That two things were wanting to enable him to speak in
+     public and in the forum, confidence and voice.
+
+XXXI. * * * This justice, continued Scipio, is the very foundation of
+lawful government in political constitutions. Can we call the State of
+Agrigentum a commonwealth, where all men are oppressed by the cruelty
+of a single tyrant--where there is no universal bond of right, nor
+social consent and fellowship, which should belong to every people,
+properly so named? It is the same in Syracuse--that illustrious city
+which Timæus calls the greatest of the Grecian towns. It was indeed a
+most beautiful city; and its admirable citadel, its canals distributed
+through all its districts, its broad streets, its porticoes, its
+temples, and its walls, gave Syracuse the appearance of a most
+flourishing state. But while Dionysius its tyrant reigned there,
+nothing of all its wealth belonged to the people, and the people were
+nothing better than the slaves of one master. Thus, wherever I behold a
+tyrant, I know that the social constitution must be not merely vicious
+and corrupt, as I stated yesterday, but in strict truth no social
+constitution at all.
+
+XXXII. _Lælius._ You have spoken admirably, my Scipio, and I see the
+point of your observations.
+
+_Scipio._ You grant, then, that a state which is entirely in the power
+of a faction cannot justly be entitled a political community?
+
+_Lælius._ That is evident.
+
+_Scipio._ You judge most correctly. For what was the State of Athens
+when, during the great Peloponnesian war, she fell under the unjust
+domination of the thirty tyrants? The antique glory of that city, the
+imposing aspect of its edifices, its theatre, its gymnasium, its
+porticoes, its temples, its citadel, the admirable sculptures of
+Phidias, and the magnificent harbor of Piræus--did they constitute it a
+commonwealth?
+
+_Lælius._ Certainly not, because these did not constitute the real
+welfare of the community.
+
+_Scipio._ And at Rome, when the decemvirs ruled without appeal from
+their decisions, in the third year of their power, had not liberty lost
+all its securities and all its blessings?
+
+_Lælius._ Yes; the welfare of the community was no longer consulted,
+and the people soon roused themselves, and recovered their appropriate
+rights.
+
+XXXIII. _Scipio._ I now come to the third, or democratical, form of
+government, in which a considerable difficulty presents itself, because
+all things are there said to lie at the disposition of the people, and
+are carried into execution just as they please. Here the populace
+inflict punishments at their pleasure, and act, and seize, and keep
+possession, and distribute property, without let or hinderance. Can you
+deny, my Lælius, that this is a fair definition of a democracy, where
+the people are all in all, and where the people constitute the State?
+
+_Lælius._ There is no political constitution to which I more absolutely
+deny the name of a _commonwealth_ than that in which all things lie in
+the power of the multitude. If a commonwealth, which implies the
+welfare of the entire community, could not exist in Agrigentum,
+Syracuse, or Athens when tyrants reigned over them--if it could not
+exist in Rome when under the oligarchy of the decemvirs--neither do I
+see how this sacred name of commonwealth can be applied to a democracy
+and the sway of the mob; because, in the first place, my Scipio, I
+build on your own admirable definition, that there can be no community,
+properly so called, unless it be regulated by a combination of rights.
+And, by this definition, it appears that a multitude of men may be just
+as tyrannical as a single despot; and it is so much the worse, since no
+monster can be more barbarous than the mob, which assumes the name and
+appearance of the people. Nor is it at all reasonable, since the laws
+place the property of madmen in the hands of their sane relations, that
+we should do the [very reverse in politics, and throw the property of
+the sane into the hands of the mad multitude][346] * * *
+
+XXXIV. * * * [It is far more rational] to assert that a wise and
+virtuous aristocratical government deserves the title of a
+commonwealth, as it approaches to the nature of a kingdom.
+
+And much more so in my opinion, said Mummius. For the unity of power
+often exposes a king to become a despot; but when an aristocracy,
+consisting of many virtuous men, exercise power, that is the most
+fortunate circumstance possible for any state. However this be, I much
+prefer royalty to democracy; for that is the third kind of government
+which you have remaining, and a most vicious one it is.
+
+XXXV. Scipio replied: I am well acquainted, my Mummius, with your
+decided antipathy to the democratical system. And, although, we may
+speak of it with rather more indulgence than you are accustomed to
+accord it, I must certainly agree with you, that of all the three
+particular forms of government, none is less commendable than
+democracy.
+
+I do not agree with you, however, when you would imply that aristocracy
+is preferable to royalty. If you suppose that wisdom governs the State,
+is it not as well that this wisdom should reside in one monarch as in
+many nobles?
+
+But we are led away by a certain incorrectness of terms in a discussion
+like the present. When we pronounce the word "aristocracy," which, in
+Greek, signifies the government of the best men, what can be conceived
+more excellent? For what can be thought better than the best? But when,
+on the other hand, the title "king" is mentioned, we begin to imagine a
+tyrant; as if a king must be necessarily unjust. But we are not
+speaking of an unjust king when we are examining the true nature of
+royal authority. To this name of king, therefore, do but attach the
+idea of a Romulus, a Numa, a Tullus, and perhaps you will be less
+severe to the monarchical form of constitution.
+
+_Mummius_. Have you, then, no commendation at all for any kind of
+democratical government?
+
+_Scipio._ Why, I think some democratical forms less objectionable than
+others; and, by way of illustration, I will ask you what you thought of
+the government in the isle of Rhodes, where we were lately together;
+did it appear to you a legitimate and rational constitution?
+
+_Mummius_. It did, and not much liable to abuse.
+
+_Scipio._ You say truly. But, if you recollect, it was a very
+extraordinary experiment. All the inhabitants were alternately senators
+and citizens. Some months they spent in their senatorial functions, and
+some months they spent in their civil employments. In both they
+exercised judicial powers; and in the theatre and the court, the same
+men judged all causes, capital and not capital. And they had as much
+influence, and were of as much importance as * * *
+
+
+FRAGMENTS.
+
+
+     XXXVI. There is therefore some unquiet feeling in
+     individuals, which either exults in pleasure or is crushed by
+     annoyance.
+
+          [_The next is an incomplete sentence, and, as such,
+          unintelligible_.]
+
+     The Phoenicians were the first who by their commerce, and by
+     the merchandise which they carried, brought avarice and
+     magnificence and insatiable degrees of everything into
+     Greece.
+
+     Sardanapalus, the luxurious king of Assyria, of whom Tully,
+     in the third book of his treatise on the Republic, says, "The
+     notorious Sardanapalus, far more deformed by his vices than
+     even by his name."
+
+     What is the meaning, then, of this absurd acceptation, unless
+     some one wishes to make the whole of Athos a monument? For
+     what is Athos or the vast Olympus? * * *
+
+     XXXVII. I will endeavor in the proper place to show it,
+     according to the definitions of Cicero himself, in which,
+     putting forth Scipio as the speaker, he has briefly explained
+     what a commonwealth and what a republic is; adducing also
+     many assertions of his own, and of those whom he has
+     represented as taking part in that discussion, to the effect
+     that the State of Rome was not such a commonwealth, because
+     there has never been genuine justice in it. However,
+     according to definitions which are more reasonable, it was a
+     commonwealth in some degree, and it was better regulated by
+     the more ancient than by the later Romans.
+
+     It is now fitting that I should explain, as briefly and as
+     clearly as I can, what, in the second book of this work, I
+     promised to prove, according to the definitions which Cicero,
+     in his books on the Commonwealth, puts into the mouth of
+     Scipio, arguing that the Roman State was never a
+     commonwealth; for he briefly defines a commonwealth as a
+     state of the people; the people as an assembly of the
+     multitude, united by a common feeling of right, and a
+     community of interests. What he calls a common feeling of
+     right he explains by discussion, showing in this way that a
+     commonwealth cannot proceed without justice. Where,
+     therefore, there is no genuine justice, there can be no
+     right, for that which is done according to right is done
+     justly; and what is done unjustly cannot be done according to
+     right, for the unjust regulations of men are not to be called
+     or thought rights; since they themselves call that right
+     (_jus_) which flows from the source of justice: and they say
+     that that assertion which is often made by some persons of
+     erroneous sentiments, namely, that that is right which is
+     advantageous to the most powerful, is false. Wherefore, where
+     there is no true justice there can be no company of men
+     united by a common feeling of right; therefore there can be
+     no people (_populus_), according to that definition of Scipio
+     or Cicero: and if there be no people, there can be no state
+     of the people, but only of a mob such as it may be, which is
+     not worthy of the name of a people. And thus, if a
+     commonwealth is a state of a people, and if that is not a
+     people which is not united by a common feeling of right, and
+     if there is no right where there is no justice, then the
+     undoubted inference is, that where there is no justice there
+     is no commonwealth. Moreover, justice is that virtue which
+     gives every one his own.
+
+No war can be undertaken by a just and wise state unless for faith or
+self-defence. This self-defence of the State is enough to insure its
+perpetuity, and this perpetuity is what all patriots desire. Those
+afflictions which even the hardiest spirits smart under--poverty,
+exile, prison, and torment--private individuals seek to escape from by
+an instantaneous death. But for states, the greatest calamity of all is
+that of death, which to individuals appears a refuge. A state should be
+so constituted as to live forever. For a commonwealth there is no
+natural dissolution as there is for a man, to whom death not only
+becomes necessary, but often desirable. And when a state once decays
+and falls, it is so utterly revolutionized, that, if we may compare
+great things with small, it resembles the final wreck of the universe.
+
+All wars undertaken without a proper motive are unjust. And no war can
+be reputed just unless it be duly announced and proclaimed, and if it
+be not preceded by a rational demand for restitution.
+
+Our Roman Commonwealth, by defending its allies, has got possession of
+the world.
+
+       *       *       *       *       *
+
+
+
+
+INTRODUCTION TO THE FOURTH BOOK,
+
+BY THE ORIGINAL TRANSLATOR.
+
+
+   In this fourth book Cicero treats of morals and education, and
+     the use and abuse of stage entertainments. We retain nothing
+     of this important book save a few scattered fragments, the
+     beauty of which fills us with the greater regret for the
+     passages we have lost.
+
+
+
+
+BOOK IV.
+
+FRAGMENTS.
+
+
+     I. * * * Since mention has been made of the body and of the
+     mind, I will endeavor to explain the theory of each as well
+     as the weakness of my understanding is able to comprehend
+     it--a duty which I think it the more becoming in me to
+     undertake, because Marcus Tullius, a man of singular genius,
+     after having attempted to perform it in the fourth book of
+     his treatise on the Commonwealth, compressed a subject of
+     wide extent within narrow limits, only touching lightly on
+     all the principal points. And that there might be no excuse
+     alleged for his not having followed out this topic, he
+     himself has assured us that he was not wanting either in
+     inclination or in anxiety to do so; for, in the first book of
+     his treatise on Laws, when he was touching briefly on the
+     same subject, he speaks thus: "This topic Scipio, in my
+     opinion, has sufficiently discussed in those books which you
+     have read."
+
+     And the mind itself, which sees the future, remembers the
+     past.
+
+     Well did Marcus Tullius say, In truth, if there is no one who
+     would not prefer death to being changed into the form of some
+     beast, although he were still to retain the mind of a man,
+     how much more wretched is it to have the mind of a beast in
+     the form of a man! To me this fate appears as much worse than
+     the other as the mind is superior to the body.
+
+     Tullius says somewhere that he does not think the good of a
+     ram and of Publius Africanus identical.
+
+     And also by its being interposed, it causes shade and night,
+     which is adapted both to the numbering of days and to rest
+     from labor.
+
+     And as in the autumn he has opened the earth to receive
+     seeds, in winter relaxed it that it may digest them, and by
+     the ripening powers of summer softened some and burned up
+     others.
+
+     When the shepherds use * * * for cattle.
+
+     Cicero, in the fourth book of his Commonwealth, uses the word
+     "armentum," and "armentarius," derived from it.
+
+II. The great law of just and regular subordination is the basis of
+political prosperity. There is much advantage in the harmonious
+succession of ranks and orders and classes, in which the suffrages of
+the knights and the senators have their due weight. Too many have
+foolishly desired to destroy this institution, in the vain hope of
+receiving some new largess, by a public decree, out of a distribution
+of the property of the nobility.
+
+III. Consider, now, how wisely the other provisions have been adopted,
+in order to secure to the citizens the benefits of an honest and happy
+life; for that is, indeed, the grand object of all political
+association, and that which every government should endeavor to procure
+for the people, partly by its institutions, and partly by its laws.
+
+Consider, in the first place, the national education of the people--a
+matter on which the Greeks have expended much labor in vain, and which
+is the only point on which Polybius, who settled among us, accuses the
+negligence of our institutions. For our countrymen have thought that
+education ought not to be fixed, nor regulated by laws, nor be given
+publicly and uniformly to all classes of society. For[347] * * *
+
+     According to Tully, who says that men going to serve in the
+     army have guardians assigned to them, by whom they are
+     governed the first year.
+
+IV. [In our ancient laws, young men were prohibited from appearing]
+naked in the public baths, so far back were the principles of modesty
+traced by our ancestors. Among the Greeks, on the contrary, what an
+absurd system of training youth is exhibited in their gymnasia! What a
+frivolous preparation for the labors and hazards of war! what indecent
+spectacles, what impure and licentious amours are permitted! I do not
+speak only of the Eleans and Thebans, among whom, in all love affairs,
+passion is allowed to run into shameless excesses; but the Spartans,
+while they permit every kind of license to their young men, save that
+of violation, fence off, by a very slight wall, the very exception on
+which they insist, besides other crimes which I will not mention.
+
+Then Lælius said: I see, my Scipio, that on the subject of the Greek
+institutions, which you censure, you prefer attacking the customs of
+the most renowned peoples to contending with your favorite Plato, whose
+name you have avoided citing, especially as * * *
+
+     V. So that Cicero, in his treatise on the Commonwealth, says
+     that it was a reproach to young men if they had no lovers.
+
+     Not only as at Sparta, where boys learn to steal and plunder.
+
+     And our master Plato, even more than Lycurgus, who would have
+     everything to be common, so that no one should be able to
+     call anything his own property.
+
+     I would send him to the same place whither he sends Homer,
+     crowned with chaplets and anointed with perfumes, banishing
+     him from the city which he is describing.
+
+     VI. The judgment of the censor inflicts scarcely anything
+     more than a blush on the man whom he condemns. Therefore as
+     all that adjudication turns solely on the name (_nomen_), the
+     punishment is called ignominy.
+
+     Nor should a prefect be set over women, an officer who is
+     created among the Greeks; but there should be a censor to
+     teach husbands to manage their wives.
+
+     So the discipline of modesty has great power. All women
+     abstain from wine.
+
+     And also if any woman was of bad character, her relations
+     used not to kiss her.
+
+     So petulance is derived from asking (_petendo_); wantonness
+     (_procacitas_) from _procando_, that is, from demanding.
+
+     VII. For I do not approve of the same nation being the ruler
+     and the farmer of lands. But both in private families and in
+     the affairs of the Commonwealth I look upon economy as a
+     revenue.
+
+     Faith (_fides_) appears to me to derive its name from that
+     being done (_fit_) which is said.
+
+     In a citizen of rank and noble birth, caressing manners,
+     display, and ambition are marks of levity.
+
+     Examine for a while the books on the Republic, and learn that
+     good men know no bound or limit in consulting the interests
+     of their country. See in that treatise with what praises
+     frugality, and continency, and fidelity to the marriage tie,
+     and chaste, honorable, and virtuous manners are extolled.
+
+     VIII. I marvel at the elegant choice, not only of the facts,
+     but of the language. If they dispute (_jurgant_). It is a
+     contest between well-wishers, not a quarrel between enemies,
+     that is called a dispute (_jurgium_),
+
+     Therefore the law considers that neighbors dispute
+     (_jurgare_) rather than quarrel (_litigare_) with one
+     another.
+
+     The bounds of man's care and of man's life are the same; so
+     by the pontifical law the sanctity of burial * * *
+
+     They put them to death, though innocent, because they had
+     left those men unburied whom they could not rescue from the
+     sea because of the violence of the storm.
+
+     Nor in this discussion have I advocated the cause of the
+     populace, but of the good.
+
+     For one cannot easily resist a powerful people if one gives
+     them either no rights at all or very little.
+
+     In which case I wish I could augur first with truth and
+     fidelity * * *
+
+     IX. Cicero saying this in vain, when speaking of poets, "And
+     when the shouts and approval of the people, as of some great
+     and wise teacher, has reached them, what darkness do they
+     bring on! what alarms do they cause! what desires do they
+     excite!"
+
+     Cicero says that if his life were extended to twice its
+     length, he should not have time to read the lyric poets.
+
+     X. As Scipio says in Cicero, "As they thought the whole
+     histrionic art, and everything connected with the theatre,
+     discreditable, they thought fit that all men of that
+     description should not only be deprived of the honors
+     belonging to the rest of the citizens, but should also be
+     deprived of their franchise by the sentence of the censors."
+
+     And what the ancient Romans thought on this subject Cicero
+     informs us, in those books which he wrote on the
+     Commonwealth, where Scipio argues and says * * *
+
+Comedies could never (if it had not been authorized by the common
+customs of life) have made theatres approve of their scandalous
+exhibitions. And the more ancient Greeks provided a certain correction
+for the vicious taste of the people, by making a law that it should be
+expressly defined by a censorship what subjects comedy should treat,
+and how she should treat them.
+
+Whom has it not attacked? or, rather, whom has it not wounded? and whom
+has it spared? In this, no doubt, it sometimes took the right side, and
+lashed the popular demagogues and seditious agitators, such as Cleon,
+Cleophon, and Hyperbolus. We may tolerate that; though indeed the
+censure of the magistrate would, in these cases, have been more
+efficacious than the satire of the poet. But when Pericles, who
+governed the Athenian Commonwealth for so many years with the highest
+authority, both in peace and war, was outraged by verses, and these
+were acted on the stage, it was hardly more decent than if, among us,
+Plautus and Nævius had attacked Publius and Cnæus, or Cæcilius had
+ventured to revile Marcus Cato.
+
+Our laws of the Twelve Tables, on the contrary--so careful to attach
+capital punishment to a very few crimes only--have included in this
+class of capital offences the offence of composing or publicly reciting
+verses of libel, slander, and defamation, in order to cast dishonor and
+infamy on a fellow-citizen. And they have decided wisely; for our life
+and character should, if suspected, be submitted to the sentence of
+judicial tribunals and the legal investigations of our magistrates, and
+not to the whims and fancies of poets. Nor should we be exposed to any
+charge of disgrace which we cannot meet by legal process, and openly
+refute at the bar.
+
+In our laws, I admire the justice of their expressions, as well as
+their decisions. Thus the word _pleading_ signifies rather an amicable
+suit between friends than a quarrel between enemies.
+
+It is not easy to resist a powerful people, if you allow them no
+rights, or next to none.
+
+     The old Romans would not allow any living man to be either
+     praised or blamed on the stage.
+
+     XI. Cicero says that comedy is an imitation of life; a mirror
+     of customs, an image of truth.
+
+     Since, as is mentioned in that book on the Commonwealth, not
+     only did Æschines the Athenian, a man of the greatest
+     eloquence, who, when a young man, had been an actor of
+     tragedies, concern himself in public affairs, but the
+     Athenians often sent Aristodemus, who was also a tragic
+     actor, to Philip as an ambassador, to treat of the most
+     important affairs of peace and war.
+
+       *       *       *       *       *
+
+
+
+
+INTRODUCTION TO THE FIFTH BOOK,
+
+BY THE ORIGINAL TRANSLATOR.
+
+
+   In this fifth book Cicero explains and enforces the duties of
+     magistrates, and the importance of practical experience to
+     all who undertake their important functions. Only a few
+     fragments have survived the wreck of ages and descended to
+     us.
+
+
+
+
+BOOK V.
+
+FRAGMENTS.
+
+
+I. Ennius has told us--
+
+    Of men and customs mighty Rome consists;
+
+which verse, both for its precision and its verity, appears to me as if
+it had issued from an oracle; for neither the men, unless the State had
+adopted a certain system of manners--nor the manners, unless they had
+been illustrated by the men--could ever have established or maintained
+for so many ages so vast a republic, or one of such righteous and
+extensive sway.
+
+Thus, long before our own times, the force of hereditary manners of
+itself moulded most eminent men; and admirable citizens, in return,
+gave new weight to the ancient customs and institutions of our
+ancestors. But our age, on the contrary, having received the
+Commonwealth as a finished picture of another century, but one already
+beginning to fade through the lapse of years, has not only neglected to
+renew the colors of the original painting, but has not even cared to
+preserve its general form and prominent lineaments.
+
+For what now remains of those antique manners, of which the poet said
+that our Commonwealth consisted? They have now become so obsolete and
+forgotten that they are not only not cultivated, but they are not even
+known. And as to the men, what shall I say? For the manners themselves
+have only perished through a scarcity of men; of which great misfortune
+we are not only called to give an account, but even, as men accused of
+capital offences, to a certain degree to plead our own cause in
+connection with it. For it is owing to our vices, rather than to any
+accident, that we have retained the name of republic when we have long
+since lost the reality.
+
+II. * * * There is no employment so essentially royal as the exposition
+of equity, which comprises the true interpretation of all laws. This
+justice subjects used generally to expect from their kings. For this
+reason, lands, fields, woods, and pastures were reserved as the
+property of kings, and cultivated for them, without any labor on their
+part, in order that no anxiety on account of their personal interests
+might distract their attention from the welfare of the State. Nor was
+any private man allowed to be the judge or arbitrator in any suit; but
+all disputes were terminated by the royal sentence.
+
+And of all our Roman monarchs, Numa appears to me to have best
+preserved this ancient custom of the kings of Greece. For the others,
+though they also discharged this duty, were for the main part employed
+in conducting military enterprises, and in attending to those rights
+which belonged to war. But the long peace of Numa's reign was the
+mother of law and religion in this city. And he was himself the author
+of those admirable laws which, as you are aware, are still extant. And
+this character is precisely what belongs to the man of whom we are
+speaking. * * *
+
+III. [_Scipio._ Ought not a farmer] to be acquainted with the nature of
+plants and seeds?
+
+_Manilius._ Certainly, provided he attends to his practical business
+also.
+
+_Scipio._ Do you think that knowledge only fit for a steward?
+
+_Manilius._ Certainly not, inasmuch as the cultivation of land often
+fails for want of agricultural labor.
+
+_Scipio._ Therefore, as the steward knows the nature of a field, and
+the scribe knows penmanship, and as both of them seek, in their
+respective sciences, not mere amusement only, but practical utility, so
+this statesman of ours should have studied the science of jurisprudence
+and legislation; he should have investigated their original sources;
+but he should not embarrass himself in debating and arguing, reading
+and scribbling. He should rather employ himself in the actual
+administration of government, and become a sort of steward of it, being
+perfectly conversant with the principles of universal law and equity,
+without which no man can be just: not unfamiliar with the civil laws of
+states; but he will use them for practical purposes, even as a pilot
+uses astronomy, and a physician natural philosophy. For both these men
+bring their theoretical science to bear on the practice of their arts;
+and our statesman [should do the same with the science of politics, and
+make it subservient to the actual interests of philanthropy and
+patriotism]. * * *
+
+IV. * * * In states in which good men desire glory and approbation, and
+shun disgrace and ignominy. Nor are such men so much alarmed by the
+threats and penalties of the law as by that sentiment of shame with
+which nature has endowed man, which is nothing else than a certain fear
+of deserved censure. The wise director of a government strengthens this
+natural instinct by the force of public opinion, and perfects it by
+education and manners. And thus the citizens are preserved from vice
+and corruption rather by honor and shame than by fear of punishment.
+But this argument will be better illustrated when we treat of the love
+of glory and praise, which we shall discuss on another occasion.
+
+V. As respects the private life and the manners of the citizens, they
+are intimately connected with the laws that constitute just marriages
+and legitimate offspring, under the protection of the guardian deities
+around the domestic hearths. By these laws, all men should be
+maintained in their rights of public and private property. It is only
+under a good government like this that men can live happily--for
+nothing can be more delightful than a well-constituted state.
+
+On which account it appears to me a very strange thing what this * * *
+
+     VI. I therefore consume all my time in considering what is
+     the power of that man, whom, as you think, we have described
+     carefully enough in our books. Do you, then, admit our idea
+     of that governor of a commonwealth to whom we wish to refer
+     everything? For thus, I imagine, does Scipio speak in the
+     fifth book: "For as a fair voyage is the object of the master
+     of a ship, the health of his patient the aim of a physician,
+     and victory that of a general, so the happiness of his
+     fellow-citizens is the proper study of the ruler of a
+     commonwealth; that they may be stable in power, rich in
+     resources, widely known in reputation, and honorable through
+     their virtue. For a ruler ought to be one who can perfect
+     this, which is the best and most important employment among
+     mankind."
+
+     And works in your literature rightly praise that ruler of a
+     country who consults the welfare of his people more than
+     their inclinations.
+
+     VII. Tully, in those books which he wrote upon the
+     Commonwealth, could not conceal his opinions, when he speaks
+     of appointing a chief of the State, who, he says, must be
+     maintained by glory; and afterward he relates that his
+     ancestors did many admirable and noble actions from a desire
+     of glory.
+
+     Tully, in his treatise on the Commonwealth, wrote that the
+     chief of a state must be maintained by glory, and that a
+     commonwealth would last as long as honor was paid by every
+     one to the chief.
+
+          [_The next paragraph is unintelligible._]
+
+     Which virtue is called fortitude, which consists of
+     magnanimity, and a great contempt of death and pain.
+
+     VIII. As Marcellus was fierce, and eager to fight, Maximus
+     prudent and cautious.
+
+     Who discovered his violence and unbridled ferocity.
+
+     Which has often happened not only to individuals, but also to
+     most powerful nations.
+
+     In the whole world.
+
+     Because he inflicted the annoyances of his old age on your
+     families.
+
+     IX. Cicero, in his treatise on the Commonwealth, says, "As
+     Menelaus of Lacedæmon had a certain agreeable sweetness of
+     eloquence." And in another place he says, "Let him cultivate
+     brevity in speaking."
+
+     By the evidence of which arts, as Tully says, it is a shame
+     for the conscience of the judge to be misled. For he says,
+     "And as nothing in a commonwealth ought to be so uncorrupt as
+     a suffrage and a sentence, I do not see why the man who
+     perverts them by money is worthy of punishment, while he who
+     does so by eloquence is even praised. Indeed, I myself think
+     that he who corrupts the judge by his speech does more harm
+     than he who does so by money, because no one can corrupt a
+     sensible man by money, though he may by speaking."
+
+     And when Scipio had said this, Mummius praised him greatly,
+     for he was extravagantly imbued with a hatred of orators.
+
+       *       *       *       *       *
+
+
+
+
+INTRODUCTION TO THE SIXTH BOOK.
+
+
+   In this last book of his Commonwealth, Cicero labors to show
+     that truly pious philanthropical and patriotic statesmen will
+     not only be rewarded on earth by the approval of conscience
+     and the applause of all good citizens, but that they may
+     expect hereafter immortal glory in new forms of being. To
+     illustrate this, he introduces the "Dream of Scipio," in
+     which he explains the resplendent doctrines of Plato
+     respecting the immortality of the soul with inimitable
+     dignity and elegance. This Somnium Scipionis, for which we
+     are indebted to the citation of Macrobius, is the most
+     beautiful thing of the kind ever written. It has been
+     intensely admired by all European scholars, and will be still
+     more so. There are two translations of it in our language;
+     one attached to Oliver's edition of Cicero's Thoughts, the
+     other by Mr. Danby, published in 1829. Of these we have
+     freely availed ourselves, and as freely we express our
+     acknowledgments.
+
+
+
+
+BOOK VI.
+
+SCIPIO'S DREAM.
+
+
+     I. Therefore you rely upon all the prudence of this rule,
+     which has derived its very name (_prudentia_) from foreseeing
+     (_a providendo_). Wherefore the citizen must so prepare
+     himself as to be always armed against those things which
+     trouble the constitution of a state. And that dissension of
+     the citizens, when one party separates from and attacks
+     another, is called sedition.
+
+     And in truth in civil dissensions, as the good are of more
+     importance than the many, I think that we should regard the
+     weight of the citizens, and not their number.
+
+     For the lusts, being severe mistresses of the thoughts,
+     command and compel many an unbridled action. And as they
+     cannot be satisfied or appeased by any means, they urge those
+     whom they have inflamed with their allurements to every kind
+     of atrocity.
+
+     II. Which indeed was so much the greater in him because
+     though the cause of the colleagues was identical, not only
+     was their unpopularity not equal, but the influence of
+     Gracchus was employed in mitigating the hatred borne to
+     Claudius.
+
+     Who encountered the number of the chiefs and nobles with
+     these words, and left behind him that mournful and dignified
+     expression of his gravity and influence.
+
+     That, as he writes, a thousand men might every day descend
+     into the forum with cloaks dyed in purple.
+
+          [_The next paragraph is unintelligible._]
+
+     For our ancestors wished marriages to be firmly established.
+
+     There is a speech extant of Lælius with which we are all
+     acquainted, expressing how pleasing to the immortal gods are
+     the * * * and * * * of the priests.
+
+     III. Cicero, writing about the Commonwealth, in imitation of
+     Plato, has related the story of the return of Er the
+     Pamphylian to life; who, as he says, had come to life again
+     after he had been placed on the funeral pile, and related
+     many secrets about the shades below; not speaking, like
+     Plato, in a fabulous imitation of truth, but using a certain
+     reasonable invention of an ingenious dream, cleverly
+     intimating that these things which were uttered about the
+     immortality of the soul, and about heaven, are not the
+     inventions of dreaming philosophers, nor the incredible
+     fables which the Epicureans ridicule, but the conjectures of
+     wise men. He insinuates that that Scipio who by the
+     subjugation of Carthage obtained Africanus as a surname for
+     his family, gave notice to Scipio the son of Paulus of the
+     treachery which threatened him from his relations, and the
+     course of fate, because by the necessity of numbers he was
+     confined in the period of a perfect life, and he says that he
+     in the fifty-sixth year of his age * * *
+
+     IV. Some of our religion who love Plato, on account of his
+     admirable kind of eloquence, and of some correct opinions
+     which he held, say that he had some opinions similar to my
+     own touching the resurrection of the dead, which subject
+     Tully touches on in his treatise on the Commonwealth, and
+     says that he was rather jesting than intending to say that
+     was true. For he asserts that a man returned to life, and
+     related some stories which harmonized with the discussions of
+     the Platonists.
+
+     V. In this point the imitation has especially preserved the
+     likeness of the work, because, as Plato, in the conclusion of
+     his volume, represents a certain person who had returned to
+     life, which he appeared to have quitted, as indicating what
+     is the condition of souls when stripped of the body, with the
+     addition of a certain not unnecessary description of the
+     spheres and stars, an appearance of circumstances indicating
+     things of the same kind is related by the Scipio of Cicero,
+     as having been brought before him in sleep.
+
+     VI. Tully is found to have preserved this arrangement with no
+     less judgment than genius. After, in every condition of the
+     Commonwealth, whether of leisure or business, he has given
+     the palm to justice, he has placed the sacred abodes of the
+     immortal souls, and the secrets of the heavenly regions, on
+     the very summit of his completed work, indicating whither
+     they must come, or rather return, who have managed the
+     republic with prudence, justice, fortitude, and moderation.
+     But that Platonic relater of secrets was a man of the name of
+     Er, a Pamphylian by nation, a soldier by profession, who,
+     after he appeared to have died from wounds received in
+     battle, and twelve days afterward was about to receive the
+     honors of the funeral pile with the others who were slain at
+     the same time, suddenly either recovering his life, or else
+     never having lost it, as if he were giving a public
+     testimony, related to all men all that he had done or seen in
+     the days that he had thus passed between life and death.
+     Although Cicero, as if himself conscious of the truth,
+     grieves that this story has been ridiculed by the ignorant,
+     still, avoiding giving an example of foolish reproach, he
+     preferred speaking of the relater as of one awakened from a
+     swoon rather than restored to life.
+
+     VII. And before we look at the words of the dream we must
+     explain what kind of persons they are by whom Cicero says
+     that even the account of Plato was ridiculed, who are not
+     apprehensive that the same thing may happen to them. Nor by
+     this expression does he wish the ignorant mob to be
+     understood, but a kind of men who are ignorant of the truth,
+     though pretending to be philosophers with a display of
+     learning, who, it was notorious, had read such things, and
+     were eager to find faults. We will say, therefore, who they
+     are whom he reports as having levelled light reproaches
+     against so great a philosopher, and who of them has even left
+     an accusation of him committed to writing, etc. The whole
+     faction of the Epicureans, always wandering at an equal
+     distance from truth, and thinking everything ridiculous which
+     they do not understand, has ridiculed the sacred volume, and
+     the most venerable mysteries of nature. But Colotes, who is
+     somewhat celebrated and remarkable for his loquacity among
+     the pupils of Epicurus, has even recorded in a book the
+     bitter reproaches which he aims at him. But since the other
+     arguments which he foolishly urges have no connection with
+     the dream of which we are now talking, we will pass them over
+     at present, and attend only to the calumny which will stick
+     both to Cicero and Plato, unless it is silenced. He says that
+     a fable ought not to have been invented by a philosopher,
+     since no kind of falsehood is suitable to professors of
+     truth. For why, says he, if you wish to give us a notion of
+     heavenly things and to teach us the nature of souls, did you
+     not do so by a simple and plain explanation? Why was a
+     character invented, and circumstances, and strange events,
+     and a scene of cunningly adduced falsehood arranged, to
+     pollute the very door of the investigation of truth by a lie?
+     Since these things, though they are said of the Platonic Er,
+     do also attack the rest of our dreaming Africanus.
+
+     VIII. This occasion incited Scipio to relate his dream, which
+     he declares that he had buried in silence for a long time.
+     For when Lælius was complaining that there were no statues of
+     Nasica erected in any public place, as a reward for his
+     having slain the tyrant, Scipio replied in these words: "But
+     although the consciousness itself of great deeds is to wise
+     men the most ample reward of virtue, yet that divine nature
+     ought to have, not statues fixed in lead, nor triumphs with
+     withering laurels, but some more stable and lasting kinds of
+     rewards." "What are they?" said Lælius. "Then," said Scipio,
+     "suffer me, since we have now been keeping holiday for three
+     days, * * * etc." By which preface he came to the relation of
+     his dream; pointing out that those were the more stable and
+     lasting kinds of rewards which he himself had seen in heaven
+     reserved for good governors of commonwealths.
+
+IX. When I had arrived in Africa, where I was, as you are aware,
+military tribune of the fourth legion under the consul Manilius, there
+was nothing of which I was more earnestly desirous than to see King
+Masinissa, who, for very just reasons, had been always the especial
+friend of our family. When I was introduced to him, the old man
+embraced me, shed tears, and then, looking up to heaven, exclaimed--I
+thank thee, O supreme Sun, and ye also, ye other celestial beings, that
+before I depart from this life I behold in my kingdom, and in this my
+palace, Publius Cornelius Scipio, by whose mere name I seem to be
+reanimated; so completely and indelibly is the recollection of that
+best and most invincible of men, Africanus, imprinted in my mind.
+
+After this, I inquired of him concerning the affairs of his kingdom.
+He, on the other hand, questioned me about the condition of our
+Commonwealth, and in this mutual interchange of conversation we passed
+the whole of that day.
+
+X. In the evening we were entertained in a manner worthy the
+magnificence of a king, and carried on our discourse for a considerable
+part of the night. And during all this time the old man spoke of
+nothing but Africanus, all whose actions, and even remarkable sayings,
+he remembered distinctly. At last, when we retired to bed, I fell into
+a more profound sleep than usual, both because I was fatigued with my
+journey, and because I had sat up the greatest part of the night.
+
+Here I had the following dream, occasioned, as I verily believe, by our
+preceding conversation; for it frequently happens that the thoughts and
+discourses which have employed us in the daytime produce in our sleep
+an effect somewhat similar to that which Ennius writes happened to him
+about Homer, of whom, in his waking hours, he used frequently to think
+and speak.
+
+Africanus, I thought, appeared to me in that shape, with which I was
+better acquainted from his picture than from any personal knowledge of
+him. When I perceived it was he, I confess I trembled with
+consternation; but he addressed me, saying, Take courage, my Scipio; be
+not afraid, and carefully remember what I shall say to you.
+
+XI. Do you see that city Carthage, which, though brought under the
+Roman yoke by me, is now renewing former wars, and cannot live in
+peace? (and he pointed to Carthage from a lofty spot, full of stars,
+and brilliant, and glittering)--to attack which city you are this day
+arrived in a station not much superior to that of a private soldier.
+Before two years, however, are elapsed, you shall be consul, and
+complete its overthrow; and you shall obtain, by your own merit, the
+surname of Africanus, which as yet belongs to you no otherwise than as
+derived from me. And when you have destroyed Carthage, and received the
+honor of a triumph, and been made censor, and, in quality of
+ambassador, visited Egypt, Syria, Asia, and Greece, you shall be
+elected a second time consul in your absence, and, by utterly
+destroying Numantia, put an end to a most dangerous war.
+
+But when you have entered the Capitol in your triumphal car, you shall
+find the Roman Commonwealth all in a ferment, through the intrigues of
+my grandson Tiberius Gracchus.
+
+XII. It is on this occasion, my dear Africanus, that you show your
+country the greatness of your understanding, capacity, and prudence.
+But I see that the destiny, however, of that time is, as it were,
+uncertain; for when your age shall have accomplished seven times eight
+revolutions of the sun, and your fatal hours shall be marked put by the
+natural product of these two numbers, each of which is esteemed a
+perfect one, but for different reasons, then shall the whole city have
+recourse to you alone, and place its hopes in your auspicious name. On
+you the senate, all good citizens, the allies, the people of Latium,
+shall cast their eyes; on you the preservation of the State shall
+entirely depend. In a word, _if you escape the impious machinations of
+your relatives_, you will, in quality of dictator, establish order and
+tranquillity in the Commonwealth.
+
+When on this Lælius made an exclamation, and the rest of the company
+groaned loudly, Scipio, with a gentle smile, said, I entreat you, do
+not wake me out of my dream, but have patience, and hear the rest.
+
+XIII. Now, in order to encourage you, my dear Africanus, continued the
+shade of my ancestor, to defend the State with the greater
+cheerfulness, be assured that, for all those who have in any way
+conduced to the preservation, defence, and enlargement of their native
+country, there is a certain place in heaven where they shall enjoy an
+eternity of happiness. For nothing on earth is more agreeable to God,
+the Supreme Governor of the universe, than the assemblies and societies
+of men united together by laws, which are called states. It is from
+heaven their rulers and preservers came, and thither they return.
+
+XIV. Though at these words I was extremely troubled, not so much at the
+fear of death as at the perfidy of my own relations, yet I recollected
+myself enough to inquire whether he himself, my father Paulus, and
+others whom we look upon as dead, were really living.
+
+Yes, truly, replied he, they all enjoy life who have escaped from the
+chains of the body as from a prison. But as to what you call life on
+earth, that is no more than one form of death. But see; here comes your
+father Paulus towards you! And as soon as I observed him, my eyes burst
+out into a flood of tears; but he took me in his arms, embraced me, and
+bade me not weep.
+
+XV. When my first transports subsided, and I regained the liberty of
+speech, I addressed my father thus: Thou best and most venerable of
+parents, since this, as I am informed by Africanus, is the only
+substantial life, why do I linger on earth, and not rather haste to
+come hither where you are?
+
+That, replied he, is impossible: unless that God, whose temple is all
+that vast expanse you behold, shall free you from the fetters of the
+body, you can have no admission into this place. Mankind have received
+their being on this very condition, that they should labor for the
+preservation of that globe which is situated, as you see, in the midst
+of this temple, and is called earth.
+
+Men are likewise endowed with a soul, which is a portion of the eternal
+fires which you call stars and constellations; and which, being round,
+spherical bodies, animated by divine intelligences, perform their
+cycles and revolutions with amazing rapidity. It is your duty,
+therefore, my Publius, and that of all who have any veneration for the
+Gods, to preserve this wonderful union of soul and body; nor without
+the express command of Him who gave you a soul should the least thought
+be entertained of quitting human life, lest you seem to desert the post
+assigned you by God himself.
+
+But rather follow the examples of your grandfather here, and of me,
+your father, in paying a strict regard to justice and piety; which is
+due in a great degree to parents and relations, but most of all to our
+country. Such a life as this is the true way to heaven, and to the
+company of those, who, after having lived on earth and escaped from the
+body, inhabit the place which you now behold.
+
+XVI. This was the shining circle, or zone, whose remarkable brightness
+distinguishes it among the constellations, and which, after the Greeks,
+you call the Milky Way.
+
+From thence, as I took a view of the universe, everything appeared
+beautiful and admirable; for there those stars are to be seen that are
+never visible from our globe, and everything appears of such magnitude
+as we could not have imagined. The least of all the stars was that
+removed farthest from heaven, and situated next to the earth; I mean
+our moon, which shines with a borrowed light. Now, the globes of the
+stars far surpass the magnitude of our earth, which at that distance
+appeared so exceedingly small that I could not but be sensibly affected
+on seeing our whole empire no larger than if we touched the earth, as
+it were, at a single point.
+
+XVII. And as I continued to observe the earth with great attention, How
+long, I pray you, said Africanus, will your mind be fixed on that
+object? why don't you rather take a view of the magnificent temples
+among which you have arrived? The universe is composed of nine circles,
+or rather spheres, one of which is the heavenly one, and is exterior to
+all the rest, which it embraces; being itself the Supreme God, and
+bounding and containing the whole. In it are fixed those stars which
+revolve with never-varying courses. Below this are seven other spheres,
+which revolve in a contrary direction to that of the heavens. One of
+these is occupied by the globe which on earth they call Saturn. Next to
+that is the star of Jupiter, so benign and salutary to mankind. The
+third in order is that fiery and terrible planet called Mars. Below
+this, again, almost in the middle region, is the sun--the leader,
+governor, and prince of the other luminaries; the soul of the world,
+which it regulates and illumines; being of such vast size that it
+pervades and gives light to all places. Then follow Venus and Mercury,
+which attend, as it were, on the sun. Lastly, the moon, which shines
+only in the reflected beams of the sun, moves in the lowest sphere of
+all. Below this, if we except that gift of the Gods, the soul, which
+has been given by the liberality of the Gods to the human race,
+everything is mortal, and tends to dissolution; but above the moon all
+is eternal. For the earth, which is the ninth globe, and occupies the
+centre, is immovable, and, being the lowest, all others gravitate
+towards it.
+
+XVIII. When I had recovered myself from the astonishment occasioned by
+such a wonderful prospect, I thus addressed Africanus: Pray what is
+this sound that strikes my ears in so loud and agreeable a manner? To
+which he replied: It is that which is called the _music of the
+spheres_, being produced by their motion and impulse; and being formed
+by unequal intervals, but such as are divided according to the justest
+proportion, it produces, by duly tempering acute with grave sounds,
+various concerts of harmony. For it is impossible that motions so great
+should be performed without any noise; and it is agreeable to nature
+that the extremes on one side should produce sharp, and on the other
+flat sounds. For which reason the sphere of the fixed stars, being the
+highest, and being carried with a more rapid velocity, moves with a
+shrill and acute sound; whereas that of the moon, being the lowest,
+moves with a very flat one. As to the earth, which makes the ninth
+sphere, it remains immovably fixed in the middle or lowest part of the
+universe. But those eight revolving circles, in which both Mercury and
+Venus are moved with the same celerity, give out sounds that are
+divided by seven distinct intervals, which is generally the regulating
+number of all things.
+
+This celestial harmony has been imitated by learned musicians both on
+stringed instruments and with the voice, whereby they have opened to
+themselves a way to return to the celestial regions, as have likewise
+many others who have employed their sublime genius while on earth in
+cultivating the divine sciences.
+
+By the amazing noise of this sound the ears of mankind have been in
+some degree deafened; and indeed hearing is the dullest of all the
+human senses. Thus, the people who dwell near the cataracts of the
+Nile, which are called Catadupa[348], are, by the excessive roar which
+that river makes in precipitating itself from those lofty mountains,
+entirely deprived of the sense of hearing. And so inconceivably great
+is this sound which is produced by the rapid motion of the whole
+universe, that the human ear is no more capable of receiving it than
+the eye is able to look steadfastly and directly on the sun, whose
+beams easily dazzle the strongest sight.
+
+While I was busied in admiring the scene of wonders, I could not help
+casting my eyes every now and then on the earth.
+
+XIX. On which Africanus said, I perceive that you are still employed in
+contemplating the seat and residence of mankind. But if it appears to
+you so small, as in fact it really is, despise its vanities, and fix
+your attention forever on these heavenly objects. Is it possible that
+you should attain any human applause or glory that is worth the
+contending for? The earth, you see, is peopled but in a very few
+places, and those, too, of small extent; and they appear like so many
+little spots of green scattered through vast, uncultivated deserts. And
+those who inhabit the earth are not only so remote from each other as
+to be cut off from all mutual correspondence, but their situation being
+in oblique or contrary parts of the globe, or perhaps in those
+diametrically opposite to yours, all expectation of universal fame must
+fall to the ground.
+
+XX. You may likewise observe that the same globe of the earth is girt
+and surrounded with certain zones, whereof those two that are most
+remote from each other, and lie under the opposite poles of heaven, are
+congealed with frost; but that one in the middle, which is far the
+largest, is scorched with the intense heat of the sun. The other two
+are habitable, one towards the south, the inhabitants of which are your
+antipodes, with whom you have no connection; the other, towards the
+north, is that which you inhabit, whereof a very small part, as you may
+see, falls to your share. For the whole extent of what you see is, as
+it were, but a little island, narrow at both ends and wide in the
+middle, which is surrounded by the sea which on earth you call the
+great Atlantic Ocean, and which, notwithstanding this magnificent name,
+you see is very insignificant. And even in these cultivated and
+well-known countries, has yours, or any of our names, ever passed the
+heights of the Caucasus or the currents of the Ganges? In what other
+parts to the north or the south, or where the sun rises and sets, will
+your names ever be heard? And if we leave these out of the question,
+how small a space is there left for your glory to spread itself abroad;
+and how long will it remain in the memory of those whose minds are now
+full of it?
+
+XXI. Besides all this, if the progeny of any future generation should
+wish to transmit to their posterity the praises of any one of us which
+they have heard from their forefathers, yet the deluges and combustions
+of the earth, which must necessarily happen at their destined periods,
+will prevent our obtaining, not only an eternal, but even a durable
+glory. And, after all, what does it signify whether those who shall
+hereafter be born talk of you, when those who have lived before you,
+whose number was perhaps not less, and whose merit certainly greater,
+were not so much as acquainted with your name?
+
+XXII. Especially since not one of those who shall hear of us is able to
+retain in his memory the transactions of a single year. The bulk of
+mankind, indeed, measure their year by the return of the sun, which is
+only one star. But when all the stars shall have returned to the place
+whence they set out, and after long periods shall again exhibit the
+same aspect of the whole heavens, that is what ought properly to be
+called the revolution of a year, though I scarcely dare attempt to
+enumerate the vast multitude of ages contained in it. For as the sun in
+old time was eclipsed, and seemed to be extinguished, at the time when
+the soul of Romulus penetrated into these eternal mansions, so, when
+all the constellations and stars shall revert to their primary
+position, and the sun shall at the same point and time be again
+eclipsed, then you may consider that the grand year is completed. Be
+assured, however, that the twentieth part of it is not yet elapsed.
+
+XXIII. Wherefore, if you have no hopes of returning to this place where
+great and good men enjoy all that their souls can wish for, of what
+value, pray, is all that human glory, which can hardly endure for a
+small portion of one year?
+
+If, then, you wish to elevate your views to the contemplation of this
+eternal seat of splendor, you will not be satisfied with the praises of
+your fellow-mortals, nor with any human rewards that your exploits can
+obtain; but Virtue herself must point out to you the true and only
+object worthy of your pursuit. Leave to others to speak of you as they
+may, for speak they will. Their discourses will be confined to the
+narrow limits of the countries you see, nor will their duration be very
+extensive; for they will perish like those who utter them, and will be
+no more remembered by their posterity.
+
+XXIV. When he had ceased to speak in this manner, I said, O Africanus,
+if indeed the door of heaven is open to those who have deserved well of
+their country, although, indeed, from my childhood I have always
+followed yours and my father's steps, and have not neglected to imitate
+your glory, still, I will from henceforth strive to follow them more
+closely.
+
+Follow them, then, said he, and consider your body only, not yourself,
+as mortal. For it is not your outward form which constitutes your
+being, but your mind; not that substance which is palpable to the
+senses, but your spiritual nature. _Know, then, that you are a
+God_--for a God it must be, which flourishes, and feels, and
+recollects, and foresees, and governs, regulates and moves the body
+over which it is set, as the Supreme Ruler does the world which is
+subject to him. For as that Eternal Being moves whatever is mortal in
+this world, so the immortal mind of man moves the frail body with which
+it is connected.
+
+XXV. For whatever is always moving must be eternal; but that which
+derives its motion from a power which is foreign to itself, when that
+motion ceases must itself lose its animation.
+
+That alone, then, which moves itself can never cease to be moved,
+because it can never desert itself. Moreover, it must be the source,
+and origin, and principle of motion in all the rest. There can be
+nothing prior to a principle, for all things must originate from it;
+and it cannot itself derive its existence from any other source, for if
+it did it would no longer be a principle. And if it had no beginning,
+it can have no end; for a beginning that is put an end to will neither
+be renewed by any other cause, nor will it produce anything else of
+itself. All things, therefore, must originate from one source. Thus it
+follows that motion must have its source in something which is moved by
+itself, and which can neither have a beginning nor an end. Otherwise
+all the heavens and all nature must perish, for it is impossible that
+they can of themselves acquire any power of producing motion in
+themselves.
+
+XXVI. As, therefore, it is plain that what is moved by itself must be
+eternal, who will deny that this is the general condition and nature of
+minds? For as everything is inanimate which is moved by an impulse
+exterior to itself, so what is animated is moved by an interior impulse
+of its own; for this is the peculiar nature and power of mind. And if
+that alone has the power of self-motion, it can neither have had a
+beginning, nor can it have an end.
+
+Do you, therefore, exercise this mind of yours in the best pursuits.
+And the best pursuits are those which consist in promoting the good of
+your country. Such employments will speed the flight of your mind to
+this its proper abode; and its flight will be still more rapid, if,
+even while it is enclosed in the body, it will look abroad, and
+disengage itself as much as possible from its bodily dwelling, by the
+contemplation of things which are external to itself.
+
+This it should do to the utmost of its power. For the minds of those
+who have given themselves up to the pleasures of the body, paying, as
+it were, a servile obedience to their lustful impulses, have violated
+the laws of God and man; and therefore, when they are separated from
+their bodies, flutter continually round the earth on which they lived,
+and are not allowed to return to this celestial region till they have
+been purified by the revolution of many ages.
+
+Thus saying, he vanished, and I awoke from my dream.
+
+
+A FRAGMENT.
+
+
+And although it is most desirable that fortune should remain forever in
+the most brilliant possible condition, nevertheless, the equability of
+life excites less interest than those changeable conditions wherein
+prosperity suddenly revives out of the most desperate and ruinous
+circumstances.
+
+
+
+
+
+
+THE END.
+
+
+
+
+
+
+FOOTNOTES:
+
+
+[1] Archilochus was a native of Paros, and flourished about 714-676
+B.C. His poems were chiefly Iambics of bitter satire. Horace speaks of
+him as the inventor of Iambics, and calls himself his pupil.
+
+                  Parios ego primus Iambos
+    Ostendi Latio, numeros animosque secutus
+    Archilochi, non res et agentia verba Lycamben.
+                              Epist. I. xix. 25.
+
+And in another place he says,
+
+    Archilochum proprio rabies armavit Iambo--A.P. 74.
+
+[2] This was Livius Andronicus: he is supposed to have been a native of
+Tarentum, and he was made prisoner by the Romans, during their wars in
+Southern Italy; owing to which he became the slave of M. Livius
+Salinator. He wrote both comedies and tragedies, of which Cicero
+(Brutus 18) speaks very contemptuously, as "Livianæ fabulæ non satis
+dignæ quæ iterum legantur"--not worth reading a second time. He also
+wrote a Latin Odyssey, and some hymns, and died probably about 221 B.C.
+
+[3] C. Fabius, surnamed Pictor, painted the temple of Salus, which the
+dictator C. Junius Brutus Bubulus dedicated 302 B.C. The temple was
+destroyed by fire in the reign of Claudius. The painting is highly
+praised by Dionysius, xvi. 6.
+
+[4] For an account of the ancient Greek philosophers, see the sketch at
+the end of the Disputations.
+
+[5] Isocrates was born at Athens 436 B.C. He was a pupil of Gorgias,
+Prodicus, and Socrates. He opened a school of rhetoric, at Athens, with
+great success. He died by his own hand at the age of ninety-eight.
+
+[6] So Horace joins these two classes as inventors of all kinds of
+improbable fictions:
+
+                      Pictoribus atque poetis
+    Quidlibet audendi semper fuit æqua potestas.--A. P. 9.
+
+Which Roscommon translates:
+
+    Painters and poets have been still allow'd
+    Their pencil and their fancies unconfined.
+
+[7] Epicharmus was a native of Cos, but lived at Megara, in Sicily, and
+when Megara was destroyed, removed to Syracuse, and lived at the court
+of Hiero, where he became the first writer of comedies, so that Horace
+ascribes the invention of comedy to him, and so does Theocritus. He
+lived to a great age.
+
+[8] Pherecydes was a native of Scyros, one of the Cyclades; and is said
+to have obtained his knowledge from the secret books of the
+Phoenicians. He is said also to have been a pupil of Pittacus, the
+rival of Thales, and the master of Pythagoras. His doctrine was that
+there were three principles ([Greek: Zeus], or Æther; [Greek: Chthôn],
+or Chaos; and [Greek: Chronos], or Time) and four elements (Fire,
+Earth, Air, and Water), from which everything that exists was
+formed.--_Vide_ Smith's Dict. Gr. and Rom. Biog.
+
+[9] Archytas was a native of Tarentum, and is said to have saved the
+life of Plato by his influence with the tyrant Dionysius. He was
+especially great as a mathematician and geometrician, so that Horace
+calls him
+
+    Maris et terra numeroque carentis arenæ
+    Mensorem.
+                              Od. i. 28.1.
+
+Plato is supposed to have learned some of his views from him, and
+Aristotle to have borrowed from him every idea of the Categories.
+
+[10] This was not Timæus the historian, but a native of Locri, who is
+said also in the De Finibus (c. 29) to have been a teacher of Plato.
+There is a treatise extant bearing his name, which is, however,
+probably spurious, and only an abridgment of Plato's dialogue Timæus.
+
+[11] Dicæarchus was a native of Messana, in Sicily, though he lived
+chiefly in Greece. He was one of the later disciples of Aristotle. He
+was a great geographer, politician, historian, and philosopher, and
+died about 285 B.C.
+
+[12] Aristoxenus was a native of Tarentum, and also a pupil of
+Aristotle. We know nothing of his opinions except that he held the soul
+to be a _harmony_ of the body; a doctrine which had been already
+discussed by Plato in the Phædo, and combated by Aristotle. He was a
+great musician, and the chief portions of his works which have come
+down to us are fragments of some musical treatises.--Smith's Dict. Gr.
+and Rom. Biog.; to which source I must acknowledge my obligation for
+nearly the whole of these biographical notes.
+
+[13] The Simonides here meant is the celebrated poet of Ceos, the
+perfecter of elegiac poetry among the Greeks. He flourished about the
+time of the Persian war. Besides his poetry, he is said to have been
+the inventor of some method of aiding the memory. He died at the court
+of Hiero, 467 B.C.
+
+[14] Theodectes was a native of Phaselis, in Pamphylia, a distinguished
+rhetorician and tragic poet, and flourished in the time of Philip of
+Macedon. He was a pupil of Isocrates, and lived at Athens, and died
+there at the age of forty-one.
+
+[15] Cineas was a Thessalian, and (as is said in the text) came to Rome
+as ambassador from Pyrrhus after the battle of Heraclea, 280 B.C., and
+his memory is said to have been so great that on the day after his
+arrival he was able to address all the senators and knights by name. He
+probably died before Pyrrhus returned to Italy, 276 B.C.
+
+[16] Charmadas, called also Charmides, was a fellow-pupil with Philo,
+the Larissæan of Clitomachus, the Carthaginian. He is said by some
+authors to have founded a fourth academy.
+
+[17] Metrodorus was a minister of Mithridates the Great; and employed
+by him as supreme judge in Pontus, and afterward as an ambassador.
+Cicero speaks of him in other places (De Orat. ii. 88) as a man of
+wonderful memory.
+
+[18] Quintus Hortensius was eight years older than Cicero; and, till
+Cicero's fame surpassed his, he was accounted the most eloquent of all
+the Romans. He was Verres's counsel in the prosecution conducted
+against him by Cicero. Seneca relates that his memory was so great that
+he could come out of an auction and repeat the catalogue backward. He
+died 50 B.C.
+
+[19] This treatise is one which has not come down to us, but which had
+been lately composed by Cicero in order to comfort himself for the loss
+of his daughter.
+
+[20] The epigram is,
+
+    [Greek: Eipas Hêlie chaire, Kleombrotos Hômbrakiôtês
+      hêlat' aph' hypsêlou teicheos eis Aidên,
+    axion ouden idôn thanatou kakon, alla Platônos
+      hen to peri psychês gramm' analexamenos.]
+
+Which may be translated, perhaps,
+
+    Farewell, O sun, Cleombrotus exclaim'd,
+      Then plunged from off a height beneath the sea;
+    Stung by pain, of no disgrace ashamed,
+      But moved by Plato's high philosophy.
+
+[21] This is alluded to by Juvenal:
+
+    Provida Pompeio dederat Campania febres
+    Optandas: sed multæ urbes et publica vota
+    Vicerunt. Igitur Fortuna ipsius et Urbis,
+    Servatum victo caput abstulit.--Sat. x. 283.
+
+[22] Pompey's second wife was Julia, the daughter of Julius Cæsar, she
+died the year before the death of Crassus, in Parthia. Virgil speaks of
+Cæsar and Pompey as relations, using the same expression (socer) as
+Cicero:
+
+    Aggeribus socer Alpinis atque arce Monoeci
+    Descendens, gener adversis instructus Eois.--Æn. vi. 830.
+
+[23] This idea is beautifully expanded by Byron:
+
+    Yet if, as holiest men have deem'd, there be
+    A land of souls beyond that sable shore
+    To shame the doctrine of the Sadducee
+    And sophist, madly vain or dubious lore,
+    How sweet it were in concert to adore
+    With those who made our mortal labors light,
+    To hear each voice we fear'd to hear no more.
+    Behold each mighty shade reveal'd to sight,
+    The Bactrian, Samian sage, and all who taught the right!
+                              _Childe Harold_, ii.
+
+[24] The epitaph in the original is:
+
+    [Greek: Ô xein' angeilon Lakedaimoniois hoti têde
+      keimetha, tois keinôn peithomenoi nomimois.]
+
+[25] This was expressed in the Greek verses,
+
+    [Greek: Archês men mê phynai epichthonioisin ariston,
+    phynta d' hopôs ôkista pylas Aidyo perêsai]
+
+which by some authors are attributed to Homer.
+
+[26] This is the first fragment of the Cresphontes.--Ed. Var. vii., p.
+594.
+
+    [Greek: Edei gar hêmas syllogon poioumenous
+    Ton phynta thrênein, eis hos' erchetai kaka.
+    Ton d' au thanonta kai ponôn pepaumenon
+    chairontas euphêmointas ekpemein domôn]
+
+[27] The Greek verses are quoted by Plutarch:
+
+        [Greek: Êpou nêpie, êlithioi phrenes andrôn
+      Euthynoos keitai moiridiô thanatô
+    Ouk ên gar zôein kalon autô oute goneusi.]
+
+[28] This refers to the story that when Eumolpus, the son of Neptune,
+whose assistance the Eleusinians had called in against the Athenians,
+had been slain by the Athenians, an oracle demanded the sacrifice of
+one of the daughters of Erechtheus, the King of Athens. And when one
+was drawn by lot, the others voluntarily accompanied her to death.
+
+[29] Menoeceus was son of Creon, and in the war of the Argives against
+Thebes, Teresias declared that the Thebans should conquer if Menoeceus
+would sacrifice himself for his country; and accordingly he killed
+himself outside the gates of Thebes.
+
+[30] The Greek is,
+
+    [Greek: mêde moi aklaustos thanatos moloi, alla philoisi
+      poiêsaimi thanôn algea kai stonachas.]
+
+[31] Soph. Trach. 1047.
+
+[32] The lines quoted by Cicero here appear to have come from the Latin
+play of Prometheus by Accius; the ideas are borrowed, rather than
+translated, from the Prometheus of Æschylus.
+
+[33] From _exerceo_.
+
+[34] Each soldier carried a stake, to help form a palisade in front of
+the camp.
+
+[35] Insania--from _in_, a particle of negative force in composition,
+and _sanus_, healthy, sound.
+
+[36] The man who first received this surname was L. Calpurnius Piso,
+who was consul, 133 B.C., in the Servile War.
+
+[37] The Greek is,
+
+    [Greek: Alla moi oidanetai kradiê cholô hoppot' ekeinou
+    Mnêsomai hos m' asyphêlon en Argeioisin erexen.]--Il. ix. 642.
+
+I have given Pope's translation in the text.
+
+[38] This is from the Theseus:
+
+    [Greek: Egô de touto para sophou tinos mathôn
+    eis phrontidas noun symphoras t' eballomên
+    phygas t' emautô prostitheis patras emês.
+    thanatous t' aôrous, kai kakôn allas hodous
+    hôs, ei ti paschoim' ôn edoxazon pote
+    Mê moi neorton prospeson mallon dakoi.]
+
+[39] Ter. Phorm. II. i. 11.
+
+[40] This refers to the speech of Agamemnon in Euripides, in the
+Iphigenia in Aulis,
+
+              [Greek: Zêlô se, geron,
+    zêlô d' andrôn hos akindynon
+    bion exeperas', agnôs, akleês.]--v. 15.
+
+[41] This is a fragment from the Hypsipyle:
+
+    [Greek: Ephy men oudeis hostis ou ponei brotôn
+    thaptei te tekna chater' au ktatai nea,
+    autos te thnêskei. kai tad' achthontai brotoi
+    eis gên pherontes gên anankaiôs d' echei
+    bion therizein hôste karpimon stachyn.]
+
+[42]
+    [Greek: Pollas ek kephalês prothelymnous helketo chaitas.]--Il. x. 15.
+
+[43]
+    [Greek: Êtoi ho kappedion to Alêion oios alato
+    hon thymon katedôn, paton anthrôpôn aleeinôn.]--Il. vi. 201.
+
+[44] This is a translation from Euripides:
+
+    [Greek: Hôsth' himeros m' hypêlthe gê te k' ouranô
+    lexai molousê deuro Mêdeias tychas.]--Med. 57.
+
+[45]
+    [Greek: Liên gar polloi kai epêtrimoi êmata panta
+    piptousin, pote ken tis anapneuseie ponoio;
+    alla chrê ton men katathaptemen, hos ke thanêsi,
+    nêlea thymon echontas, ep' êmati dakrysantas.]--
+                              Hom. Il. xix. 226.
+
+[46] This is one of the fragments of Euripides which we are unable to
+assign to any play in particular; it occurs Var. Ed. Tr. Inc. 167.
+
+    [Greek: Ei men tod' êmar prôton ên kakoumenô
+    kai mê makran dê dia ponôn enaustoloun
+    eikos sphadazein ên an, hôs neozyga
+    pôlon, chalinon artiôs dedegmenon
+    nyn d' amblys eimi, kai katêrtykôs kakôn.]
+
+[47] This is only a fragment, preserved by Stobæus:
+
+    [Greek: Tous d' an megistous kai sophôtatous phreni
+    toiousd' idois an, oios esti nyn hode,
+    kalôs kakôs prassonti symparainesai
+    hotan de daimôn andros eutychous to prin
+    mastig' episê tou biou palintropon,
+    ta polla phrouda kai kakôs eirêmena.]
+
+[48]
+    [Greek: Ôk. Oukoun Promêtheu touto gignôskeis hoti
+      orgês nosousês eisin iatroi logoi.
+    Pr. ean tis en kairô ge malthassê kear
+      kai mê sphrigônta thymon ischnainê bia.]--
+                              Æsch. Prom. v. 378.
+
+[49] Cicero alludes here to Il. vii. 211, which is thus translated by
+Pope:
+
+    His massy javelin quivering in his hand,
+    He stood the bulwark of the Grecian band;
+    Through every Argive heart new transport ran,
+    All Troy stood trembling at the mighty man:
+    E'en Hector paused, and with new doubt oppress'd,
+    Felt his great heart suspended in his breast;
+    'Twas vain to seek retreat, and vain to fear,
+    Himself had challenged, and the foe drew near.
+
+But Melmoth (Note on the Familiar Letters of Cicero, book ii. Let. 23)
+rightly accuses Cicero of having misunderstood Homer, who "by no means
+represents Hector as being thus totally dismayed at the approach of his
+adversary; and, indeed, it would have been inconsistent with the
+general character of that hero to have described him under such
+circumstances of terror."
+
+    [Greek: Ton de kai Argeioi meg' egêtheon eisoroôntes,
+    Trôas de tromos ainos hypêlythe gyia hekaston,
+    Hektori d' autô thymos eni stêthessi patassen.]
+
+But there is a great difference, as Dr. Clarke remarks, between [Greek:
+thymos eni stêthessi patassen] and [Greek: kardeê exô stêtheôn
+ethrôsken], or [Greek: tromos ainos hypêlythe gyia].--_The Trojans_,
+says Homer, _trembled_ at the sight of Ajax, and even Hector himself
+felt some emotion in his breast.
+
+[50] Cicero means Scipio Nasica, who, in the riots consequent on the
+reelection of Tiberius Gracchus to the tribunate, 133 B.C., having
+called in vain on the consul, Mucius Scævola, to save the republic,
+attacked Gracchus himself, who was slain in the tumult.
+
+[51] _Morosus_ is evidently derived from _mores_--"_Morosus_, _mos_,
+stubbornness, self-will, etc."--Riddle and Arnold, Lat. Dict.
+
+[52] In the original they run thus:
+
+    [Greek: Ouk estin ouden deinon hôd' eipein epos,
+    Oude pathos, oude xymphora theêlatos
+    hês ouk an aroit' achthos anthrôpon physis.]
+
+[53] This passage is from the Eunuch of Terence, act i., sc. 1, 14.
+
+[54] These verses are from the Atreus of Accius.
+
+[55] This was Marcus Atilius Regulus, the story of whose treatment by
+the Carthaginians in the first Punic War is well known to everybody.
+
+[56] This was Quintus Servilius Cæpio, who, 105 B.C., was destroyed,
+with his army, by the Cimbri, it was believed as a judgment for the
+covetousness which he had displayed in the plunder of Tolosa.
+
+[57] This was Marcus Aquilius, who, in the year 88 B.C., was sent
+against Mithridates as one of the consular legates; and, being
+defeated, was delivered up to the king by the inhabitants of Mitylene.
+Mithridates put him to death by pouring molten gold down his throat.
+
+[58] This was the elder brother of the triumvir Marcus Crassus, 87 B.C.
+He was put to death by Fimbria, who was in command of some of the
+troops of Marius.
+
+[59] Lucius Cæsar and Caius Cæsar were relations (it is uncertain in
+what degree) of the great Cæsar, and were killed by Fimbria on the same
+occasion as Octavius.
+
+[60] M. Antonius was the grandfather of the triumvir; he was murdered
+the same year, 87 B.C., by Annius, when Marius and Cinna took Rome.
+
+[61] This story is alluded to by Horace:
+
+    Districtus ensis cui super impiâ
+    Cervice pendet non Siculæ dapes
+      Dulcem elaborabunt saporem,
+        Non avium citharæve cantus
+    Somnum reducent.--iii. 1. 17.
+
+[62] Hieronymus was a Rhodian, and a pupil of Aristotle, flourishing
+about 300 B.C. He is frequently mentioned by Cicero.
+
+[63] We know very little of Dinomachus. Some MSS. have Clitomachus.
+
+[64] Callipho was in all probability a pupil of Epicurus, but we have
+no certain information about him.
+
+[65] Diodorus was a Syrian, and succeeded Critolaus as the head of the
+Peripatetic School at Athens.
+
+[66] Aristo was a native of Ceos, and a pupil of Lycon, who succeeded
+Straton as the head of the Peripatetic School, 270 B.C. He afterward
+himself succeeded Lycon.
+
+[67] Pyrrho was a native of Elis, and the originator of the sceptical
+theories of some of the ancient philosophers. He was a contemporary of
+Alexander.
+
+[68] Herillus was a disciple of Zeno of Cittium, and therefore a Stoic.
+He did not, however, follow all the opinions of his master: he held
+that knowledge was the chief good. Some of the treatises of Cleanthes
+were written expressly to confute him.
+
+[69] Anacharsis was (Herod., iv., 76) son of Gnurus and brother of
+Saulius, King of Thrace. He came to Athens while Solon was occupied in
+framing laws for his people; and by the simplicity of his way of
+living, and his acute observations on the manners of the Greeks, he
+excited such general admiration that he was reckoned by some writers
+among the Seven Wise Men of Greece.
+
+[70] This was Appius Claudius Cæcus, who was censor 310 B.C., and who,
+according to Livy, was afflicted with blindness by the Gods for
+persuading the Potitii to instruct the public servants in the way of
+sacrificing to Hercules. He it was who made the Via Appia.
+
+[71] The fact of Homer's blindness rests on a passage in the Hymn to
+Apollo, quoted by Thucydides as a genuine work of Homer, and which is
+thus spoken of by one of the most accomplished scholars that this
+country or this age has ever produced: "They are indeed beautiful
+verses; and if none worse had ever been attributed to Homer, the Prince
+of Poets would have had little reason to complain.
+
+"He has been describing the Delian festival in honor of Apollo and
+Diana, and concludes this part of the poem with an address to the women
+of that island, to whom it is to be supposed that he had become
+familiarly known by his frequent recitations:
+
+    [Greek: Chairete d' hymeis pasai, emeio de kai metopisthe
+    mnêsasth', hoppote ken tis epichthoniôn anthrôpôn
+    enthad' aneirêtai xeinos talapeirios elthôn
+    ô kourai, tis d' hymmin anêr hêdistos aoidôn
+    enthade pôleitai kai teô terpesthe malista;
+    hymeis d' eu mala pasai hypokrinasthe aph' hêmôn,
+    Typhlos anêr, oikei de Chiô eni paipaloessê,
+    tou pasai metopisthen aristeuousin aoidai.]
+
+    Virgins, farewell--and oh! remember me
+    Hereafter, when some stranger from the sea,
+    A hapless wanderer, may your isle explore,
+    And ask you, 'Maids, of all the bards you boast,
+    Who sings the sweetest, and delights you most?'
+    Oh! answer all, 'A blind old man, and poor,
+    Sweetest he sings, and dwells on Chios' rocky shore.'
+
+                              _Coleridge's Introduction to the Study
+                              of the Greek Classic Poets._
+
+[72] Some read _scientiam_ and some _inscientiam;_ the latter of which
+is preferred by some of the best editors and commentators.
+
+[73] For a short account of these ancient Greek philosophers, see the
+sketch prefixed to the Academics (_Classical Library_).
+
+[74] Cicero wrote his philosophical works in the last three years of
+his life. When he wrote this piece, he was in the sixty-third year of
+his age, in the year of Rome 709.
+
+[75] The Academic.
+
+[76] Diodorus and Posidonius were Stoics; Philo and Antiochus were
+Academics; but the latter afterward inclined to the doctrine of the
+Stoics.
+
+[77] Julius Cæsar.
+
+[78] Cicero was one of the College of Augurs.
+
+[79] The Latinæ Feriæ was originally a festival of the Latins, altered
+by Tarquinius Superbus into a Roman one. It was held in the Alban
+Mount, in honor of Jupiter Latiaris. This holiday lasted six days: it
+was not held at any fixed time; but the consul was never allowed to
+take the field till he had held them.--_Vide_ Smith, Dict. Gr. and Rom.
+Ant., p. 414.
+
+[80] _Exhedra_, the word used by Cicero, means a study, or place where
+disputes were held.
+
+[81] M. Piso was a Peripatetic. The four great sects were the Stoics,
+the Peripatetics, the Academics, and the Epicureans.
+
+[82] It was a prevailing tenet of the Academics that there is no
+certain knowledge.
+
+[83] The five forms of Plato are these: [Greek: ousia, tauton, heteron,
+stasis, kinêsis.]
+
+[84] The four natures here to be understood are the four
+elements--fire, water, air, and earth; which are mentioned as the four
+principles of Empedocles by Diogenes Laertius.
+
+[85] These five moving stars are Saturn, Jupiter, Mars, Mercury, and
+Venus. Their revolutions are considered in the next book.
+
+[86] Or, Generation of the Gods.
+
+[87] The [Greek: prolêpsis] of Epicurus, before mentioned, is what he
+here means.
+
+[88] [Greek: Steremnia] is the word which Epicurus used to distinguish
+between those objects which are perceptible to sense, and those which
+are imperceptible; as the essence of the Divine Being, and the various
+operations of the divine power.
+
+[89] Zeno here mentioned is not the same that Cotta spoke of before.
+This was the founder of the Stoics. The other was an Epicurean
+philosopher whom he had heard at Athens.
+
+[90] That is, there would be the same uncertainty in heaven as is among
+the Academics.
+
+[91] Those nations which were neither Greek nor Roman.
+
+[92] _Sigilla numerantes_ is the common reading; but P. Manucius
+proposes _venerantes_, which I choose as the better of the two, and in
+which sense I have translated it.
+
+[93] Fundamental doctrines.
+
+[94] That is, the zodiac.
+
+[95] The moon, as well as the sun, is indeed in the zodiac, but she
+does not measure the same course in a month. She moves in another line
+of the zodiac nearer the earth.
+
+[96] According to the doctrines of Epicurus, none of these bodies
+themselves are clearly seen, but _simulacra ex corporibus effluentia_.
+
+[97] Epicurus taught his disciples in a garden.
+
+[98] By the word _Deus_, as often used by our author, we are to
+understand all the Gods in that theology then treated of, and not a
+single personal Deity.
+
+[99] The best commentators on this passage agree that Cicero does not
+mean that Aristotle affirmed that there was no such person as Orpheus,
+but that there was no such poet, and that the verse called Orphic was
+said to be the invention of another. The passage of Aristotle to which
+Cicero here alludes has, as Dr. Davis observes, been long lost.
+
+[100] A just proportion between the different sorts of beings.
+
+[101] Some give _quos non pudeat earum Epicuri vocum;_ but the best
+copies have not _non;_ nor would it be consistent with Cotta to say
+_quos non pudeat_, for he throughout represents Velleius as a perfect
+Epicurean in every article.
+
+[102] His country was Abdera, the natives of which were remarkable for
+their stupidity.
+
+[103] This passage will not admit of a translation answerable to the
+sense of the original. Cicero says the word _amicitia_ (friendship) is
+derived from _amor_ (love or affection).
+
+[104] This manner of speaking of Jupiter frequently occurs in Homer,
+
+    ----[Greek: patêr andrôn te theôn te,]
+
+and has been used by Virgil and other poets since Ennius.
+
+[105] Perses, or Perseus, the last king of Macedonia, was taken by
+Cnæus Octavius, the prætor, and brought as prisoner to Paullus Æmilius,
+167 B.C.
+
+[106] An exemption from serving in the wars, and from paying public
+taxes.
+
+[107] Mopsus. There were two soothsayers of this name: the first was
+one of the Lapithæ, son of Ampycus and Chloris, called also the son of
+Apollo and Hienantis; the other a son of Apollo and Manto, who is said
+to have founded Mallus, in Asia Minor, where his oracle existed as late
+as the time of Strabo.
+
+[108] Tiresias was the great Theban prophet at the time of the war of
+the Seven against Thebes.
+
+[109] Amphiaraus was King of Argos (he had been one of the Argonauts
+also). He was killed after the war of the Seven against Thebes, which
+he was compelled to join in by the treachery of his wife Eriphyle, by
+the earth opening and swallowing him up as he was fleeing from
+Periclymenus.
+
+[110] Calchas was the prophet of the Grecian army at the siege of Troy.
+
+[111] Helenus was a son of Priam and Hecuba. He is represented as a
+prophet in the Philoctetes of Sophocles. And in the Æneid he is also
+represented as king of part of Epirus, and as predicting to Æneas the
+dangers and fortunes which awaited him.
+
+[112] This short passage would be very obscure to the reader without an
+explanation from another of Cicero's treatises. The expression here,
+_ad investigandum suem regiones vineæ terminavit_, which is a metaphor
+too bold, if it was not a sort of augural language, seems to me to have
+been the effect of carelessness in our great author; for Navius did not
+divide the regions, as he calls them, of the vine to find his sow, but
+to find a grape.
+
+[113] The Peremnia were a sort of auspices performed just before the
+passing a river.
+
+[114] The Acumina were a military auspices, and were partly performed
+on the point of a spear, from which they were called Acumina.
+
+[115] Those were called _testamenta in procinctu_, which were made by
+soldiers just before an engagement, in the presence of men called as
+witnesses.
+
+[116] This especially refers to the Decii, one of whom devoted himself
+for his country in the war with the Latins, 340 B.C., and his son
+imitated the action in the war with the Samnites, 295 B.C. Cicero
+(Tusc. i. 37) says that his son did the same thing in the war with
+Pyrrhus at the battle of Asculum, though in other places (De Off. iii.
+4) he speaks of only two Decii as having signalized themselves in this
+manner.
+
+[117] The Rogator, who collected the votes, and pronounced who was the
+person chosen. There were two sorts of Rogators; one was the officer
+here mentioned, and the other was the Rogator, or speaker of the whole
+assembly.
+
+[118] Which was Sardinia, as appears from one of Cicero's epistles to
+his brother Quintus.
+
+[119] Their sacred books of ceremonies.
+
+[120] The war between Octavius and Cinna, the consuls.
+
+[121] This, in the original, is a fragment of an old Latin verse,
+
+    _----Terram fumare calentem._
+
+[122] The Latin word is _principatus_, which exactly corresponds with
+the Greek word here used by Cicero; by which is to be understood the
+superior, the most prevailing excellence in every kind and species of
+things through the universe.
+
+[123] The passage of Aristotle to which Cicero here refers is lost.
+
+[124] He means the Epicureans.
+
+[125] Here the Stoic speaks too plain to be misunderstood. His world,
+his _mundus_, is the universe, and that universe is his great Deity,
+_in quo sit totius naturæ principatus_, in which the superior
+excellence of universal nature consists.
+
+[126] Athens, the seat of learning and politeness, of which Balbus will
+not allow Epicurus to be worthy.
+
+[127] This is Pythagoras's doctrine, as appears in Diogenes Laertius.
+
+[128] He here alludes to mathematical and geometrical instruments.
+
+[129] Balbus here speaks of the fixed stars, and of the motions of the
+orbs of the planets. He here alludes, says M. Bonhier, to the different
+and diurnal motions of these stars; one sort from east to west, the
+other from one tropic to the other: and this is the construction which
+our learned and great geometrician and astronomer, Dr. Halley, made of
+this passage.
+
+[130] This mensuration of the year into three hundred and sixty-five
+days and near six hours (by the odd hours and minutes of which, in
+every fifth year, the _dies intercalaris_, or leap-year, is made) could
+not but be known, Dr. Halley states, by Hipparchus, as appears from the
+remains of that great astronomer of the ancients. We are inclined to
+think that Julius Cæsar had divided the year, according to what we call
+the Julian year, before Cicero wrote this book; for we see, in the
+beginning of it, how pathetically he speaks of Cæsar's usurpation.
+
+[131] The words of Censorinus, on this occasion, are to the same
+effect. The opinions of philosophers concerning this great year are
+very different; but the institution of it is ascribed to Democritus.
+
+[132] The zodiac.
+
+[133] Though Mars is said to hold his orbit in the zodiac with the
+rest, and to finish his revolution through the same orbit (that is, the
+zodiac) with the other two, yet Balbus means in a different line of the
+zodiac.
+
+[134] According to late observations, it never goes but a sign and a
+half from the sun.
+
+[135] These, Dr. Davis says, are "aërial fires;" concerning which he
+refers to the second book of Pliny.
+
+[136] In the Eunuch of Terence.
+
+[137] Bacchus.
+
+[138] The son of Ceres.
+
+[139] The books of Ceremonies.
+
+[140] This Libera is taken for Proserpine, who, with her brother Liber,
+was consecrated by the Romans; all which are parts of nature in
+prosopopoeias. Cicero, therefore, makes Balbus distinguish between the
+person Liber, or Bacchus, and the Liber which is a part of nature in
+prosopopoeia.
+
+[141] These allegorical fables are largely related by Hesiod in his
+Theogony.
+
+Horace says exactly the same thing:
+
+    Hâc arte Pollux et vagus Hercules
+    Enisus arces attigit igneas:
+      Quos inter Augustus recumbens
+        Purpureo bibit ore nectar.
+    Hâc te merentem, Bacche pater, tuæ
+    Vexere tigres indocili jugum
+      Collo ferentes: hâc Quirinus
+        Martis equis Acheronta fugit.--Hor. iii. 3. 9.
+
+[142] Cicero means by _conversis casibus_, varying the cases from the
+common rule of declension; that is, by departing from the true
+grammatical rules of speech; for if we would keep to it, we should
+decline the word _Jupiter_, _Jupiteris_ in the second case, etc.
+
+[143] _Pater divûmque hominumque._
+
+[144] The common reading is, _planiusque alio loco idem;_ which, as Dr.
+Davis observes, is absurd; therefore, in his note, he prefers _planius
+quam alia loco idem_, from two copies, in which sense I have translated
+it.
+
+[145] From the verb _gero_, to bear.
+
+[146] That is, "mother earth."
+
+[147] Janus is said to be the first who erected temples in Italy, and
+instituted religious rites, and from whom the first month in the Roman
+calendar is derived.
+
+[148] _Stellæ vagantes._
+
+[149] _Noctu quasi diem efficeret._ Ben Jonson says the same thing:
+
+    Thou that mak'st a day of night,
+    Goddess excellently bright.--_Ode to the Moon._
+
+[150] Olympias was the mother of Alexander.
+
+[151] Venus is here said to be one of the names of Diana, because _ad
+res omnes veniret;_ but she is not supposed to be the same as the
+mother of Cupid.
+
+[152] Here is a mistake, as Fulvius Ursinus observes; for the discourse
+seems to be continued in one day, as appears from the beginning of this
+book. This may be an inadvertency of Cicero.
+
+[153] The senate of Athens was so called from the words [Greek: Areios
+Pagos], the Village, some say the Hill, of Mars.
+
+[154] Epicurus.
+
+[155] The Stoics.
+
+[156] By _nulla cohærendi natura_--if it is the right, as it is the
+common reading--Cicero must mean the same as by _nulla crescendi
+natura_, or _coalescendi_, either of which Lambinus proposes; for, as
+the same learned critic well observes, is there not a cohesion of parts
+in a clod, or in a piece of stone? Our learned Walker proposes _sola
+cohærendi natura_, which mends the sense very much; and I wish he had
+the authority of any copy for it.
+
+[157] Nasica Scipio, the censor, is said to have been the first who
+made a water-clock in Rome.
+
+[158] The Epicureans.
+
+[159] An old Latin poet, commended by Quintilian for the gravity of his
+sense and his loftiness of style.
+
+[160] The shepherd is here supposed to take the stem or beak of the
+ship for the mouth, from which the roaring voices of the sailors came.
+_Rostrum_ is here a lucky word to put in the mouth of one who never saw
+a ship before, as it is used for the beak of a bird, the snout of a
+beast or fish, and for the stem of a ship.
+
+[161] The Epicureans.
+
+[162] Greek, [Greek: aêr]; Latin, _aer_.
+
+[163] The treatise of Aristotle, from whence this is taken, is lost.
+
+[164] To the universe the Stoics certainly annexed the idea of a
+limited space, otherwise they could not have talked of a middle; for
+there can be no middle but of a limited space: infinite space can have
+no middle, there being infinite extension from every part.
+
+[165] These two contrary reversions are from the tropics of Cancer and
+Capricorn. They are the extreme bounds of the sun's course. The reader
+must observe that the astronomical parts of this book are introduced by
+the Stoic as proofs of design and reason in the universe; and,
+notwithstanding the errors in his planetary system, his intent is well
+answered, because all he means is that the regular motions of the
+heavenly bodies, and their dependencies, are demonstrations of a divine
+mind. The inference proposed to be drawn from his astronomical
+observations is as just as if his system was in every part
+unexceptionably right: the same may be said of his anatomical
+observations.
+
+[166] In the zodiac.
+
+[167] Ibid.
+
+[168] These verses of Cicero are a translation from a Greek poem of
+Aratus, called the Phænomena.
+
+[169] The fixed stars.
+
+[170] The arctic and antarctic poles.
+
+[171] The two Arctoi are northern constellations. Cynosura is what we
+call the Lesser Bear; Helice, the Greater Bear; in Latin, _Ursa Minor_
+and _Ursa Major_.
+
+[172] These stars in the Greater Bear are vulgarly called the "Seven
+Stars," or the "Northern Wain;" by the Latins, "Septentriones."
+
+[173] The Lesser Bear.
+
+[174] The Greater Bear.
+
+[175] Exactly agreeable to this and the following description of the
+Dragon is the same northern constellation described in the map by
+Flamsteed in his Atlas Coelestis; and all the figures here described by
+Aratus nearly agree with the maps of the same constellations in the
+Atlas Coelestis, though they are not all placed precisely alike.
+
+[176] The tail of the Greater Bear.
+
+[177] That is, in Macedon, where Aratus lived.
+
+[178] The true interpretation of this passage is as follows: Here in
+Macedon, says Aratus, the head of the Dragon does not entirely immerge
+itself in the ocean, but only touches the superficies of it. By _ortus_
+and _obitus_ I doubt not but Cicero meant, agreeable to Aratus, those
+parts which arise to view, and those which are removed from sight.
+
+[179] These are two northern constellations. Engonasis, in some
+catalogues called Hercules, because he is figured kneeling [Greek: en
+gonasin] (on his knees). [Greek: Engonasin kaleous'], as Aratus says,
+they call Engonasis.
+
+[180] The crown is placed under the feet of Hercules in the Atlas
+Coelestis; but Ophiuchus ([Greek: Ophiouchos]), the Snake-holder, is
+placed in the map by Flamsteed as described here by Aratus; and their
+heads almost meet.
+
+[181] The Scorpion. Ophiuchus, though a northern constellation, is not
+far from that part of the zodiac where the Scorpion is, which is one of
+the six southern signs.
+
+[182] The Wain of seven stars.
+
+[183] The Wain-driver. This northern constellation is, in our present
+maps, figured with a club in his right hand behind the Greater Bear.
+
+[184] In some modern maps Arcturus, a star of the first magnitude, is
+placed in the belt that is round the waist of Boötes. Cicero says
+_subter præcordia_, which is about the waist; and Aratus says [Greek:
+hypo zônê], under the belt.
+
+[185] _Sub caput Arcti_, under the head of the Greater Bear.
+
+[186] The Crab is, by the ancients and moderns, placed in the zodiac,
+as here, between the Twins and the Lion; and they are all three
+northern signs.
+
+[187] The Twins are placed in the zodiac with the side of one to the
+northern hemisphere, and the side of the other to the southern
+hemisphere. Auriga, the Charioteer, is placed in the northern
+hemisphere near the zodiac, by the Twins; and at the head of the
+Charioteer is Helice, the Greater Bear, placed; and the Goat is a
+bright star of the first magnitude placed on the left shoulder of this
+northern constellation, and called _Capra_, the Goat. _Hoedi_, the
+Kids, are two more stars of the same constellation.
+
+[188] A constellation; one of the northern signs in the zodiac, in
+which the Hyades are placed.
+
+[189] One of the feet of Cepheus, a northern constellation, is under
+the tail of the Lesser Bear.
+
+[190] Grotius, and after him Dr. Davis, and other learned men, read
+_Cassiepea_, after the Greek [Greek: Kassiepeia], and reject the common
+reading, _Cassiopea_.
+
+[191] These northern constellations here mentioned have been always
+placed together as one family with Cepheus and Perseus, as they are in
+our modern maps.
+
+[192] This alludes to the fable of Perseus and Andromeda.
+
+[193] Pegasus, who is one of Perseus and Andromeda's family.
+
+[194] That is, with wings.
+
+[195] _Aries_, the Ram, is the first northern sign in the zodiac;
+_Pisces_, the Fishes, the last southern sign; therefore they must be
+near one another, as they are in a circle or belt. In Flamsteed's Atlas
+Coelestis one of the Fishes is near the head of the Ram, and the other
+near the Urn of Aquarius.
+
+[196] These are called Virgiliæ by Cicero; by Aratus, the Pleiades,
+[Greek: Plêiades]; and they are placed at the neck of the Bull; and one
+of Perseus's feet touches the Bull in the Atlas Coelestis.
+
+[197] This northern constellation is called Fides by Cicero; but it
+must be the same with Lyra; because Lyra is placed in our maps as Fides
+is here.
+
+[198] This is called Ales Avis by Cicero; and I doubt not but the
+northern constellation Cygnus is here to be understood, for the
+description and place of the Swan in the Atlas Coelestis are the same
+which Ales Avis has here.
+
+[199] Pegasus.
+
+[200] The Water-bearer, one of the six southern signs in the zodiac: he
+is described in our maps pouring water out of an urn, and leaning with
+one hand on the tail of Capricorn, another southern sign.
+
+[201] When the sun is in Capricorn, the days are at the shortest; and
+when in Cancer, at the longest.
+
+[202] One of the six southern signs.
+
+[203] Sagittarius, another southern sign.
+
+[204] A northern constellation.
+
+[205] A northern constellation.
+
+[206] A southern constellation.
+
+[207] This is Canis Major, a southern constellation. Orion and the Dog
+are named together by Hesiod, who flourished many hundred years before
+Cicero or Aratus.
+
+[208] A southern constellation, placed as here in the Atlas Coelestis.
+
+[209] A southern constellation, so called from the ship Argo, in which
+Jason and the rest of the Argonauts sailed on their expedition to
+Colchos.
+
+[210] The Ram is the first of the northern signs in the zodiac; and the
+last southern sign is the Fishes; which two signs, meeting in the
+zodiac, cover the constellation called Argo.
+
+[211] The river Eridanus, a southern constellation.
+
+[212] A southern constellation.
+
+[213] This is called the Scorpion in the original of Aratus.
+
+[214] A southern constellation.
+
+[215] A southern constellation.
+
+[216] The Serpent is not mentioned in Cicero's translation; but it is
+in the original of Aratus.
+
+[217] A southern constellation.
+
+[218] The Goblet, or Cup, a southern constellation.
+
+[219] A southern constellation.
+
+[220] Antecanis, a southern constellation, is the Little Dog, and
+called _Antecanis_ in Latin, and [Greek: Prokyôn] in Greek, because he
+rises before the other Dog.
+
+[221] Pansætius, a Stoic philosopher.
+
+[222] Mercury and Venus.
+
+[223] The proboscis of the elephant is frequently called a hand,
+because it is as useful to him as one. "They breathe, drink, and smell,
+with what may not be improperly called a hand," says Pliny, bk. viii.
+c. 10.--DAVIS.
+
+[224] The passage of Aristotle's works to which Cicero here alludes is
+entirely lost; but Plutarch gives a similar account.
+
+[225] Balbus does not tell us the remedy which the panther makes use
+of; but Pliny is not quite so delicate: he says, _excrementis hominis
+sibi medetur_.
+
+[226] Aristotle says they purge themselves with this herb after they
+fawn. Pliny says both before and after.
+
+[227] The cuttle-fish has a bag at its neck, the black blood of which
+the Romans used for ink. It was called _atramentum_.
+
+[228] The Euphrates is said to carry into Mesopotamia a large quantity
+of citrons, with which it covers the fields.
+
+[229] Q. Curtius, and some other authors, say the Ganges is the largest
+river in India; but Ammianus Marcellinus concurs with Cicero in calling
+the river Indus the largest of all rivers.
+
+[230] These Etesian winds return periodically once a year, and blow at
+certain seasons, and for a certain time.
+
+[231] Some read _mollitur_, and some _molitur;_ the latter of which P.
+Manucius justly prefers, from the verb _molo_, _molis;_ from whence,
+says he, _molares dentes_, the grinders.
+
+[232] The weasand, or windpipe.
+
+[233] The epiglottis, which is a cartilaginous flap in the shape of a
+tongue, and therefore called so.
+
+[234] Cicero is here giving the opinion of the ancients concerning the
+passage of the chyle till it is converted to blood.
+
+[235] What Cicero here calls the ventricles of the heart are likewise
+called auricles, of which there is the right and left.
+
+[236] The Stoics and Peripatetics said that the nerves, veins, and
+arteries come directly from the heart. According to the anatomy of the
+moderns, they come from the brain.
+
+[237] The author means all musical instruments, whether string or wind
+instruments, which are hollow and tortuous.
+
+[238] The Latin version of Cicero is a translation from the Greek of
+Aratus.
+
+[239] Chrysippus's meaning is, that the swine is so inactive and
+slothful a beast that life seems to be of no use to it but to keep it
+from putrefaction, as salt keeps dead flesh.
+
+[240] _Ales_, in the general signification, is any large bird; and
+_oscinis_ is any singing bird. But they here mean those birds which are
+used in augury: _alites_ are the birds whose flight was observed by the
+augurs, and _oscines_ the birds from whose voices they augured.
+
+[241] As the Academics doubted everything, it was indifferent to them
+which side of a question they took.
+
+[242] The keepers and interpreters of the Sibylline oracles were the
+Quindecimviri.
+
+[243] The popular name of Jupiter in Rome, being looked upon as
+defender of the Capitol (in which he was placed), and stayer of the
+State.
+
+[244] Some passages of the original are here wanting. Cotta continues
+speaking against the doctrine of the Stoics.
+
+[245] The word _sortes_ is often used for the answers of the oracles,
+or, rather, for the rolls in which the answers were written.
+
+[246] Three of this eminent family sacrificed themselves for their
+country; the father in the Latin war, the son in the Tuscan war, and
+the grandson in the war with Pyrrhus.
+
+[247] The Straits of Gibraltar.
+
+[248] The common reading is, _ex quo anima dicitur;_ but Dr. Davis and
+M. Bouhier prefer _animal_, though they keep _anima_ in the text,
+because our author says elsewhere, _animum ex anima dictum_, Tusc. I.
+1. Cicero is not here to be accused of contradictions, for we are to
+consider that he speaks in the characters of other persons; but there
+appears to be nothing in these two passages irreconcilable, and
+probably _anima_ is the right word here.
+
+[249] He is said to have led a colony from Greece into Caria, in Asia,
+and to have built a town, and called it after his own name, for which
+his countrymen paid him divine honors after his death.
+
+[250] Our great author is under a mistake here. Homer does not say he
+met Hercules himself, but his [Greek: Eidôlon], his "visionary
+likeness;" and adds that he himself
+
+                   [Greek: met' athanatoisi theoisi
+    terpetai en thaliês, kai echei kallisphyrou Hêbên,
+    paida Dios megaloio kai Hêrês chrysopedilou.]
+
+which Pope translates--
+
+    A shadowy form, for high in heaven's abodes
+    Himself resides, a God among the Gods;
+    There, in the bright assemblies of the skies,
+    He nectar quaffs, and Hebe crowns his joys.
+
+[251] They are said to have been the first workers in iron. They were
+called Idæi, because they inhabited about Mount Ida in Crete, and
+Dactyli, from [Greek: daktyloi] (the fingers), their number being five.
+
+[252] From whom, some say, the city of that name was called.
+
+[253] Capedunculæ seem to have been bowls or cups, with handles on each
+side, set apart for the use of the altar.--DAVIS.
+
+[254] See Cicero de Divinatione, and Ovid. Fast.
+
+[255] In the consulship of Piso and Gabinius sacrifices to Serapis and
+Isis were prohibited in Rome; but the Roman people afterward placed
+them again in the number of their gods. See Tertullian's Apol. and his
+first book Ad Nationes, and Arnobius, lib. 2.--DAVIS.
+
+[256] In some copies Circe, Pasiphae, and Æa are mentioned together;
+but Æa is rejected by the most judicious editors.
+
+[257] They were three, and are said to have averted a plague by
+offering themselves a sacrifice.
+
+[258] So called from the Greek word [Greek: thaumazô], to wonder.
+
+[259] She was first called Geres, from _gero_, to bear.
+
+[260] The word is _precatione_, which means the books or forms of
+prayers used by the augurs.
+
+[261] Cotta's intent here, as well as in other places, is to show how
+unphilosophical their civil theology was, and with what confusions it
+was embarrassed; which design of the Academic the reader should
+carefully keep in view, or he will lose the chain of argument.
+
+[262] Anactes, [Greek: Anaktes], was a general name for all kings, as
+we find in the oldest Greek writers, and particularly in Homer.
+
+[263] The common reading is Aleo; but we follow Lambinus and Davis, who
+had the authority of the best manuscript copies.
+
+[264] Some prefer Phthas to Opas (see Dr. Davis's edition); but Opas is
+the generally received reading.
+
+[265] The Lipari Isles.
+
+[266] A town in Arcadia.
+
+[267] In Arcadia.
+
+[268] A northern people.
+
+[269] So called from the Greek word [Greek: nomos], _lex_, a law.
+
+[270] He is called [Greek: Ôpis] in some old Greek fragments, and
+[Greek: Oupis] by Callimachus in his hymn on Diana.
+
+[271] [Greek: Sabazios], Sabazius, is one of the names used for
+Bacchus.
+
+[272] Here is a wide chasm in the original. What is lost probably may
+have contained great part of Cotta's arguments against the providence
+of the Stoics.
+
+[273] Here is one expression in the quotation from Cæcilius that is not
+commonly met with, which is _præstigias præstrinxit;_ Lambinus gives
+_præstinxit_, for the sake, I suppose, of playing on words, because it
+might then be translated, "He has deluded my delusions, or stratagems;"
+but _præstrinxit_ is certainly the right reading.
+
+[274] The ancient Romans had a judicial as well as a military prætor;
+and he sat, with inferior judges attending him, like one of our
+chief-justices. _Sessum it prætor_, which I doubt not is the right
+reading, Lambinus restored from an old copy. The common reading was
+_sessum ite precor_.
+
+[275] Picenum was a region of Italy.
+
+[276] The _sex primi_ were general receivers of all taxes and tributes;
+and they were obliged to make good, out of their own fortunes, whatever
+deficiencies were in the public treasury.
+
+[277] The Lætorian Law was a security for those under age against
+extortioners, etc. By this law all debts contracted under twenty-five
+years of age were void.
+
+[278] This is from Ennius--
+
+    Utinam ne in nemore Pelio securibus
+    Cæsa cecidisset abiegna ad terram trabes.
+
+Translated from the beginning of the Medea of Euripides--
+
+    [Greek: Mêd' en napaisi Pêlion pesein pote
+    tmêtheisa peukê.]
+
+[279] Q. Fabius Maximus, surnamed Cunctator.
+
+[280] Diogenes Laertius says he was pounded to death in a stone mortar
+by command of Nicocreon, tyrant of Cyprus.
+
+[281] Elea, a city of Lucania, in Italy. The manner in which Zeno was
+put to death is, according to Diogenes Laertius, uncertain.
+
+[282] This great and good man was accused of destroying the divinity of
+the Gods of his country. He was condemned, and died by drinking a glass
+of poison.
+
+[283] Tyrant of Sicily.
+
+[284] The common reading is, _in tympanidis rogum inlatus est_. This
+passage has been the occasion of as many different opinions concerning
+both the reading and the sense as any passage in the whole treatise.
+_Tympanum_ is used for a timbrel or drum, _tympanidia_ a diminutive of
+it. Lambinus says _tympana_ "were sticks with which the tyrant used to
+beat the condemned." P. Victorius substitutes _tyrannidis_ for
+_tympanidis_.
+
+[285] The original is _de amissa salute;_ which means the sentence of
+banishment among the Romans, in which was contained the loss of goods
+and estate, and the privileges of a Roman; and in this sense L'Abbé
+d'Olivet translates it.
+
+[286] The forty-seventh proposition of the first book of Euclid is
+unanimously ascribed to him by the ancients. Dr. Wotton, in his
+Reflections upon Ancient and Modern Learning, says, "It is indeed a
+very noble proposition, the foundation of trigonometry, of universal
+and various use in those curious speculations about incommensurable
+numbers."
+
+[287] These votive tables, or pictures, were hung up in the temples.
+
+[288] This passage is a fragment from a tragedy of Attius.
+
+[289] Hipponax was a poet at Ephesus, and so deformed that Bupalus drew
+a picture of him to provoke laughter; for which Hipponax is said to
+have written such keen iambics on the painter that he hanged himself.
+
+Lycambes had promised Archilochus the poet to marry his daughter to
+him, but afterward retracted his promise, and refused her; upon which
+Archilochus is said to have published a satire in iambic verse that
+provoked him to hang himself.
+
+[290] Cicero refers here to an oracle approving of his laws, and
+promising Sparta prosperity as long as they were obeyed, which Lycurgus
+procured from Delphi.
+
+[291] _Pro aris et focis_ is a proverbial expression. The Romans, when
+they would say their all was at stake, could not express it stronger
+than by saying they contended _pro aris et focis_, for religion and
+their firesides, or, as we express it, for religion and property.
+
+[292] Cicero, who was an Academic, gives his opinion according to the
+manner of the Academics, who looked upon probability, and a resemblance
+of truth, as the utmost they could arrive at.
+
+[293] _I.e._, Regulus.
+
+[294] _I.e._, Fabius.
+
+[295] It is unnecessary to give an account of the other names here
+mentioned; but that of Lænas is probably less known. He was Publius
+Popillius Lænas, consul 132 B.C., the year after the death of Tiberius
+Gracchus, and it became his duty to prosecute the accomplices of
+Gracchus, for which he was afterward attacked by Caius Gracchus with
+such animosity that he withdrew into voluntary exile. Cicero pays a
+tribute to the energy of Opimius in the first Oration against Catiline,
+c. iii.
+
+[296] This phenomenon of the parhelion, or mock sun, which so puzzled
+Cicero's interlocutors, has been very satisfactorily explained by
+modern science. The parhelia are formed by the reflection of the
+sunbeams on a cloud properly situated. They usually accompany the
+coronæ, or luminous circles, and are placed in the same circumference,
+and at the same height. Their colors resemble that of the rainbow; the
+red and yellow are towards the side of the sun, and the blue and violet
+on the other. There are, however, coronæ sometimes seen without
+parhelia, and _vice versâ_. Parhelia are double, triple, etc., and in
+1629, a parhelion of five suns was seen at Rome, and another of six
+suns at Arles, 1666.
+
+[297] There is a little uncertainty as to what this age was, but it was
+probably about twenty-five.
+
+[298] Cicero here gives a very exact and correct account of the
+planetarium of Archimedes, which is so often noticed by the ancient
+astronomers. It no doubt corresponded in a great measure to our modern
+planetarium, or orrery, invented by the earl of that name. This
+elaborate machine, whose manufacture requires the most exact and
+critical science, is of the greatest service to those who study the
+revolutions of the stars, for astronomic, astrologic, or meteorologic
+purposes.
+
+[299] The end of the fourteenth chapter and the first words of the
+fifteenth are lost; but it is plain that in the fifteenth it is Scipio
+who is speaking.
+
+[300] There is evidently some error in the text here, for Ennius was
+born 515 A.U.C., was a personal friend of the elder Africanus, and died
+about 575 A.U.C., so that it is plain that we ought to read in the text
+550, not 350.
+
+[301] Two pages are lost here. Afterward it is again Scipio who is
+speaking.
+
+[302] Two pages are lost here.
+
+[303] Both Ennius and Nævius wrote tragedies called "Iphigenia." Mai
+thinks the text here corrupt, and expresses some doubt whether there is
+a quotation here at all.
+
+[304] He means Scipio himself.
+
+[305] There is again a hiatus. What follows is spoken by Lælius.
+
+[306] Again two pages are lost.
+
+[307] Again two pages are lost. It is evident that Scipio is speaking
+again in cap. xxxi.
+
+[308] Again two pages are lost.
+
+[309] Again two pages are lost.
+
+[310] Here four pages are lost.
+
+[311] Here four pages are lost.
+
+[312] Two pages are missing here.
+
+[313] A name of Neptune.
+
+[314] About seven lines are lost here, and there is a great deal of
+corruption and imperfection in the next few sentences.
+
+[315] Two pages are lost here.
+
+[316] The _Lex Curiata de Imperio_, so often mentioned here, was the
+same as the _Auctoritas Patrum_, and was necessary in order to confer
+upon the dictator, consuls, and other magistrates the _imperium_, or
+military command: without this they had only a _potestas_, or civil
+authority, and could not meddle with military affairs.
+
+[317] Two pages are missing here.
+
+[318] Here two pages are missing.
+
+[319] I have translated this very corrupt passage according to
+Niebuhr's emendation.
+
+[320] Assiduus, ab ære dando.
+
+[321] Proletarii, a prole.
+
+[322] Here four pages are missing.
+
+[323] Two pages are missing here.
+
+[324] Two pages are missing here.
+
+[325] Here twelve pages are missing.
+
+[326] Sixteen pages are missing here.
+
+[327] Here eight pages are missing.
+
+[328] A great many pages are missing here.
+
+[329] Several pages are lost here; the passage in brackets is found in
+Nonius under the word "exulto."
+
+[330] This and other chapters printed in smaller type are generally
+presumed to be of doubtful authenticity.
+
+[331] The beginning of this book is lost. The two first paragraphs
+come, the one from St. Augustine, the other from Lactantius.
+
+[332] Eight or nine pages are lost here.
+
+[333] Here six pages are lost.
+
+[334] Here twelve pages are missing.
+
+[335] We have been obliged to insert two or three of these sentences
+between brackets, which are not found in the original, for the sake of
+showing the drift of the arguments of Philus. He himself was fully
+convinced that justice and morality were of eternal and immutable
+obligation, and that the best interests of all beings lie in their
+perpetual development and application. This eternity of Justice is
+beautifully illustrated by Montesquieu. "Long," says he, "before
+positive laws were instituted, the moral relations of justice were
+absolute and universal. To say that there were no justice or injustice
+but that which depends on the injunctions or prohibitions of positive
+laws, is to say that the radii which spring from a centre are not equal
+till we have formed a circle to illustrate the proposition. We must,
+therefore, acknowledge that the relations of equity were antecedent to
+the positive laws which corroborated them." But though Philus was fully
+convinced of this, in order to give his friends Scipio and Lælius an
+opportunity of proving it, he frankly brings forward every argument for
+injustice that sophistry had ever cast in the teeth of reason.--_By the
+original Translator_.
+
+[336] Here four pages are missing. The following sentence is preserved
+in Nonius.
+
+[337] Two pages are missing here.
+
+[338] Several pages are missing here.
+
+[339] He means Alexander the Great.
+
+[340] Six or eight pages are lost here.
+
+[341] A great many pages are missing here.
+
+[342] Six or eight pages are missing here.
+
+[343] Several pages are lost here.
+
+[344] This and the following chapters are not the actual words of
+Cicero, but quotations by Lactantius and Augustine of what they affirm
+that he said.
+
+[345] Twelve pages are missing here.
+
+[346] Eight pages are missing here.
+
+[347] Six or eight pages are missing here.
+
+[348] Catadupa, from [Greek: kata] and [Greek: doipos], noise.
+
+
+
+
+
+
+End of the Project Gutenberg EBook of Cicero's Tusculan Disputations
+by Marcus Tullius Cicero
+
+*** END OF THIS PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK CICERO'S TUSCULAN DISPUTATIONS ***
+
+***** This file should be named 14988-8.txt or 14988-8.zip *****
+This and all associated files of various formats will be found in:
+        https://www.gutenberg.org/1/4/9/8/14988/
+
+Produced by Ted Garvin, Hagen von Eitzen and the PG Online Distributed
+Proofreading Team.
+
+
+Updated editions will replace the previous one--the old editions
+will be renamed.
+
+Creating the works from public domain print editions means that no
+one owns a United States copyright in these works, so the Foundation
+(and you!) can copy and distribute it in the United States without
+permission and without paying copyright royalties.  Special rules,
+set forth in the General Terms of Use part of this license, apply to
+copying and distributing Project Gutenberg-tm electronic works to
+protect the PROJECT GUTENBERG-tm concept and trademark.  Project
+Gutenberg is a registered trademark, and may not be used if you
+charge for the eBooks, unless you receive specific permission.  If you
+do not charge anything for copies of this eBook, complying with the
+rules is very easy.  You may use this eBook for nearly any purpose
+such as creation of derivative works, reports, performances and
+research.  They may be modified and printed and given away--you may do
+practically ANYTHING with public domain eBooks.  Redistribution is
+subject to the trademark license, especially commercial
+redistribution.
+
+
+
+*** START: FULL LICENSE ***
+
+THE FULL PROJECT GUTENBERG LICENSE
+PLEASE READ THIS BEFORE YOU DISTRIBUTE OR USE THIS WORK
+
+To protect the Project Gutenberg-tm mission of promoting the free
+distribution of electronic works, by using or distributing this work
+(or any other work associated in any way with the phrase "Project
+Gutenberg"), you agree to comply with all the terms of the Full Project
+Gutenberg-tm License (available with this file or online at
+https://gutenberg.org/license).
+
+
+Section 1.  General Terms of Use and Redistributing Project Gutenberg-tm
+electronic works
+
+1.A.  By reading or using any part of this Project Gutenberg-tm
+electronic work, you indicate that you have read, understand, agree to
+and accept all the terms of this license and intellectual property
+(trademark/copyright) agreement.  If you do not agree to abide by all
+the terms of this agreement, you must cease using and return or destroy
+all copies of Project Gutenberg-tm electronic works in your possession.
+If you paid a fee for obtaining a copy of or access to a Project
+Gutenberg-tm electronic work and you do not agree to be bound by the
+terms of this agreement, you may obtain a refund from the person or
+entity to whom you paid the fee as set forth in paragraph 1.E.8.
+
+1.B.  "Project Gutenberg" is a registered trademark.  It may only be
+used on or associated in any way with an electronic work by people who
+agree to be bound by the terms of this agreement.  There are a few
+things that you can do with most Project Gutenberg-tm electronic works
+even without complying with the full terms of this agreement.  See
+paragraph 1.C below.  There are a lot of things you can do with Project
+Gutenberg-tm electronic works if you follow the terms of this agreement
+and help preserve free future access to Project Gutenberg-tm electronic
+works.  See paragraph 1.E below.
+
+1.C.  The Project Gutenberg Literary Archive Foundation ("the Foundation"
+or PGLAF), owns a compilation copyright in the collection of Project
+Gutenberg-tm electronic works.  Nearly all the individual works in the
+collection are in the public domain in the United States.  If an
+individual work is in the public domain in the United States and you are
+located in the United States, we do not claim a right to prevent you from
+copying, distributing, performing, displaying or creating derivative
+works based on the work as long as all references to Project Gutenberg
+are removed.  Of course, we hope that you will support the Project
+Gutenberg-tm mission of promoting free access to electronic works by
+freely sharing Project Gutenberg-tm works in compliance with the terms of
+this agreement for keeping the Project Gutenberg-tm name associated with
+the work.  You can easily comply with the terms of this agreement by
+keeping this work in the same format with its attached full Project
+Gutenberg-tm License when you share it without charge with others.
+
+1.D.  The copyright laws of the place where you are located also govern
+what you can do with this work.  Copyright laws in most countries are in
+a constant state of change.  If you are outside the United States, check
+the laws of your country in addition to the terms of this agreement
+before downloading, copying, displaying, performing, distributing or
+creating derivative works based on this work or any other Project
+Gutenberg-tm work.  The Foundation makes no representations concerning
+the copyright status of any work in any country outside the United
+States.
+
+1.E.  Unless you have removed all references to Project Gutenberg:
+
+1.E.1.  The following sentence, with active links to, or other immediate
+access to, the full Project Gutenberg-tm License must appear prominently
+whenever any copy of a Project Gutenberg-tm work (any work on which the
+phrase "Project Gutenberg" appears, or with which the phrase "Project
+Gutenberg" is associated) is accessed, displayed, performed, viewed,
+copied or distributed:
+
+This eBook is for the use of anyone anywhere at no cost and with
+almost no restrictions whatsoever.  You may copy it, give it away or
+re-use it under the terms of the Project Gutenberg License included
+with this eBook or online at www.gutenberg.org
+
+1.E.2.  If an individual Project Gutenberg-tm electronic work is derived
+from the public domain (does not contain a notice indicating that it is
+posted with permission of the copyright holder), the work can be copied
+and distributed to anyone in the United States without paying any fees
+or charges.  If you are redistributing or providing access to a work
+with the phrase "Project Gutenberg" associated with or appearing on the
+work, you must comply either with the requirements of paragraphs 1.E.1
+through 1.E.7 or obtain permission for the use of the work and the
+Project Gutenberg-tm trademark as set forth in paragraphs 1.E.8 or
+1.E.9.
+
+1.E.3.  If an individual Project Gutenberg-tm electronic work is posted
+with the permission of the copyright holder, your use and distribution
+must comply with both paragraphs 1.E.1 through 1.E.7 and any additional
+terms imposed by the copyright holder.  Additional terms will be linked
+to the Project Gutenberg-tm License for all works posted with the
+permission of the copyright holder found at the beginning of this work.
+
+1.E.4.  Do not unlink or detach or remove the full Project Gutenberg-tm
+License terms from this work, or any files containing a part of this
+work or any other work associated with Project Gutenberg-tm.
+
+1.E.5.  Do not copy, display, perform, distribute or redistribute this
+electronic work, or any part of this electronic work, without
+prominently displaying the sentence set forth in paragraph 1.E.1 with
+active links or immediate access to the full terms of the Project
+Gutenberg-tm License.
+
+1.E.6.  You may convert to and distribute this work in any binary,
+compressed, marked up, nonproprietary or proprietary form, including any
+word processing or hypertext form.  However, if you provide access to or
+distribute copies of a Project Gutenberg-tm work in a format other than
+"Plain Vanilla ASCII" or other format used in the official version
+posted on the official Project Gutenberg-tm web site (www.gutenberg.org),
+you must, at no additional cost, fee or expense to the user, provide a
+copy, a means of exporting a copy, or a means of obtaining a copy upon
+request, of the work in its original "Plain Vanilla ASCII" or other
+form.  Any alternate format must include the full Project Gutenberg-tm
+License as specified in paragraph 1.E.1.
+
+1.E.7.  Do not charge a fee for access to, viewing, displaying,
+performing, copying or distributing any Project Gutenberg-tm works
+unless you comply with paragraph 1.E.8 or 1.E.9.
+
+1.E.8.  You may charge a reasonable fee for copies of or providing
+access to or distributing Project Gutenberg-tm electronic works provided
+that
+
+- You pay a royalty fee of 20% of the gross profits you derive from
+     the use of Project Gutenberg-tm works calculated using the method
+     you already use to calculate your applicable taxes.  The fee is
+     owed to the owner of the Project Gutenberg-tm trademark, but he
+     has agreed to donate royalties under this paragraph to the
+     Project Gutenberg Literary Archive Foundation.  Royalty payments
+     must be paid within 60 days following each date on which you
+     prepare (or are legally required to prepare) your periodic tax
+     returns.  Royalty payments should be clearly marked as such and
+     sent to the Project Gutenberg Literary Archive Foundation at the
+     address specified in Section 4, "Information about donations to
+     the Project Gutenberg Literary Archive Foundation."
+
+- You provide a full refund of any money paid by a user who notifies
+     you in writing (or by e-mail) within 30 days of receipt that s/he
+     does not agree to the terms of the full Project Gutenberg-tm
+     License.  You must require such a user to return or
+     destroy all copies of the works possessed in a physical medium
+     and discontinue all use of and all access to other copies of
+     Project Gutenberg-tm works.
+
+- You provide, in accordance with paragraph 1.F.3, a full refund of any
+     money paid for a work or a replacement copy, if a defect in the
+     electronic work is discovered and reported to you within 90 days
+     of receipt of the work.
+
+- You comply with all other terms of this agreement for free
+     distribution of Project Gutenberg-tm works.
+
+1.E.9.  If you wish to charge a fee or distribute a Project Gutenberg-tm
+electronic work or group of works on different terms than are set
+forth in this agreement, you must obtain permission in writing from
+both the Project Gutenberg Literary Archive Foundation and Michael
+Hart, the owner of the Project Gutenberg-tm trademark.  Contact the
+Foundation as set forth in Section 3 below.
+
+1.F.
+
+1.F.1.  Project Gutenberg volunteers and employees expend considerable
+effort to identify, do copyright research on, transcribe and proofread
+public domain works in creating the Project Gutenberg-tm
+collection.  Despite these efforts, Project Gutenberg-tm electronic
+works, and the medium on which they may be stored, may contain
+"Defects," such as, but not limited to, incomplete, inaccurate or
+corrupt data, transcription errors, a copyright or other intellectual
+property infringement, a defective or damaged disk or other medium, a
+computer virus, or computer codes that damage or cannot be read by
+your equipment.
+
+1.F.2.  LIMITED WARRANTY, DISCLAIMER OF DAMAGES - Except for the "Right
+of Replacement or Refund" described in paragraph 1.F.3, the Project
+Gutenberg Literary Archive Foundation, the owner of the Project
+Gutenberg-tm trademark, and any other party distributing a Project
+Gutenberg-tm electronic work under this agreement, disclaim all
+liability to you for damages, costs and expenses, including legal
+fees.  YOU AGREE THAT YOU HAVE NO REMEDIES FOR NEGLIGENCE, STRICT
+LIABILITY, BREACH OF WARRANTY OR BREACH OF CONTRACT EXCEPT THOSE
+PROVIDED IN PARAGRAPH F3.  YOU AGREE THAT THE FOUNDATION, THE
+TRADEMARK OWNER, AND ANY DISTRIBUTOR UNDER THIS AGREEMENT WILL NOT BE
+LIABLE TO YOU FOR ACTUAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, CONSEQUENTIAL, PUNITIVE OR
+INCIDENTAL DAMAGES EVEN IF YOU GIVE NOTICE OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH
+DAMAGE.
+
+1.F.3.  LIMITED RIGHT OF REPLACEMENT OR REFUND - If you discover a
+defect in this electronic work within 90 days of receiving it, you can
+receive a refund of the money (if any) you paid for it by sending a
+written explanation to the person you received the work from.  If you
+received the work on a physical medium, you must return the medium with
+your written explanation.  The person or entity that provided you with
+the defective work may elect to provide a replacement copy in lieu of a
+refund.  If you received the work electronically, the person or entity
+providing it to you may choose to give you a second opportunity to
+receive the work electronically in lieu of a refund.  If the second copy
+is also defective, you may demand a refund in writing without further
+opportunities to fix the problem.
+
+1.F.4.  Except for the limited right of replacement or refund set forth
+in paragraph 1.F.3, this work is provided to you 'AS-IS' WITH NO OTHER
+WARRANTIES OF ANY KIND, EXPRESS OR IMPLIED, INCLUDING BUT NOT LIMITED TO
+WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTIBILITY OR FITNESS FOR ANY PURPOSE.
+
+1.F.5.  Some states do not allow disclaimers of certain implied
+warranties or the exclusion or limitation of certain types of damages.
+If any disclaimer or limitation set forth in this agreement violates the
+law of the state applicable to this agreement, the agreement shall be
+interpreted to make the maximum disclaimer or limitation permitted by
+the applicable state law.  The invalidity or unenforceability of any
+provision of this agreement shall not void the remaining provisions.
+
+1.F.6.  INDEMNITY - You agree to indemnify and hold the Foundation, the
+trademark owner, any agent or employee of the Foundation, anyone
+providing copies of Project Gutenberg-tm electronic works in accordance
+with this agreement, and any volunteers associated with the production,
+promotion and distribution of Project Gutenberg-tm electronic works,
+harmless from all liability, costs and expenses, including legal fees,
+that arise directly or indirectly from any of the following which you do
+or cause to occur: (a) distribution of this or any Project Gutenberg-tm
+work, (b) alteration, modification, or additions or deletions to any
+Project Gutenberg-tm work, and (c) any Defect you cause.
+
+
+Section  2.  Information about the Mission of Project Gutenberg-tm
+
+Project Gutenberg-tm is synonymous with the free distribution of
+electronic works in formats readable by the widest variety of computers
+including obsolete, old, middle-aged and new computers.  It exists
+because of the efforts of hundreds of volunteers and donations from
+people in all walks of life.
+
+Volunteers and financial support to provide volunteers with the
+assistance they need, is critical to reaching Project Gutenberg-tm's
+goals and ensuring that the Project Gutenberg-tm collection will
+remain freely available for generations to come.  In 2001, the Project
+Gutenberg Literary Archive Foundation was created to provide a secure
+and permanent future for Project Gutenberg-tm and future generations.
+To learn more about the Project Gutenberg Literary Archive Foundation
+and how your efforts and donations can help, see Sections 3 and 4
+and the Foundation web page at https://www.pglaf.org.
+
+
+Section 3.  Information about the Project Gutenberg Literary Archive
+Foundation
+
+The Project Gutenberg Literary Archive Foundation is a non profit
+501(c)(3) educational corporation organized under the laws of the
+state of Mississippi and granted tax exempt status by the Internal
+Revenue Service.  The Foundation's EIN or federal tax identification
+number is 64-6221541.  Its 501(c)(3) letter is posted at
+https://pglaf.org/fundraising.  Contributions to the Project Gutenberg
+Literary Archive Foundation are tax deductible to the full extent
+permitted by U.S. federal laws and your state's laws.
+
+The Foundation's principal office is located at 4557 Melan Dr. S.
+Fairbanks, AK, 99712., but its volunteers and employees are scattered
+throughout numerous locations.  Its business office is located at
+809 North 1500 West, Salt Lake City, UT 84116, (801) 596-1887, email
+business@pglaf.org.  Email contact links and up to date contact
+information can be found at the Foundation's web site and official
+page at https://pglaf.org
+
+For additional contact information:
+     Dr. Gregory B. Newby
+     Chief Executive and Director
+     gbnewby@pglaf.org
+
+
+Section 4.  Information about Donations to the Project Gutenberg
+Literary Archive Foundation
+
+Project Gutenberg-tm depends upon and cannot survive without wide
+spread public support and donations to carry out its mission of
+increasing the number of public domain and licensed works that can be
+freely distributed in machine readable form accessible by the widest
+array of equipment including outdated equipment.  Many small donations
+($1 to $5,000) are particularly important to maintaining tax exempt
+status with the IRS.
+
+The Foundation is committed to complying with the laws regulating
+charities and charitable donations in all 50 states of the United
+States.  Compliance requirements are not uniform and it takes a
+considerable effort, much paperwork and many fees to meet and keep up
+with these requirements.  We do not solicit donations in locations
+where we have not received written confirmation of compliance.  To
+SEND DONATIONS or determine the status of compliance for any
+particular state visit https://pglaf.org
+
+While we cannot and do not solicit contributions from states where we
+have not met the solicitation requirements, we know of no prohibition
+against accepting unsolicited donations from donors in such states who
+approach us with offers to donate.
+
+International donations are gratefully accepted, but we cannot make
+any statements concerning tax treatment of donations received from
+outside the United States.  U.S. laws alone swamp our small staff.
+
+Please check the Project Gutenberg Web pages for current donation
+methods and addresses.  Donations are accepted in a number of other
+ways including including checks, online payments and credit card
+donations.  To donate, please visit: https://pglaf.org/donate
+
+
+Section 5.  General Information About Project Gutenberg-tm electronic
+works.
+
+Professor Michael S. Hart was the originator of the Project Gutenberg-tm
+concept of a library of electronic works that could be freely shared
+with anyone.  For thirty years, he produced and distributed Project
+Gutenberg-tm eBooks with only a loose network of volunteer support.
+
+
+Project Gutenberg-tm eBooks are often created from several printed
+editions, all of which are confirmed as Public Domain in the U.S.
+unless a copyright notice is included.  Thus, we do not necessarily
+keep eBooks in compliance with any particular paper edition.
+
+
+Most people start at our Web site which has the main PG search facility:
+
+     https://www.gutenberg.org
+
+This Web site includes information about Project Gutenberg-tm,
+including how to make donations to the Project Gutenberg Literary
+Archive Foundation, how to help produce our new eBooks, and how to
+subscribe to our email newsletter to hear about new eBooks.
diff --git a/14988-8.zip b/14988-8.zip
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..29d5379
--- /dev/null
+++ b/14988-8.zip
diff --git a/14988-h.zip b/14988-h.zip
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..042251b
--- /dev/null
+++ b/14988-h.zip
diff --git a/14988-h/14988-h.htm b/14988-h/14988-h.htm
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..da62521
--- /dev/null
+++ b/14988-h/14988-h.htm
@@ -0,0 +1,19213 @@
+<!DOCTYPE html PUBLIC "-//W3C//DTD XHTML 1.0 Strict//EN" "http://www.w3.org/TR/xhtml1/DTD/xhtml1-strict.dtd">
+<html xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"><head>
+  <meta http-equiv="Content-Type" content="text/html; charset=utf-8"/>
+  <title>Cicero’s Tusculan Disputations, On the Nature of the Gods, On the Commonwealth</title>
+
+  <style type="text/css">
+body { margin-left: 9%; margin-right: 9%; }
+
+h1 { text-align: center; margin-top: 12ex; }
+h2 { text-align: center; margin-top: 10ex; }
+h3 { text-align: center; margin-top: 6ex; }
+h4 { text-align: center; margin-top: 2ex; }
+
+a { text-decoration: none; }
+
+hr { width: 68%; height: 0px; margin-top: 6ex; }
+hr.tiny { width: 20%; height: 0px; margin-top: 2ex; }
+hr.front { width: 100%; height: 0px; }
+
+p { text-align: justify; text-indent: 1em; }
+p.cont { text-indent: 0em; }
+p.comment { text-align: center; }
+p.front { text-align: center; text-indent: 0em; margin-top: 5ex; }
+p.intro { padding-left: 1em; text-indent: -1em; line-height: 95%; }
+p.nodist { margin-bottom: 0; }
+span.greek { }
+span.pgnum { position: absolute; left: 1%; right: 91%; font-size: 8pt;
+    text-indent: 0; font-weight: normal; text-align: left; visibility: visible; }
+span.pgnum:before { content: "page " }
+
+span.sc { font-variant: small-caps; }
+span.first {  font-variant: small-caps; }
+div.unclear { margin-left: 1em; margin-right: 1em; font-size: 0.9em; line-height: 95%; }
+div.poem { margin-left:10%; margin-right:10%; margin-bottom: 1em;
+    text-align: left; font-size: 0.9em; }
+div.poem p { text-align: left; margin: 0; padding-left: 3em; text-indent: -3em; }
+div.poem p.L2 { margin-left: 1em; }
+div.poem p.L4 { margin-left: 2em; }
+div.poem p.L6 { margin-left: 3em; }
+div.poem p.poet { text-align: right; }
+p.poet { text-align: right; }
+
+sup { font-size: 0.7em; }
+
+blockquote { font-size: 0.9em; }
+
+ </style>
+
+ </head>
+
+<body>
+
+
+<pre>
+
+Project Gutenberg's Cicero's Tusculan Disputations, by Marcus Tullius Cicero
+
+This eBook is for the use of anyone anywhere at no cost and with
+almost no restrictions whatsoever.  You may copy it, give it away or
+re-use it under the terms of the Project Gutenberg License included
+with this eBook or online at www.gutenberg.org
+
+
+Title: Cicero's Tusculan Disputations
+       Also, Treatises On The Nature Of The Gods, And On The Commonwealth
+
+Author: Marcus Tullius Cicero
+
+Release Date: February 9, 2005 [EBook #14988]
+
+Language: English and Latin
+
+Character set encoding: ISO-8859-1
+
+*** START OF THIS PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK CICERO'S TUSCULAN DISPUTATIONS ***
+
+
+
+
+Produced by Ted Garvin, Hagen von Eitzen and the PG Online Distributed
+Proofreading Team.
+
+
+
+
+
+
+</pre>
+
+
+
+
+
+
+<h1><big>CICERO’S</big><br/>
+TUSCULAN DISPUTATIONS;</h1>
+
+<p> </p>
+
+<p class="front"><big>ALSO, TREATISES ON</big></p>
+
+<p class="front"><big><big>THE NATURE OF THE GODS,</big></big></p>
+
+<p class="front"><big>AND ON</big></p>
+
+<p class="front"><big><big>THE COMMONWEALTH.</big></big></p>
+
+<p> </p>
+
+<p class="front">LITERALLY TRANSLATED, CHIEFLY BY</p>
+
+<p class="front"><big>C. D. YONGE.</big></p>
+
+<p class="front">NEW YORK:<br/>
+
+HARPER &amp; BROTHERS, PUBLISHERS,<br/>
+
+FRANKLIN SQUARE.<br/>
+
+1877.</p>
+
+
+<hr class="front"/>
+
+<p class="front"><a id="page-2"></a><span class="pgnum">2</span><big>HARPER’S<br/>
+<big>NEW CLASSICAL LIBRARY.</big></big></p>
+
+<p class="front">COMPRISING LITERAL TRANSLATIONS OF</p>
+
+<div class="poem">
+<p>CÆSAR.</p>
+<p>VIRGIL.</p>
+<p>SALLUST.</p>
+<p>HORACE.</p>
+<p>CICERO’S ORATIONS.</p>
+<p>CICERO’S OFFICES &amp;c.</p>
+<p>CICERO ON ORATORY AND ORATORS.</p>
+<p>CICERO’S TUSCULAN DISPUTATIONS, the Republic, and the Nature of the Gods.</p>
+<p>TERENCE.</p>
+<p>TACITUS.</p>
+<p>LIVY. 2 Vols.</p>
+<p>JUVENAL.</p>
+<p>XENOPHON.</p>
+<p>HOMER’S ILIAD.</p>
+<p>HOMER’S ODYSSEY.</p>
+<p>HERODOTUS.</p>
+<p>DEMOSTHENES. 2 Vols.</p>
+<p>THUCIDIDES.</p>
+<p>ÆSCHYLUS.</p>
+<p>SOPHOCLES.</p>
+<p>EURIPIDES. 2 Vols.</p>
+<p>PLATO. [<span class="sc">Select Dialogues</span>.]</p>
+</div>
+
+<p class="front">12mo, Cloth, $1.50 per Volume.</p>
+
+<p class="front"><span class="sc">Harper &amp; Brothers</span> <i>will send either of the above works by mail, postage
+prepaid, to any part of the United States, on receipt of the price</i>.</p>
+
+
+<hr class="front"/>
+
+
+<h2><a id="page-3"></a><span class="pgnum">3</span>NOTE.</h2>
+
+<hr class="tiny"/>
+
+<p><span class="first">The</span> greater portion of the Republic was previously translated by Francis
+Barham, Esq., and published in 1841. Although ably performed, it was not
+sufficiently close for the purpose of the “<span class="sc">Classical Library</span>,” and was
+therefore placed in the hands of the present editor for revision, as
+well as for collation with recent texts. This has occasioned material
+alterations and additions.</p>
+
+<p>The treatise “On the Nature of the Gods” is a revision of that usually
+ascribed to the celebrated Benjamin Franklin.</p>
+
+
+<hr class="front"/>
+
+
+<h2><a id="page-5"></a><span class="pgnum">5</span>CONTENTS.</h2>
+
+<hr class="tiny"/>
+
+<p><a href="#page-7"><i>Tusculan Disputations</i></a></p>
+
+<p><a href="#page-209"><i>On the Nature of the Gods</i></a></p>
+
+<p><a href="#page-357"><i>On the Commonwealth</i></a></p>
+
+<hr class="front"/>
+
+
+
+
+<h2><a id="page-7"></a><span class="pgnum">7</span>THE TUSCULAN DISPUTATIONS.</h2>
+
+<hr class="tiny"/>
+
+
+<h3>INTRODUCTION.</h3>
+
+
+<p><span class="first">In</span> the year <span class="sc">a.u.c.</span> 708, and the sixty-second year of Cicero’s age, his
+daughter, Tullia, died in childbed; and her loss afflicted Cicero to
+such a degree that he abandoned all public business, and, leaving the
+city, retired to Asterra, which was a country house that he had near
+Antium; where, after a while, he devoted himself to philosophical
+studies, and, besides other works, he published his Treatise de Finibus,
+and also this treatise called the Tusculan Disputations, of which
+Middleton gives this concise description:</p>
+
+<p>“The first book teaches us how to contemn the terrors of death, and to
+look upon it as a blessing rather than an evil;</p>
+
+<p>“The second, to support pain and affliction with a manly fortitude;</p>
+
+<p>“The third, to appease all our complaints and uneasinesses under the
+accidents of life;</p>
+
+<p>“The fourth, to moderate all our other passions;</p>
+
+<p>“And the fifth explains the sufficiency of virtue to make men happy.”</p>
+
+<p>It was his custom in the opportunities of his leisure to take some
+friends with him into the country, where, instead of amusing themselves
+with idle sports or feasts, their diversions were wholly speculative,
+tending to improve the mind and enlarge the understanding. In this
+manner he now spent five days at his Tusculan villa in discussing with
+his friends the several questions just mentioned. For, after employing
+the mornings in declaiming and rhetorical exercises, they used to retire
+in the afternoon <a id="page-8"></a><span class="pgnum">8</span>into a gallery, called the Academy, which he had built
+for the purpose of philosophical conferences, where, after the manner of
+the Greeks, he held a school, as they called it, and invited the company
+to call for any subject that they desired to hear explained, which being
+proposed accordingly by some of the audience became immediately the
+argument of that day’s debate. These five conferences, or dialogues, he
+collected afterward into writing in the very words and manner in which
+they really passed; and published them under the title of his Tusculan
+Disputations, from the name of the villa in which they were held.</p>
+
+<hr/>
+
+
+<h3>BOOK I.</h3>
+
+<h4>ON THE CONTEMPT OF DEATH.</h4>
+
+
+<p>I. <span class="first">At</span> a time when I had entirely, or to a great degree, released myself
+from my labors as an advocate, and from my duties as a senator, I had
+recourse again, Brutus, principally by your advice, to those studies
+which never had been out of my mind, although neglected at times, and
+which after a long interval I resumed; and now, since the principles and
+rules of all arts which relate to living well depend on the study of
+wisdom, which is called philosophy, I have thought it an employment
+worthy of me to illustrate them in the Latin tongue, not because
+philosophy could not be understood in the Greek language, or by the
+teaching of Greek masters; but it has always been my opinion that our
+countrymen have, in some instances, made wiser discoveries than the
+Greeks, with reference to those subjects which they have considered
+worthy of devoting their attention to, and in others have improved upon
+their discoveries, so that in one way or other we surpass them on every
+point; for, with regard to the manners and habits of private life, and
+family and domestic affairs, we certainly manage them with more
+elegance, and better than they did; and as to our republic, that our
+ancestors have, beyond all dispute, formed on better customs and laws.
+What shall I say of our military affairs; in which our ancestors have
+been most eminent in valor, and still more so <a id="page-9"></a><span class="pgnum">9</span>in discipline? As to
+those things which are attained not by study, but nature, neither
+Greece, nor any nation, is comparable to us; for what people has
+displayed such gravity, such steadiness, such greatness of soul,
+probity, faith—such distinguished virtue of every kind, as to be equal
+to our ancestors. In learning, indeed, and all kinds of literature,
+Greece did excel us, and it was easy to do so where there was no
+competition; for while among the Greeks the poets were the most ancient
+species of learned men—since Homer and Hesiod lived before the
+foundation of Rome, and Archilochus<a id="FNA-1"></a><a href="#FN-1"><sup>1</sup></a> was a contemporary of Romulus—we
+received poetry much later. For it was about five hundred and ten years
+after the building of Rome before Livius<a id="FNA-2"></a><a href="#FN-2"><sup>2</sup></a> published a play in the
+consulship of C. Claudius, the son of CÊcus, and M. Tuditanus, a year
+before the birth of Ennius, who was older than Plautus and NÊvius.</p>
+
+<p>II. It was, therefore, late before poets were either known or received
+among us; though we find in Cato de Originibus that the guests used, at
+their entertainments, to sing the praises of famous men to the sound of
+the flute; but a speech of Cato’s shows this kind of poetry to have been
+in no great esteem, as he censures Marcus Nobilior for carrying poets
+with him into his province; for that consul, as we know, carried Ennius
+with him into Ætolia. Therefore the less esteem poets were in, the less
+were <a id="page-10"></a><span class="pgnum">10</span>those studies pursued; though even then those who did display the
+greatest abilities that way were not very inferior to the Greeks. Do we
+imagine that if it had been considered commendable in Fabius,<a id="FNA-3"></a><a href="#FN-3"><sup>3</sup></a> a man
+of the highest rank, to paint, we should not have had many Polycleti and
+Parrhasii? Honor nourishes art, and glory is the spur with all to
+studies; while those studies are always neglected in every nation which
+are looked upon disparagingly. The Greeks held skill in vocal and
+instrumental music as a very important accomplishment, and therefore it
+is recorded of Epaminondas, who, in my opinion, was the greatest man
+among the Greeks, that he played excellently on the flute; and
+Themistocles, some years before, was deemed ignorant because at an
+entertainment he declined the lyre when it was offered to him. For this
+reason musicians flourished in Greece; music was a general study; and
+whoever was unacquainted with it was not considered as fully instructed
+in learning. Geometry was in high esteem with them, therefore none were
+more honorable than mathematicians. But we have confined this art to
+bare measuring and calculating.</p>
+
+<p>III. But, on the contrary, we early entertained an esteem for the
+orator; though he was not at first a man of learning, but only quick at
+speaking: in subsequent times he became learned; for it is reported that
+Galba, Africanus, and LÊlius were men of learning; and that even Cato,
+who preceded them in point of time, was a studious man: then succeeded
+the Lepidi, Carbo, and Gracchi, and so many great orators after them,
+down to our own times, that we were very little, if at all, inferior to
+the Greeks. Philosophy has been at a low ebb even to this present time,
+and has had no assistance from our own language, and so now I have
+undertaken to raise and illustrate it, in order that, as I have been of
+service to my countrymen, when employed on public affairs, I may, if
+possible, be so likewise in my retirement; and in this I must take the
+more pains, because there are already many books in the <a id="page-11"></a><span class="pgnum">11</span>Latin language
+which are said to be written inaccurately, having been composed by
+excellent men, only not of sufficient learning; for, indeed, it is
+possible that a man may think well, and yet not be able to express his
+thoughts elegantly; but for any one to publish thoughts which he can
+neither arrange skilfully nor illustrate so as to entertain his reader,
+is an unpardonable abuse of letters and retirement: they, therefore,
+read their books to one another, and no one ever takes them up but those
+who wish to have the same license for careless writing allowed to
+themselves. Wherefore, if oratory has acquired any reputation from my
+industry, I shall take the more pains to open the fountains of
+philosophy, from which all my eloquence has taken its rise.</p>
+
+<p>IV. But, as Aristotle,<a id="FNA-4"></a><a href="#FN-4"><sup>4</sup></a> a man of the greatest genius, and of the most
+various knowledge, being excited by the glory of the rhetorician
+Isocrates,<a id="FNA-5"></a><a href="#FN-5"><sup>5</sup></a> commenced teaching young men to speak, and joined
+philosophy with eloquence: so it is my design not to lay aside my former
+study of oratory, and yet to employ myself at the same time in this
+greater and more fruitful art; for I have always thought that to be able
+to speak copiously and elegantly on the most important questions was the
+most perfect philosophy. And I have so diligently applied myself to this
+pursuit, that I have already ventured to have a school like the Greeks.
+And lately when you left us, having many of my friends about me, I
+attempted at my Tusculan villa what I could do in that way; for as I
+formerly used to practise declaiming, which nobody continued longer than
+myself, so this is now to be the declamation of my old age. I desired
+any one to propose a question which he wished to have discussed, and
+then I argued that point either sitting or walking; and so I have
+compiled the scholÊ, as the Greeks call them, of five days, in as many
+books. We proceeded in this manner: when he who had proposed the subject
+for discussion had said what he thought proper, I <a id="page-12"></a><span class="pgnum">12</span>spoke against him;
+for this is, you know, the old and Socratic method of arguing against
+another’s opinion; for Socrates thought that thus the truth would more
+easily be arrived at. But to give you a better notion of our
+disputations, I will not barely send you an account of them, but
+represent them to you as they were carried on; therefore let the
+introduction be thus:</p>
+
+<p>V. <i>A.</i> To me death seems to be an evil.</p>
+
+<p><i>M.</i> What, to those who are already dead? or to those who must die?</p>
+
+<p><i>A.</i> To both.</p>
+
+<p><i>M.</i> It is a misery, then, because an evil?</p>
+
+<p><i>A.</i> Certainly.</p>
+
+<p><i>M.</i> Then those who have already died, and those who have still got to
+die, are both miserable?</p>
+
+<p><i>A.</i> So it appears to me.</p>
+
+<p><i>M.</i> Then all are miserable?</p>
+
+<p><i>A.</i> Every one.</p>
+
+<p><i>M.</i> And, indeed, if you wish to be consistent, all that are already
+born, or ever shall be, are not only miserable, but always will be so;
+for should you maintain those only to be miserable, you would not except
+any one living, for all must die; but there should be an end of misery
+in death. But seeing that the dead are miserable, we are born to eternal
+misery, for they must of consequence be miserable who died a hundred
+thousand years ago; or rather, all that have ever been born.</p>
+
+<p><i>A.</i> So, indeed, I think.</p>
+
+<p><i>M.</i> Tell me, I beseech you, are you afraid of the three-headed Cerberus
+in the shades below, and the roaring waves of Cocytus, and the passage
+over Acheron, and Tantalus expiring with thirst, while the water touches
+his chin; and Sisyphus,</p>
+
+<div class="poem">
+<p>Who sweats with arduous toil in vain</p>
+<p>The steepy summit of the mount to gain?</p>
+</div>
+
+<p class="cont">Perhaps, too, you dread the inexorable judges, Minos and Rhadamanthus;
+before whom neither L. Crassus nor M. Antonius can defend you; and
+where, since the cause lies before Grecian judges, you will not even be
+able to employ Demosthenes; but you must plead for yourself before a
+<a id="page-13"></a><span class="pgnum">13</span>very great assembly. These things perhaps you dread, and therefore look
+on death as an eternal evil.</p>
+
+<p>VI. <i>A.</i> Do you take me to be so imbecile as to give credit to such
+things?</p>
+
+<p><i>M.</i> What, do you not believe them?</p>
+
+<p><i>A.</i> Not in the least.</p>
+
+<p><i>M.</i> I am sorry to hear that.</p>
+
+<p><i>A.</i> Why, I beg?</p>
+
+<p><i>M.</i> Because I could have been very eloquent in speaking against them.</p>
+
+<p><i>A.</i> And who could not on such a subject? or what trouble is it to
+refute these monstrous inventions of the poets and painters?<a id="FNA-6"></a><a href="#FN-6"><sup>6</sup></a></p>
+
+<p><i>M.</i> And yet you have books of philosophers full of arguments against
+these.</p>
+
+<p><i>A.</i> A great waste of time, truly! for who is so weak as to be concerned
+about them?</p>
+
+<p><i>M.</i> If, then, there is no one miserable in the infernal regions, there
+can be no one there at all.</p>
+
+<p><i>A.</i> I am altogether of that opinion.</p>
+
+<p><i>M.</i> Where, then, are those you call miserable? or what place do they
+inhabit? For, if they exist at all, they must be somewhere.</p>
+
+<p><i>A.</i> I, indeed, am of opinion that they are nowhere.</p>
+
+<p><i>M.</i> Then they have no existence at all.</p>
+
+<p><i>A.</i> Even so, and yet they are miserable for this very reason, that they
+have no existence.</p>
+
+<p><i>M.</i> I had rather now have you afraid of Cerberus than speak thus
+inaccurately.</p>
+
+<p><i>A.</i> In what respect?</p>
+
+<p><i>M.</i> Because you admit him to exist whose existence you deny with the
+same breath. Where now is your sagacity? When you say any one is
+miserable, you say that he who does not exist, does exist.</p>
+
+<p><i>A.</i> I am not so absurd as to say that.</p>
+
+<p><a id="page-14"></a><span class="pgnum">14</span><i>M.</i> What is it that you do say, then?</p>
+
+<p><i>A.</i> I say, for instance, that Marcus Crassus is miserable in being
+deprived of such great riches as his by death; that Cn. Pompey is
+miserable in being taken from such glory and honor; and, in short, that
+all are miserable who are deprived of this light of life.</p>
+
+<p><i>M.</i> You have returned to the same point, for to be miserable implies an
+existence; but you just now denied that the dead had any existence: if,
+then, they have not, they can be nothing; and if so, they are not even
+miserable.</p>
+
+<p><i>A.</i> Perhaps I do not express what I mean, for I look upon this very
+circumstance, not to exist after having existed, to be very miserable.</p>
+
+<p><i>M.</i> What, more so than not to have existed at all? Therefore, those who
+are not yet born are miserable because they are not; and we ourselves,
+if we are to be miserable after death, were miserable before we were
+born: but I do not remember that I was miserable before I was born; and
+I should be glad to know, if your memory is better, what you recollect
+of yourself before you were born.</p>
+
+<p>VII. <i>A.</i> You are pleasant: as if I had said that those men are
+miserable who are not born, and not that they are so who are dead.</p>
+
+<p><i>M.</i> You say, then, that they are so?</p>
+
+<p><i>A.</i> Yes; I say that because they no longer exist after having existed
+they are miserable.</p>
+
+<p><i>M.</i> You do not perceive that you are asserting contradictions; for what
+is a greater contradiction, than that that should be not only miserable,
+but should have any existence at all, which does not exist? When you go
+out at the Capene gate and see the tombs of the Calatini, the Scipios,
+Servilii, and Metelli, do you look on them as miserable?</p>
+
+<p><i>A.</i> Because you press me with a word, henceforward I will not say they
+are miserable absolutely, but miserable on this account, because they
+have no existence.</p>
+
+<p><i>M.</i> You do not say, then, “M. Crassus is miserable,” but only
+“Miserable M. Crassus.”</p>
+
+<p><i>A.</i> Exactly so.</p>
+
+<p><i>M.</i> As if it did not follow that whatever you speak of <a id="page-15"></a><span class="pgnum">15</span>in that manner
+either is or is not. Are you not acquainted with the first principles of
+logic? For this is the first thing they lay down, Whatever is asserted
+(for that is the best way that occurs to me, at the moment, of rendering
+the Greek term <span class="greek">ጀΟ᜷ωΌα</span>; if I can think of a more accurate expression
+hereafter, I will use it), is asserted as being either true or false.
+When, therefore, you say, “Miserable M. Crassus,” you either say this,
+“M. Crassus is miserable,” so that some judgment may be made whether it
+is true or false, or you say nothing at all.</p>
+
+<p><i>A.</i> Well, then, I now own that the dead are not miserable, since you
+have drawn from me a concession that they who do not exist at all can
+not be miserable. What then? We that are alive, are we not wretched,
+seeing we must die? for what is there agreeable in life, when we must
+night and day reflect that, at some time or other, we must die?</p>
+
+<p>VIII. <i>M.</i> Do you not, then, perceive how great is the evil from which
+you have delivered human nature?</p>
+
+<p><i>A.</i> By what means?</p>
+
+<p><i>M.</i> Because, if to die were miserable to the dead, to live would be a
+kind of infinite and eternal misery. Now, however, I see a goal, and
+when I have reached it, there is nothing more to be feared; but you seem
+to me to follow the opinion of Epicharmus,<a id="FNA-7"></a><a href="#FN-7"><sup>7</sup></a> a man of some discernment,
+and sharp enough for a Sicilian.</p>
+
+<p><i>A.</i> What opinion? for I do not recollect it.</p>
+
+<p><i>M.</i> I will tell you if I can in Latin; for you know I am no more used
+to bring in Latin sentences in a Greek discourse than Greek in a Latin
+one.</p>
+
+<p><i>A.</i> And that is right enough. But what is that opinion of Epicharmus?</p>
+
+<p class="nodist"><i>M.</i></p>
+
+<div class="poem">
+<p>I would not die, but yet</p>
+<p>Am not concerned that I shall be dead.</p>
+</div>
+
+<p><i>A.</i> I now recollect the Greek; but since you have <a id="page-16"></a><span class="pgnum">16</span>obliged me to grant
+that the dead are not miserable, proceed to convince me that it is not
+miserable to be under a necessity of dying.</p>
+
+<p><i>M.</i> That is easy enough; but I have greater things in hand.</p>
+
+<p><i>A.</i> How comes that to be so easy? And what are those things of more
+consequence?</p>
+
+<p><i>M.</i> Thus: because, if there is no evil after death, then even death
+itself can be none; for that which immediately succeeds that is a state
+where you grant that there is no evil: so that even to be obliged to die
+can be no evil, for that is only the being obliged to arrive at a place
+where we allow that no evil is.</p>
+
+<p><i>A.</i> I beg you will be more explicit on this point, for these subtle
+arguments force me sooner to admissions than to conviction. But what are
+those more important things about which you say that you are occupied?</p>
+
+<p><i>M.</i> To teach you, if I can, that death is not only no evil, but a good.</p>
+
+<p><i>A.</i> I do not insist on that, but should be glad to hear you argue it,
+for even though you should not prove your point, yet you will prove that
+death is no evil. But I will not interrupt you; I would rather hear a
+continued discourse.</p>
+
+<p><i>M.</i> What, if I should ask you a question, would you not answer?</p>
+
+<p><i>A.</i> That would look like pride; but I would rather you should not ask
+but where necessity requires.</p>
+
+<p>IX. <i>M.</i> I will comply with your wishes, and explain as well as I can
+what you require; but not with any idea that, like the Pythian Apollo,
+what I say must needs be certain and indisputable, but as a mere man,
+endeavoring to arrive at probabilities by conjecture, for I have no
+ground to proceed further on than probability. Those men may call their
+statements indisputable who assert that what they say can be perceived
+by the senses, and who proclaim themselves philosophers by profession.</p>
+
+<p><i>A.</i> Do as you please: We are ready to hear you.</p>
+
+<p><i>M.</i> The first thing, then, is to inquire what death, which seems to be
+so well understood, really is; for some imagine death to be the
+departure of the soul from the body; <a id="page-17"></a><span class="pgnum">17</span>others think that there is no such
+departure, but that soul and body perish together, and that the soul is
+extinguished with the body. Of those who think that the soul does depart
+from the body, some believe in its immediate dissolution; others fancy
+that it continues to exist for a time; and others believe that it lasts
+forever. There is great dispute even what the soul is, where it is, and
+whence it is derived: with some, the heart itself (<i>cor</i>) seems to be
+the soul, hence the expressions, <i>excordes</i>, <i>vecordes</i>, <i>concordes;</i> and that
+prudent Nasica, who was twice consul, was called Corculus, <i>i.e.</i>,
+wise-heart; and Ælius Sextus is described as <i>Egregie</i> cordatus <i>homo,
+catus Æliu’ Sextus</i>—that great <i>wise-hearted</i> man, sage Ælius.
+Empedocles imagines the blood, which is suffused over the heart, to be
+the soul; to others, a certain part of the brain seems to be the throne
+of the soul; others neither allow the heart itself, nor any portion of
+the brain, to be the soul, but think either that the heart is the seat
+and abode of the soul, or else that the brain is so. Some would have the
+soul, or spirit, to be the <i>anima</i>, as our schools generally agree; and
+indeed the name signifies as much, for we use the expressions <i>animam
+agere</i>, to live; <i>animam efflare</i>, to expire; <i>animosi</i>, men of spirit;
+<i>bene animati</i>, men of right feeling; <i>exanimi sententia</i>, according to
+our real opinion; and the very word <i>animus</i> is derived from <i>anima</i>.
+Again, the soul seems to Zeno the Stoic to be fire.</p>
+
+<p>X. But what I have said as to the heart, the blood, the brain, air, or
+fire being the soul, are common opinions: the others are only
+entertained by individuals; and, indeed, there were many among the
+ancients who held singular opinions on this subject, of whom the latest
+was Aristoxenus, a man who was both a musician and a philosopher. He
+maintained a certain straining of the body, like what is called harmony
+in music, to be the soul, and believed that, from the figure and nature
+of the whole body, various motions are excited, as sounds are from an
+instrument. He adhered steadily to his system, and yet he said
+something, the nature of which, whatever it was, had been detailed and
+explained a great while before by Plato. Xenocrates denied that the soul
+had any figure, or anything like a body; but said it was a number, the
+power of which, as <a id="page-18"></a><span class="pgnum">18</span>Pythagoras had fancied, some ages before, was the
+greatest in nature: his master, Plato, imagined a threefold soul, a
+dominant portion of which—that is to say, reason—he had lodged in the
+head, as in a tower; and the other two parts—namely, anger and
+desire—he made subservient to this one, and allotted them distinct
+abodes, placing anger in the breast, and desire under the prÊcordia. But
+DicÊarchus, in that discourse of some learned disputants, held at
+Corinth, which he details to us in three books—in the first book
+introduces many speakers; and in the other two he introduces a certain
+Pherecrates, an old man of Phthia, who, as he said, was descended from
+Deucalion; asserting, that there is in fact no such thing at all as a
+soul, but that it is a name without a meaning; and that it is idle to
+use the expression “animals,” or “animated beings;” that neither men nor
+beasts have minds or souls, but that all that power by which we act or
+perceive is equally infused into every living creature, and is
+inseparable from the body, for if it were not, it would be nothing; nor
+is there anything whatever really existing except body, which is a
+single and simple thing, so fashioned as to live and have its sensations
+in consequence of the regulations of nature. Aristotle, a man superior
+to all others, both in genius and industry (I always except Plato),
+after having embraced these four known sorts of principles, from which
+all things deduce their origin, imagines that there is a certain fifth
+nature, from whence comes the soul; for to think, to foresee, to learn,
+to teach, to invent anything, and many other attributes of the same
+kind, such as to remember, to love, to hate, to desire, to fear, to be
+pleased or displeased—these, and others like them, exist, he thinks, in
+none of those first four kinds: on such account he adds a fifth kind,
+which has no name, and so by a new name he calls the soul <span class="greek">ጐΜΎελᜳχεια</span>, as
+if it were a certain continued and perpetual motion.</p>
+
+<p>XI. If I have not forgotten anything unintentionally, these are the
+principal opinions concerning the soul. I have omitted Democritus, a
+very great man indeed, but one who deduces the soul from the fortuitous
+concourse of small, light, and round substances; for, if you believe men
+of his school, there is nothing which a crowd of atoms <a id="page-19"></a><span class="pgnum">19</span>cannot effect.
+Which of these opinions is true, some God must determine. It is an
+important question for us, Which has the most appearance of truth? Shall
+we, then, prefer determining between them, or shall we return to our
+subject?</p>
+
+<p><i>A.</i> I could wish both, if possible; but it is difficult to mix them:
+therefore, if without a discussion of them we can get rid of the fears
+of death, let us proceed to do so; but if this is not to be done without
+explaining the question about souls, let us have that now, and the other
+at another time.</p>
+
+<p><i>M.</i> I take that plan to be the best, which I perceive you are inclined
+to; for reason will demonstrate that, whichever of the opinions which I
+have stated is true, it must follow, then, that death cannot be an evil;
+or that it must rather be something desirable; for if either the heart,
+or the blood, or the brain, is the soul, then certainly the soul, being
+corporeal, must perish with the rest of the body; if it is air, it will
+perhaps be dissolved; if it is fire, it will be extinguished; if it is
+Aristoxenus’s harmony, it will be put out of tune. What shall I say of
+DicÊarchus, who denies that there is any soul? In all these opinions,
+there is nothing to affect any one after death; for all feeling is lost
+with life, and where there is no sensation, nothing can interfere to
+affect us. The opinions of others do indeed bring us hope; if it is any
+pleasure to you to think that souls, after they leave the body, may go
+to heaven as to a permanent home.</p>
+
+<p><i>A.</i> I have great pleasure in that thought, and it is what I most
+desire; and even if it should not be so, I should still be very willing
+to believe it.</p>
+
+<p><i>M.</i> What occasion have you, then, for my assistance? Am I superior to
+Plato in eloquence? Turn over carefully his book that treats of the
+soul; you will have there all that you can want.</p>
+
+<p><i>A.</i> I have, indeed, done that, and often; but, I know not how it comes
+to pass, I agree with it while I am reading it; but when I have laid
+down the book, and begin to reflect with myself on the immortality of
+the soul, all that agreement vanishes.</p>
+
+<p><i>M.</i> How comes that? Do you admit this—that souls <a id="page-20"></a><span class="pgnum">20</span>either exist after
+death, or else that they also perish at the moment of death?</p>
+
+<p><i>A.</i> I agree to that. And if they do exist, I admit that they are happy;
+but if they perish, I cannot suppose them to be unhappy, because, in
+fact, they have no existence at all. You drove me to that concession but
+just now.</p>
+
+<p><i>M.</i> How, then, can you, or why do you, assert that you think that death
+is an evil, when it either makes us happy, in the case of the soul
+continuing to exist, or, at all events, not unhappy, in the case of our
+becoming destitute of all sensation?</p>
+
+<p>XII. <i>A.</i> Explain, therefore, if it is not troublesome to you, first, if
+you can, that souls do exist after death; secondly, should you fail in
+that (and it is a very difficult thing to establish), that death is free
+from all evil; for I am not without my fears that this itself is an
+evil: I do not mean the immediate deprivation of sense, but the fact
+that we shall hereafter suffer deprivation.</p>
+
+<p><i>M.</i> I have the best authority in support of the opinion you desire to
+have established, which ought, and generally has, great weight in all
+cases. And, first, I have all antiquity on that side, which the more
+near it is to its origin and divine descent, the more clearly, perhaps,
+on that account, did it discern the truth in these matters. This very
+doctrine, then, was adopted by all those ancients whom Ennius calls in
+the Sabine tongue Casci; namely, that in death there was a sensation,
+and that, when men departed this life, they were not so entirely
+destroyed as to perish absolutely. And this may appear from many other
+circumstances, and especially from the pontifical rites and funeral
+obsequies, which men of the greatest genius would not have been so
+solicitous about, and would not have guarded from any injury by such
+severe laws, but from a firm persuasion that death was not so entire a
+destruction as wholly to abolish and destroy everything, but rather a
+kind of transmigration, as it were, and change of life, which was, in
+the case of illustrious men and women, usually a guide to heaven, while
+in that of others it was still confined to the earth, but in such a
+manner as still to exist. From this, and the sentiments of the Romans,</p>
+
+<div class="poem">
+<p>In heaven Romulus with Gods now lives,</p>
+</div>
+
+<p class="cont"><a id="page-21"></a><span class="pgnum">21</span>as Ennius saith, agreeing with the common belief; hence, too, Hercules
+is considered so great and propitious a God among the Greeks, and from
+them he was introduced among us, and his worship has extended even to
+the very ocean itself. This is how it was that Bacchus was deified, the
+offspring of Semele; and from the same illustrious fame we receive
+Castor and Pollux as Gods, who are reported not only to have helped the
+Romans to victory in their battles, but to have been the messengers of
+their success. What shall we say of Ino, the daughter of Cadmus? Is she
+not called Leucothea by the Greeks, and Matuta by us? Nay, more; is not
+the whole of heaven (not to dwell on particulars) almost filled with the
+offspring of men?</p>
+
+<p>Should I attempt to search into antiquity, and produce from thence what
+the Greek writers have asserted, it would appear that even those who are
+called their principal Gods were taken from among men up into heaven.</p>
+
+<p>XIII. Examine the sepulchres of those which are shown in Greece;
+recollect, for you have been initiated, what lessons are taught in the
+mysteries; then will you perceive how extensive this doctrine is. But
+they who were not acquainted with natural philosophy (for it did not
+begin to be in vogue till many years later) had no higher belief than
+what natural reason could give them; they were not acquainted with the
+principles and causes of things; they were often induced by certain
+visions, and those generally in the night, to think that those men who
+had departed from this life were still alive. And this may further be
+brought as an irrefragable argument for us to believe that there are
+Gods—that there never was any nation so barbarous, nor any people in
+the world so savage, as to be without some notion of Gods. Many have
+wrong notions of the Gods, for that is the nature and ordinary
+consequence of bad customs, yet all allow that there is a certain divine
+nature and energy. Nor does this proceed from the conversation of men,
+or the agreement of philosophers; it is not an opinion established by
+institutions or by laws; but, no doubt, in every case the consent of all
+nations is to be looked on as a law of nature. Who is there, then, that
+does not lament the loss of his friends, principally from <a id="page-22"></a><span class="pgnum">22</span>imagining
+them deprived of the conveniences of life? Take away this opinion, and
+you remove with it all grief; for no one is afflicted merely on account
+of a loss sustained by himself. Perhaps we may be sorry, and grieve a
+little; but that bitter lamentation and those mournful tears have their
+origin in our apprehensions that he whom we loved is deprived of all the
+advantages of life, and is sensible of his loss. And we are led to this
+opinion by nature, without any arguments or any instruction.</p>
+
+<p>XIV. But the greatest proof of all is, that nature herself gives a
+silent judgment in favor of the immortality of the soul, inasmuch as all
+are anxious, and that to a great degree, about the things which concern
+futurity:</p>
+
+<div class="poem">
+<p>One plants what future ages shall enjoy,</p>
+</div>
+
+<p class="cont">as Statius saith in his Synephebi. What is his object in doing so,
+except that he is interested in posterity? Shall the industrious
+husbandman, then, plant trees the fruit of which he shall never see? And
+shall not the great man found laws, institutions, and a republic? What
+does the procreation of children imply, and our care to continue our
+names, and our adoptions, and our scrupulous exactness in drawing up
+wills, and the inscriptions on monuments, and panegyrics, but that our
+thoughts run on futurity? There is no doubt but a judgment may be formed
+of nature in general, from looking at each nature in its most perfect
+specimens; and what is a more perfect specimen of a man than those are
+who look on themselves as born for the assistance, the protection, and
+the preservation of others? Hercules has gone to heaven; he never would
+have gone thither had he not, while among men, made that road for
+himself. These things are of old date, and have, besides, the sanction
+of universal religion.</p>
+
+<p>XV. What will you say? What do you imagine that so many and such great
+men of our republic, who have sacrificed their lives for its good,
+expected? Do you believe that they thought that their names should not
+continue beyond their lives? None ever encountered death for their
+country but under a firm persuasion of immortality! Themistocles might
+have lived at his ease; so might Epaminondas; and, not to look abroad
+and among the ancients <a id="page-23"></a><span class="pgnum">23</span>for instances, so might I myself. But, somehow
+or other there clings to our minds a certain presage of future ages; and
+this both exists most firmly, and appears most clearly, in men of the
+loftiest genius and greatest souls. Take away this, and who would be so
+mad as to spend his life amidst toils and dangers? I speak of those in
+power. What are the poet’s views but to be ennobled after death? What
+else is the object of these lines,</p>
+
+<div class="poem">
+<p>Behold old Ennius here, who erst</p>
+<p>Thy fathers’ great exploits rehearsed?</p>
+</div>
+
+<p class="cont">He is challenging the reward of glory from those men whose ancestors he
+himself had ennobled by his poetry. And in the same spirit he says, in
+another passage,</p>
+
+<div class="poem">
+<p>Let none with tears my funeral grace, for I</p>
+<p>Claim from my works an immortality.</p>
+</div>
+
+<p class="cont">Why do I mention poets? The very mechanics are desirous of fame after
+death. Why did Phidias include a likeness of himself in the shield of
+Minerva, when he was not allowed to inscribe his name on it? What do our
+philosophers think on the subject? Do not they put their names to those
+very books which they write on the contempt of glory? If, then,
+universal consent is the voice of nature, and if it is the general
+opinion everywhere that those who have quitted this life are still
+interested in something, we also must subscribe to that opinion. And if
+we think that men of the greatest abilities and virtues see most clearly
+into the power of nature, because they themselves are her most perfect
+work, it is very probable that, as every great man is especially anxious
+to benefit posterity, there is something of which he himself will be
+sensible after death.</p>
+
+<p>XVI. But as we are led by nature to think there are Gods, and as we
+discover, by reason, of what description they are, so, by the consent of
+all nations, we are induced to believe that our souls survive; but where
+their habitation is, and of what character they eventually are, must be
+learned from reason. The want of any certain reason on which to argue
+has given rise to the idea of the shades below, and to those fears which
+you seem, not without <a id="page-24"></a><span class="pgnum">24</span>reason, to despise; for as our bodies fall to the
+ground, and are covered with earth (<i>humus</i>), from whence we derive the
+expression to be interred (<i>humari</i>), that has occasioned men to imagine
+that the dead continue, during the remainder of their existence, under
+ground; which opinion has drawn after it many errors, which the poets
+have increased; for the theatre, being frequented by a large crowd,
+among which are women and children, is wont to be greatly affected on
+hearing such pompous verses as these,</p>
+
+<div class="poem">
+<p>Lo! here I am, who scarce could gain this place,</p>
+<p>Through stony mountains and a dreary waste;</p>
+<p>Through cliffs, whose sharpen’d stones tremendous hung,</p>
+<p>Where dreadful darkness spread itself around.</p>
+</div>
+
+<p class="cont">And the error prevailed so much, though indeed at present it seems to me
+to be removed, that although men knew that the bodies of the dead had
+been burned, yet they conceived such things to be done in the infernal
+regions as could not be executed or imagined without a body; for they
+could not conceive how disembodied souls could exist; and, therefore,
+they looked out for some shape or figure. This was the origin of all
+that account of the dead in Homer. This was the idea that caused my
+friend Appius to frame his Necromancy; and this is how there got about
+that idea of the lake of Avernus, in my neighborhood,</p>
+
+<div class="poem">
+<p>From whence the souls of undistinguish’d shape,</p>
+<p>Clad in thick shade, rush from the open gate</p>
+<p>Of Acheron, vain phantoms of the dead.</p>
+</div>
+
+<p class="cont">And they must needs have these appearances speak, which is not possible
+without a tongue, and a palate, and jaws, and without the help of lungs
+and sides, and without some shape or figure; for they could see nothing
+by their mind alone—they referred all to their eyes. To withdraw the
+mind from sensual objects, and abstract our thoughts from what we are
+accustomed to, is an attribute of great genius. I am persuaded, indeed,
+that there were many such men in former ages; but Pherecydes<a id="FNA-8"></a><a href="#FN-8"><sup>8</sup></a> the
+Syrian is the <a id="page-25"></a><span class="pgnum">25</span>first on record who said that the souls of men were
+immortal, and he was a philosopher of great antiquity, in the reign of
+my namesake Tullius. His disciple Pythagoras greatly confirmed this
+opinion, who came into Italy in the reign of Tarquin the Proud; and all
+that country which is called Great Greece was occupied by his school,
+and he himself was held in high honor, and had the greatest authority;
+and the Pythagorean sect was for many ages after in such great credit,
+that all learning was believed to be confined to that name.</p>
+
+<p>XVII. But I return to the ancients. They scarcely ever gave any reason
+for their opinion but what could be explained by numbers or definitions.
+It is reported of Plato that he came into Italy to make himself
+acquainted with the Pythagoreans; and that when there, among others, he
+made an acquaintance with Archytas<a id="FNA-9"></a><a href="#FN-9"><sup>9</sup></a> and TimÊus,<a id="FNA-10"></a><a href="#FN-10"><sup>10</sup></a> and learned from
+them all the tenets of the Pythagoreans; and that he not only was of the
+same opinion with Pythagoras concerning the immortality of the soul, but
+that he also brought reasons in support of it; which, if you have
+nothing to say against it, I will pass over, and say no more at present
+about all this hope of immortality.</p>
+
+<p><i>A.</i> What, will you leave me when you have raised my expectations so
+high? I had rather, so help me Hercules! be mistaken with Plato, whom I
+know how much you esteem, and whom I admire myself, from what you say of
+him, than be in the right with those others.</p>
+
+<p><a id="page-26"></a><span class="pgnum">26</span><i>M.</i> I commend you; for, indeed, I could myself willingly be mistaken
+in his company. Do we, then, doubt, as we do in other cases (though I
+think here is very little room for doubt in this case, for the
+mathematicians prove the facts to us), that the earth is placed in the
+midst of the world, being, as it were, a sort of point, which they call
+a <span class="greek">κᜳΜτροΜ</span>, surrounded by the whole heavens; and that such is the nature
+of the four principles which are the generating causes of all things,
+that they have equally divided among them the constituents of all
+bodies; moreover, that earthy and humid bodies are carried at equal
+angles by their own weight and ponderosity into the earth and sea; that
+the other two parts consist, one of fire, and the other of air? As the
+two former are carried by their gravity and weight into the middle
+region of the world, so these, on the other hand, ascend by right lines
+into the celestial regions, either because, owing to their intrinsic
+nature, they are always endeavoring to reach the highest place, or else
+because lighter bodies are naturally repelled by heavier; and as this is
+notoriously the case, it must evidently follow that souls, when once
+they have departed from the body, whether they are animal (by which term
+I mean capable of breathing) or of the nature of fire, must mount
+upward. But if the soul is some number, as some people assert, speaking
+with more subtlety than clearness, or if it is that fifth nature, for
+which it would be more correct to say that we have not given a name to
+than that we do not correctly understand it—still it is too pure and
+perfect not to go to a great distance from the earth. Something of this
+sort, then, we must believe the soul to be, that we may not commit the
+folly of thinking that so active a principle lies immerged in the heart
+or brain; or, as Empedocles would have it, in the blood.</p>
+
+<p>XVIII. We will pass over DicÊarchus,<a id="FNA-11"></a><a href="#FN-11"><sup>11</sup></a> with his contemporary and
+fellow-disciple Aristoxenus,<a id="FNA-12"></a><a href="#FN-12"><sup>12</sup></a> both indeed <a id="page-27"></a><span class="pgnum">27</span>men of learning. One of
+them seems never even to have been affected with grief, as he could not
+perceive that he had a soul; while the other is so pleased with his
+musical compositions that he endeavors to show an analogy betwixt them
+and souls. Now, we may understand harmony to arise from the intervals of
+sounds, whose various compositions occasion many harmonies; but I do not
+see how a disposition of members, and the figure of a body without a
+soul, can occasion harmony. He had better, learned as he is, leave these
+speculations to his master Aristotle, and follow his own trade as a
+musician. Good advice is given him in that Greek proverb,</p>
+
+<div class="poem">
+<p>Apply your talents where you best are skill’d.</p>
+</div>
+
+<p class="cont">I will have nothing at all to do with that fortuitous concourse of
+individual light and round bodies, notwithstanding Democritus insists on
+their being warm and having breath, that is to say, life. But this soul,
+which is compounded of either of the four principles from which we
+assert that all things are derived, is of inflamed air, as seems
+particularly to have been the opinion of PanÊtius, and must necessarily
+mount upward; for air and fire have no tendency downward, but always
+ascend; so should they be dissipated that must be at some distance from
+the earth; but should they remain, and preserve their original state, it
+is clearer still that they must be carried heavenward, and this gross
+and concrete air, which is nearest the earth, must be divided and broken
+by them; for the soul is warmer, or rather hotter, than that air, which
+I just now called gross and concrete: and this may be made evident from
+this consideration—that our bodies, being compounded of the earthy
+class of principles, grow warm by the heat of the soul.</p>
+
+<p>XIX. We may add, that the soul can the more easily escape from this air,
+which I have often named, and break <a id="page-28"></a><span class="pgnum">28</span>through it, because nothing is
+swifter than the soul; no swiftness is comparable to the swiftness of
+the soul, which, should it remain uncorrupt and without alteration, must
+necessarily be carried on with such velocity as to penetrate and divide
+all this atmosphere, where clouds, and rain, and winds are formed,
+which, in consequence of the exhalations from the earth, is moist and
+dark: but, when the soul has once got above this region, and falls in
+with, and recognizes, a nature like its own, it then rests upon fires
+composed of a combination of thin air and a moderate solar heat, and
+does not aim at any higher flight; for then, after it has attained a
+lightness and heat resembling its own, it moves no more, but remains
+steady, being balanced, as it were, between two equal weights. That,
+then, is its natural seat where it has penetrated to something like
+itself, and where, wanting nothing further, it may be supported and
+maintained by the same aliment which nourishes and maintains the stars.</p>
+
+<p>Now, as we are usually incited to all sorts of desires by the stimulus
+of the body, and the more so as we endeavor to rival those who are in
+possession of what we long for, we shall certainly be happy when, being
+emancipated from that body, we at the same time get rid of these desires
+and this rivalry. And that which we do at present, when, dismissing all
+other cares, we curiously examine and look into anything, we shall then
+do with greater freedom; and we shall employ ourselves entirely in the
+contemplation and examination of things; because there is naturally in
+our minds a certain insatiable desire to know the truth, and the very
+region itself where we shall arrive, as it gives us a more intuitive and
+easy knowledge of celestial things, will raise our desires after
+knowledge. For it was this beauty of the heavens, as seen even here upon
+earth, which gave birth to that national and hereditary philosophy (as
+Theophrastus calls it), which was thus excited to a desire of knowledge.
+But those persons will in a most especial degree enjoy this philosophy,
+who, while they were only inhabitants of this world and enveloped in
+darkness, were still desirous of looking into these things with the eye
+of their mind.</p>
+
+<p>XX. For if those men now think that they have attained <a id="page-29"></a><span class="pgnum">29</span>something who
+have seen the mouth of the Pontus, and those straits which were passed
+by the ship called Argo, because,</p>
+
+<div class="poem">
+<p>From Argos she did chosen men convey,</p>
+<p>Bound to fetch back the Golden Fleece, their prey;</p>
+</div>
+
+<p class="cont">or those who have seen the straits of the ocean,</p>
+
+<div class="poem">
+<p>Where the swift waves divide the neighboring shores</p>
+<p>Of Europe, and of Afric;</p>
+</div>
+
+<p class="cont">what kind of sight do you imagine that will be when the whole earth is
+laid open to our view? and that, too, not only in its position, form,
+and boundaries, nor those parts of it only which are habitable, but
+those also that lie uncultivated, through the extremities of heat and
+cold to which they are exposed; for not even now is it with our eyes
+that we view what we see, for the body itself has no senses; but (as the
+naturalists, ay, and even the physicians assure us, who have opened our
+bodies, and examined them) there are certain perforated channels from
+the seat of the soul to the eyes, ears, and nose; so that frequently,
+when either prevented by meditation, or the force of some bodily
+disorder, we neither hear nor see, though our eyes and ears are open and
+in good condition; so that we may easily apprehend that it is the soul
+itself which sees and hears, and not those parts which are, as it were,
+but windows to the soul, by means of which, however, she can perceive
+nothing, unless she is on the spot, and exerts herself. How shall we
+account for the fact that by the same power of thinking we comprehend
+the most different things—as color, taste, heat, smell, and
+sound—which the soul could never know by her five messengers, unless
+every thing were referred to her, and she were the sole judge of all?
+And we shall certainly discover these things in a more clear and perfect
+degree when the soul is disengaged from the body, and has arrived at
+that goal to which nature leads her; for at present, notwithstanding
+nature has contrived, with the greatest skill, those channels which lead
+from the body to the soul, yet are they, in some way or other, stopped
+up with earthy and concrete bodies; but when we shall be nothing but
+soul, then nothing will interfere <a id="page-30"></a><span class="pgnum">30</span>to prevent our seeing everything in
+its real substance and in its true character.</p>
+
+<p>XXI. It is true, I might expatiate, did the subject require it, on the
+many and various objects with which the soul will be entertained in
+those heavenly regions; when I reflect on which, I am apt to wonder at
+the boldness of some philosophers, who are so struck with admiration at
+the knowledge of nature as to thank, in an exulting manner, the first
+inventor and teacher of natural philosophy, and to reverence him as a
+God; for they declare that they have been delivered by his means from
+the greatest tyrants, a perpetual terror, and a fear that molested them
+by night and day. What is this dread—this fear? What old woman is there
+so weak as to fear these things, which you, forsooth, had you not been
+acquainted with natural philosophy, would stand in awe of?</p>
+
+<div class="poem">
+<p>The hallow’d roofs of Acheron, the dread</p>
+<p>Of Orcus, the pale regions of the dead.</p>
+</div>
+
+<p class="cont">And does it become a philosopher to boast that he is not afraid of these
+things, and that he has discovered them to be false? And from this we
+may perceive how acute these men were by nature, who, if they had been
+left without any instruction, would have believed in these things. But
+now they have certainly made a very fine acquisition in learning that
+when the day of their death arrives, they will perish entirely. And if
+that really is the case—for I say nothing either way—what is there
+agreeable or glorious in it? Not that I see any reason why the opinion
+of Pythagoras and Plato may not be true; but even although Plato were to
+have assigned no reason for his opinion (observe how much I esteem the
+man), the weight of his authority would have borne me down; but he has
+brought so many reasons, that he appears to me to have endeavored to
+convince others, and certainly to have convinced himself.</p>
+
+<p>XXII. But there are many who labor on the other side of the question,
+and condemn souls to death, as if they were criminals capitally
+convicted; nor have they any other reason to allege why the immortality
+of the soul appears to them to be incredible, except that they are not
+<a id="page-31"></a><span class="pgnum">31</span>able to conceive what sort of thing the soul can be when disentangled
+from the body; just as if they could really form a correct idea as to
+what sort of thing it is, even when it is in the body; what its form,
+and size, and abode are; so that were they able to have a full view of
+all that is now hidden from them in a living body, they have no idea
+whether the soul would be discernible by them, or whether it is of so
+fine a texture that it would escape their sight. Let those consider
+this, who say that they are unable to form any idea of the soul without
+the body, and then they will see whether they can form any adequate idea
+of what it is when it is in the body. For my own part, when I reflect on
+the nature of the soul, it appears to me a far more perplexing and
+obscure question to determine what is its character while it is in the
+body—a place which, as it were, does not belong to it—than to imagine
+what it is when it leaves it, and has arrived at the free Êther, which
+is, if I may so say, its proper, its own habitation. For unless we are
+to say that we cannot apprehend the character or nature of anything
+which we have never seen, we certainly may be able to form some notion
+of God, and of the divine soul when released from the body. DicÊarchus,
+indeed, and Aristoxenus, because it was hard to understand the existence
+and substance and nature of the soul, asserted that there was no such
+thing as a soul at all. It is, indeed, the most difficult thing
+imaginable to discern the soul by the soul. And this, doubtless, is the
+meaning of the precept of Apollo, which advises every one to know
+himself. For I do not apprehend the meaning of the God to have been that
+we should understand our members, our stature, and form; for we are not
+merely bodies; nor, when I say these things to you, am I addressing
+myself to your body: when, therefore, he says, “Know yourself,” he says
+this, “Inform yourself of the nature of your soul;” for the body is but
+a kind of vessel, or receptacle of the soul, and whatever your soul does
+is your own act. To know the soul, then, unless it had been divine,
+would not have been a precept of such excellent wisdom as to be
+attributed to a God; but even though the soul should not know of what
+nature itself is, will you say that it does not even perceive that <a id="page-32"></a><span class="pgnum">32</span>it
+exists at all, or that it has motion? On which is founded that reason
+of Plato’s, which is explained by Socrates in the PhÊdrus, and inserted
+by me, in my sixth book of the Republic.</p>
+
+<p>XXIII. “That which is always moved is eternal; but that which gives
+motion to something else, and is moved itself by some external cause,
+when that motion ceases, must necessarily cease to exist. That,
+therefore, alone, which is self-moved, because it is never forsaken by
+itself, can never cease to be moved. Besides, it is the beginning and
+principle of motion to everything else; but whatever is a principle has
+no beginning, for all things arise from that principle, and it cannot
+itself owe its rise to anything else; for then it would not be a
+principle did it proceed from anything else. But if it has no beginning,
+it never will have any end; for a principle which is once extinguished
+cannot itself be restored by anything else, nor can it produce anything
+else from itself; inasmuch as all things must necessarily arise from
+some first cause. And thus it comes about that the first principle of
+motion must arise from that thing which is itself moved by itself; and
+that can neither have a beginning nor an end of its existence, for
+otherwise the whole heaven and earth would be overset, and all nature
+would stand still, and not be able to acquire any force by the impulse
+of which it might be first set in motion. Seeing, then, that it is clear
+that whatever moves itself is eternal, can there be any doubt that the
+soul is so? For everything is inanimate which is moved by an external
+force; but everything which is animate is moved by an interior force,
+which also belongs to itself. For this is the peculiar nature and power
+of the soul; and if the soul be the only thing in the whole world which
+has the power of self-motion, then certainly it never had a beginning,
+and therefore it is eternal.”</p>
+
+<p>Now, should all the lower order of philosophers (for so I think they may
+be called who dissent from Plato and Socrates and that school) unite
+their force, they never would be able to explain anything so elegantly
+as this, nor even to understand how ingeniously this conclusion is
+drawn. The soul, then, perceives itself to have motion, <a id="page-33"></a><span class="pgnum">33</span>and at the same
+time that it gets that perception, it is sensible that it derives that
+motion from its own power, and not from the agency of another; and it is
+impossible that it should ever forsake itself. And these premises compel
+you to allow its eternity, unless you have something to say against
+them.</p>
+
+<p><i>A.</i> I should myself be very well pleased not to have even a thought
+arise in my mind against them, so much am I inclined to that opinion.</p>
+
+<p>XXIV. <i>M.</i> Well, then, I appeal to you, if the arguments which prove
+that there is something divine in the souls of men are not equally
+strong? But if I could account for the origin of these divine
+properties, then I might also be able to explain how they might cease to
+exist; for I think I can account for the manner in which the blood, and
+bile, and phlegm, and bones, and nerves, and veins, and all the limbs,
+and the shape of the whole body, were put together and made; ay, and
+even as to the soul itself, were there nothing more in it than a
+principle of life, then the life of a man might be put upon the same
+footing as that of a vine or any other tree, and accounted for as caused
+by nature; for these things, as we say, live. Besides, if desires and
+aversions were all that belonged to the soul, it would have them only in
+common with the beasts; but it has, in the first place, memory, and
+that, too, so infinite as to recollect an absolute countless number of
+circumstances, which Plato will have to be a recollection of a former
+life; for in that book which is inscribed Menon, Socrates asks a child
+some questions in geometry, with reference to measuring a square; his
+answers are such as a child would make, and yet the questions are so
+easy, that while answering them, one by one, he comes to the same point
+as if he had learned geometry. From whence Socrates would infer that
+learning is nothing more than recollection; and this topic he explains
+more accurately in the discourse which he held the very day he died; for
+he there asserts that, any one, who seeming to be entirely illiterate,
+is yet able to answer a question well that is proposed to him, does in
+so doing manifestly show that he is not learning it then, but
+recollecting it by his memory. Nor is it to be accounted for in any
+other way, how children <a id="page-34"></a><span class="pgnum">34</span>come to have notions of so many and such
+important things as are implanted, and, as it were, sealed up, in their
+minds (which the Greeks call <span class="greek">ጔΜΜοιαι</span>), unless the soul, before it
+entered the body, had been well stored with knowledge. And as it had no
+existence at all (for this is the invariable doctrine of Plato, who will
+not admit anything to have a real existence which has a beginning and an
+end, and who thinks that that alone does really exist which is of such a
+character as what he calls <span class="greek">εጎΎεα</span>, and we species), therefore, being shut
+up in the body, it could not while in the body discover what it knows;
+but it knew it before, and brought the knowledge with it, so that we are
+no longer surprised at its extensive and multifarious knowledge. Nor
+does the soul clearly discover its ideas at its first resort to this
+abode to which it is so unaccustomed, and which is in so disturbed a
+state; but after having refreshed and recollected itself, it then by its
+memory recovers them; and, therefore, to learn implies nothing more than
+to recollect. But I am in a particular manner surprised at memory. For
+what is that faculty by which we remember? what is its force? what its
+nature? I am not inquiring how great a memory Simonides<a id="FNA-13"></a><a href="#FN-13"><sup>13</sup></a> may be said
+to have had, or Theodectes,<a id="FNA-14"></a><a href="#FN-14"><sup>14</sup></a> or that Cineas<a id="FNA-15"></a><a href="#FN-15"><sup>15</sup></a> who was sent to Rome
+as ambassador from Pyrrhus; or, in more modern times, Charmadas;<a id="FNA-16"></a><a href="#FN-16"><sup>16</sup></a> or,
+very lately, Metrodorus<a id="FNA-17"></a><a href="#FN-17"><sup>17</sup></a> <a id="page-35"></a><span class="pgnum">35</span>the Scepsian, or our own contemporary
+Hortensius<a id="FNA-18"></a><a href="#FN-18"><sup>18</sup></a>: I am speaking of ordinary memory, and especially of
+those men who are employed in any important study or art, the great
+capacity of whose minds it is hard to estimate, such numbers of things
+do they remember.</p>
+
+<p>XXV. Should you ask what this leads to, I think we may understand what
+that power is, and whence we have it. It certainly proceeds neither from
+the heart, nor from the blood, nor from the brain, nor from atoms;
+whether it be air or fire, I know not, nor am I, as those men are,
+ashamed, in cases where I am ignorant, to own that I am so. If in any
+other obscure matter I were able to assert anything positively, then I
+would swear that the soul, be it air or fire, is divine. Just think, I
+beseech you: can you imagine this wonderful power of memory to be sown
+in or to be a part of the composition of the earth, or of this dark and
+gloomy atmosphere? Though you cannot apprehend what it is, yet you see
+what kind of thing it is, or if you do not quite see that, yet you
+certainly see how great it is. What, then? Shall we imagine that there
+is a kind of measure in the soul, into which, as into a vessel, all that
+we remember is poured? That indeed is absurd; for how shall we form any
+idea of the bottom, or of the shape or fashion of such a soul as that?
+And, again, how are we to conceive how much it is able to contain? Shall
+we imagine the soul to receive impressions like wax, and memory to be
+marks of the impressions made on the soul? What are the characters of
+the words, what of the facts themselves? and what, again, is that
+prodigious greatness which can give rise to impressions of so many
+things? What, lastly, is that power which investigates secret things,
+and is called invention and contrivance? Does that man seem to be
+compounded of this earthly, mortal, and perishing nature who first
+invented names for everything; <a id="page-36"></a><span class="pgnum">36</span>which, if you will believe Pythagoras,
+is the highest pitch of wisdom? or he who collected the dispersed
+inhabitants of the world, and united them in the bonds of social life?
+or he who confined the sounds of the voice, which used to seem infinite,
+to the marks of a few letters? or he who first observed the courses of
+the planets, their progressive motions, their laws? These were all great
+men. But they were greater still who invented food, and raiment, and
+houses; who introduced civilization among us, and armed us against the
+wild beasts; by whom we were made sociable and polished, and so
+proceeded from the necessaries of life to its embellishments. For we
+have provided great entertainments for the ears by inventing and
+modulating the variety and nature of sounds; we have learned to survey
+the stars, not only those that are fixed, but also those which are
+improperly called wandering; and the man who has acquainted himself with
+all their revolutions and motions is fairly considered to have a soul
+resembling the soul of that Being who has created those stars in the
+heavens: for when Archimedes described in a sphere the motions of the
+moon, sun, and five planets, he did the very same thing as Plato’s God,
+in his TimÊus, who made the world, causing one revolution to adjust
+motions differing as much as possible in their slowness and velocity.
+Now, allowing that what we see in the world could not be effected
+without a God, Archimedes could not have imitated the same motions in
+his sphere without a divine soul.</p>
+
+<p>XXVI. To me, indeed, it appears that even those studies which are more
+common and in greater esteem are not without some divine energy: so that
+I do not consider that a poet can produce a serious and sublime poem
+without some divine impulse working on his mind; nor do I think that
+eloquence, abounding with sonorous words and fruitful sentences, can
+flow thus without something beyond mere human power. But as to
+philosophy, that is the parent of all the arts: what can we call that
+but, as Plato says, a gift, or, as I express it, an invention, of the
+Gods? This it was which first taught us the worship of the Gods; and
+then led us on to justice, which arises from the human race being formed
+into society; and after that <a id="page-37"></a><span class="pgnum">37</span>it imbued us with modesty and elevation of
+soul. This it was which dispersed darkness from our souls, as it is
+dispelled from our eyes, enabling us to see all things that are above or
+below, the beginning, end, and middle of everything. I am convinced
+entirely that that which could effect so many and such great things must
+be a divine power. For what is memory of words and circumstances? What,
+too, is invention? Surely they are things than which nothing greater can
+be conceived in a God! For I do not imagine the Gods to be delighted
+with nectar and ambrosia, or with Juventas presenting them with a cup;
+nor do I put any faith in Homer, who says that Ganymede was carried away
+by the Gods on account of his beauty, in order to give Jupiter his wine.
+Too weak reasons for doing Laomedon such injury! These were mere
+inventions of Homer, who gave his Gods the imperfections of men. I would
+rather that he had given men the perfections of the Gods! those
+perfections, I mean, of uninterrupted health, wisdom, invention, memory.
+Therefore the soul (which is, as I say, divine) is, as Euripides more
+boldly expresses it, a God. And thus, if the divinity be air or fire,
+the soul of man is the same; for as that celestial nature has nothing
+earthly or humid about it, in like manner the soul of man is also free
+from both these qualities: but if it is of that fifth kind of nature,
+first introduced by Aristotle, then both Gods and souls are of the same.</p>
+
+<p>XXVII. As this is my opinion, I have explained it in these very words,
+in my book on Consolation.<a id="FNA-19"></a><a href="#FN-19"><sup>19</sup></a> The origin of the soul of man is not to
+be found upon earth, for there is nothing in the soul of a mixed or
+concrete nature, or that has any appearance of being formed or made out
+of the earth; nothing even humid, or airy, or fiery. For what is there
+in natures of that kind which has the power of memory, understanding, or
+thought? which can recollect the past, foresee the future, and
+comprehend the present? for these capabilities are confined to divine
+beings; nor can we discover any source from which men could derive them,
+but from God. There is therefore a peculiar <a id="page-38"></a><span class="pgnum">38</span>nature and power in the
+soul, distinct from those natures which are more known and familiar to
+us. Whatever, then, that is which thinks, and which has understanding,
+and volition, and a principle of life, is heavenly and divine, and on
+that account must necessarily be eternal; nor can God himself, who is
+known to us, be conceived to be anything else except a soul free and
+unembarrassed, distinct from all mortal concretion, acquainted with
+everything, and giving motion to everything, and itself endued with
+perpetual motion.</p>
+
+<p>XXVIII. Of this kind and nature is the intellect of man. Where, then, is
+this intellect seated, and of what character is it? where is your own,
+and what is its character? Are you able to tell? If I have not faculties
+for knowing all that I could desire to know, will you not even allow me
+to make use of those which I have? The soul has not sufficient capacity
+to comprehend itself; yet, the soul, like the eye, though it has no
+distinct view of itself, sees other things: it does not see (which is of
+least consequence) its own shape; perhaps not, though it possibly may;
+but we will pass that by: but it certainly sees that it has vigor,
+sagacity, memory, motion, and velocity; these are all great, divine,
+eternal properties. What its appearance is, or where it dwells, it is
+not necessary even to inquire. As when we behold, first of all, the
+beauty and brilliant appearance of the heavens; secondly, the vast
+velocity of its revolutions, beyond power of our imagination to
+conceive; then the vicissitudes of nights and days, the fourfold
+division of the seasons, so well adapted to the ripening of the fruits
+of the earth, and the temperature of our bodies: and after that we look
+up to the sun, the moderator and governor of all these things; and view
+the moon, by the increase and decrease of its light, marking, as it
+were, and appointing our holy days; and see the five planets, borne on
+in the same circle, divided into twelve parts, preserving the same
+course with the greatest regularity, but with utterly dissimilar motions
+among themselves; and the nightly appearance of the heaven, adorned on
+all sides with stars; then, the globe of the earth, raised above the
+sea, and placed in the centre of the universe, inhabited and cultivated
+in its two opposite extremities, one of which, the <a id="page-39"></a><span class="pgnum">39</span>place of our
+habitation, is situated towards the north pole, under the seven stars:</p>
+
+<div class="poem">
+<p>Where the cold northern blasts, with horrid sound,</p>
+<p>Harden to ice the snowy cover’d ground;</p>
+</div>
+
+<p class="cont">the other, towards the south pole, is unknown to us, but is called by
+the Greeks <span class="greek">ጀΜτ᜷χΞοΜα</span>: the other parts are uncultivated, because they are
+either frozen with cold, or burned up with heat; but where we dwell, it
+never fails, in its season,</p>
+
+<div class="poem">
+<p>To yield a placid sky, to bid the trees</p>
+<p>Assume the lively verdure of their leaves:</p>
+<p>The vine to bud, and, joyful, in its shoots,</p>
+<p>Foretell the approaching vintage of its fruits:</p>
+<p>The ripen’d corn to sing, while all around</p>
+<p>Full riv’lets glide; and flowers deck the ground:</p>
+</div>
+
+<p class="cont">then the multitude of cattle, fit part for food, part for tilling the
+ground, others for carrying us, or for clothing us; and man himself,
+made, as it were, on purpose to contemplate the heavens and the Gods,
+and to pay adoration to them: lastly, the whole earth, and wide
+extending seas, given to man’s use. When we view these and numberless
+other things, can we doubt that they have some being who presides over
+them, or has made them (if, indeed, they have been made, as is the
+opinion of Plato, or if, as Aristotle thinks, they are eternal), or who
+at all events is the regulator of so immense a fabric and so great a
+blessing to men? Thus, though you see not the soul of man, as you see
+not the Deity, yet, as by the contemplation of his works you are led to
+acknowledge a God, so you must own the divine power of the soul, from
+its remembering things, from its invention, from the quickness of its
+motion, and from all the beauty of virtue. Where, then, is it seated,
+you will say?</p>
+
+<p>XXIX. In my opinion, it is seated in the head, and I can bring you
+reasons for my adopting that opinion. At present, let the soul reside
+where it will, you certainly have one in you. Should you ask what its
+nature is? It has one peculiarly its own; but admitting it to consist of
+fire, or air, it does not affect the present question. Only observe
+this, that as you are convinced there is a God, though <a id="page-40"></a><span class="pgnum">40</span>you are ignorant
+where he resides, and what shape he is of; in like manner you ought to
+feel assured that you have a soul, though you cannot satisfy yourself of
+the place of its residence, nor its form. In our knowledge of the soul,
+unless we are grossly ignorant of natural philosophy, we cannot but be
+satisfied that it has nothing but what is simple, unmixed, uncompounded,
+and single; and if this is admitted, then it cannot be separated, nor
+divided, nor dispersed, nor parted, and therefore it cannot perish; for
+to perish implies a parting-asunder, a division, a disunion, of those
+parts which, while it subsisted, were held together by some band. And it
+was because he was influenced by these and similar reasons that Socrates
+neither looked out for anybody to plead for him when he was accused, nor
+begged any favor from his judges, but maintained a manly freedom, which
+was the effect not of pride, but of the true greatness of his soul; and
+on the last day of his life he held a long discourse on this subject;
+and a few days before, when he might have been easily freed from his
+confinement, he refused to be so; and when he had almost actually hold
+of that deadly cup, he spoke with the air of a man not forced to die,
+but ascending into heaven.</p>
+
+<p>XXX. For so indeed he thought himself, and thus he spoke: “That there
+were two ways, and that the souls of men, at their departure from the
+body, took different roads; for those which were polluted with vices
+that are common to men, and which had given themselves up entirely to
+unclean desires, and had become so blinded by them as to have habituated
+themselves to all manner of debauchery and profligacy, or to have laid
+detestable schemes for the ruin of their country, took a road wide of
+that which led to the assembly of the Gods; but they who had preserved
+themselves upright and chaste, and free from the slightest contagion of
+the body, and had always kept themselves as far as possible at a
+distance from it, and while on earth had proposed to themselves as a
+model the life of the Gods, found the return to those beings from whom
+they had come an easy one.” Therefore, he argues, that all good and wise
+men should take example from the swans, who are considered sacred to
+Apollo, not without reason, but particularly because they seem to have
+received <a id="page-41"></a><span class="pgnum">41</span>the gift of divination from him, by which, foreseeing how
+happy it is to die, they leave this world with singing and joy. Nor can
+any one doubt of this, unless it happens to us who think with care and
+anxiety about the soul (as is often the case with those who look
+earnestly at the setting sun), to lose the sight of it entirely; and so
+the mind’s eye, viewing itself, sometimes grows dull, and for that
+reason we become remiss in our contemplation. Thus our reasoning is
+borne about, harassed with doubts and anxieties, not knowing how to
+proceed, but measuring back again those dangerous tracts which it has
+passed, like a boat tossed about on the boundless ocean. But these
+reflections are of long standing, and borrowed from the Greeks. But Cato
+left this world in such a manner as if he were delighted that he had
+found an opportunity of dying; for that God who presides in us forbids
+our departure hence without his leave. But when God himself has given us
+a just cause, as formerly he did to Socrates, and lately to Cato, and
+often to many others—in such a case, certainly every man of sense would
+gladly exchange this darkness for that light: not that he would forcibly
+break from the chains that held him, for that would be against the law;
+but, like a man released from prison by a magistrate or some lawful
+authority, so he too would walk away, being released and discharged by
+God. For the whole life of a philosopher is, as the same philosopher
+says, a meditation on death.</p>
+
+<p>XXXI. For what else is it that we do, when we call off our minds from
+pleasure, that is to say, from our attention to the body, from the
+managing our domestic estate, which is a sort of handmaid and servant of
+the body, or from duties of a public nature, or from all other serious
+business whatever? What else is it, I say, that we do, but invite the
+soul to reflect on itself? oblige it to converse with itself, and, as
+far as possible, break off its acquaintance with the body? Now, to
+separate the soul from the body, is to learn to die, and nothing else
+whatever. Wherefore take my advice; and let us meditate on this, and
+separate ourselves as far as possible from the body, that is to say, let
+us accustom ourselves to die. This will be enjoying a life like that of
+heaven even while we remain on earth; and <a id="page-42"></a><span class="pgnum">42</span>when we are carried thither
+and released from these bonds, our souls will make their progress with
+more rapidity; for the spirit which has always been fettered by the
+bonds of the body, even when it is disengaged, advances more slowly,
+just as those do who have worn actual fetters for many years: but when
+we have arrived at this emancipation from the bonds of the body, then
+indeed we shall begin to live, for this present life is really death,
+which I could say a good deal in lamentation for if I chose.</p>
+
+<p><i>A.</i> You have lamented it sufficiently in your book on Consolation; and
+when I read that, there is nothing which I desire more than to leave
+these things; but that desire is increased a great deal by what I have
+just heard.</p>
+
+<p><i>M.</i> The time will come, and that soon, and with equal certainty,
+whether you hang back or press forward; for time flies. But death is so
+far from being an evil, as it lately appeared to you, that I am inclined
+to suspect, not that there is no other thing which is an evil to man,
+but rather that there is nothing else which is a real good to him; if,
+at least, it is true that we become thereby either Gods ourselves, or
+companions of the Gods. However, this is not of so much consequence, as
+there are some of us here who will not allow this. But I will not leave
+off discussing this point till I have convinced you that death can, upon
+no consideration whatever, be an evil.</p>
+
+<p><i>A.</i> How can it, after what I now know?</p>
+
+<p><i>M.</i> Do you ask how it can? There are crowds of arguers who contradict
+this; and those not only Epicureans, whom I regard very little, but,
+somehow or other, almost every man of letters; and, above all, my
+favorite DicÊarchus is very strenuous in opposing the immortality of the
+soul: for he has written three books, which are entitled Lesbiacs,
+because the discourse was held at Mitylene, in which he seeks to prove
+that souls are mortal. The Stoics, on the other hand, allow us as long a
+time for enjoyment as the life of a raven; they allow the soul to exist
+a great while, but are against its eternity.</p>
+
+<p>XXXII. Are you willing to hear then why, even allowing this, death
+cannot be an evil.</p>
+
+<p><i>A.</i> As you please; but no one shall drive me from my belief in
+mortality.</p>
+
+<p><a id="page-43"></a><span class="pgnum">43</span><i>M.</i> I commend you, indeed, for that; though we should not be too
+confident in our belief of anything; for we are frequently disturbed by
+some subtle conclusion. We give way and change our opinions even in
+things that are more evident than this; for in this there certainly is
+some obscurity. Therefore, should anything of this kind happen, it is
+well to be on our guard.</p>
+
+<p><i>A.</i> You are right in that; but I will provide against any accident.</p>
+
+<p><i>M.</i> Have you any objection to our dismissing our friends the
+Stoics—those, I mean, who allow that the souls exist after they have
+left the body, but yet deny that they exist forever?</p>
+
+<p><i>A.</i> We certainly may dismiss the consideration of those men who admit
+that which is the most difficult point in the whole question, namely,
+that a soul can exist independently of the body, and yet refuse to grant
+that which is not only very easy to believe, but which is even the
+natural consequence of the concession which they have made—that if they
+can exist for a length of time; they most likely do so forever.</p>
+
+<p><i>M.</i> You take it right; that is the very thing. Shall we give,
+therefore, any credit to PauÊstius, when he dissents from his master,
+Plato? whom he everywhere calls divine, the wisest, the holiest of men,
+the Homer of philosophers, and whom he opposes in nothing except this
+single opinion of the soul’s immortality: for he maintains what nobody
+denies, that everything which has been generated will perish, and that
+even souls are generated, which he thinks appears from their resemblance
+to those of the men who begot them; for that likeness is as apparent in
+the turn of their minds as in their bodies. But he brings another
+reason—that there is nothing which is sensible of pain which is not
+also liable to disease; but whatever is liable to disease must be liable
+to death. The soul is sensible of pain, therefore it is liable to
+perish.</p>
+
+<p>XXXIII. These arguments may be refuted; for they proceed from his not
+knowing that, while discussing the subject of the immortality of the
+soul, he is speaking of the intellect, which is free from all turbid
+motion; but not of those parts of the mind in which those disorders,
+<a id="page-44"></a><span class="pgnum">44</span>anger and lust, have their seat, and which he whom he is opposing, when
+he argues thus, imagines to be distinct and separate from the mind. Now
+this resemblance is more remarkable in beasts, whose souls are void of
+reason. But the likeness in men consists more in the configuration of
+the bodies: and it is of no little consequence in what bodies the soul
+is lodged; for there are many things which depend on the body that give
+an edge to the soul, many which blunt it. Aristotle, indeed, says that
+all men of great genius are melancholy; so that I should not have been
+displeased to have been somewhat duller than I am. He instances many,
+and, as if it were matter of fact, brings his reasons for it. But if the
+power of those things that proceed from the body be so great as to
+influence the mind (for they are the things, whatever they are, that
+occasion this likeness), still that does not necessarily prove why a
+similitude of souls should be generated. I say nothing about cases of
+unlikeness. I wish PanÊtius could be here: he lived with Africanus. I
+would inquire of him which of his family the nephew of Africanus’s
+brother was like? Possibly he may in person have resembled his father;
+but in his manners he was so like every profligate, abandoned man, that
+it was impossible to be more so. Whom did the grandson of P. Crassus,
+that wise and eloquent and most distinguished man, resemble? Or the
+relations and sons of many other excellent men, whose names there is no
+occasion to mention? But what are we doing? Have we forgotten that our
+purpose was, when we had sufficiently spoken on the subject of the
+immortality of the soul, to prove that, even if the soul did perish,
+there would be, even then, no evil in death?</p>
+
+<p><i>A.</i> I remembered it very well; but I had no dislike to your digressing
+a little from your original design, while you were talking of the soul’s
+immortality.</p>
+
+<p><i>M.</i> I perceive you have sublime thoughts, and are eager to mount up to
+heaven.</p>
+
+<p>XXXIV. I am not without hopes myself that such may be our fate. But
+admit what they assert—that the soul does not continue to exist after
+death.</p>
+
+<p><i>A.</i> Should it be so, I see that we are then deprived of the hopes of a
+happier life.</p>
+
+<p><a id="page-45"></a><span class="pgnum">45</span><i>M.</i> But what is there of evil in that opinion? For let the soul perish
+as the body: is there any pain, or indeed any feeling at all, in the
+body after death? No one, indeed asserts that; though Epicurus charges
+Democritus with saying so; but the disciples of Democritus deny it. No
+sense, therefore, remains in the soul; for the soul is nowhere. Where,
+then, is the evil? for there is nothing but these two things. Is it
+because the mere separation of the soul and body cannot be effected
+without pain? But even should that be granted, how small a pain must
+that be! Yet I think that it is false, and that it is very often
+unaccompanied by any sensation at all, and sometimes even attended with
+pleasure; but certainly the whole must be very trifling, whatever it is,
+for it is instantaneous. What makes us uneasy, or rather gives us pain,
+is the leaving all the good things of life. But just consider if I might
+not more properly say, leaving the evils of life; only there is no
+reason for my now occupying myself in bewailing the life of man, and yet
+I might, with very good reason. But what occasion is there, when what I
+am laboring to prove is that no one is miserable after death, to make
+life more miserable by lamenting over it? I have done that in the book
+which I wrote, in order to comfort myself as well as I could. If, then,
+our inquiry is after truth, death withdraws us from evil, not from good.
+This subject is indeed so copiously handled by Hegesias, the Cyrenaic
+philosopher, that he is said to have been forbidden by Ptolemy from
+delivering his lectures in the schools, because some who heard him made
+away with themselves. There is, too, an epigram of Callimachus<a id="FNA-20"></a><a href="#FN-20"><sup>20</sup></a> on
+Cleombrotus of Ambracia, who, without any misfortune having befallen
+him, as he says, threw himself from a wall into the sea, after he had
+read a book of Plato’s. The book I mentioned of that Hegesias is called
+<span class="greek">ገποκαρτερτερῶΜ</span>, or “A Man who
+<a id="page-46"></a><span class="pgnum">46</span>starves himself,” in which a man is represented as killing
+himself by starvation, till he is prevented by his friends,
+in reply to whom he reckons up all the miseries of human
+life. I might do the same, though not so fully as he, who
+thinks it not worth any man’s while to live. I pass over
+others. Was it even worth my while to live, for, had I
+died before I was deprived of the comforts of my own
+family, and of the honors which I received for my public
+services, would not death have taken me from the evils of
+life rather than from its blessings?</p>
+
+<p>XXXV. Mention, therefore, some one, who never knew
+distress; who never received any blow from fortune.
+The great Metellus had four distinguished sons; but
+Priam had fifty, seventeen of whom were born to him by
+his lawful wife. Fortune had the same power over both,
+though she exercised it but on one; for Metellus was laid
+on his funeral pile by a great company of sons and daughters,
+grandsons, and granddaughters; but Priam fell by
+the hand of an enemy, after having fled to the altar, and
+having seen himself deprived of all his numerous progeny.
+Had he died before the death of his sons and the ruin of
+his kingdom,</p>
+
+<div class="poem">
+<p>With all his mighty wealth elate,</p>
+<p>Under rich canopies of state;</p>
+</div>
+
+<p class="cont">would he then have been taken from good or from evil?
+It would indeed, at that time, have appeared that he was
+being taken away from good; yet surely it would have
+turned out advantageous for him; nor should we have
+had these mournful verses,</p>
+
+<div class="poem">
+<p>Lo! these all perish’d in one flaming pile;</p>
+<p>The foe old Priam did of life beguile,</p>
+<p>And with his blood, thy altar, Jove, defile.</p>
+</div>
+
+<p class="cont">As if anything better could have happened to him at that
+time than to lose his life in that manner; but yet, if it had
+befallen him sooner, it would have prevented all those consequences;
+but even as it was, it released him from any
+further sense of them. The case of our friend Pompey<a id="FNA-21"></a><a href="#FN-21"><sup>21</sup></a>
+<a id="page-47"></a><span class="pgnum">47</span>was something better: once, when he had been very ill
+at Naples, the Neapolitans, on his recovery, put crowns
+on their heads, as did those of Puteoli; the people flocked
+from the country to congratulate him—it is a Grecian
+custom, and a foolish one; still it is a sign of good fortune.
+But the question is, had he died, would he have
+been taken from good, or from evil? Certainly from
+evil. He would not have been engaged in a war with his
+father-in-law;<a id="FNA-22"></a><a href="#FN-22"><sup>22</sup></a> he would not have taken up arms before
+he was prepared; he would not have left his own house,
+nor fled from Italy; he would not, after the loss of his
+army, have fallen unarmed into the hands of slaves, and
+been put to death by them; his children would not have
+been destroyed; nor would his whole fortune have come
+into the possession of the conquerors. Did not he, then,
+who, if he had died at that time, would have died in all
+his glory, owe all the great and terrible misfortunes into
+which he subsequently fell to the prolongation of his life
+at that time?</p>
+
+<p>XXXVI. These calamities are avoided by death, for
+even though they should never happen, there is a possibility
+that they may; but it never occurs to a man that such
+a disaster may befall him himself. Every one hopes to
+be as happy as Metellus: as if the number of the happy
+exceeded that of the miserable; or as if there were any
+certainty in human affairs; or, again, as if there were
+more rational foundation for hope than fear. But should
+we grant them even this, that men are by death deprived
+of good things; would it follow that the dead are therefore
+in need of the good things of life, and are miserable
+on that account? Certainly they must necessarily say so.
+Can he who does not exist be in need of anything? To
+be in need of has a melancholy sound, because it in effect
+amounts to this—he had, but he has not; he regrets, he
+looks back upon, he wants. Such are, I suppose, the distresses
+<a id="page-48"></a><span class="pgnum">48</span>of one who is in need of. Is he deprived
+of eyes? to be blind is misery. Is he destitute of children? not to have
+them is misery. These considerations apply to the living, but the dead
+are neither in need of the blessings of life, nor of life itself. But
+when I am speaking of the dead, I am speaking of those who have no
+existence. But would any one say of us, who do exist, that we want horns
+or wings? Certainly not. Should it be asked, why not? the answer would
+be, that not to have what neither custom nor nature has fitted you for
+would not imply a want of them, even though you were sensible that you
+had them not. This argument should be pressed over and over again, after
+that point has once been established, which, if souls are mortal, there
+can be no dispute about—I mean, that the destruction of them by death
+is so entire as to remove even the least suspicion of any sense
+remaining. When, therefore, this point is once well grounded and
+established, we must correctly define what the term to want means; that
+there may be no mistake in the word. To want, then, signifies this: to
+be without that which you would be glad to have; for inclination for a
+thing is implied in the word want, excepting when we use the word in an
+entirely different sense, as we do when we say that a fever is wanting
+to any one. For it admits of a different interpretation, when you are
+without a certain thing, and are sensible that you are without it, but
+yet can easily dispense with having it. “To want,” then, is an
+expression which you cannot apply to the dead; nor is the mere fact of
+wanting something necessarily lamentable. The proper expression ought to
+be, “that they want a good,” and that is an evil.</p>
+
+<p>But a living man does not want a good, unless he is distressed without
+it; and yet, we can easily understand how any man alive can be without a
+kingdom. But this cannot be predicated of you with any accuracy: it
+might have been asserted of Tarquin, when he was driven from his
+kingdom. But when such an expression is used respecting the dead, it is
+absolutely unintelligible. For to want implies to be sensible; but the
+dead are insensible: therefore, the dead can be in no want.</p>
+
+<p>XXXVII. But what occasion is there to philosophize <a id="page-49"></a><span class="pgnum">49</span>here in a matter
+with which we see that philosophy is but little concerned? How often
+have not only our generals but whole armies, rushed on certain death!
+But if it had been a thing to be feared, L. Brutus would never have
+fallen in fight, to prevent the return of that tyrant whom he had
+expelled; nor would Decius the father have been slain in fighting with
+the Latins; nor would his son, when engaged with the Etruscans, nor his
+grandson with Pyrrhus have exposed themselves to the enemy’s darts.
+Spain would never have seen, in one campaign, the Scipios fall fighting
+for their country; nor would the plains of CannÊ have witnessed the
+death of Paulus and Geminus, or Venusia that of Marcellus; nor would the
+Latins have beheld the death of Albinus, nor the Leucanians that of
+Gracchus. But are any of these miserable now? Nay, they were not so even
+at the first moment after they had breathed their last; nor can any one
+be miserable after he has lost all sensation. Oh, but the mere
+circumstance of being without sensation is miserable. It might be so if
+being without sensation were the same thing as wanting it; but as it is
+evident there can be nothing of any kind in that which has no existence,
+what can there be afflicting to that which can neither feel want nor be
+sensible of anything? We might be said to have repeated this over too
+often, only that here lies all that the soul shudders at from the fear
+of death. For whoever can clearly apprehend that which is as manifest as
+the light—that when both soul and body are consumed, and there is a
+total destruction, then that which was an animal becomes nothing—will
+clearly see that there is no difference between a Hippocentaur, which
+never had existence, and King Agamemnon, and that M. Camillus is no more
+concerned about this present civil war than I was at the sacking of
+Rome, when he was living.</p>
+
+<p>XXXVIII. Why, then, should Camillus be affected with the thoughts of
+these things happening three hundred and fifty years after his time? And
+why should I be uneasy it I were to expect that some nation might
+possess itself of this city ten thousand years hence? Because so great
+is our regard for our country, as not to be measured by our own feeling,
+but by its own actual safety.</p>
+
+<p><a id="page-50"></a><span class="pgnum">50</span>Death, then, which threatens us daily from a thousand accidents, and
+which, by reason of the shortness of life, can never be far off, does
+not deter a wise man from making such provision for his country and his
+family as he hopes may last forever; and from regarding posterity, of
+which he can never have any real perception, as belonging to himself.
+Wherefore a man may act for eternity, even though he be persuaded that
+his soul is mortal; not, indeed, from a desire of glory, which he will
+be insensible of, but from a principle of virtue, which glory will
+inevitably attend, though that is not his object. The process, indeed,
+of nature is this: that just in the same manner as our birth was the
+beginning of things with us, so death will be the end; and as we were
+noways concerned with anything before we were born, so neither shall we
+be after we are dead. And in this state of things where can the evil be,
+since death has no connection with either the living or the dead? The
+one have no existence at all, the other are not yet affected by it. They
+who make the least of death consider it as having a great resemblance to
+sleep; as if any one would choose to live ninety years on condition
+that, at the expiration of sixty, he should sleep out the remainder. The
+very swine would not accept of life on those terms, much less I.
+Endymion, indeed, if you listen to fables, slept once on a time on
+Latmus, a mountain of Caria, and for such a length of time that I
+imagine he is not as yet awake. Do you think that he is concerned at the
+Moon’s being in difficulties, though it was by her that he was thrown
+into that sleep, in order that she might kiss him while sleeping. For
+what should he be concerned for who has not even any sensation? You look
+on sleep as an image of death, and you take that on you daily; and have
+you, then, any doubt that there is no sensation in death, when you see
+there is none in sleep, which is its near resemblance?</p>
+
+<p>XXXIX. Away, then, with those follies, which are little better than the
+old women’s dreams, such as that it is miserable to die before our time.
+What time do you mean? That of nature? But she has only lent you life,
+as she might lend you money, without fixing any certain time for its
+repayment. Have you any grounds of complaint, <a id="page-51"></a><span class="pgnum">51</span>then, that she recalls it
+at her pleasure? for you received it on these terms. They that complain
+thus allow that if a young child dies, the survivors ought to bear his
+loss with equanimity; that if an infant in the cradle dies, they ought
+not even to utter a complaint; and yet nature has been more severe with
+them in demanding back what she gave. They answer by saying that such
+have not tasted the sweets of life; while the other had begun to
+conceive hopes of great happiness, and, indeed, had begun to realize
+them. Men judge better in other things, and allow a part to be
+preferable to none. Why do they not admit the same estimate in life?
+Though Callimachus does not speak amiss in saying that more tears had
+flowed from Priam than his son; yet they are thought happier who die
+after they have reached old age. It would be hard to say why; for I do
+not apprehend that any one, if a longer life were granted to him, would
+find it happier. There is nothing more agreeable to a man than prudence,
+which old age most certainly bestows on a man, though it may strip him
+of everything else. But what age is long, or what is there at all long
+to a man? Does not</p>
+
+<div class="poem">
+<p>Old age, though unregarded, still attend</p>
+<p>On childhood’s pastimes, as the cares of men?</p>
+</div>
+
+<p class="cont">But because there is nothing beyond old age, we call that long: all
+these things are said to be long or short, according to the proportion
+of time they were given us for. Artistotle saith there is a kind of
+insect near the river Hypanis, which runs from a certain part of Europe
+into the Pontus, whose life consists but of one day; those that die at
+the eighth hour die in full age; those who die when the sun sets are
+very old, especially when the days are at the longest. Compare our
+longest life with eternity, and we shall be found almost as short-lived
+as those little animals.</p>
+
+<p>XL. Let us, then, despise all these follies—for what softer name can I
+give to such levities?—and let us lay the foundation of our happiness
+in the strength and greatness of our minds, in a contempt and disregard
+of all earthly things, and in the practice of every virtue. For at
+present we are enervated by the softness of our imaginations, <a id="page-52"></a><span class="pgnum">52</span>so that,
+should we leave this world before the promises of our fortune-tellers
+are made good to us, we should think ourselves deprived of some great
+advantages, and seem disappointed and forlorn. But if, through life, we
+are in continual suspense, still expecting, still desiring, and are in
+continual pain and torture, good Gods! how pleasant must that journey be
+which ends in security and ease! How pleased am I with Theramenes! Of
+how exalted a soul does he appear! For, although we never read of him
+without tears, yet that illustrious man is not to be lamented in his
+death, who, when he had been imprisoned by the command of the thirty
+tyrants, drank off, at one draught, as if he had been thirsty, the
+poisoned cup, and threw the remainder out of it with such force that it
+sounded as it fell; and then, on hearing the sound of the drops, he
+said, with a smile, “I drink this to the most excellent Critias,” who
+had been his most bitter enemy; for it is customary among the Greeks, at
+their banquets, to name the person to whom they intend to deliver the
+cup. This celebrated man was pleasant to the last, even when he had
+received the poison into his bowels, and truly foretold the death of
+that man whom he named when he drank the poison, and that death soon
+followed. Who that thinks death an evil could approve of the evenness of
+temper in this great man at the instant of dying? Socrates came, a few
+years after, to the same prison and the same cup by as great iniquity on
+the part of his judges as the tyrants displayed when they executed
+Theramenes. What a speech is that which Plato makes him deliver before
+his judges, after they had condemned him to death!</p>
+
+<p>XLI. “I am not without hopes, O judges, that it is a favorable
+circumstance for me that I am condemned to die; for one of these two
+things must necessarily happen—either that death will deprive me
+entirely of all sense, or else that, by dying, I shall go from hence
+into some other place; wherefore, if all sense is utterly extinguished,
+and if death is like that sleep which sometimes is so undisturbed as to
+be even without the visions of dreams—in that case, O ye good Gods!
+what gain is it to die? or what length of days can be imagined which
+would be preferable to such a night? And if the constant course of
+future time <a id="page-53"></a><span class="pgnum">53</span>is to resemble that night, who is happier than I am? But if
+on the other hand, what is said be true, namely, that death is but a
+removal to those regions where the souls of the departed dwell, then
+that state must be more happy still to have escaped from those who call
+themselves judges, and to appear before such as are truly so—Minos,
+Rhadamanthus, Æacus, Triptolemus—and to meet with those who have lived
+with justice and probity!<a id="FNA-23"></a><a href="#FN-23"><sup>23</sup></a> Can this change of abode appear otherwise
+than great to you? What bounds can you set to the value of conversing
+with Orpheus, and MusÊus, and Homer, and Hesiod? I would even, were it
+possible, willingly die often, in order to prove the certainty of what I
+speak of. What delight must it be to meet with Palamedes, and Ajax, and
+others, who have been betrayed by the iniquity of their judges! Then,
+also, should I experience the wisdom of even that king of kings, who led
+his vast troops to Troy, and the prudence of Ulysses and Sisyphus: nor
+should I then be condemned for prosecuting my inquiries on such subjects
+in the same way in which I have done here on earth. And even you, my
+judges, you, I mean, who have voted for my acquittal, do not you fear
+death, for nothing bad can befall a good man, whether he be alive or
+dead; nor are his concerns ever overlooked by the Gods; nor in my case
+either has this befallen me by chance; and I have nothing to charge
+those men with who accused or condemned me but the fact that they
+believed that they were doing me harm.” In this manner he proceeded.
+There is no part of his speech which I admire more than his last words:
+“But it is time,” says he, “for me now to go hence, that I may die; and
+for you, that you may continue to live. Which condition of the two is
+the best, the immortal Gods know; but I do not believe that any mortal
+man does.”</p>
+
+<p><a id="page-54"></a><span class="pgnum">54</span>XLII. Surely I would rather have had this man’s soul than all the
+fortunes of those who sat in judgment on him; although that very thing
+which he says no one except the Gods know, namely, whether life or death
+is most preferable, he knows himself, for he had previously stated his
+opinion on it; but he maintained to the last that favorite maxim of his,
+of affirming nothing. And let us, too, adhere to this rule of not
+thinking anything an evil which is a general provision of nature; and
+let us assure ourselves, that if death is an evil, it is an eternal
+evil, for death seems to be the end of a miserable life; but if death is
+a misery, there can be no end of that. But why do I mention Socrates, or
+Theramenes, men distinguished by the glory of virtue and wisdom? when a
+certain LacedÊmomian, whose name is not so much as known, held death in
+such contempt, that, when led to it by the ephori, he bore a cheerful
+and pleasant countenance; and, when he was asked by one of his enemies
+whether he despised the laws of Lycurgus, “On the contrary,” answered
+he, “I am greatly obliged to him, for he has amerced me in a fine which
+I can pay without borrowing, or taking up money at interest.” This was a
+man worthy of Sparta. And I am almost persuaded of his innocence because
+of the greatness of his soul. Our own city has produced many such. But
+why should I name generals, and other men of high rank, when Cato could
+write that legions have marched with alacrity to that place from whence
+they never expected to return? With no less greatness of soul fell the
+LacedÊmonians at ThermopylÊ, on whom Simonides wrote the following
+epitaph:</p>
+
+<div class="poem">
+<p>Go, stranger, tell the Spartans, here we lie,</p>
+<p>Who to support their laws durst boldly die.<a id="FNA-24"></a><a href="#FN-24"><sup>24</sup></a></p>
+</div>
+
+<p class="cont">What was it that Leonidas, their general, said to them? “March on with
+courage, my LacedÊmonians. To-night, perhaps, we shall sup in the
+regions below.” This was a brave nation while the laws of Lycurgus were
+in force. One of them, when a Persian had said to him in conversation,
+<a id="page-55"></a><span class="pgnum">55</span>“We shall hide the sun from your sight by the number of our arrows and
+darts,” replied, “We shall fight, then in the shade.” Do I talk of their
+men? How great was that LacedÊmonian woman, who had sent her son to
+battle, and when she heard that he was slain, said, “I bore him for that
+purpose, that you might have a man who durst die for his country!”
+However, it is a matter of notoriety that the Spartans were bold and
+hardy, for the discipline of a republic has great influence.</p>
+
+<p>XLIII. What, then, have we not reason to admire Theodorus the Cyrenean,
+a philosopher of no small distinction, who, when Lysimachus threatened
+to crucify him, bade him keep those menaces for his courtiers? “To
+Theodorus it makes no difference whether he rot in the air or
+underground.” By which saying of the philosopher I am reminded to say
+something of the custom of funerals and sepulture, and of funeral
+ceremonies, which is, indeed, not a difficult subject, especially if we
+recollect what has been before said about insensibility. The opinion of
+Socrates respecting this matter is clearly stated in the book which
+treats of his death, of which we have already said so much; for when he
+had discussed the immortality of the soul, and when the time of his
+dying was approaching rapidly, being asked by Criton how he would be
+buried, “I have taken a great deal of pains,” saith he, “my friends, to
+no purpose, for I have not convinced our Criton that I shall fly from
+hence, and leave no part of me behind. Notwithstanding, Criton, if you
+can overtake me, wheresoever you get hold of me, bury me as you please:
+but believe me, none of you will be able to catch me when I have flown
+away from hence.” That was excellently said, inasmuch as he allows his
+friend to do as he pleased, and yet shows his indifference about
+anything of this kind. Diogenes was rougher, though of the same opinion;
+but in his character of a Cynic he expressed himself in a somewhat
+harsher manner; he ordered himself to be thrown anywhere without being
+buried. And when his friends replied, “What! to the birds and beasts?”
+“By no means,” saith he; “place my staff near me, that I may drive them
+away.” “How can you do that,” they answer, “for you will not perceive
+them?” “How am I then <a id="page-56"></a><span class="pgnum">56</span>injured by being torn by those animals, if I have
+no sensation?” Anaxagoras, when he was at the point of death at
+Lampsacus, and was asked by his friends, whether, if anything should
+happen to him, he would not choose to be carried to ClazomenÊ, his
+country, made this excellent answer, “There is,” says he, “no occasion
+for that, for all places are at an equal distance from the infernal
+regions.” There is one thing to be observed with respect to the whole
+subject of burial, that it relates to the body, whether the soul live or
+die. Now, with regard to the body, it is clear that, whether the soul
+live or die, that has no sensation.</p>
+
+<p>XLIV. But all things are full of errors. Achilles drags Hector, tied to
+his chariot; he thinks, I suppose, he tears his flesh, and that Hector
+feels the pain of it; therefore, he avenges himself on him, as he
+imagines. But Hecuba bewails this as a sore misfortune:</p>
+
+<div class="poem">
+<p>I saw (a dreadful sight) great Hector slain,</p>
+<p>Dragg’d at Achilles’ car along the plain.</p>
+</div>
+
+<p class="cont">What Hector? or how long will he be Hector? Accius is better in this,
+and Achilles, too, is sometimes reasonable:</p>
+
+<div class="poem">
+<p>I Hector’s body to his sire convey’d,</p>
+<p>Hector I sent to the infernal shade.</p>
+</div>
+
+<p class="cont">It was not Hector that you dragged along, but a body that had been
+Hector’s. Here another starts from underground, and will not suffer his
+mother to sleep:</p>
+
+<div class="poem">
+<p>To thee I call, my once-loved parent, hear,</p>
+<p>Nor longer with thy sleep relieve thy care;</p>
+<p>Thine eye which pities not is closed—arise;</p>
+<p>Ling’ring I wait the unpaid obsequies.</p>
+</div>
+
+<p class="cont">When these verses are sung with a slow and melancholy tune, so as to
+affect the whole theatre with sadness, one can scarce help thinking
+those unhappy that are unburied:</p>
+
+<div class="poem">
+<p>Ere the devouring dogs and hungry vultures...</p>
+</div>
+
+<p class="cont">He is afraid he shall not have the use of his limbs so well if they are
+torn to pieces, but is under no such apprehensions if they are burned:</p>
+
+<div class="poem"><a id="page-57"></a><span class="pgnum">57</span>
+<p>Nor leave my naked bones, my poor remains,</p>
+<p>To shameful violence and bloody stains.</p>
+</div>
+
+<p class="cont">I do not understand what he could fear who could pour forth such
+excellent verses to the sound of the flute. We must, therefore, adhere
+to this, that nothing is to be regarded after we are dead, though many
+people revenge themselves on their dead enemies. Thyestes pours forth
+several curses in some good lines of Ennius, praying, first of all, that
+Atreus may perish by a shipwreck, which is certainly a very terrible
+thing, for such a death is not free from very grievous sensations. Then
+follow these unmeaning expressions:</p>
+
+<div class="poem">
+<p class="L6" style="margin-left: 25ex">May</p>
+<p>On the sharp rock his mangled carcass lie,</p>
+<p>His entrails torn, to hungry birds a prey!</p>
+<p>May he convulsive writhe his bleeding side,</p>
+<p>And with his clotted gore the stones be dyed!</p>
+</div>
+
+<p class="cont">The rocks themselves were not more destitute of feeling than he who was
+hanging to them by his side; though Thyestes imagines he is wishing him
+the greatest torture. It would be torture, indeed, if he were sensible;
+but as he is not, it can be none; then how very unmeaning is this:</p>
+
+<div class="poem">
+<p>Let him, still hovering o’er the Stygian wave,</p>
+<p>Ne’er reach the body’s peaceful port, the grave!</p>
+</div>
+
+<p class="cont">You see under what mistaken notions all this is said. He imagines the
+body has its haven, and that the dead are at rest in their graves.
+Pelops was greatly to blame in not having informed and taught his son
+what regard was due to everything.</p>
+
+<p>XLV. But what occasion is there to animadvert on the opinions of
+individuals, when we may observe whole nations to fall into all sorts of
+errors? The Egyptians embalm their dead, and keep them in their houses;
+the Persians dress them over with wax, and then bury them, that they may
+preserve their bodies as long as possible. It is customary with the Magi
+to bury none of their order, unless they have been first torn by wild
+beasts. In Hyrcania, the people maintain dogs for the public use; the
+nobles have their own—and we know that they have a good breed of dogs;
+but every one, according to his ability, <a id="page-58"></a><span class="pgnum">58</span>provides himself with some, in
+order to be torn by them; and they hold that to be the best kind of
+interment. Chrysippus, who is curious in all kinds of historical facts,
+has collected many other things of this kind; but some of them are so
+offensive as not to admit of being related. All that has been said of
+burying is not worth our regard with respect to ourselves, though it is
+not to be neglected as to our friends, provided we are thoroughly aware
+that the dead are insensible. But the living, indeed, should consider
+what is due to custom and opinion; only they should at the same time
+consider that the dead are noways interested in it. But death truly is
+then met with the greatest tranquillity when the dying man can comfort
+himself with his own praise. No one dies too soon who has finished the
+course of perfect virtue. I myself have known many occasions when I have
+seemed in danger of immediate death; oh! how I wish it had come to me!
+for I have gained nothing by the delay. I had gone over and over again
+the duties of life; nothing remained but to contend with fortune. If
+reason, then, cannot sufficiently fortify us to enable us to feel a
+contempt for death, at all events let our past life prove that we have
+lived long enough, and even longer than was necessary; for
+notwithstanding the deprivation of sense, the dead are not without that
+good which peculiarly belongs to them, namely, the praise and glory
+which they have acquired, even though they are not sensible of it. For
+although there be nothing in glory to make it desirable, yet it follows
+virtue as its shadow; and the genuine judgment of the multitude on good
+men, if ever they form any, is more to their own praise than of any real
+advantage to the dead. Yet I cannot say, however it may be received,
+that Lycurgus and Solon have no glory from their laws, and from the
+political constitution which they established in their country; or that
+Themistocles and Epaminondas have not glory from their martial virtue.</p>
+
+<p>XLVI. For Neptune shall sooner bury Salamis itself with his waters than
+the memory of the trophies gained there; and the Bœotian Leuctra shall
+perish sooner than the glory of that great battle. And longer still
+shall fame be before it deserts Curius, and Fabricius, and Calatinus,
+<a id="page-59"></a><span class="pgnum">59</span>and the two Scipios, and the two Africani, and Maximus, and Marcellus,
+and Paulus, and Cato, and LÊlius, and numberless other heroes; and
+whoever has caught any resemblance of them, not estimating it by common
+fame, but by the real applause of good men, may with confidence, when
+the occasion requires, approach death, on which we are sure that even if
+the chief good is not continued, at least no evil is. Such a man would
+even wish to die while in prosperity; for all the favors that could be
+heaped on him would not be so agreeable to him as the loss of them would
+be painful. That speech of the LacedÊmonian seems to have the same
+meaning, who, when Diagoras the Rhodian, who had himself been a
+conqueror at the Olympic games, saw two of his own sons conquerors there
+on the same day, approached the old man, and, congratulating him, said,
+“You should die now, Diagoras, for no greater happiness can possibly
+await you.” The Greeks look on these as great things; perhaps they think
+too highly of them, or, rather, they did so then. And so he who said
+this to Diagoras, looking on it as something very glorious, that three
+men out of one family should have been conquerors there, thought it
+could answer no purpose to him to continue any longer in life, where he
+could only be exposed to a reverse of fortune.</p>
+
+<p>I might have given you a sufficient answer, as it seems to me, on this
+point, in a few words, as you had allowed the dead were not exposed to
+any positive evil; but I have spoken at greater length on the subject
+for this reason, because this is our greatest consolation in the losing
+and bewailing of our friends. For we ought to bear with moderation any
+grief which arises from ourselves, or is endured on our own account,
+lest we should seem to be too much influenced by self-love. But should
+we suspect our departed friends to be under those evils, which they are
+generally imagined to be, and to be sensible of them, then such a
+suspicion would give us intolerable pain; and accordingly I wished, for
+my own sake, to pluck up this opinion by the roots, and on that account
+I have been perhaps somewhat more prolix than was necessary.</p>
+
+<p>XLVII. <i>A.</i> More prolix than was necessary? Certainty not, in my
+opinion. For I was induced, by the former <a id="page-60"></a><span class="pgnum">60</span>part of your speech, to wish
+to die; but, by the latter, sometimes not to be unwilling, and at others
+to be wholly indifferent about it. But the effect of your whole argument
+is, that I am convinced that death ought not to be classed among the
+evils.</p>
+
+<p><i>M.</i> Do you, then, expect that I am to give you a regular peroration,
+like the rhetoricians, or shall I forego that art?</p>
+
+<p><i>A.</i> I would not have you give over an art which you have set off to
+such advantage; and you were in the right to do so, for, to speak the
+truth, it also has set you off. But what is that peroration? For I
+should be glad to hear it, whatever it is.</p>
+
+<p><i>M.</i> It is customary, in the schools, to produce the opinions of the
+immortal Gods on death; nor are these opinions the fruits of the
+imagination alone of the lecturers, but they have the authority of
+Herodotus and many others. Cleobis and Biton are the first they mention,
+sons of the Argive priestess; the story is a well-known one. As it was
+necessary that she should be drawn in a chariot to a certain annual
+sacrifice, which was solemnized at a temple some considerable distance
+from the town, and the cattle that were to draw the chariot had not
+arrived, those two young men whom I have just mentioned, pulling off
+their garments, and anointing their bodies with oil, harnessed
+themselves to the yoke. And in this manner the priestess was conveyed to
+the temple; and when the chariot had arrived at the proper place, she is
+said to have entreated the Goddess to bestow on them, as a reward for
+their piety, the greatest gift that a God could confer on man. And the
+young men, after having feasted with their mother, fell asleep; and in
+the morning they were found dead. Trophonius and Agamedes are said to
+have put up the same petition, for they, having built a temple to Apollo
+at Delphi, offered supplications to the God, and desired of him some
+extraordinary reward for their care and labor, particularizing nothing,
+but asking for whatever was best for men. Accordingly, Apollo signified
+to them that he would bestow it on them in three days, and on the third
+day at daybreak they were found dead. And so they say that this was a
+formal decision pronounced by that God to <a id="page-61"></a><span class="pgnum">61</span>whom the rest of the deities
+have assigned the province of divining with an accuracy superior to that
+of all the rest.</p>
+
+<p>XLVIII. There is also a story told of Silenus, who, when taken prisoner
+by Midas, is said to have made him this present for his ransom—namely,
+that he informed him<a id="FNA-25"></a><a href="#FN-25"><sup>25</sup></a> that never to have been born was by far the
+greatest blessing that could happen to man; and that the next best thing
+was to die very soon; which very opinion Euripides makes use of in his
+Cresphontes, saying,</p>
+
+<div class="poem">
+<p>When man is born, ‘tis fit, with solemn show,</p>
+<p>We speak our sense of his approaching woe;</p>
+<p>With other gestures and a different eye,</p>
+<p>Proclaim our pleasure when he’s bid to die.<a id="FNA-26"></a><a href="#FN-26"><sup>26</sup></a></p>
+</div>
+
+<p class="cont">There is something like this in Crantor’s Consolation; for he says that
+TerinÊsus of Elysia, when he was bitterly lamenting the loss of his son,
+came to a place of divination to be informed why he was visited with so
+great affliction, and received in his tablet these three verses:</p>
+
+<div class="poem">
+<p>Thou fool, to murmur at Euthynous’ death!</p>
+<p>The blooming youth to fate resigns his breath:</p>
+<p>The fate, whereon your happiness depends,</p>
+<p>At once the parent and the son befriends.<a id="FNA-27"></a><a href="#FN-27"><sup>27</sup></a></p>
+</div>
+
+<p class="cont">On these and similar authorities they affirm that the question has been
+determined by the Gods. Nay, more; Alcidamas, an ancient rhetorician of
+the very highest reputation, wrote even in praise of death, which he
+endeavored to establish by an enumeration of the evils of life; and his
+Dissertation has a great deal of eloquence in it; but <a id="page-62"></a><span class="pgnum">62</span>he was
+unacquainted with the more refined arguments of the philosophers. By the
+orators, indeed, to die for our country is always considered not only as
+glorious, but even as happy: they go back as far as Erechtheus,<a id="FNA-28"></a><a href="#FN-28"><sup>28</sup></a>
+whose very daughters underwent death, for the safety of their
+fellow-citizens: they instance Codrus, who threw himself into the midst
+of his enemies, dressed like a common man, that his royal robes might
+not betray him, because the oracle had declared the Athenians
+conquerors, if their king was slain. Menœceus<a id="FNA-29"></a><a href="#FN-29"><sup>29</sup></a> is not overlooked by
+them, who, in compliance with the injunctions of an oracle, freely shed
+his blood for his country. Iphigenia ordered herself to be conveyed to
+Aulis, to be sacrificed, that her blood might be the cause of spilling
+that of her enemies.</p>
+
+<p>XLIX. From hence they proceed to instances of a fresher date. Harmodius
+and Aristogiton are in everybody’s mouth; the memory of Leonidas the
+LacedÊmonian and Epaminondas the Theban is as fresh as ever. Those
+philosophers were not acquainted with the many instances in our
+country—to give a list of whom would take up too much time—who, we
+see, considered death desirable as long as it was accompanied with
+honor. But, notwithstanding this is the correct view of the case, we
+must use much persuasion, speak as if we were endued with some higher
+authority, in order to bring men to begin to wish to die, or cease to be
+afraid of death. For if that last day does not occasion an entire
+extinction, but a change of abode only, what can be more desirable? And
+if it, on the other hand, destroys, and absolutely puts an end to us,
+what can be preferable to the having a deep sleep fall on us, in the
+midst of the fatigues of life, and being thus overtaken, to sleep to
+eternity? And, should this really <a id="page-63"></a><span class="pgnum">63</span>be the case, then Ennius’s language
+is more consistent with wisdom than Solon’s; for our Ennius says,</p>
+
+<div class="poem">
+<p>Let none bestow upon my passing bier</p>
+<p>One needless sigh or unavailing tear.</p>
+</div>
+
+<p class="cont">But the wise Solon says,</p>
+
+<div class="poem">
+<p>Let me not unlamented die, but o’er my bier</p>
+<p>Burst forth the tender sigh, the friendly tear.<a id="FNA-30"></a><a href="#FN-30"><sup>30</sup></a></p>
+</div>
+
+<p class="cont">But let us, if indeed it should be our fate to know the time which is
+appointed by the Gods for us to die, prepare ourselves for it with a
+cheerful and grateful mind, thinking ourselves like men who are
+delivered from a jail, and released from their fetters, for the purpose
+of going back to our eternal habitation, which may be more emphatically
+called our own; or else to be divested of all sense and trouble. If, on
+the other hand, we should have no notice given us of this decree, yet
+let us cultivate such a disposition as to look on that formidable hour
+of death as happy for us, though shocking to our friends; and let us
+never imagine anything to be an evil which is an appointment of the
+immortal Gods, or of nature, the common parent of all. For it is not by
+hazard or without design that we have been born and situated as we have.
+On the contrary, beyond all doubt there is a certain power which
+consults the happiness of human nature; and this would neither have
+produced nor provided for a being which, after having gone through the
+labors of life, was to fall into eternal misery by death. Let us rather
+infer that we have a retreat and haven prepared for us, which I wish we
+could crowd all sail and arrive at; but though the winds should not
+serve, and we should be driven back, yet we shall to a certainty arrive
+at that point eventually, though somewhat later. But how can that be
+miserable for one which all must of necessity undergo? I have given you
+a peroration, that you might not think I had overlooked or neglected
+anything.</p>
+
+<p><i>A.</i> I am persuaded you have not; and, indeed, that peroration has
+confirmed me.</p>
+
+<p><a id="page-64"></a><span class="pgnum">64</span><i>M.</i> I am glad it has had that effect. But it is now time to consult
+our health. To-morrow, and all the time we continue in this Tusculan
+villa, let us consider this subject; and especially those portions of it
+which may ease our pain, alleviate our fears, and lessen our desires,
+which is the greatest advantage we can reap from the whole of
+philosophy.</p>
+
+       <hr/>
+
+
+
+
+<h3>BOOK II.</h3>
+
+<h4>ON BEARING PAIN.</h4>
+
+
+<p>I. <span class="first">Neoptolemus</span>, in Ennius, indeed, says that the study of philosophy was
+expedient for him; but that it required limiting to a few subjects, for
+that to give himself up entirely to it was what he did not approve of.
+And for my part, Brutus, I am perfectly persuaded that it is expedient
+for me to philosophize; for what can I do better, especially as I have
+no regular occupation? But I am not for limiting my philosophy to a few
+subjects, as he does; for philosophy is a matter in which it is
+difficult to acquire a little knowledge without acquainting yourself
+with many, or all its branches, nor can you well take a few subjects
+without selecting them out of a great number; nor can any one, who has
+acquired the knowledge of a few points, avoid endeavoring with the same
+eagerness to understand more. But still, in a busy life, and in one
+mainly occupied with military matters, such as that of Neoptolemus was
+at that time, even that limited degree of acquaintance with philosophy
+may be of great use, and may yield fruit, not perhaps so plentiful as a
+thorough knowledge of the whole of philosophy, but yet such as in some
+degree may at times deliver us from the dominion of our desires, our
+sorrows, and our fears; just as the effect of that discussion which we
+lately maintained in my Tusculan villa seemed to be that a great
+contempt of death was engendered, which contempt is of no small efficacy
+towards delivering the mind from fear; for whoever dreads what cannot be
+avoided can by no means live with a quiet and tranquil mind. But he who
+is under no <a id="page-65"></a><span class="pgnum">65</span>fear of death, not only because it is a thing absolutely
+inevitable but also because he is persuaded that death itself hath
+nothing terrible in it, provides himself with a very great resource
+towards a happy life. However, I am not tolerant that many will argue
+strenuously against us; and, indeed, that is a thing which can never be
+avoided, except by abstaining from writing at all. For if my Orations,
+which were addressed to the judgment and approbation of the people (for
+that is a popular art, and the object of oratory is popular applause),
+have been criticised by some people who are inclined to withhold their
+praise from everything but what they are persuaded they can attain to
+themselves, and who limit their ideas of good speaking by the hopes
+which they conceive of what they themselves may attain to, and who
+declare, when they are overwhelmed with a flow of words and sentences,
+that they prefer the utmost poverty of thought and expression to that
+plenty and copiousness (from which arose the Attic kind of oratory,
+which they who professed it were strangers to, though they have now been
+some time silenced, and laughed out of the very courts of justice), what
+may I not expect, when at present I cannot have the least countenance
+from the people by whom I used to be upheld before? For philosophy is
+satisfied with a few judges, and of her own accord industriously avoids
+the multitude, who are jealous of it, and utterly displeased with it; so
+that, should any one undertake to cry down the whole of it, he would
+have the people on his side; while, if he should attack that school
+which I particularly profess, he would have great assistance from those
+of the other philosophers.</p>
+
+<p>II. But I have answered the detractors of philosophy in general, in my
+Hortensius. And what I had to say in favor of the Academics, is, I
+think, explained with sufficient accuracy in my four books of the
+Academic Question.</p>
+
+<p>But yet I am so far from desiring that no one should write against me,
+that it is what I most earnestly wish; for philosophy would never have
+been in such esteem in Greece itself, if it had not been for the
+strength which it acquired from the contentions and disputations of the
+<a id="page-66"></a><span class="pgnum">66</span>most learned men; and therefore I recommend all men who have abilities
+to follow my advice to snatch this art also from declining Greece, and
+to transport it to this city; as our ancestors by their study and
+industry have imported all their other arts which were worth having.
+Thus the praise of oratory, raised from a low degree, is arrived at such
+perfection that it must now decline, and, as is the nature of all
+things, verge to its dissolution in a very short time. Let philosophy,
+then, derive its birth in Latin language from this time, and let us lend
+it our assistance, and bear patiently to be contradicted and refuted;
+and although those men may dislike such treatment who are bound and
+devoted to certain predetermined opinions, and are under such
+obligations to maintain them that they are forced, for the sake of
+consistency, to adhere to them even though they do not themselves wholly
+approve of them; we, on the other hand, who pursue only probabilities,
+and who cannot go beyond that which seems really likely, can confute
+others without obstinacy, and are prepared to be confuted ourselves
+without resentment. Besides, if these studies are ever brought home to
+us, we shall not want even Greek libraries, in which there is an
+infinite number of books, by reason of the multitude of authors among
+them; for it is a common practice with many to repeat the same things
+which have been written by others, which serves no purpose but to stuff
+their shelves; and this will be our case, too, if many apply themselves
+to this study.</p>
+
+<p>III. But let us excite those, if possible, who have had a liberal
+education, and are masters of an elegant style, and who philosophize
+with reason and method.</p>
+
+<p>For there is a certain class of them who would willingly be called
+philosophers, whose books in our language are said to be numerous, and
+which I do not despise; for, indeed, I never read them: but still,
+because the authors themselves declare that they write without any
+regularity, or method, or elegance, or ornament, I do not care to read
+what must be so void of entertainment. There is no one in the least
+acquainted with literature who does not know the style and sentiments of
+that school; wherefore, since they are at no pains to express themselves
+well, I <a id="page-67"></a><span class="pgnum">67</span>do not see why they should be read by anybody except by one
+another. Let them read them, if they please, who are of the same
+opinions; for in the same manner as all men read Plato and the other
+Socratics, with those who sprung from them, even those who do not agree
+with their opinions, or are very indifferent about them; but scarcely
+any one except their own disciples take Epicurus or Metrodorus into
+their hands; so they alone read these Latin books who think that the
+arguments contained in them are sound. But, in my opinion, whatever is
+published should be recommended to the reading of every man of learning;
+and though we may not succeed in this ourselves, yet nevertheless we
+must be sensible that this ought to be the aim of every writer. And on
+this account I have always been pleased with the custom of the
+Peripatetics and Academics, of disputing on both sides of the question;
+not solely from its being the only method of discovering what is
+probable on every subject, but also because it affords the greatest
+scope for practising eloquence; a method that Aristotle first made use
+of, and afterward all the Aristotelians; and in our own memory Plilo,
+whom we have often heard, appointed one time to treat of the precepts of
+the rhetoricians, and another for philosophical discussion, to which
+custom I was brought to conform by my friends at my Tusculum; and
+accordingly our leisure time was spent in this manner. And therefore, as
+yesterday before noon we applied ourselves to speaking, and in the
+afternoon went down into the Academy, the discussions which were held
+there I have acquainted you with, not in the manner of a narration, but
+in almost the very same words which were employed in the debate.</p>
+
+<p>IV. The discourse, then, was introduced in this manner while we were
+walking, and it was commenced by some such an opening as this:</p>
+
+<p><i>A.</i> It is not to be expressed how much I was delighted, or rather
+edified, by your discourse of yesterday. For although I am conscious to
+myself that I have never been too fond of life, yet at times, when I
+have considered that there would be an end to this life, and that I must
+some time or other part with all its good things, a certain dread <a id="page-68"></a><span class="pgnum">68</span>and
+uneasiness used to intrude itself on my thoughts; but now, believe me, I
+am so freed from that kind of uneasiness that there is nothing that I
+think less worth any regard.</p>
+
+<p><i>M.</i> I am not at all surprised at that, for it is the effect of
+philosophy, which is the medicine of our souls; it banishes all
+groundless apprehensions, frees us from desires, and drives away fears:
+but it has not the same influence over all men; it is of very great
+influence when it falls in with a disposition well adapted to it. For
+not only does Fortune, as the old proverb says, assist the bold, but
+reason does so in a still greater degree; for it, by certain precepts,
+as it were, strengthens even courage itself. You were born naturally
+great and soaring, and with a contempt for all things which pertain to
+man alone; therefore a discourse against death took easy possession of a
+brave soul. But do you imagine that these same arguments have any force
+with those very persons who have invented, and canvassed, and published
+them, excepting indeed some very few particular persons? For how few
+philosophers will you meet with whose life and manners are conformable
+to the dictates of reason! who look on their profession, not as a means
+of displaying their learning, but as a rule for their own practice! who
+follow their own precepts, and comply with their own decrees! You may
+see some of such levity and such vanity, that it would have been better
+for them to have been ignorant; some covetous of money, some others
+eager for glory, many slaves to their lusts; so that their discourses
+and their actions are most strangely at variance; than which nothing in
+my opinion can be more unbecoming: for just as if one who professed to
+teach grammar should speak with impropriety, or a master of music sing
+out of tune, such conduct has the worst appearance in these men, because
+they blunder in the very particular with which they profess that they
+are well acquainted. So a philosopher who errs in the conduct of his
+life is the more infamous because he is erring in the very thing which
+he pretends to teach, and, while he lays down rules to regulate life by,
+is irregular in his own life.</p>
+
+<p>V. <i>A.</i> Should this be the case, is it not to be feared that <a id="page-69"></a><span class="pgnum">69</span>you are
+dressing up philosophy in false colors? For what stronger argument can
+there be that it is of little use than that some very profound
+philosophers live in a discreditable manner?</p>
+
+<p><i>M.</i> That, indeed, is no argument at all, for as all the fields which
+are cultivated are not fruitful (and this sentiment of Accius is false,
+and asserted without any foundation,</p>
+
+<div class="poem">
+<p>The ground you sow on is of small avail;</p>
+<p>To yield a crop good seed can never fail),</p>
+</div>
+
+<p class="cont">it is not every mind which has been properly cultivated that produces
+fruit; and, to go on with the comparison, as a field, although it may be
+naturally fruitful, cannot produce a crop without dressing, so neither
+can the mind without education; such is the weakness of either without
+the other. Whereas philosophy is the culture of the mind: this it is
+which plucks up vices by the roots; prepares the mind for the receiving
+of seeds; commits them to it, or, as I may say, sows them, in the hope
+that, when come to maturity, they may produce a plentiful harvest. Let
+us proceed, then, as we began. Say, if you please, what shall be the
+subject of our disputation.</p>
+
+<p><i>A.</i> I look on pain to be the greatest of all evils.</p>
+
+<p><i>M.</i> What, even greater than infamy?</p>
+
+<p><i>A.</i> I dare not indeed assert that; and I blush to think I am so soon
+driven from my ground.</p>
+
+<p><i>M.</i> You would have had greater reason for blushing had you persevered
+in it; for what is so unbecoming—what can appear worse to you, than
+disgrace, wickedness, immorality? To avoid which, what pain is there
+which we ought not (I will not say to avoid shirking, but even) of our
+own accord to encounter, and undergo, and even to court?</p>
+
+<p><i>A.</i> I am entirely of that opinion; but, notwithstanding that pain is
+not the greatest evil, yet surely it is an evil.</p>
+
+<p><i>M.</i> Do you perceive, then, how much of the terror of pain you have
+given up on a small hint?</p>
+
+<p><i>A.</i> I see that plainly; but I should be glad to give up more of it.</p>
+
+<p><i>M.</i> I will endeavor to make you do so; but it is a great <a id="page-70"></a><span class="pgnum">70</span>undertaking,
+and I must have a disposition on your part which is not inclined to
+offer any obstacles.</p>
+
+<p><i>A.</i> You shall have such: for as I behaved yesterday, so now I will
+follow reason wherever she leads.</p>
+
+<p>VI. <i>M.</i> First, then, I will speak of the weakness of many philosophers,
+and those, too, of various sects; the head of whom, both in authority
+and antiquity, was Aristippus, the pupil of Socrates, who hesitated not
+to say that pain was the greatest of all evils. And after him Epicurus
+easily gave in to this effeminate and enervated doctrine. After him
+Hieronymus the Rhodian said, that to be without pain was the chief good,
+so great an evil did pain appear to him to be. The rest, with the
+exceptions of Zeno, Aristo, Pyrrho, were pretty much of the same opinion
+that you were of just now—that it was indeed an evil, but that there
+were many worse. When, then, nature herself, and a certain generous
+feeling of virtue, at once prevents you from persisting in the assertion
+that pain is the chief evil, and when you were driven from such an
+opinion when disgrace was contrasted with pain, shall philosophy, the
+preceptress of life, cling to this idea for so many ages? What duty of
+life, what praise, what reputation, would be of such consequence that a
+man should be desirous of gaining it at the expense of submitting to
+bodily pain, when he has persuaded himself that pain is the greatest
+evil? On the other side, what disgrace, what ignominy, would he not
+submit to that he might avoid pain, when persuaded that it was the
+greatest of evils? Besides, what person, if it be only true that pain is
+the greatest of evils, is not miserable, not only when he actually feels
+pain, but also whenever he is aware that it may befall him. And who is
+there whom pain may not befall? So that it is clear that there is
+absolutely no one who can possibly be happy. Metrodorus, indeed, thinks
+that man perfectly happy whose body is free from all disorders, and who
+has an assurance that it will always continue so; but who is there who
+can be assured of that?</p>
+
+<p>VII. But Epicurus, indeed, says such things that it should seem that his
+design was only to make people laugh; for he affirms somewhere that if a
+wise man were to be burned or put to the torture—you expect, perhaps,
+<a id="page-71"></a><span class="pgnum">71</span>that he is going to say he would bear it, he would support himself
+under it with resolution, he would not yield to it (and that by
+Hercules! would be very commendable, and worthy of that very Hercules
+whom I have just invoked): but even this will not satisfy Epicurus, that
+robust and hardy man! No; his wise man, even if he were in Phalaris’s
+bull, would say, How sweet it is! how little do I regard it! What,
+sweet? Is it not sufficient, if it is not disagreeable? But those very
+men who deny pain to be an evil are not in the habit of saying that it
+is agreeable to any one to be tormented; they rather say that it is
+cruel, or hard to bear, afflicting, unnatural, but still not an evil:
+while this man who says that it is the only evil, and the very worst of
+all evils, yet thinks that a wise man would pronounce it sweet. I do not
+require of you to speak of pain in the same words which Epicurus uses—a
+man, as you know, devoted to pleasure: he may make no difference, if he
+pleases, between Phalaris’s bull and his own bed; but I cannot allow the
+wise man to be so indifferent about pain. If he bears it with courage,
+it is sufficient: that he should rejoice in it, I do not expect; for
+pain is, beyond all question, sharp, bitter, against nature, hard to
+submit to and to bear. Observe Philoctetes: We may allow him to lament,
+for he saw Hercules himself groaning loudly through extremity of pain on
+Mount Œta. The arrows with which Hercules presented him were then no
+consolation to him, when</p>
+
+<div class="poem">
+<p>The viper’s bite, impregnating his veins</p>
+<p>With poison, rack’d him with its bitter pains.</p>
+</div>
+
+<p class="cont">And therefore he cries out, desiring help, and wishing to die,</p>
+
+<div class="poem">
+<p>Oh that some friendly hand its aid would lend,</p>
+<p>My body from this rock’s vast height to send</p>
+<p>Into the briny deep! I’m all on fire,</p>
+<p>And by this fatal wound must soon expire.</p>
+</div>
+
+<p class="cont">It is hard to say that the man who was obliged to cry out in this manner
+was not oppressed with evil, and great evil too.</p>
+
+<p>VIII. But let us observe Hercules himself, who was subdued by pain at
+the very time when he was on the point <a id="page-72"></a><span class="pgnum">72</span>of attaining immortality by
+death. What words does Sophocles here put in his mouth, in his
+TrachiniÊ? who, when Deianira had put upon him a tunic dyed in the
+centaur’s blood, and it stuck to his entrails, says,</p>
+
+<div class="poem">
+<p>What tortures I endure no words can tell,</p>
+<p>Far greater these, than those which erst befell</p>
+<p>From the dire terror of thy consort, Jove—</p>
+<p>E’en stern Eurystheus’ dire command above;</p>
+<p>This of thy daughter, Œneus, is the fruit,</p>
+<p>Beguiling me with her envenom’d suit,</p>
+<p>Whose close embrace doth on my entrails prey,</p>
+<p>Consuming life; my lungs forbid to play;</p>
+<p>The blood forsakes my veins; my manly heart</p>
+<p>Forgets to beat; enervated, each part</p>
+<p>Neglects its office, while my fatal doom</p>
+<p>Proceeds ignobly from the weaver’s loom.</p>
+<p>The hand of foe ne’er hurt me, nor the fierce</p>
+<p>Giant issuing from his parent earth.</p>
+<p>Ne’er could the Centaur such a blow enforce,</p>
+<p>No barbarous foe, nor all the Grecian force;</p>
+<p>This arm no savage people could withstand,</p>
+<p>Whose realms I traversed to reform the land.</p>
+<p>Thus, though I ever bore a manly heart,</p>
+<p>I fall a victim to a woman’s art.</p>
+</div>
+
+<p class="nodist">IX.</p>
+
+<div class="poem">
+<p>Assist, my son, if thou that name dost hear,</p>
+<p>My groans preferring to thy mother’s tear:</p>
+<p>Convey her here, if, in thy pious heart,</p>
+<p>Thy mother shares not an unequal part:</p>
+<p>Proceed, be bold, thy father’s fate bemoan,</p>
+<p>Nations will join, you will not weep alone.</p>
+<p>Oh, what a sight is this same briny source,</p>
+<p>Unknown before, through all my labors’ course!</p>
+<p>That virtue, which could brave each toil but late,</p>
+<p>With woman’s weakness now bewails its fate.</p>
+<p>Approach, my son; behold thy father laid,</p>
+<p>A wither’d carcass that implores thy aid;</p>
+<p>Let all behold: and thou, imperious Jove,</p>
+<p>On me direct thy lightning from above:</p>
+<p>Now all its force the poison doth assume,</p>
+<p>And my burnt entrails with its flame consume.</p>
+<p>Crestfallen, unembraced, I now let fall</p>
+<p>Listless, those hands that lately conquer’d all;</p>
+<p>When the NemÊan lion own’d their force,</p>
+<p>And he indignant fell a breathless corse;</p>
+<p>The serpent slew, of the Lernean lake,</p>
+<p>As did the Hydra of its force partake:</p>
+<p>By this, too, fell the Erymanthian boar:</p>
+<p><a id="page-73"></a><span class="pgnum">73</span>E’en Cerberus did his weak strength deplore.</p>
+<p>This sinewy arm did overcome with ease</p>
+<p>That dragon, guardian of the Golden Fleece.</p>
+<p>My many conquests let some others trace;</p>
+<p>It’s mine to say, I never knew disgrace.<a id="FNA-31"></a><a href="#FN-31"><sup>31</sup></a></p>
+</div>
+
+<p class="cont">Can we then, despise pain, when we see Hercules himself giving vent to
+his expressions of agony with such impatience?</p>
+
+<p>X. Let us see what Æschylus says, who was not only a poet but a
+Pythagorean philosopher also, for that is the account which you have
+received of him; how doth he make Prometheus bear the pain he suffered
+for the Lemnian theft, when he clandestinely stole away the celestial
+fire, and bestowed it on men, and was severely punished by Jupiter for
+the theft. Fastened to Mount Caucasus, he speaks thus:</p>
+
+<div class="poem">
+<p>Thou heav’n-born race of Titans here fast bound,</p>
+<p>Behold thy brother! As the sailors sound</p>
+<p>With care the bottom, and their ships confine</p>
+<p>To some safe shore, with anchor and with line;</p>
+<p>So, by Jove’s dread decree, the God of fire</p>
+<p>Confines me here the victim of Jove’s ire.</p>
+<p>With baneful art his dire machine he shapes;</p>
+<p>From such a God what mortal e’er escapes?</p>
+<p>When each third day shall triumph o’er the night,</p>
+<p>Then doth the vulture, with his talons light,</p>
+<p>Seize on my entrails; which, in rav’nous guise,</p>
+<p>He preys on! then with wing extended flies</p>
+<p>Aloft, and brushes with his plumes the gore:</p>
+<p>But when dire Jove my liver doth restore,</p>
+<p>Back he returns impetuous to his prey,</p>
+<p>Clapping his wings, he cuts th’ ethereal way.</p>
+<p>Thus do I nourish with my blood this pest,</p>
+<p>Confined my arms, unable to contest;</p>
+<p>Entreating only that in pity Jove</p>
+<p>Would take my life, and this cursed plague remove.</p>
+<p>But endless ages past unheard my moan,</p>
+<p>Sooner shall drops dissolve this very stone.<a id="FNA-32"></a><a href="#FN-32"><sup>32</sup></a></p>
+</div>
+
+<p class="cont">And therefore it scarcely seems possible to avoid calling a man who is
+suffering, miserable; and if he is miserable, then pain is an evil.</p>
+
+<p><a id="page-74"></a><span class="pgnum">74</span>XI. <i>A.</i> Hitherto you are on my side; I will see to that by-and-by;
+and, in the mean while, whence are those verses? I do not remember them.</p>
+
+<p><i>M.</i> I will inform you, for you are in the right to ask. Do you see that
+I have much leisure?</p>
+
+<p><i>A.</i> What, then?</p>
+
+<p><i>M.</i> I imagine, when you were at Athens, you attended frequently at the
+schools of the philosophers.</p>
+
+<p><i>A.</i> Yes, and with great pleasure.</p>
+
+<p><i>M.</i> You observed, then, that though none of them at that time were very
+eloquent, yet they used to mix verses with their harangues.</p>
+
+<p><i>A.</i> Yes, and particularly Dionysius the Stoic used to employ a great
+many.</p>
+
+<p><i>M.</i> You say right; but they were quoted without any appropriateness or
+elegance. But our friend Philo used to give a few select lines and well
+adapted; and in imitation of him, ever since I took a fancy to this kind
+of elderly declamation, I have been very fond of quoting our poets; and
+where I cannot be supplied from them, I translate from the Greek, that
+the Latin language may not want any kind of ornament in this kind of
+disputation.</p>
+
+<p>But, do you not see how much harm is done by poets? They introduce the
+bravest men lamenting over their misfortunes: they soften our minds; and
+they are, besides, so entertaining, that we do not only read them, but
+get them by heart. Thus the influence of the poets is added to our want
+of discipline at home, and our tender and delicate manner of living, so
+that between them they have deprived virtue of all its vigor and energy.
+Plato, therefore, was right in banishing them from his commonwealth,
+where he required the best morals, and the best form of government. But
+we, who have all our learning from Greece, read and learn these works of
+theirs from our childhood; and look on this as a liberal and learned
+education.</p>
+
+<p>XII. But why are we angry with the poets? We may find some philosophers,
+those masters of virtue, who have taught that pain was the greatest of
+evils. But you, young man, when you said but just now that it appeared
+so to you, upon being asked by me what appeared greater than infamy,
+gave up that opinion at a word. Suppose I ask <a id="page-75"></a><span class="pgnum">75</span>Epicurus the same
+question. He will answer that a trifling degree of pain is a greater
+evil than the greatest infamy; for that there is no evil in infamy
+itself, unless attended with pain. What pain, then, attends Epicurus,
+when he says that very thing, that pain is the greatest evil! And yet
+nothing can be a greater disgrace to a philosopher than to talk thus.
+Therefore, you allowed enough when you admitted that infamy appeared to
+you to be a greater evil than pain. And if you abide by this admission,
+you will see how far pain should be resisted; and that our inquiry
+should be not so much whether pain be an evil, as how the mind may be
+fortified for resisting it. The Stoics infer from some petty quibbling
+arguments that it is no evil, as if the dispute were about a word, and
+not about the thing itself. Why do you impose upon me, Zeno? For when
+you deny what appears very dreadful to me to be an evil, I am deceived,
+and am at a loss to know why that which appears to me to be a most
+miserable thing should be no evil. The answer is, that nothing is an
+evil but what is base and vicious. You return to your trifling, for you
+do not remove what made me uneasy. I know that pain is not vice—you
+need not inform me of that: but show me that it makes no difference to
+me whether I am in pain or not. It has never anything to do, say you,
+with a happy life, for that depends upon virtue alone; but yet pain is
+to be avoided. If I ask, why? It is disagreeable, against nature, hard
+to bear, woful and afflicting.</p>
+
+<p>XIII. Here are many words to express that by so many different forms
+which we call by the single word evil. You are defining pain, instead of
+removing it, when you say, it is disagreeable, unnatural, scarcely
+possible to be endured or borne, nor are you wrong in saying so: but the
+man who vaunts himself in such a manner should not give way in his
+conduct, if it be true that nothing is good but what is honest, and
+nothing evil but what is disgraceful. This would be wishing, not
+proving. This argument is a better one, and has more truth in it—that
+all things which Nature abhors are to be looked upon as evil; that those
+which she approves of are to be considered as good: for when this is
+admitted, and the dispute <a id="page-76"></a><span class="pgnum">76</span>about words removed, that which they with
+reason embrace, and which we call honest, right, becoming, and sometimes
+include under the general name of virtue, appears so far superior to
+everything else that all other things which are looked upon as the gifts
+of fortune, or the good things of the body, seem trifling and
+insignificant; and no evil whatever, nor all the collective body of
+evils together, appears to be compared to the evil of infamy. Wherefore,
+if, as you granted in the beginning, infamy is worse than pain, pain is
+certainly nothing; for while it appears to you base and unmanly to
+groan, cry out, lament, or faint under pain; while you cherish notions
+of probity, dignity, honor, and, keeping your eye on them, refrain
+yourself, pain will certainly yield to virtue, and, by the influence of
+imagination, will lose its whole force.—For you must either admit that
+there is no such thing as virtue, or you must despise every kind of
+pain. Will you allow of such a virtue as prudence, without which no
+virtue whatever can even be conceived? What, then? Will that suffer you
+to labor and take pains to no purpose? Will temperance permit you to do
+anything to excess? Will it be possible for justice to be maintained by
+one who through the force of pain discovers secrets, or betrays his
+confederates, or deserts many duties of life? Will you act in a manner
+consistently with courage, and its attendants, greatness of soul,
+resolution, patience, and contempt for all worldly things? Can you hear
+yourself called a great man when you lie grovelling, dejected, and
+deploring your condition with a lamentable voice; no one would call you
+even a man while in such a condition. You must therefore either abandon
+all pretensions to courage, or else pain must be put out of the
+question.</p>
+
+<p>XIV. You know very well that, even though part of your Corinthian
+furniture were gone, the remainder might be safe without that; but if
+you lose one virtue (though virtue in reality cannot be lost), still if,
+I say, you should acknowledge that you were deficient in one, you would
+be stripped of all. Can you, then, call yourself a brave man, of a great
+soul, endued with patience and steadiness above the frowns of fortune?
+or Philoctetes? for I choose to instance him, rather than yourself, for
+he certainly was not <a id="page-77"></a><span class="pgnum">77</span>a brave man, who lay in his bed, which was watered
+with his tears,</p>
+
+<div class="poem">
+<p>Whose groans, bewailings, and whose bitter cries,</p>
+<p>With grief incessant rent the very skies.</p>
+</div>
+
+<p class="cont">I do not deny pain to be pain—for were that the case, in what would
+courage consist?—but I say it should be assuaged by patience, if there
+be such a thing as patience: if there be no such thing, why do we speak
+so in praise of philosophy? or why do we glory in its name? Does pain
+annoy us? Let it sting us to the heart: if you are without defensive
+armor, bare your throat to it; but if you are secured by Vulcanian
+armor, that is to say by resolution, resist it. Should you fail to do
+so, that guardian of your honor, your courage, will forsake and leave
+you.—By the laws of Lycurgus, and by those which were given to the
+Cretans by Jupiter, or which Minos established under the direction of
+Jupiter, as the poets say, the youths of the State are trained by the
+practice of hunting, running, enduring hunger and thirst, cold and heat.
+The boys at Sparta are scourged so at the altars that blood follows the
+lash in abundance; nay, sometimes, as I used to hear when I was there,
+they are whipped even to death; and yet not one of them was ever heard
+to cry out, or so much as groan. What, then? Shall men not be able to
+bear what boys do? and shall custom have such great force, and reason
+none at all?</p>
+
+<p>XV. There is some difference between labor and pain; they border upon
+one another, but still there is a certain difference between them. Labor
+is a certain exercise of the mind or body, in some employment or
+undertaking of serious trouble and importance; but pain is a sharp
+motion in the body, disagreeable to our senses.—Both these feelings,
+the Greeks, whose language is more copious than ours, express by the
+common name of <span class="greek">Π᜹Μος</span>: therefore they call industrious men painstaking,
+or, rather, fond of labor; we, more conveniently, call them laborious;
+for laboring is one thing, and enduring pain another. You see, O Greece!
+your barrenness of words, sometimes, though you think you are always so
+rich in them. I say, then, that there is a difference between laboring
+and being in <a id="page-78"></a><span class="pgnum">78</span>pain. When Caius Marius had an operation performed for a
+swelling in his thigh, he felt pain; when he headed his troops in a very
+hot season, he labored. Yet these two feelings bear some resemblance to
+one another; for the accustoming ourselves to labor makes the endurance
+of pain more easy to us. And it was because they were influenced by this
+reason that the founders of the Grecian form of government provided that
+the bodies of their youth should be strengthened by labor, which custom
+the Spartans transferred even to their women, who in other cities lived
+more delicately, keeping within the walls of their houses; but it was
+otherwise with the Spartans.</p>
+
+<div class="poem">
+<p>The Spartan women, with a manly air,</p>
+<p>Fatigues and dangers with their husbands share;</p>
+<p>They in fantastic sports have no delight,</p>
+<p>Partners with them in exercise and fight.</p>
+</div>
+
+<p class="cont">And in these laborious exercises pain interferes sometimes. They are
+thrown down, receive blows, have bad falls, and are bruised, and the
+labor itself produces a sort of callousness to pain.</p>
+
+<p>XVI. As to military service (I speak of our own, not of that of the
+Spartans, for they used to march slowly to the sound of the flute, and
+scarce a word of command was given without an anapÊst), you may see, in
+the first place, whence the very name of an army (<i>exercitus</i><a id="FNA-33"></a><a href="#FN-33"><sup>33</sup></a>) is
+derived; and, secondly, how great the labor is of an army on its march:
+then consider that they carry more than a fortnight’s provision, and
+whatever else they may want; that they carry the burden of the
+stakes,<a id="FNA-34"></a><a href="#FN-34"><sup>34</sup></a> for as to shield, sword, or helmet, they look on them as no
+more encumbrance than their own limbs, for they say that arms are the
+limbs of a soldier, and those, indeed, they carry so commodiously that,
+when there is occasion, they throw down their burdens, and use their
+arms as readily as their limbs. Why need I mention the exercises of the
+legions? And how great the labor is which is undergone in the running,
+encounters, shouts! Hence it is that their minds are worked <a id="page-79"></a><span class="pgnum">79</span>up to make
+so light of wounds in action. Take a soldier of equal bravery, but
+undisciplined, and he will seem a woman. Why is it that there is this
+sensible difference between a raw recruit and a veteran soldier? The age
+of the young soldiers is for the most part in their favor; but it is
+practice only that enables men to bear labor and despise wounds.
+Moreover, we often see, when the wounded are carried off the field, the
+raw, untried soldier, though but slightly wounded, cries out most
+shamefully; but the more brave, experienced veteran only inquires for
+some one to dress his wounds, and says,</p>
+
+<div class="poem">
+<p>Patroclus, to thy aid I must appeal</p>
+<p>Ere worse ensue, my bleeding wounds to heal;</p>
+<p>The sons of Æsculapius are employ’d,</p>
+<p>No room for me, so many are annoy’d.</p>
+</div>
+
+<p>XVII. This is certainly Eurypylus himself. What an experienced
+man!—While his friend is continually enlarging on his misfortunes, you
+may observe that he is so far from weeping that he even assigns a reason
+why he should bear his wounds with patience.</p>
+
+<div class="poem">
+<p>Who at his enemy a stroke directs,</p>
+<p>His sword to light upon himself expects.</p>
+</div>
+
+<p>Patroclus, I suppose, will lead him off to his chamber to bind up his
+wounds, at least if he be a man: but not a word of that; he only
+inquires how the battle went:</p>
+
+<div class="poem">
+<p>Say how the Argives bear themselves in fight?</p>
+</div>
+
+<p class="cont">And yet no words can show the truth as well as those, your deeds and
+visible sufferings.</p>
+
+<div class="poem">
+<p>Peace! and my wounds bind up;</p>
+</div>
+
+<p class="cont">but though Eurypylus could bear these afflictions, Æsopus could not,</p>
+
+<div class="poem">
+<p>Where Hector’s fortune press’d our yielding troops;</p>
+</div>
+
+<p class="cont">and he explains the rest, though in pain. So unbounded is military glory
+in a brave man! Shall, then, a veteran soldier be able to behave in this
+manner, and shall a wise and learned man not be able? Surely the latter
+might be <a id="page-80"></a><span class="pgnum">80</span>able to bear pain better, and in no small degree either. At
+present, however, I am confining myself to what is engendered by
+practice and discipline. I am not yet come to speak of reason and
+philosophy. You may often hear of old women living without victuals for
+three or four days; but take away a wrestler’s provisions but for one
+day, and he will implore the aid of Jupiter Olympius, the very God for
+whom he exercises himself: he will cry out that he cannot endure it.
+Great is the force of custom! Sportsmen will continue whole nights in
+the snow; they will bear being almost frozen upon the mountains. From
+practice boxers will not so much as utter a groan, however bruised by
+the cestus. But what do you think of those to whom a victory in the
+Olympic games seemed almost on a par with the ancient consulships of the
+Roman people? What wounds will the gladiators bear, who are either
+barbarians, or the very dregs of mankind! How do they, who are trained
+to it, prefer being wounded to basely avoiding it! How often do they
+prove that they consider nothing but the giving satisfaction to their
+masters or to the people! for when covered with wounds, they send to
+their masters to learn their pleasure: if it is their will, they are
+ready to lie down and die. What gladiator, of even moderate reputation,
+ever gave a sigh? who ever turned pale? who ever disgraced himself
+either in the actual combat, or even when about to die? who that had
+been defeated ever drew in his neck to avoid the stroke of death? So
+great is the force of practice, deliberation, and custom! Shall this,
+then, be done by</p>
+
+<div class="poem">
+<p>A Samnite rascal, worthy of his trade;</p>
+</div>
+
+<p class="cont">and shall a man born to glory have so soft a part in his soul as not to
+be able to fortify it by reason and reflection? The sight of the
+gladiators’ combats is by some looked on as cruel and inhuman, and I do
+not know, as it is at present managed, but it may be so; but when the
+guilty fought, we might receive by our ears perhaps (but certainly by
+our eyes we could not) better training to harden us against pain and
+death.</p>
+
+<p>XVIII. I have now said enough about the effects of exercise, custom, and
+careful meditation. Proceed we now <a id="page-81"></a><span class="pgnum">81</span>to consider the force of reason,
+unless you have something to reply to what has been said.</p>
+
+<p><i>A.</i> That I should interrupt you! By no means; for your discourse has
+brought me over to your opinion. Let the Stoics, then, think it their
+business to determine whether pain be an evil or not, while they
+endeavor to show by some strained and trifling conclusions, which are
+nothing to the purpose, that pain is no evil. My opinion is, that
+whatever it is, it is not so great as it appears; and I say, that men
+are influenced to a great extent by some false representations and
+appearance of it, and that all which is really felt is capable of being
+endured. Where shall I begin, then? Shall I superficially go over what I
+said before, that my discourse may have a greater scope?</p>
+
+<p>This, then, is agreed upon by all, and not only by learned men, but also
+by the unlearned, that it becomes the brave and magnanimous—those that
+have patience and a spirit above this world—not to give way to pain.
+Nor has there ever been any one who did not commend a man who bore it in
+this manner. That, then, which is expected from a brave man, and is
+commended when it is seen, it must surely be base in any one to be
+afraid of at its approach, or not to bear when it comes. But I would
+have you consider whether, as all the right affections of the soul are
+classed under the name of virtues, the truth is that this is not
+properly the name of them all, but that they all have their name from
+that leading virtue which is superior to all the rest: for the name
+“virtue” comes from <i>vir</i>, a man, and courage is the peculiar
+distinction of a man: and this virtue has two principal duties, to
+despise death and pain. We must, then, exert these, if we would be men
+of virtue, or, rather, if we would be men, because virtue (<i>virtus</i>) takes
+its very name from <i>vir</i>, man.</p>
+
+<p>XIX. You may inquire, perhaps, how? And such an inquiry is not amiss,
+for philosophy is ready with her assistance. Epicurus offers himself to
+you, a man far from a bad—or, I should rather say, a very good man: he
+advises no more than he knows. “Despise pain,” says he. Who is it saith
+this? Is it the same man who calls pain the greatest of all evils? It is
+not, indeed, very consistent in him. Let us hear what he says: “If the
+pain is excessive, <a id="page-82"></a><span class="pgnum">82</span>it must needs be short.” I must have that over
+again, for I do not apprehend what you mean exactly by “excessive” or
+“short.” That is excessive than which nothing can be greater; that is
+short than which nothing is shorter. I do not regard the greatness of
+any pain from which, by reason of the shortness of its continuance, I
+shall be delivered almost before it reaches me. But if the pain be as
+great as that of Philoctetes, it will appear great indeed to me, but yet
+not the greatest that I am capable of bearing; for the pain is confined
+to my foot. But my eye may pain me, I may have a pain in the head, or
+sides, or lungs, or in every part of me. It is far, then, from being
+excessive. Therefore, says he, pain of a long continuance has more
+pleasure in it than uneasiness. Now, I cannot bring myself to say so
+great a man talks nonsense; but I imagine he is laughing at us. My
+opinion is that the greatest pain (I say the greatest, though it may be
+ten atoms less than another) is not therefore short, because acute. I
+could name to you a great many good men who have been tormented many
+years with the acutest pains of the gout. But this cautious man doth not
+determine the measure of that greatness or of duration, so as to enable
+us to know what he calls excessive with regard to pain, or short with
+respect to its continuance. Let us pass him by, then, as one who says
+just nothing at all; and let us force him to acknowledge,
+notwithstanding he might behave himself somewhat boldly under his colic
+and his strangury, that no remedy against pain can be had from him who
+looks on pain as the greatest of all evils. We must apply, then, for
+relief elsewhere, and nowhere better (if we seek for what is most
+consistent with itself) than to those who place the chief good in
+honesty, and the greatest evil in infamy. You dare not so much as groan,
+or discover the least uneasiness in their company, for virtue itself
+speaks to you through them.</p>
+
+<p>XX. Will you, when you may observe children at LacedÊmon, and young men
+at Olympia, and barbarians in the amphitheatre, receive the severest
+wounds, and bear them without once opening their mouths—will you, I
+say, if any pain should by chance attack you, cry out like a woman? Will
+you not rather bear it with resolution and constancy? <a id="page-83"></a><span class="pgnum">83</span>and not cry, It
+is intolerable; nature cannot bear it! I hear what you say: Boys bear
+this because they are led thereto by glory; some bear it through shame,
+many through fear, and yet are we afraid that nature cannot bear what is
+borne by many, and in such different circumstances? Nature not only
+bears it, but challenges it, for there is nothing with her preferable,
+nothing which she desires more than credit, and reputation, and praise,
+and honor, and glory. I choose here to describe this one thing under
+many names, and I have used many that you may have the clearer idea of
+it; for what I mean to say is, that whatever is desirable of itself,
+proceeding from virtue, or placed in virtue, and commendable on its own
+account (which I would rather agree to call the only good than deny it
+to be the chief good) is what men should prefer above all things. And as
+we declare this to be the case with respect to honesty, so we speak in
+the contrary manner of infamy; nothing is so odious, so detestable,
+nothing so unworthy of a man. And if you are thoroughly convinced of
+this (for, at the beginning of this discourse, you allowed that there
+appeared to you more evil in infamy than in pain), it follows that you
+ought to have the command over yourself, though I scarcely know how this
+expression may seem an accurate one, which appears to represent man as
+made up of two natures, so that one should be in command and the other
+be subject to it.</p>
+
+<p>XXI. Yet this division does not proceed from ignorance; for the soul
+admits of a twofold division, one of which partakes of reason, the other
+is without it. When, therefore, we are ordered to give a law to
+ourselves, the meaning is, that reason should restrain our rashness.
+There is in the soul of every man something naturally soft, low,
+enervated in a manner, and languid. Were there nothing besides this, men
+would be the greatest of monsters; but there is present to every man
+reason, which presides over and gives laws to all; which, by improving
+itself, and making continual advances, becomes perfect virtue. It
+behooves a man, then, to take care that reason shall have the command
+over that part which is bound to practise obedience. In what manner? you
+will say. Why, as a master has over his slave, a general over his <a id="page-84"></a><span class="pgnum">84</span>army,
+a father over his son. If that part of the soul which I have called soft
+behaves disgracefully, if it gives itself up to lamentations and
+womanish tears, then let it be restrained, and committed to the care of
+friends and relations, for we often see those persons brought to order
+by shame whom no reasons can influence. Therefore, we should confine
+those feelings, like our servants, in safe custody, and almost with
+chains. But those who have more resolution, and yet are not utterly
+immovable, we should encourage with our exhortations, as we would good
+soldiers, to recollect themselves, and maintain their honor. That wisest
+man of all Greece, in the NiptrÊ, does not lament too much over his
+wounds, or, rather, he is moderate in his grief:</p>
+
+<div class="poem">
+<p>Move slow, my friends; your hasty speed refrain,</p>
+<p>Lest by your motion you increase my pain.</p>
+</div>
+
+<p>Pacuvius is better in this than Sophocles, for in the one Ulysses
+bemoans his wounds too vehemently; for the very people who carried him
+after he was wounded, though his grief was moderate, yet, considering
+the dignity of the man, did not scruple to say,</p>
+
+<div class="poem">
+<p>And thou, Ulysses, long to war inured,</p>
+<p>Thy wounds, though great, too feebly hast endured.</p>
+</div>
+
+<p class="cont">The wise poet understood that custom was no contemptible instructor how
+to bear pain. But the same hero complains with more decency, though in
+great pain:</p>
+
+<div class="poem">
+<p>Assist, support me, never leave me so;</p>
+<p>Unbind my wounds, oh! execrable woe!</p>
+</div>
+
+<p class="cont">He begins to give way, but instantly checks himself:</p>
+
+<div class="poem">
+<p>Away! begone! but cover first the sore;</p>
+<p>For your rude hands but make my pains the more.</p>
+</div>
+
+<p class="cont">Do you observe how he constrains himself? not that his bodily pains were
+less, but because he checks the anguish of his mind. Therefore, in the
+conclusion of the NiptrÊ, he blames others, even when he himself is
+dying:</p>
+
+<div class="poem">
+<p>Complaints of fortune may become the man,</p>
+<p>None but a woman will thus weeping stand.</p>
+</div>
+
+<p class="cont"><a id="page-85"></a><span class="pgnum">85</span>And so that soft place in his soul obeys his reason, just as an abashed
+soldier does his stern commander.</p>
+
+<p>XXII. The man, then, in whom absolute wisdom exists (such a man, indeed,
+we have never as yet seen, but the philosophers have described in their
+writings what sort of man he will be, if he should exist); such a man,
+or at least that perfect and absolute reason which exists in him, will
+have the same authority over the inferior part as a good parent has over
+his dutiful children: he will bring it to obey his nod without any
+trouble or difficulty. He will rouse himself, prepare and arm himself,
+to oppose pain as he would an enemy. If you inquire what arms he will
+provide himself with, they will be contention, encouragement, discourse
+with himself. He will say thus to himself: Take care that you are guilty
+of nothing base, languid, or unmanly. He will turn over in his mind all
+the different kinds of honor. Zeno of Elea will occur to him, who
+suffered everything rather than betray his confederates in the design of
+putting an end to the tyranny. He will reflect on Anaxarchus, the pupil
+of Democritus, who, having fallen into the hands of Nicocreon, King of
+Cyprus, without the least entreaty for mercy or refusal, submitted to
+every kind of torture. Calanus the Indian will occur to him, an ignorant
+man and a barbarian, born at the foot of Mount Caucasus, who committed
+himself to the flames by his own free, voluntary act. But we, if we have
+the toothache, or a pain in the foot, or if the body be anyways
+affected, cannot bear it. For our sentiments of pain as well as pleasure
+are so trifling and effeminate, we are so enervated and relaxed by
+luxuries, that we cannot bear the sting of a bee without crying out. But
+Caius Marius, a plain countryman, but of a manly soul, when he had an
+operation performed on him, as I mentioned above, at first refused to be
+tied down; and he is the first instance of any one’s having had an
+operation performed on him without being tied down. Why, then, did
+others bear it afterward? Why, from the force of example. You see, then,
+that pain exists more in opinion than in nature; and yet the same Marius
+gave a proof that there is something very sharp in pain for he would not
+submit to have the other thigh cut. So that he bore his pain with
+resolution as a man; but, <a id="page-86"></a><span class="pgnum">86</span>like a reasonable person, he was not willing
+to undergo any greater pain without some necessary reason. The whole,
+then, consists in this—that you should have command over yourself. I
+have already told you what kind of command this is; and by considering
+what is most consistent with patience, fortitude, and greatness of soul,
+a man not only restrains himself, but, somehow or other, mitigates even
+pain itself.</p>
+
+<p>XXIII. Even as in a battle the dastardly and timorous soldier throws
+away his shield on the first appearance of an enemy, and runs as fast as
+he can, and on that account loses his life sometimes, though he has
+never received even one wound, when he who stands his ground has nothing
+of the sort happen to him, so they who cannot bear the appearance of
+pain throw themselves away, and give themselves up to affliction and
+dismay. But they that oppose it, often come off more than a match for
+it. For the body has a certain resemblance to the soul: as burdens are
+more easily borne the more the body is exerted, while they crush us if
+we give way, so the soul by exerting itself resists the whole weight
+that would oppress it; but if it yields, it is so pressed that it cannot
+support itself. And if we consider things truly, the soul should exert
+itself in every pursuit, for that is the only security for its doing its
+duty. But this should be principally regarded in pain, that we must not
+do anything timidly, or dastardly, or basely, or slavishly, or
+effeminately, and, above all things, we must dismiss and avoid that
+Philoctetean sort of outcry. A man is allowed sometimes to groan, but
+yet seldom; but it is not permissible even in a woman to howl; for such
+a noise as this is forbidden, by the twelve tables, to be used even at
+funerals. Nor does a wise or brave man ever groan, unless when he exerts
+himself to give his resolution greater force, as they who run in the
+stadium make as much noise as they can. The wrestlers, too, do the same
+when they are training; and the boxers, when they aim a blow with the
+cestus at their adversary, give a groan, not because they are in pain,
+or from a sinking of their spirits, but because their whole body is put
+upon the stretch by the throwing-out of these groans, and the blow comes
+the stronger.</p>
+
+<p><a id="page-87"></a><span class="pgnum">87</span>XXIV. What! they who would speak louder than ordinary are they
+satisfied with working their jaws, sides, or tongue or stretching the
+common organs of speech and utterance? The whole body and every muscle
+is at full stretch if I may be allowed the expression; every nerve is
+exerted to assist their voice. I have actually seen the knees of Marcus
+Antonius touch the ground when he was speaking with vehemence for
+himself, with relation to the Varian law. For, as the engines you throw
+stones or darts with throw them out with the greater force the more they
+are strained and drawn back; so it is in speaking, running, or
+boxing—the more people strain themselves, the greater their force.
+Since, therefore, this exertion has so much influence—if in a moment of
+pain groans help to strengthen the mind, let us use them; but if they be
+groans of lamentation, if they be the expression of weakness or
+abjectness, or unmanly weeping, then I should scarcely call him a man
+who yielded to them. For even supposing that such groaning could give
+any ease, it still should be considered whether it were consistent with
+a brave and resolute man. But if it does not ease our pain, why should
+we debase ourselves to no purpose? For what is more unbecoming in a man
+than to cry like a woman? But this precept which is laid down with
+respect to pain is not confined to it. We should apply this exertion of
+the soul to everything else. Is anger inflamed? is lust excited? we must
+have recourse to the same citadel, and apply to the same arms. But since
+it is pain which we are at present discussing, we will let the other
+subjects alone. To bear pain, then, sedately and calmly, it is of great
+use to consider with all our soul, as the saying is, how noble it is to
+do so, for we are naturally desirous (as I said before, but it cannot be
+too often repeated) and very much inclined to what is honorable, of
+which, if we discover but the least glimpse, there is nothing which we
+are not prepared to undergo and suffer to attain it. From this impulse
+of our minds, this desire for genuine glory and honorable conduct, it is
+that such dangers are supported in war, and that brave men are not
+sensible of their wounds in action, or, if they are sensible of them,
+prefer death to the departing but the least step <a id="page-88"></a><span class="pgnum">88</span>from their honor. The
+Decii saw the shining swords of their enemies when they were rushing
+into the battle. But the honorable character and the glory of the death
+which they were seeking made all fear of death of little weight. Do you
+imagine that Epaminondas groaned when he perceived that his life was
+flowing out with his blood? No; for he left his country triumphing over
+the LacedÊmonians, whereas he had found it in subjection to them. These
+are the comforts, these are the things that assuage the greatest pain.</p>
+
+<p>XXV. You may ask, How the case is in peace? What is to be done at home?
+How we are to behave in bed? You bring me back to the philosophers, who
+seldom go to war. Among these, Dionysius of Heraclea, a man certainly of
+no resolution, having learned fortitude of Zeno, quitted it on being in
+pain; for, being tormented with a pain in his kidneys, in bewailing
+himself he cried out that those things were false which he had formerly
+conceived of pain. And when his fellow-disciple, Cleanthes, asked him
+why he had changed his opinion, he answered, “That the case of any man
+who had applied so much time to philosophy, and yet was unable to bear
+pain, might be a sufficient proof that pain is an evil; that he himself
+had spent many years at philosophy, and yet could not bear pain: it
+followed, therefore, that pain was an evil.” It is reported that
+Cleanthes on that struck his foot on the ground, and repeated a verse
+out of the EpigonÊ:</p>
+
+<div class="poem">
+<p>Amphiaraus, hear’st thou this below?</p>
+</div>
+
+<p class="cont">He meant Zeno: he was sorry the other had degenerated from him.</p>
+
+<p>But it was not so with our friend Posidonius, whom I have often seen
+myself; and I will tell you what Pompey used to say of him: that when he
+came to Rhodes, after his departure from Syria, he had a great desire to
+hear Posidonius, but was informed that he was very ill of a severe fit
+of the gout; yet he had great inclination to pay a visit to so famous a
+philosopher. Accordingly, when he had seen him, and paid his
+compliments, and had spoken with great respect of him, he said he was
+very sorry that he could not hear him lecture. “But indeed you may,”
+<a id="page-89"></a><span class="pgnum">89</span>replied the other, “nor will I suffer any bodily pain to occasion so
+great a man to visit me in vain.” On this Pompey relates that, as he lay
+on his bed, he disputed with great dignity and fluency on this very
+subject: that nothing was good but what was honest; and that in his
+paroxysms he would often say, “Pain, it is to no purpose;
+notwithstanding you are troublesome, I will never acknowledge you an
+evil.” And in general all celebrated and notorious afflictions become
+endurable by disregarding them.</p>
+
+<p>XXVI. Do we not observe that where those exercises called gymnastic are
+in esteem, those who enter the lists never concern themselves about
+dangers? that where the praise of riding and hunting is highly esteemed,
+they who practice these arts decline no pain? What shall I say of our
+own ambitious pursuits or desire of honors? What fire have not
+candidates run through to gain a single vote? Therefore Africanus had
+always in his hands Xenophon, the pupil of Socrates, being particularly
+pleased with his saying, that the same labors were not equally heavy to
+the general and to the common man, because the honor itself made the
+labor lighter to the general. But yet, so it happens, that even with the
+illiterate vulgar an idea of honor is of great influence, though they
+cannot understand what it is. They are led by report and common opinion
+to look on that as honorable which has the general voice. Not that I
+would have you, should the multitude be ever so fond of you, rely on
+their judgment, nor approve of everything which they think right: you
+must use your own judgment. If you are satisfied with yourself when you
+have approved of what is right, you will not only have the mastery over
+yourself (which I recommended to you just now), but over everybody, and
+everything. Lay this down, then, as a rule, that a great capacity, and
+lofty elevation of soul, which distinguishes itself most by despising
+and looking down with contempt on pain, is the most excellent of all
+things, and the more so if it does not depend on the people and does not
+aim at applause, but derives its satisfaction from itself. Besides, to
+me, indeed, everything seems the more commendable the less the people
+are courted, and the fewer eyes there <a id="page-90"></a><span class="pgnum">90</span>are to see it. Not that you
+should avoid the public, for every generous action loves the public
+view; yet no theatre for virtue is equal to a consciousness of it.</p>
+
+<p>XXVII. And let this be principally considered: that this bearing of
+pain, which I have often said is to be strengthened by an exertion of
+the soul, should be the same in everything. For you meet with many who,
+through a desire of victory, or for glory, or to maintain their rights,
+or their liberty, have boldly received wounds, and borne themselves up
+under them; and yet those very same persons, by relaxing that
+intenseness of their minds, were unequal to bearing the pain of a
+disease; for they did not support themselves under their former
+sufferings by reason or philosophy, but by inclination and glory.
+Therefore some barbarians and savage people are able to fight very
+stoutly with the sword, but cannot bear sickness like men; but the
+Grecians, men of no great courage, but as wise as human nature will
+admit of, cannot look an enemy in the face, yet the same will bear to be
+visited with sickness tolerably, and with a sufficiently manly spirit;
+and the Cimbrians and Celtiberians are very alert in battle, but bemoan
+themselves in sickness. For nothing can be consistent which has not
+reason for its foundation. But when you see those who are led by
+inclination or opinion, not retarded by pain in their pursuits, nor
+hindered by it from succeeding in them, you may conclude, either that
+pain is no evil, or that, notwithstanding you may choose to call an evil
+whatever is disagreeable and contrary to nature, yet it is so very
+trifling an evil that it may so effectually be got the better of by
+virtue as quite to disappear. And I would have you think of this night
+and day; for this argument will spread itself, and take up more room
+some time or other, and not be confined to pain alone; for if the
+motives to all our actions are to avoid disgrace and acquire honor, we
+may not only despise the stings of pain, but the storms of fortune,
+especially if we have recourse to that retreat which was pointed out in
+our yesterday’s discussion; for, as if some God had advised a man who
+was pursued by pirates to throw himself overboard, saying, “There is
+something at hand to receive you; either a dolphin will take you up, as
+it did Arion of <a id="page-91"></a><span class="pgnum">91</span>Methymna; or those horses sent by Neptune to Pelops
+(who are said to have carried chariots so rapidly as to be borne up by
+the waves) will receive you, and convey you wherever you please. Cast
+away all fear.” So, though your pains be ever so sharp and disagreeable,
+if the case is not such that it is worth your while to endure them, you
+see whither you may betake yourself. I think this will do for the
+present. But perhaps you still abide by your opinion.</p>
+
+<p><i>A.</i> Not in the least, indeed; and I hope I am freed by these two days’
+discourses from the fear of two things that I greatly dreaded.</p>
+
+<p><i>M.</i> To-morrow, then, for rhetoric, as we were saying. But I see we must
+not drop our philosophy.</p>
+
+<p><i>A.</i> No, indeed; we will have the one in the forenoon, and this at the
+usual time.</p>
+
+<p><i>M.</i> It shall be so, and I will comply with your very laudable
+inclinations.</p>
+
+<hr/>
+
+
+<h3>BOOK III.</h3>
+
+<h4>ON GRIEF OF MIND.</h4>
+
+
+<p>I. <span class="first">What</span> reason shall I assign, O Brutus, why, as we consist of mind and
+body, the art of curing and preserving the body should be so much sought
+after, and the invention of it, as being so useful, should be ascribed
+to the immortal Gods; but the medicine of the mind should not have been
+so much the object of inquiry while it was unknown, nor so much attended
+to and cultivated after its discovery, nor so well received or approved
+of by some, and accounted actually disagreeable, and looked upon with an
+envious eye by many? Is it because we, by means of the mind, judge of
+the pains and disorders of the body, but do not, by means of the body,
+arrive at any perception of the disorders of the mind? Hence it comes
+that the mind only judges of itself when that very faculty by which it
+is judged is in a bad state. Had nature given us faculties for
+discerning and viewing herself, and could we go through life by keeping
+our eye on her—our best guide—<a id="page-92"></a><span class="pgnum">92</span>there would be no reason certainly why
+any one should be in want of philosophy or learning; but, as it is, she
+has furnished us only with some feeble rays of light, which we
+immediately extinguish so completely by evil habits and erroneous
+opinions that the light of nature is nowhere visible. The seeds of
+virtues are natural to our constitutions, and, were they suffered to
+come to maturity, would naturally conduct us to a happy life; but now,
+as soon as we are born and received into the world, we are instantly
+familiarized with all kinds of depravity and perversity of opinions; so
+that we may be said almost to suck in error with our nurse’s milk. When
+we return to our parents, and are put into the hands of tutors and
+governors, we are imbued with so many errors that truth gives place to
+falsehood, and nature herself to established opinion.</p>
+
+<p>II. To these we may add the poets; who, on account of the appearance
+they exhibit of learning and wisdom, are heard, read, and got by heart,
+and make a deep impression on our minds. But when to these are added the
+people, who are, as it were, one great body of instructors, and the
+multitude, who declare unanimously for what is wrong, then are we
+altogether overwhelmed with bad opinions, and revolt entirely from
+nature; so that they seem to deprive us of our best guide who have
+decided that there is nothing better for man, nothing more worthy of
+being desired by him, nothing more excellent, than honors and commands,
+and a high reputation with the people; which indeed every excellent man
+aims at; but while he pursues that only true honor which nature has in
+view above all other objects, he finds himself busied in arrant trifles,
+and in pursuit of no conspicuous form of virtue, but only some shadowy
+representation of glory. For glory is a real and express substance, not
+a mere shadow. It consists in the united praise of good men, the free
+voice of those who form a true judgment of pre-eminent virtue; it is, as
+it were, the very echo of virtue; and being generally the attendant on
+laudable actions, should not be slighted by good men. But popular fame,
+which would pretend to imitate it, is hasty and inconsiderate, and
+generally commends wicked and immoral actions, and throws discredit upon
+the appearance and beauty of honesty by assuming <a id="page-93"></a><span class="pgnum">93</span>a resemblance of it.
+And it is owing to their not being able to discover the difference
+between them that some men ignorant of real excellence, and in what it
+consists, have been the destruction of their country and of themselves.
+And thus the best men have erred, not so much in their intentions as by
+a mistaken conduct. What? is no cure to be attempted to be applied to
+those who are carried away by the love of money, or the lust of
+pleasures, by which they are rendered little short of madmen, which is
+the case of all weak people? or is it because the disorders of the mind
+are less dangerous than those of the body? or because the body will
+admit of a cure, while there is no medicine whatever for the mind?</p>
+
+<p>III. But there are more disorders of the mind than of the body, and they
+are of a more dangerous nature; for these very disorders are the more
+offensive because they belong to the mind and disturb it; and the mind,
+when disordered, is, as Ennius says, in a constant error: it can neither
+bear nor endure anything, and is under the perpetual influence of
+desires. Now, what disorders can be worse to the body than these two
+distempers of the mind (for I overlook others), weakness and desire? But
+how, indeed, can it be maintained that the mind cannot prescribe for
+itself, when she it is who has invented the medicines for the body,
+when, with regard to bodily cures, constitution and nature have a great
+share, nor do all who suffer themselves to be cured find that effect
+instantly; but those minds which are disposed to be cured, and submit to
+the precepts of the wise, may undoubtedly recover a healthy state?
+Philosophy is certainly the medicine of the soul, whose assistance we do
+not seek from abroad, as in bodily disorders, but we ourselves are bound
+to exert our utmost energy and power in order to effect our cure. But as
+to philosophy in general, I have, I think, in my Hortensius,
+sufficiently spoken of the credit and attention which it deserves: since
+that, indeed, I have been continually either disputing or writing on its
+most material branches; and I have laid down in these books all the
+discussions which took place between myself and my particular friends at
+my Tusculan villa. But as I have spoken in the two former of pain and
+death, this book shall be <a id="page-94"></a><span class="pgnum">94</span>devoted to the account of the third day of
+our disputations.</p>
+
+<p>We came down into the Academy when the day was already declining towards
+afternoon, and I asked one of those who were present to propose a
+subject for us to discourse on; and then the business was carried on in
+this manner:</p>
+
+<p>IV. <i>A.</i> My opinion is, that a wise man is subject to grief.</p>
+
+<p><i>M.</i> What, and to the other perturbations of mind, as fears, lusts,
+anger? For these are pretty much like what the Greeks call <span class="greek">πᜱΞη</span>. I might
+call them diseases, and that would be a literal translation, but it is
+not agreeable to our way of speaking. For envy, delight, and pleasure
+are all called by the Greeks diseases, being affections of the mind not
+in subordination to reason; but we, I think, are right in calling the
+same motions of a disturbed soul perturbations, and in very seldom using
+the term diseases; though, perhaps, it appears otherwise to you.</p>
+
+<p><i>A.</i> I am of your opinion.</p>
+
+<p><i>M.</i> And do you think a wise man subject to these?</p>
+
+<p><i>A.</i> Entirely, I think.</p>
+
+<p><i>M.</i> Then that boasted wisdom is but of small account, if it differs so
+little from madness?</p>
+
+<p><i>A.</i> What? does every commotion of the mind seem to you to be madness?</p>
+
+<p><i>M.</i> Not to me only; but I apprehend, though I have often been surprised
+at it, that it appeared so to our ancestors many ages before Socrates;
+from whom is derived all that philosophy which relates to life and
+morals.</p>
+
+<p><i>A.</i> How so?</p>
+
+<p><i>M.</i> Because the name madness<a id="FNA-35"></a><a href="#FN-35"><sup>35</sup></a> implies a sickness of the mind and
+disease; that is to say, an unsoundness and an unhealthiness of mind,
+which they call madness. But the philosophers call all perturbations of
+the soul diseases, and their opinion is that no fool is ever free from
+these; but all that are diseased are unsound; and the minds of all fools
+are diseased; therefore all fools are mad. For they held that soundness
+of the mind depends on a certain <a id="page-95"></a><span class="pgnum">95</span>tranquillity and steadiness; and a
+mind which was destitute of these qualities they called insane, because
+soundness was inconsistent with a perturbed mind just as much as with a
+disordered body.</p>
+
+<p>V. Nor were they less ingenious in calling the state of the soul devoid
+of the light of the mind, “a being out of one’s mind,” “a being beside
+one’s self.” From whence we may understand that they who gave these
+names to things were of the same opinion with Socrates, that all silly
+people were unsound, which the Stoics have carefully preserved as being
+derived from him; for whatever mind is distempered (and, as I just now
+said, the philosophers call all perturbed motions of the mind
+distempers) is no more sound than a body is when in a fit of sickness.
+Hence it is that wisdom is the soundness of the mind, folly a sort of
+unsoundness, which is insanity, or a being out of one’s mind: and these
+are much better expressed by the Latin words than the Greek, which you
+will find the case also in many other topics. But we will discuss that
+point elsewhere: let us now attend to our present subject. The very
+meaning of the word describes the whole thing about which we are
+inquiring, both as to its substance and character. For we must
+necessarily understand by “sound” those whose minds are under no
+perturbation from any motion as if it were a disease. They who are
+differently affected we must necessarily call “unsound.” So that nothing
+is better than what is usual in Latin, to say that they who are run away
+with by their lust or anger have quitted the command over themselves;
+though anger includes lust, for anger is defined to be the lust of
+revenge. They, then, who are said not to be masters of themselves, are
+said to be so because they are not under the government of reason, to
+which is assigned by nature the power over the whole soul. Why the
+Greeks should call this mania, I do not easily apprehend; but we define
+it much better than they, for we distinguish this madness (<i>insania</i>),
+which, being allied to folly, is more extensive, from what we call
+<i>furor</i>, or raving. The Greeks, indeed, would do so too, but they have
+no one word that will express it: what we call <i>furor</i>, they call
+<span class="greek">Όελαγχολ᜷α</span>, as if the reason <a id="page-96"></a><span class="pgnum">96</span>were affected only by a black bile, and
+not disturbed as often by a violent rage, or fear, or grief. Thus we say
+Athamas, AlcmÊon, Ajax, and Orestes were raving (<i>furere</i>); because a
+person affected in this manner was not allowed by the Twelve Tables to
+have the management of his own affairs; therefore the words are not, if
+he is mad (<i>insanus</i>), but if he begins to be raving (<i>furiosus</i>). For
+they looked upon madness to be an unsettled humor that proceeded from
+not being of sound mind; yet such a person might perform his ordinary
+duties, and discharge the usual and customary requirements of life: but
+they considered one that was raving as afflicted with a total blindness
+of the mind, which, notwithstanding it is allowed to be greater than
+madness, is nevertheless of such a nature that a wise man may be subject
+to raving (<i>furor</i>), but cannot possibly be afflicted by insanity
+(<i>insania</i>). But this is another question: let us now return to our
+original subject.</p>
+
+<p>VI. I think you said that it was your opinion that a wise man was liable
+to grief.</p>
+
+<p><i>A.</i> And so, indeed, I think.</p>
+
+<p><i>M.</i> It is natural enough to think so, for we are not the offspring of
+flints; but we have by nature something soft and tender in our souls,
+which may be put into a violent motion by grief, as by a storm; nor did
+that Crantor, who was one of the most distinguished men that our Academy
+has ever produced, say this amiss: “I am by no means of their opinion
+who talk so much in praise of I know not what insensibility, which
+neither can exist, nor ought to exist”. “I would choose,” says he, “never
+to be ill; but should I be so, still I should choose to retain my
+sensation, whether there was to be an amputation or any other separation
+of anything from my body. For that insensibility cannot be but at the
+expense of some unnatural ferocity of mind, or stupor of body.”But let
+us consider whether to talk in this manner be not allowing that we are
+weak, and yielding to our softness. Notwithstanding, let us be hardy
+enough, not only to lop off every arm of our miseries, but even to pluck
+up every fibre of their roots. Yet still something, perhaps, may be left
+behind, so deep does folly strike its roots: but whatever may be <a id="page-97"></a><span class="pgnum">97</span>left
+it will be no more than is necessary. But let us be persuaded of this,
+that unless the mind be in a sound state, which philosophy alone can
+effect, there can be no end of our miseries. Wherefore, as we began, let
+us submit ourselves to it for a cure; we shall be cured if we choose to
+be. I shall advance something further. I shall not treat of grief alone,
+though that indeed is the principal thing; but, as I originally
+proposed, of every perturbation of the mind, as I termed it; disorder,
+as the Greeks call it: and first, with your leave, I shall treat it in
+the manner of the Stoics, whose method is to reduce their arguments into
+a very small space; afterward I shall enlarge more in my own way.</p>
+
+<p>VII. A man of courage is also full of faith. I do not use the word
+confident, because, owing to an erroneous custom of speaking, that word
+has come to be used in a bad sense, though it is derived from confiding,
+which is commendable. But he who is full of faith is certainly under no
+fear; for there is an inconsistency between faith and fear. Now, whoever
+is subject to grief is subject to fear; for whatever things we grieve at
+when present we dread when hanging over us and approaching. Thus it
+comes about that grief is inconsistent with courage: it is very
+probable, therefore, that whoever is subject to grief is also liable to
+fear, and to a broken kind of spirits and sinking. Now, whenever these
+befall a man, he is in a servile state, and must own that he is
+overpowered; for whoever admits these feelings, must admit timidity and
+cowardice. But these cannot enter into the mind of a man of courage;
+neither, therefore, can grief: but the man of courage is the only wise
+man; therefore grief cannot befall the wise man. It is, besides,
+necessary that whoever is brave should be a man of great soul; that
+whoever is a man of a great soul should be invincible; whoever is
+invincible looks down with contempt on all things here, and considers
+them, beneath him. But no one can despise those things on account of
+which he may be affected with grief; from whence it follows that a wise
+man is never affected with grief: for all wise men are brave; therefore
+a wise man is not subject to grief. And as the eye, when disordered, is
+not in a good condition for performing its <a id="page-98"></a><span class="pgnum">98</span>office properly; and as the
+other parts, and the whole body itself, when unsettled, cannot perform
+their office and business; so the mind, when disordered, is but
+ill-fitted to perform its duty. The office of the mind is to use its
+reason well; but the mind of a wise man is always in condition to make
+the best use of his reason, and therefore is never out of order. But
+grief is a disorder of the mind; therefore a wise man will be always
+free from it.</p>
+
+<p>VIII. And from these considerations we may get at a very probable
+definition of the temperate man, whom the Greeks call <span class="greek">σ᜜φρωΜ</span>: and they
+call that virtue <span class="greek">σωφροσ᜻ΜηΜ</span>, which I at one time call temperance, at
+another time moderation, and sometimes even modesty; but I do not know
+whether that virtue may not be properly called frugality, which has a
+more confined meaning with the Greeks; for they call frugal men
+<span class="greek">χρησ᜷Όους</span>, which implies only that they are useful; but our name has a
+more extensive meaning: for all abstinence, all innocency (which the
+Greeks have no ordinary name for, though they might use the word
+<span class="greek">ጀβλᜱβεια</span>, for innocency is that disposition of mind which would offend
+no one) and several other virtues are comprehended under frugality; but
+if this quality were of less importance, and confined in as small a
+compass as some imagine, the surname of Piso<a id="FNA-36"></a><a href="#FN-36"><sup>36</sup></a> would not have been in
+so great esteem. But as we allow him not the name of a frugal man
+(<i>frugi</i>), who either quits his post through fear, which is cowardice;
+or who reserves to his own use what was privately committed to his
+keeping, which is injustice; or who fails in his military undertakings
+through rashness, which is folly—for that reason the word frugality
+takes in these three virtues of fortitude, justice, and prudence, though
+it is indeed common to all virtues, for they are all connected and knit
+together. Let us allow, then, frugality itself to be another and fourth
+virtue; for its peculiar property seems to be, to govern and appease all
+tendencies to too eager a desire after anything, to restrain lust, and
+to preserve a decent steadiness in everything. The vice in contrast to
+this is called prodigality (<i>nequitia</i>). Frugality, I imagine, is
+derived from the <a id="page-99"></a><span class="pgnum">99</span>word <i>fruge</i>, the best thing which the earth produces;
+<i>nequitia</i> is derived (though this is perhaps rather more strained;
+still, let us try it; we shall only be thought to have been trifling if
+there is nothing in what we say) from the fact of everything being to no
+purpose (<i>nequicquam</i>) in such a man; from which circumstance he is
+called also <i>Nihil</i>, nothing. Whoever is frugal, then, or, if it is more
+agreeable to you, whoever is moderate and temperate, such a one must of
+course be consistent; whoever is consistent, must be quiet; the quiet
+man must be free from all perturbation, therefore from grief likewise:
+and these are the properties of a wise man; therefore a wise man must be
+free from grief.</p>
+
+<p>IX. So that Dionysius of Heraclea is right when, upon this complaint of
+Achilles in Homer,</p>
+
+<div class="poem">
+<p>Well hast thou spoke, but at the tyrant’s name</p>
+<p>My rage rekindles, and my soul’s in flame:</p>
+<p>’Tis just resentment, and becomes the brave,</p>
+<p>Disgraced, dishonor’d like the vilest slave<a id="FNA-37"></a><a href="#FN-37"><sup>37</sup></a>—</p>
+</div>
+
+<p class="cont">he reasons thus: Is the hand as it should be, when it is affected with a
+swelling? or is it possible for any other member of the body, when
+swollen or enlarged, to be in any other than a disordered state? Must
+not the mind, then, when it is puffed up, or distended, be out of order?
+But the mind of a wise man is always free from every kind of disorder:
+it never swells, never is puffed up; but the mind when in anger is in a
+different state. A wise man, therefore, is never angry; for when he is
+angry, he lusts after something; for whoever is angry naturally has a
+longing desire to give all the pain he can to the person who he thinks
+has injured him; and whoever has this earnest desire must necessarily be
+much pleased with the accomplishment of his wishes; hence he is
+delighted with his neighbor’s misery; and as a wise man is not capable
+of such feelings as these, he is therefore not capable of anger. But
+should a wise man be subject to grief, he may likewise <a id="page-100"></a><span class="pgnum">100</span>be subject to
+anger; for as he is free from anger, he must likewise be free from
+grief. Again, could a wise man be subject to grief, he might also be
+liable to pity, or even might be open to a disposition towards envy
+(<i>invidentia</i>); I do not say to envy (<i>invidia</i>), for that can only
+exist by the very act of envying: but we may fairly form the word
+<i>invidentia</i> from <i>invidendo</i>, and so avoid the doubtful name <i>invidia;</i>
+for this word is probably derived from <i>in</i> and <i>video</i>, looking too
+closely into another’s fortune; as it is said in the Melanippus,</p>
+
+<div class="poem">
+<p>Who envies me the flower of my children?</p>
+</div>
+
+<p class="cont">where the Latin is <i>invidit florem.</i> It may appear not good Latin, but
+it is very well put by Accius; for as <i>video</i> governs an accusative
+case, so it is more correct to say <i>invideo florem</i> than <i>flori.</i> We are
+debarred from saying so by common usage. The poet stood in his own
+right, and expressed himself with more freedom.</p>
+
+<p>X. Therefore compassion and envy are consistent in the same man; for
+whoever is uneasy at any one’s adversity is also uneasy at another’s
+prosperity: as Theophrastus, while he laments the death of his companion
+Callisthenes, is at the same time disturbed at the success of Alexander;
+and therefore he says that Callisthenes met with man of the greatest
+power and good fortune, but one who did not know how to make use of his
+good fortune. And as pity is an uneasiness which arises from the
+misfortunes of another, so envy is an uneasiness that proceeds from the
+good success of another: therefore whoever is capable of pity is capable
+of envy. But a wise man is incapable of envy, and consequently incapable
+of pity. But were a wise man used to grieve, to pity also would be
+familiar to him; therefore to grieve is a feeling which cannot affect a
+wise man. Now, though these reasonings of the Stoics, and their
+conclusions, are rather strained and distorted, and ought to be
+expressed in a less stringent and narrow manner, yet great stress is to
+be laid on the opinions of those men who have a peculiarly bold and
+manly turn of thought and sentiment. For our friends the Peripatetics,
+notwithstanding all their erudition, gravity, and fluency of language,
+do not satisfy me about the moderation of these disorders and diseases
+<a id="page-101"></a><span class="pgnum">101</span>of the soul which they insist upon; for every evil, though moderate, is
+in its nature great. But our object is to make out that the wise man is
+free from all evil; for as the body is unsound if it is ever so slightly
+affected, so the mind under any moderate disorder loses its soundness;
+therefore the Romans have, with their usual accuracy of expression,
+called trouble, and anguish, and vexation, on account of the analogy
+between a troubled mind and a diseased body, disorders. The Greeks call
+all perturbation of mind by pretty nearly the same name; for they name
+every turbid motion of the soul <span class="greek">πᜱΞος</span>, that is to say, a distemper. But
+we have given them a more proper name; for a disorder of the mind is
+very like a disease of the body. But lust does not resemble sickness;
+neither does immoderate joy, which is an elated and exulting pleasure of
+the mind. Fear, too, is not very like a distemper, though it is akin to
+grief of mind, but properly, as is also the case with sickness of the
+body, so too sickness of mind has no name separated from pain. And
+therefore I must explain the origin of this pain, that is to say, the
+cause that occasions this grief in the mind, as if it were a sickness of
+the body. For as physicians think they have found out the cure when they
+have discovered the cause of the distemper, so we shall discover the
+method of curing melancholy when the cause of it is found out.</p>
+
+<p>XI. The whole cause, then, is in opinion; and this observation applies
+not to this grief alone, but to every other disorder of the mind, which
+are of four sorts, but consisting of many parts. For as every disorder
+or perturbation is a motion of the mind, either devoid of reason, or in
+despite of reason, or in disobedience to reason, and as that motion is
+excited by an opinion of either good or evil; these four perturbations
+are divided equally into two parts: for two of them proceed from an
+opinion of good, one of which is an exulting pleasure, that is to say, a
+joy elated beyond measure, arising from an opinion of some present great
+good; the other is a desire which may fairly be called even a lust, and
+is an immoderate inclination after some conceived great good without any
+obedience to reason. Therefore these two kinds, the exulting pleasure
+and the lust, have their rise from an opinion of good, as <a id="page-102"></a><span class="pgnum">102</span>the other
+two, fear and grief, have from an opinion of evil. For fear is an
+opinion of some great evil impending over us, and grief is an opinion of
+some great evil present; and, indeed, it is a freshly conceived opinion
+of an evil so great that to grieve at it seems right: it is of that kind
+that he who is uneasy at it thinks he has good reason to be so. Now we
+should exert, our utmost efforts to oppose these perturbations—which
+are, as it were, so many furies let loose upon us and urged on by
+folly—if we are desirous to pass this share of life that is allotted to
+us with ease and satisfaction. But of the other feelings I shall speak
+elsewhere: our business at present is to drive away grief if we can, for
+that shall be the object of our present discussion, since you have said
+that it was your opinion that a wise man might be subject to grief,
+which I can by no means allow of; for it is a frightful, miserable, and
+detestable thing, which we should fly from with our utmost efforts—with
+all our sails and oars, as I may say.</p>
+
+<p>XII. That descendant of Tantalus, how does he appear to you—he who
+sprung from Pelops, who formerly stole Hippodamia from her
+father-in-law, King Œnomaus, and married her by force?—he who was
+descended from Jupiter himself, how broken-hearted and dispirited does
+he not seem!</p>
+
+<div class="poem">
+<p>Stand off, my friends, nor come within my shade,</p>
+<p>That no pollutions your sound hearts pervade,</p>
+<p>So foul a stain my body doth partake.</p>
+</div>
+
+<p class="cont">Will you condemn yourself, Thyestes, and deprive yourself of life, on
+account of the greatness of another’s crime? What do you think of that
+son of Phœbus? Do you not look upon him as unworthy of his own father’s
+light?</p>
+
+<div class="poem">
+<p>Hollow his eyes, his body worn away,</p>
+<p>His furrow’d cheeks his frequent tears betray;</p>
+<p>His beard neglected, and his hoary hairs</p>
+<p>Rough and uncomb’d, bespeak his bitter cares.</p>
+</div>
+
+<p class="cont">O foolish Æetes! these are evils which you yourself have been the cause
+of, and are not occasioned by any accidents with which chance has
+visited you; and you behaved as you did, even after you had been inured
+to your distress, and after the first swelling of the mind had
+subsided!—whereas grief consists (as I shall show) in the notion of
+<a id="page-103"></a><span class="pgnum">103</span>some recent evil—but your grief, it is very plain, proceeded from the
+loss of your kingdom, not of your daughter, for you hated her, and
+perhaps with reason, but you could not calmly bear to part with your
+kingdom. But surely it is an impudent grief which preys upon a man for
+not being able to command those that are free. Dionysius, it is true,
+the tyrant of Syracuse, when driven from his country, taught a school at
+Corinth; so incapable was he of living without some authority. But what
+could be more impudent than Tarquin, who made war upon those who could
+not bear his tyranny; and, when he could not recover his kingdom by the
+aid of the forces of the Veientians and the Latins, is said to have
+betaken himself to Cuma, and to have died in that city of old age and
+grief!</p>
+
+<p>XIII. Do you, then, think that it can befall a wise man to be oppressed
+with grief, that is to say, with misery? for, as all perturbation is
+misery, grief is the rack itself. Lust is attended with heat, exulting
+joy with levity, fear with meanness, but grief with something greater
+than these; it consumes, torments, afflicts, and disgraces a man; it
+tears him, preys upon his mind, and utterly destroys him: if we do not
+so divest ourselves of it as to throw it completely off, we cannot be
+free from misery. And it is clear that there must be grief where
+anything has the appearance of a present sore and oppressing evil.
+Epicurus is of opinion that grief arises naturally from the imagination
+of any evil; so that whosoever is eye-witness of any great misfortune,
+if he conceives that the like may possibly befall himself, becomes sad
+instantly from such an idea. The Cyrenaics think that grief is not
+engendered by every kind of evil, but only by unexpected, unforeseen
+evil; and that circumstance is, indeed, of no small effect on the
+heightening of grief; for whatsoever comes of a sudden appears more
+formidable. Hence these lines are deservedly commended:</p>
+
+<div class="poem">
+<p>I knew my son, when first he drew his breath,</p>
+<p>Destined by fate to an untimely death;</p>
+<p>And when I sent him to defend the Greeks,</p>
+<p>War was his business, not your sportive freaks.</p>
+</div>
+
+<p>XIV. Therefore, this ruminating beforehand upon future evils which you
+see at a distance makes their approach <a id="page-104"></a><span class="pgnum">104</span>more tolerable; and on this
+account what Euripides makes Theseus say is much commended. You will
+give me leave to translate them, as is usual with me:</p>
+
+<div class="poem">
+<p>I treasured up what some learn’d sage did tell,</p>
+<p>And on my future misery did dwell;</p>
+<p>I thought of bitter death, of being drove</p>
+<p>Far from my home by exile, and I strove</p>
+<p>With every evil to possess my mind,</p>
+<p>That, when they came, I the less care might find.<a id="FNA-38"></a><a href="#FN-38"><sup>38</sup></a></p>
+</div>
+
+<p class="cont">But Euripides says that of himself, which Theseus said he had heard from
+some learned man, for the poet had been a pupil of Anaxagoras, who, as
+they relate, on hearing of the death of his son, said, “I knew that my
+son was mortal;” which speech seems to intimate that such things afflict
+those men who have not thought on them before. Therefore, there is no
+doubt but that all those things which are considered evils are the
+heavier from not being foreseen. Though, notwithstanding this is not the
+only circumstance which occasions the greatest grief, still, as the
+mind, by foreseeing and preparing for it, has great power to make all
+grief the less, a man should at all times consider all the events that
+may befall him in this life; and certainly the excellence and divine
+nature of wisdom consists in taking a near view of, and gaining a
+thorough acquaintance with, all human affairs, in not being surprised
+when anything happens, and in thinking, before the event, that there is
+nothing but what may come to pass.</p>
+
+<div class="poem">
+<p class="L6" style="margin-left:15ex">Wherefore ev’ry man,</p>
+<p>When his affairs go on most swimmingly,</p>
+<p>E’en then it most behooves to arm himself</p>
+<p>Against the coming storm: loss, danger, exile,</p>
+<p>Returning ever, let him look to meet;</p>
+<p>His son in fault, wife dead, or daughter sick;</p>
+<p>All common accidents, and may have happen’d</p>
+<p>That nothing shall seem new or strange. But if</p>
+<p>Aught has fall’n out beyond his hopes, all that</p>
+<p>Let him account clear gain.<a id="FNA-39"></a><a href="#FN-39"><sup>39</sup></a></p>
+</div>
+
+<p><a id="page-105"></a><span class="pgnum">105</span>XV. Therefore, as Terence has so well expressed what he borrowed from
+philosophy, shall not we, from whose fountains he drew it, say the same
+thing in a better manner, and abide by it with more steadiness? Hence
+came that steady countenance, which, according to Xantippe, her husband
+Socrates always had; so that she said that she never observed any
+difference in his looks when he went out and when he came home. Yet the
+look of that old Roman, M. Crassus, who, as Lucilius says, never smiled
+but once in his lifetime, was not of this kind, but placid and serene,
+for so we are told. He, indeed, might well have had the same look at all
+times who never changed his mind, from which the countenance derives its
+expression. So that I am ready to borrow of the Cyrenaics those arms
+against the accidents and events of life by means of which, by long
+premeditation, they break the force of all approaching evils; and at the
+same time I think that those very evils themselves arise more from
+opinion than nature, for if they were real, no forecast could make them
+lighter. But I shall speak more particularly on these matters after I
+have first considered Epicurus’s opinion, who thinks that all people
+must necessarily be uneasy who believe themselves to be in any evils,
+let them be either foreseen and expected, or habitual to them; for with
+him evils are not the less by reason of their continuance, nor the
+lighter for having been foreseen; and it is folly to ruminate on evils
+to come, or such as, perhaps, never may come: every evil is disagreeable
+enough when it does come; but he who is constantly considering that some
+evil may befall him is loading himself with a perpetual evil; and even
+should such evil never light on him, he voluntarily takes upon himself
+unnecessary misery, so that he is under constant uneasiness, whether he
+actually suffers any evil, or only thinks of it. But he makes the
+alleviation of grief depend on two things—a ceasing to think on evil,
+and a turning to the contemplation of pleasure. For he thinks that the
+mind may possibly be under the power of reason, and follow her
+directions: he forbids us, therefore, to mind trouble, and calls us off
+from sorrowful reflections; he throws a mist over our eyes to hinder us
+from the contemplation of misery. Having sounded a retreat <a id="page-106"></a><span class="pgnum">106</span>from this
+statement, he drives our thoughts on again, and encourages them to view
+and engage the whole mind in the various pleasures with which he thinks
+the life of a wise man abounds, either from reflecting on the past, or
+from the hope of what is to come. I have said these things in my own
+way; the Epicureans have theirs. However, let us examine what they say;
+how they say it is of little consequence.</p>
+
+<p>XVI. In the first place, they are wrong in forbidding men to premeditate
+on futurity and blaming their wish to do so; for there is nothing that
+breaks the edge of grief and lightens it more than considering, during
+one’s whole life, that there is nothing which it is impossible should
+happen, or than, considering what human nature is, on what conditions
+life was given, and how we may comply with them. The effect of which is
+that we are always grieving, but that we never do so; for whoever
+reflects on the nature of things, the various turns of life, and the
+weakness of human nature, grieves, indeed, at that reflection; but while
+so grieving he is, above all other times, behaving as a wise man, for he
+gains these two things by it: one, that while he is considering the
+state of human nature he is performing the especial duties of
+philosophy, and is provided with a triple medicine against adversity—in
+the first place, because he has long reflected that such things might
+befall him, and this reflection by itself contributes much towards
+lessening and weakening all misfortunes; and, secondly, because he is
+persuaded that we should bear all the accidents which can happen to man
+with the feelings and spirit of a man; and, lastly, because he considers
+that what is blamable is the only evil. But it is not your fault that
+something has happened to you which it was impossible for man to avoid.
+For that withdrawing of our thoughts which he recommends when he calls
+us off from contemplating our misfortunes is an imaginary action; for it
+is not in our power to dissemble or to forget those evils which lie
+heavy on us; they tear, vex, and sting us—they burn us up, and leave no
+breathing time. And do you order us to forget them (for such
+forgetfulness is contrary to nature), and at the same time deprive us of
+the only assistance which nature affords, the being accustomed to them?
+<a id="page-107"></a><span class="pgnum">107</span>For that, though it is but a slow medicine (I mean that which is
+brought by lapse of time), is still a very effectual one. You order me
+to employ my thoughts on something good, and forget my misfortunes. You
+would say something worthy a great philosopher if you thought those
+things good which are best suited to the dignity of human nature.</p>
+
+<p>XVII. Should Pythagoras, Socrates, or Plato say to me, Why are you
+dejected or sad? Why do you faint, and yield to fortune, which, perhaps,
+may have power to harass and disturb you, but should not quite unman
+you? There is great power in the virtues; rouse them, if they chance to
+droop. Take fortitude for your guide, which will give you such spirits
+that you will despise everything that can befall man, and look on it as
+a trifle. Add to this temperance, which is moderation, and which was
+just now called frugality, which will not suffer you to do anything base
+or bad—for what is worse or baser than an effeminate man? Not even
+justice will suffer you to act in this manner, though she seems to have
+the least weight in this affair; but still, notwithstanding, even she
+will inform you that you are doubly unjust when you both require what
+does not belong to you, inasmuch as though you who have been born mortal
+demand to be placed in the condition of the immortals, and at the same
+time you take it much to heart that you are to restore what was lent
+you. What answer will you make to prudence, who informs you that she is
+a virtue sufficient of herself both to teach you a good life and also to
+secure you a happy one? And, indeed, if she were fettered by external
+circumstances, and dependent on others, and if she did not originate in
+herself and return to herself, and also embrace everything in herself,
+so as to seek no adventitious aid from any quarter, I cannot imagine why
+she should appear deserving of such lofty panegyrics, or of being sought
+after with such excessive eagerness. Now, Epicurus, if you call me back
+to such goods as these, I will obey you, and follow you, and use you as
+my guide, and even forget, as you order me, all my misfortunes; and I
+will do this the more readily from a persuasion that they are not to be
+ranked among evils at all. But you are for bringing my thoughts over to
+pleasure. <a id="page-108"></a><span class="pgnum">108</span>What pleasures? Pleasures of the body, I imagine, or such as
+are recollected or imagined on account of the body. Is this all? Do I
+explain your opinion rightly? for your disciples are used to deny that
+we understand at all what Epicurus means. This is what he says, and what
+that subtle fellow, old Zeno, who is one of the sharpest of them, used,
+when I was attending lectures at Athens, to enforce and talk so loudly
+of; saying that he alone was happy who could enjoy present pleasure, and
+who was at the same time persuaded that he should enjoy it without pain,
+either during the whole or the greatest part of his life; or if, should
+any pain interfere, if it was very sharp, then it must be short; should
+it be of longer continuance, it would have more of what was sweet than
+bitter in it; that whosoever reflected on these things would be happy,
+especially if satisfied with the good things which he had already
+enjoyed, and if he were without fear of death or of the Gods.</p>
+
+<p>XVIII. You have here a representation of a happy life according to
+Epicurus, in the words of Zeno, so that there is no room for
+contradiction in any point. What, then? Can the proposing and thinking
+of such a life make Thyestes’s grief the less, or Æetes’s, of whom I
+spoke above, or Telamon’s, who was driven from his country to penury and
+banishment? in wonder at whom men exclaimed thus:</p>
+
+<div class="poem">
+<p>Is this the man surpassing glory raised?</p>
+<p>Is this that Telamon so highly praised</p>
+<p>By wondering Greece, at whose sight, like the sun,</p>
+<p>All others with diminish’d lustre shone?</p>
+</div>
+
+<p>Now, should any one, as the same author says, find his spirits sink with
+the loss of his fortune, he must apply to those grave philosophers of
+antiquity for relief, and not to these voluptuaries: for what great
+abundance of good do they promise? Suppose that we allow that to be
+without pain is the chief good? Yet that is not called pleasure. But it
+is not necessary at present to go through the whole: the question is, to
+what point are we to advance in order to abate our grief? Grant that to
+be in pain is the greatest evil: whosoever, then, has proceeded so far
+as not to be in pain, is he, therefore, in immediate possession of the
+greatest good? Why, Epicurus, do we use any evasions, <a id="page-109"></a><span class="pgnum">109</span>and not allow in
+our own words the same feeling to be pleasure which you are used to
+boast of with such assurance? Are these your words or not? This is what
+you say in that book which contains all the doctrine of your school; for
+I will perform on this occasion the office of a translator, lest any one
+should imagine that I am inventing anything. Thus you speak: “Nor can I
+form any notion of the chief good, abstracted from those pleasures which
+are perceived by taste, or from what depends on hearing music, or
+abstracted from ideas raised by external objects visible to the eye, or
+by agreeable motions, or from those other pleasures which are perceived
+by the whole man by means of any of his senses; nor can it possibly be
+said that the pleasures of the mind are excited only by what is good,
+for I have perceived men’s minds to be pleased with the hopes of
+enjoying those things which I mentioned above, and with the idea that it
+should enjoy them without any interruption from pain.” And these are his
+exact words, so that any one may understand what were the pleasures with
+which Epicurus was acquainted. Then he speaks thus, a little lower down:
+“I have often inquired of those who have been called wise men what would
+be the remaining good if they should exclude from consideration all
+these pleasures, unless they meant to give us nothing but words. I could
+never learn anything from them; and unless they choose that all virtue
+and wisdom should vanish and come to nothing, they must say with me that
+the only road to happiness lies through those pleasures which I
+mentioned above.” What follows is much the same, and his whole book on
+the chief good everywhere abounds with the same opinions. Will you,
+then, invite Telamon to this kind of life to ease his grief? And should
+you observe any one of your friends under affliction, would you rather
+prescribe him a sturgeon than a treatise of Socrates? or advise him to
+listen to the music of a water organ rather than to Plato? or lay before
+him the beauty and variety of some garden, put a nosegay to his nose,
+burn perfumes before him, and bid him crown himself with a garland of
+roses and woodbines? Should you add one thing more, you would certainly
+wipe out all his grief.</p>
+
+<p><a id="page-110"></a><span class="pgnum">110</span>XIX. Epicurus must admit these arguments, or he must take out of his
+book what I just now said was a literal translation; or, rather, he must
+destroy his whole book, for it is crammed full of pleasures. We must
+inquire, then, how we can ease him of his grief who speaks in this
+manner:</p>
+
+<div class="poem">
+<p>My present state proceeds from fortune’s stings;</p>
+<p>By birth I boast of a descent from kings;</p>
+<p>Hence may you see from what a noble height</p>
+<p>I’m sunk by fortune to this abject plight.</p>
+</div>
+
+<p class="cont">What! to ease his grief, must we mix him a cup of sweet wine, or
+something of that kind? Lo! the same poet presents us with another
+sentiment somewhere else:</p>
+
+<div class="poem">
+<p>I, Hector, once so great, now claim your aid.</p>
+</div>
+
+<p class="cont">We should assist her, for she looks out for help:</p>
+
+<div class="poem">
+<p>Where shall I now apply, where seek support?</p>
+<p>Where hence betake me, or to whom resort?”</p>
+<p>No means remain of comfort or of joy,</p>
+<p>In flames my palace, and in ruins Troy;</p>
+<p>Each wall, so late superb, deformed nods,</p>
+<p>And not an altar’s left t’ appease the Gods.</p>
+</div>
+
+<p class="cont">You know what should follow, and particularly this:</p>
+
+<div class="poem">
+<p>Of father, country, and of friends bereft,</p>
+<p>Not one of all these sumptuous temples left;</p>
+<p>Which, while the fortune of our house did stand,</p>
+<p>With rich wrought ceilings spoke the artist’s hand.</p>
+</div>
+
+<p class="cont">O excellent poet! though despised by those who sing the verses of
+Euphorion. He is sensible that all things which come on a sudden are
+harder to be borne. Therefore, when he had set off the riches of Priam
+to the best advantage, which had the appearance of a long continuance,
+what does he add?</p>
+
+<div class="poem">
+<p>Lo! these all perish’d in one blazing pile;</p>
+<p>The foe old Priam of his life beguiled,</p>
+<p>And with his blood, thy altar, Jove, defiled.</p>
+</div>
+
+<p class="cont">Admirable poetry! There is something mournful in the subject, as well as
+in the words and measure. We must drive away this grief of hers: how is
+that to be done? Shall we lay her on a bed of down; introduce a singer;
+<a id="page-111"></a><span class="pgnum">111</span>shall we burn cedar, or present here with some pleasant liquor, and
+provide her something to eat? Are these the good things which remove the
+most afflicting grief? For you but just now said you knew of no other
+good. I should agree with Epicurus that we ought to be called off from
+grief to contemplate good things, if we could only agree upon what was
+good.</p>
+
+<p>XX. It may be said, What! do you imagine Epicurus really meant this, and
+that he maintained anything so sensual? Indeed I do not imagine so, for
+I am sensible that he has uttered many excellent things and sentiments,
+and delivered maxims of great weight. Therefore, as I said before, I am
+speaking of his acuteness, not of his morals. Though he should hold
+those pleasures in contempt which he just now commended, yet I must
+remember wherein he places the chief good. For he was not contented with
+barely saying this, but he has explained what he meant: he says that
+taste, and embraces, and sports, and music, and those forms which affect
+the eyes with pleasure, are the chief good. Have I invented this? have I
+misrepresented him? I should be glad to be confuted; for what am I
+endeavoring at but to clear up truth in every question? Well, but the
+same man says that pleasure is at its height where pain ceases, and that
+to be free from all pain is the very greatest pleasure. Here are three
+very great mistakes in a very few words. One is, that he contradicts
+himself; for, but just now, he could not imagine anything good unless
+the senses were in a manner tickled with some pleasure; but now he says
+that to be free from pain is the highest pleasure. Can any one
+contradict himself more? The next mistake is, that where there is
+naturally a threefold division—the first, to be pleased; next, to be in
+pain; the last, to be affected neither by pleasure nor pain—he imagines
+the first and the last to be the same, and makes no difference between
+pleasure and a cessation of pain. The last mistake he falls into in
+common with some others, which is this: that as virtue is the most
+desirable thing, and as philosophy has been investigated with a view to
+the attainment of it, he has separated the chief good from virtue. But
+he commends virtue, and that frequently; and indeed C. Gracchus, when he
+had made the <a id="page-112"></a><span class="pgnum">112</span>largest distributions of the public money, and had
+exhausted the treasury, nevertheless spoke much of defending the
+treasury. What signifies what men say when we see what they do? That
+Piso, who was surnamed Frugal, had always harangued against the law that
+was proposed for distributing the corn; but when it had passed, though a
+man of consular dignity, he came to receive the corn. Gracchus observed
+Piso standing in the court, and asked him, in the hearing of the people,
+how it was consistent for him to take corn by a law he had himself
+opposed. “It was,” said he, “against your distributing my goods to every
+man as you thought proper; but, as you do so, I claim my share.” Did not
+this grave and wise man sufficiently show that the public revenue was
+dissipated by the Sempronian law? Read Gracchus’s speeches, and you will
+pronounce him the advocate of the treasury. Epicurus denies that any one
+can live pleasantly who does not lead a life of virtue; he denies that
+fortune has any power over a wise man; he prefers a spare diet to great
+plenty, and maintains that a wise man is always happy. All these things
+become a philosopher to say, but they are not consistent with pleasure.
+But the reply is, that he doth not mean <i>that</i> pleasure: let him mean
+any pleasure, it must be such a one as makes no part of virtue. But
+suppose we are mistaken as to his pleasure; are we so, too, as to his
+pain? I maintain, therefore, the impropriety of language which that man
+uses, when talking of virtue, who would measure every great evil by
+pain.</p>
+
+<p>XXI. And indeed the Epicureans, those best of men—for there is no order
+of men more innocent—complain that I take great pains to inveigh
+against Epicurus. We are rivals, I suppose, for some honor or
+distinction. I place the chief good in the mind, he in the body; I in
+virtue, he in pleasure; and the Epicureans are up in arms, and implore
+the assistance of their neighbors, and many are ready to fly to their
+aid. But as for my part, I declare that I am very indifferent about the
+matter, and that I consider the whole discussion which they are so
+anxious about at an end. For what! is the contention about the Punic
+war? on which very subject, though M. Cato and L. Lentulus were of
+different opinions, still there was no <a id="page-113"></a><span class="pgnum">113</span>difference between them. But
+these men behave with too much heat, especially as the opinions which
+they would uphold are no very spirited ones, and such as they dare not
+plead for either in the senate or before the assembly of the people, or
+before the army or the censors. But, however, I will argue with them
+another time, and with such a disposition that no quarrel shall arise
+between us; for I shall be ready to yield to their opinions when founded
+on truth. Only I must give them this advice: That were it ever so true,
+that a wise man regards nothing but the body, or, to express myself with
+more decency, never does anything except what is expedient, and views
+all things with exclusive reference to his own advantage, as such things
+are not very commendable, they should confine them to their own breasts,
+and leave off talking with that parade of them.</p>
+
+<p>XXII. What remains is the opinion of the Cyrenaics, who think that men
+grieve when anything happens unexpectedly. And that is indeed, as I said
+before, a great aggravation of a misfortune; and I know that it appeared
+so to Chrysippus—“Whatever falls out unexpected is so much the
+heavier.” But the whole question does not turn on this; though the
+sudden approach of an enemy sometimes occasions more confusion than it
+would if you had expected him, and a sudden storm at sea throws the
+sailors into a greater fright than one which they have foreseen; and it
+is the same in many other cases. But when you carefully consider the
+nature of what was expected, you will find nothing more than that all
+things which come on a sudden appear greater; and this upon two
+accounts: first of all, because you have not time to consider how great
+the accident is; and, secondly, because you are probably persuaded that
+you could have guarded against it had you foreseen if, and therefore the
+misfortune, having been seemingly encountered by your own fault, makes
+your grief the greater. That it is so, time evinces; which, as it
+advances, brings with it so much mitigation that though the same
+misfortunes continue, the grief not only becomes the less, but in some
+cases is entirely removed. Many Carthaginians were slaves at Rome, and
+many Macedonians, when Perseus their king was taken prisoner. I saw,
+<a id="page-114"></a><span class="pgnum">114</span>too, when I was a young man, some Corinthians in the Peloponnesus. They
+might all have lamented with Andromache,</p>
+
+<div class="poem">
+<p>All these I saw......;</p>
+</div>
+
+<p class="cont">but they had perhaps given over lamenting themselves, for by their
+countenances, and speech, and other gestures you might have taken them
+for Argives or Sicyonians. And I myself was more concerned at the ruined
+walls of Corinth than the Corinthians themselves were, whose minds by
+frequent reflection and time had become callous to such sights. I have
+read a book of Clitomachus, which he sent to his fellow-citizens who
+were prisoners, to comfort them after the destruction of Carthage. There
+is in it a treatise written by Carneades, which, as Clitomachus says, he
+had inserted into his book; the subject was, “That it appeared probable
+that a wise man would grieve at the state of subjection of his country,”
+and all the arguments which Carneades used against this proposition are
+set down in the book. There the philosopher applies such a strong
+medicine to a fresh grief as would be quite unnecessary in one of any
+continuance; nor, if this very book had been sent to the captives some
+years after, would it have found any wounds to cure, but only scars; for
+grief, by a gentle progress and slow degrees, wears away imperceptibly.
+Not that the circumstances which gave rise to it are altered, or can be,
+but that custom teaches what reason should—that those things which
+before seemed to be of some consequence are of no such great importance,
+after all.</p>
+
+<p>XXIII. It may be said, What occasion is there to apply to reason, or to
+any sort of consolation such as we generally make use of, to mitigate
+the grief of the afflicted? For we have this argument always at hand,
+that nothing ought to appear unexpected. But how will any one be enabled
+to bear his misfortunes the better by knowing that it is unavoidable
+that such things should happen to man? Saying this subtracts nothing
+from the sum of the grief: it only asserts that nothing has fallen out
+but what might have been anticipated; and yet this manner of speaking
+has some little consolation in it, though I apprehend not a great deal.
+Therefore those unlooked-for things have not so much force as to give
+rise to all our <a id="page-115"></a><span class="pgnum">115</span>grief; the blow perhaps may fall the heavier, but
+whatever happens does not appear the greater on that account. No, it is
+the fact of its having happened lately, and not of its having befallen
+us unexpectedly, that makes it seem the greater. There are two ways,
+then, of discerning the truth, not only of things that seem evil, but of
+those that have the appearance of good. For we either inquire into the
+nature of the thing, of what description, and magnitude, and importance
+it is—as sometimes with regard to poverty, the burden of which we may
+lighten when by our disputations we show how few things nature requires,
+and of what a trifling kind they are—or, without any subtle arguing, we
+refer them to examples, as here we instance a Socrates, there a
+Diogenes, and then again that line in CÊcilius,</p>
+
+<div class="poem">
+<p>Wisdom is oft conceal’d in mean attire.</p>
+</div>
+
+<p class="cont">For as poverty is of equal weight with all, what reason can be given why
+what was borne by Fabricius should be spoken of by any one else as
+unsupportable when it falls upon themselves? Of a piece with this is
+that other way of comforting, which consists in pointing out that
+nothing has happened but what is common to human nature; for this
+argument doth not only inform us what human nature is, but implies that
+all things are tolerable which others have borne and are bearing.</p>
+
+<p>XXIV. Is poverty the subject? They tell you of many who have submitted
+to it with patience. Is it the contempt of honors? They acquaint you
+with some who never enjoyed any, and were the happier for it; and of
+those who have preferred a private retired life to public employment,
+mentioning their names with respect; they tell you of the verse<a id="FNA-40"></a><a href="#FN-40"><sup>40</sup></a> of
+that most powerful king who praises an old man, and pronounces him happy
+because he was unknown to fame and seemed likely to arrive at the hour
+of death in obscurity and without notice. Thus, too, they have examples
+for those who are deprived of their children: they who are under any
+great grief are comforted by instances of like affliction; and thus the
+endurance <a id="page-116"></a><span class="pgnum">116</span>of every misfortune is rendered more easy by the fact of
+others having undergone the same, and the fate of others causes what has
+happened to appear less important than it has been previously thought,
+and reflection thus discovers to us how much opinion had imposed on us.
+And this is what the Telamon declares, “I, when my son was born,” etc.;
+and thus Theseus, “I on my future misery did dwell;” and Anaxagoras, “I
+knew my son was mortal.” All these men, by frequently reflecting on
+human affairs, had discovered that they were by no means to be estimated
+by the opinion of the multitude; and, indeed, it seems to me to be
+pretty much the same case with those who consider beforehand as with
+those who derive their remedies from time, excepting that a kind of
+reason cures the one, and the other remedy is provided by nature; by
+which we discover (and this contains the whole marrow of the matter)
+that what was imagined to be the greatest evil is by no means so great
+as to defeat the happiness of life. And the effect of this is, that the
+blow is greater by reason of its not having been foreseen, and not, as
+they suppose, that when similar misfortunes befall two different people,
+that man only is affected with grief whom this calamity has befallen
+unexpectedly. So that some persons, under the oppression of grief, are
+said to have borne it actually worse for hearing of this common
+condition of man, that we are born under such conditions as render it
+impossible for a man to be exempt from all evil.</p>
+
+<p>XXV. For this reason Carneades, as I see our friend Antiochus writes,
+used to blame Chrysippus for commending these verses of Euripides:</p>
+
+<div class="poem">
+<p>Man, doom’d to care, to pain, disease, and strife,</p>
+<p>Walks his short journey thro’ the vale of life:</p>
+<p>Watchful attends the cradle and the grave,</p>
+<p>And passing generations longs to save:</p>
+<p>Last, dies himself: yet wherefore should we mourn?</p>
+<p>For man must to his kindred dust return;</p>
+<p>Submit to the destroying hand of fate,</p>
+<p>As ripen’d ears the harvest-sickle wait.<a id="FNA-41"></a><a href="#FN-41"><sup>41</sup></a></p>
+</div>
+
+<p class="cont"><a id="page-117"></a><span class="pgnum">117</span>He would not allow a speech of this kind to avail at all to the cure of
+our grief, for he said it was a lamentable case itself that we were
+fallen into the hands of such a cruel fate; and that a speech like that,
+preaching up comfort from the misfortunes of another, was a comfort
+adapted only to those of a malevolent disposition. But to me it appears
+far otherwise; for the necessity of bearing what is the common condition
+of humanity forbids your resisting the will of the Gods, and reminds you
+that you are a man, which reflection greatly alleviates grief; and the
+enumeration of these examples is not produced with a view to please
+those of a malevolent disposition, but in order that any one in
+affliction may be induced to bear what he observes many others have
+previously borne with tranquillity and moderation. For they who are
+falling to pieces, and cannot hold together through the greatness of
+their grief, should be supported by all kinds of assistance. From whence
+Chrysippus thinks that grief is called <span class="greek">λ᜻πη</span>, as it were <span class="greek">λ᜻σις</span>, that is
+to say, a dissolution of the whole man—the whole of which I think may
+be pulled up by the roots by explaining, as I said at the beginning, the
+cause of grief; for it is nothing else but an opinion and judgment
+formed of a present acute evil. And thus any bodily pain, let it be ever
+so grievous, may be endurable where any hopes are proposed of some
+considerable good; and we receive such consolation from a virtuous and
+illustrious life that they who lead such lives are seldom attacked by
+grief, or but slightly affected by it.</p>
+
+<p>XXVI. But as besides this opinion of great evil there is this other
+added also—that we ought to lament what has happened, that it is right
+so to do, and part of our duty, then is brought about that terrible
+disorder of mind, grief. And it is to this opinion that we owe all those
+various and horrid kinds of lamentation, that neglect of our persons,
+that womanish tearing of our cheeks, that striking on our thighs,
+breasts, and heads. Thus Agamemnon, in Homer and in Accius,</p>
+
+<div class="poem">
+<p>Tears in his grief his uncomb’d locks;<a id="FNA-42"></a><a href="#FN-42"><sup>42</sup></a></p>
+</div>
+
+<p class="cont">from whence comes that pleasant saying of Bion, that the <a id="page-118"></a><span class="pgnum">118</span>foolish king
+in his sorrow tore away the hairs of his head, imagining that his grief
+would be alleviated by baldness. But men do all these things from being
+persuaded that they ought to do so. And thus Æschines inveighs against
+Demosthenes for sacrificing within seven days after the death of his
+daughter. But with what eloquence, with what fluency, does he attack
+him! what sentiments does he collect! what words does he hurl against
+him! You may see by this that an orator may do anything; but nobody
+would approve of such license if it were not that we have an idea innate
+in our minds that every good man ought to lament the loss of a relation
+as bitterly as possible. And it is owing to this that some men, when in
+sorrow, betake themselves to deserts, as Homer says of Bellerophon:</p>
+
+<div class="poem">
+<p class="L6" style="margin-left: 15ex">Distracted in his mind,</p>
+<p>Forsook by heaven, forsaking human kind,</p>
+<p>Wide o’er the Aleïan field he chose to stray,</p>
+<p>A long, forlorn, uncomfortable way!<a id="FNA-43"></a><a href="#FN-43"><sup>43</sup></a></p>
+</div>
+
+<p class="cont">And thus Niobe is feigned to have been turned into stone, from her never
+speaking, I suppose, in her grief. But they imagine Hecuba to have been
+converted into a bitch, from her rage and bitterness of mind. There are
+others who love to converse with solitude itself when in grief, as the
+nurse in Ennius,</p>
+
+<div class="poem">
+<p>Fain would I to the heavens find earth relate</p>
+<p>Medea’s ceaseless woes and cruel fate.<a id="FNA-44"></a><a href="#FN-44"><sup>44</sup></a></p>
+</div>
+
+<p>XXVII. Now all these things are done in grief, from a persuasion of
+their truth and propriety and necessity; and it is plain that those who
+behave thus do so from a conviction of its being their duty; for should
+these mourners by chance drop their grief, and either act or speak for a
+moment in a more calm or cheerful manner, they presently check
+themselves and return to their lamentations again, and blame themselves
+for having been guilty of any intermissions <a id="page-119"></a><span class="pgnum">119</span>from their grief; and
+parents and masters generally correct children not by words only, but by
+blows, if they show any levity by either word or deed when the family is
+under affliction, and, as it were, oblige them to be sorrowful. What!
+does it not appear, when you have ceased to mourn, and have discovered
+that your grief has been ineffectual, that the whole of that mourning
+was voluntary on your part? What does that man say in Terence who
+punishes himself, the Self-tormentor?</p>
+
+<div class="poem">
+<p>I think I do my son less harm, O Chremes,</p>
+<p>As long as I myself am miserable.</p>
+</div>
+
+<p class="cont">He determines to be miserable: and can any one determine on anything
+against his will?</p>
+
+<div class="poem">
+<p>I well might think that I deserved all evil.</p>
+</div>
+
+<p class="cont">He would think he deserved any misfortune were he otherwise than
+miserable! Therefore, you see, the evil is in opinion, not in nature.
+How is it when some things do of themselves prevent your grieving at
+them? as in Homer, so many died and were buried daily that they had not
+leisure to grieve: where you find these lines—</p>
+
+<div class="poem">
+<p>The great, the bold, by thousands daily fall,</p>
+<p>And endless were the grief to weep for all.</p>
+<p>Eternal sorrows what avails to shed?</p>
+<p>Greece honors not with solemn fasts the dead:</p>
+<p>Enough when death demands the brave to pay</p>
+<p>The tribute of a melancholy day.</p>
+<p>One chief with patience to the grave resign’d,</p>
+<p>Our care devolves on others left behind.<a id="FNA-45"></a><a href="#FN-45"><sup>45</sup></a></p>
+</div>
+
+<p>Therefore it is in our own power to lay aside grief upon occasion; and
+is there any opportunity (seeing the thing is in our own power) that we
+should let slip of getting rid of care and grief? It was plain that the
+friends of CnÊus Pompeius, when they saw him fainting under his wounds,
+at the very moment of that most miserable and bitter sight were under
+great uneasiness how they themselves, <a id="page-120"></a><span class="pgnum">120</span>surrounded by the enemy as they
+were, should escape, and were employed in nothing but encouraging the
+rowers and aiding their escape; but when they reached Tyre, they began
+to grieve and lament over him. Therefore, as fear with them, prevailed
+over grief, cannot reason and true philosophy have the same effect with
+a wise man?</p>
+
+<p>XXVIII. But what is there more effectual to dispel grief than the
+discovery that it answers no purpose, and has been undergone to no
+account? Therefore, if we can get rid of it, we need never have been
+subject to it. It must be acknowledged, then, that men take up grief
+wilfully and knowingly; and this appears from the patience of those who,
+after they have been exercised in afflictions and are better able to
+bear whatever befalls them, suppose themselves hardened against fortune;
+as that person in Euripides,</p>
+
+<div class="poem">
+<p>Had this the first essay of fortune been,</p>
+<p>And I no storms thro’ all my life had seen,</p>
+<p>Wild as a colt I’d broke from reason’s sway;</p>
+<p>But frequent griefs have taught me to obey.<a id="FNA-46"></a><a href="#FN-46"><sup>46</sup></a></p>
+</div>
+
+<p class="cont">As, then, the frequent bearing of misery makes grief the lighter, we
+must necessarily perceive that the cause and original of it does not lie
+in the calamity itself. Your principal philosophers, or lovers of
+wisdom, though they have not yet arrived at perfect wisdom, are not they
+sensible that they are in the greatest evil? For they are foolish, and
+foolishness is the greatest of all evils, and yet they lament not. How
+shall we account for this? Because opinion is not fixed upon that kind
+of evil, it is not our opinion that it is right, meet, and our duty to
+be uneasy because we are not all wise men. Whereas this opinion is
+strongly affixed to that uneasiness where mourning is concerned, which
+is the greatest of all grief. Therefore Aristotle, when he blames some
+ancient philosophers for imagining that by their genius they had brought
+philosophy <a id="page-121"></a><span class="pgnum">121</span>to the highest perfection, says, they must be either
+extremely foolish or extremely vain; but that he himself could see that
+great improvements had been made therein in a few years, and that
+philosophy would in a little time arrive at perfection. And Theophrastus
+is reported to have reproached nature at his death for giving to stags
+and crows so long a life, which was of no use to them, but allowing only
+so short a span to men, to whom length of days would have been of the
+greatest use; for if the life of man could have been lengthened, it
+would have been able to provide itself with all kinds of learning, and
+with arts in the greatest perfection. He lamented, therefore, that he
+was dying just when he had begun to discover these. What! does not every
+grave and distinguished philosopher acknowledge himself ignorant of many
+things, and confess that there are many things which he must learn over
+and over again? And yet, though these men are sensible that they are
+standing still in the very midway of folly, than which nothing can be
+worse, they are under no great affliction, because no opinion that it is
+their duty to lament is ever mingled with this knowledge. What shall we
+say of those who think it unbecoming in a man to grieve? among whom we
+may reckon Q. Maximus, when he buried his son that had been consul, and
+L. Paulus, who lost two sons within a few days of one another. Of the
+same opinion was M. Cato, who lost his son just after he had been
+elected prÊtor, and many others, whose names I have collected in my book
+on Consolation. Now what made these men so easy, but their persuasion
+that grief and lamentation was not becoming in a man? Therefore, as some
+give themselves up to grief from an opinion that it is right so to do,
+they refrained themselves, from an opinion that it was discreditable;
+from which we may infer that grief is owing more to opinion than nature.</p>
+
+<p>XXIX. It may be said, on the other side, Who is so mad as to grieve of
+his own accord? Pain proceeds from nature, which you must submit to, say
+they, agreeably to what even your own Crantor teaches, for it presses
+and gains upon you unavoidably, and cannot possibly be resisted. So that
+the very same Oileus, in Sophocles, who had before comforted Telamon on
+the death of Ajax, on <a id="page-122"></a><span class="pgnum">122</span>hearing of the death of his own son, is
+broken-hearted. On this alteration of his mind we have these lines:</p>
+
+<div class="poem">
+<p>Show me the man so well by wisdom taught</p>
+<p>That what he charges to another’s fault,</p>
+<p>When like affliction doth himself betide,</p>
+<p>True to his own wise counsel will abide.<a id="FNA-47"></a><a href="#FN-47"><sup>47</sup></a></p>
+</div>
+
+<p class="cont">Now, when they urge these things, their endeavor is to prove that nature
+is absolutely and wholly irresistible; and yet the same people allow
+that we take greater grief on ourselves than nature requires. What
+madness is it, then, in us to require the same from others? But there
+are many reasons for our taking grief on us. The first is from the
+opinion of some evil, on the discovery and certainty of which grief
+comes of course. Besides, many people are persuaded that they are doing
+something very acceptable to the dead when they lament bitterly over
+them. To these may be added a kind of womanish superstition, in
+imagining that when they have been stricken by the afflictions sent by
+the Gods, to acknowledge themselves afflicted and humbled by them is the
+readiest way of appeasing them. But most men appear to be unaware what
+contradictions these things are full of. They commend those who die
+calmly, but they blame those who can bear the loss of another with the
+same calmness, as if it were possible that it should be true, as is
+occasionally said in love speeches, that any one can love another more
+than himself. There is, indeed, something excellent in this, and, if you
+examine it, something no less just than true, that we love those who
+ought to be most dear to us as well as we love ourselves; but to love
+them more than ourselves is absolutely impossible; nor is it desirable
+in friendship that I should love my friend more than myself, or that he
+should love me so; for this would occasion much confusion in life, and
+break in upon all the duties of it.</p>
+
+<p><a id="page-123"></a><span class="pgnum">123</span>XXX. But we will speak of this another time: at present it is
+sufficient not to attribute our misery to the loss of our friends, nor
+to love them more than, if they themselves could be sensible of our
+conduct, they would approve of, or at least not more than we do
+ourselves. Now as to what they say, that some are not at all appeased by
+our consolations; and, moreover, as to what they add, that the
+comforters themselves acknowledge they are miserable when fortune varies
+the attack and falls on them—in both these cases the solution is easy:
+for the fault here is not in nature, but in our own folly; and much may
+be said against folly. But men who do not admit of consolation seem to
+bespeak misery for themselves; and they who cannot bear their
+misfortunes with that temper which they recommend to others are not more
+faulty in this particular than most other persons; for we see that
+covetous men find fault with others who are covetous, as do the
+vainglorious with those who appear too wholly devoted to the pursuit of
+glory. For it is the peculiar characteristic of folly to perceive the
+vices of others, but to forget its own. But since we find that grief is
+removed by length of time, we have the greatest proof that the strength
+of it depends not merely on time, but on the daily consideration of it.
+For if the cause continues the same, and the man be the same, how can
+there be any alteration in the grief, if there is no change in what
+occasioned the grief, nor in him who grieves? Therefore it is from daily
+reflecting that there is no real evil in the circumstance for which you
+grieve, and not from the length of time, that you procure a remedy for
+your grief.</p>
+
+<p>XXXI. Here some people talk of moderate grief; but if such be natural,
+what occasion is there for consolation? for nature herself will
+determine, the measure of it: but if it depends on and is caused by
+opinion, the whole opinion should be destroyed. I think that it has been
+sufficiently said, that grief arises from an opinion of some present
+evil, which includes this belief, that it is incumbent on us to grieve.
+To this definition Zeno has added, very justly, that the opinion of this
+present evil should be recent. Now this word recent they explain thus:
+those are not the only recent things which happened a little while ago;
+but as <a id="page-124"></a><span class="pgnum">124</span>long as there shall be any force, or vigor, or freshness in that
+imagined evil, so long it is entitled to the name of recent. Take the
+case of Artemisia, the wife of Mausolus, King of Caria, who made that
+noble sepulchre at Halicarnassus; while she lived, she lived in grief,
+and died of it, being worn out by it, for that opinion was always recent
+with her: but you cannot call that recent which has already begun to
+decay through time. Now the duty of a comforter is, to remove grief
+entirely, to quiet it, or draw it off as much as you can, or else to
+keep it under, and prevent its spreading any further, and to divert
+one’s attention to other matters. There are some who think, with
+Cleanthes, that the only duty of a comforter is to prove that what one
+is lamenting is by no means an evil. Others, as the Peripatetics, prefer
+urging that the evil is not great. Others, with Epicurus, seek to divert
+your attention from the evil to good: some think it sufficient to show
+that nothing has happened but what you had reason to expect; and this is
+the practice of the Cyrenaics. But Chrysippus thinks that the main thing
+in comforting is, to remove the opinion from the person who is grieving,
+that to grieve is his bounden duty. There are others who bring together
+all these various kinds of consolations, for people are differently
+affected; as I have done myself in my book on Consolation; for as my own
+mind was much disordered, I have attempted in that book to discover
+every method of cure. But the proper season is as much to be attended to
+in the cure of the mind as of the body; as Prometheus in Æschylus, on
+its being said to him,</p>
+
+<div class="poem">
+<p>I think, Prometheus, you this tenet hold,</p>
+<p>That all men’s reason should their rage control?</p>
+</div>
+
+<p class="cont">answers,</p>
+
+<div class="poem">
+<p>Yes, when one reason properly applies;</p>
+<p>Ill-timed advice will make the storm but rise.<a id="FNA-48"></a><a href="#FN-48"><sup>48</sup></a></p>
+</div>
+
+<p>XXXII. But the principal medicine to be applied in consolation is, to
+maintain either that it is no evil at all, <a id="page-125"></a><span class="pgnum">125</span>or a very inconsiderable
+one: the next best to that is, to speak of the common condition of life,
+having a view, if possible, to the state of the person whom you comfort
+particularly. The third is, that it is folly to wear one’s self out with
+grief which can avail nothing. For the comfort of Cleanthes is suitable
+only for a wise man, who is in no need of any comfort at all; for could
+you persuade one in grief that nothing is an evil but what is base, you
+would not only cure him of grief, but folly. But the time for such
+precepts is not well chosen. Besides, Cleanthes does not seem to me
+sufficiently aware that affliction may very often proceed from that very
+thing which he himself allows to be the greatest misfortune. For what
+shall we say? When Socrates had convinced Alcibiades, as we are told,
+that he had no distinctive qualifications as a man different from other
+people, and that, in fact, there was no difference between him, though a
+man of the highest rank, and a porter; and when Alcibiades became uneasy
+at this, and entreated Socrates, with tears in his eyes, to make him a
+man of virtue, and to cure him of that mean position; what shall we say
+to this, Cleanthes? Was there no evil in what afflicted Alcibiades thus?
+What strange things does Lycon say? who, making light of grief, says
+that it arises from trifles, from things that affect our fortune or
+bodies, not from the evils of the mind. What, then? did not the grief of
+Alcibiades proceed from the defects and evils of the mind? I have
+already said enough of Epicurus’s consolation.</p>
+
+<p>XXXIII. Nor is that consolation much to be relied on, though it is
+frequently practised, and sometimes has some effect, namely, “That you
+are not alone in this.” It has its effect, as I said, but not always,
+nor with every person, for some reject it; but much depends on the
+application of it; for you ought rather to show, not how men in general
+have been affected with such evils, but how men of sense have borne
+them. As to Chrysippus’s method, it is certainly founded in truth; but
+it is difficult to apply it in time of distress. It is a work of no
+small difficulty to persuade a person in affliction that he grieves
+merely because he thinks it right so to do. Certainly, then, as in
+pleadings we do not state all cases alike (if I may adopt <a id="page-126"></a><span class="pgnum">126</span>the language
+of lawyers for a moment), but adapt what we have to say to the time, to
+the nature of the subject under debate, and to the person; so, too, in
+alleviating grief, regard should be had to what kind of cure the party
+to be comforted can admit of. But, somehow or other, we have rambled
+from what you originally proposed. For your question was concerning a
+wise man, with whom nothing can have the appearance of evil that is not
+dishonorable; or at least, anything else would seem so small an evil
+that by his wisdom he would so overmatch it as to make it wholly
+disappear; and such a man makes no addition to his grief through
+opinion, and never conceives it right to torment himself above measure,
+nor to wear himself out with grief, which is the meanest thing
+imaginable. Reason, however, it seems, has demonstrated (though it was
+not directly our object at the moment to inquire whether anything can be
+called an evil except what is base) that it is in our power to discern
+that all the evil which there is in affliction has nothing natural in
+it, but is contracted by our own voluntary judgment of it, and the error
+of opinion.</p>
+
+<p>XXXIV. But the kind of affliction of which I have treated is that which
+is the greatest; in order that when we have once got rid of that, it may
+appear a business of less consequence to look after remedies for the
+others. For there are certain things which are usually said about
+poverty; and also certain statements ordinarily applied to retired and
+undistinguished life. There are particular treatises on banishment, on
+the ruin of one’s country, on slavery, on weakness, on blindness, and on
+every incident that can come under the name of an evil. The Greeks
+divide these into different treatises and distinct books; but they do it
+for the sake of employment: not but that all such discussions are full
+of entertainment. And yet, as physicians, in curing the whole body,
+attend to even the most insignificant part of the body which is at all
+disordered, so does philosophy act, after it has removed grief in
+general; still, if any other deficiency exists—should poverty bite,
+should ignominy sting, should banishment bring a dark cloud over us, or
+should any of those things which I have just mentioned appear, there is
+for each its appropriate <a id="page-127"></a><span class="pgnum">127</span>consolation, which you shall hear whenever you
+please. But we must have recourse again to the same original principle,
+that a wise man is free from all sorrow, because it is vain, because it
+answers no purpose, because it is not founded in nature, but on opinion
+and prejudice, and is engendered by a kind of invitation to grieve, when
+once men have imagined that it is their duty to do so. When, then, we
+have subtracted what is altogether voluntary, that mournful uneasiness
+will be removed; yet some little anxiety, some slight pricking, will
+still remain. They may indeed call this natural, provided they give it
+not that horrid, solemn, melancholy name of grief, which can by no means
+consist with wisdom. But how various and how bitter are the roots of
+grief! Whatever they are, I propose, after having felled the trunk, to
+destroy them all; even if it should be necessary, by allotting a
+separate dissertation to each, for I have leisure enough to do so,
+whatever time it may take up. But the principle of every uneasiness is
+the same, though they may appear under different names. For envy is an
+uneasiness; so are emulation, detraction, anguish, sorrow, sadness,
+tribulation, lamentation, vexation, grief, trouble, affliction, and
+despair. The Stoics define all these different feelings; and all those
+words which I have mentioned belong to different things, and do not, as
+they seem, express the same ideas; but they are to a certain extent
+distinct, as I shall make appear perhaps in another place. These are
+those fibres of the roots which, as I said at first, must be traced back
+and cut off and destroyed, so that not one shall remain. You say it is a
+great and difficult undertaking: who denies it? But what is there of any
+excellency which has not its difficulty? Yet philosophy undertakes to
+effect it, provided we admit its superintendence. But enough of this.
+The other books, whenever you please, shall be ready for you here or
+anywhere else.</p>
+
+
+<hr/>
+
+<h3><a id="page-128"></a><span class="pgnum">128</span>BOOK IV.</h3>
+
+<h4>On other perturbations of the mind.</h4>
+
+
+<p>I. <span class="first">I have</span> often wondered, Brutus, on many occasions, at the ingenuity
+and virtues of our countrymen; but nothing has surprised me more than
+their development in those studies, which, though they came somewhat
+late to us, have been transported into this city from Greece. For the
+system of auspices, and religious ceremonies, and courts of justice, and
+appeals to the people, the senate, the establishment of an army of
+cavalry and infantry, and the whole military discipline, were instituted
+as early as the foundation of the city by royal authority, partly too by
+laws, not without the assistance of the Gods. Then with what a
+surprising and incredible progress did our ancestors advance towards all
+kind of excellence, when once the republic was freed from the regal
+power! Not that this is a proper occasion to treat of the manners and
+customs of our ancestors, or of the discipline and constitution of the
+city; for I have elsewhere, particularly in the six books I wrote on the
+Republic, given a sufficiently accurate account of them. But while I am
+on this subject, and considering the study of philosophy, I meet with
+many reasons to imagine that those studies were brought to us from
+abroad, and not merely imported, but preserved and improved; for they
+had Pythagoras, a man of consummate wisdom and nobleness of character,
+in a manner, before their eyes, who was in Italy at the time that Lucius
+Brutus, the illustrious founder of your nobility, delivered his country
+from tyranny. As the doctrine of Pythagoras spread itself on all sides,
+it seems probable to me that it reached this city; and this is not only
+probable of itself, but it does really appear to have been the case from
+many remains of it. For who can imagine that, when it flourished so much
+in that part of Italy which was called Magna GrÊcia, and in some of the
+<a id="page-129"></a><span class="pgnum">129</span>largest and most powerful cities, in which, first the name of
+Pythagoras, and then that of those men who were afterward his followers,
+was in so high esteem; who can imagine, I say, that our people could
+shut their ears to what was said by such learned men? Besides, it is
+even my opinion that it was the great esteem in which the Pythagoreans
+were held, that gave rise to that opinion among those who came after
+him, that King Numa was a Pythagorean. For, being acquainted with the
+doctrine and principles of Pythagoras, and having heard from their
+ancestors that this king was a very wise and just man, and not being
+able to distinguish accurately between times and periods that were so
+remote, they inferred, from his being so eminent for his wisdom, that he
+had been a pupil of Pythagoras.</p>
+
+<p>II. So far we proceed on conjecture. As to the vestiges of the
+Pythagoreans, though I might collect many, I shall use but a few;
+because they have no connection with our present purpose. For, as it is
+reported to have been a custom with them to deliver certain precepts in
+a more abstruse manner in verse, and to bring their minds from severe
+thought to a more composed state by songs and musical instruments; so
+Cato, a writer of the very highest authority, says in his Origins, that
+it was customary with our ancestors for the guests at their
+entertainments, every one in his turn, to celebrate the praises and
+virtues of illustrious men in song to the sound of the flute; from
+whence it is clear that poems and songs were then composed for the
+voice. And, indeed, it is also clear that poetry was in fashion from the
+laws of the Twelve Tables, wherein it is provided that no song should be
+made to the injury of another. Another argument of the erudition of
+those times is, that they played on instruments before the shrines of
+their Gods, and at the entertainments of their magistrates; but that
+custom was peculiar to the sect I am speaking of. To me, indeed, that
+poem of Appius CÊcus, which PanÊtius commends so much in a certain
+letter of his which is addressed to Quintus Tubero, has all the marks of
+a Pythagorean author. We have many things derived from the Pythagoreans
+in our customs, which I pass over, that we may <a id="page-130"></a><span class="pgnum">130</span>not seem to have learned
+that elsewhere which we look upon ourselves as the inventors of. But to
+return to our purpose. How many great poets as well as orators have
+sprung up among us! and in what a short time! so that it is evident that
+our people could arrive at any learning as soon as they had an
+inclination for it. But of other studies I shall speak elsewhere if
+there is occasion, as I have already often done.</p>
+
+<p>III. The study of philosophy is certainly of long standing with us; but
+yet I do not find that I can give you the names of any philosopher
+before the age of LÊlius and Scipio, in whose younger days we find that
+Diogenes the Stoic, and Carneades the Academic, were sent as ambassadors
+by the Athenians to our senate. And as these had never been concerned in
+public affairs, and one of them was a Cyrenean, the other a Babylonian,
+they certainly would never have been forced from their studies, nor
+chosen for that employment, unless the study of philosophy had been in
+vogue with some of the great men at that time; who, though they might
+employ their pens on other subjects—some on civil law, others on
+oratory, others on the history of former times—yet promoted this most
+extensive of all arts, the principle of living well, even more by their
+life than by their writings. So that of that true and elegant philosophy
+(which was derived from Socrates, and is still preserved by the
+Peripatetics and by the Stoics, though they express themselves
+differently in their disputes with the Academics) there are few or no
+Latin records; whether this proceeds from the importance of the thing
+itself, or from men’s being otherwise employed, or from their concluding
+that the capacity of the people was not equal to the apprehension of
+them. But, during this silence, C. Amafinius arose and took upon himself
+to speak; on the publishing of whose writings the people were moved, and
+enlisted themselves chiefly under this sect, either because the doctrine
+was more easily understood, or because they were invited thereto by the
+pleasing thoughts of amusement, or that, because there was nothing
+better, they laid hold of what was offered them. And after Amafinius,
+when many of the same sentiments had written much about them, the
+Pythagoreans <a id="page-131"></a><span class="pgnum">131</span>spread over all Italy: but that these doctrines should be
+so easily understood and approved of by the unlearned is a great proof
+that they were not written with any great subtlety, and they think their
+establishment to be owing to this.</p>
+
+<p>IV. But let every one defend his own opinion, for every one is at
+liberty to choose what he likes: I shall keep to my old custom; and,
+being under no restraint from the laws of any particular school, which
+in philosophy every one must necessarily confine himself to, I shall
+always inquire what has the most probability in every question, and this
+system, which I have often practised on other occasions, I have adhered
+closely to in my Tusculan Disputations. Therefore, as I have acquainted
+you with the disputations of the three former days, this book shall
+conclude the discussion of the fourth day. When we had come down into
+the Academy, as we had done the former days, the business was carried on
+thus:</p>
+
+<p><i>M.</i> Let any one say, who pleases, what he would wish to have discussed.</p>
+
+<p><i>A.</i> I do not think a wise man can possibly be free from every
+perturbation of mind.</p>
+
+<p><i>M.</i> He seemed by yesterday’s discourse to be free from grief; unless
+you agreed with us only to avoid taking up time.</p>
+
+<p><i>A.</i> Not at all on that account, for I was extremely satisfied with your
+discourse.</p>
+
+<p><i>M.</i> You do not think, then, that a wise man is subject to grief?</p>
+
+<p><i>A.</i> No, by no means.</p>
+
+<p><i>M.</i> But if that cannot disorder the mind of a wise man, nothing else
+can. For what—can such a man be disturbed by fear? Fear proceeds from
+the same things when absent which occasion grief when present. Take away
+grief, then, and you remove fear.</p>
+
+<p>The two remaining perturbations are, a joy elate above measure, and
+lust; and if a wise man is not subject to these, his mind will be always
+at rest.</p>
+
+<p><i>A.</i> I am entirely of that opinion.</p>
+
+<p><i>M.</i> Which, then, shall we do? Shall I immediately crowd all my sails?
+or shall I make use of my oars, as if I were just endeavoring to get
+clear of the harbor?</p>
+
+<p><a id="page-132"></a><span class="pgnum">132</span><i>A.</i> What is it that you mean, for I do not exactly comprehend you?</p>
+
+<p>V. <i>M.</i> Because, Chrysippus and the Stoics, when they discuss the
+perturbations of the mind, make great part of their debate to consist in
+definitions and distinctions; while they employ but few words on the
+subject of curing the mind, and preventing it from being disordered.
+Whereas the Peripatetics bring a great many things to promote the cure
+of it, but have no regard to their thorny partitions and definitions. My
+question, then, was, whether I should instantly unfold the sails of my
+eloquence, or be content for a while to make less way with the oars of
+logic?</p>
+
+<p><i>A.</i> Let it be so; for by the employment of both these means the subject
+of our inquiry will be more thoroughly discussed.</p>
+
+<p><i>M.</i> It is certainly the better way; and should anything be too obscure,
+you may examine that afterward.</p>
+
+<p><i>A.</i> I will do so; but those very obscure points you will, as usual,
+deliver with more clearness than the Greeks.</p>
+
+<p><i>M.</i> I will, indeed, endeavor to do so; but it well requires great
+attention, lest, by losing one word, the whole should escape you. What
+the Greeks call <span class="greek">πᜱΞη</span> we choose to name perturbations (or disorders)
+rather than diseases; in explaining which, I shall follow, first, that
+very old description of Pythagoras, and afterward that of Plato; for
+they both divide the mind into two parts, and make one of these partake
+of reason, and the other they represent without it. In that which
+partakes of reason they place tranquillity, that is to say, a placid and
+undisturbed constancy; to the other they assign the turbid motions of
+anger and desire, which are contrary and opposite to reason. Let this,
+then, be our principle, the spring of all our reasonings. But
+notwithstanding, I shall use the partitions and definitions of the
+Stoics in describing these perturbations; who seem to me to have shown
+very great acuteness on this question.</p>
+
+<p>VI. Zeno’s definition, then, is this: “A perturbation” (which he calls a
+<span class="greek">πᜱΞος</span>) “is a commotion of the mind repugnant to reason, and against
+nature.” Some of them define it even more briefly, saying that a
+perturbation is a somewhat too vehement appetite; but by too vehement
+they mean an appetite <a id="page-133"></a><span class="pgnum">133</span>that recedes further from the constancy of
+nature. But they would have the divisions of perturbations to arise from
+two imagined goods, and from two imagined evils; and thus they become
+four: from the good proceed lust and joy—joy having reference to some
+present good, and lust to some future one. They suppose fear and grief
+to proceed from evils: fear from something future, grief from something
+present; for whatever things are dreaded as approaching always occasion
+grief when present. But joy and lust depend on the opinion of good; as
+lust, being inflamed and provoked, is carried on eagerly towards what
+has the appearance of good; and joy is transported and exults on
+obtaining what was desired: for we naturally pursue those things that
+have the appearance of good, and avoid the contrary. Wherefore, as soon
+as anything that has the appearance of good presents itself, nature
+incites us to endeavor to obtain it. Now, where this strong desire is
+consistent and founded on prudence, it is by the Stoics called <span class="greek">βο᜻λησις</span>,
+and the name which we give it is volition; and this they allow to none
+but their wise man, and define it thus: Volition is a reasonable desire;
+but whatever is incited too violently in opposition to reason, that is a
+lust, or an unbridled desire, which is discoverable in all fools. And,
+therefore, when we are affected so as to be placed in any good
+condition, we are moved in two ways; for when the mind is moved in a
+placid and calm motion, consistent with reason, that is called joy; but
+when it exults with a vain, wanton exultation, or immoderate joy, then
+that feeling may be called immoderate ecstasy or transport, which they
+define to be an elation of the mind without reason. And as we naturally
+desire good things, so in like manner we naturally seek to avoid what is
+evil; and this avoidance of which, if conducted in accordance with
+reason, is called caution; and this the wise man alone is supposed to
+have: but that caution which is not under the guidance of reason, but is
+attended with a base and low dejection, is called fear. Fear is,
+therefore, caution destitute of reason. But a wise man is not affected
+by any present evil; while the grief of a fool proceeds from being
+affected with an imaginary evil, by which his mind is contracted and
+sunk, since it is not under the dominion <a id="page-134"></a><span class="pgnum">134</span>of reason. This, then, is the
+first definition, which makes grief to consist in a shrinking of the
+mind contrary to the dictates of reason. Thus, there are four
+perturbations, and but three calm rational emotions; for grief has no
+exact opposite.</p>
+
+<p>VII. But they insist upon it that all perturbations depend on opinion
+and judgment; therefore they define them more strictly, in order not
+only the better to show how blamable they are, but to discover how much
+they are in our power. Grief, then, is a recent opinion of some present
+evil, in which it seems to be right that the mind should shrink and be
+dejected. Joy is a recent opinion of a present good, in which it seems
+to be right that the mind should be elated. Fear is an opinion of an
+impending evil which we apprehend will be intolerable. Lust is an
+opinion of a good to come, which would be of advantage were it already
+come, and present with us. But however I have named the judgments and
+opinions of perturbations, their meaning is, not that merely the
+perturbations consist in them, but that the effects likewise of these
+perturbations do so; as grief occasions a kind of painful pricking, and
+fear engenders a recoil or sudden abandonment of the mind, joy gives
+rise to a profuse mirth, while lust is the parent of an unbridled habit
+of coveting. But that imagination, which I have included in all the
+above definitions, they would have to consist in assenting without
+warrantable grounds. Now, every perturbation has many subordinate parts
+annexed to it of the same kind. Grief is attended with enviousness
+(<i>invidentia</i>)—I use that word for instruction’s sake, though it is not
+so common; because envy (<i>invidia</i>) takes in not only the person who
+envies, but the person, too, who is envied—emulation, detraction, pity,
+vexation, mourning, sadness, tribulation, sorrow, lamentation,
+solicitude, disquiet of mind, pain, despair, and many other similar
+feelings are so too. Under fear are comprehended sloth, shame, terror,
+cowardice, fainting, confusion, astonishment. In pleasure they
+comprehend malevolence—that is, pleased at another’s
+misfortune—delight, boastfulness, and the like. To lust they associate
+anger, fury, hatred, enmity, discord, wants, desire, and other feelings
+of that kind.</p>
+
+<p><a id="page-135"></a><span class="pgnum">135</span>But they define these in this manner:</p>
+
+<p>VIII. Enviousness (<i>invidentia</i>), they say, is a grief arising from the
+prosperous circumstances of another, which are in no degree injurious to
+the person who envies; for where any one grieves at the prosperity of
+another, by which he is injured, such a one is not properly said to
+envy—as when Agamemnon grieves at Hector’s success; but where any one,
+who is in no way hurt by the prosperity of another, is in pain at his
+success, such a one envies indeed. Now the name “emulation” is taken in
+a double sense, so that the same word may stand for praise and
+dispraise: for the imitation of virtue is called emulation (however,
+that sense of it I shall have no occasion for here, for that carries
+praise with it); but emulation is also a term applied to grief at
+another’s enjoying what I desired to have, and am without. Detraction
+(and I mean by that, jealousy) is a grief even at another’s enjoying
+what I had a great inclination for. Pity is a grief at the misery of
+another who suffers wrongfully; for no one is moved by pity at the
+punishment of a parricide or of a betrayer of his country. Vexation is a
+pressing grief. Mourning is a grief at the bitter death of one who was
+dear to you. Sadness is a grief attended with tears. Tribulation is a
+painful grief. Sorrow, an excruciating grief. Lamentation, a grief where
+we loudly bewail ourselves. Solicitude, a pensive grief. Trouble, a
+continued grief. Affliction, a grief that harasses the body. Despair, a
+grief that excludes all hope of better things to come. But those
+feelings which are included under fear, they define thus: There is
+sloth, which is a dread of some ensuing labor; shame and terror, which
+affect the body—hence blushing attends shame; a paleness, and tremor,
+and chattering of the teeth attend terror—cowardice, which is an
+apprehension of some approaching evil; dread, a fear that unhinges the
+mind, whence comes that line of Ennius,</p>
+
+<div class="poem">
+<p>Then dread discharged all wisdom from my mind;</p>
+</div>
+
+<p class="cont">fainting is the associate and constant attendant on dread; confusion, a
+fear that drives away all thought; alarm, a continued fear.</p>
+
+<p><a id="page-136"></a><span class="pgnum">136</span>IX. The different species into which they divide pleasure come under
+this description; so that malevolence is a pleasure in the misfortunes
+of another, without any advantage to yourself; delight, a pleasure that
+soothes the mind by agreeable impressions on the ear. What is said of
+the ear may be applied to the sight, to the touch, smell, and taste. All
+feelings of this kind are a sort of melting pleasure that dissolves the
+mind. Boastfulness is a pleasure that consists in making an appearance,
+and setting off yourself with insolence.—The subordinate species of
+lust they define in this manner: Anger is a lust of punishing any one
+who, as we imagine, has injured us without cause. Heat is anger just
+forming and beginning to exist, which the Greeks call <span class="greek">Ξ᜻Όωσις</span>. Hatred is
+a settled anger. Enmity is anger waiting for an opportunity of revenge.
+Discord is a sharper anger conceived deeply in the mind and heart. Want
+an insatiable lust. Regret is when one eagerly wishes to see a person
+who is absent. Now here they have a distinction; so that with them
+regret is a lust conceived on hearing of certain things reported of some
+one, or of many, which the Greeks call <span class="greek">κατηγορ᜵Όατα</span>, or predicaments; as
+that they are in possession of riches and honors: but want is a lust for
+those very honors and riches. But these definers make intemperance the
+fountain of all these perturbations; which is an absolute revolt from
+the mind and right reason—a state so averse to all rules of reason that
+the appetites of the mind can by no means be governed and restrained.
+As, therefore, temperance appeases these desires, making them obey right
+reason, and maintains the well-weighed judgments of the mind, so
+intemperance, which is in opposition to this, inflames, confounds, and
+puts every state of the mind into a violent motion. Thus, grief and
+fear, and every other perturbation of the mind, have their rise from
+intemperance.</p>
+
+<p>X. Just as distempers and sickness are bred in the body from the
+corruption of the blood, and the too great abundance of phlegm and bile,
+so the mind is deprived of its health, and disordered with sickness,
+from a confusion of depraved opinions that are in opposition to one
+another. From these perturbations arise, first, diseases, which they
+call <span class="greek">Μοσ᜵Όατα</span>; and also those feelings which are in opposition <a id="page-137"></a><span class="pgnum">137</span>to these
+diseases, and which admit certain faulty distastes or loathings; then
+come sicknesses, which are called <span class="greek">ጀ῀ῥωστ᜵Όατα</span> by the Stoics, and these
+two have their opposite aversions. Here the Stoics, especially
+Chrysippus, give themselves unnecessary trouble to show the analogy
+which the diseases of the mind have to those of the body: but,
+overlooking all that they say as of little consequence, I shall treat
+only of the thing itself. Let us, then, understand perturbation to imply
+a restlessness from the variety and confusion of contradictory opinions;
+and that when this heat and disturbance of the mind is of any standing,
+and has taken up its residence, as it were, in the veins and marrow,
+then commence diseases and sickness, and those aversions which are in
+opposition to these diseases and sicknesses.</p>
+
+<p>XI. What I say here may be distinguished in thought, though they are in
+fact the same; inasmuch as they both have their rise from lust and joy.
+For should money be the object of our desire, and should we not
+instantly apply to reason, as if it were a kind of Socratic medicine to
+heal this desire, the evil glides into our veins, and cleaves to our
+bowels, and from thence proceeds a distemper or sickness, which, when it
+is of any continuance, is incurable, and the name of this disease is
+covetousness. It is the same with other diseases; as the desire of
+glory, a passion for women, to which the Greeks give the name of
+<span class="greek">φιλογυΜε᜷α</span>: and thus all other diseases and sicknesses are generated.
+But those feelings which are the contrary of these are supposed to have
+fear for their foundation, as a hatred of women, such as is displayed in
+the Woman-hater of Atilius; or the hatred of the whole human species, as
+Timon is reported to have done, whom they call the Misanthrope. Of the
+same kind is inhospitality. And all these diseases proceed from a
+certain dread of such things as they hate and avoid. But they define
+sickness of mind to be an overweening opinion, and that fixed and deeply
+implanted in the heart, of something as very desirable which is by no
+means so. What proceeds from aversion, they define thus: a vehement idea
+of something to be avoided, deeply implanted, and inherent in our minds,
+when there is no reason for avoiding it; and this kind of opinion is a
+deliberate <a id="page-138"></a><span class="pgnum">138</span>belief that one understands things of which one is wholly
+ignorant. Now, sickness of the mind has all these subordinate divisions:
+avarice, ambition, fondness for women, obstinacy, gluttony, drunkenness,
+covetousness, and other similar vices. But avarice is a violent opinion
+about money, as if it were vehemently to be desired and sought after,
+which opinion is deeply implanted and inherent in our minds; and the
+definition of all the other similar feelings resembles these. But the
+definitions of aversions are of this sort: inhospitality is a vehement
+opinion, deeply implanted and inherent in your mind, that you should
+avoid a stranger. Thus, too, the hatred of women, like that felt by
+Hippolytus, is defined; and the hatred of the human species like that
+displayed by Timon.</p>
+
+<p>XII. But to come to the analogy of the state of body and mind, which I
+shall sometimes make use of, though more sparingly than the Stoics. Some
+men are more inclined to particular disorders than others; and,
+therefore, we say that some people are rheumatic, others dropsical, not
+because they are so at present, but because they are often so: some are
+inclined to fear, others to some other perturbation. Thus in some there
+is a continual anxiety, owing to which they are anxious; in some a
+hastiness of temper, which differs from anger, as anxiety differs from
+anguish: for all are not anxious who are sometimes vexed, nor are they
+who are anxious always uneasy in that manner: as there is a difference
+between being drunk and drunkenness; and it is one thing to be a lover,
+another to be given to women. And this disposition of particular people
+to particular disorders is very common: for it relates to all
+perturbations; it appears in many vices, though it has no name. Some
+are, therefore, said to be envious, malevolent, spiteful, fearful,
+pitiful, from a propensity to those perturbations, not from their being
+always carried away by them. Now this propensity to these particular
+disorders may be called a sickness from analogy with the body; meaning,
+that is to say, nothing more than a propensity towards sickness. But
+with regard to whatever is good, as some are more inclined to different
+good qualities than others, we may call this a facility or tendency:
+this tendency to evil is a proclivity or inclination to falling; <a id="page-139"></a><span class="pgnum">139</span>but
+where anything is neither good nor bad, it may have the former name.</p>
+
+<p>XIII. Even as there may be, with respect to the body, a disease, a
+sickness, and a defect, so it is with the mind. They call that a disease
+where the whole body is corrupted; they call that sickness where a
+disease is attended with a weakness, and that a defect where the parts
+of the body are not well compacted together; from whence it follows that
+the members are misshapen, crooked, and deformed. So that these two, a
+disease and sickness, proceed from a violent concussion and perturbation
+of the health of the whole body; but a defect discovers itself even when
+the body is in perfect health. But a disease of the mind is
+distinguishable only in thought from a sickness. But a viciousness is a
+habit or affection discordant and inconsistent with itself through life.
+Thus it happens that, in the one case, a disease and sickness may arise
+from a corruption of opinions; in the other case, the consequence may be
+inconstancy and inconsistency. For every vice of the mind does not imply
+a disunion of parts; as is the case with those who are not far from
+being wise men. With them there is that affection which is inconsistent
+with itself while it is foolish; but it is not distorted, nor depraved.
+But diseases and sicknesses are parts of viciousness; but it is a
+question whether perturbations are parts of the same, for vices are
+permanent affections: perturbations are such as are restless; so that
+they cannot be parts of permanent ones. As there is some analogy between
+the nature of the body and mind in evil, so is there in good; for the
+distinctions of the body are beauty, strength, health, firmness,
+quickness of motion: the same may be said of the mind. The body is said
+to be in a good state when all those things on which health depends are
+consistent: the same may be said of the mind when its judgments and
+opinions are not at variance with one another. And this union is the
+virtue of the mind, which, according to some people, is temperance
+itself; others make it consist in an obedience to the precepts of
+temperance, and a compliance with them, not allowing it to be any
+distinct species of itself. But, be it one or the other, it is to be
+found only in a wise man. But there is a certain <a id="page-140"></a><span class="pgnum">140</span>soundness of mind,
+which even a fool may have, when the perturbation of his mind is removed
+by the care and management of his physicians. And as what is called
+beauty arises from an exact proportion of the limbs, together with a
+certain sweetness of complexion, so the beauty of the mind consists in
+an equality and constancy of opinions and judgments, joined to a certain
+firmness and stability, pursuing virtue, or containing within itself the
+very essence of virtue. Besides, we give the very same names to the
+faculties of the mind as we do to the powers of the body, the nerves,
+and other powers of action. Thus the velocity of the body is called
+swiftness: a praise which we ascribe to the mind, from its running over
+in its thoughts so many things in so short a time.</p>
+
+<p>XIV. Herein, indeed, the mind and body are unlike: that though the mind
+when in perfect health may be visited by sickness, as the body may, yet
+the body may be disordered without our fault; the mind cannot. For all
+the disorders and perturbations of the mind proceed from a neglect of
+reason; these disorders, therefore, are confined to men: the beasts are
+not subject to such perturbations, though they act sometimes as if they
+had reason. There is a difference, too, between ingenious and dull men;
+the ingenious, like the Corinthian brass, which is long before it
+receives rust, are longer before they fall into these perturbations, and
+are recovered sooner: the case is different with the dull. Nor does the
+mind of an ingenious man fall into every kind of perturbation, for it
+never yields to any that are brutish and savage; and some of their
+perturbations have at first even the appearance of humanity, as mercy,
+grief, and fear. But the sicknesses and diseases of the mind are thought
+to be harder to eradicate than those leading vices which are in
+opposition to virtues; for vices may be removed, though the diseases of
+the mind should continue, which diseases are not cured with that
+expedition with which vices are removed. I have now acquainted you with
+the arguments which the Stoics put forth with such exactness; which they
+call logic, from their close arguing: and since my discourse has got
+clear of these rocks, I will proceed with the remainder of it, provided
+I have been sufficiently clear in what I have already <a id="page-141"></a><span class="pgnum">141</span>said, considering
+the obscurity of the subject I have treated.</p>
+
+<p><i>A.</i> Clear enough; but should there be occasion for a more exact
+inquiry, I shall take another opportunity of asking you. I expect you
+now to hoist your sails, as you just now called them, and proceed on
+your course.</p>
+
+<p>XV. <i>M.</i> Since I have spoken before of virtue in other places, and shall
+often have occasion to speak again (for a great many questions that
+relate to life and manners arise from the spring of virtue); and since,
+as I say, virtue consists in a settled and uniform affection of mind,
+making those persons praiseworthy who are possessed of her, she herself
+also, independent of anything else, without regard to any advantage,
+must be praiseworthy; for from her proceed good inclinations, opinions,
+actions, and the whole of right reason; though virtue may be defined in
+a few words to be right reason itself. The opposite to this is
+viciousness (for so I choose to translate what the Greeks call <span class="greek">κακ᜷α</span>,
+rather than by perverseness; for perverseness is the name of a
+particular vice; but viciousness includes all), from whence arise those
+perturbations which, as I just now said, are turbid and violent motions
+of the mind, repugnant to reason, and enemies in a high degree to the
+peace of the mind and a tranquil life, for they introduce piercing and
+anxious cares, and afflict and debilitate the mind through fear; they
+violently inflame our hearts with exaggerated appetite, which is in
+reality an impotence of mind, utterly irreconcilable with temperance and
+moderation, which we sometimes call desire, and sometimes lust, and
+which, should it even attain the object of its wishes, immediately
+becomes so elated that it loses all its resolution, and knows not what
+to pursue; so that he was in the right who said “that exaggerated
+pleasure was the very greatest of mistakes.” Virtue, then, alone can
+effect the cure of these evils.</p>
+
+<p>XVI. For what is not only more miserable, but more base and sordid, than
+a man afflicted, weakened, and oppressed with grief? And little short of
+this misery is one who dreads some approaching evil, and who, through
+faintheartedness, is under continual suspense. The poets, to express the
+greatness of this evil, imagine a stone to <a id="page-142"></a><span class="pgnum">142</span>hang over the head of
+Tantalus, as a punishment for his wickedness, his pride, and his
+boasting. And this is the common punishment of folly; for there hangs
+over the head of every one whose mind revolts from reason some similar
+fear. And as these perturbations of the mind, grief and fear, are of a
+most wasting nature, so those two others, though of a more merry cast (I
+mean lust, which is always coveting something with eagerness, and empty
+mirth, which is an exulting joy), differ very little from madness. Hence
+you may understand what sort of person he is whom we call at one time
+moderate, at another modest or temperate, at another constant and
+virtuous; while sometimes we include all these names in the word
+frugality, as the crown of all; for if that word did not include all
+virtues, it would never have been proverbial to say that a frugal man
+does everything rightly. But when the Stoics apply this saying to their
+wise man, they seem to exalt him too much, and to speak of him with too
+much admiration.</p>
+
+<p>XVII. Whoever, then, through moderation and constancy, is at rest in his
+mind, and in calm possession of himself, so as neither to pine with
+care, nor be dejected with fear, nor to be inflamed with desire,
+coveting something greedily, nor relaxed by extravagant mirth—such a
+man is that identical wise man whom we are inquiring for: he is the
+happy man, to whom nothing in this life seems intolerable enough to
+depress him; nothing exquisite enough to transport him unduly. For what
+is there in this life that can appear great to him who has acquainted
+himself with eternity and the utmost extent of the universe? For what is
+there in human knowledge, or the short span of this life, that can
+appear great to a wise man? whose mind is always so upon its guard that
+nothing can befall him which is unforeseen, nothing which is unexpected,
+nothing, in short, which is new. Such a man takes so exact a survey on
+all sides of him, that he always knows the proper place and spot to live
+in free from all the troubles and annoyances of life, and encounters
+every accident that fortune can bring upon him with a becoming calmness.
+Whoever conducts himself in this manner will be free from grief, and
+from every other perturbation; and a mind free from these feelings
+renders men completely happy; whereas <a id="page-143"></a><span class="pgnum">143</span>a mind disordered and drawn off
+from right and unerring reason loses at once, not only its resolution,
+but its health.—Therefore the thoughts and declarations of the
+Peripatetics are soft and effeminate, for they say that the mind must
+necessarily be agitated, but at the same time they lay down certain
+bounds beyond which that agitation is not to proceed. And do you set
+bounds to vice? or is it no vice to disobey reason? Does not reason
+sufficiently declare that there is no real good which you should desire
+too ardently, or the possession of which you should allow to transport
+you? and that there is no evil that should be able to overwhelm you, or
+the suspicion of which should distract you? and that all these things
+assume too melancholy or too cheerful an appearance through our own
+error? But if fools find this error lessened by time, so that, though
+the cause remains the same, they are not affected, in the same manner,
+after some time, as they were at first, why, surely a wise man ought not
+to be influenced at all by it. But what are those degrees by which we
+are to limit it? Let us fix these degrees in grief, a difficult subject,
+and one much canvassed.—Fannius writes that P. Rutilius took it much to
+heart that his brother was refused the consulship; but he seems to have
+been too much affected by this disappointment, for it was the occasion
+of his death: he ought, therefore, to have borne it with more
+moderation. But let us suppose that while he was bearing this with
+moderation, the death of his children had intervened; here would have
+started a fresh grief, which, admitting it to be moderate in itself, yet
+still must have been a great addition to the other. Now, to these let us
+add some acute pains of body, the loss of his fortune, blindness,
+banishment. Supposing, then, each separate misfortune to occasion a
+separate additional grief, the whole would be too great to be
+supportable.</p>
+
+<p>XVIII. The man who attempts to set bounds to vice acts like one who
+should throw himself headlong from Leucate, persuaded that he could stop
+himself whenever he pleased. Now, as that is impossible, so a perturbed
+and disordered mind cannot restrain itself, and stop where it pleases.
+Certainly whatever is bad in its increase is bad in its birth. Now grief
+and all other perturbations <a id="page-144"></a><span class="pgnum">144</span>are doubtless baneful in their progress,
+and have, therefore, no small share of evil at the beginning; for they
+go on of themselves when once they depart from reason, for every
+weakness is self-indulgent, and indiscreetly launches out, and does not
+know where to stop. So that it makes no difference whether you approve
+of moderate perturbations of mind, or of moderate injustice, moderate
+cowardice, and moderate intemperance; for whoever prescribes bounds to
+vice admits a part of it, which, as it is odious of itself, becomes the
+more so as it stands on slippery ground, and, being once set forward,
+glides on headlong, and cannot by any means be stopped.</p>
+
+<p>XIX. Why should I say more? Why should I add that the Peripatetics say
+that these perturbations, which we insist upon it should be extirpated,
+are not only natural, but were given to men by nature for a good
+purpose? They usually talk in this manner. In the first place, they say
+much in praise of anger; they call it the whetstone of courage, and they
+say that angry men exert themselves most against an enemy or against a
+bad citizen: that those reasons are of little weight which are the
+motives of men who think thus, as—it is a just war; it becomes us to
+fight for our laws, our liberties, our country: they will allow no force
+to these arguments unless our courage is warmed by anger.—Nor do they
+confine their argument to warriors; but their opinion is that no one can
+issue any rigid commands without some bitterness and anger. In short,
+they have no notion of an orator either accusing or even defending a
+client without he is spurred on by anger. And though this anger should
+not be real, still they think his words and gestures ought to wear the
+appearance of it, so that the action of the orator may excite the anger
+of his hearer. And they deny that any man has ever been seen who does
+not know what it is to be angry; and they name what we call lenity by
+the bad appellation of indolence. Nor do they commend only this lust
+(for anger is, as I defined it above, the lust of revenge), but they
+maintain that kind of lust or desire to be given us by nature for very
+good purposes, saying that no one can execute anything well but what he
+is in earnest about. Themistocles used to walk in the public places in
+the night because he could <a id="page-145"></a><span class="pgnum">145</span>not sleep; and when asked the reason, his
+answer was, that Miltiades’s trophies kept him awake. Who has not heard
+how Demosthenes used to watch, who said that it gave him pain if any
+mechanic was up in a morning at his work before him? Lastly, they urge
+that some of the greatest philosophers would never have made that
+progress in their studies without some ardent desire spurring them
+on.—We are informed that Pythagoras, Democritus, and Plato visited the
+remotest parts of the world; for they thought that they ought to go
+wherever anything was to be learned. Now, it is not conceivable that
+these things could be effected by anything but by the greatest ardor of
+mind.</p>
+
+<p>XX. They say that even grief, which we have already said ought to be
+avoided as a monstrous and fierce beast, was appointed by nature, not
+without some good purpose, in order that men should lament when they had
+committed a fault, well knowing they had exposed themselves to
+correction, rebuke, and ignominy; for they think that those who can bear
+ignominy and infamy without pain have acquired a complete impunity for
+all sorts of crimes; for with them reproach is a stronger check than
+conscience. From whence we have that scene in Afranius borrowed from
+common life; for when the abandoned son saith, “Wretched that I am!” the
+severe father replies,</p>
+
+<div class="poem">
+<p>Let him but grieve, no matter what the cause.</p>
+</div>
+
+<p class="cont">And they say the other divisions of sorrow have their use; that pity
+incites us to hasten to the assistance of others, and to alleviate the
+calamities of men who have undeservedly fallen into them; that even envy
+and detraction are not without their use, as when a man sees that
+another person has attained what he cannot, or observes another to be
+equally successful with himself; that he who should take away fear would
+take away all industry in life, which those men exert in the greatest
+degree who are afraid of the laws and of the magistrates, who dread
+poverty, ignominy, death, and pain. But while they argue thus, they
+allow indeed of these feelings being retrenched, though they deny that
+they either can or should be plucked up by the roots; so that their
+opinion is that mediocrity is <a id="page-146"></a><span class="pgnum">146</span>best in everything. When they reason in
+this manner, what think you—is what they say worth attending to or not?</p>
+
+<p><i>A.</i> I think it is. I wait, therefore, to hear what you will say in
+reply to them.</p>
+
+<p>XXI. <i>M.</i> Perhaps I may find something to say; but I will make this
+observation first: do you take notice with what modesty the Academics
+behave themselves? for they speak plainly to the purpose. The
+Peripatetics are answered by the Stoics; they have my leave to fight it
+out, who think myself no otherwise concerned than to inquire for what
+may seem to be most probable. Our present business is, then, to see if
+we can meet with anything in this question which is the probable, for
+beyond such approximation to truth as that human nature cannot proceed.
+The definition of a perturbation, as Zeno, I think, has rightly
+determined it, is thus: That a perturbation is a commotion of the mind
+against nature, in opposition to right reason; or, more briefly, thus,
+that a perturbation is a somewhat too vehement appetite; and when he
+says somewhat too vehement, he means such as is at a greater distance
+from the constant course of nature. What can I say to these definitions?
+The greater part of them we have from those who dispute with sagacity
+and acuteness: some of them expressions, indeed, such as the “ardors of
+the mind,” and “the whetstones of virtue,” savoring of the pomp of
+rhetoricians. As to the question, if a brave man can maintain his
+courage without becoming angry, it may be questioned with regard to the
+gladiators; though we often observe much resolution even in them: they
+meet, converse, they make objections and demands, they agree about
+terms, so that they seem calm rather than angry. But let us admit a man
+of the name of Placideianus, who was one of that trade, to be in such a
+mind, as Lucilius relates of him,</p>
+
+<div class="poem">
+<p>If for his blood you thirst, the task be mine;</p>
+<p>His laurels at my feet he shall resign;</p>
+<p>Not but I know, before I reach his heart,</p>
+<p>First on myself a wound he will impart.</p>
+<p>I hate the man; enraged I fight, and straight</p>
+<p>In action we had been, but that I wait</p>
+<p>Till each his sword had fitted to his hand.</p>
+<p>My rage I scarce can keep within command.</p>
+</div>
+
+<p><a id="page-147"></a><span class="pgnum">147</span>XXII. But we see Ajax in Homer advancing to meet Hector in battle
+cheerfully, without any of this boisterous wrath. For he had no sooner
+taken up his arms than the first step which he made inspired his
+associates with joy, his enemies with fear; so that even Hector, as he
+is represented by Homer,<a id="FNA-49"></a><a href="#FN-49"><sup>49</sup></a> trembling, condemned himself for having
+challenged him to fight. Yet these heroes conversed together, calmly and
+quietly, before they engaged; nor did they show any anger or outrageous
+behavior during the combat. Nor do I imagine that Torquatus, the first
+who obtained this surname, was in a rage when he plundered the Gaul of
+his collar; or that Marcellus’s courage at Clastidium was only owing to
+his anger. I could almost swear that Africanus, with whom we are better
+acquainted, from our recollection of him being more recent, was noways
+inflamed by anger when he covered Alienus Pelignus with his shield, and
+drove his sword into the enemy’s breast. There may be some doubt of L.
+Brutus, whether he was not influenced by extraordinary hatred of the
+tyrant, so as to attack Aruns with more than usual rashness; for I
+observe that they mutually killed each other in close fight. Why, then,
+do you call in the assistance of anger? Would courage, unless it began
+to get <a id="page-148"></a><span class="pgnum">148</span>furious, lose its energy? What! do you imagine that Hercules,
+whom the very courage which you would try to represent as anger raised
+to heaven, was angry when he engaged the Erymanthian boar, or the NemÊan
+lion? Or was Theseus in a passion when he seized on the horns of the
+Marathonian bull? Take care how you make courage to depend in the least
+on rage. For anger is altogether irrational, and that is not courage
+which is void of reason.</p>
+
+<p>XXIII. We ought to hold all things here in contempt; death is to be
+looked on with indifference; pains and labors must be considered as
+easily supportable. And when these sentiments are established on
+judgment and conviction, then will that stout and firm courage take
+place; unless you attribute to anger whatever is done with vehemence,
+alacrity, and spirit. To me, indeed, that very Scipio<a id="FNA-50"></a><a href="#FN-50"><sup>50</sup></a> who was chief
+priest, that favorer of the saying of the Stoics, “That no private man
+could be a wise man,” does not seem to be angry with Tiberius Gracchus,
+even when he left the consul in a hesitating frame of mind, and, though
+a private man himself, commanded, with the authority of a consul, that
+all who meant well to the republic should follow him. I do not know
+whether I have done anything in the republic that has the appearance of
+courage; but if I have, I certainly did not do it in wrath. Doth
+anything come nearer madness than anger? And indeed Ennius has well
+defined it as the beginning of madness. The changing color, the
+alteration of our voice, the look of our eyes, our manner of fetching
+our breath, the little command we have over our words and actions, how
+little do all these things indicate a sound mind! What can make a worse
+appearance than Homer’s Achilles, or Agamemnon, during the quarrel? And
+as to Ajax, anger drove him into downright madness, and was the occasion
+of his death. Courage, therefore, does not want the assistance of anger;
+it is sufficiently provided, armed, and prepared of itself. We may as
+well say that drunkenness or madness is of service to courage, because
+those who <a id="page-149"></a><span class="pgnum">149</span>are mad or drunk often do a great many things with unusual
+vehemence. Ajax was always brave; but still he was most brave when he
+was in that state of frenzy:</p>
+
+<div class="poem">
+<p>The greatest feat that Ajax e’er achieved</p>
+<p>Was, when his single arm the Greeks relieved.</p>
+<p>Quitting the field; urged on by rising rage,</p>
+<p>Forced the declining troops again t’engage.</p>
+</div>
+
+<p class="cont">Shall we say, then, that madness has its use?</p>
+
+<p>XXIV. Examine the definitions of courage: you will find it does not
+require the assistance of passion. Courage is, then, an affection of
+mind that endures all things, being itself in proper subjection to the
+highest of all laws; or it may be called a firm maintenance of judgment
+in supporting or repelling everything that has a formidable appearance,
+or a knowledge of what is formidable or otherwise, and maintaining
+invariably a stable judgment of all such things, so as to bear them or
+despise them; or, in fewer words, according to Chrysippus (for the above
+definitions are SphÊrus’s, a man of the first ability as a layer-down of
+definitions, as the Stoics think. But they are all pretty much alike:
+they give us only common notions, some one way, and some another). But
+what is Chrysippus’s definition? Fortitude, says he, is the knowledge of
+all things that are bearable, or an affection of the mind which bears
+and supports everything in obedience to the chief law of reason without
+fear. Now, though we should attack these men in the same manner as
+Carneades used to do, I fear they are the only real philosophers; for
+which of these definitions is there which does not explain that obscure
+and intricate notion of courage which every man conceives within
+himself? And when it is thus explained, what can a warrior, a commander,
+or an orator want more? And no one can think that they will be unable to
+behave themselves courageously without anger. What! do not even the
+Stoics, who maintain that all fools are mad, make the same inferences?
+for, take away perturbations, especially a hastiness of temper, and they
+will appear to talk very absurdly. But what they assert is this: they
+say that all fools are mad, as all dunghills stink; not that they always
+do so, but stir them, and you will perceive it. And in like manner, a
+warm-tempered man is <a id="page-150"></a><span class="pgnum">150</span>not always in a passion; but provoke him, and you
+will see him run mad. Now, that very warlike anger, which is of such
+service in war, what is the use of it to him when he is at home with his
+wife, children, and family? Is there, then, anything that a disturbed
+mind can do better than one which is calm and steady? Or can any one be
+angry without a perturbation of mind? Our people, then, were in the
+right, who, as all vices depend on our manners, and nothing is worse
+than a passionate disposition, called angry men the only morose men.<a id="FNA-51"></a><a href="#FN-51"><sup>51</sup></a></p>
+
+<p>XXV. Anger is in no wise becoming in an orator, though it is not amiss
+to affect it. Do you imagine that I am angry when in pleading I use any
+extraordinary vehemence and sharpness? What! when I write out my
+speeches after all is over and past, am I then angry while writing? Or
+do you think Æsopus was ever angry when he acted, or Accius was so when
+he wrote? Those men, indeed, act very well, but the orator acts better
+than the player, provided he be really an orator; but, then, they carry
+it on without passion, and with a composed mind. But what wantonness is
+it to commend lust! You produce Themistocles and Demosthenes; to these
+you add Pythagoras, Democritus, and Plato. What! do you then call
+studies lust? But these studies of the most excellent and admirable
+things, such as those were which you bring forward on all occasions,
+ought to be composed and tranquil; and what kind of philosophers are
+they who commend grief, than which nothing is more detestable? Afranius
+has said much to this purpose:</p>
+
+<div class="poem">
+<p>Let him but grieve, no matter what the cause.</p>
+</div>
+
+<p class="cont">But he spoke this of a debauched and dissolute youth. But we are
+inquiring into the conduct of a constant and wise man. We may even allow
+a centurion or standard-bearer to be angry, or any others, whom, not to
+explain too far the mysteries of the rhetoricians, I shall not mention
+here; for to touch the passions, where reason cannot be come at, may
+have its use; but my inquiry, as I often repeat, is about a wise man.</p>
+
+<p><a id="page-151"></a><span class="pgnum">151</span>XXVI. But even envy, detraction, pity, have their use. Why should you
+pity rather than assist, if it is in your power to do so? Is it because
+you cannot be liberal without pity? We should not take sorrows on
+ourselves upon another’s account; but we ought to relieve others of
+their grief if we can. But to detract from another’s reputation, or to
+rival him with that vicious emulation which resembles an enmity, of what
+use can that conduct be? Now, envy implies being uneasy at another’s
+good because one does not enjoy it one’s self; but detraction is the
+being uneasy at another’s good, merely because he enjoys it. How can it
+be right that you should voluntarily grieve, rather than take the
+trouble of acquiring what you want to have? for it is madness in the
+highest degree to desire to be the only one that has any particular
+happiness. But who can with correctness speak in praise of a mediocrity
+of evils? Can any one in whom there is lust or desire be otherwise than
+libidinous or desirous? or can a man who is occupied by anger avoid
+being angry? or can one who is exposed to any vexation escape being
+vexed? or if he is under the influence of fear, must he not be fearful?
+Do we look, then, on the libidinous, the angry, the anxious, and the
+timid man, as persons of wisdom, of excellence? of which I could speak
+very copiously and diffusely, but I wish to be as concise as possible.
+And so I will merely say that wisdom is an acquaintance with all divine
+and human affairs, and a knowledge of the cause of everything. Hence it
+is that it imitates what is divine, and looks upon all human concerns as
+inferior to virtue. Did you, then, say that it was your opinion that
+such a man was as naturally liable to perturbation as the sea is exposed
+to winds? What is there that can discompose such gravity and constancy?
+Anything sudden or unforeseen? How can anything of this kind befall one
+to whom nothing is sudden and unforeseen that can happen to man? Now, as
+to their saying that redundancies should be pared off, and only what is
+natural remain, what, I pray you, can be natural which may be too
+exuberant?</p>
+
+<p>XXVII. All these assertions proceed from the roots of errors, which must
+be entirely plucked up and destroyed, not pared and amputated. But as I
+suspect that your inquiry <a id="page-152"></a><span class="pgnum">152</span>is not so much respecting the wise man as
+concerning yourself (for you allow that he is free from all
+perturbations, and you would willingly be so too yourself), let us see
+what remedies there are which may be applied by philosophy to the
+diseases of the mind. There is certainly some remedy; nor has nature
+been so unkind to the human race as to have discovered so many things
+salutary to the body, and none which are medicinal to the mind. She has
+even been kinder to the mind than to the body; inasmuch as you must seek
+abroad for the assistance which the body requires, while the mind has
+all that it requires within itself. But in proportion as the excellency
+of the mind is of a higher and more divine nature, the more diligence
+does it require; and therefore reason, when it is well applied,
+discovers what is best, but when it is neglected, it becomes involved in
+many errors. I shall apply, then, all my discourse to you; for though
+you pretend to be inquiring about the wise man, your inquiry may
+possibly be about yourself. Various, then, are the cures of those
+perturbations which I have expounded, for every disorder is not to be
+appeased the same way. One medicine must be applied to the man who
+mourns, another to the pitiful, another to the person who envies; for
+there is this difference to be maintained in all the four perturbations:
+we are to consider whether our discourse had better be directed to
+perturbations in general, which are a contempt of reason, or a somewhat
+too vehement appetite; or whether it would be better applied to
+particular descriptions, as, for instance, to fear, lust, and the rest,
+and whether it appears preferable to endeavor to remove that which has
+occasioned the grief, or rather to attempt wholly to eradicate every
+kind of grief. As, should any one grieve that he is poor, the question
+is, Would you maintain poverty to be no evil, or would you contend that
+a man ought not to grieve at anything? Certainly this last is the best
+course; for should you not convince him with regard to poverty, you must
+allow him to grieve; but if you remove grief by particular arguments,
+such as I used yesterday, the evil of poverty is in some manner removed.</p>
+
+<p>XXVIII. But any perturbation of the mind of this sort may be, as it
+were, wiped away by the method of appeasing <a id="page-153"></a><span class="pgnum">153</span>the mind, if you succeed in
+showing that there is no good in that which has given rise to joy and
+lust, nor any evil in that which has occasioned fear or grief. But
+certainly the most effectual cure is to be achieved by showing that all
+perturbations are of themselves vicious, and have nothing natural or
+necessary in them. As we see, grief itself is easily softened when we
+charge those who grieve with weakness and an effeminate mind; or when we
+commend the gravity and constancy of those who bear calmly whatever
+befalls them here, as accidents to which all men are liable; and,
+indeed, this is generally the feeling of those who look on these as real
+evils, but yet think they should be borne with resignation. One imagines
+pleasure to be a good, another money; and yet the one may be called off
+from intemperance, the other from covetousness. The other method and
+address, which, at the same time that it removes the false opinion,
+withdraws the disorder, has more subtlety in it; but it seldom succeeds,
+and is not applicable to vulgar minds, for there are some diseases which
+that medicine can by no means remove. For, should any one be uneasy
+because he is without virtue, without courage, destitute of a sense of
+duty or honesty, his anxiety proceeds from a real evil; and yet we must
+apply another method of cure to him, and such a one as all the
+philosophers, however they may differ about other things, agree in. For
+they must necessarily agree in this, that commotions of the mind in
+opposition to right reason are vicious; and that even admitting those
+things to be evils which occasion fear or grief, and those to be goods
+which provoke desire or joy, yet that very commotion itself is vicious;
+for we mean by the expressions magnanimous and brave, one who is
+resolute, sedate, grave, and superior to everything in this life; but
+one who either grieves, or fears, or covets, or is transported with
+passion, cannot come under that denomination; for these things are
+consistent only with those who look on the things of this world as
+things with which their minds are unequal to contend.</p>
+
+<p>XXIX. Wherefore, as I before said, the philosophers have all one method
+of cure, so that we need say nothing about what sort of thing that is
+which <a id="page-154"></a><span class="pgnum">154</span>disturbs the mind, but we must speak only concerning the
+perturbation itself. Thus, first, with regard to desire itself, when the
+business is only to remove that, the inquiry is not to be, whether that
+thing be good or evil which provokes lust, but the lust itself is to be
+removed; so that whether whatever is honest is the chief good, or
+whether it consists in pleasure, or in both these things together, or in
+the other three kinds of goods, yet should there be in any one too
+vehement an appetite for even virtue itself, the whole discourse should
+be directed to the deterring him from that vehemence. But human nature,
+when placed in a conspicuous point of view, gives us every argument for
+appeasing the mind, and, to make this the more distinct, the laws and
+conditions of life should be explained in our discourse. Therefore, it
+was not without reason that Socrates is reported, when Euripides was
+exhibiting his play called Orestes, to have repeated the first three
+verses of that tragedy—</p>
+
+<div class="poem">
+<p>What tragic story men can mournful tell,</p>
+<p>Whate’er from fate or from the gods befell,</p>
+<p>That human nature can support—<a id="FNA-52"></a><a href="#FN-52"><sup>52</sup></a></p>
+</div>
+
+<p class="cont">But, in order to persuade those to whom any misfortune has happened that
+they can and ought to bear it, it is very useful to set before them an
+enumeration of other persons who have borne similar calamities. Indeed,
+the method of appeasing grief was explained in my dispute of yesterday,
+and in my book on Consolation, which I wrote in the midst of my own
+grief; for I was not myself so wise a man as to be insensible to grief,
+and I used this, notwithstanding Chrysippus’s advice to the contrary,
+who is against applying a medicine to the agitations of the mind while
+they are fresh; but I did it, and committed a violence on nature, that
+the greatness of my grief might give way to the greatness of the
+medicine.</p>
+
+<p>XXX. But fear borders upon grief, of which I have already said enough;
+but I must say a little more on that. Now, as grief proceeds from what
+is present, so does fear <a id="page-155"></a><span class="pgnum">155</span>from future evil; so that some have said that
+fear is a certain part of grief: others have called fear the harbinger
+of trouble, which, as it were, introduces the ensuing evil. Now, the
+reasons that make what is present supportable, make what is to come very
+contemptible; for, with regard to both, we should take care to do
+nothing low or grovelling, soft or effeminate, mean or abject. But,
+notwithstanding we should speak of the inconstancy, imbecility, and
+levity of fear itself, yet it is of very great service to speak
+contemptuously of those very things of which we are afraid. So that it
+fell out very well, whether it was by accident or design, that I
+disputed the first and second day on death and pain—the two things that
+are the most dreaded: now, if what I then said was approved of, we are
+in a great degree freed from fear. And this is sufficient, as far as
+regards the opinion of evils.</p>
+
+<p>XXXI. Proceed we now to what are goods—that is to say, to joy and
+desire. To me, indeed, one thing alone seems to embrace the question of
+all that relates to the perturbations of the mind—the fact, namely,
+that all perturbations are in our own power; that they are taken up upon
+opinion, and are voluntary. This error, then, must be got rid of; this
+opinion must be removed; and, as with regard to imagined evils, we are
+to make them more supportable, so with respect to goods, we are to
+lessen the violent effects of those things which are called great and
+joyous. But one thing is to be observed, that equally relates both to
+good and evil: that, should it be difficult to persuade any one that
+none of those things which disturb the mind are to be looked on as good
+or evil, yet a different cure is to be applied to different feelings;
+and the malevolent person is to be corrected by one way of reasoning,
+the lover by another, the anxious man by another, and the fearful by
+another: and it would be easy for any one who pursues the best approved
+method of reasoning, with regard to good and evil, to maintain that no
+fool can be affected with joy, as he never can have anything good. But,
+at present, my discourse proceeds upon the common received notions. Let,
+then, honors, riches, pleasures, and the rest be the very good things
+which they are imagined to be; yet a too elevated and exulting joy on
+the possession <a id="page-156"></a><span class="pgnum">156</span>of them is unbecoming; just as, though it might be
+allowable to laugh, to giggle would be indecent. Thus, a mind enlarged
+by joy is as blamable as a contraction of it by grief; and eager longing
+is a sign of as much levity in desiring as immoderate joy is in
+possessing; and, as those who are too dejected are said to be
+effeminate, so they who are too elated with joy are properly called
+volatile; and as feeling envy is a part of grief, and the being pleased
+with another’s misfortune is a kind of joy, both these feelings are
+usually corrected by showing the wildness and insensibility of them: and
+as it becomes a man to be cautious, but it is unbecoming in him to be
+fearful, so to be pleased is proper, but to be joyful improper. I have,
+in order that I might be the better understood, distinguished pleasure
+from joy. I have already said above, that a contraction of the mind can
+never be right, but that an elation of it may; for the joy of Hector in
+NÊvius is one thing—</p>
+
+<div class="poem">
+<p>’Tis joy indeed to hear my praises sung</p>
+<p>By you, who are the theme of honor’s tongue—</p>
+</div>
+
+<p class="cont">but that of the character in Trabea another: “The kind procuress,
+allured by my money, will observe my nod, will watch my desires, and
+study my will. If I but move the door with my little finger, instantly
+it flies open; and if Chrysis should unexpectedly discover me, she will
+run with joy to meet me, and throw herself into my arms.”</p>
+
+<p>Now he will tell you how excellent he thinks this:</p>
+
+<div class="poem">
+<p>Not even fortune herself is so fortunate.</p>
+</div>
+
+<p>XXXII. Any one who attends the least to the subject will be convinced
+how unbecoming this joy is. And as they are very shameful who are
+immoderately delighted with the enjoyment of venereal pleasures, so are
+they very scandalous who lust vehemently after them. And all that which
+is commonly called love (and, believe me, I can find out no other name
+to call it by) is of such a trivial nature that nothing, I think, is to
+be compared to it: of which CÊcilius says,</p>
+
+<div class="poem">
+<p>I hold the man of every sense bereaved</p>
+<p>Who grants not Love to be of Gods the chief:</p>
+<p><a id="page-157"></a><span class="pgnum">157</span>Whose mighty power whate’er is good effects,</p>
+<p>Who gives to each his beauty and defects:</p>
+<p>Hence, health and sickness; wit and folly, hence,</p>
+<p>The God that love and hatred doth dispense!</p>
+</div>
+
+<p class="cont">An excellent corrector of life this same poetry, which thinks that love,
+the promoter of debauchery and vanity, should have a place in the
+council of the Gods! I am speaking of comedy, which could not subsist at
+all without our approving of these debaucheries. But what said that
+chief of the Argonauts in tragedy?</p>
+
+<div class="poem">
+<p>My life I owe to honor less than love.</p>
+</div>
+
+<p class="cont">What, then, are we to say of this love of Medea?—what a train of
+miseries did it occasion! And yet the same woman has the assurance to
+say to her father, in another poet, that she had a husband</p>
+
+<div class="poem">
+<p>Dearer by love than ever fathers were.</p>
+</div>
+
+<p>XXXIII. However, we may allow the poets to trifle, in whose fables we
+see Jupiter himself engaged in these debaucheries: but let us apply to
+the masters of virtue—the philosophers who deny love to be anything
+carnal; and in this they differ from Epicurus, who, I think, is not much
+mistaken. For what is that love of friendship? How comes it that no one
+is in love with a deformed young man, or a handsome old one? I am of
+opinion that this love of men had its rise from the Gymnastics of the
+Greeks, where these kinds of loves are admissible and permitted;
+therefore Ennius spoke well:</p>
+
+<div class="poem">
+<p>The censure of this crime to those is due</p>
+<p>Who naked bodies first exposed to view.</p>
+</div>
+
+<p class="cont">Now, supposing them chaste, which I think is hardly possible, they are
+uneasy and distressed, and the more so because they contain and refrain
+themselves. But, to pass over the love of women, where nature has
+allowed more liberty, who can misunderstand the poets in their rape of
+Ganymede, or not apprehend what Laius says, and what he desires, in
+Euripides? Lastly, what have the principal poets and the most learned
+men published of themselves in their poems and songs? What doth AlcÊus,
+who was <a id="page-158"></a><span class="pgnum">158</span>distinguished in his own republic for his bravery, write on the
+love of young men? And as for Anacreon’s poetry, it is wholly on love.
+But Ibycus of Rhegium appears, from his writings, to have had this love
+stronger on him than all the rest.</p>
+
+<p>XXXIV. Now we see that the loves of all these writers were entirely
+libidinous. There have arisen also some among us philosophers (and Plato
+is at the head of them, whom DicÊarchus blames not without reason) who
+have countenanced love. The Stoics, in truth, say, not only that their
+wise man may be a lover, but they even define love itself as an endeavor
+to originate friendship out of the appearance of beauty. Now, provided
+there is any one in the nature of things without desire, without care,
+without a sigh, such a one may be a lover; for he is free from all lust:
+but I have nothing to say to him, as it is lust of which I am now
+speaking. But should there be any love—as there certainly is—which is
+but little, or perhaps not at all, short of madness, such as his is in
+the Leucadia—</p>
+
+<div class="poem">
+<p>Should there be any God whose care I am—</p>
+</div>
+
+<p class="cont">it is incumbent on all the Gods to see that he enjoys his amorous
+pleasure.</p>
+
+<div class="poem">
+<p>Wretch that I am!</p>
+</div>
+
+<p class="cont">Nothing is more true, and he says very appropriately,</p>
+
+<div class="poem">
+<p>What, are you sane, who at this rate lament?</p>
+</div>
+
+<p class="cont">He seems even to his friends to be out of his senses: then how tragical
+he becomes!</p>
+
+<div class="poem">
+<p>Thy aid, divine Apollo, I implore,</p>
+<p>And thine, dread ruler of the wat’ry store!</p>
+<p>Oh! all ye winds, assist me!</p>
+</div>
+
+<p class="cont">He thinks that the whole world ought to apply itself to help his love:
+he excludes Venus alone, as unkind to him.</p>
+
+<div class="poem">
+<p>Thy aid, O Venus, why should I invoke?</p>
+</div>
+
+<p class="cont">He thinks Venus too much employed in her own lust to have regard to
+anything else, as if he himself had not said and committed these
+shameful things from lust.</p>
+
+<p><a id="page-159"></a><span class="pgnum">159</span>XXXV. Now, the cure for one who is affected in this manner is to show
+how light, how contemptible, how very trifling he is in what he desires;
+how he may turn his affections to another object, or accomplish his
+desires by some other means; or else to persuade him that he may
+entirely disregard it: sometimes he is to be led away to objects of
+another kind, to study, business, or other different engagements and
+concerns: very often the cure is effected by change of place, as sick
+people, that have not recovered their strength, are benefited by change
+of air. Some people think an old love may be driven out by a new one, as
+one nail drives out another: but, above all things, the man thus
+afflicted should be advised what madness love is: for of all the
+perturbations of the mind, there is not one which is more vehement; for
+(without charging it with rapes, debaucheries, adultery, or even incest,
+the baseness of any of these being very blamable; not, I say, to mention
+these) the very perturbation of the mind in love is base of itself, for,
+to pass over all its acts of downright madness, what weakness do not
+those very things which are looked upon as indifferent argue?</p>
+
+<div class="poem">
+<p>Affronts and jealousies, jars, squabbles, wars,</p>
+<p>Then peace again. The man who seeks to fix</p>
+<p>These restless feelings, and to subjugate</p>
+<p>Them to some regular law, is just as wise</p>
+<p>As one who’d try to lay down rules by which</p>
+<p>Men should go mad.<a id="FNA-53"></a><a href="#FN-53"><sup>53</sup></a></p>
+</div>
+
+<p class="cont">Now, is not this inconstancy and mutability of mind enough to deter any
+one by its own deformity? We are to demonstrate, as was said of every
+perturbation, that there are no such feelings which do not consist
+entirely of opinion and judgment, and are not owing to ourselves. For if
+love were natural, all would be in love, and always so, and all love the
+same object; nor would one be deterred by shame, another by reflection,
+another by satiety.</p>
+
+<p>XXXVI. Anger, too, when it disturbs the mind any time, leaves no room to
+doubt its being madness: by the <a id="page-160"></a><span class="pgnum">160</span>instigation of which we see such
+contention as this between brothers:</p>
+
+<div class="poem">
+<p>Where was there ever impudence like thine?</p>
+<p>Who on thy malice ever could refine?<a id="FNA-54"></a><a href="#FN-54"><sup>54</sup></a></p>
+</div>
+
+<p class="cont">You know what follows: for abuses are thrown out by these brothers with
+great bitterness in every other verse; so that you may easily know them
+for the sons of Atreus, of that Atreus who invented a new punishment for
+his brother:</p>
+
+<div class="poem">
+<p>I who his cruel heart to gall am bent,</p>
+<p>Some new, unheard-of torment must invent.</p>
+</div>
+
+<p>Now, what were these inventions? Hear Thyestes:</p>
+
+<div class="poem">
+<p>My impious brother fain would have me eat</p>
+<p>My children, and thus serves them up for meat.</p>
+</div>
+
+<p class="cont">To what length now will not anger go? even as far as madness. Therefore
+we say, properly enough, that angry men have given up their power, that
+is, they are out of the power of advice, reason, and understanding; for
+these ought to have power over the whole mind. Now, you should put those
+out of the way whom they endeavor to attack till they have recollected
+themselves; but what does recollection here imply but getting together
+again the dispersed parts of their mind into their proper place? or else
+you must beg and entreat them, if they have the means of revenge, to
+defer it to another opportunity, till their anger cools. But the
+expression of cooling implies, certainly, that there was a heat raised
+in their minds in opposition to reason; from which consideration that
+saying of Archytas is commended, who being somewhat provoked at his
+steward, “How would I have treated you,” said he, “if I had not been in
+a passion?”</p>
+
+<p>XXXVII. Where, then, are they who say that anger has its use? Can
+madness be of any use? But still it is natural. Can anything be natural
+that is against reason? or how is it, if anger is natural, that one
+person is more inclined to anger than another? or that the lust of
+revenge should cease before it has revenged itself? or that any one
+<a id="page-161"></a><span class="pgnum">161</span>should repent of what he had done in a passion? as we see that
+Alexander the king did, who could scarcely keep his hands from himself,
+when he had killed his favorite Clytus, so great was his compunction.
+Now who that is acquainted with these instances can doubt that this
+motion of the mind is altogether in opinion and voluntary? for who can
+doubt that disorders of the mind, such as covetousness and a desire of
+glory, arise from a great estimation of those things by which the mind
+is disordered? from whence we may understand that every perturbation of
+the mind is founded in opinion. And if boldness—that is to say, a firm
+assurance of mind—is a kind of knowledge and serious opinion not
+hastily taken up, then diffidence is a fear of an expected and impending
+evil; and if hope is an expectation of good, fear must, of course, be an
+expectation of evil. Thus fear and other perturbations are evils.
+Therefore, as constancy proceeds from knowledge, so does perturbation
+from error. Now, they who are said to be naturally inclined to anger, or
+to pity, or to envy, or to any feeling of this kind, their minds are
+constitutionally, as it were, in bad health; yet they are curable, as
+the disposition of Socrates is said to have been; for when Zopyrus, who
+professed to know the character of every one from his person, had heaped
+a great many vices on him in a public assembly, he was laughed at by
+others, who could perceive no such vices in Socrates; but Socrates kept
+him in countenance by declaring that such vices were natural to him, but
+that he had got the better of them by his reason. Therefore, as any one
+who has the appearance of the best constitution may yet appear to be
+naturally rather inclined to some particular disorder, so different
+minds may be more particularly inclined to different diseases. But as to
+those men who are said to be vicious, not by nature, but their own
+fault, their vices proceed from wrong opinions of good and bad things,
+so that one is more prone than another to different motions and
+perturbations. But, just as it is in the case of the body, an inveterate
+disease is harder to be got rid of than a sudden disorder; and it is
+more easy to cure a fresh tumor in the eyes than to remove a defluxion
+of any continuance.</p>
+
+<p>XXXVIII. But as the cause of perturbations is now discovered, <a id="page-162"></a><span class="pgnum">162</span>for all
+of them arise from the judgment or opinion, or volition, I shall put an
+end to this discourse. But we ought to be assured, since the boundaries
+of good and evil are now discovered, as far as they are discoverable by
+man, that nothing can be desired of philosophy greater or more useful
+than the discussions which we have held these four days. For besides
+instilling a contempt of death, and relieving pain so as to enable men
+to bear it, we have added the appeasing of grief, than which there is no
+greater evil to man. For though every perturbation of mind is grievous,
+and differs but little from madness, yet we are used to say of others
+when they are under any perturbation, as of fear, joy, or desire, that
+they are agitated and disturbed; but of those who give themselves up to
+grief, that they are miserable, afflicted, wretched, unhappy. So that it
+doth not seem to be by accident, but with reason proposed by you, that I
+should discuss grief, and the other perturbations separately; for there
+lies the spring and head of all our miseries; but the cure of grief, and
+of other disorders, is one and the same in that they are all voluntary,
+and founded on opinion; we take them on ourselves because it seems right
+so to do. Philosophy undertakes to eradicate this error, as the root of
+all our evils: let us therefore surrender ourselves to be instructed by
+it, and suffer ourselves to be cured; for while these evils have
+possession of us, we not only cannot be happy, but cannot be right in
+our minds. We must either deny that reason can effect anything, while,
+on the other hand, nothing can be done right without reason, or else,
+since philosophy depends on the deductions of reason, we must seek from
+her, if we would be good or happy, every help and assistance for living
+well and happily.</p>
+
+
+
+
+<h3><a id="page-163"></a><span class="pgnum">163</span>BOOK V.</h3>
+
+<h4>WHETHER VIRTUE ALONE BE SUFFICIENT FOR A HAPPY LIFE.</h4>
+
+
+<p>I. <span class="first">This</span> fifth day, Brutus, shall put an end to our Tusculan
+Disputations: on which day we discussed your favorite subject. For I
+perceive from that book which you wrote for me with the greatest
+accuracy, as well as from your frequent conversation, that you are
+clearly of this opinion, that virtue is of itself sufficient for a happy
+life: and though it may be difficult to prove this, on account of the
+many various strokes of fortune, yet it is a truth of such a nature that
+we should endeavor to facilitate the proof of it. For among all the
+topics of philosophy, there is not one of more dignity or importance.
+For as the first philosophers must have had some inducement to neglect
+everything for the search of the best state of life: surely, the
+inducement must have been the hope of living happily, which impelled
+them to devote so much care and pains to that study. Now, if virtue was
+discovered and carried to perfection by them, and if virtue is a
+sufficient security for a happy life, who can avoid thinking the work of
+philosophizing excellently recommended by them, and undertaken by me?
+But if virtue, as being subject to such various and uncertain accidents,
+were but the slave of fortune, and were not of sufficient ability to
+support herself, I am afraid that it would seem desirable rather to
+offer up prayers, than to rely on our own confidence in virtue as the
+foundation for our hope of a happy life. And, indeed, when I reflect on
+those troubles with which I have been so severely exercised by fortune,
+I begin to distrust this opinion; and sometimes even to dread the
+weakness and frailty of human nature, for I am afraid lest, when nature
+had given us infirm bodies, and had joined to them incurable diseases
+and intolerable pains, she perhaps also gave us minds participating in
+these bodily pains, and harassed <a id="page-164"></a><span class="pgnum">164</span>also with troubles and uneasinesses,
+peculiarly their own. But here I correct myself for forming my judgment
+of the power of virtue more from the weakness of others, or of myself
+perhaps, than from virtue itself: for she herself (provided there is
+such a thing as virtue; and your uncle Brutus has removed all doubt of
+it) has everything that can befall mankind in subjection to her; and by
+disregarding such things, she is far removed from being at all concerned
+at human accidents; and, being free from every imperfection, she thinks
+that nothing which is external to herself can concern her. But we, who
+increase every approaching evil by our fear, and every present one by
+our grief, choose rather to condemn the nature of things than our own
+errors.</p>
+
+<p>II. But the amendment of this fault, and of all our other vices and
+offences, is to be sought for in philosophy: and as my own inclination
+and desire led me, from my earliest youth upward, to seek her
+protection, so, under my present misfortunes, I have had recourse to the
+same port from whence I set out, after having been tossed by a violent
+tempest. O Philosophy, thou guide of life! thou discoverer of virtue and
+expeller of vices! what had not only I myself, but the whole life of
+man, been without you? To you it is that we owe the origin of cities;
+you it was who called together the dispersed race of men into social
+life; you united them together, first, by placing them near one another,
+then by marriages, and lastly, by the communication of speech and
+languages. You have been the inventress of laws; you have been our
+instructress in morals and discipline; to you we fly for refuge; from
+you we implore assistance; and as I formerly submitted to you in a great
+degree, so now I surrender up myself entirely to you. For one day spent
+well, and agreeably to your precepts, is preferable to an eternity of
+error. Whose assistance, then, can be of more service to me than yours,
+when you have bestowed on us tranquillity of life, and removed the fear
+of death? But Philosophy is so far from being praised as much as she has
+deserved by mankind, that she is wholly neglected by most men, and
+actually evil spoken of by many. Can any person speak ill of the parent
+of life, and dare to pollute himself thus with parricide, and be so
+impiously <a id="page-165"></a><span class="pgnum">165</span>ungrateful as to accuse her whom he ought to reverence, even
+were he less able to appreciate the advantages which he might derive
+from her? But this error, I imagine, and this darkness has spread itself
+over the minds of ignorant men, from their not being able to look so far
+back, and from their not imagining that those men by whom human life was
+first improved were philosophers; for though we see philosophy to have
+been of long standing, yet the name must be acknowledged to be but
+modern.</p>
+
+<p>III. But, indeed, who can dispute the antiquity of philosophy, either in
+fact or name? For it acquired this excellent name from the ancients, by
+the knowledge of the origin and causes of everything, both divine and
+human. Thus those seven <span class="greek">Σ᜹φοι</span>, as they were considered and called by the
+Greeks, have always been esteemed and called wise men by us; and thus
+Lycurgus many ages before, in whose time, before the building of this
+city, Homer is said to have lived, as well as Ulysses and Nestor in the
+heroic ages, are all handed down to us by tradition as having really
+been what they were called, wise men; nor would it have been said that
+Atlas supported the heavens, or that Prometheus was bound to Caucasus,
+nor would Cepheus, with his wife, his son-in-law, and his daughter have
+been enrolled among the constellations, but that their more than human
+knowledge of the heavenly bodies had transferred their names into an
+erroneous fable. From whence all who occupied themselves in the
+contemplation of nature were both considered and called wise men; and
+that name of theirs continued to the age of Pythagoras, who is reported
+to have gone to Phlius, as we find it stated by Heraclides Ponticus, a
+very learned man, and a pupil of Plato, and to have discoursed very
+learnedly and copiously on certain subjects with Leon, prince of the
+Phliasii; and when Leon, admiring his ingenuity and eloquence, asked him
+what art he particularly professed, his answer was, that he was
+acquainted with no art, but that he was a philosopher. Leon, surprised
+at the novelty of the name, inquired what he meant by the name of
+philosopher, and in what philosophers differed from other men; on which
+Pythagoras replied, “That the life of man seemed to him to resemble
+those games which were celebrated with the <a id="page-166"></a><span class="pgnum">166</span>greatest possible variety of
+sports and the general concourse of all Greece. For as in those games
+there were some persons whose object was glory and the honor of a crown,
+to be attained by the performance of bodily exercises, so others were
+led thither by the gain of buying and selling, and mere views of profit;
+but there was likewise one class of persons, and they were by far the
+best, whose aim was neither applause nor profit, but who came merely as
+spectators through curiosity, to observe what was done, and to see in
+what manner things were carried on there. And thus, said he, we come
+from another life and nature unto this one, just as men come out of some
+other city, to some much frequented mart; some being slaves to glory,
+others to money; and there are some few who, taking no account of
+anything else, earnestly look into the nature of things; and these men
+call themselves studious of wisdom, that is, philosophers: and as there
+it is the most reputable occupation of all to be a looker-on without
+making any acquisition, so in life, the contemplating things, and
+acquainting one’s self with them, greatly exceeds every other pursuit of
+life.”</p>
+
+<p>IV. Nor was Pythagoras the inventor only of the name, but he enlarged
+also the thing itself, and, when he came into Italy after this
+conversation at Phlius, he adorned that Greece, which is called Great
+Greece, both privately and publicly, with the most excellent
+institutions and arts; but of his school and system I shall, perhaps,
+find another opportunity to speak. But numbers and motions, and the
+beginning and end of all things, were the subjects of the ancient
+philosophy down to Socrates, who was a pupil of Archelaus, who had been
+the disciple of Anaxagoras. These made diligent inquiry into the
+magnitude of the stars, their distances, courses, and all that relates
+to the heavens. But Socrates was the first who brought down philosophy
+from the heavens, placed it in cities, introduced it into families, and
+obliged it to examine into life and morals, and good and evil. And his
+different methods of discussing questions, together with the variety of
+his topics, and the greatness of his abilities, being immortalized by
+the memory and writings of Plato, gave rise to many sects of
+philosophers of different sentiments, of all which I have principally
+adhered <a id="page-167"></a><span class="pgnum">167</span>to that one which, in my opinion, Socrates himself followed;
+and argue so as to conceal my own opinion, while I deliver others from
+their errors, and so discover what has the greatest appearance of
+probability in every question. And the custom Carneades adopted with
+great copiousness and acuteness, and I myself have often given in to it
+on many occasions elsewhere, and in this manner, too, I disputed lately,
+in my Tusculan villa; indeed, I have sent you a book of the four former
+days’ discussions; but the fifth day, when we had seated ourselves as
+before, what we were to dispute on was proposed thus:</p>
+
+<p>V. <i>A.</i> I do not think virtue can possibly be sufficient for a happy
+life.</p>
+
+<p><i>M.</i> But my friend Brutus thinks so, whose judgment, with submission, I
+greatly prefer to yours.</p>
+
+<p><i>A.</i> I make no doubt of it; but your regard for him is not the business
+now: the question is now, what is the real character of that quality of
+which I have declared my opinion. I wish you to dispute on that.</p>
+
+<p><i>M.</i> What! do you deny that virtue can possibly be sufficient for a
+happy life?</p>
+
+<p><i>A.</i> It is what I entirely deny.</p>
+
+<p><i>M.</i> What! is not virtue sufficient to enable us to live as we ought,
+honestly, commendably, or, in fine, to live well?</p>
+
+<p><i>A.</i> Certainly sufficient.</p>
+
+<p><i>M.</i> Can you, then, help calling any one miserable who lives ill? or
+will you deny that any one who you allow lives well must inevitably live
+happily?</p>
+
+<p><i>A.</i> Why may I not? for a man may be upright in his life, honest,
+praiseworthy, even in the midst of torments, and therefore live well.
+Provided you understand what I mean by well; for when I say well, I mean
+with constancy, and dignity, and wisdom, and courage; for a man may
+display all these qualities on the rack; but yet the rack is
+inconsistent with a happy life.</p>
+
+<p><i>M.</i> What, then? is your happy life left on the outside of the prison,
+while constancy, dignity, wisdom, and the other virtues, are surrendered
+up to the executioner, and bear punishment and pain without reluctance?</p>
+
+<p><i>A.</i> You must look out for something new if you would <a id="page-168"></a><span class="pgnum">168</span>do any good.
+These things have very little effect on me, not merely from their being
+common, but principally because, like certain light wines that will not
+bear water, these arguments of the Stoics are pleasanter to taste than
+to swallow. As when that assemblage of virtues is committed to the rack,
+it raises so reverend a spectacle before our eyes that happiness seems
+to hasten on towards them, and not to suffer them to be deserted by her.
+But when you take your attention off from this picture and these images
+of the virtues to the truth and the reality, what remains without
+disguise is, the question whether any one can be happy in torment?
+Wherefore let us now examine that point, and not be under any
+apprehensions, lest the virtues should expostulate, and complain that
+they are forsaken by happiness. For if prudence is connected with every
+virtue, then prudence itself discovers this, that all good men are not
+therefore happy; and she recollects many things of Marcus Atilius<a id="FNA-55"></a><a href="#FN-55"><sup>55</sup></a>,
+Quintus CÊpio<a id="FNA-56"></a><a href="#FN-56"><sup>56</sup></a>, Marcus Aquilius<a id="FNA-57"></a><a href="#FN-57"><sup>57</sup></a>; and prudence herself, if these
+representations are more agreeable to you than the things themselves,
+restrains happiness when it is endeavoring to throw itself into
+torments, and denies that it has any connection with pain and torture.</p>
+
+<p>VI. <i>M.</i> I can easily bear with your behaving in this manner, though it
+is not fair in you to prescribe to me how you would have me carry on
+this discussion. But I ask you if I have effected anything or nothing in
+the preceding days?</p>
+
+<p><i>A.</i> Yes; something was done, some little matter indeed.</p>
+
+<p><i>M.</i> But if that is the case, this question is settled, and almost put
+an end to.</p>
+
+<p><i>A.</i> How so?</p>
+
+<p><i>M.</i> Because turbulent motions and violent agitations of <a id="page-169"></a><span class="pgnum">169</span>the mind, when
+it is raised and elated by a rash impulse, getting the better of reason,
+leave no room for a happy life. For who that fears either pain or death,
+the one of which is always present, the other always impending, can be
+otherwise than miserable? Now, supposing the same person—which is often
+the case—to be afraid of poverty, ignominy, infamy, or weakness, or
+blindness, or, lastly, slavery, which doth not only befall individual
+men, but often even the most powerful nations; now can any one under the
+apprehension of these evils be happy? What shall we say of him who not
+only dreads these evils as impending, but actually feels and bears them
+at present? Let us unite in the same person banishment, mourning, the
+loss of children; now, how can any one who is broken down and rendered
+sick in body and mind by such affliction be otherwise than very
+miserable indeed? What reason, again, can there be why a man should not
+rightly enough be called miserable whom we see inflamed and raging with
+lust, coveting everything with an insatiable desire, and, in proportion
+as he derives more pleasure from anything, thirsting the more violently
+after them? And as to a man vainly elated, exulting with an empty joy,
+and boasting of himself without reason, is not he so much the more
+miserable in proportion as he thinks himself happier? Therefore, as
+these men are miserable, so, on the other hand, those are happy who are
+alarmed by no fears, wasted by no griefs, provoked by no lusts, melted
+by no languid pleasures that arise from vain and exulting joys. We look
+on the sea as calm when not the least breath of air disturbs its waves;
+and, in like manner, the placid and quiet state of the mind is
+discovered when unmoved by any perturbation. Now, if there be any one
+who holds the power of fortune, and everything human, everything that
+can possibly befall any man, as supportable, so as to be out of the
+reach of fear or anxiety, and if such a man covets nothing, and is
+lifted up by no vain joy of mind, what can prevent his being happy? And
+if these are the effects of virtue, why cannot virtue itself make men
+happy?</p>
+
+<p>VII. <i>A.</i> But the other of these two propositions is undeniable, that
+they who are under no apprehensions, who are <a id="page-170"></a><span class="pgnum">170</span>noways uneasy, who covet
+nothing, who are lifted up by no vain joy, are happy: and therefore I
+grant you that. But as for the other, that is not now in a fit state for
+discussion; for it has been proved by your former arguments that a wise
+man is free from every perturbation of mind.</p>
+
+<p><i>M.</i> Doubtless, then, the dispute is over; for the question appears to
+have been entirely exhausted.</p>
+
+<p><i>A.</i> I think, indeed, that that is almost the case.</p>
+
+<p><i>M.</i> But yet that is more usually the case with the mathematicians than
+philosophers. For when the geometricians teach anything, if what they
+have before taught relates to their present subject, they take that for
+granted which has been already proved, and explain only what they had
+not written on before. But the philosophers, whatever subject they have
+in hand, get together everything that relates to it, notwithstanding
+they may have dilated on it somewhere else. Were not that the case, why
+should the Stoics say so much on that question, Whether virtue was
+abundantly sufficient to a happy life? when it would have been answer
+enough that they had before taught that nothing was good but what was
+honorable; for, as this had been proved, the consequence must be that
+virtue was sufficient to a happy life; and each premise may be made to
+follow from the admission of the other, so that if it be admitted that
+virtue is sufficient to secure a happy life, it may also be inferred
+that nothing is good except what is honorable. They, however, do not
+proceed in this manner; for they would separate books about what is
+honorable, and what is the chief good; and when they have demonstrated
+from the one that virtue has power enough to make life happy, yet they
+treat this point separately; for everything, and especially a subject of
+such great consequence, should be supported by arguments and
+exhortations which belong to that alone. For you should have a care how
+you imagine philosophy to have uttered anything more noble, or that she
+has promised anything more fruitful or of greater consequence, for, good
+Gods! doth she not engage that she will render him who submits to her
+laws so accomplished as to be always armed against fortune, and to have
+every assurance within himself of living well and happily—that he
+shall, in short, be forever <a id="page-171"></a><span class="pgnum">171</span>happy? But let us see what she will
+perform? In the mean while, I look upon it as a great thing that she has
+even made such a promise. For Xerxes, who was loaded with all the
+rewards and gifts of fortune, not satisfied with his armies of horse and
+foot, nor the multitude of his ships, nor his infinite treasure of gold,
+offered a reward to any one who could find out a new pleasure; and yet,
+when it was discovered, he was not satisfied with it; nor can there ever
+be an end to lust. I wish we could engage any one by a reward to produce
+something the better to establish us in this belief.</p>
+
+<p>VIII. <i>A.</i> I wish that, indeed, myself; but I want a little information.
+For I allow that in what you have stated the one proposition is the
+consequence of the other; that as, if what is honorable be the only
+good, it must follow that a happy life is the effect of virtue: so that
+if a happy life consists in virtue, nothing can be good but virtue. But
+your friend Brutus, on the authority of Aristo and Antiochus, does not
+see this; for he thinks the case would be the same even if there were
+anything good besides virtue.</p>
+
+<p><i>M.</i> What, then? do you imagine that I am going to argue against Brutus?</p>
+
+<p><i>A.</i> You may do what you please; for it is not for me to prescribe what
+you shall do.</p>
+
+<p><i>M.</i> How these things agree together shall be examined somewhere else;
+for I frequently discussed that point with Antiochus, and lately with
+Aristo, when, during the period of my command as general, I was lodging
+with him at Athens. For to me it seemed that no one could possibly be
+happy under any evil; but a wise man might be afflicted with evil, if
+there are any things arising from body or fortune deserving the name of
+evils. These things were said, which Antiochus has inserted in his books
+in many places—that virtue itself was sufficient to make life happy,
+but yet not perfectly happy; and that many things derive their names
+from the predominant portion of them, though they do not include
+everything, as strength, health, riches, honor, and glory: which
+qualities are determined by their kind, not their number. Thus a happy
+life is so called from its being so in a great degree, even though it
+<a id="page-172"></a><span class="pgnum">172</span>should fall short in some point. To clear this up is not absolutely
+necessary at present, though it seems to be said without any great
+consistency; for I cannot imagine what is wanting to one that is happy
+to make him happier, for if anything be wanting to him, he cannot be so
+much as happy; and as to what they say, that everything is named and
+estimated from its predominant portion, that may be admitted in some
+things. But when they allow three kinds of evils—when any one is
+oppressed with every imaginable evil of two kinds, being afflicted with
+adverse fortune, and having at the same time his body worn out and
+harassed with all sorts of pains—shall we say that such a one is but
+little short of a happy life, to say nothing about the happiest possible
+life?</p>
+
+<p>IX. This is the point which Theophrastus was unable to maintain; for
+after he had once laid down the position that stripes, torments,
+tortures, the ruin of one’s country, banishment, the loss of children,
+had great influence on men’s living miserably and unhappily, he durst
+not any longer use any high and lofty expressions when he was so low and
+abject in his opinion. How right he was is not the question; he
+certainly was consistent. Therefore, I am not for objecting to
+consequences where the premises are admitted. But this most elegant and
+learned of all the philosophers is not taken to task very severely when
+he asserts his three kinds of good; but he is attacked by every one for
+that book which he wrote on a happy life, in which book he has many
+arguments why one who is tortured and racked cannot be happy. For in
+that book he is supposed to say that a man who is placed on the wheel
+(that is a kind of torture in use among the Greeks) cannot attain to a
+completely happy life. He nowhere, indeed, says so absolutely; but what
+he says amounts to the same thing. Can I, then, find fault with him,
+after having allowed that pains of the body are evils, that the ruin of
+a man’s fortunes is an evil, if he should say that every good man is not
+happy, when all those things which he reckons as evils may befall a good
+man? The same Theophrastus is found fault with by all the books and
+schools of the philosophers for commending that sentence in his
+Callisthenes,</p>
+
+<div class="poem">
+<p>Fortune, not wisdom, rules the life of man.</p>
+</div>
+
+<p class="cont"><a id="page-173"></a><span class="pgnum">173</span>They say never did philosopher assert anything so languid. They are
+right, indeed, in that; but I do not apprehend anything could be more
+consistent, for if there are so many good things that depend on the
+body, and so many foreign to it that depend on chance and fortune, is it
+inconsistent to say that fortune, which governs everything, both what is
+foreign and what belongs to the body, has greater power than counsel. Or
+would we rather imitate Epicurus? who is often excellent in many things
+which he speaks, but quite indifferent how consistent he may be, or how
+much to the purpose he is speaking. He commends spare diet, and in that
+he speaks as a philosopher; but it is for Socrates or Antisthenes to say
+so, and not for one who confines all good to pleasure. He denies that
+any one can live pleasantly unless he lives honestly, wisely, and
+justly. Nothing is more dignified than this assertion, nothing more
+becoming a philosopher, had he not measured this very expression of
+living honestly, justly, and wisely by pleasure. What could be better
+than to assert that fortune interferes but little with a wise man? But
+does he talk thus, who, after he has said that pain is the greatest
+evil, or the only evil, might himself be afflicted with the sharpest
+pains all over his body, even at the time he is vaunting himself the
+most against fortune? And this very thing, too, Metrodorus has said, but
+in better language: “I have anticipated you, Fortune; I have caught you,
+and cut off every access, so that you cannot possibly reach me.” This
+would be excellent in the mouth of Aristo the Chian, or Zeno the Stoic,
+who held nothing to be an evil but what was base; but for you,
+Metrodorus, to anticipate the approaches of fortune, who confine all
+that is good to your bowels and marrow—for you to say so, who define
+the chief good by a strong constitution of body, and well-assured hope
+of its continuance—for you to cut off every access of fortune! Why, you
+may instantly be deprived of that good. Yet the simple are taken with
+these propositions, and a vast crowd is led away by such sentences to
+become their followers.</p>
+
+<p>X. But it is the duty of one who would argue accurately to consider not
+what is said, but what is said consistently. <a id="page-174"></a><span class="pgnum">174</span>As in that very opinion
+which we have adopted in this discussion, namely, that every good man is
+always happy, it is clear what I mean by good men: I call those both
+wise and good men who are provided and adorned with every virtue. Let us
+see, then, who are to be called happy. I imagine, indeed, that those men
+are to be called so who are possessed of good without any alloy of evil;
+nor is there any other notion connected with the word that expresses
+happiness but an absolute enjoyment of good without any evil. Virtue
+cannot attain this, if there is anything good besides itself. For a
+crowd of evils would present themselves, if we were to allow poverty,
+obscurity, humility, solitude, the loss of friends, acute pains of the
+body, the loss of health, weakness, blindness, the ruin of one’s
+country, banishment, slavery, to be evils; for a wise man may be
+afflicted by all these evils, numerous and important as they are, and
+many others also may be added, for they are brought on by chance, which
+may attack a wise man; but if these things are evils, who can maintain
+that a wise man is always happy when all these evils may light on him at
+the same time? I therefore do not easily agree with my friend Brutus,
+nor with our common masters, nor those ancient ones, Aristotle,
+Speusippus, Xenocrates, Polemon, who reckon all that I have mentioned
+above as evils, and yet they say that a wise man is always happy; nor
+can I allow them, because they are charmed with this beautiful and
+illustrious title, which would very well become Pythagoras, Socrates,
+and Plato, to persuade my mind that strength, health, beauty, riches,
+honors, power, with the beauty of which they are ravished, are
+contemptible, and that all those things which are the opposites of these
+are not to be regarded. Then might they declare openly, with a loud
+voice, that neither the attacks of fortune, nor the opinion of the
+multitude, nor pain, nor poverty, occasions them any apprehensions; and
+that they have everything within themselves, and that there is nothing
+whatever which they consider as good but what is within their own power.
+Nor can I by any means allow the same person who falls into the vulgar
+opinion of good and evil to make use of these expressions, which can
+only become <a id="page-175"></a><span class="pgnum">175</span>a great and exalted man. Struck with which glory, up starts
+Epicurus, who, with submission to the Gods, thinks a wise man always
+happy. He is much charmed with the dignity of this opinion, but he never
+would have owned that, had he attended to himself; for what is there
+more inconsistent than for one who could say that pain was the greatest
+or the only evil to think also that a wise man can possibly say in the
+midst of his torture, How sweet is this! We are not, therefore, to form
+our judgment of philosophers from detached sentences, but from their
+consistency with themselves, and their ordinary manner of talking.</p>
+
+<p>XI. <i>A.</i> You compel me to be of your opinion; but have a care that you
+are not inconsistent yourself.</p>
+
+<p><i>M.</i> In what respect?</p>
+
+<p><i>A.</i> Because I have lately read your fourth book on Good and Evil: and
+in that you appeared to me, while disputing against Cato, to be
+endeavoring to show, which in my opinion means to prove, that Zeno and
+the Peripatetics differ only about some new words; but if we allow that,
+what reason can there be, if it follows from the arguments of Zeno that
+virtue contains all that is necessary to a happy life, that the
+Peripatetics should not be at liberty to say the same? For, in my
+opinion, regard should be had to the thing, not to words.</p>
+
+<p><i>M.</i> What! you would convict me from my own words, and bring against me
+what I had said or written elsewhere. You may act in that manner with
+those who dispute by established rules. We live from hand to mouth, and
+say anything that strikes our mind with probability, so that we are the
+only people who are really at liberty. But, since I just now spoke of
+consistency, I do not think the inquiry in this place is, if the opinion
+of Zeno and his pupil Aristo be true that nothing is good but what is
+honorable; but, admitting that, then, whether the whole of a happy life
+can be rested on virtue alone. Wherefore, if we certainly grant Brutus
+this, that a wise man is always happy, how consistent he is, is his own
+business; for who, indeed, is more worthy than himself of the glory of
+that opinion? Still, we may maintain that such a man is more happy than
+any one else.</p>
+
+<p><a id="page-176"></a><span class="pgnum">176</span>XII. Though Zeno the CittiÊan, a stranger and an inconsiderable coiner
+of words, appears to have insinuated himself into the old philosophy;
+still, the prevalence of this opinion is due to the authority of Plato,
+who often makes use of this expression, “That nothing but virtue can be
+entitled to the name of good,” agreeably to what Socrates says in
+Plato’s Gorgias; for it is there related that when some one asked him if
+he did not think Archelaus the son of Perdiccas, who was then looked
+upon as a most fortunate person, a very happy man, “I do not know,”
+replied he, “for I never conversed with him.” “What! is there no other
+way you can know it by?” “None at all.” “You cannot, then, pronounce of
+the great king of the Persians whether he is happy or not?” “How can I,
+when I do not know how learned or how good a man he is?” “What! do you
+imagine that a happy life depends on that?” “My opinion entirely is,
+that good men are happy, and the wicked miserable.” “Is Archelaus, then,
+miserable?” “Certainly, if unjust.” Now, does it not appear to you that
+he is here placing the whole of a happy life in virtue alone? But what
+does the same man say in his funeral oration? “For,” saith he, “whoever
+has everything that relates to a happy life so entirely dependent on
+himself as not to be connected with the good or bad fortune of another,
+and not to be affected by, or made in any degree uncertain by, what
+befalls another; and whoever is such a one has acquired the best rule of
+living; he is that moderate, that brave, that wise man, who submits to
+the gain and loss of everything, and especially of his children, and
+obeys that old precept; for he will never be too joyful or too sad,
+because he depends entirely upon himself.”</p>
+
+<p>XIII. From Plato, therefore, all my discourse shall be deduced, as if
+from some sacred and hallowed fountain. Whence can I, then, more
+properly begin than from Nature, the parent of all? For whatsoever she
+produces (I am not speaking only of animals, but even of those things
+which have sprung from the earth in such a manner as to rest on their
+own roots) she designed it to be perfect in its respective kind. So that
+among trees and vines, and those lower plants and trees which cannot
+advance themselves <a id="page-177"></a><span class="pgnum">177</span>high above the earth, some are evergreen, others are
+stripped of their leaves in winter, and, warmed by the spring season,
+put them out afresh, and there are none of them but what are so
+quickened by a certain interior motion, and their own seeds enclosed in
+every one, so as to yield flowers, fruit, or berries, that all may have
+every perfection that belongs to it; provided no violence prevents it.
+But the force of Nature itself may be more easily discovered in animals,
+as she has bestowed sense on them. For some animals she has taught to
+swim, and designed to be inhabitants of the water; others she has
+enabled to fly, and has willed that they should enjoy the boundless air;
+some others she has made to creep, others to walk. Again, of these very
+animals, some are solitary, some gregarious, some wild, others tame,
+some hidden and buried beneath the earth, and every one of these
+maintains the law of nature, confining itself to what was bestowed on
+it, and unable to change its manner of life. And as every animal has
+from nature something that distinguishes it, which every one maintains
+and never quits; so man has something far more excellent, though
+everything is said to be excellent by comparison. But the human mind,
+being derived from the divine reason, can be compared with nothing but
+with the Deity itself, if I may be allowed the expression. This, then,
+if it is improved, and when its perception is so preserved as not to be
+blinded by errors, becomes a perfect understanding, that is to say,
+absolute reason, which is the very same as virtue. And if everything is
+happy which wants nothing, and is complete and perfect in its kind, and
+that is the peculiar lot of virtue, certainly all who are possessed of
+virtue are happy. And in this I agree with Brutus, and also with
+Aristotle, Xenocrates, Speusippus, Polemon.</p>
+
+<p>XIV. To me such are the only men who appear completely happy; for what
+can he want to a complete happy life who relies on his own good
+qualities, or how can he be happy who does not rely on them? But he who
+makes a threefold division of goods must necessarily be diffident, for
+how can he depend on having a sound body, or that his fortune shall
+continue? But no one can be happy without an immovable, fixed, and
+permanent good. What, <a id="page-178"></a><span class="pgnum">178</span>then, is this opinion of theirs? So that I think
+that saying of the Spartan may be applied to them, who, on some
+merchant’s boasting before him that he had despatched ships to every
+maritime coast, replied that a fortune which depended on ropes was not
+very desirable. Can there be any doubt that whatever may be lost cannot
+be properly classed in the number of those things which complete a happy
+life? for of all that constitutes a happy life, nothing will admit of
+withering, or growing old, or wearing out, or decaying; for whoever is
+apprehensive of any loss of these things cannot be happy: the happy man
+should be safe, well fenced, well fortified, out of the reach of all
+annoyance, not like a man under trifling apprehensions, but free from
+all such. As he is not called innocent who but slightly offends, but he
+who offends not at all, so it is he alone who is to be considered
+without fear who is free from all fear, not he who is but in little
+fear. For what else is courage but an affection of mind that is ready to
+undergo perils, and patient in the endurance of pain and labor without
+any alloy of fear? Now, this certainly could not be the case if there
+were anything else good but what depended on honesty alone. But how can
+any one be in possession of that desirable and much-coveted security
+(for I now call a freedom from anxiety a security, on which freedom a
+happy life depends) who has, or may have, a multitude of evils attending
+him? How can he be brave and undaunted, and hold everything as trifles
+which can befall a man? for so a wise man should do, unless he be one
+who thinks that everything depends on himself. Could the LacedÊmonians
+without this, when Philip threatened to prevent all their attempts, have
+asked him if he could prevent their killing themselves? Is it not
+easier, then, to find one man of such a spirit as we are inquiring
+after, than to meet with a whole city of such men? Now, if to this
+courage I am speaking of we add temperance, that it may govern all our
+feelings and agitations, what can be wanting to complete his happiness
+who is secured by his courage from uneasiness and fear, and is prevented
+from immoderate desires and immoderate insolence of joy by temperance? I
+could easily show that virtue is able to <a id="page-179"></a><span class="pgnum">179</span>produce these effects, but
+that I have explained on the foregoing days.</p>
+
+<p>XV. But as the perturbations of the mind make life miserable, and
+tranquillity renders it happy; and as these perturbations are of two
+sorts, grief and fear, proceeding from imagined evils, and as immoderate
+joy and lust arise from a mistake about what is good, and as all these
+feelings are in opposition to reason and counsel; when you see a man at
+ease, quite free and disengaged from such troublesome commotions, which
+are so much at variance with one another, can you hesitate to pronounce
+such a one a happy man? Now, the wise man is always in such a
+disposition; therefore the wise man is always happy. Besides, every good
+is pleasant; whatever is pleasant may be boasted and talked of; whatever
+may be boasted of is glorious; but whatever is glorious is certainly
+laudable, and whatever is laudable doubtless, also, honorable: whatever,
+then, is good is honorable (but the things which they reckon as goods
+they themselves do not call honorable); therefore what is honorable
+alone is good. Hence it follows that a happy life is comprised in
+honesty alone. Such things, then, are not to be called or considered
+goods, when a man may enjoy an abundance of them, and yet be most
+miserable. Is there any doubt but that a man who enjoys the best health,
+and who has strength and beauty, and his senses flourishing in their
+utmost quickness and perfection—suppose him likewise, if you please,
+nimble and active, nay, give him riches, honors, authority, power,
+glory—now, I say, should this person, who is in possession of all
+these, be unjust, intemperate, timid, stupid, or an idiot—could you
+hesitate to call such a one miserable? What, then, are those goods in
+the possession of which you may be very miserable? Let us see if a happy
+life is not made up of parts of the same nature, as a heap implies a
+quantity of grain of the same kind. And if this be once admitted,
+happiness must be compounded of different good things, which alone are
+honorable; if there is any mixture of things of another sort with these,
+nothing honorable can proceed from such a composition: now, take away
+honesty, and how can you imagine anything happy? For whatever is good is
+desirable on that account; whatever is desirable <a id="page-180"></a><span class="pgnum">180</span>must certainly be
+approved of; whatever you approve of must be looked on as acceptable and
+welcome. You must consequently impute dignity to this; and if so, it
+must necessarily be laudable: therefore, everything that is laudable is
+good. Hence it follows that what is honorable is the only good. And
+should we not look upon it in this light, there will be a great many
+things which we must call good.</p>
+
+<p>XVI. I forbear to mention riches, which, as any one, let him be ever so
+unworthy, may have them, I do not reckon among goods; for what is good
+is not attainable by all. I pass over notoriety and popular fame, raised
+by the united voice of knaves and fools. Even things which are absolute
+nothings may be called goods; such as white teeth, handsome eyes, a good
+complexion, and what was commended by Euryclea, when she was washing
+Ulysses’s feet, the softness of his skin and the mildness of his
+discourse. If you look on these as goods, what greater encomiums can the
+gravity of a philosopher be entitled to than the wild opinion of the
+vulgar and the thoughtless crowd? The Stoics give the name of excellent
+and choice to what the others call good: they call them so, indeed; but
+they do not allow them to complete a happy life. But these others think
+that there is no life happy without them; or, admitting it to be happy,
+they deny it to be the most happy. But our opinion is, that it is the
+most happy; and we prove it from that conclusion of Socrates. For thus
+that author of philosophy argued: that as the disposition of a man’s
+mind is, so is the man; such as the man is, such will be his discourse;
+his actions will correspond with his discourse, and his life with his
+actions. But the disposition of a good man’s mind is laudable; the life,
+therefore, of a good man is laudable; it is honorable, therefore,
+because laudable; the unavoidable conclusion from which is that the life
+of good men is happy. For, good Gods! did I not make it appear, by my
+former arguments—or was I only amusing myself and killing time in what
+I then said?—that the mind of a wise man was always free from every
+hasty motion which I call a perturbation, and that the most undisturbed
+peace always reigned in his breast? A man, then, who is temperate and
+consistent, free from fear or <a id="page-181"></a><span class="pgnum">181</span>grief, and uninfluenced by any immoderate
+joy or desire, cannot be otherwise than happy; but a wise man is always
+so, therefore he is always happy. Moreover, how can a good man avoid
+referring all his actions and all his feelings to the one standard of
+whether or not it is laudable? But he does refer everything to the
+object of living happily: it follows, then, that a happy life is
+laudable; but nothing is laudable without virtue: a happy life, then, is
+the consequence of virtue. And this is the unavoidable conclusion to be
+drawn from these arguments.</p>
+
+<p>XVII. A wicked life has nothing which we ought to speak of or glory in;
+nor has that life which is neither happy nor miserable. But there is a
+kind of life that admits of being spoken of, and gloried in, and boasted
+of, as Epaminondas saith,</p>
+
+<div class="poem">
+<p>The wings of Sparta’s pride my counsels clipp’d.</p>
+</div>
+
+<p class="cont">And Africanus boasts,</p>
+
+<div class="poem">
+<p>Who, from beyond MÊotis to the place</p>
+<p>Where the sun rises, deeds like mine can trace?</p>
+</div>
+
+<p class="cont">If, then, there is such a thing as a happy life, it is to be gloried in,
+spoken of, and commended by the person who enjoys it; for there is
+nothing excepting that which can be spoken of or gloried in; and when
+that is once admitted, you know what follows. Now, unless an honorable
+life is a happy life, there must, of course, be something preferable to
+a happy life; for that which is honorable all men will certainly grant
+to be preferable to anything else. And thus there will be something
+better than a happy life: but what can be more absurd than such an
+assertion? What! when they grant vice to be effectual to the rendering
+life miserable, must they not admit that there is a corresponding power
+in virtue to make life happy? For contraries follow from contraries. And
+here I ask what weight they think there is in the balance of Critolaus,
+who having put the goods of the mind into one scale, and the goods of
+the body and other external advantages into the other, thought the goods
+of the mind outweighed the others so far that they would require the
+whole earth and sea to equalize the scale.</p>
+
+<p><a id="page-182"></a><span class="pgnum">182</span>XVIII. What hinders Critolaus, then, or that gravest of philosophers,
+Xenocrates (who raises virtue so high, and who lessens and depreciates
+everything else), from not only placing a happy life, but the happiest
+possible life, in virtue? And, indeed, if this were not the case, virtue
+would be absolutely lost. For whoever is subject to grief must
+necessarily be subject to fear too, for fear is an uneasy apprehension
+of future grief; and whoever is subject to fear is liable to dread,
+timidity, consternation, cowardice. Therefore, such a person may, some
+time or other, be defeated, and not think himself concerned with that
+precept of Atreus,</p>
+
+<div class="poem">
+<p>And let men so conduct themselves in life,</p>
+<p>As to be always strangers to defeat.</p>
+</div>
+
+<p class="cont">But such a man, as I have said, will be defeated; and not only defeated,
+but made a slave of. But we would have virtue always free, always
+invincible; and were it not so, there would be an end of virtue. But if
+virtue has in herself all that is necessary for a good life, she is
+certainly sufficient for happiness: virtue is certainly sufficient, too,
+for our living with courage; if with courage, then with a magnanimous
+spirit, and indeed so as never to be under any fear, and thus to be
+always invincible. Hence it follows that there can be nothing to be
+repented of, no wants, no lets or hinderances. Thus all things will be
+prosperous, perfect, and as you would have them, and, consequently,
+happy; but virtue is sufficient for living with courage, and therefore
+virtue is able by herself to make life happy. For as folly, even when
+possessed of what it desires, never thinks it has acquired enough, so
+wisdom is always satisfied with the present, and never repents on her
+own account.</p>
+
+<p>XIX. Look but on the single consulship of LÊlius, and that, too, after
+having been set aside (though when a wise and good man like him is
+outvoted, the people are disappointed of a good consul, rather than be
+disappointed by a vain people); but the point is, would you prefer, were
+it in your power, to be once such a consul as LÊlius, or be elected four
+times, like Cinna? I have no doubt in the world what answer you will
+make, and it is on that account I put the question to you.</p>
+
+<p><a id="page-183"></a><span class="pgnum">183</span>I would not ask every one this question; for some one perhaps might
+answer that he would not only prefer four consulates to one, but even
+one day of Cinna’s life to whole ages of many famous men. LÊlius would
+have suffered had he but touched any one with his finger; but Cinna
+ordered the head of his colleague consul, Cn. Octavius, to be struck
+off; and put to death P. Crassus<a id="FNA-58"></a><a href="#FN-58"><sup>58</sup></a>, and L. CÊsar<a id="FNA-59"></a><a href="#FN-59"><sup>59</sup></a>, those excellent
+men, so renowned both at home and abroad; and even M. Antonius<a id="FNA-60"></a><a href="#FN-60"><sup>60</sup></a>, the
+greatest orator whom I ever heard; and C. CÊsar, who seems to me to have
+been the pattern of humanity, politeness, sweetness of temper, and wit.
+Could he, then, be happy who occasioned the death of these men? So far
+from it, that he seems to be miserable, not only for having performed
+these actions, but also for acting in such a manner that it was lawful
+for him to do it, though it is unlawful for any one to do wicked
+actions; but this proceeds from inaccuracy, of speech, for we call
+whatever a man is allowed to do lawful. Was not Marius happier, I pray
+you, when he shared the glory of the victory gained over the Cimbrians
+with his colleague Catulus (who was almost another LÊlius; for I look
+upon the two men as very like one another), than when, conqueror in the
+civil war, he in a passion answered the friends of Catulus, who were
+interceding for him, “Let him die?” And this answer he gave, not once
+only, but often. But in such a case, he was happier who submitted to
+that barbarous decree than he who issued it. And it is better to receive
+an injury than to do one; and so it was better to advance a little to
+meet that death that was making its approaches, as Catulus did, than,
+like Marius, to sully the glory of six consulships, and disgrace his
+latter days, by the death of such a man.</p>
+
+<p>XX. Dionysius exercised his tyranny over the Syracusans thirty-eight
+years, being but twenty-five years old <a id="page-184"></a><span class="pgnum">184</span>when he seized on the
+government. How beautiful and how wealthy a city did he oppress with
+slavery! And yet we have it from good authority that he was remarkably
+temperate in his manner of living, that he was very active and energetic
+in carrying on business, but naturally mischievous and unjust; from
+which description every one who diligently inquires into truth must
+inevitably see that he was very miserable. Neither did he attain what he
+so greatly desired, even when he was persuaded that he had unlimited
+power; for, notwithstanding he was of a good family and reputable
+parents (though that is contested by some authors), and had a very large
+acquaintance of intimate friends and relations, and also some youths
+attached to him by ties of love after the fashion of the Greeks, he
+could not trust any one of them, but committed the guard of his person
+to slaves, whom he had selected from rich men’s families and made free,
+and to strangers and barbarians. And thus, through an unjust desire of
+governing, he in a manner shut himself up in a prison. Besides, he would
+not trust his throat to a barber, but had his daughters taught to shave;
+so that these royal virgins were forced to descend to the base and
+slavish employment of shaving the head and beard of their father. Nor
+would he trust even them, when they were grown up, with a razor; but
+contrived how they might burn off the hair of his head and beard with
+red-hot nutshells. And as to his two wives, Aristomache, his
+countrywoman, and Doris of Locris, he never visited them at night before
+everything had been well searched and examined. And as he had surrounded
+the place where his bed was with a broad ditch, and made a way over it
+with a wooden bridge, he drew that bridge over after shutting his
+bedchamber door. And as he did not dare to stand on the ordinary pulpits
+from which they usually harangued the people, he generally addressed
+them from a high tower. And it is said that when he was disposed to play
+at ball—for he delighted much in it—and had pulled off his clothes, he
+used to give his sword into the keeping of a young man whom he was very
+fond of. On this, one of his intimates said pleasantly, “You certainly
+trust your life with him;” and as the young man happened to smile at
+this, he ordered them both to be slain, <a id="page-185"></a><span class="pgnum">185</span>the one for showing how he
+might be taken off, the other for approving of what had been said by
+smiling. But he was so concerned at what he had done that nothing
+affected him more during his whole life; for he had slain one to whom he
+was extremely partial. Thus do weak men’s desires pull them different
+ways, and while they indulge one, they act counter to another.</p>
+
+<p>XXI. This tyrant, however, showed himself how happy he really was; for
+once, when Damocles, one of his flatterers, was dilating in conversation
+on his forces, his wealth, the greatness of his power, the plenty he
+enjoyed, the grandeur of his royal palaces, and maintaining that no one
+was ever happier, “Have you an inclination,” said he, “Damocles, as this
+kind of life pleases you, to have a taste of it yourself, and to make a
+trial of the good fortune that attends me?” And when he said that he
+should like it extremely, Dionysius ordered him to be laid on a bed of
+gold with the most beautiful covering, embroidered and wrought with the
+most exquisite work, and he dressed out a great many sideboards with
+silver and embossed gold. He then ordered some youths, distinguished for
+their handsome persons, to wait at his table, and to observe his nod, in
+order to serve him with what he wanted. There were ointments and
+garlands; perfumes were burned; tables provided with the most exquisite
+meats. Damocles thought himself very happy. In the midst of this
+apparatus, Dionysius ordered a bright sword to be let down from the
+ceiling, suspended by a single horse-hair, so as to hang over the head
+of that happy man. After which he neither cast his eye on those handsome
+waiters, nor on the well-wrought plate; nor touched any of the
+provisions: presently the garlands fell to pieces. At last he entreated
+the tyrant to give him leave to go, for that now he had no desire to be
+happy<a id="FNA-61"></a><a href="#FN-61"><sup>61</sup></a>. Does not Dionysius, then, seem to have declared there can be
+no happiness for one who is under constant apprehensions? But it was not
+now in his power <a id="page-186"></a><span class="pgnum">186</span>to return to justice, and restore his citizens their
+rights and privileges; for, by the indiscretion of youth, he had engaged
+in so many wrong steps and committed such extravagances, that, had he
+attempted to have returned to a right way of thinking, he must have
+endangered his life.</p>
+
+<p>XXII. Yet, how desirous he was of friendship, though at the same time he
+dreaded the treachery of friends, appears from the story of those two
+Pythagoreans: one of these had been security for his friend, who was
+condemned to die; the other, to release his security, presented himself
+at the time appointed for his dying: “I wish,” said Dionysius,“ you
+would admit me as the third in your friendship.” What misery was it for
+him to be deprived of acquaintance, of company at his table, and of the
+freedom of conversation! especially for one who was a man of learning,
+and from his childhood acquainted with liberal arts, very fond of music,
+and himself a tragic poet—how good a one is not to the purpose, for I
+know not how it is, but in this way, more than any other, every one
+thinks his own performances excellent. I never as yet knew any poet (and
+I was very intimate with Aquinius), who did not appear to himself to be
+very admirable. The case is this: you are pleased with your own works; I
+like mine. But to return to Dionysius. He debarred himself from all
+civil and polite conversation, and spent his life among fugitives,
+bondmen, and barbarians; for he was persuaded that no one could be his
+friend who was worthy of liberty, or had the least desire of being free.</p>
+
+<p>XXIII. Shall I not, then, prefer the life of Plato and Archytas,
+manifestly wise and learned men, to his, than which nothing can possibly
+be more horrid, or miserable, or detestable?</p>
+
+<p>I will present you with an humble and obscure mathematician of the same
+city, called Archimedes, who lived many years after; whose tomb,
+overgrown with shrubs and briers, I in my quÊstorship discovered, when
+the Syracusans knew nothing of it, and even denied that there was any
+such thing remaining; for I remembered some verses, which I had been
+informed were engraved on his monument, and these set forth that on the
+top of the tomb <a id="page-187"></a><span class="pgnum">187</span>there was placed a sphere with a cylinder. When I had
+carefully examined all the monuments (for there are a great many tombs
+at the gate AchradinÊ), I observed a small column standing out a little
+above the briers, with the figure of a sphere and a cylinder upon it;
+whereupon I immediately said to the Syracusans—for there were some of
+their principal men with me there—that I imagined that was what I was
+inquiring for. Several men, being sent in with scythes, cleared the way,
+and made an opening for us. When we could get at it, and were come near
+to the front of the pedestal, I found the inscription, though the latter
+parts of all the verses were effaced almost half away. Thus one of the
+noblest cities of Greece, and one which at one time likewise had been
+very celebrated for learning, had known nothing of the monument of its
+greatest genius, if it had not been discovered to them by a native of
+Arpinum. But to return to the subject from which I have been digressing.
+Who is there in the least degree acquainted with the Muses, that is,
+with liberal knowledge, or that deals at all in learning, who would not
+choose to be this mathematician rather than that tyrant? If we look into
+their methods of living and their employments, we shall find the mind of
+the one strengthened and improved with tracing the deductions of reason,
+amused with his own ingenuity, which is the one most delicious food of
+the mind; the thoughts of the other engaged in continual murders and
+injuries, in constant fears by night and by day. Now imagine a
+Democritus, a Pythagoras, and an Anaxagoras; what kingdom, what riches,
+would you prefer to their studies and amusements? For you must
+necessarily look for that excellence which we are seeking for in that
+which is the most perfect part of man; but what is there better in man
+than a sagacious and good mind? The enjoyment, therefore, of that good
+which proceeds from that sagacious mind can alone make us happy; but
+virtue is the good of the mind: it follows, therefore, that a happy life
+depends on virtue. Hence proceed all things that are beautiful,
+honorable, and excellent, as I said above (but this point must, I think,
+be treated of more at large), and they are well stored with joys. For,
+as it is clear that a happy life consists in perpetual and unexhausted
+<a id="page-188"></a><span class="pgnum">188</span>pleasures, it follows, too, that a happy life must arise from honesty.</p>
+
+<p>XXIV. But that what I propose to demonstrate to you may not rest on mere
+words only, I must set before you the picture of something, as it were,
+living and moving in the world, that may dispose us more for the
+improvement of the understanding and real knowledge. Let us, then, pitch
+upon some man perfectly acquainted with the most excellent arts; let us
+present him for awhile to our own thoughts, and figure him to our own
+imaginations. In the first place, he must necessarily be of an
+extraordinary capacity; for virtue is not easily connected with dull
+minds. Secondly, he must have a great desire of discovering truth, from
+whence will arise that threefold production of the mind; one of which
+depends on knowing things, and explaining nature; the other, in defining
+what we ought to desire and what to avoid; the third, in judging of
+consequences and impossibilities, in which consists both subtlety in
+disputing and also clearness of judgment. Now, with what pleasure must
+the mind of a wise man be affected which continually dwells in the midst
+of such cares and occupations as these, when he views the revolutions
+and motions of the whole world, and sees those innumerable stars in the
+heavens, which, though fixed in their places, have yet one motion in
+common with the whole universe, and observes the seven other stars, some
+higher, some lower, each maintaining their own course, while their
+motions, though wandering, have certain defined and appointed spaces to
+run through! the sight of which doubtless urged and encouraged those
+ancient philosophers to exercise their investigating spirit on many
+other things. Hence arose an inquiry after the beginnings, and, as it
+were, seeds from which all things were produced and composed; what was
+the origin of every kind of thing, whether animate or inanimate,
+articulately speaking or mute; what occasioned their beginning and end,
+and by what alteration and change one thing was converted into another;
+whence the earth originated, and by what weights it was balanced; by
+what caverns the seas were supplied; by what gravity all things being
+carried down tend always to the middle of the world, which in any round
+body is the lowest place.</p>
+
+<p><a id="page-189"></a><span class="pgnum">189</span>XXV. A mind employed on such subjects, and which night and day
+contemplates them, contains in itself that precept of the Delphic God,
+so as to “know itself,” and to perceive its connection with the divine
+reason, from whence it is filled with an insatiable joy. For reflections
+on the power and nature of the Gods raise in us a desire of imitating
+their eternity. Nor does the mind, that sees the necessary dependences
+and connections that one cause has with another, think it possible that
+it should be itself confined to the shortness of this life. Those
+causes, though they proceed from eternity to eternity, are governed by
+reason and understanding. And he who beholds them and examines them, or
+rather he whose view takes in all the parts and boundaries of things,
+with what tranquillity of mind does he look on all human affairs, and on
+all that is nearer him! Hence proceeds the knowledge of virtue; hence
+arise the kinds and species of virtues; hence are discovered those
+things which nature regards as the bounds and extremities of good and
+evil; by this it is discovered to what all duties ought to be referred,
+and which is the most eligible manner of life. And when these and
+similar points have been investigated, the principal consequence which
+is deduced from them, and that which is our main object in this
+discussion, is the establishment of the point, that virtue is of itself
+sufficient to a happy life.</p>
+
+<p>The third qualification of our wise man is the next to be considered,
+which goes through and spreads itself over every part of wisdom; it is
+that whereby we define each particular thing, distinguish the genus from
+its species, connect consequences, draw just conclusions, and
+distinguish truth from falsehood, which is the very art and science of
+disputing; which is not only of the greatest use in the examination of
+what passes in the world, but is likewise the most rational
+entertainment, and that which is most becoming to true wisdom. Such are
+its effects in retirement. Now, let our wise man be considered as
+protecting the republic; what can be more excellent than such a
+character? By his prudence he will discover the true interests of his
+fellow-citizens; by his justice he will be prevented from applying what
+belongs to the public to his own use; and, in short, he will be ever
+governed by all the <a id="page-190"></a><span class="pgnum">190</span>virtues, which are many and various. To these let
+us add the advantage of his friendships; in which the learned reckon not
+only a natural harmony and agreement of sentiments throughout the
+conduct of life, but the utmost pleasure and satisfaction in conversing
+and passing our time constantly with one another. What can be wanting to
+such a life as this to make it more happy than it is? Fortune herself
+must yield to a life stored with such joys. Now, if it be a happiness to
+rejoice in such goods of the mind, that is to say, in such virtues, and
+if all wise men enjoy thoroughly these pleasures, it must necessarily be
+granted that all such are happy.</p>
+
+<p>XXVI. <i>A.</i> What, when in torments and on the rack?</p>
+
+<p><i>M.</i> Do you imagine I am speaking of him as laid on roses and violets?
+Is it allowable even for Epicurus (who only puts on the appearance of
+being a philosopher, and who himself assumed that name for himself) to
+say (though, as matters stand, I commend him for his saying) that a wise
+man might at all times cry out, though he be burned, tortured, cut to
+pieces, “How little I regard it!” Shall this be said by one who defines
+all evil as pain, and measures every good by pleasure; who could
+ridicule whatever we call either honorable or base, and could declare of
+us that we were employed about words, and uttering mere empty sounds;
+and that nothing is to be regarded by us but as it is perceived to be
+smooth or rough by the body? What! shall such a man as this, as I said,
+whose understanding is little superior to the beasts’, be at liberty to
+forget himself; and not only to despise fortune, when the whole of his
+good and evil is in the power of fortune, but to say that he is happy in
+the most racking torture, when he had actually declared pain to be not
+only the greatest evil, but the only one? Nor did he take any trouble to
+provide himself with those remedies which might have enabled him to bear
+pain, such as firmness of mind, a shame of doing anything base,
+exercise, and the habit of patience, precepts of courage, and a manly
+hardiness; but he says that he supports himself on the single
+recollection of past pleasures, as if any one, when the weather was so
+hot as that he was scarcely able to bear it, should comfort himself by
+recollecting that he was once in my country, <a id="page-191"></a><span class="pgnum">191</span>Arpinum, where he was
+surrounded on every side by cooling streams. For I do not apprehend how
+past pleasures can allay present evils. But when he says that a wise man
+is always happy who would have no right to say so if he were consistent
+with himself, what may they not do who allow nothing to be desirable,
+nothing to be looked on as good but what is honorable? Let, then, the
+Peripatetics and Old Academics follow my example, and at length leave
+off muttering to themselves; and openly and with a clear voice let them
+be bold to say that a happy life may not be inconsistent with the
+agonies of Phalaris’s bull.</p>
+
+<p>XXVII. But to dismiss the subtleties of the Stoics, which I am sensible
+I have employed more than was necessary, let us admit of three kinds of
+goods; and let them really be kinds of goods, provided no regard is had
+to the body and to external circumstances, as entitled to the
+appellation of good in any other sense than because we are obliged to
+use them: but let those other divine goods spread themselves far in
+every direction, and reach the very heavens. Why, then, may I not call
+him happy, nay, the happiest of men, who has attained them? Shall a wise
+man be afraid of pain? which is, indeed, the greatest enemy to our
+opinion. For I am persuaded that we are prepared and fortified
+sufficiently, by the disputations of the foregoing days, against our own
+death or that of our friends, against grief, and the other perturbations
+of the mind. But pain seems to be the sharpest adversary of virtue; that
+it is which menaces us with burning torches; that it is which threatens
+to crush our fortitude, and greatness of mind, and patience. Shall
+virtue, then, yield to this? Shall the happy life of a wise and
+consistent man succumb to this? Good. Gods! how base would this be!
+Spartan boys will bear to have their bodies torn by rods without
+uttering a groan. I myself have seen at LacedÊmon troops of young men,
+with incredible earnestness contending together with their hands and
+feet, with their teeth and nails, nay, even ready to expire, rather than
+own themselves conquered. Is any country of barbarians more uncivilized
+or desolate than India? Yet they have among them some that are held for
+wise men, who never wear any clothes all their life long, and who bear
+the <a id="page-192"></a><span class="pgnum">192</span>snow of Caucasus, and the piercing cold of winter, without any
+pain; and who if they come in contact with fire endure being burned
+without a groan. The women, too, in India, on the death of their
+husbands have a regular contest, and apply to the judge to have it
+determined which of them was best beloved by him; for it is customary
+there for one man to have many wives. She in whose favor it is
+determined exults greatly, and being attended by her relations, is laid
+on the funeral pile with her husband; the others, who are postponed,
+walk away very much dejected. Custom can never be superior to nature,
+for nature is never to be got the better of. But our minds are infected
+by sloth and idleness, and luxury, and languor, and indolence: we have
+enervated them by opinions and bad customs. Who is there who is
+unacquainted with the customs of the Egyptians? Their minds being
+tainted by pernicious opinions, they are ready to bear any torture
+rather than hurt an ibis, a snake, a cat, a dog, or a crocodile; and
+should any one inadvertently have hurt any of these animals, he will
+submit to any punishment. I am speaking of men only. As to the beasts,
+do they not bear cold and hunger, running about in woods, and on
+mountains and deserts? Will they not fight for their young ones till
+they are wounded? Are they afraid of any attacks or blows? I mention not
+what the ambitious will suffer for honor’s sake, or those who are
+desirous of praise on account of glory, or lovers to gratify their lust.
+Life is full of such instances.</p>
+
+<p>XXVIII. But let us not dwell too much on these questions, but rather let
+us return to our subject. I say, and say again, that happiness will
+submit even to be tormented; and that in pursuit of justice, and
+temperance, and still more especially and principally fortitude, and
+greatness of soul, and patience, it will not stop short at sight of the
+executioner; and when all other virtues proceed calmly to the torture,
+that one will never halt, as I said, on the outside and threshold of the
+prison; for what can be baser, what can carry a worse appearance, than
+to be left alone, separated from those beautiful attendants? Not,
+however, that this is by any means possible; for neither can the virtues
+hold together without happiness, nor happiness <a id="page-193"></a><span class="pgnum">193</span>without the virtues; so
+that they will not suffer her to desert them, but will carry her along
+with them, to whatever torments, to whatever pain they are led. For it
+is the peculiar quality of a wise man to do nothing that he may repent
+of, nothing against his inclination, but always to act nobly, with
+constancy, gravity, and honesty; to depend on nothing as certainty; to
+wonder at nothing, when it falls out, as if it appeared strange and
+unexpected to him; to be independent of every one, and abide by his own
+opinion. For my part, I cannot form an idea of anything happier than
+this. The conclusion of the Stoics is indeed easy; for since they are
+persuaded that the end of good is to live agreeably to nature, and to be
+consistent with that—as a wise man should do so, not only because it is
+his duty, but because it is in his power—it must, of course, follow
+that whoever has the chief good in his power has his happiness so too.
+And thus the life of a wise man is always happy. You have here what I
+think may be confidently said of a happy life; and as things now stand,
+very truly also, unless you can advance something better.</p>
+
+<p>XXIX. <i>A.</i> Indeed I cannot; but I should be glad to prevail on you,
+unless it is troublesome (as you are under no confinement from
+obligations to any particular sect, but gather from all of them whatever
+strikes you most as having the appearance of probability), as you just
+now seemed to advise the Peripatetics and the Old Academy boldly to
+speak out without reserve, “that wise men are always the happiest”—I
+should be glad to hear how you think it consistent for them to say so,
+when you have said so much against that opinion, and the conclusions of
+the Stoics.</p>
+
+<p><i>M.</i> I will make use, then, of that liberty which no one has the
+privilege of using in philosophy but those of our school, whose
+discourses determine nothing, but take in everything, leaving them
+unsupported by the authority of any particular person, to be judged of
+by others, according to their weight. And as you seem desirous of
+knowing how it is that, notwithstanding the different opinions of
+philosophers with regard to the ends of goods, virtue has still
+sufficient security for the effecting of a happy life—which security,
+as we are informed, Carneades used indeed to dispute against; but he
+disputed as against the <a id="page-194"></a><span class="pgnum">194</span>Stoics, whose opinions he combated with great
+zeal and vehemence. I, however, shall handle the question with more
+temper; for if the Stoics have rightly settled the <i>ends</i> of goods, the
+affair is at an end; for a wise man must necessarily be always happy.
+But let us examine, if we can, the particular opinions of the others,
+that so this excellent decision, if I may so call it, in favor of a
+happy life, may be agreeable to the opinions and discipline of all.</p>
+
+<p>XXX. These, then, are the opinions, as I think, that are held and
+defended—the first four are simple ones: “that nothing is good but what
+is honest,” according to the Stoics; “nothing good but pleasure,” as
+Epicurus maintains; “nothing good but a freedom from pain,” as
+Hieronymus<a id="FNA-62"></a><a href="#FN-62"><sup>62</sup></a> asserts; “nothing good but an enjoyment of the principal,
+or all, or the greatest goods of nature,” as Carneades maintained
+against the Stoics—these are simple, the others are mixed propositions.
+Then there are three kinds of goods: the greatest being those of the
+mind; the next best those of the body; the third are external goods, as
+the Peripatetics call them, and the Old Academics differ very little
+from them. Dinomachus<a id="FNA-63"></a><a href="#FN-63"><sup>63</sup></a> and Callipho<a id="FNA-64"></a><a href="#FN-64"><sup>64</sup></a> have coupled pleasure with
+honesty; but Diodorus<a id="FNA-65"></a><a href="#FN-65"><sup>65</sup></a> the Peripatetic has joined indolence to
+honesty. These are the opinions that have some footing; for those of
+Aristo,<a id="FNA-66"></a><a href="#FN-66"><sup>66</sup></a> Pyrrho,<a id="FNA-67"></a><a href="#FN-67"><sup>67</sup></a> Herillus,<a id="FNA-68"></a><a href="#FN-68"><sup>68</sup></a> and of some others, are quite out
+of date. Now let us see what weight these men have in <a id="page-195"></a><span class="pgnum">195</span>them, excepting the
+Stoics, whose opinion I think I have sufficiently defended; and indeed I
+have explained what the Peripatetics have to say; excepting that
+Theophrastus, and those who followed him, dread and abhor pain in too
+weak a manner. The others may go on to exaggerate the gravity and
+dignity of virtue, as usual; and then, after they have extolled it to
+the skies, with the usual extravagance of good orators, it is easy to
+reduce the other topics to nothing by comparison, and to hold them up to
+contempt. They who think that praise deserves to be sought after, even
+at the expense of pain, are not at liberty to deny those men to be happy
+who have obtained it. Though they may be under some evils, yet this name
+of happy has a very wide application.</p>
+
+<p>XXXI. For even as trading is said to be lucrative, and farming
+advantageous, not because the one never meets with any loss, nor the
+other with any damage from the inclemency of the weather, but because
+they succeed in general; so life may be properly called happy, not from
+its being entirely made up of good things, but because it abounds with
+these to a great and considerable degree. By this way of reasoning,
+then, a happy life may attend virtue even to the moment of execution;
+nay, may descend with her into Phalaris’s bull, according to Aristotle,
+Xenocrates, Speusippus, Polemon; and will not be gained over by any
+allurements to forsake her. Of the same opinion will Calliphon and
+Diodorus be; for they are both of them such friends to virtue as to
+think that all things should be discarded and far removed that are
+incompatible with it. The rest seem to be more hampered with these
+doctrines, but yet they get clear of them; such as Epicurus, Hieronymus,
+and whoever else thinks it worth while to defend the deserted Carneades:
+for there is not one of them who does not think the mind to be judge of
+those goods, and able sufficiently to instruct him how to despise what
+has the appearance only of good or evil. For what seems to you to be the
+case with Epicurus is the case also with Hieronymus and Carneades, and,
+indeed, with all the rest of them; for who is there who is not
+sufficiently prepared against death and pain? I will begin, with your
+leave, with him whom we call soft and voluptuous. What! <a id="page-196"></a><span class="pgnum">196</span>does he seem,
+to you to be afraid of death or pain when he calls the day of his death
+happy; and who, when he is afflicted by the greatest pains, silences
+them all by recollecting arguments of his own discovering? And this is
+not done in such a manner as to give room for imagining that he talks
+thus wildly from some sudden impulse; but his opinion of death is, that
+on the dissolution of the animal all sense is lost; and what is deprived
+of sense is, as he thinks, what we have no concern at all with. And as
+to pain, too, he has certain rules to follow then: if it be great, the
+comfort is that it must be short; if it be of long continuance, then it
+must be supportable. What, then? Do those grandiloquent gentlemen state
+anything better than Epicurus in opposition to these two things which
+distress us the most? And as to other things, do not Epicurus and the
+rest of the philosophers seem sufficiently prepared? Who is there who
+does not dread poverty? And yet no true philosopher ever can dread it.</p>
+
+<p>XXXII. But with how little is this man himself satisfied! No one has
+said more on frugality. For when a man is far removed from those things
+which occasion a desire of money, from love, ambition, or other daily
+extravagance, why should he be fond of money, or concern himself at all
+about it? Could the Scythian Anacharsis<a id="FNA-69"></a><a href="#FN-69"><sup>69</sup></a> disregard money, and shall
+not our philosophers be able to do so? We are informed of an epistle of
+his in these words: “Anacharsis to Hanno, greeting. My clothing is the
+same as that with which the Scythians cover themselves; the hardness of
+my feet supplies the want of shoes; the ground is my bed, hunger my
+sauce, my food milk, cheese, and flesh. So you may come to me as to a
+man in want of nothing. But as to those presents you take so much
+pleasure in, you may dispose of them to your own citizens, or to the
+immortal Gods.” And almost all philosophers, of all schools, excepting
+those who are warped <a id="page-197"></a><span class="pgnum">197</span>from right reason by a vicious disposition, might
+have been of this same opinion. Socrates, when on one occasion he saw a
+great quantity of gold and silver carried in a procession, cried out,
+“How many things are there which I do not want!” Xenocrates, when some
+ambassadors from Alexander had brought him fifty talents, which was a
+very large sum of money in those times, especially at Athens, carried
+the ambassadors to sup in the Academy, and placed just a sufficiency
+before them, without any apparatus. When they asked him, the next day,
+to whom he wished the money which they had for him to be paid: “What!”
+said he, “did you not perceive by our slight repast of yesterday that I
+had no occasion for money?” But when he perceived that they were
+somewhat dejected, he accepted of thirty minas, that he might not seem
+to treat with disrespect the king’s generosity. But Diogenes took a
+greater liberty, like a Cynic, when Alexander asked him if he wanted
+anything: “Just at present,” said he, “I wish that you would stand a
+little out of the line between me and the sun,” for Alexander was
+hindering him from sunning himself. And, indeed, this very man used to
+maintain how much he surpassed the Persian king in his manner of life
+and fortune; for that he himself was in want of nothing, while the other
+never had enough; and that he had no inclination for those pleasures of
+which the other could never get enough to satisfy himself; and that the
+other could never obtain his.</p>
+
+<p>XXXIII. You see, I imagine, how Epicurus has divided his kinds of
+desires, not very acutely perhaps, but yet usefully: saying that they
+are “partly natural and necessary; partly natural, but not necessary;
+partly neither. That those which are necessary may be supplied almost
+for nothing; for that the things which nature requires are easily
+obtained.” As to the second kind of desires, his opinion is that any one
+may easily either enjoy or go without them. And with regard to the
+third, since they are utterly frivolous, being neither allied to
+necessity nor nature, he thinks that they should be entirely rooted out.
+On this topic a great many arguments are adduced by the Epicureans; and
+those pleasures which they do not despise in a body, they disparage one
+by one, and seem rather <a id="page-198"></a><span class="pgnum">198</span>for lessening the number of them; for as to
+wanton pleasures, on which subject they say a great deal, these, say
+they, are easy, common, and within any one’s reach; and they think that
+if nature requires them, they are not to be estimated by birth,
+condition, or rank, but by shape, age, and person: and that it is by no
+means difficult to refrain from them, should health, duty, or reputation
+require it; but that pleasures of this kind may be desirable, where they
+are attended with no inconvenience, but can never be of any use. And the
+assertions which Epicurus makes with respect to the whole of pleasure
+are such as show his opinion to be that pleasure is always desirable,
+and to be pursued merely because it is pleasure; and for the same reason
+pain is to be avoided, because it is pain. So that a wise man will
+always adopt such a system of counterbalancing as to do himself the
+justice to avoid pleasure, should pain ensue from it in too great a
+proportion; and will submit to pain, provided the effects of it are to
+produce a greater pleasure: so that all pleasurable things, though the
+corporeal senses are the judges of them, are still to be referred to the
+mind, on which account the body rejoices while it perceives a present
+pleasure; but that the mind not only perceives the present as well as
+the body, but foresees it while it is coming, and even when it is past
+will not let it quite slip away. So that a wise man enjoys a continual
+series of pleasures, uniting the expectation of future pleasure to the
+recollection of what he has already tasted. The like notions are applied
+by them to high living; and the magnificence and expensiveness of
+entertainments are deprecated, because nature is satisfied at a small
+expense.</p>
+
+<p>XXXIV. For who does not see this, that an appetite is the best sauce?
+When Darius, in his flight from the enemy, had drunk some water which
+was muddy and tainted with dead bodies, he declared that he had never
+drunk anything more pleasant; the fact was, that he had never drunk
+before when he was thirsty. Nor had Ptolemy ever eaten when he was
+hungry; for as he was travelling over Egypt, his company not keeping up
+with him, he had some coarse bread presented him in a cottage, upon
+which he said, “Nothing ever seemed to him pleasanter <a id="page-199"></a><span class="pgnum">199</span>than that bread.”
+They relate, too, of Socrates, that, once when he was walking very fast
+till the evening, on his being asked why he did so, his reply was that
+he was purchasing an appetite by walking, that he might sup the better.
+And do we not see what the LacedÊmonians provide in their Phiditia?
+where the tyrant Dionysius supped, but told them he did not at all like
+that black broth, which was their principal dish; on which he who
+dressed it said, “It was no wonder, for it wanted seasoning.” Dionysius
+asked what that seasoning was; to which it was replied, “Fatigue in
+hunting, sweating, a race on the banks of Eurotas, hunger and thirst,”
+for these are the seasonings to the LacedÊmonian banquets. And this may
+not only be conceived from the custom of men, but from the beasts, who
+are satisfied with anything that is thrown before them, provided it is
+not unnatural, and they seek no farther. Some entire cities, taught by
+custom, delight in parsimony, as I said but just now of the
+LacedÊmonians. Xenophon has given an account of the Persian diet, who
+never, as he saith, use anything but cresses with their bread; not but
+that, should nature require anything more agreeable, many things might
+be easily supplied by the ground, and plants in great abundance, and of
+incomparable sweetness. Add to this strength and health, as the
+consequence of this abstemious way of living. Now, compare with this
+those who sweat and belch, being crammed with eating, like fatted oxen;
+then will you perceive that they who pursue pleasure most attain it
+least; and that the pleasure of eating lies not in satiety, but
+appetite.</p>
+
+<p>XXXV. They report of Timotheus, a famous man at Athens, and the head of
+the city, that having supped with Plato, and being extremely delighted
+with his entertainment, on seeing him the next day, he said, “Your
+suppers are not only agreeable while I partake of them, but the next day
+also.” Besides, the understanding is impaired when we are full with
+overeating and drinking. There is an excellent epistle of Plato to
+Dion’s relations, in which there occurs as nearly as possible these
+words: “When I came there, that happy life so much talked of, devoted to
+Italian and Syracusan entertainments, was noways agreeable to me; to be
+crammed twice a day, and never to <a id="page-200"></a><span class="pgnum">200</span>have the night to yourself, and the
+other things which are the accompaniments of this kind of life, by which
+a man will never be made the wiser, but will be rendered much less
+temperate; for it must be an extraordinary disposition that can be
+temperate in such circumstances.” How, then, can a life be pleasant
+without prudence and temperance? Hence you discover the mistake of
+Sardanapalus, the wealthiest king of the Assyrians, who ordered it to be
+engraved on his tomb,</p>
+
+<div class="poem">
+<p>I still have what in food I did exhaust;</p>
+<p>But what I left, though excellent, is lost.</p>
+</div>
+
+<p>“What less than this,” says Aristotle, “could be inscribed on the tomb,
+not of a king, but an ox?” He said that he possessed those things when
+dead, which, in his lifetime, he could have no longer than while he was
+enjoying them. Why, then, are riches desired? And wherein doth poverty
+prevent us from being happy? In the want, I imagine, of statues,
+pictures, and diversions. But if any one is delighted with these things,
+have not the poor people the enjoyment of them more than they who are
+the owners of them in the greatest abundance? For we have great numbers
+of them displayed publicly in our city. And whatever store of them
+private people have, they cannot have a great number, and they but
+seldom see them, only when they go to their country seats; and some of
+them must be stung to the heart when they consider how they came by
+them. The day would fail me, should I be inclined to defend the cause of
+poverty. The thing is manifest; and nature daily informs us how few
+things there are, and how trifling they are, of which she really stands
+in need.</p>
+
+<p>XXXVI. Let us inquire, then, if obscurity, the want of power, or even
+the being unpopular, can prevent a wise man from being happy. Observe if
+popular favor, and this glory which they are so fond of, be not attended
+with more uneasiness than pleasure. Our friend Demosthenes was certainly
+very weak in declaring himself pleased with the whisper of a woman who
+was carrying water, as is the custom in Greece, and who whispered to
+another, “That is he—that is Demosthenes.” What could be weaker than
+<a id="page-201"></a><span class="pgnum">201</span>this? and yet what an orator he was! But although he had learned to
+speak to others, he had conversed but little with himself. We may
+perceive, therefore, that popular glory is not desirable of itself; nor
+is obscurity to be dreaded. “I came to Athens,” saith Democritus, “and
+there was no one there that knew me:” this was a moderate and grave man
+who could glory in his obscurity. Shall musicians compose their tunes to
+their own tastes? and shall a philosopher, master of a much better art,
+seek to ascertain, not what is most true, but what will please the
+people? Can anything be more absurd than to despise the vulgar as mere
+unpolished mechanics, taken singly, and to think them of consequence
+when collected into a body? These wise men would contemn our ambitious
+pursuits and our vanities, and would reject all the honors which the
+people could voluntarily offer to them; but we know not how to despise
+them till we begin to repent of having accepted them. There is an
+anecdote related by Heraclitus, the natural philosopher, of Hermodorus,
+the chief of the Ephesians, that he said “that all the Ephesians ought
+to be punished with death for saying, when they had expelled Hermodorus
+out of their city, that they would have no one among them better than
+another; but that if there were any such, he might go elsewhere to some
+other people.” Is not this the case with the people everywhere? Do they
+not hate every virtue that distinguishes itself? What! was not Aristides
+(I had rather instance in the Greeks than ourselves) banished his
+country for being eminently just? What troubles, then, are they free
+from who have no connection whatever with the people? What is more
+agreeable than a learned retirement? I speak of that learning which
+makes us acquainted with the boundless extent of nature and the
+universe, and which even while we remain in this world discovers to us
+both heaven, earth, and sea.</p>
+
+<p>XXXVII. If, then, honor and riches have no value, what is there else to
+be afraid of? Banishment, I suppose; which is looked on as the greatest
+evil. Now, if the evil of banishment proceeds not from ourselves, but
+from the froward disposition of the people, I have just now declared how
+contemptible it is. But if to leave one’s country be miserable, <a id="page-202"></a><span class="pgnum">202</span>the
+provinces are full of miserable men, very few of the settlers in which
+ever return to their country again. But exiles are deprived of their
+property! What, then! has there not been enough said on bearing poverty?
+But with regard to banishment, if we examine the nature of things, not
+the ignominy of the name, how little does it differ from constant
+travelling! in which some of the most famous philosophers have spent
+their whole life, as Xenocrates, Crantor, Arcesilas, Lacydes, Aristotle,
+Theophrastus, Zeno, Cleanthes, Chrysippus, Antipater, Carneades,
+PanÊtius, Clitomachus, Philo, Antiochus, Posidonius, and innumerable
+others, who from their first setting-out never returned home again.
+Now, what ignominy can a wise man be affected with (for it is of such a
+one that I am speaking) who can be guilty of nothing which deserves it?
+for there is no occasion to comfort one who is banished for his deserts.
+Lastly, they can easily reconcile themselves to every accident who
+measure all their objects and pursuits in life by the standard of
+pleasure; so that in whatever place that is supplied, there they may
+live happily. Thus what Teucer said may be applied to every case:</p>
+
+<div class="poem">
+<p>“Wherever I am happy is my country.”</p>
+</div>
+
+<p>Socrates, indeed, when he was asked where he belonged to, replied, “The
+world;” for he looked upon himself as a citizen and inhabitant of the
+whole world. How was it with T. Altibutius? Did he not follow his
+philosophical studies with the greatest satisfaction at Athens, although
+he was banished? which, however, would not have happened to him if he
+had obeyed the laws of Epicurus and lived peaceably in the republic. In
+what was Epicurus happier, living in his own country, than Metrodorus,
+who lived at Athens? Or did Plato’s happiness exceed that of Xenocrates,
+or Polemo, or Arcesilas? Or is that city to be valued much that banishes
+all her good and wise men? Demaratus, the father of our King Tarquin,
+not being able to bear the tyrant Cypselus, fled from Corinth to
+Tarquinii, settled there, and had children. Was it, then, an unwise act
+in him to prefer the liberty of banishment to slavery at home?</p>
+
+<p>XXXVIII. Besides the emotions of the mind, all griefs <a id="page-203"></a><span class="pgnum">203</span>and anxieties are
+assuaged by forgetting them, and turning our thoughts to pleasure.
+Therefore, it was not without reason that Epicurus presumed to say that
+a wise man abounds with good things, because he may always have his
+pleasures; from whence it follows, as he thinks, that that point is
+gained which is the subject of our present inquiry, that a wise man is
+always happy. What! though he should be deprived of the senses of seeing
+and hearing? Yes; for he holds those things very cheap. For, in the
+first place, what are the pleasures of which we are deprived by that
+dreadful thing, blindness? For though they allow other pleasures to be
+confined to the senses, yet the things which are perceived by the sight
+do not depend wholly on the pleasure the eyes receive; as is the case
+when we taste, smell, touch, or hear; for, in respect of all these
+senses, the organs themselves are the seat of pleasure; but it is not so
+with the eyes. For it is the mind which is entertained by what we see;
+but the mind may be entertained in many ways, even though we could not
+see at all. I am speaking of a learned and a wise man, with whom to
+think is to live. But thinking in the case of a wise man does not
+altogether require the use of his eyes in his investigations; for if
+night does not strip him of his happiness, why should blindness, which
+resembles night, have that effect? For the reply of Antipater the
+Cyrenaic to some women who bewailed his being blind, though it is a
+little too obscene, is not without its significance. “What do you mean?”
+saith he; “do you think the night can furnish no pleasure?” And we find
+by his magistracies and his actions that old Appius,<a id="FNA-70"></a><a href="#FN-70"><sup>70</sup></a> too, who was
+blind for many years, was not prevented from doing whatever was required
+of him with respect either to the republic or his own affairs. It is
+said that C. Drusus’s house was crowded with clients. When they whose
+business it was could not see how to conduct themselves, they applied to
+a blind guide.</p>
+
+<p>XXXIX. When I was a boy, Cn. Aufidius, a blind man, <a id="page-204"></a><span class="pgnum">204</span>who had served the
+office of prÊtor, not only gave his opinion in the Senate, and was ready
+to assist his friends, but wrote a Greek history, and had a considerable
+acquaintance with literature. Diodorus the Stoic was blind, and lived
+many years at my house. He, indeed, which is scarcely credible, besides
+applying himself more than usual to philosophy, and playing on the
+flute, agreeably to the custom of the Pythagoreans, and having books
+read to him night and day, in all which he did not want eyes, contrived
+to teach geometry, which, one would think, could hardly be done without
+the assistance of eyes, telling his scholars how and where to draw every
+line. They relate of Asclepiades, a native of Eretria, and no obscure
+philosopher, when some one asked him what inconvenience he suffered from
+his blindness, that his reply was, “He was at the expense of another
+servant.” So that, as the most extreme poverty may be borne if you
+please, as is daily the case with some in Greece, so blindness may
+easily be borne, provided you have the support of good health in other
+respects. Democritus was so blind he could not distinguish white from
+black; but he knew the difference between good and evil, just and
+unjust, honorable and base, the useful and useless, great and small.
+Thus one may live happily without distinguishing colors; but without
+acquainting yourself with things, you cannot; and this man was of
+opinion that the intense application of the mind was taken off by the
+objects that presented themselves to the eye; and while others often
+could not see what was before their feet, he travelled through all
+infinity. It is reported also that Homer<a id="FNA-71"></a><a href="#FN-71"><sup>71</sup></a> was blind, but we observe
+<a id="page-205"></a><span class="pgnum">205</span>his painting as well as his poetry. What country, what coast, what part
+of Greece, what military attacks, what dispositions of battle, what
+array, what ship, what motions of men and animals, can be mentioned
+which he has not described in such a manner as to enable us to see what
+he could not see himself? What, then! can we imagine that Homer, or any
+other learned man, has ever been in want of pleasure and entertainment
+for his mind? Were it not so, would Anaxagoras, or this very Democritus,
+have left their estates and patrimonies, and given themselves up to the
+pursuit of acquiring this divine pleasure? It is thus that the poets who
+have represented Tiresias the Augur as a wise man and blind never
+exhibit him as bewailing his blindness. And Homer, too, after he had
+described Polyphemus as a monster and a wild man, represents him talking
+with his ram, and speaking of his good fortune, inasmuch as he could go
+wherever he pleased and touch what he would. And so far he was right,
+for that Cyclops was a being of not much more understanding than his
+ram.</p>
+
+<p>XL. Now, as to the evil of being deaf. M. Crassus was a little thick of
+hearing; but it was more uneasiness to him that he heard himself ill
+spoken of, though, in my opinion, he did not deserve it. Our Epicureans
+cannot understand Greek, nor the Greeks Latin: now, they are deaf
+reciprocally as to each other’s language, and we are all truly deaf with
+regard to those innumerable languages which we do not understand. They
+do not hear the voice of the harper; but, then, they do not hear the
+grating of a saw when it is setting, or the grunting of a hog when his
+<a id="page-206"></a><span class="pgnum">206</span>throat is being cut, nor the roaring of the sea when they are desirous
+of rest. And if they should chance to be fond of singing, they ought, in
+the first place, to consider that many wise men lived happily before
+music was discovered; besides, they may have more pleasure in reading
+verses than in hearing them sung. Then, as I before referred the blind
+to the pleasures of hearing, so I may the deaf to the pleasures of
+sight: moreover, whoever can converse with himself doth not need the
+conversation of another. But suppose all these misfortunes to meet in
+one person: suppose him blind and deaf—let him be afflicted with the
+sharpest pains of body, which, in the first place, generally of
+themselves make an end of him; still, should they continue so long, and
+the pain be so exquisite, that we should be unable to assign any reason
+for our being so afflicted—still, why, good Gods! should we be under
+any difficulty? For there is a retreat at hand: death is that retreat—a
+shelter where we shall forever be insensible. Theodorus said to
+Lysimachus, who threatened him with death, “It is a great matter,
+indeed, for you to have acquired the power of a Spanish fly!” When
+Perses entreated Paulus not to lead him in triumph, “That is a matter
+which you have in your own power,” said Paulus. I said many things about
+death in our first day’s disputation, when death was the subject; and
+not a little the next day, when I treated of pain; which things if you
+recollect, there can be no danger of your looking upon death as
+undesirable, or, at least, it will not be dreadful.</p>
+
+<p>That custom which is common among the Grecians at their banquets should,
+in my opinion, be observed in life: Drink, say they, or leave the
+company; and rightly enough; for a guest should either enjoy the
+pleasure of drinking with others, or else not stay till he meets with
+affronts from those that are in liquor. Thus, those injuries of fortune
+which you cannot bear you should flee from.</p>
+
+<p>XLI. This is the very same which is said by Epicurus and Hieronymus.
+Now, if those philosophers, whose opinion it is that virtue has no power
+of itself, and who say that the conduct which we denominate honorable
+and laudable is really nothing, and is only an empty circumstance <a id="page-207"></a><span class="pgnum">207</span>set
+off with an unmeaning sound, can nevertheless maintain that a wise man
+is always happy, what, think you, may be done by the Socratic and
+Platonic philosophers? Some of these allow such superiority to the goods
+of the mind as quite to eclipse what concerns the body and all external
+circumstances. But others do not admit these to be goods; they make
+everything depend on the mind: whose disputes Carneades used, as a sort
+of honorary arbitrator, to determine. For, as what seemed goods to the
+Peripatetics were allowed to be advantages by the Stoics, and as the
+Peripatetics allowed no more to riches, good health; and other things of
+that sort than the Stoics, when these things were considered according
+to their reality, and not by mere names, his opinion was that there was
+no ground for disagreeing. Therefore, let the philosophers of other
+schools see how they can establish this point also. It is very agreeable
+to me that they make some professions worthy of being uttered by the
+mouth of a philosopher with regard to a wise man’s having always the
+means of living happily.</p>
+
+<p>XLII. But as we are to depart in the morning, let us remember these five
+days’ discussions; though, indeed, I think I shall commit them to
+writing: for how can I better employ the leisure which I have, of
+whatever kind it is, and whatever it be owing to? And I will send these
+five books also to my friend Brutus, by whom I was not only incited to
+write on philosophy, but, I may say, provoked. And by so doing it is not
+easy to say what service I may be of to others. At all events, in my own
+various and acute afflictions, which surround me on all sides, I cannot
+find any better comfort for myself.</p>
+
+
+
+
+<hr class="front"/>
+
+<h2><a id="page-209"></a><span class="pgnum">209</span>THE NATURE OF THE GODS.</h2>
+
+<hr/>
+
+
+<h3>BOOK I.</h3>
+
+
+<p>I. <span class="first">There</span> are many things in philosophy, my dear Brutus, which are not as
+yet fully explained to us, and particularly (as you very well know) that
+most obscure and difficult question concerning the Nature of the Gods,
+so extremely necessary both towards a knowledge of the human mind and
+the practice of true religion: concerning which the opinions of men are
+so various, and so different from each other, as to lead strongly to the
+inference that ignorance<a id="FNA-72"></a><a href="#FN-72"><sup>72</sup></a> is the cause, or origin, of philosophy, and
+that the Academic philosophers have been prudent in refusing their
+assent to things uncertain: for what is more unbecoming to a wise man
+than to judge rashly? or what rashness is so unworthy of the gravity and
+stability of a philosopher as either to maintain false opinions, or,
+without the least hesitation, to support and defend what he has not
+thoroughly examined and does not clearly comprehend?</p>
+
+<p>In the question now before us, the greater part of mankind have united
+to acknowledge that which is most probable, and which we are all by
+nature led to suppose, namely, that there are Gods. Protagoras<a id="FNA-73"></a><a href="#FN-73"><sup>73</sup></a>
+doubted whether there were any. Diagoras the Melian and Theodorus of
+Cyrene entirely believed there were no such beings. But they who have
+affirmed that there are Gods, have expressed such a variety of
+sentiments on the subject, and the disagreement between them is so
+great, that it would be <a id="page-210"></a><span class="pgnum">210</span>tiresome to enumerate their opinions; for they
+give us many statements respecting the forms of the Gods, and their
+places of abode, and the employment of their lives. And these are
+matters on which the philosophers differ with the most exceeding
+earnestness. But the most considerable part of the dispute is, whether
+they are wholly inactive, totally unemployed, and free from all care and
+administration of affairs; or, on the contrary, whether all things were
+made and constituted by them from the beginning; and whether they will
+continue to be actuated and governed by them to eternity. This is one of
+the greatest points in debate; and unless this is decided, mankind must
+necessarily remain in the greatest of errors, and ignorant of what is
+most important to be known.</p>
+
+<p>II. For there are some philosophers, both ancient and modern, who have
+conceived that the Gods take not the least cognizance of human affairs.
+But if their doctrine be true, of what avail is piety, sanctity, or
+religion? for these are feelings and marks of devotion which are offered
+to the Gods by men with uprightness and holiness, on the ground that men
+are the objects of the attention of the Gods, and that many benefits are
+conferred by the immortal Gods on the human race. But if the Gods have
+neither the power nor the inclination to help us; if they take no care
+of us, and pay no regard to our actions; and if there is no single
+advantage which can possibly accrue to the life of man; then what reason
+can we have to pay any adoration, or any honors, or to prefer any
+prayers to them? Piety, like the other virtues, cannot have any
+connection with vain show or dissimulation; and without piety, neither
+sanctity nor religion can be supported; the total subversion of which
+must be attended with great confusion and disturbance in life.</p>
+
+<p>I do not even know, if we cast off piety towards the Gods, but that
+faith, and all the associations of human life, and that most excellent
+of all virtues, justice, may perish with it.</p>
+
+<p>There are other philosophers, and those, too, very great and illustrious
+men, who conceive the whole world to be directed and governed by the
+will and wisdom of the Gods; nor do they stop here, but conceive
+likewise that the Deities <a id="page-211"></a><span class="pgnum">211</span>consult and provide for the preservation of
+mankind. For they think that the fruits, and the produce of the earth,
+and the seasons, and the variety of weather, and the change of climates,
+by which all the productions of the earth are brought to maturity, are
+designed by the immortal Gods for the use of man. They instance many
+other things, which shall be related in these books; and which would
+almost induce us to believe that the immortal Gods had made them all
+expressly and solely for the benefit and advantage of men. Against these
+opinions Carneades has advanced so much that what he has said should
+excite a desire in men who are not naturally slothful to search after
+truth; for there is no subject on which the learned as well as the
+unlearned differ so strenuously as in this; and since their opinions are
+so various, and so repugnant one to another, it is possible that none of
+them may be, and absolutely impossible that more than one should be,
+right.</p>
+
+<p>III. Now, in a cause like this, I may be able to pacify well-meaning
+opposers, and to confute invidious censurers, so as to induce the latter
+to repent of their unreasonable contradiction, and the former to be glad
+to learn; for they who admonish one in a friendly spirit should be
+instructed, they who attack one like enemies should be repelled. But I
+observe that the several books which I have lately published<a id="FNA-74"></a><a href="#FN-74"><sup>74</sup></a> have
+occasioned much noise and various discourse about them; some people
+wondering what the reason has been why I have applied myself so suddenly
+to the study of philosophy, and others desirous of knowing what my
+opinion is on such subjects. I likewise perceive that many people wonder
+at my following that philosophy<a id="FNA-75"></a><a href="#FN-75"><sup>75</sup></a> chiefly which seems to take away the
+light, and to bury and envelop things in a kind of artificial night, and
+that I should so unexpectedly have taken up the defence of a school that
+has been long neglected and forsaken. But it is a mistake to suppose
+that this application to philosophical studies has been sudden on my
+part. I have applied <a id="page-212"></a><span class="pgnum">212</span>myself to them from my youth, at no small expense
+of time and trouble; and I have been in the habit of philosophizing a
+great deal when I least seemed to think about it; for the truth of which
+I appeal to my orations, which are filled with quotations from
+philosophers, and to my intimacy with those very learned men who
+frequented my house and conversed daily with me, particularly Diodorus,
+Philo, Antiochus, and Posidonius,<a id="FNA-76"></a><a href="#FN-76"><sup>76</sup></a> under whom I was bred; and if all
+the precepts of philosophy are to have reference to the conduct of life,
+I am inclined to think that I have advanced, both in public and private
+affairs, only such principles as may be supported by reason and
+authority.</p>
+
+<p>IV. But if any one should ask what has induced me, in the decline of
+life, to write on these subjects, nothing is more easily answered; for
+when I found myself entirely disengaged from business, and the
+commonwealth reduced to the necessity of being governed by the direction
+and care of one man,<a id="FNA-77"></a><a href="#FN-77"><sup>77</sup></a> I thought it becoming, for the sake of the
+public, to instruct my countrymen in philosophy, and that it would be of
+importance, and much to the honor and commendation of our city, to have
+such great and excellent subjects introduced in the Latin tongue. I the
+less repent of my undertaking, since I plainly see that I have excited
+in many a desire, not only of learning, but of writing; for we have had
+several Romans well grounded in the learning of the Greeks who were
+unable to communicate to their countrymen what they had learned, because
+they looked upon it as impossible to express that in Latin which they
+had received from the Greeks. In this point I think I have succeeded so
+well that what I have done is not, even in copiousness of expression,
+inferior to that language.</p>
+
+<p>Another inducement to it was a melancholy disposition of mind, and the
+great and heavy oppression of fortune that was upon me; from which, if I
+could have found any surer remedy, I would not have sought relief in
+this pursuit. But I could procure ease by no means better than by not
+only applying myself to books, but by devoting myself <a id="page-213"></a><span class="pgnum">213</span>to the
+examination of the whole body of philosophy. And every part and branch
+of this is readily discovered when every question is propounded in
+writing; for there is such an admirable continuation and series of
+things that each seems connected with the other, and all appear linked
+together and united.</p>
+
+<p>V. Now, those men who desire to know my own private opinion on every
+particular subject have more curiosity than is necessary. For the force
+of reason in disputation is to be sought after rather than authority,
+since the authority of the teacher is often a disadvantage to those who
+are willing to learn; as they refuse to use their own judgment, and rely
+implicitly on him whom they make choice of for a preceptor. Nor could I
+ever approve this custom of the Pythagoreans, who, when they affirmed
+anything in disputation, and were asked why it was so, used to give this
+answer: “He himself has said it;” and this “he himself,” it seems, was
+Pythagoras. Such was the force of prejudice and opinion that his
+authority was to prevail even without argument or reason.</p>
+
+<p>They who wonder at my being a follower of this sect in particular may
+find a satisfactory answer in my four books of Academical Questions. But
+I deny that I have undertaken the protection of what is neglected and
+forsaken; for the opinions of men do not die with them, though they may
+perhaps want the author’s explanation. This manner of philosophizing, of
+disputing all things and assuming nothing certainly, was begun by
+Socrates, revived by Arcesilaus, confirmed by Carneades, and has
+descended, with all its power, even to the present age; but I am
+informed that it is now almost exploded even in Greece. However, I do
+not impute that to any fault in the institution of the Academy, but to
+the negligence of mankind. If it is difficult to know all the doctrines
+of any one sect, how much more is it to know those of every sect! which,
+however, must necessarily be known to those who resolve, for the sake of
+discovering truth, to dispute for or against all philosophers without
+partiality.</p>
+
+<p>I do not profess myself to be master of this difficult and noble
+faculty; but I do assert that I have endeavored to make myself so; and
+it is impossible that they who choose <a id="page-214"></a><span class="pgnum">214</span>this manner of philosophizing
+should not meet at least with something worthy their pursuit. I have
+spoken more fully on this head in another place. But as some are too
+slow of apprehension, and some too careless, men stand in perpetual need
+of caution. For we are not people who believe that there is nothing
+whatever which is true; but we say that some falsehoods are so blended
+with all truths, and have so great a resemblance to them, that there is
+no certain rule for judging of or assenting to propositions; from which
+this maxim also follows, that many things are probable, which, though
+they are not evident to the senses, have still so persuasive and
+beautiful an aspect that a wise man chooses to direct his conduct by
+them.</p>
+
+<p>VI. Now, to free myself from the reproach of partiality, I propose to
+lay before you the opinions of various philosophers concerning the
+nature of the Gods, by which means all men may judge which of them are
+consistent with truth; and if all agree together, or if any one shall be
+found to have discovered what may be absolutely called truth, I will
+then give up the Academy as vain and arrogant. So I may cry out, in the
+words of Statius, in the Synephebi,</p>
+
+<blockquote>
+<p>Ye Gods, I call upon, require, pray, beseech, entreat, and implore
+the attention of my countrymen all, both young and old;</p>
+</blockquote>
+
+<p class="cont">yet not on so trifling an occasion as when the person in the play
+complains that,</p>
+
+<blockquote>
+<p>In this city we have discovered a most flagrant iniquity: here is a
+professed courtesan, who refuses money from her lover;</p>
+</blockquote>
+
+<p class="cont">but that they may attend, know, and consider what sentiments they ought
+to preserve concerning religion, piety, sanctity, ceremonies, faith,
+oaths, temples, shrines, and solemn sacrifices; what they ought to think
+of the auspices over which I preside;<a id="FNA-78"></a><a href="#FN-78"><sup>78</sup></a> for all these have relation to
+the present question. The manifest disagreement among the most learned
+on this subject creates doubts in those who imagine they have some
+certain knowledge of the subject.</p>
+
+<p>Which fact I have often taken notice of elsewhere, and <a id="page-215"></a><span class="pgnum">215</span>I did so more
+especially at the discussion that was held at my friend C. Cotta’s
+concerning the immortal Gods, and which was carried on with the greatest
+care, accuracy, and precision; for coming to him at the time of the
+Latin holidays,<a id="FNA-79"></a><a href="#FN-79"><sup>79</sup></a> according to his own invitation and message from
+him, I found him sitting in his study,<a id="FNA-80"></a><a href="#FN-80"><sup>80</sup></a> and in a discourse with C.
+Velleius, the senator, who was then reputed by the Epicureans the ablest
+of our countrymen. Q. Lucilius Balbus was likewise there, a great
+proficient in the doctrine of the Stoics, and esteemed equal to the most
+eminent of the Greeks in that part of knowledge. As soon as Cotta saw
+me, You are come, says he, very seasonably; for I am having a dispute
+with Velleius on an important subject, which, considering the nature of
+your studies, is not improper for you to join in.</p>
+
+<p>VII. Indeed, says I, I think I am come very seasonably, as you say; for
+here are three chiefs of three principal sects met together. If M.
+Piso<a id="FNA-81"></a><a href="#FN-81"><sup>81</sup></a> was present, no sect of philosophy that is in any esteem would
+want an advocate. If Antiochus’s book, replies Cotta, which he lately
+sent to Balbus, says true, you have no occasion to wish for your friend
+Piso; for Antiochus is of the opinion that the Stoics do not differ from
+the Peripatetics in fact, though they do in words; and I should be glad
+to know what you think of that book, Balbus. I? says he. I wonder that
+Antiochus, a man of the clearest apprehension, should not see what a
+vast difference there is between the Stoics, who distinguish the honest
+and the profitable, not only in name, but absolutely in kind, and the
+Peripatetics, who blend the honest with the profitable in such a manner
+that they differ only in degrees and proportion, and not in kind. This
+is not a little difference in words, but a great one in things; <a id="page-216"></a><span class="pgnum">216</span>but of
+this hereafter. Now, if you think fit, let us return to what we began
+with.</p>
+
+<p>With all my heart, says Cotta. But that this visitor (looking at me),
+who is just come in, may not be ignorant of what we are upon, I will
+inform him that we were discoursing on the nature of the Gods;
+concerning which, as it is a subject that always appeared very obscure
+to me, I prevailed on Velleius to give us the sentiments of Epicurus.
+Therefore, continues he, if it is not troublesome, Velleius, repeat what
+you have already stated to us. I will, says he, though this new-comer
+will be no advocate for me, but for you; for you have both, adds he,
+with a smile, learned from the same Philo to be certain of nothing.<a id="FNA-82"></a><a href="#FN-82"><sup>82</sup></a>
+What we have learned from him, replied I, Cotta will discover; but I
+would not have you think I am come as an assistant to him, but as an
+auditor, with an impartial and unbiassed mind, and not bound by any
+obligation to defend any particular principle, whether I like or dislike
+it.</p>
+
+<p>VIII. After this, Velleius, with the confidence peculiar to his sect,
+dreading nothing so much as to seem to doubt of anything, began as if he
+had just then descended from the council of the Gods, and Epicurus’s
+intervals of worlds. Do not attend, says he, to these idle and imaginary
+tales; nor to the operator and builder of the World, the God of Plato’s
+TimÊus; nor to the old prophetic dame, the <span class="greek">Πρ᜹Μοια</span> of the Stoics, which
+the Latins call Providence; nor to that round, that burning, revolving
+deity, the World, endowed with sense and understanding; the prodigies
+and wonders, not of inquisitive philosophers, but of dreamers!</p>
+
+<p>For with what eyes of the mind was your Plato able to see that workhouse
+of such stupendous toil, in which he makes the world to be modelled and
+built by God? What materials, what tools, what bars, what machines, what
+servants, were employed in so vast a work? How could the air, fire,
+water, and earth pay obedience and submit to the will of the architect?
+>From whence arose those five forms,<a id="FNA-83"></a><a href="#FN-83"><sup>83</sup></a> of which the rest were composed,
+so aptly contributing to frame the mind and produce the senses? It <a id="page-217"></a><span class="pgnum">217</span>is
+tedious to go through all, as they are of such a sort that they look
+more like things to be desired than to be discovered.</p>
+
+<p>But, what is more remarkable, he gives us a world which has been not
+only created, but, if I may so say, in a manner formed with hands, and
+yet he says it is eternal. Do you conceive him to have the least skill
+in natural philosophy who is capable of thinking anything to be
+everlasting that had a beginning? For what can possibly ever have been
+put together which cannot be dissolved again? Or what is there that had
+a beginning which will not have an end? If your Providence, Lucilius, is
+the same as Plato’s God, I ask you, as before, who were the assistants,
+what were the engines, what was the plan and preparation of the whole
+work? If it is not the same, then why did she make the world mortal, and
+not everlasting, like Plato’s God?</p>
+
+<p>IX. But I would demand of you both, why these world-builders started up
+so suddenly, and lay dormant for so many ages? For we are not to
+conclude that, if there was no world, there were therefore no ages. I do
+not now speak of such ages as are finished by a certain number of days
+and nights in annual courses; for I acknowledge that those could not be
+without the revolution of the world; but there was a certain eternity
+from infinite time, not measured by any circumscription of seasons; but
+how that was in space we cannot understand, because we cannot possibly
+have even the slightest idea of time before time was. I desire,
+therefore, to know, Balbus, why this Providence of yours was idle for
+such an immense space of time? Did she avoid labor? But that could have
+no effect on the Deity; nor could there be any labor, since all nature,
+air, fire, earth, and water would obey the divine essence. What was it
+that incited the Deity to act the part of an Êdile, to illuminate and
+decorate the world? If it was in order that God might be the better
+accommodated in his habitation, then he must have been dwelling an
+infinite length of time before in darkness as in a dungeon. But do we
+imagine that he was afterward delighted with that variety with which we
+see the heaven and earth adorned? What entertainment could that be to
+the Deity? If it was any, he would not have been without it so long.</p>
+
+<p><a id="page-218"></a><span class="pgnum">218</span>Or were these things made, as you almost assert, by God for the sake of
+men? Was it for the wise? If so, then this great design was adopted for
+the sake of a very small number. Or for the sake of fools? First of all,
+there was no reason why God should consult the advantage of the wicked;
+and, further, what could be his object in doing so, since all fools are,
+without doubt, the most miserable of men, chiefly because they are
+fools? For what can we pronounce more deplorable than folly? Besides,
+there are many inconveniences in life which the wise can learn to think
+lightly of by dwelling rather on the advantages which they receive; but
+which fools are unable to avoid when they are coming, or to bear when
+they are come.</p>
+
+<p>X. They who affirm the world to be an animated and intelligent being
+have by no means discovered the nature of the mind, nor are able to
+conceive in what form that essence can exist; but of that I shall speak
+more hereafter. At present I must express my surprise at the weakness of
+those who endeavor to make it out to be not only animated and immortal,
+but likewise happy, and round, because Plato says that is the most
+beautiful form; whereas I think a cylinder, a square, a cone, or a
+pyramid more beautiful. But what life do they attribute to that round
+Deity? Truly it is a being whirled about with a celerity to which
+nothing can be even conceived by the imagination as equal; nor can I
+imagine how a settled mind and happy life can consist in such motion,
+the least degree of which would be troublesome to us. Why, therefore,
+should it not be considered troublesome also to the Deity? For the earth
+itself, as it is part of the world, is part also of the Deity. We see
+vast tracts of land barren and uninhabitable; some, because they are
+scorched by the too near approach of the sun; others, because they are
+bound up with frost and snow, through the great distance which the sun
+is from them. Therefore, if the world is a Deity, as these are parts of
+the world, some of the Deity’s limbs must be said to be scorched, and
+some frozen.</p>
+
+<p>These are your doctrines, Lucilius; but what those of others are I will
+endeavor to ascertain by tracing them back from the earliest of ancient
+philosophers. Thales <a id="page-219"></a><span class="pgnum">219</span>the Milesian, who first inquired after such
+subjects, asserted water to be the origin of things, and that God was
+that mind which formed all things from water. If the Gods can exist
+without corporeal sense, and if there can be a mind without a body, why
+did he annex a mind to water?</p>
+
+<p>It was Anaximander’s opinion that the Gods were born; that after a great
+length of time they died; and that they are innumerable worlds. But what
+conception can we possibly have of a Deity who is not eternal?</p>
+
+<p>Anaximenes, after him, taught that the air is God, and that he was
+generated, and that he is immense, infinite, and always in motion; as if
+air, which has no form, could possibly be God; for the Deity must
+necessarily be not only of some form or other, but of the most beautiful
+form. Besides, is not everything that had a beginning subject to
+mortality?</p>
+
+<p>XI. Anaxagoras, who received his learning from Anaximenes, was the first
+who affirmed the system and disposition of all things to be contrived
+and perfected by the power and reason of an infinite mind; in which
+infinity he did not perceive that there could be no conjunction of sense
+and motion, nor any sense in the least degree, where nature herself
+could feel no impulse. If he would have this mind to be a sort of
+animal, then there must be some more internal principle from whence that
+animal should receive its appellation. But what can be more internal
+than the mind? Let it, therefore, be clothed with an external body. But
+this is not agreeable to his doctrine; but we are utterly unable to
+conceive how a pure simple mind can exist without any substance annexed
+to it.</p>
+
+<p>AlcmÊon of Crotona, in attributing a divinity to the sun, the moon, and
+the rest of the stars, and also to the mind, did not perceive that he
+was ascribing immortality to mortal beings.</p>
+
+<p>Pythagoras, who supposed the Deity to be one soul, mixing with and
+pervading all nature, from which our souls are taken, did not consider
+that the Deity himself must, in consequence of this doctrine, be maimed
+and torn with the rending every human soul from it; nor that, when the
+human mind is afflicted (as is the case in many instances), that part of
+the Deity must likewise be afflicted, <a id="page-220"></a><span class="pgnum">220</span>which cannot be. If the human
+mind were a Deity, how could it be ignorant of any thing? Besides, how
+could that Deity, if it is nothing but soul, be mixed with, or infused
+into, the world?</p>
+
+<p>Then Xenophanes, who said that everything in the world which had any
+existence, with the addition of intellect, was God, is as liable to
+exception as the rest, especially in relation to the infinity of it, in
+which there can be nothing sentient, nothing composite.</p>
+
+<p>Parmenides formed a conceit to himself of something circular like a
+crown. (He names it Stephane.) It is an orb of constant light and heat
+around the heavens; this he calls God; in which there is no room to
+imagine any divine form or sense. And he uttered many other absurdities
+on the same subject; for he ascribed a divinity to war, to discord, to
+lust, and other passions of the same kind, which are destroyed by
+disease, or sleep, or oblivion, or age. The same honor he gives to the
+stars; but I shall forbear making any objections to his system here,
+having already done it in another place.</p>
+
+<p>XII. Empedocles, who erred in many things, is most grossly mistaken in
+his notion of the Gods. He lays down four natures<a id="FNA-84"></a><a href="#FN-84"><sup>84</sup></a> as divine, from
+which he thinks that all things were made. Yet it is evident that they
+have a beginning, that they decay, and that they are void of all sense.</p>
+
+<p>Protagoras did not seem to have any idea of the real nature of the Gods;
+for he acknowledged that he was altogether ignorant whether there are or
+are not any, or what they are.</p>
+
+<p>What shall I say of Democritus, who classes our images of objects, and
+their orbs, in the number of the Gods; as he does that principle through
+which those images appear and have their influence? He deifies likewise
+our knowledge and understanding. Is he not involved in a very great
+error? And because nothing continues always in the same state, he denies
+that anything is everlasting, does he not thereby entirely destroy the
+Deity, and make it impossible to form any opinion of him?</p>
+
+<p><a id="page-221"></a><span class="pgnum">221</span>Diogenes of Apollonia looks upon the air to be a Deity. But what sense
+can the air have? or what divine form can be attributed to it?</p>
+
+<p>It would be tedious to show the uncertainty of Plato’s opinion; for, in
+his TimÊus, he denies the propriety of asserting that there is one great
+father or creator of the world; and, in his book of Laws, he thinks we
+ought not to make too strict an inquiry into the nature of the Deity.
+And as for his statement when he asserts that God is a being without any
+body—what the Greeks call <span class="greek">ጀσ᜜Όατος</span>—it is certainly quite
+unintelligible how that theory can possibly be true; for such a God must
+then necessarily be destitute of sense, prudence, and pleasure; all
+which things are comprehended in our notion of the Gods. He likewise
+asserts in his TimÊus, and in his Laws, that the world, the heavens, the
+stars, the mind, and those Gods which are delivered down to us from our
+ancestors, constitute the Deity. These opinions, taken separately, are
+apparently false; and, together, are directly inconsistent with each
+other.</p>
+
+<p>Xenophon has committed almost the same mistakes, but in fewer words. In
+those sayings which he has related of Socrates, he introduces him
+disputing the lawfulness of inquiring into the form of the Deity, and
+makes him assert the sun and the mind to be Deities: he represents him
+likewise as affirming the being of one God only, and at another time of
+many; which are errors of almost the same kind which I before took
+notice of in Plato.</p>
+
+<p>XIII. Antisthenes, in his book called the Natural Philosopher, says that
+there are many national and one natural Deity; but by this saying he
+destroys the power and nature of the Gods. Speusippus is not much less
+in the wrong; who, following his uncle Plato, says that a certain
+incorporeal power governs everything; by which he endeavors to root out
+of our minds the knowledge of the Gods.</p>
+
+<p>Aristotle, in his third book of Philosophy, confounds many things
+together, as the rest have done; but he does not differ from his master
+Plato. At one time he attributes all divinity to the mind, at another he
+asserts that the world is God. Soon afterward he makes some other
+essence <a id="page-222"></a><span class="pgnum">222</span>preside over the world, and gives it those faculties by which,
+with certain revolutions, he may govern and preserve the motion of it.
+Then he asserts the heat of the firmament to be God; not perceiving the
+firmament to be part of the world, which in another place he had
+described as God. How can that divine sense of the firmament be
+preserved in so rapid a motion? And where do the multitude of Gods
+dwell, if heaven itself is a Deity? But when this philosopher says that
+God is without a body, he makes him an irrational and insensible being.
+Besides, how can the world move itself, if it wants a body? Or how, if
+it is in perpetual self-motion, can it be easy and happy?</p>
+
+<p>Xenocrates, his fellow-pupil, does not appear much wiser on this head,
+for in his books concerning the nature of the Gods no divine form is
+described; but he says the number of them is eight. Five are moving
+planets;<a id="FNA-85"></a><a href="#FN-85"><sup>85</sup></a> the sixth is contained in all the fixed stars; which,
+dispersed, are so many several members, but, considered together, are
+one single Deity; the seventh is the sun; and the eighth the moon. But
+in what sense they can possibly be happy is not easy to be understood.</p>
+
+<p>From the same school of Plato, Heraclides of Pontus stuffed his books
+with puerile tales. Sometimes he thinks the world a Deity, at other
+times the mind. He attributes divinity likewise to the wandering stars.
+He deprives the Deity of sense, and makes his form mutable; and, in the
+same book again, he makes earth and heaven Deities.</p>
+
+<p>The unsteadiness of Theophrastus is equally intolerable. At one time he
+attributes a divine prerogative to the mind; at another, to the
+firmament; at another, to the stars and celestial constellations.</p>
+
+<p>Nor is his disciple Strato, who is called the naturalist, any more
+worthy to be regarded; for he thinks that the divine power is diffused
+through nature, which is the cause of birth, increase, and diminution,
+but that it has no sense nor form.</p>
+
+<p>XIV. Zeno (to come to your sect, Balbus) thinks the law of nature to be
+the divinity, and that it has the power <a id="page-223"></a><span class="pgnum">223</span>to force us to what is right,
+and to restrain us from what is wrong. How this law can be an animated
+being I cannot conceive; but that God is so we would certainly maintain.
+The same person says, in another place, that the sky is God; but can we
+possibly conceive that God is a being insensible, deaf to our prayers,
+our wishes, and our vows, and wholly unconnected with us? In other books
+he thinks there is a certain rational essence pervading all nature,
+indued with divine efficacy. He attributes the same power to the stars,
+to the years, to the months, and to the seasons. In his interpretation
+of Hesiod’s Theogony,<a id="FNA-86"></a><a href="#FN-86"><sup>86</sup></a> he entirely destroys the established notions
+of the Gods; for he excludes Jupiter, Juno, and Vesta, and those
+esteemed divine, from the number of them; but his doctrine is that these
+are names which by some kind of allusion are given to mute and inanimate
+beings. The sentiments of his disciple Aristo are not less erroneous. He
+thought it impossible to conceive the form of the Deity, and asserts
+that the Gods are destitute of sense; and he is entirely dubious whether
+the Deity is an animated being or not.</p>
+
+<p>Cleanthes, who next comes under my notice, a disciple of Zeno at the
+same time with Aristo, in one place says that the world is God; in
+another, he attributes divinity to the mind and spirit of universal
+nature; then he asserts that the most remote, the highest, the
+all-surrounding, the all-enclosing and embracing heat, which is called
+the sky, is most certainly the Deity. In the books he wrote against
+pleasure, in which he seems to be raving, he imagines the Gods to have a
+certain form and shape; then he ascribes all divinity to the stars; and,
+lastly, he thinks nothing more divine than reason. So that this God,
+whom we know mentally and in the speculations of our minds, from which
+traces we receive our impression, has at last actually no visible form
+at all.</p>
+
+<p>XV. PersÊus, another disciple of Zeno, says that they who have made
+discoveries advantageous to the life of man should be esteemed as Gods;
+and the very things, he says, which are healthful and beneficial have
+derived their names from those of the Gods; so that he thinks it not
+sufficient to call them the discoveries of Gods, but he urges that they
+<a id="page-224"></a><span class="pgnum">224</span>themselves should be deemed divine. What can be more absurd than to
+ascribe divine honors to sordid and deformed things; or to place among
+the Gods men who are dead and mixed with the dust, to whose memory all
+the respect that could be paid would be but mourning for their loss?</p>
+
+<p>Chrysippus, who is looked upon as the most subtle interpreter of the
+dreams of the Stoics, has mustered up a numerous band of unknown Gods;
+and so unknown that we are not able to form any idea about them, though
+our mind seems capable of framing any image to itself in its thoughts.
+For he says that the divine power is placed in reason, and in the spirit
+and mind of universal nature; that the world, with a universal effusion
+of its spirit, is God; that the superior part of that spirit, which is
+the mind and reason, is the great principle of nature, containing and
+preserving the chain of all things; that the divinity is the power of
+fate, and the necessity of future events. He deifies fire also, and what
+I before called the ethereal spirit, and those elements which naturally
+proceed from it—water, earth, and air. He attributes divinity to the
+sun, moon, stars, and universal space, the grand container of all
+things, and to those men likewise who have obtained immortality. He
+maintains the sky to be what men call Jupiter; the air, which pervades
+the sea, to be Neptune; and the earth, Ceres. In like manner he goes
+through the names of the other Deities. He says that Jupiter is that
+immutable and eternal law which guides and directs us in our manners;
+and this he calls fatal necessity, the everlasting verity of future
+events. But none of these are of such a nature as to seem to carry any
+indication of divine virtue in them. These are the doctrines contained
+in his first book of the Nature of the Gods. In the second, he endeavors
+to accommodate the fables of Orpheus, MusÊus, Hesiod, and Homer to what
+he has advanced in the first, in order that the most ancient poets, who
+never dreamed of these things, may seem to have been Stoics. Diogenes
+the Babylonian was a follower of the doctrine of Chrysippus; and in that
+book which he wrote, entitled “A Treatise concerning Minerva,” he
+separates the account of Jupiter’s bringing-forth, and the birth of that
+virgin, from the fabulous, and reduces it to a natural construction.</p>
+
+<p><a id="page-225"></a><span class="pgnum">225</span>XVI. Thus far have I been rather exposing the dreams of dotards than
+giving the opinions of philosophers. Not much more absurd than these are
+the fables of the poets, who owe all their power of doing harm to the
+sweetness of their language; who have represented the Gods as enraged
+with anger and inflamed with lust; who have brought before our eyes
+their wars, battles, combats, wounds; their hatreds, dissensions,
+discords, births, deaths, complaints, and lamentations; their
+indulgences in all kinds of intemperance; their adulteries; their
+chains; their amours with mortals, and mortals begotten by immortals. To
+these idle and ridiculous flights of the poets we may add the prodigious
+stories invented by the Magi, and by the Egyptians also, which were of
+the same nature, together with the extravagant notions of the multitude
+at all times, who, from total ignorance of the truth, are always
+fluctuating in uncertainty.</p>
+
+<p>Now, whoever reflects on the rashness and absurdity of these tenets must
+inevitably entertain the highest respect and veneration for Epicurus,
+and perhaps even rank him in the number of those beings who are the
+subject of this dispute; for he alone first founded the idea of the
+existence of the Gods on the impression which nature herself hath made
+on the minds of all men. For what nation, what people are there, who
+have not, without any learning, a natural idea, or prenotion, of a
+Deity? Epicurus calls this <span class="greek">πρ᜹ληψις</span>; that is, an antecedent conception
+of the fact in the mind, without which nothing can be understood,
+inquired after, or discoursed on; the force and advantage of which
+reasoning we receive from that celestial volume of Epicurus concerning
+the Rule and Judgment of Things.</p>
+
+<p>XVII. Here, then, you see the foundation of this question clearly laid;
+for since it is the constant and universal opinion of mankind,
+independent of education, custom, or law, that there are Gods, it must
+necessarily follow that this knowledge is implanted in our minds, or,
+rather, innate in us. That opinion respecting which there is a general
+agreement in universal nature must infallibly be true; therefore it must
+be allowed that there are Gods; for in this we have the concurrence, not
+only of almost all philosophers, but likewise of the ignorant and
+illiterate. It <a id="page-226"></a><span class="pgnum">226</span>must be also confessed that the point is established
+that we have naturally this idea, as I said before, or prenotion, of the
+existence of the Gods. As new things require new names, so that
+prenotion was called <span class="greek">πρ᜹ληψις</span> by Epicurus; an appellation never used
+before. On the same principle of reasoning, we think that the Gods are
+happy and immortal; for that nature which hath assured us that there are
+Gods has likewise imprinted in our minds the knowledge of their
+immortality and felicity; and if so, what Epicurus hath declared in
+these words is true: “That which is eternally happy cannot be burdened
+with any labor itself, nor can it impose any labor on another; nor can
+it be influenced by resentment or favor: because things which are liable
+to such feelings must be weak and frail.” We have said enough to prove
+that we should worship the Gods with piety, and without superstition, if
+that were the only question.</p>
+
+<p>For the superior and excellent nature of the Gods requires a pious
+adoration from men, because it is possessed of immortality and the most
+exalted felicity; for whatever excels has a right to veneration, and all
+fear of the power and anger of the Gods should be banished; for we must
+understand that anger and affection are inconsistent with the nature of
+a happy and immortal being. These apprehensions being removed, no dread
+of the superior powers remains. To confirm this opinion, our curiosity
+leads us to inquire into the form and life and action of the intellect
+and spirit of the Deity.</p>
+
+<p>XVIII. With regard to his form, we are directed partly by nature and
+partly by reason. All men are told by nature that none but a human form
+can be ascribed to the Gods; for under what other image did it ever
+appear to any one either sleeping or waking? and, without having
+recourse to our first notions,<a id="FNA-87"></a><a href="#FN-87"><sup>87</sup></a> reason itself declares the same; for
+as it is easy to conceive that the most excellent nature, either because
+of its happiness or immortality, should be the most beautiful, what
+composition of limbs, what conformation of lineaments, what form, what
+aspect, can be more beautiful than the human? Your sect, Lucilius (not
+like my friend Cotta, who sometimes says one <a id="page-227"></a><span class="pgnum">227</span>thing and sometimes
+another), when they represent the divine art and workmanship in the
+human body, are used to describe how very completely each member is
+formed, not only for convenience, but also for beauty. Therefore, if the
+human form excels that of all other animal beings, as God himself is an
+animated being, he must surely be of that form which is the most
+beautiful. Besides, the Gods are granted to be perfectly happy; and
+nobody can be happy without virtue, nor can virtue exist where reason is
+not; and reason can reside in none but the human form; the Gods,
+therefore, must be acknowledged to be of human form; yet that form is
+not body, but something like body; nor does it contain any blood, but
+something like blood. Though these distinctions were more acutely
+devised and more artfully expressed by Epicurus than any common capacity
+can comprehend; yet, depending on your understanding, I shall be more
+brief on the subject than otherwise I should be. Epicurus, who not only
+discovered and understood the occult and almost hidden secrets of
+nature, but explained them with ease, teaches that the power and nature
+of the Gods is not to be discerned by the senses, but by the mind; nor
+are they to be considered as bodies of any solidity, or reducible to
+number, like those things which, because of their firmness, he calls
+<span class="greek">ΣτερᜳΌΜια</span>;<a id="FNA-88"></a><a href="#FN-88"><sup>88</sup></a> but as images, perceived by similitude and transition. As
+infinite kinds of those images result from innumerable individuals, and
+centre in the Gods, our minds and understanding are directed towards and
+fixed with the greatest delight on them, in order to comprehend what
+that happy and eternal essence is.</p>
+
+<p>XIX. Surely the mighty power of the Infinite Being is most worthy our
+great and earnest contemplation; the nature of which we must necessarily
+understand to be such that everything in it is made to correspond
+completely to some other answering part. This is called by Epicurus
+<span class="greek">ጰσοΜοΌ᜷α</span>; that is to say, an equal distribution or even disposition of
+things. From hence he draws this inference, <a id="page-228"></a><span class="pgnum">228</span>that, as there is such a
+vast multitude of mortals, there cannot be a less number of immortals;
+and if those which perish are innumerable, those which are preserved
+ought also to be countless. Your sect, Balbus, frequently ask us how the
+Gods live, and how they pass their time? Their life is the most happy,
+and the most abounding with all kinds of blessings, which can be
+conceived. They do nothing. They are embarrassed with no business; nor
+do they perform any work. They rejoice in the possession of their own
+wisdom and virtue. They are satisfied that they shall ever enjoy the
+fulness of eternal pleasures.</p>
+
+<p>XX. Such a Deity may properly be called happy; but yours is a most
+laborious God. For let us suppose the world a Deity—what can be a more
+uneasy state than, without the least cessation, to be whirled about the
+axle-tree of heaven with a surprising celerity? But nothing can be happy
+that is not at ease. Or let us suppose a Deity residing in the world,
+who directs and governs it, who preserves the courses of the stars, the
+changes of the seasons, and the vicissitudes and orders of things,
+surveying the earth and the sea, and accommodating them to the advantage
+and necessities of man. Truly this Deity is embarrassed with a very
+troublesome and laborious office. We make a happy life to consist in a
+tranquillity of mind, a perfect freedom from care, and an exemption from
+all employment. The philosopher from whom we received all our knowledge
+has taught us that the world was made by nature; that there was no
+occasion for a workhouse to frame it in; and that, though you deny the
+possibility of such a work without divine skill, it is so easy to her,
+that she has made, does make, and will make innumerable worlds. But,
+because you do not conceive that nature is able to produce such effects
+without some rational aid, you are forced, like the tragic poets, when
+you cannot wind up your argument in any other way, to have recourse to a
+Deity, whose assistance you would not seek, if you could view that vast
+and unbounded magnitude of regions in all parts; where the mind,
+extending and spreading itself, travels so far and wide that it can find
+no end, no extremity to stop at. In this immensity of breadth, length,
+and height, a most boundless company of innumerable atoms <a id="page-229"></a><span class="pgnum">229</span>are
+fluttering about, which, notwithstanding the interposition of a void
+space, meet and cohere, and continue clinging to one another; and by
+this union these modifications and forms of things arise, which, in your
+opinions, could not possibly be made without the help of bellows and
+anvils. Thus you have imposed on us an eternal master, whom we must
+dread day and night. For who can be free from fear of a Deity who
+foresees, regards, and takes notice of everything; one who thinks all
+things his own; a curious, ever-busy God?</p>
+
+<p>Hence first arose your <span class="greek">ΕጱΌαρΌᜳΜη</span>, as you call it, your fatal necessity;
+so that, whatever happens, you affirm that it flows from an eternal
+chain and continuance of causes. Of what value is this philosophy,
+which, like old women and illiterate men, attributes everything to fate?
+Then follows your <span class="greek">ΌαΜτικᜎ</span>, in Latin called <i>divinatio</i>, divination;
+which, if we would listen to you, would plunge us into such superstition
+that we should fall down and worship your inspectors into sacrifices,
+your augurs, your soothsayers, your prophets, and your fortune-tellers.</p>
+
+<p>Epicurus having freed us from these terrors and restored us to liberty,
+we have no dread of those beings whom we have reason to think entirely
+free from all trouble themselves, and who do not impose any on others.
+We pay our adoration, indeed, with piety and reverence to that essence
+which is above all excellence and perfection. But I fear my zeal for
+this doctrine has made me too prolix. However, I could not easily leave
+so eminent and important a subject unfinished, though I must confess I
+should rather endeavor to hear than speak so long.</p>
+
+<p>XXI. Cotta, with his usual courtesy, then began. Velleius, says he, were
+it not for something which you have advanced, I should have remained
+silent; for I have often observed, as I did just now upon hearing you,
+that I cannot so easily conceive why a proposition is true as why it is
+false. Should you ask me what I take the nature of the Gods to be, I
+should perhaps make no answer. But if you should ask whether I think it
+to be of that nature which you have described, I should answer that I
+was as far as possible from agreeing with you. However, before I enter
+on the subject of your discourse and what you <a id="page-230"></a><span class="pgnum">230</span>have advanced upon it, I
+will give you my opinion of yourself. Your intimate friend, L. Crassus,
+has been often heard by me to say that you were beyond all question
+superior to all our learned Romans; and that few Epicureans in Greece
+were to be compared to you. But as I knew what a wonderful esteem he had
+for you, I imagined that might make him the more lavish in commendation
+of you. Now, however, though I do not choose to praise any one when
+present, yet I must confess that I think you have delivered your
+thoughts clearly on an obscure and very intricate subject; that you are
+not only copious in your sentiments, but more elegant in your language
+than your sect generally are. When I was at Athens, I went often to hear
+Zeno, by the advice of Philo, who used to call him the chief of the
+Epicureans; partly, probably, in order to judge more easily how
+completely those principles could be refuted after I had heard them
+stated by the most learned of the Epicureans. And, indeed, he did not
+speak in any ordinary manner; but, like you, with clearness, gravity,
+and elegance; yet what frequently gave me great uneasiness when I heard
+him, as it did while I attended to you, was to see so excellent a genius
+falling into such frivolous (excuse my freedom), not to say foolish,
+doctrines. However, I shall not at present offer anything better; for,
+as I said before, we can in most subjects, especially in physics, sooner
+discover what is not true than what is.</p>
+
+<p>XXII. If you should ask me what God is, or what his character and nature
+are, I should follow the example of Simonides, who, when Hiero the
+tyrant proposed the same question to him, desired a day to consider of
+it. When he required his answer the next day, Simonides begged two days
+more; and as he kept constantly desiring double the number which he had
+required before instead of giving his answer, Hiero, with surprise,
+asked him his meaning in doing so: “Because,” says he, “the longer I
+meditate on it, the more obscure it appears to me.” Simonides, who was
+not only a delightful poet, but reputed a wise and learned man in other
+branches of knowledge, found, I suppose, so many acute and refined
+arguments occurring to him, that he was doubtful which was the truest,
+and therefore despaired of discovering any truth.</p>
+
+<p><a id="page-231"></a><span class="pgnum">231</span>But does your Epicurus (for I had rather contend with him than with
+you) say anything that is worthy the name of philosophy, or even of
+common-sense?</p>
+
+<p>In the question concerning the nature of the Gods, his first inquiry is,
+whether there are Gods or not. It would be dangerous, I believe, to take
+the negative side before a public auditory; but it is very safe in a
+discourse of this kind, and in this company. I, who am a priest, and who
+think that religions and ceremonies ought sacredly to be maintained, am
+certainly desirous to have the existence of the Gods, which is the
+principal point in debate, not only fixed in opinion, but proved to a
+demonstration; for many notions flow into and disturb the mind which
+sometimes seem to convince us that there are none. But see how candidly
+I will behave to you: as I shall not touch upon those tenets you hold in
+common with other philosophers, consequently I shall not dispute the
+existence of the Gods, for that doctrine is agreeable to almost all men,
+and to myself in particular; but I am still at liberty to find fault
+with the reasons you give for it, which I think are very insufficient.</p>
+
+<p>XXIII. You have said that the general assent of men of all nations and
+all degrees is an argument strong enough to induce us to acknowledge the
+being of the Gods. This is not only a weak, but a false, argument; for,
+first of all, how do you know the opinions of all nations? I really
+believe there are many people so savage that they have no thoughts of a
+Deity. What think you of Diagoras, who was called the atheist; and of
+Theodorus after him? Did not they plainly deny the very essence of a
+Deity? Protagoras of Abdera, whom you just now mentioned, the greatest
+sophist of his age, was banished by order of the Athenians from their
+city and territories, and his books were publicly burned, because these
+words were in the beginning of his treatise concerning the Gods: “I am
+unable to arrive at any knowledge whether there are, or are not, any
+Gods.” This treatment of him, I imagine, restrained many from professing
+their disbelief of a Deity, since the doubt of it only could not escape
+punishment. What shall we say of the sacrilegious, the impious, and the
+perjured? If Tubulus Lucius, Lupus, or Carbo the son of <a id="page-232"></a><span class="pgnum">232</span>Neptune, as
+Lucilius says, had believed that there were Gods, would either of them
+have carried his perjuries and impieties to such excess? Your reasoning,
+therefore, to confirm your assertion is not so conclusive as you think
+it is. But as this is the manner in which other philosophers have argued
+on the same subject, I will take no further notice of it at present; I
+rather choose to proceed to what is properly your own.</p>
+
+<p>I allow that there are Gods. Instruct me, then, concerning their origin;
+inform me where they are, what sort of body, what mind, they have, and
+what is their course of life; for these I am desirous of knowing. You
+attribute the most absolute power and efficacy to atoms. Out of them you
+pretend that everything is made. But there are no atoms, for there is
+nothing without body; every place is occupied by body, therefore there
+can be no such thing as a vacuum or an atom.</p>
+
+<p>XXIV. I advance these principles of the naturalists without knowing
+whether they are true or false; yet they are more like truth than those
+statements of yours; for they are the absurdities in which Democritus,
+or before him Leucippus, used to indulge, saying that there are certain
+light corpuscles—some smooth, some rough, some round, some square, some
+crooked and bent as bows—which by a fortuitous concourse made heaven
+and earth, without the influence of any natural power. This opinion, C.
+Velleius, you have brought down to these our times; and you would sooner
+be deprived of the greatest advantages of life than of that authority;
+for before you were acquainted with those tenets, you thought that you
+ought to profess yourself an Epicurean; so that it was necessary that
+you should either embrace these absurdities or lose the philosophical
+character which you had taken upon you; and what could bribe you to
+renounce the Epicurean opinion? Nothing, you say, can prevail on you to
+forsake the truth and the sure means of a happy life. But is that the
+truth? for I shall not contest your happy life, which you think the
+Deity himself does not enjoy unless he languishes in idleness. But where
+is truth? Is it in your innumerable worlds, some of which are rising,
+some falling, at every moment of time? Or is it in your atomical
+corpuscles, <a id="page-233"></a><span class="pgnum">233</span>which form such excellent works without the direction of
+any natural power or reason? But I was forgetting my liberality, which I
+had promised to exert in your case, and exceeding the bounds which I at
+first proposed to myself. Granting, then, everything to be made of
+atoms, what advantage is that to your argument? For we are searching
+after the nature of the Gods; and allowing them to be made of atoms,
+they cannot be eternal, because whatever is made of atoms must have had
+a beginning: if so, there were no Gods till there was this beginning;
+and if the Gods have had a beginning, they must necessarily have an end,
+as you have before contended when you were discussing Plato’s world.
+Where, then, is your beatitude and immortality, in which two words you
+say that God is expressed, the endeavor to prove which reduces you to
+the greatest perplexities? For you said that God had no body, but
+something like body; and no blood, but something like blood.</p>
+
+<p>XXV. It is a frequent practice among you, when you assert anything that
+has no resemblance to truth, and wish to avoid reprehension, to advance
+something else which is absolutely and utterly impossible, in order that
+it may seem to your adversaries better to grant that point which has
+been a matter of doubt than to keep on pertinaciously contradicting you
+on every point: like Epicurus, who, when he found that if his atoms were
+allowed to descend by their own weight, our actions could not be in our
+own power, because their motions would be certain and necessary,
+invented an expedient, which escaped Democritus, to avoid necessity. He
+says that when the atoms descend by their own weight and gravity, they
+move a little obliquely. Surely, to make such an assertion as this is
+what one ought more to be ashamed of than the acknowledging ourselves
+unable to defend the proposition. His practice is the same against the
+logicians, who say that in all propositions in which yes or no is
+required, one of them must be true; he was afraid that if this were
+granted, then, in such a proposition as “Epicurus will be alive or dead
+to-morrow,” either one or the other must necessarily be admitted;
+therefore he absolutely denied the necessity of yes or no. Can anything
+<a id="page-234"></a><span class="pgnum">234</span>show stupidity in a greater degree? Zeno,<a id="FNA-89"></a><a href="#FN-89"><sup>89</sup></a> being pressed by
+Arcesilas, who pronounced all things to be false which are perceived by
+the senses, said that some things were false, but not all. Epicurus was
+afraid that if any one thing seen should be false, nothing could be
+true; and therefore he asserted all the senses to be infallible
+directors of truth. Nothing can be more rash than this; for by
+endeavoring to repel a light stroke, he receives a heavy blow. On the
+subject of the nature of the Gods, he falls into the same errors. While
+he would avoid the concretion of individual bodies, lest death and
+dissolution should be the consequence, he denies that the Gods have
+body, but says they have something like body; and says they have no
+blood, but something like blood.</p>
+
+<p>XXVI. It seems an unaccountable thing how one soothsayer can refrain
+from laughing when he sees another. It is yet a greater wonder that you
+can refrain from laughing among yourselves. It is no body, but something
+like body! I could understand this if it were applied to statues made of
+wax or clay; but in regard to the Deity, I am not able to discover what
+is meant by a quasi-body or quasi-blood. Nor indeed are you, Velleius,
+though you will not confess so much. For those precepts are delivered to
+you as dictates which Epicurus carelessly blundered out; for he boasted,
+as we see in his writings, that he had no instructor, which I could
+easily believe without his public declaration of it, for the same reason
+that I could believe the master of a very bad edifice if he were to
+boast that he had no architect but himself: for there is nothing of the
+Academy, nothing of the Lyceum, in his doctrine; nothing but
+puerilities. He might have been a pupil of Xenocrates. O ye immortal
+Gods, what a teacher was he! And there are those who believe that he
+actually was his pupil; but he says otherwise, and I shall give more
+credit to his word than to another’s. He confesses that he was a pupil
+of a certain disciple of Plato, one Pamphilus, at Samos; for he lived
+there when he was young, with his father and his brothers. His father,
+Neocles, was a farmer in those parts; <a id="page-235"></a><span class="pgnum">235</span>but as the farm, I suppose, was
+not sufficient to maintain him, he turned school-master; yet Epicurus
+treats this Platonic philosopher with wonderful contempt, so fearful was
+he that it should be thought he had ever had any instruction. But it is
+well known he had been a pupil of Nausiphanes, the follower of
+Democritus; and since he could not deny it, he loaded him with insults
+in abundance. If he never heard a lecture on these Democritean
+principles, what lectures did he ever hear? What is there in Epicurus’s
+physics that is not taken from Democritus? For though he altered some
+things, as what I mentioned before of the oblique motions of the atoms,
+yet most of his doctrines are the same; his atoms—his vacuum—his
+images—infinity of space—innumerable worlds, their rise and decay—and
+almost every part of natural learning that he treats of.</p>
+
+<p>Now, do you understand what is meant by quasi-body and quasi-blood? For
+I not only acknowledge that you are a better judge of it than I am, but
+I can bear it without envy. If any sentiments, indeed, are communicated
+without obscurity, what is there that Velleius can understand and Cotta
+not? I know what body is, and what blood is; but I cannot possibly find
+out the meaning of quasi-body and quasi-blood. Not that you
+intentionally conceal your principles from me, as Pythagoras did his
+from those who were not his disciples; or that you are intentionally
+obscure, like Heraclitus. But the truth is (which I may venture to say
+in this company), you do not understand them yourself.</p>
+
+<p>XXVII. This, I perceive, is what you contend for, that the Gods have a
+certain figure that has nothing concrete, nothing solid, nothing of
+express substance, nothing prominent in it; but that it is pure, smooth,
+and transparent. Let us suppose the same with the Venus of Cos, which is
+not a body, but the representation of a body; nor is the red, which is
+drawn there and mixed with the white, real blood, but a certain
+resemblance of blood; so in Epicurus’s Deity there is no real substance,
+but the resemblance of substance.</p>
+
+<p>Let me take for granted that which is perfectly unintelligible; then
+tell me what are the lineaments and figures <a id="page-236"></a><span class="pgnum">236</span>of these sketched-out
+Deities. Here you have plenty of arguments by which you would show the
+Gods to be in human form. The first is, that our minds are so
+anticipated and prepossessed, that whenever we think of a Deity the
+human shape occurs to us. The next is, that as the divine nature excels
+all things, so it ought to be of the most beautiful form, and there is
+no form more beautiful than the human; and the third is, that reason
+cannot reside in any other shape.</p>
+
+<p>First, let us consider each argument separately. You seem to me to
+assume a principle, despotically I may say, that has no manner of
+probability in it. Who was ever so blind, in contemplating these
+subjects, as not to see that the Gods were represented in human form,
+either by the particular advice of wise men, who thought by those means
+the more easily to turn the minds of the ignorant from a depravity of
+manners to the worship of the Gods; or through superstition, which was
+the cause of their believing that when they were paying adoration to
+these images they were approaching the Gods themselves. These conceits
+were not a little improved by the poets, painters, and artificers; for
+it would not have been very easy to represent the Gods planning and
+executing any work in another form, and perhaps this opinion arose from
+the idea which mankind have of their own beauty. But do not you, who are
+so great an adept in physics, see what a soothing flatterer, what a sort
+of procuress, nature is to herself? Do you think there is any creature
+on the land or in the sea that is not highly delighted with its own
+form? If it were not so, why would not a bull become enamored of a mare,
+or a horse of a cow? Do you believe an eagle, a lion, or a dolphin
+prefers any shape to its own? If nature, therefore, has instructed us in
+the same manner, that nothing is more beautiful than man, what wonder is
+it that we, for that reason, should imagine the Gods are of the human
+form? Do you suppose if beasts were endowed with reason that every one
+would not give the prize of beauty to his own species?</p>
+
+<p>XXVIII. Yet, by Hercules (I speak as I think)! though I am fond enough
+of myself, I dare not say that I excel in beauty that bull which carried
+Europa. For the question <a id="page-237"></a><span class="pgnum">237</span>here is not concerning our genius and
+elocution, but our species and figure. If we could make and assume to
+ourselves any form, would you be unwilling to resemble the sea-triton as
+he is painted supported swimming on sea-monsters whose bodies are partly
+human? Here I touch on a difficult point; for so great is the force of
+nature that there is no man who would not choose to be like a man, nor,
+indeed, any ant that would not be like an ant. But like what man? For
+how few can pretend to beauty! When I was at Athens, the whole flock of
+youths afforded scarcely one. You laugh, I see; but what I tell you is
+the truth. Nay, to us who, after the examples of ancient philosophers,
+delight in boys, defects are often pleasing. AlcÊus was charmed with a
+wart on a boy’s knuckle; but a wart is a blemish on the body; yet it
+seemed a beauty to him. Q. Catulus, my friend and colleague’s father,
+was enamored with your fellow-citizen Roscius, on whom he wrote these
+verses:</p>
+
+<div class="poem">
+<p>As once I stood to hail the rising day,</p>
+<p class="L2">Roscius appearing on the left I spied:</p>
+<p>Forgive me, Gods, if I presume to say</p>
+<p class="L2">The mortal’s beauty with th’ immortal vied.</p>
+</div>
+
+<p class="cont">Roscius more beautiful than a God! yet he was then, as he now is,
+squint-eyed. But what signifies that, if his defects were beauties to
+Catulus?</p>
+
+<p>XXIX. I return to the Gods. Can we suppose any of them to be
+squint-eyed, or even to have a cast in the eye? Have they any warts? Are
+any of them hook-nosed, flap-eared, beetle-browed, or jolt-headed, as
+some of us are? Or are they free from imperfections? Let us grant you
+that. Are they all alike in the face? For if they are many, then one
+must necessarily be more beautiful than another, and then there must be
+some Deity not absolutely most beautiful. Or if their faces are all
+alike, there would be an Academy<a id="FNA-90"></a><a href="#FN-90"><sup>90</sup></a> in heaven; for if one God does not
+differ from another, there is no possibility of knowing or
+distinguishing them.</p>
+
+<p>What if your assertion, Velleius, proves absolutely false, that no form
+occurs to us, in our contemplations on the <a id="page-238"></a><span class="pgnum">238</span>Deity, but the human? Will
+you, notwithstanding that, persist in the defence of such an absurdity?
+Supposing that form occurs to us, as you say it does, and we know
+Jupiter, Juno, Minerva, Neptune, Vulcan, Apollo, and the other Deities,
+by the countenance which painters and statuaries have given them, and
+not only by their countenances, but by their decorations, their age, and
+attire; yet the Egyptians, the Syrians, and almost all barbarous
+nations,<a id="FNA-91"></a><a href="#FN-91"><sup>91</sup></a> are without such distinctions. You may see a greater regard
+paid by them to certain beasts than by us to the most sacred temples and
+images of the Gods; for many shrines have been rifled, and images of the
+Deities have been carried from their most sacred places by us; but we
+never heard that an Egyptian offered any violence to a crocodile, an
+ibis, or a cat. What do you think, then? Do not the Egyptians esteem
+their sacred bull, their Apis, as a Deity? Yes, by Hercules! as
+certainly as you do our protectress Juno, whom you never behold, even in
+your dreams, without a goat-skin, a spear, a shield, and broad sandals.
+But the Grecian Juno of Argos and the Roman Juno are not represented in
+this manner; so that the Grecians, the Lanuvinians, and we, ascribe
+different forms to Juno; and our Capitoline Jupiter is not the same with
+the Jupiter Ammon of the Africans.</p>
+
+<p>XXX. Therefore, ought not a natural philosopher—that is, an inquirer
+into the secrets of nature—to be ashamed of seeking a testimony to
+truth from minds prepossessed by custom? According to the rule you have
+laid down, it may be said that Jupiter is always bearded, Apollo always
+beardless; that Minerva has gray and Neptune azure eyes; and, indeed, we
+must then honor that Vulcan at Athens, made by Alcamenes, whose lameness
+through his thin robes appears to be no deformity. Shall we, therefore,
+receive a lame Deity because we have such an account of him?</p>
+
+<p>Consider, likewise, that the Gods go by what names we give them. Now, in
+the first place, they have as many names as men have languages; for
+Vulcan is not called Vulcan in Italy, Africa, or Spain, as you are
+called Velleius in all countries. Besides, the Gods are innumerable,
+though the list of their names is of no great length even <a id="page-239"></a><span class="pgnum">239</span>in the
+records of our priests. Have they no names? You must necessarily
+confess, indeed, they have none; for what occasion is there for
+different names if their persons are alike?</p>
+
+<p>How much more laudable would it be, Velleius, to acknowledge that you do
+not know what you do not know than to follow a man whom you must
+despise! Do you think the Deity is like either me or you? You do not
+really think he is like either of us. What is to be done, then? Shall I
+call the sun, the moon, or the sky a Deity? If so, they are consequently
+happy. But what pleasures can they enjoy? And they are wise too. But how
+can wisdom reside in such shapes? These are your own principles.
+Therefore, if they are not of human form, as I have proved, and if you
+cannot persuade yourself that they are of any other, why are you
+cautious of denying absolutely the being of any Gods? You dare not deny
+it—which is very prudent in you, though here you are not afraid of the
+people, but of the Gods themselves. I have known Epicureans who
+reverence<a id="FNA-92"></a><a href="#FN-92"><sup>92</sup></a> even the least images of the Gods, though I perceive it to
+be the opinion of some that Epicurus, through fear of offending against
+the Athenian laws, has allowed a Deity in words and destroyed him in
+fact; so in those his select and short sentences, which are called by
+you <span class="greek">κυρ᜷αι Ύ᜹Οαι</span>,<a id="FNA-93"></a><a href="#FN-93"><sup>93</sup></a> this, I think, is the first: “That being which is
+happy and immortal is not burdened with any labor, and does not impose
+any on any one else.”</p>
+
+<p>XXXI. In his statement of this sentence, some think that he avoided
+speaking clearly on purpose, though it was manifestly without design.
+But they judge ill of a man who had not the least art. It is doubtful
+whether he means that there is any being happy and immortal, or that if
+there is any being happy, he must likewise be immortal. They do not
+consider that he speaks here, indeed, ambiguously; but in many other
+places both he and Metrodorus explain themselves as clearly as you have
+done. But he believed there are Gods; nor have I ever seen any one <a id="page-240"></a><span class="pgnum">240</span>who
+was more exceedingly afraid of what he declared ought to be no objects
+of fear, namely, death and the Gods, with the apprehensions of which the
+common rank of people are very little affected; but he says that the
+minds of all mortals are terrified by them. Many thousands of men commit
+robberies in the face of death; others rifle all the temples they can
+get into: such as these, no doubt, must be greatly terrified, the one by
+the fears of death, and the others by the fear of the Gods.</p>
+
+<p>But since you dare not (for I am now addressing my discourse to Epicurus
+himself) absolutely deny the existence of the Gods, what hinders you
+from ascribing a divine nature to the sun, the world, or some eternal
+mind? I never, says he, saw wisdom and a rational soul in any but a
+human form. What! did you ever observe anything like the sun, the moon,
+or the five moving planets? The sun, terminating his course in two
+extreme parts of one circle,<a id="FNA-94"></a><a href="#FN-94"><sup>94</sup></a> finishes his annual revolutions. The
+moon, receiving her light from the sun, completes the same course in
+the space of a month.<a id="FNA-95"></a><a href="#FN-95"><sup>95</sup></a> The five planets in the same circle, some
+nearer, others more remote from the earth, begin the same courses
+together, and finish them in different spaces of time. Did you ever
+observe anything like this, Epicurus? So that, according to you, there
+can be neither sun, moon, nor stars, because nothing can exist but what
+we have touched or seen.<a id="FNA-96"></a><a href="#FN-96"><sup>96</sup></a> What! have you ever seen the Deity himself?
+Why else do you believe there is any? If this doctrine prevails, we must
+reject all that history relates or reason discovers; and the people who
+inhabit inland countries must not believe there is such a thing as the
+sea. This is so narrow a way of thinking that if you had been born in
+Seriphus, and never had been from out of that island, where you had
+frequently been in the habit of seeing little hares and foxes, you would
+not, therefore, believe that there are such beasts as lions and
+panthers; <a id="page-241"></a><span class="pgnum">241</span>and if any one should describe an elephant to you, you would
+think that he designed to laugh at you.</p>
+
+<p>XXXII. You indeed, Velleius, have concluded your argument, not after the
+manner of your own sect, but of the logicians, to which your people are
+utter strangers. You have taken it for granted that the Gods are happy.
+I allow it. You say that without virtue no one can be happy. I willingly
+concur with you in this also. You likewise say that virtue cannot reside
+where reason is not. That I must necessarily allow. You add, moreover,
+that reason cannot exist but in a human form. Who, do you think, will
+admit that? If it were true, what occasion was there to come so
+gradually to it? And to what purpose? You might have answered it on your
+own authority. I perceive your gradations from happiness to virtue, and
+from virtue to reason; but how do you come from reason to human form?
+There, indeed, you do not descend by degrees, but precipitately.</p>
+
+<p>Nor can I conceive why Epicurus should rather say the Gods are like men
+than that men are like the Gods. You ask what is the difference; for,
+say you, if this is like that, that is like this. I grant it; but this I
+assert, that the Gods could not take their form from men; for the Gods
+always existed, and never had a beginning, if they are to exist
+eternally; but men had a beginning: therefore that form, of which the
+immortal Gods are, must have had existence before mankind; consequently,
+the Gods should not be said to be of human form, but our form should be
+called divine. However, let this be as you will. I now inquire how this
+extraordinary good fortune came about; for you deny that reason had any
+share in the formation of things. But still, what was this extraordinary
+fortune? Whence proceeded that happy concourse of atoms which gave so
+sudden a rise to men in the form of Gods? Are we to suppose the divine
+seed fell from heaven upon earth, and that men sprung up in the likeness
+of their celestial sires? I wish you would assert it; for I should not
+be unwilling to acknowledge my relation to the Gods. But you say nothing
+like it; no, our resemblance to the Gods, it seems, was by chance. Must
+I now seek for arguments to refute this doctrine seriously? I wish I
+could <a id="page-242"></a><span class="pgnum">242</span>as easily discover what is true as I can overthrow what is false.</p>
+
+<p>XXXIII. You have enumerated with so ready a memory, and so copiously,
+the opinions of philosophers, from Thales the Milesian, concerning the
+nature of the Gods, that I am surprised to see so much learning in a
+Roman. But do you think they were all madmen who thought that a Deity
+could by some possibility exist without hands and feet? Does not even
+this consideration have weight with you when you consider what is the
+use and advantage of limbs in men, and lead you to admit that the Gods
+have no need of them? What necessity can there be of feet, without
+walking; or of hands, if there is nothing to be grasped? The same may be
+asked of the other parts of the body, in which nothing is vain, nothing
+useless, nothing superfluous; therefore we may infer that no art can
+imitate the skill of nature. Shall the Deity, then, have a tongue, and
+not speak—teeth, palate, and jaws, though he will have no use for them?
+Shall the members which nature has given to the body for the sake of
+generation be useless to the Deity? Nor would the internal parts be less
+superfluous than the external. What comeliness is there in the heart,
+the lungs, the liver, and the rest of them, abstracted from their use? I
+mention these because you place them in the Deity on account of the
+beauty of the human form.</p>
+
+<p>Depending on these dreams, not only Epicurus, Metrodorus, and Hermachus
+declaimed against Pythagoras, Plato, and Empedocles, but that little
+harlot Leontium presumed to write against Theophrastus: indeed, she had
+a neat Attic style; but yet, to think of her arguing against
+Theophrastus! So much did the garden of Epicurus<a id="FNA-97"></a><a href="#FN-97"><sup>97</sup></a> abound with these
+liberties, and, indeed, you are always complaining against them. Zeno
+wrangled. Why need I mention Albutius? Nothing could be more elegant or
+humane than PhÊdrus; yet a sharp expression would disgust the old man.
+Epicurus treated Aristotle with great contumely. He foully slandered
+PhÊdo, the disciple of Socrates. He pelted Timocrates, the brother of
+his companion Metrodorus, with whole volumes, because he disagreed with
+him in some trifling point of philosophy. He <a id="page-243"></a><span class="pgnum">243</span>was ungrateful even to
+Democritus, whose follower he was; and his master Nausiphanes, from whom
+he learned nothing, had no better treatment from him.</p>
+
+<p>XXXIV. Zeno gave abusive language not only to those who were then
+living, as Apollodorus, Syllus, and the rest, but he called Socrates,
+who was the father of philosophy, the Attic buffoon, using the Latin
+word <i>Scurra</i>. He never called Chrysippus by any name but Chesippus. And
+you yourself a little before, when you were numbering up a senate, as we
+may call them, of philosophers, scrupled not to say that the most
+eminent men talked like foolish, visionary dotards. Certainly,
+therefore, if they have all erred in regard to the nature of the Gods,
+it is to be feared there are no such beings. What you deliver on that
+head are all whimsical notions, and not worthy the consideration even of
+old women. For you do not seem to be in the least aware what a task you
+draw on yourselves, if you should prevail on us to grant that the same
+form is common to Gods and men. The Deity would then require the same
+trouble in dressing, and the same care of the body, that mankind does.
+He must walk, run, lie down, lean, sit, hold, speak, and discourse. You
+need not be told the consequence of making the Gods male and female.</p>
+
+<p>Therefore I cannot sufficiently wonder how this chief of yours came to
+entertain these strange opinions. But you constantly insist on the
+certainty of this tenet, that the Deity is both happy and immortal.
+Supposing he is so, would his happiness be less perfect if he had not
+two feet? Or cannot that blessedness or beatitude—call it which you
+will (they are both harsh terms, but we must mollify them by use)—can
+it not, I say, exist in that sun, or in this world, or in some eternal
+mind that has not human shape or limbs? All you say against it is, that
+you never saw any happiness in the sun or the world. What, then? Did you
+ever see any world but this? No, you will say. Why, therefore, do you
+presume to assert that there are not only six hundred thousand worlds,
+but that they are innumerable? Reason tells you so. Will not reason tell
+you likewise that as, in our inquiries into the most excellent nature,
+we find none but the divine nature can be happy and eternal, so the same
+divine nature surpasses us in
+<a id="page-244"></a><span class="pgnum">244</span>excellence of mind; and as in mind, so in body? Why,
+therefore, as we are inferior in all other respects, should
+we be equal in form? For human virtue approaches
+nearer to the divinity than human form.</p>
+
+<p>XXXV. To return to the subject I was upon. What
+can be more childish than to assert that there are no such
+creatures as are generated in the Red Sea or in India?
+The most curious inquirer cannot arrive at the knowledge
+of all those creatures which inhabit the earth, sea, fens, and
+rivers; and shall we deny the existence of them because
+we never saw them? That similitude which you are so
+very fond of is nothing to the purpose. Is not a dog like
+a wolf? And, as Ennius says,</p>
+
+<div class="poem">
+<p>The monkey, filthiest beast, how like to man!</p>
+</div>
+
+<p class="cont">Yet they differ in nature. No beast has more sagacity
+than an elephant; yet where can you find any of a larger
+size? I am speaking here of beasts. But among men, do
+we not see a disparity of manners in persons very much
+alike, and a similitude of manners in persons unlike? If
+this sort of argument were once to prevail, Velleius, observe
+what it would lead to. You have laid it down as
+certain that reason cannot possibly reside in any but the
+human form. Another may affirm that it can exist in none
+but a terrestrial being; in none but a being that is born,
+that grows up, and receives instruction, and that consists
+of a soul, and an infirm and perishable body; in short, in
+none but a mortal man. But if you decline those opinions,
+why should a single form disturb you? You perceive
+that man is possessed of reason and understanding, with
+all the infirmities which I have mentioned interwoven
+with his being; abstracted from which, you nevertheless
+know God, you say, if the lineaments do but remain.
+This is not talking considerately, but at a venture; for
+surely you did not think what an encumbrance anything
+superfluous or useless is, not only in a man, but a tree.
+How troublesome it is to have a finger too much! And
+why so? Because neither use nor ornament requires
+more than five; but your Deity has not only a finger more
+than he wants, but a head, a neck, shoulders, sides, a
+paunch, back, hams, hands, feet, thighs, and legs. Are
+<a id="page-245"></a><span class="pgnum">245</span>these parts necessary to immortality? Are they conducive
+to the existence of the Deity? Is the face itself of
+use? One would rather say so of the brain, the heart,
+the lights, and the liver; for these are the seats of life.
+The features of the face contribute nothing to the preservation
+of it.</p>
+
+<p>XXXVI. You censured those who, beholding those excellent
+and stupendous works, the world, and its respective
+parts—the heaven, the earth, the seas—and the splendor
+with which they are adorned; who, contemplating the
+sun, moon, and stars; and who, observing the maturity
+and changes of the seasons, and vicissitudes of times, inferred
+from thence that there must be some excellent and
+eminent essence that originally made, and still moves, directs,
+and governs them. Suppose they should mistake in
+their conjecture, yet I see what they aim at. But what is
+that great and noble work which appears to you to be the
+effect of a divine mind, and from which you conclude that
+there are Gods? “I have,” say you, “a certain information
+of a Deity imprinted in my mind.” Of a bearded
+Jupiter, I suppose, and a helmeted Minerva.</p>
+
+<p>But do you really imagine them to be such? How
+much better are the notions of the ignorant vulgar, who
+not only believe the Deities have members like ours, but
+that they make use of them; and therefore they assign
+them a bow and arrows, a spear, a shield, a trident, and
+lightning; and though they do not behold the actions of
+the Gods, yet they cannot entertain a thought of a Deity
+doing nothing. The Egyptians (so much ridiculed) held
+no beasts to be sacred, except on account of some advantage
+which they had received from them. The ibis, a very
+large bird, with strong legs and a horny long beak, destroys
+a great number of serpents. These birds keep
+Egypt from pestilential diseases by killing and devouring
+the flying serpents brought from the deserts of Lybia by
+the south-west wind, which prevents the mischief that
+may attend their biting while alive, or any infection when
+dead. I could speak of the advantage of the ichneumon,
+the crocodile, and the cat; but I am unwilling to be tedious;
+yet I will conclude with observing that the barbarians
+paid divine honors to beasts because of the benefits
+<a id="page-246"></a><span class="pgnum">246</span>they received from them; whereas your
+Gods not only confer no benefit, but are idle, and do no single act of
+any description whatever.</p>
+
+<p>XXXVII. “They have nothing to do,” your teacher says. Epicurus truly,
+like indolent boys, thinks nothing preferable to idleness; yet those
+very boys, when they have a holiday, entertain themselves in some
+sportive exercise. But we are to suppose the Deity in such an inactive
+state that if he should move we may justly fear he would be no longer
+happy. This doctrine divests the Gods of motion and operation; besides,
+it encourages men to be lazy, as they are by this taught to believe that
+the least labor is incompatible even with divine felicity.</p>
+
+<p>But let it be as you would have it, that the Deity is in the form and
+image of a man. Where is his abode? Where is his habitation? Where is
+the place where he is to be found? What is his course of life? And what
+is it that constitutes the happiness which you assert that he enjoys?
+For it seems necessary that a being who is to be happy must use and
+enjoy what belongs to him. And with regard to place, even those natures
+which are inanimate have each their proper stations assigned to them: so
+that the earth is the lowest; then water is next above the earth; the
+air is above the water; and fire has the highest situation of all
+allotted to it. Some creatures inhabit the earth, some the water, and
+some, of an amphibious nature, live in both. There are some, also, which
+are thought to be born in fire, and which often appear fluttering in
+burning furnaces.</p>
+
+<p>In the first place, therefore, I ask you, Where is the habitation of
+your Deity? Secondly, What motive is it that stirs him from his place,
+supposing he ever moves? And, lastly, since it is peculiar to animated
+beings to have an inclination to something that is agreeable to their
+several natures, what is it that the Deity affects, and to what purpose
+does he exert the motion of his mind and reason? In short, how is he
+happy? how eternal? Whichever of these points you touch upon, I am
+afraid you will come lamely off. For there is never a proper end to
+reasoning which proceeds on a false foundation; for you asserted
+likewise that the form of the Deity is perceptible by the mind, but <a id="page-247"></a><span class="pgnum">247</span>not
+by sense; that it is neither solid, nor invariable in number; that it is
+to be discerned by similitude and transition, and that a constant supply
+of images is perpetually flowing on from innumerable atoms, on which our
+minds are intent; so that we from that conclude that divine nature to be
+happy and everlasting.</p>
+
+<p>XXXVIII. What, in the name of those Deities concerning whom we are now
+disputing, is the meaning of all this? For if they exist only in
+thought, and have no solidity nor substance, what difference can there
+be between thinking of a Hippocentaur and thinking of a Deity? Other
+philosophers call every such conformation of the mind a vain motion; but
+you term it “the approach and entrance of images into the mind.” Thus,
+when I imagine that I behold T. Gracchus haranguing the people in the
+Capitol, and collecting their suffrages concerning M. Octavius, I call
+that a vain motion of the mind: but you affirm that the images of
+Gracchus and Octavius are present, which are only conveyed to my mind
+when they have arrived at the Capitol. The case is the same, you say, in
+regard to the Deity, with the frequent representation of which the mind
+is so affected that from thence it may be clearly understood that the
+Gods<a id="FNA-98"></a><a href="#FN-98"><sup>98</sup></a> are happy and eternal.</p>
+
+<p>Let it be granted that there are images by which the mind is affected,
+yet it is only a certain form that occurs; and why must that form be
+pronounced happy? why eternal? But what are those images you talk of,
+or whence do they proceed? This loose manner of arguing is taken from
+Democritus; but he is reproved by many people for it; nor can you derive
+any conclusions from it: the whole system is weak and imperfect. For
+what can be more improbable than that the images of Homer, Archilochus,
+Romulus, Numa, Pythagoras, and Plato should come into my mind, and yet
+not in the form in which they existed? How, therefore, can they be those
+persons? And whose images are they? Aristotle tells us that there never
+was such a person as Orpheus the poet;<a id="FNA-99"></a><a href="#FN-99"><sup>99</sup></a> and it is said that the verse
+<a id="page-248"></a><span class="pgnum">248</span>called Orphic verse was the invention of Cercops, a Pythagorean; yet
+Orpheus, that is to say, the image of him, as you will have it, often
+runs in my head. What is the reason that I entertain one idea of the
+figure of the same person, and you another? Why do we image to ourselves
+such things as never had any existence, and which never can have, such
+as Scyllas and ChimÊras? Why do we frame ideas of men, countries, and
+cities which we never saw? How is it that the very first moment that I
+choose I can form representations of them in my mind? How is it that
+they come to me, even in my sleep, without being called or sought after?</p>
+
+<p>XXXIX. The whole affair, Velleius, is ridiculous. You do not impose
+images on our eyes only, but on our minds. Such is the privilege which
+you have assumed of talking nonsense with impunity. But there is, you
+say, a transition of images flowing on in great crowds in such a way
+that out of many some one at least must be perceived! I should be
+ashamed of my incapacity to understand this if you, who assert it, could
+comprehend it yourselves; for how do you prove that these images are
+continued in uninterrupted motion? Or, if uninterrupted, still how do
+you prove them to be eternal? There is a constant supply, you say, of
+innumerable atoms. But must they, for that reason, be all eternal? To
+elude this, you have recourse to equilibration (for so, with your leave,
+I will call your <span class="greek">ጞσοΜοΌ᜷α</span>),<a id="FNA-100"></a><a href="#FN-100"><sup>100</sup></a> and say that as there is a sort of
+nature mortal, so there must also be a sort which is immortal. By the
+same rule, as there are men mortal, there are men immortal; and as some
+arise from the earth, some must arise from the water also; and as there
+are causes which destroy, there must likewise be causes which preserve.
+Be it as you say; but let those causes preserve which have existence
+themselves. I cannot conceive these your Gods to have any. But how does
+all this face of things arise from atomic corpuscles? Were there any
+such atoms (as there <a id="page-249"></a><span class="pgnum">249</span>are not), they might perhaps impel one another,
+and be jumbled together in their motion; but they could never be able to
+impart form, or figure, or color, or animation, so that you by no means
+demonstrate the immortality of your Deity.</p>
+
+<p>XL. Let us now inquire into his happiness. It is certain that without
+virtue there can be no happiness; but virtue consists in action: now
+your Deity does nothing; therefore he is void of virtue, and
+consequently cannot be happy. What sort of life does he lead? He has a
+constant supply, you say, of good things, without any intermixture of
+bad. What are those good things? Sensual pleasures, no doubt; for you
+know no delight of the mind but what arises from the body, and returns
+to it. I do not suppose, Velleius, that you are like some of the
+Epicureans, who are ashamed of those expressions of Epicurus,<a id="FNA-101"></a><a href="#FN-101"><sup>101</sup></a> in
+which he openly avows that he has no idea of any good separate from
+wanton and obscene pleasures, which, without a blush, he names
+distinctly. What food, therefore, what drink, what variety of music or
+flowers, what kind of pleasures of touch, what odors, will you offer to
+the Gods to fill them with pleasures? The poets indeed provide them with
+banquets of nectar and ambrosia, and a Hebe or a Ganymede to serve up
+the cup. But what is it, Epicurus, that you do for them? For I do not
+see from whence your Deity should have those things, nor how he could
+use them. Therefore the nature of man is better constituted for a happy
+life than the nature of the Gods, because men enjoy various kinds of
+pleasures; but you look on all those pleasures as superficial which
+delight the senses only by a titillation, as Epicurus calls it. Where is
+to be the end of this trifling? Even Philo, who followed the Academy,
+could not bear to hear the soft and luscious delights of the Epicureans
+despised; for with his admirable memory he perfectly remembered and used
+to repeat many sentences of Epicurus in the very words in which they
+were written. He likewise used to quote many, <a id="page-250"></a><span class="pgnum">250</span>which were more gross,
+from Metrodorus, the sage colleague of Epicurus, who blamed his brother
+Timocrates because he would not allow that everything which had any
+reference to a happy life was to be measured by the belly; nor has he
+said this once only, but often. You grant what I say, I perceive; for
+you know it to be true. I can produce the books, if you should deny it;
+but I am not now reproving you for referring all things to the standard
+of pleasure: that is another question. What I am now showing is, that
+your Gods are destitute of pleasure; and therefore, according to your
+own manner of reasoning, they are not happy.</p>
+
+<p>XLI. But they are free from pain. Is that sufficient for beings who are
+supposed to enjoy all good things and the most supreme felicity? The
+Deity, they say, is constantly meditating on his own happiness, for he
+has no other idea which can possibly occupy his mind. Consider a little;
+reflect what a figure the Deity would make if he were to be idly
+thinking of nothing through all eternity but “It is very well with me,
+and I am happy;” nor do I see why this happy Deity should not fear being
+destroyed, since, without any intermission, he is driven and agitated by
+an everlasting incursion of atoms, and since images are constantly
+floating off from him. Your Deity, therefore, is neither happy nor
+eternal.</p>
+
+<p>Epicurus, it seems, has written books concerning sanctity and piety
+towards the Gods. But how does he speak on these subjects? You would say
+that you were listening to Coruncanius or ScÊvola, the high-priests, and
+not to a man who tore up all religion by the roots, and who overthrew
+the temples and altars of the immortal Gods; not, indeed, with hands,
+like Xerxes, but with arguments; for what reason is there for your
+saying that men ought to worship the Gods, when the Gods not only do not
+regard men, but are entirely careless of everything, and absolutely do
+nothing at all?</p>
+
+<p>But they are, you say, of so glorious and excellent a nature that a wise
+man is induced by their excellence to adore them. Can there be any glory
+or excellence in that nature which only contemplates its own happiness,
+and neither will do, nor does, nor ever did anything? Besides, <a id="page-251"></a><span class="pgnum">251</span>what
+piety is due to a being from whom you receive nothing? Or how can you,
+or any one else, be indebted to him who bestows no benefits? For piety
+is only justice towards the Gods; but what right have they to it, when
+there is no communication whatever between the Gods and men? And
+sanctity is the knowledge of how we ought to worship them; but I do not
+understand why they are to be worshipped, if we are neither to receive
+nor expect any good from them.</p>
+
+<p>XLII. And why should we worship them from an admiration only of that
+nature in which we can behold nothing excellent? and as for that freedom
+from superstition, which you are in the habit of boasting of so much, it
+is easy to be free from that feeling when you have renounced all belief
+in the power of the Gods; unless, indeed, you imagine that Diagoras or
+Theodorus, who absolutely denied the being of the Gods, could possibly
+be superstitious. I do not suppose that even Protagoras could, who
+doubted whether there were Gods or not. The opinions of these
+philosophers are not only destructive of superstition, which arises from
+a vain fear of the Gods, but of religion also, which consists in a pious
+adoration of them.</p>
+
+<p>What think you of those who have asserted that the whole doctrine
+concerning the immortal Gods was the invention of politicians, whose
+view was to govern that part of the community by religion which reason
+could not influence? Are not their opinions subversive of all religion?
+Or what religion did Prodicus the Chian leave to men, who held that
+everything beneficial to human life should be numbered among the Gods?
+Were not they likewise void of religion who taught that the Deities, at
+present the object of our prayers and adoration, were valiant,
+illustrious, and mighty men who arose to divinity after death?
+Euhemerus, whom our Ennius translated, and followed more than other
+authors, has particularly advanced this doctrine, and treated of the
+deaths and burials of the Gods; can he, then, be said to have confirmed
+religion, or, rather, to have totally subverted it? I shall say nothing
+of that sacred and august Eleusina, into whose mysteries the most
+distant nations were initiated, <a id="page-252"></a><span class="pgnum">252</span>nor of the solemnities in Samothrace,
+or in Lemnos, secretly resorted to by night, and surrounded by thick and
+shady groves; which, if they were properly explained, and reduced to
+reasonable principles, would rather explain the nature of things than
+discover the knowledge of the Gods.</p>
+
+<p>XLIII. Even that great man Democritus, from whose fountains Epicurus
+watered his little garden, seems to me to be very inferior to his usual
+acuteness when speaking about the nature of the Gods. For at one time he
+thinks that there are images endowed with divinity, inherent in the
+universality of things; at another, that the principles and minds
+contained in the universe are Gods; then he attributes divinity to
+animated images, employing themselves in doing us good or harm; and,
+lastly, he speaks of certain images of such vast extent that they
+encompass the whole outside of the universe; all which opinions are more
+worthy of the country<a id="FNA-102"></a><a href="#FN-102"><sup>102</sup></a> of Democritus than of Democritus himself; for
+who can frame in his mind any ideas of such images? who can admire them?
+who can think they merit a religious adoration?</p>
+
+<p>But Epicurus, when he divests the Gods of the power of doing good,
+extirpates all religion from the minds of men; for though he says the
+divine nature is the best and the most excellent of all natures, he will
+not allow it to be susceptible of any benevolence, by which he destroys
+the chief and peculiar attribute of the most perfect being. For what is
+better and more excellent than goodness and beneficence? To refuse your
+Gods that quality is to say that no man is any object of their favor,
+and no Gods either; that they neither love nor esteem any one; in short,
+that they not only give themselves no trouble about us, but even look on
+each other with the greatest indifference.</p>
+
+<p>XLIV. How much more reasonable is the doctrine of the Stoics, whom you
+censure? It is one of their maxims that the wise are friends to the
+wise, though unknown to each other; for as nothing is more amiable than
+virtue, he who possesses it is worthy our love, to whatever country <a id="page-253"></a><span class="pgnum">253</span>he
+belongs. But what evils do your principles bring, when you make good
+actions and benevolence the marks of imbecility! For, not to mention the
+power and nature of the Gods, you hold that even men, if they had no
+need of mutual assistance, would be neither courteous nor beneficent. Is
+there no natural charity in the dispositions of good men? The very name
+of love, from which friendship is derived, is dear to men;<a id="FNA-103"></a><a href="#FN-103"><sup>103</sup></a> and if
+friendship is to centre in our own advantage only, without regard to him
+whom we esteem a friend, it cannot be called friendship, but a sort of
+traffic for our own profit. Pastures, lands, and herds of cattle are
+valued in the same manner on account of the profit we gather from them;
+but charity and friendship expect no return. How much more reason have
+we to think that the Gods, who want nothing, should love each other, and
+employ themselves about us! If it were not so, why should we pray to or
+adore them? Why do the priests preside over the altars, and the augurs
+over the auspices? What have we to ask of the Gods, and why do we prefer
+our vows to them?</p>
+
+<p>But Epicurus, you say, has written a book concerning sanctity. A
+trifling performance by a man whose wit is not so remarkable in it, as
+the unrestrained license of writing which he has permitted himself; for
+what sanctity can there be if the Gods take no care of human affairs? Or
+how can that nature be called animated which neither regards nor
+performs anything? Therefore our friend Posidonius has well observed, in
+his fifth book of the Nature of the Gods, that Epicurus believed there
+were no Gods, and that what he had said about the immortal Gods was only
+said from a desire to avoid unpopularity. He could not be so weak as to
+imagine that the Deity has only the outward features of a simple mortal,
+without any real solidity; that he has all the members of a man, without
+the least power to use them—a certain unsubstantial pellucid being,
+neither favorable nor beneficial to any one, neither regarding nor doing
+anything. There can be no such being in nature; and as Epicurus said
+this plainly, he allows <a id="page-254"></a><span class="pgnum">254</span>the Gods in words, and destroys them in fact;
+and if the Deity is truly such a being that he shows no favor, no
+benevolence to mankind, away with him! For why should I entreat him to
+be propitious? He can be propitious to none, since, as you say, all his
+favor and benevolence are the effects of imbecility.</p>
+
+       <hr/>
+
+
+
+
+<h3>BOOK II.</h3>
+
+
+<p>I. <span class="first">When</span> Cotta had thus concluded, Velleius replied: I certainly was
+inconsiderate to engage in argument with an Academician who is likewise
+a rhetorician. I should not have feared an Academician without
+eloquence, nor a rhetorician without that philosophy, however eloquent
+he might be; for I am never puzzled by an empty flow of words, nor by
+the most subtle reasonings delivered without any grace of oratory. But
+you, Cotta, have excelled in both. You only wanted the assembly and the
+judges. However, enough of this at present. Now, let us hear what
+Lucilius has to say, if it is agreeable to him.</p>
+
+<p>I had much rather, says Balbus, hear Cotta resume his discourse, and
+demonstrate the true Gods with the same eloquence which he made use of
+to explode the false; for, on such a subject, the loose, unsettled
+doctrine of the Academy does not become a philosopher, a priest, a
+Cotta, whose opinions should be, like those we hold, firm and certain.
+Epicurus has been more than sufficiently refuted; but I would willingly
+hear your own sentiments, Cotta.</p>
+
+<p>Do you forget, replies Cotta, what I at first said—that it is easier
+for me, especially on this point, to explain what opinions those are
+which I do not hold, rather than what those are which I do? Nay, even if
+I did feel some certainty on any particular point, yet, after having
+been so diffuse myself already, I would prefer now hearing you speak in
+your turn. I submit, says Balbus, and will be as brief as I possibly
+can; for as you have confuted the errors of Epicurus, my part in the
+dispute will be the shorter. <a id="page-255"></a><span class="pgnum">255</span>Our sect divide the whole question
+concerning the immortal Gods into four parts. First, they prove that
+there are Gods; secondly, of what character and nature they are;
+thirdly, that the universe is governed by them; and, lastly, that they
+exercise a superintendence over human affairs. But in this present
+discussion let us confine ourselves to the first two articles, and defer
+the third and fourth till another opportunity, as they require more time
+to discuss. By no means, says Cotta, for we have time enough on our
+hands; besides that, we are now discussing a subject which should be
+preferred even to serious business.</p>
+
+<p>II. The first point, then, says Lucilius, I think needs no discourse to
+prove it; for what can be so plain and evident, when we behold the
+heavens and contemplate the celestial bodies, as the existence of some
+supreme, divine intelligence, by which all these things are governed?
+Were it otherwise, Ennius would not, with a universal approbation, have
+said,</p>
+
+<div class="poem">
+<p>Look up to the refulgent heaven above,</p>
+<p>Which all men call, unanimously, Jove.</p>
+</div>
+
+<p class="cont">This is Jupiter, the governor of the world, who rules all things with
+his nod, and is, as the same Ennius adds,</p>
+
+<div class="poem">
+<p>——of Gods and men the sire,<a id="FNA-104"></a><a href="#FN-104"><sup>104</sup></a></p>
+</div>
+
+<p class="cont">an omnipresent and omnipotent God. And if any one doubts this, I really
+do not understand why the same man may not also doubt whether there is a
+sun or not. For what can possibly be more evident than this? And if it
+were not a truth universally impressed on the minds of men, the belief
+in it would never have been so firm; nor would it have been, as it is,
+increased by length of years, nor would it have gathered strength and
+stability through every age. And, in truth, we see that other opinions,
+being false and groundless, have already fallen into oblivion by lapse
+of time. Who now believes in Hippocentaurs and <a id="page-256"></a><span class="pgnum">256</span>ChimÊras? Or what old
+woman is now to be found so weak and ignorant as to stand in fear of
+those infernal monsters which once so terrified mankind? For time
+destroys the fictions of error and opinion, while it confirms the
+determinations of nature and of truth. And therefore it is that, both
+among us and among other nations, sacred institutions and the divine
+worship of the Gods have been strengthened and improved from time to
+time. And this is not to be imputed to chance or folly, but to the
+frequent appearance of the Gods themselves. In the war with the Latins,
+when A. Posthumius, the dictator, attacked Octavius Mamilius, the
+Tusculan, at Regillus, Castor and Pollux were seen fighting in our army
+on horseback; and since that the same offspring of Tyndarus gave notice
+of the defeat of Perses; for as P. Vatienus, the grandfather of the
+present young man of that name, was coming in the night to Rome from his
+government of Reate, two young men on white horses appeared to him, and
+told him that King<a id="FNA-105"></a><a href="#FN-105"><sup>105</sup></a> Perses was that day taken prisoner. This news he
+carried to the senate, who immediately threw him into prison for
+speaking inconsiderately on a state affair; but when it was confirmed by
+letters from Paullus, he was recompensed by the senate with land and
+immunities.<a id="FNA-106"></a><a href="#FN-106"><sup>106</sup></a> Nor do we forget when the Locrians defeated the people
+of Crotone, in a great battle on the banks of the river Sagra, that it
+was known the same day at the Olympic Games. The voices of the Fauns
+have been often heard, and Deities have appeared in forms so visible
+that they have compelled every one who is not senseless, or hardened in
+impiety, to confess the presence of the Gods.</p>
+
+<p>III. What do predictions and foreknowledge of future events indicate,
+but that such future events are shown, pointed out, portended, and
+foretold to men? From whence they are called omens, signs, portents,
+prodigies. But though we should esteem fabulous what is said of
+<a id="page-257"></a><span class="pgnum">257</span>Mopsus,<a id="FNA-107"></a><a href="#FN-107"><sup>107</sup></a> Tiresias,<a id="FNA-108"></a><a href="#FN-108"><sup>108</sup></a> Amphiaraus,<a id="FNA-109"></a><a href="#FN-109"><sup>109</sup></a> Calchas,<a id="FNA-110"></a><a href="#FN-110"><sup>110</sup></a> and
+Helenus<a id="FNA-111"></a><a href="#FN-111"><sup>111</sup></a> (who would not have been delivered down to us as augurs
+even in fable if their art had been despised), may we not be
+sufficiently apprised of the power of the Gods by domestic examples?
+Will not the temerity of P. Claudius, in the first Punic war, affect us?
+who, when the poultry were let out of the coop and would not feed,
+ordered them to be thrown into the water, and, joking even upon the
+Gods, said, with a sneer, “Let them drink, since they will not eat;”
+which piece of ridicule, being followed by a victory over his fleet,
+cost him many tears, and brought great calamity on the Roman people. Did
+not his colleague Junius, in the same war, lose his fleet in a tempest
+by disregarding the auspices? Claudius, therefore, was condemned by the
+people, and Junius killed himself. Cœlius says that P. Flaminius, from
+his neglect of religion, fell at Thrasimenus; a loss which the public
+severely felt. By these instances of calamity we may be assured that
+Rome owes her grandeur and success to the conduct of those who were
+tenacious of their religious duties; and if we compare ourselves to our
+neighbors, we shall find that we are infinitely distinguished above
+foreign nations by our zeal for religious ceremonies, though in other
+things we may be only equal to them, and in other respects even inferior
+to them.</p>
+
+<p>Ought we to contemn Attius Navius’s staff, with which <a id="page-258"></a><span class="pgnum">258</span>he divided the
+regions of the vine to find his sow?<a id="FNA-112"></a><a href="#FN-112"><sup>112</sup></a> I should despise it, if I were
+not aware that King Hostilius had carried on most important wars in
+deference to his auguries; but by the negligence of our nobility the
+discipline of the augury is now omitted, the truth of the auspices
+despised, and only a mere form observed; so that the most important
+affairs of the commonwealth, even the wars, on which the public safety
+depends, are conducted without any auspices; the Peremnia<a id="FNA-113"></a><a href="#FN-113"><sup>113</sup></a> are
+discussed; no part of the Acumina<a id="FNA-114"></a><a href="#FN-114"><sup>114</sup></a> performed; no select men are
+called to witness to the military testaments;<a id="FNA-115"></a><a href="#FN-115"><sup>115</sup></a> our generals now
+begin their wars as soon as they have arranged the Auspicia. The force
+of religion was so great among our ancestors that some of their
+commanders have, with their faces veiled, and with the solemn, formal
+expressions of religion, sacrificed themselves to the immortal Gods to
+save their country.<a id="FNA-116"></a><a href="#FN-116"><sup>116</sup></a> I could mention many of the Sibylline
+prophecies, and many answers of the haruspices, to confirm those things,
+which ought not to be doubted.</p>
+
+<p>IV. For example: our augurs and the Etrurian haruspices saw the truth of
+their art established when P. Scipio and C. Figulus were consuls; for as
+Tiberius Gracchus, who was a second time consul, wished to proceed to a
+<a id="page-259"></a><span class="pgnum">259</span>fresh election, the first Rogator,<a id="FNA-117"></a><a href="#FN-117"><sup>117</sup></a> as he was collecting the
+suffrages, fell down dead on the spot. Gracchus nevertheless went on
+with the assembly, but perceiving that this accident had a religious
+influence on the people, he brought the affair before the senate. The
+senate thought fit to refer it to those who usually took cognizance of
+such things. The haruspices were called, and declared that the man who
+had acted as Rogator of the assembly had no right to do so; to which, as
+I have heard my father say, he replied with great warmth, Have I no
+right, who am consul, and augur, and favored by the Auspicia? And shall
+you, who are Tuscans and Barbarians, pretend that you have authority
+over the Roman Auspicia, and a right to give judgment in matters
+respecting the formality of our assemblies? Therefore, he then commanded
+them to withdraw; but not long afterward he wrote from his province<a id="FNA-118"></a><a href="#FN-118"><sup>118</sup></a>
+to the college of augurs, acknowledging that in reading the books<a id="FNA-119"></a><a href="#FN-119"><sup>119</sup></a>
+he remembered that he had illegally chosen a place for his tent in the
+gardens of Scipio, and had afterward entered the Pomœrium, in order to
+hold a senate, but that in repassing the same Pomœrium he had forgotten
+to take the auspices; and that, therefore, the consuls had been created
+informally. The augurs laid the case before the senate. The senate
+decreed that they should resign their charge, and so they accordingly
+abdicated. What greater example need we seek for? The wisest, perhaps
+the most excellent of men, chose to confess his fault, which he might
+have concealed, rather than leave the public the least atom of religious
+guilt; and the consuls chose to quit the highest office in the State,
+rather than fill it for a moment in defiance of religion. How great is
+the reputation of the augurs!</p>
+
+<p>And is not the art of the soothsayers divine? And must not every one who
+sees what innumerable instances of the same kind there are confess the
+existence of the <a id="page-260"></a><span class="pgnum">260</span>Gods? For they who have interpreters must certainly
+exist themselves; now, there are interpreters of the Gods; therefore we
+must allow there are Gods. But it may be said, perhaps, that all
+predictions are not accomplished. We may as well conclude there is no
+art of physic, because all sick persons do not recover. The Gods show us
+signs of future events; if we are occasionally deceived in the results,
+it is not to be imputed to the nature of the Gods, but to the
+conjectures of men. All nations agree that there are Gods; the opinion
+is innate, and, as it were, engraved in the minds of all men. The only
+point in dispute among us is, what they are.</p>
+
+<p>V. Their existence no one denies. Cleanthes, one of our sect, imputes
+the way in which the idea of the Gods is implanted in the minds of men
+to four causes. The first is that which I just now mentioned—the
+foreknowledge of future things. The second is the great advantages which
+we enjoy from the temperature of the air, the fertility of the earth,
+and the abundance of various benefits of other kinds. The third cause is
+deduced from the terror with which the mind is affected by thunder,
+tempests, storms, snow, hail, devastation, pestilence, earthquakes often
+attended with hideous noises, showers of stones, and rain like drops of
+blood; by rocks and sudden openings of the earth; by monstrous births of
+men and beasts; by meteors in the air, and blazing stars, by the Greeks
+called <i>cometÊ</i>, by us <i>crinitÊ</i>, the appearance of which, in the late
+Octavian war,<a id="FNA-120"></a><a href="#FN-120"><sup>120</sup></a> were foreboders of great calamities; by two suns,
+which, as I have heard my father say, happened in the consulate of
+Tuditanus and Aquillius, and in which year also another sun (P.
+Africanus) was extinguished. These things terrified mankind, and raised
+in them a firm belief of the existence of some celestial and divine
+power.</p>
+
+<p>His fourth cause, and that the strongest, is drawn from the regularity
+of the motion and revolution of the heavens, the distinctness, variety,
+beauty, and order of the sun, moon, and all the stars, the appearance
+only of which is sufficient to convince us they are not the effects of
+chance; as when we enter into a house, or school, or court, and observe
+the exact order, discipline, and method of it, we cannot suppose <a id="page-261"></a><span class="pgnum">261</span>that
+it is so regulated without a cause, but must conclude that there is some
+one who commands, and to whom obedience is paid. It is quite impossible
+for us to avoid thinking that the wonderful motions, revolutions, and
+order of those many and great bodies, no part of which is impaired by
+the countless and infinite succession of ages, must be governed and
+directed by some supreme intelligent being.</p>
+
+<p>VI. Chrysippus, indeed, had a very penetrating genius; yet such is the
+doctrine which he delivers, that he seems rather to have been instructed
+by nature than to owe it to any discovery of his own. “If,” says he,
+“there is anything in the universe which no human reason, ability, or
+power can make, the being who produced it must certainly be preferable
+to man. Now, celestial bodies, and all those things which proceed in any
+eternal order, cannot be made by man; the being who made them is
+therefore preferable to man. What, then, is that being but a God? If
+there be no such thing as a Deity, what is there better than man, since
+he only is possessed of reason, the most excellent of all things? But it
+is a foolish piece of vanity in man to think there is nothing preferable
+to him. There is, therefore, something preferable; consequently, there
+is certainly a God.”</p>
+
+<p>When you behold a large and beautiful house, surely no one can persuade
+you it was built for mice and weasels, though you do not see the master;
+and would it not, therefore, be most manifest folly to imagine that a
+world so magnificently adorned, with such an immense variety of
+celestial bodies of such exquisite beauty, and that the vast sizes and
+magnitude of the sea and land were intended as the abode of man, and not
+as the mansion of the immortal Gods? Do we not also plainly see this,
+that all the most elevated regions are the best, and that the earth is
+the lowest region, and is surrounded with the grossest air? so that as
+we perceive that in some cities and countries the capacities of men are
+naturally duller, from the thickness of the climate, so mankind in
+general are affected by the heaviness of the air which surrounds the
+earth, the grossest region of the world.</p>
+
+<p>Yet even from this inferior intelligence of man we may <a id="page-262"></a><span class="pgnum">262</span>discover the
+existence of some intelligent agent that is divine, and wiser than
+ourselves; for, as Socrates says in Xenophon, from whence had man his
+portion of understanding? And, indeed, if any one were to push his
+inquiries about the moisture and heat which is diffused through the
+human body, and the earthy kind of solidity existing in our entrails,
+and that soul by which we breathe, and to ask whence we derived them, it
+would be plain that we have received one thing from the earth, another
+from liquid, another from fire, and another from that air which we
+inhale every time that we breathe.</p>
+
+<p>VII. But where did we find that which excels all these things—I mean
+reason, or (if you please, in other terms) the mind, understanding,
+thought, prudence; and from whence did we receive it? Shall the world be
+possessed of every other perfection, and be destitute of this one, which
+is the most important and valuable of all? But certainly there is
+nothing better, or more excellent, or more beautiful than the world; and
+not only there is nothing better, but we cannot even conceive anything
+superior to it; and if reason and wisdom are the greatest of all
+perfections, they must necessarily be a part of what we all allow to be
+the most excellent.</p>
+
+<p>Who is not compelled to admit the truth of what I assert by that
+agreeable, uniform, and continued agreement of things in the universe?
+Could the earth at one season be adorned with flowers, at another be
+covered with snow? Or, if such a number of things regulated their own
+changes, could the approach and retreat of the sun in the summer and
+winter solstices be so regularly known and calculated? Could the flux
+and reflux of the sea and the height of the tides be affected by the
+increase or wane of the moon? Could the different courses of the stars
+be preserved by the uniform movement of the whole heaven? Could these
+things subsist, I say, in such a harmony of all the parts of the
+universe without the continued influence of a divine spirit?</p>
+
+<p>If these points are handled in a free and copious manner, as I purpose
+to do, they will be less liable to the cavils of the Academics; but the
+narrow, confined way in which Zeno reasoned upon them laid them more
+open to <a id="page-263"></a><span class="pgnum">263</span>objection; for as running streams are seldom or never tainted,
+while standing waters easily grow corrupt, so a fluency of expression
+washes away the censures of the caviller, while the narrow limits of a
+discourse which is too concise is almost defenceless; for the arguments
+which I am enlarging upon are thus briefly laid down by Zeno:</p>
+
+<p>VIII. “That which reasons is superior to that which does not; nothing is
+superior to the world; the world, therefore, reasons.” By the same rule
+the world may be proved to be wise, happy, and eternal; for the
+possession of all these qualities is superior to the want of them; and
+nothing is superior to the world; the inevitable consequence of which
+argument is, that the world, therefore, is a Deity. He goes on: “No part
+of anything void of sense is capable of perception; some parts of the
+world have perception; the world, therefore, has sense.” He proceeds,
+and pursues the argument closely. “Nothing,” says he, “that is destitute
+itself of life and reason can generate a being possessed of life and
+reason; but the world does generate beings possessed of life and reason;
+the world, therefore, is not itself destitute of life and reason.”</p>
+
+<p>He concludes his argument in his usual manner with a simile: “If
+well-tuned pipes should spring out of the olive, would you have the
+slightest doubt that there was in the olive-tree itself some kind of
+skill and knowledge? Or if the plane-tree could produce harmonious
+lutes, surely you would infer, on the same principle, that music was
+contained in the plane-tree. Why, then, should we not believe the world
+is a living and wise being, since it produces living and wise beings out
+of itself?”</p>
+
+<p>IX. But as I have been insensibly led into a length of discourse beyond
+my first design (for I said that, as the existence of the Gods was
+evident to all, there was no need of any long oration to prove it), I
+will demonstrate it by reasons deduced from the nature of things. For it
+is a fact that all beings which take nourishment and increase contain in
+themselves a power of natural heat, without which they could neither be
+nourished nor increase. For everything which is of a warm and fiery
+character is agitated and stirred up by its own motion. But that which
+is nourished and grows is influenced by a certain regular <a id="page-264"></a><span class="pgnum">264</span>and equable
+motion. And as long as this motion remains in us, so long does sense and
+life remain; but the moment that it abates and is extinguished, we
+ourselves decay and perish.</p>
+
+<p>By arguments like these, Cleanthes shows how great is the power of heat
+in all bodies. He observes that there is no food so gross as not to be
+digested in a night and a day; and that even in the excrementitious
+parts, which nature rejects, there remains a heat. The veins and
+arteries seem, by their continual quivering, to resemble the agitation
+of fire; and it has often been observed when the heart of an animal is
+just plucked from the body that it palpitates with such visible motion
+as to resemble the rapidity of fire. Everything, therefore, that has
+life, whether it be animal or vegetable, owes that life to the heat
+inherent in it; it is this nature of heat which contains in itself the
+vital power which extends throughout the whole world. This will appear
+more clearly on a more close explanation of this fiery quality, which
+pervades all things.</p>
+
+<p>Every division, then, of the world (and I shall touch upon the most
+considerable) is sustained by heat; and first it may be observed in
+earthly substances that fire is produced from stones by striking or
+rubbing one against another; that “the warm earth smokes”<a id="FNA-121"></a><a href="#FN-121"><sup>121</sup></a> when just
+turned up, and that water is drawn warm from well-springs; and this is
+most especially the case in the winter season, because there is a great
+quantity of heat contained in the caverns of the earth; and this becomes
+more dense in the winter, and on that account confines more closely the
+innate heat which is discoverable in the earth.</p>
+
+<p>X. It would require a long dissertation, and many reasons would require
+to be adduced, to show that all the seeds which the earth conceives, and
+all those which it contains having been generated from itself, and fixed
+in roots and trunks, derive all their origin and increase from the
+temperature and regulation of heat. And that even every liquor has a
+mixture of heat in it is plainly demonstrated by the effusion of water;
+for it would not congeal by cold, nor become solid, as ice or snow, and
+return again <a id="page-265"></a><span class="pgnum">265</span>to its natural state, if it were not that, when heat is
+applied to it, it again becomes liquefied and dissolved, and so diffuses
+itself. Therefore, by northern and other cold winds it is frozen and
+hardened, and in turn it dissolves and melts again by heat. The seas
+likewise, we find, when agitated by winds, grow warm, so that from this
+fact we may understand that there is heat included in that vast body of
+water; for we cannot imagine it to be external and adventitious heat,
+but such as is stirred up by agitation from the deep recesses of the
+seas; and the same thing takes place with respect to our bodies, which
+grow warm with motion and exercise.</p>
+
+<p>And the very air itself, which indeed is the coldest element, is by no
+means void of heat; for there is a great quantity, arising from the
+exhalations of water, which appears to be a sort of steam occasioned by
+its internal heat, like that of boiling liquors. The fourth part of the
+universe is entirely fire, and is the source of the salutary and vital
+heat which is found in the rest. From hence we may conclude that, as all
+parts of the world are sustained by heat, the world itself also has such
+a great length of time subsisted from the same cause; and so much the
+more, because we ought to understand that that hot and fiery principle
+is so diffused over universal nature that there is contained in it a
+power and cause of generation and procreation, from which all animate
+beings, and all those creatures of the vegetable world, the roots of
+which are contained in the earth, must inevitably derive their origin
+and their increase.</p>
+
+<p>XI. It is nature, consequently, that continues and preserves the world,
+and that, too, a nature which is not destitute of sense and reason; for
+in every essence that is not simple, but composed of several parts,
+there must be some predominant quality—as, for instance, the mind in
+man, and in beasts something resembling it, from which arise all the
+appetites and desires for anything. As for trees, and all the vegetable
+produce of the earth, it is thought to be in their roots. I call that
+the predominant quality,<a id="FNA-122"></a><a href="#FN-122"><sup>122</sup></a> which <a id="page-266"></a><span class="pgnum">266</span>the Greeks call <span class="greek">ጡγεΌοΜικ᜹Μ</span>; which
+must and ought to be the most excellent quality, wherever it is found.
+That, therefore, in which the prevailing quality of all nature resides
+must be the most excellent of all things, and most worthy of the power
+and pre-eminence over all things.</p>
+
+<p>Now, we see that there is nothing in being that is not a part of the
+universe; and as there are sense and reason in the parts of it, there
+must therefore be these qualities, and these, too, in a more energetic
+and powerful degree, in that part in which the predominant quality of
+the world is found. The world, therefore, must necessarily be possessed
+of wisdom; and that element, which embraces all things, must excel in
+perfection of reason. The world, therefore, is a God, and the whole
+power of the world is contained in that divine element.</p>
+
+<p>The heat also of the world is more pure, clear, and lively, and,
+consequently, better adapted to move the senses than the heat allotted
+to us; and it vivifies and preserves all things within the compass of
+our knowledge.</p>
+
+<p>It is absurd, therefore, to say that the world, which is endued with a
+perfect, free, pure, spirituous, and active heat, is not sensitive,
+since by this heat men and beasts are preserved, and move, and think;
+more especially since this heat of the world is itself the sole
+principle of agitation, and has no external impulse, but is moved
+spontaneously; for what can be more powerful than the world, which moves
+and raises that heat by which it subsists?</p>
+
+<p>XII. For let us listen to Plato, who is regarded as a God among
+philosophers. He says that there are two sorts of motion, one innate and
+the other external; and that that which is moved spontaneously is more
+divine than that which is moved by another power. This self-motion he
+places in the mind alone, and concludes that the first principle of
+motion is derived from the mind. Therefore, since all motion arises from
+the heat of the world, and that heat is not moved by the effect of any
+external impulse, but of its own accord, it must necessarily be a mind;
+from whence it follows that the world is animated.</p>
+
+<p>On such reasoning is founded this opinion, that the world is possessed
+of understanding, because it certainly has more perfections in itself
+than any other nature; for <a id="page-267"></a><span class="pgnum">267</span>as there is no part of our bodies so
+considerable as the whole of us, so it is clear that there is no
+particular portion of the universe equal in magnitude to the whole of
+it; from whence it follows that wisdom must be an attribute of the
+world; otherwise man, who is a part of it, and possessed of reason,
+would be superior to the entire world.</p>
+
+<p>And thus, if we proceed from the first rude, unfinished natures to the
+most superior and perfect ones, we shall inevitably come at last to the
+nature of the Gods. For, in the first place, we observe that those
+vegetables which are produced out of the earth are supported by nature,
+and she gives them no further supply than is sufficient to preserve them
+by nourishing them and making them grow. To beasts she has given sense
+and motion, and a faculty which directs them to what is wholesome, and
+prompts them to shun what is noxious to them. On man she has conferred a
+greater portion of her favor; inasmuch as she has added reason, by which
+he is enabled to command his passions, to moderate some, and to subdue
+others.</p>
+
+<p>XIII. In the fourth and highest degree are those beings which are
+naturally wise and good, who from the first moment of their existence
+are possessed of right and consistent reason, which we must consider
+superior to man and deserving to be attributed to a God; that is to say,
+to the world, in which it is inevitable that that perfect and complete
+reason should be inherent. Nor is it possible that it should be said
+with justice that there is any arrangement of things in which there
+cannot be something entire and perfect. For as in a vine or in beasts we
+see that nature, if not prevented by some superior violence, proceeds by
+her own appropriate path to her destined end; and as in painting,
+architecture, and the other arts there is a point of perfection which is
+attainable, and occasionally attained, so it is even much more necessary
+that in universal nature there must be some complete and perfect result
+arrived at. Many external accidents may happen to all other natures
+which may impede their progress to perfection, but nothing can hinder
+universal nature, because she is herself the ruler and governor of all
+other natures. That, therefore, must be the fourth and most elevated
+degree to which no other power can approach.</p>
+
+<p><a id="page-268"></a><span class="pgnum">268</span>But this degree is that on which the nature of all things is placed;
+and since she is possessed of this, and she presides over all things,
+and is subject to no possible impediment, the world must necessarily be
+an intelligent and even a wise being. But how marvellously great is the
+ignorance of those men who dispute the perfection of that nature which
+encircles all things; or who, allowing it to be infinitely perfect, yet
+deny it to be, in the first place, animated, then reasonable, and,
+lastly, prudent and wise! For how without these qualities could it be
+infinitely perfect? If it were like vegetables, or even like beasts,
+there would be no more reason for thinking it extremely good than
+extremely bad; and if it were possessed of reason, and had not wisdom
+from the beginning, the world would be in a worse condition than man;
+for man may grow wise, but the world, if it were destitute of wisdom
+through an infinite space of time past, could never acquire it. Thus it
+would be worse than man. But as that is absurd to imagine, the world
+must be esteemed wise from all eternity, and consequently a Deity: since
+there is nothing existing that is not defective, except the universe,
+which is well provided, and fully complete and perfect in all its
+numbers and parts.</p>
+
+<p>XIV. For Chrysippus says, very acutely, that as the case is made for the
+buckler, and the scabbard for the sword, so all things, except the
+universe, were made for the sake of something else. As, for instance,
+all those crops and fruits which the earth produces were made for the
+sake of animals, and animals for man; as, the horse for carrying, the ox
+for the plough, the dog for hunting and for a guard. But man himself was
+born to contemplate and imitate the world, being in no wise perfect,
+but, if I may so express myself, a particle of perfection; but the
+world, as it comprehends all, and as nothing exists that is not
+contained in it, is entirely perfect. In what, therefore, can it be
+defective, since it is perfect? It cannot want understanding and reason,
+for they are the most desirable of all qualities. The same Chrysippus
+observes also, by the use of similitudes, that everything in its kind,
+when arrived at maturity and perfection, is superior to that which is
+not—as, a horse to a colt, a dog to a puppy, and a man to a boy—so
+whatever <a id="page-269"></a><span class="pgnum">269</span>is best in the whole universe must exist in some complete and
+perfect being. But nothing is more perfect than the world, and nothing
+better than virtue. Virtue, therefore, is an attribute of the world. But
+human nature is not perfect, and nevertheless virtue is produced in it:
+with how much greater reason, then, do we conceive it to be inherent in
+the world! Therefore the world has virtue, and it is also wise, and
+consequently a Deity.</p>
+
+<p>XV. The divinity of the world being now clearly perceived, we must
+acknowledge the same divinity to be likewise in the stars, which are
+formed from the lightest and purest part of the ether, without a mixture
+of any other matter; and, being altogether hot and transparent, we may
+justly say they have life, sense, and understanding. And Cleanthes
+thinks that it may be established by the evidence of two of our
+senses—feeling and seeing—that they are entirely fiery bodies; for the
+heat and brightness of the sun far exceed any other fire, inasmuch as it
+enlightens the whole universe, covering such a vast extent of space, and
+its power is such that we perceive that it not only warms, but often
+even burns: neither of which it could do if it were not of a fiery
+quality. Since, then, says he, the sun is a fiery body, and is nourished
+by the vapors of the ocean (for no fire can continue without some
+sustenance), it must be either like that fire which we use to warm us
+and dress our food, or like that which is contained in the bodies of
+animals.</p>
+
+<p>And this fire, which the convenience of life requires, is the devourer
+and consumer of everything, and throws into confusion and destroys
+whatever it reaches. On the contrary, the corporeal heat is full of
+life, and salutary; and vivifies, preserves, cherishes, increases, and
+sustains all things, and is productive of sense; therefore, says he,
+there can be no doubt which of these fires the sun is like, since it
+causes all things in their respective kinds to flourish and arrive to
+maturity; and as the fire of the sun is like that which is contained in
+the bodies of animated beings, the sun itself must likewise be animated,
+and so must the other stars also, which arise out of the celestial ardor
+that we call the sky, or firmament.</p>
+
+<p>As, then, some animals are generated in the earth, some <a id="page-270"></a><span class="pgnum">270</span>in the water,
+and some in the air, Aristotle<a id="FNA-123"></a><a href="#FN-123"><sup>123</sup></a> thinks it ridiculous to imagine that
+no animal is formed in that part of the universe which is the most
+capable to produce them. But the stars are situated in the ethereal
+space; and as this is an element the most subtle, whose motion is
+continual, and whose force does not decay, it follows, of necessity,
+that every animated being which is produced in it must be endowed with
+the quickest sense and the swiftest motion. The stars, therefore, being
+there generated, it is a natural inference to suppose them endued with
+such a degree of sense and understanding as places them in the rank of
+Gods.</p>
+
+<p>XVI. For it may be observed that they who inhabit countries of a pure,
+clear air have a quicker apprehension and a readier genius than those
+who live in a thick, foggy climate. It is thought likewise that the
+nature of a man’s diet has an effect on the mind; therefore it is
+probable that the stars are possessed of an excellent understanding,
+inasmuch as they are situated in the ethereal part of the universe, and
+are nourished by the vapors of the earth and sea, which are purified by
+their long passage to the heavens. But the invariable order and regular
+motion of the stars plainly manifest their sense and understanding; for
+all motion which seems to be conducted with reason and harmony supposes
+an intelligent principle, that does not act blindly, or inconsistently,
+or at random. And this regularity and consistent course of the stars
+from all eternity indicates not any natural order, for it is pregnant
+with sound reason, not fortune (for fortune, being a friend to change,
+despises consistency). It follows, therefore, that they move
+spontaneously by their own sense and divinity.</p>
+
+<p>Aristotle also deserves high commendation for his observation that
+everything that moves is either put in motion by natural impulse, or by
+some external force, or of its own accord; and that the sun, and moon,
+and all the stars move; but that those things which are moved by natural
+impulse are either borne downward by their weight, or upward by their
+lightness; neither of which things could be the case with the stars,
+because they move in a regular circle and orbit. Nor can it be said that
+<a id="page-271"></a><span class="pgnum">271</span>there is some superior force which causes the stars to be moved in a
+manner contrary to nature. For what superior force can there be? It
+follows, therefore, that their motion must be voluntary. And whoever is
+convinced of this must discover not only great ignorance, but great
+impiety likewise, if he denies the existence of the Gods; nor is the
+difference great whether a man denies their existence, or deprives them
+of all design and action; for whatever is wholly inactive seems to me
+not to exist at all. Their existence, therefore, appears so plain that I
+can scarcely think that man in his senses who denies it.</p>
+
+<p>XVII. It now remains that we consider what is the character of the Gods.
+Nothing is more difficult than to divert our thoughts and judgment from
+the information of our corporeal sight, and the view of objects which
+our eyes are accustomed to; and it is this difficulty which has had such
+an influence on the unlearned, and on philosophers<a id="FNA-124"></a><a href="#FN-124"><sup>124</sup></a> also who
+resembled the unlearned multitude, that they have been unable to form
+any idea of the immortal Gods except under the clothing of the human
+figure; the weakness of which opinion Cotta has so well confuted that I
+need not add my thoughts upon it. But as the previous idea which we have
+of the Deity comprehends two things—first of all, that he is an
+animated being; secondly, that there is nothing in all nature superior
+to him—I do not see what can be more consistent with this idea and
+preconception than to attribute a mind and divinity to the world,<a id="FNA-125"></a><a href="#FN-125"><sup>125</sup></a>
+the most excellent of all beings.</p>
+
+<p>Epicurus may be as merry with this notion as he pleases; a man not the
+best qualified for a joker, as not having the wit and sense of his
+country.<a id="FNA-126"></a><a href="#FN-126"><sup>126</sup></a> Let him say that a voluble round Deity is to him
+incomprehensible; yet he shall never dissuade me from a principle which
+he himself approves, for he is of opinion there are Gods when he allows
+that there must be a nature excellently perfect. But it is certain <a id="page-272"></a><span class="pgnum">272</span>that
+the world is most excellently perfect: nor is it to be doubted that
+whatever has life, sense, reason, and understanding must excel that
+which is destitute of these things. It follows, then, that the world has
+life, sense, reason, and understanding, and is consequently a Deity. But
+this shall soon be made more manifest by the operation of these very
+things which the world causes.</p>
+
+<p>XVIII. In the mean while, Velleius, let me entreat you not to be always
+saying that we are utterly destitute of every sort of learning. The
+cone, you say, the cylinder, and the pyramid, are more beautiful to you
+than the sphere. This is to have different eyes from other men. But
+suppose they are more beautiful to the sight only, which does not appear
+to me, for I can see nothing more beautiful than that figure which
+contains all others, and which has nothing rough in it, nothing
+offensive, nothing cut into angles, nothing broken, nothing swelling,
+and nothing hollow; yet as there are two forms most esteemed,<a id="FNA-127"></a><a href="#FN-127"><sup>127</sup></a> the
+globe in solids (for so the Greek word <span class="greek">σφαῖρα</span>, I think, should be
+construed), and the circle, or orb, in planes (in Greek, <span class="greek">κ᜻κλος</span>); and as
+they only have an exact similitude of parts in which every extreme is
+equally distant from the centre, what can we imagine in nature to be
+more just and proper? But if you have never raked into this learned
+dust<a id="FNA-128"></a><a href="#FN-128"><sup>128</sup></a> to find out these things, surely, at all events, you natural
+philosophers must know that equality of motion and invariable order
+could not be preserved in any other figure. Nothing, therefore, can be
+more illiterate than to assert, as you are in the habit of doing, that
+it is doubtful whether the world is round or not, because it may
+possibly be of another shape, and that there are innumerable worlds of
+different forms; which Epicurus, if he ever had learned that two and two
+are equal to four, would not have said. But while he judges of what is
+best by his palate, he does not look up to the “palace of heaven,” as
+Ennius calls it.</p>
+
+<p>XIX. For as there are two sorts of stars,<a id="FNA-129"></a><a href="#FN-129"><sup>129</sup></a> one kind of <a id="page-273"></a><span class="pgnum">273</span>which
+measure their journey from east to west by immutable stages, never in
+the least varying from their usual course, while the other completes a
+double revolution with an equally constant regularity; from each of
+these facts we demonstrate the volubility of the world (which could not
+possibly take place in any but a globular form) and the circular orbits
+of the stars. And first of all the sun, which has the chief rank among
+all the stars, is moved in such a manner that it fills the whole earth
+with its light, and illuminates alternately one part of the earth, while
+it leaves the other in darkness. The shadow of the earth interposing
+causes night; and the intervals of night are equal to those of day. And
+it is the regular approaches and retreats of the sun from which arise
+the regulated degrees of cold and heat. His annual circuit is in three
+hundred and sixty-five days, and nearly six hours more.<a id="FNA-130"></a><a href="#FN-130"><sup>130</sup></a> At one time
+he bends his course to the north, at another to the south, and thus
+produces summer and winter, with the other two seasons, one of which
+succeeds the decline of winter, and the other that of summer. And so to
+these four changes of the seasons we attribute the origin and cause of
+all the productions both of sea and land.</p>
+
+<p>The moon completes the same course every month which the sun does in a
+year. The nearer she approaches to the sun, the dimmer light does she
+yield, and when most remote from it she shines with the fullest
+brilliancy; nor are her figure and form only changed in her wane, but
+her situation likewise, which is sometimes in the north and sometimes in
+the south. By this course she has a sort of summer and winter solstices;
+and by her influence she contributes to the nourishment and increase of
+animated <a id="page-274"></a><span class="pgnum">274</span>beings, and to the ripeness and maturity of all vegetables.</p>
+
+<p>XX. But most worthy our admiration is the motion of those five stars
+which are falsely called wandering stars; for they cannot be said to
+wander which keep from all eternity their approaches and retreats, and
+have all the rest of their motions, in one regular constant and
+established order. What is yet more wonderful in these stars which we
+are speaking of is that sometimes they appear, and sometimes they
+disappear; sometimes they advance towards the sun, and sometimes they
+retreat; sometimes they precede him, and sometimes follow him; sometimes
+they move faster, sometimes slower, and sometimes they do not stir in
+the least, but for a while stand still. From these unequal motions of
+the planets, mathematicians have called that the “great year”<a id="FNA-131"></a><a href="#FN-131"><sup>131</sup></a> in
+which the sun, moon, and five wandering stars, having finished their
+revolutions, are found in their original situation. In how long a time
+this is effected is much disputed, but it must be a certain and definite
+period. For the planet Saturn (called by the Greeks <span class="greek">Ία᜷ΜοΜ</span>), which is
+farthest from the earth, finishes his course in about thirty years; and
+in his course there is something very singular, for sometimes he moves
+before the sun, sometimes he keeps behind it; at one time lying hidden
+in the night, at another again appearing in the morning; and ever
+performing the same motions in the same space of time without any
+alteration, so as to be for infinite ages regular in these courses.
+Beneath this planet, and nearer the earth, is Jupiter, called <span class="greek">ΊαᜳΞωΜ</span>,
+which passes the same orbit of the twelve signs<a id="FNA-132"></a><a href="#FN-132"><sup>132</sup></a> in twelve years,
+and goes through exactly the same variety in its course that the star of
+Saturn does. Next to Jupiter is the planet Mars (in Greek, <span class="greek">Πυρ᜹εις</span>),
+which finishes its revolution through the same orbit as the two
+previously mentioned,<a id="FNA-133"></a><a href="#FN-133"><sup>133</sup></a> in twenty-four months, wanting six days, as I
+<a id="page-275"></a><span class="pgnum">275</span>imagine. Below this is Mercury (called by the Greeks <span class="greek">Στ᜷λβωΜ</span>), which
+performs the same course in little less than a year, and is never
+farther distant from the sun than the space of one sign, whether it
+precedes or follows it. The lowest of the five planets, and nearest the
+earth, is that of Venus (called in Greek <span class="greek">Ίωσφ᜹ρος</span>). Before the rising of
+the sun, it is called the morning-star, and after the setting, the
+evening-star. It has the same revolution through the zodiac, both as to
+latitude and longitude, with the other planets, in a year, and never is
+more than two<a id="FNA-134"></a><a href="#FN-134"><sup>134</sup></a> signs from the sun, whether it precedes or follows
+it.</p>
+
+<p>XXI. I cannot, therefore, conceive that this constant course of the
+planets, this just agreement in such various motions through all
+eternity, can be preserved without a mind, reason, and consideration;
+and since we may perceive these qualities in the stars, we cannot but
+place them in the rank of Gods. Those which are called the fixed stars
+have the same indications of reason and prudence. Their motion is daily,
+regular, and constant. They do not move with the sky, nor have they an
+adhesion to the firmament, as they who are ignorant of natural
+philosophy affirm. For the sky, which is thin, transparent, and suffused
+with an equal heat, does not seem by its nature to have power to whirl
+about the stars, or to be proper to contain them. The fixed stars,
+therefore, have their own sphere, separate and free from any conjunction
+with the sky. Their perpetual courses, with that admirable and
+incredible regularity of theirs, so plainly declare a divine power and
+mind to be in them, that he who cannot perceive that they are also
+endowed with divine power must be incapable of all perception whatever.</p>
+
+<p>In the heavens, therefore, there is nothing fortuitous, unadvised,
+inconstant, or variable: all there is order, truth, reason, and
+constancy; and all the things which are destitute of these qualities are
+counterfeit, deceitful, and erroneous, and have their residence about
+the earth<a id="FNA-135"></a><a href="#FN-135"><sup>135</sup></a> beneath the moon, the lowest of all the planets. He,
+therefore, <a id="page-276"></a><span class="pgnum">276</span>who believes that this admirable order and almost incredible
+regularity of the heavenly bodies, by which the preservation and entire
+safety of all things is secured, is destitute of intelligence, must be
+considered to be himself wholly destitute of all intellect whatever.</p>
+
+<p>I think, then, I shall not deceive myself in maintaining this dispute
+upon the principle of Zeno, who went the farthest in his search after
+truth.</p>
+
+<p>XXII. Zeno, then, defines nature to be “an artificial fire, proceeding
+in a regular way to generation;” for he thinks that to create and beget
+are especial properties of art, and that whatever may be wrought by the
+hands of our artificers is much more skilfully performed by nature, that
+is, by this artificial fire, which is the master of all other arts.</p>
+
+<p>According to this manner of reasoning, every particular nature is
+artificial, as it operates agreeably to a certain method peculiar to
+itself; but that universal nature which embraces all things is said by
+Zeno to be not only artificial, but absolutely the artificer, ever
+thinking and providing all things useful and proper; and as every
+particular nature owes its rise and increase to its own proper seed, so
+universal nature has all her motions voluntary, has affections and
+desires (by the Greeks called <span class="greek">ᜁρΌᜰς</span>) productive of actions agreeable to
+them, like us, who have sense and understanding to direct us. Such,
+then, is the intelligence of the universe; for which reason it may be
+properly termed prudence or providence (in Greek, <span class="greek">πρ᜹Μοια</span>), since her
+chiefest care and employment is to provide all things fit for its
+duration, that it may want nothing, and, above all, that it may be
+adorned with all perfection of beauty and ornament.</p>
+
+<p>XXIII. Thus far have I spoken concerning the universe, and also of the
+stars; from whence it is apparent that there is almost an infinite
+number of Gods, always in action, but without labor or fatigue; for they
+are not composed of veins, nerves, and bones; their food and drink are
+not such as cause humors too gross or too subtle; nor are their bodies
+such as to be subject to the fear of falls or blows, or in danger of
+diseases from a weariness of limbs. Epicurus, to secure his Gods from
+such accidents, <a id="page-277"></a><span class="pgnum">277</span>has made them only outlines of Deities, void of action;
+but our Gods being of the most beautiful form, and situated in the
+purest region of the heavens, dispose and rule their course in such a
+manner that they seem to contribute to the support and preservation of
+all things.</p>
+
+<p>Besides these, there are many other natures which have with reason been
+deified by the wisest Grecians, and by our ancestors, in consideration
+of the benefits derived from them; for they were persuaded that whatever
+was of great utility to human kind must proceed from divine goodness,
+and the name of the Deity was applied to that which the Deity produced,
+as when we call corn Ceres, and wine Bacchus; whence that saying of
+Terence,<a id="FNA-136"></a><a href="#FN-136"><sup>136</sup></a></p>
+
+<div class="poem">
+<p>Without Ceres and Bacchus, Venus starves.</p>
+</div>
+
+<p class="cont">And any quality, also, in which there was any singular virtue was
+nominated a Deity, such as Faith and Wisdom, which are placed among the
+divinities in the Capitol; the last by Æmilius Scaurus, but Faith was
+consecrated before by Atilius Calatinus. You see the temple of Virtue
+and that of Honor repaired by M. Marcellus, erected formerly, in the
+Ligurian war, by Q. Maximus. Need I mention those dedicated to Help,
+Safety, Concord, Liberty, and Victory, which have been called Deities,
+because their efficacy has been so great that it could not have
+proceeded from any but from some divine power? In like manner are the
+names of Cupid, Voluptas, and of Lubentine Venus consecrated, though
+they were things vicious and not natural, whatever Velleius may think
+to the contrary, for they frequently stimulate nature in too violent a
+manner. Everything, then, from which any great utility proceeded was
+deified; and, indeed, the names I have just now mentioned are
+declaratory of the particular virtue of each Deity.</p>
+
+<p>XXIV. It has been a general custom likewise, that men who have done
+important service to the public should be exalted to heaven by fame and
+universal consent. Thus Hercules, Castor and Pollux, Æsculapius, and
+Liber became Gods (I mean Liber<a id="FNA-137"></a><a href="#FN-137"><sup>137</sup></a> the son of Semele, and not him<a id="FNA-138"></a><a href="#FN-138"><sup>138</sup></a>
+whom our ancestors consecrated in such state and <a id="page-278"></a><span class="pgnum">278</span>solemnity with Ceres
+and Libera; the difference in which may be seen in our Mysteries.<a id="FNA-139"></a><a href="#FN-139"><sup>139</sup></a>
+But because the offsprings of our bodies are called “Liberi” (children),
+therefore the offsprings of Ceres are called Liber and Libera
+(Libera<a id="FNA-140"></a><a href="#FN-140"><sup>140</sup></a> is the feminine, and Liber the masculine); thus likewise
+Romulus, or Quirinus—for they are thought to be the same—became a God.</p>
+
+<p>They are justly esteemed as Deities, since their souls subsist and enjoy
+eternity, from whence they are perfect and immortal beings.</p>
+
+<p>There is another reason, too, and that founded on natural philosophy,
+which has greatly contributed to the number of Deities; namely, the
+custom of representing in human form a crowd of Gods who have supplied
+the poets with fables, and filled mankind with all sorts of
+superstition. Zeno has treated of this subject, but it has been
+discussed more at length by Cleanthes and Chrysippus. All Greece was of
+opinion that Cœlum was castrated by his son Saturn,<a id="FNA-141"></a><a href="#FN-141"><sup>141</sup></a> and that Saturn
+was chained by his son Jupiter. In these impious fables, a physical and
+not inelegant meaning is contained; for they would denote that the
+celestial, most exalted, and ethereal nature—that is, the fiery nature,
+which produces all things by itself—is destitute of that part of the
+body which is necessary for the act of generation by conjunction with
+another.</p>
+
+<p>XXV. By Saturn they mean that which comprehends the course and
+revolution of times and seasons; the Greek name for which Deity implies
+as much, for he is called <a id="page-279"></a><span class="pgnum">279</span><span class="greek">Κρ᜹Μος,</span> which is the same with <span class="greek">Χρ᜹Μος</span>, that
+is, a “space of time.” But he is called Saturn, because he is filled
+(<i>saturatur</i>) with years; and he is usually feigned to have devoured his
+children, because time, ever insatiable, consumes the rolling years; but
+to restrain him from immoderate haste, Jupiter has confined him to the
+course of the stars, which are as chains to him. Jupiter (that is,
+<i>juvans pater</i>) signifies a “helping father,” whom, by changing the
+cases, we call Jove,<a id="FNA-142"></a><a href="#FN-142"><sup>142</sup></a> <i>a juvando</i>. The poets call him “father of
+Gods and men;”<a id="FNA-143"></a><a href="#FN-143"><sup>143</sup></a> and our ancestors “the most good, the most great;”
+and as there is something more glorious in itself, and more agreeable to
+others, to be good (that is, beneficent) than to be great, the title of
+“most good” precedes that of “most great.” This, then, is he whom Ennius
+means in the following passage, before quoted—</p>
+
+<div class="poem">
+<p>Look up to the refulgent heaven above,</p>
+<p>Which all men call, unanimously, Jove:</p>
+</div>
+
+<p class="cont">which is more plainly expressed than in this other passage<a id="FNA-144"></a><a href="#FN-144"><sup>144</sup></a> of the
+same poet—</p>
+
+<div class="poem">
+<p>On whose account I’ll curse that flood of light,</p>
+<p>Whate’er it is above that shines so bright.</p>
+</div>
+
+<p class="cont">Our augurs also mean the same, when, for the “thundering and lightning
+heaven,” they say the “thundering and lightning Jove.” Euripides, among
+many excellent things, has this:</p>
+
+<div class="poem">
+<p>The vast, expanded, boundless sky behold,</p>
+<p>See it with soft embrace the earth enfold;</p>
+<p>This own the chief of Deities above,</p>
+<p>And this acknowledge by the name of Jove.</p>
+</div>
+
+<p>XXVI. The air, according to the Stoics, which is between the sea and the
+heaven, is consecrated by the name of Juno, and is called the sister and
+wife of Jove, because <a id="page-280"></a><span class="pgnum">280</span>it resembles the sky, and is in close conjunction
+with it. They have made it feminine, because there is nothing softer.
+But I believe it is called Juno, <i>a juvando</i> (from helping).</p>
+
+<p>To make three separate kingdoms, by fable, there remained yet the water
+and the earth. The dominion of the sea is given, therefore, to Neptune,
+a brother, as he is called, of Jove; whose name, Neptunus—as <i>Portunus,
+a portu</i>, from a port—is derived <i>a nando</i> (from swimming), the first
+letters being a little changed. The sovereignty and power over the earth
+is the portion of a God, to whom we, as well as the Greeks, have given a
+name that denotes riches (in Latin, <i>Dis</i>; in Greek, <span class="greek">Πλο᜻τωΜ</span>), because
+all things arise from the earth and return to it. He forced away
+Proserpine (in Greek called <span class="greek">Περσεφ᜹Μη</span>), by which the poets mean the
+“seed of corn,” from whence comes their fiction of Ceres, the mother of
+Proserpine, seeking for her daughter, who was hidden from her. She is
+called Ceres, which is the same as Geres—<i>a gerendis
+frugibus</i><a id="FNA-145"></a><a href="#FN-145"><sup>145</sup></a>—“from bearing fruit,” the first letter of the word being
+altered after the manner of the Greeks, for by them she is called
+<span class="greek">ΔηΌ᜵τηρ</span>, the same as <span class="greek">ΓηΌ᜵τηρ</span>.<a id="FNA-146"></a><a href="#FN-146"><sup>146</sup></a> Again, he (<i>qui magna vorteret</i>) “who
+brings about mighty changes” is called Mavors; and Minerva is so called
+because (<i>minueret</i>, or <i>minaretur</i>) she diminishes or menaces.</p>
+
+<p>XXVII. And as the beginnings and endings of all things are of the
+greatest importance, therefore they would have their sacrifices to begin
+with Janus.<a id="FNA-147"></a><a href="#FN-147"><sup>147</sup></a> His name is derived <i>ab eundo</i>, from passing; from
+whence thorough passages are called <i>jani</i>, and the outward doors of
+common houses are called <i>januÊ</i>. The name of Vesta is, from the Greeks,
+the same with their <span class="greek">ጙστ᜷α</span>. Her province is over altars and hearths; and
+in the name of this Goddess, who is the keeper of all things within,
+prayers and sacrifices are concluded. The <i>Dii Penates</i>, “household Gods,”
+have some affinity with this power, and are so called either from
+<i>penus</i>, <a id="page-281"></a><span class="pgnum">281</span>“all kind of human provisions,” or because <i>penitus insident</i>
+(they reside within), from which, by the poets, they are called
+<i>penetrales</i> also. Apollo, a Greek name, is called <i>Sol</i>, the sun; and
+Diana, <i>Luna</i>, the moon. The sun (<i>sol</i>) is so named either because he
+is <i>solus</i> (alone), so eminent above all the stars; or because he
+obscures all the stars, and appears alone as soon as he rises. <i>Luna</i>,
+the moon, is so called <i>a lucendo</i> (from shining); she bears the name
+also of Lucina: and as in Greece the women in labor invoke Diana
+Lucifera, so here they invoke Juno Lucina. She is likewise called Diana
+<i>omnivaga</i>, not <i>a venando</i> (from hunting), but because she is reckoned
+one of the seven stars that seem to wander.<a id="FNA-148"></a><a href="#FN-148"><sup>148</sup></a> She is called Diana
+because she makes a kind of day of the night;<a id="FNA-149"></a><a href="#FN-149"><sup>149</sup></a> and presides over
+births, because the delivery is effected sometimes in seven, or at most
+in nine, courses of the moon; which, because they make <i>mensa spatia</i>
+(measured spaces), are called <i>menses</i> (months). This occasioned a
+pleasant observation of TimÊus (as he has many). Having said in his
+history that “the same night in which Alexander was born, the temple of
+Diana at Ephesus was burned down,” he adds, “It is not in the least to
+be wondered at, because Diana, being willing to assist at the labor of
+Olympias,<a id="FNA-150"></a><a href="#FN-150"><sup>150</sup></a> was absent from home.” But to this Goddess, because <i>ad
+res omnes veniret</i>—“she has an influence upon all things”—we have
+given the appellation of Venus,<a id="FNA-151"></a><a href="#FN-151"><sup>151</sup></a> from whom the word <i>venustas</i>
+(beauty) is rather derived than Venus from <i>venustas</i>.</p>
+
+<p>XXVIII. Do you not see, therefore, how, from the productions of nature
+and the useful inventions of men, have arisen fictitious and imaginary
+Deities, which have been the foundation of false opinions, pernicious
+errors, and wretched superstitions? For we know how the different forms
+of the Gods—their ages, apparel, ornaments; their <a id="page-282"></a><span class="pgnum">282</span>pedigrees,
+marriages, relations, and everything belonging to them—are adapted to
+human weakness and represented with our passions; with lust, sorrow, and
+anger, according to fabulous history: they have had wars and combats,
+not only, as Homer relates, when they have interested themselves in two
+different armies, but when they have fought battles in their own defence
+against the Titans and giants. These stories, of the greatest weakness
+and levity, are related and believed with the most implicit folly.</p>
+
+<p>But, rejecting these fables with contempt, a Deity is diffused in every
+part of nature; in earth under the name of Ceres, in the sea under the
+name of Neptune, in other parts under other names. Yet whatever they
+are, and whatever characters and dispositions they have, and whatever
+name custom has given them, we are bound to worship and adore them. The
+best, the chastest, the most sacred and pious worship of the Gods is to
+reverence them always with a pure, perfect, and unpolluted mind and
+voice; for our ancestors, as well as the philosophers, have separated
+superstition from religion. They who prayed whole days and sacrificed,
+that their children might survive them (<i>ut superstites essent</i>), were
+called superstitious, which word became afterward more general; but they
+who diligently perused, and, as we may say, read or practised over
+again, all the duties relating to the worship of the Gods, were called
+<i>religiosi</i>—religious, from <i>relegendo</i>—“reading over again, or
+practising;” as <i>elegantes</i>, elegant, <i>ex eligendo</i>, “from choosing,
+making a good choice;” <i>diligentes</i>, diligent, <i>ex diligendo</i>, “from
+attending on what we love;” <i>intelligentes</i>, intelligent, from
+understanding—for the signification is derived in the same manner. Thus
+are the words superstitious and religious understood; the one being a
+term of reproach, the other of commendation. I think I have now
+sufficiently demonstrated that there are Gods, and what they are.</p>
+
+<p>XXIX. I am now to show that the world is governed by the providence of
+the Gods. This is an important point, which you Academics endeavor to
+confound; and, indeed, the whole contest is with you, Cotta; for your
+sect, Velleius, know very little of what is said on different subjects
+by other schools. You read and have a taste only for <a id="page-283"></a><span class="pgnum">283</span>your own books,
+and condemn all others without examination. For instance, when you
+mentioned yesterday<a id="FNA-152"></a><a href="#FN-152"><sup>152</sup></a> that prophetic old dame <span class="greek">Πρ᜹Μοια</span>, Providence,
+invented by the Stoics, you were led into that error by imagining that
+Providence was made by them to be a particular Deity that governs the
+whole universe, whereas it is only spoken in a short manner; as when it
+is said “The commonwealth of Athens is governed by the council,” it is
+meant “of the Areopagus;”<a id="FNA-153"></a><a href="#FN-153"><sup>153</sup></a> so when we say “The world is governed by
+providence,” we mean “by the providence of the Gods.” To express
+ourselves, therefore, more fully and clearly, we say, “The world is
+governed by the providence of the Gods.” Be not, therefore, lavish of
+your railleries, of which your sect has little to spare: if I may advise
+you, do not attempt it. It does not become you, it is not your talent,
+nor is it in your power. This is not applied to you in particular who
+have the education and politeness of a Roman, but to all your sect in
+general, and especially to your leader<a id="FNA-154"></a><a href="#FN-154"><sup>154</sup></a>—a man unpolished,
+illiterate, insulting, without wit, without reputation, without
+elegance.</p>
+
+<p>XXX. I assert, then, that the universe, with all its parts, was
+originally constituted, and has, without any cessation, been ever
+governed by the providence of the Gods. This argument we Stoics commonly
+divide into three parts; the first of which is, that the existence of
+the Gods being once known, it must follow that the world is governed by
+their wisdom; the second, that as everything is under the direction of
+an intelligent nature, which has produced that beautiful order in the
+world, it is evident that it is formed from animating principles; the
+third is deduced from those glorious works which we behold in the
+heavens and the earth.</p>
+
+<p>First, then, we must either deny the existence of the Gods (as
+Democritus and Epicurus by their doctrine of images in some sort do),
+or, if we acknowledge that there <a id="page-284"></a><span class="pgnum">284</span>are Gods, we must believe they are
+employed, and that, too, in something excellent. Now, nothing is so
+excellent as the administration of the universe. The universe,
+therefore, is governed by the wisdom of the Gods. Otherwise, we must
+imagine that there is some cause superior to the Deity, whether it be a
+nature inanimate, or a necessity agitated by a mighty force, that
+produces those beautiful works which we behold. The nature of the Gods
+would then be neither supreme nor excellent, if you subject it to that
+necessity or to that nature, by which you would make the heaven, the
+earth, and the seas to be governed. But there is nothing superior to the
+Deity; the world, therefore, must be governed by him: consequently, the
+Deity is under no obedience or subjection to nature, but does himself
+rule over all nature. In effect, if we allow the Gods have
+understanding, we allow also their providence, which regards the most
+important things; for, can they be ignorant of those important things,
+and how they are to be conducted and preserved, or do they want power to
+sustain and direct them? Ignorance is inconsistent with the nature of
+the Gods, and imbecility is repugnant to their majesty. From whence it
+follows, as we assert, that the world is governed by the providence of
+the Gods.</p>
+
+<p>XXXI. But supposing, which is incontestable, that there are Gods, they
+must be animated, and not only animated, but endowed with
+reason—united, as we may say, in a civil agreement and society, and
+governing together one universe, as a republic or city. Thus the same
+reason, the same verity, the same law, which ordains good and prohibits
+evil, exists in the Gods as it does in men. From them, consequently, we
+have prudence and understanding, for which reason our ancestors erected
+temples to the Mind, Faith, Virtue, and Concord. Shall we not then allow
+the Gods to have these perfections, since we worship the sacred and
+august images of them? But if understanding, faith, virtue, and concord
+reside in human kind, how could they come on earth, unless from heaven?
+And if we are possessed of wisdom, reason, and prudence, the Gods must
+have the same qualities in a greater degree; and not only have them, but
+employ them in the best and greatest works. The universe is the best and
+greatest <a id="page-285"></a><span class="pgnum">285</span>work; therefore it must be governed by the wisdom and
+providence of the Gods.</p>
+
+<p>Lastly, as we have sufficiently shown that those glorious and luminous
+bodies which we behold are Deities—I mean the sun, the moon, the fixed
+and wandering stars, the firmament, and the world itself, and those
+other things also which have any singular virtue, and are of any great
+utility to human kind—it follows that all things are governed by
+providence and a divine mind. But enough has been said on the first
+part.</p>
+
+<p>XXXII. It is now incumbent on me to prove that all things are subjected
+to nature, and most beautifully directed by her. But, first of all, it
+is proper to explain precisely what that nature is, in order to come to
+the more easy understanding of what I would demonstrate. Some think that
+nature is a certain irrational power exciting in bodies the necessary
+motions. Others, that it is an intelligent power, acting by order and
+method, designing some end in every cause, and always aiming at that
+end, whose works express such skill as no art, no hand, can imitate;
+for, they say, such is the virtue of its seed, that, however small it
+is, if it falls into a place proper for its reception, and meets with
+matter conducive to its nourishment and increase, it forms and produces
+everything in its respective kind; either vegetables, which receive
+their nourishment from their roots; or animals, endowed with motion,
+sense, appetite, and abilities to beget their likeness.</p>
+
+<p>Some apply the word nature to everything; as Epicurus does, who
+acknowledges no cause, but atoms, a vacuum, and their accidents. But
+when we<a id="FNA-155"></a><a href="#FN-155"><sup>155</sup></a> say that nature forms and governs the world, we do not
+apply it to a clod of earth, or piece of stone, or anything of that
+sort, whose parts have not the necessary cohesion,<a id="FNA-156"></a><a href="#FN-156"><sup>156</sup></a> but to a tree,
+in <a id="page-286"></a><span class="pgnum">286</span>which there is not the appearance of chance, but of order and a
+resemblance of art.</p>
+
+<p>XXXIII. But if the art of nature gives life and increase to vegetables,
+without doubt it supports the earth itself; for, being impregnated with
+seeds, she produces every kind of vegetable, and embracing their roots,
+she nourishes and increases them; while, in her turn, she receives her
+nourishment from the other elements, and by her exhalations gives proper
+sustenance to the air, the sky, and all the superior bodies. If nature
+gives vigor and support to the earth, by the same reason she has an
+influence over the rest of the world; for as the earth gives nourishment
+to vegetables, so the air is the preservation of animals. The air sees
+with us, hears with us, and utters sounds with us; without it, there
+would be no seeing, hearing, or sounding. It even moves with us; for
+wherever we go, whatever motion we make, it seems to retire and give
+place to us.</p>
+
+<p>That which inclines to the centre, that which rises from it to the
+surface, and that which rolls about the centre, constitute the universal
+world, and make one entire nature; and as there are four sorts of
+bodies, the continuance of nature is caused by their reciprocal changes;
+for the water arises from the earth, the air from the water, and the
+fire from the air; and, reversing this order, the air arises from fire,
+the water from the air, and from the water the earth, the lowest of the
+four elements, of which all beings are formed. Thus by their continual
+motions backward and forward, upward and downward, the conjunction of
+the several parts of the universe is preserved; a union which, in the
+beauty we now behold it, must be eternal, or at least of a very long
+duration, and almost for an infinite space of time; and, whichever it
+is, the universe must of consequence be governed by nature. For what art
+of navigating fleets, or of marshalling an army, and—to instance the
+produce of nature—what vine, what tree, what animated form and
+conformation of their members, give us so great an indication of skill
+as appears in the universe? Therefore we must either deny that there is
+the least trace of an intelligent nature, or acknowledge that the world
+is governed by it. But since the universe <a id="page-287"></a><span class="pgnum">287</span>contains all particular
+beings, as well as their seeds, can we say that it is not itself
+governed by nature? That would be the same as saying that the teeth and
+the beard of man are the work of nature, but that the man himself is
+not. Thus the effect would be understood to be greater than the cause.</p>
+
+<p>XXXIV. Now, the universe sows, as I may say, plants, produces, raises,
+nourishes, and preserves what nature administers, as members and parts
+of itself. If nature, therefore, governs them, she must also govern the
+universe. And, lastly, in nature’s administration there is nothing
+faulty. She produced the best possible effect out of those elements
+which existed. Let any one show how it could have been better. But that
+can never be; and whoever attempts to mend it will either make it worse,
+or aim at impossibilities.</p>
+
+<p>But if all the parts of the universe are so constituted that nothing
+could be better for use or beauty, let us consider whether this is the
+effect of chance, or whether, in such a state they could possibly
+cohere, but by the direction of wisdom and divine providence. Nature,
+therefore, cannot be void of reason, if art can bring nothing to
+perfection without it, and if the works of nature exceed those of art.
+How is it consistent with common-sense that when you view an image or a
+picture, you imagine it is wrought by art; when you behold afar off a
+ship under sail, you judge it is steered by reason and art; when you see
+a dial or water-clock,<a id="FNA-157"></a><a href="#FN-157"><sup>157</sup></a> you believe the hours are shown by art, and
+not by chance; and yet that you should imagine that the universe, which
+contains all arts and the artificers, can be void of reason and
+understanding?</p>
+
+<p>But if that sphere which was lately made by our friend Posidonius, the
+regular revolutions of which show the course of the sun, moon, and five
+wandering stars, as it is every day and night performed, were carried
+into Scythia or Britain, who, in those barbarous countries, would doubt
+that that sphere had been made so perfect by the exertion of reason?</p>
+
+<p>XXXV. Yet these people<a id="FNA-158"></a><a href="#FN-158"><sup>158</sup></a> doubt whether the universe, <a id="page-288"></a><span class="pgnum">288</span>from whence all
+things arise and are made, is not the effect of chance, or some
+necessity, rather than the work of reason and a divine mind. According
+to them, Archimedes shows more knowledge in representing the motions of
+the celestial globe than nature does in causing them, though the copy is
+so infinitely beneath the original. The shepherd in Attius,<a id="FNA-159"></a><a href="#FN-159"><sup>159</sup></a> who had
+never seen a ship, when he perceived from a mountain afar off the divine
+vessel of the Argonauts, surprised and frighted at this new object,
+expressed himself in this manner:</p>
+
+<div class="poem">
+<p>What horrid bulk is that before my eyes,</p>
+<p>Which o’er the deep with noise and vigor flies?</p>
+<p>It turns the whirlpools up, its force so strong,</p>
+<p>And drives the billows as it rolls along.</p>
+<p>The ocean’s violence it fiercely braves;</p>
+<p>Runs furious on, and throws about the waves.</p>
+<p>Swiftly impetuous in its course, and loud,</p>
+<p>Like the dire bursting of a show’ry cloud;</p>
+<p>Or, like a rock, forced by the winds and rain,</p>
+<p>Now whirl’d aloft, then plunged into the main.</p>
+<p>But hold! perhaps the Earth and Neptune jar,</p>
+<p>And fiercely wage an elemental war;</p>
+<p>Or Triton with his trident has o’erthrown</p>
+<p>His den, and loosen’d from the roots the stone;</p>
+<p>The rocky fragment, from the bottom torn,</p>
+<p>Is lifted up, and on the surface borne.</p>
+</div>
+
+<p class="cont">At first he is in suspense at the sight of this unknown object; but on
+seeing the young mariners, and hearing their singing, he says,</p>
+
+<div class="poem">
+<p>Like sportive dolphins, with their snouts they roar;<a id="FNA-160"></a><a href="#FN-160"><sup>160</sup></a></p>
+</div>
+
+<p class="cont">and afterward goes on,</p>
+
+<div class="poem">
+<p>Loud in my ears methinks their voices ring,</p>
+<p>As if I heard the God Sylvanus sing.</p>
+</div>
+
+<p>As at first view the shepherd thinks he sees something inanimate and
+insensible, but afterward, judging by more <a id="page-289"></a><span class="pgnum">289</span>trustworthy indications, he
+begins to figure to himself what it is; so philosophers, if they are
+surprised at first at the sight of the universe, ought, when they have
+considered the regular, uniform, and immutable motions of it, to
+conceive that there is some Being that is not only an inhabitant of this
+celestial and divine mansion, but a ruler and a governor, as architect
+of this mighty fabric.</p>
+
+<p>XXXVI. Now, in my opinion, they<a id="FNA-161"></a><a href="#FN-161"><sup>161</sup></a> do not seem to have even the least
+suspicion that the heavens and earth afford anything marvellous. For, in
+the first place, the earth is situated in the middle part of the
+universe, and is surrounded on all sides by the air, which we breathe,
+and which is called “aer,”<a id="FNA-162"></a><a href="#FN-162"><sup>162</sup></a> which, indeed, is a Greek word; but by
+constant use it is well understood by our countrymen, for, indeed, it is
+employed as a Latin word. The air is encompassed by the boundless ether
+(sky), which consists of the fires above. This word we borrow also, for
+we use <i>Êther</i> in Latin as well as <i>aer;</i> though Pacuvius thus expresses
+it,</p>
+
+<div class="poem">
+<p class="L6" style="margin-left: 10ex">—This, of which I speak,</p>
+<p>In Latin’s <i>cœlum</i>, <i>Êther</i> call’d in Greek.</p>
+</div>
+
+<p class="cont">As though he were not a Greek into whose mouth he puts this sentence;
+but he is speaking in Latin, though we listen as if he were speaking
+Greek; for, as he says elsewhere,</p>
+
+<div class="poem">
+<p>His speech discovers him a Grecian born.</p>
+</div>
+
+<p>But to return to more important matters. In the sky innumerable fiery
+stars exist, of which the sun is the chief, enlightening all with his
+refulgent splendor, and being by many degrees larger than the whole
+earth; and this multitude of vast fires are so far from hurting the
+earth, and things terrestrial, that they are of benefit to them;
+whereas, if they were moved from their stations, we should inevitably be
+burned through the want of a proper moderation and temperature of heat.</p>
+
+<p>XXXVII. Is it possible for any man to behold these things, and yet
+imagine that certain solid and individual bodies move by their natural
+force and gravitation, and that a world so beautifully adorned was made
+by their fortuitous concourse? He who believes this may as well <a id="page-290"></a><span class="pgnum">290</span>believe
+that if a great quantity of the one-and-twenty letters, composed either
+of gold or any other matter, were thrown upon the ground, they would
+fall into such order as legibly to form the Annals of Ennius. I doubt
+whether fortune could make a single verse of them. How, therefore, can
+these people assert that the world was made by the fortuitous concourse
+of atoms, which have no color, no quality—which the Greeks call
+<span class="greek">ποι᜹της</span>, no sense? or that there are innumerable worlds, some rising and
+some perishing, in every moment of time? But if a concourse of atoms can
+make a world, why not a porch, a temple, a house, a city, which are
+works of less labor and difficulty?</p>
+
+<p>Certainly those men talk so idly and inconsiderately concerning this
+lower world that they appear to me never to have contemplated the
+wonderful magnificence of the heavens; which is the next topic for our
+consideration.</p>
+
+<p>Well, then, did Aristotle<a id="FNA-163"></a><a href="#FN-163"><sup>163</sup></a> observe: “If there were men whose
+habitations had been always underground, in great and commodious houses,
+adorned with statues and pictures, furnished with everything which they
+who are reputed happy abound with; and if, without stirring from thence,
+they should be informed of a certain divine power and majesty, and,
+after some time, the earth should open, and they should quit their dark
+abode to come to us, where they should immediately behold the earth, the
+seas, the heavens; should consider the vast extent of the clouds and
+force of the winds; should see the sun, and observe his grandeur and
+beauty, and also his generative power, inasmuch as day is occasioned by
+the diffusion of his light through the sky; and when night has obscured
+the earth, they should contemplate the heavens bespangled and adorned
+with stars, the surprising variety of the moon in her increase and wane,
+the rising and setting of all the stars, and the inviolable regularity
+of their courses; when,” says he, “they should see these things, they
+would undoubtedly conclude that there are Gods, and that these are their
+mighty works.”</p>
+
+<p>XXXVIII. Thus far Aristotle. Let us imagine, also, as great darkness as
+was formerly occasioned by the irruption of the fires of Mount Ætna,
+which are said to have obscured <a id="page-291"></a><span class="pgnum">291</span>the adjacent countries for two days to
+such a degree that no man could recognize his fellow; but on the third,
+when the sun appeared, they seemed to be risen from the dead. Now, if we
+should be suddenly brought from a state of eternal darkness to see the
+light, how beautiful would the heavens seem! But our minds have become
+used to it from the daily practice and habituation of our eyes, nor do
+we take the trouble to search into the principles of what is always in
+view; as if the novelty, rather than the importance, of things ought to
+excite us to investigate their causes.</p>
+
+<p>Is he worthy to be called a man who attributes to chance, not to an
+intelligent cause, the constant motion of the heavens, the regular
+courses of the stars, the agreeable proportion and connection of all
+things, conducted with so much reason that our intellect itself is
+unable to estimate it rightly? When we see machines move artificially,
+as a sphere, a clock, or the like, do we doubt whether they are the
+productions of reason? And when we behold the heavens moving with a
+prodigious celerity, and causing an annual succession of the different
+seasons of the year, which vivify and preserve all things, can we doubt
+that this world is directed, I will not say only by reason, but by
+reason most excellent and divine? For without troubling ourselves with
+too refined a subtlety of discussion, we may use our eyes to contemplate
+the beauty of those things which we assert have been arranged by divine
+providence.</p>
+
+<p>XXXIX. First, let us examine the earth, whose situation is in the middle
+of the universe,<a id="FNA-164"></a><a href="#FN-164"><sup>164</sup></a> solid, round, and conglobular by its natural
+tendency; clothed with flowers, herbs, trees, and fruits; the whole in
+multitudes incredible, and with a variety suitable to every taste: let
+us consider the ever-cool and running springs, the clear waters of the
+rivers, the verdure of their banks, the hollow depths of caves, the
+cragginess of rocks, the heights of impending mountains, and the
+boundless extent of plains, the hidden veins of gold and silver, and the
+infinite quarries of marble.</p>
+
+<p><a id="page-292"></a><span class="pgnum">292</span>What and how various are the kinds of animals, tame or wild? The
+flights and notes of birds? How do the beasts live in the fields and in
+the forests? What shall I say of men, who, being appointed, as we may
+say, to cultivate the earth, do not suffer its fertility to be choked
+with weeds, nor the ferocity of beasts to make it desolate; who, by the
+houses and cities which they build, adorn the fields, the isles, and the
+shores? If we could view these objects with the naked eye, as we can by
+the contemplation of the mind, nobody, at such a sight, would doubt
+there was a divine intelligence.</p>
+
+<p>But how beautiful is the sea! How pleasant to see the extent of it! What
+a multitude and variety of islands! How delightful are the coasts! What
+numbers and what diversity of inhabitants does it contain; some within
+the bosom of it, some floating on the surface, and others by their
+shells cleaving to the rocks! While the sea itself, approaching to the
+land, sports so closely to its shores that those two elements appear to
+be but one.</p>
+
+<p>Next above the sea is the air, diversified by day and night: when
+rarefied, it possesses the higher region; when condensed, it turns into
+clouds, and with the waters which it gathers enriches the earth by the
+rain. Its agitation produces the winds. It causes heat and cold
+according to the different seasons. It sustains birds in their flight;
+and, being inhaled, nourishes and preserves all animated beings.</p>
+
+<p>XL. Add to these, which alone remaineth to be mentioned, the firmament
+of heaven, a region the farthest from our abodes, which surrounds and
+contains all things. It is likewise called ether, or sky, the extreme
+bounds and limits of the universe, in which the stars perform their
+appointed courses in a most wonderful manner; among which, the sun,
+whose magnitude far surpasses the earth, makes his revolution round it,
+and by his rising and setting causes day and night; sometimes coming
+near towards the earth, and sometimes going from it, he every year makes
+two contrary reversions<a id="FNA-165"></a><a href="#FN-165"><sup>165</sup></a> from the extreme <a id="page-293"></a><span class="pgnum">293</span>point of its course. In
+his retreat the earth seems locked up in sadness; in his return it
+appears exhilarated with the heavens. The moon, which, as mathematicians
+demonstrate, is bigger than half the earth, makes her revolutions
+through the same spaces<a id="FNA-166"></a><a href="#FN-166"><sup>166</sup></a> as the sun; but at one time approaching,
+and at another receding from, the sun, she diffuses the light which she
+has borrowed from him over the whole earth, and has herself also many
+various changes in her appearance. When she is found under the sun, and
+opposite to it, the brightness of her rays is lost; but when the earth
+directly interposes between the moon and sun, the moon is totally
+eclipsed. The other wandering stars have their courses round the earth
+in the same spaces,<a id="FNA-167"></a><a href="#FN-167"><sup>167</sup></a> and rise and set in the same manner; their
+motions are sometimes quick, sometimes slow, and often they stand still.
+There is nothing more wonderful, nothing more beautiful. There is a vast
+number of fixed stars, distinguished by the names of certain figures, to
+which we find they have some resemblance.</p>
+
+<p>XLI. I will here, says Balbus, looking at me, make use of the verses
+which, when you were young, you translated from Aratus,<a id="FNA-168"></a><a href="#FN-168"><sup>168</sup></a> and which,
+because they are in Latin, gave me so much delight that I have many of
+them still in my memory. As then, we daily see, without any change or
+variation,</p>
+
+<div class="poem">
+<p class="L6" style="margin-left: 25ex">—the rest<a id="FNA-169"></a><a href="#FN-169"><sup>169</sup></a></p>
+<p>Swiftly pursue the course to which they’re bound;</p>
+<p>And with the heavens the days and nights go round;</p>
+</div>
+
+<p class="cont">the contemplation of which, to a mind desirous of observing the
+constancy of nature, is inexhaustible.</p>
+
+<div class="poem">
+<p>The extreme top of either point is call’d</p>
+<p>The pole.<a id="FNA-170"></a><a href="#FN-170"><sup>170</sup></a></p>
+</div>
+
+<p class="cont"><a id="page-294"></a><span class="pgnum">294</span>About this the two <span class="greek">ጌρκτοι</span> are turned, which never set;</p>
+
+<div class="poem">
+<p>Of these, the Greeks one Cynosura call,</p>
+<p>The other Helice.<a id="FNA-171"></a><a href="#FN-171"><sup>171</sup></a></p>
+</div>
+
+<p class="cont">The brightest stars,<a id="FNA-172"></a><a href="#FN-172"><sup>172</sup></a> indeed, of Helice are discernible all night,</p>
+
+<div class="poem">
+<p>Which are by us Septentriones call’d.</p>
+</div>
+
+<p class="cont">Cynosura moves about the same pole, with a like number of stars, and
+ranged in the same order:</p>
+
+<div class="poem">
+<p>This<a id="FNA-173"></a><a href="#FN-173"><sup>173</sup></a> the Phœnicians choose to make their guide</p>
+<p>When on the ocean in the night they ride.</p>
+<p>Adorned with stars of more refulgent light,</p>
+<p>The other<a id="FNA-174"></a><a href="#FN-174"><sup>174</sup></a> shines, and first appears at night.</p>
+<p>Though this is small, sailors its use have found;</p>
+<p>More inward is its course, and short its round.</p>
+</div>
+
+<p>XLII. The aspect of those stars is the more admirable, because,</p>
+
+<div class="poem">
+<p>The Dragon grim between them bends his way,</p>
+<p>As through the winding banks the currents stray,</p>
+<p>And up and down in sinuous bending rolls.<a id="FNA-175"></a><a href="#FN-175"><sup>175</sup></a></p>
+</div>
+
+<p class="cont">His whole form is excellent; but the shape of his head and the ardor of
+his eyes are most remarkable.</p>
+
+<div class="poem">
+<p>Various the stars which deck his glittering head;</p>
+<p>His temples are with double glory spread;</p>
+<p>From his fierce eyes two fervid lights afar</p>
+<p>Flash, and his chin shines with one radiant star;</p>
+<p>Bow’d is his head; and his round neck he bends,</p>
+<p>And to the tail of Helice<a id="FNA-176"></a><a href="#FN-176"><sup>176</sup></a> extends.</p>
+</div>
+
+<p class="cont">The rest of the Dragon’s body we see<a id="FNA-177"></a><a href="#FN-177"><sup>177</sup></a> at every hour in the night.</p>
+
+<div class="poem">
+<p><a id="page-295"></a><span class="pgnum">295</span>Here<a id="FNA-178"></a><a href="#FN-178"><sup>178</sup></a> suddenly the head a little hides</p>
+<p>Itself, where all its parts, which are in sight,</p>
+<p>And those unseen in the same place unite.</p>
+</div>
+
+<p class="cont">Near to this head</p>
+
+<div class="poem">
+<p>Is placed the figure of a man that moves</p>
+<p>Weary and sad,</p>
+</div>
+
+<p class="cont">which the Greeks</p>
+
+<div class="poem">
+<p>Engonasis do call, because he’s borne<a id="FNA-179"></a><a href="#FN-179"><sup>179</sup></a></p>
+<p>About with bended knee. Near him is placed</p>
+<p>The crown with a refulgent lustre graced.</p>
+</div>
+
+<p class="cont">This indeed is at his back; but Anguitenens (the Snake-holder) is near
+his head:<a id="FNA-180"></a><a href="#FN-180"><sup>180</sup></a></p>
+
+<div class="poem">
+<p>The Greeks him Ophiuchus call, renown’d</p>
+<p>The name. He strongly grasps the serpent round</p>
+<p>With both his hands; himself the serpent folds</p>
+<p>Beneath his breast, and round his middle holds;</p>
+<p>Yet gravely he, bright shining in the skies,</p>
+<p>Moves on, and treads on Nepa’s<a id="FNA-181"></a><a href="#FN-181"><sup>181</sup></a> breast and eyes.</p>
+</div>
+
+<p class="cont">The Septentriones<a id="FNA-182"></a><a href="#FN-182"><sup>182</sup></a> are followed by—</p>
+
+<div class="poem">
+<p>Arctophylax,<a id="FNA-183"></a><a href="#FN-183"><sup>183</sup></a> that’s said to be the same</p>
+<p>Which we Boötes call, who has the name,</p>
+<p>Because he drives the Greater Bear along</p>
+<p>Yoked to a wain.</p>
+</div>
+
+<p class="cont">Besides, in Boötes,</p>
+
+<div class="poem">
+<p>A star of glittering rays about his waist,</p>
+<p>Arcturus called, a name renown’d, is placed.<a id="FNA-184"></a><a href="#FN-184"><sup>184</sup></a></p>
+</div>
+
+<p class="cont"><a id="page-296"></a><span class="pgnum">296</span>Beneath which is</p>
+
+<div class="poem">
+<p>The Virgin of illustrious form, whose hand</p>
+<p>Holds a bright spike.</p>
+</div>
+
+<p>XLIII. And truly these signs are so regularly disposed that a divine
+wisdom evidently appears in them:</p>
+
+<div class="poem">
+<p>Beneath the Bear’s<a id="FNA-185"></a><a href="#FN-185"><sup>185</sup></a> head have the Twins their seat,</p>
+<p>Under his chest the Crab, beneath his feet</p>
+<p>The mighty Lion darts a trembling flame.<a id="FNA-186"></a><a href="#FN-186"><sup>186</sup></a></p>
+</div>
+
+<p class="cont">The Charioteer</p>
+
+<div class="poem">
+<p>On the left side of Gemini we see,<a id="FNA-187"></a><a href="#FN-187"><sup>187</sup></a></p>
+<p>And at his head behold fierce Helice;</p>
+<p>On his left shoulder the bright Goat appears.</p>
+</div>
+
+<p class="cont">But to proceed—</p>
+
+<div class="poem">
+<p>This is indeed a great and glorious star,</p>
+<p>On th’ other side the Kids, inferior far,</p>
+<p>Yield but a slender light to mortal eyes.</p>
+</div>
+
+<p class="cont">Under his feet</p>
+
+<div class="poem">
+<p>The horned bull,<a id="FNA-188"></a><a href="#FN-188"><sup>188</sup></a> with sturdy limbs, is placed:</p>
+</div>
+
+<p class="cont">his head is spangled with a number of stars;</p>
+
+<div class="poem">
+<p>These by the Greeks are called the Hyades,</p>
+</div>
+
+<p class="cont">from raining; for <span class="greek">᜕ειΜ</span> is to rain: therefore they are injudiciously
+called <i>SuculÊ</i> by our people, as if they had their name from <span class="greek">᜗ς</span>, a sow,
+and not from <span class="greek">᜕ω</span>.</p>
+
+<p>Behind the Lesser Bear, Cepheus<a id="FNA-189"></a><a href="#FN-189"><sup>189</sup></a> follows with extended hands,</p>
+
+<div class="poem">
+<p>For close behind the Lesser Bear he comes.</p>
+</div>
+
+<p class="cont"><a id="page-297"></a><span class="pgnum">297</span>Before him goes</p>
+
+<div class="poem">
+<p>Cassiopea<a id="FNA-190"></a><a href="#FN-190"><sup>190</sup></a> with a faintish light;</p>
+<p>But near her moves (fair and illustrious sight!)</p>
+<p>Andromeda,<a id="FNA-191"></a><a href="#FN-191"><sup>191</sup></a> who, with an eager pace,</p>
+<p>Seems to avoid her parent’s mournful face.<a id="FNA-192"></a><a href="#FN-192"><sup>192</sup></a></p>
+<p>With glittering mane the Horse<a id="FNA-193"></a><a href="#FN-193"><sup>193</sup></a> now seems to tread,</p>
+<p>So near he comes, on her refulgent head;</p>
+<p>With a fair star, that close to him appears,</p>
+<p>A double form<a id="FNA-194"></a><a href="#FN-194"><sup>194</sup></a> and but one light he wears;</p>
+<p>By which he seems ambitious in the sky</p>
+<p>An everlasting knot of stars to tie.</p>
+<p>Near him the Ram, with wreathed horns, is placed;</p>
+</div>
+
+<p class="cont">by whom</p>
+
+<div class="poem">
+<p>The Fishes<a id="FNA-195"></a><a href="#FN-195"><sup>195</sup></a> are; of which one seems to haste</p>
+<p>Somewhat before the other, to the blast</p>
+<p>Of the north wind exposed.</p>
+</div>
+
+<p>XLIV. Perseus is described as placed at the feet of Andromeda:</p>
+
+<div class="poem">
+<p>And him the sharp blasts of the north wind beat.</p>
+<p>Near his left knee, but dim their light, their seat</p>
+<p>The small Pleiades<a id="FNA-196"></a><a href="#FN-196"><sup>196</sup></a> maintain. We find,</p>
+<p>Not far from them, the Lyre<a id="FNA-197"></a><a href="#FN-197"><sup>197</sup></a> but slightly join’d.</p>
+<p>Next is the winged Bird,<a id="FNA-198"></a><a href="#FN-198"><sup>198</sup></a> that seems to fly</p>
+<p>Beneath the spacious covering of the sky.</p>
+</div>
+
+<p class="cont"><a id="page-298"></a><span class="pgnum">298</span>Near the head of the Horse<a id="FNA-199"></a><a href="#FN-199"><sup>199</sup></a> lies the right hand of Aquarius, then
+all Aquarius himself.<a id="FNA-200"></a><a href="#FN-200"><sup>200</sup></a></p>
+
+<div class="poem">
+<p>Then Capricorn, with half the form of beast,</p>
+<p>Breathes chill and piercing colds from his strong breast,</p>
+<p>And in a spacious circle takes his round;</p>
+<p>When him, while in the winter solstice bound,</p>
+<p>The sun has visited with constant light,</p>
+<p>He turns his course, and shorter makes the night.<a id="FNA-201"></a><a href="#FN-201"><sup>201</sup></a></p>
+</div>
+
+<p class="cont">Not far from hence is seen</p>
+
+<div class="poem">
+<p>The Scorpion<a id="FNA-202"></a><a href="#FN-202"><sup>202</sup></a> rising lofty from below;</p>
+<p>By him the Archer,<a id="FNA-203"></a><a href="#FN-203"><sup>203</sup></a> with his bended bow;</p>
+<p>Near him the Bird, with gaudy feathers spread;</p>
+<p>And the fierce Eagle<a id="FNA-204"></a><a href="#FN-204"><sup>204</sup></a> hovers o’er his head.</p>
+</div>
+
+<p class="cont">Next comes the Dolphin;<a id="FNA-205"></a><a href="#FN-205"><sup>205</sup></a></p>
+
+<div class="poem">
+<p>Then bright Orion,<a id="FNA-206"></a><a href="#FN-206"><sup>206</sup></a> who obliquely moves;</p>
+</div>
+
+<p class="cont">he is followed by</p>
+
+<div class="poem">
+<p>The fervent Dog,<a id="FNA-207"></a><a href="#FN-207"><sup>207</sup></a> bright with refulgent stars:</p>
+</div>
+
+<p class="cont">next the Hare follows<a id="FNA-208"></a><a href="#FN-208"><sup>208</sup></a></p>
+
+<div class="poem">
+<p>Unwearied in his course. At the Dog’s tail</p>
+<p>Argo<a id="FNA-209"></a><a href="#FN-209"><sup>209</sup></a> moves on, and moving seems to sail;</p>
+<p>O’er her the Ram and Fishes have their place;<a id="FNA-210"></a><a href="#FN-210"><sup>210</sup></a></p>
+<p>The illustrious vessel touches, in her pace,</p>
+<p>The river’s banks;<a id="FNA-211"></a><a href="#FN-211"><sup>211</sup></a></p>
+</div>
+
+<p class="cont">which you may see winding and extending itself to a great length.</p>
+
+<div class="poem">
+<p><a id="page-299"></a><span class="pgnum">299</span>The Fetters<a id="FNA-212"></a><a href="#FN-212"><sup>212</sup></a> at the Fishes’ tails are hung.</p>
+<p>By Nepa’s<a id="FNA-213"></a><a href="#FN-213"><sup>213</sup></a> head behold the Altar stand,<a id="FNA-214"></a><a href="#FN-214"><sup>214</sup></a></p>
+<p>Which by the breath of southern winds is fann’d;</p>
+</div>
+
+<p class="cont">near which the Centaur<a id="FNA-215"></a><a href="#FN-215"><sup>215</sup></a></p>
+
+<div class="poem">
+<p>Hastens his mingled parts to join beneath</p>
+<p>The Serpent,<a id="FNA-216"></a><a href="#FN-216"><sup>216</sup></a> there extending his right hand,</p>
+<p>To where you see the monstrous Scorpion stand,</p>
+<p>Which he at the bright Altar fiercely slays.</p>
+<p>Here on her lower parts see Hydra<a id="FNA-217"></a><a href="#FN-217"><sup>217</sup></a> raise</p>
+<p>Herself;</p>
+</div>
+
+<p class="cont">whose bulk is very far extended.</p>
+
+<div class="poem">
+<p>Amid the winding of her body’s placed</p>
+<p>The shining Goblet;<a id="FNA-218"></a><a href="#FN-218"><sup>218</sup></a> and the glossy Crow<a id="FNA-219"></a><a href="#FN-219"><sup>219</sup></a></p>
+<p>Plunges his beak into her parts below.</p>
+<p>Antecanis beneath the Twins is seen,</p>
+<p>Call’d Procyon by the Greeks.<a id="FNA-220"></a><a href="#FN-220"><sup>220</sup></a></p>
+</div>
+
+<p>Can any one in his senses imagine that this disposition of the stars,
+and this heaven so beautifully adorned, could ever have been formed by a
+fortuitous concourse of atoms? Or what other nature, being destitute of
+intellect and reason, could possibly have produced these effects, which
+not only required reason to bring them about, but the very character of
+which could not be understood and appreciated without the most strenuous
+exertions of well-directed reason?</p>
+
+<p>XLV. But our admiration is not limited to the objects here described.
+What is most wonderful is that the world is so durable, and so perfectly
+made for lasting that it is not to be impaired by time; for all its
+parts tend equally to the centre, and are bound together by a sort of
+chain, which surrounds the elements. This chain is nature, which <a id="page-300"></a><span class="pgnum">300</span>being
+diffused through the universe, and performing all things with judgment
+and reason, attracts the extremities to the centre.</p>
+
+<p>If, then, the world is round, and if on that account all its parts,
+being of equal dimensions and relative proportions, mutually support and
+are supported by one another, it must follow that as all the parts
+incline to the centre (for that is the lowest place of a globe) there is
+nothing whatever which can put a stop to that propensity in the case of
+such great weights. For the same reason, though the sea is higher than
+the earth, yet because it has the like tendency, it is collected
+everywhere, equally concentres, and never overflows, and is never
+wasted.</p>
+
+<p>The air, which is contiguous, ascends by its lightness, but diffuses
+itself through the whole; therefore it is by nature joined and united to
+the sea, and at the same time borne by the same power towards the
+heaven, by the thinness and heat of which it is so tempered as to be
+made proper to supply life and wholesome air for the support of animated
+beings. This is encompassed by the highest region of the heavens, which
+is called the sky, which is joined to the extremity of the air, but
+retains its own heat pure and unmixed.</p>
+
+<p>XLVI. The stars have their revolutions in the sky, and are continued by
+the tendency of all parts towards the centre. Their duration is
+perpetuated by their form and figure, for they are round; which form, as
+I think has been before observed, is the least liable to injury; and as
+they are composed of fire, they are fed by the vapors which are exhaled
+by the sun from the earth, the sea, and other waters; but when these
+vapors have nourished and refreshed the stars, and the whole sky, they
+are sent back to be exhaled again; so that very little is lost or
+consumed by the fire of the stars and the flame of the sky. Hence we
+Stoics conclude—which PanÊtius<a id="FNA-221"></a><a href="#FN-221"><sup>221</sup></a> is said to have doubted of—that
+the whole world at last would be consumed by a general conflagration,
+when, all moisture being exhausted, neither the earth could have any
+nourishment, nor the air return again, since water, of which it is
+formed, would then be all consumed; so that only fire would subsist; and
+<a id="page-301"></a><span class="pgnum">301</span>from this fire, which is an animating power and a Deity, a new world
+would arise and be re-established in the same beauty.</p>
+
+<p>I should be sorry to appear to you to dwell too long upon this subject
+of the stars, and more especially upon that of the planets, whose
+motions, though different, make a very just agreement. Saturn, the
+highest, chills; Mars, placed in the middle, burns; while Jupiter,
+interposing, moderates their excess, both of light and heat. The two
+planets beneath Mars<a id="FNA-222"></a><a href="#FN-222"><sup>222</sup></a> obey the sun. The sun himself fills the whole
+universe with his own genial light; and the moon, illuminated by him,
+influences conception, birth, and maturity. And who is there who is not
+moved by this union of things, and by this concurrence of nature
+agreeing together, as it were, for the safety of the world? And yet I
+feel sure that none of these reflections have ever been made by these
+men.</p>
+
+<p>XLVII. Let us proceed from celestial to terrestrial things. What is
+there in them which does not prove the principle of an intelligent
+nature? First, as to vegetables; they have roots to sustain their stems,
+and to draw from the earth a nourishing moisture to support the vital
+principle which those roots contain. They are clothed with a rind or
+bark, to secure them more thoroughly from heat and cold. The vines we
+see take hold on props with their tendrils, as if with hands, and raise
+themselves as if they were animated; it is even said that they shun
+cabbages and coleworts, as noxious and pestilential to them, and, if
+planted by them, will not touch any part.</p>
+
+<p>But what a vast variety is there of animals! and how wonderfully is
+every kind adapted to preserve itself! Some are covered with hides, some
+clothed with fleeces, and some guarded with bristles; some are sheltered
+with feathers, some with scales; some are armed with horns, and some are
+furnished with wings to escape from danger. Nature hath also liberally
+and plentifully provided for all animals their proper food. I could
+expatiate on the judicious and curious formation and disposition of
+their bodies for the reception and digestion of it, for all their
+interior parts are so framed and disposed that there is <a id="page-302"></a><span class="pgnum">302</span>nothing
+superfluous, nothing that is not necessary for the preservation of life.
+Besides, nature has also given these beasts appetite and sense; in order
+that by the one they may be excited to procure sufficient sustenance,
+and by the other they may distinguish what is noxious from what is
+salutary. Some animals seek their food walking, some creeping, some
+flying, and some swimming; some take it with their mouth and teeth; some
+seize it with their claws, and some with their beaks; some suck, some
+graze, some bolt it whole, and some chew it. Some are so low that they
+can with ease take such food as is to be found on the ground; but the
+taller, as geese, swans, cranes, and camels, are assisted by a length of
+neck. To the elephant is given a hand,<a id="FNA-223"></a><a href="#FN-223"><sup>223</sup></a> without which, from his
+unwieldiness of body, he would scarce have any means of attaining food.</p>
+
+<p>XLVIII. But to those beasts which live by preying on others, nature has
+given either strength or swiftness. On some animals she has even
+bestowed artifice and cunning; as on spiders, some of which weave a sort
+of net to entrap and destroy whatever falls into it, others sit on the
+watch unobserved to fall on their prey and devour it. The naker—by the
+Greeks called <i>Pinna</i>—has a kind of confederacy with the prawn for
+procuring food. It has two large shells open, into which when the little
+fishes swim, the naker, having notice given by the bite of the prawn,
+closes them immediately. Thus, these little animals, though of different
+kinds, seek their food in common; in which it is matter of wonder
+whether they associate by any agreement, or are naturally joined
+together from their beginning.</p>
+
+<p>There is some cause to admire also the provision of nature in the case
+of those aquatic animals which are generated on land, such as
+crocodiles, river-tortoises, and a certain kind of serpents, which seek
+the water as soon as they are able to drag themselves along. We
+frequently put duck-eggs under hens, by which, as by their true mothers,
+the ducklings are at first hatched and nourished; but when they see the
+water, they forsake them and run to it, as to <a id="page-303"></a><span class="pgnum">303</span>their natural abode: so
+strong is the impression of nature in animals for their own
+preservation.</p>
+
+<p>XLIX. I have read that there is a bird called Platalea (the shoveller),
+that lives by watching those fowls which dive into the sea for their
+prey, and when they return with it, he squeezes their heads with his
+beak till they drop it, and then seizes on it himself. It is said
+likewise that he is in the habit of filling his stomach with shell-fish,
+and when they are digested by the heat which exists in the stomach, they
+cast them up, and then pick out what is proper nourishment. The
+sea-frogs, they say, are wont to cover themselves with sand, and moving
+near the water, the fishes strike at them, as at a bait, and are
+themselves taken and devoured by the frogs. Between the kite and the
+crow there is a kind of natural war, and wherever the one finds the eggs
+of the other, he breaks them.</p>
+
+<p>But who is there who can avoid being struck with wonder at that which
+has been noticed by Aristotle, who has enriched us with so many valuable
+remarks? When the cranes<a id="FNA-224"></a><a href="#FN-224"><sup>224</sup></a> pass the sea in search of warmer climes,
+they fly in the form of a triangle. By the first angle they repel the
+resisting air; on each side, their wings serve as oars to facilitate
+their flight; and the basis of their triangle is assisted by the wind in
+their stern. Those which are behind rest their necks and heads on those
+which precede; and as the leader has not the same relief, because he has
+none to lean upon, he at length flies behind that he may also rest,
+while one of those which have been eased succeeds him, and through the
+whole flight each regularly takes his turn.</p>
+
+<p>I could produce many instances of this kind; but these may suffice. Let
+us now proceed to things more familiar to us. The care of beasts for
+their own preservation, their circumspection while feeding, and their
+manner of taking rest in their lairs, are generally known, but still
+they are greatly to be admired.</p>
+
+<p>L. Dogs cure themselves by a vomit, the Egyptian ibis by a purge; from
+whence physicians have lately—I mean but few ages since—greatly
+improved their art. It is reported <a id="page-304"></a><span class="pgnum">304</span>that panthers, which in barbarous
+countries are taken with poisoned flesh, have a certain remedy<a id="FNA-225"></a><a href="#FN-225"><sup>225</sup></a> that
+preserves them from dying; and that in Crete, the wild goats, when they
+are wounded with poisoned arrows, seek for an herb called dittany,
+which, when they have tasted, the arrows (they say) drop from their
+bodies. It is said also that deer, before they fawn, purge themselves
+with a little herb called hartswort.<a id="FNA-226"></a><a href="#FN-226"><sup>226</sup></a> Beasts, when they receive any
+hurt, or fear it, have recourse to their natural arms: the bull to his
+horns, the boar to his tusks, and the lion to his teeth. Some take to
+flight, others hide themselves; the cuttle-fish vomits<a id="FNA-227"></a><a href="#FN-227"><sup>227</sup></a> blood; the
+cramp-fish benumbs; and there are many animals that, by their
+intolerable stink, oblige their pursuers to retire.</p>
+
+<p>LI. But that the beauty of the world might be eternal, great care has
+been taken by the providence of the Gods to perpetuate the different
+kinds of animals, and vegetables, and trees, and all those things which
+sink deep into the earth, and are contained in it by their roots and
+trunks; in order to which every individual has within itself such
+fertile seed that many are generated from one; and in vegetables this
+seed is enclosed in the heart of their fruit, but in such abundance that
+men may plentifully feed on it, and the earth be always replanted.</p>
+
+<p>With regard to animals, do we not see how aptly they are formed for the
+propagation of their species? Nature for this end created some males and
+some females. Their parts are perfectly framed for generation, and they
+have a wonderful propensity to copulation. When the seed has fallen on
+the matrix, it draws almost all the nourishment to itself, by which the
+fœtus is formed; but as soon as it is discharged from thence, if it is
+an animal that is nourished by milk, almost all the food of the mother
+turns into milk, and the animal, without any direction but by the pure
+instinct of nature, immediately hunts for the <a id="page-305"></a><span class="pgnum">305</span>teat, and is there fed
+with plenty. What makes it evidently appear that there is nothing in
+this fortuitous, but the work of a wise and foreseeing nature, is, that
+those females which bring forth many young, as sows and bitches, have
+many teats, and those which bear a small number have but few. What
+tenderness do beasts show in preserving and raising up their young till
+they are able to defend themselves! They say, indeed, that fish, when
+they have spawned, leave their eggs; but the water easily supports them,
+and produces the young fry in abundance.</p>
+
+<p>LII. It is said, likewise, that tortoises and crocodiles, when they have
+laid their eggs on the land, only cover them with earth, and then leave
+them, so that their young are hatched and brought up without assistance;
+but fowls and other birds seek for quiet places to lay in, where they
+build their nests in the softest manner, for the surest preservation of
+their eggs; which, when they have hatched, they defend from the cold by
+the warmth of their wings, or screen them from the sultry heat of the
+sun. When their young begin to be able to use their wings, they attend
+and instruct them; and then their cares are at an end.</p>
+
+<p>Human art and industry are indeed necessary towards the preservation and
+improvement of certain animals and vegetables; for there are several of
+both kinds which would perish without that assistance. There are
+likewise innumerable facilities (being different in different places)
+supplied to man to aid him in his civilization, and in procuring
+abundantly what he requires. The Nile waters Egypt, and after having
+overflowed and covered it the whole summer, it retires, and leaves the
+fields softened and manured for the reception of seed. The Euphrates
+fertilizes Mesopotamia, into which, as we may say, it carries yearly new
+fields.<a id="FNA-228"></a><a href="#FN-228"><sup>228</sup></a> The Indus, which is the largest of all rivers,<a id="FNA-229"></a><a href="#FN-229"><sup>229</sup></a> not
+only improves and cultivates the ground, <a id="page-306"></a><span class="pgnum">306</span>but sows it also; for it is
+said to carry with it a great quantity of grain. I could mention many
+other countries remarkable for something singular, and many fields,
+which are, in their own natures, exceedingly fertile.</p>
+
+<p>LIII. But how bountiful is nature that has provided for us such an
+abundance of various and delicious food; and this varying with the
+different seasons, so that we may be constantly pleased with change, and
+satisfied with abundance! How seasonable and useful to man, to beasts,
+and even to vegetables, are the Etesian winds<a id="FNA-230"></a><a href="#FN-230"><sup>230</sup></a> she has bestowed,
+which moderate intemperate heat, and render navigation more sure and
+speedy! Many things must be omitted on a subject so copious—and still a
+great deal must be said—for it is impossible to relate the great
+utility of rivers, the flux and reflux of the sea, the mountains clothed
+with grass and trees, the salt-pits remote from the sea-coasts, the
+earth replete with salutary medicines, or, in short, the innumerable
+designs of nature necessary for sustenance and the enjoyment of life. We
+must not forget the vicissitudes of day and night, ordained for the
+health of animated beings, giving them a time to labor and a time to
+rest. Thus, if we every way examine the universe, it is apparent, from
+the greatest reason, that the whole is admirably governed by a divine
+providence for the safety and preservation of all beings.</p>
+
+<p>If it should be asked for whose sake this mighty fabric was raised,
+shall we say for trees and other vegetables, which, though destitute of
+sense, are supported by nature? That would be absurd. Is it for beasts?
+Nothing can be less probable than that the Gods should have taken such
+pains for beings void of speech and understanding. For whom, then, will
+any one presume to say that the world was made? Undoubtedly for
+reasonable beings; these are the Gods and men, who are certainly the
+most perfect of all beings, as nothing is equal to reason. It is
+therefore credible that the universe, and all things in it, were made
+for the Gods and for men.</p>
+
+<p>But we may yet more easily comprehend that the Gods have taken great
+care of the interests and welfare of men, <a id="page-307"></a><span class="pgnum">307</span>if we examine thoroughly into
+the structure of the body, and the form and perfection of human nature.
+There are three things absolutely necessary for the support of life—to
+eat, to drink, and to breathe. For these operations the mouth is most
+aptly framed, which, by the assistance of the nostrils, draws in the
+more air.</p>
+
+<p>LIV. The teeth are there placed to divide and grind the food.<a id="FNA-231"></a><a href="#FN-231"><sup>231</sup></a> The
+fore-teeth, being sharp and opposite to each other, cut it asunder, and
+the hind-teeth (called the grinders) chew it, in which office the tongue
+seems to assist. At the root of the tongue is the gullet, which receives
+whatever is swallowed: it touches the tonsils on each side, and
+terminates at the interior extremity of the palate. When, by the motions
+of the tongue, the food is forced into this passage, it descends, and
+those parts of the gullet which are below it are dilated, and those
+above are contracted. There is another passage, called by physicians the
+rough artery,<a id="FNA-232"></a><a href="#FN-232"><sup>232</sup></a> which reaches to the lungs, for the entrance and
+return of the air we breathe; and as its orifice is joined to the roots
+of the tongue a little above the part to which the gullet is annexed, it
+is furnished with a sort of coverlid,<a id="FNA-233"></a><a href="#FN-233"><sup>233</sup></a> lest, by the accidental
+falling of any food into it, the respiration should be stopped.</p>
+
+<p>As the stomach, which is beneath the gullet, receives the meat and
+drink, so the lungs and the heart draw in the air from without. The
+stomach is wonderfully composed, consisting almost wholly of nerves; it
+abounds with membranes and fibres, and detains what it receives, whether
+solid or liquid, till it is altered and digested. It sometimes
+contracts, sometimes dilates. It blends and mixes the food together, so
+that it is easily concocted and digested by its force of heat, and by
+the animal spirits is distributed into the other parts of the body.</p>
+
+<p>LV. As to the lungs, they are of a soft and spongy substance, which
+renders them the most commodious for respiration; <a id="page-308"></a><span class="pgnum">308</span>they alternately
+dilate and contract to receive and return the air, that what is the
+chief animal sustenance may be always fresh. The juice,<a id="FNA-234"></a><a href="#FN-234"><sup>234</sup></a> by which we
+are nourished, being separated from the rest of the food, passes the
+stomach and intestines to the liver, through open and direct passages,
+which lead from the mesentery to the gates of the liver (for so they
+call those vessels at the entrance of it). There are other passages from
+thence, through which the food has its course when it has passed the
+liver. When the bile, and those humors which proceed from the kidneys,
+are separated from the food, the remaining part turns to blood, and
+flows to those vessels at the entrance of the liver to which all the
+passages adjoin. The chyle, being conveyed from this place through them
+into the vessel called the hollow vein, is mixed together, and, being
+already digested and distilled, passes into the heart; and from the
+heart it is communicated through a great number of veins to every part
+of the body.</p>
+
+<p>It is not difficult to describe how the gross remains are detruded by
+the motion of the intestines, which contract and dilate; but that must
+be declined, as too indelicate for discourse. Let us rather explain that
+other wonder of nature, the air, which is drawn into the lungs, receives
+heat both by that already in and by the coagitation of the lungs; one
+part is turned back by respiration, and the other is received into a
+place called the ventricle of the heart.<a id="FNA-235"></a><a href="#FN-235"><sup>235</sup></a> There is another ventricle
+like it annexed to the heart, into which the blood flows from the liver
+through the hollow vein. Thus by one ventricle the blood is diffused to
+the extremities through the veins, and by the other the breath is
+communicated through the arteries; and there are such numbers of both
+dispersed through the whole body that they manifest a divine art.</p>
+
+<p>Why need I speak of the bones, those supports of the body, whose joints
+are so wonderfully contrived for stability, and to render the limbs
+complete with regard to motion and to every action of the body? Or need
+I mention <a id="page-309"></a><span class="pgnum">309</span>the nerves, by which the limbs are governed—their many
+interweavings, and their proceeding from the heart,<a id="FNA-236"></a><a href="#FN-236"><sup>236</sup></a> from whence,
+like the veins and arteries, they have their origin, and are distributed
+through the whole corporeal frame?</p>
+
+<p>LVI. To this skill of nature, and this care of providence, so diligent
+and so ingenious, many reflections may be added, which show what
+valuable things the Deity has bestowed on man. He has made us of a
+stature tall and upright, in order that we might behold the heavens, and
+so arrive at the knowledge of the Gods; for men are not simply to dwell
+here as inhabitants of the earth, but to be, as it were, spectators of
+the heavens and the stars, which is a privilege not granted to any other
+kind of animated beings. The senses, which are the interpreters and
+messengers of things, are placed in the head, as in a tower, and
+wonderfully situated for their proper uses; for the eyes, being in the
+highest part, have the office of sentinels, in discovering to us
+objects; and the ears are conveniently placed in a high part of the
+person, being appointed to receive sound, which naturally ascends. The
+nostrils have the like situation, because all scent likewise ascends;
+and they have, with great reason, a near vicinity to the mouth, because
+they assist us in judging of meat and drink. The taste, which is to
+distinguish the quality of what we take; is in that part of the mouth
+where nature has laid open a passage for what we eat and drink. But the
+touch is equally diffused through the whole body, that we may not
+receive any blows, or the too rigid attacks of cold and heat, without
+feeling them. And as in building the architect averts from the eyes and
+nose of the master those things which must necessarily be offensive, so
+has nature removed far from our senses what is of the same kind in the
+human body.</p>
+
+<p>LVII. What artificer but nature, whose direction is incomparable, could
+have exhibited so much ingenuity in the formation of the senses? In the
+first place, she has covered and invested the eyes with the finest
+membranes, which she hath made transparent, that we may see through
+<a id="page-310"></a><span class="pgnum">310</span>them, and firm in their texture, to preserve the eyes. She has made
+them slippery and movable, that they might avoid what would offend them,
+and easily direct the sight wherever they will. The actual organ of
+sight, which is called the pupil, is so small that it can easily shun
+whatever might be hurtful to it. The eyelids, which are their coverings,
+are soft and smooth, that they may not injure the eyes; and are made to
+shut at the apprehension of any accident, or to open at pleasure; and
+these movements nature has ordained to be made in an instant: they are
+fortified with a sort of palisade of hairs, to keep off what may be
+noxious to them when open, and to be a fence to their repose when sleep
+closes them, and allows them to rest as if they were wrapped up in a
+case. Besides, they are commodiously hidden and defended by eminences on
+every side; for on the upper part the eyebrows turn aside the
+perspiration which falls from the head and forehead; the cheeks beneath
+rise a little, so as to protect them on the lower side; and the nose is
+placed between them as a wall of separation.</p>
+
+<p>The hearing is always open, for that is a sense of which we are in need
+even while we are sleeping; and the moment that any sound is admitted by
+it we are awakened even from sleep. It has a winding passage, lest
+anything should slip into it, as it might if it were straight and
+simple. Nature also hath taken the same precaution in making there a
+viscous humor, that if any little creatures should endeavor to creep in,
+they might stick in it as in bird-lime. The ears (by which we mean the
+outward part) are made prominent, to cover and preserve the hearing,
+lest the sound should be dissipated and escape before the sense is
+affected. Their entrances are hard and horny, and their form winding,
+because bodies of this kind better return and increase the sound. This
+appears in the harp, lute, or horn;<a id="FNA-237"></a><a href="#FN-237"><sup>237</sup></a> and from all tortuous and
+enclosed places sounds are returned stronger.</p>
+
+<p>The nostrils, in like manner, are ever open, because we have a continual
+use for them; and their entrances also are rather narrow, lest anything
+noxious should enter <a id="page-311"></a><span class="pgnum">311</span>them; and they have always a humidity necessary
+for the repelling dust and many other extraneous bodies. The taste,
+having the mouth for an enclosure, is admirably situated, both in regard
+to the use we make of it and to its security.</p>
+
+<p>LVIII. Besides, every human sense is much more exquisite than those of
+brutes; for our eyes, in those arts which come under their judgment,
+distinguish with great nicety; as in painting, sculpture, engraving, and
+in the gesture and motion of bodies. They understand the beauty,
+proportion, and, as I may so term it, the becomingness of colors and
+figures; they distinguish things of greater importance, even virtues and
+vices; they know whether a man is angry or calm, cheerful or sad,
+courageous or cowardly, bold or timorous.</p>
+
+<p>The judgment of the ears is not less admirably and scientifically
+contrived with regard to vocal and instrumental music. They distinguish
+the variety of sounds, the measure, the stops, the different sorts of
+voices, the treble and the base, the soft and the harsh, the sharp and
+the flat, of which human ears only are capable to judge. There is
+likewise great judgment in the smell, the taste, and the touch; to
+indulge and gratify which senses more arts have been invented than I
+could wish: it is apparent to what excess we have arrived in the
+composition of our perfumes, the preparation of our food, and the
+enjoyment of corporeal pleasures.</p>
+
+<p>LIX. Again, he who does not perceive the soul and mind of man, his
+reason, prudence, and discernment, to be the work of a divine
+providence, seems himself to be destitute of those faculties. While I am
+on this subject, Cotta, I wish I had your eloquence: how would you
+illustrate so fine a subject! You would show the great extent of the
+understanding; how we collect our ideas, and join those which follow to
+those which precede; establish principles, draw consequences, define
+things separately, and comprehend them with accuracy; from whence you
+demonstrate how great is the power of intelligence and knowledge, which
+is such that even God himself has no qualities more admirable. How
+valuable (though you Academics despise and even deny that we have it) is
+our <a id="page-312"></a><span class="pgnum">312</span>knowledge of exterior objects, from the perception of the senses
+joined to the application of the mind; by which we see in what relation
+one thing stands to another, and by the aid of which we have invented
+those arts which are necessary for the support and pleasure of life. How
+charming is eloquence! How divine that mistress of the universe, as you
+call it! It teaches us what we were ignorant of, and makes us capable of
+teaching what we have learned. By this we exhort others; by this we
+persuade them; by this we comfort the afflicted; by this we deliver the
+affrighted from their fear; by this we moderate excessive joy; by this
+we assuage the passions of lust and anger. This it is which bound men by
+the chains of right and law, formed the bonds of civil society, and made
+us quit a wild and savage life.</p>
+
+<p>And it will appear incredible, unless you carefully observe the facts,
+how complete the work of nature is in giving us the use of speech; for,
+first of all, there is an artery from the lungs to the bottom of the
+mouth, through which the voice, having its original principle in the
+mind, is transmitted. Then the tongue is placed in the mouth, bounded by
+the teeth. It softens and modulates the voice, which would otherwise be
+confusedly uttered; and, by pushing it to the teeth and other parts of
+the mouth, makes the sound distinct and articulate. We Stoics,
+therefore, compare the tongue to the bow of an instrument, the teeth to
+the strings, and the nostrils to the sounding-board.</p>
+
+<p>LX. But how commodious are the hands which nature has given to man, and
+how beautifully do they minister to many arts! For, such is the
+flexibility of the joints, that our fingers are closed and opened
+without any difficulty. With their help, the hand is formed for
+painting, carving, and engraving; for playing on stringed instruments,
+and on the pipe. These are matters of pleasure. There are also works of
+necessity, such as tilling the ground, building houses, making cloth and
+habits, and working in brass and iron. It is the business of the mind to
+invent, the senses to perceive, and the hands to execute; so that if we
+have buildings, if we are clothed, if we live in safety, if we have
+cities, walls, habitations, and temples, it is to the hands we owe them.</p>
+
+<p><a id="page-313"></a><span class="pgnum">313</span>By our labor, that is, by our hands, variety and plenty of food are
+provided; for, without culture, many fruits, which serve either for
+present or future consumption, would not be produced; besides, we feed
+on flesh, fish, and fowl, catching some, and bringing up others. We
+subdue four-footed beasts for our carriage, whose speed and strength
+supply our slowness and inability. On some we put burdens, on others
+yokes. We convert the sagacity of the elephant and the quick scent of
+the dog to our own advantage. Out of the caverns of the earth we dig
+iron, a thing entirely necessary for the cultivation of the ground. We
+discover the hidden veins of copper, silver, and gold, advantageous for
+our use and beautiful as ornaments. We cut down trees, and use every
+kind of wild and cultivated timber, not only to make fire to warm us and
+dress our meat, but also for building, that we may have houses to defend
+us from the heat and cold. With timber likewise we build ships, which
+bring us from all parts every commodity of life. We are the only animals
+who, from our knowledge of navigation, can manage what nature has made
+the most violent—the sea and the winds. Thus we obtain from the ocean
+great numbers of profitable things. We are the absolute masters of what
+the earth produces. We enjoy the mountains and the plains. The rivers
+and the lakes are ours. We sow the seed, and plant the trees. We
+fertilize the earth by overflowing it. We stop, direct, and turn the
+rivers: in short, by our hands we endeavor, by our various operations in
+this world, to make, as it were, another nature.</p>
+
+<p>LXI. But what shall I say of human reason? Has it not even entered the
+heavens? Man alone of all animals has observed the courses of the stars,
+their risings and settings. By man the day, the month, the year, is
+determined. He foresees the eclipses of the sun and moon, and foretells
+them to futurity, marking their greatness, duration, and precise time.
+>From the contemplation of these things the mind extracts the knowledge
+of the Gods—a knowledge which produces piety, with which is connected
+justice, and all the other virtues; from which arises a life of
+felicity, inferior to that of the Gods in no single particular, except
+in immortality, which is not absolutely necessary <a id="page-314"></a><span class="pgnum">314</span>to happy living. In
+explaining these things, I think that I have sufficiently demonstrated
+the superiority of man to other animated beings; from whence we should
+infer that neither the form and position of his limbs nor that strength
+of mind and understanding could possibly be the effect of chance.</p>
+
+<p>LXII. I am now to prove, by way of conclusion, that every thing in this
+world of use to us was made designedly for us.</p>
+
+<p>First of all, the universe was made for the Gods and men, and all things
+therein were prepared and provided for our service. For the world is the
+common habitation or city of the Gods and men; for they are the only
+reasonable beings: they alone live by justice and law. As, therefore, it
+must be presumed the cities of Athens and LacedÊmon were built for the
+Athenians and LacedÊmonians, and as everything there is said to belong
+to those people, so everything in the universe may with propriety be
+said to belong to the Gods and men, and to them alone.</p>
+
+<p>In the next place, though the revolutions of the sun, moon, and all the
+stars are necessary for the cohesion of the universe, yet may they be
+considered also as objects designed for the view and contemplation of
+man. There is no sight less apt to satiate the eye, none more beautiful,
+or more worthy to employ our reason and penetration. By measuring their
+courses we find the different seasons, their durations and vicissitudes,
+which, if they are known to men alone, we must believe were made only
+for their sake.</p>
+
+<p>Does the earth bring forth fruit and grain in such excessive abundance
+and variety for men or for brutes? The plentiful and exhilarating fruit
+of the vine and the olive-tree are entirely useless to beasts. They know
+not the time for sowing, tilling, or for reaping in season and gathering
+in the fruits of the earth, or for laying up and preserving their
+stores. Man alone has the care and advantage of these things.</p>
+
+<p>LXIII. Thus, as the lute and the pipe were made for those, and those
+only, who are capable of playing on them, so it must be allowed that the
+produce of the earth was designed for those only who make use of them;
+and <a id="page-315"></a><span class="pgnum">315</span>though some beasts may rob us of a small part, it does not follow
+that the earth produced it also for them. Men do not store up corn for
+mice and ants, but for their wives, their children, and their families.
+Beasts, therefore, as I said before, possess it by stealth, but their
+masters openly and freely. It is for us, therefore, that nature hath
+provided this abundance. Can there be any doubt that this plenty and
+variety of fruit, which delight not only the taste, but the smell and
+sight, was by nature intended for men only? Beasts are so far from being
+partakers of this design, that we see that even they themselves were
+made for man; for of what utility would sheep be, unless for their wool,
+which, when dressed and woven, serves us for clothing? For they are not
+capable of anything, not even of procuring their own food, without the
+care and assistance of man. The fidelity of the dog, his affectionate
+fawning on his master, his aversion to strangers, his sagacity in
+finding game, and his vivacity in pursuit of it, what do these qualities
+denote but that he was created for our use? Why need I mention oxen? We
+perceive that their backs were not formed for carrying burdens, but
+their necks were naturally made for the yoke, and their strong broad
+shoulders to draw the plough. In the Golden Age, which poets speak of,
+they were so greatly beneficial to the husbandman in tilling the fallow
+ground that no violence was ever offered them, and it was even thought a
+crime to eat them:</p>
+
+<div class="poem">
+<p>The Iron Age began the fatal trade</p>
+<p>Of blood, and hammer’d the destructive blade;</p>
+<p>Then men began to make the ox to bleed,</p>
+<p>And on the tamed and docile beast to feed<a id="FNA-238"></a><a href="#FN-238"><sup>238</sup></a>.</p>
+</div>
+
+<p>LXIV. It would take a long time to relate the advantages which we
+receive from mules and asses, which undoubtedly were designed for our
+use. What is the swine good for but to eat? whose life, Chrysippus says,
+was given it but as salt<a id="FNA-239"></a><a href="#FN-239"><sup>239</sup></a> to keep it from putrefying; and as it <a id="page-316"></a><span class="pgnum">316</span>is
+proper food for man, nature hath made no animal more fruitful. What a
+multitude of birds and fishes are taken by the art and contrivance of
+man only, and which are so delicious to our taste that one would be
+tempted sometimes to believe that this Providence which watches over us
+was an Epicurean! Though we think there are some birds—the alites and
+oscines<a id="FNA-240"></a><a href="#FN-240"><sup>240</sup></a>, as our augurs call them—which were made merely to
+foretell events.</p>
+
+<p>The large savage beasts we take by hunting, partly for food, partly to
+exercise ourselves in imitation of martial discipline, and to use those
+we can tame and instruct, as elephants, or to extract remedies for our
+diseases and wounds, as we do from certain roots and herbs, the virtues
+of which are known by long use and experience. Represent to yourself the
+whole earth and seas as if before your eyes. You will see the vast and
+fertile plains, the thick, shady mountains, the immense pasturage for
+cattle, and ships sailing over the deep with incredible celerity; nor
+are our discoveries only on the face of the earth, but in its secret
+recesses there are many useful things, which being made for man, by man
+alone are discovered.</p>
+
+<p>LXV. Another, and in my opinion the strongest, proof that the providence
+of the Gods takes care of us is divination, which both of you, perhaps,
+will attack; you, Cotta, because Carneades took pleasure in inveighing
+against the Stoics; and you, Velleius, because there is nothing Epicurus
+ridicules so much as the prediction of events. Yet the truth of
+divination appears in many places, on many occasions, often in private,
+but particularly in public concerns. We receive many intimations from
+the foresight and presages of augurs and auspices; from oracles,
+prophecies, dreams, and prodigies; and it often happens that by these
+means events have proved happy to men, and imminent dangers have been
+avoided. This knowledge, therefore—call it either a kind of transport,
+or an art, or a natural faculty—is certainly found only in men, and is
+a gift from the immortal Gods. If these proofs, when taken <a id="page-317"></a><span class="pgnum">317</span>separately,
+should make no impression upon your mind, yet, when collected together,
+they must certainly affect you.</p>
+
+<p>Besides, the Gods not only provide for mankind universally, but for
+particular men. You may bring this universality to gradually a smaller
+number, and again you may reduce that smaller number to individuals.</p>
+
+<p>LXVI. For if the reasons which I have given prove to all of us that the
+Gods take care of all men, in every country, in every part of the world
+separate from our continent, they take care of those who dwell on the
+same land with us, from east to west; and if they regard those who
+inhabit this kind of great island, which we call the globe of the earth,
+they have the like regard for those who possess the parts of this
+island—Europe, Asia, and Africa; and therefore they favor the parts of
+these parts, as Rome, Athens, Sparta, and Rhodes; and particular men of
+these cities, separate from the whole; as Curius, Fabricius,
+Coruncanius, in the war with Pyrrhus; in the first Punic war, Calatinus,
+Duillius, Metellus, Lutatius; in the second, Maximus, Marcellus,
+Africanus; after these, Paullus, Gracchus, Cato; and in our fathers’
+times, Scipio, LÊlius. Rome also and Greece have produced many
+illustrious men, who we cannot believe were so without the assistance of
+the Deity; which is the reason that the poets, Homer in particular,
+joined their chief heroes—Ulysses, Agamemnon, Diomedes, Achilles—to
+certain Deities, as companions in their adventures and dangers. Besides,
+the frequent appearances of the Gods, as I have before mentioned,
+demonstrate their regard for cities and particular men. This is also
+apparent indeed from the foreknowledge of events, which we receive
+either sleeping or waking. We are likewise forewarned of many things by
+the entrails of victims, by presages, and many other means, which have
+been long observed with such exactness as to produce an art of
+divination.</p>
+
+<p>There never, therefore, was a great man without divine inspiration. If a
+storm should damage the corn or vineyard of a person, or any accident
+should deprive him of some conveniences of life, we should not judge
+from thence that the Deity hates or neglects him. The Gods take care <a id="page-318"></a><span class="pgnum">318</span>of
+great things, and disregard the small. But to truly great men all things
+ever happen prosperously; as has been sufficiently asserted and proved
+by us Stoics, as well as by Socrates, the prince of philosophers, in his
+discourses on the infinite advantages arising from virtue.</p>
+
+<p>LXVII. This is almost the whole that hath occurred to my mind on the
+nature of the Gods, and what I thought proper to advance. Do you, Cotta,
+if I may advise, defend the same cause. Remember that in Rome you keep
+the first rank; remember that you are Pontifex; and as your school is at
+liberty to argue on which side you please<a id="FNA-241"></a><a href="#FN-241"><sup>241</sup></a>, do you rather take mine,
+and reason on it with that eloquence which you acquired by your
+rhetorical exercises, and which the Academy improved; for it is a
+pernicious and impious custom to argue against the Gods, whether it be
+done seriously, or only in pretence and out of sport.</p>
+
+<hr/>
+
+
+<h3>BOOK III.</h3>
+
+
+<p>I. <span class="first">When</span> Balbus had ended this discourse, then Cotta, with a smile,
+rejoined, You direct me too late which side to defend; for during the
+course of your argument I was revolving in my mind what objections to
+make to what you were saying, not so much for the sake of opposition, as
+of obliging you to explain what I did not perfectly comprehend; and as
+every one may use his own judgment, it is scarcely possible for me to
+think in every instance exactly what you wish.</p>
+
+<p>You have no idea, O Cotta, said Velleius, how impatient I am to hear
+what you have to say. For since our friend Balbus was highly delighted
+with your discourse against Epicurus, I ought in my turn to be
+solicitous to hear what you can say against the Stoics; and I therefore
+will give you my best attention, for I believe you are, as usual, well
+prepared for the engagement.</p>
+
+<p>I wish, by Hercules! I were, replies Cotta; for it is more difficult to
+dispute with Lucilius than it was with you. <a id="page-319"></a><span class="pgnum">319</span>Why so? says Velleius.
+Because, replies Cotta, your Epicurus, in my opinion, does not contend
+strongly for the Gods: he only, for the sake of avoiding any
+unpopularity or punishment, is afraid to deny their existence; for when
+he asserts that the Gods are wholly inactive and regardless of
+everything, and that they have limbs like ours, but make no use of them,
+he seems to jest with us, and to think it sufficient if he allows that
+there are beings of any kind happy and eternal. But with regard to
+Balbus, I suppose you observed how many things were said by him, which,
+however false they may be, yet have a perfect coherence and connection;
+therefore, my design, as I said, in opposing him, is not so much to
+confute his principles as to induce him to explain what I do not clearly
+understand: for which reason, Balbus, I will give you the choice, either
+to answer me every particular as I go on, or permit me to proceed
+without interruption. If you want any explanation, replies Balbus, I
+would rather you would propose your doubts singly; but if your intention
+is rather to confute me than to seek instruction for yourself, it shall
+be as you please; I will either answer you immediately on every point,
+or stay till you have finished your discourse.</p>
+
+<p>II. Very well, says Cotta; then let us proceed as our conversation shall
+direct. But before I enter on the subject, I have a word to say
+concerning myself; for I am greatly influenced by your authority, and
+your exhortation at the conclusion of your discourse, when you desired
+me to remember that I was Cotta and Pontifex; by which I presume you
+intimated that I should defend the sacred rites and religion and
+ceremonies which we received from our ancestors. Most undoubtedly I
+always have, and always shall defend them, nor shall the arguments
+either of the learned or unlearned ever remove the opinions which I have
+imbibed from them concerning the worship of the immortal Gods. In
+matters of religion I submit to the rules of the high-priests, T.
+Coruncanius, P. Scipio, and P. ScÊvola; not to the sentiments of Zeno,
+Cleanthes, or Chrysippus; and I pay a greater regard to what C. LÊlius,
+one of our augurs and wise men, has written concerning religion, in that
+noble oration of his, than to the most eminent of the Stoics: and as the
+whole religion of the Romans at <a id="page-320"></a><span class="pgnum">320</span>first consisted in sacrifices and
+divination by birds, to which have since been added predictions, if the
+interpreters<a id="FNA-242"></a><a href="#FN-242"><sup>242</sup></a> of the Sibylline oracle or the aruspices have foretold
+any event from portents and prodigies, I have ever thought that there
+was no point of all these holy things which deserved to be despised. I
+have been even persuaded that Romulus, by instituting divination, and
+Numa, by establishing sacrifices, laid the foundation of Rome, which
+undoubtedly would never have risen to such a height of grandeur if the
+Gods had not been made propitious by this worship. These, Balbus, are my
+sentiments both as a priest and as Cotta. But you must bring me to your
+opinion by the force of your reason: for I have a right to demand from
+you, as a philosopher, a reason for the religion which you would have me
+embrace. But I must believe the religion of our ancestors without any
+proof.</p>
+
+<p>III. What proof, says Balbus, do you require of me? You have proposed,
+says Cotta, four articles. First of all, you undertook to prove that
+there “are Gods;” secondly, “of what kind and character they are;”
+thirdly, that “the universe is governed by them;” lastly, that “they
+provide for the welfare of mankind in particular.” Thus, if I remember
+rightly, you divided your discourse. Exactly so, replies Balbus; but let
+us see what you require.</p>
+
+<p>Let us examine, says Cotta, every proposition. The first one—that there
+are Gods—is never contested but by the most impious of men; nay, though
+it can never be rooted out of my mind, yet I believe it on the authority
+of our ancestors, and not on the proofs which you have brought. Why do
+you expect a proof from me, says Balbus, if you thoroughly believe it?
+Because, says Cotta, I come to this discussion as if I had never thought
+of the Gods, or heard anything concerning them. Take me as a disciple
+wholly ignorant and unbiassed, and prove to me all the points which I
+ask.</p>
+
+<p>Begin, then, replies Balbus. I would first know, says Cotta, why you
+have been so long in proving the existence of the Gods, which you said
+was a point so very evident to all, that there was no need of any proof?
+In that, answers <a id="page-321"></a><span class="pgnum">321</span>Balbus, I have followed your example, whom I have
+often observed, when pleading in the Forum, to load the judge with all
+the arguments which the nature of your cause would permit. This also is
+the practice of philosophers, and I have a right to follow it. Besides,
+you may as well ask me why I look upon you with two eyes, since I can
+see you with one.</p>
+
+<p>IV. You shall judge, then, yourself, says Cotta, if this is a very just
+comparison; for, when I plead, I do not dwell upon any point agreed to
+be self-evident, because long reasoning only serves to confound the
+clearest matters; besides, though I might take this method in pleading,
+yet I should not make use of it in such a discourse as this, which
+requires the nicest distinction. And with regard to your making use of
+one eye only when you look on me, there is no reason for it, since
+together they have the same view; and since nature, to which you
+attribute wisdom, has been pleased to give us two passages by which we
+receive light. But the truth is, that it was because you did not think
+that the existence of the Gods was so evident as you could wish that you
+therefore brought so many proofs. It was sufficient for me to believe it
+on the tradition of our ancestors; and since you disregard authorities,
+and appeal to reason, permit my reason to defend them against yours. The
+proofs on which you found the existence of the Gods tend only to render
+a proposition doubtful that, in my opinion, is not so; I have not only
+retained in my memory the whole of these proofs, but even the order in
+which you proposed them. The first was, that when we lift up our eyes
+towards the heavens, we immediately conceive that there is some divinity
+that governs those celestial bodies; on which you quoted this passage—</p>
+
+<div class="poem">
+<p>Look up to the refulgent heaven above,</p>
+<p>Which all men call, unanimously, Jove;</p>
+</div>
+
+<p class="cont">intimating that we should invoke that as Jupiter, rather than our
+Capitoline Jove<a id="FNA-243"></a><a href="#FN-243"><sup>243</sup></a>, or that it is evident to the whole world that
+those bodies are Gods which Velleius and many others do not place even
+in the rank of animated beings.</p>
+
+<p><a id="page-322"></a><span class="pgnum">322</span>Another strong proof, in your opinion, was that the belief of the
+existence of the Gods was universal, and that mankind was daily more and
+more convinced of it. What! should an affair of such importance be left
+to the decision of fools, who, by your sect especially, are called
+madmen?</p>
+
+<p>V. But the Gods have appeared to us, as to Posthumius at the Lake
+Regillus, and to Vatienus in the Salarian Way: something you mentioned,
+too, I know not what, of a battle of the Locrians at Sagra. Do you
+believe that the TyndaridÊ, as you called them; that is, men sprung from
+men, and who were buried in LacedÊmon, as we learn from Homer, who lived
+in the next age—do you believe, I say, that they appeared to Vatienus
+on the road mounted on white horses, without any servant to attend them,
+to tell the victory of the Romans to a country fellow rather than to M.
+Cato, who was at that time the chief person of the senate? Do you take
+that print of a horse’s hoof which is now to be seen on a stone at
+Regillus to be made by Castor’s horse? Should you not believe, what is
+probable, that the souls of eminent men, such as the TyndaridÊ, are
+divine and immortal, rather than that those bodies which had been
+reduced to ashes should mount on horses, and fight in an army? If you
+say that was possible, you ought to show how it is so, and not amuse us
+with fabulous old women’s stories.</p>
+
+<p>Do you take these for fabulous stories? says Balbus. Is not the temple,
+built by Posthumius in honor of Castor and Pollux, to be seen in the
+Forum? Is not the decree of the senate concerning Vatienus still
+subsisting? As to the affair of Sagra, it is a common proverb among the
+Greeks; when they would affirm anything strongly, they say “It is as
+certain as what passed at Sagra.” Ought not such authorities to move
+you? You oppose me, replies Cotta, with stories, but I ask reasons of
+you<a id="FNA-244"></a><a href="#FN-244"><sup>244</sup></a>. * * *</p>
+
+<p>VI. We are now to speak of predictions. No one can avoid what is to
+come, and, indeed, it is commonly useless to know it; for it is a
+miserable case to be afflicted to no purpose, and not to have even the
+last, the common comfort, <a id="page-323"></a><span class="pgnum">323</span>hope, which, according to your principles,
+none can have; for you say that fate governs all things, and call that
+fate which has been true from all eternity. What advantage, then, is the
+knowledge of futurity to us, or how does it assist us to guard against
+impending evils, since it will come inevitably?</p>
+
+<p>But whence comes that divination? To whom is owing that knowledge from
+the entrails of beasts? Who first made observations from the voice of
+the crow? Who invented the Lots?<a id="FNA-245"></a><a href="#FN-245"><sup>245</sup></a> Not that I give no credit to these
+things, or that I despise Attius Navius’s staff, which you mentioned;
+but I ought to be informed how these things are understood by
+philosophers, especially as the diviners are often wrong in their
+conjectures. But physicians, you say, are likewise often mistaken. What
+comparison can there be between divination, of the origin of which we
+are ignorant, and physic, which proceeds on principles intelligible to
+every one? You believe that the Decii,<a id="FNA-246"></a><a href="#FN-246"><sup>246</sup></a> in devoting themselves to
+death, appeased the Gods. How great, then, was the iniquity of the Gods
+that they could not be appeased but at the price of such noble blood!
+That was the stratagem of generals such as the Greeks call <span class="greek">στρατ᜵γηΌα</span>,
+and it was a stratagem worthy such illustrious leaders, who consulted
+the public good even at the expense of their lives: they conceived
+rightly, what indeed happened, that if the general rode furiously upon
+the enemy, the whole army would follow his example. As to the voice of
+the Fauns, I never heard it. If you assure me that you have, I shall
+believe you, though I really know not what a Faun is.</p>
+
+<p>VII. I do not, then, O Balbus, from anything that you have said,
+perceive as yet that it is proved that there are Gods. I believe it,
+indeed, but not from any arguments of the Stoics. Cleanthes, you have
+said, attributes the idea that men have of the Gods to four causes. In
+the first place (as I have already sufficiently mentioned), to a
+foreknowledge <a id="page-324"></a><span class="pgnum">324</span>of future events; secondly, to tempests, and other shocks
+of nature; thirdly, to the utility and plenty of things we enjoy;
+fourthly, to the invariable order of the stars and the heavens. The
+arguments drawn from foreknowledge I have already answered. With regard
+to tempests in the air, the sea, and the earth, I own that many people
+are affrighted by them, and imagine that the immortal Gods are the
+authors of them.</p>
+
+<p>But the question is, not whether there are people who believe that there
+are Gods, but whether there are Gods or not. As to the two other causes
+of Cleanthes, one of which is derived from the great abundance of
+desirable things which we enjoy, the other from the invariable order of
+the seasons and the heavens, I shall treat on them when I answer your
+discourse concerning the providence of the Gods—a point, Balbus, upon
+which you have spoken at great length. I shall likewise defer till then
+examining the argument which you attribute to Chrysippus, that “if there
+is in nature anything which surpasses the power of man to produce, there
+must consequently be some being better than man.” I shall also postpone,
+till we come to that part of my argument, your comparison of the world
+to a fine house, your observations on the proportion and harmony of the
+universe, and those smart, short reasons of Zeno which you quote; and I
+shall examine at the same time your reasons drawn from natural
+philosophy, concerning that fiery force and that vital heat which you
+regard as the principle of all things; and I will investigate, in its
+proper place, all that you advanced the other day on the existence of
+the Gods, and on the sense and understanding which you attributed to the
+sun, the moon, and all the stars; and I shall ask you this question over
+and over again, By what proofs are you convinced yourself there are
+Gods?</p>
+
+<p>VIII. I thought, says Balbus, that I had brought ample proofs to
+establish this point. But such is your manner of opposing, that, when
+you seem on the point of interrogating me, and when I am preparing to
+answer, you suddenly divert the discourse, and give me no opportunity to
+reply to you; and thus those most important points concerning divination
+and fate are neglected which we Stoics <a id="page-325"></a><span class="pgnum">325</span>have thoroughly examined, but
+which your school has only slightly touched upon. But they are not
+thought essential to the question in hand; therefore, if you think
+proper, do not confuse them together, that we in this discussion may
+come to a clear explanation of the subject of our present inquiry.</p>
+
+<p>Very well, says Cotta. Since, then, you have divided the whole question
+into four parts, and I have said all that I had to say on the first, I
+will take the second into consideration; in which, when you attempted to
+show what the character of the Gods was, you seemed to me rather to
+prove that there are none; for you said that it was the greatest
+difficulty to draw our minds from the prepossessions of the eyes; but
+that as nothing is more excellent than the Deity, you did not doubt that
+the world was God, because there is nothing better in nature than the
+world, and so we may reasonably think it animated, or, rather, perceive
+it in our minds as clearly as if it were obvious to our eyes.</p>
+
+<p>Now, in what sense do you say there is nothing better than the world? If
+you mean that there is nothing more beautiful, I agree with you; that
+there is nothing more adapted to our wants, I likewise agree with you:
+but if you mean that nothing is wiser than the world, I am by no means
+of your opinion. Not that I find it difficult to conceive anything in my
+mind independent of my eyes; on the contrary, the more I separate my
+mind from my eyes, the less I am able to comprehend your opinion.</p>
+
+<p>IX. Nothing is better than the world, you say. Nor is there, indeed,
+anything on earth better than the city of Rome; do you think, therefore,
+that our city has a mind; that it thinks and reasons; or that this most
+beautiful city, being void of sense, is not preferable to an ant,
+because an ant has sense, understanding, reason, and memory? You should
+consider, Balbus, what ought to be allowed you, and not advance things
+because they please you.</p>
+
+<p>For that old, concise, and, as it seemed to you, acute syllogism of Zeno
+has been all which you have so much enlarged upon in handling this
+topic: “That which reasons is superior to that which does not; nothing
+is superior to the world; therefore the world reasons.” If you would
+<a id="page-326"></a><span class="pgnum">326</span>prove also that the world can very well read a book, follow the example
+of Zeno, and say, “That which can read is better than that which cannot;
+nothing is better than the world; the world therefore can read.” After
+the same manner you may prove the world to be an orator, a
+mathematician, a musician—that it possesses all sciences, and, in
+short, is a philosopher. You have often said that God made all things,
+and that no cause can produce an effect unlike itself. From hence it
+will follow, not only that the world is animated, and is wise, but also
+plays upon the fiddle and the flute, because it produces men who play on
+those instruments. Zeno, therefore, the chief of your sect, advances no
+argument sufficient to induce us to think that the world reasons, or,
+indeed, that it is animated at all, and consequently none to think it a
+Deity; though it may be said that there is nothing superior to it, as
+there is nothing more beautiful, nothing more useful to us, nothing more
+adorned, and nothing more regular in its motions. But if the world,
+considered as one great whole, is not God, you should not surely deify,
+as you have done, that infinite multitude of stars which only form a
+part of it, and which so delight you with the regularity of their
+eternal courses; not but that there is something truly wonderful and
+incredible in their regularity; but this regularity of motion, Balbus,
+may as well be ascribed to a natural as to a divine cause.</p>
+
+<p>X. What can be more regular than the flux and reflux of the Euripus at
+Chalcis, the Sicilian sea, and the violence of the ocean in those
+parts<a id="FNA-247"></a><a href="#FN-247"><sup>247</sup></a></p>
+
+<div class="poem">
+<p class="L6" style="margin-left: 15ex">where the rapid tide</p>
+<p>Does Europe from the Libyan coast divide?</p>
+</div>
+
+<p class="cont">The same appears on the Spanish and British coasts. Must we conclude
+that some Deity appoints and directs these ebbings and flowings to
+certain fixed times? Consider, I pray, if everything which is regular in
+its motion is deemed divine, whether it will not follow that tertian and
+quartan agues must likewise be so, as their returns have the greatest
+regularity. These effects are to be explained by reason; but, because
+you are unable to assign any, you have recourse to a Deity as your last
+refuge.</p>
+
+<p><a id="page-327"></a><span class="pgnum">327</span>The arguments of Chrysippus appeared to you of great weight; a
+man undoubtedly of great quickness and subtlety (I call those quick who
+have a sprightly turn of thought, and those subtle whose minds are
+seasoned by use as their hands are by labor): “If,” says he, “there is
+anything which is beyond the power of man to produce, the being who
+produces it is better than man. Man is unable to make what is in the
+world; the being, therefore, that could do it is superior to man. What
+being is there but a God superior to man? Therefore there is a God.”</p>
+
+<p>These arguments are founded on the same erroneous principles as Zeno’s,
+for he does not define what is meant by being better or more excellent,
+or distinguish between an intelligent cause and a natural cause.
+Chrysippus adds, “If there are no Gods, there is nothing better than
+man; but we cannot, without the highest arrogance, have this idea of
+ourselves.” Let us grant that it is arrogance in man to think himself
+better than the world; but to comprehend that he has understanding and
+reason, and that in Orion and Canicula there is neither, is no
+arrogance, but an indication of good sense. “Since we suppose,”
+continues he, “when we see a beautiful house, that it was built for the
+master, and not for mice, we should likewise judge that the world is the
+mansion of the Gods.” Yes, if I believed that the Gods built the world;
+but not if, as I believe, and intend to prove, it is the work of nature.</p>
+
+<p>XI. Socrates, in Xenophon, asks, “Whence had man his understanding, if
+there was none in the world?” And I ask, Whence had we speech, harmony,
+singing; unless we think it is the sun conversing with the moon when she
+approaches near it, or that the world forms an harmonious concert, as
+Pythagoras imagines? This, Balbus, is the effect of nature; not of that
+nature which proceeds artificially, as Zeno says, and the character of
+which I shall presently examine into, but a nature which, by its own
+proper motions and mutations, modifies everything.</p>
+
+<p>For I readily agree to what you said about the harmony and general
+agreement of nature, which you pronounced to be firmly bound and united
+together, as it were, by ties of blood; but I do not approve of what you
+added, that “it could not possibly be so, unless it were so united by
+<a id="page-328"></a><span class="pgnum">328</span>one divine spirit.” On the contrary, the whole subsists by the power of
+nature, independently of the Gods, and there is a kind of sympathy (as
+the Greeks call it) which joins together all the parts of the universe;
+and the greater that is in its own power, the less is it necessary to
+have recourse to a divine intelligence.</p>
+
+<p>XII. But how will you get rid of the objections which Carneades made?
+“If,” says he, “there is no body immortal, there is none eternal; but
+there is no body immortal, nor even indivisible, or that cannot be
+separated and disunited; and as every animal is in its nature passive,
+so there is not one which is not subject to the impressions of
+extraneous bodies; none, that is to say, which can avoid the necessity
+of enduring and suffering: and if every animal is mortal, there is none
+immortal; so, likewise, if every animal may be cut up and divided, there
+is none indivisible, none eternal, but all are liable to be affected by,
+and compelled to submit to, external power. Every animal, therefore, is
+necessarily mortal, dissoluble, and divisible.”</p>
+
+<p>For as there is no wax, no silver, no brass which cannot be converted
+into something else, whatever is composed of wax, or silver, or brass
+may cease to be what it is. By the same reason, if all the elements are
+mutable, every body is mutable.</p>
+
+<p>Now, according to your doctrine, all the elements are mutable; all
+bodies, therefore, are mutable. But if there were any body immortal,
+then all bodies would not be mutable. Every body, then, is mortal; for
+every body is either water, air, fire, or earth, or composed of the four
+elements together, or of some of them. Now, there is not one of all
+these elements that does not perish; for earthly bodies are fragile:
+water is so soft that the least shock will separate its parts, and fire
+and air yield to the least impulse, and are subject to dissolution;
+besides, any of these elements perish when converted into another
+nature, as when water is formed from earth, the air from water, and the
+sky from air, and when they change in the same manner back again.
+Therefore, if there is nothing but what is perishable in the composition
+of all animals, there is no animal eternal.</p>
+
+<p>XIII. But, not to insist on these arguments, there is no <a id="page-329"></a><span class="pgnum">329</span>animal to be
+found that had not a beginning, and will not have an end; for every
+animal being sensitive, they are consequently all sensible of cold and
+heat, sweet and bitter; nor can they have pleasing sensations without
+being subject to the contrary. As, therefore, they receive pleasure,
+they likewise receive pain; and whatever being is subject to pain must
+necessarily be subject to death. It must be allowed, therefore, that
+every animal is mortal.</p>
+
+<p>Besides, a being that is not sensible of pleasure or pain cannot have
+the essence of an animal; if, then, on the one hand, every animal must
+be sensible of pleasure and pain, and if, on the other, every being that
+has these sensations cannot be immortal, we may conclude that as there
+is no animal insensible, there is none immortal. Besides, there is no
+animal without inclination and aversion—an inclination to that which is
+agreeable to nature, and an aversion to the contrary: there are in the
+case of every animal some things which they covet, and others they
+reject. What they reject are repugnant to their nature, and consequently
+would destroy them. Every animal, therefore, is inevitably subject to be
+destroyed. There are innumerable arguments to prove that whatever is
+sensitive is perishable; for cold, heat, pleasure, pain, and all that
+affects the sense, when they become excessive, cause destruction. Since,
+then, there is no animal that is not sensitive, there is none immortal.</p>
+
+<p>XIV. The substance of an animal is either simple or compound; simple, if
+it is composed only of earth, of fire, of air, or of water (and of such
+a sort of being we can form no idea); compound, if it is formed of
+different elements, which have each their proper situation, and have a
+natural tendency to it—this element tending towards the highest parts,
+that towards the lowest, and another towards the middle. This
+conjunction may for some time subsist, but not forever; for every
+element must return to its first situation. No animal, therefore, is
+eternal.</p>
+
+<p>But your school, Balbus, allows fire only to be the sole active
+principle; an opinion which I believe you derive from Heraclitus, whom
+some men understand in one sense, some in another: but since he seems
+unwilling to be understood, we will pass him by. You Stoics, then, say
+that <a id="page-330"></a><span class="pgnum">330</span>fire is the universal principle of all things; that all living
+bodies cease to live on the extinction of that heat; and that throughout
+all nature whatever is sensible of that heat lives and flourishes. Now,
+I cannot conceive that bodies should perish for want of heat, rather
+than for want of moisture or air, especially as they even die through
+excess of heat; so that the life of animals does not depend more on fire
+than on the other elements.</p>
+
+<p>However, air and water have this quality in common with fire and heat.
+But let us see to what this tends. If I am not mistaken, you believe
+that in all nature there is nothing but fire, which is self-animated.
+Why fire rather than air, of which the life of animals consists, and
+which is called from thence <i>anima</i>,<a id="FNA-248"></a><a href="#FN-248"><sup>248</sup></a> the soul? But how is it that
+you take it for granted that life is nothing but fire? It seems more
+probable that it is a compound of fire and air. But if fire is
+self-animated, unmixed with any other element, it must be sensitive,
+because it renders our bodies sensitive; and the same objection which I
+just now made will arise, that whatever is sensitive must necessarily be
+susceptible of pleasure and pain, and whatever is sensible of pain is
+likewise subject to the approach of death; therefore you cannot prove
+fire to be eternal.</p>
+
+<p>You Stoics hold that all fire has need of nourishment, without which it
+cannot possibly subsist; that the sun, moon, and all the stars are fed
+either with fresh or salt waters; and the reason that Cleanthes gives
+why the sun is retrograde, and does not go beyond the tropics in the
+summer or winter, is that he may not be too far from his sustenance.
+This I shall fully examine hereafter; but at present we may conclude
+that whatever may cease to be cannot of its own nature be eternal; that
+if fire wants sustenance, it will cease to be, and that, therefore, fire
+is not of its own nature eternal.</p>
+
+<p>XV. After all, what kind of a Deity must that be who <a id="page-331"></a><span class="pgnum">331</span>is not graced with
+one single virtue, if we should succeed in forming this idea of such a
+one? Must we not attribute prudence to a Deity? a virtue which consists
+in the knowledge of things good, bad, and indifferent. Yet what need has
+a being for the discernment of good and ill who neither has nor can have
+any ill? Of what use is reason to him? of what use is understanding? We
+men, indeed, find them useful to aid us in finding out things which are
+obscure by those which are clear to us; but nothing can be obscure to a
+Deity. As to justice, which gives to every one his own, it is not the
+concern of the Gods; since that virtue, according to your doctrine,
+received its birth from men and from civil society. Temperance consists
+in abstinence from corporeal pleasures, and if such abstinence hath a
+place in heaven, so also must the pleasures abstained from. Lastly, if
+fortitude is ascribed to the Deity, how does it appear? In afflictions,
+in labor, in danger? None of these things can affect a God. How, then,
+can we conceive this to be a Deity that makes no use of reason, and is
+not endowed with any virtue?</p>
+
+<p>However, when I consider what is advanced by the Stoics, my contempt for
+the ignorant multitude vanishes. For these are their divinities. The
+Syrians worshipped a fish. The Egyptians consecrated beasts of almost
+every kind. The Greeks deified many men; as Alabandus<a id="FNA-249"></a><a href="#FN-249"><sup>249</sup></a> at AlabandÊ,
+Tenes at Tenedos; and all Greece pay divine honors to Leucothea (who was
+before called Ino), to her son PalÊmon, to Hercules, to Æsculapius, and
+to the TyndaridÊ; our own people to Romulus, and to many others, who, as
+citizens newly admitted into the ancient body, they imagine have been
+received into heaven.</p>
+
+<p>These are the Gods of the illiterate.</p>
+
+<p>XVI. What are the notions of you philosophers? In what respect are they
+superior to these ideas? I shall pass them over; for they are certainly
+very admirable. Let the world, then, be a Deity, for that, I conceive,
+is what you mean by</p>
+
+<div class="poem">
+<p class="L4">The refulgent heaven above,</p>
+<p>Which all men call, unanimously, Jove.</p>
+</div>
+
+<p><a id="page-332"></a><span class="pgnum">332</span>But why are we to add many more Gods? What a multitude of them there
+is! At least, it seems so to me; for every constellation, according to
+you, is a Deity: to some you give the name of beasts, as the goat, the
+scorpion, the bull, the lion; to others the names of inanimate things,
+as the ship, the altar, the crown.</p>
+
+<p>But supposing these were to be allowed, how can the rest be granted, or
+even so much as understood? When we call corn Ceres, and wine Bacchus,
+we make use of the common manner of speaking; but do you think any one
+so mad as to believe that his food is a Deity? With regard to those who,
+you say, from having been men became Gods, I should be very willing to
+learn of you, either how it was possible formerly, or, if it had ever
+been, why is it not so now? I do not conceive, as things are at present,
+how Hercules,</p>
+
+<div class="poem">
+<p>Burn’d with fiery torches on Mount Œta,</p>
+</div>
+
+<p class="cont">as Accius says, should rise, with the flames,</p>
+
+<div class="poem">
+<p>To the eternal mansions of his father.</p>
+</div>
+
+<p>Besides, Homer also says that Ulysses<a id="FNA-250"></a><a href="#FN-250"><sup>250</sup></a> met him in the shades below,
+among the other dead.</p>
+
+<p>But yet I should be glad to know which Hercules we should chiefly
+worship; for they who have searched into those histories, which are but
+little known, tell us of several. The most ancient is he who fought with
+Apollo about the Tripos of Delphi, and is son of Jupiter and Lisyto; and
+of the most ancient Jupiters too, for we find many Jupiters also in the
+Grecian chronicles. The second is the Egyptian Hercules, and is believed
+to be the son of Nilus, and to be the author of the Phrygian characters.
+The third, to whom they offered sacrifices, is one of the <a id="page-333"></a><span class="pgnum">333</span>IdÊi
+Dactyli.<a id="FNA-251"></a><a href="#FN-251"><sup>251</sup></a> The fourth is the son of Jupiter and Asteria, the sister
+of Latona, chiefly honored by the Tyrians, who pretend that
+Carthago<a id="FNA-252"></a><a href="#FN-252"><sup>252</sup></a> is his daughter. The fifth, called Belus, is worshipped in
+India. The sixth is the son of Alcmena by Jupiter; but by the third
+Jupiter, for there are many Jupiters, as you shall soon see.</p>
+
+<p>XVII. Since this examination has led me so far, I will convince you that
+in matters of religion I have learned more from the pontifical rites,
+the customs of our ancestors, and the vessels of Numa,<a id="FNA-253"></a><a href="#FN-253"><sup>253</sup></a> which LÊlius
+mentions in his little Golden Oration, than from all the learning of the
+Stoics; for tell me, if I were a disciple of your school, what answer
+could I make to these questions? If there are Gods, are nymphs also
+Goddesses? If they are Goddesses, are Pans and Satyrs in the same rank?
+But they are not; consequently, nymphs are not Goddesses. Yet they have
+temples publicly dedicated to them. What do you conclude from thence?
+Others who have temples are not therefore Gods. But let us go on. You
+call Jupiter and Neptune Gods; their brother Pluto, then, is one; and if
+so, those rivers also are Deities which they say flow in the infernal
+regions—Acheron, Cocytus, Pyriphlegethon; Charon also, and Cerberus,
+are Gods; but that cannot be allowed; nor can Pluto be placed among the
+Deities. What, then, will you say of his brothers?</p>
+
+<p>Thus reasons Carneades; not with any design to destroy the existence of
+the Gods (for what would less become a philosopher?), but to convince us
+that on that matter the Stoics have said nothing plausible. If, then,
+Jupiter and Neptune are Gods, adds he, can that divinity be denied to
+their father Saturn, who is principally worshipped throughout the West?
+If Saturn is a God, then must his father, Cœlus, be one too, and so must
+the parents of Cœlus, which are the Sky and Day, as also their brothers
+and sisters, which by ancient genealogists are <a id="page-334"></a><span class="pgnum">334</span>thus named: Love,
+Deceit, Fear, Labor, Envy, Fate, Old Age, Death, Darkness, Misery,
+Lamentation, Favor, Fraud, Obstinacy, the Destinies, the Hesperides, and
+Dreams; all which are the offspring of Erebus and Night. These monstrous
+Deities, therefore, must be received, or else those from whom they
+sprung must be disallowed.</p>
+
+<p>XVIII. If you say that Apollo, Vulcan, Mercury, and the rest of that
+sort are Gods, can you doubt the divinity of Hercules and Æsculapius,
+Bacchus, Castor and Pollux? These are worshipped as much as those, and
+even more in some places. Therefore they must be numbered among the
+Gods, though on the mother’s side they are only of mortal race.
+AristÊus, who is said to have been the son of Apollo, and to have found
+out the art of making oil from the olive; Theseus, the son of Neptune;
+and the rest whose fathers were Deities, shall they not be placed in the
+number of the Gods? But what think you of those whose mothers were
+Goddesses? They surely have a better title to divinity; for, in the
+civil law, as he is a freeman who is born of a freewoman, so, in the law
+of nature, he whose mother is a Goddess must be a God. The isle
+AstypalÊa religiously honor Achilles; and if he is a Deity, Orpheus and
+Rhesus are so, who were born of one of the Muses; unless, perhaps, there
+may be a privilege belonging to sea marriages which land marriages have
+not. Orpheus and Rhesus are nowhere worshipped; and if they are
+therefore not Gods, because they are nowhere worshipped as such, how can
+the others be Deities? You, Balbus, seemed to agree with me that the
+honors which they received were not from their being regarded as
+immortals, but as men richly endued with virtue.</p>
+
+<p>But if you think Latona a Goddess, how can you avoid admitting Hecate to
+be one also, who was the daughter of Asteria, Latona’s sister? Certainly
+she is one, if we may judge by the altars erected to her in Greece. And
+if Hecate is a Goddess, how can you refuse that rank to the Eumenides?
+for they also have a temple at Athens, and, if I understand right, the
+Romans have consecrated a grove to them. The Furies, too, whom we look
+upon as the inspectors into and scourges of impiety, I suppose, must
+have their divinity too. As you hold that there is some divinity
+<a id="page-335"></a><span class="pgnum">335</span>presides over every human affair, there is one who presides over the
+travail of matrons, whose name, <i>Natio</i>, is derived <i>a nascentibus</i>,
+from nativities, and to whom we used to sacrifice in our processions in
+the fields of ArdÊa; but if she is a Deity, we must likewise acknowledge
+all those you mentioned, Honor, Faith, Intellect, Concord; by the same
+rule also, Hope, Juno, Moneta,<a id="FNA-254"></a><a href="#FN-254"><sup>254</sup></a> and every idle phantom, every child
+of our imagination, are Deities. But as this consequence is quite
+inadmissible, do not you either defend the cause from which it flows.</p>
+
+<p>XIX. What say you to this? If these are Deities, which we worship and
+regard as such, why are not Serapis and Isis<a id="FNA-255"></a><a href="#FN-255"><sup>255</sup></a> placed in the same
+rank? And if they are admitted, what reason have we to reject the Gods
+of the barbarians? Thus we should deify oxen, horses, the ibis, hawks,
+asps, crocodiles, fishes, dogs, wolves, cats, and many other beasts. If
+we go back to the source of this superstition, we must equally condemn
+all the Deities from which they proceed. Shall Ino, whom the Greeks call
+Leucothea, and we Matuta, be reputed a Goddess, because she was the
+daughter of Cadmus, and shall that title be refused to Circe and
+Pasiphae,<a id="FNA-256"></a><a href="#FN-256"><sup>256</sup></a> who had the sun for their father, and Perseis, daughter
+of the Ocean, for their mother? It is true, Circe has divine honors paid
+her by our colony of CircÊum; therefore you call her a Goddess; but what
+will you say of Medea, the granddaughter of the Sun and the Ocean, and
+daughter of Æetes and Idyia? What will you say of her brother Absyrtus,
+whom Pacuvius calls Ægialeus, though the other name is more frequent in
+the writings of the ancients? If you did not deify one as well as the
+other, what will become of Ino? for all these Deities have the same
+origin.</p>
+
+<p>Shall Amphiaraus and Tryphonius be called Gods? Our publicans, when some
+lands in Bœotia were exempted from the tax, as belonging to the immortal
+Gods, denied that <a id="page-336"></a><span class="pgnum">336</span>any were immortal who had been men. But if you deify
+these, Erechtheus surely is a God, whose temple and priest we have seen
+at Athens. And can you, then, refuse to acknowledge also Codrus, and
+many others who shed their blood for the preservation of their country?
+And if it is not allowable to consider all these men as Gods, then,
+certainly, probabilities are not in favor of our acknowledging the
+<i>Divinity</i> of those previously mentioned beings from whom these have
+proceeded.</p>
+
+<p>It is easy to observe, likewise, that if in many countries people have
+paid divine honors to the memory of those who have signalized their
+courage, it was done in order to animate others to practise virtue, and
+to expose themselves the more willingly to dangers in their country’s
+cause. From this motive the Athenians have deified Erechtheus and his
+daughters, and have erected also a temple, called Leocorion, to the
+daughters of Leus.<a id="FNA-257"></a><a href="#FN-257"><sup>257</sup></a> Alabandus is more honored in the city which he
+founded than any of the more illustrious Deities; from thence
+Stratonicus had a pleasant turn—as he had many—when he was troubled
+with an impertinent fellow who insisted that Alabandus was a God, but
+that Hercules was not; “Very well,” says he, “then let the anger of
+Alabandus fall upon me, and that of Hercules upon you.”</p>
+
+<p>XX. Do you not consider, Balbus, to what lengths your arguments for the
+divinity of the heaven and the stars will carry you? You deify the sun
+and the moon, which the Greeks take to be Apollo and Diana. If the moon
+is a Deity, the morning-star, the other planets, and all the fixed stars
+are also Deities; and why shall not the rainbow be placed in that
+number? for it is so wonderfully beautiful that it is justly said to be
+the daughter of Thaumas.<a id="FNA-258"></a><a href="#FN-258"><sup>258</sup></a> But if you deify the rainbow, what regard
+will you pay to the clouds? for the colors which appear in the bow are
+only formed of the clouds, one of which is said to have brought forth
+the Centaurs; and if you deify the clouds, you cannot pay less regard to
+the seasons, which the Roman people have really consecrated. Tempests,
+showers, <a id="page-337"></a><span class="pgnum">337</span>storms, and whirlwinds must then be Deities. It is certain, at
+least, that our captains used to sacrifice a victim to the waves before
+they embarked on any voyage.</p>
+
+<p>As you deify the earth under the name of Ceres,<a id="FNA-259"></a><a href="#FN-259"><sup>259</sup></a> because, as you
+said, she bears fruits (<i>a gerendo</i>), and the ocean under that of
+Neptune, rivers and fountains have the same right. Thus we see that
+Maso, the conqueror of Corsica, dedicated a temple to a fountain, and
+the names of the Tiber, Spino, Almo, Nodinus, and other neighboring
+rivers are in the prayers<a id="FNA-260"></a><a href="#FN-260"><sup>260</sup></a> of the augurs. Therefore, either the
+number of such Deities will be infinite, or we must admit none of them,
+and wholly disapprove of such an endless series of superstition.</p>
+
+<p>XXI. None of all these assertions, then, are to be admitted. I must
+proceed now, Balbus, to answer those who say that, with regard to those
+deified mortals, so religiously and devoutly reverenced, the public
+opinion should have the force of reality. To begin, then: they who are
+called theologists say that there are three Jupiters; the first and
+second of whom were born in Arcadia; one of whom was the son of Æther,
+and father of Proserpine and Bacchus; the other the son of Cœlus, and
+father of Minerva, who is called the Goddess and inventress of war; the
+third one born of Saturn in the isle of Crete,<a id="FNA-261"></a><a href="#FN-261"><sup>261</sup></a> where his sepulchre
+is shown. The sons of Jupiter (<span class="greek">Δι᜹σκουροι</span>) also, among the Greeks, have
+many names; first, the three who at Athens have the title of
+Anactes,<a id="FNA-262"></a><a href="#FN-262"><sup>262</sup></a> Tritopatreus, Eubuleus, and Dionysus, sons of the most
+ancient king Jupiter and Proserpine; the next are Castor and Pollux,
+sons of the third Jupiter and Leda; and, lastly, three others, by some
+called Alco,<a id="FNA-263"></a><a href="#FN-263"><sup>263</sup></a> Melampus, and Tmolus, sons of Atreus, the son of
+Pelops.</p>
+
+<p><a id="page-338"></a><span class="pgnum">338</span>As to the Muses, there were at first four—Thelxiope, Aœde, Arche, and
+Melete—daughters of the second Jupiter; afterward there were nine,
+daughters of the third Jupiter and Mnemosyne; there were also nine
+others, having the same appellations, born of Pierus and Antiopa, by the
+poets usually called Pierides and PieriÊ. Though <i>Sol</i> (the sun) is so
+called, you say, because he is <i>solus</i> (single); yet how many suns do
+theologists mention? There is one, the son of Jupiter and grandson of
+Æther; another, the son of Hyperion; a third, who, the Egyptians say,
+was of the city Heliopolis, sprung from Vulcan, the son of Nilus; a
+fourth is said to have been born at Rhodes of Acantho, in the times of
+the heroes, and was the grandfather of Jalysus, Camirus, and Lindus; a
+fifth, of whom, it is pretended, Aretes and Circe were born at Colchis.</p>
+
+<p>XXII. There are likewise several Vulcans. The first (who had of Minerva
+that Apollo whom the ancient historians call the tutelary God of Athens)
+was the son of Cœlus; the second, whom the Egyptians call Opas,<a id="FNA-264"></a><a href="#FN-264"><sup>264</sup></a> and
+whom they looked upon as the protector of Egypt, is the son of Nilus;
+the third, who is said to have been the master of the forges at Lemnos,
+was the son of the third Jupiter and of Juno; the fourth, who possessed
+the islands near Sicily called VulcaniÊ,<a id="FNA-265"></a><a href="#FN-265"><sup>265</sup></a> was the son of Menalius.
+One Mercury had Cœlus for his father and Dies for his mother; another,
+who is said to dwell in a cavern, and is the same as Trophonius, is the
+son of Valens and Phoronis. A third, of whom, and of Penelope, Pan was
+the offspring, is the son of the third Jupiter and Maia. A fourth, whom
+the Egyptians think it a crime to name, is the son of Nilus. A fifth,
+whom we call, in their language, Thoth, as with them the first month of
+the year is called, is he whom the people of Pheneum<a id="FNA-266"></a><a href="#FN-266"><sup>266</sup></a> worship, and
+who is said to have killed Argus, to have fled for it into Egypt, and to
+have given laws and learning to the Egyptians. The first of the
+Æsculapii, the God of Arcadia, who is said to have invented the probe
+and to have been the first person who taught men to use bandages for
+wounds, is the son of <a id="page-339"></a><span class="pgnum">339</span>Apollo. The second, who was killed with thunder,
+and is said to be buried in Cynosura,<a id="FNA-267"></a><a href="#FN-267"><sup>267</sup></a> is the brother of the second
+Mercury. The third, who is said to have found out the art of purging the
+stomach, and of drawing teeth, is the son of Arsippus and Arsinoe; and
+in Arcadia there is shown his tomb, and the wood which is consecrated to
+him, near the river Lusium.</p>
+
+<p>XXIII. I have already spoken of the most ancient of the Apollos, who is
+the son of Vulcan, and tutelar God of Athens. There is another, son of
+Corybas, and native of Crete, for which island he is said to have
+contended with Jupiter himself. A third, who came from the regions of
+the Hyperborei<a id="FNA-268"></a><a href="#FN-268"><sup>268</sup></a> to Delphi, is the son of the third Jupiter and of
+Latona. A fourth was of Arcadia, whom the Arcadians called Nomio,<a id="FNA-269"></a><a href="#FN-269"><sup>269</sup></a>
+because they regarded him as their legislator. There are likewise many
+Dianas. The first, who is thought to be the mother of the winged Cupid,
+is the daughter of Jupiter and Proserpine. The second, who is more
+known, is daughter of the third Jupiter and of Latona. The third, whom
+the Greeks often call by her father’s name, is the daughter of Upis<a id="FNA-270"></a><a href="#FN-270"><sup>270</sup></a>
+and Glauce. There are many also of the Dionysi. The first was the son of
+Jupiter and Proserpine. The second, who is said to have killed Nysa, was
+the son of Nilus. The third, who reigned in Asia, and for whom the
+Sabazia<a id="FNA-271"></a><a href="#FN-271"><sup>271</sup></a> were instituted, was the son of Caprius. The fourth, for
+whom they celebrate the Orphic festivals, sprung from Jupiter and Luna.
+The fifth, who is supposed to have instituted the Trieterides, was the
+son of Nysus and Thyone.</p>
+
+<p>The first Venus, who has a temple at Elis, was the daughter of Cœlus and
+Dies. The second arose out of the froth of the sea, and became, by
+Mercury, the mother of the second Cupid. The third, the daughter of
+Jupiter and Diana, was married to Vulcan, but is said to have had
+Anteros by Mars. The fourth was a Syrian, born of Tyro, who is called
+Astarte, and is said to have been married to <a id="page-340"></a><span class="pgnum">340</span>Adonis. I have already
+mentioned one Minerva, mother of Apollo. Another, who is worshipped at
+Sais, a city in Egypt, sprung from Nilus. The third, whom I have also
+mentioned, was daughter of Jupiter. The fourth, sprung from Jupiter and
+Coryphe, the daughter of the Ocean; the Arcadians call her Coria, and
+make her the inventress of chariots. A fifth, whom they paint with wings
+at her heels, was daughter of Pallas, and is said to have killed her
+father for endeavoring to violate her chastity. The first Cupid is said
+to be the son of Mercury and the first Diana; the second, of Mercury and
+the second Venus; the third, who is the same as Anteros, of Mars and the
+third Venus.</p>
+
+<p>All these opinions arise from old stories that were spread in Greece;
+the belief in which, Balbus, you well know, ought to be stopped, lest
+religion should suffer. But you Stoics, so far from refuting them, even
+give them authority by the mysterious sense which you pretend to find in
+them. Can you, then, think, after this plain refutation, that there is
+need to employ more subtle reasonings? But to return from this
+digression.</p>
+
+<p>XXIV. We see that the mind, faith, hope, virtue, honor, victory, health,
+concord, and things of such kind, are purely natural, and have nothing
+of divinity in them; for either they are inherent in us, as the mind,
+faith, hope, virtue, and concord are; or else they are to be desired, as
+honor, health, and victory. I know indeed that they are useful to us,
+and see that statues have been religiously erected for them; but as to
+their divinity, I shall begin to believe it when you have proved it for
+certain. Of this kind I may particularly mention Fortune, which is
+allowed to be ever inseparable from inconstancy and temerity, which are
+certainly qualities unworthy of a divine being.</p>
+
+<p>But what delight do you take in the explication of fables, and in the
+etymology of names?—that Cœlus was castrated by his son, and that
+Saturn was bound in chains by his son! By your defence of these and such
+like fictions you would make the authors of them appear not only not to
+be madmen, but to have been even very wise. But the pains which you take
+with your etymologies deserve our pity. That Saturn is so called because
+<i>se saturat annis</i>, he is full of years; Mavors, Mars, because <i>magna
+<a id="page-341"></a><span class="pgnum">341</span>vortit</i>, he brings about mighty changes; Minerva, because <i>minuit</i>, she
+diminishes, or because <i>minatur</i>, she threatens; Venus, because <i>venit
+ad omnia</i>, she comes to all; Ceres, <i>a gerendo</i>, from bearing. How
+dangerous is this method! for there are many names would puzzle you.
+>From what would you derive Vejupiter and Vulcan? Though, indeed, if you
+can derive Neptune <i>a nando</i>, from swimming, in which you seem to me to
+flounder about yourself more than Neptune, you may easily find the
+origin of all names, since it is founded only upon the conformity of
+some one letter. Zeno first, and after him Cleanthes and Chrysippus, are
+put to the unnecessary trouble of explaining mere fables, and giving
+reasons for the several appellations of every Deity; which is really
+owning that those whom we call Gods are not the representations of
+deities, but natural things, and that to judge otherwise is an error.</p>
+
+<p>XXV. Yet this error has so much prevailed that even pernicious things
+have not only the title of divinity ascribed to them, but have also
+sacrifices offered to them; for Fever has a temple on the Palatine hill,
+and Orbona another near that of the Lares, and we see on the Esquiline
+hill an altar consecrated to Ill-fortune. Let all such errors be
+banished from philosophy, if we would advance, in our dispute concerning
+the immortal Gods, nothing unworthy of immortal beings. I know myself
+what I ought to believe; which is far different from what you have said.
+You take Neptune for an intelligence pervading the sea. You have the
+same opinion of Ceres with regard to the earth. I cannot, I own, find
+out, or in the least conjecture, what that intelligence of the sea or
+the earth is. To learn, therefore, the existence of the Gods, and of
+what description and character they are, I must apply elsewhere, not to
+the Stoics.</p>
+
+<p>Let us proceed to the two other parts of our dispute: first, “whether
+there is a divine providence which governs the world;” and lastly,
+“whether that providence particularly regards mankind;” for these are
+the remaining propositions of your discourse; and I think that, if you
+approve of it, we should examine these more accurately. With all my
+heart, says Velleius, for I readily agree to what you have hitherto
+said, and expect still greater things from you.</p>
+
+<p>I am unwilling to interrupt you, says Balbus to Cotta, <a id="page-342"></a><span class="pgnum">342</span>but we shall
+take another opportunity, and I shall effectually convince you. But<a id="FNA-272"></a><a href="#FN-272"><sup>272</sup></a>
+* * *</p>
+
+<p class="nodist">XXVI.</p>
+
+<div class="poem">
+<p>Shall I adore, and bend the suppliant knee,</p>
+<p>Who scorn their power and doubt their deity?</p>
+</div>
+
+<p>Does not Niobe here seem to reason, and by that reasoning to bring all
+her misfortunes upon herself? But what a subtle expression is the
+following!</p>
+
+<div class="poem">
+<p>On strength of will alone depends success;</p>
+</div>
+
+<p class="cont">a maxim capable of leading us into all that is bad.</p>
+
+<div class="poem">
+<p>Though I’m confined, his malice yet is vain,</p>
+<p>His tortured heart shall answer pain for pain;</p>
+<p>His ruin soothe my soul with soft content,</p>
+<p>Lighten my chains, and welcome banishment!</p>
+</div>
+
+<p>This, now, is reason; that reason which you say the divine goodness has
+denied to the brute creation, kindly to bestow it on men alone. How
+great, how immense the favor! Observe the same Medea flying from her
+father and her country:</p>
+
+<div class="poem">
+<p>The guilty wretch from her pursuer flies.</p>
+<p>By her own hands the young Absyrtus slain,</p>
+<p>His mangled limbs she scatters o’er the plain,</p>
+<p>That the fond sire might sink beneath his woe,</p>
+<p>And she to parricide her safety owe.</p>
+</div>
+
+<p>Reflection, as well as wickedness, must have been necessary to the
+preparation of such a fact; and did he too, who prepared that fatal
+repast for his brother, do it without reflection?</p>
+
+<div class="poem">
+<p>Revenge as great as Atreus’ injury</p>
+<p>Shall sink his soul and crown his misery.</p>
+</div>
+
+<p>XXVII. Did not Thyestes himself, not content with having defiled his
+brother’s bed (of which Atreus with great justice thus complains,</p>
+
+<div class="poem">
+<p>When faithless comforts, in the lewd embrace,</p>
+<p>With vile adultery stain a royal race,</p>
+<p>The blood thus mix’d in fouler currents flows,</p>
+<p>Taints the rich soil, and breeds unnumber’d woes)—</p>
+</div>
+
+<p class="cont"><a id="page-343"></a><span class="pgnum">343</span>did he not, I say, by that adultery, aim at the possession of the
+crown? Atreus thus continues:</p>
+
+<div class="poem">
+<p>A lamb, fair gift of heaven, with golden fleece,</p>
+<p>Promised in vain to fix my crown in peace;</p>
+<p>But base Thyestes, eager for the prey,</p>
+<p>Crept to my bed, and stole the gem away.</p>
+</div>
+
+<p>Do you not perceive that Thyestes must have had a share of reason
+proportionable to the greatness of his crimes—such crimes as are not
+only represented to us on the stage, but such as we see committed, nay,
+often exceeded, in the common course of life? The private houses of
+individual citizens, the public courts, the senate, the camp, our
+allies, our provinces, all agree that reason is the author of all the
+ill, as well as of all the good, which is done; that it makes few act
+well, and that but seldom, but many act ill, and that frequently; and
+that, in short, the Gods would have shown greater benevolence in denying
+us any reason at all than in sending us that which is accompanied with
+so much mischief; for as wine is seldom wholesome, but often hurtful in
+diseases, we think it more prudent to deny it to the patient than to run
+the risk of so uncertain a remedy; so I do not know whether it would not
+be better for mankind to be deprived of wit, thought, and penetration,
+or what we call reason, since it is a thing pernicious to many and very
+useful to few, than to have it bestowed upon them with so much
+liberality and in such abundance. But if the divine will has really
+consulted the good of man in this gift of reason, the good of those men
+only was consulted on whom a well-regulated one is bestowed: how few
+those are, if any, is very apparent. We cannot admit, therefore, that
+the Gods consulted the good of a few only; the conclusion must be that
+they consulted the good of none.</p>
+
+<p>XXVIII. You answer that the ill use which a great part of mankind make
+of reason no more takes away the goodness of the Gods, who bestow it as
+a present of the greatest benefit to them, than the ill use which
+children make of their patrimony diminishes the obligation which they
+have to their parents for it. We grant you this; but where is the
+similitude? It was far from Deianira’s design to injure Hercules when
+she made him a present <a id="page-344"></a><span class="pgnum">344</span>of the shirt dipped in the blood of the
+Centaurs. Nor was it a regard to the welfare of Jason of PherÊ that
+influenced the man who with his sword opened his imposthume, which the
+physicians had in vain attempted to cure. For it has often happened that
+people have served a man whom they intended to injure, and have injured
+one whom they designed to serve; so that the effect of the gift is by no
+means always a proof of the intention of the giver; neither does the
+benefit which may accrue from it prove that it came from the hands of a
+benefactor. For, in short, what debauchery, what avarice, what crime
+among men is there which does not owe its birth to thought and
+reflection, that is, to reason? For all opinion is reason: right reason,
+if men’s thoughts are conformable to truth; wrong reason, if they are
+not. The Gods only give us the mere faculty of reason, if we have any;
+the use or abuse of it depends entirely upon ourselves; so that the
+comparison is not just between the present of reason given us by the
+Gods, and a patrimony left to a son by his father; for, after all, if
+the injury of mankind had been the end proposed by the Gods, what could
+they have given them more pernicious than reason? for what seed could
+there be of injustice, intemperance, and cowardice, if reason were not
+laid as the foundation of these vices?</p>
+
+<p>XXIX. I mentioned just now Medea and Atreus, persons celebrated in
+heroic poems, who had used this reason only for the contrivance and
+practice of the most flagitious crimes; but even the trifling characters
+which appear in comedies supply us with the like instances of this
+reasoning faculty; for example, does not he, in the Eunuch, reason with
+some subtlety?—</p>
+
+<div class="poem">
+<p>What, then, must I resolve upon?</p>
+<p>She turn’d me out-of-doors; she sends for me back again;</p>
+<p>Shall I go? no, not if she were to beg it of me.</p>
+</div>
+
+<p class="cont">Another, in the Twins, making no scruple of opposing a received maxim,
+after the manner of the Academics, asserts that when a man is in love
+and in want, it is pleasant</p>
+
+<div class="poem">
+<p>To have a father covetous, crabbed, and passionate,</p>
+<p>Who has no love or affection for his children.</p>
+</div>
+
+<p class="cont"><a id="page-345"></a><span class="pgnum">345</span>This unaccountable opinion he strengthens thus:</p>
+
+<div class="poem">
+<p>You may defraud him of his profits, or forge letters in his name,</p>
+<p>Or fright him by your servant into compliance;</p>
+<p>And what you take from such an old hunks,</p>
+<p>How much more pleasantly do you spend it!</p>
+</div>
+
+<p>On the contrary, he says that an easy, generous father is an
+inconvenience to a son in love; for, says he,</p>
+
+<div class="poem">
+<p>I can’t tell how to abuse so good, so prudent a parent,</p>
+<p>Who always foreruns my desires, and meets me purse in hand,</p>
+<p>To support me in my pleasures: this easy goodness and generosity</p>
+<p>Quite defeat all my frauds, tricks, and stratagems.<a id="FNA-273"></a><a href="#FN-273"><sup>273</sup></a></p>
+</div>
+
+<p>What are these frauds, tricks, and stratagems but the effects of reason?
+O excellent gift of the Gods! Without this Phormio could not have said,</p>
+
+<div class="poem">
+<p>Find me out the old man: I have something hatching for him in my
+head.</p>
+</div>
+
+<p>XXX. But let us pass from the stage to the bar. The prÊtor<a id="FNA-274"></a><a href="#FN-274"><sup>274</sup></a> takes
+his seat. To judge whom? The man who set fire to our archives. How
+secretly was that villany conducted! Q. Sosius, an illustrious Roman
+knight, of the Picene field,<a id="FNA-275"></a><a href="#FN-275"><sup>275</sup></a> confessed the fact. Who else is to be
+tried? He who forged the public registers—Alenus, an artful fellow, who
+counterfeited the handwriting of the six officers.<a id="FNA-276"></a><a href="#FN-276"><sup>276</sup></a> Let us call to
+mind other trials: that on the subject of the gold of Tolosa, or the
+conspiracy of Jugurtha. Let us trace back the informations laid against
+Tubulus for bribery in his judicial office; and, since that, the
+proceedings of the tribune Peduceus concerning the <a id="page-346"></a><span class="pgnum">346</span>incest of the
+vestals. Let us reflect upon the trials which daily happen for
+assassinations, poisonings, embezzlement of public money, frauds in
+wills, against which we have a new law; then that action against the
+advisers or assisters of any theft; the many laws concerning frauds in
+guardianship, breaches of trust in partnerships and commissions in
+trade, and other violations of faith in buying, selling, borrowing, or
+lending; the public decree on a private affair by the LÊtorian Law;<a id="FNA-277"></a><a href="#FN-277"><sup>277</sup></a>
+and, lastly, that scourge of all dishonesty, the law against fraud,
+proposed by our friend Aquillius; that sort of fraud, he says, by which
+one thing is pretended and another done. Can we, then, think that this
+plentiful fountain of evil sprung from the immortal Gods? If they have
+given reason to man, they have likewise given him subtlety, for subtlety
+is only a deceitful manner of applying reason to do mischief. To them
+likewise we must owe deceit, and every other crime, which, without the
+help of reason, would neither have been thought of nor committed. As the
+old woman wished</p>
+
+<div class="poem">
+<p>That to the fir which on Mount Pelion grew</p>
+<p>The axe had ne’er been laid,<a id="FNA-278"></a><a href="#FN-278"><sup>278</sup></a></p>
+</div>
+
+<p class="cont">so we should wish that the Gods had never bestowed this ability on man,
+the abuse of which is so general that the small number of those who make
+a good use of it are often oppressed by those who make a bad use of it;
+so that it seems to be given rather to help vice than to promote virtue
+among us.</p>
+
+<p>XXXI. This, you insist on it, is the fault of man, and not of the Gods.
+But should we not laugh at a physician or pilot, though they are weak
+mortals, if they were to lay the blame of their ill success on the
+violence of the disease or the fury of the tempest? Had there not been
+danger, <a id="page-347"></a><span class="pgnum">347</span>we should say, who would have applied to you? This reasoning
+has still greater force against the Deity. The fault, you say, is in
+man, if he commits crimes. But why was not man endued with a reason
+incapable of producing any crimes? How could the Gods err? When we leave
+our effects to our children, it is in hopes that they may be well
+bestowed; in which we may be deceived, but how can the Deity be
+deceived? As Phœbus when he trusted his chariot to his son Phaëthon, or
+as Neptune when he indulged his son Theseus in granting him three
+wishes, the consequence of which was the destruction of Hippolitus?
+These are poetical fictions; but truth, and not fables, ought to proceed
+from philosophers. Yet if those poetical Deities had foreseen that
+their indulgence would have proved fatal to their sons, they must have
+been thought blamable for it.</p>
+
+<p>Aristo of Chios used often to say that the philosophers do hurt to such
+of their disciples as take their good doctrine in a wrong sense; thus
+the lectures of Aristippus might produce debauchees, and those of Zeno
+pedants. If this be true, it were better that philosophers should be
+silent than that their disciples should be corrupted by a
+misapprehension of their master’s meaning; so if reason, which was
+bestowed on mankind by the Gods with a good design, tends only to make
+men more subtle and fraudulent, it had been better for them never to
+have received it. There could be no excuse for a physician who
+prescribes wine to a patient, knowing that he will drink it and
+immediately expire. Your Providence is no less blamable in giving reason
+to man, who, it foresaw, would make a bad use of it. Will you say that
+it did not foresee it? Nothing could please me more than such an
+acknowledgment. But you dare not. I know what a sublime idea you
+entertain of her.</p>
+
+<p>XXXII. But to conclude. If folly, by the unanimous consent of
+philosophers, is allowed to be the greatest of all evils, and if no one
+ever attained to true wisdom, we, whom they say the immortal Gods take
+care of, are consequently in a state of the utmost misery. For that
+nobody is well, or that nobody can be well, is in effect the same thing;
+and, in my opinion, that no man is truly wise, or that no <a id="page-348"></a><span class="pgnum">348</span>man can be
+truly wise, is likewise the same thing. But I will insist no further on
+so self-evident a point. Telamon in one verse decides the question. If,
+says he, there is a Divine Providence,</p>
+
+<div class="poem">
+<p>Good men would be happy, bad men miserable.</p>
+</div>
+
+<p class="cont">But it is not so. If the Gods had regarded mankind, they should have
+made them all virtuous; but if they did not regard the welfare of all
+mankind, at least they ought to have provided for the happiness of the
+virtuous. Why, therefore, was the Carthaginian in Spain suffered to
+destroy those best and bravest men, the two Scipios? Why did
+Maximus<a id="FNA-279"></a><a href="#FN-279"><sup>279</sup></a> lose his son, the consul? Why did Hannibal kill Marcellus?
+Why did CannÊ deprive us of Paulus? Why was the body of Regulus
+delivered up to the cruelty of the Carthaginians? Why was not Africanus
+protected from violence in his own house? To these, and many more
+ancient instances, let us add some of later date. Why is Rutilius, my
+uncle, a man of the greatest virtue and learning, now in banishment? Why
+was my own friend and companion Drusus assassinated in his own house?
+Why was ScÊvola, the high-priest, that pattern of moderation and
+prudence, massacred before the statue of Vesta? Why, before that, were
+so many illustrious citizens put to death by Cinna? Why had Marius, the
+most perfidious of men, the power to cause the death of Catulus, a man
+of the greatest dignity? But there would be no end of enumerating
+examples of good men made miserable and wicked men prosperous. Why did
+that Marius live to an old age, and die so happily at his own house in
+his seventh consulship? Why was that inhuman wretch Cinna permitted to
+enjoy so long a reign?</p>
+
+<p>XXXIII. He, indeed, met with deserved punishment at last. But would it
+not have been better that these inhumanities had been prevented than
+that the author of them should be punished afterward? Varius, a most
+impious wretch, was tortured and put to death. If this was his
+punishment for the murdering Drusus by the sword, and Metellus by
+poison, would it not have been better to have preserved their lives than
+to have their deaths avenged on <a id="page-349"></a><span class="pgnum">349</span>Varius? Dionysius was thirty-eight
+years a tyrant over the most opulent and flourishing city; and, before
+him, how many years did Pisistratus tyrannize in the very flower of
+Greece! Phalaris and Apollodorus met with the fate they deserved, but
+not till after they had tortured and put to death multitudes. Many
+robbers have been executed; but the number of those who have suffered
+for their crimes is short of those whom they have robbed and murdered.
+Anaxarchus,<a id="FNA-280"></a><a href="#FN-280"><sup>280</sup></a> a scholar of Democritus, was cut to pieces by command
+of the tyrant of Cyprus; and Zeno of Elea<a id="FNA-281"></a><a href="#FN-281"><sup>281</sup></a> ended his life in
+tortures. What shall I say of Socrates,<a id="FNA-282"></a><a href="#FN-282"><sup>282</sup></a> whose death, as often as I
+read of it in Plato, draws fresh tears from my eyes? If, therefore, the
+Gods really see everything that happens to men, you must acknowledge
+they make no distinction between the good and the bad.</p>
+
+<p>XXXIV. Diogenes the Cynic used to say of Harpalus, one of the most
+fortunate villains of his time, that the constant prosperity of such a
+man was a kind of witness against the Gods. Dionysius, of whom we have
+before spoken, after he had pillaged the temple of Proserpine at Locris,
+set sail for Syracuse, and, having a fair wind during his voyage, said,
+with a smile, “See, my friends, what favorable winds the immortal Gods
+bestow upon church-robbers.” Encouraged by this prosperous event, he
+proceeded in his impiety. When he landed at Peloponnesus, he went into
+the temple of Jupiter Olympius, and disrobed his statue of a golden
+mantle of great weight, an ornament which the tyrant Gelo<a id="FNA-283"></a><a href="#FN-283"><sup>283</sup></a> had given
+out of the spoils of the Carthaginians, and at the same time, in a
+jesting manner, he said “that a golden mantle was too heavy in summer
+and too cold in winter;” and then, throwing a woollen cloak over the
+statue, added, “This will serve for all seasons.” At another time, he
+ordered the golden beard of Æsculapius of Epidaurus to be taken away,
+saying that “it <a id="page-350"></a><span class="pgnum">350</span>was absurd for the son to have a beard, when his father
+had none.” He likewise robbed the temples of the silver tables, which,
+according to the ancient custom of Greece, bore this inscription, “To
+the good Gods,” saying “he was willing to make use of their goodness;”
+and, without the least scruple, took away the little golden emblems of
+victory, the cups and coronets, which were in the stretched-out hands of
+the statues, saying “he did not take, but receive them; for it would be
+folly not to accept good things from the Gods, to whom we are constantly
+praying for favors, when they stretch out their hands towards us.” And,
+last of all, all the things which he had thus pillaged from the temples
+were, by his order, brought to the market-place and sold by the common
+crier; and, after he had received the money for them, he commanded every
+purchaser to restore what he had bought, within a limited time, to the
+temples from whence they came. Thus to his impiety towards the Gods he
+added injustice to man.</p>
+
+<p>XXXV. Yet neither did Olympian Jove strike him with his thunder, nor did
+Æsculapius cause him to die by tedious diseases and a lingering death.
+He died in his bed, had funeral honors<a id="FNA-284"></a><a href="#FN-284"><sup>284</sup></a> paid to him, and left his
+power, which he had wickedly obtained, as a just and lawful inheritance
+to his son.</p>
+
+<p>It is not without concern that I maintain a doctrine which seems to
+authorize evil, and which might probably give a sanction to it, if
+conscience, without any divine assistance, did not point out, in the
+clearest manner, the difference between virtue and vice. Without
+conscience man is contemptible. For as no family or state can be
+supposed to be formed with any reason or discipline if there are no
+rewards for good actions nor punishment for crimes, so we cannot believe
+that a Divine Providence regulates the world if there is no distinction
+between the honest and the wicked.</p>
+
+<p><a id="page-351"></a><span class="pgnum">351</span>But the Gods, you say, neglect trifling things: the little fields or
+vineyards of particular men are not worthy their attention; and if
+blasts or hail destroy their product, Jupiter does not regard it, nor do
+kings extend their care to the lower offices of government. This
+argument might have some weight if, in bringing Rutilius as an instance,
+I had only complained of the loss of his farm at FormiÊ; but I spoke of
+a personal misfortune, his banishment.<a id="FNA-285"></a><a href="#FN-285"><sup>285</sup></a></p>
+
+<p>XXXVI. All men agree that external benefits, such as vineyards, corn,
+olives, plenty of fruit and grain, and, in short, every convenience and
+property of life, are derived from the Gods; and, indeed, with reason,
+since by our virtue we claim applause, and in virtue we justly glory,
+which we could have no right to do if it was the gift of the Gods, and
+not a personal merit. When we are honored with new dignities, or blessed
+with increase of riches; when we are favored by fortune beyond our
+expectation, or luckily delivered from any approaching evil, we return
+thanks for it to the Gods, and assume no praise to ourselves. But who
+ever thanked the Gods that he was a good man? We thank them, indeed, for
+riches, health, and honor. For these we invoke the all-good and
+all-powerful Jupiter; but not for wisdom, temperance, and justice. No
+one ever offered a tenth of his estate to Hercules to be made wise. It
+is reported, indeed, of Pythagoras that he sacrificed an ox to the Muses
+upon having made some new discovery in geometry;<a id="FNA-286"></a><a href="#FN-286"><sup>286</sup></a> but, for my part,
+I cannot believe it, because he refused to sacrifice even to Apollo at
+Delos, lest he should defile the altar with blood. But to return. It is
+universally agreed that good fortune we must ask of the Gods, but wisdom
+must arise from ourselves; and though temples have been consecrated to
+the Mind, to Virtue, and to Faith, yet that does not contradict their
+being <a id="page-352"></a><span class="pgnum">352</span>inherent in us. In regard to hope, safety, assistance, and
+victory, we must rely upon the Gods for them; from whence it follows, as
+Diogenes said, that the prosperity of the wicked destroys the idea of a
+Divine Providence.</p>
+
+<p>XXXVII. But good men have sometimes success. They have so; but we
+cannot, with any show of reason, attribute that success to the Gods.
+Diagoras, who is called the atheist, being at Samothrace, one of his
+friends showed him several pictures<a id="FNA-287"></a><a href="#FN-287"><sup>287</sup></a> of people who had endured very
+dangerous storms; “See,” says he, “you who deny a providence, how many
+have been saved by their prayers to the Gods.” “Ay,” says Diagoras, “I
+see those who were saved, but where are those painted who were
+shipwrecked?” At another time, he himself was in a storm, when the
+sailors, being greatly alarmed, told him they justly deserved that
+misfortune for admitting him into their ship; when he, pointing to
+others under the like distress, asked them “if they believed Diagoras
+was also aboard those ships?” In short, with regard to good or bad
+fortune, it matters not what you are, or how you have lived. The Gods,
+like kings, regard not everything. What similitude is there between
+them? If kings neglect anything, want of knowledge may be pleaded in
+their defence; but ignorance cannot be brought as an excuse for the
+Gods.</p>
+
+<p>XXXVIII. Your manner of justifying them is somewhat extraordinary, when
+you say that if a wicked man dies without suffering for his crimes, the
+Gods inflict a punishment on his children, his children’s children, and
+all his posterity. O wonderful equity of the Gods! What city would
+endure the maker of a law which should condemn a son or a grandson for a
+crime committed by the father or the grandfather?</p>
+
+<div class="poem">
+<p>Shall Tantalus’ unhappy offspring know</p>
+<p>No end, no close, of this long scene of woe?</p>
+<p>When will the dire reward of guilt be o’er,</p>
+<p>And Myrtilus demand revenge no more?<a id="FNA-288"></a><a href="#FN-288"><sup>288</sup></a></p>
+</div>
+
+<p>Whether the poets have corrupted the Stoics, or the Stoics given
+authority to the poets, I cannot easily determine. Both alike are to be
+condemned. If those persons <a id="page-353"></a><span class="pgnum">353</span>whose names have been branded in the
+satires of Hipponax or Archilochus<a id="FNA-289"></a><a href="#FN-289"><sup>289</sup></a> were driven to despair, it did
+not proceed from the Gods, but had its origin in their own minds. When
+we see Ægistus and Paris lost in the heat of an impure passion, why are
+we to attribute it to a Deity, when the crime, as it were, speaks for
+itself? I believe that those who recover from illness are more indebted
+to the care of Hippocrates than to the power of Æsculapius; that Sparta
+received her laws from Lycurgus<a id="FNA-290"></a><a href="#FN-290"><sup>290</sup></a> rather than from Apollo; that those
+eyes of the maritime coast, Corinth and Carthage, were plucked out, the
+one by Critolaus, the other by Hasdrubal, without the assistance of any
+divine anger, since you yourselves confess that a Deity cannot possibly
+be angry on any provocation.</p>
+
+<p>XXXIX. But could not the Deity have assisted and preserved those eminent
+cities? Undoubtedly he could; for, according to your doctrine, his power
+is infinite, and without the least labor; and as nothing but the will is
+necessary to the motion of our bodies, so the divine will of the Gods,
+with the like ease, can create, move, and change all things. This you
+hold, not from a mere phantom of superstition, but on natural and
+settled principles of reason; for matter, you say, of which all things
+are composed and consist, is susceptible of all forms and changes, and
+there is nothing which cannot be, or cease to be, in an instant; and
+that Divine Providence has the command and disposal of this universal
+matter, and consequently can, in any part of the universe, do whatever
+she pleases: from whence I conclude that this Providence either knows
+not the extent of her power, or neglects human affairs, or cannot judge
+what is best for us. Providence, you say, does not extend her care to
+particular men; there <a id="page-354"></a><span class="pgnum">354</span>is no wonder in that, since she does not extend
+it to cities, or even to nations, or people. If, therefore, she neglects
+whole nations, is it not very probable that she neglects all mankind?
+But how can you assert that the Gods do not enter into all the little
+circumstances of life, and yet hold that they distribute dreams among
+men? Since you believe in dreams, it is your part to solve this
+difficulty. Besides, you say we ought to call upon the Gods. Those who
+call upon the Gods are individuals. Divine Providence, therefore,
+regards individuals, which consequently proves that they are more at
+leisure than you imagine. Let us suppose the Divine Providence to be
+greatly busied; that it causes the revolutions of the heavens, supports
+the earth, and rules the seas; why does it suffer so many Gods to be
+unemployed? Why is not the superintendence of human affairs given to
+some of those idle Deities which you say are innumerable?</p>
+
+<p>This is the purport of what I had to say concerning “the Nature of the
+Gods;” not with a design to destroy their existence, but merely to show
+what an obscure point it is, and with what difficulties an explanation
+of it is attended.</p>
+
+<p>XL. Balbus, observing that Cotta had finished his discourse—You have
+been very severe, says he, against a Divine Providence, a doctrine
+established by the Stoics with piety and wisdom; but, as it grows too
+late, I shall defer my answer to another day. Our argument is of the
+greatest importance; it concerns our altars,<a id="FNA-291"></a><a href="#FN-291"><sup>291</sup></a> our hearths, our
+temples, nay, even the walls of our city, which you priests hold sacred;
+you, who by religion defend Rome better than she is defended by her
+ramparts. This is a cause which, while I have life, I think I cannot
+abandon without impiety.</p>
+
+<p>There is nothing, replied Cotta, which I desire more than to be
+confuted. I have not pretended to decide this point, but to give you my
+private sentiments upon it; and am very sensible of your great
+superiority in argument. <a id="page-355"></a><span class="pgnum">355</span>No doubt of it, says Velleius; we have much to
+fear from one who believes that our dreams are sent from Jupiter, which,
+though they are of little weight, are yet of more importance than the
+discourse of the Stoics concerning the nature of the Gods. The
+conversation ended here, and we parted. Velleius judged that the
+arguments of Cotta were truest; but those of Balbus seemed to me to have
+the greater probability.<a id="FNA-292"></a><a href="#FN-292"><sup>292</sup></a></p>
+
+
+
+
+<hr class="front"/>
+
+<h2><a id="page-357"></a><span class="pgnum">357</span>ON THE COMMONWEALTH.</h2>
+
+<hr/>
+
+
+<h3>PREFACE BY THE EDITOR.</h3>
+
+
+<p><span class="first">This</span> work was one of Cicero’s earlier treatises, though one of those
+which was most admired by his contemporaries, and one of which he
+himself was most proud. It was composed 54 <span class="sc">b.c.</span> It was originally in two
+books: then it was altered and enlarged into nine, and finally reduced
+to six. With the exception of the dream of Scipio, in the last book, the
+whole treatise was lost till the year 1822, when the librarian of the
+Vatican discovered a portion of them among the palimpsests in that
+library. What he discovered is translated here; but it is in a most
+imperfect and mutilated state.</p>
+
+<p>The form selected was that of a dialogue, in imitation of those of
+Plato; and the several conferences were supposed to have taken place
+during the Latin holidays, 129 <span class="sc">b.c.</span>, in the consulship of Caius
+Sempronius, Tuditanus, and Marcus Aquilius. The speakers are Scipio
+Africanus the younger, in whose garden the scene is laid; Caius LÊlius;
+Lucius Furius Philus; Marcus Manilius; Spurius Mummius, the brother of
+the taker of Corinth, a Stoic; Quintus Ælius Tubero, a nephew of
+Africanus; Publius Rutilius Rufus; Quintus Mucius ScÊvola, the tutor of
+Cicero; and Caius Fannius, who was absent, however, on the second day of
+the conference.</p>
+
+<p>In the first book, the first thirty-three pages are wanting, and there
+are chasms amounting to thirty-eight pages more. In this book Scipio
+asserts the superiority of an active over a speculative career; and
+after analyzing and comparing the monarchical, aristocratic, and
+democratic forms of government, gives a preference to the first;
+although <a id="page-358"></a><span class="pgnum">358</span>his idea of a perfect constitution would be one compounded of
+three kinds in due proportion.</p>
+
+<p>There are a few chasms in the earlier part of the second book, and the
+latter part of it is wholly lost. In it Scipio was led on to give an
+account of the rise and progress of the Roman Constitution, from which
+he passed on to the examination of the great moral obligations which are
+the foundations of all political union.</p>
+
+<p>Of the remaining books we have only a few disjointed fragments, with the
+exception, as has been before mentioned, of the dream of Scipio in the
+sixth.</p>
+
+
+<hr/>
+
+<h3><a id="page-359"></a><span class="pgnum">359</span>INTRODUCTION TO THE FIRST BOOK,</h3>
+
+<h4>BY THE ORIGINAL TRANSLATOR.</h4>
+
+
+<p class="intro">Cicero introduces his subject by showing that men were not born for the
+mere abstract study of philosophy, but that the study of philosophic
+truth should always be made as practical as possible, and applicable to
+the great interests of philanthropy and patriotism. Cicero endeavors to
+show the benefit of mingling the contemplative or philosophic with the
+political and active life, according to that maxim of Plato—“Happy is
+the nation whose philosophers are kings, and whose kings are
+philosophers.”</p>
+
+<p class="intro">This kind of introduction was the more necessary because many of the
+ancient philosophers, too warmly attached to transcendental metaphysics
+and sequestered speculations, had affirmed that true philosophers ought
+not to interest themselves in the management of public affairs. Thus, as
+M. Villemain observes, it was a maxim of the Epicureans, “Sapiens ne
+accedat ad rempublicam” (Let no wise man meddle in politics). The
+Pythagoreans had enforced the same principle with more gravity.
+Aristotle examines the question on both sides, and concludes in favor of
+active life. Among Aristotle’s disciples, a writer, singularly elegant
+and pure, had maintained the pre-eminence of the contemplative life over
+the political or active one, in a work which Cicero cites with
+admiration, and to which he seems to have applied for relief whenever he
+felt harassed and discouraged in public business. But here this great
+man was interested by the subject he discusses, and by the whole course
+of his experience and conduct, to refute the dogmas of that
+pusillanimous sophistry and selfish indulgence by bringing forward the
+most glorious examples and achievements of patriotism. In this strain he
+had doubtless commenced his exordium, and in this strain we find him
+continuing it at the point in which the palimpsest becomes legible. He
+then proceeds to introduce his illustrious interlocutors, and leads them
+at first to discourse on the astronomical laws that regulate the
+revolutions of our planet. From this, by a very graceful and beautiful
+transition, he passes on to the consideration of the best forms of
+political constitutions that had prevailed in different nations, and
+those modes of government which had produced the greatest benefits in
+the commonwealths of antiquity.</p>
+
+<p class="intro">This first book is, in fact, a splendid epitome of the political science
+of the age of Cicero, and probably the most eloquent plea in favor of
+mixed monarchy to be found in all literature.</p>
+
+
+<hr/>
+
+<h3><a id="page-360"></a><span class="pgnum">360</span>BOOK I.</h3>
+
+
+<p>I. [<span class="first">Without</span> the virtue of patriotism], neither Caius Duilius, nor Aulus
+Atilius,<a id="FNA-293"></a><a href="#FN-293"><sup>293</sup></a> nor Lucius Metellus, could have delivered Rome by their
+courage from the terror of Carthage; nor could the two Scipios, when the
+fire of the second Punic War was kindled, have quenched it in their
+blood; nor, when it revived in greater force, could either Quintus
+Maximus<a id="FNA-294"></a><a href="#FN-294"><sup>294</sup></a> have enervated it, or Marcus Marcellus have crushed it;
+nor, when it was repulsed from the gates of our own city, would Scipio
+have confined it within the walls of our enemies.</p>
+
+<p>But Cato, at first a new and unknown man, whom all we who aspire to the
+same honors consider as a pattern to lead us on to industry and virtue,
+was undoubtedly at liberty to enjoy his repose at Tusculum, a most
+salubrious and convenient retreat. But he, mad as some people think him,
+though no necessity compelled him, preferred being tossed about amidst
+the tempestuous waves of politics, even till extreme old age, to living
+with all imaginable luxury in that tranquillity and relaxation. I omit
+innumerable men who have separately devoted themselves to the protection
+of our Commonwealth; and those whose lives are within the memory of the
+present generation I will not mention, lest any one should complain that
+I had invidiously forgotten himself or some one of his family. This only
+I insist on—that so great is the necessity of this virtue which nature
+has implanted in man, and so great is the desire to defend the common
+safety of our country, that its energy has continually overcome all the
+blandishments of pleasure and repose.</p>
+
+<p>II. Nor is it sufficient to possess this virtue as if it were some kind
+of art, unless we put it in practice. An art, indeed, though not
+exercised, may still be retained in knowledge; but virtue consists
+wholly in its proper use <a id="page-361"></a><span class="pgnum">361</span>and action. Now, the noblest use of virtue is
+the government of the Commonwealth, and the carrying-out in real action,
+not in words only, of all those identical theories which those
+philosophers discuss at every corner. For nothing is spoken by
+philosophers, so far as they speak correctly and honorably, which has
+not been discovered and confirmed by those persons who have been the
+founders of the laws of states. For whence comes piety, or from whom has
+religion been derived? Whence comes law, either that of nations, or that
+which is called the civil law? Whence comes justice, faith, equity?
+Whence modesty, continence, the horror of baseness, the desire of praise
+and renown? Whence fortitude in labors and perils? Doubtless, from those
+who have instilled some of these moral principles into men by education,
+and confirmed others by custom, and sanctioned others by laws.</p>
+
+<p>Moreover, it is reported of Xenocrates, one of the sublimest
+philosophers, that when some one asked him what his disciples learned,
+he replied, “To do that of their own accord which they might be
+compelled to do by law.” That citizen, therefore, who obliges all men to
+those virtuous actions, by the authority of laws and penalties, to which
+the philosophers can scarcely persuade a few by the force of their
+eloquence, is certainly to be preferred to the sagest of the doctors who
+spend their lives in such discussions. For which of their exquisite
+orations is so admirable as to be entitled to be preferred to a
+well-constituted government, public justice, and good customs?
+Certainly, just as I think that magnificent and imperious cities (as
+Ennius says) are superior to castles and villages, so I imagine that
+those who regulate such cities by their counsel and authority are far
+preferable, with respect to real wisdom, to men who are unacquainted
+with any kind of political knowledge. And since we are strongly prompted
+to augment the prosperity of the human race, and since we do endeavor by
+our counsels and exertions to render the life of man safer and
+wealthier, and since we are incited to this blessing by the spur of
+nature herself, let us hold on that course which has always been pursued
+by all the best men, and not listen for a moment to the signals of those
+who sound a retreat so loudly that they <a id="page-362"></a><span class="pgnum">362</span>sometimes call back even those
+who have made considerable progress.</p>
+
+<p>III. These reasons, so certain and so evident, are opposed by those who,
+on the other side, argue that the labors which must necessarily be
+sustained in maintaining the Commonwealth form but a slight impediment
+to the vigilant and industrious, and are only a contemptible obstacle in
+such important affairs, and even in common studies, offices, and
+employments. They add the peril of life, that base fear of death, which
+has ever been opposed by brave men, to whom it appears far more
+miserable to die by the decay of nature and old age than to be allowed
+an opportunity of gallantly sacrificing that life for their country
+which must otherwise be yielded up to nature.</p>
+
+<p>On this point, however, our antagonists esteem themselves copious and
+eloquent when they collect all the calamities of heroic men, and the
+injuries inflicted on them by their ungrateful countrymen. For on this
+subject they bring forward those notable examples among the Greeks; and
+tell us that Miltiades, the vanquisher and conqueror of the Persians,
+before even those wounds were healed which he had received in that most
+glorious victory, wasted away in the chains of his fellow-citizens that
+life which had been preserved from the weapons of the enemy. They cite
+Themistocles, expelled and proscribed by the country which he had
+rescued, and forced to flee, not to the Grecian ports which he had
+preserved, but to the bosom of the barbarous power which he had
+defeated. There is, indeed, no deficiency of examples to illustrate the
+levity and cruelty of the Athenians to their noblest citizens—examples
+which, originating and multiplying among them, are said at different
+times to have abounded in our own most august empire. For we are told:
+of the exile of Camillus, the disgrace of Ahala, the unpopularity of
+Nasica, the expulsion of LÊnas,<a id="FNA-295"></a><a href="#FN-295"><sup>295</sup></a> the condemnation of <a id="page-363"></a><span class="pgnum">363</span>Opimius, the
+flight of Metellus, the cruel destruction of Caius Marius, the massacre
+of our chieftains, and the many atrocious crimes which followed. My own
+history is by no means free from such calamities; and I imagine that
+when they recollect that by my counsel and perils they were preserved in
+life and liberty, they are led by that consideration to bewail my
+misfortunes more deeply and affectionately. But I cannot tell why those
+who sail over the seas for the sake of knowledge and experience [should
+wonder at seeing still greater hazards braved in the service of the
+Commonwealth].</p>
+
+<p>IV. [Since], on my quitting the consulship, I swore in the assembly of
+the Roman people, who re-echoed my words, that I had saved the
+Commonwealth, I console myself with this remembrance for all my cares,
+troubles, and injuries. Although my misfortune had more of honor than
+misfortune, and more of glory than disaster; and I derive greater
+pleasure from the regrets of good men than sorrow from the exultation of
+the worthless. But even if it had happened otherwise, how could I have
+complained, as nothing befell me which was either unforeseen, or more
+painful than I expected, as a return for my illustrious actions? For I
+was one who, though it was in my power to reap more profit from leisure
+than most men, on account of the diversified sweetness of my studies, in
+which I had lived from boyhood—or, if any public calamity had happened,
+to have borne no more than an equal share with the rest of my countrymen
+in the misfortune—I nevertheless did not hesitate to oppose myself to
+the most formidable tempests and torrents of sedition, for the sake of
+saving my countrymen, and at my own proper danger to secure the common
+safety of all the rest. For our country did not beget and educate us
+with the expectation of receiving no support, as I may call it, from us;
+nor for the purpose of consulting nothing but our convenience, to supply
+us with a secure refuge for idleness and a tranquil spot for rest; but
+rather with a view of turning to her own advantage the nobler portion of
+our genius, heart, and counsel; giving us back for our private service
+only what she can spare from the public interests.</p>
+
+<p>V. Those apologies, therefore, in which men take refuge <a id="page-364"></a><span class="pgnum">364</span>as an excuse
+for their devoting themselves with more plausibility to mere inactivity
+do certainly not deserve to be listened to; when, for instance, they
+tell us that those who meddle with public affairs are generally
+good-for-nothing men, with whom it is discreditable to be compared, and
+miserable and dangerous to contend, especially when the multitude is in
+an excited state. On which account it is not the part of a wise man to
+take the reins, since he cannot restrain the insane and unregulated
+movements of the common people. Nor is it becoming to a man of liberal
+birth, say they, thus to contend with such vile and unrefined
+antagonists, or to subject one’s self to the lashings of contumely, or
+to put one’s self in the way of injuries which ought not to be borne by
+a wise man. As if to a virtuous, brave, and magnanimous man there could
+be a juster reason for seeking the government than this—to avoid being
+subjected to worthless men, and to prevent the Commonwealth from being
+torn to pieces by them; when, even if they were then desirous to save
+her, they would not have the power.</p>
+
+<p>VI. But this restriction who can approve, which would interdict the wise
+man from taking any share in the government beyond such as the occasion
+and necessity may compel him to? As if any greater necessity could
+possibly happen to any man than happened to me. In which, how could I
+have acted if I had not been consul at the time? and how could I have
+been a consul unless I had maintained that course of life from my
+childhood which raised me from the order of knights, in which I was
+born, to the very highest station? You cannot produce <i>extempore</i>, and
+just when you please, the power of assisting a commonwealth, although it
+may be severely pressed by dangers, unless you have attained the
+position which enables you legally to do so. And what most surprises me
+in the discourses of learned men, is to hear those persons who confess
+themselves incapable of steering the vessel of the State in smooth seas
+(which, indeed, they never learned, and never cared to know) profess
+themselves ready to assume the helm amidst the fiercest tempests. For
+those men are accustomed to say openly, and indeed to boast greatly,
+that they have never learned, and have never taken <a id="page-365"></a><span class="pgnum">365</span>the least pains to
+explain, the principles of either establishing or maintaining a
+commonwealth; and they look on this practical science as one which
+belongs not to men of learning and wisdom, but to those who have made it
+their especial study. How, then, can it be reasonable for such men to
+promise their assistance to the State, when they shall be compelled to
+it by necessity, while they are ignorant how to govern the republic when
+no necessity presses upon it, which is a much more easy task? Indeed,
+though it were true that the wise man loves not to thrust himself of his
+own accord into the administration of public affairs, but that if
+circumstances oblige him to it, then he does not refuse the office, yet
+I think that this science of civil legislation should in no wise be
+neglected by the philosopher, because all resources ought to be ready to
+his hand, which he knows not how soon he may be called on to use.</p>
+
+<p>VII. I have spoken thus at large for this reason, because in this work I
+have proposed to myself and undertaken a discussion on the government of
+a state; and in order to render it useful, I was bound, in the first
+place, to do away with this pusillanimous hesitation to mingle in public
+affairs. If there be any, therefore, who are too much influenced by the
+authority of the philosophers, let them consider the subject for a
+moment, and be guided by the opinions of those men whose authority and
+credit are greatest among learned men; whom I look upon, though some of
+them have not personally governed any state, as men who have
+nevertheless discharged a kind of office in the republic, inasmuch as
+they have made many investigations into, and left many writings
+concerning, state affairs. As to those whom the Greeks entitle the Seven
+Wise Men, I find that they almost all lived in the middle of public
+business. Nor, indeed, is there anything in which human virtue can more
+closely resemble the divine powers than in establishing new states, or
+in preserving those already established.</p>
+
+<p>VIII. And concerning these affairs, since it has been our good fortune
+to achieve something worthy of memorial in the government of our
+country, and also to have acquired some facility of explaining the
+powers and resources of politics, we can treat of this subject with the
+weight of <a id="page-366"></a><span class="pgnum">366</span>personal experience and the habit of instruction and
+illustration. Whereas before us many have been skilful in theory, though
+no exploits of theirs are recorded; and many others have been men of
+consideration in action, but unfamiliar with the arts of exposition.
+Nor, indeed, is it at all our intention to establish a new and
+self-invented system of government; but our purpose is rather to recall
+to memory a discussion of the most illustrious men of their age in our
+Commonwealth, which you and I, in our youth, when at Smyrna, heard
+mentioned by Publius Rutilius Rufus, who reported to us a conference of
+many days in which, in my opinion, there was nothing omitted that could
+throw light on political affairs.</p>
+
+<p>IX. For when, in the year of the consulship of Tuditanus and Aquilius,
+Scipio Africanus, the son of Paulus Æmilius, formed the project of
+spending the Latin holidays at his country-seat, where his most intimate
+friends had promised him frequent visits during this season of
+relaxation, on the first morning of the festival, his nephew, Quintus
+Tubero, made his appearance; and when Scipio had greeted him heartily
+and embraced him—How is it, my dear Tubero, said he, that I see you so
+early? For these holidays must afford you a capital opportunity of
+pursuing your favorite studies. Ah! replied Tubero, I can study my books
+at any time, for they are always disengaged; but it is a great
+privilege, my Scipio, to find you at leisure, especially in this
+restless period of public affairs. You certainly have found me so, said
+Scipio, but, to speak truth, I am rather relaxing from business than
+from study. Nay, said Tubero, you must try to relax from your studies
+too, for here are several of us, as we have appointed, all ready, if it
+suits your convenience, to aid you in getting through this leisure time
+of yours. I am very willing to consent, answered Scipio, and we may be
+able to compare notes respecting the several topics that interest us.</p>
+
+<p>X. Be it so, said Tubero; and since you invite me to discussion, and
+present the opportunity, let us first examine, before any one else
+arrives, what can be the nature of the parhelion, or double sun, which
+was mentioned in the senate. Those that affirm they witnessed this
+prodigy <a id="page-367"></a><span class="pgnum">367</span>are neither few nor unworthy of credit, so that there is more
+reason for investigation than incredulity.<a id="FNA-296"></a><a href="#FN-296"><sup>296</sup></a></p>
+
+<p>Ah! said Scipio, I wish we had our friend PanÊtius with us, who is fond
+of investigating all things of this kind, but especially all celestial
+phenomena. As for my opinion, Tubero, for I always tell you just what I
+think, I hardly agree in these subjects with that friend of mine, since,
+respecting things of which we can scarcely form a conjecture as to their
+character, he is as positive as if he had seen them with his own eyes
+and felt them with his own hands. And I cannot but the more admire the
+wisdom of Socrates, who discarded all anxiety respecting things of this
+kind, and affirmed that these inquiries concerning the secrets of nature
+were either above the efforts of human reason, or were absolutely of no
+consequence at all to human life.</p>
+
+<p>But, then, my Africanus, replied Tubero, of what credit is the tradition
+which states that Socrates rejected all these physical investigations,
+and confined his whole attention to men and manners? For, with respect
+to him what better authority can we cite than Plato? in many passages of
+whose works Socrates speaks in such a manner that even when he is
+discussing morals, and virtues, and even public affairs and politics, he
+endeavors to interweave, after the fashion of Pythagoras, the doctrines
+of arithmetic, geometry, and harmonic proportions with them.</p>
+
+<p>That is true, replied Scipio; but you are aware, I believe, that Plato,
+after the death of Socrates, was induced to visit Egypt by his love of
+science, and that after that he proceeded to Italy and Sicily, from his
+desire of understanding the Pythagorean dogmas; that he conversed much
+with Archytas of Tarentum and TimÊus of Locris; <a id="page-368"></a><span class="pgnum">368</span>that he collected the
+works of Philolaus; and that, finding in these places the renown of
+Pythagoras flourishing, he addicted himself exceedingly to the disciples
+of Pythagoras, and their studies; therefore, as he loved Socrates with
+his whole heart, and wished to attribute all great discoveries to him,
+he interwove the Socratic elegance and subtlety of eloquence with
+somewhat of the obscurity of Pythagoras, and with that notorious gravity
+of his diversified arts.</p>
+
+<p>XI. When Scipio had spoken thus, he suddenly saw Lucius Furius
+approaching, and saluting him, and embracing him most affectionately, he
+gave him a seat on his own couch. And as soon as Publius Rutilius, the
+worthy reporter of the conference to us, had arrived, when we had
+saluted him, he placed him by the side of Tubero. Then said Furius, What
+is it that you are about? Has our entrance at all interrupted any
+conversation of yours? By no means, said Scipio, for you yourself too
+are in the habit of investigating carefully the subject which Tubero was
+a little before proposing to examine; and our friend Rutilius, even
+under the walls of Numantia, was in the habit at times of conversing
+with me on questions of the same kind. What, then, was the subject of
+your discussion? said Philus. We were talking, said Scipio, of the
+double suns that recently appeared, and I wish, Philus, to hear what you
+think of them.</p>
+
+<p>XII. Just as he was speaking, a boy announced that LÊlius was coming to
+call on him, and that he had already left his house. Then Scipio,
+putting on his sandals and robes, immediately went forth from his
+chamber, and when he had walked a little time in the portico, he met
+LÊlius, and welcomed him and those that accompanied him, namely, Spurius
+Mummius, to whom he was greatly attached, and C. Fannius and Quintus
+ScÊvola, sons-in-law of LÊlius, two very intelligent young men, and now
+of the quÊstorian age.<a id="FNA-297"></a><a href="#FN-297"><sup>297</sup></a></p>
+
+<p>When he had saluted them all, he returned through the portico, placing
+LÊlius in the middle; for there was in their friendship a sort of law of
+reciprocal courtesy, so <a id="page-369"></a><span class="pgnum">369</span>that in the camp LÊlius paid Scipio almost
+divine honors, on account of his eminent renown in war and in private
+life; in his turn Scipio reverenced LÊlius, even as a father, because he
+was older than himself.</p>
+
+<p>Then after they had exchanged a few words, as they walked up and down,
+Scipio, to whom their visit was extremely welcome and agreeable, wished
+to assemble them in a sunny corner of the gardens, because it was still
+winter; and when they had agreed to this, there came in another friend,
+a learned man, much beloved and esteemed by all of them, M. Manilius,
+who, after having been most warmly welcomed by Scipio and the rest,
+seated himself next to LÊlius.</p>
+
+<p>XIII. Then Philus, commencing the conversation, said: It does not appear
+to me that the presence of our new guests need alter the subject of our
+discussion, but only that it should induce us to treat it more
+philosophically, and in a manner more worthy of our increased audience.
+What do you allude to? said LÊlius; or what was the discussion we broke
+in upon? Scipio was asking me, replied Philus, what I thought of the
+parhelion, or mock sun, whose recent apparition was so strongly
+attested.</p>
+
+<p><i>LÊlius.</i> Do you say then, my Philus, that we have sufficiently examined
+those questions which concern our own houses and the Commonwealth, that
+we begin to investigate the celestial mysteries?</p>
+
+<p>And Philus replied: Do you think, then, that it does not concern our
+houses to know what happens in that vast home which is not included in
+walls of human fabrication, but which embraces the entire universe—a
+home which the Gods share with us, as the common country of all
+intelligent beings? Especially when, if we are ignorant of these things,
+there are also many great practical truths which result from them, and
+which bear directly on the welfare of our race, of which we must be also
+ignorant. And here I can speak for myself, as well as for you, LÊlius,
+and all men who are ambitious of wisdom, that the knowledge and
+consideration of the facts of nature are by themselves very delightful.</p>
+
+<p><i>LÊlius.</i> I have no objection to the discussion, especially as it is
+holiday-time with us. But cannot we have the <a id="page-370"></a><span class="pgnum">370</span>pleasure of hearing you
+resume it, or are we come too late?</p>
+
+<p><i>Philus</i>. We have not yet commenced the discussion, and since the
+question remains entire and unbroken, I shall have the greatest
+pleasure, my LÊlius, in handing over the argument to you.</p>
+
+<p><i>LÊlius.</i> No, I had much rather hear you, unless, indeed, Manilius
+thinks himself able to compromise the suit between the two suns, that
+they may possess heaven as joint sovereigns without intruding on each
+other’s empire.</p>
+
+<p>Then Manilius said: Are you going, LÊlius, to ridicule a science in
+which, in the first place, I myself excel; and, secondly, without which
+no one can distinguish what is his own, and what is another’s? But to
+return to the point. Let us now at present listen to Philus, who seems
+to me to have started a greater question than any of those that have
+engaged the attention of either Publius Mucius or myself.</p>
+
+<p>XIV. Then Philus said: I am not about to bring you anything new, or
+anything which has been thought over or discovered by me myself. But I
+recollect that Caius Sulpicius Gallus, who was a man of profound
+learning, as you are aware, when this same thing was reported to have
+taken place in his time, while he was staying in the house of Marcus
+Marcellus, who had been his colleague in the consulship, asked to see a
+celestial globe which Marcellus’s grandfather had saved after the
+capture of Syracuse from that magnificent and opulent city, without
+bringing to his own home any other memorial out of so great a booty;
+which I had often heard mentioned on account of the great fame of
+Archimedes; but its appearance, however, did not seem to me particularly
+striking. For that other is more elegant in form, and more generally
+known, which was made by the same Archimedes, and deposited by the same
+Marcellus in the Temple of Virtue at Rome. But as soon as Gallus had
+begun to explain, in a most scientific manner, the principle of this
+machine, I felt that the Sicilian geometrician must have possessed a
+genius superior to anything we usually conceive to belong to our nature.
+For Gallus assured us that that other solid and compact globe was a very
+ancient invention, and that the first <a id="page-371"></a><span class="pgnum">371</span>model had been originally made by
+Thales of Miletus. That afterward Eudoxus of Cnidus, a disciple of
+Plato, had traced on its surface the stars that appear in the sky, and
+that many years subsequently, borrowing from Eudoxus this beautiful
+design and representation, Aratus had illustrated it in his verses, not
+by any science of astronomy, but by the ornament of poetic description.
+He added that the figure of the globe, which displayed the motions of
+the sun and moon, and the five planets, or wandering stars, could not be
+represented by the primitive solid globe; and that in this the invention
+of Archimedes was admirable, because he had calculated how a single
+revolution should maintain unequal and diversified progressions in
+dissimilar motions. In fact, when Gallus moved this globe, we observed
+that the moon succeeded the sun by as many turns of the wheel in the
+machine as days in the heavens. From whence it resulted that the
+progress of the sun was marked as in the heavens, and that the moon
+touched the point where she is obscured by the earth’s shadow at the
+instant the sun appears opposite.<a id="FNA-298"></a><a href="#FN-298"><sup>298</sup></a> * * *</p>
+
+<p>XV. * * *<a id="FNA-299"></a><a href="#FN-299"><sup>299</sup></a> I had myself a great affection for this Gallus, and I
+know that he was very much beloved and esteemed by my father Paulus. I
+recollect that when I was very young, when my father, as consul,
+commanded in Macedonia, and we were in the camp, our army was seized
+with a pious terror, because suddenly, in a clear night, the bright and
+full moon became eclipsed. And Gallus, who was then our lieutenant, the
+year before that in which he was elected consul, hesitated not, next
+morning, to state in the camp that it was no prodigy, and that the
+phenomenon which had then appeared would always appear at certain
+periods, when the sun was so placed that he could not affect the moon
+with his light.</p>
+
+<p><a id="page-372"></a><span class="pgnum">372</span>But do you mean, said Tubero, that he dared to speak thus to men almost
+entirely uneducated and ignorant?</p>
+
+<p><i>Scipio.</i> He did, and with great * * * for his opinion was no result of
+insolent ostentation, nor was his language unbecoming the dignity of so
+wise a man: indeed, he performed a very noble action in thus freeing his
+countrymen from the terrors of an idle superstition.</p>
+
+<p>XVI. And they relate that in a similar way, in the great war in which
+the Athenians and LacedÊmonians contended with such violent resentment,
+the famous Pericles, the first man of his country in credit, eloquence,
+and political genius, observing the Athenians overwhelmed with an
+excessive alarm during an eclipse of the sun which caused a sudden
+darkness, told them, what he had learned in the school of Anaxagoras,
+that these phenomena necessarily happened at precise and regular periods
+when the body of the moon was interposed between the sun and the earth,
+and that if they happened not before every new moon, still they could
+not possibly happen except at the exact time of the new moon. And when
+he had proved this truth by his reasonings, he freed the people from
+their alarms; for at that period the doctrine was new and unfamiliar
+that the sun was accustomed to be eclipsed by the interposition of the
+moon, which fact they say that Thales of Miletus was the first to
+discover. Afterward my friend Ennius appears to have been acquainted
+with the same theory, who, writing about 350<a id="FNA-300"></a><a href="#FN-300"><sup>300</sup></a> years after the
+foundation of Rome, says, “In the nones of June the sun was covered by
+the moon and night.” The calculations in the astronomical art have
+attained such perfection that from that day, thus described to us by
+Ennius and recorded in the pontifical registers, the anterior eclipses
+of the sun have been computed as far back as the nones of July in the
+reign of Romulus, when that eclipse took place, in the obscurity of
+which it was affirmed that Virtue bore Romulus to heaven, in spite of
+the perishable nature which carried him off by the common fate of
+humanity.</p>
+
+<p><a id="page-373"></a><span class="pgnum">373</span>XVII. Then said Tubero: Do not you think, Scipio, that this
+astronomical science, which every day proves so useful, just now
+appeared in a different light to you,<a id="FNA-301"></a><a href="#FN-301"><sup>301</sup></a> * * * which the rest may see.
+Moreover, who can think anything in human affairs of brilliant
+importance who has penetrated this starry empire of the gods? Or who can
+think anything connected with mankind long who has learned to estimate
+the nature of eternity? or glorious who is aware of the insignificance
+of the size of the earth, even in its whole extent, and especially in
+the portion which men inhabit? And when we consider that almost
+imperceptible point which we ourselves occupy unknown to the majority of
+nations, can we still hope that our name and reputation can be widely
+circulated? And then our estates and edifices, our cattle, and the
+enormous treasures of our gold and silver, can they be esteemed or
+denominated as desirable goods by him who observes their perishable
+profit, and their contemptible use, and their uncertain domination,
+often falling into the possession of the very worst men? How happy,
+then, ought we to esteem that man who alone has it in his power, not by
+the law of the Romans, but by the privilege of philosophers, to enjoy
+all things as his own; not by any civil bond, but by the common right of
+nature, which denies that anything can really be possessed by any one
+but him who understands its true nature and use; who reckons our
+dictatorships and consulships rather in the rank of necessary offices
+than desirable employments, and thinks they must be endured rather as
+acquittances of our debt to our country than sought for the sake of
+emolument or glory—the man, in short, who can apply to himself the
+sentence which Cato tells us my ancestor Africanus loved to repeat,
+“that he was never so busy as when he did nothing, and never less
+solitary than when alone.”</p>
+
+<p>For who can believe that Dionysius, when after every possible effort he
+ravished from his fellow-citizens their liberty, had performed a nobler
+work than Archimedes, when, without appearing to be doing anything, he
+manufactured the globe which we have just been describing? <a id="page-374"></a><span class="pgnum">374</span>Who does not
+see that those men are in reality more solitary who, in the midst of a
+crowd, find no one with whom they can converse congenially than those
+who, without witnesses, hold communion with themselves, and enter into
+the secret counsels of the sagest philosophers, while they delight
+themselves in their writings and discoveries? And who would think any
+one richer than the man who is in want of nothing which nature requires;
+or more powerful than he who has attained all that she has need of; or
+happier than he who is free from all mental perturbation; or more secure
+in future than he who carries all his property in himself, which is thus
+secured from shipwreck? And what power, what magistracy, what royalty,
+can be preferred to a wisdom which, looking down on all terrestrial
+objects as low and transitory things, incessantly directs its attention
+to eternal and immutable verities, and which is persuaded that though
+others are called men, none are really so but those who are refined by
+the appropriate acts of humanity?</p>
+
+<p>In this sense an expression of Plato or some other philosopher appears
+to me exceedingly elegant, who, when a tempest had driven his ship on an
+unknown country and a desolate shore, during the alarms with which their
+ignorance of the region inspired his companions, observed, they say,
+geometrical figures traced in the sand, on which he immediately told
+them to be of good cheer, for he had observed the indications of Man. A
+conjecture he deduced, not from the cultivation of the soil which he
+beheld, but from the symbols of science. For this reason, Tubero,
+learning and learned men, and these your favorite studies, have always
+particularly pleased me.</p>
+
+<p>XVIII. Then LÊlius replied: I cannot venture, Scipio, to answer your
+arguments, or to [maintain the discussion either against] you, Philus,
+or Manilius.<a id="FNA-302"></a><a href="#FN-302"><sup>302</sup></a> * * *</p>
+
+<p>We had a friend in Tubero’s father’s family, who in these respects may
+serve him as a model.</p>
+
+<blockquote>
+<p>Sextus so wise, and ever on his guard.</p>
+</blockquote>
+
+<p>Wise and cautious indeed he was, as Ennius justly describes him—not
+because he searched for what he could <a id="page-375"></a><span class="pgnum">375</span>never find, but because he knew
+how to answer those who prayed for deliverance from cares and
+difficulties. It is he who, reasoning against the astronomical studies
+of Gallus, used frequently to repeat these words of Achilles in the
+Iphigenia<a id="FNA-303"></a><a href="#FN-303"><sup>303</sup></a>:</p>
+
+<div class="poem">
+<p>They note the astrologic signs of heaven,</p>
+<p>Whene’er the goats or scorpions of great Jove,</p>
+<p>Or other monstrous names of brutal forms,</p>
+<p>Rise in the zodiac; but not one regards</p>
+<p>The sensible facts of earth, on which we tread,</p>
+<p>While gazing on the starry prodigies.</p>
+</div>
+
+<p>He used, however, to say (and I have often listened to him with
+pleasure) that for his part he thought that Zethus, in the piece of
+Pacuvius, was too inimical to learning. He much preferred the
+Neoptolemus of Ennius, who professes himself desirous of philosophizing
+only in moderation; for that he did not think it right to be wholly
+devoted to it. But though the studies of the Greeks have so many charms
+for you, there are others, perhaps, nobler and more extensive, which we
+may be better able to apply to the service of real life, and even to
+political affairs. As to these abstract sciences, their utility, if they
+possess any, lies principally in exciting and stimulating the abilities
+of youth, so that they more easily acquire more important
+accomplishments.</p>
+
+<p>XIX. Then Tubero said: I do not mean to disagree with you, LÊlius; but,
+pray, what do you call more important studies?</p>
+
+<p><i>LÊlius.</i> I will tell you frankly, though perhaps you will think lightly
+of my opinion, since you appeared so eager in interrogating Scipio
+respecting the celestial phenomena; but I happen to think that those
+things which are every day before our eyes are more particularly
+deserving of our attention. Why should the child of Paulus Æmilius, the
+nephew of Æmilius, the descendant of such a noble family and so glorious
+a republic, inquire how there can be two suns in heaven, and not ask how
+there can be two senates in one Commonwealth, and, as it were, two
+distinct peoples? <a id="page-376"></a><span class="pgnum">376</span>For, as you see, the death of Tiberius Gracchus, and
+the whole system of his tribuneship, has divided one people into two
+parties. But the slanderers and the enemies of Scipio, encouraged by P.
+Crassus and Appius Claudius, maintained, after the death of these two
+chiefs, a division of nearly half the senate, under the influence of
+Metellus and Mucius. Nor would they permit the man<a id="FNA-304"></a><a href="#FN-304"><sup>304</sup></a> who alone could
+have been of service to help us out of our difficulties during the
+movement of the Latins and their allies towards rebellion, violating all
+our treaties in the presence of factious triumvirs, and creating every
+day some fresh intrigue, to the disturbance of the worthier and
+wealthier citizens. This is the reason, young men, if you will listen to
+me, why you should regard this new sun with less alarm; for, whether it
+does exist, or whether it does not exist, it is, as you see, quite
+harmless to us. As to the manner of its existence, we can know little or
+nothing; and even if we obtained the most perfect understanding of it,
+this knowledge would make us but little wiser or happier. But that there
+should exist a united people and a united senate is a thing which
+actually may be brought about, and it will be a great evil if it is not;
+and that it does not exist at present we are aware; and we see that if
+it can be effected, our lives will be both better and happier.</p>
+
+<p>XX. Then Mucius said: What, then, do you consider, my LÊlius, should be
+our best arguments in endeavoring to bring about the object of your
+wishes?</p>
+
+<p><i>LÊlius.</i> Those sciences and arts which teach us how we may be most
+useful to the State; for I consider that the most glorious office of
+wisdom, and the noblest proof and business of virtue. In order,
+therefore, that we may consecrate these holidays as much as possible to
+conversations which may be profitable to the Commonwealth, let us beg
+Scipio to explain to us what in his estimation appears to be the best
+form of government. Then let us pass on to other points, the knowledge
+of which may lead us, as I hope, to sound political views, and unfold
+the causes of the dangers which now threaten us.</p>
+
+<p>XXI. When Philus, Manilius, and Mummius had all expressed <a id="page-377"></a><span class="pgnum">377</span>their great
+approbation of this idea<a id="FNA-305"></a><a href="#FN-305"><sup>305</sup></a> * * * I have ventured [to open our
+discussion] in this way, not only because it is but just that on State
+politics the chief man in the State should be the principal speaker, but
+also because I recollect that you, Scipio, were formerly very much in
+the habit of conversing with PanÊtius and Polybius, two Greeks,
+exceedingly learned in political questions, and that you are master of
+many arguments by which you prove that by far the best condition of
+government is that which our ancestors have handed down to us. And as
+you, therefore, are familiar with this subject, if you will explain to
+us your views respecting the general principles of a state (I speak for
+my friends as well as myself), we shall feel exceedingly obliged to you.</p>
+
+<p>XXII. Then Scipio said: I must acknowledge that there is no subject of
+meditation to which my mind naturally turns with more ardor and
+intensity than this very one which LÊlius has proposed to us. And,
+indeed, as I see that in every profession, every artist who would
+distinguish himself, thinks of, and aims at, and labors for no other
+object but that of attaining perfection in his art, should not I, whose
+main business, according to the example of my father and my ancestors,
+is the advancement and right administration of government, be confessing
+myself more indolent than any common mechanic if I were to bestow on
+this noblest of sciences less attention and labor than they devote to
+their insignificant trades? However, I am neither entirely satisfied
+with the decisions which the greatest and wisest men of Greece have left
+us; nor, on the other hand, do I venture to prefer my own opinions to
+theirs. Therefore, I must request you not to consider me either entirely
+ignorant of the Grecian literature, nor yet disposed, especially in
+political questions, to yield it the pre-eminence over our own; but
+rather to regard me as a true-born Roman, not illiberally instructed by
+the care of my father, and inflamed with the desire of knowledge, even
+from my boyhood, but still even more familiar with domestic precepts and
+practices than the literature of books.</p>
+
+<p>XXIII. On this Philus said: I have no doubt, my Scipio, that no one is
+superior to you in natural genius, <a id="page-378"></a><span class="pgnum">378</span>and that you are very far superior
+to every one in the practical experience of national government and of
+important business. We are also acquainted with the course which your
+studies have at all times taken; and if, as you say, you have given so
+much attention to this science and art of politics, we cannot be too
+much obliged to LÊlius for introducing the subject: for I trust that
+what we shall hear from you will be far more useful and available than
+all the writings put together which the Greeks have written for us.</p>
+
+<p>Then Scipio replied: You are raising a very high expectation of my
+discourse, such as is a most oppressive burden to a man who is required
+to discuss grave subjects.</p>
+
+<p>And Philus said: Although that may be a difficulty, my Scipio, still you
+will be sure to conquer it, as you always do; nor is there any danger of
+eloquence failing you, when you begin to speak on the affairs of a
+commonwealth.</p>
+
+<p>XXIV. Then Scipio proceeded: I will do what you wish, as far as I can;
+and I shall enter into the discussion under favor of that rule which, I
+think, should be adopted by all persons in disputations of this kind, if
+they wish to avoid being misunderstood; namely, that when men have
+agreed respecting the proper name of the matter under discussion, it
+should be stated what that name exactly means, and what it legitimately
+includes. And when that point is settled, then it is fit to enter on the
+discussion; for it will never be possible to arrive at an understanding
+of what the character of the subject of the discussion is, unless one
+first understands exactly what it is. Since, then, our investigations
+relate to a commonwealth, we must first examine what this name properly
+signifies.</p>
+
+<p>And when LÊlius had intimated his approbation of this course, Scipio
+continued:</p>
+
+<p>I shall not adopt, said he, in so clear and simple a manner that system
+of discussion which goes back to first principles; as learned men often
+do in this sort of discussion, so as to go back to the first meeting of
+male and female, and then to the first birth and formation of the first
+family, and define over and over again what there is in words, and in
+how many manners each thing is stated. <a id="page-379"></a><span class="pgnum">379</span>For, as I am speaking to men of
+prudence, who have acted with the greatest glory in the Commonwealth,
+both in peace and war, I will take care not to allow the subject of the
+discussion itself to be clearer than my explanation of it. Nor have I
+undertaken this task with the design of examining all its minuter
+points, like a school-master; nor will I promise you in the following
+discourse not to omit any single particular.</p>
+
+<p>Then LÊlius said: For my part, I am impatient for exactly that kind of
+disquisition which you promise us.</p>
+
+<p>XXV. Well, then, said Africanus, a commonwealth is a constitution of the
+entire people. But the people is not every association of men, however
+congregated, but the association of the entire number, bound together by
+the compact of justice, and the communication of utility. The first
+cause of this association is not so much the weakness of man as a
+certain spirit of congregation which naturally belongs to him. For the
+human race is not a race of isolated individuals, wandering and
+solitary; but it is so constituted that even in the affluence of all
+things [and without any need of reciprocal assistance, it spontaneously
+seeks society].</p>
+
+<p>XXVI. [It is necessary to presuppose] these original seeds, as it were,
+since we cannot discover any primary establishment of the other virtues,
+or even of a commonwealth itself. These unions, then, formed by the
+principle which I have mentioned, established their headquarters
+originally in certain central positions, for the convenience of the
+whole population; and having fortified them by natural and artificial
+means, they called this collection of houses a city or town,
+distinguished by temples and public squares. Every people, therefore,
+which consists of such an association of the entire multitude as I have
+described, every city which consists of an assemblage of the people, and
+every commonwealth which embraces every member of these associations,
+must be regulated by a certain authority, in order to be permanent.</p>
+
+<p>This intelligent authority should always refer itself to that grand
+first principle which established the Commonwealth. It must be deposited
+in the hands of one supreme person, or intrusted to the administration
+of certain delegated <a id="page-380"></a><span class="pgnum">380</span>rulers, or undertaken by the whole multitude. When
+the direction of all depends on one person, we call this individual a
+king, and this form of political constitution a kingdom. When it is in
+the power of privileged delegates, the State is said to be ruled by an
+aristocracy; and when the people are all in all, they call it a
+democracy, or popular constitution. And if the tie of social affection,
+which originally united men in political associations for the sake of
+public interest, maintains its force, each of these forms of government
+is, I will not say perfect, nor, in my opinion, essentially good, but
+tolerable, and such that one may accidentally be better than another:
+either a just and wise king, or a selection of the most eminent
+citizens, or even the populace itself (though this is the least
+commendable form), may, if there be no interference of crime and
+cupidity, form a constitution sufficiently secure.</p>
+
+<p>XXVII. But in a monarchy the other members of the State are often too
+much deprived of public counsel and jurisdiction; and under the rule of
+an aristocracy the multitude can hardly possess its due share of
+liberty, since it is allowed no share in the public deliberation, and no
+power. And when all things are carried by a democracy, although it be
+just and moderate, yet its very equality is a culpable levelling,
+inasmuch as it allows no gradations of rank. Therefore, even if Cyrus,
+the King of the Persians, was a most righteous and wise monarch, I
+should still think that the interest of the people (for this is, as I
+have said before, the same as the Commonwealth) could not be very
+effectually promoted when all things depended on the beck and nod of one
+individual. And though at present the people of Marseilles, our clients,
+are governed with the greatest justice by elected magistrates of the
+highest rank, still there is always in this condition of the people a
+certain appearance of servitude; and when the Athenians, at a certain
+period, having demolished their Areopagus, conducted all public affairs
+by the acts and decrees of the democracy alone, their State, as it no
+longer contained a distinct gradation of ranks, was no longer able to
+retain its original fair appearance.</p>
+
+<p>XXVIII. I have reasoned thus on the three forms of government, not
+looking on them in their disorganized <a id="page-381"></a><span class="pgnum">381</span>and confused conditions, but in
+their proper and regular administration. These three particular forms,
+however, contained in themselves, from the first, the faults and defects
+I have mentioned; but they have also other dangerous vices, for there is
+not one of these three forms of government which has not a precipitous
+and slippery passage down to some proximate abuse. For, after thinking
+of that endurable, or, as you will have it, most amiable king, Cyrus—to
+name him in preference to any one else—then, to produce a change in our
+minds, we behold the barbarous Phalaris, that model of tyranny, to which
+the monarchical authority is easily abused by a facile and natural
+inclination. And, in like manner, along-side of the wise aristocracy of
+Marseilles, we might exhibit the oligarchical faction of the thirty
+tyrants which once existed at Athens. And, not to seek for other
+instances, among the same Athenians, we can show you that when unlimited
+power was cast into the hands of the people, it inflamed the fury of the
+multitude, and aggravated that universal license which ruined their
+State.<a id="FNA-306"></a><a href="#FN-306"><sup>306</sup></a> * * *</p>
+
+<p>XXIX. The worst condition of things sometimes results from a confusion
+of those factious tyrannies into which kings, aristocrats, and democrats
+are apt to degenerate. For thus, from these diverse elements, there
+occasionally arises (as I have said before) a new kind of government.
+And wonderful indeed are the revolutions and periodical returns in
+natural constitutions of such alternations and vicissitudes, which it is
+the part of the wise politician to investigate with the closest
+attention. But to calculate their approach, and to join to this
+foresight the skill which moderates the course of events, and retains in
+a steady hand the reins of that authority which safely conducts the
+people through all the dangers to which they expose themselves, is the
+work of a most illustrious citizen, and of almost divine genius.</p>
+
+<p>There is a fourth kind of government, therefore, which, in my opinion,
+is preferable to all these: it is that mixed and moderate government
+which is composed of the three particular forms which I have already
+noticed.</p>
+
+<p>XXX. <i>LÊlius.</i> I am not ignorant, Scipio, that such is <a id="page-382"></a><span class="pgnum">382</span>your opinion,
+for I have often heard you say so. But I do not the less desire, if it
+is not giving you too much trouble, to hear which you consider the best
+of these three forms of commonwealths. For it may be of some use in
+considering<a id="FNA-307"></a><a href="#FN-307"><sup>307</sup></a> * * *</p>
+
+<p>XXXI. * * * And each commonwealth corresponds to the nature and will of
+him who governs it. Therefore, in no other constitution than that in
+which the people exercise sovereign power has liberty any sure abode,
+than which there certainly is no more desirable blessing. And if it be
+not equally established for every one, it is not even liberty at all.
+And how can there be this character of equality, I do not say under a
+monarchy, where slavery is least disguised or doubtful, but even in
+those constitutions in which the people are free indeed in words, for
+they give their suffrages, they elect officers, they are canvassed and
+solicited for magistracies; but yet they only grant those things which
+they are obliged to grant whether they will or not, and which are not
+really in their free power, though others ask them for them? For they
+are not themselves admitted to the government, to the exercise of public
+authority, or to offices of select judges, which are permitted to those
+only of ancient families and large fortunes. But in a free people, as
+among the Rhodians and Athenians, there is no citizen who<a id="FNA-308"></a><a href="#FN-308"><sup>308</sup></a> * * *</p>
+
+<p>XXXII. * * * No sooner is one man, or several, elevated by wealth and
+power, than they say that * * * arise from their pride and arrogance,
+when the idle and the timid give way, and bow down to the insolence of
+riches. But if the people knew how to maintain its rights, then they say
+that nothing could be more glorious and prosperous than democracy;
+inasmuch as they themselves would be the sovereign dispensers of laws,
+judgments, war, peace, public treaties, and, finally, of the fortune and
+life of each individual citizen; and this condition of things is the
+only one which, in their opinion, can be really called a commonwealth,
+that is to say, a constitution of the people. It is on this principle
+that, according to them, a people often vindicates its liberty from the
+domination of kings and <a id="page-383"></a><span class="pgnum">383</span>nobles; while, on the other hand, kings are not
+sought for among free peoples, nor are the power and wealth of
+aristocracies. They deny, moreover, that it is fair to reject this
+general constitution of freemen, on account of the vices of the
+unbridled populace; but that if the people be united and inclined, and
+directs all its efforts to the safety and freedom of the community,
+nothing can be stronger or more unchangeable; and they assert that this
+necessary union is easily obtained in a republic so constituted that the
+good of all classes is the same; while the conflicting interests that
+prevail in other constitutions inevitably produce dissensions;
+therefore, say they, when the senate had the ascendency, the republic
+had no stability; and when kings possess the power, this blessing is
+still more rare, since, as Ennius expresses it,</p>
+
+<div class="poem">
+<p>In kingdoms there’s no faith, and little love. </p>
+</div>
+
+<p>Wherefore, since the law is the bond of civil society, and the justice
+of the law equal, by what rule can the association of citizens be held
+together, if the condition of the citizens be not equal? For if the
+fortunes of men cannot be reduced to this equality—if genius cannot be
+equally the property of all—rights, at least, should be equal among
+those who are citizens of the same republic. For what is a republic but
+an association of rights?<a id="FNA-309"></a><a href="#FN-309"><sup>309</sup></a> * * *</p>
+
+<p>XXXIII. But as to the other political constitutions, these democratical
+advocates do not think they are worthy of being distinguished by the
+name which they claim. For why, say they, should we apply the name of
+king, the title of Jupiter the Beneficent, and not rather the title of
+tyrant, to a man ambitious of sole authority and power, lording it over
+a degraded multitude? For a tyrant may be as merciful as a king may be
+oppressive; so that the whole difference to the people is, whether they
+serve an indulgent master or a cruel one, since serve some one they
+must. But how could Sparta, at the period of the boasted superiority of
+her political institution, obtain a constant enjoyment of just and
+virtuous kings, when they necessarily received an hereditary monarch,
+good, bad, or indifferent, because he happened to be of the blood royal?
+As to <a id="page-384"></a><span class="pgnum">384</span>aristocrats, Who will endure, say they, that men should
+distinguish themselves by such a title, and that not by the voice of the
+people, but by their own votes? For how is such a one judged to be best
+either in learning, sciences, or arts?<a id="FNA-310"></a><a href="#FN-310"><sup>310</sup></a> * * *</p>
+
+<p>XXXIV. * * * If it does so by hap-hazard, it will be as easily upset as
+a vessel if the pilot were chosen by lot from among the passengers. But
+if a people, being free, chooses those to whom it can trust itself—and,
+if it desires its own preservation, it will always choose the
+noblest—then certainly it is in the counsels of the aristocracy that
+the safety of the State consists, especially as nature has not only
+appointed that these superior men should excel the inferior sort in high
+virtue and courage, but has inspired the people also with the desire of
+obedience towards these, their natural lords. But they say this
+aristocratical State is destroyed by the depraved opinions of men, who,
+through ignorance of virtue (which, as it belongs to few, can be
+discerned and appreciated by few), imagine that not only rich and
+powerful men, but also those who are nobly born, are necessarily the
+best. And so when, through this popular error, the riches, and not the
+virtue, of a few men has taken possession of the State, these chiefs
+obstinately retain the title of nobles, though they want the essence of
+nobility. For riches, fame, and power, without wisdom and a just method
+of regulating ourselves and commanding others, are full of discredit and
+insolent arrogance; nor is there any kind of government more deformed
+than that in which the wealthiest are regarded as the noblest.</p>
+
+<p>But when virtue governs the Commonwealth, what can be more glorious?
+When he who commands the rest is himself enslaved by no lust or passion;
+when he himself exhibits all the virtues to which he incites and
+educates the citizens; when he imposes no law on the people which he
+does not himself observe, but presents his life as a living law to his
+fellow-countrymen; if a single individual could thus suffice for all,
+there would be no need of more; and if the community could find a chief
+ruler thus worthy of all their suffrages, none would require elected
+magistrates.</p>
+
+<p><a id="page-385"></a><span class="pgnum">385</span>It was the difficulty of forming plans which transferred the government
+from a king into the hands of many; and the error and temerity of the
+people likewise transferred it from the hands of the many into those of
+the few. Thus, between the weakness of the monarch and the rashness of
+the multitude, the aristocrats have occupied the middle place, than
+which nothing can be better arranged; and while they superintend the
+public interest, the people necessarily enjoy the greatest possible
+prosperity, being free from all care and anxiety, having intrusted their
+security to others, who ought sedulously to defend it, and not allow the
+people to suspect that their advantage is neglected by their rulers.</p>
+
+<p>For as to that equality of rights which democracies so loudly boast of,
+it can never be maintained; for the people themselves, so dissolute and
+so unbridled, are always inclined to flatter a number of demagogues; and
+there is in them a very great partiality for certain men and dignities,
+so that their equality, so called, becomes most unfair and iniquitous.
+For as equal honor is given to the most noble and the most infamous,
+some of whom must exist in every State, then the equity which they
+eulogize becomes most inequitable—an evil which never can happen in
+those states which are governed by aristocracies. These reasonings, my
+LÊlius, and some others of the same kind, are usually brought forward by
+those that so highly extol this form of political constitution.</p>
+
+<p>XXXV. Then LÊlius said: But you have not told us, Scipio, which of these
+three forms of government you yourself most approve.</p>
+
+<p><i>Scipio.</i> You are right to shape your question, which of the three I
+most approve, for there is not one of them which I approve at all by
+itself, since, as I told you, I prefer that government which is mixed
+and composed of all these forms, to any one of them taken separately.
+But if I must confine myself to one of these particular forms simply and
+exclusively, I must confess I prefer the royal one, and praise that as
+the first and best. In this, which I here choose to call the primitive
+form of government, I find the title of father attached to that of king,
+to express that he watches over the citizens as over his children, and
+endeavors <a id="page-386"></a><span class="pgnum">386</span>rather to preserve them in freedom than reduce them to
+slavery. So that it is more advantageous for those who are insignificant
+in property and capacity to be supported by the care of one excellent
+and eminently powerful man. The nobles here present themselves, who
+profess that they can do all this in much better style; for they say
+that there is much more wisdom in many than in one, and at least as much
+faith and equity. And, last of all, come the people, who cry with a loud
+voice that they will render obedience neither to the one nor the few;
+that even to brute beasts nothing is so dear as liberty; and that all
+men who serve either kings or nobles are deprived of it. Thus, the kings
+attract us by affection, the nobles by talent, the people by liberty;
+and in the comparison it is hard to choose the best.</p>
+
+<p><i>LÊlius.</i> I think so too, but yet it is impossible to despatch the other
+branches of the question, if you leave this primary point undetermined.</p>
+
+<p>XXXVI. <i>Scipio.</i> We must then, I suppose, imitate Aratus, who, when he
+prepared himself to treat of great things, thought himself in duty bound
+to begin with Jupiter.</p>
+
+<p><i>LÊlius.</i> Wherefore Jupiter? and what is there in this discussion which
+resembles that poem?</p>
+
+<p><i>Scipio.</i> Why, it serves to teach us that we cannot better commence our
+investigations than by invoking him whom, with one voice, both learned
+and unlearned extol as the universal king of all gods and men.</p>
+
+<p>How so? said LÊlius.</p>
+
+<p>Do you, then, asked Scipio, believe in nothing which is not before your
+eyes? whether these ideas have been established by the chiefs of states
+for the benefit of society, that there might be believed to exist one
+Universal Monarch in heaven, at whose nod (as Homer expresses it) all
+Olympus trembles, and that he might be accounted both king and father of
+all creatures; for there is great authority, and there are many
+witnesses, if you choose to call all many, who attest that all nations
+have unanimously recognized, by the decrees of their chiefs, that
+nothing is better than a king, since they think that all the Gods are
+governed by the divine power of one sovereign; or if we suspect <a id="page-387"></a><span class="pgnum">387</span>that
+this opinion rests on the error of the ignorant, and should be classed
+among the fables, let us listen to those universal testimonies of
+erudite men, who have, as it were, seen with their eyes those things to
+the knowledge of which we can hardly attain by report.</p>
+
+<p>What men do you mean? said LÊlius.</p>
+
+<p>Those, replied Scipio, who, by the investigation of nature, have arrived
+at the opinion that the whole universe [is animated] by a single
+Mind<a id="FNA-311"></a><a href="#FN-311"><sup>311</sup></a>. * * *</p>
+
+<p>XXXVII. But if you please, my LÊlius, I will bring forward evidences
+which are neither too ancient nor in any respect barbarous.</p>
+
+<p>Those, said LÊlius, are what I want.</p>
+
+<p><i>Scipio.</i> You are aware that it is now not four centuries since this
+city of ours has been without kings.</p>
+
+<p><i>LÊlius.</i> You are correct; it is less than four centuries.</p>
+
+<p><i>Scipio.</i> Well, then, what are four centuries in the age of a state or
+city? is it a long time?</p>
+
+<p><i>LÊlius.</i> It hardly amounts to the age of maturity.</p>
+
+<p><i>Scipio.</i> You say truly; and yet not four centuries have elapsed since
+there was a king in Rome.</p>
+
+<p><i>LÊlius.</i> And he was a proud king.</p>
+
+<p><i>Scipio.</i> But who was his predecessor?</p>
+
+<p><i>LÊlius.</i> He was an admirably just one; and, indeed, we must bestow the
+same praise on all his predecessors as far back as Romulus, who reigned
+about six centuries ago.</p>
+
+<p><i>Scipio.</i> Even he, then, is not very ancient.</p>
+
+<p><i>LÊlius.</i> No; he reigned when Greece was already becoming old.</p>
+
+<p><i>Scipio.</i> Agreed. Was Romulus, then, think you, king of a barbarous
+people?</p>
+
+<p><i>LÊlius.</i> Why, as to that, if we were to follow the example of the
+Greeks, who say that all people are either Greeks or barbarians, I am
+afraid that we must confess that he was a king of barbarians; but if
+this name belongs rather to manners than to languages, then I believe
+the Greeks were just as barbarous as the Romans.</p>
+
+<p>Then Scipio said: But with respect to the present question, we do not so
+much need to inquire into the nation as into the disposition. For if
+intelligent men, at a period so <a id="page-388"></a><span class="pgnum">388</span>little remote, desired the government
+of kings, you will confess that I am producing authorities that are
+neither antiquated, rude, nor insignificant.</p>
+
+<p>XXXVIII. Then LÊlius said: I see, Scipio, that you are very sufficiently
+provided with authorities; but with me, as with every fair judge,
+authorities are worth less than arguments.</p>
+
+<p>Scipio replied: Then, LÊlius, you shall yourself make use of an argument
+derived from your own senses.</p>
+
+<p><i>LÊlius.</i> What senses do you mean?</p>
+
+<p><i>Scipio.</i> The feelings which you experience when at any time you happen
+to feel angry with any one.</p>
+
+<p><i>LÊlius.</i> That happens rather oftener than I could wish.</p>
+
+<p><i>Scipio.</i> Well, then, when you are angry, do you permit your anger to
+triumph over your judgment?</p>
+
+<p>No, by Hercules! said LÊlius; I imitate the famous Archytas of Tarentum,
+who, when he came to his villa, and found all its arrangements were
+contrary to his orders, said to his steward, “Ah! you unlucky scoundrel,
+I would flog you to death, if it were not that I am in a rage with you.”</p>
+
+<p>Capital, said Scipio. Archytas, then, regarded unreasonable anger as a
+kind of sedition and rebellion of nature which he sought to appease by
+reflection. And so, if we examine avarice, the ambition of power or of
+glory, or the lusts of concupiscence and licentiousness, we shall find a
+certain conscience in the mind of man, which, like a king, sways by the
+force of counsel all the inferior faculties and propensities; and this,
+in truth, is the noblest portion of our nature; for when conscience
+reigns, it allows no resting-place to lust, violence, or temerity.</p>
+
+<p><i>LÊlius.</i> You have spoken the truth.</p>
+
+<p><i>Scipio.</i> Well, then, does a mind thus governed and regulated meet your
+approbation?</p>
+
+<p><i>LÊlius.</i> More than anything upon earth.</p>
+
+<p><i>Scipio.</i> Then you would not approve that the evil passions, which are
+innumerable, should expel conscience, and that lusts and animal
+propensities should assume an ascendency over us?</p>
+
+<p><i>LÊlius.</i> For my part, I can conceive nothing more wretched than a mind
+thus degraded, or a man animated by a soul so licentious.</p>
+
+<p><a id="page-389"></a><span class="pgnum">389</span><i>Scipio.</i> You desire, then, that all the faculties of the mind should
+submit to a ruling power, and that conscience should reign over them
+all?</p>
+
+<p><i>LÊlius.</i> Certainly, that is my wish.</p>
+
+<p><i>Scipio.</i> How, then, can you doubt what opinion to form on the subject
+of the Commonwealth? in which, if the State is thrown into many hands,
+it is very plain that there will be no presiding authority; for if power
+be not united, it soon comes to nothing.</p>
+
+<p>XXXIX. Then LÊlius asked: But what difference is there, I should like to
+know, between the one and the many, if justice exists equally in many?</p>
+
+<p>And Scipio said: Since I see, my LÊlius, that the authorities I have
+adduced have no great influence on you, I must continue to employ you
+yourself as my witness in proof of what I am saying.</p>
+
+<p>In what way, said LÊlius, are you going to make me again support your
+argument?</p>
+
+<p><i>Scipio.</i> Why, thus: I recollect, when we were lately at FormiÊ, that
+you told your servants repeatedly to obey the orders of more than one
+master only.</p>
+
+<p><i>LÊlius.</i> To be sure, those of my steward.</p>
+
+<p><i>Scipio.</i> What do you at home? Do you commit your affairs to the hands
+of many persons?</p>
+
+<p><i>LÊlius.</i> No, I trust them to myself alone.</p>
+
+<p><i>Scipio.</i> Well, in your whole establishment, is there any other master
+but yourself?</p>
+
+<p><i>LÊlius.</i> Not one.</p>
+
+<p><i>Scipio.</i> Then I think you must grant me that, as respects the State,
+the government of single individuals, provided they are just, is
+superior to any other.</p>
+
+<p><i>LÊlius.</i> You have conducted me to this conclusion, and I entertain very
+nearly that opinion.</p>
+
+<p>XL. And Scipio said: You would still further agree with me, my LÊlius,
+if, omitting the common comparisons, that one pilot is better fitted to
+steer a ship, and a physician to treat an invalid, provided they be
+competent men in their respective professions, than many could be, I
+should come at once to more illustrious examples.</p>
+
+<p><i>LÊlius.</i> What examples do you mean?</p>
+
+<p><i>Scipio.</i> Do not you observe that it was the cruelty and <a id="page-390"></a><span class="pgnum">390</span>pride of one
+single Tarquin only that made the title of king unpopular among the
+Romans?</p>
+
+<p><i>LÊlius.</i> Yes, I acknowledge that.</p>
+
+<p><i>Scipio.</i> You are also aware of this fact, on which I think I shall
+debate in the course of the coming discussion, that after the expulsion
+of King Tarquin, the people was transported by a wonderful excess of
+liberty. Then innocent men were driven into banishment; then the estates
+of many individuals were pillaged, consulships were made annual, public
+authorities were overawed by mobs, popular appeals took place in all
+cases imaginable; then secessions of the lower orders ensued, and,
+lastly, those proceedings which tended to place all powers in the hands
+of the populace.</p>
+
+<p><i>LÊlius.</i> I must confess this is all too true.</p>
+
+<p>All these things now, said Scipio, happened during periods of peace and
+tranquillity, for license is wont to prevail when there is little to
+fear, as in a calm voyage or a trifling disease. But as we observe the
+voyager and the invalid implore the aid of some one competent director,
+as soon as the sea grows stormy and the disease alarming, so our nation
+in peace and security commands, threatens, resists, appeals from, and
+insults its magistrates, but in war obeys them as strictly as kings; for
+public safety is, after all, rather more valuable than popular license.
+And in the most serious wars, our countrymen have even chosen the entire
+command to be deposited in the hands of some single chief, without a
+colleague; the very name of which magistrate indicates the absolute
+character of his power. For though he is evidently called dictator
+because he is appointed (dicitur), yet do we still observe him, my
+LÊlius, in our sacred books entitled Magister Populi (the master of the
+people).</p>
+
+<p>This is certainly the case, said LÊlius.</p>
+
+<p>Our ancestors, therefore, said Scipio, acted wisely.<a id="FNA-312"></a><a href="#FN-312"><sup>312</sup></a> * * *</p>
+
+<p>XLI. When the people is deprived of a just king, as Ennius says, after
+the death of one of the best of monarchs,</p>
+
+<div class="poem">
+<p>They hold his memory dear, and, in the warmth</p>
+<p>Of their discourse, they cry, O Romulus!</p>
+<p>O prince divine, sprung from the might of Mars</p>
+<p>To be thy country’s guardian! O our sire!</p>
+<p>Be our protector still, O heaven-begot!</p>
+</div>
+
+<p><a id="page-391"></a><span class="pgnum">391</span>Not heroes, nor lords alone, did they call those whom they lawfully
+obeyed; nor merely as kings did they proclaim them; but they pronounced
+them their country’s guardians, their fathers, and their Gods. Nor,
+indeed, without cause, for they added,</p>
+
+<div class="poem">
+<p>Thou, Prince, hast brought us to the gates of light.</p>
+</div>
+
+<p class="cont">And truly they believed that life and honor and glory had arisen to them
+from the justice of their king. The same good-will would doubtless have
+remained in their descendants, if the same virtues had been preserved on
+the throne; but, as you see, by the injustice of one man the whole of
+that kind of constitution fell into ruin.</p>
+
+<p>I see it indeed, said LÊlius, and I long to know the history of these
+political revolutions both in our own Commonwealth and in every other.</p>
+
+<p>XLII. And Scipio said: When I shall have explained my opinion respecting
+the form of government which I prefer, I shall be able to speak to you
+more accurately respecting the revolutions of states, though I think
+that such will not take place so easily in the mixed form of government
+which I recommend. With respect, however, to absolute monarchy, it
+presents an inherent and invincible tendency to revolution. No sooner
+does a king begin to be unjust than this entire form of government is
+demolished, and he at once becomes a tyrant, which is the worst of all
+governments, and one very closely related to monarchy. If this State
+falls into the hands of the nobles, which is the usual course of events,
+it becomes an aristocracy, or the second of the three kinds of
+constitutions which I have described; for it is, as it were, a
+royal—that is to say, a paternal—council of the chief men of the State
+consulting for the public benefit. Or if the people by itself has
+expelled or slain a tyrant, it is moderate in its conduct as long as it
+has sense and wisdom, and while it rejoices in its exploit, and applies
+itself to maintaining the constitution which it has established. But if
+ever the people has raised its forces against a just king and robbed him
+of his throne, or, as has frequently happened, has tasted the blood of
+its legitimate nobles, and subjected the whole Commonwealth to its own
+license, you can imagine <a id="page-392"></a><span class="pgnum">392</span>no flood or conflagration so terrible, or any
+whose violence is harder to appease than this unbridled insolence of the
+populace.</p>
+
+<p>XLIII. Then we see realized that which Plato so vividly describes, if I
+can but express it in our language. It is by no means easy to do it
+justice in translation: however, I will try.</p>
+
+<p>When, says Plato, the insatiate jaws of the populace are fired with the
+thirst of liberty, and when the people, urged on by evil ministers,
+drains in its thirst the cup, not of tempered liberty, but unmitigated
+license, then the magistrates and chiefs, if they are not utterly
+subservient and remiss, and shameless promoters of the popular
+licentiousness, are pursued, incriminated, accused, and cried down under
+the title of despots and tyrants. I dare say you recollect the passage.</p>
+
+<p>Yes, said LÊlius, it is familiar to me.</p>
+
+<p><i>Scipio.</i> Plato thus proceeds: Then those who feel in duty bound to obey
+the chiefs of the State are persecuted by the insensate populace, who
+call them voluntary slaves. But those who, though invested with
+magistracies, wish to be considered on an equality with private
+individuals, and those private individuals who labor to abolish all
+distinctions between their own class and the magistrates, are extolled
+with acclamations and overwhelmed with honors, so that it inevitably
+happens in a commonwealth thus revolutionized that liberalism abounds in
+all directions, due authority is found wanting even in private families,
+and misrule seems to extend even to the animals that witness it. Then
+the father fears the son, and the son neglects the father. All modesty
+is banished; they become far too liberal for that. No difference is made
+between the citizen and the alien; the master dreads and cajoles his
+scholars, and the scholars despise their masters. The young men assume
+the gravity of sages, and sages must stoop to the follies of children,
+lest they should be hated and oppressed by them. The very slaves even
+are under but little restraint; wives boast the same rights as their
+husbands; dogs, horses, and asses are emancipated in this outrageous
+excess of freedom, and run about so violently that they frighten the
+passengers from the road. At length <a id="page-393"></a><span class="pgnum">393</span>the termination of all this
+infinite licentiousness is, that the minds of the citizens become so
+fastidious and effeminate, that when they observe even the slightest
+exertion of authority they grow angry and seditious, and thus the laws
+begin to be neglected, so that the people are absolutely without any
+master at all.</p>
+
+<p>Then LÊlius said: You have very accurately rendered the opinions which
+he expressed.</p>
+
+<p>XLIV. <i>Scipio.</i> Now, to return to the argument of my discourse. It
+appears that this extreme license, which is the only liberty in the eyes
+of the vulgar, is, according to Plato, such that from it as a sort of
+root tyrants naturally arise and spring up. For as the excessive power
+of an aristocracy occasions the destruction of the nobles, so this
+excessive liberalism of democracies brings after it the slavery of the
+people. Thus we find in the weather, the soil, and the animal
+constitution the most favorable conditions are sometimes suddenly
+converted by their excess into the contrary, and this fact is especially
+observable in political governments; and this excessive liberty soon
+brings the people collectively and individually to an excessive
+servitude. For, as I said, this extreme liberty easily introduces the
+reign of tyranny, the severest of all unjust slaveries. In fact, from
+the midst of this unbridled and capricious populace, they elect some one
+as a leader in opposition to their afflicted and expelled nobles: some
+new chief, forsooth, audacious and impure, often insolently persecuting
+those who have deserved well of the State, and ready to gratify the
+populace at his neighbor’s expense as well as his own. Then, since the
+private condition is naturally exposed to fears and alarms, the people
+invest him with many powers, and these are continued in his hands. Such
+men, like Pisistratus of Athens, will soon find an excuse for
+surrounding themselves with body-guards, and they will conclude by
+becoming tyrants over the very persons who raised them to dignity. If
+such despots perish by the vengeance of the better citizens, as is
+generally the case, the constitution is re-established; but if they fall
+by the hands of bold insurgents, then the same faction succeeds them,
+which is only another species of tyranny. And the same revolution arises
+<a id="page-394"></a><span class="pgnum">394</span>from the fair system of aristocracy when any corruption has betrayed
+the nobles from the path of rectitude. Thus the power is like the ball
+which is flung from hand to hand: it passes from kings to tyrants, from
+tyrants to the aristocracy, from them to democracy, and from these back
+again to tyrants and to factions; and thus the same kind of government
+is seldom long maintained.</p>
+
+<p>XLV. Since these are the facts of experience, royalty is, in my opinion,
+very far preferable to the three other kinds of political constitutions.
+But it is itself inferior to that which is composed of an equal mixture
+of the three best forms of government, united and modified by one
+another. I wish to establish in a commonwealth a royal and pre-eminent
+chief. Another portion of power should be deposited in the hands of the
+aristocracy, and certain things should be reserved to the judgment and
+wish of the multitude. This constitution, in the first place, possesses
+that great equality without which men cannot long maintain their
+freedom; secondly, it offers a great stability, while the particular
+separate and isolated forms easily fall into their contraries; so that a
+king is succeeded by a despot, an aristocracy by a faction, a democracy
+by a mob and confusion; and all these forms are frequently sacrificed to
+new revolutions. In this united and mixed constitution, however, similar
+disasters cannot happen without the greatest vices in public men. For
+there can be little to occasion revolution in a state in which every
+person is firmly established in his appropriate rank, and there are but
+few modes of corruption into which we can fall.</p>
+
+<p>XLVI. But I fear, LÊlius, and you, my amiable and learned friends, that
+if I were to dwell any longer on this argument, my words would seem
+rather like the lessons of a master, and not like the free conversation
+of one who is uniting with you in the consideration of truth. I shall
+therefore pass on to those things which are familiar to all, and which I
+have long studied. And in these matters I believe, I feel, and I affirm
+that of all governments there is none which, either in its entire
+constitution or the distribution of its parts, or in the discipline of
+its manners, is comparable to that which our fathers received from our
+earliest ancestors, and which they have handed down to <a id="page-395"></a><span class="pgnum">395</span>us. And since
+you wish to hear from me a development of this constitution, with which
+you are all acquainted, I shall endeavor to explain its true character
+and excellence. Thus keeping my eye fixed on the model of our Roman
+Commonwealth, I shall endeavor to accommodate to it all that I have to
+say on the best form of government. And by treating the subject in this
+way, I think I shall be able to accomplish most satisfactorily the task
+which LÊlius has imposed on me.</p>
+
+<p>XLVII. <i>LÊlius.</i> It is a task most properly and peculiarly your own, my
+Scipio; for who can speak so well as you either on the subject of the
+institutions of our ancestors, since you yourself are descended from
+most illustrious ancestors, or on that of the best form of a
+constitution which, if we possess (though at this moment we do not,
+still), when we do possess such a thing, who will be more flourishing in
+it than you? or on that of providing counsels for the future, as you,
+who, by dispelling two mighty perils from our city, have provided for
+its safety forever?</p>
+
+<hr class="tiny"/>
+
+<h4>FRAGMENTS.</h4>
+
+
+<p>XLVIII. As our country is the source of the greatest benefits, and is a
+parent dearer than those who have given us life, we owe her still warmer
+gratitude than belongs to our human relations. * * *</p>
+
+<p>Nor would Carthage have continued to flourish during six centuries
+without wisdom and good institutions. * * *</p>
+
+<p>In truth, says Cicero, although the reasonings of those men may contain
+most abundant fountains of science and virtue; still, if we compare them
+with the achievements and complete actions of statesmen, they will seem
+not to have been of so much service in the actual business of men as of
+amusement for their leisure.</p>
+
+
+
+<hr/>
+
+<h3><a id="page-396"></a><span class="pgnum">396</span>INTRODUCTION TO THE SECOND BOOK,</h3>
+
+<h4>BY THE ORIGINAL TRANSLATOR.</h4>
+
+
+<p class="intro"><span class="first">In</span> this second book of his Commonwealth, Cicero gives us a spirited and
+eloquent review of the history and successive developments of the Roman
+constitution. He bestows the warmest praises on its early kings, points
+out the great advantages which had resulted from its primitive
+monarchical system, and explains how that system had been gradually
+broken up. In order to prove the importance of reviving it, he gives a
+glowing picture of the evils and disasters that had befallen the Roman
+State in consequence of that overcharge of democratic folly and violence
+which had gradually gained an alarming preponderance, and describes,
+with a kind of prophetic sagacity, the fruit of his political
+experience, the subsequent revolutions of the Roman State, which such a
+state of things would necessarily bring about.</p>
+
+
+<hr class="tiny"/>
+
+
+<h3>BOOK II.</h3>
+
+
+<p>I. [<span class="first">When</span>, therefore, he observed all his friends kindled with the
+de]sire of hearing him, Scipio thus opened the discussion. I will
+commence, said Scipio, with a sentiment of old Cato, whom, as you know,
+I singularly loved and exceedingly admired, and to whom, in compliance
+with the judgment of both my parents, and also by my own desire, I was
+entirely devoted during my youth; of whose discourse, indeed, I could
+never have enough, so much experience did he possess as a statesman
+respecting the republic which he had so long governed, both in peace and
+war, with so much success. There was also an admirable propriety in his
+style of conversation, in which wit was tempered with gravity; a
+wonderful aptitude for acquiring, and at the same time communicating,
+information; and his life was in perfect correspondence and unison with
+his language. He used to say that the government of Rome was superior to
+that of other states for this reason, because in nearly all of them
+there had been single individuals, each of whom had regulated their
+commonwealth <a id="page-397"></a><span class="pgnum">397</span>according to their own laws and their own ordinances. So
+Minos had done in Crete, and Lycurgus in Sparta; and in Athens, which
+experienced so many revolutions, first Theseus, then Draco, then Solon,
+then Clisthenes, afterward many others; and, lastly, when it was almost
+lifeless and quite prostrate, that great and wise man, Demetrius
+Phalereus, supported it. But our Roman constitution, on the contrary,
+did not spring from the genius of one individual, but from that of many;
+and it was established, not in the lifetime of one man, but in the
+course of several ages and centuries. For, added he, there never yet
+existed any genius so vast and comprehensive as to allow nothing at any
+time to escape its attention; and all the geniuses in the world united
+in a single mind could never, within the limits of a single life, exert
+a foresight sufficiently extensive to embrace and harmonize all, without
+the aid of experience and practice.</p>
+
+<p>Thus, according to Cato’s usual habit, I now ascend in my discourse to
+the “origin of the people,” for I like to adopt the expression of Cato.
+I shall also more easily execute my proposed task if I thus exhibit to
+you our political constitution in its infancy, progress, and maturity,
+now so firm and fully established, than if, after the example of
+Socrates in the books of Plato, I were to delineate a mere imaginary
+republic.</p>
+
+<p>II. When all had signified their approbation, Scipio resumed: What
+commencement of a political constitution can we conceive more brilliant,
+or more universally known, than the foundation of Rome by the hand of
+Romulus? And he was the son of Mars: for we may grant this much to the
+common report existing among men, especially as it is not merely
+ancient, but one also which has been wisely maintained by our ancestors,
+in order that those who have done great service to communities may enjoy
+the reputation of having received from the Gods, not only their genius,
+but their very birth.</p>
+
+<p>It is related, then, that soon after the birth of Romulus and his
+brother Remus, Amulius, King of Alba, fearing that they might one day
+undermine his authority, ordered that they should be exposed on the
+banks of the Tiber; and that in this situation the infant Romulus was
+suckled <a id="page-398"></a><span class="pgnum">398</span>by a wild beast; that he was afterward educated by the
+shepherds, and brought up in the rough way of living and labors of the
+countrymen; and that he acquired, when he grew up, such superiority over
+the rest by the vigor of his body and the courage of his soul, that all
+the people who at that time inhabited the plains in the midst of which
+Rome now stands, tranquilly and willingly submitted to his government.
+And when he had made himself the chief of those bands, to come from
+fables to facts, he took Alba Longa, a powerful and strong city at that
+time, and slew its king, Amulius.</p>
+
+<p>III. Having acquired this glory, he conceived the design (as they tell
+us) of founding a new city and establishing a new state. As respected
+the site of his new city, a point which requires the greatest foresight
+in him who would lay the foundation of a durable commonwealth, he chose
+the most convenient possible position. For he did not advance too near
+the sea, which he might easily have done with the forces under his
+command, either by entering the territory of the Rutuli and Aborigines,
+or by founding his citadel at the mouth of the Tiber, where many years
+after Ancus Martius established a colony. But Romulus, with admirable
+genius and foresight, observed and perceived that sites very near the
+sea are not the most favorable positions for cities which would attain a
+durable prosperity and dominion. And this, first, because maritime
+cities are always exposed, not only to many attacks, but to perils they
+cannot provide against. For the continued land gives notice, by many
+indications, not only of any regular approaches, but also of any sudden
+surprises of an enemy, and announces them beforehand by the mere sound.
+There is no adversary who, on an inland territory, can arrive so swiftly
+as to prevent our knowing not only his existence, but his character too,
+and where he comes from. But a maritime and naval enemy can fall upon a
+town on the sea-coast before any one suspects that he is about to come;
+and when he does come, nothing exterior indicates who he is, or whence
+he comes, or what he wishes; nor can it even be determined and
+distinguished on all occasions whether he is a friend or a foe.</p>
+
+<p>IV. But maritime cities are likewise naturally exposed <a id="page-399"></a><span class="pgnum">399</span>to corrupt
+influences, and revolutions of manners. Their civilization is more or
+less adulterated by new languages and customs, and they import not only
+foreign merchandise, but foreign fashions, to such a degree that nothing
+can continue unalloyed in the national institutions. Those who inhabit
+these maritime towns do not remain in their native place, but are urged
+afar from their homes by winged hope and speculation. And even when they
+do not desert their country in person, still their minds are always
+expatiating and voyaging round the world.</p>
+
+<p>Nor, indeed, was there any cause which more deeply undermined Corinth
+and Carthage, and at last overthrew them both, than this wandering and
+dispersion of their citizens, whom the passion of commerce and
+navigation had induced to abandon the cultivation of their lands and
+their attention to military pursuits.</p>
+
+<p>The proximity of the sea likewise administers to maritime cities a
+multitude of pernicious incentives to luxury, which are either acquired
+by victory or imported by commerce; and the very agreeableness of their
+position nourishes many expensive and deceitful gratifications of the
+passions. And what I have spoken of Corinth may be applied, for aught I
+know, without incorrectness to the whole of Greece. For the Peloponnesus
+itself is almost wholly on the sea-coast; nor, besides the Phliasians,
+are there any whose lands do not touch the sea; and beyond the
+Peloponnesus, the Ænianes, the Dorians, and the Dolopes are the only
+inland people. Why should I speak of the Grecian islands, which, girded
+by the waves, seem all afloat, as it were, together with the
+institutions and manners of their cities? And these things, I have
+before noticed, do not respect ancient Greece only; for which of all
+those colonies which have been led from Greece into Asia, Thracia,
+Italy, Sicily, and Africa, with the single exception of Magnesia, is
+there that is not washed by the sea? Thus it seems as if a sort of
+Grecian coast had been annexed to territories of the barbarians. For
+among the barbarians themselves none were heretofore a maritime people,
+if we except the Carthaginians and Etruscans; one for the sake of
+commerce, the other of pillage. And this is one evident reason of the
+calamities and revolutions of Greece, <a id="page-400"></a><span class="pgnum">400</span>because she became infected with
+the vices which belong to maritime cities, which I just now briefly
+enumerated. But yet, notwithstanding these vices, they have one great
+advantage, and one which is of universal application, namely, that there
+is a great facility for new inhabitants flocking to them. And, again,
+that the inhabitants are enabled to export and send abroad the produce
+of their native lands to any nation they please, which offers them a
+market for their goods.</p>
+
+<p>V. By what divine wisdom, then, could Romulus embrace all the benefits
+that could belong to maritime cities, and at the same time avoid the
+dangers to which they are exposed, except, as he did, by building his
+city on the bank of an inexhaustible river, whose equal current
+discharges itself into the sea by a vast mouth, so that the city could
+receive all it wanted from the sea, and discharge its superabundant
+commodities by the same channel? And in the same river a communication
+is found by which it not only receives from the sea all the productions
+necessary to the conveniences and elegances of life, but those also
+which are brought from the inland districts. So that Romulus seems to me
+to have divined and anticipated that this city would one day become the
+centre and abode of a powerful and opulent empire; for there is no other
+part of Italy in which a city could be situated so as to be able to
+maintain so wide a dominion with so much ease.</p>
+
+<p>VI. As to the natural fortifications of Rome, who is so negligent and
+unobservant as not to have them depicted and deeply stamped on his
+memory? Such is the plan and direction of the walls, which, by the
+prudence of Romulus and his royal successors, are bounded on all sides
+by steep and rugged hills; and the only aperture between the Esquiline
+and Quirinal mountains is enclosed by a formidable rampart, and
+surrounded by an immense fosse. And as for our fortified citadel, it is
+so secured by a precipitous barrier and enclosure of rocks, that, even
+in that horrible attack and invasion of the Gauls, it remained
+impregnable and inviolable. Moreover, the site which he selected had
+also an abundance of fountains, and was healthy, though it was in the
+midst of a pestilential region; for there are hills which at once create
+a current <a id="page-401"></a><span class="pgnum">401</span>of fresh air, and fling an agreeable shade over the valleys.</p>
+
+<p>VII. These things he effected with wonderful rapidity, and thus
+established the city, which, from his own name Romulus, he determined to
+call Rome. And in order to strengthen his new city, he conceived a
+design, singular enough, and even a little rude, yet worthy of a great
+man, and of a genius which discerned far away in futurity the means of
+strengthening his power and his people. The young Sabine females of
+honorable birth who had come to Rome, attracted by the public games and
+spectacles which Romulus then, for the first time, established as annual
+games in the circus, were suddenly carried off at the feast of
+Consus<a id="FNA-313"></a><a href="#FN-313"><sup>313</sup></a> by his orders, and were given in marriage to the men of the
+noblest families in Rome. And when, on this account, the Sabines had
+declared war against Rome, the issue of the battle being doubtful and
+undecided, Romulus made an alliance with Tatius, King of the Sabines, at
+the intercession of the matrons themselves who had been carried off. By
+this compact he admitted the Sabines into the city, gave them a
+participation in the religious ceremonies, and divided his power with
+their king.</p>
+
+<p>VIII. But after the death of Tatius, the entire government was again
+vested in the hands of Romulus, although, besides making Tatius his own
+partner, he had also elected some of the chiefs of the Sabines into the
+royal council, who on account of their affectionate regard for the
+people were called <i>patres</i>, or fathers. He also divided the people into
+three tribes, called after the name of Tatius, and his own name, and
+that of Locumo, who had fallen as his ally in the Sabine war; and also
+into thirty curiÊ, designated by the names of those Sabine virgins, who,
+after being carried off at the festivals, generously offered themselves
+as the mediators of peace and coalition.</p>
+
+<p>But though these orders were established in the life of Tatius, yet,
+after his death, Romulus reigned with still greater power by the counsel
+and authority of the senate.</p>
+
+<p>IX. In this respect he approved and adopted the principle which Lycurgus
+but little before had applied to the government of LacedÊmon; namely,
+that the monarchical <a id="page-402"></a><span class="pgnum">402</span>authority and the royal power operate best in the
+government of states when to this supreme authority is joined the
+influence of the noblest of the citizens.</p>
+
+<p>Therefore, thus supported, and, as it were, propped up by this council
+or senate, Romulus conducted many wars with the neighboring nations in a
+most successful manner; and while he refused to take any portion of the
+booty to his own palace, he did not cease to enrich the citizens. He
+also cherished the greatest respect for that institution of hierarchical
+and ecclesiastical ordinances which we still retain to the great benefit
+of the Commonwealth; for in the very commencement of his government he
+founded the city with religious rites, and in the institution of all
+public establishments he was equally careful in attending to these
+sacred ceremonials, and associated with himself on these occasions
+priests that were selected from each of the tribes. He also enacted that
+the nobles should act as patrons and protectors to the inferior
+citizens, their natural clients and dependants, in their respective
+districts, a measure the utility of which I shall afterward notice.—The
+judicial punishments were mostly fines of sheep and oxen; for the
+property of the people at that time consisted in their fields and
+cattle, and this circumstance has given rise to the expressions which
+still designate real and personal wealth. Thus the people were kept in
+order rather by mulctations than by bodily inflictions.</p>
+
+<p>X. After Romulus had thus reigned thirty-seven years, and established
+these two great supports of government, the hierarchy and the senate,
+having disappeared in a sudden eclipse of the sun, he was thought worthy
+of being added to the number of the Gods—an honor which no mortal man
+ever was able to attain to but by a glorious pre-eminence of virtue. And
+this circumstance was the more to be admired in the case of Romulus
+because most of the great men that have been deified were so exalted to
+celestial dignities by the people, in periods very little enlightened,
+when fiction was easy and ignorance went hand-in-hand with credulity.
+But with respect to Romulus we know that he lived less than six
+centuries ago, at a time when science and literature were already
+advanced, and had got rid of many of the ancient errors that had
+<a id="page-403"></a><span class="pgnum">403</span>prevailed among less civilized peoples. For if, as we consider proved
+by the Grecian annals, Rome was founded in the seventh Olympiad, the
+life of Romulus was contemporary with that period in which Greece
+already abounded in poets and musicians—an age when fables, except
+those concerning ancient matters, received little credit.</p>
+
+<p>For, one hundred and eight years after the promulgation of the laws of
+Lycurgus, the first Olympiad was established, which indeed, through a
+mistake of names, some authors have supposed constituted, by Lycurgus
+likewise. And Homer himself, according to the best computation, lived
+about thirty years before the time of Lycurgus. We must conclude,
+therefore, that Homer flourished very many years before the date of
+Romulus. So that, as men had now become learned, and as the times
+themselves were not destitute of knowledge, there was not much room left
+for the success of mere fictions. Antiquity indeed has received fables
+that have at times been sufficiently improbable: but this epoch, which
+was already so cultivated, disdaining every fiction that was impossible,
+rejected<a id="FNA-314"></a><a href="#FN-314"><sup>314</sup></a> * * * We may therefore, perhaps, attach some credit to
+this story of Romulus’s immortality, since human life was at that time
+experienced, cultivated, and instructed. And doubtless there was in him
+such energy of genius and virtue that it is not altogether impossible to
+believe the report of Proculus Julius, the husbandman, of that
+glorification having befallen Romulus which for many ages we have denied
+to less illustrious men. At all events, Proculus is reported to have
+stated in the council, at the instigation of the senators, who wished to
+free themselves from all suspicion of having been accessaries to the
+death of Romulus, that he had seen him on that hill which is now called
+the Quirinal, and that he had commanded him to inform the people that
+they should build him a temple on that same hill, and offer him
+sacrifices under the name of Quirinus.</p>
+
+<p>XI. You see, therefore, that the genius of this great man did not merely
+establish the constitution of a new people, and then leave them, as it
+were, crying in their cradle; but he still continued to superintend
+their education <a id="page-404"></a><span class="pgnum">404</span>till they had arrived at an adult and wellnigh a mature
+age.</p>
+
+<p>Then LÊlius said: We now see, my Scipio, what you meant when you said
+that you would adopt a new method of discussing the science of
+government, different from any found in the writings of the Greeks. For
+that prime master of philosophy, whom none ever surpassed in eloquence,
+I mean Plato, chose an open plain on which to build an imaginary city
+after his own taste—a city admirably conceived, as none can deny, but
+remote enough from the real life and manners of men. Others, without
+proposing to themselves any model or type of government whatever, have
+argued on the constitutions and forms of states. You, on the contrary,
+appear to be about to unite these two methods; for, as far as you have
+gone, you seem to prefer attributing to others your discoveries, rather
+than start new theories under your own name and authority, as Socrates
+has done in the writings of Plato. Thus, in speaking of the site of
+Rome, you refer to a systematic policy, to the acts of Romulus, which
+were many of them the result of necessity or chance; and you do not
+allow your discourse to run riot over many states, but you fix and
+concentrate it on our own Commonwealth. Proceed, then, in the course you
+have adopted; for I see that you intend to examine our other kings, in
+your pursuit of a perfect republic, as it were.</p>
+
+<p>XII. Therefore, said Scipio, when that senate of Romulus which was
+composed of the nobles, whom the king himself respected so highly that
+he designated them <i>patres</i>, or fathers, and their children patricians,
+attempted after the death of Romulus to conduct the government without a
+king, the people would not suffer it, but, amidst their regret for
+Romulus, desisted not from demanding a fresh monarch. The nobles then
+prudently resolved to establish an interregnum—a new political form,
+unknown to other nations. It was not without its use, however, since,
+during the interval which elapsed before the definitive nomination of
+the new king, the State was not left without a ruler, nor subjected too
+long to the same governor, nor exposed to the fear lest some one, in
+consequence of the prolonged enjoyment of power, should become more
+unwilling <a id="page-405"></a><span class="pgnum">405</span>to lay it aside, or more powerful if he wished to secure it
+permanently for himself. At which time this new nation discovered a
+political provision which had escaped the Spartan Lycurgus, who
+conceived that the monarch ought not to be elective—if indeed it is
+true that this depended on Lycurgus—but that it was better for the
+LacedÊmonians to acknowledge as their sovereign the next heir of the
+race of Hercules, whoever he might be: but our Romans, rude as they
+were, saw the importance of appointing a king, not for his family, but
+for his virtue and experience.</p>
+
+<p>XIII. And fame having recognized these eminent qualities in Numa
+Pompilius, the Roman people, without partiality for their own citizens,
+committed itself, by the counsel of the senators, to a king of foreign
+origin, and summoned this Sabine from the city of Cures to Rome, that he
+might reign over them. Numa, although the people had proclaimed him king
+in their Comitia Curiata, did nevertheless himself pass a Lex Curiata
+respecting his own authority; and observing that the institutions of
+Romulus had too much excited the military propensities of the people, he
+judged it expedient to recall them from this habit of warfare by other
+employments.</p>
+
+<p>XIV. And, in the first place, he divided severally among the citizens
+the lands which Romulus had conquered, and taught them that even without
+the aid of pillage and devastation they could, by the cultivation of
+their own territories, procure themselves all kinds of commodities. And
+he inspired them with the love of peace and tranquillity, in which faith
+and justice are likeliest to flourish, and extended the most powerful
+protection to the people in the cultivation of their fields and the
+enjoyment of their produce. Pompilius likewise having created
+hierarchical institutions of the highest class, added two augurs to the
+old number. He intrusted the superintendence of the sacred rites to five
+pontiffs, selected from the body of the nobles; and by those laws which
+we still preserve on our monuments he mitigated, by religious
+ceremonials, the minds that had been too long inflamed by military
+enthusiasm and enterprise.</p>
+
+<p>He also established the Flamines and the Salian priests <a id="page-406"></a><span class="pgnum">406</span>and the Vestal
+Virgins, and regulated all departments of our ecclesiastical policy with
+the most pious care. In the ordinance of sacrifices, he wished that the
+ceremonial should be very arduous and the expenditure very light. He
+thus appointed many observances, whose knowledge is extremely important,
+and whose expense far from burdensome. Thus in religious worship he
+added devotion and removed costliness. He was also the first to
+introduce markets, games, and the other usual methods of assembling and
+uniting men. By these establishments, he inclined to benevolence and
+amiability spirits whom the passion for war had rendered savage and
+ferocious. Having thus reigned in the greatest peace and concord
+thirty-nine years—for in dates we mainly follow our Polybius, than whom
+no one ever gave more attention to the investigation of the history of
+the times—he departed this life, having corroborated the two grand
+principles of political stability, religion and clemency.</p>
+
+<p>XV. When Scipio had concluded these remarks, Is it not, said Manilius, a
+true tradition which is current, that our king Numa was a disciple of
+Pythagoras himself, or that at least he was a Pythagorean in his
+doctrines? For I have often heard this from my elders, and we know that
+it is the popular opinion; but it does not seem to be clearly proved by
+the testimony of our public annals.</p>
+
+<p>Then Scipio replied: The supposition is false, my Manilius; it is not
+merely a fiction, but a ridiculous and bungling one too; and we should
+not tolerate those statements, even in fiction, relating to facts which
+not only did not happen, but which never could have happened. For it was
+not till the fourth year of the reign of Tarquinius Superbus that
+Pythagoras is ascertained to have come to Sybaris, Crotona, and this
+part of Italy. And the sixty-second Olympiad is the common date of the
+elevation of Tarquin to the throne, and of the arrival of Pythagoras.
+>From which it appears, when we calculate the duration of the reigns of
+the kings, that about one hundred and forty years must have elapsed
+after the death of Numa before Pythagoras first arrived in Italy. And
+this fact, in the minds of men who have carefully studied the annals of
+time, has never been at all doubted.</p>
+
+<p><a id="page-407"></a><span class="pgnum">407</span>O ye immortal Gods! said Manilius, how deep and how inveterate is this
+error in the minds of men! However, it costs me no effort to concede
+that our Roman sciences were not imported from beyond the seas, but that
+they sprung from our own indigenous and domestic virtues.</p>
+
+<p>XVI. You will become still more convinced of this fact, said Africanus,
+when tracing the progress of our Commonwealth as it became gradually
+developed to its best and maturest condition. And you will find yet
+further occasion to admire the wisdom of our ancestors on this very
+account, since you will perceive, that even those things which they
+borrowed from foreigners received a much higher improvement among us
+than they possessed in the countries from whence they were imported
+among us; and you will learn that the Roman people was aggrandized, not
+by chance or hazard, but rather by counsel and discipline, to which
+fortune indeed was by no means unfavorable.</p>
+
+<p>XVII. After the death of King Pompilius, the people, after a short
+period of interregnum, chose Tullus Hostilius for their king, in the
+Comitia Curiata; and Tullus, after Numa’s example, consulted the people
+in their curias to procure a sanction for his government. His excellence
+chiefly appeared in his military glory and great achievements in war. He
+likewise, out of his military spoils, constructed and decorated the
+House of Comitia and the Senate-house. He also settled the ceremonies of
+the proclamation of hostilities, and consecrated their righteous
+institution by the religious sanction of the Fetial priests, so that
+every war which was not duly announced and declared might be adjudged
+illegal, unjust, and impious. And observe how wisely our kings at that
+time perceived that certain rights ought to be allowed to the people, of
+which we shall have a good deal to say hereafter. Tullus did not even
+assume the ensigns of royalty without the approbation of the people; and
+when he appointed twelve lictors, with their axes to go before him<a id="FNA-315"></a><a href="#FN-315"><sup>315</sup></a> * * *</p>
+
+<p>XVIII. * * * [<i>Manilius</i>.] This Commonwealth of Rome, which you are so
+eloquently describing, did not creep towards perfection; it rather flew
+at once to the maturity of its grandeur.</p>
+
+<p><a id="page-408"></a><span class="pgnum">408</span>[<i>Scipio.</i>] After Tullus, Ancus Martius, a descendant of Numa by his
+daughter, was appointed king by the people. He also procured the passing
+of a law<a id="FNA-316"></a><a href="#FN-316"><sup>316</sup></a> through the Comitia Curiata respecting his government.
+This king having conquered the Latins, admitted them to the rights of
+citizens of Rome. He added to the city the Aventine and CÊlian hills; he
+distributed the lands he had taken in war; he bestowed on the public all
+the maritime forests he had acquired; and he built the city Ostia, at
+the mouth of the Tiber, and colonized it. When he had thus reigned
+twenty-three years, he died.</p>
+
+<p>Then said LÊlius: Doubtless this king deserves our praises, but the
+Roman history is obscure. We possess, indeed, the name of this monarch’s
+mother, but we know nothing of his father.</p>
+
+<p>It is so, said Scipio; but in those ages little more than the names of
+the kings were recorded.</p>
+
+<p>XIX. For the first time at this period, Rome appears to have become more
+learned by the study of foreign literature; for it was no longer a
+little rivulet, flowing from Greece towards the walls of our city, but
+an overflowing river of Grecian sciences and arts. This is generally
+attributed to Demaratus, a Corinthian, the first man of his country in
+reputation, honor, and wealth; who, not being able to bear the despotism
+of Cypselus, tyrant of Corinth, fled with large treasures, and arrived
+at Tarquinii, the most flourishing city in Etruria. There, understanding
+that the domination of Cypselus was thoroughly established, he, like a
+free and bold-hearted man, renounced his country, and was admitted into
+the number of the citizens of Tarquinii, and fixed his residence in that
+city. And having married a woman of the city, he instructed his two
+sons, according to the method of Greek education, in all kinds of
+sciences and arts.<a id="FNA-317"></a><a href="#FN-317"><sup>317</sup></a> * * *</p>
+
+<p>XX. * * * [One of these sons] was easily admitted to <a id="page-409"></a><span class="pgnum">409</span>the rights of
+citizenship at Rome; and on account of his accomplished manners and
+learning, he became a favorite of our king Ancus to such a degree that
+he was a partner in all his counsels, and was looked upon almost as his
+associate in the government. He, besides, possessed wonderful
+affability, and was very kind in assistance, support, protection, and
+even gifts of money, to the citizens.</p>
+
+<p>When, therefore, Ancus died, the people by their unanimous suffrages
+chose for their king this Lucius Tarquinius (for he had thus transformed
+the Greek name of his family, that he might seem in all respects to
+imitate the customs of his adopted countrymen). And when he, too, had
+procured the passing of a law respecting his authority, he commenced his
+reign by doubling the original number of the senators. The ancient
+senators he called patricians of the major families (<i>patres majorum
+gentium</i>), and he asked their votes first; and those new senators whom
+he himself had added, he entitled patricians of minor families. After
+this, he established the order of knights, on the plan which we maintain
+to this day. He would not, however, change the denomination of the
+Tatian, Rhamnensian, and Lucerian orders, though he wished to do so,
+because Attus NÊvius, an augur of the highest reputation, would not
+sanction it. And, indeed, I am aware that the Corinthians were
+remarkably attentive to provide for the maintenance and good condition
+of their cavalry by taxes levied on the inheritance of widows and
+orphans. To the first equestrian orders Lucius also added new ones,
+composing a body of three hundred knights. And this number he doubled,
+after having conquered the Æquicoli, a large and ferocious people, and
+dangerous enemies of the Roman State. Having likewise repulsed from our
+walls an invasion of the Sabines, he routed them by the aid of his
+cavalry, and subdued them. He also was the first person who instituted
+the grand games which are now called the Roman Games. He fulfilled his
+vow to build a temple to the all-good and all-powerful Jupiter in the
+Capitol—a vow which he made during a battle in the Sabine war—and died
+after a reign of thirty-eight years.</p>
+
+<p>XXI. Then LÊlius said: All that you have been relating corroborates the
+saying of Cato, that the constitution <a id="page-410"></a><span class="pgnum">410</span>of the Roman Commonwealth is not
+the work of one man, or one age; for we can clearly see what a great
+progress in excellent and useful institutions was continued under each
+successive king. But we are now arrived at the reign of a monarch who
+appears to me to have been of all our kings he who had the greatest
+foresight in matters of political government.</p>
+
+<p>So it appears to me, said Scipio; for after Tarquinius Priscus comes
+Servius Sulpicius, who was the first who is reported to have reigned
+without an order from the people. He is supposed to have been the son of
+a female slave at Tarquinii, by one of the soldiers or clients of King
+Priscus; and as he was educated among the servants of this prince, and
+waiting on him at table, the king soon observed the fire of his genius,
+which shone forth even from his childhood, so skilful was he in all his
+words and actions. Therefore, Tarquin, whose own children were then very
+young, so loved Servius that he was very commonly believed to be his own
+son, and he instructed him with the greatest care in all the sciences
+with which he was acquainted, according to the most exact discipline of
+the Greeks.</p>
+
+<p>But when Tarquin had perished by the plots of the sons of Ancus, and
+Servius (as I have said) had begun to reign, not by the order, but yet
+with the good-will and consent, of the citizens—because, as it was
+falsely reported that Priscus was recovering from his wounds, Servius,
+arrayed in the royal robes, delivered judgment, freed the debtors at his
+own expense, and, exhibiting the greatest affability, announced that he
+delivered judgment at the command of Priscus—he did not commit himself
+to the senate; but, after Priscus was buried, he consulted the people
+respecting his authority, and, being authorized by them to assume the
+dominion, he procured a law to be passed through the Comitia Curiata,
+confirming his government.</p>
+
+<p>He then, in the first place, avenged the injuries of the Etruscans by
+arms. After which<a id="FNA-318"></a><a href="#FN-318"><sup>318</sup></a> * * *</p>
+
+<p>XXII. * * * he enrolled eighteen centuries of knights of the first
+order. Afterward, having created a great number of knights from the
+common mass of the people, he <a id="page-411"></a><span class="pgnum">411</span>divided the rest of the people into five
+classes, distinguishing between the seniors and the juniors. These he so
+constituted as to place the suffrages, not in the hands of the
+multitude, but in the power of the men of property. And he took care to
+make it a rule of ours, as it ought to be in every government, that the
+greatest number should not have the greatest weight. You are well
+acquainted with this institution, otherwise I would explain it to you;
+but you are familiar with the whole system, and know how the centuries
+of knights, with six suffrages, and the first class, comprising eighty
+centuries, besides one other century which was allotted to the
+artificers, on account of their utility to the State, produce
+eighty-nine centuries. If to these there are added twelve centuries—for
+that is the number of the centuries of the knights which
+remain<a id="FNA-319"></a><a href="#FN-319"><sup>319</sup></a>—the entire force of the State is summed up; and the
+arrangement is such that the remaining and far more numerous multitude,
+which is distributed through the ninety-six last centuries, is not
+deprived of a right of suffrage, which would be an arrogant measure;
+nor, on the other hand, permitted to exert too great a preponderance in
+the government, which would be dangerous.</p>
+
+<p>In this arrangement, Servius was very cautious in his choice of terms
+and denominations. He called the rich <i>assidui</i>, because they afforded
+pecuniary succor<a id="FNA-320"></a><a href="#FN-320"><sup>320</sup></a> to the State. As to those whoso fortune did not
+exceed 1500 pence, or those who had nothing but their labor, he called
+them <i>proletarii</i> classes, as if the State should expect from them a
+hardy progeny<a id="FNA-321"></a><a href="#FN-321"><sup>321</sup></a> and population.</p>
+
+<p>Even a single one of the ninety-six last centuries contained numerically
+more citizens than the entire first class. Thus, no one was excluded
+from his right of voting, yet the preponderance of votes was secured to
+those who had the deepest stake in the welfare of the State. Moreover,
+with reference to the accensi, velati, trumpeters, hornblowers,
+proletarii<a id="FNA-322"></a><a href="#FN-322"><sup>322</sup></a> * * *</p>
+
+<p>XXIII. * * * That that republic is arranged in the best manner which,
+being composed in due proportions of those <a id="page-412"></a><span class="pgnum">412</span>three elements, the
+monarchical, the aristocratical, and the democratic, does not by
+punishment irritate a fierce and savage mind. * * * [A similar
+institution prevailed at Carthage], which was sixty-five years more
+ancient than Rome, since it was founded thirty-nine years before the
+first Olympiad; and that most ancient law-giver Lycurgus made nearly the
+same arrangements. Thus the system of regular subordination, and this
+mixture of the three principal forms of government, appear to me common
+alike to us and them. But there is a peculiar advantage in our
+Commonwealth, than which nothing can be more excellent, which I shall
+endeavor to describe as accurately as possible, because it is of such a
+character that nothing analogous can be discovered in ancient states;
+for these political elements which I have noticed were so united in the
+constitutions of Rome, of Sparta, and of Carthage, that they were not
+counterbalanced by any modifying power. For in a state in which one man
+is invested with a perpetual domination, especially of the monarchical
+character, although there be a senate in it, as there was in Rome under
+the kings, and in Sparta, by the laws of Lycurgus, or even where the
+people exercise a sort of jurisdiction, as they used in the days of our
+monarchy, the title of king must still be pre-eminent; nor can such a
+state avoid being, and being called, a kingdom. And this kind of
+government is especially subject to frequent revolutions, because the
+fault of a single individual is sufficient to precipitate it into the
+most pernicious disasters.</p>
+
+<p>In itself, however, royalty is not only not a reprehensible form of
+government, but I do not know whether it is not far preferable to all
+other simple constitutions, if I approved of any simple constitution
+whatever. But this preference applies to royalty so long only as it
+maintains its appropriate character; and this character provides that
+one individual’s perpetual power, and justice, and universal wisdom
+should regulate the safety, equality, and tranquillity of the whole
+people. But many privileges must be wanting to communities that live
+under a king; and, in the first place, liberty, which does not consist
+in slavery to a just master, but in slavery to no master at all<a id="FNA-323"></a><a href="#FN-323"><sup>323</sup></a> * * *</p>
+
+<p><a id="page-413"></a><span class="pgnum">413</span>XXIV. * * * [Let us now pass on to the reign of the seventh and last
+king of Rome, Tarquinius Superbus.] And even this unjust and cruel
+master had good fortune for his companion for some time in all his
+enterprises. For he subdued all Latium; he captured Suessa Pometia, a
+powerful and wealthy city, and, becoming possessed of an immense spoil
+of gold and silver, he accomplished his father’s vow by the building of
+the Capitol. He established colonies, and, faithful to the institutions
+of those from whom he sprung, he sent magnificent presents, as tokens of
+gratitude for his victories, to Apollo at Delphi.</p>
+
+<p>XXV. Here begins the revolution of our political system of government,
+and I must beg your attention to its natural course and progression. For
+the grand point of political science, the object of our discourses, is
+to know the march and the deviations of governments, that when we are
+acquainted with the particular courses and inclinations of
+constitutions, we may be able to restrain them from their fatal
+tendencies, or to oppose adequate obstacles to their decline and fall.</p>
+
+<p>For this Tarquinius Superbus, of whom I am speaking, being first of all
+stained with the blood of his admirable predecessor on the throne, could
+not be a man of sound conscience and mind; and as he feared himself the
+severest punishment for his enormous crime, he sought his protection in
+making himself feared. Then, in the glory of his victories and his
+treasures, he exulted in insolent pride, and could neither regulate his
+own manners nor the passions of the members of his family.</p>
+
+<p>When, therefore, his eldest son had offered violence to Lucretia,
+daughter of Tricipitinus and wife of Collatinus, and this chaste and
+noble lady had stabbed herself to death on account of the injury she
+could not survive—then a man eminent for his genius and virtue, Lucius
+Brutus, dashed from his fellow-citizens this unjust yoke of odious
+servitude; and though he was but a private man, he sustained the
+government of the entire Commonwealth, and was the first that taught the
+people in this State that no one was a private man when the preservation
+of our liberties was concerned. Beneath his authority and command our
+city rose against tyranny, and, stirred by the recent <a id="page-414"></a><span class="pgnum">414</span>grief of the
+father and relatives of Lucretia, and with the recollections of
+Tarquin’s haughtiness, and the numberless crimes of himself and his
+sons, they pronounced sentence of banishment against him and his
+children, and the whole race of the Tarquins.</p>
+
+<p>XXVI. Do you not observe, then, how the king sometimes degenerates into
+the despot, and how, by the fault of one individual, a form of
+government originally good is abused to the worst of purposes? Here is a
+specimen of that despot over the people whom the Greeks denominate a
+tyrant. For, according to them, a king is he who, like a father,
+consults the interests of his people, and who preserves those whom he is
+set over in the very best condition of life. This indeed is, as I have
+said, an excellent form of government, yet still liable, and, as it
+were, inclined, to a pernicious abuse. For as soon as a king assumes an
+unjust and despotic power, he instantly becomes a tyrant, than which
+nothing baser or fouler, than which no imaginable animal can be more
+detestable to gods or men; for though in form a man, he surpasses the
+most savage monsters in ferocious cruelty. For who can justly call him a
+human being, who admits not between himself and his fellow-countrymen,
+between himself and the whole human race, any communication of justice,
+any association of kindness? But we shall find some fitter occasion of
+speaking of the evils of tyranny when the subject itself prompts us to
+declare against them who, even in a state already liberated, have
+affected these despotic insolencies.</p>
+
+<p>XXVII. Such is the first origin and rise of a tyrant. For this was the
+name by which the Greeks choose to designate an unjust king; and by the
+title king our Romans universally understand every man who exercises
+over the people a perpetual and undivided domination. Thus Spurius
+Cassius, and Marcus Manlius, and Spurius MÊlius, are said to have wished
+to seize upon the kingly power, and lately [Tiberius Gracchus incurred
+the same accusation].<a id="FNA-324"></a><a href="#FN-324"><sup>324</sup></a> * * *</p>
+
+<p>XXVIII. * * * [Lycurgus, in Sparta, formed, under the name of Elders,] a
+small council consisting of twenty-eight members only; to these he
+allotted the supreme legislative <a id="page-415"></a><span class="pgnum">415</span>authority, while the king held the
+supreme executive authority. Our Romans, emulating his example, and
+translating his terms, entitled those whom he had called Elders,
+Senators, which, as we have said, was done by Romulus in reference to
+the elect patricians. In this constitution, however, the power, the
+influence, and name of the king is still pre-eminent. You may
+distribute, indeed, some show of power to the people, as Lycurgus and
+Romulus did, but you inflame them, with the thirst of liberty by
+allowing them even the slightest taste of its sweetness; and still their
+hearts will be overcast with alarm lest their king, as often happens,
+should become unjust. The prosperity of the people, therefore, can be
+little better than fragile, when placed at the disposal of any one
+individual, and subjected to his will and caprices.</p>
+
+<p>XXIX. Thus the first example, prototype, and original of tyranny has
+been discovered by us in the history of our own Roman State, religiously
+founded by Romulus, without applying to the theoretical Commonwealth
+which, according to Plato’s recital, Socrates was accustomed to describe
+in his peripatetic dialogues. We have observed Tarquin, not by the
+usurpation of any new power, but by the unjust abuse of the power which
+he already possessed, overturn the whole system of our monarchical
+constitution.</p>
+
+<p>Let us oppose to this example of the tyrant another, a virtuous
+king—wise, experienced, and well informed respecting the true interest
+and dignity of the citizens—a guardian, as it were, and superintendent
+of the Commonwealth; for that is a proper name for every ruler and
+governor of a state. And take you care to recognize such a man when you
+meet him, for he is the man who, by counsel and exertion, can best
+protect the nation. And as the name of this man has not yet been often
+mentioned in our discourse, and as the character of such a man must be
+often alluded to in our future conversations, [I shall take an early
+opportunity of describing it.]<a id="FNA-325"></a><a href="#FN-325"><sup>325</sup></a> * * *</p>
+
+<p>XXX. * * * [Plato has chosen to suppose a territory and establishments
+of citizens, whose fortunes] were precisely equal. And he has given us a
+description of a city, rather to be desired than expected; and he has
+made out <a id="page-416"></a><span class="pgnum">416</span>not such a one as can really exist, but one in which the
+principles of political affairs may be discerned. But for me, if I can
+in any way accomplish it, while I adopt the same general principles as
+Plato, I am seeking to reduce them to experience and practice, not in
+the shadow and picture of a state, but in a real and actual
+Commonwealth, of unrivalled amplitude and power; in order to be able to
+point out, with the most graphic precision, the causes of every
+political good and social evil.</p>
+
+<p>For after Rome had flourished more than two hundred and forty years
+under her kings and interreges, and after Tarquin was sent into
+banishment, the Roman people conceived as much detestation of the name
+of king as they had once experienced regret at the death, or rather
+disappearance, of Romulus. Therefore, as in the first instance they
+could hardly bear the idea of losing a king, so in the latter, after the
+expulsion of Tarquin, they could not endure to hear the name of a
+king.<a id="FNA-326"></a><a href="#FN-326"><sup>326</sup></a> * * *</p>
+
+<p>XXXI. * * * Therefore, when that admirable constitution of Romulus had
+lasted steadily about two hundred and forty years. * * * The whole of
+that law was abolished. In this humor, our ancestors banished
+Collatinus, in spite of his innocence, because of the suspicion that
+attached to his family, and all the rest of the Tarquins, on account of
+the unpopularity of their name. In the same humor, Valerius Publicola
+was the first to lower the fasces before the people, when he spoke in
+the assembly of the people. He also had the materials of his house
+conveyed to the foot of Mount Velia, having observed that the
+commencement of his edifice on the summit of this hill, where King
+Tullius had once dwelt, excited the suspicions of the people.</p>
+
+<p>It was the same man, who in this respect pre-eminently deserved the name
+of Publicola, who carried in favor of the people the first law received
+in the Comitia Centuriata, that no magistrate should sentence to death
+or scourging a Roman citizen who appealed from his authority to the
+people. And the pontifical books attest that the right of appeal had
+existed, even against the decision of the kings. Our augural books
+affirm the same thing. And the Twelve <a id="page-417"></a><span class="pgnum">417</span>Tables prove, by a multitude of
+laws, that there was a right of appeal from every judgment and penalty.
+Besides, the historical fact that the decemviri who compiled the laws
+were created with the privilege of judging without appeal, sufficiently
+proves that the other magistrates had not the same power. And a consular
+law, passed by Lucius Valerius Politus and Marcus Horatius Barbatus, men
+justly popular for promoting union and concord, enacted that no
+magistrate should thenceforth be appointed with authority to judge
+without appeal; and the Portian laws, the work of three citizens of the
+name of Portius, as you are aware, added nothing new to this edict but a
+penal sanction.</p>
+
+<p>Therefore Publicola, having promulgated this law in favor of appeal to
+the people, immediately ordered the axes to be removed from the fasces,
+which the lictors carried before the consuls, and the next day appointed
+Spurius Lucretius for his colleague. And as the new consul was the
+oldest of the two, Publicola ordered his lictors to pass over to him;
+and he was the first to establish the rule, that each of the consuls
+should be preceded by the lictors in alternate months, that there should
+be no greater appearance of imperial insignia among the free people than
+they had witnessed in the days of their kings. Thus, in my opinion, he
+proved himself no ordinary man, as, by so granting the people a moderate
+degree of liberty, he more easily maintained the authority of the
+nobles.</p>
+
+<p>Nor is it without reason that I have related to you these ancient and
+almost obsolete events; but I wished to adduce my instances of men and
+circumstances from illustrious persons and times, as it is to such
+events that the rest of my discourse will be directed.</p>
+
+<p>XXXII. At that period, then, the senate preserved the Commonwealth in
+such a condition that though the people were really free, yet few acts
+were passed by the people, but almost all, on the contrary, by the
+authority, customs, and traditions of the senate. And over all the
+consuls exercised a power—in time, indeed, only annual, but in nature
+and prerogative completely royal.</p>
+
+<p>The consuls maintained, with the greatest energy, that rule which so
+much conduces to the power of our nobles and great men, that the acts of
+the commons of the people <a id="page-418"></a><span class="pgnum">418</span>shall not be binding, unless the authority of
+the patricians has approved them. About the same period, and scarcely
+ten years after the first consuls, we find the appointment of the
+dictator in the person of Titus Lartius. And this new kind of
+power—namely, the dictatorship—appears exceedingly similar to the
+monarchical royalty. All his power, however, was vested in the supreme
+authority of the senate, to which the people deferred; and in these
+times great exploits were performed in war by brave men invested with
+the supreme command, whether dictators or consuls.</p>
+
+<p>XXXIII. But as the nature of things necessarily brought it to pass that
+the people, once freed from its kings, should arrogate to itself more
+and more authority, we observe that after a short interval of only
+sixteen years, in the consulship of Postumus Cominius and Spurius
+Cassius, they attained their object; an event explicable, perhaps, on no
+distinct principle, but, nevertheless, in a manner independent of any
+distinct principle. For recollect what I said in commencing our
+discourse, that if there exists not in the State a just distribution and
+subordination of rights, offices, and prerogatives, so as to give
+sufficient domination to the chiefs, sufficient authority to the counsel
+of the senators, and sufficient liberty to the people, this form of the
+government cannot be durable.</p>
+
+<p>For when the excessive debts of the citizens had thrown the State into
+disorder, the people first retired to Mount Sacer, and next occupied
+Mount Aventine. And even the rigid discipline of Lycurgus could not
+maintain those restraints in the case of the Greeks. For in Sparta
+itself, under the reign of Theopompus, the five magistrates whom they
+term Ephori, and in Crete ten whom they entitle Cosmi, were established
+in opposition to the royal power, just as tribunes were added among us
+to counterbalance the consular authority.</p>
+
+<p>XXXIV. There might have been a method, indeed, by which our ancestors
+could have been relieved from the pressure of debt, a method with which
+Solon the Athenian, who lived at no very distant period before, was
+acquainted, and which our senate did not neglect when, in the
+indignation which the odious avarice of one individual excited, <a id="page-419"></a><span class="pgnum">419</span>all the
+bonds of the citizens were cancelled, and the right of arrest for a
+while suspended. In the same way, when the plebeians were oppressed by
+the weight of the expenses occasioned by public misfortunes, a cure and
+remedy were sought for the sake of public security. The senate, however,
+having forgotten their former decision, gave an advantage to the
+democracy; for, by the creation of two tribunes to appease the sedition
+of the people, the power and authority of the senate were diminished;
+which, however, still remained dignified and august, inasmuch as it was
+still composed of the wisest and bravest men, who protected their
+country both with their arms and with their counsels; whose authority
+was exceedingly strong and flourishing, because in honor they were as
+much before their fellow-citizens as they were inferior in
+luxuriousness, and, as a general rule, not superior to them in wealth.
+And their public virtues were the more agreeable to the people, because
+even in private matters they were ready to serve every citizen, by their
+exertions, their counsels, and their liberality.</p>
+
+<p>XXXV. Such was the situation of the Commonwealth when the quÊstor
+impeached Spurius Cassius of being so much emboldened by the excessive
+favor of the people as to endeavor to make himself master of monarchical
+power. And, as you have heard, his own father, having said that he had
+found that his son was really guilty of this crime, condemned him to
+death at the instance of the people. About fifty-four years after the
+first consulate, Spurius Tarpeius and Aulus Aternius very much gratified
+the people by proposing, in the Comitia Centuriata, the substitution of
+fines instead of corporal punishments. Twenty years afterward, Lucius
+Papirius and Publius Pinarius, the censors, having by a strict levy of
+fines confiscated to the State the entire flocks and herds of many
+private individuals, a light tax on the cattle was substituted for the
+law of fines in the consulship of Caius Julius and Publius Papirius.</p>
+
+<p>XXXVI. But, some years previous to this, at a period when the senate
+possessed the supreme influence, and the people were submissive and
+obedient, a new system was adopted. At that time both the consuls and
+tribunes of <a id="page-420"></a><span class="pgnum">420</span>the people abdicated their magistracies, and the decemviri
+were appointed, who were invested with great authority, from which there
+was no appeal whatever, so as to exercise the chief domination, and to
+compile the laws. After having composed, with much wisdom and equity,
+the Ten Tables of laws, they nominated as their successors in the
+ensuing year other decemviri, whose good faith and justice do not
+deserve equal praise. One member of this college, however, merits our
+highest commendation. I allude to Caius Julius, who declared respecting
+the nobleman Lucius Sestius, in whose chamber a dead body had been
+exhumed under his own eyes, that though as decemvir he held the highest
+power without appeal, he still required bail, because he was unwilling
+to neglect that admirable law which permitted no court but the Comitia
+Centuriata to pronounce final sentence on the life of a Roman citizen.</p>
+
+<p>XXXVII. A third year followed under the authority of the same decemvirs,
+and still they were not disposed to appoint their successors. In a
+situation of the Commonwealth like this, which, as I have often
+repeated, could not be durable, because it had not an equal operation
+with respect to all the ranks of the citizens, the whole public power
+was lodged in the hands of the chiefs and decemvirs of the highest
+nobility, without the counterbalancing authority of the tribunes of the
+people, without the sanction of any other magistracies, and without
+appeal to the people in the case of a sentence of death or scourging.</p>
+
+<p>Thus, out of the injustice of these men, there was suddenly produced a
+great revolution, which changed the entire condition of the government,
+or they added two tables of very tyrannical laws, and though matrimonial
+alliances had always been permitted, even with foreigners, they forbade,
+by the most abominable and inhuman edict, that any marriages should take
+place between the nobles and the commons—an order which was afterward
+abrogated by the decree of Canuleius. Besides, they introduced into all
+their political measures corruption, cruelty, and avarice. And indeed
+the story is well known, and celebrated in many literary compositions,
+that a certain Decimus Virginius was obliged, on account of the
+libidinous violence of one of these decemvirs, to stab his virgin
+daughter <a id="page-421"></a><span class="pgnum">421</span>in the midst of the forum. Then, when he in his desperation
+had fled to the Roman army which was encamped on Mount Algidum, the
+soldiers abandoned the war in which they were engaged, and took
+possession of the Sacred Mount, as they had done before on a similar
+occasion, and next invested Mount Aventine in their arms.<a id="FNA-327"></a><a href="#FN-327"><sup>327</sup></a> Our
+ancestors knew how to prove most thoroughly, and to retain most wisely.
+* * *</p>
+
+<p>XXXVIII. And when Scipio had spoken in this manner, and all his friends
+were awaiting in silence the rest of his discourse, then said Tubero:
+Since these men who are older than I, my Scipio, make no fresh demands
+on you, I shall take the liberty to tell you what I particularly wish
+you would explain in your subsequent remarks.</p>
+
+<p>Do so, said Scipio, and I shall be glad to hear.</p>
+
+<p>Then Tubero said: You appear to me to have spoken a panegyric on our
+Commonwealth of Rome exclusively, though LÊlius requested your views not
+only of the government of our own State, but of the policy of states in
+general. I have not, therefore, yet sufficiently learned from your
+discourse, with respect to that mixed form of government you most
+approve, by what discipline, moral and legal, we may be best able to
+establish and maintain it.</p>
+
+<p>XXXIX. Africanus replied: I think that we shall soon find an occasion
+better adapted to the discussion you have proposed, respecting the
+constitution and conservatism of states. As to the best form of
+government, I think on this point I have sufficiently answered the
+question of LÊlius. For in answering him, I, in the first place,
+specifically noticed the three simple forms of government—monarchy,
+aristocracy, and democracy; and the three vicious constitutions contrary
+to them, into which they often degenerate; and I said that none of these
+forms, taken separately, was absolutely good; but I described as
+preferable to either of them that mixed government which is composed of
+a proper amalgamation of these simple ingredients. If I have since
+depicted our own Roman constitution as an example, it was not in order
+to define the very best form of government, for that may be understood
+without an example; but I wished, in the exhibition of a <a id="page-422"></a><span class="pgnum">422</span>mighty
+commonwealth actually in existence, to render distinct and visible what
+reason and discourse would vainly attempt to display without the
+assistance of experimental illustration. Yet, if you still require me to
+describe the best form of government, independent of all particular
+examples, we must consult that exactly proportioned and graduated image
+of government which nature herself presents to her investigators. Since
+you * * * this model of a city and people<a id="FNA-328"></a><a href="#FN-328"><sup>328</sup></a> * * *</p>
+
+<p>XL. * * * which I also am searching for, and which I am anxious to
+arrive at.</p>
+
+<p><i>LÊlius.</i> You mean the model that would be approved by the truly
+accomplished politician?</p>
+
+<p><i>Scipio.</i> The same.</p>
+
+<p><i>LÊlius.</i> You have plenty of fair patterns even now before you, if you
+would but begin with yourself.</p>
+
+<p>Then Scipio said: I wish I could find even one such, even in the entire
+senate. For he is really a wise politician who, as we have often seen in
+Africa, while seated on a huge and unsightly elephant, can guide and
+rule the monster, and turn him whichever way he likes by a slight
+admonition, without any actual exertion.</p>
+
+<p><i>LÊlius.</i> I recollect, and when I was your lieutenant I often saw, one
+of these drivers.</p>
+
+<p><i>Scipio.</i> Thus an Indian or Carthaginian regulates one of these huge
+animals, and renders him docile and familiar with human manners. But the
+genius which resides in the mind of man, by whatever name it may be
+called, is required to rein and tame a monster far more multiform and
+intractable, whenever it can accomplish it, which indeed is seldom. It
+is necessary to hold in with a strong hand that ferocious<a id="FNA-329"></a><a href="#FN-329"><sup>329</sup></a> * * *</p>
+
+<p>XLI. * * * [beast, denominated the mob, which thirsts after blood] to
+such a degree that it can scarcely be sated with the most hideous
+massacres of men. * * *</p>
+
+<div class="unclear">
+<p>But to a man who is greedy, and grasping, and lustful, and fond of
+     wallowing in voluptuousness.</p>
+
+<p><a id="page-423"></a><span class="pgnum">423</span>The fourth kind of anxiety is that which is prone to mourning and
+     melancholy, and which is constantly worrying itself.</p>
+
+<p class="comment">[<i>The next paragraph, “Esse autem angores,” etc., is wholly
+     unintelligible without the context.</i>]</p>
+
+<p>As an unskilful charioteer is dragged from his chariot, covered
+     with dirt, bruised, and lacerated.</p>
+
+<p>The excitements of men’s minds are like a chariot, with horses
+     harnessed to it; in the proper management of which, the chief duty
+     of the driver consists in knowing his road: and if he keeps the
+     road, then, however rapidly he proceeds, he will encounter no
+     obstacles; but if he quits the proper track, then, although he may
+     be going gently and slowly, he will either be perplexed on rugged
+     ground, or fall over some steep place, or at least he will be
+     carried where he has no need to go.<a id="FNA-330"></a><a href="#FN-330"><sup>330</sup></a></p>
+</div>
+
+<p>XLII. * * * can be said.</p>
+
+<p>Then LÊlius said: I now see the sort of politician you require, on whom
+you would impose the office and task of government, which is what I
+wished to understand.</p>
+
+<p>He must be an almost unique specimen, said Africanus, for the task which
+I set him comprises all others. He must never cease from cultivating and
+studying himself, that he may excite others to imitate him, and become,
+through the splendor of his talents and enterprises, a living mirror to
+his countrymen. For as in flutes and harps, and in all vocal
+performances, a certain unison and harmony must be preserved amidst the
+distinctive tones, which cannot be broken or violated without offending
+experienced ears; and as this concord and delicious harmony is produced
+by the exact gradation and modulation of dissimilar notes; even so, by
+means of the just apportionment of the highest, middle, and lower
+classes, the State is maintained in concord and peace by the harmonic
+subordination of its discordant elements: and thus, that which is by
+musicians called harmony in song answers and corresponds to what we call
+concord in the State—concord, the strongest and loveliest bond of
+security in every commonwealth, being always accompanied by justice and
+equity.</p>
+
+<div class="unclear">
+
+<p>XLIII. And after this, when Scipio had discussed with considerable
+breadth of principle and felicity of illustration the great advantage
+that justice is to a state, and the great injury which would arise if it
+were <a id="page-424"></a><span class="pgnum">424</span>wanting, Pilus, one of those who were present at the discussion,
+took up the matter and demanded that this question should be argued more
+carefully, and that something more should be said about justice, on
+account of a sentiment that was now obtaining among people in general,
+that political affairs could not be wholly carried on without some
+disregard of justice.</p>
+
+</div>
+
+<p>XLIV. * * * to be full of justice.</p>
+
+<p>Then Scipio replied: I certainly think so. And I declare to you that I
+consider that all I have spoken respecting the government of the State
+is worth nothing, and that it will be useless to proceed further, unless
+I can prove that it is a false assertion that political business cannot
+be conducted without injustice and corruption; and, on the other hand,
+establish as a most indisputable fact that without the strictest justice
+no government whatever can last long.</p>
+
+<p>But, with your permission, we have had discussion enough for the day.
+The rest—and much remains for our consideration—we will defer till
+to-morrow. When they had all agreed to this, the debate of the day was
+closed.</p>
+
+       <hr/>
+
+
+
+
+<h3>INTRODUCTION TO THE THIRD BOOK,</h3>
+
+<h4>BY THE ORIGINAL TRANSLATOR.</h4>
+
+
+<p class="intro"><span class="first">Cicero</span> here enters on the grand question of Political Justice, and
+endeavors to evince throughout the absolute verity of that inestimable
+proverb, “Honesty is the best policy,” in all public as well as in all
+private affairs. St. Augustine, in his City of God, has given the
+following analysis of this magnificent disquisition:</p>
+
+<p class="intro">“In the third book of Cicero’s Commonwealth” (says he) “the question of
+Political Justice is most earnestly discussed. Philus is appointed to
+support, as well as he can, the sophistical arguments of those who think
+that political government cannot be carried on without the aid of
+injustice and chicanery. He denies holding any such opinion himself;
+yet, in order to exhibit the truth more vividly through the force of
+contrast, he pleads with the utmost ingenuity the cause of injustice
+against justice; and endeavors to show, by plausible examples and
+specious dialectics, that injustice is as useful to a statesman as
+justice would be injurious. Then LÊlius, at the general request, takes
+up the plea for justice, and maintains with all his eloquence that
+nothing could be so ruinous to states as injustice and dishonesty, and
+that <a id="page-425"></a><span class="pgnum">425</span>without a supreme justice, no political government could expect a
+long duration. This point being sufficiently proved, Scipio returns to
+the principal discussion. He reproduces and enforces the short
+definition that he had given of a commonwealth—that it consisted in the
+welfare of the entire people, by which word ‘people’ he does not mean
+the mob, but the community, bound together by the sense of common rights
+and mutual benefits. He notices how important such just definitions are
+in all debates whatever, and draws this conclusion from the preceding
+arguments—that the Commonwealth is the common welfare whenever it is
+swayed with justice and wisdom, whether it be subordinated to a king, an
+aristocracy, or a democracy. But if the king be unjust, and so becomes a
+tyrant; and the aristocracy unjust, which makes them a faction; or the
+democrats unjust, and so degenerate into revolutionists and
+destructives—then not only the Commonwealth is corrupted, but in fact
+annihilated. For it can be no longer the common welfare when a tyrant or
+a faction abuse it; and the people itself is no longer the people when
+it becomes unjust, since it is no longer a community associated by a
+sense of right and utility, according to the definition.”—<i>Aug. Civ.
+Dei.</i> 3-21.</p>
+
+<p class="intro">This book is of the utmost importance to statesmen, as it serves to
+neutralize the sophistries of Machiavelli, which are still repeated in
+many cabinets.</p>
+
+<hr class="tiny"/>
+
+
+<h3>BOOK III.</h3>
+
+
+<p>I. * * *<a id="FNA-331"></a><a href="#FN-331"><sup>331</sup></a> Cicero, in the third book of his treatise On a
+Commonwealth, says that nature has treated man less like a mother than a
+step-dame, for she has cast him into mortal life with a body naked,
+fragile, and infirm, and with a mind agitated by troubles, depressed by
+fears, broken by labors, and exposed to passions. In this mind, however,
+there lies hidden, and, as it were, buried, a certain divine spark of
+genius and intellect.</p>
+
+<p>Though man is born a frail and powerless being, nevertheless he is safe
+from all animals destitute of voice; and at the same time those other
+animals of greater strength, although they bravely endure the violence
+of weather, cannot be safe from man. And the result is, that reason does
+more for man than nature does for brutes; since, in the latter, neither
+the greatness of their strength nor the firmness of their bodies can
+save them from being oppressed by us, and made subject to our power. * * *</p>
+
+<p><a id="page-426"></a><span class="pgnum">426</span>Plato returned thanks to nature that he had been born a man.</p>
+
+<p>II. * * * aiding our slowness by carriages, and when it had taught men
+to utter the elementary and confused sounds of unpolished expression,
+articulated and distinguished them into their proper classes, and, as
+their appropriate signs, attached certain words to certain things, and
+thus associated, by the most delightful bond of speech, the once divided
+races of men.</p>
+
+<p>And by a similar intelligence, the inflections of the voice, which
+appeared infinite, are, by the discovery of a few alphabetic characters,
+all designated and expressed; by which we maintain converse with our
+absent friends, by which also indications of our wishes and monuments of
+past events are preserved. Then came the use of numbers—a thing
+necessary to human life, and at the same time immutable and eternal; a
+science which first urged us to raise our views to heaven, and not gaze
+without an object on the motions of the stars, and the distribution of
+days and nights.</p>
+
+<p>III. * * *<a id="FNA-332"></a><a href="#FN-332"><sup>332</sup></a> [Then appeared the sages of philosophy], whose minds
+took a higher flight, and who were able to conceive and to execute
+designs worthy of the gifts of the Gods. Wherefore let those men who
+have left us sublime essays on the principles of living be regarded as
+great men—which indeed they are—as learned men, as masters of truth
+and virtue; provided that these principles of civil government, this
+system of governing people, whether it be a thing discovered by men who
+have lived amidst a variety of political events, or one discussed amidst
+their opportunities of literary tranquillity, is remembered to be, as
+indeed it is, a thing by no means to be despised, being one which causes
+in first-rate minds, as we not unfrequently see, an incredible and
+almost divine virtue. And when to these high faculties of soul, received
+from nature and expanded by social institutions, a politician adds
+learning and extensive information concerning things in general, like
+those illustrious personages who conduct the dialogue in the present
+treatise, none will refuse to confess the superiority of such persons to
+all others; for, in fact, what <a id="page-427"></a><span class="pgnum">427</span>can be more admirable than the study and
+practice of the grand affairs of state, united to a literary taste and a
+familiarity with the liberal arts? or what can we imagine more perfect
+than a Scipio, a LÊlius, or a Philus, who, not to omit anything which
+belonged to the most perfect excellence of the greatest men, joined to
+the examples of our ancestors and the traditions of our countrymen the
+foreign philosophy of Socrates?</p>
+
+<p>Wherefore he who had both the desire and the power to acquaint himself
+thoroughly both with the customs and the learning of his ancestors
+appears to me to have attained to the very highest glory and honor. But
+if we cannot combine both, and are compelled to select one of these two
+paths to wisdom—though to some people the tranquil life spent in the
+research of literature and arts may appear to be the most happy and
+delectable—yet, doubtless, the science of politics is more laudable and
+illustrious, for in this political field of exertion our greatest men
+have reaped their honors, like the invincible Curius,</p>
+
+<div class="poem">
+<p>Whom neither gold nor iron could subdue.</p>
+</div>
+
+<p>IV. * * *<a id="FNA-333"></a><a href="#FN-333"><sup>333</sup></a> that wisdom existed still. There existed this general
+difference between these two classes, that among the one the development
+of the principles of nature is the subject of their study and eloquence,
+and among the other national laws and institutions form the principal
+topics of investigation.</p>
+
+<p>In honor of our country, we may assert that she has produced within
+herself a great number, I will not say of sages (since philosophy is so
+jealous of this name), but of men worthy of the highest celebrity,
+because by them the precepts and discoveries of the sages have been
+carried out into actual practice. And, moreover, though there have
+existed, and still do exist, many great and glorious empires, yet since
+the noblest masterpiece of genius in the world is the establishment of a
+state and commonwealth which shall be a lasting one, even if we reckon
+but a single legislator for each empire, the number of these excellent
+men will appear very numerous. To be convinced of this, we have only to
+turn our eyes on any nation of Italy, Latium, the <a id="page-428"></a><span class="pgnum">428</span>Sabines, the
+Volscians, the Samnites, or the Etrurians, and then direct our attention
+to that mighty nation of the Greeks, and then to the Assyrians,
+Persians, and Carthaginians, and<a id="FNA-334"></a><a href="#FN-334"><sup>334</sup></a> * * *</p>
+
+<p>V. * * * [Scipio and his friends having again assembled, Scipio spoke as
+follows: In our last conversation, I promised to prove that honesty is
+the best policy in all states and commonwealths whatsoever. But if I am
+to plead in favor of strict honesty and justice in all public affairs,
+no less than in private, I must request Philus, or some one else, to
+take up the advocacy of the other side; the truth will then become more
+manifest, from the collision of opposite arguments, as we see every day
+exemplified at the Bar.]</p>
+
+<p>And Philus replied: In good truth, you have allotted me a very
+creditable cause when you wish me to undertake the defence of vice.</p>
+
+<p>Perhaps, said LÊlius, you are afraid, lest, in reproducing the ordinary
+objections made to justice in politics, you should seem to express your
+own sentiments; though you are universally respected as an almost unique
+example of the ancient probity and good faith; nor is it unknown how
+familiar you are with the lawyer-like habit of disputing on both sides
+of a question, because you think that this is the best way of getting at
+the truth.</p>
+
+<p>And Philus said: Very well; I obey you, and wilfully, with my eyes open,
+I will undertake this dirty business; because, since those who seek for
+gold do not flinch at the sight of the mud, so we who are searching for
+justice, which is far more precious than gold, are bound to shrink from
+no annoyance. And I wish, as I am about to make use of the antagonist
+arguments of a foreigner, I might also employ a foreign language. The
+pleas, therefore, now to be urged by Lucius Furius Philus are those
+[once employed by] the Greek Carneades, a man who was accustomed to
+express whatever [served his turn].<a id="FNA-335"></a><a href="#FN-335"><sup>335</sup></a> * * *<a id="FNA-336"></a><a href="#FN-336"><sup>336</sup></a><a id="page-429"></a><span class="pgnum">429</span>Let it be understood,
+therefore, that I by no means express my own sentiments, but those of
+Carneades, in order that you may refute this philosopher, who was wont
+to turn the best causes into joke, through the mere wantonness of wit.</p>
+
+<div class="unclear">
+<p>VI. He was a philosopher of the Academic School; and if any one is
+     ignorant of his great power, and eloquence, and acuteness in
+     arguing, he may learn it from the mention made of him by Cicero or
+     by Lucilius, when Neptune, discoursing on a very difficult subject,
+     declares that it cannot be explained, not even if hell were to
+     restore Carneades himself for the purpose. This philosopher, having
+     been sent by the Athenians to Rome as an ambassador, discussed the
+     subject of justice very amply in the hearing of Galba and Cato the
+     Censor, who were the greatest orators of the day. And the next day
+     he overturned all his arguments by others of a contrary tendency,
+     and disparaged justice, which the day before he had extolled;
+     speaking not indeed with the gravity of a philosopher whose wisdom
+     ought to be steady, and whose opinions unchangeable, but in a kind
+     of rhetorical exercise of arguing on each side—a practice which he
+     was accustomed to adopt, in order to be able to refute others who
+     were asserting anything. The arguments by which he disparaged
+     justice are mentioned by Lucius Furius in Cicero; I suppose, since
+     he was discussing the Commonwealth, in order to introduce a defence
+     and panegyric of that quality without which he did not think a
+     commonwealth could be administered. But Carneades, in order to
+     refute Aristotle and Plato, the advocates of justice, collected in
+     his first argument everything that was in the habit of being
+     advanced on behalf of justice, in order afterward to be able to
+     overturn it, as he did.</p>
+
+<p>VII. Many philosophers indeed, and especially Plato and Aristotle,
+     have spoken a great deal of justice, inculcating that virtue, and
+     extolling it with the highest praise, as giving to every one what
+     belongs to him, as preserving equity in all things, and urging that
+     while the other virtues are, as it were, silent and shut up,
+     justice is the only one which <a id="page-430"></a><span class="pgnum">430</span>is not absorbed in considerations of
+     self-interest, and which is not secret, but finds its whole field
+     for exercise out-of-doors, and is desirous of doing good and
+     serving as many people as possible; as if, forsooth, justice ought
+     to exist in judges only, and in men invested with a certain
+     authority, and not in every one! But there is no one, not even a
+     man of the lowest class, or a beggar, who is destitute of
+     opportunities of displaying justice. But because these philosophers
+     knew not what its essence was, or whence it proceeded, or what its
+     employment was, they attributed that first of all virtues, which is
+     the common good of all men, to a few only, and asserted that it
+     aimed at no advantage of its own, but was anxious only for that of
+     others. So it was well that Carneades, a man of the greatest genius
+     and acuteness, refuted their assertions, and overthrew that justice
+     which had no firm foundation; not because he thought justice itself
+     deserving of blame, but in order to show that those its defenders
+     had brought forward no trustworthy or strong arguments in its
+     behalf.</p>
+
+<p>Justice looks out-of-doors, and is prominent and conspicuous in its
+     whole essence.</p>
+
+<p>Which virtue, beyond all others, wholly devotes and dedicates
+     itself to the advantage of others.</p>
+</div>
+
+<p>VIII. * * * Both to discover and maintain. While the other, Aristotle,
+has filled four large volumes with a discussion on abstract justice. For
+I did not expect anything grand or magnificent from Chrysippus, who,
+after his usual fashion, examines everything rather by the signification
+of words than the reality of things. But it was surely worthy of those
+heroes of philosophy to ennoble by their genius a virtue so eminently
+beneficent and liberal, which everywhere exalts the social interests
+above the selfish, and teaches us to love others rather than ourselves.
+It was worthy of their genius, we say, to elevate this virtue to a
+divine throne, not far from that of Wisdom. And certainly they neither
+wanted the will to accomplish this (for what else could be the cause of
+their writing on the subject, or what could have been their design?) nor
+the genius, in which they excelled all men. But the weakness of their
+cause was too great for either their intention or their eloquence to
+make it popular. In fact, this justice on which we reason is a civil
+right, but no natural one; for if it were natural and universal, then
+justice and injustice would be recognized similarly by all men, just as
+the heat and cold, sweetness and bitterness.</p>
+
+<p>IX. Now, if any one, carried in that chariot of winged serpents of which
+the poet Pacuvius makes mention, could <a id="page-431"></a><span class="pgnum">431</span>take his flight over all nations
+and cities, and accurately observe their proceedings, he would see that
+the sense of justice and right varies in different regions. In the first
+place, he would behold among the unchangeable people of Egypt, which
+preserves in its archives the memory of so many ages and events, a bull
+adored as a Deity, under the name of Apis, and a multitude of other
+monsters, and all kinds of animals admitted by the same nation into the
+number of the Gods.</p>
+
+<p>In the next place, he would see in Greece, as among ourselves,
+magnificent temples consecrated by images in human form, which the
+Persians regarded as impious; and it is affirmed that the sole motive of
+Xerxes for commanding the conflagration of the Athenian temples was the
+belief that it was a superstitious sacrilege to keep confined within
+narrow walls the Gods, whose proper home was the entire universe. But
+afterward Philip, in his hostile projects against the Persians, and
+Alexander, who carried them into execution, alleged this plea for war,
+that they were desirous to avenge the temples of Greece, which the
+Greeks had thought proper never to rebuild, that this monument of the
+impiety of the Persians might always remain before the eyes of their
+posterity.</p>
+
+<p>How many—such as the inhabitants of Taurica along the Euxine Sea; as
+the King of Egypt, Busiris; as the Gauls and the Carthaginians—have
+thought it exceedingly pious and agreeable to the Gods to sacrifice men!
+And, besides, the customs of life are so various that the Cretans and
+Ætolians regard robbery as honorable. And the LacedÊmonians say that
+their territory extends to all places which they can touch with a lance.
+The Athenians had a custom of swearing, by a public proclamation, that
+all the lands which produced olives and corn were their own. The Gauls
+consider it a base employment to raise corn by agricultural labor, and
+go with arms in their hands, and mow down the harvests of neighboring
+peoples. But we ourselves, the most equitable of all nations, who, in
+order to raise the value of our vines and olives, do not permit the
+races beyond the Alps to cultivate either vineyards or oliveyards, are
+said in this matter to act with prudence, but not with justice. You see,
+then, that wisdom <a id="page-432"></a><span class="pgnum">432</span>and policy are not always the same as equity. And
+Lycurgus, that famous inventor of a most admirable jurisprudence and
+most wholesome laws, gave the lands of the rich to be cultivated by the
+common people, who were reduced to slavery.</p>
+
+<p>X. If I were to describe the diverse kinds of laws, institutions,
+manners, and customs, not only as they vary in the numerous nations, but
+as they vary likewise in single cities—in this one of ours, for
+example—I could prove that they have had a thousand revolutions. For
+instance, that eminent expositor of our laws who sits in the present
+company—I mean Manilius—if you were to consult him relative to the
+legacies and inheritances of women, he would tell you that the present
+law is quite different from that he was accustomed to plead in his
+youth, before the Voconian enactment came into force—an edict which was
+passed in favor of the interests of the men, but which is evidently full
+of injustice with regard to women. For why should a woman be disabled
+from inheriting property? Why can a vestal virgin become an heir, while
+her mother cannot? And why, admitting that it is necessary to set some
+limit to the wealth of women, should Crassus’s daughter, if she be his
+only child, inherit thousands without offending the law, while my
+daughter can only receive a small share in a bequest.<a id="FNA-337"></a><a href="#FN-337"><sup>337</sup></a> * * *</p>
+
+<p>XI. * * * [If this justice were natural, innate, and universal, all men
+would admit the same] law and right, and the same men would not enact
+different laws at different times. If a just man and a virtuous man is
+bound to obey the laws, I ask, what laws do you mean? Do you intend all
+the laws indifferently? But neither does virtue permit this inconstancy
+in moral obligation, nor is such a variation compatible with natural
+conscience. The laws are, therefore, based not on our sense of justice,
+but on our fear of punishment. There is, therefore, no natural justice;
+and hence it follows that men cannot be just by nature.</p>
+
+<p>Are men, then, to say that variations indeed do exist in the laws, but
+that men who are virtuous through natural conscience follow that which
+is really justice, and not a mere semblance and disguise, and that it is
+the distinguishing <a id="page-433"></a><span class="pgnum">433</span>characteristic of the truly just and virtuous man to
+render every one his due rights? Are we, then, to attribute the first of
+these characteristics to animals? For not only men of moderate
+abilities, but even first-rate sages and philosophers, as Pythagoras and
+Empedocles, declare that all kinds of living creatures have a right to
+the same justice. They declare that inexpiable penalties impend over
+those who have done violence to any animal whatsoever. It is, therefore,
+a crime to injure an animal, and the perpetrator of such crime<a id="FNA-338"></a><a href="#FN-338"><sup>338</sup></a> * * *</p>
+
+<div class="unclear">
+<p>XII. For when he<a id="FNA-339"></a><a href="#FN-339"><sup>339</sup></a> inquired of a pirate by what right he dared
+     to infest the sea with his little brigantine: “By the same right,”
+     he replied, “which is your warrant for conquering the world.” * * * </p>
+</div>
+
+<p>Wisdom and prudence instruct us by all means to increase our power,
+riches, and estates. For by what means could this same Alexander, that
+illustrious general, who extended his empire over all Asia, without
+violating the property of other men, have acquired such universal
+dominion, enjoyed so many pleasures, such great power, and reigned
+without bound or limit?</p>
+
+<p>But justice commands us to have mercy upon all men, to consult the
+interests of the whole human race, to give to every one his due, and
+injure no sacred, public, or foreign rights, and to forbear touching
+what does not belong to us. What is the result, then? If you obey the
+dictates of wisdom, then wealth, power, riches, honors, provinces, and
+kingdoms, from all classes, peoples, and nations, are to be aimed at.</p>
+
+<p>However, as we are discussing public matters, those examples are more
+illustrious which refer to what is done publicly. And since the question
+between justice and policy applies equally to private and public
+affairs, I think it well to speak of the wisdom of the people. I will
+not, however, mention other nations, but come at once to our own Roman
+people, whom Africanus, in his discourse yesterday, traced from the
+cradle, and whose empire now embraces the whole world. Justice is<a id="FNA-340"></a><a href="#FN-340"><sup>340</sup></a> * * *</p>
+
+<div class="unclear">
+<p><a id="page-434"></a><span class="pgnum">434</span>XIII. How far utility is at variance with justice we may learn from
+     the Roman people itself, which, declaring war by means of the
+     fecials, and committing injustice with all legal formality, always
+     coveting and laying violent hands on the property of others,
+     acquired the possession of the whole world.</p>
+
+<p>What is the advantage of one’s own country but the disadvantage of
+     another state or nation, by extending one’s dominions by
+     territories evidently wrested from others, increasing one’s power,
+     improving one’s revenues, etc.? Therefore, whoever has obtained
+     these advantages for his country—that is to say, whoever has
+     overthrown cities, subdued nations, and by these means filled the
+     treasury with money, taken lands, and enriched his
+     fellow-citizens—such a man is extolled to the skies; is believed
+     to be endowed with consummate and perfect virtue; and this mistake
+     is fallen into not only by the populace and the ignorant, but by
+     philosophers, who even give rules for injustice.</p>
+</div>
+
+<p>XIV. * * * For all those who have the right of life and death over the
+people are in fact tyrants; but they prefer being called by the title of
+king, which belongs to the all-good Jupiter. But when certain men, by
+favor of wealth, birth, or any other means, get possession of the entire
+government, it is a faction; but they choose to denominate themselves an
+aristocracy. If the people gets the upper hand, and rules everything
+after its capricious will, they call it liberty, but it is in fact
+license. And when every man is a guard upon his neighbor, and every
+class is a guard upon every other class, then because no one trusts in
+his own strength, a kind of compact is formed between the great and the
+little, from whence arises that mixed kind of government which Scipio
+has been commending. Thus justice, according to these facts, is not the
+daughter of nature or conscience, but of human imbecility. For when it
+becomes necessary to choose between these three predicaments, either to
+do wrong without retribution, or to do wrong with retribution, or to do
+no wrong at all, it is best to do wrong with impunity; next, neither to
+do wrong nor to suffer for it; but nothing is more wretched than to
+struggle incessantly between the wrong we inflict and that we receive.
+Therefore, he who attains to that first end<a id="FNA-341"></a><a href="#FN-341"><sup>341</sup></a> * * *</p>
+
+<div class="unclear">
+<p>XV. This was the sum of the argument of Carneades: that men had
+     established laws among themselves from considerations of advantage,
+     <a id="page-435"></a><span class="pgnum">435</span>varying them according to their different customs, and altering
+     them often so as to adapt them to the times; but that there was no
+     such thing as natural law; that all men and all other animals are
+     led to their own advantage by the guidance of nature; that there is
+     no such thing as justice, or, if there be, that it is extreme
+     folly, since a man would injure himself while consulting the
+     interests of others. And he added these arguments, that all nations
+     who were flourishing and dominant, and even the Romans themselves,
+     who were the masters of the whole world, if they wished to be
+     just—that is to say, if they restored all that belonged to
+     others—would have to return to their cottages, and to lie down in
+     want and misery.</p>
+</div>
+
+<p>Except, perhaps, of the Arcadians and Athenians, who, I presume,
+dreading that this great act of retribution might one day arrive,
+pretend that they were sprung from the earth, like so many field-mice.</p>
+
+<p>XVI. In reply to these statements, the following arguments are often
+adduced by those who are not unskilful in discussions, and who, in this
+question, have all the greater weight of authority, because, when we
+inquire, Who is a good man?—understanding by that term a frank and
+single-minded man—we have little need of captious casuists, quibblers,
+and slanderers. For those men assert that the wise man does not seek
+virtue because of the personal gratification which the practice of
+justice and beneficence procures him, but rather because the life of the
+good man is free from fear, care, solicitude, and peril; while, on the
+other hand, the wicked always feel in their souls a certain suspicion,
+and always behold before their eyes images of judgment and punishment.
+Do not you think, therefore, that there is any benefit, or that there is
+any advantage which can be procured by injustice, precious enough to
+counterbalance the constant pressure of remorse, and the haunting
+consciousness that retribution awaits the sinner, and hangs over his
+devoted head.<a id="FNA-342"></a><a href="#FN-342"><sup>342</sup></a> * * *</p>
+
+<p>XVII. [Our philosophers, therefore, put a case. Suppose, say they, two
+men, one of whom is an excellent and admirable person, of high honor and
+remarkable integrity; the latter is distinguished by nothing but his
+vice and audacity. And suppose that their city has so mistaken their
+characters as to imagine the good man to be a scandalous, impious, and
+audacious criminal, and to esteem the wicked <a id="page-436"></a><span class="pgnum">436</span>man, on the contrary, as a
+pattern of probity and fidelity. On account of this error of their
+fellow-citizens, the good man is arrested and tormented, his hands are
+cut off, his eyes are plucked out, he is condemned, bound, burned,
+exterminated, reduced to want, and to the last appears to all men to be
+most deservedly the most miserable of men. On the other hand, the
+flagitious wretch is exalted, worshipped, loved by all, and honors,
+offices, riches, and emoluments are all conferred on him, and he shall
+be reckoned by his fellow-citizens the best and worthiest of mortals,
+and in the highest degree deserving of all manner of prosperity. Yet,
+for all this, who is so mad as to doubt which of these two men he would
+rather be?</p>
+
+<p>XVIII. What happens among individuals happens also among nations. There
+is no state so absurd and ridiculous as not to prefer unjust dominion to
+just subordination. I need not go far for examples. During my own
+consulship, when you were my fellow-counsellors, we consulted respecting
+the treaty of Numantia. No one was ignorant that Quintus Pompey had
+signed a treaty, and that Mancinus had done the same. The latter, being
+a virtuous man, supported the proposition which I laid before the
+people, after the decree of the senate. The former, on the other side,
+opposed it vehemently. If modesty, probity, or faith had been regarded,
+Mancinus would have carried his point; but in reason, counsel, and
+prudence, Pompey surpassed him. Whether<a id="FNA-343"></a><a href="#FN-343"><sup>343</sup></a> * * *</p>
+
+<p>XIX. If a man should have a faithless slave, or an unwholesome house,
+with whose defect he alone was acquainted, and he advertised them for
+sale, would he state the fact that his servant was infected with
+knavery, and his house with malaria, or would he conceal these
+objections from the buyer? If he stated those facts, he would be honest,
+no doubt, because he would deceive nobody; but still he would be thought
+a fool, because he would either get very little for his property, or
+else fail to sell it at all. By concealing these defects, on the other
+hand, he will be called a shrewd man—as one who has taken care of his
+own interest; but he will be a rogue, notwithstanding, because he will
+be deceiving his neighbors. Again, <a id="page-437"></a><span class="pgnum">437</span>let us suppose that one man meets
+another, who sells gold and silver, conceiving them to be copper or
+lead; shall he hold his peace that he may make a capital bargain, or
+correct the mistake, and purchase at a fair rate? He would evidently be
+a fool in the world’s opinion if he preferred the latter.</p>
+
+<p>XX. It is justice, beyond all question, neither to commit murder nor
+robbery. What, then, would your just man do, if, in a case of shipwreck,
+he saw a weaker man than himself get possession of a plank? Would he not
+thrust him off, get hold of the timber himself, and escape by his
+exertions, especially as no human witness could be present in the
+mid-sea? If he acted like a wise man of the world, he would certainly do
+so, for to act in any other way would cost him his life. If, on the
+other hand, he prefers death to inflicting unjustifiable injury on his
+neighbor, he will be an eminently honorable and just man, but not the
+less a fool, because he saved another’s life at the expense of his own.
+Again, if in case of a defeat and rout, when the enemy were pressing in
+the rear, this just man should find a wounded comrade mounted on a
+horse, shall he respect his right at the risk of being killed himself,
+or shall he fling him from the horse in order to preserve his own life
+from the pursuers? If he does so, he is a wise man, but at the same time
+a wicked one; if he does not, he is admirably just, but at the same time
+stupid.</p>
+
+<p>XXI. <i>Scipio.</i> I might reply at great length to these sophistical
+objections of Philus, if it were not, my LÊlius, that all our friends
+are no less anxious than myself to hear you take a leading part in the
+present debate, especially as you promised yesterday that you would
+plead at large on my side of the argument. If you cannot spare time for
+this, at any rate do not desert us; we all ask it of you.</p>
+
+<p><i>LÊlius.</i> This Carneades ought not to be even listened to by our young
+men. I think all the while that I am hearing him that he must be a very
+impure person; if he be not, as I would fain believe, his discourse is
+not less pernicious.</p>
+
+<p>XXII.<a id="FNA-344"></a><a href="#FN-344"><sup>344</sup></a> True law is right reason conformable to nature, <a id="page-438"></a><span class="pgnum">438</span>universal,
+unchangeable, eternal, whose commands urge us to duty, and whose
+prohibitions restrain us from evil. Whether it enjoins or forbids, the
+good respect its injunctions, and the wicked treat them with
+indifference. This law cannot be contradicted by any other law, and is
+not liable either to derogation or abrogation. Neither the senate nor
+the people can give us any dispensation for not obeying this universal
+law of justice. It needs no other expositor and interpreter than our own
+conscience. It is not one thing at Rome, and another at Athens; one
+thing to-day, and another to-morrow; but in all times and nations this
+universal law must forever reign, eternal and imperishable. It is the
+sovereign master and emperor of all beings. God himself is its author,
+its promulgator, its enforcer. And he who does not obey it flies from
+himself, and does violence to the very nature of man. And by so doing he
+will endure the severest penalties even if he avoid the other evils
+which are usually accounted punishments.</p>
+
+<div class="unclear">
+<p>XXIII. I am aware that in the third book of Cicero’s treatise on
+     the Commonwealth (unless I am mistaken) it is argued that no war is
+     ever undertaken by a well-regulated commonwealth unless it be one
+     either for the sake of keeping faith, or for safety; and what he
+     means by a war for safety, and what safety he wishes us to
+     understand, he points out in another passage, where he says, “But
+     private men often escape from these penalties, which even the most
+     stupid persons feel—want, exile, imprisonment, and stripes—by
+     embracing the opportunity of a speedy death; but to states death
+     itself is a penalty, though it appears to deliver individuals from
+     punishment. For a state ought to be established so as to be
+     eternal: therefore, there is no natural decease for a state, as
+     there is for a man, in whose case death is not only inevitable, but
+     often even desirable; but when a state is put an end to, it is
+     destroyed, extinguished. It is in some degree, to compare small
+     things with great, as if this whole world were to perish and fall
+     to pieces.”</p>
+
+<p>In his treatise on the Commonwealth, Cicero says those wars are
+     unjust which are undertaken without reason. Again, after a few
+     sentences, he adds, No war is considered just unless it be formally
+     announced and declared, and unless it be to obtain restitution of
+     what has been taken away.</p>
+
+<p>But our nation, by defending its allies, has now become the master
+     of all the whole world.</p>
+
+<p>XXIV. Also, in that same treatise on the Commonwealth, he argues
+     most strenuously and vigorously in the cause of justice against
+     injustice. And since, when a little time before the part of
+     injustice was upheld against justice, and the doctrine was urged
+     that a republic could not <a id="page-439"></a><span class="pgnum">439</span>prosper and flourish except by
+     injustice, this was put forward as the strongest argument, that it
+     was unjust for men to serve other men as their masters; but that
+     unless a dominant state, such as a great republic, acted on this
+     injustice, it could not govern its provinces; answer was made on
+     behalf of justice, that it was just that it should be so, because
+     slavery is advantageous to such men, and their interests are
+     consulted by a right course of conduct—that is, by the license of
+     doing injury being taken from the wicked—and they will fare better
+     when subjugated, because when not subjugated they fared worse: and
+     to confirm this reasoning, a noble instance, taken, as it were,
+     from nature, was added, and it was said, Why, then, does God govern
+     man, and why does the mind govern the body, and reason govern lust,
+     and the other vicious parts of the mind?</p>
+
+<p>XXV. Hear what Tully says more plainly still in the third book of
+     his treatise on the Commonwealth, when discussing the reasons for
+     government. Do we not, says he, see that nature herself has given
+     the power of dominion to everything that is best, to the extreme
+     advantage of what is subjected to it? Why, then, does God govern
+     man, and why does the mind govern the body, and reason govern lust
+     and passion and the other vicious parts of the same mind? Listen
+     thus far; for presently he adds, But still there are
+     dissimilarities to be recognized in governing and in obeying. For
+     as the mind is said to govern the body, and also to govern lust,
+     still it governs the body as a king governs his subjects, or a
+     parent his children; but it governs lust as a master governs his
+     slaves, because it restrains and breaks it. The authority of kings,
+     of generals, of magistrates, of fathers, and of nations, rules
+     their subjects and allies as the mind rules bodies; but masters
+     control their slaves, as the best part of the mind—that is to say,
+     wisdom—controls the vicious and weak parts of itself, such as
+     lust, passion, and the other perturbations.</p>
+
+<p>For there is a kind of unjust slavery when those belong to some one
+     else who might be their own masters; but when those are slaves who
+     cannot govern themselves, there is no injury done.</p>
+
+<p>XXVI. If, says Carneades, you were to know that an asp was lying
+     hidden anywhere, and that some one who did not know it was going to
+     sit upon it, whose death would be a gain to you, you would act
+     wickedly if you did not warn him not to sit down. Still, you would
+     not be liable to punishment; for who could prove that you had
+     known? But we are bringing forward too many instances; for it is
+     plain that unless equity, good faith, and justice proceed from
+     nature, and if all these things are referred to interest, a good
+     man cannot be found. And on these topics a great deal is said by
+     LÊlius in our treatise on the Republic.</p>
+
+<p>If, as we are reminded by you, we have spoken well in that
+     treatise, when we said that nothing is good excepting what is
+     honorable, and nothing bad excepting what is disgraceful. * * *</p>
+
+<p>XXVII. I am glad that you approve of the doctrine that the
+     affection borne to our children is implanted by nature; indeed, if
+     it be not, there can be no conection between man and man which has
+     its origin in nature. And if there be not, then there is an end of
+     all society in life. May it turn out well, says Carneades, speaking
+     shamelessly, but still <a id="page-440"></a><span class="pgnum">440</span>more sensibly than my friend Lucius or
+     Patro: for, as they refer everything to themselves, do they think
+     that anything is ever done for the sake of another? And when they
+     say that a man ought to be good, in order to avoid misfortune, not
+     because it is right by nature, they do not perceive that they are
+     speaking of a cunning man, not of a good one. But these arguments
+     are argued, I think, in those books by praising which you have
+     given me spirits.</p>
+
+<p>In which I agree that an anxious and hazardous justice is not that
+     of a wise man.</p>
+
+<p>XXVIII. And again, in Cicero, that same advocate of justice,
+     LÊlius, says, Virtue is clearly eager for honor, nor has she any
+     other reward; which, however, she accepts easily, and exacts
+     without bitterness. And in another place the same LÊlius says:</p>
+</div>
+
+<p>When a man is inspired by virtue such as this, what bribes can you offer
+him, what treasures, what thrones, what empires? He considers these but
+mortal goods, and esteems his own divine. And if the ingratitude of the
+people, and the envy of his competitors, or the violence of powerful
+enemies, despoil his virtue of its earthly recompense, he still enjoys a
+thousand consolations in the approbation of conscience, and sustains
+himself by contemplating the beauty of moral rectitude.</p>
+
+<p>XXIX. * * * This virtue, in order to be true, must be universal.
+Tiberius Gracchus continued faithful to his fellow-citizens, but he
+violated the rights and treaties guaranteed to our allies and the Latin
+peoples. But if this habit of arbitrary violence begins to extend itself
+further, and perverts our authority, leading it from right to violence,
+so that those who had voluntarily obeyed us are only restrained by fear,
+then, although we, during our days, may escape the peril, yet am I
+solicitous respecting the safety of our posterity and the immortality of
+the Commonwealth itself, which, doubtless, might become perpetual and
+invincible if our people would maintain their ancient institutions and
+manners.</p>
+
+<p>XXX. When LÊlius had ceased to speak, all those that were present
+expressed the extreme pleasure they found in his discourse. But Scipio,
+more affected than the rest, and ravished with the delight of sympathy,
+exclaimed: You have pleaded, my LÊlius, many causes with an eloquence
+superior to that of Servius Galba, our colleague, whom you used during
+his life to prefer to all others, even to the Attic orators [and never
+did I hear you speak with <a id="page-441"></a><span class="pgnum">441</span>more energy than to-day, while pleading the
+cause of justice]<a id="FNA-345"></a><a href="#FN-345"><sup>345</sup></a> * * *</p>
+
+<div class="unclear">
+<p>* * * That two things were wanting to enable him to speak in public
+     and in the forum, confidence and voice.</p>
+</div>
+
+<p>XXXI. * * * This justice, continued Scipio, is the very foundation of
+lawful government in political constitutions. Can we call the State of
+Agrigentum a commonwealth, where all men are oppressed by the cruelty of
+a single tyrant—where there is no universal bond of right, nor social
+consent and fellowship, which should belong to every people, properly so
+named? It is the same in Syracuse—that illustrious city which TimÊus
+calls the greatest of the Grecian towns. It was indeed a most beautiful
+city; and its admirable citadel, its canals distributed through all its
+districts, its broad streets, its porticoes, its temples, and its walls,
+gave Syracuse the appearance of a most flourishing state. But while
+Dionysius its tyrant reigned there, nothing of all its wealth belonged
+to the people, and the people were nothing better than the slaves of one
+master. Thus, wherever I behold a tyrant, I know that the social
+constitution must be not merely vicious and corrupt, as I stated
+yesterday, but in strict truth no social constitution at all.</p>
+
+<p>XXXII. <i>LÊlius.</i> You have spoken admirably, my Scipio, and I see the
+point of your observations.</p>
+
+<p><i>Scipio.</i> You grant, then, that a state which is entirely in the power
+of a faction cannot justly be entitled a political community?</p>
+
+<p><i>LÊlius.</i> That is evident.</p>
+
+<p><i>Scipio.</i> You judge most correctly. For what was the State of Athens
+when, during the great Peloponnesian war, she fell under the unjust
+domination of the thirty tyrants? The antique glory of that city, the
+imposing aspect of its edifices, its theatre, its gymnasium, its
+porticoes, its temples, its citadel, the admirable sculptures of
+Phidias, and the magnificent harbor of PirÊus—did they constitute it a
+commonwealth?</p>
+
+<p><i>LÊlius.</i> Certainly not, because these did not constitute the real
+welfare of the community.</p>
+
+<p><a id="page-442"></a><span class="pgnum">442</span><i>Scipio.</i> And at Rome, when the decemvirs ruled without appeal from
+their decisions, in the third year of their power, had not liberty lost
+all its securities and all its blessings?</p>
+
+<p><i>LÊlius.</i> Yes; the welfare of the community was no longer consulted, and
+the people soon roused themselves, and recovered their appropriate
+rights.</p>
+
+<p>XXXIII. <i>Scipio.</i> I now come to the third, or democratical, form of
+government, in which a considerable difficulty presents itself, because
+all things are there said to lie at the disposition of the people, and
+are carried into execution just as they please. Here the populace
+inflict punishments at their pleasure, and act, and seize, and keep
+possession, and distribute property, without let or hinderance. Can you
+deny, my LÊlius, that this is a fair definition of a democracy, where
+the people are all in all, and where the people constitute the State?</p>
+
+<p><i>LÊlius.</i> There is no political constitution to which I more absolutely
+deny the name of a <i>commonwealth</i> than that in which all things lie in
+the power of the multitude. If a commonwealth, which implies the welfare
+of the entire community, could not exist in Agrigentum, Syracuse, or
+Athens when tyrants reigned over them—if it could not exist in Rome
+when under the oligarchy of the decemvirs—neither do I see how this
+sacred name of commonwealth can be applied to a democracy and the sway
+of the mob; because, in the first place, my Scipio, I build on your own
+admirable definition, that there can be no community, properly so
+called, unless it be regulated by a combination of rights. And, by this
+definition, it appears that a multitude of men may be just as tyrannical
+as a single despot; and it is so much the worse, since no monster can be
+more barbarous than the mob, which assumes the name and appearance of
+the people. Nor is it at all reasonable, since the laws place the
+property of madmen in the hands of their sane relations, that we should
+do the [very reverse in politics, and throw the property of the sane
+into the hands of the mad multitude]<a id="FNA-346"></a><a href="#FN-346"><sup>346</sup></a> * * *</p>
+
+<p>XXXIV. * * * [It is far more rational] to assert that a wise and
+virtuous aristocratical government deserves <a id="page-443"></a><span class="pgnum">443</span>the title of a
+commonwealth, as it approaches to the nature of a kingdom.</p>
+
+<p>And much more so in my opinion, said Mummius. For the unity of power
+often exposes a king to become a despot; but when an aristocracy,
+consisting of many virtuous men, exercise power, that is the most
+fortunate circumstance possible for any state. However this be, I much
+prefer royalty to democracy; for that is the third kind of government
+which you have remaining, and a most vicious one it is.</p>
+
+<p>XXXV. Scipio replied: I am well acquainted, my Mummius, with your
+decided antipathy to the democratical system. And, although, we may
+speak of it with rather more indulgence than you are accustomed to
+accord it, I must certainly agree with you, that of all the three
+particular forms of government, none is less commendable than democracy.</p>
+
+<p>I do not agree with you, however, when you would imply that aristocracy
+is preferable to royalty. If you suppose that wisdom governs the State,
+is it not as well that this wisdom should reside in one monarch as in
+many nobles?</p>
+
+<p>But we are led away by a certain incorrectness of terms in a discussion
+like the present. When we pronounce the word “aristocracy,” which, in
+Greek, signifies the government of the best men, what can be conceived
+more excellent? For what can be thought better than the best? But when,
+on the other hand, the title “king” is mentioned, we begin to imagine a
+tyrant; as if a king must be necessarily unjust. But we are not speaking
+of an unjust king when we are examining the true nature of royal
+authority. To this name of king, therefore, do but attach the idea of a
+Romulus, a Numa, a Tullus, and perhaps you will be less severe to the
+monarchical form of constitution.</p>
+
+<p><i>Mummius</i>. Have you, then, no commendation at all for any kind of
+democratical government?</p>
+
+<p><i>Scipio.</i> Why, I think some democratical forms less objectionable than
+others; and, by way of illustration, I will ask you what you thought of
+the government in the isle of Rhodes, where we were lately together; did
+it appear to you a legitimate and rational constitution?</p>
+
+<p><a id="page-444"></a><span class="pgnum">444</span><i>Mummius</i>. It did, and not much liable to abuse.</p>
+
+<p><i>Scipio.</i> You say truly. But, if you recollect, it was a very
+extraordinary experiment. All the inhabitants were alternately senators
+and citizens. Some months they spent in their senatorial functions, and
+some months they spent in their civil employments. In both they
+exercised judicial powers; and in the theatre and the court, the same
+men judged all causes, capital and not capital. And they had as much
+influence, and were of as much importance as * * *</p>
+
+       <hr class="tiny"/>
+
+
+
+
+<h4>FRAGMENTS.</h4>
+
+
+<div class="unclear">
+<p>XXXVI. There is therefore some unquiet feeling in individuals,
+     which either exults in pleasure or is crushed by annoyance.</p>
+
+<p class="comment">[<i>The next is an incomplete sentence, and, as such,
+     unintelligible</i>.]</p>
+
+<p>The Phœnicians were the first who by their commerce, and by the
+     merchandise which they carried, brought avarice and magnificence
+     and insatiable degrees of everything into Greece.</p>
+
+<p>Sardanapalus, the luxurious king of Assyria, of whom Tully, in the
+     third book of his treatise on the Republic, says, “The notorious
+     Sardanapalus, far more deformed by his vices than even by his
+     name.”</p>
+
+<p>What is the meaning, then, of this absurd acceptation, unless some
+     one wishes to make the whole of Athos a monument? For what is Athos
+     or the vast Olympus? * * *</p>
+
+<p>XXXVII. I will endeavor in the proper place to show it, according
+     to the definitions of Cicero himself, in which, putting forth
+     Scipio as the speaker, he has briefly explained what a commonwealth
+     and what a republic is; adducing also many assertions of his own,
+     and of those whom he has represented as taking part in that
+     discussion, to the effect that the State of Rome was not such a
+     commonwealth, because there has never been genuine justice in it.
+     However, according to definitions which are more reasonable, it was
+     a commonwealth in some degree, and it was better regulated by the
+     more ancient than by the later Romans.</p>
+
+<p>It is now fitting that I should explain, as briefly and as clearly
+     as I can, what, in the second book of this work, I promised to
+     prove, according to the definitions which Cicero, in his books on
+     the Commonwealth, puts into the mouth of Scipio, arguing that the
+     Roman State was never a commonwealth; for he briefly defines a
+     commonwealth as a state of the people; the people as an assembly of
+     the multitude, united by a common feeling of right, and a community
+     of interests. What he calls a common feeling of right he explains
+     by discussion, showing in this way that a commonwealth cannot
+     proceed without justice. Where, therefore, there is no genuine
+     justice, there can be no right, for that which is done according to
+     right is done justly; and what is done unjustly cannot <a id="page-445"></a><span class="pgnum">445</span>be done
+     according to right, for the unjust regulations of men are not to be
+     called or thought rights; since they themselves call that right
+     (<i>jus</i>) which flows from the source of justice: and they say that
+     that assertion which is often made by some persons of erroneous
+     sentiments, namely, that that is right which is advantageous to the
+     most powerful, is false. Wherefore, where there is no true justice
+     there can be no company of men united by a common feeling of right;
+     therefore there can be no people (<i>populus</i>), according to that
+     definition of Scipio or Cicero: and if there be no people, there
+     can be no state of the people, but only of a mob such as it may be,
+     which is not worthy of the name of a people. And thus, if a
+     commonwealth is a state of a people, and if that is not a people
+     which is not united by a common feeling of right, and if there is
+     no right where there is no justice, then the undoubted inference
+     is, that where there is no justice there is no commonwealth.
+     Moreover, justice is that virtue which gives every one his own.</p>
+</div>
+
+<p>No war can be undertaken by a just and wise state unless for faith or
+self-defence. This self-defence of the State is enough to insure its
+perpetuity, and this perpetuity is what all patriots desire. Those
+afflictions which even the hardiest spirits smart under—poverty, exile,
+prison, and torment—private individuals seek to escape from by an
+instantaneous death. But for states, the greatest calamity of all is
+that of death, which to individuals appears a refuge. A state should be
+so constituted as to live forever. For a commonwealth there is no
+natural dissolution as there is for a man, to whom death not only
+becomes necessary, but often desirable. And when a state once decays and
+falls, it is so utterly revolutionized, that, if we may compare great
+things with small, it resembles the final wreck of the universe.</p>
+
+<p>All wars undertaken without a proper motive are unjust. And no war can
+be reputed just unless it be duly announced and proclaimed, and if it be
+not preceded by a rational demand for restitution.</p>
+
+<p>Our Roman Commonwealth, by defending its allies, has got possession of
+the world.</p>
+
+
+
+<hr/>
+
+<h3><a id="page-446"></a><span class="pgnum">446</span>INTRODUCTION TO THE FOURTH BOOK,</h3>
+
+<h4>BY THE ORIGINAL TRANSLATOR.</h4>
+
+
+<p class="intro"><span class="first">In</span> this fourth book Cicero treats of morals and education, and the
+     use and abuse of stage entertainments. We retain nothing of this
+     important book save a few scattered fragments, the beauty of which
+     fills us with the greater regret for the passages we have lost.</p>
+
+       <hr class="tiny"/>
+
+
+
+
+<h3>BOOK IV.</h3>
+
+<h4>FRAGMENTS.</h4>
+
+
+<div class="unclear">
+<p>I. * * * Since mention has been made of the body and of the mind, I
+     will endeavor to explain the theory of each as well as the weakness
+     of my understanding is able to comprehend it—a duty which I think
+     it the more becoming in me to undertake, because Marcus Tullius, a
+     man of singular genius, after having attempted to perform it in the
+     fourth book of his treatise on the Commonwealth, compressed a
+     subject of wide extent within narrow limits, only touching lightly
+     on all the principal points. And that there might be no excuse
+     alleged for his not having followed out this topic, he himself has
+     assured us that he was not wanting either in inclination or in
+     anxiety to do so; for, in the first book of his treatise on Laws,
+     when he was touching briefly on the same subject, he speaks thus:
+     “This topic Scipio, in my opinion, has sufficiently discussed in
+     those books which you have read.”</p>
+
+<p>And the mind itself, which sees the future, remembers the past.</p>
+
+<p>Well did Marcus Tullius say, In truth, if there is no one who would
+     not prefer death to being changed into the form of some beast,
+     although he were still to retain the mind of a man, how much more
+     wretched is it to have the mind of a beast in the form of a man! To
+     me this fate appears as much worse than the other as the mind is
+     superior to the body.</p>
+
+<p>Tullius says somewhere that he does not think the good of a ram and
+     of Publius Africanus identical.</p>
+
+<p>And also by its being interposed, it causes shade and night, which
+     is adapted both to the numbering of days and to rest from labor.</p>
+
+<p>And as in the autumn he has opened the earth to receive seeds, in
+     winter relaxed it that it may digest them, and by the ripening
+     powers of summer softened some and burned up others.</p>
+
+<p>When the shepherds use * * * for cattle.</p>
+
+<p>Cicero, in the fourth book of his Commonwealth, uses the word
+     “armentum,” and “armentarius,” derived from it.</p>
+</div>
+
+<p><a id="page-447"></a><span class="pgnum">447</span>II. The great law of just and regular subordination is the basis of
+political prosperity. There is much advantage in the harmonious
+succession of ranks and orders and classes, in which the suffrages of
+the knights and the senators have their due weight. Too many have
+foolishly desired to destroy this institution, in the vain hope of
+receiving some new largess, by a public decree, out of a distribution of
+the property of the nobility.</p>
+
+<p>III. Consider, now, how wisely the other provisions have been adopted,
+in order to secure to the citizens the benefits of an honest and happy
+life; for that is, indeed, the grand object of all political
+association, and that which every government should endeavor to procure
+for the people, partly by its institutions, and partly by its laws.</p>
+
+<p>Consider, in the first place, the national education of the people—a
+matter on which the Greeks have expended much labor in vain, and which
+is the only point on which Polybius, who settled among us, accuses the
+negligence of our institutions. For our countrymen have thought that
+education ought not to be fixed, nor regulated by laws, nor be given
+publicly and uniformly to all classes of society. For<a id="FNA-347"></a><a href="#FN-347"><sup>347</sup></a> * * *</p>
+
+<div class="unclear">
+<p>According to Tully, who says that men going to serve in the army
+     have guardians assigned to them, by whom they are governed the
+     first year.</p>
+</div>
+
+<p>IV. [In our ancient laws, young men were prohibited from appearing]
+naked in the public baths, so far back were the principles of modesty
+traced by our ancestors. Among the Greeks, on the contrary, what an
+absurd system of training youth is exhibited in their gymnasia! What a
+frivolous preparation for the labors and hazards of war! what indecent
+spectacles, what impure and licentious amours are permitted! I do not
+speak only of the Eleans and Thebans, among whom, in all love affairs,
+passion is allowed to run into shameless excesses; but the Spartans,
+while they permit every kind of license to their young men, save that of
+violation, fence off, by a very slight wall, the very exception on which
+they insist, besides other crimes which I will not mention.</p>
+
+<p><a id="page-448"></a><span class="pgnum">448</span>Then LÊlius said: I see, my Scipio, that on the subject of the Greek
+institutions, which you censure, you prefer attacking the customs of the
+most renowned peoples to contending with your favorite Plato, whose name
+you have avoided citing, especially as *&nbsp;*&nbsp;*</p>
+
+<div class="unclear">
+<p>V. So that Cicero, in his treatise on the Commonwealth, says that
+     it was a reproach to young men if they had no lovers.</p>
+
+<p>Not only as at Sparta, where boys learn to steal and plunder.</p>
+
+<p>And our master Plato, even more than Lycurgus, who would have
+     everything to be common, so that no one should be able to call
+     anything his own property.</p>
+
+<p>I would send him to the same place whither he sends Homer, crowned
+     with chaplets and anointed with perfumes, banishing him from the
+     city which he is describing.</p>
+
+<p>VI. The judgment of the censor inflicts scarcely anything more than
+     a blush on the man whom he condemns. Therefore as all that
+     adjudication turns solely on the name (<i>nomen</i>), the punishment is
+     called ignominy.</p>
+
+<p>Nor should a prefect be set over women, an officer who is created
+     among the Greeks; but there should be a censor to teach husbands to
+     manage their wives.</p>
+
+<p>So the discipline of modesty has great power. All women abstain
+     from wine.</p>
+
+<p>And also if any woman was of bad character, her relations used not
+     to kiss her.</p>
+
+<p>So petulance is derived from asking (<i>petendo</i>); wantonness
+     (<i>procacitas</i>) from <i>procando</i>, that is, from demanding.</p>
+
+<p>VII. For I do not approve of the same nation being the ruler and
+     the farmer of lands. But both in private families and in the
+     affairs of the Commonwealth I look upon economy as a revenue.</p>
+
+<p>Faith (<i>fides</i>) appears to me to derive its name from that being
+     done (<i>fit</i>) which is said.</p>
+
+<p>In a citizen of rank and noble birth, caressing manners, display,
+     and ambition are marks of levity.</p>
+
+<p>Examine for a while the books on the Republic, and learn that good
+     men know no bound or limit in consulting the interests of their
+     country. See in that treatise with what praises frugality, and
+     continency, and fidelity to the marriage tie, and chaste,
+     honorable, and virtuous manners are extolled.</p>
+
+<p>VIII. I marvel at the elegant choice, not only of the facts, but of
+     the language. If they dispute (<i>jurgant</i>). It is a contest between
+     well-wishers, not a quarrel between enemies, that is called a
+     dispute (<i>jurgium</i>),</p>
+
+<p>Therefore the law considers that neighbors dispute (<i>jurgare</i>)
+     rather than quarrel (<i>litigare</i>) with one another.</p>
+
+<p>The bounds of man’s care and of man’s life are the same; so by the
+     pontifical law the sanctity of burial *&nbsp;*&nbsp;*</p>
+
+<p>They put them to death, though innocent, because they had left
+     those men unburied whom they could not rescue from the sea because
+     of the violence of the storm.</p>
+
+<p><a id="page-449"></a><span class="pgnum">449</span>Nor in this discussion have I advocated the cause of the populace,
+     but of the good.</p>
+
+<p>For one cannot easily resist a powerful people if one gives them
+     either no rights at all or very little.</p>
+
+<p>In which case I wish I could augur first with truth and fidelity *&nbsp;*&nbsp;*</p>
+
+<p>IX. Cicero saying this in vain, when speaking of poets, “And when
+     the shouts and approval of the people, as of some great and wise
+     teacher, has reached them, what darkness do they bring on! what
+     alarms do they cause! what desires do they excite!”</p>
+
+<p>Cicero says that if his life were extended to twice its length, he
+     should not have time to read the lyric poets.</p>
+
+<p>X. As Scipio says in Cicero, “As they thought the whole histrionic
+     art, and everything connected with the theatre, discreditable, they
+     thought fit that all men of that description should not only be
+     deprived of the honors belonging to the rest of the citizens, but
+     should also be deprived of their franchise by the sentence of the
+     censors.”</p>
+
+<p>And what the ancient Romans thought on this subject Cicero informs
+     us, in those books which he wrote on the Commonwealth, where Scipio
+     argues and says * * *</p>
+</div>
+
+<p>Comedies could never (if it had not been authorized by the common
+customs of life) have made theatres approve of their scandalous
+exhibitions. And the more ancient Greeks provided a certain correction
+for the vicious taste of the people, by making a law that it should be
+expressly defined by a censorship what subjects comedy should treat, and
+how she should treat them.</p>
+
+<p>Whom has it not attacked? or, rather, whom has it not wounded? and whom
+has it spared? In this, no doubt, it sometimes took the right side, and
+lashed the popular demagogues and seditious agitators, such as Cleon,
+Cleophon, and Hyperbolus. We may tolerate that; though indeed the
+censure of the magistrate would, in these cases, have been more
+efficacious than the satire of the poet. But when Pericles, who governed
+the Athenian Commonwealth for so many years with the highest authority,
+both in peace and war, was outraged by verses, and these were acted on
+the stage, it was hardly more decent than if, among us, Plautus and
+NÊvius had attacked Publius and CnÊus, or CÊcilius had ventured to
+revile Marcus Cato.</p>
+
+<p>Our laws of the Twelve Tables, on the contrary—so careful to attach
+capital punishment to a very few crimes only—have included in this
+class of capital offences the offence of composing or publicly reciting
+verses of libel, slander, and defamation, in order to cast dishonor and
+infamy <a id="page-450"></a><span class="pgnum">450</span>on a fellow-citizen. And they have decided wisely; for our life
+and character should, if suspected, be submitted to the sentence of
+judicial tribunals and the legal investigations of our magistrates, and
+not to the whims and fancies of poets. Nor should we be exposed to any
+charge of disgrace which we cannot meet by legal process, and openly
+refute at the bar.</p>
+
+<p>In our laws, I admire the justice of their expressions, as well as their
+decisions. Thus the word <i>pleading</i> signifies rather an amicable suit
+between friends than a quarrel between enemies.</p>
+
+<p>It is not easy to resist a powerful people, if you allow them no rights,
+or next to none.</p>
+
+<div class="unclear">
+<p>The old Romans would not allow any living man to be either praised
+     or blamed on the stage.</p>
+
+<p>XI. Cicero says that comedy is an imitation of life; a mirror of
+     customs, an image of truth.</p>
+
+<p>Since, as is mentioned in that book on the Commonwealth, not only
+     did Æschines the Athenian, a man of the greatest eloquence, who,
+     when a young man, had been an actor of tragedies, concern himself
+     in public affairs, but the Athenians often sent Aristodemus, who
+     was also a tragic actor, to Philip as an ambassador, to treat of
+     the most important affairs of peace and war.</p>
+</div>
+
+<hr/>
+
+
+
+<h3>INTRODUCTION TO THE FIFTH BOOK,</h3>
+
+<h4>BY THE ORIGINAL TRANSLATOR.</h4>
+
+
+<p class="intro"><span class="first">In</span> this fifth book Cicero explains and enforces the duties of
+     magistrates, and the importance of practical experience to all who
+     undertake their important functions. Only a few fragments have
+     survived the wreck of ages and descended to us.</p>
+
+<hr class="tiny"/>
+
+
+<h3>BOOK V.</h3>
+
+<h4>FRAGMENTS.</h4>
+
+
+<p>I. <span class="first">Ennius</span> has told us—</p>
+
+<div class="poem">
+<p>Of men and customs mighty Rome consists;</p>
+</div>
+
+<p class="cont">which verse, both for its precision and its verity, appears to me as if
+it had issued from an oracle; for neither the <a id="page-451"></a><span class="pgnum">451</span>men, unless the State had
+adopted a certain system of manners—nor the manners, unless they had
+been illustrated by the men—could ever have established or maintained
+for so many ages so vast a republic, or one of such righteous and
+extensive sway.</p>
+
+<p>Thus, long before our own times, the force of hereditary manners of
+itself moulded most eminent men; and admirable citizens, in return, gave
+new weight to the ancient customs and institutions of our ancestors. But
+our age, on the contrary, having received the Commonwealth as a finished
+picture of another century, but one already beginning to fade through
+the lapse of years, has not only neglected to renew the colors of the
+original painting, but has not even cared to preserve its general form
+and prominent lineaments.</p>
+
+<p>For what now remains of those antique manners, of which the poet said
+that our Commonwealth consisted? They have now become so obsolete and
+forgotten that they are not only not cultivated, but they are not even
+known. And as to the men, what shall I say? For the manners themselves
+have only perished through a scarcity of men; of which great misfortune
+we are not only called to give an account, but even, as men accused of
+capital offences, to a certain degree to plead our own cause in
+connection with it. For it is owing to our vices, rather than to any
+accident, that we have retained the name of republic when we have long
+since lost the reality.</p>
+
+<p>II. * * * There is no employment so essentially royal as the exposition
+of equity, which comprises the true interpretation of all laws. This
+justice subjects used generally to expect from their kings. For this
+reason, lands, fields, woods, and pastures were reserved as the property
+of kings, and cultivated for them, without any labor on their part, in
+order that no anxiety on account of their personal interests might
+distract their attention from the welfare of the State. Nor was any
+private man allowed to be the judge or arbitrator in any suit; but all
+disputes were terminated by the royal sentence.</p>
+
+<p>And of all our Roman monarchs, Numa appears to me to have best preserved
+this ancient custom of the kings of Greece. For the others, though they
+also discharged this <a id="page-452"></a><span class="pgnum">452</span>duty, were for the main part employed in
+conducting military enterprises, and in attending to those rights which
+belonged to war. But the long peace of Numa’s reign was the mother of
+law and religion in this city. And he was himself the author of those
+admirable laws which, as you are aware, are still extant. And this
+character is precisely what belongs to the man of whom we are speaking.
+* * *</p>
+
+<p>III. [<i>Scipio.</i> Ought not a farmer] to be acquainted with the nature of
+plants and seeds?</p>
+
+<p><i>Manilius.</i> Certainly, provided he attends to his practical business
+also.</p>
+
+<p><i>Scipio.</i> Do you think that knowledge only fit for a steward?</p>
+
+<p><i>Manilius.</i> Certainly not, inasmuch as the cultivation of land often
+fails for want of agricultural labor.</p>
+
+<p><i>Scipio.</i> Therefore, as the steward knows the nature of a field, and the
+scribe knows penmanship, and as both of them seek, in their respective
+sciences, not mere amusement only, but practical utility, so this
+statesman of ours should have studied the science of jurisprudence and
+legislation; he should have investigated their original sources; but he
+should not embarrass himself in debating and arguing, reading and
+scribbling. He should rather employ himself in the actual administration
+of government, and become a sort of steward of it, being perfectly
+conversant with the principles of universal law and equity, without
+which no man can be just: not unfamiliar with the civil laws of states;
+but he will use them for practical purposes, even as a pilot uses
+astronomy, and a physician natural philosophy. For both these men bring
+their theoretical science to bear on the practice of their arts; and our
+statesman [should do the same with the science of politics, and make it
+subservient to the actual interests of philanthropy and patriotism]. * * *</p>
+
+<p>IV. * * * In states in which good men desire glory and approbation, and
+shun disgrace and ignominy. Nor are such men so much alarmed by the
+threats and penalties of the law as by that sentiment of shame with
+which nature has endowed man, which is nothing else than a certain fear
+of deserved censure. The wise director of a government <a id="page-453"></a><span class="pgnum">453</span>strengthens this
+natural instinct by the force of public opinion, and perfects it by
+education and manners. And thus the citizens are preserved from vice and
+corruption rather by honor and shame than by fear of punishment. But
+this argument will be better illustrated when we treat of the love of
+glory and praise, which we shall discuss on another occasion.</p>
+
+<p>V. As respects the private life and the manners of the citizens, they
+are intimately connected with the laws that constitute just marriages
+and legitimate offspring, under the protection of the guardian deities
+around the domestic hearths. By these laws, all men should be maintained
+in their rights of public and private property. It is only under a good
+government like this that men can live happily—for nothing can be more
+delightful than a well-constituted state.</p>
+
+<p>On which account it appears to me a very strange thing what this * * *</p>
+
+<div class="unclear">
+<p>VI. I therefore consume all my time in considering what is the
+     power of that man, whom, as you think, we have described carefully
+     enough in our books. Do you, then, admit our idea of that governor
+     of a commonwealth to whom we wish to refer everything? For thus, I
+     imagine, does Scipio speak in the fifth book: “For as a fair voyage
+     is the object of the master of a ship, the health of his patient
+     the aim of a physician, and victory that of a general, so the
+     happiness of his fellow-citizens is the proper study of the ruler
+     of a commonwealth; that they may be stable in power, rich in
+     resources, widely known in reputation, and honorable through their
+     virtue. For a ruler ought to be one who can perfect this, which is
+     the best and most important employment among mankind.”</p>
+
+<p>And works in your literature rightly praise that ruler of a country
+     who consults the welfare of his people more than their
+     inclinations.</p>
+
+<p>VII. Tully, in those books which he wrote upon the Commonwealth,
+     could not conceal his opinions, when he speaks of appointing a
+     chief of the State, who, he says, must be maintained by glory; and
+     afterward he relates that his ancestors did many admirable and
+     noble actions from a desire of glory.</p>
+
+<p>Tully, in his treatise on the Commonwealth, wrote that the chief of
+     a state must be maintained by glory, and that a commonwealth would
+     last as long as honor was paid by every one to the chief.</p>
+
+<p class="comment">[<i>The next paragraph is unintelligible.</i>]</p>
+
+<p>Which virtue is called fortitude, which consists of magnanimity,
+     and a great contempt of death and pain.</p>
+
+<p>VIII. As Marcellus was fierce, and eager to fight, Maximus prudent
+     and cautious.</p>
+
+<p><a id="page-454"></a><span class="pgnum">454</span>Who discovered his violence and unbridled ferocity.</p>
+
+<p>Which has often happened not only to individuals, but also to most
+     powerful nations.</p>
+
+<p>In the whole world.</p>
+
+<p>Because he inflicted the annoyances of his old age on your
+     families.</p>
+
+<p>IX. Cicero, in his treatise on the Commonwealth, says, “As Menelaus
+     of LacedÊmon had a certain agreeable sweetness of eloquence.” And
+     in another place he says, “Let him cultivate brevity in speaking.”</p>
+
+<p>By the evidence of which arts, as Tully says, it is a shame for the
+     conscience of the judge to be misled. For he says, “And as nothing
+     in a commonwealth ought to be so uncorrupt as a suffrage and a
+     sentence, I do not see why the man who perverts them by money is
+     worthy of punishment, while he who does so by eloquence is even
+     praised. Indeed, I myself think that he who corrupts the judge by
+     his speech does more harm than he who does so by money, because no
+     one can corrupt a sensible man by money, though he may by
+     speaking.”</p>
+
+<p>And when Scipio had said this, Mummius praised him greatly, for he
+     was extravagantly imbued with a hatred of orators.</p>
+</div>
+
+       <hr/>
+
+
+
+
+<h3>INTRODUCTION TO THE SIXTH BOOK.</h3>
+
+
+<p class="intro"><span class="first">In</span> this last book of his Commonwealth, Cicero labors to show that
+     truly pious philanthropical and patriotic statesmen will not only
+     be rewarded on earth by the approval of conscience and the applause
+     of all good citizens, but that they may expect hereafter immortal
+     glory in new forms of being. To illustrate this, he introduces the
+     “Dream of Scipio,” in which he explains the resplendent doctrines
+     of Plato respecting the immortality of the soul with inimitable
+     dignity and elegance. This Somnium Scipionis, for which we are
+     indebted to the citation of Macrobius, is the most beautiful thing
+     of the kind ever written. It has been intensely admired by all
+     European scholars, and will be still more so. There are two
+     translations of it in our language; one attached to Oliver’s
+     edition of Cicero’s Thoughts, the other by Mr. Danby, published in
+     1829. Of these we have freely availed ourselves, and as freely we
+     express our acknowledgments.</p>
+
+       <hr class="tiny"/>
+
+
+
+
+<h3>BOOK VI.</h3>
+
+<h4>SCIPIO’S DREAM.</h4>
+
+
+<div class="unclear">
+<p>I. <span class="first">Therefore</span> you rely upon all the prudence of this rule, which has
+     derived its very name (<i>prudentia</i>) from foreseeing (<i>a
+     providendo</i>). Wherefore the citizen must so prepare himself as to
+     be always armed against those things which trouble the constitution
+     of a state. And that <a id="page-455"></a><span class="pgnum">455</span>dissension of the citizens, when one party
+     separates from and attacks another, is called sedition.</p>
+
+<p>And in truth in civil dissensions, as the good are of more
+     importance than the many, I think that we should regard the weight
+     of the citizens, and not their number.</p>
+
+<p>For the lusts, being severe mistresses of the thoughts, command and
+     compel many an unbridled action. And as they cannot be satisfied or
+     appeased by any means, they urge those whom they have inflamed with
+     their allurements to every kind of atrocity.</p>
+
+<p>II. Which indeed was so much the greater in him because though the
+     cause of the colleagues was identical, not only was their
+     unpopularity not equal, but the influence of Gracchus was employed
+     in mitigating the hatred borne to Claudius.</p>
+
+<p>Who encountered the number of the chiefs and nobles with these
+     words, and left behind him that mournful and dignified expression
+     of his gravity and influence.</p>
+
+<p>That, as he writes, a thousand men might every day descend into the
+     forum with cloaks dyed in purple.</p>
+
+<p class="comment">[<i>The next paragraph is unintelligible.</i>]</p>
+
+<p>For our ancestors wished marriages to be firmly established.</p>
+
+<p>There is a speech extant of LÊlius with which we are all
+     acquainted, expressing how pleasing to the immortal gods are the * * * and * * * of the priests.</p>
+
+<p>III. Cicero, writing about the Commonwealth, in imitation of Plato,
+     has related the story of the return of Er the Pamphylian to life;
+     who, as he says, had come to life again after he had been placed on
+     the funeral pile, and related many secrets about the shades below;
+     not speaking, like Plato, in a fabulous imitation of truth, but
+     using a certain reasonable invention of an ingenious dream,
+     cleverly intimating that these things which were uttered about the
+     immortality of the soul, and about heaven, are not the inventions
+     of dreaming philosophers, nor the incredible fables which the
+     Epicureans ridicule, but the conjectures of wise men. He insinuates
+     that that Scipio who by the subjugation of Carthage obtained
+     Africanus as a surname for his family, gave notice to Scipio the
+     son of Paulus of the treachery which threatened him from his
+     relations, and the course of fate, because by the necessity of
+     numbers he was confined in the period of a perfect life, and he
+     says that he in the fifty-sixth year of his age * * *</p>
+
+<p>IV. Some of our religion who love Plato, on account of his
+     admirable kind of eloquence, and of some correct opinions which he
+     held, say that he had some opinions similar to my own touching the
+     resurrection of the dead, which subject Tully touches on in his
+     treatise on the Commonwealth, and says that he was rather jesting
+     than intending to say that was true. For he asserts that a man
+     returned to life, and related some stories which harmonized with
+     the discussions of the Platonists.</p>
+
+<p>V. In this point the imitation has especially preserved the
+     likeness of the work, because, as Plato, in the conclusion of his
+     volume, represents a certain person who had returned to life, which
+     he appeared to have quitted, as indicating what is the condition of
+     souls when stripped of the <a id="page-456"></a><span class="pgnum">456</span>body, with the addition of a certain
+     not unnecessary description of the spheres and stars, an appearance
+     of circumstances indicating things of the same kind is related by
+     the Scipio of Cicero, as having been brought before him in sleep.</p>
+
+<p>VI. Tully is found to have preserved this arrangement with no less
+     judgment than genius. After, in every condition of the
+     Commonwealth, whether of leisure or business, he has given the palm
+     to justice, he has placed the sacred abodes of the immortal souls,
+     and the secrets of the heavenly regions, on the very summit of his
+     completed work, indicating whither they must come, or rather
+     return, who have managed the republic with prudence, justice,
+     fortitude, and moderation. But that Platonic relater of secrets was
+     a man of the name of Er, a Pamphylian by nation, a soldier by
+     profession, who, after he appeared to have died from wounds
+     received in battle, and twelve days afterward was about to receive
+     the honors of the funeral pile with the others who were slain at
+     the same time, suddenly either recovering his life, or else never
+     having lost it, as if he were giving a public testimony, related to
+     all men all that he had done or seen in the days that he had thus
+     passed between life and death. Although Cicero, as if himself
+     conscious of the truth, grieves that this story has been ridiculed
+     by the ignorant, still, avoiding giving an example of foolish
+     reproach, he preferred speaking of the relater as of one awakened
+     from a swoon rather than restored to life.</p>
+
+<p>VII. And before we look at the words of the dream we must explain
+     what kind of persons they are by whom Cicero says that even the
+     account of Plato was ridiculed, who are not apprehensive that the
+     same thing may happen to them. Nor by this expression does he wish
+     the ignorant mob to be understood, but a kind of men who are
+     ignorant of the truth, though pretending to be philosophers with a
+     display of learning, who, it was notorious, had read such things,
+     and were eager to find faults. We will say, therefore, who they are
+     whom he reports as having levelled light reproaches against so
+     great a philosopher, and who of them has even left an accusation of
+     him committed to writing, etc. The whole faction of the Epicureans,
+     always wandering at an equal distance from truth, and thinking
+     everything ridiculous which they do not understand, has ridiculed
+     the sacred volume, and the most venerable mysteries of nature. But
+     Colotes, who is somewhat celebrated and remarkable for his
+     loquacity among the pupils of Epicurus, has even recorded in a book
+     the bitter reproaches which he aims at him. But since the other
+     arguments which he foolishly urges have no connection with the
+     dream of which we are now talking, we will pass them over at
+     present, and attend only to the calumny which will stick both to
+     Cicero and Plato, unless it is silenced. He says that a fable ought
+     not to have been invented by a philosopher, since no kind of
+     falsehood is suitable to professors of truth. For why, says he, if
+     you wish to give us a notion of heavenly things and to teach us the
+     nature of souls, did you not do so by a simple and plain
+     explanation? Why was a character invented, and circumstances, and
+     strange events, and a scene of cunningly adduced falsehood
+     arranged, to pollute the very door of the investigation of truth by
+     a lie? Since these things, though they are said of the Platonic Er,
+     do also attack the rest of our dreaming Africanus.</p>
+
+<p><a id="page-457"></a><span class="pgnum">457</span>VIII. This occasion incited Scipio to relate his dream, which he
+     declares that he had buried in silence for a long time. For when
+     LÊlius was complaining that there were no statues of Nasica erected
+     in any public place, as a reward for his having slain the tyrant,
+     Scipio replied in these words: “But although the consciousness
+     itself of great deeds is to wise men the most ample reward of
+     virtue, yet that divine nature ought to have, not statues fixed in
+     lead, nor triumphs with withering laurels, but some more stable and
+     lasting kinds of rewards.” “What are they?” said LÊlius. “Then,”
+     said Scipio, “suffer me, since we have now been keeping holiday for
+     three days, * * * etc.” By which preface he came to the relation of
+     his dream; pointing out that those were the more stable and lasting
+     kinds of rewards which he himself had seen in heaven reserved for
+     good governors of commonwealths.</p>
+</div>
+
+<p>IX. When I had arrived in Africa, where I was, as you are aware,
+military tribune of the fourth legion under the consul Manilius, there
+was nothing of which I was more earnestly desirous than to see King
+Masinissa, who, for very just reasons, had been always the especial
+friend of our family. When I was introduced to him, the old man embraced
+me, shed tears, and then, looking up to heaven, exclaimed—I thank thee,
+O supreme Sun, and ye also, ye other celestial beings, that before I
+depart from this life I behold in my kingdom, and in this my palace,
+Publius Cornelius Scipio, by whose mere name I seem to be reanimated; so
+completely and indelibly is the recollection of that best and most
+invincible of men, Africanus, imprinted in my mind.</p>
+
+<p>After this, I inquired of him concerning the affairs of his kingdom. He,
+on the other hand, questioned me about the condition of our
+Commonwealth, and in this mutual interchange of conversation we passed
+the whole of that day.</p>
+
+<p>X. In the evening we were entertained in a manner worthy the
+magnificence of a king, and carried on our discourse for a considerable
+part of the night. And during all this time the old man spoke of nothing
+but Africanus, all whose actions, and even remarkable sayings, he
+remembered distinctly. At last, when we retired to bed, I fell into a
+more profound sleep than usual, both because I was fatigued with my
+journey, and because I had sat up the greatest part of the night.</p>
+
+<p>Here I had the following dream, occasioned, as I verily believe, by our
+preceding conversation; for it frequently happens that the thoughts and
+discourses which have employed us in the daytime produce in our sleep an
+effect somewhat similar to that which Ennius writes happened to him
+about Homer, of whom, in his waking hours, he used frequently <a id="page-458"></a><span class="pgnum">458</span>to think
+and speak.</p>
+
+<p>Africanus, I thought, appeared to me in that shape, with which I was
+better acquainted from his picture than from any personal knowledge of
+him. When I perceived it was he, I confess I trembled with
+consternation; but he addressed me, saying, Take courage, my Scipio; be
+not afraid, and carefully remember what I shall say to you.</p>
+
+<p>XI. Do you see that city Carthage, which, though brought under the Roman
+yoke by me, is now renewing former wars, and cannot live in peace? (and
+he pointed to Carthage from a lofty spot, full of stars, and brilliant,
+and glittering)—to attack which city you are this day arrived in a
+station not much superior to that of a private soldier. Before two
+years, however, are elapsed, you shall be consul, and complete its
+overthrow; and you shall obtain, by your own merit, the surname of
+Africanus, which as yet belongs to you no otherwise than as derived from
+me. And when you have destroyed Carthage, and received the honor of a
+triumph, and been made censor, and, in quality of ambassador, visited
+Egypt, Syria, Asia, and Greece, you shall be elected a second time
+consul in your absence, and, by utterly destroying Numantia, put an end
+to a most dangerous war.</p>
+
+<p>But when you have entered the Capitol in your triumphal car, you shall
+find the Roman Commonwealth all in a ferment, through the intrigues of
+my grandson Tiberius Gracchus.</p>
+
+<p>XII. It is on this occasion, my dear Africanus, that you show your
+country the greatness of your understanding, capacity, and prudence. But
+I see that the destiny, however, of that time is, as it were, uncertain;
+for when your age shall have accomplished seven times eight revolutions
+of the sun, and your fatal hours shall be marked put by the natural
+product of these two numbers, each of which is esteemed a perfect one,
+but for different reasons, then shall the whole city have recourse to
+you alone, and place its hopes in your auspicious name. On you the
+senate, <a id="page-459"></a><span class="pgnum">459</span>all good citizens, the allies, the people of Latium, shall cast
+their eyes; on you the preservation of the State shall entirely depend.
+In a word, <i>if you escape the impious machinations of your relatives</i>,
+you will, in quality of dictator, establish order and tranquillity in
+the Commonwealth.</p>
+
+<p>When on this LÊlius made an exclamation, and the rest of the company
+groaned loudly, Scipio, with a gentle smile, said, I entreat you, do not
+wake me out of my dream, but have patience, and hear the rest.</p>
+
+<p>XIII. Now, in order to encourage you, my dear Africanus, continued the
+shade of my ancestor, to defend the State with the greater cheerfulness,
+be assured that, for all those who have in any way conduced to the
+preservation, defence, and enlargement of their native country, there is
+a certain place in heaven where they shall enjoy an eternity of
+happiness. For nothing on earth is more agreeable to God, the Supreme
+Governor of the universe, than the assemblies and societies of men
+united together by laws, which are called states. It is from heaven
+their rulers and preservers came, and thither they return.</p>
+
+<p>XIV. Though at these words I was extremely troubled, not so much at the
+fear of death as at the perfidy of my own relations, yet I recollected
+myself enough to inquire whether he himself, my father Paulus, and
+others whom we look upon as dead, were really living.</p>
+
+<p>Yes, truly, replied he, they all enjoy life who have escaped from the
+chains of the body as from a prison. But as to what you call life on
+earth, that is no more than one form of death. But see; here comes your
+father Paulus towards you! And as soon as I observed him, my eyes burst
+out into a flood of tears; but he took me in his arms, embraced me, and
+bade me not weep.</p>
+
+<p>XV. When my first transports subsided, and I regained the liberty of
+speech, I addressed my father thus: Thou best and most venerable of
+parents, since this, as I am informed by Africanus, is the only
+substantial life, why do I linger on earth, and not rather haste to come
+hither where you are?</p>
+
+<p>That, replied he, is impossible: unless that God, whose temple is all
+that vast expanse you behold, shall free you <a id="page-460"></a><span class="pgnum">460</span>from the fetters of the
+body, you can have no admission into this place. Mankind have received
+their being on this very condition, that they should labor for the
+preservation of that globe which is situated, as you see, in the midst
+of this temple, and is called earth.</p>
+
+<p>Men are likewise endowed with a soul, which is a portion of the eternal
+fires which you call stars and constellations; and which, being round,
+spherical bodies, animated by divine intelligences, perform their cycles
+and revolutions with amazing rapidity. It is your duty, therefore, my
+Publius, and that of all who have any veneration for the Gods, to
+preserve this wonderful union of soul and body; nor without the express
+command of Him who gave you a soul should the least thought be
+entertained of quitting human life, lest you seem to desert the post
+assigned you by God himself.</p>
+
+<p>But rather follow the examples of your grandfather here, and of me, your
+father, in paying a strict regard to justice and piety; which is due in
+a great degree to parents and relations, but most of all to our country.
+Such a life as this is the true way to heaven, and to the company of
+those, who, after having lived on earth and escaped from the body,
+inhabit the place which you now behold.</p>
+
+<p>XVI. This was the shining circle, or zone, whose remarkable brightness
+distinguishes it among the constellations, and which, after the Greeks,
+you call the Milky Way.</p>
+
+<p>From thence, as I took a view of the universe, everything appeared
+beautiful and admirable; for there those stars are to be seen that are
+never visible from our globe, and everything appears of such magnitude
+as we could not have imagined. The least of all the stars was that
+removed farthest from heaven, and situated next to the earth; I mean our
+moon, which shines with a borrowed light. Now, the globes of the stars
+far surpass the magnitude of our earth, which at that distance appeared
+so exceedingly small that I could not but be sensibly affected on seeing
+our whole empire no larger than if we touched the earth, as it were, at
+a single point.</p>
+
+<p>XVII. And as I continued to observe the earth with great attention, How
+long, I pray you, said Africanus, <a id="page-461"></a><span class="pgnum">461</span>will your mind be fixed on that
+object? why don’t you rather take a view of the magnificent temples
+among which you have arrived? The universe is composed of nine circles,
+or rather spheres, one of which is the heavenly one, and is exterior to
+all the rest, which it embraces; being itself the Supreme God, and
+bounding and containing the whole. In it are fixed those stars which
+revolve with never-varying courses. Below this are seven other spheres,
+which revolve in a contrary direction to that of the heavens. One of
+these is occupied by the globe which on earth they call Saturn. Next to
+that is the star of Jupiter, so benign and salutary to mankind. The
+third in order is that fiery and terrible planet called Mars. Below
+this, again, almost in the middle region, is the sun—the leader,
+governor, and prince of the other luminaries; the soul of the world,
+which it regulates and illumines; being of such vast size that it
+pervades and gives light to all places. Then follow Venus and Mercury,
+which attend, as it were, on the sun. Lastly, the moon, which shines
+only in the reflected beams of the sun, moves in the lowest sphere of
+all. Below this, if we except that gift of the Gods, the soul, which has
+been given by the liberality of the Gods to the human race, everything
+is mortal, and tends to dissolution; but above the moon all is eternal.
+For the earth, which is the ninth globe, and occupies the centre, is
+immovable, and, being the lowest, all others gravitate towards it.</p>
+
+<p>XVIII. When I had recovered myself from the astonishment occasioned by
+such a wonderful prospect, I thus addressed Africanus: Pray what is this
+sound that strikes my ears in so loud and agreeable a manner? To which
+he replied: It is that which is called the <i>music of the spheres</i>, being
+produced by their motion and impulse; and being formed by unequal
+intervals, but such as are divided according to the justest proportion,
+it produces, by duly tempering acute with grave sounds, various concerts
+of harmony. For it is impossible that motions so great should be
+performed without any noise; and it is agreeable to nature that the
+extremes on one side should produce sharp, and on the other flat sounds.
+For which reason the sphere of the fixed stars, being the highest, and
+being <a id="page-462"></a><span class="pgnum">462</span>carried with a more rapid velocity, moves with a shrill and acute
+sound; whereas that of the moon, being the lowest, moves with a very
+flat one. As to the earth, which makes the ninth sphere, it remains
+immovably fixed in the middle or lowest part of the universe. But those
+eight revolving circles, in which both Mercury and Venus are moved with
+the same celerity, give out sounds that are divided by seven distinct
+intervals, which is generally the regulating number of all things.</p>
+
+<p>This celestial harmony has been imitated by learned musicians both on
+stringed instruments and with the voice, whereby they have opened to
+themselves a way to return to the celestial regions, as have likewise
+many others who have employed their sublime genius while on earth in
+cultivating the divine sciences.</p>
+
+<p>By the amazing noise of this sound the ears of mankind have been in some
+degree deafened; and indeed hearing is the dullest of all the human
+senses. Thus, the people who dwell near the cataracts of the Nile, which
+are called Catadupa<a id="FNA-348"></a><a href="#FN-348"><sup>348</sup></a>, are, by the excessive roar which that river
+makes in precipitating itself from those lofty mountains, entirely
+deprived of the sense of hearing. And so inconceivably great is this
+sound which is produced by the rapid motion of the whole universe, that
+the human ear is no more capable of receiving it than the eye is able to
+look steadfastly and directly on the sun, whose beams easily dazzle the
+strongest sight.</p>
+
+<p>While I was busied in admiring the scene of wonders, I could not help
+casting my eyes every now and then on the earth.</p>
+
+<p>XIX. On which Africanus said, I perceive that you are still employed in
+contemplating the seat and residence of mankind. But if it appears to
+you so small, as in fact it really is, despise its vanities, and fix
+your attention forever on these heavenly objects. Is it possible that
+you should attain any human applause or glory that is worth the
+contending for? The earth, you see, is peopled but in a very few places,
+and those, too, of small extent; and they appear like so many little
+spots of green scattered through vast, uncultivated deserts. And those
+who inhabit the <a id="page-463"></a><span class="pgnum">463</span>earth are not only so remote from each other as to be
+cut off from all mutual correspondence, but their situation being in
+oblique or contrary parts of the globe, or perhaps in those
+diametrically opposite to yours, all expectation of universal fame must
+fall to the ground.</p>
+
+<p>XX. You may likewise observe that the same globe of the earth is girt
+and surrounded with certain zones, whereof those two that are most
+remote from each other, and lie under the opposite poles of heaven, are
+congealed with frost; but that one in the middle, which is far the
+largest, is scorched with the intense heat of the sun. The other two are
+habitable, one towards the south, the inhabitants of which are your
+antipodes, with whom you have no connection; the other, towards the
+north, is that which you inhabit, whereof a very small part, as you may
+see, falls to your share. For the whole extent of what you see is, as it
+were, but a little island, narrow at both ends and wide in the middle,
+which is surrounded by the sea which on earth you call the great
+Atlantic Ocean, and which, notwithstanding this magnificent name, you
+see is very insignificant. And even in these cultivated and well-known
+countries, has yours, or any of our names, ever passed the heights of
+the Caucasus or the currents of the Ganges? In what other parts to the
+north or the south, or where the sun rises and sets, will your names
+ever be heard? And if we leave these out of the question, how small a
+space is there left for your glory to spread itself abroad; and how long
+will it remain in the memory of those whose minds are now full of it?</p>
+
+<p>XXI. Besides all this, if the progeny of any future generation should
+wish to transmit to their posterity the praises of any one of us which
+they have heard from their forefathers, yet the deluges and combustions
+of the earth, which must necessarily happen at their destined periods,
+will prevent our obtaining, not only an eternal, but even a durable
+glory. And, after all, what does it signify whether those who shall
+hereafter be born talk of you, when those who have lived before you,
+whose number was perhaps not less, and whose merit certainly greater,
+were not so much as acquainted with your name?</p>
+
+<p>XXII. Especially since not one of those who shall hear <a id="page-464"></a><span class="pgnum">464</span>of us is able to
+retain in his memory the transactions of a single year. The bulk of
+mankind, indeed, measure their year by the return of the sun, which is
+only one star. But when all the stars shall have returned to the place
+whence they set out, and after long periods shall again exhibit the same
+aspect of the whole heavens, that is what ought properly to be called
+the revolution of a year, though I scarcely dare attempt to enumerate
+the vast multitude of ages contained in it. For as the sun in old time
+was eclipsed, and seemed to be extinguished, at the time when the soul
+of Romulus penetrated into these eternal mansions, so, when all the
+constellations and stars shall revert to their primary position, and the
+sun shall at the same point and time be again eclipsed, then you may
+consider that the grand year is completed. Be assured, however, that the
+twentieth part of it is not yet elapsed.</p>
+
+<p>XXIII. Wherefore, if you have no hopes of returning to this place where
+great and good men enjoy all that their souls can wish for, of what
+value, pray, is all that human glory, which can hardly endure for a
+small portion of one year?</p>
+
+<p>If, then, you wish to elevate your views to the contemplation of this
+eternal seat of splendor, you will not be satisfied with the praises of
+your fellow-mortals, nor with any human rewards that your exploits can
+obtain; but Virtue herself must point out to you the true and only
+object worthy of your pursuit. Leave to others to speak of you as they
+may, for speak they will. Their discourses will be confined to the
+narrow limits of the countries you see, nor will their duration be very
+extensive; for they will perish like those who utter them, and will be
+no more remembered by their posterity.</p>
+
+<p>XXIV. When he had ceased to speak in this manner, I said, O Africanus,
+if indeed the door of heaven is open to those who have deserved well of
+their country, although, indeed, from my childhood I have always
+followed yours and my father’s steps, and have not neglected to imitate
+your glory, still, I will from henceforth strive to follow them more
+closely.</p>
+
+<p>Follow them, then, said he, and consider your body only, not yourself,
+as mortal. For it is not your outward form <a id="page-465"></a><span class="pgnum">465</span>which constitutes your
+being, but your mind; not that substance which is palpable to the
+senses, but your spiritual nature. <i>Know, then, that you are a God</i>—for
+a God it must be, which flourishes, and feels, and recollects, and
+foresees, and governs, regulates and moves the body over which it is
+set, as the Supreme Ruler does the world which is subject to him. For as
+that Eternal Being moves whatever is mortal in this world, so the
+immortal mind of man moves the frail body with which it is connected.</p>
+
+<p>XXV. For whatever is always moving must be eternal; but that which
+derives its motion from a power which is foreign to itself, when that
+motion ceases must itself lose its animation.</p>
+
+<p>That alone, then, which moves itself can never cease to be moved,
+because it can never desert itself. Moreover, it must be the source, and
+origin, and principle of motion in all the rest. There can be nothing
+prior to a principle, for all things must originate from it; and it
+cannot itself derive its existence from any other source, for if it did
+it would no longer be a principle. And if it had no beginning, it can
+have no end; for a beginning that is put an end to will neither be
+renewed by any other cause, nor will it produce anything else of itself.
+All things, therefore, must originate from one source. Thus it follows
+that motion must have its source in something which is moved by itself,
+and which can neither have a beginning nor an end. Otherwise all the
+heavens and all nature must perish, for it is impossible that they can
+of themselves acquire any power of producing motion in themselves.</p>
+
+<p>XXVI. As, therefore, it is plain that what is moved by itself must be
+eternal, who will deny that this is the general condition and nature of
+minds? For as everything is inanimate which is moved by an impulse
+exterior to itself, so what is animated is moved by an interior impulse
+of its own; for this is the peculiar nature and power of mind. And if
+that alone has the power of self-motion, it can neither have had a
+beginning, nor can it have an end.</p>
+
+<p>Do you, therefore, exercise this mind of yours in the best pursuits. And
+the best pursuits are those which consist in promoting the good of your
+country. Such employments will speed the flight of your mind to this its
+<a id="page-466"></a><span class="pgnum">466</span>proper abode; and its flight will be still more rapid, if, even while
+it is enclosed in the body, it will look abroad, and disengage itself as
+much as possible from its bodily dwelling, by the contemplation of
+things which are external to itself.</p>
+
+<p>This it should do to the utmost of its power. For the minds of those who
+have given themselves up to the pleasures of the body, paying, as it
+were, a servile obedience to their lustful impulses, have violated the
+laws of God and man; and therefore, when they are separated from their
+bodies, flutter continually round the earth on which they lived, and are
+not allowed to return to this celestial region till they have been
+purified by the revolution of many ages.</p>
+
+<p>Thus saying, he vanished, and I awoke from my dream.</p>
+
+       <hr class="tiny"/>
+
+
+
+
+<h4>A FRAGMENT.</h4>
+
+
+<p>And although it is most desirable that fortune should remain forever in
+the most brilliant possible condition, nevertheless, the equability of
+life excites less interest than those changeable conditions wherein
+prosperity suddenly revives out of the most desperate and ruinous
+circumstances.</p>
+
+
+
+
+<h2>THE END.</h2>
+
+<hr class="front"/>
+
+
+<h2>FOOTNOTES:</h2>
+
+<div class="FN"><p><a id="FN-1"></a><a href="#FNA-1"><sup>1</sup></a> Archilochus was a native of Paros, and flourished about
+714-676 <span class="sc">b.c.</span> His poems were chiefly Iambics of bitter satire. Horace
+speaks of him as the inventor of Iambics, and calls himself his pupil.</p>
+
+<div class="poem">
+<p class="L6" style="margin-left: 14ex;">Parios ego primus Iambos</p>
+<p>Ostendi Latio, numeros animosque secutus</p>
+<p>Archilochi, non res et agentia verba Lycamben.</p>
+<p class="poet">Epist. I. xix. 25.</p>
+</div>
+
+<p class="cont">And in another place he says,</p>
+
+<div class="poem">
+<p>Archilochum proprio rabies armavit Iambo—A.P. 74.</p>
+</div>
+</div>
+
+<div class="FN"><p><a id="FN-2"></a><a href="#FNA-2"><sup>2</sup></a> This was Livius Andronicus: he is supposed to have been a
+native of Tarentum, and he was made prisoner by the Romans, during their
+wars in Southern Italy; owing to which he became the slave of M. Livius
+Salinator. He wrote both comedies and tragedies, of which Cicero (Brutus
+18) speaks very contemptuously, as “LivianÊ fabulÊ non satis dignÊ quÊ
+iterum legantur”—not worth reading a second time. He also wrote a Latin
+Odyssey, and some hymns, and died probably about 221 <span class="sc">b.c.</span></p>
+</div>
+
+<div class="FN"><p><a id="FN-3"></a><a href="#FNA-3"><sup>3</sup></a> C. Fabius, surnamed Pictor, painted the temple of Salus,
+which the dictator C. Junius Brutus Bubulus dedicated 302 <span class="sc">b.c.</span> The
+temple was destroyed by fire in the reign of Claudius. The painting is
+highly praised by Dionysius, xvi. 6.</p>
+</div>
+
+<div class="FN"><p><a id="FN-4"></a><a href="#FNA-4"><sup>4</sup></a> For an account of the ancient Greek philosophers, see the
+sketch at the end of the Disputations.</p>
+</div>
+
+<div class="FN"><p><a id="FN-5"></a><a href="#FNA-5"><sup>5</sup></a> Isocrates was born at Athens 436 <span class="sc">b.c.</span> He was a pupil of
+Gorgias, Prodicus, and Socrates. He opened a school of rhetoric, at
+Athens, with great success. He died by his own hand at the age of
+ninety-eight.</p>
+</div>
+
+<div class="FN"><p><a id="FN-6"></a><a href="#FNA-6"><sup>6</sup></a> So Horace joins these two classes as inventors of all kinds
+of improbable fictions:</p>
+
+<div class="poem">
+<p class="L6" style="margin-left: 18ex;">Pictoribus atque poetis</p>
+<p>Quidlibet audendi semper fuit Êqua potestas.—A. P. 9.</p>
+</div>
+
+<p class="cont">Which Roscommon translates:</p>
+
+<div class="poem">
+<p>Painters and poets have been still allow’d</p>
+<p>Their pencil and their fancies unconfined.</p>
+</div>
+</div>
+
+<div class="FN"><p><a id="FN-7"></a><a href="#FNA-7"><sup>7</sup></a> Epicharmus was a native of Cos, but lived at Megara, in
+Sicily, and when Megara was destroyed, removed to Syracuse, and lived at
+the court of Hiero, where he became the first writer of comedies, so
+that Horace ascribes the invention of comedy to him, and so does
+Theocritus. He lived to a great age.</p>
+</div>
+
+<div class="FN"><p><a id="FN-8"></a><a href="#FNA-8"><sup>8</sup></a> Pherecydes was a native of Scyros, one of the Cyclades; and
+is said to have obtained his knowledge from the secret books of the
+Phœnicians. He is said also to have been a pupil of Pittacus, the rival
+of Thales, and the master of Pythagoras. His doctrine was that there
+were three principles (<span class="greek">Ζε᜺ς</span>, or Æther; <span class="greek">ΧΞᜌΜ</span>, or Chaos; and <span class="greek">Χρ᜹Μος</span>, or
+Time) and four elements (Fire, Earth, Air, and Water), from which
+everything that exists was formed.—<i>Vide</i> Smith’s Dict. Gr. and Rom.
+Biog.</p>
+</div>
+
+<div class="FN"><p><a id="FN-9"></a><a href="#FNA-9"><sup>9</sup></a> Archytas was a native of Tarentum, and is said to have
+saved the life of Plato by his influence with the tyrant Dionysius. He
+was especially great as a mathematician and geometrician, so that Horace
+calls him</p>
+
+<div class="poem">
+<p>Maris et terra numeroque carentis arenÊ</p>
+<p>Mensorem.</p>
+<p class="poet">Od. i. 28.1.</p>
+</div>
+
+<p>Plato is supposed to have learned some of his views from him, and
+Aristotle to have borrowed from him every idea of the Categories.</p>
+</div>
+
+<div class="FN"><p><a id="FN-10"></a><a href="#FNA-10"><sup>10</sup></a> This was not TimÊus the historian, but a native of Locri,
+who is said also in the De Finibus (c. 29) to have been a teacher of
+Plato. There is a treatise extant bearing his name, which is, however,
+probably spurious, and only an abridgment of Plato’s dialogue TimÊus.</p>
+</div>
+
+<div class="FN"><p><a id="FN-11"></a><a href="#FNA-11"><sup>11</sup></a> DicÊarchus was a native of Messana, in Sicily, though he
+lived chiefly in Greece. He was one of the later disciples of Aristotle.
+He was a great geographer, politician, historian, and philosopher, and
+died about 285 <span class="sc">b.c.</span></p>
+</div>
+
+<div class="FN"><p><a id="FN-12"></a><a href="#FNA-12"><sup>12</sup></a> Aristoxenus was a native of Tarentum, and also a pupil of
+Aristotle. We know nothing of his opinions except that he held the soul
+to be a <i>harmony</i> of the body; a doctrine which had been already
+discussed by Plato in the PhÊdo, and combated by Aristotle. He was a
+great musician, and the chief portions of his works which have come down
+to us are fragments of some musical treatises.—Smith’s Dict. Gr. and
+Rom. Biog.; to which source I must acknowledge my obligation for nearly
+the whole of these biographical notes.</p>
+</div>
+
+<div class="FN"><p><a id="FN-13"></a><a href="#FNA-13"><sup>13</sup></a> The Simonides here meant is the celebrated poet of Ceos,
+the perfecter of elegiac poetry among the Greeks. He flourished about
+the time of the Persian war. Besides his poetry, he is said to have been
+the inventor of some method of aiding the memory. He died at the court
+of Hiero, 467 <span class="sc">b.c.</span></p>
+</div>
+
+<div class="FN"><p><a id="FN-14"></a><a href="#FNA-14"><sup>14</sup></a> Theodectes was a native of Phaselis, in Pamphylia, a
+distinguished rhetorician and tragic poet, and flourished in the time of
+Philip of Macedon. He was a pupil of Isocrates, and lived at Athens, and
+died there at the age of forty-one.</p>
+</div>
+
+<div class="FN"><p><a id="FN-15"></a><a href="#FNA-15"><sup>15</sup></a> Cineas was a Thessalian, and (as is said in the text) came
+to Rome as ambassador from Pyrrhus after the battle of Heraclea, 280
+<span class="sc">b.c.</span>, and his memory is said to have been so great that on the day after
+his arrival he was able to address all the senators and knights by name.
+He probably died before Pyrrhus returned to Italy, 276 <span class="sc">b.c.</span></p>
+</div>
+
+<div class="FN"><p><a id="FN-16"></a><a href="#FNA-16"><sup>16</sup></a> Charmadas, called also Charmides, was a fellow-pupil with
+Philo, the LarissÊan of Clitomachus, the Carthaginian. He is said by
+some authors to have founded a fourth academy.</p>
+</div>
+
+<div class="FN"><p><a id="FN-17"></a><a href="#FNA-17"><sup>17</sup></a> Metrodorus was a minister of Mithridates the Great; and
+employed by him as supreme judge in Pontus, and afterward as an
+ambassador. Cicero speaks of him in other places (De Orat. ii. 88) as a
+man of wonderful memory.</p>
+</div>
+
+<div class="FN"><p><a id="FN-18"></a><a href="#FNA-18"><sup>18</sup></a> Quintus Hortensius was eight years older than Cicero; and,
+till Cicero’s fame surpassed his, he was accounted the most eloquent of
+all the Romans. He was Verres’s counsel in the prosecution conducted
+against him by Cicero. Seneca relates that his memory was so great that
+he could come out of an auction and repeat the catalogue backward. He
+died 50 <span class="sc">b.c.</span></p>
+</div>
+
+<div class="FN"><p><a id="FN-19"></a><a href="#FNA-19"><sup>19</sup></a> This treatise is one which has not come down to us, but
+which had been lately composed by Cicero in order to comfort himself for
+the loss of his daughter.</p>
+</div>
+
+<div class="FN"><p><a id="FN-20"></a><a href="#FNA-20"><sup>20</sup></a> The epigram is,</p>
+
+<div class="poem">
+<p><span class="greek">Εጎπας ጭλιε χαῖρε, Κλε᜹Όβροτος ᜭΌβρακι᜜της</span></p>
+<p class="L2"><span class="greek">ጥλατ’ ጀφ’ ᜑψηλοῊ τε᜷χεος εጰς ገΐΎηΜ,</span></p>
+<p><span class="greek">ጄΟιοΜ οᜐΎᜲΜ ጰΎᜌΜ ΞαΜᜱτου κακ᜞Μ, ጀλλᜰ ΠλᜱτωΜος</span></p>
+<p class="L2"><span class="greek">ጓΜ τ᜞ περ᜶ ψ᜻χης γρᜱΌΌ’ ጀΜαλεΟᜱΌεΜος.</span></p>
+</div>
+
+<p>Which may be translated, perhaps,</p>
+
+<div class="poem">
+<p>Farewell, O sun, Cleombrotus exclaim’d,</p>
+<p class="L2">Then plunged from off a height beneath the sea;</p>
+<p>Stung by pain, of no disgrace ashamed,</p>
+<p class="L2">But moved by Plato’s high philosophy.</p>
+</div>
+</div>
+
+<div class="FN"><p><a id="FN-21"></a><a href="#FNA-21"><sup>21</sup></a> This is alluded to by Juvenal:</p>
+
+<div class="poem">
+<p>Provida Pompeio dederat Campania febres</p>
+<p>Optandas: sed multÊ urbes et publica vota</p>
+<p>Vicerunt. Igitur Fortuna ipsius et Urbis,</p>
+<p>Servatum victo caput abstulit.—Sat. x. 283.</p>
+</div>
+</div>
+
+
+<div class="FN"><p><a id="FN-22"></a><a href="#FNA-22"><sup>22</sup></a> Pompey’s second wife was Julia, the daughter of Julius CÊsar,
+she died the year before the death of Crassus, in Parthia. Virgil
+speaks of CÊsar and Pompey as relations, using the same expression
+(socer) as Cicero:</p>
+
+<div class="poem">
+<p>Aggeribus socer Alpinis atque arce Mon&oelig;ci</p>
+<p>Descendens, gener adversis instructus Eois.—&AElig;n. vi. 830.</p>
+</div>
+</div>
+
+
+<div class="FN"><p><a id="FN-23"></a><a href="#FNA-23"><sup>23</sup></a> This idea is beautifully expanded by Byron:</p>
+
+<div class="poem">
+<p>Yet if, as holiest men have deem’d, there be</p>
+<p>A land of souls beyond that sable shore</p>
+<p>To shame the doctrine of the Sadducee</p>
+<p>And sophist, madly vain or dubious lore,</p>
+<p>How sweet it were in concert to adore</p>
+<p>With those who made our mortal labors light,</p>
+<p>To hear each voice we fear’d to hear no more.</p>
+<p>Behold each mighty shade reveal’d to sight,</p>
+<p>The Bactrian, Samian sage, and all who taught the right!</p>
+</div>
+
+<p class="poet"><i>Childe Harold</i>, ii.</p>
+</div>
+
+<div class="FN"><p><a id="FN-24"></a><a href="#FNA-24"><sup>24</sup></a> The epitaph in the original is:</p>
+
+<div class="poem">
+<p><span class="greek">ᜮ ΟεῖΜ’ ጀγγεῖλοΜ ΛακεΎαιΌοΜ᜷οις ᜅτι τῇΎε</span></p>
+<p class="L2"><span class="greek">κε᜷ΌεΞα, τοῐς κε᜷ΜωΜ πειΞ᜹ΌεΜοι ΜοΌ᜷Όοις.</span></p>
+</div>
+</div>
+
+<div class="FN"><p><a id="FN-25"></a><a href="#FNA-25"><sup>25</sup></a> This was expressed in the Greek verses,</p>
+
+<div class="poem">
+<p><span class="greek">ገρχᜎς ΌᜲΜ Όᜎ φῊΜαι ጐπιχΞοΜ᜷οισιΜ ጄριστοΜ,</span></p>
+<p><span class="greek">φ᜻Μτα ή’ ᜅπως ᜀκιστα π᜻λας ገΐΎϋο περῆσαι</span></p>
+</div>
+
+<p class="cont">which by some authors are attributed to Homer.</p>
+</div>
+
+<div class="FN"><p><a id="FN-26"></a><a href="#FNA-26"><sup>26</sup></a> This is the first fragment of the Cresphontes.—Ed. Var.
+vii., p. 594.</p>
+
+<div class="poem">
+<p><span class="greek">ጜΎει γᜰρ ጡΌ៶ς σ᜻λλογοΜ ποιουΌᜳΜους</span></p>
+<p><span class="greek">΀᜞Μ φ᜻Μτα ΞρηΜεῖΜ, εጰς ᜅσ’ ጔρχεται κακᜱ.</span></p>
+<p><span class="greek">΀᜞Μ ή’ α᜖ ΞαΜ᜹Μτα κα᜶ π᜹ΜωΜ πεπαυΌᜳΜοΜ</span></p>
+<p><span class="greek">χα᜷ροΜτας εᜐφηΌοῖΜτας ጐκπᜳΌειΜ Ύ᜹ΌωΜ</span></p>
+</div>
+</div>
+
+<div class="FN"><p><a id="FN-27"></a><a href="#FNA-27"><sup>27</sup></a> The Greek verses are quoted by Plutarch:</p>
+
+<div class="poem">
+<p class="L4"><span class="greek">ጬπου Μ᜵πιε, ጠλ᜷Ξιοι φρᜳΜες ጀΜΎρῶΜ</span></p>
+<p class="L2"><span class="greek">ΕᜐΞ᜻Μοος κεῖται ΌοιριΎ᜷ῳ ΞαΜᜱτῳ</span></p>
+<p><span class="greek">Οᜐκ ጠΜ γᜰρ ζ᜜ειΜ καλ᜞Μ αᜐτῷ ο᜔τε γοΜεῊσι.</span></p>
+</div>
+</div>
+
+<div class="FN"><p><a id="FN-28"></a><a href="#FNA-28"><sup>28</sup></a> This refers to the story that when Eumolpus, the son of
+Neptune, whose assistance the Eleusinians had called in against the
+Athenians, had been slain by the Athenians, an oracle demanded the
+sacrifice of one of the daughters of Erechtheus, the King of Athens. And
+when one was drawn by lot, the others voluntarily accompanied her to
+death.</p>
+</div>
+
+<div class="FN"><p><a id="FN-29"></a><a href="#FNA-29"><sup>29</sup></a> Menœceus was son of Creon, and in the war of the Argives
+against Thebes, Teresias declared that the Thebans should conquer if
+Menœceus would sacrifice himself for his country; and accordingly he
+killed himself outside the gates of Thebes.</p>
+</div>
+
+<div class="FN"><p><a id="FN-30"></a><a href="#FNA-30"><sup>30</sup></a> The Greek is,</p>
+
+<div class="poem">
+<p><span class="greek">Ό᜵Ύε Όοι ጄκλαυστος ΞᜱΜατος Ό᜹λοι, ጀλλᜰ φ᜷λοισι</span></p>
+<p class="L2"><span class="greek">ποι᜵σαιΌι ΞαΜᜌΜ ጄλγεα κα᜶ στοΜαχᜱς.</span></p>
+</div>
+</div>
+
+<div class="FN"><p><a id="FN-31"></a><a href="#FNA-31"><sup>31</sup></a> Soph. Trach. 1047.</p>
+</div>
+
+<div class="FN"><p><a id="FN-32"></a><a href="#FNA-32"><sup>32</sup></a> The lines quoted by Cicero here appear to have come from
+the Latin play of Prometheus by Accius; the ideas are borrowed, rather
+than translated, from the Prometheus of Æschylus.</p>
+</div>
+
+<div class="FN"><p><a id="FN-33"></a><a href="#FNA-33"><sup>33</sup></a> From <i>exerceo</i>.</p>
+</div>
+
+<div class="FN"><p><a id="FN-34"></a><a href="#FNA-34"><sup>34</sup></a> Each soldier carried a stake, to help form a palisade in
+front of the camp.</p>
+</div>
+
+<div class="FN"><p><a id="FN-35"></a><a href="#FNA-35"><sup>35</sup></a> Insania—from <i>in</i>, a particle of negative force in
+composition, and <i>sanus</i>, healthy, sound.</p>
+</div>
+
+<div class="FN"><p><a id="FN-36"></a><a href="#FNA-36"><sup>36</sup></a> The man who first received this surname was L. Calpurnius
+Piso, who was consul, 133 <span class="sc">b.c.</span>, in the Servile War.</p>
+</div>
+
+<div class="FN"><p><a id="FN-37"></a><a href="#FNA-37"><sup>37</sup></a> The Greek is,</p>
+
+<div class="poem">
+<p><span class="greek">ገλλᜱ Όοι οጰΎᜱΜεται κραΎ᜷η χ᜹λῳ ᜅπποτ’ ጐκε᜷Μου</span></p>
+<p><span class="greek">ΜΜ᜵σοΌαι ᜅς Ό’ ጀσ᜻φηλοΜ ጐΜ ገργε᜷οισιΜ ጔρεΟεΜ.</span>—Il. ix. 642.</p>
+</div>
+
+<p>I have given Pope’s translation in the text.</p>
+</div>
+
+<div class="FN"><p><a id="FN-38"></a><a href="#FNA-38"><sup>38</sup></a> This is from the Theseus:</p>
+
+<div class="poem">
+<p><span class="greek">ጘγᜌ Ύᜲ τοῊτο παρᜰ σοφοῊ τιΜος ΌαΞᜌΜ</span></p>
+<p><span class="greek">ε᜶ς φροΜτ᜷Ύας ΜοῊΜ συΌφορᜱς τ’ ጐβαλλ᜹ΌηΜ</span></p>
+<p><span class="greek">φυγᜱς τ’ ጐΌαυτῷ προστιΞε᜶ς πᜱτρας ጐΌῆς.</span></p>
+<p><span class="greek">ΞαΜᜱτους τ’ ጀ᜜ρους, κα᜶ κακῶΜ ጄλλας ᜁΎο᜺ς</span></p>
+<p><span class="greek">ᜡς, εጎ τι πᜱσχοιΌ’ ᜠΜ ጐΎ᜹Οαζ᜹Μ ποτε</span></p>
+<p><span class="greek">Μ᜵ Όοι ΜᜳορτοΜ προσπεσ᜞Μ Ό៶λλοΜ Ύᜱκοι.</span></p>
+</div>
+</div>
+
+<div class="FN"><p><a id="FN-39"></a><a href="#FNA-39"><sup>39</sup></a> Ter. Phorm. II. i. 11.</p>
+</div>
+
+<div class="FN"><p><a id="FN-40"></a><a href="#FNA-40"><sup>40</sup></a> This refers to the speech of Agamemnon in Euripides, in
+the Iphigenia in Aulis,</p>
+
+<div class="poem">
+<p class="L6" style="margin-left: 10ex"><span class="greek">Ζηλῶ σε, γᜳροΜ,</span></p>
+<p><span class="greek">ζηλῶ ή’ ጀΜΎρῶΜ ᜃς ጀκ᜷ΜΎυΜοΜ</span></p>
+<p><span class="greek">β᜷οΜ ጐΟεπᜳρασ’, ጀγΜᜌς, ጀκλε᜵ς.</span>—v. 15.</p>
+</div>
+</div>
+
+<div class="FN"><p><a id="FN-41"></a><a href="#FNA-41"><sup>41</sup></a> This is a fragment from the Hypsipyle:</p>
+
+<div class="poem">
+<p><span class="greek">Εφυ ΌᜲΜ οᜐΎε᜶ς ᜅστις οᜐ ποΜεῖ βροτῶΜ</span></p>
+<p><span class="greek">Ξᜱπτει τε τᜳκΜα χጄτερ’ α᜖ κτ៶ται Μεᜰ,</span></p>
+<p><span class="greek">αᜐτ᜹ς τε ΞΜ᜵σκει. κα᜶ τᜱΎ’ ጄχΞοΜται βροτο᜶</span></p>
+<p><span class="greek">εጰς γῆΜ φᜳροΜτες γῆΜ ጀΜαγκα᜷ως ή’ ጔχει</span></p>
+<p><span class="greek">β᜷οΜ Ξερ᜷ζειΜ ᜥστε κᜱρπιΌοΜ στᜱχυΜ.</span></p>
+</div>
+</div>
+
+<div class="FN"><p class="nodist"><a id="FN-42"></a><a href="#FNA-42"><sup>42</sup></a></p>
+
+<div class="poem">
+<p><span class="greek">Πολλᜰς ጐκ κεφαλῆς προΞελ᜻ΌΜους ጕλκετο χα᜷τας.</span>—Il. x. 15.</p>
+</div>
+</div>
+
+<div class="FN"><p class="nodist"><a id="FN-43"></a><a href="#FNA-43"><sup>43</sup></a></p>
+
+<div class="poem">
+<p><span class="greek">ጬτοι ᜁ καππᜳΎιοΜ τ᜞ ገληΐοΜ οጶος ጀλ៶το</span></p>
+<p><span class="greek">ᜅΜ ΞυΌ᜞Μ κατεΎᜌΜ, πᜱτοΜ ጀΜΞρ᜜πωΜ ጀλεε᜷ΜωΜ.</span>—Il. vi. 201.</p>
+</div>
+</div>
+
+<div class="FN"><p><a id="FN-44"></a><a href="#FNA-44"><sup>44</sup></a> This is a translation from Euripides:</p>
+
+<div class="poem">
+<p><span class="greek">ᜭσΞ’ ጵΌερος Ό’ ᜑπῆλΞε γῇ τε κ’ οᜐραΜῷ</span></p>
+<p><span class="greek">λᜳΟαι Όολο᜻σῃ ΎεῊρο ΜηΎε᜷ας τ᜻χας.</span>—Med. 57.</p>
+</div>
+</div>
+
+<div class="FN"><p class="nodist"><a id="FN-45"></a><a href="#FNA-45"><sup>45</sup></a></p>
+
+<div class="poem">
+<p><span class="greek">Λ᜷ηΜ γᜰρ πολλο᜶ κα᜶ ጐπ᜵τριΌοι ጀΌατα πᜱΜτα</span></p>
+<p><span class="greek">π᜷πτουσιΜ, π᜹τε κᜳΜ τις ጀΜαπΜε᜻σειε π᜹Μοιο;</span></p>
+<p><span class="greek">ጀλλᜰ χρᜎ τ᜞Μ ΌᜲΜ καταΞαπτᜳΌεΜ, ᜅς κε ΞᜱΜησι,</span></p>
+<p><span class="greek">Μηλᜳα ΞυΌ᜞Μ ጔχοΜτας, ጔπ’ ጀΌατι ΎακρυσᜱΜτας.—</span></p>
+<p class="poet">Hom. Il. xix. 226.</p>
+</div>
+</div>
+
+<div class="FN"><p><a id="FN-46"></a><a href="#FNA-46"><sup>46</sup></a> This is one of the fragments of Euripides which we are
+unable to assign to any play in particular; it occurs Var. Ed. Tr. Inc.
+167.</p>
+
+<div class="poem">
+<p><span class="greek">Εጰ ΌεΜ τ᜹Ύ’ ጊΌαρ πρῶτοΜ ጊΜ κακουΌᜳΜῳ</span></p>
+<p><span class="greek">κα᜶ Όᜎ ΌακρᜰΜ Ύᜎ Ύιᜰ π᜹ΜωΜ ጐΜαυστ᜹λουΜ</span></p>
+<p><span class="greek">εጰκ᜞ς σφαΎᜱζειΜ ጊΜ ጂΜ, ᜡς Με᜹ζυγα</span></p>
+<p><span class="greek">πῶλοΜ, χᜱλιΜοΜ ጀρτ᜷ως ΎεΎεγΌᜳΜοΜ</span></p>
+<p><span class="greek">ΜῊΜ ή’ ጀΌβλ᜻ς εጰΌι, κα᜶ κατηρτυκᜌς κακῶΜ.</span></p>
+</div>
+</div>
+
+<div class="FN"><p><a id="FN-47"></a><a href="#FNA-47"><sup>47</sup></a> This is only a fragment, preserved by StobÊus:</p>
+
+<div class="poem">
+<p><span class="greek">΀ο᜺ς ή’ ጂΜ Όεγ᜷στους κα᜶ σοφωτᜱτους φρεΜ᜶</span></p>
+<p><span class="greek">τοιο᜻σΎ’ ጎΎοις ጂΜ, οጶ᜹ς ጐστι ΜῊΜ ᜅΎε,</span></p>
+<p><span class="greek">καλῶς κακῶς πρᜱσσοΜτι συΌπαραιΜᜳσαι</span></p>
+<p><span class="greek">ᜅταΜ Ύᜲ Ύα᜷ΌωΜ ጀΜΎρ᜞ς εᜐτυχοῊς τ᜞ πρ᜶Μ</span></p>
+<p><span class="greek">Όᜱστιγ’ ጐπ᜷σῃ τοῊ β᜷ου παλ᜷ΜτροποΜ,</span></p>
+<p><span class="greek">τᜰ πολλᜰ φροῊΎα κα᜶ κακῶς εጰρηΌᜳΜα.</span></p>
+</div>
+</div>
+
+<div class="FN"><p class="nodist"><a id="FN-48"></a><a href="#FNA-48"><sup>48</sup></a></p>
+
+<div class="poem">
+<p><span class="greek">Ωκ. ΟᜐκοῊΜ ΠροΌηΞεῊ τοῊτο γιγΜ᜜σκεις ᜅτι</span></p>
+<p class="L2"><span class="greek">ᜀργῆς Μοσο᜻σης εጰσ᜶Μ ጰατρο᜶ λ᜹γοι.</span></p>
+<p><span class="greek">Πρ. ጐᜱΜ τις ጐΜ καιρῷ γε ΌαλΞᜱσσῃ κεᜱρ</span></p>
+<p class="L2"><span class="greek">κα᜶ Όᜎ σφριγῶΜτα ΞυΌ᜞Μ ጰσχΜα᜷Μη βι៳.—</span></p>
+<p class="poet">Æsch. Prom. v. 378.</p>
+</div>
+</div>
+
+<div class="FN"><p><a id="FN-49"></a><a href="#FNA-49"><sup>49</sup></a> Cicero alludes here to Il. vii. 211, which is thus
+translated by Pope:</p>
+
+<div class="poem">
+<p>His massy javelin quivering in his hand,</p>
+<p>He stood the bulwark of the Grecian band;</p>
+<p>Through every Argive heart new transport ran,</p>
+<p>All Troy stood trembling at the mighty man:</p>
+<p>E’en Hector paused, and with new doubt oppress’d,</p>
+<p>Felt his great heart suspended in his breast;</p>
+<p>’Twas vain to seek retreat, and vain to fear,</p>
+<p>Himself had challenged, and the foe drew near.</p>
+</div>
+
+<p>But Melmoth (Note on the Familiar Letters of Cicero, book ii. Let. 23)
+rightly accuses Cicero of having misunderstood Homer, who “by no means
+represents Hector as being thus totally dismayed at the approach of his
+adversary; and, indeed, it would have been inconsistent with the general
+character of that hero to have described him under such circumstances of
+terror.”</p>
+
+<div class="poem">
+<p><span class="greek">΀᜞Μ Ύᜲ κα᜶ ገργεῖοι Όᜳγ’ ጐγ᜵ΞεοΜ εጰσορ᜹ωΜτες,</span></p>
+<p><span class="greek">΀ρωᜰς Ύᜲ τρ᜹Όος αጶΜος ᜑπ᜵λυΞε γυῖα ጕκαστοΜ,</span></p>
+<p><span class="greek">ጝκτορι ή’ αᜐτῷ ΞυΌ᜞ς ጐΜ᜶ στ᜵Ξεσσι πᜱτασσεΜ.</span></p>
+</div>
+
+<p>But there is a great difference, as Dr. Clarke remarks, between <span class="greek">ΞυΌ᜞ς ጐΜ᜶ στ᜵Ξεσσι πᜱτασσεΜ</span> and <span class="greek">καρΎᜳη ጔΟω στηΞᜳωΜ ጔΞρωσκεΜ</span>, or <span class="greek">τρ᜹Όος αጶΜος
+ᜑπ᜵λυΞε γυῖα</span>.—<i>The Trojans</i>, says Homer, <i>trembled</i> at the sight of
+Ajax, and even Hector himself felt some emotion in his breast.</p>
+</div>
+
+<div class="FN"><p><a id="FN-50"></a><a href="#FNA-50"><sup>50</sup></a> Cicero means Scipio Nasica, who, in the riots consequent
+on the reelection of Tiberius Gracchus to the tribunate, 133 <span class="sc">b.c.</span>,
+having called in vain on the consul, Mucius ScÊvola, to save the
+republic, attacked Gracchus himself, who was slain in the tumult.</p>
+</div>
+
+<div class="FN"><p><a id="FN-51"></a><a href="#FNA-51"><sup>51</sup></a> <i>Morosus</i> is evidently derived from <i>mores</i>—“<i>Morosus</i>,
+<i>mos</i>, stubbornness, self-will, etc.”—Riddle and Arnold, Lat. Dict.</p>
+</div>
+
+<div class="FN"><p><a id="FN-52"></a><a href="#FNA-52"><sup>52</sup></a> In the original they run thus:</p>
+
+<div class="poem">
+<p><span class="greek">Ο᜔κ ጐστιΜ οᜐΎᜲΜ ΎειΜ᜞Μ ᜧΎ’ εጰπεῖΜ ጔπος,</span></p>
+<p><span class="greek">ΟᜐΎᜲ πᜱΞος, οᜐΎᜲ ΟυΌφορᜰ Ξε᜵λατος</span></p>
+<p><span class="greek">ጧς οᜐκ ጂΜ ጀροιτ’ ጄχΞος ጀΜΞρ᜜ποΜ φ᜻σις.</span></p>
+</div>
+</div>
+
+<div class="FN"><p><a id="FN-53"></a><a href="#FNA-53"><sup>53</sup></a> This passage is from the Eunuch of Terence, act i., sc. 1,
+14.</p>
+</div>
+
+<div class="FN"><p><a id="FN-54"></a><a href="#FNA-54"><sup>54</sup></a> These verses are from the Atreus of Accius.</p>
+</div>
+
+<div class="FN"><p><a id="FN-55"></a><a href="#FNA-55"><sup>55</sup></a> This was Marcus Atilius Regulus, the story of whose
+treatment by the Carthaginians in the first Punic War is well known to
+everybody.</p>
+</div>
+
+<div class="FN"><p><a id="FN-56"></a><a href="#FNA-56"><sup>56</sup></a> This was Quintus Servilius CÊpio, who, 105 <span class="sc">b.c.</span>, was
+destroyed, with his army, by the Cimbri, it was believed as a judgment
+for the covetousness which he had displayed in the plunder of Tolosa.</p>
+</div>
+
+<div class="FN"><p><a id="FN-57"></a><a href="#FNA-57"><sup>57</sup></a> This was Marcus Aquilius, who, in the year 88 <span class="sc">b.c.</span>, was
+sent against Mithridates as one of the consular legates; and, being
+defeated, was delivered up to the king by the inhabitants of Mitylene.
+Mithridates put him to death by pouring molten gold down his throat.</p>
+</div>
+
+<div class="FN"><p><a id="FN-58"></a><a href="#FNA-58"><sup>58</sup></a> This was the elder brother of the triumvir Marcus Crassus,
+87 <span class="sc">b.c.</span> He was put to death by Fimbria, who was in command of some of
+the troops of Marius.</p>
+</div>
+
+<div class="FN"><p><a id="FN-59"></a><a href="#FNA-59"><sup>59</sup></a> Lucius CÊsar and Caius CÊsar were relations (it is
+uncertain in what degree) of the great CÊsar, and were killed by Fimbria
+on the same occasion as Octavius.</p>
+</div>
+
+<div class="FN"><p><a id="FN-60"></a><a href="#FNA-60"><sup>60</sup></a> M. Antonius was the grandfather of the triumvir; he was
+murdered the same year, 87 <span class="sc">b.c.</span>, by Annius, when Marius and Cinna took
+Rome.</p>
+</div>
+
+<div class="FN"><p><a id="FN-61"></a><a href="#FNA-61"><sup>61</sup></a> This story is alluded to by Horace:</p>
+
+<div class="poem">
+<p>Districtus ensis cui super impiâ</p>
+<p>Cervice pendet non SiculÊ dapes</p>
+<p class="L2">Dulcem elaborabunt saporem,</p>
+<p class="L4">Non avium citharÊve cantus</p>
+<p>Somnum reducent.—iii. 1. 17.</p>
+</div>
+</div>
+
+<div class="FN"><p><a id="FN-62"></a><a href="#FNA-62"><sup>62</sup></a> Hieronymus was a Rhodian, and a pupil of Aristotle,
+flourishing about 300 <span class="sc">b.c.</span> He is frequently mentioned by Cicero.</p>
+</div>
+
+<div class="FN"><p><a id="FN-63"></a><a href="#FNA-63"><sup>63</sup></a> We know very little of Dinomachus. Some MSS. have
+Clitomachus.</p>
+</div>
+
+<div class="FN"><p><a id="FN-64"></a><a href="#FNA-64"><sup>64</sup></a> Callipho was in all probability a pupil of Epicurus, but
+we have no certain information about him.</p>
+</div>
+
+<div class="FN"><p><a id="FN-65"></a><a href="#FNA-65"><sup>65</sup></a> Diodorus was a Syrian, and succeeded Critolaus as the head
+of the Peripatetic School at Athens.</p>
+</div>
+
+<div class="FN"><p><a id="FN-66"></a><a href="#FNA-66"><sup>66</sup></a> Aristo was a native of Ceos, and a pupil of Lycon, who
+succeeded Straton as the head of the Peripatetic School, 270 <span class="sc">b.c.</span> He
+afterward himself succeeded Lycon.</p>
+</div>
+
+<div class="FN"><p><a id="FN-67"></a><a href="#FNA-67"><sup>67</sup></a> Pyrrho was a native of Elis, and the originator of the
+sceptical theories of some of the ancient philosophers. He was a
+contemporary of Alexander.</p>
+</div>
+
+<div class="FN"><p><a id="FN-68"></a><a href="#FNA-68"><sup>68</sup></a> Herillus was a disciple of Zeno of Cittium, and therefore
+a Stoic. He did not, however, follow all the opinions of his master: he
+held that knowledge was the chief good. Some of the treatises of
+Cleanthes were written expressly to confute him.</p>
+</div>
+
+<div class="FN"><p><a id="FN-69"></a><a href="#FNA-69"><sup>69</sup></a> Anacharsis was (Herod., iv., 76) son of Gnurus and brother
+of Saulius, King of Thrace. He came to Athens while Solon was occupied
+in framing laws for his people; and by the simplicity of his way of
+living, and his acute observations on the manners of the Greeks, he
+excited such general admiration that he was reckoned by some writers
+among the Seven Wise Men of Greece.</p>
+</div>
+
+<div class="FN"><p><a id="FN-70"></a><a href="#FNA-70"><sup>70</sup></a> This was Appius Claudius CÊcus, who was censor 310 <span class="sc">b.c.</span>,
+and who, according to Livy, was afflicted with blindness by the Gods for
+persuading the Potitii to instruct the public servants in the way of
+sacrificing to Hercules. He it was who made the Via Appia.</p>
+</div>
+
+<div class="FN"><p><a id="FN-71"></a><a href="#FNA-71"><sup>71</sup></a> The fact of Homer’s blindness rests on a passage in the
+Hymn to Apollo, quoted by Thucydides as a genuine work of Homer, and
+which is thus spoken of by one of the most accomplished scholars that
+this country or this age has ever produced: “They are indeed beautiful
+verses; and if none worse had ever been attributed to Homer, the Prince
+of Poets would have had little reason to complain.</p>
+
+<p>“He has been describing the Delian festival in honor of Apollo and
+Diana, and concludes this part of the poem with an address to the women
+of that island, to whom it is to be supposed that he had become
+familiarly known by his frequent recitations:</p>
+
+<div class="poem">
+<p><span class="greek">Χα᜷ρετε ή’ ᜑΌεῖς π៶σαι, ጐΌεῖο Ύᜲ κα᜶ Όετ᜹πισΞε</span></p>
+<p><span class="greek">ΌΜ᜵σασΞ’, ᜅπποτᜳ κᜳΜ τις ጐπιχΞοΜ᜷ωΜ ጀΜΞρ᜜πωΜ</span></p>
+<p><span class="greek">ጐΜΞᜱΎ’ ጀΜε᜷ρηται ΟεῖΜος ταλαπε᜷ριος ጐλΞᜌΜ</span></p>
+<p><span class="greek">ᜊ κοῊραι, τ᜷ς ή’ ᜕ΌΌιΜ ጀΜᜎρ ጥΎιστος ጀοιΎῶΜ</span></p>
+<p><span class="greek">ጐΜΞᜱΎε πωλεῖται κα᜶ τᜳῳ τᜳρπεσΞε Όᜱλιστα;</span></p>
+<p><span class="greek">ᜑΌεῖς ή’ ε᜖ Όᜱλα π៶σαι ᜑποκρ᜷ΜασΞε ጀφ’ ጡΌῶΜ,</span></p>
+<p><span class="greek">΀υφλ᜞ς ጀΜᜎρ, οጰκεῖ Ύᜲ Χ᜷ῳ ጐΜ᜶ παιπαλοᜳσσῃ,</span></p>
+<p><span class="greek">τοῊ π៶σαι Όετ᜹πισΞεΜ ጀριστε᜻ουσιΜ ጀοιΎα᜷.</span></p>
+</div>
+
+<div class="poem">
+<p>Virgins, farewell—and oh! remember me</p>
+<p>Hereafter, when some stranger from the sea,</p>
+<p>A hapless wanderer, may your isle explore,</p>
+<p>And ask you, ‘Maids, of all the bards you boast,</p>
+<p>Who sings the sweetest, and delights you most?’</p>
+<p>Oh! answer all, ‘A blind old man, and poor,</p>
+<p>Sweetest he sings, and dwells on Chios’ rocky shore.’”</p>
+</div>
+
+<p class="poet"><i>Coleridge’s Introduction to the Study of the Greek Classic Poets.</i></p>
+</div>
+
+<div class="FN"><p><a id="FN-72"></a><a href="#FNA-72"><sup>72</sup></a> Some read <i>scientiam</i> and some <i>inscientiam;</i> the latter
+of which is preferred by some of the best editors and commentators.</p>
+</div>
+
+<div class="FN"><p><a id="FN-73"></a><a href="#FNA-73"><sup>73</sup></a> For a short account of these ancient Greek philosophers,
+see the sketch prefixed to the Academics (<i>Classical Library</i>).</p>
+</div>
+
+<div class="FN"><p><a id="FN-74"></a><a href="#FNA-74"><sup>74</sup></a> Cicero wrote his philosophical works in the last three
+years of his life. When he wrote this piece, he was in the sixty-third
+year of his age, in the year of Rome 709.</p>
+</div>
+
+<div class="FN"><p><a id="FN-75"></a><a href="#FNA-75"><sup>75</sup></a> The Academic.</p>
+</div>
+
+<div class="FN"><p><a id="FN-76"></a><a href="#FNA-76"><sup>76</sup></a> Diodorus and Posidonius were Stoics; Philo and Antiochus
+were Academics; but the latter afterward inclined to the doctrine of the
+Stoics.</p>
+</div>
+
+<div class="FN"><p><a id="FN-77"></a><a href="#FNA-77"><sup>77</sup></a> Julius CÊsar.</p>
+</div>
+
+<div class="FN"><p><a id="FN-78"></a><a href="#FNA-78"><sup>78</sup></a> Cicero was one of the College of Augurs.</p>
+</div>
+
+<div class="FN"><p><a id="FN-79"></a><a href="#FNA-79"><sup>79</sup></a> The LatinÊ FeriÊ was originally a festival of the Latins,
+altered by Tarquinius Superbus into a Roman one. It was held in the
+Alban Mount, in honor of Jupiter Latiaris. This holiday lasted six days:
+it was not held at any fixed time; but the consul was never allowed to
+take the field till he had held them.—<i>Vide</i> Smith, Dict. Gr. and Rom.
+Ant., p. 414.</p>
+</div>
+
+<div class="FN"><p><a id="FN-80"></a><a href="#FNA-80"><sup>80</sup></a> <i>Exhedra</i>, the word used by Cicero, means a study, or
+place where disputes were held.</p>
+</div>
+
+<div class="FN"><p><a id="FN-81"></a><a href="#FNA-81"><sup>81</sup></a> M. Piso was a Peripatetic. The four great sects were the
+Stoics, the Peripatetics, the Academics, and the Epicureans.</p>
+</div>
+
+<div class="FN"><p><a id="FN-82"></a><a href="#FNA-82"><sup>82</sup></a> It was a prevailing tenet of the Academics that there is
+no certain knowledge.</p>
+</div>
+
+<div class="FN"><p><a id="FN-83"></a><a href="#FNA-83"><sup>83</sup></a> The five forms of Plato are these: <span class="greek">οᜐσ᜷α, ταᜐτ᜞Μ, ጕτεροΜ,
+στᜱσις, κ᜷Μησις.</span></p>
+</div>
+
+<div class="FN"><p><a id="FN-84"></a><a href="#FNA-84"><sup>84</sup></a> The four natures here to be understood are the four
+elements—fire, water, air, and earth; which are mentioned as the four
+principles of Empedocles by Diogenes Laertius.</p>
+</div>
+
+<div class="FN"><p><a id="FN-85"></a><a href="#FNA-85"><sup>85</sup></a> These five moving stars are Saturn, Jupiter, Mars,
+Mercury, and Venus. Their revolutions are considered in the next book.</p>
+</div>
+
+<div class="FN"><p><a id="FN-86"></a><a href="#FNA-86"><sup>86</sup></a> Or, Generation of the Gods.</p>
+</div>
+
+<div class="FN"><p><a id="FN-87"></a><a href="#FNA-87"><sup>87</sup></a> The <span class="greek">πρ᜹ληψις</span> of Epicurus, before mentioned, is what he
+here means.</p>
+</div>
+
+<div class="FN"><p><a id="FN-88"></a><a href="#FNA-88"><sup>88</sup></a> <span class="greek">ΣτερᜳΌΜια</span> is the word which Epicurus used to distinguish
+between those objects which are perceptible to sense, and those which
+are imperceptible; as the essence of the Divine Being, and the various
+operations of the divine power.</p>
+</div>
+
+<div class="FN"><p><a id="FN-89"></a><a href="#FNA-89"><sup>89</sup></a> Zeno here mentioned is not the same that Cotta spoke of
+before. This was the founder of the Stoics. The other was an Epicurean
+philosopher whom he had heard at Athens.</p>
+</div>
+
+<div class="FN"><p><a id="FN-90"></a><a href="#FNA-90"><sup>90</sup></a> That is, there would be the same uncertainty in heaven as
+is among the Academics.</p>
+</div>
+
+<div class="FN"><p><a id="FN-91"></a><a href="#FNA-91"><sup>91</sup></a> Those nations which were neither Greek nor Roman.</p>
+</div>
+
+<div class="FN"><p><a id="FN-92"></a><a href="#FNA-92"><sup>92</sup></a> <i>Sigilla numerantes</i> is the common reading; but P.
+Manucius proposes <i>venerantes</i>, which I choose as the better of the two,
+and in which sense I have translated it.</p>
+</div>
+
+<div class="FN"><p><a id="FN-93"></a><a href="#FNA-93"><sup>93</sup></a> Fundamental doctrines.</p>
+</div>
+
+<div class="FN"><p><a id="FN-94"></a><a href="#FNA-94"><sup>94</sup></a> That is, the zodiac.</p>
+</div>
+
+<div class="FN"><p><a id="FN-95"></a><a href="#FNA-95"><sup>95</sup></a> The moon, as well as the sun, is indeed in the zodiac, but
+she does not measure the same course in a month. She moves in another
+line of the zodiac nearer the earth.</p>
+</div>
+
+<div class="FN"><p><a id="FN-96"></a><a href="#FNA-96"><sup>96</sup></a> According to the doctrines of Epicurus, none of these
+bodies themselves are clearly seen, but <i>simulacra ex corporibus
+effluentia</i>.</p>
+</div>
+
+<div class="FN"><p><a id="FN-97"></a><a href="#FNA-97"><sup>97</sup></a> Epicurus taught his disciples in a garden.</p>
+</div>
+
+<div class="FN"><p><a id="FN-98"></a><a href="#FNA-98"><sup>98</sup></a> By the word <i>Deus</i>, as often used by our author, we are to
+understand all the Gods in that theology then treated of, and not a
+single personal Deity.</p>
+</div>
+
+<div class="FN"><p><a id="FN-99"></a><a href="#FNA-99"><sup>99</sup></a> The best commentators on this passage agree that Cicero
+does not mean that Aristotle affirmed that there was no such person as
+Orpheus, but that there was no such poet, and that the verse called
+Orphic was said to be the invention of another. The passage of Aristotle
+to which Cicero here alludes has, as Dr. Davis observes, been long
+lost.</p>
+</div>
+
+<div class="FN"><p><a id="FN-100"></a><a href="#FNA-100"><sup>100</sup></a> A just proportion between the different sorts of beings.</p>
+</div>
+
+<div class="FN"><p><a id="FN-101"></a><a href="#FNA-101"><sup>101</sup></a> Some give <i>quos non pudeat earum Epicuri vocum;</i> but the
+best copies have not <i>non;</i> nor would it be consistent with Cotta to say
+<i>quos non pudeat</i>, for he throughout represents Velleius as a perfect
+Epicurean in every article.</p>
+</div>
+
+<div class="FN"><p><a id="FN-102"></a><a href="#FNA-102"><sup>102</sup></a> His country was Abdera, the natives of which were
+remarkable for their stupidity.</p>
+</div>
+
+<div class="FN"><p><a id="FN-103"></a><a href="#FNA-103"><sup>103</sup></a> This passage will not admit of a translation answerable
+to the sense of the original. Cicero says the word <i>amicitia</i>
+(friendship) is derived from <i>amor</i> (love or affection).</p>
+</div>
+
+<div class="FN"><p><a id="FN-104"></a><a href="#FNA-104"><sup>104</sup></a> This manner of speaking of Jupiter frequently occurs in
+Homer,</p>
+
+<div class="poem">
+<p>——<span class="greek">πατᜎρ ጀΜΎρῶΜ τε ΞεῶΜ τε,</span></p>
+</div>
+
+<p>and has been used by Virgil and other poets since Ennius.</p>
+</div>
+
+<div class="FN"><p><a id="FN-105"></a><a href="#FNA-105"><sup>105</sup></a> Perses, or Perseus, the last king of Macedonia, was taken
+by CnÊus Octavius, the prÊtor, and brought as prisoner to Paullus
+Æmilius, 167 <span class="sc">b.c.</span></p>
+</div>
+
+<div class="FN"><p><a id="FN-106"></a><a href="#FNA-106"><sup>106</sup></a> An exemption from serving in the wars, and from paying
+public taxes.</p>
+</div>
+
+<div class="FN"><p><a id="FN-107"></a><a href="#FNA-107"><sup>107</sup></a> Mopsus. There were two soothsayers of this name: the
+first was one of the LapithÊ, son of Ampycus and Chloris, called also
+the son of Apollo and Hienantis; the other a son of Apollo and Manto,
+who is said to have founded Mallus, in Asia Minor, where his oracle
+existed as late as the time of Strabo.</p>
+</div>
+
+<div class="FN"><p><a id="FN-108"></a><a href="#FNA-108"><sup>108</sup></a> Tiresias was the great Theban prophet at the time of the
+war of the Seven against Thebes.</p>
+</div>
+
+<div class="FN"><p><a id="FN-109"></a><a href="#FNA-109"><sup>109</sup></a> Amphiaraus was King of Argos (he had been one of the
+Argonauts also). He was killed after the war of the Seven against
+Thebes, which he was compelled to join in by the treachery of his wife
+Eriphyle, by the earth opening and swallowing him up as he was fleeing
+from Periclymenus.</p>
+</div>
+
+<div class="FN"><p><a id="FN-110"></a><a href="#FNA-110"><sup>110</sup></a> Calchas was the prophet of the Grecian army at the siege
+of Troy.</p>
+</div>
+
+<div class="FN"><p><a id="FN-111"></a><a href="#FNA-111"><sup>111</sup></a> Helenus was a son of Priam and Hecuba. He is represented
+as a prophet in the Philoctetes of Sophocles. And in the Æneid he is
+also represented as king of part of Epirus, and as predicting to Æneas
+the dangers and fortunes which awaited him.</p>
+</div>
+
+<div class="FN"><p><a id="FN-112"></a><a href="#FNA-112"><sup>112</sup></a> This short passage would be very obscure to the reader
+without an explanation from another of Cicero’s treatises. The
+expression here, <i>ad investigandum suem regiones vineÊ terminavit</i>,
+which is a metaphor too bold, if it was not a sort of augural language,
+seems to me to have been the effect of carelessness in our great author;
+for Navius did not divide the regions, as he calls them, of the vine to
+find his sow, but to find a grape.</p>
+</div>
+
+<div class="FN"><p><a id="FN-113"></a><a href="#FNA-113"><sup>113</sup></a> The Peremnia were a sort of auspices performed just
+before the passing a river.</p>
+</div>
+
+<div class="FN"><p><a id="FN-114"></a><a href="#FNA-114"><sup>114</sup></a> The Acumina were a military auspices, and were partly
+performed on the point of a spear, from which they were called Acumina.</p>
+</div>
+
+<div class="FN"><p><a id="FN-115"></a><a href="#FNA-115"><sup>115</sup></a> Those were called <i>testamenta in procinctu</i>, which were
+made by soldiers just before an engagement, in the presence of men
+called as witnesses.</p>
+</div>
+
+<div class="FN"><p><a id="FN-116"></a><a href="#FNA-116"><sup>116</sup></a> This especially refers to the Decii, one of whom devoted
+himself for his country in the war with the Latins, 340 <span class="sc">b.c.</span>, and his
+son imitated the action in the war with the Samnites, 295 <span class="sc">b.c.</span> Cicero
+(Tusc. i. 37) says that his son did the same thing in the war with
+Pyrrhus at the battle of Asculum, though in other places (De Off. iii.
+4) he speaks of only two Decii as having signalized themselves in this
+manner.</p>
+</div>
+
+<div class="FN"><p><a id="FN-117"></a><a href="#FNA-117"><sup>117</sup></a> The Rogator, who collected the votes, and pronounced who
+was the person chosen. There were two sorts of Rogators; one was the
+officer here mentioned, and the other was the Rogator, or speaker of the
+whole assembly.</p>
+</div>
+
+<div class="FN"><p><a id="FN-118"></a><a href="#FNA-118"><sup>118</sup></a> Which was Sardinia, as appears from one of Cicero’s
+epistles to his brother Quintus.</p>
+</div>
+
+<div class="FN"><p><a id="FN-119"></a><a href="#FNA-119"><sup>119</sup></a> Their sacred books of ceremonies.</p>
+</div>
+
+<div class="FN"><p><a id="FN-120"></a><a href="#FNA-120"><sup>120</sup></a> The war between Octavius and Cinna, the consuls.</p>
+</div>
+
+<div class="FN"><p><a id="FN-121"></a><a href="#FNA-121"><sup>121</sup></a> This, in the original, is a fragment of an old Latin
+verse,</p>
+
+<div class="poem">
+<p><i>——Terram fumare calentem.</i></p>
+</div>
+</div>
+
+<div class="FN"><p><a id="FN-122"></a><a href="#FNA-122"><sup>122</sup></a> The Latin word is <i>principatus</i>, which exactly
+corresponds with the Greek word here used by Cicero; by which is to be
+understood the superior, the most prevailing excellence in every kind
+and species of things through the universe.</p>
+</div>
+
+<div class="FN"><p><a id="FN-123"></a><a href="#FNA-123"><sup>123</sup></a> The passage of Aristotle to which Cicero here refers is
+lost.</p>
+</div>
+
+<div class="FN"><p><a id="FN-124"></a><a href="#FNA-124"><sup>124</sup></a> He means the Epicureans.</p>
+</div>
+
+<div class="FN"><p><a id="FN-125"></a><a href="#FNA-125"><sup>125</sup></a> Here the Stoic speaks too plain to be misunderstood. His
+world, his <i>mundus</i>, is the universe, and that universe is his great
+Deity, <i>in quo sit totius naturÊ principatus</i>, in which the superior
+excellence of universal nature consists.</p>
+</div>
+
+<div class="FN"><p><a id="FN-126"></a><a href="#FNA-126"><sup>126</sup></a> Athens, the seat of learning and politeness, of which
+Balbus will not allow Epicurus to be worthy.</p>
+</div>
+
+<div class="FN"><p><a id="FN-127"></a><a href="#FNA-127"><sup>127</sup></a> This is Pythagoras’s doctrine, as appears in Diogenes
+Laertius.</p>
+</div>
+
+<div class="FN"><p><a id="FN-128"></a><a href="#FNA-128"><sup>128</sup></a> He here alludes to mathematical and geometrical
+instruments.</p>
+</div>
+
+<div class="FN"><p><a id="FN-129"></a><a href="#FNA-129"><sup>129</sup></a> Balbus here speaks of the fixed stars, and of the motions
+of the orbs of the planets. He here alludes, says M. Bonhier, to the
+different and diurnal motions of these stars; one sort from east to
+west, the other from one tropic to the other: and this is the
+construction which our learned and great geometrician and astronomer,
+Dr. Halley, made of this passage.</p>
+</div>
+
+<div class="FN"><p><a id="FN-130"></a><a href="#FNA-130"><sup>130</sup></a> This mensuration of the year into three hundred and
+sixty-five days and near six hours (by the odd hours and minutes of
+which, in every fifth year, the <i>dies intercalaris</i>, or leap-year, is
+made) could not but be known, Dr. Halley states, by Hipparchus, as
+appears from the remains of that great astronomer of the ancients. We
+are inclined to think that Julius CÊsar had divided the year, according
+to what we call the Julian year, before Cicero wrote this book; for we
+see, in the beginning of it, how pathetically he speaks of CÊsar’s
+usurpation.</p>
+</div>
+
+<div class="FN"><p><a id="FN-131"></a><a href="#FNA-131"><sup>131</sup></a> The words of Censorinus, on this occasion, are to the
+same effect. The opinions of philosophers concerning this great year are
+very different; but the institution of it is ascribed to Democritus.</p>
+</div>
+
+<div class="FN"><p><a id="FN-132"></a><a href="#FNA-132"><sup>132</sup></a> The zodiac.</p>
+</div>
+
+<div class="FN"><p><a id="FN-133"></a><a href="#FNA-133"><sup>133</sup></a> Though Mars is said to hold his orbit in the zodiac with
+the rest, and to finish his revolution through the same orbit (that is,
+the zodiac) with the other two, yet Balbus means in a different line of
+the zodiac.</p>
+</div>
+
+<div class="FN"><p><a id="FN-134"></a><a href="#FNA-134"><sup>134</sup></a> According to late observations, it never goes but a sign
+and a half from the sun.</p>
+</div>
+
+<div class="FN"><p><a id="FN-135"></a><a href="#FNA-135"><sup>135</sup></a> These, Dr. Davis says, are “aërial fires;” concerning
+which he refers to the second book of Pliny.</p>
+</div>
+
+<div class="FN"><p><a id="FN-136"></a><a href="#FNA-136"><sup>136</sup></a> In the Eunuch of Terence.</p>
+</div>
+
+<div class="FN"><p><a id="FN-137"></a><a href="#FNA-137"><sup>137</sup></a> Bacchus.</p>
+</div>
+
+<div class="FN"><p><a id="FN-138"></a><a href="#FNA-138"><sup>138</sup></a> The son of Ceres.</p>
+</div>
+
+<div class="FN"><p><a id="FN-139"></a><a href="#FNA-139"><sup>139</sup></a> The books of Ceremonies.</p>
+</div>
+
+<div class="FN"><p><a id="FN-140"></a><a href="#FNA-140"><sup>140</sup></a> This Libera is taken for Proserpine, who, with her
+brother Liber, was consecrated by the Romans; all which are parts of
+nature in prosopopœias. Cicero, therefore, makes Balbus distinguish
+between the person Liber, or Bacchus, and the Liber which is a part of
+nature in prosopopœia.</p>
+</div>
+
+<div class="FN"><p><a id="FN-141"></a><a href="#FNA-141"><sup>141</sup></a> These allegorical fables are largely related by Hesiod in
+his Theogony.</p>
+
+<p>Horace says exactly the same thing:</p>
+
+<div class="poem">
+<p>Hâc arte Pollux et vagus Hercules</p>
+<p>Enisus arces attigit igneas:</p>
+<p class="L2">Quos inter Augustus recumbens</p>
+<p class="L4">Purpureo bibit ore nectar.</p>
+<p>Hâc te merentem, Bacche pater, tuÊ</p>
+<p>Vexere tigres indocili jugum</p>
+<p class="L2">Collo ferentes: hâc Quirinus</p>
+<p class="L4">Martis equis Acheronta fugit.—Hor. iii. 3. 9.</p>
+</div>
+</div>
+
+<div class="FN"><p><a id="FN-142"></a><a href="#FNA-142"><sup>142</sup></a> Cicero means by <i>conversis casibus</i>, varying the cases
+from the common rule of declension; that is, by departing from the true
+grammatical rules of speech; for if we would keep to it, we should
+decline the word <i>Jupiter</i>, <i>Jupiteris</i> in the second case, etc.</p>
+</div>
+
+<div class="FN"><p><a id="FN-143"></a><a href="#FNA-143"><sup>143</sup></a> <i>Pater divûmque hominumque.</i></p>
+</div>
+
+<div class="FN"><p><a id="FN-144"></a><a href="#FNA-144"><sup>144</sup></a> The common reading is, <i>planiusque alio loco idem;</i>
+which, as Dr. Davis observes, is absurd; therefore, in his note, he
+prefers <i>planius quam alia loco idem</i>, from two copies, in which sense I
+have translated it.</p>
+</div>
+
+<div class="FN"><p><a id="FN-145"></a><a href="#FNA-145"><sup>145</sup></a> From the verb <i>gero</i>, to bear.</p>
+</div>
+
+<div class="FN"><p><a id="FN-146"></a><a href="#FNA-146"><sup>146</sup></a> That is, “mother earth.”</p>
+</div>
+
+<div class="FN"><p><a id="FN-147"></a><a href="#FNA-147"><sup>147</sup></a> Janus is said to be the first who erected temples in
+Italy, and instituted religious rites, and from whom the first month in
+the Roman calendar is derived.</p>
+</div>
+
+<div class="FN"><p><a id="FN-148"></a><a href="#FNA-148"><sup>148</sup></a> <i>StellÊ vagantes.</i></p>
+</div>
+
+<div class="FN"><p><a id="FN-149"></a><a href="#FNA-149"><sup>149</sup></a> <i>Noctu quasi diem efficeret.</i> Ben Jonson says the same
+thing:</p>
+
+<div class="poem">
+<p>Thou that mak’st a day of night,</p>
+<p>Goddess excellently bright.—<i>Ode to the Moon.</i></p>
+</div>
+</div>
+
+<div class="FN"><p><a id="FN-150"></a><a href="#FNA-150"><sup>150</sup></a> Olympias was the mother of Alexander.</p>
+</div>
+
+<div class="FN"><p><a id="FN-151"></a><a href="#FNA-151"><sup>151</sup></a> Venus is here said to be one of the names of Diana,
+because <i>ad res omnes veniret;</i> but she is not supposed to be the same
+as the mother of Cupid.</p>
+</div>
+
+<div class="FN"><p><a id="FN-152"></a><a href="#FNA-152"><sup>152</sup></a> Here is a mistake, as Fulvius Ursinus observes; for the
+discourse seems to be continued in one day, as appears from the
+beginning of this book. This may be an inadvertency of Cicero.</p>
+</div>
+
+<div class="FN"><p><a id="FN-153"></a><a href="#FNA-153"><sup>153</sup></a> The senate of Athens was so called from the words <span class="greek">ጌρειος Πᜱγος</span>, the Village, some say the Hill, of Mars.</p>
+</div>
+
+<div class="FN"><p><a id="FN-154"></a><a href="#FNA-154"><sup>154</sup></a> Epicurus.</p>
+</div>
+
+<div class="FN"><p><a id="FN-155"></a><a href="#FNA-155"><sup>155</sup></a> The Stoics.</p>
+</div>
+
+<div class="FN"><p><a id="FN-156"></a><a href="#FNA-156"><sup>156</sup></a> By <i>nulla cohÊrendi natura</i>—if it is the right, as it is
+the common reading—Cicero must mean the same as by <i>nulla crescendi
+natura</i>, or <i>coalescendi</i>, either of which Lambinus proposes; for, as the
+same learned critic well observes, is there not a cohesion of parts in a
+clod, or in a piece of stone? Our learned Walker proposes <i>sola
+cohÊrendi natura</i>, which mends the sense very much; and I wish he had
+the authority of any copy for it.</p>
+</div>
+
+<div class="FN"><p><a id="FN-157"></a><a href="#FNA-157"><sup>157</sup></a> Nasica Scipio, the censor, is said to have been the first
+who made a water-clock in Rome.</p>
+</div>
+
+<div class="FN"><p><a id="FN-158"></a><a href="#FNA-158"><sup>158</sup></a> The Epicureans.</p>
+</div>
+
+<div class="FN"><p><a id="FN-159"></a><a href="#FNA-159"><sup>159</sup></a> An old Latin poet, commended by Quintilian for the
+gravity of his sense and his loftiness of style.</p>
+</div>
+
+<div class="FN"><p><a id="FN-160"></a><a href="#FNA-160"><sup>160</sup></a> The shepherd is here supposed to take the stem or beak of
+the ship for the mouth, from which the roaring voices of the sailors
+came. <i>Rostrum</i> is here a lucky word to put in the mouth of one who
+never saw a ship before, as it is used for the beak of a bird, the snout
+of a beast or fish, and for the stem of a ship.</p>
+</div>
+
+<div class="FN"><p><a id="FN-161"></a><a href="#FNA-161"><sup>161</sup></a> The Epicureans.</p>
+</div>
+
+<div class="FN"><p><a id="FN-162"></a><a href="#FNA-162"><sup>162</sup></a> Greek, <span class="greek">ጀᜎρ</span>; Latin, <i>aer</i>.</p>
+</div>
+
+<div class="FN"><p><a id="FN-163"></a><a href="#FNA-163"><sup>163</sup></a> The treatise of Aristotle, from whence this is taken, is
+lost.</p>
+</div>
+
+<div class="FN"><p><a id="FN-164"></a><a href="#FNA-164"><sup>164</sup></a> To the universe the Stoics certainly annexed the idea of
+a limited space, otherwise they could not have talked of a middle; for
+there can be no middle but of a limited space: infinite space can have
+no middle, there being infinite extension from every part.</p>
+</div>
+
+<div class="FN"><p><a id="FN-165"></a><a href="#FNA-165"><sup>165</sup></a> These two contrary reversions are from the tropics of
+Cancer and Capricorn. They are the extreme bounds of the sun’s course.
+The reader must observe that the astronomical parts of this book are
+introduced by the Stoic as proofs of design and reason in the universe;
+and, notwithstanding the errors in his planetary system, his intent is
+well answered, because all he means is that the regular motions of the
+heavenly bodies, and their dependencies, are demonstrations of a divine
+mind. The inference proposed to be drawn from his astronomical
+observations is as just as if his system was in every part
+unexceptionably right: the same may be said of his anatomical
+observations.</p>
+</div>
+
+<div class="FN"><p><a id="FN-166"></a><a href="#FNA-166"><sup>166</sup></a> In the zodiac.</p>
+</div>
+
+<div class="FN"><p><a id="FN-167"></a><a href="#FNA-167"><sup>167</sup></a> Ibid.</p>
+</div>
+
+<div class="FN"><p><a id="FN-168"></a><a href="#FNA-168"><sup>168</sup></a> These verses of Cicero are a translation from a Greek
+poem of Aratus, called the PhÊnomena.</p>
+</div>
+
+<div class="FN"><p><a id="FN-169"></a><a href="#FNA-169"><sup>169</sup></a> The fixed stars.</p>
+</div>
+
+<div class="FN"><p><a id="FN-170"></a><a href="#FNA-170"><sup>170</sup></a> The arctic and antarctic poles.</p>
+</div>
+
+<div class="FN"><p><a id="FN-171"></a><a href="#FNA-171"><sup>171</sup></a> The two Arctoi are northern constellations. Cynosura is
+what we call the Lesser Bear; Helice, the Greater Bear; in Latin, <i>Ursa
+Minor</i> and <i>Ursa Major</i>.</p>
+</div>
+
+<div class="FN"><p><a id="FN-172"></a><a href="#FNA-172"><sup>172</sup></a> These stars in the Greater Bear are vulgarly called the
+“Seven Stars,” or the “Northern Wain;” by the Latins, “Septentriones.”</p>
+</div>
+
+<div class="FN"><p><a id="FN-173"></a><a href="#FNA-173"><sup>173</sup></a> The Lesser Bear.</p>
+</div>
+
+<div class="FN"><p><a id="FN-174"></a><a href="#FNA-174"><sup>174</sup></a> The Greater Bear.</p>
+</div>
+
+<div class="FN"><p><a id="FN-175"></a><a href="#FNA-175"><sup>175</sup></a> Exactly agreeable to this and the following description
+of the Dragon is the same northern constellation described in the map by
+Flamsteed in his Atlas Cœlestis; and all the figures here described by
+Aratus nearly agree with the maps of the same constellations in the
+Atlas Cœlestis, though they are not all placed precisely alike.</p>
+</div>
+
+<div class="FN"><p><a id="FN-176"></a><a href="#FNA-176"><sup>176</sup></a> The tail of the Greater Bear.</p>
+</div>
+
+<div class="FN"><p><a id="FN-177"></a><a href="#FNA-177"><sup>177</sup></a> That is, in Macedon, where Aratus lived.</p>
+</div>
+
+<div class="FN"><p><a id="FN-178"></a><a href="#FNA-178"><sup>178</sup></a> The true interpretation of this passage is as follows:
+Here in Macedon, says Aratus, the head of the Dragon does not entirely
+immerge itself in the ocean, but only touches the superficies of it. By
+<i>ortus</i> and <i>obitus</i> I doubt not but Cicero meant, agreeable to Aratus,
+those parts which arise to view, and those which are removed from
+sight.</p>
+</div>
+
+<div class="FN"><p><a id="FN-179"></a><a href="#FNA-179"><sup>179</sup></a> These are two northern constellations. Engonasis, in some
+catalogues called Hercules, because he is figured kneeling <span class="greek">ጐΜ γ᜹ΜασιΜ</span>
+(on his knees). <span class="greek">ጘΜγ᜹ΜασιΜ καλᜳουσ’</span>, as Aratus says, they call
+Engonasis.</p>
+</div>
+
+<div class="FN"><p><a id="FN-180"></a><a href="#FNA-180"><sup>180</sup></a> The crown is placed under the feet of Hercules in the
+Atlas Cœlestis; but Ophiuchus (<span class="greek">ᜈφιοῊχος</span>), the Snake-holder, is placed in
+the map by Flamsteed as described here by Aratus; and their heads almost
+meet.</p>
+</div>
+
+<div class="FN"><p><a id="FN-181"></a><a href="#FNA-181"><sup>181</sup></a> The Scorpion. Ophiuchus, though a northern constellation,
+is not far from that part of the zodiac where the Scorpion is, which is
+one of the six southern signs.</p>
+</div>
+
+<div class="FN"><p><a id="FN-182"></a><a href="#FNA-182"><sup>182</sup></a> The Wain of seven stars.</p>
+</div>
+
+<div class="FN"><p><a id="FN-183"></a><a href="#FNA-183"><sup>183</sup></a> The Wain-driver. This northern constellation is, in our
+present maps, figured with a club in his right hand behind the Greater
+Bear.</p>
+</div>
+
+<div class="FN"><p><a id="FN-184"></a><a href="#FNA-184"><sup>184</sup></a> In some modern maps Arcturus, a star of the first
+magnitude, is placed in the belt that is round the waist of Boötes.
+Cicero says <i>subter prÊcordia</i>, which is about the waist; and Aratus
+says <span class="greek">ᜑπ᜞ ζ᜜Μῃ</span>, under the belt.</p>
+</div>
+
+<div class="FN"><p><a id="FN-185"></a><a href="#FNA-185"><sup>185</sup></a> <i>Sub caput Arcti</i>, under the head of the Greater Bear.</p>
+</div>
+
+<div class="FN"><p><a id="FN-186"></a><a href="#FNA-186"><sup>186</sup></a> The Crab is, by the ancients and moderns, placed in the
+zodiac, as here, between the Twins and the Lion; and they are all three
+northern signs.</p>
+</div>
+
+<div class="FN"><p><a id="FN-187"></a><a href="#FNA-187"><sup>187</sup></a> The Twins are placed in the zodiac with the side of one
+to the northern hemisphere, and the side of the other to the southern
+hemisphere. Auriga, the Charioteer, is placed in the northern hemisphere
+near the zodiac, by the Twins; and at the head of the Charioteer is
+Helice, the Greater Bear, placed; and the Goat is a bright star of the
+first magnitude placed on the left shoulder of this northern
+constellation, and called <i>Capra</i>, the Goat. <i>Hœdi</i>, the Kids, are two
+more stars of the same constellation.</p>
+</div>
+
+<div class="FN"><p><a id="FN-188"></a><a href="#FNA-188"><sup>188</sup></a> A constellation; one of the northern signs in the zodiac,
+in which the Hyades are placed.</p>
+</div>
+
+<div class="FN"><p><a id="FN-189"></a><a href="#FNA-189"><sup>189</sup></a> One of the feet of Cepheus, a northern constellation, is
+under the tail of the Lesser Bear.</p>
+</div>
+
+<div class="FN"><p><a id="FN-190"></a><a href="#FNA-190"><sup>190</sup></a> Grotius, and after him Dr. Davis, and other learned men,
+read <i>Cassiepea</i>, after the Greek <span class="greek">Κασσ᜷επεια</span>, and reject the common
+reading, <i>Cassiopea</i>.</p>
+</div>
+
+<div class="FN"><p><a id="FN-191"></a><a href="#FNA-191"><sup>191</sup></a> These northern constellations here mentioned have been
+always placed together as one family with Cepheus and Perseus, as they
+are in our modern maps.</p>
+</div>
+
+<div class="FN"><p><a id="FN-192"></a><a href="#FNA-192"><sup>192</sup></a> This alludes to the fable of Perseus and Andromeda.</p>
+</div>
+
+<div class="FN"><p><a id="FN-193"></a><a href="#FNA-193"><sup>193</sup></a> Pegasus, who is one of Perseus and Andromeda’s family.</p>
+</div>
+
+<div class="FN"><p><a id="FN-194"></a><a href="#FNA-194"><sup>194</sup></a> That is, with wings.</p>
+</div>
+
+<div class="FN"><p><a id="FN-195"></a><a href="#FNA-195"><sup>195</sup></a> <i>Aries</i>, the Ram, is the first northern sign in the
+zodiac; <i>Pisces</i>, the Fishes, the last southern sign; therefore they
+must be near one another, as they are in a circle or belt. In
+Flamsteed’s Atlas Cœlestis one of the Fishes is near the head of the
+Ram, and the other near the Urn of Aquarius.</p>
+</div>
+
+<div class="FN"><p><a id="FN-196"></a><a href="#FNA-196"><sup>196</sup></a> These are called VirgiliÊ by Cicero; by Aratus, the
+Pleiades, <span class="greek">ΠληϊᜱΎες</span>; and they are placed at the neck of the Bull; and one
+of Perseus’s feet touches the Bull in the Atlas Cœlestis.</p>
+</div>
+
+<div class="FN"><p><a id="FN-197"></a><a href="#FNA-197"><sup>197</sup></a> This northern constellation is called Fides by Cicero;
+but it must be the same with Lyra; because Lyra is placed in our maps as
+Fides is here.</p>
+</div>
+
+<div class="FN"><p><a id="FN-198"></a><a href="#FNA-198"><sup>198</sup></a> This is called Ales Avis by Cicero; and I doubt not but
+the northern constellation Cygnus is here to be understood, for the
+description and place of the Swan in the Atlas Cœlestis are the same
+which Ales Avis has here.</p>
+</div>
+
+<div class="FN"><p><a id="FN-199"></a><a href="#FNA-199"><sup>199</sup></a> Pegasus.</p>
+</div>
+
+<div class="FN"><p><a id="FN-200"></a><a href="#FNA-200"><sup>200</sup></a> The Water-bearer, one of the six southern signs in the
+zodiac: he is described in our maps pouring water out of an urn, and
+leaning with one hand on the tail of Capricorn, another southern sign.</p>
+</div>
+
+<div class="FN"><p><a id="FN-201"></a><a href="#FNA-201"><sup>201</sup></a> When the sun is in Capricorn, the days are at the
+shortest; and when in Cancer, at the longest.</p>
+</div>
+
+<div class="FN"><p><a id="FN-202"></a><a href="#FNA-202"><sup>202</sup></a> One of the six southern signs.</p>
+</div>
+
+<div class="FN"><p><a id="FN-203"></a><a href="#FNA-203"><sup>203</sup></a> Sagittarius, another southern sign.</p>
+</div>
+
+<div class="FN"><p><a id="FN-204"></a><a href="#FNA-204"><sup>204</sup></a> A northern constellation.</p>
+</div>
+
+<div class="FN"><p><a id="FN-205"></a><a href="#FNA-205"><sup>205</sup></a> A northern constellation.</p>
+</div>
+
+<div class="FN"><p><a id="FN-206"></a><a href="#FNA-206"><sup>206</sup></a> A southern constellation.</p>
+</div>
+
+<div class="FN"><p><a id="FN-207"></a><a href="#FNA-207"><sup>207</sup></a> This is Canis Major, a southern constellation. Orion and
+the Dog are named together by Hesiod, who flourished many hundred years
+before Cicero or Aratus.</p>
+</div>
+
+<div class="FN"><p><a id="FN-208"></a><a href="#FNA-208"><sup>208</sup></a> A southern constellation, placed as here in the Atlas
+Cœlestis.</p>
+</div>
+
+<div class="FN"><p><a id="FN-209"></a><a href="#FNA-209"><sup>209</sup></a> A southern constellation, so called from the ship Argo,
+in which Jason and the rest of the Argonauts sailed on their expedition
+to Colchos.</p>
+</div>
+
+<div class="FN"><p><a id="FN-210"></a><a href="#FNA-210"><sup>210</sup></a> The Ram is the first of the northern signs in the zodiac;
+and the last southern sign is the Fishes; which two signs, meeting in
+the zodiac, cover the constellation called Argo.</p>
+</div>
+
+<div class="FN"><p><a id="FN-211"></a><a href="#FNA-211"><sup>211</sup></a> The river Eridanus, a southern constellation.</p>
+</div>
+
+<div class="FN"><p><a id="FN-212"></a><a href="#FNA-212"><sup>212</sup></a> A southern constellation.</p>
+</div>
+
+<div class="FN"><p><a id="FN-213"></a><a href="#FNA-213"><sup>213</sup></a> This is called the Scorpion in the original of Aratus.</p>
+</div>
+
+<div class="FN"><p><a id="FN-214"></a><a href="#FNA-214"><sup>214</sup></a> A southern constellation.</p>
+</div>
+
+<div class="FN"><p><a id="FN-215"></a><a href="#FNA-215"><sup>215</sup></a> A southern constellation.</p>
+</div>
+
+<div class="FN"><p><a id="FN-216"></a><a href="#FNA-216"><sup>216</sup></a> The Serpent is not mentioned in Cicero’s translation; but
+it is in the original of Aratus.</p>
+</div>
+
+<div class="FN"><p><a id="FN-217"></a><a href="#FNA-217"><sup>217</sup></a> A southern constellation.</p>
+</div>
+
+<div class="FN"><p><a id="FN-218"></a><a href="#FNA-218"><sup>218</sup></a> The Goblet, or Cup, a southern constellation.</p>
+</div>
+
+<div class="FN"><p><a id="FN-219"></a><a href="#FNA-219"><sup>219</sup></a> A southern constellation.</p>
+</div>
+
+<div class="FN"><p><a id="FN-220"></a><a href="#FNA-220"><sup>220</sup></a> Antecanis, a southern constellation, is the Little Dog,
+and called <i>Antecanis</i> in Latin, and <span class="greek">Προκ᜻ωΜ</span> in Greek, because he rises
+before the other Dog.</p>
+</div>
+
+<div class="FN"><p><a id="FN-221"></a><a href="#FNA-221"><sup>221</sup></a> PansÊtius, a Stoic philosopher.</p>
+</div>
+
+<div class="FN"><p><a id="FN-222"></a><a href="#FNA-222"><sup>222</sup></a> Mercury and Venus.</p>
+</div>
+
+<div class="FN"><p><a id="FN-223"></a><a href="#FNA-223"><sup>223</sup></a> The proboscis of the elephant is frequently called a
+hand, because it is as useful to him as one. “They breathe, drink, and
+smell, with what may not be improperly called a hand,” says Pliny, bk.
+viii. c. 10.—<span class="sc">Davis</span>.</p>
+</div>
+
+<div class="FN"><p><a id="FN-224"></a><a href="#FNA-224"><sup>224</sup></a> The passage of Aristotle’s works to which Cicero here
+alludes is entirely lost; but Plutarch gives a similar account.</p>
+</div>
+
+<div class="FN"><p><a id="FN-225"></a><a href="#FNA-225"><sup>225</sup></a> Balbus does not tell us the remedy which the panther
+makes use of; but Pliny is not quite so delicate: he says, <i>excrementis
+hominis sibi medetur</i>.</p>
+</div>
+
+<div class="FN"><p><a id="FN-226"></a><a href="#FNA-226"><sup>226</sup></a> Aristotle says they purge themselves with this herb after
+they fawn. Pliny says both before and after.</p>
+</div>
+
+<div class="FN"><p><a id="FN-227"></a><a href="#FNA-227"><sup>227</sup></a> The cuttle-fish has a bag at its neck, the black blood of
+which the Romans used for ink. It was called <i>atramentum</i>.</p>
+</div>
+
+<div class="FN"><p><a id="FN-228"></a><a href="#FNA-228"><sup>228</sup></a> The Euphrates is said to carry into Mesopotamia a large
+quantity of citrons, with which it covers the fields.</p>
+</div>
+
+<div class="FN"><p><a id="FN-229"></a><a href="#FNA-229"><sup>229</sup></a> Q. Curtius, and some other authors, say the Ganges is the
+largest river in India; but Ammianus Marcellinus concurs with Cicero in
+calling the river Indus the largest of all rivers.</p>
+</div>
+
+<div class="FN"><p><a id="FN-230"></a><a href="#FNA-230"><sup>230</sup></a> These Etesian winds return periodically once a year, and
+blow at certain seasons, and for a certain time.</p>
+</div>
+
+<div class="FN"><p><a id="FN-231"></a><a href="#FNA-231"><sup>231</sup></a> Some read <i>mollitur</i>, and some <i>molitur;</i> the latter of
+which P. Manucius justly prefers, from the verb <i>molo</i>, <i>molis;</i> from
+whence, says he, <i>molares dentes</i>, the grinders.</p>
+</div>
+
+<div class="FN"><p><a id="FN-232"></a><a href="#FNA-232"><sup>232</sup></a> The weasand, or windpipe.</p>
+</div>
+
+<div class="FN"><p><a id="FN-233"></a><a href="#FNA-233"><sup>233</sup></a> The epiglottis, which is a cartilaginous flap in the
+shape of a tongue, and therefore called so.</p>
+</div>
+
+<div class="FN"><p><a id="FN-234"></a><a href="#FNA-234"><sup>234</sup></a> Cicero is here giving the opinion of the ancients
+concerning the passage of the chyle till it is converted to blood.</p>
+</div>
+
+<div class="FN"><p><a id="FN-235"></a><a href="#FNA-235"><sup>235</sup></a> What Cicero here calls the ventricles of the heart are
+likewise called auricles, of which there is the right and left.</p>
+</div>
+
+<div class="FN"><p><a id="FN-236"></a><a href="#FNA-236"><sup>236</sup></a> The Stoics and Peripatetics said that the nerves, veins,
+and arteries come directly from the heart. According to the anatomy of
+the moderns, they come from the brain.</p>
+</div>
+
+<div class="FN"><p><a id="FN-237"></a><a href="#FNA-237"><sup>237</sup></a> The author means all musical instruments, whether string
+or wind instruments, which are hollow and tortuous.</p>
+</div>
+
+<div class="FN"><p><a id="FN-238"></a><a href="#FNA-238"><sup>238</sup></a> The Latin version of Cicero is a translation from the
+Greek of Aratus.</p>
+</div>
+
+<div class="FN"><p><a id="FN-239"></a><a href="#FNA-239"><sup>239</sup></a> Chrysippus’s meaning is, that the swine is so inactive
+and slothful a beast that life seems to be of no use to it but to keep
+it from putrefaction, as salt keeps dead flesh.</p>
+</div>
+
+<div class="FN"><p><a id="FN-240"></a><a href="#FNA-240"><sup>240</sup></a> <i>Ales</i>, in the general signification, is any large bird;
+and <i>oscinis</i> is any singing bird. But they here mean those birds which
+are used in augury: <i>alites</i> are the birds whose flight was observed by
+the augurs, and <i>oscines</i> the birds from whose voices they augured.</p>
+</div>
+
+<div class="FN"><p><a id="FN-241"></a><a href="#FNA-241"><sup>241</sup></a> As the Academics doubted everything, it was indifferent
+to them which side of a question they took.</p>
+</div>
+
+<div class="FN"><p><a id="FN-242"></a><a href="#FNA-242"><sup>242</sup></a> The keepers and interpreters of the Sibylline oracles
+were the Quindecimviri.</p>
+</div>
+
+<div class="FN"><p><a id="FN-243"></a><a href="#FNA-243"><sup>243</sup></a> The popular name of Jupiter in Rome, being looked upon as
+defender of the Capitol (in which he was placed), and stayer of the
+State.</p>
+</div>
+
+<div class="FN"><p><a id="FN-244"></a><a href="#FNA-244"><sup>244</sup></a> Some passages of the original are here wanting. Cotta
+continues speaking against the doctrine of the Stoics.</p>
+</div>
+
+<div class="FN"><p><a id="FN-245"></a><a href="#FNA-245"><sup>245</sup></a> The word <i>sortes</i> is often used for the answers of the
+oracles, or, rather, for the rolls in which the answers were written.</p>
+</div>
+
+<div class="FN"><p><a id="FN-246"></a><a href="#FNA-246"><sup>246</sup></a> Three of this eminent family sacrificed themselves for
+their country; the father in the Latin war, the son in the Tuscan war,
+and the grandson in the war with Pyrrhus.</p>
+</div>
+
+<div class="FN"><p><a id="FN-247"></a><a href="#FNA-247"><sup>247</sup></a> The Straits of Gibraltar.</p>
+</div>
+
+<div class="FN"><p><a id="FN-248"></a><a href="#FNA-248"><sup>248</sup></a> The common reading is, <i>ex quo anima dicitur;</i> but Dr.
+Davis and M. Bouhier prefer <i>animal</i>, though they keep <i>anima</i> in the
+text, because our author says elsewhere, <i>animum ex anima dictum</i>, Tusc.
+I. 1. Cicero is not here to be accused of contradictions, for we are to
+consider that he speaks in the characters of other persons; but there
+appears to be nothing in these two passages irreconcilable, and probably
+<i>anima</i> is the right word here.</p>
+</div>
+
+<div class="FN"><p><a id="FN-249"></a><a href="#FNA-249"><sup>249</sup></a> He is said to have led a colony from Greece into Caria,
+in Asia, and to have built a town, and called it after his own name, for
+which his countrymen paid him divine honors after his death.</p>
+</div>
+
+<div class="FN"><p><a id="FN-250"></a><a href="#FNA-250"><sup>250</sup></a> Our great author is under a mistake here. Homer does not
+say he met Hercules himself, but his <span class="greek">ΕጎΎωλοΜ</span>, his “visionary likeness;”
+and adds that he himself</p>
+
+<div class="poem">
+<p class="L6" style="margin-left: 15ex"><span class="greek">Όετ’ ጀΞαΜᜱτοισι Ξεοῖσι</span></p>
+<p><span class="greek">τᜳρπεται ጐΜ Ξαλ᜷ῃς, κα᜶ ጔχει καλλ᜷σφυρου ጭβηΜ,</span></p>
+<p><span class="greek">παῖΎα Δι᜞ς Όεγᜱλοιο κα᜶ ጭρης χρυσοπεΎ᜷λου.</span></p>
+</div>
+
+<p>which Pope translates—</p>
+
+<div class="poem">
+<p>A shadowy form, for high in heaven’s abodes</p>
+<p>Himself resides, a God among the Gods;</p>
+<p>There, in the bright assemblies of the skies,</p>
+<p>He nectar quaffs, and Hebe crowns his joys.</p>
+</div>
+</div>
+
+<div class="FN"><p><a id="FN-251"></a><a href="#FNA-251"><sup>251</sup></a> They are said to have been the first workers in iron.
+They were called IdÊi, because they inhabited about Mount Ida in Crete,
+and Dactyli, from <span class="greek">Ύᜱκτυλοι</span> (the fingers), their number being five.</p>
+</div>
+
+<div class="FN"><p><a id="FN-252"></a><a href="#FNA-252"><sup>252</sup></a> From whom, some say, the city of that name was called.</p>
+</div>
+
+<div class="FN"><p><a id="FN-253"></a><a href="#FNA-253"><sup>253</sup></a> CapedunculÊ seem to have been bowls or cups, with handles
+on each side, set apart for the use of the altar.—<span class="sc">Davis</span>.</p>
+</div>
+
+<div class="FN"><p><a id="FN-254"></a><a href="#FNA-254"><sup>254</sup></a> See Cicero de Divinatione, and Ovid. Fast.</p>
+</div>
+
+<div class="FN"><p><a id="FN-255"></a><a href="#FNA-255"><sup>255</sup></a> In the consulship of Piso and Gabinius sacrifices to
+Serapis and Isis were prohibited in Rome; but the Roman people afterward
+placed them again in the number of their gods. See Tertullian’s Apol.
+and his first book Ad Nationes, and Arnobius, lib. 2.—<span class="sc">Davis</span>.</p>
+</div>
+
+<div class="FN"><p><a id="FN-256"></a><a href="#FNA-256"><sup>256</sup></a> In some copies Circe, Pasiphae, and Æa are mentioned
+together; but Æa is rejected by the most judicious editors.</p>
+</div>
+
+<div class="FN"><p><a id="FN-257"></a><a href="#FNA-257"><sup>257</sup></a> They were three, and are said to have averted a plague by
+offering themselves a sacrifice.</p>
+</div>
+
+<div class="FN"><p><a id="FN-258"></a><a href="#FNA-258"><sup>258</sup></a> So called from the Greek word <span class="greek">ΞαυΌᜱζω</span>, to wonder.</p>
+</div>
+
+<div class="FN"><p><a id="FN-259"></a><a href="#FNA-259"><sup>259</sup></a> She was first called Geres, from <i>gero</i>, to bear.</p>
+</div>
+
+<div class="FN"><p><a id="FN-260"></a><a href="#FNA-260"><sup>260</sup></a> The word is <i>precatione</i>, which means the books or forms
+of prayers used by the augurs.</p>
+</div>
+
+<div class="FN"><p><a id="FN-261"></a><a href="#FNA-261"><sup>261</sup></a> Cotta’s intent here, as well as in other places, is to
+show how unphilosophical their civil theology was, and with what
+confusions it was embarrassed; which design of the Academic the reader
+should carefully keep in view, or he will lose the chain of argument.</p>
+</div>
+
+<div class="FN"><p><a id="FN-262"></a><a href="#FNA-262"><sup>262</sup></a> Anactes, <span class="greek">ጌΜακτες</span>, was a general name for all kings, as we
+find in the oldest Greek writers, and particularly in Homer.</p>
+</div>
+
+<div class="FN"><p><a id="FN-263"></a><a href="#FNA-263"><sup>263</sup></a> The common reading is Aleo; but we follow Lambinus and
+Davis, who had the authority of the best manuscript copies.</p>
+</div>
+
+<div class="FN"><p><a id="FN-264"></a><a href="#FNA-264"><sup>264</sup></a> Some prefer Phthas to Opas (see Dr. Davis’s edition); but
+Opas is the generally received reading.</p>
+</div>
+
+<div class="FN"><p><a id="FN-265"></a><a href="#FNA-265"><sup>265</sup></a> The Lipari Isles.</p>
+</div>
+
+<div class="FN"><p><a id="FN-266"></a><a href="#FNA-266"><sup>266</sup></a> A town in Arcadia.</p>
+</div>
+
+<div class="FN"><p><a id="FN-267"></a><a href="#FNA-267"><sup>267</sup></a> In Arcadia.</p>
+</div>
+
+<div class="FN"><p><a id="FN-268"></a><a href="#FNA-268"><sup>268</sup></a> A northern people.</p>
+</div>
+
+<div class="FN"><p><a id="FN-269"></a><a href="#FNA-269"><sup>269</sup></a> So called from the Greek word <span class="greek">Μ᜹Όος</span>, <i>lex</i>, a law.</p>
+</div>
+
+<div class="FN"><p><a id="FN-270"></a><a href="#FNA-270"><sup>270</sup></a> He is called <span class="greek">ᜮπις</span> in some old Greek fragments, and <span class="greek">Ο᜖πις</span> by Callimachus in his hymn on Diana.</p>
+</div>
+
+<div class="FN"><p><a id="FN-271"></a><a href="#FNA-271"><sup>271</sup></a> <span class="greek">Σαβᜱζ᜷ος</span>, Sabazius, is one of the names used for
+Bacchus.</p>
+</div>
+
+<div class="FN"><p><a id="FN-272"></a><a href="#FNA-272"><sup>272</sup></a> Here is a wide chasm in the original. What is lost
+probably may have contained great part of Cotta’s arguments against the
+providence of the Stoics.</p>
+</div>
+
+<div class="FN"><p><a id="FN-273"></a><a href="#FNA-273"><sup>273</sup></a> Here is one expression in the quotation from CÊcilius
+that is not commonly met with, which is <i>prÊstigias prÊstrinxit;</i>
+Lambinus gives <i>prÊstinxit</i>, for the sake, I suppose, of playing on
+words, because it might then be translated, “He has deluded my
+delusions, or stratagems;” but <i>prÊstrinxit</i> is certainly the right
+reading.</p>
+</div>
+
+<div class="FN"><p><a id="FN-274"></a><a href="#FNA-274"><sup>274</sup></a> The ancient Romans had a judicial as well as a military
+prÊtor; and he sat, with inferior judges attending him, like one of our
+chief-justices. <i>Sessum it prÊtor</i>, which I doubt not is the right
+reading, Lambinus restored from an old copy. The common reading was
+<i>sessum ite precor</i>.</p>
+</div>
+
+<div class="FN"><p><a id="FN-275"></a><a href="#FNA-275"><sup>275</sup></a> Picenum was a region of Italy.</p>
+</div>
+
+<div class="FN"><p><a id="FN-276"></a><a href="#FNA-276"><sup>276</sup></a> The <i>sex primi</i> were general receivers of all taxes and
+tributes; and they were obliged to make good, out of their own fortunes,
+whatever deficiencies were in the public treasury.</p>
+</div>
+
+<div class="FN"><p><a id="FN-277"></a><a href="#FNA-277"><sup>277</sup></a> The LÊtorian Law was a security for those under age
+against extortioners, etc. By this law all debts contracted under
+twenty-five years of age were void.</p>
+</div>
+
+<div class="FN"><p><a id="FN-278"></a><a href="#FNA-278"><sup>278</sup></a> This is from Ennius—</p>
+
+<div class="poem">
+<p>Utinam ne in nemore Pelio securibus</p>
+<p>CÊsa cecidisset abiegna ad terram trabes.</p>
+</div>
+
+<p>Translated from the beginning of the Medea of Euripides—</p>
+
+<div class="poem">
+<p><span class="greek">Μ᜵Ύ’ ጐΜ Μᜱπαισι Πηλ᜷οΜ πεσεῖΜ ποτε</span></p>
+<p><span class="greek">τΌηΞεῖσα πε᜻κη.</span></p>
+</div>
+</div>
+
+<div class="FN"><p><a id="FN-279"></a><a href="#FNA-279"><sup>279</sup></a> Q. Fabius Maximus, surnamed Cunctator.</p>
+</div>
+
+<div class="FN"><p><a id="FN-280"></a><a href="#FNA-280"><sup>280</sup></a> Diogenes Laertius says he was pounded to death in a stone
+mortar by command of Nicocreon, tyrant of Cyprus.</p>
+</div>
+
+<div class="FN"><p><a id="FN-281"></a><a href="#FNA-281"><sup>281</sup></a> Elea, a city of Lucania, in Italy. The manner in which
+Zeno was put to death is, according to Diogenes Laertius, uncertain.</p>
+</div>
+
+<div class="FN"><p><a id="FN-282"></a><a href="#FNA-282"><sup>282</sup></a> This great and good man was accused of destroying the
+divinity of the Gods of his country. He was condemned, and died by
+drinking a glass of poison.</p>
+</div>
+
+<div class="FN"><p><a id="FN-283"></a><a href="#FNA-283"><sup>283</sup></a> Tyrant of Sicily.</p>
+</div>
+
+<div class="FN"><p><a id="FN-284"></a><a href="#FNA-284"><sup>284</sup></a> The common reading is, <i>in tympanidis rogum inlatus est</i>.
+This passage has been the occasion of as many different opinions
+concerning both the reading and the sense as any passage in the whole
+treatise. <i>Tympanum</i> is used for a timbrel or drum, <i>tympanidia</i> a
+diminutive of it. Lambinus says <i>tympana</i> “were sticks with which the
+tyrant used to beat the condemned.” P. Victorius substitutes
+<i>tyrannidis</i> for <i>tympanidis</i>.</p>
+</div>
+
+<div class="FN"><p><a id="FN-285"></a><a href="#FNA-285"><sup>285</sup></a> The original is <i>de amissa salute;</i> which means the
+sentence of banishment among the Romans, in which was contained the loss
+of goods and estate, and the privileges of a Roman; and in this sense
+L’Abbé d’Olivet translates it.</p>
+</div>
+
+<div class="FN"><p><a id="FN-286"></a><a href="#FNA-286"><sup>286</sup></a> The forty-seventh proposition of the first book of Euclid
+is unanimously ascribed to him by the ancients. Dr. Wotton, in his
+Reflections upon Ancient and Modern Learning, says, “It is indeed a very
+noble proposition, the foundation of trigonometry, of universal and
+various use in those curious speculations about incommensurable
+numbers.”</p>
+</div>
+
+<div class="FN"><p><a id="FN-287"></a><a href="#FNA-287"><sup>287</sup></a> These votive tables, or pictures, were hung up in the
+temples.</p>
+</div>
+
+<div class="FN"><p><a id="FN-288"></a><a href="#FNA-288"><sup>288</sup></a> This passage is a fragment from a tragedy of Attius.</p>
+</div>
+
+<div class="FN"><p><a id="FN-289"></a><a href="#FNA-289"><sup>289</sup></a> Hipponax was a poet at Ephesus, and so deformed that
+Bupalus drew a picture of him to provoke laughter; for which Hipponax is
+said to have written such keen iambics on the painter that he hanged
+himself.</p>
+
+<p>Lycambes had promised Archilochus the poet to marry his daughter to him,
+but afterward retracted his promise, and refused her; upon which
+Archilochus is said to have published a satire in iambic verse that
+provoked him to hang himself.</p>
+</div>
+
+<div class="FN"><p><a id="FN-290"></a><a href="#FNA-290"><sup>290</sup></a> Cicero refers here to an oracle approving of his laws,
+and promising Sparta prosperity as long as they were obeyed, which
+Lycurgus procured from Delphi.</p>
+</div>
+
+<div class="FN"><p><a id="FN-291"></a><a href="#FNA-291"><sup>291</sup></a> <i>Pro aris et focis</i> is a proverbial expression. The
+Romans, when they would say their all was at stake, could not express it
+stronger than by saying they contended <i>pro aris et focis</i>, for religion
+and their firesides, or, as we express it, for religion and property.</p>
+</div>
+
+<div class="FN"><p><a id="FN-292"></a><a href="#FNA-292"><sup>292</sup></a> Cicero, who was an Academic, gives his opinion according
+to the manner of the Academics, who looked upon probability, and a
+resemblance of truth, as the utmost they could arrive at.</p>
+</div>
+
+<div class="FN"><p><a id="FN-293"></a><a href="#FNA-293"><sup>293</sup></a> <i>I.e.</i>, Regulus.</p>
+</div>
+
+<div class="FN"><p><a id="FN-294"></a><a href="#FNA-294"><sup>294</sup></a> <i>I.e.</i>, Fabius.</p>
+</div>
+
+<div class="FN"><p><a id="FN-295"></a><a href="#FNA-295"><sup>295</sup></a> It is unnecessary to give an account of the other names
+here mentioned; but that of LÊnas is probably less known. He was Publius
+Popillius LÊnas, consul 132 <span class="sc">b.c.</span>, the year after the death of Tiberius
+Gracchus, and it became his duty to prosecute the accomplices of
+Gracchus, for which he was afterward attacked by Caius Gracchus with
+such animosity that he withdrew into voluntary exile. Cicero pays a
+tribute to the energy of Opimius in the first Oration against Catiline,
+c. iii.</p>
+</div>
+
+<div class="FN"><p><a id="FN-296"></a><a href="#FNA-296"><sup>296</sup></a> This phenomenon of the parhelion, or mock sun, which so
+puzzled Cicero’s interlocutors, has been very satisfactorily explained
+by modern science. The parhelia are formed by the reflection of the
+sunbeams on a cloud properly situated. They usually accompany the
+coronÊ, or luminous circles, and are placed in the same circumference,
+and at the same height. Their colors resemble that of the rainbow; the
+red and yellow are towards the side of the sun, and the blue and violet
+on the other. There are, however, coronÊ sometimes seen without
+parhelia, and <i>vice versâ</i>. Parhelia are double, triple, etc., and in
+1629, a parhelion of five suns was seen at Rome, and another of six suns
+at Arles, 1666.</p>
+</div>
+
+<div class="FN"><p><a id="FN-297"></a><a href="#FNA-297"><sup>297</sup></a> There is a little uncertainty as to what this age was,
+but it was probably about twenty-five.</p>
+</div>
+
+<div class="FN"><p><a id="FN-298"></a><a href="#FNA-298"><sup>298</sup></a> Cicero here gives a very exact and correct account of the
+planetarium of Archimedes, which is so often noticed by the ancient
+astronomers. It no doubt corresponded in a great measure to our modern
+planetarium, or orrery, invented by the earl of that name. This
+elaborate machine, whose manufacture requires the most exact and
+critical science, is of the greatest service to those who study the
+revolutions of the stars, for astronomic, astrologic, or meteorologic
+purposes.</p>
+</div>
+
+<div class="FN"><p><a id="FN-299"></a><a href="#FNA-299"><sup>299</sup></a> The end of the fourteenth chapter and the first words of
+the fifteenth are lost; but it is plain that in the fifteenth it is
+Scipio who is speaking.</p>
+</div>
+
+<div class="FN"><p><a id="FN-300"></a><a href="#FNA-300"><sup>300</sup></a> There is evidently some error in the text here, for
+Ennius was born 515 <span class="sc">a.u.c.</span>, was a personal friend of the elder
+Africanus, and died about 575 <span class="sc">a.u.c.</span>, so that it is plain that we ought
+to read in the text 550, not 350.</p>
+</div>
+
+<div class="FN"><p><a id="FN-301"></a><a href="#FNA-301"><sup>301</sup></a> Two pages are lost here. Afterward it is again Scipio who
+is speaking.</p>
+</div>
+
+<div class="FN"><p><a id="FN-302"></a><a href="#FNA-302"><sup>302</sup></a> Two pages are lost here.</p>
+</div>
+
+<div class="FN"><p><a id="FN-303"></a><a href="#FNA-303"><sup>303</sup></a> Both Ennius and NÊvius wrote tragedies called
+“Iphigenia.” Mai thinks the text here corrupt, and expresses some doubt
+whether there is a quotation here at all.</p>
+</div>
+
+<div class="FN"><p><a id="FN-304"></a><a href="#FNA-304"><sup>304</sup></a> He means Scipio himself.</p>
+</div>
+
+<div class="FN"><p><a id="FN-305"></a><a href="#FNA-305"><sup>305</sup></a> There is again a hiatus. What follows is spoken by
+LÊlius.</p>
+</div>
+
+<div class="FN"><p><a id="FN-306"></a><a href="#FNA-306"><sup>306</sup></a> Again two pages are lost.</p>
+</div>
+
+<div class="FN"><p><a id="FN-307"></a><a href="#FNA-307"><sup>307</sup></a> Again two pages are lost. It is evident that Scipio is
+speaking again in cap. xxxi.</p>
+</div>
+
+<div class="FN"><p><a id="FN-308"></a><a href="#FNA-308"><sup>308</sup></a> Again two pages are lost.</p>
+</div>
+
+<div class="FN"><p><a id="FN-309"></a><a href="#FNA-309"><sup>309</sup></a> Again two pages are lost.</p>
+</div>
+
+<div class="FN"><p><a id="FN-310"></a><a href="#FNA-310"><sup>310</sup></a> Here four pages are lost.</p>
+</div>
+
+<div class="FN"><p><a id="FN-311"></a><a href="#FNA-311"><sup>311</sup></a> Here four pages are lost.</p>
+</div>
+
+<div class="FN"><p><a id="FN-312"></a><a href="#FNA-312"><sup>312</sup></a> Two pages are missing here.</p>
+</div>
+
+<div class="FN"><p><a id="FN-313"></a><a href="#FNA-313"><sup>313</sup></a> A name of Neptune.</p>
+</div>
+
+<div class="FN"><p><a id="FN-314"></a><a href="#FNA-314"><sup>314</sup></a> About seven lines are lost here, and there is a great
+deal of corruption and imperfection in the next few sentences.</p>
+</div>
+
+<div class="FN"><p><a id="FN-315"></a><a href="#FNA-315"><sup>315</sup></a> Two pages are lost here.</p>
+</div>
+
+<div class="FN"><p><a id="FN-316"></a><a href="#FNA-316"><sup>316</sup></a> The <i>Lex Curiata de Imperio</i>, so often mentioned here,
+was the same as the <i>Auctoritas Patrum</i>, and was necessary in order to
+confer upon the dictator, consuls, and other magistrates the <i>imperium</i>,
+or military command: without this they had only a <i>potestas</i>, or civil
+authority, and could not meddle with military affairs.</p>
+</div>
+
+<div class="FN"><p><a id="FN-317"></a><a href="#FNA-317"><sup>317</sup></a> Two pages are missing here.</p>
+</div>
+
+<div class="FN"><p><a id="FN-318"></a><a href="#FNA-318"><sup>318</sup></a> Here two pages are missing.</p>
+</div>
+
+<div class="FN"><p><a id="FN-319"></a><a href="#FNA-319"><sup>319</sup></a> I have translated this very corrupt passage according to
+Niebuhr’s emendation.</p>
+</div>
+
+<div class="FN"><p><a id="FN-320"></a><a href="#FNA-320"><sup>320</sup></a> Assiduus, ab Êre dando.</p>
+</div>
+
+<div class="FN"><p><a id="FN-321"></a><a href="#FNA-321"><sup>321</sup></a> Proletarii, a prole.</p>
+</div>
+
+<div class="FN"><p><a id="FN-322"></a><a href="#FNA-322"><sup>322</sup></a> Here four pages are missing.</p>
+</div>
+
+<div class="FN"><p><a id="FN-323"></a><a href="#FNA-323"><sup>323</sup></a> Two pages are missing here.</p>
+</div>
+
+<div class="FN"><p><a id="FN-324"></a><a href="#FNA-324"><sup>324</sup></a> Two pages are missing here.</p>
+</div>
+
+<div class="FN"><p><a id="FN-325"></a><a href="#FNA-325"><sup>325</sup></a> Here twelve pages are missing.</p>
+</div>
+
+<div class="FN"><p><a id="FN-326"></a><a href="#FNA-326"><sup>326</sup></a> Sixteen pages are missing here.</p>
+</div>
+
+<div class="FN"><p><a id="FN-327"></a><a href="#FNA-327"><sup>327</sup></a> Here eight pages are missing.</p>
+</div>
+
+<div class="FN"><p><a id="FN-328"></a><a href="#FNA-328"><sup>328</sup></a> A great many pages are missing here.</p>
+</div>
+
+<div class="FN"><p><a id="FN-329"></a><a href="#FNA-329"><sup>329</sup></a> Several pages are lost here; the passage in brackets is
+found in Nonius under the word “exulto.”</p>
+</div>
+
+<div class="FN"><p><a id="FN-330"></a><a href="#FNA-330"><sup>330</sup></a> This and other chapters printed in smaller type are
+generally presumed to be of doubtful authenticity.</p>
+</div>
+
+<div class="FN"><p><a id="FN-331"></a><a href="#FNA-331"><sup>331</sup></a> The beginning of this book is lost. The two first
+paragraphs come, the one from St. Augustine, the other from Lactantius.</p>
+</div>
+
+<div class="FN"><p><a id="FN-332"></a><a href="#FNA-332"><sup>332</sup></a> Eight or nine pages are lost here.</p>
+</div>
+
+<div class="FN"><p><a id="FN-333"></a><a href="#FNA-333"><sup>333</sup></a> Here six pages are lost.</p>
+</div>
+
+<div class="FN"><p><a id="FN-334"></a><a href="#FNA-334"><sup>334</sup></a> Here twelve pages are missing.</p>
+</div>
+
+<div class="FN"><p><a id="FN-335"></a><a href="#FNA-335"><sup>335</sup></a> We have been obliged to insert two or three of these
+sentences between brackets, which are not found in the original, for the
+sake of showing the drift of the arguments of Philus. He himself was
+fully convinced that justice and morality were of eternal and immutable
+obligation, and that the best interests of all beings lie in their
+perpetual development and application. This eternity of Justice is
+beautifully illustrated by Montesquieu. “Long,” says he, “before
+positive laws were instituted, the moral relations of justice were
+absolute and universal. To say that there were no justice or injustice
+but that which depends on the injunctions or prohibitions of positive
+laws, is to say that the radii which spring from a centre are not equal
+till we have formed a circle to illustrate the proposition. We must,
+therefore, acknowledge that the relations of equity were antecedent to
+the positive laws which corroborated them.” But though Philus was fully
+convinced of this, in order to give his friends Scipio and LÊlius an
+opportunity of proving it, he frankly brings forward every argument for
+injustice that sophistry had ever cast in the teeth of reason.—<i>By the
+original Translator</i>.</p>
+</div>
+
+<div class="FN"><p><a id="FN-336"></a><a href="#FNA-336"><sup>336</sup></a> Here four pages are missing. The following sentence is
+preserved in Nonius.</p>
+</div>
+
+<div class="FN"><p><a id="FN-337"></a><a href="#FNA-337"><sup>337</sup></a> Two pages are missing here.</p>
+</div>
+
+<div class="FN"><p><a id="FN-338"></a><a href="#FNA-338"><sup>338</sup></a> Several pages are missing here.</p>
+</div>
+
+<div class="FN"><p><a id="FN-339"></a><a href="#FNA-339"><sup>339</sup></a> He means Alexander the Great.</p>
+</div>
+
+<div class="FN"><p><a id="FN-340"></a><a href="#FNA-340"><sup>340</sup></a> Six or eight pages are lost here.</p>
+</div>
+
+<div class="FN"><p><a id="FN-341"></a><a href="#FNA-341"><sup>341</sup></a> A great many pages are missing here.</p>
+</div>
+
+<div class="FN"><p><a id="FN-342"></a><a href="#FNA-342"><sup>342</sup></a> Six or eight pages are missing here.</p>
+</div>
+
+<div class="FN"><p><a id="FN-343"></a><a href="#FNA-343"><sup>343</sup></a> Several pages are lost here.</p>
+</div>
+
+<div class="FN"><p><a id="FN-344"></a><a href="#FNA-344"><sup>344</sup></a> This and the following chapters are not the actual words
+of Cicero, but quotations by Lactantius and Augustine of what they
+affirm that he said.</p>
+</div>
+
+<div class="FN"><p><a id="FN-345"></a><a href="#FNA-345"><sup>345</sup></a> Twelve pages are missing here.</p>
+</div>
+
+<div class="FN"><p><a id="FN-346"></a><a href="#FNA-346"><sup>346</sup></a> Eight pages are missing here.</p>
+</div>
+
+<div class="FN"><p><a id="FN-347"></a><a href="#FNA-347"><sup>347</sup></a> Six or eight pages are missing here.</p>
+</div>
+
+<div class="FN"><p><a id="FN-348"></a><a href="#FNA-348"><sup>348</sup></a> Catadupa, from <span class="greek">κατᜰ</span> and <span class="greek">Ύοῖπος</span>, noise.</p>
+</div>
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+<pre>
+
+
+
+
+
+End of the Project Gutenberg EBook of Cicero's Tusculan Disputations
+by Marcus Tullius Cicero
+
+*** END OF THIS PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK CICERO'S TUSCULAN DISPUTATIONS ***
+
+***** This file should be named 14988-h.htm or 14988-h.zip *****
+This and all associated files of various formats will be found in:
+        https://www.gutenberg.org/1/4/9/8/14988/
+
+Produced by Ted Garvin, Hagen von Eitzen and the PG Online Distributed
+Proofreading Team.
+
+
+Updated editions will replace the previous one--the old editions
+will be renamed.
+
+Creating the works from public domain print editions means that no
+one owns a United States copyright in these works, so the Foundation
+(and you!) can copy and distribute it in the United States without
+permission and without paying copyright royalties.  Special rules,
+set forth in the General Terms of Use part of this license, apply to
+copying and distributing Project Gutenberg-tm electronic works to
+protect the PROJECT GUTENBERG-tm concept and trademark.  Project
+Gutenberg is a registered trademark, and may not be used if you
+charge for the eBooks, unless you receive specific permission.  If you
+do not charge anything for copies of this eBook, complying with the
+rules is very easy.  You may use this eBook for nearly any purpose
+such as creation of derivative works, reports, performances and
+research.  They may be modified and printed and given away--you may do
+practically ANYTHING with public domain eBooks.  Redistribution is
+subject to the trademark license, especially commercial
+redistribution.
+
+
+
+*** START: FULL LICENSE ***
+
+THE FULL PROJECT GUTENBERG LICENSE
+PLEASE READ THIS BEFORE YOU DISTRIBUTE OR USE THIS WORK
+
+To protect the Project Gutenberg-tm mission of promoting the free
+distribution of electronic works, by using or distributing this work
+(or any other work associated in any way with the phrase "Project
+Gutenberg"), you agree to comply with all the terms of the Full Project
+Gutenberg-tm License (available with this file or online at
+https://gutenberg.org/license).
+
+
+Section 1.  General Terms of Use and Redistributing Project Gutenberg-tm
+electronic works
+
+1.A.  By reading or using any part of this Project Gutenberg-tm
+electronic work, you indicate that you have read, understand, agree to
+and accept all the terms of this license and intellectual property
+(trademark/copyright) agreement.  If you do not agree to abide by all
+the terms of this agreement, you must cease using and return or destroy
+all copies of Project Gutenberg-tm electronic works in your possession.
+If you paid a fee for obtaining a copy of or access to a Project
+Gutenberg-tm electronic work and you do not agree to be bound by the
+terms of this agreement, you may obtain a refund from the person or
+entity to whom you paid the fee as set forth in paragraph 1.E.8.
+
+1.B.  "Project Gutenberg" is a registered trademark.  It may only be
+used on or associated in any way with an electronic work by people who
+agree to be bound by the terms of this agreement.  There are a few
+things that you can do with most Project Gutenberg-tm electronic works
+even without complying with the full terms of this agreement.  See
+paragraph 1.C below.  There are a lot of things you can do with Project
+Gutenberg-tm electronic works if you follow the terms of this agreement
+and help preserve free future access to Project Gutenberg-tm electronic
+works.  See paragraph 1.E below.
+
+1.C.  The Project Gutenberg Literary Archive Foundation ("the Foundation"
+or PGLAF), owns a compilation copyright in the collection of Project
+Gutenberg-tm electronic works.  Nearly all the individual works in the
+collection are in the public domain in the United States.  If an
+individual work is in the public domain in the United States and you are
+located in the United States, we do not claim a right to prevent you from
+copying, distributing, performing, displaying or creating derivative
+works based on the work as long as all references to Project Gutenberg
+are removed.  Of course, we hope that you will support the Project
+Gutenberg-tm mission of promoting free access to electronic works by
+freely sharing Project Gutenberg-tm works in compliance with the terms of
+this agreement for keeping the Project Gutenberg-tm name associated with
+the work.  You can easily comply with the terms of this agreement by
+keeping this work in the same format with its attached full Project
+Gutenberg-tm License when you share it without charge with others.
+
+1.D.  The copyright laws of the place where you are located also govern
+what you can do with this work.  Copyright laws in most countries are in
+a constant state of change.  If you are outside the United States, check
+the laws of your country in addition to the terms of this agreement
+before downloading, copying, displaying, performing, distributing or
+creating derivative works based on this work or any other Project
+Gutenberg-tm work.  The Foundation makes no representations concerning
+the copyright status of any work in any country outside the United
+States.
+
+1.E.  Unless you have removed all references to Project Gutenberg:
+
+1.E.1.  The following sentence, with active links to, or other immediate
+access to, the full Project Gutenberg-tm License must appear prominently
+whenever any copy of a Project Gutenberg-tm work (any work on which the
+phrase "Project Gutenberg" appears, or with which the phrase "Project
+Gutenberg" is associated) is accessed, displayed, performed, viewed,
+copied or distributed:
+
+This eBook is for the use of anyone anywhere at no cost and with
+almost no restrictions whatsoever.  You may copy it, give it away or
+re-use it under the terms of the Project Gutenberg License included
+with this eBook or online at www.gutenberg.org
+
+1.E.2.  If an individual Project Gutenberg-tm electronic work is derived
+from the public domain (does not contain a notice indicating that it is
+posted with permission of the copyright holder), the work can be copied
+and distributed to anyone in the United States without paying any fees
+or charges.  If you are redistributing or providing access to a work
+with the phrase "Project Gutenberg" associated with or appearing on the
+work, you must comply either with the requirements of paragraphs 1.E.1
+through 1.E.7 or obtain permission for the use of the work and the
+Project Gutenberg-tm trademark as set forth in paragraphs 1.E.8 or
+1.E.9.
+
+1.E.3.  If an individual Project Gutenberg-tm electronic work is posted
+with the permission of the copyright holder, your use and distribution
+must comply with both paragraphs 1.E.1 through 1.E.7 and any additional
+terms imposed by the copyright holder.  Additional terms will be linked
+to the Project Gutenberg-tm License for all works posted with the
+permission of the copyright holder found at the beginning of this work.
+
+1.E.4.  Do not unlink or detach or remove the full Project Gutenberg-tm
+License terms from this work, or any files containing a part of this
+work or any other work associated with Project Gutenberg-tm.
+
+1.E.5.  Do not copy, display, perform, distribute or redistribute this
+electronic work, or any part of this electronic work, without
+prominently displaying the sentence set forth in paragraph 1.E.1 with
+active links or immediate access to the full terms of the Project
+Gutenberg-tm License.
+
+1.E.6.  You may convert to and distribute this work in any binary,
+compressed, marked up, nonproprietary or proprietary form, including any
+word processing or hypertext form.  However, if you provide access to or
+distribute copies of a Project Gutenberg-tm work in a format other than
+"Plain Vanilla ASCII" or other format used in the official version
+posted on the official Project Gutenberg-tm web site (www.gutenberg.org),
+you must, at no additional cost, fee or expense to the user, provide a
+copy, a means of exporting a copy, or a means of obtaining a copy upon
+request, of the work in its original "Plain Vanilla ASCII" or other
+form.  Any alternate format must include the full Project Gutenberg-tm
+License as specified in paragraph 1.E.1.
+
+1.E.7.  Do not charge a fee for access to, viewing, displaying,
+performing, copying or distributing any Project Gutenberg-tm works
+unless you comply with paragraph 1.E.8 or 1.E.9.
+
+1.E.8.  You may charge a reasonable fee for copies of or providing
+access to or distributing Project Gutenberg-tm electronic works provided
+that
+
+- You pay a royalty fee of 20% of the gross profits you derive from
+     the use of Project Gutenberg-tm works calculated using the method
+     you already use to calculate your applicable taxes.  The fee is
+     owed to the owner of the Project Gutenberg-tm trademark, but he
+     has agreed to donate royalties under this paragraph to the
+     Project Gutenberg Literary Archive Foundation.  Royalty payments
+     must be paid within 60 days following each date on which you
+     prepare (or are legally required to prepare) your periodic tax
+     returns.  Royalty payments should be clearly marked as such and
+     sent to the Project Gutenberg Literary Archive Foundation at the
+     address specified in Section 4, "Information about donations to
+     the Project Gutenberg Literary Archive Foundation."
+
+- You provide a full refund of any money paid by a user who notifies
+     you in writing (or by e-mail) within 30 days of receipt that s/he
+     does not agree to the terms of the full Project Gutenberg-tm
+     License.  You must require such a user to return or
+     destroy all copies of the works possessed in a physical medium
+     and discontinue all use of and all access to other copies of
+     Project Gutenberg-tm works.
+
+- You provide, in accordance with paragraph 1.F.3, a full refund of any
+     money paid for a work or a replacement copy, if a defect in the
+     electronic work is discovered and reported to you within 90 days
+     of receipt of the work.
+
+- You comply with all other terms of this agreement for free
+     distribution of Project Gutenberg-tm works.
+
+1.E.9.  If you wish to charge a fee or distribute a Project Gutenberg-tm
+electronic work or group of works on different terms than are set
+forth in this agreement, you must obtain permission in writing from
+both the Project Gutenberg Literary Archive Foundation and Michael
+Hart, the owner of the Project Gutenberg-tm trademark.  Contact the
+Foundation as set forth in Section 3 below.
+
+1.F.
+
+1.F.1.  Project Gutenberg volunteers and employees expend considerable
+effort to identify, do copyright research on, transcribe and proofread
+public domain works in creating the Project Gutenberg-tm
+collection.  Despite these efforts, Project Gutenberg-tm electronic
+works, and the medium on which they may be stored, may contain
+"Defects," such as, but not limited to, incomplete, inaccurate or
+corrupt data, transcription errors, a copyright or other intellectual
+property infringement, a defective or damaged disk or other medium, a
+computer virus, or computer codes that damage or cannot be read by
+your equipment.
+
+1.F.2.  LIMITED WARRANTY, DISCLAIMER OF DAMAGES - Except for the "Right
+of Replacement or Refund" described in paragraph 1.F.3, the Project
+Gutenberg Literary Archive Foundation, the owner of the Project
+Gutenberg-tm trademark, and any other party distributing a Project
+Gutenberg-tm electronic work under this agreement, disclaim all
+liability to you for damages, costs and expenses, including legal
+fees.  YOU AGREE THAT YOU HAVE NO REMEDIES FOR NEGLIGENCE, STRICT
+LIABILITY, BREACH OF WARRANTY OR BREACH OF CONTRACT EXCEPT THOSE
+PROVIDED IN PARAGRAPH F3.  YOU AGREE THAT THE FOUNDATION, THE
+TRADEMARK OWNER, AND ANY DISTRIBUTOR UNDER THIS AGREEMENT WILL NOT BE
+LIABLE TO YOU FOR ACTUAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, CONSEQUENTIAL, PUNITIVE OR
+INCIDENTAL DAMAGES EVEN IF YOU GIVE NOTICE OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH
+DAMAGE.
+
+1.F.3.  LIMITED RIGHT OF REPLACEMENT OR REFUND - If you discover a
+defect in this electronic work within 90 days of receiving it, you can
+receive a refund of the money (if any) you paid for it by sending a
+written explanation to the person you received the work from.  If you
+received the work on a physical medium, you must return the medium with
+your written explanation.  The person or entity that provided you with
+the defective work may elect to provide a replacement copy in lieu of a
+refund.  If you received the work electronically, the person or entity
+providing it to you may choose to give you a second opportunity to
+receive the work electronically in lieu of a refund.  If the second copy
+is also defective, you may demand a refund in writing without further
+opportunities to fix the problem.
+
+1.F.4.  Except for the limited right of replacement or refund set forth
+in paragraph 1.F.3, this work is provided to you 'AS-IS' WITH NO OTHER
+WARRANTIES OF ANY KIND, EXPRESS OR IMPLIED, INCLUDING BUT NOT LIMITED TO
+WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTIBILITY OR FITNESS FOR ANY PURPOSE.
+
+1.F.5.  Some states do not allow disclaimers of certain implied
+warranties or the exclusion or limitation of certain types of damages.
+If any disclaimer or limitation set forth in this agreement violates the
+law of the state applicable to this agreement, the agreement shall be
+interpreted to make the maximum disclaimer or limitation permitted by
+the applicable state law.  The invalidity or unenforceability of any
+provision of this agreement shall not void the remaining provisions.
+
+1.F.6.  INDEMNITY - You agree to indemnify and hold the Foundation, the
+trademark owner, any agent or employee of the Foundation, anyone
+providing copies of Project Gutenberg-tm electronic works in accordance
+with this agreement, and any volunteers associated with the production,
+promotion and distribution of Project Gutenberg-tm electronic works,
+harmless from all liability, costs and expenses, including legal fees,
+that arise directly or indirectly from any of the following which you do
+or cause to occur: (a) distribution of this or any Project Gutenberg-tm
+work, (b) alteration, modification, or additions or deletions to any
+Project Gutenberg-tm work, and (c) any Defect you cause.
+
+
+Section  2.  Information about the Mission of Project Gutenberg-tm
+
+Project Gutenberg-tm is synonymous with the free distribution of
+electronic works in formats readable by the widest variety of computers
+including obsolete, old, middle-aged and new computers.  It exists
+because of the efforts of hundreds of volunteers and donations from
+people in all walks of life.
+
+Volunteers and financial support to provide volunteers with the
+assistance they need, is critical to reaching Project Gutenberg-tm's
+goals and ensuring that the Project Gutenberg-tm collection will
+remain freely available for generations to come.  In 2001, the Project
+Gutenberg Literary Archive Foundation was created to provide a secure
+and permanent future for Project Gutenberg-tm and future generations.
+To learn more about the Project Gutenberg Literary Archive Foundation
+and how your efforts and donations can help, see Sections 3 and 4
+and the Foundation web page at https://www.pglaf.org.
+
+
+Section 3.  Information about the Project Gutenberg Literary Archive
+Foundation
+
+The Project Gutenberg Literary Archive Foundation is a non profit
+501(c)(3) educational corporation organized under the laws of the
+state of Mississippi and granted tax exempt status by the Internal
+Revenue Service.  The Foundation's EIN or federal tax identification
+number is 64-6221541.  Its 501(c)(3) letter is posted at
+https://pglaf.org/fundraising.  Contributions to the Project Gutenberg
+Literary Archive Foundation are tax deductible to the full extent
+permitted by U.S. federal laws and your state's laws.
+
+The Foundation's principal office is located at 4557 Melan Dr. S.
+Fairbanks, AK, 99712., but its volunteers and employees are scattered
+throughout numerous locations.  Its business office is located at
+809 North 1500 West, Salt Lake City, UT 84116, (801) 596-1887, email
+business@pglaf.org.  Email contact links and up to date contact
+information can be found at the Foundation's web site and official
+page at https://pglaf.org
+
+For additional contact information:
+     Dr. Gregory B. Newby
+     Chief Executive and Director
+     gbnewby@pglaf.org
+
+
+Section 4.  Information about Donations to the Project Gutenberg
+Literary Archive Foundation
+
+Project Gutenberg-tm depends upon and cannot survive without wide
+spread public support and donations to carry out its mission of
+increasing the number of public domain and licensed works that can be
+freely distributed in machine readable form accessible by the widest
+array of equipment including outdated equipment.  Many small donations
+($1 to $5,000) are particularly important to maintaining tax exempt
+status with the IRS.
+
+The Foundation is committed to complying with the laws regulating
+charities and charitable donations in all 50 states of the United
+States.  Compliance requirements are not uniform and it takes a
+considerable effort, much paperwork and many fees to meet and keep up
+with these requirements.  We do not solicit donations in locations
+where we have not received written confirmation of compliance.  To
+SEND DONATIONS or determine the status of compliance for any
+particular state visit https://pglaf.org
+
+While we cannot and do not solicit contributions from states where we
+have not met the solicitation requirements, we know of no prohibition
+against accepting unsolicited donations from donors in such states who
+approach us with offers to donate.
+
+International donations are gratefully accepted, but we cannot make
+any statements concerning tax treatment of donations received from
+outside the United States.  U.S. laws alone swamp our small staff.
+
+Please check the Project Gutenberg Web pages for current donation
+methods and addresses.  Donations are accepted in a number of other
+ways including including checks, online payments and credit card
+donations.  To donate, please visit: https://pglaf.org/donate
+
+
+Section 5.  General Information About Project Gutenberg-tm electronic
+works.
+
+Professor Michael S. Hart was the originator of the Project Gutenberg-tm
+concept of a library of electronic works that could be freely shared
+with anyone.  For thirty years, he produced and distributed Project
+Gutenberg-tm eBooks with only a loose network of volunteer support.
+
+
+Project Gutenberg-tm eBooks are often created from several printed
+editions, all of which are confirmed as Public Domain in the U.S.
+unless a copyright notice is included.  Thus, we do not necessarily
+keep eBooks in compliance with any particular paper edition.
+
+
+Most people start at our Web site which has the main PG search facility:
+
+     https://www.gutenberg.org
+
+This Web site includes information about Project Gutenberg-tm,
+including how to make donations to the Project Gutenberg Literary
+Archive Foundation, how to help produce our new eBooks, and how to
+subscribe to our email newsletter to hear about new eBooks.
+
+
+</pre>
+
+</body>
+</html>
+
+
+
diff --git a/14988.txt b/14988.txt
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..b4216e9
--- /dev/null
+++ b/14988.txt
@@ -0,0 +1,18517 @@
+Project Gutenberg's Cicero's Tusculan Disputations, by Marcus Tullius Cicero
+
+This eBook is for the use of anyone anywhere at no cost and with
+almost no restrictions whatsoever.  You may copy it, give it away or
+re-use it under the terms of the Project Gutenberg License included
+with this eBook or online at www.gutenberg.org
+
+
+Title: Cicero's Tusculan Disputations
+       Also, Treatises On The Nature Of The Gods, And On The Commonwealth
+
+Author: Marcus Tullius Cicero
+
+Release Date: February 9, 2005 [EBook #14988]
+
+Language: English and Latin
+
+Character set encoding: ASCII
+
+*** START OF THIS PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK CICERO'S TUSCULAN DISPUTATIONS ***
+
+
+
+
+Produced by Ted Garvin, Hagen von Eitzen and the PG Online Distributed
+Proofreading Team.
+
+
+
+
+
+CICERO'S TUSCULAN DISPUTATIONS;
+
+
+
+
+ALSO, TREATISES ON
+
+THE NATURE OF THE GODS,
+
+AND ON
+
+THE COMMONWEALTH.
+
+
+
+
+
+LITERALLY TRANSLATED, CHIEFLY BY
+C. D. YONGE.
+
+
+NEW YORK:
+HARPER & BROTHERS, PUBLISHERS,
+FRANKLIN SQUARE.
+1877.
+
+
+HARPER'S NEW CLASSICAL LIBRARY.
+
+
+COMPRISING LITERAL TRANSLATIONS OF
+
+
+  CAESAR.
+  VIRGIL.
+  SALLUST.
+  HORACE.
+  CICERO'S ORATIONS.
+  CICERO'S OFFICES &c.
+  CICERO ON ORATORY AND ORATORS.
+  CICERO'S TUSCULAN DISPUTATIONS, the Republic, and the Nature of the Gods.
+  TERENCE.
+  TACITUS.
+  LIVY. 2 Vols.
+  JUVENAL.
+  XENOPHON.
+  HOMER'S ILIAD.
+  HOMER'S ODYSSEY.
+  HERODOTUS.
+  DEMOSTHENES. 2 Vols.
+  THUCIDIDES.
+  AESCHYLUS.
+  SOPHOCLES.
+  EURIPIDES. 2 Vols.
+  PLATO. [SELECT DIALOGUES.]
+
+
+12mo, Cloth, $1.50 per Volume.
+
+
+HARPER & BROTHERS _will send either of the above works by mail, postage
+prepaid, to any part of the United States, on receipt of the price_.
+
+
+
+
+
+
+NOTE.
+
+
+The greater portion of the Republic was previously translated by
+Francis Barham, Esq., and published in 1841. Although ably performed,
+it was not sufficiently close for the purpose of the "CLASSICAL
+LIBRARY," and was therefore placed in the hands of the present editor
+for revision, as well as for collation with recent texts. This has
+occasioned material alterations and additions.
+
+The treatise "On the Nature of the Gods" is a revision of that usually
+ascribed to the celebrated Benjamin Franklin.
+
+
+
+
+
+
+CONTENTS.
+
+
+_Tusculan Disputations_
+
+_On the Nature of the Gods_
+
+_On the Commonwealth_
+
+
+
+
+
+
+THE TUSCULAN DISPUTATIONS.
+
+INTRODUCTION.
+
+
+In the year A.U.C. 708, and the sixty-second year of Cicero's age, his
+daughter, Tullia, died in childbed; and her loss afflicted Cicero to
+such a degree that he abandoned all public business, and, leaving the
+city, retired to Asterra, which was a country house that he had near
+Antium; where, after a while, he devoted himself to philosophical
+studies, and, besides other works, he published his Treatise de
+Finibus, and also this treatise called the Tusculan Disputations, of
+which Middleton gives this concise description:
+
+"The first book teaches us how to contemn the terrors of death, and to
+look upon it as a blessing rather than an evil;
+
+"The second, to support pain and affliction with a manly fortitude;
+
+"The third, to appease all our complaints and uneasinesses under the
+accidents of life;
+
+"The fourth, to moderate all our other passions;
+
+"And the fifth explains the sufficiency of virtue to make men happy."
+
+It was his custom in the opportunities of his leisure to take some
+friends with him into the country, where, instead of amusing themselves
+with idle sports or feasts, their diversions were wholly speculative,
+tending to improve the mind and enlarge the understanding. In this
+manner he now spent five days at his Tusculan villa in discussing with
+his friends the several questions just mentioned. For, after employing
+the mornings in declaiming and rhetorical exercises, they used to
+retire in the afternoon into a gallery, called the Academy, which he
+had built for the purpose of philosophical conferences, where, after
+the manner of the Greeks, he held a school, as they called it, and
+invited the company to call for any subject that they desired to hear
+explained, which being proposed accordingly by some of the audience
+became immediately the argument of that day's debate. These five
+conferences, or dialogues, he collected afterward into writing in the
+very words and manner in which they really passed; and published them
+under the title of his Tusculan Disputations, from the name of the
+villa in which they were held.
+
+       *       *       *       *       *
+
+
+
+
+BOOK I.
+
+ON THE CONTEMPT OF DEATH.
+
+
+I. At a time when I had entirely, or to a great degree, released myself
+from my labors as an advocate, and from my duties as a senator, I had
+recourse again, Brutus, principally by your advice, to those studies
+which never had been out of my mind, although neglected at times, and
+which after a long interval I resumed; and now, since the principles
+and rules of all arts which relate to living well depend on the study
+of wisdom, which is called philosophy, I have thought it an employment
+worthy of me to illustrate them in the Latin tongue, not because
+philosophy could not be understood in the Greek language, or by the
+teaching of Greek masters; but it has always been my opinion that our
+countrymen have, in some instances, made wiser discoveries than the
+Greeks, with reference to those subjects which they have considered
+worthy of devoting their attention to, and in others have improved upon
+their discoveries, so that in one way or other we surpass them on every
+point; for, with regard to the manners and habits of private life, and
+family and domestic affairs, we certainly manage them with more
+elegance, and better than they did; and as to our republic, that our
+ancestors have, beyond all dispute, formed on better customs and laws.
+What shall I say of our military affairs; in which our ancestors have
+been most eminent in valor, and still more so in discipline? As to
+those things which are attained not by study, but nature, neither
+Greece, nor any nation, is comparable to us; for what people has
+displayed such gravity, such steadiness, such greatness of soul,
+probity, faith--such distinguished virtue of every kind, as to be equal
+to our ancestors. In learning, indeed, and all kinds of literature,
+Greece did excel us, and it was easy to do so where there was no
+competition; for while among the Greeks the poets were the most ancient
+species of learned men--since Homer and Hesiod lived before the
+foundation of Rome, and Archilochus[1] was a contemporary of
+Romulus--we received poetry much later. For it was about five hundred
+and ten years after the building of Rome before Livius[2] published a
+play in the consulship of C. Claudius, the son of Caecus, and M.
+Tuditanus, a year before the birth of Ennius, who was older than
+Plautus and Naevius.
+
+II. It was, therefore, late before poets were either known or received
+among us; though we find in Cato de Originibus that the guests used, at
+their entertainments, to sing the praises of famous men to the sound of
+the flute; but a speech of Cato's shows this kind of poetry to have
+been in no great esteem, as he censures Marcus Nobilior for carrying
+poets with him into his province; for that consul, as we know, carried
+Ennius with him into AEtolia. Therefore the less esteem poets were in,
+the less were those studies pursued; though even then those who did
+display the greatest abilities that way were not very inferior to the
+Greeks. Do we imagine that if it had been considered commendable in
+Fabius,[3] a man of the highest rank, to paint, we should not have had
+many Polycleti and Parrhasii? Honor nourishes art, and glory is the
+spur with all to studies; while those studies are always neglected in
+every nation which are looked upon disparagingly. The Greeks held skill
+in vocal and instrumental music as a very important accomplishment, and
+therefore it is recorded of Epaminondas, who, in my opinion, was the
+greatest man among the Greeks, that he played excellently on the flute;
+and Themistocles, some years before, was deemed ignorant because at an
+entertainment he declined the lyre when it was offered to him. For this
+reason musicians flourished in Greece; music was a general study; and
+whoever was unacquainted with it was not considered as fully instructed
+in learning. Geometry was in high esteem with them, therefore none were
+more honorable than mathematicians. But we have confined this art to
+bare measuring and calculating.
+
+III. But, on the contrary, we early entertained an esteem for the
+orator; though he was not at first a man of learning, but only quick at
+speaking: in subsequent times he became learned; for it is reported
+that Galba, Africanus, and Laelius were men of learning; and that even
+Cato, who preceded them in point of time, was a studious man: then
+succeeded the Lepidi, Carbo, and Gracchi, and so many great orators
+after them, down to our own times, that we were very little, if at all,
+inferior to the Greeks. Philosophy has been at a low ebb even to this
+present time, and has had no assistance from our own language, and so
+now I have undertaken to raise and illustrate it, in order that, as I
+have been of service to my countrymen, when employed on public affairs,
+I may, if possible, be so likewise in my retirement; and in this I must
+take the more pains, because there are already many books in the Latin
+language which are said to be written inaccurately, having been
+composed by excellent men, only not of sufficient learning; for,
+indeed, it is possible that a man may think well, and yet not be able
+to express his thoughts elegantly; but for any one to publish thoughts
+which he can neither arrange skilfully nor illustrate so as to
+entertain his reader, is an unpardonable abuse of letters and
+retirement: they, therefore, read their books to one another, and no
+one ever takes them up but those who wish to have the same license for
+careless writing allowed to themselves. Wherefore, if oratory has
+acquired any reputation from my industry, I shall take the more pains
+to open the fountains of philosophy, from which all my eloquence has
+taken its rise.
+
+IV. But, as Aristotle,[4] a man of the greatest genius, and of the most
+various knowledge, being excited by the glory of the rhetorician
+Isocrates,[5] commenced teaching young men to speak, and joined
+philosophy with eloquence: so it is my design not to lay aside my
+former study of oratory, and yet to employ myself at the same time in
+this greater and more fruitful art; for I have always thought that to
+be able to speak copiously and elegantly on the most important
+questions was the most perfect philosophy. And I have so diligently
+applied myself to this pursuit, that I have already ventured to have a
+school like the Greeks. And lately when you left us, having many of my
+friends about me, I attempted at my Tusculan villa what I could do in
+that way; for as I formerly used to practise declaiming, which nobody
+continued longer than myself, so this is now to be the declamation of
+my old age. I desired any one to propose a question which he wished to
+have discussed, and then I argued that point either sitting or walking;
+and so I have compiled the scholae, as the Greeks call them, of five
+days, in as many books. We proceeded in this manner: when he who had
+proposed the subject for discussion had said what he thought proper, I
+spoke against him; for this is, you know, the old and Socratic method
+of arguing against another's opinion; for Socrates thought that thus
+the truth would more easily be arrived at. But to give you a better
+notion of our disputations, I will not barely send you an account of
+them, but represent them to you as they were carried on; therefore let
+the introduction be thus:
+
+V. _A._ To me death seems to be an evil.
+
+_M._ What, to those who are already dead? or to those who must die?
+
+_A._ To both.
+
+_M._ It is a misery, then, because an evil?
+
+_A._ Certainly.
+
+_M._ Then those who have already died, and those who have still got to
+die, are both miserable?
+
+_A._ So it appears to me.
+
+_M._ Then all are miserable?
+
+_A._ Every one.
+
+_M._ And, indeed, if you wish to be consistent, all that are already
+born, or ever shall be, are not only miserable, but always will be so;
+for should you maintain those only to be miserable, you would not
+except any one living, for all must die; but there should be an end of
+misery in death. But seeing that the dead are miserable, we are born to
+eternal misery, for they must of consequence be miserable who died a
+hundred thousand years ago; or rather, all that have ever been born.
+
+_A._ So, indeed, I think.
+
+_M._ Tell me, I beseech you, are you afraid of the three-headed
+Cerberus in the shades below, and the roaring waves of Cocytus, and the
+passage over Acheron, and Tantalus expiring with thirst, while the
+water touches his chin; and Sisyphus,
+
+    Who sweats with arduous toil in vain
+    The steepy summit of the mount to gain?
+
+Perhaps, too, you dread the inexorable judges, Minos and Rhadamanthus;
+before whom neither L. Crassus nor M. Antonius can defend you; and
+where, since the cause lies before Grecian judges, you will not even be
+able to employ Demosthenes; but you must plead for yourself before a
+very great assembly. These things perhaps you dread, and therefore look
+on death as an eternal evil.
+
+VI. _A._ Do you take me to be so imbecile as to give credit to such
+things?
+
+_M._ What, do you not believe them?
+
+_A._ Not in the least.
+
+_M._ I am sorry to hear that.
+
+_A._ Why, I beg?
+
+_M._ Because I could have been very eloquent in speaking against them.
+
+_A._ And who could not on such a subject? or what trouble is it to
+refute these monstrous inventions of the poets and painters?[6]
+
+_M._ And yet you have books of philosophers full of arguments against
+these.
+
+_A._ A great waste of time, truly! for who is so weak as to be
+concerned about them?
+
+_M._ If, then, there is no one miserable in the infernal regions, there
+can be no one there at all.
+
+_A._ I am altogether of that opinion.
+
+_M._ Where, then, are those you call miserable? or what place do they
+inhabit? For, if they exist at all, they must be somewhere.
+
+_A._ I, indeed, am of opinion that they are nowhere.
+
+_M._ Then they have no existence at all.
+
+_A._ Even so, and yet they are miserable for this very reason, that
+they have no existence.
+
+_M._ I had rather now have you afraid of Cerberus than speak thus
+inaccurately.
+
+_A._ In what respect?
+
+_M._ Because you admit him to exist whose existence you deny with the
+same breath. Where now is your sagacity? When you say any one is
+miserable, you say that he who does not exist, does exist.
+
+_A._ I am not so absurd as to say that.
+
+_M._ What is it that you do say, then?
+
+_A._ I say, for instance, that Marcus Crassus is miserable in being
+deprived of such great riches as his by death; that Cn. Pompey is
+miserable in being taken from such glory and honor; and, in short, that
+all are miserable who are deprived of this light of life.
+
+_M._ You have returned to the same point, for to be miserable implies
+an existence; but you just now denied that the dead had any existence:
+if, then, they have not, they can be nothing; and if so, they are not
+even miserable.
+
+_A._ Perhaps I do not express what I mean, for I look upon this very
+circumstance, not to exist after having existed, to be very miserable.
+
+_M._ What, more so than not to have existed at all? Therefore, those
+who are not yet born are miserable because they are not; and we
+ourselves, if we are to be miserable after death, were miserable before
+we were born: but I do not remember that I was miserable before I was
+born; and I should be glad to know, if your memory is better, what you
+recollect of yourself before you were born.
+
+VII. _A._ You are pleasant: as if I had said that those men are
+miserable who are not born, and not that they are so who are dead.
+
+_M._ You say, then, that they are so?
+
+_A._ Yes; I say that because they no longer exist after having existed
+they are miserable.
+
+_M._ You do not perceive that you are asserting contradictions; for
+what is a greater contradiction, than that that should be not only
+miserable, but should have any existence at all, which does not exist?
+When you go out at the Capene gate and see the tombs of the Calatini,
+the Scipios, Servilii, and Metelli, do you look on them as miserable?
+
+_A._ Because you press me with a word, henceforward I will not say they
+are miserable absolutely, but miserable on this account, because they
+have no existence.
+
+_M._ You do not say, then, "M. Crassus is miserable," but only
+"Miserable M. Crassus."
+
+_A._ Exactly so.
+
+_M._ As if it did not follow that whatever you speak of in that manner
+either is or is not. Are you not acquainted with the first principles
+of logic? For this is the first thing they lay down, Whatever is
+asserted (for that is the best way that occurs to me, at the moment, of
+rendering the Greek term [Greek: axioma]; if I can think of a more
+accurate expression hereafter, I will use it), is asserted as being
+either true or false. When, therefore, you say, "Miserable M. Crassus,"
+you either say this, "M. Crassus is miserable," so that some judgment
+may be made whether it is true or false, or you say nothing at all.
+
+_A._ Well, then, I now own that the dead are not miserable, since you
+have drawn from me a concession that they who do not exist at all can
+not be miserable. What then? We that are alive, are we not wretched,
+seeing we must die? for what is there agreeable in life, when we must
+night and day reflect that, at some time or other, we must die?
+
+VIII. _M._ Do you not, then, perceive how great is the evil from which
+you have delivered human nature?
+
+_A._ By what means?
+
+_M._ Because, if to die were miserable to the dead, to live would be a
+kind of infinite and eternal misery. Now, however, I see a goal, and
+when I have reached it, there is nothing more to be feared; but you
+seem to me to follow the opinion of Epicharmus,[7] a man of some
+discernment, and sharp enough for a Sicilian.
+
+_A._ What opinion? for I do not recollect it.
+
+_M._ I will tell you if I can in Latin; for you know I am no more used
+to bring in Latin sentences in a Greek discourse than Greek in a Latin
+one.
+
+_A._ And that is right enough. But what is that opinion of Epicharmus?
+
+_M._
+    I would not die, but yet
+    Am not concerned that I shall be dead.
+
+_A._ I now recollect the Greek; but since you have obliged me to grant
+that the dead are not miserable, proceed to convince me that it is not
+miserable to be under a necessity of dying.
+
+_M._ That is easy enough; but I have greater things in hand.
+
+_A._ How comes that to be so easy? And what are those things of more
+consequence?
+
+_M._ Thus: because, if there is no evil after death, then even death
+itself can be none; for that which immediately succeeds that is a state
+where you grant that there is no evil: so that even to be obliged to
+die can be no evil, for that is only the being obliged to arrive at a
+place where we allow that no evil is.
+
+_A._ I beg you will be more explicit on this point, for these subtle
+arguments force me sooner to admissions than to conviction. But what
+are those more important things about which you say that you are
+occupied?
+
+_M._ To teach you, if I can, that death is not only no evil, but a
+good.
+
+_A._ I do not insist on that, but should be glad to hear you argue it,
+for even though you should not prove your point, yet you will prove
+that death is no evil. But I will not interrupt you; I would rather
+hear a continued discourse.
+
+_M._ What, if I should ask you a question, would you not answer?
+
+_A._ That would look like pride; but I would rather you should not ask
+but where necessity requires.
+
+IX. _M._ I will comply with your wishes, and explain as well as I can
+what you require; but not with any idea that, like the Pythian Apollo,
+what I say must needs be certain and indisputable, but as a mere man,
+endeavoring to arrive at probabilities by conjecture, for I have no
+ground to proceed further on than probability. Those men may call their
+statements indisputable who assert that what they say can be perceived
+by the senses, and who proclaim themselves philosophers by profession.
+
+_A._ Do as you please: We are ready to hear you.
+
+_M._ The first thing, then, is to inquire what death, which seems to be
+so well understood, really is; for some imagine death to be the
+departure of the soul from the body; others think that there is no such
+departure, but that soul and body perish together, and that the soul is
+extinguished with the body. Of those who think that the soul does
+depart from the body, some believe in its immediate dissolution; others
+fancy that it continues to exist for a time; and others believe that it
+lasts forever. There is great dispute even what the soul is, where it
+is, and whence it is derived: with some, the heart itself (_cor_) seems
+to be the soul, hence the expressions, _excordes_, _vecordes_,
+_concordes;_ and that prudent Nasica, who was twice consul, was called
+Corculus, _i.e._, wise-heart; and AElius Sextus is described as
+_Egregie_ cordatus _homo, catus AEliu' Sextus_--that great
+_wise-hearted_ man, sage AElius. Empedocles imagines the blood, which is
+suffused over the heart, to be the soul; to others, a certain part of
+the brain seems to be the throne of the soul; others neither allow the
+heart itself, nor any portion of the brain, to be the soul, but think
+either that the heart is the seat and abode of the soul, or else that
+the brain is so. Some would have the soul, or spirit, to be the
+_anima_, as our schools generally agree; and indeed the name signifies
+as much, for we use the expressions _animam agere_, to live; _animam
+efflare_, to expire; _animosi_, men of spirit; _bene animati_, men of
+right feeling; _exanimi sententia_, according to our real opinion; and
+the very word _animus_ is derived from _anima_. Again, the soul seems
+to Zeno the Stoic to be fire.
+
+X. But what I have said as to the heart, the blood, the brain, air, or
+fire being the soul, are common opinions: the others are only
+entertained by individuals; and, indeed, there were many among the
+ancients who held singular opinions on this subject, of whom the latest
+was Aristoxenus, a man who was both a musician and a philosopher. He
+maintained a certain straining of the body, like what is called harmony
+in music, to be the soul, and believed that, from the figure and nature
+of the whole body, various motions are excited, as sounds are from an
+instrument. He adhered steadily to his system, and yet he said
+something, the nature of which, whatever it was, had been detailed and
+explained a great while before by Plato. Xenocrates denied that the
+soul had any figure, or anything like a body; but said it was a number,
+the power of which, as Pythagoras had fancied, some ages before, was
+the greatest in nature: his master, Plato, imagined a threefold soul, a
+dominant portion of which--that is to say, reason--he had lodged in the
+head, as in a tower; and the other two parts--namely, anger and
+desire--he made subservient to this one, and allotted them distinct
+abodes, placing anger in the breast, and desire under the praecordia.
+But Dicaearchus, in that discourse of some learned disputants, held at
+Corinth, which he details to us in three books--in the first book
+introduces many speakers; and in the other two he introduces a certain
+Pherecrates, an old man of Phthia, who, as he said, was descended from
+Deucalion; asserting, that there is in fact no such thing at all as a
+soul, but that it is a name without a meaning; and that it is idle to
+use the expression "animals," or "animated beings;" that neither men
+nor beasts have minds or souls, but that all that power by which we act
+or perceive is equally infused into every living creature, and is
+inseparable from the body, for if it were not, it would be nothing; nor
+is there anything whatever really existing except body, which is a
+single and simple thing, so fashioned as to live and have its
+sensations in consequence of the regulations of nature. Aristotle, a
+man superior to all others, both in genius and industry (I always
+except Plato), after having embraced these four known sorts of
+principles, from which all things deduce their origin, imagines that
+there is a certain fifth nature, from whence comes the soul; for to
+think, to foresee, to learn, to teach, to invent anything, and many
+other attributes of the same kind, such as to remember, to love, to
+hate, to desire, to fear, to be pleased or displeased--these, and
+others like them, exist, he thinks, in none of those first four kinds:
+on such account he adds a fifth kind, which has no name, and so by a
+new name he calls the soul [Greek: endelecheia], as if it were a
+certain continued and perpetual motion.
+
+XI. If I have not forgotten anything unintentionally, these are the
+principal opinions concerning the soul. I have omitted Democritus, a
+very great man indeed, but one who deduces the soul from the fortuitous
+concourse of small, light, and round substances; for, if you believe
+men of his school, there is nothing which a crowd of atoms cannot
+effect. Which of these opinions is true, some God must determine. It is
+an important question for us, Which has the most appearance of truth?
+Shall we, then, prefer determining between them, or shall we return to
+our subject?
+
+_A._ I could wish both, if possible; but it is difficult to mix them:
+therefore, if without a discussion of them we can get rid of the fears
+of death, let us proceed to do so; but if this is not to be done
+without explaining the question about souls, let us have that now, and
+the other at another time.
+
+_M._ I take that plan to be the best, which I perceive you are inclined
+to; for reason will demonstrate that, whichever of the opinions which I
+have stated is true, it must follow, then, that death cannot be an
+evil; or that it must rather be something desirable; for if either the
+heart, or the blood, or the brain, is the soul, then certainly the
+soul, being corporeal, must perish with the rest of the body; if it is
+air, it will perhaps be dissolved; if it is fire, it will be
+extinguished; if it is Aristoxenus's harmony, it will be put out of
+tune. What shall I say of Dicaearchus, who denies that there is any
+soul? In all these opinions, there is nothing to affect any one after
+death; for all feeling is lost with life, and where there is no
+sensation, nothing can interfere to affect us. The opinions of others
+do indeed bring us hope; if it is any pleasure to you to think that
+souls, after they leave the body, may go to heaven as to a permanent
+home.
+
+_A._ I have great pleasure in that thought, and it is what I most
+desire; and even if it should not be so, I should still be very willing
+to believe it.
+
+_M._ What occasion have you, then, for my assistance? Am I superior to
+Plato in eloquence? Turn over carefully his book that treats of the
+soul; you will have there all that you can want.
+
+_A._ I have, indeed, done that, and often; but, I know not how it comes
+to pass, I agree with it while I am reading it; but when I have laid
+down the book, and begin to reflect with myself on the immortality of
+the soul, all that agreement vanishes.
+
+_M._ How comes that? Do you admit this--that souls either exist after
+death, or else that they also perish at the moment of death?
+
+_A._ I agree to that. And if they do exist, I admit that they are
+happy; but if they perish, I cannot suppose them to be unhappy,
+because, in fact, they have no existence at all. You drove me to that
+concession but just now.
+
+_M._ How, then, can you, or why do you, assert that you think that
+death is an evil, when it either makes us happy, in the case of the
+soul continuing to exist, or, at all events, not unhappy, in the case
+of our becoming destitute of all sensation?
+
+XII. _A._ Explain, therefore, if it is not troublesome to you, first,
+if you can, that souls do exist after death; secondly, should you fail
+in that (and it is a very difficult thing to establish), that death is
+free from all evil; for I am not without my fears that this itself is
+an evil: I do not mean the immediate deprivation of sense, but the fact
+that we shall hereafter suffer deprivation.
+
+_M._ I have the best authority in support of the opinion you desire to
+have established, which ought, and generally has, great weight in all
+cases. And, first, I have all antiquity on that side, which the more
+near it is to its origin and divine descent, the more clearly, perhaps,
+on that account, did it discern the truth in these matters. This very
+doctrine, then, was adopted by all those ancients whom Ennius calls in
+the Sabine tongue Casci; namely, that in death there was a sensation,
+and that, when men departed this life, they were not so entirely
+destroyed as to perish absolutely. And this may appear from many other
+circumstances, and especially from the pontifical rites and funeral
+obsequies, which men of the greatest genius would not have been so
+solicitous about, and would not have guarded from any injury by such
+severe laws, but from a firm persuasion that death was not so entire a
+destruction as wholly to abolish and destroy everything, but rather a
+kind of transmigration, as it were, and change of life, which was, in
+the case of illustrious men and women, usually a guide to heaven, while
+in that of others it was still confined to the earth, but in such a
+manner as still to exist. From this, and the sentiments of the Romans,
+
+    In heaven Romulus with Gods now lives,
+
+as Ennius saith, agreeing with the common belief; hence, too, Hercules
+is considered so great and propitious a God among the Greeks, and from
+them he was introduced among us, and his worship has extended even to
+the very ocean itself. This is how it was that Bacchus was deified, the
+offspring of Semele; and from the same illustrious fame we receive
+Castor and Pollux as Gods, who are reported not only to have helped the
+Romans to victory in their battles, but to have been the messengers of
+their success. What shall we say of Ino, the daughter of Cadmus? Is she
+not called Leucothea by the Greeks, and Matuta by us? Nay, more; is not
+the whole of heaven (not to dwell on particulars) almost filled with
+the offspring of men?
+
+Should I attempt to search into antiquity, and produce from thence what
+the Greek writers have asserted, it would appear that even those who
+are called their principal Gods were taken from among men up into
+heaven.
+
+XIII. Examine the sepulchres of those which are shown in Greece;
+recollect, for you have been initiated, what lessons are taught in the
+mysteries; then will you perceive how extensive this doctrine is. But
+they who were not acquainted with natural philosophy (for it did not
+begin to be in vogue till many years later) had no higher belief than
+what natural reason could give them; they were not acquainted with the
+principles and causes of things; they were often induced by certain
+visions, and those generally in the night, to think that those men who
+had departed from this life were still alive. And this may further be
+brought as an irrefragable argument for us to believe that there are
+Gods--that there never was any nation so barbarous, nor any people in
+the world so savage, as to be without some notion of Gods. Many have
+wrong notions of the Gods, for that is the nature and ordinary
+consequence of bad customs, yet all allow that there is a certain
+divine nature and energy. Nor does this proceed from the conversation
+of men, or the agreement of philosophers; it is not an opinion
+established by institutions or by laws; but, no doubt, in every case
+the consent of all nations is to be looked on as a law of nature. Who
+is there, then, that does not lament the loss of his friends,
+principally from imagining them deprived of the conveniences of life?
+Take away this opinion, and you remove with it all grief; for no one is
+afflicted merely on account of a loss sustained by himself. Perhaps we
+may be sorry, and grieve a little; but that bitter lamentation and
+those mournful tears have their origin in our apprehensions that he
+whom we loved is deprived of all the advantages of life, and is
+sensible of his loss. And we are led to this opinion by nature, without
+any arguments or any instruction.
+
+XIV. But the greatest proof of all is, that nature herself gives a
+silent judgment in favor of the immortality of the soul, inasmuch as
+all are anxious, and that to a great degree, about the things which
+concern futurity:
+
+    One plants what future ages shall enjoy,
+
+as Statius saith in his Synephebi. What is his object in doing so,
+except that he is interested in posterity? Shall the industrious
+husbandman, then, plant trees the fruit of which he shall never see?
+And shall not the great man found laws, institutions, and a republic?
+What does the procreation of children imply, and our care to continue
+our names, and our adoptions, and our scrupulous exactness in drawing
+up wills, and the inscriptions on monuments, and panegyrics, but that
+our thoughts run on futurity? There is no doubt but a judgment may be
+formed of nature in general, from looking at each nature in its most
+perfect specimens; and what is a more perfect specimen of a man than
+those are who look on themselves as born for the assistance, the
+protection, and the preservation of others? Hercules has gone to
+heaven; he never would have gone thither had he not, while among men,
+made that road for himself. These things are of old date, and have,
+besides, the sanction of universal religion.
+
+XV. What will you say? What do you imagine that so many and such great
+men of our republic, who have sacrificed their lives for its good,
+expected? Do you believe that they thought that their names should not
+continue beyond their lives? None ever encountered death for their
+country but under a firm persuasion of immortality! Themistocles might
+have lived at his ease; so might Epaminondas; and, not to look abroad
+and among the ancients for instances, so might I myself. But, somehow
+or other there clings to our minds a certain presage of future ages;
+and this both exists most firmly, and appears most clearly, in men of
+the loftiest genius and greatest souls. Take away this, and who would
+be so mad as to spend his life amidst toils and dangers? I speak of
+those in power. What are the poet's views but to be ennobled after
+death? What else is the object of these lines,
+
+    Behold old Ennius here, who erst
+    Thy fathers' great exploits rehearsed?
+
+He is challenging the reward of glory from those men whose ancestors he
+himself had ennobled by his poetry. And in the same spirit he says, in
+another passage,
+
+    Let none with tears my funeral grace, for I
+    Claim from my works an immortality.
+
+Why do I mention poets? The very mechanics are desirous of fame after
+death. Why did Phidias include a likeness of himself in the shield of
+Minerva, when he was not allowed to inscribe his name on it? What do
+our philosophers think on the subject? Do not they put their names to
+those very books which they write on the contempt of glory? If, then,
+universal consent is the voice of nature, and if it is the general
+opinion everywhere that those who have quitted this life are still
+interested in something, we also must subscribe to that opinion. And if
+we think that men of the greatest abilities and virtues see most
+clearly into the power of nature, because they themselves are her most
+perfect work, it is very probable that, as every great man is
+especially anxious to benefit posterity, there is something of which he
+himself will be sensible after death.
+
+XVI. But as we are led by nature to think there are Gods, and as we
+discover, by reason, of what description they are, so, by the consent
+of all nations, we are induced to believe that our souls survive; but
+where their habitation is, and of what character they eventually are,
+must be learned from reason. The want of any certain reason on which to
+argue has given rise to the idea of the shades below, and to those
+fears which you seem, not without reason, to despise; for as our bodies
+fall to the ground, and are covered with earth (_humus_), from whence
+we derive the expression to be interred (_humari_), that has occasioned
+men to imagine that the dead continue, during the remainder of their
+existence, under ground; which opinion has drawn after it many errors,
+which the poets have increased; for the theatre, being frequented by a
+large crowd, among which are women and children, is wont to be greatly
+affected on hearing such pompous verses as these,
+
+    Lo! here I am, who scarce could gain this place,
+    Through stony mountains and a dreary waste;
+    Through cliffs, whose sharpen'd stones tremendous hung,
+    Where dreadful darkness spread itself around.
+
+And the error prevailed so much, though indeed at present it seems to
+me to be removed, that although men knew that the bodies of the dead
+had been burned, yet they conceived such things to be done in the
+infernal regions as could not be executed or imagined without a body;
+for they could not conceive how disembodied souls could exist; and,
+therefore, they looked out for some shape or figure. This was the
+origin of all that account of the dead in Homer. This was the idea that
+caused my friend Appius to frame his Necromancy; and this is how there
+got about that idea of the lake of Avernus, in my neighborhood,
+
+    From whence the souls of undistinguish'd shape,
+    Clad in thick shade, rush from the open gate
+    Of Acheron, vain phantoms of the dead.
+
+And they must needs have these appearances speak, which is not possible
+without a tongue, and a palate, and jaws, and without the help of lungs
+and sides, and without some shape or figure; for they could see nothing
+by their mind alone--they referred all to their eyes. To withdraw the
+mind from sensual objects, and abstract our thoughts from what we are
+accustomed to, is an attribute of great genius. I am persuaded, indeed,
+that there were many such men in former ages; but Pherecydes[8] the
+Syrian is the first on record who said that the souls of men were
+immortal, and he was a philosopher of great antiquity, in the reign of
+my namesake Tullius. His disciple Pythagoras greatly confirmed this
+opinion, who came into Italy in the reign of Tarquin the Proud; and all
+that country which is called Great Greece was occupied by his school,
+and he himself was held in high honor, and had the greatest authority;
+and the Pythagorean sect was for many ages after in such great credit,
+that all learning was believed to be confined to that name.
+
+XVII. But I return to the ancients. They scarcely ever gave any reason
+for their opinion but what could be explained by numbers or
+definitions. It is reported of Plato that he came into Italy to make
+himself acquainted with the Pythagoreans; and that when there, among
+others, he made an acquaintance with Archytas[9] and Timaeus,[10] and
+learned from them all the tenets of the Pythagoreans; and that he not
+only was of the same opinion with Pythagoras concerning the immortality
+of the soul, but that he also brought reasons in support of it; which,
+if you have nothing to say against it, I will pass over, and say no
+more at present about all this hope of immortality.
+
+_A._ What, will you leave me when you have raised my expectations so
+high? I had rather, so help me Hercules! be mistaken with Plato, whom I
+know how much you esteem, and whom I admire myself, from what you say
+of him, than be in the right with those others.
+
+_M._ I commend you; for, indeed, I could myself willingly be mistaken
+in his company. Do we, then, doubt, as we do in other cases (though I
+think here is very little room for doubt in this case, for the
+mathematicians prove the facts to us), that the earth is placed in the
+midst of the world, being, as it were, a sort of point, which they call
+a [Greek: kentron], surrounded by the whole heavens; and that such is
+the nature of the four principles which are the generating causes of
+all things, that they have equally divided among them the constituents
+of all bodies; moreover, that earthy and humid bodies are carried at
+equal angles by their own weight and ponderosity into the earth and
+sea; that the other two parts consist, one of fire, and the other of
+air? As the two former are carried by their gravity and weight into the
+middle region of the world, so these, on the other hand, ascend by
+right lines into the celestial regions, either because, owing to their
+intrinsic nature, they are always endeavoring to reach the highest
+place, or else because lighter bodies are naturally repelled by
+heavier; and as this is notoriously the case, it must evidently follow
+that souls, when once they have departed from the body, whether they
+are animal (by which term I mean capable of breathing) or of the nature
+of fire, must mount upward. But if the soul is some number, as some
+people assert, speaking with more subtlety than clearness, or if it is
+that fifth nature, for which it would be more correct to say that we
+have not given a name to than that we do not correctly understand
+it--still it is too pure and perfect not to go to a great distance from
+the earth. Something of this sort, then, we must believe the soul to
+be, that we may not commit the folly of thinking that so active a
+principle lies immerged in the heart or brain; or, as Empedocles would
+have it, in the blood.
+
+XVIII. We will pass over Dicaearchus,[11] with his contemporary and
+fellow-disciple Aristoxenus,[12] both indeed men of learning. One of
+them seems never even to have been affected with grief, as he could not
+perceive that he had a soul; while the other is so pleased with his
+musical compositions that he endeavors to show an analogy betwixt them
+and souls. Now, we may understand harmony to arise from the intervals
+of sounds, whose various compositions occasion many harmonies; but I do
+not see how a disposition of members, and the figure of a body without
+a soul, can occasion harmony. He had better, learned as he is, leave
+these speculations to his master Aristotle, and follow his own trade as
+a musician. Good advice is given him in that Greek proverb,
+
+    Apply your talents where you best are skill'd.
+
+I will have nothing at all to do with that fortuitous concourse of
+individual light and round bodies, notwithstanding Democritus insists
+on their being warm and having breath, that is to say, life. But this
+soul, which is compounded of either of the four principles from which
+we assert that all things are derived, is of inflamed air, as seems
+particularly to have been the opinion of Panaetius, and must necessarily
+mount upward; for air and fire have no tendency downward, but always
+ascend; so should they be dissipated that must be at some distance from
+the earth; but should they remain, and preserve their original state,
+it is clearer still that they must be carried heavenward, and this
+gross and concrete air, which is nearest the earth, must be divided and
+broken by them; for the soul is warmer, or rather hotter, than that
+air, which I just now called gross and concrete: and this may be made
+evident from this consideration--that our bodies, being compounded of
+the earthy class of principles, grow warm by the heat of the soul.
+
+XIX. We may add, that the soul can the more easily escape from this
+air, which I have often named, and break through it, because nothing is
+swifter than the soul; no swiftness is comparable to the swiftness of
+the soul, which, should it remain uncorrupt and without alteration,
+must necessarily be carried on with such velocity as to penetrate and
+divide all this atmosphere, where clouds, and rain, and winds are
+formed, which, in consequence of the exhalations from the earth, is
+moist and dark: but, when the soul has once got above this region, and
+falls in with, and recognizes, a nature like its own, it then rests
+upon fires composed of a combination of thin air and a moderate solar
+heat, and does not aim at any higher flight; for then, after it has
+attained a lightness and heat resembling its own, it moves no more, but
+remains steady, being balanced, as it were, between two equal weights.
+That, then, is its natural seat where it has penetrated to something
+like itself, and where, wanting nothing further, it may be supported
+and maintained by the same aliment which nourishes and maintains the
+stars.
+
+Now, as we are usually incited to all sorts of desires by the stimulus
+of the body, and the more so as we endeavor to rival those who are in
+possession of what we long for, we shall certainly be happy when, being
+emancipated from that body, we at the same time get rid of these
+desires and this rivalry. And that which we do at present, when,
+dismissing all other cares, we curiously examine and look into
+anything, we shall then do with greater freedom; and we shall employ
+ourselves entirely in the contemplation and examination of things;
+because there is naturally in our minds a certain insatiable desire to
+know the truth, and the very region itself where we shall arrive, as it
+gives us a more intuitive and easy knowledge of celestial things, will
+raise our desires after knowledge. For it was this beauty of the
+heavens, as seen even here upon earth, which gave birth to that
+national and hereditary philosophy (as Theophrastus calls it), which
+was thus excited to a desire of knowledge. But those persons will in a
+most especial degree enjoy this philosophy, who, while they were only
+inhabitants of this world and enveloped in darkness, were still
+desirous of looking into these things with the eye of their mind.
+
+XX. For if those men now think that they have attained something who
+have seen the mouth of the Pontus, and those straits which were passed
+by the ship called Argo, because,
+
+    From Argos she did chosen men convey,
+    Bound to fetch back the Golden Fleece, their prey;
+
+or those who have seen the straits of the ocean,
+
+    Where the swift waves divide the neighboring shores
+    Of Europe, and of Afric;
+
+what kind of sight do you imagine that will be when the whole earth is
+laid open to our view? and that, too, not only in its position, form,
+and boundaries, nor those parts of it only which are habitable, but
+those also that lie uncultivated, through the extremities of heat and
+cold to which they are exposed; for not even now is it with our eyes
+that we view what we see, for the body itself has no senses; but (as
+the naturalists, ay, and even the physicians assure us, who have opened
+our bodies, and examined them) there are certain perforated channels
+from the seat of the soul to the eyes, ears, and nose; so that
+frequently, when either prevented by meditation, or the force of some
+bodily disorder, we neither hear nor see, though our eyes and ears are
+open and in good condition; so that we may easily apprehend that it is
+the soul itself which sees and hears, and not those parts which are, as
+it were, but windows to the soul, by means of which, however, she can
+perceive nothing, unless she is on the spot, and exerts herself. How
+shall we account for the fact that by the same power of thinking we
+comprehend the most different things--as color, taste, heat, smell, and
+sound--which the soul could never know by her five messengers, unless
+every thing were referred to her, and she were the sole judge of all?
+And we shall certainly discover these things in a more clear and
+perfect degree when the soul is disengaged from the body, and has
+arrived at that goal to which nature leads her; for at present,
+notwithstanding nature has contrived, with the greatest skill, those
+channels which lead from the body to the soul, yet are they, in some
+way or other, stopped up with earthy and concrete bodies; but when we
+shall be nothing but soul, then nothing will interfere to prevent our
+seeing everything in its real substance and in its true character.
+
+XXI. It is true, I might expatiate, did the subject require it, on the
+many and various objects with which the soul will be entertained in
+those heavenly regions; when I reflect on which, I am apt to wonder at
+the boldness of some philosophers, who are so struck with admiration at
+the knowledge of nature as to thank, in an exulting manner, the first
+inventor and teacher of natural philosophy, and to reverence him as a
+God; for they declare that they have been delivered by his means from
+the greatest tyrants, a perpetual terror, and a fear that molested them
+by night and day. What is this dread--this fear? What old woman is
+there so weak as to fear these things, which you, forsooth, had you not
+been acquainted with natural philosophy, would stand in awe of?
+
+    The hallow'd roofs of Acheron, the dread
+    Of Orcus, the pale regions of the dead.
+
+And does it become a philosopher to boast that he is not afraid of
+these things, and that he has discovered them to be false? And from
+this we may perceive how acute these men were by nature, who, if they
+had been left without any instruction, would have believed in these
+things. But now they have certainly made a very fine acquisition in
+learning that when the day of their death arrives, they will perish
+entirely. And if that really is the case--for I say nothing either
+way--what is there agreeable or glorious in it? Not that I see any
+reason why the opinion of Pythagoras and Plato may not be true; but
+even although Plato were to have assigned no reason for his opinion
+(observe how much I esteem the man), the weight of his authority would
+have borne me down; but he has brought so many reasons, that he appears
+to me to have endeavored to convince others, and certainly to have
+convinced himself.
+
+XXII. But there are many who labor on the other side of the question,
+and condemn souls to death, as if they were criminals capitally
+convicted; nor have they any other reason to allege why the immortality
+of the soul appears to them to be incredible, except that they are not
+able to conceive what sort of thing the soul can be when disentangled
+from the body; just as if they could really form a correct idea as to
+what sort of thing it is, even when it is in the body; what its form,
+and size, and abode are; so that were they able to have a full view of
+all that is now hidden from them in a living body, they have no idea
+whether the soul would be discernible by them, or whether it is of so
+fine a texture that it would escape their sight. Let those consider
+this, who say that they are unable to form any idea of the soul without
+the body, and then they will see whether they can form any adequate
+idea of what it is when it is in the body. For my own part, when I
+reflect on the nature of the soul, it appears to me a far more
+perplexing and obscure question to determine what is its character
+while it is in the body--a place which, as it were, does not belong to
+it--than to imagine what it is when it leaves it, and has arrived at
+the free aether, which is, if I may so say, its proper, its own
+habitation. For unless we are to say that we cannot apprehend the
+character or nature of anything which we have never seen, we certainly
+may be able to form some notion of God, and of the divine soul when
+released from the body. Dicaearchus, indeed, and Aristoxenus, because it
+was hard to understand the existence and substance and nature of the
+soul, asserted that there was no such thing as a soul at all. It is,
+indeed, the most difficult thing imaginable to discern the soul by the
+soul. And this, doubtless, is the meaning of the precept of Apollo,
+which advises every one to know himself. For I do not apprehend the
+meaning of the God to have been that we should understand our members,
+our stature, and form; for we are not merely bodies; nor, when I say
+these things to you, am I addressing myself to your body: when,
+therefore, he says, "Know yourself," he says this, "Inform yourself of
+the nature of your soul;" for the body is but a kind of vessel, or
+receptacle of the soul, and whatever your soul does is your own act. To
+know the soul, then, unless it had been divine, would not have been a
+precept of such excellent wisdom as to be attributed to a God; but even
+though the soul should not know of what nature itself is, will you say
+that it does not even perceive that it exists at all, or that it has
+motion? On which is founded that reason of Plato's, which is explained
+by Socrates in the Phaedrus, and inserted by me, in my sixth book of the
+Republic.
+
+XXIII. "That which is always moved is eternal; but that which gives
+motion to something else, and is moved itself by some external cause,
+when that motion ceases, must necessarily cease to exist. That,
+therefore, alone, which is self-moved, because it is never forsaken by
+itself, can never cease to be moved. Besides, it is the beginning and
+principle of motion to everything else; but whatever is a principle has
+no beginning, for all things arise from that principle, and it cannot
+itself owe its rise to anything else; for then it would not be a
+principle did it proceed from anything else. But if it has no
+beginning, it never will have any end; for a principle which is once
+extinguished cannot itself be restored by anything else, nor can it
+produce anything else from itself; inasmuch as all things must
+necessarily arise from some first cause. And thus it comes about that
+the first principle of motion must arise from that thing which is
+itself moved by itself; and that can neither have a beginning nor an
+end of its existence, for otherwise the whole heaven and earth would be
+overset, and all nature would stand still, and not be able to acquire
+any force by the impulse of which it might be first set in motion.
+Seeing, then, that it is clear that whatever moves itself is eternal,
+can there be any doubt that the soul is so? For everything is inanimate
+which is moved by an external force; but everything which is animate is
+moved by an interior force, which also belongs to itself. For this is
+the peculiar nature and power of the soul; and if the soul be the only
+thing in the whole world which has the power of self-motion, then
+certainly it never had a beginning, and therefore it is eternal."
+
+Now, should all the lower order of philosophers (for so I think they
+may be called who dissent from Plato and Socrates and that school)
+unite their force, they never would be able to explain anything so
+elegantly as this, nor even to understand how ingeniously this
+conclusion is drawn. The soul, then, perceives itself to have motion,
+and at the same time that it gets that perception, it is sensible that
+it derives that motion from its own power, and not from the agency of
+another; and it is impossible that it should ever forsake itself. And
+these premises compel you to allow its eternity, unless you have
+something to say against them.
+
+_A._ I should myself be very well pleased not to have even a thought
+arise in my mind against them, so much am I inclined to that opinion.
+
+XXIV. _M._ Well, then, I appeal to you, if the arguments which prove
+that there is something divine in the souls of men are not equally
+strong? But if I could account for the origin of these divine
+properties, then I might also be able to explain how they might cease
+to exist; for I think I can account for the manner in which the blood,
+and bile, and phlegm, and bones, and nerves, and veins, and all the
+limbs, and the shape of the whole body, were put together and made; ay,
+and even as to the soul itself, were there nothing more in it than a
+principle of life, then the life of a man might be put upon the same
+footing as that of a vine or any other tree, and accounted for as
+caused by nature; for these things, as we say, live. Besides, if
+desires and aversions were all that belonged to the soul, it would have
+them only in common with the beasts; but it has, in the first place,
+memory, and that, too, so infinite as to recollect an absolute
+countless number of circumstances, which Plato will have to be a
+recollection of a former life; for in that book which is inscribed
+Menon, Socrates asks a child some questions in geometry, with reference
+to measuring a square; his answers are such as a child would make, and
+yet the questions are so easy, that while answering them, one by one,
+he comes to the same point as if he had learned geometry. From whence
+Socrates would infer that learning is nothing more than recollection;
+and this topic he explains more accurately in the discourse which he
+held the very day he died; for he there asserts that, any one, who
+seeming to be entirely illiterate, is yet able to answer a question
+well that is proposed to him, does in so doing manifestly show that he
+is not learning it then, but recollecting it by his memory. Nor is it
+to be accounted for in any other way, how children come to have notions
+of so many and such important things as are implanted, and, as it were,
+sealed up, in their minds (which the Greeks call [Greek: ennoiai]),
+unless the soul, before it entered the body, had been well stored with
+knowledge. And as it had no existence at all (for this is the
+invariable doctrine of Plato, who will not admit anything to have a
+real existence which has a beginning and an end, and who thinks that
+that alone does really exist which is of such a character as what he
+calls [Greek: eidea], and we species), therefore, being shut up in the
+body, it could not while in the body discover what it knows; but it
+knew it before, and brought the knowledge with it, so that we are no
+longer surprised at its extensive and multifarious knowledge. Nor does
+the soul clearly discover its ideas at its first resort to this abode
+to which it is so unaccustomed, and which is in so disturbed a state;
+but after having refreshed and recollected itself, it then by its
+memory recovers them; and, therefore, to learn implies nothing more
+than to recollect. But I am in a particular manner surprised at memory.
+For what is that faculty by which we remember? what is its force? what
+its nature? I am not inquiring how great a memory Simonides[13] may be
+said to have had, or Theodectes,[14] or that Cineas[15] who was sent to
+Rome as ambassador from Pyrrhus; or, in more modern times,
+Charmadas;[16] or, very lately, Metrodorus[17] the Scepsian, or our own
+contemporary Hortensius[18]: I am speaking of ordinary memory, and
+especially of those men who are employed in any important study or art,
+the great capacity of whose minds it is hard to estimate, such numbers
+of things do they remember.
+
+XXV. Should you ask what this leads to, I think we may understand what
+that power is, and whence we have it. It certainly proceeds neither
+from the heart, nor from the blood, nor from the brain, nor from atoms;
+whether it be air or fire, I know not, nor am I, as those men are,
+ashamed, in cases where I am ignorant, to own that I am so. If in any
+other obscure matter I were able to assert anything positively, then I
+would swear that the soul, be it air or fire, is divine. Just think, I
+beseech you: can you imagine this wonderful power of memory to be sown
+in or to be a part of the composition of the earth, or of this dark and
+gloomy atmosphere? Though you cannot apprehend what it is, yet you see
+what kind of thing it is, or if you do not quite see that, yet you
+certainly see how great it is. What, then? Shall we imagine that there
+is a kind of measure in the soul, into which, as into a vessel, all
+that we remember is poured? That indeed is absurd; for how shall we
+form any idea of the bottom, or of the shape or fashion of such a soul
+as that? And, again, how are we to conceive how much it is able to
+contain? Shall we imagine the soul to receive impressions like wax, and
+memory to be marks of the impressions made on the soul? What are the
+characters of the words, what of the facts themselves? and what, again,
+is that prodigious greatness which can give rise to impressions of so
+many things? What, lastly, is that power which investigates secret
+things, and is called invention and contrivance? Does that man seem to
+be compounded of this earthly, mortal, and perishing nature who first
+invented names for everything; which, if you will believe Pythagoras,
+is the highest pitch of wisdom? or he who collected the dispersed
+inhabitants of the world, and united them in the bonds of social life?
+or he who confined the sounds of the voice, which used to seem
+infinite, to the marks of a few letters? or he who first observed the
+courses of the planets, their progressive motions, their laws? These
+were all great men. But they were greater still who invented food, and
+raiment, and houses; who introduced civilization among us, and armed us
+against the wild beasts; by whom we were made sociable and polished,
+and so proceeded from the necessaries of life to its embellishments.
+For we have provided great entertainments for the ears by inventing and
+modulating the variety and nature of sounds; we have learned to survey
+the stars, not only those that are fixed, but also those which are
+improperly called wandering; and the man who has acquainted himself
+with all their revolutions and motions is fairly considered to have a
+soul resembling the soul of that Being who has created those stars in
+the heavens: for when Archimedes described in a sphere the motions of
+the moon, sun, and five planets, he did the very same thing as Plato's
+God, in his Timaeus, who made the world, causing one revolution to
+adjust motions differing as much as possible in their slowness and
+velocity. Now, allowing that what we see in the world could not be
+effected without a God, Archimedes could not have imitated the same
+motions in his sphere without a divine soul.
+
+XXVI. To me, indeed, it appears that even those studies which are more
+common and in greater esteem are not without some divine energy: so
+that I do not consider that a poet can produce a serious and sublime
+poem without some divine impulse working on his mind; nor do I think
+that eloquence, abounding with sonorous words and fruitful sentences,
+can flow thus without something beyond mere human power. But as to
+philosophy, that is the parent of all the arts: what can we call that
+but, as Plato says, a gift, or, as I express it, an invention, of the
+Gods? This it was which first taught us the worship of the Gods; and
+then led us on to justice, which arises from the human race being
+formed into society; and after that it imbued us with modesty and
+elevation of soul. This it was which dispersed darkness from our souls,
+as it is dispelled from our eyes, enabling us to see all things that
+are above or below, the beginning, end, and middle of everything. I am
+convinced entirely that that which could effect so many and such great
+things must be a divine power. For what is memory of words and
+circumstances? What, too, is invention? Surely they are things than
+which nothing greater can be conceived in a God! For I do not imagine
+the Gods to be delighted with nectar and ambrosia, or with Juventas
+presenting them with a cup; nor do I put any faith in Homer, who says
+that Ganymede was carried away by the Gods on account of his beauty, in
+order to give Jupiter his wine. Too weak reasons for doing Laomedon
+such injury! These were mere inventions of Homer, who gave his Gods the
+imperfections of men. I would rather that he had given men the
+perfections of the Gods! those perfections, I mean, of uninterrupted
+health, wisdom, invention, memory. Therefore the soul (which is, as I
+say, divine) is, as Euripides more boldly expresses it, a God. And
+thus, if the divinity be air or fire, the soul of man is the same; for
+as that celestial nature has nothing earthly or humid about it, in like
+manner the soul of man is also free from both these qualities: but if
+it is of that fifth kind of nature, first introduced by Aristotle, then
+both Gods and souls are of the same.
+
+XXVII. As this is my opinion, I have explained it in these very words,
+in my book on Consolation.[19] The origin of the soul of man is not to
+be found upon earth, for there is nothing in the soul of a mixed or
+concrete nature, or that has any appearance of being formed or made out
+of the earth; nothing even humid, or airy, or fiery. For what is there
+in natures of that kind which has the power of memory, understanding,
+or thought? which can recollect the past, foresee the future, and
+comprehend the present? for these capabilities are confined to divine
+beings; nor can we discover any source from which men could derive
+them, but from God. There is therefore a peculiar nature and power in
+the soul, distinct from those natures which are more known and familiar
+to us. Whatever, then, that is which thinks, and which has
+understanding, and volition, and a principle of life, is heavenly and
+divine, and on that account must necessarily be eternal; nor can God
+himself, who is known to us, be conceived to be anything else except a
+soul free and unembarrassed, distinct from all mortal concretion,
+acquainted with everything, and giving motion to everything, and itself
+endued with perpetual motion.
+
+XXVIII. Of this kind and nature is the intellect of man. Where, then,
+is this intellect seated, and of what character is it? where is your
+own, and what is its character? Are you able to tell? If I have not
+faculties for knowing all that I could desire to know, will you not
+even allow me to make use of those which I have? The soul has not
+sufficient capacity to comprehend itself; yet, the soul, like the eye,
+though it has no distinct view of itself, sees other things: it does
+not see (which is of least consequence) its own shape; perhaps not,
+though it possibly may; but we will pass that by: but it certainly sees
+that it has vigor, sagacity, memory, motion, and velocity; these are
+all great, divine, eternal properties. What its appearance is, or where
+it dwells, it is not necessary even to inquire. As when we behold,
+first of all, the beauty and brilliant appearance of the heavens;
+secondly, the vast velocity of its revolutions, beyond power of our
+imagination to conceive; then the vicissitudes of nights and days, the
+fourfold division of the seasons, so well adapted to the ripening of
+the fruits of the earth, and the temperature of our bodies: and after
+that we look up to the sun, the moderator and governor of all these
+things; and view the moon, by the increase and decrease of its light,
+marking, as it were, and appointing our holy days; and see the five
+planets, borne on in the same circle, divided into twelve parts,
+preserving the same course with the greatest regularity, but with
+utterly dissimilar motions among themselves; and the nightly appearance
+of the heaven, adorned on all sides with stars; then, the globe of the
+earth, raised above the sea, and placed in the centre of the universe,
+inhabited and cultivated in its two opposite extremities, one of which,
+the place of our habitation, is situated towards the north pole, under
+the seven stars:
+
+    Where the cold northern blasts, with horrid sound,
+    Harden to ice the snowy cover'd ground;
+
+the other, towards the south pole, is unknown to us, but is called by
+the Greeks [Greek: antichthona]: the other parts are uncultivated,
+because they are either frozen with cold, or burned up with heat; but
+where we dwell, it never fails, in its season,
+
+    To yield a placid sky, to bid the trees
+    Assume the lively verdure of their leaves:
+    The vine to bud, and, joyful, in its shoots,
+    Foretell the approaching vintage of its fruits:
+    The ripen'd corn to sing, while all around
+    Full riv'lets glide; and flowers deck the ground:
+
+then the multitude of cattle, fit part for food, part for tilling the
+ground, others for carrying us, or for clothing us; and man himself,
+made, as it were, on purpose to contemplate the heavens and the Gods,
+and to pay adoration to them: lastly, the whole earth, and wide
+extending seas, given to man's use. When we view these and numberless
+other things, can we doubt that they have some being who presides over
+them, or has made them (if, indeed, they have been made, as is the
+opinion of Plato, or if, as Aristotle thinks, they are eternal), or who
+at all events is the regulator of so immense a fabric and so great a
+blessing to men? Thus, though you see not the soul of man, as you see
+not the Deity, yet, as by the contemplation of his works you are led to
+acknowledge a God, so you must own the divine power of the soul, from
+its remembering things, from its invention, from the quickness of its
+motion, and from all the beauty of virtue. Where, then, is it seated,
+you will say?
+
+XXIX. In my opinion, it is seated in the head, and I can bring you
+reasons for my adopting that opinion. At present, let the soul reside
+where it will, you certainly have one in you. Should you ask what its
+nature is? It has one peculiarly its own; but admitting it to consist
+of fire, or air, it does not affect the present question. Only observe
+this, that as you are convinced there is a God, though you are ignorant
+where he resides, and what shape he is of; in like manner you ought to
+feel assured that you have a soul, though you cannot satisfy yourself
+of the place of its residence, nor its form. In our knowledge of the
+soul, unless we are grossly ignorant of natural philosophy, we cannot
+but be satisfied that it has nothing but what is simple, unmixed,
+uncompounded, and single; and if this is admitted, then it cannot be
+separated, nor divided, nor dispersed, nor parted, and therefore it
+cannot perish; for to perish implies a parting-asunder, a division, a
+disunion, of those parts which, while it subsisted, were held together
+by some band. And it was because he was influenced by these and similar
+reasons that Socrates neither looked out for anybody to plead for him
+when he was accused, nor begged any favor from his judges, but
+maintained a manly freedom, which was the effect not of pride, but of
+the true greatness of his soul; and on the last day of his life he held
+a long discourse on this subject; and a few days before, when he might
+have been easily freed from his confinement, he refused to be so; and
+when he had almost actually hold of that deadly cup, he spoke with the
+air of a man not forced to die, but ascending into heaven.
+
+XXX. For so indeed he thought himself, and thus he spoke: "That there
+were two ways, and that the souls of men, at their departure from the
+body, took different roads; for those which were polluted with vices
+that are common to men, and which had given themselves up entirely to
+unclean desires, and had become so blinded by them as to have
+habituated themselves to all manner of debauchery and profligacy, or to
+have laid detestable schemes for the ruin of their country, took a road
+wide of that which led to the assembly of the Gods; but they who had
+preserved themselves upright and chaste, and free from the slightest
+contagion of the body, and had always kept themselves as far as
+possible at a distance from it, and while on earth had proposed to
+themselves as a model the life of the Gods, found the return to those
+beings from whom they had come an easy one." Therefore, he argues, that
+all good and wise men should take example from the swans, who are
+considered sacred to Apollo, not without reason, but particularly
+because they seem to have received the gift of divination from him, by
+which, foreseeing how happy it is to die, they leave this world with
+singing and joy. Nor can any one doubt of this, unless it happens to us
+who think with care and anxiety about the soul (as is often the case
+with those who look earnestly at the setting sun), to lose the sight of
+it entirely; and so the mind's eye, viewing itself, sometimes grows
+dull, and for that reason we become remiss in our contemplation. Thus
+our reasoning is borne about, harassed with doubts and anxieties, not
+knowing how to proceed, but measuring back again those dangerous tracts
+which it has passed, like a boat tossed about on the boundless ocean.
+But these reflections are of long standing, and borrowed from the
+Greeks. But Cato left this world in such a manner as if he were
+delighted that he had found an opportunity of dying; for that God who
+presides in us forbids our departure hence without his leave. But when
+God himself has given us a just cause, as formerly he did to Socrates,
+and lately to Cato, and often to many others--in such a case, certainly
+every man of sense would gladly exchange this darkness for that light:
+not that he would forcibly break from the chains that held him, for
+that would be against the law; but, like a man released from prison by
+a magistrate or some lawful authority, so he too would walk away, being
+released and discharged by God. For the whole life of a philosopher is,
+as the same philosopher says, a meditation on death.
+
+XXXI. For what else is it that we do, when we call off our minds from
+pleasure, that is to say, from our attention to the body, from the
+managing our domestic estate, which is a sort of handmaid and servant
+of the body, or from duties of a public nature, or from all other
+serious business whatever? What else is it, I say, that we do, but
+invite the soul to reflect on itself? oblige it to converse with
+itself, and, as far as possible, break off its acquaintance with the
+body? Now, to separate the soul from the body, is to learn to die, and
+nothing else whatever. Wherefore take my advice; and let us meditate on
+this, and separate ourselves as far as possible from the body, that is
+to say, let us accustom ourselves to die. This will be enjoying a life
+like that of heaven even while we remain on earth; and when we are
+carried thither and released from these bonds, our souls will make
+their progress with more rapidity; for the spirit which has always been
+fettered by the bonds of the body, even when it is disengaged, advances
+more slowly, just as those do who have worn actual fetters for many
+years: but when we have arrived at this emancipation from the bonds of
+the body, then indeed we shall begin to live, for this present life is
+really death, which I could say a good deal in lamentation for if I
+chose.
+
+_A._ You have lamented it sufficiently in your book on Consolation; and
+when I read that, there is nothing which I desire more than to leave
+these things; but that desire is increased a great deal by what I have
+just heard.
+
+_M._ The time will come, and that soon, and with equal certainty,
+whether you hang back or press forward; for time flies. But death is so
+far from being an evil, as it lately appeared to you, that I am
+inclined to suspect, not that there is no other thing which is an evil
+to man, but rather that there is nothing else which is a real good to
+him; if, at least, it is true that we become thereby either Gods
+ourselves, or companions of the Gods. However, this is not of so much
+consequence, as there are some of us here who will not allow this. But
+I will not leave off discussing this point till I have convinced you
+that death can, upon no consideration whatever, be an evil.
+
+_A._ How can it, after what I now know?
+
+_M._ Do you ask how it can? There are crowds of arguers who contradict
+this; and those not only Epicureans, whom I regard very little, but,
+somehow or other, almost every man of letters; and, above all, my
+favorite Dicaearchus is very strenuous in opposing the immortality of
+the soul: for he has written three books, which are entitled Lesbiacs,
+because the discourse was held at Mitylene, in which he seeks to prove
+that souls are mortal. The Stoics, on the other hand, allow us as long
+a time for enjoyment as the life of a raven; they allow the soul to
+exist a great while, but are against its eternity.
+
+XXXII. Are you willing to hear then why, even allowing this, death
+cannot be an evil.
+
+_A._ As you please; but no one shall drive me from my belief in
+mortality.
+
+_M._ I commend you, indeed, for that; though we should not be too
+confident in our belief of anything; for we are frequently disturbed by
+some subtle conclusion. We give way and change our opinions even in
+things that are more evident than this; for in this there certainly is
+some obscurity. Therefore, should anything of this kind happen, it is
+well to be on our guard.
+
+_A._ You are right in that; but I will provide against any accident.
+
+_M._ Have you any objection to our dismissing our friends the
+Stoics--those, I mean, who allow that the souls exist after they have
+left the body, but yet deny that they exist forever?
+
+_A._ We certainly may dismiss the consideration of those men who admit
+that which is the most difficult point in the whole question, namely,
+that a soul can exist independently of the body, and yet refuse to
+grant that which is not only very easy to believe, but which is even
+the natural consequence of the concession which they have made--that if
+they can exist for a length of time; they most likely do so forever.
+
+_M._ You take it right; that is the very thing. Shall we give,
+therefore, any credit to Pauaestius, when he dissents from his master,
+Plato? whom he everywhere calls divine, the wisest, the holiest of men,
+the Homer of philosophers, and whom he opposes in nothing except this
+single opinion of the soul's immortality: for he maintains what nobody
+denies, that everything which has been generated will perish, and that
+even souls are generated, which he thinks appears from their
+resemblance to those of the men who begot them; for that likeness is as
+apparent in the turn of their minds as in their bodies. But he brings
+another reason--that there is nothing which is sensible of pain which
+is not also liable to disease; but whatever is liable to disease must
+be liable to death. The soul is sensible of pain, therefore it is
+liable to perish.
+
+XXXIII. These arguments may be refuted; for they proceed from his not
+knowing that, while discussing the subject of the immortality of the
+soul, he is speaking of the intellect, which is free from all turbid
+motion; but not of those parts of the mind in which those disorders,
+anger and lust, have their seat, and which he whom he is opposing, when
+he argues thus, imagines to be distinct and separate from the mind. Now
+this resemblance is more remarkable in beasts, whose souls are void of
+reason. But the likeness in men consists more in the configuration of
+the bodies: and it is of no little consequence in what bodies the soul
+is lodged; for there are many things which depend on the body that give
+an edge to the soul, many which blunt it. Aristotle, indeed, says that
+all men of great genius are melancholy; so that I should not have been
+displeased to have been somewhat duller than I am. He instances many,
+and, as if it were matter of fact, brings his reasons for it. But if
+the power of those things that proceed from the body be so great as to
+influence the mind (for they are the things, whatever they are, that
+occasion this likeness), still that does not necessarily prove why a
+similitude of souls should be generated. I say nothing about cases of
+unlikeness. I wish Panaetius could be here: he lived with Africanus. I
+would inquire of him which of his family the nephew of Africanus's
+brother was like? Possibly he may in person have resembled his father;
+but in his manners he was so like every profligate, abandoned man, that
+it was impossible to be more so. Whom did the grandson of P. Crassus,
+that wise and eloquent and most distinguished man, resemble? Or the
+relations and sons of many other excellent men, whose names there is no
+occasion to mention? But what are we doing? Have we forgotten that our
+purpose was, when we had sufficiently spoken on the subject of the
+immortality of the soul, to prove that, even if the soul did perish,
+there would be, even then, no evil in death?
+
+_A._ I remembered it very well; but I had no dislike to your digressing
+a little from your original design, while you were talking of the
+soul's immortality.
+
+_M._ I perceive you have sublime thoughts, and are eager to mount up to
+heaven.
+
+XXXIV. I am not without hopes myself that such may be our fate. But
+admit what they assert--that the soul does not continue to exist after
+death.
+
+_A._ Should it be so, I see that we are then deprived of the hopes of a
+happier life.
+
+_M._ But what is there of evil in that opinion? For let the soul perish
+as the body: is there any pain, or indeed any feeling at all, in the
+body after death? No one, indeed asserts that; though Epicurus charges
+Democritus with saying so; but the disciples of Democritus deny it. No
+sense, therefore, remains in the soul; for the soul is nowhere. Where,
+then, is the evil? for there is nothing but these two things. Is it
+because the mere separation of the soul and body cannot be effected
+without pain? But even should that be granted, how small a pain must
+that be! Yet I think that it is false, and that it is very often
+unaccompanied by any sensation at all, and sometimes even attended with
+pleasure; but certainly the whole must be very trifling, whatever it
+is, for it is instantaneous. What makes us uneasy, or rather gives us
+pain, is the leaving all the good things of life. But just consider if
+I might not more properly say, leaving the evils of life; only there is
+no reason for my now occupying myself in bewailing the life of man, and
+yet I might, with very good reason. But what occasion is there, when
+what I am laboring to prove is that no one is miserable after death, to
+make life more miserable by lamenting over it? I have done that in the
+book which I wrote, in order to comfort myself as well as I could. If,
+then, our inquiry is after truth, death withdraws us from evil, not
+from good. This subject is indeed so copiously handled by Hegesias, the
+Cyrenaic philosopher, that he is said to have been forbidden by Ptolemy
+from delivering his lectures in the schools, because some who heard him
+made away with themselves. There is, too, an epigram of Callimachus[20]
+on Cleombrotus of Ambracia, who, without any misfortune having befallen
+him, as he says, threw himself from a wall into the sea, after he had
+read a book of Plato's. The book I mentioned of that Hegesias is called
+[Greek: Apokarterteron], or "A Man who starves himself," in which a man
+is represented as killing himself by starvation, till he is prevented
+by his friends, in reply to whom he reckons up all the miseries of
+human life. I might do the same, though not so fully as he, who thinks
+it not worth any man's while to live. I pass over others. Was it even
+worth my while to live, for, had I died before I was deprived of the
+comforts of my own family, and of the honors which I received for my
+public services, would not death have taken me from the evils of life
+rather than from its blessings?
+
+XXXV. Mention, therefore, some one, who never knew distress; who never
+received any blow from fortune. The great Metellus had four
+distinguished sons; but Priam had fifty, seventeen of whom were born to
+him by his lawful wife. Fortune had the same power over both, though
+she exercised it but on one; for Metellus was laid on his funeral pile
+by a great company of sons and daughters, grandsons, and
+granddaughters; but Priam fell by the hand of an enemy, after having
+fled to the altar, and having seen himself deprived of all his numerous
+progeny. Had he died before the death of his sons and the ruin of his
+kingdom,
+
+    With all his mighty wealth elate,
+    Under rich canopies of state;
+
+would he then have been taken from good or from evil? It would indeed,
+at that time, have appeared that he was being taken away from good; yet
+surely it would have turned out advantageous for him; nor should we
+have had these mournful verses,
+
+    Lo! these all perish'd in one flaming pile;
+    The foe old Priam did of life beguile,
+    And with his blood, thy altar, Jove, defile.
+
+As if anything better could have happened to him at that time than to
+lose his life in that manner; but yet, if it had befallen him sooner,
+it would have prevented all those consequences; but even as it was, it
+released him from any further sense of them. The case of our friend
+Pompey[21] was something better: once, when he had been very ill at
+Naples, the Neapolitans, on his recovery, put crowns on their heads, as
+did those of Puteoli; the people flocked from the country to
+congratulate him--it is a Grecian custom, and a foolish one; still it
+is a sign of good fortune. But the question is, had he died, would he
+have been taken from good, or from evil? Certainly from evil. He would
+not have been engaged in a war with his father-in-law;[22] he would not
+have taken up arms before he was prepared; he would not have left his
+own house, nor fled from Italy; he would not, after the loss of his
+army, have fallen unarmed into the hands of slaves, and been put to
+death by them; his children would not have been destroyed; nor would
+his whole fortune have come into the possession of the conquerors. Did
+not he, then, who, if he had died at that time, would have died in all
+his glory, owe all the great and terrible misfortunes into which he
+subsequently fell to the prolongation of his life at that time?
+
+XXXVI. These calamities are avoided by death, for even though they
+should never happen, there is a possibility that they may; but it never
+occurs to a man that such a disaster may befall him himself. Every one
+hopes to be as happy as Metellus: as if the number of the happy
+exceeded that of the miserable; or as if there were any certainty in
+human affairs; or, again, as if there were more rational foundation for
+hope than fear. But should we grant them even this, that men are by
+death deprived of good things; would it follow that the dead are
+therefore in need of the good things of life, and are miserable on that
+account? Certainly they must necessarily say so. Can he who does not
+exist be in need of anything? To be in need of has a melancholy sound,
+because it in effect amounts to this--he had, but he has not; he
+regrets, he looks back upon, he wants. Such are, I suppose, the
+distresses of one who is in need of. Is he deprived of eyes? to be
+blind is misery. Is he destitute of children? not to have them is
+misery. These considerations apply to the living, but the dead are
+neither in need of the blessings of life, nor of life itself. But when
+I am speaking of the dead, I am speaking of those who have no
+existence. But would any one say of us, who do exist, that we want
+horns or wings? Certainly not. Should it be asked, why not? the answer
+would be, that not to have what neither custom nor nature has fitted
+you for would not imply a want of them, even though you were sensible
+that you had them not. This argument should be pressed over and over
+again, after that point has once been established, which, if souls are
+mortal, there can be no dispute about--I mean, that the destruction of
+them by death is so entire as to remove even the least suspicion of any
+sense remaining. When, therefore, this point is once well grounded and
+established, we must correctly define what the term to want means; that
+there may be no mistake in the word. To want, then, signifies this: to
+be without that which you would be glad to have; for inclination for a
+thing is implied in the word want, excepting when we use the word in an
+entirely different sense, as we do when we say that a fever is wanting
+to any one. For it admits of a different interpretation, when you are
+without a certain thing, and are sensible that you are without it, but
+yet can easily dispense with having it. "To want," then, is an
+expression which you cannot apply to the dead; nor is the mere fact of
+wanting something necessarily lamentable. The proper expression ought
+to be, "that they want a good," and that is an evil.
+
+But a living man does not want a good, unless he is distressed without
+it; and yet, we can easily understand how any man alive can be without
+a kingdom. But this cannot be predicated of you with any accuracy: it
+might have been asserted of Tarquin, when he was driven from his
+kingdom. But when such an expression is used respecting the dead, it is
+absolutely unintelligible. For to want implies to be sensible; but the
+dead are insensible: therefore, the dead can be in no want.
+
+XXXVII. But what occasion is there to philosophize here in a matter
+with which we see that philosophy is but little concerned? How often
+have not only our generals but whole armies, rushed on certain death!
+But if it had been a thing to be feared, L. Brutus would never have
+fallen in fight, to prevent the return of that tyrant whom he had
+expelled; nor would Decius the father have been slain in fighting with
+the Latins; nor would his son, when engaged with the Etruscans, nor his
+grandson with Pyrrhus have exposed themselves to the enemy's darts.
+Spain would never have seen, in one campaign, the Scipios fall fighting
+for their country; nor would the plains of Cannae have witnessed the
+death of Paulus and Geminus, or Venusia that of Marcellus; nor would
+the Latins have beheld the death of Albinus, nor the Leucanians that of
+Gracchus. But are any of these miserable now? Nay, they were not so
+even at the first moment after they had breathed their last; nor can
+any one be miserable after he has lost all sensation. Oh, but the mere
+circumstance of being without sensation is miserable. It might be so if
+being without sensation were the same thing as wanting it; but as it is
+evident there can be nothing of any kind in that which has no
+existence, what can there be afflicting to that which can neither feel
+want nor be sensible of anything? We might be said to have repeated
+this over too often, only that here lies all that the soul shudders at
+from the fear of death. For whoever can clearly apprehend that which is
+as manifest as the light--that when both soul and body are consumed,
+and there is a total destruction, then that which was an animal becomes
+nothing--will clearly see that there is no difference between a
+Hippocentaur, which never had existence, and King Agamemnon, and that
+M. Camillus is no more concerned about this present civil war than I
+was at the sacking of Rome, when he was living.
+
+XXXVIII. Why, then, should Camillus be affected with the thoughts of
+these things happening three hundred and fifty years after his time?
+And why should I be uneasy it I were to expect that some nation might
+possess itself of this city ten thousand years hence? Because so great
+is our regard for our country, as not to be measured by our own
+feeling, but by its own actual safety.
+
+Death, then, which threatens us daily from a thousand accidents, and
+which, by reason of the shortness of life, can never be far off, does
+not deter a wise man from making such provision for his country and his
+family as he hopes may last forever; and from regarding posterity, of
+which he can never have any real perception, as belonging to himself.
+Wherefore a man may act for eternity, even though he be persuaded that
+his soul is mortal; not, indeed, from a desire of glory, which he will
+be insensible of, but from a principle of virtue, which glory will
+inevitably attend, though that is not his object. The process, indeed,
+of nature is this: that just in the same manner as our birth was the
+beginning of things with us, so death will be the end; and as we were
+noways concerned with anything before we were born, so neither shall we
+be after we are dead. And in this state of things where can the evil
+be, since death has no connection with either the living or the dead?
+The one have no existence at all, the other are not yet affected by it.
+They who make the least of death consider it as having a great
+resemblance to sleep; as if any one would choose to live ninety years
+on condition that, at the expiration of sixty, he should sleep out the
+remainder. The very swine would not accept of life on those terms, much
+less I. Endymion, indeed, if you listen to fables, slept once on a time
+on Latmus, a mountain of Caria, and for such a length of time that I
+imagine he is not as yet awake. Do you think that he is concerned at
+the Moon's being in difficulties, though it was by her that he was
+thrown into that sleep, in order that she might kiss him while
+sleeping. For what should he be concerned for who has not even any
+sensation? You look on sleep as an image of death, and you take that on
+you daily; and have you, then, any doubt that there is no sensation in
+death, when you see there is none in sleep, which is its near
+resemblance?
+
+XXXIX. Away, then, with those follies, which are little better than the
+old women's dreams, such as that it is miserable to die before our
+time. What time do you mean? That of nature? But she has only lent you
+life, as she might lend you money, without fixing any certain time for
+its repayment. Have you any grounds of complaint, then, that she
+recalls it at her pleasure? for you received it on these terms. They
+that complain thus allow that if a young child dies, the survivors
+ought to bear his loss with equanimity; that if an infant in the cradle
+dies, they ought not even to utter a complaint; and yet nature has been
+more severe with them in demanding back what she gave. They answer by
+saying that such have not tasted the sweets of life; while the other
+had begun to conceive hopes of great happiness, and, indeed, had begun
+to realize them. Men judge better in other things, and allow a part to
+be preferable to none. Why do they not admit the same estimate in life?
+Though Callimachus does not speak amiss in saying that more tears had
+flowed from Priam than his son; yet they are thought happier who die
+after they have reached old age. It would be hard to say why; for I do
+not apprehend that any one, if a longer life were granted to him, would
+find it happier. There is nothing more agreeable to a man than
+prudence, which old age most certainly bestows on a man, though it may
+strip him of everything else. But what age is long, or what is there at
+all long to a man? Does not
+
+    Old age, though unregarded, still attend
+    On childhood's pastimes, as the cares of men?
+
+But because there is nothing beyond old age, we call that long: all
+these things are said to be long or short, according to the proportion
+of time they were given us for. Artistotle saith there is a kind of
+insect near the river Hypanis, which runs from a certain part of Europe
+into the Pontus, whose life consists but of one day; those that die at
+the eighth hour die in full age; those who die when the sun sets are
+very old, especially when the days are at the longest. Compare our
+longest life with eternity, and we shall be found almost as short-lived
+as those little animals.
+
+XL. Let us, then, despise all these follies--for what softer name can I
+give to such levities?--and let us lay the foundation of our happiness
+in the strength and greatness of our minds, in a contempt and disregard
+of all earthly things, and in the practice of every virtue. For at
+present we are enervated by the softness of our imaginations, so that,
+should we leave this world before the promises of our fortune-tellers
+are made good to us, we should think ourselves deprived of some great
+advantages, and seem disappointed and forlorn. But if, through life, we
+are in continual suspense, still expecting, still desiring, and are in
+continual pain and torture, good Gods! how pleasant must that journey
+be which ends in security and ease! How pleased am I with Theramenes!
+Of how exalted a soul does he appear! For, although we never read of
+him without tears, yet that illustrious man is not to be lamented in
+his death, who, when he had been imprisoned by the command of the
+thirty tyrants, drank off, at one draught, as if he had been thirsty,
+the poisoned cup, and threw the remainder out of it with such force
+that it sounded as it fell; and then, on hearing the sound of the
+drops, he said, with a smile, "I drink this to the most excellent
+Critias," who had been his most bitter enemy; for it is customary among
+the Greeks, at their banquets, to name the person to whom they intend
+to deliver the cup. This celebrated man was pleasant to the last, even
+when he had received the poison into his bowels, and truly foretold the
+death of that man whom he named when he drank the poison, and that
+death soon followed. Who that thinks death an evil could approve of the
+evenness of temper in this great man at the instant of dying? Socrates
+came, a few years after, to the same prison and the same cup by as
+great iniquity on the part of his judges as the tyrants displayed when
+they executed Theramenes. What a speech is that which Plato makes him
+deliver before his judges, after they had condemned him to death!
+
+XLI. "I am not without hopes, O judges, that it is a favorable
+circumstance for me that I am condemned to die; for one of these two
+things must necessarily happen--either that death will deprive me
+entirely of all sense, or else that, by dying, I shall go from hence
+into some other place; wherefore, if all sense is utterly extinguished,
+and if death is like that sleep which sometimes is so undisturbed as to
+be even without the visions of dreams--in that case, O ye good Gods!
+what gain is it to die? or what length of days can be imagined which
+would be preferable to such a night? And if the constant course of
+future time is to resemble that night, who is happier than I am? But if
+on the other hand, what is said be true, namely, that death is but a
+removal to those regions where the souls of the departed dwell, then
+that state must be more happy still to have escaped from those who call
+themselves judges, and to appear before such as are truly so--Minos,
+Rhadamanthus, AEacus, Triptolemus--and to meet with those who have lived
+with justice and probity![23] Can this change of abode appear otherwise
+than great to you? What bounds can you set to the value of conversing
+with Orpheus, and Musaeus, and Homer, and Hesiod? I would even, were it
+possible, willingly die often, in order to prove the certainty of what
+I speak of. What delight must it be to meet with Palamedes, and Ajax,
+and others, who have been betrayed by the iniquity of their judges!
+Then, also, should I experience the wisdom of even that king of kings,
+who led his vast troops to Troy, and the prudence of Ulysses and
+Sisyphus: nor should I then be condemned for prosecuting my inquiries
+on such subjects in the same way in which I have done here on earth.
+And even you, my judges, you, I mean, who have voted for my acquittal,
+do not you fear death, for nothing bad can befall a good man, whether
+he be alive or dead; nor are his concerns ever overlooked by the Gods;
+nor in my case either has this befallen me by chance; and I have
+nothing to charge those men with who accused or condemned me but the
+fact that they believed that they were doing me harm." In this manner
+he proceeded. There is no part of his speech which I admire more than
+his last words: "But it is time," says he, "for me now to go hence,
+that I may die; and for you, that you may continue to live. Which
+condition of the two is the best, the immortal Gods know; but I do not
+believe that any mortal man does."
+
+XLII. Surely I would rather have had this man's soul than all the
+fortunes of those who sat in judgment on him; although that very thing
+which he says no one except the Gods know, namely, whether life or
+death is most preferable, he knows himself, for he had previously
+stated his opinion on it; but he maintained to the last that favorite
+maxim of his, of affirming nothing. And let us, too, adhere to this
+rule of not thinking anything an evil which is a general provision of
+nature; and let us assure ourselves, that if death is an evil, it is an
+eternal evil, for death seems to be the end of a miserable life; but if
+death is a misery, there can be no end of that. But why do I mention
+Socrates, or Theramenes, men distinguished by the glory of virtue and
+wisdom? when a certain Lacedaemomian, whose name is not so much as
+known, held death in such contempt, that, when led to it by the ephori,
+he bore a cheerful and pleasant countenance; and, when he was asked by
+one of his enemies whether he despised the laws of Lycurgus, "On the
+contrary," answered he, "I am greatly obliged to him, for he has
+amerced me in a fine which I can pay without borrowing, or taking up
+money at interest." This was a man worthy of Sparta. And I am almost
+persuaded of his innocence because of the greatness of his soul. Our
+own city has produced many such. But why should I name generals, and
+other men of high rank, when Cato could write that legions have marched
+with alacrity to that place from whence they never expected to return?
+With no less greatness of soul fell the Lacedaemonians at Thermopylae, on
+whom Simonides wrote the following epitaph:
+
+    Go, stranger, tell the Spartans, here we lie,
+    Who to support their laws durst boldly die.[24]
+
+What was it that Leonidas, their general, said to them? "March on with
+courage, my Lacedaemonians. To-night, perhaps, we shall sup in the
+regions below." This was a brave nation while the laws of Lycurgus were
+in force. One of them, when a Persian had said to him in conversation,
+"We shall hide the sun from your sight by the number of our arrows and
+darts," replied, "We shall fight, then in the shade." Do I talk of
+their men? How great was that Lacedaemonian woman, who had sent her son
+to battle, and when she heard that he was slain, said, "I bore him for
+that purpose, that you might have a man who durst die for his country!"
+However, it is a matter of notoriety that the Spartans were bold and
+hardy, for the discipline of a republic has great influence.
+
+XLIII. What, then, have we not reason to admire Theodorus the Cyrenean,
+a philosopher of no small distinction, who, when Lysimachus threatened
+to crucify him, bade him keep those menaces for his courtiers? "To
+Theodorus it makes no difference whether he rot in the air or
+underground." By which saying of the philosopher I am reminded to say
+something of the custom of funerals and sepulture, and of funeral
+ceremonies, which is, indeed, not a difficult subject, especially if we
+recollect what has been before said about insensibility. The opinion of
+Socrates respecting this matter is clearly stated in the book which
+treats of his death, of which we have already said so much; for when he
+had discussed the immortality of the soul, and when the time of his
+dying was approaching rapidly, being asked by Criton how he would be
+buried, "I have taken a great deal of pains," saith he, "my friends, to
+no purpose, for I have not convinced our Criton that I shall fly from
+hence, and leave no part of me behind. Notwithstanding, Criton, if you
+can overtake me, wheresoever you get hold of me, bury me as you please:
+but believe me, none of you will be able to catch me when I have flown
+away from hence." That was excellently said, inasmuch as he allows his
+friend to do as he pleased, and yet shows his indifference about
+anything of this kind. Diogenes was rougher, though of the same
+opinion; but in his character of a Cynic he expressed himself in a
+somewhat harsher manner; he ordered himself to be thrown anywhere
+without being buried. And when his friends replied, "What! to the birds
+and beasts?" "By no means," saith he; "place my staff near me, that I
+may drive them away." "How can you do that," they answer, "for you will
+not perceive them?" "How am I then injured by being torn by those
+animals, if I have no sensation?" Anaxagoras, when he was at the point
+of death at Lampsacus, and was asked by his friends, whether, if
+anything should happen to him, he would not choose to be carried to
+Clazomenae, his country, made this excellent answer, "There is," says
+he, "no occasion for that, for all places are at an equal distance from
+the infernal regions." There is one thing to be observed with respect
+to the whole subject of burial, that it relates to the body, whether
+the soul live or die. Now, with regard to the body, it is clear that,
+whether the soul live or die, that has no sensation.
+
+XLIV. But all things are full of errors. Achilles drags Hector, tied to
+his chariot; he thinks, I suppose, he tears his flesh, and that Hector
+feels the pain of it; therefore, he avenges himself on him, as he
+imagines. But Hecuba bewails this as a sore misfortune:
+
+    I saw (a dreadful sight) great Hector slain,
+    Dragg'd at Achilles' car along the plain.
+
+What Hector? or how long will he be Hector? Accius is better in this,
+and Achilles, too, is sometimes reasonable:
+
+    I Hector's body to his sire convey'd,
+    Hector I sent to the infernal shade.
+
+It was not Hector that you dragged along, but a body that had been
+Hector's. Here another starts from underground, and will not suffer his
+mother to sleep:
+
+    To thee I call, my once-loved parent, hear,
+    Nor longer with thy sleep relieve thy care;
+    Thine eye which pities not is closed--arise;
+    Ling'ring I wait the unpaid obsequies.
+
+When these verses are sung with a slow and melancholy tune, so as to
+affect the whole theatre with sadness, one can scarce help thinking
+those unhappy that are unburied:
+
+    Ere the devouring dogs and hungry vultures...
+
+He is afraid he shall not have the use of his limbs so well if they are
+torn to pieces, but is under no such apprehensions if they are burned:
+
+    Nor leave my naked bones, my poor remains,
+    To shameful violence and bloody stains.
+
+I do not understand what he could fear who could pour forth such
+excellent verses to the sound of the flute. We must, therefore, adhere
+to this, that nothing is to be regarded after we are dead, though many
+people revenge themselves on their dead enemies. Thyestes pours forth
+several curses in some good lines of Ennius, praying, first of all,
+that Atreus may perish by a shipwreck, which is certainly a very
+terrible thing, for such a death is not free from very grievous
+sensations. Then follow these unmeaning expressions:
+
+                                         May
+    On the sharp rock his mangled carcass lie,
+    His entrails torn, to hungry birds a prey!
+    May he convulsive writhe his bleeding side,
+    And with his clotted gore the stones be dyed!
+
+The rocks themselves were not more destitute of feeling than he who was
+hanging to them by his side; though Thyestes imagines he is wishing him
+the greatest torture. It would be torture, indeed, if he were sensible;
+but as he is not, it can be none; then how very unmeaning is this:
+
+    Let him, still hovering o'er the Stygian wave,
+    Ne'er reach the body's peaceful port, the grave!
+
+You see under what mistaken notions all this is said. He imagines the
+body has its haven, and that the dead are at rest in their graves.
+Pelops was greatly to blame in not having informed and taught his son
+what regard was due to everything.
+
+XLV. But what occasion is there to animadvert on the opinions of
+individuals, when we may observe whole nations to fall into all sorts
+of errors? The Egyptians embalm their dead, and keep them in their
+houses; the Persians dress them over with wax, and then bury them, that
+they may preserve their bodies as long as possible. It is customary
+with the Magi to bury none of their order, unless they have been first
+torn by wild beasts. In Hyrcania, the people maintain dogs for the
+public use; the nobles have their own--and we know that they have a
+good breed of dogs; but every one, according to his ability, provides
+himself with some, in order to be torn by them; and they hold that to
+be the best kind of interment. Chrysippus, who is curious in all kinds
+of historical facts, has collected many other things of this kind; but
+some of them are so offensive as not to admit of being related. All
+that has been said of burying is not worth our regard with respect to
+ourselves, though it is not to be neglected as to our friends, provided
+we are thoroughly aware that the dead are insensible. But the living,
+indeed, should consider what is due to custom and opinion; only they
+should at the same time consider that the dead are noways interested in
+it. But death truly is then met with the greatest tranquillity when the
+dying man can comfort himself with his own praise. No one dies too soon
+who has finished the course of perfect virtue. I myself have known many
+occasions when I have seemed in danger of immediate death; oh! how I
+wish it had come to me! for I have gained nothing by the delay. I had
+gone over and over again the duties of life; nothing remained but to
+contend with fortune. If reason, then, cannot sufficiently fortify us
+to enable us to feel a contempt for death, at all events let our past
+life prove that we have lived long enough, and even longer than was
+necessary; for notwithstanding the deprivation of sense, the dead are
+not without that good which peculiarly belongs to them, namely, the
+praise and glory which they have acquired, even though they are not
+sensible of it. For although there be nothing in glory to make it
+desirable, yet it follows virtue as its shadow; and the genuine
+judgment of the multitude on good men, if ever they form any, is more
+to their own praise than of any real advantage to the dead. Yet I
+cannot say, however it may be received, that Lycurgus and Solon have no
+glory from their laws, and from the political constitution which they
+established in their country; or that Themistocles and Epaminondas have
+not glory from their martial virtue.
+
+XLVI. For Neptune shall sooner bury Salamis itself with his waters than
+the memory of the trophies gained there; and the Boeotian Leuctra shall
+perish sooner than the glory of that great battle. And longer still
+shall fame be before it deserts Curius, and Fabricius, and Calatinus,
+and the two Scipios, and the two Africani, and Maximus, and Marcellus,
+and Paulus, and Cato, and Laelius, and numberless other heroes; and
+whoever has caught any resemblance of them, not estimating it by common
+fame, but by the real applause of good men, may with confidence, when
+the occasion requires, approach death, on which we are sure that even
+if the chief good is not continued, at least no evil is. Such a man
+would even wish to die while in prosperity; for all the favors that
+could be heaped on him would not be so agreeable to him as the loss of
+them would be painful. That speech of the Lacedaemonian seems to have
+the same meaning, who, when Diagoras the Rhodian, who had himself been
+a conqueror at the Olympic games, saw two of his own sons conquerors
+there on the same day, approached the old man, and, congratulating him,
+said, "You should die now, Diagoras, for no greater happiness can
+possibly await you." The Greeks look on these as great things; perhaps
+they think too highly of them, or, rather, they did so then. And so he
+who said this to Diagoras, looking on it as something very glorious,
+that three men out of one family should have been conquerors there,
+thought it could answer no purpose to him to continue any longer in
+life, where he could only be exposed to a reverse of fortune.
+
+I might have given you a sufficient answer, as it seems to me, on this
+point, in a few words, as you had allowed the dead were not exposed to
+any positive evil; but I have spoken at greater length on the subject
+for this reason, because this is our greatest consolation in the losing
+and bewailing of our friends. For we ought to bear with moderation any
+grief which arises from ourselves, or is endured on our own account,
+lest we should seem to be too much influenced by self-love. But should
+we suspect our departed friends to be under those evils, which they are
+generally imagined to be, and to be sensible of them, then such a
+suspicion would give us intolerable pain; and accordingly I wished, for
+my own sake, to pluck up this opinion by the roots, and on that account
+I have been perhaps somewhat more prolix than was necessary.
+
+XLVII. _A._ More prolix than was necessary? Certainty not, in my
+opinion. For I was induced, by the former part of your speech, to wish
+to die; but, by the latter, sometimes not to be unwilling, and at
+others to be wholly indifferent about it. But the effect of your whole
+argument is, that I am convinced that death ought not to be classed
+among the evils.
+
+_M._ Do you, then, expect that I am to give you a regular peroration,
+like the rhetoricians, or shall I forego that art?
+
+_A._ I would not have you give over an art which you have set off to
+such advantage; and you were in the right to do so, for, to speak the
+truth, it also has set you off. But what is that peroration? For I
+should be glad to hear it, whatever it is.
+
+_M._ It is customary, in the schools, to produce the opinions of the
+immortal Gods on death; nor are these opinions the fruits of the
+imagination alone of the lecturers, but they have the authority of
+Herodotus and many others. Cleobis and Biton are the first they
+mention, sons of the Argive priestess; the story is a well-known one.
+As it was necessary that she should be drawn in a chariot to a certain
+annual sacrifice, which was solemnized at a temple some considerable
+distance from the town, and the cattle that were to draw the chariot
+had not arrived, those two young men whom I have just mentioned,
+pulling off their garments, and anointing their bodies with oil,
+harnessed themselves to the yoke. And in this manner the priestess was
+conveyed to the temple; and when the chariot had arrived at the proper
+place, she is said to have entreated the Goddess to bestow on them, as
+a reward for their piety, the greatest gift that a God could confer on
+man. And the young men, after having feasted with their mother, fell
+asleep; and in the morning they were found dead. Trophonius and
+Agamedes are said to have put up the same petition, for they, having
+built a temple to Apollo at Delphi, offered supplications to the God,
+and desired of him some extraordinary reward for their care and labor,
+particularizing nothing, but asking for whatever was best for men.
+Accordingly, Apollo signified to them that he would bestow it on them
+in three days, and on the third day at daybreak they were found dead.
+And so they say that this was a formal decision pronounced by that God
+to whom the rest of the deities have assigned the province of divining
+with an accuracy superior to that of all the rest.
+
+XLVIII. There is also a story told of Silenus, who, when taken prisoner
+by Midas, is said to have made him this present for his ransom--namely,
+that he informed him[25] that never to have been born was by far the
+greatest blessing that could happen to man; and that the next best
+thing was to die very soon; which very opinion Euripides makes use of
+in his Cresphontes, saying,
+
+    When man is born, 'tis fit, with solemn show,
+    We speak our sense of his approaching woe;
+    With other gestures and a different eye,
+    Proclaim our pleasure when he's bid to die.[26]
+
+There is something like this in Crantor's Consolation; for he says that
+Terinaesus of Elysia, when he was bitterly lamenting the loss of his
+son, came to a place of divination to be informed why he was visited
+with so great affliction, and received in his tablet these three
+verses:
+
+    Thou fool, to murmur at Euthynous' death!
+    The blooming youth to fate resigns his breath:
+    The fate, whereon your happiness depends,
+    At once the parent and the son befriends.[27]
+
+On these and similar authorities they affirm that the question has been
+determined by the Gods. Nay, more; Alcidamas, an ancient rhetorician of
+the very highest reputation, wrote even in praise of death, which he
+endeavored to establish by an enumeration of the evils of life; and his
+Dissertation has a great deal of eloquence in it; but he was
+unacquainted with the more refined arguments of the philosophers. By
+the orators, indeed, to die for our country is always considered not
+only as glorious, but even as happy: they go back as far as
+Erechtheus,[28] whose very daughters underwent death, for the safety of
+their fellow-citizens: they instance Codrus, who threw himself into the
+midst of his enemies, dressed like a common man, that his royal robes
+might not betray him, because the oracle had declared the Athenians
+conquerors, if their king was slain. Menoeceus[29] is not overlooked by
+them, who, in compliance with the injunctions of an oracle, freely shed
+his blood for his country. Iphigenia ordered herself to be conveyed to
+Aulis, to be sacrificed, that her blood might be the cause of spilling
+that of her enemies.
+
+XLIX. From hence they proceed to instances of a fresher date. Harmodius
+and Aristogiton are in everybody's mouth; the memory of Leonidas the
+Lacedaemonian and Epaminondas the Theban is as fresh as ever. Those
+philosophers were not acquainted with the many instances in our
+country--to give a list of whom would take up too much time--who, we
+see, considered death desirable as long as it was accompanied with
+honor. But, notwithstanding this is the correct view of the case, we
+must use much persuasion, speak as if we were endued with some higher
+authority, in order to bring men to begin to wish to die, or cease to
+be afraid of death. For if that last day does not occasion an entire
+extinction, but a change of abode only, what can be more desirable? And
+if it, on the other hand, destroys, and absolutely puts an end to us,
+what can be preferable to the having a deep sleep fall on us, in the
+midst of the fatigues of life, and being thus overtaken, to sleep to
+eternity? And, should this really be the case, then Ennius's language
+is more consistent with wisdom than Solon's; for our Ennius says,
+
+    Let none bestow upon my passing bier
+    One needless sigh or unavailing tear.
+
+But the wise Solon says,
+
+    Let me not unlamented die, but o'er my bier
+    Burst forth the tender sigh, the friendly tear.[30]
+
+But let us, if indeed it should be our fate to know the time which is
+appointed by the Gods for us to die, prepare ourselves for it with a
+cheerful and grateful mind, thinking ourselves like men who are
+delivered from a jail, and released from their fetters, for the purpose
+of going back to our eternal habitation, which may be more emphatically
+called our own; or else to be divested of all sense and trouble. If, on
+the other hand, we should have no notice given us of this decree, yet
+let us cultivate such a disposition as to look on that formidable hour
+of death as happy for us, though shocking to our friends; and let us
+never imagine anything to be an evil which is an appointment of the
+immortal Gods, or of nature, the common parent of all. For it is not by
+hazard or without design that we have been born and situated as we
+have. On the contrary, beyond all doubt there is a certain power which
+consults the happiness of human nature; and this would neither have
+produced nor provided for a being which, after having gone through the
+labors of life, was to fall into eternal misery by death. Let us rather
+infer that we have a retreat and haven prepared for us, which I wish we
+could crowd all sail and arrive at; but though the winds should not
+serve, and we should be driven back, yet we shall to a certainty arrive
+at that point eventually, though somewhat later. But how can that be
+miserable for one which all must of necessity undergo? I have given you
+a peroration, that you might not think I had overlooked or neglected
+anything.
+
+_A._ I am persuaded you have not; and, indeed, that peroration has
+confirmed me.
+
+_M._ I am glad it has had that effect. But it is now time to consult
+our health. To-morrow, and all the time we continue in this Tusculan
+villa, let us consider this subject; and especially those portions of
+it which may ease our pain, alleviate our fears, and lessen our
+desires, which is the greatest advantage we can reap from the whole of
+philosophy.
+
+       *       *       *       *       *
+
+
+
+
+BOOK II.
+
+ON BEARING PAIN.
+
+
+I. Neoptolemus, in Ennius, indeed, says that the study of philosophy
+was expedient for him; but that it required limiting to a few subjects,
+for that to give himself up entirely to it was what he did not approve
+of. And for my part, Brutus, I am perfectly persuaded that it is
+expedient for me to philosophize; for what can I do better, especially
+as I have no regular occupation? But I am not for limiting my
+philosophy to a few subjects, as he does; for philosophy is a matter in
+which it is difficult to acquire a little knowledge without acquainting
+yourself with many, or all its branches, nor can you well take a few
+subjects without selecting them out of a great number; nor can any one,
+who has acquired the knowledge of a few points, avoid endeavoring with
+the same eagerness to understand more. But still, in a busy life, and
+in one mainly occupied with military matters, such as that of
+Neoptolemus was at that time, even that limited degree of acquaintance
+with philosophy may be of great use, and may yield fruit, not perhaps
+so plentiful as a thorough knowledge of the whole of philosophy, but
+yet such as in some degree may at times deliver us from the dominion of
+our desires, our sorrows, and our fears; just as the effect of that
+discussion which we lately maintained in my Tusculan villa seemed to be
+that a great contempt of death was engendered, which contempt is of no
+small efficacy towards delivering the mind from fear; for whoever
+dreads what cannot be avoided can by no means live with a quiet and
+tranquil mind. But he who is under no fear of death, not only because
+it is a thing absolutely inevitable but also because he is persuaded
+that death itself hath nothing terrible in it, provides himself with a
+very great resource towards a happy life. However, I am not tolerant
+that many will argue strenuously against us; and, indeed, that is a
+thing which can never be avoided, except by abstaining from writing at
+all. For if my Orations, which were addressed to the judgment and
+approbation of the people (for that is a popular art, and the object of
+oratory is popular applause), have been criticised by some people who
+are inclined to withhold their praise from everything but what they are
+persuaded they can attain to themselves, and who limit their ideas of
+good speaking by the hopes which they conceive of what they themselves
+may attain to, and who declare, when they are overwhelmed with a flow
+of words and sentences, that they prefer the utmost poverty of thought
+and expression to that plenty and copiousness (from which arose the
+Attic kind of oratory, which they who professed it were strangers to,
+though they have now been some time silenced, and laughed out of the
+very courts of justice), what may I not expect, when at present I
+cannot have the least countenance from the people by whom I used to be
+upheld before? For philosophy is satisfied with a few judges, and of
+her own accord industriously avoids the multitude, who are jealous of
+it, and utterly displeased with it; so that, should any one undertake
+to cry down the whole of it, he would have the people on his side;
+while, if he should attack that school which I particularly profess, he
+would have great assistance from those of the other philosophers.
+
+II. But I have answered the detractors of philosophy in general, in my
+Hortensius. And what I had to say in favor of the Academics, is, I
+think, explained with sufficient accuracy in my four books of the
+Academic Question.
+
+But yet I am so far from desiring that no one should write against me,
+that it is what I most earnestly wish; for philosophy would never have
+been in such esteem in Greece itself, if it had not been for the
+strength which it acquired from the contentions and disputations of the
+most learned men; and therefore I recommend all men who have abilities
+to follow my advice to snatch this art also from declining Greece, and
+to transport it to this city; as our ancestors by their study and
+industry have imported all their other arts which were worth having.
+Thus the praise of oratory, raised from a low degree, is arrived at
+such perfection that it must now decline, and, as is the nature of all
+things, verge to its dissolution in a very short time. Let philosophy,
+then, derive its birth in Latin language from this time, and let us
+lend it our assistance, and bear patiently to be contradicted and
+refuted; and although those men may dislike such treatment who are
+bound and devoted to certain predetermined opinions, and are under such
+obligations to maintain them that they are forced, for the sake of
+consistency, to adhere to them even though they do not themselves
+wholly approve of them; we, on the other hand, who pursue only
+probabilities, and who cannot go beyond that which seems really likely,
+can confute others without obstinacy, and are prepared to be confuted
+ourselves without resentment. Besides, if these studies are ever
+brought home to us, we shall not want even Greek libraries, in which
+there is an infinite number of books, by reason of the multitude of
+authors among them; for it is a common practice with many to repeat the
+same things which have been written by others, which serves no purpose
+but to stuff their shelves; and this will be our case, too, if many
+apply themselves to this study.
+
+III. But let us excite those, if possible, who have had a liberal
+education, and are masters of an elegant style, and who philosophize
+with reason and method.
+
+For there is a certain class of them who would willingly be called
+philosophers, whose books in our language are said to be numerous, and
+which I do not despise; for, indeed, I never read them: but still,
+because the authors themselves declare that they write without any
+regularity, or method, or elegance, or ornament, I do not care to read
+what must be so void of entertainment. There is no one in the least
+acquainted with literature who does not know the style and sentiments
+of that school; wherefore, since they are at no pains to express
+themselves well, I do not see why they should be read by anybody except
+by one another. Let them read them, if they please, who are of the same
+opinions; for in the same manner as all men read Plato and the other
+Socratics, with those who sprung from them, even those who do not agree
+with their opinions, or are very indifferent about them; but scarcely
+any one except their own disciples take Epicurus or Metrodorus into
+their hands; so they alone read these Latin books who think that the
+arguments contained in them are sound. But, in my opinion, whatever is
+published should be recommended to the reading of every man of
+learning; and though we may not succeed in this ourselves, yet
+nevertheless we must be sensible that this ought to be the aim of every
+writer. And on this account I have always been pleased with the custom
+of the Peripatetics and Academics, of disputing on both sides of the
+question; not solely from its being the only method of discovering what
+is probable on every subject, but also because it affords the greatest
+scope for practising eloquence; a method that Aristotle first made use
+of, and afterward all the Aristotelians; and in our own memory Plilo,
+whom we have often heard, appointed one time to treat of the precepts
+of the rhetoricians, and another for philosophical discussion, to which
+custom I was brought to conform by my friends at my Tusculum; and
+accordingly our leisure time was spent in this manner. And therefore,
+as yesterday before noon we applied ourselves to speaking, and in the
+afternoon went down into the Academy, the discussions which were held
+there I have acquainted you with, not in the manner of a narration, but
+in almost the very same words which were employed in the debate.
+
+IV. The discourse, then, was introduced in this manner while we were
+walking, and it was commenced by some such an opening as this:
+
+_A._ It is not to be expressed how much I was delighted, or rather
+edified, by your discourse of yesterday. For although I am conscious to
+myself that I have never been too fond of life, yet at times, when I
+have considered that there would be an end to this life, and that I
+must some time or other part with all its good things, a certain dread
+and uneasiness used to intrude itself on my thoughts; but now, believe
+me, I am so freed from that kind of uneasiness that there is nothing
+that I think less worth any regard.
+
+_M._ I am not at all surprised at that, for it is the effect of
+philosophy, which is the medicine of our souls; it banishes all
+groundless apprehensions, frees us from desires, and drives away fears:
+but it has not the same influence over all men; it is of very great
+influence when it falls in with a disposition well adapted to it. For
+not only does Fortune, as the old proverb says, assist the bold, but
+reason does so in a still greater degree; for it, by certain precepts,
+as it were, strengthens even courage itself. You were born naturally
+great and soaring, and with a contempt for all things which pertain to
+man alone; therefore a discourse against death took easy possession of
+a brave soul. But do you imagine that these same arguments have any
+force with those very persons who have invented, and canvassed, and
+published them, excepting indeed some very few particular persons? For
+how few philosophers will you meet with whose life and manners are
+conformable to the dictates of reason! who look on their profession,
+not as a means of displaying their learning, but as a rule for their
+own practice! who follow their own precepts, and comply with their own
+decrees! You may see some of such levity and such vanity, that it would
+have been better for them to have been ignorant; some covetous of
+money, some others eager for glory, many slaves to their lusts; so that
+their discourses and their actions are most strangely at variance; than
+which nothing in my opinion can be more unbecoming: for just as if one
+who professed to teach grammar should speak with impropriety, or a
+master of music sing out of tune, such conduct has the worst appearance
+in these men, because they blunder in the very particular with which
+they profess that they are well acquainted. So a philosopher who errs
+in the conduct of his life is the more infamous because he is erring in
+the very thing which he pretends to teach, and, while he lays down
+rules to regulate life by, is irregular in his own life.
+
+V. _A._ Should this be the case, is it not to be feared that you are
+dressing up philosophy in false colors? For what stronger argument can
+there be that it is of little use than that some very profound
+philosophers live in a discreditable manner?
+
+_M._ That, indeed, is no argument at all, for as all the fields which
+are cultivated are not fruitful (and this sentiment of Accius is false,
+and asserted without any foundation,
+
+    The ground you sow on is of small avail;
+    To yield a crop good seed can never fail),
+
+it is not every mind which has been properly cultivated that produces
+fruit; and, to go on with the comparison, as a field, although it may
+be naturally fruitful, cannot produce a crop without dressing, so
+neither can the mind without education; such is the weakness of either
+without the other. Whereas philosophy is the culture of the mind: this
+it is which plucks up vices by the roots; prepares the mind for the
+receiving of seeds; commits them to it, or, as I may say, sows them, in
+the hope that, when come to maturity, they may produce a plentiful
+harvest. Let us proceed, then, as we began. Say, if you please, what
+shall be the subject of our disputation.
+
+_A._ I look on pain to be the greatest of all evils.
+
+_M._ What, even greater than infamy?
+
+_A._ I dare not indeed assert that; and I blush to think I am so soon
+driven from my ground.
+
+_M._ You would have had greater reason for blushing had you persevered
+in it; for what is so unbecoming--what can appear worse to you, than
+disgrace, wickedness, immorality? To avoid which, what pain is there
+which we ought not (I will not say to avoid shirking, but even) of our
+own accord to encounter, and undergo, and even to court?
+
+_A._ I am entirely of that opinion; but, notwithstanding that pain is
+not the greatest evil, yet surely it is an evil.
+
+_M._ Do you perceive, then, how much of the terror of pain you have
+given up on a small hint?
+
+_A._ I see that plainly; but I should be glad to give up more of it.
+
+_M._ I will endeavor to make you do so; but it is a great undertaking,
+and I must have a disposition on your part which is not inclined to
+offer any obstacles.
+
+_A._ You shall have such: for as I behaved yesterday, so now I will
+follow reason wherever she leads.
+
+VI. _M._ First, then, I will speak of the weakness of many
+philosophers, and those, too, of various sects; the head of whom, both
+in authority and antiquity, was Aristippus, the pupil of Socrates, who
+hesitated not to say that pain was the greatest of all evils. And after
+him Epicurus easily gave in to this effeminate and enervated doctrine.
+After him Hieronymus the Rhodian said, that to be without pain was the
+chief good, so great an evil did pain appear to him to be. The rest,
+with the exceptions of Zeno, Aristo, Pyrrho, were pretty much of the
+same opinion that you were of just now--that it was indeed an evil, but
+that there were many worse. When, then, nature herself, and a certain
+generous feeling of virtue, at once prevents you from persisting in the
+assertion that pain is the chief evil, and when you were driven from
+such an opinion when disgrace was contrasted with pain, shall
+philosophy, the preceptress of life, cling to this idea for so many
+ages? What duty of life, what praise, what reputation, would be of such
+consequence that a man should be desirous of gaining it at the expense
+of submitting to bodily pain, when he has persuaded himself that pain
+is the greatest evil? On the other side, what disgrace, what ignominy,
+would he not submit to that he might avoid pain, when persuaded that it
+was the greatest of evils? Besides, what person, if it be only true
+that pain is the greatest of evils, is not miserable, not only when he
+actually feels pain, but also whenever he is aware that it may befall
+him. And who is there whom pain may not befall? So that it is clear
+that there is absolutely no one who can possibly be happy. Metrodorus,
+indeed, thinks that man perfectly happy whose body is free from all
+disorders, and who has an assurance that it will always continue so;
+but who is there who can be assured of that?
+
+VII. But Epicurus, indeed, says such things that it should seem that
+his design was only to make people laugh; for he affirms somewhere that
+if a wise man were to be burned or put to the torture--you expect,
+perhaps, that he is going to say he would bear it, he would support
+himself under it with resolution, he would not yield to it (and that by
+Hercules! would be very commendable, and worthy of that very Hercules
+whom I have just invoked): but even this will not satisfy Epicurus,
+that robust and hardy man! No; his wise man, even if he were in
+Phalaris's bull, would say, How sweet it is! how little do I regard it!
+What, sweet? Is it not sufficient, if it is not disagreeable? But those
+very men who deny pain to be an evil are not in the habit of saying
+that it is agreeable to any one to be tormented; they rather say that
+it is cruel, or hard to bear, afflicting, unnatural, but still not an
+evil: while this man who says that it is the only evil, and the very
+worst of all evils, yet thinks that a wise man would pronounce it
+sweet. I do not require of you to speak of pain in the same words which
+Epicurus uses--a man, as you know, devoted to pleasure: he may make no
+difference, if he pleases, between Phalaris's bull and his own bed; but
+I cannot allow the wise man to be so indifferent about pain. If he
+bears it with courage, it is sufficient: that he should rejoice in it,
+I do not expect; for pain is, beyond all question, sharp, bitter,
+against nature, hard to submit to and to bear. Observe Philoctetes: We
+may allow him to lament, for he saw Hercules himself groaning loudly
+through extremity of pain on Mount Oeta. The arrows with which Hercules
+presented him were then no consolation to him, when
+
+    The viper's bite, impregnating his veins
+    With poison, rack'd him with its bitter pains.
+
+And therefore he cries out, desiring help, and wishing to die,
+
+    Oh that some friendly hand its aid would lend,
+    My body from this rock's vast height to send
+    Into the briny deep! I'm all on fire,
+    And by this fatal wound must soon expire.
+
+It is hard to say that the man who was obliged to cry out in this
+manner was not oppressed with evil, and great evil too.
+
+VIII. But let us observe Hercules himself, who was subdued by pain at
+the very time when he was on the point of attaining immortality by
+death. What words does Sophocles here put in his mouth, in his
+Trachiniae? who, when Deianira had put upon him a tunic dyed in the
+centaur's blood, and it stuck to his entrails, says,
+
+    What tortures I endure no words can tell,
+    Far greater these, than those which erst befell
+    From the dire terror of thy consort, Jove--
+    E'en stern Eurystheus' dire command above;
+    This of thy daughter, Oeneus, is the fruit,
+    Beguiling me with her envenom'd suit,
+    Whose close embrace doth on my entrails prey,
+    Consuming life; my lungs forbid to play;
+    The blood forsakes my veins; my manly heart
+    Forgets to beat; enervated, each part
+    Neglects its office, while my fatal doom
+    Proceeds ignobly from the weaver's loom.
+    The hand of foe ne'er hurt me, nor the fierce
+    Giant issuing from his parent earth.
+    Ne'er could the Centaur such a blow enforce,
+    No barbarous foe, nor all the Grecian force;
+    This arm no savage people could withstand,
+    Whose realms I traversed to reform the land.
+    Thus, though I ever bore a manly heart,
+    I fall a victim to a woman's art.
+IX. Assist, my son, if thou that name dost hear,
+    My groans preferring to thy mother's tear:
+    Convey her here, if, in thy pious heart,
+    Thy mother shares not an unequal part:
+    Proceed, be bold, thy father's fate bemoan,
+    Nations will join, you will not weep alone.
+    Oh, what a sight is this same briny source,
+    Unknown before, through all my labors' course!
+    That virtue, which could brave each toil but late,
+    With woman's weakness now bewails its fate.
+    Approach, my son; behold thy father laid,
+    A wither'd carcass that implores thy aid;
+    Let all behold: and thou, imperious Jove,
+    On me direct thy lightning from above:
+    Now all its force the poison doth assume,
+    And my burnt entrails with its flame consume.
+    Crestfallen, unembraced, I now let fall
+    Listless, those hands that lately conquer'd all;
+    When the Nemaean lion own'd their force,
+    And he indignant fell a breathless corse;
+    The serpent slew, of the Lernean lake,
+    As did the Hydra of its force partake:
+    By this, too, fell the Erymanthian boar:
+    E'en Cerberus did his weak strength deplore.
+    This sinewy arm did overcome with ease
+    That dragon, guardian of the Golden Fleece.
+    My many conquests let some others trace;
+    It's mine to say, I never knew disgrace.[31]
+
+Can we then, despise pain, when we see Hercules himself giving vent to
+his expressions of agony with such impatience?
+
+X. Let us see what AEschylus says, who was not only a poet but a
+Pythagorean philosopher also, for that is the account which you have
+received of him; how doth he make Prometheus bear the pain he suffered
+for the Lemnian theft, when he clandestinely stole away the celestial
+fire, and bestowed it on men, and was severely punished by Jupiter for
+the theft. Fastened to Mount Caucasus, he speaks thus:
+
+    Thou heav'n-born race of Titans here fast bound,
+    Behold thy brother! As the sailors sound
+    With care the bottom, and their ships confine
+    To some safe shore, with anchor and with line;
+    So, by Jove's dread decree, the God of fire
+    Confines me here the victim of Jove's ire.
+    With baneful art his dire machine he shapes;
+    From such a God what mortal e'er escapes?
+    When each third day shall triumph o'er the night,
+    Then doth the vulture, with his talons light,
+    Seize on my entrails; which, in rav'nous guise,
+    He preys on! then with wing extended flies
+    Aloft, and brushes with his plumes the gore:
+    But when dire Jove my liver doth restore,
+    Back he returns impetuous to his prey,
+    Clapping his wings, he cuts th' ethereal way.
+    Thus do I nourish with my blood this pest,
+    Confined my arms, unable to contest;
+    Entreating only that in pity Jove
+    Would take my life, and this cursed plague remove.
+    But endless ages past unheard my moan,
+    Sooner shall drops dissolve this very stone.[32]
+
+And therefore it scarcely seems possible to avoid calling a man who is
+suffering, miserable; and if he is miserable, then pain is an evil.
+
+XI. _A._ Hitherto you are on my side; I will see to that by-and-by;
+and, in the mean while, whence are those verses? I do not remember
+them.
+
+_M._ I will inform you, for you are in the right to ask. Do you see
+that I have much leisure?
+
+_A._ What, then?
+
+_M._ I imagine, when you were at Athens, you attended frequently at the
+schools of the philosophers.
+
+_A._ Yes, and with great pleasure.
+
+_M._ You observed, then, that though none of them at that time were
+very eloquent, yet they used to mix verses with their harangues.
+
+_A._ Yes, and particularly Dionysius the Stoic used to employ a great
+many.
+
+_M._ You say right; but they were quoted without any appropriateness or
+elegance. But our friend Philo used to give a few select lines and well
+adapted; and in imitation of him, ever since I took a fancy to this
+kind of elderly declamation, I have been very fond of quoting our
+poets; and where I cannot be supplied from them, I translate from the
+Greek, that the Latin language may not want any kind of ornament in
+this kind of disputation.
+
+But, do you not see how much harm is done by poets? They introduce the
+bravest men lamenting over their misfortunes: they soften our minds;
+and they are, besides, so entertaining, that we do not only read them,
+but get them by heart. Thus the influence of the poets is added to our
+want of discipline at home, and our tender and delicate manner of
+living, so that between them they have deprived virtue of all its vigor
+and energy. Plato, therefore, was right in banishing them from his
+commonwealth, where he required the best morals, and the best form of
+government. But we, who have all our learning from Greece, read and
+learn these works of theirs from our childhood; and look on this as a
+liberal and learned education.
+
+XII. But why are we angry with the poets? We may find some
+philosophers, those masters of virtue, who have taught that pain was
+the greatest of evils. But you, young man, when you said but just now
+that it appeared so to you, upon being asked by me what appeared
+greater than infamy, gave up that opinion at a word. Suppose I ask
+Epicurus the same question. He will answer that a trifling degree of
+pain is a greater evil than the greatest infamy; for that there is no
+evil in infamy itself, unless attended with pain. What pain, then,
+attends Epicurus, when he says that very thing, that pain is the
+greatest evil! And yet nothing can be a greater disgrace to a
+philosopher than to talk thus. Therefore, you allowed enough when you
+admitted that infamy appeared to you to be a greater evil than pain.
+And if you abide by this admission, you will see how far pain should be
+resisted; and that our inquiry should be not so much whether pain be an
+evil, as how the mind may be fortified for resisting it. The Stoics
+infer from some petty quibbling arguments that it is no evil, as if the
+dispute were about a word, and not about the thing itself. Why do you
+impose upon me, Zeno? For when you deny what appears very dreadful to
+me to be an evil, I am deceived, and am at a loss to know why that
+which appears to me to be a most miserable thing should be no evil. The
+answer is, that nothing is an evil but what is base and vicious. You
+return to your trifling, for you do not remove what made me uneasy. I
+know that pain is not vice--you need not inform me of that: but show me
+that it makes no difference to me whether I am in pain or not. It has
+never anything to do, say you, with a happy life, for that depends upon
+virtue alone; but yet pain is to be avoided. If I ask, why? It is
+disagreeable, against nature, hard to bear, woful and afflicting.
+
+XIII. Here are many words to express that by so many different forms
+which we call by the single word evil. You are defining pain, instead
+of removing it, when you say, it is disagreeable, unnatural, scarcely
+possible to be endured or borne, nor are you wrong in saying so: but
+the man who vaunts himself in such a manner should not give way in his
+conduct, if it be true that nothing is good but what is honest, and
+nothing evil but what is disgraceful. This would be wishing, not
+proving. This argument is a better one, and has more truth in it--that
+all things which Nature abhors are to be looked upon as evil; that
+those which she approves of are to be considered as good: for when this
+is admitted, and the dispute about words removed, that which they with
+reason embrace, and which we call honest, right, becoming, and
+sometimes include under the general name of virtue, appears so far
+superior to everything else that all other things which are looked upon
+as the gifts of fortune, or the good things of the body, seem trifling
+and insignificant; and no evil whatever, nor all the collective body of
+evils together, appears to be compared to the evil of infamy.
+Wherefore, if, as you granted in the beginning, infamy is worse than
+pain, pain is certainly nothing; for while it appears to you base and
+unmanly to groan, cry out, lament, or faint under pain; while you
+cherish notions of probity, dignity, honor, and, keeping your eye on
+them, refrain yourself, pain will certainly yield to virtue, and, by
+the influence of imagination, will lose its whole force.--For you must
+either admit that there is no such thing as virtue, or you must despise
+every kind of pain. Will you allow of such a virtue as prudence,
+without which no virtue whatever can even be conceived? What, then?
+Will that suffer you to labor and take pains to no purpose? Will
+temperance permit you to do anything to excess? Will it be possible for
+justice to be maintained by one who through the force of pain discovers
+secrets, or betrays his confederates, or deserts many duties of life?
+Will you act in a manner consistently with courage, and its attendants,
+greatness of soul, resolution, patience, and contempt for all worldly
+things? Can you hear yourself called a great man when you lie
+grovelling, dejected, and deploring your condition with a lamentable
+voice; no one would call you even a man while in such a condition. You
+must therefore either abandon all pretensions to courage, or else pain
+must be put out of the question.
+
+XIV. You know very well that, even though part of your Corinthian
+furniture were gone, the remainder might be safe without that; but if
+you lose one virtue (though virtue in reality cannot be lost), still
+if, I say, you should acknowledge that you were deficient in one, you
+would be stripped of all. Can you, then, call yourself a brave man, of
+a great soul, endued with patience and steadiness above the frowns of
+fortune? or Philoctetes? for I choose to instance him, rather than
+yourself, for he certainly was not a brave man, who lay in his bed,
+which was watered with his tears,
+
+    Whose groans, bewailings, and whose bitter cries,
+    With grief incessant rent the very skies.
+
+I do not deny pain to be pain--for were that the case, in what would
+courage consist?--but I say it should be assuaged by patience, if there
+be such a thing as patience: if there be no such thing, why do we speak
+so in praise of philosophy? or why do we glory in its name? Does pain
+annoy us? Let it sting us to the heart: if you are without defensive
+armor, bare your throat to it; but if you are secured by Vulcanian
+armor, that is to say by resolution, resist it. Should you fail to do
+so, that guardian of your honor, your courage, will forsake and leave
+you.--By the laws of Lycurgus, and by those which were given to the
+Cretans by Jupiter, or which Minos established under the direction of
+Jupiter, as the poets say, the youths of the State are trained by the
+practice of hunting, running, enduring hunger and thirst, cold and
+heat. The boys at Sparta are scourged so at the altars that blood
+follows the lash in abundance; nay, sometimes, as I used to hear when I
+was there, they are whipped even to death; and yet not one of them was
+ever heard to cry out, or so much as groan. What, then? Shall men not
+be able to bear what boys do? and shall custom have such great force,
+and reason none at all?
+
+XV. There is some difference between labor and pain; they border upon
+one another, but still there is a certain difference between them.
+Labor is a certain exercise of the mind or body, in some employment or
+undertaking of serious trouble and importance; but pain is a sharp
+motion in the body, disagreeable to our senses.--Both these feelings,
+the Greeks, whose language is more copious than ours, express by the
+common name of [Greek: Ponos]: therefore they call industrious men
+painstaking, or, rather, fond of labor; we, more conveniently, call
+them laborious; for laboring is one thing, and enduring pain another.
+You see, O Greece! your barrenness of words, sometimes, though you
+think you are always so rich in them. I say, then, that there is a
+difference between laboring and being in pain. When Caius Marius had an
+operation performed for a swelling in his thigh, he felt pain; when he
+headed his troops in a very hot season, he labored. Yet these two
+feelings bear some resemblance to one another; for the accustoming
+ourselves to labor makes the endurance of pain more easy to us. And it
+was because they were influenced by this reason that the founders of
+the Grecian form of government provided that the bodies of their youth
+should be strengthened by labor, which custom the Spartans transferred
+even to their women, who in other cities lived more delicately, keeping
+within the walls of their houses; but it was otherwise with the
+Spartans.
+
+    The Spartan women, with a manly air,
+    Fatigues and dangers with their husbands share;
+    They in fantastic sports have no delight,
+    Partners with them in exercise and fight.
+
+And in these laborious exercises pain interferes sometimes. They are
+thrown down, receive blows, have bad falls, and are bruised, and the
+labor itself produces a sort of callousness to pain.
+
+XVI. As to military service (I speak of our own, not of that of the
+Spartans, for they used to march slowly to the sound of the flute, and
+scarce a word of command was given without an anapaest), you may see, in
+the first place, whence the very name of an army (_exercitus_[33]) is
+derived; and, secondly, how great the labor is of an army on its march:
+then consider that they carry more than a fortnight's provision, and
+whatever else they may want; that they carry the burden of the
+stakes,[34] for as to shield, sword, or helmet, they look on them as no
+more encumbrance than their own limbs, for they say that arms are the
+limbs of a soldier, and those, indeed, they carry so commodiously that,
+when there is occasion, they throw down their burdens, and use their
+arms as readily as their limbs. Why need I mention the exercises of the
+legions? And how great the labor is which is undergone in the running,
+encounters, shouts! Hence it is that their minds are worked up to make
+so light of wounds in action. Take a soldier of equal bravery, but
+undisciplined, and he will seem a woman. Why is it that there is this
+sensible difference between a raw recruit and a veteran soldier? The
+age of the young soldiers is for the most part in their favor; but it
+is practice only that enables men to bear labor and despise wounds.
+Moreover, we often see, when the wounded are carried off the field, the
+raw, untried soldier, though but slightly wounded, cries out most
+shamefully; but the more brave, experienced veteran only inquires for
+some one to dress his wounds, and says,
+
+    Patroclus, to thy aid I must appeal
+    Ere worse ensue, my bleeding wounds to heal;
+    The sons of AEsculapius are employ'd,
+    No room for me, so many are annoy'd.
+
+XVII. This is certainly Eurypylus himself. What an experienced
+man!--While his friend is continually enlarging on his misfortunes, you
+may observe that he is so far from weeping that he even assigns a
+reason why he should bear his wounds with patience.
+
+    Who at his enemy a stroke directs,
+    His sword to light upon himself expects.
+
+Patroclus, I suppose, will lead him off to his chamber to bind up his
+wounds, at least if he be a man: but not a word of that; he only
+inquires how the battle went:
+
+    Say how the Argives bear themselves in fight?
+
+And yet no words can show the truth as well as those, your deeds and
+visible sufferings.
+
+    Peace! and my wounds bind up;
+
+but though Eurypylus could bear these afflictions, AEsopus could not,
+
+    Where Hector's fortune press'd our yielding troops;
+
+and he explains the rest, though in pain. So unbounded is military
+glory in a brave man! Shall, then, a veteran soldier be able to behave
+in this manner, and shall a wise and learned man not be able? Surely
+the latter might be able to bear pain better, and in no small degree
+either. At present, however, I am confining myself to what is
+engendered by practice and discipline. I am not yet come to speak of
+reason and philosophy. You may often hear of old women living without
+victuals for three or four days; but take away a wrestler's provisions
+but for one day, and he will implore the aid of Jupiter Olympius, the
+very God for whom he exercises himself: he will cry out that he cannot
+endure it. Great is the force of custom! Sportsmen will continue whole
+nights in the snow; they will bear being almost frozen upon the
+mountains. From practice boxers will not so much as utter a groan,
+however bruised by the cestus. But what do you think of those to whom a
+victory in the Olympic games seemed almost on a par with the ancient
+consulships of the Roman people? What wounds will the gladiators bear,
+who are either barbarians, or the very dregs of mankind! How do they,
+who are trained to it, prefer being wounded to basely avoiding it! How
+often do they prove that they consider nothing but the giving
+satisfaction to their masters or to the people! for when covered with
+wounds, they send to their masters to learn their pleasure: if it is
+their will, they are ready to lie down and die. What gladiator, of even
+moderate reputation, ever gave a sigh? who ever turned pale? who ever
+disgraced himself either in the actual combat, or even when about to
+die? who that had been defeated ever drew in his neck to avoid the
+stroke of death? So great is the force of practice, deliberation, and
+custom! Shall this, then, be done by
+
+    A Samnite rascal, worthy of his trade;
+
+and shall a man born to glory have so soft a part in his soul as not to
+be able to fortify it by reason and reflection? The sight of the
+gladiators' combats is by some looked on as cruel and inhuman, and I do
+not know, as it is at present managed, but it may be so; but when the
+guilty fought, we might receive by our ears perhaps (but certainly by
+our eyes we could not) better training to harden us against pain and
+death.
+
+XVIII. I have now said enough about the effects of exercise, custom,
+and careful meditation. Proceed we now to consider the force of reason,
+unless you have something to reply to what has been said.
+
+_A._ That I should interrupt you! By no means; for your discourse has
+brought me over to your opinion. Let the Stoics, then, think it their
+business to determine whether pain be an evil or not, while they
+endeavor to show by some strained and trifling conclusions, which are
+nothing to the purpose, that pain is no evil. My opinion is, that
+whatever it is, it is not so great as it appears; and I say, that men
+are influenced to a great extent by some false representations and
+appearance of it, and that all which is really felt is capable of being
+endured. Where shall I begin, then? Shall I superficially go over what
+I said before, that my discourse may have a greater scope?
+
+This, then, is agreed upon by all, and not only by learned men, but
+also by the unlearned, that it becomes the brave and magnanimous--those
+that have patience and a spirit above this world--not to give way to
+pain. Nor has there ever been any one who did not commend a man who
+bore it in this manner. That, then, which is expected from a brave man,
+and is commended when it is seen, it must surely be base in any one to
+be afraid of at its approach, or not to bear when it comes. But I would
+have you consider whether, as all the right affections of the soul are
+classed under the name of virtues, the truth is that this is not
+properly the name of them all, but that they all have their name from
+that leading virtue which is superior to all the rest: for the name
+"virtue" comes from _vir_, a man, and courage is the peculiar
+distinction of a man: and this virtue has two principal duties, to
+despise death and pain. We must, then, exert these, if we would be men
+of virtue, or, rather, if we would be men, because virtue (_virtus_)
+takes its very name from _vir_, man.
+
+XIX. You may inquire, perhaps, how? And such an inquiry is not amiss,
+for philosophy is ready with her assistance. Epicurus offers himself to
+you, a man far from a bad--or, I should rather say, a very good man: he
+advises no more than he knows. "Despise pain," says he. Who is it saith
+this? Is it the same man who calls pain the greatest of all evils? It
+is not, indeed, very consistent in him. Let us hear what he says: "If
+the pain is excessive, it must needs be short." I must have that over
+again, for I do not apprehend what you mean exactly by "excessive" or
+"short." That is excessive than which nothing can be greater; that is
+short than which nothing is shorter. I do not regard the greatness of
+any pain from which, by reason of the shortness of its continuance, I
+shall be delivered almost before it reaches me. But if the pain be as
+great as that of Philoctetes, it will appear great indeed to me, but
+yet not the greatest that I am capable of bearing; for the pain is
+confined to my foot. But my eye may pain me, I may have a pain in the
+head, or sides, or lungs, or in every part of me. It is far, then, from
+being excessive. Therefore, says he, pain of a long continuance has
+more pleasure in it than uneasiness. Now, I cannot bring myself to say
+so great a man talks nonsense; but I imagine he is laughing at us. My
+opinion is that the greatest pain (I say the greatest, though it may be
+ten atoms less than another) is not therefore short, because acute. I
+could name to you a great many good men who have been tormented many
+years with the acutest pains of the gout. But this cautious man doth
+not determine the measure of that greatness or of duration, so as to
+enable us to know what he calls excessive with regard to pain, or short
+with respect to its continuance. Let us pass him by, then, as one who
+says just nothing at all; and let us force him to acknowledge,
+notwithstanding he might behave himself somewhat boldly under his colic
+and his strangury, that no remedy against pain can be had from him who
+looks on pain as the greatest of all evils. We must apply, then, for
+relief elsewhere, and nowhere better (if we seek for what is most
+consistent with itself) than to those who place the chief good in
+honesty, and the greatest evil in infamy. You dare not so much as
+groan, or discover the least uneasiness in their company, for virtue
+itself speaks to you through them.
+
+XX. Will you, when you may observe children at Lacedaemon, and young men
+at Olympia, and barbarians in the amphitheatre, receive the severest
+wounds, and bear them without once opening their mouths--will you, I
+say, if any pain should by chance attack you, cry out like a woman?
+Will you not rather bear it with resolution and constancy? and not cry,
+It is intolerable; nature cannot bear it! I hear what you say: Boys
+bear this because they are led thereto by glory; some bear it through
+shame, many through fear, and yet are we afraid that nature cannot bear
+what is borne by many, and in such different circumstances? Nature not
+only bears it, but challenges it, for there is nothing with her
+preferable, nothing which she desires more than credit, and reputation,
+and praise, and honor, and glory. I choose here to describe this one
+thing under many names, and I have used many that you may have the
+clearer idea of it; for what I mean to say is, that whatever is
+desirable of itself, proceeding from virtue, or placed in virtue, and
+commendable on its own account (which I would rather agree to call the
+only good than deny it to be the chief good) is what men should prefer
+above all things. And as we declare this to be the case with respect to
+honesty, so we speak in the contrary manner of infamy; nothing is so
+odious, so detestable, nothing so unworthy of a man. And if you are
+thoroughly convinced of this (for, at the beginning of this discourse,
+you allowed that there appeared to you more evil in infamy than in
+pain), it follows that you ought to have the command over yourself,
+though I scarcely know how this expression may seem an accurate one,
+which appears to represent man as made up of two natures, so that one
+should be in command and the other be subject to it.
+
+XXI. Yet this division does not proceed from ignorance; for the soul
+admits of a twofold division, one of which partakes of reason, the
+other is without it. When, therefore, we are ordered to give a law to
+ourselves, the meaning is, that reason should restrain our rashness.
+There is in the soul of every man something naturally soft, low,
+enervated in a manner, and languid. Were there nothing besides this,
+men would be the greatest of monsters; but there is present to every
+man reason, which presides over and gives laws to all; which, by
+improving itself, and making continual advances, becomes perfect
+virtue. It behooves a man, then, to take care that reason shall have
+the command over that part which is bound to practise obedience. In
+what manner? you will say. Why, as a master has over his slave, a
+general over his army, a father over his son. If that part of the soul
+which I have called soft behaves disgracefully, if it gives itself up
+to lamentations and womanish tears, then let it be restrained, and
+committed to the care of friends and relations, for we often see those
+persons brought to order by shame whom no reasons can influence.
+Therefore, we should confine those feelings, like our servants, in safe
+custody, and almost with chains. But those who have more resolution,
+and yet are not utterly immovable, we should encourage with our
+exhortations, as we would good soldiers, to recollect themselves, and
+maintain their honor. That wisest man of all Greece, in the Niptrae,
+does not lament too much over his wounds, or, rather, he is moderate in
+his grief:
+
+    Move slow, my friends; your hasty speed refrain,
+    Lest by your motion you increase my pain.
+
+Pacuvius is better in this than Sophocles, for in the one Ulysses
+bemoans his wounds too vehemently; for the very people who carried him
+after he was wounded, though his grief was moderate, yet, considering
+the dignity of the man, did not scruple to say,
+
+    And thou, Ulysses, long to war inured,
+    Thy wounds, though great, too feebly hast endured.
+
+The wise poet understood that custom was no contemptible instructor how
+to bear pain. But the same hero complains with more decency, though in
+great pain:
+
+    Assist, support me, never leave me so;
+    Unbind my wounds, oh! execrable woe!
+
+He begins to give way, but instantly checks himself:
+
+    Away! begone! but cover first the sore;
+    For your rude hands but make my pains the more.
+
+Do you observe how he constrains himself? not that his bodily pains
+were less, but because he checks the anguish of his mind. Therefore, in
+the conclusion of the Niptrae, he blames others, even when he himself is
+dying:
+
+    Complaints of fortune may become the man,
+    None but a woman will thus weeping stand.
+
+And so that soft place in his soul obeys his reason, just as an abashed
+soldier does his stern commander.
+
+XXII. The man, then, in whom absolute wisdom exists (such a man,
+indeed, we have never as yet seen, but the philosophers have described
+in their writings what sort of man he will be, if he should exist);
+such a man, or at least that perfect and absolute reason which exists
+in him, will have the same authority over the inferior part as a good
+parent has over his dutiful children: he will bring it to obey his nod
+without any trouble or difficulty. He will rouse himself, prepare and
+arm himself, to oppose pain as he would an enemy. If you inquire what
+arms he will provide himself with, they will be contention,
+encouragement, discourse with himself. He will say thus to himself:
+Take care that you are guilty of nothing base, languid, or unmanly. He
+will turn over in his mind all the different kinds of honor. Zeno of
+Elea will occur to him, who suffered everything rather than betray his
+confederates in the design of putting an end to the tyranny. He will
+reflect on Anaxarchus, the pupil of Democritus, who, having fallen into
+the hands of Nicocreon, King of Cyprus, without the least entreaty for
+mercy or refusal, submitted to every kind of torture. Calanus the
+Indian will occur to him, an ignorant man and a barbarian, born at the
+foot of Mount Caucasus, who committed himself to the flames by his own
+free, voluntary act. But we, if we have the toothache, or a pain in the
+foot, or if the body be anyways affected, cannot bear it. For our
+sentiments of pain as well as pleasure are so trifling and effeminate,
+we are so enervated and relaxed by luxuries, that we cannot bear the
+sting of a bee without crying out. But Caius Marius, a plain
+countryman, but of a manly soul, when he had an operation performed on
+him, as I mentioned above, at first refused to be tied down; and he is
+the first instance of any one's having had an operation performed on
+him without being tied down. Why, then, did others bear it afterward?
+Why, from the force of example. You see, then, that pain exists more in
+opinion than in nature; and yet the same Marius gave a proof that there
+is something very sharp in pain for he would not submit to have the
+other thigh cut. So that he bore his pain with resolution as a man;
+but, like a reasonable person, he was not willing to undergo any
+greater pain without some necessary reason. The whole, then, consists
+in this--that you should have command over yourself. I have already
+told you what kind of command this is; and by considering what is most
+consistent with patience, fortitude, and greatness of soul, a man not
+only restrains himself, but, somehow or other, mitigates even pain
+itself.
+
+XXIII. Even as in a battle the dastardly and timorous soldier throws
+away his shield on the first appearance of an enemy, and runs as fast
+as he can, and on that account loses his life sometimes, though he has
+never received even one wound, when he who stands his ground has
+nothing of the sort happen to him, so they who cannot bear the
+appearance of pain throw themselves away, and give themselves up to
+affliction and dismay. But they that oppose it, often come off more
+than a match for it. For the body has a certain resemblance to the
+soul: as burdens are more easily borne the more the body is exerted,
+while they crush us if we give way, so the soul by exerting itself
+resists the whole weight that would oppress it; but if it yields, it is
+so pressed that it cannot support itself. And if we consider things
+truly, the soul should exert itself in every pursuit, for that is the
+only security for its doing its duty. But this should be principally
+regarded in pain, that we must not do anything timidly, or dastardly,
+or basely, or slavishly, or effeminately, and, above all things, we
+must dismiss and avoid that Philoctetean sort of outcry. A man is
+allowed sometimes to groan, but yet seldom; but it is not permissible
+even in a woman to howl; for such a noise as this is forbidden, by the
+twelve tables, to be used even at funerals. Nor does a wise or brave
+man ever groan, unless when he exerts himself to give his resolution
+greater force, as they who run in the stadium make as much noise as
+they can. The wrestlers, too, do the same when they are training; and
+the boxers, when they aim a blow with the cestus at their adversary,
+give a groan, not because they are in pain, or from a sinking of their
+spirits, but because their whole body is put upon the stretch by the
+throwing-out of these groans, and the blow comes the stronger.
+
+XXIV. What! they who would speak louder than ordinary are they
+satisfied with working their jaws, sides, or tongue or stretching the
+common organs of speech and utterance? The whole body and every muscle
+is at full stretch if I may be allowed the expression; every nerve is
+exerted to assist their voice. I have actually seen the knees of Marcus
+Antonius touch the ground when he was speaking with vehemence for
+himself, with relation to the Varian law. For, as the engines you throw
+stones or darts with throw them out with the greater force the more
+they are strained and drawn back; so it is in speaking, running, or
+boxing--the more people strain themselves, the greater their force.
+Since, therefore, this exertion has so much influence--if in a moment
+of pain groans help to strengthen the mind, let us use them; but if
+they be groans of lamentation, if they be the expression of weakness or
+abjectness, or unmanly weeping, then I should scarcely call him a man
+who yielded to them. For even supposing that such groaning could give
+any ease, it still should be considered whether it were consistent with
+a brave and resolute man. But if it does not ease our pain, why should
+we debase ourselves to no purpose? For what is more unbecoming in a man
+than to cry like a woman? But this precept which is laid down with
+respect to pain is not confined to it. We should apply this exertion of
+the soul to everything else. Is anger inflamed? is lust excited? we
+must have recourse to the same citadel, and apply to the same arms. But
+since it is pain which we are at present discussing, we will let the
+other subjects alone. To bear pain, then, sedately and calmly, it is of
+great use to consider with all our soul, as the saying is, how noble it
+is to do so, for we are naturally desirous (as I said before, but it
+cannot be too often repeated) and very much inclined to what is
+honorable, of which, if we discover but the least glimpse, there is
+nothing which we are not prepared to undergo and suffer to attain it.
+From this impulse of our minds, this desire for genuine glory and
+honorable conduct, it is that such dangers are supported in war, and
+that brave men are not sensible of their wounds in action, or, if they
+are sensible of them, prefer death to the departing but the least step
+from their honor. The Decii saw the shining swords of their enemies
+when they were rushing into the battle. But the honorable character and
+the glory of the death which they were seeking made all fear of death
+of little weight. Do you imagine that Epaminondas groaned when he
+perceived that his life was flowing out with his blood? No; for he left
+his country triumphing over the Lacedaemonians, whereas he had found it
+in subjection to them. These are the comforts, these are the things
+that assuage the greatest pain.
+
+XXV. You may ask, How the case is in peace? What is to be done at home?
+How we are to behave in bed? You bring me back to the philosophers, who
+seldom go to war. Among these, Dionysius of Heraclea, a man certainly
+of no resolution, having learned fortitude of Zeno, quitted it on being
+in pain; for, being tormented with a pain in his kidneys, in bewailing
+himself he cried out that those things were false which he had formerly
+conceived of pain. And when his fellow-disciple, Cleanthes, asked him
+why he had changed his opinion, he answered, "That the case of any man
+who had applied so much time to philosophy, and yet was unable to bear
+pain, might be a sufficient proof that pain is an evil; that he himself
+had spent many years at philosophy, and yet could not bear pain: it
+followed, therefore, that pain was an evil." It is reported that
+Cleanthes on that struck his foot on the ground, and repeated a verse
+out of the Epigonae:
+
+    Amphiaraus, hear'st thou this below?
+
+He meant Zeno: he was sorry the other had degenerated from him.
+
+But it was not so with our friend Posidonius, whom I have often seen
+myself; and I will tell you what Pompey used to say of him: that when
+he came to Rhodes, after his departure from Syria, he had a great
+desire to hear Posidonius, but was informed that he was very ill of a
+severe fit of the gout; yet he had great inclination to pay a visit to
+so famous a philosopher. Accordingly, when he had seen him, and paid
+his compliments, and had spoken with great respect of him, he said he
+was very sorry that he could not hear him lecture. "But indeed you
+may," replied the other, "nor will I suffer any bodily pain to occasion
+so great a man to visit me in vain." On this Pompey relates that, as he
+lay on his bed, he disputed with great dignity and fluency on this very
+subject: that nothing was good but what was honest; and that in his
+paroxysms he would often say, "Pain, it is to no purpose;
+notwithstanding you are troublesome, I will never acknowledge you an
+evil." And in general all celebrated and notorious afflictions become
+endurable by disregarding them.
+
+XXVI. Do we not observe that where those exercises called gymnastic are
+in esteem, those who enter the lists never concern themselves about
+dangers? that where the praise of riding and hunting is highly
+esteemed, they who practice these arts decline no pain? What shall I
+say of our own ambitious pursuits or desire of honors? What fire have
+not candidates run through to gain a single vote? Therefore Africanus
+had always in his hands Xenophon, the pupil of Socrates, being
+particularly pleased with his saying, that the same labors were not
+equally heavy to the general and to the common man, because the honor
+itself made the labor lighter to the general. But yet, so it happens,
+that even with the illiterate vulgar an idea of honor is of great
+influence, though they cannot understand what it is. They are led by
+report and common opinion to look on that as honorable which has the
+general voice. Not that I would have you, should the multitude be ever
+so fond of you, rely on their judgment, nor approve of everything which
+they think right: you must use your own judgment. If you are satisfied
+with yourself when you have approved of what is right, you will not
+only have the mastery over yourself (which I recommended to you just
+now), but over everybody, and everything. Lay this down, then, as a
+rule, that a great capacity, and lofty elevation of soul, which
+distinguishes itself most by despising and looking down with contempt
+on pain, is the most excellent of all things, and the more so if it
+does not depend on the people and does not aim at applause, but derives
+its satisfaction from itself. Besides, to me, indeed, everything seems
+the more commendable the less the people are courted, and the fewer
+eyes there are to see it. Not that you should avoid the public, for
+every generous action loves the public view; yet no theatre for virtue
+is equal to a consciousness of it.
+
+XXVII. And let this be principally considered: that this bearing of
+pain, which I have often said is to be strengthened by an exertion of
+the soul, should be the same in everything. For you meet with many who,
+through a desire of victory, or for glory, or to maintain their rights,
+or their liberty, have boldly received wounds, and borne themselves up
+under them; and yet those very same persons, by relaxing that
+intenseness of their minds, were unequal to bearing the pain of a
+disease; for they did not support themselves under their former
+sufferings by reason or philosophy, but by inclination and glory.
+Therefore some barbarians and savage people are able to fight very
+stoutly with the sword, but cannot bear sickness like men; but the
+Grecians, men of no great courage, but as wise as human nature will
+admit of, cannot look an enemy in the face, yet the same will bear to
+be visited with sickness tolerably, and with a sufficiently manly
+spirit; and the Cimbrians and Celtiberians are very alert in battle,
+but bemoan themselves in sickness. For nothing can be consistent which
+has not reason for its foundation. But when you see those who are led
+by inclination or opinion, not retarded by pain in their pursuits, nor
+hindered by it from succeeding in them, you may conclude, either that
+pain is no evil, or that, notwithstanding you may choose to call an
+evil whatever is disagreeable and contrary to nature, yet it is so very
+trifling an evil that it may so effectually be got the better of by
+virtue as quite to disappear. And I would have you think of this night
+and day; for this argument will spread itself, and take up more room
+some time or other, and not be confined to pain alone; for if the
+motives to all our actions are to avoid disgrace and acquire honor, we
+may not only despise the stings of pain, but the storms of fortune,
+especially if we have recourse to that retreat which was pointed out in
+our yesterday's discussion; for, as if some God had advised a man who
+was pursued by pirates to throw himself overboard, saying, "There is
+something at hand to receive you; either a dolphin will take you up, as
+it did Arion of Methymna; or those horses sent by Neptune to Pelops
+(who are said to have carried chariots so rapidly as to be borne up by
+the waves) will receive you, and convey you wherever you please. Cast
+away all fear." So, though your pains be ever so sharp and
+disagreeable, if the case is not such that it is worth your while to
+endure them, you see whither you may betake yourself. I think this will
+do for the present. But perhaps you still abide by your opinion.
+
+_A._ Not in the least, indeed; and I hope I am freed by these two days'
+discourses from the fear of two things that I greatly dreaded.
+
+_M._ To-morrow, then, for rhetoric, as we were saying. But I see we
+must not drop our philosophy.
+
+_A._ No, indeed; we will have the one in the forenoon, and this at the
+usual time.
+
+_M._ It shall be so, and I will comply with your very laudable
+inclinations.
+
+       *       *       *       *       *
+
+
+
+
+BOOK III.
+
+ON GRIEF OF MIND.
+
+
+I. What reason shall I assign, O Brutus, why, as we consist of mind and
+body, the art of curing and preserving the body should be so much
+sought after, and the invention of it, as being so useful, should be
+ascribed to the immortal Gods; but the medicine of the mind should not
+have been so much the object of inquiry while it was unknown, nor so
+much attended to and cultivated after its discovery, nor so well
+received or approved of by some, and accounted actually disagreeable,
+and looked upon with an envious eye by many? Is it because we, by means
+of the mind, judge of the pains and disorders of the body, but do not,
+by means of the body, arrive at any perception of the disorders of the
+mind? Hence it comes that the mind only judges of itself when that very
+faculty by which it is judged is in a bad state. Had nature given us
+faculties for discerning and viewing herself, and could we go through
+life by keeping our eye on her--our best guide--there would be no
+reason certainly why any one should be in want of philosophy or
+learning; but, as it is, she has furnished us only with some feeble
+rays of light, which we immediately extinguish so completely by evil
+habits and erroneous opinions that the light of nature is nowhere
+visible. The seeds of virtues are natural to our constitutions, and,
+were they suffered to come to maturity, would naturally conduct us to a
+happy life; but now, as soon as we are born and received into the
+world, we are instantly familiarized with all kinds of depravity and
+perversity of opinions; so that we may be said almost to suck in error
+with our nurse's milk. When we return to our parents, and are put into
+the hands of tutors and governors, we are imbued with so many errors
+that truth gives place to falsehood, and nature herself to established
+opinion.
+
+II. To these we may add the poets; who, on account of the appearance
+they exhibit of learning and wisdom, are heard, read, and got by heart,
+and make a deep impression on our minds. But when to these are added
+the people, who are, as it were, one great body of instructors, and the
+multitude, who declare unanimously for what is wrong, then are we
+altogether overwhelmed with bad opinions, and revolt entirely from
+nature; so that they seem to deprive us of our best guide who have
+decided that there is nothing better for man, nothing more worthy of
+being desired by him, nothing more excellent, than honors and commands,
+and a high reputation with the people; which indeed every excellent man
+aims at; but while he pursues that only true honor which nature has in
+view above all other objects, he finds himself busied in arrant
+trifles, and in pursuit of no conspicuous form of virtue, but only some
+shadowy representation of glory. For glory is a real and express
+substance, not a mere shadow. It consists in the united praise of good
+men, the free voice of those who form a true judgment of pre-eminent
+virtue; it is, as it were, the very echo of virtue; and being generally
+the attendant on laudable actions, should not be slighted by good men.
+But popular fame, which would pretend to imitate it, is hasty and
+inconsiderate, and generally commends wicked and immoral actions, and
+throws discredit upon the appearance and beauty of honesty by assuming
+a resemblance of it. And it is owing to their not being able to
+discover the difference between them that some men ignorant of real
+excellence, and in what it consists, have been the destruction of their
+country and of themselves. And thus the best men have erred, not so
+much in their intentions as by a mistaken conduct. What? is no cure to
+be attempted to be applied to those who are carried away by the love of
+money, or the lust of pleasures, by which they are rendered little
+short of madmen, which is the case of all weak people? or is it because
+the disorders of the mind are less dangerous than those of the body? or
+because the body will admit of a cure, while there is no medicine
+whatever for the mind?
+
+III. But there are more disorders of the mind than of the body, and
+they are of a more dangerous nature; for these very disorders are the
+more offensive because they belong to the mind and disturb it; and the
+mind, when disordered, is, as Ennius says, in a constant error: it can
+neither bear nor endure anything, and is under the perpetual influence
+of desires. Now, what disorders can be worse to the body than these two
+distempers of the mind (for I overlook others), weakness and desire?
+But how, indeed, can it be maintained that the mind cannot prescribe
+for itself, when she it is who has invented the medicines for the body,
+when, with regard to bodily cures, constitution and nature have a great
+share, nor do all who suffer themselves to be cured find that effect
+instantly; but those minds which are disposed to be cured, and submit
+to the precepts of the wise, may undoubtedly recover a healthy state?
+Philosophy is certainly the medicine of the soul, whose assistance we
+do not seek from abroad, as in bodily disorders, but we ourselves are
+bound to exert our utmost energy and power in order to effect our cure.
+But as to philosophy in general, I have, I think, in my Hortensius,
+sufficiently spoken of the credit and attention which it deserves:
+since that, indeed, I have been continually either disputing or writing
+on its most material branches; and I have laid down in these books all
+the discussions which took place between myself and my particular
+friends at my Tusculan villa. But as I have spoken in the two former of
+pain and death, this book shall be devoted to the account of the third
+day of our disputations.
+
+We came down into the Academy when the day was already declining
+towards afternoon, and I asked one of those who were present to propose
+a subject for us to discourse on; and then the business was carried on
+in this manner:
+
+IV. _A._ My opinion is, that a wise man is subject to grief.
+
+_M._ What, and to the other perturbations of mind, as fears, lusts,
+anger? For these are pretty much like what the Greeks call [Greek:
+pathe]. I might call them diseases, and that would be a literal
+translation, but it is not agreeable to our way of speaking. For envy,
+delight, and pleasure are all called by the Greeks diseases, being
+affections of the mind not in subordination to reason; but we, I think,
+are right in calling the same motions of a disturbed soul
+perturbations, and in very seldom using the term diseases; though,
+perhaps, it appears otherwise to you.
+
+_A._ I am of your opinion.
+
+_M._ And do you think a wise man subject to these?
+
+_A._ Entirely, I think.
+
+_M._ Then that boasted wisdom is but of small account, if it differs so
+little from madness?
+
+_A._ What? does every commotion of the mind seem to you to be madness?
+
+_M._ Not to me only; but I apprehend, though I have often been
+surprised at it, that it appeared so to our ancestors many ages before
+Socrates; from whom is derived all that philosophy which relates to
+life and morals.
+
+_A._ How so?
+
+_M._ Because the name madness[35] implies a sickness of the mind and
+disease; that is to say, an unsoundness and an unhealthiness of mind,
+which they call madness. But the philosophers call all perturbations of
+the soul diseases, and their opinion is that no fool is ever free from
+these; but all that are diseased are unsound; and the minds of all
+fools are diseased; therefore all fools are mad. For they held that
+soundness of the mind depends on a certain tranquillity and steadiness;
+and a mind which was destitute of these qualities they called insane,
+because soundness was inconsistent with a perturbed mind just as much
+as with a disordered body.
+
+V. Nor were they less ingenious in calling the state of the soul devoid
+of the light of the mind, "a being out of one's mind," "a being beside
+one's self." From whence we may understand that they who gave these
+names to things were of the same opinion with Socrates, that all silly
+people were unsound, which the Stoics have carefully preserved as being
+derived from him; for whatever mind is distempered (and, as I just now
+said, the philosophers call all perturbed motions of the mind
+distempers) is no more sound than a body is when in a fit of sickness.
+Hence it is that wisdom is the soundness of the mind, folly a sort of
+unsoundness, which is insanity, or a being out of one's mind: and these
+are much better expressed by the Latin words than the Greek, which you
+will find the case also in many other topics. But we will discuss that
+point elsewhere: let us now attend to our present subject. The very
+meaning of the word describes the whole thing about which we are
+inquiring, both as to its substance and character. For we must
+necessarily understand by "sound" those whose minds are under no
+perturbation from any motion as if it were a disease. They who are
+differently affected we must necessarily call "unsound." So that
+nothing is better than what is usual in Latin, to say that they who are
+run away with by their lust or anger have quitted the command over
+themselves; though anger includes lust, for anger is defined to be the
+lust of revenge. They, then, who are said not to be masters of
+themselves, are said to be so because they are not under the government
+of reason, to which is assigned by nature the power over the whole
+soul. Why the Greeks should call this mania, I do not easily apprehend;
+but we define it much better than they, for we distinguish this madness
+(_insania_), which, being allied to folly, is more extensive, from what
+we call _furor_, or raving. The Greeks, indeed, would do so too, but
+they have no one word that will express it: what we call _furor_, they
+call [Greek: melancholia], as if the reason were affected only by a
+black bile, and not disturbed as often by a violent rage, or fear, or
+grief. Thus we say Athamas, Alcmaeon, Ajax, and Orestes were raving
+(_furere_); because a person affected in this manner was not allowed by
+the Twelve Tables to have the management of his own affairs; therefore
+the words are not, if he is mad (_insanus_), but if he begins to be
+raving (_furiosus_). For they looked upon madness to be an unsettled
+humor that proceeded from not being of sound mind; yet such a person
+might perform his ordinary duties, and discharge the usual and
+customary requirements of life: but they considered one that was raving
+as afflicted with a total blindness of the mind, which, notwithstanding
+it is allowed to be greater than madness, is nevertheless of such a
+nature that a wise man may be subject to raving (_furor_), but cannot
+possibly be afflicted by insanity (_insania_). But this is another
+question: let us now return to our original subject.
+
+VI. I think you said that it was your opinion that a wise man was
+liable to grief.
+
+_A._ And so, indeed, I think.
+
+_M._ It is natural enough to think so, for we are not the offspring of
+flints; but we have by nature something soft and tender in our souls,
+which may be put into a violent motion by grief, as by a storm; nor did
+that Crantor, who was one of the most distinguished men that our
+Academy has ever produced, say this amiss: "I am by no means of their
+opinion who talk so much in praise of I know not what insensibility,
+which neither can exist, nor ought to exist. "I would choose," says he,
+"never to be ill; but should I be so, still I should choose to retain
+my sensation, whether there was to be an amputation or any other
+separation of anything from my body. For that insensibility cannot be
+but at the expense of some unnatural ferocity of mind, or stupor of
+body." But let us consider whether to talk in this manner be not
+allowing that we are weak, and yielding to our softness.
+Notwithstanding, let us be hardy enough, not only to lop off every arm
+of our miseries, but even to pluck up every fibre of their roots. Yet
+still something, perhaps, may be left behind, so deep does folly strike
+its roots: but whatever may be left it will be no more than is
+necessary. But let us be persuaded of this, that unless the mind be in
+a sound state, which philosophy alone can effect, there can be no end
+of our miseries. Wherefore, as we began, let us submit ourselves to it
+for a cure; we shall be cured if we choose to be. I shall advance
+something further. I shall not treat of grief alone, though that indeed
+is the principal thing; but, as I originally proposed, of every
+perturbation of the mind, as I termed it; disorder, as the Greeks call
+it: and first, with your leave, I shall treat it in the manner of the
+Stoics, whose method is to reduce their arguments into a very small
+space; afterward I shall enlarge more in my own way.
+
+VII. A man of courage is also full of faith. I do not use the word
+confident, because, owing to an erroneous custom of speaking, that word
+has come to be used in a bad sense, though it is derived from
+confiding, which is commendable. But he who is full of faith is
+certainly under no fear; for there is an inconsistency between faith
+and fear. Now, whoever is subject to grief is subject to fear; for
+whatever things we grieve at when present we dread when hanging over us
+and approaching. Thus it comes about that grief is inconsistent with
+courage: it is very probable, therefore, that whoever is subject to
+grief is also liable to fear, and to a broken kind of spirits and
+sinking. Now, whenever these befall a man, he is in a servile state,
+and must own that he is overpowered; for whoever admits these feelings,
+must admit timidity and cowardice. But these cannot enter into the mind
+of a man of courage; neither, therefore, can grief: but the man of
+courage is the only wise man; therefore grief cannot befall the wise
+man. It is, besides, necessary that whoever is brave should be a man of
+great soul; that whoever is a man of a great soul should be invincible;
+whoever is invincible looks down with contempt on all things here, and
+considers them, beneath him. But no one can despise those things on
+account of which he may be affected with grief; from whence it follows
+that a wise man is never affected with grief: for all wise men are
+brave; therefore a wise man is not subject to grief. And as the eye,
+when disordered, is not in a good condition for performing its office
+properly; and as the other parts, and the whole body itself, when
+unsettled, cannot perform their office and business; so the mind, when
+disordered, is but ill-fitted to perform its duty. The office of the
+mind is to use its reason well; but the mind of a wise man is always in
+condition to make the best use of his reason, and therefore is never
+out of order. But grief is a disorder of the mind; therefore a wise man
+will be always free from it.
+
+VIII. And from these considerations we may get at a very probable
+definition of the temperate man, whom the Greeks call [Greek: sophron]:
+and they call that virtue [Greek: sophrosynen], which I at one time
+call temperance, at another time moderation, and sometimes even
+modesty; but I do not know whether that virtue may not be properly
+called frugality, which has a more confined meaning with the Greeks;
+for they call frugal men [Greek: chresimous], which implies only that
+they are useful; but our name has a more extensive meaning: for all
+abstinence, all innocency (which the Greeks have no ordinary name for,
+though they might use the word [Greek: ablabeia], for innocency is that
+disposition of mind which would offend no one) and several other
+virtues are comprehended under frugality; but if this quality were of
+less importance, and confined in as small a compass as some imagine,
+the surname of Piso[36] would not have been in so great esteem. But as
+we allow him not the name of a frugal man (_frugi_), who either quits
+his post through fear, which is cowardice; or who reserves to his own
+use what was privately committed to his keeping, which is injustice; or
+who fails in his military undertakings through rashness, which is
+folly--for that reason the word frugality takes in these three virtues
+of fortitude, justice, and prudence, though it is indeed common to all
+virtues, for they are all connected and knit together. Let us allow,
+then, frugality itself to be another and fourth virtue; for its
+peculiar property seems to be, to govern and appease all tendencies to
+too eager a desire after anything, to restrain lust, and to preserve a
+decent steadiness in everything. The vice in contrast to this is called
+prodigality (_nequitia_). Frugality, I imagine, is derived from the
+word _fruge_, the best thing which the earth produces; _nequitia_ is
+derived (though this is perhaps rather more strained; still, let us try
+it; we shall only be thought to have been trifling if there is nothing
+in what we say) from the fact of everything being to no purpose
+(_nequicquam_) in such a man; from which circumstance he is called also
+_Nihil_, nothing. Whoever is frugal, then, or, if it is more agreeable
+to you, whoever is moderate and temperate, such a one must of course be
+consistent; whoever is consistent, must be quiet; the quiet man must be
+free from all perturbation, therefore from grief likewise: and these
+are the properties of a wise man; therefore a wise man must be free
+from grief.
+
+IX. So that Dionysius of Heraclea is right when, upon this complaint of
+Achilles in Homer,
+
+    Well hast thou spoke, but at the tyrant's name
+    My rage rekindles, and my soul's in flame:
+    'Tis just resentment, and becomes the brave,
+    Disgraced, dishonor'd like the vilest slave[37]--
+
+he reasons thus: Is the hand as it should be, when it is affected with
+a swelling? or is it possible for any other member of the body, when
+swollen or enlarged, to be in any other than a disordered state? Must
+not the mind, then, when it is puffed up, or distended, be out of
+order? But the mind of a wise man is always free from every kind of
+disorder: it never swells, never is puffed up; but the mind when in
+anger is in a different state. A wise man, therefore, is never angry;
+for when he is angry, he lusts after something; for whoever is angry
+naturally has a longing desire to give all the pain he can to the
+person who he thinks has injured him; and whoever has this earnest
+desire must necessarily be much pleased with the accomplishment of his
+wishes; hence he is delighted with his neighbor's misery; and as a wise
+man is not capable of such feelings as these, he is therefore not
+capable of anger. But should a wise man be subject to grief, he may
+likewise be subject to anger; for as he is free from anger, he must
+likewise be free from grief. Again, could a wise man be subject to
+grief, he might also be liable to pity, or even might be open to a
+disposition towards envy (_invidentia_); I do not say to envy
+(_invidia_), for that can only exist by the very act of envying: but we
+may fairly form the word _invidentia_ from _invidendo_, and so avoid
+the doubtful name _invidia;_ for this word is probably derived from
+_in_ and _video_, looking too closely into another's fortune; as it is
+said in the Melanippus,
+
+    Who envies me the flower of my children?
+
+where the Latin is _invidit florem._ It may appear not good Latin, but
+it is very well put by Accius; for as _video_ governs an accusative
+case, so it is more correct to say _invideo florem_ than _flori._ We
+are debarred from saying so by common usage. The poet stood in his own
+right, and expressed himself with more freedom.
+
+X. Therefore compassion and envy are consistent in the same man; for
+whoever is uneasy at any one's adversity is also uneasy at another's
+prosperity: as Theophrastus, while he laments the death of his
+companion Callisthenes, is at the same time disturbed at the success of
+Alexander; and therefore he says that Callisthenes met with man of the
+greatest power and good fortune, but one who did not know how to make
+use of his good fortune. And as pity is an uneasiness which arises from
+the misfortunes of another, so envy is an uneasiness that proceeds from
+the good success of another: therefore whoever is capable of pity is
+capable of envy. But a wise man is incapable of envy, and consequently
+incapable of pity. But were a wise man used to grieve, to pity also
+would be familiar to him; therefore to grieve is a feeling which cannot
+affect a wise man. Now, though these reasonings of the Stoics, and
+their conclusions, are rather strained and distorted, and ought to be
+expressed in a less stringent and narrow manner, yet great stress is to
+be laid on the opinions of those men who have a peculiarly bold and
+manly turn of thought and sentiment. For our friends the Peripatetics,
+notwithstanding all their erudition, gravity, and fluency of language,
+do not satisfy me about the moderation of these disorders and diseases
+of the soul which they insist upon; for every evil, though moderate, is
+in its nature great. But our object is to make out that the wise man is
+free from all evil; for as the body is unsound if it is ever so
+slightly affected, so the mind under any moderate disorder loses its
+soundness; therefore the Romans have, with their usual accuracy of
+expression, called trouble, and anguish, and vexation, on account of
+the analogy between a troubled mind and a diseased body, disorders. The
+Greeks call all perturbation of mind by pretty nearly the same name;
+for they name every turbid motion of the soul [Greek: pathos], that is
+to say, a distemper. But we have given them a more proper name; for a
+disorder of the mind is very like a disease of the body. But lust does
+not resemble sickness; neither does immoderate joy, which is an elated
+and exulting pleasure of the mind. Fear, too, is not very like a
+distemper, though it is akin to grief of mind, but properly, as is also
+the case with sickness of the body, so too sickness of mind has no name
+separated from pain. And therefore I must explain the origin of this
+pain, that is to say, the cause that occasions this grief in the mind,
+as if it were a sickness of the body. For as physicians think they have
+found out the cure when they have discovered the cause of the
+distemper, so we shall discover the method of curing melancholy when
+the cause of it is found out.
+
+XI. The whole cause, then, is in opinion; and this observation applies
+not to this grief alone, but to every other disorder of the mind, which
+are of four sorts, but consisting of many parts. For as every disorder
+or perturbation is a motion of the mind, either devoid of reason, or in
+despite of reason, or in disobedience to reason, and as that motion is
+excited by an opinion of either good or evil; these four perturbations
+are divided equally into two parts: for two of them proceed from an
+opinion of good, one of which is an exulting pleasure, that is to say,
+a joy elated beyond measure, arising from an opinion of some present
+great good; the other is a desire which may fairly be called even a
+lust, and is an immoderate inclination after some conceived great good
+without any obedience to reason. Therefore these two kinds, the
+exulting pleasure and the lust, have their rise from an opinion of
+good, as the other two, fear and grief, have from an opinion of evil.
+For fear is an opinion of some great evil impending over us, and grief
+is an opinion of some great evil present; and, indeed, it is a freshly
+conceived opinion of an evil so great that to grieve at it seems right:
+it is of that kind that he who is uneasy at it thinks he has good
+reason to be so. Now we should exert, our utmost efforts to oppose
+these perturbations--which are, as it were, so many furies let loose
+upon us and urged on by folly--if we are desirous to pass this share of
+life that is allotted to us with ease and satisfaction. But of the
+other feelings I shall speak elsewhere: our business at present is to
+drive away grief if we can, for that shall be the object of our present
+discussion, since you have said that it was your opinion that a wise
+man might be subject to grief, which I can by no means allow of; for it
+is a frightful, miserable, and detestable thing, which we should fly
+from with our utmost efforts--with all our sails and oars, as I may
+say.
+
+XII. That descendant of Tantalus, how does he appear to you--he who
+sprung from Pelops, who formerly stole Hippodamia from her
+father-in-law, King Oenomaus, and married her by force?--he who was
+descended from Jupiter himself, how broken-hearted and dispirited does
+he not seem!
+
+    Stand off, my friends, nor come within my shade,
+    That no pollutions your sound hearts pervade,
+    So foul a stain my body doth partake.
+
+Will you condemn yourself, Thyestes, and deprive yourself of life, on
+account of the greatness of another's crime? What do you think of that
+son of Phoebus? Do you not look upon him as unworthy of his own
+father's light?
+
+    Hollow his eyes, his body worn away,
+    His furrow'd cheeks his frequent tears betray;
+    His beard neglected, and his hoary hairs
+    Rough and uncomb'd, bespeak his bitter cares.
+
+O foolish AEetes! these are evils which you yourself have been the cause
+of, and are not occasioned by any accidents with which chance has
+visited you; and you behaved as you did, even after you had been inured
+to your distress, and after the first swelling of the mind had
+subsided!--whereas grief consists (as I shall show) in the notion of
+some recent evil--but your grief, it is very plain, proceeded from the
+loss of your kingdom, not of your daughter, for you hated her, and
+perhaps with reason, but you could not calmly bear to part with your
+kingdom. But surely it is an impudent grief which preys upon a man for
+not being able to command those that are free. Dionysius, it is true,
+the tyrant of Syracuse, when driven from his country, taught a school
+at Corinth; so incapable was he of living without some authority. But
+what could be more impudent than Tarquin, who made war upon those who
+could not bear his tyranny; and, when he could not recover his kingdom
+by the aid of the forces of the Veientians and the Latins, is said to
+have betaken himself to Cuma, and to have died in that city of old age
+and grief!
+
+XIII. Do you, then, think that it can befall a wise man to be oppressed
+with grief, that is to say, with misery? for, as all perturbation is
+misery, grief is the rack itself. Lust is attended with heat, exulting
+joy with levity, fear with meanness, but grief with something greater
+than these; it consumes, torments, afflicts, and disgraces a man; it
+tears him, preys upon his mind, and utterly destroys him: if we do not
+so divest ourselves of it as to throw it completely off, we cannot be
+free from misery. And it is clear that there must be grief where
+anything has the appearance of a present sore and oppressing evil.
+Epicurus is of opinion that grief arises naturally from the imagination
+of any evil; so that whosoever is eye-witness of any great misfortune,
+if he conceives that the like may possibly befall himself, becomes sad
+instantly from such an idea. The Cyrenaics think that grief is not
+engendered by every kind of evil, but only by unexpected, unforeseen
+evil; and that circumstance is, indeed, of no small effect on the
+heightening of grief; for whatsoever comes of a sudden appears more
+formidable. Hence these lines are deservedly commended:
+
+    I knew my son, when first he drew his breath,
+    Destined by fate to an untimely death;
+    And when I sent him to defend the Greeks,
+    War was his business, not your sportive freaks.
+
+XIV. Therefore, this ruminating beforehand upon future evils which you
+see at a distance makes their approach more tolerable; and on this
+account what Euripides makes Theseus say is much commended. You will
+give me leave to translate them, as is usual with me:
+
+    I treasured up what some learn'd sage did tell,
+    And on my future misery did dwell;
+    I thought of bitter death, of being drove
+    Far from my home by exile, and I strove
+    With every evil to possess my mind,
+    That, when they came, I the less care might find.[38]
+
+But Euripides says that of himself, which Theseus said he had heard
+from some learned man, for the poet had been a pupil of Anaxagoras,
+who, as they relate, on hearing of the death of his son, said, "I knew
+that my son was mortal;" which speech seems to intimate that such
+things afflict those men who have not thought on them before.
+Therefore, there is no doubt but that all those things which are
+considered evils are the heavier from not being foreseen. Though,
+notwithstanding this is not the only circumstance which occasions the
+greatest grief, still, as the mind, by foreseeing and preparing for it,
+has great power to make all grief the less, a man should at all times
+consider all the events that may befall him in this life; and certainly
+the excellence and divine nature of wisdom consists in taking a near
+view of, and gaining a thorough acquaintance with, all human affairs,
+in not being surprised when anything happens, and in thinking, before
+the event, that there is nothing but what may come to pass.
+
+                      Wherefore ev'ry man,
+    When his affairs go on most swimmingly,
+    E'en then it most behooves to arm himself
+    Against the coming storm: loss, danger, exile,
+    Returning ever, let him look to meet;
+    His son in fault, wife dead, or daughter sick;
+    All common accidents, and may have happen'd
+    That nothing shall seem new or strange. But if
+    Aught has fall'n out beyond his hopes, all that
+    Let him account clear gain.[39]
+
+XV. Therefore, as Terence has so well expressed what he borrowed from
+philosophy, shall not we, from whose fountains he drew it, say the same
+thing in a better manner, and abide by it with more steadiness? Hence
+came that steady countenance, which, according to Xantippe, her husband
+Socrates always had; so that she said that she never observed any
+difference in his looks when he went out and when he came home. Yet the
+look of that old Roman, M. Crassus, who, as Lucilius says, never smiled
+but once in his lifetime, was not of this kind, but placid and serene,
+for so we are told. He, indeed, might well have had the same look at
+all times who never changed his mind, from which the countenance
+derives its expression. So that I am ready to borrow of the Cyrenaics
+those arms against the accidents and events of life by means of which,
+by long premeditation, they break the force of all approaching evils;
+and at the same time I think that those very evils themselves arise
+more from opinion than nature, for if they were real, no forecast could
+make them lighter. But I shall speak more particularly on these matters
+after I have first considered Epicurus's opinion, who thinks that all
+people must necessarily be uneasy who believe themselves to be in any
+evils, let them be either foreseen and expected, or habitual to them;
+for with him evils are not the less by reason of their continuance, nor
+the lighter for having been foreseen; and it is folly to ruminate on
+evils to come, or such as, perhaps, never may come: every evil is
+disagreeable enough when it does come; but he who is constantly
+considering that some evil may befall him is loading himself with a
+perpetual evil; and even should such evil never light on him, he
+voluntarily takes upon himself unnecessary misery, so that he is under
+constant uneasiness, whether he actually suffers any evil, or only
+thinks of it. But he makes the alleviation of grief depend on two
+things--a ceasing to think on evil, and a turning to the contemplation
+of pleasure. For he thinks that the mind may possibly be under the
+power of reason, and follow her directions: he forbids us, therefore,
+to mind trouble, and calls us off from sorrowful reflections; he throws
+a mist over our eyes to hinder us from the contemplation of misery.
+Having sounded a retreat from this statement, he drives our thoughts on
+again, and encourages them to view and engage the whole mind in the
+various pleasures with which he thinks the life of a wise man abounds,
+either from reflecting on the past, or from the hope of what is to
+come. I have said these things in my own way; the Epicureans have
+theirs. However, let us examine what they say; how they say it is of
+little consequence.
+
+XVI. In the first place, they are wrong in forbidding men to
+premeditate on futurity and blaming their wish to do so; for there is
+nothing that breaks the edge of grief and lightens it more than
+considering, during one's whole life, that there is nothing which it is
+impossible should happen, or than, considering what human nature is, on
+what conditions life was given, and how we may comply with them. The
+effect of which is that we are always grieving, but that we never do
+so; for whoever reflects on the nature of things, the various turns of
+life, and the weakness of human nature, grieves, indeed, at that
+reflection; but while so grieving he is, above all other times,
+behaving as a wise man, for he gains these two things by it: one, that
+while he is considering the state of human nature he is performing the
+especial duties of philosophy, and is provided with a triple medicine
+against adversity--in the first place, because he has long reflected
+that such things might befall him, and this reflection by itself
+contributes much towards lessening and weakening all misfortunes; and,
+secondly, because he is persuaded that we should bear all the accidents
+which can happen to man with the feelings and spirit of a man; and,
+lastly, because he considers that what is blamable is the only evil.
+But it is not your fault that something has happened to you which it
+was impossible for man to avoid. For that withdrawing of our thoughts
+which he recommends when he calls us off from contemplating our
+misfortunes is an imaginary action; for it is not in our power to
+dissemble or to forget those evils which lie heavy on us; they tear,
+vex, and sting us--they burn us up, and leave no breathing time. And do
+you order us to forget them (for such forgetfulness is contrary to
+nature), and at the same time deprive us of the only assistance which
+nature affords, the being accustomed to them? For that, though it is
+but a slow medicine (I mean that which is brought by lapse of time), is
+still a very effectual one. You order me to employ my thoughts on
+something good, and forget my misfortunes. You would say something
+worthy a great philosopher if you thought those things good which are
+best suited to the dignity of human nature.
+
+XVII. Should Pythagoras, Socrates, or Plato say to me, Why are you
+dejected or sad? Why do you faint, and yield to fortune, which,
+perhaps, may have power to harass and disturb you, but should not quite
+unman you? There is great power in the virtues; rouse them, if they
+chance to droop. Take fortitude for your guide, which will give you
+such spirits that you will despise everything that can befall man, and
+look on it as a trifle. Add to this temperance, which is moderation,
+and which was just now called frugality, which will not suffer you to
+do anything base or bad--for what is worse or baser than an effeminate
+man? Not even justice will suffer you to act in this manner, though she
+seems to have the least weight in this affair; but still,
+notwithstanding, even she will inform you that you are doubly unjust
+when you both require what does not belong to you, inasmuch as though
+you who have been born mortal demand to be placed in the condition of
+the immortals, and at the same time you take it much to heart that you
+are to restore what was lent you. What answer will you make to
+prudence, who informs you that she is a virtue sufficient of herself
+both to teach you a good life and also to secure you a happy one? And,
+indeed, if she were fettered by external circumstances, and dependent
+on others, and if she did not originate in herself and return to
+herself, and also embrace everything in herself, so as to seek no
+adventitious aid from any quarter, I cannot imagine why she should
+appear deserving of such lofty panegyrics, or of being sought after
+with such excessive eagerness. Now, Epicurus, if you call me back to
+such goods as these, I will obey you, and follow you, and use you as my
+guide, and even forget, as you order me, all my misfortunes; and I will
+do this the more readily from a persuasion that they are not to be
+ranked among evils at all. But you are for bringing my thoughts over to
+pleasure. What pleasures? Pleasures of the body, I imagine, or such as
+are recollected or imagined on account of the body. Is this all? Do I
+explain your opinion rightly? for your disciples are used to deny that
+we understand at all what Epicurus means. This is what he says, and
+what that subtle fellow, old Zeno, who is one of the sharpest of them,
+used, when I was attending lectures at Athens, to enforce and talk so
+loudly of; saying that he alone was happy who could enjoy present
+pleasure, and who was at the same time persuaded that he should enjoy
+it without pain, either during the whole or the greatest part of his
+life; or if, should any pain interfere, if it was very sharp, then it
+must be short; should it be of longer continuance, it would have more
+of what was sweet than bitter in it; that whosoever reflected on these
+things would be happy, especially if satisfied with the good things
+which he had already enjoyed, and if he were without fear of death or
+of the Gods.
+
+XVIII. You have here a representation of a happy life according to
+Epicurus, in the words of Zeno, so that there is no room for
+contradiction in any point. What, then? Can the proposing and thinking
+of such a life make Thyestes's grief the less, or AEetes's, of whom I
+spoke above, or Telamon's, who was driven from his country to penury
+and banishment? in wonder at whom men exclaimed thus:
+
+    Is this the man surpassing glory raised?
+    Is this that Telamon so highly praised
+    By wondering Greece, at whose sight, like the sun,
+    All others with diminish'd lustre shone?
+
+Now, should any one, as the same author says, find his spirits sink
+with the loss of his fortune, he must apply to those grave philosophers
+of antiquity for relief, and not to these voluptuaries: for what great
+abundance of good do they promise? Suppose that we allow that to be
+without pain is the chief good? Yet that is not called pleasure. But it
+is not necessary at present to go through the whole: the question is,
+to what point are we to advance in order to abate our grief? Grant that
+to be in pain is the greatest evil: whosoever, then, has proceeded so
+far as not to be in pain, is he, therefore, in immediate possession of
+the greatest good? Why, Epicurus, do we use any evasions, and not allow
+in our own words the same feeling to be pleasure which you are used to
+boast of with such assurance? Are these your words or not? This is what
+you say in that book which contains all the doctrine of your school;
+for I will perform on this occasion the office of a translator, lest
+any one should imagine that I am inventing anything. Thus you speak:
+"Nor can I form any notion of the chief good, abstracted from those
+pleasures which are perceived by taste, or from what depends on hearing
+music, or abstracted from ideas raised by external objects visible to
+the eye, or by agreeable motions, or from those other pleasures which
+are perceived by the whole man by means of any of his senses; nor can
+it possibly be said that the pleasures of the mind are excited only by
+what is good, for I have perceived men's minds to be pleased with the
+hopes of enjoying those things which I mentioned above, and with the
+idea that it should enjoy them without any interruption from pain." And
+these are his exact words, so that any one may understand what were the
+pleasures with which Epicurus was acquainted. Then he speaks thus, a
+little lower down: "I have often inquired of those who have been called
+wise men what would be the remaining good if they should exclude from
+consideration all these pleasures, unless they meant to give us nothing
+but words. I could never learn anything from them; and unless they
+choose that all virtue and wisdom should vanish and come to nothing,
+they must say with me that the only road to happiness lies through
+those pleasures which I mentioned above." What follows is much the
+same, and his whole book on the chief good everywhere abounds with the
+same opinions. Will you, then, invite Telamon to this kind of life to
+ease his grief? And should you observe any one of your friends under
+affliction, would you rather prescribe him a sturgeon than a treatise
+of Socrates? or advise him to listen to the music of a water organ
+rather than to Plato? or lay before him the beauty and variety of some
+garden, put a nosegay to his nose, burn perfumes before him, and bid
+him crown himself with a garland of roses and woodbines? Should you add
+one thing more, you would certainly wipe out all his grief.
+
+XIX. Epicurus must admit these arguments, or he must take out of his
+book what I just now said was a literal translation; or, rather, he
+must destroy his whole book, for it is crammed full of pleasures. We
+must inquire, then, how we can ease him of his grief who speaks in this
+manner:
+
+    My present state proceeds from fortune's stings;
+    By birth I boast of a descent from kings;
+    Hence may you see from what a noble height
+    I'm sunk by fortune to this abject plight.
+
+What! to ease his grief, must we mix him a cup of sweet wine, or
+something of that kind? Lo! the same poet presents us with another
+sentiment somewhere else:
+
+    I, Hector, once so great, now claim your aid.
+
+We should assist her, for she looks out for help:
+
+    Where shall I now apply, where seek support?
+    Where hence betake me, or to whom resort?"
+    No means remain of comfort or of joy,
+    In flames my palace, and in ruins Troy;
+    Each wall, so late superb, deformed nods,
+    And not an altar's left t' appease the Gods.
+
+You know what should follow, and particularly this:
+
+    Of father, country, and of friends bereft,
+    Not one of all these sumptuous temples left;
+    Which, while the fortune of our house did stand,
+    With rich wrought ceilings spoke the artist's hand.
+
+O excellent poet! though despised by those who sing the verses of
+Euphorion. He is sensible that all things which come on a sudden are
+harder to be borne. Therefore, when he had set off the riches of Priam
+to the best advantage, which had the appearance of a long continuance,
+what does he add?
+
+    Lo! these all perish'd in one blazing pile;
+    The foe old Priam of his life beguiled,
+    And with his blood, thy altar, Jove, defiled.
+
+Admirable poetry! There is something mournful in the subject, as well
+as in the words and measure. We must drive away this grief of hers: how
+is that to be done? Shall we lay her on a bed of down; introduce a
+singer; shall we burn cedar, or present here with some pleasant liquor,
+and provide her something to eat? Are these the good things which
+remove the most afflicting grief? For you but just now said you knew of
+no other good. I should agree with Epicurus that we ought to be called
+off from grief to contemplate good things, if we could only agree upon
+what was good.
+
+XX. It may be said, What! do you imagine Epicurus really meant this,
+and that he maintained anything so sensual? Indeed I do not imagine so,
+for I am sensible that he has uttered many excellent things and
+sentiments, and delivered maxims of great weight. Therefore, as I said
+before, I am speaking of his acuteness, not of his morals. Though he
+should hold those pleasures in contempt which he just now commended,
+yet I must remember wherein he places the chief good. For he was not
+contented with barely saying this, but he has explained what he meant:
+he says that taste, and embraces, and sports, and music, and those
+forms which affect the eyes with pleasure, are the chief good. Have I
+invented this? have I misrepresented him? I should be glad to be
+confuted; for what am I endeavoring at but to clear up truth in every
+question? Well, but the same man says that pleasure is at its height
+where pain ceases, and that to be free from all pain is the very
+greatest pleasure. Here are three very great mistakes in a very few
+words. One is, that he contradicts himself; for, but just now, he could
+not imagine anything good unless the senses were in a manner tickled
+with some pleasure; but now he says that to be free from pain is the
+highest pleasure. Can any one contradict himself more? The next mistake
+is, that where there is naturally a threefold division--the first, to
+be pleased; next, to be in pain; the last, to be affected neither by
+pleasure nor pain--he imagines the first and the last to be the same,
+and makes no difference between pleasure and a cessation of pain. The
+last mistake he falls into in common with some others, which is this:
+that as virtue is the most desirable thing, and as philosophy has been
+investigated with a view to the attainment of it, he has separated the
+chief good from virtue. But he commends virtue, and that frequently;
+and indeed C. Gracchus, when he had made the largest distributions of
+the public money, and had exhausted the treasury, nevertheless spoke
+much of defending the treasury. What signifies what men say when we see
+what they do? That Piso, who was surnamed Frugal, had always harangued
+against the law that was proposed for distributing the corn; but when
+it had passed, though a man of consular dignity, he came to receive the
+corn. Gracchus observed Piso standing in the court, and asked him, in
+the hearing of the people, how it was consistent for him to take corn
+by a law he had himself opposed. "It was," said he, "against your
+distributing my goods to every man as you thought proper; but, as you
+do so, I claim my share." Did not this grave and wise man sufficiently
+show that the public revenue was dissipated by the Sempronian law? Read
+Gracchus's speeches, and you will pronounce him the advocate of the
+treasury. Epicurus denies that any one can live pleasantly who does not
+lead a life of virtue; he denies that fortune has any power over a wise
+man; he prefers a spare diet to great plenty, and maintains that a wise
+man is always happy. All these things become a philosopher to say, but
+they are not consistent with pleasure. But the reply is, that he doth
+not mean _that_ pleasure: let him mean any pleasure, it must be such a
+one as makes no part of virtue. But suppose we are mistaken as to his
+pleasure; are we so, too, as to his pain? I maintain, therefore, the
+impropriety of language which that man uses, when talking of virtue,
+who would measure every great evil by pain.
+
+XXI. And indeed the Epicureans, those best of men--for there is no
+order of men more innocent--complain that I take great pains to inveigh
+against Epicurus. We are rivals, I suppose, for some honor or
+distinction. I place the chief good in the mind, he in the body; I in
+virtue, he in pleasure; and the Epicureans are up in arms, and implore
+the assistance of their neighbors, and many are ready to fly to their
+aid. But as for my part, I declare that I am very indifferent about the
+matter, and that I consider the whole discussion which they are so
+anxious about at an end. For what! is the contention about the Punic
+war? on which very subject, though M. Cato and L. Lentulus were of
+different opinions, still there was no difference between them. But
+these men behave with too much heat, especially as the opinions which
+they would uphold are no very spirited ones, and such as they dare not
+plead for either in the senate or before the assembly of the people, or
+before the army or the censors. But, however, I will argue with them
+another time, and with such a disposition that no quarrel shall arise
+between us; for I shall be ready to yield to their opinions when
+founded on truth. Only I must give them this advice: That were it ever
+so true, that a wise man regards nothing but the body, or, to express
+myself with more decency, never does anything except what is expedient,
+and views all things with exclusive reference to his own advantage, as
+such things are not very commendable, they should confine them to their
+own breasts, and leave off talking with that parade of them.
+
+XXII. What remains is the opinion of the Cyrenaics, who think that men
+grieve when anything happens unexpectedly. And that is indeed, as I
+said before, a great aggravation of a misfortune; and I know that it
+appeared so to Chrysippus--"Whatever falls out unexpected is so much
+the heavier." But the whole question does not turn on this; though the
+sudden approach of an enemy sometimes occasions more confusion than it
+would if you had expected him, and a sudden storm at sea throws the
+sailors into a greater fright than one which they have foreseen; and it
+is the same in many other cases. But when you carefully consider the
+nature of what was expected, you will find nothing more than that all
+things which come on a sudden appear greater; and this upon two
+accounts: first of all, because you have not time to consider how great
+the accident is; and, secondly, because you are probably persuaded that
+you could have guarded against it had you foreseen if, and therefore
+the misfortune, having been seemingly encountered by your own fault,
+makes your grief the greater. That it is so, time evinces; which, as it
+advances, brings with it so much mitigation that though the same
+misfortunes continue, the grief not only becomes the less, but in some
+cases is entirely removed. Many Carthaginians were slaves at Rome, and
+many Macedonians, when Perseus their king was taken prisoner. I saw,
+too, when I was a young man, some Corinthians in the Peloponnesus. They
+might all have lamented with Andromache,
+
+    All these I saw......;
+
+but they had perhaps given over lamenting themselves, for by their
+countenances, and speech, and other gestures you might have taken them
+for Argives or Sicyonians. And I myself was more concerned at the
+ruined walls of Corinth than the Corinthians themselves were, whose
+minds by frequent reflection and time had become callous to such
+sights. I have read a book of Clitomachus, which he sent to his
+fellow-citizens who were prisoners, to comfort them after the
+destruction of Carthage. There is in it a treatise written by
+Carneades, which, as Clitomachus says, he had inserted into his book;
+the subject was, "That it appeared probable that a wise man would
+grieve at the state of subjection of his country," and all the
+arguments which Carneades used against this proposition are set down in
+the book. There the philosopher applies such a strong medicine to a
+fresh grief as would be quite unnecessary in one of any continuance;
+nor, if this very book had been sent to the captives some years after,
+would it have found any wounds to cure, but only scars; for grief, by a
+gentle progress and slow degrees, wears away imperceptibly. Not that
+the circumstances which gave rise to it are altered, or can be, but
+that custom teaches what reason should--that those things which before
+seemed to be of some consequence are of no such great importance, after
+all.
+
+XXIII. It may be said, What occasion is there to apply to reason, or to
+any sort of consolation such as we generally make use of, to mitigate
+the grief of the afflicted? For we have this argument always at hand,
+that nothing ought to appear unexpected. But how will any one be
+enabled to bear his misfortunes the better by knowing that it is
+unavoidable that such things should happen to man? Saying this
+subtracts nothing from the sum of the grief: it only asserts that
+nothing has fallen out but what might have been anticipated; and yet
+this manner of speaking has some little consolation in it, though I
+apprehend not a great deal. Therefore those unlooked-for things have
+not so much force as to give rise to all our grief; the blow perhaps
+may fall the heavier, but whatever happens does not appear the greater
+on that account. No, it is the fact of its having happened lately, and
+not of its having befallen us unexpectedly, that makes it seem the
+greater. There are two ways, then, of discerning the truth, not only of
+things that seem evil, but of those that have the appearance of good.
+For we either inquire into the nature of the thing, of what
+description, and magnitude, and importance it is--as sometimes with
+regard to poverty, the burden of which we may lighten when by our
+disputations we show how few things nature requires, and of what a
+trifling kind they are--or, without any subtle arguing, we refer them
+to examples, as here we instance a Socrates, there a Diogenes, and then
+again that line in Caecilius,
+
+    Wisdom is oft conceal'd in mean attire.
+
+For as poverty is of equal weight with all, what reason can be given
+why what was borne by Fabricius should be spoken of by any one else as
+unsupportable when it falls upon themselves? Of a piece with this is
+that other way of comforting, which consists in pointing out that
+nothing has happened but what is common to human nature; for this
+argument doth not only inform us what human nature is, but implies that
+all things are tolerable which others have borne and are bearing.
+
+XXIV. Is poverty the subject? They tell you of many who have submitted
+to it with patience. Is it the contempt of honors? They acquaint you
+with some who never enjoyed any, and were the happier for it; and of
+those who have preferred a private retired life to public employment,
+mentioning their names with respect; they tell you of the verse[40] of
+that most powerful king who praises an old man, and pronounces him
+happy because he was unknown to fame and seemed likely to arrive at the
+hour of death in obscurity and without notice. Thus, too, they have
+examples for those who are deprived of their children: they who are
+under any great grief are comforted by instances of like affliction;
+and thus the endurance of every misfortune is rendered more easy by the
+fact of others having undergone the same, and the fate of others causes
+what has happened to appear less important than it has been previously
+thought, and reflection thus discovers to us how much opinion had
+imposed on us. And this is what the Telamon declares, "I, when my son
+was born," etc.; and thus Theseus, "I on my future misery did dwell;"
+and Anaxagoras, "I knew my son was mortal." All these men, by
+frequently reflecting on human affairs, had discovered that they were
+by no means to be estimated by the opinion of the multitude; and,
+indeed, it seems to me to be pretty much the same case with those who
+consider beforehand as with those who derive their remedies from time,
+excepting that a kind of reason cures the one, and the other remedy is
+provided by nature; by which we discover (and this contains the whole
+marrow of the matter) that what was imagined to be the greatest evil is
+by no means so great as to defeat the happiness of life. And the effect
+of this is, that the blow is greater by reason of its not having been
+foreseen, and not, as they suppose, that when similar misfortunes
+befall two different people, that man only is affected with grief whom
+this calamity has befallen unexpectedly. So that some persons, under
+the oppression of grief, are said to have borne it actually worse for
+hearing of this common condition of man, that we are born under such
+conditions as render it impossible for a man to be exempt from all
+evil.
+
+XXV. For this reason Carneades, as I see our friend Antiochus writes,
+used to blame Chrysippus for commending these verses of Euripides:
+
+    Man, doom'd to care, to pain, disease, and strife,
+    Walks his short journey thro' the vale of life:
+    Watchful attends the cradle and the grave,
+    And passing generations longs to save:
+    Last, dies himself: yet wherefore should we mourn?
+    For man must to his kindred dust return;
+    Submit to the destroying hand of fate,
+    As ripen'd ears the harvest-sickle wait.[41]
+
+He would not allow a speech of this kind to avail at all to the cure of
+our grief, for he said it was a lamentable case itself that we were
+fallen into the hands of such a cruel fate; and that a speech like
+that, preaching up comfort from the misfortunes of another, was a
+comfort adapted only to those of a malevolent disposition. But to me it
+appears far otherwise; for the necessity of bearing what is the common
+condition of humanity forbids your resisting the will of the Gods, and
+reminds you that you are a man, which reflection greatly alleviates
+grief; and the enumeration of these examples is not produced with a
+view to please those of a malevolent disposition, but in order that any
+one in affliction may be induced to bear what he observes many others
+have previously borne with tranquillity and moderation. For they who
+are falling to pieces, and cannot hold together through the greatness
+of their grief, should be supported by all kinds of assistance. From
+whence Chrysippus thinks that grief is called [Greek: lype], as it were
+[Greek: lysis], that is to say, a dissolution of the whole man--the
+whole of which I think may be pulled up by the roots by explaining, as
+I said at the beginning, the cause of grief; for it is nothing else but
+an opinion and judgment formed of a present acute evil. And thus any
+bodily pain, let it be ever so grievous, may be endurable where any
+hopes are proposed of some considerable good; and we receive such
+consolation from a virtuous and illustrious life that they who lead
+such lives are seldom attacked by grief, or but slightly affected by
+it.
+
+XXVI. But as besides this opinion of great evil there is this other
+added also--that we ought to lament what has happened, that it is right
+so to do, and part of our duty, then is brought about that terrible
+disorder of mind, grief. And it is to this opinion that we owe all
+those various and horrid kinds of lamentation, that neglect of our
+persons, that womanish tearing of our cheeks, that striking on our
+thighs, breasts, and heads. Thus Agamemnon, in Homer and in Accius,
+
+    Tears in his grief his uncomb'd locks;[42]
+
+from whence comes that pleasant saying of Bion, that the foolish king
+in his sorrow tore away the hairs of his head, imagining that his grief
+would be alleviated by baldness. But men do all these things from being
+persuaded that they ought to do so. And thus AEschines inveighs against
+Demosthenes for sacrificing within seven days after the death of his
+daughter. But with what eloquence, with what fluency, does he attack
+him! what sentiments does he collect! what words does he hurl against
+him! You may see by this that an orator may do anything; but nobody
+would approve of such license if it were not that we have an idea
+innate in our minds that every good man ought to lament the loss of a
+relation as bitterly as possible. And it is owing to this that some
+men, when in sorrow, betake themselves to deserts, as Homer says of
+Bellerophon:
+
+                   Distracted in his mind,
+    Forsook by heaven, forsaking human kind,
+    Wide o'er the Aleian field he chose to stray,
+    A long, forlorn, uncomfortable way![43]
+
+And thus Niobe is feigned to have been turned into stone, from her
+never speaking, I suppose, in her grief. But they imagine Hecuba to
+have been converted into a bitch, from her rage and bitterness of mind.
+There are others who love to converse with solitude itself when in
+grief, as the nurse in Ennius,
+
+    Fain would I to the heavens find earth relate
+    Medea's ceaseless woes and cruel fate.[44]
+
+XXVII. Now all these things are done in grief, from a persuasion of
+their truth and propriety and necessity; and it is plain that those who
+behave thus do so from a conviction of its being their duty; for should
+these mourners by chance drop their grief, and either act or speak for
+a moment in a more calm or cheerful manner, they presently check
+themselves and return to their lamentations again, and blame themselves
+for having been guilty of any intermissions from their grief; and
+parents and masters generally correct children not by words only, but
+by blows, if they show any levity by either word or deed when the
+family is under affliction, and, as it were, oblige them to be
+sorrowful. What! does it not appear, when you have ceased to mourn, and
+have discovered that your grief has been ineffectual, that the whole of
+that mourning was voluntary on your part? What does that man say in
+Terence who punishes himself, the Self-tormentor?
+
+    I think I do my son less harm, O Chremes,
+    As long as I myself am miserable.
+
+He determines to be miserable: and can any one determine on anything
+against his will?
+
+    I well might think that I deserved all evil.
+
+He would think he deserved any misfortune were he otherwise than
+miserable! Therefore, you see, the evil is in opinion, not in nature.
+How is it when some things do of themselves prevent your grieving at
+them? as in Homer, so many died and were buried daily that they had not
+leisure to grieve: where you find these lines--
+
+    The great, the bold, by thousands daily fall,
+    And endless were the grief to weep for all.
+    Eternal sorrows what avails to shed?
+    Greece honors not with solemn fasts the dead:
+    Enough when death demands the brave to pay
+    The tribute of a melancholy day.
+    One chief with patience to the grave resign'd,
+    Our care devolves on others left behind.[45]
+
+Therefore it is in our own power to lay aside grief upon occasion; and
+is there any opportunity (seeing the thing is in our own power) that we
+should let slip of getting rid of care and grief? It was plain that the
+friends of Cnaeus Pompeius, when they saw him fainting under his wounds,
+at the very moment of that most miserable and bitter sight were under
+great uneasiness how they themselves, surrounded by the enemy as they
+were, should escape, and were employed in nothing but encouraging the
+rowers and aiding their escape; but when they reached Tyre, they began
+to grieve and lament over him. Therefore, as fear with them, prevailed
+over grief, cannot reason and true philosophy have the same effect with
+a wise man?
+
+XXVIII. But what is there more effectual to dispel grief than the
+discovery that it answers no purpose, and has been undergone to no
+account? Therefore, if we can get rid of it, we need never have been
+subject to it. It must be acknowledged, then, that men take up grief
+wilfully and knowingly; and this appears from the patience of those
+who, after they have been exercised in afflictions and are better able
+to bear whatever befalls them, suppose themselves hardened against
+fortune; as that person in Euripides,
+
+    Had this the first essay of fortune been,
+    And I no storms thro' all my life had seen,
+    Wild as a colt I'd broke from reason's sway;
+    But frequent griefs have taught me to obey.[46]
+
+As, then, the frequent bearing of misery makes grief the lighter, we
+must necessarily perceive that the cause and original of it does not
+lie in the calamity itself. Your principal philosophers, or lovers of
+wisdom, though they have not yet arrived at perfect wisdom, are not
+they sensible that they are in the greatest evil? For they are foolish,
+and foolishness is the greatest of all evils, and yet they lament not.
+How shall we account for this? Because opinion is not fixed upon that
+kind of evil, it is not our opinion that it is right, meet, and our
+duty to be uneasy because we are not all wise men. Whereas this opinion
+is strongly affixed to that uneasiness where mourning is concerned,
+which is the greatest of all grief. Therefore Aristotle, when he blames
+some ancient philosophers for imagining that by their genius they had
+brought philosophy to the highest perfection, says, they must be either
+extremely foolish or extremely vain; but that he himself could see that
+great improvements had been made therein in a few years, and that
+philosophy would in a little time arrive at perfection. And
+Theophrastus is reported to have reproached nature at his death for
+giving to stags and crows so long a life, which was of no use to them,
+but allowing only so short a span to men, to whom length of days would
+have been of the greatest use; for if the life of man could have been
+lengthened, it would have been able to provide itself with all kinds of
+learning, and with arts in the greatest perfection. He lamented,
+therefore, that he was dying just when he had begun to discover these.
+What! does not every grave and distinguished philosopher acknowledge
+himself ignorant of many things, and confess that there are many things
+which he must learn over and over again? And yet, though these men are
+sensible that they are standing still in the very midway of folly, than
+which nothing can be worse, they are under no great affliction, because
+no opinion that it is their duty to lament is ever mingled with this
+knowledge. What shall we say of those who think it unbecoming in a man
+to grieve? among whom we may reckon Q. Maximus, when he buried his son
+that had been consul, and L. Paulus, who lost two sons within a few
+days of one another. Of the same opinion was M. Cato, who lost his son
+just after he had been elected praetor, and many others, whose names I
+have collected in my book on Consolation. Now what made these men so
+easy, but their persuasion that grief and lamentation was not becoming
+in a man? Therefore, as some give themselves up to grief from an
+opinion that it is right so to do, they refrained themselves, from an
+opinion that it was discreditable; from which we may infer that grief
+is owing more to opinion than nature.
+
+XXIX. It may be said, on the other side, Who is so mad as to grieve of
+his own accord? Pain proceeds from nature, which you must submit to,
+say they, agreeably to what even your own Crantor teaches, for it
+presses and gains upon you unavoidably, and cannot possibly be
+resisted. So that the very same Oileus, in Sophocles, who had before
+comforted Telamon on the death of Ajax, on hearing of the death of his
+own son, is broken-hearted. On this alteration of his mind we have
+these lines:
+
+    Show me the man so well by wisdom taught
+    That what he charges to another's fault,
+    When like affliction doth himself betide,
+    True to his own wise counsel will abide.[47]
+
+Now, when they urge these things, their endeavor is to prove that
+nature is absolutely and wholly irresistible; and yet the same people
+allow that we take greater grief on ourselves than nature requires.
+What madness is it, then, in us to require the same from others? But
+there are many reasons for our taking grief on us. The first is from
+the opinion of some evil, on the discovery and certainty of which grief
+comes of course. Besides, many people are persuaded that they are doing
+something very acceptable to the dead when they lament bitterly over
+them. To these may be added a kind of womanish superstition, in
+imagining that when they have been stricken by the afflictions sent by
+the Gods, to acknowledge themselves afflicted and humbled by them is
+the readiest way of appeasing them. But most men appear to be unaware
+what contradictions these things are full of. They commend those who
+die calmly, but they blame those who can bear the loss of another with
+the same calmness, as if it were possible that it should be true, as is
+occasionally said in love speeches, that any one can love another more
+than himself. There is, indeed, something excellent in this, and, if
+you examine it, something no less just than true, that we love those
+who ought to be most dear to us as well as we love ourselves; but to
+love them more than ourselves is absolutely impossible; nor is it
+desirable in friendship that I should love my friend more than myself,
+or that he should love me so; for this would occasion much confusion in
+life, and break in upon all the duties of it.
+
+XXX. But we will speak of this another time: at present it is
+sufficient not to attribute our misery to the loss of our friends, nor
+to love them more than, if they themselves could be sensible of our
+conduct, they would approve of, or at least not more than we do
+ourselves. Now as to what they say, that some are not at all appeased
+by our consolations; and, moreover, as to what they add, that the
+comforters themselves acknowledge they are miserable when fortune
+varies the attack and falls on them--in both these cases the solution
+is easy: for the fault here is not in nature, but in our own folly; and
+much may be said against folly. But men who do not admit of consolation
+seem to bespeak misery for themselves; and they who cannot bear their
+misfortunes with that temper which they recommend to others are not
+more faulty in this particular than most other persons; for we see that
+covetous men find fault with others who are covetous, as do the
+vainglorious with those who appear too wholly devoted to the pursuit of
+glory. For it is the peculiar characteristic of folly to perceive the
+vices of others, but to forget its own. But since we find that grief is
+removed by length of time, we have the greatest proof that the strength
+of it depends not merely on time, but on the daily consideration of it.
+For if the cause continues the same, and the man be the same, how can
+there be any alteration in the grief, if there is no change in what
+occasioned the grief, nor in him who grieves? Therefore it is from
+daily reflecting that there is no real evil in the circumstance for
+which you grieve, and not from the length of time, that you procure a
+remedy for your grief.
+
+XXXI. Here some people talk of moderate grief; but if such be natural,
+what occasion is there for consolation? for nature herself will
+determine, the measure of it: but if it depends on and is caused by
+opinion, the whole opinion should be destroyed. I think that it has
+been sufficiently said, that grief arises from an opinion of some
+present evil, which includes this belief, that it is incumbent on us to
+grieve. To this definition Zeno has added, very justly, that the
+opinion of this present evil should be recent. Now this word recent
+they explain thus: those are not the only recent things which happened
+a little while ago; but as long as there shall be any force, or vigor,
+or freshness in that imagined evil, so long it is entitled to the name
+of recent. Take the case of Artemisia, the wife of Mausolus, King of
+Caria, who made that noble sepulchre at Halicarnassus; while she lived,
+she lived in grief, and died of it, being worn out by it, for that
+opinion was always recent with her: but you cannot call that recent
+which has already begun to decay through time. Now the duty of a
+comforter is, to remove grief entirely, to quiet it, or draw it off as
+much as you can, or else to keep it under, and prevent its spreading
+any further, and to divert one's attention to other matters. There are
+some who think, with Cleanthes, that the only duty of a comforter is to
+prove that what one is lamenting is by no means an evil. Others, as the
+Peripatetics, prefer urging that the evil is not great. Others, with
+Epicurus, seek to divert your attention from the evil to good: some
+think it sufficient to show that nothing has happened but what you had
+reason to expect; and this is the practice of the Cyrenaics. But
+Chrysippus thinks that the main thing in comforting is, to remove the
+opinion from the person who is grieving, that to grieve is his bounden
+duty. There are others who bring together all these various kinds of
+consolations, for people are differently affected; as I have done
+myself in my book on Consolation; for as my own mind was much
+disordered, I have attempted in that book to discover every method of
+cure. But the proper season is as much to be attended to in the cure of
+the mind as of the body; as Prometheus in AEschylus, on its being said
+to him,
+
+    I think, Prometheus, you this tenet hold,
+    That all men's reason should their rage control?
+
+answers,
+
+    Yes, when one reason properly applies;
+    Ill-timed advice will make the storm but rise.[48]
+
+XXXII. But the principal medicine to be applied in consolation is, to
+maintain either that it is no evil at all, or a very inconsiderable
+one: the next best to that is, to speak of the common condition of
+life, having a view, if possible, to the state of the person whom you
+comfort particularly. The third is, that it is folly to wear one's self
+out with grief which can avail nothing. For the comfort of Cleanthes is
+suitable only for a wise man, who is in no need of any comfort at all;
+for could you persuade one in grief that nothing is an evil but what is
+base, you would not only cure him of grief, but folly. But the time for
+such precepts is not well chosen. Besides, Cleanthes does not seem to
+me sufficiently aware that affliction may very often proceed from that
+very thing which he himself allows to be the greatest misfortune. For
+what shall we say? When Socrates had convinced Alcibiades, as we are
+told, that he had no distinctive qualifications as a man different from
+other people, and that, in fact, there was no difference between him,
+though a man of the highest rank, and a porter; and when Alcibiades
+became uneasy at this, and entreated Socrates, with tears in his eyes,
+to make him a man of virtue, and to cure him of that mean position;
+what shall we say to this, Cleanthes? Was there no evil in what
+afflicted Alcibiades thus? What strange things does Lycon say? who,
+making light of grief, says that it arises from trifles, from things
+that affect our fortune or bodies, not from the evils of the mind.
+What, then? did not the grief of Alcibiades proceed from the defects
+and evils of the mind? I have already said enough of Epicurus's
+consolation.
+
+XXXIII. Nor is that consolation much to be relied on, though it is
+frequently practised, and sometimes has some effect, namely, "That you
+are not alone in this." It has its effect, as I said, but not always,
+nor with every person, for some reject it; but much depends on the
+application of it; for you ought rather to show, not how men in general
+have been affected with such evils, but how men of sense have borne
+them. As to Chrysippus's method, it is certainly founded in truth; but
+it is difficult to apply it in time of distress. It is a work of no
+small difficulty to persuade a person in affliction that he grieves
+merely because he thinks it right so to do. Certainly, then, as in
+pleadings we do not state all cases alike (if I may adopt the language
+of lawyers for a moment), but adapt what we have to say to the time, to
+the nature of the subject under debate, and to the person; so, too, in
+alleviating grief, regard should be had to what kind of cure the party
+to be comforted can admit of. But, somehow or other, we have rambled
+from what you originally proposed. For your question was concerning a
+wise man, with whom nothing can have the appearance of evil that is not
+dishonorable; or at least, anything else would seem so small an evil
+that by his wisdom he would so overmatch it as to make it wholly
+disappear; and such a man makes no addition to his grief through
+opinion, and never conceives it right to torment himself above measure,
+nor to wear himself out with grief, which is the meanest thing
+imaginable. Reason, however, it seems, has demonstrated (though it was
+not directly our object at the moment to inquire whether anything can
+be called an evil except what is base) that it is in our power to
+discern that all the evil which there is in affliction has nothing
+natural in it, but is contracted by our own voluntary judgment of it,
+and the error of opinion.
+
+XXXIV. But the kind of affliction of which I have treated is that which
+is the greatest; in order that when we have once got rid of that, it
+may appear a business of less consequence to look after remedies for
+the others. For there are certain things which are usually said about
+poverty; and also certain statements ordinarily applied to retired and
+undistinguished life. There are particular treatises on banishment, on
+the ruin of one's country, on slavery, on weakness, on blindness, and
+on every incident that can come under the name of an evil. The Greeks
+divide these into different treatises and distinct books; but they do
+it for the sake of employment: not but that all such discussions are
+full of entertainment. And yet, as physicians, in curing the whole
+body, attend to even the most insignificant part of the body which is
+at all disordered, so does philosophy act, after it has removed grief
+in general; still, if any other deficiency exists--should poverty bite,
+should ignominy sting, should banishment bring a dark cloud over us, or
+should any of those things which I have just mentioned appear, there is
+for each its appropriate consolation, which you shall hear whenever you
+please. But we must have recourse again to the same original principle,
+that a wise man is free from all sorrow, because it is vain, because it
+answers no purpose, because it is not founded in nature, but on opinion
+and prejudice, and is engendered by a kind of invitation to grieve,
+when once men have imagined that it is their duty to do so. When, then,
+we have subtracted what is altogether voluntary, that mournful
+uneasiness will be removed; yet some little anxiety, some slight
+pricking, will still remain. They may indeed call this natural,
+provided they give it not that horrid, solemn, melancholy name of
+grief, which can by no means consist with wisdom. But how various and
+how bitter are the roots of grief! Whatever they are, I propose, after
+having felled the trunk, to destroy them all; even if it should be
+necessary, by allotting a separate dissertation to each, for I have
+leisure enough to do so, whatever time it may take up. But the
+principle of every uneasiness is the same, though they may appear under
+different names. For envy is an uneasiness; so are emulation,
+detraction, anguish, sorrow, sadness, tribulation, lamentation,
+vexation, grief, trouble, affliction, and despair. The Stoics define
+all these different feelings; and all those words which I have
+mentioned belong to different things, and do not, as they seem, express
+the same ideas; but they are to a certain extent distinct, as I shall
+make appear perhaps in another place. These are those fibres of the
+roots which, as I said at first, must be traced back and cut off and
+destroyed, so that not one shall remain. You say it is a great and
+difficult undertaking: who denies it? But what is there of any
+excellency which has not its difficulty? Yet philosophy undertakes to
+effect it, provided we admit its superintendence. But enough of this.
+The other books, whenever you please, shall be ready for you here or
+anywhere else.
+
+       *       *       *       *       *
+
+
+
+
+BOOK IV.
+
+On other perturbations of the mind.
+
+
+I. I have often wondered, Brutus, on many occasions, at the ingenuity
+and virtues of our countrymen; but nothing has surprised me more than
+their development in those studies, which, though they came somewhat
+late to us, have been transported into this city from Greece. For the
+system of auspices, and religious ceremonies, and courts of justice,
+and appeals to the people, the senate, the establishment of an army of
+cavalry and infantry, and the whole military discipline, were
+instituted as early as the foundation of the city by royal authority,
+partly too by laws, not without the assistance of the Gods. Then with
+what a surprising and incredible progress did our ancestors advance
+towards all kind of excellence, when once the republic was freed from
+the regal power! Not that this is a proper occasion to treat of the
+manners and customs of our ancestors, or of the discipline and
+constitution of the city; for I have elsewhere, particularly in the six
+books I wrote on the Republic, given a sufficiently accurate account of
+them. But while I am on this subject, and considering the study of
+philosophy, I meet with many reasons to imagine that those studies were
+brought to us from abroad, and not merely imported, but preserved and
+improved; for they had Pythagoras, a man of consummate wisdom and
+nobleness of character, in a manner, before their eyes, who was in
+Italy at the time that Lucius Brutus, the illustrious founder of your
+nobility, delivered his country from tyranny. As the doctrine of
+Pythagoras spread itself on all sides, it seems probable to me that it
+reached this city; and this is not only probable of itself, but it does
+really appear to have been the case from many remains of it. For who
+can imagine that, when it flourished so much in that part of Italy
+which was called Magna Graecia, and in some of the largest and most
+powerful cities, in which, first the name of Pythagoras, and then that
+of those men who were afterward his followers, was in so high esteem;
+who can imagine, I say, that our people could shut their ears to what
+was said by such learned men? Besides, it is even my opinion that it
+was the great esteem in which the Pythagoreans were held, that gave
+rise to that opinion among those who came after him, that King Numa was
+a Pythagorean. For, being acquainted with the doctrine and principles
+of Pythagoras, and having heard from their ancestors that this king was
+a very wise and just man, and not being able to distinguish accurately
+between times and periods that were so remote, they inferred, from his
+being so eminent for his wisdom, that he had been a pupil of
+Pythagoras.
+
+II. So far we proceed on conjecture. As to the vestiges of the
+Pythagoreans, though I might collect many, I shall use but a few;
+because they have no connection with our present purpose. For, as it is
+reported to have been a custom with them to deliver certain precepts in
+a more abstruse manner in verse, and to bring their minds from severe
+thought to a more composed state by songs and musical instruments; so
+Cato, a writer of the very highest authority, says in his Origins, that
+it was customary with our ancestors for the guests at their
+entertainments, every one in his turn, to celebrate the praises and
+virtues of illustrious men in song to the sound of the flute; from
+whence it is clear that poems and songs were then composed for the
+voice. And, indeed, it is also clear that poetry was in fashion from
+the laws of the Twelve Tables, wherein it is provided that no song
+should be made to the injury of another. Another argument of the
+erudition of those times is, that they played on instruments before the
+shrines of their Gods, and at the entertainments of their magistrates;
+but that custom was peculiar to the sect I am speaking of. To me,
+indeed, that poem of Appius Caecus, which Panaetius commends so much in a
+certain letter of his which is addressed to Quintus Tubero, has all the
+marks of a Pythagorean author. We have many things derived from the
+Pythagoreans in our customs, which I pass over, that we may not seem to
+have learned that elsewhere which we look upon ourselves as the
+inventors of. But to return to our purpose. How many great poets as
+well as orators have sprung up among us! and in what a short time! so
+that it is evident that our people could arrive at any learning as soon
+as they had an inclination for it. But of other studies I shall speak
+elsewhere if there is occasion, as I have already often done.
+
+III. The study of philosophy is certainly of long standing with us; but
+yet I do not find that I can give you the names of any philosopher
+before the age of Laelius and Scipio, in whose younger days we find that
+Diogenes the Stoic, and Carneades the Academic, were sent as
+ambassadors by the Athenians to our senate. And as these had never been
+concerned in public affairs, and one of them was a Cyrenean, the other
+a Babylonian, they certainly would never have been forced from their
+studies, nor chosen for that employment, unless the study of philosophy
+had been in vogue with some of the great men at that time; who, though
+they might employ their pens on other subjects--some on civil law,
+others on oratory, others on the history of former times--yet promoted
+this most extensive of all arts, the principle of living well, even
+more by their life than by their writings. So that of that true and
+elegant philosophy (which was derived from Socrates, and is still
+preserved by the Peripatetics and by the Stoics, though they express
+themselves differently in their disputes with the Academics) there are
+few or no Latin records; whether this proceeds from the importance of
+the thing itself, or from men's being otherwise employed, or from their
+concluding that the capacity of the people was not equal to the
+apprehension of them. But, during this silence, C. Amafinius arose and
+took upon himself to speak; on the publishing of whose writings the
+people were moved, and enlisted themselves chiefly under this sect,
+either because the doctrine was more easily understood, or because they
+were invited thereto by the pleasing thoughts of amusement, or that,
+because there was nothing better, they laid hold of what was offered
+them. And after Amafinius, when many of the same sentiments had written
+much about them, the Pythagoreans spread over all Italy: but that these
+doctrines should be so easily understood and approved of by the
+unlearned is a great proof that they were not written with any great
+subtlety, and they think their establishment to be owing to this.
+
+IV. But let every one defend his own opinion, for every one is at
+liberty to choose what he likes: I shall keep to my old custom; and,
+being under no restraint from the laws of any particular school, which
+in philosophy every one must necessarily confine himself to, I shall
+always inquire what has the most probability in every question, and
+this system, which I have often practised on other occasions, I have
+adhered closely to in my Tusculan Disputations. Therefore, as I have
+acquainted you with the disputations of the three former days, this
+book shall conclude the discussion of the fourth day. When we had come
+down into the Academy, as we had done the former days, the business was
+carried on thus:
+
+_M._ Let any one say, who pleases, what he would wish to have
+discussed.
+
+_A._ I do not think a wise man can possibly be free from every
+perturbation of mind.
+
+_M._ He seemed by yesterday's discourse to be free from grief; unless
+you agreed with us only to avoid taking up time.
+
+_A._ Not at all on that account, for I was extremely satisfied with
+your discourse.
+
+_M._ You do not think, then, that a wise man is subject to grief?
+
+_A._ No, by no means.
+
+_M._ But if that cannot disorder the mind of a wise man, nothing else
+can. For what--can such a man be disturbed by fear? Fear proceeds from
+the same things when absent which occasion grief when present. Take
+away grief, then, and you remove fear.
+
+The two remaining perturbations are, a joy elate above measure, and
+lust; and if a wise man is not subject to these, his mind will be
+always at rest.
+
+_A._ I am entirely of that opinion.
+
+_M._ Which, then, shall we do? Shall I immediately crowd all my sails?
+or shall I make use of my oars, as if I were just endeavoring to get
+clear of the harbor?
+
+_A._ What is it that you mean, for I do not exactly comprehend you?
+
+V. _M._ Because, Chrysippus and the Stoics, when they discuss the
+perturbations of the mind, make great part of their debate to consist
+in definitions and distinctions; while they employ but few words on the
+subject of curing the mind, and preventing it from being disordered.
+Whereas the Peripatetics bring a great many things to promote the cure
+of it, but have no regard to their thorny partitions and definitions.
+My question, then, was, whether I should instantly unfold the sails of
+my eloquence, or be content for a while to make less way with the oars
+of logic?
+
+_A._ Let it be so; for by the employment of both these means the
+subject of our inquiry will be more thoroughly discussed.
+
+_M._ It is certainly the better way; and should anything be too
+obscure, you may examine that afterward.
+
+_A._ I will do so; but those very obscure points you will, as usual,
+deliver with more clearness than the Greeks.
+
+_M._ I will, indeed, endeavor to do so; but it well requires great
+attention, lest, by losing one word, the whole should escape you. What
+the Greeks call [Greek: pathe] we choose to name perturbations (or
+disorders) rather than diseases; in explaining which, I shall follow,
+first, that very old description of Pythagoras, and afterward that of
+Plato; for they both divide the mind into two parts, and make one of
+these partake of reason, and the other they represent without it. In
+that which partakes of reason they place tranquillity, that is to say,
+a placid and undisturbed constancy; to the other they assign the turbid
+motions of anger and desire, which are contrary and opposite to reason.
+Let this, then, be our principle, the spring of all our reasonings. But
+notwithstanding, I shall use the partitions and definitions of the
+Stoics in describing these perturbations; who seem to me to have shown
+very great acuteness on this question.
+
+VI. Zeno's definition, then, is this: "A perturbation" (which he calls
+a [Greek: pathos]) "is a commotion of the mind repugnant to reason, and
+against nature." Some of them define it even more briefly, saying that
+a perturbation is a somewhat too vehement appetite; but by too vehement
+they mean an appetite that recedes further from the constancy of
+nature. But they would have the divisions of perturbations to arise
+from two imagined goods, and from two imagined evils; and thus they
+become four: from the good proceed lust and joy--joy having reference
+to some present good, and lust to some future one. They suppose fear
+and grief to proceed from evils: fear from something future, grief from
+something present; for whatever things are dreaded as approaching
+always occasion grief when present. But joy and lust depend on the
+opinion of good; as lust, being inflamed and provoked, is carried on
+eagerly towards what has the appearance of good; and joy is transported
+and exults on obtaining what was desired: for we naturally pursue those
+things that have the appearance of good, and avoid the contrary.
+Wherefore, as soon as anything that has the appearance of good presents
+itself, nature incites us to endeavor to obtain it. Now, where this
+strong desire is consistent and founded on prudence, it is by the
+Stoics called [Greek: boulesis], and the name which we give it is
+volition; and this they allow to none but their wise man, and define it
+thus: Volition is a reasonable desire; but whatever is incited too
+violently in opposition to reason, that is a lust, or an unbridled
+desire, which is discoverable in all fools. And, therefore, when we are
+affected so as to be placed in any good condition, we are moved in two
+ways; for when the mind is moved in a placid and calm motion,
+consistent with reason, that is called joy; but when it exults with a
+vain, wanton exultation, or immoderate joy, then that feeling may be
+called immoderate ecstasy or transport, which they define to be an
+elation of the mind without reason. And as we naturally desire good
+things, so in like manner we naturally seek to avoid what is evil; and
+this avoidance of which, if conducted in accordance with reason, is
+called caution; and this the wise man alone is supposed to have: but
+that caution which is not under the guidance of reason, but is attended
+with a base and low dejection, is called fear. Fear is, therefore,
+caution destitute of reason. But a wise man is not affected by any
+present evil; while the grief of a fool proceeds from being affected
+with an imaginary evil, by which his mind is contracted and sunk, since
+it is not under the dominion of reason. This, then, is the first
+definition, which makes grief to consist in a shrinking of the mind
+contrary to the dictates of reason. Thus, there are four perturbations,
+and but three calm rational emotions; for grief has no exact opposite.
+
+VII. But they insist upon it that all perturbations depend on opinion
+and judgment; therefore they define them more strictly, in order not
+only the better to show how blamable they are, but to discover how much
+they are in our power. Grief, then, is a recent opinion of some present
+evil, in which it seems to be right that the mind should shrink and be
+dejected. Joy is a recent opinion of a present good, in which it seems
+to be right that the mind should be elated. Fear is an opinion of an
+impending evil which we apprehend will be intolerable. Lust is an
+opinion of a good to come, which would be of advantage were it already
+come, and present with us. But however I have named the judgments and
+opinions of perturbations, their meaning is, not that merely the
+perturbations consist in them, but that the effects likewise of these
+perturbations do so; as grief occasions a kind of painful pricking, and
+fear engenders a recoil or sudden abandonment of the mind, joy gives
+rise to a profuse mirth, while lust is the parent of an unbridled habit
+of coveting. But that imagination, which I have included in all the
+above definitions, they would have to consist in assenting without
+warrantable grounds. Now, every perturbation has many subordinate parts
+annexed to it of the same kind. Grief is attended with enviousness
+(_invidentia_)--I use that word for instruction's sake, though it is
+not so common; because envy (_invidia_) takes in not only the person
+who envies, but the person, too, who is envied--emulation, detraction,
+pity, vexation, mourning, sadness, tribulation, sorrow, lamentation,
+solicitude, disquiet of mind, pain, despair, and many other similar
+feelings are so too. Under fear are comprehended sloth, shame, terror,
+cowardice, fainting, confusion, astonishment. In pleasure they
+comprehend malevolence--that is, pleased at another's
+misfortune--delight, boastfulness, and the like. To lust they associate
+anger, fury, hatred, enmity, discord, wants, desire, and other feelings
+of that kind.
+
+But they define these in this manner:
+
+VIII. Enviousness (_invidentia_), they say, is a grief arising from the
+prosperous circumstances of another, which are in no degree injurious
+to the person who envies; for where any one grieves at the prosperity
+of another, by which he is injured, such a one is not properly said to
+envy--as when Agamemnon grieves at Hector's success; but where any one,
+who is in no way hurt by the prosperity of another, is in pain at his
+success, such a one envies indeed. Now the name "emulation" is taken in
+a double sense, so that the same word may stand for praise and
+dispraise: for the imitation of virtue is called emulation (however,
+that sense of it I shall have no occasion for here, for that carries
+praise with it); but emulation is also a term applied to grief at
+another's enjoying what I desired to have, and am without. Detraction
+(and I mean by that, jealousy) is a grief even at another's enjoying
+what I had a great inclination for. Pity is a grief at the misery of
+another who suffers wrongfully; for no one is moved by pity at the
+punishment of a parricide or of a betrayer of his country. Vexation is
+a pressing grief. Mourning is a grief at the bitter death of one who
+was dear to you. Sadness is a grief attended with tears. Tribulation is
+a painful grief. Sorrow, an excruciating grief. Lamentation, a grief
+where we loudly bewail ourselves. Solicitude, a pensive grief. Trouble,
+a continued grief. Affliction, a grief that harasses the body. Despair,
+a grief that excludes all hope of better things to come. But those
+feelings which are included under fear, they define thus: There is
+sloth, which is a dread of some ensuing labor; shame and terror, which
+affect the body--hence blushing attends shame; a paleness, and tremor,
+and chattering of the teeth attend terror--cowardice, which is an
+apprehension of some approaching evil; dread, a fear that unhinges the
+mind, whence comes that line of Ennius,
+
+    Then dread discharged all wisdom from my mind;
+
+fainting is the associate and constant attendant on dread; confusion, a
+fear that drives away all thought; alarm, a continued fear.
+
+IX. The different species into which they divide pleasure come under
+this description; so that malevolence is a pleasure in the misfortunes
+of another, without any advantage to yourself; delight, a pleasure that
+soothes the mind by agreeable impressions on the ear. What is said of
+the ear may be applied to the sight, to the touch, smell, and taste.
+All feelings of this kind are a sort of melting pleasure that dissolves
+the mind. Boastfulness is a pleasure that consists in making an
+appearance, and setting off yourself with insolence.--The subordinate
+species of lust they define in this manner: Anger is a lust of
+punishing any one who, as we imagine, has injured us without cause.
+Heat is anger just forming and beginning to exist, which the Greeks
+call [Greek: thymosis]. Hatred is a settled anger. Enmity is anger
+waiting for an opportunity of revenge. Discord is a sharper anger
+conceived deeply in the mind and heart. Want an insatiable lust. Regret
+is when one eagerly wishes to see a person who is absent. Now here they
+have a distinction; so that with them regret is a lust conceived on
+hearing of certain things reported of some one, or of many, which the
+Greeks call [Greek: kategoremata], or predicaments; as that they are in
+possession of riches and honors: but want is a lust for those very
+honors and riches. But these definers make intemperance the fountain of
+all these perturbations; which is an absolute revolt from the mind and
+right reason--a state so averse to all rules of reason that the
+appetites of the mind can by no means be governed and restrained. As,
+therefore, temperance appeases these desires, making them obey right
+reason, and maintains the well-weighed judgments of the mind, so
+intemperance, which is in opposition to this, inflames, confounds, and
+puts every state of the mind into a violent motion. Thus, grief and
+fear, and every other perturbation of the mind, have their rise from
+intemperance.
+
+X. Just as distempers and sickness are bred in the body from the
+corruption of the blood, and the too great abundance of phlegm and
+bile, so the mind is deprived of its health, and disordered with
+sickness, from a confusion of depraved opinions that are in opposition
+to one another. From these perturbations arise, first, diseases, which
+they call [Greek: nosemata]; and also those feelings which are in
+opposition to these diseases, and which admit certain faulty distastes
+or loathings; then come sicknesses, which are called [Greek:
+arrhostemata] by the Stoics, and these two have their opposite
+aversions. Here the Stoics, especially Chrysippus, give themselves
+unnecessary trouble to show the analogy which the diseases of the mind
+have to those of the body: but, overlooking all that they say as of
+little consequence, I shall treat only of the thing itself. Let us,
+then, understand perturbation to imply a restlessness from the variety
+and confusion of contradictory opinions; and that when this heat and
+disturbance of the mind is of any standing, and has taken up its
+residence, as it were, in the veins and marrow, then commence diseases
+and sickness, and those aversions which are in opposition to these
+diseases and sicknesses.
+
+XI. What I say here may be distinguished in thought, though they are in
+fact the same; inasmuch as they both have their rise from lust and joy.
+For should money be the object of our desire, and should we not
+instantly apply to reason, as if it were a kind of Socratic medicine to
+heal this desire, the evil glides into our veins, and cleaves to our
+bowels, and from thence proceeds a distemper or sickness, which, when
+it is of any continuance, is incurable, and the name of this disease is
+covetousness. It is the same with other diseases; as the desire of
+glory, a passion for women, to which the Greeks give the name of
+[Greek: philogyneia]: and thus all other diseases and sicknesses are
+generated. But those feelings which are the contrary of these are
+supposed to have fear for their foundation, as a hatred of women, such
+as is displayed in the Woman-hater of Atilius; or the hatred of the
+whole human species, as Timon is reported to have done, whom they call
+the Misanthrope. Of the same kind is inhospitality. And all these
+diseases proceed from a certain dread of such things as they hate and
+avoid. But they define sickness of mind to be an overweening opinion,
+and that fixed and deeply implanted in the heart, of something as very
+desirable which is by no means so. What proceeds from aversion, they
+define thus: a vehement idea of something to be avoided, deeply
+implanted, and inherent in our minds, when there is no reason for
+avoiding it; and this kind of opinion is a deliberate belief that one
+understands things of which one is wholly ignorant. Now, sickness of
+the mind has all these subordinate divisions: avarice, ambition,
+fondness for women, obstinacy, gluttony, drunkenness, covetousness, and
+other similar vices. But avarice is a violent opinion about money, as
+if it were vehemently to be desired and sought after, which opinion is
+deeply implanted and inherent in our minds; and the definition of all
+the other similar feelings resembles these. But the definitions of
+aversions are of this sort: inhospitality is a vehement opinion, deeply
+implanted and inherent in your mind, that you should avoid a stranger.
+Thus, too, the hatred of women, like that felt by Hippolytus, is
+defined; and the hatred of the human species like that displayed by
+Timon.
+
+XII. But to come to the analogy of the state of body and mind, which I
+shall sometimes make use of, though more sparingly than the Stoics.
+Some men are more inclined to particular disorders than others; and,
+therefore, we say that some people are rheumatic, others dropsical, not
+because they are so at present, but because they are often so: some are
+inclined to fear, others to some other perturbation. Thus in some there
+is a continual anxiety, owing to which they are anxious; in some a
+hastiness of temper, which differs from anger, as anxiety differs from
+anguish: for all are not anxious who are sometimes vexed, nor are they
+who are anxious always uneasy in that manner: as there is a difference
+between being drunk and drunkenness; and it is one thing to be a lover,
+another to be given to women. And this disposition of particular people
+to particular disorders is very common: for it relates to all
+perturbations; it appears in many vices, though it has no name. Some
+are, therefore, said to be envious, malevolent, spiteful, fearful,
+pitiful, from a propensity to those perturbations, not from their being
+always carried away by them. Now this propensity to these particular
+disorders may be called a sickness from analogy with the body; meaning,
+that is to say, nothing more than a propensity towards sickness. But
+with regard to whatever is good, as some are more inclined to different
+good qualities than others, we may call this a facility or tendency:
+this tendency to evil is a proclivity or inclination to falling; but
+where anything is neither good nor bad, it may have the former name.
+
+XIII. Even as there may be, with respect to the body, a disease, a
+sickness, and a defect, so it is with the mind. They call that a
+disease where the whole body is corrupted; they call that sickness
+where a disease is attended with a weakness, and that a defect where
+the parts of the body are not well compacted together; from whence it
+follows that the members are misshapen, crooked, and deformed. So that
+these two, a disease and sickness, proceed from a violent concussion
+and perturbation of the health of the whole body; but a defect
+discovers itself even when the body is in perfect health. But a disease
+of the mind is distinguishable only in thought from a sickness. But a
+viciousness is a habit or affection discordant and inconsistent with
+itself through life. Thus it happens that, in the one case, a disease
+and sickness may arise from a corruption of opinions; in the other
+case, the consequence may be inconstancy and inconsistency. For every
+vice of the mind does not imply a disunion of parts; as is the case
+with those who are not far from being wise men. With them there is that
+affection which is inconsistent with itself while it is foolish; but it
+is not distorted, nor depraved. But diseases and sicknesses are parts
+of viciousness; but it is a question whether perturbations are parts of
+the same, for vices are permanent affections: perturbations are such as
+are restless; so that they cannot be parts of permanent ones. As there
+is some analogy between the nature of the body and mind in evil, so is
+there in good; for the distinctions of the body are beauty, strength,
+health, firmness, quickness of motion: the same may be said of the
+mind. The body is said to be in a good state when all those things on
+which health depends are consistent: the same may be said of the mind
+when its judgments and opinions are not at variance with one another.
+And this union is the virtue of the mind, which, according to some
+people, is temperance itself; others make it consist in an obedience to
+the precepts of temperance, and a compliance with them, not allowing it
+to be any distinct species of itself. But, be it one or the other, it
+is to be found only in a wise man. But there is a certain soundness of
+mind, which even a fool may have, when the perturbation of his mind is
+removed by the care and management of his physicians. And as what is
+called beauty arises from an exact proportion of the limbs, together
+with a certain sweetness of complexion, so the beauty of the mind
+consists in an equality and constancy of opinions and judgments, joined
+to a certain firmness and stability, pursuing virtue, or containing
+within itself the very essence of virtue. Besides, we give the very
+same names to the faculties of the mind as we do to the powers of the
+body, the nerves, and other powers of action. Thus the velocity of the
+body is called swiftness: a praise which we ascribe to the mind, from
+its running over in its thoughts so many things in so short a time.
+
+XIV. Herein, indeed, the mind and body are unlike: that though the mind
+when in perfect health may be visited by sickness, as the body may, yet
+the body may be disordered without our fault; the mind cannot. For all
+the disorders and perturbations of the mind proceed from a neglect of
+reason; these disorders, therefore, are confined to men: the beasts are
+not subject to such perturbations, though they act sometimes as if they
+had reason. There is a difference, too, between ingenious and dull men;
+the ingenious, like the Corinthian brass, which is long before it
+receives rust, are longer before they fall into these perturbations,
+and are recovered sooner: the case is different with the dull. Nor does
+the mind of an ingenious man fall into every kind of perturbation, for
+it never yields to any that are brutish and savage; and some of their
+perturbations have at first even the appearance of humanity, as mercy,
+grief, and fear. But the sicknesses and diseases of the mind are
+thought to be harder to eradicate than those leading vices which are in
+opposition to virtues; for vices may be removed, though the diseases of
+the mind should continue, which diseases are not cured with that
+expedition with which vices are removed. I have now acquainted you with
+the arguments which the Stoics put forth with such exactness; which
+they call logic, from their close arguing: and since my discourse has
+got clear of these rocks, I will proceed with the remainder of it,
+provided I have been sufficiently clear in what I have already said,
+considering the obscurity of the subject I have treated.
+
+_A._ Clear enough; but should there be occasion for a more exact
+inquiry, I shall take another opportunity of asking you. I expect you
+now to hoist your sails, as you just now called them, and proceed on
+your course.
+
+XV. _M._ Since I have spoken before of virtue in other places, and
+shall often have occasion to speak again (for a great many questions
+that relate to life and manners arise from the spring of virtue); and
+since, as I say, virtue consists in a settled and uniform affection of
+mind, making those persons praiseworthy who are possessed of her, she
+herself also, independent of anything else, without regard to any
+advantage, must be praiseworthy; for from her proceed good
+inclinations, opinions, actions, and the whole of right reason; though
+virtue may be defined in a few words to be right reason itself. The
+opposite to this is viciousness (for so I choose to translate what the
+Greeks call [Greek: kakia], rather than by perverseness; for
+perverseness is the name of a particular vice; but viciousness includes
+all), from whence arise those perturbations which, as I just now said,
+are turbid and violent motions of the mind, repugnant to reason, and
+enemies in a high degree to the peace of the mind and a tranquil life,
+for they introduce piercing and anxious cares, and afflict and
+debilitate the mind through fear; they violently inflame our hearts
+with exaggerated appetite, which is in reality an impotence of mind,
+utterly irreconcilable with temperance and moderation, which we
+sometimes call desire, and sometimes lust, and which, should it even
+attain the object of its wishes, immediately becomes so elated that it
+loses all its resolution, and knows not what to pursue; so that he was
+in the right who said "that exaggerated pleasure was the very greatest
+of mistakes." Virtue, then, alone can effect the cure of these evils.
+
+XVI. For what is not only more miserable, but more base and sordid,
+than a man afflicted, weakened, and oppressed with grief? And little
+short of this misery is one who dreads some approaching evil, and who,
+through faintheartedness, is under continual suspense. The poets, to
+express the greatness of this evil, imagine a stone to hang over the
+head of Tantalus, as a punishment for his wickedness, his pride, and
+his boasting. And this is the common punishment of folly; for there
+hangs over the head of every one whose mind revolts from reason some
+similar fear. And as these perturbations of the mind, grief and fear,
+are of a most wasting nature, so those two others, though of a more
+merry cast (I mean lust, which is always coveting something with
+eagerness, and empty mirth, which is an exulting joy), differ very
+little from madness. Hence you may understand what sort of person he is
+whom we call at one time moderate, at another modest or temperate, at
+another constant and virtuous; while sometimes we include all these
+names in the word frugality, as the crown of all; for if that word did
+not include all virtues, it would never have been proverbial to say
+that a frugal man does everything rightly. But when the Stoics apply
+this saying to their wise man, they seem to exalt him too much, and to
+speak of him with too much admiration.
+
+XVII. Whoever, then, through moderation and constancy, is at rest in
+his mind, and in calm possession of himself, so as neither to pine with
+care, nor be dejected with fear, nor to be inflamed with desire,
+coveting something greedily, nor relaxed by extravagant mirth--such a
+man is that identical wise man whom we are inquiring for: he is the
+happy man, to whom nothing in this life seems intolerable enough to
+depress him; nothing exquisite enough to transport him unduly. For what
+is there in this life that can appear great to him who has acquainted
+himself with eternity and the utmost extent of the universe? For what
+is there in human knowledge, or the short span of this life, that can
+appear great to a wise man? whose mind is always so upon its guard that
+nothing can befall him which is unforeseen, nothing which is
+unexpected, nothing, in short, which is new. Such a man takes so exact
+a survey on all sides of him, that he always knows the proper place and
+spot to live in free from all the troubles and annoyances of life, and
+encounters every accident that fortune can bring upon him with a
+becoming calmness. Whoever conducts himself in this manner will be free
+from grief, and from every other perturbation; and a mind free from
+these feelings renders men completely happy; whereas a mind disordered
+and drawn off from right and unerring reason loses at once, not only
+its resolution, but its health.--Therefore the thoughts and
+declarations of the Peripatetics are soft and effeminate, for they say
+that the mind must necessarily be agitated, but at the same time they
+lay down certain bounds beyond which that agitation is not to proceed.
+And do you set bounds to vice? or is it no vice to disobey reason? Does
+not reason sufficiently declare that there is no real good which you
+should desire too ardently, or the possession of which you should allow
+to transport you? and that there is no evil that should be able to
+overwhelm you, or the suspicion of which should distract you? and that
+all these things assume too melancholy or too cheerful an appearance
+through our own error? But if fools find this error lessened by time,
+so that, though the cause remains the same, they are not affected, in
+the same manner, after some time, as they were at first, why, surely a
+wise man ought not to be influenced at all by it. But what are those
+degrees by which we are to limit it? Let us fix these degrees in grief,
+a difficult subject, and one much canvassed.--Fannius writes that P.
+Rutilius took it much to heart that his brother was refused the
+consulship; but he seems to have been too much affected by this
+disappointment, for it was the occasion of his death: he ought,
+therefore, to have borne it with more moderation. But let us suppose
+that while he was bearing this with moderation, the death of his
+children had intervened; here would have started a fresh grief, which,
+admitting it to be moderate in itself, yet still must have been a great
+addition to the other. Now, to these let us add some acute pains of
+body, the loss of his fortune, blindness, banishment. Supposing, then,
+each separate misfortune to occasion a separate additional grief, the
+whole would be too great to be supportable.
+
+XVIII. The man who attempts to set bounds to vice acts like one who
+should throw himself headlong from Leucate, persuaded that he could
+stop himself whenever he pleased. Now, as that is impossible, so a
+perturbed and disordered mind cannot restrain itself, and stop where it
+pleases. Certainly whatever is bad in its increase is bad in its birth.
+Now grief and all other perturbations are doubtless baneful in their
+progress, and have, therefore, no small share of evil at the beginning;
+for they go on of themselves when once they depart from reason, for
+every weakness is self-indulgent, and indiscreetly launches out, and
+does not know where to stop. So that it makes no difference whether you
+approve of moderate perturbations of mind, or of moderate injustice,
+moderate cowardice, and moderate intemperance; for whoever prescribes
+bounds to vice admits a part of it, which, as it is odious of itself,
+becomes the more so as it stands on slippery ground, and, being once
+set forward, glides on headlong, and cannot by any means be stopped.
+
+XIX. Why should I say more? Why should I add that the Peripatetics say
+that these perturbations, which we insist upon it should be extirpated,
+are not only natural, but were given to men by nature for a good
+purpose? They usually talk in this manner. In the first place, they say
+much in praise of anger; they call it the whetstone of courage, and
+they say that angry men exert themselves most against an enemy or
+against a bad citizen: that those reasons are of little weight which
+are the motives of men who think thus, as--it is a just war; it becomes
+us to fight for our laws, our liberties, our country: they will allow
+no force to these arguments unless our courage is warmed by anger.--Nor
+do they confine their argument to warriors; but their opinion is that
+no one can issue any rigid commands without some bitterness and anger.
+In short, they have no notion of an orator either accusing or even
+defending a client without he is spurred on by anger. And though this
+anger should not be real, still they think his words and gestures ought
+to wear the appearance of it, so that the action of the orator may
+excite the anger of his hearer. And they deny that any man has ever
+been seen who does not know what it is to be angry; and they name what
+we call lenity by the bad appellation of indolence. Nor do they commend
+only this lust (for anger is, as I defined it above, the lust of
+revenge), but they maintain that kind of lust or desire to be given us
+by nature for very good purposes, saying that no one can execute
+anything well but what he is in earnest about. Themistocles used to
+walk in the public places in the night because he could not sleep; and
+when asked the reason, his answer was, that Miltiades's trophies kept
+him awake. Who has not heard how Demosthenes used to watch, who said
+that it gave him pain if any mechanic was up in a morning at his work
+before him? Lastly, they urge that some of the greatest philosophers
+would never have made that progress in their studies without some
+ardent desire spurring them on.--We are informed that Pythagoras,
+Democritus, and Plato visited the remotest parts of the world; for they
+thought that they ought to go wherever anything was to be learned. Now,
+it is not conceivable that these things could be effected by anything
+but by the greatest ardor of mind.
+
+XX. They say that even grief, which we have already said ought to be
+avoided as a monstrous and fierce beast, was appointed by nature, not
+without some good purpose, in order that men should lament when they
+had committed a fault, well knowing they had exposed themselves to
+correction, rebuke, and ignominy; for they think that those who can
+bear ignominy and infamy without pain have acquired a complete impunity
+for all sorts of crimes; for with them reproach is a stronger check
+than conscience. From whence we have that scene in Afranius borrowed
+from common life; for when the abandoned son saith, "Wretched that I
+am!" the severe father replies,
+
+    Let him but grieve, no matter what the cause.
+
+And they say the other divisions of sorrow have their use; that pity
+incites us to hasten to the assistance of others, and to alleviate the
+calamities of men who have undeservedly fallen into them; that even
+envy and detraction are not without their use, as when a man sees that
+another person has attained what he cannot, or observes another to be
+equally successful with himself; that he who should take away fear
+would take away all industry in life, which those men exert in the
+greatest degree who are afraid of the laws and of the magistrates, who
+dread poverty, ignominy, death, and pain. But while they argue thus,
+they allow indeed of these feelings being retrenched, though they deny
+that they either can or should be plucked up by the roots; so that
+their opinion is that mediocrity is best in everything. When they
+reason in this manner, what think you--is what they say worth attending
+to or not?
+
+_A._ I think it is. I wait, therefore, to hear what you will say in
+reply to them.
+
+XXI. _M._ Perhaps I may find something to say; but I will make this
+observation first: do you take notice with what modesty the Academics
+behave themselves? for they speak plainly to the purpose. The
+Peripatetics are answered by the Stoics; they have my leave to fight it
+out, who think myself no otherwise concerned than to inquire for what
+may seem to be most probable. Our present business is, then, to see if
+we can meet with anything in this question which is the probable, for
+beyond such approximation to truth as that human nature cannot proceed.
+The definition of a perturbation, as Zeno, I think, has rightly
+determined it, is thus: That a perturbation is a commotion of the mind
+against nature, in opposition to right reason; or, more briefly, thus,
+that a perturbation is a somewhat too vehement appetite; and when he
+says somewhat too vehement, he means such as is at a greater distance
+from the constant course of nature. What can I say to these
+definitions? The greater part of them we have from those who dispute
+with sagacity and acuteness: some of them expressions, indeed, such as
+the "ardors of the mind," and "the whetstones of virtue," savoring of
+the pomp of rhetoricians. As to the question, if a brave man can
+maintain his courage without becoming angry, it may be questioned with
+regard to the gladiators; though we often observe much resolution even
+in them: they meet, converse, they make objections and demands, they
+agree about terms, so that they seem calm rather than angry. But let us
+admit a man of the name of Placideianus, who was one of that trade, to
+be in such a mind, as Lucilius relates of him,
+
+    If for his blood you thirst, the task be mine;
+    His laurels at my feet he shall resign;
+    Not but I know, before I reach his heart,
+    First on myself a wound he will impart.
+    I hate the man; enraged I fight, and straight
+    In action we had been, but that I wait
+    Till each his sword had fitted to his hand.
+    My rage I scarce can keep within command.
+
+XXII. But we see Ajax in Homer advancing to meet Hector in battle
+cheerfully, without any of this boisterous wrath. For he had no sooner
+taken up his arms than the first step which he made inspired his
+associates with joy, his enemies with fear; so that even Hector, as he
+is represented by Homer,[49] trembling, condemned himself for having
+challenged him to fight. Yet these heroes conversed together, calmly
+and quietly, before they engaged; nor did they show any anger or
+outrageous behavior during the combat. Nor do I imagine that Torquatus,
+the first who obtained this surname, was in a rage when he plundered
+the Gaul of his collar; or that Marcellus's courage at Clastidium was
+only owing to his anger. I could almost swear that Africanus, with whom
+we are better acquainted, from our recollection of him being more
+recent, was noways inflamed by anger when he covered Alienus Pelignus
+with his shield, and drove his sword into the enemy's breast. There may
+be some doubt of L. Brutus, whether he was not influenced by
+extraordinary hatred of the tyrant, so as to attack Aruns with more
+than usual rashness; for I observe that they mutually killed each other
+in close fight. Why, then, do you call in the assistance of anger?
+Would courage, unless it began to get furious, lose its energy? What!
+do you imagine that Hercules, whom the very courage which you would try
+to represent as anger raised to heaven, was angry when he engaged the
+Erymanthian boar, or the Nemaean lion? Or was Theseus in a passion when
+he seized on the horns of the Marathonian bull? Take care how you make
+courage to depend in the least on rage. For anger is altogether
+irrational, and that is not courage which is void of reason.
+
+XXIII. We ought to hold all things here in contempt; death is to be
+looked on with indifference; pains and labors must be considered as
+easily supportable. And when these sentiments are established on
+judgment and conviction, then will that stout and firm courage take
+place; unless you attribute to anger whatever is done with vehemence,
+alacrity, and spirit. To me, indeed, that very Scipio[50] who was chief
+priest, that favorer of the saying of the Stoics, "That no private man
+could be a wise man," does not seem to be angry with Tiberius Gracchus,
+even when he left the consul in a hesitating frame of mind, and, though
+a private man himself, commanded, with the authority of a consul, that
+all who meant well to the republic should follow him. I do not know
+whether I have done anything in the republic that has the appearance of
+courage; but if I have, I certainly did not do it in wrath. Doth
+anything come nearer madness than anger? And indeed Ennius has well
+defined it as the beginning of madness. The changing color, the
+alteration of our voice, the look of our eyes, our manner of fetching
+our breath, the little command we have over our words and actions, how
+little do all these things indicate a sound mind! What can make a worse
+appearance than Homer's Achilles, or Agamemnon, during the quarrel? And
+as to Ajax, anger drove him into downright madness, and was the
+occasion of his death. Courage, therefore, does not want the assistance
+of anger; it is sufficiently provided, armed, and prepared of itself.
+We may as well say that drunkenness or madness is of service to
+courage, because those who are mad or drunk often do a great many
+things with unusual vehemence. Ajax was always brave; but still he was
+most brave when he was in that state of frenzy:
+
+    The greatest feat that Ajax e'er achieved
+    Was, when his single arm the Greeks relieved.
+    Quitting the field; urged on by rising rage,
+    Forced the declining troops again t'engage.
+
+Shall we say, then, that madness has its use?
+
+XXIV. Examine the definitions of courage: you will find it does not
+require the assistance of passion. Courage is, then, an affection of
+mind that endures all things, being itself in proper subjection to the
+highest of all laws; or it may be called a firm maintenance of judgment
+in supporting or repelling everything that has a formidable appearance,
+or a knowledge of what is formidable or otherwise, and maintaining
+invariably a stable judgment of all such things, so as to bear them or
+despise them; or, in fewer words, according to Chrysippus (for the
+above definitions are Sphaerus's, a man of the first ability as a
+layer-down of definitions, as the Stoics think. But they are all pretty
+much alike: they give us only common notions, some one way, and some
+another). But what is Chrysippus's definition? Fortitude, says he, is
+the knowledge of all things that are bearable, or an affection of the
+mind which bears and supports everything in obedience to the chief law
+of reason without fear. Now, though we should attack these men in the
+same manner as Carneades used to do, I fear they are the only real
+philosophers; for which of these definitions is there which does not
+explain that obscure and intricate notion of courage which every man
+conceives within himself? And when it is thus explained, what can a
+warrior, a commander, or an orator want more? And no one can think that
+they will be unable to behave themselves courageously without anger.
+What! do not even the Stoics, who maintain that all fools are mad, make
+the same inferences? for, take away perturbations, especially a
+hastiness of temper, and they will appear to talk very absurdly. But
+what they assert is this: they say that all fools are mad, as all
+dunghills stink; not that they always do so, but stir them, and you
+will perceive it. And in like manner, a warm-tempered man is not always
+in a passion; but provoke him, and you will see him run mad. Now, that
+very warlike anger, which is of such service in war, what is the use of
+it to him when he is at home with his wife, children, and family? Is
+there, then, anything that a disturbed mind can do better than one
+which is calm and steady? Or can any one be angry without a
+perturbation of mind? Our people, then, were in the right, who, as all
+vices depend on our manners, and nothing is worse than a passionate
+disposition, called angry men the only morose men.[51]
+
+XXV. Anger is in no wise becoming in an orator, though it is not amiss
+to affect it. Do you imagine that I am angry when in pleading I use any
+extraordinary vehemence and sharpness? What! when I write out my
+speeches after all is over and past, am I then angry while writing? Or
+do you think AEsopus was ever angry when he acted, or Accius was so when
+he wrote? Those men, indeed, act very well, but the orator acts better
+than the player, provided he be really an orator; but, then, they carry
+it on without passion, and with a composed mind. But what wantonness is
+it to commend lust! You produce Themistocles and Demosthenes; to these
+you add Pythagoras, Democritus, and Plato. What! do you then call
+studies lust? But these studies of the most excellent and admirable
+things, such as those were which you bring forward on all occasions,
+ought to be composed and tranquil; and what kind of philosophers are
+they who commend grief, than which nothing is more detestable? Afranius
+has said much to this purpose:
+
+    Let him but grieve, no matter what the cause.
+
+But he spoke this of a debauched and dissolute youth. But we are
+inquiring into the conduct of a constant and wise man. We may even
+allow a centurion or standard-bearer to be angry, or any others, whom,
+not to explain too far the mysteries of the rhetoricians, I shall not
+mention here; for to touch the passions, where reason cannot be come
+at, may have its use; but my inquiry, as I often repeat, is about a
+wise man.
+
+XXVI. But even envy, detraction, pity, have their use. Why should you
+pity rather than assist, if it is in your power to do so? Is it because
+you cannot be liberal without pity? We should not take sorrows on
+ourselves upon another's account; but we ought to relieve others of
+their grief if we can. But to detract from another's reputation, or to
+rival him with that vicious emulation which resembles an enmity, of
+what use can that conduct be? Now, envy implies being uneasy at
+another's good because one does not enjoy it one's self; but detraction
+is the being uneasy at another's good, merely because he enjoys it. How
+can it be right that you should voluntarily grieve, rather than take
+the trouble of acquiring what you want to have? for it is madness in
+the highest degree to desire to be the only one that has any particular
+happiness. But who can with correctness speak in praise of a mediocrity
+of evils? Can any one in whom there is lust or desire be otherwise than
+libidinous or desirous? or can a man who is occupied by anger avoid
+being angry? or can one who is exposed to any vexation escape being
+vexed? or if he is under the influence of fear, must he not be fearful?
+Do we look, then, on the libidinous, the angry, the anxious, and the
+timid man, as persons of wisdom, of excellence? of which I could speak
+very copiously and diffusely, but I wish to be as concise as possible.
+And so I will merely say that wisdom is an acquaintance with all divine
+and human affairs, and a knowledge of the cause of everything. Hence it
+is that it imitates what is divine, and looks upon all human concerns
+as inferior to virtue. Did you, then, say that it was your opinion that
+such a man was as naturally liable to perturbation as the sea is
+exposed to winds? What is there that can discompose such gravity and
+constancy? Anything sudden or unforeseen? How can anything of this kind
+befall one to whom nothing is sudden and unforeseen that can happen to
+man? Now, as to their saying that redundancies should be pared off, and
+only what is natural remain, what, I pray you, can be natural which may
+be too exuberant?
+
+XXVII. All these assertions proceed from the roots of errors, which
+must be entirely plucked up and destroyed, not pared and amputated. But
+as I suspect that your inquiry is not so much respecting the wise man
+as concerning yourself (for you allow that he is free from all
+perturbations, and you would willingly be so too yourself), let us see
+what remedies there are which may be applied by philosophy to the
+diseases of the mind. There is certainly some remedy; nor has nature
+been so unkind to the human race as to have discovered so many things
+salutary to the body, and none which are medicinal to the mind. She has
+even been kinder to the mind than to the body; inasmuch as you must
+seek abroad for the assistance which the body requires, while the mind
+has all that it requires within itself. But in proportion as the
+excellency of the mind is of a higher and more divine nature, the more
+diligence does it require; and therefore reason, when it is well
+applied, discovers what is best, but when it is neglected, it becomes
+involved in many errors. I shall apply, then, all my discourse to you;
+for though you pretend to be inquiring about the wise man, your inquiry
+may possibly be about yourself. Various, then, are the cures of those
+perturbations which I have expounded, for every disorder is not to be
+appeased the same way. One medicine must be applied to the man who
+mourns, another to the pitiful, another to the person who envies; for
+there is this difference to be maintained in all the four
+perturbations: we are to consider whether our discourse had better be
+directed to perturbations in general, which are a contempt of reason,
+or a somewhat too vehement appetite; or whether it would be better
+applied to particular descriptions, as, for instance, to fear, lust,
+and the rest, and whether it appears preferable to endeavor to remove
+that which has occasioned the grief, or rather to attempt wholly to
+eradicate every kind of grief. As, should any one grieve that he is
+poor, the question is, Would you maintain poverty to be no evil, or
+would you contend that a man ought not to grieve at anything? Certainly
+this last is the best course; for should you not convince him with
+regard to poverty, you must allow him to grieve; but if you remove
+grief by particular arguments, such as I used yesterday, the evil of
+poverty is in some manner removed.
+
+XXVIII. But any perturbation of the mind of this sort may be, as it
+were, wiped away by the method of appeasing the mind, if you succeed in
+showing that there is no good in that which has given rise to joy and
+lust, nor any evil in that which has occasioned fear or grief. But
+certainly the most effectual cure is to be achieved by showing that all
+perturbations are of themselves vicious, and have nothing natural or
+necessary in them. As we see, grief itself is easily softened when we
+charge those who grieve with weakness and an effeminate mind; or when
+we commend the gravity and constancy of those who bear calmly whatever
+befalls them here, as accidents to which all men are liable; and,
+indeed, this is generally the feeling of those who look on these as
+real evils, but yet think they should be borne with resignation. One
+imagines pleasure to be a good, another money; and yet the one may be
+called off from intemperance, the other from covetousness. The other
+method and address, which, at the same time that it removes the false
+opinion, withdraws the disorder, has more subtlety in it; but it seldom
+succeeds, and is not applicable to vulgar minds, for there are some
+diseases which that medicine can by no means remove. For, should any
+one be uneasy because he is without virtue, without courage, destitute
+of a sense of duty or honesty, his anxiety proceeds from a real evil;
+and yet we must apply another method of cure to him, and such a one as
+all the philosophers, however they may differ about other things, agree
+in. For they must necessarily agree in this, that commotions of the
+mind in opposition to right reason are vicious; and that even admitting
+those things to be evils which occasion fear or grief, and those to be
+goods which provoke desire or joy, yet that very commotion itself is
+vicious; for we mean by the expressions magnanimous and brave, one who
+is resolute, sedate, grave, and superior to everything in this life;
+but one who either grieves, or fears, or covets, or is transported with
+passion, cannot come under that denomination; for these things are
+consistent only with those who look on the things of this world as
+things with which their minds are unequal to contend.
+
+XXIX. Wherefore, as I before said, the philosophers have all one method
+of cure, so that we need say nothing about what sort of thing that is
+which disturbs the mind, but we must speak only concerning the
+perturbation itself. Thus, first, with regard to desire itself, when
+the business is only to remove that, the inquiry is not to be, whether
+that thing be good or evil which provokes lust, but the lust itself is
+to be removed; so that whether whatever is honest is the chief good, or
+whether it consists in pleasure, or in both these things together, or
+in the other three kinds of goods, yet should there be in any one too
+vehement an appetite for even virtue itself, the whole discourse should
+be directed to the deterring him from that vehemence. But human nature,
+when placed in a conspicuous point of view, gives us every argument for
+appeasing the mind, and, to make this the more distinct, the laws and
+conditions of life should be explained in our discourse. Therefore, it
+was not without reason that Socrates is reported, when Euripides was
+exhibiting his play called Orestes, to have repeated the first three
+verses of that tragedy--
+
+    What tragic story men can mournful tell,
+    Whate'er from fate or from the gods befell,
+    That human nature can support--[52]
+
+But, in order to persuade those to whom any misfortune has happened
+that they can and ought to bear it, it is very useful to set before
+them an enumeration of other persons who have borne similar calamities.
+Indeed, the method of appeasing grief was explained in my dispute of
+yesterday, and in my book on Consolation, which I wrote in the midst of
+my own grief; for I was not myself so wise a man as to be insensible to
+grief, and I used this, notwithstanding Chrysippus's advice to the
+contrary, who is against applying a medicine to the agitations of the
+mind while they are fresh; but I did it, and committed a violence on
+nature, that the greatness of my grief might give way to the greatness
+of the medicine.
+
+XXX. But fear borders upon grief, of which I have already said enough;
+but I must say a little more on that. Now, as grief proceeds from what
+is present, so does fear from future evil; so that some have said that
+fear is a certain part of grief: others have called fear the harbinger
+of trouble, which, as it were, introduces the ensuing evil. Now, the
+reasons that make what is present supportable, make what is to come
+very contemptible; for, with regard to both, we should take care to do
+nothing low or grovelling, soft or effeminate, mean or abject. But,
+notwithstanding we should speak of the inconstancy, imbecility, and
+levity of fear itself, yet it is of very great service to speak
+contemptuously of those very things of which we are afraid. So that it
+fell out very well, whether it was by accident or design, that I
+disputed the first and second day on death and pain--the two things
+that are the most dreaded: now, if what I then said was approved of, we
+are in a great degree freed from fear. And this is sufficient, as far
+as regards the opinion of evils.
+
+XXXI. Proceed we now to what are goods--that is to say, to joy and
+desire. To me, indeed, one thing alone seems to embrace the question of
+all that relates to the perturbations of the mind--the fact, namely,
+that all perturbations are in our own power; that they are taken up
+upon opinion, and are voluntary. This error, then, must be got rid of;
+this opinion must be removed; and, as with regard to imagined evils, we
+are to make them more supportable, so with respect to goods, we are to
+lessen the violent effects of those things which are called great and
+joyous. But one thing is to be observed, that equally relates both to
+good and evil: that, should it be difficult to persuade any one that
+none of those things which disturb the mind are to be looked on as good
+or evil, yet a different cure is to be applied to different feelings;
+and the malevolent person is to be corrected by one way of reasoning,
+the lover by another, the anxious man by another, and the fearful by
+another: and it would be easy for any one who pursues the best approved
+method of reasoning, with regard to good and evil, to maintain that no
+fool can be affected with joy, as he never can have anything good. But,
+at present, my discourse proceeds upon the common received notions.
+Let, then, honors, riches, pleasures, and the rest be the very good
+things which they are imagined to be; yet a too elevated and exulting
+joy on the possession of them is unbecoming; just as, though it might
+be allowable to laugh, to giggle would be indecent. Thus, a mind
+enlarged by joy is as blamable as a contraction of it by grief; and
+eager longing is a sign of as much levity in desiring as immoderate joy
+is in possessing; and, as those who are too dejected are said to be
+effeminate, so they who are too elated with joy are properly called
+volatile; and as feeling envy is a part of grief, and the being pleased
+with another's misfortune is a kind of joy, both these feelings are
+usually corrected by showing the wildness and insensibility of them:
+and as it becomes a man to be cautious, but it is unbecoming in him to
+be fearful, so to be pleased is proper, but to be joyful improper. I
+have, in order that I might be the better understood, distinguished
+pleasure from joy. I have already said above, that a contraction of the
+mind can never be right, but that an elation of it may; for the joy of
+Hector in Naevius is one thing--
+
+    'Tis joy indeed to hear my praises sung
+    By you, who are the theme of honor's tongue--
+
+but that of the character in Trabea another: "The kind procuress,
+allured by my money, will observe my nod, will watch my desires, and
+study my will. If I but move the door with my little finger, instantly
+it flies open; and if Chrysis should unexpectedly discover me, she will
+run with joy to meet me, and throw herself into my arms."
+
+Now he will tell you how excellent he thinks this:
+
+    Not even fortune herself is so fortunate.
+
+XXXII. Any one who attends the least to the subject will be convinced
+how unbecoming this joy is. And as they are very shameful who are
+immoderately delighted with the enjoyment of venereal pleasures, so are
+they very scandalous who lust vehemently after them. And all that which
+is commonly called love (and, believe me, I can find out no other name
+to call it by) is of such a trivial nature that nothing, I think, is to
+be compared to it: of which Caecilius says,
+
+    I hold the man of every sense bereaved
+    Who grants not Love to be of Gods the chief:
+    Whose mighty power whate'er is good effects,
+    Who gives to each his beauty and defects:
+    Hence, health and sickness; wit and folly, hence,
+    The God that love and hatred doth dispense!
+
+An excellent corrector of life this same poetry, which thinks that
+love, the promoter of debauchery and vanity, should have a place in the
+council of the Gods! I am speaking of comedy, which could not subsist
+at all without our approving of these debaucheries. But what said that
+chief of the Argonauts in tragedy?
+
+    My life I owe to honor less than love.
+
+What, then, are we to say of this love of Medea?--what a train of
+miseries did it occasion! And yet the same woman has the assurance to
+say to her father, in another poet, that she had a husband
+
+    Dearer by love than ever fathers were.
+
+XXXIII. However, we may allow the poets to trifle, in whose fables we
+see Jupiter himself engaged in these debaucheries: but let us apply to
+the masters of virtue--the philosophers who deny love to be anything
+carnal; and in this they differ from Epicurus, who, I think, is not
+much mistaken. For what is that love of friendship? How comes it that
+no one is in love with a deformed young man, or a handsome old one? I
+am of opinion that this love of men had its rise from the Gymnastics of
+the Greeks, where these kinds of loves are admissible and permitted;
+therefore Ennius spoke well:
+
+    The censure of this crime to those is due
+    Who naked bodies first exposed to view.
+
+Now, supposing them chaste, which I think is hardly possible, they are
+uneasy and distressed, and the more so because they contain and refrain
+themselves. But, to pass over the love of women, where nature has
+allowed more liberty, who can misunderstand the poets in their rape of
+Ganymede, or not apprehend what Laius says, and what he desires, in
+Euripides? Lastly, what have the principal poets and the most learned
+men published of themselves in their poems and songs? What doth Alcaeus,
+who was distinguished in his own republic for his bravery, write on the
+love of young men? And as for Anacreon's poetry, it is wholly on love.
+But Ibycus of Rhegium appears, from his writings, to have had this love
+stronger on him than all the rest.
+
+XXXIV. Now we see that the loves of all these writers were entirely
+libidinous. There have arisen also some among us philosophers (and
+Plato is at the head of them, whom Dicaearchus blames not without
+reason) who have countenanced love. The Stoics, in truth, say, not only
+that their wise man may be a lover, but they even define love itself as
+an endeavor to originate friendship out of the appearance of beauty.
+Now, provided there is any one in the nature of things without desire,
+without care, without a sigh, such a one may be a lover; for he is free
+from all lust: but I have nothing to say to him, as it is lust of which
+I am now speaking. But should there be any love--as there certainly
+is--which is but little, or perhaps not at all, short of madness, such
+as his is in the Leucadia--
+
+    Should there be any God whose care I am--
+
+it is incumbent on all the Gods to see that he enjoys his amorous
+pleasure.
+
+    Wretch that I am!
+
+Nothing is more true, and he says very appropriately,
+
+    What, are you sane, who at this rate lament?
+
+He seems even to his friends to be out of his senses: then how tragical
+he becomes!
+
+    Thy aid, divine Apollo, I implore,
+    And thine, dread ruler of the wat'ry store!
+    Oh! all ye winds, assist me!
+
+He thinks that the whole world ought to apply itself to help his love:
+he excludes Venus alone, as unkind to him.
+
+    Thy aid, O Venus, why should I invoke?
+
+He thinks Venus too much employed in her own lust to have regard to
+anything else, as if he himself had not said and committed these
+shameful things from lust.
+
+XXXV. Now, the cure for one who is affected in this manner is to show
+how light, how contemptible, how very trifling he is in what he
+desires; how he may turn his affections to another object, or
+accomplish his desires by some other means; or else to persuade him
+that he may entirely disregard it: sometimes he is to be led away to
+objects of another kind, to study, business, or other different
+engagements and concerns: very often the cure is effected by change of
+place, as sick people, that have not recovered their strength, are
+benefited by change of air. Some people think an old love may be driven
+out by a new one, as one nail drives out another: but, above all
+things, the man thus afflicted should be advised what madness love is:
+for of all the perturbations of the mind, there is not one which is
+more vehement; for (without charging it with rapes, debaucheries,
+adultery, or even incest, the baseness of any of these being very
+blamable; not, I say, to mention these) the very perturbation of the
+mind in love is base of itself, for, to pass over all its acts of
+downright madness, what weakness do not those very things which are
+looked upon as indifferent argue?
+
+    Affronts and jealousies, jars, squabbles, wars,
+    Then peace again. The man who seeks to fix
+    These restless feelings, and to subjugate
+    Them to some regular law, is just as wise
+    As one who'd try to lay down rules by which
+    Men should go mad.[53]
+
+Now, is not this inconstancy and mutability of mind enough to deter any
+one by its own deformity? We are to demonstrate, as was said of every
+perturbation, that there are no such feelings which do not consist
+entirely of opinion and judgment, and are not owing to ourselves. For
+if love were natural, all would be in love, and always so, and all love
+the same object; nor would one be deterred by shame, another by
+reflection, another by satiety.
+
+XXXVI. Anger, too, when it disturbs the mind any time, leaves no room
+to doubt its being madness: by the instigation of which we see such
+contention as this between brothers:
+
+    Where was there ever impudence like thine?
+    Who on thy malice ever could refine?[54]
+
+You know what follows: for abuses are thrown out by these brothers with
+great bitterness in every other verse; so that you may easily know them
+for the sons of Atreus, of that Atreus who invented a new punishment
+for his brother:
+
+    I who his cruel heart to gall am bent,
+    Some new, unheard-of torment must invent.
+
+Now, what were these inventions? Hear Thyestes:
+
+    My impious brother fain would have me eat
+    My children, and thus serves them up for meat.
+
+To what length now will not anger go? even as far as madness. Therefore
+we say, properly enough, that angry men have given up their power, that
+is, they are out of the power of advice, reason, and understanding; for
+these ought to have power over the whole mind. Now, you should put
+those out of the way whom they endeavor to attack till they have
+recollected themselves; but what does recollection here imply but
+getting together again the dispersed parts of their mind into their
+proper place? or else you must beg and entreat them, if they have the
+means of revenge, to defer it to another opportunity, till their anger
+cools. But the expression of cooling implies, certainly, that there was
+a heat raised in their minds in opposition to reason; from which
+consideration that saying of Archytas is commended, who being somewhat
+provoked at his steward, "How would I have treated you," said he, "if I
+had not been in a passion?"
+
+XXXVII. Where, then, are they who say that anger has its use? Can
+madness be of any use? But still it is natural. Can anything be natural
+that is against reason? or how is it, if anger is natural, that one
+person is more inclined to anger than another? or that the lust of
+revenge should cease before it has revenged itself? or that any one
+should repent of what he had done in a passion? as we see that
+Alexander the king did, who could scarcely keep his hands from himself,
+when he had killed his favorite Clytus, so great was his compunction.
+Now who that is acquainted with these instances can doubt that this
+motion of the mind is altogether in opinion and voluntary? for who can
+doubt that disorders of the mind, such as covetousness and a desire of
+glory, arise from a great estimation of those things by which the mind
+is disordered? from whence we may understand that every perturbation of
+the mind is founded in opinion. And if boldness--that is to say, a firm
+assurance of mind--is a kind of knowledge and serious opinion not
+hastily taken up, then diffidence is a fear of an expected and
+impending evil; and if hope is an expectation of good, fear must, of
+course, be an expectation of evil. Thus fear and other perturbations
+are evils. Therefore, as constancy proceeds from knowledge, so does
+perturbation from error. Now, they who are said to be naturally
+inclined to anger, or to pity, or to envy, or to any feeling of this
+kind, their minds are constitutionally, as it were, in bad health; yet
+they are curable, as the disposition of Socrates is said to have been;
+for when Zopyrus, who professed to know the character of every one from
+his person, had heaped a great many vices on him in a public assembly,
+he was laughed at by others, who could perceive no such vices in
+Socrates; but Socrates kept him in countenance by declaring that such
+vices were natural to him, but that he had got the better of them by
+his reason. Therefore, as any one who has the appearance of the best
+constitution may yet appear to be naturally rather inclined to some
+particular disorder, so different minds may be more particularly
+inclined to different diseases. But as to those men who are said to be
+vicious, not by nature, but their own fault, their vices proceed from
+wrong opinions of good and bad things, so that one is more prone than
+another to different motions and perturbations. But, just as it is in
+the case of the body, an inveterate disease is harder to be got rid of
+than a sudden disorder; and it is more easy to cure a fresh tumor in
+the eyes than to remove a defluxion of any continuance.
+
+XXXVIII. But as the cause of perturbations is now discovered, for all
+of them arise from the judgment or opinion, or volition, I shall put an
+end to this discourse. But we ought to be assured, since the boundaries
+of good and evil are now discovered, as far as they are discoverable by
+man, that nothing can be desired of philosophy greater or more useful
+than the discussions which we have held these four days. For besides
+instilling a contempt of death, and relieving pain so as to enable men
+to bear it, we have added the appeasing of grief, than which there is
+no greater evil to man. For though every perturbation of mind is
+grievous, and differs but little from madness, yet we are used to say
+of others when they are under any perturbation, as of fear, joy, or
+desire, that they are agitated and disturbed; but of those who give
+themselves up to grief, that they are miserable, afflicted, wretched,
+unhappy. So that it doth not seem to be by accident, but with reason
+proposed by you, that I should discuss grief, and the other
+perturbations separately; for there lies the spring and head of all our
+miseries; but the cure of grief, and of other disorders, is one and the
+same in that they are all voluntary, and founded on opinion; we take
+them on ourselves because it seems right so to do. Philosophy
+undertakes to eradicate this error, as the root of all our evils: let
+us therefore surrender ourselves to be instructed by it, and suffer
+ourselves to be cured; for while these evils have possession of us, we
+not only cannot be happy, but cannot be right in our minds. We must
+either deny that reason can effect anything, while, on the other hand,
+nothing can be done right without reason, or else, since philosophy
+depends on the deductions of reason, we must seek from her, if we would
+be good or happy, every help and assistance for living well and
+happily.
+
+
+
+
+BOOK V.
+
+WHETHER VIRTUE ALONE BE SUFFICIENT FOR A HAPPY LIFE.
+
+
+I. This fifth day, Brutus, shall put an end to our Tusculan
+Disputations: on which day we discussed your favorite subject. For I
+perceive from that book which you wrote for me with the greatest
+accuracy, as well as from your frequent conversation, that you are
+clearly of this opinion, that virtue is of itself sufficient for a
+happy life: and though it may be difficult to prove this, on account of
+the many various strokes of fortune, yet it is a truth of such a nature
+that we should endeavor to facilitate the proof of it. For among all
+the topics of philosophy, there is not one of more dignity or
+importance. For as the first philosophers must have had some inducement
+to neglect everything for the search of the best state of life: surely,
+the inducement must have been the hope of living happily, which
+impelled them to devote so much care and pains to that study. Now, if
+virtue was discovered and carried to perfection by them, and if virtue
+is a sufficient security for a happy life, who can avoid thinking the
+work of philosophizing excellently recommended by them, and undertaken
+by me? But if virtue, as being subject to such various and uncertain
+accidents, were but the slave of fortune, and were not of sufficient
+ability to support herself, I am afraid that it would seem desirable
+rather to offer up prayers, than to rely on our own confidence in
+virtue as the foundation for our hope of a happy life. And, indeed,
+when I reflect on those troubles with which I have been so severely
+exercised by fortune, I begin to distrust this opinion; and sometimes
+even to dread the weakness and frailty of human nature, for I am afraid
+lest, when nature had given us infirm bodies, and had joined to them
+incurable diseases and intolerable pains, she perhaps also gave us
+minds participating in these bodily pains, and harassed also with
+troubles and uneasinesses, peculiarly their own. But here I correct
+myself for forming my judgment of the power of virtue more from the
+weakness of others, or of myself perhaps, than from virtue itself: for
+she herself (provided there is such a thing as virtue; and your uncle
+Brutus has removed all doubt of it) has everything that can befall
+mankind in subjection to her; and by disregarding such things, she is
+far removed from being at all concerned at human accidents; and, being
+free from every imperfection, she thinks that nothing which is external
+to herself can concern her. But we, who increase every approaching evil
+by our fear, and every present one by our grief, choose rather to
+condemn the nature of things than our own errors.
+
+II. But the amendment of this fault, and of all our other vices and
+offences, is to be sought for in philosophy: and as my own inclination
+and desire led me, from my earliest youth upward, to seek her
+protection, so, under my present misfortunes, I have had recourse to
+the same port from whence I set out, after having been tossed by a
+violent tempest. O Philosophy, thou guide of life! thou discoverer of
+virtue and expeller of vices! what had not only I myself, but the whole
+life of man, been without you? To you it is that we owe the origin of
+cities; you it was who called together the dispersed race of men into
+social life; you united them together, first, by placing them near one
+another, then by marriages, and lastly, by the communication of speech
+and languages. You have been the inventress of laws; you have been our
+instructress in morals and discipline; to you we fly for refuge; from
+you we implore assistance; and as I formerly submitted to you in a
+great degree, so now I surrender up myself entirely to you. For one day
+spent well, and agreeably to your precepts, is preferable to an
+eternity of error. Whose assistance, then, can be of more service to me
+than yours, when you have bestowed on us tranquillity of life, and
+removed the fear of death? But Philosophy is so far from being praised
+as much as she has deserved by mankind, that she is wholly neglected by
+most men, and actually evil spoken of by many. Can any person speak ill
+of the parent of life, and dare to pollute himself thus with parricide,
+and be so impiously ungrateful as to accuse her whom he ought to
+reverence, even were he less able to appreciate the advantages which he
+might derive from her? But this error, I imagine, and this darkness has
+spread itself over the minds of ignorant men, from their not being able
+to look so far back, and from their not imagining that those men by
+whom human life was first improved were philosophers; for though we see
+philosophy to have been of long standing, yet the name must be
+acknowledged to be but modern.
+
+III. But, indeed, who can dispute the antiquity of philosophy, either
+in fact or name? For it acquired this excellent name from the ancients,
+by the knowledge of the origin and causes of everything, both divine
+and human. Thus those seven [Greek: Sophoi], as they were considered
+and called by the Greeks, have always been esteemed and called wise men
+by us; and thus Lycurgus many ages before, in whose time, before the
+building of this city, Homer is said to have lived, as well as Ulysses
+and Nestor in the heroic ages, are all handed down to us by tradition
+as having really been what they were called, wise men; nor would it
+have been said that Atlas supported the heavens, or that Prometheus was
+bound to Caucasus, nor would Cepheus, with his wife, his son-in-law,
+and his daughter have been enrolled among the constellations, but that
+their more than human knowledge of the heavenly bodies had transferred
+their names into an erroneous fable. From whence all who occupied
+themselves in the contemplation of nature were both considered and
+called wise men; and that name of theirs continued to the age of
+Pythagoras, who is reported to have gone to Phlius, as we find it
+stated by Heraclides Ponticus, a very learned man, and a pupil of
+Plato, and to have discoursed very learnedly and copiously on certain
+subjects with Leon, prince of the Phliasii; and when Leon, admiring his
+ingenuity and eloquence, asked him what art he particularly professed,
+his answer was, that he was acquainted with no art, but that he was a
+philosopher. Leon, surprised at the novelty of the name, inquired what
+he meant by the name of philosopher, and in what philosophers differed
+from other men; on which Pythagoras replied, "That the life of man
+seemed to him to resemble those games which were celebrated with the
+greatest possible variety of sports and the general concourse of all
+Greece. For as in those games there were some persons whose object was
+glory and the honor of a crown, to be attained by the performance of
+bodily exercises, so others were led thither by the gain of buying and
+selling, and mere views of profit; but there was likewise one class of
+persons, and they were by far the best, whose aim was neither applause
+nor profit, but who came merely as spectators through curiosity, to
+observe what was done, and to see in what manner things were carried on
+there. And thus, said he, we come from another life and nature unto
+this one, just as men come out of some other city, to some much
+frequented mart; some being slaves to glory, others to money; and there
+are some few who, taking no account of anything else, earnestly look
+into the nature of things; and these men call themselves studious of
+wisdom, that is, philosophers: and as there it is the most reputable
+occupation of all to be a looker-on without making any acquisition, so
+in life, the contemplating things, and acquainting one's self with
+them, greatly exceeds every other pursuit of life."
+
+IV. Nor was Pythagoras the inventor only of the name, but he enlarged
+also the thing itself, and, when he came into Italy after this
+conversation at Phlius, he adorned that Greece, which is called Great
+Greece, both privately and publicly, with the most excellent
+institutions and arts; but of his school and system I shall, perhaps,
+find another opportunity to speak. But numbers and motions, and the
+beginning and end of all things, were the subjects of the ancient
+philosophy down to Socrates, who was a pupil of Archelaus, who had been
+the disciple of Anaxagoras. These made diligent inquiry into the
+magnitude of the stars, their distances, courses, and all that relates
+to the heavens. But Socrates was the first who brought down philosophy
+from the heavens, placed it in cities, introduced it into families, and
+obliged it to examine into life and morals, and good and evil. And his
+different methods of discussing questions, together with the variety of
+his topics, and the greatness of his abilities, being immortalized by
+the memory and writings of Plato, gave rise to many sects of
+philosophers of different sentiments, of all which I have principally
+adhered to that one which, in my opinion, Socrates himself followed;
+and argue so as to conceal my own opinion, while I deliver others from
+their errors, and so discover what has the greatest appearance of
+probability in every question. And the custom Carneades adopted with
+great copiousness and acuteness, and I myself have often given in to it
+on many occasions elsewhere, and in this manner, too, I disputed
+lately, in my Tusculan villa; indeed, I have sent you a book of the
+four former days' discussions; but the fifth day, when we had seated
+ourselves as before, what we were to dispute on was proposed thus:
+
+V. _A._ I do not think virtue can possibly be sufficient for a happy
+life.
+
+_M._ But my friend Brutus thinks so, whose judgment, with submission, I
+greatly prefer to yours.
+
+_A._ I make no doubt of it; but your regard for him is not the business
+now: the question is now, what is the real character of that quality of
+which I have declared my opinion. I wish you to dispute on that.
+
+_M._ What! do you deny that virtue can possibly be sufficient for a
+happy life?
+
+_A._ It is what I entirely deny.
+
+_M._ What! is not virtue sufficient to enable us to live as we ought,
+honestly, commendably, or, in fine, to live well?
+
+_A._ Certainly sufficient.
+
+_M._ Can you, then, help calling any one miserable who lives ill? or
+will you deny that any one who you allow lives well must inevitably
+live happily?
+
+_A._ Why may I not? for a man may be upright in his life, honest,
+praiseworthy, even in the midst of torments, and therefore live well.
+Provided you understand what I mean by well; for when I say well, I
+mean with constancy, and dignity, and wisdom, and courage; for a man
+may display all these qualities on the rack; but yet the rack is
+inconsistent with a happy life.
+
+_M._ What, then? is your happy life left on the outside of the prison,
+while constancy, dignity, wisdom, and the other virtues, are
+surrendered up to the executioner, and bear punishment and pain without
+reluctance?
+
+_A._ You must look out for something new if you would do any good.
+These things have very little effect on me, not merely from their being
+common, but principally because, like certain light wines that will not
+bear water, these arguments of the Stoics are pleasanter to taste than
+to swallow. As when that assemblage of virtues is committed to the
+rack, it raises so reverend a spectacle before our eyes that happiness
+seems to hasten on towards them, and not to suffer them to be deserted
+by her. But when you take your attention off from this picture and
+these images of the virtues to the truth and the reality, what remains
+without disguise is, the question whether any one can be happy in
+torment? Wherefore let us now examine that point, and not be under any
+apprehensions, lest the virtues should expostulate, and complain that
+they are forsaken by happiness. For if prudence is connected with every
+virtue, then prudence itself discovers this, that all good men are not
+therefore happy; and she recollects many things of Marcus Atilius[55],
+Quintus Caepio[56], Marcus Aquilius[57]; and prudence herself, if these
+representations are more agreeable to you than the things themselves,
+restrains happiness when it is endeavoring to throw itself into
+torments, and denies that it has any connection with pain and torture.
+
+VI. _M._ I can easily bear with your behaving in this manner, though it
+is not fair in you to prescribe to me how you would have me carry on
+this discussion. But I ask you if I have effected anything or nothing
+in the preceding days?
+
+_A._ Yes; something was done, some little matter indeed.
+
+_M._ But if that is the case, this question is settled, and almost put
+an end to.
+
+_A._ How so?
+
+_M._ Because turbulent motions and violent agitations of the mind, when
+it is raised and elated by a rash impulse, getting the better of
+reason, leave no room for a happy life. For who that fears either pain
+or death, the one of which is always present, the other always
+impending, can be otherwise than miserable? Now, supposing the same
+person--which is often the case--to be afraid of poverty, ignominy,
+infamy, or weakness, or blindness, or, lastly, slavery, which doth not
+only befall individual men, but often even the most powerful nations;
+now can any one under the apprehension of these evils be happy? What
+shall we say of him who not only dreads these evils as impending, but
+actually feels and bears them at present? Let us unite in the same
+person banishment, mourning, the loss of children; now, how can any one
+who is broken down and rendered sick in body and mind by such
+affliction be otherwise than very miserable indeed? What reason, again,
+can there be why a man should not rightly enough be called miserable
+whom we see inflamed and raging with lust, coveting everything with an
+insatiable desire, and, in proportion as he derives more pleasure from
+anything, thirsting the more violently after them? And as to a man
+vainly elated, exulting with an empty joy, and boasting of himself
+without reason, is not he so much the more miserable in proportion as
+he thinks himself happier? Therefore, as these men are miserable, so,
+on the other hand, those are happy who are alarmed by no fears, wasted
+by no griefs, provoked by no lusts, melted by no languid pleasures that
+arise from vain and exulting joys. We look on the sea as calm when not
+the least breath of air disturbs its waves; and, in like manner, the
+placid and quiet state of the mind is discovered when unmoved by any
+perturbation. Now, if there be any one who holds the power of fortune,
+and everything human, everything that can possibly befall any man, as
+supportable, so as to be out of the reach of fear or anxiety, and if
+such a man covets nothing, and is lifted up by no vain joy of mind,
+what can prevent his being happy? And if these are the effects of
+virtue, why cannot virtue itself make men happy?
+
+VII. _A._ But the other of these two propositions is undeniable, that
+they who are under no apprehensions, who are noways uneasy, who covet
+nothing, who are lifted up by no vain joy, are happy: and therefore I
+grant you that. But as for the other, that is not now in a fit state
+for discussion; for it has been proved by your former arguments that a
+wise man is free from every perturbation of mind.
+
+_M._ Doubtless, then, the dispute is over; for the question appears to
+have been entirely exhausted.
+
+_A._ I think, indeed, that that is almost the case.
+
+_M._ But yet that is more usually the case with the mathematicians than
+philosophers. For when the geometricians teach anything, if what they
+have before taught relates to their present subject, they take that for
+granted which has been already proved, and explain only what they had
+not written on before. But the philosophers, whatever subject they have
+in hand, get together everything that relates to it, notwithstanding
+they may have dilated on it somewhere else. Were not that the case, why
+should the Stoics say so much on that question, Whether virtue was
+abundantly sufficient to a happy life? when it would have been answer
+enough that they had before taught that nothing was good but what was
+honorable; for, as this had been proved, the consequence must be that
+virtue was sufficient to a happy life; and each premise may be made to
+follow from the admission of the other, so that if it be admitted that
+virtue is sufficient to secure a happy life, it may also be inferred
+that nothing is good except what is honorable. They, however, do not
+proceed in this manner; for they would separate books about what is
+honorable, and what is the chief good; and when they have demonstrated
+from the one that virtue has power enough to make life happy, yet they
+treat this point separately; for everything, and especially a subject
+of such great consequence, should be supported by arguments and
+exhortations which belong to that alone. For you should have a care how
+you imagine philosophy to have uttered anything more noble, or that she
+has promised anything more fruitful or of greater consequence, for,
+good Gods! doth she not engage that she will render him who submits to
+her laws so accomplished as to be always armed against fortune, and to
+have every assurance within himself of living well and happily--that he
+shall, in short, be forever happy? But let us see what she will
+perform? In the mean while, I look upon it as a great thing that she
+has even made such a promise. For Xerxes, who was loaded with all the
+rewards and gifts of fortune, not satisfied with his armies of horse
+and foot, nor the multitude of his ships, nor his infinite treasure of
+gold, offered a reward to any one who could find out a new pleasure;
+and yet, when it was discovered, he was not satisfied with it; nor can
+there ever be an end to lust. I wish we could engage any one by a
+reward to produce something the better to establish us in this belief.
+
+VIII. _A._ I wish that, indeed, myself; but I want a little
+information. For I allow that in what you have stated the one
+proposition is the consequence of the other; that as, if what is
+honorable be the only good, it must follow that a happy life is the
+effect of virtue: so that if a happy life consists in virtue, nothing
+can be good but virtue. But your friend Brutus, on the authority of
+Aristo and Antiochus, does not see this; for he thinks the case would
+be the same even if there were anything good besides virtue.
+
+_M._ What, then? do you imagine that I am going to argue against
+Brutus?
+
+_A._ You may do what you please; for it is not for me to prescribe what
+you shall do.
+
+_M._ How these things agree together shall be examined somewhere else;
+for I frequently discussed that point with Antiochus, and lately with
+Aristo, when, during the period of my command as general, I was lodging
+with him at Athens. For to me it seemed that no one could possibly be
+happy under any evil; but a wise man might be afflicted with evil, if
+there are any things arising from body or fortune deserving the name of
+evils. These things were said, which Antiochus has inserted in his
+books in many places--that virtue itself was sufficient to make life
+happy, but yet not perfectly happy; and that many things derive their
+names from the predominant portion of them, though they do not include
+everything, as strength, health, riches, honor, and glory: which
+qualities are determined by their kind, not their number. Thus a happy
+life is so called from its being so in a great degree, even though it
+should fall short in some point. To clear this up is not absolutely
+necessary at present, though it seems to be said without any great
+consistency; for I cannot imagine what is wanting to one that is happy
+to make him happier, for if anything be wanting to him, he cannot be so
+much as happy; and as to what they say, that everything is named and
+estimated from its predominant portion, that may be admitted in some
+things. But when they allow three kinds of evils--when any one is
+oppressed with every imaginable evil of two kinds, being afflicted with
+adverse fortune, and having at the same time his body worn out and
+harassed with all sorts of pains--shall we say that such a one is but
+little short of a happy life, to say nothing about the happiest
+possible life?
+
+IX. This is the point which Theophrastus was unable to maintain; for
+after he had once laid down the position that stripes, torments,
+tortures, the ruin of one's country, banishment, the loss of children,
+had great influence on men's living miserably and unhappily, he durst
+not any longer use any high and lofty expressions when he was so low
+and abject in his opinion. How right he was is not the question; he
+certainly was consistent. Therefore, I am not for objecting to
+consequences where the premises are admitted. But this most elegant and
+learned of all the philosophers is not taken to task very severely when
+he asserts his three kinds of good; but he is attacked by every one for
+that book which he wrote on a happy life, in which book he has many
+arguments why one who is tortured and racked cannot be happy. For in
+that book he is supposed to say that a man who is placed on the wheel
+(that is a kind of torture in use among the Greeks) cannot attain to a
+completely happy life. He nowhere, indeed, says so absolutely; but what
+he says amounts to the same thing. Can I, then, find fault with him,
+after having allowed that pains of the body are evils, that the ruin of
+a man's fortunes is an evil, if he should say that every good man is
+not happy, when all those things which he reckons as evils may befall a
+good man? The same Theophrastus is found fault with by all the books
+and schools of the philosophers for commending that sentence in his
+Callisthenes,
+
+    Fortune, not wisdom, rules the life of man.
+
+They say never did philosopher assert anything so languid. They are
+right, indeed, in that; but I do not apprehend anything could be more
+consistent, for if there are so many good things that depend on the
+body, and so many foreign to it that depend on chance and fortune, is
+it inconsistent to say that fortune, which governs everything, both
+what is foreign and what belongs to the body, has greater power than
+counsel. Or would we rather imitate Epicurus? who is often excellent in
+many things which he speaks, but quite indifferent how consistent he
+may be, or how much to the purpose he is speaking. He commends spare
+diet, and in that he speaks as a philosopher; but it is for Socrates or
+Antisthenes to say so, and not for one who confines all good to
+pleasure. He denies that any one can live pleasantly unless he lives
+honestly, wisely, and justly. Nothing is more dignified than this
+assertion, nothing more becoming a philosopher, had he not measured
+this very expression of living honestly, justly, and wisely by
+pleasure. What could be better than to assert that fortune interferes
+but little with a wise man? But does he talk thus, who, after he has
+said that pain is the greatest evil, or the only evil, might himself be
+afflicted with the sharpest pains all over his body, even at the time
+he is vaunting himself the most against fortune? And this very thing,
+too, Metrodorus has said, but in better language: "I have anticipated
+you, Fortune; I have caught you, and cut off every access, so that you
+cannot possibly reach me." This would be excellent in the mouth of
+Aristo the Chian, or Zeno the Stoic, who held nothing to be an evil but
+what was base; but for you, Metrodorus, to anticipate the approaches of
+fortune, who confine all that is good to your bowels and marrow--for
+you to say so, who define the chief good by a strong constitution of
+body, and well-assured hope of its continuance--for you to cut off
+every access of fortune! Why, you may instantly be deprived of that
+good. Yet the simple are taken with these propositions, and a vast
+crowd is led away by such sentences to become their followers.
+
+X. But it is the duty of one who would argue accurately to consider not
+what is said, but what is said consistently. As in that very opinion
+which we have adopted in this discussion, namely, that every good man
+is always happy, it is clear what I mean by good men: I call those both
+wise and good men who are provided and adorned with every virtue. Let
+us see, then, who are to be called happy. I imagine, indeed, that those
+men are to be called so who are possessed of good without any alloy of
+evil; nor is there any other notion connected with the word that
+expresses happiness but an absolute enjoyment of good without any evil.
+Virtue cannot attain this, if there is anything good besides itself.
+For a crowd of evils would present themselves, if we were to allow
+poverty, obscurity, humility, solitude, the loss of friends, acute
+pains of the body, the loss of health, weakness, blindness, the ruin of
+one's country, banishment, slavery, to be evils; for a wise man may be
+afflicted by all these evils, numerous and important as they are, and
+many others also may be added, for they are brought on by chance, which
+may attack a wise man; but if these things are evils, who can maintain
+that a wise man is always happy when all these evils may light on him
+at the same time? I therefore do not easily agree with my friend
+Brutus, nor with our common masters, nor those ancient ones, Aristotle,
+Speusippus, Xenocrates, Polemon, who reckon all that I have mentioned
+above as evils, and yet they say that a wise man is always happy; nor
+can I allow them, because they are charmed with this beautiful and
+illustrious title, which would very well become Pythagoras, Socrates,
+and Plato, to persuade my mind that strength, health, beauty, riches,
+honors, power, with the beauty of which they are ravished, are
+contemptible, and that all those things which are the opposites of
+these are not to be regarded. Then might they declare openly, with a
+loud voice, that neither the attacks of fortune, nor the opinion of the
+multitude, nor pain, nor poverty, occasions them any apprehensions; and
+that they have everything within themselves, and that there is nothing
+whatever which they consider as good but what is within their own
+power. Nor can I by any means allow the same person who falls into the
+vulgar opinion of good and evil to make use of these expressions, which
+can only become a great and exalted man. Struck with which glory, up
+starts Epicurus, who, with submission to the Gods, thinks a wise man
+always happy. He is much charmed with the dignity of this opinion, but
+he never would have owned that, had he attended to himself; for what is
+there more inconsistent than for one who could say that pain was the
+greatest or the only evil to think also that a wise man can possibly
+say in the midst of his torture, How sweet is this! We are not,
+therefore, to form our judgment of philosophers from detached
+sentences, but from their consistency with themselves, and their
+ordinary manner of talking.
+
+XI. _A._ You compel me to be of your opinion; but have a care that you
+are not inconsistent yourself.
+
+_M._ In what respect?
+
+_A._ Because I have lately read your fourth book on Good and Evil: and
+in that you appeared to me, while disputing against Cato, to be
+endeavoring to show, which in my opinion means to prove, that Zeno and
+the Peripatetics differ only about some new words; but if we allow
+that, what reason can there be, if it follows from the arguments of
+Zeno that virtue contains all that is necessary to a happy life, that
+the Peripatetics should not be at liberty to say the same? For, in my
+opinion, regard should be had to the thing, not to words.
+
+_M._ What! you would convict me from my own words, and bring against me
+what I had said or written elsewhere. You may act in that manner with
+those who dispute by established rules. We live from hand to mouth, and
+say anything that strikes our mind with probability, so that we are the
+only people who are really at liberty. But, since I just now spoke of
+consistency, I do not think the inquiry in this place is, if the
+opinion of Zeno and his pupil Aristo be true that nothing is good but
+what is honorable; but, admitting that, then, whether the whole of a
+happy life can be rested on virtue alone. Wherefore, if we certainly
+grant Brutus this, that a wise man is always happy, how consistent he
+is, is his own business; for who, indeed, is more worthy than himself
+of the glory of that opinion? Still, we may maintain that such a man is
+more happy than any one else.
+
+XII. Though Zeno the Cittiaean, a stranger and an inconsiderable coiner
+of words, appears to have insinuated himself into the old philosophy;
+still, the prevalence of this opinion is due to the authority of Plato,
+who often makes use of this expression, "That nothing but virtue can be
+entitled to the name of good," agreeably to what Socrates says in
+Plato's Gorgias; for it is there related that when some one asked him
+if he did not think Archelaus the son of Perdiccas, who was then looked
+upon as a most fortunate person, a very happy man, "I do not know,"
+replied he, "for I never conversed with him." "What! is there no other
+way you can know it by?" "None at all." "You cannot, then, pronounce of
+the great king of the Persians whether he is happy or not?" "How can I,
+when I do not know how learned or how good a man he is?" "What! do you
+imagine that a happy life depends on that?" "My opinion entirely is,
+that good men are happy, and the wicked miserable." "Is Archelaus,
+then, miserable?" "Certainly, if unjust." Now, does it not appear to
+you that he is here placing the whole of a happy life in virtue alone?
+But what does the same man say in his funeral oration? "For," saith he,
+"whoever has everything that relates to a happy life so entirely
+dependent on himself as not to be connected with the good or bad
+fortune of another, and not to be affected by, or made in any degree
+uncertain by, what befalls another; and whoever is such a one has
+acquired the best rule of living; he is that moderate, that brave, that
+wise man, who submits to the gain and loss of everything, and
+especially of his children, and obeys that old precept; for he will
+never be too joyful or too sad, because he depends entirely upon
+himself."
+
+XIII. From Plato, therefore, all my discourse shall be deduced, as if
+from some sacred and hallowed fountain. Whence can I, then, more
+properly begin than from Nature, the parent of all? For whatsoever she
+produces (I am not speaking only of animals, but even of those things
+which have sprung from the earth in such a manner as to rest on their
+own roots) she designed it to be perfect in its respective kind. So
+that among trees and vines, and those lower plants and trees which
+cannot advance themselves high above the earth, some are evergreen,
+others are stripped of their leaves in winter, and, warmed by the
+spring season, put them out afresh, and there are none of them but what
+are so quickened by a certain interior motion, and their own seeds
+enclosed in every one, so as to yield flowers, fruit, or berries, that
+all may have every perfection that belongs to it; provided no violence
+prevents it. But the force of Nature itself may be more easily
+discovered in animals, as she has bestowed sense on them. For some
+animals she has taught to swim, and designed to be inhabitants of the
+water; others she has enabled to fly, and has willed that they should
+enjoy the boundless air; some others she has made to creep, others to
+walk. Again, of these very animals, some are solitary, some gregarious,
+some wild, others tame, some hidden and buried beneath the earth, and
+every one of these maintains the law of nature, confining itself to
+what was bestowed on it, and unable to change its manner of life. And
+as every animal has from nature something that distinguishes it, which
+every one maintains and never quits; so man has something far more
+excellent, though everything is said to be excellent by comparison. But
+the human mind, being derived from the divine reason, can be compared
+with nothing but with the Deity itself, if I may be allowed the
+expression. This, then, if it is improved, and when its perception is
+so preserved as not to be blinded by errors, becomes a perfect
+understanding, that is to say, absolute reason, which is the very same
+as virtue. And if everything is happy which wants nothing, and is
+complete and perfect in its kind, and that is the peculiar lot of
+virtue, certainly all who are possessed of virtue are happy. And in
+this I agree with Brutus, and also with Aristotle, Xenocrates,
+Speusippus, Polemon.
+
+XIV. To me such are the only men who appear completely happy; for what
+can he want to a complete happy life who relies on his own good
+qualities, or how can he be happy who does not rely on them? But he who
+makes a threefold division of goods must necessarily be diffident, for
+how can he depend on having a sound body, or that his fortune shall
+continue? But no one can be happy without an immovable, fixed, and
+permanent good. What, then, is this opinion of theirs? So that I think
+that saying of the Spartan may be applied to them, who, on some
+merchant's boasting before him that he had despatched ships to every
+maritime coast, replied that a fortune which depended on ropes was not
+very desirable. Can there be any doubt that whatever may be lost cannot
+be properly classed in the number of those things which complete a
+happy life? for of all that constitutes a happy life, nothing will
+admit of withering, or growing old, or wearing out, or decaying; for
+whoever is apprehensive of any loss of these things cannot be happy:
+the happy man should be safe, well fenced, well fortified, out of the
+reach of all annoyance, not like a man under trifling apprehensions,
+but free from all such. As he is not called innocent who but slightly
+offends, but he who offends not at all, so it is he alone who is to be
+considered without fear who is free from all fear, not he who is but in
+little fear. For what else is courage but an affection of mind that is
+ready to undergo perils, and patient in the endurance of pain and labor
+without any alloy of fear? Now, this certainly could not be the case if
+there were anything else good but what depended on honesty alone. But
+how can any one be in possession of that desirable and much-coveted
+security (for I now call a freedom from anxiety a security, on which
+freedom a happy life depends) who has, or may have, a multitude of
+evils attending him? How can he be brave and undaunted, and hold
+everything as trifles which can befall a man? for so a wise man should
+do, unless he be one who thinks that everything depends on himself.
+Could the Lacedaemonians without this, when Philip threatened to prevent
+all their attempts, have asked him if he could prevent their killing
+themselves? Is it not easier, then, to find one man of such a spirit as
+we are inquiring after, than to meet with a whole city of such men?
+Now, if to this courage I am speaking of we add temperance, that it may
+govern all our feelings and agitations, what can be wanting to complete
+his happiness who is secured by his courage from uneasiness and fear,
+and is prevented from immoderate desires and immoderate insolence of
+joy by temperance? I could easily show that virtue is able to produce
+these effects, but that I have explained on the foregoing days.
+
+XV. But as the perturbations of the mind make life miserable, and
+tranquillity renders it happy; and as these perturbations are of two
+sorts, grief and fear, proceeding from imagined evils, and as
+immoderate joy and lust arise from a mistake about what is good, and as
+all these feelings are in opposition to reason and counsel; when you
+see a man at ease, quite free and disengaged from such troublesome
+commotions, which are so much at variance with one another, can you
+hesitate to pronounce such a one a happy man? Now, the wise man is
+always in such a disposition; therefore the wise man is always happy.
+Besides, every good is pleasant; whatever is pleasant may be boasted
+and talked of; whatever may be boasted of is glorious; but whatever is
+glorious is certainly laudable, and whatever is laudable doubtless,
+also, honorable: whatever, then, is good is honorable (but the things
+which they reckon as goods they themselves do not call honorable);
+therefore what is honorable alone is good. Hence it follows that a
+happy life is comprised in honesty alone. Such things, then, are not to
+be called or considered goods, when a man may enjoy an abundance of
+them, and yet be most miserable. Is there any doubt but that a man who
+enjoys the best health, and who has strength and beauty, and his senses
+flourishing in their utmost quickness and perfection--suppose him
+likewise, if you please, nimble and active, nay, give him riches,
+honors, authority, power, glory--now, I say, should this person, who is
+in possession of all these, be unjust, intemperate, timid, stupid, or
+an idiot--could you hesitate to call such a one miserable? What, then,
+are those goods in the possession of which you may be very miserable?
+Let us see if a happy life is not made up of parts of the same nature,
+as a heap implies a quantity of grain of the same kind. And if this be
+once admitted, happiness must be compounded of different good things,
+which alone are honorable; if there is any mixture of things of another
+sort with these, nothing honorable can proceed from such a composition:
+now, take away honesty, and how can you imagine anything happy? For
+whatever is good is desirable on that account; whatever is desirable
+must certainly be approved of; whatever you approve of must be looked
+on as acceptable and welcome. You must consequently impute dignity to
+this; and if so, it must necessarily be laudable: therefore, everything
+that is laudable is good. Hence it follows that what is honorable is
+the only good. And should we not look upon it in this light, there will
+be a great many things which we must call good.
+
+XVI. I forbear to mention riches, which, as any one, let him be ever so
+unworthy, may have them, I do not reckon among goods; for what is good
+is not attainable by all. I pass over notoriety and popular fame,
+raised by the united voice of knaves and fools. Even things which are
+absolute nothings may be called goods; such as white teeth, handsome
+eyes, a good complexion, and what was commended by Euryclea, when she
+was washing Ulysses's feet, the softness of his skin and the mildness
+of his discourse. If you look on these as goods, what greater encomiums
+can the gravity of a philosopher be entitled to than the wild opinion
+of the vulgar and the thoughtless crowd? The Stoics give the name of
+excellent and choice to what the others call good: they call them so,
+indeed; but they do not allow them to complete a happy life. But these
+others think that there is no life happy without them; or, admitting it
+to be happy, they deny it to be the most happy. But our opinion is,
+that it is the most happy; and we prove it from that conclusion of
+Socrates. For thus that author of philosophy argued: that as the
+disposition of a man's mind is, so is the man; such as the man is, such
+will be his discourse; his actions will correspond with his discourse,
+and his life with his actions. But the disposition of a good man's mind
+is laudable; the life, therefore, of a good man is laudable; it is
+honorable, therefore, because laudable; the unavoidable conclusion from
+which is that the life of good men is happy. For, good Gods! did I not
+make it appear, by my former arguments--or was I only amusing myself
+and killing time in what I then said?--that the mind of a wise man was
+always free from every hasty motion which I call a perturbation, and
+that the most undisturbed peace always reigned in his breast? A man,
+then, who is temperate and consistent, free from fear or grief, and
+uninfluenced by any immoderate joy or desire, cannot be otherwise than
+happy; but a wise man is always so, therefore he is always happy.
+Moreover, how can a good man avoid referring all his actions and all
+his feelings to the one standard of whether or not it is laudable? But
+he does refer everything to the object of living happily: it follows,
+then, that a happy life is laudable; but nothing is laudable without
+virtue: a happy life, then, is the consequence of virtue. And this is
+the unavoidable conclusion to be drawn from these arguments.
+
+XVII. A wicked life has nothing which we ought to speak of or glory in;
+nor has that life which is neither happy nor miserable. But there is a
+kind of life that admits of being spoken of, and gloried in, and
+boasted of, as Epaminondas saith,
+
+    The wings of Sparta's pride my counsels clipp'd.
+
+And Africanus boasts,
+
+    Who, from beyond Maeotis to the place
+    Where the sun rises, deeds like mine can trace?
+
+If, then, there is such a thing as a happy life, it is to be gloried
+in, spoken of, and commended by the person who enjoys it; for there is
+nothing excepting that which can be spoken of or gloried in; and when
+that is once admitted, you know what follows. Now, unless an honorable
+life is a happy life, there must, of course, be something preferable to
+a happy life; for that which is honorable all men will certainly grant
+to be preferable to anything else. And thus there will be something
+better than a happy life: but what can be more absurd than such an
+assertion? What! when they grant vice to be effectual to the rendering
+life miserable, must they not admit that there is a corresponding power
+in virtue to make life happy? For contraries follow from contraries.
+And here I ask what weight they think there is in the balance of
+Critolaus, who having put the goods of the mind into one scale, and the
+goods of the body and other external advantages into the other, thought
+the goods of the mind outweighed the others so far that they would
+require the whole earth and sea to equalize the scale.
+
+XVIII. What hinders Critolaus, then, or that gravest of philosophers,
+Xenocrates (who raises virtue so high, and who lessens and depreciates
+everything else), from not only placing a happy life, but the happiest
+possible life, in virtue? And, indeed, if this were not the case,
+virtue would be absolutely lost. For whoever is subject to grief must
+necessarily be subject to fear too, for fear is an uneasy apprehension
+of future grief; and whoever is subject to fear is liable to dread,
+timidity, consternation, cowardice. Therefore, such a person may, some
+time or other, be defeated, and not think himself concerned with that
+precept of Atreus,
+
+    And let men so conduct themselves in life,
+    As to be always strangers to defeat.
+
+But such a man, as I have said, will be defeated; and not only
+defeated, but made a slave of. But we would have virtue always free,
+always invincible; and were it not so, there would be an end of virtue.
+But if virtue has in herself all that is necessary for a good life, she
+is certainly sufficient for happiness: virtue is certainly sufficient,
+too, for our living with courage; if with courage, then with a
+magnanimous spirit, and indeed so as never to be under any fear, and
+thus to be always invincible. Hence it follows that there can be
+nothing to be repented of, no wants, no lets or hinderances. Thus all
+things will be prosperous, perfect, and as you would have them, and,
+consequently, happy; but virtue is sufficient for living with courage,
+and therefore virtue is able by herself to make life happy. For as
+folly, even when possessed of what it desires, never thinks it has
+acquired enough, so wisdom is always satisfied with the present, and
+never repents on her own account.
+
+XIX. Look but on the single consulship of Laelius, and that, too, after
+having been set aside (though when a wise and good man like him is
+outvoted, the people are disappointed of a good consul, rather than be
+disappointed by a vain people); but the point is, would you prefer,
+were it in your power, to be once such a consul as Laelius, or be
+elected four times, like Cinna? I have no doubt in the world what
+answer you will make, and it is on that account I put the question to
+you.
+
+I would not ask every one this question; for some one perhaps might
+answer that he would not only prefer four consulates to one, but even
+one day of Cinna's life to whole ages of many famous men. Laelius would
+have suffered had he but touched any one with his finger; but Cinna
+ordered the head of his colleague consul, Cn. Octavius, to be struck
+off; and put to death P. Crassus[58], and L. Caesar[59], those excellent
+men, so renowned both at home and abroad; and even M. Antonius[60], the
+greatest orator whom I ever heard; and C. Caesar, who seems to me to
+have been the pattern of humanity, politeness, sweetness of temper, and
+wit. Could he, then, be happy who occasioned the death of these men? So
+far from it, that he seems to be miserable, not only for having
+performed these actions, but also for acting in such a manner that it
+was lawful for him to do it, though it is unlawful for any one to do
+wicked actions; but this proceeds from inaccuracy, of speech, for we
+call whatever a man is allowed to do lawful. Was not Marius happier, I
+pray you, when he shared the glory of the victory gained over the
+Cimbrians with his colleague Catulus (who was almost another Laelius;
+for I look upon the two men as very like one another), than when,
+conqueror in the civil war, he in a passion answered the friends of
+Catulus, who were interceding for him, "Let him die?" And this answer
+he gave, not once only, but often. But in such a case, he was happier
+who submitted to that barbarous decree than he who issued it. And it is
+better to receive an injury than to do one; and so it was better to
+advance a little to meet that death that was making its approaches, as
+Catulus did, than, like Marius, to sully the glory of six consulships,
+and disgrace his latter days, by the death of such a man.
+
+XX. Dionysius exercised his tyranny over the Syracusans thirty-eight
+years, being but twenty-five years old when he seized on the
+government. How beautiful and how wealthy a city did he oppress with
+slavery! And yet we have it from good authority that he was remarkably
+temperate in his manner of living, that he was very active and
+energetic in carrying on business, but naturally mischievous and
+unjust; from which description every one who diligently inquires into
+truth must inevitably see that he was very miserable. Neither did he
+attain what he so greatly desired, even when he was persuaded that he
+had unlimited power; for, notwithstanding he was of a good family and
+reputable parents (though that is contested by some authors), and had a
+very large acquaintance of intimate friends and relations, and also
+some youths attached to him by ties of love after the fashion of the
+Greeks, he could not trust any one of them, but committed the guard of
+his person to slaves, whom he had selected from rich men's families and
+made free, and to strangers and barbarians. And thus, through an unjust
+desire of governing, he in a manner shut himself up in a prison.
+Besides, he would not trust his throat to a barber, but had his
+daughters taught to shave; so that these royal virgins were forced to
+descend to the base and slavish employment of shaving the head and
+beard of their father. Nor would he trust even them, when they were
+grown up, with a razor; but contrived how they might burn off the hair
+of his head and beard with red-hot nutshells. And as to his two wives,
+Aristomache, his countrywoman, and Doris of Locris, he never visited
+them at night before everything had been well searched and examined.
+And as he had surrounded the place where his bed was with a broad
+ditch, and made a way over it with a wooden bridge, he drew that bridge
+over after shutting his bedchamber door. And as he did not dare to
+stand on the ordinary pulpits from which they usually harangued the
+people, he generally addressed them from a high tower. And it is said
+that when he was disposed to play at ball--for he delighted much in
+it--and had pulled off his clothes, he used to give his sword into the
+keeping of a young man whom he was very fond of. On this, one of his
+intimates said pleasantly, "You certainly trust your life with him;"
+and as the young man happened to smile at this, he ordered them both to
+be slain, the one for showing how he might be taken off, the other for
+approving of what had been said by smiling. But he was so concerned at
+what he had done that nothing affected him more during his whole life;
+for he had slain one to whom he was extremely partial. Thus do weak
+men's desires pull them different ways, and while they indulge one,
+they act counter to another.
+
+XXI. This tyrant, however, showed himself how happy he really was; for
+once, when Damocles, one of his flatterers, was dilating in
+conversation on his forces, his wealth, the greatness of his power, the
+plenty he enjoyed, the grandeur of his royal palaces, and maintaining
+that no one was ever happier, "Have you an inclination," said he,
+"Damocles, as this kind of life pleases you, to have a taste of it
+yourself, and to make a trial of the good fortune that attends me?" And
+when he said that he should like it extremely, Dionysius ordered him to
+be laid on a bed of gold with the most beautiful covering, embroidered
+and wrought with the most exquisite work, and he dressed out a great
+many sideboards with silver and embossed gold. He then ordered some
+youths, distinguished for their handsome persons, to wait at his table,
+and to observe his nod, in order to serve him with what he wanted.
+There were ointments and garlands; perfumes were burned; tables
+provided with the most exquisite meats. Damocles thought himself very
+happy. In the midst of this apparatus, Dionysius ordered a bright sword
+to be let down from the ceiling, suspended by a single horse-hair, so
+as to hang over the head of that happy man. After which he neither cast
+his eye on those handsome waiters, nor on the well-wrought plate; nor
+touched any of the provisions: presently the garlands fell to pieces.
+At last he entreated the tyrant to give him leave to go, for that now
+he had no desire to be happy[61]. Does not Dionysius, then, seem to
+have declared there can be no happiness for one who is under constant
+apprehensions? But it was not now in his power to return to justice,
+and restore his citizens their rights and privileges; for, by the
+indiscretion of youth, he had engaged in so many wrong steps and
+committed such extravagances, that, had he attempted to have returned
+to a right way of thinking, he must have endangered his life.
+
+XXII. Yet, how desirous he was of friendship, though at the same time
+he dreaded the treachery of friends, appears from the story of those
+two Pythagoreans: one of these had been security for his friend, who
+was condemned to die; the other, to release his security, presented
+himself at the time appointed for his dying: "I wish," said Dionysius,"
+you would admit me as the third in your friendship." What misery was it
+for him to be deprived of acquaintance, of company at his table, and of
+the freedom of conversation! especially for one who was a man of
+learning, and from his childhood acquainted with liberal arts, very
+fond of music, and himself a tragic poet--how good a one is not to the
+purpose, for I know not how it is, but in this way, more than any
+other, every one thinks his own performances excellent. I never as yet
+knew any poet (and I was very intimate with Aquinius), who did not
+appear to himself to be very admirable. The case is this: you are
+pleased with your own works; I like mine. But to return to Dionysius.
+He debarred himself from all civil and polite conversation, and spent
+his life among fugitives, bondmen, and barbarians; for he was persuaded
+that no one could be his friend who was worthy of liberty, or had the
+least desire of being free.
+
+XXIII. Shall I not, then, prefer the life of Plato and Archytas,
+manifestly wise and learned men, to his, than which nothing can
+possibly be more horrid, or miserable, or detestable?
+
+I will present you with an humble and obscure mathematician of the same
+city, called Archimedes, who lived many years after; whose tomb,
+overgrown with shrubs and briers, I in my quaestorship discovered, when
+the Syracusans knew nothing of it, and even denied that there was any
+such thing remaining; for I remembered some verses, which I had been
+informed were engraved on his monument, and these set forth that on the
+top of the tomb there was placed a sphere with a cylinder. When I had
+carefully examined all the monuments (for there are a great many tombs
+at the gate Achradinae), I observed a small column standing out a little
+above the briers, with the figure of a sphere and a cylinder upon it;
+whereupon I immediately said to the Syracusans--for there were some of
+their principal men with me there--that I imagined that was what I was
+inquiring for. Several men, being sent in with scythes, cleared the
+way, and made an opening for us. When we could get at it, and were come
+near to the front of the pedestal, I found the inscription, though the
+latter parts of all the verses were effaced almost half away. Thus one
+of the noblest cities of Greece, and one which at one time likewise had
+been very celebrated for learning, had known nothing of the monument of
+its greatest genius, if it had not been discovered to them by a native
+of Arpinum. But to return to the subject from which I have been
+digressing. Who is there in the least degree acquainted with the Muses,
+that is, with liberal knowledge, or that deals at all in learning, who
+would not choose to be this mathematician rather than that tyrant? If
+we look into their methods of living and their employments, we shall
+find the mind of the one strengthened and improved with tracing the
+deductions of reason, amused with his own ingenuity, which is the one
+most delicious food of the mind; the thoughts of the other engaged in
+continual murders and injuries, in constant fears by night and by day.
+Now imagine a Democritus, a Pythagoras, and an Anaxagoras; what
+kingdom, what riches, would you prefer to their studies and amusements?
+For you must necessarily look for that excellence which we are seeking
+for in that which is the most perfect part of man; but what is there
+better in man than a sagacious and good mind? The enjoyment, therefore,
+of that good which proceeds from that sagacious mind can alone make us
+happy; but virtue is the good of the mind: it follows, therefore, that
+a happy life depends on virtue. Hence proceed all things that are
+beautiful, honorable, and excellent, as I said above (but this point
+must, I think, be treated of more at large), and they are well stored
+with joys. For, as it is clear that a happy life consists in perpetual
+and unexhausted pleasures, it follows, too, that a happy life must
+arise from honesty.
+
+XXIV. But that what I propose to demonstrate to you may not rest on
+mere words only, I must set before you the picture of something, as it
+were, living and moving in the world, that may dispose us more for the
+improvement of the understanding and real knowledge. Let us, then,
+pitch upon some man perfectly acquainted with the most excellent arts;
+let us present him for awhile to our own thoughts, and figure him to
+our own imaginations. In the first place, he must necessarily be of an
+extraordinary capacity; for virtue is not easily connected with dull
+minds. Secondly, he must have a great desire of discovering truth, from
+whence will arise that threefold production of the mind; one of which
+depends on knowing things, and explaining nature; the other, in
+defining what we ought to desire and what to avoid; the third, in
+judging of consequences and impossibilities, in which consists both
+subtlety in disputing and also clearness of judgment. Now, with what
+pleasure must the mind of a wise man be affected which continually
+dwells in the midst of such cares and occupations as these, when he
+views the revolutions and motions of the whole world, and sees those
+innumerable stars in the heavens, which, though fixed in their places,
+have yet one motion in common with the whole universe, and observes the
+seven other stars, some higher, some lower, each maintaining their own
+course, while their motions, though wandering, have certain defined and
+appointed spaces to run through! the sight of which doubtless urged and
+encouraged those ancient philosophers to exercise their investigating
+spirit on many other things. Hence arose an inquiry after the
+beginnings, and, as it were, seeds from which all things were produced
+and composed; what was the origin of every kind of thing, whether
+animate or inanimate, articulately speaking or mute; what occasioned
+their beginning and end, and by what alteration and change one thing
+was converted into another; whence the earth originated, and by what
+weights it was balanced; by what caverns the seas were supplied; by
+what gravity all things being carried down tend always to the middle of
+the world, which in any round body is the lowest place.
+
+XXV. A mind employed on such subjects, and which night and day
+contemplates them, contains in itself that precept of the Delphic God,
+so as to "know itself," and to perceive its connection with the divine
+reason, from whence it is filled with an insatiable joy. For
+reflections on the power and nature of the Gods raise in us a desire of
+imitating their eternity. Nor does the mind, that sees the necessary
+dependences and connections that one cause has with another, think it
+possible that it should be itself confined to the shortness of this
+life. Those causes, though they proceed from eternity to eternity, are
+governed by reason and understanding. And he who beholds them and
+examines them, or rather he whose view takes in all the parts and
+boundaries of things, with what tranquillity of mind does he look on
+all human affairs, and on all that is nearer him! Hence proceeds the
+knowledge of virtue; hence arise the kinds and species of virtues;
+hence are discovered those things which nature regards as the bounds
+and extremities of good and evil; by this it is discovered to what all
+duties ought to be referred, and which is the most eligible manner of
+life. And when these and similar points have been investigated, the
+principal consequence which is deduced from them, and that which is our
+main object in this discussion, is the establishment of the point, that
+virtue is of itself sufficient to a happy life.
+
+The third qualification of our wise man is the next to be considered,
+which goes through and spreads itself over every part of wisdom; it is
+that whereby we define each particular thing, distinguish the genus
+from its species, connect consequences, draw just conclusions, and
+distinguish truth from falsehood, which is the very art and science of
+disputing; which is not only of the greatest use in the examination of
+what passes in the world, but is likewise the most rational
+entertainment, and that which is most becoming to true wisdom. Such are
+its effects in retirement. Now, let our wise man be considered as
+protecting the republic; what can be more excellent than such a
+character? By his prudence he will discover the true interests of his
+fellow-citizens; by his justice he will be prevented from applying what
+belongs to the public to his own use; and, in short, he will be ever
+governed by all the virtues, which are many and various. To these let
+us add the advantage of his friendships; in which the learned reckon
+not only a natural harmony and agreement of sentiments throughout the
+conduct of life, but the utmost pleasure and satisfaction in conversing
+and passing our time constantly with one another. What can be wanting
+to such a life as this to make it more happy than it is? Fortune
+herself must yield to a life stored with such joys. Now, if it be a
+happiness to rejoice in such goods of the mind, that is to say, in such
+virtues, and if all wise men enjoy thoroughly these pleasures, it must
+necessarily be granted that all such are happy.
+
+XXVI. _A._ What, when in torments and on the rack?
+
+_M._ Do you imagine I am speaking of him as laid on roses and violets?
+Is it allowable even for Epicurus (who only puts on the appearance of
+being a philosopher, and who himself assumed that name for himself) to
+say (though, as matters stand, I commend him for his saying) that a
+wise man might at all times cry out, though he be burned, tortured, cut
+to pieces, "How little I regard it!" Shall this be said by one who
+defines all evil as pain, and measures every good by pleasure; who
+could ridicule whatever we call either honorable or base, and could
+declare of us that we were employed about words, and uttering mere
+empty sounds; and that nothing is to be regarded by us but as it is
+perceived to be smooth or rough by the body? What! shall such a man as
+this, as I said, whose understanding is little superior to the beasts',
+be at liberty to forget himself; and not only to despise fortune, when
+the whole of his good and evil is in the power of fortune, but to say
+that he is happy in the most racking torture, when he had actually
+declared pain to be not only the greatest evil, but the only one? Nor
+did he take any trouble to provide himself with those remedies which
+might have enabled him to bear pain, such as firmness of mind, a shame
+of doing anything base, exercise, and the habit of patience, precepts
+of courage, and a manly hardiness; but he says that he supports himself
+on the single recollection of past pleasures, as if any one, when the
+weather was so hot as that he was scarcely able to bear it, should
+comfort himself by recollecting that he was once in my country,
+Arpinum, where he was surrounded on every side by cooling streams. For
+I do not apprehend how past pleasures can allay present evils. But when
+he says that a wise man is always happy who would have no right to say
+so if he were consistent with himself, what may they not do who allow
+nothing to be desirable, nothing to be looked on as good but what is
+honorable? Let, then, the Peripatetics and Old Academics follow my
+example, and at length leave off muttering to themselves; and openly
+and with a clear voice let them be bold to say that a happy life may
+not be inconsistent with the agonies of Phalaris's bull.
+
+XXVII. But to dismiss the subtleties of the Stoics, which I am sensible
+I have employed more than was necessary, let us admit of three kinds of
+goods; and let them really be kinds of goods, provided no regard is had
+to the body and to external circumstances, as entitled to the
+appellation of good in any other sense than because we are obliged to
+use them: but let those other divine goods spread themselves far in
+every direction, and reach the very heavens. Why, then, may I not call
+him happy, nay, the happiest of men, who has attained them? Shall a
+wise man be afraid of pain? which is, indeed, the greatest enemy to our
+opinion. For I am persuaded that we are prepared and fortified
+sufficiently, by the disputations of the foregoing days, against our
+own death or that of our friends, against grief, and the other
+perturbations of the mind. But pain seems to be the sharpest adversary
+of virtue; that it is which menaces us with burning torches; that it is
+which threatens to crush our fortitude, and greatness of mind, and
+patience. Shall virtue, then, yield to this? Shall the happy life of a
+wise and consistent man succumb to this? Good. Gods! how base would
+this be! Spartan boys will bear to have their bodies torn by rods
+without uttering a groan. I myself have seen at Lacedaemon troops of
+young men, with incredible earnestness contending together with their
+hands and feet, with their teeth and nails, nay, even ready to expire,
+rather than own themselves conquered. Is any country of barbarians more
+uncivilized or desolate than India? Yet they have among them some that
+are held for wise men, who never wear any clothes all their life long,
+and who bear the snow of Caucasus, and the piercing cold of winter,
+without any pain; and who if they come in contact with fire endure
+being burned without a groan. The women, too, in India, on the death of
+their husbands have a regular contest, and apply to the judge to have
+it determined which of them was best beloved by him; for it is
+customary there for one man to have many wives. She in whose favor it
+is determined exults greatly, and being attended by her relations, is
+laid on the funeral pile with her husband; the others, who are
+postponed, walk away very much dejected. Custom can never be superior
+to nature, for nature is never to be got the better of. But our minds
+are infected by sloth and idleness, and luxury, and languor, and
+indolence: we have enervated them by opinions and bad customs. Who is
+there who is unacquainted with the customs of the Egyptians? Their
+minds being tainted by pernicious opinions, they are ready to bear any
+torture rather than hurt an ibis, a snake, a cat, a dog, or a
+crocodile; and should any one inadvertently have hurt any of these
+animals, he will submit to any punishment. I am speaking of men only.
+As to the beasts, do they not bear cold and hunger, running about in
+woods, and on mountains and deserts? Will they not fight for their
+young ones till they are wounded? Are they afraid of any attacks or
+blows? I mention not what the ambitious will suffer for honor's sake,
+or those who are desirous of praise on account of glory, or lovers to
+gratify their lust. Life is full of such instances.
+
+XXVIII. But let us not dwell too much on these questions, but rather
+let us return to our subject. I say, and say again, that happiness will
+submit even to be tormented; and that in pursuit of justice, and
+temperance, and still more especially and principally fortitude, and
+greatness of soul, and patience, it will not stop short at sight of the
+executioner; and when all other virtues proceed calmly to the torture,
+that one will never halt, as I said, on the outside and threshold of
+the prison; for what can be baser, what can carry a worse appearance,
+than to be left alone, separated from those beautiful attendants? Not,
+however, that this is by any means possible; for neither can the
+virtues hold together without happiness, nor happiness without the
+virtues; so that they will not suffer her to desert them, but will
+carry her along with them, to whatever torments, to whatever pain they
+are led. For it is the peculiar quality of a wise man to do nothing
+that he may repent of, nothing against his inclination, but always to
+act nobly, with constancy, gravity, and honesty; to depend on nothing
+as certainty; to wonder at nothing, when it falls out, as if it
+appeared strange and unexpected to him; to be independent of every one,
+and abide by his own opinion. For my part, I cannot form an idea of
+anything happier than this. The conclusion of the Stoics is indeed
+easy; for since they are persuaded that the end of good is to live
+agreeably to nature, and to be consistent with that--as a wise man
+should do so, not only because it is his duty, but because it is in his
+power--it must, of course, follow that whoever has the chief good in
+his power has his happiness so too. And thus the life of a wise man is
+always happy. You have here what I think may be confidently said of a
+happy life; and as things now stand, very truly also, unless you can
+advance something better.
+
+XXIX. _A._ Indeed I cannot; but I should be glad to prevail on you,
+unless it is troublesome (as you are under no confinement from
+obligations to any particular sect, but gather from all of them
+whatever strikes you most as having the appearance of probability), as
+you just now seemed to advise the Peripatetics and the Old Academy
+boldly to speak out without reserve, "that wise men are always the
+happiest"--I should be glad to hear how you think it consistent for
+them to say so, when you have said so much against that opinion, and
+the conclusions of the Stoics.
+
+_M._ I will make use, then, of that liberty which no one has the
+privilege of using in philosophy but those of our school, whose
+discourses determine nothing, but take in everything, leaving them
+unsupported by the authority of any particular person, to be judged of
+by others, according to their weight. And as you seem desirous of
+knowing how it is that, notwithstanding the different opinions of
+philosophers with regard to the ends of goods, virtue has still
+sufficient security for the effecting of a happy life--which security,
+as we are informed, Carneades used indeed to dispute against; but he
+disputed as against the Stoics, whose opinions he combated with great
+zeal and vehemence. I, however, shall handle the question with more
+temper; for if the Stoics have rightly settled the _ends_ of goods, the
+affair is at an end; for a wise man must necessarily be always happy.
+But let us examine, if we can, the particular opinions of the others,
+that so this excellent decision, if I may so call it, in favor of a
+happy life, may be agreeable to the opinions and discipline of all.
+
+XXX. These, then, are the opinions, as I think, that are held and
+defended--the first four are simple ones: "that nothing is good but
+what is honest," according to the Stoics; "nothing good but pleasure,"
+as Epicurus maintains; "nothing good but a freedom from pain," as
+Hieronymus[62] asserts; "nothing good but an enjoyment of the
+principal, or all, or the greatest goods of nature," as Carneades
+maintained against the Stoics--these are simple, the others are mixed
+propositions. Then there are three kinds of goods: the greatest being
+those of the mind; the next best those of the body; the third are
+external goods, as the Peripatetics call them, and the Old Academics
+differ very little from them. Dinomachus[63] and Callipho[64] have
+coupled pleasure with honesty; but Diodorus[65] the Peripatetic has
+joined indolence to honesty. These are the opinions that have some
+footing; for those of Aristo,[66] Pyrrho,[67] Herillus,[68] and of some
+others, are quite out of date. Now let us see what weight these men
+have in them, excepting the Stoics, whose opinion I think I have
+sufficiently defended; and indeed I have explained what the
+Peripatetics have to say; excepting that Theophrastus, and those who
+followed him, dread and abhor pain in too weak a manner. The others may
+go on to exaggerate the gravity and dignity of virtue, as usual; and
+then, after they have extolled it to the skies, with the usual
+extravagance of good orators, it is easy to reduce the other topics to
+nothing by comparison, and to hold them up to contempt. They who think
+that praise deserves to be sought after, even at the expense of pain,
+are not at liberty to deny those men to be happy who have obtained it.
+Though they may be under some evils, yet this name of happy has a very
+wide application.
+
+XXXI. For even as trading is said to be lucrative, and farming
+advantageous, not because the one never meets with any loss, nor the
+other with any damage from the inclemency of the weather, but because
+they succeed in general; so life may be properly called happy, not from
+its being entirely made up of good things, but because it abounds with
+these to a great and considerable degree. By this way of reasoning,
+then, a happy life may attend virtue even to the moment of execution;
+nay, may descend with her into Phalaris's bull, according to Aristotle,
+Xenocrates, Speusippus, Polemon; and will not be gained over by any
+allurements to forsake her. Of the same opinion will Calliphon and
+Diodorus be; for they are both of them such friends to virtue as to
+think that all things should be discarded and far removed that are
+incompatible with it. The rest seem to be more hampered with these
+doctrines, but yet they get clear of them; such as Epicurus,
+Hieronymus, and whoever else thinks it worth while to defend the
+deserted Carneades: for there is not one of them who does not think the
+mind to be judge of those goods, and able sufficiently to instruct him
+how to despise what has the appearance only of good or evil. For what
+seems to you to be the case with Epicurus is the case also with
+Hieronymus and Carneades, and, indeed, with all the rest of them; for
+who is there who is not sufficiently prepared against death and pain? I
+will begin, with your leave, with him whom we call soft and voluptuous.
+What! does he seem, to you to be afraid of death or pain when he calls
+the day of his death happy; and who, when he is afflicted by the
+greatest pains, silences them all by recollecting arguments of his own
+discovering? And this is not done in such a manner as to give room for
+imagining that he talks thus wildly from some sudden impulse; but his
+opinion of death is, that on the dissolution of the animal all sense is
+lost; and what is deprived of sense is, as he thinks, what we have no
+concern at all with. And as to pain, too, he has certain rules to
+follow then: if it be great, the comfort is that it must be short; if
+it be of long continuance, then it must be supportable. What, then? Do
+those grandiloquent gentlemen state anything better than Epicurus in
+opposition to these two things which distress us the most? And as to
+other things, do not Epicurus and the rest of the philosophers seem
+sufficiently prepared? Who is there who does not dread poverty? And yet
+no true philosopher ever can dread it.
+
+XXXII. But with how little is this man himself satisfied! No one has
+said more on frugality. For when a man is far removed from those things
+which occasion a desire of money, from love, ambition, or other daily
+extravagance, why should he be fond of money, or concern himself at all
+about it? Could the Scythian Anacharsis[69] disregard money, and shall
+not our philosophers be able to do so? We are informed of an epistle of
+his in these words: "Anacharsis to Hanno, greeting. My clothing is the
+same as that with which the Scythians cover themselves; the hardness of
+my feet supplies the want of shoes; the ground is my bed, hunger my
+sauce, my food milk, cheese, and flesh. So you may come to me as to a
+man in want of nothing. But as to those presents you take so much
+pleasure in, you may dispose of them to your own citizens, or to the
+immortal Gods." And almost all philosophers, of all schools, excepting
+those who are warped from right reason by a vicious disposition, might
+have been of this same opinion. Socrates, when on one occasion he saw a
+great quantity of gold and silver carried in a procession, cried out,
+"How many things are there which I do not want!" Xenocrates, when some
+ambassadors from Alexander had brought him fifty talents, which was a
+very large sum of money in those times, especially at Athens, carried
+the ambassadors to sup in the Academy, and placed just a sufficiency
+before them, without any apparatus. When they asked him, the next day,
+to whom he wished the money which they had for him to be paid: "What!"
+said he, "did you not perceive by our slight repast of yesterday that I
+had no occasion for money?" But when he perceived that they were
+somewhat dejected, he accepted of thirty minas, that he might not seem
+to treat with disrespect the king's generosity. But Diogenes took a
+greater liberty, like a Cynic, when Alexander asked him if he wanted
+anything: "Just at present," said he, "I wish that you would stand a
+little out of the line between me and the sun," for Alexander was
+hindering him from sunning himself. And, indeed, this very man used to
+maintain how much he surpassed the Persian king in his manner of life
+and fortune; for that he himself was in want of nothing, while the
+other never had enough; and that he had no inclination for those
+pleasures of which the other could never get enough to satisfy himself;
+and that the other could never obtain his.
+
+XXXIII. You see, I imagine, how Epicurus has divided his kinds of
+desires, not very acutely perhaps, but yet usefully: saying that they
+are "partly natural and necessary; partly natural, but not necessary;
+partly neither. That those which are necessary may be supplied almost
+for nothing; for that the things which nature requires are easily
+obtained." As to the second kind of desires, his opinion is that any
+one may easily either enjoy or go without them. And with regard to the
+third, since they are utterly frivolous, being neither allied to
+necessity nor nature, he thinks that they should be entirely rooted
+out. On this topic a great many arguments are adduced by the
+Epicureans; and those pleasures which they do not despise in a body,
+they disparage one by one, and seem rather for lessening the number of
+them; for as to wanton pleasures, on which subject they say a great
+deal, these, say they, are easy, common, and within any one's reach;
+and they think that if nature requires them, they are not to be
+estimated by birth, condition, or rank, but by shape, age, and person:
+and that it is by no means difficult to refrain from them, should
+health, duty, or reputation require it; but that pleasures of this kind
+may be desirable, where they are attended with no inconvenience, but
+can never be of any use. And the assertions which Epicurus makes with
+respect to the whole of pleasure are such as show his opinion to be
+that pleasure is always desirable, and to be pursued merely because it
+is pleasure; and for the same reason pain is to be avoided, because it
+is pain. So that a wise man will always adopt such a system of
+counterbalancing as to do himself the justice to avoid pleasure, should
+pain ensue from it in too great a proportion; and will submit to pain,
+provided the effects of it are to produce a greater pleasure: so that
+all pleasurable things, though the corporeal senses are the judges of
+them, are still to be referred to the mind, on which account the body
+rejoices while it perceives a present pleasure; but that the mind not
+only perceives the present as well as the body, but foresees it while
+it is coming, and even when it is past will not let it quite slip away.
+So that a wise man enjoys a continual series of pleasures, uniting the
+expectation of future pleasure to the recollection of what he has
+already tasted. The like notions are applied by them to high living;
+and the magnificence and expensiveness of entertainments are
+deprecated, because nature is satisfied at a small expense.
+
+XXXIV. For who does not see this, that an appetite is the best sauce?
+When Darius, in his flight from the enemy, had drunk some water which
+was muddy and tainted with dead bodies, he declared that he had never
+drunk anything more pleasant; the fact was, that he had never drunk
+before when he was thirsty. Nor had Ptolemy ever eaten when he was
+hungry; for as he was travelling over Egypt, his company not keeping up
+with him, he had some coarse bread presented him in a cottage, upon
+which he said, "Nothing ever seemed to him pleasanter than that bread."
+They relate, too, of Socrates, that, once when he was walking very fast
+till the evening, on his being asked why he did so, his reply was that
+he was purchasing an appetite by walking, that he might sup the better.
+And do we not see what the Lacedaemonians provide in their Phiditia?
+where the tyrant Dionysius supped, but told them he did not at all like
+that black broth, which was their principal dish; on which he who
+dressed it said, "It was no wonder, for it wanted seasoning." Dionysius
+asked what that seasoning was; to which it was replied, "Fatigue in
+hunting, sweating, a race on the banks of Eurotas, hunger and thirst,"
+for these are the seasonings to the Lacedaemonian banquets. And this may
+not only be conceived from the custom of men, but from the beasts, who
+are satisfied with anything that is thrown before them, provided it is
+not unnatural, and they seek no farther. Some entire cities, taught by
+custom, delight in parsimony, as I said but just now of the
+Lacedaemonians. Xenophon has given an account of the Persian diet, who
+never, as he saith, use anything but cresses with their bread; not but
+that, should nature require anything more agreeable, many things might
+be easily supplied by the ground, and plants in great abundance, and of
+incomparable sweetness. Add to this strength and health, as the
+consequence of this abstemious way of living. Now, compare with this
+those who sweat and belch, being crammed with eating, like fatted oxen;
+then will you perceive that they who pursue pleasure most attain it
+least; and that the pleasure of eating lies not in satiety, but
+appetite.
+
+XXXV. They report of Timotheus, a famous man at Athens, and the head of
+the city, that having supped with Plato, and being extremely delighted
+with his entertainment, on seeing him the next day, he said, "Your
+suppers are not only agreeable while I partake of them, but the next
+day also." Besides, the understanding is impaired when we are full with
+overeating and drinking. There is an excellent epistle of Plato to
+Dion's relations, in which there occurs as nearly as possible these
+words: "When I came there, that happy life so much talked of, devoted
+to Italian and Syracusan entertainments, was noways agreeable to me; to
+be crammed twice a day, and never to have the night to yourself, and
+the other things which are the accompaniments of this kind of life, by
+which a man will never be made the wiser, but will be rendered much
+less temperate; for it must be an extraordinary disposition that can be
+temperate in such circumstances." How, then, can a life be pleasant
+without prudence and temperance? Hence you discover the mistake of
+Sardanapalus, the wealthiest king of the Assyrians, who ordered it to
+be engraved on his tomb,
+
+    I still have what in food I did exhaust;
+    But what I left, though excellent, is lost.
+
+"What less than this," says Aristotle, "could be inscribed on the tomb,
+not of a king, but an ox?" He said that he possessed those things when
+dead, which, in his lifetime, he could have no longer than while he was
+enjoying them. Why, then, are riches desired? And wherein doth poverty
+prevent us from being happy? In the want, I imagine, of statues,
+pictures, and diversions. But if any one is delighted with these
+things, have not the poor people the enjoyment of them more than they
+who are the owners of them in the greatest abundance? For we have great
+numbers of them displayed publicly in our city. And whatever store of
+them private people have, they cannot have a great number, and they but
+seldom see them, only when they go to their country seats; and some of
+them must be stung to the heart when they consider how they came by
+them. The day would fail me, should I be inclined to defend the cause
+of poverty. The thing is manifest; and nature daily informs us how few
+things there are, and how trifling they are, of which she really stands
+in need.
+
+XXXVI. Let us inquire, then, if obscurity, the want of power, or even
+the being unpopular, can prevent a wise man from being happy. Observe
+if popular favor, and this glory which they are so fond of, be not
+attended with more uneasiness than pleasure. Our friend Demosthenes was
+certainly very weak in declaring himself pleased with the whisper of a
+woman who was carrying water, as is the custom in Greece, and who
+whispered to another, "That is he--that is Demosthenes." What could be
+weaker than this? and yet what an orator he was! But although he had
+learned to speak to others, he had conversed but little with himself.
+We may perceive, therefore, that popular glory is not desirable of
+itself; nor is obscurity to be dreaded. "I came to Athens," saith
+Democritus, "and there was no one there that knew me:" this was a
+moderate and grave man who could glory in his obscurity. Shall
+musicians compose their tunes to their own tastes? and shall a
+philosopher, master of a much better art, seek to ascertain, not what
+is most true, but what will please the people? Can anything be more
+absurd than to despise the vulgar as mere unpolished mechanics, taken
+singly, and to think them of consequence when collected into a body?
+These wise men would contemn our ambitious pursuits and our vanities,
+and would reject all the honors which the people could voluntarily
+offer to them; but we know not how to despise them till we begin to
+repent of having accepted them. There is an anecdote related by
+Heraclitus, the natural philosopher, of Hermodorus, the chief of the
+Ephesians, that he said "that all the Ephesians ought to be punished
+with death for saying, when they had expelled Hermodorus out of their
+city, that they would have no one among them better than another; but
+that if there were any such, he might go elsewhere to some other
+people." Is not this the case with the people everywhere? Do they not
+hate every virtue that distinguishes itself? What! was not Aristides (I
+had rather instance in the Greeks than ourselves) banished his country
+for being eminently just? What troubles, then, are they free from who
+have no connection whatever with the people? What is more agreeable
+than a learned retirement? I speak of that learning which makes us
+acquainted with the boundless extent of nature and the universe, and
+which even while we remain in this world discovers to us both heaven,
+earth, and sea.
+
+XXXVII. If, then, honor and riches have no value, what is there else to
+be afraid of? Banishment, I suppose; which is looked on as the greatest
+evil. Now, if the evil of banishment proceeds not from ourselves, but
+from the froward disposition of the people, I have just now declared
+how contemptible it is. But if to leave one's country be miserable, the
+provinces are full of miserable men, very few of the settlers in which
+ever return to their country again. But exiles are deprived of their
+property! What, then! has there not been enough said on bearing
+poverty? But with regard to banishment, if we examine the nature of
+things, not the ignominy of the name, how little does it differ from
+constant travelling! in which some of the most famous philosophers have
+spent their whole life, as Xenocrates, Crantor, Arcesilas, Lacydes,
+Aristotle, Theophrastus, Zeno, Cleanthes, Chrysippus, Antipater,
+Carneades, Panaetius, Clitomachus, Philo, Antiochus, Posidonius, and
+innumerable others, who from their first setting-out never returned
+home again. Now, what ignominy can a wise man be affected with (for it
+is of such a one that I am speaking) who can be guilty of nothing which
+deserves it? for there is no occasion to comfort one who is banished
+for his deserts. Lastly, they can easily reconcile themselves to every
+accident who measure all their objects and pursuits in life by the
+standard of pleasure; so that in whatever place that is supplied, there
+they may live happily. Thus what Teucer said may be applied to every
+case:
+
+    "Wherever I am happy is my country."
+
+Socrates, indeed, when he was asked where he belonged to, replied, "The
+world;" for he looked upon himself as a citizen and inhabitant of the
+whole world. How was it with T. Altibutius? Did he not follow his
+philosophical studies with the greatest satisfaction at Athens,
+although he was banished? which, however, would not have happened to
+him if he had obeyed the laws of Epicurus and lived peaceably in the
+republic. In what was Epicurus happier, living in his own country, than
+Metrodorus, who lived at Athens? Or did Plato's happiness exceed that
+of Xenocrates, or Polemo, or Arcesilas? Or is that city to be valued
+much that banishes all her good and wise men? Demaratus, the father of
+our King Tarquin, not being able to bear the tyrant Cypselus, fled from
+Corinth to Tarquinii, settled there, and had children. Was it, then, an
+unwise act in him to prefer the liberty of banishment to slavery at
+home?
+
+XXXVIII. Besides the emotions of the mind, all griefs and anxieties are
+assuaged by forgetting them, and turning our thoughts to pleasure.
+Therefore, it was not without reason that Epicurus presumed to say that
+a wise man abounds with good things, because he may always have his
+pleasures; from whence it follows, as he thinks, that that point is
+gained which is the subject of our present inquiry, that a wise man is
+always happy. What! though he should be deprived of the senses of
+seeing and hearing? Yes; for he holds those things very cheap. For, in
+the first place, what are the pleasures of which we are deprived by
+that dreadful thing, blindness? For though they allow other pleasures
+to be confined to the senses, yet the things which are perceived by the
+sight do not depend wholly on the pleasure the eyes receive; as is the
+case when we taste, smell, touch, or hear; for, in respect of all these
+senses, the organs themselves are the seat of pleasure; but it is not
+so with the eyes. For it is the mind which is entertained by what we
+see; but the mind may be entertained in many ways, even though we could
+not see at all. I am speaking of a learned and a wise man, with whom to
+think is to live. But thinking in the case of a wise man does not
+altogether require the use of his eyes in his investigations; for if
+night does not strip him of his happiness, why should blindness, which
+resembles night, have that effect? For the reply of Antipater the
+Cyrenaic to some women who bewailed his being blind, though it is a
+little too obscene, is not without its significance. "What do you
+mean?" saith he; "do you think the night can furnish no pleasure?" And
+we find by his magistracies and his actions that old Appius,[70] too,
+who was blind for many years, was not prevented from doing whatever was
+required of him with respect either to the republic or his own affairs.
+It is said that C. Drusus's house was crowded with clients. When they
+whose business it was could not see how to conduct themselves, they
+applied to a blind guide.
+
+XXXIX. When I was a boy, Cn. Aufidius, a blind man, who had served the
+office of praetor, not only gave his opinion in the Senate, and was
+ready to assist his friends, but wrote a Greek history, and had a
+considerable acquaintance with literature. Diodorus the Stoic was
+blind, and lived many years at my house. He, indeed, which is scarcely
+credible, besides applying himself more than usual to philosophy, and
+playing on the flute, agreeably to the custom of the Pythagoreans, and
+having books read to him night and day, in all which he did not want
+eyes, contrived to teach geometry, which, one would think, could hardly
+be done without the assistance of eyes, telling his scholars how and
+where to draw every line. They relate of Asclepiades, a native of
+Eretria, and no obscure philosopher, when some one asked him what
+inconvenience he suffered from his blindness, that his reply was, "He
+was at the expense of another servant." So that, as the most extreme
+poverty may be borne if you please, as is daily the case with some in
+Greece, so blindness may easily be borne, provided you have the support
+of good health in other respects. Democritus was so blind he could not
+distinguish white from black; but he knew the difference between good
+and evil, just and unjust, honorable and base, the useful and useless,
+great and small. Thus one may live happily without distinguishing
+colors; but without acquainting yourself with things, you cannot; and
+this man was of opinion that the intense application of the mind was
+taken off by the objects that presented themselves to the eye; and
+while others often could not see what was before their feet, he
+travelled through all infinity. It is reported also that Homer[71] was
+blind, but we observe his painting as well as his poetry. What country,
+what coast, what part of Greece, what military attacks, what
+dispositions of battle, what array, what ship, what motions of men and
+animals, can be mentioned which he has not described in such a manner
+as to enable us to see what he could not see himself? What, then! can
+we imagine that Homer, or any other learned man, has ever been in want
+of pleasure and entertainment for his mind? Were it not so, would
+Anaxagoras, or this very Democritus, have left their estates and
+patrimonies, and given themselves up to the pursuit of acquiring this
+divine pleasure? It is thus that the poets who have represented
+Tiresias the Augur as a wise man and blind never exhibit him as
+bewailing his blindness. And Homer, too, after he had described
+Polyphemus as a monster and a wild man, represents him talking with his
+ram, and speaking of his good fortune, inasmuch as he could go wherever
+he pleased and touch what he would. And so far he was right, for that
+Cyclops was a being of not much more understanding than his ram.
+
+XL. Now, as to the evil of being deaf. M. Crassus was a little thick of
+hearing; but it was more uneasiness to him that he heard himself ill
+spoken of, though, in my opinion, he did not deserve it. Our Epicureans
+cannot understand Greek, nor the Greeks Latin: now, they are deaf
+reciprocally as to each other's language, and we are all truly deaf
+with regard to those innumerable languages which we do not understand.
+They do not hear the voice of the harper; but, then, they do not hear
+the grating of a saw when it is setting, or the grunting of a hog when
+his throat is being cut, nor the roaring of the sea when they are
+desirous of rest. And if they should chance to be fond of singing, they
+ought, in the first place, to consider that many wise men lived happily
+before music was discovered; besides, they may have more pleasure in
+reading verses than in hearing them sung. Then, as I before referred
+the blind to the pleasures of hearing, so I may the deaf to the
+pleasures of sight: moreover, whoever can converse with himself doth
+not need the conversation of another. But suppose all these misfortunes
+to meet in one person: suppose him blind and deaf--let him be afflicted
+with the sharpest pains of body, which, in the first place, generally
+of themselves make an end of him; still, should they continue so long,
+and the pain be so exquisite, that we should be unable to assign any
+reason for our being so afflicted--still, why, good Gods! should we be
+under any difficulty? For there is a retreat at hand: death is that
+retreat--a shelter where we shall forever be insensible. Theodorus said
+to Lysimachus, who threatened him with death, "It is a great matter,
+indeed, for you to have acquired the power of a Spanish fly!" When
+Perses entreated Paulus not to lead him in triumph, "That is a matter
+which you have in your own power," said Paulus. I said many things
+about death in our first day's disputation, when death was the subject;
+and not a little the next day, when I treated of pain; which things if
+you recollect, there can be no danger of your looking upon death as
+undesirable, or, at least, it will not be dreadful.
+
+That custom which is common among the Grecians at their banquets
+should, in my opinion, be observed in life: Drink, say they, or leave
+the company; and rightly enough; for a guest should either enjoy the
+pleasure of drinking with others, or else not stay till he meets with
+affronts from those that are in liquor. Thus, those injuries of fortune
+which you cannot bear you should flee from.
+
+XLI. This is the very same which is said by Epicurus and Hieronymus.
+Now, if those philosophers, whose opinion it is that virtue has no
+power of itself, and who say that the conduct which we denominate
+honorable and laudable is really nothing, and is only an empty
+circumstance set off with an unmeaning sound, can nevertheless maintain
+that a wise man is always happy, what, think you, may be done by the
+Socratic and Platonic philosophers? Some of these allow such
+superiority to the goods of the mind as quite to eclipse what concerns
+the body and all external circumstances. But others do not admit these
+to be goods; they make everything depend on the mind: whose disputes
+Carneades used, as a sort of honorary arbitrator, to determine. For, as
+what seemed goods to the Peripatetics were allowed to be advantages by
+the Stoics, and as the Peripatetics allowed no more to riches, good
+health; and other things of that sort than the Stoics, when these
+things were considered according to their reality, and not by mere
+names, his opinion was that there was no ground for disagreeing.
+Therefore, let the philosophers of other schools see how they can
+establish this point also. It is very agreeable to me that they make
+some professions worthy of being uttered by the mouth of a philosopher
+with regard to a wise man's having always the means of living happily.
+
+XLII. But as we are to depart in the morning, let us remember these
+five days' discussions; though, indeed, I think I shall commit them to
+writing: for how can I better employ the leisure which I have, of
+whatever kind it is, and whatever it be owing to? And I will send these
+five books also to my friend Brutus, by whom I was not only incited to
+write on philosophy, but, I may say, provoked. And by so doing it is
+not easy to say what service I may be of to others. At all events, in
+my own various and acute afflictions, which surround me on all sides, I
+cannot find any better comfort for myself.
+
+
+
+
+
+
+THE NATURE OF THE GODS.
+
+       *       *       *       *       *
+
+
+
+
+BOOK I.
+
+
+I. There are many things in philosophy, my dear Brutus, which are not
+as yet fully explained to us, and particularly (as you very well know)
+that most obscure and difficult question concerning the Nature of the
+Gods, so extremely necessary both towards a knowledge of the human mind
+and the practice of true religion: concerning which the opinions of men
+are so various, and so different from each other, as to lead strongly
+to the inference that ignorance[72] is the cause, or origin, of
+philosophy, and that the Academic philosophers have been prudent in
+refusing their assent to things uncertain: for what is more unbecoming
+to a wise man than to judge rashly? or what rashness is so unworthy of
+the gravity and stability of a philosopher as either to maintain false
+opinions, or, without the least hesitation, to support and defend what
+he has not thoroughly examined and does not clearly comprehend?
+
+In the question now before us, the greater part of mankind have united
+to acknowledge that which is most probable, and which we are all by
+nature led to suppose, namely, that there are Gods. Protagoras[73]
+doubted whether there were any. Diagoras the Melian and Theodorus of
+Cyrene entirely believed there were no such beings. But they who have
+affirmed that there are Gods, have expressed such a variety of
+sentiments on the subject, and the disagreement between them is so
+great, that it would be tiresome to enumerate their opinions; for they
+give us many statements respecting the forms of the Gods, and their
+places of abode, and the employment of their lives. And these are
+matters on which the philosophers differ with the most exceeding
+earnestness. But the most considerable part of the dispute is, whether
+they are wholly inactive, totally unemployed, and free from all care
+and administration of affairs; or, on the contrary, whether all things
+were made and constituted by them from the beginning; and whether they
+will continue to be actuated and governed by them to eternity. This is
+one of the greatest points in debate; and unless this is decided,
+mankind must necessarily remain in the greatest of errors, and ignorant
+of what is most important to be known.
+
+II. For there are some philosophers, both ancient and modern, who have
+conceived that the Gods take not the least cognizance of human affairs.
+But if their doctrine be true, of what avail is piety, sanctity, or
+religion? for these are feelings and marks of devotion which are
+offered to the Gods by men with uprightness and holiness, on the ground
+that men are the objects of the attention of the Gods, and that many
+benefits are conferred by the immortal Gods on the human race. But if
+the Gods have neither the power nor the inclination to help us; if they
+take no care of us, and pay no regard to our actions; and if there is
+no single advantage which can possibly accrue to the life of man; then
+what reason can we have to pay any adoration, or any honors, or to
+prefer any prayers to them? Piety, like the other virtues, cannot have
+any connection with vain show or dissimulation; and without piety,
+neither sanctity nor religion can be supported; the total subversion of
+which must be attended with great confusion and disturbance in life.
+
+I do not even know, if we cast off piety towards the Gods, but that
+faith, and all the associations of human life, and that most excellent
+of all virtues, justice, may perish with it.
+
+There are other philosophers, and those, too, very great and
+illustrious men, who conceive the whole world to be directed and
+governed by the will and wisdom of the Gods; nor do they stop here, but
+conceive likewise that the Deities consult and provide for the
+preservation of mankind. For they think that the fruits, and the
+produce of the earth, and the seasons, and the variety of weather, and
+the change of climates, by which all the productions of the earth are
+brought to maturity, are designed by the immortal Gods for the use of
+man. They instance many other things, which shall be related in these
+books; and which would almost induce us to believe that the immortal
+Gods had made them all expressly and solely for the benefit and
+advantage of men. Against these opinions Carneades has advanced so much
+that what he has said should excite a desire in men who are not
+naturally slothful to search after truth; for there is no subject on
+which the learned as well as the unlearned differ so strenuously as in
+this; and since their opinions are so various, and so repugnant one to
+another, it is possible that none of them may be, and absolutely
+impossible that more than one should be, right.
+
+III. Now, in a cause like this, I may be able to pacify well-meaning
+opposers, and to confute invidious censurers, so as to induce the
+latter to repent of their unreasonable contradiction, and the former to
+be glad to learn; for they who admonish one in a friendly spirit should
+be instructed, they who attack one like enemies should be repelled. But
+I observe that the several books which I have lately published[74] have
+occasioned much noise and various discourse about them; some people
+wondering what the reason has been why I have applied myself so
+suddenly to the study of philosophy, and others desirous of knowing
+what my opinion is on such subjects. I likewise perceive that many
+people wonder at my following that philosophy[75] chiefly which seems
+to take away the light, and to bury and envelop things in a kind of
+artificial night, and that I should so unexpectedly have taken up the
+defence of a school that has been long neglected and forsaken. But it
+is a mistake to suppose that this application to philosophical studies
+has been sudden on my part. I have applied myself to them from my
+youth, at no small expense of time and trouble; and I have been in the
+habit of philosophizing a great deal when I least seemed to think about
+it; for the truth of which I appeal to my orations, which are filled
+with quotations from philosophers, and to my intimacy with those very
+learned men who frequented my house and conversed daily with me,
+particularly Diodorus, Philo, Antiochus, and Posidonius,[76] under whom
+I was bred; and if all the precepts of philosophy are to have reference
+to the conduct of life, I am inclined to think that I have advanced,
+both in public and private affairs, only such principles as may be
+supported by reason and authority.
+
+IV. But if any one should ask what has induced me, in the decline of
+life, to write on these subjects, nothing is more easily answered; for
+when I found myself entirely disengaged from business, and the
+commonwealth reduced to the necessity of being governed by the
+direction and care of one man,[77] I thought it becoming, for the sake
+of the public, to instruct my countrymen in philosophy, and that it
+would be of importance, and much to the honor and commendation of our
+city, to have such great and excellent subjects introduced in the Latin
+tongue. I the less repent of my undertaking, since I plainly see that I
+have excited in many a desire, not only of learning, but of writing;
+for we have had several Romans well grounded in the learning of the
+Greeks who were unable to communicate to their countrymen what they had
+learned, because they looked upon it as impossible to express that in
+Latin which they had received from the Greeks. In this point I think I
+have succeeded so well that what I have done is not, even in
+copiousness of expression, inferior to that language.
+
+Another inducement to it was a melancholy disposition of mind, and the
+great and heavy oppression of fortune that was upon me; from which, if
+I could have found any surer remedy, I would not have sought relief in
+this pursuit. But I could procure ease by no means better than by not
+only applying myself to books, but by devoting myself to the
+examination of the whole body of philosophy. And every part and branch
+of this is readily discovered when every question is propounded in
+writing; for there is such an admirable continuation and series of
+things that each seems connected with the other, and all appear linked
+together and united.
+
+V. Now, those men who desire to know my own private opinion on every
+particular subject have more curiosity than is necessary. For the force
+of reason in disputation is to be sought after rather than authority,
+since the authority of the teacher is often a disadvantage to those who
+are willing to learn; as they refuse to use their own judgment, and
+rely implicitly on him whom they make choice of for a preceptor. Nor
+could I ever approve this custom of the Pythagoreans, who, when they
+affirmed anything in disputation, and were asked why it was so, used to
+give this answer: "He himself has said it;" and this "he himself," it
+seems, was Pythagoras. Such was the force of prejudice and opinion that
+his authority was to prevail even without argument or reason.
+
+They who wonder at my being a follower of this sect in particular may
+find a satisfactory answer in my four books of Academical Questions.
+But I deny that I have undertaken the protection of what is neglected
+and forsaken; for the opinions of men do not die with them, though they
+may perhaps want the author's explanation. This manner of
+philosophizing, of disputing all things and assuming nothing certainly,
+was begun by Socrates, revived by Arcesilaus, confirmed by Carneades,
+and has descended, with all its power, even to the present age; but I
+am informed that it is now almost exploded even in Greece. However, I
+do not impute that to any fault in the institution of the Academy, but
+to the negligence of mankind. If it is difficult to know all the
+doctrines of any one sect, how much more is it to know those of every
+sect! which, however, must necessarily be known to those who resolve,
+for the sake of discovering truth, to dispute for or against all
+philosophers without partiality.
+
+I do not profess myself to be master of this difficult and noble
+faculty; but I do assert that I have endeavored to make myself so; and
+it is impossible that they who choose this manner of philosophizing
+should not meet at least with something worthy their pursuit. I have
+spoken more fully on this head in another place. But as some are too
+slow of apprehension, and some too careless, men stand in perpetual
+need of caution. For we are not people who believe that there is
+nothing whatever which is true; but we say that some falsehoods are so
+blended with all truths, and have so great a resemblance to them, that
+there is no certain rule for judging of or assenting to propositions;
+from which this maxim also follows, that many things are probable,
+which, though they are not evident to the senses, have still so
+persuasive and beautiful an aspect that a wise man chooses to direct
+his conduct by them.
+
+VI. Now, to free myself from the reproach of partiality, I propose to
+lay before you the opinions of various philosophers concerning the
+nature of the Gods, by which means all men may judge which of them are
+consistent with truth; and if all agree together, or if any one shall
+be found to have discovered what may be absolutely called truth, I will
+then give up the Academy as vain and arrogant. So I may cry out, in the
+words of Statius, in the Synephebi,
+
+     Ye Gods, I call upon, require, pray, beseech, entreat, and
+     implore the attention of my countrymen all, both young and
+     old;
+
+yet not on so trifling an occasion as when the person in the play
+complains that,
+
+     In this city we have discovered a most flagrant iniquity:
+     here is a professed courtesan, who refuses money from her
+     lover;
+
+but that they may attend, know, and consider what sentiments they ought
+to preserve concerning religion, piety, sanctity, ceremonies, faith,
+oaths, temples, shrines, and solemn sacrifices; what they ought to
+think of the auspices over which I preside;[78] for all these have
+relation to the present question. The manifest disagreement among the
+most learned on this subject creates doubts in those who imagine they
+have some certain knowledge of the subject.
+
+Which fact I have often taken notice of elsewhere, and I did so more
+especially at the discussion that was held at my friend C. Cotta's
+concerning the immortal Gods, and which was carried on with the
+greatest care, accuracy, and precision; for coming to him at the time
+of the Latin holidays,[79] according to his own invitation and message
+from him, I found him sitting in his study,[80] and in a discourse with
+C. Velleius, the senator, who was then reputed by the Epicureans the
+ablest of our countrymen. Q. Lucilius Balbus was likewise there, a
+great proficient in the doctrine of the Stoics, and esteemed equal to
+the most eminent of the Greeks in that part of knowledge. As soon as
+Cotta saw me, You are come, says he, very seasonably; for I am having a
+dispute with Velleius on an important subject, which, considering the
+nature of your studies, is not improper for you to join in.
+
+VII. Indeed, says I, I think I am come very seasonably, as you say; for
+here are three chiefs of three principal sects met together. If M.
+Piso[81] was present, no sect of philosophy that is in any esteem would
+want an advocate. If Antiochus's book, replies Cotta, which he lately
+sent to Balbus, says true, you have no occasion to wish for your friend
+Piso; for Antiochus is of the opinion that the Stoics do not differ
+from the Peripatetics in fact, though they do in words; and I should be
+glad to know what you think of that book, Balbus. I? says he. I wonder
+that Antiochus, a man of the clearest apprehension, should not see what
+a vast difference there is between the Stoics, who distinguish the
+honest and the profitable, not only in name, but absolutely in kind,
+and the Peripatetics, who blend the honest with the profitable in such
+a manner that they differ only in degrees and proportion, and not in
+kind. This is not a little difference in words, but a great one in
+things; but of this hereafter. Now, if you think fit, let us return to
+what we began with.
+
+With all my heart, says Cotta. But that this visitor (looking at me),
+who is just come in, may not be ignorant of what we are upon, I will
+inform him that we were discoursing on the nature of the Gods;
+concerning which, as it is a subject that always appeared very obscure
+to me, I prevailed on Velleius to give us the sentiments of Epicurus.
+Therefore, continues he, if it is not troublesome, Velleius, repeat
+what you have already stated to us. I will, says he, though this
+new-comer will be no advocate for me, but for you; for you have both,
+adds he, with a smile, learned from the same Philo to be certain of
+nothing.[82] What we have learned from him, replied I, Cotta will
+discover; but I would not have you think I am come as an assistant to
+him, but as an auditor, with an impartial and unbiassed mind, and not
+bound by any obligation to defend any particular principle, whether I
+like or dislike it.
+
+VIII. After this, Velleius, with the confidence peculiar to his sect,
+dreading nothing so much as to seem to doubt of anything, began as if
+he had just then descended from the council of the Gods, and Epicurus's
+intervals of worlds. Do not attend, says he, to these idle and
+imaginary tales; nor to the operator and builder of the World, the God
+of Plato's Timaeus; nor to the old prophetic dame, the [Greek: Pronoia]
+of the Stoics, which the Latins call Providence; nor to that round,
+that burning, revolving deity, the World, endowed with sense and
+understanding; the prodigies and wonders, not of inquisitive
+philosophers, but of dreamers!
+
+For with what eyes of the mind was your Plato able to see that
+workhouse of such stupendous toil, in which he makes the world to be
+modelled and built by God? What materials, what tools, what bars, what
+machines, what servants, were employed in so vast a work? How could the
+air, fire, water, and earth pay obedience and submit to the will of the
+architect? From whence arose those five forms,[83] of which the rest
+were composed, so aptly contributing to frame the mind and produce the
+senses? It is tedious to go through all, as they are of such a sort
+that they look more like things to be desired than to be discovered.
+
+But, what is more remarkable, he gives us a world which has been not
+only created, but, if I may so say, in a manner formed with hands, and
+yet he says it is eternal. Do you conceive him to have the least skill
+in natural philosophy who is capable of thinking anything to be
+everlasting that had a beginning? For what can possibly ever have been
+put together which cannot be dissolved again? Or what is there that had
+a beginning which will not have an end? If your Providence, Lucilius,
+is the same as Plato's God, I ask you, as before, who were the
+assistants, what were the engines, what was the plan and preparation of
+the whole work? If it is not the same, then why did she make the world
+mortal, and not everlasting, like Plato's God?
+
+IX. But I would demand of you both, why these world-builders started up
+so suddenly, and lay dormant for so many ages? For we are not to
+conclude that, if there was no world, there were therefore no ages. I
+do not now speak of such ages as are finished by a certain number of
+days and nights in annual courses; for I acknowledge that those could
+not be without the revolution of the world; but there was a certain
+eternity from infinite time, not measured by any circumscription of
+seasons; but how that was in space we cannot understand, because we
+cannot possibly have even the slightest idea of time before time was. I
+desire, therefore, to know, Balbus, why this Providence of yours was
+idle for such an immense space of time? Did she avoid labor? But that
+could have no effect on the Deity; nor could there be any labor, since
+all nature, air, fire, earth, and water would obey the divine essence.
+What was it that incited the Deity to act the part of an aedile, to
+illuminate and decorate the world? If it was in order that God might be
+the better accommodated in his habitation, then he must have been
+dwelling an infinite length of time before in darkness as in a dungeon.
+But do we imagine that he was afterward delighted with that variety
+with which we see the heaven and earth adorned? What entertainment
+could that be to the Deity? If it was any, he would not have been
+without it so long.
+
+Or were these things made, as you almost assert, by God for the sake of
+men? Was it for the wise? If so, then this great design was adopted for
+the sake of a very small number. Or for the sake of fools? First of
+all, there was no reason why God should consult the advantage of the
+wicked; and, further, what could be his object in doing so, since all
+fools are, without doubt, the most miserable of men, chiefly because
+they are fools? For what can we pronounce more deplorable than folly?
+Besides, there are many inconveniences in life which the wise can learn
+to think lightly of by dwelling rather on the advantages which they
+receive; but which fools are unable to avoid when they are coming, or
+to bear when they are come.
+
+X. They who affirm the world to be an animated and intelligent being
+have by no means discovered the nature of the mind, nor are able to
+conceive in what form that essence can exist; but of that I shall speak
+more hereafter. At present I must express my surprise at the weakness
+of those who endeavor to make it out to be not only animated and
+immortal, but likewise happy, and round, because Plato says that is the
+most beautiful form; whereas I think a cylinder, a square, a cone, or a
+pyramid more beautiful. But what life do they attribute to that round
+Deity? Truly it is a being whirled about with a celerity to which
+nothing can be even conceived by the imagination as equal; nor can I
+imagine how a settled mind and happy life can consist in such motion,
+the least degree of which would be troublesome to us. Why, therefore,
+should it not be considered troublesome also to the Deity? For the
+earth itself, as it is part of the world, is part also of the Deity. We
+see vast tracts of land barren and uninhabitable; some, because they
+are scorched by the too near approach of the sun; others, because they
+are bound up with frost and snow, through the great distance which the
+sun is from them. Therefore, if the world is a Deity, as these are
+parts of the world, some of the Deity's limbs must be said to be
+scorched, and some frozen.
+
+These are your doctrines, Lucilius; but what those of others are I will
+endeavor to ascertain by tracing them back from the earliest of ancient
+philosophers. Thales the Milesian, who first inquired after such
+subjects, asserted water to be the origin of things, and that God was
+that mind which formed all things from water. If the Gods can exist
+without corporeal sense, and if there can be a mind without a body, why
+did he annex a mind to water?
+
+It was Anaximander's opinion that the Gods were born; that after a
+great length of time they died; and that they are innumerable worlds.
+But what conception can we possibly have of a Deity who is not eternal?
+
+Anaximenes, after him, taught that the air is God, and that he was
+generated, and that he is immense, infinite, and always in motion; as
+if air, which has no form, could possibly be God; for the Deity must
+necessarily be not only of some form or other, but of the most
+beautiful form. Besides, is not everything that had a beginning subject
+to mortality?
+
+XI. Anaxagoras, who received his learning from Anaximenes, was the
+first who affirmed the system and disposition of all things to be
+contrived and perfected by the power and reason of an infinite mind; in
+which infinity he did not perceive that there could be no conjunction
+of sense and motion, nor any sense in the least degree, where nature
+herself could feel no impulse. If he would have this mind to be a sort
+of animal, then there must be some more internal principle from whence
+that animal should receive its appellation. But what can be more
+internal than the mind? Let it, therefore, be clothed with an external
+body. But this is not agreeable to his doctrine; but we are utterly
+unable to conceive how a pure simple mind can exist without any
+substance annexed to it.
+
+Alcmaeon of Crotona, in attributing a divinity to the sun, the moon, and
+the rest of the stars, and also to the mind, did not perceive that he
+was ascribing immortality to mortal beings.
+
+Pythagoras, who supposed the Deity to be one soul, mixing with and
+pervading all nature, from which our souls are taken, did not consider
+that the Deity himself must, in consequence of this doctrine, be maimed
+and torn with the rending every human soul from it; nor that, when the
+human mind is afflicted (as is the case in many instances), that part
+of the Deity must likewise be afflicted, which cannot be. If the human
+mind were a Deity, how could it be ignorant of any thing? Besides, how
+could that Deity, if it is nothing but soul, be mixed with, or infused
+into, the world?
+
+Then Xenophanes, who said that everything in the world which had any
+existence, with the addition of intellect, was God, is as liable to
+exception as the rest, especially in relation to the infinity of it, in
+which there can be nothing sentient, nothing composite.
+
+Parmenides formed a conceit to himself of something circular like a
+crown. (He names it Stephane.) It is an orb of constant light and heat
+around the heavens; this he calls God; in which there is no room to
+imagine any divine form or sense. And he uttered many other absurdities
+on the same subject; for he ascribed a divinity to war, to discord, to
+lust, and other passions of the same kind, which are destroyed by
+disease, or sleep, or oblivion, or age. The same honor he gives to the
+stars; but I shall forbear making any objections to his system here,
+having already done it in another place.
+
+XII. Empedocles, who erred in many things, is most grossly mistaken in
+his notion of the Gods. He lays down four natures[84] as divine, from
+which he thinks that all things were made. Yet it is evident that they
+have a beginning, that they decay, and that they are void of all sense.
+
+Protagoras did not seem to have any idea of the real nature of the
+Gods; for he acknowledged that he was altogether ignorant whether there
+are or are not any, or what they are.
+
+What shall I say of Democritus, who classes our images of objects, and
+their orbs, in the number of the Gods; as he does that principle
+through which those images appear and have their influence? He deifies
+likewise our knowledge and understanding. Is he not involved in a very
+great error? And because nothing continues always in the same state, he
+denies that anything is everlasting, does he not thereby entirely
+destroy the Deity, and make it impossible to form any opinion of him?
+
+Diogenes of Apollonia looks upon the air to be a Deity. But what sense
+can the air have? or what divine form can be attributed to it?
+
+It would be tedious to show the uncertainty of Plato's opinion; for, in
+his Timaeus, he denies the propriety of asserting that there is one
+great father or creator of the world; and, in his book of Laws, he
+thinks we ought not to make too strict an inquiry into the nature of
+the Deity. And as for his statement when he asserts that God is a being
+without any body--what the Greeks call [Greek: asomatos]--it is
+certainly quite unintelligible how that theory can possibly be true;
+for such a God must then necessarily be destitute of sense, prudence,
+and pleasure; all which things are comprehended in our notion of the
+Gods. He likewise asserts in his Timaeus, and in his Laws, that the
+world, the heavens, the stars, the mind, and those Gods which are
+delivered down to us from our ancestors, constitute the Deity. These
+opinions, taken separately, are apparently false; and, together, are
+directly inconsistent with each other.
+
+Xenophon has committed almost the same mistakes, but in fewer words. In
+those sayings which he has related of Socrates, he introduces him
+disputing the lawfulness of inquiring into the form of the Deity, and
+makes him assert the sun and the mind to be Deities: he represents him
+likewise as affirming the being of one God only, and at another time of
+many; which are errors of almost the same kind which I before took
+notice of in Plato.
+
+XIII. Antisthenes, in his book called the Natural Philosopher, says
+that there are many national and one natural Deity; but by this saying
+he destroys the power and nature of the Gods. Speusippus is not much
+less in the wrong; who, following his uncle Plato, says that a certain
+incorporeal power governs everything; by which he endeavors to root out
+of our minds the knowledge of the Gods.
+
+Aristotle, in his third book of Philosophy, confounds many things
+together, as the rest have done; but he does not differ from his master
+Plato. At one time he attributes all divinity to the mind, at another
+he asserts that the world is God. Soon afterward he makes some other
+essence preside over the world, and gives it those faculties by which,
+with certain revolutions, he may govern and preserve the motion of it.
+Then he asserts the heat of the firmament to be God; not perceiving the
+firmament to be part of the world, which in another place he had
+described as God. How can that divine sense of the firmament be
+preserved in so rapid a motion? And where do the multitude of Gods
+dwell, if heaven itself is a Deity? But when this philosopher says that
+God is without a body, he makes him an irrational and insensible being.
+Besides, how can the world move itself, if it wants a body? Or how, if
+it is in perpetual self-motion, can it be easy and happy?
+
+Xenocrates, his fellow-pupil, does not appear much wiser on this head,
+for in his books concerning the nature of the Gods no divine form is
+described; but he says the number of them is eight. Five are moving
+planets;[85] the sixth is contained in all the fixed stars; which,
+dispersed, are so many several members, but, considered together, are
+one single Deity; the seventh is the sun; and the eighth the moon. But
+in what sense they can possibly be happy is not easy to be understood.
+
+From the same school of Plato, Heraclides of Pontus stuffed his books
+with puerile tales. Sometimes he thinks the world a Deity, at other
+times the mind. He attributes divinity likewise to the wandering stars.
+He deprives the Deity of sense, and makes his form mutable; and, in the
+same book again, he makes earth and heaven Deities.
+
+The unsteadiness of Theophrastus is equally intolerable. At one time he
+attributes a divine prerogative to the mind; at another, to the
+firmament; at another, to the stars and celestial constellations.
+
+Nor is his disciple Strato, who is called the naturalist, any more
+worthy to be regarded; for he thinks that the divine power is diffused
+through nature, which is the cause of birth, increase, and diminution,
+but that it has no sense nor form.
+
+XIV. Zeno (to come to your sect, Balbus) thinks the law of nature to be
+the divinity, and that it has the power to force us to what is right,
+and to restrain us from what is wrong. How this law can be an animated
+being I cannot conceive; but that God is so we would certainly
+maintain. The same person says, in another place, that the sky is God;
+but can we possibly conceive that God is a being insensible, deaf to
+our prayers, our wishes, and our vows, and wholly unconnected with us?
+In other books he thinks there is a certain rational essence pervading
+all nature, indued with divine efficacy. He attributes the same power
+to the stars, to the years, to the months, and to the seasons. In his
+interpretation of Hesiod's Theogony,[86] he entirely destroys the
+established notions of the Gods; for he excludes Jupiter, Juno, and
+Vesta, and those esteemed divine, from the number of them; but his
+doctrine is that these are names which by some kind of allusion are
+given to mute and inanimate beings. The sentiments of his disciple
+Aristo are not less erroneous. He thought it impossible to conceive the
+form of the Deity, and asserts that the Gods are destitute of sense;
+and he is entirely dubious whether the Deity is an animated being or
+not.
+
+Cleanthes, who next comes under my notice, a disciple of Zeno at the
+same time with Aristo, in one place says that the world is God; in
+another, he attributes divinity to the mind and spirit of universal
+nature; then he asserts that the most remote, the highest, the
+all-surrounding, the all-enclosing and embracing heat, which is called
+the sky, is most certainly the Deity. In the books he wrote against
+pleasure, in which he seems to be raving, he imagines the Gods to have
+a certain form and shape; then he ascribes all divinity to the stars;
+and, lastly, he thinks nothing more divine than reason. So that this
+God, whom we know mentally and in the speculations of our minds, from
+which traces we receive our impression, has at last actually no visible
+form at all.
+
+XV. Persaeus, another disciple of Zeno, says that they who have made
+discoveries advantageous to the life of man should be esteemed as Gods;
+and the very things, he says, which are healthful and beneficial have
+derived their names from those of the Gods; so that he thinks it not
+sufficient to call them the discoveries of Gods, but he urges that they
+themselves should be deemed divine. What can be more absurd than to
+ascribe divine honors to sordid and deformed things; or to place among
+the Gods men who are dead and mixed with the dust, to whose memory all
+the respect that could be paid would be but mourning for their loss?
+
+Chrysippus, who is looked upon as the most subtle interpreter of the
+dreams of the Stoics, has mustered up a numerous band of unknown Gods;
+and so unknown that we are not able to form any idea about them, though
+our mind seems capable of framing any image to itself in its thoughts.
+For he says that the divine power is placed in reason, and in the
+spirit and mind of universal nature; that the world, with a universal
+effusion of its spirit, is God; that the superior part of that spirit,
+which is the mind and reason, is the great principle of nature,
+containing and preserving the chain of all things; that the divinity is
+the power of fate, and the necessity of future events. He deifies fire
+also, and what I before called the ethereal spirit, and those elements
+which naturally proceed from it--water, earth, and air. He attributes
+divinity to the sun, moon, stars, and universal space, the grand
+container of all things, and to those men likewise who have obtained
+immortality. He maintains the sky to be what men call Jupiter; the air,
+which pervades the sea, to be Neptune; and the earth, Ceres. In like
+manner he goes through the names of the other Deities. He says that
+Jupiter is that immutable and eternal law which guides and directs us
+in our manners; and this he calls fatal necessity, the everlasting
+verity of future events. But none of these are of such a nature as to
+seem to carry any indication of divine virtue in them. These are the
+doctrines contained in his first book of the Nature of the Gods. In the
+second, he endeavors to accommodate the fables of Orpheus, Musaeus,
+Hesiod, and Homer to what he has advanced in the first, in order that
+the most ancient poets, who never dreamed of these things, may seem to
+have been Stoics. Diogenes the Babylonian was a follower of the
+doctrine of Chrysippus; and in that book which he wrote, entitled "A
+Treatise concerning Minerva," he separates the account of Jupiter's
+bringing-forth, and the birth of that virgin, from the fabulous, and
+reduces it to a natural construction.
+
+XVI. Thus far have I been rather exposing the dreams of dotards than
+giving the opinions of philosophers. Not much more absurd than these
+are the fables of the poets, who owe all their power of doing harm to
+the sweetness of their language; who have represented the Gods as
+enraged with anger and inflamed with lust; who have brought before our
+eyes their wars, battles, combats, wounds; their hatreds, dissensions,
+discords, births, deaths, complaints, and lamentations; their
+indulgences in all kinds of intemperance; their adulteries; their
+chains; their amours with mortals, and mortals begotten by immortals.
+To these idle and ridiculous flights of the poets we may add the
+prodigious stories invented by the Magi, and by the Egyptians also,
+which were of the same nature, together with the extravagant notions of
+the multitude at all times, who, from total ignorance of the truth, are
+always fluctuating in uncertainty.
+
+Now, whoever reflects on the rashness and absurdity of these tenets
+must inevitably entertain the highest respect and veneration for
+Epicurus, and perhaps even rank him in the number of those beings who
+are the subject of this dispute; for he alone first founded the idea of
+the existence of the Gods on the impression which nature herself hath
+made on the minds of all men. For what nation, what people are there,
+who have not, without any learning, a natural idea, or prenotion, of a
+Deity? Epicurus calls this [Greek: prolepsis]; that is, an antecedent
+conception of the fact in the mind, without which nothing can be
+understood, inquired after, or discoursed on; the force and advantage
+of which reasoning we receive from that celestial volume of Epicurus
+concerning the Rule and Judgment of Things.
+
+XVII. Here, then, you see the foundation of this question clearly laid;
+for since it is the constant and universal opinion of mankind,
+independent of education, custom, or law, that there are Gods, it must
+necessarily follow that this knowledge is implanted in our minds, or,
+rather, innate in us. That opinion respecting which there is a general
+agreement in universal nature must infallibly be true; therefore it
+must be allowed that there are Gods; for in this we have the
+concurrence, not only of almost all philosophers, but likewise of the
+ignorant and illiterate. It must be also confessed that the point is
+established that we have naturally this idea, as I said before, or
+prenotion, of the existence of the Gods. As new things require new
+names, so that prenotion was called [Greek: prolepsis] by Epicurus; an
+appellation never used before. On the same principle of reasoning, we
+think that the Gods are happy and immortal; for that nature which hath
+assured us that there are Gods has likewise imprinted in our minds the
+knowledge of their immortality and felicity; and if so, what Epicurus
+hath declared in these words is true: "That which is eternally happy
+cannot be burdened with any labor itself, nor can it impose any labor
+on another; nor can it be influenced by resentment or favor: because
+things which are liable to such feelings must be weak and frail." We
+have said enough to prove that we should worship the Gods with piety,
+and without superstition, if that were the only question.
+
+For the superior and excellent nature of the Gods requires a pious
+adoration from men, because it is possessed of immortality and the most
+exalted felicity; for whatever excels has a right to veneration, and
+all fear of the power and anger of the Gods should be banished; for we
+must understand that anger and affection are inconsistent with the
+nature of a happy and immortal being. These apprehensions being
+removed, no dread of the superior powers remains. To confirm this
+opinion, our curiosity leads us to inquire into the form and life and
+action of the intellect and spirit of the Deity.
+
+XVIII. With regard to his form, we are directed partly by nature and
+partly by reason. All men are told by nature that none but a human form
+can be ascribed to the Gods; for under what other image did it ever
+appear to any one either sleeping or waking? and, without having
+recourse to our first notions,[87] reason itself declares the same; for
+as it is easy to conceive that the most excellent nature, either
+because of its happiness or immortality, should be the most beautiful,
+what composition of limbs, what conformation of lineaments, what form,
+what aspect, can be more beautiful than the human? Your sect, Lucilius
+(not like my friend Cotta, who sometimes says one thing and sometimes
+another), when they represent the divine art and workmanship in the
+human body, are used to describe how very completely each member is
+formed, not only for convenience, but also for beauty. Therefore, if
+the human form excels that of all other animal beings, as God himself
+is an animated being, he must surely be of that form which is the most
+beautiful. Besides, the Gods are granted to be perfectly happy; and
+nobody can be happy without virtue, nor can virtue exist where reason
+is not; and reason can reside in none but the human form; the Gods,
+therefore, must be acknowledged to be of human form; yet that form is
+not body, but something like body; nor does it contain any blood, but
+something like blood. Though these distinctions were more acutely
+devised and more artfully expressed by Epicurus than any common
+capacity can comprehend; yet, depending on your understanding, I shall
+be more brief on the subject than otherwise I should be. Epicurus, who
+not only discovered and understood the occult and almost hidden secrets
+of nature, but explained them with ease, teaches that the power and
+nature of the Gods is not to be discerned by the senses, but by the
+mind; nor are they to be considered as bodies of any solidity, or
+reducible to number, like those things which, because of their
+firmness, he calls [Greek: Steremnia];[88] but as images, perceived by
+similitude and transition. As infinite kinds of those images result
+from innumerable individuals, and centre in the Gods, our minds and
+understanding are directed towards and fixed with the greatest delight
+on them, in order to comprehend what that happy and eternal essence is.
+
+XIX. Surely the mighty power of the Infinite Being is most worthy our
+great and earnest contemplation; the nature of which we must
+necessarily understand to be such that everything in it is made to
+correspond completely to some other answering part. This is called by
+Epicurus [Greek: isonomia]; that is to say, an equal distribution or
+even disposition of things. From hence he draws this inference, that,
+as there is such a vast multitude of mortals, there cannot be a less
+number of immortals; and if those which perish are innumerable, those
+which are preserved ought also to be countless. Your sect, Balbus,
+frequently ask us how the Gods live, and how they pass their time?
+Their life is the most happy, and the most abounding with all kinds of
+blessings, which can be conceived. They do nothing. They are
+embarrassed with no business; nor do they perform any work. They
+rejoice in the possession of their own wisdom and virtue. They are
+satisfied that they shall ever enjoy the fulness of eternal pleasures.
+
+XX. Such a Deity may properly be called happy; but yours is a most
+laborious God. For let us suppose the world a Deity--what can be a more
+uneasy state than, without the least cessation, to be whirled about the
+axle-tree of heaven with a surprising celerity? But nothing can be
+happy that is not at ease. Or let us suppose a Deity residing in the
+world, who directs and governs it, who preserves the courses of the
+stars, the changes of the seasons, and the vicissitudes and orders of
+things, surveying the earth and the sea, and accommodating them to the
+advantage and necessities of man. Truly this Deity is embarrassed with
+a very troublesome and laborious office. We make a happy life to
+consist in a tranquillity of mind, a perfect freedom from care, and an
+exemption from all employment. The philosopher from whom we received
+all our knowledge has taught us that the world was made by nature; that
+there was no occasion for a workhouse to frame it in; and that, though
+you deny the possibility of such a work without divine skill, it is so
+easy to her, that she has made, does make, and will make innumerable
+worlds. But, because you do not conceive that nature is able to produce
+such effects without some rational aid, you are forced, like the tragic
+poets, when you cannot wind up your argument in any other way, to have
+recourse to a Deity, whose assistance you would not seek, if you could
+view that vast and unbounded magnitude of regions in all parts; where
+the mind, extending and spreading itself, travels so far and wide that
+it can find no end, no extremity to stop at. In this immensity of
+breadth, length, and height, a most boundless company of innumerable
+atoms are fluttering about, which, notwithstanding the interposition of
+a void space, meet and cohere, and continue clinging to one another;
+and by this union these modifications and forms of things arise, which,
+in your opinions, could not possibly be made without the help of
+bellows and anvils. Thus you have imposed on us an eternal master, whom
+we must dread day and night. For who can be free from fear of a Deity
+who foresees, regards, and takes notice of everything; one who thinks
+all things his own; a curious, ever-busy God?
+
+Hence first arose your [Greek: Heimarmene], as you call it, your fatal
+necessity; so that, whatever happens, you affirm that it flows from an
+eternal chain and continuance of causes. Of what value is this
+philosophy, which, like old women and illiterate men, attributes
+everything to fate? Then follows your [Greek: mantike], in Latin called
+_divinatio_, divination; which, if we would listen to you, would plunge
+us into such superstition that we should fall down and worship your
+inspectors into sacrifices, your augurs, your soothsayers, your
+prophets, and your fortune-tellers.
+
+Epicurus having freed us from these terrors and restored us to liberty,
+we have no dread of those beings whom we have reason to think entirely
+free from all trouble themselves, and who do not impose any on others.
+We pay our adoration, indeed, with piety and reverence to that essence
+which is above all excellence and perfection. But I fear my zeal for
+this doctrine has made me too prolix. However, I could not easily leave
+so eminent and important a subject unfinished, though I must confess I
+should rather endeavor to hear than speak so long.
+
+XXI. Cotta, with his usual courtesy, then began. Velleius, says he,
+were it not for something which you have advanced, I should have
+remained silent; for I have often observed, as I did just now upon
+hearing you, that I cannot so easily conceive why a proposition is true
+as why it is false. Should you ask me what I take the nature of the
+Gods to be, I should perhaps make no answer. But if you should ask
+whether I think it to be of that nature which you have described, I
+should answer that I was as far as possible from agreeing with you.
+However, before I enter on the subject of your discourse and what you
+have advanced upon it, I will give you my opinion of yourself. Your
+intimate friend, L. Crassus, has been often heard by me to say that you
+were beyond all question superior to all our learned Romans; and that
+few Epicureans in Greece were to be compared to you. But as I knew what
+a wonderful esteem he had for you, I imagined that might make him the
+more lavish in commendation of you. Now, however, though I do not
+choose to praise any one when present, yet I must confess that I think
+you have delivered your thoughts clearly on an obscure and very
+intricate subject; that you are not only copious in your sentiments,
+but more elegant in your language than your sect generally are. When I
+was at Athens, I went often to hear Zeno, by the advice of Philo, who
+used to call him the chief of the Epicureans; partly, probably, in
+order to judge more easily how completely those principles could be
+refuted after I had heard them stated by the most learned of the
+Epicureans. And, indeed, he did not speak in any ordinary manner; but,
+like you, with clearness, gravity, and elegance; yet what frequently
+gave me great uneasiness when I heard him, as it did while I attended
+to you, was to see so excellent a genius falling into such frivolous
+(excuse my freedom), not to say foolish, doctrines. However, I shall
+not at present offer anything better; for, as I said before, we can in
+most subjects, especially in physics, sooner discover what is not true
+than what is.
+
+XXII. If you should ask me what God is, or what his character and
+nature are, I should follow the example of Simonides, who, when Hiero
+the tyrant proposed the same question to him, desired a day to consider
+of it. When he required his answer the next day, Simonides begged two
+days more; and as he kept constantly desiring double the number which
+he had required before instead of giving his answer, Hiero, with
+surprise, asked him his meaning in doing so: "Because," says he, "the
+longer I meditate on it, the more obscure it appears to me." Simonides,
+who was not only a delightful poet, but reputed a wise and learned man
+in other branches of knowledge, found, I suppose, so many acute and
+refined arguments occurring to him, that he was doubtful which was the
+truest, and therefore despaired of discovering any truth.
+
+But does your Epicurus (for I had rather contend with him than with
+you) say anything that is worthy the name of philosophy, or even of
+common-sense?
+
+In the question concerning the nature of the Gods, his first inquiry
+is, whether there are Gods or not. It would be dangerous, I believe, to
+take the negative side before a public auditory; but it is very safe in
+a discourse of this kind, and in this company. I, who am a priest, and
+who think that religions and ceremonies ought sacredly to be
+maintained, am certainly desirous to have the existence of the Gods,
+which is the principal point in debate, not only fixed in opinion, but
+proved to a demonstration; for many notions flow into and disturb the
+mind which sometimes seem to convince us that there are none. But see
+how candidly I will behave to you: as I shall not touch upon those
+tenets you hold in common with other philosophers, consequently I shall
+not dispute the existence of the Gods, for that doctrine is agreeable
+to almost all men, and to myself in particular; but I am still at
+liberty to find fault with the reasons you give for it, which I think
+are very insufficient.
+
+XXIII. You have said that the general assent of men of all nations and
+all degrees is an argument strong enough to induce us to acknowledge
+the being of the Gods. This is not only a weak, but a false, argument;
+for, first of all, how do you know the opinions of all nations? I
+really believe there are many people so savage that they have no
+thoughts of a Deity. What think you of Diagoras, who was called the
+atheist; and of Theodorus after him? Did not they plainly deny the very
+essence of a Deity? Protagoras of Abdera, whom you just now mentioned,
+the greatest sophist of his age, was banished by order of the Athenians
+from their city and territories, and his books were publicly burned,
+because these words were in the beginning of his treatise concerning
+the Gods: "I am unable to arrive at any knowledge whether there are, or
+are not, any Gods." This treatment of him, I imagine, restrained many
+from professing their disbelief of a Deity, since the doubt of it only
+could not escape punishment. What shall we say of the sacrilegious, the
+impious, and the perjured? If Tubulus Lucius, Lupus, or Carbo the son
+of Neptune, as Lucilius says, had believed that there were Gods, would
+either of them have carried his perjuries and impieties to such excess?
+Your reasoning, therefore, to confirm your assertion is not so
+conclusive as you think it is. But as this is the manner in which other
+philosophers have argued on the same subject, I will take no further
+notice of it at present; I rather choose to proceed to what is properly
+your own.
+
+I allow that there are Gods. Instruct me, then, concerning their
+origin; inform me where they are, what sort of body, what mind, they
+have, and what is their course of life; for these I am desirous of
+knowing. You attribute the most absolute power and efficacy to atoms.
+Out of them you pretend that everything is made. But there are no
+atoms, for there is nothing without body; every place is occupied by
+body, therefore there can be no such thing as a vacuum or an atom.
+
+XXIV. I advance these principles of the naturalists without knowing
+whether they are true or false; yet they are more like truth than those
+statements of yours; for they are the absurdities in which Democritus,
+or before him Leucippus, used to indulge, saying that there are certain
+light corpuscles--some smooth, some rough, some round, some square,
+some crooked and bent as bows--which by a fortuitous concourse made
+heaven and earth, without the influence of any natural power. This
+opinion, C. Velleius, you have brought down to these our times; and you
+would sooner be deprived of the greatest advantages of life than of
+that authority; for before you were acquainted with those tenets, you
+thought that you ought to profess yourself an Epicurean; so that it was
+necessary that you should either embrace these absurdities or lose the
+philosophical character which you had taken upon you; and what could
+bribe you to renounce the Epicurean opinion? Nothing, you say, can
+prevail on you to forsake the truth and the sure means of a happy life.
+But is that the truth? for I shall not contest your happy life, which
+you think the Deity himself does not enjoy unless he languishes in
+idleness. But where is truth? Is it in your innumerable worlds, some of
+which are rising, some falling, at every moment of time? Or is it in
+your atomical corpuscles, which form such excellent works without the
+direction of any natural power or reason? But I was forgetting my
+liberality, which I had promised to exert in your case, and exceeding
+the bounds which I at first proposed to myself. Granting, then,
+everything to be made of atoms, what advantage is that to your
+argument? For we are searching after the nature of the Gods; and
+allowing them to be made of atoms, they cannot be eternal, because
+whatever is made of atoms must have had a beginning: if so, there were
+no Gods till there was this beginning; and if the Gods have had a
+beginning, they must necessarily have an end, as you have before
+contended when you were discussing Plato's world. Where, then, is your
+beatitude and immortality, in which two words you say that God is
+expressed, the endeavor to prove which reduces you to the greatest
+perplexities? For you said that God had no body, but something like
+body; and no blood, but something like blood.
+
+XXV. It is a frequent practice among you, when you assert anything that
+has no resemblance to truth, and wish to avoid reprehension, to advance
+something else which is absolutely and utterly impossible, in order
+that it may seem to your adversaries better to grant that point which
+has been a matter of doubt than to keep on pertinaciously contradicting
+you on every point: like Epicurus, who, when he found that if his atoms
+were allowed to descend by their own weight, our actions could not be
+in our own power, because their motions would be certain and necessary,
+invented an expedient, which escaped Democritus, to avoid necessity. He
+says that when the atoms descend by their own weight and gravity, they
+move a little obliquely. Surely, to make such an assertion as this is
+what one ought more to be ashamed of than the acknowledging ourselves
+unable to defend the proposition. His practice is the same against the
+logicians, who say that in all propositions in which yes or no is
+required, one of them must be true; he was afraid that if this were
+granted, then, in such a proposition as "Epicurus will be alive or dead
+to-morrow," either one or the other must necessarily be admitted;
+therefore he absolutely denied the necessity of yes or no. Can anything
+show stupidity in a greater degree? Zeno,[89] being pressed by
+Arcesilas, who pronounced all things to be false which are perceived by
+the senses, said that some things were false, but not all. Epicurus was
+afraid that if any one thing seen should be false, nothing could be
+true; and therefore he asserted all the senses to be infallible
+directors of truth. Nothing can be more rash than this; for by
+endeavoring to repel a light stroke, he receives a heavy blow. On the
+subject of the nature of the Gods, he falls into the same errors. While
+he would avoid the concretion of individual bodies, lest death and
+dissolution should be the consequence, he denies that the Gods have
+body, but says they have something like body; and says they have no
+blood, but something like blood.
+
+XXVI. It seems an unaccountable thing how one soothsayer can refrain
+from laughing when he sees another. It is yet a greater wonder that you
+can refrain from laughing among yourselves. It is no body, but
+something like body! I could understand this if it were applied to
+statues made of wax or clay; but in regard to the Deity, I am not able
+to discover what is meant by a quasi-body or quasi-blood. Nor indeed
+are you, Velleius, though you will not confess so much. For those
+precepts are delivered to you as dictates which Epicurus carelessly
+blundered out; for he boasted, as we see in his writings, that he had
+no instructor, which I could easily believe without his public
+declaration of it, for the same reason that I could believe the master
+of a very bad edifice if he were to boast that he had no architect but
+himself: for there is nothing of the Academy, nothing of the Lyceum, in
+his doctrine; nothing but puerilities. He might have been a pupil of
+Xenocrates. O ye immortal Gods, what a teacher was he! And there are
+those who believe that he actually was his pupil; but he says
+otherwise, and I shall give more credit to his word than to another's.
+He confesses that he was a pupil of a certain disciple of Plato, one
+Pamphilus, at Samos; for he lived there when he was young, with his
+father and his brothers. His father, Neocles, was a farmer in those
+parts; but as the farm, I suppose, was not sufficient to maintain him,
+he turned school-master; yet Epicurus treats this Platonic philosopher
+with wonderful contempt, so fearful was he that it should be thought he
+had ever had any instruction. But it is well known he had been a pupil
+of Nausiphanes, the follower of Democritus; and since he could not deny
+it, he loaded him with insults in abundance. If he never heard a
+lecture on these Democritean principles, what lectures did he ever
+hear? What is there in Epicurus's physics that is not taken from
+Democritus? For though he altered some things, as what I mentioned
+before of the oblique motions of the atoms, yet most of his doctrines
+are the same; his atoms--his vacuum--his images--infinity of
+space--innumerable worlds, their rise and decay--and almost every part
+of natural learning that he treats of.
+
+Now, do you understand what is meant by quasi-body and quasi-blood? For
+I not only acknowledge that you are a better judge of it than I am, but
+I can bear it without envy. If any sentiments, indeed, are communicated
+without obscurity, what is there that Velleius can understand and Cotta
+not? I know what body is, and what blood is; but I cannot possibly find
+out the meaning of quasi-body and quasi-blood. Not that you
+intentionally conceal your principles from me, as Pythagoras did his
+from those who were not his disciples; or that you are intentionally
+obscure, like Heraclitus. But the truth is (which I may venture to say
+in this company), you do not understand them yourself.
+
+XXVII. This, I perceive, is what you contend for, that the Gods have a
+certain figure that has nothing concrete, nothing solid, nothing of
+express substance, nothing prominent in it; but that it is pure,
+smooth, and transparent. Let us suppose the same with the Venus of Cos,
+which is not a body, but the representation of a body; nor is the red,
+which is drawn there and mixed with the white, real blood, but a
+certain resemblance of blood; so in Epicurus's Deity there is no real
+substance, but the resemblance of substance.
+
+Let me take for granted that which is perfectly unintelligible; then
+tell me what are the lineaments and figures of these sketched-out
+Deities. Here you have plenty of arguments by which you would show the
+Gods to be in human form. The first is, that our minds are so
+anticipated and prepossessed, that whenever we think of a Deity the
+human shape occurs to us. The next is, that as the divine nature excels
+all things, so it ought to be of the most beautiful form, and there is
+no form more beautiful than the human; and the third is, that reason
+cannot reside in any other shape.
+
+First, let us consider each argument separately. You seem to me to
+assume a principle, despotically I may say, that has no manner of
+probability in it. Who was ever so blind, in contemplating these
+subjects, as not to see that the Gods were represented in human form,
+either by the particular advice of wise men, who thought by those means
+the more easily to turn the minds of the ignorant from a depravity of
+manners to the worship of the Gods; or through superstition, which was
+the cause of their believing that when they were paying adoration to
+these images they were approaching the Gods themselves. These conceits
+were not a little improved by the poets, painters, and artificers; for
+it would not have been very easy to represent the Gods planning and
+executing any work in another form, and perhaps this opinion arose from
+the idea which mankind have of their own beauty. But do not you, who
+are so great an adept in physics, see what a soothing flatterer, what a
+sort of procuress, nature is to herself? Do you think there is any
+creature on the land or in the sea that is not highly delighted with
+its own form? If it were not so, why would not a bull become enamored
+of a mare, or a horse of a cow? Do you believe an eagle, a lion, or a
+dolphin prefers any shape to its own? If nature, therefore, has
+instructed us in the same manner, that nothing is more beautiful than
+man, what wonder is it that we, for that reason, should imagine the
+Gods are of the human form? Do you suppose if beasts were endowed with
+reason that every one would not give the prize of beauty to his own
+species?
+
+XXVIII. Yet, by Hercules (I speak as I think)! though I am fond enough
+of myself, I dare not say that I excel in beauty that bull which
+carried Europa. For the question here is not concerning our genius and
+elocution, but our species and figure. If we could make and assume to
+ourselves any form, would you be unwilling to resemble the sea-triton
+as he is painted supported swimming on sea-monsters whose bodies are
+partly human? Here I touch on a difficult point; for so great is the
+force of nature that there is no man who would not choose to be like a
+man, nor, indeed, any ant that would not be like an ant. But like what
+man? For how few can pretend to beauty! When I was at Athens, the whole
+flock of youths afforded scarcely one. You laugh, I see; but what I
+tell you is the truth. Nay, to us who, after the examples of ancient
+philosophers, delight in boys, defects are often pleasing. Alcaeus was
+charmed with a wart on a boy's knuckle; but a wart is a blemish on the
+body; yet it seemed a beauty to him. Q. Catulus, my friend and
+colleague's father, was enamored with your fellow-citizen Roscius, on
+whom he wrote these verses:
+
+    As once I stood to hail the rising day,
+      Roscius appearing on the left I spied:
+    Forgive me, Gods, if I presume to say
+      The mortal's beauty with th' immortal vied.
+
+Roscius more beautiful than a God! yet he was then, as he now is,
+squint-eyed. But what signifies that, if his defects were beauties to
+Catulus?
+
+XXIX. I return to the Gods. Can we suppose any of them to be
+squint-eyed, or even to have a cast in the eye? Have they any warts?
+Are any of them hook-nosed, flap-eared, beetle-browed, or jolt-headed,
+as some of us are? Or are they free from imperfections? Let us grant
+you that. Are they all alike in the face? For if they are many, then
+one must necessarily be more beautiful than another, and then there
+must be some Deity not absolutely most beautiful. Or if their faces are
+all alike, there would be an Academy[90] in heaven; for if one God does
+not differ from another, there is no possibility of knowing or
+distinguishing them.
+
+What if your assertion, Velleius, proves absolutely false, that no form
+occurs to us, in our contemplations on the Deity, but the human? Will
+you, notwithstanding that, persist in the defence of such an absurdity?
+Supposing that form occurs to us, as you say it does, and we know
+Jupiter, Juno, Minerva, Neptune, Vulcan, Apollo, and the other Deities,
+by the countenance which painters and statuaries have given them, and
+not only by their countenances, but by their decorations, their age,
+and attire; yet the Egyptians, the Syrians, and almost all barbarous
+nations,[91] are without such distinctions. You may see a greater
+regard paid by them to certain beasts than by us to the most sacred
+temples and images of the Gods; for many shrines have been rifled, and
+images of the Deities have been carried from their most sacred places
+by us; but we never heard that an Egyptian offered any violence to a
+crocodile, an ibis, or a cat. What do you think, then? Do not the
+Egyptians esteem their sacred bull, their Apis, as a Deity? Yes, by
+Hercules! as certainly as you do our protectress Juno, whom you never
+behold, even in your dreams, without a goat-skin, a spear, a shield,
+and broad sandals. But the Grecian Juno of Argos and the Roman Juno are
+not represented in this manner; so that the Grecians, the Lanuvinians,
+and we, ascribe different forms to Juno; and our Capitoline Jupiter is
+not the same with the Jupiter Ammon of the Africans.
+
+XXX. Therefore, ought not a natural philosopher--that is, an inquirer
+into the secrets of nature--to be ashamed of seeking a testimony to
+truth from minds prepossessed by custom? According to the rule you have
+laid down, it may be said that Jupiter is always bearded, Apollo always
+beardless; that Minerva has gray and Neptune azure eyes; and, indeed,
+we must then honor that Vulcan at Athens, made by Alcamenes, whose
+lameness through his thin robes appears to be no deformity. Shall we,
+therefore, receive a lame Deity because we have such an account of him?
+
+Consider, likewise, that the Gods go by what names we give them. Now,
+in the first place, they have as many names as men have languages; for
+Vulcan is not called Vulcan in Italy, Africa, or Spain, as you are
+called Velleius in all countries. Besides, the Gods are innumerable,
+though the list of their names is of no great length even in the
+records of our priests. Have they no names? You must necessarily
+confess, indeed, they have none; for what occasion is there for
+different names if their persons are alike?
+
+How much more laudable would it be, Velleius, to acknowledge that you
+do not know what you do not know than to follow a man whom you must
+despise! Do you think the Deity is like either me or you? You do not
+really think he is like either of us. What is to be done, then? Shall I
+call the sun, the moon, or the sky a Deity? If so, they are
+consequently happy. But what pleasures can they enjoy? And they are
+wise too. But how can wisdom reside in such shapes? These are your own
+principles. Therefore, if they are not of human form, as I have proved,
+and if you cannot persuade yourself that they are of any other, why are
+you cautious of denying absolutely the being of any Gods? You dare not
+deny it--which is very prudent in you, though here you are not afraid
+of the people, but of the Gods themselves. I have known Epicureans who
+reverence[92] even the least images of the Gods, though I perceive it
+to be the opinion of some that Epicurus, through fear of offending
+against the Athenian laws, has allowed a Deity in words and destroyed
+him in fact; so in those his select and short sentences, which are
+called by you [Greek: kyriai doxai],[93] this, I think, is the first:
+"That being which is happy and immortal is not burdened with any labor,
+and does not impose any on any one else."
+
+XXXI. In his statement of this sentence, some think that he avoided
+speaking clearly on purpose, though it was manifestly without design.
+But they judge ill of a man who had not the least art. It is doubtful
+whether he means that there is any being happy and immortal, or that if
+there is any being happy, he must likewise be immortal. They do not
+consider that he speaks here, indeed, ambiguously; but in many other
+places both he and Metrodorus explain themselves as clearly as you have
+done. But he believed there are Gods; nor have I ever seen any one who
+was more exceedingly afraid of what he declared ought to be no objects
+of fear, namely, death and the Gods, with the apprehensions of which
+the common rank of people are very little affected; but he says that
+the minds of all mortals are terrified by them. Many thousands of men
+commit robberies in the face of death; others rifle all the temples
+they can get into: such as these, no doubt, must be greatly terrified,
+the one by the fears of death, and the others by the fear of the Gods.
+
+But since you dare not (for I am now addressing my discourse to
+Epicurus himself) absolutely deny the existence of the Gods, what
+hinders you from ascribing a divine nature to the sun, the world, or
+some eternal mind? I never, says he, saw wisdom and a rational soul in
+any but a human form. What! did you ever observe anything like the sun,
+the moon, or the five moving planets? The sun, terminating his course
+in two extreme parts of one circle,[94] finishes his annual
+revolutions. The moon, receiving her light from the sun, completes the
+same course in the space of a month.[95] The five planets in the same
+circle, some nearer, others more remote from the earth, begin the same
+courses together, and finish them in different spaces of time. Did you
+ever observe anything like this, Epicurus? So that, according to you,
+there can be neither sun, moon, nor stars, because nothing can exist
+but what we have touched or seen.[96] What! have you ever seen the
+Deity himself? Why else do you believe there is any? If this doctrine
+prevails, we must reject all that history relates or reason discovers;
+and the people who inhabit inland countries must not believe there is
+such a thing as the sea. This is so narrow a way of thinking that if
+you had been born in Seriphus, and never had been from out of that
+island, where you had frequently been in the habit of seeing little
+hares and foxes, you would not, therefore, believe that there are such
+beasts as lions and panthers; and if any one should describe an
+elephant to you, you would think that he designed to laugh at you.
+
+XXXII. You indeed, Velleius, have concluded your argument, not after
+the manner of your own sect, but of the logicians, to which your people
+are utter strangers. You have taken it for granted that the Gods are
+happy. I allow it. You say that without virtue no one can be happy. I
+willingly concur with you in this also. You likewise say that virtue
+cannot reside where reason is not. That I must necessarily allow. You
+add, moreover, that reason cannot exist but in a human form. Who, do
+you think, will admit that? If it were true, what occasion was there to
+come so gradually to it? And to what purpose? You might have answered
+it on your own authority. I perceive your gradations from happiness to
+virtue, and from virtue to reason; but how do you come from reason to
+human form? There, indeed, you do not descend by degrees, but
+precipitately.
+
+Nor can I conceive why Epicurus should rather say the Gods are like men
+than that men are like the Gods. You ask what is the difference; for,
+say you, if this is like that, that is like this. I grant it; but this
+I assert, that the Gods could not take their form from men; for the
+Gods always existed, and never had a beginning, if they are to exist
+eternally; but men had a beginning: therefore that form, of which the
+immortal Gods are, must have had existence before mankind;
+consequently, the Gods should not be said to be of human form, but our
+form should be called divine. However, let this be as you will. I now
+inquire how this extraordinary good fortune came about; for you deny
+that reason had any share in the formation of things. But still, what
+was this extraordinary fortune? Whence proceeded that happy concourse
+of atoms which gave so sudden a rise to men in the form of Gods? Are we
+to suppose the divine seed fell from heaven upon earth, and that men
+sprung up in the likeness of their celestial sires? I wish you would
+assert it; for I should not be unwilling to acknowledge my relation to
+the Gods. But you say nothing like it; no, our resemblance to the Gods,
+it seems, was by chance. Must I now seek for arguments to refute this
+doctrine seriously? I wish I could as easily discover what is true as I
+can overthrow what is false.
+
+XXXIII. You have enumerated with so ready a memory, and so copiously,
+the opinions of philosophers, from Thales the Milesian, concerning the
+nature of the Gods, that I am surprised to see so much learning in a
+Roman. But do you think they were all madmen who thought that a Deity
+could by some possibility exist without hands and feet? Does not even
+this consideration have weight with you when you consider what is the
+use and advantage of limbs in men, and lead you to admit that the Gods
+have no need of them? What necessity can there be of feet, without
+walking; or of hands, if there is nothing to be grasped? The same may
+be asked of the other parts of the body, in which nothing is vain,
+nothing useless, nothing superfluous; therefore we may infer that no
+art can imitate the skill of nature. Shall the Deity, then, have a
+tongue, and not speak--teeth, palate, and jaws, though he will have no
+use for them? Shall the members which nature has given to the body for
+the sake of generation be useless to the Deity? Nor would the internal
+parts be less superfluous than the external. What comeliness is there
+in the heart, the lungs, the liver, and the rest of them, abstracted
+from their use? I mention these because you place them in the Deity on
+account of the beauty of the human form.
+
+Depending on these dreams, not only Epicurus, Metrodorus, and Hermachus
+declaimed against Pythagoras, Plato, and Empedocles, but that little
+harlot Leontium presumed to write against Theophrastus: indeed, she had
+a neat Attic style; but yet, to think of her arguing against
+Theophrastus! So much did the garden of Epicurus[97] abound with these
+liberties, and, indeed, you are always complaining against them. Zeno
+wrangled. Why need I mention Albutius? Nothing could be more elegant or
+humane than Phaedrus; yet a sharp expression would disgust the old man.
+Epicurus treated Aristotle with great contumely. He foully slandered
+Phaedo, the disciple of Socrates. He pelted Timocrates, the brother of
+his companion Metrodorus, with whole volumes, because he disagreed with
+him in some trifling point of philosophy. He was ungrateful even to
+Democritus, whose follower he was; and his master Nausiphanes, from
+whom he learned nothing, had no better treatment from him.
+
+XXXIV. Zeno gave abusive language not only to those who were then
+living, as Apollodorus, Syllus, and the rest, but he called Socrates,
+who was the father of philosophy, the Attic buffoon, using the Latin
+word _Scurra_. He never called Chrysippus by any name but Chesippus.
+And you yourself a little before, when you were numbering up a senate,
+as we may call them, of philosophers, scrupled not to say that the most
+eminent men talked like foolish, visionary dotards. Certainly,
+therefore, if they have all erred in regard to the nature of the Gods,
+it is to be feared there are no such beings. What you deliver on that
+head are all whimsical notions, and not worthy the consideration even
+of old women. For you do not seem to be in the least aware what a task
+you draw on yourselves, if you should prevail on us to grant that the
+same form is common to Gods and men. The Deity would then require the
+same trouble in dressing, and the same care of the body, that mankind
+does. He must walk, run, lie down, lean, sit, hold, speak, and
+discourse. You need not be told the consequence of making the Gods male
+and female.
+
+Therefore I cannot sufficiently wonder how this chief of yours came to
+entertain these strange opinions. But you constantly insist on the
+certainty of this tenet, that the Deity is both happy and immortal.
+Supposing he is so, would his happiness be less perfect if he had not
+two feet? Or cannot that blessedness or beatitude--call it which you
+will (they are both harsh terms, but we must mollify them by use)--can
+it not, I say, exist in that sun, or in this world, or in some eternal
+mind that has not human shape or limbs? All you say against it is, that
+you never saw any happiness in the sun or the world. What, then? Did
+you ever see any world but this? No, you will say. Why, therefore, do
+you presume to assert that there are not only six hundred thousand
+worlds, but that they are innumerable? Reason tells you so. Will not
+reason tell you likewise that as, in our inquiries into the most
+excellent nature, we find none but the divine nature can be happy and
+eternal, so the same divine nature surpasses us in excellence of mind;
+and as in mind, so in body? Why, therefore, as we are inferior in all
+other respects, should we be equal in form? For human virtue approaches
+nearer to the divinity than human form.
+
+XXXV. To return to the subject I was upon. What can be more childish
+than to assert that there are no such creatures as are generated in the
+Red Sea or in India? The most curious inquirer cannot arrive at the
+knowledge of all those creatures which inhabit the earth, sea, fens,
+and rivers; and shall we deny the existence of them because we never
+saw them? That similitude which you are so very fond of is nothing to
+the purpose. Is not a dog like a wolf? And, as Ennius says,
+
+    The monkey, filthiest beast, how like to man!
+
+Yet they differ in nature. No beast has more sagacity than an elephant;
+yet where can you find any of a larger size? I am speaking here of
+beasts. But among men, do we not see a disparity of manners in persons
+very much alike, and a similitude of manners in persons unlike? If this
+sort of argument were once to prevail, Velleius, observe what it would
+lead to. You have laid it down as certain that reason cannot possibly
+reside in any but the human form. Another may affirm that it can exist
+in none but a terrestrial being; in none but a being that is born, that
+grows up, and receives instruction, and that consists of a soul, and an
+infirm and perishable body; in short, in none but a mortal man. But if
+you decline those opinions, why should a single form disturb you? You
+perceive that man is possessed of reason and understanding, with all
+the infirmities which I have mentioned interwoven with his being;
+abstracted from which, you nevertheless know God, you say, if the
+lineaments do but remain. This is not talking considerately, but at a
+venture; for surely you did not think what an encumbrance anything
+superfluous or useless is, not only in a man, but a tree. How
+troublesome it is to have a finger too much! And why so? Because
+neither use nor ornament requires more than five; but your Deity has
+not only a finger more than he wants, but a head, a neck, shoulders,
+sides, a paunch, back, hams, hands, feet, thighs, and legs. Are these
+parts necessary to immortality? Are they conducive to the existence of
+the Deity? Is the face itself of use? One would rather say so of the
+brain, the heart, the lights, and the liver; for these are the seats of
+life. The features of the face contribute nothing to the preservation
+of it.
+
+XXXVI. You censured those who, beholding those excellent and stupendous
+works, the world, and its respective parts--the heaven, the earth, the
+seas--and the splendor with which they are adorned; who, contemplating
+the sun, moon, and stars; and who, observing the maturity and changes
+of the seasons, and vicissitudes of times, inferred from thence that
+there must be some excellent and eminent essence that originally made,
+and still moves, directs, and governs them. Suppose they should mistake
+in their conjecture, yet I see what they aim at. But what is that great
+and noble work which appears to you to be the effect of a divine mind,
+and from which you conclude that there are Gods? "I have," say you, "a
+certain information of a Deity imprinted in my mind." Of a bearded
+Jupiter, I suppose, and a helmeted Minerva.
+
+But do you really imagine them to be such? How much better are the
+notions of the ignorant vulgar, who not only believe the Deities have
+members like ours, but that they make use of them; and therefore they
+assign them a bow and arrows, a spear, a shield, a trident, and
+lightning; and though they do not behold the actions of the Gods, yet
+they cannot entertain a thought of a Deity doing nothing. The Egyptians
+(so much ridiculed) held no beasts to be sacred, except on account of
+some advantage which they had received from them. The ibis, a very
+large bird, with strong legs and a horny long beak, destroys a great
+number of serpents. These birds keep Egypt from pestilential diseases
+by killing and devouring the flying serpents brought from the deserts
+of Lybia by the south-west wind, which prevents the mischief that may
+attend their biting while alive, or any infection when dead. I could
+speak of the advantage of the ichneumon, the crocodile, and the cat;
+but I am unwilling to be tedious; yet I will conclude with observing
+that the barbarians paid divine honors to beasts because of the
+benefits they received from them; whereas your Gods not only confer no
+benefit, but are idle, and do no single act of any description
+whatever.
+
+XXXVII. "They have nothing to do," your teacher says. Epicurus truly,
+like indolent boys, thinks nothing preferable to idleness; yet those
+very boys, when they have a holiday, entertain themselves in some
+sportive exercise. But we are to suppose the Deity in such an inactive
+state that if he should move we may justly fear he would be no longer
+happy. This doctrine divests the Gods of motion and operation; besides,
+it encourages men to be lazy, as they are by this taught to believe
+that the least labor is incompatible even with divine felicity.
+
+But let it be as you would have it, that the Deity is in the form and
+image of a man. Where is his abode? Where is his habitation? Where is
+the place where he is to be found? What is his course of life? And what
+is it that constitutes the happiness which you assert that he enjoys?
+For it seems necessary that a being who is to be happy must use and
+enjoy what belongs to him. And with regard to place, even those natures
+which are inanimate have each their proper stations assigned to them:
+so that the earth is the lowest; then water is next above the earth;
+the air is above the water; and fire has the highest situation of all
+allotted to it. Some creatures inhabit the earth, some the water, and
+some, of an amphibious nature, live in both. There are some, also,
+which are thought to be born in fire, and which often appear fluttering
+in burning furnaces.
+
+In the first place, therefore, I ask you, Where is the habitation of
+your Deity? Secondly, What motive is it that stirs him from his place,
+supposing he ever moves? And, lastly, since it is peculiar to animated
+beings to have an inclination to something that is agreeable to their
+several natures, what is it that the Deity affects, and to what purpose
+does he exert the motion of his mind and reason? In short, how is he
+happy? how eternal? Whichever of these points you touch upon, I am
+afraid you will come lamely off. For there is never a proper end to
+reasoning which proceeds on a false foundation; for you asserted
+likewise that the form of the Deity is perceptible by the mind, but not
+by sense; that it is neither solid, nor invariable in number; that it
+is to be discerned by similitude and transition, and that a constant
+supply of images is perpetually flowing on from innumerable atoms, on
+which our minds are intent; so that we from that conclude that divine
+nature to be happy and everlasting.
+
+XXXVIII. What, in the name of those Deities concerning whom we are now
+disputing, is the meaning of all this? For if they exist only in
+thought, and have no solidity nor substance, what difference can there
+be between thinking of a Hippocentaur and thinking of a Deity? Other
+philosophers call every such conformation of the mind a vain motion;
+but you term it "the approach and entrance of images into the mind."
+Thus, when I imagine that I behold T. Gracchus haranguing the people in
+the Capitol, and collecting their suffrages concerning M. Octavius, I
+call that a vain motion of the mind: but you affirm that the images of
+Gracchus and Octavius are present, which are only conveyed to my mind
+when they have arrived at the Capitol. The case is the same, you say,
+in regard to the Deity, with the frequent representation of which the
+mind is so affected that from thence it may be clearly understood that
+the Gods[98] are happy and eternal.
+
+Let it be granted that there are images by which the mind is affected,
+yet it is only a certain form that occurs; and why must that form be
+pronounced happy? why eternal? But what are those images you talk of,
+or whence do they proceed? This loose manner of arguing is taken from
+Democritus; but he is reproved by many people for it; nor can you
+derive any conclusions from it: the whole system is weak and imperfect.
+For what can be more improbable than that the images of Homer,
+Archilochus, Romulus, Numa, Pythagoras, and Plato should come into my
+mind, and yet not in the form in which they existed? How, therefore,
+can they be those persons? And whose images are they? Aristotle tells
+us that there never was such a person as Orpheus the poet;[99] and it
+is said that the verse called Orphic verse was the invention of
+Cercops, a Pythagorean; yet Orpheus, that is to say, the image of him,
+as you will have it, often runs in my head. What is the reason that I
+entertain one idea of the figure of the same person, and you another?
+Why do we image to ourselves such things as never had any existence,
+and which never can have, such as Scyllas and Chimaeras? Why do we frame
+ideas of men, countries, and cities which we never saw? How is it that
+the very first moment that I choose I can form representations of them
+in my mind? How is it that they come to me, even in my sleep, without
+being called or sought after?
+
+XXXIX. The whole affair, Velleius, is ridiculous. You do not impose
+images on our eyes only, but on our minds. Such is the privilege which
+you have assumed of talking nonsense with impunity. But there is, you
+say, a transition of images flowing on in great crowds in such a way
+that out of many some one at least must be perceived! I should be
+ashamed of my incapacity to understand this if you, who assert it,
+could comprehend it yourselves; for how do you prove that these images
+are continued in uninterrupted motion? Or, if uninterrupted, still how
+do you prove them to be eternal? There is a constant supply, you say,
+of innumerable atoms. But must they, for that reason, be all eternal?
+To elude this, you have recourse to equilibration (for so, with your
+leave, I will call your [Greek: Isonomia]),[100] and say that as there
+is a sort of nature mortal, so there must also be a sort which is
+immortal. By the same rule, as there are men mortal, there are men
+immortal; and as some arise from the earth, some must arise from the
+water also; and as there are causes which destroy, there must likewise
+be causes which preserve. Be it as you say; but let those causes
+preserve which have existence themselves. I cannot conceive these your
+Gods to have any. But how does all this face of things arise from
+atomic corpuscles? Were there any such atoms (as there are not), they
+might perhaps impel one another, and be jumbled together in their
+motion; but they could never be able to impart form, or figure, or
+color, or animation, so that you by no means demonstrate the
+immortality of your Deity.
+
+XL. Let us now inquire into his happiness. It is certain that without
+virtue there can be no happiness; but virtue consists in action: now
+your Deity does nothing; therefore he is void of virtue, and
+consequently cannot be happy. What sort of life does he lead? He has a
+constant supply, you say, of good things, without any intermixture of
+bad. What are those good things? Sensual pleasures, no doubt; for you
+know no delight of the mind but what arises from the body, and returns
+to it. I do not suppose, Velleius, that you are like some of the
+Epicureans, who are ashamed of those expressions of Epicurus,[101] in
+which he openly avows that he has no idea of any good separate from
+wanton and obscene pleasures, which, without a blush, he names
+distinctly. What food, therefore, what drink, what variety of music or
+flowers, what kind of pleasures of touch, what odors, will you offer to
+the Gods to fill them with pleasures? The poets indeed provide them
+with banquets of nectar and ambrosia, and a Hebe or a Ganymede to serve
+up the cup. But what is it, Epicurus, that you do for them? For I do
+not see from whence your Deity should have those things, nor how he
+could use them. Therefore the nature of man is better constituted for a
+happy life than the nature of the Gods, because men enjoy various kinds
+of pleasures; but you look on all those pleasures as superficial which
+delight the senses only by a titillation, as Epicurus calls it. Where
+is to be the end of this trifling? Even Philo, who followed the
+Academy, could not bear to hear the soft and luscious delights of the
+Epicureans despised; for with his admirable memory he perfectly
+remembered and used to repeat many sentences of Epicurus in the very
+words in which they were written. He likewise used to quote many, which
+were more gross, from Metrodorus, the sage colleague of Epicurus, who
+blamed his brother Timocrates because he would not allow that
+everything which had any reference to a happy life was to be measured
+by the belly; nor has he said this once only, but often. You grant what
+I say, I perceive; for you know it to be true. I can produce the books,
+if you should deny it; but I am not now reproving you for referring all
+things to the standard of pleasure: that is another question. What I am
+now showing is, that your Gods are destitute of pleasure; and
+therefore, according to your own manner of reasoning, they are not
+happy.
+
+XLI. But they are free from pain. Is that sufficient for beings who are
+supposed to enjoy all good things and the most supreme felicity? The
+Deity, they say, is constantly meditating on his own happiness, for he
+has no other idea which can possibly occupy his mind. Consider a
+little; reflect what a figure the Deity would make if he were to be
+idly thinking of nothing through all eternity but "It is very well with
+me, and I am happy;" nor do I see why this happy Deity should not fear
+being destroyed, since, without any intermission, he is driven and
+agitated by an everlasting incursion of atoms, and since images are
+constantly floating off from him. Your Deity, therefore, is neither
+happy nor eternal.
+
+Epicurus, it seems, has written books concerning sanctity and piety
+towards the Gods. But how does he speak on these subjects? You would
+say that you were listening to Coruncanius or Scaevola, the
+high-priests, and not to a man who tore up all religion by the roots,
+and who overthrew the temples and altars of the immortal Gods; not,
+indeed, with hands, like Xerxes, but with arguments; for what reason is
+there for your saying that men ought to worship the Gods, when the Gods
+not only do not regard men, but are entirely careless of everything,
+and absolutely do nothing at all?
+
+But they are, you say, of so glorious and excellent a nature that a
+wise man is induced by their excellence to adore them. Can there be any
+glory or excellence in that nature which only contemplates its own
+happiness, and neither will do, nor does, nor ever did anything?
+Besides, what piety is due to a being from whom you receive nothing? Or
+how can you, or any one else, be indebted to him who bestows no
+benefits? For piety is only justice towards the Gods; but what right
+have they to it, when there is no communication whatever between the
+Gods and men? And sanctity is the knowledge of how we ought to worship
+them; but I do not understand why they are to be worshipped, if we are
+neither to receive nor expect any good from them.
+
+XLII. And why should we worship them from an admiration only of that
+nature in which we can behold nothing excellent? and as for that
+freedom from superstition, which you are in the habit of boasting of so
+much, it is easy to be free from that feeling when you have renounced
+all belief in the power of the Gods; unless, indeed, you imagine that
+Diagoras or Theodorus, who absolutely denied the being of the Gods,
+could possibly be superstitious. I do not suppose that even Protagoras
+could, who doubted whether there were Gods or not. The opinions of
+these philosophers are not only destructive of superstition, which
+arises from a vain fear of the Gods, but of religion also, which
+consists in a pious adoration of them.
+
+What think you of those who have asserted that the whole doctrine
+concerning the immortal Gods was the invention of politicians, whose
+view was to govern that part of the community by religion which reason
+could not influence? Are not their opinions subversive of all religion?
+Or what religion did Prodicus the Chian leave to men, who held that
+everything beneficial to human life should be numbered among the Gods?
+Were not they likewise void of religion who taught that the Deities, at
+present the object of our prayers and adoration, were valiant,
+illustrious, and mighty men who arose to divinity after death?
+Euhemerus, whom our Ennius translated, and followed more than other
+authors, has particularly advanced this doctrine, and treated of the
+deaths and burials of the Gods; can he, then, be said to have confirmed
+religion, or, rather, to have totally subverted it? I shall say nothing
+of that sacred and august Eleusina, into whose mysteries the most
+distant nations were initiated, nor of the solemnities in Samothrace,
+or in Lemnos, secretly resorted to by night, and surrounded by thick
+and shady groves; which, if they were properly explained, and reduced
+to reasonable principles, would rather explain the nature of things
+than discover the knowledge of the Gods.
+
+XLIII. Even that great man Democritus, from whose fountains Epicurus
+watered his little garden, seems to me to be very inferior to his usual
+acuteness when speaking about the nature of the Gods. For at one time
+he thinks that there are images endowed with divinity, inherent in the
+universality of things; at another, that the principles and minds
+contained in the universe are Gods; then he attributes divinity to
+animated images, employing themselves in doing us good or harm; and,
+lastly, he speaks of certain images of such vast extent that they
+encompass the whole outside of the universe; all which opinions are
+more worthy of the country[102] of Democritus than of Democritus
+himself; for who can frame in his mind any ideas of such images? who
+can admire them? who can think they merit a religious adoration?
+
+But Epicurus, when he divests the Gods of the power of doing good,
+extirpates all religion from the minds of men; for though he says the
+divine nature is the best and the most excellent of all natures, he
+will not allow it to be susceptible of any benevolence, by which he
+destroys the chief and peculiar attribute of the most perfect being.
+For what is better and more excellent than goodness and beneficence? To
+refuse your Gods that quality is to say that no man is any object of
+their favor, and no Gods either; that they neither love nor esteem any
+one; in short, that they not only give themselves no trouble about us,
+but even look on each other with the greatest indifference.
+
+XLIV. How much more reasonable is the doctrine of the Stoics, whom you
+censure? It is one of their maxims that the wise are friends to the
+wise, though unknown to each other; for as nothing is more amiable than
+virtue, he who possesses it is worthy our love, to whatever country he
+belongs. But what evils do your principles bring, when you make good
+actions and benevolence the marks of imbecility! For, not to mention
+the power and nature of the Gods, you hold that even men, if they had
+no need of mutual assistance, would be neither courteous nor
+beneficent. Is there no natural charity in the dispositions of good
+men? The very name of love, from which friendship is derived, is dear
+to men;[103] and if friendship is to centre in our own advantage only,
+without regard to him whom we esteem a friend, it cannot be called
+friendship, but a sort of traffic for our own profit. Pastures, lands,
+and herds of cattle are valued in the same manner on account of the
+profit we gather from them; but charity and friendship expect no
+return. How much more reason have we to think that the Gods, who want
+nothing, should love each other, and employ themselves about us! If it
+were not so, why should we pray to or adore them? Why do the priests
+preside over the altars, and the augurs over the auspices? What have we
+to ask of the Gods, and why do we prefer our vows to them?
+
+But Epicurus, you say, has written a book concerning sanctity. A
+trifling performance by a man whose wit is not so remarkable in it, as
+the unrestrained license of writing which he has permitted himself; for
+what sanctity can there be if the Gods take no care of human affairs?
+Or how can that nature be called animated which neither regards nor
+performs anything? Therefore our friend Posidonius has well observed,
+in his fifth book of the Nature of the Gods, that Epicurus believed
+there were no Gods, and that what he had said about the immortal Gods
+was only said from a desire to avoid unpopularity. He could not be so
+weak as to imagine that the Deity has only the outward features of a
+simple mortal, without any real solidity; that he has all the members
+of a man, without the least power to use them--a certain unsubstantial
+pellucid being, neither favorable nor beneficial to any one, neither
+regarding nor doing anything. There can be no such being in nature; and
+as Epicurus said this plainly, he allows the Gods in words, and
+destroys them in fact; and if the Deity is truly such a being that he
+shows no favor, no benevolence to mankind, away with him! For why
+should I entreat him to be propitious? He can be propitious to none,
+since, as you say, all his favor and benevolence are the effects of
+imbecility.
+
+       *       *       *       *       *
+
+
+
+
+BOOK II.
+
+
+I. When Cotta had thus concluded, Velleius replied: I certainly was
+inconsiderate to engage in argument with an Academician who is likewise
+a rhetorician. I should not have feared an Academician without
+eloquence, nor a rhetorician without that philosophy, however eloquent
+he might be; for I am never puzzled by an empty flow of words, nor by
+the most subtle reasonings delivered without any grace of oratory. But
+you, Cotta, have excelled in both. You only wanted the assembly and the
+judges. However, enough of this at present. Now, let us hear what
+Lucilius has to say, if it is agreeable to him.
+
+I had much rather, says Balbus, hear Cotta resume his discourse, and
+demonstrate the true Gods with the same eloquence which he made use of
+to explode the false; for, on such a subject, the loose, unsettled
+doctrine of the Academy does not become a philosopher, a priest, a
+Cotta, whose opinions should be, like those we hold, firm and certain.
+Epicurus has been more than sufficiently refuted; but I would willingly
+hear your own sentiments, Cotta.
+
+Do you forget, replies Cotta, what I at first said--that it is easier
+for me, especially on this point, to explain what opinions those are
+which I do not hold, rather than what those are which I do? Nay, even
+if I did feel some certainty on any particular point, yet, after having
+been so diffuse myself already, I would prefer now hearing you speak in
+your turn. I submit, says Balbus, and will be as brief as I possibly
+can; for as you have confuted the errors of Epicurus, my part in the
+dispute will be the shorter. Our sect divide the whole question
+concerning the immortal Gods into four parts. First, they prove that
+there are Gods; secondly, of what character and nature they are;
+thirdly, that the universe is governed by them; and, lastly, that they
+exercise a superintendence over human affairs. But in this present
+discussion let us confine ourselves to the first two articles, and
+defer the third and fourth till another opportunity, as they require
+more time to discuss. By no means, says Cotta, for we have time enough
+on our hands; besides that, we are now discussing a subject which
+should be preferred even to serious business.
+
+II. The first point, then, says Lucilius, I think needs no discourse to
+prove it; for what can be so plain and evident, when we behold the
+heavens and contemplate the celestial bodies, as the existence of some
+supreme, divine intelligence, by which all these things are governed?
+Were it otherwise, Ennius would not, with a universal approbation, have
+said,
+
+    Look up to the refulgent heaven above,
+    Which all men call, unanimously, Jove.
+
+This is Jupiter, the governor of the world, who rules all things with
+his nod, and is, as the same Ennius adds,
+
+    ----of Gods and men the sire,[104]
+
+an omnipresent and omnipotent God. And if any one doubts this, I really
+do not understand why the same man may not also doubt whether there is
+a sun or not. For what can possibly be more evident than this? And if
+it were not a truth universally impressed on the minds of men, the
+belief in it would never have been so firm; nor would it have been, as
+it is, increased by length of years, nor would it have gathered
+strength and stability through every age. And, in truth, we see that
+other opinions, being false and groundless, have already fallen into
+oblivion by lapse of time. Who now believes in Hippocentaurs and
+Chimaeras? Or what old woman is now to be found so weak and ignorant as
+to stand in fear of those infernal monsters which once so terrified
+mankind? For time destroys the fictions of error and opinion, while it
+confirms the determinations of nature and of truth. And therefore it is
+that, both among us and among other nations, sacred institutions and
+the divine worship of the Gods have been strengthened and improved from
+time to time. And this is not to be imputed to chance or folly, but to
+the frequent appearance of the Gods themselves. In the war with the
+Latins, when A. Posthumius, the dictator, attacked Octavius Mamilius,
+the Tusculan, at Regillus, Castor and Pollux were seen fighting in our
+army on horseback; and since that the same offspring of Tyndarus gave
+notice of the defeat of Perses; for as P. Vatienus, the grandfather of
+the present young man of that name, was coming in the night to Rome
+from his government of Reate, two young men on white horses appeared to
+him, and told him that King[105] Perses was that day taken prisoner.
+This news he carried to the senate, who immediately threw him into
+prison for speaking inconsiderately on a state affair; but when it was
+confirmed by letters from Paullus, he was recompensed by the senate
+with land and immunities.[106] Nor do we forget when the Locrians
+defeated the people of Crotone, in a great battle on the banks of the
+river Sagra, that it was known the same day at the Olympic Games. The
+voices of the Fauns have been often heard, and Deities have appeared in
+forms so visible that they have compelled every one who is not
+senseless, or hardened in impiety, to confess the presence of the Gods.
+
+III. What do predictions and foreknowledge of future events indicate,
+but that such future events are shown, pointed out, portended, and
+foretold to men? From whence they are called omens, signs, portents,
+prodigies. But though we should esteem fabulous what is said of
+Mopsus,[107] Tiresias,[108] Amphiaraus,[109] Calchas,[110] and
+Helenus[111] (who would not have been delivered down to us as augurs
+even in fable if their art had been despised), may we not be
+sufficiently apprised of the power of the Gods by domestic examples?
+Will not the temerity of P. Claudius, in the first Punic war, affect
+us? who, when the poultry were let out of the coop and would not feed,
+ordered them to be thrown into the water, and, joking even upon the
+Gods, said, with a sneer, "Let them drink, since they will not eat;"
+which piece of ridicule, being followed by a victory over his fleet,
+cost him many tears, and brought great calamity on the Roman people.
+Did not his colleague Junius, in the same war, lose his fleet in a
+tempest by disregarding the auspices? Claudius, therefore, was
+condemned by the people, and Junius killed himself. Coelius says that
+P. Flaminius, from his neglect of religion, fell at Thrasimenus; a loss
+which the public severely felt. By these instances of calamity we may
+be assured that Rome owes her grandeur and success to the conduct of
+those who were tenacious of their religious duties; and if we compare
+ourselves to our neighbors, we shall find that we are infinitely
+distinguished above foreign nations by our zeal for religious
+ceremonies, though in other things we may be only equal to them, and in
+other respects even inferior to them.
+
+Ought we to contemn Attius Navius's staff, with which he divided the
+regions of the vine to find his sow?[112] I should despise it, if I
+were not aware that King Hostilius had carried on most important wars
+in deference to his auguries; but by the negligence of our nobility the
+discipline of the augury is now omitted, the truth of the auspices
+despised, and only a mere form observed; so that the most important
+affairs of the commonwealth, even the wars, on which the public safety
+depends, are conducted without any auspices; the Peremnia[113] are
+discussed; no part of the Acumina[114] performed; no select men are
+called to witness to the military testaments;[115] our generals now
+begin their wars as soon as they have arranged the Auspicia. The force
+of religion was so great among our ancestors that some of their
+commanders have, with their faces veiled, and with the solemn, formal
+expressions of religion, sacrificed themselves to the immortal Gods to
+save their country.[116] I could mention many of the Sibylline
+prophecies, and many answers of the haruspices, to confirm those
+things, which ought not to be doubted.
+
+IV. For example: our augurs and the Etrurian haruspices saw the truth
+of their art established when P. Scipio and C. Figulus were consuls;
+for as Tiberius Gracchus, who was a second time consul, wished to
+proceed to a fresh election, the first Rogator,[117] as he was
+collecting the suffrages, fell down dead on the spot. Gracchus
+nevertheless went on with the assembly, but perceiving that this
+accident had a religious influence on the people, he brought the affair
+before the senate. The senate thought fit to refer it to those who
+usually took cognizance of such things. The haruspices were called, and
+declared that the man who had acted as Rogator of the assembly had no
+right to do so; to which, as I have heard my father say, he replied
+with great warmth, Have I no right, who am consul, and augur, and
+favored by the Auspicia? And shall you, who are Tuscans and Barbarians,
+pretend that you have authority over the Roman Auspicia, and a right to
+give judgment in matters respecting the formality of our assemblies?
+Therefore, he then commanded them to withdraw; but not long afterward
+he wrote from his province[118] to the college of augurs, acknowledging
+that in reading the books[119] he remembered that he had illegally
+chosen a place for his tent in the gardens of Scipio, and had afterward
+entered the Pomoerium, in order to hold a senate, but that in repassing
+the same Pomoerium he had forgotten to take the auspices; and that,
+therefore, the consuls had been created informally. The augurs laid the
+case before the senate. The senate decreed that they should resign
+their charge, and so they accordingly abdicated. What greater example
+need we seek for? The wisest, perhaps the most excellent of men, chose
+to confess his fault, which he might have concealed, rather than leave
+the public the least atom of religious guilt; and the consuls chose to
+quit the highest office in the State, rather than fill it for a moment
+in defiance of religion. How great is the reputation of the augurs!
+
+And is not the art of the soothsayers divine? And must not every one
+who sees what innumerable instances of the same kind there are confess
+the existence of the Gods? For they who have interpreters must
+certainly exist themselves; now, there are interpreters of the Gods;
+therefore we must allow there are Gods. But it may be said, perhaps,
+that all predictions are not accomplished. We may as well conclude
+there is no art of physic, because all sick persons do not recover. The
+Gods show us signs of future events; if we are occasionally deceived in
+the results, it is not to be imputed to the nature of the Gods, but to
+the conjectures of men. All nations agree that there are Gods; the
+opinion is innate, and, as it were, engraved in the minds of all men.
+The only point in dispute among us is, what they are.
+
+V. Their existence no one denies. Cleanthes, one of our sect, imputes
+the way in which the idea of the Gods is implanted in the minds of men
+to four causes. The first is that which I just now mentioned--the
+foreknowledge of future things. The second is the great advantages
+which we enjoy from the temperature of the air, the fertility of the
+earth, and the abundance of various benefits of other kinds. The third
+cause is deduced from the terror with which the mind is affected by
+thunder, tempests, storms, snow, hail, devastation, pestilence,
+earthquakes often attended with hideous noises, showers of stones, and
+rain like drops of blood; by rocks and sudden openings of the earth; by
+monstrous births of men and beasts; by meteors in the air, and blazing
+stars, by the Greeks called _cometae_, by us _crinitae_, the appearance
+of which, in the late Octavian war,[120] were foreboders of great
+calamities; by two suns, which, as I have heard my father say, happened
+in the consulate of Tuditanus and Aquillius, and in which year also
+another sun (P. Africanus) was extinguished. These things terrified
+mankind, and raised in them a firm belief of the existence of some
+celestial and divine power.
+
+His fourth cause, and that the strongest, is drawn from the regularity
+of the motion and revolution of the heavens, the distinctness, variety,
+beauty, and order of the sun, moon, and all the stars, the appearance
+only of which is sufficient to convince us they are not the effects of
+chance; as when we enter into a house, or school, or court, and observe
+the exact order, discipline, and method of it, we cannot suppose that
+it is so regulated without a cause, but must conclude that there is
+some one who commands, and to whom obedience is paid. It is quite
+impossible for us to avoid thinking that the wonderful motions,
+revolutions, and order of those many and great bodies, no part of which
+is impaired by the countless and infinite succession of ages, must be
+governed and directed by some supreme intelligent being.
+
+VI. Chrysippus, indeed, had a very penetrating genius; yet such is the
+doctrine which he delivers, that he seems rather to have been
+instructed by nature than to owe it to any discovery of his own. "If,"
+says he, "there is anything in the universe which no human reason,
+ability, or power can make, the being who produced it must certainly be
+preferable to man. Now, celestial bodies, and all those things which
+proceed in any eternal order, cannot be made by man; the being who made
+them is therefore preferable to man. What, then, is that being but a
+God? If there be no such thing as a Deity, what is there better than
+man, since he only is possessed of reason, the most excellent of all
+things? But it is a foolish piece of vanity in man to think there is
+nothing preferable to him. There is, therefore, something preferable;
+consequently, there is certainly a God."
+
+When you behold a large and beautiful house, surely no one can persuade
+you it was built for mice and weasels, though you do not see the
+master; and would it not, therefore, be most manifest folly to imagine
+that a world so magnificently adorned, with such an immense variety of
+celestial bodies of such exquisite beauty, and that the vast sizes and
+magnitude of the sea and land were intended as the abode of man, and
+not as the mansion of the immortal Gods? Do we not also plainly see
+this, that all the most elevated regions are the best, and that the
+earth is the lowest region, and is surrounded with the grossest air? so
+that as we perceive that in some cities and countries the capacities of
+men are naturally duller, from the thickness of the climate, so mankind
+in general are affected by the heaviness of the air which surrounds the
+earth, the grossest region of the world.
+
+Yet even from this inferior intelligence of man we may discover the
+existence of some intelligent agent that is divine, and wiser than
+ourselves; for, as Socrates says in Xenophon, from whence had man his
+portion of understanding? And, indeed, if any one were to push his
+inquiries about the moisture and heat which is diffused through the
+human body, and the earthy kind of solidity existing in our entrails,
+and that soul by which we breathe, and to ask whence we derived them,
+it would be plain that we have received one thing from the earth,
+another from liquid, another from fire, and another from that air which
+we inhale every time that we breathe.
+
+VII. But where did we find that which excels all these things--I mean
+reason, or (if you please, in other terms) the mind, understanding,
+thought, prudence; and from whence did we receive it? Shall the world
+be possessed of every other perfection, and be destitute of this one,
+which is the most important and valuable of all? But certainly there is
+nothing better, or more excellent, or more beautiful than the world;
+and not only there is nothing better, but we cannot even conceive
+anything superior to it; and if reason and wisdom are the greatest of
+all perfections, they must necessarily be a part of what we all allow
+to be the most excellent.
+
+Who is not compelled to admit the truth of what I assert by that
+agreeable, uniform, and continued agreement of things in the universe?
+Could the earth at one season be adorned with flowers, at another be
+covered with snow? Or, if such a number of things regulated their own
+changes, could the approach and retreat of the sun in the summer and
+winter solstices be so regularly known and calculated? Could the flux
+and reflux of the sea and the height of the tides be affected by the
+increase or wane of the moon? Could the different courses of the stars
+be preserved by the uniform movement of the whole heaven? Could these
+things subsist, I say, in such a harmony of all the parts of the
+universe without the continued influence of a divine spirit?
+
+If these points are handled in a free and copious manner, as I purpose
+to do, they will be less liable to the cavils of the Academics; but the
+narrow, confined way in which Zeno reasoned upon them laid them more
+open to objection; for as running streams are seldom or never tainted,
+while standing waters easily grow corrupt, so a fluency of expression
+washes away the censures of the caviller, while the narrow limits of a
+discourse which is too concise is almost defenceless; for the arguments
+which I am enlarging upon are thus briefly laid down by Zeno:
+
+VIII. "That which reasons is superior to that which does not; nothing
+is superior to the world; the world, therefore, reasons." By the same
+rule the world may be proved to be wise, happy, and eternal; for the
+possession of all these qualities is superior to the want of them; and
+nothing is superior to the world; the inevitable consequence of which
+argument is, that the world, therefore, is a Deity. He goes on: "No
+part of anything void of sense is capable of perception; some parts of
+the world have perception; the world, therefore, has sense." He
+proceeds, and pursues the argument closely. "Nothing," says he, "that
+is destitute itself of life and reason can generate a being possessed
+of life and reason; but the world does generate beings possessed of
+life and reason; the world, therefore, is not itself destitute of life
+and reason."
+
+He concludes his argument in his usual manner with a simile: "If
+well-tuned pipes should spring out of the olive, would you have the
+slightest doubt that there was in the olive-tree itself some kind of
+skill and knowledge? Or if the plane-tree could produce harmonious
+lutes, surely you would infer, on the same principle, that music was
+contained in the plane-tree. Why, then, should we not believe the world
+is a living and wise being, since it produces living and wise beings
+out of itself?"
+
+IX. But as I have been insensibly led into a length of discourse beyond
+my first design (for I said that, as the existence of the Gods was
+evident to all, there was no need of any long oration to prove it), I
+will demonstrate it by reasons deduced from the nature of things. For
+it is a fact that all beings which take nourishment and increase
+contain in themselves a power of natural heat, without which they could
+neither be nourished nor increase. For everything which is of a warm
+and fiery character is agitated and stirred up by its own motion. But
+that which is nourished and grows is influenced by a certain regular
+and equable motion. And as long as this motion remains in us, so long
+does sense and life remain; but the moment that it abates and is
+extinguished, we ourselves decay and perish.
+
+By arguments like these, Cleanthes shows how great is the power of heat
+in all bodies. He observes that there is no food so gross as not to be
+digested in a night and a day; and that even in the excrementitious
+parts, which nature rejects, there remains a heat. The veins and
+arteries seem, by their continual quivering, to resemble the agitation
+of fire; and it has often been observed when the heart of an animal is
+just plucked from the body that it palpitates with such visible motion
+as to resemble the rapidity of fire. Everything, therefore, that has
+life, whether it be animal or vegetable, owes that life to the heat
+inherent in it; it is this nature of heat which contains in itself the
+vital power which extends throughout the whole world. This will appear
+more clearly on a more close explanation of this fiery quality, which
+pervades all things.
+
+Every division, then, of the world (and I shall touch upon the most
+considerable) is sustained by heat; and first it may be observed in
+earthly substances that fire is produced from stones by striking or
+rubbing one against another; that "the warm earth smokes"[121] when
+just turned up, and that water is drawn warm from well-springs; and
+this is most especially the case in the winter season, because there is
+a great quantity of heat contained in the caverns of the earth; and
+this becomes more dense in the winter, and on that account confines
+more closely the innate heat which is discoverable in the earth.
+
+X. It would require a long dissertation, and many reasons would require
+to be adduced, to show that all the seeds which the earth conceives,
+and all those which it contains having been generated from itself, and
+fixed in roots and trunks, derive all their origin and increase from
+the temperature and regulation of heat. And that even every liquor has
+a mixture of heat in it is plainly demonstrated by the effusion of
+water; for it would not congeal by cold, nor become solid, as ice or
+snow, and return again to its natural state, if it were not that, when
+heat is applied to it, it again becomes liquefied and dissolved, and so
+diffuses itself. Therefore, by northern and other cold winds it is
+frozen and hardened, and in turn it dissolves and melts again by heat.
+The seas likewise, we find, when agitated by winds, grow warm, so that
+from this fact we may understand that there is heat included in that
+vast body of water; for we cannot imagine it to be external and
+adventitious heat, but such as is stirred up by agitation from the deep
+recesses of the seas; and the same thing takes place with respect to
+our bodies, which grow warm with motion and exercise.
+
+And the very air itself, which indeed is the coldest element, is by no
+means void of heat; for there is a great quantity, arising from the
+exhalations of water, which appears to be a sort of steam occasioned by
+its internal heat, like that of boiling liquors. The fourth part of the
+universe is entirely fire, and is the source of the salutary and vital
+heat which is found in the rest. From hence we may conclude that, as
+all parts of the world are sustained by heat, the world itself also has
+such a great length of time subsisted from the same cause; and so much
+the more, because we ought to understand that that hot and fiery
+principle is so diffused over universal nature that there is contained
+in it a power and cause of generation and procreation, from which all
+animate beings, and all those creatures of the vegetable world, the
+roots of which are contained in the earth, must inevitably derive their
+origin and their increase.
+
+XI. It is nature, consequently, that continues and preserves the world,
+and that, too, a nature which is not destitute of sense and reason; for
+in every essence that is not simple, but composed of several parts,
+there must be some predominant quality--as, for instance, the mind in
+man, and in beasts something resembling it, from which arise all the
+appetites and desires for anything. As for trees, and all the vegetable
+produce of the earth, it is thought to be in their roots. I call that
+the predominant quality,[122] which the Greeks call [Greek:
+hegemonikon]; which must and ought to be the most excellent quality,
+wherever it is found. That, therefore, in which the prevailing quality
+of all nature resides must be the most excellent of all things, and
+most worthy of the power and pre-eminence over all things.
+
+Now, we see that there is nothing in being that is not a part of the
+universe; and as there are sense and reason in the parts of it, there
+must therefore be these qualities, and these, too, in a more energetic
+and powerful degree, in that part in which the predominant quality of
+the world is found. The world, therefore, must necessarily be possessed
+of wisdom; and that element, which embraces all things, must excel in
+perfection of reason. The world, therefore, is a God, and the whole
+power of the world is contained in that divine element.
+
+The heat also of the world is more pure, clear, and lively, and,
+consequently, better adapted to move the senses than the heat allotted
+to us; and it vivifies and preserves all things within the compass of
+our knowledge.
+
+It is absurd, therefore, to say that the world, which is endued with a
+perfect, free, pure, spirituous, and active heat, is not sensitive,
+since by this heat men and beasts are preserved, and move, and think;
+more especially since this heat of the world is itself the sole
+principle of agitation, and has no external impulse, but is moved
+spontaneously; for what can be more powerful than the world, which
+moves and raises that heat by which it subsists?
+
+XII. For let us listen to Plato, who is regarded as a God among
+philosophers. He says that there are two sorts of motion, one innate
+and the other external; and that that which is moved spontaneously is
+more divine than that which is moved by another power. This self-motion
+he places in the mind alone, and concludes that the first principle of
+motion is derived from the mind. Therefore, since all motion arises
+from the heat of the world, and that heat is not moved by the effect of
+any external impulse, but of its own accord, it must necessarily be a
+mind; from whence it follows that the world is animated.
+
+On such reasoning is founded this opinion, that the world is possessed
+of understanding, because it certainly has more perfections in itself
+than any other nature; for as there is no part of our bodies so
+considerable as the whole of us, so it is clear that there is no
+particular portion of the universe equal in magnitude to the whole of
+it; from whence it follows that wisdom must be an attribute of the
+world; otherwise man, who is a part of it, and possessed of reason,
+would be superior to the entire world.
+
+And thus, if we proceed from the first rude, unfinished natures to the
+most superior and perfect ones, we shall inevitably come at last to the
+nature of the Gods. For, in the first place, we observe that those
+vegetables which are produced out of the earth are supported by nature,
+and she gives them no further supply than is sufficient to preserve
+them by nourishing them and making them grow. To beasts she has given
+sense and motion, and a faculty which directs them to what is
+wholesome, and prompts them to shun what is noxious to them. On man she
+has conferred a greater portion of her favor; inasmuch as she has added
+reason, by which he is enabled to command his passions, to moderate
+some, and to subdue others.
+
+XIII. In the fourth and highest degree are those beings which are
+naturally wise and good, who from the first moment of their existence
+are possessed of right and consistent reason, which we must consider
+superior to man and deserving to be attributed to a God; that is to
+say, to the world, in which it is inevitable that that perfect and
+complete reason should be inherent. Nor is it possible that it should
+be said with justice that there is any arrangement of things in which
+there cannot be something entire and perfect. For as in a vine or in
+beasts we see that nature, if not prevented by some superior violence,
+proceeds by her own appropriate path to her destined end; and as in
+painting, architecture, and the other arts there is a point of
+perfection which is attainable, and occasionally attained, so it is
+even much more necessary that in universal nature there must be some
+complete and perfect result arrived at. Many external accidents may
+happen to all other natures which may impede their progress to
+perfection, but nothing can hinder universal nature, because she is
+herself the ruler and governor of all other natures. That, therefore,
+must be the fourth and most elevated degree to which no other power can
+approach.
+
+But this degree is that on which the nature of all things is placed;
+and since she is possessed of this, and she presides over all things,
+and is subject to no possible impediment, the world must necessarily be
+an intelligent and even a wise being. But how marvellously great is the
+ignorance of those men who dispute the perfection of that nature which
+encircles all things; or who, allowing it to be infinitely perfect, yet
+deny it to be, in the first place, animated, then reasonable, and,
+lastly, prudent and wise! For how without these qualities could it be
+infinitely perfect? If it were like vegetables, or even like beasts,
+there would be no more reason for thinking it extremely good than
+extremely bad; and if it were possessed of reason, and had not wisdom
+from the beginning, the world would be in a worse condition than man;
+for man may grow wise, but the world, if it were destitute of wisdom
+through an infinite space of time past, could never acquire it. Thus it
+would be worse than man. But as that is absurd to imagine, the world
+must be esteemed wise from all eternity, and consequently a Deity:
+since there is nothing existing that is not defective, except the
+universe, which is well provided, and fully complete and perfect in all
+its numbers and parts.
+
+XIV. For Chrysippus says, very acutely, that as the case is made for
+the buckler, and the scabbard for the sword, so all things, except the
+universe, were made for the sake of something else. As, for instance,
+all those crops and fruits which the earth produces were made for the
+sake of animals, and animals for man; as, the horse for carrying, the
+ox for the plough, the dog for hunting and for a guard. But man himself
+was born to contemplate and imitate the world, being in no wise
+perfect, but, if I may so express myself, a particle of perfection; but
+the world, as it comprehends all, and as nothing exists that is not
+contained in it, is entirely perfect. In what, therefore, can it be
+defective, since it is perfect? It cannot want understanding and
+reason, for they are the most desirable of all qualities. The same
+Chrysippus observes also, by the use of similitudes, that everything in
+its kind, when arrived at maturity and perfection, is superior to that
+which is not--as, a horse to a colt, a dog to a puppy, and a man to a
+boy--so whatever is best in the whole universe must exist in some
+complete and perfect being. But nothing is more perfect than the world,
+and nothing better than virtue. Virtue, therefore, is an attribute of
+the world. But human nature is not perfect, and nevertheless virtue is
+produced in it: with how much greater reason, then, do we conceive it
+to be inherent in the world! Therefore the world has virtue, and it is
+also wise, and consequently a Deity.
+
+XV. The divinity of the world being now clearly perceived, we must
+acknowledge the same divinity to be likewise in the stars, which are
+formed from the lightest and purest part of the ether, without a
+mixture of any other matter; and, being altogether hot and transparent,
+we may justly say they have life, sense, and understanding. And
+Cleanthes thinks that it may be established by the evidence of two of
+our senses--feeling and seeing--that they are entirely fiery bodies;
+for the heat and brightness of the sun far exceed any other fire,
+inasmuch as it enlightens the whole universe, covering such a vast
+extent of space, and its power is such that we perceive that it not
+only warms, but often even burns: neither of which it could do if it
+were not of a fiery quality. Since, then, says he, the sun is a fiery
+body, and is nourished by the vapors of the ocean (for no fire can
+continue without some sustenance), it must be either like that fire
+which we use to warm us and dress our food, or like that which is
+contained in the bodies of animals.
+
+And this fire, which the convenience of life requires, is the devourer
+and consumer of everything, and throws into confusion and destroys
+whatever it reaches. On the contrary, the corporeal heat is full of
+life, and salutary; and vivifies, preserves, cherishes, increases, and
+sustains all things, and is productive of sense; therefore, says he,
+there can be no doubt which of these fires the sun is like, since it
+causes all things in their respective kinds to flourish and arrive to
+maturity; and as the fire of the sun is like that which is contained in
+the bodies of animated beings, the sun itself must likewise be
+animated, and so must the other stars also, which arise out of the
+celestial ardor that we call the sky, or firmament.
+
+As, then, some animals are generated in the earth, some in the water,
+and some in the air, Aristotle[123] thinks it ridiculous to imagine
+that no animal is formed in that part of the universe which is the most
+capable to produce them. But the stars are situated in the ethereal
+space; and as this is an element the most subtle, whose motion is
+continual, and whose force does not decay, it follows, of necessity,
+that every animated being which is produced in it must be endowed with
+the quickest sense and the swiftest motion. The stars, therefore, being
+there generated, it is a natural inference to suppose them endued with
+such a degree of sense and understanding as places them in the rank of
+Gods.
+
+XVI. For it may be observed that they who inhabit countries of a pure,
+clear air have a quicker apprehension and a readier genius than those
+who live in a thick, foggy climate. It is thought likewise that the
+nature of a man's diet has an effect on the mind; therefore it is
+probable that the stars are possessed of an excellent understanding,
+inasmuch as they are situated in the ethereal part of the universe, and
+are nourished by the vapors of the earth and sea, which are purified by
+their long passage to the heavens. But the invariable order and regular
+motion of the stars plainly manifest their sense and understanding; for
+all motion which seems to be conducted with reason and harmony supposes
+an intelligent principle, that does not act blindly, or inconsistently,
+or at random. And this regularity and consistent course of the stars
+from all eternity indicates not any natural order, for it is pregnant
+with sound reason, not fortune (for fortune, being a friend to change,
+despises consistency). It follows, therefore, that they move
+spontaneously by their own sense and divinity.
+
+Aristotle also deserves high commendation for his observation that
+everything that moves is either put in motion by natural impulse, or by
+some external force, or of its own accord; and that the sun, and moon,
+and all the stars move; but that those things which are moved by
+natural impulse are either borne downward by their weight, or upward by
+their lightness; neither of which things could be the case with the
+stars, because they move in a regular circle and orbit. Nor can it be
+said that there is some superior force which causes the stars to be
+moved in a manner contrary to nature. For what superior force can there
+be? It follows, therefore, that their motion must be voluntary. And
+whoever is convinced of this must discover not only great ignorance,
+but great impiety likewise, if he denies the existence of the Gods; nor
+is the difference great whether a man denies their existence, or
+deprives them of all design and action; for whatever is wholly inactive
+seems to me not to exist at all. Their existence, therefore, appears so
+plain that I can scarcely think that man in his senses who denies it.
+
+XVII. It now remains that we consider what is the character of the
+Gods. Nothing is more difficult than to divert our thoughts and
+judgment from the information of our corporeal sight, and the view of
+objects which our eyes are accustomed to; and it is this difficulty
+which has had such an influence on the unlearned, and on
+philosophers[124] also who resembled the unlearned multitude, that they
+have been unable to form any idea of the immortal Gods except under the
+clothing of the human figure; the weakness of which opinion Cotta has
+so well confuted that I need not add my thoughts upon it. But as the
+previous idea which we have of the Deity comprehends two things--first
+of all, that he is an animated being; secondly, that there is nothing
+in all nature superior to him--I do not see what can be more consistent
+with this idea and preconception than to attribute a mind and divinity
+to the world,[125] the most excellent of all beings.
+
+Epicurus may be as merry with this notion as he pleases; a man not the
+best qualified for a joker, as not having the wit and sense of his
+country.[126] Let him say that a voluble round Deity is to him
+incomprehensible; yet he shall never dissuade me from a principle which
+he himself approves, for he is of opinion there are Gods when he allows
+that there must be a nature excellently perfect. But it is certain that
+the world is most excellently perfect: nor is it to be doubted that
+whatever has life, sense, reason, and understanding must excel that
+which is destitute of these things. It follows, then, that the world
+has life, sense, reason, and understanding, and is consequently a
+Deity. But this shall soon be made more manifest by the operation of
+these very things which the world causes.
+
+XVIII. In the mean while, Velleius, let me entreat you not to be always
+saying that we are utterly destitute of every sort of learning. The
+cone, you say, the cylinder, and the pyramid, are more beautiful to you
+than the sphere. This is to have different eyes from other men. But
+suppose they are more beautiful to the sight only, which does not
+appear to me, for I can see nothing more beautiful than that figure
+which contains all others, and which has nothing rough in it, nothing
+offensive, nothing cut into angles, nothing broken, nothing swelling,
+and nothing hollow; yet as there are two forms most esteemed,[127] the
+globe in solids (for so the Greek word [Greek: sphaira], I think,
+should be construed), and the circle, or orb, in planes (in Greek,
+[Greek: kyklos]); and as they only have an exact similitude of parts in
+which every extreme is equally distant from the centre, what can we
+imagine in nature to be more just and proper? But if you have never
+raked into this learned dust[128] to find out these things, surely, at
+all events, you natural philosophers must know that equality of motion
+and invariable order could not be preserved in any other figure.
+Nothing, therefore, can be more illiterate than to assert, as you are
+in the habit of doing, that it is doubtful whether the world is round
+or not, because it may possibly be of another shape, and that there are
+innumerable worlds of different forms; which Epicurus, if he ever had
+learned that two and two are equal to four, would not have said. But
+while he judges of what is best by his palate, he does not look up to
+the "palace of heaven," as Ennius calls it.
+
+XIX. For as there are two sorts of stars,[129] one kind of which
+measure their journey from east to west by immutable stages, never in
+the least varying from their usual course, while the other completes a
+double revolution with an equally constant regularity; from each of
+these facts we demonstrate the volubility of the world (which could not
+possibly take place in any but a globular form) and the circular orbits
+of the stars. And first of all the sun, which has the chief rank among
+all the stars, is moved in such a manner that it fills the whole earth
+with its light, and illuminates alternately one part of the earth,
+while it leaves the other in darkness. The shadow of the earth
+interposing causes night; and the intervals of night are equal to those
+of day. And it is the regular approaches and retreats of the sun from
+which arise the regulated degrees of cold and heat. His annual circuit
+is in three hundred and sixty-five days, and nearly six hours
+more.[130] At one time he bends his course to the north, at another to
+the south, and thus produces summer and winter, with the other two
+seasons, one of which succeeds the decline of winter, and the other
+that of summer. And so to these four changes of the seasons we
+attribute the origin and cause of all the productions both of sea and
+land.
+
+The moon completes the same course every month which the sun does in a
+year. The nearer she approaches to the sun, the dimmer light does she
+yield, and when most remote from it she shines with the fullest
+brilliancy; nor are her figure and form only changed in her wane, but
+her situation likewise, which is sometimes in the north and sometimes
+in the south. By this course she has a sort of summer and winter
+solstices; and by her influence she contributes to the nourishment and
+increase of animated beings, and to the ripeness and maturity of all
+vegetables.
+
+XX. But most worthy our admiration is the motion of those five stars
+which are falsely called wandering stars; for they cannot be said to
+wander which keep from all eternity their approaches and retreats, and
+have all the rest of their motions, in one regular constant and
+established order. What is yet more wonderful in these stars which we
+are speaking of is that sometimes they appear, and sometimes they
+disappear; sometimes they advance towards the sun, and sometimes they
+retreat; sometimes they precede him, and sometimes follow him;
+sometimes they move faster, sometimes slower, and sometimes they do not
+stir in the least, but for a while stand still. From these unequal
+motions of the planets, mathematicians have called that the "great
+year"[131] in which the sun, moon, and five wandering stars, having
+finished their revolutions, are found in their original situation. In
+how long a time this is effected is much disputed, but it must be a
+certain and definite period. For the planet Saturn (called by the
+Greeks [Greek: Phainon]), which is farthest from the earth, finishes
+his course in about thirty years; and in his course there is something
+very singular, for sometimes he moves before the sun, sometimes he
+keeps behind it; at one time lying hidden in the night, at another
+again appearing in the morning; and ever performing the same motions in
+the same space of time without any alteration, so as to be for infinite
+ages regular in these courses. Beneath this planet, and nearer the
+earth, is Jupiter, called [Greek: Phaethon], which passes the same
+orbit of the twelve signs[132] in twelve years, and goes through
+exactly the same variety in its course that the star of Saturn does.
+Next to Jupiter is the planet Mars (in Greek, [Greek: Pyroeis]), which
+finishes its revolution through the same orbit as the two previously
+mentioned,[133] in twenty-four months, wanting six days, as I imagine.
+Below this is Mercury (called by the Greeks [Greek: Stilbon]), which
+performs the same course in little less than a year, and is never
+farther distant from the sun than the space of one sign, whether it
+precedes or follows it. The lowest of the five planets, and nearest the
+earth, is that of Venus (called in Greek [Greek: Phosphoros]). Before
+the rising of the sun, it is called the morning-star, and after the
+setting, the evening-star. It has the same revolution through the
+zodiac, both as to latitude and longitude, with the other planets, in a
+year, and never is more than two[134] signs from the sun, whether it
+precedes or follows it.
+
+XXI. I cannot, therefore, conceive that this constant course of the
+planets, this just agreement in such various motions through all
+eternity, can be preserved without a mind, reason, and consideration;
+and since we may perceive these qualities in the stars, we cannot but
+place them in the rank of Gods. Those which are called the fixed stars
+have the same indications of reason and prudence. Their motion is
+daily, regular, and constant. They do not move with the sky, nor have
+they an adhesion to the firmament, as they who are ignorant of natural
+philosophy affirm. For the sky, which is thin, transparent, and
+suffused with an equal heat, does not seem by its nature to have power
+to whirl about the stars, or to be proper to contain them. The fixed
+stars, therefore, have their own sphere, separate and free from any
+conjunction with the sky. Their perpetual courses, with that admirable
+and incredible regularity of theirs, so plainly declare a divine power
+and mind to be in them, that he who cannot perceive that they are also
+endowed with divine power must be incapable of all perception whatever.
+
+In the heavens, therefore, there is nothing fortuitous, unadvised,
+inconstant, or variable: all there is order, truth, reason, and
+constancy; and all the things which are destitute of these qualities
+are counterfeit, deceitful, and erroneous, and have their residence
+about the earth[135] beneath the moon, the lowest of all the planets.
+He, therefore, who believes that this admirable order and almost
+incredible regularity of the heavenly bodies, by which the preservation
+and entire safety of all things is secured, is destitute of
+intelligence, must be considered to be himself wholly destitute of all
+intellect whatever.
+
+I think, then, I shall not deceive myself in maintaining this dispute
+upon the principle of Zeno, who went the farthest in his search after
+truth.
+
+XXII. Zeno, then, defines nature to be "an artificial fire, proceeding
+in a regular way to generation;" for he thinks that to create and beget
+are especial properties of art, and that whatever may be wrought by the
+hands of our artificers is much more skilfully performed by nature,
+that is, by this artificial fire, which is the master of all other
+arts.
+
+According to this manner of reasoning, every particular nature is
+artificial, as it operates agreeably to a certain method peculiar to
+itself; but that universal nature which embraces all things is said by
+Zeno to be not only artificial, but absolutely the artificer, ever
+thinking and providing all things useful and proper; and as every
+particular nature owes its rise and increase to its own proper seed, so
+universal nature has all her motions voluntary, has affections and
+desires (by the Greeks called [Greek: hormas]) productive of actions
+agreeable to them, like us, who have sense and understanding to direct
+us. Such, then, is the intelligence of the universe; for which reason
+it may be properly termed prudence or providence (in Greek, [Greek:
+pronoia]), since her chiefest care and employment is to provide all
+things fit for its duration, that it may want nothing, and, above all,
+that it may be adorned with all perfection of beauty and ornament.
+
+XXIII. Thus far have I spoken concerning the universe, and also of the
+stars; from whence it is apparent that there is almost an infinite
+number of Gods, always in action, but without labor or fatigue; for
+they are not composed of veins, nerves, and bones; their food and drink
+are not such as cause humors too gross or too subtle; nor are their
+bodies such as to be subject to the fear of falls or blows, or in
+danger of diseases from a weariness of limbs. Epicurus, to secure his
+Gods from such accidents, has made them only outlines of Deities, void
+of action; but our Gods being of the most beautiful form, and situated
+in the purest region of the heavens, dispose and rule their course in
+such a manner that they seem to contribute to the support and
+preservation of all things.
+
+Besides these, there are many other natures which have with reason been
+deified by the wisest Grecians, and by our ancestors, in consideration
+of the benefits derived from them; for they were persuaded that
+whatever was of great utility to human kind must proceed from divine
+goodness, and the name of the Deity was applied to that which the Deity
+produced, as when we call corn Ceres, and wine Bacchus; whence that
+saying of Terence,[136]
+
+    Without Ceres and Bacchus, Venus starves.
+
+And any quality, also, in which there was any singular virtue was
+nominated a Deity, such as Faith and Wisdom, which are placed among the
+divinities in the Capitol; the last by AEmilius Scaurus, but Faith was
+consecrated before by Atilius Calatinus. You see the temple of Virtue
+and that of Honor repaired by M. Marcellus, erected formerly, in the
+Ligurian war, by Q. Maximus. Need I mention those dedicated to Help,
+Safety, Concord, Liberty, and Victory, which have been called Deities,
+because their efficacy has been so great that it could not have
+proceeded from any but from some divine power? In like manner are the
+names of Cupid, Voluptas, and of Lubentine Venus consecrated, though
+they were things vicious and not natural, whatever Velleius may think
+to the contrary, for they frequently stimulate nature in too violent a
+manner. Everything, then, from which any great utility proceeded was
+deified; and, indeed, the names I have just now mentioned are
+declaratory of the particular virtue of each Deity.
+
+XXIV. It has been a general custom likewise, that men who have done
+important service to the public should be exalted to heaven by fame and
+universal consent. Thus Hercules, Castor and Pollux, AEsculapius, and
+Liber became Gods (I mean Liber[137] the son of Semele, and not
+him[138] whom our ancestors consecrated in such state and solemnity
+with Ceres and Libera; the difference in which may be seen in our
+Mysteries.[139] But because the offsprings of our bodies are called
+"Liberi" (children), therefore the offsprings of Ceres are called Liber
+and Libera (Libera[140] is the feminine, and Liber the masculine); thus
+likewise Romulus, or Quirinus--for they are thought to be the
+same--became a God.
+
+They are justly esteemed as Deities, since their souls subsist and
+enjoy eternity, from whence they are perfect and immortal beings.
+
+There is another reason, too, and that founded on natural philosophy,
+which has greatly contributed to the number of Deities; namely, the
+custom of representing in human form a crowd of Gods who have supplied
+the poets with fables, and filled mankind with all sorts of
+superstition. Zeno has treated of this subject, but it has been
+discussed more at length by Cleanthes and Chrysippus. All Greece was of
+opinion that Coelum was castrated by his son Saturn,[141] and that
+Saturn was chained by his son Jupiter. In these impious fables, a
+physical and not inelegant meaning is contained; for they would denote
+that the celestial, most exalted, and ethereal nature--that is, the
+fiery nature, which produces all things by itself--is destitute of that
+part of the body which is necessary for the act of generation by
+conjunction with another.
+
+XXV. By Saturn they mean that which comprehends the course and
+revolution of times and seasons; the Greek name for which Deity implies
+as much, for he is called [Greek: Kronos,] which is the same with
+[Greek: Chronos], that is, a "space of time." But he is called Saturn,
+because he is filled (_saturatur_) with years; and he is usually
+feigned to have devoured his children, because time, ever insatiable,
+consumes the rolling years; but to restrain him from immoderate haste,
+Jupiter has confined him to the course of the stars, which are as
+chains to him. Jupiter (that is, _juvans pater_) signifies a "helping
+father," whom, by changing the cases, we call Jove,[142] _a juvando_.
+The poets call him "father of Gods and men;"[143] and our ancestors
+"the most good, the most great;" and as there is something more
+glorious in itself, and more agreeable to others, to be good (that is,
+beneficent) than to be great, the title of "most good" precedes that of
+"most great." This, then, is he whom Ennius means in the following
+passage, before quoted--
+
+    Look up to the refulgent heaven above,
+    Which all men call, unanimously, Jove:
+
+which is more plainly expressed than in this other passage[144] of the
+same poet--
+
+    On whose account I'll curse that flood of light,
+    Whate'er it is above that shines so bright.
+
+Our augurs also mean the same, when, for the "thundering and lightning
+heaven," they say the "thundering and lightning Jove." Euripides, among
+many excellent things, has this:
+
+    The vast, expanded, boundless sky behold,
+    See it with soft embrace the earth enfold;
+    This own the chief of Deities above,
+    And this acknowledge by the name of Jove.
+
+XXVI. The air, according to the Stoics, which is between the sea and
+the heaven, is consecrated by the name of Juno, and is called the
+sister and wife of Jove, because it resembles the sky, and is in close
+conjunction with it. They have made it feminine, because there is
+nothing softer. But I believe it is called Juno, _a juvando_ (from
+helping).
+
+To make three separate kingdoms, by fable, there remained yet the water
+and the earth. The dominion of the sea is given, therefore, to Neptune,
+a brother, as he is called, of Jove; whose name, Neptunus--as
+_Portunus, a portu_, from a port--is derived _a nando_ (from swimming),
+the first letters being a little changed. The sovereignty and power
+over the earth is the portion of a God, to whom we, as well as the
+Greeks, have given a name that denotes riches (in Latin, _Dis_; in
+Greek, [Greek: Plouton]), because all things arise from the earth and
+return to it. He forced away Proserpine (in Greek called [Greek:
+Persephone]), by which the poets mean the "seed of corn," from whence
+comes their fiction of Ceres, the mother of Proserpine, seeking for her
+daughter, who was hidden from her. She is called Ceres, which is the
+same as Geres--_a gerendis frugibus_[145]--"from bearing fruit," the
+first letter of the word being altered after the manner of the Greeks,
+for by them she is called [Greek: Demeter], the same as [Greek:
+Gemeter].[146] Again, he (_qui magna vorteret_) "who brings about
+mighty changes" is called Mavors; and Minerva is so called because
+(_minueret_, or _minaretur_) she diminishes or menaces.
+
+XXVII. And as the beginnings and endings of all things are of the
+greatest importance, therefore they would have their sacrifices to
+begin with Janus.[147] His name is derived _ab eundo_, from passing;
+from whence thorough passages are called _jani_, and the outward doors
+of common houses are called _januae_. The name of Vesta is, from the
+Greeks, the same with their [Greek: Hestia]. Her province is over
+altars and hearths; and in the name of this Goddess, who is the keeper
+of all things within, prayers and sacrifices are concluded. The _Dii
+Penates_, "household Gods," have some affinity with this power, and are
+so called either from _penus_, "all kind of human provisions," or
+because _penitus insident_ (they reside within), from which, by the
+poets, they are called _penetrales_ also. Apollo, a Greek name, is
+called _Sol_, the sun; and Diana, _Luna_, the moon. The sun (_sol_) is
+so named either because he is _solus_ (alone), so eminent above all the
+stars; or because he obscures all the stars, and appears alone as soon
+as he rises. _Luna_, the moon, is so called _a lucendo_ (from shining);
+she bears the name also of Lucina: and as in Greece the women in labor
+invoke Diana Lucifera, so here they invoke Juno Lucina. She is likewise
+called Diana _omnivaga_, not _a venando_ (from hunting), but because
+she is reckoned one of the seven stars that seem to wander.[148] She is
+called Diana because she makes a kind of day of the night;[149] and
+presides over births, because the delivery is effected sometimes in
+seven, or at most in nine, courses of the moon; which, because they
+make _mensa spatia_ (measured spaces), are called _menses_ (months).
+This occasioned a pleasant observation of Timaeus (as he has many).
+Having said in his history that "the same night in which Alexander was
+born, the temple of Diana at Ephesus was burned down," he adds, "It is
+not in the least to be wondered at, because Diana, being willing to
+assist at the labor of Olympias,[150] was absent from home." But to
+this Goddess, because _ad res omnes veniret_--"she has an influence
+upon all things"--we have given the appellation of Venus,[151] from
+whom the word _venustas_ (beauty) is rather derived than Venus from
+_venustas_.
+
+XXVIII. Do you not see, therefore, how, from the productions of nature
+and the useful inventions of men, have arisen fictitious and imaginary
+Deities, which have been the foundation of false opinions, pernicious
+errors, and wretched superstitions? For we know how the different forms
+of the Gods--their ages, apparel, ornaments; their pedigrees,
+marriages, relations, and everything belonging to them--are adapted to
+human weakness and represented with our passions; with lust, sorrow,
+and anger, according to fabulous history: they have had wars and
+combats, not only, as Homer relates, when they have interested
+themselves in two different armies, but when they have fought battles
+in their own defence against the Titans and giants. These stories, of
+the greatest weakness and levity, are related and believed with the
+most implicit folly.
+
+But, rejecting these fables with contempt, a Deity is diffused in every
+part of nature; in earth under the name of Ceres, in the sea under the
+name of Neptune, in other parts under other names. Yet whatever they
+are, and whatever characters and dispositions they have, and whatever
+name custom has given them, we are bound to worship and adore them. The
+best, the chastest, the most sacred and pious worship of the Gods is to
+reverence them always with a pure, perfect, and unpolluted mind and
+voice; for our ancestors, as well as the philosophers, have separated
+superstition from religion. They who prayed whole days and sacrificed,
+that their children might survive them (_ut superstites essent_), were
+called superstitious, which word became afterward more general; but
+they who diligently perused, and, as we may say, read or practised over
+again, all the duties relating to the worship of the Gods, were called
+_religiosi_--religious, from _relegendo_--"reading over again, or
+practising;" as _elegantes_, elegant, _ex eligendo_, "from choosing,
+making a good choice;" _diligentes_, diligent, _ex diligendo_, "from
+attending on what we love;" _intelligentes_, intelligent, from
+understanding--for the signification is derived in the same manner.
+Thus are the words superstitious and religious understood; the one
+being a term of reproach, the other of commendation. I think I have now
+sufficiently demonstrated that there are Gods, and what they are.
+
+XXIX. I am now to show that the world is governed by the providence of
+the Gods. This is an important point, which you Academics endeavor to
+confound; and, indeed, the whole contest is with you, Cotta; for your
+sect, Velleius, know very little of what is said on different subjects
+by other schools. You read and have a taste only for your own books,
+and condemn all others without examination. For instance, when you
+mentioned yesterday[152] that prophetic old dame [Greek: Pronoia],
+Providence, invented by the Stoics, you were led into that error by
+imagining that Providence was made by them to be a particular Deity
+that governs the whole universe, whereas it is only spoken in a short
+manner; as when it is said "The commonwealth of Athens is governed by
+the council," it is meant "of the Areopagus;"[153] so when we say "The
+world is governed by providence," we mean "by the providence of the
+Gods." To express ourselves, therefore, more fully and clearly, we say,
+"The world is governed by the providence of the Gods." Be not,
+therefore, lavish of your railleries, of which your sect has little to
+spare: if I may advise you, do not attempt it. It does not become you,
+it is not your talent, nor is it in your power. This is not applied to
+you in particular who have the education and politeness of a Roman, but
+to all your sect in general, and especially to your leader[154]--a man
+unpolished, illiterate, insulting, without wit, without reputation,
+without elegance.
+
+XXX. I assert, then, that the universe, with all its parts, was
+originally constituted, and has, without any cessation, been ever
+governed by the providence of the Gods. This argument we Stoics
+commonly divide into three parts; the first of which is, that the
+existence of the Gods being once known, it must follow that the world
+is governed by their wisdom; the second, that as everything is under
+the direction of an intelligent nature, which has produced that
+beautiful order in the world, it is evident that it is formed from
+animating principles; the third is deduced from those glorious works
+which we behold in the heavens and the earth.
+
+First, then, we must either deny the existence of the Gods (as
+Democritus and Epicurus by their doctrine of images in some sort do),
+or, if we acknowledge that there are Gods, we must believe they are
+employed, and that, too, in something excellent. Now, nothing is so
+excellent as the administration of the universe. The universe,
+therefore, is governed by the wisdom of the Gods. Otherwise, we must
+imagine that there is some cause superior to the Deity, whether it be a
+nature inanimate, or a necessity agitated by a mighty force, that
+produces those beautiful works which we behold. The nature of the Gods
+would then be neither supreme nor excellent, if you subject it to that
+necessity or to that nature, by which you would make the heaven, the
+earth, and the seas to be governed. But there is nothing superior to
+the Deity; the world, therefore, must be governed by him: consequently,
+the Deity is under no obedience or subjection to nature, but does
+himself rule over all nature. In effect, if we allow the Gods have
+understanding, we allow also their providence, which regards the most
+important things; for, can they be ignorant of those important things,
+and how they are to be conducted and preserved, or do they want power
+to sustain and direct them? Ignorance is inconsistent with the nature
+of the Gods, and imbecility is repugnant to their majesty. From whence
+it follows, as we assert, that the world is governed by the providence
+of the Gods.
+
+XXXI. But supposing, which is incontestable, that there are Gods, they
+must be animated, and not only animated, but endowed with
+reason--united, as we may say, in a civil agreement and society, and
+governing together one universe, as a republic or city. Thus the same
+reason, the same verity, the same law, which ordains good and prohibits
+evil, exists in the Gods as it does in men. From them, consequently, we
+have prudence and understanding, for which reason our ancestors erected
+temples to the Mind, Faith, Virtue, and Concord. Shall we not then
+allow the Gods to have these perfections, since we worship the sacred
+and august images of them? But if understanding, faith, virtue, and
+concord reside in human kind, how could they come on earth, unless from
+heaven? And if we are possessed of wisdom, reason, and prudence, the
+Gods must have the same qualities in a greater degree; and not only
+have them, but employ them in the best and greatest works. The universe
+is the best and greatest work; therefore it must be governed by the
+wisdom and providence of the Gods.
+
+Lastly, as we have sufficiently shown that those glorious and luminous
+bodies which we behold are Deities--I mean the sun, the moon, the fixed
+and wandering stars, the firmament, and the world itself, and those
+other things also which have any singular virtue, and are of any great
+utility to human kind--it follows that all things are governed by
+providence and a divine mind. But enough has been said on the first
+part.
+
+XXXII. It is now incumbent on me to prove that all things are subjected
+to nature, and most beautifully directed by her. But, first of all, it
+is proper to explain precisely what that nature is, in order to come to
+the more easy understanding of what I would demonstrate. Some think
+that nature is a certain irrational power exciting in bodies the
+necessary motions. Others, that it is an intelligent power, acting by
+order and method, designing some end in every cause, and always aiming
+at that end, whose works express such skill as no art, no hand, can
+imitate; for, they say, such is the virtue of its seed, that, however
+small it is, if it falls into a place proper for its reception, and
+meets with matter conducive to its nourishment and increase, it forms
+and produces everything in its respective kind; either vegetables,
+which receive their nourishment from their roots; or animals, endowed
+with motion, sense, appetite, and abilities to beget their likeness.
+
+Some apply the word nature to everything; as Epicurus does, who
+acknowledges no cause, but atoms, a vacuum, and their accidents. But
+when we[155] say that nature forms and governs the world, we do not
+apply it to a clod of earth, or piece of stone, or anything of that
+sort, whose parts have not the necessary cohesion,[156] but to a tree,
+in which there is not the appearance of chance, but of order and a
+resemblance of art.
+
+XXXIII. But if the art of nature gives life and increase to vegetables,
+without doubt it supports the earth itself; for, being impregnated with
+seeds, she produces every kind of vegetable, and embracing their roots,
+she nourishes and increases them; while, in her turn, she receives her
+nourishment from the other elements, and by her exhalations gives
+proper sustenance to the air, the sky, and all the superior bodies. If
+nature gives vigor and support to the earth, by the same reason she has
+an influence over the rest of the world; for as the earth gives
+nourishment to vegetables, so the air is the preservation of animals.
+The air sees with us, hears with us, and utters sounds with us; without
+it, there would be no seeing, hearing, or sounding. It even moves with
+us; for wherever we go, whatever motion we make, it seems to retire and
+give place to us.
+
+That which inclines to the centre, that which rises from it to the
+surface, and that which rolls about the centre, constitute the
+universal world, and make one entire nature; and as there are four
+sorts of bodies, the continuance of nature is caused by their
+reciprocal changes; for the water arises from the earth, the air from
+the water, and the fire from the air; and, reversing this order, the
+air arises from fire, the water from the air, and from the water the
+earth, the lowest of the four elements, of which all beings are formed.
+Thus by their continual motions backward and forward, upward and
+downward, the conjunction of the several parts of the universe is
+preserved; a union which, in the beauty we now behold it, must be
+eternal, or at least of a very long duration, and almost for an
+infinite space of time; and, whichever it is, the universe must of
+consequence be governed by nature. For what art of navigating fleets,
+or of marshalling an army, and--to instance the produce of nature--what
+vine, what tree, what animated form and conformation of their members,
+give us so great an indication of skill as appears in the universe?
+Therefore we must either deny that there is the least trace of an
+intelligent nature, or acknowledge that the world is governed by it.
+But since the universe contains all particular beings, as well as their
+seeds, can we say that it is not itself governed by nature? That would
+be the same as saying that the teeth and the beard of man are the work
+of nature, but that the man himself is not. Thus the effect would be
+understood to be greater than the cause.
+
+XXXIV. Now, the universe sows, as I may say, plants, produces, raises,
+nourishes, and preserves what nature administers, as members and parts
+of itself. If nature, therefore, governs them, she must also govern the
+universe. And, lastly, in nature's administration there is nothing
+faulty. She produced the best possible effect out of those elements
+which existed. Let any one show how it could have been better. But that
+can never be; and whoever attempts to mend it will either make it
+worse, or aim at impossibilities.
+
+But if all the parts of the universe are so constituted that nothing
+could be better for use or beauty, let us consider whether this is the
+effect of chance, or whether, in such a state they could possibly
+cohere, but by the direction of wisdom and divine providence. Nature,
+therefore, cannot be void of reason, if art can bring nothing to
+perfection without it, and if the works of nature exceed those of art.
+How is it consistent with common-sense that when you view an image or a
+picture, you imagine it is wrought by art; when you behold afar off a
+ship under sail, you judge it is steered by reason and art; when you
+see a dial or water-clock,[157] you believe the hours are shown by art,
+and not by chance; and yet that you should imagine that the universe,
+which contains all arts and the artificers, can be void of reason and
+understanding?
+
+But if that sphere which was lately made by our friend Posidonius, the
+regular revolutions of which show the course of the sun, moon, and five
+wandering stars, as it is every day and night performed, were carried
+into Scythia or Britain, who, in those barbarous countries, would doubt
+that that sphere had been made so perfect by the exertion of reason?
+
+XXXV. Yet these people[158] doubt whether the universe, from whence all
+things arise and are made, is not the effect of chance, or some
+necessity, rather than the work of reason and a divine mind. According
+to them, Archimedes shows more knowledge in representing the motions of
+the celestial globe than nature does in causing them, though the copy
+is so infinitely beneath the original. The shepherd in Attius,[159] who
+had never seen a ship, when he perceived from a mountain afar off the
+divine vessel of the Argonauts, surprised and frighted at this new
+object, expressed himself in this manner:
+
+    What horrid bulk is that before my eyes,
+    Which o'er the deep with noise and vigor flies?
+    It turns the whirlpools up, its force so strong,
+    And drives the billows as it rolls along.
+    The ocean's violence it fiercely braves;
+    Runs furious on, and throws about the waves.
+    Swiftly impetuous in its course, and loud,
+    Like the dire bursting of a show'ry cloud;
+    Or, like a rock, forced by the winds and rain,
+    Now whirl'd aloft, then plunged into the main.
+    But hold! perhaps the Earth and Neptune jar,
+    And fiercely wage an elemental war;
+    Or Triton with his trident has o'erthrown
+    His den, and loosen'd from the roots the stone;
+    The rocky fragment, from the bottom torn,
+    Is lifted up, and on the surface borne.
+
+At first he is in suspense at the sight of this unknown object; but on
+seeing the young mariners, and hearing their singing, he says,
+
+    Like sportive dolphins, with their snouts they roar;[160]
+
+and afterward goes on,
+
+    Loud in my ears methinks their voices ring,
+    As if I heard the God Sylvanus sing.
+
+As at first view the shepherd thinks he sees something inanimate and
+insensible, but afterward, judging by more trustworthy indications, he
+begins to figure to himself what it is; so philosophers, if they are
+surprised at first at the sight of the universe, ought, when they have
+considered the regular, uniform, and immutable motions of it, to
+conceive that there is some Being that is not only an inhabitant of
+this celestial and divine mansion, but a ruler and a governor, as
+architect of this mighty fabric.
+
+XXXVI. Now, in my opinion, they[161] do not seem to have even the least
+suspicion that the heavens and earth afford anything marvellous. For,
+in the first place, the earth is situated in the middle part of the
+universe, and is surrounded on all sides by the air, which we breathe,
+and which is called "aer,"[162] which, indeed, is a Greek word; but by
+constant use it is well understood by our countrymen, for, indeed, it
+is employed as a Latin word. The air is encompassed by the boundless
+ether (sky), which consists of the fires above. This word we borrow
+also, for we use _aether_ in Latin as well as _aer;_ though Pacuvius
+thus expresses it,
+
+                       --This, of which I speak,
+    In Latin's _coelum_, _aether_ call'd in Greek.
+
+As though he were not a Greek into whose mouth he puts this sentence;
+but he is speaking in Latin, though we listen as if he were speaking
+Greek; for, as he says elsewhere,
+
+    His speech discovers him a Grecian born.
+
+But to return to more important matters. In the sky innumerable fiery
+stars exist, of which the sun is the chief, enlightening all with his
+refulgent splendor, and being by many degrees larger than the whole
+earth; and this multitude of vast fires are so far from hurting the
+earth, and things terrestrial, that they are of benefit to them;
+whereas, if they were moved from their stations, we should inevitably
+be burned through the want of a proper moderation and temperature of
+heat.
+
+XXXVII. Is it possible for any man to behold these things, and yet
+imagine that certain solid and individual bodies move by their natural
+force and gravitation, and that a world so beautifully adorned was made
+by their fortuitous concourse? He who believes this may as well believe
+that if a great quantity of the one-and-twenty letters, composed either
+of gold or any other matter, were thrown upon the ground, they would
+fall into such order as legibly to form the Annals of Ennius. I doubt
+whether fortune could make a single verse of them. How, therefore, can
+these people assert that the world was made by the fortuitous concourse
+of atoms, which have no color, no quality--which the Greeks call
+[Greek: poiotes], no sense? or that there are innumerable worlds, some
+rising and some perishing, in every moment of time? But if a concourse
+of atoms can make a world, why not a porch, a temple, a house, a city,
+which are works of less labor and difficulty?
+
+Certainly those men talk so idly and inconsiderately concerning this
+lower world that they appear to me never to have contemplated the
+wonderful magnificence of the heavens; which is the next topic for our
+consideration.
+
+Well, then, did Aristotle[163] observe: "If there were men whose
+habitations had been always underground, in great and commodious
+houses, adorned with statues and pictures, furnished with everything
+which they who are reputed happy abound with; and if, without stirring
+from thence, they should be informed of a certain divine power and
+majesty, and, after some time, the earth should open, and they should
+quit their dark abode to come to us, where they should immediately
+behold the earth, the seas, the heavens; should consider the vast
+extent of the clouds and force of the winds; should see the sun, and
+observe his grandeur and beauty, and also his generative power,
+inasmuch as day is occasioned by the diffusion of his light through the
+sky; and when night has obscured the earth, they should contemplate the
+heavens bespangled and adorned with stars, the surprising variety of
+the moon in her increase and wane, the rising and setting of all the
+stars, and the inviolable regularity of their courses; when," says he,
+"they should see these things, they would undoubtedly conclude that
+there are Gods, and that these are their mighty works."
+
+XXXVIII. Thus far Aristotle. Let us imagine, also, as great darkness as
+was formerly occasioned by the irruption of the fires of Mount AEtna,
+which are said to have obscured the adjacent countries for two days to
+such a degree that no man could recognize his fellow; but on the third,
+when the sun appeared, they seemed to be risen from the dead. Now, if
+we should be suddenly brought from a state of eternal darkness to see
+the light, how beautiful would the heavens seem! But our minds have
+become used to it from the daily practice and habituation of our eyes,
+nor do we take the trouble to search into the principles of what is
+always in view; as if the novelty, rather than the importance, of
+things ought to excite us to investigate their causes.
+
+Is he worthy to be called a man who attributes to chance, not to an
+intelligent cause, the constant motion of the heavens, the regular
+courses of the stars, the agreeable proportion and connection of all
+things, conducted with so much reason that our intellect itself is
+unable to estimate it rightly? When we see machines move artificially,
+as a sphere, a clock, or the like, do we doubt whether they are the
+productions of reason? And when we behold the heavens moving with a
+prodigious celerity, and causing an annual succession of the different
+seasons of the year, which vivify and preserve all things, can we doubt
+that this world is directed, I will not say only by reason, but by
+reason most excellent and divine? For without troubling ourselves with
+too refined a subtlety of discussion, we may use our eyes to
+contemplate the beauty of those things which we assert have been
+arranged by divine providence.
+
+XXXIX. First, let us examine the earth, whose situation is in the
+middle of the universe,[164] solid, round, and conglobular by its
+natural tendency; clothed with flowers, herbs, trees, and fruits; the
+whole in multitudes incredible, and with a variety suitable to every
+taste: let us consider the ever-cool and running springs, the clear
+waters of the rivers, the verdure of their banks, the hollow depths of
+caves, the cragginess of rocks, the heights of impending mountains, and
+the boundless extent of plains, the hidden veins of gold and silver,
+and the infinite quarries of marble.
+
+What and how various are the kinds of animals, tame or wild? The
+flights and notes of birds? How do the beasts live in the fields and in
+the forests? What shall I say of men, who, being appointed, as we may
+say, to cultivate the earth, do not suffer its fertility to be choked
+with weeds, nor the ferocity of beasts to make it desolate; who, by the
+houses and cities which they build, adorn the fields, the isles, and
+the shores? If we could view these objects with the naked eye, as we
+can by the contemplation of the mind, nobody, at such a sight, would
+doubt there was a divine intelligence.
+
+But how beautiful is the sea! How pleasant to see the extent of it!
+What a multitude and variety of islands! How delightful are the coasts!
+What numbers and what diversity of inhabitants does it contain; some
+within the bosom of it, some floating on the surface, and others by
+their shells cleaving to the rocks! While the sea itself, approaching
+to the land, sports so closely to its shores that those two elements
+appear to be but one.
+
+Next above the sea is the air, diversified by day and night: when
+rarefied, it possesses the higher region; when condensed, it turns into
+clouds, and with the waters which it gathers enriches the earth by the
+rain. Its agitation produces the winds. It causes heat and cold
+according to the different seasons. It sustains birds in their flight;
+and, being inhaled, nourishes and preserves all animated beings.
+
+XL. Add to these, which alone remaineth to be mentioned, the firmament
+of heaven, a region the farthest from our abodes, which surrounds and
+contains all things. It is likewise called ether, or sky, the extreme
+bounds and limits of the universe, in which the stars perform their
+appointed courses in a most wonderful manner; among which, the sun,
+whose magnitude far surpasses the earth, makes his revolution round it,
+and by his rising and setting causes day and night; sometimes coming
+near towards the earth, and sometimes going from it, he every year
+makes two contrary reversions[165] from the extreme point of its
+course. In his retreat the earth seems locked up in sadness; in his
+return it appears exhilarated with the heavens. The moon, which, as
+mathematicians demonstrate, is bigger than half the earth, makes her
+revolutions through the same spaces[166] as the sun; but at one time
+approaching, and at another receding from, the sun, she diffuses the
+light which she has borrowed from him over the whole earth, and has
+herself also many various changes in her appearance. When she is found
+under the sun, and opposite to it, the brightness of her rays is lost;
+but when the earth directly interposes between the moon and sun, the
+moon is totally eclipsed. The other wandering stars have their courses
+round the earth in the same spaces,[167] and rise and set in the same
+manner; their motions are sometimes quick, sometimes slow, and often
+they stand still. There is nothing more wonderful, nothing more
+beautiful. There is a vast number of fixed stars, distinguished by the
+names of certain figures, to which we find they have some resemblance.
+
+XLI. I will here, says Balbus, looking at me, make use of the verses
+which, when you were young, you translated from Aratus,[168] and which,
+because they are in Latin, gave me so much delight that I have many of
+them still in my memory. As then, we daily see, without any change or
+variation,
+
+                                     --the rest[169]
+    Swiftly pursue the course to which they're bound;
+    And with the heavens the days and nights go round;
+
+the contemplation of which, to a mind desirous of observing the
+constancy of nature, is inexhaustible.
+
+    The extreme top of either point is call'd
+    The pole.[170]
+
+About this the two [Greek: Arktoi] are turned, which never set;
+
+    Of these, the Greeks one Cynosura call,
+    The other Helice.[171]
+
+The brightest stars,[172] indeed, of Helice are discernible all night,
+
+    Which are by us Septentriones call'd.
+
+Cynosura moves about the same pole, with a like number of stars, and
+ranged in the same order:
+
+    This[173] the Phoenicians choose to make their guide
+    When on the ocean in the night they ride.
+    Adorned with stars of more refulgent light,
+    The other[174] shines, and first appears at night.
+    Though this is small, sailors its use have found;
+    More inward is its course, and short its round.
+
+XLII. The aspect of those stars is the more admirable, because,
+
+    The Dragon grim between them bends his way,
+    As through the winding banks the currents stray,
+    And up and down in sinuous bending rolls.[175]
+
+His whole form is excellent; but the shape of his head and the ardor of
+his eyes are most remarkable.
+
+    Various the stars which deck his glittering head;
+    His temples are with double glory spread;
+    From his fierce eyes two fervid lights afar
+    Flash, and his chin shines with one radiant star;
+    Bow'd is his head; and his round neck he bends,
+    And to the tail of Helice[176] extends.
+
+The rest of the Dragon's body we see[177] at every hour in the night.
+
+    Here[178] suddenly the head a little hides
+    Itself, where all its parts, which are in sight,
+    And those unseen in the same place unite.
+
+Near to this head
+
+    Is placed the figure of a man that moves
+    Weary and sad,
+
+which the Greeks
+
+    Engonasis do call, because he's borne[179]
+    About with bended knee. Near him is placed
+    The crown with a refulgent lustre graced.
+
+This indeed is at his back; but Anguitenens (the Snake-holder) is near
+his head:[180]
+
+    The Greeks him Ophiuchus call, renown'd
+    The name. He strongly grasps the serpent round
+    With both his hands; himself the serpent folds
+    Beneath his breast, and round his middle holds;
+    Yet gravely he, bright shining in the skies,
+    Moves on, and treads on Nepa's[181] breast and eyes.
+
+The Septentriones[182] are followed by--
+
+    Arctophylax,[183] that's said to be the same
+    Which we Booetes call, who has the name,
+    Because he drives the Greater Bear along
+    Yoked to a wain.
+
+Besides, in Booetes,
+
+    A star of glittering rays about his waist,
+    Arcturus called, a name renown'd, is placed.[184]
+
+Beneath which is
+
+    The Virgin of illustrious form, whose hand
+    Holds a bright spike.
+
+XLIII. And truly these signs are so regularly disposed that a divine
+wisdom evidently appears in them:
+
+    Beneath the Bear's[185] head have the Twins their seat,
+    Under his chest the Crab, beneath his feet
+    The mighty Lion darts a trembling flame.[186]
+
+The Charioteer
+
+    On the left side of Gemini we see,[187]
+    And at his head behold fierce Helice;
+    On his left shoulder the bright Goat appears.
+
+But to proceed--
+
+    This is indeed a great and glorious star,
+    On th' other side the Kids, inferior far,
+    Yield but a slender light to mortal eyes.
+
+Under his feet
+
+    The horned bull,[188] with sturdy limbs, is placed:
+
+his head is spangled with a number of stars;
+
+    These by the Greeks are called the Hyades,
+
+from raining; for [Greek: hyein] is to rain: therefore they are
+injudiciously called _Suculae_ by our people, as if they had their name
+from [Greek: hys], a sow, and not from [Greek: hyo].
+
+Behind the Lesser Bear, Cepheus[189] follows with extended hands,
+
+    For close behind the Lesser Bear he comes.
+
+Before him goes
+
+    Cassiopea[190] with a faintish light;
+    But near her moves (fair and illustrious sight!)
+    Andromeda,[191] who, with an eager pace,
+    Seems to avoid her parent's mournful face.[192]
+    With glittering mane the Horse[193] now seems to tread,
+    So near he comes, on her refulgent head;
+    With a fair star, that close to him appears,
+    A double form[194] and but one light he wears;
+    By which he seems ambitious in the sky
+    An everlasting knot of stars to tie.
+    Near him the Ram, with wreathed horns, is placed;
+
+by whom
+
+    The Fishes[195] are; of which one seems to haste
+    Somewhat before the other, to the blast
+    Of the north wind exposed.
+
+XLIV. Perseus is described as placed at the feet of Andromeda:
+
+    And him the sharp blasts of the north wind beat.
+    Near his left knee, but dim their light, their seat
+    The small Pleiades[196] maintain. We find,
+    Not far from them, the Lyre[197] but slightly join'd.
+    Next is the winged Bird,[198] that seems to fly
+    Beneath the spacious covering of the sky.
+
+Near the head of the Horse[199] lies the right hand of Aquarius, then
+all Aquarius himself.[200]
+
+    Then Capricorn, with half the form of beast,
+    Breathes chill and piercing colds from his strong breast,
+    And in a spacious circle takes his round;
+    When him, while in the winter solstice bound,
+    The sun has visited with constant light,
+    He turns his course, and shorter makes the night.[201]
+
+Not far from hence is seen
+
+    The Scorpion[202] rising lofty from below;
+    By him the Archer,[203] with his bended bow;
+    Near him the Bird, with gaudy feathers spread;
+    And the fierce Eagle[204] hovers o'er his head.
+
+Next comes the Dolphin;[205]
+
+    Then bright Orion,[206] who obliquely moves;
+
+he is followed by
+
+    The fervent Dog,[207] bright with refulgent stars:
+
+next the Hare follows[208]
+
+    Unwearied in his course. At the Dog's tail
+    Argo[209] moves on, and moving seems to sail;
+    O'er her the Ram and Fishes have their place;[210]
+    The illustrious vessel touches, in her pace,
+    The river's banks;[211]
+
+which you may see winding and extending itself to a great length.
+
+    The Fetters[212] at the Fishes' tails are hung.
+    By Nepa's[213] head behold the Altar stand,[214]
+    Which by the breath of southern winds is fann'd;
+
+near which the Centaur[215]
+
+    Hastens his mingled parts to join beneath
+    The Serpent,[216] there extending his right hand,
+    To where you see the monstrous Scorpion stand,
+    Which he at the bright Altar fiercely slays.
+    Here on her lower parts see Hydra[217] raise
+    Herself;
+
+whose bulk is very far extended.
+
+    Amid the winding of her body's placed
+    The shining Goblet;[218] and the glossy Crow[219]
+    Plunges his beak into her parts below.
+    Antecanis beneath the Twins is seen,
+    Call'd Procyon by the Greeks.[220]
+
+Can any one in his senses imagine that this disposition of the stars,
+and this heaven so beautifully adorned, could ever have been formed by
+a fortuitous concourse of atoms? Or what other nature, being destitute
+of intellect and reason, could possibly have produced these effects,
+which not only required reason to bring them about, but the very
+character of which could not be understood and appreciated without the
+most strenuous exertions of well-directed reason?
+
+XLV. But our admiration is not limited to the objects here described.
+What is most wonderful is that the world is so durable, and so
+perfectly made for lasting that it is not to be impaired by time; for
+all its parts tend equally to the centre, and are bound together by a
+sort of chain, which surrounds the elements. This chain is nature,
+which being diffused through the universe, and performing all things
+with judgment and reason, attracts the extremities to the centre.
+
+If, then, the world is round, and if on that account all its parts,
+being of equal dimensions and relative proportions, mutually support
+and are supported by one another, it must follow that as all the parts
+incline to the centre (for that is the lowest place of a globe) there
+is nothing whatever which can put a stop to that propensity in the case
+of such great weights. For the same reason, though the sea is higher
+than the earth, yet because it has the like tendency, it is collected
+everywhere, equally concentres, and never overflows, and is never
+wasted.
+
+The air, which is contiguous, ascends by its lightness, but diffuses
+itself through the whole; therefore it is by nature joined and united
+to the sea, and at the same time borne by the same power towards the
+heaven, by the thinness and heat of which it is so tempered as to be
+made proper to supply life and wholesome air for the support of
+animated beings. This is encompassed by the highest region of the
+heavens, which is called the sky, which is joined to the extremity of
+the air, but retains its own heat pure and unmixed.
+
+XLVI. The stars have their revolutions in the sky, and are continued by
+the tendency of all parts towards the centre. Their duration is
+perpetuated by their form and figure, for they are round; which form,
+as I think has been before observed, is the least liable to injury; and
+as they are composed of fire, they are fed by the vapors which are
+exhaled by the sun from the earth, the sea, and other waters; but when
+these vapors have nourished and refreshed the stars, and the whole sky,
+they are sent back to be exhaled again; so that very little is lost or
+consumed by the fire of the stars and the flame of the sky. Hence we
+Stoics conclude--which Panaetius[221] is said to have doubted of--that
+the whole world at last would be consumed by a general conflagration,
+when, all moisture being exhausted, neither the earth could have any
+nourishment, nor the air return again, since water, of which it is
+formed, would then be all consumed; so that only fire would subsist;
+and from this fire, which is an animating power and a Deity, a new
+world would arise and be re-established in the same beauty.
+
+I should be sorry to appear to you to dwell too long upon this subject
+of the stars, and more especially upon that of the planets, whose
+motions, though different, make a very just agreement. Saturn, the
+highest, chills; Mars, placed in the middle, burns; while Jupiter,
+interposing, moderates their excess, both of light and heat. The two
+planets beneath Mars[222] obey the sun. The sun himself fills the whole
+universe with his own genial light; and the moon, illuminated by him,
+influences conception, birth, and maturity. And who is there who is not
+moved by this union of things, and by this concurrence of nature
+agreeing together, as it were, for the safety of the world? And yet I
+feel sure that none of these reflections have ever been made by these
+men.
+
+XLVII. Let us proceed from celestial to terrestrial things. What is
+there in them which does not prove the principle of an intelligent
+nature? First, as to vegetables; they have roots to sustain their
+stems, and to draw from the earth a nourishing moisture to support the
+vital principle which those roots contain. They are clothed with a rind
+or bark, to secure them more thoroughly from heat and cold. The vines
+we see take hold on props with their tendrils, as if with hands, and
+raise themselves as if they were animated; it is even said that they
+shun cabbages and coleworts, as noxious and pestilential to them, and,
+if planted by them, will not touch any part.
+
+But what a vast variety is there of animals! and how wonderfully is
+every kind adapted to preserve itself! Some are covered with hides,
+some clothed with fleeces, and some guarded with bristles; some are
+sheltered with feathers, some with scales; some are armed with horns,
+and some are furnished with wings to escape from danger. Nature hath
+also liberally and plentifully provided for all animals their proper
+food. I could expatiate on the judicious and curious formation and
+disposition of their bodies for the reception and digestion of it, for
+all their interior parts are so framed and disposed that there is
+nothing superfluous, nothing that is not necessary for the preservation
+of life. Besides, nature has also given these beasts appetite and
+sense; in order that by the one they may be excited to procure
+sufficient sustenance, and by the other they may distinguish what is
+noxious from what is salutary. Some animals seek their food walking,
+some creeping, some flying, and some swimming; some take it with their
+mouth and teeth; some seize it with their claws, and some with their
+beaks; some suck, some graze, some bolt it whole, and some chew it.
+Some are so low that they can with ease take such food as is to be
+found on the ground; but the taller, as geese, swans, cranes, and
+camels, are assisted by a length of neck. To the elephant is given a
+hand,[223] without which, from his unwieldiness of body, he would
+scarce have any means of attaining food.
+
+XLVIII. But to those beasts which live by preying on others, nature has
+given either strength or swiftness. On some animals she has even
+bestowed artifice and cunning; as on spiders, some of which weave a
+sort of net to entrap and destroy whatever falls into it, others sit on
+the watch unobserved to fall on their prey and devour it. The naker--by
+the Greeks called _Pinna_--has a kind of confederacy with the prawn for
+procuring food. It has two large shells open, into which when the
+little fishes swim, the naker, having notice given by the bite of the
+prawn, closes them immediately. Thus, these little animals, though of
+different kinds, seek their food in common; in which it is matter of
+wonder whether they associate by any agreement, or are naturally joined
+together from their beginning.
+
+There is some cause to admire also the provision of nature in the case
+of those aquatic animals which are generated on land, such as
+crocodiles, river-tortoises, and a certain kind of serpents, which seek
+the water as soon as they are able to drag themselves along. We
+frequently put duck-eggs under hens, by which, as by their true
+mothers, the ducklings are at first hatched and nourished; but when
+they see the water, they forsake them and run to it, as to their
+natural abode: so strong is the impression of nature in animals for
+their own preservation.
+
+XLIX. I have read that there is a bird called Platalea (the shoveller),
+that lives by watching those fowls which dive into the sea for their
+prey, and when they return with it, he squeezes their heads with his
+beak till they drop it, and then seizes on it himself. It is said
+likewise that he is in the habit of filling his stomach with
+shell-fish, and when they are digested by the heat which exists in the
+stomach, they cast them up, and then pick out what is proper
+nourishment. The sea-frogs, they say, are wont to cover themselves with
+sand, and moving near the water, the fishes strike at them, as at a
+bait, and are themselves taken and devoured by the frogs. Between the
+kite and the crow there is a kind of natural war, and wherever the one
+finds the eggs of the other, he breaks them.
+
+But who is there who can avoid being struck with wonder at that which
+has been noticed by Aristotle, who has enriched us with so many
+valuable remarks? When the cranes[224] pass the sea in search of warmer
+climes, they fly in the form of a triangle. By the first angle they
+repel the resisting air; on each side, their wings serve as oars to
+facilitate their flight; and the basis of their triangle is assisted by
+the wind in their stern. Those which are behind rest their necks and
+heads on those which precede; and as the leader has not the same
+relief, because he has none to lean upon, he at length flies behind
+that he may also rest, while one of those which have been eased
+succeeds him, and through the whole flight each regularly takes his
+turn.
+
+I could produce many instances of this kind; but these may suffice. Let
+us now proceed to things more familiar to us. The care of beasts for
+their own preservation, their circumspection while feeding, and their
+manner of taking rest in their lairs, are generally known, but still
+they are greatly to be admired.
+
+L. Dogs cure themselves by a vomit, the Egyptian ibis by a purge; from
+whence physicians have lately--I mean but few ages since--greatly
+improved their art. It is reported that panthers, which in barbarous
+countries are taken with poisoned flesh, have a certain remedy[225]
+that preserves them from dying; and that in Crete, the wild goats, when
+they are wounded with poisoned arrows, seek for an herb called dittany,
+which, when they have tasted, the arrows (they say) drop from their
+bodies. It is said also that deer, before they fawn, purge themselves
+with a little herb called hartswort.[226] Beasts, when they receive any
+hurt, or fear it, have recourse to their natural arms: the bull to his
+horns, the boar to his tusks, and the lion to his teeth. Some take to
+flight, others hide themselves; the cuttle-fish vomits[227] blood; the
+cramp-fish benumbs; and there are many animals that, by their
+intolerable stink, oblige their pursuers to retire.
+
+LI. But that the beauty of the world might be eternal, great care has
+been taken by the providence of the Gods to perpetuate the different
+kinds of animals, and vegetables, and trees, and all those things which
+sink deep into the earth, and are contained in it by their roots and
+trunks; in order to which every individual has within itself such
+fertile seed that many are generated from one; and in vegetables this
+seed is enclosed in the heart of their fruit, but in such abundance
+that men may plentifully feed on it, and the earth be always replanted.
+
+With regard to animals, do we not see how aptly they are formed for the
+propagation of their species? Nature for this end created some males
+and some females. Their parts are perfectly framed for generation, and
+they have a wonderful propensity to copulation. When the seed has
+fallen on the matrix, it draws almost all the nourishment to itself, by
+which the foetus is formed; but as soon as it is discharged from
+thence, if it is an animal that is nourished by milk, almost all the
+food of the mother turns into milk, and the animal, without any
+direction but by the pure instinct of nature, immediately hunts for the
+teat, and is there fed with plenty. What makes it evidently appear that
+there is nothing in this fortuitous, but the work of a wise and
+foreseeing nature, is, that those females which bring forth many young,
+as sows and bitches, have many teats, and those which bear a small
+number have but few. What tenderness do beasts show in preserving and
+raising up their young till they are able to defend themselves! They
+say, indeed, that fish, when they have spawned, leave their eggs; but
+the water easily supports them, and produces the young fry in
+abundance.
+
+LII. It is said, likewise, that tortoises and crocodiles, when they
+have laid their eggs on the land, only cover them with earth, and then
+leave them, so that their young are hatched and brought up without
+assistance; but fowls and other birds seek for quiet places to lay in,
+where they build their nests in the softest manner, for the surest
+preservation of their eggs; which, when they have hatched, they defend
+from the cold by the warmth of their wings, or screen them from the
+sultry heat of the sun. When their young begin to be able to use their
+wings, they attend and instruct them; and then their cares are at an
+end.
+
+Human art and industry are indeed necessary towards the preservation
+and improvement of certain animals and vegetables; for there are
+several of both kinds which would perish without that assistance. There
+are likewise innumerable facilities (being different in different
+places) supplied to man to aid him in his civilization, and in
+procuring abundantly what he requires. The Nile waters Egypt, and after
+having overflowed and covered it the whole summer, it retires, and
+leaves the fields softened and manured for the reception of seed. The
+Euphrates fertilizes Mesopotamia, into which, as we may say, it carries
+yearly new fields.[228] The Indus, which is the largest of all
+rivers,[229] not only improves and cultivates the ground, but sows it
+also; for it is said to carry with it a great quantity of grain. I
+could mention many other countries remarkable for something singular,
+and many fields, which are, in their own natures, exceedingly fertile.
+
+LIII. But how bountiful is nature that has provided for us such an
+abundance of various and delicious food; and this varying with the
+different seasons, so that we may be constantly pleased with change,
+and satisfied with abundance! How seasonable and useful to man, to
+beasts, and even to vegetables, are the Etesian winds[230] she has
+bestowed, which moderate intemperate heat, and render navigation more
+sure and speedy! Many things must be omitted on a subject so
+copious--and still a great deal must be said--for it is impossible to
+relate the great utility of rivers, the flux and reflux of the sea, the
+mountains clothed with grass and trees, the salt-pits remote from the
+sea-coasts, the earth replete with salutary medicines, or, in short,
+the innumerable designs of nature necessary for sustenance and the
+enjoyment of life. We must not forget the vicissitudes of day and
+night, ordained for the health of animated beings, giving them a time
+to labor and a time to rest. Thus, if we every way examine the
+universe, it is apparent, from the greatest reason, that the whole is
+admirably governed by a divine providence for the safety and
+preservation of all beings.
+
+If it should be asked for whose sake this mighty fabric was raised,
+shall we say for trees and other vegetables, which, though destitute of
+sense, are supported by nature? That would be absurd. Is it for beasts?
+Nothing can be less probable than that the Gods should have taken such
+pains for beings void of speech and understanding. For whom, then, will
+any one presume to say that the world was made? Undoubtedly for
+reasonable beings; these are the Gods and men, who are certainly the
+most perfect of all beings, as nothing is equal to reason. It is
+therefore credible that the universe, and all things in it, were made
+for the Gods and for men.
+
+But we may yet more easily comprehend that the Gods have taken great
+care of the interests and welfare of men, if we examine thoroughly into
+the structure of the body, and the form and perfection of human nature.
+There are three things absolutely necessary for the support of life--to
+eat, to drink, and to breathe. For these operations the mouth is most
+aptly framed, which, by the assistance of the nostrils, draws in the
+more air.
+
+LIV. The teeth are there placed to divide and grind the food.[231] The
+fore-teeth, being sharp and opposite to each other, cut it asunder, and
+the hind-teeth (called the grinders) chew it, in which office the
+tongue seems to assist. At the root of the tongue is the gullet, which
+receives whatever is swallowed: it touches the tonsils on each side,
+and terminates at the interior extremity of the palate. When, by the
+motions of the tongue, the food is forced into this passage, it
+descends, and those parts of the gullet which are below it are dilated,
+and those above are contracted. There is another passage, called by
+physicians the rough artery,[232] which reaches to the lungs, for the
+entrance and return of the air we breathe; and as its orifice is joined
+to the roots of the tongue a little above the part to which the gullet
+is annexed, it is furnished with a sort of coverlid,[233] lest, by the
+accidental falling of any food into it, the respiration should be
+stopped.
+
+As the stomach, which is beneath the gullet, receives the meat and
+drink, so the lungs and the heart draw in the air from without. The
+stomach is wonderfully composed, consisting almost wholly of nerves; it
+abounds with membranes and fibres, and detains what it receives,
+whether solid or liquid, till it is altered and digested. It sometimes
+contracts, sometimes dilates. It blends and mixes the food together, so
+that it is easily concocted and digested by its force of heat, and by
+the animal spirits is distributed into the other parts of the body.
+
+LV. As to the lungs, they are of a soft and spongy substance, which
+renders them the most commodious for respiration; they alternately
+dilate and contract to receive and return the air, that what is the
+chief animal sustenance may be always fresh. The juice,[234] by which
+we are nourished, being separated from the rest of the food, passes the
+stomach and intestines to the liver, through open and direct passages,
+which lead from the mesentery to the gates of the liver (for so they
+call those vessels at the entrance of it). There are other passages
+from thence, through which the food has its course when it has passed
+the liver. When the bile, and those humors which proceed from the
+kidneys, are separated from the food, the remaining part turns to
+blood, and flows to those vessels at the entrance of the liver to which
+all the passages adjoin. The chyle, being conveyed from this place
+through them into the vessel called the hollow vein, is mixed together,
+and, being already digested and distilled, passes into the heart; and
+from the heart it is communicated through a great number of veins to
+every part of the body.
+
+It is not difficult to describe how the gross remains are detruded by
+the motion of the intestines, which contract and dilate; but that must
+be declined, as too indelicate for discourse. Let us rather explain
+that other wonder of nature, the air, which is drawn into the lungs,
+receives heat both by that already in and by the coagitation of the
+lungs; one part is turned back by respiration, and the other is
+received into a place called the ventricle of the heart.[235] There is
+another ventricle like it annexed to the heart, into which the blood
+flows from the liver through the hollow vein. Thus by one ventricle the
+blood is diffused to the extremities through the veins, and by the
+other the breath is communicated through the arteries; and there are
+such numbers of both dispersed through the whole body that they
+manifest a divine art.
+
+Why need I speak of the bones, those supports of the body, whose joints
+are so wonderfully contrived for stability, and to render the limbs
+complete with regard to motion and to every action of the body? Or need
+I mention the nerves, by which the limbs are governed--their many
+interweavings, and their proceeding from the heart,[236] from whence,
+like the veins and arteries, they have their origin, and are
+distributed through the whole corporeal frame?
+
+LVI. To this skill of nature, and this care of providence, so diligent
+and so ingenious, many reflections may be added, which show what
+valuable things the Deity has bestowed on man. He has made us of a
+stature tall and upright, in order that we might behold the heavens,
+and so arrive at the knowledge of the Gods; for men are not simply to
+dwell here as inhabitants of the earth, but to be, as it were,
+spectators of the heavens and the stars, which is a privilege not
+granted to any other kind of animated beings. The senses, which are the
+interpreters and messengers of things, are placed in the head, as in a
+tower, and wonderfully situated for their proper uses; for the eyes,
+being in the highest part, have the office of sentinels, in discovering
+to us objects; and the ears are conveniently placed in a high part of
+the person, being appointed to receive sound, which naturally ascends.
+The nostrils have the like situation, because all scent likewise
+ascends; and they have, with great reason, a near vicinity to the
+mouth, because they assist us in judging of meat and drink. The taste,
+which is to distinguish the quality of what we take; is in that part of
+the mouth where nature has laid open a passage for what we eat and
+drink. But the touch is equally diffused through the whole body, that
+we may not receive any blows, or the too rigid attacks of cold and
+heat, without feeling them. And as in building the architect averts
+from the eyes and nose of the master those things which must
+necessarily be offensive, so has nature removed far from our senses
+what is of the same kind in the human body.
+
+LVII. What artificer but nature, whose direction is incomparable, could
+have exhibited so much ingenuity in the formation of the senses? In the
+first place, she has covered and invested the eyes with the finest
+membranes, which she hath made transparent, that we may see through
+them, and firm in their texture, to preserve the eyes. She has made
+them slippery and movable, that they might avoid what would offend
+them, and easily direct the sight wherever they will. The actual organ
+of sight, which is called the pupil, is so small that it can easily
+shun whatever might be hurtful to it. The eyelids, which are their
+coverings, are soft and smooth, that they may not injure the eyes; and
+are made to shut at the apprehension of any accident, or to open at
+pleasure; and these movements nature has ordained to be made in an
+instant: they are fortified with a sort of palisade of hairs, to keep
+off what may be noxious to them when open, and to be a fence to their
+repose when sleep closes them, and allows them to rest as if they were
+wrapped up in a case. Besides, they are commodiously hidden and
+defended by eminences on every side; for on the upper part the eyebrows
+turn aside the perspiration which falls from the head and forehead; the
+cheeks beneath rise a little, so as to protect them on the lower side;
+and the nose is placed between them as a wall of separation.
+
+The hearing is always open, for that is a sense of which we are in need
+even while we are sleeping; and the moment that any sound is admitted
+by it we are awakened even from sleep. It has a winding passage, lest
+anything should slip into it, as it might if it were straight and
+simple. Nature also hath taken the same precaution in making there a
+viscous humor, that if any little creatures should endeavor to creep
+in, they might stick in it as in bird-lime. The ears (by which we mean
+the outward part) are made prominent, to cover and preserve the
+hearing, lest the sound should be dissipated and escape before the
+sense is affected. Their entrances are hard and horny, and their form
+winding, because bodies of this kind better return and increase the
+sound. This appears in the harp, lute, or horn;[237] and from all
+tortuous and enclosed places sounds are returned stronger.
+
+The nostrils, in like manner, are ever open, because we have a
+continual use for them; and their entrances also are rather narrow,
+lest anything noxious should enter them; and they have always a
+humidity necessary for the repelling dust and many other extraneous
+bodies. The taste, having the mouth for an enclosure, is admirably
+situated, both in regard to the use we make of it and to its security.
+
+LVIII. Besides, every human sense is much more exquisite than those of
+brutes; for our eyes, in those arts which come under their judgment,
+distinguish with great nicety; as in painting, sculpture, engraving,
+and in the gesture and motion of bodies. They understand the beauty,
+proportion, and, as I may so term it, the becomingness of colors and
+figures; they distinguish things of greater importance, even virtues
+and vices; they know whether a man is angry or calm, cheerful or sad,
+courageous or cowardly, bold or timorous.
+
+The judgment of the ears is not less admirably and scientifically
+contrived with regard to vocal and instrumental music. They distinguish
+the variety of sounds, the measure, the stops, the different sorts of
+voices, the treble and the base, the soft and the harsh, the sharp and
+the flat, of which human ears only are capable to judge. There is
+likewise great judgment in the smell, the taste, and the touch; to
+indulge and gratify which senses more arts have been invented than I
+could wish: it is apparent to what excess we have arrived in the
+composition of our perfumes, the preparation of our food, and the
+enjoyment of corporeal pleasures.
+
+LIX. Again, he who does not perceive the soul and mind of man, his
+reason, prudence, and discernment, to be the work of a divine
+providence, seems himself to be destitute of those faculties. While I
+am on this subject, Cotta, I wish I had your eloquence: how would you
+illustrate so fine a subject! You would show the great extent of the
+understanding; how we collect our ideas, and join those which follow to
+those which precede; establish principles, draw consequences, define
+things separately, and comprehend them with accuracy; from whence you
+demonstrate how great is the power of intelligence and knowledge, which
+is such that even God himself has no qualities more admirable. How
+valuable (though you Academics despise and even deny that we have it)
+is our knowledge of exterior objects, from the perception of the senses
+joined to the application of the mind; by which we see in what relation
+one thing stands to another, and by the aid of which we have invented
+those arts which are necessary for the support and pleasure of life.
+How charming is eloquence! How divine that mistress of the universe, as
+you call it! It teaches us what we were ignorant of, and makes us
+capable of teaching what we have learned. By this we exhort others; by
+this we persuade them; by this we comfort the afflicted; by this we
+deliver the affrighted from their fear; by this we moderate excessive
+joy; by this we assuage the passions of lust and anger. This it is
+which bound men by the chains of right and law, formed the bonds of
+civil society, and made us quit a wild and savage life.
+
+And it will appear incredible, unless you carefully observe the facts,
+how complete the work of nature is in giving us the use of speech; for,
+first of all, there is an artery from the lungs to the bottom of the
+mouth, through which the voice, having its original principle in the
+mind, is transmitted. Then the tongue is placed in the mouth, bounded
+by the teeth. It softens and modulates the voice, which would otherwise
+be confusedly uttered; and, by pushing it to the teeth and other parts
+of the mouth, makes the sound distinct and articulate. We Stoics,
+therefore, compare the tongue to the bow of an instrument, the teeth to
+the strings, and the nostrils to the sounding-board.
+
+LX. But how commodious are the hands which nature has given to man, and
+how beautifully do they minister to many arts! For, such is the
+flexibility of the joints, that our fingers are closed and opened
+without any difficulty. With their help, the hand is formed for
+painting, carving, and engraving; for playing on stringed instruments,
+and on the pipe. These are matters of pleasure. There are also works of
+necessity, such as tilling the ground, building houses, making cloth
+and habits, and working in brass and iron. It is the business of the
+mind to invent, the senses to perceive, and the hands to execute; so
+that if we have buildings, if we are clothed, if we live in safety, if
+we have cities, walls, habitations, and temples, it is to the hands we
+owe them.
+
+By our labor, that is, by our hands, variety and plenty of food are
+provided; for, without culture, many fruits, which serve either for
+present or future consumption, would not be produced; besides, we feed
+on flesh, fish, and fowl, catching some, and bringing up others. We
+subdue four-footed beasts for our carriage, whose speed and strength
+supply our slowness and inability. On some we put burdens, on others
+yokes. We convert the sagacity of the elephant and the quick scent of
+the dog to our own advantage. Out of the caverns of the earth we dig
+iron, a thing entirely necessary for the cultivation of the ground. We
+discover the hidden veins of copper, silver, and gold, advantageous for
+our use and beautiful as ornaments. We cut down trees, and use every
+kind of wild and cultivated timber, not only to make fire to warm us
+and dress our meat, but also for building, that we may have houses to
+defend us from the heat and cold. With timber likewise we build ships,
+which bring us from all parts every commodity of life. We are the only
+animals who, from our knowledge of navigation, can manage what nature
+has made the most violent--the sea and the winds. Thus we obtain from
+the ocean great numbers of profitable things. We are the absolute
+masters of what the earth produces. We enjoy the mountains and the
+plains. The rivers and the lakes are ours. We sow the seed, and plant
+the trees. We fertilize the earth by overflowing it. We stop, direct,
+and turn the rivers: in short, by our hands we endeavor, by our various
+operations in this world, to make, as it were, another nature.
+
+LXI. But what shall I say of human reason? Has it not even entered the
+heavens? Man alone of all animals has observed the courses of the
+stars, their risings and settings. By man the day, the month, the year,
+is determined. He foresees the eclipses of the sun and moon, and
+foretells them to futurity, marking their greatness, duration, and
+precise time. From the contemplation of these things the mind extracts
+the knowledge of the Gods--a knowledge which produces piety, with which
+is connected justice, and all the other virtues; from which arises a
+life of felicity, inferior to that of the Gods in no single particular,
+except in immortality, which is not absolutely necessary to happy
+living. In explaining these things, I think that I have sufficiently
+demonstrated the superiority of man to other animated beings; from
+whence we should infer that neither the form and position of his limbs
+nor that strength of mind and understanding could possibly be the
+effect of chance.
+
+LXII. I am now to prove, by way of conclusion, that every thing in this
+world of use to us was made designedly for us.
+
+First of all, the universe was made for the Gods and men, and all
+things therein were prepared and provided for our service. For the
+world is the common habitation or city of the Gods and men; for they
+are the only reasonable beings: they alone live by justice and law. As,
+therefore, it must be presumed the cities of Athens and Lacedaemon were
+built for the Athenians and Lacedaemonians, and as everything there is
+said to belong to those people, so everything in the universe may with
+propriety be said to belong to the Gods and men, and to them alone.
+
+In the next place, though the revolutions of the sun, moon, and all the
+stars are necessary for the cohesion of the universe, yet may they be
+considered also as objects designed for the view and contemplation of
+man. There is no sight less apt to satiate the eye, none more
+beautiful, or more worthy to employ our reason and penetration. By
+measuring their courses we find the different seasons, their durations
+and vicissitudes, which, if they are known to men alone, we must
+believe were made only for their sake.
+
+Does the earth bring forth fruit and grain in such excessive abundance
+and variety for men or for brutes? The plentiful and exhilarating fruit
+of the vine and the olive-tree are entirely useless to beasts. They
+know not the time for sowing, tilling, or for reaping in season and
+gathering in the fruits of the earth, or for laying up and preserving
+their stores. Man alone has the care and advantage of these things.
+
+LXIII. Thus, as the lute and the pipe were made for those, and those
+only, who are capable of playing on them, so it must be allowed that
+the produce of the earth was designed for those only who make use of
+them; and though some beasts may rob us of a small part, it does not
+follow that the earth produced it also for them. Men do not store up
+corn for mice and ants, but for their wives, their children, and their
+families. Beasts, therefore, as I said before, possess it by stealth,
+but their masters openly and freely. It is for us, therefore, that
+nature hath provided this abundance. Can there be any doubt that this
+plenty and variety of fruit, which delight not only the taste, but the
+smell and sight, was by nature intended for men only? Beasts are so far
+from being partakers of this design, that we see that even they
+themselves were made for man; for of what utility would sheep be,
+unless for their wool, which, when dressed and woven, serves us for
+clothing? For they are not capable of anything, not even of procuring
+their own food, without the care and assistance of man. The fidelity of
+the dog, his affectionate fawning on his master, his aversion to
+strangers, his sagacity in finding game, and his vivacity in pursuit of
+it, what do these qualities denote but that he was created for our use?
+Why need I mention oxen? We perceive that their backs were not formed
+for carrying burdens, but their necks were naturally made for the yoke,
+and their strong broad shoulders to draw the plough. In the Golden Age,
+which poets speak of, they were so greatly beneficial to the husbandman
+in tilling the fallow ground that no violence was ever offered them,
+and it was even thought a crime to eat them:
+
+    The Iron Age began the fatal trade
+    Of blood, and hammer'd the destructive blade;
+    Then men began to make the ox to bleed,
+    And on the tamed and docile beast to feed[238].
+
+LXIV. It would take a long time to relate the advantages which we
+receive from mules and asses, which undoubtedly were designed for our
+use. What is the swine good for but to eat? whose life, Chrysippus
+says, was given it but as salt[239] to keep it from putrefying; and as
+it is proper food for man, nature hath made no animal more fruitful.
+What a multitude of birds and fishes are taken by the art and
+contrivance of man only, and which are so delicious to our taste that
+one would be tempted sometimes to believe that this Providence which
+watches over us was an Epicurean! Though we think there are some
+birds--the alites and oscines[240], as our augurs call them--which were
+made merely to foretell events.
+
+The large savage beasts we take by hunting, partly for food, partly to
+exercise ourselves in imitation of martial discipline, and to use those
+we can tame and instruct, as elephants, or to extract remedies for our
+diseases and wounds, as we do from certain roots and herbs, the virtues
+of which are known by long use and experience. Represent to yourself
+the whole earth and seas as if before your eyes. You will see the vast
+and fertile plains, the thick, shady mountains, the immense pasturage
+for cattle, and ships sailing over the deep with incredible celerity;
+nor are our discoveries only on the face of the earth, but in its
+secret recesses there are many useful things, which being made for man,
+by man alone are discovered.
+
+LXV. Another, and in my opinion the strongest, proof that the
+providence of the Gods takes care of us is divination, which both of
+you, perhaps, will attack; you, Cotta, because Carneades took pleasure
+in inveighing against the Stoics; and you, Velleius, because there is
+nothing Epicurus ridicules so much as the prediction of events. Yet the
+truth of divination appears in many places, on many occasions, often in
+private, but particularly in public concerns. We receive many
+intimations from the foresight and presages of augurs and auspices;
+from oracles, prophecies, dreams, and prodigies; and it often happens
+that by these means events have proved happy to men, and imminent
+dangers have been avoided. This knowledge, therefore--call it either a
+kind of transport, or an art, or a natural faculty--is certainly found
+only in men, and is a gift from the immortal Gods. If these proofs,
+when taken separately, should make no impression upon your mind, yet,
+when collected together, they must certainly affect you.
+
+Besides, the Gods not only provide for mankind universally, but for
+particular men. You may bring this universality to gradually a smaller
+number, and again you may reduce that smaller number to individuals.
+
+LXVI. For if the reasons which I have given prove to all of us that the
+Gods take care of all men, in every country, in every part of the world
+separate from our continent, they take care of those who dwell on the
+same land with us, from east to west; and if they regard those who
+inhabit this kind of great island, which we call the globe of the
+earth, they have the like regard for those who possess the parts of
+this island--Europe, Asia, and Africa; and therefore they favor the
+parts of these parts, as Rome, Athens, Sparta, and Rhodes; and
+particular men of these cities, separate from the whole; as Curius,
+Fabricius, Coruncanius, in the war with Pyrrhus; in the first Punic
+war, Calatinus, Duillius, Metellus, Lutatius; in the second, Maximus,
+Marcellus, Africanus; after these, Paullus, Gracchus, Cato; and in our
+fathers' times, Scipio, Laelius. Rome also and Greece have produced many
+illustrious men, who we cannot believe were so without the assistance
+of the Deity; which is the reason that the poets, Homer in particular,
+joined their chief heroes--Ulysses, Agamemnon, Diomedes, Achilles--to
+certain Deities, as companions in their adventures and dangers.
+Besides, the frequent appearances of the Gods, as I have before
+mentioned, demonstrate their regard for cities and particular men. This
+is also apparent indeed from the foreknowledge of events, which we
+receive either sleeping or waking. We are likewise forewarned of many
+things by the entrails of victims, by presages, and many other means,
+which have been long observed with such exactness as to produce an art
+of divination.
+
+There never, therefore, was a great man without divine inspiration. If
+a storm should damage the corn or vineyard of a person, or any accident
+should deprive him of some conveniences of life, we should not judge
+from thence that the Deity hates or neglects him. The Gods take care of
+great things, and disregard the small. But to truly great men all
+things ever happen prosperously; as has been sufficiently asserted and
+proved by us Stoics, as well as by Socrates, the prince of
+philosophers, in his discourses on the infinite advantages arising from
+virtue.
+
+LXVII. This is almost the whole that hath occurred to my mind on the
+nature of the Gods, and what I thought proper to advance. Do you,
+Cotta, if I may advise, defend the same cause. Remember that in Rome
+you keep the first rank; remember that you are Pontifex; and as your
+school is at liberty to argue on which side you please[241], do you
+rather take mine, and reason on it with that eloquence which you
+acquired by your rhetorical exercises, and which the Academy improved;
+for it is a pernicious and impious custom to argue against the Gods,
+whether it be done seriously, or only in pretence and out of sport.
+
+       *       *       *       *       *
+
+
+
+
+BOOK III.
+
+
+I. When Balbus had ended this discourse, then Cotta, with a smile,
+rejoined, You direct me too late which side to defend; for during the
+course of your argument I was revolving in my mind what objections to
+make to what you were saying, not so much for the sake of opposition,
+as of obliging you to explain what I did not perfectly comprehend; and
+as every one may use his own judgment, it is scarcely possible for me
+to think in every instance exactly what you wish.
+
+You have no idea, O Cotta, said Velleius, how impatient I am to hear
+what you have to say. For since our friend Balbus was highly delighted
+with your discourse against Epicurus, I ought in my turn to be
+solicitous to hear what you can say against the Stoics; and I therefore
+will give you my best attention, for I believe you are, as usual, well
+prepared for the engagement.
+
+I wish, by Hercules! I were, replies Cotta; for it is more difficult to
+dispute with Lucilius than it was with you. Why so? says Velleius.
+Because, replies Cotta, your Epicurus, in my opinion, does not contend
+strongly for the Gods: he only, for the sake of avoiding any
+unpopularity or punishment, is afraid to deny their existence; for when
+he asserts that the Gods are wholly inactive and regardless of
+everything, and that they have limbs like ours, but make no use of
+them, he seems to jest with us, and to think it sufficient if he allows
+that there are beings of any kind happy and eternal. But with regard to
+Balbus, I suppose you observed how many things were said by him, which,
+however false they may be, yet have a perfect coherence and connection;
+therefore, my design, as I said, in opposing him, is not so much to
+confute his principles as to induce him to explain what I do not
+clearly understand: for which reason, Balbus, I will give you the
+choice, either to answer me every particular as I go on, or permit me
+to proceed without interruption. If you want any explanation, replies
+Balbus, I would rather you would propose your doubts singly; but if
+your intention is rather to confute me than to seek instruction for
+yourself, it shall be as you please; I will either answer you
+immediately on every point, or stay till you have finished your
+discourse.
+
+II. Very well, says Cotta; then let us proceed as our conversation
+shall direct. But before I enter on the subject, I have a word to say
+concerning myself; for I am greatly influenced by your authority, and
+your exhortation at the conclusion of your discourse, when you desired
+me to remember that I was Cotta and Pontifex; by which I presume you
+intimated that I should defend the sacred rites and religion and
+ceremonies which we received from our ancestors. Most undoubtedly I
+always have, and always shall defend them, nor shall the arguments
+either of the learned or unlearned ever remove the opinions which I
+have imbibed from them concerning the worship of the immortal Gods. In
+matters of religion I submit to the rules of the high-priests, T.
+Coruncanius, P. Scipio, and P. Scaevola; not to the sentiments of Zeno,
+Cleanthes, or Chrysippus; and I pay a greater regard to what C. Laelius,
+one of our augurs and wise men, has written concerning religion, in
+that noble oration of his, than to the most eminent of the Stoics: and
+as the whole religion of the Romans at first consisted in sacrifices
+and divination by birds, to which have since been added predictions, if
+the interpreters[242] of the Sibylline oracle or the aruspices have
+foretold any event from portents and prodigies, I have ever thought
+that there was no point of all these holy things which deserved to be
+despised. I have been even persuaded that Romulus, by instituting
+divination, and Numa, by establishing sacrifices, laid the foundation
+of Rome, which undoubtedly would never have risen to such a height of
+grandeur if the Gods had not been made propitious by this worship.
+These, Balbus, are my sentiments both as a priest and as Cotta. But you
+must bring me to your opinion by the force of your reason: for I have a
+right to demand from you, as a philosopher, a reason for the religion
+which you would have me embrace. But I must believe the religion of our
+ancestors without any proof.
+
+III. What proof, says Balbus, do you require of me? You have proposed,
+says Cotta, four articles. First of all, you undertook to prove that
+there "are Gods;" secondly, "of what kind and character they are;"
+thirdly, that "the universe is governed by them;" lastly, that "they
+provide for the welfare of mankind in particular." Thus, if I remember
+rightly, you divided your discourse. Exactly so, replies Balbus; but
+let us see what you require.
+
+Let us examine, says Cotta, every proposition. The first one--that
+there are Gods--is never contested but by the most impious of men; nay,
+though it can never be rooted out of my mind, yet I believe it on the
+authority of our ancestors, and not on the proofs which you have
+brought. Why do you expect a proof from me, says Balbus, if you
+thoroughly believe it? Because, says Cotta, I come to this discussion
+as if I had never thought of the Gods, or heard anything concerning
+them. Take me as a disciple wholly ignorant and unbiassed, and prove to
+me all the points which I ask.
+
+Begin, then, replies Balbus. I would first know, says Cotta, why you
+have been so long in proving the existence of the Gods, which you said
+was a point so very evident to all, that there was no need of any
+proof? In that, answers Balbus, I have followed your example, whom I
+have often observed, when pleading in the Forum, to load the judge with
+all the arguments which the nature of your cause would permit. This
+also is the practice of philosophers, and I have a right to follow it.
+Besides, you may as well ask me why I look upon you with two eyes,
+since I can see you with one.
+
+IV. You shall judge, then, yourself, says Cotta, if this is a very just
+comparison; for, when I plead, I do not dwell upon any point agreed to
+be self-evident, because long reasoning only serves to confound the
+clearest matters; besides, though I might take this method in pleading,
+yet I should not make use of it in such a discourse as this, which
+requires the nicest distinction. And with regard to your making use of
+one eye only when you look on me, there is no reason for it, since
+together they have the same view; and since nature, to which you
+attribute wisdom, has been pleased to give us two passages by which we
+receive light. But the truth is, that it was because you did not think
+that the existence of the Gods was so evident as you could wish that
+you therefore brought so many proofs. It was sufficient for me to
+believe it on the tradition of our ancestors; and since you disregard
+authorities, and appeal to reason, permit my reason to defend them
+against yours. The proofs on which you found the existence of the Gods
+tend only to render a proposition doubtful that, in my opinion, is not
+so; I have not only retained in my memory the whole of these proofs,
+but even the order in which you proposed them. The first was, that when
+we lift up our eyes towards the heavens, we immediately conceive that
+there is some divinity that governs those celestial bodies; on which
+you quoted this passage--
+
+    Look up to the refulgent heaven above,
+    Which all men call, unanimously, Jove;
+
+intimating that we should invoke that as Jupiter, rather than our
+Capitoline Jove[243], or that it is evident to the whole world that
+those bodies are Gods which Velleius and many others do not place even
+in the rank of animated beings.
+
+Another strong proof, in your opinion, was that the belief of the
+existence of the Gods was universal, and that mankind was daily more
+and more convinced of it. What! should an affair of such importance be
+left to the decision of fools, who, by your sect especially, are called
+madmen?
+
+V. But the Gods have appeared to us, as to Posthumius at the Lake
+Regillus, and to Vatienus in the Salarian Way: something you mentioned,
+too, I know not what, of a battle of the Locrians at Sagra. Do you
+believe that the Tyndaridae, as you called them; that is, men sprung
+from men, and who were buried in Lacedaemon, as we learn from Homer, who
+lived in the next age--do you believe, I say, that they appeared to
+Vatienus on the road mounted on white horses, without any servant to
+attend them, to tell the victory of the Romans to a country fellow
+rather than to M. Cato, who was at that time the chief person of the
+senate? Do you take that print of a horse's hoof which is now to be
+seen on a stone at Regillus to be made by Castor's horse? Should you
+not believe, what is probable, that the souls of eminent men, such as
+the Tyndaridae, are divine and immortal, rather than that those bodies
+which had been reduced to ashes should mount on horses, and fight in an
+army? If you say that was possible, you ought to show how it is so, and
+not amuse us with fabulous old women's stories.
+
+Do you take these for fabulous stories? says Balbus. Is not the temple,
+built by Posthumius in honor of Castor and Pollux, to be seen in the
+Forum? Is not the decree of the senate concerning Vatienus still
+subsisting? As to the affair of Sagra, it is a common proverb among the
+Greeks; when they would affirm anything strongly, they say "It is as
+certain as what passed at Sagra." Ought not such authorities to move
+you? You oppose me, replies Cotta, with stories, but I ask reasons of
+you[244]. * * *
+
+VI. We are now to speak of predictions. No one can avoid what is to
+come, and, indeed, it is commonly useless to know it; for it is a
+miserable case to be afflicted to no purpose, and not to have even the
+last, the common comfort, hope, which, according to your principles,
+none can have; for you say that fate governs all things, and call that
+fate which has been true from all eternity. What advantage, then, is
+the knowledge of futurity to us, or how does it assist us to guard
+against impending evils, since it will come inevitably?
+
+But whence comes that divination? To whom is owing that knowledge from
+the entrails of beasts? Who first made observations from the voice of
+the crow? Who invented the Lots?[245] Not that I give no credit to
+these things, or that I despise Attius Navius's staff, which you
+mentioned; but I ought to be informed how these things are understood
+by philosophers, especially as the diviners are often wrong in their
+conjectures. But physicians, you say, are likewise often mistaken. What
+comparison can there be between divination, of the origin of which we
+are ignorant, and physic, which proceeds on principles intelligible to
+every one? You believe that the Decii,[246] in devoting themselves to
+death, appeased the Gods. How great, then, was the iniquity of the Gods
+that they could not be appeased but at the price of such noble blood!
+That was the stratagem of generals such as the Greeks call [Greek:
+strategema], and it was a stratagem worthy such illustrious leaders,
+who consulted the public good even at the expense of their lives: they
+conceived rightly, what indeed happened, that if the general rode
+furiously upon the enemy, the whole army would follow his example. As
+to the voice of the Fauns, I never heard it. If you assure me that you
+have, I shall believe you, though I really know not what a Faun is.
+
+VII. I do not, then, O Balbus, from anything that you have said,
+perceive as yet that it is proved that there are Gods. I believe it,
+indeed, but not from any arguments of the Stoics. Cleanthes, you have
+said, attributes the idea that men have of the Gods to four causes. In
+the first place (as I have already sufficiently mentioned), to a
+foreknowledge of future events; secondly, to tempests, and other shocks
+of nature; thirdly, to the utility and plenty of things we enjoy;
+fourthly, to the invariable order of the stars and the heavens. The
+arguments drawn from foreknowledge I have already answered. With regard
+to tempests in the air, the sea, and the earth, I own that many people
+are affrighted by them, and imagine that the immortal Gods are the
+authors of them.
+
+But the question is, not whether there are people who believe that
+there are Gods, but whether there are Gods or not. As to the two other
+causes of Cleanthes, one of which is derived from the great abundance
+of desirable things which we enjoy, the other from the invariable order
+of the seasons and the heavens, I shall treat on them when I answer
+your discourse concerning the providence of the Gods--a point, Balbus,
+upon which you have spoken at great length. I shall likewise defer till
+then examining the argument which you attribute to Chrysippus, that "if
+there is in nature anything which surpasses the power of man to
+produce, there must consequently be some being better than man." I
+shall also postpone, till we come to that part of my argument, your
+comparison of the world to a fine house, your observations on the
+proportion and harmony of the universe, and those smart, short reasons
+of Zeno which you quote; and I shall examine at the same time your
+reasons drawn from natural philosophy, concerning that fiery force and
+that vital heat which you regard as the principle of all things; and I
+will investigate, in its proper place, all that you advanced the other
+day on the existence of the Gods, and on the sense and understanding
+which you attributed to the sun, the moon, and all the stars; and I
+shall ask you this question over and over again, By what proofs are you
+convinced yourself there are Gods?
+
+VIII. I thought, says Balbus, that I had brought ample proofs to
+establish this point. But such is your manner of opposing, that, when
+you seem on the point of interrogating me, and when I am preparing to
+answer, you suddenly divert the discourse, and give me no opportunity
+to reply to you; and thus those most important points concerning
+divination and fate are neglected which we Stoics have thoroughly
+examined, but which your school has only slightly touched upon. But
+they are not thought essential to the question in hand; therefore, if
+you think proper, do not confuse them together, that we in this
+discussion may come to a clear explanation of the subject of our
+present inquiry.
+
+Very well, says Cotta. Since, then, you have divided the whole question
+into four parts, and I have said all that I had to say on the first, I
+will take the second into consideration; in which, when you attempted
+to show what the character of the Gods was, you seemed to me rather to
+prove that there are none; for you said that it was the greatest
+difficulty to draw our minds from the prepossessions of the eyes; but
+that as nothing is more excellent than the Deity, you did not doubt
+that the world was God, because there is nothing better in nature than
+the world, and so we may reasonably think it animated, or, rather,
+perceive it in our minds as clearly as if it were obvious to our eyes.
+
+Now, in what sense do you say there is nothing better than the world?
+If you mean that there is nothing more beautiful, I agree with you;
+that there is nothing more adapted to our wants, I likewise agree with
+you: but if you mean that nothing is wiser than the world, I am by no
+means of your opinion. Not that I find it difficult to conceive
+anything in my mind independent of my eyes; on the contrary, the more I
+separate my mind from my eyes, the less I am able to comprehend your
+opinion.
+
+IX. Nothing is better than the world, you say. Nor is there, indeed,
+anything on earth better than the city of Rome; do you think,
+therefore, that our city has a mind; that it thinks and reasons; or
+that this most beautiful city, being void of sense, is not preferable
+to an ant, because an ant has sense, understanding, reason, and memory?
+You should consider, Balbus, what ought to be allowed you, and not
+advance things because they please you.
+
+For that old, concise, and, as it seemed to you, acute syllogism of
+Zeno has been all which you have so much enlarged upon in handling this
+topic: "That which reasons is superior to that which does not; nothing
+is superior to the world; therefore the world reasons." If you would
+prove also that the world can very well read a book, follow the example
+of Zeno, and say, "That which can read is better than that which
+cannot; nothing is better than the world; the world therefore can
+read." After the same manner you may prove the world to be an orator, a
+mathematician, a musician--that it possesses all sciences, and, in
+short, is a philosopher. You have often said that God made all things,
+and that no cause can produce an effect unlike itself. From hence it
+will follow, not only that the world is animated, and is wise, but also
+plays upon the fiddle and the flute, because it produces men who play
+on those instruments. Zeno, therefore, the chief of your sect, advances
+no argument sufficient to induce us to think that the world reasons,
+or, indeed, that it is animated at all, and consequently none to think
+it a Deity; though it may be said that there is nothing superior to it,
+as there is nothing more beautiful, nothing more useful to us, nothing
+more adorned, and nothing more regular in its motions. But if the
+world, considered as one great whole, is not God, you should not surely
+deify, as you have done, that infinite multitude of stars which only
+form a part of it, and which so delight you with the regularity of
+their eternal courses; not but that there is something truly wonderful
+and incredible in their regularity; but this regularity of motion,
+Balbus, may as well be ascribed to a natural as to a divine cause.
+
+X. What can be more regular than the flux and reflux of the Euripus at
+Chalcis, the Sicilian sea, and the violence of the ocean in those
+parts[247]
+
+                        where the rapid tide
+    Does Europe from the Libyan coast divide?
+
+The same appears on the Spanish and British coasts. Must we conclude
+that some Deity appoints and directs these ebbings and flowings to
+certain fixed times? Consider, I pray, if everything which is regular
+in its motion is deemed divine, whether it will not follow that tertian
+and quartan agues must likewise be so, as their returns have the
+greatest regularity. These effects are to be explained by reason; but,
+because you are unable to assign any, you have recourse to a Deity as
+your last refuge.
+
+The arguments of Chrysippus appeared to you of great weight; a man
+undoubtedly of great quickness and subtlety (I call those quick who
+have a sprightly turn of thought, and those subtle whose minds are
+seasoned by use as their hands are by labor): "If," says he, "there is
+anything which is beyond the power of man to produce, the being who
+produces it is better than man. Man is unable to make what is in the
+world; the being, therefore, that could do it is superior to man. What
+being is there but a God superior to man? Therefore there is a God."
+
+These arguments are founded on the same erroneous principles as Zeno's,
+for he does not define what is meant by being better or more excellent,
+or distinguish between an intelligent cause and a natural cause.
+Chrysippus adds, "If there are no Gods, there is nothing better than
+man; but we cannot, without the highest arrogance, have this idea of
+ourselves." Let us grant that it is arrogance in man to think himself
+better than the world; but to comprehend that he has understanding and
+reason, and that in Orion and Canicula there is neither, is no
+arrogance, but an indication of good sense. "Since we suppose,"
+continues he, "when we see a beautiful house, that it was built for the
+master, and not for mice, we should likewise judge that the world is
+the mansion of the Gods." Yes, if I believed that the Gods built the
+world; but not if, as I believe, and intend to prove, it is the work of
+nature.
+
+XI. Socrates, in Xenophon, asks, "Whence had man his understanding, if
+there was none in the world?" And I ask, Whence had we speech, harmony,
+singing; unless we think it is the sun conversing with the moon when
+she approaches near it, or that the world forms an harmonious concert,
+as Pythagoras imagines? This, Balbus, is the effect of nature; not of
+that nature which proceeds artificially, as Zeno says, and the
+character of which I shall presently examine into, but a nature which,
+by its own proper motions and mutations, modifies everything.
+
+For I readily agree to what you said about the harmony and general
+agreement of nature, which you pronounced to be firmly bound and united
+together, as it were, by ties of blood; but I do not approve of what
+you added, that "it could not possibly be so, unless it were so united
+by one divine spirit." On the contrary, the whole subsists by the power
+of nature, independently of the Gods, and there is a kind of sympathy
+(as the Greeks call it) which joins together all the parts of the
+universe; and the greater that is in its own power, the less is it
+necessary to have recourse to a divine intelligence.
+
+XII. But how will you get rid of the objections which Carneades made?
+"If," says he, "there is no body immortal, there is none eternal; but
+there is no body immortal, nor even indivisible, or that cannot be
+separated and disunited; and as every animal is in its nature passive,
+so there is not one which is not subject to the impressions of
+extraneous bodies; none, that is to say, which can avoid the necessity
+of enduring and suffering: and if every animal is mortal, there is none
+immortal; so, likewise, if every animal may be cut up and divided,
+there is none indivisible, none eternal, but all are liable to be
+affected by, and compelled to submit to, external power. Every animal,
+therefore, is necessarily mortal, dissoluble, and divisible."
+
+For as there is no wax, no silver, no brass which cannot be converted
+into something else, whatever is composed of wax, or silver, or brass
+may cease to be what it is. By the same reason, if all the elements are
+mutable, every body is mutable.
+
+Now, according to your doctrine, all the elements are mutable; all
+bodies, therefore, are mutable. But if there were any body immortal,
+then all bodies would not be mutable. Every body, then, is mortal; for
+every body is either water, air, fire, or earth, or composed of the
+four elements together, or of some of them. Now, there is not one of
+all these elements that does not perish; for earthly bodies are
+fragile: water is so soft that the least shock will separate its parts,
+and fire and air yield to the least impulse, and are subject to
+dissolution; besides, any of these elements perish when converted into
+another nature, as when water is formed from earth, the air from water,
+and the sky from air, and when they change in the same manner back
+again. Therefore, if there is nothing but what is perishable in the
+composition of all animals, there is no animal eternal.
+
+XIII. But, not to insist on these arguments, there is no animal to be
+found that had not a beginning, and will not have an end; for every
+animal being sensitive, they are consequently all sensible of cold and
+heat, sweet and bitter; nor can they have pleasing sensations without
+being subject to the contrary. As, therefore, they receive pleasure,
+they likewise receive pain; and whatever being is subject to pain must
+necessarily be subject to death. It must be allowed, therefore, that
+every animal is mortal.
+
+Besides, a being that is not sensible of pleasure or pain cannot have
+the essence of an animal; if, then, on the one hand, every animal must
+be sensible of pleasure and pain, and if, on the other, every being
+that has these sensations cannot be immortal, we may conclude that as
+there is no animal insensible, there is none immortal. Besides, there
+is no animal without inclination and aversion--an inclination to that
+which is agreeable to nature, and an aversion to the contrary: there
+are in the case of every animal some things which they covet, and
+others they reject. What they reject are repugnant to their nature, and
+consequently would destroy them. Every animal, therefore, is inevitably
+subject to be destroyed. There are innumerable arguments to prove that
+whatever is sensitive is perishable; for cold, heat, pleasure, pain,
+and all that affects the sense, when they become excessive, cause
+destruction. Since, then, there is no animal that is not sensitive,
+there is none immortal.
+
+XIV. The substance of an animal is either simple or compound; simple,
+if it is composed only of earth, of fire, of air, or of water (and of
+such a sort of being we can form no idea); compound, if it is formed of
+different elements, which have each their proper situation, and have a
+natural tendency to it--this element tending towards the highest parts,
+that towards the lowest, and another towards the middle. This
+conjunction may for some time subsist, but not forever; for every
+element must return to its first situation. No animal, therefore, is
+eternal.
+
+But your school, Balbus, allows fire only to be the sole active
+principle; an opinion which I believe you derive from Heraclitus, whom
+some men understand in one sense, some in another: but since he seems
+unwilling to be understood, we will pass him by. You Stoics, then, say
+that fire is the universal principle of all things; that all living
+bodies cease to live on the extinction of that heat; and that
+throughout all nature whatever is sensible of that heat lives and
+flourishes. Now, I cannot conceive that bodies should perish for want
+of heat, rather than for want of moisture or air, especially as they
+even die through excess of heat; so that the life of animals does not
+depend more on fire than on the other elements.
+
+However, air and water have this quality in common with fire and heat.
+But let us see to what this tends. If I am not mistaken, you believe
+that in all nature there is nothing but fire, which is self-animated.
+Why fire rather than air, of which the life of animals consists, and
+which is called from thence _anima_,[248] the soul? But how is it that
+you take it for granted that life is nothing but fire? It seems more
+probable that it is a compound of fire and air. But if fire is
+self-animated, unmixed with any other element, it must be sensitive,
+because it renders our bodies sensitive; and the same objection which I
+just now made will arise, that whatever is sensitive must necessarily
+be susceptible of pleasure and pain, and whatever is sensible of pain
+is likewise subject to the approach of death; therefore you cannot
+prove fire to be eternal.
+
+You Stoics hold that all fire has need of nourishment, without which it
+cannot possibly subsist; that the sun, moon, and all the stars are fed
+either with fresh or salt waters; and the reason that Cleanthes gives
+why the sun is retrograde, and does not go beyond the tropics in the
+summer or winter, is that he may not be too far from his sustenance.
+This I shall fully examine hereafter; but at present we may conclude
+that whatever may cease to be cannot of its own nature be eternal; that
+if fire wants sustenance, it will cease to be, and that, therefore,
+fire is not of its own nature eternal.
+
+XV. After all, what kind of a Deity must that be who is not graced with
+one single virtue, if we should succeed in forming this idea of such a
+one? Must we not attribute prudence to a Deity? a virtue which consists
+in the knowledge of things good, bad, and indifferent. Yet what need
+has a being for the discernment of good and ill who neither has nor can
+have any ill? Of what use is reason to him? of what use is
+understanding? We men, indeed, find them useful to aid us in finding
+out things which are obscure by those which are clear to us; but
+nothing can be obscure to a Deity. As to justice, which gives to every
+one his own, it is not the concern of the Gods; since that virtue,
+according to your doctrine, received its birth from men and from civil
+society. Temperance consists in abstinence from corporeal pleasures,
+and if such abstinence hath a place in heaven, so also must the
+pleasures abstained from. Lastly, if fortitude is ascribed to the
+Deity, how does it appear? In afflictions, in labor, in danger? None of
+these things can affect a God. How, then, can we conceive this to be a
+Deity that makes no use of reason, and is not endowed with any virtue?
+
+However, when I consider what is advanced by the Stoics, my contempt
+for the ignorant multitude vanishes. For these are their divinities.
+The Syrians worshipped a fish. The Egyptians consecrated beasts of
+almost every kind. The Greeks deified many men; as Alabandus[249] at
+Alabandae, Tenes at Tenedos; and all Greece pay divine honors to
+Leucothea (who was before called Ino), to her son Palaemon, to Hercules,
+to AEsculapius, and to the Tyndaridae; our own people to Romulus, and to
+many others, who, as citizens newly admitted into the ancient body,
+they imagine have been received into heaven.
+
+These are the Gods of the illiterate.
+
+XVI. What are the notions of you philosophers? In what respect are they
+superior to these ideas? I shall pass them over; for they are certainly
+very admirable. Let the world, then, be a Deity, for that, I conceive,
+is what you mean by
+
+              The refulgent heaven above,
+    Which all men call, unanimously, Jove.
+
+But why are we to add many more Gods? What a multitude of them there
+is! At least, it seems so to me; for every constellation, according to
+you, is a Deity: to some you give the name of beasts, as the goat, the
+scorpion, the bull, the lion; to others the names of inanimate things,
+as the ship, the altar, the crown.
+
+But supposing these were to be allowed, how can the rest be granted, or
+even so much as understood? When we call corn Ceres, and wine Bacchus,
+we make use of the common manner of speaking; but do you think any one
+so mad as to believe that his food is a Deity? With regard to those
+who, you say, from having been men became Gods, I should be very
+willing to learn of you, either how it was possible formerly, or, if it
+had ever been, why is it not so now? I do not conceive, as things are
+at present, how Hercules,
+
+    Burn'd with fiery torches on Mount Oeta,
+
+as Accius says, should rise, with the flames,
+
+    To the eternal mansions of his father.
+
+Besides, Homer also says that Ulysses[250] met him in the shades below,
+among the other dead.
+
+But yet I should be glad to know which Hercules we should chiefly
+worship; for they who have searched into those histories, which are but
+little known, tell us of several. The most ancient is he who fought
+with Apollo about the Tripos of Delphi, and is son of Jupiter and
+Lisyto; and of the most ancient Jupiters too, for we find many Jupiters
+also in the Grecian chronicles. The second is the Egyptian Hercules,
+and is believed to be the son of Nilus, and to be the author of the
+Phrygian characters. The third, to whom they offered sacrifices, is one
+of the Idaei Dactyli.[251] The fourth is the son of Jupiter and Asteria,
+the sister of Latona, chiefly honored by the Tyrians, who pretend that
+Carthago[252] is his daughter. The fifth, called Belus, is worshipped
+in India. The sixth is the son of Alcmena by Jupiter; but by the third
+Jupiter, for there are many Jupiters, as you shall soon see.
+
+XVII. Since this examination has led me so far, I will convince you
+that in matters of religion I have learned more from the pontifical
+rites, the customs of our ancestors, and the vessels of Numa,[253]
+which Laelius mentions in his little Golden Oration, than from all the
+learning of the Stoics; for tell me, if I were a disciple of your
+school, what answer could I make to these questions? If there are Gods,
+are nymphs also Goddesses? If they are Goddesses, are Pans and Satyrs
+in the same rank? But they are not; consequently, nymphs are not
+Goddesses. Yet they have temples publicly dedicated to them. What do
+you conclude from thence? Others who have temples are not therefore
+Gods. But let us go on. You call Jupiter and Neptune Gods; their
+brother Pluto, then, is one; and if so, those rivers also are Deities
+which they say flow in the infernal regions--Acheron, Cocytus,
+Pyriphlegethon; Charon also, and Cerberus, are Gods; but that cannot be
+allowed; nor can Pluto be placed among the Deities. What, then, will
+you say of his brothers?
+
+Thus reasons Carneades; not with any design to destroy the existence of
+the Gods (for what would less become a philosopher?), but to convince
+us that on that matter the Stoics have said nothing plausible. If,
+then, Jupiter and Neptune are Gods, adds he, can that divinity be
+denied to their father Saturn, who is principally worshipped throughout
+the West? If Saturn is a God, then must his father, Coelus, be one too,
+and so must the parents of Coelus, which are the Sky and Day, as also
+their brothers and sisters, which by ancient genealogists are thus
+named: Love, Deceit, Fear, Labor, Envy, Fate, Old Age, Death, Darkness,
+Misery, Lamentation, Favor, Fraud, Obstinacy, the Destinies, the
+Hesperides, and Dreams; all which are the offspring of Erebus and
+Night. These monstrous Deities, therefore, must be received, or else
+those from whom they sprung must be disallowed.
+
+XVIII. If you say that Apollo, Vulcan, Mercury, and the rest of that
+sort are Gods, can you doubt the divinity of Hercules and AEsculapius,
+Bacchus, Castor and Pollux? These are worshipped as much as those, and
+even more in some places. Therefore they must be numbered among the
+Gods, though on the mother's side they are only of mortal race.
+Aristaeus, who is said to have been the son of Apollo, and to have found
+out the art of making oil from the olive; Theseus, the son of Neptune;
+and the rest whose fathers were Deities, shall they not be placed in
+the number of the Gods? But what think you of those whose mothers were
+Goddesses? They surely have a better title to divinity; for, in the
+civil law, as he is a freeman who is born of a freewoman, so, in the
+law of nature, he whose mother is a Goddess must be a God. The isle
+Astypalaea religiously honor Achilles; and if he is a Deity, Orpheus and
+Rhesus are so, who were born of one of the Muses; unless, perhaps,
+there may be a privilege belonging to sea marriages which land
+marriages have not. Orpheus and Rhesus are nowhere worshipped; and if
+they are therefore not Gods, because they are nowhere worshipped as
+such, how can the others be Deities? You, Balbus, seemed to agree with
+me that the honors which they received were not from their being
+regarded as immortals, but as men richly endued with virtue.
+
+But if you think Latona a Goddess, how can you avoid admitting Hecate
+to be one also, who was the daughter of Asteria, Latona's sister?
+Certainly she is one, if we may judge by the altars erected to her in
+Greece. And if Hecate is a Goddess, how can you refuse that rank to the
+Eumenides? for they also have a temple at Athens, and, if I understand
+right, the Romans have consecrated a grove to them. The Furies, too,
+whom we look upon as the inspectors into and scourges of impiety, I
+suppose, must have their divinity too. As you hold that there is some
+divinity presides over every human affair, there is one who presides
+over the travail of matrons, whose name, _Natio_, is derived _a
+nascentibus_, from nativities, and to whom we used to sacrifice in our
+processions in the fields of Ardaea; but if she is a Deity, we must
+likewise acknowledge all those you mentioned, Honor, Faith, Intellect,
+Concord; by the same rule also, Hope, Juno, Moneta,[254] and every idle
+phantom, every child of our imagination, are Deities. But as this
+consequence is quite inadmissible, do not you either defend the cause
+from which it flows.
+
+XIX. What say you to this? If these are Deities, which we worship and
+regard as such, why are not Serapis and Isis[255] placed in the same
+rank? And if they are admitted, what reason have we to reject the Gods
+of the barbarians? Thus we should deify oxen, horses, the ibis, hawks,
+asps, crocodiles, fishes, dogs, wolves, cats, and many other beasts. If
+we go back to the source of this superstition, we must equally condemn
+all the Deities from which they proceed. Shall Ino, whom the Greeks
+call Leucothea, and we Matuta, be reputed a Goddess, because she was
+the daughter of Cadmus, and shall that title be refused to Circe and
+Pasiphae,[256] who had the sun for their father, and Perseis, daughter
+of the Ocean, for their mother? It is true, Circe has divine honors
+paid her by our colony of Circaeum; therefore you call her a Goddess;
+but what will you say of Medea, the granddaughter of the Sun and the
+Ocean, and daughter of AEetes and Idyia? What will you say of her
+brother Absyrtus, whom Pacuvius calls AEgialeus, though the other name
+is more frequent in the writings of the ancients? If you did not deify
+one as well as the other, what will become of Ino? for all these
+Deities have the same origin.
+
+Shall Amphiaraus and Tryphonius be called Gods? Our publicans, when
+some lands in Boeotia were exempted from the tax, as belonging to the
+immortal Gods, denied that any were immortal who had been men. But if
+you deify these, Erechtheus surely is a God, whose temple and priest we
+have seen at Athens. And can you, then, refuse to acknowledge also
+Codrus, and many others who shed their blood for the preservation of
+their country? And if it is not allowable to consider all these men as
+Gods, then, certainly, probabilities are not in favor of our
+acknowledging the _Divinity_ of those previously mentioned beings from
+whom these have proceeded.
+
+It is easy to observe, likewise, that if in many countries people have
+paid divine honors to the memory of those who have signalized their
+courage, it was done in order to animate others to practise virtue, and
+to expose themselves the more willingly to dangers in their country's
+cause. From this motive the Athenians have deified Erechtheus and his
+daughters, and have erected also a temple, called Leocorion, to the
+daughters of Leus.[257] Alabandus is more honored in the city which he
+founded than any of the more illustrious Deities; from thence
+Stratonicus had a pleasant turn--as he had many--when he was troubled
+with an impertinent fellow who insisted that Alabandus was a God, but
+that Hercules was not; "Very well," says he, "then let the anger of
+Alabandus fall upon me, and that of Hercules upon you."
+
+XX. Do you not consider, Balbus, to what lengths your arguments for the
+divinity of the heaven and the stars will carry you? You deify the sun
+and the moon, which the Greeks take to be Apollo and Diana. If the moon
+is a Deity, the morning-star, the other planets, and all the fixed
+stars are also Deities; and why shall not the rainbow be placed in that
+number? for it is so wonderfully beautiful that it is justly said to be
+the daughter of Thaumas.[258] But if you deify the rainbow, what regard
+will you pay to the clouds? for the colors which appear in the bow are
+only formed of the clouds, one of which is said to have brought forth
+the Centaurs; and if you deify the clouds, you cannot pay less regard
+to the seasons, which the Roman people have really consecrated.
+Tempests, showers, storms, and whirlwinds must then be Deities. It is
+certain, at least, that our captains used to sacrifice a victim to the
+waves before they embarked on any voyage.
+
+As you deify the earth under the name of Ceres,[259] because, as you
+said, she bears fruits (_a gerendo_), and the ocean under that of
+Neptune, rivers and fountains have the same right. Thus we see that
+Maso, the conqueror of Corsica, dedicated a temple to a fountain, and
+the names of the Tiber, Spino, Almo, Nodinus, and other neighboring
+rivers are in the prayers[260] of the augurs. Therefore, either the
+number of such Deities will be infinite, or we must admit none of them,
+and wholly disapprove of such an endless series of superstition.
+
+XXI. None of all these assertions, then, are to be admitted. I must
+proceed now, Balbus, to answer those who say that, with regard to those
+deified mortals, so religiously and devoutly reverenced, the public
+opinion should have the force of reality. To begin, then: they who are
+called theologists say that there are three Jupiters; the first and
+second of whom were born in Arcadia; one of whom was the son of AEther,
+and father of Proserpine and Bacchus; the other the son of Coelus, and
+father of Minerva, who is called the Goddess and inventress of war; the
+third one born of Saturn in the isle of Crete,[261] where his sepulchre
+is shown. The sons of Jupiter ([Greek: Dioskouroi]) also, among the
+Greeks, have many names; first, the three who at Athens have the title
+of Anactes,[262] Tritopatreus, Eubuleus, and Dionysus, sons of the most
+ancient king Jupiter and Proserpine; the next are Castor and Pollux,
+sons of the third Jupiter and Leda; and, lastly, three others, by some
+called Alco,[263] Melampus, and Tmolus, sons of Atreus, the son of
+Pelops.
+
+As to the Muses, there were at first four--Thelxiope, Aoede, Arche, and
+Melete--daughters of the second Jupiter; afterward there were nine,
+daughters of the third Jupiter and Mnemosyne; there were also nine
+others, having the same appellations, born of Pierus and Antiopa, by
+the poets usually called Pierides and Pieriae. Though _Sol_ (the sun) is
+so called, you say, because he is _solus_ (single); yet how many suns
+do theologists mention? There is one, the son of Jupiter and grandson
+of AEther; another, the son of Hyperion; a third, who, the Egyptians
+say, was of the city Heliopolis, sprung from Vulcan, the son of Nilus;
+a fourth is said to have been born at Rhodes of Acantho, in the times
+of the heroes, and was the grandfather of Jalysus, Camirus, and Lindus;
+a fifth, of whom, it is pretended, Aretes and Circe were born at
+Colchis.
+
+XXII. There are likewise several Vulcans. The first (who had of Minerva
+that Apollo whom the ancient historians call the tutelary God of
+Athens) was the son of Coelus; the second, whom the Egyptians call
+Opas,[264] and whom they looked upon as the protector of Egypt, is the
+son of Nilus; the third, who is said to have been the master of the
+forges at Lemnos, was the son of the third Jupiter and of Juno; the
+fourth, who possessed the islands near Sicily called Vulcaniae,[265] was
+the son of Menalius. One Mercury had Coelus for his father and Dies for
+his mother; another, who is said to dwell in a cavern, and is the same
+as Trophonius, is the son of Valens and Phoronis. A third, of whom, and
+of Penelope, Pan was the offspring, is the son of the third Jupiter and
+Maia. A fourth, whom the Egyptians think it a crime to name, is the son
+of Nilus. A fifth, whom we call, in their language, Thoth, as with them
+the first month of the year is called, is he whom the people of
+Pheneum[266] worship, and who is said to have killed Argus, to have
+fled for it into Egypt, and to have given laws and learning to the
+Egyptians. The first of the AEsculapii, the God of Arcadia, who is said
+to have invented the probe and to have been the first person who taught
+men to use bandages for wounds, is the son of Apollo. The second, who
+was killed with thunder, and is said to be buried in Cynosura,[267] is
+the brother of the second Mercury. The third, who is said to have found
+out the art of purging the stomach, and of drawing teeth, is the son of
+Arsippus and Arsinoe; and in Arcadia there is shown his tomb, and the
+wood which is consecrated to him, near the river Lusium.
+
+XXIII. I have already spoken of the most ancient of the Apollos, who is
+the son of Vulcan, and tutelar God of Athens. There is another, son of
+Corybas, and native of Crete, for which island he is said to have
+contended with Jupiter himself. A third, who came from the regions of
+the Hyperborei[268] to Delphi, is the son of the third Jupiter and of
+Latona. A fourth was of Arcadia, whom the Arcadians called Nomio,[269]
+because they regarded him as their legislator. There are likewise many
+Dianas. The first, who is thought to be the mother of the winged Cupid,
+is the daughter of Jupiter and Proserpine. The second, who is more
+known, is daughter of the third Jupiter and of Latona. The third, whom
+the Greeks often call by her father's name, is the daughter of
+Upis[270] and Glauce. There are many also of the Dionysi. The first was
+the son of Jupiter and Proserpine. The second, who is said to have
+killed Nysa, was the son of Nilus. The third, who reigned in Asia, and
+for whom the Sabazia[271] were instituted, was the son of Caprius. The
+fourth, for whom they celebrate the Orphic festivals, sprung from
+Jupiter and Luna. The fifth, who is supposed to have instituted the
+Trieterides, was the son of Nysus and Thyone.
+
+The first Venus, who has a temple at Elis, was the daughter of Coelus
+and Dies. The second arose out of the froth of the sea, and became, by
+Mercury, the mother of the second Cupid. The third, the daughter of
+Jupiter and Diana, was married to Vulcan, but is said to have had
+Anteros by Mars. The fourth was a Syrian, born of Tyro, who is called
+Astarte, and is said to have been married to Adonis. I have already
+mentioned one Minerva, mother of Apollo. Another, who is worshipped at
+Sais, a city in Egypt, sprung from Nilus. The third, whom I have also
+mentioned, was daughter of Jupiter. The fourth, sprung from Jupiter and
+Coryphe, the daughter of the Ocean; the Arcadians call her Coria, and
+make her the inventress of chariots. A fifth, whom they paint with
+wings at her heels, was daughter of Pallas, and is said to have killed
+her father for endeavoring to violate her chastity. The first Cupid is
+said to be the son of Mercury and the first Diana; the second, of
+Mercury and the second Venus; the third, who is the same as Anteros, of
+Mars and the third Venus.
+
+All these opinions arise from old stories that were spread in Greece;
+the belief in which, Balbus, you well know, ought to be stopped, lest
+religion should suffer. But you Stoics, so far from refuting them, even
+give them authority by the mysterious sense which you pretend to find
+in them. Can you, then, think, after this plain refutation, that there
+is need to employ more subtle reasonings? But to return from this
+digression.
+
+XXIV. We see that the mind, faith, hope, virtue, honor, victory,
+health, concord, and things of such kind, are purely natural, and have
+nothing of divinity in them; for either they are inherent in us, as the
+mind, faith, hope, virtue, and concord are; or else they are to be
+desired, as honor, health, and victory. I know indeed that they are
+useful to us, and see that statues have been religiously erected for
+them; but as to their divinity, I shall begin to believe it when you
+have proved it for certain. Of this kind I may particularly mention
+Fortune, which is allowed to be ever inseparable from inconstancy and
+temerity, which are certainly qualities unworthy of a divine being.
+
+But what delight do you take in the explication of fables, and in the
+etymology of names?--that Coelus was castrated by his son, and that
+Saturn was bound in chains by his son! By your defence of these and
+such like fictions you would make the authors of them appear not only
+not to be madmen, but to have been even very wise. But the pains which
+you take with your etymologies deserve our pity. That Saturn is so
+called because _se saturat annis_, he is full of years; Mavors, Mars,
+because _magna vortit_, he brings about mighty changes; Minerva,
+because _minuit_, she diminishes, or because _minatur_, she threatens;
+Venus, because _venit ad omnia_, she comes to all; Ceres, _a gerendo_,
+from bearing. How dangerous is this method! for there are many names
+would puzzle you. From what would you derive Vejupiter and Vulcan?
+Though, indeed, if you can derive Neptune _a nando_, from swimming, in
+which you seem to me to flounder about yourself more than Neptune, you
+may easily find the origin of all names, since it is founded only upon
+the conformity of some one letter. Zeno first, and after him Cleanthes
+and Chrysippus, are put to the unnecessary trouble of explaining mere
+fables, and giving reasons for the several appellations of every Deity;
+which is really owning that those whom we call Gods are not the
+representations of deities, but natural things, and that to judge
+otherwise is an error.
+
+XXV. Yet this error has so much prevailed that even pernicious things
+have not only the title of divinity ascribed to them, but have also
+sacrifices offered to them; for Fever has a temple on the Palatine
+hill, and Orbona another near that of the Lares, and we see on the
+Esquiline hill an altar consecrated to Ill-fortune. Let all such errors
+be banished from philosophy, if we would advance, in our dispute
+concerning the immortal Gods, nothing unworthy of immortal beings. I
+know myself what I ought to believe; which is far different from what
+you have said. You take Neptune for an intelligence pervading the sea.
+You have the same opinion of Ceres with regard to the earth. I cannot,
+I own, find out, or in the least conjecture, what that intelligence of
+the sea or the earth is. To learn, therefore, the existence of the
+Gods, and of what description and character they are, I must apply
+elsewhere, not to the Stoics.
+
+Let us proceed to the two other parts of our dispute: first, "whether
+there is a divine providence which governs the world;" and lastly,
+"whether that providence particularly regards mankind;" for these are
+the remaining propositions of your discourse; and I think that, if you
+approve of it, we should examine these more accurately. With all my
+heart, says Velleius, for I readily agree to what you have hitherto
+said, and expect still greater things from you.
+
+I am unwilling to interrupt you, says Balbus to Cotta, but we shall
+take another opportunity, and I shall effectually convince you.
+But[272] * * *
+
+XXVI.
+    Shall I adore, and bend the suppliant knee,
+    Who scorn their power and doubt their deity?
+
+Does not Niobe here seem to reason, and by that reasoning to bring all
+her misfortunes upon herself? But what a subtle expression is the
+following!
+
+    On strength of will alone depends success;
+
+a maxim capable of leading us into all that is bad.
+
+    Though I'm confined, his malice yet is vain,
+    His tortured heart shall answer pain for pain;
+    His ruin soothe my soul with soft content,
+    Lighten my chains, and welcome banishment!
+
+This, now, is reason; that reason which you say the divine goodness has
+denied to the brute creation, kindly to bestow it on men alone. How
+great, how immense the favor! Observe the same Medea flying from her
+father and her country:
+
+    The guilty wretch from her pursuer flies.
+    By her own hands the young Absyrtus slain,
+    His mangled limbs she scatters o'er the plain,
+    That the fond sire might sink beneath his woe,
+    And she to parricide her safety owe.
+
+Reflection, as well as wickedness, must have been necessary to the
+preparation of such a fact; and did he too, who prepared that fatal
+repast for his brother, do it without reflection?
+
+    Revenge as great as Atreus' injury
+    Shall sink his soul and crown his misery.
+
+XXVII. Did not Thyestes himself, not content with having defiled his
+brother's bed (of which Atreus with great justice thus complains,
+
+    When faithless comforts, in the lewd embrace,
+    With vile adultery stain a royal race,
+    The blood thus mix'd in fouler currents flows,
+    Taints the rich soil, and breeds unnumber'd woes)--
+
+did he not, I say, by that adultery, aim at the possession of the
+crown? Atreus thus continues:
+
+    A lamb, fair gift of heaven, with golden fleece,
+    Promised in vain to fix my crown in peace;
+    But base Thyestes, eager for the prey,
+    Crept to my bed, and stole the gem away.
+
+Do you not perceive that Thyestes must have had a share of reason
+proportionable to the greatness of his crimes--such crimes as are not
+only represented to us on the stage, but such as we see committed, nay,
+often exceeded, in the common course of life? The private houses of
+individual citizens, the public courts, the senate, the camp, our
+allies, our provinces, all agree that reason is the author of all the
+ill, as well as of all the good, which is done; that it makes few act
+well, and that but seldom, but many act ill, and that frequently; and
+that, in short, the Gods would have shown greater benevolence in
+denying us any reason at all than in sending us that which is
+accompanied with so much mischief; for as wine is seldom wholesome, but
+often hurtful in diseases, we think it more prudent to deny it to the
+patient than to run the risk of so uncertain a remedy; so I do not know
+whether it would not be better for mankind to be deprived of wit,
+thought, and penetration, or what we call reason, since it is a thing
+pernicious to many and very useful to few, than to have it bestowed
+upon them with so much liberality and in such abundance. But if the
+divine will has really consulted the good of man in this gift of
+reason, the good of those men only was consulted on whom a
+well-regulated one is bestowed: how few those are, if any, is very
+apparent. We cannot admit, therefore, that the Gods consulted the good
+of a few only; the conclusion must be that they consulted the good of
+none.
+
+XXVIII. You answer that the ill use which a great part of mankind make
+of reason no more takes away the goodness of the Gods, who bestow it as
+a present of the greatest benefit to them, than the ill use which
+children make of their patrimony diminishes the obligation which they
+have to their parents for it. We grant you this; but where is the
+similitude? It was far from Deianira's design to injure Hercules when
+she made him a present of the shirt dipped in the blood of the
+Centaurs. Nor was it a regard to the welfare of Jason of Pherae that
+influenced the man who with his sword opened his imposthume, which the
+physicians had in vain attempted to cure. For it has often happened
+that people have served a man whom they intended to injure, and have
+injured one whom they designed to serve; so that the effect of the gift
+is by no means always a proof of the intention of the giver; neither
+does the benefit which may accrue from it prove that it came from the
+hands of a benefactor. For, in short, what debauchery, what avarice,
+what crime among men is there which does not owe its birth to thought
+and reflection, that is, to reason? For all opinion is reason: right
+reason, if men's thoughts are conformable to truth; wrong reason, if
+they are not. The Gods only give us the mere faculty of reason, if we
+have any; the use or abuse of it depends entirely upon ourselves; so
+that the comparison is not just between the present of reason given us
+by the Gods, and a patrimony left to a son by his father; for, after
+all, if the injury of mankind had been the end proposed by the Gods,
+what could they have given them more pernicious than reason? for what
+seed could there be of injustice, intemperance, and cowardice, if
+reason were not laid as the foundation of these vices?
+
+XXIX. I mentioned just now Medea and Atreus, persons celebrated in
+heroic poems, who had used this reason only for the contrivance and
+practice of the most flagitious crimes; but even the trifling
+characters which appear in comedies supply us with the like instances
+of this reasoning faculty; for example, does not he, in the Eunuch,
+reason with some subtlety?--
+
+    What, then, must I resolve upon?
+    She turn'd me out-of-doors; she sends for me back again;
+    Shall I go? no, not if she were to beg it of me.
+
+Another, in the Twins, making no scruple of opposing a received maxim,
+after the manner of the Academics, asserts that when a man is in love
+and in want, it is pleasant
+
+    To have a father covetous, crabbed, and passionate,
+    Who has no love or affection for his children.
+
+This unaccountable opinion he strengthens thus:
+
+    You may defraud him of his profits, or forge letters in his name,
+    Or fright him by your servant into compliance;
+    And what you take from such an old hunks,
+    How much more pleasantly do you spend it!
+
+On the contrary, he says that an easy, generous father is an
+inconvenience to a son in love; for, says he,
+
+    I can't tell how to abuse so good, so prudent a parent,
+    Who always foreruns my desires, and meets me purse in hand,
+    To support me in my pleasures: this easy goodness and generosity
+    Quite defeat all my frauds, tricks, and stratagems.[273]
+
+What are these frauds, tricks, and stratagems but the effects of
+reason? O excellent gift of the Gods! Without this Phormio could not
+have said,
+
+    Find me out the old man: I have something hatching for him in my head.
+
+XXX. But let us pass from the stage to the bar. The praetor[274] takes
+his seat. To judge whom? The man who set fire to our archives. How
+secretly was that villany conducted! Q. Sosius, an illustrious Roman
+knight, of the Picene field,[275] confessed the fact. Who else is to be
+tried? He who forged the public registers--Alenus, an artful fellow,
+who counterfeited the handwriting of the six officers.[276] Let us call
+to mind other trials: that on the subject of the gold of Tolosa, or the
+conspiracy of Jugurtha. Let us trace back the informations laid against
+Tubulus for bribery in his judicial office; and, since that, the
+proceedings of the tribune Peduceus concerning the incest of the
+vestals. Let us reflect upon the trials which daily happen for
+assassinations, poisonings, embezzlement of public money, frauds in
+wills, against which we have a new law; then that action against the
+advisers or assisters of any theft; the many laws concerning frauds in
+guardianship, breaches of trust in partnerships and commissions in
+trade, and other violations of faith in buying, selling, borrowing, or
+lending; the public decree on a private affair by the Laetorian
+Law;[277] and, lastly, that scourge of all dishonesty, the law against
+fraud, proposed by our friend Aquillius; that sort of fraud, he says,
+by which one thing is pretended and another done. Can we, then, think
+that this plentiful fountain of evil sprung from the immortal Gods? If
+they have given reason to man, they have likewise given him subtlety,
+for subtlety is only a deceitful manner of applying reason to do
+mischief. To them likewise we must owe deceit, and every other crime,
+which, without the help of reason, would neither have been thought of
+nor committed. As the old woman wished
+
+    That to the fir which on Mount Pelion grew
+    The axe had ne'er been laid,[278]
+
+so we should wish that the Gods had never bestowed this ability on man,
+the abuse of which is so general that the small number of those who
+make a good use of it are often oppressed by those who make a bad use
+of it; so that it seems to be given rather to help vice than to promote
+virtue among us.
+
+XXXI. This, you insist on it, is the fault of man, and not of the Gods.
+But should we not laugh at a physician or pilot, though they are weak
+mortals, if they were to lay the blame of their ill success on the
+violence of the disease or the fury of the tempest? Had there not been
+danger, we should say, who would have applied to you? This reasoning
+has still greater force against the Deity. The fault, you say, is in
+man, if he commits crimes. But why was not man endued with a reason
+incapable of producing any crimes? How could the Gods err? When we
+leave our effects to our children, it is in hopes that they may be well
+bestowed; in which we may be deceived, but how can the Deity be
+deceived? As Phoebus when he trusted his chariot to his son Phaethon,
+or as Neptune when he indulged his son Theseus in granting him three
+wishes, the consequence of which was the destruction of Hippolitus?
+These are poetical fictions; but truth, and not fables, ought to
+proceed from philosophers. Yet if those poetical Deities had foreseen
+that their indulgence would have proved fatal to their sons, they must
+have been thought blamable for it.
+
+Aristo of Chios used often to say that the philosophers do hurt to such
+of their disciples as take their good doctrine in a wrong sense; thus
+the lectures of Aristippus might produce debauchees, and those of Zeno
+pedants. If this be true, it were better that philosophers should be
+silent than that their disciples should be corrupted by a
+misapprehension of their master's meaning; so if reason, which was
+bestowed on mankind by the Gods with a good design, tends only to make
+men more subtle and fraudulent, it had been better for them never to
+have received it. There could be no excuse for a physician who
+prescribes wine to a patient, knowing that he will drink it and
+immediately expire. Your Providence is no less blamable in giving
+reason to man, who, it foresaw, would make a bad use of it. Will you
+say that it did not foresee it? Nothing could please me more than such
+an acknowledgment. But you dare not. I know what a sublime idea you
+entertain of her.
+
+XXXII. But to conclude. If folly, by the unanimous consent of
+philosophers, is allowed to be the greatest of all evils, and if no one
+ever attained to true wisdom, we, whom they say the immortal Gods take
+care of, are consequently in a state of the utmost misery. For that
+nobody is well, or that nobody can be well, is in effect the same
+thing; and, in my opinion, that no man is truly wise, or that no man
+can be truly wise, is likewise the same thing. But I will insist no
+further on so self-evident a point. Telamon in one verse decides the
+question. If, says he, there is a Divine Providence,
+
+    Good men would be happy, bad men miserable.
+
+But it is not so. If the Gods had regarded mankind, they should have
+made them all virtuous; but if they did not regard the welfare of all
+mankind, at least they ought to have provided for the happiness of the
+virtuous. Why, therefore, was the Carthaginian in Spain suffered to
+destroy those best and bravest men, the two Scipios? Why did
+Maximus[279] lose his son, the consul? Why did Hannibal kill Marcellus?
+Why did Cannae deprive us of Paulus? Why was the body of Regulus
+delivered up to the cruelty of the Carthaginians? Why was not Africanus
+protected from violence in his own house? To these, and many more
+ancient instances, let us add some of later date. Why is Rutilius, my
+uncle, a man of the greatest virtue and learning, now in banishment?
+Why was my own friend and companion Drusus assassinated in his own
+house? Why was Scaevola, the high-priest, that pattern of moderation and
+prudence, massacred before the statue of Vesta? Why, before that, were
+so many illustrious citizens put to death by Cinna? Why had Marius, the
+most perfidious of men, the power to cause the death of Catulus, a man
+of the greatest dignity? But there would be no end of enumerating
+examples of good men made miserable and wicked men prosperous. Why did
+that Marius live to an old age, and die so happily at his own house in
+his seventh consulship? Why was that inhuman wretch Cinna permitted to
+enjoy so long a reign?
+
+XXXIII. He, indeed, met with deserved punishment at last. But would it
+not have been better that these inhumanities had been prevented than
+that the author of them should be punished afterward? Varius, a most
+impious wretch, was tortured and put to death. If this was his
+punishment for the murdering Drusus by the sword, and Metellus by
+poison, would it not have been better to have preserved their lives
+than to have their deaths avenged on Varius? Dionysius was thirty-eight
+years a tyrant over the most opulent and flourishing city; and, before
+him, how many years did Pisistratus tyrannize in the very flower of
+Greece! Phalaris and Apollodorus met with the fate they deserved, but
+not till after they had tortured and put to death multitudes. Many
+robbers have been executed; but the number of those who have suffered
+for their crimes is short of those whom they have robbed and murdered.
+Anaxarchus,[280] a scholar of Democritus, was cut to pieces by command
+of the tyrant of Cyprus; and Zeno of Elea[281] ended his life in
+tortures. What shall I say of Socrates,[282] whose death, as often as I
+read of it in Plato, draws fresh tears from my eyes? If, therefore, the
+Gods really see everything that happens to men, you must acknowledge
+they make no distinction between the good and the bad.
+
+XXXIV. Diogenes the Cynic used to say of Harpalus, one of the most
+fortunate villains of his time, that the constant prosperity of such a
+man was a kind of witness against the Gods. Dionysius, of whom we have
+before spoken, after he had pillaged the temple of Proserpine at
+Locris, set sail for Syracuse, and, having a fair wind during his
+voyage, said, with a smile, "See, my friends, what favorable winds the
+immortal Gods bestow upon church-robbers." Encouraged by this
+prosperous event, he proceeded in his impiety. When he landed at
+Peloponnesus, he went into the temple of Jupiter Olympius, and disrobed
+his statue of a golden mantle of great weight, an ornament which the
+tyrant Gelo[283] had given out of the spoils of the Carthaginians, and
+at the same time, in a jesting manner, he said "that a golden mantle
+was too heavy in summer and too cold in winter;" and then, throwing a
+woollen cloak over the statue, added, "This will serve for all
+seasons." At another time, he ordered the golden beard of AEsculapius of
+Epidaurus to be taken away, saying that "it was absurd for the son to
+have a beard, when his father had none." He likewise robbed the temples
+of the silver tables, which, according to the ancient custom of Greece,
+bore this inscription, "To the good Gods," saying "he was willing to
+make use of their goodness;" and, without the least scruple, took away
+the little golden emblems of victory, the cups and coronets, which were
+in the stretched-out hands of the statues, saying "he did not take, but
+receive them; for it would be folly not to accept good things from the
+Gods, to whom we are constantly praying for favors, when they stretch
+out their hands towards us." And, last of all, all the things which he
+had thus pillaged from the temples were, by his order, brought to the
+market-place and sold by the common crier; and, after he had received
+the money for them, he commanded every purchaser to restore what he had
+bought, within a limited time, to the temples from whence they came.
+Thus to his impiety towards the Gods he added injustice to man.
+
+XXXV. Yet neither did Olympian Jove strike him with his thunder, nor
+did AEsculapius cause him to die by tedious diseases and a lingering
+death. He died in his bed, had funeral honors[284] paid to him, and
+left his power, which he had wickedly obtained, as a just and lawful
+inheritance to his son.
+
+It is not without concern that I maintain a doctrine which seems to
+authorize evil, and which might probably give a sanction to it, if
+conscience, without any divine assistance, did not point out, in the
+clearest manner, the difference between virtue and vice. Without
+conscience man is contemptible. For as no family or state can be
+supposed to be formed with any reason or discipline if there are no
+rewards for good actions nor punishment for crimes, so we cannot
+believe that a Divine Providence regulates the world if there is no
+distinction between the honest and the wicked.
+
+But the Gods, you say, neglect trifling things: the little fields or
+vineyards of particular men are not worthy their attention; and if
+blasts or hail destroy their product, Jupiter does not regard it, nor
+do kings extend their care to the lower offices of government. This
+argument might have some weight if, in bringing Rutilius as an
+instance, I had only complained of the loss of his farm at Formiae; but
+I spoke of a personal misfortune, his banishment.[285]
+
+XXXVI. All men agree that external benefits, such as vineyards, corn,
+olives, plenty of fruit and grain, and, in short, every convenience and
+property of life, are derived from the Gods; and, indeed, with reason,
+since by our virtue we claim applause, and in virtue we justly glory,
+which we could have no right to do if it was the gift of the Gods, and
+not a personal merit. When we are honored with new dignities, or
+blessed with increase of riches; when we are favored by fortune beyond
+our expectation, or luckily delivered from any approaching evil, we
+return thanks for it to the Gods, and assume no praise to ourselves.
+But who ever thanked the Gods that he was a good man? We thank them,
+indeed, for riches, health, and honor. For these we invoke the all-good
+and all-powerful Jupiter; but not for wisdom, temperance, and justice.
+No one ever offered a tenth of his estate to Hercules to be made wise.
+It is reported, indeed, of Pythagoras that he sacrificed an ox to the
+Muses upon having made some new discovery in geometry;[286] but, for my
+part, I cannot believe it, because he refused to sacrifice even to
+Apollo at Delos, lest he should defile the altar with blood. But to
+return. It is universally agreed that good fortune we must ask of the
+Gods, but wisdom must arise from ourselves; and though temples have
+been consecrated to the Mind, to Virtue, and to Faith, yet that does
+not contradict their being inherent in us. In regard to hope, safety,
+assistance, and victory, we must rely upon the Gods for them; from
+whence it follows, as Diogenes said, that the prosperity of the wicked
+destroys the idea of a Divine Providence.
+
+XXXVII. But good men have sometimes success. They have so; but we
+cannot, with any show of reason, attribute that success to the Gods.
+Diagoras, who is called the atheist, being at Samothrace, one of his
+friends showed him several pictures[287] of people who had endured very
+dangerous storms; "See," says he, "you who deny a providence, how many
+have been saved by their prayers to the Gods." "Ay," says Diagoras, "I
+see those who were saved, but where are those painted who were
+shipwrecked?" At another time, he himself was in a storm, when the
+sailors, being greatly alarmed, told him they justly deserved that
+misfortune for admitting him into their ship; when he, pointing to
+others under the like distress, asked them "if they believed Diagoras
+was also aboard those ships?" In short, with regard to good or bad
+fortune, it matters not what you are, or how you have lived. The Gods,
+like kings, regard not everything. What similitude is there between
+them? If kings neglect anything, want of knowledge may be pleaded in
+their defence; but ignorance cannot be brought as an excuse for the
+Gods.
+
+XXXVIII. Your manner of justifying them is somewhat extraordinary, when
+you say that if a wicked man dies without suffering for his crimes, the
+Gods inflict a punishment on his children, his children's children, and
+all his posterity. O wonderful equity of the Gods! What city would
+endure the maker of a law which should condemn a son or a grandson for
+a crime committed by the father or the grandfather?
+
+    Shall Tantalus' unhappy offspring know
+    No end, no close, of this long scene of woe?
+    When will the dire reward of guilt be o'er,
+    And Myrtilus demand revenge no more?[288]
+
+Whether the poets have corrupted the Stoics, or the Stoics given
+authority to the poets, I cannot easily determine. Both alike are to be
+condemned. If those persons whose names have been branded in the
+satires of Hipponax or Archilochus[289] were driven to despair, it did
+not proceed from the Gods, but had its origin in their own minds. When
+we see AEgistus and Paris lost in the heat of an impure passion, why are
+we to attribute it to a Deity, when the crime, as it were, speaks for
+itself? I believe that those who recover from illness are more indebted
+to the care of Hippocrates than to the power of AEsculapius; that Sparta
+received her laws from Lycurgus[290] rather than from Apollo; that
+those eyes of the maritime coast, Corinth and Carthage, were plucked
+out, the one by Critolaus, the other by Hasdrubal, without the
+assistance of any divine anger, since you yourselves confess that a
+Deity cannot possibly be angry on any provocation.
+
+XXXIX. But could not the Deity have assisted and preserved those
+eminent cities? Undoubtedly he could; for, according to your doctrine,
+his power is infinite, and without the least labor; and as nothing but
+the will is necessary to the motion of our bodies, so the divine will
+of the Gods, with the like ease, can create, move, and change all
+things. This you hold, not from a mere phantom of superstition, but on
+natural and settled principles of reason; for matter, you say, of which
+all things are composed and consist, is susceptible of all forms and
+changes, and there is nothing which cannot be, or cease to be, in an
+instant; and that Divine Providence has the command and disposal of
+this universal matter, and consequently can, in any part of the
+universe, do whatever she pleases: from whence I conclude that this
+Providence either knows not the extent of her power, or neglects human
+affairs, or cannot judge what is best for us. Providence, you say, does
+not extend her care to particular men; there is no wonder in that,
+since she does not extend it to cities, or even to nations, or people.
+If, therefore, she neglects whole nations, is it not very probable that
+she neglects all mankind? But how can you assert that the Gods do not
+enter into all the little circumstances of life, and yet hold that they
+distribute dreams among men? Since you believe in dreams, it is your
+part to solve this difficulty. Besides, you say we ought to call upon
+the Gods. Those who call upon the Gods are individuals. Divine
+Providence, therefore, regards individuals, which consequently proves
+that they are more at leisure than you imagine. Let us suppose the
+Divine Providence to be greatly busied; that it causes the revolutions
+of the heavens, supports the earth, and rules the seas; why does it
+suffer so many Gods to be unemployed? Why is not the superintendence of
+human affairs given to some of those idle Deities which you say are
+innumerable?
+
+This is the purport of what I had to say concerning "the Nature of the
+Gods;" not with a design to destroy their existence, but merely to show
+what an obscure point it is, and with what difficulties an explanation
+of it is attended.
+
+XL. Balbus, observing that Cotta had finished his discourse--You have
+been very severe, says he, against a Divine Providence, a doctrine
+established by the Stoics with piety and wisdom; but, as it grows too
+late, I shall defer my answer to another day. Our argument is of the
+greatest importance; it concerns our altars,[291] our hearths, our
+temples, nay, even the walls of our city, which you priests hold
+sacred; you, who by religion defend Rome better than she is defended by
+her ramparts. This is a cause which, while I have life, I think I
+cannot abandon without impiety.
+
+There is nothing, replied Cotta, which I desire more than to be
+confuted. I have not pretended to decide this point, but to give you my
+private sentiments upon it; and am very sensible of your great
+superiority in argument. No doubt of it, says Velleius; we have much to
+fear from one who believes that our dreams are sent from Jupiter,
+which, though they are of little weight, are yet of more importance
+than the discourse of the Stoics concerning the nature of the Gods. The
+conversation ended here, and we parted. Velleius judged that the
+arguments of Cotta were truest; but those of Balbus seemed to me to
+have the greater probability.[292]
+
+
+
+
+
+
+ON THE COMMONWEALTH.
+
+       *       *       *       *       *
+
+
+
+
+PREFACE BY THE EDITOR.
+
+
+This work was one of Cicero's earlier treatises, though one of those
+which was most admired by his contemporaries, and one of which he
+himself was most proud. It was composed 54 B.C. It was originally in
+two books: then it was altered and enlarged into nine, and finally
+reduced to six. With the exception of the dream of Scipio, in the last
+book, the whole treatise was lost till the year 1822, when the
+librarian of the Vatican discovered a portion of them among the
+palimpsests in that library. What he discovered is translated here; but
+it is in a most imperfect and mutilated state.
+
+The form selected was that of a dialogue, in imitation of those of
+Plato; and the several conferences were supposed to have taken place
+during the Latin holidays, 129 B.C., in the consulship of Caius
+Sempronius, Tuditanus, and Marcus Aquilius. The speakers are Scipio
+Africanus the younger, in whose garden the scene is laid; Caius Laelius;
+Lucius Furius Philus; Marcus Manilius; Spurius Mummius, the brother of
+the taker of Corinth, a Stoic; Quintus AElius Tubero, a nephew of
+Africanus; Publius Rutilius Rufus; Quintus Mucius Scaevola, the tutor of
+Cicero; and Caius Fannius, who was absent, however, on the second day
+of the conference.
+
+In the first book, the first thirty-three pages are wanting, and there
+are chasms amounting to thirty-eight pages more. In this book Scipio
+asserts the superiority of an active over a speculative career; and
+after analyzing and comparing the monarchical, aristocratic, and
+democratic forms of government, gives a preference to the first;
+although his idea of a perfect constitution would be one compounded of
+three kinds in due proportion.
+
+There are a few chasms in the earlier part of the second book, and the
+latter part of it is wholly lost. In it Scipio was led on to give an
+account of the rise and progress of the Roman Constitution, from which
+he passed on to the examination of the great moral obligations which
+are the foundations of all political union.
+
+Of the remaining books we have only a few disjointed fragments, with
+the exception, as has been before mentioned, of the dream of Scipio in
+the sixth.
+
+       *       *       *       *       *
+
+
+
+
+INTRODUCTION TO THE FIRST BOOK,
+
+BY THE ORIGINAL TRANSLATOR.
+
+
+   Cicero introduces his subject by showing that men were not born
+     for the mere abstract study of philosophy, but that the study
+     of philosophic truth should always be made as practical as
+     possible, and applicable to the great interests of
+     philanthropy and patriotism. Cicero endeavors to show the
+     benefit of mingling the contemplative or philosophic with the
+     political and active life, according to that maxim of
+     Plato--"Happy is the nation whose philosophers are kings, and
+     whose kings are philosophers."
+
+   This kind of introduction was the more necessary because many
+     of the ancient philosophers, too warmly attached to
+     transcendental metaphysics and sequestered speculations, had
+     affirmed that true philosophers ought not to interest
+     themselves in the management of public affairs. Thus, as M.
+     Villemain observes, it was a maxim of the Epicureans,
+     "Sapiens ne accedat ad rempublicam" (Let no wise man meddle
+     in politics). The Pythagoreans had enforced the same
+     principle with more gravity. Aristotle examines the question
+     on both sides, and concludes in favor of active life. Among
+     Aristotle's disciples, a writer, singularly elegant and pure,
+     had maintained the pre-eminence of the contemplative life
+     over the political or active one, in a work which Cicero
+     cites with admiration, and to which he seems to have applied
+     for relief whenever he felt harassed and discouraged in
+     public business. But here this great man was interested by
+     the subject he discusses, and by the whole course of his
+     experience and conduct, to refute the dogmas of that
+     pusillanimous sophistry and selfish indulgence by bringing
+     forward the most glorious examples and achievements of
+     patriotism. In this strain he had doubtless commenced his
+     exordium, and in this strain we find him continuing it at the
+     point in which the palimpsest becomes legible. He then
+     proceeds to introduce his illustrious interlocutors, and
+     leads them at first to discourse on the astronomical laws
+     that regulate the revolutions of our planet. From this, by a
+     very graceful and beautiful transition, he passes on to the
+     consideration of the best forms of political constitutions
+     that had prevailed in different nations, and those modes of
+     government which had produced the greatest benefits in the
+     commonwealths of antiquity.
+
+   This first book is, in fact, a splendid epitome of the
+     political science of the age of Cicero, and probably the most
+     eloquent plea in favor of mixed monarchy to be found in all
+     literature.
+
+       *       *       *       *       *
+
+
+
+
+BOOK I.
+
+
+I. [Without the virtue of patriotism], neither Caius Duilius, nor Aulus
+Atilius,[293] nor Lucius Metellus, could have delivered Rome by their
+courage from the terror of Carthage; nor could the two Scipios, when
+the fire of the second Punic War was kindled, have quenched it in their
+blood; nor, when it revived in greater force, could either Quintus
+Maximus[294] have enervated it, or Marcus Marcellus have crushed it;
+nor, when it was repulsed from the gates of our own city, would Scipio
+have confined it within the walls of our enemies.
+
+But Cato, at first a new and unknown man, whom all we who aspire to the
+same honors consider as a pattern to lead us on to industry and virtue,
+was undoubtedly at liberty to enjoy his repose at Tusculum, a most
+salubrious and convenient retreat. But he, mad as some people think
+him, though no necessity compelled him, preferred being tossed about
+amidst the tempestuous waves of politics, even till extreme old age, to
+living with all imaginable luxury in that tranquillity and relaxation.
+I omit innumerable men who have separately devoted themselves to the
+protection of our Commonwealth; and those whose lives are within the
+memory of the present generation I will not mention, lest any one
+should complain that I had invidiously forgotten himself or some one of
+his family. This only I insist on--that so great is the necessity of
+this virtue which nature has implanted in man, and so great is the
+desire to defend the common safety of our country, that its energy has
+continually overcome all the blandishments of pleasure and repose.
+
+II. Nor is it sufficient to possess this virtue as if it were some kind
+of art, unless we put it in practice. An art, indeed, though not
+exercised, may still be retained in knowledge; but virtue consists
+wholly in its proper use and action. Now, the noblest use of virtue is
+the government of the Commonwealth, and the carrying-out in real
+action, not in words only, of all those identical theories which those
+philosophers discuss at every corner. For nothing is spoken by
+philosophers, so far as they speak correctly and honorably, which has
+not been discovered and confirmed by those persons who have been the
+founders of the laws of states. For whence comes piety, or from whom
+has religion been derived? Whence comes law, either that of nations, or
+that which is called the civil law? Whence comes justice, faith,
+equity? Whence modesty, continence, the horror of baseness, the desire
+of praise and renown? Whence fortitude in labors and perils? Doubtless,
+from those who have instilled some of these moral principles into men
+by education, and confirmed others by custom, and sanctioned others by
+laws.
+
+Moreover, it is reported of Xenocrates, one of the sublimest
+philosophers, that when some one asked him what his disciples learned,
+he replied, "To do that of their own accord which they might be
+compelled to do by law." That citizen, therefore, who obliges all men
+to those virtuous actions, by the authority of laws and penalties, to
+which the philosophers can scarcely persuade a few by the force of
+their eloquence, is certainly to be preferred to the sagest of the
+doctors who spend their lives in such discussions. For which of their
+exquisite orations is so admirable as to be entitled to be preferred to
+a well-constituted government, public justice, and good customs?
+Certainly, just as I think that magnificent and imperious cities (as
+Ennius says) are superior to castles and villages, so I imagine that
+those who regulate such cities by their counsel and authority are far
+preferable, with respect to real wisdom, to men who are unacquainted
+with any kind of political knowledge. And since we are strongly
+prompted to augment the prosperity of the human race, and since we do
+endeavor by our counsels and exertions to render the life of man safer
+and wealthier, and since we are incited to this blessing by the spur of
+nature herself, let us hold on that course which has always been
+pursued by all the best men, and not listen for a moment to the signals
+of those who sound a retreat so loudly that they sometimes call back
+even those who have made considerable progress.
+
+III. These reasons, so certain and so evident, are opposed by those
+who, on the other side, argue that the labors which must necessarily be
+sustained in maintaining the Commonwealth form but a slight impediment
+to the vigilant and industrious, and are only a contemptible obstacle
+in such important affairs, and even in common studies, offices, and
+employments. They add the peril of life, that base fear of death, which
+has ever been opposed by brave men, to whom it appears far more
+miserable to die by the decay of nature and old age than to be allowed
+an opportunity of gallantly sacrificing that life for their country
+which must otherwise be yielded up to nature.
+
+On this point, however, our antagonists esteem themselves copious and
+eloquent when they collect all the calamities of heroic men, and the
+injuries inflicted on them by their ungrateful countrymen. For on this
+subject they bring forward those notable examples among the Greeks; and
+tell us that Miltiades, the vanquisher and conqueror of the Persians,
+before even those wounds were healed which he had received in that most
+glorious victory, wasted away in the chains of his fellow-citizens that
+life which had been preserved from the weapons of the enemy. They cite
+Themistocles, expelled and proscribed by the country which he had
+rescued, and forced to flee, not to the Grecian ports which he had
+preserved, but to the bosom of the barbarous power which he had
+defeated. There is, indeed, no deficiency of examples to illustrate the
+levity and cruelty of the Athenians to their noblest citizens--examples
+which, originating and multiplying among them, are said at different
+times to have abounded in our own most august empire. For we are told:
+of the exile of Camillus, the disgrace of Ahala, the unpopularity of
+Nasica, the expulsion of Laenas,[295] the condemnation of Opimius, the
+flight of Metellus, the cruel destruction of Caius Marius, the massacre
+of our chieftains, and the many atrocious crimes which followed. My own
+history is by no means free from such calamities; and I imagine that
+when they recollect that by my counsel and perils they were preserved
+in life and liberty, they are led by that consideration to bewail my
+misfortunes more deeply and affectionately. But I cannot tell why those
+who sail over the seas for the sake of knowledge and experience [should
+wonder at seeing still greater hazards braved in the service of the
+Commonwealth].
+
+IV. [Since], on my quitting the consulship, I swore in the assembly of
+the Roman people, who re-echoed my words, that I had saved the
+Commonwealth, I console myself with this remembrance for all my cares,
+troubles, and injuries. Although my misfortune had more of honor than
+misfortune, and more of glory than disaster; and I derive greater
+pleasure from the regrets of good men than sorrow from the exultation
+of the worthless. But even if it had happened otherwise, how could I
+have complained, as nothing befell me which was either unforeseen, or
+more painful than I expected, as a return for my illustrious actions?
+For I was one who, though it was in my power to reap more profit from
+leisure than most men, on account of the diversified sweetness of my
+studies, in which I had lived from boyhood--or, if any public calamity
+had happened, to have borne no more than an equal share with the rest
+of my countrymen in the misfortune--I nevertheless did not hesitate to
+oppose myself to the most formidable tempests and torrents of sedition,
+for the sake of saving my countrymen, and at my own proper danger to
+secure the common safety of all the rest. For our country did not beget
+and educate us with the expectation of receiving no support, as I may
+call it, from us; nor for the purpose of consulting nothing but our
+convenience, to supply us with a secure refuge for idleness and a
+tranquil spot for rest; but rather with a view of turning to her own
+advantage the nobler portion of our genius, heart, and counsel; giving
+us back for our private service only what she can spare from the public
+interests.
+
+V. Those apologies, therefore, in which men take refuge as an excuse
+for their devoting themselves with more plausibility to mere inactivity
+do certainly not deserve to be listened to; when, for instance, they
+tell us that those who meddle with public affairs are generally
+good-for-nothing men, with whom it is discreditable to be compared, and
+miserable and dangerous to contend, especially when the multitude is in
+an excited state. On which account it is not the part of a wise man to
+take the reins, since he cannot restrain the insane and unregulated
+movements of the common people. Nor is it becoming to a man of liberal
+birth, say they, thus to contend with such vile and unrefined
+antagonists, or to subject one's self to the lashings of contumely, or
+to put one's self in the way of injuries which ought not to be borne by
+a wise man. As if to a virtuous, brave, and magnanimous man there could
+be a juster reason for seeking the government than this--to avoid being
+subjected to worthless men, and to prevent the Commonwealth from being
+torn to pieces by them; when, even if they were then desirous to save
+her, they would not have the power.
+
+VI. But this restriction who can approve, which would interdict the
+wise man from taking any share in the government beyond such as the
+occasion and necessity may compel him to? As if any greater necessity
+could possibly happen to any man than happened to me. In which, how
+could I have acted if I had not been consul at the time? and how could
+I have been a consul unless I had maintained that course of life from
+my childhood which raised me from the order of knights, in which I was
+born, to the very highest station? You cannot produce _extempore_, and
+just when you please, the power of assisting a commonwealth, although
+it may be severely pressed by dangers, unless you have attained the
+position which enables you legally to do so. And what most surprises me
+in the discourses of learned men, is to hear those persons who confess
+themselves incapable of steering the vessel of the State in smooth seas
+(which, indeed, they never learned, and never cared to know) profess
+themselves ready to assume the helm amidst the fiercest tempests. For
+those men are accustomed to say openly, and indeed to boast greatly,
+that they have never learned, and have never taken the least pains to
+explain, the principles of either establishing or maintaining a
+commonwealth; and they look on this practical science as one which
+belongs not to men of learning and wisdom, but to those who have made
+it their especial study. How, then, can it be reasonable for such men
+to promise their assistance to the State, when they shall be compelled
+to it by necessity, while they are ignorant how to govern the republic
+when no necessity presses upon it, which is a much more easy task?
+Indeed, though it were true that the wise man loves not to thrust
+himself of his own accord into the administration of public affairs,
+but that if circumstances oblige him to it, then he does not refuse the
+office, yet I think that this science of civil legislation should in no
+wise be neglected by the philosopher, because all resources ought to be
+ready to his hand, which he knows not how soon he may be called on to
+use.
+
+VII. I have spoken thus at large for this reason, because in this work
+I have proposed to myself and undertaken a discussion on the government
+of a state; and in order to render it useful, I was bound, in the first
+place, to do away with this pusillanimous hesitation to mingle in
+public affairs. If there be any, therefore, who are too much influenced
+by the authority of the philosophers, let them consider the subject for
+a moment, and be guided by the opinions of those men whose authority
+and credit are greatest among learned men; whom I look upon, though
+some of them have not personally governed any state, as men who have
+nevertheless discharged a kind of office in the republic, inasmuch as
+they have made many investigations into, and left many writings
+concerning, state affairs. As to those whom the Greeks entitle the
+Seven Wise Men, I find that they almost all lived in the middle of
+public business. Nor, indeed, is there anything in which human virtue
+can more closely resemble the divine powers than in establishing new
+states, or in preserving those already established.
+
+VIII. And concerning these affairs, since it has been our good fortune
+to achieve something worthy of memorial in the government of our
+country, and also to have acquired some facility of explaining the
+powers and resources of politics, we can treat of this subject with the
+weight of personal experience and the habit of instruction and
+illustration. Whereas before us many have been skilful in theory,
+though no exploits of theirs are recorded; and many others have been
+men of consideration in action, but unfamiliar with the arts of
+exposition. Nor, indeed, is it at all our intention to establish a new
+and self-invented system of government; but our purpose is rather to
+recall to memory a discussion of the most illustrious men of their age
+in our Commonwealth, which you and I, in our youth, when at Smyrna,
+heard mentioned by Publius Rutilius Rufus, who reported to us a
+conference of many days in which, in my opinion, there was nothing
+omitted that could throw light on political affairs.
+
+IX. For when, in the year of the consulship of Tuditanus and Aquilius,
+Scipio Africanus, the son of Paulus AEmilius, formed the project of
+spending the Latin holidays at his country-seat, where his most
+intimate friends had promised him frequent visits during this season of
+relaxation, on the first morning of the festival, his nephew, Quintus
+Tubero, made his appearance; and when Scipio had greeted him heartily
+and embraced him--How is it, my dear Tubero, said he, that I see you so
+early? For these holidays must afford you a capital opportunity of
+pursuing your favorite studies. Ah! replied Tubero, I can study my
+books at any time, for they are always disengaged; but it is a great
+privilege, my Scipio, to find you at leisure, especially in this
+restless period of public affairs. You certainly have found me so, said
+Scipio, but, to speak truth, I am rather relaxing from business than
+from study. Nay, said Tubero, you must try to relax from your studies
+too, for here are several of us, as we have appointed, all ready, if it
+suits your convenience, to aid you in getting through this leisure time
+of yours. I am very willing to consent, answered Scipio, and we may be
+able to compare notes respecting the several topics that interest us.
+
+X. Be it so, said Tubero; and since you invite me to discussion, and
+present the opportunity, let us first examine, before any one else
+arrives, what can be the nature of the parhelion, or double sun, which
+was mentioned in the senate. Those that affirm they witnessed this
+prodigy are neither few nor unworthy of credit, so that there is more
+reason for investigation than incredulity.[296]
+
+Ah! said Scipio, I wish we had our friend Panaetius with us, who is fond
+of investigating all things of this kind, but especially all celestial
+phenomena. As for my opinion, Tubero, for I always tell you just what I
+think, I hardly agree in these subjects with that friend of mine,
+since, respecting things of which we can scarcely form a conjecture as
+to their character, he is as positive as if he had seen them with his
+own eyes and felt them with his own hands. And I cannot but the more
+admire the wisdom of Socrates, who discarded all anxiety respecting
+things of this kind, and affirmed that these inquiries concerning the
+secrets of nature were either above the efforts of human reason, or
+were absolutely of no consequence at all to human life.
+
+But, then, my Africanus, replied Tubero, of what credit is the
+tradition which states that Socrates rejected all these physical
+investigations, and confined his whole attention to men and manners?
+For, with respect to him what better authority can we cite than Plato?
+in many passages of whose works Socrates speaks in such a manner that
+even when he is discussing morals, and virtues, and even public affairs
+and politics, he endeavors to interweave, after the fashion of
+Pythagoras, the doctrines of arithmetic, geometry, and harmonic
+proportions with them.
+
+That is true, replied Scipio; but you are aware, I believe, that Plato,
+after the death of Socrates, was induced to visit Egypt by his love of
+science, and that after that he proceeded to Italy and Sicily, from his
+desire of understanding the Pythagorean dogmas; that he conversed much
+with Archytas of Tarentum and Timaeus of Locris; that he collected the
+works of Philolaus; and that, finding in these places the renown of
+Pythagoras flourishing, he addicted himself exceedingly to the
+disciples of Pythagoras, and their studies; therefore, as he loved
+Socrates with his whole heart, and wished to attribute all great
+discoveries to him, he interwove the Socratic elegance and subtlety of
+eloquence with somewhat of the obscurity of Pythagoras, and with that
+notorious gravity of his diversified arts.
+
+XI. When Scipio had spoken thus, he suddenly saw Lucius Furius
+approaching, and saluting him, and embracing him most affectionately,
+he gave him a seat on his own couch. And as soon as Publius Rutilius,
+the worthy reporter of the conference to us, had arrived, when we had
+saluted him, he placed him by the side of Tubero. Then said Furius,
+What is it that you are about? Has our entrance at all interrupted any
+conversation of yours? By no means, said Scipio, for you yourself too
+are in the habit of investigating carefully the subject which Tubero
+was a little before proposing to examine; and our friend Rutilius, even
+under the walls of Numantia, was in the habit at times of conversing
+with me on questions of the same kind. What, then, was the subject of
+your discussion? said Philus. We were talking, said Scipio, of the
+double suns that recently appeared, and I wish, Philus, to hear what
+you think of them.
+
+XII. Just as he was speaking, a boy announced that Laelius was coming to
+call on him, and that he had already left his house. Then Scipio,
+putting on his sandals and robes, immediately went forth from his
+chamber, and when he had walked a little time in the portico, he met
+Laelius, and welcomed him and those that accompanied him, namely,
+Spurius Mummius, to whom he was greatly attached, and C. Fannius and
+Quintus Scaevola, sons-in-law of Laelius, two very intelligent young men,
+and now of the quaestorian age.[297]
+
+When he had saluted them all, he returned through the portico, placing
+Laelius in the middle; for there was in their friendship a sort of law
+of reciprocal courtesy, so that in the camp Laelius paid Scipio almost
+divine honors, on account of his eminent renown in war and in private
+life; in his turn Scipio reverenced Laelius, even as a father, because
+he was older than himself.
+
+Then after they had exchanged a few words, as they walked up and down,
+Scipio, to whom their visit was extremely welcome and agreeable, wished
+to assemble them in a sunny corner of the gardens, because it was still
+winter; and when they had agreed to this, there came in another friend,
+a learned man, much beloved and esteemed by all of them, M. Manilius,
+who, after having been most warmly welcomed by Scipio and the rest,
+seated himself next to Laelius.
+
+XIII. Then Philus, commencing the conversation, said: It does not
+appear to me that the presence of our new guests need alter the subject
+of our discussion, but only that it should induce us to treat it more
+philosophically, and in a manner more worthy of our increased audience.
+What do you allude to? said Laelius; or what was the discussion we broke
+in upon? Scipio was asking me, replied Philus, what I thought of the
+parhelion, or mock sun, whose recent apparition was so strongly
+attested.
+
+_Laelius._ Do you say then, my Philus, that we have sufficiently
+examined those questions which concern our own houses and the
+Commonwealth, that we begin to investigate the celestial mysteries?
+
+And Philus replied: Do you think, then, that it does not concern our
+houses to know what happens in that vast home which is not included in
+walls of human fabrication, but which embraces the entire universe--a
+home which the Gods share with us, as the common country of all
+intelligent beings? Especially when, if we are ignorant of these
+things, there are also many great practical truths which result from
+them, and which bear directly on the welfare of our race, of which we
+must be also ignorant. And here I can speak for myself, as well as for
+you, Laelius, and all men who are ambitious of wisdom, that the
+knowledge and consideration of the facts of nature are by themselves
+very delightful.
+
+_Laelius._ I have no objection to the discussion, especially as it is
+holiday-time with us. But cannot we have the pleasure of hearing you
+resume it, or are we come too late?
+
+_Philus_. We have not yet commenced the discussion, and since the
+question remains entire and unbroken, I shall have the greatest
+pleasure, my Laelius, in handing over the argument to you.
+
+_Laelius._ No, I had much rather hear you, unless, indeed, Manilius
+thinks himself able to compromise the suit between the two suns, that
+they may possess heaven as joint sovereigns without intruding on each
+other's empire.
+
+Then Manilius said: Are you going, Laelius, to ridicule a science in
+which, in the first place, I myself excel; and, secondly, without which
+no one can distinguish what is his own, and what is another's? But to
+return to the point. Let us now at present listen to Philus, who seems
+to me to have started a greater question than any of those that have
+engaged the attention of either Publius Mucius or myself.
+
+XIV. Then Philus said: I am not about to bring you anything new, or
+anything which has been thought over or discovered by me myself. But I
+recollect that Caius Sulpicius Gallus, who was a man of profound
+learning, as you are aware, when this same thing was reported to have
+taken place in his time, while he was staying in the house of Marcus
+Marcellus, who had been his colleague in the consulship, asked to see a
+celestial globe which Marcellus's grandfather had saved after the
+capture of Syracuse from that magnificent and opulent city, without
+bringing to his own home any other memorial out of so great a booty;
+which I had often heard mentioned on account of the great fame of
+Archimedes; but its appearance, however, did not seem to me
+particularly striking. For that other is more elegant in form, and more
+generally known, which was made by the same Archimedes, and deposited
+by the same Marcellus in the Temple of Virtue at Rome. But as soon as
+Gallus had begun to explain, in a most scientific manner, the principle
+of this machine, I felt that the Sicilian geometrician must have
+possessed a genius superior to anything we usually conceive to belong
+to our nature. For Gallus assured us that that other solid and compact
+globe was a very ancient invention, and that the first model had been
+originally made by Thales of Miletus. That afterward Eudoxus of Cnidus,
+a disciple of Plato, had traced on its surface the stars that appear in
+the sky, and that many years subsequently, borrowing from Eudoxus this
+beautiful design and representation, Aratus had illustrated it in his
+verses, not by any science of astronomy, but by the ornament of poetic
+description. He added that the figure of the globe, which displayed the
+motions of the sun and moon, and the five planets, or wandering stars,
+could not be represented by the primitive solid globe; and that in this
+the invention of Archimedes was admirable, because he had calculated
+how a single revolution should maintain unequal and diversified
+progressions in dissimilar motions. In fact, when Gallus moved this
+globe, we observed that the moon succeeded the sun by as many turns of
+the wheel in the machine as days in the heavens. From whence it
+resulted that the progress of the sun was marked as in the heavens, and
+that the moon touched the point where she is obscured by the earth's
+shadow at the instant the sun appears opposite.[298] * * *
+
+XV. * * *[299] I had myself a great affection for this Gallus, and I
+know that he was very much beloved and esteemed by my father Paulus. I
+recollect that when I was very young, when my father, as consul,
+commanded in Macedonia, and we were in the camp, our army was seized
+with a pious terror, because suddenly, in a clear night, the bright and
+full moon became eclipsed. And Gallus, who was then our lieutenant, the
+year before that in which he was elected consul, hesitated not, next
+morning, to state in the camp that it was no prodigy, and that the
+phenomenon which had then appeared would always appear at certain
+periods, when the sun was so placed that he could not affect the moon
+with his light.
+
+But do you mean, said Tubero, that he dared to speak thus to men almost
+entirely uneducated and ignorant?
+
+_Scipio._ He did, and with great * * * for his opinion was no result of
+insolent ostentation, nor was his language unbecoming the dignity of so
+wise a man: indeed, he performed a very noble action in thus freeing
+his countrymen from the terrors of an idle superstition.
+
+XVI. And they relate that in a similar way, in the great war in which
+the Athenians and Lacedaemonians contended with such violent resentment,
+the famous Pericles, the first man of his country in credit, eloquence,
+and political genius, observing the Athenians overwhelmed with an
+excessive alarm during an eclipse of the sun which caused a sudden
+darkness, told them, what he had learned in the school of Anaxagoras,
+that these phenomena necessarily happened at precise and regular
+periods when the body of the moon was interposed between the sun and
+the earth, and that if they happened not before every new moon, still
+they could not possibly happen except at the exact time of the new
+moon. And when he had proved this truth by his reasonings, he freed the
+people from their alarms; for at that period the doctrine was new and
+unfamiliar that the sun was accustomed to be eclipsed by the
+interposition of the moon, which fact they say that Thales of Miletus
+was the first to discover. Afterward my friend Ennius appears to have
+been acquainted with the same theory, who, writing about 350[300] years
+after the foundation of Rome, says, "In the nones of June the sun was
+covered by the moon and night." The calculations in the astronomical
+art have attained such perfection that from that day, thus described to
+us by Ennius and recorded in the pontifical registers, the anterior
+eclipses of the sun have been computed as far back as the nones of July
+in the reign of Romulus, when that eclipse took place, in the obscurity
+of which it was affirmed that Virtue bore Romulus to heaven, in spite
+of the perishable nature which carried him off by the common fate of
+humanity.
+
+XVII. Then said Tubero: Do not you think, Scipio, that this
+astronomical science, which every day proves so useful, just now
+appeared in a different light to you,[301] * * * which the rest may
+see. Moreover, who can think anything in human affairs of brilliant
+importance who has penetrated this starry empire of the gods? Or who
+can think anything connected with mankind long who has learned to
+estimate the nature of eternity? or glorious who is aware of the
+insignificance of the size of the earth, even in its whole extent, and
+especially in the portion which men inhabit? And when we consider that
+almost imperceptible point which we ourselves occupy unknown to the
+majority of nations, can we still hope that our name and reputation can
+be widely circulated? And then our estates and edifices, our cattle,
+and the enormous treasures of our gold and silver, can they be esteemed
+or denominated as desirable goods by him who observes their perishable
+profit, and their contemptible use, and their uncertain domination,
+often falling into the possession of the very worst men? How happy,
+then, ought we to esteem that man who alone has it in his power, not by
+the law of the Romans, but by the privilege of philosophers, to enjoy
+all things as his own; not by any civil bond, but by the common right
+of nature, which denies that anything can really be possessed by any
+one but him who understands its true nature and use; who reckons our
+dictatorships and consulships rather in the rank of necessary offices
+than desirable employments, and thinks they must be endured rather as
+acquittances of our debt to our country than sought for the sake of
+emolument or glory--the man, in short, who can apply to himself the
+sentence which Cato tells us my ancestor Africanus loved to repeat,
+"that he was never so busy as when he did nothing, and never less
+solitary than when alone."
+
+For who can believe that Dionysius, when after every possible effort he
+ravished from his fellow-citizens their liberty, had performed a nobler
+work than Archimedes, when, without appearing to be doing anything, he
+manufactured the globe which we have just been describing? Who does not
+see that those men are in reality more solitary who, in the midst of a
+crowd, find no one with whom they can converse congenially than those
+who, without witnesses, hold communion with themselves, and enter into
+the secret counsels of the sagest philosophers, while they delight
+themselves in their writings and discoveries? And who would think any
+one richer than the man who is in want of nothing which nature
+requires; or more powerful than he who has attained all that she has
+need of; or happier than he who is free from all mental perturbation;
+or more secure in future than he who carries all his property in
+himself, which is thus secured from shipwreck? And what power, what
+magistracy, what royalty, can be preferred to a wisdom which, looking
+down on all terrestrial objects as low and transitory things,
+incessantly directs its attention to eternal and immutable verities,
+and which is persuaded that though others are called men, none are
+really so but those who are refined by the appropriate acts of
+humanity?
+
+In this sense an expression of Plato or some other philosopher appears
+to me exceedingly elegant, who, when a tempest had driven his ship on
+an unknown country and a desolate shore, during the alarms with which
+their ignorance of the region inspired his companions, observed, they
+say, geometrical figures traced in the sand, on which he immediately
+told them to be of good cheer, for he had observed the indications of
+Man. A conjecture he deduced, not from the cultivation of the soil
+which he beheld, but from the symbols of science. For this reason,
+Tubero, learning and learned men, and these your favorite studies, have
+always particularly pleased me.
+
+XVIII. Then Laelius replied: I cannot venture, Scipio, to answer your
+arguments, or to [maintain the discussion either against] you, Philus,
+or Manilius.[302] * * *
+
+We had a friend in Tubero's father's family, who in these respects may
+serve him as a model.
+
+     Sextus so wise, and ever on his guard.
+
+Wise and cautious indeed he was, as Ennius justly describes him--not
+because he searched for what he could never find, but because he knew
+how to answer those who prayed for deliverance from cares and
+difficulties. It is he who, reasoning against the astronomical studies
+of Gallus, used frequently to repeat these words of Achilles in the
+Iphigenia[303]:
+
+    They note the astrologic signs of heaven,
+    Whene'er the goats or scorpions of great Jove,
+    Or other monstrous names of brutal forms,
+    Rise in the zodiac; but not one regards
+    The sensible facts of earth, on which we tread,
+    While gazing on the starry prodigies.
+
+He used, however, to say (and I have often listened to him with
+pleasure) that for his part he thought that Zethus, in the piece of
+Pacuvius, was too inimical to learning. He much preferred the
+Neoptolemus of Ennius, who professes himself desirous of philosophizing
+only in moderation; for that he did not think it right to be wholly
+devoted to it. But though the studies of the Greeks have so many charms
+for you, there are others, perhaps, nobler and more extensive, which we
+may be better able to apply to the service of real life, and even to
+political affairs. As to these abstract sciences, their utility, if
+they possess any, lies principally in exciting and stimulating the
+abilities of youth, so that they more easily acquire more important
+accomplishments.
+
+XIX. Then Tubero said: I do not mean to disagree with you, Laelius; but,
+pray, what do you call more important studies?
+
+_Laelius._ I will tell you frankly, though perhaps you will think
+lightly of my opinion, since you appeared so eager in interrogating
+Scipio respecting the celestial phenomena; but I happen to think that
+those things which are every day before our eyes are more particularly
+deserving of our attention. Why should the child of Paulus AEmilius, the
+nephew of AEmilius, the descendant of such a noble family and so
+glorious a republic, inquire how there can be two suns in heaven, and
+not ask how there can be two senates in one Commonwealth, and, as it
+were, two distinct peoples? For, as you see, the death of Tiberius
+Gracchus, and the whole system of his tribuneship, has divided one
+people into two parties. But the slanderers and the enemies of Scipio,
+encouraged by P. Crassus and Appius Claudius, maintained, after the
+death of these two chiefs, a division of nearly half the senate, under
+the influence of Metellus and Mucius. Nor would they permit the
+man[304] who alone could have been of service to help us out of our
+difficulties during the movement of the Latins and their allies towards
+rebellion, violating all our treaties in the presence of factious
+triumvirs, and creating every day some fresh intrigue, to the
+disturbance of the worthier and wealthier citizens. This is the reason,
+young men, if you will listen to me, why you should regard this new sun
+with less alarm; for, whether it does exist, or whether it does not
+exist, it is, as you see, quite harmless to us. As to the manner of its
+existence, we can know little or nothing; and even if we obtained the
+most perfect understanding of it, this knowledge would make us but
+little wiser or happier. But that there should exist a united people
+and a united senate is a thing which actually may be brought about, and
+it will be a great evil if it is not; and that it does not exist at
+present we are aware; and we see that if it can be effected, our lives
+will be both better and happier.
+
+XX. Then Mucius said: What, then, do you consider, my Laelius, should be
+our best arguments in endeavoring to bring about the object of your
+wishes?
+
+_Laelius._ Those sciences and arts which teach us how we may be most
+useful to the State; for I consider that the most glorious office of
+wisdom, and the noblest proof and business of virtue. In order,
+therefore, that we may consecrate these holidays as much as possible to
+conversations which may be profitable to the Commonwealth, let us beg
+Scipio to explain to us what in his estimation appears to be the best
+form of government. Then let us pass on to other points, the knowledge
+of which may lead us, as I hope, to sound political views, and unfold
+the causes of the dangers which now threaten us.
+
+XXI. When Philus, Manilius, and Mummius had all expressed their great
+approbation of this idea[305] * * * I have ventured [to open our
+discussion] in this way, not only because it is but just that on State
+politics the chief man in the State should be the principal speaker,
+but also because I recollect that you, Scipio, were formerly very much
+in the habit of conversing with Panaetius and Polybius, two Greeks,
+exceedingly learned in political questions, and that you are master of
+many arguments by which you prove that by far the best condition of
+government is that which our ancestors have handed down to us. And as
+you, therefore, are familiar with this subject, if you will explain to
+us your views respecting the general principles of a state (I speak for
+my friends as well as myself), we shall feel exceedingly obliged to
+you.
+
+XXII. Then Scipio said: I must acknowledge that there is no subject of
+meditation to which my mind naturally turns with more ardor and
+intensity than this very one which Laelius has proposed to us. And,
+indeed, as I see that in every profession, every artist who would
+distinguish himself, thinks of, and aims at, and labors for no other
+object but that of attaining perfection in his art, should not I, whose
+main business, according to the example of my father and my ancestors,
+is the advancement and right administration of government, be
+confessing myself more indolent than any common mechanic if I were to
+bestow on this noblest of sciences less attention and labor than they
+devote to their insignificant trades? However, I am neither entirely
+satisfied with the decisions which the greatest and wisest men of
+Greece have left us; nor, on the other hand, do I venture to prefer my
+own opinions to theirs. Therefore, I must request you not to consider
+me either entirely ignorant of the Grecian literature, nor yet
+disposed, especially in political questions, to yield it the
+pre-eminence over our own; but rather to regard me as a true-born
+Roman, not illiberally instructed by the care of my father, and
+inflamed with the desire of knowledge, even from my boyhood, but still
+even more familiar with domestic precepts and practices than the
+literature of books.
+
+XXIII. On this Philus said: I have no doubt, my Scipio, that no one is
+superior to you in natural genius, and that you are very far superior
+to every one in the practical experience of national government and of
+important business. We are also acquainted with the course which your
+studies have at all times taken; and if, as you say, you have given so
+much attention to this science and art of politics, we cannot be too
+much obliged to Laelius for introducing the subject: for I trust that
+what we shall hear from you will be far more useful and available than
+all the writings put together which the Greeks have written for us.
+
+Then Scipio replied: You are raising a very high expectation of my
+discourse, such as is a most oppressive burden to a man who is required
+to discuss grave subjects.
+
+And Philus said: Although that may be a difficulty, my Scipio, still
+you will be sure to conquer it, as you always do; nor is there any
+danger of eloquence failing you, when you begin to speak on the affairs
+of a commonwealth.
+
+XXIV. Then Scipio proceeded: I will do what you wish, as far as I can;
+and I shall enter into the discussion under favor of that rule which, I
+think, should be adopted by all persons in disputations of this kind,
+if they wish to avoid being misunderstood; namely, that when men have
+agreed respecting the proper name of the matter under discussion, it
+should be stated what that name exactly means, and what it legitimately
+includes. And when that point is settled, then it is fit to enter on
+the discussion; for it will never be possible to arrive at an
+understanding of what the character of the subject of the discussion
+is, unless one first understands exactly what it is. Since, then, our
+investigations relate to a commonwealth, we must first examine what
+this name properly signifies.
+
+And when Laelius had intimated his approbation of this course, Scipio
+continued:
+
+I shall not adopt, said he, in so clear and simple a manner that system
+of discussion which goes back to first principles; as learned men often
+do in this sort of discussion, so as to go back to the first meeting of
+male and female, and then to the first birth and formation of the first
+family, and define over and over again what there is in words, and in
+how many manners each thing is stated. For, as I am speaking to men of
+prudence, who have acted with the greatest glory in the Commonwealth,
+both in peace and war, I will take care not to allow the subject of the
+discussion itself to be clearer than my explanation of it. Nor have I
+undertaken this task with the design of examining all its minuter
+points, like a school-master; nor will I promise you in the following
+discourse not to omit any single particular.
+
+Then Laelius said: For my part, I am impatient for exactly that kind of
+disquisition which you promise us.
+
+XXV. Well, then, said Africanus, a commonwealth is a constitution of
+the entire people. But the people is not every association of men,
+however congregated, but the association of the entire number, bound
+together by the compact of justice, and the communication of utility.
+The first cause of this association is not so much the weakness of man
+as a certain spirit of congregation which naturally belongs to him. For
+the human race is not a race of isolated individuals, wandering and
+solitary; but it is so constituted that even in the affluence of all
+things [and without any need of reciprocal assistance, it spontaneously
+seeks society].
+
+XXVI. [It is necessary to presuppose] these original seeds, as it were,
+since we cannot discover any primary establishment of the other
+virtues, or even of a commonwealth itself. These unions, then, formed
+by the principle which I have mentioned, established their headquarters
+originally in certain central positions, for the convenience of the
+whole population; and having fortified them by natural and artificial
+means, they called this collection of houses a city or town,
+distinguished by temples and public squares. Every people, therefore,
+which consists of such an association of the entire multitude as I have
+described, every city which consists of an assemblage of the people,
+and every commonwealth which embraces every member of these
+associations, must be regulated by a certain authority, in order to be
+permanent.
+
+This intelligent authority should always refer itself to that grand
+first principle which established the Commonwealth. It must be
+deposited in the hands of one supreme person, or intrusted to the
+administration of certain delegated rulers, or undertaken by the whole
+multitude. When the direction of all depends on one person, we call
+this individual a king, and this form of political constitution a
+kingdom. When it is in the power of privileged delegates, the State is
+said to be ruled by an aristocracy; and when the people are all in all,
+they call it a democracy, or popular constitution. And if the tie of
+social affection, which originally united men in political associations
+for the sake of public interest, maintains its force, each of these
+forms of government is, I will not say perfect, nor, in my opinion,
+essentially good, but tolerable, and such that one may accidentally be
+better than another: either a just and wise king, or a selection of the
+most eminent citizens, or even the populace itself (though this is the
+least commendable form), may, if there be no interference of crime and
+cupidity, form a constitution sufficiently secure.
+
+XXVII. But in a monarchy the other members of the State are often too
+much deprived of public counsel and jurisdiction; and under the rule of
+an aristocracy the multitude can hardly possess its due share of
+liberty, since it is allowed no share in the public deliberation, and
+no power. And when all things are carried by a democracy, although it
+be just and moderate, yet its very equality is a culpable levelling,
+inasmuch as it allows no gradations of rank. Therefore, even if Cyrus,
+the King of the Persians, was a most righteous and wise monarch, I
+should still think that the interest of the people (for this is, as I
+have said before, the same as the Commonwealth) could not be very
+effectually promoted when all things depended on the beck and nod of
+one individual. And though at present the people of Marseilles, our
+clients, are governed with the greatest justice by elected magistrates
+of the highest rank, still there is always in this condition of the
+people a certain appearance of servitude; and when the Athenians, at a
+certain period, having demolished their Areopagus, conducted all public
+affairs by the acts and decrees of the democracy alone, their State, as
+it no longer contained a distinct gradation of ranks, was no longer
+able to retain its original fair appearance.
+
+XXVIII. I have reasoned thus on the three forms of government, not
+looking on them in their disorganized and confused conditions, but in
+their proper and regular administration. These three particular forms,
+however, contained in themselves, from the first, the faults and
+defects I have mentioned; but they have also other dangerous vices, for
+there is not one of these three forms of government which has not a
+precipitous and slippery passage down to some proximate abuse. For,
+after thinking of that endurable, or, as you will have it, most amiable
+king, Cyrus--to name him in preference to any one else--then, to
+produce a change in our minds, we behold the barbarous Phalaris, that
+model of tyranny, to which the monarchical authority is easily abused
+by a facile and natural inclination. And, in like manner, along-side of
+the wise aristocracy of Marseilles, we might exhibit the oligarchical
+faction of the thirty tyrants which once existed at Athens. And, not to
+seek for other instances, among the same Athenians, we can show you
+that when unlimited power was cast into the hands of the people, it
+inflamed the fury of the multitude, and aggravated that universal
+license which ruined their State.[306] * * *
+
+XXIX. The worst condition of things sometimes results from a confusion
+of those factious tyrannies into which kings, aristocrats, and
+democrats are apt to degenerate. For thus, from these diverse elements,
+there occasionally arises (as I have said before) a new kind of
+government. And wonderful indeed are the revolutions and periodical
+returns in natural constitutions of such alternations and vicissitudes,
+which it is the part of the wise politician to investigate with the
+closest attention. But to calculate their approach, and to join to this
+foresight the skill which moderates the course of events, and retains
+in a steady hand the reins of that authority which safely conducts the
+people through all the dangers to which they expose themselves, is the
+work of a most illustrious citizen, and of almost divine genius.
+
+There is a fourth kind of government, therefore, which, in my opinion,
+is preferable to all these: it is that mixed and moderate government
+which is composed of the three particular forms which I have already
+noticed.
+
+XXX. _Laelius._ I am not ignorant, Scipio, that such is your opinion,
+for I have often heard you say so. But I do not the less desire, if it
+is not giving you too much trouble, to hear which you consider the best
+of these three forms of commonwealths. For it may be of some use in
+considering[307] * * *
+
+XXXI. * * * And each commonwealth corresponds to the nature and will of
+him who governs it. Therefore, in no other constitution than that in
+which the people exercise sovereign power has liberty any sure abode,
+than which there certainly is no more desirable blessing. And if it be
+not equally established for every one, it is not even liberty at all.
+And how can there be this character of equality, I do not say under a
+monarchy, where slavery is least disguised or doubtful, but even in
+those constitutions in which the people are free indeed in words, for
+they give their suffrages, they elect officers, they are canvassed and
+solicited for magistracies; but yet they only grant those things which
+they are obliged to grant whether they will or not, and which are not
+really in their free power, though others ask them for them? For they
+are not themselves admitted to the government, to the exercise of
+public authority, or to offices of select judges, which are permitted
+to those only of ancient families and large fortunes. But in a free
+people, as among the Rhodians and Athenians, there is no citizen
+who[308] * * *
+
+XXXII. * * * No sooner is one man, or several, elevated by wealth and
+power, than they say that * * * arise from their pride and arrogance,
+when the idle and the timid give way, and bow down to the insolence of
+riches. But if the people knew how to maintain its rights, then they
+say that nothing could be more glorious and prosperous than democracy;
+inasmuch as they themselves would be the sovereign dispensers of laws,
+judgments, war, peace, public treaties, and, finally, of the fortune
+and life of each individual citizen; and this condition of things is
+the only one which, in their opinion, can be really called a
+commonwealth, that is to say, a constitution of the people. It is on
+this principle that, according to them, a people often vindicates its
+liberty from the domination of kings and nobles; while, on the other
+hand, kings are not sought for among free peoples, nor are the power
+and wealth of aristocracies. They deny, moreover, that it is fair to
+reject this general constitution of freemen, on account of the vices of
+the unbridled populace; but that if the people be united and inclined,
+and directs all its efforts to the safety and freedom of the community,
+nothing can be stronger or more unchangeable; and they assert that this
+necessary union is easily obtained in a republic so constituted that
+the good of all classes is the same; while the conflicting interests
+that prevail in other constitutions inevitably produce dissensions;
+therefore, say they, when the senate had the ascendency, the republic
+had no stability; and when kings possess the power, this blessing is
+still more rare, since, as Ennius expresses it,
+
+    In kingdoms there's no faith, and little love.
+
+Wherefore, since the law is the bond of civil society, and the justice
+of the law equal, by what rule can the association of citizens be held
+together, if the condition of the citizens be not equal? For if the
+fortunes of men cannot be reduced to this equality--if genius cannot be
+equally the property of all--rights, at least, should be equal among
+those who are citizens of the same republic. For what is a republic but
+an association of rights?[309] * * *
+
+XXXIII. But as to the other political constitutions, these democratical
+advocates do not think they are worthy of being distinguished by the
+name which they claim. For why, say they, should we apply the name of
+king, the title of Jupiter the Beneficent, and not rather the title of
+tyrant, to a man ambitious of sole authority and power, lording it over
+a degraded multitude? For a tyrant may be as merciful as a king may be
+oppressive; so that the whole difference to the people is, whether they
+serve an indulgent master or a cruel one, since serve some one they
+must. But how could Sparta, at the period of the boasted superiority of
+her political institution, obtain a constant enjoyment of just and
+virtuous kings, when they necessarily received an hereditary monarch,
+good, bad, or indifferent, because he happened to be of the blood
+royal? As to aristocrats, Who will endure, say they, that men should
+distinguish themselves by such a title, and that not by the voice of
+the people, but by their own votes? For how is such a one judged to be
+best either in learning, sciences, or arts?[310] * * *
+
+XXXIV. * * * If it does so by hap-hazard, it will be as easily upset as
+a vessel if the pilot were chosen by lot from among the passengers. But
+if a people, being free, chooses those to whom it can trust
+itself--and, if it desires its own preservation, it will always choose
+the noblest--then certainly it is in the counsels of the aristocracy
+that the safety of the State consists, especially as nature has not
+only appointed that these superior men should excel the inferior sort
+in high virtue and courage, but has inspired the people also with the
+desire of obedience towards these, their natural lords. But they say
+this aristocratical State is destroyed by the depraved opinions of men,
+who, through ignorance of virtue (which, as it belongs to few, can be
+discerned and appreciated by few), imagine that not only rich and
+powerful men, but also those who are nobly born, are necessarily the
+best. And so when, through this popular error, the riches, and not the
+virtue, of a few men has taken possession of the State, these chiefs
+obstinately retain the title of nobles, though they want the essence of
+nobility. For riches, fame, and power, without wisdom and a just method
+of regulating ourselves and commanding others, are full of discredit
+and insolent arrogance; nor is there any kind of government more
+deformed than that in which the wealthiest are regarded as the noblest.
+
+But when virtue governs the Commonwealth, what can be more glorious?
+When he who commands the rest is himself enslaved by no lust or
+passion; when he himself exhibits all the virtues to which he incites
+and educates the citizens; when he imposes no law on the people which
+he does not himself observe, but presents his life as a living law to
+his fellow-countrymen; if a single individual could thus suffice for
+all, there would be no need of more; and if the community could find a
+chief ruler thus worthy of all their suffrages, none would require
+elected magistrates.
+
+It was the difficulty of forming plans which transferred the government
+from a king into the hands of many; and the error and temerity of the
+people likewise transferred it from the hands of the many into those of
+the few. Thus, between the weakness of the monarch and the rashness of
+the multitude, the aristocrats have occupied the middle place, than
+which nothing can be better arranged; and while they superintend the
+public interest, the people necessarily enjoy the greatest possible
+prosperity, being free from all care and anxiety, having intrusted
+their security to others, who ought sedulously to defend it, and not
+allow the people to suspect that their advantage is neglected by their
+rulers.
+
+For as to that equality of rights which democracies so loudly boast of,
+it can never be maintained; for the people themselves, so dissolute and
+so unbridled, are always inclined to flatter a number of demagogues;
+and there is in them a very great partiality for certain men and
+dignities, so that their equality, so called, becomes most unfair and
+iniquitous. For as equal honor is given to the most noble and the most
+infamous, some of whom must exist in every State, then the equity which
+they eulogize becomes most inequitable--an evil which never can happen
+in those states which are governed by aristocracies. These reasonings,
+my Laelius, and some others of the same kind, are usually brought
+forward by those that so highly extol this form of political
+constitution.
+
+XXXV. Then Laelius said: But you have not told us, Scipio, which of
+these three forms of government you yourself most approve.
+
+_Scipio._ You are right to shape your question, which of the three I
+most approve, for there is not one of them which I approve at all by
+itself, since, as I told you, I prefer that government which is mixed
+and composed of all these forms, to any one of them taken separately.
+But if I must confine myself to one of these particular forms simply
+and exclusively, I must confess I prefer the royal one, and praise that
+as the first and best. In this, which I here choose to call the
+primitive form of government, I find the title of father attached to
+that of king, to express that he watches over the citizens as over his
+children, and endeavors rather to preserve them in freedom than reduce
+them to slavery. So that it is more advantageous for those who are
+insignificant in property and capacity to be supported by the care of
+one excellent and eminently powerful man. The nobles here present
+themselves, who profess that they can do all this in much better style;
+for they say that there is much more wisdom in many than in one, and at
+least as much faith and equity. And, last of all, come the people, who
+cry with a loud voice that they will render obedience neither to the
+one nor the few; that even to brute beasts nothing is so dear as
+liberty; and that all men who serve either kings or nobles are deprived
+of it. Thus, the kings attract us by affection, the nobles by talent,
+the people by liberty; and in the comparison it is hard to choose the
+best.
+
+_Laelius._ I think so too, but yet it is impossible to despatch the
+other branches of the question, if you leave this primary point
+undetermined.
+
+XXXVI. _Scipio._ We must then, I suppose, imitate Aratus, who, when he
+prepared himself to treat of great things, thought himself in duty
+bound to begin with Jupiter.
+
+_Laelius._ Wherefore Jupiter? and what is there in this discussion which
+resembles that poem?
+
+_Scipio._ Why, it serves to teach us that we cannot better commence our
+investigations than by invoking him whom, with one voice, both learned
+and unlearned extol as the universal king of all gods and men.
+
+How so? said Laelius.
+
+Do you, then, asked Scipio, believe in nothing which is not before your
+eyes? whether these ideas have been established by the chiefs of states
+for the benefit of society, that there might be believed to exist one
+Universal Monarch in heaven, at whose nod (as Homer expresses it) all
+Olympus trembles, and that he might be accounted both king and father
+of all creatures; for there is great authority, and there are many
+witnesses, if you choose to call all many, who attest that all nations
+have unanimously recognized, by the decrees of their chiefs, that
+nothing is better than a king, since they think that all the Gods are
+governed by the divine power of one sovereign; or if we suspect that
+this opinion rests on the error of the ignorant, and should be classed
+among the fables, let us listen to those universal testimonies of
+erudite men, who have, as it were, seen with their eyes those things to
+the knowledge of which we can hardly attain by report.
+
+What men do you mean? said Laelius.
+
+Those, replied Scipio, who, by the investigation of nature, have
+arrived at the opinion that the whole universe [is animated] by a
+single Mind[311]. * * *
+
+XXXVII. But if you please, my Laelius, I will bring forward evidences
+which are neither too ancient nor in any respect barbarous.
+
+Those, said Laelius, are what I want.
+
+_Scipio._ You are aware that it is now not four centuries since this
+city of ours has been without kings.
+
+_Laelius._ You are correct; it is less than four centuries.
+
+_Scipio._ Well, then, what are four centuries in the age of a state or
+city? is it a long time?
+
+_Laelius._ It hardly amounts to the age of maturity.
+
+_Scipio._ You say truly; and yet not four centuries have elapsed since
+there was a king in Rome.
+
+_Laelius._ And he was a proud king.
+
+_Scipio._ But who was his predecessor?
+
+_Laelius._ He was an admirably just one; and, indeed, we must bestow the
+same praise on all his predecessors as far back as Romulus, who reigned
+about six centuries ago.
+
+_Scipio._ Even he, then, is not very ancient.
+
+_Laelius._ No; he reigned when Greece was already becoming old.
+
+_Scipio._ Agreed. Was Romulus, then, think you, king of a barbarous
+people?
+
+_Laelius._ Why, as to that, if we were to follow the example of the
+Greeks, who say that all people are either Greeks or barbarians, I am
+afraid that we must confess that he was a king of barbarians; but if
+this name belongs rather to manners than to languages, then I believe
+the Greeks were just as barbarous as the Romans.
+
+Then Scipio said: But with respect to the present question, we do not
+so much need to inquire into the nation as into the disposition. For if
+intelligent men, at a period so little remote, desired the government
+of kings, you will confess that I am producing authorities that are
+neither antiquated, rude, nor insignificant.
+
+XXXVIII. Then Laelius said: I see, Scipio, that you are very
+sufficiently provided with authorities; but with me, as with every fair
+judge, authorities are worth less than arguments.
+
+Scipio replied: Then, Laelius, you shall yourself make use of an
+argument derived from your own senses.
+
+_Laelius._ What senses do you mean?
+
+_Scipio._ The feelings which you experience when at any time you happen
+to feel angry with any one.
+
+_Laelius._ That happens rather oftener than I could wish.
+
+_Scipio._ Well, then, when you are angry, do you permit your anger to
+triumph over your judgment?
+
+No, by Hercules! said Laelius; I imitate the famous Archytas of
+Tarentum, who, when he came to his villa, and found all its
+arrangements were contrary to his orders, said to his steward, "Ah! you
+unlucky scoundrel, I would flog you to death, if it were not that I am
+in a rage with you."
+
+Capital, said Scipio. Archytas, then, regarded unreasonable anger as a
+kind of sedition and rebellion of nature which he sought to appease by
+reflection. And so, if we examine avarice, the ambition of power or of
+glory, or the lusts of concupiscence and licentiousness, we shall find
+a certain conscience in the mind of man, which, like a king, sways by
+the force of counsel all the inferior faculties and propensities; and
+this, in truth, is the noblest portion of our nature; for when
+conscience reigns, it allows no resting-place to lust, violence, or
+temerity.
+
+_Laelius._ You have spoken the truth.
+
+_Scipio._ Well, then, does a mind thus governed and regulated meet your
+approbation?
+
+_Laelius._ More than anything upon earth.
+
+_Scipio._ Then you would not approve that the evil passions, which are
+innumerable, should expel conscience, and that lusts and animal
+propensities should assume an ascendency over us?
+
+_Laelius._ For my part, I can conceive nothing more wretched than a mind
+thus degraded, or a man animated by a soul so licentious.
+
+_Scipio._ You desire, then, that all the faculties of the mind should
+submit to a ruling power, and that conscience should reign over them
+all?
+
+_Laelius._ Certainly, that is my wish.
+
+_Scipio._ How, then, can you doubt what opinion to form on the subject
+of the Commonwealth? in which, if the State is thrown into many hands,
+it is very plain that there will be no presiding authority; for if
+power be not united, it soon comes to nothing.
+
+XXXIX. Then Laelius asked: But what difference is there, I should like
+to know, between the one and the many, if justice exists equally in
+many?
+
+And Scipio said: Since I see, my Laelius, that the authorities I have
+adduced have no great influence on you, I must continue to employ you
+yourself as my witness in proof of what I am saying.
+
+In what way, said Laelius, are you going to make me again support your
+argument?
+
+_Scipio._ Why, thus: I recollect, when we were lately at Formiae, that
+you told your servants repeatedly to obey the orders of more than one
+master only.
+
+_Laelius._ To be sure, those of my steward.
+
+_Scipio._ What do you at home? Do you commit your affairs to the hands
+of many persons?
+
+_Laelius._ No, I trust them to myself alone.
+
+_Scipio._ Well, in your whole establishment, is there any other master
+but yourself?
+
+_Laelius._ Not one.
+
+_Scipio._ Then I think you must grant me that, as respects the State,
+the government of single individuals, provided they are just, is
+superior to any other.
+
+_Laelius._ You have conducted me to this conclusion, and I entertain
+very nearly that opinion.
+
+XL. And Scipio said: You would still further agree with me, my Laelius,
+if, omitting the common comparisons, that one pilot is better fitted to
+steer a ship, and a physician to treat an invalid, provided they be
+competent men in their respective professions, than many could be, I
+should come at once to more illustrious examples.
+
+_Laelius._ What examples do you mean?
+
+_Scipio._ Do not you observe that it was the cruelty and pride of one
+single Tarquin only that made the title of king unpopular among the
+Romans?
+
+_Laelius._ Yes, I acknowledge that.
+
+_Scipio._ You are also aware of this fact, on which I think I shall
+debate in the course of the coming discussion, that after the expulsion
+of King Tarquin, the people was transported by a wonderful excess of
+liberty. Then innocent men were driven into banishment; then the
+estates of many individuals were pillaged, consulships were made
+annual, public authorities were overawed by mobs, popular appeals took
+place in all cases imaginable; then secessions of the lower orders
+ensued, and, lastly, those proceedings which tended to place all powers
+in the hands of the populace.
+
+_Laelius._ I must confess this is all too true.
+
+All these things now, said Scipio, happened during periods of peace and
+tranquillity, for license is wont to prevail when there is little to
+fear, as in a calm voyage or a trifling disease. But as we observe the
+voyager and the invalid implore the aid of some one competent director,
+as soon as the sea grows stormy and the disease alarming, so our nation
+in peace and security commands, threatens, resists, appeals from, and
+insults its magistrates, but in war obeys them as strictly as kings;
+for public safety is, after all, rather more valuable than popular
+license. And in the most serious wars, our countrymen have even chosen
+the entire command to be deposited in the hands of some single chief,
+without a colleague; the very name of which magistrate indicates the
+absolute character of his power. For though he is evidently called
+dictator because he is appointed (dicitur), yet do we still observe
+him, my Laelius, in our sacred books entitled Magister Populi (the
+master of the people).
+
+This is certainly the case, said Laelius.
+
+Our ancestors, therefore, said Scipio, acted wisely.[312] * * *
+
+XLI. When the people is deprived of a just king, as Ennius says, after
+the death of one of the best of monarchs,
+
+    They hold his memory dear, and, in the warmth
+    Of their discourse, they cry, O Romulus!
+    O prince divine, sprung from the might of Mars
+    To be thy country's guardian! O our sire!
+    Be our protector still, O heaven-begot!
+
+Not heroes, nor lords alone, did they call those whom they lawfully
+obeyed; nor merely as kings did they proclaim them; but they pronounced
+them their country's guardians, their fathers, and their Gods. Nor,
+indeed, without cause, for they added,
+
+    Thou, Prince, hast brought us to the gates of light.
+
+And truly they believed that life and honor and glory had arisen to
+them from the justice of their king. The same good-will would doubtless
+have remained in their descendants, if the same virtues had been
+preserved on the throne; but, as you see, by the injustice of one man
+the whole of that kind of constitution fell into ruin.
+
+I see it indeed, said Laelius, and I long to know the history of these
+political revolutions both in our own Commonwealth and in every other.
+
+XLII. And Scipio said: When I shall have explained my opinion
+respecting the form of government which I prefer, I shall be able to
+speak to you more accurately respecting the revolutions of states,
+though I think that such will not take place so easily in the mixed
+form of government which I recommend. With respect, however, to
+absolute monarchy, it presents an inherent and invincible tendency to
+revolution. No sooner does a king begin to be unjust than this entire
+form of government is demolished, and he at once becomes a tyrant,
+which is the worst of all governments, and one very closely related to
+monarchy. If this State falls into the hands of the nobles, which is
+the usual course of events, it becomes an aristocracy, or the second of
+the three kinds of constitutions which I have described; for it is, as
+it were, a royal--that is to say, a paternal--council of the chief men
+of the State consulting for the public benefit. Or if the people by
+itself has expelled or slain a tyrant, it is moderate in its conduct as
+long as it has sense and wisdom, and while it rejoices in its exploit,
+and applies itself to maintaining the constitution which it has
+established. But if ever the people has raised its forces against a
+just king and robbed him of his throne, or, as has frequently happened,
+has tasted the blood of its legitimate nobles, and subjected the whole
+Commonwealth to its own license, you can imagine no flood or
+conflagration so terrible, or any whose violence is harder to appease
+than this unbridled insolence of the populace.
+
+XLIII. Then we see realized that which Plato so vividly describes, if I
+can but express it in our language. It is by no means easy to do it
+justice in translation: however, I will try.
+
+When, says Plato, the insatiate jaws of the populace are fired with the
+thirst of liberty, and when the people, urged on by evil ministers,
+drains in its thirst the cup, not of tempered liberty, but unmitigated
+license, then the magistrates and chiefs, if they are not utterly
+subservient and remiss, and shameless promoters of the popular
+licentiousness, are pursued, incriminated, accused, and cried down
+under the title of despots and tyrants. I dare say you recollect the
+passage.
+
+Yes, said Laelius, it is familiar to me.
+
+_Scipio._ Plato thus proceeds: Then those who feel in duty bound to
+obey the chiefs of the State are persecuted by the insensate populace,
+who call them voluntary slaves. But those who, though invested with
+magistracies, wish to be considered on an equality with private
+individuals, and those private individuals who labor to abolish all
+distinctions between their own class and the magistrates, are extolled
+with acclamations and overwhelmed with honors, so that it inevitably
+happens in a commonwealth thus revolutionized that liberalism abounds
+in all directions, due authority is found wanting even in private
+families, and misrule seems to extend even to the animals that witness
+it. Then the father fears the son, and the son neglects the father. All
+modesty is banished; they become far too liberal for that. No
+difference is made between the citizen and the alien; the master dreads
+and cajoles his scholars, and the scholars despise their masters. The
+young men assume the gravity of sages, and sages must stoop to the
+follies of children, lest they should be hated and oppressed by them.
+The very slaves even are under but little restraint; wives boast the
+same rights as their husbands; dogs, horses, and asses are emancipated
+in this outrageous excess of freedom, and run about so violently that
+they frighten the passengers from the road. At length the termination
+of all this infinite licentiousness is, that the minds of the citizens
+become so fastidious and effeminate, that when they observe even the
+slightest exertion of authority they grow angry and seditious, and thus
+the laws begin to be neglected, so that the people are absolutely
+without any master at all.
+
+Then Laelius said: You have very accurately rendered the opinions which
+he expressed.
+
+XLIV. _Scipio._ Now, to return to the argument of my discourse. It
+appears that this extreme license, which is the only liberty in the
+eyes of the vulgar, is, according to Plato, such that from it as a sort
+of root tyrants naturally arise and spring up. For as the excessive
+power of an aristocracy occasions the destruction of the nobles, so
+this excessive liberalism of democracies brings after it the slavery of
+the people. Thus we find in the weather, the soil, and the animal
+constitution the most favorable conditions are sometimes suddenly
+converted by their excess into the contrary, and this fact is
+especially observable in political governments; and this excessive
+liberty soon brings the people collectively and individually to an
+excessive servitude. For, as I said, this extreme liberty easily
+introduces the reign of tyranny, the severest of all unjust slaveries.
+In fact, from the midst of this unbridled and capricious populace, they
+elect some one as a leader in opposition to their afflicted and
+expelled nobles: some new chief, forsooth, audacious and impure, often
+insolently persecuting those who have deserved well of the State, and
+ready to gratify the populace at his neighbor's expense as well as his
+own. Then, since the private condition is naturally exposed to fears
+and alarms, the people invest him with many powers, and these are
+continued in his hands. Such men, like Pisistratus of Athens, will soon
+find an excuse for surrounding themselves with body-guards, and they
+will conclude by becoming tyrants over the very persons who raised them
+to dignity. If such despots perish by the vengeance of the better
+citizens, as is generally the case, the constitution is re-established;
+but if they fall by the hands of bold insurgents, then the same faction
+succeeds them, which is only another species of tyranny. And the same
+revolution arises from the fair system of aristocracy when any
+corruption has betrayed the nobles from the path of rectitude. Thus the
+power is like the ball which is flung from hand to hand: it passes from
+kings to tyrants, from tyrants to the aristocracy, from them to
+democracy, and from these back again to tyrants and to factions; and
+thus the same kind of government is seldom long maintained.
+
+XLV. Since these are the facts of experience, royalty is, in my
+opinion, very far preferable to the three other kinds of political
+constitutions. But it is itself inferior to that which is composed of
+an equal mixture of the three best forms of government, united and
+modified by one another. I wish to establish in a commonwealth a royal
+and pre-eminent chief. Another portion of power should be deposited in
+the hands of the aristocracy, and certain things should be reserved to
+the judgment and wish of the multitude. This constitution, in the first
+place, possesses that great equality without which men cannot long
+maintain their freedom; secondly, it offers a great stability, while
+the particular separate and isolated forms easily fall into their
+contraries; so that a king is succeeded by a despot, an aristocracy by
+a faction, a democracy by a mob and confusion; and all these forms are
+frequently sacrificed to new revolutions. In this united and mixed
+constitution, however, similar disasters cannot happen without the
+greatest vices in public men. For there can be little to occasion
+revolution in a state in which every person is firmly established in
+his appropriate rank, and there are but few modes of corruption into
+which we can fall.
+
+XLVI. But I fear, Laelius, and you, my amiable and learned friends, that
+if I were to dwell any longer on this argument, my words would seem
+rather like the lessons of a master, and not like the free conversation
+of one who is uniting with you in the consideration of truth. I shall
+therefore pass on to those things which are familiar to all, and which
+I have long studied. And in these matters I believe, I feel, and I
+affirm that of all governments there is none which, either in its
+entire constitution or the distribution of its parts, or in the
+discipline of its manners, is comparable to that which our fathers
+received from our earliest ancestors, and which they have handed down
+to us. And since you wish to hear from me a development of this
+constitution, with which you are all acquainted, I shall endeavor to
+explain its true character and excellence. Thus keeping my eye fixed on
+the model of our Roman Commonwealth, I shall endeavor to accommodate to
+it all that I have to say on the best form of government. And by
+treating the subject in this way, I think I shall be able to accomplish
+most satisfactorily the task which Laelius has imposed on me.
+
+XLVII. _Laelius._ It is a task most properly and peculiarly your own, my
+Scipio; for who can speak so well as you either on the subject of the
+institutions of our ancestors, since you yourself are descended from
+most illustrious ancestors, or on that of the best form of a
+constitution which, if we possess (though at this moment we do not,
+still), when we do possess such a thing, who will be more flourishing
+in it than you? or on that of providing counsels for the future, as
+you, who, by dispelling two mighty perils from our city, have provided
+for its safety forever?
+
+
+FRAGMENTS.
+
+
+XLVIII. As our country is the source of the greatest benefits, and is a
+parent dearer than those who have given us life, we owe her still
+warmer gratitude than belongs to our human relations. * * *
+
+Nor would Carthage have continued to flourish during six centuries
+without wisdom and good institutions. * * *
+
+In truth, says Cicero, although the reasonings of those men may contain
+most abundant fountains of science and virtue; still, if we compare
+them with the achievements and complete actions of statesmen, they will
+seem not to have been of so much service in the actual business of men
+as of amusement for their leisure.
+
+       *       *       *       *       *
+
+
+
+
+INTRODUCTION TO THE SECOND BOOK,
+
+BY THE ORIGINAL TRANSLATOR.
+
+
+   In this second book of his Commonwealth, Cicero gives us a
+     spirited and eloquent review of the history and successive
+     developments of the Roman constitution. He bestows the
+     warmest praises on its early kings, points out the great
+     advantages which had resulted from its primitive monarchical
+     system, and explains how that system had been gradually
+     broken up. In order to prove the importance of reviving it,
+     he gives a glowing picture of the evils and disasters that
+     had befallen the Roman State in consequence of that
+     overcharge of democratic folly and violence which had
+     gradually gained an alarming preponderance, and describes,
+     with a kind of prophetic sagacity, the fruit of his political
+     experience, the subsequent revolutions of the Roman State,
+     which such a state of things would necessarily bring about.
+
+
+
+
+BOOK II.
+
+
+I. [When, therefore, he observed all his friends kindled with the
+de]sire of hearing him, Scipio thus opened the discussion. I will
+commence, said Scipio, with a sentiment of old Cato, whom, as you know,
+I singularly loved and exceedingly admired, and to whom, in compliance
+with the judgment of both my parents, and also by my own desire, I was
+entirely devoted during my youth; of whose discourse, indeed, I could
+never have enough, so much experience did he possess as a statesman
+respecting the republic which he had so long governed, both in peace
+and war, with so much success. There was also an admirable propriety in
+his style of conversation, in which wit was tempered with gravity; a
+wonderful aptitude for acquiring, and at the same time communicating,
+information; and his life was in perfect correspondence and unison with
+his language. He used to say that the government of Rome was superior
+to that of other states for this reason, because in nearly all of them
+there had been single individuals, each of whom had regulated their
+commonwealth according to their own laws and their own ordinances. So
+Minos had done in Crete, and Lycurgus in Sparta; and in Athens, which
+experienced so many revolutions, first Theseus, then Draco, then Solon,
+then Clisthenes, afterward many others; and, lastly, when it was almost
+lifeless and quite prostrate, that great and wise man, Demetrius
+Phalereus, supported it. But our Roman constitution, on the contrary,
+did not spring from the genius of one individual, but from that of
+many; and it was established, not in the lifetime of one man, but in
+the course of several ages and centuries. For, added he, there never
+yet existed any genius so vast and comprehensive as to allow nothing at
+any time to escape its attention; and all the geniuses in the world
+united in a single mind could never, within the limits of a single
+life, exert a foresight sufficiently extensive to embrace and harmonize
+all, without the aid of experience and practice.
+
+Thus, according to Cato's usual habit, I now ascend in my discourse to
+the "origin of the people," for I like to adopt the expression of Cato.
+I shall also more easily execute my proposed task if I thus exhibit to
+you our political constitution in its infancy, progress, and maturity,
+now so firm and fully established, than if, after the example of
+Socrates in the books of Plato, I were to delineate a mere imaginary
+republic.
+
+II. When all had signified their approbation, Scipio resumed: What
+commencement of a political constitution can we conceive more
+brilliant, or more universally known, than the foundation of Rome by
+the hand of Romulus? And he was the son of Mars: for we may grant this
+much to the common report existing among men, especially as it is not
+merely ancient, but one also which has been wisely maintained by our
+ancestors, in order that those who have done great service to
+communities may enjoy the reputation of having received from the Gods,
+not only their genius, but their very birth.
+
+It is related, then, that soon after the birth of Romulus and his
+brother Remus, Amulius, King of Alba, fearing that they might one day
+undermine his authority, ordered that they should be exposed on the
+banks of the Tiber; and that in this situation the infant Romulus was
+suckled by a wild beast; that he was afterward educated by the
+shepherds, and brought up in the rough way of living and labors of the
+countrymen; and that he acquired, when he grew up, such superiority
+over the rest by the vigor of his body and the courage of his soul,
+that all the people who at that time inhabited the plains in the midst
+of which Rome now stands, tranquilly and willingly submitted to his
+government. And when he had made himself the chief of those bands, to
+come from fables to facts, he took Alba Longa, a powerful and strong
+city at that time, and slew its king, Amulius.
+
+III. Having acquired this glory, he conceived the design (as they tell
+us) of founding a new city and establishing a new state. As respected
+the site of his new city, a point which requires the greatest foresight
+in him who would lay the foundation of a durable commonwealth, he chose
+the most convenient possible position. For he did not advance too near
+the sea, which he might easily have done with the forces under his
+command, either by entering the territory of the Rutuli and Aborigines,
+or by founding his citadel at the mouth of the Tiber, where many years
+after Ancus Martius established a colony. But Romulus, with admirable
+genius and foresight, observed and perceived that sites very near the
+sea are not the most favorable positions for cities which would attain
+a durable prosperity and dominion. And this, first, because maritime
+cities are always exposed, not only to many attacks, but to perils they
+cannot provide against. For the continued land gives notice, by many
+indications, not only of any regular approaches, but also of any sudden
+surprises of an enemy, and announces them beforehand by the mere sound.
+There is no adversary who, on an inland territory, can arrive so
+swiftly as to prevent our knowing not only his existence, but his
+character too, and where he comes from. But a maritime and naval enemy
+can fall upon a town on the sea-coast before any one suspects that he
+is about to come; and when he does come, nothing exterior indicates who
+he is, or whence he comes, or what he wishes; nor can it even be
+determined and distinguished on all occasions whether he is a friend or
+a foe.
+
+IV. But maritime cities are likewise naturally exposed to corrupt
+influences, and revolutions of manners. Their civilization is more or
+less adulterated by new languages and customs, and they import not only
+foreign merchandise, but foreign fashions, to such a degree that
+nothing can continue unalloyed in the national institutions. Those who
+inhabit these maritime towns do not remain in their native place, but
+are urged afar from their homes by winged hope and speculation. And
+even when they do not desert their country in person, still their minds
+are always expatiating and voyaging round the world.
+
+Nor, indeed, was there any cause which more deeply undermined Corinth
+and Carthage, and at last overthrew them both, than this wandering and
+dispersion of their citizens, whom the passion of commerce and
+navigation had induced to abandon the cultivation of their lands and
+their attention to military pursuits.
+
+The proximity of the sea likewise administers to maritime cities a
+multitude of pernicious incentives to luxury, which are either acquired
+by victory or imported by commerce; and the very agreeableness of their
+position nourishes many expensive and deceitful gratifications of the
+passions. And what I have spoken of Corinth may be applied, for aught I
+know, without incorrectness to the whole of Greece. For the
+Peloponnesus itself is almost wholly on the sea-coast; nor, besides the
+Phliasians, are there any whose lands do not touch the sea; and beyond
+the Peloponnesus, the AEnianes, the Dorians, and the Dolopes are the
+only inland people. Why should I speak of the Grecian islands, which,
+girded by the waves, seem all afloat, as it were, together with the
+institutions and manners of their cities? And these things, I have
+before noticed, do not respect ancient Greece only; for which of all
+those colonies which have been led from Greece into Asia, Thracia,
+Italy, Sicily, and Africa, with the single exception of Magnesia, is
+there that is not washed by the sea? Thus it seems as if a sort of
+Grecian coast had been annexed to territories of the barbarians. For
+among the barbarians themselves none were heretofore a maritime people,
+if we except the Carthaginians and Etruscans; one for the sake of
+commerce, the other of pillage. And this is one evident reason of the
+calamities and revolutions of Greece, because she became infected with
+the vices which belong to maritime cities, which I just now briefly
+enumerated. But yet, notwithstanding these vices, they have one great
+advantage, and one which is of universal application, namely, that
+there is a great facility for new inhabitants flocking to them. And,
+again, that the inhabitants are enabled to export and send abroad the
+produce of their native lands to any nation they please, which offers
+them a market for their goods.
+
+V. By what divine wisdom, then, could Romulus embrace all the benefits
+that could belong to maritime cities, and at the same time avoid the
+dangers to which they are exposed, except, as he did, by building his
+city on the bank of an inexhaustible river, whose equal current
+discharges itself into the sea by a vast mouth, so that the city could
+receive all it wanted from the sea, and discharge its superabundant
+commodities by the same channel? And in the same river a communication
+is found by which it not only receives from the sea all the productions
+necessary to the conveniences and elegances of life, but those also
+which are brought from the inland districts. So that Romulus seems to
+me to have divined and anticipated that this city would one day become
+the centre and abode of a powerful and opulent empire; for there is no
+other part of Italy in which a city could be situated so as to be able
+to maintain so wide a dominion with so much ease.
+
+VI. As to the natural fortifications of Rome, who is so negligent and
+unobservant as not to have them depicted and deeply stamped on his
+memory? Such is the plan and direction of the walls, which, by the
+prudence of Romulus and his royal successors, are bounded on all sides
+by steep and rugged hills; and the only aperture between the Esquiline
+and Quirinal mountains is enclosed by a formidable rampart, and
+surrounded by an immense fosse. And as for our fortified citadel, it is
+so secured by a precipitous barrier and enclosure of rocks, that, even
+in that horrible attack and invasion of the Gauls, it remained
+impregnable and inviolable. Moreover, the site which he selected had
+also an abundance of fountains, and was healthy, though it was in the
+midst of a pestilential region; for there are hills which at once
+create a current of fresh air, and fling an agreeable shade over the
+valleys.
+
+VII. These things he effected with wonderful rapidity, and thus
+established the city, which, from his own name Romulus, he determined
+to call Rome. And in order to strengthen his new city, he conceived a
+design, singular enough, and even a little rude, yet worthy of a great
+man, and of a genius which discerned far away in futurity the means of
+strengthening his power and his people. The young Sabine females of
+honorable birth who had come to Rome, attracted by the public games and
+spectacles which Romulus then, for the first time, established as
+annual games in the circus, were suddenly carried off at the feast of
+Consus[313] by his orders, and were given in marriage to the men of the
+noblest families in Rome. And when, on this account, the Sabines had
+declared war against Rome, the issue of the battle being doubtful and
+undecided, Romulus made an alliance with Tatius, King of the Sabines,
+at the intercession of the matrons themselves who had been carried off.
+By this compact he admitted the Sabines into the city, gave them a
+participation in the religious ceremonies, and divided his power with
+their king.
+
+VIII. But after the death of Tatius, the entire government was again
+vested in the hands of Romulus, although, besides making Tatius his own
+partner, he had also elected some of the chiefs of the Sabines into the
+royal council, who on account of their affectionate regard for the
+people were called _patres_, or fathers. He also divided the people
+into three tribes, called after the name of Tatius, and his own name,
+and that of Locumo, who had fallen as his ally in the Sabine war; and
+also into thirty curiae, designated by the names of those Sabine
+virgins, who, after being carried off at the festivals, generously
+offered themselves as the mediators of peace and coalition.
+
+But though these orders were established in the life of Tatius, yet,
+after his death, Romulus reigned with still greater power by the
+counsel and authority of the senate.
+
+IX. In this respect he approved and adopted the principle which
+Lycurgus but little before had applied to the government of Lacedaemon;
+namely, that the monarchical authority and the royal power operate best
+in the government of states when to this supreme authority is joined
+the influence of the noblest of the citizens.
+
+Therefore, thus supported, and, as it were, propped up by this council
+or senate, Romulus conducted many wars with the neighboring nations in
+a most successful manner; and while he refused to take any portion of
+the booty to his own palace, he did not cease to enrich the citizens.
+He also cherished the greatest respect for that institution of
+hierarchical and ecclesiastical ordinances which we still retain to the
+great benefit of the Commonwealth; for in the very commencement of his
+government he founded the city with religious rites, and in the
+institution of all public establishments he was equally careful in
+attending to these sacred ceremonials, and associated with himself on
+these occasions priests that were selected from each of the tribes. He
+also enacted that the nobles should act as patrons and protectors to
+the inferior citizens, their natural clients and dependants, in their
+respective districts, a measure the utility of which I shall afterward
+notice.--The judicial punishments were mostly fines of sheep and oxen;
+for the property of the people at that time consisted in their fields
+and cattle, and this circumstance has given rise to the expressions
+which still designate real and personal wealth. Thus the people were
+kept in order rather by mulctations than by bodily inflictions.
+
+X. After Romulus had thus reigned thirty-seven years, and established
+these two great supports of government, the hierarchy and the senate,
+having disappeared in a sudden eclipse of the sun, he was thought
+worthy of being added to the number of the Gods--an honor which no
+mortal man ever was able to attain to but by a glorious pre-eminence of
+virtue. And this circumstance was the more to be admired in the case of
+Romulus because most of the great men that have been deified were so
+exalted to celestial dignities by the people, in periods very little
+enlightened, when fiction was easy and ignorance went hand-in-hand with
+credulity. But with respect to Romulus we know that he lived less than
+six centuries ago, at a time when science and literature were already
+advanced, and had got rid of many of the ancient errors that had
+prevailed among less civilized peoples. For if, as we consider proved
+by the Grecian annals, Rome was founded in the seventh Olympiad, the
+life of Romulus was contemporary with that period in which Greece
+already abounded in poets and musicians--an age when fables, except
+those concerning ancient matters, received little credit.
+
+For, one hundred and eight years after the promulgation of the laws of
+Lycurgus, the first Olympiad was established, which indeed, through a
+mistake of names, some authors have supposed constituted, by Lycurgus
+likewise. And Homer himself, according to the best computation, lived
+about thirty years before the time of Lycurgus. We must conclude,
+therefore, that Homer flourished very many years before the date of
+Romulus. So that, as men had now become learned, and as the times
+themselves were not destitute of knowledge, there was not much room
+left for the success of mere fictions. Antiquity indeed has received
+fables that have at times been sufficiently improbable: but this epoch,
+which was already so cultivated, disdaining every fiction that was
+impossible, rejected[314] * * * We may therefore, perhaps, attach some
+credit to this story of Romulus's immortality, since human life was at
+that time experienced, cultivated, and instructed. And doubtless there
+was in him such energy of genius and virtue that it is not altogether
+impossible to believe the report of Proculus Julius, the husbandman, of
+that glorification having befallen Romulus which for many ages we have
+denied to less illustrious men. At all events, Proculus is reported to
+have stated in the council, at the instigation of the senators, who
+wished to free themselves from all suspicion of having been accessaries
+to the death of Romulus, that he had seen him on that hill which is now
+called the Quirinal, and that he had commanded him to inform the people
+that they should build him a temple on that same hill, and offer him
+sacrifices under the name of Quirinus.
+
+XI. You see, therefore, that the genius of this great man did not
+merely establish the constitution of a new people, and then leave them,
+as it were, crying in their cradle; but he still continued to
+superintend their education till they had arrived at an adult and
+wellnigh a mature age.
+
+Then Laelius said: We now see, my Scipio, what you meant when you said
+that you would adopt a new method of discussing the science of
+government, different from any found in the writings of the Greeks. For
+that prime master of philosophy, whom none ever surpassed in eloquence,
+I mean Plato, chose an open plain on which to build an imaginary city
+after his own taste--a city admirably conceived, as none can deny, but
+remote enough from the real life and manners of men. Others, without
+proposing to themselves any model or type of government whatever, have
+argued on the constitutions and forms of states. You, on the contrary,
+appear to be about to unite these two methods; for, as far as you have
+gone, you seem to prefer attributing to others your discoveries, rather
+than start new theories under your own name and authority, as Socrates
+has done in the writings of Plato. Thus, in speaking of the site of
+Rome, you refer to a systematic policy, to the acts of Romulus, which
+were many of them the result of necessity or chance; and you do not
+allow your discourse to run riot over many states, but you fix and
+concentrate it on our own Commonwealth. Proceed, then, in the course
+you have adopted; for I see that you intend to examine our other kings,
+in your pursuit of a perfect republic, as it were.
+
+XII. Therefore, said Scipio, when that senate of Romulus which was
+composed of the nobles, whom the king himself respected so highly that
+he designated them _patres_, or fathers, and their children patricians,
+attempted after the death of Romulus to conduct the government without
+a king, the people would not suffer it, but, amidst their regret for
+Romulus, desisted not from demanding a fresh monarch. The nobles then
+prudently resolved to establish an interregnum--a new political form,
+unknown to other nations. It was not without its use, however, since,
+during the interval which elapsed before the definitive nomination of
+the new king, the State was not left without a ruler, nor subjected too
+long to the same governor, nor exposed to the fear lest some one, in
+consequence of the prolonged enjoyment of power, should become more
+unwilling to lay it aside, or more powerful if he wished to secure it
+permanently for himself. At which time this new nation discovered a
+political provision which had escaped the Spartan Lycurgus, who
+conceived that the monarch ought not to be elective--if indeed it is
+true that this depended on Lycurgus--but that it was better for the
+Lacedaemonians to acknowledge as their sovereign the next heir of the
+race of Hercules, whoever he might be: but our Romans, rude as they
+were, saw the importance of appointing a king, not for his family, but
+for his virtue and experience.
+
+XIII. And fame having recognized these eminent qualities in Numa
+Pompilius, the Roman people, without partiality for their own citizens,
+committed itself, by the counsel of the senators, to a king of foreign
+origin, and summoned this Sabine from the city of Cures to Rome, that
+he might reign over them. Numa, although the people had proclaimed him
+king in their Comitia Curiata, did nevertheless himself pass a Lex
+Curiata respecting his own authority; and observing that the
+institutions of Romulus had too much excited the military propensities
+of the people, he judged it expedient to recall them from this habit of
+warfare by other employments.
+
+XIV. And, in the first place, he divided severally among the citizens
+the lands which Romulus had conquered, and taught them that even
+without the aid of pillage and devastation they could, by the
+cultivation of their own territories, procure themselves all kinds of
+commodities. And he inspired them with the love of peace and
+tranquillity, in which faith and justice are likeliest to flourish, and
+extended the most powerful protection to the people in the cultivation
+of their fields and the enjoyment of their produce. Pompilius likewise
+having created hierarchical institutions of the highest class, added
+two augurs to the old number. He intrusted the superintendence of the
+sacred rites to five pontiffs, selected from the body of the nobles;
+and by those laws which we still preserve on our monuments he
+mitigated, by religious ceremonials, the minds that had been too long
+inflamed by military enthusiasm and enterprise.
+
+He also established the Flamines and the Salian priests and the Vestal
+Virgins, and regulated all departments of our ecclesiastical policy
+with the most pious care. In the ordinance of sacrifices, he wished
+that the ceremonial should be very arduous and the expenditure very
+light. He thus appointed many observances, whose knowledge is extremely
+important, and whose expense far from burdensome. Thus in religious
+worship he added devotion and removed costliness. He was also the first
+to introduce markets, games, and the other usual methods of assembling
+and uniting men. By these establishments, he inclined to benevolence
+and amiability spirits whom the passion for war had rendered savage and
+ferocious. Having thus reigned in the greatest peace and concord
+thirty-nine years--for in dates we mainly follow our Polybius, than
+whom no one ever gave more attention to the investigation of the
+history of the times--he departed this life, having corroborated the
+two grand principles of political stability, religion and clemency.
+
+XV. When Scipio had concluded these remarks, Is it not, said Manilius,
+a true tradition which is current, that our king Numa was a disciple of
+Pythagoras himself, or that at least he was a Pythagorean in his
+doctrines? For I have often heard this from my elders, and we know that
+it is the popular opinion; but it does not seem to be clearly proved by
+the testimony of our public annals.
+
+Then Scipio replied: The supposition is false, my Manilius; it is not
+merely a fiction, but a ridiculous and bungling one too; and we should
+not tolerate those statements, even in fiction, relating to facts which
+not only did not happen, but which never could have happened. For it
+was not till the fourth year of the reign of Tarquinius Superbus that
+Pythagoras is ascertained to have come to Sybaris, Crotona, and this
+part of Italy. And the sixty-second Olympiad is the common date of the
+elevation of Tarquin to the throne, and of the arrival of Pythagoras.
+From which it appears, when we calculate the duration of the reigns of
+the kings, that about one hundred and forty years must have elapsed
+after the death of Numa before Pythagoras first arrived in Italy. And
+this fact, in the minds of men who have carefully studied the annals of
+time, has never been at all doubted.
+
+O ye immortal Gods! said Manilius, how deep and how inveterate is this
+error in the minds of men! However, it costs me no effort to concede
+that our Roman sciences were not imported from beyond the seas, but
+that they sprung from our own indigenous and domestic virtues.
+
+XVI. You will become still more convinced of this fact, said Africanus,
+when tracing the progress of our Commonwealth as it became gradually
+developed to its best and maturest condition. And you will find yet
+further occasion to admire the wisdom of our ancestors on this very
+account, since you will perceive, that even those things which they
+borrowed from foreigners received a much higher improvement among us
+than they possessed in the countries from whence they were imported
+among us; and you will learn that the Roman people was aggrandized, not
+by chance or hazard, but rather by counsel and discipline, to which
+fortune indeed was by no means unfavorable.
+
+XVII. After the death of King Pompilius, the people, after a short
+period of interregnum, chose Tullus Hostilius for their king, in the
+Comitia Curiata; and Tullus, after Numa's example, consulted the people
+in their curias to procure a sanction for his government. His
+excellence chiefly appeared in his military glory and great
+achievements in war. He likewise, out of his military spoils,
+constructed and decorated the House of Comitia and the Senate-house. He
+also settled the ceremonies of the proclamation of hostilities, and
+consecrated their righteous institution by the religious sanction of
+the Fetial priests, so that every war which was not duly announced and
+declared might be adjudged illegal, unjust, and impious. And observe
+how wisely our kings at that time perceived that certain rights ought
+to be allowed to the people, of which we shall have a good deal to say
+hereafter. Tullus did not even assume the ensigns of royalty without
+the approbation of the people; and when he appointed twelve lictors,
+with their axes to go before him[315] * * *
+
+XVIII. * * * [_Manilius_.] This Commonwealth of Rome, which you are so
+eloquently describing, did not creep towards perfection; it rather flew
+at once to the maturity of its grandeur.
+
+[_Scipio._] After Tullus, Ancus Martius, a descendant of Numa by his
+daughter, was appointed king by the people. He also procured the
+passing of a law[316] through the Comitia Curiata respecting his
+government. This king having conquered the Latins, admitted them to the
+rights of citizens of Rome. He added to the city the Aventine and
+Caelian hills; he distributed the lands he had taken in war; he bestowed
+on the public all the maritime forests he had acquired; and he built
+the city Ostia, at the mouth of the Tiber, and colonized it. When he
+had thus reigned twenty-three years, he died.
+
+Then said Laelius: Doubtless this king deserves our praises, but the
+Roman history is obscure. We possess, indeed, the name of this
+monarch's mother, but we know nothing of his father.
+
+It is so, said Scipio; but in those ages little more than the names of
+the kings were recorded.
+
+XIX. For the first time at this period, Rome appears to have become
+more learned by the study of foreign literature; for it was no longer a
+little rivulet, flowing from Greece towards the walls of our city, but
+an overflowing river of Grecian sciences and arts. This is generally
+attributed to Demaratus, a Corinthian, the first man of his country in
+reputation, honor, and wealth; who, not being able to bear the
+despotism of Cypselus, tyrant of Corinth, fled with large treasures,
+and arrived at Tarquinii, the most flourishing city in Etruria. There,
+understanding that the domination of Cypselus was thoroughly
+established, he, like a free and bold-hearted man, renounced his
+country, and was admitted into the number of the citizens of Tarquinii,
+and fixed his residence in that city. And having married a woman of the
+city, he instructed his two sons, according to the method of Greek
+education, in all kinds of sciences and arts.[317] * * *
+
+XX. * * * [One of these sons] was easily admitted to the rights of
+citizenship at Rome; and on account of his accomplished manners and
+learning, he became a favorite of our king Ancus to such a degree that
+he was a partner in all his counsels, and was looked upon almost as his
+associate in the government. He, besides, possessed wonderful
+affability, and was very kind in assistance, support, protection, and
+even gifts of money, to the citizens.
+
+When, therefore, Ancus died, the people by their unanimous suffrages
+chose for their king this Lucius Tarquinius (for he had thus
+transformed the Greek name of his family, that he might seem in all
+respects to imitate the customs of his adopted countrymen). And when
+he, too, had procured the passing of a law respecting his authority, he
+commenced his reign by doubling the original number of the senators.
+The ancient senators he called patricians of the major families
+(_patres majorum gentium_), and he asked their votes first; and those
+new senators whom he himself had added, he entitled patricians of minor
+families. After this, he established the order of knights, on the plan
+which we maintain to this day. He would not, however, change the
+denomination of the Tatian, Rhamnensian, and Lucerian orders, though he
+wished to do so, because Attus Naevius, an augur of the highest
+reputation, would not sanction it. And, indeed, I am aware that the
+Corinthians were remarkably attentive to provide for the maintenance
+and good condition of their cavalry by taxes levied on the inheritance
+of widows and orphans. To the first equestrian orders Lucius also added
+new ones, composing a body of three hundred knights. And this number he
+doubled, after having conquered the AEquicoli, a large and ferocious
+people, and dangerous enemies of the Roman State. Having likewise
+repulsed from our walls an invasion of the Sabines, he routed them by
+the aid of his cavalry, and subdued them. He also was the first person
+who instituted the grand games which are now called the Roman Games. He
+fulfilled his vow to build a temple to the all-good and all-powerful
+Jupiter in the Capitol--a vow which he made during a battle in the
+Sabine war--and died after a reign of thirty-eight years.
+
+XXI. Then Laelius said: All that you have been relating corroborates the
+saying of Cato, that the constitution of the Roman Commonwealth is not
+the work of one man, or one age; for we can clearly see what a great
+progress in excellent and useful institutions was continued under each
+successive king. But we are now arrived at the reign of a monarch who
+appears to me to have been of all our kings he who had the greatest
+foresight in matters of political government.
+
+So it appears to me, said Scipio; for after Tarquinius Priscus comes
+Servius Sulpicius, who was the first who is reported to have reigned
+without an order from the people. He is supposed to have been the son
+of a female slave at Tarquinii, by one of the soldiers or clients of
+King Priscus; and as he was educated among the servants of this prince,
+and waiting on him at table, the king soon observed the fire of his
+genius, which shone forth even from his childhood, so skilful was he in
+all his words and actions. Therefore, Tarquin, whose own children were
+then very young, so loved Servius that he was very commonly believed to
+be his own son, and he instructed him with the greatest care in all the
+sciences with which he was acquainted, according to the most exact
+discipline of the Greeks.
+
+But when Tarquin had perished by the plots of the sons of Ancus, and
+Servius (as I have said) had begun to reign, not by the order, but yet
+with the good-will and consent, of the citizens--because, as it was
+falsely reported that Priscus was recovering from his wounds, Servius,
+arrayed in the royal robes, delivered judgment, freed the debtors at
+his own expense, and, exhibiting the greatest affability, announced
+that he delivered judgment at the command of Priscus--he did not commit
+himself to the senate; but, after Priscus was buried, he consulted the
+people respecting his authority, and, being authorized by them to
+assume the dominion, he procured a law to be passed through the Comitia
+Curiata, confirming his government.
+
+He then, in the first place, avenged the injuries of the Etruscans by
+arms. After which[318] * * *
+
+XXII. * * * he enrolled eighteen centuries of knights of the first
+order. Afterward, having created a great number of knights from the
+common mass of the people, he divided the rest of the people into five
+classes, distinguishing between the seniors and the juniors. These he
+so constituted as to place the suffrages, not in the hands of the
+multitude, but in the power of the men of property. And he took care to
+make it a rule of ours, as it ought to be in every government, that the
+greatest number should not have the greatest weight. You are well
+acquainted with this institution, otherwise I would explain it to you;
+but you are familiar with the whole system, and know how the centuries
+of knights, with six suffrages, and the first class, comprising eighty
+centuries, besides one other century which was allotted to the
+artificers, on account of their utility to the State, produce
+eighty-nine centuries. If to these there are added twelve
+centuries--for that is the number of the centuries of the knights which
+remain[319]--the entire force of the State is summed up; and the
+arrangement is such that the remaining and far more numerous multitude,
+which is distributed through the ninety-six last centuries, is not
+deprived of a right of suffrage, which would be an arrogant measure;
+nor, on the other hand, permitted to exert too great a preponderance in
+the government, which would be dangerous.
+
+In this arrangement, Servius was very cautious in his choice of terms
+and denominations. He called the rich _assidui_, because they afforded
+pecuniary succor[320] to the State. As to those whoso fortune did not
+exceed 1500 pence, or those who had nothing but their labor, he called
+them _proletarii_ classes, as if the State should expect from them a
+hardy progeny[321] and population.
+
+Even a single one of the ninety-six last centuries contained
+numerically more citizens than the entire first class. Thus, no one was
+excluded from his right of voting, yet the preponderance of votes was
+secured to those who had the deepest stake in the welfare of the State.
+Moreover, with reference to the accensi, velati, trumpeters,
+hornblowers, proletarii[322] * * *
+
+XXIII. * * * That that republic is arranged in the best manner which,
+being composed in due proportions of those three elements, the
+monarchical, the aristocratical, and the democratic, does not by
+punishment irritate a fierce and savage mind. * * * [A similar
+institution prevailed at Carthage], which was sixty-five years more
+ancient than Rome, since it was founded thirty-nine years before the
+first Olympiad; and that most ancient law-giver Lycurgus made nearly
+the same arrangements. Thus the system of regular subordination, and
+this mixture of the three principal forms of government, appear to me
+common alike to us and them. But there is a peculiar advantage in our
+Commonwealth, than which nothing can be more excellent, which I shall
+endeavor to describe as accurately as possible, because it is of such a
+character that nothing analogous can be discovered in ancient states;
+for these political elements which I have noticed were so united in the
+constitutions of Rome, of Sparta, and of Carthage, that they were not
+counterbalanced by any modifying power. For in a state in which one man
+is invested with a perpetual domination, especially of the monarchical
+character, although there be a senate in it, as there was in Rome under
+the kings, and in Sparta, by the laws of Lycurgus, or even where the
+people exercise a sort of jurisdiction, as they used in the days of our
+monarchy, the title of king must still be pre-eminent; nor can such a
+state avoid being, and being called, a kingdom. And this kind of
+government is especially subject to frequent revolutions, because the
+fault of a single individual is sufficient to precipitate it into the
+most pernicious disasters.
+
+In itself, however, royalty is not only not a reprehensible form of
+government, but I do not know whether it is not far preferable to all
+other simple constitutions, if I approved of any simple constitution
+whatever. But this preference applies to royalty so long only as it
+maintains its appropriate character; and this character provides that
+one individual's perpetual power, and justice, and universal wisdom
+should regulate the safety, equality, and tranquillity of the whole
+people. But many privileges must be wanting to communities that live
+under a king; and, in the first place, liberty, which does not consist
+in slavery to a just master, but in slavery to no master at all[323]
+* * *
+
+XXIV. * * * [Let us now pass on to the reign of the seventh and last
+king of Rome, Tarquinius Superbus.] And even this unjust and cruel
+master had good fortune for his companion for some time in all his
+enterprises. For he subdued all Latium; he captured Suessa Pometia, a
+powerful and wealthy city, and, becoming possessed of an immense spoil
+of gold and silver, he accomplished his father's vow by the building of
+the Capitol. He established colonies, and, faithful to the institutions
+of those from whom he sprung, he sent magnificent presents, as tokens
+of gratitude for his victories, to Apollo at Delphi.
+
+XXV. Here begins the revolution of our political system of government,
+and I must beg your attention to its natural course and progression.
+For the grand point of political science, the object of our discourses,
+is to know the march and the deviations of governments, that when we
+are acquainted with the particular courses and inclinations of
+constitutions, we may be able to restrain them from their fatal
+tendencies, or to oppose adequate obstacles to their decline and fall.
+
+For this Tarquinius Superbus, of whom I am speaking, being first of all
+stained with the blood of his admirable predecessor on the throne,
+could not be a man of sound conscience and mind; and as he feared
+himself the severest punishment for his enormous crime, he sought his
+protection in making himself feared. Then, in the glory of his
+victories and his treasures, he exulted in insolent pride, and could
+neither regulate his own manners nor the passions of the members of his
+family.
+
+When, therefore, his eldest son had offered violence to Lucretia,
+daughter of Tricipitinus and wife of Collatinus, and this chaste and
+noble lady had stabbed herself to death on account of the injury she
+could not survive--then a man eminent for his genius and virtue, Lucius
+Brutus, dashed from his fellow-citizens this unjust yoke of odious
+servitude; and though he was but a private man, he sustained the
+government of the entire Commonwealth, and was the first that taught
+the people in this State that no one was a private man when the
+preservation of our liberties was concerned. Beneath his authority and
+command our city rose against tyranny, and, stirred by the recent grief
+of the father and relatives of Lucretia, and with the recollections of
+Tarquin's haughtiness, and the numberless crimes of himself and his
+sons, they pronounced sentence of banishment against him and his
+children, and the whole race of the Tarquins.
+
+XXVI. Do you not observe, then, how the king sometimes degenerates into
+the despot, and how, by the fault of one individual, a form of
+government originally good is abused to the worst of purposes? Here is
+a specimen of that despot over the people whom the Greeks denominate a
+tyrant. For, according to them, a king is he who, like a father,
+consults the interests of his people, and who preserves those whom he
+is set over in the very best condition of life. This indeed is, as I
+have said, an excellent form of government, yet still liable, and, as
+it were, inclined, to a pernicious abuse. For as soon as a king assumes
+an unjust and despotic power, he instantly becomes a tyrant, than which
+nothing baser or fouler, than which no imaginable animal can be more
+detestable to gods or men; for though in form a man, he surpasses the
+most savage monsters in ferocious cruelty. For who can justly call him
+a human being, who admits not between himself and his
+fellow-countrymen, between himself and the whole human race, any
+communication of justice, any association of kindness? But we shall
+find some fitter occasion of speaking of the evils of tyranny when the
+subject itself prompts us to declare against them who, even in a state
+already liberated, have affected these despotic insolencies.
+
+XXVII. Such is the first origin and rise of a tyrant. For this was the
+name by which the Greeks choose to designate an unjust king; and by the
+title king our Romans universally understand every man who exercises
+over the people a perpetual and undivided domination. Thus Spurius
+Cassius, and Marcus Manlius, and Spurius Maelius, are said to have
+wished to seize upon the kingly power, and lately [Tiberius Gracchus
+incurred the same accusation].[324] * * *
+
+XXVIII. * * * [Lycurgus, in Sparta, formed, under the name of Elders,]
+a small council consisting of twenty-eight members only; to these he
+allotted the supreme legislative authority, while the king held the
+supreme executive authority. Our Romans, emulating his example, and
+translating his terms, entitled those whom he had called Elders,
+Senators, which, as we have said, was done by Romulus in reference to
+the elect patricians. In this constitution, however, the power, the
+influence, and name of the king is still pre-eminent. You may
+distribute, indeed, some show of power to the people, as Lycurgus and
+Romulus did, but you inflame them, with the thirst of liberty by
+allowing them even the slightest taste of its sweetness; and still
+their hearts will be overcast with alarm lest their king, as often
+happens, should become unjust. The prosperity of the people, therefore,
+can be little better than fragile, when placed at the disposal of any
+one individual, and subjected to his will and caprices.
+
+XXIX. Thus the first example, prototype, and original of tyranny has
+been discovered by us in the history of our own Roman State,
+religiously founded by Romulus, without applying to the theoretical
+Commonwealth which, according to Plato's recital, Socrates was
+accustomed to describe in his peripatetic dialogues. We have observed
+Tarquin, not by the usurpation of any new power, but by the unjust
+abuse of the power which he already possessed, overturn the whole
+system of our monarchical constitution.
+
+Let us oppose to this example of the tyrant another, a virtuous
+king--wise, experienced, and well informed respecting the true interest
+and dignity of the citizens--a guardian, as it were, and superintendent
+of the Commonwealth; for that is a proper name for every ruler and
+governor of a state. And take you care to recognize such a man when you
+meet him, for he is the man who, by counsel and exertion, can best
+protect the nation. And as the name of this man has not yet been often
+mentioned in our discourse, and as the character of such a man must be
+often alluded to in our future conversations, [I shall take an early
+opportunity of describing it.][325] * * *
+
+XXX. * * * [Plato has chosen to suppose a territory and establishments
+of citizens, whose fortunes] were precisely equal. And he has given us
+a description of a city, rather to be desired than expected; and he has
+made out not such a one as can really exist, but one in which the
+principles of political affairs may be discerned. But for me, if I can
+in any way accomplish it, while I adopt the same general principles as
+Plato, I am seeking to reduce them to experience and practice, not in
+the shadow and picture of a state, but in a real and actual
+Commonwealth, of unrivalled amplitude and power; in order to be able to
+point out, with the most graphic precision, the causes of every
+political good and social evil.
+
+For after Rome had flourished more than two hundred and forty years
+under her kings and interreges, and after Tarquin was sent into
+banishment, the Roman people conceived as much detestation of the name
+of king as they had once experienced regret at the death, or rather
+disappearance, of Romulus. Therefore, as in the first instance they
+could hardly bear the idea of losing a king, so in the latter, after
+the expulsion of Tarquin, they could not endure to hear the name of a
+king.[326] * * *
+
+XXXI. * * * Therefore, when that admirable constitution of Romulus had
+lasted steadily about two hundred and forty years. * * * The whole of
+that law was abolished. In this humor, our ancestors banished
+Collatinus, in spite of his innocence, because of the suspicion that
+attached to his family, and all the rest of the Tarquins, on account of
+the unpopularity of their name. In the same humor, Valerius Publicola
+was the first to lower the fasces before the people, when he spoke in
+the assembly of the people. He also had the materials of his house
+conveyed to the foot of Mount Velia, having observed that the
+commencement of his edifice on the summit of this hill, where King
+Tullius had once dwelt, excited the suspicions of the people.
+
+It was the same man, who in this respect pre-eminently deserved the
+name of Publicola, who carried in favor of the people the first law
+received in the Comitia Centuriata, that no magistrate should sentence
+to death or scourging a Roman citizen who appealed from his authority
+to the people. And the pontifical books attest that the right of appeal
+had existed, even against the decision of the kings. Our augural books
+affirm the same thing. And the Twelve Tables prove, by a multitude of
+laws, that there was a right of appeal from every judgment and penalty.
+Besides, the historical fact that the decemviri who compiled the laws
+were created with the privilege of judging without appeal, sufficiently
+proves that the other magistrates had not the same power. And a
+consular law, passed by Lucius Valerius Politus and Marcus Horatius
+Barbatus, men justly popular for promoting union and concord, enacted
+that no magistrate should thenceforth be appointed with authority to
+judge without appeal; and the Portian laws, the work of three citizens
+of the name of Portius, as you are aware, added nothing new to this
+edict but a penal sanction.
+
+Therefore Publicola, having promulgated this law in favor of appeal to
+the people, immediately ordered the axes to be removed from the fasces,
+which the lictors carried before the consuls, and the next day
+appointed Spurius Lucretius for his colleague. And as the new consul
+was the oldest of the two, Publicola ordered his lictors to pass over
+to him; and he was the first to establish the rule, that each of the
+consuls should be preceded by the lictors in alternate months, that
+there should be no greater appearance of imperial insignia among the
+free people than they had witnessed in the days of their kings. Thus,
+in my opinion, he proved himself no ordinary man, as, by so granting
+the people a moderate degree of liberty, he more easily maintained the
+authority of the nobles.
+
+Nor is it without reason that I have related to you these ancient and
+almost obsolete events; but I wished to adduce my instances of men and
+circumstances from illustrious persons and times, as it is to such
+events that the rest of my discourse will be directed.
+
+XXXII. At that period, then, the senate preserved the Commonwealth in
+such a condition that though the people were really free, yet few acts
+were passed by the people, but almost all, on the contrary, by the
+authority, customs, and traditions of the senate. And over all the
+consuls exercised a power--in time, indeed, only annual, but in nature
+and prerogative completely royal.
+
+The consuls maintained, with the greatest energy, that rule which so
+much conduces to the power of our nobles and great men, that the acts
+of the commons of the people shall not be binding, unless the authority
+of the patricians has approved them. About the same period, and
+scarcely ten years after the first consuls, we find the appointment of
+the dictator in the person of Titus Lartius. And this new kind of
+power--namely, the dictatorship--appears exceedingly similar to the
+monarchical royalty. All his power, however, was vested in the supreme
+authority of the senate, to which the people deferred; and in these
+times great exploits were performed in war by brave men invested with
+the supreme command, whether dictators or consuls.
+
+XXXIII. But as the nature of things necessarily brought it to pass that
+the people, once freed from its kings, should arrogate to itself more
+and more authority, we observe that after a short interval of only
+sixteen years, in the consulship of Postumus Cominius and Spurius
+Cassius, they attained their object; an event explicable, perhaps, on
+no distinct principle, but, nevertheless, in a manner independent of
+any distinct principle. For recollect what I said in commencing our
+discourse, that if there exists not in the State a just distribution
+and subordination of rights, offices, and prerogatives, so as to give
+sufficient domination to the chiefs, sufficient authority to the
+counsel of the senators, and sufficient liberty to the people, this
+form of the government cannot be durable.
+
+For when the excessive debts of the citizens had thrown the State into
+disorder, the people first retired to Mount Sacer, and next occupied
+Mount Aventine. And even the rigid discipline of Lycurgus could not
+maintain those restraints in the case of the Greeks. For in Sparta
+itself, under the reign of Theopompus, the five magistrates whom they
+term Ephori, and in Crete ten whom they entitle Cosmi, were established
+in opposition to the royal power, just as tribunes were added among us
+to counterbalance the consular authority.
+
+XXXIV. There might have been a method, indeed, by which our ancestors
+could have been relieved from the pressure of debt, a method with which
+Solon the Athenian, who lived at no very distant period before, was
+acquainted, and which our senate did not neglect when, in the
+indignation which the odious avarice of one individual excited, all the
+bonds of the citizens were cancelled, and the right of arrest for a
+while suspended. In the same way, when the plebeians were oppressed by
+the weight of the expenses occasioned by public misfortunes, a cure and
+remedy were sought for the sake of public security. The senate,
+however, having forgotten their former decision, gave an advantage to
+the democracy; for, by the creation of two tribunes to appease the
+sedition of the people, the power and authority of the senate were
+diminished; which, however, still remained dignified and august,
+inasmuch as it was still composed of the wisest and bravest men, who
+protected their country both with their arms and with their counsels;
+whose authority was exceedingly strong and flourishing, because in
+honor they were as much before their fellow-citizens as they were
+inferior in luxuriousness, and, as a general rule, not superior to them
+in wealth. And their public virtues were the more agreeable to the
+people, because even in private matters they were ready to serve every
+citizen, by their exertions, their counsels, and their liberality.
+
+XXXV. Such was the situation of the Commonwealth when the quaestor
+impeached Spurius Cassius of being so much emboldened by the excessive
+favor of the people as to endeavor to make himself master of
+monarchical power. And, as you have heard, his own father, having said
+that he had found that his son was really guilty of this crime,
+condemned him to death at the instance of the people. About fifty-four
+years after the first consulate, Spurius Tarpeius and Aulus Aternius
+very much gratified the people by proposing, in the Comitia Centuriata,
+the substitution of fines instead of corporal punishments. Twenty years
+afterward, Lucius Papirius and Publius Pinarius, the censors, having by
+a strict levy of fines confiscated to the State the entire flocks and
+herds of many private individuals, a light tax on the cattle was
+substituted for the law of fines in the consulship of Caius Julius and
+Publius Papirius.
+
+XXXVI. But, some years previous to this, at a period when the senate
+possessed the supreme influence, and the people were submissive and
+obedient, a new system was adopted. At that time both the consuls and
+tribunes of the people abdicated their magistracies, and the decemviri
+were appointed, who were invested with great authority, from which
+there was no appeal whatever, so as to exercise the chief domination,
+and to compile the laws. After having composed, with much wisdom and
+equity, the Ten Tables of laws, they nominated as their successors in
+the ensuing year other decemviri, whose good faith and justice do not
+deserve equal praise. One member of this college, however, merits our
+highest commendation. I allude to Caius Julius, who declared respecting
+the nobleman Lucius Sestius, in whose chamber a dead body had been
+exhumed under his own eyes, that though as decemvir he held the highest
+power without appeal, he still required bail, because he was unwilling
+to neglect that admirable law which permitted no court but the Comitia
+Centuriata to pronounce final sentence on the life of a Roman citizen.
+
+XXXVII. A third year followed under the authority of the same
+decemvirs, and still they were not disposed to appoint their
+successors. In a situation of the Commonwealth like this, which, as I
+have often repeated, could not be durable, because it had not an equal
+operation with respect to all the ranks of the citizens, the whole
+public power was lodged in the hands of the chiefs and decemvirs of the
+highest nobility, without the counterbalancing authority of the
+tribunes of the people, without the sanction of any other magistracies,
+and without appeal to the people in the case of a sentence of death or
+scourging.
+
+Thus, out of the injustice of these men, there was suddenly produced a
+great revolution, which changed the entire condition of the government,
+or they added two tables of very tyrannical laws, and though
+matrimonial alliances had always been permitted, even with foreigners,
+they forbade, by the most abominable and inhuman edict, that any
+marriages should take place between the nobles and the commons--an
+order which was afterward abrogated by the decree of Canuleius.
+Besides, they introduced into all their political measures corruption,
+cruelty, and avarice. And indeed the story is well known, and
+celebrated in many literary compositions, that a certain Decimus
+Virginius was obliged, on account of the libidinous violence of one of
+these decemvirs, to stab his virgin daughter in the midst of the forum.
+Then, when he in his desperation had fled to the Roman army which was
+encamped on Mount Algidum, the soldiers abandoned the war in which they
+were engaged, and took possession of the Sacred Mount, as they had done
+before on a similar occasion, and next invested Mount Aventine in their
+arms.[327] Our ancestors knew how to prove most thoroughly, and to
+retain most wisely. * * *
+
+XXXVIII. And when Scipio had spoken in this manner, and all his friends
+were awaiting in silence the rest of his discourse, then said Tubero:
+Since these men who are older than I, my Scipio, make no fresh demands
+on you, I shall take the liberty to tell you what I particularly wish
+you would explain in your subsequent remarks.
+
+Do so, said Scipio, and I shall be glad to hear.
+
+Then Tubero said: You appear to me to have spoken a panegyric on our
+Commonwealth of Rome exclusively, though Laelius requested your views
+not only of the government of our own State, but of the policy of
+states in general. I have not, therefore, yet sufficiently learned from
+your discourse, with respect to that mixed form of government you most
+approve, by what discipline, moral and legal, we may be best able to
+establish and maintain it.
+
+XXXIX. Africanus replied: I think that we shall soon find an occasion
+better adapted to the discussion you have proposed, respecting the
+constitution and conservatism of states. As to the best form of
+government, I think on this point I have sufficiently answered the
+question of Laelius. For in answering him, I, in the first place,
+specifically noticed the three simple forms of government--monarchy,
+aristocracy, and democracy; and the three vicious constitutions
+contrary to them, into which they often degenerate; and I said that
+none of these forms, taken separately, was absolutely good; but I
+described as preferable to either of them that mixed government which
+is composed of a proper amalgamation of these simple ingredients. If I
+have since depicted our own Roman constitution as an example, it was
+not in order to define the very best form of government, for that may
+be understood without an example; but I wished, in the exhibition of a
+mighty commonwealth actually in existence, to render distinct and
+visible what reason and discourse would vainly attempt to display
+without the assistance of experimental illustration. Yet, if you still
+require me to describe the best form of government, independent of all
+particular examples, we must consult that exactly proportioned and
+graduated image of government which nature herself presents to her
+investigators. Since you * * * this model of a city and people[328]
+* * *
+
+XL. * * * which I also am searching for, and which I am anxious to
+arrive at.
+
+_Laelius._ You mean the model that would be approved by the truly
+accomplished politician?
+
+_Scipio._ The same.
+
+_Laelius._ You have plenty of fair patterns even now before you, if you
+would but begin with yourself.
+
+Then Scipio said: I wish I could find even one such, even in the entire
+senate. For he is really a wise politician who, as we have often seen
+in Africa, while seated on a huge and unsightly elephant, can guide and
+rule the monster, and turn him whichever way he likes by a slight
+admonition, without any actual exertion.
+
+_Laelius._ I recollect, and when I was your lieutenant I often saw, one
+of these drivers.
+
+_Scipio._ Thus an Indian or Carthaginian regulates one of these huge
+animals, and renders him docile and familiar with human manners. But
+the genius which resides in the mind of man, by whatever name it may be
+called, is required to rein and tame a monster far more multiform and
+intractable, whenever it can accomplish it, which indeed is seldom. It
+is necessary to hold in with a strong hand that ferocious[329] * * *
+
+XLI. * * * [beast, denominated the mob, which thirsts after blood] to
+such a degree that it can scarcely be sated with the most hideous
+massacres of men. * * *
+
+     But to a man who is greedy, and grasping, and lustful, and
+     fond of wallowing in voluptuousness.
+
+     The fourth kind of anxiety is that which is prone to mourning
+     and melancholy, and which is constantly worrying itself.
+
+          [_The next paragraph, "Esse autem angores," etc.,
+          is wholly unintelligible without the context._]
+
+     As an unskilful charioteer is dragged from his chariot,
+     covered with dirt, bruised, and lacerated.
+
+     The excitements of men's minds are like a chariot, with
+     horses harnessed to it; in the proper management of which,
+     the chief duty of the driver consists in knowing his road:
+     and if he keeps the road, then, however rapidly he proceeds,
+     he will encounter no obstacles; but if he quits the proper
+     track, then, although he may be going gently and slowly, he
+     will either be perplexed on rugged ground, or fall over some
+     steep place, or at least he will be carried where he has no
+     need to go.[330]
+
+XLII. * * * can be said.
+
+Then Laelius said: I now see the sort of politician you require, on whom
+you would impose the office and task of government, which is what I
+wished to understand.
+
+He must be an almost unique specimen, said Africanus, for the task
+which I set him comprises all others. He must never cease from
+cultivating and studying himself, that he may excite others to imitate
+him, and become, through the splendor of his talents and enterprises, a
+living mirror to his countrymen. For as in flutes and harps, and in all
+vocal performances, a certain unison and harmony must be preserved
+amidst the distinctive tones, which cannot be broken or violated
+without offending experienced ears; and as this concord and delicious
+harmony is produced by the exact gradation and modulation of dissimilar
+notes; even so, by means of the just apportionment of the highest,
+middle, and lower classes, the State is maintained in concord and peace
+by the harmonic subordination of its discordant elements: and thus,
+that which is by musicians called harmony in song answers and
+corresponds to what we call concord in the State--concord, the
+strongest and loveliest bond of security in every commonwealth, being
+always accompanied by justice and equity.
+
+     XLIII. And after this, when Scipio had discussed with
+     considerable breadth of principle and felicity of
+     illustration the great advantage that justice is to a state,
+     and the great injury which would arise if it were wanting,
+     Pilus, one of those who were present at the discussion, took
+     up the matter and demanded that this question should be
+     argued more carefully, and that something more should be said
+     about justice, on account of a sentiment that was now
+     obtaining among people in general, that political affairs
+     could not be wholly carried on without some disregard of
+     justice.
+
+XLIV. * * * to be full of justice.
+
+Then Scipio replied: I certainly think so. And I declare to you that I
+consider that all I have spoken respecting the government of the State
+is worth nothing, and that it will be useless to proceed further,
+unless I can prove that it is a false assertion that political business
+cannot be conducted without injustice and corruption; and, on the other
+hand, establish as a most indisputable fact that without the strictest
+justice no government whatever can last long.
+
+But, with your permission, we have had discussion enough for the day.
+The rest--and much remains for our consideration--we will defer till
+to-morrow. When they had all agreed to this, the debate of the day was
+closed.
+
+       *       *       *       *       *
+
+
+
+
+INTRODUCTION TO THE THIRD BOOK,
+
+BY THE ORIGINAL TRANSLATOR.
+
+
+   Cicero here enters on the grand question of Political Justice,
+     and endeavors to evince throughout the absolute verity of
+     that inestimable proverb, "Honesty is the best policy," in
+     all public as well as in all private affairs. St. Augustine,
+     in his City of God, has given the following analysis of this
+     magnificent disquisition:
+
+   "In the third book of Cicero's Commonwealth" (says he) "the
+     question of Political Justice is most earnestly discussed.
+     Philus is appointed to support, as well as he can, the
+     sophistical arguments of those who think that political
+     government cannot be carried on without the aid of injustice
+     and chicanery. He denies holding any such opinion himself;
+     yet, in order to exhibit the truth more vividly through the
+     force of contrast, he pleads with the utmost ingenuity the
+     cause of injustice against justice; and endeavors to show, by
+     plausible examples and specious dialectics, that injustice is
+     as useful to a statesman as justice would be injurious. Then
+     Laelius, at the general request, takes up the plea for
+     justice, and maintains with all his eloquence that nothing
+     could be so ruinous to states as injustice and dishonesty,
+     and that without a supreme justice, no political government
+     could expect a long duration. This point being sufficiently
+     proved, Scipio returns to the principal discussion. He
+     reproduces and enforces the short definition that he had
+     given of a commonwealth--that it consisted in the welfare of
+     the entire people, by which word 'people' he does not mean
+     the mob, but the community, bound together by the sense of
+     common rights and mutual benefits. He notices how important
+     such just definitions are in all debates whatever, and draws
+     this conclusion from the preceding arguments--that the
+     Commonwealth is the common welfare whenever it is swayed with
+     justice and wisdom, whether it be subordinated to a king, an
+     aristocracy, or a democracy. But if the king be unjust, and
+     so becomes a tyrant; and the aristocracy unjust, which makes
+     them a faction; or the democrats unjust, and so degenerate
+     into revolutionists and destructives--then not only the
+     Commonwealth is corrupted, but in fact annihilated. For it
+     can be no longer the common welfare when a tyrant or a
+     faction abuse it; and the people itself is no longer the
+     people when it becomes unjust, since it is no longer a
+     community associated by a sense of right and utility,
+     according to the definition."--_Aug. Civ. Dei._ 3-21.
+
+   This book is of the utmost importance to statesmen, as it
+     serves to neutralize the sophistries of Machiavelli, which
+     are still repeated in many cabinets.
+
+
+
+
+BOOK III.
+
+
+I. * * *[331] Cicero, in the third book of his treatise On a
+Commonwealth, says that nature has treated man less like a mother than
+a step-dame, for she has cast him into mortal life with a body naked,
+fragile, and infirm, and with a mind agitated by troubles, depressed by
+fears, broken by labors, and exposed to passions. In this mind,
+however, there lies hidden, and, as it were, buried, a certain divine
+spark of genius and intellect.
+
+Though man is born a frail and powerless being, nevertheless he is safe
+from all animals destitute of voice; and at the same time those other
+animals of greater strength, although they bravely endure the violence
+of weather, cannot be safe from man. And the result is, that reason
+does more for man than nature does for brutes; since, in the latter,
+neither the greatness of their strength nor the firmness of their
+bodies can save them from being oppressed by us, and made subject to
+our power. * * *
+
+Plato returned thanks to nature that he had been born a man.
+
+II. * * * aiding our slowness by carriages, and when it had taught men
+to utter the elementary and confused sounds of unpolished expression,
+articulated and distinguished them into their proper classes, and, as
+their appropriate signs, attached certain words to certain things, and
+thus associated, by the most delightful bond of speech, the once
+divided races of men.
+
+And by a similar intelligence, the inflections of the voice, which
+appeared infinite, are, by the discovery of a few alphabetic
+characters, all designated and expressed; by which we maintain converse
+with our absent friends, by which also indications of our wishes and
+monuments of past events are preserved. Then came the use of numbers--a
+thing necessary to human life, and at the same time immutable and
+eternal; a science which first urged us to raise our views to heaven,
+and not gaze without an object on the motions of the stars, and the
+distribution of days and nights.
+
+III. * * *[332] [Then appeared the sages of philosophy], whose minds
+took a higher flight, and who were able to conceive and to execute
+designs worthy of the gifts of the Gods. Wherefore let those men who
+have left us sublime essays on the principles of living be regarded as
+great men--which indeed they are--as learned men, as masters of truth
+and virtue; provided that these principles of civil government, this
+system of governing people, whether it be a thing discovered by men who
+have lived amidst a variety of political events, or one discussed
+amidst their opportunities of literary tranquillity, is remembered to
+be, as indeed it is, a thing by no means to be despised, being one
+which causes in first-rate minds, as we not unfrequently see, an
+incredible and almost divine virtue. And when to these high faculties
+of soul, received from nature and expanded by social institutions, a
+politician adds learning and extensive information concerning things in
+general, like those illustrious personages who conduct the dialogue in
+the present treatise, none will refuse to confess the superiority of
+such persons to all others; for, in fact, what can be more admirable
+than the study and practice of the grand affairs of state, united to a
+literary taste and a familiarity with the liberal arts? or what can we
+imagine more perfect than a Scipio, a Laelius, or a Philus, who, not to
+omit anything which belonged to the most perfect excellence of the
+greatest men, joined to the examples of our ancestors and the
+traditions of our countrymen the foreign philosophy of Socrates?
+
+Wherefore he who had both the desire and the power to acquaint himself
+thoroughly both with the customs and the learning of his ancestors
+appears to me to have attained to the very highest glory and honor. But
+if we cannot combine both, and are compelled to select one of these two
+paths to wisdom--though to some people the tranquil life spent in the
+research of literature and arts may appear to be the most happy and
+delectable--yet, doubtless, the science of politics is more laudable
+and illustrious, for in this political field of exertion our greatest
+men have reaped their honors, like the invincible Curius,
+
+    Whom neither gold nor iron could subdue.
+
+IV. * * *[333] that wisdom existed still. There existed this general
+difference between these two classes, that among the one the
+development of the principles of nature is the subject of their study
+and eloquence, and among the other national laws and institutions form
+the principal topics of investigation.
+
+In honor of our country, we may assert that she has produced within
+herself a great number, I will not say of sages (since philosophy is so
+jealous of this name), but of men worthy of the highest celebrity,
+because by them the precepts and discoveries of the sages have been
+carried out into actual practice. And, moreover, though there have
+existed, and still do exist, many great and glorious empires, yet since
+the noblest masterpiece of genius in the world is the establishment of
+a state and commonwealth which shall be a lasting one, even if we
+reckon but a single legislator for each empire, the number of these
+excellent men will appear very numerous. To be convinced of this, we
+have only to turn our eyes on any nation of Italy, Latium, the Sabines,
+the Volscians, the Samnites, or the Etrurians, and then direct our
+attention to that mighty nation of the Greeks, and then to the
+Assyrians, Persians, and Carthaginians, and[334] * * *
+
+V. * * * [Scipio and his friends having again assembled, Scipio spoke
+as follows: In our last conversation, I promised to prove that honesty
+is the best policy in all states and commonwealths whatsoever. But if I
+am to plead in favor of strict honesty and justice in all public
+affairs, no less than in private, I must request Philus, or some one
+else, to take up the advocacy of the other side; the truth will then
+become more manifest, from the collision of opposite arguments, as we
+see every day exemplified at the Bar.]
+
+And Philus replied: In good truth, you have allotted me a very
+creditable cause when you wish me to undertake the defence of vice.
+
+Perhaps, said Laelius, you are afraid, lest, in reproducing the ordinary
+objections made to justice in politics, you should seem to express your
+own sentiments; though you are universally respected as an almost
+unique example of the ancient probity and good faith; nor is it unknown
+how familiar you are with the lawyer-like habit of disputing on both
+sides of a question, because you think that this is the best way of
+getting at the truth.
+
+And Philus said: Very well; I obey you, and wilfully, with my eyes
+open, I will undertake this dirty business; because, since those who
+seek for gold do not flinch at the sight of the mud, so we who are
+searching for justice, which is far more precious than gold, are bound
+to shrink from no annoyance. And I wish, as I am about to make use of
+the antagonist arguments of a foreigner, I might also employ a foreign
+language. The pleas, therefore, now to be urged by Lucius Furius Philus
+are those [once employed by] the Greek Carneades, a man who was
+accustomed to express whatever [served his turn].[335] * * *[336]Let it
+be understood, therefore, that I by no means express my own sentiments,
+but those of Carneades, in order that you may refute this philosopher,
+who was wont to turn the best causes into joke, through the mere
+wantonness of wit.
+
+     VI. He was a philosopher of the Academic School; and if any
+     one is ignorant of his great power, and eloquence, and
+     acuteness in arguing, he may learn it from the mention made
+     of him by Cicero or by Lucilius, when Neptune, discoursing on
+     a very difficult subject, declares that it cannot be
+     explained, not even if hell were to restore Carneades himself
+     for the purpose. This philosopher, having been sent by the
+     Athenians to Rome as an ambassador, discussed the subject of
+     justice very amply in the hearing of Galba and Cato the
+     Censor, who were the greatest orators of the day. And the
+     next day he overturned all his arguments by others of a
+     contrary tendency, and disparaged justice, which the day
+     before he had extolled; speaking not indeed with the gravity
+     of a philosopher whose wisdom ought to be steady, and whose
+     opinions unchangeable, but in a kind of rhetorical exercise
+     of arguing on each side--a practice which he was accustomed
+     to adopt, in order to be able to refute others who were
+     asserting anything. The arguments by which he disparaged
+     justice are mentioned by Lucius Furius in Cicero; I suppose,
+     since he was discussing the Commonwealth, in order to
+     introduce a defence and panegyric of that quality without
+     which he did not think a commonwealth could be administered.
+     But Carneades, in order to refute Aristotle and Plato, the
+     advocates of justice, collected in his first argument
+     everything that was in the habit of being advanced on behalf
+     of justice, in order afterward to be able to overturn it, as
+     he did.
+
+     VII. Many philosophers indeed, and especially Plato and
+     Aristotle, have spoken a great deal of justice, inculcating
+     that virtue, and extolling it with the highest praise, as
+     giving to every one what belongs to him, as preserving equity
+     in all things, and urging that while the other virtues are,
+     as it were, silent and shut up, justice is the only one which
+     is not absorbed in considerations of self-interest, and which
+     is not secret, but finds its whole field for exercise
+     out-of-doors, and is desirous of doing good and serving as
+     many people as possible; as if, forsooth, justice ought to
+     exist in judges only, and in men invested with a certain
+     authority, and not in every one! But there is no one, not
+     even a man of the lowest class, or a beggar, who is destitute
+     of opportunities of displaying justice. But because these
+     philosophers knew not what its essence was, or whence it
+     proceeded, or what its employment was, they attributed that
+     first of all virtues, which is the common good of all men, to
+     a few only, and asserted that it aimed at no advantage of its
+     own, but was anxious only for that of others. So it was well
+     that Carneades, a man of the greatest genius and acuteness,
+     refuted their assertions, and overthrew that justice which
+     had no firm foundation; not because he thought justice itself
+     deserving of blame, but in order to show that those its
+     defenders had brought forward no trustworthy or strong
+     arguments in its behalf.
+
+     Justice looks out-of-doors, and is prominent and conspicuous
+     in its whole essence.
+
+     Which virtue, beyond all others, wholly devotes and dedicates
+     itself to the advantage of others.
+
+VIII. * * * Both to discover and maintain. While the other, Aristotle,
+has filled four large volumes with a discussion on abstract justice.
+For I did not expect anything grand or magnificent from Chrysippus,
+who, after his usual fashion, examines everything rather by the
+signification of words than the reality of things. But it was surely
+worthy of those heroes of philosophy to ennoble by their genius a
+virtue so eminently beneficent and liberal, which everywhere exalts the
+social interests above the selfish, and teaches us to love others
+rather than ourselves. It was worthy of their genius, we say, to
+elevate this virtue to a divine throne, not far from that of Wisdom.
+And certainly they neither wanted the will to accomplish this (for what
+else could be the cause of their writing on the subject, or what could
+have been their design?) nor the genius, in which they excelled all
+men. But the weakness of their cause was too great for either their
+intention or their eloquence to make it popular. In fact, this justice
+on which we reason is a civil right, but no natural one; for if it were
+natural and universal, then justice and injustice would be recognized
+similarly by all men, just as the heat and cold, sweetness and
+bitterness.
+
+IX. Now, if any one, carried in that chariot of winged serpents of
+which the poet Pacuvius makes mention, could take his flight over all
+nations and cities, and accurately observe their proceedings, he would
+see that the sense of justice and right varies in different regions. In
+the first place, he would behold among the unchangeable people of
+Egypt, which preserves in its archives the memory of so many ages and
+events, a bull adored as a Deity, under the name of Apis, and a
+multitude of other monsters, and all kinds of animals admitted by the
+same nation into the number of the Gods.
+
+In the next place, he would see in Greece, as among ourselves,
+magnificent temples consecrated by images in human form, which the
+Persians regarded as impious; and it is affirmed that the sole motive
+of Xerxes for commanding the conflagration of the Athenian temples was
+the belief that it was a superstitious sacrilege to keep confined
+within narrow walls the Gods, whose proper home was the entire
+universe. But afterward Philip, in his hostile projects against the
+Persians, and Alexander, who carried them into execution, alleged this
+plea for war, that they were desirous to avenge the temples of Greece,
+which the Greeks had thought proper never to rebuild, that this
+monument of the impiety of the Persians might always remain before the
+eyes of their posterity.
+
+How many--such as the inhabitants of Taurica along the Euxine Sea; as
+the King of Egypt, Busiris; as the Gauls and the Carthaginians--have
+thought it exceedingly pious and agreeable to the Gods to sacrifice
+men! And, besides, the customs of life are so various that the Cretans
+and AEtolians regard robbery as honorable. And the Lacedaemonians say
+that their territory extends to all places which they can touch with a
+lance. The Athenians had a custom of swearing, by a public
+proclamation, that all the lands which produced olives and corn were
+their own. The Gauls consider it a base employment to raise corn by
+agricultural labor, and go with arms in their hands, and mow down the
+harvests of neighboring peoples. But we ourselves, the most equitable
+of all nations, who, in order to raise the value of our vines and
+olives, do not permit the races beyond the Alps to cultivate either
+vineyards or oliveyards, are said in this matter to act with prudence,
+but not with justice. You see, then, that wisdom and policy are not
+always the same as equity. And Lycurgus, that famous inventor of a most
+admirable jurisprudence and most wholesome laws, gave the lands of the
+rich to be cultivated by the common people, who were reduced to
+slavery.
+
+X. If I were to describe the diverse kinds of laws, institutions,
+manners, and customs, not only as they vary in the numerous nations,
+but as they vary likewise in single cities--in this one of ours, for
+example--I could prove that they have had a thousand revolutions. For
+instance, that eminent expositor of our laws who sits in the present
+company--I mean Manilius--if you were to consult him relative to the
+legacies and inheritances of women, he would tell you that the present
+law is quite different from that he was accustomed to plead in his
+youth, before the Voconian enactment came into force--an edict which
+was passed in favor of the interests of the men, but which is evidently
+full of injustice with regard to women. For why should a woman be
+disabled from inheriting property? Why can a vestal virgin become an
+heir, while her mother cannot? And why, admitting that it is necessary
+to set some limit to the wealth of women, should Crassus's daughter, if
+she be his only child, inherit thousands without offending the law,
+while my daughter can only receive a small share in a bequest.[337]
+* * *
+
+XI. * * * [If this justice were natural, innate, and universal, all men
+would admit the same] law and right, and the same men would not enact
+different laws at different times. If a just man and a virtuous man is
+bound to obey the laws, I ask, what laws do you mean? Do you intend all
+the laws indifferently? But neither does virtue permit this inconstancy
+in moral obligation, nor is such a variation compatible with natural
+conscience. The laws are, therefore, based not on our sense of justice,
+but on our fear of punishment. There is, therefore, no natural justice;
+and hence it follows that men cannot be just by nature.
+
+Are men, then, to say that variations indeed do exist in the laws, but
+that men who are virtuous through natural conscience follow that which
+is really justice, and not a mere semblance and disguise, and that it
+is the distinguishing characteristic of the truly just and virtuous man
+to render every one his due rights? Are we, then, to attribute the
+first of these characteristics to animals? For not only men of moderate
+abilities, but even first-rate sages and philosophers, as Pythagoras
+and Empedocles, declare that all kinds of living creatures have a right
+to the same justice. They declare that inexpiable penalties impend over
+those who have done violence to any animal whatsoever. It is,
+therefore, a crime to injure an animal, and the perpetrator of such
+crime[338] * * *
+
+     XII. For when he[339] inquired of a pirate by what right he
+     dared to infest the sea with his little brigantine: "By the
+     same right," he replied, "which is your warrant for
+     conquering the world." * * *
+
+Wisdom and prudence instruct us by all means to increase our power,
+riches, and estates. For by what means could this same Alexander, that
+illustrious general, who extended his empire over all Asia, without
+violating the property of other men, have acquired such universal
+dominion, enjoyed so many pleasures, such great power, and reigned
+without bound or limit?
+
+But justice commands us to have mercy upon all men, to consult the
+interests of the whole human race, to give to every one his due, and
+injure no sacred, public, or foreign rights, and to forbear touching
+what does not belong to us. What is the result, then? If you obey the
+dictates of wisdom, then wealth, power, riches, honors, provinces, and
+kingdoms, from all classes, peoples, and nations, are to be aimed at.
+
+However, as we are discussing public matters, those examples are more
+illustrious which refer to what is done publicly. And since the
+question between justice and policy applies equally to private and
+public affairs, I think it well to speak of the wisdom of the people. I
+will not, however, mention other nations, but come at once to our own
+Roman people, whom Africanus, in his discourse yesterday, traced from
+the cradle, and whose empire now embraces the whole world. Justice
+is[340] * * *
+
+     XIII. How far utility is at variance with justice we may
+     learn from the Roman people itself, which, declaring war by
+     means of the fecials, and committing injustice with all legal
+     formality, always coveting and laying violent hands on the
+     property of others, acquired the possession of the whole
+     world.
+
+     What is the advantage of one's own country but the
+     disadvantage of another state or nation, by extending one's
+     dominions by territories evidently wrested from others,
+     increasing one's power, improving one's revenues, etc.?
+     Therefore, whoever has obtained these advantages for his
+     country--that is to say, whoever has overthrown cities,
+     subdued nations, and by these means filled the treasury with
+     money, taken lands, and enriched his fellow-citizens--such a
+     man is extolled to the skies; is believed to be endowed with
+     consummate and perfect virtue; and this mistake is fallen
+     into not only by the populace and the ignorant, but by
+     philosophers, who even give rules for injustice.
+
+XIV. * * * For all those who have the right of life and death over the
+people are in fact tyrants; but they prefer being called by the title
+of king, which belongs to the all-good Jupiter. But when certain men,
+by favor of wealth, birth, or any other means, get possession of the
+entire government, it is a faction; but they choose to denominate
+themselves an aristocracy. If the people gets the upper hand, and rules
+everything after its capricious will, they call it liberty, but it is
+in fact license. And when every man is a guard upon his neighbor, and
+every class is a guard upon every other class, then because no one
+trusts in his own strength, a kind of compact is formed between the
+great and the little, from whence arises that mixed kind of government
+which Scipio has been commending. Thus justice, according to these
+facts, is not the daughter of nature or conscience, but of human
+imbecility. For when it becomes necessary to choose between these three
+predicaments, either to do wrong without retribution, or to do wrong
+with retribution, or to do no wrong at all, it is best to do wrong with
+impunity; next, neither to do wrong nor to suffer for it; but nothing
+is more wretched than to struggle incessantly between the wrong we
+inflict and that we receive. Therefore, he who attains to that first
+end[341] * * *
+
+     XV. This was the sum of the argument of Carneades: that men
+     had established laws among themselves from considerations of
+     advantage, varying them according to their different customs,
+     and altering them often so as to adapt them to the times; but
+     that there was no such thing as natural law; that all men and
+     all other animals are led to their own advantage by the
+     guidance of nature; that there is no such thing as justice,
+     or, if there be, that it is extreme folly, since a man would
+     injure himself while consulting the interests of others. And
+     he added these arguments, that all nations who were
+     flourishing and dominant, and even the Romans themselves, who
+     were the masters of the whole world, if they wished to be
+     just--that is to say, if they restored all that belonged to
+     others--would have to return to their cottages, and to lie
+     down in want and misery.
+
+Except, perhaps, of the Arcadians and Athenians, who, I presume,
+dreading that this great act of retribution might one day arrive,
+pretend that they were sprung from the earth, like so many field-mice.
+
+XVI. In reply to these statements, the following arguments are often
+adduced by those who are not unskilful in discussions, and who, in this
+question, have all the greater weight of authority, because, when we
+inquire, Who is a good man?--understanding by that term a frank and
+single-minded man--we have little need of captious casuists, quibblers,
+and slanderers. For those men assert that the wise man does not seek
+virtue because of the personal gratification which the practice of
+justice and beneficence procures him, but rather because the life of
+the good man is free from fear, care, solicitude, and peril; while, on
+the other hand, the wicked always feel in their souls a certain
+suspicion, and always behold before their eyes images of judgment and
+punishment. Do not you think, therefore, that there is any benefit, or
+that there is any advantage which can be procured by injustice,
+precious enough to counterbalance the constant pressure of remorse, and
+the haunting consciousness that retribution awaits the sinner, and
+hangs over his devoted head.[342] * * *
+
+XVII. [Our philosophers, therefore, put a case. Suppose, say they, two
+men, one of whom is an excellent and admirable person, of high honor
+and remarkable integrity; the latter is distinguished by nothing but
+his vice and audacity. And suppose that their city has so mistaken
+their characters as to imagine the good man to be a scandalous,
+impious, and audacious criminal, and to esteem the wicked man, on the
+contrary, as a pattern of probity and fidelity. On account of this
+error of their fellow-citizens, the good man is arrested and tormented,
+his hands are cut off, his eyes are plucked out, he is condemned,
+bound, burned, exterminated, reduced to want, and to the last appears
+to all men to be most deservedly the most miserable of men. On the
+other hand, the flagitious wretch is exalted, worshipped, loved by all,
+and honors, offices, riches, and emoluments are all conferred on him,
+and he shall be reckoned by his fellow-citizens the best and worthiest
+of mortals, and in the highest degree deserving of all manner of
+prosperity. Yet, for all this, who is so mad as to doubt which of these
+two men he would rather be?
+
+XVIII. What happens among individuals happens also among nations. There
+is no state so absurd and ridiculous as not to prefer unjust dominion
+to just subordination. I need not go far for examples. During my own
+consulship, when you were my fellow-counsellors, we consulted
+respecting the treaty of Numantia. No one was ignorant that Quintus
+Pompey had signed a treaty, and that Mancinus had done the same. The
+latter, being a virtuous man, supported the proposition which I laid
+before the people, after the decree of the senate. The former, on the
+other side, opposed it vehemently. If modesty, probity, or faith had
+been regarded, Mancinus would have carried his point; but in reason,
+counsel, and prudence, Pompey surpassed him. Whether[343] * * *
+
+XIX. If a man should have a faithless slave, or an unwholesome house,
+with whose defect he alone was acquainted, and he advertised them for
+sale, would he state the fact that his servant was infected with
+knavery, and his house with malaria, or would he conceal these
+objections from the buyer? If he stated those facts, he would be
+honest, no doubt, because he would deceive nobody; but still he would
+be thought a fool, because he would either get very little for his
+property, or else fail to sell it at all. By concealing these defects,
+on the other hand, he will be called a shrewd man--as one who has taken
+care of his own interest; but he will be a rogue, notwithstanding,
+because he will be deceiving his neighbors. Again, let us suppose that
+one man meets another, who sells gold and silver, conceiving them to be
+copper or lead; shall he hold his peace that he may make a capital
+bargain, or correct the mistake, and purchase at a fair rate? He would
+evidently be a fool in the world's opinion if he preferred the latter.
+
+XX. It is justice, beyond all question, neither to commit murder nor
+robbery. What, then, would your just man do, if, in a case of
+shipwreck, he saw a weaker man than himself get possession of a plank?
+Would he not thrust him off, get hold of the timber himself, and escape
+by his exertions, especially as no human witness could be present in
+the mid-sea? If he acted like a wise man of the world, he would
+certainly do so, for to act in any other way would cost him his life.
+If, on the other hand, he prefers death to inflicting unjustifiable
+injury on his neighbor, he will be an eminently honorable and just man,
+but not the less a fool, because he saved another's life at the expense
+of his own. Again, if in case of a defeat and rout, when the enemy were
+pressing in the rear, this just man should find a wounded comrade
+mounted on a horse, shall he respect his right at the risk of being
+killed himself, or shall he fling him from the horse in order to
+preserve his own life from the pursuers? If he does so, he is a wise
+man, but at the same time a wicked one; if he does not, he is admirably
+just, but at the same time stupid.
+
+XXI. _Scipio._ I might reply at great length to these sophistical
+objections of Philus, if it were not, my Laelius, that all our friends
+are no less anxious than myself to hear you take a leading part in the
+present debate, especially as you promised yesterday that you would
+plead at large on my side of the argument. If you cannot spare time for
+this, at any rate do not desert us; we all ask it of you.
+
+_Laelius._ This Carneades ought not to be even listened to by our young
+men. I think all the while that I am hearing him that he must be a very
+impure person; if he be not, as I would fain believe, his discourse is
+not less pernicious.
+
+XXII.[344] True law is right reason conformable to nature, universal,
+unchangeable, eternal, whose commands urge us to duty, and whose
+prohibitions restrain us from evil. Whether it enjoins or forbids, the
+good respect its injunctions, and the wicked treat them with
+indifference. This law cannot be contradicted by any other law, and is
+not liable either to derogation or abrogation. Neither the senate nor
+the people can give us any dispensation for not obeying this universal
+law of justice. It needs no other expositor and interpreter than our
+own conscience. It is not one thing at Rome, and another at Athens; one
+thing to-day, and another to-morrow; but in all times and nations this
+universal law must forever reign, eternal and imperishable. It is the
+sovereign master and emperor of all beings. God himself is its author,
+its promulgator, its enforcer. And he who does not obey it flies from
+himself, and does violence to the very nature of man. And by so doing
+he will endure the severest penalties even if he avoid the other evils
+which are usually accounted punishments.
+
+     XXIII. I am aware that in the third book of Cicero's treatise
+     on the Commonwealth (unless I am mistaken) it is argued that
+     no war is ever undertaken by a well-regulated commonwealth
+     unless it be one either for the sake of keeping faith, or for
+     safety; and what he means by a war for safety, and what
+     safety he wishes us to understand, he points out in another
+     passage, where he says, "But private men often escape from
+     these penalties, which even the most stupid persons
+     feel--want, exile, imprisonment, and stripes--by embracing
+     the opportunity of a speedy death; but to states death itself
+     is a penalty, though it appears to deliver individuals from
+     punishment. For a state ought to be established so as to be
+     eternal: therefore, there is no natural decease for a state,
+     as there is for a man, in whose case death is not only
+     inevitable, but often even desirable; but when a state is put
+     an end to, it is destroyed, extinguished. It is in some
+     degree, to compare small things with great, as if this whole
+     world were to perish and fall to pieces."
+
+     In his treatise on the Commonwealth, Cicero says those wars
+     are unjust which are undertaken without reason. Again, after
+     a few sentences, he adds, No war is considered just unless it
+     be formally announced and declared, and unless it be to
+     obtain restitution of what has been taken away.
+
+     But our nation, by defending its allies, has now become the
+     master of all the whole world.
+
+     XXIV. Also, in that same treatise on the Commonwealth, he
+     argues most strenuously and vigorously in the cause of
+     justice against injustice. And since, when a little time
+     before the part of injustice was upheld against justice, and
+     the doctrine was urged that a republic could not prosper and
+     flourish except by injustice, this was put forward as the
+     strongest argument, that it was unjust for men to serve other
+     men as their masters; but that unless a dominant state, such
+     as a great republic, acted on this injustice, it could not
+     govern its provinces; answer was made on behalf of justice,
+     that it was just that it should be so, because slavery is
+     advantageous to such men, and their interests are consulted
+     by a right course of conduct--that is, by the license of
+     doing injury being taken from the wicked--and they will fare
+     better when subjugated, because when not subjugated they
+     fared worse: and to confirm this reasoning, a noble instance,
+     taken, as it were, from nature, was added, and it was said,
+     Why, then, does God govern man, and why does the mind govern
+     the body, and reason govern lust, and the other vicious parts
+     of the mind?
+
+     XXV. Hear what Tully says more plainly still in the third
+     book of his treatise on the Commonwealth, when discussing the
+     reasons for government. Do we not, says he, see that nature
+     herself has given the power of dominion to everything that is
+     best, to the extreme advantage of what is subjected to it?
+     Why, then, does God govern man, and why does the mind govern
+     the body, and reason govern lust and passion and the other
+     vicious parts of the same mind? Listen thus far; for
+     presently he adds, But still there are dissimilarities to be
+     recognized in governing and in obeying. For as the mind is
+     said to govern the body, and also to govern lust, still it
+     governs the body as a king governs his subjects, or a parent
+     his children; but it governs lust as a master governs his
+     slaves, because it restrains and breaks it. The authority of
+     kings, of generals, of magistrates, of fathers, and of
+     nations, rules their subjects and allies as the mind rules
+     bodies; but masters control their slaves, as the best part of
+     the mind--that is to say, wisdom--controls the vicious and
+     weak parts of itself, such as lust, passion, and the other
+     perturbations.
+
+     For there is a kind of unjust slavery when those belong to
+     some one else who might be their own masters; but when those
+     are slaves who cannot govern themselves, there is no injury
+     done.
+
+     XXVI. If, says Carneades, you were to know that an asp was
+     lying hidden anywhere, and that some one who did not know it
+     was going to sit upon it, whose death would be a gain to you,
+     you would act wickedly if you did not warn him not to sit
+     down. Still, you would not be liable to punishment; for who
+     could prove that you had known? But we are bringing forward
+     too many instances; for it is plain that unless equity, good
+     faith, and justice proceed from nature, and if all these
+     things are referred to interest, a good man cannot be found.
+     And on these topics a great deal is said by Laelius in our
+     treatise on the Republic.
+
+     If, as we are reminded by you, we have spoken well in that
+     treatise, when we said that nothing is good excepting what is
+     honorable, and nothing bad excepting what is disgraceful.
+     * * *
+
+     XXVII. I am glad that you approve of the doctrine that the
+     affection borne to our children is implanted by nature;
+     indeed, if it be not, there can be no conection between man
+     and man which has its origin in nature. And if there be not,
+     then there is an end of all society in life. May it turn out
+     well, says Carneades, speaking shamelessly, but still more
+     sensibly than my friend Lucius or Patro: for, as they refer
+     everything to themselves, do they think that anything is ever
+     done for the sake of another? And when they say that a man
+     ought to be good, in order to avoid misfortune, not because
+     it is right by nature, they do not perceive that they are
+     speaking of a cunning man, not of a good one. But these
+     arguments are argued, I think, in those books by praising
+     which you have given me spirits.
+
+     In which I agree that an anxious and hazardous justice is not
+     that of a wise man.
+
+     XXVIII. And again, in Cicero, that same advocate of justice,
+     Laelius, says, Virtue is clearly eager for honor, nor has she
+     any other reward; which, however, she accepts easily, and
+     exacts without bitterness. And in another place the same
+     Laelius says:
+
+When a man is inspired by virtue such as this, what bribes can you
+offer him, what treasures, what thrones, what empires? He considers
+these but mortal goods, and esteems his own divine. And if the
+ingratitude of the people, and the envy of his competitors, or the
+violence of powerful enemies, despoil his virtue of its earthly
+recompense, he still enjoys a thousand consolations in the approbation
+of conscience, and sustains himself by contemplating the beauty of
+moral rectitude.
+
+XXIX. * * * This virtue, in order to be true, must be universal.
+Tiberius Gracchus continued faithful to his fellow-citizens, but he
+violated the rights and treaties guaranteed to our allies and the Latin
+peoples. But if this habit of arbitrary violence begins to extend
+itself further, and perverts our authority, leading it from right to
+violence, so that those who had voluntarily obeyed us are only
+restrained by fear, then, although we, during our days, may escape the
+peril, yet am I solicitous respecting the safety of our posterity and
+the immortality of the Commonwealth itself, which, doubtless, might
+become perpetual and invincible if our people would maintain their
+ancient institutions and manners.
+
+XXX. When Laelius had ceased to speak, all those that were present
+expressed the extreme pleasure they found in his discourse. But Scipio,
+more affected than the rest, and ravished with the delight of sympathy,
+exclaimed: You have pleaded, my Laelius, many causes with an eloquence
+superior to that of Servius Galba, our colleague, whom you used during
+his life to prefer to all others, even to the Attic orators [and never
+did I hear you speak with more energy than to-day, while pleading the
+cause of justice][345] * * *
+
+     * * * That two things were wanting to enable him to speak in
+     public and in the forum, confidence and voice.
+
+XXXI. * * * This justice, continued Scipio, is the very foundation of
+lawful government in political constitutions. Can we call the State of
+Agrigentum a commonwealth, where all men are oppressed by the cruelty
+of a single tyrant--where there is no universal bond of right, nor
+social consent and fellowship, which should belong to every people,
+properly so named? It is the same in Syracuse--that illustrious city
+which Timaeus calls the greatest of the Grecian towns. It was indeed a
+most beautiful city; and its admirable citadel, its canals distributed
+through all its districts, its broad streets, its porticoes, its
+temples, and its walls, gave Syracuse the appearance of a most
+flourishing state. But while Dionysius its tyrant reigned there,
+nothing of all its wealth belonged to the people, and the people were
+nothing better than the slaves of one master. Thus, wherever I behold a
+tyrant, I know that the social constitution must be not merely vicious
+and corrupt, as I stated yesterday, but in strict truth no social
+constitution at all.
+
+XXXII. _Laelius._ You have spoken admirably, my Scipio, and I see the
+point of your observations.
+
+_Scipio._ You grant, then, that a state which is entirely in the power
+of a faction cannot justly be entitled a political community?
+
+_Laelius._ That is evident.
+
+_Scipio._ You judge most correctly. For what was the State of Athens
+when, during the great Peloponnesian war, she fell under the unjust
+domination of the thirty tyrants? The antique glory of that city, the
+imposing aspect of its edifices, its theatre, its gymnasium, its
+porticoes, its temples, its citadel, the admirable sculptures of
+Phidias, and the magnificent harbor of Piraeus--did they constitute it a
+commonwealth?
+
+_Laelius._ Certainly not, because these did not constitute the real
+welfare of the community.
+
+_Scipio._ And at Rome, when the decemvirs ruled without appeal from
+their decisions, in the third year of their power, had not liberty lost
+all its securities and all its blessings?
+
+_Laelius._ Yes; the welfare of the community was no longer consulted,
+and the people soon roused themselves, and recovered their appropriate
+rights.
+
+XXXIII. _Scipio._ I now come to the third, or democratical, form of
+government, in which a considerable difficulty presents itself, because
+all things are there said to lie at the disposition of the people, and
+are carried into execution just as they please. Here the populace
+inflict punishments at their pleasure, and act, and seize, and keep
+possession, and distribute property, without let or hinderance. Can you
+deny, my Laelius, that this is a fair definition of a democracy, where
+the people are all in all, and where the people constitute the State?
+
+_Laelius._ There is no political constitution to which I more absolutely
+deny the name of a _commonwealth_ than that in which all things lie in
+the power of the multitude. If a commonwealth, which implies the
+welfare of the entire community, could not exist in Agrigentum,
+Syracuse, or Athens when tyrants reigned over them--if it could not
+exist in Rome when under the oligarchy of the decemvirs--neither do I
+see how this sacred name of commonwealth can be applied to a democracy
+and the sway of the mob; because, in the first place, my Scipio, I
+build on your own admirable definition, that there can be no community,
+properly so called, unless it be regulated by a combination of rights.
+And, by this definition, it appears that a multitude of men may be just
+as tyrannical as a single despot; and it is so much the worse, since no
+monster can be more barbarous than the mob, which assumes the name and
+appearance of the people. Nor is it at all reasonable, since the laws
+place the property of madmen in the hands of their sane relations, that
+we should do the [very reverse in politics, and throw the property of
+the sane into the hands of the mad multitude][346] * * *
+
+XXXIV. * * * [It is far more rational] to assert that a wise and
+virtuous aristocratical government deserves the title of a
+commonwealth, as it approaches to the nature of a kingdom.
+
+And much more so in my opinion, said Mummius. For the unity of power
+often exposes a king to become a despot; but when an aristocracy,
+consisting of many virtuous men, exercise power, that is the most
+fortunate circumstance possible for any state. However this be, I much
+prefer royalty to democracy; for that is the third kind of government
+which you have remaining, and a most vicious one it is.
+
+XXXV. Scipio replied: I am well acquainted, my Mummius, with your
+decided antipathy to the democratical system. And, although, we may
+speak of it with rather more indulgence than you are accustomed to
+accord it, I must certainly agree with you, that of all the three
+particular forms of government, none is less commendable than
+democracy.
+
+I do not agree with you, however, when you would imply that aristocracy
+is preferable to royalty. If you suppose that wisdom governs the State,
+is it not as well that this wisdom should reside in one monarch as in
+many nobles?
+
+But we are led away by a certain incorrectness of terms in a discussion
+like the present. When we pronounce the word "aristocracy," which, in
+Greek, signifies the government of the best men, what can be conceived
+more excellent? For what can be thought better than the best? But when,
+on the other hand, the title "king" is mentioned, we begin to imagine a
+tyrant; as if a king must be necessarily unjust. But we are not
+speaking of an unjust king when we are examining the true nature of
+royal authority. To this name of king, therefore, do but attach the
+idea of a Romulus, a Numa, a Tullus, and perhaps you will be less
+severe to the monarchical form of constitution.
+
+_Mummius_. Have you, then, no commendation at all for any kind of
+democratical government?
+
+_Scipio._ Why, I think some democratical forms less objectionable than
+others; and, by way of illustration, I will ask you what you thought of
+the government in the isle of Rhodes, where we were lately together;
+did it appear to you a legitimate and rational constitution?
+
+_Mummius_. It did, and not much liable to abuse.
+
+_Scipio._ You say truly. But, if you recollect, it was a very
+extraordinary experiment. All the inhabitants were alternately senators
+and citizens. Some months they spent in their senatorial functions, and
+some months they spent in their civil employments. In both they
+exercised judicial powers; and in the theatre and the court, the same
+men judged all causes, capital and not capital. And they had as much
+influence, and were of as much importance as * * *
+
+
+FRAGMENTS.
+
+
+     XXXVI. There is therefore some unquiet feeling in
+     individuals, which either exults in pleasure or is crushed by
+     annoyance.
+
+          [_The next is an incomplete sentence, and, as such,
+          unintelligible_.]
+
+     The Phoenicians were the first who by their commerce, and by
+     the merchandise which they carried, brought avarice and
+     magnificence and insatiable degrees of everything into
+     Greece.
+
+     Sardanapalus, the luxurious king of Assyria, of whom Tully,
+     in the third book of his treatise on the Republic, says, "The
+     notorious Sardanapalus, far more deformed by his vices than
+     even by his name."
+
+     What is the meaning, then, of this absurd acceptation, unless
+     some one wishes to make the whole of Athos a monument? For
+     what is Athos or the vast Olympus? * * *
+
+     XXXVII. I will endeavor in the proper place to show it,
+     according to the definitions of Cicero himself, in which,
+     putting forth Scipio as the speaker, he has briefly explained
+     what a commonwealth and what a republic is; adducing also
+     many assertions of his own, and of those whom he has
+     represented as taking part in that discussion, to the effect
+     that the State of Rome was not such a commonwealth, because
+     there has never been genuine justice in it. However,
+     according to definitions which are more reasonable, it was a
+     commonwealth in some degree, and it was better regulated by
+     the more ancient than by the later Romans.
+
+     It is now fitting that I should explain, as briefly and as
+     clearly as I can, what, in the second book of this work, I
+     promised to prove, according to the definitions which Cicero,
+     in his books on the Commonwealth, puts into the mouth of
+     Scipio, arguing that the Roman State was never a
+     commonwealth; for he briefly defines a commonwealth as a
+     state of the people; the people as an assembly of the
+     multitude, united by a common feeling of right, and a
+     community of interests. What he calls a common feeling of
+     right he explains by discussion, showing in this way that a
+     commonwealth cannot proceed without justice. Where,
+     therefore, there is no genuine justice, there can be no
+     right, for that which is done according to right is done
+     justly; and what is done unjustly cannot be done according to
+     right, for the unjust regulations of men are not to be called
+     or thought rights; since they themselves call that right
+     (_jus_) which flows from the source of justice: and they say
+     that that assertion which is often made by some persons of
+     erroneous sentiments, namely, that that is right which is
+     advantageous to the most powerful, is false. Wherefore, where
+     there is no true justice there can be no company of men
+     united by a common feeling of right; therefore there can be
+     no people (_populus_), according to that definition of Scipio
+     or Cicero: and if there be no people, there can be no state
+     of the people, but only of a mob such as it may be, which is
+     not worthy of the name of a people. And thus, if a
+     commonwealth is a state of a people, and if that is not a
+     people which is not united by a common feeling of right, and
+     if there is no right where there is no justice, then the
+     undoubted inference is, that where there is no justice there
+     is no commonwealth. Moreover, justice is that virtue which
+     gives every one his own.
+
+No war can be undertaken by a just and wise state unless for faith or
+self-defence. This self-defence of the State is enough to insure its
+perpetuity, and this perpetuity is what all patriots desire. Those
+afflictions which even the hardiest spirits smart under--poverty,
+exile, prison, and torment--private individuals seek to escape from by
+an instantaneous death. But for states, the greatest calamity of all is
+that of death, which to individuals appears a refuge. A state should be
+so constituted as to live forever. For a commonwealth there is no
+natural dissolution as there is for a man, to whom death not only
+becomes necessary, but often desirable. And when a state once decays
+and falls, it is so utterly revolutionized, that, if we may compare
+great things with small, it resembles the final wreck of the universe.
+
+All wars undertaken without a proper motive are unjust. And no war can
+be reputed just unless it be duly announced and proclaimed, and if it
+be not preceded by a rational demand for restitution.
+
+Our Roman Commonwealth, by defending its allies, has got possession of
+the world.
+
+       *       *       *       *       *
+
+
+
+
+INTRODUCTION TO THE FOURTH BOOK,
+
+BY THE ORIGINAL TRANSLATOR.
+
+
+   In this fourth book Cicero treats of morals and education, and
+     the use and abuse of stage entertainments. We retain nothing
+     of this important book save a few scattered fragments, the
+     beauty of which fills us with the greater regret for the
+     passages we have lost.
+
+
+
+
+BOOK IV.
+
+FRAGMENTS.
+
+
+     I. * * * Since mention has been made of the body and of the
+     mind, I will endeavor to explain the theory of each as well
+     as the weakness of my understanding is able to comprehend
+     it--a duty which I think it the more becoming in me to
+     undertake, because Marcus Tullius, a man of singular genius,
+     after having attempted to perform it in the fourth book of
+     his treatise on the Commonwealth, compressed a subject of
+     wide extent within narrow limits, only touching lightly on
+     all the principal points. And that there might be no excuse
+     alleged for his not having followed out this topic, he
+     himself has assured us that he was not wanting either in
+     inclination or in anxiety to do so; for, in the first book of
+     his treatise on Laws, when he was touching briefly on the
+     same subject, he speaks thus: "This topic Scipio, in my
+     opinion, has sufficiently discussed in those books which you
+     have read."
+
+     And the mind itself, which sees the future, remembers the
+     past.
+
+     Well did Marcus Tullius say, In truth, if there is no one who
+     would not prefer death to being changed into the form of some
+     beast, although he were still to retain the mind of a man,
+     how much more wretched is it to have the mind of a beast in
+     the form of a man! To me this fate appears as much worse than
+     the other as the mind is superior to the body.
+
+     Tullius says somewhere that he does not think the good of a
+     ram and of Publius Africanus identical.
+
+     And also by its being interposed, it causes shade and night,
+     which is adapted both to the numbering of days and to rest
+     from labor.
+
+     And as in the autumn he has opened the earth to receive
+     seeds, in winter relaxed it that it may digest them, and by
+     the ripening powers of summer softened some and burned up
+     others.
+
+     When the shepherds use * * * for cattle.
+
+     Cicero, in the fourth book of his Commonwealth, uses the word
+     "armentum," and "armentarius," derived from it.
+
+II. The great law of just and regular subordination is the basis of
+political prosperity. There is much advantage in the harmonious
+succession of ranks and orders and classes, in which the suffrages of
+the knights and the senators have their due weight. Too many have
+foolishly desired to destroy this institution, in the vain hope of
+receiving some new largess, by a public decree, out of a distribution
+of the property of the nobility.
+
+III. Consider, now, how wisely the other provisions have been adopted,
+in order to secure to the citizens the benefits of an honest and happy
+life; for that is, indeed, the grand object of all political
+association, and that which every government should endeavor to procure
+for the people, partly by its institutions, and partly by its laws.
+
+Consider, in the first place, the national education of the people--a
+matter on which the Greeks have expended much labor in vain, and which
+is the only point on which Polybius, who settled among us, accuses the
+negligence of our institutions. For our countrymen have thought that
+education ought not to be fixed, nor regulated by laws, nor be given
+publicly and uniformly to all classes of society. For[347] * * *
+
+     According to Tully, who says that men going to serve in the
+     army have guardians assigned to them, by whom they are
+     governed the first year.
+
+IV. [In our ancient laws, young men were prohibited from appearing]
+naked in the public baths, so far back were the principles of modesty
+traced by our ancestors. Among the Greeks, on the contrary, what an
+absurd system of training youth is exhibited in their gymnasia! What a
+frivolous preparation for the labors and hazards of war! what indecent
+spectacles, what impure and licentious amours are permitted! I do not
+speak only of the Eleans and Thebans, among whom, in all love affairs,
+passion is allowed to run into shameless excesses; but the Spartans,
+while they permit every kind of license to their young men, save that
+of violation, fence off, by a very slight wall, the very exception on
+which they insist, besides other crimes which I will not mention.
+
+Then Laelius said: I see, my Scipio, that on the subject of the Greek
+institutions, which you censure, you prefer attacking the customs of
+the most renowned peoples to contending with your favorite Plato, whose
+name you have avoided citing, especially as * * *
+
+     V. So that Cicero, in his treatise on the Commonwealth, says
+     that it was a reproach to young men if they had no lovers.
+
+     Not only as at Sparta, where boys learn to steal and plunder.
+
+     And our master Plato, even more than Lycurgus, who would have
+     everything to be common, so that no one should be able to
+     call anything his own property.
+
+     I would send him to the same place whither he sends Homer,
+     crowned with chaplets and anointed with perfumes, banishing
+     him from the city which he is describing.
+
+     VI. The judgment of the censor inflicts scarcely anything
+     more than a blush on the man whom he condemns. Therefore as
+     all that adjudication turns solely on the name (_nomen_), the
+     punishment is called ignominy.
+
+     Nor should a prefect be set over women, an officer who is
+     created among the Greeks; but there should be a censor to
+     teach husbands to manage their wives.
+
+     So the discipline of modesty has great power. All women
+     abstain from wine.
+
+     And also if any woman was of bad character, her relations
+     used not to kiss her.
+
+     So petulance is derived from asking (_petendo_); wantonness
+     (_procacitas_) from _procando_, that is, from demanding.
+
+     VII. For I do not approve of the same nation being the ruler
+     and the farmer of lands. But both in private families and in
+     the affairs of the Commonwealth I look upon economy as a
+     revenue.
+
+     Faith (_fides_) appears to me to derive its name from that
+     being done (_fit_) which is said.
+
+     In a citizen of rank and noble birth, caressing manners,
+     display, and ambition are marks of levity.
+
+     Examine for a while the books on the Republic, and learn that
+     good men know no bound or limit in consulting the interests
+     of their country. See in that treatise with what praises
+     frugality, and continency, and fidelity to the marriage tie,
+     and chaste, honorable, and virtuous manners are extolled.
+
+     VIII. I marvel at the elegant choice, not only of the facts,
+     but of the language. If they dispute (_jurgant_). It is a
+     contest between well-wishers, not a quarrel between enemies,
+     that is called a dispute (_jurgium_),
+
+     Therefore the law considers that neighbors dispute
+     (_jurgare_) rather than quarrel (_litigare_) with one
+     another.
+
+     The bounds of man's care and of man's life are the same; so
+     by the pontifical law the sanctity of burial * * *
+
+     They put them to death, though innocent, because they had
+     left those men unburied whom they could not rescue from the
+     sea because of the violence of the storm.
+
+     Nor in this discussion have I advocated the cause of the
+     populace, but of the good.
+
+     For one cannot easily resist a powerful people if one gives
+     them either no rights at all or very little.
+
+     In which case I wish I could augur first with truth and
+     fidelity * * *
+
+     IX. Cicero saying this in vain, when speaking of poets, "And
+     when the shouts and approval of the people, as of some great
+     and wise teacher, has reached them, what darkness do they
+     bring on! what alarms do they cause! what desires do they
+     excite!"
+
+     Cicero says that if his life were extended to twice its
+     length, he should not have time to read the lyric poets.
+
+     X. As Scipio says in Cicero, "As they thought the whole
+     histrionic art, and everything connected with the theatre,
+     discreditable, they thought fit that all men of that
+     description should not only be deprived of the honors
+     belonging to the rest of the citizens, but should also be
+     deprived of their franchise by the sentence of the censors."
+
+     And what the ancient Romans thought on this subject Cicero
+     informs us, in those books which he wrote on the
+     Commonwealth, where Scipio argues and says * * *
+
+Comedies could never (if it had not been authorized by the common
+customs of life) have made theatres approve of their scandalous
+exhibitions. And the more ancient Greeks provided a certain correction
+for the vicious taste of the people, by making a law that it should be
+expressly defined by a censorship what subjects comedy should treat,
+and how she should treat them.
+
+Whom has it not attacked? or, rather, whom has it not wounded? and whom
+has it spared? In this, no doubt, it sometimes took the right side, and
+lashed the popular demagogues and seditious agitators, such as Cleon,
+Cleophon, and Hyperbolus. We may tolerate that; though indeed the
+censure of the magistrate would, in these cases, have been more
+efficacious than the satire of the poet. But when Pericles, who
+governed the Athenian Commonwealth for so many years with the highest
+authority, both in peace and war, was outraged by verses, and these
+were acted on the stage, it was hardly more decent than if, among us,
+Plautus and Naevius had attacked Publius and Cnaeus, or Caecilius had
+ventured to revile Marcus Cato.
+
+Our laws of the Twelve Tables, on the contrary--so careful to attach
+capital punishment to a very few crimes only--have included in this
+class of capital offences the offence of composing or publicly reciting
+verses of libel, slander, and defamation, in order to cast dishonor and
+infamy on a fellow-citizen. And they have decided wisely; for our life
+and character should, if suspected, be submitted to the sentence of
+judicial tribunals and the legal investigations of our magistrates, and
+not to the whims and fancies of poets. Nor should we be exposed to any
+charge of disgrace which we cannot meet by legal process, and openly
+refute at the bar.
+
+In our laws, I admire the justice of their expressions, as well as
+their decisions. Thus the word _pleading_ signifies rather an amicable
+suit between friends than a quarrel between enemies.
+
+It is not easy to resist a powerful people, if you allow them no
+rights, or next to none.
+
+     The old Romans would not allow any living man to be either
+     praised or blamed on the stage.
+
+     XI. Cicero says that comedy is an imitation of life; a mirror
+     of customs, an image of truth.
+
+     Since, as is mentioned in that book on the Commonwealth, not
+     only did AEschines the Athenian, a man of the greatest
+     eloquence, who, when a young man, had been an actor of
+     tragedies, concern himself in public affairs, but the
+     Athenians often sent Aristodemus, who was also a tragic
+     actor, to Philip as an ambassador, to treat of the most
+     important affairs of peace and war.
+
+       *       *       *       *       *
+
+
+
+
+INTRODUCTION TO THE FIFTH BOOK,
+
+BY THE ORIGINAL TRANSLATOR.
+
+
+   In this fifth book Cicero explains and enforces the duties of
+     magistrates, and the importance of practical experience to
+     all who undertake their important functions. Only a few
+     fragments have survived the wreck of ages and descended to
+     us.
+
+
+
+
+BOOK V.
+
+FRAGMENTS.
+
+
+I. Ennius has told us--
+
+    Of men and customs mighty Rome consists;
+
+which verse, both for its precision and its verity, appears to me as if
+it had issued from an oracle; for neither the men, unless the State had
+adopted a certain system of manners--nor the manners, unless they had
+been illustrated by the men--could ever have established or maintained
+for so many ages so vast a republic, or one of such righteous and
+extensive sway.
+
+Thus, long before our own times, the force of hereditary manners of
+itself moulded most eminent men; and admirable citizens, in return,
+gave new weight to the ancient customs and institutions of our
+ancestors. But our age, on the contrary, having received the
+Commonwealth as a finished picture of another century, but one already
+beginning to fade through the lapse of years, has not only neglected to
+renew the colors of the original painting, but has not even cared to
+preserve its general form and prominent lineaments.
+
+For what now remains of those antique manners, of which the poet said
+that our Commonwealth consisted? They have now become so obsolete and
+forgotten that they are not only not cultivated, but they are not even
+known. And as to the men, what shall I say? For the manners themselves
+have only perished through a scarcity of men; of which great misfortune
+we are not only called to give an account, but even, as men accused of
+capital offences, to a certain degree to plead our own cause in
+connection with it. For it is owing to our vices, rather than to any
+accident, that we have retained the name of republic when we have long
+since lost the reality.
+
+II. * * * There is no employment so essentially royal as the exposition
+of equity, which comprises the true interpretation of all laws. This
+justice subjects used generally to expect from their kings. For this
+reason, lands, fields, woods, and pastures were reserved as the
+property of kings, and cultivated for them, without any labor on their
+part, in order that no anxiety on account of their personal interests
+might distract their attention from the welfare of the State. Nor was
+any private man allowed to be the judge or arbitrator in any suit; but
+all disputes were terminated by the royal sentence.
+
+And of all our Roman monarchs, Numa appears to me to have best
+preserved this ancient custom of the kings of Greece. For the others,
+though they also discharged this duty, were for the main part employed
+in conducting military enterprises, and in attending to those rights
+which belonged to war. But the long peace of Numa's reign was the
+mother of law and religion in this city. And he was himself the author
+of those admirable laws which, as you are aware, are still extant. And
+this character is precisely what belongs to the man of whom we are
+speaking. * * *
+
+III. [_Scipio._ Ought not a farmer] to be acquainted with the nature of
+plants and seeds?
+
+_Manilius._ Certainly, provided he attends to his practical business
+also.
+
+_Scipio._ Do you think that knowledge only fit for a steward?
+
+_Manilius._ Certainly not, inasmuch as the cultivation of land often
+fails for want of agricultural labor.
+
+_Scipio._ Therefore, as the steward knows the nature of a field, and
+the scribe knows penmanship, and as both of them seek, in their
+respective sciences, not mere amusement only, but practical utility, so
+this statesman of ours should have studied the science of jurisprudence
+and legislation; he should have investigated their original sources;
+but he should not embarrass himself in debating and arguing, reading
+and scribbling. He should rather employ himself in the actual
+administration of government, and become a sort of steward of it, being
+perfectly conversant with the principles of universal law and equity,
+without which no man can be just: not unfamiliar with the civil laws of
+states; but he will use them for practical purposes, even as a pilot
+uses astronomy, and a physician natural philosophy. For both these men
+bring their theoretical science to bear on the practice of their arts;
+and our statesman [should do the same with the science of politics, and
+make it subservient to the actual interests of philanthropy and
+patriotism]. * * *
+
+IV. * * * In states in which good men desire glory and approbation, and
+shun disgrace and ignominy. Nor are such men so much alarmed by the
+threats and penalties of the law as by that sentiment of shame with
+which nature has endowed man, which is nothing else than a certain fear
+of deserved censure. The wise director of a government strengthens this
+natural instinct by the force of public opinion, and perfects it by
+education and manners. And thus the citizens are preserved from vice
+and corruption rather by honor and shame than by fear of punishment.
+But this argument will be better illustrated when we treat of the love
+of glory and praise, which we shall discuss on another occasion.
+
+V. As respects the private life and the manners of the citizens, they
+are intimately connected with the laws that constitute just marriages
+and legitimate offspring, under the protection of the guardian deities
+around the domestic hearths. By these laws, all men should be
+maintained in their rights of public and private property. It is only
+under a good government like this that men can live happily--for
+nothing can be more delightful than a well-constituted state.
+
+On which account it appears to me a very strange thing what this * * *
+
+     VI. I therefore consume all my time in considering what is
+     the power of that man, whom, as you think, we have described
+     carefully enough in our books. Do you, then, admit our idea
+     of that governor of a commonwealth to whom we wish to refer
+     everything? For thus, I imagine, does Scipio speak in the
+     fifth book: "For as a fair voyage is the object of the master
+     of a ship, the health of his patient the aim of a physician,
+     and victory that of a general, so the happiness of his
+     fellow-citizens is the proper study of the ruler of a
+     commonwealth; that they may be stable in power, rich in
+     resources, widely known in reputation, and honorable through
+     their virtue. For a ruler ought to be one who can perfect
+     this, which is the best and most important employment among
+     mankind."
+
+     And works in your literature rightly praise that ruler of a
+     country who consults the welfare of his people more than
+     their inclinations.
+
+     VII. Tully, in those books which he wrote upon the
+     Commonwealth, could not conceal his opinions, when he speaks
+     of appointing a chief of the State, who, he says, must be
+     maintained by glory; and afterward he relates that his
+     ancestors did many admirable and noble actions from a desire
+     of glory.
+
+     Tully, in his treatise on the Commonwealth, wrote that the
+     chief of a state must be maintained by glory, and that a
+     commonwealth would last as long as honor was paid by every
+     one to the chief.
+
+          [_The next paragraph is unintelligible._]
+
+     Which virtue is called fortitude, which consists of
+     magnanimity, and a great contempt of death and pain.
+
+     VIII. As Marcellus was fierce, and eager to fight, Maximus
+     prudent and cautious.
+
+     Who discovered his violence and unbridled ferocity.
+
+     Which has often happened not only to individuals, but also to
+     most powerful nations.
+
+     In the whole world.
+
+     Because he inflicted the annoyances of his old age on your
+     families.
+
+     IX. Cicero, in his treatise on the Commonwealth, says, "As
+     Menelaus of Lacedaemon had a certain agreeable sweetness of
+     eloquence." And in another place he says, "Let him cultivate
+     brevity in speaking."
+
+     By the evidence of which arts, as Tully says, it is a shame
+     for the conscience of the judge to be misled. For he says,
+     "And as nothing in a commonwealth ought to be so uncorrupt as
+     a suffrage and a sentence, I do not see why the man who
+     perverts them by money is worthy of punishment, while he who
+     does so by eloquence is even praised. Indeed, I myself think
+     that he who corrupts the judge by his speech does more harm
+     than he who does so by money, because no one can corrupt a
+     sensible man by money, though he may by speaking."
+
+     And when Scipio had said this, Mummius praised him greatly,
+     for he was extravagantly imbued with a hatred of orators.
+
+       *       *       *       *       *
+
+
+
+
+INTRODUCTION TO THE SIXTH BOOK.
+
+
+   In this last book of his Commonwealth, Cicero labors to show
+     that truly pious philanthropical and patriotic statesmen will
+     not only be rewarded on earth by the approval of conscience
+     and the applause of all good citizens, but that they may
+     expect hereafter immortal glory in new forms of being. To
+     illustrate this, he introduces the "Dream of Scipio," in
+     which he explains the resplendent doctrines of Plato
+     respecting the immortality of the soul with inimitable
+     dignity and elegance. This Somnium Scipionis, for which we
+     are indebted to the citation of Macrobius, is the most
+     beautiful thing of the kind ever written. It has been
+     intensely admired by all European scholars, and will be still
+     more so. There are two translations of it in our language;
+     one attached to Oliver's edition of Cicero's Thoughts, the
+     other by Mr. Danby, published in 1829. Of these we have
+     freely availed ourselves, and as freely we express our
+     acknowledgments.
+
+
+
+
+BOOK VI.
+
+SCIPIO'S DREAM.
+
+
+     I. Therefore you rely upon all the prudence of this rule,
+     which has derived its very name (_prudentia_) from foreseeing
+     (_a providendo_). Wherefore the citizen must so prepare
+     himself as to be always armed against those things which
+     trouble the constitution of a state. And that dissension of
+     the citizens, when one party separates from and attacks
+     another, is called sedition.
+
+     And in truth in civil dissensions, as the good are of more
+     importance than the many, I think that we should regard the
+     weight of the citizens, and not their number.
+
+     For the lusts, being severe mistresses of the thoughts,
+     command and compel many an unbridled action. And as they
+     cannot be satisfied or appeased by any means, they urge those
+     whom they have inflamed with their allurements to every kind
+     of atrocity.
+
+     II. Which indeed was so much the greater in him because
+     though the cause of the colleagues was identical, not only
+     was their unpopularity not equal, but the influence of
+     Gracchus was employed in mitigating the hatred borne to
+     Claudius.
+
+     Who encountered the number of the chiefs and nobles with
+     these words, and left behind him that mournful and dignified
+     expression of his gravity and influence.
+
+     That, as he writes, a thousand men might every day descend
+     into the forum with cloaks dyed in purple.
+
+          [_The next paragraph is unintelligible._]
+
+     For our ancestors wished marriages to be firmly established.
+
+     There is a speech extant of Laelius with which we are all
+     acquainted, expressing how pleasing to the immortal gods are
+     the * * * and * * * of the priests.
+
+     III. Cicero, writing about the Commonwealth, in imitation of
+     Plato, has related the story of the return of Er the
+     Pamphylian to life; who, as he says, had come to life again
+     after he had been placed on the funeral pile, and related
+     many secrets about the shades below; not speaking, like
+     Plato, in a fabulous imitation of truth, but using a certain
+     reasonable invention of an ingenious dream, cleverly
+     intimating that these things which were uttered about the
+     immortality of the soul, and about heaven, are not the
+     inventions of dreaming philosophers, nor the incredible
+     fables which the Epicureans ridicule, but the conjectures of
+     wise men. He insinuates that that Scipio who by the
+     subjugation of Carthage obtained Africanus as a surname for
+     his family, gave notice to Scipio the son of Paulus of the
+     treachery which threatened him from his relations, and the
+     course of fate, because by the necessity of numbers he was
+     confined in the period of a perfect life, and he says that he
+     in the fifty-sixth year of his age * * *
+
+     IV. Some of our religion who love Plato, on account of his
+     admirable kind of eloquence, and of some correct opinions
+     which he held, say that he had some opinions similar to my
+     own touching the resurrection of the dead, which subject
+     Tully touches on in his treatise on the Commonwealth, and
+     says that he was rather jesting than intending to say that
+     was true. For he asserts that a man returned to life, and
+     related some stories which harmonized with the discussions of
+     the Platonists.
+
+     V. In this point the imitation has especially preserved the
+     likeness of the work, because, as Plato, in the conclusion of
+     his volume, represents a certain person who had returned to
+     life, which he appeared to have quitted, as indicating what
+     is the condition of souls when stripped of the body, with the
+     addition of a certain not unnecessary description of the
+     spheres and stars, an appearance of circumstances indicating
+     things of the same kind is related by the Scipio of Cicero,
+     as having been brought before him in sleep.
+
+     VI. Tully is found to have preserved this arrangement with no
+     less judgment than genius. After, in every condition of the
+     Commonwealth, whether of leisure or business, he has given
+     the palm to justice, he has placed the sacred abodes of the
+     immortal souls, and the secrets of the heavenly regions, on
+     the very summit of his completed work, indicating whither
+     they must come, or rather return, who have managed the
+     republic with prudence, justice, fortitude, and moderation.
+     But that Platonic relater of secrets was a man of the name of
+     Er, a Pamphylian by nation, a soldier by profession, who,
+     after he appeared to have died from wounds received in
+     battle, and twelve days afterward was about to receive the
+     honors of the funeral pile with the others who were slain at
+     the same time, suddenly either recovering his life, or else
+     never having lost it, as if he were giving a public
+     testimony, related to all men all that he had done or seen in
+     the days that he had thus passed between life and death.
+     Although Cicero, as if himself conscious of the truth,
+     grieves that this story has been ridiculed by the ignorant,
+     still, avoiding giving an example of foolish reproach, he
+     preferred speaking of the relater as of one awakened from a
+     swoon rather than restored to life.
+
+     VII. And before we look at the words of the dream we must
+     explain what kind of persons they are by whom Cicero says
+     that even the account of Plato was ridiculed, who are not
+     apprehensive that the same thing may happen to them. Nor by
+     this expression does he wish the ignorant mob to be
+     understood, but a kind of men who are ignorant of the truth,
+     though pretending to be philosophers with a display of
+     learning, who, it was notorious, had read such things, and
+     were eager to find faults. We will say, therefore, who they
+     are whom he reports as having levelled light reproaches
+     against so great a philosopher, and who of them has even left
+     an accusation of him committed to writing, etc. The whole
+     faction of the Epicureans, always wandering at an equal
+     distance from truth, and thinking everything ridiculous which
+     they do not understand, has ridiculed the sacred volume, and
+     the most venerable mysteries of nature. But Colotes, who is
+     somewhat celebrated and remarkable for his loquacity among
+     the pupils of Epicurus, has even recorded in a book the
+     bitter reproaches which he aims at him. But since the other
+     arguments which he foolishly urges have no connection with
+     the dream of which we are now talking, we will pass them over
+     at present, and attend only to the calumny which will stick
+     both to Cicero and Plato, unless it is silenced. He says that
+     a fable ought not to have been invented by a philosopher,
+     since no kind of falsehood is suitable to professors of
+     truth. For why, says he, if you wish to give us a notion of
+     heavenly things and to teach us the nature of souls, did you
+     not do so by a simple and plain explanation? Why was a
+     character invented, and circumstances, and strange events,
+     and a scene of cunningly adduced falsehood arranged, to
+     pollute the very door of the investigation of truth by a lie?
+     Since these things, though they are said of the Platonic Er,
+     do also attack the rest of our dreaming Africanus.
+
+     VIII. This occasion incited Scipio to relate his dream, which
+     he declares that he had buried in silence for a long time.
+     For when Laelius was complaining that there were no statues of
+     Nasica erected in any public place, as a reward for his
+     having slain the tyrant, Scipio replied in these words: "But
+     although the consciousness itself of great deeds is to wise
+     men the most ample reward of virtue, yet that divine nature
+     ought to have, not statues fixed in lead, nor triumphs with
+     withering laurels, but some more stable and lasting kinds of
+     rewards." "What are they?" said Laelius. "Then," said Scipio,
+     "suffer me, since we have now been keeping holiday for three
+     days, * * * etc." By which preface he came to the relation of
+     his dream; pointing out that those were the more stable and
+     lasting kinds of rewards which he himself had seen in heaven
+     reserved for good governors of commonwealths.
+
+IX. When I had arrived in Africa, where I was, as you are aware,
+military tribune of the fourth legion under the consul Manilius, there
+was nothing of which I was more earnestly desirous than to see King
+Masinissa, who, for very just reasons, had been always the especial
+friend of our family. When I was introduced to him, the old man
+embraced me, shed tears, and then, looking up to heaven, exclaimed--I
+thank thee, O supreme Sun, and ye also, ye other celestial beings, that
+before I depart from this life I behold in my kingdom, and in this my
+palace, Publius Cornelius Scipio, by whose mere name I seem to be
+reanimated; so completely and indelibly is the recollection of that
+best and most invincible of men, Africanus, imprinted in my mind.
+
+After this, I inquired of him concerning the affairs of his kingdom.
+He, on the other hand, questioned me about the condition of our
+Commonwealth, and in this mutual interchange of conversation we passed
+the whole of that day.
+
+X. In the evening we were entertained in a manner worthy the
+magnificence of a king, and carried on our discourse for a considerable
+part of the night. And during all this time the old man spoke of
+nothing but Africanus, all whose actions, and even remarkable sayings,
+he remembered distinctly. At last, when we retired to bed, I fell into
+a more profound sleep than usual, both because I was fatigued with my
+journey, and because I had sat up the greatest part of the night.
+
+Here I had the following dream, occasioned, as I verily believe, by our
+preceding conversation; for it frequently happens that the thoughts and
+discourses which have employed us in the daytime produce in our sleep
+an effect somewhat similar to that which Ennius writes happened to him
+about Homer, of whom, in his waking hours, he used frequently to think
+and speak.
+
+Africanus, I thought, appeared to me in that shape, with which I was
+better acquainted from his picture than from any personal knowledge of
+him. When I perceived it was he, I confess I trembled with
+consternation; but he addressed me, saying, Take courage, my Scipio; be
+not afraid, and carefully remember what I shall say to you.
+
+XI. Do you see that city Carthage, which, though brought under the
+Roman yoke by me, is now renewing former wars, and cannot live in
+peace? (and he pointed to Carthage from a lofty spot, full of stars,
+and brilliant, and glittering)--to attack which city you are this day
+arrived in a station not much superior to that of a private soldier.
+Before two years, however, are elapsed, you shall be consul, and
+complete its overthrow; and you shall obtain, by your own merit, the
+surname of Africanus, which as yet belongs to you no otherwise than as
+derived from me. And when you have destroyed Carthage, and received the
+honor of a triumph, and been made censor, and, in quality of
+ambassador, visited Egypt, Syria, Asia, and Greece, you shall be
+elected a second time consul in your absence, and, by utterly
+destroying Numantia, put an end to a most dangerous war.
+
+But when you have entered the Capitol in your triumphal car, you shall
+find the Roman Commonwealth all in a ferment, through the intrigues of
+my grandson Tiberius Gracchus.
+
+XII. It is on this occasion, my dear Africanus, that you show your
+country the greatness of your understanding, capacity, and prudence.
+But I see that the destiny, however, of that time is, as it were,
+uncertain; for when your age shall have accomplished seven times eight
+revolutions of the sun, and your fatal hours shall be marked put by the
+natural product of these two numbers, each of which is esteemed a
+perfect one, but for different reasons, then shall the whole city have
+recourse to you alone, and place its hopes in your auspicious name. On
+you the senate, all good citizens, the allies, the people of Latium,
+shall cast their eyes; on you the preservation of the State shall
+entirely depend. In a word, _if you escape the impious machinations of
+your relatives_, you will, in quality of dictator, establish order and
+tranquillity in the Commonwealth.
+
+When on this Laelius made an exclamation, and the rest of the company
+groaned loudly, Scipio, with a gentle smile, said, I entreat you, do
+not wake me out of my dream, but have patience, and hear the rest.
+
+XIII. Now, in order to encourage you, my dear Africanus, continued the
+shade of my ancestor, to defend the State with the greater
+cheerfulness, be assured that, for all those who have in any way
+conduced to the preservation, defence, and enlargement of their native
+country, there is a certain place in heaven where they shall enjoy an
+eternity of happiness. For nothing on earth is more agreeable to God,
+the Supreme Governor of the universe, than the assemblies and societies
+of men united together by laws, which are called states. It is from
+heaven their rulers and preservers came, and thither they return.
+
+XIV. Though at these words I was extremely troubled, not so much at the
+fear of death as at the perfidy of my own relations, yet I recollected
+myself enough to inquire whether he himself, my father Paulus, and
+others whom we look upon as dead, were really living.
+
+Yes, truly, replied he, they all enjoy life who have escaped from the
+chains of the body as from a prison. But as to what you call life on
+earth, that is no more than one form of death. But see; here comes your
+father Paulus towards you! And as soon as I observed him, my eyes burst
+out into a flood of tears; but he took me in his arms, embraced me, and
+bade me not weep.
+
+XV. When my first transports subsided, and I regained the liberty of
+speech, I addressed my father thus: Thou best and most venerable of
+parents, since this, as I am informed by Africanus, is the only
+substantial life, why do I linger on earth, and not rather haste to
+come hither where you are?
+
+That, replied he, is impossible: unless that God, whose temple is all
+that vast expanse you behold, shall free you from the fetters of the
+body, you can have no admission into this place. Mankind have received
+their being on this very condition, that they should labor for the
+preservation of that globe which is situated, as you see, in the midst
+of this temple, and is called earth.
+
+Men are likewise endowed with a soul, which is a portion of the eternal
+fires which you call stars and constellations; and which, being round,
+spherical bodies, animated by divine intelligences, perform their
+cycles and revolutions with amazing rapidity. It is your duty,
+therefore, my Publius, and that of all who have any veneration for the
+Gods, to preserve this wonderful union of soul and body; nor without
+the express command of Him who gave you a soul should the least thought
+be entertained of quitting human life, lest you seem to desert the post
+assigned you by God himself.
+
+But rather follow the examples of your grandfather here, and of me,
+your father, in paying a strict regard to justice and piety; which is
+due in a great degree to parents and relations, but most of all to our
+country. Such a life as this is the true way to heaven, and to the
+company of those, who, after having lived on earth and escaped from the
+body, inhabit the place which you now behold.
+
+XVI. This was the shining circle, or zone, whose remarkable brightness
+distinguishes it among the constellations, and which, after the Greeks,
+you call the Milky Way.
+
+From thence, as I took a view of the universe, everything appeared
+beautiful and admirable; for there those stars are to be seen that are
+never visible from our globe, and everything appears of such magnitude
+as we could not have imagined. The least of all the stars was that
+removed farthest from heaven, and situated next to the earth; I mean
+our moon, which shines with a borrowed light. Now, the globes of the
+stars far surpass the magnitude of our earth, which at that distance
+appeared so exceedingly small that I could not but be sensibly affected
+on seeing our whole empire no larger than if we touched the earth, as
+it were, at a single point.
+
+XVII. And as I continued to observe the earth with great attention, How
+long, I pray you, said Africanus, will your mind be fixed on that
+object? why don't you rather take a view of the magnificent temples
+among which you have arrived? The universe is composed of nine circles,
+or rather spheres, one of which is the heavenly one, and is exterior to
+all the rest, which it embraces; being itself the Supreme God, and
+bounding and containing the whole. In it are fixed those stars which
+revolve with never-varying courses. Below this are seven other spheres,
+which revolve in a contrary direction to that of the heavens. One of
+these is occupied by the globe which on earth they call Saturn. Next to
+that is the star of Jupiter, so benign and salutary to mankind. The
+third in order is that fiery and terrible planet called Mars. Below
+this, again, almost in the middle region, is the sun--the leader,
+governor, and prince of the other luminaries; the soul of the world,
+which it regulates and illumines; being of such vast size that it
+pervades and gives light to all places. Then follow Venus and Mercury,
+which attend, as it were, on the sun. Lastly, the moon, which shines
+only in the reflected beams of the sun, moves in the lowest sphere of
+all. Below this, if we except that gift of the Gods, the soul, which
+has been given by the liberality of the Gods to the human race,
+everything is mortal, and tends to dissolution; but above the moon all
+is eternal. For the earth, which is the ninth globe, and occupies the
+centre, is immovable, and, being the lowest, all others gravitate
+towards it.
+
+XVIII. When I had recovered myself from the astonishment occasioned by
+such a wonderful prospect, I thus addressed Africanus: Pray what is
+this sound that strikes my ears in so loud and agreeable a manner? To
+which he replied: It is that which is called the _music of the
+spheres_, being produced by their motion and impulse; and being formed
+by unequal intervals, but such as are divided according to the justest
+proportion, it produces, by duly tempering acute with grave sounds,
+various concerts of harmony. For it is impossible that motions so great
+should be performed without any noise; and it is agreeable to nature
+that the extremes on one side should produce sharp, and on the other
+flat sounds. For which reason the sphere of the fixed stars, being the
+highest, and being carried with a more rapid velocity, moves with a
+shrill and acute sound; whereas that of the moon, being the lowest,
+moves with a very flat one. As to the earth, which makes the ninth
+sphere, it remains immovably fixed in the middle or lowest part of the
+universe. But those eight revolving circles, in which both Mercury and
+Venus are moved with the same celerity, give out sounds that are
+divided by seven distinct intervals, which is generally the regulating
+number of all things.
+
+This celestial harmony has been imitated by learned musicians both on
+stringed instruments and with the voice, whereby they have opened to
+themselves a way to return to the celestial regions, as have likewise
+many others who have employed their sublime genius while on earth in
+cultivating the divine sciences.
+
+By the amazing noise of this sound the ears of mankind have been in
+some degree deafened; and indeed hearing is the dullest of all the
+human senses. Thus, the people who dwell near the cataracts of the
+Nile, which are called Catadupa[348], are, by the excessive roar which
+that river makes in precipitating itself from those lofty mountains,
+entirely deprived of the sense of hearing. And so inconceivably great
+is this sound which is produced by the rapid motion of the whole
+universe, that the human ear is no more capable of receiving it than
+the eye is able to look steadfastly and directly on the sun, whose
+beams easily dazzle the strongest sight.
+
+While I was busied in admiring the scene of wonders, I could not help
+casting my eyes every now and then on the earth.
+
+XIX. On which Africanus said, I perceive that you are still employed in
+contemplating the seat and residence of mankind. But if it appears to
+you so small, as in fact it really is, despise its vanities, and fix
+your attention forever on these heavenly objects. Is it possible that
+you should attain any human applause or glory that is worth the
+contending for? The earth, you see, is peopled but in a very few
+places, and those, too, of small extent; and they appear like so many
+little spots of green scattered through vast, uncultivated deserts. And
+those who inhabit the earth are not only so remote from each other as
+to be cut off from all mutual correspondence, but their situation being
+in oblique or contrary parts of the globe, or perhaps in those
+diametrically opposite to yours, all expectation of universal fame must
+fall to the ground.
+
+XX. You may likewise observe that the same globe of the earth is girt
+and surrounded with certain zones, whereof those two that are most
+remote from each other, and lie under the opposite poles of heaven, are
+congealed with frost; but that one in the middle, which is far the
+largest, is scorched with the intense heat of the sun. The other two
+are habitable, one towards the south, the inhabitants of which are your
+antipodes, with whom you have no connection; the other, towards the
+north, is that which you inhabit, whereof a very small part, as you may
+see, falls to your share. For the whole extent of what you see is, as
+it were, but a little island, narrow at both ends and wide in the
+middle, which is surrounded by the sea which on earth you call the
+great Atlantic Ocean, and which, notwithstanding this magnificent name,
+you see is very insignificant. And even in these cultivated and
+well-known countries, has yours, or any of our names, ever passed the
+heights of the Caucasus or the currents of the Ganges? In what other
+parts to the north or the south, or where the sun rises and sets, will
+your names ever be heard? And if we leave these out of the question,
+how small a space is there left for your glory to spread itself abroad;
+and how long will it remain in the memory of those whose minds are now
+full of it?
+
+XXI. Besides all this, if the progeny of any future generation should
+wish to transmit to their posterity the praises of any one of us which
+they have heard from their forefathers, yet the deluges and combustions
+of the earth, which must necessarily happen at their destined periods,
+will prevent our obtaining, not only an eternal, but even a durable
+glory. And, after all, what does it signify whether those who shall
+hereafter be born talk of you, when those who have lived before you,
+whose number was perhaps not less, and whose merit certainly greater,
+were not so much as acquainted with your name?
+
+XXII. Especially since not one of those who shall hear of us is able to
+retain in his memory the transactions of a single year. The bulk of
+mankind, indeed, measure their year by the return of the sun, which is
+only one star. But when all the stars shall have returned to the place
+whence they set out, and after long periods shall again exhibit the
+same aspect of the whole heavens, that is what ought properly to be
+called the revolution of a year, though I scarcely dare attempt to
+enumerate the vast multitude of ages contained in it. For as the sun in
+old time was eclipsed, and seemed to be extinguished, at the time when
+the soul of Romulus penetrated into these eternal mansions, so, when
+all the constellations and stars shall revert to their primary
+position, and the sun shall at the same point and time be again
+eclipsed, then you may consider that the grand year is completed. Be
+assured, however, that the twentieth part of it is not yet elapsed.
+
+XXIII. Wherefore, if you have no hopes of returning to this place where
+great and good men enjoy all that their souls can wish for, of what
+value, pray, is all that human glory, which can hardly endure for a
+small portion of one year?
+
+If, then, you wish to elevate your views to the contemplation of this
+eternal seat of splendor, you will not be satisfied with the praises of
+your fellow-mortals, nor with any human rewards that your exploits can
+obtain; but Virtue herself must point out to you the true and only
+object worthy of your pursuit. Leave to others to speak of you as they
+may, for speak they will. Their discourses will be confined to the
+narrow limits of the countries you see, nor will their duration be very
+extensive; for they will perish like those who utter them, and will be
+no more remembered by their posterity.
+
+XXIV. When he had ceased to speak in this manner, I said, O Africanus,
+if indeed the door of heaven is open to those who have deserved well of
+their country, although, indeed, from my childhood I have always
+followed yours and my father's steps, and have not neglected to imitate
+your glory, still, I will from henceforth strive to follow them more
+closely.
+
+Follow them, then, said he, and consider your body only, not yourself,
+as mortal. For it is not your outward form which constitutes your
+being, but your mind; not that substance which is palpable to the
+senses, but your spiritual nature. _Know, then, that you are a
+God_--for a God it must be, which flourishes, and feels, and
+recollects, and foresees, and governs, regulates and moves the body
+over which it is set, as the Supreme Ruler does the world which is
+subject to him. For as that Eternal Being moves whatever is mortal in
+this world, so the immortal mind of man moves the frail body with which
+it is connected.
+
+XXV. For whatever is always moving must be eternal; but that which
+derives its motion from a power which is foreign to itself, when that
+motion ceases must itself lose its animation.
+
+That alone, then, which moves itself can never cease to be moved,
+because it can never desert itself. Moreover, it must be the source,
+and origin, and principle of motion in all the rest. There can be
+nothing prior to a principle, for all things must originate from it;
+and it cannot itself derive its existence from any other source, for if
+it did it would no longer be a principle. And if it had no beginning,
+it can have no end; for a beginning that is put an end to will neither
+be renewed by any other cause, nor will it produce anything else of
+itself. All things, therefore, must originate from one source. Thus it
+follows that motion must have its source in something which is moved by
+itself, and which can neither have a beginning nor an end. Otherwise
+all the heavens and all nature must perish, for it is impossible that
+they can of themselves acquire any power of producing motion in
+themselves.
+
+XXVI. As, therefore, it is plain that what is moved by itself must be
+eternal, who will deny that this is the general condition and nature of
+minds? For as everything is inanimate which is moved by an impulse
+exterior to itself, so what is animated is moved by an interior impulse
+of its own; for this is the peculiar nature and power of mind. And if
+that alone has the power of self-motion, it can neither have had a
+beginning, nor can it have an end.
+
+Do you, therefore, exercise this mind of yours in the best pursuits.
+And the best pursuits are those which consist in promoting the good of
+your country. Such employments will speed the flight of your mind to
+this its proper abode; and its flight will be still more rapid, if,
+even while it is enclosed in the body, it will look abroad, and
+disengage itself as much as possible from its bodily dwelling, by the
+contemplation of things which are external to itself.
+
+This it should do to the utmost of its power. For the minds of those
+who have given themselves up to the pleasures of the body, paying, as
+it were, a servile obedience to their lustful impulses, have violated
+the laws of God and man; and therefore, when they are separated from
+their bodies, flutter continually round the earth on which they lived,
+and are not allowed to return to this celestial region till they have
+been purified by the revolution of many ages.
+
+Thus saying, he vanished, and I awoke from my dream.
+
+
+A FRAGMENT.
+
+
+And although it is most desirable that fortune should remain forever in
+the most brilliant possible condition, nevertheless, the equability of
+life excites less interest than those changeable conditions wherein
+prosperity suddenly revives out of the most desperate and ruinous
+circumstances.
+
+
+
+
+
+
+THE END.
+
+
+
+
+
+
+FOOTNOTES:
+
+
+[1] Archilochus was a native of Paros, and flourished about 714-676
+B.C. His poems were chiefly Iambics of bitter satire. Horace speaks of
+him as the inventor of Iambics, and calls himself his pupil.
+
+                  Parios ego primus Iambos
+    Ostendi Latio, numeros animosque secutus
+    Archilochi, non res et agentia verba Lycamben.
+                              Epist. I. xix. 25.
+
+And in another place he says,
+
+    Archilochum proprio rabies armavit Iambo--A.P. 74.
+
+[2] This was Livius Andronicus: he is supposed to have been a native of
+Tarentum, and he was made prisoner by the Romans, during their wars in
+Southern Italy; owing to which he became the slave of M. Livius
+Salinator. He wrote both comedies and tragedies, of which Cicero
+(Brutus 18) speaks very contemptuously, as "Livianae fabulae non satis
+dignae quae iterum legantur"--not worth reading a second time. He also
+wrote a Latin Odyssey, and some hymns, and died probably about 221 B.C.
+
+[3] C. Fabius, surnamed Pictor, painted the temple of Salus, which the
+dictator C. Junius Brutus Bubulus dedicated 302 B.C. The temple was
+destroyed by fire in the reign of Claudius. The painting is highly
+praised by Dionysius, xvi. 6.
+
+[4] For an account of the ancient Greek philosophers, see the sketch at
+the end of the Disputations.
+
+[5] Isocrates was born at Athens 436 B.C. He was a pupil of Gorgias,
+Prodicus, and Socrates. He opened a school of rhetoric, at Athens, with
+great success. He died by his own hand at the age of ninety-eight.
+
+[6] So Horace joins these two classes as inventors of all kinds of
+improbable fictions:
+
+                      Pictoribus atque poetis
+    Quidlibet audendi semper fuit aequa potestas.--A. P. 9.
+
+Which Roscommon translates:
+
+    Painters and poets have been still allow'd
+    Their pencil and their fancies unconfined.
+
+[7] Epicharmus was a native of Cos, but lived at Megara, in Sicily, and
+when Megara was destroyed, removed to Syracuse, and lived at the court
+of Hiero, where he became the first writer of comedies, so that Horace
+ascribes the invention of comedy to him, and so does Theocritus. He
+lived to a great age.
+
+[8] Pherecydes was a native of Scyros, one of the Cyclades; and is said
+to have obtained his knowledge from the secret books of the
+Phoenicians. He is said also to have been a pupil of Pittacus, the
+rival of Thales, and the master of Pythagoras. His doctrine was that
+there were three principles ([Greek: Zeus], or AEther; [Greek: Chthon],
+or Chaos; and [Greek: Chronos], or Time) and four elements (Fire,
+Earth, Air, and Water), from which everything that exists was
+formed.--_Vide_ Smith's Dict. Gr. and Rom. Biog.
+
+[9] Archytas was a native of Tarentum, and is said to have saved the
+life of Plato by his influence with the tyrant Dionysius. He was
+especially great as a mathematician and geometrician, so that Horace
+calls him
+
+    Maris et terra numeroque carentis arenae
+    Mensorem.
+                              Od. i. 28.1.
+
+Plato is supposed to have learned some of his views from him, and
+Aristotle to have borrowed from him every idea of the Categories.
+
+[10] This was not Timaeus the historian, but a native of Locri, who is
+said also in the De Finibus (c. 29) to have been a teacher of Plato.
+There is a treatise extant bearing his name, which is, however,
+probably spurious, and only an abridgment of Plato's dialogue Timaeus.
+
+[11] Dicaearchus was a native of Messana, in Sicily, though he lived
+chiefly in Greece. He was one of the later disciples of Aristotle. He
+was a great geographer, politician, historian, and philosopher, and
+died about 285 B.C.
+
+[12] Aristoxenus was a native of Tarentum, and also a pupil of
+Aristotle. We know nothing of his opinions except that he held the soul
+to be a _harmony_ of the body; a doctrine which had been already
+discussed by Plato in the Phaedo, and combated by Aristotle. He was a
+great musician, and the chief portions of his works which have come
+down to us are fragments of some musical treatises.--Smith's Dict. Gr.
+and Rom. Biog.; to which source I must acknowledge my obligation for
+nearly the whole of these biographical notes.
+
+[13] The Simonides here meant is the celebrated poet of Ceos, the
+perfecter of elegiac poetry among the Greeks. He flourished about the
+time of the Persian war. Besides his poetry, he is said to have been
+the inventor of some method of aiding the memory. He died at the court
+of Hiero, 467 B.C.
+
+[14] Theodectes was a native of Phaselis, in Pamphylia, a distinguished
+rhetorician and tragic poet, and flourished in the time of Philip of
+Macedon. He was a pupil of Isocrates, and lived at Athens, and died
+there at the age of forty-one.
+
+[15] Cineas was a Thessalian, and (as is said in the text) came to Rome
+as ambassador from Pyrrhus after the battle of Heraclea, 280 B.C., and
+his memory is said to have been so great that on the day after his
+arrival he was able to address all the senators and knights by name. He
+probably died before Pyrrhus returned to Italy, 276 B.C.
+
+[16] Charmadas, called also Charmides, was a fellow-pupil with Philo,
+the Larissaean of Clitomachus, the Carthaginian. He is said by some
+authors to have founded a fourth academy.
+
+[17] Metrodorus was a minister of Mithridates the Great; and employed
+by him as supreme judge in Pontus, and afterward as an ambassador.
+Cicero speaks of him in other places (De Orat. ii. 88) as a man of
+wonderful memory.
+
+[18] Quintus Hortensius was eight years older than Cicero; and, till
+Cicero's fame surpassed his, he was accounted the most eloquent of all
+the Romans. He was Verres's counsel in the prosecution conducted
+against him by Cicero. Seneca relates that his memory was so great that
+he could come out of an auction and repeat the catalogue backward. He
+died 50 B.C.
+
+[19] This treatise is one which has not come down to us, but which had
+been lately composed by Cicero in order to comfort himself for the loss
+of his daughter.
+
+[20] The epigram is,
+
+    [Greek: Eipas Helie chaire, Kleombrotos Hombrakiotes
+      helat' aph' hypselou teicheos eis Aiden,
+    axion ouden idon thanatou kakon, alla Platonos
+      hen to peri psyches gramm' analexamenos.]
+
+Which may be translated, perhaps,
+
+    Farewell, O sun, Cleombrotus exclaim'd,
+      Then plunged from off a height beneath the sea;
+    Stung by pain, of no disgrace ashamed,
+      But moved by Plato's high philosophy.
+
+[21] This is alluded to by Juvenal:
+
+    Provida Pompeio dederat Campania febres
+    Optandas: sed multae urbes et publica vota
+    Vicerunt. Igitur Fortuna ipsius et Urbis,
+    Servatum victo caput abstulit.--Sat. x. 283.
+
+[22] Pompey's second wife was Julia, the daughter of Julius Caesar, she
+died the year before the death of Crassus, in Parthia. Virgil speaks of
+Caesar and Pompey as relations, using the same expression (socer) as
+Cicero:
+
+    Aggeribus socer Alpinis atque arce Monoeci
+    Descendens, gener adversis instructus Eois.--AEn. vi. 830.
+
+[23] This idea is beautifully expanded by Byron:
+
+    Yet if, as holiest men have deem'd, there be
+    A land of souls beyond that sable shore
+    To shame the doctrine of the Sadducee
+    And sophist, madly vain or dubious lore,
+    How sweet it were in concert to adore
+    With those who made our mortal labors light,
+    To hear each voice we fear'd to hear no more.
+    Behold each mighty shade reveal'd to sight,
+    The Bactrian, Samian sage, and all who taught the right!
+                              _Childe Harold_, ii.
+
+[24] The epitaph in the original is:
+
+    [Greek: O xein' angeilon Lakedaimoniois hoti tede
+      keimetha, tois keinon peithomenoi nomimois.]
+
+[25] This was expressed in the Greek verses,
+
+    [Greek: Arches men me phynai epichthonioisin ariston,
+    phynta d' hopos okista pylas Aidyo peresai]
+
+which by some authors are attributed to Homer.
+
+[26] This is the first fragment of the Cresphontes.--Ed. Var. vii., p.
+594.
+
+    [Greek: Edei gar hemas syllogon poioumenous
+    Ton phynta threnein, eis hos' erchetai kaka.
+    Ton d' au thanonta kai ponon pepaumenon
+    chairontas euphemointas ekpemein domon]
+
+[27] The Greek verses are quoted by Plutarch:
+
+        [Greek: Epou nepie, elithioi phrenes andron
+      Euthynoos keitai moiridio thanato
+    Ouk en gar zoein kalon auto oute goneusi.]
+
+[28] This refers to the story that when Eumolpus, the son of Neptune,
+whose assistance the Eleusinians had called in against the Athenians,
+had been slain by the Athenians, an oracle demanded the sacrifice of
+one of the daughters of Erechtheus, the King of Athens. And when one
+was drawn by lot, the others voluntarily accompanied her to death.
+
+[29] Menoeceus was son of Creon, and in the war of the Argives against
+Thebes, Teresias declared that the Thebans should conquer if Menoeceus
+would sacrifice himself for his country; and accordingly he killed
+himself outside the gates of Thebes.
+
+[30] The Greek is,
+
+    [Greek: mede moi aklaustos thanatos moloi, alla philoisi
+      poiesaimi thanon algea kai stonachas.]
+
+[31] Soph. Trach. 1047.
+
+[32] The lines quoted by Cicero here appear to have come from the Latin
+play of Prometheus by Accius; the ideas are borrowed, rather than
+translated, from the Prometheus of AEschylus.
+
+[33] From _exerceo_.
+
+[34] Each soldier carried a stake, to help form a palisade in front of
+the camp.
+
+[35] Insania--from _in_, a particle of negative force in composition,
+and _sanus_, healthy, sound.
+
+[36] The man who first received this surname was L. Calpurnius Piso,
+who was consul, 133 B.C., in the Servile War.
+
+[37] The Greek is,
+
+    [Greek: Alla moi oidanetai kradie cholo hoppot' ekeinou
+    Mnesomai hos m' asyphelon en Argeioisin erexen.]--Il. ix. 642.
+
+I have given Pope's translation in the text.
+
+[38] This is from the Theseus:
+
+    [Greek: Ego de touto para sophou tinos mathon
+    eis phrontidas noun symphoras t' eballomen
+    phygas t' emauto prostitheis patras emes.
+    thanatous t' aorous, kai kakon allas hodous
+    hos, ei ti paschoim' on edoxazon pote
+    Me moi neorton prospeson mallon dakoi.]
+
+[39] Ter. Phorm. II. i. 11.
+
+[40] This refers to the speech of Agamemnon in Euripides, in the
+Iphigenia in Aulis,
+
+              [Greek: Zelo se, geron,
+    zelo d' andron hos akindynon
+    bion exeperas', agnos, aklees.]--v. 15.
+
+[41] This is a fragment from the Hypsipyle:
+
+    [Greek: Ephy men oudeis hostis ou ponei broton
+    thaptei te tekna chater' au ktatai nea,
+    autos te thneskei. kai tad' achthontai brotoi
+    eis gen pherontes gen anankaios d' echei
+    bion therizein hoste karpimon stachyn.]
+
+[42]
+    [Greek: Pollas ek kephales prothelymnous helketo chaitas.]--Il. x. 15.
+
+[43]
+    [Greek: Etoi ho kappedion to Aleion oios alato
+    hon thymon katedon, paton anthropon aleeinon.]--Il. vi. 201.
+
+[44] This is a translation from Euripides:
+
+    [Greek: Hosth' himeros m' hypelthe ge te k' ourano
+    lexai molouse deuro Medeias tychas.]--Med. 57.
+
+[45]
+    [Greek: Lien gar polloi kai epetrimoi emata panta
+    piptousin, pote ken tis anapneuseie ponoio;
+    alla chre ton men katathaptemen, hos ke thanesi,
+    nelea thymon echontas, ep' emati dakrysantas.]--
+                              Hom. Il. xix. 226.
+
+[46] This is one of the fragments of Euripides which we are unable to
+assign to any play in particular; it occurs Var. Ed. Tr. Inc. 167.
+
+    [Greek: Ei men tod' emar proton en kakoumeno
+    kai me makran de dia ponon enaustoloun
+    eikos sphadazein en an, hos neozyga
+    polon, chalinon artios dedegmenon
+    nyn d' amblys eimi, kai katertykos kakon.]
+
+[47] This is only a fragment, preserved by Stobaeus:
+
+    [Greek: Tous d' an megistous kai sophotatous phreni
+    toiousd' idois an, oios esti nyn hode,
+    kalos kakos prassonti symparainesai
+    hotan de daimon andros eutychous to prin
+    mastig' epise tou biou palintropon,
+    ta polla phrouda kai kakos eiremena.]
+
+[48]
+    [Greek: Ok. Oukoun Prometheu touto gignoskeis hoti
+      orges nosouses eisin iatroi logoi.
+    Pr. ean tis en kairo ge malthasse kear
+      kai me sphrigonta thymon ischnaine bia.]--
+                              AEsch. Prom. v. 378.
+
+[49] Cicero alludes here to Il. vii. 211, which is thus translated by
+Pope:
+
+    His massy javelin quivering in his hand,
+    He stood the bulwark of the Grecian band;
+    Through every Argive heart new transport ran,
+    All Troy stood trembling at the mighty man:
+    E'en Hector paused, and with new doubt oppress'd,
+    Felt his great heart suspended in his breast;
+    'Twas vain to seek retreat, and vain to fear,
+    Himself had challenged, and the foe drew near.
+
+But Melmoth (Note on the Familiar Letters of Cicero, book ii. Let. 23)
+rightly accuses Cicero of having misunderstood Homer, who "by no means
+represents Hector as being thus totally dismayed at the approach of his
+adversary; and, indeed, it would have been inconsistent with the
+general character of that hero to have described him under such
+circumstances of terror."
+
+    [Greek: Ton de kai Argeioi meg' egetheon eisoroontes,
+    Troas de tromos ainos hypelythe gyia hekaston,
+    Hektori d' auto thymos eni stethessi patassen.]
+
+But there is a great difference, as Dr. Clarke remarks, between [Greek:
+thymos eni stethessi patassen] and [Greek: kardee exo stetheon
+ethrosken], or [Greek: tromos ainos hypelythe gyia].--_The Trojans_,
+says Homer, _trembled_ at the sight of Ajax, and even Hector himself
+felt some emotion in his breast.
+
+[50] Cicero means Scipio Nasica, who, in the riots consequent on the
+reelection of Tiberius Gracchus to the tribunate, 133 B.C., having
+called in vain on the consul, Mucius Scaevola, to save the republic,
+attacked Gracchus himself, who was slain in the tumult.
+
+[51] _Morosus_ is evidently derived from _mores_--"_Morosus_, _mos_,
+stubbornness, self-will, etc."--Riddle and Arnold, Lat. Dict.
+
+[52] In the original they run thus:
+
+    [Greek: Ouk estin ouden deinon hod' eipein epos,
+    Oude pathos, oude xymphora theelatos
+    hes ouk an aroit' achthos anthropon physis.]
+
+[53] This passage is from the Eunuch of Terence, act i., sc. 1, 14.
+
+[54] These verses are from the Atreus of Accius.
+
+[55] This was Marcus Atilius Regulus, the story of whose treatment by
+the Carthaginians in the first Punic War is well known to everybody.
+
+[56] This was Quintus Servilius Caepio, who, 105 B.C., was destroyed,
+with his army, by the Cimbri, it was believed as a judgment for the
+covetousness which he had displayed in the plunder of Tolosa.
+
+[57] This was Marcus Aquilius, who, in the year 88 B.C., was sent
+against Mithridates as one of the consular legates; and, being
+defeated, was delivered up to the king by the inhabitants of Mitylene.
+Mithridates put him to death by pouring molten gold down his throat.
+
+[58] This was the elder brother of the triumvir Marcus Crassus, 87 B.C.
+He was put to death by Fimbria, who was in command of some of the
+troops of Marius.
+
+[59] Lucius Caesar and Caius Caesar were relations (it is uncertain in
+what degree) of the great Caesar, and were killed by Fimbria on the same
+occasion as Octavius.
+
+[60] M. Antonius was the grandfather of the triumvir; he was murdered
+the same year, 87 B.C., by Annius, when Marius and Cinna took Rome.
+
+[61] This story is alluded to by Horace:
+
+    Districtus ensis cui super impia
+    Cervice pendet non Siculae dapes
+      Dulcem elaborabunt saporem,
+        Non avium citharaeve cantus
+    Somnum reducent.--iii. 1. 17.
+
+[62] Hieronymus was a Rhodian, and a pupil of Aristotle, flourishing
+about 300 B.C. He is frequently mentioned by Cicero.
+
+[63] We know very little of Dinomachus. Some MSS. have Clitomachus.
+
+[64] Callipho was in all probability a pupil of Epicurus, but we have
+no certain information about him.
+
+[65] Diodorus was a Syrian, and succeeded Critolaus as the head of the
+Peripatetic School at Athens.
+
+[66] Aristo was a native of Ceos, and a pupil of Lycon, who succeeded
+Straton as the head of the Peripatetic School, 270 B.C. He afterward
+himself succeeded Lycon.
+
+[67] Pyrrho was a native of Elis, and the originator of the sceptical
+theories of some of the ancient philosophers. He was a contemporary of
+Alexander.
+
+[68] Herillus was a disciple of Zeno of Cittium, and therefore a Stoic.
+He did not, however, follow all the opinions of his master: he held
+that knowledge was the chief good. Some of the treatises of Cleanthes
+were written expressly to confute him.
+
+[69] Anacharsis was (Herod., iv., 76) son of Gnurus and brother of
+Saulius, King of Thrace. He came to Athens while Solon was occupied in
+framing laws for his people; and by the simplicity of his way of
+living, and his acute observations on the manners of the Greeks, he
+excited such general admiration that he was reckoned by some writers
+among the Seven Wise Men of Greece.
+
+[70] This was Appius Claudius Caecus, who was censor 310 B.C., and who,
+according to Livy, was afflicted with blindness by the Gods for
+persuading the Potitii to instruct the public servants in the way of
+sacrificing to Hercules. He it was who made the Via Appia.
+
+[71] The fact of Homer's blindness rests on a passage in the Hymn to
+Apollo, quoted by Thucydides as a genuine work of Homer, and which is
+thus spoken of by one of the most accomplished scholars that this
+country or this age has ever produced: "They are indeed beautiful
+verses; and if none worse had ever been attributed to Homer, the Prince
+of Poets would have had little reason to complain.
+
+"He has been describing the Delian festival in honor of Apollo and
+Diana, and concludes this part of the poem with an address to the women
+of that island, to whom it is to be supposed that he had become
+familiarly known by his frequent recitations:
+
+    [Greek: Chairete d' hymeis pasai, emeio de kai metopisthe
+    mnesasth', hoppote ken tis epichthonion anthropon
+    enthad' aneiretai xeinos talapeirios elthon
+    o kourai, tis d' hymmin aner hedistos aoidon
+    enthade poleitai kai teo terpesthe malista;
+    hymeis d' eu mala pasai hypokrinasthe aph' hemon,
+    Typhlos aner, oikei de Chio eni paipaloesse,
+    tou pasai metopisthen aristeuousin aoidai.]
+
+    Virgins, farewell--and oh! remember me
+    Hereafter, when some stranger from the sea,
+    A hapless wanderer, may your isle explore,
+    And ask you, 'Maids, of all the bards you boast,
+    Who sings the sweetest, and delights you most?'
+    Oh! answer all, 'A blind old man, and poor,
+    Sweetest he sings, and dwells on Chios' rocky shore.'
+
+                              _Coleridge's Introduction to the Study
+                              of the Greek Classic Poets._
+
+[72] Some read _scientiam_ and some _inscientiam;_ the latter of which
+is preferred by some of the best editors and commentators.
+
+[73] For a short account of these ancient Greek philosophers, see the
+sketch prefixed to the Academics (_Classical Library_).
+
+[74] Cicero wrote his philosophical works in the last three years of
+his life. When he wrote this piece, he was in the sixty-third year of
+his age, in the year of Rome 709.
+
+[75] The Academic.
+
+[76] Diodorus and Posidonius were Stoics; Philo and Antiochus were
+Academics; but the latter afterward inclined to the doctrine of the
+Stoics.
+
+[77] Julius Caesar.
+
+[78] Cicero was one of the College of Augurs.
+
+[79] The Latinae Feriae was originally a festival of the Latins, altered
+by Tarquinius Superbus into a Roman one. It was held in the Alban
+Mount, in honor of Jupiter Latiaris. This holiday lasted six days: it
+was not held at any fixed time; but the consul was never allowed to
+take the field till he had held them.--_Vide_ Smith, Dict. Gr. and Rom.
+Ant., p. 414.
+
+[80] _Exhedra_, the word used by Cicero, means a study, or place where
+disputes were held.
+
+[81] M. Piso was a Peripatetic. The four great sects were the Stoics,
+the Peripatetics, the Academics, and the Epicureans.
+
+[82] It was a prevailing tenet of the Academics that there is no
+certain knowledge.
+
+[83] The five forms of Plato are these: [Greek: ousia, tauton, heteron,
+stasis, kinesis.]
+
+[84] The four natures here to be understood are the four
+elements--fire, water, air, and earth; which are mentioned as the four
+principles of Empedocles by Diogenes Laertius.
+
+[85] These five moving stars are Saturn, Jupiter, Mars, Mercury, and
+Venus. Their revolutions are considered in the next book.
+
+[86] Or, Generation of the Gods.
+
+[87] The [Greek: prolepsis] of Epicurus, before mentioned, is what he
+here means.
+
+[88] [Greek: Steremnia] is the word which Epicurus used to distinguish
+between those objects which are perceptible to sense, and those which
+are imperceptible; as the essence of the Divine Being, and the various
+operations of the divine power.
+
+[89] Zeno here mentioned is not the same that Cotta spoke of before.
+This was the founder of the Stoics. The other was an Epicurean
+philosopher whom he had heard at Athens.
+
+[90] That is, there would be the same uncertainty in heaven as is among
+the Academics.
+
+[91] Those nations which were neither Greek nor Roman.
+
+[92] _Sigilla numerantes_ is the common reading; but P. Manucius
+proposes _venerantes_, which I choose as the better of the two, and in
+which sense I have translated it.
+
+[93] Fundamental doctrines.
+
+[94] That is, the zodiac.
+
+[95] The moon, as well as the sun, is indeed in the zodiac, but she
+does not measure the same course in a month. She moves in another line
+of the zodiac nearer the earth.
+
+[96] According to the doctrines of Epicurus, none of these bodies
+themselves are clearly seen, but _simulacra ex corporibus effluentia_.
+
+[97] Epicurus taught his disciples in a garden.
+
+[98] By the word _Deus_, as often used by our author, we are to
+understand all the Gods in that theology then treated of, and not a
+single personal Deity.
+
+[99] The best commentators on this passage agree that Cicero does not
+mean that Aristotle affirmed that there was no such person as Orpheus,
+but that there was no such poet, and that the verse called Orphic was
+said to be the invention of another. The passage of Aristotle to which
+Cicero here alludes has, as Dr. Davis observes, been long lost.
+
+[100] A just proportion between the different sorts of beings.
+
+[101] Some give _quos non pudeat earum Epicuri vocum;_ but the best
+copies have not _non;_ nor would it be consistent with Cotta to say
+_quos non pudeat_, for he throughout represents Velleius as a perfect
+Epicurean in every article.
+
+[102] His country was Abdera, the natives of which were remarkable for
+their stupidity.
+
+[103] This passage will not admit of a translation answerable to the
+sense of the original. Cicero says the word _amicitia_ (friendship) is
+derived from _amor_ (love or affection).
+
+[104] This manner of speaking of Jupiter frequently occurs in Homer,
+
+    ----[Greek: pater andron te theon te,]
+
+and has been used by Virgil and other poets since Ennius.
+
+[105] Perses, or Perseus, the last king of Macedonia, was taken by
+Cnaeus Octavius, the praetor, and brought as prisoner to Paullus AEmilius,
+167 B.C.
+
+[106] An exemption from serving in the wars, and from paying public
+taxes.
+
+[107] Mopsus. There were two soothsayers of this name: the first was
+one of the Lapithae, son of Ampycus and Chloris, called also the son of
+Apollo and Hienantis; the other a son of Apollo and Manto, who is said
+to have founded Mallus, in Asia Minor, where his oracle existed as late
+as the time of Strabo.
+
+[108] Tiresias was the great Theban prophet at the time of the war of
+the Seven against Thebes.
+
+[109] Amphiaraus was King of Argos (he had been one of the Argonauts
+also). He was killed after the war of the Seven against Thebes, which
+he was compelled to join in by the treachery of his wife Eriphyle, by
+the earth opening and swallowing him up as he was fleeing from
+Periclymenus.
+
+[110] Calchas was the prophet of the Grecian army at the siege of Troy.
+
+[111] Helenus was a son of Priam and Hecuba. He is represented as a
+prophet in the Philoctetes of Sophocles. And in the AEneid he is also
+represented as king of part of Epirus, and as predicting to AEneas the
+dangers and fortunes which awaited him.
+
+[112] This short passage would be very obscure to the reader without an
+explanation from another of Cicero's treatises. The expression here,
+_ad investigandum suem regiones vineae terminavit_, which is a metaphor
+too bold, if it was not a sort of augural language, seems to me to have
+been the effect of carelessness in our great author; for Navius did not
+divide the regions, as he calls them, of the vine to find his sow, but
+to find a grape.
+
+[113] The Peremnia were a sort of auspices performed just before the
+passing a river.
+
+[114] The Acumina were a military auspices, and were partly performed
+on the point of a spear, from which they were called Acumina.
+
+[115] Those were called _testamenta in procinctu_, which were made by
+soldiers just before an engagement, in the presence of men called as
+witnesses.
+
+[116] This especially refers to the Decii, one of whom devoted himself
+for his country in the war with the Latins, 340 B.C., and his son
+imitated the action in the war with the Samnites, 295 B.C. Cicero
+(Tusc. i. 37) says that his son did the same thing in the war with
+Pyrrhus at the battle of Asculum, though in other places (De Off. iii.
+4) he speaks of only two Decii as having signalized themselves in this
+manner.
+
+[117] The Rogator, who collected the votes, and pronounced who was the
+person chosen. There were two sorts of Rogators; one was the officer
+here mentioned, and the other was the Rogator, or speaker of the whole
+assembly.
+
+[118] Which was Sardinia, as appears from one of Cicero's epistles to
+his brother Quintus.
+
+[119] Their sacred books of ceremonies.
+
+[120] The war between Octavius and Cinna, the consuls.
+
+[121] This, in the original, is a fragment of an old Latin verse,
+
+    _----Terram fumare calentem._
+
+[122] The Latin word is _principatus_, which exactly corresponds with
+the Greek word here used by Cicero; by which is to be understood the
+superior, the most prevailing excellence in every kind and species of
+things through the universe.
+
+[123] The passage of Aristotle to which Cicero here refers is lost.
+
+[124] He means the Epicureans.
+
+[125] Here the Stoic speaks too plain to be misunderstood. His world,
+his _mundus_, is the universe, and that universe is his great Deity,
+_in quo sit totius naturae principatus_, in which the superior
+excellence of universal nature consists.
+
+[126] Athens, the seat of learning and politeness, of which Balbus will
+not allow Epicurus to be worthy.
+
+[127] This is Pythagoras's doctrine, as appears in Diogenes Laertius.
+
+[128] He here alludes to mathematical and geometrical instruments.
+
+[129] Balbus here speaks of the fixed stars, and of the motions of the
+orbs of the planets. He here alludes, says M. Bonhier, to the different
+and diurnal motions of these stars; one sort from east to west, the
+other from one tropic to the other: and this is the construction which
+our learned and great geometrician and astronomer, Dr. Halley, made of
+this passage.
+
+[130] This mensuration of the year into three hundred and sixty-five
+days and near six hours (by the odd hours and minutes of which, in
+every fifth year, the _dies intercalaris_, or leap-year, is made) could
+not but be known, Dr. Halley states, by Hipparchus, as appears from the
+remains of that great astronomer of the ancients. We are inclined to
+think that Julius Caesar had divided the year, according to what we call
+the Julian year, before Cicero wrote this book; for we see, in the
+beginning of it, how pathetically he speaks of Caesar's usurpation.
+
+[131] The words of Censorinus, on this occasion, are to the same
+effect. The opinions of philosophers concerning this great year are
+very different; but the institution of it is ascribed to Democritus.
+
+[132] The zodiac.
+
+[133] Though Mars is said to hold his orbit in the zodiac with the
+rest, and to finish his revolution through the same orbit (that is, the
+zodiac) with the other two, yet Balbus means in a different line of the
+zodiac.
+
+[134] According to late observations, it never goes but a sign and a
+half from the sun.
+
+[135] These, Dr. Davis says, are "aerial fires;" concerning which he
+refers to the second book of Pliny.
+
+[136] In the Eunuch of Terence.
+
+[137] Bacchus.
+
+[138] The son of Ceres.
+
+[139] The books of Ceremonies.
+
+[140] This Libera is taken for Proserpine, who, with her brother Liber,
+was consecrated by the Romans; all which are parts of nature in
+prosopopoeias. Cicero, therefore, makes Balbus distinguish between the
+person Liber, or Bacchus, and the Liber which is a part of nature in
+prosopopoeia.
+
+[141] These allegorical fables are largely related by Hesiod in his
+Theogony.
+
+Horace says exactly the same thing:
+
+    Hac arte Pollux et vagus Hercules
+    Enisus arces attigit igneas:
+      Quos inter Augustus recumbens
+        Purpureo bibit ore nectar.
+    Hac te merentem, Bacche pater, tuae
+    Vexere tigres indocili jugum
+      Collo ferentes: hac Quirinus
+        Martis equis Acheronta fugit.--Hor. iii. 3. 9.
+
+[142] Cicero means by _conversis casibus_, varying the cases from the
+common rule of declension; that is, by departing from the true
+grammatical rules of speech; for if we would keep to it, we should
+decline the word _Jupiter_, _Jupiteris_ in the second case, etc.
+
+[143] _Pater divumque hominumque._
+
+[144] The common reading is, _planiusque alio loco idem;_ which, as Dr.
+Davis observes, is absurd; therefore, in his note, he prefers _planius
+quam alia loco idem_, from two copies, in which sense I have translated
+it.
+
+[145] From the verb _gero_, to bear.
+
+[146] That is, "mother earth."
+
+[147] Janus is said to be the first who erected temples in Italy, and
+instituted religious rites, and from whom the first month in the Roman
+calendar is derived.
+
+[148] _Stellae vagantes._
+
+[149] _Noctu quasi diem efficeret._ Ben Jonson says the same thing:
+
+    Thou that mak'st a day of night,
+    Goddess excellently bright.--_Ode to the Moon._
+
+[150] Olympias was the mother of Alexander.
+
+[151] Venus is here said to be one of the names of Diana, because _ad
+res omnes veniret;_ but she is not supposed to be the same as the
+mother of Cupid.
+
+[152] Here is a mistake, as Fulvius Ursinus observes; for the discourse
+seems to be continued in one day, as appears from the beginning of this
+book. This may be an inadvertency of Cicero.
+
+[153] The senate of Athens was so called from the words [Greek: Areios
+Pagos], the Village, some say the Hill, of Mars.
+
+[154] Epicurus.
+
+[155] The Stoics.
+
+[156] By _nulla cohaerendi natura_--if it is the right, as it is the
+common reading--Cicero must mean the same as by _nulla crescendi
+natura_, or _coalescendi_, either of which Lambinus proposes; for, as
+the same learned critic well observes, is there not a cohesion of parts
+in a clod, or in a piece of stone? Our learned Walker proposes _sola
+cohaerendi natura_, which mends the sense very much; and I wish he had
+the authority of any copy for it.
+
+[157] Nasica Scipio, the censor, is said to have been the first who
+made a water-clock in Rome.
+
+[158] The Epicureans.
+
+[159] An old Latin poet, commended by Quintilian for the gravity of his
+sense and his loftiness of style.
+
+[160] The shepherd is here supposed to take the stem or beak of the
+ship for the mouth, from which the roaring voices of the sailors came.
+_Rostrum_ is here a lucky word to put in the mouth of one who never saw
+a ship before, as it is used for the beak of a bird, the snout of a
+beast or fish, and for the stem of a ship.
+
+[161] The Epicureans.
+
+[162] Greek, [Greek: aer]; Latin, _aer_.
+
+[163] The treatise of Aristotle, from whence this is taken, is lost.
+
+[164] To the universe the Stoics certainly annexed the idea of a
+limited space, otherwise they could not have talked of a middle; for
+there can be no middle but of a limited space: infinite space can have
+no middle, there being infinite extension from every part.
+
+[165] These two contrary reversions are from the tropics of Cancer and
+Capricorn. They are the extreme bounds of the sun's course. The reader
+must observe that the astronomical parts of this book are introduced by
+the Stoic as proofs of design and reason in the universe; and,
+notwithstanding the errors in his planetary system, his intent is well
+answered, because all he means is that the regular motions of the
+heavenly bodies, and their dependencies, are demonstrations of a divine
+mind. The inference proposed to be drawn from his astronomical
+observations is as just as if his system was in every part
+unexceptionably right: the same may be said of his anatomical
+observations.
+
+[166] In the zodiac.
+
+[167] Ibid.
+
+[168] These verses of Cicero are a translation from a Greek poem of
+Aratus, called the Phaenomena.
+
+[169] The fixed stars.
+
+[170] The arctic and antarctic poles.
+
+[171] The two Arctoi are northern constellations. Cynosura is what we
+call the Lesser Bear; Helice, the Greater Bear; in Latin, _Ursa Minor_
+and _Ursa Major_.
+
+[172] These stars in the Greater Bear are vulgarly called the "Seven
+Stars," or the "Northern Wain;" by the Latins, "Septentriones."
+
+[173] The Lesser Bear.
+
+[174] The Greater Bear.
+
+[175] Exactly agreeable to this and the following description of the
+Dragon is the same northern constellation described in the map by
+Flamsteed in his Atlas Coelestis; and all the figures here described by
+Aratus nearly agree with the maps of the same constellations in the
+Atlas Coelestis, though they are not all placed precisely alike.
+
+[176] The tail of the Greater Bear.
+
+[177] That is, in Macedon, where Aratus lived.
+
+[178] The true interpretation of this passage is as follows: Here in
+Macedon, says Aratus, the head of the Dragon does not entirely immerge
+itself in the ocean, but only touches the superficies of it. By _ortus_
+and _obitus_ I doubt not but Cicero meant, agreeable to Aratus, those
+parts which arise to view, and those which are removed from sight.
+
+[179] These are two northern constellations. Engonasis, in some
+catalogues called Hercules, because he is figured kneeling [Greek: en
+gonasin] (on his knees). [Greek: Engonasin kaleous'], as Aratus says,
+they call Engonasis.
+
+[180] The crown is placed under the feet of Hercules in the Atlas
+Coelestis; but Ophiuchus ([Greek: Ophiouchos]), the Snake-holder, is
+placed in the map by Flamsteed as described here by Aratus; and their
+heads almost meet.
+
+[181] The Scorpion. Ophiuchus, though a northern constellation, is not
+far from that part of the zodiac where the Scorpion is, which is one of
+the six southern signs.
+
+[182] The Wain of seven stars.
+
+[183] The Wain-driver. This northern constellation is, in our present
+maps, figured with a club in his right hand behind the Greater Bear.
+
+[184] In some modern maps Arcturus, a star of the first magnitude, is
+placed in the belt that is round the waist of Booetes. Cicero says
+_subter praecordia_, which is about the waist; and Aratus says [Greek:
+hypo zone], under the belt.
+
+[185] _Sub caput Arcti_, under the head of the Greater Bear.
+
+[186] The Crab is, by the ancients and moderns, placed in the zodiac,
+as here, between the Twins and the Lion; and they are all three
+northern signs.
+
+[187] The Twins are placed in the zodiac with the side of one to the
+northern hemisphere, and the side of the other to the southern
+hemisphere. Auriga, the Charioteer, is placed in the northern
+hemisphere near the zodiac, by the Twins; and at the head of the
+Charioteer is Helice, the Greater Bear, placed; and the Goat is a
+bright star of the first magnitude placed on the left shoulder of this
+northern constellation, and called _Capra_, the Goat. _Hoedi_, the
+Kids, are two more stars of the same constellation.
+
+[188] A constellation; one of the northern signs in the zodiac, in
+which the Hyades are placed.
+
+[189] One of the feet of Cepheus, a northern constellation, is under
+the tail of the Lesser Bear.
+
+[190] Grotius, and after him Dr. Davis, and other learned men, read
+_Cassiepea_, after the Greek [Greek: Kassiepeia], and reject the common
+reading, _Cassiopea_.
+
+[191] These northern constellations here mentioned have been always
+placed together as one family with Cepheus and Perseus, as they are in
+our modern maps.
+
+[192] This alludes to the fable of Perseus and Andromeda.
+
+[193] Pegasus, who is one of Perseus and Andromeda's family.
+
+[194] That is, with wings.
+
+[195] _Aries_, the Ram, is the first northern sign in the zodiac;
+_Pisces_, the Fishes, the last southern sign; therefore they must be
+near one another, as they are in a circle or belt. In Flamsteed's Atlas
+Coelestis one of the Fishes is near the head of the Ram, and the other
+near the Urn of Aquarius.
+
+[196] These are called Virgiliae by Cicero; by Aratus, the Pleiades,
+[Greek: Pleiades]; and they are placed at the neck of the Bull; and one
+of Perseus's feet touches the Bull in the Atlas Coelestis.
+
+[197] This northern constellation is called Fides by Cicero; but it
+must be the same with Lyra; because Lyra is placed in our maps as Fides
+is here.
+
+[198] This is called Ales Avis by Cicero; and I doubt not but the
+northern constellation Cygnus is here to be understood, for the
+description and place of the Swan in the Atlas Coelestis are the same
+which Ales Avis has here.
+
+[199] Pegasus.
+
+[200] The Water-bearer, one of the six southern signs in the zodiac: he
+is described in our maps pouring water out of an urn, and leaning with
+one hand on the tail of Capricorn, another southern sign.
+
+[201] When the sun is in Capricorn, the days are at the shortest; and
+when in Cancer, at the longest.
+
+[202] One of the six southern signs.
+
+[203] Sagittarius, another southern sign.
+
+[204] A northern constellation.
+
+[205] A northern constellation.
+
+[206] A southern constellation.
+
+[207] This is Canis Major, a southern constellation. Orion and the Dog
+are named together by Hesiod, who flourished many hundred years before
+Cicero or Aratus.
+
+[208] A southern constellation, placed as here in the Atlas Coelestis.
+
+[209] A southern constellation, so called from the ship Argo, in which
+Jason and the rest of the Argonauts sailed on their expedition to
+Colchos.
+
+[210] The Ram is the first of the northern signs in the zodiac; and the
+last southern sign is the Fishes; which two signs, meeting in the
+zodiac, cover the constellation called Argo.
+
+[211] The river Eridanus, a southern constellation.
+
+[212] A southern constellation.
+
+[213] This is called the Scorpion in the original of Aratus.
+
+[214] A southern constellation.
+
+[215] A southern constellation.
+
+[216] The Serpent is not mentioned in Cicero's translation; but it is
+in the original of Aratus.
+
+[217] A southern constellation.
+
+[218] The Goblet, or Cup, a southern constellation.
+
+[219] A southern constellation.
+
+[220] Antecanis, a southern constellation, is the Little Dog, and
+called _Antecanis_ in Latin, and [Greek: Prokyon] in Greek, because he
+rises before the other Dog.
+
+[221] Pansaetius, a Stoic philosopher.
+
+[222] Mercury and Venus.
+
+[223] The proboscis of the elephant is frequently called a hand,
+because it is as useful to him as one. "They breathe, drink, and smell,
+with what may not be improperly called a hand," says Pliny, bk. viii.
+c. 10.--DAVIS.
+
+[224] The passage of Aristotle's works to which Cicero here alludes is
+entirely lost; but Plutarch gives a similar account.
+
+[225] Balbus does not tell us the remedy which the panther makes use
+of; but Pliny is not quite so delicate: he says, _excrementis hominis
+sibi medetur_.
+
+[226] Aristotle says they purge themselves with this herb after they
+fawn. Pliny says both before and after.
+
+[227] The cuttle-fish has a bag at its neck, the black blood of which
+the Romans used for ink. It was called _atramentum_.
+
+[228] The Euphrates is said to carry into Mesopotamia a large quantity
+of citrons, with which it covers the fields.
+
+[229] Q. Curtius, and some other authors, say the Ganges is the largest
+river in India; but Ammianus Marcellinus concurs with Cicero in calling
+the river Indus the largest of all rivers.
+
+[230] These Etesian winds return periodically once a year, and blow at
+certain seasons, and for a certain time.
+
+[231] Some read _mollitur_, and some _molitur;_ the latter of which P.
+Manucius justly prefers, from the verb _molo_, _molis;_ from whence,
+says he, _molares dentes_, the grinders.
+
+[232] The weasand, or windpipe.
+
+[233] The epiglottis, which is a cartilaginous flap in the shape of a
+tongue, and therefore called so.
+
+[234] Cicero is here giving the opinion of the ancients concerning the
+passage of the chyle till it is converted to blood.
+
+[235] What Cicero here calls the ventricles of the heart are likewise
+called auricles, of which there is the right and left.
+
+[236] The Stoics and Peripatetics said that the nerves, veins, and
+arteries come directly from the heart. According to the anatomy of the
+moderns, they come from the brain.
+
+[237] The author means all musical instruments, whether string or wind
+instruments, which are hollow and tortuous.
+
+[238] The Latin version of Cicero is a translation from the Greek of
+Aratus.
+
+[239] Chrysippus's meaning is, that the swine is so inactive and
+slothful a beast that life seems to be of no use to it but to keep it
+from putrefaction, as salt keeps dead flesh.
+
+[240] _Ales_, in the general signification, is any large bird; and
+_oscinis_ is any singing bird. But they here mean those birds which are
+used in augury: _alites_ are the birds whose flight was observed by the
+augurs, and _oscines_ the birds from whose voices they augured.
+
+[241] As the Academics doubted everything, it was indifferent to them
+which side of a question they took.
+
+[242] The keepers and interpreters of the Sibylline oracles were the
+Quindecimviri.
+
+[243] The popular name of Jupiter in Rome, being looked upon as
+defender of the Capitol (in which he was placed), and stayer of the
+State.
+
+[244] Some passages of the original are here wanting. Cotta continues
+speaking against the doctrine of the Stoics.
+
+[245] The word _sortes_ is often used for the answers of the oracles,
+or, rather, for the rolls in which the answers were written.
+
+[246] Three of this eminent family sacrificed themselves for their
+country; the father in the Latin war, the son in the Tuscan war, and
+the grandson in the war with Pyrrhus.
+
+[247] The Straits of Gibraltar.
+
+[248] The common reading is, _ex quo anima dicitur;_ but Dr. Davis and
+M. Bouhier prefer _animal_, though they keep _anima_ in the text,
+because our author says elsewhere, _animum ex anima dictum_, Tusc. I.
+1. Cicero is not here to be accused of contradictions, for we are to
+consider that he speaks in the characters of other persons; but there
+appears to be nothing in these two passages irreconcilable, and
+probably _anima_ is the right word here.
+
+[249] He is said to have led a colony from Greece into Caria, in Asia,
+and to have built a town, and called it after his own name, for which
+his countrymen paid him divine honors after his death.
+
+[250] Our great author is under a mistake here. Homer does not say he
+met Hercules himself, but his [Greek: Eidolon], his "visionary
+likeness;" and adds that he himself
+
+                   [Greek: met' athanatoisi theoisi
+    terpetai en thalies, kai echei kallisphyrou Heben,
+    paida Dios megaloio kai Heres chrysopedilou.]
+
+which Pope translates--
+
+    A shadowy form, for high in heaven's abodes
+    Himself resides, a God among the Gods;
+    There, in the bright assemblies of the skies,
+    He nectar quaffs, and Hebe crowns his joys.
+
+[251] They are said to have been the first workers in iron. They were
+called Idaei, because they inhabited about Mount Ida in Crete, and
+Dactyli, from [Greek: daktyloi] (the fingers), their number being five.
+
+[252] From whom, some say, the city of that name was called.
+
+[253] Capedunculae seem to have been bowls or cups, with handles on each
+side, set apart for the use of the altar.--DAVIS.
+
+[254] See Cicero de Divinatione, and Ovid. Fast.
+
+[255] In the consulship of Piso and Gabinius sacrifices to Serapis and
+Isis were prohibited in Rome; but the Roman people afterward placed
+them again in the number of their gods. See Tertullian's Apol. and his
+first book Ad Nationes, and Arnobius, lib. 2.--DAVIS.
+
+[256] In some copies Circe, Pasiphae, and AEa are mentioned together;
+but AEa is rejected by the most judicious editors.
+
+[257] They were three, and are said to have averted a plague by
+offering themselves a sacrifice.
+
+[258] So called from the Greek word [Greek: thaumazo], to wonder.
+
+[259] She was first called Geres, from _gero_, to bear.
+
+[260] The word is _precatione_, which means the books or forms of
+prayers used by the augurs.
+
+[261] Cotta's intent here, as well as in other places, is to show how
+unphilosophical their civil theology was, and with what confusions it
+was embarrassed; which design of the Academic the reader should
+carefully keep in view, or he will lose the chain of argument.
+
+[262] Anactes, [Greek: Anaktes], was a general name for all kings, as
+we find in the oldest Greek writers, and particularly in Homer.
+
+[263] The common reading is Aleo; but we follow Lambinus and Davis, who
+had the authority of the best manuscript copies.
+
+[264] Some prefer Phthas to Opas (see Dr. Davis's edition); but Opas is
+the generally received reading.
+
+[265] The Lipari Isles.
+
+[266] A town in Arcadia.
+
+[267] In Arcadia.
+
+[268] A northern people.
+
+[269] So called from the Greek word [Greek: nomos], _lex_, a law.
+
+[270] He is called [Greek: Opis] in some old Greek fragments, and
+[Greek: Oupis] by Callimachus in his hymn on Diana.
+
+[271] [Greek: Sabazios], Sabazius, is one of the names used for
+Bacchus.
+
+[272] Here is a wide chasm in the original. What is lost probably may
+have contained great part of Cotta's arguments against the providence
+of the Stoics.
+
+[273] Here is one expression in the quotation from Caecilius that is not
+commonly met with, which is _praestigias praestrinxit;_ Lambinus gives
+_praestinxit_, for the sake, I suppose, of playing on words, because it
+might then be translated, "He has deluded my delusions, or stratagems;"
+but _praestrinxit_ is certainly the right reading.
+
+[274] The ancient Romans had a judicial as well as a military praetor;
+and he sat, with inferior judges attending him, like one of our
+chief-justices. _Sessum it praetor_, which I doubt not is the right
+reading, Lambinus restored from an old copy. The common reading was
+_sessum ite precor_.
+
+[275] Picenum was a region of Italy.
+
+[276] The _sex primi_ were general receivers of all taxes and tributes;
+and they were obliged to make good, out of their own fortunes, whatever
+deficiencies were in the public treasury.
+
+[277] The Laetorian Law was a security for those under age against
+extortioners, etc. By this law all debts contracted under twenty-five
+years of age were void.
+
+[278] This is from Ennius--
+
+    Utinam ne in nemore Pelio securibus
+    Caesa cecidisset abiegna ad terram trabes.
+
+Translated from the beginning of the Medea of Euripides--
+
+    [Greek: Med' en napaisi Pelion pesein pote
+    tmetheisa peuke.]
+
+[279] Q. Fabius Maximus, surnamed Cunctator.
+
+[280] Diogenes Laertius says he was pounded to death in a stone mortar
+by command of Nicocreon, tyrant of Cyprus.
+
+[281] Elea, a city of Lucania, in Italy. The manner in which Zeno was
+put to death is, according to Diogenes Laertius, uncertain.
+
+[282] This great and good man was accused of destroying the divinity of
+the Gods of his country. He was condemned, and died by drinking a glass
+of poison.
+
+[283] Tyrant of Sicily.
+
+[284] The common reading is, _in tympanidis rogum inlatus est_. This
+passage has been the occasion of as many different opinions concerning
+both the reading and the sense as any passage in the whole treatise.
+_Tympanum_ is used for a timbrel or drum, _tympanidia_ a diminutive of
+it. Lambinus says _tympana_ "were sticks with which the tyrant used to
+beat the condemned." P. Victorius substitutes _tyrannidis_ for
+_tympanidis_.
+
+[285] The original is _de amissa salute;_ which means the sentence of
+banishment among the Romans, in which was contained the loss of goods
+and estate, and the privileges of a Roman; and in this sense L'Abbe
+d'Olivet translates it.
+
+[286] The forty-seventh proposition of the first book of Euclid is
+unanimously ascribed to him by the ancients. Dr. Wotton, in his
+Reflections upon Ancient and Modern Learning, says, "It is indeed a
+very noble proposition, the foundation of trigonometry, of universal
+and various use in those curious speculations about incommensurable
+numbers."
+
+[287] These votive tables, or pictures, were hung up in the temples.
+
+[288] This passage is a fragment from a tragedy of Attius.
+
+[289] Hipponax was a poet at Ephesus, and so deformed that Bupalus drew
+a picture of him to provoke laughter; for which Hipponax is said to
+have written such keen iambics on the painter that he hanged himself.
+
+Lycambes had promised Archilochus the poet to marry his daughter to
+him, but afterward retracted his promise, and refused her; upon which
+Archilochus is said to have published a satire in iambic verse that
+provoked him to hang himself.
+
+[290] Cicero refers here to an oracle approving of his laws, and
+promising Sparta prosperity as long as they were obeyed, which Lycurgus
+procured from Delphi.
+
+[291] _Pro aris et focis_ is a proverbial expression. The Romans, when
+they would say their all was at stake, could not express it stronger
+than by saying they contended _pro aris et focis_, for religion and
+their firesides, or, as we express it, for religion and property.
+
+[292] Cicero, who was an Academic, gives his opinion according to the
+manner of the Academics, who looked upon probability, and a resemblance
+of truth, as the utmost they could arrive at.
+
+[293] _I.e._, Regulus.
+
+[294] _I.e._, Fabius.
+
+[295] It is unnecessary to give an account of the other names here
+mentioned; but that of Laenas is probably less known. He was Publius
+Popillius Laenas, consul 132 B.C., the year after the death of Tiberius
+Gracchus, and it became his duty to prosecute the accomplices of
+Gracchus, for which he was afterward attacked by Caius Gracchus with
+such animosity that he withdrew into voluntary exile. Cicero pays a
+tribute to the energy of Opimius in the first Oration against Catiline,
+c. iii.
+
+[296] This phenomenon of the parhelion, or mock sun, which so puzzled
+Cicero's interlocutors, has been very satisfactorily explained by
+modern science. The parhelia are formed by the reflection of the
+sunbeams on a cloud properly situated. They usually accompany the
+coronae, or luminous circles, and are placed in the same circumference,
+and at the same height. Their colors resemble that of the rainbow; the
+red and yellow are towards the side of the sun, and the blue and violet
+on the other. There are, however, coronae sometimes seen without
+parhelia, and _vice versa_. Parhelia are double, triple, etc., and in
+1629, a parhelion of five suns was seen at Rome, and another of six
+suns at Arles, 1666.
+
+[297] There is a little uncertainty as to what this age was, but it was
+probably about twenty-five.
+
+[298] Cicero here gives a very exact and correct account of the
+planetarium of Archimedes, which is so often noticed by the ancient
+astronomers. It no doubt corresponded in a great measure to our modern
+planetarium, or orrery, invented by the earl of that name. This
+elaborate machine, whose manufacture requires the most exact and
+critical science, is of the greatest service to those who study the
+revolutions of the stars, for astronomic, astrologic, or meteorologic
+purposes.
+
+[299] The end of the fourteenth chapter and the first words of the
+fifteenth are lost; but it is plain that in the fifteenth it is Scipio
+who is speaking.
+
+[300] There is evidently some error in the text here, for Ennius was
+born 515 A.U.C., was a personal friend of the elder Africanus, and died
+about 575 A.U.C., so that it is plain that we ought to read in the text
+550, not 350.
+
+[301] Two pages are lost here. Afterward it is again Scipio who is
+speaking.
+
+[302] Two pages are lost here.
+
+[303] Both Ennius and Naevius wrote tragedies called "Iphigenia." Mai
+thinks the text here corrupt, and expresses some doubt whether there is
+a quotation here at all.
+
+[304] He means Scipio himself.
+
+[305] There is again a hiatus. What follows is spoken by Laelius.
+
+[306] Again two pages are lost.
+
+[307] Again two pages are lost. It is evident that Scipio is speaking
+again in cap. xxxi.
+
+[308] Again two pages are lost.
+
+[309] Again two pages are lost.
+
+[310] Here four pages are lost.
+
+[311] Here four pages are lost.
+
+[312] Two pages are missing here.
+
+[313] A name of Neptune.
+
+[314] About seven lines are lost here, and there is a great deal of
+corruption and imperfection in the next few sentences.
+
+[315] Two pages are lost here.
+
+[316] The _Lex Curiata de Imperio_, so often mentioned here, was the
+same as the _Auctoritas Patrum_, and was necessary in order to confer
+upon the dictator, consuls, and other magistrates the _imperium_, or
+military command: without this they had only a _potestas_, or civil
+authority, and could not meddle with military affairs.
+
+[317] Two pages are missing here.
+
+[318] Here two pages are missing.
+
+[319] I have translated this very corrupt passage according to
+Niebuhr's emendation.
+
+[320] Assiduus, ab aere dando.
+
+[321] Proletarii, a prole.
+
+[322] Here four pages are missing.
+
+[323] Two pages are missing here.
+
+[324] Two pages are missing here.
+
+[325] Here twelve pages are missing.
+
+[326] Sixteen pages are missing here.
+
+[327] Here eight pages are missing.
+
+[328] A great many pages are missing here.
+
+[329] Several pages are lost here; the passage in brackets is found in
+Nonius under the word "exulto."
+
+[330] This and other chapters printed in smaller type are generally
+presumed to be of doubtful authenticity.
+
+[331] The beginning of this book is lost. The two first paragraphs
+come, the one from St. Augustine, the other from Lactantius.
+
+[332] Eight or nine pages are lost here.
+
+[333] Here six pages are lost.
+
+[334] Here twelve pages are missing.
+
+[335] We have been obliged to insert two or three of these sentences
+between brackets, which are not found in the original, for the sake of
+showing the drift of the arguments of Philus. He himself was fully
+convinced that justice and morality were of eternal and immutable
+obligation, and that the best interests of all beings lie in their
+perpetual development and application. This eternity of Justice is
+beautifully illustrated by Montesquieu. "Long," says he, "before
+positive laws were instituted, the moral relations of justice were
+absolute and universal. To say that there were no justice or injustice
+but that which depends on the injunctions or prohibitions of positive
+laws, is to say that the radii which spring from a centre are not equal
+till we have formed a circle to illustrate the proposition. We must,
+therefore, acknowledge that the relations of equity were antecedent to
+the positive laws which corroborated them." But though Philus was fully
+convinced of this, in order to give his friends Scipio and Laelius an
+opportunity of proving it, he frankly brings forward every argument for
+injustice that sophistry had ever cast in the teeth of reason.--_By the
+original Translator_.
+
+[336] Here four pages are missing. The following sentence is preserved
+in Nonius.
+
+[337] Two pages are missing here.
+
+[338] Several pages are missing here.
+
+[339] He means Alexander the Great.
+
+[340] Six or eight pages are lost here.
+
+[341] A great many pages are missing here.
+
+[342] Six or eight pages are missing here.
+
+[343] Several pages are lost here.
+
+[344] This and the following chapters are not the actual words of
+Cicero, but quotations by Lactantius and Augustine of what they affirm
+that he said.
+
+[345] Twelve pages are missing here.
+
+[346] Eight pages are missing here.
+
+[347] Six or eight pages are missing here.
+
+[348] Catadupa, from [Greek: kata] and [Greek: doipos], noise.
+
+
+
+
+
+
+End of the Project Gutenberg EBook of Cicero's Tusculan Disputations
+by Marcus Tullius Cicero
+
+*** END OF THIS PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK CICERO'S TUSCULAN DISPUTATIONS ***
+
+***** This file should be named 14988.txt or 14988.zip *****
+This and all associated files of various formats will be found in:
+        https://www.gutenberg.org/1/4/9/8/14988/
+
+Produced by Ted Garvin, Hagen von Eitzen and the PG Online Distributed
+Proofreading Team.
+
+
+Updated editions will replace the previous one--the old editions
+will be renamed.
+
+Creating the works from public domain print editions means that no
+one owns a United States copyright in these works, so the Foundation
+(and you!) can copy and distribute it in the United States without
+permission and without paying copyright royalties.  Special rules,
+set forth in the General Terms of Use part of this license, apply to
+copying and distributing Project Gutenberg-tm electronic works to
+protect the PROJECT GUTENBERG-tm concept and trademark.  Project
+Gutenberg is a registered trademark, and may not be used if you
+charge for the eBooks, unless you receive specific permission.  If you
+do not charge anything for copies of this eBook, complying with the
+rules is very easy.  You may use this eBook for nearly any purpose
+such as creation of derivative works, reports, performances and
+research.  They may be modified and printed and given away--you may do
+practically ANYTHING with public domain eBooks.  Redistribution is
+subject to the trademark license, especially commercial
+redistribution.
+
+
+
+*** START: FULL LICENSE ***
+
+THE FULL PROJECT GUTENBERG LICENSE
+PLEASE READ THIS BEFORE YOU DISTRIBUTE OR USE THIS WORK
+
+To protect the Project Gutenberg-tm mission of promoting the free
+distribution of electronic works, by using or distributing this work
+(or any other work associated in any way with the phrase "Project
+Gutenberg"), you agree to comply with all the terms of the Full Project
+Gutenberg-tm License (available with this file or online at
+https://gutenberg.org/license).
+
+
+Section 1.  General Terms of Use and Redistributing Project Gutenberg-tm
+electronic works
+
+1.A.  By reading or using any part of this Project Gutenberg-tm
+electronic work, you indicate that you have read, understand, agree to
+and accept all the terms of this license and intellectual property
+(trademark/copyright) agreement.  If you do not agree to abide by all
+the terms of this agreement, you must cease using and return or destroy
+all copies of Project Gutenberg-tm electronic works in your possession.
+If you paid a fee for obtaining a copy of or access to a Project
+Gutenberg-tm electronic work and you do not agree to be bound by the
+terms of this agreement, you may obtain a refund from the person or
+entity to whom you paid the fee as set forth in paragraph 1.E.8.
+
+1.B.  "Project Gutenberg" is a registered trademark.  It may only be
+used on or associated in any way with an electronic work by people who
+agree to be bound by the terms of this agreement.  There are a few
+things that you can do with most Project Gutenberg-tm electronic works
+even without complying with the full terms of this agreement.  See
+paragraph 1.C below.  There are a lot of things you can do with Project
+Gutenberg-tm electronic works if you follow the terms of this agreement
+and help preserve free future access to Project Gutenberg-tm electronic
+works.  See paragraph 1.E below.
+
+1.C.  The Project Gutenberg Literary Archive Foundation ("the Foundation"
+or PGLAF), owns a compilation copyright in the collection of Project
+Gutenberg-tm electronic works.  Nearly all the individual works in the
+collection are in the public domain in the United States.  If an
+individual work is in the public domain in the United States and you are
+located in the United States, we do not claim a right to prevent you from
+copying, distributing, performing, displaying or creating derivative
+works based on the work as long as all references to Project Gutenberg
+are removed.  Of course, we hope that you will support the Project
+Gutenberg-tm mission of promoting free access to electronic works by
+freely sharing Project Gutenberg-tm works in compliance with the terms of
+this agreement for keeping the Project Gutenberg-tm name associated with
+the work.  You can easily comply with the terms of this agreement by
+keeping this work in the same format with its attached full Project
+Gutenberg-tm License when you share it without charge with others.
+
+1.D.  The copyright laws of the place where you are located also govern
+what you can do with this work.  Copyright laws in most countries are in
+a constant state of change.  If you are outside the United States, check
+the laws of your country in addition to the terms of this agreement
+before downloading, copying, displaying, performing, distributing or
+creating derivative works based on this work or any other Project
+Gutenberg-tm work.  The Foundation makes no representations concerning
+the copyright status of any work in any country outside the United
+States.
+
+1.E.  Unless you have removed all references to Project Gutenberg:
+
+1.E.1.  The following sentence, with active links to, or other immediate
+access to, the full Project Gutenberg-tm License must appear prominently
+whenever any copy of a Project Gutenberg-tm work (any work on which the
+phrase "Project Gutenberg" appears, or with which the phrase "Project
+Gutenberg" is associated) is accessed, displayed, performed, viewed,
+copied or distributed:
+
+This eBook is for the use of anyone anywhere at no cost and with
+almost no restrictions whatsoever.  You may copy it, give it away or
+re-use it under the terms of the Project Gutenberg License included
+with this eBook or online at www.gutenberg.org
+
+1.E.2.  If an individual Project Gutenberg-tm electronic work is derived
+from the public domain (does not contain a notice indicating that it is
+posted with permission of the copyright holder), the work can be copied
+and distributed to anyone in the United States without paying any fees
+or charges.  If you are redistributing or providing access to a work
+with the phrase "Project Gutenberg" associated with or appearing on the
+work, you must comply either with the requirements of paragraphs 1.E.1
+through 1.E.7 or obtain permission for the use of the work and the
+Project Gutenberg-tm trademark as set forth in paragraphs 1.E.8 or
+1.E.9.
+
+1.E.3.  If an individual Project Gutenberg-tm electronic work is posted
+with the permission of the copyright holder, your use and distribution
+must comply with both paragraphs 1.E.1 through 1.E.7 and any additional
+terms imposed by the copyright holder.  Additional terms will be linked
+to the Project Gutenberg-tm License for all works posted with the
+permission of the copyright holder found at the beginning of this work.
+
+1.E.4.  Do not unlink or detach or remove the full Project Gutenberg-tm
+License terms from this work, or any files containing a part of this
+work or any other work associated with Project Gutenberg-tm.
+
+1.E.5.  Do not copy, display, perform, distribute or redistribute this
+electronic work, or any part of this electronic work, without
+prominently displaying the sentence set forth in paragraph 1.E.1 with
+active links or immediate access to the full terms of the Project
+Gutenberg-tm License.
+
+1.E.6.  You may convert to and distribute this work in any binary,
+compressed, marked up, nonproprietary or proprietary form, including any
+word processing or hypertext form.  However, if you provide access to or
+distribute copies of a Project Gutenberg-tm work in a format other than
+"Plain Vanilla ASCII" or other format used in the official version
+posted on the official Project Gutenberg-tm web site (www.gutenberg.org),
+you must, at no additional cost, fee or expense to the user, provide a
+copy, a means of exporting a copy, or a means of obtaining a copy upon
+request, of the work in its original "Plain Vanilla ASCII" or other
+form.  Any alternate format must include the full Project Gutenberg-tm
+License as specified in paragraph 1.E.1.
+
+1.E.7.  Do not charge a fee for access to, viewing, displaying,
+performing, copying or distributing any Project Gutenberg-tm works
+unless you comply with paragraph 1.E.8 or 1.E.9.
+
+1.E.8.  You may charge a reasonable fee for copies of or providing
+access to or distributing Project Gutenberg-tm electronic works provided
+that
+
+- You pay a royalty fee of 20% of the gross profits you derive from
+     the use of Project Gutenberg-tm works calculated using the method
+     you already use to calculate your applicable taxes.  The fee is
+     owed to the owner of the Project Gutenberg-tm trademark, but he
+     has agreed to donate royalties under this paragraph to the
+     Project Gutenberg Literary Archive Foundation.  Royalty payments
+     must be paid within 60 days following each date on which you
+     prepare (or are legally required to prepare) your periodic tax
+     returns.  Royalty payments should be clearly marked as such and
+     sent to the Project Gutenberg Literary Archive Foundation at the
+     address specified in Section 4, "Information about donations to
+     the Project Gutenberg Literary Archive Foundation."
+
+- You provide a full refund of any money paid by a user who notifies
+     you in writing (or by e-mail) within 30 days of receipt that s/he
+     does not agree to the terms of the full Project Gutenberg-tm
+     License.  You must require such a user to return or
+     destroy all copies of the works possessed in a physical medium
+     and discontinue all use of and all access to other copies of
+     Project Gutenberg-tm works.
+
+- You provide, in accordance with paragraph 1.F.3, a full refund of any
+     money paid for a work or a replacement copy, if a defect in the
+     electronic work is discovered and reported to you within 90 days
+     of receipt of the work.
+
+- You comply with all other terms of this agreement for free
+     distribution of Project Gutenberg-tm works.
+
+1.E.9.  If you wish to charge a fee or distribute a Project Gutenberg-tm
+electronic work or group of works on different terms than are set
+forth in this agreement, you must obtain permission in writing from
+both the Project Gutenberg Literary Archive Foundation and Michael
+Hart, the owner of the Project Gutenberg-tm trademark.  Contact the
+Foundation as set forth in Section 3 below.
+
+1.F.
+
+1.F.1.  Project Gutenberg volunteers and employees expend considerable
+effort to identify, do copyright research on, transcribe and proofread
+public domain works in creating the Project Gutenberg-tm
+collection.  Despite these efforts, Project Gutenberg-tm electronic
+works, and the medium on which they may be stored, may contain
+"Defects," such as, but not limited to, incomplete, inaccurate or
+corrupt data, transcription errors, a copyright or other intellectual
+property infringement, a defective or damaged disk or other medium, a
+computer virus, or computer codes that damage or cannot be read by
+your equipment.
+
+1.F.2.  LIMITED WARRANTY, DISCLAIMER OF DAMAGES - Except for the "Right
+of Replacement or Refund" described in paragraph 1.F.3, the Project
+Gutenberg Literary Archive Foundation, the owner of the Project
+Gutenberg-tm trademark, and any other party distributing a Project
+Gutenberg-tm electronic work under this agreement, disclaim all
+liability to you for damages, costs and expenses, including legal
+fees.  YOU AGREE THAT YOU HAVE NO REMEDIES FOR NEGLIGENCE, STRICT
+LIABILITY, BREACH OF WARRANTY OR BREACH OF CONTRACT EXCEPT THOSE
+PROVIDED IN PARAGRAPH F3.  YOU AGREE THAT THE FOUNDATION, THE
+TRADEMARK OWNER, AND ANY DISTRIBUTOR UNDER THIS AGREEMENT WILL NOT BE
+LIABLE TO YOU FOR ACTUAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, CONSEQUENTIAL, PUNITIVE OR
+INCIDENTAL DAMAGES EVEN IF YOU GIVE NOTICE OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH
+DAMAGE.
+
+1.F.3.  LIMITED RIGHT OF REPLACEMENT OR REFUND - If you discover a
+defect in this electronic work within 90 days of receiving it, you can
+receive a refund of the money (if any) you paid for it by sending a
+written explanation to the person you received the work from.  If you
+received the work on a physical medium, you must return the medium with
+your written explanation.  The person or entity that provided you with
+the defective work may elect to provide a replacement copy in lieu of a
+refund.  If you received the work electronically, the person or entity
+providing it to you may choose to give you a second opportunity to
+receive the work electronically in lieu of a refund.  If the second copy
+is also defective, you may demand a refund in writing without further
+opportunities to fix the problem.
+
+1.F.4.  Except for the limited right of replacement or refund set forth
+in paragraph 1.F.3, this work is provided to you 'AS-IS' WITH NO OTHER
+WARRANTIES OF ANY KIND, EXPRESS OR IMPLIED, INCLUDING BUT NOT LIMITED TO
+WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTIBILITY OR FITNESS FOR ANY PURPOSE.
+
+1.F.5.  Some states do not allow disclaimers of certain implied
+warranties or the exclusion or limitation of certain types of damages.
+If any disclaimer or limitation set forth in this agreement violates the
+law of the state applicable to this agreement, the agreement shall be
+interpreted to make the maximum disclaimer or limitation permitted by
+the applicable state law.  The invalidity or unenforceability of any
+provision of this agreement shall not void the remaining provisions.
+
+1.F.6.  INDEMNITY - You agree to indemnify and hold the Foundation, the
+trademark owner, any agent or employee of the Foundation, anyone
+providing copies of Project Gutenberg-tm electronic works in accordance
+with this agreement, and any volunteers associated with the production,
+promotion and distribution of Project Gutenberg-tm electronic works,
+harmless from all liability, costs and expenses, including legal fees,
+that arise directly or indirectly from any of the following which you do
+or cause to occur: (a) distribution of this or any Project Gutenberg-tm
+work, (b) alteration, modification, or additions or deletions to any
+Project Gutenberg-tm work, and (c) any Defect you cause.
+
+
+Section  2.  Information about the Mission of Project Gutenberg-tm
+
+Project Gutenberg-tm is synonymous with the free distribution of
+electronic works in formats readable by the widest variety of computers
+including obsolete, old, middle-aged and new computers.  It exists
+because of the efforts of hundreds of volunteers and donations from
+people in all walks of life.
+
+Volunteers and financial support to provide volunteers with the
+assistance they need, is critical to reaching Project Gutenberg-tm's
+goals and ensuring that the Project Gutenberg-tm collection will
+remain freely available for generations to come.  In 2001, the Project
+Gutenberg Literary Archive Foundation was created to provide a secure
+and permanent future for Project Gutenberg-tm and future generations.
+To learn more about the Project Gutenberg Literary Archive Foundation
+and how your efforts and donations can help, see Sections 3 and 4
+and the Foundation web page at https://www.pglaf.org.
+
+
+Section 3.  Information about the Project Gutenberg Literary Archive
+Foundation
+
+The Project Gutenberg Literary Archive Foundation is a non profit
+501(c)(3) educational corporation organized under the laws of the
+state of Mississippi and granted tax exempt status by the Internal
+Revenue Service.  The Foundation's EIN or federal tax identification
+number is 64-6221541.  Its 501(c)(3) letter is posted at
+https://pglaf.org/fundraising.  Contributions to the Project Gutenberg
+Literary Archive Foundation are tax deductible to the full extent
+permitted by U.S. federal laws and your state's laws.
+
+The Foundation's principal office is located at 4557 Melan Dr. S.
+Fairbanks, AK, 99712., but its volunteers and employees are scattered
+throughout numerous locations.  Its business office is located at
+809 North 1500 West, Salt Lake City, UT 84116, (801) 596-1887, email
+business@pglaf.org.  Email contact links and up to date contact
+information can be found at the Foundation's web site and official
+page at https://pglaf.org
+
+For additional contact information:
+     Dr. Gregory B. Newby
+     Chief Executive and Director
+     gbnewby@pglaf.org
+
+
+Section 4.  Information about Donations to the Project Gutenberg
+Literary Archive Foundation
+
+Project Gutenberg-tm depends upon and cannot survive without wide
+spread public support and donations to carry out its mission of
+increasing the number of public domain and licensed works that can be
+freely distributed in machine readable form accessible by the widest
+array of equipment including outdated equipment.  Many small donations
+($1 to $5,000) are particularly important to maintaining tax exempt
+status with the IRS.
+
+The Foundation is committed to complying with the laws regulating
+charities and charitable donations in all 50 states of the United
+States.  Compliance requirements are not uniform and it takes a
+considerable effort, much paperwork and many fees to meet and keep up
+with these requirements.  We do not solicit donations in locations
+where we have not received written confirmation of compliance.  To
+SEND DONATIONS or determine the status of compliance for any
+particular state visit https://pglaf.org
+
+While we cannot and do not solicit contributions from states where we
+have not met the solicitation requirements, we know of no prohibition
+against accepting unsolicited donations from donors in such states who
+approach us with offers to donate.
+
+International donations are gratefully accepted, but we cannot make
+any statements concerning tax treatment of donations received from
+outside the United States.  U.S. laws alone swamp our small staff.
+
+Please check the Project Gutenberg Web pages for current donation
+methods and addresses.  Donations are accepted in a number of other
+ways including including checks, online payments and credit card
+donations.  To donate, please visit: https://pglaf.org/donate
+
+
+Section 5.  General Information About Project Gutenberg-tm electronic
+works.
+
+Professor Michael S. Hart was the originator of the Project Gutenberg-tm
+concept of a library of electronic works that could be freely shared
+with anyone.  For thirty years, he produced and distributed Project
+Gutenberg-tm eBooks with only a loose network of volunteer support.
+
+
+Project Gutenberg-tm eBooks are often created from several printed
+editions, all of which are confirmed as Public Domain in the U.S.
+unless a copyright notice is included.  Thus, we do not necessarily
+keep eBooks in compliance with any particular paper edition.
+
+
+Most people start at our Web site which has the main PG search facility:
+
+     https://www.gutenberg.org
+
+This Web site includes information about Project Gutenberg-tm,
+including how to make donations to the Project Gutenberg Literary
+Archive Foundation, how to help produce our new eBooks, and how to
+subscribe to our email newsletter to hear about new eBooks.
diff --git a/14988.zip b/14988.zip
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..a1959a1
--- /dev/null
+++ b/14988.zip
diff --git a/LICENSE.txt b/LICENSE.txt
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..6312041
--- /dev/null
+++ b/LICENSE.txt
@@ -0,0 +1,11 @@
+This eBook, including all associated images, markup, improvements,
+metadata, and any other content or labor, has been confirmed to be
+in the PUBLIC DOMAIN IN THE UNITED STATES.
+
+Procedures for determining public domain status are described in
+the "Copyright How-To" at https://www.gutenberg.org.
+
+No investigation has been made concerning possible copyrights in
+jurisdictions other than the United States. Anyone seeking to utilize
+this eBook outside of the United States should confirm copyright
+status under the laws that apply to them.
diff --git a/README.md b/README.md
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..ec16191
--- /dev/null
+++ b/README.md
@@ -0,0 +1,2 @@
+Project Gutenberg (https://www.gutenberg.org) public repository for
+eBook #14988 (https://www.gutenberg.org/ebooks/14988)