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diff --git a/14988.txt b/14988.txt new file mode 100644 index 0000000..b4216e9 --- /dev/null +++ b/14988.txt @@ -0,0 +1,18517 @@ +Project Gutenberg's Cicero's Tusculan Disputations, by Marcus Tullius Cicero + +This eBook is for the use of anyone anywhere at no cost and with +almost no restrictions whatsoever. You may copy it, give it away or +re-use it under the terms of the Project Gutenberg License included +with this eBook or online at www.gutenberg.org + + +Title: Cicero's Tusculan Disputations + Also, Treatises On The Nature Of The Gods, And On The Commonwealth + +Author: Marcus Tullius Cicero + +Release Date: February 9, 2005 [EBook #14988] + +Language: English and Latin + +Character set encoding: ASCII + +*** START OF THIS PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK CICERO'S TUSCULAN DISPUTATIONS *** + + + + +Produced by Ted Garvin, Hagen von Eitzen and the PG Online Distributed +Proofreading Team. + + + + + +CICERO'S TUSCULAN DISPUTATIONS; + + + + +ALSO, TREATISES ON + +THE NATURE OF THE GODS, + +AND ON + +THE COMMONWEALTH. + + + + + +LITERALLY TRANSLATED, CHIEFLY BY +C. D. YONGE. + + +NEW YORK: +HARPER & BROTHERS, PUBLISHERS, +FRANKLIN SQUARE. +1877. + + +HARPER'S NEW CLASSICAL LIBRARY. + + +COMPRISING LITERAL TRANSLATIONS OF + + + CAESAR. + VIRGIL. + SALLUST. + HORACE. + CICERO'S ORATIONS. + CICERO'S OFFICES &c. + CICERO ON ORATORY AND ORATORS. + CICERO'S TUSCULAN DISPUTATIONS, the Republic, and the Nature of the Gods. + TERENCE. + TACITUS. + LIVY. 2 Vols. + JUVENAL. + XENOPHON. + HOMER'S ILIAD. + HOMER'S ODYSSEY. + HERODOTUS. + DEMOSTHENES. 2 Vols. + THUCIDIDES. + AESCHYLUS. + SOPHOCLES. + EURIPIDES. 2 Vols. + PLATO. [SELECT DIALOGUES.] + + +12mo, Cloth, $1.50 per Volume. + + +HARPER & BROTHERS _will send either of the above works by mail, postage +prepaid, to any part of the United States, on receipt of the price_. + + + + + + +NOTE. + + +The greater portion of the Republic was previously translated by +Francis Barham, Esq., and published in 1841. Although ably performed, +it was not sufficiently close for the purpose of the "CLASSICAL +LIBRARY," and was therefore placed in the hands of the present editor +for revision, as well as for collation with recent texts. This has +occasioned material alterations and additions. + +The treatise "On the Nature of the Gods" is a revision of that usually +ascribed to the celebrated Benjamin Franklin. + + + + + + +CONTENTS. + + +_Tusculan Disputations_ + +_On the Nature of the Gods_ + +_On the Commonwealth_ + + + + + + +THE TUSCULAN DISPUTATIONS. + +INTRODUCTION. + + +In the year A.U.C. 708, and the sixty-second year of Cicero's age, his +daughter, Tullia, died in childbed; and her loss afflicted Cicero to +such a degree that he abandoned all public business, and, leaving the +city, retired to Asterra, which was a country house that he had near +Antium; where, after a while, he devoted himself to philosophical +studies, and, besides other works, he published his Treatise de +Finibus, and also this treatise called the Tusculan Disputations, of +which Middleton gives this concise description: + +"The first book teaches us how to contemn the terrors of death, and to +look upon it as a blessing rather than an evil; + +"The second, to support pain and affliction with a manly fortitude; + +"The third, to appease all our complaints and uneasinesses under the +accidents of life; + +"The fourth, to moderate all our other passions; + +"And the fifth explains the sufficiency of virtue to make men happy." + +It was his custom in the opportunities of his leisure to take some +friends with him into the country, where, instead of amusing themselves +with idle sports or feasts, their diversions were wholly speculative, +tending to improve the mind and enlarge the understanding. In this +manner he now spent five days at his Tusculan villa in discussing with +his friends the several questions just mentioned. For, after employing +the mornings in declaiming and rhetorical exercises, they used to +retire in the afternoon into a gallery, called the Academy, which he +had built for the purpose of philosophical conferences, where, after +the manner of the Greeks, he held a school, as they called it, and +invited the company to call for any subject that they desired to hear +explained, which being proposed accordingly by some of the audience +became immediately the argument of that day's debate. These five +conferences, or dialogues, he collected afterward into writing in the +very words and manner in which they really passed; and published them +under the title of his Tusculan Disputations, from the name of the +villa in which they were held. + + * * * * * + + + + +BOOK I. + +ON THE CONTEMPT OF DEATH. + + +I. At a time when I had entirely, or to a great degree, released myself +from my labors as an advocate, and from my duties as a senator, I had +recourse again, Brutus, principally by your advice, to those studies +which never had been out of my mind, although neglected at times, and +which after a long interval I resumed; and now, since the principles +and rules of all arts which relate to living well depend on the study +of wisdom, which is called philosophy, I have thought it an employment +worthy of me to illustrate them in the Latin tongue, not because +philosophy could not be understood in the Greek language, or by the +teaching of Greek masters; but it has always been my opinion that our +countrymen have, in some instances, made wiser discoveries than the +Greeks, with reference to those subjects which they have considered +worthy of devoting their attention to, and in others have improved upon +their discoveries, so that in one way or other we surpass them on every +point; for, with regard to the manners and habits of private life, and +family and domestic affairs, we certainly manage them with more +elegance, and better than they did; and as to our republic, that our +ancestors have, beyond all dispute, formed on better customs and laws. +What shall I say of our military affairs; in which our ancestors have +been most eminent in valor, and still more so in discipline? As to +those things which are attained not by study, but nature, neither +Greece, nor any nation, is comparable to us; for what people has +displayed such gravity, such steadiness, such greatness of soul, +probity, faith--such distinguished virtue of every kind, as to be equal +to our ancestors. In learning, indeed, and all kinds of literature, +Greece did excel us, and it was easy to do so where there was no +competition; for while among the Greeks the poets were the most ancient +species of learned men--since Homer and Hesiod lived before the +foundation of Rome, and Archilochus[1] was a contemporary of +Romulus--we received poetry much later. For it was about five hundred +and ten years after the building of Rome before Livius[2] published a +play in the consulship of C. Claudius, the son of Caecus, and M. +Tuditanus, a year before the birth of Ennius, who was older than +Plautus and Naevius. + +II. It was, therefore, late before poets were either known or received +among us; though we find in Cato de Originibus that the guests used, at +their entertainments, to sing the praises of famous men to the sound of +the flute; but a speech of Cato's shows this kind of poetry to have +been in no great esteem, as he censures Marcus Nobilior for carrying +poets with him into his province; for that consul, as we know, carried +Ennius with him into AEtolia. Therefore the less esteem poets were in, +the less were those studies pursued; though even then those who did +display the greatest abilities that way were not very inferior to the +Greeks. Do we imagine that if it had been considered commendable in +Fabius,[3] a man of the highest rank, to paint, we should not have had +many Polycleti and Parrhasii? Honor nourishes art, and glory is the +spur with all to studies; while those studies are always neglected in +every nation which are looked upon disparagingly. The Greeks held skill +in vocal and instrumental music as a very important accomplishment, and +therefore it is recorded of Epaminondas, who, in my opinion, was the +greatest man among the Greeks, that he played excellently on the flute; +and Themistocles, some years before, was deemed ignorant because at an +entertainment he declined the lyre when it was offered to him. For this +reason musicians flourished in Greece; music was a general study; and +whoever was unacquainted with it was not considered as fully instructed +in learning. Geometry was in high esteem with them, therefore none were +more honorable than mathematicians. But we have confined this art to +bare measuring and calculating. + +III. But, on the contrary, we early entertained an esteem for the +orator; though he was not at first a man of learning, but only quick at +speaking: in subsequent times he became learned; for it is reported +that Galba, Africanus, and Laelius were men of learning; and that even +Cato, who preceded them in point of time, was a studious man: then +succeeded the Lepidi, Carbo, and Gracchi, and so many great orators +after them, down to our own times, that we were very little, if at all, +inferior to the Greeks. Philosophy has been at a low ebb even to this +present time, and has had no assistance from our own language, and so +now I have undertaken to raise and illustrate it, in order that, as I +have been of service to my countrymen, when employed on public affairs, +I may, if possible, be so likewise in my retirement; and in this I must +take the more pains, because there are already many books in the Latin +language which are said to be written inaccurately, having been +composed by excellent men, only not of sufficient learning; for, +indeed, it is possible that a man may think well, and yet not be able +to express his thoughts elegantly; but for any one to publish thoughts +which he can neither arrange skilfully nor illustrate so as to +entertain his reader, is an unpardonable abuse of letters and +retirement: they, therefore, read their books to one another, and no +one ever takes them up but those who wish to have the same license for +careless writing allowed to themselves. Wherefore, if oratory has +acquired any reputation from my industry, I shall take the more pains +to open the fountains of philosophy, from which all my eloquence has +taken its rise. + +IV. But, as Aristotle,[4] a man of the greatest genius, and of the most +various knowledge, being excited by the glory of the rhetorician +Isocrates,[5] commenced teaching young men to speak, and joined +philosophy with eloquence: so it is my design not to lay aside my +former study of oratory, and yet to employ myself at the same time in +this greater and more fruitful art; for I have always thought that to +be able to speak copiously and elegantly on the most important +questions was the most perfect philosophy. And I have so diligently +applied myself to this pursuit, that I have already ventured to have a +school like the Greeks. And lately when you left us, having many of my +friends about me, I attempted at my Tusculan villa what I could do in +that way; for as I formerly used to practise declaiming, which nobody +continued longer than myself, so this is now to be the declamation of +my old age. I desired any one to propose a question which he wished to +have discussed, and then I argued that point either sitting or walking; +and so I have compiled the scholae, as the Greeks call them, of five +days, in as many books. We proceeded in this manner: when he who had +proposed the subject for discussion had said what he thought proper, I +spoke against him; for this is, you know, the old and Socratic method +of arguing against another's opinion; for Socrates thought that thus +the truth would more easily be arrived at. But to give you a better +notion of our disputations, I will not barely send you an account of +them, but represent them to you as they were carried on; therefore let +the introduction be thus: + +V. _A._ To me death seems to be an evil. + +_M._ What, to those who are already dead? or to those who must die? + +_A._ To both. + +_M._ It is a misery, then, because an evil? + +_A._ Certainly. + +_M._ Then those who have already died, and those who have still got to +die, are both miserable? + +_A._ So it appears to me. + +_M._ Then all are miserable? + +_A._ Every one. + +_M._ And, indeed, if you wish to be consistent, all that are already +born, or ever shall be, are not only miserable, but always will be so; +for should you maintain those only to be miserable, you would not +except any one living, for all must die; but there should be an end of +misery in death. But seeing that the dead are miserable, we are born to +eternal misery, for they must of consequence be miserable who died a +hundred thousand years ago; or rather, all that have ever been born. + +_A._ So, indeed, I think. + +_M._ Tell me, I beseech you, are you afraid of the three-headed +Cerberus in the shades below, and the roaring waves of Cocytus, and the +passage over Acheron, and Tantalus expiring with thirst, while the +water touches his chin; and Sisyphus, + + Who sweats with arduous toil in vain + The steepy summit of the mount to gain? + +Perhaps, too, you dread the inexorable judges, Minos and Rhadamanthus; +before whom neither L. Crassus nor M. Antonius can defend you; and +where, since the cause lies before Grecian judges, you will not even be +able to employ Demosthenes; but you must plead for yourself before a +very great assembly. These things perhaps you dread, and therefore look +on death as an eternal evil. + +VI. _A._ Do you take me to be so imbecile as to give credit to such +things? + +_M._ What, do you not believe them? + +_A._ Not in the least. + +_M._ I am sorry to hear that. + +_A._ Why, I beg? + +_M._ Because I could have been very eloquent in speaking against them. + +_A._ And who could not on such a subject? or what trouble is it to +refute these monstrous inventions of the poets and painters?[6] + +_M._ And yet you have books of philosophers full of arguments against +these. + +_A._ A great waste of time, truly! for who is so weak as to be +concerned about them? + +_M._ If, then, there is no one miserable in the infernal regions, there +can be no one there at all. + +_A._ I am altogether of that opinion. + +_M._ Where, then, are those you call miserable? or what place do they +inhabit? For, if they exist at all, they must be somewhere. + +_A._ I, indeed, am of opinion that they are nowhere. + +_M._ Then they have no existence at all. + +_A._ Even so, and yet they are miserable for this very reason, that +they have no existence. + +_M._ I had rather now have you afraid of Cerberus than speak thus +inaccurately. + +_A._ In what respect? + +_M._ Because you admit him to exist whose existence you deny with the +same breath. Where now is your sagacity? When you say any one is +miserable, you say that he who does not exist, does exist. + +_A._ I am not so absurd as to say that. + +_M._ What is it that you do say, then? + +_A._ I say, for instance, that Marcus Crassus is miserable in being +deprived of such great riches as his by death; that Cn. Pompey is +miserable in being taken from such glory and honor; and, in short, that +all are miserable who are deprived of this light of life. + +_M._ You have returned to the same point, for to be miserable implies +an existence; but you just now denied that the dead had any existence: +if, then, they have not, they can be nothing; and if so, they are not +even miserable. + +_A._ Perhaps I do not express what I mean, for I look upon this very +circumstance, not to exist after having existed, to be very miserable. + +_M._ What, more so than not to have existed at all? Therefore, those +who are not yet born are miserable because they are not; and we +ourselves, if we are to be miserable after death, were miserable before +we were born: but I do not remember that I was miserable before I was +born; and I should be glad to know, if your memory is better, what you +recollect of yourself before you were born. + +VII. _A._ You are pleasant: as if I had said that those men are +miserable who are not born, and not that they are so who are dead. + +_M._ You say, then, that they are so? + +_A._ Yes; I say that because they no longer exist after having existed +they are miserable. + +_M._ You do not perceive that you are asserting contradictions; for +what is a greater contradiction, than that that should be not only +miserable, but should have any existence at all, which does not exist? +When you go out at the Capene gate and see the tombs of the Calatini, +the Scipios, Servilii, and Metelli, do you look on them as miserable? + +_A._ Because you press me with a word, henceforward I will not say they +are miserable absolutely, but miserable on this account, because they +have no existence. + +_M._ You do not say, then, "M. Crassus is miserable," but only +"Miserable M. Crassus." + +_A._ Exactly so. + +_M._ As if it did not follow that whatever you speak of in that manner +either is or is not. Are you not acquainted with the first principles +of logic? For this is the first thing they lay down, Whatever is +asserted (for that is the best way that occurs to me, at the moment, of +rendering the Greek term [Greek: axioma]; if I can think of a more +accurate expression hereafter, I will use it), is asserted as being +either true or false. When, therefore, you say, "Miserable M. Crassus," +you either say this, "M. Crassus is miserable," so that some judgment +may be made whether it is true or false, or you say nothing at all. + +_A._ Well, then, I now own that the dead are not miserable, since you +have drawn from me a concession that they who do not exist at all can +not be miserable. What then? We that are alive, are we not wretched, +seeing we must die? for what is there agreeable in life, when we must +night and day reflect that, at some time or other, we must die? + +VIII. _M._ Do you not, then, perceive how great is the evil from which +you have delivered human nature? + +_A._ By what means? + +_M._ Because, if to die were miserable to the dead, to live would be a +kind of infinite and eternal misery. Now, however, I see a goal, and +when I have reached it, there is nothing more to be feared; but you +seem to me to follow the opinion of Epicharmus,[7] a man of some +discernment, and sharp enough for a Sicilian. + +_A._ What opinion? for I do not recollect it. + +_M._ I will tell you if I can in Latin; for you know I am no more used +to bring in Latin sentences in a Greek discourse than Greek in a Latin +one. + +_A._ And that is right enough. But what is that opinion of Epicharmus? + +_M._ + I would not die, but yet + Am not concerned that I shall be dead. + +_A._ I now recollect the Greek; but since you have obliged me to grant +that the dead are not miserable, proceed to convince me that it is not +miserable to be under a necessity of dying. + +_M._ That is easy enough; but I have greater things in hand. + +_A._ How comes that to be so easy? And what are those things of more +consequence? + +_M._ Thus: because, if there is no evil after death, then even death +itself can be none; for that which immediately succeeds that is a state +where you grant that there is no evil: so that even to be obliged to +die can be no evil, for that is only the being obliged to arrive at a +place where we allow that no evil is. + +_A._ I beg you will be more explicit on this point, for these subtle +arguments force me sooner to admissions than to conviction. But what +are those more important things about which you say that you are +occupied? + +_M._ To teach you, if I can, that death is not only no evil, but a +good. + +_A._ I do not insist on that, but should be glad to hear you argue it, +for even though you should not prove your point, yet you will prove +that death is no evil. But I will not interrupt you; I would rather +hear a continued discourse. + +_M._ What, if I should ask you a question, would you not answer? + +_A._ That would look like pride; but I would rather you should not ask +but where necessity requires. + +IX. _M._ I will comply with your wishes, and explain as well as I can +what you require; but not with any idea that, like the Pythian Apollo, +what I say must needs be certain and indisputable, but as a mere man, +endeavoring to arrive at probabilities by conjecture, for I have no +ground to proceed further on than probability. Those men may call their +statements indisputable who assert that what they say can be perceived +by the senses, and who proclaim themselves philosophers by profession. + +_A._ Do as you please: We are ready to hear you. + +_M._ The first thing, then, is to inquire what death, which seems to be +so well understood, really is; for some imagine death to be the +departure of the soul from the body; others think that there is no such +departure, but that soul and body perish together, and that the soul is +extinguished with the body. Of those who think that the soul does +depart from the body, some believe in its immediate dissolution; others +fancy that it continues to exist for a time; and others believe that it +lasts forever. There is great dispute even what the soul is, where it +is, and whence it is derived: with some, the heart itself (_cor_) seems +to be the soul, hence the expressions, _excordes_, _vecordes_, +_concordes;_ and that prudent Nasica, who was twice consul, was called +Corculus, _i.e._, wise-heart; and AElius Sextus is described as +_Egregie_ cordatus _homo, catus AEliu' Sextus_--that great +_wise-hearted_ man, sage AElius. Empedocles imagines the blood, which is +suffused over the heart, to be the soul; to others, a certain part of +the brain seems to be the throne of the soul; others neither allow the +heart itself, nor any portion of the brain, to be the soul, but think +either that the heart is the seat and abode of the soul, or else that +the brain is so. Some would have the soul, or spirit, to be the +_anima_, as our schools generally agree; and indeed the name signifies +as much, for we use the expressions _animam agere_, to live; _animam +efflare_, to expire; _animosi_, men of spirit; _bene animati_, men of +right feeling; _exanimi sententia_, according to our real opinion; and +the very word _animus_ is derived from _anima_. Again, the soul seems +to Zeno the Stoic to be fire. + +X. But what I have said as to the heart, the blood, the brain, air, or +fire being the soul, are common opinions: the others are only +entertained by individuals; and, indeed, there were many among the +ancients who held singular opinions on this subject, of whom the latest +was Aristoxenus, a man who was both a musician and a philosopher. He +maintained a certain straining of the body, like what is called harmony +in music, to be the soul, and believed that, from the figure and nature +of the whole body, various motions are excited, as sounds are from an +instrument. He adhered steadily to his system, and yet he said +something, the nature of which, whatever it was, had been detailed and +explained a great while before by Plato. Xenocrates denied that the +soul had any figure, or anything like a body; but said it was a number, +the power of which, as Pythagoras had fancied, some ages before, was +the greatest in nature: his master, Plato, imagined a threefold soul, a +dominant portion of which--that is to say, reason--he had lodged in the +head, as in a tower; and the other two parts--namely, anger and +desire--he made subservient to this one, and allotted them distinct +abodes, placing anger in the breast, and desire under the praecordia. +But Dicaearchus, in that discourse of some learned disputants, held at +Corinth, which he details to us in three books--in the first book +introduces many speakers; and in the other two he introduces a certain +Pherecrates, an old man of Phthia, who, as he said, was descended from +Deucalion; asserting, that there is in fact no such thing at all as a +soul, but that it is a name without a meaning; and that it is idle to +use the expression "animals," or "animated beings;" that neither men +nor beasts have minds or souls, but that all that power by which we act +or perceive is equally infused into every living creature, and is +inseparable from the body, for if it were not, it would be nothing; nor +is there anything whatever really existing except body, which is a +single and simple thing, so fashioned as to live and have its +sensations in consequence of the regulations of nature. Aristotle, a +man superior to all others, both in genius and industry (I always +except Plato), after having embraced these four known sorts of +principles, from which all things deduce their origin, imagines that +there is a certain fifth nature, from whence comes the soul; for to +think, to foresee, to learn, to teach, to invent anything, and many +other attributes of the same kind, such as to remember, to love, to +hate, to desire, to fear, to be pleased or displeased--these, and +others like them, exist, he thinks, in none of those first four kinds: +on such account he adds a fifth kind, which has no name, and so by a +new name he calls the soul [Greek: endelecheia], as if it were a +certain continued and perpetual motion. + +XI. If I have not forgotten anything unintentionally, these are the +principal opinions concerning the soul. I have omitted Democritus, a +very great man indeed, but one who deduces the soul from the fortuitous +concourse of small, light, and round substances; for, if you believe +men of his school, there is nothing which a crowd of atoms cannot +effect. Which of these opinions is true, some God must determine. It is +an important question for us, Which has the most appearance of truth? +Shall we, then, prefer determining between them, or shall we return to +our subject? + +_A._ I could wish both, if possible; but it is difficult to mix them: +therefore, if without a discussion of them we can get rid of the fears +of death, let us proceed to do so; but if this is not to be done +without explaining the question about souls, let us have that now, and +the other at another time. + +_M._ I take that plan to be the best, which I perceive you are inclined +to; for reason will demonstrate that, whichever of the opinions which I +have stated is true, it must follow, then, that death cannot be an +evil; or that it must rather be something desirable; for if either the +heart, or the blood, or the brain, is the soul, then certainly the +soul, being corporeal, must perish with the rest of the body; if it is +air, it will perhaps be dissolved; if it is fire, it will be +extinguished; if it is Aristoxenus's harmony, it will be put out of +tune. What shall I say of Dicaearchus, who denies that there is any +soul? In all these opinions, there is nothing to affect any one after +death; for all feeling is lost with life, and where there is no +sensation, nothing can interfere to affect us. The opinions of others +do indeed bring us hope; if it is any pleasure to you to think that +souls, after they leave the body, may go to heaven as to a permanent +home. + +_A._ I have great pleasure in that thought, and it is what I most +desire; and even if it should not be so, I should still be very willing +to believe it. + +_M._ What occasion have you, then, for my assistance? Am I superior to +Plato in eloquence? Turn over carefully his book that treats of the +soul; you will have there all that you can want. + +_A._ I have, indeed, done that, and often; but, I know not how it comes +to pass, I agree with it while I am reading it; but when I have laid +down the book, and begin to reflect with myself on the immortality of +the soul, all that agreement vanishes. + +_M._ How comes that? Do you admit this--that souls either exist after +death, or else that they also perish at the moment of death? + +_A._ I agree to that. And if they do exist, I admit that they are +happy; but if they perish, I cannot suppose them to be unhappy, +because, in fact, they have no existence at all. You drove me to that +concession but just now. + +_M._ How, then, can you, or why do you, assert that you think that +death is an evil, when it either makes us happy, in the case of the +soul continuing to exist, or, at all events, not unhappy, in the case +of our becoming destitute of all sensation? + +XII. _A._ Explain, therefore, if it is not troublesome to you, first, +if you can, that souls do exist after death; secondly, should you fail +in that (and it is a very difficult thing to establish), that death is +free from all evil; for I am not without my fears that this itself is +an evil: I do not mean the immediate deprivation of sense, but the fact +that we shall hereafter suffer deprivation. + +_M._ I have the best authority in support of the opinion you desire to +have established, which ought, and generally has, great weight in all +cases. And, first, I have all antiquity on that side, which the more +near it is to its origin and divine descent, the more clearly, perhaps, +on that account, did it discern the truth in these matters. This very +doctrine, then, was adopted by all those ancients whom Ennius calls in +the Sabine tongue Casci; namely, that in death there was a sensation, +and that, when men departed this life, they were not so entirely +destroyed as to perish absolutely. And this may appear from many other +circumstances, and especially from the pontifical rites and funeral +obsequies, which men of the greatest genius would not have been so +solicitous about, and would not have guarded from any injury by such +severe laws, but from a firm persuasion that death was not so entire a +destruction as wholly to abolish and destroy everything, but rather a +kind of transmigration, as it were, and change of life, which was, in +the case of illustrious men and women, usually a guide to heaven, while +in that of others it was still confined to the earth, but in such a +manner as still to exist. From this, and the sentiments of the Romans, + + In heaven Romulus with Gods now lives, + +as Ennius saith, agreeing with the common belief; hence, too, Hercules +is considered so great and propitious a God among the Greeks, and from +them he was introduced among us, and his worship has extended even to +the very ocean itself. This is how it was that Bacchus was deified, the +offspring of Semele; and from the same illustrious fame we receive +Castor and Pollux as Gods, who are reported not only to have helped the +Romans to victory in their battles, but to have been the messengers of +their success. What shall we say of Ino, the daughter of Cadmus? Is she +not called Leucothea by the Greeks, and Matuta by us? Nay, more; is not +the whole of heaven (not to dwell on particulars) almost filled with +the offspring of men? + +Should I attempt to search into antiquity, and produce from thence what +the Greek writers have asserted, it would appear that even those who +are called their principal Gods were taken from among men up into +heaven. + +XIII. Examine the sepulchres of those which are shown in Greece; +recollect, for you have been initiated, what lessons are taught in the +mysteries; then will you perceive how extensive this doctrine is. But +they who were not acquainted with natural philosophy (for it did not +begin to be in vogue till many years later) had no higher belief than +what natural reason could give them; they were not acquainted with the +principles and causes of things; they were often induced by certain +visions, and those generally in the night, to think that those men who +had departed from this life were still alive. And this may further be +brought as an irrefragable argument for us to believe that there are +Gods--that there never was any nation so barbarous, nor any people in +the world so savage, as to be without some notion of Gods. Many have +wrong notions of the Gods, for that is the nature and ordinary +consequence of bad customs, yet all allow that there is a certain +divine nature and energy. Nor does this proceed from the conversation +of men, or the agreement of philosophers; it is not an opinion +established by institutions or by laws; but, no doubt, in every case +the consent of all nations is to be looked on as a law of nature. Who +is there, then, that does not lament the loss of his friends, +principally from imagining them deprived of the conveniences of life? +Take away this opinion, and you remove with it all grief; for no one is +afflicted merely on account of a loss sustained by himself. Perhaps we +may be sorry, and grieve a little; but that bitter lamentation and +those mournful tears have their origin in our apprehensions that he +whom we loved is deprived of all the advantages of life, and is +sensible of his loss. And we are led to this opinion by nature, without +any arguments or any instruction. + +XIV. But the greatest proof of all is, that nature herself gives a +silent judgment in favor of the immortality of the soul, inasmuch as +all are anxious, and that to a great degree, about the things which +concern futurity: + + One plants what future ages shall enjoy, + +as Statius saith in his Synephebi. What is his object in doing so, +except that he is interested in posterity? Shall the industrious +husbandman, then, plant trees the fruit of which he shall never see? +And shall not the great man found laws, institutions, and a republic? +What does the procreation of children imply, and our care to continue +our names, and our adoptions, and our scrupulous exactness in drawing +up wills, and the inscriptions on monuments, and panegyrics, but that +our thoughts run on futurity? There is no doubt but a judgment may be +formed of nature in general, from looking at each nature in its most +perfect specimens; and what is a more perfect specimen of a man than +those are who look on themselves as born for the assistance, the +protection, and the preservation of others? Hercules has gone to +heaven; he never would have gone thither had he not, while among men, +made that road for himself. These things are of old date, and have, +besides, the sanction of universal religion. + +XV. What will you say? What do you imagine that so many and such great +men of our republic, who have sacrificed their lives for its good, +expected? Do you believe that they thought that their names should not +continue beyond their lives? None ever encountered death for their +country but under a firm persuasion of immortality! Themistocles might +have lived at his ease; so might Epaminondas; and, not to look abroad +and among the ancients for instances, so might I myself. But, somehow +or other there clings to our minds a certain presage of future ages; +and this both exists most firmly, and appears most clearly, in men of +the loftiest genius and greatest souls. Take away this, and who would +be so mad as to spend his life amidst toils and dangers? I speak of +those in power. What are the poet's views but to be ennobled after +death? What else is the object of these lines, + + Behold old Ennius here, who erst + Thy fathers' great exploits rehearsed? + +He is challenging the reward of glory from those men whose ancestors he +himself had ennobled by his poetry. And in the same spirit he says, in +another passage, + + Let none with tears my funeral grace, for I + Claim from my works an immortality. + +Why do I mention poets? The very mechanics are desirous of fame after +death. Why did Phidias include a likeness of himself in the shield of +Minerva, when he was not allowed to inscribe his name on it? What do +our philosophers think on the subject? Do not they put their names to +those very books which they write on the contempt of glory? If, then, +universal consent is the voice of nature, and if it is the general +opinion everywhere that those who have quitted this life are still +interested in something, we also must subscribe to that opinion. And if +we think that men of the greatest abilities and virtues see most +clearly into the power of nature, because they themselves are her most +perfect work, it is very probable that, as every great man is +especially anxious to benefit posterity, there is something of which he +himself will be sensible after death. + +XVI. But as we are led by nature to think there are Gods, and as we +discover, by reason, of what description they are, so, by the consent +of all nations, we are induced to believe that our souls survive; but +where their habitation is, and of what character they eventually are, +must be learned from reason. The want of any certain reason on which to +argue has given rise to the idea of the shades below, and to those +fears which you seem, not without reason, to despise; for as our bodies +fall to the ground, and are covered with earth (_humus_), from whence +we derive the expression to be interred (_humari_), that has occasioned +men to imagine that the dead continue, during the remainder of their +existence, under ground; which opinion has drawn after it many errors, +which the poets have increased; for the theatre, being frequented by a +large crowd, among which are women and children, is wont to be greatly +affected on hearing such pompous verses as these, + + Lo! here I am, who scarce could gain this place, + Through stony mountains and a dreary waste; + Through cliffs, whose sharpen'd stones tremendous hung, + Where dreadful darkness spread itself around. + +And the error prevailed so much, though indeed at present it seems to +me to be removed, that although men knew that the bodies of the dead +had been burned, yet they conceived such things to be done in the +infernal regions as could not be executed or imagined without a body; +for they could not conceive how disembodied souls could exist; and, +therefore, they looked out for some shape or figure. This was the +origin of all that account of the dead in Homer. This was the idea that +caused my friend Appius to frame his Necromancy; and this is how there +got about that idea of the lake of Avernus, in my neighborhood, + + From whence the souls of undistinguish'd shape, + Clad in thick shade, rush from the open gate + Of Acheron, vain phantoms of the dead. + +And they must needs have these appearances speak, which is not possible +without a tongue, and a palate, and jaws, and without the help of lungs +and sides, and without some shape or figure; for they could see nothing +by their mind alone--they referred all to their eyes. To withdraw the +mind from sensual objects, and abstract our thoughts from what we are +accustomed to, is an attribute of great genius. I am persuaded, indeed, +that there were many such men in former ages; but Pherecydes[8] the +Syrian is the first on record who said that the souls of men were +immortal, and he was a philosopher of great antiquity, in the reign of +my namesake Tullius. His disciple Pythagoras greatly confirmed this +opinion, who came into Italy in the reign of Tarquin the Proud; and all +that country which is called Great Greece was occupied by his school, +and he himself was held in high honor, and had the greatest authority; +and the Pythagorean sect was for many ages after in such great credit, +that all learning was believed to be confined to that name. + +XVII. But I return to the ancients. They scarcely ever gave any reason +for their opinion but what could be explained by numbers or +definitions. It is reported of Plato that he came into Italy to make +himself acquainted with the Pythagoreans; and that when there, among +others, he made an acquaintance with Archytas[9] and Timaeus,[10] and +learned from them all the tenets of the Pythagoreans; and that he not +only was of the same opinion with Pythagoras concerning the immortality +of the soul, but that he also brought reasons in support of it; which, +if you have nothing to say against it, I will pass over, and say no +more at present about all this hope of immortality. + +_A._ What, will you leave me when you have raised my expectations so +high? I had rather, so help me Hercules! be mistaken with Plato, whom I +know how much you esteem, and whom I admire myself, from what you say +of him, than be in the right with those others. + +_M._ I commend you; for, indeed, I could myself willingly be mistaken +in his company. Do we, then, doubt, as we do in other cases (though I +think here is very little room for doubt in this case, for the +mathematicians prove the facts to us), that the earth is placed in the +midst of the world, being, as it were, a sort of point, which they call +a [Greek: kentron], surrounded by the whole heavens; and that such is +the nature of the four principles which are the generating causes of +all things, that they have equally divided among them the constituents +of all bodies; moreover, that earthy and humid bodies are carried at +equal angles by their own weight and ponderosity into the earth and +sea; that the other two parts consist, one of fire, and the other of +air? As the two former are carried by their gravity and weight into the +middle region of the world, so these, on the other hand, ascend by +right lines into the celestial regions, either because, owing to their +intrinsic nature, they are always endeavoring to reach the highest +place, or else because lighter bodies are naturally repelled by +heavier; and as this is notoriously the case, it must evidently follow +that souls, when once they have departed from the body, whether they +are animal (by which term I mean capable of breathing) or of the nature +of fire, must mount upward. But if the soul is some number, as some +people assert, speaking with more subtlety than clearness, or if it is +that fifth nature, for which it would be more correct to say that we +have not given a name to than that we do not correctly understand +it--still it is too pure and perfect not to go to a great distance from +the earth. Something of this sort, then, we must believe the soul to +be, that we may not commit the folly of thinking that so active a +principle lies immerged in the heart or brain; or, as Empedocles would +have it, in the blood. + +XVIII. We will pass over Dicaearchus,[11] with his contemporary and +fellow-disciple Aristoxenus,[12] both indeed men of learning. One of +them seems never even to have been affected with grief, as he could not +perceive that he had a soul; while the other is so pleased with his +musical compositions that he endeavors to show an analogy betwixt them +and souls. Now, we may understand harmony to arise from the intervals +of sounds, whose various compositions occasion many harmonies; but I do +not see how a disposition of members, and the figure of a body without +a soul, can occasion harmony. He had better, learned as he is, leave +these speculations to his master Aristotle, and follow his own trade as +a musician. Good advice is given him in that Greek proverb, + + Apply your talents where you best are skill'd. + +I will have nothing at all to do with that fortuitous concourse of +individual light and round bodies, notwithstanding Democritus insists +on their being warm and having breath, that is to say, life. But this +soul, which is compounded of either of the four principles from which +we assert that all things are derived, is of inflamed air, as seems +particularly to have been the opinion of Panaetius, and must necessarily +mount upward; for air and fire have no tendency downward, but always +ascend; so should they be dissipated that must be at some distance from +the earth; but should they remain, and preserve their original state, +it is clearer still that they must be carried heavenward, and this +gross and concrete air, which is nearest the earth, must be divided and +broken by them; for the soul is warmer, or rather hotter, than that +air, which I just now called gross and concrete: and this may be made +evident from this consideration--that our bodies, being compounded of +the earthy class of principles, grow warm by the heat of the soul. + +XIX. We may add, that the soul can the more easily escape from this +air, which I have often named, and break through it, because nothing is +swifter than the soul; no swiftness is comparable to the swiftness of +the soul, which, should it remain uncorrupt and without alteration, +must necessarily be carried on with such velocity as to penetrate and +divide all this atmosphere, where clouds, and rain, and winds are +formed, which, in consequence of the exhalations from the earth, is +moist and dark: but, when the soul has once got above this region, and +falls in with, and recognizes, a nature like its own, it then rests +upon fires composed of a combination of thin air and a moderate solar +heat, and does not aim at any higher flight; for then, after it has +attained a lightness and heat resembling its own, it moves no more, but +remains steady, being balanced, as it were, between two equal weights. +That, then, is its natural seat where it has penetrated to something +like itself, and where, wanting nothing further, it may be supported +and maintained by the same aliment which nourishes and maintains the +stars. + +Now, as we are usually incited to all sorts of desires by the stimulus +of the body, and the more so as we endeavor to rival those who are in +possession of what we long for, we shall certainly be happy when, being +emancipated from that body, we at the same time get rid of these +desires and this rivalry. And that which we do at present, when, +dismissing all other cares, we curiously examine and look into +anything, we shall then do with greater freedom; and we shall employ +ourselves entirely in the contemplation and examination of things; +because there is naturally in our minds a certain insatiable desire to +know the truth, and the very region itself where we shall arrive, as it +gives us a more intuitive and easy knowledge of celestial things, will +raise our desires after knowledge. For it was this beauty of the +heavens, as seen even here upon earth, which gave birth to that +national and hereditary philosophy (as Theophrastus calls it), which +was thus excited to a desire of knowledge. But those persons will in a +most especial degree enjoy this philosophy, who, while they were only +inhabitants of this world and enveloped in darkness, were still +desirous of looking into these things with the eye of their mind. + +XX. For if those men now think that they have attained something who +have seen the mouth of the Pontus, and those straits which were passed +by the ship called Argo, because, + + From Argos she did chosen men convey, + Bound to fetch back the Golden Fleece, their prey; + +or those who have seen the straits of the ocean, + + Where the swift waves divide the neighboring shores + Of Europe, and of Afric; + +what kind of sight do you imagine that will be when the whole earth is +laid open to our view? and that, too, not only in its position, form, +and boundaries, nor those parts of it only which are habitable, but +those also that lie uncultivated, through the extremities of heat and +cold to which they are exposed; for not even now is it with our eyes +that we view what we see, for the body itself has no senses; but (as +the naturalists, ay, and even the physicians assure us, who have opened +our bodies, and examined them) there are certain perforated channels +from the seat of the soul to the eyes, ears, and nose; so that +frequently, when either prevented by meditation, or the force of some +bodily disorder, we neither hear nor see, though our eyes and ears are +open and in good condition; so that we may easily apprehend that it is +the soul itself which sees and hears, and not those parts which are, as +it were, but windows to the soul, by means of which, however, she can +perceive nothing, unless she is on the spot, and exerts herself. How +shall we account for the fact that by the same power of thinking we +comprehend the most different things--as color, taste, heat, smell, and +sound--which the soul could never know by her five messengers, unless +every thing were referred to her, and she were the sole judge of all? +And we shall certainly discover these things in a more clear and +perfect degree when the soul is disengaged from the body, and has +arrived at that goal to which nature leads her; for at present, +notwithstanding nature has contrived, with the greatest skill, those +channels which lead from the body to the soul, yet are they, in some +way or other, stopped up with earthy and concrete bodies; but when we +shall be nothing but soul, then nothing will interfere to prevent our +seeing everything in its real substance and in its true character. + +XXI. It is true, I might expatiate, did the subject require it, on the +many and various objects with which the soul will be entertained in +those heavenly regions; when I reflect on which, I am apt to wonder at +the boldness of some philosophers, who are so struck with admiration at +the knowledge of nature as to thank, in an exulting manner, the first +inventor and teacher of natural philosophy, and to reverence him as a +God; for they declare that they have been delivered by his means from +the greatest tyrants, a perpetual terror, and a fear that molested them +by night and day. What is this dread--this fear? What old woman is +there so weak as to fear these things, which you, forsooth, had you not +been acquainted with natural philosophy, would stand in awe of? + + The hallow'd roofs of Acheron, the dread + Of Orcus, the pale regions of the dead. + +And does it become a philosopher to boast that he is not afraid of +these things, and that he has discovered them to be false? And from +this we may perceive how acute these men were by nature, who, if they +had been left without any instruction, would have believed in these +things. But now they have certainly made a very fine acquisition in +learning that when the day of their death arrives, they will perish +entirely. And if that really is the case--for I say nothing either +way--what is there agreeable or glorious in it? Not that I see any +reason why the opinion of Pythagoras and Plato may not be true; but +even although Plato were to have assigned no reason for his opinion +(observe how much I esteem the man), the weight of his authority would +have borne me down; but he has brought so many reasons, that he appears +to me to have endeavored to convince others, and certainly to have +convinced himself. + +XXII. But there are many who labor on the other side of the question, +and condemn souls to death, as if they were criminals capitally +convicted; nor have they any other reason to allege why the immortality +of the soul appears to them to be incredible, except that they are not +able to conceive what sort of thing the soul can be when disentangled +from the body; just as if they could really form a correct idea as to +what sort of thing it is, even when it is in the body; what its form, +and size, and abode are; so that were they able to have a full view of +all that is now hidden from them in a living body, they have no idea +whether the soul would be discernible by them, or whether it is of so +fine a texture that it would escape their sight. Let those consider +this, who say that they are unable to form any idea of the soul without +the body, and then they will see whether they can form any adequate +idea of what it is when it is in the body. For my own part, when I +reflect on the nature of the soul, it appears to me a far more +perplexing and obscure question to determine what is its character +while it is in the body--a place which, as it were, does not belong to +it--than to imagine what it is when it leaves it, and has arrived at +the free aether, which is, if I may so say, its proper, its own +habitation. For unless we are to say that we cannot apprehend the +character or nature of anything which we have never seen, we certainly +may be able to form some notion of God, and of the divine soul when +released from the body. Dicaearchus, indeed, and Aristoxenus, because it +was hard to understand the existence and substance and nature of the +soul, asserted that there was no such thing as a soul at all. It is, +indeed, the most difficult thing imaginable to discern the soul by the +soul. And this, doubtless, is the meaning of the precept of Apollo, +which advises every one to know himself. For I do not apprehend the +meaning of the God to have been that we should understand our members, +our stature, and form; for we are not merely bodies; nor, when I say +these things to you, am I addressing myself to your body: when, +therefore, he says, "Know yourself," he says this, "Inform yourself of +the nature of your soul;" for the body is but a kind of vessel, or +receptacle of the soul, and whatever your soul does is your own act. To +know the soul, then, unless it had been divine, would not have been a +precept of such excellent wisdom as to be attributed to a God; but even +though the soul should not know of what nature itself is, will you say +that it does not even perceive that it exists at all, or that it has +motion? On which is founded that reason of Plato's, which is explained +by Socrates in the Phaedrus, and inserted by me, in my sixth book of the +Republic. + +XXIII. "That which is always moved is eternal; but that which gives +motion to something else, and is moved itself by some external cause, +when that motion ceases, must necessarily cease to exist. That, +therefore, alone, which is self-moved, because it is never forsaken by +itself, can never cease to be moved. Besides, it is the beginning and +principle of motion to everything else; but whatever is a principle has +no beginning, for all things arise from that principle, and it cannot +itself owe its rise to anything else; for then it would not be a +principle did it proceed from anything else. But if it has no +beginning, it never will have any end; for a principle which is once +extinguished cannot itself be restored by anything else, nor can it +produce anything else from itself; inasmuch as all things must +necessarily arise from some first cause. And thus it comes about that +the first principle of motion must arise from that thing which is +itself moved by itself; and that can neither have a beginning nor an +end of its existence, for otherwise the whole heaven and earth would be +overset, and all nature would stand still, and not be able to acquire +any force by the impulse of which it might be first set in motion. +Seeing, then, that it is clear that whatever moves itself is eternal, +can there be any doubt that the soul is so? For everything is inanimate +which is moved by an external force; but everything which is animate is +moved by an interior force, which also belongs to itself. For this is +the peculiar nature and power of the soul; and if the soul be the only +thing in the whole world which has the power of self-motion, then +certainly it never had a beginning, and therefore it is eternal." + +Now, should all the lower order of philosophers (for so I think they +may be called who dissent from Plato and Socrates and that school) +unite their force, they never would be able to explain anything so +elegantly as this, nor even to understand how ingeniously this +conclusion is drawn. The soul, then, perceives itself to have motion, +and at the same time that it gets that perception, it is sensible that +it derives that motion from its own power, and not from the agency of +another; and it is impossible that it should ever forsake itself. And +these premises compel you to allow its eternity, unless you have +something to say against them. + +_A._ I should myself be very well pleased not to have even a thought +arise in my mind against them, so much am I inclined to that opinion. + +XXIV. _M._ Well, then, I appeal to you, if the arguments which prove +that there is something divine in the souls of men are not equally +strong? But if I could account for the origin of these divine +properties, then I might also be able to explain how they might cease +to exist; for I think I can account for the manner in which the blood, +and bile, and phlegm, and bones, and nerves, and veins, and all the +limbs, and the shape of the whole body, were put together and made; ay, +and even as to the soul itself, were there nothing more in it than a +principle of life, then the life of a man might be put upon the same +footing as that of a vine or any other tree, and accounted for as +caused by nature; for these things, as we say, live. Besides, if +desires and aversions were all that belonged to the soul, it would have +them only in common with the beasts; but it has, in the first place, +memory, and that, too, so infinite as to recollect an absolute +countless number of circumstances, which Plato will have to be a +recollection of a former life; for in that book which is inscribed +Menon, Socrates asks a child some questions in geometry, with reference +to measuring a square; his answers are such as a child would make, and +yet the questions are so easy, that while answering them, one by one, +he comes to the same point as if he had learned geometry. From whence +Socrates would infer that learning is nothing more than recollection; +and this topic he explains more accurately in the discourse which he +held the very day he died; for he there asserts that, any one, who +seeming to be entirely illiterate, is yet able to answer a question +well that is proposed to him, does in so doing manifestly show that he +is not learning it then, but recollecting it by his memory. Nor is it +to be accounted for in any other way, how children come to have notions +of so many and such important things as are implanted, and, as it were, +sealed up, in their minds (which the Greeks call [Greek: ennoiai]), +unless the soul, before it entered the body, had been well stored with +knowledge. And as it had no existence at all (for this is the +invariable doctrine of Plato, who will not admit anything to have a +real existence which has a beginning and an end, and who thinks that +that alone does really exist which is of such a character as what he +calls [Greek: eidea], and we species), therefore, being shut up in the +body, it could not while in the body discover what it knows; but it +knew it before, and brought the knowledge with it, so that we are no +longer surprised at its extensive and multifarious knowledge. Nor does +the soul clearly discover its ideas at its first resort to this abode +to which it is so unaccustomed, and which is in so disturbed a state; +but after having refreshed and recollected itself, it then by its +memory recovers them; and, therefore, to learn implies nothing more +than to recollect. But I am in a particular manner surprised at memory. +For what is that faculty by which we remember? what is its force? what +its nature? I am not inquiring how great a memory Simonides[13] may be +said to have had, or Theodectes,[14] or that Cineas[15] who was sent to +Rome as ambassador from Pyrrhus; or, in more modern times, +Charmadas;[16] or, very lately, Metrodorus[17] the Scepsian, or our own +contemporary Hortensius[18]: I am speaking of ordinary memory, and +especially of those men who are employed in any important study or art, +the great capacity of whose minds it is hard to estimate, such numbers +of things do they remember. + +XXV. Should you ask what this leads to, I think we may understand what +that power is, and whence we have it. It certainly proceeds neither +from the heart, nor from the blood, nor from the brain, nor from atoms; +whether it be air or fire, I know not, nor am I, as those men are, +ashamed, in cases where I am ignorant, to own that I am so. If in any +other obscure matter I were able to assert anything positively, then I +would swear that the soul, be it air or fire, is divine. Just think, I +beseech you: can you imagine this wonderful power of memory to be sown +in or to be a part of the composition of the earth, or of this dark and +gloomy atmosphere? Though you cannot apprehend what it is, yet you see +what kind of thing it is, or if you do not quite see that, yet you +certainly see how great it is. What, then? Shall we imagine that there +is a kind of measure in the soul, into which, as into a vessel, all +that we remember is poured? That indeed is absurd; for how shall we +form any idea of the bottom, or of the shape or fashion of such a soul +as that? And, again, how are we to conceive how much it is able to +contain? Shall we imagine the soul to receive impressions like wax, and +memory to be marks of the impressions made on the soul? What are the +characters of the words, what of the facts themselves? and what, again, +is that prodigious greatness which can give rise to impressions of so +many things? What, lastly, is that power which investigates secret +things, and is called invention and contrivance? Does that man seem to +be compounded of this earthly, mortal, and perishing nature who first +invented names for everything; which, if you will believe Pythagoras, +is the highest pitch of wisdom? or he who collected the dispersed +inhabitants of the world, and united them in the bonds of social life? +or he who confined the sounds of the voice, which used to seem +infinite, to the marks of a few letters? or he who first observed the +courses of the planets, their progressive motions, their laws? These +were all great men. But they were greater still who invented food, and +raiment, and houses; who introduced civilization among us, and armed us +against the wild beasts; by whom we were made sociable and polished, +and so proceeded from the necessaries of life to its embellishments. +For we have provided great entertainments for the ears by inventing and +modulating the variety and nature of sounds; we have learned to survey +the stars, not only those that are fixed, but also those which are +improperly called wandering; and the man who has acquainted himself +with all their revolutions and motions is fairly considered to have a +soul resembling the soul of that Being who has created those stars in +the heavens: for when Archimedes described in a sphere the motions of +the moon, sun, and five planets, he did the very same thing as Plato's +God, in his Timaeus, who made the world, causing one revolution to +adjust motions differing as much as possible in their slowness and +velocity. Now, allowing that what we see in the world could not be +effected without a God, Archimedes could not have imitated the same +motions in his sphere without a divine soul. + +XXVI. To me, indeed, it appears that even those studies which are more +common and in greater esteem are not without some divine energy: so +that I do not consider that a poet can produce a serious and sublime +poem without some divine impulse working on his mind; nor do I think +that eloquence, abounding with sonorous words and fruitful sentences, +can flow thus without something beyond mere human power. But as to +philosophy, that is the parent of all the arts: what can we call that +but, as Plato says, a gift, or, as I express it, an invention, of the +Gods? This it was which first taught us the worship of the Gods; and +then led us on to justice, which arises from the human race being +formed into society; and after that it imbued us with modesty and +elevation of soul. This it was which dispersed darkness from our souls, +as it is dispelled from our eyes, enabling us to see all things that +are above or below, the beginning, end, and middle of everything. I am +convinced entirely that that which could effect so many and such great +things must be a divine power. For what is memory of words and +circumstances? What, too, is invention? Surely they are things than +which nothing greater can be conceived in a God! For I do not imagine +the Gods to be delighted with nectar and ambrosia, or with Juventas +presenting them with a cup; nor do I put any faith in Homer, who says +that Ganymede was carried away by the Gods on account of his beauty, in +order to give Jupiter his wine. Too weak reasons for doing Laomedon +such injury! These were mere inventions of Homer, who gave his Gods the +imperfections of men. I would rather that he had given men the +perfections of the Gods! those perfections, I mean, of uninterrupted +health, wisdom, invention, memory. Therefore the soul (which is, as I +say, divine) is, as Euripides more boldly expresses it, a God. And +thus, if the divinity be air or fire, the soul of man is the same; for +as that celestial nature has nothing earthly or humid about it, in like +manner the soul of man is also free from both these qualities: but if +it is of that fifth kind of nature, first introduced by Aristotle, then +both Gods and souls are of the same. + +XXVII. As this is my opinion, I have explained it in these very words, +in my book on Consolation.[19] The origin of the soul of man is not to +be found upon earth, for there is nothing in the soul of a mixed or +concrete nature, or that has any appearance of being formed or made out +of the earth; nothing even humid, or airy, or fiery. For what is there +in natures of that kind which has the power of memory, understanding, +or thought? which can recollect the past, foresee the future, and +comprehend the present? for these capabilities are confined to divine +beings; nor can we discover any source from which men could derive +them, but from God. There is therefore a peculiar nature and power in +the soul, distinct from those natures which are more known and familiar +to us. Whatever, then, that is which thinks, and which has +understanding, and volition, and a principle of life, is heavenly and +divine, and on that account must necessarily be eternal; nor can God +himself, who is known to us, be conceived to be anything else except a +soul free and unembarrassed, distinct from all mortal concretion, +acquainted with everything, and giving motion to everything, and itself +endued with perpetual motion. + +XXVIII. Of this kind and nature is the intellect of man. Where, then, +is this intellect seated, and of what character is it? where is your +own, and what is its character? Are you able to tell? If I have not +faculties for knowing all that I could desire to know, will you not +even allow me to make use of those which I have? The soul has not +sufficient capacity to comprehend itself; yet, the soul, like the eye, +though it has no distinct view of itself, sees other things: it does +not see (which is of least consequence) its own shape; perhaps not, +though it possibly may; but we will pass that by: but it certainly sees +that it has vigor, sagacity, memory, motion, and velocity; these are +all great, divine, eternal properties. What its appearance is, or where +it dwells, it is not necessary even to inquire. As when we behold, +first of all, the beauty and brilliant appearance of the heavens; +secondly, the vast velocity of its revolutions, beyond power of our +imagination to conceive; then the vicissitudes of nights and days, the +fourfold division of the seasons, so well adapted to the ripening of +the fruits of the earth, and the temperature of our bodies: and after +that we look up to the sun, the moderator and governor of all these +things; and view the moon, by the increase and decrease of its light, +marking, as it were, and appointing our holy days; and see the five +planets, borne on in the same circle, divided into twelve parts, +preserving the same course with the greatest regularity, but with +utterly dissimilar motions among themselves; and the nightly appearance +of the heaven, adorned on all sides with stars; then, the globe of the +earth, raised above the sea, and placed in the centre of the universe, +inhabited and cultivated in its two opposite extremities, one of which, +the place of our habitation, is situated towards the north pole, under +the seven stars: + + Where the cold northern blasts, with horrid sound, + Harden to ice the snowy cover'd ground; + +the other, towards the south pole, is unknown to us, but is called by +the Greeks [Greek: antichthona]: the other parts are uncultivated, +because they are either frozen with cold, or burned up with heat; but +where we dwell, it never fails, in its season, + + To yield a placid sky, to bid the trees + Assume the lively verdure of their leaves: + The vine to bud, and, joyful, in its shoots, + Foretell the approaching vintage of its fruits: + The ripen'd corn to sing, while all around + Full riv'lets glide; and flowers deck the ground: + +then the multitude of cattle, fit part for food, part for tilling the +ground, others for carrying us, or for clothing us; and man himself, +made, as it were, on purpose to contemplate the heavens and the Gods, +and to pay adoration to them: lastly, the whole earth, and wide +extending seas, given to man's use. When we view these and numberless +other things, can we doubt that they have some being who presides over +them, or has made them (if, indeed, they have been made, as is the +opinion of Plato, or if, as Aristotle thinks, they are eternal), or who +at all events is the regulator of so immense a fabric and so great a +blessing to men? Thus, though you see not the soul of man, as you see +not the Deity, yet, as by the contemplation of his works you are led to +acknowledge a God, so you must own the divine power of the soul, from +its remembering things, from its invention, from the quickness of its +motion, and from all the beauty of virtue. Where, then, is it seated, +you will say? + +XXIX. In my opinion, it is seated in the head, and I can bring you +reasons for my adopting that opinion. At present, let the soul reside +where it will, you certainly have one in you. Should you ask what its +nature is? It has one peculiarly its own; but admitting it to consist +of fire, or air, it does not affect the present question. Only observe +this, that as you are convinced there is a God, though you are ignorant +where he resides, and what shape he is of; in like manner you ought to +feel assured that you have a soul, though you cannot satisfy yourself +of the place of its residence, nor its form. In our knowledge of the +soul, unless we are grossly ignorant of natural philosophy, we cannot +but be satisfied that it has nothing but what is simple, unmixed, +uncompounded, and single; and if this is admitted, then it cannot be +separated, nor divided, nor dispersed, nor parted, and therefore it +cannot perish; for to perish implies a parting-asunder, a division, a +disunion, of those parts which, while it subsisted, were held together +by some band. And it was because he was influenced by these and similar +reasons that Socrates neither looked out for anybody to plead for him +when he was accused, nor begged any favor from his judges, but +maintained a manly freedom, which was the effect not of pride, but of +the true greatness of his soul; and on the last day of his life he held +a long discourse on this subject; and a few days before, when he might +have been easily freed from his confinement, he refused to be so; and +when he had almost actually hold of that deadly cup, he spoke with the +air of a man not forced to die, but ascending into heaven. + +XXX. For so indeed he thought himself, and thus he spoke: "That there +were two ways, and that the souls of men, at their departure from the +body, took different roads; for those which were polluted with vices +that are common to men, and which had given themselves up entirely to +unclean desires, and had become so blinded by them as to have +habituated themselves to all manner of debauchery and profligacy, or to +have laid detestable schemes for the ruin of their country, took a road +wide of that which led to the assembly of the Gods; but they who had +preserved themselves upright and chaste, and free from the slightest +contagion of the body, and had always kept themselves as far as +possible at a distance from it, and while on earth had proposed to +themselves as a model the life of the Gods, found the return to those +beings from whom they had come an easy one." Therefore, he argues, that +all good and wise men should take example from the swans, who are +considered sacred to Apollo, not without reason, but particularly +because they seem to have received the gift of divination from him, by +which, foreseeing how happy it is to die, they leave this world with +singing and joy. Nor can any one doubt of this, unless it happens to us +who think with care and anxiety about the soul (as is often the case +with those who look earnestly at the setting sun), to lose the sight of +it entirely; and so the mind's eye, viewing itself, sometimes grows +dull, and for that reason we become remiss in our contemplation. Thus +our reasoning is borne about, harassed with doubts and anxieties, not +knowing how to proceed, but measuring back again those dangerous tracts +which it has passed, like a boat tossed about on the boundless ocean. +But these reflections are of long standing, and borrowed from the +Greeks. But Cato left this world in such a manner as if he were +delighted that he had found an opportunity of dying; for that God who +presides in us forbids our departure hence without his leave. But when +God himself has given us a just cause, as formerly he did to Socrates, +and lately to Cato, and often to many others--in such a case, certainly +every man of sense would gladly exchange this darkness for that light: +not that he would forcibly break from the chains that held him, for +that would be against the law; but, like a man released from prison by +a magistrate or some lawful authority, so he too would walk away, being +released and discharged by God. For the whole life of a philosopher is, +as the same philosopher says, a meditation on death. + +XXXI. For what else is it that we do, when we call off our minds from +pleasure, that is to say, from our attention to the body, from the +managing our domestic estate, which is a sort of handmaid and servant +of the body, or from duties of a public nature, or from all other +serious business whatever? What else is it, I say, that we do, but +invite the soul to reflect on itself? oblige it to converse with +itself, and, as far as possible, break off its acquaintance with the +body? Now, to separate the soul from the body, is to learn to die, and +nothing else whatever. Wherefore take my advice; and let us meditate on +this, and separate ourselves as far as possible from the body, that is +to say, let us accustom ourselves to die. This will be enjoying a life +like that of heaven even while we remain on earth; and when we are +carried thither and released from these bonds, our souls will make +their progress with more rapidity; for the spirit which has always been +fettered by the bonds of the body, even when it is disengaged, advances +more slowly, just as those do who have worn actual fetters for many +years: but when we have arrived at this emancipation from the bonds of +the body, then indeed we shall begin to live, for this present life is +really death, which I could say a good deal in lamentation for if I +chose. + +_A._ You have lamented it sufficiently in your book on Consolation; and +when I read that, there is nothing which I desire more than to leave +these things; but that desire is increased a great deal by what I have +just heard. + +_M._ The time will come, and that soon, and with equal certainty, +whether you hang back or press forward; for time flies. But death is so +far from being an evil, as it lately appeared to you, that I am +inclined to suspect, not that there is no other thing which is an evil +to man, but rather that there is nothing else which is a real good to +him; if, at least, it is true that we become thereby either Gods +ourselves, or companions of the Gods. However, this is not of so much +consequence, as there are some of us here who will not allow this. But +I will not leave off discussing this point till I have convinced you +that death can, upon no consideration whatever, be an evil. + +_A._ How can it, after what I now know? + +_M._ Do you ask how it can? There are crowds of arguers who contradict +this; and those not only Epicureans, whom I regard very little, but, +somehow or other, almost every man of letters; and, above all, my +favorite Dicaearchus is very strenuous in opposing the immortality of +the soul: for he has written three books, which are entitled Lesbiacs, +because the discourse was held at Mitylene, in which he seeks to prove +that souls are mortal. The Stoics, on the other hand, allow us as long +a time for enjoyment as the life of a raven; they allow the soul to +exist a great while, but are against its eternity. + +XXXII. Are you willing to hear then why, even allowing this, death +cannot be an evil. + +_A._ As you please; but no one shall drive me from my belief in +mortality. + +_M._ I commend you, indeed, for that; though we should not be too +confident in our belief of anything; for we are frequently disturbed by +some subtle conclusion. We give way and change our opinions even in +things that are more evident than this; for in this there certainly is +some obscurity. Therefore, should anything of this kind happen, it is +well to be on our guard. + +_A._ You are right in that; but I will provide against any accident. + +_M._ Have you any objection to our dismissing our friends the +Stoics--those, I mean, who allow that the souls exist after they have +left the body, but yet deny that they exist forever? + +_A._ We certainly may dismiss the consideration of those men who admit +that which is the most difficult point in the whole question, namely, +that a soul can exist independently of the body, and yet refuse to +grant that which is not only very easy to believe, but which is even +the natural consequence of the concession which they have made--that if +they can exist for a length of time; they most likely do so forever. + +_M._ You take it right; that is the very thing. Shall we give, +therefore, any credit to Pauaestius, when he dissents from his master, +Plato? whom he everywhere calls divine, the wisest, the holiest of men, +the Homer of philosophers, and whom he opposes in nothing except this +single opinion of the soul's immortality: for he maintains what nobody +denies, that everything which has been generated will perish, and that +even souls are generated, which he thinks appears from their +resemblance to those of the men who begot them; for that likeness is as +apparent in the turn of their minds as in their bodies. But he brings +another reason--that there is nothing which is sensible of pain which +is not also liable to disease; but whatever is liable to disease must +be liable to death. The soul is sensible of pain, therefore it is +liable to perish. + +XXXIII. These arguments may be refuted; for they proceed from his not +knowing that, while discussing the subject of the immortality of the +soul, he is speaking of the intellect, which is free from all turbid +motion; but not of those parts of the mind in which those disorders, +anger and lust, have their seat, and which he whom he is opposing, when +he argues thus, imagines to be distinct and separate from the mind. Now +this resemblance is more remarkable in beasts, whose souls are void of +reason. But the likeness in men consists more in the configuration of +the bodies: and it is of no little consequence in what bodies the soul +is lodged; for there are many things which depend on the body that give +an edge to the soul, many which blunt it. Aristotle, indeed, says that +all men of great genius are melancholy; so that I should not have been +displeased to have been somewhat duller than I am. He instances many, +and, as if it were matter of fact, brings his reasons for it. But if +the power of those things that proceed from the body be so great as to +influence the mind (for they are the things, whatever they are, that +occasion this likeness), still that does not necessarily prove why a +similitude of souls should be generated. I say nothing about cases of +unlikeness. I wish Panaetius could be here: he lived with Africanus. I +would inquire of him which of his family the nephew of Africanus's +brother was like? Possibly he may in person have resembled his father; +but in his manners he was so like every profligate, abandoned man, that +it was impossible to be more so. Whom did the grandson of P. Crassus, +that wise and eloquent and most distinguished man, resemble? Or the +relations and sons of many other excellent men, whose names there is no +occasion to mention? But what are we doing? Have we forgotten that our +purpose was, when we had sufficiently spoken on the subject of the +immortality of the soul, to prove that, even if the soul did perish, +there would be, even then, no evil in death? + +_A._ I remembered it very well; but I had no dislike to your digressing +a little from your original design, while you were talking of the +soul's immortality. + +_M._ I perceive you have sublime thoughts, and are eager to mount up to +heaven. + +XXXIV. I am not without hopes myself that such may be our fate. But +admit what they assert--that the soul does not continue to exist after +death. + +_A._ Should it be so, I see that we are then deprived of the hopes of a +happier life. + +_M._ But what is there of evil in that opinion? For let the soul perish +as the body: is there any pain, or indeed any feeling at all, in the +body after death? No one, indeed asserts that; though Epicurus charges +Democritus with saying so; but the disciples of Democritus deny it. No +sense, therefore, remains in the soul; for the soul is nowhere. Where, +then, is the evil? for there is nothing but these two things. Is it +because the mere separation of the soul and body cannot be effected +without pain? But even should that be granted, how small a pain must +that be! Yet I think that it is false, and that it is very often +unaccompanied by any sensation at all, and sometimes even attended with +pleasure; but certainly the whole must be very trifling, whatever it +is, for it is instantaneous. What makes us uneasy, or rather gives us +pain, is the leaving all the good things of life. But just consider if +I might not more properly say, leaving the evils of life; only there is +no reason for my now occupying myself in bewailing the life of man, and +yet I might, with very good reason. But what occasion is there, when +what I am laboring to prove is that no one is miserable after death, to +make life more miserable by lamenting over it? I have done that in the +book which I wrote, in order to comfort myself as well as I could. If, +then, our inquiry is after truth, death withdraws us from evil, not +from good. This subject is indeed so copiously handled by Hegesias, the +Cyrenaic philosopher, that he is said to have been forbidden by Ptolemy +from delivering his lectures in the schools, because some who heard him +made away with themselves. There is, too, an epigram of Callimachus[20] +on Cleombrotus of Ambracia, who, without any misfortune having befallen +him, as he says, threw himself from a wall into the sea, after he had +read a book of Plato's. The book I mentioned of that Hegesias is called +[Greek: Apokarterteron], or "A Man who starves himself," in which a man +is represented as killing himself by starvation, till he is prevented +by his friends, in reply to whom he reckons up all the miseries of +human life. I might do the same, though not so fully as he, who thinks +it not worth any man's while to live. I pass over others. Was it even +worth my while to live, for, had I died before I was deprived of the +comforts of my own family, and of the honors which I received for my +public services, would not death have taken me from the evils of life +rather than from its blessings? + +XXXV. Mention, therefore, some one, who never knew distress; who never +received any blow from fortune. The great Metellus had four +distinguished sons; but Priam had fifty, seventeen of whom were born to +him by his lawful wife. Fortune had the same power over both, though +she exercised it but on one; for Metellus was laid on his funeral pile +by a great company of sons and daughters, grandsons, and +granddaughters; but Priam fell by the hand of an enemy, after having +fled to the altar, and having seen himself deprived of all his numerous +progeny. Had he died before the death of his sons and the ruin of his +kingdom, + + With all his mighty wealth elate, + Under rich canopies of state; + +would he then have been taken from good or from evil? It would indeed, +at that time, have appeared that he was being taken away from good; yet +surely it would have turned out advantageous for him; nor should we +have had these mournful verses, + + Lo! these all perish'd in one flaming pile; + The foe old Priam did of life beguile, + And with his blood, thy altar, Jove, defile. + +As if anything better could have happened to him at that time than to +lose his life in that manner; but yet, if it had befallen him sooner, +it would have prevented all those consequences; but even as it was, it +released him from any further sense of them. The case of our friend +Pompey[21] was something better: once, when he had been very ill at +Naples, the Neapolitans, on his recovery, put crowns on their heads, as +did those of Puteoli; the people flocked from the country to +congratulate him--it is a Grecian custom, and a foolish one; still it +is a sign of good fortune. But the question is, had he died, would he +have been taken from good, or from evil? Certainly from evil. He would +not have been engaged in a war with his father-in-law;[22] he would not +have taken up arms before he was prepared; he would not have left his +own house, nor fled from Italy; he would not, after the loss of his +army, have fallen unarmed into the hands of slaves, and been put to +death by them; his children would not have been destroyed; nor would +his whole fortune have come into the possession of the conquerors. Did +not he, then, who, if he had died at that time, would have died in all +his glory, owe all the great and terrible misfortunes into which he +subsequently fell to the prolongation of his life at that time? + +XXXVI. These calamities are avoided by death, for even though they +should never happen, there is a possibility that they may; but it never +occurs to a man that such a disaster may befall him himself. Every one +hopes to be as happy as Metellus: as if the number of the happy +exceeded that of the miserable; or as if there were any certainty in +human affairs; or, again, as if there were more rational foundation for +hope than fear. But should we grant them even this, that men are by +death deprived of good things; would it follow that the dead are +therefore in need of the good things of life, and are miserable on that +account? Certainly they must necessarily say so. Can he who does not +exist be in need of anything? To be in need of has a melancholy sound, +because it in effect amounts to this--he had, but he has not; he +regrets, he looks back upon, he wants. Such are, I suppose, the +distresses of one who is in need of. Is he deprived of eyes? to be +blind is misery. Is he destitute of children? not to have them is +misery. These considerations apply to the living, but the dead are +neither in need of the blessings of life, nor of life itself. But when +I am speaking of the dead, I am speaking of those who have no +existence. But would any one say of us, who do exist, that we want +horns or wings? Certainly not. Should it be asked, why not? the answer +would be, that not to have what neither custom nor nature has fitted +you for would not imply a want of them, even though you were sensible +that you had them not. This argument should be pressed over and over +again, after that point has once been established, which, if souls are +mortal, there can be no dispute about--I mean, that the destruction of +them by death is so entire as to remove even the least suspicion of any +sense remaining. When, therefore, this point is once well grounded and +established, we must correctly define what the term to want means; that +there may be no mistake in the word. To want, then, signifies this: to +be without that which you would be glad to have; for inclination for a +thing is implied in the word want, excepting when we use the word in an +entirely different sense, as we do when we say that a fever is wanting +to any one. For it admits of a different interpretation, when you are +without a certain thing, and are sensible that you are without it, but +yet can easily dispense with having it. "To want," then, is an +expression which you cannot apply to the dead; nor is the mere fact of +wanting something necessarily lamentable. The proper expression ought +to be, "that they want a good," and that is an evil. + +But a living man does not want a good, unless he is distressed without +it; and yet, we can easily understand how any man alive can be without +a kingdom. But this cannot be predicated of you with any accuracy: it +might have been asserted of Tarquin, when he was driven from his +kingdom. But when such an expression is used respecting the dead, it is +absolutely unintelligible. For to want implies to be sensible; but the +dead are insensible: therefore, the dead can be in no want. + +XXXVII. But what occasion is there to philosophize here in a matter +with which we see that philosophy is but little concerned? How often +have not only our generals but whole armies, rushed on certain death! +But if it had been a thing to be feared, L. Brutus would never have +fallen in fight, to prevent the return of that tyrant whom he had +expelled; nor would Decius the father have been slain in fighting with +the Latins; nor would his son, when engaged with the Etruscans, nor his +grandson with Pyrrhus have exposed themselves to the enemy's darts. +Spain would never have seen, in one campaign, the Scipios fall fighting +for their country; nor would the plains of Cannae have witnessed the +death of Paulus and Geminus, or Venusia that of Marcellus; nor would +the Latins have beheld the death of Albinus, nor the Leucanians that of +Gracchus. But are any of these miserable now? Nay, they were not so +even at the first moment after they had breathed their last; nor can +any one be miserable after he has lost all sensation. Oh, but the mere +circumstance of being without sensation is miserable. It might be so if +being without sensation were the same thing as wanting it; but as it is +evident there can be nothing of any kind in that which has no +existence, what can there be afflicting to that which can neither feel +want nor be sensible of anything? We might be said to have repeated +this over too often, only that here lies all that the soul shudders at +from the fear of death. For whoever can clearly apprehend that which is +as manifest as the light--that when both soul and body are consumed, +and there is a total destruction, then that which was an animal becomes +nothing--will clearly see that there is no difference between a +Hippocentaur, which never had existence, and King Agamemnon, and that +M. Camillus is no more concerned about this present civil war than I +was at the sacking of Rome, when he was living. + +XXXVIII. Why, then, should Camillus be affected with the thoughts of +these things happening three hundred and fifty years after his time? +And why should I be uneasy it I were to expect that some nation might +possess itself of this city ten thousand years hence? Because so great +is our regard for our country, as not to be measured by our own +feeling, but by its own actual safety. + +Death, then, which threatens us daily from a thousand accidents, and +which, by reason of the shortness of life, can never be far off, does +not deter a wise man from making such provision for his country and his +family as he hopes may last forever; and from regarding posterity, of +which he can never have any real perception, as belonging to himself. +Wherefore a man may act for eternity, even though he be persuaded that +his soul is mortal; not, indeed, from a desire of glory, which he will +be insensible of, but from a principle of virtue, which glory will +inevitably attend, though that is not his object. The process, indeed, +of nature is this: that just in the same manner as our birth was the +beginning of things with us, so death will be the end; and as we were +noways concerned with anything before we were born, so neither shall we +be after we are dead. And in this state of things where can the evil +be, since death has no connection with either the living or the dead? +The one have no existence at all, the other are not yet affected by it. +They who make the least of death consider it as having a great +resemblance to sleep; as if any one would choose to live ninety years +on condition that, at the expiration of sixty, he should sleep out the +remainder. The very swine would not accept of life on those terms, much +less I. Endymion, indeed, if you listen to fables, slept once on a time +on Latmus, a mountain of Caria, and for such a length of time that I +imagine he is not as yet awake. Do you think that he is concerned at +the Moon's being in difficulties, though it was by her that he was +thrown into that sleep, in order that she might kiss him while +sleeping. For what should he be concerned for who has not even any +sensation? You look on sleep as an image of death, and you take that on +you daily; and have you, then, any doubt that there is no sensation in +death, when you see there is none in sleep, which is its near +resemblance? + +XXXIX. Away, then, with those follies, which are little better than the +old women's dreams, such as that it is miserable to die before our +time. What time do you mean? That of nature? But she has only lent you +life, as she might lend you money, without fixing any certain time for +its repayment. Have you any grounds of complaint, then, that she +recalls it at her pleasure? for you received it on these terms. They +that complain thus allow that if a young child dies, the survivors +ought to bear his loss with equanimity; that if an infant in the cradle +dies, they ought not even to utter a complaint; and yet nature has been +more severe with them in demanding back what she gave. They answer by +saying that such have not tasted the sweets of life; while the other +had begun to conceive hopes of great happiness, and, indeed, had begun +to realize them. Men judge better in other things, and allow a part to +be preferable to none. Why do they not admit the same estimate in life? +Though Callimachus does not speak amiss in saying that more tears had +flowed from Priam than his son; yet they are thought happier who die +after they have reached old age. It would be hard to say why; for I do +not apprehend that any one, if a longer life were granted to him, would +find it happier. There is nothing more agreeable to a man than +prudence, which old age most certainly bestows on a man, though it may +strip him of everything else. But what age is long, or what is there at +all long to a man? Does not + + Old age, though unregarded, still attend + On childhood's pastimes, as the cares of men? + +But because there is nothing beyond old age, we call that long: all +these things are said to be long or short, according to the proportion +of time they were given us for. Artistotle saith there is a kind of +insect near the river Hypanis, which runs from a certain part of Europe +into the Pontus, whose life consists but of one day; those that die at +the eighth hour die in full age; those who die when the sun sets are +very old, especially when the days are at the longest. Compare our +longest life with eternity, and we shall be found almost as short-lived +as those little animals. + +XL. Let us, then, despise all these follies--for what softer name can I +give to such levities?--and let us lay the foundation of our happiness +in the strength and greatness of our minds, in a contempt and disregard +of all earthly things, and in the practice of every virtue. For at +present we are enervated by the softness of our imaginations, so that, +should we leave this world before the promises of our fortune-tellers +are made good to us, we should think ourselves deprived of some great +advantages, and seem disappointed and forlorn. But if, through life, we +are in continual suspense, still expecting, still desiring, and are in +continual pain and torture, good Gods! how pleasant must that journey +be which ends in security and ease! How pleased am I with Theramenes! +Of how exalted a soul does he appear! For, although we never read of +him without tears, yet that illustrious man is not to be lamented in +his death, who, when he had been imprisoned by the command of the +thirty tyrants, drank off, at one draught, as if he had been thirsty, +the poisoned cup, and threw the remainder out of it with such force +that it sounded as it fell; and then, on hearing the sound of the +drops, he said, with a smile, "I drink this to the most excellent +Critias," who had been his most bitter enemy; for it is customary among +the Greeks, at their banquets, to name the person to whom they intend +to deliver the cup. This celebrated man was pleasant to the last, even +when he had received the poison into his bowels, and truly foretold the +death of that man whom he named when he drank the poison, and that +death soon followed. Who that thinks death an evil could approve of the +evenness of temper in this great man at the instant of dying? Socrates +came, a few years after, to the same prison and the same cup by as +great iniquity on the part of his judges as the tyrants displayed when +they executed Theramenes. What a speech is that which Plato makes him +deliver before his judges, after they had condemned him to death! + +XLI. "I am not without hopes, O judges, that it is a favorable +circumstance for me that I am condemned to die; for one of these two +things must necessarily happen--either that death will deprive me +entirely of all sense, or else that, by dying, I shall go from hence +into some other place; wherefore, if all sense is utterly extinguished, +and if death is like that sleep which sometimes is so undisturbed as to +be even without the visions of dreams--in that case, O ye good Gods! +what gain is it to die? or what length of days can be imagined which +would be preferable to such a night? And if the constant course of +future time is to resemble that night, who is happier than I am? But if +on the other hand, what is said be true, namely, that death is but a +removal to those regions where the souls of the departed dwell, then +that state must be more happy still to have escaped from those who call +themselves judges, and to appear before such as are truly so--Minos, +Rhadamanthus, AEacus, Triptolemus--and to meet with those who have lived +with justice and probity![23] Can this change of abode appear otherwise +than great to you? What bounds can you set to the value of conversing +with Orpheus, and Musaeus, and Homer, and Hesiod? I would even, were it +possible, willingly die often, in order to prove the certainty of what +I speak of. What delight must it be to meet with Palamedes, and Ajax, +and others, who have been betrayed by the iniquity of their judges! +Then, also, should I experience the wisdom of even that king of kings, +who led his vast troops to Troy, and the prudence of Ulysses and +Sisyphus: nor should I then be condemned for prosecuting my inquiries +on such subjects in the same way in which I have done here on earth. +And even you, my judges, you, I mean, who have voted for my acquittal, +do not you fear death, for nothing bad can befall a good man, whether +he be alive or dead; nor are his concerns ever overlooked by the Gods; +nor in my case either has this befallen me by chance; and I have +nothing to charge those men with who accused or condemned me but the +fact that they believed that they were doing me harm." In this manner +he proceeded. There is no part of his speech which I admire more than +his last words: "But it is time," says he, "for me now to go hence, +that I may die; and for you, that you may continue to live. Which +condition of the two is the best, the immortal Gods know; but I do not +believe that any mortal man does." + +XLII. Surely I would rather have had this man's soul than all the +fortunes of those who sat in judgment on him; although that very thing +which he says no one except the Gods know, namely, whether life or +death is most preferable, he knows himself, for he had previously +stated his opinion on it; but he maintained to the last that favorite +maxim of his, of affirming nothing. And let us, too, adhere to this +rule of not thinking anything an evil which is a general provision of +nature; and let us assure ourselves, that if death is an evil, it is an +eternal evil, for death seems to be the end of a miserable life; but if +death is a misery, there can be no end of that. But why do I mention +Socrates, or Theramenes, men distinguished by the glory of virtue and +wisdom? when a certain Lacedaemomian, whose name is not so much as +known, held death in such contempt, that, when led to it by the ephori, +he bore a cheerful and pleasant countenance; and, when he was asked by +one of his enemies whether he despised the laws of Lycurgus, "On the +contrary," answered he, "I am greatly obliged to him, for he has +amerced me in a fine which I can pay without borrowing, or taking up +money at interest." This was a man worthy of Sparta. And I am almost +persuaded of his innocence because of the greatness of his soul. Our +own city has produced many such. But why should I name generals, and +other men of high rank, when Cato could write that legions have marched +with alacrity to that place from whence they never expected to return? +With no less greatness of soul fell the Lacedaemonians at Thermopylae, on +whom Simonides wrote the following epitaph: + + Go, stranger, tell the Spartans, here we lie, + Who to support their laws durst boldly die.[24] + +What was it that Leonidas, their general, said to them? "March on with +courage, my Lacedaemonians. To-night, perhaps, we shall sup in the +regions below." This was a brave nation while the laws of Lycurgus were +in force. One of them, when a Persian had said to him in conversation, +"We shall hide the sun from your sight by the number of our arrows and +darts," replied, "We shall fight, then in the shade." Do I talk of +their men? How great was that Lacedaemonian woman, who had sent her son +to battle, and when she heard that he was slain, said, "I bore him for +that purpose, that you might have a man who durst die for his country!" +However, it is a matter of notoriety that the Spartans were bold and +hardy, for the discipline of a republic has great influence. + +XLIII. What, then, have we not reason to admire Theodorus the Cyrenean, +a philosopher of no small distinction, who, when Lysimachus threatened +to crucify him, bade him keep those menaces for his courtiers? "To +Theodorus it makes no difference whether he rot in the air or +underground." By which saying of the philosopher I am reminded to say +something of the custom of funerals and sepulture, and of funeral +ceremonies, which is, indeed, not a difficult subject, especially if we +recollect what has been before said about insensibility. The opinion of +Socrates respecting this matter is clearly stated in the book which +treats of his death, of which we have already said so much; for when he +had discussed the immortality of the soul, and when the time of his +dying was approaching rapidly, being asked by Criton how he would be +buried, "I have taken a great deal of pains," saith he, "my friends, to +no purpose, for I have not convinced our Criton that I shall fly from +hence, and leave no part of me behind. Notwithstanding, Criton, if you +can overtake me, wheresoever you get hold of me, bury me as you please: +but believe me, none of you will be able to catch me when I have flown +away from hence." That was excellently said, inasmuch as he allows his +friend to do as he pleased, and yet shows his indifference about +anything of this kind. Diogenes was rougher, though of the same +opinion; but in his character of a Cynic he expressed himself in a +somewhat harsher manner; he ordered himself to be thrown anywhere +without being buried. And when his friends replied, "What! to the birds +and beasts?" "By no means," saith he; "place my staff near me, that I +may drive them away." "How can you do that," they answer, "for you will +not perceive them?" "How am I then injured by being torn by those +animals, if I have no sensation?" Anaxagoras, when he was at the point +of death at Lampsacus, and was asked by his friends, whether, if +anything should happen to him, he would not choose to be carried to +Clazomenae, his country, made this excellent answer, "There is," says +he, "no occasion for that, for all places are at an equal distance from +the infernal regions." There is one thing to be observed with respect +to the whole subject of burial, that it relates to the body, whether +the soul live or die. Now, with regard to the body, it is clear that, +whether the soul live or die, that has no sensation. + +XLIV. But all things are full of errors. Achilles drags Hector, tied to +his chariot; he thinks, I suppose, he tears his flesh, and that Hector +feels the pain of it; therefore, he avenges himself on him, as he +imagines. But Hecuba bewails this as a sore misfortune: + + I saw (a dreadful sight) great Hector slain, + Dragg'd at Achilles' car along the plain. + +What Hector? or how long will he be Hector? Accius is better in this, +and Achilles, too, is sometimes reasonable: + + I Hector's body to his sire convey'd, + Hector I sent to the infernal shade. + +It was not Hector that you dragged along, but a body that had been +Hector's. Here another starts from underground, and will not suffer his +mother to sleep: + + To thee I call, my once-loved parent, hear, + Nor longer with thy sleep relieve thy care; + Thine eye which pities not is closed--arise; + Ling'ring I wait the unpaid obsequies. + +When these verses are sung with a slow and melancholy tune, so as to +affect the whole theatre with sadness, one can scarce help thinking +those unhappy that are unburied: + + Ere the devouring dogs and hungry vultures... + +He is afraid he shall not have the use of his limbs so well if they are +torn to pieces, but is under no such apprehensions if they are burned: + + Nor leave my naked bones, my poor remains, + To shameful violence and bloody stains. + +I do not understand what he could fear who could pour forth such +excellent verses to the sound of the flute. We must, therefore, adhere +to this, that nothing is to be regarded after we are dead, though many +people revenge themselves on their dead enemies. Thyestes pours forth +several curses in some good lines of Ennius, praying, first of all, +that Atreus may perish by a shipwreck, which is certainly a very +terrible thing, for such a death is not free from very grievous +sensations. Then follow these unmeaning expressions: + + May + On the sharp rock his mangled carcass lie, + His entrails torn, to hungry birds a prey! + May he convulsive writhe his bleeding side, + And with his clotted gore the stones be dyed! + +The rocks themselves were not more destitute of feeling than he who was +hanging to them by his side; though Thyestes imagines he is wishing him +the greatest torture. It would be torture, indeed, if he were sensible; +but as he is not, it can be none; then how very unmeaning is this: + + Let him, still hovering o'er the Stygian wave, + Ne'er reach the body's peaceful port, the grave! + +You see under what mistaken notions all this is said. He imagines the +body has its haven, and that the dead are at rest in their graves. +Pelops was greatly to blame in not having informed and taught his son +what regard was due to everything. + +XLV. But what occasion is there to animadvert on the opinions of +individuals, when we may observe whole nations to fall into all sorts +of errors? The Egyptians embalm their dead, and keep them in their +houses; the Persians dress them over with wax, and then bury them, that +they may preserve their bodies as long as possible. It is customary +with the Magi to bury none of their order, unless they have been first +torn by wild beasts. In Hyrcania, the people maintain dogs for the +public use; the nobles have their own--and we know that they have a +good breed of dogs; but every one, according to his ability, provides +himself with some, in order to be torn by them; and they hold that to +be the best kind of interment. Chrysippus, who is curious in all kinds +of historical facts, has collected many other things of this kind; but +some of them are so offensive as not to admit of being related. All +that has been said of burying is not worth our regard with respect to +ourselves, though it is not to be neglected as to our friends, provided +we are thoroughly aware that the dead are insensible. But the living, +indeed, should consider what is due to custom and opinion; only they +should at the same time consider that the dead are noways interested in +it. But death truly is then met with the greatest tranquillity when the +dying man can comfort himself with his own praise. No one dies too soon +who has finished the course of perfect virtue. I myself have known many +occasions when I have seemed in danger of immediate death; oh! how I +wish it had come to me! for I have gained nothing by the delay. I had +gone over and over again the duties of life; nothing remained but to +contend with fortune. If reason, then, cannot sufficiently fortify us +to enable us to feel a contempt for death, at all events let our past +life prove that we have lived long enough, and even longer than was +necessary; for notwithstanding the deprivation of sense, the dead are +not without that good which peculiarly belongs to them, namely, the +praise and glory which they have acquired, even though they are not +sensible of it. For although there be nothing in glory to make it +desirable, yet it follows virtue as its shadow; and the genuine +judgment of the multitude on good men, if ever they form any, is more +to their own praise than of any real advantage to the dead. Yet I +cannot say, however it may be received, that Lycurgus and Solon have no +glory from their laws, and from the political constitution which they +established in their country; or that Themistocles and Epaminondas have +not glory from their martial virtue. + +XLVI. For Neptune shall sooner bury Salamis itself with his waters than +the memory of the trophies gained there; and the Boeotian Leuctra shall +perish sooner than the glory of that great battle. And longer still +shall fame be before it deserts Curius, and Fabricius, and Calatinus, +and the two Scipios, and the two Africani, and Maximus, and Marcellus, +and Paulus, and Cato, and Laelius, and numberless other heroes; and +whoever has caught any resemblance of them, not estimating it by common +fame, but by the real applause of good men, may with confidence, when +the occasion requires, approach death, on which we are sure that even +if the chief good is not continued, at least no evil is. Such a man +would even wish to die while in prosperity; for all the favors that +could be heaped on him would not be so agreeable to him as the loss of +them would be painful. That speech of the Lacedaemonian seems to have +the same meaning, who, when Diagoras the Rhodian, who had himself been +a conqueror at the Olympic games, saw two of his own sons conquerors +there on the same day, approached the old man, and, congratulating him, +said, "You should die now, Diagoras, for no greater happiness can +possibly await you." The Greeks look on these as great things; perhaps +they think too highly of them, or, rather, they did so then. And so he +who said this to Diagoras, looking on it as something very glorious, +that three men out of one family should have been conquerors there, +thought it could answer no purpose to him to continue any longer in +life, where he could only be exposed to a reverse of fortune. + +I might have given you a sufficient answer, as it seems to me, on this +point, in a few words, as you had allowed the dead were not exposed to +any positive evil; but I have spoken at greater length on the subject +for this reason, because this is our greatest consolation in the losing +and bewailing of our friends. For we ought to bear with moderation any +grief which arises from ourselves, or is endured on our own account, +lest we should seem to be too much influenced by self-love. But should +we suspect our departed friends to be under those evils, which they are +generally imagined to be, and to be sensible of them, then such a +suspicion would give us intolerable pain; and accordingly I wished, for +my own sake, to pluck up this opinion by the roots, and on that account +I have been perhaps somewhat more prolix than was necessary. + +XLVII. _A._ More prolix than was necessary? Certainty not, in my +opinion. For I was induced, by the former part of your speech, to wish +to die; but, by the latter, sometimes not to be unwilling, and at +others to be wholly indifferent about it. But the effect of your whole +argument is, that I am convinced that death ought not to be classed +among the evils. + +_M._ Do you, then, expect that I am to give you a regular peroration, +like the rhetoricians, or shall I forego that art? + +_A._ I would not have you give over an art which you have set off to +such advantage; and you were in the right to do so, for, to speak the +truth, it also has set you off. But what is that peroration? For I +should be glad to hear it, whatever it is. + +_M._ It is customary, in the schools, to produce the opinions of the +immortal Gods on death; nor are these opinions the fruits of the +imagination alone of the lecturers, but they have the authority of +Herodotus and many others. Cleobis and Biton are the first they +mention, sons of the Argive priestess; the story is a well-known one. +As it was necessary that she should be drawn in a chariot to a certain +annual sacrifice, which was solemnized at a temple some considerable +distance from the town, and the cattle that were to draw the chariot +had not arrived, those two young men whom I have just mentioned, +pulling off their garments, and anointing their bodies with oil, +harnessed themselves to the yoke. And in this manner the priestess was +conveyed to the temple; and when the chariot had arrived at the proper +place, she is said to have entreated the Goddess to bestow on them, as +a reward for their piety, the greatest gift that a God could confer on +man. And the young men, after having feasted with their mother, fell +asleep; and in the morning they were found dead. Trophonius and +Agamedes are said to have put up the same petition, for they, having +built a temple to Apollo at Delphi, offered supplications to the God, +and desired of him some extraordinary reward for their care and labor, +particularizing nothing, but asking for whatever was best for men. +Accordingly, Apollo signified to them that he would bestow it on them +in three days, and on the third day at daybreak they were found dead. +And so they say that this was a formal decision pronounced by that God +to whom the rest of the deities have assigned the province of divining +with an accuracy superior to that of all the rest. + +XLVIII. There is also a story told of Silenus, who, when taken prisoner +by Midas, is said to have made him this present for his ransom--namely, +that he informed him[25] that never to have been born was by far the +greatest blessing that could happen to man; and that the next best +thing was to die very soon; which very opinion Euripides makes use of +in his Cresphontes, saying, + + When man is born, 'tis fit, with solemn show, + We speak our sense of his approaching woe; + With other gestures and a different eye, + Proclaim our pleasure when he's bid to die.[26] + +There is something like this in Crantor's Consolation; for he says that +Terinaesus of Elysia, when he was bitterly lamenting the loss of his +son, came to a place of divination to be informed why he was visited +with so great affliction, and received in his tablet these three +verses: + + Thou fool, to murmur at Euthynous' death! + The blooming youth to fate resigns his breath: + The fate, whereon your happiness depends, + At once the parent and the son befriends.[27] + +On these and similar authorities they affirm that the question has been +determined by the Gods. Nay, more; Alcidamas, an ancient rhetorician of +the very highest reputation, wrote even in praise of death, which he +endeavored to establish by an enumeration of the evils of life; and his +Dissertation has a great deal of eloquence in it; but he was +unacquainted with the more refined arguments of the philosophers. By +the orators, indeed, to die for our country is always considered not +only as glorious, but even as happy: they go back as far as +Erechtheus,[28] whose very daughters underwent death, for the safety of +their fellow-citizens: they instance Codrus, who threw himself into the +midst of his enemies, dressed like a common man, that his royal robes +might not betray him, because the oracle had declared the Athenians +conquerors, if their king was slain. Menoeceus[29] is not overlooked by +them, who, in compliance with the injunctions of an oracle, freely shed +his blood for his country. Iphigenia ordered herself to be conveyed to +Aulis, to be sacrificed, that her blood might be the cause of spilling +that of her enemies. + +XLIX. From hence they proceed to instances of a fresher date. Harmodius +and Aristogiton are in everybody's mouth; the memory of Leonidas the +Lacedaemonian and Epaminondas the Theban is as fresh as ever. Those +philosophers were not acquainted with the many instances in our +country--to give a list of whom would take up too much time--who, we +see, considered death desirable as long as it was accompanied with +honor. But, notwithstanding this is the correct view of the case, we +must use much persuasion, speak as if we were endued with some higher +authority, in order to bring men to begin to wish to die, or cease to +be afraid of death. For if that last day does not occasion an entire +extinction, but a change of abode only, what can be more desirable? And +if it, on the other hand, destroys, and absolutely puts an end to us, +what can be preferable to the having a deep sleep fall on us, in the +midst of the fatigues of life, and being thus overtaken, to sleep to +eternity? And, should this really be the case, then Ennius's language +is more consistent with wisdom than Solon's; for our Ennius says, + + Let none bestow upon my passing bier + One needless sigh or unavailing tear. + +But the wise Solon says, + + Let me not unlamented die, but o'er my bier + Burst forth the tender sigh, the friendly tear.[30] + +But let us, if indeed it should be our fate to know the time which is +appointed by the Gods for us to die, prepare ourselves for it with a +cheerful and grateful mind, thinking ourselves like men who are +delivered from a jail, and released from their fetters, for the purpose +of going back to our eternal habitation, which may be more emphatically +called our own; or else to be divested of all sense and trouble. If, on +the other hand, we should have no notice given us of this decree, yet +let us cultivate such a disposition as to look on that formidable hour +of death as happy for us, though shocking to our friends; and let us +never imagine anything to be an evil which is an appointment of the +immortal Gods, or of nature, the common parent of all. For it is not by +hazard or without design that we have been born and situated as we +have. On the contrary, beyond all doubt there is a certain power which +consults the happiness of human nature; and this would neither have +produced nor provided for a being which, after having gone through the +labors of life, was to fall into eternal misery by death. Let us rather +infer that we have a retreat and haven prepared for us, which I wish we +could crowd all sail and arrive at; but though the winds should not +serve, and we should be driven back, yet we shall to a certainty arrive +at that point eventually, though somewhat later. But how can that be +miserable for one which all must of necessity undergo? I have given you +a peroration, that you might not think I had overlooked or neglected +anything. + +_A._ I am persuaded you have not; and, indeed, that peroration has +confirmed me. + +_M._ I am glad it has had that effect. But it is now time to consult +our health. To-morrow, and all the time we continue in this Tusculan +villa, let us consider this subject; and especially those portions of +it which may ease our pain, alleviate our fears, and lessen our +desires, which is the greatest advantage we can reap from the whole of +philosophy. + + * * * * * + + + + +BOOK II. + +ON BEARING PAIN. + + +I. Neoptolemus, in Ennius, indeed, says that the study of philosophy +was expedient for him; but that it required limiting to a few subjects, +for that to give himself up entirely to it was what he did not approve +of. And for my part, Brutus, I am perfectly persuaded that it is +expedient for me to philosophize; for what can I do better, especially +as I have no regular occupation? But I am not for limiting my +philosophy to a few subjects, as he does; for philosophy is a matter in +which it is difficult to acquire a little knowledge without acquainting +yourself with many, or all its branches, nor can you well take a few +subjects without selecting them out of a great number; nor can any one, +who has acquired the knowledge of a few points, avoid endeavoring with +the same eagerness to understand more. But still, in a busy life, and +in one mainly occupied with military matters, such as that of +Neoptolemus was at that time, even that limited degree of acquaintance +with philosophy may be of great use, and may yield fruit, not perhaps +so plentiful as a thorough knowledge of the whole of philosophy, but +yet such as in some degree may at times deliver us from the dominion of +our desires, our sorrows, and our fears; just as the effect of that +discussion which we lately maintained in my Tusculan villa seemed to be +that a great contempt of death was engendered, which contempt is of no +small efficacy towards delivering the mind from fear; for whoever +dreads what cannot be avoided can by no means live with a quiet and +tranquil mind. But he who is under no fear of death, not only because +it is a thing absolutely inevitable but also because he is persuaded +that death itself hath nothing terrible in it, provides himself with a +very great resource towards a happy life. However, I am not tolerant +that many will argue strenuously against us; and, indeed, that is a +thing which can never be avoided, except by abstaining from writing at +all. For if my Orations, which were addressed to the judgment and +approbation of the people (for that is a popular art, and the object of +oratory is popular applause), have been criticised by some people who +are inclined to withhold their praise from everything but what they are +persuaded they can attain to themselves, and who limit their ideas of +good speaking by the hopes which they conceive of what they themselves +may attain to, and who declare, when they are overwhelmed with a flow +of words and sentences, that they prefer the utmost poverty of thought +and expression to that plenty and copiousness (from which arose the +Attic kind of oratory, which they who professed it were strangers to, +though they have now been some time silenced, and laughed out of the +very courts of justice), what may I not expect, when at present I +cannot have the least countenance from the people by whom I used to be +upheld before? For philosophy is satisfied with a few judges, and of +her own accord industriously avoids the multitude, who are jealous of +it, and utterly displeased with it; so that, should any one undertake +to cry down the whole of it, he would have the people on his side; +while, if he should attack that school which I particularly profess, he +would have great assistance from those of the other philosophers. + +II. But I have answered the detractors of philosophy in general, in my +Hortensius. And what I had to say in favor of the Academics, is, I +think, explained with sufficient accuracy in my four books of the +Academic Question. + +But yet I am so far from desiring that no one should write against me, +that it is what I most earnestly wish; for philosophy would never have +been in such esteem in Greece itself, if it had not been for the +strength which it acquired from the contentions and disputations of the +most learned men; and therefore I recommend all men who have abilities +to follow my advice to snatch this art also from declining Greece, and +to transport it to this city; as our ancestors by their study and +industry have imported all their other arts which were worth having. +Thus the praise of oratory, raised from a low degree, is arrived at +such perfection that it must now decline, and, as is the nature of all +things, verge to its dissolution in a very short time. Let philosophy, +then, derive its birth in Latin language from this time, and let us +lend it our assistance, and bear patiently to be contradicted and +refuted; and although those men may dislike such treatment who are +bound and devoted to certain predetermined opinions, and are under such +obligations to maintain them that they are forced, for the sake of +consistency, to adhere to them even though they do not themselves +wholly approve of them; we, on the other hand, who pursue only +probabilities, and who cannot go beyond that which seems really likely, +can confute others without obstinacy, and are prepared to be confuted +ourselves without resentment. Besides, if these studies are ever +brought home to us, we shall not want even Greek libraries, in which +there is an infinite number of books, by reason of the multitude of +authors among them; for it is a common practice with many to repeat the +same things which have been written by others, which serves no purpose +but to stuff their shelves; and this will be our case, too, if many +apply themselves to this study. + +III. But let us excite those, if possible, who have had a liberal +education, and are masters of an elegant style, and who philosophize +with reason and method. + +For there is a certain class of them who would willingly be called +philosophers, whose books in our language are said to be numerous, and +which I do not despise; for, indeed, I never read them: but still, +because the authors themselves declare that they write without any +regularity, or method, or elegance, or ornament, I do not care to read +what must be so void of entertainment. There is no one in the least +acquainted with literature who does not know the style and sentiments +of that school; wherefore, since they are at no pains to express +themselves well, I do not see why they should be read by anybody except +by one another. Let them read them, if they please, who are of the same +opinions; for in the same manner as all men read Plato and the other +Socratics, with those who sprung from them, even those who do not agree +with their opinions, or are very indifferent about them; but scarcely +any one except their own disciples take Epicurus or Metrodorus into +their hands; so they alone read these Latin books who think that the +arguments contained in them are sound. But, in my opinion, whatever is +published should be recommended to the reading of every man of +learning; and though we may not succeed in this ourselves, yet +nevertheless we must be sensible that this ought to be the aim of every +writer. And on this account I have always been pleased with the custom +of the Peripatetics and Academics, of disputing on both sides of the +question; not solely from its being the only method of discovering what +is probable on every subject, but also because it affords the greatest +scope for practising eloquence; a method that Aristotle first made use +of, and afterward all the Aristotelians; and in our own memory Plilo, +whom we have often heard, appointed one time to treat of the precepts +of the rhetoricians, and another for philosophical discussion, to which +custom I was brought to conform by my friends at my Tusculum; and +accordingly our leisure time was spent in this manner. And therefore, +as yesterday before noon we applied ourselves to speaking, and in the +afternoon went down into the Academy, the discussions which were held +there I have acquainted you with, not in the manner of a narration, but +in almost the very same words which were employed in the debate. + +IV. The discourse, then, was introduced in this manner while we were +walking, and it was commenced by some such an opening as this: + +_A._ It is not to be expressed how much I was delighted, or rather +edified, by your discourse of yesterday. For although I am conscious to +myself that I have never been too fond of life, yet at times, when I +have considered that there would be an end to this life, and that I +must some time or other part with all its good things, a certain dread +and uneasiness used to intrude itself on my thoughts; but now, believe +me, I am so freed from that kind of uneasiness that there is nothing +that I think less worth any regard. + +_M._ I am not at all surprised at that, for it is the effect of +philosophy, which is the medicine of our souls; it banishes all +groundless apprehensions, frees us from desires, and drives away fears: +but it has not the same influence over all men; it is of very great +influence when it falls in with a disposition well adapted to it. For +not only does Fortune, as the old proverb says, assist the bold, but +reason does so in a still greater degree; for it, by certain precepts, +as it were, strengthens even courage itself. You were born naturally +great and soaring, and with a contempt for all things which pertain to +man alone; therefore a discourse against death took easy possession of +a brave soul. But do you imagine that these same arguments have any +force with those very persons who have invented, and canvassed, and +published them, excepting indeed some very few particular persons? For +how few philosophers will you meet with whose life and manners are +conformable to the dictates of reason! who look on their profession, +not as a means of displaying their learning, but as a rule for their +own practice! who follow their own precepts, and comply with their own +decrees! You may see some of such levity and such vanity, that it would +have been better for them to have been ignorant; some covetous of +money, some others eager for glory, many slaves to their lusts; so that +their discourses and their actions are most strangely at variance; than +which nothing in my opinion can be more unbecoming: for just as if one +who professed to teach grammar should speak with impropriety, or a +master of music sing out of tune, such conduct has the worst appearance +in these men, because they blunder in the very particular with which +they profess that they are well acquainted. So a philosopher who errs +in the conduct of his life is the more infamous because he is erring in +the very thing which he pretends to teach, and, while he lays down +rules to regulate life by, is irregular in his own life. + +V. _A._ Should this be the case, is it not to be feared that you are +dressing up philosophy in false colors? For what stronger argument can +there be that it is of little use than that some very profound +philosophers live in a discreditable manner? + +_M._ That, indeed, is no argument at all, for as all the fields which +are cultivated are not fruitful (and this sentiment of Accius is false, +and asserted without any foundation, + + The ground you sow on is of small avail; + To yield a crop good seed can never fail), + +it is not every mind which has been properly cultivated that produces +fruit; and, to go on with the comparison, as a field, although it may +be naturally fruitful, cannot produce a crop without dressing, so +neither can the mind without education; such is the weakness of either +without the other. Whereas philosophy is the culture of the mind: this +it is which plucks up vices by the roots; prepares the mind for the +receiving of seeds; commits them to it, or, as I may say, sows them, in +the hope that, when come to maturity, they may produce a plentiful +harvest. Let us proceed, then, as we began. Say, if you please, what +shall be the subject of our disputation. + +_A._ I look on pain to be the greatest of all evils. + +_M._ What, even greater than infamy? + +_A._ I dare not indeed assert that; and I blush to think I am so soon +driven from my ground. + +_M._ You would have had greater reason for blushing had you persevered +in it; for what is so unbecoming--what can appear worse to you, than +disgrace, wickedness, immorality? To avoid which, what pain is there +which we ought not (I will not say to avoid shirking, but even) of our +own accord to encounter, and undergo, and even to court? + +_A._ I am entirely of that opinion; but, notwithstanding that pain is +not the greatest evil, yet surely it is an evil. + +_M._ Do you perceive, then, how much of the terror of pain you have +given up on a small hint? + +_A._ I see that plainly; but I should be glad to give up more of it. + +_M._ I will endeavor to make you do so; but it is a great undertaking, +and I must have a disposition on your part which is not inclined to +offer any obstacles. + +_A._ You shall have such: for as I behaved yesterday, so now I will +follow reason wherever she leads. + +VI. _M._ First, then, I will speak of the weakness of many +philosophers, and those, too, of various sects; the head of whom, both +in authority and antiquity, was Aristippus, the pupil of Socrates, who +hesitated not to say that pain was the greatest of all evils. And after +him Epicurus easily gave in to this effeminate and enervated doctrine. +After him Hieronymus the Rhodian said, that to be without pain was the +chief good, so great an evil did pain appear to him to be. The rest, +with the exceptions of Zeno, Aristo, Pyrrho, were pretty much of the +same opinion that you were of just now--that it was indeed an evil, but +that there were many worse. When, then, nature herself, and a certain +generous feeling of virtue, at once prevents you from persisting in the +assertion that pain is the chief evil, and when you were driven from +such an opinion when disgrace was contrasted with pain, shall +philosophy, the preceptress of life, cling to this idea for so many +ages? What duty of life, what praise, what reputation, would be of such +consequence that a man should be desirous of gaining it at the expense +of submitting to bodily pain, when he has persuaded himself that pain +is the greatest evil? On the other side, what disgrace, what ignominy, +would he not submit to that he might avoid pain, when persuaded that it +was the greatest of evils? Besides, what person, if it be only true +that pain is the greatest of evils, is not miserable, not only when he +actually feels pain, but also whenever he is aware that it may befall +him. And who is there whom pain may not befall? So that it is clear +that there is absolutely no one who can possibly be happy. Metrodorus, +indeed, thinks that man perfectly happy whose body is free from all +disorders, and who has an assurance that it will always continue so; +but who is there who can be assured of that? + +VII. But Epicurus, indeed, says such things that it should seem that +his design was only to make people laugh; for he affirms somewhere that +if a wise man were to be burned or put to the torture--you expect, +perhaps, that he is going to say he would bear it, he would support +himself under it with resolution, he would not yield to it (and that by +Hercules! would be very commendable, and worthy of that very Hercules +whom I have just invoked): but even this will not satisfy Epicurus, +that robust and hardy man! No; his wise man, even if he were in +Phalaris's bull, would say, How sweet it is! how little do I regard it! +What, sweet? Is it not sufficient, if it is not disagreeable? But those +very men who deny pain to be an evil are not in the habit of saying +that it is agreeable to any one to be tormented; they rather say that +it is cruel, or hard to bear, afflicting, unnatural, but still not an +evil: while this man who says that it is the only evil, and the very +worst of all evils, yet thinks that a wise man would pronounce it +sweet. I do not require of you to speak of pain in the same words which +Epicurus uses--a man, as you know, devoted to pleasure: he may make no +difference, if he pleases, between Phalaris's bull and his own bed; but +I cannot allow the wise man to be so indifferent about pain. If he +bears it with courage, it is sufficient: that he should rejoice in it, +I do not expect; for pain is, beyond all question, sharp, bitter, +against nature, hard to submit to and to bear. Observe Philoctetes: We +may allow him to lament, for he saw Hercules himself groaning loudly +through extremity of pain on Mount Oeta. The arrows with which Hercules +presented him were then no consolation to him, when + + The viper's bite, impregnating his veins + With poison, rack'd him with its bitter pains. + +And therefore he cries out, desiring help, and wishing to die, + + Oh that some friendly hand its aid would lend, + My body from this rock's vast height to send + Into the briny deep! I'm all on fire, + And by this fatal wound must soon expire. + +It is hard to say that the man who was obliged to cry out in this +manner was not oppressed with evil, and great evil too. + +VIII. But let us observe Hercules himself, who was subdued by pain at +the very time when he was on the point of attaining immortality by +death. What words does Sophocles here put in his mouth, in his +Trachiniae? who, when Deianira had put upon him a tunic dyed in the +centaur's blood, and it stuck to his entrails, says, + + What tortures I endure no words can tell, + Far greater these, than those which erst befell + From the dire terror of thy consort, Jove-- + E'en stern Eurystheus' dire command above; + This of thy daughter, Oeneus, is the fruit, + Beguiling me with her envenom'd suit, + Whose close embrace doth on my entrails prey, + Consuming life; my lungs forbid to play; + The blood forsakes my veins; my manly heart + Forgets to beat; enervated, each part + Neglects its office, while my fatal doom + Proceeds ignobly from the weaver's loom. + The hand of foe ne'er hurt me, nor the fierce + Giant issuing from his parent earth. + Ne'er could the Centaur such a blow enforce, + No barbarous foe, nor all the Grecian force; + This arm no savage people could withstand, + Whose realms I traversed to reform the land. + Thus, though I ever bore a manly heart, + I fall a victim to a woman's art. +IX. Assist, my son, if thou that name dost hear, + My groans preferring to thy mother's tear: + Convey her here, if, in thy pious heart, + Thy mother shares not an unequal part: + Proceed, be bold, thy father's fate bemoan, + Nations will join, you will not weep alone. + Oh, what a sight is this same briny source, + Unknown before, through all my labors' course! + That virtue, which could brave each toil but late, + With woman's weakness now bewails its fate. + Approach, my son; behold thy father laid, + A wither'd carcass that implores thy aid; + Let all behold: and thou, imperious Jove, + On me direct thy lightning from above: + Now all its force the poison doth assume, + And my burnt entrails with its flame consume. + Crestfallen, unembraced, I now let fall + Listless, those hands that lately conquer'd all; + When the Nemaean lion own'd their force, + And he indignant fell a breathless corse; + The serpent slew, of the Lernean lake, + As did the Hydra of its force partake: + By this, too, fell the Erymanthian boar: + E'en Cerberus did his weak strength deplore. + This sinewy arm did overcome with ease + That dragon, guardian of the Golden Fleece. + My many conquests let some others trace; + It's mine to say, I never knew disgrace.[31] + +Can we then, despise pain, when we see Hercules himself giving vent to +his expressions of agony with such impatience? + +X. Let us see what AEschylus says, who was not only a poet but a +Pythagorean philosopher also, for that is the account which you have +received of him; how doth he make Prometheus bear the pain he suffered +for the Lemnian theft, when he clandestinely stole away the celestial +fire, and bestowed it on men, and was severely punished by Jupiter for +the theft. Fastened to Mount Caucasus, he speaks thus: + + Thou heav'n-born race of Titans here fast bound, + Behold thy brother! As the sailors sound + With care the bottom, and their ships confine + To some safe shore, with anchor and with line; + So, by Jove's dread decree, the God of fire + Confines me here the victim of Jove's ire. + With baneful art his dire machine he shapes; + From such a God what mortal e'er escapes? + When each third day shall triumph o'er the night, + Then doth the vulture, with his talons light, + Seize on my entrails; which, in rav'nous guise, + He preys on! then with wing extended flies + Aloft, and brushes with his plumes the gore: + But when dire Jove my liver doth restore, + Back he returns impetuous to his prey, + Clapping his wings, he cuts th' ethereal way. + Thus do I nourish with my blood this pest, + Confined my arms, unable to contest; + Entreating only that in pity Jove + Would take my life, and this cursed plague remove. + But endless ages past unheard my moan, + Sooner shall drops dissolve this very stone.[32] + +And therefore it scarcely seems possible to avoid calling a man who is +suffering, miserable; and if he is miserable, then pain is an evil. + +XI. _A._ Hitherto you are on my side; I will see to that by-and-by; +and, in the mean while, whence are those verses? I do not remember +them. + +_M._ I will inform you, for you are in the right to ask. Do you see +that I have much leisure? + +_A._ What, then? + +_M._ I imagine, when you were at Athens, you attended frequently at the +schools of the philosophers. + +_A._ Yes, and with great pleasure. + +_M._ You observed, then, that though none of them at that time were +very eloquent, yet they used to mix verses with their harangues. + +_A._ Yes, and particularly Dionysius the Stoic used to employ a great +many. + +_M._ You say right; but they were quoted without any appropriateness or +elegance. But our friend Philo used to give a few select lines and well +adapted; and in imitation of him, ever since I took a fancy to this +kind of elderly declamation, I have been very fond of quoting our +poets; and where I cannot be supplied from them, I translate from the +Greek, that the Latin language may not want any kind of ornament in +this kind of disputation. + +But, do you not see how much harm is done by poets? They introduce the +bravest men lamenting over their misfortunes: they soften our minds; +and they are, besides, so entertaining, that we do not only read them, +but get them by heart. Thus the influence of the poets is added to our +want of discipline at home, and our tender and delicate manner of +living, so that between them they have deprived virtue of all its vigor +and energy. Plato, therefore, was right in banishing them from his +commonwealth, where he required the best morals, and the best form of +government. But we, who have all our learning from Greece, read and +learn these works of theirs from our childhood; and look on this as a +liberal and learned education. + +XII. But why are we angry with the poets? We may find some +philosophers, those masters of virtue, who have taught that pain was +the greatest of evils. But you, young man, when you said but just now +that it appeared so to you, upon being asked by me what appeared +greater than infamy, gave up that opinion at a word. Suppose I ask +Epicurus the same question. He will answer that a trifling degree of +pain is a greater evil than the greatest infamy; for that there is no +evil in infamy itself, unless attended with pain. What pain, then, +attends Epicurus, when he says that very thing, that pain is the +greatest evil! And yet nothing can be a greater disgrace to a +philosopher than to talk thus. Therefore, you allowed enough when you +admitted that infamy appeared to you to be a greater evil than pain. +And if you abide by this admission, you will see how far pain should be +resisted; and that our inquiry should be not so much whether pain be an +evil, as how the mind may be fortified for resisting it. The Stoics +infer from some petty quibbling arguments that it is no evil, as if the +dispute were about a word, and not about the thing itself. Why do you +impose upon me, Zeno? For when you deny what appears very dreadful to +me to be an evil, I am deceived, and am at a loss to know why that +which appears to me to be a most miserable thing should be no evil. The +answer is, that nothing is an evil but what is base and vicious. You +return to your trifling, for you do not remove what made me uneasy. I +know that pain is not vice--you need not inform me of that: but show me +that it makes no difference to me whether I am in pain or not. It has +never anything to do, say you, with a happy life, for that depends upon +virtue alone; but yet pain is to be avoided. If I ask, why? It is +disagreeable, against nature, hard to bear, woful and afflicting. + +XIII. Here are many words to express that by so many different forms +which we call by the single word evil. You are defining pain, instead +of removing it, when you say, it is disagreeable, unnatural, scarcely +possible to be endured or borne, nor are you wrong in saying so: but +the man who vaunts himself in such a manner should not give way in his +conduct, if it be true that nothing is good but what is honest, and +nothing evil but what is disgraceful. This would be wishing, not +proving. This argument is a better one, and has more truth in it--that +all things which Nature abhors are to be looked upon as evil; that +those which she approves of are to be considered as good: for when this +is admitted, and the dispute about words removed, that which they with +reason embrace, and which we call honest, right, becoming, and +sometimes include under the general name of virtue, appears so far +superior to everything else that all other things which are looked upon +as the gifts of fortune, or the good things of the body, seem trifling +and insignificant; and no evil whatever, nor all the collective body of +evils together, appears to be compared to the evil of infamy. +Wherefore, if, as you granted in the beginning, infamy is worse than +pain, pain is certainly nothing; for while it appears to you base and +unmanly to groan, cry out, lament, or faint under pain; while you +cherish notions of probity, dignity, honor, and, keeping your eye on +them, refrain yourself, pain will certainly yield to virtue, and, by +the influence of imagination, will lose its whole force.--For you must +either admit that there is no such thing as virtue, or you must despise +every kind of pain. Will you allow of such a virtue as prudence, +without which no virtue whatever can even be conceived? What, then? +Will that suffer you to labor and take pains to no purpose? Will +temperance permit you to do anything to excess? Will it be possible for +justice to be maintained by one who through the force of pain discovers +secrets, or betrays his confederates, or deserts many duties of life? +Will you act in a manner consistently with courage, and its attendants, +greatness of soul, resolution, patience, and contempt for all worldly +things? Can you hear yourself called a great man when you lie +grovelling, dejected, and deploring your condition with a lamentable +voice; no one would call you even a man while in such a condition. You +must therefore either abandon all pretensions to courage, or else pain +must be put out of the question. + +XIV. You know very well that, even though part of your Corinthian +furniture were gone, the remainder might be safe without that; but if +you lose one virtue (though virtue in reality cannot be lost), still +if, I say, you should acknowledge that you were deficient in one, you +would be stripped of all. Can you, then, call yourself a brave man, of +a great soul, endued with patience and steadiness above the frowns of +fortune? or Philoctetes? for I choose to instance him, rather than +yourself, for he certainly was not a brave man, who lay in his bed, +which was watered with his tears, + + Whose groans, bewailings, and whose bitter cries, + With grief incessant rent the very skies. + +I do not deny pain to be pain--for were that the case, in what would +courage consist?--but I say it should be assuaged by patience, if there +be such a thing as patience: if there be no such thing, why do we speak +so in praise of philosophy? or why do we glory in its name? Does pain +annoy us? Let it sting us to the heart: if you are without defensive +armor, bare your throat to it; but if you are secured by Vulcanian +armor, that is to say by resolution, resist it. Should you fail to do +so, that guardian of your honor, your courage, will forsake and leave +you.--By the laws of Lycurgus, and by those which were given to the +Cretans by Jupiter, or which Minos established under the direction of +Jupiter, as the poets say, the youths of the State are trained by the +practice of hunting, running, enduring hunger and thirst, cold and +heat. The boys at Sparta are scourged so at the altars that blood +follows the lash in abundance; nay, sometimes, as I used to hear when I +was there, they are whipped even to death; and yet not one of them was +ever heard to cry out, or so much as groan. What, then? Shall men not +be able to bear what boys do? and shall custom have such great force, +and reason none at all? + +XV. There is some difference between labor and pain; they border upon +one another, but still there is a certain difference between them. +Labor is a certain exercise of the mind or body, in some employment or +undertaking of serious trouble and importance; but pain is a sharp +motion in the body, disagreeable to our senses.--Both these feelings, +the Greeks, whose language is more copious than ours, express by the +common name of [Greek: Ponos]: therefore they call industrious men +painstaking, or, rather, fond of labor; we, more conveniently, call +them laborious; for laboring is one thing, and enduring pain another. +You see, O Greece! your barrenness of words, sometimes, though you +think you are always so rich in them. I say, then, that there is a +difference between laboring and being in pain. When Caius Marius had an +operation performed for a swelling in his thigh, he felt pain; when he +headed his troops in a very hot season, he labored. Yet these two +feelings bear some resemblance to one another; for the accustoming +ourselves to labor makes the endurance of pain more easy to us. And it +was because they were influenced by this reason that the founders of +the Grecian form of government provided that the bodies of their youth +should be strengthened by labor, which custom the Spartans transferred +even to their women, who in other cities lived more delicately, keeping +within the walls of their houses; but it was otherwise with the +Spartans. + + The Spartan women, with a manly air, + Fatigues and dangers with their husbands share; + They in fantastic sports have no delight, + Partners with them in exercise and fight. + +And in these laborious exercises pain interferes sometimes. They are +thrown down, receive blows, have bad falls, and are bruised, and the +labor itself produces a sort of callousness to pain. + +XVI. As to military service (I speak of our own, not of that of the +Spartans, for they used to march slowly to the sound of the flute, and +scarce a word of command was given without an anapaest), you may see, in +the first place, whence the very name of an army (_exercitus_[33]) is +derived; and, secondly, how great the labor is of an army on its march: +then consider that they carry more than a fortnight's provision, and +whatever else they may want; that they carry the burden of the +stakes,[34] for as to shield, sword, or helmet, they look on them as no +more encumbrance than their own limbs, for they say that arms are the +limbs of a soldier, and those, indeed, they carry so commodiously that, +when there is occasion, they throw down their burdens, and use their +arms as readily as their limbs. Why need I mention the exercises of the +legions? And how great the labor is which is undergone in the running, +encounters, shouts! Hence it is that their minds are worked up to make +so light of wounds in action. Take a soldier of equal bravery, but +undisciplined, and he will seem a woman. Why is it that there is this +sensible difference between a raw recruit and a veteran soldier? The +age of the young soldiers is for the most part in their favor; but it +is practice only that enables men to bear labor and despise wounds. +Moreover, we often see, when the wounded are carried off the field, the +raw, untried soldier, though but slightly wounded, cries out most +shamefully; but the more brave, experienced veteran only inquires for +some one to dress his wounds, and says, + + Patroclus, to thy aid I must appeal + Ere worse ensue, my bleeding wounds to heal; + The sons of AEsculapius are employ'd, + No room for me, so many are annoy'd. + +XVII. This is certainly Eurypylus himself. What an experienced +man!--While his friend is continually enlarging on his misfortunes, you +may observe that he is so far from weeping that he even assigns a +reason why he should bear his wounds with patience. + + Who at his enemy a stroke directs, + His sword to light upon himself expects. + +Patroclus, I suppose, will lead him off to his chamber to bind up his +wounds, at least if he be a man: but not a word of that; he only +inquires how the battle went: + + Say how the Argives bear themselves in fight? + +And yet no words can show the truth as well as those, your deeds and +visible sufferings. + + Peace! and my wounds bind up; + +but though Eurypylus could bear these afflictions, AEsopus could not, + + Where Hector's fortune press'd our yielding troops; + +and he explains the rest, though in pain. So unbounded is military +glory in a brave man! Shall, then, a veteran soldier be able to behave +in this manner, and shall a wise and learned man not be able? Surely +the latter might be able to bear pain better, and in no small degree +either. At present, however, I am confining myself to what is +engendered by practice and discipline. I am not yet come to speak of +reason and philosophy. You may often hear of old women living without +victuals for three or four days; but take away a wrestler's provisions +but for one day, and he will implore the aid of Jupiter Olympius, the +very God for whom he exercises himself: he will cry out that he cannot +endure it. Great is the force of custom! Sportsmen will continue whole +nights in the snow; they will bear being almost frozen upon the +mountains. From practice boxers will not so much as utter a groan, +however bruised by the cestus. But what do you think of those to whom a +victory in the Olympic games seemed almost on a par with the ancient +consulships of the Roman people? What wounds will the gladiators bear, +who are either barbarians, or the very dregs of mankind! How do they, +who are trained to it, prefer being wounded to basely avoiding it! How +often do they prove that they consider nothing but the giving +satisfaction to their masters or to the people! for when covered with +wounds, they send to their masters to learn their pleasure: if it is +their will, they are ready to lie down and die. What gladiator, of even +moderate reputation, ever gave a sigh? who ever turned pale? who ever +disgraced himself either in the actual combat, or even when about to +die? who that had been defeated ever drew in his neck to avoid the +stroke of death? So great is the force of practice, deliberation, and +custom! Shall this, then, be done by + + A Samnite rascal, worthy of his trade; + +and shall a man born to glory have so soft a part in his soul as not to +be able to fortify it by reason and reflection? The sight of the +gladiators' combats is by some looked on as cruel and inhuman, and I do +not know, as it is at present managed, but it may be so; but when the +guilty fought, we might receive by our ears perhaps (but certainly by +our eyes we could not) better training to harden us against pain and +death. + +XVIII. I have now said enough about the effects of exercise, custom, +and careful meditation. Proceed we now to consider the force of reason, +unless you have something to reply to what has been said. + +_A._ That I should interrupt you! By no means; for your discourse has +brought me over to your opinion. Let the Stoics, then, think it their +business to determine whether pain be an evil or not, while they +endeavor to show by some strained and trifling conclusions, which are +nothing to the purpose, that pain is no evil. My opinion is, that +whatever it is, it is not so great as it appears; and I say, that men +are influenced to a great extent by some false representations and +appearance of it, and that all which is really felt is capable of being +endured. Where shall I begin, then? Shall I superficially go over what +I said before, that my discourse may have a greater scope? + +This, then, is agreed upon by all, and not only by learned men, but +also by the unlearned, that it becomes the brave and magnanimous--those +that have patience and a spirit above this world--not to give way to +pain. Nor has there ever been any one who did not commend a man who +bore it in this manner. That, then, which is expected from a brave man, +and is commended when it is seen, it must surely be base in any one to +be afraid of at its approach, or not to bear when it comes. But I would +have you consider whether, as all the right affections of the soul are +classed under the name of virtues, the truth is that this is not +properly the name of them all, but that they all have their name from +that leading virtue which is superior to all the rest: for the name +"virtue" comes from _vir_, a man, and courage is the peculiar +distinction of a man: and this virtue has two principal duties, to +despise death and pain. We must, then, exert these, if we would be men +of virtue, or, rather, if we would be men, because virtue (_virtus_) +takes its very name from _vir_, man. + +XIX. You may inquire, perhaps, how? And such an inquiry is not amiss, +for philosophy is ready with her assistance. Epicurus offers himself to +you, a man far from a bad--or, I should rather say, a very good man: he +advises no more than he knows. "Despise pain," says he. Who is it saith +this? Is it the same man who calls pain the greatest of all evils? It +is not, indeed, very consistent in him. Let us hear what he says: "If +the pain is excessive, it must needs be short." I must have that over +again, for I do not apprehend what you mean exactly by "excessive" or +"short." That is excessive than which nothing can be greater; that is +short than which nothing is shorter. I do not regard the greatness of +any pain from which, by reason of the shortness of its continuance, I +shall be delivered almost before it reaches me. But if the pain be as +great as that of Philoctetes, it will appear great indeed to me, but +yet not the greatest that I am capable of bearing; for the pain is +confined to my foot. But my eye may pain me, I may have a pain in the +head, or sides, or lungs, or in every part of me. It is far, then, from +being excessive. Therefore, says he, pain of a long continuance has +more pleasure in it than uneasiness. Now, I cannot bring myself to say +so great a man talks nonsense; but I imagine he is laughing at us. My +opinion is that the greatest pain (I say the greatest, though it may be +ten atoms less than another) is not therefore short, because acute. I +could name to you a great many good men who have been tormented many +years with the acutest pains of the gout. But this cautious man doth +not determine the measure of that greatness or of duration, so as to +enable us to know what he calls excessive with regard to pain, or short +with respect to its continuance. Let us pass him by, then, as one who +says just nothing at all; and let us force him to acknowledge, +notwithstanding he might behave himself somewhat boldly under his colic +and his strangury, that no remedy against pain can be had from him who +looks on pain as the greatest of all evils. We must apply, then, for +relief elsewhere, and nowhere better (if we seek for what is most +consistent with itself) than to those who place the chief good in +honesty, and the greatest evil in infamy. You dare not so much as +groan, or discover the least uneasiness in their company, for virtue +itself speaks to you through them. + +XX. Will you, when you may observe children at Lacedaemon, and young men +at Olympia, and barbarians in the amphitheatre, receive the severest +wounds, and bear them without once opening their mouths--will you, I +say, if any pain should by chance attack you, cry out like a woman? +Will you not rather bear it with resolution and constancy? and not cry, +It is intolerable; nature cannot bear it! I hear what you say: Boys +bear this because they are led thereto by glory; some bear it through +shame, many through fear, and yet are we afraid that nature cannot bear +what is borne by many, and in such different circumstances? Nature not +only bears it, but challenges it, for there is nothing with her +preferable, nothing which she desires more than credit, and reputation, +and praise, and honor, and glory. I choose here to describe this one +thing under many names, and I have used many that you may have the +clearer idea of it; for what I mean to say is, that whatever is +desirable of itself, proceeding from virtue, or placed in virtue, and +commendable on its own account (which I would rather agree to call the +only good than deny it to be the chief good) is what men should prefer +above all things. And as we declare this to be the case with respect to +honesty, so we speak in the contrary manner of infamy; nothing is so +odious, so detestable, nothing so unworthy of a man. And if you are +thoroughly convinced of this (for, at the beginning of this discourse, +you allowed that there appeared to you more evil in infamy than in +pain), it follows that you ought to have the command over yourself, +though I scarcely know how this expression may seem an accurate one, +which appears to represent man as made up of two natures, so that one +should be in command and the other be subject to it. + +XXI. Yet this division does not proceed from ignorance; for the soul +admits of a twofold division, one of which partakes of reason, the +other is without it. When, therefore, we are ordered to give a law to +ourselves, the meaning is, that reason should restrain our rashness. +There is in the soul of every man something naturally soft, low, +enervated in a manner, and languid. Were there nothing besides this, +men would be the greatest of monsters; but there is present to every +man reason, which presides over and gives laws to all; which, by +improving itself, and making continual advances, becomes perfect +virtue. It behooves a man, then, to take care that reason shall have +the command over that part which is bound to practise obedience. In +what manner? you will say. Why, as a master has over his slave, a +general over his army, a father over his son. If that part of the soul +which I have called soft behaves disgracefully, if it gives itself up +to lamentations and womanish tears, then let it be restrained, and +committed to the care of friends and relations, for we often see those +persons brought to order by shame whom no reasons can influence. +Therefore, we should confine those feelings, like our servants, in safe +custody, and almost with chains. But those who have more resolution, +and yet are not utterly immovable, we should encourage with our +exhortations, as we would good soldiers, to recollect themselves, and +maintain their honor. That wisest man of all Greece, in the Niptrae, +does not lament too much over his wounds, or, rather, he is moderate in +his grief: + + Move slow, my friends; your hasty speed refrain, + Lest by your motion you increase my pain. + +Pacuvius is better in this than Sophocles, for in the one Ulysses +bemoans his wounds too vehemently; for the very people who carried him +after he was wounded, though his grief was moderate, yet, considering +the dignity of the man, did not scruple to say, + + And thou, Ulysses, long to war inured, + Thy wounds, though great, too feebly hast endured. + +The wise poet understood that custom was no contemptible instructor how +to bear pain. But the same hero complains with more decency, though in +great pain: + + Assist, support me, never leave me so; + Unbind my wounds, oh! execrable woe! + +He begins to give way, but instantly checks himself: + + Away! begone! but cover first the sore; + For your rude hands but make my pains the more. + +Do you observe how he constrains himself? not that his bodily pains +were less, but because he checks the anguish of his mind. Therefore, in +the conclusion of the Niptrae, he blames others, even when he himself is +dying: + + Complaints of fortune may become the man, + None but a woman will thus weeping stand. + +And so that soft place in his soul obeys his reason, just as an abashed +soldier does his stern commander. + +XXII. The man, then, in whom absolute wisdom exists (such a man, +indeed, we have never as yet seen, but the philosophers have described +in their writings what sort of man he will be, if he should exist); +such a man, or at least that perfect and absolute reason which exists +in him, will have the same authority over the inferior part as a good +parent has over his dutiful children: he will bring it to obey his nod +without any trouble or difficulty. He will rouse himself, prepare and +arm himself, to oppose pain as he would an enemy. If you inquire what +arms he will provide himself with, they will be contention, +encouragement, discourse with himself. He will say thus to himself: +Take care that you are guilty of nothing base, languid, or unmanly. He +will turn over in his mind all the different kinds of honor. Zeno of +Elea will occur to him, who suffered everything rather than betray his +confederates in the design of putting an end to the tyranny. He will +reflect on Anaxarchus, the pupil of Democritus, who, having fallen into +the hands of Nicocreon, King of Cyprus, without the least entreaty for +mercy or refusal, submitted to every kind of torture. Calanus the +Indian will occur to him, an ignorant man and a barbarian, born at the +foot of Mount Caucasus, who committed himself to the flames by his own +free, voluntary act. But we, if we have the toothache, or a pain in the +foot, or if the body be anyways affected, cannot bear it. For our +sentiments of pain as well as pleasure are so trifling and effeminate, +we are so enervated and relaxed by luxuries, that we cannot bear the +sting of a bee without crying out. But Caius Marius, a plain +countryman, but of a manly soul, when he had an operation performed on +him, as I mentioned above, at first refused to be tied down; and he is +the first instance of any one's having had an operation performed on +him without being tied down. Why, then, did others bear it afterward? +Why, from the force of example. You see, then, that pain exists more in +opinion than in nature; and yet the same Marius gave a proof that there +is something very sharp in pain for he would not submit to have the +other thigh cut. So that he bore his pain with resolution as a man; +but, like a reasonable person, he was not willing to undergo any +greater pain without some necessary reason. The whole, then, consists +in this--that you should have command over yourself. I have already +told you what kind of command this is; and by considering what is most +consistent with patience, fortitude, and greatness of soul, a man not +only restrains himself, but, somehow or other, mitigates even pain +itself. + +XXIII. Even as in a battle the dastardly and timorous soldier throws +away his shield on the first appearance of an enemy, and runs as fast +as he can, and on that account loses his life sometimes, though he has +never received even one wound, when he who stands his ground has +nothing of the sort happen to him, so they who cannot bear the +appearance of pain throw themselves away, and give themselves up to +affliction and dismay. But they that oppose it, often come off more +than a match for it. For the body has a certain resemblance to the +soul: as burdens are more easily borne the more the body is exerted, +while they crush us if we give way, so the soul by exerting itself +resists the whole weight that would oppress it; but if it yields, it is +so pressed that it cannot support itself. And if we consider things +truly, the soul should exert itself in every pursuit, for that is the +only security for its doing its duty. But this should be principally +regarded in pain, that we must not do anything timidly, or dastardly, +or basely, or slavishly, or effeminately, and, above all things, we +must dismiss and avoid that Philoctetean sort of outcry. A man is +allowed sometimes to groan, but yet seldom; but it is not permissible +even in a woman to howl; for such a noise as this is forbidden, by the +twelve tables, to be used even at funerals. Nor does a wise or brave +man ever groan, unless when he exerts himself to give his resolution +greater force, as they who run in the stadium make as much noise as +they can. The wrestlers, too, do the same when they are training; and +the boxers, when they aim a blow with the cestus at their adversary, +give a groan, not because they are in pain, or from a sinking of their +spirits, but because their whole body is put upon the stretch by the +throwing-out of these groans, and the blow comes the stronger. + +XXIV. What! they who would speak louder than ordinary are they +satisfied with working their jaws, sides, or tongue or stretching the +common organs of speech and utterance? The whole body and every muscle +is at full stretch if I may be allowed the expression; every nerve is +exerted to assist their voice. I have actually seen the knees of Marcus +Antonius touch the ground when he was speaking with vehemence for +himself, with relation to the Varian law. For, as the engines you throw +stones or darts with throw them out with the greater force the more +they are strained and drawn back; so it is in speaking, running, or +boxing--the more people strain themselves, the greater their force. +Since, therefore, this exertion has so much influence--if in a moment +of pain groans help to strengthen the mind, let us use them; but if +they be groans of lamentation, if they be the expression of weakness or +abjectness, or unmanly weeping, then I should scarcely call him a man +who yielded to them. For even supposing that such groaning could give +any ease, it still should be considered whether it were consistent with +a brave and resolute man. But if it does not ease our pain, why should +we debase ourselves to no purpose? For what is more unbecoming in a man +than to cry like a woman? But this precept which is laid down with +respect to pain is not confined to it. We should apply this exertion of +the soul to everything else. Is anger inflamed? is lust excited? we +must have recourse to the same citadel, and apply to the same arms. But +since it is pain which we are at present discussing, we will let the +other subjects alone. To bear pain, then, sedately and calmly, it is of +great use to consider with all our soul, as the saying is, how noble it +is to do so, for we are naturally desirous (as I said before, but it +cannot be too often repeated) and very much inclined to what is +honorable, of which, if we discover but the least glimpse, there is +nothing which we are not prepared to undergo and suffer to attain it. +From this impulse of our minds, this desire for genuine glory and +honorable conduct, it is that such dangers are supported in war, and +that brave men are not sensible of their wounds in action, or, if they +are sensible of them, prefer death to the departing but the least step +from their honor. The Decii saw the shining swords of their enemies +when they were rushing into the battle. But the honorable character and +the glory of the death which they were seeking made all fear of death +of little weight. Do you imagine that Epaminondas groaned when he +perceived that his life was flowing out with his blood? No; for he left +his country triumphing over the Lacedaemonians, whereas he had found it +in subjection to them. These are the comforts, these are the things +that assuage the greatest pain. + +XXV. You may ask, How the case is in peace? What is to be done at home? +How we are to behave in bed? You bring me back to the philosophers, who +seldom go to war. Among these, Dionysius of Heraclea, a man certainly +of no resolution, having learned fortitude of Zeno, quitted it on being +in pain; for, being tormented with a pain in his kidneys, in bewailing +himself he cried out that those things were false which he had formerly +conceived of pain. And when his fellow-disciple, Cleanthes, asked him +why he had changed his opinion, he answered, "That the case of any man +who had applied so much time to philosophy, and yet was unable to bear +pain, might be a sufficient proof that pain is an evil; that he himself +had spent many years at philosophy, and yet could not bear pain: it +followed, therefore, that pain was an evil." It is reported that +Cleanthes on that struck his foot on the ground, and repeated a verse +out of the Epigonae: + + Amphiaraus, hear'st thou this below? + +He meant Zeno: he was sorry the other had degenerated from him. + +But it was not so with our friend Posidonius, whom I have often seen +myself; and I will tell you what Pompey used to say of him: that when +he came to Rhodes, after his departure from Syria, he had a great +desire to hear Posidonius, but was informed that he was very ill of a +severe fit of the gout; yet he had great inclination to pay a visit to +so famous a philosopher. Accordingly, when he had seen him, and paid +his compliments, and had spoken with great respect of him, he said he +was very sorry that he could not hear him lecture. "But indeed you +may," replied the other, "nor will I suffer any bodily pain to occasion +so great a man to visit me in vain." On this Pompey relates that, as he +lay on his bed, he disputed with great dignity and fluency on this very +subject: that nothing was good but what was honest; and that in his +paroxysms he would often say, "Pain, it is to no purpose; +notwithstanding you are troublesome, I will never acknowledge you an +evil." And in general all celebrated and notorious afflictions become +endurable by disregarding them. + +XXVI. Do we not observe that where those exercises called gymnastic are +in esteem, those who enter the lists never concern themselves about +dangers? that where the praise of riding and hunting is highly +esteemed, they who practice these arts decline no pain? What shall I +say of our own ambitious pursuits or desire of honors? What fire have +not candidates run through to gain a single vote? Therefore Africanus +had always in his hands Xenophon, the pupil of Socrates, being +particularly pleased with his saying, that the same labors were not +equally heavy to the general and to the common man, because the honor +itself made the labor lighter to the general. But yet, so it happens, +that even with the illiterate vulgar an idea of honor is of great +influence, though they cannot understand what it is. They are led by +report and common opinion to look on that as honorable which has the +general voice. Not that I would have you, should the multitude be ever +so fond of you, rely on their judgment, nor approve of everything which +they think right: you must use your own judgment. If you are satisfied +with yourself when you have approved of what is right, you will not +only have the mastery over yourself (which I recommended to you just +now), but over everybody, and everything. Lay this down, then, as a +rule, that a great capacity, and lofty elevation of soul, which +distinguishes itself most by despising and looking down with contempt +on pain, is the most excellent of all things, and the more so if it +does not depend on the people and does not aim at applause, but derives +its satisfaction from itself. Besides, to me, indeed, everything seems +the more commendable the less the people are courted, and the fewer +eyes there are to see it. Not that you should avoid the public, for +every generous action loves the public view; yet no theatre for virtue +is equal to a consciousness of it. + +XXVII. And let this be principally considered: that this bearing of +pain, which I have often said is to be strengthened by an exertion of +the soul, should be the same in everything. For you meet with many who, +through a desire of victory, or for glory, or to maintain their rights, +or their liberty, have boldly received wounds, and borne themselves up +under them; and yet those very same persons, by relaxing that +intenseness of their minds, were unequal to bearing the pain of a +disease; for they did not support themselves under their former +sufferings by reason or philosophy, but by inclination and glory. +Therefore some barbarians and savage people are able to fight very +stoutly with the sword, but cannot bear sickness like men; but the +Grecians, men of no great courage, but as wise as human nature will +admit of, cannot look an enemy in the face, yet the same will bear to +be visited with sickness tolerably, and with a sufficiently manly +spirit; and the Cimbrians and Celtiberians are very alert in battle, +but bemoan themselves in sickness. For nothing can be consistent which +has not reason for its foundation. But when you see those who are led +by inclination or opinion, not retarded by pain in their pursuits, nor +hindered by it from succeeding in them, you may conclude, either that +pain is no evil, or that, notwithstanding you may choose to call an +evil whatever is disagreeable and contrary to nature, yet it is so very +trifling an evil that it may so effectually be got the better of by +virtue as quite to disappear. And I would have you think of this night +and day; for this argument will spread itself, and take up more room +some time or other, and not be confined to pain alone; for if the +motives to all our actions are to avoid disgrace and acquire honor, we +may not only despise the stings of pain, but the storms of fortune, +especially if we have recourse to that retreat which was pointed out in +our yesterday's discussion; for, as if some God had advised a man who +was pursued by pirates to throw himself overboard, saying, "There is +something at hand to receive you; either a dolphin will take you up, as +it did Arion of Methymna; or those horses sent by Neptune to Pelops +(who are said to have carried chariots so rapidly as to be borne up by +the waves) will receive you, and convey you wherever you please. Cast +away all fear." So, though your pains be ever so sharp and +disagreeable, if the case is not such that it is worth your while to +endure them, you see whither you may betake yourself. I think this will +do for the present. But perhaps you still abide by your opinion. + +_A._ Not in the least, indeed; and I hope I am freed by these two days' +discourses from the fear of two things that I greatly dreaded. + +_M._ To-morrow, then, for rhetoric, as we were saying. But I see we +must not drop our philosophy. + +_A._ No, indeed; we will have the one in the forenoon, and this at the +usual time. + +_M._ It shall be so, and I will comply with your very laudable +inclinations. + + * * * * * + + + + +BOOK III. + +ON GRIEF OF MIND. + + +I. What reason shall I assign, O Brutus, why, as we consist of mind and +body, the art of curing and preserving the body should be so much +sought after, and the invention of it, as being so useful, should be +ascribed to the immortal Gods; but the medicine of the mind should not +have been so much the object of inquiry while it was unknown, nor so +much attended to and cultivated after its discovery, nor so well +received or approved of by some, and accounted actually disagreeable, +and looked upon with an envious eye by many? Is it because we, by means +of the mind, judge of the pains and disorders of the body, but do not, +by means of the body, arrive at any perception of the disorders of the +mind? Hence it comes that the mind only judges of itself when that very +faculty by which it is judged is in a bad state. Had nature given us +faculties for discerning and viewing herself, and could we go through +life by keeping our eye on her--our best guide--there would be no +reason certainly why any one should be in want of philosophy or +learning; but, as it is, she has furnished us only with some feeble +rays of light, which we immediately extinguish so completely by evil +habits and erroneous opinions that the light of nature is nowhere +visible. The seeds of virtues are natural to our constitutions, and, +were they suffered to come to maturity, would naturally conduct us to a +happy life; but now, as soon as we are born and received into the +world, we are instantly familiarized with all kinds of depravity and +perversity of opinions; so that we may be said almost to suck in error +with our nurse's milk. When we return to our parents, and are put into +the hands of tutors and governors, we are imbued with so many errors +that truth gives place to falsehood, and nature herself to established +opinion. + +II. To these we may add the poets; who, on account of the appearance +they exhibit of learning and wisdom, are heard, read, and got by heart, +and make a deep impression on our minds. But when to these are added +the people, who are, as it were, one great body of instructors, and the +multitude, who declare unanimously for what is wrong, then are we +altogether overwhelmed with bad opinions, and revolt entirely from +nature; so that they seem to deprive us of our best guide who have +decided that there is nothing better for man, nothing more worthy of +being desired by him, nothing more excellent, than honors and commands, +and a high reputation with the people; which indeed every excellent man +aims at; but while he pursues that only true honor which nature has in +view above all other objects, he finds himself busied in arrant +trifles, and in pursuit of no conspicuous form of virtue, but only some +shadowy representation of glory. For glory is a real and express +substance, not a mere shadow. It consists in the united praise of good +men, the free voice of those who form a true judgment of pre-eminent +virtue; it is, as it were, the very echo of virtue; and being generally +the attendant on laudable actions, should not be slighted by good men. +But popular fame, which would pretend to imitate it, is hasty and +inconsiderate, and generally commends wicked and immoral actions, and +throws discredit upon the appearance and beauty of honesty by assuming +a resemblance of it. And it is owing to their not being able to +discover the difference between them that some men ignorant of real +excellence, and in what it consists, have been the destruction of their +country and of themselves. And thus the best men have erred, not so +much in their intentions as by a mistaken conduct. What? is no cure to +be attempted to be applied to those who are carried away by the love of +money, or the lust of pleasures, by which they are rendered little +short of madmen, which is the case of all weak people? or is it because +the disorders of the mind are less dangerous than those of the body? or +because the body will admit of a cure, while there is no medicine +whatever for the mind? + +III. But there are more disorders of the mind than of the body, and +they are of a more dangerous nature; for these very disorders are the +more offensive because they belong to the mind and disturb it; and the +mind, when disordered, is, as Ennius says, in a constant error: it can +neither bear nor endure anything, and is under the perpetual influence +of desires. Now, what disorders can be worse to the body than these two +distempers of the mind (for I overlook others), weakness and desire? +But how, indeed, can it be maintained that the mind cannot prescribe +for itself, when she it is who has invented the medicines for the body, +when, with regard to bodily cures, constitution and nature have a great +share, nor do all who suffer themselves to be cured find that effect +instantly; but those minds which are disposed to be cured, and submit +to the precepts of the wise, may undoubtedly recover a healthy state? +Philosophy is certainly the medicine of the soul, whose assistance we +do not seek from abroad, as in bodily disorders, but we ourselves are +bound to exert our utmost energy and power in order to effect our cure. +But as to philosophy in general, I have, I think, in my Hortensius, +sufficiently spoken of the credit and attention which it deserves: +since that, indeed, I have been continually either disputing or writing +on its most material branches; and I have laid down in these books all +the discussions which took place between myself and my particular +friends at my Tusculan villa. But as I have spoken in the two former of +pain and death, this book shall be devoted to the account of the third +day of our disputations. + +We came down into the Academy when the day was already declining +towards afternoon, and I asked one of those who were present to propose +a subject for us to discourse on; and then the business was carried on +in this manner: + +IV. _A._ My opinion is, that a wise man is subject to grief. + +_M._ What, and to the other perturbations of mind, as fears, lusts, +anger? For these are pretty much like what the Greeks call [Greek: +pathe]. I might call them diseases, and that would be a literal +translation, but it is not agreeable to our way of speaking. For envy, +delight, and pleasure are all called by the Greeks diseases, being +affections of the mind not in subordination to reason; but we, I think, +are right in calling the same motions of a disturbed soul +perturbations, and in very seldom using the term diseases; though, +perhaps, it appears otherwise to you. + +_A._ I am of your opinion. + +_M._ And do you think a wise man subject to these? + +_A._ Entirely, I think. + +_M._ Then that boasted wisdom is but of small account, if it differs so +little from madness? + +_A._ What? does every commotion of the mind seem to you to be madness? + +_M._ Not to me only; but I apprehend, though I have often been +surprised at it, that it appeared so to our ancestors many ages before +Socrates; from whom is derived all that philosophy which relates to +life and morals. + +_A._ How so? + +_M._ Because the name madness[35] implies a sickness of the mind and +disease; that is to say, an unsoundness and an unhealthiness of mind, +which they call madness. But the philosophers call all perturbations of +the soul diseases, and their opinion is that no fool is ever free from +these; but all that are diseased are unsound; and the minds of all +fools are diseased; therefore all fools are mad. For they held that +soundness of the mind depends on a certain tranquillity and steadiness; +and a mind which was destitute of these qualities they called insane, +because soundness was inconsistent with a perturbed mind just as much +as with a disordered body. + +V. Nor were they less ingenious in calling the state of the soul devoid +of the light of the mind, "a being out of one's mind," "a being beside +one's self." From whence we may understand that they who gave these +names to things were of the same opinion with Socrates, that all silly +people were unsound, which the Stoics have carefully preserved as being +derived from him; for whatever mind is distempered (and, as I just now +said, the philosophers call all perturbed motions of the mind +distempers) is no more sound than a body is when in a fit of sickness. +Hence it is that wisdom is the soundness of the mind, folly a sort of +unsoundness, which is insanity, or a being out of one's mind: and these +are much better expressed by the Latin words than the Greek, which you +will find the case also in many other topics. But we will discuss that +point elsewhere: let us now attend to our present subject. The very +meaning of the word describes the whole thing about which we are +inquiring, both as to its substance and character. For we must +necessarily understand by "sound" those whose minds are under no +perturbation from any motion as if it were a disease. They who are +differently affected we must necessarily call "unsound." So that +nothing is better than what is usual in Latin, to say that they who are +run away with by their lust or anger have quitted the command over +themselves; though anger includes lust, for anger is defined to be the +lust of revenge. They, then, who are said not to be masters of +themselves, are said to be so because they are not under the government +of reason, to which is assigned by nature the power over the whole +soul. Why the Greeks should call this mania, I do not easily apprehend; +but we define it much better than they, for we distinguish this madness +(_insania_), which, being allied to folly, is more extensive, from what +we call _furor_, or raving. The Greeks, indeed, would do so too, but +they have no one word that will express it: what we call _furor_, they +call [Greek: melancholia], as if the reason were affected only by a +black bile, and not disturbed as often by a violent rage, or fear, or +grief. Thus we say Athamas, Alcmaeon, Ajax, and Orestes were raving +(_furere_); because a person affected in this manner was not allowed by +the Twelve Tables to have the management of his own affairs; therefore +the words are not, if he is mad (_insanus_), but if he begins to be +raving (_furiosus_). For they looked upon madness to be an unsettled +humor that proceeded from not being of sound mind; yet such a person +might perform his ordinary duties, and discharge the usual and +customary requirements of life: but they considered one that was raving +as afflicted with a total blindness of the mind, which, notwithstanding +it is allowed to be greater than madness, is nevertheless of such a +nature that a wise man may be subject to raving (_furor_), but cannot +possibly be afflicted by insanity (_insania_). But this is another +question: let us now return to our original subject. + +VI. I think you said that it was your opinion that a wise man was +liable to grief. + +_A._ And so, indeed, I think. + +_M._ It is natural enough to think so, for we are not the offspring of +flints; but we have by nature something soft and tender in our souls, +which may be put into a violent motion by grief, as by a storm; nor did +that Crantor, who was one of the most distinguished men that our +Academy has ever produced, say this amiss: "I am by no means of their +opinion who talk so much in praise of I know not what insensibility, +which neither can exist, nor ought to exist. "I would choose," says he, +"never to be ill; but should I be so, still I should choose to retain +my sensation, whether there was to be an amputation or any other +separation of anything from my body. For that insensibility cannot be +but at the expense of some unnatural ferocity of mind, or stupor of +body." But let us consider whether to talk in this manner be not +allowing that we are weak, and yielding to our softness. +Notwithstanding, let us be hardy enough, not only to lop off every arm +of our miseries, but even to pluck up every fibre of their roots. Yet +still something, perhaps, may be left behind, so deep does folly strike +its roots: but whatever may be left it will be no more than is +necessary. But let us be persuaded of this, that unless the mind be in +a sound state, which philosophy alone can effect, there can be no end +of our miseries. Wherefore, as we began, let us submit ourselves to it +for a cure; we shall be cured if we choose to be. I shall advance +something further. I shall not treat of grief alone, though that indeed +is the principal thing; but, as I originally proposed, of every +perturbation of the mind, as I termed it; disorder, as the Greeks call +it: and first, with your leave, I shall treat it in the manner of the +Stoics, whose method is to reduce their arguments into a very small +space; afterward I shall enlarge more in my own way. + +VII. A man of courage is also full of faith. I do not use the word +confident, because, owing to an erroneous custom of speaking, that word +has come to be used in a bad sense, though it is derived from +confiding, which is commendable. But he who is full of faith is +certainly under no fear; for there is an inconsistency between faith +and fear. Now, whoever is subject to grief is subject to fear; for +whatever things we grieve at when present we dread when hanging over us +and approaching. Thus it comes about that grief is inconsistent with +courage: it is very probable, therefore, that whoever is subject to +grief is also liable to fear, and to a broken kind of spirits and +sinking. Now, whenever these befall a man, he is in a servile state, +and must own that he is overpowered; for whoever admits these feelings, +must admit timidity and cowardice. But these cannot enter into the mind +of a man of courage; neither, therefore, can grief: but the man of +courage is the only wise man; therefore grief cannot befall the wise +man. It is, besides, necessary that whoever is brave should be a man of +great soul; that whoever is a man of a great soul should be invincible; +whoever is invincible looks down with contempt on all things here, and +considers them, beneath him. But no one can despise those things on +account of which he may be affected with grief; from whence it follows +that a wise man is never affected with grief: for all wise men are +brave; therefore a wise man is not subject to grief. And as the eye, +when disordered, is not in a good condition for performing its office +properly; and as the other parts, and the whole body itself, when +unsettled, cannot perform their office and business; so the mind, when +disordered, is but ill-fitted to perform its duty. The office of the +mind is to use its reason well; but the mind of a wise man is always in +condition to make the best use of his reason, and therefore is never +out of order. But grief is a disorder of the mind; therefore a wise man +will be always free from it. + +VIII. And from these considerations we may get at a very probable +definition of the temperate man, whom the Greeks call [Greek: sophron]: +and they call that virtue [Greek: sophrosynen], which I at one time +call temperance, at another time moderation, and sometimes even +modesty; but I do not know whether that virtue may not be properly +called frugality, which has a more confined meaning with the Greeks; +for they call frugal men [Greek: chresimous], which implies only that +they are useful; but our name has a more extensive meaning: for all +abstinence, all innocency (which the Greeks have no ordinary name for, +though they might use the word [Greek: ablabeia], for innocency is that +disposition of mind which would offend no one) and several other +virtues are comprehended under frugality; but if this quality were of +less importance, and confined in as small a compass as some imagine, +the surname of Piso[36] would not have been in so great esteem. But as +we allow him not the name of a frugal man (_frugi_), who either quits +his post through fear, which is cowardice; or who reserves to his own +use what was privately committed to his keeping, which is injustice; or +who fails in his military undertakings through rashness, which is +folly--for that reason the word frugality takes in these three virtues +of fortitude, justice, and prudence, though it is indeed common to all +virtues, for they are all connected and knit together. Let us allow, +then, frugality itself to be another and fourth virtue; for its +peculiar property seems to be, to govern and appease all tendencies to +too eager a desire after anything, to restrain lust, and to preserve a +decent steadiness in everything. The vice in contrast to this is called +prodigality (_nequitia_). Frugality, I imagine, is derived from the +word _fruge_, the best thing which the earth produces; _nequitia_ is +derived (though this is perhaps rather more strained; still, let us try +it; we shall only be thought to have been trifling if there is nothing +in what we say) from the fact of everything being to no purpose +(_nequicquam_) in such a man; from which circumstance he is called also +_Nihil_, nothing. Whoever is frugal, then, or, if it is more agreeable +to you, whoever is moderate and temperate, such a one must of course be +consistent; whoever is consistent, must be quiet; the quiet man must be +free from all perturbation, therefore from grief likewise: and these +are the properties of a wise man; therefore a wise man must be free +from grief. + +IX. So that Dionysius of Heraclea is right when, upon this complaint of +Achilles in Homer, + + Well hast thou spoke, but at the tyrant's name + My rage rekindles, and my soul's in flame: + 'Tis just resentment, and becomes the brave, + Disgraced, dishonor'd like the vilest slave[37]-- + +he reasons thus: Is the hand as it should be, when it is affected with +a swelling? or is it possible for any other member of the body, when +swollen or enlarged, to be in any other than a disordered state? Must +not the mind, then, when it is puffed up, or distended, be out of +order? But the mind of a wise man is always free from every kind of +disorder: it never swells, never is puffed up; but the mind when in +anger is in a different state. A wise man, therefore, is never angry; +for when he is angry, he lusts after something; for whoever is angry +naturally has a longing desire to give all the pain he can to the +person who he thinks has injured him; and whoever has this earnest +desire must necessarily be much pleased with the accomplishment of his +wishes; hence he is delighted with his neighbor's misery; and as a wise +man is not capable of such feelings as these, he is therefore not +capable of anger. But should a wise man be subject to grief, he may +likewise be subject to anger; for as he is free from anger, he must +likewise be free from grief. Again, could a wise man be subject to +grief, he might also be liable to pity, or even might be open to a +disposition towards envy (_invidentia_); I do not say to envy +(_invidia_), for that can only exist by the very act of envying: but we +may fairly form the word _invidentia_ from _invidendo_, and so avoid +the doubtful name _invidia;_ for this word is probably derived from +_in_ and _video_, looking too closely into another's fortune; as it is +said in the Melanippus, + + Who envies me the flower of my children? + +where the Latin is _invidit florem._ It may appear not good Latin, but +it is very well put by Accius; for as _video_ governs an accusative +case, so it is more correct to say _invideo florem_ than _flori._ We +are debarred from saying so by common usage. The poet stood in his own +right, and expressed himself with more freedom. + +X. Therefore compassion and envy are consistent in the same man; for +whoever is uneasy at any one's adversity is also uneasy at another's +prosperity: as Theophrastus, while he laments the death of his +companion Callisthenes, is at the same time disturbed at the success of +Alexander; and therefore he says that Callisthenes met with man of the +greatest power and good fortune, but one who did not know how to make +use of his good fortune. And as pity is an uneasiness which arises from +the misfortunes of another, so envy is an uneasiness that proceeds from +the good success of another: therefore whoever is capable of pity is +capable of envy. But a wise man is incapable of envy, and consequently +incapable of pity. But were a wise man used to grieve, to pity also +would be familiar to him; therefore to grieve is a feeling which cannot +affect a wise man. Now, though these reasonings of the Stoics, and +their conclusions, are rather strained and distorted, and ought to be +expressed in a less stringent and narrow manner, yet great stress is to +be laid on the opinions of those men who have a peculiarly bold and +manly turn of thought and sentiment. For our friends the Peripatetics, +notwithstanding all their erudition, gravity, and fluency of language, +do not satisfy me about the moderation of these disorders and diseases +of the soul which they insist upon; for every evil, though moderate, is +in its nature great. But our object is to make out that the wise man is +free from all evil; for as the body is unsound if it is ever so +slightly affected, so the mind under any moderate disorder loses its +soundness; therefore the Romans have, with their usual accuracy of +expression, called trouble, and anguish, and vexation, on account of +the analogy between a troubled mind and a diseased body, disorders. The +Greeks call all perturbation of mind by pretty nearly the same name; +for they name every turbid motion of the soul [Greek: pathos], that is +to say, a distemper. But we have given them a more proper name; for a +disorder of the mind is very like a disease of the body. But lust does +not resemble sickness; neither does immoderate joy, which is an elated +and exulting pleasure of the mind. Fear, too, is not very like a +distemper, though it is akin to grief of mind, but properly, as is also +the case with sickness of the body, so too sickness of mind has no name +separated from pain. And therefore I must explain the origin of this +pain, that is to say, the cause that occasions this grief in the mind, +as if it were a sickness of the body. For as physicians think they have +found out the cure when they have discovered the cause of the +distemper, so we shall discover the method of curing melancholy when +the cause of it is found out. + +XI. The whole cause, then, is in opinion; and this observation applies +not to this grief alone, but to every other disorder of the mind, which +are of four sorts, but consisting of many parts. For as every disorder +or perturbation is a motion of the mind, either devoid of reason, or in +despite of reason, or in disobedience to reason, and as that motion is +excited by an opinion of either good or evil; these four perturbations +are divided equally into two parts: for two of them proceed from an +opinion of good, one of which is an exulting pleasure, that is to say, +a joy elated beyond measure, arising from an opinion of some present +great good; the other is a desire which may fairly be called even a +lust, and is an immoderate inclination after some conceived great good +without any obedience to reason. Therefore these two kinds, the +exulting pleasure and the lust, have their rise from an opinion of +good, as the other two, fear and grief, have from an opinion of evil. +For fear is an opinion of some great evil impending over us, and grief +is an opinion of some great evil present; and, indeed, it is a freshly +conceived opinion of an evil so great that to grieve at it seems right: +it is of that kind that he who is uneasy at it thinks he has good +reason to be so. Now we should exert, our utmost efforts to oppose +these perturbations--which are, as it were, so many furies let loose +upon us and urged on by folly--if we are desirous to pass this share of +life that is allotted to us with ease and satisfaction. But of the +other feelings I shall speak elsewhere: our business at present is to +drive away grief if we can, for that shall be the object of our present +discussion, since you have said that it was your opinion that a wise +man might be subject to grief, which I can by no means allow of; for it +is a frightful, miserable, and detestable thing, which we should fly +from with our utmost efforts--with all our sails and oars, as I may +say. + +XII. That descendant of Tantalus, how does he appear to you--he who +sprung from Pelops, who formerly stole Hippodamia from her +father-in-law, King Oenomaus, and married her by force?--he who was +descended from Jupiter himself, how broken-hearted and dispirited does +he not seem! + + Stand off, my friends, nor come within my shade, + That no pollutions your sound hearts pervade, + So foul a stain my body doth partake. + +Will you condemn yourself, Thyestes, and deprive yourself of life, on +account of the greatness of another's crime? What do you think of that +son of Phoebus? Do you not look upon him as unworthy of his own +father's light? + + Hollow his eyes, his body worn away, + His furrow'd cheeks his frequent tears betray; + His beard neglected, and his hoary hairs + Rough and uncomb'd, bespeak his bitter cares. + +O foolish AEetes! these are evils which you yourself have been the cause +of, and are not occasioned by any accidents with which chance has +visited you; and you behaved as you did, even after you had been inured +to your distress, and after the first swelling of the mind had +subsided!--whereas grief consists (as I shall show) in the notion of +some recent evil--but your grief, it is very plain, proceeded from the +loss of your kingdom, not of your daughter, for you hated her, and +perhaps with reason, but you could not calmly bear to part with your +kingdom. But surely it is an impudent grief which preys upon a man for +not being able to command those that are free. Dionysius, it is true, +the tyrant of Syracuse, when driven from his country, taught a school +at Corinth; so incapable was he of living without some authority. But +what could be more impudent than Tarquin, who made war upon those who +could not bear his tyranny; and, when he could not recover his kingdom +by the aid of the forces of the Veientians and the Latins, is said to +have betaken himself to Cuma, and to have died in that city of old age +and grief! + +XIII. Do you, then, think that it can befall a wise man to be oppressed +with grief, that is to say, with misery? for, as all perturbation is +misery, grief is the rack itself. Lust is attended with heat, exulting +joy with levity, fear with meanness, but grief with something greater +than these; it consumes, torments, afflicts, and disgraces a man; it +tears him, preys upon his mind, and utterly destroys him: if we do not +so divest ourselves of it as to throw it completely off, we cannot be +free from misery. And it is clear that there must be grief where +anything has the appearance of a present sore and oppressing evil. +Epicurus is of opinion that grief arises naturally from the imagination +of any evil; so that whosoever is eye-witness of any great misfortune, +if he conceives that the like may possibly befall himself, becomes sad +instantly from such an idea. The Cyrenaics think that grief is not +engendered by every kind of evil, but only by unexpected, unforeseen +evil; and that circumstance is, indeed, of no small effect on the +heightening of grief; for whatsoever comes of a sudden appears more +formidable. Hence these lines are deservedly commended: + + I knew my son, when first he drew his breath, + Destined by fate to an untimely death; + And when I sent him to defend the Greeks, + War was his business, not your sportive freaks. + +XIV. Therefore, this ruminating beforehand upon future evils which you +see at a distance makes their approach more tolerable; and on this +account what Euripides makes Theseus say is much commended. You will +give me leave to translate them, as is usual with me: + + I treasured up what some learn'd sage did tell, + And on my future misery did dwell; + I thought of bitter death, of being drove + Far from my home by exile, and I strove + With every evil to possess my mind, + That, when they came, I the less care might find.[38] + +But Euripides says that of himself, which Theseus said he had heard +from some learned man, for the poet had been a pupil of Anaxagoras, +who, as they relate, on hearing of the death of his son, said, "I knew +that my son was mortal;" which speech seems to intimate that such +things afflict those men who have not thought on them before. +Therefore, there is no doubt but that all those things which are +considered evils are the heavier from not being foreseen. Though, +notwithstanding this is not the only circumstance which occasions the +greatest grief, still, as the mind, by foreseeing and preparing for it, +has great power to make all grief the less, a man should at all times +consider all the events that may befall him in this life; and certainly +the excellence and divine nature of wisdom consists in taking a near +view of, and gaining a thorough acquaintance with, all human affairs, +in not being surprised when anything happens, and in thinking, before +the event, that there is nothing but what may come to pass. + + Wherefore ev'ry man, + When his affairs go on most swimmingly, + E'en then it most behooves to arm himself + Against the coming storm: loss, danger, exile, + Returning ever, let him look to meet; + His son in fault, wife dead, or daughter sick; + All common accidents, and may have happen'd + That nothing shall seem new or strange. But if + Aught has fall'n out beyond his hopes, all that + Let him account clear gain.[39] + +XV. Therefore, as Terence has so well expressed what he borrowed from +philosophy, shall not we, from whose fountains he drew it, say the same +thing in a better manner, and abide by it with more steadiness? Hence +came that steady countenance, which, according to Xantippe, her husband +Socrates always had; so that she said that she never observed any +difference in his looks when he went out and when he came home. Yet the +look of that old Roman, M. Crassus, who, as Lucilius says, never smiled +but once in his lifetime, was not of this kind, but placid and serene, +for so we are told. He, indeed, might well have had the same look at +all times who never changed his mind, from which the countenance +derives its expression. So that I am ready to borrow of the Cyrenaics +those arms against the accidents and events of life by means of which, +by long premeditation, they break the force of all approaching evils; +and at the same time I think that those very evils themselves arise +more from opinion than nature, for if they were real, no forecast could +make them lighter. But I shall speak more particularly on these matters +after I have first considered Epicurus's opinion, who thinks that all +people must necessarily be uneasy who believe themselves to be in any +evils, let them be either foreseen and expected, or habitual to them; +for with him evils are not the less by reason of their continuance, nor +the lighter for having been foreseen; and it is folly to ruminate on +evils to come, or such as, perhaps, never may come: every evil is +disagreeable enough when it does come; but he who is constantly +considering that some evil may befall him is loading himself with a +perpetual evil; and even should such evil never light on him, he +voluntarily takes upon himself unnecessary misery, so that he is under +constant uneasiness, whether he actually suffers any evil, or only +thinks of it. But he makes the alleviation of grief depend on two +things--a ceasing to think on evil, and a turning to the contemplation +of pleasure. For he thinks that the mind may possibly be under the +power of reason, and follow her directions: he forbids us, therefore, +to mind trouble, and calls us off from sorrowful reflections; he throws +a mist over our eyes to hinder us from the contemplation of misery. +Having sounded a retreat from this statement, he drives our thoughts on +again, and encourages them to view and engage the whole mind in the +various pleasures with which he thinks the life of a wise man abounds, +either from reflecting on the past, or from the hope of what is to +come. I have said these things in my own way; the Epicureans have +theirs. However, let us examine what they say; how they say it is of +little consequence. + +XVI. In the first place, they are wrong in forbidding men to +premeditate on futurity and blaming their wish to do so; for there is +nothing that breaks the edge of grief and lightens it more than +considering, during one's whole life, that there is nothing which it is +impossible should happen, or than, considering what human nature is, on +what conditions life was given, and how we may comply with them. The +effect of which is that we are always grieving, but that we never do +so; for whoever reflects on the nature of things, the various turns of +life, and the weakness of human nature, grieves, indeed, at that +reflection; but while so grieving he is, above all other times, +behaving as a wise man, for he gains these two things by it: one, that +while he is considering the state of human nature he is performing the +especial duties of philosophy, and is provided with a triple medicine +against adversity--in the first place, because he has long reflected +that such things might befall him, and this reflection by itself +contributes much towards lessening and weakening all misfortunes; and, +secondly, because he is persuaded that we should bear all the accidents +which can happen to man with the feelings and spirit of a man; and, +lastly, because he considers that what is blamable is the only evil. +But it is not your fault that something has happened to you which it +was impossible for man to avoid. For that withdrawing of our thoughts +which he recommends when he calls us off from contemplating our +misfortunes is an imaginary action; for it is not in our power to +dissemble or to forget those evils which lie heavy on us; they tear, +vex, and sting us--they burn us up, and leave no breathing time. And do +you order us to forget them (for such forgetfulness is contrary to +nature), and at the same time deprive us of the only assistance which +nature affords, the being accustomed to them? For that, though it is +but a slow medicine (I mean that which is brought by lapse of time), is +still a very effectual one. You order me to employ my thoughts on +something good, and forget my misfortunes. You would say something +worthy a great philosopher if you thought those things good which are +best suited to the dignity of human nature. + +XVII. Should Pythagoras, Socrates, or Plato say to me, Why are you +dejected or sad? Why do you faint, and yield to fortune, which, +perhaps, may have power to harass and disturb you, but should not quite +unman you? There is great power in the virtues; rouse them, if they +chance to droop. Take fortitude for your guide, which will give you +such spirits that you will despise everything that can befall man, and +look on it as a trifle. Add to this temperance, which is moderation, +and which was just now called frugality, which will not suffer you to +do anything base or bad--for what is worse or baser than an effeminate +man? Not even justice will suffer you to act in this manner, though she +seems to have the least weight in this affair; but still, +notwithstanding, even she will inform you that you are doubly unjust +when you both require what does not belong to you, inasmuch as though +you who have been born mortal demand to be placed in the condition of +the immortals, and at the same time you take it much to heart that you +are to restore what was lent you. What answer will you make to +prudence, who informs you that she is a virtue sufficient of herself +both to teach you a good life and also to secure you a happy one? And, +indeed, if she were fettered by external circumstances, and dependent +on others, and if she did not originate in herself and return to +herself, and also embrace everything in herself, so as to seek no +adventitious aid from any quarter, I cannot imagine why she should +appear deserving of such lofty panegyrics, or of being sought after +with such excessive eagerness. Now, Epicurus, if you call me back to +such goods as these, I will obey you, and follow you, and use you as my +guide, and even forget, as you order me, all my misfortunes; and I will +do this the more readily from a persuasion that they are not to be +ranked among evils at all. But you are for bringing my thoughts over to +pleasure. What pleasures? Pleasures of the body, I imagine, or such as +are recollected or imagined on account of the body. Is this all? Do I +explain your opinion rightly? for your disciples are used to deny that +we understand at all what Epicurus means. This is what he says, and +what that subtle fellow, old Zeno, who is one of the sharpest of them, +used, when I was attending lectures at Athens, to enforce and talk so +loudly of; saying that he alone was happy who could enjoy present +pleasure, and who was at the same time persuaded that he should enjoy +it without pain, either during the whole or the greatest part of his +life; or if, should any pain interfere, if it was very sharp, then it +must be short; should it be of longer continuance, it would have more +of what was sweet than bitter in it; that whosoever reflected on these +things would be happy, especially if satisfied with the good things +which he had already enjoyed, and if he were without fear of death or +of the Gods. + +XVIII. You have here a representation of a happy life according to +Epicurus, in the words of Zeno, so that there is no room for +contradiction in any point. What, then? Can the proposing and thinking +of such a life make Thyestes's grief the less, or AEetes's, of whom I +spoke above, or Telamon's, who was driven from his country to penury +and banishment? in wonder at whom men exclaimed thus: + + Is this the man surpassing glory raised? + Is this that Telamon so highly praised + By wondering Greece, at whose sight, like the sun, + All others with diminish'd lustre shone? + +Now, should any one, as the same author says, find his spirits sink +with the loss of his fortune, he must apply to those grave philosophers +of antiquity for relief, and not to these voluptuaries: for what great +abundance of good do they promise? Suppose that we allow that to be +without pain is the chief good? Yet that is not called pleasure. But it +is not necessary at present to go through the whole: the question is, +to what point are we to advance in order to abate our grief? Grant that +to be in pain is the greatest evil: whosoever, then, has proceeded so +far as not to be in pain, is he, therefore, in immediate possession of +the greatest good? Why, Epicurus, do we use any evasions, and not allow +in our own words the same feeling to be pleasure which you are used to +boast of with such assurance? Are these your words or not? This is what +you say in that book which contains all the doctrine of your school; +for I will perform on this occasion the office of a translator, lest +any one should imagine that I am inventing anything. Thus you speak: +"Nor can I form any notion of the chief good, abstracted from those +pleasures which are perceived by taste, or from what depends on hearing +music, or abstracted from ideas raised by external objects visible to +the eye, or by agreeable motions, or from those other pleasures which +are perceived by the whole man by means of any of his senses; nor can +it possibly be said that the pleasures of the mind are excited only by +what is good, for I have perceived men's minds to be pleased with the +hopes of enjoying those things which I mentioned above, and with the +idea that it should enjoy them without any interruption from pain." And +these are his exact words, so that any one may understand what were the +pleasures with which Epicurus was acquainted. Then he speaks thus, a +little lower down: "I have often inquired of those who have been called +wise men what would be the remaining good if they should exclude from +consideration all these pleasures, unless they meant to give us nothing +but words. I could never learn anything from them; and unless they +choose that all virtue and wisdom should vanish and come to nothing, +they must say with me that the only road to happiness lies through +those pleasures which I mentioned above." What follows is much the +same, and his whole book on the chief good everywhere abounds with the +same opinions. Will you, then, invite Telamon to this kind of life to +ease his grief? And should you observe any one of your friends under +affliction, would you rather prescribe him a sturgeon than a treatise +of Socrates? or advise him to listen to the music of a water organ +rather than to Plato? or lay before him the beauty and variety of some +garden, put a nosegay to his nose, burn perfumes before him, and bid +him crown himself with a garland of roses and woodbines? Should you add +one thing more, you would certainly wipe out all his grief. + +XIX. Epicurus must admit these arguments, or he must take out of his +book what I just now said was a literal translation; or, rather, he +must destroy his whole book, for it is crammed full of pleasures. We +must inquire, then, how we can ease him of his grief who speaks in this +manner: + + My present state proceeds from fortune's stings; + By birth I boast of a descent from kings; + Hence may you see from what a noble height + I'm sunk by fortune to this abject plight. + +What! to ease his grief, must we mix him a cup of sweet wine, or +something of that kind? Lo! the same poet presents us with another +sentiment somewhere else: + + I, Hector, once so great, now claim your aid. + +We should assist her, for she looks out for help: + + Where shall I now apply, where seek support? + Where hence betake me, or to whom resort?" + No means remain of comfort or of joy, + In flames my palace, and in ruins Troy; + Each wall, so late superb, deformed nods, + And not an altar's left t' appease the Gods. + +You know what should follow, and particularly this: + + Of father, country, and of friends bereft, + Not one of all these sumptuous temples left; + Which, while the fortune of our house did stand, + With rich wrought ceilings spoke the artist's hand. + +O excellent poet! though despised by those who sing the verses of +Euphorion. He is sensible that all things which come on a sudden are +harder to be borne. Therefore, when he had set off the riches of Priam +to the best advantage, which had the appearance of a long continuance, +what does he add? + + Lo! these all perish'd in one blazing pile; + The foe old Priam of his life beguiled, + And with his blood, thy altar, Jove, defiled. + +Admirable poetry! There is something mournful in the subject, as well +as in the words and measure. We must drive away this grief of hers: how +is that to be done? Shall we lay her on a bed of down; introduce a +singer; shall we burn cedar, or present here with some pleasant liquor, +and provide her something to eat? Are these the good things which +remove the most afflicting grief? For you but just now said you knew of +no other good. I should agree with Epicurus that we ought to be called +off from grief to contemplate good things, if we could only agree upon +what was good. + +XX. It may be said, What! do you imagine Epicurus really meant this, +and that he maintained anything so sensual? Indeed I do not imagine so, +for I am sensible that he has uttered many excellent things and +sentiments, and delivered maxims of great weight. Therefore, as I said +before, I am speaking of his acuteness, not of his morals. Though he +should hold those pleasures in contempt which he just now commended, +yet I must remember wherein he places the chief good. For he was not +contented with barely saying this, but he has explained what he meant: +he says that taste, and embraces, and sports, and music, and those +forms which affect the eyes with pleasure, are the chief good. Have I +invented this? have I misrepresented him? I should be glad to be +confuted; for what am I endeavoring at but to clear up truth in every +question? Well, but the same man says that pleasure is at its height +where pain ceases, and that to be free from all pain is the very +greatest pleasure. Here are three very great mistakes in a very few +words. One is, that he contradicts himself; for, but just now, he could +not imagine anything good unless the senses were in a manner tickled +with some pleasure; but now he says that to be free from pain is the +highest pleasure. Can any one contradict himself more? The next mistake +is, that where there is naturally a threefold division--the first, to +be pleased; next, to be in pain; the last, to be affected neither by +pleasure nor pain--he imagines the first and the last to be the same, +and makes no difference between pleasure and a cessation of pain. The +last mistake he falls into in common with some others, which is this: +that as virtue is the most desirable thing, and as philosophy has been +investigated with a view to the attainment of it, he has separated the +chief good from virtue. But he commends virtue, and that frequently; +and indeed C. Gracchus, when he had made the largest distributions of +the public money, and had exhausted the treasury, nevertheless spoke +much of defending the treasury. What signifies what men say when we see +what they do? That Piso, who was surnamed Frugal, had always harangued +against the law that was proposed for distributing the corn; but when +it had passed, though a man of consular dignity, he came to receive the +corn. Gracchus observed Piso standing in the court, and asked him, in +the hearing of the people, how it was consistent for him to take corn +by a law he had himself opposed. "It was," said he, "against your +distributing my goods to every man as you thought proper; but, as you +do so, I claim my share." Did not this grave and wise man sufficiently +show that the public revenue was dissipated by the Sempronian law? Read +Gracchus's speeches, and you will pronounce him the advocate of the +treasury. Epicurus denies that any one can live pleasantly who does not +lead a life of virtue; he denies that fortune has any power over a wise +man; he prefers a spare diet to great plenty, and maintains that a wise +man is always happy. All these things become a philosopher to say, but +they are not consistent with pleasure. But the reply is, that he doth +not mean _that_ pleasure: let him mean any pleasure, it must be such a +one as makes no part of virtue. But suppose we are mistaken as to his +pleasure; are we so, too, as to his pain? I maintain, therefore, the +impropriety of language which that man uses, when talking of virtue, +who would measure every great evil by pain. + +XXI. And indeed the Epicureans, those best of men--for there is no +order of men more innocent--complain that I take great pains to inveigh +against Epicurus. We are rivals, I suppose, for some honor or +distinction. I place the chief good in the mind, he in the body; I in +virtue, he in pleasure; and the Epicureans are up in arms, and implore +the assistance of their neighbors, and many are ready to fly to their +aid. But as for my part, I declare that I am very indifferent about the +matter, and that I consider the whole discussion which they are so +anxious about at an end. For what! is the contention about the Punic +war? on which very subject, though M. Cato and L. Lentulus were of +different opinions, still there was no difference between them. But +these men behave with too much heat, especially as the opinions which +they would uphold are no very spirited ones, and such as they dare not +plead for either in the senate or before the assembly of the people, or +before the army or the censors. But, however, I will argue with them +another time, and with such a disposition that no quarrel shall arise +between us; for I shall be ready to yield to their opinions when +founded on truth. Only I must give them this advice: That were it ever +so true, that a wise man regards nothing but the body, or, to express +myself with more decency, never does anything except what is expedient, +and views all things with exclusive reference to his own advantage, as +such things are not very commendable, they should confine them to their +own breasts, and leave off talking with that parade of them. + +XXII. What remains is the opinion of the Cyrenaics, who think that men +grieve when anything happens unexpectedly. And that is indeed, as I +said before, a great aggravation of a misfortune; and I know that it +appeared so to Chrysippus--"Whatever falls out unexpected is so much +the heavier." But the whole question does not turn on this; though the +sudden approach of an enemy sometimes occasions more confusion than it +would if you had expected him, and a sudden storm at sea throws the +sailors into a greater fright than one which they have foreseen; and it +is the same in many other cases. But when you carefully consider the +nature of what was expected, you will find nothing more than that all +things which come on a sudden appear greater; and this upon two +accounts: first of all, because you have not time to consider how great +the accident is; and, secondly, because you are probably persuaded that +you could have guarded against it had you foreseen if, and therefore +the misfortune, having been seemingly encountered by your own fault, +makes your grief the greater. That it is so, time evinces; which, as it +advances, brings with it so much mitigation that though the same +misfortunes continue, the grief not only becomes the less, but in some +cases is entirely removed. Many Carthaginians were slaves at Rome, and +many Macedonians, when Perseus their king was taken prisoner. I saw, +too, when I was a young man, some Corinthians in the Peloponnesus. They +might all have lamented with Andromache, + + All these I saw......; + +but they had perhaps given over lamenting themselves, for by their +countenances, and speech, and other gestures you might have taken them +for Argives or Sicyonians. And I myself was more concerned at the +ruined walls of Corinth than the Corinthians themselves were, whose +minds by frequent reflection and time had become callous to such +sights. I have read a book of Clitomachus, which he sent to his +fellow-citizens who were prisoners, to comfort them after the +destruction of Carthage. There is in it a treatise written by +Carneades, which, as Clitomachus says, he had inserted into his book; +the subject was, "That it appeared probable that a wise man would +grieve at the state of subjection of his country," and all the +arguments which Carneades used against this proposition are set down in +the book. There the philosopher applies such a strong medicine to a +fresh grief as would be quite unnecessary in one of any continuance; +nor, if this very book had been sent to the captives some years after, +would it have found any wounds to cure, but only scars; for grief, by a +gentle progress and slow degrees, wears away imperceptibly. Not that +the circumstances which gave rise to it are altered, or can be, but +that custom teaches what reason should--that those things which before +seemed to be of some consequence are of no such great importance, after +all. + +XXIII. It may be said, What occasion is there to apply to reason, or to +any sort of consolation such as we generally make use of, to mitigate +the grief of the afflicted? For we have this argument always at hand, +that nothing ought to appear unexpected. But how will any one be +enabled to bear his misfortunes the better by knowing that it is +unavoidable that such things should happen to man? Saying this +subtracts nothing from the sum of the grief: it only asserts that +nothing has fallen out but what might have been anticipated; and yet +this manner of speaking has some little consolation in it, though I +apprehend not a great deal. Therefore those unlooked-for things have +not so much force as to give rise to all our grief; the blow perhaps +may fall the heavier, but whatever happens does not appear the greater +on that account. No, it is the fact of its having happened lately, and +not of its having befallen us unexpectedly, that makes it seem the +greater. There are two ways, then, of discerning the truth, not only of +things that seem evil, but of those that have the appearance of good. +For we either inquire into the nature of the thing, of what +description, and magnitude, and importance it is--as sometimes with +regard to poverty, the burden of which we may lighten when by our +disputations we show how few things nature requires, and of what a +trifling kind they are--or, without any subtle arguing, we refer them +to examples, as here we instance a Socrates, there a Diogenes, and then +again that line in Caecilius, + + Wisdom is oft conceal'd in mean attire. + +For as poverty is of equal weight with all, what reason can be given +why what was borne by Fabricius should be spoken of by any one else as +unsupportable when it falls upon themselves? Of a piece with this is +that other way of comforting, which consists in pointing out that +nothing has happened but what is common to human nature; for this +argument doth not only inform us what human nature is, but implies that +all things are tolerable which others have borne and are bearing. + +XXIV. Is poverty the subject? They tell you of many who have submitted +to it with patience. Is it the contempt of honors? They acquaint you +with some who never enjoyed any, and were the happier for it; and of +those who have preferred a private retired life to public employment, +mentioning their names with respect; they tell you of the verse[40] of +that most powerful king who praises an old man, and pronounces him +happy because he was unknown to fame and seemed likely to arrive at the +hour of death in obscurity and without notice. Thus, too, they have +examples for those who are deprived of their children: they who are +under any great grief are comforted by instances of like affliction; +and thus the endurance of every misfortune is rendered more easy by the +fact of others having undergone the same, and the fate of others causes +what has happened to appear less important than it has been previously +thought, and reflection thus discovers to us how much opinion had +imposed on us. And this is what the Telamon declares, "I, when my son +was born," etc.; and thus Theseus, "I on my future misery did dwell;" +and Anaxagoras, "I knew my son was mortal." All these men, by +frequently reflecting on human affairs, had discovered that they were +by no means to be estimated by the opinion of the multitude; and, +indeed, it seems to me to be pretty much the same case with those who +consider beforehand as with those who derive their remedies from time, +excepting that a kind of reason cures the one, and the other remedy is +provided by nature; by which we discover (and this contains the whole +marrow of the matter) that what was imagined to be the greatest evil is +by no means so great as to defeat the happiness of life. And the effect +of this is, that the blow is greater by reason of its not having been +foreseen, and not, as they suppose, that when similar misfortunes +befall two different people, that man only is affected with grief whom +this calamity has befallen unexpectedly. So that some persons, under +the oppression of grief, are said to have borne it actually worse for +hearing of this common condition of man, that we are born under such +conditions as render it impossible for a man to be exempt from all +evil. + +XXV. For this reason Carneades, as I see our friend Antiochus writes, +used to blame Chrysippus for commending these verses of Euripides: + + Man, doom'd to care, to pain, disease, and strife, + Walks his short journey thro' the vale of life: + Watchful attends the cradle and the grave, + And passing generations longs to save: + Last, dies himself: yet wherefore should we mourn? + For man must to his kindred dust return; + Submit to the destroying hand of fate, + As ripen'd ears the harvest-sickle wait.[41] + +He would not allow a speech of this kind to avail at all to the cure of +our grief, for he said it was a lamentable case itself that we were +fallen into the hands of such a cruel fate; and that a speech like +that, preaching up comfort from the misfortunes of another, was a +comfort adapted only to those of a malevolent disposition. But to me it +appears far otherwise; for the necessity of bearing what is the common +condition of humanity forbids your resisting the will of the Gods, and +reminds you that you are a man, which reflection greatly alleviates +grief; and the enumeration of these examples is not produced with a +view to please those of a malevolent disposition, but in order that any +one in affliction may be induced to bear what he observes many others +have previously borne with tranquillity and moderation. For they who +are falling to pieces, and cannot hold together through the greatness +of their grief, should be supported by all kinds of assistance. From +whence Chrysippus thinks that grief is called [Greek: lype], as it were +[Greek: lysis], that is to say, a dissolution of the whole man--the +whole of which I think may be pulled up by the roots by explaining, as +I said at the beginning, the cause of grief; for it is nothing else but +an opinion and judgment formed of a present acute evil. And thus any +bodily pain, let it be ever so grievous, may be endurable where any +hopes are proposed of some considerable good; and we receive such +consolation from a virtuous and illustrious life that they who lead +such lives are seldom attacked by grief, or but slightly affected by +it. + +XXVI. But as besides this opinion of great evil there is this other +added also--that we ought to lament what has happened, that it is right +so to do, and part of our duty, then is brought about that terrible +disorder of mind, grief. And it is to this opinion that we owe all +those various and horrid kinds of lamentation, that neglect of our +persons, that womanish tearing of our cheeks, that striking on our +thighs, breasts, and heads. Thus Agamemnon, in Homer and in Accius, + + Tears in his grief his uncomb'd locks;[42] + +from whence comes that pleasant saying of Bion, that the foolish king +in his sorrow tore away the hairs of his head, imagining that his grief +would be alleviated by baldness. But men do all these things from being +persuaded that they ought to do so. And thus AEschines inveighs against +Demosthenes for sacrificing within seven days after the death of his +daughter. But with what eloquence, with what fluency, does he attack +him! what sentiments does he collect! what words does he hurl against +him! You may see by this that an orator may do anything; but nobody +would approve of such license if it were not that we have an idea +innate in our minds that every good man ought to lament the loss of a +relation as bitterly as possible. And it is owing to this that some +men, when in sorrow, betake themselves to deserts, as Homer says of +Bellerophon: + + Distracted in his mind, + Forsook by heaven, forsaking human kind, + Wide o'er the Aleian field he chose to stray, + A long, forlorn, uncomfortable way![43] + +And thus Niobe is feigned to have been turned into stone, from her +never speaking, I suppose, in her grief. But they imagine Hecuba to +have been converted into a bitch, from her rage and bitterness of mind. +There are others who love to converse with solitude itself when in +grief, as the nurse in Ennius, + + Fain would I to the heavens find earth relate + Medea's ceaseless woes and cruel fate.[44] + +XXVII. Now all these things are done in grief, from a persuasion of +their truth and propriety and necessity; and it is plain that those who +behave thus do so from a conviction of its being their duty; for should +these mourners by chance drop their grief, and either act or speak for +a moment in a more calm or cheerful manner, they presently check +themselves and return to their lamentations again, and blame themselves +for having been guilty of any intermissions from their grief; and +parents and masters generally correct children not by words only, but +by blows, if they show any levity by either word or deed when the +family is under affliction, and, as it were, oblige them to be +sorrowful. What! does it not appear, when you have ceased to mourn, and +have discovered that your grief has been ineffectual, that the whole of +that mourning was voluntary on your part? What does that man say in +Terence who punishes himself, the Self-tormentor? + + I think I do my son less harm, O Chremes, + As long as I myself am miserable. + +He determines to be miserable: and can any one determine on anything +against his will? + + I well might think that I deserved all evil. + +He would think he deserved any misfortune were he otherwise than +miserable! Therefore, you see, the evil is in opinion, not in nature. +How is it when some things do of themselves prevent your grieving at +them? as in Homer, so many died and were buried daily that they had not +leisure to grieve: where you find these lines-- + + The great, the bold, by thousands daily fall, + And endless were the grief to weep for all. + Eternal sorrows what avails to shed? + Greece honors not with solemn fasts the dead: + Enough when death demands the brave to pay + The tribute of a melancholy day. + One chief with patience to the grave resign'd, + Our care devolves on others left behind.[45] + +Therefore it is in our own power to lay aside grief upon occasion; and +is there any opportunity (seeing the thing is in our own power) that we +should let slip of getting rid of care and grief? It was plain that the +friends of Cnaeus Pompeius, when they saw him fainting under his wounds, +at the very moment of that most miserable and bitter sight were under +great uneasiness how they themselves, surrounded by the enemy as they +were, should escape, and were employed in nothing but encouraging the +rowers and aiding their escape; but when they reached Tyre, they began +to grieve and lament over him. Therefore, as fear with them, prevailed +over grief, cannot reason and true philosophy have the same effect with +a wise man? + +XXVIII. But what is there more effectual to dispel grief than the +discovery that it answers no purpose, and has been undergone to no +account? Therefore, if we can get rid of it, we need never have been +subject to it. It must be acknowledged, then, that men take up grief +wilfully and knowingly; and this appears from the patience of those +who, after they have been exercised in afflictions and are better able +to bear whatever befalls them, suppose themselves hardened against +fortune; as that person in Euripides, + + Had this the first essay of fortune been, + And I no storms thro' all my life had seen, + Wild as a colt I'd broke from reason's sway; + But frequent griefs have taught me to obey.[46] + +As, then, the frequent bearing of misery makes grief the lighter, we +must necessarily perceive that the cause and original of it does not +lie in the calamity itself. Your principal philosophers, or lovers of +wisdom, though they have not yet arrived at perfect wisdom, are not +they sensible that they are in the greatest evil? For they are foolish, +and foolishness is the greatest of all evils, and yet they lament not. +How shall we account for this? Because opinion is not fixed upon that +kind of evil, it is not our opinion that it is right, meet, and our +duty to be uneasy because we are not all wise men. Whereas this opinion +is strongly affixed to that uneasiness where mourning is concerned, +which is the greatest of all grief. Therefore Aristotle, when he blames +some ancient philosophers for imagining that by their genius they had +brought philosophy to the highest perfection, says, they must be either +extremely foolish or extremely vain; but that he himself could see that +great improvements had been made therein in a few years, and that +philosophy would in a little time arrive at perfection. And +Theophrastus is reported to have reproached nature at his death for +giving to stags and crows so long a life, which was of no use to them, +but allowing only so short a span to men, to whom length of days would +have been of the greatest use; for if the life of man could have been +lengthened, it would have been able to provide itself with all kinds of +learning, and with arts in the greatest perfection. He lamented, +therefore, that he was dying just when he had begun to discover these. +What! does not every grave and distinguished philosopher acknowledge +himself ignorant of many things, and confess that there are many things +which he must learn over and over again? And yet, though these men are +sensible that they are standing still in the very midway of folly, than +which nothing can be worse, they are under no great affliction, because +no opinion that it is their duty to lament is ever mingled with this +knowledge. What shall we say of those who think it unbecoming in a man +to grieve? among whom we may reckon Q. Maximus, when he buried his son +that had been consul, and L. Paulus, who lost two sons within a few +days of one another. Of the same opinion was M. Cato, who lost his son +just after he had been elected praetor, and many others, whose names I +have collected in my book on Consolation. Now what made these men so +easy, but their persuasion that grief and lamentation was not becoming +in a man? Therefore, as some give themselves up to grief from an +opinion that it is right so to do, they refrained themselves, from an +opinion that it was discreditable; from which we may infer that grief +is owing more to opinion than nature. + +XXIX. It may be said, on the other side, Who is so mad as to grieve of +his own accord? Pain proceeds from nature, which you must submit to, +say they, agreeably to what even your own Crantor teaches, for it +presses and gains upon you unavoidably, and cannot possibly be +resisted. So that the very same Oileus, in Sophocles, who had before +comforted Telamon on the death of Ajax, on hearing of the death of his +own son, is broken-hearted. On this alteration of his mind we have +these lines: + + Show me the man so well by wisdom taught + That what he charges to another's fault, + When like affliction doth himself betide, + True to his own wise counsel will abide.[47] + +Now, when they urge these things, their endeavor is to prove that +nature is absolutely and wholly irresistible; and yet the same people +allow that we take greater grief on ourselves than nature requires. +What madness is it, then, in us to require the same from others? But +there are many reasons for our taking grief on us. The first is from +the opinion of some evil, on the discovery and certainty of which grief +comes of course. Besides, many people are persuaded that they are doing +something very acceptable to the dead when they lament bitterly over +them. To these may be added a kind of womanish superstition, in +imagining that when they have been stricken by the afflictions sent by +the Gods, to acknowledge themselves afflicted and humbled by them is +the readiest way of appeasing them. But most men appear to be unaware +what contradictions these things are full of. They commend those who +die calmly, but they blame those who can bear the loss of another with +the same calmness, as if it were possible that it should be true, as is +occasionally said in love speeches, that any one can love another more +than himself. There is, indeed, something excellent in this, and, if +you examine it, something no less just than true, that we love those +who ought to be most dear to us as well as we love ourselves; but to +love them more than ourselves is absolutely impossible; nor is it +desirable in friendship that I should love my friend more than myself, +or that he should love me so; for this would occasion much confusion in +life, and break in upon all the duties of it. + +XXX. But we will speak of this another time: at present it is +sufficient not to attribute our misery to the loss of our friends, nor +to love them more than, if they themselves could be sensible of our +conduct, they would approve of, or at least not more than we do +ourselves. Now as to what they say, that some are not at all appeased +by our consolations; and, moreover, as to what they add, that the +comforters themselves acknowledge they are miserable when fortune +varies the attack and falls on them--in both these cases the solution +is easy: for the fault here is not in nature, but in our own folly; and +much may be said against folly. But men who do not admit of consolation +seem to bespeak misery for themselves; and they who cannot bear their +misfortunes with that temper which they recommend to others are not +more faulty in this particular than most other persons; for we see that +covetous men find fault with others who are covetous, as do the +vainglorious with those who appear too wholly devoted to the pursuit of +glory. For it is the peculiar characteristic of folly to perceive the +vices of others, but to forget its own. But since we find that grief is +removed by length of time, we have the greatest proof that the strength +of it depends not merely on time, but on the daily consideration of it. +For if the cause continues the same, and the man be the same, how can +there be any alteration in the grief, if there is no change in what +occasioned the grief, nor in him who grieves? Therefore it is from +daily reflecting that there is no real evil in the circumstance for +which you grieve, and not from the length of time, that you procure a +remedy for your grief. + +XXXI. Here some people talk of moderate grief; but if such be natural, +what occasion is there for consolation? for nature herself will +determine, the measure of it: but if it depends on and is caused by +opinion, the whole opinion should be destroyed. I think that it has +been sufficiently said, that grief arises from an opinion of some +present evil, which includes this belief, that it is incumbent on us to +grieve. To this definition Zeno has added, very justly, that the +opinion of this present evil should be recent. Now this word recent +they explain thus: those are not the only recent things which happened +a little while ago; but as long as there shall be any force, or vigor, +or freshness in that imagined evil, so long it is entitled to the name +of recent. Take the case of Artemisia, the wife of Mausolus, King of +Caria, who made that noble sepulchre at Halicarnassus; while she lived, +she lived in grief, and died of it, being worn out by it, for that +opinion was always recent with her: but you cannot call that recent +which has already begun to decay through time. Now the duty of a +comforter is, to remove grief entirely, to quiet it, or draw it off as +much as you can, or else to keep it under, and prevent its spreading +any further, and to divert one's attention to other matters. There are +some who think, with Cleanthes, that the only duty of a comforter is to +prove that what one is lamenting is by no means an evil. Others, as the +Peripatetics, prefer urging that the evil is not great. Others, with +Epicurus, seek to divert your attention from the evil to good: some +think it sufficient to show that nothing has happened but what you had +reason to expect; and this is the practice of the Cyrenaics. But +Chrysippus thinks that the main thing in comforting is, to remove the +opinion from the person who is grieving, that to grieve is his bounden +duty. There are others who bring together all these various kinds of +consolations, for people are differently affected; as I have done +myself in my book on Consolation; for as my own mind was much +disordered, I have attempted in that book to discover every method of +cure. But the proper season is as much to be attended to in the cure of +the mind as of the body; as Prometheus in AEschylus, on its being said +to him, + + I think, Prometheus, you this tenet hold, + That all men's reason should their rage control? + +answers, + + Yes, when one reason properly applies; + Ill-timed advice will make the storm but rise.[48] + +XXXII. But the principal medicine to be applied in consolation is, to +maintain either that it is no evil at all, or a very inconsiderable +one: the next best to that is, to speak of the common condition of +life, having a view, if possible, to the state of the person whom you +comfort particularly. The third is, that it is folly to wear one's self +out with grief which can avail nothing. For the comfort of Cleanthes is +suitable only for a wise man, who is in no need of any comfort at all; +for could you persuade one in grief that nothing is an evil but what is +base, you would not only cure him of grief, but folly. But the time for +such precepts is not well chosen. Besides, Cleanthes does not seem to +me sufficiently aware that affliction may very often proceed from that +very thing which he himself allows to be the greatest misfortune. For +what shall we say? When Socrates had convinced Alcibiades, as we are +told, that he had no distinctive qualifications as a man different from +other people, and that, in fact, there was no difference between him, +though a man of the highest rank, and a porter; and when Alcibiades +became uneasy at this, and entreated Socrates, with tears in his eyes, +to make him a man of virtue, and to cure him of that mean position; +what shall we say to this, Cleanthes? Was there no evil in what +afflicted Alcibiades thus? What strange things does Lycon say? who, +making light of grief, says that it arises from trifles, from things +that affect our fortune or bodies, not from the evils of the mind. +What, then? did not the grief of Alcibiades proceed from the defects +and evils of the mind? I have already said enough of Epicurus's +consolation. + +XXXIII. Nor is that consolation much to be relied on, though it is +frequently practised, and sometimes has some effect, namely, "That you +are not alone in this." It has its effect, as I said, but not always, +nor with every person, for some reject it; but much depends on the +application of it; for you ought rather to show, not how men in general +have been affected with such evils, but how men of sense have borne +them. As to Chrysippus's method, it is certainly founded in truth; but +it is difficult to apply it in time of distress. It is a work of no +small difficulty to persuade a person in affliction that he grieves +merely because he thinks it right so to do. Certainly, then, as in +pleadings we do not state all cases alike (if I may adopt the language +of lawyers for a moment), but adapt what we have to say to the time, to +the nature of the subject under debate, and to the person; so, too, in +alleviating grief, regard should be had to what kind of cure the party +to be comforted can admit of. But, somehow or other, we have rambled +from what you originally proposed. For your question was concerning a +wise man, with whom nothing can have the appearance of evil that is not +dishonorable; or at least, anything else would seem so small an evil +that by his wisdom he would so overmatch it as to make it wholly +disappear; and such a man makes no addition to his grief through +opinion, and never conceives it right to torment himself above measure, +nor to wear himself out with grief, which is the meanest thing +imaginable. Reason, however, it seems, has demonstrated (though it was +not directly our object at the moment to inquire whether anything can +be called an evil except what is base) that it is in our power to +discern that all the evil which there is in affliction has nothing +natural in it, but is contracted by our own voluntary judgment of it, +and the error of opinion. + +XXXIV. But the kind of affliction of which I have treated is that which +is the greatest; in order that when we have once got rid of that, it +may appear a business of less consequence to look after remedies for +the others. For there are certain things which are usually said about +poverty; and also certain statements ordinarily applied to retired and +undistinguished life. There are particular treatises on banishment, on +the ruin of one's country, on slavery, on weakness, on blindness, and +on every incident that can come under the name of an evil. The Greeks +divide these into different treatises and distinct books; but they do +it for the sake of employment: not but that all such discussions are +full of entertainment. And yet, as physicians, in curing the whole +body, attend to even the most insignificant part of the body which is +at all disordered, so does philosophy act, after it has removed grief +in general; still, if any other deficiency exists--should poverty bite, +should ignominy sting, should banishment bring a dark cloud over us, or +should any of those things which I have just mentioned appear, there is +for each its appropriate consolation, which you shall hear whenever you +please. But we must have recourse again to the same original principle, +that a wise man is free from all sorrow, because it is vain, because it +answers no purpose, because it is not founded in nature, but on opinion +and prejudice, and is engendered by a kind of invitation to grieve, +when once men have imagined that it is their duty to do so. When, then, +we have subtracted what is altogether voluntary, that mournful +uneasiness will be removed; yet some little anxiety, some slight +pricking, will still remain. They may indeed call this natural, +provided they give it not that horrid, solemn, melancholy name of +grief, which can by no means consist with wisdom. But how various and +how bitter are the roots of grief! Whatever they are, I propose, after +having felled the trunk, to destroy them all; even if it should be +necessary, by allotting a separate dissertation to each, for I have +leisure enough to do so, whatever time it may take up. But the +principle of every uneasiness is the same, though they may appear under +different names. For envy is an uneasiness; so are emulation, +detraction, anguish, sorrow, sadness, tribulation, lamentation, +vexation, grief, trouble, affliction, and despair. The Stoics define +all these different feelings; and all those words which I have +mentioned belong to different things, and do not, as they seem, express +the same ideas; but they are to a certain extent distinct, as I shall +make appear perhaps in another place. These are those fibres of the +roots which, as I said at first, must be traced back and cut off and +destroyed, so that not one shall remain. You say it is a great and +difficult undertaking: who denies it? But what is there of any +excellency which has not its difficulty? Yet philosophy undertakes to +effect it, provided we admit its superintendence. But enough of this. +The other books, whenever you please, shall be ready for you here or +anywhere else. + + * * * * * + + + + +BOOK IV. + +On other perturbations of the mind. + + +I. I have often wondered, Brutus, on many occasions, at the ingenuity +and virtues of our countrymen; but nothing has surprised me more than +their development in those studies, which, though they came somewhat +late to us, have been transported into this city from Greece. For the +system of auspices, and religious ceremonies, and courts of justice, +and appeals to the people, the senate, the establishment of an army of +cavalry and infantry, and the whole military discipline, were +instituted as early as the foundation of the city by royal authority, +partly too by laws, not without the assistance of the Gods. Then with +what a surprising and incredible progress did our ancestors advance +towards all kind of excellence, when once the republic was freed from +the regal power! Not that this is a proper occasion to treat of the +manners and customs of our ancestors, or of the discipline and +constitution of the city; for I have elsewhere, particularly in the six +books I wrote on the Republic, given a sufficiently accurate account of +them. But while I am on this subject, and considering the study of +philosophy, I meet with many reasons to imagine that those studies were +brought to us from abroad, and not merely imported, but preserved and +improved; for they had Pythagoras, a man of consummate wisdom and +nobleness of character, in a manner, before their eyes, who was in +Italy at the time that Lucius Brutus, the illustrious founder of your +nobility, delivered his country from tyranny. As the doctrine of +Pythagoras spread itself on all sides, it seems probable to me that it +reached this city; and this is not only probable of itself, but it does +really appear to have been the case from many remains of it. For who +can imagine that, when it flourished so much in that part of Italy +which was called Magna Graecia, and in some of the largest and most +powerful cities, in which, first the name of Pythagoras, and then that +of those men who were afterward his followers, was in so high esteem; +who can imagine, I say, that our people could shut their ears to what +was said by such learned men? Besides, it is even my opinion that it +was the great esteem in which the Pythagoreans were held, that gave +rise to that opinion among those who came after him, that King Numa was +a Pythagorean. For, being acquainted with the doctrine and principles +of Pythagoras, and having heard from their ancestors that this king was +a very wise and just man, and not being able to distinguish accurately +between times and periods that were so remote, they inferred, from his +being so eminent for his wisdom, that he had been a pupil of +Pythagoras. + +II. So far we proceed on conjecture. As to the vestiges of the +Pythagoreans, though I might collect many, I shall use but a few; +because they have no connection with our present purpose. For, as it is +reported to have been a custom with them to deliver certain precepts in +a more abstruse manner in verse, and to bring their minds from severe +thought to a more composed state by songs and musical instruments; so +Cato, a writer of the very highest authority, says in his Origins, that +it was customary with our ancestors for the guests at their +entertainments, every one in his turn, to celebrate the praises and +virtues of illustrious men in song to the sound of the flute; from +whence it is clear that poems and songs were then composed for the +voice. And, indeed, it is also clear that poetry was in fashion from +the laws of the Twelve Tables, wherein it is provided that no song +should be made to the injury of another. Another argument of the +erudition of those times is, that they played on instruments before the +shrines of their Gods, and at the entertainments of their magistrates; +but that custom was peculiar to the sect I am speaking of. To me, +indeed, that poem of Appius Caecus, which Panaetius commends so much in a +certain letter of his which is addressed to Quintus Tubero, has all the +marks of a Pythagorean author. We have many things derived from the +Pythagoreans in our customs, which I pass over, that we may not seem to +have learned that elsewhere which we look upon ourselves as the +inventors of. But to return to our purpose. How many great poets as +well as orators have sprung up among us! and in what a short time! so +that it is evident that our people could arrive at any learning as soon +as they had an inclination for it. But of other studies I shall speak +elsewhere if there is occasion, as I have already often done. + +III. The study of philosophy is certainly of long standing with us; but +yet I do not find that I can give you the names of any philosopher +before the age of Laelius and Scipio, in whose younger days we find that +Diogenes the Stoic, and Carneades the Academic, were sent as +ambassadors by the Athenians to our senate. And as these had never been +concerned in public affairs, and one of them was a Cyrenean, the other +a Babylonian, they certainly would never have been forced from their +studies, nor chosen for that employment, unless the study of philosophy +had been in vogue with some of the great men at that time; who, though +they might employ their pens on other subjects--some on civil law, +others on oratory, others on the history of former times--yet promoted +this most extensive of all arts, the principle of living well, even +more by their life than by their writings. So that of that true and +elegant philosophy (which was derived from Socrates, and is still +preserved by the Peripatetics and by the Stoics, though they express +themselves differently in their disputes with the Academics) there are +few or no Latin records; whether this proceeds from the importance of +the thing itself, or from men's being otherwise employed, or from their +concluding that the capacity of the people was not equal to the +apprehension of them. But, during this silence, C. Amafinius arose and +took upon himself to speak; on the publishing of whose writings the +people were moved, and enlisted themselves chiefly under this sect, +either because the doctrine was more easily understood, or because they +were invited thereto by the pleasing thoughts of amusement, or that, +because there was nothing better, they laid hold of what was offered +them. And after Amafinius, when many of the same sentiments had written +much about them, the Pythagoreans spread over all Italy: but that these +doctrines should be so easily understood and approved of by the +unlearned is a great proof that they were not written with any great +subtlety, and they think their establishment to be owing to this. + +IV. But let every one defend his own opinion, for every one is at +liberty to choose what he likes: I shall keep to my old custom; and, +being under no restraint from the laws of any particular school, which +in philosophy every one must necessarily confine himself to, I shall +always inquire what has the most probability in every question, and +this system, which I have often practised on other occasions, I have +adhered closely to in my Tusculan Disputations. Therefore, as I have +acquainted you with the disputations of the three former days, this +book shall conclude the discussion of the fourth day. When we had come +down into the Academy, as we had done the former days, the business was +carried on thus: + +_M._ Let any one say, who pleases, what he would wish to have +discussed. + +_A._ I do not think a wise man can possibly be free from every +perturbation of mind. + +_M._ He seemed by yesterday's discourse to be free from grief; unless +you agreed with us only to avoid taking up time. + +_A._ Not at all on that account, for I was extremely satisfied with +your discourse. + +_M._ You do not think, then, that a wise man is subject to grief? + +_A._ No, by no means. + +_M._ But if that cannot disorder the mind of a wise man, nothing else +can. For what--can such a man be disturbed by fear? Fear proceeds from +the same things when absent which occasion grief when present. Take +away grief, then, and you remove fear. + +The two remaining perturbations are, a joy elate above measure, and +lust; and if a wise man is not subject to these, his mind will be +always at rest. + +_A._ I am entirely of that opinion. + +_M._ Which, then, shall we do? Shall I immediately crowd all my sails? +or shall I make use of my oars, as if I were just endeavoring to get +clear of the harbor? + +_A._ What is it that you mean, for I do not exactly comprehend you? + +V. _M._ Because, Chrysippus and the Stoics, when they discuss the +perturbations of the mind, make great part of their debate to consist +in definitions and distinctions; while they employ but few words on the +subject of curing the mind, and preventing it from being disordered. +Whereas the Peripatetics bring a great many things to promote the cure +of it, but have no regard to their thorny partitions and definitions. +My question, then, was, whether I should instantly unfold the sails of +my eloquence, or be content for a while to make less way with the oars +of logic? + +_A._ Let it be so; for by the employment of both these means the +subject of our inquiry will be more thoroughly discussed. + +_M._ It is certainly the better way; and should anything be too +obscure, you may examine that afterward. + +_A._ I will do so; but those very obscure points you will, as usual, +deliver with more clearness than the Greeks. + +_M._ I will, indeed, endeavor to do so; but it well requires great +attention, lest, by losing one word, the whole should escape you. What +the Greeks call [Greek: pathe] we choose to name perturbations (or +disorders) rather than diseases; in explaining which, I shall follow, +first, that very old description of Pythagoras, and afterward that of +Plato; for they both divide the mind into two parts, and make one of +these partake of reason, and the other they represent without it. In +that which partakes of reason they place tranquillity, that is to say, +a placid and undisturbed constancy; to the other they assign the turbid +motions of anger and desire, which are contrary and opposite to reason. +Let this, then, be our principle, the spring of all our reasonings. But +notwithstanding, I shall use the partitions and definitions of the +Stoics in describing these perturbations; who seem to me to have shown +very great acuteness on this question. + +VI. Zeno's definition, then, is this: "A perturbation" (which he calls +a [Greek: pathos]) "is a commotion of the mind repugnant to reason, and +against nature." Some of them define it even more briefly, saying that +a perturbation is a somewhat too vehement appetite; but by too vehement +they mean an appetite that recedes further from the constancy of +nature. But they would have the divisions of perturbations to arise +from two imagined goods, and from two imagined evils; and thus they +become four: from the good proceed lust and joy--joy having reference +to some present good, and lust to some future one. They suppose fear +and grief to proceed from evils: fear from something future, grief from +something present; for whatever things are dreaded as approaching +always occasion grief when present. But joy and lust depend on the +opinion of good; as lust, being inflamed and provoked, is carried on +eagerly towards what has the appearance of good; and joy is transported +and exults on obtaining what was desired: for we naturally pursue those +things that have the appearance of good, and avoid the contrary. +Wherefore, as soon as anything that has the appearance of good presents +itself, nature incites us to endeavor to obtain it. Now, where this +strong desire is consistent and founded on prudence, it is by the +Stoics called [Greek: boulesis], and the name which we give it is +volition; and this they allow to none but their wise man, and define it +thus: Volition is a reasonable desire; but whatever is incited too +violently in opposition to reason, that is a lust, or an unbridled +desire, which is discoverable in all fools. And, therefore, when we are +affected so as to be placed in any good condition, we are moved in two +ways; for when the mind is moved in a placid and calm motion, +consistent with reason, that is called joy; but when it exults with a +vain, wanton exultation, or immoderate joy, then that feeling may be +called immoderate ecstasy or transport, which they define to be an +elation of the mind without reason. And as we naturally desire good +things, so in like manner we naturally seek to avoid what is evil; and +this avoidance of which, if conducted in accordance with reason, is +called caution; and this the wise man alone is supposed to have: but +that caution which is not under the guidance of reason, but is attended +with a base and low dejection, is called fear. Fear is, therefore, +caution destitute of reason. But a wise man is not affected by any +present evil; while the grief of a fool proceeds from being affected +with an imaginary evil, by which his mind is contracted and sunk, since +it is not under the dominion of reason. This, then, is the first +definition, which makes grief to consist in a shrinking of the mind +contrary to the dictates of reason. Thus, there are four perturbations, +and but three calm rational emotions; for grief has no exact opposite. + +VII. But they insist upon it that all perturbations depend on opinion +and judgment; therefore they define them more strictly, in order not +only the better to show how blamable they are, but to discover how much +they are in our power. Grief, then, is a recent opinion of some present +evil, in which it seems to be right that the mind should shrink and be +dejected. Joy is a recent opinion of a present good, in which it seems +to be right that the mind should be elated. Fear is an opinion of an +impending evil which we apprehend will be intolerable. Lust is an +opinion of a good to come, which would be of advantage were it already +come, and present with us. But however I have named the judgments and +opinions of perturbations, their meaning is, not that merely the +perturbations consist in them, but that the effects likewise of these +perturbations do so; as grief occasions a kind of painful pricking, and +fear engenders a recoil or sudden abandonment of the mind, joy gives +rise to a profuse mirth, while lust is the parent of an unbridled habit +of coveting. But that imagination, which I have included in all the +above definitions, they would have to consist in assenting without +warrantable grounds. Now, every perturbation has many subordinate parts +annexed to it of the same kind. Grief is attended with enviousness +(_invidentia_)--I use that word for instruction's sake, though it is +not so common; because envy (_invidia_) takes in not only the person +who envies, but the person, too, who is envied--emulation, detraction, +pity, vexation, mourning, sadness, tribulation, sorrow, lamentation, +solicitude, disquiet of mind, pain, despair, and many other similar +feelings are so too. Under fear are comprehended sloth, shame, terror, +cowardice, fainting, confusion, astonishment. In pleasure they +comprehend malevolence--that is, pleased at another's +misfortune--delight, boastfulness, and the like. To lust they associate +anger, fury, hatred, enmity, discord, wants, desire, and other feelings +of that kind. + +But they define these in this manner: + +VIII. Enviousness (_invidentia_), they say, is a grief arising from the +prosperous circumstances of another, which are in no degree injurious +to the person who envies; for where any one grieves at the prosperity +of another, by which he is injured, such a one is not properly said to +envy--as when Agamemnon grieves at Hector's success; but where any one, +who is in no way hurt by the prosperity of another, is in pain at his +success, such a one envies indeed. Now the name "emulation" is taken in +a double sense, so that the same word may stand for praise and +dispraise: for the imitation of virtue is called emulation (however, +that sense of it I shall have no occasion for here, for that carries +praise with it); but emulation is also a term applied to grief at +another's enjoying what I desired to have, and am without. Detraction +(and I mean by that, jealousy) is a grief even at another's enjoying +what I had a great inclination for. Pity is a grief at the misery of +another who suffers wrongfully; for no one is moved by pity at the +punishment of a parricide or of a betrayer of his country. Vexation is +a pressing grief. Mourning is a grief at the bitter death of one who +was dear to you. Sadness is a grief attended with tears. Tribulation is +a painful grief. Sorrow, an excruciating grief. Lamentation, a grief +where we loudly bewail ourselves. Solicitude, a pensive grief. Trouble, +a continued grief. Affliction, a grief that harasses the body. Despair, +a grief that excludes all hope of better things to come. But those +feelings which are included under fear, they define thus: There is +sloth, which is a dread of some ensuing labor; shame and terror, which +affect the body--hence blushing attends shame; a paleness, and tremor, +and chattering of the teeth attend terror--cowardice, which is an +apprehension of some approaching evil; dread, a fear that unhinges the +mind, whence comes that line of Ennius, + + Then dread discharged all wisdom from my mind; + +fainting is the associate and constant attendant on dread; confusion, a +fear that drives away all thought; alarm, a continued fear. + +IX. The different species into which they divide pleasure come under +this description; so that malevolence is a pleasure in the misfortunes +of another, without any advantage to yourself; delight, a pleasure that +soothes the mind by agreeable impressions on the ear. What is said of +the ear may be applied to the sight, to the touch, smell, and taste. +All feelings of this kind are a sort of melting pleasure that dissolves +the mind. Boastfulness is a pleasure that consists in making an +appearance, and setting off yourself with insolence.--The subordinate +species of lust they define in this manner: Anger is a lust of +punishing any one who, as we imagine, has injured us without cause. +Heat is anger just forming and beginning to exist, which the Greeks +call [Greek: thymosis]. Hatred is a settled anger. Enmity is anger +waiting for an opportunity of revenge. Discord is a sharper anger +conceived deeply in the mind and heart. Want an insatiable lust. Regret +is when one eagerly wishes to see a person who is absent. Now here they +have a distinction; so that with them regret is a lust conceived on +hearing of certain things reported of some one, or of many, which the +Greeks call [Greek: kategoremata], or predicaments; as that they are in +possession of riches and honors: but want is a lust for those very +honors and riches. But these definers make intemperance the fountain of +all these perturbations; which is an absolute revolt from the mind and +right reason--a state so averse to all rules of reason that the +appetites of the mind can by no means be governed and restrained. As, +therefore, temperance appeases these desires, making them obey right +reason, and maintains the well-weighed judgments of the mind, so +intemperance, which is in opposition to this, inflames, confounds, and +puts every state of the mind into a violent motion. Thus, grief and +fear, and every other perturbation of the mind, have their rise from +intemperance. + +X. Just as distempers and sickness are bred in the body from the +corruption of the blood, and the too great abundance of phlegm and +bile, so the mind is deprived of its health, and disordered with +sickness, from a confusion of depraved opinions that are in opposition +to one another. From these perturbations arise, first, diseases, which +they call [Greek: nosemata]; and also those feelings which are in +opposition to these diseases, and which admit certain faulty distastes +or loathings; then come sicknesses, which are called [Greek: +arrhostemata] by the Stoics, and these two have their opposite +aversions. Here the Stoics, especially Chrysippus, give themselves +unnecessary trouble to show the analogy which the diseases of the mind +have to those of the body: but, overlooking all that they say as of +little consequence, I shall treat only of the thing itself. Let us, +then, understand perturbation to imply a restlessness from the variety +and confusion of contradictory opinions; and that when this heat and +disturbance of the mind is of any standing, and has taken up its +residence, as it were, in the veins and marrow, then commence diseases +and sickness, and those aversions which are in opposition to these +diseases and sicknesses. + +XI. What I say here may be distinguished in thought, though they are in +fact the same; inasmuch as they both have their rise from lust and joy. +For should money be the object of our desire, and should we not +instantly apply to reason, as if it were a kind of Socratic medicine to +heal this desire, the evil glides into our veins, and cleaves to our +bowels, and from thence proceeds a distemper or sickness, which, when +it is of any continuance, is incurable, and the name of this disease is +covetousness. It is the same with other diseases; as the desire of +glory, a passion for women, to which the Greeks give the name of +[Greek: philogyneia]: and thus all other diseases and sicknesses are +generated. But those feelings which are the contrary of these are +supposed to have fear for their foundation, as a hatred of women, such +as is displayed in the Woman-hater of Atilius; or the hatred of the +whole human species, as Timon is reported to have done, whom they call +the Misanthrope. Of the same kind is inhospitality. And all these +diseases proceed from a certain dread of such things as they hate and +avoid. But they define sickness of mind to be an overweening opinion, +and that fixed and deeply implanted in the heart, of something as very +desirable which is by no means so. What proceeds from aversion, they +define thus: a vehement idea of something to be avoided, deeply +implanted, and inherent in our minds, when there is no reason for +avoiding it; and this kind of opinion is a deliberate belief that one +understands things of which one is wholly ignorant. Now, sickness of +the mind has all these subordinate divisions: avarice, ambition, +fondness for women, obstinacy, gluttony, drunkenness, covetousness, and +other similar vices. But avarice is a violent opinion about money, as +if it were vehemently to be desired and sought after, which opinion is +deeply implanted and inherent in our minds; and the definition of all +the other similar feelings resembles these. But the definitions of +aversions are of this sort: inhospitality is a vehement opinion, deeply +implanted and inherent in your mind, that you should avoid a stranger. +Thus, too, the hatred of women, like that felt by Hippolytus, is +defined; and the hatred of the human species like that displayed by +Timon. + +XII. But to come to the analogy of the state of body and mind, which I +shall sometimes make use of, though more sparingly than the Stoics. +Some men are more inclined to particular disorders than others; and, +therefore, we say that some people are rheumatic, others dropsical, not +because they are so at present, but because they are often so: some are +inclined to fear, others to some other perturbation. Thus in some there +is a continual anxiety, owing to which they are anxious; in some a +hastiness of temper, which differs from anger, as anxiety differs from +anguish: for all are not anxious who are sometimes vexed, nor are they +who are anxious always uneasy in that manner: as there is a difference +between being drunk and drunkenness; and it is one thing to be a lover, +another to be given to women. And this disposition of particular people +to particular disorders is very common: for it relates to all +perturbations; it appears in many vices, though it has no name. Some +are, therefore, said to be envious, malevolent, spiteful, fearful, +pitiful, from a propensity to those perturbations, not from their being +always carried away by them. Now this propensity to these particular +disorders may be called a sickness from analogy with the body; meaning, +that is to say, nothing more than a propensity towards sickness. But +with regard to whatever is good, as some are more inclined to different +good qualities than others, we may call this a facility or tendency: +this tendency to evil is a proclivity or inclination to falling; but +where anything is neither good nor bad, it may have the former name. + +XIII. Even as there may be, with respect to the body, a disease, a +sickness, and a defect, so it is with the mind. They call that a +disease where the whole body is corrupted; they call that sickness +where a disease is attended with a weakness, and that a defect where +the parts of the body are not well compacted together; from whence it +follows that the members are misshapen, crooked, and deformed. So that +these two, a disease and sickness, proceed from a violent concussion +and perturbation of the health of the whole body; but a defect +discovers itself even when the body is in perfect health. But a disease +of the mind is distinguishable only in thought from a sickness. But a +viciousness is a habit or affection discordant and inconsistent with +itself through life. Thus it happens that, in the one case, a disease +and sickness may arise from a corruption of opinions; in the other +case, the consequence may be inconstancy and inconsistency. For every +vice of the mind does not imply a disunion of parts; as is the case +with those who are not far from being wise men. With them there is that +affection which is inconsistent with itself while it is foolish; but it +is not distorted, nor depraved. But diseases and sicknesses are parts +of viciousness; but it is a question whether perturbations are parts of +the same, for vices are permanent affections: perturbations are such as +are restless; so that they cannot be parts of permanent ones. As there +is some analogy between the nature of the body and mind in evil, so is +there in good; for the distinctions of the body are beauty, strength, +health, firmness, quickness of motion: the same may be said of the +mind. The body is said to be in a good state when all those things on +which health depends are consistent: the same may be said of the mind +when its judgments and opinions are not at variance with one another. +And this union is the virtue of the mind, which, according to some +people, is temperance itself; others make it consist in an obedience to +the precepts of temperance, and a compliance with them, not allowing it +to be any distinct species of itself. But, be it one or the other, it +is to be found only in a wise man. But there is a certain soundness of +mind, which even a fool may have, when the perturbation of his mind is +removed by the care and management of his physicians. And as what is +called beauty arises from an exact proportion of the limbs, together +with a certain sweetness of complexion, so the beauty of the mind +consists in an equality and constancy of opinions and judgments, joined +to a certain firmness and stability, pursuing virtue, or containing +within itself the very essence of virtue. Besides, we give the very +same names to the faculties of the mind as we do to the powers of the +body, the nerves, and other powers of action. Thus the velocity of the +body is called swiftness: a praise which we ascribe to the mind, from +its running over in its thoughts so many things in so short a time. + +XIV. Herein, indeed, the mind and body are unlike: that though the mind +when in perfect health may be visited by sickness, as the body may, yet +the body may be disordered without our fault; the mind cannot. For all +the disorders and perturbations of the mind proceed from a neglect of +reason; these disorders, therefore, are confined to men: the beasts are +not subject to such perturbations, though they act sometimes as if they +had reason. There is a difference, too, between ingenious and dull men; +the ingenious, like the Corinthian brass, which is long before it +receives rust, are longer before they fall into these perturbations, +and are recovered sooner: the case is different with the dull. Nor does +the mind of an ingenious man fall into every kind of perturbation, for +it never yields to any that are brutish and savage; and some of their +perturbations have at first even the appearance of humanity, as mercy, +grief, and fear. But the sicknesses and diseases of the mind are +thought to be harder to eradicate than those leading vices which are in +opposition to virtues; for vices may be removed, though the diseases of +the mind should continue, which diseases are not cured with that +expedition with which vices are removed. I have now acquainted you with +the arguments which the Stoics put forth with such exactness; which +they call logic, from their close arguing: and since my discourse has +got clear of these rocks, I will proceed with the remainder of it, +provided I have been sufficiently clear in what I have already said, +considering the obscurity of the subject I have treated. + +_A._ Clear enough; but should there be occasion for a more exact +inquiry, I shall take another opportunity of asking you. I expect you +now to hoist your sails, as you just now called them, and proceed on +your course. + +XV. _M._ Since I have spoken before of virtue in other places, and +shall often have occasion to speak again (for a great many questions +that relate to life and manners arise from the spring of virtue); and +since, as I say, virtue consists in a settled and uniform affection of +mind, making those persons praiseworthy who are possessed of her, she +herself also, independent of anything else, without regard to any +advantage, must be praiseworthy; for from her proceed good +inclinations, opinions, actions, and the whole of right reason; though +virtue may be defined in a few words to be right reason itself. The +opposite to this is viciousness (for so I choose to translate what the +Greeks call [Greek: kakia], rather than by perverseness; for +perverseness is the name of a particular vice; but viciousness includes +all), from whence arise those perturbations which, as I just now said, +are turbid and violent motions of the mind, repugnant to reason, and +enemies in a high degree to the peace of the mind and a tranquil life, +for they introduce piercing and anxious cares, and afflict and +debilitate the mind through fear; they violently inflame our hearts +with exaggerated appetite, which is in reality an impotence of mind, +utterly irreconcilable with temperance and moderation, which we +sometimes call desire, and sometimes lust, and which, should it even +attain the object of its wishes, immediately becomes so elated that it +loses all its resolution, and knows not what to pursue; so that he was +in the right who said "that exaggerated pleasure was the very greatest +of mistakes." Virtue, then, alone can effect the cure of these evils. + +XVI. For what is not only more miserable, but more base and sordid, +than a man afflicted, weakened, and oppressed with grief? And little +short of this misery is one who dreads some approaching evil, and who, +through faintheartedness, is under continual suspense. The poets, to +express the greatness of this evil, imagine a stone to hang over the +head of Tantalus, as a punishment for his wickedness, his pride, and +his boasting. And this is the common punishment of folly; for there +hangs over the head of every one whose mind revolts from reason some +similar fear. And as these perturbations of the mind, grief and fear, +are of a most wasting nature, so those two others, though of a more +merry cast (I mean lust, which is always coveting something with +eagerness, and empty mirth, which is an exulting joy), differ very +little from madness. Hence you may understand what sort of person he is +whom we call at one time moderate, at another modest or temperate, at +another constant and virtuous; while sometimes we include all these +names in the word frugality, as the crown of all; for if that word did +not include all virtues, it would never have been proverbial to say +that a frugal man does everything rightly. But when the Stoics apply +this saying to their wise man, they seem to exalt him too much, and to +speak of him with too much admiration. + +XVII. Whoever, then, through moderation and constancy, is at rest in +his mind, and in calm possession of himself, so as neither to pine with +care, nor be dejected with fear, nor to be inflamed with desire, +coveting something greedily, nor relaxed by extravagant mirth--such a +man is that identical wise man whom we are inquiring for: he is the +happy man, to whom nothing in this life seems intolerable enough to +depress him; nothing exquisite enough to transport him unduly. For what +is there in this life that can appear great to him who has acquainted +himself with eternity and the utmost extent of the universe? For what +is there in human knowledge, or the short span of this life, that can +appear great to a wise man? whose mind is always so upon its guard that +nothing can befall him which is unforeseen, nothing which is +unexpected, nothing, in short, which is new. Such a man takes so exact +a survey on all sides of him, that he always knows the proper place and +spot to live in free from all the troubles and annoyances of life, and +encounters every accident that fortune can bring upon him with a +becoming calmness. Whoever conducts himself in this manner will be free +from grief, and from every other perturbation; and a mind free from +these feelings renders men completely happy; whereas a mind disordered +and drawn off from right and unerring reason loses at once, not only +its resolution, but its health.--Therefore the thoughts and +declarations of the Peripatetics are soft and effeminate, for they say +that the mind must necessarily be agitated, but at the same time they +lay down certain bounds beyond which that agitation is not to proceed. +And do you set bounds to vice? or is it no vice to disobey reason? Does +not reason sufficiently declare that there is no real good which you +should desire too ardently, or the possession of which you should allow +to transport you? and that there is no evil that should be able to +overwhelm you, or the suspicion of which should distract you? and that +all these things assume too melancholy or too cheerful an appearance +through our own error? But if fools find this error lessened by time, +so that, though the cause remains the same, they are not affected, in +the same manner, after some time, as they were at first, why, surely a +wise man ought not to be influenced at all by it. But what are those +degrees by which we are to limit it? Let us fix these degrees in grief, +a difficult subject, and one much canvassed.--Fannius writes that P. +Rutilius took it much to heart that his brother was refused the +consulship; but he seems to have been too much affected by this +disappointment, for it was the occasion of his death: he ought, +therefore, to have borne it with more moderation. But let us suppose +that while he was bearing this with moderation, the death of his +children had intervened; here would have started a fresh grief, which, +admitting it to be moderate in itself, yet still must have been a great +addition to the other. Now, to these let us add some acute pains of +body, the loss of his fortune, blindness, banishment. Supposing, then, +each separate misfortune to occasion a separate additional grief, the +whole would be too great to be supportable. + +XVIII. The man who attempts to set bounds to vice acts like one who +should throw himself headlong from Leucate, persuaded that he could +stop himself whenever he pleased. Now, as that is impossible, so a +perturbed and disordered mind cannot restrain itself, and stop where it +pleases. Certainly whatever is bad in its increase is bad in its birth. +Now grief and all other perturbations are doubtless baneful in their +progress, and have, therefore, no small share of evil at the beginning; +for they go on of themselves when once they depart from reason, for +every weakness is self-indulgent, and indiscreetly launches out, and +does not know where to stop. So that it makes no difference whether you +approve of moderate perturbations of mind, or of moderate injustice, +moderate cowardice, and moderate intemperance; for whoever prescribes +bounds to vice admits a part of it, which, as it is odious of itself, +becomes the more so as it stands on slippery ground, and, being once +set forward, glides on headlong, and cannot by any means be stopped. + +XIX. Why should I say more? Why should I add that the Peripatetics say +that these perturbations, which we insist upon it should be extirpated, +are not only natural, but were given to men by nature for a good +purpose? They usually talk in this manner. In the first place, they say +much in praise of anger; they call it the whetstone of courage, and +they say that angry men exert themselves most against an enemy or +against a bad citizen: that those reasons are of little weight which +are the motives of men who think thus, as--it is a just war; it becomes +us to fight for our laws, our liberties, our country: they will allow +no force to these arguments unless our courage is warmed by anger.--Nor +do they confine their argument to warriors; but their opinion is that +no one can issue any rigid commands without some bitterness and anger. +In short, they have no notion of an orator either accusing or even +defending a client without he is spurred on by anger. And though this +anger should not be real, still they think his words and gestures ought +to wear the appearance of it, so that the action of the orator may +excite the anger of his hearer. And they deny that any man has ever +been seen who does not know what it is to be angry; and they name what +we call lenity by the bad appellation of indolence. Nor do they commend +only this lust (for anger is, as I defined it above, the lust of +revenge), but they maintain that kind of lust or desire to be given us +by nature for very good purposes, saying that no one can execute +anything well but what he is in earnest about. Themistocles used to +walk in the public places in the night because he could not sleep; and +when asked the reason, his answer was, that Miltiades's trophies kept +him awake. Who has not heard how Demosthenes used to watch, who said +that it gave him pain if any mechanic was up in a morning at his work +before him? Lastly, they urge that some of the greatest philosophers +would never have made that progress in their studies without some +ardent desire spurring them on.--We are informed that Pythagoras, +Democritus, and Plato visited the remotest parts of the world; for they +thought that they ought to go wherever anything was to be learned. Now, +it is not conceivable that these things could be effected by anything +but by the greatest ardor of mind. + +XX. They say that even grief, which we have already said ought to be +avoided as a monstrous and fierce beast, was appointed by nature, not +without some good purpose, in order that men should lament when they +had committed a fault, well knowing they had exposed themselves to +correction, rebuke, and ignominy; for they think that those who can +bear ignominy and infamy without pain have acquired a complete impunity +for all sorts of crimes; for with them reproach is a stronger check +than conscience. From whence we have that scene in Afranius borrowed +from common life; for when the abandoned son saith, "Wretched that I +am!" the severe father replies, + + Let him but grieve, no matter what the cause. + +And they say the other divisions of sorrow have their use; that pity +incites us to hasten to the assistance of others, and to alleviate the +calamities of men who have undeservedly fallen into them; that even +envy and detraction are not without their use, as when a man sees that +another person has attained what he cannot, or observes another to be +equally successful with himself; that he who should take away fear +would take away all industry in life, which those men exert in the +greatest degree who are afraid of the laws and of the magistrates, who +dread poverty, ignominy, death, and pain. But while they argue thus, +they allow indeed of these feelings being retrenched, though they deny +that they either can or should be plucked up by the roots; so that +their opinion is that mediocrity is best in everything. When they +reason in this manner, what think you--is what they say worth attending +to or not? + +_A._ I think it is. I wait, therefore, to hear what you will say in +reply to them. + +XXI. _M._ Perhaps I may find something to say; but I will make this +observation first: do you take notice with what modesty the Academics +behave themselves? for they speak plainly to the purpose. The +Peripatetics are answered by the Stoics; they have my leave to fight it +out, who think myself no otherwise concerned than to inquire for what +may seem to be most probable. Our present business is, then, to see if +we can meet with anything in this question which is the probable, for +beyond such approximation to truth as that human nature cannot proceed. +The definition of a perturbation, as Zeno, I think, has rightly +determined it, is thus: That a perturbation is a commotion of the mind +against nature, in opposition to right reason; or, more briefly, thus, +that a perturbation is a somewhat too vehement appetite; and when he +says somewhat too vehement, he means such as is at a greater distance +from the constant course of nature. What can I say to these +definitions? The greater part of them we have from those who dispute +with sagacity and acuteness: some of them expressions, indeed, such as +the "ardors of the mind," and "the whetstones of virtue," savoring of +the pomp of rhetoricians. As to the question, if a brave man can +maintain his courage without becoming angry, it may be questioned with +regard to the gladiators; though we often observe much resolution even +in them: they meet, converse, they make objections and demands, they +agree about terms, so that they seem calm rather than angry. But let us +admit a man of the name of Placideianus, who was one of that trade, to +be in such a mind, as Lucilius relates of him, + + If for his blood you thirst, the task be mine; + His laurels at my feet he shall resign; + Not but I know, before I reach his heart, + First on myself a wound he will impart. + I hate the man; enraged I fight, and straight + In action we had been, but that I wait + Till each his sword had fitted to his hand. + My rage I scarce can keep within command. + +XXII. But we see Ajax in Homer advancing to meet Hector in battle +cheerfully, without any of this boisterous wrath. For he had no sooner +taken up his arms than the first step which he made inspired his +associates with joy, his enemies with fear; so that even Hector, as he +is represented by Homer,[49] trembling, condemned himself for having +challenged him to fight. Yet these heroes conversed together, calmly +and quietly, before they engaged; nor did they show any anger or +outrageous behavior during the combat. Nor do I imagine that Torquatus, +the first who obtained this surname, was in a rage when he plundered +the Gaul of his collar; or that Marcellus's courage at Clastidium was +only owing to his anger. I could almost swear that Africanus, with whom +we are better acquainted, from our recollection of him being more +recent, was noways inflamed by anger when he covered Alienus Pelignus +with his shield, and drove his sword into the enemy's breast. There may +be some doubt of L. Brutus, whether he was not influenced by +extraordinary hatred of the tyrant, so as to attack Aruns with more +than usual rashness; for I observe that they mutually killed each other +in close fight. Why, then, do you call in the assistance of anger? +Would courage, unless it began to get furious, lose its energy? What! +do you imagine that Hercules, whom the very courage which you would try +to represent as anger raised to heaven, was angry when he engaged the +Erymanthian boar, or the Nemaean lion? Or was Theseus in a passion when +he seized on the horns of the Marathonian bull? Take care how you make +courage to depend in the least on rage. For anger is altogether +irrational, and that is not courage which is void of reason. + +XXIII. We ought to hold all things here in contempt; death is to be +looked on with indifference; pains and labors must be considered as +easily supportable. And when these sentiments are established on +judgment and conviction, then will that stout and firm courage take +place; unless you attribute to anger whatever is done with vehemence, +alacrity, and spirit. To me, indeed, that very Scipio[50] who was chief +priest, that favorer of the saying of the Stoics, "That no private man +could be a wise man," does not seem to be angry with Tiberius Gracchus, +even when he left the consul in a hesitating frame of mind, and, though +a private man himself, commanded, with the authority of a consul, that +all who meant well to the republic should follow him. I do not know +whether I have done anything in the republic that has the appearance of +courage; but if I have, I certainly did not do it in wrath. Doth +anything come nearer madness than anger? And indeed Ennius has well +defined it as the beginning of madness. The changing color, the +alteration of our voice, the look of our eyes, our manner of fetching +our breath, the little command we have over our words and actions, how +little do all these things indicate a sound mind! What can make a worse +appearance than Homer's Achilles, or Agamemnon, during the quarrel? And +as to Ajax, anger drove him into downright madness, and was the +occasion of his death. Courage, therefore, does not want the assistance +of anger; it is sufficiently provided, armed, and prepared of itself. +We may as well say that drunkenness or madness is of service to +courage, because those who are mad or drunk often do a great many +things with unusual vehemence. Ajax was always brave; but still he was +most brave when he was in that state of frenzy: + + The greatest feat that Ajax e'er achieved + Was, when his single arm the Greeks relieved. + Quitting the field; urged on by rising rage, + Forced the declining troops again t'engage. + +Shall we say, then, that madness has its use? + +XXIV. Examine the definitions of courage: you will find it does not +require the assistance of passion. Courage is, then, an affection of +mind that endures all things, being itself in proper subjection to the +highest of all laws; or it may be called a firm maintenance of judgment +in supporting or repelling everything that has a formidable appearance, +or a knowledge of what is formidable or otherwise, and maintaining +invariably a stable judgment of all such things, so as to bear them or +despise them; or, in fewer words, according to Chrysippus (for the +above definitions are Sphaerus's, a man of the first ability as a +layer-down of definitions, as the Stoics think. But they are all pretty +much alike: they give us only common notions, some one way, and some +another). But what is Chrysippus's definition? Fortitude, says he, is +the knowledge of all things that are bearable, or an affection of the +mind which bears and supports everything in obedience to the chief law +of reason without fear. Now, though we should attack these men in the +same manner as Carneades used to do, I fear they are the only real +philosophers; for which of these definitions is there which does not +explain that obscure and intricate notion of courage which every man +conceives within himself? And when it is thus explained, what can a +warrior, a commander, or an orator want more? And no one can think that +they will be unable to behave themselves courageously without anger. +What! do not even the Stoics, who maintain that all fools are mad, make +the same inferences? for, take away perturbations, especially a +hastiness of temper, and they will appear to talk very absurdly. But +what they assert is this: they say that all fools are mad, as all +dunghills stink; not that they always do so, but stir them, and you +will perceive it. And in like manner, a warm-tempered man is not always +in a passion; but provoke him, and you will see him run mad. Now, that +very warlike anger, which is of such service in war, what is the use of +it to him when he is at home with his wife, children, and family? Is +there, then, anything that a disturbed mind can do better than one +which is calm and steady? Or can any one be angry without a +perturbation of mind? Our people, then, were in the right, who, as all +vices depend on our manners, and nothing is worse than a passionate +disposition, called angry men the only morose men.[51] + +XXV. Anger is in no wise becoming in an orator, though it is not amiss +to affect it. Do you imagine that I am angry when in pleading I use any +extraordinary vehemence and sharpness? What! when I write out my +speeches after all is over and past, am I then angry while writing? Or +do you think AEsopus was ever angry when he acted, or Accius was so when +he wrote? Those men, indeed, act very well, but the orator acts better +than the player, provided he be really an orator; but, then, they carry +it on without passion, and with a composed mind. But what wantonness is +it to commend lust! You produce Themistocles and Demosthenes; to these +you add Pythagoras, Democritus, and Plato. What! do you then call +studies lust? But these studies of the most excellent and admirable +things, such as those were which you bring forward on all occasions, +ought to be composed and tranquil; and what kind of philosophers are +they who commend grief, than which nothing is more detestable? Afranius +has said much to this purpose: + + Let him but grieve, no matter what the cause. + +But he spoke this of a debauched and dissolute youth. But we are +inquiring into the conduct of a constant and wise man. We may even +allow a centurion or standard-bearer to be angry, or any others, whom, +not to explain too far the mysteries of the rhetoricians, I shall not +mention here; for to touch the passions, where reason cannot be come +at, may have its use; but my inquiry, as I often repeat, is about a +wise man. + +XXVI. But even envy, detraction, pity, have their use. Why should you +pity rather than assist, if it is in your power to do so? Is it because +you cannot be liberal without pity? We should not take sorrows on +ourselves upon another's account; but we ought to relieve others of +their grief if we can. But to detract from another's reputation, or to +rival him with that vicious emulation which resembles an enmity, of +what use can that conduct be? Now, envy implies being uneasy at +another's good because one does not enjoy it one's self; but detraction +is the being uneasy at another's good, merely because he enjoys it. How +can it be right that you should voluntarily grieve, rather than take +the trouble of acquiring what you want to have? for it is madness in +the highest degree to desire to be the only one that has any particular +happiness. But who can with correctness speak in praise of a mediocrity +of evils? Can any one in whom there is lust or desire be otherwise than +libidinous or desirous? or can a man who is occupied by anger avoid +being angry? or can one who is exposed to any vexation escape being +vexed? or if he is under the influence of fear, must he not be fearful? +Do we look, then, on the libidinous, the angry, the anxious, and the +timid man, as persons of wisdom, of excellence? of which I could speak +very copiously and diffusely, but I wish to be as concise as possible. +And so I will merely say that wisdom is an acquaintance with all divine +and human affairs, and a knowledge of the cause of everything. Hence it +is that it imitates what is divine, and looks upon all human concerns +as inferior to virtue. Did you, then, say that it was your opinion that +such a man was as naturally liable to perturbation as the sea is +exposed to winds? What is there that can discompose such gravity and +constancy? Anything sudden or unforeseen? How can anything of this kind +befall one to whom nothing is sudden and unforeseen that can happen to +man? Now, as to their saying that redundancies should be pared off, and +only what is natural remain, what, I pray you, can be natural which may +be too exuberant? + +XXVII. All these assertions proceed from the roots of errors, which +must be entirely plucked up and destroyed, not pared and amputated. But +as I suspect that your inquiry is not so much respecting the wise man +as concerning yourself (for you allow that he is free from all +perturbations, and you would willingly be so too yourself), let us see +what remedies there are which may be applied by philosophy to the +diseases of the mind. There is certainly some remedy; nor has nature +been so unkind to the human race as to have discovered so many things +salutary to the body, and none which are medicinal to the mind. She has +even been kinder to the mind than to the body; inasmuch as you must +seek abroad for the assistance which the body requires, while the mind +has all that it requires within itself. But in proportion as the +excellency of the mind is of a higher and more divine nature, the more +diligence does it require; and therefore reason, when it is well +applied, discovers what is best, but when it is neglected, it becomes +involved in many errors. I shall apply, then, all my discourse to you; +for though you pretend to be inquiring about the wise man, your inquiry +may possibly be about yourself. Various, then, are the cures of those +perturbations which I have expounded, for every disorder is not to be +appeased the same way. One medicine must be applied to the man who +mourns, another to the pitiful, another to the person who envies; for +there is this difference to be maintained in all the four +perturbations: we are to consider whether our discourse had better be +directed to perturbations in general, which are a contempt of reason, +or a somewhat too vehement appetite; or whether it would be better +applied to particular descriptions, as, for instance, to fear, lust, +and the rest, and whether it appears preferable to endeavor to remove +that which has occasioned the grief, or rather to attempt wholly to +eradicate every kind of grief. As, should any one grieve that he is +poor, the question is, Would you maintain poverty to be no evil, or +would you contend that a man ought not to grieve at anything? Certainly +this last is the best course; for should you not convince him with +regard to poverty, you must allow him to grieve; but if you remove +grief by particular arguments, such as I used yesterday, the evil of +poverty is in some manner removed. + +XXVIII. But any perturbation of the mind of this sort may be, as it +were, wiped away by the method of appeasing the mind, if you succeed in +showing that there is no good in that which has given rise to joy and +lust, nor any evil in that which has occasioned fear or grief. But +certainly the most effectual cure is to be achieved by showing that all +perturbations are of themselves vicious, and have nothing natural or +necessary in them. As we see, grief itself is easily softened when we +charge those who grieve with weakness and an effeminate mind; or when +we commend the gravity and constancy of those who bear calmly whatever +befalls them here, as accidents to which all men are liable; and, +indeed, this is generally the feeling of those who look on these as +real evils, but yet think they should be borne with resignation. One +imagines pleasure to be a good, another money; and yet the one may be +called off from intemperance, the other from covetousness. The other +method and address, which, at the same time that it removes the false +opinion, withdraws the disorder, has more subtlety in it; but it seldom +succeeds, and is not applicable to vulgar minds, for there are some +diseases which that medicine can by no means remove. For, should any +one be uneasy because he is without virtue, without courage, destitute +of a sense of duty or honesty, his anxiety proceeds from a real evil; +and yet we must apply another method of cure to him, and such a one as +all the philosophers, however they may differ about other things, agree +in. For they must necessarily agree in this, that commotions of the +mind in opposition to right reason are vicious; and that even admitting +those things to be evils which occasion fear or grief, and those to be +goods which provoke desire or joy, yet that very commotion itself is +vicious; for we mean by the expressions magnanimous and brave, one who +is resolute, sedate, grave, and superior to everything in this life; +but one who either grieves, or fears, or covets, or is transported with +passion, cannot come under that denomination; for these things are +consistent only with those who look on the things of this world as +things with which their minds are unequal to contend. + +XXIX. Wherefore, as I before said, the philosophers have all one method +of cure, so that we need say nothing about what sort of thing that is +which disturbs the mind, but we must speak only concerning the +perturbation itself. Thus, first, with regard to desire itself, when +the business is only to remove that, the inquiry is not to be, whether +that thing be good or evil which provokes lust, but the lust itself is +to be removed; so that whether whatever is honest is the chief good, or +whether it consists in pleasure, or in both these things together, or +in the other three kinds of goods, yet should there be in any one too +vehement an appetite for even virtue itself, the whole discourse should +be directed to the deterring him from that vehemence. But human nature, +when placed in a conspicuous point of view, gives us every argument for +appeasing the mind, and, to make this the more distinct, the laws and +conditions of life should be explained in our discourse. Therefore, it +was not without reason that Socrates is reported, when Euripides was +exhibiting his play called Orestes, to have repeated the first three +verses of that tragedy-- + + What tragic story men can mournful tell, + Whate'er from fate or from the gods befell, + That human nature can support--[52] + +But, in order to persuade those to whom any misfortune has happened +that they can and ought to bear it, it is very useful to set before +them an enumeration of other persons who have borne similar calamities. +Indeed, the method of appeasing grief was explained in my dispute of +yesterday, and in my book on Consolation, which I wrote in the midst of +my own grief; for I was not myself so wise a man as to be insensible to +grief, and I used this, notwithstanding Chrysippus's advice to the +contrary, who is against applying a medicine to the agitations of the +mind while they are fresh; but I did it, and committed a violence on +nature, that the greatness of my grief might give way to the greatness +of the medicine. + +XXX. But fear borders upon grief, of which I have already said enough; +but I must say a little more on that. Now, as grief proceeds from what +is present, so does fear from future evil; so that some have said that +fear is a certain part of grief: others have called fear the harbinger +of trouble, which, as it were, introduces the ensuing evil. Now, the +reasons that make what is present supportable, make what is to come +very contemptible; for, with regard to both, we should take care to do +nothing low or grovelling, soft or effeminate, mean or abject. But, +notwithstanding we should speak of the inconstancy, imbecility, and +levity of fear itself, yet it is of very great service to speak +contemptuously of those very things of which we are afraid. So that it +fell out very well, whether it was by accident or design, that I +disputed the first and second day on death and pain--the two things +that are the most dreaded: now, if what I then said was approved of, we +are in a great degree freed from fear. And this is sufficient, as far +as regards the opinion of evils. + +XXXI. Proceed we now to what are goods--that is to say, to joy and +desire. To me, indeed, one thing alone seems to embrace the question of +all that relates to the perturbations of the mind--the fact, namely, +that all perturbations are in our own power; that they are taken up +upon opinion, and are voluntary. This error, then, must be got rid of; +this opinion must be removed; and, as with regard to imagined evils, we +are to make them more supportable, so with respect to goods, we are to +lessen the violent effects of those things which are called great and +joyous. But one thing is to be observed, that equally relates both to +good and evil: that, should it be difficult to persuade any one that +none of those things which disturb the mind are to be looked on as good +or evil, yet a different cure is to be applied to different feelings; +and the malevolent person is to be corrected by one way of reasoning, +the lover by another, the anxious man by another, and the fearful by +another: and it would be easy for any one who pursues the best approved +method of reasoning, with regard to good and evil, to maintain that no +fool can be affected with joy, as he never can have anything good. But, +at present, my discourse proceeds upon the common received notions. +Let, then, honors, riches, pleasures, and the rest be the very good +things which they are imagined to be; yet a too elevated and exulting +joy on the possession of them is unbecoming; just as, though it might +be allowable to laugh, to giggle would be indecent. Thus, a mind +enlarged by joy is as blamable as a contraction of it by grief; and +eager longing is a sign of as much levity in desiring as immoderate joy +is in possessing; and, as those who are too dejected are said to be +effeminate, so they who are too elated with joy are properly called +volatile; and as feeling envy is a part of grief, and the being pleased +with another's misfortune is a kind of joy, both these feelings are +usually corrected by showing the wildness and insensibility of them: +and as it becomes a man to be cautious, but it is unbecoming in him to +be fearful, so to be pleased is proper, but to be joyful improper. I +have, in order that I might be the better understood, distinguished +pleasure from joy. I have already said above, that a contraction of the +mind can never be right, but that an elation of it may; for the joy of +Hector in Naevius is one thing-- + + 'Tis joy indeed to hear my praises sung + By you, who are the theme of honor's tongue-- + +but that of the character in Trabea another: "The kind procuress, +allured by my money, will observe my nod, will watch my desires, and +study my will. If I but move the door with my little finger, instantly +it flies open; and if Chrysis should unexpectedly discover me, she will +run with joy to meet me, and throw herself into my arms." + +Now he will tell you how excellent he thinks this: + + Not even fortune herself is so fortunate. + +XXXII. Any one who attends the least to the subject will be convinced +how unbecoming this joy is. And as they are very shameful who are +immoderately delighted with the enjoyment of venereal pleasures, so are +they very scandalous who lust vehemently after them. And all that which +is commonly called love (and, believe me, I can find out no other name +to call it by) is of such a trivial nature that nothing, I think, is to +be compared to it: of which Caecilius says, + + I hold the man of every sense bereaved + Who grants not Love to be of Gods the chief: + Whose mighty power whate'er is good effects, + Who gives to each his beauty and defects: + Hence, health and sickness; wit and folly, hence, + The God that love and hatred doth dispense! + +An excellent corrector of life this same poetry, which thinks that +love, the promoter of debauchery and vanity, should have a place in the +council of the Gods! I am speaking of comedy, which could not subsist +at all without our approving of these debaucheries. But what said that +chief of the Argonauts in tragedy? + + My life I owe to honor less than love. + +What, then, are we to say of this love of Medea?--what a train of +miseries did it occasion! And yet the same woman has the assurance to +say to her father, in another poet, that she had a husband + + Dearer by love than ever fathers were. + +XXXIII. However, we may allow the poets to trifle, in whose fables we +see Jupiter himself engaged in these debaucheries: but let us apply to +the masters of virtue--the philosophers who deny love to be anything +carnal; and in this they differ from Epicurus, who, I think, is not +much mistaken. For what is that love of friendship? How comes it that +no one is in love with a deformed young man, or a handsome old one? I +am of opinion that this love of men had its rise from the Gymnastics of +the Greeks, where these kinds of loves are admissible and permitted; +therefore Ennius spoke well: + + The censure of this crime to those is due + Who naked bodies first exposed to view. + +Now, supposing them chaste, which I think is hardly possible, they are +uneasy and distressed, and the more so because they contain and refrain +themselves. But, to pass over the love of women, where nature has +allowed more liberty, who can misunderstand the poets in their rape of +Ganymede, or not apprehend what Laius says, and what he desires, in +Euripides? Lastly, what have the principal poets and the most learned +men published of themselves in their poems and songs? What doth Alcaeus, +who was distinguished in his own republic for his bravery, write on the +love of young men? And as for Anacreon's poetry, it is wholly on love. +But Ibycus of Rhegium appears, from his writings, to have had this love +stronger on him than all the rest. + +XXXIV. Now we see that the loves of all these writers were entirely +libidinous. There have arisen also some among us philosophers (and +Plato is at the head of them, whom Dicaearchus blames not without +reason) who have countenanced love. The Stoics, in truth, say, not only +that their wise man may be a lover, but they even define love itself as +an endeavor to originate friendship out of the appearance of beauty. +Now, provided there is any one in the nature of things without desire, +without care, without a sigh, such a one may be a lover; for he is free +from all lust: but I have nothing to say to him, as it is lust of which +I am now speaking. But should there be any love--as there certainly +is--which is but little, or perhaps not at all, short of madness, such +as his is in the Leucadia-- + + Should there be any God whose care I am-- + +it is incumbent on all the Gods to see that he enjoys his amorous +pleasure. + + Wretch that I am! + +Nothing is more true, and he says very appropriately, + + What, are you sane, who at this rate lament? + +He seems even to his friends to be out of his senses: then how tragical +he becomes! + + Thy aid, divine Apollo, I implore, + And thine, dread ruler of the wat'ry store! + Oh! all ye winds, assist me! + +He thinks that the whole world ought to apply itself to help his love: +he excludes Venus alone, as unkind to him. + + Thy aid, O Venus, why should I invoke? + +He thinks Venus too much employed in her own lust to have regard to +anything else, as if he himself had not said and committed these +shameful things from lust. + +XXXV. Now, the cure for one who is affected in this manner is to show +how light, how contemptible, how very trifling he is in what he +desires; how he may turn his affections to another object, or +accomplish his desires by some other means; or else to persuade him +that he may entirely disregard it: sometimes he is to be led away to +objects of another kind, to study, business, or other different +engagements and concerns: very often the cure is effected by change of +place, as sick people, that have not recovered their strength, are +benefited by change of air. Some people think an old love may be driven +out by a new one, as one nail drives out another: but, above all +things, the man thus afflicted should be advised what madness love is: +for of all the perturbations of the mind, there is not one which is +more vehement; for (without charging it with rapes, debaucheries, +adultery, or even incest, the baseness of any of these being very +blamable; not, I say, to mention these) the very perturbation of the +mind in love is base of itself, for, to pass over all its acts of +downright madness, what weakness do not those very things which are +looked upon as indifferent argue? + + Affronts and jealousies, jars, squabbles, wars, + Then peace again. The man who seeks to fix + These restless feelings, and to subjugate + Them to some regular law, is just as wise + As one who'd try to lay down rules by which + Men should go mad.[53] + +Now, is not this inconstancy and mutability of mind enough to deter any +one by its own deformity? We are to demonstrate, as was said of every +perturbation, that there are no such feelings which do not consist +entirely of opinion and judgment, and are not owing to ourselves. For +if love were natural, all would be in love, and always so, and all love +the same object; nor would one be deterred by shame, another by +reflection, another by satiety. + +XXXVI. Anger, too, when it disturbs the mind any time, leaves no room +to doubt its being madness: by the instigation of which we see such +contention as this between brothers: + + Where was there ever impudence like thine? + Who on thy malice ever could refine?[54] + +You know what follows: for abuses are thrown out by these brothers with +great bitterness in every other verse; so that you may easily know them +for the sons of Atreus, of that Atreus who invented a new punishment +for his brother: + + I who his cruel heart to gall am bent, + Some new, unheard-of torment must invent. + +Now, what were these inventions? Hear Thyestes: + + My impious brother fain would have me eat + My children, and thus serves them up for meat. + +To what length now will not anger go? even as far as madness. Therefore +we say, properly enough, that angry men have given up their power, that +is, they are out of the power of advice, reason, and understanding; for +these ought to have power over the whole mind. Now, you should put +those out of the way whom they endeavor to attack till they have +recollected themselves; but what does recollection here imply but +getting together again the dispersed parts of their mind into their +proper place? or else you must beg and entreat them, if they have the +means of revenge, to defer it to another opportunity, till their anger +cools. But the expression of cooling implies, certainly, that there was +a heat raised in their minds in opposition to reason; from which +consideration that saying of Archytas is commended, who being somewhat +provoked at his steward, "How would I have treated you," said he, "if I +had not been in a passion?" + +XXXVII. Where, then, are they who say that anger has its use? Can +madness be of any use? But still it is natural. Can anything be natural +that is against reason? or how is it, if anger is natural, that one +person is more inclined to anger than another? or that the lust of +revenge should cease before it has revenged itself? or that any one +should repent of what he had done in a passion? as we see that +Alexander the king did, who could scarcely keep his hands from himself, +when he had killed his favorite Clytus, so great was his compunction. +Now who that is acquainted with these instances can doubt that this +motion of the mind is altogether in opinion and voluntary? for who can +doubt that disorders of the mind, such as covetousness and a desire of +glory, arise from a great estimation of those things by which the mind +is disordered? from whence we may understand that every perturbation of +the mind is founded in opinion. And if boldness--that is to say, a firm +assurance of mind--is a kind of knowledge and serious opinion not +hastily taken up, then diffidence is a fear of an expected and +impending evil; and if hope is an expectation of good, fear must, of +course, be an expectation of evil. Thus fear and other perturbations +are evils. Therefore, as constancy proceeds from knowledge, so does +perturbation from error. Now, they who are said to be naturally +inclined to anger, or to pity, or to envy, or to any feeling of this +kind, their minds are constitutionally, as it were, in bad health; yet +they are curable, as the disposition of Socrates is said to have been; +for when Zopyrus, who professed to know the character of every one from +his person, had heaped a great many vices on him in a public assembly, +he was laughed at by others, who could perceive no such vices in +Socrates; but Socrates kept him in countenance by declaring that such +vices were natural to him, but that he had got the better of them by +his reason. Therefore, as any one who has the appearance of the best +constitution may yet appear to be naturally rather inclined to some +particular disorder, so different minds may be more particularly +inclined to different diseases. But as to those men who are said to be +vicious, not by nature, but their own fault, their vices proceed from +wrong opinions of good and bad things, so that one is more prone than +another to different motions and perturbations. But, just as it is in +the case of the body, an inveterate disease is harder to be got rid of +than a sudden disorder; and it is more easy to cure a fresh tumor in +the eyes than to remove a defluxion of any continuance. + +XXXVIII. But as the cause of perturbations is now discovered, for all +of them arise from the judgment or opinion, or volition, I shall put an +end to this discourse. But we ought to be assured, since the boundaries +of good and evil are now discovered, as far as they are discoverable by +man, that nothing can be desired of philosophy greater or more useful +than the discussions which we have held these four days. For besides +instilling a contempt of death, and relieving pain so as to enable men +to bear it, we have added the appeasing of grief, than which there is +no greater evil to man. For though every perturbation of mind is +grievous, and differs but little from madness, yet we are used to say +of others when they are under any perturbation, as of fear, joy, or +desire, that they are agitated and disturbed; but of those who give +themselves up to grief, that they are miserable, afflicted, wretched, +unhappy. So that it doth not seem to be by accident, but with reason +proposed by you, that I should discuss grief, and the other +perturbations separately; for there lies the spring and head of all our +miseries; but the cure of grief, and of other disorders, is one and the +same in that they are all voluntary, and founded on opinion; we take +them on ourselves because it seems right so to do. Philosophy +undertakes to eradicate this error, as the root of all our evils: let +us therefore surrender ourselves to be instructed by it, and suffer +ourselves to be cured; for while these evils have possession of us, we +not only cannot be happy, but cannot be right in our minds. We must +either deny that reason can effect anything, while, on the other hand, +nothing can be done right without reason, or else, since philosophy +depends on the deductions of reason, we must seek from her, if we would +be good or happy, every help and assistance for living well and +happily. + + + + +BOOK V. + +WHETHER VIRTUE ALONE BE SUFFICIENT FOR A HAPPY LIFE. + + +I. This fifth day, Brutus, shall put an end to our Tusculan +Disputations: on which day we discussed your favorite subject. For I +perceive from that book which you wrote for me with the greatest +accuracy, as well as from your frequent conversation, that you are +clearly of this opinion, that virtue is of itself sufficient for a +happy life: and though it may be difficult to prove this, on account of +the many various strokes of fortune, yet it is a truth of such a nature +that we should endeavor to facilitate the proof of it. For among all +the topics of philosophy, there is not one of more dignity or +importance. For as the first philosophers must have had some inducement +to neglect everything for the search of the best state of life: surely, +the inducement must have been the hope of living happily, which +impelled them to devote so much care and pains to that study. Now, if +virtue was discovered and carried to perfection by them, and if virtue +is a sufficient security for a happy life, who can avoid thinking the +work of philosophizing excellently recommended by them, and undertaken +by me? But if virtue, as being subject to such various and uncertain +accidents, were but the slave of fortune, and were not of sufficient +ability to support herself, I am afraid that it would seem desirable +rather to offer up prayers, than to rely on our own confidence in +virtue as the foundation for our hope of a happy life. And, indeed, +when I reflect on those troubles with which I have been so severely +exercised by fortune, I begin to distrust this opinion; and sometimes +even to dread the weakness and frailty of human nature, for I am afraid +lest, when nature had given us infirm bodies, and had joined to them +incurable diseases and intolerable pains, she perhaps also gave us +minds participating in these bodily pains, and harassed also with +troubles and uneasinesses, peculiarly their own. But here I correct +myself for forming my judgment of the power of virtue more from the +weakness of others, or of myself perhaps, than from virtue itself: for +she herself (provided there is such a thing as virtue; and your uncle +Brutus has removed all doubt of it) has everything that can befall +mankind in subjection to her; and by disregarding such things, she is +far removed from being at all concerned at human accidents; and, being +free from every imperfection, she thinks that nothing which is external +to herself can concern her. But we, who increase every approaching evil +by our fear, and every present one by our grief, choose rather to +condemn the nature of things than our own errors. + +II. But the amendment of this fault, and of all our other vices and +offences, is to be sought for in philosophy: and as my own inclination +and desire led me, from my earliest youth upward, to seek her +protection, so, under my present misfortunes, I have had recourse to +the same port from whence I set out, after having been tossed by a +violent tempest. O Philosophy, thou guide of life! thou discoverer of +virtue and expeller of vices! what had not only I myself, but the whole +life of man, been without you? To you it is that we owe the origin of +cities; you it was who called together the dispersed race of men into +social life; you united them together, first, by placing them near one +another, then by marriages, and lastly, by the communication of speech +and languages. You have been the inventress of laws; you have been our +instructress in morals and discipline; to you we fly for refuge; from +you we implore assistance; and as I formerly submitted to you in a +great degree, so now I surrender up myself entirely to you. For one day +spent well, and agreeably to your precepts, is preferable to an +eternity of error. Whose assistance, then, can be of more service to me +than yours, when you have bestowed on us tranquillity of life, and +removed the fear of death? But Philosophy is so far from being praised +as much as she has deserved by mankind, that she is wholly neglected by +most men, and actually evil spoken of by many. Can any person speak ill +of the parent of life, and dare to pollute himself thus with parricide, +and be so impiously ungrateful as to accuse her whom he ought to +reverence, even were he less able to appreciate the advantages which he +might derive from her? But this error, I imagine, and this darkness has +spread itself over the minds of ignorant men, from their not being able +to look so far back, and from their not imagining that those men by +whom human life was first improved were philosophers; for though we see +philosophy to have been of long standing, yet the name must be +acknowledged to be but modern. + +III. But, indeed, who can dispute the antiquity of philosophy, either +in fact or name? For it acquired this excellent name from the ancients, +by the knowledge of the origin and causes of everything, both divine +and human. Thus those seven [Greek: Sophoi], as they were considered +and called by the Greeks, have always been esteemed and called wise men +by us; and thus Lycurgus many ages before, in whose time, before the +building of this city, Homer is said to have lived, as well as Ulysses +and Nestor in the heroic ages, are all handed down to us by tradition +as having really been what they were called, wise men; nor would it +have been said that Atlas supported the heavens, or that Prometheus was +bound to Caucasus, nor would Cepheus, with his wife, his son-in-law, +and his daughter have been enrolled among the constellations, but that +their more than human knowledge of the heavenly bodies had transferred +their names into an erroneous fable. From whence all who occupied +themselves in the contemplation of nature were both considered and +called wise men; and that name of theirs continued to the age of +Pythagoras, who is reported to have gone to Phlius, as we find it +stated by Heraclides Ponticus, a very learned man, and a pupil of +Plato, and to have discoursed very learnedly and copiously on certain +subjects with Leon, prince of the Phliasii; and when Leon, admiring his +ingenuity and eloquence, asked him what art he particularly professed, +his answer was, that he was acquainted with no art, but that he was a +philosopher. Leon, surprised at the novelty of the name, inquired what +he meant by the name of philosopher, and in what philosophers differed +from other men; on which Pythagoras replied, "That the life of man +seemed to him to resemble those games which were celebrated with the +greatest possible variety of sports and the general concourse of all +Greece. For as in those games there were some persons whose object was +glory and the honor of a crown, to be attained by the performance of +bodily exercises, so others were led thither by the gain of buying and +selling, and mere views of profit; but there was likewise one class of +persons, and they were by far the best, whose aim was neither applause +nor profit, but who came merely as spectators through curiosity, to +observe what was done, and to see in what manner things were carried on +there. And thus, said he, we come from another life and nature unto +this one, just as men come out of some other city, to some much +frequented mart; some being slaves to glory, others to money; and there +are some few who, taking no account of anything else, earnestly look +into the nature of things; and these men call themselves studious of +wisdom, that is, philosophers: and as there it is the most reputable +occupation of all to be a looker-on without making any acquisition, so +in life, the contemplating things, and acquainting one's self with +them, greatly exceeds every other pursuit of life." + +IV. Nor was Pythagoras the inventor only of the name, but he enlarged +also the thing itself, and, when he came into Italy after this +conversation at Phlius, he adorned that Greece, which is called Great +Greece, both privately and publicly, with the most excellent +institutions and arts; but of his school and system I shall, perhaps, +find another opportunity to speak. But numbers and motions, and the +beginning and end of all things, were the subjects of the ancient +philosophy down to Socrates, who was a pupil of Archelaus, who had been +the disciple of Anaxagoras. These made diligent inquiry into the +magnitude of the stars, their distances, courses, and all that relates +to the heavens. But Socrates was the first who brought down philosophy +from the heavens, placed it in cities, introduced it into families, and +obliged it to examine into life and morals, and good and evil. And his +different methods of discussing questions, together with the variety of +his topics, and the greatness of his abilities, being immortalized by +the memory and writings of Plato, gave rise to many sects of +philosophers of different sentiments, of all which I have principally +adhered to that one which, in my opinion, Socrates himself followed; +and argue so as to conceal my own opinion, while I deliver others from +their errors, and so discover what has the greatest appearance of +probability in every question. And the custom Carneades adopted with +great copiousness and acuteness, and I myself have often given in to it +on many occasions elsewhere, and in this manner, too, I disputed +lately, in my Tusculan villa; indeed, I have sent you a book of the +four former days' discussions; but the fifth day, when we had seated +ourselves as before, what we were to dispute on was proposed thus: + +V. _A._ I do not think virtue can possibly be sufficient for a happy +life. + +_M._ But my friend Brutus thinks so, whose judgment, with submission, I +greatly prefer to yours. + +_A._ I make no doubt of it; but your regard for him is not the business +now: the question is now, what is the real character of that quality of +which I have declared my opinion. I wish you to dispute on that. + +_M._ What! do you deny that virtue can possibly be sufficient for a +happy life? + +_A._ It is what I entirely deny. + +_M._ What! is not virtue sufficient to enable us to live as we ought, +honestly, commendably, or, in fine, to live well? + +_A._ Certainly sufficient. + +_M._ Can you, then, help calling any one miserable who lives ill? or +will you deny that any one who you allow lives well must inevitably +live happily? + +_A._ Why may I not? for a man may be upright in his life, honest, +praiseworthy, even in the midst of torments, and therefore live well. +Provided you understand what I mean by well; for when I say well, I +mean with constancy, and dignity, and wisdom, and courage; for a man +may display all these qualities on the rack; but yet the rack is +inconsistent with a happy life. + +_M._ What, then? is your happy life left on the outside of the prison, +while constancy, dignity, wisdom, and the other virtues, are +surrendered up to the executioner, and bear punishment and pain without +reluctance? + +_A._ You must look out for something new if you would do any good. +These things have very little effect on me, not merely from their being +common, but principally because, like certain light wines that will not +bear water, these arguments of the Stoics are pleasanter to taste than +to swallow. As when that assemblage of virtues is committed to the +rack, it raises so reverend a spectacle before our eyes that happiness +seems to hasten on towards them, and not to suffer them to be deserted +by her. But when you take your attention off from this picture and +these images of the virtues to the truth and the reality, what remains +without disguise is, the question whether any one can be happy in +torment? Wherefore let us now examine that point, and not be under any +apprehensions, lest the virtues should expostulate, and complain that +they are forsaken by happiness. For if prudence is connected with every +virtue, then prudence itself discovers this, that all good men are not +therefore happy; and she recollects many things of Marcus Atilius[55], +Quintus Caepio[56], Marcus Aquilius[57]; and prudence herself, if these +representations are more agreeable to you than the things themselves, +restrains happiness when it is endeavoring to throw itself into +torments, and denies that it has any connection with pain and torture. + +VI. _M._ I can easily bear with your behaving in this manner, though it +is not fair in you to prescribe to me how you would have me carry on +this discussion. But I ask you if I have effected anything or nothing +in the preceding days? + +_A._ Yes; something was done, some little matter indeed. + +_M._ But if that is the case, this question is settled, and almost put +an end to. + +_A._ How so? + +_M._ Because turbulent motions and violent agitations of the mind, when +it is raised and elated by a rash impulse, getting the better of +reason, leave no room for a happy life. For who that fears either pain +or death, the one of which is always present, the other always +impending, can be otherwise than miserable? Now, supposing the same +person--which is often the case--to be afraid of poverty, ignominy, +infamy, or weakness, or blindness, or, lastly, slavery, which doth not +only befall individual men, but often even the most powerful nations; +now can any one under the apprehension of these evils be happy? What +shall we say of him who not only dreads these evils as impending, but +actually feels and bears them at present? Let us unite in the same +person banishment, mourning, the loss of children; now, how can any one +who is broken down and rendered sick in body and mind by such +affliction be otherwise than very miserable indeed? What reason, again, +can there be why a man should not rightly enough be called miserable +whom we see inflamed and raging with lust, coveting everything with an +insatiable desire, and, in proportion as he derives more pleasure from +anything, thirsting the more violently after them? And as to a man +vainly elated, exulting with an empty joy, and boasting of himself +without reason, is not he so much the more miserable in proportion as +he thinks himself happier? Therefore, as these men are miserable, so, +on the other hand, those are happy who are alarmed by no fears, wasted +by no griefs, provoked by no lusts, melted by no languid pleasures that +arise from vain and exulting joys. We look on the sea as calm when not +the least breath of air disturbs its waves; and, in like manner, the +placid and quiet state of the mind is discovered when unmoved by any +perturbation. Now, if there be any one who holds the power of fortune, +and everything human, everything that can possibly befall any man, as +supportable, so as to be out of the reach of fear or anxiety, and if +such a man covets nothing, and is lifted up by no vain joy of mind, +what can prevent his being happy? And if these are the effects of +virtue, why cannot virtue itself make men happy? + +VII. _A._ But the other of these two propositions is undeniable, that +they who are under no apprehensions, who are noways uneasy, who covet +nothing, who are lifted up by no vain joy, are happy: and therefore I +grant you that. But as for the other, that is not now in a fit state +for discussion; for it has been proved by your former arguments that a +wise man is free from every perturbation of mind. + +_M._ Doubtless, then, the dispute is over; for the question appears to +have been entirely exhausted. + +_A._ I think, indeed, that that is almost the case. + +_M._ But yet that is more usually the case with the mathematicians than +philosophers. For when the geometricians teach anything, if what they +have before taught relates to their present subject, they take that for +granted which has been already proved, and explain only what they had +not written on before. But the philosophers, whatever subject they have +in hand, get together everything that relates to it, notwithstanding +they may have dilated on it somewhere else. Were not that the case, why +should the Stoics say so much on that question, Whether virtue was +abundantly sufficient to a happy life? when it would have been answer +enough that they had before taught that nothing was good but what was +honorable; for, as this had been proved, the consequence must be that +virtue was sufficient to a happy life; and each premise may be made to +follow from the admission of the other, so that if it be admitted that +virtue is sufficient to secure a happy life, it may also be inferred +that nothing is good except what is honorable. They, however, do not +proceed in this manner; for they would separate books about what is +honorable, and what is the chief good; and when they have demonstrated +from the one that virtue has power enough to make life happy, yet they +treat this point separately; for everything, and especially a subject +of such great consequence, should be supported by arguments and +exhortations which belong to that alone. For you should have a care how +you imagine philosophy to have uttered anything more noble, or that she +has promised anything more fruitful or of greater consequence, for, +good Gods! doth she not engage that she will render him who submits to +her laws so accomplished as to be always armed against fortune, and to +have every assurance within himself of living well and happily--that he +shall, in short, be forever happy? But let us see what she will +perform? In the mean while, I look upon it as a great thing that she +has even made such a promise. For Xerxes, who was loaded with all the +rewards and gifts of fortune, not satisfied with his armies of horse +and foot, nor the multitude of his ships, nor his infinite treasure of +gold, offered a reward to any one who could find out a new pleasure; +and yet, when it was discovered, he was not satisfied with it; nor can +there ever be an end to lust. I wish we could engage any one by a +reward to produce something the better to establish us in this belief. + +VIII. _A._ I wish that, indeed, myself; but I want a little +information. For I allow that in what you have stated the one +proposition is the consequence of the other; that as, if what is +honorable be the only good, it must follow that a happy life is the +effect of virtue: so that if a happy life consists in virtue, nothing +can be good but virtue. But your friend Brutus, on the authority of +Aristo and Antiochus, does not see this; for he thinks the case would +be the same even if there were anything good besides virtue. + +_M._ What, then? do you imagine that I am going to argue against +Brutus? + +_A._ You may do what you please; for it is not for me to prescribe what +you shall do. + +_M._ How these things agree together shall be examined somewhere else; +for I frequently discussed that point with Antiochus, and lately with +Aristo, when, during the period of my command as general, I was lodging +with him at Athens. For to me it seemed that no one could possibly be +happy under any evil; but a wise man might be afflicted with evil, if +there are any things arising from body or fortune deserving the name of +evils. These things were said, which Antiochus has inserted in his +books in many places--that virtue itself was sufficient to make life +happy, but yet not perfectly happy; and that many things derive their +names from the predominant portion of them, though they do not include +everything, as strength, health, riches, honor, and glory: which +qualities are determined by their kind, not their number. Thus a happy +life is so called from its being so in a great degree, even though it +should fall short in some point. To clear this up is not absolutely +necessary at present, though it seems to be said without any great +consistency; for I cannot imagine what is wanting to one that is happy +to make him happier, for if anything be wanting to him, he cannot be so +much as happy; and as to what they say, that everything is named and +estimated from its predominant portion, that may be admitted in some +things. But when they allow three kinds of evils--when any one is +oppressed with every imaginable evil of two kinds, being afflicted with +adverse fortune, and having at the same time his body worn out and +harassed with all sorts of pains--shall we say that such a one is but +little short of a happy life, to say nothing about the happiest +possible life? + +IX. This is the point which Theophrastus was unable to maintain; for +after he had once laid down the position that stripes, torments, +tortures, the ruin of one's country, banishment, the loss of children, +had great influence on men's living miserably and unhappily, he durst +not any longer use any high and lofty expressions when he was so low +and abject in his opinion. How right he was is not the question; he +certainly was consistent. Therefore, I am not for objecting to +consequences where the premises are admitted. But this most elegant and +learned of all the philosophers is not taken to task very severely when +he asserts his three kinds of good; but he is attacked by every one for +that book which he wrote on a happy life, in which book he has many +arguments why one who is tortured and racked cannot be happy. For in +that book he is supposed to say that a man who is placed on the wheel +(that is a kind of torture in use among the Greeks) cannot attain to a +completely happy life. He nowhere, indeed, says so absolutely; but what +he says amounts to the same thing. Can I, then, find fault with him, +after having allowed that pains of the body are evils, that the ruin of +a man's fortunes is an evil, if he should say that every good man is +not happy, when all those things which he reckons as evils may befall a +good man? The same Theophrastus is found fault with by all the books +and schools of the philosophers for commending that sentence in his +Callisthenes, + + Fortune, not wisdom, rules the life of man. + +They say never did philosopher assert anything so languid. They are +right, indeed, in that; but I do not apprehend anything could be more +consistent, for if there are so many good things that depend on the +body, and so many foreign to it that depend on chance and fortune, is +it inconsistent to say that fortune, which governs everything, both +what is foreign and what belongs to the body, has greater power than +counsel. Or would we rather imitate Epicurus? who is often excellent in +many things which he speaks, but quite indifferent how consistent he +may be, or how much to the purpose he is speaking. He commends spare +diet, and in that he speaks as a philosopher; but it is for Socrates or +Antisthenes to say so, and not for one who confines all good to +pleasure. He denies that any one can live pleasantly unless he lives +honestly, wisely, and justly. Nothing is more dignified than this +assertion, nothing more becoming a philosopher, had he not measured +this very expression of living honestly, justly, and wisely by +pleasure. What could be better than to assert that fortune interferes +but little with a wise man? But does he talk thus, who, after he has +said that pain is the greatest evil, or the only evil, might himself be +afflicted with the sharpest pains all over his body, even at the time +he is vaunting himself the most against fortune? And this very thing, +too, Metrodorus has said, but in better language: "I have anticipated +you, Fortune; I have caught you, and cut off every access, so that you +cannot possibly reach me." This would be excellent in the mouth of +Aristo the Chian, or Zeno the Stoic, who held nothing to be an evil but +what was base; but for you, Metrodorus, to anticipate the approaches of +fortune, who confine all that is good to your bowels and marrow--for +you to say so, who define the chief good by a strong constitution of +body, and well-assured hope of its continuance--for you to cut off +every access of fortune! Why, you may instantly be deprived of that +good. Yet the simple are taken with these propositions, and a vast +crowd is led away by such sentences to become their followers. + +X. But it is the duty of one who would argue accurately to consider not +what is said, but what is said consistently. As in that very opinion +which we have adopted in this discussion, namely, that every good man +is always happy, it is clear what I mean by good men: I call those both +wise and good men who are provided and adorned with every virtue. Let +us see, then, who are to be called happy. I imagine, indeed, that those +men are to be called so who are possessed of good without any alloy of +evil; nor is there any other notion connected with the word that +expresses happiness but an absolute enjoyment of good without any evil. +Virtue cannot attain this, if there is anything good besides itself. +For a crowd of evils would present themselves, if we were to allow +poverty, obscurity, humility, solitude, the loss of friends, acute +pains of the body, the loss of health, weakness, blindness, the ruin of +one's country, banishment, slavery, to be evils; for a wise man may be +afflicted by all these evils, numerous and important as they are, and +many others also may be added, for they are brought on by chance, which +may attack a wise man; but if these things are evils, who can maintain +that a wise man is always happy when all these evils may light on him +at the same time? I therefore do not easily agree with my friend +Brutus, nor with our common masters, nor those ancient ones, Aristotle, +Speusippus, Xenocrates, Polemon, who reckon all that I have mentioned +above as evils, and yet they say that a wise man is always happy; nor +can I allow them, because they are charmed with this beautiful and +illustrious title, which would very well become Pythagoras, Socrates, +and Plato, to persuade my mind that strength, health, beauty, riches, +honors, power, with the beauty of which they are ravished, are +contemptible, and that all those things which are the opposites of +these are not to be regarded. Then might they declare openly, with a +loud voice, that neither the attacks of fortune, nor the opinion of the +multitude, nor pain, nor poverty, occasions them any apprehensions; and +that they have everything within themselves, and that there is nothing +whatever which they consider as good but what is within their own +power. Nor can I by any means allow the same person who falls into the +vulgar opinion of good and evil to make use of these expressions, which +can only become a great and exalted man. Struck with which glory, up +starts Epicurus, who, with submission to the Gods, thinks a wise man +always happy. He is much charmed with the dignity of this opinion, but +he never would have owned that, had he attended to himself; for what is +there more inconsistent than for one who could say that pain was the +greatest or the only evil to think also that a wise man can possibly +say in the midst of his torture, How sweet is this! We are not, +therefore, to form our judgment of philosophers from detached +sentences, but from their consistency with themselves, and their +ordinary manner of talking. + +XI. _A._ You compel me to be of your opinion; but have a care that you +are not inconsistent yourself. + +_M._ In what respect? + +_A._ Because I have lately read your fourth book on Good and Evil: and +in that you appeared to me, while disputing against Cato, to be +endeavoring to show, which in my opinion means to prove, that Zeno and +the Peripatetics differ only about some new words; but if we allow +that, what reason can there be, if it follows from the arguments of +Zeno that virtue contains all that is necessary to a happy life, that +the Peripatetics should not be at liberty to say the same? For, in my +opinion, regard should be had to the thing, not to words. + +_M._ What! you would convict me from my own words, and bring against me +what I had said or written elsewhere. You may act in that manner with +those who dispute by established rules. We live from hand to mouth, and +say anything that strikes our mind with probability, so that we are the +only people who are really at liberty. But, since I just now spoke of +consistency, I do not think the inquiry in this place is, if the +opinion of Zeno and his pupil Aristo be true that nothing is good but +what is honorable; but, admitting that, then, whether the whole of a +happy life can be rested on virtue alone. Wherefore, if we certainly +grant Brutus this, that a wise man is always happy, how consistent he +is, is his own business; for who, indeed, is more worthy than himself +of the glory of that opinion? Still, we may maintain that such a man is +more happy than any one else. + +XII. Though Zeno the Cittiaean, a stranger and an inconsiderable coiner +of words, appears to have insinuated himself into the old philosophy; +still, the prevalence of this opinion is due to the authority of Plato, +who often makes use of this expression, "That nothing but virtue can be +entitled to the name of good," agreeably to what Socrates says in +Plato's Gorgias; for it is there related that when some one asked him +if he did not think Archelaus the son of Perdiccas, who was then looked +upon as a most fortunate person, a very happy man, "I do not know," +replied he, "for I never conversed with him." "What! is there no other +way you can know it by?" "None at all." "You cannot, then, pronounce of +the great king of the Persians whether he is happy or not?" "How can I, +when I do not know how learned or how good a man he is?" "What! do you +imagine that a happy life depends on that?" "My opinion entirely is, +that good men are happy, and the wicked miserable." "Is Archelaus, +then, miserable?" "Certainly, if unjust." Now, does it not appear to +you that he is here placing the whole of a happy life in virtue alone? +But what does the same man say in his funeral oration? "For," saith he, +"whoever has everything that relates to a happy life so entirely +dependent on himself as not to be connected with the good or bad +fortune of another, and not to be affected by, or made in any degree +uncertain by, what befalls another; and whoever is such a one has +acquired the best rule of living; he is that moderate, that brave, that +wise man, who submits to the gain and loss of everything, and +especially of his children, and obeys that old precept; for he will +never be too joyful or too sad, because he depends entirely upon +himself." + +XIII. From Plato, therefore, all my discourse shall be deduced, as if +from some sacred and hallowed fountain. Whence can I, then, more +properly begin than from Nature, the parent of all? For whatsoever she +produces (I am not speaking only of animals, but even of those things +which have sprung from the earth in such a manner as to rest on their +own roots) she designed it to be perfect in its respective kind. So +that among trees and vines, and those lower plants and trees which +cannot advance themselves high above the earth, some are evergreen, +others are stripped of their leaves in winter, and, warmed by the +spring season, put them out afresh, and there are none of them but what +are so quickened by a certain interior motion, and their own seeds +enclosed in every one, so as to yield flowers, fruit, or berries, that +all may have every perfection that belongs to it; provided no violence +prevents it. But the force of Nature itself may be more easily +discovered in animals, as she has bestowed sense on them. For some +animals she has taught to swim, and designed to be inhabitants of the +water; others she has enabled to fly, and has willed that they should +enjoy the boundless air; some others she has made to creep, others to +walk. Again, of these very animals, some are solitary, some gregarious, +some wild, others tame, some hidden and buried beneath the earth, and +every one of these maintains the law of nature, confining itself to +what was bestowed on it, and unable to change its manner of life. And +as every animal has from nature something that distinguishes it, which +every one maintains and never quits; so man has something far more +excellent, though everything is said to be excellent by comparison. But +the human mind, being derived from the divine reason, can be compared +with nothing but with the Deity itself, if I may be allowed the +expression. This, then, if it is improved, and when its perception is +so preserved as not to be blinded by errors, becomes a perfect +understanding, that is to say, absolute reason, which is the very same +as virtue. And if everything is happy which wants nothing, and is +complete and perfect in its kind, and that is the peculiar lot of +virtue, certainly all who are possessed of virtue are happy. And in +this I agree with Brutus, and also with Aristotle, Xenocrates, +Speusippus, Polemon. + +XIV. To me such are the only men who appear completely happy; for what +can he want to a complete happy life who relies on his own good +qualities, or how can he be happy who does not rely on them? But he who +makes a threefold division of goods must necessarily be diffident, for +how can he depend on having a sound body, or that his fortune shall +continue? But no one can be happy without an immovable, fixed, and +permanent good. What, then, is this opinion of theirs? So that I think +that saying of the Spartan may be applied to them, who, on some +merchant's boasting before him that he had despatched ships to every +maritime coast, replied that a fortune which depended on ropes was not +very desirable. Can there be any doubt that whatever may be lost cannot +be properly classed in the number of those things which complete a +happy life? for of all that constitutes a happy life, nothing will +admit of withering, or growing old, or wearing out, or decaying; for +whoever is apprehensive of any loss of these things cannot be happy: +the happy man should be safe, well fenced, well fortified, out of the +reach of all annoyance, not like a man under trifling apprehensions, +but free from all such. As he is not called innocent who but slightly +offends, but he who offends not at all, so it is he alone who is to be +considered without fear who is free from all fear, not he who is but in +little fear. For what else is courage but an affection of mind that is +ready to undergo perils, and patient in the endurance of pain and labor +without any alloy of fear? Now, this certainly could not be the case if +there were anything else good but what depended on honesty alone. But +how can any one be in possession of that desirable and much-coveted +security (for I now call a freedom from anxiety a security, on which +freedom a happy life depends) who has, or may have, a multitude of +evils attending him? How can he be brave and undaunted, and hold +everything as trifles which can befall a man? for so a wise man should +do, unless he be one who thinks that everything depends on himself. +Could the Lacedaemonians without this, when Philip threatened to prevent +all their attempts, have asked him if he could prevent their killing +themselves? Is it not easier, then, to find one man of such a spirit as +we are inquiring after, than to meet with a whole city of such men? +Now, if to this courage I am speaking of we add temperance, that it may +govern all our feelings and agitations, what can be wanting to complete +his happiness who is secured by his courage from uneasiness and fear, +and is prevented from immoderate desires and immoderate insolence of +joy by temperance? I could easily show that virtue is able to produce +these effects, but that I have explained on the foregoing days. + +XV. But as the perturbations of the mind make life miserable, and +tranquillity renders it happy; and as these perturbations are of two +sorts, grief and fear, proceeding from imagined evils, and as +immoderate joy and lust arise from a mistake about what is good, and as +all these feelings are in opposition to reason and counsel; when you +see a man at ease, quite free and disengaged from such troublesome +commotions, which are so much at variance with one another, can you +hesitate to pronounce such a one a happy man? Now, the wise man is +always in such a disposition; therefore the wise man is always happy. +Besides, every good is pleasant; whatever is pleasant may be boasted +and talked of; whatever may be boasted of is glorious; but whatever is +glorious is certainly laudable, and whatever is laudable doubtless, +also, honorable: whatever, then, is good is honorable (but the things +which they reckon as goods they themselves do not call honorable); +therefore what is honorable alone is good. Hence it follows that a +happy life is comprised in honesty alone. Such things, then, are not to +be called or considered goods, when a man may enjoy an abundance of +them, and yet be most miserable. Is there any doubt but that a man who +enjoys the best health, and who has strength and beauty, and his senses +flourishing in their utmost quickness and perfection--suppose him +likewise, if you please, nimble and active, nay, give him riches, +honors, authority, power, glory--now, I say, should this person, who is +in possession of all these, be unjust, intemperate, timid, stupid, or +an idiot--could you hesitate to call such a one miserable? What, then, +are those goods in the possession of which you may be very miserable? +Let us see if a happy life is not made up of parts of the same nature, +as a heap implies a quantity of grain of the same kind. And if this be +once admitted, happiness must be compounded of different good things, +which alone are honorable; if there is any mixture of things of another +sort with these, nothing honorable can proceed from such a composition: +now, take away honesty, and how can you imagine anything happy? For +whatever is good is desirable on that account; whatever is desirable +must certainly be approved of; whatever you approve of must be looked +on as acceptable and welcome. You must consequently impute dignity to +this; and if so, it must necessarily be laudable: therefore, everything +that is laudable is good. Hence it follows that what is honorable is +the only good. And should we not look upon it in this light, there will +be a great many things which we must call good. + +XVI. I forbear to mention riches, which, as any one, let him be ever so +unworthy, may have them, I do not reckon among goods; for what is good +is not attainable by all. I pass over notoriety and popular fame, +raised by the united voice of knaves and fools. Even things which are +absolute nothings may be called goods; such as white teeth, handsome +eyes, a good complexion, and what was commended by Euryclea, when she +was washing Ulysses's feet, the softness of his skin and the mildness +of his discourse. If you look on these as goods, what greater encomiums +can the gravity of a philosopher be entitled to than the wild opinion +of the vulgar and the thoughtless crowd? The Stoics give the name of +excellent and choice to what the others call good: they call them so, +indeed; but they do not allow them to complete a happy life. But these +others think that there is no life happy without them; or, admitting it +to be happy, they deny it to be the most happy. But our opinion is, +that it is the most happy; and we prove it from that conclusion of +Socrates. For thus that author of philosophy argued: that as the +disposition of a man's mind is, so is the man; such as the man is, such +will be his discourse; his actions will correspond with his discourse, +and his life with his actions. But the disposition of a good man's mind +is laudable; the life, therefore, of a good man is laudable; it is +honorable, therefore, because laudable; the unavoidable conclusion from +which is that the life of good men is happy. For, good Gods! did I not +make it appear, by my former arguments--or was I only amusing myself +and killing time in what I then said?--that the mind of a wise man was +always free from every hasty motion which I call a perturbation, and +that the most undisturbed peace always reigned in his breast? A man, +then, who is temperate and consistent, free from fear or grief, and +uninfluenced by any immoderate joy or desire, cannot be otherwise than +happy; but a wise man is always so, therefore he is always happy. +Moreover, how can a good man avoid referring all his actions and all +his feelings to the one standard of whether or not it is laudable? But +he does refer everything to the object of living happily: it follows, +then, that a happy life is laudable; but nothing is laudable without +virtue: a happy life, then, is the consequence of virtue. And this is +the unavoidable conclusion to be drawn from these arguments. + +XVII. A wicked life has nothing which we ought to speak of or glory in; +nor has that life which is neither happy nor miserable. But there is a +kind of life that admits of being spoken of, and gloried in, and +boasted of, as Epaminondas saith, + + The wings of Sparta's pride my counsels clipp'd. + +And Africanus boasts, + + Who, from beyond Maeotis to the place + Where the sun rises, deeds like mine can trace? + +If, then, there is such a thing as a happy life, it is to be gloried +in, spoken of, and commended by the person who enjoys it; for there is +nothing excepting that which can be spoken of or gloried in; and when +that is once admitted, you know what follows. Now, unless an honorable +life is a happy life, there must, of course, be something preferable to +a happy life; for that which is honorable all men will certainly grant +to be preferable to anything else. And thus there will be something +better than a happy life: but what can be more absurd than such an +assertion? What! when they grant vice to be effectual to the rendering +life miserable, must they not admit that there is a corresponding power +in virtue to make life happy? For contraries follow from contraries. +And here I ask what weight they think there is in the balance of +Critolaus, who having put the goods of the mind into one scale, and the +goods of the body and other external advantages into the other, thought +the goods of the mind outweighed the others so far that they would +require the whole earth and sea to equalize the scale. + +XVIII. What hinders Critolaus, then, or that gravest of philosophers, +Xenocrates (who raises virtue so high, and who lessens and depreciates +everything else), from not only placing a happy life, but the happiest +possible life, in virtue? And, indeed, if this were not the case, +virtue would be absolutely lost. For whoever is subject to grief must +necessarily be subject to fear too, for fear is an uneasy apprehension +of future grief; and whoever is subject to fear is liable to dread, +timidity, consternation, cowardice. Therefore, such a person may, some +time or other, be defeated, and not think himself concerned with that +precept of Atreus, + + And let men so conduct themselves in life, + As to be always strangers to defeat. + +But such a man, as I have said, will be defeated; and not only +defeated, but made a slave of. But we would have virtue always free, +always invincible; and were it not so, there would be an end of virtue. +But if virtue has in herself all that is necessary for a good life, she +is certainly sufficient for happiness: virtue is certainly sufficient, +too, for our living with courage; if with courage, then with a +magnanimous spirit, and indeed so as never to be under any fear, and +thus to be always invincible. Hence it follows that there can be +nothing to be repented of, no wants, no lets or hinderances. Thus all +things will be prosperous, perfect, and as you would have them, and, +consequently, happy; but virtue is sufficient for living with courage, +and therefore virtue is able by herself to make life happy. For as +folly, even when possessed of what it desires, never thinks it has +acquired enough, so wisdom is always satisfied with the present, and +never repents on her own account. + +XIX. Look but on the single consulship of Laelius, and that, too, after +having been set aside (though when a wise and good man like him is +outvoted, the people are disappointed of a good consul, rather than be +disappointed by a vain people); but the point is, would you prefer, +were it in your power, to be once such a consul as Laelius, or be +elected four times, like Cinna? I have no doubt in the world what +answer you will make, and it is on that account I put the question to +you. + +I would not ask every one this question; for some one perhaps might +answer that he would not only prefer four consulates to one, but even +one day of Cinna's life to whole ages of many famous men. Laelius would +have suffered had he but touched any one with his finger; but Cinna +ordered the head of his colleague consul, Cn. Octavius, to be struck +off; and put to death P. Crassus[58], and L. Caesar[59], those excellent +men, so renowned both at home and abroad; and even M. Antonius[60], the +greatest orator whom I ever heard; and C. Caesar, who seems to me to +have been the pattern of humanity, politeness, sweetness of temper, and +wit. Could he, then, be happy who occasioned the death of these men? So +far from it, that he seems to be miserable, not only for having +performed these actions, but also for acting in such a manner that it +was lawful for him to do it, though it is unlawful for any one to do +wicked actions; but this proceeds from inaccuracy, of speech, for we +call whatever a man is allowed to do lawful. Was not Marius happier, I +pray you, when he shared the glory of the victory gained over the +Cimbrians with his colleague Catulus (who was almost another Laelius; +for I look upon the two men as very like one another), than when, +conqueror in the civil war, he in a passion answered the friends of +Catulus, who were interceding for him, "Let him die?" And this answer +he gave, not once only, but often. But in such a case, he was happier +who submitted to that barbarous decree than he who issued it. And it is +better to receive an injury than to do one; and so it was better to +advance a little to meet that death that was making its approaches, as +Catulus did, than, like Marius, to sully the glory of six consulships, +and disgrace his latter days, by the death of such a man. + +XX. Dionysius exercised his tyranny over the Syracusans thirty-eight +years, being but twenty-five years old when he seized on the +government. How beautiful and how wealthy a city did he oppress with +slavery! And yet we have it from good authority that he was remarkably +temperate in his manner of living, that he was very active and +energetic in carrying on business, but naturally mischievous and +unjust; from which description every one who diligently inquires into +truth must inevitably see that he was very miserable. Neither did he +attain what he so greatly desired, even when he was persuaded that he +had unlimited power; for, notwithstanding he was of a good family and +reputable parents (though that is contested by some authors), and had a +very large acquaintance of intimate friends and relations, and also +some youths attached to him by ties of love after the fashion of the +Greeks, he could not trust any one of them, but committed the guard of +his person to slaves, whom he had selected from rich men's families and +made free, and to strangers and barbarians. And thus, through an unjust +desire of governing, he in a manner shut himself up in a prison. +Besides, he would not trust his throat to a barber, but had his +daughters taught to shave; so that these royal virgins were forced to +descend to the base and slavish employment of shaving the head and +beard of their father. Nor would he trust even them, when they were +grown up, with a razor; but contrived how they might burn off the hair +of his head and beard with red-hot nutshells. And as to his two wives, +Aristomache, his countrywoman, and Doris of Locris, he never visited +them at night before everything had been well searched and examined. +And as he had surrounded the place where his bed was with a broad +ditch, and made a way over it with a wooden bridge, he drew that bridge +over after shutting his bedchamber door. And as he did not dare to +stand on the ordinary pulpits from which they usually harangued the +people, he generally addressed them from a high tower. And it is said +that when he was disposed to play at ball--for he delighted much in +it--and had pulled off his clothes, he used to give his sword into the +keeping of a young man whom he was very fond of. On this, one of his +intimates said pleasantly, "You certainly trust your life with him;" +and as the young man happened to smile at this, he ordered them both to +be slain, the one for showing how he might be taken off, the other for +approving of what had been said by smiling. But he was so concerned at +what he had done that nothing affected him more during his whole life; +for he had slain one to whom he was extremely partial. Thus do weak +men's desires pull them different ways, and while they indulge one, +they act counter to another. + +XXI. This tyrant, however, showed himself how happy he really was; for +once, when Damocles, one of his flatterers, was dilating in +conversation on his forces, his wealth, the greatness of his power, the +plenty he enjoyed, the grandeur of his royal palaces, and maintaining +that no one was ever happier, "Have you an inclination," said he, +"Damocles, as this kind of life pleases you, to have a taste of it +yourself, and to make a trial of the good fortune that attends me?" And +when he said that he should like it extremely, Dionysius ordered him to +be laid on a bed of gold with the most beautiful covering, embroidered +and wrought with the most exquisite work, and he dressed out a great +many sideboards with silver and embossed gold. He then ordered some +youths, distinguished for their handsome persons, to wait at his table, +and to observe his nod, in order to serve him with what he wanted. +There were ointments and garlands; perfumes were burned; tables +provided with the most exquisite meats. Damocles thought himself very +happy. In the midst of this apparatus, Dionysius ordered a bright sword +to be let down from the ceiling, suspended by a single horse-hair, so +as to hang over the head of that happy man. After which he neither cast +his eye on those handsome waiters, nor on the well-wrought plate; nor +touched any of the provisions: presently the garlands fell to pieces. +At last he entreated the tyrant to give him leave to go, for that now +he had no desire to be happy[61]. Does not Dionysius, then, seem to +have declared there can be no happiness for one who is under constant +apprehensions? But it was not now in his power to return to justice, +and restore his citizens their rights and privileges; for, by the +indiscretion of youth, he had engaged in so many wrong steps and +committed such extravagances, that, had he attempted to have returned +to a right way of thinking, he must have endangered his life. + +XXII. Yet, how desirous he was of friendship, though at the same time +he dreaded the treachery of friends, appears from the story of those +two Pythagoreans: one of these had been security for his friend, who +was condemned to die; the other, to release his security, presented +himself at the time appointed for his dying: "I wish," said Dionysius," +you would admit me as the third in your friendship." What misery was it +for him to be deprived of acquaintance, of company at his table, and of +the freedom of conversation! especially for one who was a man of +learning, and from his childhood acquainted with liberal arts, very +fond of music, and himself a tragic poet--how good a one is not to the +purpose, for I know not how it is, but in this way, more than any +other, every one thinks his own performances excellent. I never as yet +knew any poet (and I was very intimate with Aquinius), who did not +appear to himself to be very admirable. The case is this: you are +pleased with your own works; I like mine. But to return to Dionysius. +He debarred himself from all civil and polite conversation, and spent +his life among fugitives, bondmen, and barbarians; for he was persuaded +that no one could be his friend who was worthy of liberty, or had the +least desire of being free. + +XXIII. Shall I not, then, prefer the life of Plato and Archytas, +manifestly wise and learned men, to his, than which nothing can +possibly be more horrid, or miserable, or detestable? + +I will present you with an humble and obscure mathematician of the same +city, called Archimedes, who lived many years after; whose tomb, +overgrown with shrubs and briers, I in my quaestorship discovered, when +the Syracusans knew nothing of it, and even denied that there was any +such thing remaining; for I remembered some verses, which I had been +informed were engraved on his monument, and these set forth that on the +top of the tomb there was placed a sphere with a cylinder. When I had +carefully examined all the monuments (for there are a great many tombs +at the gate Achradinae), I observed a small column standing out a little +above the briers, with the figure of a sphere and a cylinder upon it; +whereupon I immediately said to the Syracusans--for there were some of +their principal men with me there--that I imagined that was what I was +inquiring for. Several men, being sent in with scythes, cleared the +way, and made an opening for us. When we could get at it, and were come +near to the front of the pedestal, I found the inscription, though the +latter parts of all the verses were effaced almost half away. Thus one +of the noblest cities of Greece, and one which at one time likewise had +been very celebrated for learning, had known nothing of the monument of +its greatest genius, if it had not been discovered to them by a native +of Arpinum. But to return to the subject from which I have been +digressing. Who is there in the least degree acquainted with the Muses, +that is, with liberal knowledge, or that deals at all in learning, who +would not choose to be this mathematician rather than that tyrant? If +we look into their methods of living and their employments, we shall +find the mind of the one strengthened and improved with tracing the +deductions of reason, amused with his own ingenuity, which is the one +most delicious food of the mind; the thoughts of the other engaged in +continual murders and injuries, in constant fears by night and by day. +Now imagine a Democritus, a Pythagoras, and an Anaxagoras; what +kingdom, what riches, would you prefer to their studies and amusements? +For you must necessarily look for that excellence which we are seeking +for in that which is the most perfect part of man; but what is there +better in man than a sagacious and good mind? The enjoyment, therefore, +of that good which proceeds from that sagacious mind can alone make us +happy; but virtue is the good of the mind: it follows, therefore, that +a happy life depends on virtue. Hence proceed all things that are +beautiful, honorable, and excellent, as I said above (but this point +must, I think, be treated of more at large), and they are well stored +with joys. For, as it is clear that a happy life consists in perpetual +and unexhausted pleasures, it follows, too, that a happy life must +arise from honesty. + +XXIV. But that what I propose to demonstrate to you may not rest on +mere words only, I must set before you the picture of something, as it +were, living and moving in the world, that may dispose us more for the +improvement of the understanding and real knowledge. Let us, then, +pitch upon some man perfectly acquainted with the most excellent arts; +let us present him for awhile to our own thoughts, and figure him to +our own imaginations. In the first place, he must necessarily be of an +extraordinary capacity; for virtue is not easily connected with dull +minds. Secondly, he must have a great desire of discovering truth, from +whence will arise that threefold production of the mind; one of which +depends on knowing things, and explaining nature; the other, in +defining what we ought to desire and what to avoid; the third, in +judging of consequences and impossibilities, in which consists both +subtlety in disputing and also clearness of judgment. Now, with what +pleasure must the mind of a wise man be affected which continually +dwells in the midst of such cares and occupations as these, when he +views the revolutions and motions of the whole world, and sees those +innumerable stars in the heavens, which, though fixed in their places, +have yet one motion in common with the whole universe, and observes the +seven other stars, some higher, some lower, each maintaining their own +course, while their motions, though wandering, have certain defined and +appointed spaces to run through! the sight of which doubtless urged and +encouraged those ancient philosophers to exercise their investigating +spirit on many other things. Hence arose an inquiry after the +beginnings, and, as it were, seeds from which all things were produced +and composed; what was the origin of every kind of thing, whether +animate or inanimate, articulately speaking or mute; what occasioned +their beginning and end, and by what alteration and change one thing +was converted into another; whence the earth originated, and by what +weights it was balanced; by what caverns the seas were supplied; by +what gravity all things being carried down tend always to the middle of +the world, which in any round body is the lowest place. + +XXV. A mind employed on such subjects, and which night and day +contemplates them, contains in itself that precept of the Delphic God, +so as to "know itself," and to perceive its connection with the divine +reason, from whence it is filled with an insatiable joy. For +reflections on the power and nature of the Gods raise in us a desire of +imitating their eternity. Nor does the mind, that sees the necessary +dependences and connections that one cause has with another, think it +possible that it should be itself confined to the shortness of this +life. Those causes, though they proceed from eternity to eternity, are +governed by reason and understanding. And he who beholds them and +examines them, or rather he whose view takes in all the parts and +boundaries of things, with what tranquillity of mind does he look on +all human affairs, and on all that is nearer him! Hence proceeds the +knowledge of virtue; hence arise the kinds and species of virtues; +hence are discovered those things which nature regards as the bounds +and extremities of good and evil; by this it is discovered to what all +duties ought to be referred, and which is the most eligible manner of +life. And when these and similar points have been investigated, the +principal consequence which is deduced from them, and that which is our +main object in this discussion, is the establishment of the point, that +virtue is of itself sufficient to a happy life. + +The third qualification of our wise man is the next to be considered, +which goes through and spreads itself over every part of wisdom; it is +that whereby we define each particular thing, distinguish the genus +from its species, connect consequences, draw just conclusions, and +distinguish truth from falsehood, which is the very art and science of +disputing; which is not only of the greatest use in the examination of +what passes in the world, but is likewise the most rational +entertainment, and that which is most becoming to true wisdom. Such are +its effects in retirement. Now, let our wise man be considered as +protecting the republic; what can be more excellent than such a +character? By his prudence he will discover the true interests of his +fellow-citizens; by his justice he will be prevented from applying what +belongs to the public to his own use; and, in short, he will be ever +governed by all the virtues, which are many and various. To these let +us add the advantage of his friendships; in which the learned reckon +not only a natural harmony and agreement of sentiments throughout the +conduct of life, but the utmost pleasure and satisfaction in conversing +and passing our time constantly with one another. What can be wanting +to such a life as this to make it more happy than it is? Fortune +herself must yield to a life stored with such joys. Now, if it be a +happiness to rejoice in such goods of the mind, that is to say, in such +virtues, and if all wise men enjoy thoroughly these pleasures, it must +necessarily be granted that all such are happy. + +XXVI. _A._ What, when in torments and on the rack? + +_M._ Do you imagine I am speaking of him as laid on roses and violets? +Is it allowable even for Epicurus (who only puts on the appearance of +being a philosopher, and who himself assumed that name for himself) to +say (though, as matters stand, I commend him for his saying) that a +wise man might at all times cry out, though he be burned, tortured, cut +to pieces, "How little I regard it!" Shall this be said by one who +defines all evil as pain, and measures every good by pleasure; who +could ridicule whatever we call either honorable or base, and could +declare of us that we were employed about words, and uttering mere +empty sounds; and that nothing is to be regarded by us but as it is +perceived to be smooth or rough by the body? What! shall such a man as +this, as I said, whose understanding is little superior to the beasts', +be at liberty to forget himself; and not only to despise fortune, when +the whole of his good and evil is in the power of fortune, but to say +that he is happy in the most racking torture, when he had actually +declared pain to be not only the greatest evil, but the only one? Nor +did he take any trouble to provide himself with those remedies which +might have enabled him to bear pain, such as firmness of mind, a shame +of doing anything base, exercise, and the habit of patience, precepts +of courage, and a manly hardiness; but he says that he supports himself +on the single recollection of past pleasures, as if any one, when the +weather was so hot as that he was scarcely able to bear it, should +comfort himself by recollecting that he was once in my country, +Arpinum, where he was surrounded on every side by cooling streams. For +I do not apprehend how past pleasures can allay present evils. But when +he says that a wise man is always happy who would have no right to say +so if he were consistent with himself, what may they not do who allow +nothing to be desirable, nothing to be looked on as good but what is +honorable? Let, then, the Peripatetics and Old Academics follow my +example, and at length leave off muttering to themselves; and openly +and with a clear voice let them be bold to say that a happy life may +not be inconsistent with the agonies of Phalaris's bull. + +XXVII. But to dismiss the subtleties of the Stoics, which I am sensible +I have employed more than was necessary, let us admit of three kinds of +goods; and let them really be kinds of goods, provided no regard is had +to the body and to external circumstances, as entitled to the +appellation of good in any other sense than because we are obliged to +use them: but let those other divine goods spread themselves far in +every direction, and reach the very heavens. Why, then, may I not call +him happy, nay, the happiest of men, who has attained them? Shall a +wise man be afraid of pain? which is, indeed, the greatest enemy to our +opinion. For I am persuaded that we are prepared and fortified +sufficiently, by the disputations of the foregoing days, against our +own death or that of our friends, against grief, and the other +perturbations of the mind. But pain seems to be the sharpest adversary +of virtue; that it is which menaces us with burning torches; that it is +which threatens to crush our fortitude, and greatness of mind, and +patience. Shall virtue, then, yield to this? Shall the happy life of a +wise and consistent man succumb to this? Good. Gods! how base would +this be! Spartan boys will bear to have their bodies torn by rods +without uttering a groan. I myself have seen at Lacedaemon troops of +young men, with incredible earnestness contending together with their +hands and feet, with their teeth and nails, nay, even ready to expire, +rather than own themselves conquered. Is any country of barbarians more +uncivilized or desolate than India? Yet they have among them some that +are held for wise men, who never wear any clothes all their life long, +and who bear the snow of Caucasus, and the piercing cold of winter, +without any pain; and who if they come in contact with fire endure +being burned without a groan. The women, too, in India, on the death of +their husbands have a regular contest, and apply to the judge to have +it determined which of them was best beloved by him; for it is +customary there for one man to have many wives. She in whose favor it +is determined exults greatly, and being attended by her relations, is +laid on the funeral pile with her husband; the others, who are +postponed, walk away very much dejected. Custom can never be superior +to nature, for nature is never to be got the better of. But our minds +are infected by sloth and idleness, and luxury, and languor, and +indolence: we have enervated them by opinions and bad customs. Who is +there who is unacquainted with the customs of the Egyptians? Their +minds being tainted by pernicious opinions, they are ready to bear any +torture rather than hurt an ibis, a snake, a cat, a dog, or a +crocodile; and should any one inadvertently have hurt any of these +animals, he will submit to any punishment. I am speaking of men only. +As to the beasts, do they not bear cold and hunger, running about in +woods, and on mountains and deserts? Will they not fight for their +young ones till they are wounded? Are they afraid of any attacks or +blows? I mention not what the ambitious will suffer for honor's sake, +or those who are desirous of praise on account of glory, or lovers to +gratify their lust. Life is full of such instances. + +XXVIII. But let us not dwell too much on these questions, but rather +let us return to our subject. I say, and say again, that happiness will +submit even to be tormented; and that in pursuit of justice, and +temperance, and still more especially and principally fortitude, and +greatness of soul, and patience, it will not stop short at sight of the +executioner; and when all other virtues proceed calmly to the torture, +that one will never halt, as I said, on the outside and threshold of +the prison; for what can be baser, what can carry a worse appearance, +than to be left alone, separated from those beautiful attendants? Not, +however, that this is by any means possible; for neither can the +virtues hold together without happiness, nor happiness without the +virtues; so that they will not suffer her to desert them, but will +carry her along with them, to whatever torments, to whatever pain they +are led. For it is the peculiar quality of a wise man to do nothing +that he may repent of, nothing against his inclination, but always to +act nobly, with constancy, gravity, and honesty; to depend on nothing +as certainty; to wonder at nothing, when it falls out, as if it +appeared strange and unexpected to him; to be independent of every one, +and abide by his own opinion. For my part, I cannot form an idea of +anything happier than this. The conclusion of the Stoics is indeed +easy; for since they are persuaded that the end of good is to live +agreeably to nature, and to be consistent with that--as a wise man +should do so, not only because it is his duty, but because it is in his +power--it must, of course, follow that whoever has the chief good in +his power has his happiness so too. And thus the life of a wise man is +always happy. You have here what I think may be confidently said of a +happy life; and as things now stand, very truly also, unless you can +advance something better. + +XXIX. _A._ Indeed I cannot; but I should be glad to prevail on you, +unless it is troublesome (as you are under no confinement from +obligations to any particular sect, but gather from all of them +whatever strikes you most as having the appearance of probability), as +you just now seemed to advise the Peripatetics and the Old Academy +boldly to speak out without reserve, "that wise men are always the +happiest"--I should be glad to hear how you think it consistent for +them to say so, when you have said so much against that opinion, and +the conclusions of the Stoics. + +_M._ I will make use, then, of that liberty which no one has the +privilege of using in philosophy but those of our school, whose +discourses determine nothing, but take in everything, leaving them +unsupported by the authority of any particular person, to be judged of +by others, according to their weight. And as you seem desirous of +knowing how it is that, notwithstanding the different opinions of +philosophers with regard to the ends of goods, virtue has still +sufficient security for the effecting of a happy life--which security, +as we are informed, Carneades used indeed to dispute against; but he +disputed as against the Stoics, whose opinions he combated with great +zeal and vehemence. I, however, shall handle the question with more +temper; for if the Stoics have rightly settled the _ends_ of goods, the +affair is at an end; for a wise man must necessarily be always happy. +But let us examine, if we can, the particular opinions of the others, +that so this excellent decision, if I may so call it, in favor of a +happy life, may be agreeable to the opinions and discipline of all. + +XXX. These, then, are the opinions, as I think, that are held and +defended--the first four are simple ones: "that nothing is good but +what is honest," according to the Stoics; "nothing good but pleasure," +as Epicurus maintains; "nothing good but a freedom from pain," as +Hieronymus[62] asserts; "nothing good but an enjoyment of the +principal, or all, or the greatest goods of nature," as Carneades +maintained against the Stoics--these are simple, the others are mixed +propositions. Then there are three kinds of goods: the greatest being +those of the mind; the next best those of the body; the third are +external goods, as the Peripatetics call them, and the Old Academics +differ very little from them. Dinomachus[63] and Callipho[64] have +coupled pleasure with honesty; but Diodorus[65] the Peripatetic has +joined indolence to honesty. These are the opinions that have some +footing; for those of Aristo,[66] Pyrrho,[67] Herillus,[68] and of some +others, are quite out of date. Now let us see what weight these men +have in them, excepting the Stoics, whose opinion I think I have +sufficiently defended; and indeed I have explained what the +Peripatetics have to say; excepting that Theophrastus, and those who +followed him, dread and abhor pain in too weak a manner. The others may +go on to exaggerate the gravity and dignity of virtue, as usual; and +then, after they have extolled it to the skies, with the usual +extravagance of good orators, it is easy to reduce the other topics to +nothing by comparison, and to hold them up to contempt. They who think +that praise deserves to be sought after, even at the expense of pain, +are not at liberty to deny those men to be happy who have obtained it. +Though they may be under some evils, yet this name of happy has a very +wide application. + +XXXI. For even as trading is said to be lucrative, and farming +advantageous, not because the one never meets with any loss, nor the +other with any damage from the inclemency of the weather, but because +they succeed in general; so life may be properly called happy, not from +its being entirely made up of good things, but because it abounds with +these to a great and considerable degree. By this way of reasoning, +then, a happy life may attend virtue even to the moment of execution; +nay, may descend with her into Phalaris's bull, according to Aristotle, +Xenocrates, Speusippus, Polemon; and will not be gained over by any +allurements to forsake her. Of the same opinion will Calliphon and +Diodorus be; for they are both of them such friends to virtue as to +think that all things should be discarded and far removed that are +incompatible with it. The rest seem to be more hampered with these +doctrines, but yet they get clear of them; such as Epicurus, +Hieronymus, and whoever else thinks it worth while to defend the +deserted Carneades: for there is not one of them who does not think the +mind to be judge of those goods, and able sufficiently to instruct him +how to despise what has the appearance only of good or evil. For what +seems to you to be the case with Epicurus is the case also with +Hieronymus and Carneades, and, indeed, with all the rest of them; for +who is there who is not sufficiently prepared against death and pain? I +will begin, with your leave, with him whom we call soft and voluptuous. +What! does he seem, to you to be afraid of death or pain when he calls +the day of his death happy; and who, when he is afflicted by the +greatest pains, silences them all by recollecting arguments of his own +discovering? And this is not done in such a manner as to give room for +imagining that he talks thus wildly from some sudden impulse; but his +opinion of death is, that on the dissolution of the animal all sense is +lost; and what is deprived of sense is, as he thinks, what we have no +concern at all with. And as to pain, too, he has certain rules to +follow then: if it be great, the comfort is that it must be short; if +it be of long continuance, then it must be supportable. What, then? Do +those grandiloquent gentlemen state anything better than Epicurus in +opposition to these two things which distress us the most? And as to +other things, do not Epicurus and the rest of the philosophers seem +sufficiently prepared? Who is there who does not dread poverty? And yet +no true philosopher ever can dread it. + +XXXII. But with how little is this man himself satisfied! No one has +said more on frugality. For when a man is far removed from those things +which occasion a desire of money, from love, ambition, or other daily +extravagance, why should he be fond of money, or concern himself at all +about it? Could the Scythian Anacharsis[69] disregard money, and shall +not our philosophers be able to do so? We are informed of an epistle of +his in these words: "Anacharsis to Hanno, greeting. My clothing is the +same as that with which the Scythians cover themselves; the hardness of +my feet supplies the want of shoes; the ground is my bed, hunger my +sauce, my food milk, cheese, and flesh. So you may come to me as to a +man in want of nothing. But as to those presents you take so much +pleasure in, you may dispose of them to your own citizens, or to the +immortal Gods." And almost all philosophers, of all schools, excepting +those who are warped from right reason by a vicious disposition, might +have been of this same opinion. Socrates, when on one occasion he saw a +great quantity of gold and silver carried in a procession, cried out, +"How many things are there which I do not want!" Xenocrates, when some +ambassadors from Alexander had brought him fifty talents, which was a +very large sum of money in those times, especially at Athens, carried +the ambassadors to sup in the Academy, and placed just a sufficiency +before them, without any apparatus. When they asked him, the next day, +to whom he wished the money which they had for him to be paid: "What!" +said he, "did you not perceive by our slight repast of yesterday that I +had no occasion for money?" But when he perceived that they were +somewhat dejected, he accepted of thirty minas, that he might not seem +to treat with disrespect the king's generosity. But Diogenes took a +greater liberty, like a Cynic, when Alexander asked him if he wanted +anything: "Just at present," said he, "I wish that you would stand a +little out of the line between me and the sun," for Alexander was +hindering him from sunning himself. And, indeed, this very man used to +maintain how much he surpassed the Persian king in his manner of life +and fortune; for that he himself was in want of nothing, while the +other never had enough; and that he had no inclination for those +pleasures of which the other could never get enough to satisfy himself; +and that the other could never obtain his. + +XXXIII. You see, I imagine, how Epicurus has divided his kinds of +desires, not very acutely perhaps, but yet usefully: saying that they +are "partly natural and necessary; partly natural, but not necessary; +partly neither. That those which are necessary may be supplied almost +for nothing; for that the things which nature requires are easily +obtained." As to the second kind of desires, his opinion is that any +one may easily either enjoy or go without them. And with regard to the +third, since they are utterly frivolous, being neither allied to +necessity nor nature, he thinks that they should be entirely rooted +out. On this topic a great many arguments are adduced by the +Epicureans; and those pleasures which they do not despise in a body, +they disparage one by one, and seem rather for lessening the number of +them; for as to wanton pleasures, on which subject they say a great +deal, these, say they, are easy, common, and within any one's reach; +and they think that if nature requires them, they are not to be +estimated by birth, condition, or rank, but by shape, age, and person: +and that it is by no means difficult to refrain from them, should +health, duty, or reputation require it; but that pleasures of this kind +may be desirable, where they are attended with no inconvenience, but +can never be of any use. And the assertions which Epicurus makes with +respect to the whole of pleasure are such as show his opinion to be +that pleasure is always desirable, and to be pursued merely because it +is pleasure; and for the same reason pain is to be avoided, because it +is pain. So that a wise man will always adopt such a system of +counterbalancing as to do himself the justice to avoid pleasure, should +pain ensue from it in too great a proportion; and will submit to pain, +provided the effects of it are to produce a greater pleasure: so that +all pleasurable things, though the corporeal senses are the judges of +them, are still to be referred to the mind, on which account the body +rejoices while it perceives a present pleasure; but that the mind not +only perceives the present as well as the body, but foresees it while +it is coming, and even when it is past will not let it quite slip away. +So that a wise man enjoys a continual series of pleasures, uniting the +expectation of future pleasure to the recollection of what he has +already tasted. The like notions are applied by them to high living; +and the magnificence and expensiveness of entertainments are +deprecated, because nature is satisfied at a small expense. + +XXXIV. For who does not see this, that an appetite is the best sauce? +When Darius, in his flight from the enemy, had drunk some water which +was muddy and tainted with dead bodies, he declared that he had never +drunk anything more pleasant; the fact was, that he had never drunk +before when he was thirsty. Nor had Ptolemy ever eaten when he was +hungry; for as he was travelling over Egypt, his company not keeping up +with him, he had some coarse bread presented him in a cottage, upon +which he said, "Nothing ever seemed to him pleasanter than that bread." +They relate, too, of Socrates, that, once when he was walking very fast +till the evening, on his being asked why he did so, his reply was that +he was purchasing an appetite by walking, that he might sup the better. +And do we not see what the Lacedaemonians provide in their Phiditia? +where the tyrant Dionysius supped, but told them he did not at all like +that black broth, which was their principal dish; on which he who +dressed it said, "It was no wonder, for it wanted seasoning." Dionysius +asked what that seasoning was; to which it was replied, "Fatigue in +hunting, sweating, a race on the banks of Eurotas, hunger and thirst," +for these are the seasonings to the Lacedaemonian banquets. And this may +not only be conceived from the custom of men, but from the beasts, who +are satisfied with anything that is thrown before them, provided it is +not unnatural, and they seek no farther. Some entire cities, taught by +custom, delight in parsimony, as I said but just now of the +Lacedaemonians. Xenophon has given an account of the Persian diet, who +never, as he saith, use anything but cresses with their bread; not but +that, should nature require anything more agreeable, many things might +be easily supplied by the ground, and plants in great abundance, and of +incomparable sweetness. Add to this strength and health, as the +consequence of this abstemious way of living. Now, compare with this +those who sweat and belch, being crammed with eating, like fatted oxen; +then will you perceive that they who pursue pleasure most attain it +least; and that the pleasure of eating lies not in satiety, but +appetite. + +XXXV. They report of Timotheus, a famous man at Athens, and the head of +the city, that having supped with Plato, and being extremely delighted +with his entertainment, on seeing him the next day, he said, "Your +suppers are not only agreeable while I partake of them, but the next +day also." Besides, the understanding is impaired when we are full with +overeating and drinking. There is an excellent epistle of Plato to +Dion's relations, in which there occurs as nearly as possible these +words: "When I came there, that happy life so much talked of, devoted +to Italian and Syracusan entertainments, was noways agreeable to me; to +be crammed twice a day, and never to have the night to yourself, and +the other things which are the accompaniments of this kind of life, by +which a man will never be made the wiser, but will be rendered much +less temperate; for it must be an extraordinary disposition that can be +temperate in such circumstances." How, then, can a life be pleasant +without prudence and temperance? Hence you discover the mistake of +Sardanapalus, the wealthiest king of the Assyrians, who ordered it to +be engraved on his tomb, + + I still have what in food I did exhaust; + But what I left, though excellent, is lost. + +"What less than this," says Aristotle, "could be inscribed on the tomb, +not of a king, but an ox?" He said that he possessed those things when +dead, which, in his lifetime, he could have no longer than while he was +enjoying them. Why, then, are riches desired? And wherein doth poverty +prevent us from being happy? In the want, I imagine, of statues, +pictures, and diversions. But if any one is delighted with these +things, have not the poor people the enjoyment of them more than they +who are the owners of them in the greatest abundance? For we have great +numbers of them displayed publicly in our city. And whatever store of +them private people have, they cannot have a great number, and they but +seldom see them, only when they go to their country seats; and some of +them must be stung to the heart when they consider how they came by +them. The day would fail me, should I be inclined to defend the cause +of poverty. The thing is manifest; and nature daily informs us how few +things there are, and how trifling they are, of which she really stands +in need. + +XXXVI. Let us inquire, then, if obscurity, the want of power, or even +the being unpopular, can prevent a wise man from being happy. Observe +if popular favor, and this glory which they are so fond of, be not +attended with more uneasiness than pleasure. Our friend Demosthenes was +certainly very weak in declaring himself pleased with the whisper of a +woman who was carrying water, as is the custom in Greece, and who +whispered to another, "That is he--that is Demosthenes." What could be +weaker than this? and yet what an orator he was! But although he had +learned to speak to others, he had conversed but little with himself. +We may perceive, therefore, that popular glory is not desirable of +itself; nor is obscurity to be dreaded. "I came to Athens," saith +Democritus, "and there was no one there that knew me:" this was a +moderate and grave man who could glory in his obscurity. Shall +musicians compose their tunes to their own tastes? and shall a +philosopher, master of a much better art, seek to ascertain, not what +is most true, but what will please the people? Can anything be more +absurd than to despise the vulgar as mere unpolished mechanics, taken +singly, and to think them of consequence when collected into a body? +These wise men would contemn our ambitious pursuits and our vanities, +and would reject all the honors which the people could voluntarily +offer to them; but we know not how to despise them till we begin to +repent of having accepted them. There is an anecdote related by +Heraclitus, the natural philosopher, of Hermodorus, the chief of the +Ephesians, that he said "that all the Ephesians ought to be punished +with death for saying, when they had expelled Hermodorus out of their +city, that they would have no one among them better than another; but +that if there were any such, he might go elsewhere to some other +people." Is not this the case with the people everywhere? Do they not +hate every virtue that distinguishes itself? What! was not Aristides (I +had rather instance in the Greeks than ourselves) banished his country +for being eminently just? What troubles, then, are they free from who +have no connection whatever with the people? What is more agreeable +than a learned retirement? I speak of that learning which makes us +acquainted with the boundless extent of nature and the universe, and +which even while we remain in this world discovers to us both heaven, +earth, and sea. + +XXXVII. If, then, honor and riches have no value, what is there else to +be afraid of? Banishment, I suppose; which is looked on as the greatest +evil. Now, if the evil of banishment proceeds not from ourselves, but +from the froward disposition of the people, I have just now declared +how contemptible it is. But if to leave one's country be miserable, the +provinces are full of miserable men, very few of the settlers in which +ever return to their country again. But exiles are deprived of their +property! What, then! has there not been enough said on bearing +poverty? But with regard to banishment, if we examine the nature of +things, not the ignominy of the name, how little does it differ from +constant travelling! in which some of the most famous philosophers have +spent their whole life, as Xenocrates, Crantor, Arcesilas, Lacydes, +Aristotle, Theophrastus, Zeno, Cleanthes, Chrysippus, Antipater, +Carneades, Panaetius, Clitomachus, Philo, Antiochus, Posidonius, and +innumerable others, who from their first setting-out never returned +home again. Now, what ignominy can a wise man be affected with (for it +is of such a one that I am speaking) who can be guilty of nothing which +deserves it? for there is no occasion to comfort one who is banished +for his deserts. Lastly, they can easily reconcile themselves to every +accident who measure all their objects and pursuits in life by the +standard of pleasure; so that in whatever place that is supplied, there +they may live happily. Thus what Teucer said may be applied to every +case: + + "Wherever I am happy is my country." + +Socrates, indeed, when he was asked where he belonged to, replied, "The +world;" for he looked upon himself as a citizen and inhabitant of the +whole world. How was it with T. Altibutius? Did he not follow his +philosophical studies with the greatest satisfaction at Athens, +although he was banished? which, however, would not have happened to +him if he had obeyed the laws of Epicurus and lived peaceably in the +republic. In what was Epicurus happier, living in his own country, than +Metrodorus, who lived at Athens? Or did Plato's happiness exceed that +of Xenocrates, or Polemo, or Arcesilas? Or is that city to be valued +much that banishes all her good and wise men? Demaratus, the father of +our King Tarquin, not being able to bear the tyrant Cypselus, fled from +Corinth to Tarquinii, settled there, and had children. Was it, then, an +unwise act in him to prefer the liberty of banishment to slavery at +home? + +XXXVIII. Besides the emotions of the mind, all griefs and anxieties are +assuaged by forgetting them, and turning our thoughts to pleasure. +Therefore, it was not without reason that Epicurus presumed to say that +a wise man abounds with good things, because he may always have his +pleasures; from whence it follows, as he thinks, that that point is +gained which is the subject of our present inquiry, that a wise man is +always happy. What! though he should be deprived of the senses of +seeing and hearing? Yes; for he holds those things very cheap. For, in +the first place, what are the pleasures of which we are deprived by +that dreadful thing, blindness? For though they allow other pleasures +to be confined to the senses, yet the things which are perceived by the +sight do not depend wholly on the pleasure the eyes receive; as is the +case when we taste, smell, touch, or hear; for, in respect of all these +senses, the organs themselves are the seat of pleasure; but it is not +so with the eyes. For it is the mind which is entertained by what we +see; but the mind may be entertained in many ways, even though we could +not see at all. I am speaking of a learned and a wise man, with whom to +think is to live. But thinking in the case of a wise man does not +altogether require the use of his eyes in his investigations; for if +night does not strip him of his happiness, why should blindness, which +resembles night, have that effect? For the reply of Antipater the +Cyrenaic to some women who bewailed his being blind, though it is a +little too obscene, is not without its significance. "What do you +mean?" saith he; "do you think the night can furnish no pleasure?" And +we find by his magistracies and his actions that old Appius,[70] too, +who was blind for many years, was not prevented from doing whatever was +required of him with respect either to the republic or his own affairs. +It is said that C. Drusus's house was crowded with clients. When they +whose business it was could not see how to conduct themselves, they +applied to a blind guide. + +XXXIX. When I was a boy, Cn. Aufidius, a blind man, who had served the +office of praetor, not only gave his opinion in the Senate, and was +ready to assist his friends, but wrote a Greek history, and had a +considerable acquaintance with literature. Diodorus the Stoic was +blind, and lived many years at my house. He, indeed, which is scarcely +credible, besides applying himself more than usual to philosophy, and +playing on the flute, agreeably to the custom of the Pythagoreans, and +having books read to him night and day, in all which he did not want +eyes, contrived to teach geometry, which, one would think, could hardly +be done without the assistance of eyes, telling his scholars how and +where to draw every line. They relate of Asclepiades, a native of +Eretria, and no obscure philosopher, when some one asked him what +inconvenience he suffered from his blindness, that his reply was, "He +was at the expense of another servant." So that, as the most extreme +poverty may be borne if you please, as is daily the case with some in +Greece, so blindness may easily be borne, provided you have the support +of good health in other respects. Democritus was so blind he could not +distinguish white from black; but he knew the difference between good +and evil, just and unjust, honorable and base, the useful and useless, +great and small. Thus one may live happily without distinguishing +colors; but without acquainting yourself with things, you cannot; and +this man was of opinion that the intense application of the mind was +taken off by the objects that presented themselves to the eye; and +while others often could not see what was before their feet, he +travelled through all infinity. It is reported also that Homer[71] was +blind, but we observe his painting as well as his poetry. What country, +what coast, what part of Greece, what military attacks, what +dispositions of battle, what array, what ship, what motions of men and +animals, can be mentioned which he has not described in such a manner +as to enable us to see what he could not see himself? What, then! can +we imagine that Homer, or any other learned man, has ever been in want +of pleasure and entertainment for his mind? Were it not so, would +Anaxagoras, or this very Democritus, have left their estates and +patrimonies, and given themselves up to the pursuit of acquiring this +divine pleasure? It is thus that the poets who have represented +Tiresias the Augur as a wise man and blind never exhibit him as +bewailing his blindness. And Homer, too, after he had described +Polyphemus as a monster and a wild man, represents him talking with his +ram, and speaking of his good fortune, inasmuch as he could go wherever +he pleased and touch what he would. And so far he was right, for that +Cyclops was a being of not much more understanding than his ram. + +XL. Now, as to the evil of being deaf. M. Crassus was a little thick of +hearing; but it was more uneasiness to him that he heard himself ill +spoken of, though, in my opinion, he did not deserve it. Our Epicureans +cannot understand Greek, nor the Greeks Latin: now, they are deaf +reciprocally as to each other's language, and we are all truly deaf +with regard to those innumerable languages which we do not understand. +They do not hear the voice of the harper; but, then, they do not hear +the grating of a saw when it is setting, or the grunting of a hog when +his throat is being cut, nor the roaring of the sea when they are +desirous of rest. And if they should chance to be fond of singing, they +ought, in the first place, to consider that many wise men lived happily +before music was discovered; besides, they may have more pleasure in +reading verses than in hearing them sung. Then, as I before referred +the blind to the pleasures of hearing, so I may the deaf to the +pleasures of sight: moreover, whoever can converse with himself doth +not need the conversation of another. But suppose all these misfortunes +to meet in one person: suppose him blind and deaf--let him be afflicted +with the sharpest pains of body, which, in the first place, generally +of themselves make an end of him; still, should they continue so long, +and the pain be so exquisite, that we should be unable to assign any +reason for our being so afflicted--still, why, good Gods! should we be +under any difficulty? For there is a retreat at hand: death is that +retreat--a shelter where we shall forever be insensible. Theodorus said +to Lysimachus, who threatened him with death, "It is a great matter, +indeed, for you to have acquired the power of a Spanish fly!" When +Perses entreated Paulus not to lead him in triumph, "That is a matter +which you have in your own power," said Paulus. I said many things +about death in our first day's disputation, when death was the subject; +and not a little the next day, when I treated of pain; which things if +you recollect, there can be no danger of your looking upon death as +undesirable, or, at least, it will not be dreadful. + +That custom which is common among the Grecians at their banquets +should, in my opinion, be observed in life: Drink, say they, or leave +the company; and rightly enough; for a guest should either enjoy the +pleasure of drinking with others, or else not stay till he meets with +affronts from those that are in liquor. Thus, those injuries of fortune +which you cannot bear you should flee from. + +XLI. This is the very same which is said by Epicurus and Hieronymus. +Now, if those philosophers, whose opinion it is that virtue has no +power of itself, and who say that the conduct which we denominate +honorable and laudable is really nothing, and is only an empty +circumstance set off with an unmeaning sound, can nevertheless maintain +that a wise man is always happy, what, think you, may be done by the +Socratic and Platonic philosophers? Some of these allow such +superiority to the goods of the mind as quite to eclipse what concerns +the body and all external circumstances. But others do not admit these +to be goods; they make everything depend on the mind: whose disputes +Carneades used, as a sort of honorary arbitrator, to determine. For, as +what seemed goods to the Peripatetics were allowed to be advantages by +the Stoics, and as the Peripatetics allowed no more to riches, good +health; and other things of that sort than the Stoics, when these +things were considered according to their reality, and not by mere +names, his opinion was that there was no ground for disagreeing. +Therefore, let the philosophers of other schools see how they can +establish this point also. It is very agreeable to me that they make +some professions worthy of being uttered by the mouth of a philosopher +with regard to a wise man's having always the means of living happily. + +XLII. But as we are to depart in the morning, let us remember these +five days' discussions; though, indeed, I think I shall commit them to +writing: for how can I better employ the leisure which I have, of +whatever kind it is, and whatever it be owing to? And I will send these +five books also to my friend Brutus, by whom I was not only incited to +write on philosophy, but, I may say, provoked. And by so doing it is +not easy to say what service I may be of to others. At all events, in +my own various and acute afflictions, which surround me on all sides, I +cannot find any better comfort for myself. + + + + + + +THE NATURE OF THE GODS. + + * * * * * + + + + +BOOK I. + + +I. There are many things in philosophy, my dear Brutus, which are not +as yet fully explained to us, and particularly (as you very well know) +that most obscure and difficult question concerning the Nature of the +Gods, so extremely necessary both towards a knowledge of the human mind +and the practice of true religion: concerning which the opinions of men +are so various, and so different from each other, as to lead strongly +to the inference that ignorance[72] is the cause, or origin, of +philosophy, and that the Academic philosophers have been prudent in +refusing their assent to things uncertain: for what is more unbecoming +to a wise man than to judge rashly? or what rashness is so unworthy of +the gravity and stability of a philosopher as either to maintain false +opinions, or, without the least hesitation, to support and defend what +he has not thoroughly examined and does not clearly comprehend? + +In the question now before us, the greater part of mankind have united +to acknowledge that which is most probable, and which we are all by +nature led to suppose, namely, that there are Gods. Protagoras[73] +doubted whether there were any. Diagoras the Melian and Theodorus of +Cyrene entirely believed there were no such beings. But they who have +affirmed that there are Gods, have expressed such a variety of +sentiments on the subject, and the disagreement between them is so +great, that it would be tiresome to enumerate their opinions; for they +give us many statements respecting the forms of the Gods, and their +places of abode, and the employment of their lives. And these are +matters on which the philosophers differ with the most exceeding +earnestness. But the most considerable part of the dispute is, whether +they are wholly inactive, totally unemployed, and free from all care +and administration of affairs; or, on the contrary, whether all things +were made and constituted by them from the beginning; and whether they +will continue to be actuated and governed by them to eternity. This is +one of the greatest points in debate; and unless this is decided, +mankind must necessarily remain in the greatest of errors, and ignorant +of what is most important to be known. + +II. For there are some philosophers, both ancient and modern, who have +conceived that the Gods take not the least cognizance of human affairs. +But if their doctrine be true, of what avail is piety, sanctity, or +religion? for these are feelings and marks of devotion which are +offered to the Gods by men with uprightness and holiness, on the ground +that men are the objects of the attention of the Gods, and that many +benefits are conferred by the immortal Gods on the human race. But if +the Gods have neither the power nor the inclination to help us; if they +take no care of us, and pay no regard to our actions; and if there is +no single advantage which can possibly accrue to the life of man; then +what reason can we have to pay any adoration, or any honors, or to +prefer any prayers to them? Piety, like the other virtues, cannot have +any connection with vain show or dissimulation; and without piety, +neither sanctity nor religion can be supported; the total subversion of +which must be attended with great confusion and disturbance in life. + +I do not even know, if we cast off piety towards the Gods, but that +faith, and all the associations of human life, and that most excellent +of all virtues, justice, may perish with it. + +There are other philosophers, and those, too, very great and +illustrious men, who conceive the whole world to be directed and +governed by the will and wisdom of the Gods; nor do they stop here, but +conceive likewise that the Deities consult and provide for the +preservation of mankind. For they think that the fruits, and the +produce of the earth, and the seasons, and the variety of weather, and +the change of climates, by which all the productions of the earth are +brought to maturity, are designed by the immortal Gods for the use of +man. They instance many other things, which shall be related in these +books; and which would almost induce us to believe that the immortal +Gods had made them all expressly and solely for the benefit and +advantage of men. Against these opinions Carneades has advanced so much +that what he has said should excite a desire in men who are not +naturally slothful to search after truth; for there is no subject on +which the learned as well as the unlearned differ so strenuously as in +this; and since their opinions are so various, and so repugnant one to +another, it is possible that none of them may be, and absolutely +impossible that more than one should be, right. + +III. Now, in a cause like this, I may be able to pacify well-meaning +opposers, and to confute invidious censurers, so as to induce the +latter to repent of their unreasonable contradiction, and the former to +be glad to learn; for they who admonish one in a friendly spirit should +be instructed, they who attack one like enemies should be repelled. But +I observe that the several books which I have lately published[74] have +occasioned much noise and various discourse about them; some people +wondering what the reason has been why I have applied myself so +suddenly to the study of philosophy, and others desirous of knowing +what my opinion is on such subjects. I likewise perceive that many +people wonder at my following that philosophy[75] chiefly which seems +to take away the light, and to bury and envelop things in a kind of +artificial night, and that I should so unexpectedly have taken up the +defence of a school that has been long neglected and forsaken. But it +is a mistake to suppose that this application to philosophical studies +has been sudden on my part. I have applied myself to them from my +youth, at no small expense of time and trouble; and I have been in the +habit of philosophizing a great deal when I least seemed to think about +it; for the truth of which I appeal to my orations, which are filled +with quotations from philosophers, and to my intimacy with those very +learned men who frequented my house and conversed daily with me, +particularly Diodorus, Philo, Antiochus, and Posidonius,[76] under whom +I was bred; and if all the precepts of philosophy are to have reference +to the conduct of life, I am inclined to think that I have advanced, +both in public and private affairs, only such principles as may be +supported by reason and authority. + +IV. But if any one should ask what has induced me, in the decline of +life, to write on these subjects, nothing is more easily answered; for +when I found myself entirely disengaged from business, and the +commonwealth reduced to the necessity of being governed by the +direction and care of one man,[77] I thought it becoming, for the sake +of the public, to instruct my countrymen in philosophy, and that it +would be of importance, and much to the honor and commendation of our +city, to have such great and excellent subjects introduced in the Latin +tongue. I the less repent of my undertaking, since I plainly see that I +have excited in many a desire, not only of learning, but of writing; +for we have had several Romans well grounded in the learning of the +Greeks who were unable to communicate to their countrymen what they had +learned, because they looked upon it as impossible to express that in +Latin which they had received from the Greeks. In this point I think I +have succeeded so well that what I have done is not, even in +copiousness of expression, inferior to that language. + +Another inducement to it was a melancholy disposition of mind, and the +great and heavy oppression of fortune that was upon me; from which, if +I could have found any surer remedy, I would not have sought relief in +this pursuit. But I could procure ease by no means better than by not +only applying myself to books, but by devoting myself to the +examination of the whole body of philosophy. And every part and branch +of this is readily discovered when every question is propounded in +writing; for there is such an admirable continuation and series of +things that each seems connected with the other, and all appear linked +together and united. + +V. Now, those men who desire to know my own private opinion on every +particular subject have more curiosity than is necessary. For the force +of reason in disputation is to be sought after rather than authority, +since the authority of the teacher is often a disadvantage to those who +are willing to learn; as they refuse to use their own judgment, and +rely implicitly on him whom they make choice of for a preceptor. Nor +could I ever approve this custom of the Pythagoreans, who, when they +affirmed anything in disputation, and were asked why it was so, used to +give this answer: "He himself has said it;" and this "he himself," it +seems, was Pythagoras. Such was the force of prejudice and opinion that +his authority was to prevail even without argument or reason. + +They who wonder at my being a follower of this sect in particular may +find a satisfactory answer in my four books of Academical Questions. +But I deny that I have undertaken the protection of what is neglected +and forsaken; for the opinions of men do not die with them, though they +may perhaps want the author's explanation. This manner of +philosophizing, of disputing all things and assuming nothing certainly, +was begun by Socrates, revived by Arcesilaus, confirmed by Carneades, +and has descended, with all its power, even to the present age; but I +am informed that it is now almost exploded even in Greece. However, I +do not impute that to any fault in the institution of the Academy, but +to the negligence of mankind. If it is difficult to know all the +doctrines of any one sect, how much more is it to know those of every +sect! which, however, must necessarily be known to those who resolve, +for the sake of discovering truth, to dispute for or against all +philosophers without partiality. + +I do not profess myself to be master of this difficult and noble +faculty; but I do assert that I have endeavored to make myself so; and +it is impossible that they who choose this manner of philosophizing +should not meet at least with something worthy their pursuit. I have +spoken more fully on this head in another place. But as some are too +slow of apprehension, and some too careless, men stand in perpetual +need of caution. For we are not people who believe that there is +nothing whatever which is true; but we say that some falsehoods are so +blended with all truths, and have so great a resemblance to them, that +there is no certain rule for judging of or assenting to propositions; +from which this maxim also follows, that many things are probable, +which, though they are not evident to the senses, have still so +persuasive and beautiful an aspect that a wise man chooses to direct +his conduct by them. + +VI. Now, to free myself from the reproach of partiality, I propose to +lay before you the opinions of various philosophers concerning the +nature of the Gods, by which means all men may judge which of them are +consistent with truth; and if all agree together, or if any one shall +be found to have discovered what may be absolutely called truth, I will +then give up the Academy as vain and arrogant. So I may cry out, in the +words of Statius, in the Synephebi, + + Ye Gods, I call upon, require, pray, beseech, entreat, and + implore the attention of my countrymen all, both young and + old; + +yet not on so trifling an occasion as when the person in the play +complains that, + + In this city we have discovered a most flagrant iniquity: + here is a professed courtesan, who refuses money from her + lover; + +but that they may attend, know, and consider what sentiments they ought +to preserve concerning religion, piety, sanctity, ceremonies, faith, +oaths, temples, shrines, and solemn sacrifices; what they ought to +think of the auspices over which I preside;[78] for all these have +relation to the present question. The manifest disagreement among the +most learned on this subject creates doubts in those who imagine they +have some certain knowledge of the subject. + +Which fact I have often taken notice of elsewhere, and I did so more +especially at the discussion that was held at my friend C. Cotta's +concerning the immortal Gods, and which was carried on with the +greatest care, accuracy, and precision; for coming to him at the time +of the Latin holidays,[79] according to his own invitation and message +from him, I found him sitting in his study,[80] and in a discourse with +C. Velleius, the senator, who was then reputed by the Epicureans the +ablest of our countrymen. Q. Lucilius Balbus was likewise there, a +great proficient in the doctrine of the Stoics, and esteemed equal to +the most eminent of the Greeks in that part of knowledge. As soon as +Cotta saw me, You are come, says he, very seasonably; for I am having a +dispute with Velleius on an important subject, which, considering the +nature of your studies, is not improper for you to join in. + +VII. Indeed, says I, I think I am come very seasonably, as you say; for +here are three chiefs of three principal sects met together. If M. +Piso[81] was present, no sect of philosophy that is in any esteem would +want an advocate. If Antiochus's book, replies Cotta, which he lately +sent to Balbus, says true, you have no occasion to wish for your friend +Piso; for Antiochus is of the opinion that the Stoics do not differ +from the Peripatetics in fact, though they do in words; and I should be +glad to know what you think of that book, Balbus. I? says he. I wonder +that Antiochus, a man of the clearest apprehension, should not see what +a vast difference there is between the Stoics, who distinguish the +honest and the profitable, not only in name, but absolutely in kind, +and the Peripatetics, who blend the honest with the profitable in such +a manner that they differ only in degrees and proportion, and not in +kind. This is not a little difference in words, but a great one in +things; but of this hereafter. Now, if you think fit, let us return to +what we began with. + +With all my heart, says Cotta. But that this visitor (looking at me), +who is just come in, may not be ignorant of what we are upon, I will +inform him that we were discoursing on the nature of the Gods; +concerning which, as it is a subject that always appeared very obscure +to me, I prevailed on Velleius to give us the sentiments of Epicurus. +Therefore, continues he, if it is not troublesome, Velleius, repeat +what you have already stated to us. I will, says he, though this +new-comer will be no advocate for me, but for you; for you have both, +adds he, with a smile, learned from the same Philo to be certain of +nothing.[82] What we have learned from him, replied I, Cotta will +discover; but I would not have you think I am come as an assistant to +him, but as an auditor, with an impartial and unbiassed mind, and not +bound by any obligation to defend any particular principle, whether I +like or dislike it. + +VIII. After this, Velleius, with the confidence peculiar to his sect, +dreading nothing so much as to seem to doubt of anything, began as if +he had just then descended from the council of the Gods, and Epicurus's +intervals of worlds. Do not attend, says he, to these idle and +imaginary tales; nor to the operator and builder of the World, the God +of Plato's Timaeus; nor to the old prophetic dame, the [Greek: Pronoia] +of the Stoics, which the Latins call Providence; nor to that round, +that burning, revolving deity, the World, endowed with sense and +understanding; the prodigies and wonders, not of inquisitive +philosophers, but of dreamers! + +For with what eyes of the mind was your Plato able to see that +workhouse of such stupendous toil, in which he makes the world to be +modelled and built by God? What materials, what tools, what bars, what +machines, what servants, were employed in so vast a work? How could the +air, fire, water, and earth pay obedience and submit to the will of the +architect? From whence arose those five forms,[83] of which the rest +were composed, so aptly contributing to frame the mind and produce the +senses? It is tedious to go through all, as they are of such a sort +that they look more like things to be desired than to be discovered. + +But, what is more remarkable, he gives us a world which has been not +only created, but, if I may so say, in a manner formed with hands, and +yet he says it is eternal. Do you conceive him to have the least skill +in natural philosophy who is capable of thinking anything to be +everlasting that had a beginning? For what can possibly ever have been +put together which cannot be dissolved again? Or what is there that had +a beginning which will not have an end? If your Providence, Lucilius, +is the same as Plato's God, I ask you, as before, who were the +assistants, what were the engines, what was the plan and preparation of +the whole work? If it is not the same, then why did she make the world +mortal, and not everlasting, like Plato's God? + +IX. But I would demand of you both, why these world-builders started up +so suddenly, and lay dormant for so many ages? For we are not to +conclude that, if there was no world, there were therefore no ages. I +do not now speak of such ages as are finished by a certain number of +days and nights in annual courses; for I acknowledge that those could +not be without the revolution of the world; but there was a certain +eternity from infinite time, not measured by any circumscription of +seasons; but how that was in space we cannot understand, because we +cannot possibly have even the slightest idea of time before time was. I +desire, therefore, to know, Balbus, why this Providence of yours was +idle for such an immense space of time? Did she avoid labor? But that +could have no effect on the Deity; nor could there be any labor, since +all nature, air, fire, earth, and water would obey the divine essence. +What was it that incited the Deity to act the part of an aedile, to +illuminate and decorate the world? If it was in order that God might be +the better accommodated in his habitation, then he must have been +dwelling an infinite length of time before in darkness as in a dungeon. +But do we imagine that he was afterward delighted with that variety +with which we see the heaven and earth adorned? What entertainment +could that be to the Deity? If it was any, he would not have been +without it so long. + +Or were these things made, as you almost assert, by God for the sake of +men? Was it for the wise? If so, then this great design was adopted for +the sake of a very small number. Or for the sake of fools? First of +all, there was no reason why God should consult the advantage of the +wicked; and, further, what could be his object in doing so, since all +fools are, without doubt, the most miserable of men, chiefly because +they are fools? For what can we pronounce more deplorable than folly? +Besides, there are many inconveniences in life which the wise can learn +to think lightly of by dwelling rather on the advantages which they +receive; but which fools are unable to avoid when they are coming, or +to bear when they are come. + +X. They who affirm the world to be an animated and intelligent being +have by no means discovered the nature of the mind, nor are able to +conceive in what form that essence can exist; but of that I shall speak +more hereafter. At present I must express my surprise at the weakness +of those who endeavor to make it out to be not only animated and +immortal, but likewise happy, and round, because Plato says that is the +most beautiful form; whereas I think a cylinder, a square, a cone, or a +pyramid more beautiful. But what life do they attribute to that round +Deity? Truly it is a being whirled about with a celerity to which +nothing can be even conceived by the imagination as equal; nor can I +imagine how a settled mind and happy life can consist in such motion, +the least degree of which would be troublesome to us. Why, therefore, +should it not be considered troublesome also to the Deity? For the +earth itself, as it is part of the world, is part also of the Deity. We +see vast tracts of land barren and uninhabitable; some, because they +are scorched by the too near approach of the sun; others, because they +are bound up with frost and snow, through the great distance which the +sun is from them. Therefore, if the world is a Deity, as these are +parts of the world, some of the Deity's limbs must be said to be +scorched, and some frozen. + +These are your doctrines, Lucilius; but what those of others are I will +endeavor to ascertain by tracing them back from the earliest of ancient +philosophers. Thales the Milesian, who first inquired after such +subjects, asserted water to be the origin of things, and that God was +that mind which formed all things from water. If the Gods can exist +without corporeal sense, and if there can be a mind without a body, why +did he annex a mind to water? + +It was Anaximander's opinion that the Gods were born; that after a +great length of time they died; and that they are innumerable worlds. +But what conception can we possibly have of a Deity who is not eternal? + +Anaximenes, after him, taught that the air is God, and that he was +generated, and that he is immense, infinite, and always in motion; as +if air, which has no form, could possibly be God; for the Deity must +necessarily be not only of some form or other, but of the most +beautiful form. Besides, is not everything that had a beginning subject +to mortality? + +XI. Anaxagoras, who received his learning from Anaximenes, was the +first who affirmed the system and disposition of all things to be +contrived and perfected by the power and reason of an infinite mind; in +which infinity he did not perceive that there could be no conjunction +of sense and motion, nor any sense in the least degree, where nature +herself could feel no impulse. If he would have this mind to be a sort +of animal, then there must be some more internal principle from whence +that animal should receive its appellation. But what can be more +internal than the mind? Let it, therefore, be clothed with an external +body. But this is not agreeable to his doctrine; but we are utterly +unable to conceive how a pure simple mind can exist without any +substance annexed to it. + +Alcmaeon of Crotona, in attributing a divinity to the sun, the moon, and +the rest of the stars, and also to the mind, did not perceive that he +was ascribing immortality to mortal beings. + +Pythagoras, who supposed the Deity to be one soul, mixing with and +pervading all nature, from which our souls are taken, did not consider +that the Deity himself must, in consequence of this doctrine, be maimed +and torn with the rending every human soul from it; nor that, when the +human mind is afflicted (as is the case in many instances), that part +of the Deity must likewise be afflicted, which cannot be. If the human +mind were a Deity, how could it be ignorant of any thing? Besides, how +could that Deity, if it is nothing but soul, be mixed with, or infused +into, the world? + +Then Xenophanes, who said that everything in the world which had any +existence, with the addition of intellect, was God, is as liable to +exception as the rest, especially in relation to the infinity of it, in +which there can be nothing sentient, nothing composite. + +Parmenides formed a conceit to himself of something circular like a +crown. (He names it Stephane.) It is an orb of constant light and heat +around the heavens; this he calls God; in which there is no room to +imagine any divine form or sense. And he uttered many other absurdities +on the same subject; for he ascribed a divinity to war, to discord, to +lust, and other passions of the same kind, which are destroyed by +disease, or sleep, or oblivion, or age. The same honor he gives to the +stars; but I shall forbear making any objections to his system here, +having already done it in another place. + +XII. Empedocles, who erred in many things, is most grossly mistaken in +his notion of the Gods. He lays down four natures[84] as divine, from +which he thinks that all things were made. Yet it is evident that they +have a beginning, that they decay, and that they are void of all sense. + +Protagoras did not seem to have any idea of the real nature of the +Gods; for he acknowledged that he was altogether ignorant whether there +are or are not any, or what they are. + +What shall I say of Democritus, who classes our images of objects, and +their orbs, in the number of the Gods; as he does that principle +through which those images appear and have their influence? He deifies +likewise our knowledge and understanding. Is he not involved in a very +great error? And because nothing continues always in the same state, he +denies that anything is everlasting, does he not thereby entirely +destroy the Deity, and make it impossible to form any opinion of him? + +Diogenes of Apollonia looks upon the air to be a Deity. But what sense +can the air have? or what divine form can be attributed to it? + +It would be tedious to show the uncertainty of Plato's opinion; for, in +his Timaeus, he denies the propriety of asserting that there is one +great father or creator of the world; and, in his book of Laws, he +thinks we ought not to make too strict an inquiry into the nature of +the Deity. And as for his statement when he asserts that God is a being +without any body--what the Greeks call [Greek: asomatos]--it is +certainly quite unintelligible how that theory can possibly be true; +for such a God must then necessarily be destitute of sense, prudence, +and pleasure; all which things are comprehended in our notion of the +Gods. He likewise asserts in his Timaeus, and in his Laws, that the +world, the heavens, the stars, the mind, and those Gods which are +delivered down to us from our ancestors, constitute the Deity. These +opinions, taken separately, are apparently false; and, together, are +directly inconsistent with each other. + +Xenophon has committed almost the same mistakes, but in fewer words. In +those sayings which he has related of Socrates, he introduces him +disputing the lawfulness of inquiring into the form of the Deity, and +makes him assert the sun and the mind to be Deities: he represents him +likewise as affirming the being of one God only, and at another time of +many; which are errors of almost the same kind which I before took +notice of in Plato. + +XIII. Antisthenes, in his book called the Natural Philosopher, says +that there are many national and one natural Deity; but by this saying +he destroys the power and nature of the Gods. Speusippus is not much +less in the wrong; who, following his uncle Plato, says that a certain +incorporeal power governs everything; by which he endeavors to root out +of our minds the knowledge of the Gods. + +Aristotle, in his third book of Philosophy, confounds many things +together, as the rest have done; but he does not differ from his master +Plato. At one time he attributes all divinity to the mind, at another +he asserts that the world is God. Soon afterward he makes some other +essence preside over the world, and gives it those faculties by which, +with certain revolutions, he may govern and preserve the motion of it. +Then he asserts the heat of the firmament to be God; not perceiving the +firmament to be part of the world, which in another place he had +described as God. How can that divine sense of the firmament be +preserved in so rapid a motion? And where do the multitude of Gods +dwell, if heaven itself is a Deity? But when this philosopher says that +God is without a body, he makes him an irrational and insensible being. +Besides, how can the world move itself, if it wants a body? Or how, if +it is in perpetual self-motion, can it be easy and happy? + +Xenocrates, his fellow-pupil, does not appear much wiser on this head, +for in his books concerning the nature of the Gods no divine form is +described; but he says the number of them is eight. Five are moving +planets;[85] the sixth is contained in all the fixed stars; which, +dispersed, are so many several members, but, considered together, are +one single Deity; the seventh is the sun; and the eighth the moon. But +in what sense they can possibly be happy is not easy to be understood. + +From the same school of Plato, Heraclides of Pontus stuffed his books +with puerile tales. Sometimes he thinks the world a Deity, at other +times the mind. He attributes divinity likewise to the wandering stars. +He deprives the Deity of sense, and makes his form mutable; and, in the +same book again, he makes earth and heaven Deities. + +The unsteadiness of Theophrastus is equally intolerable. At one time he +attributes a divine prerogative to the mind; at another, to the +firmament; at another, to the stars and celestial constellations. + +Nor is his disciple Strato, who is called the naturalist, any more +worthy to be regarded; for he thinks that the divine power is diffused +through nature, which is the cause of birth, increase, and diminution, +but that it has no sense nor form. + +XIV. Zeno (to come to your sect, Balbus) thinks the law of nature to be +the divinity, and that it has the power to force us to what is right, +and to restrain us from what is wrong. How this law can be an animated +being I cannot conceive; but that God is so we would certainly +maintain. The same person says, in another place, that the sky is God; +but can we possibly conceive that God is a being insensible, deaf to +our prayers, our wishes, and our vows, and wholly unconnected with us? +In other books he thinks there is a certain rational essence pervading +all nature, indued with divine efficacy. He attributes the same power +to the stars, to the years, to the months, and to the seasons. In his +interpretation of Hesiod's Theogony,[86] he entirely destroys the +established notions of the Gods; for he excludes Jupiter, Juno, and +Vesta, and those esteemed divine, from the number of them; but his +doctrine is that these are names which by some kind of allusion are +given to mute and inanimate beings. The sentiments of his disciple +Aristo are not less erroneous. He thought it impossible to conceive the +form of the Deity, and asserts that the Gods are destitute of sense; +and he is entirely dubious whether the Deity is an animated being or +not. + +Cleanthes, who next comes under my notice, a disciple of Zeno at the +same time with Aristo, in one place says that the world is God; in +another, he attributes divinity to the mind and spirit of universal +nature; then he asserts that the most remote, the highest, the +all-surrounding, the all-enclosing and embracing heat, which is called +the sky, is most certainly the Deity. In the books he wrote against +pleasure, in which he seems to be raving, he imagines the Gods to have +a certain form and shape; then he ascribes all divinity to the stars; +and, lastly, he thinks nothing more divine than reason. So that this +God, whom we know mentally and in the speculations of our minds, from +which traces we receive our impression, has at last actually no visible +form at all. + +XV. Persaeus, another disciple of Zeno, says that they who have made +discoveries advantageous to the life of man should be esteemed as Gods; +and the very things, he says, which are healthful and beneficial have +derived their names from those of the Gods; so that he thinks it not +sufficient to call them the discoveries of Gods, but he urges that they +themselves should be deemed divine. What can be more absurd than to +ascribe divine honors to sordid and deformed things; or to place among +the Gods men who are dead and mixed with the dust, to whose memory all +the respect that could be paid would be but mourning for their loss? + +Chrysippus, who is looked upon as the most subtle interpreter of the +dreams of the Stoics, has mustered up a numerous band of unknown Gods; +and so unknown that we are not able to form any idea about them, though +our mind seems capable of framing any image to itself in its thoughts. +For he says that the divine power is placed in reason, and in the +spirit and mind of universal nature; that the world, with a universal +effusion of its spirit, is God; that the superior part of that spirit, +which is the mind and reason, is the great principle of nature, +containing and preserving the chain of all things; that the divinity is +the power of fate, and the necessity of future events. He deifies fire +also, and what I before called the ethereal spirit, and those elements +which naturally proceed from it--water, earth, and air. He attributes +divinity to the sun, moon, stars, and universal space, the grand +container of all things, and to those men likewise who have obtained +immortality. He maintains the sky to be what men call Jupiter; the air, +which pervades the sea, to be Neptune; and the earth, Ceres. In like +manner he goes through the names of the other Deities. He says that +Jupiter is that immutable and eternal law which guides and directs us +in our manners; and this he calls fatal necessity, the everlasting +verity of future events. But none of these are of such a nature as to +seem to carry any indication of divine virtue in them. These are the +doctrines contained in his first book of the Nature of the Gods. In the +second, he endeavors to accommodate the fables of Orpheus, Musaeus, +Hesiod, and Homer to what he has advanced in the first, in order that +the most ancient poets, who never dreamed of these things, may seem to +have been Stoics. Diogenes the Babylonian was a follower of the +doctrine of Chrysippus; and in that book which he wrote, entitled "A +Treatise concerning Minerva," he separates the account of Jupiter's +bringing-forth, and the birth of that virgin, from the fabulous, and +reduces it to a natural construction. + +XVI. Thus far have I been rather exposing the dreams of dotards than +giving the opinions of philosophers. Not much more absurd than these +are the fables of the poets, who owe all their power of doing harm to +the sweetness of their language; who have represented the Gods as +enraged with anger and inflamed with lust; who have brought before our +eyes their wars, battles, combats, wounds; their hatreds, dissensions, +discords, births, deaths, complaints, and lamentations; their +indulgences in all kinds of intemperance; their adulteries; their +chains; their amours with mortals, and mortals begotten by immortals. +To these idle and ridiculous flights of the poets we may add the +prodigious stories invented by the Magi, and by the Egyptians also, +which were of the same nature, together with the extravagant notions of +the multitude at all times, who, from total ignorance of the truth, are +always fluctuating in uncertainty. + +Now, whoever reflects on the rashness and absurdity of these tenets +must inevitably entertain the highest respect and veneration for +Epicurus, and perhaps even rank him in the number of those beings who +are the subject of this dispute; for he alone first founded the idea of +the existence of the Gods on the impression which nature herself hath +made on the minds of all men. For what nation, what people are there, +who have not, without any learning, a natural idea, or prenotion, of a +Deity? Epicurus calls this [Greek: prolepsis]; that is, an antecedent +conception of the fact in the mind, without which nothing can be +understood, inquired after, or discoursed on; the force and advantage +of which reasoning we receive from that celestial volume of Epicurus +concerning the Rule and Judgment of Things. + +XVII. Here, then, you see the foundation of this question clearly laid; +for since it is the constant and universal opinion of mankind, +independent of education, custom, or law, that there are Gods, it must +necessarily follow that this knowledge is implanted in our minds, or, +rather, innate in us. That opinion respecting which there is a general +agreement in universal nature must infallibly be true; therefore it +must be allowed that there are Gods; for in this we have the +concurrence, not only of almost all philosophers, but likewise of the +ignorant and illiterate. It must be also confessed that the point is +established that we have naturally this idea, as I said before, or +prenotion, of the existence of the Gods. As new things require new +names, so that prenotion was called [Greek: prolepsis] by Epicurus; an +appellation never used before. On the same principle of reasoning, we +think that the Gods are happy and immortal; for that nature which hath +assured us that there are Gods has likewise imprinted in our minds the +knowledge of their immortality and felicity; and if so, what Epicurus +hath declared in these words is true: "That which is eternally happy +cannot be burdened with any labor itself, nor can it impose any labor +on another; nor can it be influenced by resentment or favor: because +things which are liable to such feelings must be weak and frail." We +have said enough to prove that we should worship the Gods with piety, +and without superstition, if that were the only question. + +For the superior and excellent nature of the Gods requires a pious +adoration from men, because it is possessed of immortality and the most +exalted felicity; for whatever excels has a right to veneration, and +all fear of the power and anger of the Gods should be banished; for we +must understand that anger and affection are inconsistent with the +nature of a happy and immortal being. These apprehensions being +removed, no dread of the superior powers remains. To confirm this +opinion, our curiosity leads us to inquire into the form and life and +action of the intellect and spirit of the Deity. + +XVIII. With regard to his form, we are directed partly by nature and +partly by reason. All men are told by nature that none but a human form +can be ascribed to the Gods; for under what other image did it ever +appear to any one either sleeping or waking? and, without having +recourse to our first notions,[87] reason itself declares the same; for +as it is easy to conceive that the most excellent nature, either +because of its happiness or immortality, should be the most beautiful, +what composition of limbs, what conformation of lineaments, what form, +what aspect, can be more beautiful than the human? Your sect, Lucilius +(not like my friend Cotta, who sometimes says one thing and sometimes +another), when they represent the divine art and workmanship in the +human body, are used to describe how very completely each member is +formed, not only for convenience, but also for beauty. Therefore, if +the human form excels that of all other animal beings, as God himself +is an animated being, he must surely be of that form which is the most +beautiful. Besides, the Gods are granted to be perfectly happy; and +nobody can be happy without virtue, nor can virtue exist where reason +is not; and reason can reside in none but the human form; the Gods, +therefore, must be acknowledged to be of human form; yet that form is +not body, but something like body; nor does it contain any blood, but +something like blood. Though these distinctions were more acutely +devised and more artfully expressed by Epicurus than any common +capacity can comprehend; yet, depending on your understanding, I shall +be more brief on the subject than otherwise I should be. Epicurus, who +not only discovered and understood the occult and almost hidden secrets +of nature, but explained them with ease, teaches that the power and +nature of the Gods is not to be discerned by the senses, but by the +mind; nor are they to be considered as bodies of any solidity, or +reducible to number, like those things which, because of their +firmness, he calls [Greek: Steremnia];[88] but as images, perceived by +similitude and transition. As infinite kinds of those images result +from innumerable individuals, and centre in the Gods, our minds and +understanding are directed towards and fixed with the greatest delight +on them, in order to comprehend what that happy and eternal essence is. + +XIX. Surely the mighty power of the Infinite Being is most worthy our +great and earnest contemplation; the nature of which we must +necessarily understand to be such that everything in it is made to +correspond completely to some other answering part. This is called by +Epicurus [Greek: isonomia]; that is to say, an equal distribution or +even disposition of things. From hence he draws this inference, that, +as there is such a vast multitude of mortals, there cannot be a less +number of immortals; and if those which perish are innumerable, those +which are preserved ought also to be countless. Your sect, Balbus, +frequently ask us how the Gods live, and how they pass their time? +Their life is the most happy, and the most abounding with all kinds of +blessings, which can be conceived. They do nothing. They are +embarrassed with no business; nor do they perform any work. They +rejoice in the possession of their own wisdom and virtue. They are +satisfied that they shall ever enjoy the fulness of eternal pleasures. + +XX. Such a Deity may properly be called happy; but yours is a most +laborious God. For let us suppose the world a Deity--what can be a more +uneasy state than, without the least cessation, to be whirled about the +axle-tree of heaven with a surprising celerity? But nothing can be +happy that is not at ease. Or let us suppose a Deity residing in the +world, who directs and governs it, who preserves the courses of the +stars, the changes of the seasons, and the vicissitudes and orders of +things, surveying the earth and the sea, and accommodating them to the +advantage and necessities of man. Truly this Deity is embarrassed with +a very troublesome and laborious office. We make a happy life to +consist in a tranquillity of mind, a perfect freedom from care, and an +exemption from all employment. The philosopher from whom we received +all our knowledge has taught us that the world was made by nature; that +there was no occasion for a workhouse to frame it in; and that, though +you deny the possibility of such a work without divine skill, it is so +easy to her, that she has made, does make, and will make innumerable +worlds. But, because you do not conceive that nature is able to produce +such effects without some rational aid, you are forced, like the tragic +poets, when you cannot wind up your argument in any other way, to have +recourse to a Deity, whose assistance you would not seek, if you could +view that vast and unbounded magnitude of regions in all parts; where +the mind, extending and spreading itself, travels so far and wide that +it can find no end, no extremity to stop at. In this immensity of +breadth, length, and height, a most boundless company of innumerable +atoms are fluttering about, which, notwithstanding the interposition of +a void space, meet and cohere, and continue clinging to one another; +and by this union these modifications and forms of things arise, which, +in your opinions, could not possibly be made without the help of +bellows and anvils. Thus you have imposed on us an eternal master, whom +we must dread day and night. For who can be free from fear of a Deity +who foresees, regards, and takes notice of everything; one who thinks +all things his own; a curious, ever-busy God? + +Hence first arose your [Greek: Heimarmene], as you call it, your fatal +necessity; so that, whatever happens, you affirm that it flows from an +eternal chain and continuance of causes. Of what value is this +philosophy, which, like old women and illiterate men, attributes +everything to fate? Then follows your [Greek: mantike], in Latin called +_divinatio_, divination; which, if we would listen to you, would plunge +us into such superstition that we should fall down and worship your +inspectors into sacrifices, your augurs, your soothsayers, your +prophets, and your fortune-tellers. + +Epicurus having freed us from these terrors and restored us to liberty, +we have no dread of those beings whom we have reason to think entirely +free from all trouble themselves, and who do not impose any on others. +We pay our adoration, indeed, with piety and reverence to that essence +which is above all excellence and perfection. But I fear my zeal for +this doctrine has made me too prolix. However, I could not easily leave +so eminent and important a subject unfinished, though I must confess I +should rather endeavor to hear than speak so long. + +XXI. Cotta, with his usual courtesy, then began. Velleius, says he, +were it not for something which you have advanced, I should have +remained silent; for I have often observed, as I did just now upon +hearing you, that I cannot so easily conceive why a proposition is true +as why it is false. Should you ask me what I take the nature of the +Gods to be, I should perhaps make no answer. But if you should ask +whether I think it to be of that nature which you have described, I +should answer that I was as far as possible from agreeing with you. +However, before I enter on the subject of your discourse and what you +have advanced upon it, I will give you my opinion of yourself. Your +intimate friend, L. Crassus, has been often heard by me to say that you +were beyond all question superior to all our learned Romans; and that +few Epicureans in Greece were to be compared to you. But as I knew what +a wonderful esteem he had for you, I imagined that might make him the +more lavish in commendation of you. Now, however, though I do not +choose to praise any one when present, yet I must confess that I think +you have delivered your thoughts clearly on an obscure and very +intricate subject; that you are not only copious in your sentiments, +but more elegant in your language than your sect generally are. When I +was at Athens, I went often to hear Zeno, by the advice of Philo, who +used to call him the chief of the Epicureans; partly, probably, in +order to judge more easily how completely those principles could be +refuted after I had heard them stated by the most learned of the +Epicureans. And, indeed, he did not speak in any ordinary manner; but, +like you, with clearness, gravity, and elegance; yet what frequently +gave me great uneasiness when I heard him, as it did while I attended +to you, was to see so excellent a genius falling into such frivolous +(excuse my freedom), not to say foolish, doctrines. However, I shall +not at present offer anything better; for, as I said before, we can in +most subjects, especially in physics, sooner discover what is not true +than what is. + +XXII. If you should ask me what God is, or what his character and +nature are, I should follow the example of Simonides, who, when Hiero +the tyrant proposed the same question to him, desired a day to consider +of it. When he required his answer the next day, Simonides begged two +days more; and as he kept constantly desiring double the number which +he had required before instead of giving his answer, Hiero, with +surprise, asked him his meaning in doing so: "Because," says he, "the +longer I meditate on it, the more obscure it appears to me." Simonides, +who was not only a delightful poet, but reputed a wise and learned man +in other branches of knowledge, found, I suppose, so many acute and +refined arguments occurring to him, that he was doubtful which was the +truest, and therefore despaired of discovering any truth. + +But does your Epicurus (for I had rather contend with him than with +you) say anything that is worthy the name of philosophy, or even of +common-sense? + +In the question concerning the nature of the Gods, his first inquiry +is, whether there are Gods or not. It would be dangerous, I believe, to +take the negative side before a public auditory; but it is very safe in +a discourse of this kind, and in this company. I, who am a priest, and +who think that religions and ceremonies ought sacredly to be +maintained, am certainly desirous to have the existence of the Gods, +which is the principal point in debate, not only fixed in opinion, but +proved to a demonstration; for many notions flow into and disturb the +mind which sometimes seem to convince us that there are none. But see +how candidly I will behave to you: as I shall not touch upon those +tenets you hold in common with other philosophers, consequently I shall +not dispute the existence of the Gods, for that doctrine is agreeable +to almost all men, and to myself in particular; but I am still at +liberty to find fault with the reasons you give for it, which I think +are very insufficient. + +XXIII. You have said that the general assent of men of all nations and +all degrees is an argument strong enough to induce us to acknowledge +the being of the Gods. This is not only a weak, but a false, argument; +for, first of all, how do you know the opinions of all nations? I +really believe there are many people so savage that they have no +thoughts of a Deity. What think you of Diagoras, who was called the +atheist; and of Theodorus after him? Did not they plainly deny the very +essence of a Deity? Protagoras of Abdera, whom you just now mentioned, +the greatest sophist of his age, was banished by order of the Athenians +from their city and territories, and his books were publicly burned, +because these words were in the beginning of his treatise concerning +the Gods: "I am unable to arrive at any knowledge whether there are, or +are not, any Gods." This treatment of him, I imagine, restrained many +from professing their disbelief of a Deity, since the doubt of it only +could not escape punishment. What shall we say of the sacrilegious, the +impious, and the perjured? If Tubulus Lucius, Lupus, or Carbo the son +of Neptune, as Lucilius says, had believed that there were Gods, would +either of them have carried his perjuries and impieties to such excess? +Your reasoning, therefore, to confirm your assertion is not so +conclusive as you think it is. But as this is the manner in which other +philosophers have argued on the same subject, I will take no further +notice of it at present; I rather choose to proceed to what is properly +your own. + +I allow that there are Gods. Instruct me, then, concerning their +origin; inform me where they are, what sort of body, what mind, they +have, and what is their course of life; for these I am desirous of +knowing. You attribute the most absolute power and efficacy to atoms. +Out of them you pretend that everything is made. But there are no +atoms, for there is nothing without body; every place is occupied by +body, therefore there can be no such thing as a vacuum or an atom. + +XXIV. I advance these principles of the naturalists without knowing +whether they are true or false; yet they are more like truth than those +statements of yours; for they are the absurdities in which Democritus, +or before him Leucippus, used to indulge, saying that there are certain +light corpuscles--some smooth, some rough, some round, some square, +some crooked and bent as bows--which by a fortuitous concourse made +heaven and earth, without the influence of any natural power. This +opinion, C. Velleius, you have brought down to these our times; and you +would sooner be deprived of the greatest advantages of life than of +that authority; for before you were acquainted with those tenets, you +thought that you ought to profess yourself an Epicurean; so that it was +necessary that you should either embrace these absurdities or lose the +philosophical character which you had taken upon you; and what could +bribe you to renounce the Epicurean opinion? Nothing, you say, can +prevail on you to forsake the truth and the sure means of a happy life. +But is that the truth? for I shall not contest your happy life, which +you think the Deity himself does not enjoy unless he languishes in +idleness. But where is truth? Is it in your innumerable worlds, some of +which are rising, some falling, at every moment of time? Or is it in +your atomical corpuscles, which form such excellent works without the +direction of any natural power or reason? But I was forgetting my +liberality, which I had promised to exert in your case, and exceeding +the bounds which I at first proposed to myself. Granting, then, +everything to be made of atoms, what advantage is that to your +argument? For we are searching after the nature of the Gods; and +allowing them to be made of atoms, they cannot be eternal, because +whatever is made of atoms must have had a beginning: if so, there were +no Gods till there was this beginning; and if the Gods have had a +beginning, they must necessarily have an end, as you have before +contended when you were discussing Plato's world. Where, then, is your +beatitude and immortality, in which two words you say that God is +expressed, the endeavor to prove which reduces you to the greatest +perplexities? For you said that God had no body, but something like +body; and no blood, but something like blood. + +XXV. It is a frequent practice among you, when you assert anything that +has no resemblance to truth, and wish to avoid reprehension, to advance +something else which is absolutely and utterly impossible, in order +that it may seem to your adversaries better to grant that point which +has been a matter of doubt than to keep on pertinaciously contradicting +you on every point: like Epicurus, who, when he found that if his atoms +were allowed to descend by their own weight, our actions could not be +in our own power, because their motions would be certain and necessary, +invented an expedient, which escaped Democritus, to avoid necessity. He +says that when the atoms descend by their own weight and gravity, they +move a little obliquely. Surely, to make such an assertion as this is +what one ought more to be ashamed of than the acknowledging ourselves +unable to defend the proposition. His practice is the same against the +logicians, who say that in all propositions in which yes or no is +required, one of them must be true; he was afraid that if this were +granted, then, in such a proposition as "Epicurus will be alive or dead +to-morrow," either one or the other must necessarily be admitted; +therefore he absolutely denied the necessity of yes or no. Can anything +show stupidity in a greater degree? Zeno,[89] being pressed by +Arcesilas, who pronounced all things to be false which are perceived by +the senses, said that some things were false, but not all. Epicurus was +afraid that if any one thing seen should be false, nothing could be +true; and therefore he asserted all the senses to be infallible +directors of truth. Nothing can be more rash than this; for by +endeavoring to repel a light stroke, he receives a heavy blow. On the +subject of the nature of the Gods, he falls into the same errors. While +he would avoid the concretion of individual bodies, lest death and +dissolution should be the consequence, he denies that the Gods have +body, but says they have something like body; and says they have no +blood, but something like blood. + +XXVI. It seems an unaccountable thing how one soothsayer can refrain +from laughing when he sees another. It is yet a greater wonder that you +can refrain from laughing among yourselves. It is no body, but +something like body! I could understand this if it were applied to +statues made of wax or clay; but in regard to the Deity, I am not able +to discover what is meant by a quasi-body or quasi-blood. Nor indeed +are you, Velleius, though you will not confess so much. For those +precepts are delivered to you as dictates which Epicurus carelessly +blundered out; for he boasted, as we see in his writings, that he had +no instructor, which I could easily believe without his public +declaration of it, for the same reason that I could believe the master +of a very bad edifice if he were to boast that he had no architect but +himself: for there is nothing of the Academy, nothing of the Lyceum, in +his doctrine; nothing but puerilities. He might have been a pupil of +Xenocrates. O ye immortal Gods, what a teacher was he! And there are +those who believe that he actually was his pupil; but he says +otherwise, and I shall give more credit to his word than to another's. +He confesses that he was a pupil of a certain disciple of Plato, one +Pamphilus, at Samos; for he lived there when he was young, with his +father and his brothers. His father, Neocles, was a farmer in those +parts; but as the farm, I suppose, was not sufficient to maintain him, +he turned school-master; yet Epicurus treats this Platonic philosopher +with wonderful contempt, so fearful was he that it should be thought he +had ever had any instruction. But it is well known he had been a pupil +of Nausiphanes, the follower of Democritus; and since he could not deny +it, he loaded him with insults in abundance. If he never heard a +lecture on these Democritean principles, what lectures did he ever +hear? What is there in Epicurus's physics that is not taken from +Democritus? For though he altered some things, as what I mentioned +before of the oblique motions of the atoms, yet most of his doctrines +are the same; his atoms--his vacuum--his images--infinity of +space--innumerable worlds, their rise and decay--and almost every part +of natural learning that he treats of. + +Now, do you understand what is meant by quasi-body and quasi-blood? For +I not only acknowledge that you are a better judge of it than I am, but +I can bear it without envy. If any sentiments, indeed, are communicated +without obscurity, what is there that Velleius can understand and Cotta +not? I know what body is, and what blood is; but I cannot possibly find +out the meaning of quasi-body and quasi-blood. Not that you +intentionally conceal your principles from me, as Pythagoras did his +from those who were not his disciples; or that you are intentionally +obscure, like Heraclitus. But the truth is (which I may venture to say +in this company), you do not understand them yourself. + +XXVII. This, I perceive, is what you contend for, that the Gods have a +certain figure that has nothing concrete, nothing solid, nothing of +express substance, nothing prominent in it; but that it is pure, +smooth, and transparent. Let us suppose the same with the Venus of Cos, +which is not a body, but the representation of a body; nor is the red, +which is drawn there and mixed with the white, real blood, but a +certain resemblance of blood; so in Epicurus's Deity there is no real +substance, but the resemblance of substance. + +Let me take for granted that which is perfectly unintelligible; then +tell me what are the lineaments and figures of these sketched-out +Deities. Here you have plenty of arguments by which you would show the +Gods to be in human form. The first is, that our minds are so +anticipated and prepossessed, that whenever we think of a Deity the +human shape occurs to us. The next is, that as the divine nature excels +all things, so it ought to be of the most beautiful form, and there is +no form more beautiful than the human; and the third is, that reason +cannot reside in any other shape. + +First, let us consider each argument separately. You seem to me to +assume a principle, despotically I may say, that has no manner of +probability in it. Who was ever so blind, in contemplating these +subjects, as not to see that the Gods were represented in human form, +either by the particular advice of wise men, who thought by those means +the more easily to turn the minds of the ignorant from a depravity of +manners to the worship of the Gods; or through superstition, which was +the cause of their believing that when they were paying adoration to +these images they were approaching the Gods themselves. These conceits +were not a little improved by the poets, painters, and artificers; for +it would not have been very easy to represent the Gods planning and +executing any work in another form, and perhaps this opinion arose from +the idea which mankind have of their own beauty. But do not you, who +are so great an adept in physics, see what a soothing flatterer, what a +sort of procuress, nature is to herself? Do you think there is any +creature on the land or in the sea that is not highly delighted with +its own form? If it were not so, why would not a bull become enamored +of a mare, or a horse of a cow? Do you believe an eagle, a lion, or a +dolphin prefers any shape to its own? If nature, therefore, has +instructed us in the same manner, that nothing is more beautiful than +man, what wonder is it that we, for that reason, should imagine the +Gods are of the human form? Do you suppose if beasts were endowed with +reason that every one would not give the prize of beauty to his own +species? + +XXVIII. Yet, by Hercules (I speak as I think)! though I am fond enough +of myself, I dare not say that I excel in beauty that bull which +carried Europa. For the question here is not concerning our genius and +elocution, but our species and figure. If we could make and assume to +ourselves any form, would you be unwilling to resemble the sea-triton +as he is painted supported swimming on sea-monsters whose bodies are +partly human? Here I touch on a difficult point; for so great is the +force of nature that there is no man who would not choose to be like a +man, nor, indeed, any ant that would not be like an ant. But like what +man? For how few can pretend to beauty! When I was at Athens, the whole +flock of youths afforded scarcely one. You laugh, I see; but what I +tell you is the truth. Nay, to us who, after the examples of ancient +philosophers, delight in boys, defects are often pleasing. Alcaeus was +charmed with a wart on a boy's knuckle; but a wart is a blemish on the +body; yet it seemed a beauty to him. Q. Catulus, my friend and +colleague's father, was enamored with your fellow-citizen Roscius, on +whom he wrote these verses: + + As once I stood to hail the rising day, + Roscius appearing on the left I spied: + Forgive me, Gods, if I presume to say + The mortal's beauty with th' immortal vied. + +Roscius more beautiful than a God! yet he was then, as he now is, +squint-eyed. But what signifies that, if his defects were beauties to +Catulus? + +XXIX. I return to the Gods. Can we suppose any of them to be +squint-eyed, or even to have a cast in the eye? Have they any warts? +Are any of them hook-nosed, flap-eared, beetle-browed, or jolt-headed, +as some of us are? Or are they free from imperfections? Let us grant +you that. Are they all alike in the face? For if they are many, then +one must necessarily be more beautiful than another, and then there +must be some Deity not absolutely most beautiful. Or if their faces are +all alike, there would be an Academy[90] in heaven; for if one God does +not differ from another, there is no possibility of knowing or +distinguishing them. + +What if your assertion, Velleius, proves absolutely false, that no form +occurs to us, in our contemplations on the Deity, but the human? Will +you, notwithstanding that, persist in the defence of such an absurdity? +Supposing that form occurs to us, as you say it does, and we know +Jupiter, Juno, Minerva, Neptune, Vulcan, Apollo, and the other Deities, +by the countenance which painters and statuaries have given them, and +not only by their countenances, but by their decorations, their age, +and attire; yet the Egyptians, the Syrians, and almost all barbarous +nations,[91] are without such distinctions. You may see a greater +regard paid by them to certain beasts than by us to the most sacred +temples and images of the Gods; for many shrines have been rifled, and +images of the Deities have been carried from their most sacred places +by us; but we never heard that an Egyptian offered any violence to a +crocodile, an ibis, or a cat. What do you think, then? Do not the +Egyptians esteem their sacred bull, their Apis, as a Deity? Yes, by +Hercules! as certainly as you do our protectress Juno, whom you never +behold, even in your dreams, without a goat-skin, a spear, a shield, +and broad sandals. But the Grecian Juno of Argos and the Roman Juno are +not represented in this manner; so that the Grecians, the Lanuvinians, +and we, ascribe different forms to Juno; and our Capitoline Jupiter is +not the same with the Jupiter Ammon of the Africans. + +XXX. Therefore, ought not a natural philosopher--that is, an inquirer +into the secrets of nature--to be ashamed of seeking a testimony to +truth from minds prepossessed by custom? According to the rule you have +laid down, it may be said that Jupiter is always bearded, Apollo always +beardless; that Minerva has gray and Neptune azure eyes; and, indeed, +we must then honor that Vulcan at Athens, made by Alcamenes, whose +lameness through his thin robes appears to be no deformity. Shall we, +therefore, receive a lame Deity because we have such an account of him? + +Consider, likewise, that the Gods go by what names we give them. Now, +in the first place, they have as many names as men have languages; for +Vulcan is not called Vulcan in Italy, Africa, or Spain, as you are +called Velleius in all countries. Besides, the Gods are innumerable, +though the list of their names is of no great length even in the +records of our priests. Have they no names? You must necessarily +confess, indeed, they have none; for what occasion is there for +different names if their persons are alike? + +How much more laudable would it be, Velleius, to acknowledge that you +do not know what you do not know than to follow a man whom you must +despise! Do you think the Deity is like either me or you? You do not +really think he is like either of us. What is to be done, then? Shall I +call the sun, the moon, or the sky a Deity? If so, they are +consequently happy. But what pleasures can they enjoy? And they are +wise too. But how can wisdom reside in such shapes? These are your own +principles. Therefore, if they are not of human form, as I have proved, +and if you cannot persuade yourself that they are of any other, why are +you cautious of denying absolutely the being of any Gods? You dare not +deny it--which is very prudent in you, though here you are not afraid +of the people, but of the Gods themselves. I have known Epicureans who +reverence[92] even the least images of the Gods, though I perceive it +to be the opinion of some that Epicurus, through fear of offending +against the Athenian laws, has allowed a Deity in words and destroyed +him in fact; so in those his select and short sentences, which are +called by you [Greek: kyriai doxai],[93] this, I think, is the first: +"That being which is happy and immortal is not burdened with any labor, +and does not impose any on any one else." + +XXXI. In his statement of this sentence, some think that he avoided +speaking clearly on purpose, though it was manifestly without design. +But they judge ill of a man who had not the least art. It is doubtful +whether he means that there is any being happy and immortal, or that if +there is any being happy, he must likewise be immortal. They do not +consider that he speaks here, indeed, ambiguously; but in many other +places both he and Metrodorus explain themselves as clearly as you have +done. But he believed there are Gods; nor have I ever seen any one who +was more exceedingly afraid of what he declared ought to be no objects +of fear, namely, death and the Gods, with the apprehensions of which +the common rank of people are very little affected; but he says that +the minds of all mortals are terrified by them. Many thousands of men +commit robberies in the face of death; others rifle all the temples +they can get into: such as these, no doubt, must be greatly terrified, +the one by the fears of death, and the others by the fear of the Gods. + +But since you dare not (for I am now addressing my discourse to +Epicurus himself) absolutely deny the existence of the Gods, what +hinders you from ascribing a divine nature to the sun, the world, or +some eternal mind? I never, says he, saw wisdom and a rational soul in +any but a human form. What! did you ever observe anything like the sun, +the moon, or the five moving planets? The sun, terminating his course +in two extreme parts of one circle,[94] finishes his annual +revolutions. The moon, receiving her light from the sun, completes the +same course in the space of a month.[95] The five planets in the same +circle, some nearer, others more remote from the earth, begin the same +courses together, and finish them in different spaces of time. Did you +ever observe anything like this, Epicurus? So that, according to you, +there can be neither sun, moon, nor stars, because nothing can exist +but what we have touched or seen.[96] What! have you ever seen the +Deity himself? Why else do you believe there is any? If this doctrine +prevails, we must reject all that history relates or reason discovers; +and the people who inhabit inland countries must not believe there is +such a thing as the sea. This is so narrow a way of thinking that if +you had been born in Seriphus, and never had been from out of that +island, where you had frequently been in the habit of seeing little +hares and foxes, you would not, therefore, believe that there are such +beasts as lions and panthers; and if any one should describe an +elephant to you, you would think that he designed to laugh at you. + +XXXII. You indeed, Velleius, have concluded your argument, not after +the manner of your own sect, but of the logicians, to which your people +are utter strangers. You have taken it for granted that the Gods are +happy. I allow it. You say that without virtue no one can be happy. I +willingly concur with you in this also. You likewise say that virtue +cannot reside where reason is not. That I must necessarily allow. You +add, moreover, that reason cannot exist but in a human form. Who, do +you think, will admit that? If it were true, what occasion was there to +come so gradually to it? And to what purpose? You might have answered +it on your own authority. I perceive your gradations from happiness to +virtue, and from virtue to reason; but how do you come from reason to +human form? There, indeed, you do not descend by degrees, but +precipitately. + +Nor can I conceive why Epicurus should rather say the Gods are like men +than that men are like the Gods. You ask what is the difference; for, +say you, if this is like that, that is like this. I grant it; but this +I assert, that the Gods could not take their form from men; for the +Gods always existed, and never had a beginning, if they are to exist +eternally; but men had a beginning: therefore that form, of which the +immortal Gods are, must have had existence before mankind; +consequently, the Gods should not be said to be of human form, but our +form should be called divine. However, let this be as you will. I now +inquire how this extraordinary good fortune came about; for you deny +that reason had any share in the formation of things. But still, what +was this extraordinary fortune? Whence proceeded that happy concourse +of atoms which gave so sudden a rise to men in the form of Gods? Are we +to suppose the divine seed fell from heaven upon earth, and that men +sprung up in the likeness of their celestial sires? I wish you would +assert it; for I should not be unwilling to acknowledge my relation to +the Gods. But you say nothing like it; no, our resemblance to the Gods, +it seems, was by chance. Must I now seek for arguments to refute this +doctrine seriously? I wish I could as easily discover what is true as I +can overthrow what is false. + +XXXIII. You have enumerated with so ready a memory, and so copiously, +the opinions of philosophers, from Thales the Milesian, concerning the +nature of the Gods, that I am surprised to see so much learning in a +Roman. But do you think they were all madmen who thought that a Deity +could by some possibility exist without hands and feet? Does not even +this consideration have weight with you when you consider what is the +use and advantage of limbs in men, and lead you to admit that the Gods +have no need of them? What necessity can there be of feet, without +walking; or of hands, if there is nothing to be grasped? The same may +be asked of the other parts of the body, in which nothing is vain, +nothing useless, nothing superfluous; therefore we may infer that no +art can imitate the skill of nature. Shall the Deity, then, have a +tongue, and not speak--teeth, palate, and jaws, though he will have no +use for them? Shall the members which nature has given to the body for +the sake of generation be useless to the Deity? Nor would the internal +parts be less superfluous than the external. What comeliness is there +in the heart, the lungs, the liver, and the rest of them, abstracted +from their use? I mention these because you place them in the Deity on +account of the beauty of the human form. + +Depending on these dreams, not only Epicurus, Metrodorus, and Hermachus +declaimed against Pythagoras, Plato, and Empedocles, but that little +harlot Leontium presumed to write against Theophrastus: indeed, she had +a neat Attic style; but yet, to think of her arguing against +Theophrastus! So much did the garden of Epicurus[97] abound with these +liberties, and, indeed, you are always complaining against them. Zeno +wrangled. Why need I mention Albutius? Nothing could be more elegant or +humane than Phaedrus; yet a sharp expression would disgust the old man. +Epicurus treated Aristotle with great contumely. He foully slandered +Phaedo, the disciple of Socrates. He pelted Timocrates, the brother of +his companion Metrodorus, with whole volumes, because he disagreed with +him in some trifling point of philosophy. He was ungrateful even to +Democritus, whose follower he was; and his master Nausiphanes, from +whom he learned nothing, had no better treatment from him. + +XXXIV. Zeno gave abusive language not only to those who were then +living, as Apollodorus, Syllus, and the rest, but he called Socrates, +who was the father of philosophy, the Attic buffoon, using the Latin +word _Scurra_. He never called Chrysippus by any name but Chesippus. +And you yourself a little before, when you were numbering up a senate, +as we may call them, of philosophers, scrupled not to say that the most +eminent men talked like foolish, visionary dotards. Certainly, +therefore, if they have all erred in regard to the nature of the Gods, +it is to be feared there are no such beings. What you deliver on that +head are all whimsical notions, and not worthy the consideration even +of old women. For you do not seem to be in the least aware what a task +you draw on yourselves, if you should prevail on us to grant that the +same form is common to Gods and men. The Deity would then require the +same trouble in dressing, and the same care of the body, that mankind +does. He must walk, run, lie down, lean, sit, hold, speak, and +discourse. You need not be told the consequence of making the Gods male +and female. + +Therefore I cannot sufficiently wonder how this chief of yours came to +entertain these strange opinions. But you constantly insist on the +certainty of this tenet, that the Deity is both happy and immortal. +Supposing he is so, would his happiness be less perfect if he had not +two feet? Or cannot that blessedness or beatitude--call it which you +will (they are both harsh terms, but we must mollify them by use)--can +it not, I say, exist in that sun, or in this world, or in some eternal +mind that has not human shape or limbs? All you say against it is, that +you never saw any happiness in the sun or the world. What, then? Did +you ever see any world but this? No, you will say. Why, therefore, do +you presume to assert that there are not only six hundred thousand +worlds, but that they are innumerable? Reason tells you so. Will not +reason tell you likewise that as, in our inquiries into the most +excellent nature, we find none but the divine nature can be happy and +eternal, so the same divine nature surpasses us in excellence of mind; +and as in mind, so in body? Why, therefore, as we are inferior in all +other respects, should we be equal in form? For human virtue approaches +nearer to the divinity than human form. + +XXXV. To return to the subject I was upon. What can be more childish +than to assert that there are no such creatures as are generated in the +Red Sea or in India? The most curious inquirer cannot arrive at the +knowledge of all those creatures which inhabit the earth, sea, fens, +and rivers; and shall we deny the existence of them because we never +saw them? That similitude which you are so very fond of is nothing to +the purpose. Is not a dog like a wolf? And, as Ennius says, + + The monkey, filthiest beast, how like to man! + +Yet they differ in nature. No beast has more sagacity than an elephant; +yet where can you find any of a larger size? I am speaking here of +beasts. But among men, do we not see a disparity of manners in persons +very much alike, and a similitude of manners in persons unlike? If this +sort of argument were once to prevail, Velleius, observe what it would +lead to. You have laid it down as certain that reason cannot possibly +reside in any but the human form. Another may affirm that it can exist +in none but a terrestrial being; in none but a being that is born, that +grows up, and receives instruction, and that consists of a soul, and an +infirm and perishable body; in short, in none but a mortal man. But if +you decline those opinions, why should a single form disturb you? You +perceive that man is possessed of reason and understanding, with all +the infirmities which I have mentioned interwoven with his being; +abstracted from which, you nevertheless know God, you say, if the +lineaments do but remain. This is not talking considerately, but at a +venture; for surely you did not think what an encumbrance anything +superfluous or useless is, not only in a man, but a tree. How +troublesome it is to have a finger too much! And why so? Because +neither use nor ornament requires more than five; but your Deity has +not only a finger more than he wants, but a head, a neck, shoulders, +sides, a paunch, back, hams, hands, feet, thighs, and legs. Are these +parts necessary to immortality? Are they conducive to the existence of +the Deity? Is the face itself of use? One would rather say so of the +brain, the heart, the lights, and the liver; for these are the seats of +life. The features of the face contribute nothing to the preservation +of it. + +XXXVI. You censured those who, beholding those excellent and stupendous +works, the world, and its respective parts--the heaven, the earth, the +seas--and the splendor with which they are adorned; who, contemplating +the sun, moon, and stars; and who, observing the maturity and changes +of the seasons, and vicissitudes of times, inferred from thence that +there must be some excellent and eminent essence that originally made, +and still moves, directs, and governs them. Suppose they should mistake +in their conjecture, yet I see what they aim at. But what is that great +and noble work which appears to you to be the effect of a divine mind, +and from which you conclude that there are Gods? "I have," say you, "a +certain information of a Deity imprinted in my mind." Of a bearded +Jupiter, I suppose, and a helmeted Minerva. + +But do you really imagine them to be such? How much better are the +notions of the ignorant vulgar, who not only believe the Deities have +members like ours, but that they make use of them; and therefore they +assign them a bow and arrows, a spear, a shield, a trident, and +lightning; and though they do not behold the actions of the Gods, yet +they cannot entertain a thought of a Deity doing nothing. The Egyptians +(so much ridiculed) held no beasts to be sacred, except on account of +some advantage which they had received from them. The ibis, a very +large bird, with strong legs and a horny long beak, destroys a great +number of serpents. These birds keep Egypt from pestilential diseases +by killing and devouring the flying serpents brought from the deserts +of Lybia by the south-west wind, which prevents the mischief that may +attend their biting while alive, or any infection when dead. I could +speak of the advantage of the ichneumon, the crocodile, and the cat; +but I am unwilling to be tedious; yet I will conclude with observing +that the barbarians paid divine honors to beasts because of the +benefits they received from them; whereas your Gods not only confer no +benefit, but are idle, and do no single act of any description +whatever. + +XXXVII. "They have nothing to do," your teacher says. Epicurus truly, +like indolent boys, thinks nothing preferable to idleness; yet those +very boys, when they have a holiday, entertain themselves in some +sportive exercise. But we are to suppose the Deity in such an inactive +state that if he should move we may justly fear he would be no longer +happy. This doctrine divests the Gods of motion and operation; besides, +it encourages men to be lazy, as they are by this taught to believe +that the least labor is incompatible even with divine felicity. + +But let it be as you would have it, that the Deity is in the form and +image of a man. Where is his abode? Where is his habitation? Where is +the place where he is to be found? What is his course of life? And what +is it that constitutes the happiness which you assert that he enjoys? +For it seems necessary that a being who is to be happy must use and +enjoy what belongs to him. And with regard to place, even those natures +which are inanimate have each their proper stations assigned to them: +so that the earth is the lowest; then water is next above the earth; +the air is above the water; and fire has the highest situation of all +allotted to it. Some creatures inhabit the earth, some the water, and +some, of an amphibious nature, live in both. There are some, also, +which are thought to be born in fire, and which often appear fluttering +in burning furnaces. + +In the first place, therefore, I ask you, Where is the habitation of +your Deity? Secondly, What motive is it that stirs him from his place, +supposing he ever moves? And, lastly, since it is peculiar to animated +beings to have an inclination to something that is agreeable to their +several natures, what is it that the Deity affects, and to what purpose +does he exert the motion of his mind and reason? In short, how is he +happy? how eternal? Whichever of these points you touch upon, I am +afraid you will come lamely off. For there is never a proper end to +reasoning which proceeds on a false foundation; for you asserted +likewise that the form of the Deity is perceptible by the mind, but not +by sense; that it is neither solid, nor invariable in number; that it +is to be discerned by similitude and transition, and that a constant +supply of images is perpetually flowing on from innumerable atoms, on +which our minds are intent; so that we from that conclude that divine +nature to be happy and everlasting. + +XXXVIII. What, in the name of those Deities concerning whom we are now +disputing, is the meaning of all this? For if they exist only in +thought, and have no solidity nor substance, what difference can there +be between thinking of a Hippocentaur and thinking of a Deity? Other +philosophers call every such conformation of the mind a vain motion; +but you term it "the approach and entrance of images into the mind." +Thus, when I imagine that I behold T. Gracchus haranguing the people in +the Capitol, and collecting their suffrages concerning M. Octavius, I +call that a vain motion of the mind: but you affirm that the images of +Gracchus and Octavius are present, which are only conveyed to my mind +when they have arrived at the Capitol. The case is the same, you say, +in regard to the Deity, with the frequent representation of which the +mind is so affected that from thence it may be clearly understood that +the Gods[98] are happy and eternal. + +Let it be granted that there are images by which the mind is affected, +yet it is only a certain form that occurs; and why must that form be +pronounced happy? why eternal? But what are those images you talk of, +or whence do they proceed? This loose manner of arguing is taken from +Democritus; but he is reproved by many people for it; nor can you +derive any conclusions from it: the whole system is weak and imperfect. +For what can be more improbable than that the images of Homer, +Archilochus, Romulus, Numa, Pythagoras, and Plato should come into my +mind, and yet not in the form in which they existed? How, therefore, +can they be those persons? And whose images are they? Aristotle tells +us that there never was such a person as Orpheus the poet;[99] and it +is said that the verse called Orphic verse was the invention of +Cercops, a Pythagorean; yet Orpheus, that is to say, the image of him, +as you will have it, often runs in my head. What is the reason that I +entertain one idea of the figure of the same person, and you another? +Why do we image to ourselves such things as never had any existence, +and which never can have, such as Scyllas and Chimaeras? Why do we frame +ideas of men, countries, and cities which we never saw? How is it that +the very first moment that I choose I can form representations of them +in my mind? How is it that they come to me, even in my sleep, without +being called or sought after? + +XXXIX. The whole affair, Velleius, is ridiculous. You do not impose +images on our eyes only, but on our minds. Such is the privilege which +you have assumed of talking nonsense with impunity. But there is, you +say, a transition of images flowing on in great crowds in such a way +that out of many some one at least must be perceived! I should be +ashamed of my incapacity to understand this if you, who assert it, +could comprehend it yourselves; for how do you prove that these images +are continued in uninterrupted motion? Or, if uninterrupted, still how +do you prove them to be eternal? There is a constant supply, you say, +of innumerable atoms. But must they, for that reason, be all eternal? +To elude this, you have recourse to equilibration (for so, with your +leave, I will call your [Greek: Isonomia]),[100] and say that as there +is a sort of nature mortal, so there must also be a sort which is +immortal. By the same rule, as there are men mortal, there are men +immortal; and as some arise from the earth, some must arise from the +water also; and as there are causes which destroy, there must likewise +be causes which preserve. Be it as you say; but let those causes +preserve which have existence themselves. I cannot conceive these your +Gods to have any. But how does all this face of things arise from +atomic corpuscles? Were there any such atoms (as there are not), they +might perhaps impel one another, and be jumbled together in their +motion; but they could never be able to impart form, or figure, or +color, or animation, so that you by no means demonstrate the +immortality of your Deity. + +XL. Let us now inquire into his happiness. It is certain that without +virtue there can be no happiness; but virtue consists in action: now +your Deity does nothing; therefore he is void of virtue, and +consequently cannot be happy. What sort of life does he lead? He has a +constant supply, you say, of good things, without any intermixture of +bad. What are those good things? Sensual pleasures, no doubt; for you +know no delight of the mind but what arises from the body, and returns +to it. I do not suppose, Velleius, that you are like some of the +Epicureans, who are ashamed of those expressions of Epicurus,[101] in +which he openly avows that he has no idea of any good separate from +wanton and obscene pleasures, which, without a blush, he names +distinctly. What food, therefore, what drink, what variety of music or +flowers, what kind of pleasures of touch, what odors, will you offer to +the Gods to fill them with pleasures? The poets indeed provide them +with banquets of nectar and ambrosia, and a Hebe or a Ganymede to serve +up the cup. But what is it, Epicurus, that you do for them? For I do +not see from whence your Deity should have those things, nor how he +could use them. Therefore the nature of man is better constituted for a +happy life than the nature of the Gods, because men enjoy various kinds +of pleasures; but you look on all those pleasures as superficial which +delight the senses only by a titillation, as Epicurus calls it. Where +is to be the end of this trifling? Even Philo, who followed the +Academy, could not bear to hear the soft and luscious delights of the +Epicureans despised; for with his admirable memory he perfectly +remembered and used to repeat many sentences of Epicurus in the very +words in which they were written. He likewise used to quote many, which +were more gross, from Metrodorus, the sage colleague of Epicurus, who +blamed his brother Timocrates because he would not allow that +everything which had any reference to a happy life was to be measured +by the belly; nor has he said this once only, but often. You grant what +I say, I perceive; for you know it to be true. I can produce the books, +if you should deny it; but I am not now reproving you for referring all +things to the standard of pleasure: that is another question. What I am +now showing is, that your Gods are destitute of pleasure; and +therefore, according to your own manner of reasoning, they are not +happy. + +XLI. But they are free from pain. Is that sufficient for beings who are +supposed to enjoy all good things and the most supreme felicity? The +Deity, they say, is constantly meditating on his own happiness, for he +has no other idea which can possibly occupy his mind. Consider a +little; reflect what a figure the Deity would make if he were to be +idly thinking of nothing through all eternity but "It is very well with +me, and I am happy;" nor do I see why this happy Deity should not fear +being destroyed, since, without any intermission, he is driven and +agitated by an everlasting incursion of atoms, and since images are +constantly floating off from him. Your Deity, therefore, is neither +happy nor eternal. + +Epicurus, it seems, has written books concerning sanctity and piety +towards the Gods. But how does he speak on these subjects? You would +say that you were listening to Coruncanius or Scaevola, the +high-priests, and not to a man who tore up all religion by the roots, +and who overthrew the temples and altars of the immortal Gods; not, +indeed, with hands, like Xerxes, but with arguments; for what reason is +there for your saying that men ought to worship the Gods, when the Gods +not only do not regard men, but are entirely careless of everything, +and absolutely do nothing at all? + +But they are, you say, of so glorious and excellent a nature that a +wise man is induced by their excellence to adore them. Can there be any +glory or excellence in that nature which only contemplates its own +happiness, and neither will do, nor does, nor ever did anything? +Besides, what piety is due to a being from whom you receive nothing? Or +how can you, or any one else, be indebted to him who bestows no +benefits? For piety is only justice towards the Gods; but what right +have they to it, when there is no communication whatever between the +Gods and men? And sanctity is the knowledge of how we ought to worship +them; but I do not understand why they are to be worshipped, if we are +neither to receive nor expect any good from them. + +XLII. And why should we worship them from an admiration only of that +nature in which we can behold nothing excellent? and as for that +freedom from superstition, which you are in the habit of boasting of so +much, it is easy to be free from that feeling when you have renounced +all belief in the power of the Gods; unless, indeed, you imagine that +Diagoras or Theodorus, who absolutely denied the being of the Gods, +could possibly be superstitious. I do not suppose that even Protagoras +could, who doubted whether there were Gods or not. The opinions of +these philosophers are not only destructive of superstition, which +arises from a vain fear of the Gods, but of religion also, which +consists in a pious adoration of them. + +What think you of those who have asserted that the whole doctrine +concerning the immortal Gods was the invention of politicians, whose +view was to govern that part of the community by religion which reason +could not influence? Are not their opinions subversive of all religion? +Or what religion did Prodicus the Chian leave to men, who held that +everything beneficial to human life should be numbered among the Gods? +Were not they likewise void of religion who taught that the Deities, at +present the object of our prayers and adoration, were valiant, +illustrious, and mighty men who arose to divinity after death? +Euhemerus, whom our Ennius translated, and followed more than other +authors, has particularly advanced this doctrine, and treated of the +deaths and burials of the Gods; can he, then, be said to have confirmed +religion, or, rather, to have totally subverted it? I shall say nothing +of that sacred and august Eleusina, into whose mysteries the most +distant nations were initiated, nor of the solemnities in Samothrace, +or in Lemnos, secretly resorted to by night, and surrounded by thick +and shady groves; which, if they were properly explained, and reduced +to reasonable principles, would rather explain the nature of things +than discover the knowledge of the Gods. + +XLIII. Even that great man Democritus, from whose fountains Epicurus +watered his little garden, seems to me to be very inferior to his usual +acuteness when speaking about the nature of the Gods. For at one time +he thinks that there are images endowed with divinity, inherent in the +universality of things; at another, that the principles and minds +contained in the universe are Gods; then he attributes divinity to +animated images, employing themselves in doing us good or harm; and, +lastly, he speaks of certain images of such vast extent that they +encompass the whole outside of the universe; all which opinions are +more worthy of the country[102] of Democritus than of Democritus +himself; for who can frame in his mind any ideas of such images? who +can admire them? who can think they merit a religious adoration? + +But Epicurus, when he divests the Gods of the power of doing good, +extirpates all religion from the minds of men; for though he says the +divine nature is the best and the most excellent of all natures, he +will not allow it to be susceptible of any benevolence, by which he +destroys the chief and peculiar attribute of the most perfect being. +For what is better and more excellent than goodness and beneficence? To +refuse your Gods that quality is to say that no man is any object of +their favor, and no Gods either; that they neither love nor esteem any +one; in short, that they not only give themselves no trouble about us, +but even look on each other with the greatest indifference. + +XLIV. How much more reasonable is the doctrine of the Stoics, whom you +censure? It is one of their maxims that the wise are friends to the +wise, though unknown to each other; for as nothing is more amiable than +virtue, he who possesses it is worthy our love, to whatever country he +belongs. But what evils do your principles bring, when you make good +actions and benevolence the marks of imbecility! For, not to mention +the power and nature of the Gods, you hold that even men, if they had +no need of mutual assistance, would be neither courteous nor +beneficent. Is there no natural charity in the dispositions of good +men? The very name of love, from which friendship is derived, is dear +to men;[103] and if friendship is to centre in our own advantage only, +without regard to him whom we esteem a friend, it cannot be called +friendship, but a sort of traffic for our own profit. Pastures, lands, +and herds of cattle are valued in the same manner on account of the +profit we gather from them; but charity and friendship expect no +return. How much more reason have we to think that the Gods, who want +nothing, should love each other, and employ themselves about us! If it +were not so, why should we pray to or adore them? Why do the priests +preside over the altars, and the augurs over the auspices? What have we +to ask of the Gods, and why do we prefer our vows to them? + +But Epicurus, you say, has written a book concerning sanctity. A +trifling performance by a man whose wit is not so remarkable in it, as +the unrestrained license of writing which he has permitted himself; for +what sanctity can there be if the Gods take no care of human affairs? +Or how can that nature be called animated which neither regards nor +performs anything? Therefore our friend Posidonius has well observed, +in his fifth book of the Nature of the Gods, that Epicurus believed +there were no Gods, and that what he had said about the immortal Gods +was only said from a desire to avoid unpopularity. He could not be so +weak as to imagine that the Deity has only the outward features of a +simple mortal, without any real solidity; that he has all the members +of a man, without the least power to use them--a certain unsubstantial +pellucid being, neither favorable nor beneficial to any one, neither +regarding nor doing anything. There can be no such being in nature; and +as Epicurus said this plainly, he allows the Gods in words, and +destroys them in fact; and if the Deity is truly such a being that he +shows no favor, no benevolence to mankind, away with him! For why +should I entreat him to be propitious? He can be propitious to none, +since, as you say, all his favor and benevolence are the effects of +imbecility. + + * * * * * + + + + +BOOK II. + + +I. When Cotta had thus concluded, Velleius replied: I certainly was +inconsiderate to engage in argument with an Academician who is likewise +a rhetorician. I should not have feared an Academician without +eloquence, nor a rhetorician without that philosophy, however eloquent +he might be; for I am never puzzled by an empty flow of words, nor by +the most subtle reasonings delivered without any grace of oratory. But +you, Cotta, have excelled in both. You only wanted the assembly and the +judges. However, enough of this at present. Now, let us hear what +Lucilius has to say, if it is agreeable to him. + +I had much rather, says Balbus, hear Cotta resume his discourse, and +demonstrate the true Gods with the same eloquence which he made use of +to explode the false; for, on such a subject, the loose, unsettled +doctrine of the Academy does not become a philosopher, a priest, a +Cotta, whose opinions should be, like those we hold, firm and certain. +Epicurus has been more than sufficiently refuted; but I would willingly +hear your own sentiments, Cotta. + +Do you forget, replies Cotta, what I at first said--that it is easier +for me, especially on this point, to explain what opinions those are +which I do not hold, rather than what those are which I do? Nay, even +if I did feel some certainty on any particular point, yet, after having +been so diffuse myself already, I would prefer now hearing you speak in +your turn. I submit, says Balbus, and will be as brief as I possibly +can; for as you have confuted the errors of Epicurus, my part in the +dispute will be the shorter. Our sect divide the whole question +concerning the immortal Gods into four parts. First, they prove that +there are Gods; secondly, of what character and nature they are; +thirdly, that the universe is governed by them; and, lastly, that they +exercise a superintendence over human affairs. But in this present +discussion let us confine ourselves to the first two articles, and +defer the third and fourth till another opportunity, as they require +more time to discuss. By no means, says Cotta, for we have time enough +on our hands; besides that, we are now discussing a subject which +should be preferred even to serious business. + +II. The first point, then, says Lucilius, I think needs no discourse to +prove it; for what can be so plain and evident, when we behold the +heavens and contemplate the celestial bodies, as the existence of some +supreme, divine intelligence, by which all these things are governed? +Were it otherwise, Ennius would not, with a universal approbation, have +said, + + Look up to the refulgent heaven above, + Which all men call, unanimously, Jove. + +This is Jupiter, the governor of the world, who rules all things with +his nod, and is, as the same Ennius adds, + + ----of Gods and men the sire,[104] + +an omnipresent and omnipotent God. And if any one doubts this, I really +do not understand why the same man may not also doubt whether there is +a sun or not. For what can possibly be more evident than this? And if +it were not a truth universally impressed on the minds of men, the +belief in it would never have been so firm; nor would it have been, as +it is, increased by length of years, nor would it have gathered +strength and stability through every age. And, in truth, we see that +other opinions, being false and groundless, have already fallen into +oblivion by lapse of time. Who now believes in Hippocentaurs and +Chimaeras? Or what old woman is now to be found so weak and ignorant as +to stand in fear of those infernal monsters which once so terrified +mankind? For time destroys the fictions of error and opinion, while it +confirms the determinations of nature and of truth. And therefore it is +that, both among us and among other nations, sacred institutions and +the divine worship of the Gods have been strengthened and improved from +time to time. And this is not to be imputed to chance or folly, but to +the frequent appearance of the Gods themselves. In the war with the +Latins, when A. Posthumius, the dictator, attacked Octavius Mamilius, +the Tusculan, at Regillus, Castor and Pollux were seen fighting in our +army on horseback; and since that the same offspring of Tyndarus gave +notice of the defeat of Perses; for as P. Vatienus, the grandfather of +the present young man of that name, was coming in the night to Rome +from his government of Reate, two young men on white horses appeared to +him, and told him that King[105] Perses was that day taken prisoner. +This news he carried to the senate, who immediately threw him into +prison for speaking inconsiderately on a state affair; but when it was +confirmed by letters from Paullus, he was recompensed by the senate +with land and immunities.[106] Nor do we forget when the Locrians +defeated the people of Crotone, in a great battle on the banks of the +river Sagra, that it was known the same day at the Olympic Games. The +voices of the Fauns have been often heard, and Deities have appeared in +forms so visible that they have compelled every one who is not +senseless, or hardened in impiety, to confess the presence of the Gods. + +III. What do predictions and foreknowledge of future events indicate, +but that such future events are shown, pointed out, portended, and +foretold to men? From whence they are called omens, signs, portents, +prodigies. But though we should esteem fabulous what is said of +Mopsus,[107] Tiresias,[108] Amphiaraus,[109] Calchas,[110] and +Helenus[111] (who would not have been delivered down to us as augurs +even in fable if their art had been despised), may we not be +sufficiently apprised of the power of the Gods by domestic examples? +Will not the temerity of P. Claudius, in the first Punic war, affect +us? who, when the poultry were let out of the coop and would not feed, +ordered them to be thrown into the water, and, joking even upon the +Gods, said, with a sneer, "Let them drink, since they will not eat;" +which piece of ridicule, being followed by a victory over his fleet, +cost him many tears, and brought great calamity on the Roman people. +Did not his colleague Junius, in the same war, lose his fleet in a +tempest by disregarding the auspices? Claudius, therefore, was +condemned by the people, and Junius killed himself. Coelius says that +P. Flaminius, from his neglect of religion, fell at Thrasimenus; a loss +which the public severely felt. By these instances of calamity we may +be assured that Rome owes her grandeur and success to the conduct of +those who were tenacious of their religious duties; and if we compare +ourselves to our neighbors, we shall find that we are infinitely +distinguished above foreign nations by our zeal for religious +ceremonies, though in other things we may be only equal to them, and in +other respects even inferior to them. + +Ought we to contemn Attius Navius's staff, with which he divided the +regions of the vine to find his sow?[112] I should despise it, if I +were not aware that King Hostilius had carried on most important wars +in deference to his auguries; but by the negligence of our nobility the +discipline of the augury is now omitted, the truth of the auspices +despised, and only a mere form observed; so that the most important +affairs of the commonwealth, even the wars, on which the public safety +depends, are conducted without any auspices; the Peremnia[113] are +discussed; no part of the Acumina[114] performed; no select men are +called to witness to the military testaments;[115] our generals now +begin their wars as soon as they have arranged the Auspicia. The force +of religion was so great among our ancestors that some of their +commanders have, with their faces veiled, and with the solemn, formal +expressions of religion, sacrificed themselves to the immortal Gods to +save their country.[116] I could mention many of the Sibylline +prophecies, and many answers of the haruspices, to confirm those +things, which ought not to be doubted. + +IV. For example: our augurs and the Etrurian haruspices saw the truth +of their art established when P. Scipio and C. Figulus were consuls; +for as Tiberius Gracchus, who was a second time consul, wished to +proceed to a fresh election, the first Rogator,[117] as he was +collecting the suffrages, fell down dead on the spot. Gracchus +nevertheless went on with the assembly, but perceiving that this +accident had a religious influence on the people, he brought the affair +before the senate. The senate thought fit to refer it to those who +usually took cognizance of such things. The haruspices were called, and +declared that the man who had acted as Rogator of the assembly had no +right to do so; to which, as I have heard my father say, he replied +with great warmth, Have I no right, who am consul, and augur, and +favored by the Auspicia? And shall you, who are Tuscans and Barbarians, +pretend that you have authority over the Roman Auspicia, and a right to +give judgment in matters respecting the formality of our assemblies? +Therefore, he then commanded them to withdraw; but not long afterward +he wrote from his province[118] to the college of augurs, acknowledging +that in reading the books[119] he remembered that he had illegally +chosen a place for his tent in the gardens of Scipio, and had afterward +entered the Pomoerium, in order to hold a senate, but that in repassing +the same Pomoerium he had forgotten to take the auspices; and that, +therefore, the consuls had been created informally. The augurs laid the +case before the senate. The senate decreed that they should resign +their charge, and so they accordingly abdicated. What greater example +need we seek for? The wisest, perhaps the most excellent of men, chose +to confess his fault, which he might have concealed, rather than leave +the public the least atom of religious guilt; and the consuls chose to +quit the highest office in the State, rather than fill it for a moment +in defiance of religion. How great is the reputation of the augurs! + +And is not the art of the soothsayers divine? And must not every one +who sees what innumerable instances of the same kind there are confess +the existence of the Gods? For they who have interpreters must +certainly exist themselves; now, there are interpreters of the Gods; +therefore we must allow there are Gods. But it may be said, perhaps, +that all predictions are not accomplished. We may as well conclude +there is no art of physic, because all sick persons do not recover. The +Gods show us signs of future events; if we are occasionally deceived in +the results, it is not to be imputed to the nature of the Gods, but to +the conjectures of men. All nations agree that there are Gods; the +opinion is innate, and, as it were, engraved in the minds of all men. +The only point in dispute among us is, what they are. + +V. Their existence no one denies. Cleanthes, one of our sect, imputes +the way in which the idea of the Gods is implanted in the minds of men +to four causes. The first is that which I just now mentioned--the +foreknowledge of future things. The second is the great advantages +which we enjoy from the temperature of the air, the fertility of the +earth, and the abundance of various benefits of other kinds. The third +cause is deduced from the terror with which the mind is affected by +thunder, tempests, storms, snow, hail, devastation, pestilence, +earthquakes often attended with hideous noises, showers of stones, and +rain like drops of blood; by rocks and sudden openings of the earth; by +monstrous births of men and beasts; by meteors in the air, and blazing +stars, by the Greeks called _cometae_, by us _crinitae_, the appearance +of which, in the late Octavian war,[120] were foreboders of great +calamities; by two suns, which, as I have heard my father say, happened +in the consulate of Tuditanus and Aquillius, and in which year also +another sun (P. Africanus) was extinguished. These things terrified +mankind, and raised in them a firm belief of the existence of some +celestial and divine power. + +His fourth cause, and that the strongest, is drawn from the regularity +of the motion and revolution of the heavens, the distinctness, variety, +beauty, and order of the sun, moon, and all the stars, the appearance +only of which is sufficient to convince us they are not the effects of +chance; as when we enter into a house, or school, or court, and observe +the exact order, discipline, and method of it, we cannot suppose that +it is so regulated without a cause, but must conclude that there is +some one who commands, and to whom obedience is paid. It is quite +impossible for us to avoid thinking that the wonderful motions, +revolutions, and order of those many and great bodies, no part of which +is impaired by the countless and infinite succession of ages, must be +governed and directed by some supreme intelligent being. + +VI. Chrysippus, indeed, had a very penetrating genius; yet such is the +doctrine which he delivers, that he seems rather to have been +instructed by nature than to owe it to any discovery of his own. "If," +says he, "there is anything in the universe which no human reason, +ability, or power can make, the being who produced it must certainly be +preferable to man. Now, celestial bodies, and all those things which +proceed in any eternal order, cannot be made by man; the being who made +them is therefore preferable to man. What, then, is that being but a +God? If there be no such thing as a Deity, what is there better than +man, since he only is possessed of reason, the most excellent of all +things? But it is a foolish piece of vanity in man to think there is +nothing preferable to him. There is, therefore, something preferable; +consequently, there is certainly a God." + +When you behold a large and beautiful house, surely no one can persuade +you it was built for mice and weasels, though you do not see the +master; and would it not, therefore, be most manifest folly to imagine +that a world so magnificently adorned, with such an immense variety of +celestial bodies of such exquisite beauty, and that the vast sizes and +magnitude of the sea and land were intended as the abode of man, and +not as the mansion of the immortal Gods? Do we not also plainly see +this, that all the most elevated regions are the best, and that the +earth is the lowest region, and is surrounded with the grossest air? so +that as we perceive that in some cities and countries the capacities of +men are naturally duller, from the thickness of the climate, so mankind +in general are affected by the heaviness of the air which surrounds the +earth, the grossest region of the world. + +Yet even from this inferior intelligence of man we may discover the +existence of some intelligent agent that is divine, and wiser than +ourselves; for, as Socrates says in Xenophon, from whence had man his +portion of understanding? And, indeed, if any one were to push his +inquiries about the moisture and heat which is diffused through the +human body, and the earthy kind of solidity existing in our entrails, +and that soul by which we breathe, and to ask whence we derived them, +it would be plain that we have received one thing from the earth, +another from liquid, another from fire, and another from that air which +we inhale every time that we breathe. + +VII. But where did we find that which excels all these things--I mean +reason, or (if you please, in other terms) the mind, understanding, +thought, prudence; and from whence did we receive it? Shall the world +be possessed of every other perfection, and be destitute of this one, +which is the most important and valuable of all? But certainly there is +nothing better, or more excellent, or more beautiful than the world; +and not only there is nothing better, but we cannot even conceive +anything superior to it; and if reason and wisdom are the greatest of +all perfections, they must necessarily be a part of what we all allow +to be the most excellent. + +Who is not compelled to admit the truth of what I assert by that +agreeable, uniform, and continued agreement of things in the universe? +Could the earth at one season be adorned with flowers, at another be +covered with snow? Or, if such a number of things regulated their own +changes, could the approach and retreat of the sun in the summer and +winter solstices be so regularly known and calculated? Could the flux +and reflux of the sea and the height of the tides be affected by the +increase or wane of the moon? Could the different courses of the stars +be preserved by the uniform movement of the whole heaven? Could these +things subsist, I say, in such a harmony of all the parts of the +universe without the continued influence of a divine spirit? + +If these points are handled in a free and copious manner, as I purpose +to do, they will be less liable to the cavils of the Academics; but the +narrow, confined way in which Zeno reasoned upon them laid them more +open to objection; for as running streams are seldom or never tainted, +while standing waters easily grow corrupt, so a fluency of expression +washes away the censures of the caviller, while the narrow limits of a +discourse which is too concise is almost defenceless; for the arguments +which I am enlarging upon are thus briefly laid down by Zeno: + +VIII. "That which reasons is superior to that which does not; nothing +is superior to the world; the world, therefore, reasons." By the same +rule the world may be proved to be wise, happy, and eternal; for the +possession of all these qualities is superior to the want of them; and +nothing is superior to the world; the inevitable consequence of which +argument is, that the world, therefore, is a Deity. He goes on: "No +part of anything void of sense is capable of perception; some parts of +the world have perception; the world, therefore, has sense." He +proceeds, and pursues the argument closely. "Nothing," says he, "that +is destitute itself of life and reason can generate a being possessed +of life and reason; but the world does generate beings possessed of +life and reason; the world, therefore, is not itself destitute of life +and reason." + +He concludes his argument in his usual manner with a simile: "If +well-tuned pipes should spring out of the olive, would you have the +slightest doubt that there was in the olive-tree itself some kind of +skill and knowledge? Or if the plane-tree could produce harmonious +lutes, surely you would infer, on the same principle, that music was +contained in the plane-tree. Why, then, should we not believe the world +is a living and wise being, since it produces living and wise beings +out of itself?" + +IX. But as I have been insensibly led into a length of discourse beyond +my first design (for I said that, as the existence of the Gods was +evident to all, there was no need of any long oration to prove it), I +will demonstrate it by reasons deduced from the nature of things. For +it is a fact that all beings which take nourishment and increase +contain in themselves a power of natural heat, without which they could +neither be nourished nor increase. For everything which is of a warm +and fiery character is agitated and stirred up by its own motion. But +that which is nourished and grows is influenced by a certain regular +and equable motion. And as long as this motion remains in us, so long +does sense and life remain; but the moment that it abates and is +extinguished, we ourselves decay and perish. + +By arguments like these, Cleanthes shows how great is the power of heat +in all bodies. He observes that there is no food so gross as not to be +digested in a night and a day; and that even in the excrementitious +parts, which nature rejects, there remains a heat. The veins and +arteries seem, by their continual quivering, to resemble the agitation +of fire; and it has often been observed when the heart of an animal is +just plucked from the body that it palpitates with such visible motion +as to resemble the rapidity of fire. Everything, therefore, that has +life, whether it be animal or vegetable, owes that life to the heat +inherent in it; it is this nature of heat which contains in itself the +vital power which extends throughout the whole world. This will appear +more clearly on a more close explanation of this fiery quality, which +pervades all things. + +Every division, then, of the world (and I shall touch upon the most +considerable) is sustained by heat; and first it may be observed in +earthly substances that fire is produced from stones by striking or +rubbing one against another; that "the warm earth smokes"[121] when +just turned up, and that water is drawn warm from well-springs; and +this is most especially the case in the winter season, because there is +a great quantity of heat contained in the caverns of the earth; and +this becomes more dense in the winter, and on that account confines +more closely the innate heat which is discoverable in the earth. + +X. It would require a long dissertation, and many reasons would require +to be adduced, to show that all the seeds which the earth conceives, +and all those which it contains having been generated from itself, and +fixed in roots and trunks, derive all their origin and increase from +the temperature and regulation of heat. And that even every liquor has +a mixture of heat in it is plainly demonstrated by the effusion of +water; for it would not congeal by cold, nor become solid, as ice or +snow, and return again to its natural state, if it were not that, when +heat is applied to it, it again becomes liquefied and dissolved, and so +diffuses itself. Therefore, by northern and other cold winds it is +frozen and hardened, and in turn it dissolves and melts again by heat. +The seas likewise, we find, when agitated by winds, grow warm, so that +from this fact we may understand that there is heat included in that +vast body of water; for we cannot imagine it to be external and +adventitious heat, but such as is stirred up by agitation from the deep +recesses of the seas; and the same thing takes place with respect to +our bodies, which grow warm with motion and exercise. + +And the very air itself, which indeed is the coldest element, is by no +means void of heat; for there is a great quantity, arising from the +exhalations of water, which appears to be a sort of steam occasioned by +its internal heat, like that of boiling liquors. The fourth part of the +universe is entirely fire, and is the source of the salutary and vital +heat which is found in the rest. From hence we may conclude that, as +all parts of the world are sustained by heat, the world itself also has +such a great length of time subsisted from the same cause; and so much +the more, because we ought to understand that that hot and fiery +principle is so diffused over universal nature that there is contained +in it a power and cause of generation and procreation, from which all +animate beings, and all those creatures of the vegetable world, the +roots of which are contained in the earth, must inevitably derive their +origin and their increase. + +XI. It is nature, consequently, that continues and preserves the world, +and that, too, a nature which is not destitute of sense and reason; for +in every essence that is not simple, but composed of several parts, +there must be some predominant quality--as, for instance, the mind in +man, and in beasts something resembling it, from which arise all the +appetites and desires for anything. As for trees, and all the vegetable +produce of the earth, it is thought to be in their roots. I call that +the predominant quality,[122] which the Greeks call [Greek: +hegemonikon]; which must and ought to be the most excellent quality, +wherever it is found. That, therefore, in which the prevailing quality +of all nature resides must be the most excellent of all things, and +most worthy of the power and pre-eminence over all things. + +Now, we see that there is nothing in being that is not a part of the +universe; and as there are sense and reason in the parts of it, there +must therefore be these qualities, and these, too, in a more energetic +and powerful degree, in that part in which the predominant quality of +the world is found. The world, therefore, must necessarily be possessed +of wisdom; and that element, which embraces all things, must excel in +perfection of reason. The world, therefore, is a God, and the whole +power of the world is contained in that divine element. + +The heat also of the world is more pure, clear, and lively, and, +consequently, better adapted to move the senses than the heat allotted +to us; and it vivifies and preserves all things within the compass of +our knowledge. + +It is absurd, therefore, to say that the world, which is endued with a +perfect, free, pure, spirituous, and active heat, is not sensitive, +since by this heat men and beasts are preserved, and move, and think; +more especially since this heat of the world is itself the sole +principle of agitation, and has no external impulse, but is moved +spontaneously; for what can be more powerful than the world, which +moves and raises that heat by which it subsists? + +XII. For let us listen to Plato, who is regarded as a God among +philosophers. He says that there are two sorts of motion, one innate +and the other external; and that that which is moved spontaneously is +more divine than that which is moved by another power. This self-motion +he places in the mind alone, and concludes that the first principle of +motion is derived from the mind. Therefore, since all motion arises +from the heat of the world, and that heat is not moved by the effect of +any external impulse, but of its own accord, it must necessarily be a +mind; from whence it follows that the world is animated. + +On such reasoning is founded this opinion, that the world is possessed +of understanding, because it certainly has more perfections in itself +than any other nature; for as there is no part of our bodies so +considerable as the whole of us, so it is clear that there is no +particular portion of the universe equal in magnitude to the whole of +it; from whence it follows that wisdom must be an attribute of the +world; otherwise man, who is a part of it, and possessed of reason, +would be superior to the entire world. + +And thus, if we proceed from the first rude, unfinished natures to the +most superior and perfect ones, we shall inevitably come at last to the +nature of the Gods. For, in the first place, we observe that those +vegetables which are produced out of the earth are supported by nature, +and she gives them no further supply than is sufficient to preserve +them by nourishing them and making them grow. To beasts she has given +sense and motion, and a faculty which directs them to what is +wholesome, and prompts them to shun what is noxious to them. On man she +has conferred a greater portion of her favor; inasmuch as she has added +reason, by which he is enabled to command his passions, to moderate +some, and to subdue others. + +XIII. In the fourth and highest degree are those beings which are +naturally wise and good, who from the first moment of their existence +are possessed of right and consistent reason, which we must consider +superior to man and deserving to be attributed to a God; that is to +say, to the world, in which it is inevitable that that perfect and +complete reason should be inherent. Nor is it possible that it should +be said with justice that there is any arrangement of things in which +there cannot be something entire and perfect. For as in a vine or in +beasts we see that nature, if not prevented by some superior violence, +proceeds by her own appropriate path to her destined end; and as in +painting, architecture, and the other arts there is a point of +perfection which is attainable, and occasionally attained, so it is +even much more necessary that in universal nature there must be some +complete and perfect result arrived at. Many external accidents may +happen to all other natures which may impede their progress to +perfection, but nothing can hinder universal nature, because she is +herself the ruler and governor of all other natures. That, therefore, +must be the fourth and most elevated degree to which no other power can +approach. + +But this degree is that on which the nature of all things is placed; +and since she is possessed of this, and she presides over all things, +and is subject to no possible impediment, the world must necessarily be +an intelligent and even a wise being. But how marvellously great is the +ignorance of those men who dispute the perfection of that nature which +encircles all things; or who, allowing it to be infinitely perfect, yet +deny it to be, in the first place, animated, then reasonable, and, +lastly, prudent and wise! For how without these qualities could it be +infinitely perfect? If it were like vegetables, or even like beasts, +there would be no more reason for thinking it extremely good than +extremely bad; and if it were possessed of reason, and had not wisdom +from the beginning, the world would be in a worse condition than man; +for man may grow wise, but the world, if it were destitute of wisdom +through an infinite space of time past, could never acquire it. Thus it +would be worse than man. But as that is absurd to imagine, the world +must be esteemed wise from all eternity, and consequently a Deity: +since there is nothing existing that is not defective, except the +universe, which is well provided, and fully complete and perfect in all +its numbers and parts. + +XIV. For Chrysippus says, very acutely, that as the case is made for +the buckler, and the scabbard for the sword, so all things, except the +universe, were made for the sake of something else. As, for instance, +all those crops and fruits which the earth produces were made for the +sake of animals, and animals for man; as, the horse for carrying, the +ox for the plough, the dog for hunting and for a guard. But man himself +was born to contemplate and imitate the world, being in no wise +perfect, but, if I may so express myself, a particle of perfection; but +the world, as it comprehends all, and as nothing exists that is not +contained in it, is entirely perfect. In what, therefore, can it be +defective, since it is perfect? It cannot want understanding and +reason, for they are the most desirable of all qualities. The same +Chrysippus observes also, by the use of similitudes, that everything in +its kind, when arrived at maturity and perfection, is superior to that +which is not--as, a horse to a colt, a dog to a puppy, and a man to a +boy--so whatever is best in the whole universe must exist in some +complete and perfect being. But nothing is more perfect than the world, +and nothing better than virtue. Virtue, therefore, is an attribute of +the world. But human nature is not perfect, and nevertheless virtue is +produced in it: with how much greater reason, then, do we conceive it +to be inherent in the world! Therefore the world has virtue, and it is +also wise, and consequently a Deity. + +XV. The divinity of the world being now clearly perceived, we must +acknowledge the same divinity to be likewise in the stars, which are +formed from the lightest and purest part of the ether, without a +mixture of any other matter; and, being altogether hot and transparent, +we may justly say they have life, sense, and understanding. And +Cleanthes thinks that it may be established by the evidence of two of +our senses--feeling and seeing--that they are entirely fiery bodies; +for the heat and brightness of the sun far exceed any other fire, +inasmuch as it enlightens the whole universe, covering such a vast +extent of space, and its power is such that we perceive that it not +only warms, but often even burns: neither of which it could do if it +were not of a fiery quality. Since, then, says he, the sun is a fiery +body, and is nourished by the vapors of the ocean (for no fire can +continue without some sustenance), it must be either like that fire +which we use to warm us and dress our food, or like that which is +contained in the bodies of animals. + +And this fire, which the convenience of life requires, is the devourer +and consumer of everything, and throws into confusion and destroys +whatever it reaches. On the contrary, the corporeal heat is full of +life, and salutary; and vivifies, preserves, cherishes, increases, and +sustains all things, and is productive of sense; therefore, says he, +there can be no doubt which of these fires the sun is like, since it +causes all things in their respective kinds to flourish and arrive to +maturity; and as the fire of the sun is like that which is contained in +the bodies of animated beings, the sun itself must likewise be +animated, and so must the other stars also, which arise out of the +celestial ardor that we call the sky, or firmament. + +As, then, some animals are generated in the earth, some in the water, +and some in the air, Aristotle[123] thinks it ridiculous to imagine +that no animal is formed in that part of the universe which is the most +capable to produce them. But the stars are situated in the ethereal +space; and as this is an element the most subtle, whose motion is +continual, and whose force does not decay, it follows, of necessity, +that every animated being which is produced in it must be endowed with +the quickest sense and the swiftest motion. The stars, therefore, being +there generated, it is a natural inference to suppose them endued with +such a degree of sense and understanding as places them in the rank of +Gods. + +XVI. For it may be observed that they who inhabit countries of a pure, +clear air have a quicker apprehension and a readier genius than those +who live in a thick, foggy climate. It is thought likewise that the +nature of a man's diet has an effect on the mind; therefore it is +probable that the stars are possessed of an excellent understanding, +inasmuch as they are situated in the ethereal part of the universe, and +are nourished by the vapors of the earth and sea, which are purified by +their long passage to the heavens. But the invariable order and regular +motion of the stars plainly manifest their sense and understanding; for +all motion which seems to be conducted with reason and harmony supposes +an intelligent principle, that does not act blindly, or inconsistently, +or at random. And this regularity and consistent course of the stars +from all eternity indicates not any natural order, for it is pregnant +with sound reason, not fortune (for fortune, being a friend to change, +despises consistency). It follows, therefore, that they move +spontaneously by their own sense and divinity. + +Aristotle also deserves high commendation for his observation that +everything that moves is either put in motion by natural impulse, or by +some external force, or of its own accord; and that the sun, and moon, +and all the stars move; but that those things which are moved by +natural impulse are either borne downward by their weight, or upward by +their lightness; neither of which things could be the case with the +stars, because they move in a regular circle and orbit. Nor can it be +said that there is some superior force which causes the stars to be +moved in a manner contrary to nature. For what superior force can there +be? It follows, therefore, that their motion must be voluntary. And +whoever is convinced of this must discover not only great ignorance, +but great impiety likewise, if he denies the existence of the Gods; nor +is the difference great whether a man denies their existence, or +deprives them of all design and action; for whatever is wholly inactive +seems to me not to exist at all. Their existence, therefore, appears so +plain that I can scarcely think that man in his senses who denies it. + +XVII. It now remains that we consider what is the character of the +Gods. Nothing is more difficult than to divert our thoughts and +judgment from the information of our corporeal sight, and the view of +objects which our eyes are accustomed to; and it is this difficulty +which has had such an influence on the unlearned, and on +philosophers[124] also who resembled the unlearned multitude, that they +have been unable to form any idea of the immortal Gods except under the +clothing of the human figure; the weakness of which opinion Cotta has +so well confuted that I need not add my thoughts upon it. But as the +previous idea which we have of the Deity comprehends two things--first +of all, that he is an animated being; secondly, that there is nothing +in all nature superior to him--I do not see what can be more consistent +with this idea and preconception than to attribute a mind and divinity +to the world,[125] the most excellent of all beings. + +Epicurus may be as merry with this notion as he pleases; a man not the +best qualified for a joker, as not having the wit and sense of his +country.[126] Let him say that a voluble round Deity is to him +incomprehensible; yet he shall never dissuade me from a principle which +he himself approves, for he is of opinion there are Gods when he allows +that there must be a nature excellently perfect. But it is certain that +the world is most excellently perfect: nor is it to be doubted that +whatever has life, sense, reason, and understanding must excel that +which is destitute of these things. It follows, then, that the world +has life, sense, reason, and understanding, and is consequently a +Deity. But this shall soon be made more manifest by the operation of +these very things which the world causes. + +XVIII. In the mean while, Velleius, let me entreat you not to be always +saying that we are utterly destitute of every sort of learning. The +cone, you say, the cylinder, and the pyramid, are more beautiful to you +than the sphere. This is to have different eyes from other men. But +suppose they are more beautiful to the sight only, which does not +appear to me, for I can see nothing more beautiful than that figure +which contains all others, and which has nothing rough in it, nothing +offensive, nothing cut into angles, nothing broken, nothing swelling, +and nothing hollow; yet as there are two forms most esteemed,[127] the +globe in solids (for so the Greek word [Greek: sphaira], I think, +should be construed), and the circle, or orb, in planes (in Greek, +[Greek: kyklos]); and as they only have an exact similitude of parts in +which every extreme is equally distant from the centre, what can we +imagine in nature to be more just and proper? But if you have never +raked into this learned dust[128] to find out these things, surely, at +all events, you natural philosophers must know that equality of motion +and invariable order could not be preserved in any other figure. +Nothing, therefore, can be more illiterate than to assert, as you are +in the habit of doing, that it is doubtful whether the world is round +or not, because it may possibly be of another shape, and that there are +innumerable worlds of different forms; which Epicurus, if he ever had +learned that two and two are equal to four, would not have said. But +while he judges of what is best by his palate, he does not look up to +the "palace of heaven," as Ennius calls it. + +XIX. For as there are two sorts of stars,[129] one kind of which +measure their journey from east to west by immutable stages, never in +the least varying from their usual course, while the other completes a +double revolution with an equally constant regularity; from each of +these facts we demonstrate the volubility of the world (which could not +possibly take place in any but a globular form) and the circular orbits +of the stars. And first of all the sun, which has the chief rank among +all the stars, is moved in such a manner that it fills the whole earth +with its light, and illuminates alternately one part of the earth, +while it leaves the other in darkness. The shadow of the earth +interposing causes night; and the intervals of night are equal to those +of day. And it is the regular approaches and retreats of the sun from +which arise the regulated degrees of cold and heat. His annual circuit +is in three hundred and sixty-five days, and nearly six hours +more.[130] At one time he bends his course to the north, at another to +the south, and thus produces summer and winter, with the other two +seasons, one of which succeeds the decline of winter, and the other +that of summer. And so to these four changes of the seasons we +attribute the origin and cause of all the productions both of sea and +land. + +The moon completes the same course every month which the sun does in a +year. The nearer she approaches to the sun, the dimmer light does she +yield, and when most remote from it she shines with the fullest +brilliancy; nor are her figure and form only changed in her wane, but +her situation likewise, which is sometimes in the north and sometimes +in the south. By this course she has a sort of summer and winter +solstices; and by her influence she contributes to the nourishment and +increase of animated beings, and to the ripeness and maturity of all +vegetables. + +XX. But most worthy our admiration is the motion of those five stars +which are falsely called wandering stars; for they cannot be said to +wander which keep from all eternity their approaches and retreats, and +have all the rest of their motions, in one regular constant and +established order. What is yet more wonderful in these stars which we +are speaking of is that sometimes they appear, and sometimes they +disappear; sometimes they advance towards the sun, and sometimes they +retreat; sometimes they precede him, and sometimes follow him; +sometimes they move faster, sometimes slower, and sometimes they do not +stir in the least, but for a while stand still. From these unequal +motions of the planets, mathematicians have called that the "great +year"[131] in which the sun, moon, and five wandering stars, having +finished their revolutions, are found in their original situation. In +how long a time this is effected is much disputed, but it must be a +certain and definite period. For the planet Saturn (called by the +Greeks [Greek: Phainon]), which is farthest from the earth, finishes +his course in about thirty years; and in his course there is something +very singular, for sometimes he moves before the sun, sometimes he +keeps behind it; at one time lying hidden in the night, at another +again appearing in the morning; and ever performing the same motions in +the same space of time without any alteration, so as to be for infinite +ages regular in these courses. Beneath this planet, and nearer the +earth, is Jupiter, called [Greek: Phaethon], which passes the same +orbit of the twelve signs[132] in twelve years, and goes through +exactly the same variety in its course that the star of Saturn does. +Next to Jupiter is the planet Mars (in Greek, [Greek: Pyroeis]), which +finishes its revolution through the same orbit as the two previously +mentioned,[133] in twenty-four months, wanting six days, as I imagine. +Below this is Mercury (called by the Greeks [Greek: Stilbon]), which +performs the same course in little less than a year, and is never +farther distant from the sun than the space of one sign, whether it +precedes or follows it. The lowest of the five planets, and nearest the +earth, is that of Venus (called in Greek [Greek: Phosphoros]). Before +the rising of the sun, it is called the morning-star, and after the +setting, the evening-star. It has the same revolution through the +zodiac, both as to latitude and longitude, with the other planets, in a +year, and never is more than two[134] signs from the sun, whether it +precedes or follows it. + +XXI. I cannot, therefore, conceive that this constant course of the +planets, this just agreement in such various motions through all +eternity, can be preserved without a mind, reason, and consideration; +and since we may perceive these qualities in the stars, we cannot but +place them in the rank of Gods. Those which are called the fixed stars +have the same indications of reason and prudence. Their motion is +daily, regular, and constant. They do not move with the sky, nor have +they an adhesion to the firmament, as they who are ignorant of natural +philosophy affirm. For the sky, which is thin, transparent, and +suffused with an equal heat, does not seem by its nature to have power +to whirl about the stars, or to be proper to contain them. The fixed +stars, therefore, have their own sphere, separate and free from any +conjunction with the sky. Their perpetual courses, with that admirable +and incredible regularity of theirs, so plainly declare a divine power +and mind to be in them, that he who cannot perceive that they are also +endowed with divine power must be incapable of all perception whatever. + +In the heavens, therefore, there is nothing fortuitous, unadvised, +inconstant, or variable: all there is order, truth, reason, and +constancy; and all the things which are destitute of these qualities +are counterfeit, deceitful, and erroneous, and have their residence +about the earth[135] beneath the moon, the lowest of all the planets. +He, therefore, who believes that this admirable order and almost +incredible regularity of the heavenly bodies, by which the preservation +and entire safety of all things is secured, is destitute of +intelligence, must be considered to be himself wholly destitute of all +intellect whatever. + +I think, then, I shall not deceive myself in maintaining this dispute +upon the principle of Zeno, who went the farthest in his search after +truth. + +XXII. Zeno, then, defines nature to be "an artificial fire, proceeding +in a regular way to generation;" for he thinks that to create and beget +are especial properties of art, and that whatever may be wrought by the +hands of our artificers is much more skilfully performed by nature, +that is, by this artificial fire, which is the master of all other +arts. + +According to this manner of reasoning, every particular nature is +artificial, as it operates agreeably to a certain method peculiar to +itself; but that universal nature which embraces all things is said by +Zeno to be not only artificial, but absolutely the artificer, ever +thinking and providing all things useful and proper; and as every +particular nature owes its rise and increase to its own proper seed, so +universal nature has all her motions voluntary, has affections and +desires (by the Greeks called [Greek: hormas]) productive of actions +agreeable to them, like us, who have sense and understanding to direct +us. Such, then, is the intelligence of the universe; for which reason +it may be properly termed prudence or providence (in Greek, [Greek: +pronoia]), since her chiefest care and employment is to provide all +things fit for its duration, that it may want nothing, and, above all, +that it may be adorned with all perfection of beauty and ornament. + +XXIII. Thus far have I spoken concerning the universe, and also of the +stars; from whence it is apparent that there is almost an infinite +number of Gods, always in action, but without labor or fatigue; for +they are not composed of veins, nerves, and bones; their food and drink +are not such as cause humors too gross or too subtle; nor are their +bodies such as to be subject to the fear of falls or blows, or in +danger of diseases from a weariness of limbs. Epicurus, to secure his +Gods from such accidents, has made them only outlines of Deities, void +of action; but our Gods being of the most beautiful form, and situated +in the purest region of the heavens, dispose and rule their course in +such a manner that they seem to contribute to the support and +preservation of all things. + +Besides these, there are many other natures which have with reason been +deified by the wisest Grecians, and by our ancestors, in consideration +of the benefits derived from them; for they were persuaded that +whatever was of great utility to human kind must proceed from divine +goodness, and the name of the Deity was applied to that which the Deity +produced, as when we call corn Ceres, and wine Bacchus; whence that +saying of Terence,[136] + + Without Ceres and Bacchus, Venus starves. + +And any quality, also, in which there was any singular virtue was +nominated a Deity, such as Faith and Wisdom, which are placed among the +divinities in the Capitol; the last by AEmilius Scaurus, but Faith was +consecrated before by Atilius Calatinus. You see the temple of Virtue +and that of Honor repaired by M. Marcellus, erected formerly, in the +Ligurian war, by Q. Maximus. Need I mention those dedicated to Help, +Safety, Concord, Liberty, and Victory, which have been called Deities, +because their efficacy has been so great that it could not have +proceeded from any but from some divine power? In like manner are the +names of Cupid, Voluptas, and of Lubentine Venus consecrated, though +they were things vicious and not natural, whatever Velleius may think +to the contrary, for they frequently stimulate nature in too violent a +manner. Everything, then, from which any great utility proceeded was +deified; and, indeed, the names I have just now mentioned are +declaratory of the particular virtue of each Deity. + +XXIV. It has been a general custom likewise, that men who have done +important service to the public should be exalted to heaven by fame and +universal consent. Thus Hercules, Castor and Pollux, AEsculapius, and +Liber became Gods (I mean Liber[137] the son of Semele, and not +him[138] whom our ancestors consecrated in such state and solemnity +with Ceres and Libera; the difference in which may be seen in our +Mysteries.[139] But because the offsprings of our bodies are called +"Liberi" (children), therefore the offsprings of Ceres are called Liber +and Libera (Libera[140] is the feminine, and Liber the masculine); thus +likewise Romulus, or Quirinus--for they are thought to be the +same--became a God. + +They are justly esteemed as Deities, since their souls subsist and +enjoy eternity, from whence they are perfect and immortal beings. + +There is another reason, too, and that founded on natural philosophy, +which has greatly contributed to the number of Deities; namely, the +custom of representing in human form a crowd of Gods who have supplied +the poets with fables, and filled mankind with all sorts of +superstition. Zeno has treated of this subject, but it has been +discussed more at length by Cleanthes and Chrysippus. All Greece was of +opinion that Coelum was castrated by his son Saturn,[141] and that +Saturn was chained by his son Jupiter. In these impious fables, a +physical and not inelegant meaning is contained; for they would denote +that the celestial, most exalted, and ethereal nature--that is, the +fiery nature, which produces all things by itself--is destitute of that +part of the body which is necessary for the act of generation by +conjunction with another. + +XXV. By Saturn they mean that which comprehends the course and +revolution of times and seasons; the Greek name for which Deity implies +as much, for he is called [Greek: Kronos,] which is the same with +[Greek: Chronos], that is, a "space of time." But he is called Saturn, +because he is filled (_saturatur_) with years; and he is usually +feigned to have devoured his children, because time, ever insatiable, +consumes the rolling years; but to restrain him from immoderate haste, +Jupiter has confined him to the course of the stars, which are as +chains to him. Jupiter (that is, _juvans pater_) signifies a "helping +father," whom, by changing the cases, we call Jove,[142] _a juvando_. +The poets call him "father of Gods and men;"[143] and our ancestors +"the most good, the most great;" and as there is something more +glorious in itself, and more agreeable to others, to be good (that is, +beneficent) than to be great, the title of "most good" precedes that of +"most great." This, then, is he whom Ennius means in the following +passage, before quoted-- + + Look up to the refulgent heaven above, + Which all men call, unanimously, Jove: + +which is more plainly expressed than in this other passage[144] of the +same poet-- + + On whose account I'll curse that flood of light, + Whate'er it is above that shines so bright. + +Our augurs also mean the same, when, for the "thundering and lightning +heaven," they say the "thundering and lightning Jove." Euripides, among +many excellent things, has this: + + The vast, expanded, boundless sky behold, + See it with soft embrace the earth enfold; + This own the chief of Deities above, + And this acknowledge by the name of Jove. + +XXVI. The air, according to the Stoics, which is between the sea and +the heaven, is consecrated by the name of Juno, and is called the +sister and wife of Jove, because it resembles the sky, and is in close +conjunction with it. They have made it feminine, because there is +nothing softer. But I believe it is called Juno, _a juvando_ (from +helping). + +To make three separate kingdoms, by fable, there remained yet the water +and the earth. The dominion of the sea is given, therefore, to Neptune, +a brother, as he is called, of Jove; whose name, Neptunus--as +_Portunus, a portu_, from a port--is derived _a nando_ (from swimming), +the first letters being a little changed. The sovereignty and power +over the earth is the portion of a God, to whom we, as well as the +Greeks, have given a name that denotes riches (in Latin, _Dis_; in +Greek, [Greek: Plouton]), because all things arise from the earth and +return to it. He forced away Proserpine (in Greek called [Greek: +Persephone]), by which the poets mean the "seed of corn," from whence +comes their fiction of Ceres, the mother of Proserpine, seeking for her +daughter, who was hidden from her. She is called Ceres, which is the +same as Geres--_a gerendis frugibus_[145]--"from bearing fruit," the +first letter of the word being altered after the manner of the Greeks, +for by them she is called [Greek: Demeter], the same as [Greek: +Gemeter].[146] Again, he (_qui magna vorteret_) "who brings about +mighty changes" is called Mavors; and Minerva is so called because +(_minueret_, or _minaretur_) she diminishes or menaces. + +XXVII. And as the beginnings and endings of all things are of the +greatest importance, therefore they would have their sacrifices to +begin with Janus.[147] His name is derived _ab eundo_, from passing; +from whence thorough passages are called _jani_, and the outward doors +of common houses are called _januae_. The name of Vesta is, from the +Greeks, the same with their [Greek: Hestia]. Her province is over +altars and hearths; and in the name of this Goddess, who is the keeper +of all things within, prayers and sacrifices are concluded. The _Dii +Penates_, "household Gods," have some affinity with this power, and are +so called either from _penus_, "all kind of human provisions," or +because _penitus insident_ (they reside within), from which, by the +poets, they are called _penetrales_ also. Apollo, a Greek name, is +called _Sol_, the sun; and Diana, _Luna_, the moon. The sun (_sol_) is +so named either because he is _solus_ (alone), so eminent above all the +stars; or because he obscures all the stars, and appears alone as soon +as he rises. _Luna_, the moon, is so called _a lucendo_ (from shining); +she bears the name also of Lucina: and as in Greece the women in labor +invoke Diana Lucifera, so here they invoke Juno Lucina. She is likewise +called Diana _omnivaga_, not _a venando_ (from hunting), but because +she is reckoned one of the seven stars that seem to wander.[148] She is +called Diana because she makes a kind of day of the night;[149] and +presides over births, because the delivery is effected sometimes in +seven, or at most in nine, courses of the moon; which, because they +make _mensa spatia_ (measured spaces), are called _menses_ (months). +This occasioned a pleasant observation of Timaeus (as he has many). +Having said in his history that "the same night in which Alexander was +born, the temple of Diana at Ephesus was burned down," he adds, "It is +not in the least to be wondered at, because Diana, being willing to +assist at the labor of Olympias,[150] was absent from home." But to +this Goddess, because _ad res omnes veniret_--"she has an influence +upon all things"--we have given the appellation of Venus,[151] from +whom the word _venustas_ (beauty) is rather derived than Venus from +_venustas_. + +XXVIII. Do you not see, therefore, how, from the productions of nature +and the useful inventions of men, have arisen fictitious and imaginary +Deities, which have been the foundation of false opinions, pernicious +errors, and wretched superstitions? For we know how the different forms +of the Gods--their ages, apparel, ornaments; their pedigrees, +marriages, relations, and everything belonging to them--are adapted to +human weakness and represented with our passions; with lust, sorrow, +and anger, according to fabulous history: they have had wars and +combats, not only, as Homer relates, when they have interested +themselves in two different armies, but when they have fought battles +in their own defence against the Titans and giants. These stories, of +the greatest weakness and levity, are related and believed with the +most implicit folly. + +But, rejecting these fables with contempt, a Deity is diffused in every +part of nature; in earth under the name of Ceres, in the sea under the +name of Neptune, in other parts under other names. Yet whatever they +are, and whatever characters and dispositions they have, and whatever +name custom has given them, we are bound to worship and adore them. The +best, the chastest, the most sacred and pious worship of the Gods is to +reverence them always with a pure, perfect, and unpolluted mind and +voice; for our ancestors, as well as the philosophers, have separated +superstition from religion. They who prayed whole days and sacrificed, +that their children might survive them (_ut superstites essent_), were +called superstitious, which word became afterward more general; but +they who diligently perused, and, as we may say, read or practised over +again, all the duties relating to the worship of the Gods, were called +_religiosi_--religious, from _relegendo_--"reading over again, or +practising;" as _elegantes_, elegant, _ex eligendo_, "from choosing, +making a good choice;" _diligentes_, diligent, _ex diligendo_, "from +attending on what we love;" _intelligentes_, intelligent, from +understanding--for the signification is derived in the same manner. +Thus are the words superstitious and religious understood; the one +being a term of reproach, the other of commendation. I think I have now +sufficiently demonstrated that there are Gods, and what they are. + +XXIX. I am now to show that the world is governed by the providence of +the Gods. This is an important point, which you Academics endeavor to +confound; and, indeed, the whole contest is with you, Cotta; for your +sect, Velleius, know very little of what is said on different subjects +by other schools. You read and have a taste only for your own books, +and condemn all others without examination. For instance, when you +mentioned yesterday[152] that prophetic old dame [Greek: Pronoia], +Providence, invented by the Stoics, you were led into that error by +imagining that Providence was made by them to be a particular Deity +that governs the whole universe, whereas it is only spoken in a short +manner; as when it is said "The commonwealth of Athens is governed by +the council," it is meant "of the Areopagus;"[153] so when we say "The +world is governed by providence," we mean "by the providence of the +Gods." To express ourselves, therefore, more fully and clearly, we say, +"The world is governed by the providence of the Gods." Be not, +therefore, lavish of your railleries, of which your sect has little to +spare: if I may advise you, do not attempt it. It does not become you, +it is not your talent, nor is it in your power. This is not applied to +you in particular who have the education and politeness of a Roman, but +to all your sect in general, and especially to your leader[154]--a man +unpolished, illiterate, insulting, without wit, without reputation, +without elegance. + +XXX. I assert, then, that the universe, with all its parts, was +originally constituted, and has, without any cessation, been ever +governed by the providence of the Gods. This argument we Stoics +commonly divide into three parts; the first of which is, that the +existence of the Gods being once known, it must follow that the world +is governed by their wisdom; the second, that as everything is under +the direction of an intelligent nature, which has produced that +beautiful order in the world, it is evident that it is formed from +animating principles; the third is deduced from those glorious works +which we behold in the heavens and the earth. + +First, then, we must either deny the existence of the Gods (as +Democritus and Epicurus by their doctrine of images in some sort do), +or, if we acknowledge that there are Gods, we must believe they are +employed, and that, too, in something excellent. Now, nothing is so +excellent as the administration of the universe. The universe, +therefore, is governed by the wisdom of the Gods. Otherwise, we must +imagine that there is some cause superior to the Deity, whether it be a +nature inanimate, or a necessity agitated by a mighty force, that +produces those beautiful works which we behold. The nature of the Gods +would then be neither supreme nor excellent, if you subject it to that +necessity or to that nature, by which you would make the heaven, the +earth, and the seas to be governed. But there is nothing superior to +the Deity; the world, therefore, must be governed by him: consequently, +the Deity is under no obedience or subjection to nature, but does +himself rule over all nature. In effect, if we allow the Gods have +understanding, we allow also their providence, which regards the most +important things; for, can they be ignorant of those important things, +and how they are to be conducted and preserved, or do they want power +to sustain and direct them? Ignorance is inconsistent with the nature +of the Gods, and imbecility is repugnant to their majesty. From whence +it follows, as we assert, that the world is governed by the providence +of the Gods. + +XXXI. But supposing, which is incontestable, that there are Gods, they +must be animated, and not only animated, but endowed with +reason--united, as we may say, in a civil agreement and society, and +governing together one universe, as a republic or city. Thus the same +reason, the same verity, the same law, which ordains good and prohibits +evil, exists in the Gods as it does in men. From them, consequently, we +have prudence and understanding, for which reason our ancestors erected +temples to the Mind, Faith, Virtue, and Concord. Shall we not then +allow the Gods to have these perfections, since we worship the sacred +and august images of them? But if understanding, faith, virtue, and +concord reside in human kind, how could they come on earth, unless from +heaven? And if we are possessed of wisdom, reason, and prudence, the +Gods must have the same qualities in a greater degree; and not only +have them, but employ them in the best and greatest works. The universe +is the best and greatest work; therefore it must be governed by the +wisdom and providence of the Gods. + +Lastly, as we have sufficiently shown that those glorious and luminous +bodies which we behold are Deities--I mean the sun, the moon, the fixed +and wandering stars, the firmament, and the world itself, and those +other things also which have any singular virtue, and are of any great +utility to human kind--it follows that all things are governed by +providence and a divine mind. But enough has been said on the first +part. + +XXXII. It is now incumbent on me to prove that all things are subjected +to nature, and most beautifully directed by her. But, first of all, it +is proper to explain precisely what that nature is, in order to come to +the more easy understanding of what I would demonstrate. Some think +that nature is a certain irrational power exciting in bodies the +necessary motions. Others, that it is an intelligent power, acting by +order and method, designing some end in every cause, and always aiming +at that end, whose works express such skill as no art, no hand, can +imitate; for, they say, such is the virtue of its seed, that, however +small it is, if it falls into a place proper for its reception, and +meets with matter conducive to its nourishment and increase, it forms +and produces everything in its respective kind; either vegetables, +which receive their nourishment from their roots; or animals, endowed +with motion, sense, appetite, and abilities to beget their likeness. + +Some apply the word nature to everything; as Epicurus does, who +acknowledges no cause, but atoms, a vacuum, and their accidents. But +when we[155] say that nature forms and governs the world, we do not +apply it to a clod of earth, or piece of stone, or anything of that +sort, whose parts have not the necessary cohesion,[156] but to a tree, +in which there is not the appearance of chance, but of order and a +resemblance of art. + +XXXIII. But if the art of nature gives life and increase to vegetables, +without doubt it supports the earth itself; for, being impregnated with +seeds, she produces every kind of vegetable, and embracing their roots, +she nourishes and increases them; while, in her turn, she receives her +nourishment from the other elements, and by her exhalations gives +proper sustenance to the air, the sky, and all the superior bodies. If +nature gives vigor and support to the earth, by the same reason she has +an influence over the rest of the world; for as the earth gives +nourishment to vegetables, so the air is the preservation of animals. +The air sees with us, hears with us, and utters sounds with us; without +it, there would be no seeing, hearing, or sounding. It even moves with +us; for wherever we go, whatever motion we make, it seems to retire and +give place to us. + +That which inclines to the centre, that which rises from it to the +surface, and that which rolls about the centre, constitute the +universal world, and make one entire nature; and as there are four +sorts of bodies, the continuance of nature is caused by their +reciprocal changes; for the water arises from the earth, the air from +the water, and the fire from the air; and, reversing this order, the +air arises from fire, the water from the air, and from the water the +earth, the lowest of the four elements, of which all beings are formed. +Thus by their continual motions backward and forward, upward and +downward, the conjunction of the several parts of the universe is +preserved; a union which, in the beauty we now behold it, must be +eternal, or at least of a very long duration, and almost for an +infinite space of time; and, whichever it is, the universe must of +consequence be governed by nature. For what art of navigating fleets, +or of marshalling an army, and--to instance the produce of nature--what +vine, what tree, what animated form and conformation of their members, +give us so great an indication of skill as appears in the universe? +Therefore we must either deny that there is the least trace of an +intelligent nature, or acknowledge that the world is governed by it. +But since the universe contains all particular beings, as well as their +seeds, can we say that it is not itself governed by nature? That would +be the same as saying that the teeth and the beard of man are the work +of nature, but that the man himself is not. Thus the effect would be +understood to be greater than the cause. + +XXXIV. Now, the universe sows, as I may say, plants, produces, raises, +nourishes, and preserves what nature administers, as members and parts +of itself. If nature, therefore, governs them, she must also govern the +universe. And, lastly, in nature's administration there is nothing +faulty. She produced the best possible effect out of those elements +which existed. Let any one show how it could have been better. But that +can never be; and whoever attempts to mend it will either make it +worse, or aim at impossibilities. + +But if all the parts of the universe are so constituted that nothing +could be better for use or beauty, let us consider whether this is the +effect of chance, or whether, in such a state they could possibly +cohere, but by the direction of wisdom and divine providence. Nature, +therefore, cannot be void of reason, if art can bring nothing to +perfection without it, and if the works of nature exceed those of art. +How is it consistent with common-sense that when you view an image or a +picture, you imagine it is wrought by art; when you behold afar off a +ship under sail, you judge it is steered by reason and art; when you +see a dial or water-clock,[157] you believe the hours are shown by art, +and not by chance; and yet that you should imagine that the universe, +which contains all arts and the artificers, can be void of reason and +understanding? + +But if that sphere which was lately made by our friend Posidonius, the +regular revolutions of which show the course of the sun, moon, and five +wandering stars, as it is every day and night performed, were carried +into Scythia or Britain, who, in those barbarous countries, would doubt +that that sphere had been made so perfect by the exertion of reason? + +XXXV. Yet these people[158] doubt whether the universe, from whence all +things arise and are made, is not the effect of chance, or some +necessity, rather than the work of reason and a divine mind. According +to them, Archimedes shows more knowledge in representing the motions of +the celestial globe than nature does in causing them, though the copy +is so infinitely beneath the original. The shepherd in Attius,[159] who +had never seen a ship, when he perceived from a mountain afar off the +divine vessel of the Argonauts, surprised and frighted at this new +object, expressed himself in this manner: + + What horrid bulk is that before my eyes, + Which o'er the deep with noise and vigor flies? + It turns the whirlpools up, its force so strong, + And drives the billows as it rolls along. + The ocean's violence it fiercely braves; + Runs furious on, and throws about the waves. + Swiftly impetuous in its course, and loud, + Like the dire bursting of a show'ry cloud; + Or, like a rock, forced by the winds and rain, + Now whirl'd aloft, then plunged into the main. + But hold! perhaps the Earth and Neptune jar, + And fiercely wage an elemental war; + Or Triton with his trident has o'erthrown + His den, and loosen'd from the roots the stone; + The rocky fragment, from the bottom torn, + Is lifted up, and on the surface borne. + +At first he is in suspense at the sight of this unknown object; but on +seeing the young mariners, and hearing their singing, he says, + + Like sportive dolphins, with their snouts they roar;[160] + +and afterward goes on, + + Loud in my ears methinks their voices ring, + As if I heard the God Sylvanus sing. + +As at first view the shepherd thinks he sees something inanimate and +insensible, but afterward, judging by more trustworthy indications, he +begins to figure to himself what it is; so philosophers, if they are +surprised at first at the sight of the universe, ought, when they have +considered the regular, uniform, and immutable motions of it, to +conceive that there is some Being that is not only an inhabitant of +this celestial and divine mansion, but a ruler and a governor, as +architect of this mighty fabric. + +XXXVI. Now, in my opinion, they[161] do not seem to have even the least +suspicion that the heavens and earth afford anything marvellous. For, +in the first place, the earth is situated in the middle part of the +universe, and is surrounded on all sides by the air, which we breathe, +and which is called "aer,"[162] which, indeed, is a Greek word; but by +constant use it is well understood by our countrymen, for, indeed, it +is employed as a Latin word. The air is encompassed by the boundless +ether (sky), which consists of the fires above. This word we borrow +also, for we use _aether_ in Latin as well as _aer;_ though Pacuvius +thus expresses it, + + --This, of which I speak, + In Latin's _coelum_, _aether_ call'd in Greek. + +As though he were not a Greek into whose mouth he puts this sentence; +but he is speaking in Latin, though we listen as if he were speaking +Greek; for, as he says elsewhere, + + His speech discovers him a Grecian born. + +But to return to more important matters. In the sky innumerable fiery +stars exist, of which the sun is the chief, enlightening all with his +refulgent splendor, and being by many degrees larger than the whole +earth; and this multitude of vast fires are so far from hurting the +earth, and things terrestrial, that they are of benefit to them; +whereas, if they were moved from their stations, we should inevitably +be burned through the want of a proper moderation and temperature of +heat. + +XXXVII. Is it possible for any man to behold these things, and yet +imagine that certain solid and individual bodies move by their natural +force and gravitation, and that a world so beautifully adorned was made +by their fortuitous concourse? He who believes this may as well believe +that if a great quantity of the one-and-twenty letters, composed either +of gold or any other matter, were thrown upon the ground, they would +fall into such order as legibly to form the Annals of Ennius. I doubt +whether fortune could make a single verse of them. How, therefore, can +these people assert that the world was made by the fortuitous concourse +of atoms, which have no color, no quality--which the Greeks call +[Greek: poiotes], no sense? or that there are innumerable worlds, some +rising and some perishing, in every moment of time? But if a concourse +of atoms can make a world, why not a porch, a temple, a house, a city, +which are works of less labor and difficulty? + +Certainly those men talk so idly and inconsiderately concerning this +lower world that they appear to me never to have contemplated the +wonderful magnificence of the heavens; which is the next topic for our +consideration. + +Well, then, did Aristotle[163] observe: "If there were men whose +habitations had been always underground, in great and commodious +houses, adorned with statues and pictures, furnished with everything +which they who are reputed happy abound with; and if, without stirring +from thence, they should be informed of a certain divine power and +majesty, and, after some time, the earth should open, and they should +quit their dark abode to come to us, where they should immediately +behold the earth, the seas, the heavens; should consider the vast +extent of the clouds and force of the winds; should see the sun, and +observe his grandeur and beauty, and also his generative power, +inasmuch as day is occasioned by the diffusion of his light through the +sky; and when night has obscured the earth, they should contemplate the +heavens bespangled and adorned with stars, the surprising variety of +the moon in her increase and wane, the rising and setting of all the +stars, and the inviolable regularity of their courses; when," says he, +"they should see these things, they would undoubtedly conclude that +there are Gods, and that these are their mighty works." + +XXXVIII. Thus far Aristotle. Let us imagine, also, as great darkness as +was formerly occasioned by the irruption of the fires of Mount AEtna, +which are said to have obscured the adjacent countries for two days to +such a degree that no man could recognize his fellow; but on the third, +when the sun appeared, they seemed to be risen from the dead. Now, if +we should be suddenly brought from a state of eternal darkness to see +the light, how beautiful would the heavens seem! But our minds have +become used to it from the daily practice and habituation of our eyes, +nor do we take the trouble to search into the principles of what is +always in view; as if the novelty, rather than the importance, of +things ought to excite us to investigate their causes. + +Is he worthy to be called a man who attributes to chance, not to an +intelligent cause, the constant motion of the heavens, the regular +courses of the stars, the agreeable proportion and connection of all +things, conducted with so much reason that our intellect itself is +unable to estimate it rightly? When we see machines move artificially, +as a sphere, a clock, or the like, do we doubt whether they are the +productions of reason? And when we behold the heavens moving with a +prodigious celerity, and causing an annual succession of the different +seasons of the year, which vivify and preserve all things, can we doubt +that this world is directed, I will not say only by reason, but by +reason most excellent and divine? For without troubling ourselves with +too refined a subtlety of discussion, we may use our eyes to +contemplate the beauty of those things which we assert have been +arranged by divine providence. + +XXXIX. First, let us examine the earth, whose situation is in the +middle of the universe,[164] solid, round, and conglobular by its +natural tendency; clothed with flowers, herbs, trees, and fruits; the +whole in multitudes incredible, and with a variety suitable to every +taste: let us consider the ever-cool and running springs, the clear +waters of the rivers, the verdure of their banks, the hollow depths of +caves, the cragginess of rocks, the heights of impending mountains, and +the boundless extent of plains, the hidden veins of gold and silver, +and the infinite quarries of marble. + +What and how various are the kinds of animals, tame or wild? The +flights and notes of birds? How do the beasts live in the fields and in +the forests? What shall I say of men, who, being appointed, as we may +say, to cultivate the earth, do not suffer its fertility to be choked +with weeds, nor the ferocity of beasts to make it desolate; who, by the +houses and cities which they build, adorn the fields, the isles, and +the shores? If we could view these objects with the naked eye, as we +can by the contemplation of the mind, nobody, at such a sight, would +doubt there was a divine intelligence. + +But how beautiful is the sea! How pleasant to see the extent of it! +What a multitude and variety of islands! How delightful are the coasts! +What numbers and what diversity of inhabitants does it contain; some +within the bosom of it, some floating on the surface, and others by +their shells cleaving to the rocks! While the sea itself, approaching +to the land, sports so closely to its shores that those two elements +appear to be but one. + +Next above the sea is the air, diversified by day and night: when +rarefied, it possesses the higher region; when condensed, it turns into +clouds, and with the waters which it gathers enriches the earth by the +rain. Its agitation produces the winds. It causes heat and cold +according to the different seasons. It sustains birds in their flight; +and, being inhaled, nourishes and preserves all animated beings. + +XL. Add to these, which alone remaineth to be mentioned, the firmament +of heaven, a region the farthest from our abodes, which surrounds and +contains all things. It is likewise called ether, or sky, the extreme +bounds and limits of the universe, in which the stars perform their +appointed courses in a most wonderful manner; among which, the sun, +whose magnitude far surpasses the earth, makes his revolution round it, +and by his rising and setting causes day and night; sometimes coming +near towards the earth, and sometimes going from it, he every year +makes two contrary reversions[165] from the extreme point of its +course. In his retreat the earth seems locked up in sadness; in his +return it appears exhilarated with the heavens. The moon, which, as +mathematicians demonstrate, is bigger than half the earth, makes her +revolutions through the same spaces[166] as the sun; but at one time +approaching, and at another receding from, the sun, she diffuses the +light which she has borrowed from him over the whole earth, and has +herself also many various changes in her appearance. When she is found +under the sun, and opposite to it, the brightness of her rays is lost; +but when the earth directly interposes between the moon and sun, the +moon is totally eclipsed. The other wandering stars have their courses +round the earth in the same spaces,[167] and rise and set in the same +manner; their motions are sometimes quick, sometimes slow, and often +they stand still. There is nothing more wonderful, nothing more +beautiful. There is a vast number of fixed stars, distinguished by the +names of certain figures, to which we find they have some resemblance. + +XLI. I will here, says Balbus, looking at me, make use of the verses +which, when you were young, you translated from Aratus,[168] and which, +because they are in Latin, gave me so much delight that I have many of +them still in my memory. As then, we daily see, without any change or +variation, + + --the rest[169] + Swiftly pursue the course to which they're bound; + And with the heavens the days and nights go round; + +the contemplation of which, to a mind desirous of observing the +constancy of nature, is inexhaustible. + + The extreme top of either point is call'd + The pole.[170] + +About this the two [Greek: Arktoi] are turned, which never set; + + Of these, the Greeks one Cynosura call, + The other Helice.[171] + +The brightest stars,[172] indeed, of Helice are discernible all night, + + Which are by us Septentriones call'd. + +Cynosura moves about the same pole, with a like number of stars, and +ranged in the same order: + + This[173] the Phoenicians choose to make their guide + When on the ocean in the night they ride. + Adorned with stars of more refulgent light, + The other[174] shines, and first appears at night. + Though this is small, sailors its use have found; + More inward is its course, and short its round. + +XLII. The aspect of those stars is the more admirable, because, + + The Dragon grim between them bends his way, + As through the winding banks the currents stray, + And up and down in sinuous bending rolls.[175] + +His whole form is excellent; but the shape of his head and the ardor of +his eyes are most remarkable. + + Various the stars which deck his glittering head; + His temples are with double glory spread; + From his fierce eyes two fervid lights afar + Flash, and his chin shines with one radiant star; + Bow'd is his head; and his round neck he bends, + And to the tail of Helice[176] extends. + +The rest of the Dragon's body we see[177] at every hour in the night. + + Here[178] suddenly the head a little hides + Itself, where all its parts, which are in sight, + And those unseen in the same place unite. + +Near to this head + + Is placed the figure of a man that moves + Weary and sad, + +which the Greeks + + Engonasis do call, because he's borne[179] + About with bended knee. Near him is placed + The crown with a refulgent lustre graced. + +This indeed is at his back; but Anguitenens (the Snake-holder) is near +his head:[180] + + The Greeks him Ophiuchus call, renown'd + The name. He strongly grasps the serpent round + With both his hands; himself the serpent folds + Beneath his breast, and round his middle holds; + Yet gravely he, bright shining in the skies, + Moves on, and treads on Nepa's[181] breast and eyes. + +The Septentriones[182] are followed by-- + + Arctophylax,[183] that's said to be the same + Which we Booetes call, who has the name, + Because he drives the Greater Bear along + Yoked to a wain. + +Besides, in Booetes, + + A star of glittering rays about his waist, + Arcturus called, a name renown'd, is placed.[184] + +Beneath which is + + The Virgin of illustrious form, whose hand + Holds a bright spike. + +XLIII. And truly these signs are so regularly disposed that a divine +wisdom evidently appears in them: + + Beneath the Bear's[185] head have the Twins their seat, + Under his chest the Crab, beneath his feet + The mighty Lion darts a trembling flame.[186] + +The Charioteer + + On the left side of Gemini we see,[187] + And at his head behold fierce Helice; + On his left shoulder the bright Goat appears. + +But to proceed-- + + This is indeed a great and glorious star, + On th' other side the Kids, inferior far, + Yield but a slender light to mortal eyes. + +Under his feet + + The horned bull,[188] with sturdy limbs, is placed: + +his head is spangled with a number of stars; + + These by the Greeks are called the Hyades, + +from raining; for [Greek: hyein] is to rain: therefore they are +injudiciously called _Suculae_ by our people, as if they had their name +from [Greek: hys], a sow, and not from [Greek: hyo]. + +Behind the Lesser Bear, Cepheus[189] follows with extended hands, + + For close behind the Lesser Bear he comes. + +Before him goes + + Cassiopea[190] with a faintish light; + But near her moves (fair and illustrious sight!) + Andromeda,[191] who, with an eager pace, + Seems to avoid her parent's mournful face.[192] + With glittering mane the Horse[193] now seems to tread, + So near he comes, on her refulgent head; + With a fair star, that close to him appears, + A double form[194] and but one light he wears; + By which he seems ambitious in the sky + An everlasting knot of stars to tie. + Near him the Ram, with wreathed horns, is placed; + +by whom + + The Fishes[195] are; of which one seems to haste + Somewhat before the other, to the blast + Of the north wind exposed. + +XLIV. Perseus is described as placed at the feet of Andromeda: + + And him the sharp blasts of the north wind beat. + Near his left knee, but dim their light, their seat + The small Pleiades[196] maintain. We find, + Not far from them, the Lyre[197] but slightly join'd. + Next is the winged Bird,[198] that seems to fly + Beneath the spacious covering of the sky. + +Near the head of the Horse[199] lies the right hand of Aquarius, then +all Aquarius himself.[200] + + Then Capricorn, with half the form of beast, + Breathes chill and piercing colds from his strong breast, + And in a spacious circle takes his round; + When him, while in the winter solstice bound, + The sun has visited with constant light, + He turns his course, and shorter makes the night.[201] + +Not far from hence is seen + + The Scorpion[202] rising lofty from below; + By him the Archer,[203] with his bended bow; + Near him the Bird, with gaudy feathers spread; + And the fierce Eagle[204] hovers o'er his head. + +Next comes the Dolphin;[205] + + Then bright Orion,[206] who obliquely moves; + +he is followed by + + The fervent Dog,[207] bright with refulgent stars: + +next the Hare follows[208] + + Unwearied in his course. At the Dog's tail + Argo[209] moves on, and moving seems to sail; + O'er her the Ram and Fishes have their place;[210] + The illustrious vessel touches, in her pace, + The river's banks;[211] + +which you may see winding and extending itself to a great length. + + The Fetters[212] at the Fishes' tails are hung. + By Nepa's[213] head behold the Altar stand,[214] + Which by the breath of southern winds is fann'd; + +near which the Centaur[215] + + Hastens his mingled parts to join beneath + The Serpent,[216] there extending his right hand, + To where you see the monstrous Scorpion stand, + Which he at the bright Altar fiercely slays. + Here on her lower parts see Hydra[217] raise + Herself; + +whose bulk is very far extended. + + Amid the winding of her body's placed + The shining Goblet;[218] and the glossy Crow[219] + Plunges his beak into her parts below. + Antecanis beneath the Twins is seen, + Call'd Procyon by the Greeks.[220] + +Can any one in his senses imagine that this disposition of the stars, +and this heaven so beautifully adorned, could ever have been formed by +a fortuitous concourse of atoms? Or what other nature, being destitute +of intellect and reason, could possibly have produced these effects, +which not only required reason to bring them about, but the very +character of which could not be understood and appreciated without the +most strenuous exertions of well-directed reason? + +XLV. But our admiration is not limited to the objects here described. +What is most wonderful is that the world is so durable, and so +perfectly made for lasting that it is not to be impaired by time; for +all its parts tend equally to the centre, and are bound together by a +sort of chain, which surrounds the elements. This chain is nature, +which being diffused through the universe, and performing all things +with judgment and reason, attracts the extremities to the centre. + +If, then, the world is round, and if on that account all its parts, +being of equal dimensions and relative proportions, mutually support +and are supported by one another, it must follow that as all the parts +incline to the centre (for that is the lowest place of a globe) there +is nothing whatever which can put a stop to that propensity in the case +of such great weights. For the same reason, though the sea is higher +than the earth, yet because it has the like tendency, it is collected +everywhere, equally concentres, and never overflows, and is never +wasted. + +The air, which is contiguous, ascends by its lightness, but diffuses +itself through the whole; therefore it is by nature joined and united +to the sea, and at the same time borne by the same power towards the +heaven, by the thinness and heat of which it is so tempered as to be +made proper to supply life and wholesome air for the support of +animated beings. This is encompassed by the highest region of the +heavens, which is called the sky, which is joined to the extremity of +the air, but retains its own heat pure and unmixed. + +XLVI. The stars have their revolutions in the sky, and are continued by +the tendency of all parts towards the centre. Their duration is +perpetuated by their form and figure, for they are round; which form, +as I think has been before observed, is the least liable to injury; and +as they are composed of fire, they are fed by the vapors which are +exhaled by the sun from the earth, the sea, and other waters; but when +these vapors have nourished and refreshed the stars, and the whole sky, +they are sent back to be exhaled again; so that very little is lost or +consumed by the fire of the stars and the flame of the sky. Hence we +Stoics conclude--which Panaetius[221] is said to have doubted of--that +the whole world at last would be consumed by a general conflagration, +when, all moisture being exhausted, neither the earth could have any +nourishment, nor the air return again, since water, of which it is +formed, would then be all consumed; so that only fire would subsist; +and from this fire, which is an animating power and a Deity, a new +world would arise and be re-established in the same beauty. + +I should be sorry to appear to you to dwell too long upon this subject +of the stars, and more especially upon that of the planets, whose +motions, though different, make a very just agreement. Saturn, the +highest, chills; Mars, placed in the middle, burns; while Jupiter, +interposing, moderates their excess, both of light and heat. The two +planets beneath Mars[222] obey the sun. The sun himself fills the whole +universe with his own genial light; and the moon, illuminated by him, +influences conception, birth, and maturity. And who is there who is not +moved by this union of things, and by this concurrence of nature +agreeing together, as it were, for the safety of the world? And yet I +feel sure that none of these reflections have ever been made by these +men. + +XLVII. Let us proceed from celestial to terrestrial things. What is +there in them which does not prove the principle of an intelligent +nature? First, as to vegetables; they have roots to sustain their +stems, and to draw from the earth a nourishing moisture to support the +vital principle which those roots contain. They are clothed with a rind +or bark, to secure them more thoroughly from heat and cold. The vines +we see take hold on props with their tendrils, as if with hands, and +raise themselves as if they were animated; it is even said that they +shun cabbages and coleworts, as noxious and pestilential to them, and, +if planted by them, will not touch any part. + +But what a vast variety is there of animals! and how wonderfully is +every kind adapted to preserve itself! Some are covered with hides, +some clothed with fleeces, and some guarded with bristles; some are +sheltered with feathers, some with scales; some are armed with horns, +and some are furnished with wings to escape from danger. Nature hath +also liberally and plentifully provided for all animals their proper +food. I could expatiate on the judicious and curious formation and +disposition of their bodies for the reception and digestion of it, for +all their interior parts are so framed and disposed that there is +nothing superfluous, nothing that is not necessary for the preservation +of life. Besides, nature has also given these beasts appetite and +sense; in order that by the one they may be excited to procure +sufficient sustenance, and by the other they may distinguish what is +noxious from what is salutary. Some animals seek their food walking, +some creeping, some flying, and some swimming; some take it with their +mouth and teeth; some seize it with their claws, and some with their +beaks; some suck, some graze, some bolt it whole, and some chew it. +Some are so low that they can with ease take such food as is to be +found on the ground; but the taller, as geese, swans, cranes, and +camels, are assisted by a length of neck. To the elephant is given a +hand,[223] without which, from his unwieldiness of body, he would +scarce have any means of attaining food. + +XLVIII. But to those beasts which live by preying on others, nature has +given either strength or swiftness. On some animals she has even +bestowed artifice and cunning; as on spiders, some of which weave a +sort of net to entrap and destroy whatever falls into it, others sit on +the watch unobserved to fall on their prey and devour it. The naker--by +the Greeks called _Pinna_--has a kind of confederacy with the prawn for +procuring food. It has two large shells open, into which when the +little fishes swim, the naker, having notice given by the bite of the +prawn, closes them immediately. Thus, these little animals, though of +different kinds, seek their food in common; in which it is matter of +wonder whether they associate by any agreement, or are naturally joined +together from their beginning. + +There is some cause to admire also the provision of nature in the case +of those aquatic animals which are generated on land, such as +crocodiles, river-tortoises, and a certain kind of serpents, which seek +the water as soon as they are able to drag themselves along. We +frequently put duck-eggs under hens, by which, as by their true +mothers, the ducklings are at first hatched and nourished; but when +they see the water, they forsake them and run to it, as to their +natural abode: so strong is the impression of nature in animals for +their own preservation. + +XLIX. I have read that there is a bird called Platalea (the shoveller), +that lives by watching those fowls which dive into the sea for their +prey, and when they return with it, he squeezes their heads with his +beak till they drop it, and then seizes on it himself. It is said +likewise that he is in the habit of filling his stomach with +shell-fish, and when they are digested by the heat which exists in the +stomach, they cast them up, and then pick out what is proper +nourishment. The sea-frogs, they say, are wont to cover themselves with +sand, and moving near the water, the fishes strike at them, as at a +bait, and are themselves taken and devoured by the frogs. Between the +kite and the crow there is a kind of natural war, and wherever the one +finds the eggs of the other, he breaks them. + +But who is there who can avoid being struck with wonder at that which +has been noticed by Aristotle, who has enriched us with so many +valuable remarks? When the cranes[224] pass the sea in search of warmer +climes, they fly in the form of a triangle. By the first angle they +repel the resisting air; on each side, their wings serve as oars to +facilitate their flight; and the basis of their triangle is assisted by +the wind in their stern. Those which are behind rest their necks and +heads on those which precede; and as the leader has not the same +relief, because he has none to lean upon, he at length flies behind +that he may also rest, while one of those which have been eased +succeeds him, and through the whole flight each regularly takes his +turn. + +I could produce many instances of this kind; but these may suffice. Let +us now proceed to things more familiar to us. The care of beasts for +their own preservation, their circumspection while feeding, and their +manner of taking rest in their lairs, are generally known, but still +they are greatly to be admired. + +L. Dogs cure themselves by a vomit, the Egyptian ibis by a purge; from +whence physicians have lately--I mean but few ages since--greatly +improved their art. It is reported that panthers, which in barbarous +countries are taken with poisoned flesh, have a certain remedy[225] +that preserves them from dying; and that in Crete, the wild goats, when +they are wounded with poisoned arrows, seek for an herb called dittany, +which, when they have tasted, the arrows (they say) drop from their +bodies. It is said also that deer, before they fawn, purge themselves +with a little herb called hartswort.[226] Beasts, when they receive any +hurt, or fear it, have recourse to their natural arms: the bull to his +horns, the boar to his tusks, and the lion to his teeth. Some take to +flight, others hide themselves; the cuttle-fish vomits[227] blood; the +cramp-fish benumbs; and there are many animals that, by their +intolerable stink, oblige their pursuers to retire. + +LI. But that the beauty of the world might be eternal, great care has +been taken by the providence of the Gods to perpetuate the different +kinds of animals, and vegetables, and trees, and all those things which +sink deep into the earth, and are contained in it by their roots and +trunks; in order to which every individual has within itself such +fertile seed that many are generated from one; and in vegetables this +seed is enclosed in the heart of their fruit, but in such abundance +that men may plentifully feed on it, and the earth be always replanted. + +With regard to animals, do we not see how aptly they are formed for the +propagation of their species? Nature for this end created some males +and some females. Their parts are perfectly framed for generation, and +they have a wonderful propensity to copulation. When the seed has +fallen on the matrix, it draws almost all the nourishment to itself, by +which the foetus is formed; but as soon as it is discharged from +thence, if it is an animal that is nourished by milk, almost all the +food of the mother turns into milk, and the animal, without any +direction but by the pure instinct of nature, immediately hunts for the +teat, and is there fed with plenty. What makes it evidently appear that +there is nothing in this fortuitous, but the work of a wise and +foreseeing nature, is, that those females which bring forth many young, +as sows and bitches, have many teats, and those which bear a small +number have but few. What tenderness do beasts show in preserving and +raising up their young till they are able to defend themselves! They +say, indeed, that fish, when they have spawned, leave their eggs; but +the water easily supports them, and produces the young fry in +abundance. + +LII. It is said, likewise, that tortoises and crocodiles, when they +have laid their eggs on the land, only cover them with earth, and then +leave them, so that their young are hatched and brought up without +assistance; but fowls and other birds seek for quiet places to lay in, +where they build their nests in the softest manner, for the surest +preservation of their eggs; which, when they have hatched, they defend +from the cold by the warmth of their wings, or screen them from the +sultry heat of the sun. When their young begin to be able to use their +wings, they attend and instruct them; and then their cares are at an +end. + +Human art and industry are indeed necessary towards the preservation +and improvement of certain animals and vegetables; for there are +several of both kinds which would perish without that assistance. There +are likewise innumerable facilities (being different in different +places) supplied to man to aid him in his civilization, and in +procuring abundantly what he requires. The Nile waters Egypt, and after +having overflowed and covered it the whole summer, it retires, and +leaves the fields softened and manured for the reception of seed. The +Euphrates fertilizes Mesopotamia, into which, as we may say, it carries +yearly new fields.[228] The Indus, which is the largest of all +rivers,[229] not only improves and cultivates the ground, but sows it +also; for it is said to carry with it a great quantity of grain. I +could mention many other countries remarkable for something singular, +and many fields, which are, in their own natures, exceedingly fertile. + +LIII. But how bountiful is nature that has provided for us such an +abundance of various and delicious food; and this varying with the +different seasons, so that we may be constantly pleased with change, +and satisfied with abundance! How seasonable and useful to man, to +beasts, and even to vegetables, are the Etesian winds[230] she has +bestowed, which moderate intemperate heat, and render navigation more +sure and speedy! Many things must be omitted on a subject so +copious--and still a great deal must be said--for it is impossible to +relate the great utility of rivers, the flux and reflux of the sea, the +mountains clothed with grass and trees, the salt-pits remote from the +sea-coasts, the earth replete with salutary medicines, or, in short, +the innumerable designs of nature necessary for sustenance and the +enjoyment of life. We must not forget the vicissitudes of day and +night, ordained for the health of animated beings, giving them a time +to labor and a time to rest. Thus, if we every way examine the +universe, it is apparent, from the greatest reason, that the whole is +admirably governed by a divine providence for the safety and +preservation of all beings. + +If it should be asked for whose sake this mighty fabric was raised, +shall we say for trees and other vegetables, which, though destitute of +sense, are supported by nature? That would be absurd. Is it for beasts? +Nothing can be less probable than that the Gods should have taken such +pains for beings void of speech and understanding. For whom, then, will +any one presume to say that the world was made? Undoubtedly for +reasonable beings; these are the Gods and men, who are certainly the +most perfect of all beings, as nothing is equal to reason. It is +therefore credible that the universe, and all things in it, were made +for the Gods and for men. + +But we may yet more easily comprehend that the Gods have taken great +care of the interests and welfare of men, if we examine thoroughly into +the structure of the body, and the form and perfection of human nature. +There are three things absolutely necessary for the support of life--to +eat, to drink, and to breathe. For these operations the mouth is most +aptly framed, which, by the assistance of the nostrils, draws in the +more air. + +LIV. The teeth are there placed to divide and grind the food.[231] The +fore-teeth, being sharp and opposite to each other, cut it asunder, and +the hind-teeth (called the grinders) chew it, in which office the +tongue seems to assist. At the root of the tongue is the gullet, which +receives whatever is swallowed: it touches the tonsils on each side, +and terminates at the interior extremity of the palate. When, by the +motions of the tongue, the food is forced into this passage, it +descends, and those parts of the gullet which are below it are dilated, +and those above are contracted. There is another passage, called by +physicians the rough artery,[232] which reaches to the lungs, for the +entrance and return of the air we breathe; and as its orifice is joined +to the roots of the tongue a little above the part to which the gullet +is annexed, it is furnished with a sort of coverlid,[233] lest, by the +accidental falling of any food into it, the respiration should be +stopped. + +As the stomach, which is beneath the gullet, receives the meat and +drink, so the lungs and the heart draw in the air from without. The +stomach is wonderfully composed, consisting almost wholly of nerves; it +abounds with membranes and fibres, and detains what it receives, +whether solid or liquid, till it is altered and digested. It sometimes +contracts, sometimes dilates. It blends and mixes the food together, so +that it is easily concocted and digested by its force of heat, and by +the animal spirits is distributed into the other parts of the body. + +LV. As to the lungs, they are of a soft and spongy substance, which +renders them the most commodious for respiration; they alternately +dilate and contract to receive and return the air, that what is the +chief animal sustenance may be always fresh. The juice,[234] by which +we are nourished, being separated from the rest of the food, passes the +stomach and intestines to the liver, through open and direct passages, +which lead from the mesentery to the gates of the liver (for so they +call those vessels at the entrance of it). There are other passages +from thence, through which the food has its course when it has passed +the liver. When the bile, and those humors which proceed from the +kidneys, are separated from the food, the remaining part turns to +blood, and flows to those vessels at the entrance of the liver to which +all the passages adjoin. The chyle, being conveyed from this place +through them into the vessel called the hollow vein, is mixed together, +and, being already digested and distilled, passes into the heart; and +from the heart it is communicated through a great number of veins to +every part of the body. + +It is not difficult to describe how the gross remains are detruded by +the motion of the intestines, which contract and dilate; but that must +be declined, as too indelicate for discourse. Let us rather explain +that other wonder of nature, the air, which is drawn into the lungs, +receives heat both by that already in and by the coagitation of the +lungs; one part is turned back by respiration, and the other is +received into a place called the ventricle of the heart.[235] There is +another ventricle like it annexed to the heart, into which the blood +flows from the liver through the hollow vein. Thus by one ventricle the +blood is diffused to the extremities through the veins, and by the +other the breath is communicated through the arteries; and there are +such numbers of both dispersed through the whole body that they +manifest a divine art. + +Why need I speak of the bones, those supports of the body, whose joints +are so wonderfully contrived for stability, and to render the limbs +complete with regard to motion and to every action of the body? Or need +I mention the nerves, by which the limbs are governed--their many +interweavings, and their proceeding from the heart,[236] from whence, +like the veins and arteries, they have their origin, and are +distributed through the whole corporeal frame? + +LVI. To this skill of nature, and this care of providence, so diligent +and so ingenious, many reflections may be added, which show what +valuable things the Deity has bestowed on man. He has made us of a +stature tall and upright, in order that we might behold the heavens, +and so arrive at the knowledge of the Gods; for men are not simply to +dwell here as inhabitants of the earth, but to be, as it were, +spectators of the heavens and the stars, which is a privilege not +granted to any other kind of animated beings. The senses, which are the +interpreters and messengers of things, are placed in the head, as in a +tower, and wonderfully situated for their proper uses; for the eyes, +being in the highest part, have the office of sentinels, in discovering +to us objects; and the ears are conveniently placed in a high part of +the person, being appointed to receive sound, which naturally ascends. +The nostrils have the like situation, because all scent likewise +ascends; and they have, with great reason, a near vicinity to the +mouth, because they assist us in judging of meat and drink. The taste, +which is to distinguish the quality of what we take; is in that part of +the mouth where nature has laid open a passage for what we eat and +drink. But the touch is equally diffused through the whole body, that +we may not receive any blows, or the too rigid attacks of cold and +heat, without feeling them. And as in building the architect averts +from the eyes and nose of the master those things which must +necessarily be offensive, so has nature removed far from our senses +what is of the same kind in the human body. + +LVII. What artificer but nature, whose direction is incomparable, could +have exhibited so much ingenuity in the formation of the senses? In the +first place, she has covered and invested the eyes with the finest +membranes, which she hath made transparent, that we may see through +them, and firm in their texture, to preserve the eyes. She has made +them slippery and movable, that they might avoid what would offend +them, and easily direct the sight wherever they will. The actual organ +of sight, which is called the pupil, is so small that it can easily +shun whatever might be hurtful to it. The eyelids, which are their +coverings, are soft and smooth, that they may not injure the eyes; and +are made to shut at the apprehension of any accident, or to open at +pleasure; and these movements nature has ordained to be made in an +instant: they are fortified with a sort of palisade of hairs, to keep +off what may be noxious to them when open, and to be a fence to their +repose when sleep closes them, and allows them to rest as if they were +wrapped up in a case. Besides, they are commodiously hidden and +defended by eminences on every side; for on the upper part the eyebrows +turn aside the perspiration which falls from the head and forehead; the +cheeks beneath rise a little, so as to protect them on the lower side; +and the nose is placed between them as a wall of separation. + +The hearing is always open, for that is a sense of which we are in need +even while we are sleeping; and the moment that any sound is admitted +by it we are awakened even from sleep. It has a winding passage, lest +anything should slip into it, as it might if it were straight and +simple. Nature also hath taken the same precaution in making there a +viscous humor, that if any little creatures should endeavor to creep +in, they might stick in it as in bird-lime. The ears (by which we mean +the outward part) are made prominent, to cover and preserve the +hearing, lest the sound should be dissipated and escape before the +sense is affected. Their entrances are hard and horny, and their form +winding, because bodies of this kind better return and increase the +sound. This appears in the harp, lute, or horn;[237] and from all +tortuous and enclosed places sounds are returned stronger. + +The nostrils, in like manner, are ever open, because we have a +continual use for them; and their entrances also are rather narrow, +lest anything noxious should enter them; and they have always a +humidity necessary for the repelling dust and many other extraneous +bodies. The taste, having the mouth for an enclosure, is admirably +situated, both in regard to the use we make of it and to its security. + +LVIII. Besides, every human sense is much more exquisite than those of +brutes; for our eyes, in those arts which come under their judgment, +distinguish with great nicety; as in painting, sculpture, engraving, +and in the gesture and motion of bodies. They understand the beauty, +proportion, and, as I may so term it, the becomingness of colors and +figures; they distinguish things of greater importance, even virtues +and vices; they know whether a man is angry or calm, cheerful or sad, +courageous or cowardly, bold or timorous. + +The judgment of the ears is not less admirably and scientifically +contrived with regard to vocal and instrumental music. They distinguish +the variety of sounds, the measure, the stops, the different sorts of +voices, the treble and the base, the soft and the harsh, the sharp and +the flat, of which human ears only are capable to judge. There is +likewise great judgment in the smell, the taste, and the touch; to +indulge and gratify which senses more arts have been invented than I +could wish: it is apparent to what excess we have arrived in the +composition of our perfumes, the preparation of our food, and the +enjoyment of corporeal pleasures. + +LIX. Again, he who does not perceive the soul and mind of man, his +reason, prudence, and discernment, to be the work of a divine +providence, seems himself to be destitute of those faculties. While I +am on this subject, Cotta, I wish I had your eloquence: how would you +illustrate so fine a subject! You would show the great extent of the +understanding; how we collect our ideas, and join those which follow to +those which precede; establish principles, draw consequences, define +things separately, and comprehend them with accuracy; from whence you +demonstrate how great is the power of intelligence and knowledge, which +is such that even God himself has no qualities more admirable. How +valuable (though you Academics despise and even deny that we have it) +is our knowledge of exterior objects, from the perception of the senses +joined to the application of the mind; by which we see in what relation +one thing stands to another, and by the aid of which we have invented +those arts which are necessary for the support and pleasure of life. +How charming is eloquence! How divine that mistress of the universe, as +you call it! It teaches us what we were ignorant of, and makes us +capable of teaching what we have learned. By this we exhort others; by +this we persuade them; by this we comfort the afflicted; by this we +deliver the affrighted from their fear; by this we moderate excessive +joy; by this we assuage the passions of lust and anger. This it is +which bound men by the chains of right and law, formed the bonds of +civil society, and made us quit a wild and savage life. + +And it will appear incredible, unless you carefully observe the facts, +how complete the work of nature is in giving us the use of speech; for, +first of all, there is an artery from the lungs to the bottom of the +mouth, through which the voice, having its original principle in the +mind, is transmitted. Then the tongue is placed in the mouth, bounded +by the teeth. It softens and modulates the voice, which would otherwise +be confusedly uttered; and, by pushing it to the teeth and other parts +of the mouth, makes the sound distinct and articulate. We Stoics, +therefore, compare the tongue to the bow of an instrument, the teeth to +the strings, and the nostrils to the sounding-board. + +LX. But how commodious are the hands which nature has given to man, and +how beautifully do they minister to many arts! For, such is the +flexibility of the joints, that our fingers are closed and opened +without any difficulty. With their help, the hand is formed for +painting, carving, and engraving; for playing on stringed instruments, +and on the pipe. These are matters of pleasure. There are also works of +necessity, such as tilling the ground, building houses, making cloth +and habits, and working in brass and iron. It is the business of the +mind to invent, the senses to perceive, and the hands to execute; so +that if we have buildings, if we are clothed, if we live in safety, if +we have cities, walls, habitations, and temples, it is to the hands we +owe them. + +By our labor, that is, by our hands, variety and plenty of food are +provided; for, without culture, many fruits, which serve either for +present or future consumption, would not be produced; besides, we feed +on flesh, fish, and fowl, catching some, and bringing up others. We +subdue four-footed beasts for our carriage, whose speed and strength +supply our slowness and inability. On some we put burdens, on others +yokes. We convert the sagacity of the elephant and the quick scent of +the dog to our own advantage. Out of the caverns of the earth we dig +iron, a thing entirely necessary for the cultivation of the ground. We +discover the hidden veins of copper, silver, and gold, advantageous for +our use and beautiful as ornaments. We cut down trees, and use every +kind of wild and cultivated timber, not only to make fire to warm us +and dress our meat, but also for building, that we may have houses to +defend us from the heat and cold. With timber likewise we build ships, +which bring us from all parts every commodity of life. We are the only +animals who, from our knowledge of navigation, can manage what nature +has made the most violent--the sea and the winds. Thus we obtain from +the ocean great numbers of profitable things. We are the absolute +masters of what the earth produces. We enjoy the mountains and the +plains. The rivers and the lakes are ours. We sow the seed, and plant +the trees. We fertilize the earth by overflowing it. We stop, direct, +and turn the rivers: in short, by our hands we endeavor, by our various +operations in this world, to make, as it were, another nature. + +LXI. But what shall I say of human reason? Has it not even entered the +heavens? Man alone of all animals has observed the courses of the +stars, their risings and settings. By man the day, the month, the year, +is determined. He foresees the eclipses of the sun and moon, and +foretells them to futurity, marking their greatness, duration, and +precise time. From the contemplation of these things the mind extracts +the knowledge of the Gods--a knowledge which produces piety, with which +is connected justice, and all the other virtues; from which arises a +life of felicity, inferior to that of the Gods in no single particular, +except in immortality, which is not absolutely necessary to happy +living. In explaining these things, I think that I have sufficiently +demonstrated the superiority of man to other animated beings; from +whence we should infer that neither the form and position of his limbs +nor that strength of mind and understanding could possibly be the +effect of chance. + +LXII. I am now to prove, by way of conclusion, that every thing in this +world of use to us was made designedly for us. + +First of all, the universe was made for the Gods and men, and all +things therein were prepared and provided for our service. For the +world is the common habitation or city of the Gods and men; for they +are the only reasonable beings: they alone live by justice and law. As, +therefore, it must be presumed the cities of Athens and Lacedaemon were +built for the Athenians and Lacedaemonians, and as everything there is +said to belong to those people, so everything in the universe may with +propriety be said to belong to the Gods and men, and to them alone. + +In the next place, though the revolutions of the sun, moon, and all the +stars are necessary for the cohesion of the universe, yet may they be +considered also as objects designed for the view and contemplation of +man. There is no sight less apt to satiate the eye, none more +beautiful, or more worthy to employ our reason and penetration. By +measuring their courses we find the different seasons, their durations +and vicissitudes, which, if they are known to men alone, we must +believe were made only for their sake. + +Does the earth bring forth fruit and grain in such excessive abundance +and variety for men or for brutes? The plentiful and exhilarating fruit +of the vine and the olive-tree are entirely useless to beasts. They +know not the time for sowing, tilling, or for reaping in season and +gathering in the fruits of the earth, or for laying up and preserving +their stores. Man alone has the care and advantage of these things. + +LXIII. Thus, as the lute and the pipe were made for those, and those +only, who are capable of playing on them, so it must be allowed that +the produce of the earth was designed for those only who make use of +them; and though some beasts may rob us of a small part, it does not +follow that the earth produced it also for them. Men do not store up +corn for mice and ants, but for their wives, their children, and their +families. Beasts, therefore, as I said before, possess it by stealth, +but their masters openly and freely. It is for us, therefore, that +nature hath provided this abundance. Can there be any doubt that this +plenty and variety of fruit, which delight not only the taste, but the +smell and sight, was by nature intended for men only? Beasts are so far +from being partakers of this design, that we see that even they +themselves were made for man; for of what utility would sheep be, +unless for their wool, which, when dressed and woven, serves us for +clothing? For they are not capable of anything, not even of procuring +their own food, without the care and assistance of man. The fidelity of +the dog, his affectionate fawning on his master, his aversion to +strangers, his sagacity in finding game, and his vivacity in pursuit of +it, what do these qualities denote but that he was created for our use? +Why need I mention oxen? We perceive that their backs were not formed +for carrying burdens, but their necks were naturally made for the yoke, +and their strong broad shoulders to draw the plough. In the Golden Age, +which poets speak of, they were so greatly beneficial to the husbandman +in tilling the fallow ground that no violence was ever offered them, +and it was even thought a crime to eat them: + + The Iron Age began the fatal trade + Of blood, and hammer'd the destructive blade; + Then men began to make the ox to bleed, + And on the tamed and docile beast to feed[238]. + +LXIV. It would take a long time to relate the advantages which we +receive from mules and asses, which undoubtedly were designed for our +use. What is the swine good for but to eat? whose life, Chrysippus +says, was given it but as salt[239] to keep it from putrefying; and as +it is proper food for man, nature hath made no animal more fruitful. +What a multitude of birds and fishes are taken by the art and +contrivance of man only, and which are so delicious to our taste that +one would be tempted sometimes to believe that this Providence which +watches over us was an Epicurean! Though we think there are some +birds--the alites and oscines[240], as our augurs call them--which were +made merely to foretell events. + +The large savage beasts we take by hunting, partly for food, partly to +exercise ourselves in imitation of martial discipline, and to use those +we can tame and instruct, as elephants, or to extract remedies for our +diseases and wounds, as we do from certain roots and herbs, the virtues +of which are known by long use and experience. Represent to yourself +the whole earth and seas as if before your eyes. You will see the vast +and fertile plains, the thick, shady mountains, the immense pasturage +for cattle, and ships sailing over the deep with incredible celerity; +nor are our discoveries only on the face of the earth, but in its +secret recesses there are many useful things, which being made for man, +by man alone are discovered. + +LXV. Another, and in my opinion the strongest, proof that the +providence of the Gods takes care of us is divination, which both of +you, perhaps, will attack; you, Cotta, because Carneades took pleasure +in inveighing against the Stoics; and you, Velleius, because there is +nothing Epicurus ridicules so much as the prediction of events. Yet the +truth of divination appears in many places, on many occasions, often in +private, but particularly in public concerns. We receive many +intimations from the foresight and presages of augurs and auspices; +from oracles, prophecies, dreams, and prodigies; and it often happens +that by these means events have proved happy to men, and imminent +dangers have been avoided. This knowledge, therefore--call it either a +kind of transport, or an art, or a natural faculty--is certainly found +only in men, and is a gift from the immortal Gods. If these proofs, +when taken separately, should make no impression upon your mind, yet, +when collected together, they must certainly affect you. + +Besides, the Gods not only provide for mankind universally, but for +particular men. You may bring this universality to gradually a smaller +number, and again you may reduce that smaller number to individuals. + +LXVI. For if the reasons which I have given prove to all of us that the +Gods take care of all men, in every country, in every part of the world +separate from our continent, they take care of those who dwell on the +same land with us, from east to west; and if they regard those who +inhabit this kind of great island, which we call the globe of the +earth, they have the like regard for those who possess the parts of +this island--Europe, Asia, and Africa; and therefore they favor the +parts of these parts, as Rome, Athens, Sparta, and Rhodes; and +particular men of these cities, separate from the whole; as Curius, +Fabricius, Coruncanius, in the war with Pyrrhus; in the first Punic +war, Calatinus, Duillius, Metellus, Lutatius; in the second, Maximus, +Marcellus, Africanus; after these, Paullus, Gracchus, Cato; and in our +fathers' times, Scipio, Laelius. Rome also and Greece have produced many +illustrious men, who we cannot believe were so without the assistance +of the Deity; which is the reason that the poets, Homer in particular, +joined their chief heroes--Ulysses, Agamemnon, Diomedes, Achilles--to +certain Deities, as companions in their adventures and dangers. +Besides, the frequent appearances of the Gods, as I have before +mentioned, demonstrate their regard for cities and particular men. This +is also apparent indeed from the foreknowledge of events, which we +receive either sleeping or waking. We are likewise forewarned of many +things by the entrails of victims, by presages, and many other means, +which have been long observed with such exactness as to produce an art +of divination. + +There never, therefore, was a great man without divine inspiration. If +a storm should damage the corn or vineyard of a person, or any accident +should deprive him of some conveniences of life, we should not judge +from thence that the Deity hates or neglects him. The Gods take care of +great things, and disregard the small. But to truly great men all +things ever happen prosperously; as has been sufficiently asserted and +proved by us Stoics, as well as by Socrates, the prince of +philosophers, in his discourses on the infinite advantages arising from +virtue. + +LXVII. This is almost the whole that hath occurred to my mind on the +nature of the Gods, and what I thought proper to advance. Do you, +Cotta, if I may advise, defend the same cause. Remember that in Rome +you keep the first rank; remember that you are Pontifex; and as your +school is at liberty to argue on which side you please[241], do you +rather take mine, and reason on it with that eloquence which you +acquired by your rhetorical exercises, and which the Academy improved; +for it is a pernicious and impious custom to argue against the Gods, +whether it be done seriously, or only in pretence and out of sport. + + * * * * * + + + + +BOOK III. + + +I. When Balbus had ended this discourse, then Cotta, with a smile, +rejoined, You direct me too late which side to defend; for during the +course of your argument I was revolving in my mind what objections to +make to what you were saying, not so much for the sake of opposition, +as of obliging you to explain what I did not perfectly comprehend; and +as every one may use his own judgment, it is scarcely possible for me +to think in every instance exactly what you wish. + +You have no idea, O Cotta, said Velleius, how impatient I am to hear +what you have to say. For since our friend Balbus was highly delighted +with your discourse against Epicurus, I ought in my turn to be +solicitous to hear what you can say against the Stoics; and I therefore +will give you my best attention, for I believe you are, as usual, well +prepared for the engagement. + +I wish, by Hercules! I were, replies Cotta; for it is more difficult to +dispute with Lucilius than it was with you. Why so? says Velleius. +Because, replies Cotta, your Epicurus, in my opinion, does not contend +strongly for the Gods: he only, for the sake of avoiding any +unpopularity or punishment, is afraid to deny their existence; for when +he asserts that the Gods are wholly inactive and regardless of +everything, and that they have limbs like ours, but make no use of +them, he seems to jest with us, and to think it sufficient if he allows +that there are beings of any kind happy and eternal. But with regard to +Balbus, I suppose you observed how many things were said by him, which, +however false they may be, yet have a perfect coherence and connection; +therefore, my design, as I said, in opposing him, is not so much to +confute his principles as to induce him to explain what I do not +clearly understand: for which reason, Balbus, I will give you the +choice, either to answer me every particular as I go on, or permit me +to proceed without interruption. If you want any explanation, replies +Balbus, I would rather you would propose your doubts singly; but if +your intention is rather to confute me than to seek instruction for +yourself, it shall be as you please; I will either answer you +immediately on every point, or stay till you have finished your +discourse. + +II. Very well, says Cotta; then let us proceed as our conversation +shall direct. But before I enter on the subject, I have a word to say +concerning myself; for I am greatly influenced by your authority, and +your exhortation at the conclusion of your discourse, when you desired +me to remember that I was Cotta and Pontifex; by which I presume you +intimated that I should defend the sacred rites and religion and +ceremonies which we received from our ancestors. Most undoubtedly I +always have, and always shall defend them, nor shall the arguments +either of the learned or unlearned ever remove the opinions which I +have imbibed from them concerning the worship of the immortal Gods. In +matters of religion I submit to the rules of the high-priests, T. +Coruncanius, P. Scipio, and P. Scaevola; not to the sentiments of Zeno, +Cleanthes, or Chrysippus; and I pay a greater regard to what C. Laelius, +one of our augurs and wise men, has written concerning religion, in +that noble oration of his, than to the most eminent of the Stoics: and +as the whole religion of the Romans at first consisted in sacrifices +and divination by birds, to which have since been added predictions, if +the interpreters[242] of the Sibylline oracle or the aruspices have +foretold any event from portents and prodigies, I have ever thought +that there was no point of all these holy things which deserved to be +despised. I have been even persuaded that Romulus, by instituting +divination, and Numa, by establishing sacrifices, laid the foundation +of Rome, which undoubtedly would never have risen to such a height of +grandeur if the Gods had not been made propitious by this worship. +These, Balbus, are my sentiments both as a priest and as Cotta. But you +must bring me to your opinion by the force of your reason: for I have a +right to demand from you, as a philosopher, a reason for the religion +which you would have me embrace. But I must believe the religion of our +ancestors without any proof. + +III. What proof, says Balbus, do you require of me? You have proposed, +says Cotta, four articles. First of all, you undertook to prove that +there "are Gods;" secondly, "of what kind and character they are;" +thirdly, that "the universe is governed by them;" lastly, that "they +provide for the welfare of mankind in particular." Thus, if I remember +rightly, you divided your discourse. Exactly so, replies Balbus; but +let us see what you require. + +Let us examine, says Cotta, every proposition. The first one--that +there are Gods--is never contested but by the most impious of men; nay, +though it can never be rooted out of my mind, yet I believe it on the +authority of our ancestors, and not on the proofs which you have +brought. Why do you expect a proof from me, says Balbus, if you +thoroughly believe it? Because, says Cotta, I come to this discussion +as if I had never thought of the Gods, or heard anything concerning +them. Take me as a disciple wholly ignorant and unbiassed, and prove to +me all the points which I ask. + +Begin, then, replies Balbus. I would first know, says Cotta, why you +have been so long in proving the existence of the Gods, which you said +was a point so very evident to all, that there was no need of any +proof? In that, answers Balbus, I have followed your example, whom I +have often observed, when pleading in the Forum, to load the judge with +all the arguments which the nature of your cause would permit. This +also is the practice of philosophers, and I have a right to follow it. +Besides, you may as well ask me why I look upon you with two eyes, +since I can see you with one. + +IV. You shall judge, then, yourself, says Cotta, if this is a very just +comparison; for, when I plead, I do not dwell upon any point agreed to +be self-evident, because long reasoning only serves to confound the +clearest matters; besides, though I might take this method in pleading, +yet I should not make use of it in such a discourse as this, which +requires the nicest distinction. And with regard to your making use of +one eye only when you look on me, there is no reason for it, since +together they have the same view; and since nature, to which you +attribute wisdom, has been pleased to give us two passages by which we +receive light. But the truth is, that it was because you did not think +that the existence of the Gods was so evident as you could wish that +you therefore brought so many proofs. It was sufficient for me to +believe it on the tradition of our ancestors; and since you disregard +authorities, and appeal to reason, permit my reason to defend them +against yours. The proofs on which you found the existence of the Gods +tend only to render a proposition doubtful that, in my opinion, is not +so; I have not only retained in my memory the whole of these proofs, +but even the order in which you proposed them. The first was, that when +we lift up our eyes towards the heavens, we immediately conceive that +there is some divinity that governs those celestial bodies; on which +you quoted this passage-- + + Look up to the refulgent heaven above, + Which all men call, unanimously, Jove; + +intimating that we should invoke that as Jupiter, rather than our +Capitoline Jove[243], or that it is evident to the whole world that +those bodies are Gods which Velleius and many others do not place even +in the rank of animated beings. + +Another strong proof, in your opinion, was that the belief of the +existence of the Gods was universal, and that mankind was daily more +and more convinced of it. What! should an affair of such importance be +left to the decision of fools, who, by your sect especially, are called +madmen? + +V. But the Gods have appeared to us, as to Posthumius at the Lake +Regillus, and to Vatienus in the Salarian Way: something you mentioned, +too, I know not what, of a battle of the Locrians at Sagra. Do you +believe that the Tyndaridae, as you called them; that is, men sprung +from men, and who were buried in Lacedaemon, as we learn from Homer, who +lived in the next age--do you believe, I say, that they appeared to +Vatienus on the road mounted on white horses, without any servant to +attend them, to tell the victory of the Romans to a country fellow +rather than to M. Cato, who was at that time the chief person of the +senate? Do you take that print of a horse's hoof which is now to be +seen on a stone at Regillus to be made by Castor's horse? Should you +not believe, what is probable, that the souls of eminent men, such as +the Tyndaridae, are divine and immortal, rather than that those bodies +which had been reduced to ashes should mount on horses, and fight in an +army? If you say that was possible, you ought to show how it is so, and +not amuse us with fabulous old women's stories. + +Do you take these for fabulous stories? says Balbus. Is not the temple, +built by Posthumius in honor of Castor and Pollux, to be seen in the +Forum? Is not the decree of the senate concerning Vatienus still +subsisting? As to the affair of Sagra, it is a common proverb among the +Greeks; when they would affirm anything strongly, they say "It is as +certain as what passed at Sagra." Ought not such authorities to move +you? You oppose me, replies Cotta, with stories, but I ask reasons of +you[244]. * * * + +VI. We are now to speak of predictions. No one can avoid what is to +come, and, indeed, it is commonly useless to know it; for it is a +miserable case to be afflicted to no purpose, and not to have even the +last, the common comfort, hope, which, according to your principles, +none can have; for you say that fate governs all things, and call that +fate which has been true from all eternity. What advantage, then, is +the knowledge of futurity to us, or how does it assist us to guard +against impending evils, since it will come inevitably? + +But whence comes that divination? To whom is owing that knowledge from +the entrails of beasts? Who first made observations from the voice of +the crow? Who invented the Lots?[245] Not that I give no credit to +these things, or that I despise Attius Navius's staff, which you +mentioned; but I ought to be informed how these things are understood +by philosophers, especially as the diviners are often wrong in their +conjectures. But physicians, you say, are likewise often mistaken. What +comparison can there be between divination, of the origin of which we +are ignorant, and physic, which proceeds on principles intelligible to +every one? You believe that the Decii,[246] in devoting themselves to +death, appeased the Gods. How great, then, was the iniquity of the Gods +that they could not be appeased but at the price of such noble blood! +That was the stratagem of generals such as the Greeks call [Greek: +strategema], and it was a stratagem worthy such illustrious leaders, +who consulted the public good even at the expense of their lives: they +conceived rightly, what indeed happened, that if the general rode +furiously upon the enemy, the whole army would follow his example. As +to the voice of the Fauns, I never heard it. If you assure me that you +have, I shall believe you, though I really know not what a Faun is. + +VII. I do not, then, O Balbus, from anything that you have said, +perceive as yet that it is proved that there are Gods. I believe it, +indeed, but not from any arguments of the Stoics. Cleanthes, you have +said, attributes the idea that men have of the Gods to four causes. In +the first place (as I have already sufficiently mentioned), to a +foreknowledge of future events; secondly, to tempests, and other shocks +of nature; thirdly, to the utility and plenty of things we enjoy; +fourthly, to the invariable order of the stars and the heavens. The +arguments drawn from foreknowledge I have already answered. With regard +to tempests in the air, the sea, and the earth, I own that many people +are affrighted by them, and imagine that the immortal Gods are the +authors of them. + +But the question is, not whether there are people who believe that +there are Gods, but whether there are Gods or not. As to the two other +causes of Cleanthes, one of which is derived from the great abundance +of desirable things which we enjoy, the other from the invariable order +of the seasons and the heavens, I shall treat on them when I answer +your discourse concerning the providence of the Gods--a point, Balbus, +upon which you have spoken at great length. I shall likewise defer till +then examining the argument which you attribute to Chrysippus, that "if +there is in nature anything which surpasses the power of man to +produce, there must consequently be some being better than man." I +shall also postpone, till we come to that part of my argument, your +comparison of the world to a fine house, your observations on the +proportion and harmony of the universe, and those smart, short reasons +of Zeno which you quote; and I shall examine at the same time your +reasons drawn from natural philosophy, concerning that fiery force and +that vital heat which you regard as the principle of all things; and I +will investigate, in its proper place, all that you advanced the other +day on the existence of the Gods, and on the sense and understanding +which you attributed to the sun, the moon, and all the stars; and I +shall ask you this question over and over again, By what proofs are you +convinced yourself there are Gods? + +VIII. I thought, says Balbus, that I had brought ample proofs to +establish this point. But such is your manner of opposing, that, when +you seem on the point of interrogating me, and when I am preparing to +answer, you suddenly divert the discourse, and give me no opportunity +to reply to you; and thus those most important points concerning +divination and fate are neglected which we Stoics have thoroughly +examined, but which your school has only slightly touched upon. But +they are not thought essential to the question in hand; therefore, if +you think proper, do not confuse them together, that we in this +discussion may come to a clear explanation of the subject of our +present inquiry. + +Very well, says Cotta. Since, then, you have divided the whole question +into four parts, and I have said all that I had to say on the first, I +will take the second into consideration; in which, when you attempted +to show what the character of the Gods was, you seemed to me rather to +prove that there are none; for you said that it was the greatest +difficulty to draw our minds from the prepossessions of the eyes; but +that as nothing is more excellent than the Deity, you did not doubt +that the world was God, because there is nothing better in nature than +the world, and so we may reasonably think it animated, or, rather, +perceive it in our minds as clearly as if it were obvious to our eyes. + +Now, in what sense do you say there is nothing better than the world? +If you mean that there is nothing more beautiful, I agree with you; +that there is nothing more adapted to our wants, I likewise agree with +you: but if you mean that nothing is wiser than the world, I am by no +means of your opinion. Not that I find it difficult to conceive +anything in my mind independent of my eyes; on the contrary, the more I +separate my mind from my eyes, the less I am able to comprehend your +opinion. + +IX. Nothing is better than the world, you say. Nor is there, indeed, +anything on earth better than the city of Rome; do you think, +therefore, that our city has a mind; that it thinks and reasons; or +that this most beautiful city, being void of sense, is not preferable +to an ant, because an ant has sense, understanding, reason, and memory? +You should consider, Balbus, what ought to be allowed you, and not +advance things because they please you. + +For that old, concise, and, as it seemed to you, acute syllogism of +Zeno has been all which you have so much enlarged upon in handling this +topic: "That which reasons is superior to that which does not; nothing +is superior to the world; therefore the world reasons." If you would +prove also that the world can very well read a book, follow the example +of Zeno, and say, "That which can read is better than that which +cannot; nothing is better than the world; the world therefore can +read." After the same manner you may prove the world to be an orator, a +mathematician, a musician--that it possesses all sciences, and, in +short, is a philosopher. You have often said that God made all things, +and that no cause can produce an effect unlike itself. From hence it +will follow, not only that the world is animated, and is wise, but also +plays upon the fiddle and the flute, because it produces men who play +on those instruments. Zeno, therefore, the chief of your sect, advances +no argument sufficient to induce us to think that the world reasons, +or, indeed, that it is animated at all, and consequently none to think +it a Deity; though it may be said that there is nothing superior to it, +as there is nothing more beautiful, nothing more useful to us, nothing +more adorned, and nothing more regular in its motions. But if the +world, considered as one great whole, is not God, you should not surely +deify, as you have done, that infinite multitude of stars which only +form a part of it, and which so delight you with the regularity of +their eternal courses; not but that there is something truly wonderful +and incredible in their regularity; but this regularity of motion, +Balbus, may as well be ascribed to a natural as to a divine cause. + +X. What can be more regular than the flux and reflux of the Euripus at +Chalcis, the Sicilian sea, and the violence of the ocean in those +parts[247] + + where the rapid tide + Does Europe from the Libyan coast divide? + +The same appears on the Spanish and British coasts. Must we conclude +that some Deity appoints and directs these ebbings and flowings to +certain fixed times? Consider, I pray, if everything which is regular +in its motion is deemed divine, whether it will not follow that tertian +and quartan agues must likewise be so, as their returns have the +greatest regularity. These effects are to be explained by reason; but, +because you are unable to assign any, you have recourse to a Deity as +your last refuge. + +The arguments of Chrysippus appeared to you of great weight; a man +undoubtedly of great quickness and subtlety (I call those quick who +have a sprightly turn of thought, and those subtle whose minds are +seasoned by use as their hands are by labor): "If," says he, "there is +anything which is beyond the power of man to produce, the being who +produces it is better than man. Man is unable to make what is in the +world; the being, therefore, that could do it is superior to man. What +being is there but a God superior to man? Therefore there is a God." + +These arguments are founded on the same erroneous principles as Zeno's, +for he does not define what is meant by being better or more excellent, +or distinguish between an intelligent cause and a natural cause. +Chrysippus adds, "If there are no Gods, there is nothing better than +man; but we cannot, without the highest arrogance, have this idea of +ourselves." Let us grant that it is arrogance in man to think himself +better than the world; but to comprehend that he has understanding and +reason, and that in Orion and Canicula there is neither, is no +arrogance, but an indication of good sense. "Since we suppose," +continues he, "when we see a beautiful house, that it was built for the +master, and not for mice, we should likewise judge that the world is +the mansion of the Gods." Yes, if I believed that the Gods built the +world; but not if, as I believe, and intend to prove, it is the work of +nature. + +XI. Socrates, in Xenophon, asks, "Whence had man his understanding, if +there was none in the world?" And I ask, Whence had we speech, harmony, +singing; unless we think it is the sun conversing with the moon when +she approaches near it, or that the world forms an harmonious concert, +as Pythagoras imagines? This, Balbus, is the effect of nature; not of +that nature which proceeds artificially, as Zeno says, and the +character of which I shall presently examine into, but a nature which, +by its own proper motions and mutations, modifies everything. + +For I readily agree to what you said about the harmony and general +agreement of nature, which you pronounced to be firmly bound and united +together, as it were, by ties of blood; but I do not approve of what +you added, that "it could not possibly be so, unless it were so united +by one divine spirit." On the contrary, the whole subsists by the power +of nature, independently of the Gods, and there is a kind of sympathy +(as the Greeks call it) which joins together all the parts of the +universe; and the greater that is in its own power, the less is it +necessary to have recourse to a divine intelligence. + +XII. But how will you get rid of the objections which Carneades made? +"If," says he, "there is no body immortal, there is none eternal; but +there is no body immortal, nor even indivisible, or that cannot be +separated and disunited; and as every animal is in its nature passive, +so there is not one which is not subject to the impressions of +extraneous bodies; none, that is to say, which can avoid the necessity +of enduring and suffering: and if every animal is mortal, there is none +immortal; so, likewise, if every animal may be cut up and divided, +there is none indivisible, none eternal, but all are liable to be +affected by, and compelled to submit to, external power. Every animal, +therefore, is necessarily mortal, dissoluble, and divisible." + +For as there is no wax, no silver, no brass which cannot be converted +into something else, whatever is composed of wax, or silver, or brass +may cease to be what it is. By the same reason, if all the elements are +mutable, every body is mutable. + +Now, according to your doctrine, all the elements are mutable; all +bodies, therefore, are mutable. But if there were any body immortal, +then all bodies would not be mutable. Every body, then, is mortal; for +every body is either water, air, fire, or earth, or composed of the +four elements together, or of some of them. Now, there is not one of +all these elements that does not perish; for earthly bodies are +fragile: water is so soft that the least shock will separate its parts, +and fire and air yield to the least impulse, and are subject to +dissolution; besides, any of these elements perish when converted into +another nature, as when water is formed from earth, the air from water, +and the sky from air, and when they change in the same manner back +again. Therefore, if there is nothing but what is perishable in the +composition of all animals, there is no animal eternal. + +XIII. But, not to insist on these arguments, there is no animal to be +found that had not a beginning, and will not have an end; for every +animal being sensitive, they are consequently all sensible of cold and +heat, sweet and bitter; nor can they have pleasing sensations without +being subject to the contrary. As, therefore, they receive pleasure, +they likewise receive pain; and whatever being is subject to pain must +necessarily be subject to death. It must be allowed, therefore, that +every animal is mortal. + +Besides, a being that is not sensible of pleasure or pain cannot have +the essence of an animal; if, then, on the one hand, every animal must +be sensible of pleasure and pain, and if, on the other, every being +that has these sensations cannot be immortal, we may conclude that as +there is no animal insensible, there is none immortal. Besides, there +is no animal without inclination and aversion--an inclination to that +which is agreeable to nature, and an aversion to the contrary: there +are in the case of every animal some things which they covet, and +others they reject. What they reject are repugnant to their nature, and +consequently would destroy them. Every animal, therefore, is inevitably +subject to be destroyed. There are innumerable arguments to prove that +whatever is sensitive is perishable; for cold, heat, pleasure, pain, +and all that affects the sense, when they become excessive, cause +destruction. Since, then, there is no animal that is not sensitive, +there is none immortal. + +XIV. The substance of an animal is either simple or compound; simple, +if it is composed only of earth, of fire, of air, or of water (and of +such a sort of being we can form no idea); compound, if it is formed of +different elements, which have each their proper situation, and have a +natural tendency to it--this element tending towards the highest parts, +that towards the lowest, and another towards the middle. This +conjunction may for some time subsist, but not forever; for every +element must return to its first situation. No animal, therefore, is +eternal. + +But your school, Balbus, allows fire only to be the sole active +principle; an opinion which I believe you derive from Heraclitus, whom +some men understand in one sense, some in another: but since he seems +unwilling to be understood, we will pass him by. You Stoics, then, say +that fire is the universal principle of all things; that all living +bodies cease to live on the extinction of that heat; and that +throughout all nature whatever is sensible of that heat lives and +flourishes. Now, I cannot conceive that bodies should perish for want +of heat, rather than for want of moisture or air, especially as they +even die through excess of heat; so that the life of animals does not +depend more on fire than on the other elements. + +However, air and water have this quality in common with fire and heat. +But let us see to what this tends. If I am not mistaken, you believe +that in all nature there is nothing but fire, which is self-animated. +Why fire rather than air, of which the life of animals consists, and +which is called from thence _anima_,[248] the soul? But how is it that +you take it for granted that life is nothing but fire? It seems more +probable that it is a compound of fire and air. But if fire is +self-animated, unmixed with any other element, it must be sensitive, +because it renders our bodies sensitive; and the same objection which I +just now made will arise, that whatever is sensitive must necessarily +be susceptible of pleasure and pain, and whatever is sensible of pain +is likewise subject to the approach of death; therefore you cannot +prove fire to be eternal. + +You Stoics hold that all fire has need of nourishment, without which it +cannot possibly subsist; that the sun, moon, and all the stars are fed +either with fresh or salt waters; and the reason that Cleanthes gives +why the sun is retrograde, and does not go beyond the tropics in the +summer or winter, is that he may not be too far from his sustenance. +This I shall fully examine hereafter; but at present we may conclude +that whatever may cease to be cannot of its own nature be eternal; that +if fire wants sustenance, it will cease to be, and that, therefore, +fire is not of its own nature eternal. + +XV. After all, what kind of a Deity must that be who is not graced with +one single virtue, if we should succeed in forming this idea of such a +one? Must we not attribute prudence to a Deity? a virtue which consists +in the knowledge of things good, bad, and indifferent. Yet what need +has a being for the discernment of good and ill who neither has nor can +have any ill? Of what use is reason to him? of what use is +understanding? We men, indeed, find them useful to aid us in finding +out things which are obscure by those which are clear to us; but +nothing can be obscure to a Deity. As to justice, which gives to every +one his own, it is not the concern of the Gods; since that virtue, +according to your doctrine, received its birth from men and from civil +society. Temperance consists in abstinence from corporeal pleasures, +and if such abstinence hath a place in heaven, so also must the +pleasures abstained from. Lastly, if fortitude is ascribed to the +Deity, how does it appear? In afflictions, in labor, in danger? None of +these things can affect a God. How, then, can we conceive this to be a +Deity that makes no use of reason, and is not endowed with any virtue? + +However, when I consider what is advanced by the Stoics, my contempt +for the ignorant multitude vanishes. For these are their divinities. +The Syrians worshipped a fish. The Egyptians consecrated beasts of +almost every kind. The Greeks deified many men; as Alabandus[249] at +Alabandae, Tenes at Tenedos; and all Greece pay divine honors to +Leucothea (who was before called Ino), to her son Palaemon, to Hercules, +to AEsculapius, and to the Tyndaridae; our own people to Romulus, and to +many others, who, as citizens newly admitted into the ancient body, +they imagine have been received into heaven. + +These are the Gods of the illiterate. + +XVI. What are the notions of you philosophers? In what respect are they +superior to these ideas? I shall pass them over; for they are certainly +very admirable. Let the world, then, be a Deity, for that, I conceive, +is what you mean by + + The refulgent heaven above, + Which all men call, unanimously, Jove. + +But why are we to add many more Gods? What a multitude of them there +is! At least, it seems so to me; for every constellation, according to +you, is a Deity: to some you give the name of beasts, as the goat, the +scorpion, the bull, the lion; to others the names of inanimate things, +as the ship, the altar, the crown. + +But supposing these were to be allowed, how can the rest be granted, or +even so much as understood? When we call corn Ceres, and wine Bacchus, +we make use of the common manner of speaking; but do you think any one +so mad as to believe that his food is a Deity? With regard to those +who, you say, from having been men became Gods, I should be very +willing to learn of you, either how it was possible formerly, or, if it +had ever been, why is it not so now? I do not conceive, as things are +at present, how Hercules, + + Burn'd with fiery torches on Mount Oeta, + +as Accius says, should rise, with the flames, + + To the eternal mansions of his father. + +Besides, Homer also says that Ulysses[250] met him in the shades below, +among the other dead. + +But yet I should be glad to know which Hercules we should chiefly +worship; for they who have searched into those histories, which are but +little known, tell us of several. The most ancient is he who fought +with Apollo about the Tripos of Delphi, and is son of Jupiter and +Lisyto; and of the most ancient Jupiters too, for we find many Jupiters +also in the Grecian chronicles. The second is the Egyptian Hercules, +and is believed to be the son of Nilus, and to be the author of the +Phrygian characters. The third, to whom they offered sacrifices, is one +of the Idaei Dactyli.[251] The fourth is the son of Jupiter and Asteria, +the sister of Latona, chiefly honored by the Tyrians, who pretend that +Carthago[252] is his daughter. The fifth, called Belus, is worshipped +in India. The sixth is the son of Alcmena by Jupiter; but by the third +Jupiter, for there are many Jupiters, as you shall soon see. + +XVII. Since this examination has led me so far, I will convince you +that in matters of religion I have learned more from the pontifical +rites, the customs of our ancestors, and the vessels of Numa,[253] +which Laelius mentions in his little Golden Oration, than from all the +learning of the Stoics; for tell me, if I were a disciple of your +school, what answer could I make to these questions? If there are Gods, +are nymphs also Goddesses? If they are Goddesses, are Pans and Satyrs +in the same rank? But they are not; consequently, nymphs are not +Goddesses. Yet they have temples publicly dedicated to them. What do +you conclude from thence? Others who have temples are not therefore +Gods. But let us go on. You call Jupiter and Neptune Gods; their +brother Pluto, then, is one; and if so, those rivers also are Deities +which they say flow in the infernal regions--Acheron, Cocytus, +Pyriphlegethon; Charon also, and Cerberus, are Gods; but that cannot be +allowed; nor can Pluto be placed among the Deities. What, then, will +you say of his brothers? + +Thus reasons Carneades; not with any design to destroy the existence of +the Gods (for what would less become a philosopher?), but to convince +us that on that matter the Stoics have said nothing plausible. If, +then, Jupiter and Neptune are Gods, adds he, can that divinity be +denied to their father Saturn, who is principally worshipped throughout +the West? If Saturn is a God, then must his father, Coelus, be one too, +and so must the parents of Coelus, which are the Sky and Day, as also +their brothers and sisters, which by ancient genealogists are thus +named: Love, Deceit, Fear, Labor, Envy, Fate, Old Age, Death, Darkness, +Misery, Lamentation, Favor, Fraud, Obstinacy, the Destinies, the +Hesperides, and Dreams; all which are the offspring of Erebus and +Night. These monstrous Deities, therefore, must be received, or else +those from whom they sprung must be disallowed. + +XVIII. If you say that Apollo, Vulcan, Mercury, and the rest of that +sort are Gods, can you doubt the divinity of Hercules and AEsculapius, +Bacchus, Castor and Pollux? These are worshipped as much as those, and +even more in some places. Therefore they must be numbered among the +Gods, though on the mother's side they are only of mortal race. +Aristaeus, who is said to have been the son of Apollo, and to have found +out the art of making oil from the olive; Theseus, the son of Neptune; +and the rest whose fathers were Deities, shall they not be placed in +the number of the Gods? But what think you of those whose mothers were +Goddesses? They surely have a better title to divinity; for, in the +civil law, as he is a freeman who is born of a freewoman, so, in the +law of nature, he whose mother is a Goddess must be a God. The isle +Astypalaea religiously honor Achilles; and if he is a Deity, Orpheus and +Rhesus are so, who were born of one of the Muses; unless, perhaps, +there may be a privilege belonging to sea marriages which land +marriages have not. Orpheus and Rhesus are nowhere worshipped; and if +they are therefore not Gods, because they are nowhere worshipped as +such, how can the others be Deities? You, Balbus, seemed to agree with +me that the honors which they received were not from their being +regarded as immortals, but as men richly endued with virtue. + +But if you think Latona a Goddess, how can you avoid admitting Hecate +to be one also, who was the daughter of Asteria, Latona's sister? +Certainly she is one, if we may judge by the altars erected to her in +Greece. And if Hecate is a Goddess, how can you refuse that rank to the +Eumenides? for they also have a temple at Athens, and, if I understand +right, the Romans have consecrated a grove to them. The Furies, too, +whom we look upon as the inspectors into and scourges of impiety, I +suppose, must have their divinity too. As you hold that there is some +divinity presides over every human affair, there is one who presides +over the travail of matrons, whose name, _Natio_, is derived _a +nascentibus_, from nativities, and to whom we used to sacrifice in our +processions in the fields of Ardaea; but if she is a Deity, we must +likewise acknowledge all those you mentioned, Honor, Faith, Intellect, +Concord; by the same rule also, Hope, Juno, Moneta,[254] and every idle +phantom, every child of our imagination, are Deities. But as this +consequence is quite inadmissible, do not you either defend the cause +from which it flows. + +XIX. What say you to this? If these are Deities, which we worship and +regard as such, why are not Serapis and Isis[255] placed in the same +rank? And if they are admitted, what reason have we to reject the Gods +of the barbarians? Thus we should deify oxen, horses, the ibis, hawks, +asps, crocodiles, fishes, dogs, wolves, cats, and many other beasts. If +we go back to the source of this superstition, we must equally condemn +all the Deities from which they proceed. Shall Ino, whom the Greeks +call Leucothea, and we Matuta, be reputed a Goddess, because she was +the daughter of Cadmus, and shall that title be refused to Circe and +Pasiphae,[256] who had the sun for their father, and Perseis, daughter +of the Ocean, for their mother? It is true, Circe has divine honors +paid her by our colony of Circaeum; therefore you call her a Goddess; +but what will you say of Medea, the granddaughter of the Sun and the +Ocean, and daughter of AEetes and Idyia? What will you say of her +brother Absyrtus, whom Pacuvius calls AEgialeus, though the other name +is more frequent in the writings of the ancients? If you did not deify +one as well as the other, what will become of Ino? for all these +Deities have the same origin. + +Shall Amphiaraus and Tryphonius be called Gods? Our publicans, when +some lands in Boeotia were exempted from the tax, as belonging to the +immortal Gods, denied that any were immortal who had been men. But if +you deify these, Erechtheus surely is a God, whose temple and priest we +have seen at Athens. And can you, then, refuse to acknowledge also +Codrus, and many others who shed their blood for the preservation of +their country? And if it is not allowable to consider all these men as +Gods, then, certainly, probabilities are not in favor of our +acknowledging the _Divinity_ of those previously mentioned beings from +whom these have proceeded. + +It is easy to observe, likewise, that if in many countries people have +paid divine honors to the memory of those who have signalized their +courage, it was done in order to animate others to practise virtue, and +to expose themselves the more willingly to dangers in their country's +cause. From this motive the Athenians have deified Erechtheus and his +daughters, and have erected also a temple, called Leocorion, to the +daughters of Leus.[257] Alabandus is more honored in the city which he +founded than any of the more illustrious Deities; from thence +Stratonicus had a pleasant turn--as he had many--when he was troubled +with an impertinent fellow who insisted that Alabandus was a God, but +that Hercules was not; "Very well," says he, "then let the anger of +Alabandus fall upon me, and that of Hercules upon you." + +XX. Do you not consider, Balbus, to what lengths your arguments for the +divinity of the heaven and the stars will carry you? You deify the sun +and the moon, which the Greeks take to be Apollo and Diana. If the moon +is a Deity, the morning-star, the other planets, and all the fixed +stars are also Deities; and why shall not the rainbow be placed in that +number? for it is so wonderfully beautiful that it is justly said to be +the daughter of Thaumas.[258] But if you deify the rainbow, what regard +will you pay to the clouds? for the colors which appear in the bow are +only formed of the clouds, one of which is said to have brought forth +the Centaurs; and if you deify the clouds, you cannot pay less regard +to the seasons, which the Roman people have really consecrated. +Tempests, showers, storms, and whirlwinds must then be Deities. It is +certain, at least, that our captains used to sacrifice a victim to the +waves before they embarked on any voyage. + +As you deify the earth under the name of Ceres,[259] because, as you +said, she bears fruits (_a gerendo_), and the ocean under that of +Neptune, rivers and fountains have the same right. Thus we see that +Maso, the conqueror of Corsica, dedicated a temple to a fountain, and +the names of the Tiber, Spino, Almo, Nodinus, and other neighboring +rivers are in the prayers[260] of the augurs. Therefore, either the +number of such Deities will be infinite, or we must admit none of them, +and wholly disapprove of such an endless series of superstition. + +XXI. None of all these assertions, then, are to be admitted. I must +proceed now, Balbus, to answer those who say that, with regard to those +deified mortals, so religiously and devoutly reverenced, the public +opinion should have the force of reality. To begin, then: they who are +called theologists say that there are three Jupiters; the first and +second of whom were born in Arcadia; one of whom was the son of AEther, +and father of Proserpine and Bacchus; the other the son of Coelus, and +father of Minerva, who is called the Goddess and inventress of war; the +third one born of Saturn in the isle of Crete,[261] where his sepulchre +is shown. The sons of Jupiter ([Greek: Dioskouroi]) also, among the +Greeks, have many names; first, the three who at Athens have the title +of Anactes,[262] Tritopatreus, Eubuleus, and Dionysus, sons of the most +ancient king Jupiter and Proserpine; the next are Castor and Pollux, +sons of the third Jupiter and Leda; and, lastly, three others, by some +called Alco,[263] Melampus, and Tmolus, sons of Atreus, the son of +Pelops. + +As to the Muses, there were at first four--Thelxiope, Aoede, Arche, and +Melete--daughters of the second Jupiter; afterward there were nine, +daughters of the third Jupiter and Mnemosyne; there were also nine +others, having the same appellations, born of Pierus and Antiopa, by +the poets usually called Pierides and Pieriae. Though _Sol_ (the sun) is +so called, you say, because he is _solus_ (single); yet how many suns +do theologists mention? There is one, the son of Jupiter and grandson +of AEther; another, the son of Hyperion; a third, who, the Egyptians +say, was of the city Heliopolis, sprung from Vulcan, the son of Nilus; +a fourth is said to have been born at Rhodes of Acantho, in the times +of the heroes, and was the grandfather of Jalysus, Camirus, and Lindus; +a fifth, of whom, it is pretended, Aretes and Circe were born at +Colchis. + +XXII. There are likewise several Vulcans. The first (who had of Minerva +that Apollo whom the ancient historians call the tutelary God of +Athens) was the son of Coelus; the second, whom the Egyptians call +Opas,[264] and whom they looked upon as the protector of Egypt, is the +son of Nilus; the third, who is said to have been the master of the +forges at Lemnos, was the son of the third Jupiter and of Juno; the +fourth, who possessed the islands near Sicily called Vulcaniae,[265] was +the son of Menalius. One Mercury had Coelus for his father and Dies for +his mother; another, who is said to dwell in a cavern, and is the same +as Trophonius, is the son of Valens and Phoronis. A third, of whom, and +of Penelope, Pan was the offspring, is the son of the third Jupiter and +Maia. A fourth, whom the Egyptians think it a crime to name, is the son +of Nilus. A fifth, whom we call, in their language, Thoth, as with them +the first month of the year is called, is he whom the people of +Pheneum[266] worship, and who is said to have killed Argus, to have +fled for it into Egypt, and to have given laws and learning to the +Egyptians. The first of the AEsculapii, the God of Arcadia, who is said +to have invented the probe and to have been the first person who taught +men to use bandages for wounds, is the son of Apollo. The second, who +was killed with thunder, and is said to be buried in Cynosura,[267] is +the brother of the second Mercury. The third, who is said to have found +out the art of purging the stomach, and of drawing teeth, is the son of +Arsippus and Arsinoe; and in Arcadia there is shown his tomb, and the +wood which is consecrated to him, near the river Lusium. + +XXIII. I have already spoken of the most ancient of the Apollos, who is +the son of Vulcan, and tutelar God of Athens. There is another, son of +Corybas, and native of Crete, for which island he is said to have +contended with Jupiter himself. A third, who came from the regions of +the Hyperborei[268] to Delphi, is the son of the third Jupiter and of +Latona. A fourth was of Arcadia, whom the Arcadians called Nomio,[269] +because they regarded him as their legislator. There are likewise many +Dianas. The first, who is thought to be the mother of the winged Cupid, +is the daughter of Jupiter and Proserpine. The second, who is more +known, is daughter of the third Jupiter and of Latona. The third, whom +the Greeks often call by her father's name, is the daughter of +Upis[270] and Glauce. There are many also of the Dionysi. The first was +the son of Jupiter and Proserpine. The second, who is said to have +killed Nysa, was the son of Nilus. The third, who reigned in Asia, and +for whom the Sabazia[271] were instituted, was the son of Caprius. The +fourth, for whom they celebrate the Orphic festivals, sprung from +Jupiter and Luna. The fifth, who is supposed to have instituted the +Trieterides, was the son of Nysus and Thyone. + +The first Venus, who has a temple at Elis, was the daughter of Coelus +and Dies. The second arose out of the froth of the sea, and became, by +Mercury, the mother of the second Cupid. The third, the daughter of +Jupiter and Diana, was married to Vulcan, but is said to have had +Anteros by Mars. The fourth was a Syrian, born of Tyro, who is called +Astarte, and is said to have been married to Adonis. I have already +mentioned one Minerva, mother of Apollo. Another, who is worshipped at +Sais, a city in Egypt, sprung from Nilus. The third, whom I have also +mentioned, was daughter of Jupiter. The fourth, sprung from Jupiter and +Coryphe, the daughter of the Ocean; the Arcadians call her Coria, and +make her the inventress of chariots. A fifth, whom they paint with +wings at her heels, was daughter of Pallas, and is said to have killed +her father for endeavoring to violate her chastity. The first Cupid is +said to be the son of Mercury and the first Diana; the second, of +Mercury and the second Venus; the third, who is the same as Anteros, of +Mars and the third Venus. + +All these opinions arise from old stories that were spread in Greece; +the belief in which, Balbus, you well know, ought to be stopped, lest +religion should suffer. But you Stoics, so far from refuting them, even +give them authority by the mysterious sense which you pretend to find +in them. Can you, then, think, after this plain refutation, that there +is need to employ more subtle reasonings? But to return from this +digression. + +XXIV. We see that the mind, faith, hope, virtue, honor, victory, +health, concord, and things of such kind, are purely natural, and have +nothing of divinity in them; for either they are inherent in us, as the +mind, faith, hope, virtue, and concord are; or else they are to be +desired, as honor, health, and victory. I know indeed that they are +useful to us, and see that statues have been religiously erected for +them; but as to their divinity, I shall begin to believe it when you +have proved it for certain. Of this kind I may particularly mention +Fortune, which is allowed to be ever inseparable from inconstancy and +temerity, which are certainly qualities unworthy of a divine being. + +But what delight do you take in the explication of fables, and in the +etymology of names?--that Coelus was castrated by his son, and that +Saturn was bound in chains by his son! By your defence of these and +such like fictions you would make the authors of them appear not only +not to be madmen, but to have been even very wise. But the pains which +you take with your etymologies deserve our pity. That Saturn is so +called because _se saturat annis_, he is full of years; Mavors, Mars, +because _magna vortit_, he brings about mighty changes; Minerva, +because _minuit_, she diminishes, or because _minatur_, she threatens; +Venus, because _venit ad omnia_, she comes to all; Ceres, _a gerendo_, +from bearing. How dangerous is this method! for there are many names +would puzzle you. From what would you derive Vejupiter and Vulcan? +Though, indeed, if you can derive Neptune _a nando_, from swimming, in +which you seem to me to flounder about yourself more than Neptune, you +may easily find the origin of all names, since it is founded only upon +the conformity of some one letter. Zeno first, and after him Cleanthes +and Chrysippus, are put to the unnecessary trouble of explaining mere +fables, and giving reasons for the several appellations of every Deity; +which is really owning that those whom we call Gods are not the +representations of deities, but natural things, and that to judge +otherwise is an error. + +XXV. Yet this error has so much prevailed that even pernicious things +have not only the title of divinity ascribed to them, but have also +sacrifices offered to them; for Fever has a temple on the Palatine +hill, and Orbona another near that of the Lares, and we see on the +Esquiline hill an altar consecrated to Ill-fortune. Let all such errors +be banished from philosophy, if we would advance, in our dispute +concerning the immortal Gods, nothing unworthy of immortal beings. I +know myself what I ought to believe; which is far different from what +you have said. You take Neptune for an intelligence pervading the sea. +You have the same opinion of Ceres with regard to the earth. I cannot, +I own, find out, or in the least conjecture, what that intelligence of +the sea or the earth is. To learn, therefore, the existence of the +Gods, and of what description and character they are, I must apply +elsewhere, not to the Stoics. + +Let us proceed to the two other parts of our dispute: first, "whether +there is a divine providence which governs the world;" and lastly, +"whether that providence particularly regards mankind;" for these are +the remaining propositions of your discourse; and I think that, if you +approve of it, we should examine these more accurately. With all my +heart, says Velleius, for I readily agree to what you have hitherto +said, and expect still greater things from you. + +I am unwilling to interrupt you, says Balbus to Cotta, but we shall +take another opportunity, and I shall effectually convince you. +But[272] * * * + +XXVI. + Shall I adore, and bend the suppliant knee, + Who scorn their power and doubt their deity? + +Does not Niobe here seem to reason, and by that reasoning to bring all +her misfortunes upon herself? But what a subtle expression is the +following! + + On strength of will alone depends success; + +a maxim capable of leading us into all that is bad. + + Though I'm confined, his malice yet is vain, + His tortured heart shall answer pain for pain; + His ruin soothe my soul with soft content, + Lighten my chains, and welcome banishment! + +This, now, is reason; that reason which you say the divine goodness has +denied to the brute creation, kindly to bestow it on men alone. How +great, how immense the favor! Observe the same Medea flying from her +father and her country: + + The guilty wretch from her pursuer flies. + By her own hands the young Absyrtus slain, + His mangled limbs she scatters o'er the plain, + That the fond sire might sink beneath his woe, + And she to parricide her safety owe. + +Reflection, as well as wickedness, must have been necessary to the +preparation of such a fact; and did he too, who prepared that fatal +repast for his brother, do it without reflection? + + Revenge as great as Atreus' injury + Shall sink his soul and crown his misery. + +XXVII. Did not Thyestes himself, not content with having defiled his +brother's bed (of which Atreus with great justice thus complains, + + When faithless comforts, in the lewd embrace, + With vile adultery stain a royal race, + The blood thus mix'd in fouler currents flows, + Taints the rich soil, and breeds unnumber'd woes)-- + +did he not, I say, by that adultery, aim at the possession of the +crown? Atreus thus continues: + + A lamb, fair gift of heaven, with golden fleece, + Promised in vain to fix my crown in peace; + But base Thyestes, eager for the prey, + Crept to my bed, and stole the gem away. + +Do you not perceive that Thyestes must have had a share of reason +proportionable to the greatness of his crimes--such crimes as are not +only represented to us on the stage, but such as we see committed, nay, +often exceeded, in the common course of life? The private houses of +individual citizens, the public courts, the senate, the camp, our +allies, our provinces, all agree that reason is the author of all the +ill, as well as of all the good, which is done; that it makes few act +well, and that but seldom, but many act ill, and that frequently; and +that, in short, the Gods would have shown greater benevolence in +denying us any reason at all than in sending us that which is +accompanied with so much mischief; for as wine is seldom wholesome, but +often hurtful in diseases, we think it more prudent to deny it to the +patient than to run the risk of so uncertain a remedy; so I do not know +whether it would not be better for mankind to be deprived of wit, +thought, and penetration, or what we call reason, since it is a thing +pernicious to many and very useful to few, than to have it bestowed +upon them with so much liberality and in such abundance. But if the +divine will has really consulted the good of man in this gift of +reason, the good of those men only was consulted on whom a +well-regulated one is bestowed: how few those are, if any, is very +apparent. We cannot admit, therefore, that the Gods consulted the good +of a few only; the conclusion must be that they consulted the good of +none. + +XXVIII. You answer that the ill use which a great part of mankind make +of reason no more takes away the goodness of the Gods, who bestow it as +a present of the greatest benefit to them, than the ill use which +children make of their patrimony diminishes the obligation which they +have to their parents for it. We grant you this; but where is the +similitude? It was far from Deianira's design to injure Hercules when +she made him a present of the shirt dipped in the blood of the +Centaurs. Nor was it a regard to the welfare of Jason of Pherae that +influenced the man who with his sword opened his imposthume, which the +physicians had in vain attempted to cure. For it has often happened +that people have served a man whom they intended to injure, and have +injured one whom they designed to serve; so that the effect of the gift +is by no means always a proof of the intention of the giver; neither +does the benefit which may accrue from it prove that it came from the +hands of a benefactor. For, in short, what debauchery, what avarice, +what crime among men is there which does not owe its birth to thought +and reflection, that is, to reason? For all opinion is reason: right +reason, if men's thoughts are conformable to truth; wrong reason, if +they are not. The Gods only give us the mere faculty of reason, if we +have any; the use or abuse of it depends entirely upon ourselves; so +that the comparison is not just between the present of reason given us +by the Gods, and a patrimony left to a son by his father; for, after +all, if the injury of mankind had been the end proposed by the Gods, +what could they have given them more pernicious than reason? for what +seed could there be of injustice, intemperance, and cowardice, if +reason were not laid as the foundation of these vices? + +XXIX. I mentioned just now Medea and Atreus, persons celebrated in +heroic poems, who had used this reason only for the contrivance and +practice of the most flagitious crimes; but even the trifling +characters which appear in comedies supply us with the like instances +of this reasoning faculty; for example, does not he, in the Eunuch, +reason with some subtlety?-- + + What, then, must I resolve upon? + She turn'd me out-of-doors; she sends for me back again; + Shall I go? no, not if she were to beg it of me. + +Another, in the Twins, making no scruple of opposing a received maxim, +after the manner of the Academics, asserts that when a man is in love +and in want, it is pleasant + + To have a father covetous, crabbed, and passionate, + Who has no love or affection for his children. + +This unaccountable opinion he strengthens thus: + + You may defraud him of his profits, or forge letters in his name, + Or fright him by your servant into compliance; + And what you take from such an old hunks, + How much more pleasantly do you spend it! + +On the contrary, he says that an easy, generous father is an +inconvenience to a son in love; for, says he, + + I can't tell how to abuse so good, so prudent a parent, + Who always foreruns my desires, and meets me purse in hand, + To support me in my pleasures: this easy goodness and generosity + Quite defeat all my frauds, tricks, and stratagems.[273] + +What are these frauds, tricks, and stratagems but the effects of +reason? O excellent gift of the Gods! Without this Phormio could not +have said, + + Find me out the old man: I have something hatching for him in my head. + +XXX. But let us pass from the stage to the bar. The praetor[274] takes +his seat. To judge whom? The man who set fire to our archives. How +secretly was that villany conducted! Q. Sosius, an illustrious Roman +knight, of the Picene field,[275] confessed the fact. Who else is to be +tried? He who forged the public registers--Alenus, an artful fellow, +who counterfeited the handwriting of the six officers.[276] Let us call +to mind other trials: that on the subject of the gold of Tolosa, or the +conspiracy of Jugurtha. Let us trace back the informations laid against +Tubulus for bribery in his judicial office; and, since that, the +proceedings of the tribune Peduceus concerning the incest of the +vestals. Let us reflect upon the trials which daily happen for +assassinations, poisonings, embezzlement of public money, frauds in +wills, against which we have a new law; then that action against the +advisers or assisters of any theft; the many laws concerning frauds in +guardianship, breaches of trust in partnerships and commissions in +trade, and other violations of faith in buying, selling, borrowing, or +lending; the public decree on a private affair by the Laetorian +Law;[277] and, lastly, that scourge of all dishonesty, the law against +fraud, proposed by our friend Aquillius; that sort of fraud, he says, +by which one thing is pretended and another done. Can we, then, think +that this plentiful fountain of evil sprung from the immortal Gods? If +they have given reason to man, they have likewise given him subtlety, +for subtlety is only a deceitful manner of applying reason to do +mischief. To them likewise we must owe deceit, and every other crime, +which, without the help of reason, would neither have been thought of +nor committed. As the old woman wished + + That to the fir which on Mount Pelion grew + The axe had ne'er been laid,[278] + +so we should wish that the Gods had never bestowed this ability on man, +the abuse of which is so general that the small number of those who +make a good use of it are often oppressed by those who make a bad use +of it; so that it seems to be given rather to help vice than to promote +virtue among us. + +XXXI. This, you insist on it, is the fault of man, and not of the Gods. +But should we not laugh at a physician or pilot, though they are weak +mortals, if they were to lay the blame of their ill success on the +violence of the disease or the fury of the tempest? Had there not been +danger, we should say, who would have applied to you? This reasoning +has still greater force against the Deity. The fault, you say, is in +man, if he commits crimes. But why was not man endued with a reason +incapable of producing any crimes? How could the Gods err? When we +leave our effects to our children, it is in hopes that they may be well +bestowed; in which we may be deceived, but how can the Deity be +deceived? As Phoebus when he trusted his chariot to his son Phaethon, +or as Neptune when he indulged his son Theseus in granting him three +wishes, the consequence of which was the destruction of Hippolitus? +These are poetical fictions; but truth, and not fables, ought to +proceed from philosophers. Yet if those poetical Deities had foreseen +that their indulgence would have proved fatal to their sons, they must +have been thought blamable for it. + +Aristo of Chios used often to say that the philosophers do hurt to such +of their disciples as take their good doctrine in a wrong sense; thus +the lectures of Aristippus might produce debauchees, and those of Zeno +pedants. If this be true, it were better that philosophers should be +silent than that their disciples should be corrupted by a +misapprehension of their master's meaning; so if reason, which was +bestowed on mankind by the Gods with a good design, tends only to make +men more subtle and fraudulent, it had been better for them never to +have received it. There could be no excuse for a physician who +prescribes wine to a patient, knowing that he will drink it and +immediately expire. Your Providence is no less blamable in giving +reason to man, who, it foresaw, would make a bad use of it. Will you +say that it did not foresee it? Nothing could please me more than such +an acknowledgment. But you dare not. I know what a sublime idea you +entertain of her. + +XXXII. But to conclude. If folly, by the unanimous consent of +philosophers, is allowed to be the greatest of all evils, and if no one +ever attained to true wisdom, we, whom they say the immortal Gods take +care of, are consequently in a state of the utmost misery. For that +nobody is well, or that nobody can be well, is in effect the same +thing; and, in my opinion, that no man is truly wise, or that no man +can be truly wise, is likewise the same thing. But I will insist no +further on so self-evident a point. Telamon in one verse decides the +question. If, says he, there is a Divine Providence, + + Good men would be happy, bad men miserable. + +But it is not so. If the Gods had regarded mankind, they should have +made them all virtuous; but if they did not regard the welfare of all +mankind, at least they ought to have provided for the happiness of the +virtuous. Why, therefore, was the Carthaginian in Spain suffered to +destroy those best and bravest men, the two Scipios? Why did +Maximus[279] lose his son, the consul? Why did Hannibal kill Marcellus? +Why did Cannae deprive us of Paulus? Why was the body of Regulus +delivered up to the cruelty of the Carthaginians? Why was not Africanus +protected from violence in his own house? To these, and many more +ancient instances, let us add some of later date. Why is Rutilius, my +uncle, a man of the greatest virtue and learning, now in banishment? +Why was my own friend and companion Drusus assassinated in his own +house? Why was Scaevola, the high-priest, that pattern of moderation and +prudence, massacred before the statue of Vesta? Why, before that, were +so many illustrious citizens put to death by Cinna? Why had Marius, the +most perfidious of men, the power to cause the death of Catulus, a man +of the greatest dignity? But there would be no end of enumerating +examples of good men made miserable and wicked men prosperous. Why did +that Marius live to an old age, and die so happily at his own house in +his seventh consulship? Why was that inhuman wretch Cinna permitted to +enjoy so long a reign? + +XXXIII. He, indeed, met with deserved punishment at last. But would it +not have been better that these inhumanities had been prevented than +that the author of them should be punished afterward? Varius, a most +impious wretch, was tortured and put to death. If this was his +punishment for the murdering Drusus by the sword, and Metellus by +poison, would it not have been better to have preserved their lives +than to have their deaths avenged on Varius? Dionysius was thirty-eight +years a tyrant over the most opulent and flourishing city; and, before +him, how many years did Pisistratus tyrannize in the very flower of +Greece! Phalaris and Apollodorus met with the fate they deserved, but +not till after they had tortured and put to death multitudes. Many +robbers have been executed; but the number of those who have suffered +for their crimes is short of those whom they have robbed and murdered. +Anaxarchus,[280] a scholar of Democritus, was cut to pieces by command +of the tyrant of Cyprus; and Zeno of Elea[281] ended his life in +tortures. What shall I say of Socrates,[282] whose death, as often as I +read of it in Plato, draws fresh tears from my eyes? If, therefore, the +Gods really see everything that happens to men, you must acknowledge +they make no distinction between the good and the bad. + +XXXIV. Diogenes the Cynic used to say of Harpalus, one of the most +fortunate villains of his time, that the constant prosperity of such a +man was a kind of witness against the Gods. Dionysius, of whom we have +before spoken, after he had pillaged the temple of Proserpine at +Locris, set sail for Syracuse, and, having a fair wind during his +voyage, said, with a smile, "See, my friends, what favorable winds the +immortal Gods bestow upon church-robbers." Encouraged by this +prosperous event, he proceeded in his impiety. When he landed at +Peloponnesus, he went into the temple of Jupiter Olympius, and disrobed +his statue of a golden mantle of great weight, an ornament which the +tyrant Gelo[283] had given out of the spoils of the Carthaginians, and +at the same time, in a jesting manner, he said "that a golden mantle +was too heavy in summer and too cold in winter;" and then, throwing a +woollen cloak over the statue, added, "This will serve for all +seasons." At another time, he ordered the golden beard of AEsculapius of +Epidaurus to be taken away, saying that "it was absurd for the son to +have a beard, when his father had none." He likewise robbed the temples +of the silver tables, which, according to the ancient custom of Greece, +bore this inscription, "To the good Gods," saying "he was willing to +make use of their goodness;" and, without the least scruple, took away +the little golden emblems of victory, the cups and coronets, which were +in the stretched-out hands of the statues, saying "he did not take, but +receive them; for it would be folly not to accept good things from the +Gods, to whom we are constantly praying for favors, when they stretch +out their hands towards us." And, last of all, all the things which he +had thus pillaged from the temples were, by his order, brought to the +market-place and sold by the common crier; and, after he had received +the money for them, he commanded every purchaser to restore what he had +bought, within a limited time, to the temples from whence they came. +Thus to his impiety towards the Gods he added injustice to man. + +XXXV. Yet neither did Olympian Jove strike him with his thunder, nor +did AEsculapius cause him to die by tedious diseases and a lingering +death. He died in his bed, had funeral honors[284] paid to him, and +left his power, which he had wickedly obtained, as a just and lawful +inheritance to his son. + +It is not without concern that I maintain a doctrine which seems to +authorize evil, and which might probably give a sanction to it, if +conscience, without any divine assistance, did not point out, in the +clearest manner, the difference between virtue and vice. Without +conscience man is contemptible. For as no family or state can be +supposed to be formed with any reason or discipline if there are no +rewards for good actions nor punishment for crimes, so we cannot +believe that a Divine Providence regulates the world if there is no +distinction between the honest and the wicked. + +But the Gods, you say, neglect trifling things: the little fields or +vineyards of particular men are not worthy their attention; and if +blasts or hail destroy their product, Jupiter does not regard it, nor +do kings extend their care to the lower offices of government. This +argument might have some weight if, in bringing Rutilius as an +instance, I had only complained of the loss of his farm at Formiae; but +I spoke of a personal misfortune, his banishment.[285] + +XXXVI. All men agree that external benefits, such as vineyards, corn, +olives, plenty of fruit and grain, and, in short, every convenience and +property of life, are derived from the Gods; and, indeed, with reason, +since by our virtue we claim applause, and in virtue we justly glory, +which we could have no right to do if it was the gift of the Gods, and +not a personal merit. When we are honored with new dignities, or +blessed with increase of riches; when we are favored by fortune beyond +our expectation, or luckily delivered from any approaching evil, we +return thanks for it to the Gods, and assume no praise to ourselves. +But who ever thanked the Gods that he was a good man? We thank them, +indeed, for riches, health, and honor. For these we invoke the all-good +and all-powerful Jupiter; but not for wisdom, temperance, and justice. +No one ever offered a tenth of his estate to Hercules to be made wise. +It is reported, indeed, of Pythagoras that he sacrificed an ox to the +Muses upon having made some new discovery in geometry;[286] but, for my +part, I cannot believe it, because he refused to sacrifice even to +Apollo at Delos, lest he should defile the altar with blood. But to +return. It is universally agreed that good fortune we must ask of the +Gods, but wisdom must arise from ourselves; and though temples have +been consecrated to the Mind, to Virtue, and to Faith, yet that does +not contradict their being inherent in us. In regard to hope, safety, +assistance, and victory, we must rely upon the Gods for them; from +whence it follows, as Diogenes said, that the prosperity of the wicked +destroys the idea of a Divine Providence. + +XXXVII. But good men have sometimes success. They have so; but we +cannot, with any show of reason, attribute that success to the Gods. +Diagoras, who is called the atheist, being at Samothrace, one of his +friends showed him several pictures[287] of people who had endured very +dangerous storms; "See," says he, "you who deny a providence, how many +have been saved by their prayers to the Gods." "Ay," says Diagoras, "I +see those who were saved, but where are those painted who were +shipwrecked?" At another time, he himself was in a storm, when the +sailors, being greatly alarmed, told him they justly deserved that +misfortune for admitting him into their ship; when he, pointing to +others under the like distress, asked them "if they believed Diagoras +was also aboard those ships?" In short, with regard to good or bad +fortune, it matters not what you are, or how you have lived. The Gods, +like kings, regard not everything. What similitude is there between +them? If kings neglect anything, want of knowledge may be pleaded in +their defence; but ignorance cannot be brought as an excuse for the +Gods. + +XXXVIII. Your manner of justifying them is somewhat extraordinary, when +you say that if a wicked man dies without suffering for his crimes, the +Gods inflict a punishment on his children, his children's children, and +all his posterity. O wonderful equity of the Gods! What city would +endure the maker of a law which should condemn a son or a grandson for +a crime committed by the father or the grandfather? + + Shall Tantalus' unhappy offspring know + No end, no close, of this long scene of woe? + When will the dire reward of guilt be o'er, + And Myrtilus demand revenge no more?[288] + +Whether the poets have corrupted the Stoics, or the Stoics given +authority to the poets, I cannot easily determine. Both alike are to be +condemned. If those persons whose names have been branded in the +satires of Hipponax or Archilochus[289] were driven to despair, it did +not proceed from the Gods, but had its origin in their own minds. When +we see AEgistus and Paris lost in the heat of an impure passion, why are +we to attribute it to a Deity, when the crime, as it were, speaks for +itself? I believe that those who recover from illness are more indebted +to the care of Hippocrates than to the power of AEsculapius; that Sparta +received her laws from Lycurgus[290] rather than from Apollo; that +those eyes of the maritime coast, Corinth and Carthage, were plucked +out, the one by Critolaus, the other by Hasdrubal, without the +assistance of any divine anger, since you yourselves confess that a +Deity cannot possibly be angry on any provocation. + +XXXIX. But could not the Deity have assisted and preserved those +eminent cities? Undoubtedly he could; for, according to your doctrine, +his power is infinite, and without the least labor; and as nothing but +the will is necessary to the motion of our bodies, so the divine will +of the Gods, with the like ease, can create, move, and change all +things. This you hold, not from a mere phantom of superstition, but on +natural and settled principles of reason; for matter, you say, of which +all things are composed and consist, is susceptible of all forms and +changes, and there is nothing which cannot be, or cease to be, in an +instant; and that Divine Providence has the command and disposal of +this universal matter, and consequently can, in any part of the +universe, do whatever she pleases: from whence I conclude that this +Providence either knows not the extent of her power, or neglects human +affairs, or cannot judge what is best for us. Providence, you say, does +not extend her care to particular men; there is no wonder in that, +since she does not extend it to cities, or even to nations, or people. +If, therefore, she neglects whole nations, is it not very probable that +she neglects all mankind? But how can you assert that the Gods do not +enter into all the little circumstances of life, and yet hold that they +distribute dreams among men? Since you believe in dreams, it is your +part to solve this difficulty. Besides, you say we ought to call upon +the Gods. Those who call upon the Gods are individuals. Divine +Providence, therefore, regards individuals, which consequently proves +that they are more at leisure than you imagine. Let us suppose the +Divine Providence to be greatly busied; that it causes the revolutions +of the heavens, supports the earth, and rules the seas; why does it +suffer so many Gods to be unemployed? Why is not the superintendence of +human affairs given to some of those idle Deities which you say are +innumerable? + +This is the purport of what I had to say concerning "the Nature of the +Gods;" not with a design to destroy their existence, but merely to show +what an obscure point it is, and with what difficulties an explanation +of it is attended. + +XL. Balbus, observing that Cotta had finished his discourse--You have +been very severe, says he, against a Divine Providence, a doctrine +established by the Stoics with piety and wisdom; but, as it grows too +late, I shall defer my answer to another day. Our argument is of the +greatest importance; it concerns our altars,[291] our hearths, our +temples, nay, even the walls of our city, which you priests hold +sacred; you, who by religion defend Rome better than she is defended by +her ramparts. This is a cause which, while I have life, I think I +cannot abandon without impiety. + +There is nothing, replied Cotta, which I desire more than to be +confuted. I have not pretended to decide this point, but to give you my +private sentiments upon it; and am very sensible of your great +superiority in argument. No doubt of it, says Velleius; we have much to +fear from one who believes that our dreams are sent from Jupiter, +which, though they are of little weight, are yet of more importance +than the discourse of the Stoics concerning the nature of the Gods. The +conversation ended here, and we parted. Velleius judged that the +arguments of Cotta were truest; but those of Balbus seemed to me to +have the greater probability.[292] + + + + + + +ON THE COMMONWEALTH. + + * * * * * + + + + +PREFACE BY THE EDITOR. + + +This work was one of Cicero's earlier treatises, though one of those +which was most admired by his contemporaries, and one of which he +himself was most proud. It was composed 54 B.C. It was originally in +two books: then it was altered and enlarged into nine, and finally +reduced to six. With the exception of the dream of Scipio, in the last +book, the whole treatise was lost till the year 1822, when the +librarian of the Vatican discovered a portion of them among the +palimpsests in that library. What he discovered is translated here; but +it is in a most imperfect and mutilated state. + +The form selected was that of a dialogue, in imitation of those of +Plato; and the several conferences were supposed to have taken place +during the Latin holidays, 129 B.C., in the consulship of Caius +Sempronius, Tuditanus, and Marcus Aquilius. The speakers are Scipio +Africanus the younger, in whose garden the scene is laid; Caius Laelius; +Lucius Furius Philus; Marcus Manilius; Spurius Mummius, the brother of +the taker of Corinth, a Stoic; Quintus AElius Tubero, a nephew of +Africanus; Publius Rutilius Rufus; Quintus Mucius Scaevola, the tutor of +Cicero; and Caius Fannius, who was absent, however, on the second day +of the conference. + +In the first book, the first thirty-three pages are wanting, and there +are chasms amounting to thirty-eight pages more. In this book Scipio +asserts the superiority of an active over a speculative career; and +after analyzing and comparing the monarchical, aristocratic, and +democratic forms of government, gives a preference to the first; +although his idea of a perfect constitution would be one compounded of +three kinds in due proportion. + +There are a few chasms in the earlier part of the second book, and the +latter part of it is wholly lost. In it Scipio was led on to give an +account of the rise and progress of the Roman Constitution, from which +he passed on to the examination of the great moral obligations which +are the foundations of all political union. + +Of the remaining books we have only a few disjointed fragments, with +the exception, as has been before mentioned, of the dream of Scipio in +the sixth. + + * * * * * + + + + +INTRODUCTION TO THE FIRST BOOK, + +BY THE ORIGINAL TRANSLATOR. + + + Cicero introduces his subject by showing that men were not born + for the mere abstract study of philosophy, but that the study + of philosophic truth should always be made as practical as + possible, and applicable to the great interests of + philanthropy and patriotism. Cicero endeavors to show the + benefit of mingling the contemplative or philosophic with the + political and active life, according to that maxim of + Plato--"Happy is the nation whose philosophers are kings, and + whose kings are philosophers." + + This kind of introduction was the more necessary because many + of the ancient philosophers, too warmly attached to + transcendental metaphysics and sequestered speculations, had + affirmed that true philosophers ought not to interest + themselves in the management of public affairs. Thus, as M. + Villemain observes, it was a maxim of the Epicureans, + "Sapiens ne accedat ad rempublicam" (Let no wise man meddle + in politics). The Pythagoreans had enforced the same + principle with more gravity. Aristotle examines the question + on both sides, and concludes in favor of active life. Among + Aristotle's disciples, a writer, singularly elegant and pure, + had maintained the pre-eminence of the contemplative life + over the political or active one, in a work which Cicero + cites with admiration, and to which he seems to have applied + for relief whenever he felt harassed and discouraged in + public business. But here this great man was interested by + the subject he discusses, and by the whole course of his + experience and conduct, to refute the dogmas of that + pusillanimous sophistry and selfish indulgence by bringing + forward the most glorious examples and achievements of + patriotism. In this strain he had doubtless commenced his + exordium, and in this strain we find him continuing it at the + point in which the palimpsest becomes legible. He then + proceeds to introduce his illustrious interlocutors, and + leads them at first to discourse on the astronomical laws + that regulate the revolutions of our planet. From this, by a + very graceful and beautiful transition, he passes on to the + consideration of the best forms of political constitutions + that had prevailed in different nations, and those modes of + government which had produced the greatest benefits in the + commonwealths of antiquity. + + This first book is, in fact, a splendid epitome of the + political science of the age of Cicero, and probably the most + eloquent plea in favor of mixed monarchy to be found in all + literature. + + * * * * * + + + + +BOOK I. + + +I. [Without the virtue of patriotism], neither Caius Duilius, nor Aulus +Atilius,[293] nor Lucius Metellus, could have delivered Rome by their +courage from the terror of Carthage; nor could the two Scipios, when +the fire of the second Punic War was kindled, have quenched it in their +blood; nor, when it revived in greater force, could either Quintus +Maximus[294] have enervated it, or Marcus Marcellus have crushed it; +nor, when it was repulsed from the gates of our own city, would Scipio +have confined it within the walls of our enemies. + +But Cato, at first a new and unknown man, whom all we who aspire to the +same honors consider as a pattern to lead us on to industry and virtue, +was undoubtedly at liberty to enjoy his repose at Tusculum, a most +salubrious and convenient retreat. But he, mad as some people think +him, though no necessity compelled him, preferred being tossed about +amidst the tempestuous waves of politics, even till extreme old age, to +living with all imaginable luxury in that tranquillity and relaxation. +I omit innumerable men who have separately devoted themselves to the +protection of our Commonwealth; and those whose lives are within the +memory of the present generation I will not mention, lest any one +should complain that I had invidiously forgotten himself or some one of +his family. This only I insist on--that so great is the necessity of +this virtue which nature has implanted in man, and so great is the +desire to defend the common safety of our country, that its energy has +continually overcome all the blandishments of pleasure and repose. + +II. Nor is it sufficient to possess this virtue as if it were some kind +of art, unless we put it in practice. An art, indeed, though not +exercised, may still be retained in knowledge; but virtue consists +wholly in its proper use and action. Now, the noblest use of virtue is +the government of the Commonwealth, and the carrying-out in real +action, not in words only, of all those identical theories which those +philosophers discuss at every corner. For nothing is spoken by +philosophers, so far as they speak correctly and honorably, which has +not been discovered and confirmed by those persons who have been the +founders of the laws of states. For whence comes piety, or from whom +has religion been derived? Whence comes law, either that of nations, or +that which is called the civil law? Whence comes justice, faith, +equity? Whence modesty, continence, the horror of baseness, the desire +of praise and renown? Whence fortitude in labors and perils? Doubtless, +from those who have instilled some of these moral principles into men +by education, and confirmed others by custom, and sanctioned others by +laws. + +Moreover, it is reported of Xenocrates, one of the sublimest +philosophers, that when some one asked him what his disciples learned, +he replied, "To do that of their own accord which they might be +compelled to do by law." That citizen, therefore, who obliges all men +to those virtuous actions, by the authority of laws and penalties, to +which the philosophers can scarcely persuade a few by the force of +their eloquence, is certainly to be preferred to the sagest of the +doctors who spend their lives in such discussions. For which of their +exquisite orations is so admirable as to be entitled to be preferred to +a well-constituted government, public justice, and good customs? +Certainly, just as I think that magnificent and imperious cities (as +Ennius says) are superior to castles and villages, so I imagine that +those who regulate such cities by their counsel and authority are far +preferable, with respect to real wisdom, to men who are unacquainted +with any kind of political knowledge. And since we are strongly +prompted to augment the prosperity of the human race, and since we do +endeavor by our counsels and exertions to render the life of man safer +and wealthier, and since we are incited to this blessing by the spur of +nature herself, let us hold on that course which has always been +pursued by all the best men, and not listen for a moment to the signals +of those who sound a retreat so loudly that they sometimes call back +even those who have made considerable progress. + +III. These reasons, so certain and so evident, are opposed by those +who, on the other side, argue that the labors which must necessarily be +sustained in maintaining the Commonwealth form but a slight impediment +to the vigilant and industrious, and are only a contemptible obstacle +in such important affairs, and even in common studies, offices, and +employments. They add the peril of life, that base fear of death, which +has ever been opposed by brave men, to whom it appears far more +miserable to die by the decay of nature and old age than to be allowed +an opportunity of gallantly sacrificing that life for their country +which must otherwise be yielded up to nature. + +On this point, however, our antagonists esteem themselves copious and +eloquent when they collect all the calamities of heroic men, and the +injuries inflicted on them by their ungrateful countrymen. For on this +subject they bring forward those notable examples among the Greeks; and +tell us that Miltiades, the vanquisher and conqueror of the Persians, +before even those wounds were healed which he had received in that most +glorious victory, wasted away in the chains of his fellow-citizens that +life which had been preserved from the weapons of the enemy. They cite +Themistocles, expelled and proscribed by the country which he had +rescued, and forced to flee, not to the Grecian ports which he had +preserved, but to the bosom of the barbarous power which he had +defeated. There is, indeed, no deficiency of examples to illustrate the +levity and cruelty of the Athenians to their noblest citizens--examples +which, originating and multiplying among them, are said at different +times to have abounded in our own most august empire. For we are told: +of the exile of Camillus, the disgrace of Ahala, the unpopularity of +Nasica, the expulsion of Laenas,[295] the condemnation of Opimius, the +flight of Metellus, the cruel destruction of Caius Marius, the massacre +of our chieftains, and the many atrocious crimes which followed. My own +history is by no means free from such calamities; and I imagine that +when they recollect that by my counsel and perils they were preserved +in life and liberty, they are led by that consideration to bewail my +misfortunes more deeply and affectionately. But I cannot tell why those +who sail over the seas for the sake of knowledge and experience [should +wonder at seeing still greater hazards braved in the service of the +Commonwealth]. + +IV. [Since], on my quitting the consulship, I swore in the assembly of +the Roman people, who re-echoed my words, that I had saved the +Commonwealth, I console myself with this remembrance for all my cares, +troubles, and injuries. Although my misfortune had more of honor than +misfortune, and more of glory than disaster; and I derive greater +pleasure from the regrets of good men than sorrow from the exultation +of the worthless. But even if it had happened otherwise, how could I +have complained, as nothing befell me which was either unforeseen, or +more painful than I expected, as a return for my illustrious actions? +For I was one who, though it was in my power to reap more profit from +leisure than most men, on account of the diversified sweetness of my +studies, in which I had lived from boyhood--or, if any public calamity +had happened, to have borne no more than an equal share with the rest +of my countrymen in the misfortune--I nevertheless did not hesitate to +oppose myself to the most formidable tempests and torrents of sedition, +for the sake of saving my countrymen, and at my own proper danger to +secure the common safety of all the rest. For our country did not beget +and educate us with the expectation of receiving no support, as I may +call it, from us; nor for the purpose of consulting nothing but our +convenience, to supply us with a secure refuge for idleness and a +tranquil spot for rest; but rather with a view of turning to her own +advantage the nobler portion of our genius, heart, and counsel; giving +us back for our private service only what she can spare from the public +interests. + +V. Those apologies, therefore, in which men take refuge as an excuse +for their devoting themselves with more plausibility to mere inactivity +do certainly not deserve to be listened to; when, for instance, they +tell us that those who meddle with public affairs are generally +good-for-nothing men, with whom it is discreditable to be compared, and +miserable and dangerous to contend, especially when the multitude is in +an excited state. On which account it is not the part of a wise man to +take the reins, since he cannot restrain the insane and unregulated +movements of the common people. Nor is it becoming to a man of liberal +birth, say they, thus to contend with such vile and unrefined +antagonists, or to subject one's self to the lashings of contumely, or +to put one's self in the way of injuries which ought not to be borne by +a wise man. As if to a virtuous, brave, and magnanimous man there could +be a juster reason for seeking the government than this--to avoid being +subjected to worthless men, and to prevent the Commonwealth from being +torn to pieces by them; when, even if they were then desirous to save +her, they would not have the power. + +VI. But this restriction who can approve, which would interdict the +wise man from taking any share in the government beyond such as the +occasion and necessity may compel him to? As if any greater necessity +could possibly happen to any man than happened to me. In which, how +could I have acted if I had not been consul at the time? and how could +I have been a consul unless I had maintained that course of life from +my childhood which raised me from the order of knights, in which I was +born, to the very highest station? You cannot produce _extempore_, and +just when you please, the power of assisting a commonwealth, although +it may be severely pressed by dangers, unless you have attained the +position which enables you legally to do so. And what most surprises me +in the discourses of learned men, is to hear those persons who confess +themselves incapable of steering the vessel of the State in smooth seas +(which, indeed, they never learned, and never cared to know) profess +themselves ready to assume the helm amidst the fiercest tempests. For +those men are accustomed to say openly, and indeed to boast greatly, +that they have never learned, and have never taken the least pains to +explain, the principles of either establishing or maintaining a +commonwealth; and they look on this practical science as one which +belongs not to men of learning and wisdom, but to those who have made +it their especial study. How, then, can it be reasonable for such men +to promise their assistance to the State, when they shall be compelled +to it by necessity, while they are ignorant how to govern the republic +when no necessity presses upon it, which is a much more easy task? +Indeed, though it were true that the wise man loves not to thrust +himself of his own accord into the administration of public affairs, +but that if circumstances oblige him to it, then he does not refuse the +office, yet I think that this science of civil legislation should in no +wise be neglected by the philosopher, because all resources ought to be +ready to his hand, which he knows not how soon he may be called on to +use. + +VII. I have spoken thus at large for this reason, because in this work +I have proposed to myself and undertaken a discussion on the government +of a state; and in order to render it useful, I was bound, in the first +place, to do away with this pusillanimous hesitation to mingle in +public affairs. If there be any, therefore, who are too much influenced +by the authority of the philosophers, let them consider the subject for +a moment, and be guided by the opinions of those men whose authority +and credit are greatest among learned men; whom I look upon, though +some of them have not personally governed any state, as men who have +nevertheless discharged a kind of office in the republic, inasmuch as +they have made many investigations into, and left many writings +concerning, state affairs. As to those whom the Greeks entitle the +Seven Wise Men, I find that they almost all lived in the middle of +public business. Nor, indeed, is there anything in which human virtue +can more closely resemble the divine powers than in establishing new +states, or in preserving those already established. + +VIII. And concerning these affairs, since it has been our good fortune +to achieve something worthy of memorial in the government of our +country, and also to have acquired some facility of explaining the +powers and resources of politics, we can treat of this subject with the +weight of personal experience and the habit of instruction and +illustration. Whereas before us many have been skilful in theory, +though no exploits of theirs are recorded; and many others have been +men of consideration in action, but unfamiliar with the arts of +exposition. Nor, indeed, is it at all our intention to establish a new +and self-invented system of government; but our purpose is rather to +recall to memory a discussion of the most illustrious men of their age +in our Commonwealth, which you and I, in our youth, when at Smyrna, +heard mentioned by Publius Rutilius Rufus, who reported to us a +conference of many days in which, in my opinion, there was nothing +omitted that could throw light on political affairs. + +IX. For when, in the year of the consulship of Tuditanus and Aquilius, +Scipio Africanus, the son of Paulus AEmilius, formed the project of +spending the Latin holidays at his country-seat, where his most +intimate friends had promised him frequent visits during this season of +relaxation, on the first morning of the festival, his nephew, Quintus +Tubero, made his appearance; and when Scipio had greeted him heartily +and embraced him--How is it, my dear Tubero, said he, that I see you so +early? For these holidays must afford you a capital opportunity of +pursuing your favorite studies. Ah! replied Tubero, I can study my +books at any time, for they are always disengaged; but it is a great +privilege, my Scipio, to find you at leisure, especially in this +restless period of public affairs. You certainly have found me so, said +Scipio, but, to speak truth, I am rather relaxing from business than +from study. Nay, said Tubero, you must try to relax from your studies +too, for here are several of us, as we have appointed, all ready, if it +suits your convenience, to aid you in getting through this leisure time +of yours. I am very willing to consent, answered Scipio, and we may be +able to compare notes respecting the several topics that interest us. + +X. Be it so, said Tubero; and since you invite me to discussion, and +present the opportunity, let us first examine, before any one else +arrives, what can be the nature of the parhelion, or double sun, which +was mentioned in the senate. Those that affirm they witnessed this +prodigy are neither few nor unworthy of credit, so that there is more +reason for investigation than incredulity.[296] + +Ah! said Scipio, I wish we had our friend Panaetius with us, who is fond +of investigating all things of this kind, but especially all celestial +phenomena. As for my opinion, Tubero, for I always tell you just what I +think, I hardly agree in these subjects with that friend of mine, +since, respecting things of which we can scarcely form a conjecture as +to their character, he is as positive as if he had seen them with his +own eyes and felt them with his own hands. And I cannot but the more +admire the wisdom of Socrates, who discarded all anxiety respecting +things of this kind, and affirmed that these inquiries concerning the +secrets of nature were either above the efforts of human reason, or +were absolutely of no consequence at all to human life. + +But, then, my Africanus, replied Tubero, of what credit is the +tradition which states that Socrates rejected all these physical +investigations, and confined his whole attention to men and manners? +For, with respect to him what better authority can we cite than Plato? +in many passages of whose works Socrates speaks in such a manner that +even when he is discussing morals, and virtues, and even public affairs +and politics, he endeavors to interweave, after the fashion of +Pythagoras, the doctrines of arithmetic, geometry, and harmonic +proportions with them. + +That is true, replied Scipio; but you are aware, I believe, that Plato, +after the death of Socrates, was induced to visit Egypt by his love of +science, and that after that he proceeded to Italy and Sicily, from his +desire of understanding the Pythagorean dogmas; that he conversed much +with Archytas of Tarentum and Timaeus of Locris; that he collected the +works of Philolaus; and that, finding in these places the renown of +Pythagoras flourishing, he addicted himself exceedingly to the +disciples of Pythagoras, and their studies; therefore, as he loved +Socrates with his whole heart, and wished to attribute all great +discoveries to him, he interwove the Socratic elegance and subtlety of +eloquence with somewhat of the obscurity of Pythagoras, and with that +notorious gravity of his diversified arts. + +XI. When Scipio had spoken thus, he suddenly saw Lucius Furius +approaching, and saluting him, and embracing him most affectionately, +he gave him a seat on his own couch. And as soon as Publius Rutilius, +the worthy reporter of the conference to us, had arrived, when we had +saluted him, he placed him by the side of Tubero. Then said Furius, +What is it that you are about? Has our entrance at all interrupted any +conversation of yours? By no means, said Scipio, for you yourself too +are in the habit of investigating carefully the subject which Tubero +was a little before proposing to examine; and our friend Rutilius, even +under the walls of Numantia, was in the habit at times of conversing +with me on questions of the same kind. What, then, was the subject of +your discussion? said Philus. We were talking, said Scipio, of the +double suns that recently appeared, and I wish, Philus, to hear what +you think of them. + +XII. Just as he was speaking, a boy announced that Laelius was coming to +call on him, and that he had already left his house. Then Scipio, +putting on his sandals and robes, immediately went forth from his +chamber, and when he had walked a little time in the portico, he met +Laelius, and welcomed him and those that accompanied him, namely, +Spurius Mummius, to whom he was greatly attached, and C. Fannius and +Quintus Scaevola, sons-in-law of Laelius, two very intelligent young men, +and now of the quaestorian age.[297] + +When he had saluted them all, he returned through the portico, placing +Laelius in the middle; for there was in their friendship a sort of law +of reciprocal courtesy, so that in the camp Laelius paid Scipio almost +divine honors, on account of his eminent renown in war and in private +life; in his turn Scipio reverenced Laelius, even as a father, because +he was older than himself. + +Then after they had exchanged a few words, as they walked up and down, +Scipio, to whom their visit was extremely welcome and agreeable, wished +to assemble them in a sunny corner of the gardens, because it was still +winter; and when they had agreed to this, there came in another friend, +a learned man, much beloved and esteemed by all of them, M. Manilius, +who, after having been most warmly welcomed by Scipio and the rest, +seated himself next to Laelius. + +XIII. Then Philus, commencing the conversation, said: It does not +appear to me that the presence of our new guests need alter the subject +of our discussion, but only that it should induce us to treat it more +philosophically, and in a manner more worthy of our increased audience. +What do you allude to? said Laelius; or what was the discussion we broke +in upon? Scipio was asking me, replied Philus, what I thought of the +parhelion, or mock sun, whose recent apparition was so strongly +attested. + +_Laelius._ Do you say then, my Philus, that we have sufficiently +examined those questions which concern our own houses and the +Commonwealth, that we begin to investigate the celestial mysteries? + +And Philus replied: Do you think, then, that it does not concern our +houses to know what happens in that vast home which is not included in +walls of human fabrication, but which embraces the entire universe--a +home which the Gods share with us, as the common country of all +intelligent beings? Especially when, if we are ignorant of these +things, there are also many great practical truths which result from +them, and which bear directly on the welfare of our race, of which we +must be also ignorant. And here I can speak for myself, as well as for +you, Laelius, and all men who are ambitious of wisdom, that the +knowledge and consideration of the facts of nature are by themselves +very delightful. + +_Laelius._ I have no objection to the discussion, especially as it is +holiday-time with us. But cannot we have the pleasure of hearing you +resume it, or are we come too late? + +_Philus_. We have not yet commenced the discussion, and since the +question remains entire and unbroken, I shall have the greatest +pleasure, my Laelius, in handing over the argument to you. + +_Laelius._ No, I had much rather hear you, unless, indeed, Manilius +thinks himself able to compromise the suit between the two suns, that +they may possess heaven as joint sovereigns without intruding on each +other's empire. + +Then Manilius said: Are you going, Laelius, to ridicule a science in +which, in the first place, I myself excel; and, secondly, without which +no one can distinguish what is his own, and what is another's? But to +return to the point. Let us now at present listen to Philus, who seems +to me to have started a greater question than any of those that have +engaged the attention of either Publius Mucius or myself. + +XIV. Then Philus said: I am not about to bring you anything new, or +anything which has been thought over or discovered by me myself. But I +recollect that Caius Sulpicius Gallus, who was a man of profound +learning, as you are aware, when this same thing was reported to have +taken place in his time, while he was staying in the house of Marcus +Marcellus, who had been his colleague in the consulship, asked to see a +celestial globe which Marcellus's grandfather had saved after the +capture of Syracuse from that magnificent and opulent city, without +bringing to his own home any other memorial out of so great a booty; +which I had often heard mentioned on account of the great fame of +Archimedes; but its appearance, however, did not seem to me +particularly striking. For that other is more elegant in form, and more +generally known, which was made by the same Archimedes, and deposited +by the same Marcellus in the Temple of Virtue at Rome. But as soon as +Gallus had begun to explain, in a most scientific manner, the principle +of this machine, I felt that the Sicilian geometrician must have +possessed a genius superior to anything we usually conceive to belong +to our nature. For Gallus assured us that that other solid and compact +globe was a very ancient invention, and that the first model had been +originally made by Thales of Miletus. That afterward Eudoxus of Cnidus, +a disciple of Plato, had traced on its surface the stars that appear in +the sky, and that many years subsequently, borrowing from Eudoxus this +beautiful design and representation, Aratus had illustrated it in his +verses, not by any science of astronomy, but by the ornament of poetic +description. He added that the figure of the globe, which displayed the +motions of the sun and moon, and the five planets, or wandering stars, +could not be represented by the primitive solid globe; and that in this +the invention of Archimedes was admirable, because he had calculated +how a single revolution should maintain unequal and diversified +progressions in dissimilar motions. In fact, when Gallus moved this +globe, we observed that the moon succeeded the sun by as many turns of +the wheel in the machine as days in the heavens. From whence it +resulted that the progress of the sun was marked as in the heavens, and +that the moon touched the point where she is obscured by the earth's +shadow at the instant the sun appears opposite.[298] * * * + +XV. * * *[299] I had myself a great affection for this Gallus, and I +know that he was very much beloved and esteemed by my father Paulus. I +recollect that when I was very young, when my father, as consul, +commanded in Macedonia, and we were in the camp, our army was seized +with a pious terror, because suddenly, in a clear night, the bright and +full moon became eclipsed. And Gallus, who was then our lieutenant, the +year before that in which he was elected consul, hesitated not, next +morning, to state in the camp that it was no prodigy, and that the +phenomenon which had then appeared would always appear at certain +periods, when the sun was so placed that he could not affect the moon +with his light. + +But do you mean, said Tubero, that he dared to speak thus to men almost +entirely uneducated and ignorant? + +_Scipio._ He did, and with great * * * for his opinion was no result of +insolent ostentation, nor was his language unbecoming the dignity of so +wise a man: indeed, he performed a very noble action in thus freeing +his countrymen from the terrors of an idle superstition. + +XVI. And they relate that in a similar way, in the great war in which +the Athenians and Lacedaemonians contended with such violent resentment, +the famous Pericles, the first man of his country in credit, eloquence, +and political genius, observing the Athenians overwhelmed with an +excessive alarm during an eclipse of the sun which caused a sudden +darkness, told them, what he had learned in the school of Anaxagoras, +that these phenomena necessarily happened at precise and regular +periods when the body of the moon was interposed between the sun and +the earth, and that if they happened not before every new moon, still +they could not possibly happen except at the exact time of the new +moon. And when he had proved this truth by his reasonings, he freed the +people from their alarms; for at that period the doctrine was new and +unfamiliar that the sun was accustomed to be eclipsed by the +interposition of the moon, which fact they say that Thales of Miletus +was the first to discover. Afterward my friend Ennius appears to have +been acquainted with the same theory, who, writing about 350[300] years +after the foundation of Rome, says, "In the nones of June the sun was +covered by the moon and night." The calculations in the astronomical +art have attained such perfection that from that day, thus described to +us by Ennius and recorded in the pontifical registers, the anterior +eclipses of the sun have been computed as far back as the nones of July +in the reign of Romulus, when that eclipse took place, in the obscurity +of which it was affirmed that Virtue bore Romulus to heaven, in spite +of the perishable nature which carried him off by the common fate of +humanity. + +XVII. Then said Tubero: Do not you think, Scipio, that this +astronomical science, which every day proves so useful, just now +appeared in a different light to you,[301] * * * which the rest may +see. Moreover, who can think anything in human affairs of brilliant +importance who has penetrated this starry empire of the gods? Or who +can think anything connected with mankind long who has learned to +estimate the nature of eternity? or glorious who is aware of the +insignificance of the size of the earth, even in its whole extent, and +especially in the portion which men inhabit? And when we consider that +almost imperceptible point which we ourselves occupy unknown to the +majority of nations, can we still hope that our name and reputation can +be widely circulated? And then our estates and edifices, our cattle, +and the enormous treasures of our gold and silver, can they be esteemed +or denominated as desirable goods by him who observes their perishable +profit, and their contemptible use, and their uncertain domination, +often falling into the possession of the very worst men? How happy, +then, ought we to esteem that man who alone has it in his power, not by +the law of the Romans, but by the privilege of philosophers, to enjoy +all things as his own; not by any civil bond, but by the common right +of nature, which denies that anything can really be possessed by any +one but him who understands its true nature and use; who reckons our +dictatorships and consulships rather in the rank of necessary offices +than desirable employments, and thinks they must be endured rather as +acquittances of our debt to our country than sought for the sake of +emolument or glory--the man, in short, who can apply to himself the +sentence which Cato tells us my ancestor Africanus loved to repeat, +"that he was never so busy as when he did nothing, and never less +solitary than when alone." + +For who can believe that Dionysius, when after every possible effort he +ravished from his fellow-citizens their liberty, had performed a nobler +work than Archimedes, when, without appearing to be doing anything, he +manufactured the globe which we have just been describing? Who does not +see that those men are in reality more solitary who, in the midst of a +crowd, find no one with whom they can converse congenially than those +who, without witnesses, hold communion with themselves, and enter into +the secret counsels of the sagest philosophers, while they delight +themselves in their writings and discoveries? And who would think any +one richer than the man who is in want of nothing which nature +requires; or more powerful than he who has attained all that she has +need of; or happier than he who is free from all mental perturbation; +or more secure in future than he who carries all his property in +himself, which is thus secured from shipwreck? And what power, what +magistracy, what royalty, can be preferred to a wisdom which, looking +down on all terrestrial objects as low and transitory things, +incessantly directs its attention to eternal and immutable verities, +and which is persuaded that though others are called men, none are +really so but those who are refined by the appropriate acts of +humanity? + +In this sense an expression of Plato or some other philosopher appears +to me exceedingly elegant, who, when a tempest had driven his ship on +an unknown country and a desolate shore, during the alarms with which +their ignorance of the region inspired his companions, observed, they +say, geometrical figures traced in the sand, on which he immediately +told them to be of good cheer, for he had observed the indications of +Man. A conjecture he deduced, not from the cultivation of the soil +which he beheld, but from the symbols of science. For this reason, +Tubero, learning and learned men, and these your favorite studies, have +always particularly pleased me. + +XVIII. Then Laelius replied: I cannot venture, Scipio, to answer your +arguments, or to [maintain the discussion either against] you, Philus, +or Manilius.[302] * * * + +We had a friend in Tubero's father's family, who in these respects may +serve him as a model. + + Sextus so wise, and ever on his guard. + +Wise and cautious indeed he was, as Ennius justly describes him--not +because he searched for what he could never find, but because he knew +how to answer those who prayed for deliverance from cares and +difficulties. It is he who, reasoning against the astronomical studies +of Gallus, used frequently to repeat these words of Achilles in the +Iphigenia[303]: + + They note the astrologic signs of heaven, + Whene'er the goats or scorpions of great Jove, + Or other monstrous names of brutal forms, + Rise in the zodiac; but not one regards + The sensible facts of earth, on which we tread, + While gazing on the starry prodigies. + +He used, however, to say (and I have often listened to him with +pleasure) that for his part he thought that Zethus, in the piece of +Pacuvius, was too inimical to learning. He much preferred the +Neoptolemus of Ennius, who professes himself desirous of philosophizing +only in moderation; for that he did not think it right to be wholly +devoted to it. But though the studies of the Greeks have so many charms +for you, there are others, perhaps, nobler and more extensive, which we +may be better able to apply to the service of real life, and even to +political affairs. As to these abstract sciences, their utility, if +they possess any, lies principally in exciting and stimulating the +abilities of youth, so that they more easily acquire more important +accomplishments. + +XIX. Then Tubero said: I do not mean to disagree with you, Laelius; but, +pray, what do you call more important studies? + +_Laelius._ I will tell you frankly, though perhaps you will think +lightly of my opinion, since you appeared so eager in interrogating +Scipio respecting the celestial phenomena; but I happen to think that +those things which are every day before our eyes are more particularly +deserving of our attention. Why should the child of Paulus AEmilius, the +nephew of AEmilius, the descendant of such a noble family and so +glorious a republic, inquire how there can be two suns in heaven, and +not ask how there can be two senates in one Commonwealth, and, as it +were, two distinct peoples? For, as you see, the death of Tiberius +Gracchus, and the whole system of his tribuneship, has divided one +people into two parties. But the slanderers and the enemies of Scipio, +encouraged by P. Crassus and Appius Claudius, maintained, after the +death of these two chiefs, a division of nearly half the senate, under +the influence of Metellus and Mucius. Nor would they permit the +man[304] who alone could have been of service to help us out of our +difficulties during the movement of the Latins and their allies towards +rebellion, violating all our treaties in the presence of factious +triumvirs, and creating every day some fresh intrigue, to the +disturbance of the worthier and wealthier citizens. This is the reason, +young men, if you will listen to me, why you should regard this new sun +with less alarm; for, whether it does exist, or whether it does not +exist, it is, as you see, quite harmless to us. As to the manner of its +existence, we can know little or nothing; and even if we obtained the +most perfect understanding of it, this knowledge would make us but +little wiser or happier. But that there should exist a united people +and a united senate is a thing which actually may be brought about, and +it will be a great evil if it is not; and that it does not exist at +present we are aware; and we see that if it can be effected, our lives +will be both better and happier. + +XX. Then Mucius said: What, then, do you consider, my Laelius, should be +our best arguments in endeavoring to bring about the object of your +wishes? + +_Laelius._ Those sciences and arts which teach us how we may be most +useful to the State; for I consider that the most glorious office of +wisdom, and the noblest proof and business of virtue. In order, +therefore, that we may consecrate these holidays as much as possible to +conversations which may be profitable to the Commonwealth, let us beg +Scipio to explain to us what in his estimation appears to be the best +form of government. Then let us pass on to other points, the knowledge +of which may lead us, as I hope, to sound political views, and unfold +the causes of the dangers which now threaten us. + +XXI. When Philus, Manilius, and Mummius had all expressed their great +approbation of this idea[305] * * * I have ventured [to open our +discussion] in this way, not only because it is but just that on State +politics the chief man in the State should be the principal speaker, +but also because I recollect that you, Scipio, were formerly very much +in the habit of conversing with Panaetius and Polybius, two Greeks, +exceedingly learned in political questions, and that you are master of +many arguments by which you prove that by far the best condition of +government is that which our ancestors have handed down to us. And as +you, therefore, are familiar with this subject, if you will explain to +us your views respecting the general principles of a state (I speak for +my friends as well as myself), we shall feel exceedingly obliged to +you. + +XXII. Then Scipio said: I must acknowledge that there is no subject of +meditation to which my mind naturally turns with more ardor and +intensity than this very one which Laelius has proposed to us. And, +indeed, as I see that in every profession, every artist who would +distinguish himself, thinks of, and aims at, and labors for no other +object but that of attaining perfection in his art, should not I, whose +main business, according to the example of my father and my ancestors, +is the advancement and right administration of government, be +confessing myself more indolent than any common mechanic if I were to +bestow on this noblest of sciences less attention and labor than they +devote to their insignificant trades? However, I am neither entirely +satisfied with the decisions which the greatest and wisest men of +Greece have left us; nor, on the other hand, do I venture to prefer my +own opinions to theirs. Therefore, I must request you not to consider +me either entirely ignorant of the Grecian literature, nor yet +disposed, especially in political questions, to yield it the +pre-eminence over our own; but rather to regard me as a true-born +Roman, not illiberally instructed by the care of my father, and +inflamed with the desire of knowledge, even from my boyhood, but still +even more familiar with domestic precepts and practices than the +literature of books. + +XXIII. On this Philus said: I have no doubt, my Scipio, that no one is +superior to you in natural genius, and that you are very far superior +to every one in the practical experience of national government and of +important business. We are also acquainted with the course which your +studies have at all times taken; and if, as you say, you have given so +much attention to this science and art of politics, we cannot be too +much obliged to Laelius for introducing the subject: for I trust that +what we shall hear from you will be far more useful and available than +all the writings put together which the Greeks have written for us. + +Then Scipio replied: You are raising a very high expectation of my +discourse, such as is a most oppressive burden to a man who is required +to discuss grave subjects. + +And Philus said: Although that may be a difficulty, my Scipio, still +you will be sure to conquer it, as you always do; nor is there any +danger of eloquence failing you, when you begin to speak on the affairs +of a commonwealth. + +XXIV. Then Scipio proceeded: I will do what you wish, as far as I can; +and I shall enter into the discussion under favor of that rule which, I +think, should be adopted by all persons in disputations of this kind, +if they wish to avoid being misunderstood; namely, that when men have +agreed respecting the proper name of the matter under discussion, it +should be stated what that name exactly means, and what it legitimately +includes. And when that point is settled, then it is fit to enter on +the discussion; for it will never be possible to arrive at an +understanding of what the character of the subject of the discussion +is, unless one first understands exactly what it is. Since, then, our +investigations relate to a commonwealth, we must first examine what +this name properly signifies. + +And when Laelius had intimated his approbation of this course, Scipio +continued: + +I shall not adopt, said he, in so clear and simple a manner that system +of discussion which goes back to first principles; as learned men often +do in this sort of discussion, so as to go back to the first meeting of +male and female, and then to the first birth and formation of the first +family, and define over and over again what there is in words, and in +how many manners each thing is stated. For, as I am speaking to men of +prudence, who have acted with the greatest glory in the Commonwealth, +both in peace and war, I will take care not to allow the subject of the +discussion itself to be clearer than my explanation of it. Nor have I +undertaken this task with the design of examining all its minuter +points, like a school-master; nor will I promise you in the following +discourse not to omit any single particular. + +Then Laelius said: For my part, I am impatient for exactly that kind of +disquisition which you promise us. + +XXV. Well, then, said Africanus, a commonwealth is a constitution of +the entire people. But the people is not every association of men, +however congregated, but the association of the entire number, bound +together by the compact of justice, and the communication of utility. +The first cause of this association is not so much the weakness of man +as a certain spirit of congregation which naturally belongs to him. For +the human race is not a race of isolated individuals, wandering and +solitary; but it is so constituted that even in the affluence of all +things [and without any need of reciprocal assistance, it spontaneously +seeks society]. + +XXVI. [It is necessary to presuppose] these original seeds, as it were, +since we cannot discover any primary establishment of the other +virtues, or even of a commonwealth itself. These unions, then, formed +by the principle which I have mentioned, established their headquarters +originally in certain central positions, for the convenience of the +whole population; and having fortified them by natural and artificial +means, they called this collection of houses a city or town, +distinguished by temples and public squares. Every people, therefore, +which consists of such an association of the entire multitude as I have +described, every city which consists of an assemblage of the people, +and every commonwealth which embraces every member of these +associations, must be regulated by a certain authority, in order to be +permanent. + +This intelligent authority should always refer itself to that grand +first principle which established the Commonwealth. It must be +deposited in the hands of one supreme person, or intrusted to the +administration of certain delegated rulers, or undertaken by the whole +multitude. When the direction of all depends on one person, we call +this individual a king, and this form of political constitution a +kingdom. When it is in the power of privileged delegates, the State is +said to be ruled by an aristocracy; and when the people are all in all, +they call it a democracy, or popular constitution. And if the tie of +social affection, which originally united men in political associations +for the sake of public interest, maintains its force, each of these +forms of government is, I will not say perfect, nor, in my opinion, +essentially good, but tolerable, and such that one may accidentally be +better than another: either a just and wise king, or a selection of the +most eminent citizens, or even the populace itself (though this is the +least commendable form), may, if there be no interference of crime and +cupidity, form a constitution sufficiently secure. + +XXVII. But in a monarchy the other members of the State are often too +much deprived of public counsel and jurisdiction; and under the rule of +an aristocracy the multitude can hardly possess its due share of +liberty, since it is allowed no share in the public deliberation, and +no power. And when all things are carried by a democracy, although it +be just and moderate, yet its very equality is a culpable levelling, +inasmuch as it allows no gradations of rank. Therefore, even if Cyrus, +the King of the Persians, was a most righteous and wise monarch, I +should still think that the interest of the people (for this is, as I +have said before, the same as the Commonwealth) could not be very +effectually promoted when all things depended on the beck and nod of +one individual. And though at present the people of Marseilles, our +clients, are governed with the greatest justice by elected magistrates +of the highest rank, still there is always in this condition of the +people a certain appearance of servitude; and when the Athenians, at a +certain period, having demolished their Areopagus, conducted all public +affairs by the acts and decrees of the democracy alone, their State, as +it no longer contained a distinct gradation of ranks, was no longer +able to retain its original fair appearance. + +XXVIII. I have reasoned thus on the three forms of government, not +looking on them in their disorganized and confused conditions, but in +their proper and regular administration. These three particular forms, +however, contained in themselves, from the first, the faults and +defects I have mentioned; but they have also other dangerous vices, for +there is not one of these three forms of government which has not a +precipitous and slippery passage down to some proximate abuse. For, +after thinking of that endurable, or, as you will have it, most amiable +king, Cyrus--to name him in preference to any one else--then, to +produce a change in our minds, we behold the barbarous Phalaris, that +model of tyranny, to which the monarchical authority is easily abused +by a facile and natural inclination. And, in like manner, along-side of +the wise aristocracy of Marseilles, we might exhibit the oligarchical +faction of the thirty tyrants which once existed at Athens. And, not to +seek for other instances, among the same Athenians, we can show you +that when unlimited power was cast into the hands of the people, it +inflamed the fury of the multitude, and aggravated that universal +license which ruined their State.[306] * * * + +XXIX. The worst condition of things sometimes results from a confusion +of those factious tyrannies into which kings, aristocrats, and +democrats are apt to degenerate. For thus, from these diverse elements, +there occasionally arises (as I have said before) a new kind of +government. And wonderful indeed are the revolutions and periodical +returns in natural constitutions of such alternations and vicissitudes, +which it is the part of the wise politician to investigate with the +closest attention. But to calculate their approach, and to join to this +foresight the skill which moderates the course of events, and retains +in a steady hand the reins of that authority which safely conducts the +people through all the dangers to which they expose themselves, is the +work of a most illustrious citizen, and of almost divine genius. + +There is a fourth kind of government, therefore, which, in my opinion, +is preferable to all these: it is that mixed and moderate government +which is composed of the three particular forms which I have already +noticed. + +XXX. _Laelius._ I am not ignorant, Scipio, that such is your opinion, +for I have often heard you say so. But I do not the less desire, if it +is not giving you too much trouble, to hear which you consider the best +of these three forms of commonwealths. For it may be of some use in +considering[307] * * * + +XXXI. * * * And each commonwealth corresponds to the nature and will of +him who governs it. Therefore, in no other constitution than that in +which the people exercise sovereign power has liberty any sure abode, +than which there certainly is no more desirable blessing. And if it be +not equally established for every one, it is not even liberty at all. +And how can there be this character of equality, I do not say under a +monarchy, where slavery is least disguised or doubtful, but even in +those constitutions in which the people are free indeed in words, for +they give their suffrages, they elect officers, they are canvassed and +solicited for magistracies; but yet they only grant those things which +they are obliged to grant whether they will or not, and which are not +really in their free power, though others ask them for them? For they +are not themselves admitted to the government, to the exercise of +public authority, or to offices of select judges, which are permitted +to those only of ancient families and large fortunes. But in a free +people, as among the Rhodians and Athenians, there is no citizen +who[308] * * * + +XXXII. * * * No sooner is one man, or several, elevated by wealth and +power, than they say that * * * arise from their pride and arrogance, +when the idle and the timid give way, and bow down to the insolence of +riches. But if the people knew how to maintain its rights, then they +say that nothing could be more glorious and prosperous than democracy; +inasmuch as they themselves would be the sovereign dispensers of laws, +judgments, war, peace, public treaties, and, finally, of the fortune +and life of each individual citizen; and this condition of things is +the only one which, in their opinion, can be really called a +commonwealth, that is to say, a constitution of the people. It is on +this principle that, according to them, a people often vindicates its +liberty from the domination of kings and nobles; while, on the other +hand, kings are not sought for among free peoples, nor are the power +and wealth of aristocracies. They deny, moreover, that it is fair to +reject this general constitution of freemen, on account of the vices of +the unbridled populace; but that if the people be united and inclined, +and directs all its efforts to the safety and freedom of the community, +nothing can be stronger or more unchangeable; and they assert that this +necessary union is easily obtained in a republic so constituted that +the good of all classes is the same; while the conflicting interests +that prevail in other constitutions inevitably produce dissensions; +therefore, say they, when the senate had the ascendency, the republic +had no stability; and when kings possess the power, this blessing is +still more rare, since, as Ennius expresses it, + + In kingdoms there's no faith, and little love. + +Wherefore, since the law is the bond of civil society, and the justice +of the law equal, by what rule can the association of citizens be held +together, if the condition of the citizens be not equal? For if the +fortunes of men cannot be reduced to this equality--if genius cannot be +equally the property of all--rights, at least, should be equal among +those who are citizens of the same republic. For what is a republic but +an association of rights?[309] * * * + +XXXIII. But as to the other political constitutions, these democratical +advocates do not think they are worthy of being distinguished by the +name which they claim. For why, say they, should we apply the name of +king, the title of Jupiter the Beneficent, and not rather the title of +tyrant, to a man ambitious of sole authority and power, lording it over +a degraded multitude? For a tyrant may be as merciful as a king may be +oppressive; so that the whole difference to the people is, whether they +serve an indulgent master or a cruel one, since serve some one they +must. But how could Sparta, at the period of the boasted superiority of +her political institution, obtain a constant enjoyment of just and +virtuous kings, when they necessarily received an hereditary monarch, +good, bad, or indifferent, because he happened to be of the blood +royal? As to aristocrats, Who will endure, say they, that men should +distinguish themselves by such a title, and that not by the voice of +the people, but by their own votes? For how is such a one judged to be +best either in learning, sciences, or arts?[310] * * * + +XXXIV. * * * If it does so by hap-hazard, it will be as easily upset as +a vessel if the pilot were chosen by lot from among the passengers. But +if a people, being free, chooses those to whom it can trust +itself--and, if it desires its own preservation, it will always choose +the noblest--then certainly it is in the counsels of the aristocracy +that the safety of the State consists, especially as nature has not +only appointed that these superior men should excel the inferior sort +in high virtue and courage, but has inspired the people also with the +desire of obedience towards these, their natural lords. But they say +this aristocratical State is destroyed by the depraved opinions of men, +who, through ignorance of virtue (which, as it belongs to few, can be +discerned and appreciated by few), imagine that not only rich and +powerful men, but also those who are nobly born, are necessarily the +best. And so when, through this popular error, the riches, and not the +virtue, of a few men has taken possession of the State, these chiefs +obstinately retain the title of nobles, though they want the essence of +nobility. For riches, fame, and power, without wisdom and a just method +of regulating ourselves and commanding others, are full of discredit +and insolent arrogance; nor is there any kind of government more +deformed than that in which the wealthiest are regarded as the noblest. + +But when virtue governs the Commonwealth, what can be more glorious? +When he who commands the rest is himself enslaved by no lust or +passion; when he himself exhibits all the virtues to which he incites +and educates the citizens; when he imposes no law on the people which +he does not himself observe, but presents his life as a living law to +his fellow-countrymen; if a single individual could thus suffice for +all, there would be no need of more; and if the community could find a +chief ruler thus worthy of all their suffrages, none would require +elected magistrates. + +It was the difficulty of forming plans which transferred the government +from a king into the hands of many; and the error and temerity of the +people likewise transferred it from the hands of the many into those of +the few. Thus, between the weakness of the monarch and the rashness of +the multitude, the aristocrats have occupied the middle place, than +which nothing can be better arranged; and while they superintend the +public interest, the people necessarily enjoy the greatest possible +prosperity, being free from all care and anxiety, having intrusted +their security to others, who ought sedulously to defend it, and not +allow the people to suspect that their advantage is neglected by their +rulers. + +For as to that equality of rights which democracies so loudly boast of, +it can never be maintained; for the people themselves, so dissolute and +so unbridled, are always inclined to flatter a number of demagogues; +and there is in them a very great partiality for certain men and +dignities, so that their equality, so called, becomes most unfair and +iniquitous. For as equal honor is given to the most noble and the most +infamous, some of whom must exist in every State, then the equity which +they eulogize becomes most inequitable--an evil which never can happen +in those states which are governed by aristocracies. These reasonings, +my Laelius, and some others of the same kind, are usually brought +forward by those that so highly extol this form of political +constitution. + +XXXV. Then Laelius said: But you have not told us, Scipio, which of +these three forms of government you yourself most approve. + +_Scipio._ You are right to shape your question, which of the three I +most approve, for there is not one of them which I approve at all by +itself, since, as I told you, I prefer that government which is mixed +and composed of all these forms, to any one of them taken separately. +But if I must confine myself to one of these particular forms simply +and exclusively, I must confess I prefer the royal one, and praise that +as the first and best. In this, which I here choose to call the +primitive form of government, I find the title of father attached to +that of king, to express that he watches over the citizens as over his +children, and endeavors rather to preserve them in freedom than reduce +them to slavery. So that it is more advantageous for those who are +insignificant in property and capacity to be supported by the care of +one excellent and eminently powerful man. The nobles here present +themselves, who profess that they can do all this in much better style; +for they say that there is much more wisdom in many than in one, and at +least as much faith and equity. And, last of all, come the people, who +cry with a loud voice that they will render obedience neither to the +one nor the few; that even to brute beasts nothing is so dear as +liberty; and that all men who serve either kings or nobles are deprived +of it. Thus, the kings attract us by affection, the nobles by talent, +the people by liberty; and in the comparison it is hard to choose the +best. + +_Laelius._ I think so too, but yet it is impossible to despatch the +other branches of the question, if you leave this primary point +undetermined. + +XXXVI. _Scipio._ We must then, I suppose, imitate Aratus, who, when he +prepared himself to treat of great things, thought himself in duty +bound to begin with Jupiter. + +_Laelius._ Wherefore Jupiter? and what is there in this discussion which +resembles that poem? + +_Scipio._ Why, it serves to teach us that we cannot better commence our +investigations than by invoking him whom, with one voice, both learned +and unlearned extol as the universal king of all gods and men. + +How so? said Laelius. + +Do you, then, asked Scipio, believe in nothing which is not before your +eyes? whether these ideas have been established by the chiefs of states +for the benefit of society, that there might be believed to exist one +Universal Monarch in heaven, at whose nod (as Homer expresses it) all +Olympus trembles, and that he might be accounted both king and father +of all creatures; for there is great authority, and there are many +witnesses, if you choose to call all many, who attest that all nations +have unanimously recognized, by the decrees of their chiefs, that +nothing is better than a king, since they think that all the Gods are +governed by the divine power of one sovereign; or if we suspect that +this opinion rests on the error of the ignorant, and should be classed +among the fables, let us listen to those universal testimonies of +erudite men, who have, as it were, seen with their eyes those things to +the knowledge of which we can hardly attain by report. + +What men do you mean? said Laelius. + +Those, replied Scipio, who, by the investigation of nature, have +arrived at the opinion that the whole universe [is animated] by a +single Mind[311]. * * * + +XXXVII. But if you please, my Laelius, I will bring forward evidences +which are neither too ancient nor in any respect barbarous. + +Those, said Laelius, are what I want. + +_Scipio._ You are aware that it is now not four centuries since this +city of ours has been without kings. + +_Laelius._ You are correct; it is less than four centuries. + +_Scipio._ Well, then, what are four centuries in the age of a state or +city? is it a long time? + +_Laelius._ It hardly amounts to the age of maturity. + +_Scipio._ You say truly; and yet not four centuries have elapsed since +there was a king in Rome. + +_Laelius._ And he was a proud king. + +_Scipio._ But who was his predecessor? + +_Laelius._ He was an admirably just one; and, indeed, we must bestow the +same praise on all his predecessors as far back as Romulus, who reigned +about six centuries ago. + +_Scipio._ Even he, then, is not very ancient. + +_Laelius._ No; he reigned when Greece was already becoming old. + +_Scipio._ Agreed. Was Romulus, then, think you, king of a barbarous +people? + +_Laelius._ Why, as to that, if we were to follow the example of the +Greeks, who say that all people are either Greeks or barbarians, I am +afraid that we must confess that he was a king of barbarians; but if +this name belongs rather to manners than to languages, then I believe +the Greeks were just as barbarous as the Romans. + +Then Scipio said: But with respect to the present question, we do not +so much need to inquire into the nation as into the disposition. For if +intelligent men, at a period so little remote, desired the government +of kings, you will confess that I am producing authorities that are +neither antiquated, rude, nor insignificant. + +XXXVIII. Then Laelius said: I see, Scipio, that you are very +sufficiently provided with authorities; but with me, as with every fair +judge, authorities are worth less than arguments. + +Scipio replied: Then, Laelius, you shall yourself make use of an +argument derived from your own senses. + +_Laelius._ What senses do you mean? + +_Scipio._ The feelings which you experience when at any time you happen +to feel angry with any one. + +_Laelius._ That happens rather oftener than I could wish. + +_Scipio._ Well, then, when you are angry, do you permit your anger to +triumph over your judgment? + +No, by Hercules! said Laelius; I imitate the famous Archytas of +Tarentum, who, when he came to his villa, and found all its +arrangements were contrary to his orders, said to his steward, "Ah! you +unlucky scoundrel, I would flog you to death, if it were not that I am +in a rage with you." + +Capital, said Scipio. Archytas, then, regarded unreasonable anger as a +kind of sedition and rebellion of nature which he sought to appease by +reflection. And so, if we examine avarice, the ambition of power or of +glory, or the lusts of concupiscence and licentiousness, we shall find +a certain conscience in the mind of man, which, like a king, sways by +the force of counsel all the inferior faculties and propensities; and +this, in truth, is the noblest portion of our nature; for when +conscience reigns, it allows no resting-place to lust, violence, or +temerity. + +_Laelius._ You have spoken the truth. + +_Scipio._ Well, then, does a mind thus governed and regulated meet your +approbation? + +_Laelius._ More than anything upon earth. + +_Scipio._ Then you would not approve that the evil passions, which are +innumerable, should expel conscience, and that lusts and animal +propensities should assume an ascendency over us? + +_Laelius._ For my part, I can conceive nothing more wretched than a mind +thus degraded, or a man animated by a soul so licentious. + +_Scipio._ You desire, then, that all the faculties of the mind should +submit to a ruling power, and that conscience should reign over them +all? + +_Laelius._ Certainly, that is my wish. + +_Scipio._ How, then, can you doubt what opinion to form on the subject +of the Commonwealth? in which, if the State is thrown into many hands, +it is very plain that there will be no presiding authority; for if +power be not united, it soon comes to nothing. + +XXXIX. Then Laelius asked: But what difference is there, I should like +to know, between the one and the many, if justice exists equally in +many? + +And Scipio said: Since I see, my Laelius, that the authorities I have +adduced have no great influence on you, I must continue to employ you +yourself as my witness in proof of what I am saying. + +In what way, said Laelius, are you going to make me again support your +argument? + +_Scipio._ Why, thus: I recollect, when we were lately at Formiae, that +you told your servants repeatedly to obey the orders of more than one +master only. + +_Laelius._ To be sure, those of my steward. + +_Scipio._ What do you at home? Do you commit your affairs to the hands +of many persons? + +_Laelius._ No, I trust them to myself alone. + +_Scipio._ Well, in your whole establishment, is there any other master +but yourself? + +_Laelius._ Not one. + +_Scipio._ Then I think you must grant me that, as respects the State, +the government of single individuals, provided they are just, is +superior to any other. + +_Laelius._ You have conducted me to this conclusion, and I entertain +very nearly that opinion. + +XL. And Scipio said: You would still further agree with me, my Laelius, +if, omitting the common comparisons, that one pilot is better fitted to +steer a ship, and a physician to treat an invalid, provided they be +competent men in their respective professions, than many could be, I +should come at once to more illustrious examples. + +_Laelius._ What examples do you mean? + +_Scipio._ Do not you observe that it was the cruelty and pride of one +single Tarquin only that made the title of king unpopular among the +Romans? + +_Laelius._ Yes, I acknowledge that. + +_Scipio._ You are also aware of this fact, on which I think I shall +debate in the course of the coming discussion, that after the expulsion +of King Tarquin, the people was transported by a wonderful excess of +liberty. Then innocent men were driven into banishment; then the +estates of many individuals were pillaged, consulships were made +annual, public authorities were overawed by mobs, popular appeals took +place in all cases imaginable; then secessions of the lower orders +ensued, and, lastly, those proceedings which tended to place all powers +in the hands of the populace. + +_Laelius._ I must confess this is all too true. + +All these things now, said Scipio, happened during periods of peace and +tranquillity, for license is wont to prevail when there is little to +fear, as in a calm voyage or a trifling disease. But as we observe the +voyager and the invalid implore the aid of some one competent director, +as soon as the sea grows stormy and the disease alarming, so our nation +in peace and security commands, threatens, resists, appeals from, and +insults its magistrates, but in war obeys them as strictly as kings; +for public safety is, after all, rather more valuable than popular +license. And in the most serious wars, our countrymen have even chosen +the entire command to be deposited in the hands of some single chief, +without a colleague; the very name of which magistrate indicates the +absolute character of his power. For though he is evidently called +dictator because he is appointed (dicitur), yet do we still observe +him, my Laelius, in our sacred books entitled Magister Populi (the +master of the people). + +This is certainly the case, said Laelius. + +Our ancestors, therefore, said Scipio, acted wisely.[312] * * * + +XLI. When the people is deprived of a just king, as Ennius says, after +the death of one of the best of monarchs, + + They hold his memory dear, and, in the warmth + Of their discourse, they cry, O Romulus! + O prince divine, sprung from the might of Mars + To be thy country's guardian! O our sire! + Be our protector still, O heaven-begot! + +Not heroes, nor lords alone, did they call those whom they lawfully +obeyed; nor merely as kings did they proclaim them; but they pronounced +them their country's guardians, their fathers, and their Gods. Nor, +indeed, without cause, for they added, + + Thou, Prince, hast brought us to the gates of light. + +And truly they believed that life and honor and glory had arisen to +them from the justice of their king. The same good-will would doubtless +have remained in their descendants, if the same virtues had been +preserved on the throne; but, as you see, by the injustice of one man +the whole of that kind of constitution fell into ruin. + +I see it indeed, said Laelius, and I long to know the history of these +political revolutions both in our own Commonwealth and in every other. + +XLII. And Scipio said: When I shall have explained my opinion +respecting the form of government which I prefer, I shall be able to +speak to you more accurately respecting the revolutions of states, +though I think that such will not take place so easily in the mixed +form of government which I recommend. With respect, however, to +absolute monarchy, it presents an inherent and invincible tendency to +revolution. No sooner does a king begin to be unjust than this entire +form of government is demolished, and he at once becomes a tyrant, +which is the worst of all governments, and one very closely related to +monarchy. If this State falls into the hands of the nobles, which is +the usual course of events, it becomes an aristocracy, or the second of +the three kinds of constitutions which I have described; for it is, as +it were, a royal--that is to say, a paternal--council of the chief men +of the State consulting for the public benefit. Or if the people by +itself has expelled or slain a tyrant, it is moderate in its conduct as +long as it has sense and wisdom, and while it rejoices in its exploit, +and applies itself to maintaining the constitution which it has +established. But if ever the people has raised its forces against a +just king and robbed him of his throne, or, as has frequently happened, +has tasted the blood of its legitimate nobles, and subjected the whole +Commonwealth to its own license, you can imagine no flood or +conflagration so terrible, or any whose violence is harder to appease +than this unbridled insolence of the populace. + +XLIII. Then we see realized that which Plato so vividly describes, if I +can but express it in our language. It is by no means easy to do it +justice in translation: however, I will try. + +When, says Plato, the insatiate jaws of the populace are fired with the +thirst of liberty, and when the people, urged on by evil ministers, +drains in its thirst the cup, not of tempered liberty, but unmitigated +license, then the magistrates and chiefs, if they are not utterly +subservient and remiss, and shameless promoters of the popular +licentiousness, are pursued, incriminated, accused, and cried down +under the title of despots and tyrants. I dare say you recollect the +passage. + +Yes, said Laelius, it is familiar to me. + +_Scipio._ Plato thus proceeds: Then those who feel in duty bound to +obey the chiefs of the State are persecuted by the insensate populace, +who call them voluntary slaves. But those who, though invested with +magistracies, wish to be considered on an equality with private +individuals, and those private individuals who labor to abolish all +distinctions between their own class and the magistrates, are extolled +with acclamations and overwhelmed with honors, so that it inevitably +happens in a commonwealth thus revolutionized that liberalism abounds +in all directions, due authority is found wanting even in private +families, and misrule seems to extend even to the animals that witness +it. Then the father fears the son, and the son neglects the father. All +modesty is banished; they become far too liberal for that. No +difference is made between the citizen and the alien; the master dreads +and cajoles his scholars, and the scholars despise their masters. The +young men assume the gravity of sages, and sages must stoop to the +follies of children, lest they should be hated and oppressed by them. +The very slaves even are under but little restraint; wives boast the +same rights as their husbands; dogs, horses, and asses are emancipated +in this outrageous excess of freedom, and run about so violently that +they frighten the passengers from the road. At length the termination +of all this infinite licentiousness is, that the minds of the citizens +become so fastidious and effeminate, that when they observe even the +slightest exertion of authority they grow angry and seditious, and thus +the laws begin to be neglected, so that the people are absolutely +without any master at all. + +Then Laelius said: You have very accurately rendered the opinions which +he expressed. + +XLIV. _Scipio._ Now, to return to the argument of my discourse. It +appears that this extreme license, which is the only liberty in the +eyes of the vulgar, is, according to Plato, such that from it as a sort +of root tyrants naturally arise and spring up. For as the excessive +power of an aristocracy occasions the destruction of the nobles, so +this excessive liberalism of democracies brings after it the slavery of +the people. Thus we find in the weather, the soil, and the animal +constitution the most favorable conditions are sometimes suddenly +converted by their excess into the contrary, and this fact is +especially observable in political governments; and this excessive +liberty soon brings the people collectively and individually to an +excessive servitude. For, as I said, this extreme liberty easily +introduces the reign of tyranny, the severest of all unjust slaveries. +In fact, from the midst of this unbridled and capricious populace, they +elect some one as a leader in opposition to their afflicted and +expelled nobles: some new chief, forsooth, audacious and impure, often +insolently persecuting those who have deserved well of the State, and +ready to gratify the populace at his neighbor's expense as well as his +own. Then, since the private condition is naturally exposed to fears +and alarms, the people invest him with many powers, and these are +continued in his hands. Such men, like Pisistratus of Athens, will soon +find an excuse for surrounding themselves with body-guards, and they +will conclude by becoming tyrants over the very persons who raised them +to dignity. If such despots perish by the vengeance of the better +citizens, as is generally the case, the constitution is re-established; +but if they fall by the hands of bold insurgents, then the same faction +succeeds them, which is only another species of tyranny. And the same +revolution arises from the fair system of aristocracy when any +corruption has betrayed the nobles from the path of rectitude. Thus the +power is like the ball which is flung from hand to hand: it passes from +kings to tyrants, from tyrants to the aristocracy, from them to +democracy, and from these back again to tyrants and to factions; and +thus the same kind of government is seldom long maintained. + +XLV. Since these are the facts of experience, royalty is, in my +opinion, very far preferable to the three other kinds of political +constitutions. But it is itself inferior to that which is composed of +an equal mixture of the three best forms of government, united and +modified by one another. I wish to establish in a commonwealth a royal +and pre-eminent chief. Another portion of power should be deposited in +the hands of the aristocracy, and certain things should be reserved to +the judgment and wish of the multitude. This constitution, in the first +place, possesses that great equality without which men cannot long +maintain their freedom; secondly, it offers a great stability, while +the particular separate and isolated forms easily fall into their +contraries; so that a king is succeeded by a despot, an aristocracy by +a faction, a democracy by a mob and confusion; and all these forms are +frequently sacrificed to new revolutions. In this united and mixed +constitution, however, similar disasters cannot happen without the +greatest vices in public men. For there can be little to occasion +revolution in a state in which every person is firmly established in +his appropriate rank, and there are but few modes of corruption into +which we can fall. + +XLVI. But I fear, Laelius, and you, my amiable and learned friends, that +if I were to dwell any longer on this argument, my words would seem +rather like the lessons of a master, and not like the free conversation +of one who is uniting with you in the consideration of truth. I shall +therefore pass on to those things which are familiar to all, and which +I have long studied. And in these matters I believe, I feel, and I +affirm that of all governments there is none which, either in its +entire constitution or the distribution of its parts, or in the +discipline of its manners, is comparable to that which our fathers +received from our earliest ancestors, and which they have handed down +to us. And since you wish to hear from me a development of this +constitution, with which you are all acquainted, I shall endeavor to +explain its true character and excellence. Thus keeping my eye fixed on +the model of our Roman Commonwealth, I shall endeavor to accommodate to +it all that I have to say on the best form of government. And by +treating the subject in this way, I think I shall be able to accomplish +most satisfactorily the task which Laelius has imposed on me. + +XLVII. _Laelius._ It is a task most properly and peculiarly your own, my +Scipio; for who can speak so well as you either on the subject of the +institutions of our ancestors, since you yourself are descended from +most illustrious ancestors, or on that of the best form of a +constitution which, if we possess (though at this moment we do not, +still), when we do possess such a thing, who will be more flourishing +in it than you? or on that of providing counsels for the future, as +you, who, by dispelling two mighty perils from our city, have provided +for its safety forever? + + +FRAGMENTS. + + +XLVIII. As our country is the source of the greatest benefits, and is a +parent dearer than those who have given us life, we owe her still +warmer gratitude than belongs to our human relations. * * * + +Nor would Carthage have continued to flourish during six centuries +without wisdom and good institutions. * * * + +In truth, says Cicero, although the reasonings of those men may contain +most abundant fountains of science and virtue; still, if we compare +them with the achievements and complete actions of statesmen, they will +seem not to have been of so much service in the actual business of men +as of amusement for their leisure. + + * * * * * + + + + +INTRODUCTION TO THE SECOND BOOK, + +BY THE ORIGINAL TRANSLATOR. + + + In this second book of his Commonwealth, Cicero gives us a + spirited and eloquent review of the history and successive + developments of the Roman constitution. He bestows the + warmest praises on its early kings, points out the great + advantages which had resulted from its primitive monarchical + system, and explains how that system had been gradually + broken up. In order to prove the importance of reviving it, + he gives a glowing picture of the evils and disasters that + had befallen the Roman State in consequence of that + overcharge of democratic folly and violence which had + gradually gained an alarming preponderance, and describes, + with a kind of prophetic sagacity, the fruit of his political + experience, the subsequent revolutions of the Roman State, + which such a state of things would necessarily bring about. + + + + +BOOK II. + + +I. [When, therefore, he observed all his friends kindled with the +de]sire of hearing him, Scipio thus opened the discussion. I will +commence, said Scipio, with a sentiment of old Cato, whom, as you know, +I singularly loved and exceedingly admired, and to whom, in compliance +with the judgment of both my parents, and also by my own desire, I was +entirely devoted during my youth; of whose discourse, indeed, I could +never have enough, so much experience did he possess as a statesman +respecting the republic which he had so long governed, both in peace +and war, with so much success. There was also an admirable propriety in +his style of conversation, in which wit was tempered with gravity; a +wonderful aptitude for acquiring, and at the same time communicating, +information; and his life was in perfect correspondence and unison with +his language. He used to say that the government of Rome was superior +to that of other states for this reason, because in nearly all of them +there had been single individuals, each of whom had regulated their +commonwealth according to their own laws and their own ordinances. So +Minos had done in Crete, and Lycurgus in Sparta; and in Athens, which +experienced so many revolutions, first Theseus, then Draco, then Solon, +then Clisthenes, afterward many others; and, lastly, when it was almost +lifeless and quite prostrate, that great and wise man, Demetrius +Phalereus, supported it. But our Roman constitution, on the contrary, +did not spring from the genius of one individual, but from that of +many; and it was established, not in the lifetime of one man, but in +the course of several ages and centuries. For, added he, there never +yet existed any genius so vast and comprehensive as to allow nothing at +any time to escape its attention; and all the geniuses in the world +united in a single mind could never, within the limits of a single +life, exert a foresight sufficiently extensive to embrace and harmonize +all, without the aid of experience and practice. + +Thus, according to Cato's usual habit, I now ascend in my discourse to +the "origin of the people," for I like to adopt the expression of Cato. +I shall also more easily execute my proposed task if I thus exhibit to +you our political constitution in its infancy, progress, and maturity, +now so firm and fully established, than if, after the example of +Socrates in the books of Plato, I were to delineate a mere imaginary +republic. + +II. When all had signified their approbation, Scipio resumed: What +commencement of a political constitution can we conceive more +brilliant, or more universally known, than the foundation of Rome by +the hand of Romulus? And he was the son of Mars: for we may grant this +much to the common report existing among men, especially as it is not +merely ancient, but one also which has been wisely maintained by our +ancestors, in order that those who have done great service to +communities may enjoy the reputation of having received from the Gods, +not only their genius, but their very birth. + +It is related, then, that soon after the birth of Romulus and his +brother Remus, Amulius, King of Alba, fearing that they might one day +undermine his authority, ordered that they should be exposed on the +banks of the Tiber; and that in this situation the infant Romulus was +suckled by a wild beast; that he was afterward educated by the +shepherds, and brought up in the rough way of living and labors of the +countrymen; and that he acquired, when he grew up, such superiority +over the rest by the vigor of his body and the courage of his soul, +that all the people who at that time inhabited the plains in the midst +of which Rome now stands, tranquilly and willingly submitted to his +government. And when he had made himself the chief of those bands, to +come from fables to facts, he took Alba Longa, a powerful and strong +city at that time, and slew its king, Amulius. + +III. Having acquired this glory, he conceived the design (as they tell +us) of founding a new city and establishing a new state. As respected +the site of his new city, a point which requires the greatest foresight +in him who would lay the foundation of a durable commonwealth, he chose +the most convenient possible position. For he did not advance too near +the sea, which he might easily have done with the forces under his +command, either by entering the territory of the Rutuli and Aborigines, +or by founding his citadel at the mouth of the Tiber, where many years +after Ancus Martius established a colony. But Romulus, with admirable +genius and foresight, observed and perceived that sites very near the +sea are not the most favorable positions for cities which would attain +a durable prosperity and dominion. And this, first, because maritime +cities are always exposed, not only to many attacks, but to perils they +cannot provide against. For the continued land gives notice, by many +indications, not only of any regular approaches, but also of any sudden +surprises of an enemy, and announces them beforehand by the mere sound. +There is no adversary who, on an inland territory, can arrive so +swiftly as to prevent our knowing not only his existence, but his +character too, and where he comes from. But a maritime and naval enemy +can fall upon a town on the sea-coast before any one suspects that he +is about to come; and when he does come, nothing exterior indicates who +he is, or whence he comes, or what he wishes; nor can it even be +determined and distinguished on all occasions whether he is a friend or +a foe. + +IV. But maritime cities are likewise naturally exposed to corrupt +influences, and revolutions of manners. Their civilization is more or +less adulterated by new languages and customs, and they import not only +foreign merchandise, but foreign fashions, to such a degree that +nothing can continue unalloyed in the national institutions. Those who +inhabit these maritime towns do not remain in their native place, but +are urged afar from their homes by winged hope and speculation. And +even when they do not desert their country in person, still their minds +are always expatiating and voyaging round the world. + +Nor, indeed, was there any cause which more deeply undermined Corinth +and Carthage, and at last overthrew them both, than this wandering and +dispersion of their citizens, whom the passion of commerce and +navigation had induced to abandon the cultivation of their lands and +their attention to military pursuits. + +The proximity of the sea likewise administers to maritime cities a +multitude of pernicious incentives to luxury, which are either acquired +by victory or imported by commerce; and the very agreeableness of their +position nourishes many expensive and deceitful gratifications of the +passions. And what I have spoken of Corinth may be applied, for aught I +know, without incorrectness to the whole of Greece. For the +Peloponnesus itself is almost wholly on the sea-coast; nor, besides the +Phliasians, are there any whose lands do not touch the sea; and beyond +the Peloponnesus, the AEnianes, the Dorians, and the Dolopes are the +only inland people. Why should I speak of the Grecian islands, which, +girded by the waves, seem all afloat, as it were, together with the +institutions and manners of their cities? And these things, I have +before noticed, do not respect ancient Greece only; for which of all +those colonies which have been led from Greece into Asia, Thracia, +Italy, Sicily, and Africa, with the single exception of Magnesia, is +there that is not washed by the sea? Thus it seems as if a sort of +Grecian coast had been annexed to territories of the barbarians. For +among the barbarians themselves none were heretofore a maritime people, +if we except the Carthaginians and Etruscans; one for the sake of +commerce, the other of pillage. And this is one evident reason of the +calamities and revolutions of Greece, because she became infected with +the vices which belong to maritime cities, which I just now briefly +enumerated. But yet, notwithstanding these vices, they have one great +advantage, and one which is of universal application, namely, that +there is a great facility for new inhabitants flocking to them. And, +again, that the inhabitants are enabled to export and send abroad the +produce of their native lands to any nation they please, which offers +them a market for their goods. + +V. By what divine wisdom, then, could Romulus embrace all the benefits +that could belong to maritime cities, and at the same time avoid the +dangers to which they are exposed, except, as he did, by building his +city on the bank of an inexhaustible river, whose equal current +discharges itself into the sea by a vast mouth, so that the city could +receive all it wanted from the sea, and discharge its superabundant +commodities by the same channel? And in the same river a communication +is found by which it not only receives from the sea all the productions +necessary to the conveniences and elegances of life, but those also +which are brought from the inland districts. So that Romulus seems to +me to have divined and anticipated that this city would one day become +the centre and abode of a powerful and opulent empire; for there is no +other part of Italy in which a city could be situated so as to be able +to maintain so wide a dominion with so much ease. + +VI. As to the natural fortifications of Rome, who is so negligent and +unobservant as not to have them depicted and deeply stamped on his +memory? Such is the plan and direction of the walls, which, by the +prudence of Romulus and his royal successors, are bounded on all sides +by steep and rugged hills; and the only aperture between the Esquiline +and Quirinal mountains is enclosed by a formidable rampart, and +surrounded by an immense fosse. And as for our fortified citadel, it is +so secured by a precipitous barrier and enclosure of rocks, that, even +in that horrible attack and invasion of the Gauls, it remained +impregnable and inviolable. Moreover, the site which he selected had +also an abundance of fountains, and was healthy, though it was in the +midst of a pestilential region; for there are hills which at once +create a current of fresh air, and fling an agreeable shade over the +valleys. + +VII. These things he effected with wonderful rapidity, and thus +established the city, which, from his own name Romulus, he determined +to call Rome. And in order to strengthen his new city, he conceived a +design, singular enough, and even a little rude, yet worthy of a great +man, and of a genius which discerned far away in futurity the means of +strengthening his power and his people. The young Sabine females of +honorable birth who had come to Rome, attracted by the public games and +spectacles which Romulus then, for the first time, established as +annual games in the circus, were suddenly carried off at the feast of +Consus[313] by his orders, and were given in marriage to the men of the +noblest families in Rome. And when, on this account, the Sabines had +declared war against Rome, the issue of the battle being doubtful and +undecided, Romulus made an alliance with Tatius, King of the Sabines, +at the intercession of the matrons themselves who had been carried off. +By this compact he admitted the Sabines into the city, gave them a +participation in the religious ceremonies, and divided his power with +their king. + +VIII. But after the death of Tatius, the entire government was again +vested in the hands of Romulus, although, besides making Tatius his own +partner, he had also elected some of the chiefs of the Sabines into the +royal council, who on account of their affectionate regard for the +people were called _patres_, or fathers. He also divided the people +into three tribes, called after the name of Tatius, and his own name, +and that of Locumo, who had fallen as his ally in the Sabine war; and +also into thirty curiae, designated by the names of those Sabine +virgins, who, after being carried off at the festivals, generously +offered themselves as the mediators of peace and coalition. + +But though these orders were established in the life of Tatius, yet, +after his death, Romulus reigned with still greater power by the +counsel and authority of the senate. + +IX. In this respect he approved and adopted the principle which +Lycurgus but little before had applied to the government of Lacedaemon; +namely, that the monarchical authority and the royal power operate best +in the government of states when to this supreme authority is joined +the influence of the noblest of the citizens. + +Therefore, thus supported, and, as it were, propped up by this council +or senate, Romulus conducted many wars with the neighboring nations in +a most successful manner; and while he refused to take any portion of +the booty to his own palace, he did not cease to enrich the citizens. +He also cherished the greatest respect for that institution of +hierarchical and ecclesiastical ordinances which we still retain to the +great benefit of the Commonwealth; for in the very commencement of his +government he founded the city with religious rites, and in the +institution of all public establishments he was equally careful in +attending to these sacred ceremonials, and associated with himself on +these occasions priests that were selected from each of the tribes. He +also enacted that the nobles should act as patrons and protectors to +the inferior citizens, their natural clients and dependants, in their +respective districts, a measure the utility of which I shall afterward +notice.--The judicial punishments were mostly fines of sheep and oxen; +for the property of the people at that time consisted in their fields +and cattle, and this circumstance has given rise to the expressions +which still designate real and personal wealth. Thus the people were +kept in order rather by mulctations than by bodily inflictions. + +X. After Romulus had thus reigned thirty-seven years, and established +these two great supports of government, the hierarchy and the senate, +having disappeared in a sudden eclipse of the sun, he was thought +worthy of being added to the number of the Gods--an honor which no +mortal man ever was able to attain to but by a glorious pre-eminence of +virtue. And this circumstance was the more to be admired in the case of +Romulus because most of the great men that have been deified were so +exalted to celestial dignities by the people, in periods very little +enlightened, when fiction was easy and ignorance went hand-in-hand with +credulity. But with respect to Romulus we know that he lived less than +six centuries ago, at a time when science and literature were already +advanced, and had got rid of many of the ancient errors that had +prevailed among less civilized peoples. For if, as we consider proved +by the Grecian annals, Rome was founded in the seventh Olympiad, the +life of Romulus was contemporary with that period in which Greece +already abounded in poets and musicians--an age when fables, except +those concerning ancient matters, received little credit. + +For, one hundred and eight years after the promulgation of the laws of +Lycurgus, the first Olympiad was established, which indeed, through a +mistake of names, some authors have supposed constituted, by Lycurgus +likewise. And Homer himself, according to the best computation, lived +about thirty years before the time of Lycurgus. We must conclude, +therefore, that Homer flourished very many years before the date of +Romulus. So that, as men had now become learned, and as the times +themselves were not destitute of knowledge, there was not much room +left for the success of mere fictions. Antiquity indeed has received +fables that have at times been sufficiently improbable: but this epoch, +which was already so cultivated, disdaining every fiction that was +impossible, rejected[314] * * * We may therefore, perhaps, attach some +credit to this story of Romulus's immortality, since human life was at +that time experienced, cultivated, and instructed. And doubtless there +was in him such energy of genius and virtue that it is not altogether +impossible to believe the report of Proculus Julius, the husbandman, of +that glorification having befallen Romulus which for many ages we have +denied to less illustrious men. At all events, Proculus is reported to +have stated in the council, at the instigation of the senators, who +wished to free themselves from all suspicion of having been accessaries +to the death of Romulus, that he had seen him on that hill which is now +called the Quirinal, and that he had commanded him to inform the people +that they should build him a temple on that same hill, and offer him +sacrifices under the name of Quirinus. + +XI. You see, therefore, that the genius of this great man did not +merely establish the constitution of a new people, and then leave them, +as it were, crying in their cradle; but he still continued to +superintend their education till they had arrived at an adult and +wellnigh a mature age. + +Then Laelius said: We now see, my Scipio, what you meant when you said +that you would adopt a new method of discussing the science of +government, different from any found in the writings of the Greeks. For +that prime master of philosophy, whom none ever surpassed in eloquence, +I mean Plato, chose an open plain on which to build an imaginary city +after his own taste--a city admirably conceived, as none can deny, but +remote enough from the real life and manners of men. Others, without +proposing to themselves any model or type of government whatever, have +argued on the constitutions and forms of states. You, on the contrary, +appear to be about to unite these two methods; for, as far as you have +gone, you seem to prefer attributing to others your discoveries, rather +than start new theories under your own name and authority, as Socrates +has done in the writings of Plato. Thus, in speaking of the site of +Rome, you refer to a systematic policy, to the acts of Romulus, which +were many of them the result of necessity or chance; and you do not +allow your discourse to run riot over many states, but you fix and +concentrate it on our own Commonwealth. Proceed, then, in the course +you have adopted; for I see that you intend to examine our other kings, +in your pursuit of a perfect republic, as it were. + +XII. Therefore, said Scipio, when that senate of Romulus which was +composed of the nobles, whom the king himself respected so highly that +he designated them _patres_, or fathers, and their children patricians, +attempted after the death of Romulus to conduct the government without +a king, the people would not suffer it, but, amidst their regret for +Romulus, desisted not from demanding a fresh monarch. The nobles then +prudently resolved to establish an interregnum--a new political form, +unknown to other nations. It was not without its use, however, since, +during the interval which elapsed before the definitive nomination of +the new king, the State was not left without a ruler, nor subjected too +long to the same governor, nor exposed to the fear lest some one, in +consequence of the prolonged enjoyment of power, should become more +unwilling to lay it aside, or more powerful if he wished to secure it +permanently for himself. At which time this new nation discovered a +political provision which had escaped the Spartan Lycurgus, who +conceived that the monarch ought not to be elective--if indeed it is +true that this depended on Lycurgus--but that it was better for the +Lacedaemonians to acknowledge as their sovereign the next heir of the +race of Hercules, whoever he might be: but our Romans, rude as they +were, saw the importance of appointing a king, not for his family, but +for his virtue and experience. + +XIII. And fame having recognized these eminent qualities in Numa +Pompilius, the Roman people, without partiality for their own citizens, +committed itself, by the counsel of the senators, to a king of foreign +origin, and summoned this Sabine from the city of Cures to Rome, that +he might reign over them. Numa, although the people had proclaimed him +king in their Comitia Curiata, did nevertheless himself pass a Lex +Curiata respecting his own authority; and observing that the +institutions of Romulus had too much excited the military propensities +of the people, he judged it expedient to recall them from this habit of +warfare by other employments. + +XIV. And, in the first place, he divided severally among the citizens +the lands which Romulus had conquered, and taught them that even +without the aid of pillage and devastation they could, by the +cultivation of their own territories, procure themselves all kinds of +commodities. And he inspired them with the love of peace and +tranquillity, in which faith and justice are likeliest to flourish, and +extended the most powerful protection to the people in the cultivation +of their fields and the enjoyment of their produce. Pompilius likewise +having created hierarchical institutions of the highest class, added +two augurs to the old number. He intrusted the superintendence of the +sacred rites to five pontiffs, selected from the body of the nobles; +and by those laws which we still preserve on our monuments he +mitigated, by religious ceremonials, the minds that had been too long +inflamed by military enthusiasm and enterprise. + +He also established the Flamines and the Salian priests and the Vestal +Virgins, and regulated all departments of our ecclesiastical policy +with the most pious care. In the ordinance of sacrifices, he wished +that the ceremonial should be very arduous and the expenditure very +light. He thus appointed many observances, whose knowledge is extremely +important, and whose expense far from burdensome. Thus in religious +worship he added devotion and removed costliness. He was also the first +to introduce markets, games, and the other usual methods of assembling +and uniting men. By these establishments, he inclined to benevolence +and amiability spirits whom the passion for war had rendered savage and +ferocious. Having thus reigned in the greatest peace and concord +thirty-nine years--for in dates we mainly follow our Polybius, than +whom no one ever gave more attention to the investigation of the +history of the times--he departed this life, having corroborated the +two grand principles of political stability, religion and clemency. + +XV. When Scipio had concluded these remarks, Is it not, said Manilius, +a true tradition which is current, that our king Numa was a disciple of +Pythagoras himself, or that at least he was a Pythagorean in his +doctrines? For I have often heard this from my elders, and we know that +it is the popular opinion; but it does not seem to be clearly proved by +the testimony of our public annals. + +Then Scipio replied: The supposition is false, my Manilius; it is not +merely a fiction, but a ridiculous and bungling one too; and we should +not tolerate those statements, even in fiction, relating to facts which +not only did not happen, but which never could have happened. For it +was not till the fourth year of the reign of Tarquinius Superbus that +Pythagoras is ascertained to have come to Sybaris, Crotona, and this +part of Italy. And the sixty-second Olympiad is the common date of the +elevation of Tarquin to the throne, and of the arrival of Pythagoras. +From which it appears, when we calculate the duration of the reigns of +the kings, that about one hundred and forty years must have elapsed +after the death of Numa before Pythagoras first arrived in Italy. And +this fact, in the minds of men who have carefully studied the annals of +time, has never been at all doubted. + +O ye immortal Gods! said Manilius, how deep and how inveterate is this +error in the minds of men! However, it costs me no effort to concede +that our Roman sciences were not imported from beyond the seas, but +that they sprung from our own indigenous and domestic virtues. + +XVI. You will become still more convinced of this fact, said Africanus, +when tracing the progress of our Commonwealth as it became gradually +developed to its best and maturest condition. And you will find yet +further occasion to admire the wisdom of our ancestors on this very +account, since you will perceive, that even those things which they +borrowed from foreigners received a much higher improvement among us +than they possessed in the countries from whence they were imported +among us; and you will learn that the Roman people was aggrandized, not +by chance or hazard, but rather by counsel and discipline, to which +fortune indeed was by no means unfavorable. + +XVII. After the death of King Pompilius, the people, after a short +period of interregnum, chose Tullus Hostilius for their king, in the +Comitia Curiata; and Tullus, after Numa's example, consulted the people +in their curias to procure a sanction for his government. His +excellence chiefly appeared in his military glory and great +achievements in war. He likewise, out of his military spoils, +constructed and decorated the House of Comitia and the Senate-house. He +also settled the ceremonies of the proclamation of hostilities, and +consecrated their righteous institution by the religious sanction of +the Fetial priests, so that every war which was not duly announced and +declared might be adjudged illegal, unjust, and impious. And observe +how wisely our kings at that time perceived that certain rights ought +to be allowed to the people, of which we shall have a good deal to say +hereafter. Tullus did not even assume the ensigns of royalty without +the approbation of the people; and when he appointed twelve lictors, +with their axes to go before him[315] * * * + +XVIII. * * * [_Manilius_.] This Commonwealth of Rome, which you are so +eloquently describing, did not creep towards perfection; it rather flew +at once to the maturity of its grandeur. + +[_Scipio._] After Tullus, Ancus Martius, a descendant of Numa by his +daughter, was appointed king by the people. He also procured the +passing of a law[316] through the Comitia Curiata respecting his +government. This king having conquered the Latins, admitted them to the +rights of citizens of Rome. He added to the city the Aventine and +Caelian hills; he distributed the lands he had taken in war; he bestowed +on the public all the maritime forests he had acquired; and he built +the city Ostia, at the mouth of the Tiber, and colonized it. When he +had thus reigned twenty-three years, he died. + +Then said Laelius: Doubtless this king deserves our praises, but the +Roman history is obscure. We possess, indeed, the name of this +monarch's mother, but we know nothing of his father. + +It is so, said Scipio; but in those ages little more than the names of +the kings were recorded. + +XIX. For the first time at this period, Rome appears to have become +more learned by the study of foreign literature; for it was no longer a +little rivulet, flowing from Greece towards the walls of our city, but +an overflowing river of Grecian sciences and arts. This is generally +attributed to Demaratus, a Corinthian, the first man of his country in +reputation, honor, and wealth; who, not being able to bear the +despotism of Cypselus, tyrant of Corinth, fled with large treasures, +and arrived at Tarquinii, the most flourishing city in Etruria. There, +understanding that the domination of Cypselus was thoroughly +established, he, like a free and bold-hearted man, renounced his +country, and was admitted into the number of the citizens of Tarquinii, +and fixed his residence in that city. And having married a woman of the +city, he instructed his two sons, according to the method of Greek +education, in all kinds of sciences and arts.[317] * * * + +XX. * * * [One of these sons] was easily admitted to the rights of +citizenship at Rome; and on account of his accomplished manners and +learning, he became a favorite of our king Ancus to such a degree that +he was a partner in all his counsels, and was looked upon almost as his +associate in the government. He, besides, possessed wonderful +affability, and was very kind in assistance, support, protection, and +even gifts of money, to the citizens. + +When, therefore, Ancus died, the people by their unanimous suffrages +chose for their king this Lucius Tarquinius (for he had thus +transformed the Greek name of his family, that he might seem in all +respects to imitate the customs of his adopted countrymen). And when +he, too, had procured the passing of a law respecting his authority, he +commenced his reign by doubling the original number of the senators. +The ancient senators he called patricians of the major families +(_patres majorum gentium_), and he asked their votes first; and those +new senators whom he himself had added, he entitled patricians of minor +families. After this, he established the order of knights, on the plan +which we maintain to this day. He would not, however, change the +denomination of the Tatian, Rhamnensian, and Lucerian orders, though he +wished to do so, because Attus Naevius, an augur of the highest +reputation, would not sanction it. And, indeed, I am aware that the +Corinthians were remarkably attentive to provide for the maintenance +and good condition of their cavalry by taxes levied on the inheritance +of widows and orphans. To the first equestrian orders Lucius also added +new ones, composing a body of three hundred knights. And this number he +doubled, after having conquered the AEquicoli, a large and ferocious +people, and dangerous enemies of the Roman State. Having likewise +repulsed from our walls an invasion of the Sabines, he routed them by +the aid of his cavalry, and subdued them. He also was the first person +who instituted the grand games which are now called the Roman Games. He +fulfilled his vow to build a temple to the all-good and all-powerful +Jupiter in the Capitol--a vow which he made during a battle in the +Sabine war--and died after a reign of thirty-eight years. + +XXI. Then Laelius said: All that you have been relating corroborates the +saying of Cato, that the constitution of the Roman Commonwealth is not +the work of one man, or one age; for we can clearly see what a great +progress in excellent and useful institutions was continued under each +successive king. But we are now arrived at the reign of a monarch who +appears to me to have been of all our kings he who had the greatest +foresight in matters of political government. + +So it appears to me, said Scipio; for after Tarquinius Priscus comes +Servius Sulpicius, who was the first who is reported to have reigned +without an order from the people. He is supposed to have been the son +of a female slave at Tarquinii, by one of the soldiers or clients of +King Priscus; and as he was educated among the servants of this prince, +and waiting on him at table, the king soon observed the fire of his +genius, which shone forth even from his childhood, so skilful was he in +all his words and actions. Therefore, Tarquin, whose own children were +then very young, so loved Servius that he was very commonly believed to +be his own son, and he instructed him with the greatest care in all the +sciences with which he was acquainted, according to the most exact +discipline of the Greeks. + +But when Tarquin had perished by the plots of the sons of Ancus, and +Servius (as I have said) had begun to reign, not by the order, but yet +with the good-will and consent, of the citizens--because, as it was +falsely reported that Priscus was recovering from his wounds, Servius, +arrayed in the royal robes, delivered judgment, freed the debtors at +his own expense, and, exhibiting the greatest affability, announced +that he delivered judgment at the command of Priscus--he did not commit +himself to the senate; but, after Priscus was buried, he consulted the +people respecting his authority, and, being authorized by them to +assume the dominion, he procured a law to be passed through the Comitia +Curiata, confirming his government. + +He then, in the first place, avenged the injuries of the Etruscans by +arms. After which[318] * * * + +XXII. * * * he enrolled eighteen centuries of knights of the first +order. Afterward, having created a great number of knights from the +common mass of the people, he divided the rest of the people into five +classes, distinguishing between the seniors and the juniors. These he +so constituted as to place the suffrages, not in the hands of the +multitude, but in the power of the men of property. And he took care to +make it a rule of ours, as it ought to be in every government, that the +greatest number should not have the greatest weight. You are well +acquainted with this institution, otherwise I would explain it to you; +but you are familiar with the whole system, and know how the centuries +of knights, with six suffrages, and the first class, comprising eighty +centuries, besides one other century which was allotted to the +artificers, on account of their utility to the State, produce +eighty-nine centuries. If to these there are added twelve +centuries--for that is the number of the centuries of the knights which +remain[319]--the entire force of the State is summed up; and the +arrangement is such that the remaining and far more numerous multitude, +which is distributed through the ninety-six last centuries, is not +deprived of a right of suffrage, which would be an arrogant measure; +nor, on the other hand, permitted to exert too great a preponderance in +the government, which would be dangerous. + +In this arrangement, Servius was very cautious in his choice of terms +and denominations. He called the rich _assidui_, because they afforded +pecuniary succor[320] to the State. As to those whoso fortune did not +exceed 1500 pence, or those who had nothing but their labor, he called +them _proletarii_ classes, as if the State should expect from them a +hardy progeny[321] and population. + +Even a single one of the ninety-six last centuries contained +numerically more citizens than the entire first class. Thus, no one was +excluded from his right of voting, yet the preponderance of votes was +secured to those who had the deepest stake in the welfare of the State. +Moreover, with reference to the accensi, velati, trumpeters, +hornblowers, proletarii[322] * * * + +XXIII. * * * That that republic is arranged in the best manner which, +being composed in due proportions of those three elements, the +monarchical, the aristocratical, and the democratic, does not by +punishment irritate a fierce and savage mind. * * * [A similar +institution prevailed at Carthage], which was sixty-five years more +ancient than Rome, since it was founded thirty-nine years before the +first Olympiad; and that most ancient law-giver Lycurgus made nearly +the same arrangements. Thus the system of regular subordination, and +this mixture of the three principal forms of government, appear to me +common alike to us and them. But there is a peculiar advantage in our +Commonwealth, than which nothing can be more excellent, which I shall +endeavor to describe as accurately as possible, because it is of such a +character that nothing analogous can be discovered in ancient states; +for these political elements which I have noticed were so united in the +constitutions of Rome, of Sparta, and of Carthage, that they were not +counterbalanced by any modifying power. For in a state in which one man +is invested with a perpetual domination, especially of the monarchical +character, although there be a senate in it, as there was in Rome under +the kings, and in Sparta, by the laws of Lycurgus, or even where the +people exercise a sort of jurisdiction, as they used in the days of our +monarchy, the title of king must still be pre-eminent; nor can such a +state avoid being, and being called, a kingdom. And this kind of +government is especially subject to frequent revolutions, because the +fault of a single individual is sufficient to precipitate it into the +most pernicious disasters. + +In itself, however, royalty is not only not a reprehensible form of +government, but I do not know whether it is not far preferable to all +other simple constitutions, if I approved of any simple constitution +whatever. But this preference applies to royalty so long only as it +maintains its appropriate character; and this character provides that +one individual's perpetual power, and justice, and universal wisdom +should regulate the safety, equality, and tranquillity of the whole +people. But many privileges must be wanting to communities that live +under a king; and, in the first place, liberty, which does not consist +in slavery to a just master, but in slavery to no master at all[323] +* * * + +XXIV. * * * [Let us now pass on to the reign of the seventh and last +king of Rome, Tarquinius Superbus.] And even this unjust and cruel +master had good fortune for his companion for some time in all his +enterprises. For he subdued all Latium; he captured Suessa Pometia, a +powerful and wealthy city, and, becoming possessed of an immense spoil +of gold and silver, he accomplished his father's vow by the building of +the Capitol. He established colonies, and, faithful to the institutions +of those from whom he sprung, he sent magnificent presents, as tokens +of gratitude for his victories, to Apollo at Delphi. + +XXV. Here begins the revolution of our political system of government, +and I must beg your attention to its natural course and progression. +For the grand point of political science, the object of our discourses, +is to know the march and the deviations of governments, that when we +are acquainted with the particular courses and inclinations of +constitutions, we may be able to restrain them from their fatal +tendencies, or to oppose adequate obstacles to their decline and fall. + +For this Tarquinius Superbus, of whom I am speaking, being first of all +stained with the blood of his admirable predecessor on the throne, +could not be a man of sound conscience and mind; and as he feared +himself the severest punishment for his enormous crime, he sought his +protection in making himself feared. Then, in the glory of his +victories and his treasures, he exulted in insolent pride, and could +neither regulate his own manners nor the passions of the members of his +family. + +When, therefore, his eldest son had offered violence to Lucretia, +daughter of Tricipitinus and wife of Collatinus, and this chaste and +noble lady had stabbed herself to death on account of the injury she +could not survive--then a man eminent for his genius and virtue, Lucius +Brutus, dashed from his fellow-citizens this unjust yoke of odious +servitude; and though he was but a private man, he sustained the +government of the entire Commonwealth, and was the first that taught +the people in this State that no one was a private man when the +preservation of our liberties was concerned. Beneath his authority and +command our city rose against tyranny, and, stirred by the recent grief +of the father and relatives of Lucretia, and with the recollections of +Tarquin's haughtiness, and the numberless crimes of himself and his +sons, they pronounced sentence of banishment against him and his +children, and the whole race of the Tarquins. + +XXVI. Do you not observe, then, how the king sometimes degenerates into +the despot, and how, by the fault of one individual, a form of +government originally good is abused to the worst of purposes? Here is +a specimen of that despot over the people whom the Greeks denominate a +tyrant. For, according to them, a king is he who, like a father, +consults the interests of his people, and who preserves those whom he +is set over in the very best condition of life. This indeed is, as I +have said, an excellent form of government, yet still liable, and, as +it were, inclined, to a pernicious abuse. For as soon as a king assumes +an unjust and despotic power, he instantly becomes a tyrant, than which +nothing baser or fouler, than which no imaginable animal can be more +detestable to gods or men; for though in form a man, he surpasses the +most savage monsters in ferocious cruelty. For who can justly call him +a human being, who admits not between himself and his +fellow-countrymen, between himself and the whole human race, any +communication of justice, any association of kindness? But we shall +find some fitter occasion of speaking of the evils of tyranny when the +subject itself prompts us to declare against them who, even in a state +already liberated, have affected these despotic insolencies. + +XXVII. Such is the first origin and rise of a tyrant. For this was the +name by which the Greeks choose to designate an unjust king; and by the +title king our Romans universally understand every man who exercises +over the people a perpetual and undivided domination. Thus Spurius +Cassius, and Marcus Manlius, and Spurius Maelius, are said to have +wished to seize upon the kingly power, and lately [Tiberius Gracchus +incurred the same accusation].[324] * * * + +XXVIII. * * * [Lycurgus, in Sparta, formed, under the name of Elders,] +a small council consisting of twenty-eight members only; to these he +allotted the supreme legislative authority, while the king held the +supreme executive authority. Our Romans, emulating his example, and +translating his terms, entitled those whom he had called Elders, +Senators, which, as we have said, was done by Romulus in reference to +the elect patricians. In this constitution, however, the power, the +influence, and name of the king is still pre-eminent. You may +distribute, indeed, some show of power to the people, as Lycurgus and +Romulus did, but you inflame them, with the thirst of liberty by +allowing them even the slightest taste of its sweetness; and still +their hearts will be overcast with alarm lest their king, as often +happens, should become unjust. The prosperity of the people, therefore, +can be little better than fragile, when placed at the disposal of any +one individual, and subjected to his will and caprices. + +XXIX. Thus the first example, prototype, and original of tyranny has +been discovered by us in the history of our own Roman State, +religiously founded by Romulus, without applying to the theoretical +Commonwealth which, according to Plato's recital, Socrates was +accustomed to describe in his peripatetic dialogues. We have observed +Tarquin, not by the usurpation of any new power, but by the unjust +abuse of the power which he already possessed, overturn the whole +system of our monarchical constitution. + +Let us oppose to this example of the tyrant another, a virtuous +king--wise, experienced, and well informed respecting the true interest +and dignity of the citizens--a guardian, as it were, and superintendent +of the Commonwealth; for that is a proper name for every ruler and +governor of a state. And take you care to recognize such a man when you +meet him, for he is the man who, by counsel and exertion, can best +protect the nation. And as the name of this man has not yet been often +mentioned in our discourse, and as the character of such a man must be +often alluded to in our future conversations, [I shall take an early +opportunity of describing it.][325] * * * + +XXX. * * * [Plato has chosen to suppose a territory and establishments +of citizens, whose fortunes] were precisely equal. And he has given us +a description of a city, rather to be desired than expected; and he has +made out not such a one as can really exist, but one in which the +principles of political affairs may be discerned. But for me, if I can +in any way accomplish it, while I adopt the same general principles as +Plato, I am seeking to reduce them to experience and practice, not in +the shadow and picture of a state, but in a real and actual +Commonwealth, of unrivalled amplitude and power; in order to be able to +point out, with the most graphic precision, the causes of every +political good and social evil. + +For after Rome had flourished more than two hundred and forty years +under her kings and interreges, and after Tarquin was sent into +banishment, the Roman people conceived as much detestation of the name +of king as they had once experienced regret at the death, or rather +disappearance, of Romulus. Therefore, as in the first instance they +could hardly bear the idea of losing a king, so in the latter, after +the expulsion of Tarquin, they could not endure to hear the name of a +king.[326] * * * + +XXXI. * * * Therefore, when that admirable constitution of Romulus had +lasted steadily about two hundred and forty years. * * * The whole of +that law was abolished. In this humor, our ancestors banished +Collatinus, in spite of his innocence, because of the suspicion that +attached to his family, and all the rest of the Tarquins, on account of +the unpopularity of their name. In the same humor, Valerius Publicola +was the first to lower the fasces before the people, when he spoke in +the assembly of the people. He also had the materials of his house +conveyed to the foot of Mount Velia, having observed that the +commencement of his edifice on the summit of this hill, where King +Tullius had once dwelt, excited the suspicions of the people. + +It was the same man, who in this respect pre-eminently deserved the +name of Publicola, who carried in favor of the people the first law +received in the Comitia Centuriata, that no magistrate should sentence +to death or scourging a Roman citizen who appealed from his authority +to the people. And the pontifical books attest that the right of appeal +had existed, even against the decision of the kings. Our augural books +affirm the same thing. And the Twelve Tables prove, by a multitude of +laws, that there was a right of appeal from every judgment and penalty. +Besides, the historical fact that the decemviri who compiled the laws +were created with the privilege of judging without appeal, sufficiently +proves that the other magistrates had not the same power. And a +consular law, passed by Lucius Valerius Politus and Marcus Horatius +Barbatus, men justly popular for promoting union and concord, enacted +that no magistrate should thenceforth be appointed with authority to +judge without appeal; and the Portian laws, the work of three citizens +of the name of Portius, as you are aware, added nothing new to this +edict but a penal sanction. + +Therefore Publicola, having promulgated this law in favor of appeal to +the people, immediately ordered the axes to be removed from the fasces, +which the lictors carried before the consuls, and the next day +appointed Spurius Lucretius for his colleague. And as the new consul +was the oldest of the two, Publicola ordered his lictors to pass over +to him; and he was the first to establish the rule, that each of the +consuls should be preceded by the lictors in alternate months, that +there should be no greater appearance of imperial insignia among the +free people than they had witnessed in the days of their kings. Thus, +in my opinion, he proved himself no ordinary man, as, by so granting +the people a moderate degree of liberty, he more easily maintained the +authority of the nobles. + +Nor is it without reason that I have related to you these ancient and +almost obsolete events; but I wished to adduce my instances of men and +circumstances from illustrious persons and times, as it is to such +events that the rest of my discourse will be directed. + +XXXII. At that period, then, the senate preserved the Commonwealth in +such a condition that though the people were really free, yet few acts +were passed by the people, but almost all, on the contrary, by the +authority, customs, and traditions of the senate. And over all the +consuls exercised a power--in time, indeed, only annual, but in nature +and prerogative completely royal. + +The consuls maintained, with the greatest energy, that rule which so +much conduces to the power of our nobles and great men, that the acts +of the commons of the people shall not be binding, unless the authority +of the patricians has approved them. About the same period, and +scarcely ten years after the first consuls, we find the appointment of +the dictator in the person of Titus Lartius. And this new kind of +power--namely, the dictatorship--appears exceedingly similar to the +monarchical royalty. All his power, however, was vested in the supreme +authority of the senate, to which the people deferred; and in these +times great exploits were performed in war by brave men invested with +the supreme command, whether dictators or consuls. + +XXXIII. But as the nature of things necessarily brought it to pass that +the people, once freed from its kings, should arrogate to itself more +and more authority, we observe that after a short interval of only +sixteen years, in the consulship of Postumus Cominius and Spurius +Cassius, they attained their object; an event explicable, perhaps, on +no distinct principle, but, nevertheless, in a manner independent of +any distinct principle. For recollect what I said in commencing our +discourse, that if there exists not in the State a just distribution +and subordination of rights, offices, and prerogatives, so as to give +sufficient domination to the chiefs, sufficient authority to the +counsel of the senators, and sufficient liberty to the people, this +form of the government cannot be durable. + +For when the excessive debts of the citizens had thrown the State into +disorder, the people first retired to Mount Sacer, and next occupied +Mount Aventine. And even the rigid discipline of Lycurgus could not +maintain those restraints in the case of the Greeks. For in Sparta +itself, under the reign of Theopompus, the five magistrates whom they +term Ephori, and in Crete ten whom they entitle Cosmi, were established +in opposition to the royal power, just as tribunes were added among us +to counterbalance the consular authority. + +XXXIV. There might have been a method, indeed, by which our ancestors +could have been relieved from the pressure of debt, a method with which +Solon the Athenian, who lived at no very distant period before, was +acquainted, and which our senate did not neglect when, in the +indignation which the odious avarice of one individual excited, all the +bonds of the citizens were cancelled, and the right of arrest for a +while suspended. In the same way, when the plebeians were oppressed by +the weight of the expenses occasioned by public misfortunes, a cure and +remedy were sought for the sake of public security. The senate, +however, having forgotten their former decision, gave an advantage to +the democracy; for, by the creation of two tribunes to appease the +sedition of the people, the power and authority of the senate were +diminished; which, however, still remained dignified and august, +inasmuch as it was still composed of the wisest and bravest men, who +protected their country both with their arms and with their counsels; +whose authority was exceedingly strong and flourishing, because in +honor they were as much before their fellow-citizens as they were +inferior in luxuriousness, and, as a general rule, not superior to them +in wealth. And their public virtues were the more agreeable to the +people, because even in private matters they were ready to serve every +citizen, by their exertions, their counsels, and their liberality. + +XXXV. Such was the situation of the Commonwealth when the quaestor +impeached Spurius Cassius of being so much emboldened by the excessive +favor of the people as to endeavor to make himself master of +monarchical power. And, as you have heard, his own father, having said +that he had found that his son was really guilty of this crime, +condemned him to death at the instance of the people. About fifty-four +years after the first consulate, Spurius Tarpeius and Aulus Aternius +very much gratified the people by proposing, in the Comitia Centuriata, +the substitution of fines instead of corporal punishments. Twenty years +afterward, Lucius Papirius and Publius Pinarius, the censors, having by +a strict levy of fines confiscated to the State the entire flocks and +herds of many private individuals, a light tax on the cattle was +substituted for the law of fines in the consulship of Caius Julius and +Publius Papirius. + +XXXVI. But, some years previous to this, at a period when the senate +possessed the supreme influence, and the people were submissive and +obedient, a new system was adopted. At that time both the consuls and +tribunes of the people abdicated their magistracies, and the decemviri +were appointed, who were invested with great authority, from which +there was no appeal whatever, so as to exercise the chief domination, +and to compile the laws. After having composed, with much wisdom and +equity, the Ten Tables of laws, they nominated as their successors in +the ensuing year other decemviri, whose good faith and justice do not +deserve equal praise. One member of this college, however, merits our +highest commendation. I allude to Caius Julius, who declared respecting +the nobleman Lucius Sestius, in whose chamber a dead body had been +exhumed under his own eyes, that though as decemvir he held the highest +power without appeal, he still required bail, because he was unwilling +to neglect that admirable law which permitted no court but the Comitia +Centuriata to pronounce final sentence on the life of a Roman citizen. + +XXXVII. A third year followed under the authority of the same +decemvirs, and still they were not disposed to appoint their +successors. In a situation of the Commonwealth like this, which, as I +have often repeated, could not be durable, because it had not an equal +operation with respect to all the ranks of the citizens, the whole +public power was lodged in the hands of the chiefs and decemvirs of the +highest nobility, without the counterbalancing authority of the +tribunes of the people, without the sanction of any other magistracies, +and without appeal to the people in the case of a sentence of death or +scourging. + +Thus, out of the injustice of these men, there was suddenly produced a +great revolution, which changed the entire condition of the government, +or they added two tables of very tyrannical laws, and though +matrimonial alliances had always been permitted, even with foreigners, +they forbade, by the most abominable and inhuman edict, that any +marriages should take place between the nobles and the commons--an +order which was afterward abrogated by the decree of Canuleius. +Besides, they introduced into all their political measures corruption, +cruelty, and avarice. And indeed the story is well known, and +celebrated in many literary compositions, that a certain Decimus +Virginius was obliged, on account of the libidinous violence of one of +these decemvirs, to stab his virgin daughter in the midst of the forum. +Then, when he in his desperation had fled to the Roman army which was +encamped on Mount Algidum, the soldiers abandoned the war in which they +were engaged, and took possession of the Sacred Mount, as they had done +before on a similar occasion, and next invested Mount Aventine in their +arms.[327] Our ancestors knew how to prove most thoroughly, and to +retain most wisely. * * * + +XXXVIII. And when Scipio had spoken in this manner, and all his friends +were awaiting in silence the rest of his discourse, then said Tubero: +Since these men who are older than I, my Scipio, make no fresh demands +on you, I shall take the liberty to tell you what I particularly wish +you would explain in your subsequent remarks. + +Do so, said Scipio, and I shall be glad to hear. + +Then Tubero said: You appear to me to have spoken a panegyric on our +Commonwealth of Rome exclusively, though Laelius requested your views +not only of the government of our own State, but of the policy of +states in general. I have not, therefore, yet sufficiently learned from +your discourse, with respect to that mixed form of government you most +approve, by what discipline, moral and legal, we may be best able to +establish and maintain it. + +XXXIX. Africanus replied: I think that we shall soon find an occasion +better adapted to the discussion you have proposed, respecting the +constitution and conservatism of states. As to the best form of +government, I think on this point I have sufficiently answered the +question of Laelius. For in answering him, I, in the first place, +specifically noticed the three simple forms of government--monarchy, +aristocracy, and democracy; and the three vicious constitutions +contrary to them, into which they often degenerate; and I said that +none of these forms, taken separately, was absolutely good; but I +described as preferable to either of them that mixed government which +is composed of a proper amalgamation of these simple ingredients. If I +have since depicted our own Roman constitution as an example, it was +not in order to define the very best form of government, for that may +be understood without an example; but I wished, in the exhibition of a +mighty commonwealth actually in existence, to render distinct and +visible what reason and discourse would vainly attempt to display +without the assistance of experimental illustration. Yet, if you still +require me to describe the best form of government, independent of all +particular examples, we must consult that exactly proportioned and +graduated image of government which nature herself presents to her +investigators. Since you * * * this model of a city and people[328] +* * * + +XL. * * * which I also am searching for, and which I am anxious to +arrive at. + +_Laelius._ You mean the model that would be approved by the truly +accomplished politician? + +_Scipio._ The same. + +_Laelius._ You have plenty of fair patterns even now before you, if you +would but begin with yourself. + +Then Scipio said: I wish I could find even one such, even in the entire +senate. For he is really a wise politician who, as we have often seen +in Africa, while seated on a huge and unsightly elephant, can guide and +rule the monster, and turn him whichever way he likes by a slight +admonition, without any actual exertion. + +_Laelius._ I recollect, and when I was your lieutenant I often saw, one +of these drivers. + +_Scipio._ Thus an Indian or Carthaginian regulates one of these huge +animals, and renders him docile and familiar with human manners. But +the genius which resides in the mind of man, by whatever name it may be +called, is required to rein and tame a monster far more multiform and +intractable, whenever it can accomplish it, which indeed is seldom. It +is necessary to hold in with a strong hand that ferocious[329] * * * + +XLI. * * * [beast, denominated the mob, which thirsts after blood] to +such a degree that it can scarcely be sated with the most hideous +massacres of men. * * * + + But to a man who is greedy, and grasping, and lustful, and + fond of wallowing in voluptuousness. + + The fourth kind of anxiety is that which is prone to mourning + and melancholy, and which is constantly worrying itself. + + [_The next paragraph, "Esse autem angores," etc., + is wholly unintelligible without the context._] + + As an unskilful charioteer is dragged from his chariot, + covered with dirt, bruised, and lacerated. + + The excitements of men's minds are like a chariot, with + horses harnessed to it; in the proper management of which, + the chief duty of the driver consists in knowing his road: + and if he keeps the road, then, however rapidly he proceeds, + he will encounter no obstacles; but if he quits the proper + track, then, although he may be going gently and slowly, he + will either be perplexed on rugged ground, or fall over some + steep place, or at least he will be carried where he has no + need to go.[330] + +XLII. * * * can be said. + +Then Laelius said: I now see the sort of politician you require, on whom +you would impose the office and task of government, which is what I +wished to understand. + +He must be an almost unique specimen, said Africanus, for the task +which I set him comprises all others. He must never cease from +cultivating and studying himself, that he may excite others to imitate +him, and become, through the splendor of his talents and enterprises, a +living mirror to his countrymen. For as in flutes and harps, and in all +vocal performances, a certain unison and harmony must be preserved +amidst the distinctive tones, which cannot be broken or violated +without offending experienced ears; and as this concord and delicious +harmony is produced by the exact gradation and modulation of dissimilar +notes; even so, by means of the just apportionment of the highest, +middle, and lower classes, the State is maintained in concord and peace +by the harmonic subordination of its discordant elements: and thus, +that which is by musicians called harmony in song answers and +corresponds to what we call concord in the State--concord, the +strongest and loveliest bond of security in every commonwealth, being +always accompanied by justice and equity. + + XLIII. And after this, when Scipio had discussed with + considerable breadth of principle and felicity of + illustration the great advantage that justice is to a state, + and the great injury which would arise if it were wanting, + Pilus, one of those who were present at the discussion, took + up the matter and demanded that this question should be + argued more carefully, and that something more should be said + about justice, on account of a sentiment that was now + obtaining among people in general, that political affairs + could not be wholly carried on without some disregard of + justice. + +XLIV. * * * to be full of justice. + +Then Scipio replied: I certainly think so. And I declare to you that I +consider that all I have spoken respecting the government of the State +is worth nothing, and that it will be useless to proceed further, +unless I can prove that it is a false assertion that political business +cannot be conducted without injustice and corruption; and, on the other +hand, establish as a most indisputable fact that without the strictest +justice no government whatever can last long. + +But, with your permission, we have had discussion enough for the day. +The rest--and much remains for our consideration--we will defer till +to-morrow. When they had all agreed to this, the debate of the day was +closed. + + * * * * * + + + + +INTRODUCTION TO THE THIRD BOOK, + +BY THE ORIGINAL TRANSLATOR. + + + Cicero here enters on the grand question of Political Justice, + and endeavors to evince throughout the absolute verity of + that inestimable proverb, "Honesty is the best policy," in + all public as well as in all private affairs. St. Augustine, + in his City of God, has given the following analysis of this + magnificent disquisition: + + "In the third book of Cicero's Commonwealth" (says he) "the + question of Political Justice is most earnestly discussed. + Philus is appointed to support, as well as he can, the + sophistical arguments of those who think that political + government cannot be carried on without the aid of injustice + and chicanery. He denies holding any such opinion himself; + yet, in order to exhibit the truth more vividly through the + force of contrast, he pleads with the utmost ingenuity the + cause of injustice against justice; and endeavors to show, by + plausible examples and specious dialectics, that injustice is + as useful to a statesman as justice would be injurious. Then + Laelius, at the general request, takes up the plea for + justice, and maintains with all his eloquence that nothing + could be so ruinous to states as injustice and dishonesty, + and that without a supreme justice, no political government + could expect a long duration. This point being sufficiently + proved, Scipio returns to the principal discussion. He + reproduces and enforces the short definition that he had + given of a commonwealth--that it consisted in the welfare of + the entire people, by which word 'people' he does not mean + the mob, but the community, bound together by the sense of + common rights and mutual benefits. He notices how important + such just definitions are in all debates whatever, and draws + this conclusion from the preceding arguments--that the + Commonwealth is the common welfare whenever it is swayed with + justice and wisdom, whether it be subordinated to a king, an + aristocracy, or a democracy. But if the king be unjust, and + so becomes a tyrant; and the aristocracy unjust, which makes + them a faction; or the democrats unjust, and so degenerate + into revolutionists and destructives--then not only the + Commonwealth is corrupted, but in fact annihilated. For it + can be no longer the common welfare when a tyrant or a + faction abuse it; and the people itself is no longer the + people when it becomes unjust, since it is no longer a + community associated by a sense of right and utility, + according to the definition."--_Aug. Civ. Dei._ 3-21. + + This book is of the utmost importance to statesmen, as it + serves to neutralize the sophistries of Machiavelli, which + are still repeated in many cabinets. + + + + +BOOK III. + + +I. * * *[331] Cicero, in the third book of his treatise On a +Commonwealth, says that nature has treated man less like a mother than +a step-dame, for she has cast him into mortal life with a body naked, +fragile, and infirm, and with a mind agitated by troubles, depressed by +fears, broken by labors, and exposed to passions. In this mind, +however, there lies hidden, and, as it were, buried, a certain divine +spark of genius and intellect. + +Though man is born a frail and powerless being, nevertheless he is safe +from all animals destitute of voice; and at the same time those other +animals of greater strength, although they bravely endure the violence +of weather, cannot be safe from man. And the result is, that reason +does more for man than nature does for brutes; since, in the latter, +neither the greatness of their strength nor the firmness of their +bodies can save them from being oppressed by us, and made subject to +our power. * * * + +Plato returned thanks to nature that he had been born a man. + +II. * * * aiding our slowness by carriages, and when it had taught men +to utter the elementary and confused sounds of unpolished expression, +articulated and distinguished them into their proper classes, and, as +their appropriate signs, attached certain words to certain things, and +thus associated, by the most delightful bond of speech, the once +divided races of men. + +And by a similar intelligence, the inflections of the voice, which +appeared infinite, are, by the discovery of a few alphabetic +characters, all designated and expressed; by which we maintain converse +with our absent friends, by which also indications of our wishes and +monuments of past events are preserved. Then came the use of numbers--a +thing necessary to human life, and at the same time immutable and +eternal; a science which first urged us to raise our views to heaven, +and not gaze without an object on the motions of the stars, and the +distribution of days and nights. + +III. * * *[332] [Then appeared the sages of philosophy], whose minds +took a higher flight, and who were able to conceive and to execute +designs worthy of the gifts of the Gods. Wherefore let those men who +have left us sublime essays on the principles of living be regarded as +great men--which indeed they are--as learned men, as masters of truth +and virtue; provided that these principles of civil government, this +system of governing people, whether it be a thing discovered by men who +have lived amidst a variety of political events, or one discussed +amidst their opportunities of literary tranquillity, is remembered to +be, as indeed it is, a thing by no means to be despised, being one +which causes in first-rate minds, as we not unfrequently see, an +incredible and almost divine virtue. And when to these high faculties +of soul, received from nature and expanded by social institutions, a +politician adds learning and extensive information concerning things in +general, like those illustrious personages who conduct the dialogue in +the present treatise, none will refuse to confess the superiority of +such persons to all others; for, in fact, what can be more admirable +than the study and practice of the grand affairs of state, united to a +literary taste and a familiarity with the liberal arts? or what can we +imagine more perfect than a Scipio, a Laelius, or a Philus, who, not to +omit anything which belonged to the most perfect excellence of the +greatest men, joined to the examples of our ancestors and the +traditions of our countrymen the foreign philosophy of Socrates? + +Wherefore he who had both the desire and the power to acquaint himself +thoroughly both with the customs and the learning of his ancestors +appears to me to have attained to the very highest glory and honor. But +if we cannot combine both, and are compelled to select one of these two +paths to wisdom--though to some people the tranquil life spent in the +research of literature and arts may appear to be the most happy and +delectable--yet, doubtless, the science of politics is more laudable +and illustrious, for in this political field of exertion our greatest +men have reaped their honors, like the invincible Curius, + + Whom neither gold nor iron could subdue. + +IV. * * *[333] that wisdom existed still. There existed this general +difference between these two classes, that among the one the +development of the principles of nature is the subject of their study +and eloquence, and among the other national laws and institutions form +the principal topics of investigation. + +In honor of our country, we may assert that she has produced within +herself a great number, I will not say of sages (since philosophy is so +jealous of this name), but of men worthy of the highest celebrity, +because by them the precepts and discoveries of the sages have been +carried out into actual practice. And, moreover, though there have +existed, and still do exist, many great and glorious empires, yet since +the noblest masterpiece of genius in the world is the establishment of +a state and commonwealth which shall be a lasting one, even if we +reckon but a single legislator for each empire, the number of these +excellent men will appear very numerous. To be convinced of this, we +have only to turn our eyes on any nation of Italy, Latium, the Sabines, +the Volscians, the Samnites, or the Etrurians, and then direct our +attention to that mighty nation of the Greeks, and then to the +Assyrians, Persians, and Carthaginians, and[334] * * * + +V. * * * [Scipio and his friends having again assembled, Scipio spoke +as follows: In our last conversation, I promised to prove that honesty +is the best policy in all states and commonwealths whatsoever. But if I +am to plead in favor of strict honesty and justice in all public +affairs, no less than in private, I must request Philus, or some one +else, to take up the advocacy of the other side; the truth will then +become more manifest, from the collision of opposite arguments, as we +see every day exemplified at the Bar.] + +And Philus replied: In good truth, you have allotted me a very +creditable cause when you wish me to undertake the defence of vice. + +Perhaps, said Laelius, you are afraid, lest, in reproducing the ordinary +objections made to justice in politics, you should seem to express your +own sentiments; though you are universally respected as an almost +unique example of the ancient probity and good faith; nor is it unknown +how familiar you are with the lawyer-like habit of disputing on both +sides of a question, because you think that this is the best way of +getting at the truth. + +And Philus said: Very well; I obey you, and wilfully, with my eyes +open, I will undertake this dirty business; because, since those who +seek for gold do not flinch at the sight of the mud, so we who are +searching for justice, which is far more precious than gold, are bound +to shrink from no annoyance. And I wish, as I am about to make use of +the antagonist arguments of a foreigner, I might also employ a foreign +language. The pleas, therefore, now to be urged by Lucius Furius Philus +are those [once employed by] the Greek Carneades, a man who was +accustomed to express whatever [served his turn].[335] * * *[336]Let it +be understood, therefore, that I by no means express my own sentiments, +but those of Carneades, in order that you may refute this philosopher, +who was wont to turn the best causes into joke, through the mere +wantonness of wit. + + VI. He was a philosopher of the Academic School; and if any + one is ignorant of his great power, and eloquence, and + acuteness in arguing, he may learn it from the mention made + of him by Cicero or by Lucilius, when Neptune, discoursing on + a very difficult subject, declares that it cannot be + explained, not even if hell were to restore Carneades himself + for the purpose. This philosopher, having been sent by the + Athenians to Rome as an ambassador, discussed the subject of + justice very amply in the hearing of Galba and Cato the + Censor, who were the greatest orators of the day. And the + next day he overturned all his arguments by others of a + contrary tendency, and disparaged justice, which the day + before he had extolled; speaking not indeed with the gravity + of a philosopher whose wisdom ought to be steady, and whose + opinions unchangeable, but in a kind of rhetorical exercise + of arguing on each side--a practice which he was accustomed + to adopt, in order to be able to refute others who were + asserting anything. The arguments by which he disparaged + justice are mentioned by Lucius Furius in Cicero; I suppose, + since he was discussing the Commonwealth, in order to + introduce a defence and panegyric of that quality without + which he did not think a commonwealth could be administered. + But Carneades, in order to refute Aristotle and Plato, the + advocates of justice, collected in his first argument + everything that was in the habit of being advanced on behalf + of justice, in order afterward to be able to overturn it, as + he did. + + VII. Many philosophers indeed, and especially Plato and + Aristotle, have spoken a great deal of justice, inculcating + that virtue, and extolling it with the highest praise, as + giving to every one what belongs to him, as preserving equity + in all things, and urging that while the other virtues are, + as it were, silent and shut up, justice is the only one which + is not absorbed in considerations of self-interest, and which + is not secret, but finds its whole field for exercise + out-of-doors, and is desirous of doing good and serving as + many people as possible; as if, forsooth, justice ought to + exist in judges only, and in men invested with a certain + authority, and not in every one! But there is no one, not + even a man of the lowest class, or a beggar, who is destitute + of opportunities of displaying justice. But because these + philosophers knew not what its essence was, or whence it + proceeded, or what its employment was, they attributed that + first of all virtues, which is the common good of all men, to + a few only, and asserted that it aimed at no advantage of its + own, but was anxious only for that of others. So it was well + that Carneades, a man of the greatest genius and acuteness, + refuted their assertions, and overthrew that justice which + had no firm foundation; not because he thought justice itself + deserving of blame, but in order to show that those its + defenders had brought forward no trustworthy or strong + arguments in its behalf. + + Justice looks out-of-doors, and is prominent and conspicuous + in its whole essence. + + Which virtue, beyond all others, wholly devotes and dedicates + itself to the advantage of others. + +VIII. * * * Both to discover and maintain. While the other, Aristotle, +has filled four large volumes with a discussion on abstract justice. +For I did not expect anything grand or magnificent from Chrysippus, +who, after his usual fashion, examines everything rather by the +signification of words than the reality of things. But it was surely +worthy of those heroes of philosophy to ennoble by their genius a +virtue so eminently beneficent and liberal, which everywhere exalts the +social interests above the selfish, and teaches us to love others +rather than ourselves. It was worthy of their genius, we say, to +elevate this virtue to a divine throne, not far from that of Wisdom. +And certainly they neither wanted the will to accomplish this (for what +else could be the cause of their writing on the subject, or what could +have been their design?) nor the genius, in which they excelled all +men. But the weakness of their cause was too great for either their +intention or their eloquence to make it popular. In fact, this justice +on which we reason is a civil right, but no natural one; for if it were +natural and universal, then justice and injustice would be recognized +similarly by all men, just as the heat and cold, sweetness and +bitterness. + +IX. Now, if any one, carried in that chariot of winged serpents of +which the poet Pacuvius makes mention, could take his flight over all +nations and cities, and accurately observe their proceedings, he would +see that the sense of justice and right varies in different regions. In +the first place, he would behold among the unchangeable people of +Egypt, which preserves in its archives the memory of so many ages and +events, a bull adored as a Deity, under the name of Apis, and a +multitude of other monsters, and all kinds of animals admitted by the +same nation into the number of the Gods. + +In the next place, he would see in Greece, as among ourselves, +magnificent temples consecrated by images in human form, which the +Persians regarded as impious; and it is affirmed that the sole motive +of Xerxes for commanding the conflagration of the Athenian temples was +the belief that it was a superstitious sacrilege to keep confined +within narrow walls the Gods, whose proper home was the entire +universe. But afterward Philip, in his hostile projects against the +Persians, and Alexander, who carried them into execution, alleged this +plea for war, that they were desirous to avenge the temples of Greece, +which the Greeks had thought proper never to rebuild, that this +monument of the impiety of the Persians might always remain before the +eyes of their posterity. + +How many--such as the inhabitants of Taurica along the Euxine Sea; as +the King of Egypt, Busiris; as the Gauls and the Carthaginians--have +thought it exceedingly pious and agreeable to the Gods to sacrifice +men! And, besides, the customs of life are so various that the Cretans +and AEtolians regard robbery as honorable. And the Lacedaemonians say +that their territory extends to all places which they can touch with a +lance. The Athenians had a custom of swearing, by a public +proclamation, that all the lands which produced olives and corn were +their own. The Gauls consider it a base employment to raise corn by +agricultural labor, and go with arms in their hands, and mow down the +harvests of neighboring peoples. But we ourselves, the most equitable +of all nations, who, in order to raise the value of our vines and +olives, do not permit the races beyond the Alps to cultivate either +vineyards or oliveyards, are said in this matter to act with prudence, +but not with justice. You see, then, that wisdom and policy are not +always the same as equity. And Lycurgus, that famous inventor of a most +admirable jurisprudence and most wholesome laws, gave the lands of the +rich to be cultivated by the common people, who were reduced to +slavery. + +X. If I were to describe the diverse kinds of laws, institutions, +manners, and customs, not only as they vary in the numerous nations, +but as they vary likewise in single cities--in this one of ours, for +example--I could prove that they have had a thousand revolutions. For +instance, that eminent expositor of our laws who sits in the present +company--I mean Manilius--if you were to consult him relative to the +legacies and inheritances of women, he would tell you that the present +law is quite different from that he was accustomed to plead in his +youth, before the Voconian enactment came into force--an edict which +was passed in favor of the interests of the men, but which is evidently +full of injustice with regard to women. For why should a woman be +disabled from inheriting property? Why can a vestal virgin become an +heir, while her mother cannot? And why, admitting that it is necessary +to set some limit to the wealth of women, should Crassus's daughter, if +she be his only child, inherit thousands without offending the law, +while my daughter can only receive a small share in a bequest.[337] +* * * + +XI. * * * [If this justice were natural, innate, and universal, all men +would admit the same] law and right, and the same men would not enact +different laws at different times. If a just man and a virtuous man is +bound to obey the laws, I ask, what laws do you mean? Do you intend all +the laws indifferently? But neither does virtue permit this inconstancy +in moral obligation, nor is such a variation compatible with natural +conscience. The laws are, therefore, based not on our sense of justice, +but on our fear of punishment. There is, therefore, no natural justice; +and hence it follows that men cannot be just by nature. + +Are men, then, to say that variations indeed do exist in the laws, but +that men who are virtuous through natural conscience follow that which +is really justice, and not a mere semblance and disguise, and that it +is the distinguishing characteristic of the truly just and virtuous man +to render every one his due rights? Are we, then, to attribute the +first of these characteristics to animals? For not only men of moderate +abilities, but even first-rate sages and philosophers, as Pythagoras +and Empedocles, declare that all kinds of living creatures have a right +to the same justice. They declare that inexpiable penalties impend over +those who have done violence to any animal whatsoever. It is, +therefore, a crime to injure an animal, and the perpetrator of such +crime[338] * * * + + XII. For when he[339] inquired of a pirate by what right he + dared to infest the sea with his little brigantine: "By the + same right," he replied, "which is your warrant for + conquering the world." * * * + +Wisdom and prudence instruct us by all means to increase our power, +riches, and estates. For by what means could this same Alexander, that +illustrious general, who extended his empire over all Asia, without +violating the property of other men, have acquired such universal +dominion, enjoyed so many pleasures, such great power, and reigned +without bound or limit? + +But justice commands us to have mercy upon all men, to consult the +interests of the whole human race, to give to every one his due, and +injure no sacred, public, or foreign rights, and to forbear touching +what does not belong to us. What is the result, then? If you obey the +dictates of wisdom, then wealth, power, riches, honors, provinces, and +kingdoms, from all classes, peoples, and nations, are to be aimed at. + +However, as we are discussing public matters, those examples are more +illustrious which refer to what is done publicly. And since the +question between justice and policy applies equally to private and +public affairs, I think it well to speak of the wisdom of the people. I +will not, however, mention other nations, but come at once to our own +Roman people, whom Africanus, in his discourse yesterday, traced from +the cradle, and whose empire now embraces the whole world. Justice +is[340] * * * + + XIII. How far utility is at variance with justice we may + learn from the Roman people itself, which, declaring war by + means of the fecials, and committing injustice with all legal + formality, always coveting and laying violent hands on the + property of others, acquired the possession of the whole + world. + + What is the advantage of one's own country but the + disadvantage of another state or nation, by extending one's + dominions by territories evidently wrested from others, + increasing one's power, improving one's revenues, etc.? + Therefore, whoever has obtained these advantages for his + country--that is to say, whoever has overthrown cities, + subdued nations, and by these means filled the treasury with + money, taken lands, and enriched his fellow-citizens--such a + man is extolled to the skies; is believed to be endowed with + consummate and perfect virtue; and this mistake is fallen + into not only by the populace and the ignorant, but by + philosophers, who even give rules for injustice. + +XIV. * * * For all those who have the right of life and death over the +people are in fact tyrants; but they prefer being called by the title +of king, which belongs to the all-good Jupiter. But when certain men, +by favor of wealth, birth, or any other means, get possession of the +entire government, it is a faction; but they choose to denominate +themselves an aristocracy. If the people gets the upper hand, and rules +everything after its capricious will, they call it liberty, but it is +in fact license. And when every man is a guard upon his neighbor, and +every class is a guard upon every other class, then because no one +trusts in his own strength, a kind of compact is formed between the +great and the little, from whence arises that mixed kind of government +which Scipio has been commending. Thus justice, according to these +facts, is not the daughter of nature or conscience, but of human +imbecility. For when it becomes necessary to choose between these three +predicaments, either to do wrong without retribution, or to do wrong +with retribution, or to do no wrong at all, it is best to do wrong with +impunity; next, neither to do wrong nor to suffer for it; but nothing +is more wretched than to struggle incessantly between the wrong we +inflict and that we receive. Therefore, he who attains to that first +end[341] * * * + + XV. This was the sum of the argument of Carneades: that men + had established laws among themselves from considerations of + advantage, varying them according to their different customs, + and altering them often so as to adapt them to the times; but + that there was no such thing as natural law; that all men and + all other animals are led to their own advantage by the + guidance of nature; that there is no such thing as justice, + or, if there be, that it is extreme folly, since a man would + injure himself while consulting the interests of others. And + he added these arguments, that all nations who were + flourishing and dominant, and even the Romans themselves, who + were the masters of the whole world, if they wished to be + just--that is to say, if they restored all that belonged to + others--would have to return to their cottages, and to lie + down in want and misery. + +Except, perhaps, of the Arcadians and Athenians, who, I presume, +dreading that this great act of retribution might one day arrive, +pretend that they were sprung from the earth, like so many field-mice. + +XVI. In reply to these statements, the following arguments are often +adduced by those who are not unskilful in discussions, and who, in this +question, have all the greater weight of authority, because, when we +inquire, Who is a good man?--understanding by that term a frank and +single-minded man--we have little need of captious casuists, quibblers, +and slanderers. For those men assert that the wise man does not seek +virtue because of the personal gratification which the practice of +justice and beneficence procures him, but rather because the life of +the good man is free from fear, care, solicitude, and peril; while, on +the other hand, the wicked always feel in their souls a certain +suspicion, and always behold before their eyes images of judgment and +punishment. Do not you think, therefore, that there is any benefit, or +that there is any advantage which can be procured by injustice, +precious enough to counterbalance the constant pressure of remorse, and +the haunting consciousness that retribution awaits the sinner, and +hangs over his devoted head.[342] * * * + +XVII. [Our philosophers, therefore, put a case. Suppose, say they, two +men, one of whom is an excellent and admirable person, of high honor +and remarkable integrity; the latter is distinguished by nothing but +his vice and audacity. And suppose that their city has so mistaken +their characters as to imagine the good man to be a scandalous, +impious, and audacious criminal, and to esteem the wicked man, on the +contrary, as a pattern of probity and fidelity. On account of this +error of their fellow-citizens, the good man is arrested and tormented, +his hands are cut off, his eyes are plucked out, he is condemned, +bound, burned, exterminated, reduced to want, and to the last appears +to all men to be most deservedly the most miserable of men. On the +other hand, the flagitious wretch is exalted, worshipped, loved by all, +and honors, offices, riches, and emoluments are all conferred on him, +and he shall be reckoned by his fellow-citizens the best and worthiest +of mortals, and in the highest degree deserving of all manner of +prosperity. Yet, for all this, who is so mad as to doubt which of these +two men he would rather be? + +XVIII. What happens among individuals happens also among nations. There +is no state so absurd and ridiculous as not to prefer unjust dominion +to just subordination. I need not go far for examples. During my own +consulship, when you were my fellow-counsellors, we consulted +respecting the treaty of Numantia. No one was ignorant that Quintus +Pompey had signed a treaty, and that Mancinus had done the same. The +latter, being a virtuous man, supported the proposition which I laid +before the people, after the decree of the senate. The former, on the +other side, opposed it vehemently. If modesty, probity, or faith had +been regarded, Mancinus would have carried his point; but in reason, +counsel, and prudence, Pompey surpassed him. Whether[343] * * * + +XIX. If a man should have a faithless slave, or an unwholesome house, +with whose defect he alone was acquainted, and he advertised them for +sale, would he state the fact that his servant was infected with +knavery, and his house with malaria, or would he conceal these +objections from the buyer? If he stated those facts, he would be +honest, no doubt, because he would deceive nobody; but still he would +be thought a fool, because he would either get very little for his +property, or else fail to sell it at all. By concealing these defects, +on the other hand, he will be called a shrewd man--as one who has taken +care of his own interest; but he will be a rogue, notwithstanding, +because he will be deceiving his neighbors. Again, let us suppose that +one man meets another, who sells gold and silver, conceiving them to be +copper or lead; shall he hold his peace that he may make a capital +bargain, or correct the mistake, and purchase at a fair rate? He would +evidently be a fool in the world's opinion if he preferred the latter. + +XX. It is justice, beyond all question, neither to commit murder nor +robbery. What, then, would your just man do, if, in a case of +shipwreck, he saw a weaker man than himself get possession of a plank? +Would he not thrust him off, get hold of the timber himself, and escape +by his exertions, especially as no human witness could be present in +the mid-sea? If he acted like a wise man of the world, he would +certainly do so, for to act in any other way would cost him his life. +If, on the other hand, he prefers death to inflicting unjustifiable +injury on his neighbor, he will be an eminently honorable and just man, +but not the less a fool, because he saved another's life at the expense +of his own. Again, if in case of a defeat and rout, when the enemy were +pressing in the rear, this just man should find a wounded comrade +mounted on a horse, shall he respect his right at the risk of being +killed himself, or shall he fling him from the horse in order to +preserve his own life from the pursuers? If he does so, he is a wise +man, but at the same time a wicked one; if he does not, he is admirably +just, but at the same time stupid. + +XXI. _Scipio._ I might reply at great length to these sophistical +objections of Philus, if it were not, my Laelius, that all our friends +are no less anxious than myself to hear you take a leading part in the +present debate, especially as you promised yesterday that you would +plead at large on my side of the argument. If you cannot spare time for +this, at any rate do not desert us; we all ask it of you. + +_Laelius._ This Carneades ought not to be even listened to by our young +men. I think all the while that I am hearing him that he must be a very +impure person; if he be not, as I would fain believe, his discourse is +not less pernicious. + +XXII.[344] True law is right reason conformable to nature, universal, +unchangeable, eternal, whose commands urge us to duty, and whose +prohibitions restrain us from evil. Whether it enjoins or forbids, the +good respect its injunctions, and the wicked treat them with +indifference. This law cannot be contradicted by any other law, and is +not liable either to derogation or abrogation. Neither the senate nor +the people can give us any dispensation for not obeying this universal +law of justice. It needs no other expositor and interpreter than our +own conscience. It is not one thing at Rome, and another at Athens; one +thing to-day, and another to-morrow; but in all times and nations this +universal law must forever reign, eternal and imperishable. It is the +sovereign master and emperor of all beings. God himself is its author, +its promulgator, its enforcer. And he who does not obey it flies from +himself, and does violence to the very nature of man. And by so doing +he will endure the severest penalties even if he avoid the other evils +which are usually accounted punishments. + + XXIII. I am aware that in the third book of Cicero's treatise + on the Commonwealth (unless I am mistaken) it is argued that + no war is ever undertaken by a well-regulated commonwealth + unless it be one either for the sake of keeping faith, or for + safety; and what he means by a war for safety, and what + safety he wishes us to understand, he points out in another + passage, where he says, "But private men often escape from + these penalties, which even the most stupid persons + feel--want, exile, imprisonment, and stripes--by embracing + the opportunity of a speedy death; but to states death itself + is a penalty, though it appears to deliver individuals from + punishment. For a state ought to be established so as to be + eternal: therefore, there is no natural decease for a state, + as there is for a man, in whose case death is not only + inevitable, but often even desirable; but when a state is put + an end to, it is destroyed, extinguished. It is in some + degree, to compare small things with great, as if this whole + world were to perish and fall to pieces." + + In his treatise on the Commonwealth, Cicero says those wars + are unjust which are undertaken without reason. Again, after + a few sentences, he adds, No war is considered just unless it + be formally announced and declared, and unless it be to + obtain restitution of what has been taken away. + + But our nation, by defending its allies, has now become the + master of all the whole world. + + XXIV. Also, in that same treatise on the Commonwealth, he + argues most strenuously and vigorously in the cause of + justice against injustice. And since, when a little time + before the part of injustice was upheld against justice, and + the doctrine was urged that a republic could not prosper and + flourish except by injustice, this was put forward as the + strongest argument, that it was unjust for men to serve other + men as their masters; but that unless a dominant state, such + as a great republic, acted on this injustice, it could not + govern its provinces; answer was made on behalf of justice, + that it was just that it should be so, because slavery is + advantageous to such men, and their interests are consulted + by a right course of conduct--that is, by the license of + doing injury being taken from the wicked--and they will fare + better when subjugated, because when not subjugated they + fared worse: and to confirm this reasoning, a noble instance, + taken, as it were, from nature, was added, and it was said, + Why, then, does God govern man, and why does the mind govern + the body, and reason govern lust, and the other vicious parts + of the mind? + + XXV. Hear what Tully says more plainly still in the third + book of his treatise on the Commonwealth, when discussing the + reasons for government. Do we not, says he, see that nature + herself has given the power of dominion to everything that is + best, to the extreme advantage of what is subjected to it? + Why, then, does God govern man, and why does the mind govern + the body, and reason govern lust and passion and the other + vicious parts of the same mind? Listen thus far; for + presently he adds, But still there are dissimilarities to be + recognized in governing and in obeying. For as the mind is + said to govern the body, and also to govern lust, still it + governs the body as a king governs his subjects, or a parent + his children; but it governs lust as a master governs his + slaves, because it restrains and breaks it. The authority of + kings, of generals, of magistrates, of fathers, and of + nations, rules their subjects and allies as the mind rules + bodies; but masters control their slaves, as the best part of + the mind--that is to say, wisdom--controls the vicious and + weak parts of itself, such as lust, passion, and the other + perturbations. + + For there is a kind of unjust slavery when those belong to + some one else who might be their own masters; but when those + are slaves who cannot govern themselves, there is no injury + done. + + XXVI. If, says Carneades, you were to know that an asp was + lying hidden anywhere, and that some one who did not know it + was going to sit upon it, whose death would be a gain to you, + you would act wickedly if you did not warn him not to sit + down. Still, you would not be liable to punishment; for who + could prove that you had known? But we are bringing forward + too many instances; for it is plain that unless equity, good + faith, and justice proceed from nature, and if all these + things are referred to interest, a good man cannot be found. + And on these topics a great deal is said by Laelius in our + treatise on the Republic. + + If, as we are reminded by you, we have spoken well in that + treatise, when we said that nothing is good excepting what is + honorable, and nothing bad excepting what is disgraceful. + * * * + + XXVII. I am glad that you approve of the doctrine that the + affection borne to our children is implanted by nature; + indeed, if it be not, there can be no conection between man + and man which has its origin in nature. And if there be not, + then there is an end of all society in life. May it turn out + well, says Carneades, speaking shamelessly, but still more + sensibly than my friend Lucius or Patro: for, as they refer + everything to themselves, do they think that anything is ever + done for the sake of another? And when they say that a man + ought to be good, in order to avoid misfortune, not because + it is right by nature, they do not perceive that they are + speaking of a cunning man, not of a good one. But these + arguments are argued, I think, in those books by praising + which you have given me spirits. + + In which I agree that an anxious and hazardous justice is not + that of a wise man. + + XXVIII. And again, in Cicero, that same advocate of justice, + Laelius, says, Virtue is clearly eager for honor, nor has she + any other reward; which, however, she accepts easily, and + exacts without bitterness. And in another place the same + Laelius says: + +When a man is inspired by virtue such as this, what bribes can you +offer him, what treasures, what thrones, what empires? He considers +these but mortal goods, and esteems his own divine. And if the +ingratitude of the people, and the envy of his competitors, or the +violence of powerful enemies, despoil his virtue of its earthly +recompense, he still enjoys a thousand consolations in the approbation +of conscience, and sustains himself by contemplating the beauty of +moral rectitude. + +XXIX. * * * This virtue, in order to be true, must be universal. +Tiberius Gracchus continued faithful to his fellow-citizens, but he +violated the rights and treaties guaranteed to our allies and the Latin +peoples. But if this habit of arbitrary violence begins to extend +itself further, and perverts our authority, leading it from right to +violence, so that those who had voluntarily obeyed us are only +restrained by fear, then, although we, during our days, may escape the +peril, yet am I solicitous respecting the safety of our posterity and +the immortality of the Commonwealth itself, which, doubtless, might +become perpetual and invincible if our people would maintain their +ancient institutions and manners. + +XXX. When Laelius had ceased to speak, all those that were present +expressed the extreme pleasure they found in his discourse. But Scipio, +more affected than the rest, and ravished with the delight of sympathy, +exclaimed: You have pleaded, my Laelius, many causes with an eloquence +superior to that of Servius Galba, our colleague, whom you used during +his life to prefer to all others, even to the Attic orators [and never +did I hear you speak with more energy than to-day, while pleading the +cause of justice][345] * * * + + * * * That two things were wanting to enable him to speak in + public and in the forum, confidence and voice. + +XXXI. * * * This justice, continued Scipio, is the very foundation of +lawful government in political constitutions. Can we call the State of +Agrigentum a commonwealth, where all men are oppressed by the cruelty +of a single tyrant--where there is no universal bond of right, nor +social consent and fellowship, which should belong to every people, +properly so named? It is the same in Syracuse--that illustrious city +which Timaeus calls the greatest of the Grecian towns. It was indeed a +most beautiful city; and its admirable citadel, its canals distributed +through all its districts, its broad streets, its porticoes, its +temples, and its walls, gave Syracuse the appearance of a most +flourishing state. But while Dionysius its tyrant reigned there, +nothing of all its wealth belonged to the people, and the people were +nothing better than the slaves of one master. Thus, wherever I behold a +tyrant, I know that the social constitution must be not merely vicious +and corrupt, as I stated yesterday, but in strict truth no social +constitution at all. + +XXXII. _Laelius._ You have spoken admirably, my Scipio, and I see the +point of your observations. + +_Scipio._ You grant, then, that a state which is entirely in the power +of a faction cannot justly be entitled a political community? + +_Laelius._ That is evident. + +_Scipio._ You judge most correctly. For what was the State of Athens +when, during the great Peloponnesian war, she fell under the unjust +domination of the thirty tyrants? The antique glory of that city, the +imposing aspect of its edifices, its theatre, its gymnasium, its +porticoes, its temples, its citadel, the admirable sculptures of +Phidias, and the magnificent harbor of Piraeus--did they constitute it a +commonwealth? + +_Laelius._ Certainly not, because these did not constitute the real +welfare of the community. + +_Scipio._ And at Rome, when the decemvirs ruled without appeal from +their decisions, in the third year of their power, had not liberty lost +all its securities and all its blessings? + +_Laelius._ Yes; the welfare of the community was no longer consulted, +and the people soon roused themselves, and recovered their appropriate +rights. + +XXXIII. _Scipio._ I now come to the third, or democratical, form of +government, in which a considerable difficulty presents itself, because +all things are there said to lie at the disposition of the people, and +are carried into execution just as they please. Here the populace +inflict punishments at their pleasure, and act, and seize, and keep +possession, and distribute property, without let or hinderance. Can you +deny, my Laelius, that this is a fair definition of a democracy, where +the people are all in all, and where the people constitute the State? + +_Laelius._ There is no political constitution to which I more absolutely +deny the name of a _commonwealth_ than that in which all things lie in +the power of the multitude. If a commonwealth, which implies the +welfare of the entire community, could not exist in Agrigentum, +Syracuse, or Athens when tyrants reigned over them--if it could not +exist in Rome when under the oligarchy of the decemvirs--neither do I +see how this sacred name of commonwealth can be applied to a democracy +and the sway of the mob; because, in the first place, my Scipio, I +build on your own admirable definition, that there can be no community, +properly so called, unless it be regulated by a combination of rights. +And, by this definition, it appears that a multitude of men may be just +as tyrannical as a single despot; and it is so much the worse, since no +monster can be more barbarous than the mob, which assumes the name and +appearance of the people. Nor is it at all reasonable, since the laws +place the property of madmen in the hands of their sane relations, that +we should do the [very reverse in politics, and throw the property of +the sane into the hands of the mad multitude][346] * * * + +XXXIV. * * * [It is far more rational] to assert that a wise and +virtuous aristocratical government deserves the title of a +commonwealth, as it approaches to the nature of a kingdom. + +And much more so in my opinion, said Mummius. For the unity of power +often exposes a king to become a despot; but when an aristocracy, +consisting of many virtuous men, exercise power, that is the most +fortunate circumstance possible for any state. However this be, I much +prefer royalty to democracy; for that is the third kind of government +which you have remaining, and a most vicious one it is. + +XXXV. Scipio replied: I am well acquainted, my Mummius, with your +decided antipathy to the democratical system. And, although, we may +speak of it with rather more indulgence than you are accustomed to +accord it, I must certainly agree with you, that of all the three +particular forms of government, none is less commendable than +democracy. + +I do not agree with you, however, when you would imply that aristocracy +is preferable to royalty. If you suppose that wisdom governs the State, +is it not as well that this wisdom should reside in one monarch as in +many nobles? + +But we are led away by a certain incorrectness of terms in a discussion +like the present. When we pronounce the word "aristocracy," which, in +Greek, signifies the government of the best men, what can be conceived +more excellent? For what can be thought better than the best? But when, +on the other hand, the title "king" is mentioned, we begin to imagine a +tyrant; as if a king must be necessarily unjust. But we are not +speaking of an unjust king when we are examining the true nature of +royal authority. To this name of king, therefore, do but attach the +idea of a Romulus, a Numa, a Tullus, and perhaps you will be less +severe to the monarchical form of constitution. + +_Mummius_. Have you, then, no commendation at all for any kind of +democratical government? + +_Scipio._ Why, I think some democratical forms less objectionable than +others; and, by way of illustration, I will ask you what you thought of +the government in the isle of Rhodes, where we were lately together; +did it appear to you a legitimate and rational constitution? + +_Mummius_. It did, and not much liable to abuse. + +_Scipio._ You say truly. But, if you recollect, it was a very +extraordinary experiment. All the inhabitants were alternately senators +and citizens. Some months they spent in their senatorial functions, and +some months they spent in their civil employments. In both they +exercised judicial powers; and in the theatre and the court, the same +men judged all causes, capital and not capital. And they had as much +influence, and were of as much importance as * * * + + +FRAGMENTS. + + + XXXVI. There is therefore some unquiet feeling in + individuals, which either exults in pleasure or is crushed by + annoyance. + + [_The next is an incomplete sentence, and, as such, + unintelligible_.] + + The Phoenicians were the first who by their commerce, and by + the merchandise which they carried, brought avarice and + magnificence and insatiable degrees of everything into + Greece. + + Sardanapalus, the luxurious king of Assyria, of whom Tully, + in the third book of his treatise on the Republic, says, "The + notorious Sardanapalus, far more deformed by his vices than + even by his name." + + What is the meaning, then, of this absurd acceptation, unless + some one wishes to make the whole of Athos a monument? For + what is Athos or the vast Olympus? * * * + + XXXVII. I will endeavor in the proper place to show it, + according to the definitions of Cicero himself, in which, + putting forth Scipio as the speaker, he has briefly explained + what a commonwealth and what a republic is; adducing also + many assertions of his own, and of those whom he has + represented as taking part in that discussion, to the effect + that the State of Rome was not such a commonwealth, because + there has never been genuine justice in it. However, + according to definitions which are more reasonable, it was a + commonwealth in some degree, and it was better regulated by + the more ancient than by the later Romans. + + It is now fitting that I should explain, as briefly and as + clearly as I can, what, in the second book of this work, I + promised to prove, according to the definitions which Cicero, + in his books on the Commonwealth, puts into the mouth of + Scipio, arguing that the Roman State was never a + commonwealth; for he briefly defines a commonwealth as a + state of the people; the people as an assembly of the + multitude, united by a common feeling of right, and a + community of interests. What he calls a common feeling of + right he explains by discussion, showing in this way that a + commonwealth cannot proceed without justice. Where, + therefore, there is no genuine justice, there can be no + right, for that which is done according to right is done + justly; and what is done unjustly cannot be done according to + right, for the unjust regulations of men are not to be called + or thought rights; since they themselves call that right + (_jus_) which flows from the source of justice: and they say + that that assertion which is often made by some persons of + erroneous sentiments, namely, that that is right which is + advantageous to the most powerful, is false. Wherefore, where + there is no true justice there can be no company of men + united by a common feeling of right; therefore there can be + no people (_populus_), according to that definition of Scipio + or Cicero: and if there be no people, there can be no state + of the people, but only of a mob such as it may be, which is + not worthy of the name of a people. And thus, if a + commonwealth is a state of a people, and if that is not a + people which is not united by a common feeling of right, and + if there is no right where there is no justice, then the + undoubted inference is, that where there is no justice there + is no commonwealth. Moreover, justice is that virtue which + gives every one his own. + +No war can be undertaken by a just and wise state unless for faith or +self-defence. This self-defence of the State is enough to insure its +perpetuity, and this perpetuity is what all patriots desire. Those +afflictions which even the hardiest spirits smart under--poverty, +exile, prison, and torment--private individuals seek to escape from by +an instantaneous death. But for states, the greatest calamity of all is +that of death, which to individuals appears a refuge. A state should be +so constituted as to live forever. For a commonwealth there is no +natural dissolution as there is for a man, to whom death not only +becomes necessary, but often desirable. And when a state once decays +and falls, it is so utterly revolutionized, that, if we may compare +great things with small, it resembles the final wreck of the universe. + +All wars undertaken without a proper motive are unjust. And no war can +be reputed just unless it be duly announced and proclaimed, and if it +be not preceded by a rational demand for restitution. + +Our Roman Commonwealth, by defending its allies, has got possession of +the world. + + * * * * * + + + + +INTRODUCTION TO THE FOURTH BOOK, + +BY THE ORIGINAL TRANSLATOR. + + + In this fourth book Cicero treats of morals and education, and + the use and abuse of stage entertainments. We retain nothing + of this important book save a few scattered fragments, the + beauty of which fills us with the greater regret for the + passages we have lost. + + + + +BOOK IV. + +FRAGMENTS. + + + I. * * * Since mention has been made of the body and of the + mind, I will endeavor to explain the theory of each as well + as the weakness of my understanding is able to comprehend + it--a duty which I think it the more becoming in me to + undertake, because Marcus Tullius, a man of singular genius, + after having attempted to perform it in the fourth book of + his treatise on the Commonwealth, compressed a subject of + wide extent within narrow limits, only touching lightly on + all the principal points. And that there might be no excuse + alleged for his not having followed out this topic, he + himself has assured us that he was not wanting either in + inclination or in anxiety to do so; for, in the first book of + his treatise on Laws, when he was touching briefly on the + same subject, he speaks thus: "This topic Scipio, in my + opinion, has sufficiently discussed in those books which you + have read." + + And the mind itself, which sees the future, remembers the + past. + + Well did Marcus Tullius say, In truth, if there is no one who + would not prefer death to being changed into the form of some + beast, although he were still to retain the mind of a man, + how much more wretched is it to have the mind of a beast in + the form of a man! To me this fate appears as much worse than + the other as the mind is superior to the body. + + Tullius says somewhere that he does not think the good of a + ram and of Publius Africanus identical. + + And also by its being interposed, it causes shade and night, + which is adapted both to the numbering of days and to rest + from labor. + + And as in the autumn he has opened the earth to receive + seeds, in winter relaxed it that it may digest them, and by + the ripening powers of summer softened some and burned up + others. + + When the shepherds use * * * for cattle. + + Cicero, in the fourth book of his Commonwealth, uses the word + "armentum," and "armentarius," derived from it. + +II. The great law of just and regular subordination is the basis of +political prosperity. There is much advantage in the harmonious +succession of ranks and orders and classes, in which the suffrages of +the knights and the senators have their due weight. Too many have +foolishly desired to destroy this institution, in the vain hope of +receiving some new largess, by a public decree, out of a distribution +of the property of the nobility. + +III. Consider, now, how wisely the other provisions have been adopted, +in order to secure to the citizens the benefits of an honest and happy +life; for that is, indeed, the grand object of all political +association, and that which every government should endeavor to procure +for the people, partly by its institutions, and partly by its laws. + +Consider, in the first place, the national education of the people--a +matter on which the Greeks have expended much labor in vain, and which +is the only point on which Polybius, who settled among us, accuses the +negligence of our institutions. For our countrymen have thought that +education ought not to be fixed, nor regulated by laws, nor be given +publicly and uniformly to all classes of society. For[347] * * * + + According to Tully, who says that men going to serve in the + army have guardians assigned to them, by whom they are + governed the first year. + +IV. [In our ancient laws, young men were prohibited from appearing] +naked in the public baths, so far back were the principles of modesty +traced by our ancestors. Among the Greeks, on the contrary, what an +absurd system of training youth is exhibited in their gymnasia! What a +frivolous preparation for the labors and hazards of war! what indecent +spectacles, what impure and licentious amours are permitted! I do not +speak only of the Eleans and Thebans, among whom, in all love affairs, +passion is allowed to run into shameless excesses; but the Spartans, +while they permit every kind of license to their young men, save that +of violation, fence off, by a very slight wall, the very exception on +which they insist, besides other crimes which I will not mention. + +Then Laelius said: I see, my Scipio, that on the subject of the Greek +institutions, which you censure, you prefer attacking the customs of +the most renowned peoples to contending with your favorite Plato, whose +name you have avoided citing, especially as * * * + + V. So that Cicero, in his treatise on the Commonwealth, says + that it was a reproach to young men if they had no lovers. + + Not only as at Sparta, where boys learn to steal and plunder. + + And our master Plato, even more than Lycurgus, who would have + everything to be common, so that no one should be able to + call anything his own property. + + I would send him to the same place whither he sends Homer, + crowned with chaplets and anointed with perfumes, banishing + him from the city which he is describing. + + VI. The judgment of the censor inflicts scarcely anything + more than a blush on the man whom he condemns. Therefore as + all that adjudication turns solely on the name (_nomen_), the + punishment is called ignominy. + + Nor should a prefect be set over women, an officer who is + created among the Greeks; but there should be a censor to + teach husbands to manage their wives. + + So the discipline of modesty has great power. All women + abstain from wine. + + And also if any woman was of bad character, her relations + used not to kiss her. + + So petulance is derived from asking (_petendo_); wantonness + (_procacitas_) from _procando_, that is, from demanding. + + VII. For I do not approve of the same nation being the ruler + and the farmer of lands. But both in private families and in + the affairs of the Commonwealth I look upon economy as a + revenue. + + Faith (_fides_) appears to me to derive its name from that + being done (_fit_) which is said. + + In a citizen of rank and noble birth, caressing manners, + display, and ambition are marks of levity. + + Examine for a while the books on the Republic, and learn that + good men know no bound or limit in consulting the interests + of their country. See in that treatise with what praises + frugality, and continency, and fidelity to the marriage tie, + and chaste, honorable, and virtuous manners are extolled. + + VIII. I marvel at the elegant choice, not only of the facts, + but of the language. If they dispute (_jurgant_). It is a + contest between well-wishers, not a quarrel between enemies, + that is called a dispute (_jurgium_), + + Therefore the law considers that neighbors dispute + (_jurgare_) rather than quarrel (_litigare_) with one + another. + + The bounds of man's care and of man's life are the same; so + by the pontifical law the sanctity of burial * * * + + They put them to death, though innocent, because they had + left those men unburied whom they could not rescue from the + sea because of the violence of the storm. + + Nor in this discussion have I advocated the cause of the + populace, but of the good. + + For one cannot easily resist a powerful people if one gives + them either no rights at all or very little. + + In which case I wish I could augur first with truth and + fidelity * * * + + IX. Cicero saying this in vain, when speaking of poets, "And + when the shouts and approval of the people, as of some great + and wise teacher, has reached them, what darkness do they + bring on! what alarms do they cause! what desires do they + excite!" + + Cicero says that if his life were extended to twice its + length, he should not have time to read the lyric poets. + + X. As Scipio says in Cicero, "As they thought the whole + histrionic art, and everything connected with the theatre, + discreditable, they thought fit that all men of that + description should not only be deprived of the honors + belonging to the rest of the citizens, but should also be + deprived of their franchise by the sentence of the censors." + + And what the ancient Romans thought on this subject Cicero + informs us, in those books which he wrote on the + Commonwealth, where Scipio argues and says * * * + +Comedies could never (if it had not been authorized by the common +customs of life) have made theatres approve of their scandalous +exhibitions. And the more ancient Greeks provided a certain correction +for the vicious taste of the people, by making a law that it should be +expressly defined by a censorship what subjects comedy should treat, +and how she should treat them. + +Whom has it not attacked? or, rather, whom has it not wounded? and whom +has it spared? In this, no doubt, it sometimes took the right side, and +lashed the popular demagogues and seditious agitators, such as Cleon, +Cleophon, and Hyperbolus. We may tolerate that; though indeed the +censure of the magistrate would, in these cases, have been more +efficacious than the satire of the poet. But when Pericles, who +governed the Athenian Commonwealth for so many years with the highest +authority, both in peace and war, was outraged by verses, and these +were acted on the stage, it was hardly more decent than if, among us, +Plautus and Naevius had attacked Publius and Cnaeus, or Caecilius had +ventured to revile Marcus Cato. + +Our laws of the Twelve Tables, on the contrary--so careful to attach +capital punishment to a very few crimes only--have included in this +class of capital offences the offence of composing or publicly reciting +verses of libel, slander, and defamation, in order to cast dishonor and +infamy on a fellow-citizen. And they have decided wisely; for our life +and character should, if suspected, be submitted to the sentence of +judicial tribunals and the legal investigations of our magistrates, and +not to the whims and fancies of poets. Nor should we be exposed to any +charge of disgrace which we cannot meet by legal process, and openly +refute at the bar. + +In our laws, I admire the justice of their expressions, as well as +their decisions. Thus the word _pleading_ signifies rather an amicable +suit between friends than a quarrel between enemies. + +It is not easy to resist a powerful people, if you allow them no +rights, or next to none. + + The old Romans would not allow any living man to be either + praised or blamed on the stage. + + XI. Cicero says that comedy is an imitation of life; a mirror + of customs, an image of truth. + + Since, as is mentioned in that book on the Commonwealth, not + only did AEschines the Athenian, a man of the greatest + eloquence, who, when a young man, had been an actor of + tragedies, concern himself in public affairs, but the + Athenians often sent Aristodemus, who was also a tragic + actor, to Philip as an ambassador, to treat of the most + important affairs of peace and war. + + * * * * * + + + + +INTRODUCTION TO THE FIFTH BOOK, + +BY THE ORIGINAL TRANSLATOR. + + + In this fifth book Cicero explains and enforces the duties of + magistrates, and the importance of practical experience to + all who undertake their important functions. Only a few + fragments have survived the wreck of ages and descended to + us. + + + + +BOOK V. + +FRAGMENTS. + + +I. Ennius has told us-- + + Of men and customs mighty Rome consists; + +which verse, both for its precision and its verity, appears to me as if +it had issued from an oracle; for neither the men, unless the State had +adopted a certain system of manners--nor the manners, unless they had +been illustrated by the men--could ever have established or maintained +for so many ages so vast a republic, or one of such righteous and +extensive sway. + +Thus, long before our own times, the force of hereditary manners of +itself moulded most eminent men; and admirable citizens, in return, +gave new weight to the ancient customs and institutions of our +ancestors. But our age, on the contrary, having received the +Commonwealth as a finished picture of another century, but one already +beginning to fade through the lapse of years, has not only neglected to +renew the colors of the original painting, but has not even cared to +preserve its general form and prominent lineaments. + +For what now remains of those antique manners, of which the poet said +that our Commonwealth consisted? They have now become so obsolete and +forgotten that they are not only not cultivated, but they are not even +known. And as to the men, what shall I say? For the manners themselves +have only perished through a scarcity of men; of which great misfortune +we are not only called to give an account, but even, as men accused of +capital offences, to a certain degree to plead our own cause in +connection with it. For it is owing to our vices, rather than to any +accident, that we have retained the name of republic when we have long +since lost the reality. + +II. * * * There is no employment so essentially royal as the exposition +of equity, which comprises the true interpretation of all laws. This +justice subjects used generally to expect from their kings. For this +reason, lands, fields, woods, and pastures were reserved as the +property of kings, and cultivated for them, without any labor on their +part, in order that no anxiety on account of their personal interests +might distract their attention from the welfare of the State. Nor was +any private man allowed to be the judge or arbitrator in any suit; but +all disputes were terminated by the royal sentence. + +And of all our Roman monarchs, Numa appears to me to have best +preserved this ancient custom of the kings of Greece. For the others, +though they also discharged this duty, were for the main part employed +in conducting military enterprises, and in attending to those rights +which belonged to war. But the long peace of Numa's reign was the +mother of law and religion in this city. And he was himself the author +of those admirable laws which, as you are aware, are still extant. And +this character is precisely what belongs to the man of whom we are +speaking. * * * + +III. [_Scipio._ Ought not a farmer] to be acquainted with the nature of +plants and seeds? + +_Manilius._ Certainly, provided he attends to his practical business +also. + +_Scipio._ Do you think that knowledge only fit for a steward? + +_Manilius._ Certainly not, inasmuch as the cultivation of land often +fails for want of agricultural labor. + +_Scipio._ Therefore, as the steward knows the nature of a field, and +the scribe knows penmanship, and as both of them seek, in their +respective sciences, not mere amusement only, but practical utility, so +this statesman of ours should have studied the science of jurisprudence +and legislation; he should have investigated their original sources; +but he should not embarrass himself in debating and arguing, reading +and scribbling. He should rather employ himself in the actual +administration of government, and become a sort of steward of it, being +perfectly conversant with the principles of universal law and equity, +without which no man can be just: not unfamiliar with the civil laws of +states; but he will use them for practical purposes, even as a pilot +uses astronomy, and a physician natural philosophy. For both these men +bring their theoretical science to bear on the practice of their arts; +and our statesman [should do the same with the science of politics, and +make it subservient to the actual interests of philanthropy and +patriotism]. * * * + +IV. * * * In states in which good men desire glory and approbation, and +shun disgrace and ignominy. Nor are such men so much alarmed by the +threats and penalties of the law as by that sentiment of shame with +which nature has endowed man, which is nothing else than a certain fear +of deserved censure. The wise director of a government strengthens this +natural instinct by the force of public opinion, and perfects it by +education and manners. And thus the citizens are preserved from vice +and corruption rather by honor and shame than by fear of punishment. +But this argument will be better illustrated when we treat of the love +of glory and praise, which we shall discuss on another occasion. + +V. As respects the private life and the manners of the citizens, they +are intimately connected with the laws that constitute just marriages +and legitimate offspring, under the protection of the guardian deities +around the domestic hearths. By these laws, all men should be +maintained in their rights of public and private property. It is only +under a good government like this that men can live happily--for +nothing can be more delightful than a well-constituted state. + +On which account it appears to me a very strange thing what this * * * + + VI. I therefore consume all my time in considering what is + the power of that man, whom, as you think, we have described + carefully enough in our books. Do you, then, admit our idea + of that governor of a commonwealth to whom we wish to refer + everything? For thus, I imagine, does Scipio speak in the + fifth book: "For as a fair voyage is the object of the master + of a ship, the health of his patient the aim of a physician, + and victory that of a general, so the happiness of his + fellow-citizens is the proper study of the ruler of a + commonwealth; that they may be stable in power, rich in + resources, widely known in reputation, and honorable through + their virtue. For a ruler ought to be one who can perfect + this, which is the best and most important employment among + mankind." + + And works in your literature rightly praise that ruler of a + country who consults the welfare of his people more than + their inclinations. + + VII. Tully, in those books which he wrote upon the + Commonwealth, could not conceal his opinions, when he speaks + of appointing a chief of the State, who, he says, must be + maintained by glory; and afterward he relates that his + ancestors did many admirable and noble actions from a desire + of glory. + + Tully, in his treatise on the Commonwealth, wrote that the + chief of a state must be maintained by glory, and that a + commonwealth would last as long as honor was paid by every + one to the chief. + + [_The next paragraph is unintelligible._] + + Which virtue is called fortitude, which consists of + magnanimity, and a great contempt of death and pain. + + VIII. As Marcellus was fierce, and eager to fight, Maximus + prudent and cautious. + + Who discovered his violence and unbridled ferocity. + + Which has often happened not only to individuals, but also to + most powerful nations. + + In the whole world. + + Because he inflicted the annoyances of his old age on your + families. + + IX. Cicero, in his treatise on the Commonwealth, says, "As + Menelaus of Lacedaemon had a certain agreeable sweetness of + eloquence." And in another place he says, "Let him cultivate + brevity in speaking." + + By the evidence of which arts, as Tully says, it is a shame + for the conscience of the judge to be misled. For he says, + "And as nothing in a commonwealth ought to be so uncorrupt as + a suffrage and a sentence, I do not see why the man who + perverts them by money is worthy of punishment, while he who + does so by eloquence is even praised. Indeed, I myself think + that he who corrupts the judge by his speech does more harm + than he who does so by money, because no one can corrupt a + sensible man by money, though he may by speaking." + + And when Scipio had said this, Mummius praised him greatly, + for he was extravagantly imbued with a hatred of orators. + + * * * * * + + + + +INTRODUCTION TO THE SIXTH BOOK. + + + In this last book of his Commonwealth, Cicero labors to show + that truly pious philanthropical and patriotic statesmen will + not only be rewarded on earth by the approval of conscience + and the applause of all good citizens, but that they may + expect hereafter immortal glory in new forms of being. To + illustrate this, he introduces the "Dream of Scipio," in + which he explains the resplendent doctrines of Plato + respecting the immortality of the soul with inimitable + dignity and elegance. This Somnium Scipionis, for which we + are indebted to the citation of Macrobius, is the most + beautiful thing of the kind ever written. It has been + intensely admired by all European scholars, and will be still + more so. There are two translations of it in our language; + one attached to Oliver's edition of Cicero's Thoughts, the + other by Mr. Danby, published in 1829. Of these we have + freely availed ourselves, and as freely we express our + acknowledgments. + + + + +BOOK VI. + +SCIPIO'S DREAM. + + + I. Therefore you rely upon all the prudence of this rule, + which has derived its very name (_prudentia_) from foreseeing + (_a providendo_). Wherefore the citizen must so prepare + himself as to be always armed against those things which + trouble the constitution of a state. And that dissension of + the citizens, when one party separates from and attacks + another, is called sedition. + + And in truth in civil dissensions, as the good are of more + importance than the many, I think that we should regard the + weight of the citizens, and not their number. + + For the lusts, being severe mistresses of the thoughts, + command and compel many an unbridled action. And as they + cannot be satisfied or appeased by any means, they urge those + whom they have inflamed with their allurements to every kind + of atrocity. + + II. Which indeed was so much the greater in him because + though the cause of the colleagues was identical, not only + was their unpopularity not equal, but the influence of + Gracchus was employed in mitigating the hatred borne to + Claudius. + + Who encountered the number of the chiefs and nobles with + these words, and left behind him that mournful and dignified + expression of his gravity and influence. + + That, as he writes, a thousand men might every day descend + into the forum with cloaks dyed in purple. + + [_The next paragraph is unintelligible._] + + For our ancestors wished marriages to be firmly established. + + There is a speech extant of Laelius with which we are all + acquainted, expressing how pleasing to the immortal gods are + the * * * and * * * of the priests. + + III. Cicero, writing about the Commonwealth, in imitation of + Plato, has related the story of the return of Er the + Pamphylian to life; who, as he says, had come to life again + after he had been placed on the funeral pile, and related + many secrets about the shades below; not speaking, like + Plato, in a fabulous imitation of truth, but using a certain + reasonable invention of an ingenious dream, cleverly + intimating that these things which were uttered about the + immortality of the soul, and about heaven, are not the + inventions of dreaming philosophers, nor the incredible + fables which the Epicureans ridicule, but the conjectures of + wise men. He insinuates that that Scipio who by the + subjugation of Carthage obtained Africanus as a surname for + his family, gave notice to Scipio the son of Paulus of the + treachery which threatened him from his relations, and the + course of fate, because by the necessity of numbers he was + confined in the period of a perfect life, and he says that he + in the fifty-sixth year of his age * * * + + IV. Some of our religion who love Plato, on account of his + admirable kind of eloquence, and of some correct opinions + which he held, say that he had some opinions similar to my + own touching the resurrection of the dead, which subject + Tully touches on in his treatise on the Commonwealth, and + says that he was rather jesting than intending to say that + was true. For he asserts that a man returned to life, and + related some stories which harmonized with the discussions of + the Platonists. + + V. In this point the imitation has especially preserved the + likeness of the work, because, as Plato, in the conclusion of + his volume, represents a certain person who had returned to + life, which he appeared to have quitted, as indicating what + is the condition of souls when stripped of the body, with the + addition of a certain not unnecessary description of the + spheres and stars, an appearance of circumstances indicating + things of the same kind is related by the Scipio of Cicero, + as having been brought before him in sleep. + + VI. Tully is found to have preserved this arrangement with no + less judgment than genius. After, in every condition of the + Commonwealth, whether of leisure or business, he has given + the palm to justice, he has placed the sacred abodes of the + immortal souls, and the secrets of the heavenly regions, on + the very summit of his completed work, indicating whither + they must come, or rather return, who have managed the + republic with prudence, justice, fortitude, and moderation. + But that Platonic relater of secrets was a man of the name of + Er, a Pamphylian by nation, a soldier by profession, who, + after he appeared to have died from wounds received in + battle, and twelve days afterward was about to receive the + honors of the funeral pile with the others who were slain at + the same time, suddenly either recovering his life, or else + never having lost it, as if he were giving a public + testimony, related to all men all that he had done or seen in + the days that he had thus passed between life and death. + Although Cicero, as if himself conscious of the truth, + grieves that this story has been ridiculed by the ignorant, + still, avoiding giving an example of foolish reproach, he + preferred speaking of the relater as of one awakened from a + swoon rather than restored to life. + + VII. And before we look at the words of the dream we must + explain what kind of persons they are by whom Cicero says + that even the account of Plato was ridiculed, who are not + apprehensive that the same thing may happen to them. Nor by + this expression does he wish the ignorant mob to be + understood, but a kind of men who are ignorant of the truth, + though pretending to be philosophers with a display of + learning, who, it was notorious, had read such things, and + were eager to find faults. We will say, therefore, who they + are whom he reports as having levelled light reproaches + against so great a philosopher, and who of them has even left + an accusation of him committed to writing, etc. The whole + faction of the Epicureans, always wandering at an equal + distance from truth, and thinking everything ridiculous which + they do not understand, has ridiculed the sacred volume, and + the most venerable mysteries of nature. But Colotes, who is + somewhat celebrated and remarkable for his loquacity among + the pupils of Epicurus, has even recorded in a book the + bitter reproaches which he aims at him. But since the other + arguments which he foolishly urges have no connection with + the dream of which we are now talking, we will pass them over + at present, and attend only to the calumny which will stick + both to Cicero and Plato, unless it is silenced. He says that + a fable ought not to have been invented by a philosopher, + since no kind of falsehood is suitable to professors of + truth. For why, says he, if you wish to give us a notion of + heavenly things and to teach us the nature of souls, did you + not do so by a simple and plain explanation? Why was a + character invented, and circumstances, and strange events, + and a scene of cunningly adduced falsehood arranged, to + pollute the very door of the investigation of truth by a lie? + Since these things, though they are said of the Platonic Er, + do also attack the rest of our dreaming Africanus. + + VIII. This occasion incited Scipio to relate his dream, which + he declares that he had buried in silence for a long time. + For when Laelius was complaining that there were no statues of + Nasica erected in any public place, as a reward for his + having slain the tyrant, Scipio replied in these words: "But + although the consciousness itself of great deeds is to wise + men the most ample reward of virtue, yet that divine nature + ought to have, not statues fixed in lead, nor triumphs with + withering laurels, but some more stable and lasting kinds of + rewards." "What are they?" said Laelius. "Then," said Scipio, + "suffer me, since we have now been keeping holiday for three + days, * * * etc." By which preface he came to the relation of + his dream; pointing out that those were the more stable and + lasting kinds of rewards which he himself had seen in heaven + reserved for good governors of commonwealths. + +IX. When I had arrived in Africa, where I was, as you are aware, +military tribune of the fourth legion under the consul Manilius, there +was nothing of which I was more earnestly desirous than to see King +Masinissa, who, for very just reasons, had been always the especial +friend of our family. When I was introduced to him, the old man +embraced me, shed tears, and then, looking up to heaven, exclaimed--I +thank thee, O supreme Sun, and ye also, ye other celestial beings, that +before I depart from this life I behold in my kingdom, and in this my +palace, Publius Cornelius Scipio, by whose mere name I seem to be +reanimated; so completely and indelibly is the recollection of that +best and most invincible of men, Africanus, imprinted in my mind. + +After this, I inquired of him concerning the affairs of his kingdom. +He, on the other hand, questioned me about the condition of our +Commonwealth, and in this mutual interchange of conversation we passed +the whole of that day. + +X. In the evening we were entertained in a manner worthy the +magnificence of a king, and carried on our discourse for a considerable +part of the night. And during all this time the old man spoke of +nothing but Africanus, all whose actions, and even remarkable sayings, +he remembered distinctly. At last, when we retired to bed, I fell into +a more profound sleep than usual, both because I was fatigued with my +journey, and because I had sat up the greatest part of the night. + +Here I had the following dream, occasioned, as I verily believe, by our +preceding conversation; for it frequently happens that the thoughts and +discourses which have employed us in the daytime produce in our sleep +an effect somewhat similar to that which Ennius writes happened to him +about Homer, of whom, in his waking hours, he used frequently to think +and speak. + +Africanus, I thought, appeared to me in that shape, with which I was +better acquainted from his picture than from any personal knowledge of +him. When I perceived it was he, I confess I trembled with +consternation; but he addressed me, saying, Take courage, my Scipio; be +not afraid, and carefully remember what I shall say to you. + +XI. Do you see that city Carthage, which, though brought under the +Roman yoke by me, is now renewing former wars, and cannot live in +peace? (and he pointed to Carthage from a lofty spot, full of stars, +and brilliant, and glittering)--to attack which city you are this day +arrived in a station not much superior to that of a private soldier. +Before two years, however, are elapsed, you shall be consul, and +complete its overthrow; and you shall obtain, by your own merit, the +surname of Africanus, which as yet belongs to you no otherwise than as +derived from me. And when you have destroyed Carthage, and received the +honor of a triumph, and been made censor, and, in quality of +ambassador, visited Egypt, Syria, Asia, and Greece, you shall be +elected a second time consul in your absence, and, by utterly +destroying Numantia, put an end to a most dangerous war. + +But when you have entered the Capitol in your triumphal car, you shall +find the Roman Commonwealth all in a ferment, through the intrigues of +my grandson Tiberius Gracchus. + +XII. It is on this occasion, my dear Africanus, that you show your +country the greatness of your understanding, capacity, and prudence. +But I see that the destiny, however, of that time is, as it were, +uncertain; for when your age shall have accomplished seven times eight +revolutions of the sun, and your fatal hours shall be marked put by the +natural product of these two numbers, each of which is esteemed a +perfect one, but for different reasons, then shall the whole city have +recourse to you alone, and place its hopes in your auspicious name. On +you the senate, all good citizens, the allies, the people of Latium, +shall cast their eyes; on you the preservation of the State shall +entirely depend. In a word, _if you escape the impious machinations of +your relatives_, you will, in quality of dictator, establish order and +tranquillity in the Commonwealth. + +When on this Laelius made an exclamation, and the rest of the company +groaned loudly, Scipio, with a gentle smile, said, I entreat you, do +not wake me out of my dream, but have patience, and hear the rest. + +XIII. Now, in order to encourage you, my dear Africanus, continued the +shade of my ancestor, to defend the State with the greater +cheerfulness, be assured that, for all those who have in any way +conduced to the preservation, defence, and enlargement of their native +country, there is a certain place in heaven where they shall enjoy an +eternity of happiness. For nothing on earth is more agreeable to God, +the Supreme Governor of the universe, than the assemblies and societies +of men united together by laws, which are called states. It is from +heaven their rulers and preservers came, and thither they return. + +XIV. Though at these words I was extremely troubled, not so much at the +fear of death as at the perfidy of my own relations, yet I recollected +myself enough to inquire whether he himself, my father Paulus, and +others whom we look upon as dead, were really living. + +Yes, truly, replied he, they all enjoy life who have escaped from the +chains of the body as from a prison. But as to what you call life on +earth, that is no more than one form of death. But see; here comes your +father Paulus towards you! And as soon as I observed him, my eyes burst +out into a flood of tears; but he took me in his arms, embraced me, and +bade me not weep. + +XV. When my first transports subsided, and I regained the liberty of +speech, I addressed my father thus: Thou best and most venerable of +parents, since this, as I am informed by Africanus, is the only +substantial life, why do I linger on earth, and not rather haste to +come hither where you are? + +That, replied he, is impossible: unless that God, whose temple is all +that vast expanse you behold, shall free you from the fetters of the +body, you can have no admission into this place. Mankind have received +their being on this very condition, that they should labor for the +preservation of that globe which is situated, as you see, in the midst +of this temple, and is called earth. + +Men are likewise endowed with a soul, which is a portion of the eternal +fires which you call stars and constellations; and which, being round, +spherical bodies, animated by divine intelligences, perform their +cycles and revolutions with amazing rapidity. It is your duty, +therefore, my Publius, and that of all who have any veneration for the +Gods, to preserve this wonderful union of soul and body; nor without +the express command of Him who gave you a soul should the least thought +be entertained of quitting human life, lest you seem to desert the post +assigned you by God himself. + +But rather follow the examples of your grandfather here, and of me, +your father, in paying a strict regard to justice and piety; which is +due in a great degree to parents and relations, but most of all to our +country. Such a life as this is the true way to heaven, and to the +company of those, who, after having lived on earth and escaped from the +body, inhabit the place which you now behold. + +XVI. This was the shining circle, or zone, whose remarkable brightness +distinguishes it among the constellations, and which, after the Greeks, +you call the Milky Way. + +From thence, as I took a view of the universe, everything appeared +beautiful and admirable; for there those stars are to be seen that are +never visible from our globe, and everything appears of such magnitude +as we could not have imagined. The least of all the stars was that +removed farthest from heaven, and situated next to the earth; I mean +our moon, which shines with a borrowed light. Now, the globes of the +stars far surpass the magnitude of our earth, which at that distance +appeared so exceedingly small that I could not but be sensibly affected +on seeing our whole empire no larger than if we touched the earth, as +it were, at a single point. + +XVII. And as I continued to observe the earth with great attention, How +long, I pray you, said Africanus, will your mind be fixed on that +object? why don't you rather take a view of the magnificent temples +among which you have arrived? The universe is composed of nine circles, +or rather spheres, one of which is the heavenly one, and is exterior to +all the rest, which it embraces; being itself the Supreme God, and +bounding and containing the whole. In it are fixed those stars which +revolve with never-varying courses. Below this are seven other spheres, +which revolve in a contrary direction to that of the heavens. One of +these is occupied by the globe which on earth they call Saturn. Next to +that is the star of Jupiter, so benign and salutary to mankind. The +third in order is that fiery and terrible planet called Mars. Below +this, again, almost in the middle region, is the sun--the leader, +governor, and prince of the other luminaries; the soul of the world, +which it regulates and illumines; being of such vast size that it +pervades and gives light to all places. Then follow Venus and Mercury, +which attend, as it were, on the sun. Lastly, the moon, which shines +only in the reflected beams of the sun, moves in the lowest sphere of +all. Below this, if we except that gift of the Gods, the soul, which +has been given by the liberality of the Gods to the human race, +everything is mortal, and tends to dissolution; but above the moon all +is eternal. For the earth, which is the ninth globe, and occupies the +centre, is immovable, and, being the lowest, all others gravitate +towards it. + +XVIII. When I had recovered myself from the astonishment occasioned by +such a wonderful prospect, I thus addressed Africanus: Pray what is +this sound that strikes my ears in so loud and agreeable a manner? To +which he replied: It is that which is called the _music of the +spheres_, being produced by their motion and impulse; and being formed +by unequal intervals, but such as are divided according to the justest +proportion, it produces, by duly tempering acute with grave sounds, +various concerts of harmony. For it is impossible that motions so great +should be performed without any noise; and it is agreeable to nature +that the extremes on one side should produce sharp, and on the other +flat sounds. For which reason the sphere of the fixed stars, being the +highest, and being carried with a more rapid velocity, moves with a +shrill and acute sound; whereas that of the moon, being the lowest, +moves with a very flat one. As to the earth, which makes the ninth +sphere, it remains immovably fixed in the middle or lowest part of the +universe. But those eight revolving circles, in which both Mercury and +Venus are moved with the same celerity, give out sounds that are +divided by seven distinct intervals, which is generally the regulating +number of all things. + +This celestial harmony has been imitated by learned musicians both on +stringed instruments and with the voice, whereby they have opened to +themselves a way to return to the celestial regions, as have likewise +many others who have employed their sublime genius while on earth in +cultivating the divine sciences. + +By the amazing noise of this sound the ears of mankind have been in +some degree deafened; and indeed hearing is the dullest of all the +human senses. Thus, the people who dwell near the cataracts of the +Nile, which are called Catadupa[348], are, by the excessive roar which +that river makes in precipitating itself from those lofty mountains, +entirely deprived of the sense of hearing. And so inconceivably great +is this sound which is produced by the rapid motion of the whole +universe, that the human ear is no more capable of receiving it than +the eye is able to look steadfastly and directly on the sun, whose +beams easily dazzle the strongest sight. + +While I was busied in admiring the scene of wonders, I could not help +casting my eyes every now and then on the earth. + +XIX. On which Africanus said, I perceive that you are still employed in +contemplating the seat and residence of mankind. But if it appears to +you so small, as in fact it really is, despise its vanities, and fix +your attention forever on these heavenly objects. Is it possible that +you should attain any human applause or glory that is worth the +contending for? The earth, you see, is peopled but in a very few +places, and those, too, of small extent; and they appear like so many +little spots of green scattered through vast, uncultivated deserts. And +those who inhabit the earth are not only so remote from each other as +to be cut off from all mutual correspondence, but their situation being +in oblique or contrary parts of the globe, or perhaps in those +diametrically opposite to yours, all expectation of universal fame must +fall to the ground. + +XX. You may likewise observe that the same globe of the earth is girt +and surrounded with certain zones, whereof those two that are most +remote from each other, and lie under the opposite poles of heaven, are +congealed with frost; but that one in the middle, which is far the +largest, is scorched with the intense heat of the sun. The other two +are habitable, one towards the south, the inhabitants of which are your +antipodes, with whom you have no connection; the other, towards the +north, is that which you inhabit, whereof a very small part, as you may +see, falls to your share. For the whole extent of what you see is, as +it were, but a little island, narrow at both ends and wide in the +middle, which is surrounded by the sea which on earth you call the +great Atlantic Ocean, and which, notwithstanding this magnificent name, +you see is very insignificant. And even in these cultivated and +well-known countries, has yours, or any of our names, ever passed the +heights of the Caucasus or the currents of the Ganges? In what other +parts to the north or the south, or where the sun rises and sets, will +your names ever be heard? And if we leave these out of the question, +how small a space is there left for your glory to spread itself abroad; +and how long will it remain in the memory of those whose minds are now +full of it? + +XXI. Besides all this, if the progeny of any future generation should +wish to transmit to their posterity the praises of any one of us which +they have heard from their forefathers, yet the deluges and combustions +of the earth, which must necessarily happen at their destined periods, +will prevent our obtaining, not only an eternal, but even a durable +glory. And, after all, what does it signify whether those who shall +hereafter be born talk of you, when those who have lived before you, +whose number was perhaps not less, and whose merit certainly greater, +were not so much as acquainted with your name? + +XXII. Especially since not one of those who shall hear of us is able to +retain in his memory the transactions of a single year. The bulk of +mankind, indeed, measure their year by the return of the sun, which is +only one star. But when all the stars shall have returned to the place +whence they set out, and after long periods shall again exhibit the +same aspect of the whole heavens, that is what ought properly to be +called the revolution of a year, though I scarcely dare attempt to +enumerate the vast multitude of ages contained in it. For as the sun in +old time was eclipsed, and seemed to be extinguished, at the time when +the soul of Romulus penetrated into these eternal mansions, so, when +all the constellations and stars shall revert to their primary +position, and the sun shall at the same point and time be again +eclipsed, then you may consider that the grand year is completed. Be +assured, however, that the twentieth part of it is not yet elapsed. + +XXIII. Wherefore, if you have no hopes of returning to this place where +great and good men enjoy all that their souls can wish for, of what +value, pray, is all that human glory, which can hardly endure for a +small portion of one year? + +If, then, you wish to elevate your views to the contemplation of this +eternal seat of splendor, you will not be satisfied with the praises of +your fellow-mortals, nor with any human rewards that your exploits can +obtain; but Virtue herself must point out to you the true and only +object worthy of your pursuit. Leave to others to speak of you as they +may, for speak they will. Their discourses will be confined to the +narrow limits of the countries you see, nor will their duration be very +extensive; for they will perish like those who utter them, and will be +no more remembered by their posterity. + +XXIV. When he had ceased to speak in this manner, I said, O Africanus, +if indeed the door of heaven is open to those who have deserved well of +their country, although, indeed, from my childhood I have always +followed yours and my father's steps, and have not neglected to imitate +your glory, still, I will from henceforth strive to follow them more +closely. + +Follow them, then, said he, and consider your body only, not yourself, +as mortal. For it is not your outward form which constitutes your +being, but your mind; not that substance which is palpable to the +senses, but your spiritual nature. _Know, then, that you are a +God_--for a God it must be, which flourishes, and feels, and +recollects, and foresees, and governs, regulates and moves the body +over which it is set, as the Supreme Ruler does the world which is +subject to him. For as that Eternal Being moves whatever is mortal in +this world, so the immortal mind of man moves the frail body with which +it is connected. + +XXV. For whatever is always moving must be eternal; but that which +derives its motion from a power which is foreign to itself, when that +motion ceases must itself lose its animation. + +That alone, then, which moves itself can never cease to be moved, +because it can never desert itself. Moreover, it must be the source, +and origin, and principle of motion in all the rest. There can be +nothing prior to a principle, for all things must originate from it; +and it cannot itself derive its existence from any other source, for if +it did it would no longer be a principle. And if it had no beginning, +it can have no end; for a beginning that is put an end to will neither +be renewed by any other cause, nor will it produce anything else of +itself. All things, therefore, must originate from one source. Thus it +follows that motion must have its source in something which is moved by +itself, and which can neither have a beginning nor an end. Otherwise +all the heavens and all nature must perish, for it is impossible that +they can of themselves acquire any power of producing motion in +themselves. + +XXVI. As, therefore, it is plain that what is moved by itself must be +eternal, who will deny that this is the general condition and nature of +minds? For as everything is inanimate which is moved by an impulse +exterior to itself, so what is animated is moved by an interior impulse +of its own; for this is the peculiar nature and power of mind. And if +that alone has the power of self-motion, it can neither have had a +beginning, nor can it have an end. + +Do you, therefore, exercise this mind of yours in the best pursuits. +And the best pursuits are those which consist in promoting the good of +your country. Such employments will speed the flight of your mind to +this its proper abode; and its flight will be still more rapid, if, +even while it is enclosed in the body, it will look abroad, and +disengage itself as much as possible from its bodily dwelling, by the +contemplation of things which are external to itself. + +This it should do to the utmost of its power. For the minds of those +who have given themselves up to the pleasures of the body, paying, as +it were, a servile obedience to their lustful impulses, have violated +the laws of God and man; and therefore, when they are separated from +their bodies, flutter continually round the earth on which they lived, +and are not allowed to return to this celestial region till they have +been purified by the revolution of many ages. + +Thus saying, he vanished, and I awoke from my dream. + + +A FRAGMENT. + + +And although it is most desirable that fortune should remain forever in +the most brilliant possible condition, nevertheless, the equability of +life excites less interest than those changeable conditions wherein +prosperity suddenly revives out of the most desperate and ruinous +circumstances. + + + + + + +THE END. + + + + + + +FOOTNOTES: + + +[1] Archilochus was a native of Paros, and flourished about 714-676 +B.C. His poems were chiefly Iambics of bitter satire. Horace speaks of +him as the inventor of Iambics, and calls himself his pupil. + + Parios ego primus Iambos + Ostendi Latio, numeros animosque secutus + Archilochi, non res et agentia verba Lycamben. + Epist. I. xix. 25. + +And in another place he says, + + Archilochum proprio rabies armavit Iambo--A.P. 74. + +[2] This was Livius Andronicus: he is supposed to have been a native of +Tarentum, and he was made prisoner by the Romans, during their wars in +Southern Italy; owing to which he became the slave of M. Livius +Salinator. He wrote both comedies and tragedies, of which Cicero +(Brutus 18) speaks very contemptuously, as "Livianae fabulae non satis +dignae quae iterum legantur"--not worth reading a second time. He also +wrote a Latin Odyssey, and some hymns, and died probably about 221 B.C. + +[3] C. Fabius, surnamed Pictor, painted the temple of Salus, which the +dictator C. Junius Brutus Bubulus dedicated 302 B.C. The temple was +destroyed by fire in the reign of Claudius. The painting is highly +praised by Dionysius, xvi. 6. + +[4] For an account of the ancient Greek philosophers, see the sketch at +the end of the Disputations. + +[5] Isocrates was born at Athens 436 B.C. He was a pupil of Gorgias, +Prodicus, and Socrates. He opened a school of rhetoric, at Athens, with +great success. He died by his own hand at the age of ninety-eight. + +[6] So Horace joins these two classes as inventors of all kinds of +improbable fictions: + + Pictoribus atque poetis + Quidlibet audendi semper fuit aequa potestas.--A. P. 9. + +Which Roscommon translates: + + Painters and poets have been still allow'd + Their pencil and their fancies unconfined. + +[7] Epicharmus was a native of Cos, but lived at Megara, in Sicily, and +when Megara was destroyed, removed to Syracuse, and lived at the court +of Hiero, where he became the first writer of comedies, so that Horace +ascribes the invention of comedy to him, and so does Theocritus. He +lived to a great age. + +[8] Pherecydes was a native of Scyros, one of the Cyclades; and is said +to have obtained his knowledge from the secret books of the +Phoenicians. He is said also to have been a pupil of Pittacus, the +rival of Thales, and the master of Pythagoras. His doctrine was that +there were three principles ([Greek: Zeus], or AEther; [Greek: Chthon], +or Chaos; and [Greek: Chronos], or Time) and four elements (Fire, +Earth, Air, and Water), from which everything that exists was +formed.--_Vide_ Smith's Dict. Gr. and Rom. Biog. + +[9] Archytas was a native of Tarentum, and is said to have saved the +life of Plato by his influence with the tyrant Dionysius. He was +especially great as a mathematician and geometrician, so that Horace +calls him + + Maris et terra numeroque carentis arenae + Mensorem. + Od. i. 28.1. + +Plato is supposed to have learned some of his views from him, and +Aristotle to have borrowed from him every idea of the Categories. + +[10] This was not Timaeus the historian, but a native of Locri, who is +said also in the De Finibus (c. 29) to have been a teacher of Plato. +There is a treatise extant bearing his name, which is, however, +probably spurious, and only an abridgment of Plato's dialogue Timaeus. + +[11] Dicaearchus was a native of Messana, in Sicily, though he lived +chiefly in Greece. He was one of the later disciples of Aristotle. He +was a great geographer, politician, historian, and philosopher, and +died about 285 B.C. + +[12] Aristoxenus was a native of Tarentum, and also a pupil of +Aristotle. We know nothing of his opinions except that he held the soul +to be a _harmony_ of the body; a doctrine which had been already +discussed by Plato in the Phaedo, and combated by Aristotle. He was a +great musician, and the chief portions of his works which have come +down to us are fragments of some musical treatises.--Smith's Dict. Gr. +and Rom. Biog.; to which source I must acknowledge my obligation for +nearly the whole of these biographical notes. + +[13] The Simonides here meant is the celebrated poet of Ceos, the +perfecter of elegiac poetry among the Greeks. He flourished about the +time of the Persian war. Besides his poetry, he is said to have been +the inventor of some method of aiding the memory. He died at the court +of Hiero, 467 B.C. + +[14] Theodectes was a native of Phaselis, in Pamphylia, a distinguished +rhetorician and tragic poet, and flourished in the time of Philip of +Macedon. He was a pupil of Isocrates, and lived at Athens, and died +there at the age of forty-one. + +[15] Cineas was a Thessalian, and (as is said in the text) came to Rome +as ambassador from Pyrrhus after the battle of Heraclea, 280 B.C., and +his memory is said to have been so great that on the day after his +arrival he was able to address all the senators and knights by name. He +probably died before Pyrrhus returned to Italy, 276 B.C. + +[16] Charmadas, called also Charmides, was a fellow-pupil with Philo, +the Larissaean of Clitomachus, the Carthaginian. He is said by some +authors to have founded a fourth academy. + +[17] Metrodorus was a minister of Mithridates the Great; and employed +by him as supreme judge in Pontus, and afterward as an ambassador. +Cicero speaks of him in other places (De Orat. ii. 88) as a man of +wonderful memory. + +[18] Quintus Hortensius was eight years older than Cicero; and, till +Cicero's fame surpassed his, he was accounted the most eloquent of all +the Romans. He was Verres's counsel in the prosecution conducted +against him by Cicero. Seneca relates that his memory was so great that +he could come out of an auction and repeat the catalogue backward. He +died 50 B.C. + +[19] This treatise is one which has not come down to us, but which had +been lately composed by Cicero in order to comfort himself for the loss +of his daughter. + +[20] The epigram is, + + [Greek: Eipas Helie chaire, Kleombrotos Hombrakiotes + helat' aph' hypselou teicheos eis Aiden, + axion ouden idon thanatou kakon, alla Platonos + hen to peri psyches gramm' analexamenos.] + +Which may be translated, perhaps, + + Farewell, O sun, Cleombrotus exclaim'd, + Then plunged from off a height beneath the sea; + Stung by pain, of no disgrace ashamed, + But moved by Plato's high philosophy. + +[21] This is alluded to by Juvenal: + + Provida Pompeio dederat Campania febres + Optandas: sed multae urbes et publica vota + Vicerunt. Igitur Fortuna ipsius et Urbis, + Servatum victo caput abstulit.--Sat. x. 283. + +[22] Pompey's second wife was Julia, the daughter of Julius Caesar, she +died the year before the death of Crassus, in Parthia. Virgil speaks of +Caesar and Pompey as relations, using the same expression (socer) as +Cicero: + + Aggeribus socer Alpinis atque arce Monoeci + Descendens, gener adversis instructus Eois.--AEn. vi. 830. + +[23] This idea is beautifully expanded by Byron: + + Yet if, as holiest men have deem'd, there be + A land of souls beyond that sable shore + To shame the doctrine of the Sadducee + And sophist, madly vain or dubious lore, + How sweet it were in concert to adore + With those who made our mortal labors light, + To hear each voice we fear'd to hear no more. + Behold each mighty shade reveal'd to sight, + The Bactrian, Samian sage, and all who taught the right! + _Childe Harold_, ii. + +[24] The epitaph in the original is: + + [Greek: O xein' angeilon Lakedaimoniois hoti tede + keimetha, tois keinon peithomenoi nomimois.] + +[25] This was expressed in the Greek verses, + + [Greek: Arches men me phynai epichthonioisin ariston, + phynta d' hopos okista pylas Aidyo peresai] + +which by some authors are attributed to Homer. + +[26] This is the first fragment of the Cresphontes.--Ed. Var. vii., p. +594. + + [Greek: Edei gar hemas syllogon poioumenous + Ton phynta threnein, eis hos' erchetai kaka. + Ton d' au thanonta kai ponon pepaumenon + chairontas euphemointas ekpemein domon] + +[27] The Greek verses are quoted by Plutarch: + + [Greek: Epou nepie, elithioi phrenes andron + Euthynoos keitai moiridio thanato + Ouk en gar zoein kalon auto oute goneusi.] + +[28] This refers to the story that when Eumolpus, the son of Neptune, +whose assistance the Eleusinians had called in against the Athenians, +had been slain by the Athenians, an oracle demanded the sacrifice of +one of the daughters of Erechtheus, the King of Athens. And when one +was drawn by lot, the others voluntarily accompanied her to death. + +[29] Menoeceus was son of Creon, and in the war of the Argives against +Thebes, Teresias declared that the Thebans should conquer if Menoeceus +would sacrifice himself for his country; and accordingly he killed +himself outside the gates of Thebes. + +[30] The Greek is, + + [Greek: mede moi aklaustos thanatos moloi, alla philoisi + poiesaimi thanon algea kai stonachas.] + +[31] Soph. Trach. 1047. + +[32] The lines quoted by Cicero here appear to have come from the Latin +play of Prometheus by Accius; the ideas are borrowed, rather than +translated, from the Prometheus of AEschylus. + +[33] From _exerceo_. + +[34] Each soldier carried a stake, to help form a palisade in front of +the camp. + +[35] Insania--from _in_, a particle of negative force in composition, +and _sanus_, healthy, sound. + +[36] The man who first received this surname was L. Calpurnius Piso, +who was consul, 133 B.C., in the Servile War. + +[37] The Greek is, + + [Greek: Alla moi oidanetai kradie cholo hoppot' ekeinou + Mnesomai hos m' asyphelon en Argeioisin erexen.]--Il. ix. 642. + +I have given Pope's translation in the text. + +[38] This is from the Theseus: + + [Greek: Ego de touto para sophou tinos mathon + eis phrontidas noun symphoras t' eballomen + phygas t' emauto prostitheis patras emes. + thanatous t' aorous, kai kakon allas hodous + hos, ei ti paschoim' on edoxazon pote + Me moi neorton prospeson mallon dakoi.] + +[39] Ter. Phorm. II. i. 11. + +[40] This refers to the speech of Agamemnon in Euripides, in the +Iphigenia in Aulis, + + [Greek: Zelo se, geron, + zelo d' andron hos akindynon + bion exeperas', agnos, aklees.]--v. 15. + +[41] This is a fragment from the Hypsipyle: + + [Greek: Ephy men oudeis hostis ou ponei broton + thaptei te tekna chater' au ktatai nea, + autos te thneskei. kai tad' achthontai brotoi + eis gen pherontes gen anankaios d' echei + bion therizein hoste karpimon stachyn.] + +[42] + [Greek: Pollas ek kephales prothelymnous helketo chaitas.]--Il. x. 15. + +[43] + [Greek: Etoi ho kappedion to Aleion oios alato + hon thymon katedon, paton anthropon aleeinon.]--Il. vi. 201. + +[44] This is a translation from Euripides: + + [Greek: Hosth' himeros m' hypelthe ge te k' ourano + lexai molouse deuro Medeias tychas.]--Med. 57. + +[45] + [Greek: Lien gar polloi kai epetrimoi emata panta + piptousin, pote ken tis anapneuseie ponoio; + alla chre ton men katathaptemen, hos ke thanesi, + nelea thymon echontas, ep' emati dakrysantas.]-- + Hom. Il. xix. 226. + +[46] This is one of the fragments of Euripides which we are unable to +assign to any play in particular; it occurs Var. Ed. Tr. Inc. 167. + + [Greek: Ei men tod' emar proton en kakoumeno + kai me makran de dia ponon enaustoloun + eikos sphadazein en an, hos neozyga + polon, chalinon artios dedegmenon + nyn d' amblys eimi, kai katertykos kakon.] + +[47] This is only a fragment, preserved by Stobaeus: + + [Greek: Tous d' an megistous kai sophotatous phreni + toiousd' idois an, oios esti nyn hode, + kalos kakos prassonti symparainesai + hotan de daimon andros eutychous to prin + mastig' epise tou biou palintropon, + ta polla phrouda kai kakos eiremena.] + +[48] + [Greek: Ok. Oukoun Prometheu touto gignoskeis hoti + orges nosouses eisin iatroi logoi. + Pr. ean tis en kairo ge malthasse kear + kai me sphrigonta thymon ischnaine bia.]-- + AEsch. Prom. v. 378. + +[49] Cicero alludes here to Il. vii. 211, which is thus translated by +Pope: + + His massy javelin quivering in his hand, + He stood the bulwark of the Grecian band; + Through every Argive heart new transport ran, + All Troy stood trembling at the mighty man: + E'en Hector paused, and with new doubt oppress'd, + Felt his great heart suspended in his breast; + 'Twas vain to seek retreat, and vain to fear, + Himself had challenged, and the foe drew near. + +But Melmoth (Note on the Familiar Letters of Cicero, book ii. Let. 23) +rightly accuses Cicero of having misunderstood Homer, who "by no means +represents Hector as being thus totally dismayed at the approach of his +adversary; and, indeed, it would have been inconsistent with the +general character of that hero to have described him under such +circumstances of terror." + + [Greek: Ton de kai Argeioi meg' egetheon eisoroontes, + Troas de tromos ainos hypelythe gyia hekaston, + Hektori d' auto thymos eni stethessi patassen.] + +But there is a great difference, as Dr. Clarke remarks, between [Greek: +thymos eni stethessi patassen] and [Greek: kardee exo stetheon +ethrosken], or [Greek: tromos ainos hypelythe gyia].--_The Trojans_, +says Homer, _trembled_ at the sight of Ajax, and even Hector himself +felt some emotion in his breast. + +[50] Cicero means Scipio Nasica, who, in the riots consequent on the +reelection of Tiberius Gracchus to the tribunate, 133 B.C., having +called in vain on the consul, Mucius Scaevola, to save the republic, +attacked Gracchus himself, who was slain in the tumult. + +[51] _Morosus_ is evidently derived from _mores_--"_Morosus_, _mos_, +stubbornness, self-will, etc."--Riddle and Arnold, Lat. Dict. + +[52] In the original they run thus: + + [Greek: Ouk estin ouden deinon hod' eipein epos, + Oude pathos, oude xymphora theelatos + hes ouk an aroit' achthos anthropon physis.] + +[53] This passage is from the Eunuch of Terence, act i., sc. 1, 14. + +[54] These verses are from the Atreus of Accius. + +[55] This was Marcus Atilius Regulus, the story of whose treatment by +the Carthaginians in the first Punic War is well known to everybody. + +[56] This was Quintus Servilius Caepio, who, 105 B.C., was destroyed, +with his army, by the Cimbri, it was believed as a judgment for the +covetousness which he had displayed in the plunder of Tolosa. + +[57] This was Marcus Aquilius, who, in the year 88 B.C., was sent +against Mithridates as one of the consular legates; and, being +defeated, was delivered up to the king by the inhabitants of Mitylene. +Mithridates put him to death by pouring molten gold down his throat. + +[58] This was the elder brother of the triumvir Marcus Crassus, 87 B.C. +He was put to death by Fimbria, who was in command of some of the +troops of Marius. + +[59] Lucius Caesar and Caius Caesar were relations (it is uncertain in +what degree) of the great Caesar, and were killed by Fimbria on the same +occasion as Octavius. + +[60] M. Antonius was the grandfather of the triumvir; he was murdered +the same year, 87 B.C., by Annius, when Marius and Cinna took Rome. + +[61] This story is alluded to by Horace: + + Districtus ensis cui super impia + Cervice pendet non Siculae dapes + Dulcem elaborabunt saporem, + Non avium citharaeve cantus + Somnum reducent.--iii. 1. 17. + +[62] Hieronymus was a Rhodian, and a pupil of Aristotle, flourishing +about 300 B.C. He is frequently mentioned by Cicero. + +[63] We know very little of Dinomachus. Some MSS. have Clitomachus. + +[64] Callipho was in all probability a pupil of Epicurus, but we have +no certain information about him. + +[65] Diodorus was a Syrian, and succeeded Critolaus as the head of the +Peripatetic School at Athens. + +[66] Aristo was a native of Ceos, and a pupil of Lycon, who succeeded +Straton as the head of the Peripatetic School, 270 B.C. He afterward +himself succeeded Lycon. + +[67] Pyrrho was a native of Elis, and the originator of the sceptical +theories of some of the ancient philosophers. He was a contemporary of +Alexander. + +[68] Herillus was a disciple of Zeno of Cittium, and therefore a Stoic. +He did not, however, follow all the opinions of his master: he held +that knowledge was the chief good. Some of the treatises of Cleanthes +were written expressly to confute him. + +[69] Anacharsis was (Herod., iv., 76) son of Gnurus and brother of +Saulius, King of Thrace. He came to Athens while Solon was occupied in +framing laws for his people; and by the simplicity of his way of +living, and his acute observations on the manners of the Greeks, he +excited such general admiration that he was reckoned by some writers +among the Seven Wise Men of Greece. + +[70] This was Appius Claudius Caecus, who was censor 310 B.C., and who, +according to Livy, was afflicted with blindness by the Gods for +persuading the Potitii to instruct the public servants in the way of +sacrificing to Hercules. He it was who made the Via Appia. + +[71] The fact of Homer's blindness rests on a passage in the Hymn to +Apollo, quoted by Thucydides as a genuine work of Homer, and which is +thus spoken of by one of the most accomplished scholars that this +country or this age has ever produced: "They are indeed beautiful +verses; and if none worse had ever been attributed to Homer, the Prince +of Poets would have had little reason to complain. + +"He has been describing the Delian festival in honor of Apollo and +Diana, and concludes this part of the poem with an address to the women +of that island, to whom it is to be supposed that he had become +familiarly known by his frequent recitations: + + [Greek: Chairete d' hymeis pasai, emeio de kai metopisthe + mnesasth', hoppote ken tis epichthonion anthropon + enthad' aneiretai xeinos talapeirios elthon + o kourai, tis d' hymmin aner hedistos aoidon + enthade poleitai kai teo terpesthe malista; + hymeis d' eu mala pasai hypokrinasthe aph' hemon, + Typhlos aner, oikei de Chio eni paipaloesse, + tou pasai metopisthen aristeuousin aoidai.] + + Virgins, farewell--and oh! remember me + Hereafter, when some stranger from the sea, + A hapless wanderer, may your isle explore, + And ask you, 'Maids, of all the bards you boast, + Who sings the sweetest, and delights you most?' + Oh! answer all, 'A blind old man, and poor, + Sweetest he sings, and dwells on Chios' rocky shore.' + + _Coleridge's Introduction to the Study + of the Greek Classic Poets._ + +[72] Some read _scientiam_ and some _inscientiam;_ the latter of which +is preferred by some of the best editors and commentators. + +[73] For a short account of these ancient Greek philosophers, see the +sketch prefixed to the Academics (_Classical Library_). + +[74] Cicero wrote his philosophical works in the last three years of +his life. When he wrote this piece, he was in the sixty-third year of +his age, in the year of Rome 709. + +[75] The Academic. + +[76] Diodorus and Posidonius were Stoics; Philo and Antiochus were +Academics; but the latter afterward inclined to the doctrine of the +Stoics. + +[77] Julius Caesar. + +[78] Cicero was one of the College of Augurs. + +[79] The Latinae Feriae was originally a festival of the Latins, altered +by Tarquinius Superbus into a Roman one. It was held in the Alban +Mount, in honor of Jupiter Latiaris. This holiday lasted six days: it +was not held at any fixed time; but the consul was never allowed to +take the field till he had held them.--_Vide_ Smith, Dict. Gr. and Rom. +Ant., p. 414. + +[80] _Exhedra_, the word used by Cicero, means a study, or place where +disputes were held. + +[81] M. Piso was a Peripatetic. The four great sects were the Stoics, +the Peripatetics, the Academics, and the Epicureans. + +[82] It was a prevailing tenet of the Academics that there is no +certain knowledge. + +[83] The five forms of Plato are these: [Greek: ousia, tauton, heteron, +stasis, kinesis.] + +[84] The four natures here to be understood are the four +elements--fire, water, air, and earth; which are mentioned as the four +principles of Empedocles by Diogenes Laertius. + +[85] These five moving stars are Saturn, Jupiter, Mars, Mercury, and +Venus. Their revolutions are considered in the next book. + +[86] Or, Generation of the Gods. + +[87] The [Greek: prolepsis] of Epicurus, before mentioned, is what he +here means. + +[88] [Greek: Steremnia] is the word which Epicurus used to distinguish +between those objects which are perceptible to sense, and those which +are imperceptible; as the essence of the Divine Being, and the various +operations of the divine power. + +[89] Zeno here mentioned is not the same that Cotta spoke of before. +This was the founder of the Stoics. The other was an Epicurean +philosopher whom he had heard at Athens. + +[90] That is, there would be the same uncertainty in heaven as is among +the Academics. + +[91] Those nations which were neither Greek nor Roman. + +[92] _Sigilla numerantes_ is the common reading; but P. Manucius +proposes _venerantes_, which I choose as the better of the two, and in +which sense I have translated it. + +[93] Fundamental doctrines. + +[94] That is, the zodiac. + +[95] The moon, as well as the sun, is indeed in the zodiac, but she +does not measure the same course in a month. She moves in another line +of the zodiac nearer the earth. + +[96] According to the doctrines of Epicurus, none of these bodies +themselves are clearly seen, but _simulacra ex corporibus effluentia_. + +[97] Epicurus taught his disciples in a garden. + +[98] By the word _Deus_, as often used by our author, we are to +understand all the Gods in that theology then treated of, and not a +single personal Deity. + +[99] The best commentators on this passage agree that Cicero does not +mean that Aristotle affirmed that there was no such person as Orpheus, +but that there was no such poet, and that the verse called Orphic was +said to be the invention of another. The passage of Aristotle to which +Cicero here alludes has, as Dr. Davis observes, been long lost. + +[100] A just proportion between the different sorts of beings. + +[101] Some give _quos non pudeat earum Epicuri vocum;_ but the best +copies have not _non;_ nor would it be consistent with Cotta to say +_quos non pudeat_, for he throughout represents Velleius as a perfect +Epicurean in every article. + +[102] His country was Abdera, the natives of which were remarkable for +their stupidity. + +[103] This passage will not admit of a translation answerable to the +sense of the original. Cicero says the word _amicitia_ (friendship) is +derived from _amor_ (love or affection). + +[104] This manner of speaking of Jupiter frequently occurs in Homer, + + ----[Greek: pater andron te theon te,] + +and has been used by Virgil and other poets since Ennius. + +[105] Perses, or Perseus, the last king of Macedonia, was taken by +Cnaeus Octavius, the praetor, and brought as prisoner to Paullus AEmilius, +167 B.C. + +[106] An exemption from serving in the wars, and from paying public +taxes. + +[107] Mopsus. There were two soothsayers of this name: the first was +one of the Lapithae, son of Ampycus and Chloris, called also the son of +Apollo and Hienantis; the other a son of Apollo and Manto, who is said +to have founded Mallus, in Asia Minor, where his oracle existed as late +as the time of Strabo. + +[108] Tiresias was the great Theban prophet at the time of the war of +the Seven against Thebes. + +[109] Amphiaraus was King of Argos (he had been one of the Argonauts +also). He was killed after the war of the Seven against Thebes, which +he was compelled to join in by the treachery of his wife Eriphyle, by +the earth opening and swallowing him up as he was fleeing from +Periclymenus. + +[110] Calchas was the prophet of the Grecian army at the siege of Troy. + +[111] Helenus was a son of Priam and Hecuba. He is represented as a +prophet in the Philoctetes of Sophocles. And in the AEneid he is also +represented as king of part of Epirus, and as predicting to AEneas the +dangers and fortunes which awaited him. + +[112] This short passage would be very obscure to the reader without an +explanation from another of Cicero's treatises. The expression here, +_ad investigandum suem regiones vineae terminavit_, which is a metaphor +too bold, if it was not a sort of augural language, seems to me to have +been the effect of carelessness in our great author; for Navius did not +divide the regions, as he calls them, of the vine to find his sow, but +to find a grape. + +[113] The Peremnia were a sort of auspices performed just before the +passing a river. + +[114] The Acumina were a military auspices, and were partly performed +on the point of a spear, from which they were called Acumina. + +[115] Those were called _testamenta in procinctu_, which were made by +soldiers just before an engagement, in the presence of men called as +witnesses. + +[116] This especially refers to the Decii, one of whom devoted himself +for his country in the war with the Latins, 340 B.C., and his son +imitated the action in the war with the Samnites, 295 B.C. Cicero +(Tusc. i. 37) says that his son did the same thing in the war with +Pyrrhus at the battle of Asculum, though in other places (De Off. iii. +4) he speaks of only two Decii as having signalized themselves in this +manner. + +[117] The Rogator, who collected the votes, and pronounced who was the +person chosen. There were two sorts of Rogators; one was the officer +here mentioned, and the other was the Rogator, or speaker of the whole +assembly. + +[118] Which was Sardinia, as appears from one of Cicero's epistles to +his brother Quintus. + +[119] Their sacred books of ceremonies. + +[120] The war between Octavius and Cinna, the consuls. + +[121] This, in the original, is a fragment of an old Latin verse, + + _----Terram fumare calentem._ + +[122] The Latin word is _principatus_, which exactly corresponds with +the Greek word here used by Cicero; by which is to be understood the +superior, the most prevailing excellence in every kind and species of +things through the universe. + +[123] The passage of Aristotle to which Cicero here refers is lost. + +[124] He means the Epicureans. + +[125] Here the Stoic speaks too plain to be misunderstood. His world, +his _mundus_, is the universe, and that universe is his great Deity, +_in quo sit totius naturae principatus_, in which the superior +excellence of universal nature consists. + +[126] Athens, the seat of learning and politeness, of which Balbus will +not allow Epicurus to be worthy. + +[127] This is Pythagoras's doctrine, as appears in Diogenes Laertius. + +[128] He here alludes to mathematical and geometrical instruments. + +[129] Balbus here speaks of the fixed stars, and of the motions of the +orbs of the planets. He here alludes, says M. Bonhier, to the different +and diurnal motions of these stars; one sort from east to west, the +other from one tropic to the other: and this is the construction which +our learned and great geometrician and astronomer, Dr. Halley, made of +this passage. + +[130] This mensuration of the year into three hundred and sixty-five +days and near six hours (by the odd hours and minutes of which, in +every fifth year, the _dies intercalaris_, or leap-year, is made) could +not but be known, Dr. Halley states, by Hipparchus, as appears from the +remains of that great astronomer of the ancients. We are inclined to +think that Julius Caesar had divided the year, according to what we call +the Julian year, before Cicero wrote this book; for we see, in the +beginning of it, how pathetically he speaks of Caesar's usurpation. + +[131] The words of Censorinus, on this occasion, are to the same +effect. The opinions of philosophers concerning this great year are +very different; but the institution of it is ascribed to Democritus. + +[132] The zodiac. + +[133] Though Mars is said to hold his orbit in the zodiac with the +rest, and to finish his revolution through the same orbit (that is, the +zodiac) with the other two, yet Balbus means in a different line of the +zodiac. + +[134] According to late observations, it never goes but a sign and a +half from the sun. + +[135] These, Dr. Davis says, are "aerial fires;" concerning which he +refers to the second book of Pliny. + +[136] In the Eunuch of Terence. + +[137] Bacchus. + +[138] The son of Ceres. + +[139] The books of Ceremonies. + +[140] This Libera is taken for Proserpine, who, with her brother Liber, +was consecrated by the Romans; all which are parts of nature in +prosopopoeias. Cicero, therefore, makes Balbus distinguish between the +person Liber, or Bacchus, and the Liber which is a part of nature in +prosopopoeia. + +[141] These allegorical fables are largely related by Hesiod in his +Theogony. + +Horace says exactly the same thing: + + Hac arte Pollux et vagus Hercules + Enisus arces attigit igneas: + Quos inter Augustus recumbens + Purpureo bibit ore nectar. + Hac te merentem, Bacche pater, tuae + Vexere tigres indocili jugum + Collo ferentes: hac Quirinus + Martis equis Acheronta fugit.--Hor. iii. 3. 9. + +[142] Cicero means by _conversis casibus_, varying the cases from the +common rule of declension; that is, by departing from the true +grammatical rules of speech; for if we would keep to it, we should +decline the word _Jupiter_, _Jupiteris_ in the second case, etc. + +[143] _Pater divumque hominumque._ + +[144] The common reading is, _planiusque alio loco idem;_ which, as Dr. +Davis observes, is absurd; therefore, in his note, he prefers _planius +quam alia loco idem_, from two copies, in which sense I have translated +it. + +[145] From the verb _gero_, to bear. + +[146] That is, "mother earth." + +[147] Janus is said to be the first who erected temples in Italy, and +instituted religious rites, and from whom the first month in the Roman +calendar is derived. + +[148] _Stellae vagantes._ + +[149] _Noctu quasi diem efficeret._ Ben Jonson says the same thing: + + Thou that mak'st a day of night, + Goddess excellently bright.--_Ode to the Moon._ + +[150] Olympias was the mother of Alexander. + +[151] Venus is here said to be one of the names of Diana, because _ad +res omnes veniret;_ but she is not supposed to be the same as the +mother of Cupid. + +[152] Here is a mistake, as Fulvius Ursinus observes; for the discourse +seems to be continued in one day, as appears from the beginning of this +book. This may be an inadvertency of Cicero. + +[153] The senate of Athens was so called from the words [Greek: Areios +Pagos], the Village, some say the Hill, of Mars. + +[154] Epicurus. + +[155] The Stoics. + +[156] By _nulla cohaerendi natura_--if it is the right, as it is the +common reading--Cicero must mean the same as by _nulla crescendi +natura_, or _coalescendi_, either of which Lambinus proposes; for, as +the same learned critic well observes, is there not a cohesion of parts +in a clod, or in a piece of stone? Our learned Walker proposes _sola +cohaerendi natura_, which mends the sense very much; and I wish he had +the authority of any copy for it. + +[157] Nasica Scipio, the censor, is said to have been the first who +made a water-clock in Rome. + +[158] The Epicureans. + +[159] An old Latin poet, commended by Quintilian for the gravity of his +sense and his loftiness of style. + +[160] The shepherd is here supposed to take the stem or beak of the +ship for the mouth, from which the roaring voices of the sailors came. +_Rostrum_ is here a lucky word to put in the mouth of one who never saw +a ship before, as it is used for the beak of a bird, the snout of a +beast or fish, and for the stem of a ship. + +[161] The Epicureans. + +[162] Greek, [Greek: aer]; Latin, _aer_. + +[163] The treatise of Aristotle, from whence this is taken, is lost. + +[164] To the universe the Stoics certainly annexed the idea of a +limited space, otherwise they could not have talked of a middle; for +there can be no middle but of a limited space: infinite space can have +no middle, there being infinite extension from every part. + +[165] These two contrary reversions are from the tropics of Cancer and +Capricorn. They are the extreme bounds of the sun's course. The reader +must observe that the astronomical parts of this book are introduced by +the Stoic as proofs of design and reason in the universe; and, +notwithstanding the errors in his planetary system, his intent is well +answered, because all he means is that the regular motions of the +heavenly bodies, and their dependencies, are demonstrations of a divine +mind. The inference proposed to be drawn from his astronomical +observations is as just as if his system was in every part +unexceptionably right: the same may be said of his anatomical +observations. + +[166] In the zodiac. + +[167] Ibid. + +[168] These verses of Cicero are a translation from a Greek poem of +Aratus, called the Phaenomena. + +[169] The fixed stars. + +[170] The arctic and antarctic poles. + +[171] The two Arctoi are northern constellations. Cynosura is what we +call the Lesser Bear; Helice, the Greater Bear; in Latin, _Ursa Minor_ +and _Ursa Major_. + +[172] These stars in the Greater Bear are vulgarly called the "Seven +Stars," or the "Northern Wain;" by the Latins, "Septentriones." + +[173] The Lesser Bear. + +[174] The Greater Bear. + +[175] Exactly agreeable to this and the following description of the +Dragon is the same northern constellation described in the map by +Flamsteed in his Atlas Coelestis; and all the figures here described by +Aratus nearly agree with the maps of the same constellations in the +Atlas Coelestis, though they are not all placed precisely alike. + +[176] The tail of the Greater Bear. + +[177] That is, in Macedon, where Aratus lived. + +[178] The true interpretation of this passage is as follows: Here in +Macedon, says Aratus, the head of the Dragon does not entirely immerge +itself in the ocean, but only touches the superficies of it. By _ortus_ +and _obitus_ I doubt not but Cicero meant, agreeable to Aratus, those +parts which arise to view, and those which are removed from sight. + +[179] These are two northern constellations. Engonasis, in some +catalogues called Hercules, because he is figured kneeling [Greek: en +gonasin] (on his knees). [Greek: Engonasin kaleous'], as Aratus says, +they call Engonasis. + +[180] The crown is placed under the feet of Hercules in the Atlas +Coelestis; but Ophiuchus ([Greek: Ophiouchos]), the Snake-holder, is +placed in the map by Flamsteed as described here by Aratus; and their +heads almost meet. + +[181] The Scorpion. Ophiuchus, though a northern constellation, is not +far from that part of the zodiac where the Scorpion is, which is one of +the six southern signs. + +[182] The Wain of seven stars. + +[183] The Wain-driver. This northern constellation is, in our present +maps, figured with a club in his right hand behind the Greater Bear. + +[184] In some modern maps Arcturus, a star of the first magnitude, is +placed in the belt that is round the waist of Booetes. Cicero says +_subter praecordia_, which is about the waist; and Aratus says [Greek: +hypo zone], under the belt. + +[185] _Sub caput Arcti_, under the head of the Greater Bear. + +[186] The Crab is, by the ancients and moderns, placed in the zodiac, +as here, between the Twins and the Lion; and they are all three +northern signs. + +[187] The Twins are placed in the zodiac with the side of one to the +northern hemisphere, and the side of the other to the southern +hemisphere. Auriga, the Charioteer, is placed in the northern +hemisphere near the zodiac, by the Twins; and at the head of the +Charioteer is Helice, the Greater Bear, placed; and the Goat is a +bright star of the first magnitude placed on the left shoulder of this +northern constellation, and called _Capra_, the Goat. _Hoedi_, the +Kids, are two more stars of the same constellation. + +[188] A constellation; one of the northern signs in the zodiac, in +which the Hyades are placed. + +[189] One of the feet of Cepheus, a northern constellation, is under +the tail of the Lesser Bear. + +[190] Grotius, and after him Dr. Davis, and other learned men, read +_Cassiepea_, after the Greek [Greek: Kassiepeia], and reject the common +reading, _Cassiopea_. + +[191] These northern constellations here mentioned have been always +placed together as one family with Cepheus and Perseus, as they are in +our modern maps. + +[192] This alludes to the fable of Perseus and Andromeda. + +[193] Pegasus, who is one of Perseus and Andromeda's family. + +[194] That is, with wings. + +[195] _Aries_, the Ram, is the first northern sign in the zodiac; +_Pisces_, the Fishes, the last southern sign; therefore they must be +near one another, as they are in a circle or belt. In Flamsteed's Atlas +Coelestis one of the Fishes is near the head of the Ram, and the other +near the Urn of Aquarius. + +[196] These are called Virgiliae by Cicero; by Aratus, the Pleiades, +[Greek: Pleiades]; and they are placed at the neck of the Bull; and one +of Perseus's feet touches the Bull in the Atlas Coelestis. + +[197] This northern constellation is called Fides by Cicero; but it +must be the same with Lyra; because Lyra is placed in our maps as Fides +is here. + +[198] This is called Ales Avis by Cicero; and I doubt not but the +northern constellation Cygnus is here to be understood, for the +description and place of the Swan in the Atlas Coelestis are the same +which Ales Avis has here. + +[199] Pegasus. + +[200] The Water-bearer, one of the six southern signs in the zodiac: he +is described in our maps pouring water out of an urn, and leaning with +one hand on the tail of Capricorn, another southern sign. + +[201] When the sun is in Capricorn, the days are at the shortest; and +when in Cancer, at the longest. + +[202] One of the six southern signs. + +[203] Sagittarius, another southern sign. + +[204] A northern constellation. + +[205] A northern constellation. + +[206] A southern constellation. + +[207] This is Canis Major, a southern constellation. Orion and the Dog +are named together by Hesiod, who flourished many hundred years before +Cicero or Aratus. + +[208] A southern constellation, placed as here in the Atlas Coelestis. + +[209] A southern constellation, so called from the ship Argo, in which +Jason and the rest of the Argonauts sailed on their expedition to +Colchos. + +[210] The Ram is the first of the northern signs in the zodiac; and the +last southern sign is the Fishes; which two signs, meeting in the +zodiac, cover the constellation called Argo. + +[211] The river Eridanus, a southern constellation. + +[212] A southern constellation. + +[213] This is called the Scorpion in the original of Aratus. + +[214] A southern constellation. + +[215] A southern constellation. + +[216] The Serpent is not mentioned in Cicero's translation; but it is +in the original of Aratus. + +[217] A southern constellation. + +[218] The Goblet, or Cup, a southern constellation. + +[219] A southern constellation. + +[220] Antecanis, a southern constellation, is the Little Dog, and +called _Antecanis_ in Latin, and [Greek: Prokyon] in Greek, because he +rises before the other Dog. + +[221] Pansaetius, a Stoic philosopher. + +[222] Mercury and Venus. + +[223] The proboscis of the elephant is frequently called a hand, +because it is as useful to him as one. "They breathe, drink, and smell, +with what may not be improperly called a hand," says Pliny, bk. viii. +c. 10.--DAVIS. + +[224] The passage of Aristotle's works to which Cicero here alludes is +entirely lost; but Plutarch gives a similar account. + +[225] Balbus does not tell us the remedy which the panther makes use +of; but Pliny is not quite so delicate: he says, _excrementis hominis +sibi medetur_. + +[226] Aristotle says they purge themselves with this herb after they +fawn. Pliny says both before and after. + +[227] The cuttle-fish has a bag at its neck, the black blood of which +the Romans used for ink. It was called _atramentum_. + +[228] The Euphrates is said to carry into Mesopotamia a large quantity +of citrons, with which it covers the fields. + +[229] Q. Curtius, and some other authors, say the Ganges is the largest +river in India; but Ammianus Marcellinus concurs with Cicero in calling +the river Indus the largest of all rivers. + +[230] These Etesian winds return periodically once a year, and blow at +certain seasons, and for a certain time. + +[231] Some read _mollitur_, and some _molitur;_ the latter of which P. +Manucius justly prefers, from the verb _molo_, _molis;_ from whence, +says he, _molares dentes_, the grinders. + +[232] The weasand, or windpipe. + +[233] The epiglottis, which is a cartilaginous flap in the shape of a +tongue, and therefore called so. + +[234] Cicero is here giving the opinion of the ancients concerning the +passage of the chyle till it is converted to blood. + +[235] What Cicero here calls the ventricles of the heart are likewise +called auricles, of which there is the right and left. + +[236] The Stoics and Peripatetics said that the nerves, veins, and +arteries come directly from the heart. According to the anatomy of the +moderns, they come from the brain. + +[237] The author means all musical instruments, whether string or wind +instruments, which are hollow and tortuous. + +[238] The Latin version of Cicero is a translation from the Greek of +Aratus. + +[239] Chrysippus's meaning is, that the swine is so inactive and +slothful a beast that life seems to be of no use to it but to keep it +from putrefaction, as salt keeps dead flesh. + +[240] _Ales_, in the general signification, is any large bird; and +_oscinis_ is any singing bird. But they here mean those birds which are +used in augury: _alites_ are the birds whose flight was observed by the +augurs, and _oscines_ the birds from whose voices they augured. + +[241] As the Academics doubted everything, it was indifferent to them +which side of a question they took. + +[242] The keepers and interpreters of the Sibylline oracles were the +Quindecimviri. + +[243] The popular name of Jupiter in Rome, being looked upon as +defender of the Capitol (in which he was placed), and stayer of the +State. + +[244] Some passages of the original are here wanting. Cotta continues +speaking against the doctrine of the Stoics. + +[245] The word _sortes_ is often used for the answers of the oracles, +or, rather, for the rolls in which the answers were written. + +[246] Three of this eminent family sacrificed themselves for their +country; the father in the Latin war, the son in the Tuscan war, and +the grandson in the war with Pyrrhus. + +[247] The Straits of Gibraltar. + +[248] The common reading is, _ex quo anima dicitur;_ but Dr. Davis and +M. Bouhier prefer _animal_, though they keep _anima_ in the text, +because our author says elsewhere, _animum ex anima dictum_, Tusc. I. +1. Cicero is not here to be accused of contradictions, for we are to +consider that he speaks in the characters of other persons; but there +appears to be nothing in these two passages irreconcilable, and +probably _anima_ is the right word here. + +[249] He is said to have led a colony from Greece into Caria, in Asia, +and to have built a town, and called it after his own name, for which +his countrymen paid him divine honors after his death. + +[250] Our great author is under a mistake here. Homer does not say he +met Hercules himself, but his [Greek: Eidolon], his "visionary +likeness;" and adds that he himself + + [Greek: met' athanatoisi theoisi + terpetai en thalies, kai echei kallisphyrou Heben, + paida Dios megaloio kai Heres chrysopedilou.] + +which Pope translates-- + + A shadowy form, for high in heaven's abodes + Himself resides, a God among the Gods; + There, in the bright assemblies of the skies, + He nectar quaffs, and Hebe crowns his joys. + +[251] They are said to have been the first workers in iron. They were +called Idaei, because they inhabited about Mount Ida in Crete, and +Dactyli, from [Greek: daktyloi] (the fingers), their number being five. + +[252] From whom, some say, the city of that name was called. + +[253] Capedunculae seem to have been bowls or cups, with handles on each +side, set apart for the use of the altar.--DAVIS. + +[254] See Cicero de Divinatione, and Ovid. Fast. + +[255] In the consulship of Piso and Gabinius sacrifices to Serapis and +Isis were prohibited in Rome; but the Roman people afterward placed +them again in the number of their gods. See Tertullian's Apol. and his +first book Ad Nationes, and Arnobius, lib. 2.--DAVIS. + +[256] In some copies Circe, Pasiphae, and AEa are mentioned together; +but AEa is rejected by the most judicious editors. + +[257] They were three, and are said to have averted a plague by +offering themselves a sacrifice. + +[258] So called from the Greek word [Greek: thaumazo], to wonder. + +[259] She was first called Geres, from _gero_, to bear. + +[260] The word is _precatione_, which means the books or forms of +prayers used by the augurs. + +[261] Cotta's intent here, as well as in other places, is to show how +unphilosophical their civil theology was, and with what confusions it +was embarrassed; which design of the Academic the reader should +carefully keep in view, or he will lose the chain of argument. + +[262] Anactes, [Greek: Anaktes], was a general name for all kings, as +we find in the oldest Greek writers, and particularly in Homer. + +[263] The common reading is Aleo; but we follow Lambinus and Davis, who +had the authority of the best manuscript copies. + +[264] Some prefer Phthas to Opas (see Dr. Davis's edition); but Opas is +the generally received reading. + +[265] The Lipari Isles. + +[266] A town in Arcadia. + +[267] In Arcadia. + +[268] A northern people. + +[269] So called from the Greek word [Greek: nomos], _lex_, a law. + +[270] He is called [Greek: Opis] in some old Greek fragments, and +[Greek: Oupis] by Callimachus in his hymn on Diana. + +[271] [Greek: Sabazios], Sabazius, is one of the names used for +Bacchus. + +[272] Here is a wide chasm in the original. What is lost probably may +have contained great part of Cotta's arguments against the providence +of the Stoics. + +[273] Here is one expression in the quotation from Caecilius that is not +commonly met with, which is _praestigias praestrinxit;_ Lambinus gives +_praestinxit_, for the sake, I suppose, of playing on words, because it +might then be translated, "He has deluded my delusions, or stratagems;" +but _praestrinxit_ is certainly the right reading. + +[274] The ancient Romans had a judicial as well as a military praetor; +and he sat, with inferior judges attending him, like one of our +chief-justices. _Sessum it praetor_, which I doubt not is the right +reading, Lambinus restored from an old copy. The common reading was +_sessum ite precor_. + +[275] Picenum was a region of Italy. + +[276] The _sex primi_ were general receivers of all taxes and tributes; +and they were obliged to make good, out of their own fortunes, whatever +deficiencies were in the public treasury. + +[277] The Laetorian Law was a security for those under age against +extortioners, etc. By this law all debts contracted under twenty-five +years of age were void. + +[278] This is from Ennius-- + + Utinam ne in nemore Pelio securibus + Caesa cecidisset abiegna ad terram trabes. + +Translated from the beginning of the Medea of Euripides-- + + [Greek: Med' en napaisi Pelion pesein pote + tmetheisa peuke.] + +[279] Q. Fabius Maximus, surnamed Cunctator. + +[280] Diogenes Laertius says he was pounded to death in a stone mortar +by command of Nicocreon, tyrant of Cyprus. + +[281] Elea, a city of Lucania, in Italy. The manner in which Zeno was +put to death is, according to Diogenes Laertius, uncertain. + +[282] This great and good man was accused of destroying the divinity of +the Gods of his country. He was condemned, and died by drinking a glass +of poison. + +[283] Tyrant of Sicily. + +[284] The common reading is, _in tympanidis rogum inlatus est_. This +passage has been the occasion of as many different opinions concerning +both the reading and the sense as any passage in the whole treatise. +_Tympanum_ is used for a timbrel or drum, _tympanidia_ a diminutive of +it. Lambinus says _tympana_ "were sticks with which the tyrant used to +beat the condemned." P. Victorius substitutes _tyrannidis_ for +_tympanidis_. + +[285] The original is _de amissa salute;_ which means the sentence of +banishment among the Romans, in which was contained the loss of goods +and estate, and the privileges of a Roman; and in this sense L'Abbe +d'Olivet translates it. + +[286] The forty-seventh proposition of the first book of Euclid is +unanimously ascribed to him by the ancients. Dr. Wotton, in his +Reflections upon Ancient and Modern Learning, says, "It is indeed a +very noble proposition, the foundation of trigonometry, of universal +and various use in those curious speculations about incommensurable +numbers." + +[287] These votive tables, or pictures, were hung up in the temples. + +[288] This passage is a fragment from a tragedy of Attius. + +[289] Hipponax was a poet at Ephesus, and so deformed that Bupalus drew +a picture of him to provoke laughter; for which Hipponax is said to +have written such keen iambics on the painter that he hanged himself. + +Lycambes had promised Archilochus the poet to marry his daughter to +him, but afterward retracted his promise, and refused her; upon which +Archilochus is said to have published a satire in iambic verse that +provoked him to hang himself. + +[290] Cicero refers here to an oracle approving of his laws, and +promising Sparta prosperity as long as they were obeyed, which Lycurgus +procured from Delphi. + +[291] _Pro aris et focis_ is a proverbial expression. The Romans, when +they would say their all was at stake, could not express it stronger +than by saying they contended _pro aris et focis_, for religion and +their firesides, or, as we express it, for religion and property. + +[292] Cicero, who was an Academic, gives his opinion according to the +manner of the Academics, who looked upon probability, and a resemblance +of truth, as the utmost they could arrive at. + +[293] _I.e._, Regulus. + +[294] _I.e._, Fabius. + +[295] It is unnecessary to give an account of the other names here +mentioned; but that of Laenas is probably less known. He was Publius +Popillius Laenas, consul 132 B.C., the year after the death of Tiberius +Gracchus, and it became his duty to prosecute the accomplices of +Gracchus, for which he was afterward attacked by Caius Gracchus with +such animosity that he withdrew into voluntary exile. Cicero pays a +tribute to the energy of Opimius in the first Oration against Catiline, +c. iii. + +[296] This phenomenon of the parhelion, or mock sun, which so puzzled +Cicero's interlocutors, has been very satisfactorily explained by +modern science. The parhelia are formed by the reflection of the +sunbeams on a cloud properly situated. They usually accompany the +coronae, or luminous circles, and are placed in the same circumference, +and at the same height. Their colors resemble that of the rainbow; the +red and yellow are towards the side of the sun, and the blue and violet +on the other. There are, however, coronae sometimes seen without +parhelia, and _vice versa_. Parhelia are double, triple, etc., and in +1629, a parhelion of five suns was seen at Rome, and another of six +suns at Arles, 1666. + +[297] There is a little uncertainty as to what this age was, but it was +probably about twenty-five. + +[298] Cicero here gives a very exact and correct account of the +planetarium of Archimedes, which is so often noticed by the ancient +astronomers. It no doubt corresponded in a great measure to our modern +planetarium, or orrery, invented by the earl of that name. This +elaborate machine, whose manufacture requires the most exact and +critical science, is of the greatest service to those who study the +revolutions of the stars, for astronomic, astrologic, or meteorologic +purposes. + +[299] The end of the fourteenth chapter and the first words of the +fifteenth are lost; but it is plain that in the fifteenth it is Scipio +who is speaking. + +[300] There is evidently some error in the text here, for Ennius was +born 515 A.U.C., was a personal friend of the elder Africanus, and died +about 575 A.U.C., so that it is plain that we ought to read in the text +550, not 350. + +[301] Two pages are lost here. Afterward it is again Scipio who is +speaking. + +[302] Two pages are lost here. + +[303] Both Ennius and Naevius wrote tragedies called "Iphigenia." Mai +thinks the text here corrupt, and expresses some doubt whether there is +a quotation here at all. + +[304] He means Scipio himself. + +[305] There is again a hiatus. What follows is spoken by Laelius. + +[306] Again two pages are lost. + +[307] Again two pages are lost. It is evident that Scipio is speaking +again in cap. xxxi. + +[308] Again two pages are lost. + +[309] Again two pages are lost. + +[310] Here four pages are lost. + +[311] Here four pages are lost. + +[312] Two pages are missing here. + +[313] A name of Neptune. + +[314] About seven lines are lost here, and there is a great deal of +corruption and imperfection in the next few sentences. + +[315] Two pages are lost here. + +[316] The _Lex Curiata de Imperio_, so often mentioned here, was the +same as the _Auctoritas Patrum_, and was necessary in order to confer +upon the dictator, consuls, and other magistrates the _imperium_, or +military command: without this they had only a _potestas_, or civil +authority, and could not meddle with military affairs. + +[317] Two pages are missing here. + +[318] Here two pages are missing. + +[319] I have translated this very corrupt passage according to +Niebuhr's emendation. + +[320] Assiduus, ab aere dando. + +[321] Proletarii, a prole. + +[322] Here four pages are missing. + +[323] Two pages are missing here. + +[324] Two pages are missing here. + +[325] Here twelve pages are missing. + +[326] Sixteen pages are missing here. + +[327] Here eight pages are missing. + +[328] A great many pages are missing here. + +[329] Several pages are lost here; the passage in brackets is found in +Nonius under the word "exulto." + +[330] This and other chapters printed in smaller type are generally +presumed to be of doubtful authenticity. + +[331] The beginning of this book is lost. The two first paragraphs +come, the one from St. Augustine, the other from Lactantius. + +[332] Eight or nine pages are lost here. + +[333] Here six pages are lost. + +[334] Here twelve pages are missing. + +[335] We have been obliged to insert two or three of these sentences +between brackets, which are not found in the original, for the sake of +showing the drift of the arguments of Philus. He himself was fully +convinced that justice and morality were of eternal and immutable +obligation, and that the best interests of all beings lie in their +perpetual development and application. This eternity of Justice is +beautifully illustrated by Montesquieu. "Long," says he, "before +positive laws were instituted, the moral relations of justice were +absolute and universal. To say that there were no justice or injustice +but that which depends on the injunctions or prohibitions of positive +laws, is to say that the radii which spring from a centre are not equal +till we have formed a circle to illustrate the proposition. We must, +therefore, acknowledge that the relations of equity were antecedent to +the positive laws which corroborated them." But though Philus was fully +convinced of this, in order to give his friends Scipio and Laelius an +opportunity of proving it, he frankly brings forward every argument for +injustice that sophistry had ever cast in the teeth of reason.--_By the +original Translator_. + +[336] Here four pages are missing. The following sentence is preserved +in Nonius. + +[337] Two pages are missing here. + +[338] Several pages are missing here. + +[339] He means Alexander the Great. + +[340] Six or eight pages are lost here. + +[341] A great many pages are missing here. + +[342] Six or eight pages are missing here. + +[343] Several pages are lost here. + +[344] This and the following chapters are not the actual words of +Cicero, but quotations by Lactantius and Augustine of what they affirm +that he said. + +[345] Twelve pages are missing here. + +[346] Eight pages are missing here. + +[347] Six or eight pages are missing here. + +[348] Catadupa, from [Greek: kata] and [Greek: doipos], noise. + + + + + + +End of the Project Gutenberg EBook of Cicero's Tusculan Disputations +by Marcus Tullius Cicero + +*** END OF THIS PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK CICERO'S TUSCULAN DISPUTATIONS *** + +***** This file should be named 14988.txt or 14988.zip ***** +This and all associated files of various formats will be found in: + https://www.gutenberg.org/1/4/9/8/14988/ + +Produced by Ted Garvin, Hagen von Eitzen and the PG Online Distributed +Proofreading Team. + + +Updated editions will replace the previous one--the old editions +will be renamed. + +Creating the works from public domain print editions means that no +one owns a United States copyright in these works, so the Foundation +(and you!) can copy and distribute it in the United States without +permission and without paying copyright royalties. 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