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You may copy it, give it away or +re-use it under the terms of the Project Gutenberg License included +with this eBook or online at www.gutenberg.org + + +Title: Cicero's Tusculan Disputations + Also, Treatises On The Nature Of The Gods, And On The Commonwealth + +Author: Marcus Tullius Cicero + +Release Date: February 9, 2005 [EBook #14988] + +Language: English and Latin + +Character set encoding: ISO-8859-1 + +*** START OF THIS PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK CICERO'S TUSCULAN DISPUTATIONS *** + + + + +Produced by Ted Garvin, Hagen von Eitzen and the PG Online Distributed +Proofreading Team. + + + + + + +</pre> + + + + + + +<h1><big>CICERO’S</big><br/> +TUSCULAN DISPUTATIONS;</h1> + +<p> </p> + +<p class="front"><big>ALSO, TREATISES ON</big></p> + +<p class="front"><big><big>THE NATURE OF THE GODS,</big></big></p> + +<p class="front"><big>AND ON</big></p> + +<p class="front"><big><big>THE COMMONWEALTH.</big></big></p> + +<p> </p> + +<p class="front">LITERALLY TRANSLATED, CHIEFLY BY</p> + +<p class="front"><big>C. D. YONGE.</big></p> + +<p class="front">NEW YORK:<br/> + +HARPER & BROTHERS, PUBLISHERS,<br/> + +FRANKLIN SQUARE.<br/> + +1877.</p> + + +<hr class="front"/> + +<p class="front"><a id="page-2"></a><span class="pgnum">2</span><big>HARPER’S<br/> +<big>NEW CLASSICAL LIBRARY.</big></big></p> + +<p class="front">COMPRISING LITERAL TRANSLATIONS OF</p> + +<div class="poem"> +<p>CÆSAR.</p> +<p>VIRGIL.</p> +<p>SALLUST.</p> +<p>HORACE.</p> +<p>CICERO’S ORATIONS.</p> +<p>CICERO’S OFFICES &c.</p> +<p>CICERO ON ORATORY AND ORATORS.</p> +<p>CICERO’S TUSCULAN DISPUTATIONS, the Republic, and the Nature of the Gods.</p> +<p>TERENCE.</p> +<p>TACITUS.</p> +<p>LIVY. 2 Vols.</p> +<p>JUVENAL.</p> +<p>XENOPHON.</p> +<p>HOMER’S ILIAD.</p> +<p>HOMER’S ODYSSEY.</p> +<p>HERODOTUS.</p> +<p>DEMOSTHENES. 2 Vols.</p> +<p>THUCIDIDES.</p> +<p>ÆSCHYLUS.</p> +<p>SOPHOCLES.</p> +<p>EURIPIDES. 2 Vols.</p> +<p>PLATO. [<span class="sc">Select Dialogues</span>.]</p> +</div> + +<p class="front">12mo, Cloth, $1.50 per Volume.</p> + +<p class="front"><span class="sc">Harper & Brothers</span> <i>will send either of the above works by mail, postage +prepaid, to any part of the United States, on receipt of the price</i>.</p> + + +<hr class="front"/> + + +<h2><a id="page-3"></a><span class="pgnum">3</span>NOTE.</h2> + +<hr class="tiny"/> + +<p><span class="first">The</span> greater portion of the Republic was previously translated by Francis +Barham, Esq., and published in 1841. Although ably performed, it was not +sufficiently close for the purpose of the “<span class="sc">Classical Library</span>,” and was +therefore placed in the hands of the present editor for revision, as +well as for collation with recent texts. This has occasioned material +alterations and additions.</p> + +<p>The treatise “On the Nature of the Gods” is a revision of that usually +ascribed to the celebrated Benjamin Franklin.</p> + + +<hr class="front"/> + + +<h2><a id="page-5"></a><span class="pgnum">5</span>CONTENTS.</h2> + +<hr class="tiny"/> + +<p><a href="#page-7"><i>Tusculan Disputations</i></a></p> + +<p><a href="#page-209"><i>On the Nature of the Gods</i></a></p> + +<p><a href="#page-357"><i>On the Commonwealth</i></a></p> + +<hr class="front"/> + + + + +<h2><a id="page-7"></a><span class="pgnum">7</span>THE TUSCULAN DISPUTATIONS.</h2> + +<hr class="tiny"/> + + +<h3>INTRODUCTION.</h3> + + +<p><span class="first">In</span> the year <span class="sc">a.u.c.</span> 708, and the sixty-second year of Cicero’s age, his +daughter, Tullia, died in childbed; and her loss afflicted Cicero to +such a degree that he abandoned all public business, and, leaving the +city, retired to Asterra, which was a country house that he had near +Antium; where, after a while, he devoted himself to philosophical +studies, and, besides other works, he published his Treatise de Finibus, +and also this treatise called the Tusculan Disputations, of which +Middleton gives this concise description:</p> + +<p>“The first book teaches us how to contemn the terrors of death, and to +look upon it as a blessing rather than an evil;</p> + +<p>“The second, to support pain and affliction with a manly fortitude;</p> + +<p>“The third, to appease all our complaints and uneasinesses under the +accidents of life;</p> + +<p>“The fourth, to moderate all our other passions;</p> + +<p>“And the fifth explains the sufficiency of virtue to make men happy.”</p> + +<p>It was his custom in the opportunities of his leisure to take some +friends with him into the country, where, instead of amusing themselves +with idle sports or feasts, their diversions were wholly speculative, +tending to improve the mind and enlarge the understanding. In this +manner he now spent five days at his Tusculan villa in discussing with +his friends the several questions just mentioned. For, after employing +the mornings in declaiming and rhetorical exercises, they used to retire +in the afternoon <a id="page-8"></a><span class="pgnum">8</span>into a gallery, called the Academy, which he had built +for the purpose of philosophical conferences, where, after the manner of +the Greeks, he held a school, as they called it, and invited the company +to call for any subject that they desired to hear explained, which being +proposed accordingly by some of the audience became immediately the +argument of that day’s debate. These five conferences, or dialogues, he +collected afterward into writing in the very words and manner in which +they really passed; and published them under the title of his Tusculan +Disputations, from the name of the villa in which they were held.</p> + +<hr/> + + +<h3>BOOK I.</h3> + +<h4>ON THE CONTEMPT OF DEATH.</h4> + + +<p>I. <span class="first">At</span> a time when I had entirely, or to a great degree, released myself +from my labors as an advocate, and from my duties as a senator, I had +recourse again, Brutus, principally by your advice, to those studies +which never had been out of my mind, although neglected at times, and +which after a long interval I resumed; and now, since the principles and +rules of all arts which relate to living well depend on the study of +wisdom, which is called philosophy, I have thought it an employment +worthy of me to illustrate them in the Latin tongue, not because +philosophy could not be understood in the Greek language, or by the +teaching of Greek masters; but it has always been my opinion that our +countrymen have, in some instances, made wiser discoveries than the +Greeks, with reference to those subjects which they have considered +worthy of devoting their attention to, and in others have improved upon +their discoveries, so that in one way or other we surpass them on every +point; for, with regard to the manners and habits of private life, and +family and domestic affairs, we certainly manage them with more +elegance, and better than they did; and as to our republic, that our +ancestors have, beyond all dispute, formed on better customs and laws. +What shall I say of our military affairs; in which our ancestors have +been most eminent in valor, and still more so <a id="page-9"></a><span class="pgnum">9</span>in discipline? As to +those things which are attained not by study, but nature, neither +Greece, nor any nation, is comparable to us; for what people has +displayed such gravity, such steadiness, such greatness of soul, +probity, faith—such distinguished virtue of every kind, as to be equal +to our ancestors. In learning, indeed, and all kinds of literature, +Greece did excel us, and it was easy to do so where there was no +competition; for while among the Greeks the poets were the most ancient +species of learned men—since Homer and Hesiod lived before the +foundation of Rome, and Archilochus<a id="FNA-1"></a><a href="#FN-1"><sup>1</sup></a> was a contemporary of Romulus—we +received poetry much later. For it was about five hundred and ten years +after the building of Rome before Livius<a id="FNA-2"></a><a href="#FN-2"><sup>2</sup></a> published a play in the +consulship of C. Claudius, the son of Cæcus, and M. Tuditanus, a year +before the birth of Ennius, who was older than Plautus and Nævius.</p> + +<p>II. It was, therefore, late before poets were either known or received +among us; though we find in Cato de Originibus that the guests used, at +their entertainments, to sing the praises of famous men to the sound of +the flute; but a speech of Cato’s shows this kind of poetry to have been +in no great esteem, as he censures Marcus Nobilior for carrying poets +with him into his province; for that consul, as we know, carried Ennius +with him into Ætolia. Therefore the less esteem poets were in, the less +were <a id="page-10"></a><span class="pgnum">10</span>those studies pursued; though even then those who did display the +greatest abilities that way were not very inferior to the Greeks. Do we +imagine that if it had been considered commendable in Fabius,<a id="FNA-3"></a><a href="#FN-3"><sup>3</sup></a> a man +of the highest rank, to paint, we should not have had many Polycleti and +Parrhasii? Honor nourishes art, and glory is the spur with all to +studies; while those studies are always neglected in every nation which +are looked upon disparagingly. The Greeks held skill in vocal and +instrumental music as a very important accomplishment, and therefore it +is recorded of Epaminondas, who, in my opinion, was the greatest man +among the Greeks, that he played excellently on the flute; and +Themistocles, some years before, was deemed ignorant because at an +entertainment he declined the lyre when it was offered to him. For this +reason musicians flourished in Greece; music was a general study; and +whoever was unacquainted with it was not considered as fully instructed +in learning. Geometry was in high esteem with them, therefore none were +more honorable than mathematicians. But we have confined this art to +bare measuring and calculating.</p> + +<p>III. But, on the contrary, we early entertained an esteem for the +orator; though he was not at first a man of learning, but only quick at +speaking: in subsequent times he became learned; for it is reported that +Galba, Africanus, and Lælius were men of learning; and that even Cato, +who preceded them in point of time, was a studious man: then succeeded +the Lepidi, Carbo, and Gracchi, and so many great orators after them, +down to our own times, that we were very little, if at all, inferior to +the Greeks. Philosophy has been at a low ebb even to this present time, +and has had no assistance from our own language, and so now I have +undertaken to raise and illustrate it, in order that, as I have been of +service to my countrymen, when employed on public affairs, I may, if +possible, be so likewise in my retirement; and in this I must take the +more pains, because there are already many books in the <a id="page-11"></a><span class="pgnum">11</span>Latin language +which are said to be written inaccurately, having been composed by +excellent men, only not of sufficient learning; for, indeed, it is +possible that a man may think well, and yet not be able to express his +thoughts elegantly; but for any one to publish thoughts which he can +neither arrange skilfully nor illustrate so as to entertain his reader, +is an unpardonable abuse of letters and retirement: they, therefore, +read their books to one another, and no one ever takes them up but those +who wish to have the same license for careless writing allowed to +themselves. Wherefore, if oratory has acquired any reputation from my +industry, I shall take the more pains to open the fountains of +philosophy, from which all my eloquence has taken its rise.</p> + +<p>IV. But, as Aristotle,<a id="FNA-4"></a><a href="#FN-4"><sup>4</sup></a> a man of the greatest genius, and of the most +various knowledge, being excited by the glory of the rhetorician +Isocrates,<a id="FNA-5"></a><a href="#FN-5"><sup>5</sup></a> commenced teaching young men to speak, and joined +philosophy with eloquence: so it is my design not to lay aside my former +study of oratory, and yet to employ myself at the same time in this +greater and more fruitful art; for I have always thought that to be able +to speak copiously and elegantly on the most important questions was the +most perfect philosophy. And I have so diligently applied myself to this +pursuit, that I have already ventured to have a school like the Greeks. +And lately when you left us, having many of my friends about me, I +attempted at my Tusculan villa what I could do in that way; for as I +formerly used to practise declaiming, which nobody continued longer than +myself, so this is now to be the declamation of my old age. I desired +any one to propose a question which he wished to have discussed, and +then I argued that point either sitting or walking; and so I have +compiled the scholæ, as the Greeks call them, of five days, in as many +books. We proceeded in this manner: when he who had proposed the subject +for discussion had said what he thought proper, I <a id="page-12"></a><span class="pgnum">12</span>spoke against him; +for this is, you know, the old and Socratic method of arguing against +another’s opinion; for Socrates thought that thus the truth would more +easily be arrived at. But to give you a better notion of our +disputations, I will not barely send you an account of them, but +represent them to you as they were carried on; therefore let the +introduction be thus:</p> + +<p>V. <i>A.</i> To me death seems to be an evil.</p> + +<p><i>M.</i> What, to those who are already dead? or to those who must die?</p> + +<p><i>A.</i> To both.</p> + +<p><i>M.</i> It is a misery, then, because an evil?</p> + +<p><i>A.</i> Certainly.</p> + +<p><i>M.</i> Then those who have already died, and those who have still got to +die, are both miserable?</p> + +<p><i>A.</i> So it appears to me.</p> + +<p><i>M.</i> Then all are miserable?</p> + +<p><i>A.</i> Every one.</p> + +<p><i>M.</i> And, indeed, if you wish to be consistent, all that are already +born, or ever shall be, are not only miserable, but always will be so; +for should you maintain those only to be miserable, you would not except +any one living, for all must die; but there should be an end of misery +in death. But seeing that the dead are miserable, we are born to eternal +misery, for they must of consequence be miserable who died a hundred +thousand years ago; or rather, all that have ever been born.</p> + +<p><i>A.</i> So, indeed, I think.</p> + +<p><i>M.</i> Tell me, I beseech you, are you afraid of the three-headed Cerberus +in the shades below, and the roaring waves of Cocytus, and the passage +over Acheron, and Tantalus expiring with thirst, while the water touches +his chin; and Sisyphus,</p> + +<div class="poem"> +<p>Who sweats with arduous toil in vain</p> +<p>The steepy summit of the mount to gain?</p> +</div> + +<p class="cont">Perhaps, too, you dread the inexorable judges, Minos and Rhadamanthus; +before whom neither L. Crassus nor M. Antonius can defend you; and +where, since the cause lies before Grecian judges, you will not even be +able to employ Demosthenes; but you must plead for yourself before a +<a id="page-13"></a><span class="pgnum">13</span>very great assembly. These things perhaps you dread, and therefore look +on death as an eternal evil.</p> + +<p>VI. <i>A.</i> Do you take me to be so imbecile as to give credit to such +things?</p> + +<p><i>M.</i> What, do you not believe them?</p> + +<p><i>A.</i> Not in the least.</p> + +<p><i>M.</i> I am sorry to hear that.</p> + +<p><i>A.</i> Why, I beg?</p> + +<p><i>M.</i> Because I could have been very eloquent in speaking against them.</p> + +<p><i>A.</i> And who could not on such a subject? or what trouble is it to +refute these monstrous inventions of the poets and painters?<a id="FNA-6"></a><a href="#FN-6"><sup>6</sup></a></p> + +<p><i>M.</i> And yet you have books of philosophers full of arguments against +these.</p> + +<p><i>A.</i> A great waste of time, truly! for who is so weak as to be concerned +about them?</p> + +<p><i>M.</i> If, then, there is no one miserable in the infernal regions, there +can be no one there at all.</p> + +<p><i>A.</i> I am altogether of that opinion.</p> + +<p><i>M.</i> Where, then, are those you call miserable? or what place do they +inhabit? For, if they exist at all, they must be somewhere.</p> + +<p><i>A.</i> I, indeed, am of opinion that they are nowhere.</p> + +<p><i>M.</i> Then they have no existence at all.</p> + +<p><i>A.</i> Even so, and yet they are miserable for this very reason, that they +have no existence.</p> + +<p><i>M.</i> I had rather now have you afraid of Cerberus than speak thus +inaccurately.</p> + +<p><i>A.</i> In what respect?</p> + +<p><i>M.</i> Because you admit him to exist whose existence you deny with the +same breath. Where now is your sagacity? When you say any one is +miserable, you say that he who does not exist, does exist.</p> + +<p><i>A.</i> I am not so absurd as to say that.</p> + +<p><a id="page-14"></a><span class="pgnum">14</span><i>M.</i> What is it that you do say, then?</p> + +<p><i>A.</i> I say, for instance, that Marcus Crassus is miserable in being +deprived of such great riches as his by death; that Cn. Pompey is +miserable in being taken from such glory and honor; and, in short, that +all are miserable who are deprived of this light of life.</p> + +<p><i>M.</i> You have returned to the same point, for to be miserable implies an +existence; but you just now denied that the dead had any existence: if, +then, they have not, they can be nothing; and if so, they are not even +miserable.</p> + +<p><i>A.</i> Perhaps I do not express what I mean, for I look upon this very +circumstance, not to exist after having existed, to be very miserable.</p> + +<p><i>M.</i> What, more so than not to have existed at all? Therefore, those who +are not yet born are miserable because they are not; and we ourselves, +if we are to be miserable after death, were miserable before we were +born: but I do not remember that I was miserable before I was born; and +I should be glad to know, if your memory is better, what you recollect +of yourself before you were born.</p> + +<p>VII. <i>A.</i> You are pleasant: as if I had said that those men are +miserable who are not born, and not that they are so who are dead.</p> + +<p><i>M.</i> You say, then, that they are so?</p> + +<p><i>A.</i> Yes; I say that because they no longer exist after having existed +they are miserable.</p> + +<p><i>M.</i> You do not perceive that you are asserting contradictions; for what +is a greater contradiction, than that that should be not only miserable, +but should have any existence at all, which does not exist? When you go +out at the Capene gate and see the tombs of the Calatini, the Scipios, +Servilii, and Metelli, do you look on them as miserable?</p> + +<p><i>A.</i> Because you press me with a word, henceforward I will not say they +are miserable absolutely, but miserable on this account, because they +have no existence.</p> + +<p><i>M.</i> You do not say, then, “M. Crassus is miserable,” but only +“Miserable M. Crassus.”</p> + +<p><i>A.</i> Exactly so.</p> + +<p><i>M.</i> As if it did not follow that whatever you speak of <a id="page-15"></a><span class="pgnum">15</span>in that manner +either is or is not. Are you not acquainted with the first principles of +logic? For this is the first thing they lay down, Whatever is asserted +(for that is the best way that occurs to me, at the moment, of rendering +the Greek term <span class="greek">ἀξίωμα</span>; if I can think of a more accurate expression +hereafter, I will use it), is asserted as being either true or false. +When, therefore, you say, “Miserable M. Crassus,” you either say this, +“M. Crassus is miserable,” so that some judgment may be made whether it +is true or false, or you say nothing at all.</p> + +<p><i>A.</i> Well, then, I now own that the dead are not miserable, since you +have drawn from me a concession that they who do not exist at all can +not be miserable. What then? We that are alive, are we not wretched, +seeing we must die? for what is there agreeable in life, when we must +night and day reflect that, at some time or other, we must die?</p> + +<p>VIII. <i>M.</i> Do you not, then, perceive how great is the evil from which +you have delivered human nature?</p> + +<p><i>A.</i> By what means?</p> + +<p><i>M.</i> Because, if to die were miserable to the dead, to live would be a +kind of infinite and eternal misery. Now, however, I see a goal, and +when I have reached it, there is nothing more to be feared; but you seem +to me to follow the opinion of Epicharmus,<a id="FNA-7"></a><a href="#FN-7"><sup>7</sup></a> a man of some discernment, +and sharp enough for a Sicilian.</p> + +<p><i>A.</i> What opinion? for I do not recollect it.</p> + +<p><i>M.</i> I will tell you if I can in Latin; for you know I am no more used +to bring in Latin sentences in a Greek discourse than Greek in a Latin +one.</p> + +<p><i>A.</i> And that is right enough. But what is that opinion of Epicharmus?</p> + +<p class="nodist"><i>M.</i></p> + +<div class="poem"> +<p>I would not die, but yet</p> +<p>Am not concerned that I shall be dead.</p> +</div> + +<p><i>A.</i> I now recollect the Greek; but since you have <a id="page-16"></a><span class="pgnum">16</span>obliged me to grant +that the dead are not miserable, proceed to convince me that it is not +miserable to be under a necessity of dying.</p> + +<p><i>M.</i> That is easy enough; but I have greater things in hand.</p> + +<p><i>A.</i> How comes that to be so easy? And what are those things of more +consequence?</p> + +<p><i>M.</i> Thus: because, if there is no evil after death, then even death +itself can be none; for that which immediately succeeds that is a state +where you grant that there is no evil: so that even to be obliged to die +can be no evil, for that is only the being obliged to arrive at a place +where we allow that no evil is.</p> + +<p><i>A.</i> I beg you will be more explicit on this point, for these subtle +arguments force me sooner to admissions than to conviction. But what are +those more important things about which you say that you are occupied?</p> + +<p><i>M.</i> To teach you, if I can, that death is not only no evil, but a good.</p> + +<p><i>A.</i> I do not insist on that, but should be glad to hear you argue it, +for even though you should not prove your point, yet you will prove that +death is no evil. But I will not interrupt you; I would rather hear a +continued discourse.</p> + +<p><i>M.</i> What, if I should ask you a question, would you not answer?</p> + +<p><i>A.</i> That would look like pride; but I would rather you should not ask +but where necessity requires.</p> + +<p>IX. <i>M.</i> I will comply with your wishes, and explain as well as I can +what you require; but not with any idea that, like the Pythian Apollo, +what I say must needs be certain and indisputable, but as a mere man, +endeavoring to arrive at probabilities by conjecture, for I have no +ground to proceed further on than probability. Those men may call their +statements indisputable who assert that what they say can be perceived +by the senses, and who proclaim themselves philosophers by profession.</p> + +<p><i>A.</i> Do as you please: We are ready to hear you.</p> + +<p><i>M.</i> The first thing, then, is to inquire what death, which seems to be +so well understood, really is; for some imagine death to be the +departure of the soul from the body; <a id="page-17"></a><span class="pgnum">17</span>others think that there is no such +departure, but that soul and body perish together, and that the soul is +extinguished with the body. Of those who think that the soul does depart +from the body, some believe in its immediate dissolution; others fancy +that it continues to exist for a time; and others believe that it lasts +forever. There is great dispute even what the soul is, where it is, and +whence it is derived: with some, the heart itself (<i>cor</i>) seems to be +the soul, hence the expressions, <i>excordes</i>, <i>vecordes</i>, <i>concordes;</i> and that +prudent Nasica, who was twice consul, was called Corculus, <i>i.e.</i>, +wise-heart; and Ælius Sextus is described as <i>Egregie</i> cordatus <i>homo, +catus Æliu’ Sextus</i>—that great <i>wise-hearted</i> man, sage Ælius. +Empedocles imagines the blood, which is suffused over the heart, to be +the soul; to others, a certain part of the brain seems to be the throne +of the soul; others neither allow the heart itself, nor any portion of +the brain, to be the soul, but think either that the heart is the seat +and abode of the soul, or else that the brain is so. Some would have the +soul, or spirit, to be the <i>anima</i>, as our schools generally agree; and +indeed the name signifies as much, for we use the expressions <i>animam +agere</i>, to live; <i>animam efflare</i>, to expire; <i>animosi</i>, men of spirit; +<i>bene animati</i>, men of right feeling; <i>exanimi sententia</i>, according to +our real opinion; and the very word <i>animus</i> is derived from <i>anima</i>. +Again, the soul seems to Zeno the Stoic to be fire.</p> + +<p>X. But what I have said as to the heart, the blood, the brain, air, or +fire being the soul, are common opinions: the others are only +entertained by individuals; and, indeed, there were many among the +ancients who held singular opinions on this subject, of whom the latest +was Aristoxenus, a man who was both a musician and a philosopher. He +maintained a certain straining of the body, like what is called harmony +in music, to be the soul, and believed that, from the figure and nature +of the whole body, various motions are excited, as sounds are from an +instrument. He adhered steadily to his system, and yet he said +something, the nature of which, whatever it was, had been detailed and +explained a great while before by Plato. Xenocrates denied that the soul +had any figure, or anything like a body; but said it was a number, the +power of which, as <a id="page-18"></a><span class="pgnum">18</span>Pythagoras had fancied, some ages before, was the +greatest in nature: his master, Plato, imagined a threefold soul, a +dominant portion of which—that is to say, reason—he had lodged in the +head, as in a tower; and the other two parts—namely, anger and +desire—he made subservient to this one, and allotted them distinct +abodes, placing anger in the breast, and desire under the præcordia. But +Dicæarchus, in that discourse of some learned disputants, held at +Corinth, which he details to us in three books—in the first book +introduces many speakers; and in the other two he introduces a certain +Pherecrates, an old man of Phthia, who, as he said, was descended from +Deucalion; asserting, that there is in fact no such thing at all as a +soul, but that it is a name without a meaning; and that it is idle to +use the expression “animals,” or “animated beings;” that neither men nor +beasts have minds or souls, but that all that power by which we act or +perceive is equally infused into every living creature, and is +inseparable from the body, for if it were not, it would be nothing; nor +is there anything whatever really existing except body, which is a +single and simple thing, so fashioned as to live and have its sensations +in consequence of the regulations of nature. Aristotle, a man superior +to all others, both in genius and industry (I always except Plato), +after having embraced these four known sorts of principles, from which +all things deduce their origin, imagines that there is a certain fifth +nature, from whence comes the soul; for to think, to foresee, to learn, +to teach, to invent anything, and many other attributes of the same +kind, such as to remember, to love, to hate, to desire, to fear, to be +pleased or displeased—these, and others like them, exist, he thinks, in +none of those first four kinds: on such account he adds a fifth kind, +which has no name, and so by a new name he calls the soul <span class="greek">ἐνδελέχεια</span>, as +if it were a certain continued and perpetual motion.</p> + +<p>XI. If I have not forgotten anything unintentionally, these are the +principal opinions concerning the soul. I have omitted Democritus, a +very great man indeed, but one who deduces the soul from the fortuitous +concourse of small, light, and round substances; for, if you believe men +of his school, there is nothing which a crowd of atoms <a id="page-19"></a><span class="pgnum">19</span>cannot effect. +Which of these opinions is true, some God must determine. It is an +important question for us, Which has the most appearance of truth? Shall +we, then, prefer determining between them, or shall we return to our +subject?</p> + +<p><i>A.</i> I could wish both, if possible; but it is difficult to mix them: +therefore, if without a discussion of them we can get rid of the fears +of death, let us proceed to do so; but if this is not to be done without +explaining the question about souls, let us have that now, and the other +at another time.</p> + +<p><i>M.</i> I take that plan to be the best, which I perceive you are inclined +to; for reason will demonstrate that, whichever of the opinions which I +have stated is true, it must follow, then, that death cannot be an evil; +or that it must rather be something desirable; for if either the heart, +or the blood, or the brain, is the soul, then certainly the soul, being +corporeal, must perish with the rest of the body; if it is air, it will +perhaps be dissolved; if it is fire, it will be extinguished; if it is +Aristoxenus’s harmony, it will be put out of tune. What shall I say of +Dicæarchus, who denies that there is any soul? In all these opinions, +there is nothing to affect any one after death; for all feeling is lost +with life, and where there is no sensation, nothing can interfere to +affect us. The opinions of others do indeed bring us hope; if it is any +pleasure to you to think that souls, after they leave the body, may go +to heaven as to a permanent home.</p> + +<p><i>A.</i> I have great pleasure in that thought, and it is what I most +desire; and even if it should not be so, I should still be very willing +to believe it.</p> + +<p><i>M.</i> What occasion have you, then, for my assistance? Am I superior to +Plato in eloquence? Turn over carefully his book that treats of the +soul; you will have there all that you can want.</p> + +<p><i>A.</i> I have, indeed, done that, and often; but, I know not how it comes +to pass, I agree with it while I am reading it; but when I have laid +down the book, and begin to reflect with myself on the immortality of +the soul, all that agreement vanishes.</p> + +<p><i>M.</i> How comes that? Do you admit this—that souls <a id="page-20"></a><span class="pgnum">20</span>either exist after +death, or else that they also perish at the moment of death?</p> + +<p><i>A.</i> I agree to that. And if they do exist, I admit that they are happy; +but if they perish, I cannot suppose them to be unhappy, because, in +fact, they have no existence at all. You drove me to that concession but +just now.</p> + +<p><i>M.</i> How, then, can you, or why do you, assert that you think that death +is an evil, when it either makes us happy, in the case of the soul +continuing to exist, or, at all events, not unhappy, in the case of our +becoming destitute of all sensation?</p> + +<p>XII. <i>A.</i> Explain, therefore, if it is not troublesome to you, first, if +you can, that souls do exist after death; secondly, should you fail in +that (and it is a very difficult thing to establish), that death is free +from all evil; for I am not without my fears that this itself is an +evil: I do not mean the immediate deprivation of sense, but the fact +that we shall hereafter suffer deprivation.</p> + +<p><i>M.</i> I have the best authority in support of the opinion you desire to +have established, which ought, and generally has, great weight in all +cases. And, first, I have all antiquity on that side, which the more +near it is to its origin and divine descent, the more clearly, perhaps, +on that account, did it discern the truth in these matters. This very +doctrine, then, was adopted by all those ancients whom Ennius calls in +the Sabine tongue Casci; namely, that in death there was a sensation, +and that, when men departed this life, they were not so entirely +destroyed as to perish absolutely. And this may appear from many other +circumstances, and especially from the pontifical rites and funeral +obsequies, which men of the greatest genius would not have been so +solicitous about, and would not have guarded from any injury by such +severe laws, but from a firm persuasion that death was not so entire a +destruction as wholly to abolish and destroy everything, but rather a +kind of transmigration, as it were, and change of life, which was, in +the case of illustrious men and women, usually a guide to heaven, while +in that of others it was still confined to the earth, but in such a +manner as still to exist. From this, and the sentiments of the Romans,</p> + +<div class="poem"> +<p>In heaven Romulus with Gods now lives,</p> +</div> + +<p class="cont"><a id="page-21"></a><span class="pgnum">21</span>as Ennius saith, agreeing with the common belief; hence, too, Hercules +is considered so great and propitious a God among the Greeks, and from +them he was introduced among us, and his worship has extended even to +the very ocean itself. This is how it was that Bacchus was deified, the +offspring of Semele; and from the same illustrious fame we receive +Castor and Pollux as Gods, who are reported not only to have helped the +Romans to victory in their battles, but to have been the messengers of +their success. What shall we say of Ino, the daughter of Cadmus? Is she +not called Leucothea by the Greeks, and Matuta by us? Nay, more; is not +the whole of heaven (not to dwell on particulars) almost filled with the +offspring of men?</p> + +<p>Should I attempt to search into antiquity, and produce from thence what +the Greek writers have asserted, it would appear that even those who are +called their principal Gods were taken from among men up into heaven.</p> + +<p>XIII. Examine the sepulchres of those which are shown in Greece; +recollect, for you have been initiated, what lessons are taught in the +mysteries; then will you perceive how extensive this doctrine is. But +they who were not acquainted with natural philosophy (for it did not +begin to be in vogue till many years later) had no higher belief than +what natural reason could give them; they were not acquainted with the +principles and causes of things; they were often induced by certain +visions, and those generally in the night, to think that those men who +had departed from this life were still alive. And this may further be +brought as an irrefragable argument for us to believe that there are +Gods—that there never was any nation so barbarous, nor any people in +the world so savage, as to be without some notion of Gods. Many have +wrong notions of the Gods, for that is the nature and ordinary +consequence of bad customs, yet all allow that there is a certain divine +nature and energy. Nor does this proceed from the conversation of men, +or the agreement of philosophers; it is not an opinion established by +institutions or by laws; but, no doubt, in every case the consent of all +nations is to be looked on as a law of nature. Who is there, then, that +does not lament the loss of his friends, principally from <a id="page-22"></a><span class="pgnum">22</span>imagining +them deprived of the conveniences of life? Take away this opinion, and +you remove with it all grief; for no one is afflicted merely on account +of a loss sustained by himself. Perhaps we may be sorry, and grieve a +little; but that bitter lamentation and those mournful tears have their +origin in our apprehensions that he whom we loved is deprived of all the +advantages of life, and is sensible of his loss. And we are led to this +opinion by nature, without any arguments or any instruction.</p> + +<p>XIV. But the greatest proof of all is, that nature herself gives a +silent judgment in favor of the immortality of the soul, inasmuch as all +are anxious, and that to a great degree, about the things which concern +futurity:</p> + +<div class="poem"> +<p>One plants what future ages shall enjoy,</p> +</div> + +<p class="cont">as Statius saith in his Synephebi. What is his object in doing so, +except that he is interested in posterity? Shall the industrious +husbandman, then, plant trees the fruit of which he shall never see? And +shall not the great man found laws, institutions, and a republic? What +does the procreation of children imply, and our care to continue our +names, and our adoptions, and our scrupulous exactness in drawing up +wills, and the inscriptions on monuments, and panegyrics, but that our +thoughts run on futurity? There is no doubt but a judgment may be formed +of nature in general, from looking at each nature in its most perfect +specimens; and what is a more perfect specimen of a man than those are +who look on themselves as born for the assistance, the protection, and +the preservation of others? Hercules has gone to heaven; he never would +have gone thither had he not, while among men, made that road for +himself. These things are of old date, and have, besides, the sanction +of universal religion.</p> + +<p>XV. What will you say? What do you imagine that so many and such great +men of our republic, who have sacrificed their lives for its good, +expected? Do you believe that they thought that their names should not +continue beyond their lives? None ever encountered death for their +country but under a firm persuasion of immortality! Themistocles might +have lived at his ease; so might Epaminondas; and, not to look abroad +and among the ancients <a id="page-23"></a><span class="pgnum">23</span>for instances, so might I myself. But, somehow +or other there clings to our minds a certain presage of future ages; and +this both exists most firmly, and appears most clearly, in men of the +loftiest genius and greatest souls. Take away this, and who would be so +mad as to spend his life amidst toils and dangers? I speak of those in +power. What are the poet’s views but to be ennobled after death? What +else is the object of these lines,</p> + +<div class="poem"> +<p>Behold old Ennius here, who erst</p> +<p>Thy fathers’ great exploits rehearsed?</p> +</div> + +<p class="cont">He is challenging the reward of glory from those men whose ancestors he +himself had ennobled by his poetry. And in the same spirit he says, in +another passage,</p> + +<div class="poem"> +<p>Let none with tears my funeral grace, for I</p> +<p>Claim from my works an immortality.</p> +</div> + +<p class="cont">Why do I mention poets? The very mechanics are desirous of fame after +death. Why did Phidias include a likeness of himself in the shield of +Minerva, when he was not allowed to inscribe his name on it? What do our +philosophers think on the subject? Do not they put their names to those +very books which they write on the contempt of glory? If, then, +universal consent is the voice of nature, and if it is the general +opinion everywhere that those who have quitted this life are still +interested in something, we also must subscribe to that opinion. And if +we think that men of the greatest abilities and virtues see most clearly +into the power of nature, because they themselves are her most perfect +work, it is very probable that, as every great man is especially anxious +to benefit posterity, there is something of which he himself will be +sensible after death.</p> + +<p>XVI. But as we are led by nature to think there are Gods, and as we +discover, by reason, of what description they are, so, by the consent of +all nations, we are induced to believe that our souls survive; but where +their habitation is, and of what character they eventually are, must be +learned from reason. The want of any certain reason on which to argue +has given rise to the idea of the shades below, and to those fears which +you seem, not without <a id="page-24"></a><span class="pgnum">24</span>reason, to despise; for as our bodies fall to the +ground, and are covered with earth (<i>humus</i>), from whence we derive the +expression to be interred (<i>humari</i>), that has occasioned men to imagine +that the dead continue, during the remainder of their existence, under +ground; which opinion has drawn after it many errors, which the poets +have increased; for the theatre, being frequented by a large crowd, +among which are women and children, is wont to be greatly affected on +hearing such pompous verses as these,</p> + +<div class="poem"> +<p>Lo! here I am, who scarce could gain this place,</p> +<p>Through stony mountains and a dreary waste;</p> +<p>Through cliffs, whose sharpen’d stones tremendous hung,</p> +<p>Where dreadful darkness spread itself around.</p> +</div> + +<p class="cont">And the error prevailed so much, though indeed at present it seems to me +to be removed, that although men knew that the bodies of the dead had +been burned, yet they conceived such things to be done in the infernal +regions as could not be executed or imagined without a body; for they +could not conceive how disembodied souls could exist; and, therefore, +they looked out for some shape or figure. This was the origin of all +that account of the dead in Homer. This was the idea that caused my +friend Appius to frame his Necromancy; and this is how there got about +that idea of the lake of Avernus, in my neighborhood,</p> + +<div class="poem"> +<p>From whence the souls of undistinguish’d shape,</p> +<p>Clad in thick shade, rush from the open gate</p> +<p>Of Acheron, vain phantoms of the dead.</p> +</div> + +<p class="cont">And they must needs have these appearances speak, which is not possible +without a tongue, and a palate, and jaws, and without the help of lungs +and sides, and without some shape or figure; for they could see nothing +by their mind alone—they referred all to their eyes. To withdraw the +mind from sensual objects, and abstract our thoughts from what we are +accustomed to, is an attribute of great genius. I am persuaded, indeed, +that there were many such men in former ages; but Pherecydes<a id="FNA-8"></a><a href="#FN-8"><sup>8</sup></a> the +Syrian is the <a id="page-25"></a><span class="pgnum">25</span>first on record who said that the souls of men were +immortal, and he was a philosopher of great antiquity, in the reign of +my namesake Tullius. His disciple Pythagoras greatly confirmed this +opinion, who came into Italy in the reign of Tarquin the Proud; and all +that country which is called Great Greece was occupied by his school, +and he himself was held in high honor, and had the greatest authority; +and the Pythagorean sect was for many ages after in such great credit, +that all learning was believed to be confined to that name.</p> + +<p>XVII. But I return to the ancients. They scarcely ever gave any reason +for their opinion but what could be explained by numbers or definitions. +It is reported of Plato that he came into Italy to make himself +acquainted with the Pythagoreans; and that when there, among others, he +made an acquaintance with Archytas<a id="FNA-9"></a><a href="#FN-9"><sup>9</sup></a> and Timæus,<a id="FNA-10"></a><a href="#FN-10"><sup>10</sup></a> and learned from +them all the tenets of the Pythagoreans; and that he not only was of the +same opinion with Pythagoras concerning the immortality of the soul, but +that he also brought reasons in support of it; which, if you have +nothing to say against it, I will pass over, and say no more at present +about all this hope of immortality.</p> + +<p><i>A.</i> What, will you leave me when you have raised my expectations so +high? I had rather, so help me Hercules! be mistaken with Plato, whom I +know how much you esteem, and whom I admire myself, from what you say of +him, than be in the right with those others.</p> + +<p><a id="page-26"></a><span class="pgnum">26</span><i>M.</i> I commend you; for, indeed, I could myself willingly be mistaken +in his company. Do we, then, doubt, as we do in other cases (though I +think here is very little room for doubt in this case, for the +mathematicians prove the facts to us), that the earth is placed in the +midst of the world, being, as it were, a sort of point, which they call +a <span class="greek">κέντρον</span>, surrounded by the whole heavens; and that such is the nature +of the four principles which are the generating causes of all things, +that they have equally divided among them the constituents of all +bodies; moreover, that earthy and humid bodies are carried at equal +angles by their own weight and ponderosity into the earth and sea; that +the other two parts consist, one of fire, and the other of air? As the +two former are carried by their gravity and weight into the middle +region of the world, so these, on the other hand, ascend by right lines +into the celestial regions, either because, owing to their intrinsic +nature, they are always endeavoring to reach the highest place, or else +because lighter bodies are naturally repelled by heavier; and as this is +notoriously the case, it must evidently follow that souls, when once +they have departed from the body, whether they are animal (by which term +I mean capable of breathing) or of the nature of fire, must mount +upward. But if the soul is some number, as some people assert, speaking +with more subtlety than clearness, or if it is that fifth nature, for +which it would be more correct to say that we have not given a name to +than that we do not correctly understand it—still it is too pure and +perfect not to go to a great distance from the earth. Something of this +sort, then, we must believe the soul to be, that we may not commit the +folly of thinking that so active a principle lies immerged in the heart +or brain; or, as Empedocles would have it, in the blood.</p> + +<p>XVIII. We will pass over Dicæarchus,<a id="FNA-11"></a><a href="#FN-11"><sup>11</sup></a> with his contemporary and +fellow-disciple Aristoxenus,<a id="FNA-12"></a><a href="#FN-12"><sup>12</sup></a> both indeed <a id="page-27"></a><span class="pgnum">27</span>men of learning. One of +them seems never even to have been affected with grief, as he could not +perceive that he had a soul; while the other is so pleased with his +musical compositions that he endeavors to show an analogy betwixt them +and souls. Now, we may understand harmony to arise from the intervals of +sounds, whose various compositions occasion many harmonies; but I do not +see how a disposition of members, and the figure of a body without a +soul, can occasion harmony. He had better, learned as he is, leave these +speculations to his master Aristotle, and follow his own trade as a +musician. Good advice is given him in that Greek proverb,</p> + +<div class="poem"> +<p>Apply your talents where you best are skill’d.</p> +</div> + +<p class="cont">I will have nothing at all to do with that fortuitous concourse of +individual light and round bodies, notwithstanding Democritus insists on +their being warm and having breath, that is to say, life. But this soul, +which is compounded of either of the four principles from which we +assert that all things are derived, is of inflamed air, as seems +particularly to have been the opinion of Panætius, and must necessarily +mount upward; for air and fire have no tendency downward, but always +ascend; so should they be dissipated that must be at some distance from +the earth; but should they remain, and preserve their original state, it +is clearer still that they must be carried heavenward, and this gross +and concrete air, which is nearest the earth, must be divided and broken +by them; for the soul is warmer, or rather hotter, than that air, which +I just now called gross and concrete: and this may be made evident from +this consideration—that our bodies, being compounded of the earthy +class of principles, grow warm by the heat of the soul.</p> + +<p>XIX. We may add, that the soul can the more easily escape from this air, +which I have often named, and break <a id="page-28"></a><span class="pgnum">28</span>through it, because nothing is +swifter than the soul; no swiftness is comparable to the swiftness of +the soul, which, should it remain uncorrupt and without alteration, must +necessarily be carried on with such velocity as to penetrate and divide +all this atmosphere, where clouds, and rain, and winds are formed, +which, in consequence of the exhalations from the earth, is moist and +dark: but, when the soul has once got above this region, and falls in +with, and recognizes, a nature like its own, it then rests upon fires +composed of a combination of thin air and a moderate solar heat, and +does not aim at any higher flight; for then, after it has attained a +lightness and heat resembling its own, it moves no more, but remains +steady, being balanced, as it were, between two equal weights. That, +then, is its natural seat where it has penetrated to something like +itself, and where, wanting nothing further, it may be supported and +maintained by the same aliment which nourishes and maintains the stars.</p> + +<p>Now, as we are usually incited to all sorts of desires by the stimulus +of the body, and the more so as we endeavor to rival those who are in +possession of what we long for, we shall certainly be happy when, being +emancipated from that body, we at the same time get rid of these desires +and this rivalry. And that which we do at present, when, dismissing all +other cares, we curiously examine and look into anything, we shall then +do with greater freedom; and we shall employ ourselves entirely in the +contemplation and examination of things; because there is naturally in +our minds a certain insatiable desire to know the truth, and the very +region itself where we shall arrive, as it gives us a more intuitive and +easy knowledge of celestial things, will raise our desires after +knowledge. For it was this beauty of the heavens, as seen even here upon +earth, which gave birth to that national and hereditary philosophy (as +Theophrastus calls it), which was thus excited to a desire of knowledge. +But those persons will in a most especial degree enjoy this philosophy, +who, while they were only inhabitants of this world and enveloped in +darkness, were still desirous of looking into these things with the eye +of their mind.</p> + +<p>XX. For if those men now think that they have attained <a id="page-29"></a><span class="pgnum">29</span>something who +have seen the mouth of the Pontus, and those straits which were passed +by the ship called Argo, because,</p> + +<div class="poem"> +<p>From Argos she did chosen men convey,</p> +<p>Bound to fetch back the Golden Fleece, their prey;</p> +</div> + +<p class="cont">or those who have seen the straits of the ocean,</p> + +<div class="poem"> +<p>Where the swift waves divide the neighboring shores</p> +<p>Of Europe, and of Afric;</p> +</div> + +<p class="cont">what kind of sight do you imagine that will be when the whole earth is +laid open to our view? and that, too, not only in its position, form, +and boundaries, nor those parts of it only which are habitable, but +those also that lie uncultivated, through the extremities of heat and +cold to which they are exposed; for not even now is it with our eyes +that we view what we see, for the body itself has no senses; but (as the +naturalists, ay, and even the physicians assure us, who have opened our +bodies, and examined them) there are certain perforated channels from +the seat of the soul to the eyes, ears, and nose; so that frequently, +when either prevented by meditation, or the force of some bodily +disorder, we neither hear nor see, though our eyes and ears are open and +in good condition; so that we may easily apprehend that it is the soul +itself which sees and hears, and not those parts which are, as it were, +but windows to the soul, by means of which, however, she can perceive +nothing, unless she is on the spot, and exerts herself. How shall we +account for the fact that by the same power of thinking we comprehend +the most different things—as color, taste, heat, smell, and +sound—which the soul could never know by her five messengers, unless +every thing were referred to her, and she were the sole judge of all? +And we shall certainly discover these things in a more clear and perfect +degree when the soul is disengaged from the body, and has arrived at +that goal to which nature leads her; for at present, notwithstanding +nature has contrived, with the greatest skill, those channels which lead +from the body to the soul, yet are they, in some way or other, stopped +up with earthy and concrete bodies; but when we shall be nothing but +soul, then nothing will interfere <a id="page-30"></a><span class="pgnum">30</span>to prevent our seeing everything in +its real substance and in its true character.</p> + +<p>XXI. It is true, I might expatiate, did the subject require it, on the +many and various objects with which the soul will be entertained in +those heavenly regions; when I reflect on which, I am apt to wonder at +the boldness of some philosophers, who are so struck with admiration at +the knowledge of nature as to thank, in an exulting manner, the first +inventor and teacher of natural philosophy, and to reverence him as a +God; for they declare that they have been delivered by his means from +the greatest tyrants, a perpetual terror, and a fear that molested them +by night and day. What is this dread—this fear? What old woman is there +so weak as to fear these things, which you, forsooth, had you not been +acquainted with natural philosophy, would stand in awe of?</p> + +<div class="poem"> +<p>The hallow’d roofs of Acheron, the dread</p> +<p>Of Orcus, the pale regions of the dead.</p> +</div> + +<p class="cont">And does it become a philosopher to boast that he is not afraid of these +things, and that he has discovered them to be false? And from this we +may perceive how acute these men were by nature, who, if they had been +left without any instruction, would have believed in these things. But +now they have certainly made a very fine acquisition in learning that +when the day of their death arrives, they will perish entirely. And if +that really is the case—for I say nothing either way—what is there +agreeable or glorious in it? Not that I see any reason why the opinion +of Pythagoras and Plato may not be true; but even although Plato were to +have assigned no reason for his opinion (observe how much I esteem the +man), the weight of his authority would have borne me down; but he has +brought so many reasons, that he appears to me to have endeavored to +convince others, and certainly to have convinced himself.</p> + +<p>XXII. But there are many who labor on the other side of the question, +and condemn souls to death, as if they were criminals capitally +convicted; nor have they any other reason to allege why the immortality +of the soul appears to them to be incredible, except that they are not +<a id="page-31"></a><span class="pgnum">31</span>able to conceive what sort of thing the soul can be when disentangled +from the body; just as if they could really form a correct idea as to +what sort of thing it is, even when it is in the body; what its form, +and size, and abode are; so that were they able to have a full view of +all that is now hidden from them in a living body, they have no idea +whether the soul would be discernible by them, or whether it is of so +fine a texture that it would escape their sight. Let those consider +this, who say that they are unable to form any idea of the soul without +the body, and then they will see whether they can form any adequate idea +of what it is when it is in the body. For my own part, when I reflect on +the nature of the soul, it appears to me a far more perplexing and +obscure question to determine what is its character while it is in the +body—a place which, as it were, does not belong to it—than to imagine +what it is when it leaves it, and has arrived at the free æther, which +is, if I may so say, its proper, its own habitation. For unless we are +to say that we cannot apprehend the character or nature of anything +which we have never seen, we certainly may be able to form some notion +of God, and of the divine soul when released from the body. Dicæarchus, +indeed, and Aristoxenus, because it was hard to understand the existence +and substance and nature of the soul, asserted that there was no such +thing as a soul at all. It is, indeed, the most difficult thing +imaginable to discern the soul by the soul. And this, doubtless, is the +meaning of the precept of Apollo, which advises every one to know +himself. For I do not apprehend the meaning of the God to have been that +we should understand our members, our stature, and form; for we are not +merely bodies; nor, when I say these things to you, am I addressing +myself to your body: when, therefore, he says, “Know yourself,” he says +this, “Inform yourself of the nature of your soul;” for the body is but +a kind of vessel, or receptacle of the soul, and whatever your soul does +is your own act. To know the soul, then, unless it had been divine, +would not have been a precept of such excellent wisdom as to be +attributed to a God; but even though the soul should not know of what +nature itself is, will you say that it does not even perceive that <a id="page-32"></a><span class="pgnum">32</span>it +exists at all, or that it has motion? On which is founded that reason +of Plato’s, which is explained by Socrates in the Phædrus, and inserted +by me, in my sixth book of the Republic.</p> + +<p>XXIII. “That which is always moved is eternal; but that which gives +motion to something else, and is moved itself by some external cause, +when that motion ceases, must necessarily cease to exist. That, +therefore, alone, which is self-moved, because it is never forsaken by +itself, can never cease to be moved. Besides, it is the beginning and +principle of motion to everything else; but whatever is a principle has +no beginning, for all things arise from that principle, and it cannot +itself owe its rise to anything else; for then it would not be a +principle did it proceed from anything else. But if it has no beginning, +it never will have any end; for a principle which is once extinguished +cannot itself be restored by anything else, nor can it produce anything +else from itself; inasmuch as all things must necessarily arise from +some first cause. And thus it comes about that the first principle of +motion must arise from that thing which is itself moved by itself; and +that can neither have a beginning nor an end of its existence, for +otherwise the whole heaven and earth would be overset, and all nature +would stand still, and not be able to acquire any force by the impulse +of which it might be first set in motion. Seeing, then, that it is clear +that whatever moves itself is eternal, can there be any doubt that the +soul is so? For everything is inanimate which is moved by an external +force; but everything which is animate is moved by an interior force, +which also belongs to itself. For this is the peculiar nature and power +of the soul; and if the soul be the only thing in the whole world which +has the power of self-motion, then certainly it never had a beginning, +and therefore it is eternal.”</p> + +<p>Now, should all the lower order of philosophers (for so I think they may +be called who dissent from Plato and Socrates and that school) unite +their force, they never would be able to explain anything so elegantly +as this, nor even to understand how ingeniously this conclusion is +drawn. The soul, then, perceives itself to have motion, <a id="page-33"></a><span class="pgnum">33</span>and at the same +time that it gets that perception, it is sensible that it derives that +motion from its own power, and not from the agency of another; and it is +impossible that it should ever forsake itself. And these premises compel +you to allow its eternity, unless you have something to say against +them.</p> + +<p><i>A.</i> I should myself be very well pleased not to have even a thought +arise in my mind against them, so much am I inclined to that opinion.</p> + +<p>XXIV. <i>M.</i> Well, then, I appeal to you, if the arguments which prove +that there is something divine in the souls of men are not equally +strong? But if I could account for the origin of these divine +properties, then I might also be able to explain how they might cease to +exist; for I think I can account for the manner in which the blood, and +bile, and phlegm, and bones, and nerves, and veins, and all the limbs, +and the shape of the whole body, were put together and made; ay, and +even as to the soul itself, were there nothing more in it than a +principle of life, then the life of a man might be put upon the same +footing as that of a vine or any other tree, and accounted for as caused +by nature; for these things, as we say, live. Besides, if desires and +aversions were all that belonged to the soul, it would have them only in +common with the beasts; but it has, in the first place, memory, and +that, too, so infinite as to recollect an absolute countless number of +circumstances, which Plato will have to be a recollection of a former +life; for in that book which is inscribed Menon, Socrates asks a child +some questions in geometry, with reference to measuring a square; his +answers are such as a child would make, and yet the questions are so +easy, that while answering them, one by one, he comes to the same point +as if he had learned geometry. From whence Socrates would infer that +learning is nothing more than recollection; and this topic he explains +more accurately in the discourse which he held the very day he died; for +he there asserts that, any one, who seeming to be entirely illiterate, +is yet able to answer a question well that is proposed to him, does in +so doing manifestly show that he is not learning it then, but +recollecting it by his memory. Nor is it to be accounted for in any +other way, how children <a id="page-34"></a><span class="pgnum">34</span>come to have notions of so many and such +important things as are implanted, and, as it were, sealed up, in their +minds (which the Greeks call <span class="greek">ἔννοιαι</span>), unless the soul, before it +entered the body, had been well stored with knowledge. And as it had no +existence at all (for this is the invariable doctrine of Plato, who will +not admit anything to have a real existence which has a beginning and an +end, and who thinks that that alone does really exist which is of such a +character as what he calls <span class="greek">εἴδεα</span>, and we species), therefore, being shut +up in the body, it could not while in the body discover what it knows; +but it knew it before, and brought the knowledge with it, so that we are +no longer surprised at its extensive and multifarious knowledge. Nor +does the soul clearly discover its ideas at its first resort to this +abode to which it is so unaccustomed, and which is in so disturbed a +state; but after having refreshed and recollected itself, it then by its +memory recovers them; and, therefore, to learn implies nothing more than +to recollect. But I am in a particular manner surprised at memory. For +what is that faculty by which we remember? what is its force? what its +nature? I am not inquiring how great a memory Simonides<a id="FNA-13"></a><a href="#FN-13"><sup>13</sup></a> may be said +to have had, or Theodectes,<a id="FNA-14"></a><a href="#FN-14"><sup>14</sup></a> or that Cineas<a id="FNA-15"></a><a href="#FN-15"><sup>15</sup></a> who was sent to Rome +as ambassador from Pyrrhus; or, in more modern times, Charmadas;<a id="FNA-16"></a><a href="#FN-16"><sup>16</sup></a> or, +very lately, Metrodorus<a id="FNA-17"></a><a href="#FN-17"><sup>17</sup></a> <a id="page-35"></a><span class="pgnum">35</span>the Scepsian, or our own contemporary +Hortensius<a id="FNA-18"></a><a href="#FN-18"><sup>18</sup></a>: I am speaking of ordinary memory, and especially of +those men who are employed in any important study or art, the great +capacity of whose minds it is hard to estimate, such numbers of things +do they remember.</p> + +<p>XXV. Should you ask what this leads to, I think we may understand what +that power is, and whence we have it. It certainly proceeds neither from +the heart, nor from the blood, nor from the brain, nor from atoms; +whether it be air or fire, I know not, nor am I, as those men are, +ashamed, in cases where I am ignorant, to own that I am so. If in any +other obscure matter I were able to assert anything positively, then I +would swear that the soul, be it air or fire, is divine. Just think, I +beseech you: can you imagine this wonderful power of memory to be sown +in or to be a part of the composition of the earth, or of this dark and +gloomy atmosphere? Though you cannot apprehend what it is, yet you see +what kind of thing it is, or if you do not quite see that, yet you +certainly see how great it is. What, then? Shall we imagine that there +is a kind of measure in the soul, into which, as into a vessel, all that +we remember is poured? That indeed is absurd; for how shall we form any +idea of the bottom, or of the shape or fashion of such a soul as that? +And, again, how are we to conceive how much it is able to contain? Shall +we imagine the soul to receive impressions like wax, and memory to be +marks of the impressions made on the soul? What are the characters of +the words, what of the facts themselves? and what, again, is that +prodigious greatness which can give rise to impressions of so many +things? What, lastly, is that power which investigates secret things, +and is called invention and contrivance? Does that man seem to be +compounded of this earthly, mortal, and perishing nature who first +invented names for everything; <a id="page-36"></a><span class="pgnum">36</span>which, if you will believe Pythagoras, +is the highest pitch of wisdom? or he who collected the dispersed +inhabitants of the world, and united them in the bonds of social life? +or he who confined the sounds of the voice, which used to seem infinite, +to the marks of a few letters? or he who first observed the courses of +the planets, their progressive motions, their laws? These were all great +men. But they were greater still who invented food, and raiment, and +houses; who introduced civilization among us, and armed us against the +wild beasts; by whom we were made sociable and polished, and so +proceeded from the necessaries of life to its embellishments. For we +have provided great entertainments for the ears by inventing and +modulating the variety and nature of sounds; we have learned to survey +the stars, not only those that are fixed, but also those which are +improperly called wandering; and the man who has acquainted himself with +all their revolutions and motions is fairly considered to have a soul +resembling the soul of that Being who has created those stars in the +heavens: for when Archimedes described in a sphere the motions of the +moon, sun, and five planets, he did the very same thing as Plato’s God, +in his Timæus, who made the world, causing one revolution to adjust +motions differing as much as possible in their slowness and velocity. +Now, allowing that what we see in the world could not be effected +without a God, Archimedes could not have imitated the same motions in +his sphere without a divine soul.</p> + +<p>XXVI. To me, indeed, it appears that even those studies which are more +common and in greater esteem are not without some divine energy: so that +I do not consider that a poet can produce a serious and sublime poem +without some divine impulse working on his mind; nor do I think that +eloquence, abounding with sonorous words and fruitful sentences, can +flow thus without something beyond mere human power. But as to +philosophy, that is the parent of all the arts: what can we call that +but, as Plato says, a gift, or, as I express it, an invention, of the +Gods? This it was which first taught us the worship of the Gods; and +then led us on to justice, which arises from the human race being formed +into society; and after that <a id="page-37"></a><span class="pgnum">37</span>it imbued us with modesty and elevation of +soul. This it was which dispersed darkness from our souls, as it is +dispelled from our eyes, enabling us to see all things that are above or +below, the beginning, end, and middle of everything. I am convinced +entirely that that which could effect so many and such great things must +be a divine power. For what is memory of words and circumstances? What, +too, is invention? Surely they are things than which nothing greater can +be conceived in a God! For I do not imagine the Gods to be delighted +with nectar and ambrosia, or with Juventas presenting them with a cup; +nor do I put any faith in Homer, who says that Ganymede was carried away +by the Gods on account of his beauty, in order to give Jupiter his wine. +Too weak reasons for doing Laomedon such injury! These were mere +inventions of Homer, who gave his Gods the imperfections of men. I would +rather that he had given men the perfections of the Gods! those +perfections, I mean, of uninterrupted health, wisdom, invention, memory. +Therefore the soul (which is, as I say, divine) is, as Euripides more +boldly expresses it, a God. And thus, if the divinity be air or fire, +the soul of man is the same; for as that celestial nature has nothing +earthly or humid about it, in like manner the soul of man is also free +from both these qualities: but if it is of that fifth kind of nature, +first introduced by Aristotle, then both Gods and souls are of the same.</p> + +<p>XXVII. As this is my opinion, I have explained it in these very words, +in my book on Consolation.<a id="FNA-19"></a><a href="#FN-19"><sup>19</sup></a> The origin of the soul of man is not to +be found upon earth, for there is nothing in the soul of a mixed or +concrete nature, or that has any appearance of being formed or made out +of the earth; nothing even humid, or airy, or fiery. For what is there +in natures of that kind which has the power of memory, understanding, or +thought? which can recollect the past, foresee the future, and +comprehend the present? for these capabilities are confined to divine +beings; nor can we discover any source from which men could derive them, +but from God. There is therefore a peculiar <a id="page-38"></a><span class="pgnum">38</span>nature and power in the +soul, distinct from those natures which are more known and familiar to +us. Whatever, then, that is which thinks, and which has understanding, +and volition, and a principle of life, is heavenly and divine, and on +that account must necessarily be eternal; nor can God himself, who is +known to us, be conceived to be anything else except a soul free and +unembarrassed, distinct from all mortal concretion, acquainted with +everything, and giving motion to everything, and itself endued with +perpetual motion.</p> + +<p>XXVIII. Of this kind and nature is the intellect of man. Where, then, is +this intellect seated, and of what character is it? where is your own, +and what is its character? Are you able to tell? If I have not faculties +for knowing all that I could desire to know, will you not even allow me +to make use of those which I have? The soul has not sufficient capacity +to comprehend itself; yet, the soul, like the eye, though it has no +distinct view of itself, sees other things: it does not see (which is of +least consequence) its own shape; perhaps not, though it possibly may; +but we will pass that by: but it certainly sees that it has vigor, +sagacity, memory, motion, and velocity; these are all great, divine, +eternal properties. What its appearance is, or where it dwells, it is +not necessary even to inquire. As when we behold, first of all, the +beauty and brilliant appearance of the heavens; secondly, the vast +velocity of its revolutions, beyond power of our imagination to +conceive; then the vicissitudes of nights and days, the fourfold +division of the seasons, so well adapted to the ripening of the fruits +of the earth, and the temperature of our bodies: and after that we look +up to the sun, the moderator and governor of all these things; and view +the moon, by the increase and decrease of its light, marking, as it +were, and appointing our holy days; and see the five planets, borne on +in the same circle, divided into twelve parts, preserving the same +course with the greatest regularity, but with utterly dissimilar motions +among themselves; and the nightly appearance of the heaven, adorned on +all sides with stars; then, the globe of the earth, raised above the +sea, and placed in the centre of the universe, inhabited and cultivated +in its two opposite extremities, one of which, the <a id="page-39"></a><span class="pgnum">39</span>place of our +habitation, is situated towards the north pole, under the seven stars:</p> + +<div class="poem"> +<p>Where the cold northern blasts, with horrid sound,</p> +<p>Harden to ice the snowy cover’d ground;</p> +</div> + +<p class="cont">the other, towards the south pole, is unknown to us, but is called by +the Greeks <span class="greek">ἀντίχθονα</span>: the other parts are uncultivated, because they are +either frozen with cold, or burned up with heat; but where we dwell, it +never fails, in its season,</p> + +<div class="poem"> +<p>To yield a placid sky, to bid the trees</p> +<p>Assume the lively verdure of their leaves:</p> +<p>The vine to bud, and, joyful, in its shoots,</p> +<p>Foretell the approaching vintage of its fruits:</p> +<p>The ripen’d corn to sing, while all around</p> +<p>Full riv’lets glide; and flowers deck the ground:</p> +</div> + +<p class="cont">then the multitude of cattle, fit part for food, part for tilling the +ground, others for carrying us, or for clothing us; and man himself, +made, as it were, on purpose to contemplate the heavens and the Gods, +and to pay adoration to them: lastly, the whole earth, and wide +extending seas, given to man’s use. When we view these and numberless +other things, can we doubt that they have some being who presides over +them, or has made them (if, indeed, they have been made, as is the +opinion of Plato, or if, as Aristotle thinks, they are eternal), or who +at all events is the regulator of so immense a fabric and so great a +blessing to men? Thus, though you see not the soul of man, as you see +not the Deity, yet, as by the contemplation of his works you are led to +acknowledge a God, so you must own the divine power of the soul, from +its remembering things, from its invention, from the quickness of its +motion, and from all the beauty of virtue. Where, then, is it seated, +you will say?</p> + +<p>XXIX. In my opinion, it is seated in the head, and I can bring you +reasons for my adopting that opinion. At present, let the soul reside +where it will, you certainly have one in you. Should you ask what its +nature is? It has one peculiarly its own; but admitting it to consist of +fire, or air, it does not affect the present question. Only observe +this, that as you are convinced there is a God, though <a id="page-40"></a><span class="pgnum">40</span>you are ignorant +where he resides, and what shape he is of; in like manner you ought to +feel assured that you have a soul, though you cannot satisfy yourself of +the place of its residence, nor its form. In our knowledge of the soul, +unless we are grossly ignorant of natural philosophy, we cannot but be +satisfied that it has nothing but what is simple, unmixed, uncompounded, +and single; and if this is admitted, then it cannot be separated, nor +divided, nor dispersed, nor parted, and therefore it cannot perish; for +to perish implies a parting-asunder, a division, a disunion, of those +parts which, while it subsisted, were held together by some band. And it +was because he was influenced by these and similar reasons that Socrates +neither looked out for anybody to plead for him when he was accused, nor +begged any favor from his judges, but maintained a manly freedom, which +was the effect not of pride, but of the true greatness of his soul; and +on the last day of his life he held a long discourse on this subject; +and a few days before, when he might have been easily freed from his +confinement, he refused to be so; and when he had almost actually hold +of that deadly cup, he spoke with the air of a man not forced to die, +but ascending into heaven.</p> + +<p>XXX. For so indeed he thought himself, and thus he spoke: “That there +were two ways, and that the souls of men, at their departure from the +body, took different roads; for those which were polluted with vices +that are common to men, and which had given themselves up entirely to +unclean desires, and had become so blinded by them as to have habituated +themselves to all manner of debauchery and profligacy, or to have laid +detestable schemes for the ruin of their country, took a road wide of +that which led to the assembly of the Gods; but they who had preserved +themselves upright and chaste, and free from the slightest contagion of +the body, and had always kept themselves as far as possible at a +distance from it, and while on earth had proposed to themselves as a +model the life of the Gods, found the return to those beings from whom +they had come an easy one.” Therefore, he argues, that all good and wise +men should take example from the swans, who are considered sacred to +Apollo, not without reason, but particularly because they seem to have +received <a id="page-41"></a><span class="pgnum">41</span>the gift of divination from him, by which, foreseeing how +happy it is to die, they leave this world with singing and joy. Nor can +any one doubt of this, unless it happens to us who think with care and +anxiety about the soul (as is often the case with those who look +earnestly at the setting sun), to lose the sight of it entirely; and so +the mind’s eye, viewing itself, sometimes grows dull, and for that +reason we become remiss in our contemplation. Thus our reasoning is +borne about, harassed with doubts and anxieties, not knowing how to +proceed, but measuring back again those dangerous tracts which it has +passed, like a boat tossed about on the boundless ocean. But these +reflections are of long standing, and borrowed from the Greeks. But Cato +left this world in such a manner as if he were delighted that he had +found an opportunity of dying; for that God who presides in us forbids +our departure hence without his leave. But when God himself has given us +a just cause, as formerly he did to Socrates, and lately to Cato, and +often to many others—in such a case, certainly every man of sense would +gladly exchange this darkness for that light: not that he would forcibly +break from the chains that held him, for that would be against the law; +but, like a man released from prison by a magistrate or some lawful +authority, so he too would walk away, being released and discharged by +God. For the whole life of a philosopher is, as the same philosopher +says, a meditation on death.</p> + +<p>XXXI. For what else is it that we do, when we call off our minds from +pleasure, that is to say, from our attention to the body, from the +managing our domestic estate, which is a sort of handmaid and servant of +the body, or from duties of a public nature, or from all other serious +business whatever? What else is it, I say, that we do, but invite the +soul to reflect on itself? oblige it to converse with itself, and, as +far as possible, break off its acquaintance with the body? Now, to +separate the soul from the body, is to learn to die, and nothing else +whatever. Wherefore take my advice; and let us meditate on this, and +separate ourselves as far as possible from the body, that is to say, let +us accustom ourselves to die. This will be enjoying a life like that of +heaven even while we remain on earth; and <a id="page-42"></a><span class="pgnum">42</span>when we are carried thither +and released from these bonds, our souls will make their progress with +more rapidity; for the spirit which has always been fettered by the +bonds of the body, even when it is disengaged, advances more slowly, +just as those do who have worn actual fetters for many years: but when +we have arrived at this emancipation from the bonds of the body, then +indeed we shall begin to live, for this present life is really death, +which I could say a good deal in lamentation for if I chose.</p> + +<p><i>A.</i> You have lamented it sufficiently in your book on Consolation; and +when I read that, there is nothing which I desire more than to leave +these things; but that desire is increased a great deal by what I have +just heard.</p> + +<p><i>M.</i> The time will come, and that soon, and with equal certainty, +whether you hang back or press forward; for time flies. But death is so +far from being an evil, as it lately appeared to you, that I am inclined +to suspect, not that there is no other thing which is an evil to man, +but rather that there is nothing else which is a real good to him; if, +at least, it is true that we become thereby either Gods ourselves, or +companions of the Gods. However, this is not of so much consequence, as +there are some of us here who will not allow this. But I will not leave +off discussing this point till I have convinced you that death can, upon +no consideration whatever, be an evil.</p> + +<p><i>A.</i> How can it, after what I now know?</p> + +<p><i>M.</i> Do you ask how it can? There are crowds of arguers who contradict +this; and those not only Epicureans, whom I regard very little, but, +somehow or other, almost every man of letters; and, above all, my +favorite Dicæarchus is very strenuous in opposing the immortality of the +soul: for he has written three books, which are entitled Lesbiacs, +because the discourse was held at Mitylene, in which he seeks to prove +that souls are mortal. The Stoics, on the other hand, allow us as long a +time for enjoyment as the life of a raven; they allow the soul to exist +a great while, but are against its eternity.</p> + +<p>XXXII. Are you willing to hear then why, even allowing this, death +cannot be an evil.</p> + +<p><i>A.</i> As you please; but no one shall drive me from my belief in +mortality.</p> + +<p><a id="page-43"></a><span class="pgnum">43</span><i>M.</i> I commend you, indeed, for that; though we should not be too +confident in our belief of anything; for we are frequently disturbed by +some subtle conclusion. We give way and change our opinions even in +things that are more evident than this; for in this there certainly is +some obscurity. Therefore, should anything of this kind happen, it is +well to be on our guard.</p> + +<p><i>A.</i> You are right in that; but I will provide against any accident.</p> + +<p><i>M.</i> Have you any objection to our dismissing our friends the +Stoics—those, I mean, who allow that the souls exist after they have +left the body, but yet deny that they exist forever?</p> + +<p><i>A.</i> We certainly may dismiss the consideration of those men who admit +that which is the most difficult point in the whole question, namely, +that a soul can exist independently of the body, and yet refuse to grant +that which is not only very easy to believe, but which is even the +natural consequence of the concession which they have made—that if they +can exist for a length of time; they most likely do so forever.</p> + +<p><i>M.</i> You take it right; that is the very thing. Shall we give, +therefore, any credit to Pauæstius, when he dissents from his master, +Plato? whom he everywhere calls divine, the wisest, the holiest of men, +the Homer of philosophers, and whom he opposes in nothing except this +single opinion of the soul’s immortality: for he maintains what nobody +denies, that everything which has been generated will perish, and that +even souls are generated, which he thinks appears from their resemblance +to those of the men who begot them; for that likeness is as apparent in +the turn of their minds as in their bodies. But he brings another +reason—that there is nothing which is sensible of pain which is not +also liable to disease; but whatever is liable to disease must be liable +to death. The soul is sensible of pain, therefore it is liable to +perish.</p> + +<p>XXXIII. These arguments may be refuted; for they proceed from his not +knowing that, while discussing the subject of the immortality of the +soul, he is speaking of the intellect, which is free from all turbid +motion; but not of those parts of the mind in which those disorders, +<a id="page-44"></a><span class="pgnum">44</span>anger and lust, have their seat, and which he whom he is opposing, when +he argues thus, imagines to be distinct and separate from the mind. Now +this resemblance is more remarkable in beasts, whose souls are void of +reason. But the likeness in men consists more in the configuration of +the bodies: and it is of no little consequence in what bodies the soul +is lodged; for there are many things which depend on the body that give +an edge to the soul, many which blunt it. Aristotle, indeed, says that +all men of great genius are melancholy; so that I should not have been +displeased to have been somewhat duller than I am. He instances many, +and, as if it were matter of fact, brings his reasons for it. But if the +power of those things that proceed from the body be so great as to +influence the mind (for they are the things, whatever they are, that +occasion this likeness), still that does not necessarily prove why a +similitude of souls should be generated. I say nothing about cases of +unlikeness. I wish Panætius could be here: he lived with Africanus. I +would inquire of him which of his family the nephew of Africanus’s +brother was like? Possibly he may in person have resembled his father; +but in his manners he was so like every profligate, abandoned man, that +it was impossible to be more so. Whom did the grandson of P. Crassus, +that wise and eloquent and most distinguished man, resemble? Or the +relations and sons of many other excellent men, whose names there is no +occasion to mention? But what are we doing? Have we forgotten that our +purpose was, when we had sufficiently spoken on the subject of the +immortality of the soul, to prove that, even if the soul did perish, +there would be, even then, no evil in death?</p> + +<p><i>A.</i> I remembered it very well; but I had no dislike to your digressing +a little from your original design, while you were talking of the soul’s +immortality.</p> + +<p><i>M.</i> I perceive you have sublime thoughts, and are eager to mount up to +heaven.</p> + +<p>XXXIV. I am not without hopes myself that such may be our fate. But +admit what they assert—that the soul does not continue to exist after +death.</p> + +<p><i>A.</i> Should it be so, I see that we are then deprived of the hopes of a +happier life.</p> + +<p><a id="page-45"></a><span class="pgnum">45</span><i>M.</i> But what is there of evil in that opinion? For let the soul perish +as the body: is there any pain, or indeed any feeling at all, in the +body after death? No one, indeed asserts that; though Epicurus charges +Democritus with saying so; but the disciples of Democritus deny it. No +sense, therefore, remains in the soul; for the soul is nowhere. Where, +then, is the evil? for there is nothing but these two things. Is it +because the mere separation of the soul and body cannot be effected +without pain? But even should that be granted, how small a pain must +that be! Yet I think that it is false, and that it is very often +unaccompanied by any sensation at all, and sometimes even attended with +pleasure; but certainly the whole must be very trifling, whatever it is, +for it is instantaneous. What makes us uneasy, or rather gives us pain, +is the leaving all the good things of life. But just consider if I might +not more properly say, leaving the evils of life; only there is no +reason for my now occupying myself in bewailing the life of man, and yet +I might, with very good reason. But what occasion is there, when what I +am laboring to prove is that no one is miserable after death, to make +life more miserable by lamenting over it? I have done that in the book +which I wrote, in order to comfort myself as well as I could. If, then, +our inquiry is after truth, death withdraws us from evil, not from good. +This subject is indeed so copiously handled by Hegesias, the Cyrenaic +philosopher, that he is said to have been forbidden by Ptolemy from +delivering his lectures in the schools, because some who heard him made +away with themselves. There is, too, an epigram of Callimachus<a id="FNA-20"></a><a href="#FN-20"><sup>20</sup></a> on +Cleombrotus of Ambracia, who, without any misfortune having befallen +him, as he says, threw himself from a wall into the sea, after he had +read a book of Plato’s. The book I mentioned of that Hegesias is called +<span class="greek">Ἀποκαρτερτερῶν</span>, or “A Man who +<a id="page-46"></a><span class="pgnum">46</span>starves himself,” in which a man is represented as killing +himself by starvation, till he is prevented by his friends, +in reply to whom he reckons up all the miseries of human +life. I might do the same, though not so fully as he, who +thinks it not worth any man’s while to live. I pass over +others. Was it even worth my while to live, for, had I +died before I was deprived of the comforts of my own +family, and of the honors which I received for my public +services, would not death have taken me from the evils of +life rather than from its blessings?</p> + +<p>XXXV. Mention, therefore, some one, who never knew +distress; who never received any blow from fortune. +The great Metellus had four distinguished sons; but +Priam had fifty, seventeen of whom were born to him by +his lawful wife. Fortune had the same power over both, +though she exercised it but on one; for Metellus was laid +on his funeral pile by a great company of sons and daughters, +grandsons, and granddaughters; but Priam fell by +the hand of an enemy, after having fled to the altar, and +having seen himself deprived of all his numerous progeny. +Had he died before the death of his sons and the ruin of +his kingdom,</p> + +<div class="poem"> +<p>With all his mighty wealth elate,</p> +<p>Under rich canopies of state;</p> +</div> + +<p class="cont">would he then have been taken from good or from evil? +It would indeed, at that time, have appeared that he was +being taken away from good; yet surely it would have +turned out advantageous for him; nor should we have +had these mournful verses,</p> + +<div class="poem"> +<p>Lo! these all perish’d in one flaming pile;</p> +<p>The foe old Priam did of life beguile,</p> +<p>And with his blood, thy altar, Jove, defile.</p> +</div> + +<p class="cont">As if anything better could have happened to him at that +time than to lose his life in that manner; but yet, if it had +befallen him sooner, it would have prevented all those consequences; +but even as it was, it released him from any +further sense of them. The case of our friend Pompey<a id="FNA-21"></a><a href="#FN-21"><sup>21</sup></a> +<a id="page-47"></a><span class="pgnum">47</span>was something better: once, when he had been very ill +at Naples, the Neapolitans, on his recovery, put crowns +on their heads, as did those of Puteoli; the people flocked +from the country to congratulate him—it is a Grecian +custom, and a foolish one; still it is a sign of good fortune. +But the question is, had he died, would he have +been taken from good, or from evil? Certainly from +evil. He would not have been engaged in a war with his +father-in-law;<a id="FNA-22"></a><a href="#FN-22"><sup>22</sup></a> he would not have taken up arms before +he was prepared; he would not have left his own house, +nor fled from Italy; he would not, after the loss of his +army, have fallen unarmed into the hands of slaves, and +been put to death by them; his children would not have +been destroyed; nor would his whole fortune have come +into the possession of the conquerors. Did not he, then, +who, if he had died at that time, would have died in all +his glory, owe all the great and terrible misfortunes into +which he subsequently fell to the prolongation of his life +at that time?</p> + +<p>XXXVI. These calamities are avoided by death, for +even though they should never happen, there is a possibility +that they may; but it never occurs to a man that such +a disaster may befall him himself. Every one hopes to +be as happy as Metellus: as if the number of the happy +exceeded that of the miserable; or as if there were any +certainty in human affairs; or, again, as if there were +more rational foundation for hope than fear. But should +we grant them even this, that men are by death deprived +of good things; would it follow that the dead are therefore +in need of the good things of life, and are miserable +on that account? Certainly they must necessarily say so. +Can he who does not exist be in need of anything? To +be in need of has a melancholy sound, because it in effect +amounts to this—he had, but he has not; he regrets, he +looks back upon, he wants. Such are, I suppose, the distresses +<a id="page-48"></a><span class="pgnum">48</span>of one who is in need of. Is he deprived +of eyes? to be blind is misery. Is he destitute of children? not to have +them is misery. These considerations apply to the living, but the dead +are neither in need of the blessings of life, nor of life itself. But +when I am speaking of the dead, I am speaking of those who have no +existence. But would any one say of us, who do exist, that we want horns +or wings? Certainly not. Should it be asked, why not? the answer would +be, that not to have what neither custom nor nature has fitted you for +would not imply a want of them, even though you were sensible that you +had them not. This argument should be pressed over and over again, after +that point has once been established, which, if souls are mortal, there +can be no dispute about—I mean, that the destruction of them by death +is so entire as to remove even the least suspicion of any sense +remaining. When, therefore, this point is once well grounded and +established, we must correctly define what the term to want means; that +there may be no mistake in the word. To want, then, signifies this: to +be without that which you would be glad to have; for inclination for a +thing is implied in the word want, excepting when we use the word in an +entirely different sense, as we do when we say that a fever is wanting +to any one. For it admits of a different interpretation, when you are +without a certain thing, and are sensible that you are without it, but +yet can easily dispense with having it. “To want,” then, is an +expression which you cannot apply to the dead; nor is the mere fact of +wanting something necessarily lamentable. The proper expression ought to +be, “that they want a good,” and that is an evil.</p> + +<p>But a living man does not want a good, unless he is distressed without +it; and yet, we can easily understand how any man alive can be without a +kingdom. But this cannot be predicated of you with any accuracy: it +might have been asserted of Tarquin, when he was driven from his +kingdom. But when such an expression is used respecting the dead, it is +absolutely unintelligible. For to want implies to be sensible; but the +dead are insensible: therefore, the dead can be in no want.</p> + +<p>XXXVII. But what occasion is there to philosophize <a id="page-49"></a><span class="pgnum">49</span>here in a matter +with which we see that philosophy is but little concerned? How often +have not only our generals but whole armies, rushed on certain death! +But if it had been a thing to be feared, L. Brutus would never have +fallen in fight, to prevent the return of that tyrant whom he had +expelled; nor would Decius the father have been slain in fighting with +the Latins; nor would his son, when engaged with the Etruscans, nor his +grandson with Pyrrhus have exposed themselves to the enemy’s darts. +Spain would never have seen, in one campaign, the Scipios fall fighting +for their country; nor would the plains of Cannæ have witnessed the +death of Paulus and Geminus, or Venusia that of Marcellus; nor would the +Latins have beheld the death of Albinus, nor the Leucanians that of +Gracchus. But are any of these miserable now? Nay, they were not so even +at the first moment after they had breathed their last; nor can any one +be miserable after he has lost all sensation. Oh, but the mere +circumstance of being without sensation is miserable. It might be so if +being without sensation were the same thing as wanting it; but as it is +evident there can be nothing of any kind in that which has no existence, +what can there be afflicting to that which can neither feel want nor be +sensible of anything? We might be said to have repeated this over too +often, only that here lies all that the soul shudders at from the fear +of death. For whoever can clearly apprehend that which is as manifest as +the light—that when both soul and body are consumed, and there is a +total destruction, then that which was an animal becomes nothing—will +clearly see that there is no difference between a Hippocentaur, which +never had existence, and King Agamemnon, and that M. Camillus is no more +concerned about this present civil war than I was at the sacking of +Rome, when he was living.</p> + +<p>XXXVIII. Why, then, should Camillus be affected with the thoughts of +these things happening three hundred and fifty years after his time? And +why should I be uneasy it I were to expect that some nation might +possess itself of this city ten thousand years hence? Because so great +is our regard for our country, as not to be measured by our own feeling, +but by its own actual safety.</p> + +<p><a id="page-50"></a><span class="pgnum">50</span>Death, then, which threatens us daily from a thousand accidents, and +which, by reason of the shortness of life, can never be far off, does +not deter a wise man from making such provision for his country and his +family as he hopes may last forever; and from regarding posterity, of +which he can never have any real perception, as belonging to himself. +Wherefore a man may act for eternity, even though he be persuaded that +his soul is mortal; not, indeed, from a desire of glory, which he will +be insensible of, but from a principle of virtue, which glory will +inevitably attend, though that is not his object. The process, indeed, +of nature is this: that just in the same manner as our birth was the +beginning of things with us, so death will be the end; and as we were +noways concerned with anything before we were born, so neither shall we +be after we are dead. And in this state of things where can the evil be, +since death has no connection with either the living or the dead? The +one have no existence at all, the other are not yet affected by it. They +who make the least of death consider it as having a great resemblance to +sleep; as if any one would choose to live ninety years on condition +that, at the expiration of sixty, he should sleep out the remainder. The +very swine would not accept of life on those terms, much less I. +Endymion, indeed, if you listen to fables, slept once on a time on +Latmus, a mountain of Caria, and for such a length of time that I +imagine he is not as yet awake. Do you think that he is concerned at the +Moon’s being in difficulties, though it was by her that he was thrown +into that sleep, in order that she might kiss him while sleeping. For +what should he be concerned for who has not even any sensation? You look +on sleep as an image of death, and you take that on you daily; and have +you, then, any doubt that there is no sensation in death, when you see +there is none in sleep, which is its near resemblance?</p> + +<p>XXXIX. Away, then, with those follies, which are little better than the +old women’s dreams, such as that it is miserable to die before our time. +What time do you mean? That of nature? But she has only lent you life, +as she might lend you money, without fixing any certain time for its +repayment. Have you any grounds of complaint, <a id="page-51"></a><span class="pgnum">51</span>then, that she recalls it +at her pleasure? for you received it on these terms. They that complain +thus allow that if a young child dies, the survivors ought to bear his +loss with equanimity; that if an infant in the cradle dies, they ought +not even to utter a complaint; and yet nature has been more severe with +them in demanding back what she gave. They answer by saying that such +have not tasted the sweets of life; while the other had begun to +conceive hopes of great happiness, and, indeed, had begun to realize +them. Men judge better in other things, and allow a part to be +preferable to none. Why do they not admit the same estimate in life? +Though Callimachus does not speak amiss in saying that more tears had +flowed from Priam than his son; yet they are thought happier who die +after they have reached old age. It would be hard to say why; for I do +not apprehend that any one, if a longer life were granted to him, would +find it happier. There is nothing more agreeable to a man than prudence, +which old age most certainly bestows on a man, though it may strip him +of everything else. But what age is long, or what is there at all long +to a man? Does not</p> + +<div class="poem"> +<p>Old age, though unregarded, still attend</p> +<p>On childhood’s pastimes, as the cares of men?</p> +</div> + +<p class="cont">But because there is nothing beyond old age, we call that long: all +these things are said to be long or short, according to the proportion +of time they were given us for. Artistotle saith there is a kind of +insect near the river Hypanis, which runs from a certain part of Europe +into the Pontus, whose life consists but of one day; those that die at +the eighth hour die in full age; those who die when the sun sets are +very old, especially when the days are at the longest. Compare our +longest life with eternity, and we shall be found almost as short-lived +as those little animals.</p> + +<p>XL. Let us, then, despise all these follies—for what softer name can I +give to such levities?—and let us lay the foundation of our happiness +in the strength and greatness of our minds, in a contempt and disregard +of all earthly things, and in the practice of every virtue. For at +present we are enervated by the softness of our imaginations, <a id="page-52"></a><span class="pgnum">52</span>so that, +should we leave this world before the promises of our fortune-tellers +are made good to us, we should think ourselves deprived of some great +advantages, and seem disappointed and forlorn. But if, through life, we +are in continual suspense, still expecting, still desiring, and are in +continual pain and torture, good Gods! how pleasant must that journey be +which ends in security and ease! How pleased am I with Theramenes! Of +how exalted a soul does he appear! For, although we never read of him +without tears, yet that illustrious man is not to be lamented in his +death, who, when he had been imprisoned by the command of the thirty +tyrants, drank off, at one draught, as if he had been thirsty, the +poisoned cup, and threw the remainder out of it with such force that it +sounded as it fell; and then, on hearing the sound of the drops, he +said, with a smile, “I drink this to the most excellent Critias,” who +had been his most bitter enemy; for it is customary among the Greeks, at +their banquets, to name the person to whom they intend to deliver the +cup. This celebrated man was pleasant to the last, even when he had +received the poison into his bowels, and truly foretold the death of +that man whom he named when he drank the poison, and that death soon +followed. Who that thinks death an evil could approve of the evenness of +temper in this great man at the instant of dying? Socrates came, a few +years after, to the same prison and the same cup by as great iniquity on +the part of his judges as the tyrants displayed when they executed +Theramenes. What a speech is that which Plato makes him deliver before +his judges, after they had condemned him to death!</p> + +<p>XLI. “I am not without hopes, O judges, that it is a favorable +circumstance for me that I am condemned to die; for one of these two +things must necessarily happen—either that death will deprive me +entirely of all sense, or else that, by dying, I shall go from hence +into some other place; wherefore, if all sense is utterly extinguished, +and if death is like that sleep which sometimes is so undisturbed as to +be even without the visions of dreams—in that case, O ye good Gods! +what gain is it to die? or what length of days can be imagined which +would be preferable to such a night? And if the constant course of +future time <a id="page-53"></a><span class="pgnum">53</span>is to resemble that night, who is happier than I am? But if +on the other hand, what is said be true, namely, that death is but a +removal to those regions where the souls of the departed dwell, then +that state must be more happy still to have escaped from those who call +themselves judges, and to appear before such as are truly so—Minos, +Rhadamanthus, Æacus, Triptolemus—and to meet with those who have lived +with justice and probity!<a id="FNA-23"></a><a href="#FN-23"><sup>23</sup></a> Can this change of abode appear otherwise +than great to you? What bounds can you set to the value of conversing +with Orpheus, and Musæus, and Homer, and Hesiod? I would even, were it +possible, willingly die often, in order to prove the certainty of what I +speak of. What delight must it be to meet with Palamedes, and Ajax, and +others, who have been betrayed by the iniquity of their judges! Then, +also, should I experience the wisdom of even that king of kings, who led +his vast troops to Troy, and the prudence of Ulysses and Sisyphus: nor +should I then be condemned for prosecuting my inquiries on such subjects +in the same way in which I have done here on earth. And even you, my +judges, you, I mean, who have voted for my acquittal, do not you fear +death, for nothing bad can befall a good man, whether he be alive or +dead; nor are his concerns ever overlooked by the Gods; nor in my case +either has this befallen me by chance; and I have nothing to charge +those men with who accused or condemned me but the fact that they +believed that they were doing me harm.” In this manner he proceeded. +There is no part of his speech which I admire more than his last words: +“But it is time,” says he, “for me now to go hence, that I may die; and +for you, that you may continue to live. Which condition of the two is +the best, the immortal Gods know; but I do not believe that any mortal +man does.”</p> + +<p><a id="page-54"></a><span class="pgnum">54</span>XLII. Surely I would rather have had this man’s soul than all the +fortunes of those who sat in judgment on him; although that very thing +which he says no one except the Gods know, namely, whether life or death +is most preferable, he knows himself, for he had previously stated his +opinion on it; but he maintained to the last that favorite maxim of his, +of affirming nothing. And let us, too, adhere to this rule of not +thinking anything an evil which is a general provision of nature; and +let us assure ourselves, that if death is an evil, it is an eternal +evil, for death seems to be the end of a miserable life; but if death is +a misery, there can be no end of that. But why do I mention Socrates, or +Theramenes, men distinguished by the glory of virtue and wisdom? when a +certain Lacedæmomian, whose name is not so much as known, held death in +such contempt, that, when led to it by the ephori, he bore a cheerful +and pleasant countenance; and, when he was asked by one of his enemies +whether he despised the laws of Lycurgus, “On the contrary,” answered +he, “I am greatly obliged to him, for he has amerced me in a fine which +I can pay without borrowing, or taking up money at interest.” This was a +man worthy of Sparta. And I am almost persuaded of his innocence because +of the greatness of his soul. Our own city has produced many such. But +why should I name generals, and other men of high rank, when Cato could +write that legions have marched with alacrity to that place from whence +they never expected to return? With no less greatness of soul fell the +Lacedæmonians at Thermopylæ, on whom Simonides wrote the following +epitaph:</p> + +<div class="poem"> +<p>Go, stranger, tell the Spartans, here we lie,</p> +<p>Who to support their laws durst boldly die.<a id="FNA-24"></a><a href="#FN-24"><sup>24</sup></a></p> +</div> + +<p class="cont">What was it that Leonidas, their general, said to them? “March on with +courage, my Lacedæmonians. To-night, perhaps, we shall sup in the +regions below.” This was a brave nation while the laws of Lycurgus were +in force. One of them, when a Persian had said to him in conversation, +<a id="page-55"></a><span class="pgnum">55</span>“We shall hide the sun from your sight by the number of our arrows and +darts,” replied, “We shall fight, then in the shade.” Do I talk of their +men? How great was that Lacedæmonian woman, who had sent her son to +battle, and when she heard that he was slain, said, “I bore him for that +purpose, that you might have a man who durst die for his country!” +However, it is a matter of notoriety that the Spartans were bold and +hardy, for the discipline of a republic has great influence.</p> + +<p>XLIII. What, then, have we not reason to admire Theodorus the Cyrenean, +a philosopher of no small distinction, who, when Lysimachus threatened +to crucify him, bade him keep those menaces for his courtiers? “To +Theodorus it makes no difference whether he rot in the air or +underground.” By which saying of the philosopher I am reminded to say +something of the custom of funerals and sepulture, and of funeral +ceremonies, which is, indeed, not a difficult subject, especially if we +recollect what has been before said about insensibility. The opinion of +Socrates respecting this matter is clearly stated in the book which +treats of his death, of which we have already said so much; for when he +had discussed the immortality of the soul, and when the time of his +dying was approaching rapidly, being asked by Criton how he would be +buried, “I have taken a great deal of pains,” saith he, “my friends, to +no purpose, for I have not convinced our Criton that I shall fly from +hence, and leave no part of me behind. Notwithstanding, Criton, if you +can overtake me, wheresoever you get hold of me, bury me as you please: +but believe me, none of you will be able to catch me when I have flown +away from hence.” That was excellently said, inasmuch as he allows his +friend to do as he pleased, and yet shows his indifference about +anything of this kind. Diogenes was rougher, though of the same opinion; +but in his character of a Cynic he expressed himself in a somewhat +harsher manner; he ordered himself to be thrown anywhere without being +buried. And when his friends replied, “What! to the birds and beasts?” +“By no means,” saith he; “place my staff near me, that I may drive them +away.” “How can you do that,” they answer, “for you will not perceive +them?” “How am I then <a id="page-56"></a><span class="pgnum">56</span>injured by being torn by those animals, if I have +no sensation?” Anaxagoras, when he was at the point of death at +Lampsacus, and was asked by his friends, whether, if anything should +happen to him, he would not choose to be carried to Clazomenæ, his +country, made this excellent answer, “There is,” says he, “no occasion +for that, for all places are at an equal distance from the infernal +regions.” There is one thing to be observed with respect to the whole +subject of burial, that it relates to the body, whether the soul live or +die. Now, with regard to the body, it is clear that, whether the soul +live or die, that has no sensation.</p> + +<p>XLIV. But all things are full of errors. Achilles drags Hector, tied to +his chariot; he thinks, I suppose, he tears his flesh, and that Hector +feels the pain of it; therefore, he avenges himself on him, as he +imagines. But Hecuba bewails this as a sore misfortune:</p> + +<div class="poem"> +<p>I saw (a dreadful sight) great Hector slain,</p> +<p>Dragg’d at Achilles’ car along the plain.</p> +</div> + +<p class="cont">What Hector? or how long will he be Hector? Accius is better in this, +and Achilles, too, is sometimes reasonable:</p> + +<div class="poem"> +<p>I Hector’s body to his sire convey’d,</p> +<p>Hector I sent to the infernal shade.</p> +</div> + +<p class="cont">It was not Hector that you dragged along, but a body that had been +Hector’s. Here another starts from underground, and will not suffer his +mother to sleep:</p> + +<div class="poem"> +<p>To thee I call, my once-loved parent, hear,</p> +<p>Nor longer with thy sleep relieve thy care;</p> +<p>Thine eye which pities not is closed—arise;</p> +<p>Ling’ring I wait the unpaid obsequies.</p> +</div> + +<p class="cont">When these verses are sung with a slow and melancholy tune, so as to +affect the whole theatre with sadness, one can scarce help thinking +those unhappy that are unburied:</p> + +<div class="poem"> +<p>Ere the devouring dogs and hungry vultures...</p> +</div> + +<p class="cont">He is afraid he shall not have the use of his limbs so well if they are +torn to pieces, but is under no such apprehensions if they are burned:</p> + +<div class="poem"><a id="page-57"></a><span class="pgnum">57</span> +<p>Nor leave my naked bones, my poor remains,</p> +<p>To shameful violence and bloody stains.</p> +</div> + +<p class="cont">I do not understand what he could fear who could pour forth such +excellent verses to the sound of the flute. We must, therefore, adhere +to this, that nothing is to be regarded after we are dead, though many +people revenge themselves on their dead enemies. Thyestes pours forth +several curses in some good lines of Ennius, praying, first of all, that +Atreus may perish by a shipwreck, which is certainly a very terrible +thing, for such a death is not free from very grievous sensations. Then +follow these unmeaning expressions:</p> + +<div class="poem"> +<p class="L6" style="margin-left: 25ex">May</p> +<p>On the sharp rock his mangled carcass lie,</p> +<p>His entrails torn, to hungry birds a prey!</p> +<p>May he convulsive writhe his bleeding side,</p> +<p>And with his clotted gore the stones be dyed!</p> +</div> + +<p class="cont">The rocks themselves were not more destitute of feeling than he who was +hanging to them by his side; though Thyestes imagines he is wishing him +the greatest torture. It would be torture, indeed, if he were sensible; +but as he is not, it can be none; then how very unmeaning is this:</p> + +<div class="poem"> +<p>Let him, still hovering o’er the Stygian wave,</p> +<p>Ne’er reach the body’s peaceful port, the grave!</p> +</div> + +<p class="cont">You see under what mistaken notions all this is said. He imagines the +body has its haven, and that the dead are at rest in their graves. +Pelops was greatly to blame in not having informed and taught his son +what regard was due to everything.</p> + +<p>XLV. But what occasion is there to animadvert on the opinions of +individuals, when we may observe whole nations to fall into all sorts of +errors? The Egyptians embalm their dead, and keep them in their houses; +the Persians dress them over with wax, and then bury them, that they may +preserve their bodies as long as possible. It is customary with the Magi +to bury none of their order, unless they have been first torn by wild +beasts. In Hyrcania, the people maintain dogs for the public use; the +nobles have their own—and we know that they have a good breed of dogs; +but every one, according to his ability, <a id="page-58"></a><span class="pgnum">58</span>provides himself with some, in +order to be torn by them; and they hold that to be the best kind of +interment. Chrysippus, who is curious in all kinds of historical facts, +has collected many other things of this kind; but some of them are so +offensive as not to admit of being related. All that has been said of +burying is not worth our regard with respect to ourselves, though it is +not to be neglected as to our friends, provided we are thoroughly aware +that the dead are insensible. But the living, indeed, should consider +what is due to custom and opinion; only they should at the same time +consider that the dead are noways interested in it. But death truly is +then met with the greatest tranquillity when the dying man can comfort +himself with his own praise. No one dies too soon who has finished the +course of perfect virtue. I myself have known many occasions when I have +seemed in danger of immediate death; oh! how I wish it had come to me! +for I have gained nothing by the delay. I had gone over and over again +the duties of life; nothing remained but to contend with fortune. If +reason, then, cannot sufficiently fortify us to enable us to feel a +contempt for death, at all events let our past life prove that we have +lived long enough, and even longer than was necessary; for +notwithstanding the deprivation of sense, the dead are not without that +good which peculiarly belongs to them, namely, the praise and glory +which they have acquired, even though they are not sensible of it. For +although there be nothing in glory to make it desirable, yet it follows +virtue as its shadow; and the genuine judgment of the multitude on good +men, if ever they form any, is more to their own praise than of any real +advantage to the dead. Yet I cannot say, however it may be received, +that Lycurgus and Solon have no glory from their laws, and from the +political constitution which they established in their country; or that +Themistocles and Epaminondas have not glory from their martial virtue.</p> + +<p>XLVI. For Neptune shall sooner bury Salamis itself with his waters than +the memory of the trophies gained there; and the Bœotian Leuctra shall +perish sooner than the glory of that great battle. And longer still +shall fame be before it deserts Curius, and Fabricius, and Calatinus, +<a id="page-59"></a><span class="pgnum">59</span>and the two Scipios, and the two Africani, and Maximus, and Marcellus, +and Paulus, and Cato, and Lælius, and numberless other heroes; and +whoever has caught any resemblance of them, not estimating it by common +fame, but by the real applause of good men, may with confidence, when +the occasion requires, approach death, on which we are sure that even if +the chief good is not continued, at least no evil is. Such a man would +even wish to die while in prosperity; for all the favors that could be +heaped on him would not be so agreeable to him as the loss of them would +be painful. That speech of the Lacedæmonian seems to have the same +meaning, who, when Diagoras the Rhodian, who had himself been a +conqueror at the Olympic games, saw two of his own sons conquerors there +on the same day, approached the old man, and, congratulating him, said, +“You should die now, Diagoras, for no greater happiness can possibly +await you.” The Greeks look on these as great things; perhaps they think +too highly of them, or, rather, they did so then. And so he who said +this to Diagoras, looking on it as something very glorious, that three +men out of one family should have been conquerors there, thought it +could answer no purpose to him to continue any longer in life, where he +could only be exposed to a reverse of fortune.</p> + +<p>I might have given you a sufficient answer, as it seems to me, on this +point, in a few words, as you had allowed the dead were not exposed to +any positive evil; but I have spoken at greater length on the subject +for this reason, because this is our greatest consolation in the losing +and bewailing of our friends. For we ought to bear with moderation any +grief which arises from ourselves, or is endured on our own account, +lest we should seem to be too much influenced by self-love. But should +we suspect our departed friends to be under those evils, which they are +generally imagined to be, and to be sensible of them, then such a +suspicion would give us intolerable pain; and accordingly I wished, for +my own sake, to pluck up this opinion by the roots, and on that account +I have been perhaps somewhat more prolix than was necessary.</p> + +<p>XLVII. <i>A.</i> More prolix than was necessary? Certainty not, in my +opinion. For I was induced, by the former <a id="page-60"></a><span class="pgnum">60</span>part of your speech, to wish +to die; but, by the latter, sometimes not to be unwilling, and at others +to be wholly indifferent about it. But the effect of your whole argument +is, that I am convinced that death ought not to be classed among the +evils.</p> + +<p><i>M.</i> Do you, then, expect that I am to give you a regular peroration, +like the rhetoricians, or shall I forego that art?</p> + +<p><i>A.</i> I would not have you give over an art which you have set off to +such advantage; and you were in the right to do so, for, to speak the +truth, it also has set you off. But what is that peroration? For I +should be glad to hear it, whatever it is.</p> + +<p><i>M.</i> It is customary, in the schools, to produce the opinions of the +immortal Gods on death; nor are these opinions the fruits of the +imagination alone of the lecturers, but they have the authority of +Herodotus and many others. Cleobis and Biton are the first they mention, +sons of the Argive priestess; the story is a well-known one. As it was +necessary that she should be drawn in a chariot to a certain annual +sacrifice, which was solemnized at a temple some considerable distance +from the town, and the cattle that were to draw the chariot had not +arrived, those two young men whom I have just mentioned, pulling off +their garments, and anointing their bodies with oil, harnessed +themselves to the yoke. And in this manner the priestess was conveyed to +the temple; and when the chariot had arrived at the proper place, she is +said to have entreated the Goddess to bestow on them, as a reward for +their piety, the greatest gift that a God could confer on man. And the +young men, after having feasted with their mother, fell asleep; and in +the morning they were found dead. Trophonius and Agamedes are said to +have put up the same petition, for they, having built a temple to Apollo +at Delphi, offered supplications to the God, and desired of him some +extraordinary reward for their care and labor, particularizing nothing, +but asking for whatever was best for men. Accordingly, Apollo signified +to them that he would bestow it on them in three days, and on the third +day at daybreak they were found dead. And so they say that this was a +formal decision pronounced by that God to <a id="page-61"></a><span class="pgnum">61</span>whom the rest of the deities +have assigned the province of divining with an accuracy superior to that +of all the rest.</p> + +<p>XLVIII. There is also a story told of Silenus, who, when taken prisoner +by Midas, is said to have made him this present for his ransom—namely, +that he informed him<a id="FNA-25"></a><a href="#FN-25"><sup>25</sup></a> that never to have been born was by far the +greatest blessing that could happen to man; and that the next best thing +was to die very soon; which very opinion Euripides makes use of in his +Cresphontes, saying,</p> + +<div class="poem"> +<p>When man is born, ‘tis fit, with solemn show,</p> +<p>We speak our sense of his approaching woe;</p> +<p>With other gestures and a different eye,</p> +<p>Proclaim our pleasure when he’s bid to die.<a id="FNA-26"></a><a href="#FN-26"><sup>26</sup></a></p> +</div> + +<p class="cont">There is something like this in Crantor’s Consolation; for he says that +Terinæsus of Elysia, when he was bitterly lamenting the loss of his son, +came to a place of divination to be informed why he was visited with so +great affliction, and received in his tablet these three verses:</p> + +<div class="poem"> +<p>Thou fool, to murmur at Euthynous’ death!</p> +<p>The blooming youth to fate resigns his breath:</p> +<p>The fate, whereon your happiness depends,</p> +<p>At once the parent and the son befriends.<a id="FNA-27"></a><a href="#FN-27"><sup>27</sup></a></p> +</div> + +<p class="cont">On these and similar authorities they affirm that the question has been +determined by the Gods. Nay, more; Alcidamas, an ancient rhetorician of +the very highest reputation, wrote even in praise of death, which he +endeavored to establish by an enumeration of the evils of life; and his +Dissertation has a great deal of eloquence in it; but <a id="page-62"></a><span class="pgnum">62</span>he was +unacquainted with the more refined arguments of the philosophers. By the +orators, indeed, to die for our country is always considered not only as +glorious, but even as happy: they go back as far as Erechtheus,<a id="FNA-28"></a><a href="#FN-28"><sup>28</sup></a> +whose very daughters underwent death, for the safety of their +fellow-citizens: they instance Codrus, who threw himself into the midst +of his enemies, dressed like a common man, that his royal robes might +not betray him, because the oracle had declared the Athenians +conquerors, if their king was slain. Menœceus<a id="FNA-29"></a><a href="#FN-29"><sup>29</sup></a> is not overlooked by +them, who, in compliance with the injunctions of an oracle, freely shed +his blood for his country. Iphigenia ordered herself to be conveyed to +Aulis, to be sacrificed, that her blood might be the cause of spilling +that of her enemies.</p> + +<p>XLIX. From hence they proceed to instances of a fresher date. Harmodius +and Aristogiton are in everybody’s mouth; the memory of Leonidas the +Lacedæmonian and Epaminondas the Theban is as fresh as ever. Those +philosophers were not acquainted with the many instances in our +country—to give a list of whom would take up too much time—who, we +see, considered death desirable as long as it was accompanied with +honor. But, notwithstanding this is the correct view of the case, we +must use much persuasion, speak as if we were endued with some higher +authority, in order to bring men to begin to wish to die, or cease to be +afraid of death. For if that last day does not occasion an entire +extinction, but a change of abode only, what can be more desirable? And +if it, on the other hand, destroys, and absolutely puts an end to us, +what can be preferable to the having a deep sleep fall on us, in the +midst of the fatigues of life, and being thus overtaken, to sleep to +eternity? And, should this really <a id="page-63"></a><span class="pgnum">63</span>be the case, then Ennius’s language +is more consistent with wisdom than Solon’s; for our Ennius says,</p> + +<div class="poem"> +<p>Let none bestow upon my passing bier</p> +<p>One needless sigh or unavailing tear.</p> +</div> + +<p class="cont">But the wise Solon says,</p> + +<div class="poem"> +<p>Let me not unlamented die, but o’er my bier</p> +<p>Burst forth the tender sigh, the friendly tear.<a id="FNA-30"></a><a href="#FN-30"><sup>30</sup></a></p> +</div> + +<p class="cont">But let us, if indeed it should be our fate to know the time which is +appointed by the Gods for us to die, prepare ourselves for it with a +cheerful and grateful mind, thinking ourselves like men who are +delivered from a jail, and released from their fetters, for the purpose +of going back to our eternal habitation, which may be more emphatically +called our own; or else to be divested of all sense and trouble. If, on +the other hand, we should have no notice given us of this decree, yet +let us cultivate such a disposition as to look on that formidable hour +of death as happy for us, though shocking to our friends; and let us +never imagine anything to be an evil which is an appointment of the +immortal Gods, or of nature, the common parent of all. For it is not by +hazard or without design that we have been born and situated as we have. +On the contrary, beyond all doubt there is a certain power which +consults the happiness of human nature; and this would neither have +produced nor provided for a being which, after having gone through the +labors of life, was to fall into eternal misery by death. Let us rather +infer that we have a retreat and haven prepared for us, which I wish we +could crowd all sail and arrive at; but though the winds should not +serve, and we should be driven back, yet we shall to a certainty arrive +at that point eventually, though somewhat later. But how can that be +miserable for one which all must of necessity undergo? I have given you +a peroration, that you might not think I had overlooked or neglected +anything.</p> + +<p><i>A.</i> I am persuaded you have not; and, indeed, that peroration has +confirmed me.</p> + +<p><a id="page-64"></a><span class="pgnum">64</span><i>M.</i> I am glad it has had that effect. But it is now time to consult +our health. To-morrow, and all the time we continue in this Tusculan +villa, let us consider this subject; and especially those portions of it +which may ease our pain, alleviate our fears, and lessen our desires, +which is the greatest advantage we can reap from the whole of +philosophy.</p> + + <hr/> + + + + +<h3>BOOK II.</h3> + +<h4>ON BEARING PAIN.</h4> + + +<p>I. <span class="first">Neoptolemus</span>, in Ennius, indeed, says that the study of philosophy was +expedient for him; but that it required limiting to a few subjects, for +that to give himself up entirely to it was what he did not approve of. +And for my part, Brutus, I am perfectly persuaded that it is expedient +for me to philosophize; for what can I do better, especially as I have +no regular occupation? But I am not for limiting my philosophy to a few +subjects, as he does; for philosophy is a matter in which it is +difficult to acquire a little knowledge without acquainting yourself +with many, or all its branches, nor can you well take a few subjects +without selecting them out of a great number; nor can any one, who has +acquired the knowledge of a few points, avoid endeavoring with the same +eagerness to understand more. But still, in a busy life, and in one +mainly occupied with military matters, such as that of Neoptolemus was +at that time, even that limited degree of acquaintance with philosophy +may be of great use, and may yield fruit, not perhaps so plentiful as a +thorough knowledge of the whole of philosophy, but yet such as in some +degree may at times deliver us from the dominion of our desires, our +sorrows, and our fears; just as the effect of that discussion which we +lately maintained in my Tusculan villa seemed to be that a great +contempt of death was engendered, which contempt is of no small efficacy +towards delivering the mind from fear; for whoever dreads what cannot be +avoided can by no means live with a quiet and tranquil mind. But he who +is under no <a id="page-65"></a><span class="pgnum">65</span>fear of death, not only because it is a thing absolutely +inevitable but also because he is persuaded that death itself hath +nothing terrible in it, provides himself with a very great resource +towards a happy life. However, I am not tolerant that many will argue +strenuously against us; and, indeed, that is a thing which can never be +avoided, except by abstaining from writing at all. For if my Orations, +which were addressed to the judgment and approbation of the people (for +that is a popular art, and the object of oratory is popular applause), +have been criticised by some people who are inclined to withhold their +praise from everything but what they are persuaded they can attain to +themselves, and who limit their ideas of good speaking by the hopes +which they conceive of what they themselves may attain to, and who +declare, when they are overwhelmed with a flow of words and sentences, +that they prefer the utmost poverty of thought and expression to that +plenty and copiousness (from which arose the Attic kind of oratory, +which they who professed it were strangers to, though they have now been +some time silenced, and laughed out of the very courts of justice), what +may I not expect, when at present I cannot have the least countenance +from the people by whom I used to be upheld before? For philosophy is +satisfied with a few judges, and of her own accord industriously avoids +the multitude, who are jealous of it, and utterly displeased with it; so +that, should any one undertake to cry down the whole of it, he would +have the people on his side; while, if he should attack that school +which I particularly profess, he would have great assistance from those +of the other philosophers.</p> + +<p>II. But I have answered the detractors of philosophy in general, in my +Hortensius. And what I had to say in favor of the Academics, is, I +think, explained with sufficient accuracy in my four books of the +Academic Question.</p> + +<p>But yet I am so far from desiring that no one should write against me, +that it is what I most earnestly wish; for philosophy would never have +been in such esteem in Greece itself, if it had not been for the +strength which it acquired from the contentions and disputations of the +<a id="page-66"></a><span class="pgnum">66</span>most learned men; and therefore I recommend all men who have abilities +to follow my advice to snatch this art also from declining Greece, and +to transport it to this city; as our ancestors by their study and +industry have imported all their other arts which were worth having. +Thus the praise of oratory, raised from a low degree, is arrived at such +perfection that it must now decline, and, as is the nature of all +things, verge to its dissolution in a very short time. Let philosophy, +then, derive its birth in Latin language from this time, and let us lend +it our assistance, and bear patiently to be contradicted and refuted; +and although those men may dislike such treatment who are bound and +devoted to certain predetermined opinions, and are under such +obligations to maintain them that they are forced, for the sake of +consistency, to adhere to them even though they do not themselves wholly +approve of them; we, on the other hand, who pursue only probabilities, +and who cannot go beyond that which seems really likely, can confute +others without obstinacy, and are prepared to be confuted ourselves +without resentment. Besides, if these studies are ever brought home to +us, we shall not want even Greek libraries, in which there is an +infinite number of books, by reason of the multitude of authors among +them; for it is a common practice with many to repeat the same things +which have been written by others, which serves no purpose but to stuff +their shelves; and this will be our case, too, if many apply themselves +to this study.</p> + +<p>III. But let us excite those, if possible, who have had a liberal +education, and are masters of an elegant style, and who philosophize +with reason and method.</p> + +<p>For there is a certain class of them who would willingly be called +philosophers, whose books in our language are said to be numerous, and +which I do not despise; for, indeed, I never read them: but still, +because the authors themselves declare that they write without any +regularity, or method, or elegance, or ornament, I do not care to read +what must be so void of entertainment. There is no one in the least +acquainted with literature who does not know the style and sentiments of +that school; wherefore, since they are at no pains to express themselves +well, I <a id="page-67"></a><span class="pgnum">67</span>do not see why they should be read by anybody except by one +another. Let them read them, if they please, who are of the same +opinions; for in the same manner as all men read Plato and the other +Socratics, with those who sprung from them, even those who do not agree +with their opinions, or are very indifferent about them; but scarcely +any one except their own disciples take Epicurus or Metrodorus into +their hands; so they alone read these Latin books who think that the +arguments contained in them are sound. But, in my opinion, whatever is +published should be recommended to the reading of every man of learning; +and though we may not succeed in this ourselves, yet nevertheless we +must be sensible that this ought to be the aim of every writer. And on +this account I have always been pleased with the custom of the +Peripatetics and Academics, of disputing on both sides of the question; +not solely from its being the only method of discovering what is +probable on every subject, but also because it affords the greatest +scope for practising eloquence; a method that Aristotle first made use +of, and afterward all the Aristotelians; and in our own memory Plilo, +whom we have often heard, appointed one time to treat of the precepts of +the rhetoricians, and another for philosophical discussion, to which +custom I was brought to conform by my friends at my Tusculum; and +accordingly our leisure time was spent in this manner. And therefore, as +yesterday before noon we applied ourselves to speaking, and in the +afternoon went down into the Academy, the discussions which were held +there I have acquainted you with, not in the manner of a narration, but +in almost the very same words which were employed in the debate.</p> + +<p>IV. The discourse, then, was introduced in this manner while we were +walking, and it was commenced by some such an opening as this:</p> + +<p><i>A.</i> It is not to be expressed how much I was delighted, or rather +edified, by your discourse of yesterday. For although I am conscious to +myself that I have never been too fond of life, yet at times, when I +have considered that there would be an end to this life, and that I must +some time or other part with all its good things, a certain dread <a id="page-68"></a><span class="pgnum">68</span>and +uneasiness used to intrude itself on my thoughts; but now, believe me, I +am so freed from that kind of uneasiness that there is nothing that I +think less worth any regard.</p> + +<p><i>M.</i> I am not at all surprised at that, for it is the effect of +philosophy, which is the medicine of our souls; it banishes all +groundless apprehensions, frees us from desires, and drives away fears: +but it has not the same influence over all men; it is of very great +influence when it falls in with a disposition well adapted to it. For +not only does Fortune, as the old proverb says, assist the bold, but +reason does so in a still greater degree; for it, by certain precepts, +as it were, strengthens even courage itself. You were born naturally +great and soaring, and with a contempt for all things which pertain to +man alone; therefore a discourse against death took easy possession of a +brave soul. But do you imagine that these same arguments have any force +with those very persons who have invented, and canvassed, and published +them, excepting indeed some very few particular persons? For how few +philosophers will you meet with whose life and manners are conformable +to the dictates of reason! who look on their profession, not as a means +of displaying their learning, but as a rule for their own practice! who +follow their own precepts, and comply with their own decrees! You may +see some of such levity and such vanity, that it would have been better +for them to have been ignorant; some covetous of money, some others +eager for glory, many slaves to their lusts; so that their discourses +and their actions are most strangely at variance; than which nothing in +my opinion can be more unbecoming: for just as if one who professed to +teach grammar should speak with impropriety, or a master of music sing +out of tune, such conduct has the worst appearance in these men, because +they blunder in the very particular with which they profess that they +are well acquainted. So a philosopher who errs in the conduct of his +life is the more infamous because he is erring in the very thing which +he pretends to teach, and, while he lays down rules to regulate life by, +is irregular in his own life.</p> + +<p>V. <i>A.</i> Should this be the case, is it not to be feared that <a id="page-69"></a><span class="pgnum">69</span>you are +dressing up philosophy in false colors? For what stronger argument can +there be that it is of little use than that some very profound +philosophers live in a discreditable manner?</p> + +<p><i>M.</i> That, indeed, is no argument at all, for as all the fields which +are cultivated are not fruitful (and this sentiment of Accius is false, +and asserted without any foundation,</p> + +<div class="poem"> +<p>The ground you sow on is of small avail;</p> +<p>To yield a crop good seed can never fail),</p> +</div> + +<p class="cont">it is not every mind which has been properly cultivated that produces +fruit; and, to go on with the comparison, as a field, although it may be +naturally fruitful, cannot produce a crop without dressing, so neither +can the mind without education; such is the weakness of either without +the other. Whereas philosophy is the culture of the mind: this it is +which plucks up vices by the roots; prepares the mind for the receiving +of seeds; commits them to it, or, as I may say, sows them, in the hope +that, when come to maturity, they may produce a plentiful harvest. Let +us proceed, then, as we began. Say, if you please, what shall be the +subject of our disputation.</p> + +<p><i>A.</i> I look on pain to be the greatest of all evils.</p> + +<p><i>M.</i> What, even greater than infamy?</p> + +<p><i>A.</i> I dare not indeed assert that; and I blush to think I am so soon +driven from my ground.</p> + +<p><i>M.</i> You would have had greater reason for blushing had you persevered +in it; for what is so unbecoming—what can appear worse to you, than +disgrace, wickedness, immorality? To avoid which, what pain is there +which we ought not (I will not say to avoid shirking, but even) of our +own accord to encounter, and undergo, and even to court?</p> + +<p><i>A.</i> I am entirely of that opinion; but, notwithstanding that pain is +not the greatest evil, yet surely it is an evil.</p> + +<p><i>M.</i> Do you perceive, then, how much of the terror of pain you have +given up on a small hint?</p> + +<p><i>A.</i> I see that plainly; but I should be glad to give up more of it.</p> + +<p><i>M.</i> I will endeavor to make you do so; but it is a great <a id="page-70"></a><span class="pgnum">70</span>undertaking, +and I must have a disposition on your part which is not inclined to +offer any obstacles.</p> + +<p><i>A.</i> You shall have such: for as I behaved yesterday, so now I will +follow reason wherever she leads.</p> + +<p>VI. <i>M.</i> First, then, I will speak of the weakness of many philosophers, +and those, too, of various sects; the head of whom, both in authority +and antiquity, was Aristippus, the pupil of Socrates, who hesitated not +to say that pain was the greatest of all evils. And after him Epicurus +easily gave in to this effeminate and enervated doctrine. After him +Hieronymus the Rhodian said, that to be without pain was the chief good, +so great an evil did pain appear to him to be. The rest, with the +exceptions of Zeno, Aristo, Pyrrho, were pretty much of the same opinion +that you were of just now—that it was indeed an evil, but that there +were many worse. When, then, nature herself, and a certain generous +feeling of virtue, at once prevents you from persisting in the assertion +that pain is the chief evil, and when you were driven from such an +opinion when disgrace was contrasted with pain, shall philosophy, the +preceptress of life, cling to this idea for so many ages? What duty of +life, what praise, what reputation, would be of such consequence that a +man should be desirous of gaining it at the expense of submitting to +bodily pain, when he has persuaded himself that pain is the greatest +evil? On the other side, what disgrace, what ignominy, would he not +submit to that he might avoid pain, when persuaded that it was the +greatest of evils? Besides, what person, if it be only true that pain is +the greatest of evils, is not miserable, not only when he actually feels +pain, but also whenever he is aware that it may befall him. And who is +there whom pain may not befall? So that it is clear that there is +absolutely no one who can possibly be happy. Metrodorus, indeed, thinks +that man perfectly happy whose body is free from all disorders, and who +has an assurance that it will always continue so; but who is there who +can be assured of that?</p> + +<p>VII. But Epicurus, indeed, says such things that it should seem that his +design was only to make people laugh; for he affirms somewhere that if a +wise man were to be burned or put to the torture—you expect, perhaps, +<a id="page-71"></a><span class="pgnum">71</span>that he is going to say he would bear it, he would support himself +under it with resolution, he would not yield to it (and that by +Hercules! would be very commendable, and worthy of that very Hercules +whom I have just invoked): but even this will not satisfy Epicurus, that +robust and hardy man! No; his wise man, even if he were in Phalaris’s +bull, would say, How sweet it is! how little do I regard it! What, +sweet? Is it not sufficient, if it is not disagreeable? But those very +men who deny pain to be an evil are not in the habit of saying that it +is agreeable to any one to be tormented; they rather say that it is +cruel, or hard to bear, afflicting, unnatural, but still not an evil: +while this man who says that it is the only evil, and the very worst of +all evils, yet thinks that a wise man would pronounce it sweet. I do not +require of you to speak of pain in the same words which Epicurus uses—a +man, as you know, devoted to pleasure: he may make no difference, if he +pleases, between Phalaris’s bull and his own bed; but I cannot allow the +wise man to be so indifferent about pain. If he bears it with courage, +it is sufficient: that he should rejoice in it, I do not expect; for +pain is, beyond all question, sharp, bitter, against nature, hard to +submit to and to bear. Observe Philoctetes: We may allow him to lament, +for he saw Hercules himself groaning loudly through extremity of pain on +Mount Œta. The arrows with which Hercules presented him were then no +consolation to him, when</p> + +<div class="poem"> +<p>The viper’s bite, impregnating his veins</p> +<p>With poison, rack’d him with its bitter pains.</p> +</div> + +<p class="cont">And therefore he cries out, desiring help, and wishing to die,</p> + +<div class="poem"> +<p>Oh that some friendly hand its aid would lend,</p> +<p>My body from this rock’s vast height to send</p> +<p>Into the briny deep! I’m all on fire,</p> +<p>And by this fatal wound must soon expire.</p> +</div> + +<p class="cont">It is hard to say that the man who was obliged to cry out in this manner +was not oppressed with evil, and great evil too.</p> + +<p>VIII. But let us observe Hercules himself, who was subdued by pain at +the very time when he was on the point <a id="page-72"></a><span class="pgnum">72</span>of attaining immortality by +death. What words does Sophocles here put in his mouth, in his +Trachiniæ? who, when Deianira had put upon him a tunic dyed in the +centaur’s blood, and it stuck to his entrails, says,</p> + +<div class="poem"> +<p>What tortures I endure no words can tell,</p> +<p>Far greater these, than those which erst befell</p> +<p>From the dire terror of thy consort, Jove—</p> +<p>E’en stern Eurystheus’ dire command above;</p> +<p>This of thy daughter, Œneus, is the fruit,</p> +<p>Beguiling me with her envenom’d suit,</p> +<p>Whose close embrace doth on my entrails prey,</p> +<p>Consuming life; my lungs forbid to play;</p> +<p>The blood forsakes my veins; my manly heart</p> +<p>Forgets to beat; enervated, each part</p> +<p>Neglects its office, while my fatal doom</p> +<p>Proceeds ignobly from the weaver’s loom.</p> +<p>The hand of foe ne’er hurt me, nor the fierce</p> +<p>Giant issuing from his parent earth.</p> +<p>Ne’er could the Centaur such a blow enforce,</p> +<p>No barbarous foe, nor all the Grecian force;</p> +<p>This arm no savage people could withstand,</p> +<p>Whose realms I traversed to reform the land.</p> +<p>Thus, though I ever bore a manly heart,</p> +<p>I fall a victim to a woman’s art.</p> +</div> + +<p class="nodist">IX.</p> + +<div class="poem"> +<p>Assist, my son, if thou that name dost hear,</p> +<p>My groans preferring to thy mother’s tear:</p> +<p>Convey her here, if, in thy pious heart,</p> +<p>Thy mother shares not an unequal part:</p> +<p>Proceed, be bold, thy father’s fate bemoan,</p> +<p>Nations will join, you will not weep alone.</p> +<p>Oh, what a sight is this same briny source,</p> +<p>Unknown before, through all my labors’ course!</p> +<p>That virtue, which could brave each toil but late,</p> +<p>With woman’s weakness now bewails its fate.</p> +<p>Approach, my son; behold thy father laid,</p> +<p>A wither’d carcass that implores thy aid;</p> +<p>Let all behold: and thou, imperious Jove,</p> +<p>On me direct thy lightning from above:</p> +<p>Now all its force the poison doth assume,</p> +<p>And my burnt entrails with its flame consume.</p> +<p>Crestfallen, unembraced, I now let fall</p> +<p>Listless, those hands that lately conquer’d all;</p> +<p>When the Nemæan lion own’d their force,</p> +<p>And he indignant fell a breathless corse;</p> +<p>The serpent slew, of the Lernean lake,</p> +<p>As did the Hydra of its force partake:</p> +<p>By this, too, fell the Erymanthian boar:</p> +<p><a id="page-73"></a><span class="pgnum">73</span>E’en Cerberus did his weak strength deplore.</p> +<p>This sinewy arm did overcome with ease</p> +<p>That dragon, guardian of the Golden Fleece.</p> +<p>My many conquests let some others trace;</p> +<p>It’s mine to say, I never knew disgrace.<a id="FNA-31"></a><a href="#FN-31"><sup>31</sup></a></p> +</div> + +<p class="cont">Can we then, despise pain, when we see Hercules himself giving vent to +his expressions of agony with such impatience?</p> + +<p>X. Let us see what Æschylus says, who was not only a poet but a +Pythagorean philosopher also, for that is the account which you have +received of him; how doth he make Prometheus bear the pain he suffered +for the Lemnian theft, when he clandestinely stole away the celestial +fire, and bestowed it on men, and was severely punished by Jupiter for +the theft. Fastened to Mount Caucasus, he speaks thus:</p> + +<div class="poem"> +<p>Thou heav’n-born race of Titans here fast bound,</p> +<p>Behold thy brother! As the sailors sound</p> +<p>With care the bottom, and their ships confine</p> +<p>To some safe shore, with anchor and with line;</p> +<p>So, by Jove’s dread decree, the God of fire</p> +<p>Confines me here the victim of Jove’s ire.</p> +<p>With baneful art his dire machine he shapes;</p> +<p>From such a God what mortal e’er escapes?</p> +<p>When each third day shall triumph o’er the night,</p> +<p>Then doth the vulture, with his talons light,</p> +<p>Seize on my entrails; which, in rav’nous guise,</p> +<p>He preys on! then with wing extended flies</p> +<p>Aloft, and brushes with his plumes the gore:</p> +<p>But when dire Jove my liver doth restore,</p> +<p>Back he returns impetuous to his prey,</p> +<p>Clapping his wings, he cuts th’ ethereal way.</p> +<p>Thus do I nourish with my blood this pest,</p> +<p>Confined my arms, unable to contest;</p> +<p>Entreating only that in pity Jove</p> +<p>Would take my life, and this cursed plague remove.</p> +<p>But endless ages past unheard my moan,</p> +<p>Sooner shall drops dissolve this very stone.<a id="FNA-32"></a><a href="#FN-32"><sup>32</sup></a></p> +</div> + +<p class="cont">And therefore it scarcely seems possible to avoid calling a man who is +suffering, miserable; and if he is miserable, then pain is an evil.</p> + +<p><a id="page-74"></a><span class="pgnum">74</span>XI. <i>A.</i> Hitherto you are on my side; I will see to that by-and-by; +and, in the mean while, whence are those verses? I do not remember them.</p> + +<p><i>M.</i> I will inform you, for you are in the right to ask. Do you see that +I have much leisure?</p> + +<p><i>A.</i> What, then?</p> + +<p><i>M.</i> I imagine, when you were at Athens, you attended frequently at the +schools of the philosophers.</p> + +<p><i>A.</i> Yes, and with great pleasure.</p> + +<p><i>M.</i> You observed, then, that though none of them at that time were very +eloquent, yet they used to mix verses with their harangues.</p> + +<p><i>A.</i> Yes, and particularly Dionysius the Stoic used to employ a great +many.</p> + +<p><i>M.</i> You say right; but they were quoted without any appropriateness or +elegance. But our friend Philo used to give a few select lines and well +adapted; and in imitation of him, ever since I took a fancy to this kind +of elderly declamation, I have been very fond of quoting our poets; and +where I cannot be supplied from them, I translate from the Greek, that +the Latin language may not want any kind of ornament in this kind of +disputation.</p> + +<p>But, do you not see how much harm is done by poets? They introduce the +bravest men lamenting over their misfortunes: they soften our minds; and +they are, besides, so entertaining, that we do not only read them, but +get them by heart. Thus the influence of the poets is added to our want +of discipline at home, and our tender and delicate manner of living, so +that between them they have deprived virtue of all its vigor and energy. +Plato, therefore, was right in banishing them from his commonwealth, +where he required the best morals, and the best form of government. But +we, who have all our learning from Greece, read and learn these works of +theirs from our childhood; and look on this as a liberal and learned +education.</p> + +<p>XII. But why are we angry with the poets? We may find some philosophers, +those masters of virtue, who have taught that pain was the greatest of +evils. But you, young man, when you said but just now that it appeared +so to you, upon being asked by me what appeared greater than infamy, +gave up that opinion at a word. Suppose I ask <a id="page-75"></a><span class="pgnum">75</span>Epicurus the same +question. He will answer that a trifling degree of pain is a greater +evil than the greatest infamy; for that there is no evil in infamy +itself, unless attended with pain. What pain, then, attends Epicurus, +when he says that very thing, that pain is the greatest evil! And yet +nothing can be a greater disgrace to a philosopher than to talk thus. +Therefore, you allowed enough when you admitted that infamy appeared to +you to be a greater evil than pain. And if you abide by this admission, +you will see how far pain should be resisted; and that our inquiry +should be not so much whether pain be an evil, as how the mind may be +fortified for resisting it. The Stoics infer from some petty quibbling +arguments that it is no evil, as if the dispute were about a word, and +not about the thing itself. Why do you impose upon me, Zeno? For when +you deny what appears very dreadful to me to be an evil, I am deceived, +and am at a loss to know why that which appears to me to be a most +miserable thing should be no evil. The answer is, that nothing is an +evil but what is base and vicious. You return to your trifling, for you +do not remove what made me uneasy. I know that pain is not vice—you +need not inform me of that: but show me that it makes no difference to +me whether I am in pain or not. It has never anything to do, say you, +with a happy life, for that depends upon virtue alone; but yet pain is +to be avoided. If I ask, why? It is disagreeable, against nature, hard +to bear, woful and afflicting.</p> + +<p>XIII. Here are many words to express that by so many different forms +which we call by the single word evil. You are defining pain, instead of +removing it, when you say, it is disagreeable, unnatural, scarcely +possible to be endured or borne, nor are you wrong in saying so: but the +man who vaunts himself in such a manner should not give way in his +conduct, if it be true that nothing is good but what is honest, and +nothing evil but what is disgraceful. This would be wishing, not +proving. This argument is a better one, and has more truth in it—that +all things which Nature abhors are to be looked upon as evil; that those +which she approves of are to be considered as good: for when this is +admitted, and the dispute <a id="page-76"></a><span class="pgnum">76</span>about words removed, that which they with +reason embrace, and which we call honest, right, becoming, and sometimes +include under the general name of virtue, appears so far superior to +everything else that all other things which are looked upon as the gifts +of fortune, or the good things of the body, seem trifling and +insignificant; and no evil whatever, nor all the collective body of +evils together, appears to be compared to the evil of infamy. Wherefore, +if, as you granted in the beginning, infamy is worse than pain, pain is +certainly nothing; for while it appears to you base and unmanly to +groan, cry out, lament, or faint under pain; while you cherish notions +of probity, dignity, honor, and, keeping your eye on them, refrain +yourself, pain will certainly yield to virtue, and, by the influence of +imagination, will lose its whole force.—For you must either admit that +there is no such thing as virtue, or you must despise every kind of +pain. Will you allow of such a virtue as prudence, without which no +virtue whatever can even be conceived? What, then? Will that suffer you +to labor and take pains to no purpose? Will temperance permit you to do +anything to excess? Will it be possible for justice to be maintained by +one who through the force of pain discovers secrets, or betrays his +confederates, or deserts many duties of life? Will you act in a manner +consistently with courage, and its attendants, greatness of soul, +resolution, patience, and contempt for all worldly things? Can you hear +yourself called a great man when you lie grovelling, dejected, and +deploring your condition with a lamentable voice; no one would call you +even a man while in such a condition. You must therefore either abandon +all pretensions to courage, or else pain must be put out of the +question.</p> + +<p>XIV. You know very well that, even though part of your Corinthian +furniture were gone, the remainder might be safe without that; but if +you lose one virtue (though virtue in reality cannot be lost), still if, +I say, you should acknowledge that you were deficient in one, you would +be stripped of all. Can you, then, call yourself a brave man, of a great +soul, endued with patience and steadiness above the frowns of fortune? +or Philoctetes? for I choose to instance him, rather than yourself, for +he certainly was not <a id="page-77"></a><span class="pgnum">77</span>a brave man, who lay in his bed, which was watered +with his tears,</p> + +<div class="poem"> +<p>Whose groans, bewailings, and whose bitter cries,</p> +<p>With grief incessant rent the very skies.</p> +</div> + +<p class="cont">I do not deny pain to be pain—for were that the case, in what would +courage consist?—but I say it should be assuaged by patience, if there +be such a thing as patience: if there be no such thing, why do we speak +so in praise of philosophy? or why do we glory in its name? Does pain +annoy us? Let it sting us to the heart: if you are without defensive +armor, bare your throat to it; but if you are secured by Vulcanian +armor, that is to say by resolution, resist it. Should you fail to do +so, that guardian of your honor, your courage, will forsake and leave +you.—By the laws of Lycurgus, and by those which were given to the +Cretans by Jupiter, or which Minos established under the direction of +Jupiter, as the poets say, the youths of the State are trained by the +practice of hunting, running, enduring hunger and thirst, cold and heat. +The boys at Sparta are scourged so at the altars that blood follows the +lash in abundance; nay, sometimes, as I used to hear when I was there, +they are whipped even to death; and yet not one of them was ever heard +to cry out, or so much as groan. What, then? Shall men not be able to +bear what boys do? and shall custom have such great force, and reason +none at all?</p> + +<p>XV. There is some difference between labor and pain; they border upon +one another, but still there is a certain difference between them. Labor +is a certain exercise of the mind or body, in some employment or +undertaking of serious trouble and importance; but pain is a sharp +motion in the body, disagreeable to our senses.—Both these feelings, +the Greeks, whose language is more copious than ours, express by the +common name of <span class="greek">Πόνος</span>: therefore they call industrious men painstaking, +or, rather, fond of labor; we, more conveniently, call them laborious; +for laboring is one thing, and enduring pain another. You see, O Greece! +your barrenness of words, sometimes, though you think you are always so +rich in them. I say, then, that there is a difference between laboring +and being in <a id="page-78"></a><span class="pgnum">78</span>pain. When Caius Marius had an operation performed for a +swelling in his thigh, he felt pain; when he headed his troops in a very +hot season, he labored. Yet these two feelings bear some resemblance to +one another; for the accustoming ourselves to labor makes the endurance +of pain more easy to us. And it was because they were influenced by this +reason that the founders of the Grecian form of government provided that +the bodies of their youth should be strengthened by labor, which custom +the Spartans transferred even to their women, who in other cities lived +more delicately, keeping within the walls of their houses; but it was +otherwise with the Spartans.</p> + +<div class="poem"> +<p>The Spartan women, with a manly air,</p> +<p>Fatigues and dangers with their husbands share;</p> +<p>They in fantastic sports have no delight,</p> +<p>Partners with them in exercise and fight.</p> +</div> + +<p class="cont">And in these laborious exercises pain interferes sometimes. They are +thrown down, receive blows, have bad falls, and are bruised, and the +labor itself produces a sort of callousness to pain.</p> + +<p>XVI. As to military service (I speak of our own, not of that of the +Spartans, for they used to march slowly to the sound of the flute, and +scarce a word of command was given without an anapæst), you may see, in +the first place, whence the very name of an army (<i>exercitus</i><a id="FNA-33"></a><a href="#FN-33"><sup>33</sup></a>) is +derived; and, secondly, how great the labor is of an army on its march: +then consider that they carry more than a fortnight’s provision, and +whatever else they may want; that they carry the burden of the +stakes,<a id="FNA-34"></a><a href="#FN-34"><sup>34</sup></a> for as to shield, sword, or helmet, they look on them as no +more encumbrance than their own limbs, for they say that arms are the +limbs of a soldier, and those, indeed, they carry so commodiously that, +when there is occasion, they throw down their burdens, and use their +arms as readily as their limbs. Why need I mention the exercises of the +legions? And how great the labor is which is undergone in the running, +encounters, shouts! Hence it is that their minds are worked <a id="page-79"></a><span class="pgnum">79</span>up to make +so light of wounds in action. Take a soldier of equal bravery, but +undisciplined, and he will seem a woman. Why is it that there is this +sensible difference between a raw recruit and a veteran soldier? The age +of the young soldiers is for the most part in their favor; but it is +practice only that enables men to bear labor and despise wounds. +Moreover, we often see, when the wounded are carried off the field, the +raw, untried soldier, though but slightly wounded, cries out most +shamefully; but the more brave, experienced veteran only inquires for +some one to dress his wounds, and says,</p> + +<div class="poem"> +<p>Patroclus, to thy aid I must appeal</p> +<p>Ere worse ensue, my bleeding wounds to heal;</p> +<p>The sons of Æsculapius are employ’d,</p> +<p>No room for me, so many are annoy’d.</p> +</div> + +<p>XVII. This is certainly Eurypylus himself. What an experienced +man!—While his friend is continually enlarging on his misfortunes, you +may observe that he is so far from weeping that he even assigns a reason +why he should bear his wounds with patience.</p> + +<div class="poem"> +<p>Who at his enemy a stroke directs,</p> +<p>His sword to light upon himself expects.</p> +</div> + +<p>Patroclus, I suppose, will lead him off to his chamber to bind up his +wounds, at least if he be a man: but not a word of that; he only +inquires how the battle went:</p> + +<div class="poem"> +<p>Say how the Argives bear themselves in fight?</p> +</div> + +<p class="cont">And yet no words can show the truth as well as those, your deeds and +visible sufferings.</p> + +<div class="poem"> +<p>Peace! and my wounds bind up;</p> +</div> + +<p class="cont">but though Eurypylus could bear these afflictions, Æsopus could not,</p> + +<div class="poem"> +<p>Where Hector’s fortune press’d our yielding troops;</p> +</div> + +<p class="cont">and he explains the rest, though in pain. So unbounded is military glory +in a brave man! Shall, then, a veteran soldier be able to behave in this +manner, and shall a wise and learned man not be able? Surely the latter +might be <a id="page-80"></a><span class="pgnum">80</span>able to bear pain better, and in no small degree either. At +present, however, I am confining myself to what is engendered by +practice and discipline. I am not yet come to speak of reason and +philosophy. You may often hear of old women living without victuals for +three or four days; but take away a wrestler’s provisions but for one +day, and he will implore the aid of Jupiter Olympius, the very God for +whom he exercises himself: he will cry out that he cannot endure it. +Great is the force of custom! Sportsmen will continue whole nights in +the snow; they will bear being almost frozen upon the mountains. From +practice boxers will not so much as utter a groan, however bruised by +the cestus. But what do you think of those to whom a victory in the +Olympic games seemed almost on a par with the ancient consulships of the +Roman people? What wounds will the gladiators bear, who are either +barbarians, or the very dregs of mankind! How do they, who are trained +to it, prefer being wounded to basely avoiding it! How often do they +prove that they consider nothing but the giving satisfaction to their +masters or to the people! for when covered with wounds, they send to +their masters to learn their pleasure: if it is their will, they are +ready to lie down and die. What gladiator, of even moderate reputation, +ever gave a sigh? who ever turned pale? who ever disgraced himself +either in the actual combat, or even when about to die? who that had +been defeated ever drew in his neck to avoid the stroke of death? So +great is the force of practice, deliberation, and custom! Shall this, +then, be done by</p> + +<div class="poem"> +<p>A Samnite rascal, worthy of his trade;</p> +</div> + +<p class="cont">and shall a man born to glory have so soft a part in his soul as not to +be able to fortify it by reason and reflection? The sight of the +gladiators’ combats is by some looked on as cruel and inhuman, and I do +not know, as it is at present managed, but it may be so; but when the +guilty fought, we might receive by our ears perhaps (but certainly by +our eyes we could not) better training to harden us against pain and +death.</p> + +<p>XVIII. I have now said enough about the effects of exercise, custom, and +careful meditation. Proceed we now <a id="page-81"></a><span class="pgnum">81</span>to consider the force of reason, +unless you have something to reply to what has been said.</p> + +<p><i>A.</i> That I should interrupt you! By no means; for your discourse has +brought me over to your opinion. Let the Stoics, then, think it their +business to determine whether pain be an evil or not, while they +endeavor to show by some strained and trifling conclusions, which are +nothing to the purpose, that pain is no evil. My opinion is, that +whatever it is, it is not so great as it appears; and I say, that men +are influenced to a great extent by some false representations and +appearance of it, and that all which is really felt is capable of being +endured. Where shall I begin, then? Shall I superficially go over what I +said before, that my discourse may have a greater scope?</p> + +<p>This, then, is agreed upon by all, and not only by learned men, but also +by the unlearned, that it becomes the brave and magnanimous—those that +have patience and a spirit above this world—not to give way to pain. +Nor has there ever been any one who did not commend a man who bore it in +this manner. That, then, which is expected from a brave man, and is +commended when it is seen, it must surely be base in any one to be +afraid of at its approach, or not to bear when it comes. But I would +have you consider whether, as all the right affections of the soul are +classed under the name of virtues, the truth is that this is not +properly the name of them all, but that they all have their name from +that leading virtue which is superior to all the rest: for the name +“virtue” comes from <i>vir</i>, a man, and courage is the peculiar +distinction of a man: and this virtue has two principal duties, to +despise death and pain. We must, then, exert these, if we would be men +of virtue, or, rather, if we would be men, because virtue (<i>virtus</i>) takes +its very name from <i>vir</i>, man.</p> + +<p>XIX. You may inquire, perhaps, how? And such an inquiry is not amiss, +for philosophy is ready with her assistance. Epicurus offers himself to +you, a man far from a bad—or, I should rather say, a very good man: he +advises no more than he knows. “Despise pain,” says he. Who is it saith +this? Is it the same man who calls pain the greatest of all evils? It is +not, indeed, very consistent in him. Let us hear what he says: “If the +pain is excessive, <a id="page-82"></a><span class="pgnum">82</span>it must needs be short.” I must have that over +again, for I do not apprehend what you mean exactly by “excessive” or +“short.” That is excessive than which nothing can be greater; that is +short than which nothing is shorter. I do not regard the greatness of +any pain from which, by reason of the shortness of its continuance, I +shall be delivered almost before it reaches me. But if the pain be as +great as that of Philoctetes, it will appear great indeed to me, but yet +not the greatest that I am capable of bearing; for the pain is confined +to my foot. But my eye may pain me, I may have a pain in the head, or +sides, or lungs, or in every part of me. It is far, then, from being +excessive. Therefore, says he, pain of a long continuance has more +pleasure in it than uneasiness. Now, I cannot bring myself to say so +great a man talks nonsense; but I imagine he is laughing at us. My +opinion is that the greatest pain (I say the greatest, though it may be +ten atoms less than another) is not therefore short, because acute. I +could name to you a great many good men who have been tormented many +years with the acutest pains of the gout. But this cautious man doth not +determine the measure of that greatness or of duration, so as to enable +us to know what he calls excessive with regard to pain, or short with +respect to its continuance. Let us pass him by, then, as one who says +just nothing at all; and let us force him to acknowledge, +notwithstanding he might behave himself somewhat boldly under his colic +and his strangury, that no remedy against pain can be had from him who +looks on pain as the greatest of all evils. We must apply, then, for +relief elsewhere, and nowhere better (if we seek for what is most +consistent with itself) than to those who place the chief good in +honesty, and the greatest evil in infamy. You dare not so much as groan, +or discover the least uneasiness in their company, for virtue itself +speaks to you through them.</p> + +<p>XX. Will you, when you may observe children at Lacedæmon, and young men +at Olympia, and barbarians in the amphitheatre, receive the severest +wounds, and bear them without once opening their mouths—will you, I +say, if any pain should by chance attack you, cry out like a woman? Will +you not rather bear it with resolution and constancy? <a id="page-83"></a><span class="pgnum">83</span>and not cry, It +is intolerable; nature cannot bear it! I hear what you say: Boys bear +this because they are led thereto by glory; some bear it through shame, +many through fear, and yet are we afraid that nature cannot bear what is +borne by many, and in such different circumstances? Nature not only +bears it, but challenges it, for there is nothing with her preferable, +nothing which she desires more than credit, and reputation, and praise, +and honor, and glory. I choose here to describe this one thing under +many names, and I have used many that you may have the clearer idea of +it; for what I mean to say is, that whatever is desirable of itself, +proceeding from virtue, or placed in virtue, and commendable on its own +account (which I would rather agree to call the only good than deny it +to be the chief good) is what men should prefer above all things. And as +we declare this to be the case with respect to honesty, so we speak in +the contrary manner of infamy; nothing is so odious, so detestable, +nothing so unworthy of a man. And if you are thoroughly convinced of +this (for, at the beginning of this discourse, you allowed that there +appeared to you more evil in infamy than in pain), it follows that you +ought to have the command over yourself, though I scarcely know how this +expression may seem an accurate one, which appears to represent man as +made up of two natures, so that one should be in command and the other +be subject to it.</p> + +<p>XXI. Yet this division does not proceed from ignorance; for the soul +admits of a twofold division, one of which partakes of reason, the other +is without it. When, therefore, we are ordered to give a law to +ourselves, the meaning is, that reason should restrain our rashness. +There is in the soul of every man something naturally soft, low, +enervated in a manner, and languid. Were there nothing besides this, men +would be the greatest of monsters; but there is present to every man +reason, which presides over and gives laws to all; which, by improving +itself, and making continual advances, becomes perfect virtue. It +behooves a man, then, to take care that reason shall have the command +over that part which is bound to practise obedience. In what manner? you +will say. Why, as a master has over his slave, a general over his <a id="page-84"></a><span class="pgnum">84</span>army, +a father over his son. If that part of the soul which I have called soft +behaves disgracefully, if it gives itself up to lamentations and +womanish tears, then let it be restrained, and committed to the care of +friends and relations, for we often see those persons brought to order +by shame whom no reasons can influence. Therefore, we should confine +those feelings, like our servants, in safe custody, and almost with +chains. But those who have more resolution, and yet are not utterly +immovable, we should encourage with our exhortations, as we would good +soldiers, to recollect themselves, and maintain their honor. That wisest +man of all Greece, in the Niptræ, does not lament too much over his +wounds, or, rather, he is moderate in his grief:</p> + +<div class="poem"> +<p>Move slow, my friends; your hasty speed refrain,</p> +<p>Lest by your motion you increase my pain.</p> +</div> + +<p>Pacuvius is better in this than Sophocles, for in the one Ulysses +bemoans his wounds too vehemently; for the very people who carried him +after he was wounded, though his grief was moderate, yet, considering +the dignity of the man, did not scruple to say,</p> + +<div class="poem"> +<p>And thou, Ulysses, long to war inured,</p> +<p>Thy wounds, though great, too feebly hast endured.</p> +</div> + +<p class="cont">The wise poet understood that custom was no contemptible instructor how +to bear pain. But the same hero complains with more decency, though in +great pain:</p> + +<div class="poem"> +<p>Assist, support me, never leave me so;</p> +<p>Unbind my wounds, oh! execrable woe!</p> +</div> + +<p class="cont">He begins to give way, but instantly checks himself:</p> + +<div class="poem"> +<p>Away! begone! but cover first the sore;</p> +<p>For your rude hands but make my pains the more.</p> +</div> + +<p class="cont">Do you observe how he constrains himself? not that his bodily pains were +less, but because he checks the anguish of his mind. Therefore, in the +conclusion of the Niptræ, he blames others, even when he himself is +dying:</p> + +<div class="poem"> +<p>Complaints of fortune may become the man,</p> +<p>None but a woman will thus weeping stand.</p> +</div> + +<p class="cont"><a id="page-85"></a><span class="pgnum">85</span>And so that soft place in his soul obeys his reason, just as an abashed +soldier does his stern commander.</p> + +<p>XXII. The man, then, in whom absolute wisdom exists (such a man, indeed, +we have never as yet seen, but the philosophers have described in their +writings what sort of man he will be, if he should exist); such a man, +or at least that perfect and absolute reason which exists in him, will +have the same authority over the inferior part as a good parent has over +his dutiful children: he will bring it to obey his nod without any +trouble or difficulty. He will rouse himself, prepare and arm himself, +to oppose pain as he would an enemy. If you inquire what arms he will +provide himself with, they will be contention, encouragement, discourse +with himself. He will say thus to himself: Take care that you are guilty +of nothing base, languid, or unmanly. He will turn over in his mind all +the different kinds of honor. Zeno of Elea will occur to him, who +suffered everything rather than betray his confederates in the design of +putting an end to the tyranny. He will reflect on Anaxarchus, the pupil +of Democritus, who, having fallen into the hands of Nicocreon, King of +Cyprus, without the least entreaty for mercy or refusal, submitted to +every kind of torture. Calanus the Indian will occur to him, an ignorant +man and a barbarian, born at the foot of Mount Caucasus, who committed +himself to the flames by his own free, voluntary act. But we, if we have +the toothache, or a pain in the foot, or if the body be anyways +affected, cannot bear it. For our sentiments of pain as well as pleasure +are so trifling and effeminate, we are so enervated and relaxed by +luxuries, that we cannot bear the sting of a bee without crying out. But +Caius Marius, a plain countryman, but of a manly soul, when he had an +operation performed on him, as I mentioned above, at first refused to be +tied down; and he is the first instance of any one’s having had an +operation performed on him without being tied down. Why, then, did +others bear it afterward? Why, from the force of example. You see, then, +that pain exists more in opinion than in nature; and yet the same Marius +gave a proof that there is something very sharp in pain for he would not +submit to have the other thigh cut. So that he bore his pain with +resolution as a man; but, <a id="page-86"></a><span class="pgnum">86</span>like a reasonable person, he was not willing +to undergo any greater pain without some necessary reason. The whole, +then, consists in this—that you should have command over yourself. I +have already told you what kind of command this is; and by considering +what is most consistent with patience, fortitude, and greatness of soul, +a man not only restrains himself, but, somehow or other, mitigates even +pain itself.</p> + +<p>XXIII. Even as in a battle the dastardly and timorous soldier throws +away his shield on the first appearance of an enemy, and runs as fast as +he can, and on that account loses his life sometimes, though he has +never received even one wound, when he who stands his ground has nothing +of the sort happen to him, so they who cannot bear the appearance of +pain throw themselves away, and give themselves up to affliction and +dismay. But they that oppose it, often come off more than a match for +it. For the body has a certain resemblance to the soul: as burdens are +more easily borne the more the body is exerted, while they crush us if +we give way, so the soul by exerting itself resists the whole weight +that would oppress it; but if it yields, it is so pressed that it cannot +support itself. And if we consider things truly, the soul should exert +itself in every pursuit, for that is the only security for its doing its +duty. But this should be principally regarded in pain, that we must not +do anything timidly, or dastardly, or basely, or slavishly, or +effeminately, and, above all things, we must dismiss and avoid that +Philoctetean sort of outcry. A man is allowed sometimes to groan, but +yet seldom; but it is not permissible even in a woman to howl; for such +a noise as this is forbidden, by the twelve tables, to be used even at +funerals. Nor does a wise or brave man ever groan, unless when he exerts +himself to give his resolution greater force, as they who run in the +stadium make as much noise as they can. The wrestlers, too, do the same +when they are training; and the boxers, when they aim a blow with the +cestus at their adversary, give a groan, not because they are in pain, +or from a sinking of their spirits, but because their whole body is put +upon the stretch by the throwing-out of these groans, and the blow comes +the stronger.</p> + +<p><a id="page-87"></a><span class="pgnum">87</span>XXIV. What! they who would speak louder than ordinary are they +satisfied with working their jaws, sides, or tongue or stretching the +common organs of speech and utterance? The whole body and every muscle +is at full stretch if I may be allowed the expression; every nerve is +exerted to assist their voice. I have actually seen the knees of Marcus +Antonius touch the ground when he was speaking with vehemence for +himself, with relation to the Varian law. For, as the engines you throw +stones or darts with throw them out with the greater force the more they +are strained and drawn back; so it is in speaking, running, or +boxing—the more people strain themselves, the greater their force. +Since, therefore, this exertion has so much influence—if in a moment of +pain groans help to strengthen the mind, let us use them; but if they be +groans of lamentation, if they be the expression of weakness or +abjectness, or unmanly weeping, then I should scarcely call him a man +who yielded to them. For even supposing that such groaning could give +any ease, it still should be considered whether it were consistent with +a brave and resolute man. But if it does not ease our pain, why should +we debase ourselves to no purpose? For what is more unbecoming in a man +than to cry like a woman? But this precept which is laid down with +respect to pain is not confined to it. We should apply this exertion of +the soul to everything else. Is anger inflamed? is lust excited? we must +have recourse to the same citadel, and apply to the same arms. But since +it is pain which we are at present discussing, we will let the other +subjects alone. To bear pain, then, sedately and calmly, it is of great +use to consider with all our soul, as the saying is, how noble it is to +do so, for we are naturally desirous (as I said before, but it cannot be +too often repeated) and very much inclined to what is honorable, of +which, if we discover but the least glimpse, there is nothing which we +are not prepared to undergo and suffer to attain it. From this impulse +of our minds, this desire for genuine glory and honorable conduct, it is +that such dangers are supported in war, and that brave men are not +sensible of their wounds in action, or, if they are sensible of them, +prefer death to the departing but the least step <a id="page-88"></a><span class="pgnum">88</span>from their honor. The +Decii saw the shining swords of their enemies when they were rushing +into the battle. But the honorable character and the glory of the death +which they were seeking made all fear of death of little weight. Do you +imagine that Epaminondas groaned when he perceived that his life was +flowing out with his blood? No; for he left his country triumphing over +the Lacedæmonians, whereas he had found it in subjection to them. These +are the comforts, these are the things that assuage the greatest pain.</p> + +<p>XXV. You may ask, How the case is in peace? What is to be done at home? +How we are to behave in bed? You bring me back to the philosophers, who +seldom go to war. Among these, Dionysius of Heraclea, a man certainly of +no resolution, having learned fortitude of Zeno, quitted it on being in +pain; for, being tormented with a pain in his kidneys, in bewailing +himself he cried out that those things were false which he had formerly +conceived of pain. And when his fellow-disciple, Cleanthes, asked him +why he had changed his opinion, he answered, “That the case of any man +who had applied so much time to philosophy, and yet was unable to bear +pain, might be a sufficient proof that pain is an evil; that he himself +had spent many years at philosophy, and yet could not bear pain: it +followed, therefore, that pain was an evil.” It is reported that +Cleanthes on that struck his foot on the ground, and repeated a verse +out of the Epigonæ:</p> + +<div class="poem"> +<p>Amphiaraus, hear’st thou this below?</p> +</div> + +<p class="cont">He meant Zeno: he was sorry the other had degenerated from him.</p> + +<p>But it was not so with our friend Posidonius, whom I have often seen +myself; and I will tell you what Pompey used to say of him: that when he +came to Rhodes, after his departure from Syria, he had a great desire to +hear Posidonius, but was informed that he was very ill of a severe fit +of the gout; yet he had great inclination to pay a visit to so famous a +philosopher. Accordingly, when he had seen him, and paid his +compliments, and had spoken with great respect of him, he said he was +very sorry that he could not hear him lecture. “But indeed you may,” +<a id="page-89"></a><span class="pgnum">89</span>replied the other, “nor will I suffer any bodily pain to occasion so +great a man to visit me in vain.” On this Pompey relates that, as he lay +on his bed, he disputed with great dignity and fluency on this very +subject: that nothing was good but what was honest; and that in his +paroxysms he would often say, “Pain, it is to no purpose; +notwithstanding you are troublesome, I will never acknowledge you an +evil.” And in general all celebrated and notorious afflictions become +endurable by disregarding them.</p> + +<p>XXVI. Do we not observe that where those exercises called gymnastic are +in esteem, those who enter the lists never concern themselves about +dangers? that where the praise of riding and hunting is highly esteemed, +they who practice these arts decline no pain? What shall I say of our +own ambitious pursuits or desire of honors? What fire have not +candidates run through to gain a single vote? Therefore Africanus had +always in his hands Xenophon, the pupil of Socrates, being particularly +pleased with his saying, that the same labors were not equally heavy to +the general and to the common man, because the honor itself made the +labor lighter to the general. But yet, so it happens, that even with the +illiterate vulgar an idea of honor is of great influence, though they +cannot understand what it is. They are led by report and common opinion +to look on that as honorable which has the general voice. Not that I +would have you, should the multitude be ever so fond of you, rely on +their judgment, nor approve of everything which they think right: you +must use your own judgment. If you are satisfied with yourself when you +have approved of what is right, you will not only have the mastery over +yourself (which I recommended to you just now), but over everybody, and +everything. Lay this down, then, as a rule, that a great capacity, and +lofty elevation of soul, which distinguishes itself most by despising +and looking down with contempt on pain, is the most excellent of all +things, and the more so if it does not depend on the people and does not +aim at applause, but derives its satisfaction from itself. Besides, to +me, indeed, everything seems the more commendable the less the people +are courted, and the fewer eyes there <a id="page-90"></a><span class="pgnum">90</span>are to see it. Not that you +should avoid the public, for every generous action loves the public +view; yet no theatre for virtue is equal to a consciousness of it.</p> + +<p>XXVII. And let this be principally considered: that this bearing of +pain, which I have often said is to be strengthened by an exertion of +the soul, should be the same in everything. For you meet with many who, +through a desire of victory, or for glory, or to maintain their rights, +or their liberty, have boldly received wounds, and borne themselves up +under them; and yet those very same persons, by relaxing that +intenseness of their minds, were unequal to bearing the pain of a +disease; for they did not support themselves under their former +sufferings by reason or philosophy, but by inclination and glory. +Therefore some barbarians and savage people are able to fight very +stoutly with the sword, but cannot bear sickness like men; but the +Grecians, men of no great courage, but as wise as human nature will +admit of, cannot look an enemy in the face, yet the same will bear to be +visited with sickness tolerably, and with a sufficiently manly spirit; +and the Cimbrians and Celtiberians are very alert in battle, but bemoan +themselves in sickness. For nothing can be consistent which has not +reason for its foundation. But when you see those who are led by +inclination or opinion, not retarded by pain in their pursuits, nor +hindered by it from succeeding in them, you may conclude, either that +pain is no evil, or that, notwithstanding you may choose to call an evil +whatever is disagreeable and contrary to nature, yet it is so very +trifling an evil that it may so effectually be got the better of by +virtue as quite to disappear. And I would have you think of this night +and day; for this argument will spread itself, and take up more room +some time or other, and not be confined to pain alone; for if the +motives to all our actions are to avoid disgrace and acquire honor, we +may not only despise the stings of pain, but the storms of fortune, +especially if we have recourse to that retreat which was pointed out in +our yesterday’s discussion; for, as if some God had advised a man who +was pursued by pirates to throw himself overboard, saying, “There is +something at hand to receive you; either a dolphin will take you up, as +it did Arion of <a id="page-91"></a><span class="pgnum">91</span>Methymna; or those horses sent by Neptune to Pelops +(who are said to have carried chariots so rapidly as to be borne up by +the waves) will receive you, and convey you wherever you please. Cast +away all fear.” So, though your pains be ever so sharp and disagreeable, +if the case is not such that it is worth your while to endure them, you +see whither you may betake yourself. I think this will do for the +present. But perhaps you still abide by your opinion.</p> + +<p><i>A.</i> Not in the least, indeed; and I hope I am freed by these two days’ +discourses from the fear of two things that I greatly dreaded.</p> + +<p><i>M.</i> To-morrow, then, for rhetoric, as we were saying. But I see we must +not drop our philosophy.</p> + +<p><i>A.</i> No, indeed; we will have the one in the forenoon, and this at the +usual time.</p> + +<p><i>M.</i> It shall be so, and I will comply with your very laudable +inclinations.</p> + +<hr/> + + +<h3>BOOK III.</h3> + +<h4>ON GRIEF OF MIND.</h4> + + +<p>I. <span class="first">What</span> reason shall I assign, O Brutus, why, as we consist of mind and +body, the art of curing and preserving the body should be so much sought +after, and the invention of it, as being so useful, should be ascribed +to the immortal Gods; but the medicine of the mind should not have been +so much the object of inquiry while it was unknown, nor so much attended +to and cultivated after its discovery, nor so well received or approved +of by some, and accounted actually disagreeable, and looked upon with an +envious eye by many? Is it because we, by means of the mind, judge of +the pains and disorders of the body, but do not, by means of the body, +arrive at any perception of the disorders of the mind? Hence it comes +that the mind only judges of itself when that very faculty by which it +is judged is in a bad state. Had nature given us faculties for +discerning and viewing herself, and could we go through life by keeping +our eye on her—our best guide—<a id="page-92"></a><span class="pgnum">92</span>there would be no reason certainly why +any one should be in want of philosophy or learning; but, as it is, she +has furnished us only with some feeble rays of light, which we +immediately extinguish so completely by evil habits and erroneous +opinions that the light of nature is nowhere visible. The seeds of +virtues are natural to our constitutions, and, were they suffered to +come to maturity, would naturally conduct us to a happy life; but now, +as soon as we are born and received into the world, we are instantly +familiarized with all kinds of depravity and perversity of opinions; so +that we may be said almost to suck in error with our nurse’s milk. When +we return to our parents, and are put into the hands of tutors and +governors, we are imbued with so many errors that truth gives place to +falsehood, and nature herself to established opinion.</p> + +<p>II. To these we may add the poets; who, on account of the appearance +they exhibit of learning and wisdom, are heard, read, and got by heart, +and make a deep impression on our minds. But when to these are added the +people, who are, as it were, one great body of instructors, and the +multitude, who declare unanimously for what is wrong, then are we +altogether overwhelmed with bad opinions, and revolt entirely from +nature; so that they seem to deprive us of our best guide who have +decided that there is nothing better for man, nothing more worthy of +being desired by him, nothing more excellent, than honors and commands, +and a high reputation with the people; which indeed every excellent man +aims at; but while he pursues that only true honor which nature has in +view above all other objects, he finds himself busied in arrant trifles, +and in pursuit of no conspicuous form of virtue, but only some shadowy +representation of glory. For glory is a real and express substance, not +a mere shadow. It consists in the united praise of good men, the free +voice of those who form a true judgment of pre-eminent virtue; it is, as +it were, the very echo of virtue; and being generally the attendant on +laudable actions, should not be slighted by good men. But popular fame, +which would pretend to imitate it, is hasty and inconsiderate, and +generally commends wicked and immoral actions, and throws discredit upon +the appearance and beauty of honesty by assuming <a id="page-93"></a><span class="pgnum">93</span>a resemblance of it. +And it is owing to their not being able to discover the difference +between them that some men ignorant of real excellence, and in what it +consists, have been the destruction of their country and of themselves. +And thus the best men have erred, not so much in their intentions as by +a mistaken conduct. What? is no cure to be attempted to be applied to +those who are carried away by the love of money, or the lust of +pleasures, by which they are rendered little short of madmen, which is +the case of all weak people? or is it because the disorders of the mind +are less dangerous than those of the body? or because the body will +admit of a cure, while there is no medicine whatever for the mind?</p> + +<p>III. But there are more disorders of the mind than of the body, and they +are of a more dangerous nature; for these very disorders are the more +offensive because they belong to the mind and disturb it; and the mind, +when disordered, is, as Ennius says, in a constant error: it can neither +bear nor endure anything, and is under the perpetual influence of +desires. Now, what disorders can be worse to the body than these two +distempers of the mind (for I overlook others), weakness and desire? But +how, indeed, can it be maintained that the mind cannot prescribe for +itself, when she it is who has invented the medicines for the body, +when, with regard to bodily cures, constitution and nature have a great +share, nor do all who suffer themselves to be cured find that effect +instantly; but those minds which are disposed to be cured, and submit to +the precepts of the wise, may undoubtedly recover a healthy state? +Philosophy is certainly the medicine of the soul, whose assistance we do +not seek from abroad, as in bodily disorders, but we ourselves are bound +to exert our utmost energy and power in order to effect our cure. But as +to philosophy in general, I have, I think, in my Hortensius, +sufficiently spoken of the credit and attention which it deserves: since +that, indeed, I have been continually either disputing or writing on its +most material branches; and I have laid down in these books all the +discussions which took place between myself and my particular friends at +my Tusculan villa. But as I have spoken in the two former of pain and +death, this book shall be <a id="page-94"></a><span class="pgnum">94</span>devoted to the account of the third day of +our disputations.</p> + +<p>We came down into the Academy when the day was already declining towards +afternoon, and I asked one of those who were present to propose a +subject for us to discourse on; and then the business was carried on in +this manner:</p> + +<p>IV. <i>A.</i> My opinion is, that a wise man is subject to grief.</p> + +<p><i>M.</i> What, and to the other perturbations of mind, as fears, lusts, +anger? For these are pretty much like what the Greeks call <span class="greek">πάθη</span>. I might +call them diseases, and that would be a literal translation, but it is +not agreeable to our way of speaking. For envy, delight, and pleasure +are all called by the Greeks diseases, being affections of the mind not +in subordination to reason; but we, I think, are right in calling the +same motions of a disturbed soul perturbations, and in very seldom using +the term diseases; though, perhaps, it appears otherwise to you.</p> + +<p><i>A.</i> I am of your opinion.</p> + +<p><i>M.</i> And do you think a wise man subject to these?</p> + +<p><i>A.</i> Entirely, I think.</p> + +<p><i>M.</i> Then that boasted wisdom is but of small account, if it differs so +little from madness?</p> + +<p><i>A.</i> What? does every commotion of the mind seem to you to be madness?</p> + +<p><i>M.</i> Not to me only; but I apprehend, though I have often been surprised +at it, that it appeared so to our ancestors many ages before Socrates; +from whom is derived all that philosophy which relates to life and +morals.</p> + +<p><i>A.</i> How so?</p> + +<p><i>M.</i> Because the name madness<a id="FNA-35"></a><a href="#FN-35"><sup>35</sup></a> implies a sickness of the mind and +disease; that is to say, an unsoundness and an unhealthiness of mind, +which they call madness. But the philosophers call all perturbations of +the soul diseases, and their opinion is that no fool is ever free from +these; but all that are diseased are unsound; and the minds of all fools +are diseased; therefore all fools are mad. For they held that soundness +of the mind depends on a certain <a id="page-95"></a><span class="pgnum">95</span>tranquillity and steadiness; and a +mind which was destitute of these qualities they called insane, because +soundness was inconsistent with a perturbed mind just as much as with a +disordered body.</p> + +<p>V. Nor were they less ingenious in calling the state of the soul devoid +of the light of the mind, “a being out of one’s mind,” “a being beside +one’s self.” From whence we may understand that they who gave these +names to things were of the same opinion with Socrates, that all silly +people were unsound, which the Stoics have carefully preserved as being +derived from him; for whatever mind is distempered (and, as I just now +said, the philosophers call all perturbed motions of the mind +distempers) is no more sound than a body is when in a fit of sickness. +Hence it is that wisdom is the soundness of the mind, folly a sort of +unsoundness, which is insanity, or a being out of one’s mind: and these +are much better expressed by the Latin words than the Greek, which you +will find the case also in many other topics. But we will discuss that +point elsewhere: let us now attend to our present subject. The very +meaning of the word describes the whole thing about which we are +inquiring, both as to its substance and character. For we must +necessarily understand by “sound” those whose minds are under no +perturbation from any motion as if it were a disease. They who are +differently affected we must necessarily call “unsound.” So that nothing +is better than what is usual in Latin, to say that they who are run away +with by their lust or anger have quitted the command over themselves; +though anger includes lust, for anger is defined to be the lust of +revenge. They, then, who are said not to be masters of themselves, are +said to be so because they are not under the government of reason, to +which is assigned by nature the power over the whole soul. Why the +Greeks should call this mania, I do not easily apprehend; but we define +it much better than they, for we distinguish this madness (<i>insania</i>), +which, being allied to folly, is more extensive, from what we call +<i>furor</i>, or raving. The Greeks, indeed, would do so too, but they have +no one word that will express it: what we call <i>furor</i>, they call +<span class="greek">μελαγχολία</span>, as if the reason <a id="page-96"></a><span class="pgnum">96</span>were affected only by a black bile, and +not disturbed as often by a violent rage, or fear, or grief. Thus we say +Athamas, Alcmæon, Ajax, and Orestes were raving (<i>furere</i>); because a +person affected in this manner was not allowed by the Twelve Tables to +have the management of his own affairs; therefore the words are not, if +he is mad (<i>insanus</i>), but if he begins to be raving (<i>furiosus</i>). For +they looked upon madness to be an unsettled humor that proceeded from +not being of sound mind; yet such a person might perform his ordinary +duties, and discharge the usual and customary requirements of life: but +they considered one that was raving as afflicted with a total blindness +of the mind, which, notwithstanding it is allowed to be greater than +madness, is nevertheless of such a nature that a wise man may be subject +to raving (<i>furor</i>), but cannot possibly be afflicted by insanity +(<i>insania</i>). But this is another question: let us now return to our +original subject.</p> + +<p>VI. I think you said that it was your opinion that a wise man was liable +to grief.</p> + +<p><i>A.</i> And so, indeed, I think.</p> + +<p><i>M.</i> It is natural enough to think so, for we are not the offspring of +flints; but we have by nature something soft and tender in our souls, +which may be put into a violent motion by grief, as by a storm; nor did +that Crantor, who was one of the most distinguished men that our Academy +has ever produced, say this amiss: “I am by no means of their opinion +who talk so much in praise of I know not what insensibility, which +neither can exist, nor ought to exist”. “I would choose,” says he, “never +to be ill; but should I be so, still I should choose to retain my +sensation, whether there was to be an amputation or any other separation +of anything from my body. For that insensibility cannot be but at the +expense of some unnatural ferocity of mind, or stupor of body.”But let +us consider whether to talk in this manner be not allowing that we are +weak, and yielding to our softness. Notwithstanding, let us be hardy +enough, not only to lop off every arm of our miseries, but even to pluck +up every fibre of their roots. Yet still something, perhaps, may be left +behind, so deep does folly strike its roots: but whatever may be <a id="page-97"></a><span class="pgnum">97</span>left +it will be no more than is necessary. But let us be persuaded of this, +that unless the mind be in a sound state, which philosophy alone can +effect, there can be no end of our miseries. Wherefore, as we began, let +us submit ourselves to it for a cure; we shall be cured if we choose to +be. I shall advance something further. I shall not treat of grief alone, +though that indeed is the principal thing; but, as I originally +proposed, of every perturbation of the mind, as I termed it; disorder, +as the Greeks call it: and first, with your leave, I shall treat it in +the manner of the Stoics, whose method is to reduce their arguments into +a very small space; afterward I shall enlarge more in my own way.</p> + +<p>VII. A man of courage is also full of faith. I do not use the word +confident, because, owing to an erroneous custom of speaking, that word +has come to be used in a bad sense, though it is derived from confiding, +which is commendable. But he who is full of faith is certainly under no +fear; for there is an inconsistency between faith and fear. Now, whoever +is subject to grief is subject to fear; for whatever things we grieve at +when present we dread when hanging over us and approaching. Thus it +comes about that grief is inconsistent with courage: it is very +probable, therefore, that whoever is subject to grief is also liable to +fear, and to a broken kind of spirits and sinking. Now, whenever these +befall a man, he is in a servile state, and must own that he is +overpowered; for whoever admits these feelings, must admit timidity and +cowardice. But these cannot enter into the mind of a man of courage; +neither, therefore, can grief: but the man of courage is the only wise +man; therefore grief cannot befall the wise man. It is, besides, +necessary that whoever is brave should be a man of great soul; that +whoever is a man of a great soul should be invincible; whoever is +invincible looks down with contempt on all things here, and considers +them, beneath him. But no one can despise those things on account of +which he may be affected with grief; from whence it follows that a wise +man is never affected with grief: for all wise men are brave; therefore +a wise man is not subject to grief. And as the eye, when disordered, is +not in a good condition for performing its <a id="page-98"></a><span class="pgnum">98</span>office properly; and as the +other parts, and the whole body itself, when unsettled, cannot perform +their office and business; so the mind, when disordered, is but +ill-fitted to perform its duty. The office of the mind is to use its +reason well; but the mind of a wise man is always in condition to make +the best use of his reason, and therefore is never out of order. But +grief is a disorder of the mind; therefore a wise man will be always +free from it.</p> + +<p>VIII. And from these considerations we may get at a very probable +definition of the temperate man, whom the Greeks call <span class="greek">σώφρων</span>: and they +call that virtue <span class="greek">σωφροσύνην</span>, which I at one time call temperance, at +another time moderation, and sometimes even modesty; but I do not know +whether that virtue may not be properly called frugality, which has a +more confined meaning with the Greeks; for they call frugal men +<span class="greek">χρησίμους</span>, which implies only that they are useful; but our name has a +more extensive meaning: for all abstinence, all innocency (which the +Greeks have no ordinary name for, though they might use the word +<span class="greek">ἀβλάβεια</span>, for innocency is that disposition of mind which would offend +no one) and several other virtues are comprehended under frugality; but +if this quality were of less importance, and confined in as small a +compass as some imagine, the surname of Piso<a id="FNA-36"></a><a href="#FN-36"><sup>36</sup></a> would not have been in +so great esteem. But as we allow him not the name of a frugal man +(<i>frugi</i>), who either quits his post through fear, which is cowardice; +or who reserves to his own use what was privately committed to his +keeping, which is injustice; or who fails in his military undertakings +through rashness, which is folly—for that reason the word frugality +takes in these three virtues of fortitude, justice, and prudence, though +it is indeed common to all virtues, for they are all connected and knit +together. Let us allow, then, frugality itself to be another and fourth +virtue; for its peculiar property seems to be, to govern and appease all +tendencies to too eager a desire after anything, to restrain lust, and +to preserve a decent steadiness in everything. The vice in contrast to +this is called prodigality (<i>nequitia</i>). Frugality, I imagine, is +derived from the <a id="page-99"></a><span class="pgnum">99</span>word <i>fruge</i>, the best thing which the earth produces; +<i>nequitia</i> is derived (though this is perhaps rather more strained; +still, let us try it; we shall only be thought to have been trifling if +there is nothing in what we say) from the fact of everything being to no +purpose (<i>nequicquam</i>) in such a man; from which circumstance he is +called also <i>Nihil</i>, nothing. Whoever is frugal, then, or, if it is more +agreeable to you, whoever is moderate and temperate, such a one must of +course be consistent; whoever is consistent, must be quiet; the quiet +man must be free from all perturbation, therefore from grief likewise: +and these are the properties of a wise man; therefore a wise man must be +free from grief.</p> + +<p>IX. So that Dionysius of Heraclea is right when, upon this complaint of +Achilles in Homer,</p> + +<div class="poem"> +<p>Well hast thou spoke, but at the tyrant’s name</p> +<p>My rage rekindles, and my soul’s in flame:</p> +<p>’Tis just resentment, and becomes the brave,</p> +<p>Disgraced, dishonor’d like the vilest slave<a id="FNA-37"></a><a href="#FN-37"><sup>37</sup></a>—</p> +</div> + +<p class="cont">he reasons thus: Is the hand as it should be, when it is affected with a +swelling? or is it possible for any other member of the body, when +swollen or enlarged, to be in any other than a disordered state? Must +not the mind, then, when it is puffed up, or distended, be out of order? +But the mind of a wise man is always free from every kind of disorder: +it never swells, never is puffed up; but the mind when in anger is in a +different state. A wise man, therefore, is never angry; for when he is +angry, he lusts after something; for whoever is angry naturally has a +longing desire to give all the pain he can to the person who he thinks +has injured him; and whoever has this earnest desire must necessarily be +much pleased with the accomplishment of his wishes; hence he is +delighted with his neighbor’s misery; and as a wise man is not capable +of such feelings as these, he is therefore not capable of anger. But +should a wise man be subject to grief, he may likewise <a id="page-100"></a><span class="pgnum">100</span>be subject to +anger; for as he is free from anger, he must likewise be free from +grief. Again, could a wise man be subject to grief, he might also be +liable to pity, or even might be open to a disposition towards envy +(<i>invidentia</i>); I do not say to envy (<i>invidia</i>), for that can only +exist by the very act of envying: but we may fairly form the word +<i>invidentia</i> from <i>invidendo</i>, and so avoid the doubtful name <i>invidia;</i> +for this word is probably derived from <i>in</i> and <i>video</i>, looking too +closely into another’s fortune; as it is said in the Melanippus,</p> + +<div class="poem"> +<p>Who envies me the flower of my children?</p> +</div> + +<p class="cont">where the Latin is <i>invidit florem.</i> It may appear not good Latin, but +it is very well put by Accius; for as <i>video</i> governs an accusative +case, so it is more correct to say <i>invideo florem</i> than <i>flori.</i> We are +debarred from saying so by common usage. The poet stood in his own +right, and expressed himself with more freedom.</p> + +<p>X. Therefore compassion and envy are consistent in the same man; for +whoever is uneasy at any one’s adversity is also uneasy at another’s +prosperity: as Theophrastus, while he laments the death of his companion +Callisthenes, is at the same time disturbed at the success of Alexander; +and therefore he says that Callisthenes met with man of the greatest +power and good fortune, but one who did not know how to make use of his +good fortune. And as pity is an uneasiness which arises from the +misfortunes of another, so envy is an uneasiness that proceeds from the +good success of another: therefore whoever is capable of pity is capable +of envy. But a wise man is incapable of envy, and consequently incapable +of pity. But were a wise man used to grieve, to pity also would be +familiar to him; therefore to grieve is a feeling which cannot affect a +wise man. Now, though these reasonings of the Stoics, and their +conclusions, are rather strained and distorted, and ought to be +expressed in a less stringent and narrow manner, yet great stress is to +be laid on the opinions of those men who have a peculiarly bold and +manly turn of thought and sentiment. For our friends the Peripatetics, +notwithstanding all their erudition, gravity, and fluency of language, +do not satisfy me about the moderation of these disorders and diseases +<a id="page-101"></a><span class="pgnum">101</span>of the soul which they insist upon; for every evil, though moderate, is +in its nature great. But our object is to make out that the wise man is +free from all evil; for as the body is unsound if it is ever so slightly +affected, so the mind under any moderate disorder loses its soundness; +therefore the Romans have, with their usual accuracy of expression, +called trouble, and anguish, and vexation, on account of the analogy +between a troubled mind and a diseased body, disorders. The Greeks call +all perturbation of mind by pretty nearly the same name; for they name +every turbid motion of the soul <span class="greek">πάθος</span>, that is to say, a distemper. But +we have given them a more proper name; for a disorder of the mind is +very like a disease of the body. But lust does not resemble sickness; +neither does immoderate joy, which is an elated and exulting pleasure of +the mind. Fear, too, is not very like a distemper, though it is akin to +grief of mind, but properly, as is also the case with sickness of the +body, so too sickness of mind has no name separated from pain. And +therefore I must explain the origin of this pain, that is to say, the +cause that occasions this grief in the mind, as if it were a sickness of +the body. For as physicians think they have found out the cure when they +have discovered the cause of the distemper, so we shall discover the +method of curing melancholy when the cause of it is found out.</p> + +<p>XI. The whole cause, then, is in opinion; and this observation applies +not to this grief alone, but to every other disorder of the mind, which +are of four sorts, but consisting of many parts. For as every disorder +or perturbation is a motion of the mind, either devoid of reason, or in +despite of reason, or in disobedience to reason, and as that motion is +excited by an opinion of either good or evil; these four perturbations +are divided equally into two parts: for two of them proceed from an +opinion of good, one of which is an exulting pleasure, that is to say, a +joy elated beyond measure, arising from an opinion of some present great +good; the other is a desire which may fairly be called even a lust, and +is an immoderate inclination after some conceived great good without any +obedience to reason. Therefore these two kinds, the exulting pleasure +and the lust, have their rise from an opinion of good, as <a id="page-102"></a><span class="pgnum">102</span>the other +two, fear and grief, have from an opinion of evil. For fear is an +opinion of some great evil impending over us, and grief is an opinion of +some great evil present; and, indeed, it is a freshly conceived opinion +of an evil so great that to grieve at it seems right: it is of that kind +that he who is uneasy at it thinks he has good reason to be so. Now we +should exert, our utmost efforts to oppose these perturbations—which +are, as it were, so many furies let loose upon us and urged on by +folly—if we are desirous to pass this share of life that is allotted to +us with ease and satisfaction. But of the other feelings I shall speak +elsewhere: our business at present is to drive away grief if we can, for +that shall be the object of our present discussion, since you have said +that it was your opinion that a wise man might be subject to grief, +which I can by no means allow of; for it is a frightful, miserable, and +detestable thing, which we should fly from with our utmost efforts—with +all our sails and oars, as I may say.</p> + +<p>XII. That descendant of Tantalus, how does he appear to you—he who +sprung from Pelops, who formerly stole Hippodamia from her +father-in-law, King Œnomaus, and married her by force?—he who was +descended from Jupiter himself, how broken-hearted and dispirited does +he not seem!</p> + +<div class="poem"> +<p>Stand off, my friends, nor come within my shade,</p> +<p>That no pollutions your sound hearts pervade,</p> +<p>So foul a stain my body doth partake.</p> +</div> + +<p class="cont">Will you condemn yourself, Thyestes, and deprive yourself of life, on +account of the greatness of another’s crime? What do you think of that +son of Phœbus? Do you not look upon him as unworthy of his own father’s +light?</p> + +<div class="poem"> +<p>Hollow his eyes, his body worn away,</p> +<p>His furrow’d cheeks his frequent tears betray;</p> +<p>His beard neglected, and his hoary hairs</p> +<p>Rough and uncomb’d, bespeak his bitter cares.</p> +</div> + +<p class="cont">O foolish Æetes! these are evils which you yourself have been the cause +of, and are not occasioned by any accidents with which chance has +visited you; and you behaved as you did, even after you had been inured +to your distress, and after the first swelling of the mind had +subsided!—whereas grief consists (as I shall show) in the notion of +<a id="page-103"></a><span class="pgnum">103</span>some recent evil—but your grief, it is very plain, proceeded from the +loss of your kingdom, not of your daughter, for you hated her, and +perhaps with reason, but you could not calmly bear to part with your +kingdom. But surely it is an impudent grief which preys upon a man for +not being able to command those that are free. Dionysius, it is true, +the tyrant of Syracuse, when driven from his country, taught a school at +Corinth; so incapable was he of living without some authority. But what +could be more impudent than Tarquin, who made war upon those who could +not bear his tyranny; and, when he could not recover his kingdom by the +aid of the forces of the Veientians and the Latins, is said to have +betaken himself to Cuma, and to have died in that city of old age and +grief!</p> + +<p>XIII. Do you, then, think that it can befall a wise man to be oppressed +with grief, that is to say, with misery? for, as all perturbation is +misery, grief is the rack itself. Lust is attended with heat, exulting +joy with levity, fear with meanness, but grief with something greater +than these; it consumes, torments, afflicts, and disgraces a man; it +tears him, preys upon his mind, and utterly destroys him: if we do not +so divest ourselves of it as to throw it completely off, we cannot be +free from misery. And it is clear that there must be grief where +anything has the appearance of a present sore and oppressing evil. +Epicurus is of opinion that grief arises naturally from the imagination +of any evil; so that whosoever is eye-witness of any great misfortune, +if he conceives that the like may possibly befall himself, becomes sad +instantly from such an idea. The Cyrenaics think that grief is not +engendered by every kind of evil, but only by unexpected, unforeseen +evil; and that circumstance is, indeed, of no small effect on the +heightening of grief; for whatsoever comes of a sudden appears more +formidable. Hence these lines are deservedly commended:</p> + +<div class="poem"> +<p>I knew my son, when first he drew his breath,</p> +<p>Destined by fate to an untimely death;</p> +<p>And when I sent him to defend the Greeks,</p> +<p>War was his business, not your sportive freaks.</p> +</div> + +<p>XIV. Therefore, this ruminating beforehand upon future evils which you +see at a distance makes their approach <a id="page-104"></a><span class="pgnum">104</span>more tolerable; and on this +account what Euripides makes Theseus say is much commended. You will +give me leave to translate them, as is usual with me:</p> + +<div class="poem"> +<p>I treasured up what some learn’d sage did tell,</p> +<p>And on my future misery did dwell;</p> +<p>I thought of bitter death, of being drove</p> +<p>Far from my home by exile, and I strove</p> +<p>With every evil to possess my mind,</p> +<p>That, when they came, I the less care might find.<a id="FNA-38"></a><a href="#FN-38"><sup>38</sup></a></p> +</div> + +<p class="cont">But Euripides says that of himself, which Theseus said he had heard from +some learned man, for the poet had been a pupil of Anaxagoras, who, as +they relate, on hearing of the death of his son, said, “I knew that my +son was mortal;” which speech seems to intimate that such things afflict +those men who have not thought on them before. Therefore, there is no +doubt but that all those things which are considered evils are the +heavier from not being foreseen. Though, notwithstanding this is not the +only circumstance which occasions the greatest grief, still, as the +mind, by foreseeing and preparing for it, has great power to make all +grief the less, a man should at all times consider all the events that +may befall him in this life; and certainly the excellence and divine +nature of wisdom consists in taking a near view of, and gaining a +thorough acquaintance with, all human affairs, in not being surprised +when anything happens, and in thinking, before the event, that there is +nothing but what may come to pass.</p> + +<div class="poem"> +<p class="L6" style="margin-left:15ex">Wherefore ev’ry man,</p> +<p>When his affairs go on most swimmingly,</p> +<p>E’en then it most behooves to arm himself</p> +<p>Against the coming storm: loss, danger, exile,</p> +<p>Returning ever, let him look to meet;</p> +<p>His son in fault, wife dead, or daughter sick;</p> +<p>All common accidents, and may have happen’d</p> +<p>That nothing shall seem new or strange. But if</p> +<p>Aught has fall’n out beyond his hopes, all that</p> +<p>Let him account clear gain.<a id="FNA-39"></a><a href="#FN-39"><sup>39</sup></a></p> +</div> + +<p><a id="page-105"></a><span class="pgnum">105</span>XV. Therefore, as Terence has so well expressed what he borrowed from +philosophy, shall not we, from whose fountains he drew it, say the same +thing in a better manner, and abide by it with more steadiness? Hence +came that steady countenance, which, according to Xantippe, her husband +Socrates always had; so that she said that she never observed any +difference in his looks when he went out and when he came home. Yet the +look of that old Roman, M. Crassus, who, as Lucilius says, never smiled +but once in his lifetime, was not of this kind, but placid and serene, +for so we are told. He, indeed, might well have had the same look at all +times who never changed his mind, from which the countenance derives its +expression. So that I am ready to borrow of the Cyrenaics those arms +against the accidents and events of life by means of which, by long +premeditation, they break the force of all approaching evils; and at the +same time I think that those very evils themselves arise more from +opinion than nature, for if they were real, no forecast could make them +lighter. But I shall speak more particularly on these matters after I +have first considered Epicurus’s opinion, who thinks that all people +must necessarily be uneasy who believe themselves to be in any evils, +let them be either foreseen and expected, or habitual to them; for with +him evils are not the less by reason of their continuance, nor the +lighter for having been foreseen; and it is folly to ruminate on evils +to come, or such as, perhaps, never may come: every evil is disagreeable +enough when it does come; but he who is constantly considering that some +evil may befall him is loading himself with a perpetual evil; and even +should such evil never light on him, he voluntarily takes upon himself +unnecessary misery, so that he is under constant uneasiness, whether he +actually suffers any evil, or only thinks of it. But he makes the +alleviation of grief depend on two things—a ceasing to think on evil, +and a turning to the contemplation of pleasure. For he thinks that the +mind may possibly be under the power of reason, and follow her +directions: he forbids us, therefore, to mind trouble, and calls us off +from sorrowful reflections; he throws a mist over our eyes to hinder us +from the contemplation of misery. Having sounded a retreat <a id="page-106"></a><span class="pgnum">106</span>from this +statement, he drives our thoughts on again, and encourages them to view +and engage the whole mind in the various pleasures with which he thinks +the life of a wise man abounds, either from reflecting on the past, or +from the hope of what is to come. I have said these things in my own +way; the Epicureans have theirs. However, let us examine what they say; +how they say it is of little consequence.</p> + +<p>XVI. In the first place, they are wrong in forbidding men to premeditate +on futurity and blaming their wish to do so; for there is nothing that +breaks the edge of grief and lightens it more than considering, during +one’s whole life, that there is nothing which it is impossible should +happen, or than, considering what human nature is, on what conditions +life was given, and how we may comply with them. The effect of which is +that we are always grieving, but that we never do so; for whoever +reflects on the nature of things, the various turns of life, and the +weakness of human nature, grieves, indeed, at that reflection; but while +so grieving he is, above all other times, behaving as a wise man, for he +gains these two things by it: one, that while he is considering the +state of human nature he is performing the especial duties of +philosophy, and is provided with a triple medicine against adversity—in +the first place, because he has long reflected that such things might +befall him, and this reflection by itself contributes much towards +lessening and weakening all misfortunes; and, secondly, because he is +persuaded that we should bear all the accidents which can happen to man +with the feelings and spirit of a man; and, lastly, because he considers +that what is blamable is the only evil. But it is not your fault that +something has happened to you which it was impossible for man to avoid. +For that withdrawing of our thoughts which he recommends when he calls +us off from contemplating our misfortunes is an imaginary action; for it +is not in our power to dissemble or to forget those evils which lie +heavy on us; they tear, vex, and sting us—they burn us up, and leave no +breathing time. And do you order us to forget them (for such +forgetfulness is contrary to nature), and at the same time deprive us of +the only assistance which nature affords, the being accustomed to them? +<a id="page-107"></a><span class="pgnum">107</span>For that, though it is but a slow medicine (I mean that which is +brought by lapse of time), is still a very effectual one. You order me +to employ my thoughts on something good, and forget my misfortunes. You +would say something worthy a great philosopher if you thought those +things good which are best suited to the dignity of human nature.</p> + +<p>XVII. Should Pythagoras, Socrates, or Plato say to me, Why are you +dejected or sad? Why do you faint, and yield to fortune, which, perhaps, +may have power to harass and disturb you, but should not quite unman +you? There is great power in the virtues; rouse them, if they chance to +droop. Take fortitude for your guide, which will give you such spirits +that you will despise everything that can befall man, and look on it as +a trifle. Add to this temperance, which is moderation, and which was +just now called frugality, which will not suffer you to do anything base +or bad—for what is worse or baser than an effeminate man? Not even +justice will suffer you to act in this manner, though she seems to have +the least weight in this affair; but still, notwithstanding, even she +will inform you that you are doubly unjust when you both require what +does not belong to you, inasmuch as though you who have been born mortal +demand to be placed in the condition of the immortals, and at the same +time you take it much to heart that you are to restore what was lent +you. What answer will you make to prudence, who informs you that she is +a virtue sufficient of herself both to teach you a good life and also to +secure you a happy one? And, indeed, if she were fettered by external +circumstances, and dependent on others, and if she did not originate in +herself and return to herself, and also embrace everything in herself, +so as to seek no adventitious aid from any quarter, I cannot imagine why +she should appear deserving of such lofty panegyrics, or of being sought +after with such excessive eagerness. Now, Epicurus, if you call me back +to such goods as these, I will obey you, and follow you, and use you as +my guide, and even forget, as you order me, all my misfortunes; and I +will do this the more readily from a persuasion that they are not to be +ranked among evils at all. But you are for bringing my thoughts over to +pleasure. <a id="page-108"></a><span class="pgnum">108</span>What pleasures? Pleasures of the body, I imagine, or such as +are recollected or imagined on account of the body. Is this all? Do I +explain your opinion rightly? for your disciples are used to deny that +we understand at all what Epicurus means. This is what he says, and what +that subtle fellow, old Zeno, who is one of the sharpest of them, used, +when I was attending lectures at Athens, to enforce and talk so loudly +of; saying that he alone was happy who could enjoy present pleasure, and +who was at the same time persuaded that he should enjoy it without pain, +either during the whole or the greatest part of his life; or if, should +any pain interfere, if it was very sharp, then it must be short; should +it be of longer continuance, it would have more of what was sweet than +bitter in it; that whosoever reflected on these things would be happy, +especially if satisfied with the good things which he had already +enjoyed, and if he were without fear of death or of the Gods.</p> + +<p>XVIII. You have here a representation of a happy life according to +Epicurus, in the words of Zeno, so that there is no room for +contradiction in any point. What, then? Can the proposing and thinking +of such a life make Thyestes’s grief the less, or Æetes’s, of whom I +spoke above, or Telamon’s, who was driven from his country to penury and +banishment? in wonder at whom men exclaimed thus:</p> + +<div class="poem"> +<p>Is this the man surpassing glory raised?</p> +<p>Is this that Telamon so highly praised</p> +<p>By wondering Greece, at whose sight, like the sun,</p> +<p>All others with diminish’d lustre shone?</p> +</div> + +<p>Now, should any one, as the same author says, find his spirits sink with +the loss of his fortune, he must apply to those grave philosophers of +antiquity for relief, and not to these voluptuaries: for what great +abundance of good do they promise? Suppose that we allow that to be +without pain is the chief good? Yet that is not called pleasure. But it +is not necessary at present to go through the whole: the question is, to +what point are we to advance in order to abate our grief? Grant that to +be in pain is the greatest evil: whosoever, then, has proceeded so far +as not to be in pain, is he, therefore, in immediate possession of the +greatest good? Why, Epicurus, do we use any evasions, <a id="page-109"></a><span class="pgnum">109</span>and not allow in +our own words the same feeling to be pleasure which you are used to +boast of with such assurance? Are these your words or not? This is what +you say in that book which contains all the doctrine of your school; for +I will perform on this occasion the office of a translator, lest any one +should imagine that I am inventing anything. Thus you speak: “Nor can I +form any notion of the chief good, abstracted from those pleasures which +are perceived by taste, or from what depends on hearing music, or +abstracted from ideas raised by external objects visible to the eye, or +by agreeable motions, or from those other pleasures which are perceived +by the whole man by means of any of his senses; nor can it possibly be +said that the pleasures of the mind are excited only by what is good, +for I have perceived men’s minds to be pleased with the hopes of +enjoying those things which I mentioned above, and with the idea that it +should enjoy them without any interruption from pain.” And these are his +exact words, so that any one may understand what were the pleasures with +which Epicurus was acquainted. Then he speaks thus, a little lower down: +“I have often inquired of those who have been called wise men what would +be the remaining good if they should exclude from consideration all +these pleasures, unless they meant to give us nothing but words. I could +never learn anything from them; and unless they choose that all virtue +and wisdom should vanish and come to nothing, they must say with me that +the only road to happiness lies through those pleasures which I +mentioned above.” What follows is much the same, and his whole book on +the chief good everywhere abounds with the same opinions. Will you, +then, invite Telamon to this kind of life to ease his grief? And should +you observe any one of your friends under affliction, would you rather +prescribe him a sturgeon than a treatise of Socrates? or advise him to +listen to the music of a water organ rather than to Plato? or lay before +him the beauty and variety of some garden, put a nosegay to his nose, +burn perfumes before him, and bid him crown himself with a garland of +roses and woodbines? Should you add one thing more, you would certainly +wipe out all his grief.</p> + +<p><a id="page-110"></a><span class="pgnum">110</span>XIX. Epicurus must admit these arguments, or he must take out of his +book what I just now said was a literal translation; or, rather, he must +destroy his whole book, for it is crammed full of pleasures. We must +inquire, then, how we can ease him of his grief who speaks in this +manner:</p> + +<div class="poem"> +<p>My present state proceeds from fortune’s stings;</p> +<p>By birth I boast of a descent from kings;</p> +<p>Hence may you see from what a noble height</p> +<p>I’m sunk by fortune to this abject plight.</p> +</div> + +<p class="cont">What! to ease his grief, must we mix him a cup of sweet wine, or +something of that kind? Lo! the same poet presents us with another +sentiment somewhere else:</p> + +<div class="poem"> +<p>I, Hector, once so great, now claim your aid.</p> +</div> + +<p class="cont">We should assist her, for she looks out for help:</p> + +<div class="poem"> +<p>Where shall I now apply, where seek support?</p> +<p>Where hence betake me, or to whom resort?”</p> +<p>No means remain of comfort or of joy,</p> +<p>In flames my palace, and in ruins Troy;</p> +<p>Each wall, so late superb, deformed nods,</p> +<p>And not an altar’s left t’ appease the Gods.</p> +</div> + +<p class="cont">You know what should follow, and particularly this:</p> + +<div class="poem"> +<p>Of father, country, and of friends bereft,</p> +<p>Not one of all these sumptuous temples left;</p> +<p>Which, while the fortune of our house did stand,</p> +<p>With rich wrought ceilings spoke the artist’s hand.</p> +</div> + +<p class="cont">O excellent poet! though despised by those who sing the verses of +Euphorion. He is sensible that all things which come on a sudden are +harder to be borne. Therefore, when he had set off the riches of Priam +to the best advantage, which had the appearance of a long continuance, +what does he add?</p> + +<div class="poem"> +<p>Lo! these all perish’d in one blazing pile;</p> +<p>The foe old Priam of his life beguiled,</p> +<p>And with his blood, thy altar, Jove, defiled.</p> +</div> + +<p class="cont">Admirable poetry! There is something mournful in the subject, as well as +in the words and measure. We must drive away this grief of hers: how is +that to be done? Shall we lay her on a bed of down; introduce a singer; +<a id="page-111"></a><span class="pgnum">111</span>shall we burn cedar, or present here with some pleasant liquor, and +provide her something to eat? Are these the good things which remove the +most afflicting grief? For you but just now said you knew of no other +good. I should agree with Epicurus that we ought to be called off from +grief to contemplate good things, if we could only agree upon what was +good.</p> + +<p>XX. It may be said, What! do you imagine Epicurus really meant this, and +that he maintained anything so sensual? Indeed I do not imagine so, for +I am sensible that he has uttered many excellent things and sentiments, +and delivered maxims of great weight. Therefore, as I said before, I am +speaking of his acuteness, not of his morals. Though he should hold +those pleasures in contempt which he just now commended, yet I must +remember wherein he places the chief good. For he was not contented with +barely saying this, but he has explained what he meant: he says that +taste, and embraces, and sports, and music, and those forms which affect +the eyes with pleasure, are the chief good. Have I invented this? have I +misrepresented him? I should be glad to be confuted; for what am I +endeavoring at but to clear up truth in every question? Well, but the +same man says that pleasure is at its height where pain ceases, and that +to be free from all pain is the very greatest pleasure. Here are three +very great mistakes in a very few words. One is, that he contradicts +himself; for, but just now, he could not imagine anything good unless +the senses were in a manner tickled with some pleasure; but now he says +that to be free from pain is the highest pleasure. Can any one +contradict himself more? The next mistake is, that where there is +naturally a threefold division—the first, to be pleased; next, to be in +pain; the last, to be affected neither by pleasure nor pain—he imagines +the first and the last to be the same, and makes no difference between +pleasure and a cessation of pain. The last mistake he falls into in +common with some others, which is this: that as virtue is the most +desirable thing, and as philosophy has been investigated with a view to +the attainment of it, he has separated the chief good from virtue. But +he commends virtue, and that frequently; and indeed C. Gracchus, when he +had made the <a id="page-112"></a><span class="pgnum">112</span>largest distributions of the public money, and had +exhausted the treasury, nevertheless spoke much of defending the +treasury. What signifies what men say when we see what they do? That +Piso, who was surnamed Frugal, had always harangued against the law that +was proposed for distributing the corn; but when it had passed, though a +man of consular dignity, he came to receive the corn. Gracchus observed +Piso standing in the court, and asked him, in the hearing of the people, +how it was consistent for him to take corn by a law he had himself +opposed. “It was,” said he, “against your distributing my goods to every +man as you thought proper; but, as you do so, I claim my share.” Did not +this grave and wise man sufficiently show that the public revenue was +dissipated by the Sempronian law? Read Gracchus’s speeches, and you will +pronounce him the advocate of the treasury. Epicurus denies that any one +can live pleasantly who does not lead a life of virtue; he denies that +fortune has any power over a wise man; he prefers a spare diet to great +plenty, and maintains that a wise man is always happy. All these things +become a philosopher to say, but they are not consistent with pleasure. +But the reply is, that he doth not mean <i>that</i> pleasure: let him mean +any pleasure, it must be such a one as makes no part of virtue. But +suppose we are mistaken as to his pleasure; are we so, too, as to his +pain? I maintain, therefore, the impropriety of language which that man +uses, when talking of virtue, who would measure every great evil by +pain.</p> + +<p>XXI. And indeed the Epicureans, those best of men—for there is no order +of men more innocent—complain that I take great pains to inveigh +against Epicurus. We are rivals, I suppose, for some honor or +distinction. I place the chief good in the mind, he in the body; I in +virtue, he in pleasure; and the Epicureans are up in arms, and implore +the assistance of their neighbors, and many are ready to fly to their +aid. But as for my part, I declare that I am very indifferent about the +matter, and that I consider the whole discussion which they are so +anxious about at an end. For what! is the contention about the Punic +war? on which very subject, though M. Cato and L. Lentulus were of +different opinions, still there was no <a id="page-113"></a><span class="pgnum">113</span>difference between them. But +these men behave with too much heat, especially as the opinions which +they would uphold are no very spirited ones, and such as they dare not +plead for either in the senate or before the assembly of the people, or +before the army or the censors. But, however, I will argue with them +another time, and with such a disposition that no quarrel shall arise +between us; for I shall be ready to yield to their opinions when founded +on truth. Only I must give them this advice: That were it ever so true, +that a wise man regards nothing but the body, or, to express myself with +more decency, never does anything except what is expedient, and views +all things with exclusive reference to his own advantage, as such things +are not very commendable, they should confine them to their own breasts, +and leave off talking with that parade of them.</p> + +<p>XXII. What remains is the opinion of the Cyrenaics, who think that men +grieve when anything happens unexpectedly. And that is indeed, as I said +before, a great aggravation of a misfortune; and I know that it appeared +so to Chrysippus—“Whatever falls out unexpected is so much the +heavier.” But the whole question does not turn on this; though the +sudden approach of an enemy sometimes occasions more confusion than it +would if you had expected him, and a sudden storm at sea throws the +sailors into a greater fright than one which they have foreseen; and it +is the same in many other cases. But when you carefully consider the +nature of what was expected, you will find nothing more than that all +things which come on a sudden appear greater; and this upon two +accounts: first of all, because you have not time to consider how great +the accident is; and, secondly, because you are probably persuaded that +you could have guarded against it had you foreseen if, and therefore the +misfortune, having been seemingly encountered by your own fault, makes +your grief the greater. That it is so, time evinces; which, as it +advances, brings with it so much mitigation that though the same +misfortunes continue, the grief not only becomes the less, but in some +cases is entirely removed. Many Carthaginians were slaves at Rome, and +many Macedonians, when Perseus their king was taken prisoner. I saw, +<a id="page-114"></a><span class="pgnum">114</span>too, when I was a young man, some Corinthians in the Peloponnesus. They +might all have lamented with Andromache,</p> + +<div class="poem"> +<p>All these I saw......;</p> +</div> + +<p class="cont">but they had perhaps given over lamenting themselves, for by their +countenances, and speech, and other gestures you might have taken them +for Argives or Sicyonians. And I myself was more concerned at the ruined +walls of Corinth than the Corinthians themselves were, whose minds by +frequent reflection and time had become callous to such sights. I have +read a book of Clitomachus, which he sent to his fellow-citizens who +were prisoners, to comfort them after the destruction of Carthage. There +is in it a treatise written by Carneades, which, as Clitomachus says, he +had inserted into his book; the subject was, “That it appeared probable +that a wise man would grieve at the state of subjection of his country,” +and all the arguments which Carneades used against this proposition are +set down in the book. There the philosopher applies such a strong +medicine to a fresh grief as would be quite unnecessary in one of any +continuance; nor, if this very book had been sent to the captives some +years after, would it have found any wounds to cure, but only scars; for +grief, by a gentle progress and slow degrees, wears away imperceptibly. +Not that the circumstances which gave rise to it are altered, or can be, +but that custom teaches what reason should—that those things which +before seemed to be of some consequence are of no such great importance, +after all.</p> + +<p>XXIII. It may be said, What occasion is there to apply to reason, or to +any sort of consolation such as we generally make use of, to mitigate +the grief of the afflicted? For we have this argument always at hand, +that nothing ought to appear unexpected. But how will any one be enabled +to bear his misfortunes the better by knowing that it is unavoidable +that such things should happen to man? Saying this subtracts nothing +from the sum of the grief: it only asserts that nothing has fallen out +but what might have been anticipated; and yet this manner of speaking +has some little consolation in it, though I apprehend not a great deal. +Therefore those unlooked-for things have not so much force as to give +rise to all our <a id="page-115"></a><span class="pgnum">115</span>grief; the blow perhaps may fall the heavier, but +whatever happens does not appear the greater on that account. No, it is +the fact of its having happened lately, and not of its having befallen +us unexpectedly, that makes it seem the greater. There are two ways, +then, of discerning the truth, not only of things that seem evil, but of +those that have the appearance of good. For we either inquire into the +nature of the thing, of what description, and magnitude, and importance +it is—as sometimes with regard to poverty, the burden of which we may +lighten when by our disputations we show how few things nature requires, +and of what a trifling kind they are—or, without any subtle arguing, we +refer them to examples, as here we instance a Socrates, there a +Diogenes, and then again that line in Cæcilius,</p> + +<div class="poem"> +<p>Wisdom is oft conceal’d in mean attire.</p> +</div> + +<p class="cont">For as poverty is of equal weight with all, what reason can be given why +what was borne by Fabricius should be spoken of by any one else as +unsupportable when it falls upon themselves? Of a piece with this is +that other way of comforting, which consists in pointing out that +nothing has happened but what is common to human nature; for this +argument doth not only inform us what human nature is, but implies that +all things are tolerable which others have borne and are bearing.</p> + +<p>XXIV. Is poverty the subject? They tell you of many who have submitted +to it with patience. Is it the contempt of honors? They acquaint you +with some who never enjoyed any, and were the happier for it; and of +those who have preferred a private retired life to public employment, +mentioning their names with respect; they tell you of the verse<a id="FNA-40"></a><a href="#FN-40"><sup>40</sup></a> of +that most powerful king who praises an old man, and pronounces him happy +because he was unknown to fame and seemed likely to arrive at the hour +of death in obscurity and without notice. Thus, too, they have examples +for those who are deprived of their children: they who are under any +great grief are comforted by instances of like affliction; and thus the +endurance <a id="page-116"></a><span class="pgnum">116</span>of every misfortune is rendered more easy by the fact of +others having undergone the same, and the fate of others causes what has +happened to appear less important than it has been previously thought, +and reflection thus discovers to us how much opinion had imposed on us. +And this is what the Telamon declares, “I, when my son was born,” etc.; +and thus Theseus, “I on my future misery did dwell;” and Anaxagoras, “I +knew my son was mortal.” All these men, by frequently reflecting on +human affairs, had discovered that they were by no means to be estimated +by the opinion of the multitude; and, indeed, it seems to me to be +pretty much the same case with those who consider beforehand as with +those who derive their remedies from time, excepting that a kind of +reason cures the one, and the other remedy is provided by nature; by +which we discover (and this contains the whole marrow of the matter) +that what was imagined to be the greatest evil is by no means so great +as to defeat the happiness of life. And the effect of this is, that the +blow is greater by reason of its not having been foreseen, and not, as +they suppose, that when similar misfortunes befall two different people, +that man only is affected with grief whom this calamity has befallen +unexpectedly. So that some persons, under the oppression of grief, are +said to have borne it actually worse for hearing of this common +condition of man, that we are born under such conditions as render it +impossible for a man to be exempt from all evil.</p> + +<p>XXV. For this reason Carneades, as I see our friend Antiochus writes, +used to blame Chrysippus for commending these verses of Euripides:</p> + +<div class="poem"> +<p>Man, doom’d to care, to pain, disease, and strife,</p> +<p>Walks his short journey thro’ the vale of life:</p> +<p>Watchful attends the cradle and the grave,</p> +<p>And passing generations longs to save:</p> +<p>Last, dies himself: yet wherefore should we mourn?</p> +<p>For man must to his kindred dust return;</p> +<p>Submit to the destroying hand of fate,</p> +<p>As ripen’d ears the harvest-sickle wait.<a id="FNA-41"></a><a href="#FN-41"><sup>41</sup></a></p> +</div> + +<p class="cont"><a id="page-117"></a><span class="pgnum">117</span>He would not allow a speech of this kind to avail at all to the cure of +our grief, for he said it was a lamentable case itself that we were +fallen into the hands of such a cruel fate; and that a speech like that, +preaching up comfort from the misfortunes of another, was a comfort +adapted only to those of a malevolent disposition. But to me it appears +far otherwise; for the necessity of bearing what is the common condition +of humanity forbids your resisting the will of the Gods, and reminds you +that you are a man, which reflection greatly alleviates grief; and the +enumeration of these examples is not produced with a view to please +those of a malevolent disposition, but in order that any one in +affliction may be induced to bear what he observes many others have +previously borne with tranquillity and moderation. For they who are +falling to pieces, and cannot hold together through the greatness of +their grief, should be supported by all kinds of assistance. From whence +Chrysippus thinks that grief is called <span class="greek">λύπη</span>, as it were <span class="greek">λύσις</span>, that is +to say, a dissolution of the whole man—the whole of which I think may +be pulled up by the roots by explaining, as I said at the beginning, the +cause of grief; for it is nothing else but an opinion and judgment +formed of a present acute evil. And thus any bodily pain, let it be ever +so grievous, may be endurable where any hopes are proposed of some +considerable good; and we receive such consolation from a virtuous and +illustrious life that they who lead such lives are seldom attacked by +grief, or but slightly affected by it.</p> + +<p>XXVI. But as besides this opinion of great evil there is this other +added also—that we ought to lament what has happened, that it is right +so to do, and part of our duty, then is brought about that terrible +disorder of mind, grief. And it is to this opinion that we owe all those +various and horrid kinds of lamentation, that neglect of our persons, +that womanish tearing of our cheeks, that striking on our thighs, +breasts, and heads. Thus Agamemnon, in Homer and in Accius,</p> + +<div class="poem"> +<p>Tears in his grief his uncomb’d locks;<a id="FNA-42"></a><a href="#FN-42"><sup>42</sup></a></p> +</div> + +<p class="cont">from whence comes that pleasant saying of Bion, that the <a id="page-118"></a><span class="pgnum">118</span>foolish king +in his sorrow tore away the hairs of his head, imagining that his grief +would be alleviated by baldness. But men do all these things from being +persuaded that they ought to do so. And thus Æschines inveighs against +Demosthenes for sacrificing within seven days after the death of his +daughter. But with what eloquence, with what fluency, does he attack +him! what sentiments does he collect! what words does he hurl against +him! You may see by this that an orator may do anything; but nobody +would approve of such license if it were not that we have an idea innate +in our minds that every good man ought to lament the loss of a relation +as bitterly as possible. And it is owing to this that some men, when in +sorrow, betake themselves to deserts, as Homer says of Bellerophon:</p> + +<div class="poem"> +<p class="L6" style="margin-left: 15ex">Distracted in his mind,</p> +<p>Forsook by heaven, forsaking human kind,</p> +<p>Wide o’er the Aleïan field he chose to stray,</p> +<p>A long, forlorn, uncomfortable way!<a id="FNA-43"></a><a href="#FN-43"><sup>43</sup></a></p> +</div> + +<p class="cont">And thus Niobe is feigned to have been turned into stone, from her never +speaking, I suppose, in her grief. But they imagine Hecuba to have been +converted into a bitch, from her rage and bitterness of mind. There are +others who love to converse with solitude itself when in grief, as the +nurse in Ennius,</p> + +<div class="poem"> +<p>Fain would I to the heavens find earth relate</p> +<p>Medea’s ceaseless woes and cruel fate.<a id="FNA-44"></a><a href="#FN-44"><sup>44</sup></a></p> +</div> + +<p>XXVII. Now all these things are done in grief, from a persuasion of +their truth and propriety and necessity; and it is plain that those who +behave thus do so from a conviction of its being their duty; for should +these mourners by chance drop their grief, and either act or speak for a +moment in a more calm or cheerful manner, they presently check +themselves and return to their lamentations again, and blame themselves +for having been guilty of any intermissions <a id="page-119"></a><span class="pgnum">119</span>from their grief; and +parents and masters generally correct children not by words only, but by +blows, if they show any levity by either word or deed when the family is +under affliction, and, as it were, oblige them to be sorrowful. What! +does it not appear, when you have ceased to mourn, and have discovered +that your grief has been ineffectual, that the whole of that mourning +was voluntary on your part? What does that man say in Terence who +punishes himself, the Self-tormentor?</p> + +<div class="poem"> +<p>I think I do my son less harm, O Chremes,</p> +<p>As long as I myself am miserable.</p> +</div> + +<p class="cont">He determines to be miserable: and can any one determine on anything +against his will?</p> + +<div class="poem"> +<p>I well might think that I deserved all evil.</p> +</div> + +<p class="cont">He would think he deserved any misfortune were he otherwise than +miserable! Therefore, you see, the evil is in opinion, not in nature. +How is it when some things do of themselves prevent your grieving at +them? as in Homer, so many died and were buried daily that they had not +leisure to grieve: where you find these lines—</p> + +<div class="poem"> +<p>The great, the bold, by thousands daily fall,</p> +<p>And endless were the grief to weep for all.</p> +<p>Eternal sorrows what avails to shed?</p> +<p>Greece honors not with solemn fasts the dead:</p> +<p>Enough when death demands the brave to pay</p> +<p>The tribute of a melancholy day.</p> +<p>One chief with patience to the grave resign’d,</p> +<p>Our care devolves on others left behind.<a id="FNA-45"></a><a href="#FN-45"><sup>45</sup></a></p> +</div> + +<p>Therefore it is in our own power to lay aside grief upon occasion; and +is there any opportunity (seeing the thing is in our own power) that we +should let slip of getting rid of care and grief? It was plain that the +friends of Cnæus Pompeius, when they saw him fainting under his wounds, +at the very moment of that most miserable and bitter sight were under +great uneasiness how they themselves, <a id="page-120"></a><span class="pgnum">120</span>surrounded by the enemy as they +were, should escape, and were employed in nothing but encouraging the +rowers and aiding their escape; but when they reached Tyre, they began +to grieve and lament over him. Therefore, as fear with them, prevailed +over grief, cannot reason and true philosophy have the same effect with +a wise man?</p> + +<p>XXVIII. But what is there more effectual to dispel grief than the +discovery that it answers no purpose, and has been undergone to no +account? Therefore, if we can get rid of it, we need never have been +subject to it. It must be acknowledged, then, that men take up grief +wilfully and knowingly; and this appears from the patience of those who, +after they have been exercised in afflictions and are better able to +bear whatever befalls them, suppose themselves hardened against fortune; +as that person in Euripides,</p> + +<div class="poem"> +<p>Had this the first essay of fortune been,</p> +<p>And I no storms thro’ all my life had seen,</p> +<p>Wild as a colt I’d broke from reason’s sway;</p> +<p>But frequent griefs have taught me to obey.<a id="FNA-46"></a><a href="#FN-46"><sup>46</sup></a></p> +</div> + +<p class="cont">As, then, the frequent bearing of misery makes grief the lighter, we +must necessarily perceive that the cause and original of it does not lie +in the calamity itself. Your principal philosophers, or lovers of +wisdom, though they have not yet arrived at perfect wisdom, are not they +sensible that they are in the greatest evil? For they are foolish, and +foolishness is the greatest of all evils, and yet they lament not. How +shall we account for this? Because opinion is not fixed upon that kind +of evil, it is not our opinion that it is right, meet, and our duty to +be uneasy because we are not all wise men. Whereas this opinion is +strongly affixed to that uneasiness where mourning is concerned, which +is the greatest of all grief. Therefore Aristotle, when he blames some +ancient philosophers for imagining that by their genius they had brought +philosophy <a id="page-121"></a><span class="pgnum">121</span>to the highest perfection, says, they must be either +extremely foolish or extremely vain; but that he himself could see that +great improvements had been made therein in a few years, and that +philosophy would in a little time arrive at perfection. And Theophrastus +is reported to have reproached nature at his death for giving to stags +and crows so long a life, which was of no use to them, but allowing only +so short a span to men, to whom length of days would have been of the +greatest use; for if the life of man could have been lengthened, it +would have been able to provide itself with all kinds of learning, and +with arts in the greatest perfection. He lamented, therefore, that he +was dying just when he had begun to discover these. What! does not every +grave and distinguished philosopher acknowledge himself ignorant of many +things, and confess that there are many things which he must learn over +and over again? And yet, though these men are sensible that they are +standing still in the very midway of folly, than which nothing can be +worse, they are under no great affliction, because no opinion that it is +their duty to lament is ever mingled with this knowledge. What shall we +say of those who think it unbecoming in a man to grieve? among whom we +may reckon Q. Maximus, when he buried his son that had been consul, and +L. Paulus, who lost two sons within a few days of one another. Of the +same opinion was M. Cato, who lost his son just after he had been +elected prætor, and many others, whose names I have collected in my book +on Consolation. Now what made these men so easy, but their persuasion +that grief and lamentation was not becoming in a man? Therefore, as some +give themselves up to grief from an opinion that it is right so to do, +they refrained themselves, from an opinion that it was discreditable; +from which we may infer that grief is owing more to opinion than nature.</p> + +<p>XXIX. It may be said, on the other side, Who is so mad as to grieve of +his own accord? Pain proceeds from nature, which you must submit to, say +they, agreeably to what even your own Crantor teaches, for it presses +and gains upon you unavoidably, and cannot possibly be resisted. So that +the very same Oileus, in Sophocles, who had before comforted Telamon on +the death of Ajax, on <a id="page-122"></a><span class="pgnum">122</span>hearing of the death of his own son, is +broken-hearted. On this alteration of his mind we have these lines:</p> + +<div class="poem"> +<p>Show me the man so well by wisdom taught</p> +<p>That what he charges to another’s fault,</p> +<p>When like affliction doth himself betide,</p> +<p>True to his own wise counsel will abide.<a id="FNA-47"></a><a href="#FN-47"><sup>47</sup></a></p> +</div> + +<p class="cont">Now, when they urge these things, their endeavor is to prove that nature +is absolutely and wholly irresistible; and yet the same people allow +that we take greater grief on ourselves than nature requires. What +madness is it, then, in us to require the same from others? But there +are many reasons for our taking grief on us. The first is from the +opinion of some evil, on the discovery and certainty of which grief +comes of course. Besides, many people are persuaded that they are doing +something very acceptable to the dead when they lament bitterly over +them. To these may be added a kind of womanish superstition, in +imagining that when they have been stricken by the afflictions sent by +the Gods, to acknowledge themselves afflicted and humbled by them is the +readiest way of appeasing them. But most men appear to be unaware what +contradictions these things are full of. They commend those who die +calmly, but they blame those who can bear the loss of another with the +same calmness, as if it were possible that it should be true, as is +occasionally said in love speeches, that any one can love another more +than himself. There is, indeed, something excellent in this, and, if you +examine it, something no less just than true, that we love those who +ought to be most dear to us as well as we love ourselves; but to love +them more than ourselves is absolutely impossible; nor is it desirable +in friendship that I should love my friend more than myself, or that he +should love me so; for this would occasion much confusion in life, and +break in upon all the duties of it.</p> + +<p><a id="page-123"></a><span class="pgnum">123</span>XXX. But we will speak of this another time: at present it is +sufficient not to attribute our misery to the loss of our friends, nor +to love them more than, if they themselves could be sensible of our +conduct, they would approve of, or at least not more than we do +ourselves. Now as to what they say, that some are not at all appeased by +our consolations; and, moreover, as to what they add, that the +comforters themselves acknowledge they are miserable when fortune varies +the attack and falls on them—in both these cases the solution is easy: +for the fault here is not in nature, but in our own folly; and much may +be said against folly. But men who do not admit of consolation seem to +bespeak misery for themselves; and they who cannot bear their +misfortunes with that temper which they recommend to others are not more +faulty in this particular than most other persons; for we see that +covetous men find fault with others who are covetous, as do the +vainglorious with those who appear too wholly devoted to the pursuit of +glory. For it is the peculiar characteristic of folly to perceive the +vices of others, but to forget its own. But since we find that grief is +removed by length of time, we have the greatest proof that the strength +of it depends not merely on time, but on the daily consideration of it. +For if the cause continues the same, and the man be the same, how can +there be any alteration in the grief, if there is no change in what +occasioned the grief, nor in him who grieves? Therefore it is from daily +reflecting that there is no real evil in the circumstance for which you +grieve, and not from the length of time, that you procure a remedy for +your grief.</p> + +<p>XXXI. Here some people talk of moderate grief; but if such be natural, +what occasion is there for consolation? for nature herself will +determine, the measure of it: but if it depends on and is caused by +opinion, the whole opinion should be destroyed. I think that it has been +sufficiently said, that grief arises from an opinion of some present +evil, which includes this belief, that it is incumbent on us to grieve. +To this definition Zeno has added, very justly, that the opinion of this +present evil should be recent. Now this word recent they explain thus: +those are not the only recent things which happened a little while ago; +but as <a id="page-124"></a><span class="pgnum">124</span>long as there shall be any force, or vigor, or freshness in that +imagined evil, so long it is entitled to the name of recent. Take the +case of Artemisia, the wife of Mausolus, King of Caria, who made that +noble sepulchre at Halicarnassus; while she lived, she lived in grief, +and died of it, being worn out by it, for that opinion was always recent +with her: but you cannot call that recent which has already begun to +decay through time. Now the duty of a comforter is, to remove grief +entirely, to quiet it, or draw it off as much as you can, or else to +keep it under, and prevent its spreading any further, and to divert +one’s attention to other matters. There are some who think, with +Cleanthes, that the only duty of a comforter is to prove that what one +is lamenting is by no means an evil. Others, as the Peripatetics, prefer +urging that the evil is not great. Others, with Epicurus, seek to divert +your attention from the evil to good: some think it sufficient to show +that nothing has happened but what you had reason to expect; and this is +the practice of the Cyrenaics. But Chrysippus thinks that the main thing +in comforting is, to remove the opinion from the person who is grieving, +that to grieve is his bounden duty. There are others who bring together +all these various kinds of consolations, for people are differently +affected; as I have done myself in my book on Consolation; for as my own +mind was much disordered, I have attempted in that book to discover +every method of cure. But the proper season is as much to be attended to +in the cure of the mind as of the body; as Prometheus in Æschylus, on +its being said to him,</p> + +<div class="poem"> +<p>I think, Prometheus, you this tenet hold,</p> +<p>That all men’s reason should their rage control?</p> +</div> + +<p class="cont">answers,</p> + +<div class="poem"> +<p>Yes, when one reason properly applies;</p> +<p>Ill-timed advice will make the storm but rise.<a id="FNA-48"></a><a href="#FN-48"><sup>48</sup></a></p> +</div> + +<p>XXXII. But the principal medicine to be applied in consolation is, to +maintain either that it is no evil at all, <a id="page-125"></a><span class="pgnum">125</span>or a very inconsiderable +one: the next best to that is, to speak of the common condition of life, +having a view, if possible, to the state of the person whom you comfort +particularly. The third is, that it is folly to wear one’s self out with +grief which can avail nothing. For the comfort of Cleanthes is suitable +only for a wise man, who is in no need of any comfort at all; for could +you persuade one in grief that nothing is an evil but what is base, you +would not only cure him of grief, but folly. But the time for such +precepts is not well chosen. Besides, Cleanthes does not seem to me +sufficiently aware that affliction may very often proceed from that very +thing which he himself allows to be the greatest misfortune. For what +shall we say? When Socrates had convinced Alcibiades, as we are told, +that he had no distinctive qualifications as a man different from other +people, and that, in fact, there was no difference between him, though a +man of the highest rank, and a porter; and when Alcibiades became uneasy +at this, and entreated Socrates, with tears in his eyes, to make him a +man of virtue, and to cure him of that mean position; what shall we say +to this, Cleanthes? Was there no evil in what afflicted Alcibiades thus? +What strange things does Lycon say? who, making light of grief, says +that it arises from trifles, from things that affect our fortune or +bodies, not from the evils of the mind. What, then? did not the grief of +Alcibiades proceed from the defects and evils of the mind? I have +already said enough of Epicurus’s consolation.</p> + +<p>XXXIII. Nor is that consolation much to be relied on, though it is +frequently practised, and sometimes has some effect, namely, “That you +are not alone in this.” It has its effect, as I said, but not always, +nor with every person, for some reject it; but much depends on the +application of it; for you ought rather to show, not how men in general +have been affected with such evils, but how men of sense have borne +them. As to Chrysippus’s method, it is certainly founded in truth; but +it is difficult to apply it in time of distress. It is a work of no +small difficulty to persuade a person in affliction that he grieves +merely because he thinks it right so to do. Certainly, then, as in +pleadings we do not state all cases alike (if I may adopt <a id="page-126"></a><span class="pgnum">126</span>the language +of lawyers for a moment), but adapt what we have to say to the time, to +the nature of the subject under debate, and to the person; so, too, in +alleviating grief, regard should be had to what kind of cure the party +to be comforted can admit of. But, somehow or other, we have rambled +from what you originally proposed. For your question was concerning a +wise man, with whom nothing can have the appearance of evil that is not +dishonorable; or at least, anything else would seem so small an evil +that by his wisdom he would so overmatch it as to make it wholly +disappear; and such a man makes no addition to his grief through +opinion, and never conceives it right to torment himself above measure, +nor to wear himself out with grief, which is the meanest thing +imaginable. Reason, however, it seems, has demonstrated (though it was +not directly our object at the moment to inquire whether anything can be +called an evil except what is base) that it is in our power to discern +that all the evil which there is in affliction has nothing natural in +it, but is contracted by our own voluntary judgment of it, and the error +of opinion.</p> + +<p>XXXIV. But the kind of affliction of which I have treated is that which +is the greatest; in order that when we have once got rid of that, it may +appear a business of less consequence to look after remedies for the +others. For there are certain things which are usually said about +poverty; and also certain statements ordinarily applied to retired and +undistinguished life. There are particular treatises on banishment, on +the ruin of one’s country, on slavery, on weakness, on blindness, and on +every incident that can come under the name of an evil. The Greeks +divide these into different treatises and distinct books; but they do it +for the sake of employment: not but that all such discussions are full +of entertainment. And yet, as physicians, in curing the whole body, +attend to even the most insignificant part of the body which is at all +disordered, so does philosophy act, after it has removed grief in +general; still, if any other deficiency exists—should poverty bite, +should ignominy sting, should banishment bring a dark cloud over us, or +should any of those things which I have just mentioned appear, there is +for each its appropriate <a id="page-127"></a><span class="pgnum">127</span>consolation, which you shall hear whenever you +please. But we must have recourse again to the same original principle, +that a wise man is free from all sorrow, because it is vain, because it +answers no purpose, because it is not founded in nature, but on opinion +and prejudice, and is engendered by a kind of invitation to grieve, when +once men have imagined that it is their duty to do so. When, then, we +have subtracted what is altogether voluntary, that mournful uneasiness +will be removed; yet some little anxiety, some slight pricking, will +still remain. They may indeed call this natural, provided they give it +not that horrid, solemn, melancholy name of grief, which can by no means +consist with wisdom. But how various and how bitter are the roots of +grief! Whatever they are, I propose, after having felled the trunk, to +destroy them all; even if it should be necessary, by allotting a +separate dissertation to each, for I have leisure enough to do so, +whatever time it may take up. But the principle of every uneasiness is +the same, though they may appear under different names. For envy is an +uneasiness; so are emulation, detraction, anguish, sorrow, sadness, +tribulation, lamentation, vexation, grief, trouble, affliction, and +despair. The Stoics define all these different feelings; and all those +words which I have mentioned belong to different things, and do not, as +they seem, express the same ideas; but they are to a certain extent +distinct, as I shall make appear perhaps in another place. These are +those fibres of the roots which, as I said at first, must be traced back +and cut off and destroyed, so that not one shall remain. You say it is a +great and difficult undertaking: who denies it? But what is there of any +excellency which has not its difficulty? Yet philosophy undertakes to +effect it, provided we admit its superintendence. But enough of this. +The other books, whenever you please, shall be ready for you here or +anywhere else.</p> + + +<hr/> + +<h3><a id="page-128"></a><span class="pgnum">128</span>BOOK IV.</h3> + +<h4>On other perturbations of the mind.</h4> + + +<p>I. <span class="first">I have</span> often wondered, Brutus, on many occasions, at the ingenuity +and virtues of our countrymen; but nothing has surprised me more than +their development in those studies, which, though they came somewhat +late to us, have been transported into this city from Greece. For the +system of auspices, and religious ceremonies, and courts of justice, and +appeals to the people, the senate, the establishment of an army of +cavalry and infantry, and the whole military discipline, were instituted +as early as the foundation of the city by royal authority, partly too by +laws, not without the assistance of the Gods. Then with what a +surprising and incredible progress did our ancestors advance towards all +kind of excellence, when once the republic was freed from the regal +power! Not that this is a proper occasion to treat of the manners and +customs of our ancestors, or of the discipline and constitution of the +city; for I have elsewhere, particularly in the six books I wrote on the +Republic, given a sufficiently accurate account of them. But while I am +on this subject, and considering the study of philosophy, I meet with +many reasons to imagine that those studies were brought to us from +abroad, and not merely imported, but preserved and improved; for they +had Pythagoras, a man of consummate wisdom and nobleness of character, +in a manner, before their eyes, who was in Italy at the time that Lucius +Brutus, the illustrious founder of your nobility, delivered his country +from tyranny. As the doctrine of Pythagoras spread itself on all sides, +it seems probable to me that it reached this city; and this is not only +probable of itself, but it does really appear to have been the case from +many remains of it. For who can imagine that, when it flourished so much +in that part of Italy which was called Magna Græcia, and in some of the +<a id="page-129"></a><span class="pgnum">129</span>largest and most powerful cities, in which, first the name of +Pythagoras, and then that of those men who were afterward his followers, +was in so high esteem; who can imagine, I say, that our people could +shut their ears to what was said by such learned men? Besides, it is +even my opinion that it was the great esteem in which the Pythagoreans +were held, that gave rise to that opinion among those who came after +him, that King Numa was a Pythagorean. For, being acquainted with the +doctrine and principles of Pythagoras, and having heard from their +ancestors that this king was a very wise and just man, and not being +able to distinguish accurately between times and periods that were so +remote, they inferred, from his being so eminent for his wisdom, that he +had been a pupil of Pythagoras.</p> + +<p>II. So far we proceed on conjecture. As to the vestiges of the +Pythagoreans, though I might collect many, I shall use but a few; +because they have no connection with our present purpose. For, as it is +reported to have been a custom with them to deliver certain precepts in +a more abstruse manner in verse, and to bring their minds from severe +thought to a more composed state by songs and musical instruments; so +Cato, a writer of the very highest authority, says in his Origins, that +it was customary with our ancestors for the guests at their +entertainments, every one in his turn, to celebrate the praises and +virtues of illustrious men in song to the sound of the flute; from +whence it is clear that poems and songs were then composed for the +voice. And, indeed, it is also clear that poetry was in fashion from the +laws of the Twelve Tables, wherein it is provided that no song should be +made to the injury of another. Another argument of the erudition of +those times is, that they played on instruments before the shrines of +their Gods, and at the entertainments of their magistrates; but that +custom was peculiar to the sect I am speaking of. To me, indeed, that +poem of Appius Cæcus, which Panætius commends so much in a certain +letter of his which is addressed to Quintus Tubero, has all the marks of +a Pythagorean author. We have many things derived from the Pythagoreans +in our customs, which I pass over, that we may <a id="page-130"></a><span class="pgnum">130</span>not seem to have learned +that elsewhere which we look upon ourselves as the inventors of. But to +return to our purpose. How many great poets as well as orators have +sprung up among us! and in what a short time! so that it is evident that +our people could arrive at any learning as soon as they had an +inclination for it. But of other studies I shall speak elsewhere if +there is occasion, as I have already often done.</p> + +<p>III. The study of philosophy is certainly of long standing with us; but +yet I do not find that I can give you the names of any philosopher +before the age of Lælius and Scipio, in whose younger days we find that +Diogenes the Stoic, and Carneades the Academic, were sent as ambassadors +by the Athenians to our senate. And as these had never been concerned in +public affairs, and one of them was a Cyrenean, the other a Babylonian, +they certainly would never have been forced from their studies, nor +chosen for that employment, unless the study of philosophy had been in +vogue with some of the great men at that time; who, though they might +employ their pens on other subjects—some on civil law, others on +oratory, others on the history of former times—yet promoted this most +extensive of all arts, the principle of living well, even more by their +life than by their writings. So that of that true and elegant philosophy +(which was derived from Socrates, and is still preserved by the +Peripatetics and by the Stoics, though they express themselves +differently in their disputes with the Academics) there are few or no +Latin records; whether this proceeds from the importance of the thing +itself, or from men’s being otherwise employed, or from their concluding +that the capacity of the people was not equal to the apprehension of +them. But, during this silence, C. Amafinius arose and took upon himself +to speak; on the publishing of whose writings the people were moved, and +enlisted themselves chiefly under this sect, either because the doctrine +was more easily understood, or because they were invited thereto by the +pleasing thoughts of amusement, or that, because there was nothing +better, they laid hold of what was offered them. And after Amafinius, +when many of the same sentiments had written much about them, the +Pythagoreans <a id="page-131"></a><span class="pgnum">131</span>spread over all Italy: but that these doctrines should be +so easily understood and approved of by the unlearned is a great proof +that they were not written with any great subtlety, and they think their +establishment to be owing to this.</p> + +<p>IV. But let every one defend his own opinion, for every one is at +liberty to choose what he likes: I shall keep to my old custom; and, +being under no restraint from the laws of any particular school, which +in philosophy every one must necessarily confine himself to, I shall +always inquire what has the most probability in every question, and this +system, which I have often practised on other occasions, I have adhered +closely to in my Tusculan Disputations. Therefore, as I have acquainted +you with the disputations of the three former days, this book shall +conclude the discussion of the fourth day. When we had come down into +the Academy, as we had done the former days, the business was carried on +thus:</p> + +<p><i>M.</i> Let any one say, who pleases, what he would wish to have discussed.</p> + +<p><i>A.</i> I do not think a wise man can possibly be free from every +perturbation of mind.</p> + +<p><i>M.</i> He seemed by yesterday’s discourse to be free from grief; unless +you agreed with us only to avoid taking up time.</p> + +<p><i>A.</i> Not at all on that account, for I was extremely satisfied with your +discourse.</p> + +<p><i>M.</i> You do not think, then, that a wise man is subject to grief?</p> + +<p><i>A.</i> No, by no means.</p> + +<p><i>M.</i> But if that cannot disorder the mind of a wise man, nothing else +can. For what—can such a man be disturbed by fear? Fear proceeds from +the same things when absent which occasion grief when present. Take away +grief, then, and you remove fear.</p> + +<p>The two remaining perturbations are, a joy elate above measure, and +lust; and if a wise man is not subject to these, his mind will be always +at rest.</p> + +<p><i>A.</i> I am entirely of that opinion.</p> + +<p><i>M.</i> Which, then, shall we do? Shall I immediately crowd all my sails? +or shall I make use of my oars, as if I were just endeavoring to get +clear of the harbor?</p> + +<p><a id="page-132"></a><span class="pgnum">132</span><i>A.</i> What is it that you mean, for I do not exactly comprehend you?</p> + +<p>V. <i>M.</i> Because, Chrysippus and the Stoics, when they discuss the +perturbations of the mind, make great part of their debate to consist in +definitions and distinctions; while they employ but few words on the +subject of curing the mind, and preventing it from being disordered. +Whereas the Peripatetics bring a great many things to promote the cure +of it, but have no regard to their thorny partitions and definitions. My +question, then, was, whether I should instantly unfold the sails of my +eloquence, or be content for a while to make less way with the oars of +logic?</p> + +<p><i>A.</i> Let it be so; for by the employment of both these means the subject +of our inquiry will be more thoroughly discussed.</p> + +<p><i>M.</i> It is certainly the better way; and should anything be too obscure, +you may examine that afterward.</p> + +<p><i>A.</i> I will do so; but those very obscure points you will, as usual, +deliver with more clearness than the Greeks.</p> + +<p><i>M.</i> I will, indeed, endeavor to do so; but it well requires great +attention, lest, by losing one word, the whole should escape you. What +the Greeks call <span class="greek">πάθη</span> we choose to name perturbations (or disorders) +rather than diseases; in explaining which, I shall follow, first, that +very old description of Pythagoras, and afterward that of Plato; for +they both divide the mind into two parts, and make one of these partake +of reason, and the other they represent without it. In that which +partakes of reason they place tranquillity, that is to say, a placid and +undisturbed constancy; to the other they assign the turbid motions of +anger and desire, which are contrary and opposite to reason. Let this, +then, be our principle, the spring of all our reasonings. But +notwithstanding, I shall use the partitions and definitions of the +Stoics in describing these perturbations; who seem to me to have shown +very great acuteness on this question.</p> + +<p>VI. Zeno’s definition, then, is this: “A perturbation” (which he calls a +<span class="greek">πάθος</span>) “is a commotion of the mind repugnant to reason, and against +nature.” Some of them define it even more briefly, saying that a +perturbation is a somewhat too vehement appetite; but by too vehement +they mean an appetite <a id="page-133"></a><span class="pgnum">133</span>that recedes further from the constancy of +nature. But they would have the divisions of perturbations to arise from +two imagined goods, and from two imagined evils; and thus they become +four: from the good proceed lust and joy—joy having reference to some +present good, and lust to some future one. They suppose fear and grief +to proceed from evils: fear from something future, grief from something +present; for whatever things are dreaded as approaching always occasion +grief when present. But joy and lust depend on the opinion of good; as +lust, being inflamed and provoked, is carried on eagerly towards what +has the appearance of good; and joy is transported and exults on +obtaining what was desired: for we naturally pursue those things that +have the appearance of good, and avoid the contrary. Wherefore, as soon +as anything that has the appearance of good presents itself, nature +incites us to endeavor to obtain it. Now, where this strong desire is +consistent and founded on prudence, it is by the Stoics called <span class="greek">βούλησις</span>, +and the name which we give it is volition; and this they allow to none +but their wise man, and define it thus: Volition is a reasonable desire; +but whatever is incited too violently in opposition to reason, that is a +lust, or an unbridled desire, which is discoverable in all fools. And, +therefore, when we are affected so as to be placed in any good +condition, we are moved in two ways; for when the mind is moved in a +placid and calm motion, consistent with reason, that is called joy; but +when it exults with a vain, wanton exultation, or immoderate joy, then +that feeling may be called immoderate ecstasy or transport, which they +define to be an elation of the mind without reason. And as we naturally +desire good things, so in like manner we naturally seek to avoid what is +evil; and this avoidance of which, if conducted in accordance with +reason, is called caution; and this the wise man alone is supposed to +have: but that caution which is not under the guidance of reason, but is +attended with a base and low dejection, is called fear. Fear is, +therefore, caution destitute of reason. But a wise man is not affected +by any present evil; while the grief of a fool proceeds from being +affected with an imaginary evil, by which his mind is contracted and +sunk, since it is not under the dominion <a id="page-134"></a><span class="pgnum">134</span>of reason. This, then, is the +first definition, which makes grief to consist in a shrinking of the +mind contrary to the dictates of reason. Thus, there are four +perturbations, and but three calm rational emotions; for grief has no +exact opposite.</p> + +<p>VII. But they insist upon it that all perturbations depend on opinion +and judgment; therefore they define them more strictly, in order not +only the better to show how blamable they are, but to discover how much +they are in our power. Grief, then, is a recent opinion of some present +evil, in which it seems to be right that the mind should shrink and be +dejected. Joy is a recent opinion of a present good, in which it seems +to be right that the mind should be elated. Fear is an opinion of an +impending evil which we apprehend will be intolerable. Lust is an +opinion of a good to come, which would be of advantage were it already +come, and present with us. But however I have named the judgments and +opinions of perturbations, their meaning is, not that merely the +perturbations consist in them, but that the effects likewise of these +perturbations do so; as grief occasions a kind of painful pricking, and +fear engenders a recoil or sudden abandonment of the mind, joy gives +rise to a profuse mirth, while lust is the parent of an unbridled habit +of coveting. But that imagination, which I have included in all the +above definitions, they would have to consist in assenting without +warrantable grounds. Now, every perturbation has many subordinate parts +annexed to it of the same kind. Grief is attended with enviousness +(<i>invidentia</i>)—I use that word for instruction’s sake, though it is not +so common; because envy (<i>invidia</i>) takes in not only the person who +envies, but the person, too, who is envied—emulation, detraction, pity, +vexation, mourning, sadness, tribulation, sorrow, lamentation, +solicitude, disquiet of mind, pain, despair, and many other similar +feelings are so too. Under fear are comprehended sloth, shame, terror, +cowardice, fainting, confusion, astonishment. In pleasure they +comprehend malevolence—that is, pleased at another’s +misfortune—delight, boastfulness, and the like. To lust they associate +anger, fury, hatred, enmity, discord, wants, desire, and other feelings +of that kind.</p> + +<p><a id="page-135"></a><span class="pgnum">135</span>But they define these in this manner:</p> + +<p>VIII. Enviousness (<i>invidentia</i>), they say, is a grief arising from the +prosperous circumstances of another, which are in no degree injurious to +the person who envies; for where any one grieves at the prosperity of +another, by which he is injured, such a one is not properly said to +envy—as when Agamemnon grieves at Hector’s success; but where any one, +who is in no way hurt by the prosperity of another, is in pain at his +success, such a one envies indeed. Now the name “emulation” is taken in +a double sense, so that the same word may stand for praise and +dispraise: for the imitation of virtue is called emulation (however, +that sense of it I shall have no occasion for here, for that carries +praise with it); but emulation is also a term applied to grief at +another’s enjoying what I desired to have, and am without. Detraction +(and I mean by that, jealousy) is a grief even at another’s enjoying +what I had a great inclination for. Pity is a grief at the misery of +another who suffers wrongfully; for no one is moved by pity at the +punishment of a parricide or of a betrayer of his country. Vexation is a +pressing grief. Mourning is a grief at the bitter death of one who was +dear to you. Sadness is a grief attended with tears. Tribulation is a +painful grief. Sorrow, an excruciating grief. Lamentation, a grief where +we loudly bewail ourselves. Solicitude, a pensive grief. Trouble, a +continued grief. Affliction, a grief that harasses the body. Despair, a +grief that excludes all hope of better things to come. But those +feelings which are included under fear, they define thus: There is +sloth, which is a dread of some ensuing labor; shame and terror, which +affect the body—hence blushing attends shame; a paleness, and tremor, +and chattering of the teeth attend terror—cowardice, which is an +apprehension of some approaching evil; dread, a fear that unhinges the +mind, whence comes that line of Ennius,</p> + +<div class="poem"> +<p>Then dread discharged all wisdom from my mind;</p> +</div> + +<p class="cont">fainting is the associate and constant attendant on dread; confusion, a +fear that drives away all thought; alarm, a continued fear.</p> + +<p><a id="page-136"></a><span class="pgnum">136</span>IX. The different species into which they divide pleasure come under +this description; so that malevolence is a pleasure in the misfortunes +of another, without any advantage to yourself; delight, a pleasure that +soothes the mind by agreeable impressions on the ear. What is said of +the ear may be applied to the sight, to the touch, smell, and taste. All +feelings of this kind are a sort of melting pleasure that dissolves the +mind. Boastfulness is a pleasure that consists in making an appearance, +and setting off yourself with insolence.—The subordinate species of +lust they define in this manner: Anger is a lust of punishing any one +who, as we imagine, has injured us without cause. Heat is anger just +forming and beginning to exist, which the Greeks call <span class="greek">θύμωσις</span>. Hatred is +a settled anger. Enmity is anger waiting for an opportunity of revenge. +Discord is a sharper anger conceived deeply in the mind and heart. Want +an insatiable lust. Regret is when one eagerly wishes to see a person +who is absent. Now here they have a distinction; so that with them +regret is a lust conceived on hearing of certain things reported of some +one, or of many, which the Greeks call <span class="greek">κατηγορήματα</span>, or predicaments; as +that they are in possession of riches and honors: but want is a lust for +those very honors and riches. But these definers make intemperance the +fountain of all these perturbations; which is an absolute revolt from +the mind and right reason—a state so averse to all rules of reason that +the appetites of the mind can by no means be governed and restrained. +As, therefore, temperance appeases these desires, making them obey right +reason, and maintains the well-weighed judgments of the mind, so +intemperance, which is in opposition to this, inflames, confounds, and +puts every state of the mind into a violent motion. Thus, grief and +fear, and every other perturbation of the mind, have their rise from +intemperance.</p> + +<p>X. Just as distempers and sickness are bred in the body from the +corruption of the blood, and the too great abundance of phlegm and bile, +so the mind is deprived of its health, and disordered with sickness, +from a confusion of depraved opinions that are in opposition to one +another. From these perturbations arise, first, diseases, which they +call <span class="greek">νοσήματα</span>; and also those feelings which are in opposition <a id="page-137"></a><span class="pgnum">137</span>to these +diseases, and which admit certain faulty distastes or loathings; then +come sicknesses, which are called <span class="greek">ἀῤῥωστήματα</span> by the Stoics, and these +two have their opposite aversions. Here the Stoics, especially +Chrysippus, give themselves unnecessary trouble to show the analogy +which the diseases of the mind have to those of the body: but, +overlooking all that they say as of little consequence, I shall treat +only of the thing itself. Let us, then, understand perturbation to imply +a restlessness from the variety and confusion of contradictory opinions; +and that when this heat and disturbance of the mind is of any standing, +and has taken up its residence, as it were, in the veins and marrow, +then commence diseases and sickness, and those aversions which are in +opposition to these diseases and sicknesses.</p> + +<p>XI. What I say here may be distinguished in thought, though they are in +fact the same; inasmuch as they both have their rise from lust and joy. +For should money be the object of our desire, and should we not +instantly apply to reason, as if it were a kind of Socratic medicine to +heal this desire, the evil glides into our veins, and cleaves to our +bowels, and from thence proceeds a distemper or sickness, which, when it +is of any continuance, is incurable, and the name of this disease is +covetousness. It is the same with other diseases; as the desire of +glory, a passion for women, to which the Greeks give the name of +<span class="greek">φιλογυνεία</span>: and thus all other diseases and sicknesses are generated. +But those feelings which are the contrary of these are supposed to have +fear for their foundation, as a hatred of women, such as is displayed in +the Woman-hater of Atilius; or the hatred of the whole human species, as +Timon is reported to have done, whom they call the Misanthrope. Of the +same kind is inhospitality. And all these diseases proceed from a +certain dread of such things as they hate and avoid. But they define +sickness of mind to be an overweening opinion, and that fixed and deeply +implanted in the heart, of something as very desirable which is by no +means so. What proceeds from aversion, they define thus: a vehement idea +of something to be avoided, deeply implanted, and inherent in our minds, +when there is no reason for avoiding it; and this kind of opinion is a +deliberate <a id="page-138"></a><span class="pgnum">138</span>belief that one understands things of which one is wholly +ignorant. Now, sickness of the mind has all these subordinate divisions: +avarice, ambition, fondness for women, obstinacy, gluttony, drunkenness, +covetousness, and other similar vices. But avarice is a violent opinion +about money, as if it were vehemently to be desired and sought after, +which opinion is deeply implanted and inherent in our minds; and the +definition of all the other similar feelings resembles these. But the +definitions of aversions are of this sort: inhospitality is a vehement +opinion, deeply implanted and inherent in your mind, that you should +avoid a stranger. Thus, too, the hatred of women, like that felt by +Hippolytus, is defined; and the hatred of the human species like that +displayed by Timon.</p> + +<p>XII. But to come to the analogy of the state of body and mind, which I +shall sometimes make use of, though more sparingly than the Stoics. Some +men are more inclined to particular disorders than others; and, +therefore, we say that some people are rheumatic, others dropsical, not +because they are so at present, but because they are often so: some are +inclined to fear, others to some other perturbation. Thus in some there +is a continual anxiety, owing to which they are anxious; in some a +hastiness of temper, which differs from anger, as anxiety differs from +anguish: for all are not anxious who are sometimes vexed, nor are they +who are anxious always uneasy in that manner: as there is a difference +between being drunk and drunkenness; and it is one thing to be a lover, +another to be given to women. And this disposition of particular people +to particular disorders is very common: for it relates to all +perturbations; it appears in many vices, though it has no name. Some +are, therefore, said to be envious, malevolent, spiteful, fearful, +pitiful, from a propensity to those perturbations, not from their being +always carried away by them. Now this propensity to these particular +disorders may be called a sickness from analogy with the body; meaning, +that is to say, nothing more than a propensity towards sickness. But +with regard to whatever is good, as some are more inclined to different +good qualities than others, we may call this a facility or tendency: +this tendency to evil is a proclivity or inclination to falling; <a id="page-139"></a><span class="pgnum">139</span>but +where anything is neither good nor bad, it may have the former name.</p> + +<p>XIII. Even as there may be, with respect to the body, a disease, a +sickness, and a defect, so it is with the mind. They call that a disease +where the whole body is corrupted; they call that sickness where a +disease is attended with a weakness, and that a defect where the parts +of the body are not well compacted together; from whence it follows that +the members are misshapen, crooked, and deformed. So that these two, a +disease and sickness, proceed from a violent concussion and perturbation +of the health of the whole body; but a defect discovers itself even when +the body is in perfect health. But a disease of the mind is +distinguishable only in thought from a sickness. But a viciousness is a +habit or affection discordant and inconsistent with itself through life. +Thus it happens that, in the one case, a disease and sickness may arise +from a corruption of opinions; in the other case, the consequence may be +inconstancy and inconsistency. For every vice of the mind does not imply +a disunion of parts; as is the case with those who are not far from +being wise men. With them there is that affection which is inconsistent +with itself while it is foolish; but it is not distorted, nor depraved. +But diseases and sicknesses are parts of viciousness; but it is a +question whether perturbations are parts of the same, for vices are +permanent affections: perturbations are such as are restless; so that +they cannot be parts of permanent ones. As there is some analogy between +the nature of the body and mind in evil, so is there in good; for the +distinctions of the body are beauty, strength, health, firmness, +quickness of motion: the same may be said of the mind. The body is said +to be in a good state when all those things on which health depends are +consistent: the same may be said of the mind when its judgments and +opinions are not at variance with one another. And this union is the +virtue of the mind, which, according to some people, is temperance +itself; others make it consist in an obedience to the precepts of +temperance, and a compliance with them, not allowing it to be any +distinct species of itself. But, be it one or the other, it is to be +found only in a wise man. But there is a certain <a id="page-140"></a><span class="pgnum">140</span>soundness of mind, +which even a fool may have, when the perturbation of his mind is removed +by the care and management of his physicians. And as what is called +beauty arises from an exact proportion of the limbs, together with a +certain sweetness of complexion, so the beauty of the mind consists in +an equality and constancy of opinions and judgments, joined to a certain +firmness and stability, pursuing virtue, or containing within itself the +very essence of virtue. Besides, we give the very same names to the +faculties of the mind as we do to the powers of the body, the nerves, +and other powers of action. Thus the velocity of the body is called +swiftness: a praise which we ascribe to the mind, from its running over +in its thoughts so many things in so short a time.</p> + +<p>XIV. Herein, indeed, the mind and body are unlike: that though the mind +when in perfect health may be visited by sickness, as the body may, yet +the body may be disordered without our fault; the mind cannot. For all +the disorders and perturbations of the mind proceed from a neglect of +reason; these disorders, therefore, are confined to men: the beasts are +not subject to such perturbations, though they act sometimes as if they +had reason. There is a difference, too, between ingenious and dull men; +the ingenious, like the Corinthian brass, which is long before it +receives rust, are longer before they fall into these perturbations, and +are recovered sooner: the case is different with the dull. Nor does the +mind of an ingenious man fall into every kind of perturbation, for it +never yields to any that are brutish and savage; and some of their +perturbations have at first even the appearance of humanity, as mercy, +grief, and fear. But the sicknesses and diseases of the mind are thought +to be harder to eradicate than those leading vices which are in +opposition to virtues; for vices may be removed, though the diseases of +the mind should continue, which diseases are not cured with that +expedition with which vices are removed. I have now acquainted you with +the arguments which the Stoics put forth with such exactness; which they +call logic, from their close arguing: and since my discourse has got +clear of these rocks, I will proceed with the remainder of it, provided +I have been sufficiently clear in what I have already <a id="page-141"></a><span class="pgnum">141</span>said, considering +the obscurity of the subject I have treated.</p> + +<p><i>A.</i> Clear enough; but should there be occasion for a more exact +inquiry, I shall take another opportunity of asking you. I expect you +now to hoist your sails, as you just now called them, and proceed on +your course.</p> + +<p>XV. <i>M.</i> Since I have spoken before of virtue in other places, and shall +often have occasion to speak again (for a great many questions that +relate to life and manners arise from the spring of virtue); and since, +as I say, virtue consists in a settled and uniform affection of mind, +making those persons praiseworthy who are possessed of her, she herself +also, independent of anything else, without regard to any advantage, +must be praiseworthy; for from her proceed good inclinations, opinions, +actions, and the whole of right reason; though virtue may be defined in +a few words to be right reason itself. The opposite to this is +viciousness (for so I choose to translate what the Greeks call <span class="greek">κακία</span>, +rather than by perverseness; for perverseness is the name of a +particular vice; but viciousness includes all), from whence arise those +perturbations which, as I just now said, are turbid and violent motions +of the mind, repugnant to reason, and enemies in a high degree to the +peace of the mind and a tranquil life, for they introduce piercing and +anxious cares, and afflict and debilitate the mind through fear; they +violently inflame our hearts with exaggerated appetite, which is in +reality an impotence of mind, utterly irreconcilable with temperance and +moderation, which we sometimes call desire, and sometimes lust, and +which, should it even attain the object of its wishes, immediately +becomes so elated that it loses all its resolution, and knows not what +to pursue; so that he was in the right who said “that exaggerated +pleasure was the very greatest of mistakes.” Virtue, then, alone can +effect the cure of these evils.</p> + +<p>XVI. For what is not only more miserable, but more base and sordid, than +a man afflicted, weakened, and oppressed with grief? And little short of +this misery is one who dreads some approaching evil, and who, through +faintheartedness, is under continual suspense. The poets, to express the +greatness of this evil, imagine a stone to <a id="page-142"></a><span class="pgnum">142</span>hang over the head of +Tantalus, as a punishment for his wickedness, his pride, and his +boasting. And this is the common punishment of folly; for there hangs +over the head of every one whose mind revolts from reason some similar +fear. And as these perturbations of the mind, grief and fear, are of a +most wasting nature, so those two others, though of a more merry cast (I +mean lust, which is always coveting something with eagerness, and empty +mirth, which is an exulting joy), differ very little from madness. Hence +you may understand what sort of person he is whom we call at one time +moderate, at another modest or temperate, at another constant and +virtuous; while sometimes we include all these names in the word +frugality, as the crown of all; for if that word did not include all +virtues, it would never have been proverbial to say that a frugal man +does everything rightly. But when the Stoics apply this saying to their +wise man, they seem to exalt him too much, and to speak of him with too +much admiration.</p> + +<p>XVII. Whoever, then, through moderation and constancy, is at rest in his +mind, and in calm possession of himself, so as neither to pine with +care, nor be dejected with fear, nor to be inflamed with desire, +coveting something greedily, nor relaxed by extravagant mirth—such a +man is that identical wise man whom we are inquiring for: he is the +happy man, to whom nothing in this life seems intolerable enough to +depress him; nothing exquisite enough to transport him unduly. For what +is there in this life that can appear great to him who has acquainted +himself with eternity and the utmost extent of the universe? For what is +there in human knowledge, or the short span of this life, that can +appear great to a wise man? whose mind is always so upon its guard that +nothing can befall him which is unforeseen, nothing which is unexpected, +nothing, in short, which is new. Such a man takes so exact a survey on +all sides of him, that he always knows the proper place and spot to live +in free from all the troubles and annoyances of life, and encounters +every accident that fortune can bring upon him with a becoming calmness. +Whoever conducts himself in this manner will be free from grief, and +from every other perturbation; and a mind free from these feelings +renders men completely happy; whereas <a id="page-143"></a><span class="pgnum">143</span>a mind disordered and drawn off +from right and unerring reason loses at once, not only its resolution, +but its health.—Therefore the thoughts and declarations of the +Peripatetics are soft and effeminate, for they say that the mind must +necessarily be agitated, but at the same time they lay down certain +bounds beyond which that agitation is not to proceed. And do you set +bounds to vice? or is it no vice to disobey reason? Does not reason +sufficiently declare that there is no real good which you should desire +too ardently, or the possession of which you should allow to transport +you? and that there is no evil that should be able to overwhelm you, or +the suspicion of which should distract you? and that all these things +assume too melancholy or too cheerful an appearance through our own +error? But if fools find this error lessened by time, so that, though +the cause remains the same, they are not affected, in the same manner, +after some time, as they were at first, why, surely a wise man ought not +to be influenced at all by it. But what are those degrees by which we +are to limit it? Let us fix these degrees in grief, a difficult subject, +and one much canvassed.—Fannius writes that P. Rutilius took it much to +heart that his brother was refused the consulship; but he seems to have +been too much affected by this disappointment, for it was the occasion +of his death: he ought, therefore, to have borne it with more +moderation. But let us suppose that while he was bearing this with +moderation, the death of his children had intervened; here would have +started a fresh grief, which, admitting it to be moderate in itself, yet +still must have been a great addition to the other. Now, to these let us +add some acute pains of body, the loss of his fortune, blindness, +banishment. Supposing, then, each separate misfortune to occasion a +separate additional grief, the whole would be too great to be +supportable.</p> + +<p>XVIII. The man who attempts to set bounds to vice acts like one who +should throw himself headlong from Leucate, persuaded that he could stop +himself whenever he pleased. Now, as that is impossible, so a perturbed +and disordered mind cannot restrain itself, and stop where it pleases. +Certainly whatever is bad in its increase is bad in its birth. Now grief +and all other perturbations <a id="page-144"></a><span class="pgnum">144</span>are doubtless baneful in their progress, +and have, therefore, no small share of evil at the beginning; for they +go on of themselves when once they depart from reason, for every +weakness is self-indulgent, and indiscreetly launches out, and does not +know where to stop. So that it makes no difference whether you approve +of moderate perturbations of mind, or of moderate injustice, moderate +cowardice, and moderate intemperance; for whoever prescribes bounds to +vice admits a part of it, which, as it is odious of itself, becomes the +more so as it stands on slippery ground, and, being once set forward, +glides on headlong, and cannot by any means be stopped.</p> + +<p>XIX. Why should I say more? Why should I add that the Peripatetics say +that these perturbations, which we insist upon it should be extirpated, +are not only natural, but were given to men by nature for a good +purpose? They usually talk in this manner. In the first place, they say +much in praise of anger; they call it the whetstone of courage, and they +say that angry men exert themselves most against an enemy or against a +bad citizen: that those reasons are of little weight which are the +motives of men who think thus, as—it is a just war; it becomes us to +fight for our laws, our liberties, our country: they will allow no force +to these arguments unless our courage is warmed by anger.—Nor do they +confine their argument to warriors; but their opinion is that no one can +issue any rigid commands without some bitterness and anger. In short, +they have no notion of an orator either accusing or even defending a +client without he is spurred on by anger. And though this anger should +not be real, still they think his words and gestures ought to wear the +appearance of it, so that the action of the orator may excite the anger +of his hearer. And they deny that any man has ever been seen who does +not know what it is to be angry; and they name what we call lenity by +the bad appellation of indolence. Nor do they commend only this lust +(for anger is, as I defined it above, the lust of revenge), but they +maintain that kind of lust or desire to be given us by nature for very +good purposes, saying that no one can execute anything well but what he +is in earnest about. Themistocles used to walk in the public places in +the night because he could <a id="page-145"></a><span class="pgnum">145</span>not sleep; and when asked the reason, his +answer was, that Miltiades’s trophies kept him awake. Who has not heard +how Demosthenes used to watch, who said that it gave him pain if any +mechanic was up in a morning at his work before him? Lastly, they urge +that some of the greatest philosophers would never have made that +progress in their studies without some ardent desire spurring them +on.—We are informed that Pythagoras, Democritus, and Plato visited the +remotest parts of the world; for they thought that they ought to go +wherever anything was to be learned. Now, it is not conceivable that +these things could be effected by anything but by the greatest ardor of +mind.</p> + +<p>XX. They say that even grief, which we have already said ought to be +avoided as a monstrous and fierce beast, was appointed by nature, not +without some good purpose, in order that men should lament when they had +committed a fault, well knowing they had exposed themselves to +correction, rebuke, and ignominy; for they think that those who can bear +ignominy and infamy without pain have acquired a complete impunity for +all sorts of crimes; for with them reproach is a stronger check than +conscience. From whence we have that scene in Afranius borrowed from +common life; for when the abandoned son saith, “Wretched that I am!” the +severe father replies,</p> + +<div class="poem"> +<p>Let him but grieve, no matter what the cause.</p> +</div> + +<p class="cont">And they say the other divisions of sorrow have their use; that pity +incites us to hasten to the assistance of others, and to alleviate the +calamities of men who have undeservedly fallen into them; that even envy +and detraction are not without their use, as when a man sees that +another person has attained what he cannot, or observes another to be +equally successful with himself; that he who should take away fear would +take away all industry in life, which those men exert in the greatest +degree who are afraid of the laws and of the magistrates, who dread +poverty, ignominy, death, and pain. But while they argue thus, they +allow indeed of these feelings being retrenched, though they deny that +they either can or should be plucked up by the roots; so that their +opinion is that mediocrity is <a id="page-146"></a><span class="pgnum">146</span>best in everything. When they reason in +this manner, what think you—is what they say worth attending to or not?</p> + +<p><i>A.</i> I think it is. I wait, therefore, to hear what you will say in +reply to them.</p> + +<p>XXI. <i>M.</i> Perhaps I may find something to say; but I will make this +observation first: do you take notice with what modesty the Academics +behave themselves? for they speak plainly to the purpose. The +Peripatetics are answered by the Stoics; they have my leave to fight it +out, who think myself no otherwise concerned than to inquire for what +may seem to be most probable. Our present business is, then, to see if +we can meet with anything in this question which is the probable, for +beyond such approximation to truth as that human nature cannot proceed. +The definition of a perturbation, as Zeno, I think, has rightly +determined it, is thus: That a perturbation is a commotion of the mind +against nature, in opposition to right reason; or, more briefly, thus, +that a perturbation is a somewhat too vehement appetite; and when he +says somewhat too vehement, he means such as is at a greater distance +from the constant course of nature. What can I say to these definitions? +The greater part of them we have from those who dispute with sagacity +and acuteness: some of them expressions, indeed, such as the “ardors of +the mind,” and “the whetstones of virtue,” savoring of the pomp of +rhetoricians. As to the question, if a brave man can maintain his +courage without becoming angry, it may be questioned with regard to the +gladiators; though we often observe much resolution even in them: they +meet, converse, they make objections and demands, they agree about +terms, so that they seem calm rather than angry. But let us admit a man +of the name of Placideianus, who was one of that trade, to be in such a +mind, as Lucilius relates of him,</p> + +<div class="poem"> +<p>If for his blood you thirst, the task be mine;</p> +<p>His laurels at my feet he shall resign;</p> +<p>Not but I know, before I reach his heart,</p> +<p>First on myself a wound he will impart.</p> +<p>I hate the man; enraged I fight, and straight</p> +<p>In action we had been, but that I wait</p> +<p>Till each his sword had fitted to his hand.</p> +<p>My rage I scarce can keep within command.</p> +</div> + +<p><a id="page-147"></a><span class="pgnum">147</span>XXII. But we see Ajax in Homer advancing to meet Hector in battle +cheerfully, without any of this boisterous wrath. For he had no sooner +taken up his arms than the first step which he made inspired his +associates with joy, his enemies with fear; so that even Hector, as he +is represented by Homer,<a id="FNA-49"></a><a href="#FN-49"><sup>49</sup></a> trembling, condemned himself for having +challenged him to fight. Yet these heroes conversed together, calmly and +quietly, before they engaged; nor did they show any anger or outrageous +behavior during the combat. Nor do I imagine that Torquatus, the first +who obtained this surname, was in a rage when he plundered the Gaul of +his collar; or that Marcellus’s courage at Clastidium was only owing to +his anger. I could almost swear that Africanus, with whom we are better +acquainted, from our recollection of him being more recent, was noways +inflamed by anger when he covered Alienus Pelignus with his shield, and +drove his sword into the enemy’s breast. There may be some doubt of L. +Brutus, whether he was not influenced by extraordinary hatred of the +tyrant, so as to attack Aruns with more than usual rashness; for I +observe that they mutually killed each other in close fight. Why, then, +do you call in the assistance of anger? Would courage, unless it began +to get <a id="page-148"></a><span class="pgnum">148</span>furious, lose its energy? What! do you imagine that Hercules, +whom the very courage which you would try to represent as anger raised +to heaven, was angry when he engaged the Erymanthian boar, or the Nemæan +lion? Or was Theseus in a passion when he seized on the horns of the +Marathonian bull? Take care how you make courage to depend in the least +on rage. For anger is altogether irrational, and that is not courage +which is void of reason.</p> + +<p>XXIII. We ought to hold all things here in contempt; death is to be +looked on with indifference; pains and labors must be considered as +easily supportable. And when these sentiments are established on +judgment and conviction, then will that stout and firm courage take +place; unless you attribute to anger whatever is done with vehemence, +alacrity, and spirit. To me, indeed, that very Scipio<a id="FNA-50"></a><a href="#FN-50"><sup>50</sup></a> who was chief +priest, that favorer of the saying of the Stoics, “That no private man +could be a wise man,” does not seem to be angry with Tiberius Gracchus, +even when he left the consul in a hesitating frame of mind, and, though +a private man himself, commanded, with the authority of a consul, that +all who meant well to the republic should follow him. I do not know +whether I have done anything in the republic that has the appearance of +courage; but if I have, I certainly did not do it in wrath. Doth +anything come nearer madness than anger? And indeed Ennius has well +defined it as the beginning of madness. The changing color, the +alteration of our voice, the look of our eyes, our manner of fetching +our breath, the little command we have over our words and actions, how +little do all these things indicate a sound mind! What can make a worse +appearance than Homer’s Achilles, or Agamemnon, during the quarrel? And +as to Ajax, anger drove him into downright madness, and was the occasion +of his death. Courage, therefore, does not want the assistance of anger; +it is sufficiently provided, armed, and prepared of itself. We may as +well say that drunkenness or madness is of service to courage, because +those who <a id="page-149"></a><span class="pgnum">149</span>are mad or drunk often do a great many things with unusual +vehemence. Ajax was always brave; but still he was most brave when he +was in that state of frenzy:</p> + +<div class="poem"> +<p>The greatest feat that Ajax e’er achieved</p> +<p>Was, when his single arm the Greeks relieved.</p> +<p>Quitting the field; urged on by rising rage,</p> +<p>Forced the declining troops again t’engage.</p> +</div> + +<p class="cont">Shall we say, then, that madness has its use?</p> + +<p>XXIV. Examine the definitions of courage: you will find it does not +require the assistance of passion. Courage is, then, an affection of +mind that endures all things, being itself in proper subjection to the +highest of all laws; or it may be called a firm maintenance of judgment +in supporting or repelling everything that has a formidable appearance, +or a knowledge of what is formidable or otherwise, and maintaining +invariably a stable judgment of all such things, so as to bear them or +despise them; or, in fewer words, according to Chrysippus (for the above +definitions are Sphærus’s, a man of the first ability as a layer-down of +definitions, as the Stoics think. But they are all pretty much alike: +they give us only common notions, some one way, and some another). But +what is Chrysippus’s definition? Fortitude, says he, is the knowledge of +all things that are bearable, or an affection of the mind which bears +and supports everything in obedience to the chief law of reason without +fear. Now, though we should attack these men in the same manner as +Carneades used to do, I fear they are the only real philosophers; for +which of these definitions is there which does not explain that obscure +and intricate notion of courage which every man conceives within +himself? And when it is thus explained, what can a warrior, a commander, +or an orator want more? And no one can think that they will be unable to +behave themselves courageously without anger. What! do not even the +Stoics, who maintain that all fools are mad, make the same inferences? +for, take away perturbations, especially a hastiness of temper, and they +will appear to talk very absurdly. But what they assert is this: they +say that all fools are mad, as all dunghills stink; not that they always +do so, but stir them, and you will perceive it. And in like manner, a +warm-tempered man is <a id="page-150"></a><span class="pgnum">150</span>not always in a passion; but provoke him, and you +will see him run mad. Now, that very warlike anger, which is of such +service in war, what is the use of it to him when he is at home with his +wife, children, and family? Is there, then, anything that a disturbed +mind can do better than one which is calm and steady? Or can any one be +angry without a perturbation of mind? Our people, then, were in the +right, who, as all vices depend on our manners, and nothing is worse +than a passionate disposition, called angry men the only morose men.<a id="FNA-51"></a><a href="#FN-51"><sup>51</sup></a></p> + +<p>XXV. Anger is in no wise becoming in an orator, though it is not amiss +to affect it. Do you imagine that I am angry when in pleading I use any +extraordinary vehemence and sharpness? What! when I write out my +speeches after all is over and past, am I then angry while writing? Or +do you think Æsopus was ever angry when he acted, or Accius was so when +he wrote? Those men, indeed, act very well, but the orator acts better +than the player, provided he be really an orator; but, then, they carry +it on without passion, and with a composed mind. But what wantonness is +it to commend lust! You produce Themistocles and Demosthenes; to these +you add Pythagoras, Democritus, and Plato. What! do you then call +studies lust? But these studies of the most excellent and admirable +things, such as those were which you bring forward on all occasions, +ought to be composed and tranquil; and what kind of philosophers are +they who commend grief, than which nothing is more detestable? Afranius +has said much to this purpose:</p> + +<div class="poem"> +<p>Let him but grieve, no matter what the cause.</p> +</div> + +<p class="cont">But he spoke this of a debauched and dissolute youth. But we are +inquiring into the conduct of a constant and wise man. We may even allow +a centurion or standard-bearer to be angry, or any others, whom, not to +explain too far the mysteries of the rhetoricians, I shall not mention +here; for to touch the passions, where reason cannot be come at, may +have its use; but my inquiry, as I often repeat, is about a wise man.</p> + +<p><a id="page-151"></a><span class="pgnum">151</span>XXVI. But even envy, detraction, pity, have their use. Why should you +pity rather than assist, if it is in your power to do so? Is it because +you cannot be liberal without pity? We should not take sorrows on +ourselves upon another’s account; but we ought to relieve others of +their grief if we can. But to detract from another’s reputation, or to +rival him with that vicious emulation which resembles an enmity, of what +use can that conduct be? Now, envy implies being uneasy at another’s +good because one does not enjoy it one’s self; but detraction is the +being uneasy at another’s good, merely because he enjoys it. How can it +be right that you should voluntarily grieve, rather than take the +trouble of acquiring what you want to have? for it is madness in the +highest degree to desire to be the only one that has any particular +happiness. But who can with correctness speak in praise of a mediocrity +of evils? Can any one in whom there is lust or desire be otherwise than +libidinous or desirous? or can a man who is occupied by anger avoid +being angry? or can one who is exposed to any vexation escape being +vexed? or if he is under the influence of fear, must he not be fearful? +Do we look, then, on the libidinous, the angry, the anxious, and the +timid man, as persons of wisdom, of excellence? of which I could speak +very copiously and diffusely, but I wish to be as concise as possible. +And so I will merely say that wisdom is an acquaintance with all divine +and human affairs, and a knowledge of the cause of everything. Hence it +is that it imitates what is divine, and looks upon all human concerns as +inferior to virtue. Did you, then, say that it was your opinion that +such a man was as naturally liable to perturbation as the sea is exposed +to winds? What is there that can discompose such gravity and constancy? +Anything sudden or unforeseen? How can anything of this kind befall one +to whom nothing is sudden and unforeseen that can happen to man? Now, as +to their saying that redundancies should be pared off, and only what is +natural remain, what, I pray you, can be natural which may be too +exuberant?</p> + +<p>XXVII. All these assertions proceed from the roots of errors, which must +be entirely plucked up and destroyed, not pared and amputated. But as I +suspect that your inquiry <a id="page-152"></a><span class="pgnum">152</span>is not so much respecting the wise man as +concerning yourself (for you allow that he is free from all +perturbations, and you would willingly be so too yourself), let us see +what remedies there are which may be applied by philosophy to the +diseases of the mind. There is certainly some remedy; nor has nature +been so unkind to the human race as to have discovered so many things +salutary to the body, and none which are medicinal to the mind. She has +even been kinder to the mind than to the body; inasmuch as you must seek +abroad for the assistance which the body requires, while the mind has +all that it requires within itself. But in proportion as the excellency +of the mind is of a higher and more divine nature, the more diligence +does it require; and therefore reason, when it is well applied, +discovers what is best, but when it is neglected, it becomes involved in +many errors. I shall apply, then, all my discourse to you; for though +you pretend to be inquiring about the wise man, your inquiry may +possibly be about yourself. Various, then, are the cures of those +perturbations which I have expounded, for every disorder is not to be +appeased the same way. One medicine must be applied to the man who +mourns, another to the pitiful, another to the person who envies; for +there is this difference to be maintained in all the four perturbations: +we are to consider whether our discourse had better be directed to +perturbations in general, which are a contempt of reason, or a somewhat +too vehement appetite; or whether it would be better applied to +particular descriptions, as, for instance, to fear, lust, and the rest, +and whether it appears preferable to endeavor to remove that which has +occasioned the grief, or rather to attempt wholly to eradicate every +kind of grief. As, should any one grieve that he is poor, the question +is, Would you maintain poverty to be no evil, or would you contend that +a man ought not to grieve at anything? Certainly this last is the best +course; for should you not convince him with regard to poverty, you must +allow him to grieve; but if you remove grief by particular arguments, +such as I used yesterday, the evil of poverty is in some manner removed.</p> + +<p>XXVIII. But any perturbation of the mind of this sort may be, as it +were, wiped away by the method of appeasing <a id="page-153"></a><span class="pgnum">153</span>the mind, if you succeed in +showing that there is no good in that which has given rise to joy and +lust, nor any evil in that which has occasioned fear or grief. But +certainly the most effectual cure is to be achieved by showing that all +perturbations are of themselves vicious, and have nothing natural or +necessary in them. As we see, grief itself is easily softened when we +charge those who grieve with weakness and an effeminate mind; or when we +commend the gravity and constancy of those who bear calmly whatever +befalls them here, as accidents to which all men are liable; and, +indeed, this is generally the feeling of those who look on these as real +evils, but yet think they should be borne with resignation. One imagines +pleasure to be a good, another money; and yet the one may be called off +from intemperance, the other from covetousness. The other method and +address, which, at the same time that it removes the false opinion, +withdraws the disorder, has more subtlety in it; but it seldom succeeds, +and is not applicable to vulgar minds, for there are some diseases which +that medicine can by no means remove. For, should any one be uneasy +because he is without virtue, without courage, destitute of a sense of +duty or honesty, his anxiety proceeds from a real evil; and yet we must +apply another method of cure to him, and such a one as all the +philosophers, however they may differ about other things, agree in. For +they must necessarily agree in this, that commotions of the mind in +opposition to right reason are vicious; and that even admitting those +things to be evils which occasion fear or grief, and those to be goods +which provoke desire or joy, yet that very commotion itself is vicious; +for we mean by the expressions magnanimous and brave, one who is +resolute, sedate, grave, and superior to everything in this life; but +one who either grieves, or fears, or covets, or is transported with +passion, cannot come under that denomination; for these things are +consistent only with those who look on the things of this world as +things with which their minds are unequal to contend.</p> + +<p>XXIX. Wherefore, as I before said, the philosophers have all one method +of cure, so that we need say nothing about what sort of thing that is +which <a id="page-154"></a><span class="pgnum">154</span>disturbs the mind, but we must speak only concerning the +perturbation itself. Thus, first, with regard to desire itself, when the +business is only to remove that, the inquiry is not to be, whether that +thing be good or evil which provokes lust, but the lust itself is to be +removed; so that whether whatever is honest is the chief good, or +whether it consists in pleasure, or in both these things together, or in +the other three kinds of goods, yet should there be in any one too +vehement an appetite for even virtue itself, the whole discourse should +be directed to the deterring him from that vehemence. But human nature, +when placed in a conspicuous point of view, gives us every argument for +appeasing the mind, and, to make this the more distinct, the laws and +conditions of life should be explained in our discourse. Therefore, it +was not without reason that Socrates is reported, when Euripides was +exhibiting his play called Orestes, to have repeated the first three +verses of that tragedy—</p> + +<div class="poem"> +<p>What tragic story men can mournful tell,</p> +<p>Whate’er from fate or from the gods befell,</p> +<p>That human nature can support—<a id="FNA-52"></a><a href="#FN-52"><sup>52</sup></a></p> +</div> + +<p class="cont">But, in order to persuade those to whom any misfortune has happened that +they can and ought to bear it, it is very useful to set before them an +enumeration of other persons who have borne similar calamities. Indeed, +the method of appeasing grief was explained in my dispute of yesterday, +and in my book on Consolation, which I wrote in the midst of my own +grief; for I was not myself so wise a man as to be insensible to grief, +and I used this, notwithstanding Chrysippus’s advice to the contrary, +who is against applying a medicine to the agitations of the mind while +they are fresh; but I did it, and committed a violence on nature, that +the greatness of my grief might give way to the greatness of the +medicine.</p> + +<p>XXX. But fear borders upon grief, of which I have already said enough; +but I must say a little more on that. Now, as grief proceeds from what +is present, so does fear <a id="page-155"></a><span class="pgnum">155</span>from future evil; so that some have said that +fear is a certain part of grief: others have called fear the harbinger +of trouble, which, as it were, introduces the ensuing evil. Now, the +reasons that make what is present supportable, make what is to come very +contemptible; for, with regard to both, we should take care to do +nothing low or grovelling, soft or effeminate, mean or abject. But, +notwithstanding we should speak of the inconstancy, imbecility, and +levity of fear itself, yet it is of very great service to speak +contemptuously of those very things of which we are afraid. So that it +fell out very well, whether it was by accident or design, that I +disputed the first and second day on death and pain—the two things that +are the most dreaded: now, if what I then said was approved of, we are +in a great degree freed from fear. And this is sufficient, as far as +regards the opinion of evils.</p> + +<p>XXXI. Proceed we now to what are goods—that is to say, to joy and +desire. To me, indeed, one thing alone seems to embrace the question of +all that relates to the perturbations of the mind—the fact, namely, +that all perturbations are in our own power; that they are taken up upon +opinion, and are voluntary. This error, then, must be got rid of; this +opinion must be removed; and, as with regard to imagined evils, we are +to make them more supportable, so with respect to goods, we are to +lessen the violent effects of those things which are called great and +joyous. But one thing is to be observed, that equally relates both to +good and evil: that, should it be difficult to persuade any one that +none of those things which disturb the mind are to be looked on as good +or evil, yet a different cure is to be applied to different feelings; +and the malevolent person is to be corrected by one way of reasoning, +the lover by another, the anxious man by another, and the fearful by +another: and it would be easy for any one who pursues the best approved +method of reasoning, with regard to good and evil, to maintain that no +fool can be affected with joy, as he never can have anything good. But, +at present, my discourse proceeds upon the common received notions. Let, +then, honors, riches, pleasures, and the rest be the very good things +which they are imagined to be; yet a too elevated and exulting joy on +the possession <a id="page-156"></a><span class="pgnum">156</span>of them is unbecoming; just as, though it might be +allowable to laugh, to giggle would be indecent. Thus, a mind enlarged +by joy is as blamable as a contraction of it by grief; and eager longing +is a sign of as much levity in desiring as immoderate joy is in +possessing; and, as those who are too dejected are said to be +effeminate, so they who are too elated with joy are properly called +volatile; and as feeling envy is a part of grief, and the being pleased +with another’s misfortune is a kind of joy, both these feelings are +usually corrected by showing the wildness and insensibility of them: and +as it becomes a man to be cautious, but it is unbecoming in him to be +fearful, so to be pleased is proper, but to be joyful improper. I have, +in order that I might be the better understood, distinguished pleasure +from joy. I have already said above, that a contraction of the mind can +never be right, but that an elation of it may; for the joy of Hector in +Nævius is one thing—</p> + +<div class="poem"> +<p>’Tis joy indeed to hear my praises sung</p> +<p>By you, who are the theme of honor’s tongue—</p> +</div> + +<p class="cont">but that of the character in Trabea another: “The kind procuress, +allured by my money, will observe my nod, will watch my desires, and +study my will. If I but move the door with my little finger, instantly +it flies open; and if Chrysis should unexpectedly discover me, she will +run with joy to meet me, and throw herself into my arms.”</p> + +<p>Now he will tell you how excellent he thinks this:</p> + +<div class="poem"> +<p>Not even fortune herself is so fortunate.</p> +</div> + +<p>XXXII. Any one who attends the least to the subject will be convinced +how unbecoming this joy is. And as they are very shameful who are +immoderately delighted with the enjoyment of venereal pleasures, so are +they very scandalous who lust vehemently after them. And all that which +is commonly called love (and, believe me, I can find out no other name +to call it by) is of such a trivial nature that nothing, I think, is to +be compared to it: of which Cæcilius says,</p> + +<div class="poem"> +<p>I hold the man of every sense bereaved</p> +<p>Who grants not Love to be of Gods the chief:</p> +<p><a id="page-157"></a><span class="pgnum">157</span>Whose mighty power whate’er is good effects,</p> +<p>Who gives to each his beauty and defects:</p> +<p>Hence, health and sickness; wit and folly, hence,</p> +<p>The God that love and hatred doth dispense!</p> +</div> + +<p class="cont">An excellent corrector of life this same poetry, which thinks that love, +the promoter of debauchery and vanity, should have a place in the +council of the Gods! I am speaking of comedy, which could not subsist at +all without our approving of these debaucheries. But what said that +chief of the Argonauts in tragedy?</p> + +<div class="poem"> +<p>My life I owe to honor less than love.</p> +</div> + +<p class="cont">What, then, are we to say of this love of Medea?—what a train of +miseries did it occasion! And yet the same woman has the assurance to +say to her father, in another poet, that she had a husband</p> + +<div class="poem"> +<p>Dearer by love than ever fathers were.</p> +</div> + +<p>XXXIII. However, we may allow the poets to trifle, in whose fables we +see Jupiter himself engaged in these debaucheries: but let us apply to +the masters of virtue—the philosophers who deny love to be anything +carnal; and in this they differ from Epicurus, who, I think, is not much +mistaken. For what is that love of friendship? How comes it that no one +is in love with a deformed young man, or a handsome old one? I am of +opinion that this love of men had its rise from the Gymnastics of the +Greeks, where these kinds of loves are admissible and permitted; +therefore Ennius spoke well:</p> + +<div class="poem"> +<p>The censure of this crime to those is due</p> +<p>Who naked bodies first exposed to view.</p> +</div> + +<p class="cont">Now, supposing them chaste, which I think is hardly possible, they are +uneasy and distressed, and the more so because they contain and refrain +themselves. But, to pass over the love of women, where nature has +allowed more liberty, who can misunderstand the poets in their rape of +Ganymede, or not apprehend what Laius says, and what he desires, in +Euripides? Lastly, what have the principal poets and the most learned +men published of themselves in their poems and songs? What doth Alcæus, +who was <a id="page-158"></a><span class="pgnum">158</span>distinguished in his own republic for his bravery, write on the +love of young men? And as for Anacreon’s poetry, it is wholly on love. +But Ibycus of Rhegium appears, from his writings, to have had this love +stronger on him than all the rest.</p> + +<p>XXXIV. Now we see that the loves of all these writers were entirely +libidinous. There have arisen also some among us philosophers (and Plato +is at the head of them, whom Dicæarchus blames not without reason) who +have countenanced love. The Stoics, in truth, say, not only that their +wise man may be a lover, but they even define love itself as an endeavor +to originate friendship out of the appearance of beauty. Now, provided +there is any one in the nature of things without desire, without care, +without a sigh, such a one may be a lover; for he is free from all lust: +but I have nothing to say to him, as it is lust of which I am now +speaking. But should there be any love—as there certainly is—which is +but little, or perhaps not at all, short of madness, such as his is in +the Leucadia—</p> + +<div class="poem"> +<p>Should there be any God whose care I am—</p> +</div> + +<p class="cont">it is incumbent on all the Gods to see that he enjoys his amorous +pleasure.</p> + +<div class="poem"> +<p>Wretch that I am!</p> +</div> + +<p class="cont">Nothing is more true, and he says very appropriately,</p> + +<div class="poem"> +<p>What, are you sane, who at this rate lament?</p> +</div> + +<p class="cont">He seems even to his friends to be out of his senses: then how tragical +he becomes!</p> + +<div class="poem"> +<p>Thy aid, divine Apollo, I implore,</p> +<p>And thine, dread ruler of the wat’ry store!</p> +<p>Oh! all ye winds, assist me!</p> +</div> + +<p class="cont">He thinks that the whole world ought to apply itself to help his love: +he excludes Venus alone, as unkind to him.</p> + +<div class="poem"> +<p>Thy aid, O Venus, why should I invoke?</p> +</div> + +<p class="cont">He thinks Venus too much employed in her own lust to have regard to +anything else, as if he himself had not said and committed these +shameful things from lust.</p> + +<p><a id="page-159"></a><span class="pgnum">159</span>XXXV. Now, the cure for one who is affected in this manner is to show +how light, how contemptible, how very trifling he is in what he desires; +how he may turn his affections to another object, or accomplish his +desires by some other means; or else to persuade him that he may +entirely disregard it: sometimes he is to be led away to objects of +another kind, to study, business, or other different engagements and +concerns: very often the cure is effected by change of place, as sick +people, that have not recovered their strength, are benefited by change +of air. Some people think an old love may be driven out by a new one, as +one nail drives out another: but, above all things, the man thus +afflicted should be advised what madness love is: for of all the +perturbations of the mind, there is not one which is more vehement; for +(without charging it with rapes, debaucheries, adultery, or even incest, +the baseness of any of these being very blamable; not, I say, to mention +these) the very perturbation of the mind in love is base of itself, for, +to pass over all its acts of downright madness, what weakness do not +those very things which are looked upon as indifferent argue?</p> + +<div class="poem"> +<p>Affronts and jealousies, jars, squabbles, wars,</p> +<p>Then peace again. The man who seeks to fix</p> +<p>These restless feelings, and to subjugate</p> +<p>Them to some regular law, is just as wise</p> +<p>As one who’d try to lay down rules by which</p> +<p>Men should go mad.<a id="FNA-53"></a><a href="#FN-53"><sup>53</sup></a></p> +</div> + +<p class="cont">Now, is not this inconstancy and mutability of mind enough to deter any +one by its own deformity? We are to demonstrate, as was said of every +perturbation, that there are no such feelings which do not consist +entirely of opinion and judgment, and are not owing to ourselves. For if +love were natural, all would be in love, and always so, and all love the +same object; nor would one be deterred by shame, another by reflection, +another by satiety.</p> + +<p>XXXVI. Anger, too, when it disturbs the mind any time, leaves no room to +doubt its being madness: by the <a id="page-160"></a><span class="pgnum">160</span>instigation of which we see such +contention as this between brothers:</p> + +<div class="poem"> +<p>Where was there ever impudence like thine?</p> +<p>Who on thy malice ever could refine?<a id="FNA-54"></a><a href="#FN-54"><sup>54</sup></a></p> +</div> + +<p class="cont">You know what follows: for abuses are thrown out by these brothers with +great bitterness in every other verse; so that you may easily know them +for the sons of Atreus, of that Atreus who invented a new punishment for +his brother:</p> + +<div class="poem"> +<p>I who his cruel heart to gall am bent,</p> +<p>Some new, unheard-of torment must invent.</p> +</div> + +<p>Now, what were these inventions? Hear Thyestes:</p> + +<div class="poem"> +<p>My impious brother fain would have me eat</p> +<p>My children, and thus serves them up for meat.</p> +</div> + +<p class="cont">To what length now will not anger go? even as far as madness. Therefore +we say, properly enough, that angry men have given up their power, that +is, they are out of the power of advice, reason, and understanding; for +these ought to have power over the whole mind. Now, you should put those +out of the way whom they endeavor to attack till they have recollected +themselves; but what does recollection here imply but getting together +again the dispersed parts of their mind into their proper place? or else +you must beg and entreat them, if they have the means of revenge, to +defer it to another opportunity, till their anger cools. But the +expression of cooling implies, certainly, that there was a heat raised +in their minds in opposition to reason; from which consideration that +saying of Archytas is commended, who being somewhat provoked at his +steward, “How would I have treated you,” said he, “if I had not been in +a passion?”</p> + +<p>XXXVII. Where, then, are they who say that anger has its use? Can +madness be of any use? But still it is natural. Can anything be natural +that is against reason? or how is it, if anger is natural, that one +person is more inclined to anger than another? or that the lust of +revenge should cease before it has revenged itself? or that any one +<a id="page-161"></a><span class="pgnum">161</span>should repent of what he had done in a passion? as we see that +Alexander the king did, who could scarcely keep his hands from himself, +when he had killed his favorite Clytus, so great was his compunction. +Now who that is acquainted with these instances can doubt that this +motion of the mind is altogether in opinion and voluntary? for who can +doubt that disorders of the mind, such as covetousness and a desire of +glory, arise from a great estimation of those things by which the mind +is disordered? from whence we may understand that every perturbation of +the mind is founded in opinion. And if boldness—that is to say, a firm +assurance of mind—is a kind of knowledge and serious opinion not +hastily taken up, then diffidence is a fear of an expected and impending +evil; and if hope is an expectation of good, fear must, of course, be an +expectation of evil. Thus fear and other perturbations are evils. +Therefore, as constancy proceeds from knowledge, so does perturbation +from error. Now, they who are said to be naturally inclined to anger, or +to pity, or to envy, or to any feeling of this kind, their minds are +constitutionally, as it were, in bad health; yet they are curable, as +the disposition of Socrates is said to have been; for when Zopyrus, who +professed to know the character of every one from his person, had heaped +a great many vices on him in a public assembly, he was laughed at by +others, who could perceive no such vices in Socrates; but Socrates kept +him in countenance by declaring that such vices were natural to him, but +that he had got the better of them by his reason. Therefore, as any one +who has the appearance of the best constitution may yet appear to be +naturally rather inclined to some particular disorder, so different +minds may be more particularly inclined to different diseases. But as to +those men who are said to be vicious, not by nature, but their own +fault, their vices proceed from wrong opinions of good and bad things, +so that one is more prone than another to different motions and +perturbations. But, just as it is in the case of the body, an inveterate +disease is harder to be got rid of than a sudden disorder; and it is +more easy to cure a fresh tumor in the eyes than to remove a defluxion +of any continuance.</p> + +<p>XXXVIII. But as the cause of perturbations is now discovered, <a id="page-162"></a><span class="pgnum">162</span>for all +of them arise from the judgment or opinion, or volition, I shall put an +end to this discourse. But we ought to be assured, since the boundaries +of good and evil are now discovered, as far as they are discoverable by +man, that nothing can be desired of philosophy greater or more useful +than the discussions which we have held these four days. For besides +instilling a contempt of death, and relieving pain so as to enable men +to bear it, we have added the appeasing of grief, than which there is no +greater evil to man. For though every perturbation of mind is grievous, +and differs but little from madness, yet we are used to say of others +when they are under any perturbation, as of fear, joy, or desire, that +they are agitated and disturbed; but of those who give themselves up to +grief, that they are miserable, afflicted, wretched, unhappy. So that it +doth not seem to be by accident, but with reason proposed by you, that I +should discuss grief, and the other perturbations separately; for there +lies the spring and head of all our miseries; but the cure of grief, and +of other disorders, is one and the same in that they are all voluntary, +and founded on opinion; we take them on ourselves because it seems right +so to do. Philosophy undertakes to eradicate this error, as the root of +all our evils: let us therefore surrender ourselves to be instructed by +it, and suffer ourselves to be cured; for while these evils have +possession of us, we not only cannot be happy, but cannot be right in +our minds. We must either deny that reason can effect anything, while, +on the other hand, nothing can be done right without reason, or else, +since philosophy depends on the deductions of reason, we must seek from +her, if we would be good or happy, every help and assistance for living +well and happily.</p> + + + + +<h3><a id="page-163"></a><span class="pgnum">163</span>BOOK V.</h3> + +<h4>WHETHER VIRTUE ALONE BE SUFFICIENT FOR A HAPPY LIFE.</h4> + + +<p>I. <span class="first">This</span> fifth day, Brutus, shall put an end to our Tusculan +Disputations: on which day we discussed your favorite subject. For I +perceive from that book which you wrote for me with the greatest +accuracy, as well as from your frequent conversation, that you are +clearly of this opinion, that virtue is of itself sufficient for a happy +life: and though it may be difficult to prove this, on account of the +many various strokes of fortune, yet it is a truth of such a nature that +we should endeavor to facilitate the proof of it. For among all the +topics of philosophy, there is not one of more dignity or importance. +For as the first philosophers must have had some inducement to neglect +everything for the search of the best state of life: surely, the +inducement must have been the hope of living happily, which impelled +them to devote so much care and pains to that study. Now, if virtue was +discovered and carried to perfection by them, and if virtue is a +sufficient security for a happy life, who can avoid thinking the work of +philosophizing excellently recommended by them, and undertaken by me? +But if virtue, as being subject to such various and uncertain accidents, +were but the slave of fortune, and were not of sufficient ability to +support herself, I am afraid that it would seem desirable rather to +offer up prayers, than to rely on our own confidence in virtue as the +foundation for our hope of a happy life. And, indeed, when I reflect on +those troubles with which I have been so severely exercised by fortune, +I begin to distrust this opinion; and sometimes even to dread the +weakness and frailty of human nature, for I am afraid lest, when nature +had given us infirm bodies, and had joined to them incurable diseases +and intolerable pains, she perhaps also gave us minds participating in +these bodily pains, and harassed <a id="page-164"></a><span class="pgnum">164</span>also with troubles and uneasinesses, +peculiarly their own. But here I correct myself for forming my judgment +of the power of virtue more from the weakness of others, or of myself +perhaps, than from virtue itself: for she herself (provided there is +such a thing as virtue; and your uncle Brutus has removed all doubt of +it) has everything that can befall mankind in subjection to her; and by +disregarding such things, she is far removed from being at all concerned +at human accidents; and, being free from every imperfection, she thinks +that nothing which is external to herself can concern her. But we, who +increase every approaching evil by our fear, and every present one by +our grief, choose rather to condemn the nature of things than our own +errors.</p> + +<p>II. But the amendment of this fault, and of all our other vices and +offences, is to be sought for in philosophy: and as my own inclination +and desire led me, from my earliest youth upward, to seek her +protection, so, under my present misfortunes, I have had recourse to the +same port from whence I set out, after having been tossed by a violent +tempest. O Philosophy, thou guide of life! thou discoverer of virtue and +expeller of vices! what had not only I myself, but the whole life of +man, been without you? To you it is that we owe the origin of cities; +you it was who called together the dispersed race of men into social +life; you united them together, first, by placing them near one another, +then by marriages, and lastly, by the communication of speech and +languages. You have been the inventress of laws; you have been our +instructress in morals and discipline; to you we fly for refuge; from +you we implore assistance; and as I formerly submitted to you in a great +degree, so now I surrender up myself entirely to you. For one day spent +well, and agreeably to your precepts, is preferable to an eternity of +error. Whose assistance, then, can be of more service to me than yours, +when you have bestowed on us tranquillity of life, and removed the fear +of death? But Philosophy is so far from being praised as much as she has +deserved by mankind, that she is wholly neglected by most men, and +actually evil spoken of by many. Can any person speak ill of the parent +of life, and dare to pollute himself thus with parricide, and be so +impiously <a id="page-165"></a><span class="pgnum">165</span>ungrateful as to accuse her whom he ought to reverence, even +were he less able to appreciate the advantages which he might derive +from her? But this error, I imagine, and this darkness has spread itself +over the minds of ignorant men, from their not being able to look so far +back, and from their not imagining that those men by whom human life was +first improved were philosophers; for though we see philosophy to have +been of long standing, yet the name must be acknowledged to be but +modern.</p> + +<p>III. But, indeed, who can dispute the antiquity of philosophy, either in +fact or name? For it acquired this excellent name from the ancients, by +the knowledge of the origin and causes of everything, both divine and +human. Thus those seven <span class="greek">Σόφοι</span>, as they were considered and called by the +Greeks, have always been esteemed and called wise men by us; and thus +Lycurgus many ages before, in whose time, before the building of this +city, Homer is said to have lived, as well as Ulysses and Nestor in the +heroic ages, are all handed down to us by tradition as having really +been what they were called, wise men; nor would it have been said that +Atlas supported the heavens, or that Prometheus was bound to Caucasus, +nor would Cepheus, with his wife, his son-in-law, and his daughter have +been enrolled among the constellations, but that their more than human +knowledge of the heavenly bodies had transferred their names into an +erroneous fable. From whence all who occupied themselves in the +contemplation of nature were both considered and called wise men; and +that name of theirs continued to the age of Pythagoras, who is reported +to have gone to Phlius, as we find it stated by Heraclides Ponticus, a +very learned man, and a pupil of Plato, and to have discoursed very +learnedly and copiously on certain subjects with Leon, prince of the +Phliasii; and when Leon, admiring his ingenuity and eloquence, asked him +what art he particularly professed, his answer was, that he was +acquainted with no art, but that he was a philosopher. Leon, surprised +at the novelty of the name, inquired what he meant by the name of +philosopher, and in what philosophers differed from other men; on which +Pythagoras replied, “That the life of man seemed to him to resemble +those games which were celebrated with the <a id="page-166"></a><span class="pgnum">166</span>greatest possible variety of +sports and the general concourse of all Greece. For as in those games +there were some persons whose object was glory and the honor of a crown, +to be attained by the performance of bodily exercises, so others were +led thither by the gain of buying and selling, and mere views of profit; +but there was likewise one class of persons, and they were by far the +best, whose aim was neither applause nor profit, but who came merely as +spectators through curiosity, to observe what was done, and to see in +what manner things were carried on there. And thus, said he, we come +from another life and nature unto this one, just as men come out of some +other city, to some much frequented mart; some being slaves to glory, +others to money; and there are some few who, taking no account of +anything else, earnestly look into the nature of things; and these men +call themselves studious of wisdom, that is, philosophers: and as there +it is the most reputable occupation of all to be a looker-on without +making any acquisition, so in life, the contemplating things, and +acquainting one’s self with them, greatly exceeds every other pursuit of +life.”</p> + +<p>IV. Nor was Pythagoras the inventor only of the name, but he enlarged +also the thing itself, and, when he came into Italy after this +conversation at Phlius, he adorned that Greece, which is called Great +Greece, both privately and publicly, with the most excellent +institutions and arts; but of his school and system I shall, perhaps, +find another opportunity to speak. But numbers and motions, and the +beginning and end of all things, were the subjects of the ancient +philosophy down to Socrates, who was a pupil of Archelaus, who had been +the disciple of Anaxagoras. These made diligent inquiry into the +magnitude of the stars, their distances, courses, and all that relates +to the heavens. But Socrates was the first who brought down philosophy +from the heavens, placed it in cities, introduced it into families, and +obliged it to examine into life and morals, and good and evil. And his +different methods of discussing questions, together with the variety of +his topics, and the greatness of his abilities, being immortalized by +the memory and writings of Plato, gave rise to many sects of +philosophers of different sentiments, of all which I have principally +adhered <a id="page-167"></a><span class="pgnum">167</span>to that one which, in my opinion, Socrates himself followed; +and argue so as to conceal my own opinion, while I deliver others from +their errors, and so discover what has the greatest appearance of +probability in every question. And the custom Carneades adopted with +great copiousness and acuteness, and I myself have often given in to it +on many occasions elsewhere, and in this manner, too, I disputed lately, +in my Tusculan villa; indeed, I have sent you a book of the four former +days’ discussions; but the fifth day, when we had seated ourselves as +before, what we were to dispute on was proposed thus:</p> + +<p>V. <i>A.</i> I do not think virtue can possibly be sufficient for a happy +life.</p> + +<p><i>M.</i> But my friend Brutus thinks so, whose judgment, with submission, I +greatly prefer to yours.</p> + +<p><i>A.</i> I make no doubt of it; but your regard for him is not the business +now: the question is now, what is the real character of that quality of +which I have declared my opinion. I wish you to dispute on that.</p> + +<p><i>M.</i> What! do you deny that virtue can possibly be sufficient for a +happy life?</p> + +<p><i>A.</i> It is what I entirely deny.</p> + +<p><i>M.</i> What! is not virtue sufficient to enable us to live as we ought, +honestly, commendably, or, in fine, to live well?</p> + +<p><i>A.</i> Certainly sufficient.</p> + +<p><i>M.</i> Can you, then, help calling any one miserable who lives ill? or +will you deny that any one who you allow lives well must inevitably live +happily?</p> + +<p><i>A.</i> Why may I not? for a man may be upright in his life, honest, +praiseworthy, even in the midst of torments, and therefore live well. +Provided you understand what I mean by well; for when I say well, I mean +with constancy, and dignity, and wisdom, and courage; for a man may +display all these qualities on the rack; but yet the rack is +inconsistent with a happy life.</p> + +<p><i>M.</i> What, then? is your happy life left on the outside of the prison, +while constancy, dignity, wisdom, and the other virtues, are surrendered +up to the executioner, and bear punishment and pain without reluctance?</p> + +<p><i>A.</i> You must look out for something new if you would <a id="page-168"></a><span class="pgnum">168</span>do any good. +These things have very little effect on me, not merely from their being +common, but principally because, like certain light wines that will not +bear water, these arguments of the Stoics are pleasanter to taste than +to swallow. As when that assemblage of virtues is committed to the rack, +it raises so reverend a spectacle before our eyes that happiness seems +to hasten on towards them, and not to suffer them to be deserted by her. +But when you take your attention off from this picture and these images +of the virtues to the truth and the reality, what remains without +disguise is, the question whether any one can be happy in torment? +Wherefore let us now examine that point, and not be under any +apprehensions, lest the virtues should expostulate, and complain that +they are forsaken by happiness. For if prudence is connected with every +virtue, then prudence itself discovers this, that all good men are not +therefore happy; and she recollects many things of Marcus Atilius<a id="FNA-55"></a><a href="#FN-55"><sup>55</sup></a>, +Quintus Cæpio<a id="FNA-56"></a><a href="#FN-56"><sup>56</sup></a>, Marcus Aquilius<a id="FNA-57"></a><a href="#FN-57"><sup>57</sup></a>; and prudence herself, if these +representations are more agreeable to you than the things themselves, +restrains happiness when it is endeavoring to throw itself into +torments, and denies that it has any connection with pain and torture.</p> + +<p>VI. <i>M.</i> I can easily bear with your behaving in this manner, though it +is not fair in you to prescribe to me how you would have me carry on +this discussion. But I ask you if I have effected anything or nothing in +the preceding days?</p> + +<p><i>A.</i> Yes; something was done, some little matter indeed.</p> + +<p><i>M.</i> But if that is the case, this question is settled, and almost put +an end to.</p> + +<p><i>A.</i> How so?</p> + +<p><i>M.</i> Because turbulent motions and violent agitations of <a id="page-169"></a><span class="pgnum">169</span>the mind, when +it is raised and elated by a rash impulse, getting the better of reason, +leave no room for a happy life. For who that fears either pain or death, +the one of which is always present, the other always impending, can be +otherwise than miserable? Now, supposing the same person—which is often +the case—to be afraid of poverty, ignominy, infamy, or weakness, or +blindness, or, lastly, slavery, which doth not only befall individual +men, but often even the most powerful nations; now can any one under the +apprehension of these evils be happy? What shall we say of him who not +only dreads these evils as impending, but actually feels and bears them +at present? Let us unite in the same person banishment, mourning, the +loss of children; now, how can any one who is broken down and rendered +sick in body and mind by such affliction be otherwise than very +miserable indeed? What reason, again, can there be why a man should not +rightly enough be called miserable whom we see inflamed and raging with +lust, coveting everything with an insatiable desire, and, in proportion +as he derives more pleasure from anything, thirsting the more violently +after them? And as to a man vainly elated, exulting with an empty joy, +and boasting of himself without reason, is not he so much the more +miserable in proportion as he thinks himself happier? Therefore, as +these men are miserable, so, on the other hand, those are happy who are +alarmed by no fears, wasted by no griefs, provoked by no lusts, melted +by no languid pleasures that arise from vain and exulting joys. We look +on the sea as calm when not the least breath of air disturbs its waves; +and, in like manner, the placid and quiet state of the mind is +discovered when unmoved by any perturbation. Now, if there be any one +who holds the power of fortune, and everything human, everything that +can possibly befall any man, as supportable, so as to be out of the +reach of fear or anxiety, and if such a man covets nothing, and is +lifted up by no vain joy of mind, what can prevent his being happy? And +if these are the effects of virtue, why cannot virtue itself make men +happy?</p> + +<p>VII. <i>A.</i> But the other of these two propositions is undeniable, that +they who are under no apprehensions, who are <a id="page-170"></a><span class="pgnum">170</span>noways uneasy, who covet +nothing, who are lifted up by no vain joy, are happy: and therefore I +grant you that. But as for the other, that is not now in a fit state for +discussion; for it has been proved by your former arguments that a wise +man is free from every perturbation of mind.</p> + +<p><i>M.</i> Doubtless, then, the dispute is over; for the question appears to +have been entirely exhausted.</p> + +<p><i>A.</i> I think, indeed, that that is almost the case.</p> + +<p><i>M.</i> But yet that is more usually the case with the mathematicians than +philosophers. For when the geometricians teach anything, if what they +have before taught relates to their present subject, they take that for +granted which has been already proved, and explain only what they had +not written on before. But the philosophers, whatever subject they have +in hand, get together everything that relates to it, notwithstanding +they may have dilated on it somewhere else. Were not that the case, why +should the Stoics say so much on that question, Whether virtue was +abundantly sufficient to a happy life? when it would have been answer +enough that they had before taught that nothing was good but what was +honorable; for, as this had been proved, the consequence must be that +virtue was sufficient to a happy life; and each premise may be made to +follow from the admission of the other, so that if it be admitted that +virtue is sufficient to secure a happy life, it may also be inferred +that nothing is good except what is honorable. They, however, do not +proceed in this manner; for they would separate books about what is +honorable, and what is the chief good; and when they have demonstrated +from the one that virtue has power enough to make life happy, yet they +treat this point separately; for everything, and especially a subject of +such great consequence, should be supported by arguments and +exhortations which belong to that alone. For you should have a care how +you imagine philosophy to have uttered anything more noble, or that she +has promised anything more fruitful or of greater consequence, for, good +Gods! doth she not engage that she will render him who submits to her +laws so accomplished as to be always armed against fortune, and to have +every assurance within himself of living well and happily—that he +shall, in short, be forever <a id="page-171"></a><span class="pgnum">171</span>happy? But let us see what she will +perform? In the mean while, I look upon it as a great thing that she has +even made such a promise. For Xerxes, who was loaded with all the +rewards and gifts of fortune, not satisfied with his armies of horse and +foot, nor the multitude of his ships, nor his infinite treasure of gold, +offered a reward to any one who could find out a new pleasure; and yet, +when it was discovered, he was not satisfied with it; nor can there ever +be an end to lust. I wish we could engage any one by a reward to produce +something the better to establish us in this belief.</p> + +<p>VIII. <i>A.</i> I wish that, indeed, myself; but I want a little information. +For I allow that in what you have stated the one proposition is the +consequence of the other; that as, if what is honorable be the only +good, it must follow that a happy life is the effect of virtue: so that +if a happy life consists in virtue, nothing can be good but virtue. But +your friend Brutus, on the authority of Aristo and Antiochus, does not +see this; for he thinks the case would be the same even if there were +anything good besides virtue.</p> + +<p><i>M.</i> What, then? do you imagine that I am going to argue against Brutus?</p> + +<p><i>A.</i> You may do what you please; for it is not for me to prescribe what +you shall do.</p> + +<p><i>M.</i> How these things agree together shall be examined somewhere else; +for I frequently discussed that point with Antiochus, and lately with +Aristo, when, during the period of my command as general, I was lodging +with him at Athens. For to me it seemed that no one could possibly be +happy under any evil; but a wise man might be afflicted with evil, if +there are any things arising from body or fortune deserving the name of +evils. These things were said, which Antiochus has inserted in his books +in many places—that virtue itself was sufficient to make life happy, +but yet not perfectly happy; and that many things derive their names +from the predominant portion of them, though they do not include +everything, as strength, health, riches, honor, and glory: which +qualities are determined by their kind, not their number. Thus a happy +life is so called from its being so in a great degree, even though it +<a id="page-172"></a><span class="pgnum">172</span>should fall short in some point. To clear this up is not absolutely +necessary at present, though it seems to be said without any great +consistency; for I cannot imagine what is wanting to one that is happy +to make him happier, for if anything be wanting to him, he cannot be so +much as happy; and as to what they say, that everything is named and +estimated from its predominant portion, that may be admitted in some +things. But when they allow three kinds of evils—when any one is +oppressed with every imaginable evil of two kinds, being afflicted with +adverse fortune, and having at the same time his body worn out and +harassed with all sorts of pains—shall we say that such a one is but +little short of a happy life, to say nothing about the happiest possible +life?</p> + +<p>IX. This is the point which Theophrastus was unable to maintain; for +after he had once laid down the position that stripes, torments, +tortures, the ruin of one’s country, banishment, the loss of children, +had great influence on men’s living miserably and unhappily, he durst +not any longer use any high and lofty expressions when he was so low and +abject in his opinion. How right he was is not the question; he +certainly was consistent. Therefore, I am not for objecting to +consequences where the premises are admitted. But this most elegant and +learned of all the philosophers is not taken to task very severely when +he asserts his three kinds of good; but he is attacked by every one for +that book which he wrote on a happy life, in which book he has many +arguments why one who is tortured and racked cannot be happy. For in +that book he is supposed to say that a man who is placed on the wheel +(that is a kind of torture in use among the Greeks) cannot attain to a +completely happy life. He nowhere, indeed, says so absolutely; but what +he says amounts to the same thing. Can I, then, find fault with him, +after having allowed that pains of the body are evils, that the ruin of +a man’s fortunes is an evil, if he should say that every good man is not +happy, when all those things which he reckons as evils may befall a good +man? The same Theophrastus is found fault with by all the books and +schools of the philosophers for commending that sentence in his +Callisthenes,</p> + +<div class="poem"> +<p>Fortune, not wisdom, rules the life of man.</p> +</div> + +<p class="cont"><a id="page-173"></a><span class="pgnum">173</span>They say never did philosopher assert anything so languid. They are +right, indeed, in that; but I do not apprehend anything could be more +consistent, for if there are so many good things that depend on the +body, and so many foreign to it that depend on chance and fortune, is it +inconsistent to say that fortune, which governs everything, both what is +foreign and what belongs to the body, has greater power than counsel. Or +would we rather imitate Epicurus? who is often excellent in many things +which he speaks, but quite indifferent how consistent he may be, or how +much to the purpose he is speaking. He commends spare diet, and in that +he speaks as a philosopher; but it is for Socrates or Antisthenes to say +so, and not for one who confines all good to pleasure. He denies that +any one can live pleasantly unless he lives honestly, wisely, and +justly. Nothing is more dignified than this assertion, nothing more +becoming a philosopher, had he not measured this very expression of +living honestly, justly, and wisely by pleasure. What could be better +than to assert that fortune interferes but little with a wise man? But +does he talk thus, who, after he has said that pain is the greatest +evil, or the only evil, might himself be afflicted with the sharpest +pains all over his body, even at the time he is vaunting himself the +most against fortune? And this very thing, too, Metrodorus has said, but +in better language: “I have anticipated you, Fortune; I have caught you, +and cut off every access, so that you cannot possibly reach me.” This +would be excellent in the mouth of Aristo the Chian, or Zeno the Stoic, +who held nothing to be an evil but what was base; but for you, +Metrodorus, to anticipate the approaches of fortune, who confine all +that is good to your bowels and marrow—for you to say so, who define +the chief good by a strong constitution of body, and well-assured hope +of its continuance—for you to cut off every access of fortune! Why, you +may instantly be deprived of that good. Yet the simple are taken with +these propositions, and a vast crowd is led away by such sentences to +become their followers.</p> + +<p>X. But it is the duty of one who would argue accurately to consider not +what is said, but what is said consistently. <a id="page-174"></a><span class="pgnum">174</span>As in that very opinion +which we have adopted in this discussion, namely, that every good man is +always happy, it is clear what I mean by good men: I call those both +wise and good men who are provided and adorned with every virtue. Let us +see, then, who are to be called happy. I imagine, indeed, that those men +are to be called so who are possessed of good without any alloy of evil; +nor is there any other notion connected with the word that expresses +happiness but an absolute enjoyment of good without any evil. Virtue +cannot attain this, if there is anything good besides itself. For a +crowd of evils would present themselves, if we were to allow poverty, +obscurity, humility, solitude, the loss of friends, acute pains of the +body, the loss of health, weakness, blindness, the ruin of one’s +country, banishment, slavery, to be evils; for a wise man may be +afflicted by all these evils, numerous and important as they are, and +many others also may be added, for they are brought on by chance, which +may attack a wise man; but if these things are evils, who can maintain +that a wise man is always happy when all these evils may light on him at +the same time? I therefore do not easily agree with my friend Brutus, +nor with our common masters, nor those ancient ones, Aristotle, +Speusippus, Xenocrates, Polemon, who reckon all that I have mentioned +above as evils, and yet they say that a wise man is always happy; nor +can I allow them, because they are charmed with this beautiful and +illustrious title, which would very well become Pythagoras, Socrates, +and Plato, to persuade my mind that strength, health, beauty, riches, +honors, power, with the beauty of which they are ravished, are +contemptible, and that all those things which are the opposites of these +are not to be regarded. Then might they declare openly, with a loud +voice, that neither the attacks of fortune, nor the opinion of the +multitude, nor pain, nor poverty, occasions them any apprehensions; and +that they have everything within themselves, and that there is nothing +whatever which they consider as good but what is within their own power. +Nor can I by any means allow the same person who falls into the vulgar +opinion of good and evil to make use of these expressions, which can +only become <a id="page-175"></a><span class="pgnum">175</span>a great and exalted man. Struck with which glory, up starts +Epicurus, who, with submission to the Gods, thinks a wise man always +happy. He is much charmed with the dignity of this opinion, but he never +would have owned that, had he attended to himself; for what is there +more inconsistent than for one who could say that pain was the greatest +or the only evil to think also that a wise man can possibly say in the +midst of his torture, How sweet is this! We are not, therefore, to form +our judgment of philosophers from detached sentences, but from their +consistency with themselves, and their ordinary manner of talking.</p> + +<p>XI. <i>A.</i> You compel me to be of your opinion; but have a care that you +are not inconsistent yourself.</p> + +<p><i>M.</i> In what respect?</p> + +<p><i>A.</i> Because I have lately read your fourth book on Good and Evil: and +in that you appeared to me, while disputing against Cato, to be +endeavoring to show, which in my opinion means to prove, that Zeno and +the Peripatetics differ only about some new words; but if we allow that, +what reason can there be, if it follows from the arguments of Zeno that +virtue contains all that is necessary to a happy life, that the +Peripatetics should not be at liberty to say the same? For, in my +opinion, regard should be had to the thing, not to words.</p> + +<p><i>M.</i> What! you would convict me from my own words, and bring against me +what I had said or written elsewhere. You may act in that manner with +those who dispute by established rules. We live from hand to mouth, and +say anything that strikes our mind with probability, so that we are the +only people who are really at liberty. But, since I just now spoke of +consistency, I do not think the inquiry in this place is, if the opinion +of Zeno and his pupil Aristo be true that nothing is good but what is +honorable; but, admitting that, then, whether the whole of a happy life +can be rested on virtue alone. Wherefore, if we certainly grant Brutus +this, that a wise man is always happy, how consistent he is, is his own +business; for who, indeed, is more worthy than himself of the glory of +that opinion? Still, we may maintain that such a man is more happy than +any one else.</p> + +<p><a id="page-176"></a><span class="pgnum">176</span>XII. Though Zeno the Cittiæan, a stranger and an inconsiderable coiner +of words, appears to have insinuated himself into the old philosophy; +still, the prevalence of this opinion is due to the authority of Plato, +who often makes use of this expression, “That nothing but virtue can be +entitled to the name of good,” agreeably to what Socrates says in +Plato’s Gorgias; for it is there related that when some one asked him if +he did not think Archelaus the son of Perdiccas, who was then looked +upon as a most fortunate person, a very happy man, “I do not know,” +replied he, “for I never conversed with him.” “What! is there no other +way you can know it by?” “None at all.” “You cannot, then, pronounce of +the great king of the Persians whether he is happy or not?” “How can I, +when I do not know how learned or how good a man he is?” “What! do you +imagine that a happy life depends on that?” “My opinion entirely is, +that good men are happy, and the wicked miserable.” “Is Archelaus, then, +miserable?” “Certainly, if unjust.” Now, does it not appear to you that +he is here placing the whole of a happy life in virtue alone? But what +does the same man say in his funeral oration? “For,” saith he, “whoever +has everything that relates to a happy life so entirely dependent on +himself as not to be connected with the good or bad fortune of another, +and not to be affected by, or made in any degree uncertain by, what +befalls another; and whoever is such a one has acquired the best rule of +living; he is that moderate, that brave, that wise man, who submits to +the gain and loss of everything, and especially of his children, and +obeys that old precept; for he will never be too joyful or too sad, +because he depends entirely upon himself.”</p> + +<p>XIII. From Plato, therefore, all my discourse shall be deduced, as if +from some sacred and hallowed fountain. Whence can I, then, more +properly begin than from Nature, the parent of all? For whatsoever she +produces (I am not speaking only of animals, but even of those things +which have sprung from the earth in such a manner as to rest on their +own roots) she designed it to be perfect in its respective kind. So that +among trees and vines, and those lower plants and trees which cannot +advance themselves <a id="page-177"></a><span class="pgnum">177</span>high above the earth, some are evergreen, others are +stripped of their leaves in winter, and, warmed by the spring season, +put them out afresh, and there are none of them but what are so +quickened by a certain interior motion, and their own seeds enclosed in +every one, so as to yield flowers, fruit, or berries, that all may have +every perfection that belongs to it; provided no violence prevents it. +But the force of Nature itself may be more easily discovered in animals, +as she has bestowed sense on them. For some animals she has taught to +swim, and designed to be inhabitants of the water; others she has +enabled to fly, and has willed that they should enjoy the boundless air; +some others she has made to creep, others to walk. Again, of these very +animals, some are solitary, some gregarious, some wild, others tame, +some hidden and buried beneath the earth, and every one of these +maintains the law of nature, confining itself to what was bestowed on +it, and unable to change its manner of life. And as every animal has +from nature something that distinguishes it, which every one maintains +and never quits; so man has something far more excellent, though +everything is said to be excellent by comparison. But the human mind, +being derived from the divine reason, can be compared with nothing but +with the Deity itself, if I may be allowed the expression. This, then, +if it is improved, and when its perception is so preserved as not to be +blinded by errors, becomes a perfect understanding, that is to say, +absolute reason, which is the very same as virtue. And if everything is +happy which wants nothing, and is complete and perfect in its kind, and +that is the peculiar lot of virtue, certainly all who are possessed of +virtue are happy. And in this I agree with Brutus, and also with +Aristotle, Xenocrates, Speusippus, Polemon.</p> + +<p>XIV. To me such are the only men who appear completely happy; for what +can he want to a complete happy life who relies on his own good +qualities, or how can he be happy who does not rely on them? But he who +makes a threefold division of goods must necessarily be diffident, for +how can he depend on having a sound body, or that his fortune shall +continue? But no one can be happy without an immovable, fixed, and +permanent good. What, <a id="page-178"></a><span class="pgnum">178</span>then, is this opinion of theirs? So that I think +that saying of the Spartan may be applied to them, who, on some +merchant’s boasting before him that he had despatched ships to every +maritime coast, replied that a fortune which depended on ropes was not +very desirable. Can there be any doubt that whatever may be lost cannot +be properly classed in the number of those things which complete a happy +life? for of all that constitutes a happy life, nothing will admit of +withering, or growing old, or wearing out, or decaying; for whoever is +apprehensive of any loss of these things cannot be happy: the happy man +should be safe, well fenced, well fortified, out of the reach of all +annoyance, not like a man under trifling apprehensions, but free from +all such. As he is not called innocent who but slightly offends, but he +who offends not at all, so it is he alone who is to be considered +without fear who is free from all fear, not he who is but in little +fear. For what else is courage but an affection of mind that is ready to +undergo perils, and patient in the endurance of pain and labor without +any alloy of fear? Now, this certainly could not be the case if there +were anything else good but what depended on honesty alone. But how can +any one be in possession of that desirable and much-coveted security +(for I now call a freedom from anxiety a security, on which freedom a +happy life depends) who has, or may have, a multitude of evils attending +him? How can he be brave and undaunted, and hold everything as trifles +which can befall a man? for so a wise man should do, unless he be one +who thinks that everything depends on himself. Could the Lacedæmonians +without this, when Philip threatened to prevent all their attempts, have +asked him if he could prevent their killing themselves? Is it not +easier, then, to find one man of such a spirit as we are inquiring +after, than to meet with a whole city of such men? Now, if to this +courage I am speaking of we add temperance, that it may govern all our +feelings and agitations, what can be wanting to complete his happiness +who is secured by his courage from uneasiness and fear, and is prevented +from immoderate desires and immoderate insolence of joy by temperance? I +could easily show that virtue is able to <a id="page-179"></a><span class="pgnum">179</span>produce these effects, but +that I have explained on the foregoing days.</p> + +<p>XV. But as the perturbations of the mind make life miserable, and +tranquillity renders it happy; and as these perturbations are of two +sorts, grief and fear, proceeding from imagined evils, and as immoderate +joy and lust arise from a mistake about what is good, and as all these +feelings are in opposition to reason and counsel; when you see a man at +ease, quite free and disengaged from such troublesome commotions, which +are so much at variance with one another, can you hesitate to pronounce +such a one a happy man? Now, the wise man is always in such a +disposition; therefore the wise man is always happy. Besides, every good +is pleasant; whatever is pleasant may be boasted and talked of; whatever +may be boasted of is glorious; but whatever is glorious is certainly +laudable, and whatever is laudable doubtless, also, honorable: whatever, +then, is good is honorable (but the things which they reckon as goods +they themselves do not call honorable); therefore what is honorable +alone is good. Hence it follows that a happy life is comprised in +honesty alone. Such things, then, are not to be called or considered +goods, when a man may enjoy an abundance of them, and yet be most +miserable. Is there any doubt but that a man who enjoys the best health, +and who has strength and beauty, and his senses flourishing in their +utmost quickness and perfection—suppose him likewise, if you please, +nimble and active, nay, give him riches, honors, authority, power, +glory—now, I say, should this person, who is in possession of all +these, be unjust, intemperate, timid, stupid, or an idiot—could you +hesitate to call such a one miserable? What, then, are those goods in +the possession of which you may be very miserable? Let us see if a happy +life is not made up of parts of the same nature, as a heap implies a +quantity of grain of the same kind. And if this be once admitted, +happiness must be compounded of different good things, which alone are +honorable; if there is any mixture of things of another sort with these, +nothing honorable can proceed from such a composition: now, take away +honesty, and how can you imagine anything happy? For whatever is good is +desirable on that account; whatever is desirable <a id="page-180"></a><span class="pgnum">180</span>must certainly be +approved of; whatever you approve of must be looked on as acceptable and +welcome. You must consequently impute dignity to this; and if so, it +must necessarily be laudable: therefore, everything that is laudable is +good. Hence it follows that what is honorable is the only good. And +should we not look upon it in this light, there will be a great many +things which we must call good.</p> + +<p>XVI. I forbear to mention riches, which, as any one, let him be ever so +unworthy, may have them, I do not reckon among goods; for what is good +is not attainable by all. I pass over notoriety and popular fame, raised +by the united voice of knaves and fools. Even things which are absolute +nothings may be called goods; such as white teeth, handsome eyes, a good +complexion, and what was commended by Euryclea, when she was washing +Ulysses’s feet, the softness of his skin and the mildness of his +discourse. If you look on these as goods, what greater encomiums can the +gravity of a philosopher be entitled to than the wild opinion of the +vulgar and the thoughtless crowd? The Stoics give the name of excellent +and choice to what the others call good: they call them so, indeed; but +they do not allow them to complete a happy life. But these others think +that there is no life happy without them; or, admitting it to be happy, +they deny it to be the most happy. But our opinion is, that it is the +most happy; and we prove it from that conclusion of Socrates. For thus +that author of philosophy argued: that as the disposition of a man’s +mind is, so is the man; such as the man is, such will be his discourse; +his actions will correspond with his discourse, and his life with his +actions. But the disposition of a good man’s mind is laudable; the life, +therefore, of a good man is laudable; it is honorable, therefore, +because laudable; the unavoidable conclusion from which is that the life +of good men is happy. For, good Gods! did I not make it appear, by my +former arguments—or was I only amusing myself and killing time in what +I then said?—that the mind of a wise man was always free from every +hasty motion which I call a perturbation, and that the most undisturbed +peace always reigned in his breast? A man, then, who is temperate and +consistent, free from fear or <a id="page-181"></a><span class="pgnum">181</span>grief, and uninfluenced by any immoderate +joy or desire, cannot be otherwise than happy; but a wise man is always +so, therefore he is always happy. Moreover, how can a good man avoid +referring all his actions and all his feelings to the one standard of +whether or not it is laudable? But he does refer everything to the +object of living happily: it follows, then, that a happy life is +laudable; but nothing is laudable without virtue: a happy life, then, is +the consequence of virtue. And this is the unavoidable conclusion to be +drawn from these arguments.</p> + +<p>XVII. A wicked life has nothing which we ought to speak of or glory in; +nor has that life which is neither happy nor miserable. But there is a +kind of life that admits of being spoken of, and gloried in, and boasted +of, as Epaminondas saith,</p> + +<div class="poem"> +<p>The wings of Sparta’s pride my counsels clipp’d.</p> +</div> + +<p class="cont">And Africanus boasts,</p> + +<div class="poem"> +<p>Who, from beyond Mæotis to the place</p> +<p>Where the sun rises, deeds like mine can trace?</p> +</div> + +<p class="cont">If, then, there is such a thing as a happy life, it is to be gloried in, +spoken of, and commended by the person who enjoys it; for there is +nothing excepting that which can be spoken of or gloried in; and when +that is once admitted, you know what follows. Now, unless an honorable +life is a happy life, there must, of course, be something preferable to +a happy life; for that which is honorable all men will certainly grant +to be preferable to anything else. And thus there will be something +better than a happy life: but what can be more absurd than such an +assertion? What! when they grant vice to be effectual to the rendering +life miserable, must they not admit that there is a corresponding power +in virtue to make life happy? For contraries follow from contraries. And +here I ask what weight they think there is in the balance of Critolaus, +who having put the goods of the mind into one scale, and the goods of +the body and other external advantages into the other, thought the goods +of the mind outweighed the others so far that they would require the +whole earth and sea to equalize the scale.</p> + +<p><a id="page-182"></a><span class="pgnum">182</span>XVIII. What hinders Critolaus, then, or that gravest of philosophers, +Xenocrates (who raises virtue so high, and who lessens and depreciates +everything else), from not only placing a happy life, but the happiest +possible life, in virtue? And, indeed, if this were not the case, virtue +would be absolutely lost. For whoever is subject to grief must +necessarily be subject to fear too, for fear is an uneasy apprehension +of future grief; and whoever is subject to fear is liable to dread, +timidity, consternation, cowardice. Therefore, such a person may, some +time or other, be defeated, and not think himself concerned with that +precept of Atreus,</p> + +<div class="poem"> +<p>And let men so conduct themselves in life,</p> +<p>As to be always strangers to defeat.</p> +</div> + +<p class="cont">But such a man, as I have said, will be defeated; and not only defeated, +but made a slave of. But we would have virtue always free, always +invincible; and were it not so, there would be an end of virtue. But if +virtue has in herself all that is necessary for a good life, she is +certainly sufficient for happiness: virtue is certainly sufficient, too, +for our living with courage; if with courage, then with a magnanimous +spirit, and indeed so as never to be under any fear, and thus to be +always invincible. Hence it follows that there can be nothing to be +repented of, no wants, no lets or hinderances. Thus all things will be +prosperous, perfect, and as you would have them, and, consequently, +happy; but virtue is sufficient for living with courage, and therefore +virtue is able by herself to make life happy. For as folly, even when +possessed of what it desires, never thinks it has acquired enough, so +wisdom is always satisfied with the present, and never repents on her +own account.</p> + +<p>XIX. Look but on the single consulship of Lælius, and that, too, after +having been set aside (though when a wise and good man like him is +outvoted, the people are disappointed of a good consul, rather than be +disappointed by a vain people); but the point is, would you prefer, were +it in your power, to be once such a consul as Lælius, or be elected four +times, like Cinna? I have no doubt in the world what answer you will +make, and it is on that account I put the question to you.</p> + +<p><a id="page-183"></a><span class="pgnum">183</span>I would not ask every one this question; for some one perhaps might +answer that he would not only prefer four consulates to one, but even +one day of Cinna’s life to whole ages of many famous men. Lælius would +have suffered had he but touched any one with his finger; but Cinna +ordered the head of his colleague consul, Cn. Octavius, to be struck +off; and put to death P. Crassus<a id="FNA-58"></a><a href="#FN-58"><sup>58</sup></a>, and L. Cæsar<a id="FNA-59"></a><a href="#FN-59"><sup>59</sup></a>, those excellent +men, so renowned both at home and abroad; and even M. Antonius<a id="FNA-60"></a><a href="#FN-60"><sup>60</sup></a>, the +greatest orator whom I ever heard; and C. Cæsar, who seems to me to have +been the pattern of humanity, politeness, sweetness of temper, and wit. +Could he, then, be happy who occasioned the death of these men? So far +from it, that he seems to be miserable, not only for having performed +these actions, but also for acting in such a manner that it was lawful +for him to do it, though it is unlawful for any one to do wicked +actions; but this proceeds from inaccuracy, of speech, for we call +whatever a man is allowed to do lawful. Was not Marius happier, I pray +you, when he shared the glory of the victory gained over the Cimbrians +with his colleague Catulus (who was almost another Lælius; for I look +upon the two men as very like one another), than when, conqueror in the +civil war, he in a passion answered the friends of Catulus, who were +interceding for him, “Let him die?” And this answer he gave, not once +only, but often. But in such a case, he was happier who submitted to +that barbarous decree than he who issued it. And it is better to receive +an injury than to do one; and so it was better to advance a little to +meet that death that was making its approaches, as Catulus did, than, +like Marius, to sully the glory of six consulships, and disgrace his +latter days, by the death of such a man.</p> + +<p>XX. Dionysius exercised his tyranny over the Syracusans thirty-eight +years, being but twenty-five years old <a id="page-184"></a><span class="pgnum">184</span>when he seized on the +government. How beautiful and how wealthy a city did he oppress with +slavery! And yet we have it from good authority that he was remarkably +temperate in his manner of living, that he was very active and energetic +in carrying on business, but naturally mischievous and unjust; from +which description every one who diligently inquires into truth must +inevitably see that he was very miserable. Neither did he attain what he +so greatly desired, even when he was persuaded that he had unlimited +power; for, notwithstanding he was of a good family and reputable +parents (though that is contested by some authors), and had a very large +acquaintance of intimate friends and relations, and also some youths +attached to him by ties of love after the fashion of the Greeks, he +could not trust any one of them, but committed the guard of his person +to slaves, whom he had selected from rich men’s families and made free, +and to strangers and barbarians. And thus, through an unjust desire of +governing, he in a manner shut himself up in a prison. Besides, he would +not trust his throat to a barber, but had his daughters taught to shave; +so that these royal virgins were forced to descend to the base and +slavish employment of shaving the head and beard of their father. Nor +would he trust even them, when they were grown up, with a razor; but +contrived how they might burn off the hair of his head and beard with +red-hot nutshells. And as to his two wives, Aristomache, his +countrywoman, and Doris of Locris, he never visited them at night before +everything had been well searched and examined. And as he had surrounded +the place where his bed was with a broad ditch, and made a way over it +with a wooden bridge, he drew that bridge over after shutting his +bedchamber door. And as he did not dare to stand on the ordinary pulpits +from which they usually harangued the people, he generally addressed +them from a high tower. And it is said that when he was disposed to play +at ball—for he delighted much in it—and had pulled off his clothes, he +used to give his sword into the keeping of a young man whom he was very +fond of. On this, one of his intimates said pleasantly, “You certainly +trust your life with him;” and as the young man happened to smile at +this, he ordered them both to be slain, <a id="page-185"></a><span class="pgnum">185</span>the one for showing how he +might be taken off, the other for approving of what had been said by +smiling. But he was so concerned at what he had done that nothing +affected him more during his whole life; for he had slain one to whom he +was extremely partial. Thus do weak men’s desires pull them different +ways, and while they indulge one, they act counter to another.</p> + +<p>XXI. This tyrant, however, showed himself how happy he really was; for +once, when Damocles, one of his flatterers, was dilating in conversation +on his forces, his wealth, the greatness of his power, the plenty he +enjoyed, the grandeur of his royal palaces, and maintaining that no one +was ever happier, “Have you an inclination,” said he, “Damocles, as this +kind of life pleases you, to have a taste of it yourself, and to make a +trial of the good fortune that attends me?” And when he said that he +should like it extremely, Dionysius ordered him to be laid on a bed of +gold with the most beautiful covering, embroidered and wrought with the +most exquisite work, and he dressed out a great many sideboards with +silver and embossed gold. He then ordered some youths, distinguished for +their handsome persons, to wait at his table, and to observe his nod, in +order to serve him with what he wanted. There were ointments and +garlands; perfumes were burned; tables provided with the most exquisite +meats. Damocles thought himself very happy. In the midst of this +apparatus, Dionysius ordered a bright sword to be let down from the +ceiling, suspended by a single horse-hair, so as to hang over the head +of that happy man. After which he neither cast his eye on those handsome +waiters, nor on the well-wrought plate; nor touched any of the +provisions: presently the garlands fell to pieces. At last he entreated +the tyrant to give him leave to go, for that now he had no desire to be +happy<a id="FNA-61"></a><a href="#FN-61"><sup>61</sup></a>. Does not Dionysius, then, seem to have declared there can be +no happiness for one who is under constant apprehensions? But it was not +now in his power <a id="page-186"></a><span class="pgnum">186</span>to return to justice, and restore his citizens their +rights and privileges; for, by the indiscretion of youth, he had engaged +in so many wrong steps and committed such extravagances, that, had he +attempted to have returned to a right way of thinking, he must have +endangered his life.</p> + +<p>XXII. Yet, how desirous he was of friendship, though at the same time he +dreaded the treachery of friends, appears from the story of those two +Pythagoreans: one of these had been security for his friend, who was +condemned to die; the other, to release his security, presented himself +at the time appointed for his dying: “I wish,” said Dionysius,“ you +would admit me as the third in your friendship.” What misery was it for +him to be deprived of acquaintance, of company at his table, and of the +freedom of conversation! especially for one who was a man of learning, +and from his childhood acquainted with liberal arts, very fond of music, +and himself a tragic poet—how good a one is not to the purpose, for I +know not how it is, but in this way, more than any other, every one +thinks his own performances excellent. I never as yet knew any poet (and +I was very intimate with Aquinius), who did not appear to himself to be +very admirable. The case is this: you are pleased with your own works; I +like mine. But to return to Dionysius. He debarred himself from all +civil and polite conversation, and spent his life among fugitives, +bondmen, and barbarians; for he was persuaded that no one could be his +friend who was worthy of liberty, or had the least desire of being free.</p> + +<p>XXIII. Shall I not, then, prefer the life of Plato and Archytas, +manifestly wise and learned men, to his, than which nothing can possibly +be more horrid, or miserable, or detestable?</p> + +<p>I will present you with an humble and obscure mathematician of the same +city, called Archimedes, who lived many years after; whose tomb, +overgrown with shrubs and briers, I in my quæstorship discovered, when +the Syracusans knew nothing of it, and even denied that there was any +such thing remaining; for I remembered some verses, which I had been +informed were engraved on his monument, and these set forth that on the +top of the tomb <a id="page-187"></a><span class="pgnum">187</span>there was placed a sphere with a cylinder. When I had +carefully examined all the monuments (for there are a great many tombs +at the gate Achradinæ), I observed a small column standing out a little +above the briers, with the figure of a sphere and a cylinder upon it; +whereupon I immediately said to the Syracusans—for there were some of +their principal men with me there—that I imagined that was what I was +inquiring for. Several men, being sent in with scythes, cleared the way, +and made an opening for us. When we could get at it, and were come near +to the front of the pedestal, I found the inscription, though the latter +parts of all the verses were effaced almost half away. Thus one of the +noblest cities of Greece, and one which at one time likewise had been +very celebrated for learning, had known nothing of the monument of its +greatest genius, if it had not been discovered to them by a native of +Arpinum. But to return to the subject from which I have been digressing. +Who is there in the least degree acquainted with the Muses, that is, +with liberal knowledge, or that deals at all in learning, who would not +choose to be this mathematician rather than that tyrant? If we look into +their methods of living and their employments, we shall find the mind of +the one strengthened and improved with tracing the deductions of reason, +amused with his own ingenuity, which is the one most delicious food of +the mind; the thoughts of the other engaged in continual murders and +injuries, in constant fears by night and by day. Now imagine a +Democritus, a Pythagoras, and an Anaxagoras; what kingdom, what riches, +would you prefer to their studies and amusements? For you must +necessarily look for that excellence which we are seeking for in that +which is the most perfect part of man; but what is there better in man +than a sagacious and good mind? The enjoyment, therefore, of that good +which proceeds from that sagacious mind can alone make us happy; but +virtue is the good of the mind: it follows, therefore, that a happy life +depends on virtue. Hence proceed all things that are beautiful, +honorable, and excellent, as I said above (but this point must, I think, +be treated of more at large), and they are well stored with joys. For, +as it is clear that a happy life consists in perpetual and unexhausted +<a id="page-188"></a><span class="pgnum">188</span>pleasures, it follows, too, that a happy life must arise from honesty.</p> + +<p>XXIV. But that what I propose to demonstrate to you may not rest on mere +words only, I must set before you the picture of something, as it were, +living and moving in the world, that may dispose us more for the +improvement of the understanding and real knowledge. Let us, then, pitch +upon some man perfectly acquainted with the most excellent arts; let us +present him for awhile to our own thoughts, and figure him to our own +imaginations. In the first place, he must necessarily be of an +extraordinary capacity; for virtue is not easily connected with dull +minds. Secondly, he must have a great desire of discovering truth, from +whence will arise that threefold production of the mind; one of which +depends on knowing things, and explaining nature; the other, in defining +what we ought to desire and what to avoid; the third, in judging of +consequences and impossibilities, in which consists both subtlety in +disputing and also clearness of judgment. Now, with what pleasure must +the mind of a wise man be affected which continually dwells in the midst +of such cares and occupations as these, when he views the revolutions +and motions of the whole world, and sees those innumerable stars in the +heavens, which, though fixed in their places, have yet one motion in +common with the whole universe, and observes the seven other stars, some +higher, some lower, each maintaining their own course, while their +motions, though wandering, have certain defined and appointed spaces to +run through! the sight of which doubtless urged and encouraged those +ancient philosophers to exercise their investigating spirit on many +other things. Hence arose an inquiry after the beginnings, and, as it +were, seeds from which all things were produced and composed; what was +the origin of every kind of thing, whether animate or inanimate, +articulately speaking or mute; what occasioned their beginning and end, +and by what alteration and change one thing was converted into another; +whence the earth originated, and by what weights it was balanced; by +what caverns the seas were supplied; by what gravity all things being +carried down tend always to the middle of the world, which in any round +body is the lowest place.</p> + +<p><a id="page-189"></a><span class="pgnum">189</span>XXV. A mind employed on such subjects, and which night and day +contemplates them, contains in itself that precept of the Delphic God, +so as to “know itself,” and to perceive its connection with the divine +reason, from whence it is filled with an insatiable joy. For reflections +on the power and nature of the Gods raise in us a desire of imitating +their eternity. Nor does the mind, that sees the necessary dependences +and connections that one cause has with another, think it possible that +it should be itself confined to the shortness of this life. Those +causes, though they proceed from eternity to eternity, are governed by +reason and understanding. And he who beholds them and examines them, or +rather he whose view takes in all the parts and boundaries of things, +with what tranquillity of mind does he look on all human affairs, and on +all that is nearer him! Hence proceeds the knowledge of virtue; hence +arise the kinds and species of virtues; hence are discovered those +things which nature regards as the bounds and extremities of good and +evil; by this it is discovered to what all duties ought to be referred, +and which is the most eligible manner of life. And when these and +similar points have been investigated, the principal consequence which +is deduced from them, and that which is our main object in this +discussion, is the establishment of the point, that virtue is of itself +sufficient to a happy life.</p> + +<p>The third qualification of our wise man is the next to be considered, +which goes through and spreads itself over every part of wisdom; it is +that whereby we define each particular thing, distinguish the genus from +its species, connect consequences, draw just conclusions, and +distinguish truth from falsehood, which is the very art and science of +disputing; which is not only of the greatest use in the examination of +what passes in the world, but is likewise the most rational +entertainment, and that which is most becoming to true wisdom. Such are +its effects in retirement. Now, let our wise man be considered as +protecting the republic; what can be more excellent than such a +character? By his prudence he will discover the true interests of his +fellow-citizens; by his justice he will be prevented from applying what +belongs to the public to his own use; and, in short, he will be ever +governed by all the <a id="page-190"></a><span class="pgnum">190</span>virtues, which are many and various. To these let +us add the advantage of his friendships; in which the learned reckon not +only a natural harmony and agreement of sentiments throughout the +conduct of life, but the utmost pleasure and satisfaction in conversing +and passing our time constantly with one another. What can be wanting to +such a life as this to make it more happy than it is? Fortune herself +must yield to a life stored with such joys. Now, if it be a happiness to +rejoice in such goods of the mind, that is to say, in such virtues, and +if all wise men enjoy thoroughly these pleasures, it must necessarily be +granted that all such are happy.</p> + +<p>XXVI. <i>A.</i> What, when in torments and on the rack?</p> + +<p><i>M.</i> Do you imagine I am speaking of him as laid on roses and violets? +Is it allowable even for Epicurus (who only puts on the appearance of +being a philosopher, and who himself assumed that name for himself) to +say (though, as matters stand, I commend him for his saying) that a wise +man might at all times cry out, though he be burned, tortured, cut to +pieces, “How little I regard it!” Shall this be said by one who defines +all evil as pain, and measures every good by pleasure; who could +ridicule whatever we call either honorable or base, and could declare of +us that we were employed about words, and uttering mere empty sounds; +and that nothing is to be regarded by us but as it is perceived to be +smooth or rough by the body? What! shall such a man as this, as I said, +whose understanding is little superior to the beasts’, be at liberty to +forget himself; and not only to despise fortune, when the whole of his +good and evil is in the power of fortune, but to say that he is happy in +the most racking torture, when he had actually declared pain to be not +only the greatest evil, but the only one? Nor did he take any trouble to +provide himself with those remedies which might have enabled him to bear +pain, such as firmness of mind, a shame of doing anything base, +exercise, and the habit of patience, precepts of courage, and a manly +hardiness; but he says that he supports himself on the single +recollection of past pleasures, as if any one, when the weather was so +hot as that he was scarcely able to bear it, should comfort himself by +recollecting that he was once in my country, <a id="page-191"></a><span class="pgnum">191</span>Arpinum, where he was +surrounded on every side by cooling streams. For I do not apprehend how +past pleasures can allay present evils. But when he says that a wise man +is always happy who would have no right to say so if he were consistent +with himself, what may they not do who allow nothing to be desirable, +nothing to be looked on as good but what is honorable? Let, then, the +Peripatetics and Old Academics follow my example, and at length leave +off muttering to themselves; and openly and with a clear voice let them +be bold to say that a happy life may not be inconsistent with the +agonies of Phalaris’s bull.</p> + +<p>XXVII. But to dismiss the subtleties of the Stoics, which I am sensible +I have employed more than was necessary, let us admit of three kinds of +goods; and let them really be kinds of goods, provided no regard is had +to the body and to external circumstances, as entitled to the +appellation of good in any other sense than because we are obliged to +use them: but let those other divine goods spread themselves far in +every direction, and reach the very heavens. Why, then, may I not call +him happy, nay, the happiest of men, who has attained them? Shall a wise +man be afraid of pain? which is, indeed, the greatest enemy to our +opinion. For I am persuaded that we are prepared and fortified +sufficiently, by the disputations of the foregoing days, against our own +death or that of our friends, against grief, and the other perturbations +of the mind. But pain seems to be the sharpest adversary of virtue; that +it is which menaces us with burning torches; that it is which threatens +to crush our fortitude, and greatness of mind, and patience. Shall +virtue, then, yield to this? Shall the happy life of a wise and +consistent man succumb to this? Good. Gods! how base would this be! +Spartan boys will bear to have their bodies torn by rods without +uttering a groan. I myself have seen at Lacedæmon troops of young men, +with incredible earnestness contending together with their hands and +feet, with their teeth and nails, nay, even ready to expire, rather than +own themselves conquered. Is any country of barbarians more uncivilized +or desolate than India? Yet they have among them some that are held for +wise men, who never wear any clothes all their life long, and who bear +the <a id="page-192"></a><span class="pgnum">192</span>snow of Caucasus, and the piercing cold of winter, without any +pain; and who if they come in contact with fire endure being burned +without a groan. The women, too, in India, on the death of their +husbands have a regular contest, and apply to the judge to have it +determined which of them was best beloved by him; for it is customary +there for one man to have many wives. She in whose favor it is +determined exults greatly, and being attended by her relations, is laid +on the funeral pile with her husband; the others, who are postponed, +walk away very much dejected. Custom can never be superior to nature, +for nature is never to be got the better of. But our minds are infected +by sloth and idleness, and luxury, and languor, and indolence: we have +enervated them by opinions and bad customs. Who is there who is +unacquainted with the customs of the Egyptians? Their minds being +tainted by pernicious opinions, they are ready to bear any torture +rather than hurt an ibis, a snake, a cat, a dog, or a crocodile; and +should any one inadvertently have hurt any of these animals, he will +submit to any punishment. I am speaking of men only. As to the beasts, +do they not bear cold and hunger, running about in woods, and on +mountains and deserts? Will they not fight for their young ones till +they are wounded? Are they afraid of any attacks or blows? I mention not +what the ambitious will suffer for honor’s sake, or those who are +desirous of praise on account of glory, or lovers to gratify their lust. +Life is full of such instances.</p> + +<p>XXVIII. But let us not dwell too much on these questions, but rather let +us return to our subject. I say, and say again, that happiness will +submit even to be tormented; and that in pursuit of justice, and +temperance, and still more especially and principally fortitude, and +greatness of soul, and patience, it will not stop short at sight of the +executioner; and when all other virtues proceed calmly to the torture, +that one will never halt, as I said, on the outside and threshold of the +prison; for what can be baser, what can carry a worse appearance, than +to be left alone, separated from those beautiful attendants? Not, +however, that this is by any means possible; for neither can the virtues +hold together without happiness, nor happiness <a id="page-193"></a><span class="pgnum">193</span>without the virtues; so +that they will not suffer her to desert them, but will carry her along +with them, to whatever torments, to whatever pain they are led. For it +is the peculiar quality of a wise man to do nothing that he may repent +of, nothing against his inclination, but always to act nobly, with +constancy, gravity, and honesty; to depend on nothing as certainty; to +wonder at nothing, when it falls out, as if it appeared strange and +unexpected to him; to be independent of every one, and abide by his own +opinion. For my part, I cannot form an idea of anything happier than +this. The conclusion of the Stoics is indeed easy; for since they are +persuaded that the end of good is to live agreeably to nature, and to be +consistent with that—as a wise man should do so, not only because it is +his duty, but because it is in his power—it must, of course, follow +that whoever has the chief good in his power has his happiness so too. +And thus the life of a wise man is always happy. You have here what I +think may be confidently said of a happy life; and as things now stand, +very truly also, unless you can advance something better.</p> + +<p>XXIX. <i>A.</i> Indeed I cannot; but I should be glad to prevail on you, +unless it is troublesome (as you are under no confinement from +obligations to any particular sect, but gather from all of them whatever +strikes you most as having the appearance of probability), as you just +now seemed to advise the Peripatetics and the Old Academy boldly to +speak out without reserve, “that wise men are always the happiest”—I +should be glad to hear how you think it consistent for them to say so, +when you have said so much against that opinion, and the conclusions of +the Stoics.</p> + +<p><i>M.</i> I will make use, then, of that liberty which no one has the +privilege of using in philosophy but those of our school, whose +discourses determine nothing, but take in everything, leaving them +unsupported by the authority of any particular person, to be judged of +by others, according to their weight. And as you seem desirous of +knowing how it is that, notwithstanding the different opinions of +philosophers with regard to the ends of goods, virtue has still +sufficient security for the effecting of a happy life—which security, +as we are informed, Carneades used indeed to dispute against; but he +disputed as against the <a id="page-194"></a><span class="pgnum">194</span>Stoics, whose opinions he combated with great +zeal and vehemence. I, however, shall handle the question with more +temper; for if the Stoics have rightly settled the <i>ends</i> of goods, the +affair is at an end; for a wise man must necessarily be always happy. +But let us examine, if we can, the particular opinions of the others, +that so this excellent decision, if I may so call it, in favor of a +happy life, may be agreeable to the opinions and discipline of all.</p> + +<p>XXX. These, then, are the opinions, as I think, that are held and +defended—the first four are simple ones: “that nothing is good but what +is honest,” according to the Stoics; “nothing good but pleasure,” as +Epicurus maintains; “nothing good but a freedom from pain,” as +Hieronymus<a id="FNA-62"></a><a href="#FN-62"><sup>62</sup></a> asserts; “nothing good but an enjoyment of the principal, +or all, or the greatest goods of nature,” as Carneades maintained +against the Stoics—these are simple, the others are mixed propositions. +Then there are three kinds of goods: the greatest being those of the +mind; the next best those of the body; the third are external goods, as +the Peripatetics call them, and the Old Academics differ very little +from them. Dinomachus<a id="FNA-63"></a><a href="#FN-63"><sup>63</sup></a> and Callipho<a id="FNA-64"></a><a href="#FN-64"><sup>64</sup></a> have coupled pleasure with +honesty; but Diodorus<a id="FNA-65"></a><a href="#FN-65"><sup>65</sup></a> the Peripatetic has joined indolence to +honesty. These are the opinions that have some footing; for those of +Aristo,<a id="FNA-66"></a><a href="#FN-66"><sup>66</sup></a> Pyrrho,<a id="FNA-67"></a><a href="#FN-67"><sup>67</sup></a> Herillus,<a id="FNA-68"></a><a href="#FN-68"><sup>68</sup></a> and of some others, are quite out +of date. Now let us see what weight these men have in <a id="page-195"></a><span class="pgnum">195</span>them, excepting the +Stoics, whose opinion I think I have sufficiently defended; and indeed I +have explained what the Peripatetics have to say; excepting that +Theophrastus, and those who followed him, dread and abhor pain in too +weak a manner. The others may go on to exaggerate the gravity and +dignity of virtue, as usual; and then, after they have extolled it to +the skies, with the usual extravagance of good orators, it is easy to +reduce the other topics to nothing by comparison, and to hold them up to +contempt. They who think that praise deserves to be sought after, even +at the expense of pain, are not at liberty to deny those men to be happy +who have obtained it. Though they may be under some evils, yet this name +of happy has a very wide application.</p> + +<p>XXXI. For even as trading is said to be lucrative, and farming +advantageous, not because the one never meets with any loss, nor the +other with any damage from the inclemency of the weather, but because +they succeed in general; so life may be properly called happy, not from +its being entirely made up of good things, but because it abounds with +these to a great and considerable degree. By this way of reasoning, +then, a happy life may attend virtue even to the moment of execution; +nay, may descend with her into Phalaris’s bull, according to Aristotle, +Xenocrates, Speusippus, Polemon; and will not be gained over by any +allurements to forsake her. Of the same opinion will Calliphon and +Diodorus be; for they are both of them such friends to virtue as to +think that all things should be discarded and far removed that are +incompatible with it. The rest seem to be more hampered with these +doctrines, but yet they get clear of them; such as Epicurus, Hieronymus, +and whoever else thinks it worth while to defend the deserted Carneades: +for there is not one of them who does not think the mind to be judge of +those goods, and able sufficiently to instruct him how to despise what +has the appearance only of good or evil. For what seems to you to be the +case with Epicurus is the case also with Hieronymus and Carneades, and, +indeed, with all the rest of them; for who is there who is not +sufficiently prepared against death and pain? I will begin, with your +leave, with him whom we call soft and voluptuous. What! <a id="page-196"></a><span class="pgnum">196</span>does he seem, +to you to be afraid of death or pain when he calls the day of his death +happy; and who, when he is afflicted by the greatest pains, silences +them all by recollecting arguments of his own discovering? And this is +not done in such a manner as to give room for imagining that he talks +thus wildly from some sudden impulse; but his opinion of death is, that +on the dissolution of the animal all sense is lost; and what is deprived +of sense is, as he thinks, what we have no concern at all with. And as +to pain, too, he has certain rules to follow then: if it be great, the +comfort is that it must be short; if it be of long continuance, then it +must be supportable. What, then? Do those grandiloquent gentlemen state +anything better than Epicurus in opposition to these two things which +distress us the most? And as to other things, do not Epicurus and the +rest of the philosophers seem sufficiently prepared? Who is there who +does not dread poverty? And yet no true philosopher ever can dread it.</p> + +<p>XXXII. But with how little is this man himself satisfied! No one has +said more on frugality. For when a man is far removed from those things +which occasion a desire of money, from love, ambition, or other daily +extravagance, why should he be fond of money, or concern himself at all +about it? Could the Scythian Anacharsis<a id="FNA-69"></a><a href="#FN-69"><sup>69</sup></a> disregard money, and shall +not our philosophers be able to do so? We are informed of an epistle of +his in these words: “Anacharsis to Hanno, greeting. My clothing is the +same as that with which the Scythians cover themselves; the hardness of +my feet supplies the want of shoes; the ground is my bed, hunger my +sauce, my food milk, cheese, and flesh. So you may come to me as to a +man in want of nothing. But as to those presents you take so much +pleasure in, you may dispose of them to your own citizens, or to the +immortal Gods.” And almost all philosophers, of all schools, excepting +those who are warped <a id="page-197"></a><span class="pgnum">197</span>from right reason by a vicious disposition, might +have been of this same opinion. Socrates, when on one occasion he saw a +great quantity of gold and silver carried in a procession, cried out, +“How many things are there which I do not want!” Xenocrates, when some +ambassadors from Alexander had brought him fifty talents, which was a +very large sum of money in those times, especially at Athens, carried +the ambassadors to sup in the Academy, and placed just a sufficiency +before them, without any apparatus. When they asked him, the next day, +to whom he wished the money which they had for him to be paid: “What!” +said he, “did you not perceive by our slight repast of yesterday that I +had no occasion for money?” But when he perceived that they were +somewhat dejected, he accepted of thirty minas, that he might not seem +to treat with disrespect the king’s generosity. But Diogenes took a +greater liberty, like a Cynic, when Alexander asked him if he wanted +anything: “Just at present,” said he, “I wish that you would stand a +little out of the line between me and the sun,” for Alexander was +hindering him from sunning himself. And, indeed, this very man used to +maintain how much he surpassed the Persian king in his manner of life +and fortune; for that he himself was in want of nothing, while the other +never had enough; and that he had no inclination for those pleasures of +which the other could never get enough to satisfy himself; and that the +other could never obtain his.</p> + +<p>XXXIII. You see, I imagine, how Epicurus has divided his kinds of +desires, not very acutely perhaps, but yet usefully: saying that they +are “partly natural and necessary; partly natural, but not necessary; +partly neither. That those which are necessary may be supplied almost +for nothing; for that the things which nature requires are easily +obtained.” As to the second kind of desires, his opinion is that any one +may easily either enjoy or go without them. And with regard to the +third, since they are utterly frivolous, being neither allied to +necessity nor nature, he thinks that they should be entirely rooted out. +On this topic a great many arguments are adduced by the Epicureans; and +those pleasures which they do not despise in a body, they disparage one +by one, and seem rather <a id="page-198"></a><span class="pgnum">198</span>for lessening the number of them; for as to +wanton pleasures, on which subject they say a great deal, these, say +they, are easy, common, and within any one’s reach; and they think that +if nature requires them, they are not to be estimated by birth, +condition, or rank, but by shape, age, and person: and that it is by no +means difficult to refrain from them, should health, duty, or reputation +require it; but that pleasures of this kind may be desirable, where they +are attended with no inconvenience, but can never be of any use. And the +assertions which Epicurus makes with respect to the whole of pleasure +are such as show his opinion to be that pleasure is always desirable, +and to be pursued merely because it is pleasure; and for the same reason +pain is to be avoided, because it is pain. So that a wise man will +always adopt such a system of counterbalancing as to do himself the +justice to avoid pleasure, should pain ensue from it in too great a +proportion; and will submit to pain, provided the effects of it are to +produce a greater pleasure: so that all pleasurable things, though the +corporeal senses are the judges of them, are still to be referred to the +mind, on which account the body rejoices while it perceives a present +pleasure; but that the mind not only perceives the present as well as +the body, but foresees it while it is coming, and even when it is past +will not let it quite slip away. So that a wise man enjoys a continual +series of pleasures, uniting the expectation of future pleasure to the +recollection of what he has already tasted. The like notions are applied +by them to high living; and the magnificence and expensiveness of +entertainments are deprecated, because nature is satisfied at a small +expense.</p> + +<p>XXXIV. For who does not see this, that an appetite is the best sauce? +When Darius, in his flight from the enemy, had drunk some water which +was muddy and tainted with dead bodies, he declared that he had never +drunk anything more pleasant; the fact was, that he had never drunk +before when he was thirsty. Nor had Ptolemy ever eaten when he was +hungry; for as he was travelling over Egypt, his company not keeping up +with him, he had some coarse bread presented him in a cottage, upon +which he said, “Nothing ever seemed to him pleasanter <a id="page-199"></a><span class="pgnum">199</span>than that bread.” +They relate, too, of Socrates, that, once when he was walking very fast +till the evening, on his being asked why he did so, his reply was that +he was purchasing an appetite by walking, that he might sup the better. +And do we not see what the Lacedæmonians provide in their Phiditia? +where the tyrant Dionysius supped, but told them he did not at all like +that black broth, which was their principal dish; on which he who +dressed it said, “It was no wonder, for it wanted seasoning.” Dionysius +asked what that seasoning was; to which it was replied, “Fatigue in +hunting, sweating, a race on the banks of Eurotas, hunger and thirst,” +for these are the seasonings to the Lacedæmonian banquets. And this may +not only be conceived from the custom of men, but from the beasts, who +are satisfied with anything that is thrown before them, provided it is +not unnatural, and they seek no farther. Some entire cities, taught by +custom, delight in parsimony, as I said but just now of the +Lacedæmonians. Xenophon has given an account of the Persian diet, who +never, as he saith, use anything but cresses with their bread; not but +that, should nature require anything more agreeable, many things might +be easily supplied by the ground, and plants in great abundance, and of +incomparable sweetness. Add to this strength and health, as the +consequence of this abstemious way of living. Now, compare with this +those who sweat and belch, being crammed with eating, like fatted oxen; +then will you perceive that they who pursue pleasure most attain it +least; and that the pleasure of eating lies not in satiety, but +appetite.</p> + +<p>XXXV. They report of Timotheus, a famous man at Athens, and the head of +the city, that having supped with Plato, and being extremely delighted +with his entertainment, on seeing him the next day, he said, “Your +suppers are not only agreeable while I partake of them, but the next day +also.” Besides, the understanding is impaired when we are full with +overeating and drinking. There is an excellent epistle of Plato to +Dion’s relations, in which there occurs as nearly as possible these +words: “When I came there, that happy life so much talked of, devoted to +Italian and Syracusan entertainments, was noways agreeable to me; to be +crammed twice a day, and never to <a id="page-200"></a><span class="pgnum">200</span>have the night to yourself, and the +other things which are the accompaniments of this kind of life, by which +a man will never be made the wiser, but will be rendered much less +temperate; for it must be an extraordinary disposition that can be +temperate in such circumstances.” How, then, can a life be pleasant +without prudence and temperance? Hence you discover the mistake of +Sardanapalus, the wealthiest king of the Assyrians, who ordered it to be +engraved on his tomb,</p> + +<div class="poem"> +<p>I still have what in food I did exhaust;</p> +<p>But what I left, though excellent, is lost.</p> +</div> + +<p>“What less than this,” says Aristotle, “could be inscribed on the tomb, +not of a king, but an ox?” He said that he possessed those things when +dead, which, in his lifetime, he could have no longer than while he was +enjoying them. Why, then, are riches desired? And wherein doth poverty +prevent us from being happy? In the want, I imagine, of statues, +pictures, and diversions. But if any one is delighted with these things, +have not the poor people the enjoyment of them more than they who are +the owners of them in the greatest abundance? For we have great numbers +of them displayed publicly in our city. And whatever store of them +private people have, they cannot have a great number, and they but +seldom see them, only when they go to their country seats; and some of +them must be stung to the heart when they consider how they came by +them. The day would fail me, should I be inclined to defend the cause of +poverty. The thing is manifest; and nature daily informs us how few +things there are, and how trifling they are, of which she really stands +in need.</p> + +<p>XXXVI. Let us inquire, then, if obscurity, the want of power, or even +the being unpopular, can prevent a wise man from being happy. Observe if +popular favor, and this glory which they are so fond of, be not attended +with more uneasiness than pleasure. Our friend Demosthenes was certainly +very weak in declaring himself pleased with the whisper of a woman who +was carrying water, as is the custom in Greece, and who whispered to +another, “That is he—that is Demosthenes.” What could be weaker than +<a id="page-201"></a><span class="pgnum">201</span>this? and yet what an orator he was! But although he had learned to +speak to others, he had conversed but little with himself. We may +perceive, therefore, that popular glory is not desirable of itself; nor +is obscurity to be dreaded. “I came to Athens,” saith Democritus, “and +there was no one there that knew me:” this was a moderate and grave man +who could glory in his obscurity. Shall musicians compose their tunes to +their own tastes? and shall a philosopher, master of a much better art, +seek to ascertain, not what is most true, but what will please the +people? Can anything be more absurd than to despise the vulgar as mere +unpolished mechanics, taken singly, and to think them of consequence +when collected into a body? These wise men would contemn our ambitious +pursuits and our vanities, and would reject all the honors which the +people could voluntarily offer to them; but we know not how to despise +them till we begin to repent of having accepted them. There is an +anecdote related by Heraclitus, the natural philosopher, of Hermodorus, +the chief of the Ephesians, that he said “that all the Ephesians ought +to be punished with death for saying, when they had expelled Hermodorus +out of their city, that they would have no one among them better than +another; but that if there were any such, he might go elsewhere to some +other people.” Is not this the case with the people everywhere? Do they +not hate every virtue that distinguishes itself? What! was not Aristides +(I had rather instance in the Greeks than ourselves) banished his +country for being eminently just? What troubles, then, are they free +from who have no connection whatever with the people? What is more +agreeable than a learned retirement? I speak of that learning which +makes us acquainted with the boundless extent of nature and the +universe, and which even while we remain in this world discovers to us +both heaven, earth, and sea.</p> + +<p>XXXVII. If, then, honor and riches have no value, what is there else to +be afraid of? Banishment, I suppose; which is looked on as the greatest +evil. Now, if the evil of banishment proceeds not from ourselves, but +from the froward disposition of the people, I have just now declared how +contemptible it is. But if to leave one’s country be miserable, <a id="page-202"></a><span class="pgnum">202</span>the +provinces are full of miserable men, very few of the settlers in which +ever return to their country again. But exiles are deprived of their +property! What, then! has there not been enough said on bearing poverty? +But with regard to banishment, if we examine the nature of things, not +the ignominy of the name, how little does it differ from constant +travelling! in which some of the most famous philosophers have spent +their whole life, as Xenocrates, Crantor, Arcesilas, Lacydes, Aristotle, +Theophrastus, Zeno, Cleanthes, Chrysippus, Antipater, Carneades, +Panætius, Clitomachus, Philo, Antiochus, Posidonius, and innumerable +others, who from their first setting-out never returned home again. +Now, what ignominy can a wise man be affected with (for it is of such a +one that I am speaking) who can be guilty of nothing which deserves it? +for there is no occasion to comfort one who is banished for his deserts. +Lastly, they can easily reconcile themselves to every accident who +measure all their objects and pursuits in life by the standard of +pleasure; so that in whatever place that is supplied, there they may +live happily. Thus what Teucer said may be applied to every case:</p> + +<div class="poem"> +<p>“Wherever I am happy is my country.”</p> +</div> + +<p>Socrates, indeed, when he was asked where he belonged to, replied, “The +world;” for he looked upon himself as a citizen and inhabitant of the +whole world. How was it with T. Altibutius? Did he not follow his +philosophical studies with the greatest satisfaction at Athens, although +he was banished? which, however, would not have happened to him if he +had obeyed the laws of Epicurus and lived peaceably in the republic. In +what was Epicurus happier, living in his own country, than Metrodorus, +who lived at Athens? Or did Plato’s happiness exceed that of Xenocrates, +or Polemo, or Arcesilas? Or is that city to be valued much that banishes +all her good and wise men? Demaratus, the father of our King Tarquin, +not being able to bear the tyrant Cypselus, fled from Corinth to +Tarquinii, settled there, and had children. Was it, then, an unwise act +in him to prefer the liberty of banishment to slavery at home?</p> + +<p>XXXVIII. Besides the emotions of the mind, all griefs <a id="page-203"></a><span class="pgnum">203</span>and anxieties are +assuaged by forgetting them, and turning our thoughts to pleasure. +Therefore, it was not without reason that Epicurus presumed to say that +a wise man abounds with good things, because he may always have his +pleasures; from whence it follows, as he thinks, that that point is +gained which is the subject of our present inquiry, that a wise man is +always happy. What! though he should be deprived of the senses of seeing +and hearing? Yes; for he holds those things very cheap. For, in the +first place, what are the pleasures of which we are deprived by that +dreadful thing, blindness? For though they allow other pleasures to be +confined to the senses, yet the things which are perceived by the sight +do not depend wholly on the pleasure the eyes receive; as is the case +when we taste, smell, touch, or hear; for, in respect of all these +senses, the organs themselves are the seat of pleasure; but it is not so +with the eyes. For it is the mind which is entertained by what we see; +but the mind may be entertained in many ways, even though we could not +see at all. I am speaking of a learned and a wise man, with whom to +think is to live. But thinking in the case of a wise man does not +altogether require the use of his eyes in his investigations; for if +night does not strip him of his happiness, why should blindness, which +resembles night, have that effect? For the reply of Antipater the +Cyrenaic to some women who bewailed his being blind, though it is a +little too obscene, is not without its significance. “What do you mean?” +saith he; “do you think the night can furnish no pleasure?” And we find +by his magistracies and his actions that old Appius,<a id="FNA-70"></a><a href="#FN-70"><sup>70</sup></a> too, who was +blind for many years, was not prevented from doing whatever was required +of him with respect either to the republic or his own affairs. It is +said that C. Drusus’s house was crowded with clients. When they whose +business it was could not see how to conduct themselves, they applied to +a blind guide.</p> + +<p>XXXIX. When I was a boy, Cn. Aufidius, a blind man, <a id="page-204"></a><span class="pgnum">204</span>who had served the +office of prætor, not only gave his opinion in the Senate, and was ready +to assist his friends, but wrote a Greek history, and had a considerable +acquaintance with literature. Diodorus the Stoic was blind, and lived +many years at my house. He, indeed, which is scarcely credible, besides +applying himself more than usual to philosophy, and playing on the +flute, agreeably to the custom of the Pythagoreans, and having books +read to him night and day, in all which he did not want eyes, contrived +to teach geometry, which, one would think, could hardly be done without +the assistance of eyes, telling his scholars how and where to draw every +line. They relate of Asclepiades, a native of Eretria, and no obscure +philosopher, when some one asked him what inconvenience he suffered from +his blindness, that his reply was, “He was at the expense of another +servant.” So that, as the most extreme poverty may be borne if you +please, as is daily the case with some in Greece, so blindness may +easily be borne, provided you have the support of good health in other +respects. Democritus was so blind he could not distinguish white from +black; but he knew the difference between good and evil, just and +unjust, honorable and base, the useful and useless, great and small. +Thus one may live happily without distinguishing colors; but without +acquainting yourself with things, you cannot; and this man was of +opinion that the intense application of the mind was taken off by the +objects that presented themselves to the eye; and while others often +could not see what was before their feet, he travelled through all +infinity. It is reported also that Homer<a id="FNA-71"></a><a href="#FN-71"><sup>71</sup></a> was blind, but we observe +<a id="page-205"></a><span class="pgnum">205</span>his painting as well as his poetry. What country, what coast, what part +of Greece, what military attacks, what dispositions of battle, what +array, what ship, what motions of men and animals, can be mentioned +which he has not described in such a manner as to enable us to see what +he could not see himself? What, then! can we imagine that Homer, or any +other learned man, has ever been in want of pleasure and entertainment +for his mind? Were it not so, would Anaxagoras, or this very Democritus, +have left their estates and patrimonies, and given themselves up to the +pursuit of acquiring this divine pleasure? It is thus that the poets who +have represented Tiresias the Augur as a wise man and blind never +exhibit him as bewailing his blindness. And Homer, too, after he had +described Polyphemus as a monster and a wild man, represents him talking +with his ram, and speaking of his good fortune, inasmuch as he could go +wherever he pleased and touch what he would. And so far he was right, +for that Cyclops was a being of not much more understanding than his +ram.</p> + +<p>XL. Now, as to the evil of being deaf. M. Crassus was a little thick of +hearing; but it was more uneasiness to him that he heard himself ill +spoken of, though, in my opinion, he did not deserve it. Our Epicureans +cannot understand Greek, nor the Greeks Latin: now, they are deaf +reciprocally as to each other’s language, and we are all truly deaf with +regard to those innumerable languages which we do not understand. They +do not hear the voice of the harper; but, then, they do not hear the +grating of a saw when it is setting, or the grunting of a hog when his +<a id="page-206"></a><span class="pgnum">206</span>throat is being cut, nor the roaring of the sea when they are desirous +of rest. And if they should chance to be fond of singing, they ought, in +the first place, to consider that many wise men lived happily before +music was discovered; besides, they may have more pleasure in reading +verses than in hearing them sung. Then, as I before referred the blind +to the pleasures of hearing, so I may the deaf to the pleasures of +sight: moreover, whoever can converse with himself doth not need the +conversation of another. But suppose all these misfortunes to meet in +one person: suppose him blind and deaf—let him be afflicted with the +sharpest pains of body, which, in the first place, generally of +themselves make an end of him; still, should they continue so long, and +the pain be so exquisite, that we should be unable to assign any reason +for our being so afflicted—still, why, good Gods! should we be under +any difficulty? For there is a retreat at hand: death is that retreat—a +shelter where we shall forever be insensible. Theodorus said to +Lysimachus, who threatened him with death, “It is a great matter, +indeed, for you to have acquired the power of a Spanish fly!” When +Perses entreated Paulus not to lead him in triumph, “That is a matter +which you have in your own power,” said Paulus. I said many things about +death in our first day’s disputation, when death was the subject; and +not a little the next day, when I treated of pain; which things if you +recollect, there can be no danger of your looking upon death as +undesirable, or, at least, it will not be dreadful.</p> + +<p>That custom which is common among the Grecians at their banquets should, +in my opinion, be observed in life: Drink, say they, or leave the +company; and rightly enough; for a guest should either enjoy the +pleasure of drinking with others, or else not stay till he meets with +affronts from those that are in liquor. Thus, those injuries of fortune +which you cannot bear you should flee from.</p> + +<p>XLI. This is the very same which is said by Epicurus and Hieronymus. +Now, if those philosophers, whose opinion it is that virtue has no power +of itself, and who say that the conduct which we denominate honorable +and laudable is really nothing, and is only an empty circumstance <a id="page-207"></a><span class="pgnum">207</span>set +off with an unmeaning sound, can nevertheless maintain that a wise man +is always happy, what, think you, may be done by the Socratic and +Platonic philosophers? Some of these allow such superiority to the goods +of the mind as quite to eclipse what concerns the body and all external +circumstances. But others do not admit these to be goods; they make +everything depend on the mind: whose disputes Carneades used, as a sort +of honorary arbitrator, to determine. For, as what seemed goods to the +Peripatetics were allowed to be advantages by the Stoics, and as the +Peripatetics allowed no more to riches, good health; and other things of +that sort than the Stoics, when these things were considered according +to their reality, and not by mere names, his opinion was that there was +no ground for disagreeing. Therefore, let the philosophers of other +schools see how they can establish this point also. It is very agreeable +to me that they make some professions worthy of being uttered by the +mouth of a philosopher with regard to a wise man’s having always the +means of living happily.</p> + +<p>XLII. But as we are to depart in the morning, let us remember these five +days’ discussions; though, indeed, I think I shall commit them to +writing: for how can I better employ the leisure which I have, of +whatever kind it is, and whatever it be owing to? And I will send these +five books also to my friend Brutus, by whom I was not only incited to +write on philosophy, but, I may say, provoked. And by so doing it is not +easy to say what service I may be of to others. At all events, in my own +various and acute afflictions, which surround me on all sides, I cannot +find any better comfort for myself.</p> + + + + +<hr class="front"/> + +<h2><a id="page-209"></a><span class="pgnum">209</span>THE NATURE OF THE GODS.</h2> + +<hr/> + + +<h3>BOOK I.</h3> + + +<p>I. <span class="first">There</span> are many things in philosophy, my dear Brutus, which are not as +yet fully explained to us, and particularly (as you very well know) that +most obscure and difficult question concerning the Nature of the Gods, +so extremely necessary both towards a knowledge of the human mind and +the practice of true religion: concerning which the opinions of men are +so various, and so different from each other, as to lead strongly to the +inference that ignorance<a id="FNA-72"></a><a href="#FN-72"><sup>72</sup></a> is the cause, or origin, of philosophy, and +that the Academic philosophers have been prudent in refusing their +assent to things uncertain: for what is more unbecoming to a wise man +than to judge rashly? or what rashness is so unworthy of the gravity and +stability of a philosopher as either to maintain false opinions, or, +without the least hesitation, to support and defend what he has not +thoroughly examined and does not clearly comprehend?</p> + +<p>In the question now before us, the greater part of mankind have united +to acknowledge that which is most probable, and which we are all by +nature led to suppose, namely, that there are Gods. Protagoras<a id="FNA-73"></a><a href="#FN-73"><sup>73</sup></a> +doubted whether there were any. Diagoras the Melian and Theodorus of +Cyrene entirely believed there were no such beings. But they who have +affirmed that there are Gods, have expressed such a variety of +sentiments on the subject, and the disagreement between them is so +great, that it would be <a id="page-210"></a><span class="pgnum">210</span>tiresome to enumerate their opinions; for they +give us many statements respecting the forms of the Gods, and their +places of abode, and the employment of their lives. And these are +matters on which the philosophers differ with the most exceeding +earnestness. But the most considerable part of the dispute is, whether +they are wholly inactive, totally unemployed, and free from all care and +administration of affairs; or, on the contrary, whether all things were +made and constituted by them from the beginning; and whether they will +continue to be actuated and governed by them to eternity. This is one of +the greatest points in debate; and unless this is decided, mankind must +necessarily remain in the greatest of errors, and ignorant of what is +most important to be known.</p> + +<p>II. For there are some philosophers, both ancient and modern, who have +conceived that the Gods take not the least cognizance of human affairs. +But if their doctrine be true, of what avail is piety, sanctity, or +religion? for these are feelings and marks of devotion which are offered +to the Gods by men with uprightness and holiness, on the ground that men +are the objects of the attention of the Gods, and that many benefits are +conferred by the immortal Gods on the human race. But if the Gods have +neither the power nor the inclination to help us; if they take no care +of us, and pay no regard to our actions; and if there is no single +advantage which can possibly accrue to the life of man; then what reason +can we have to pay any adoration, or any honors, or to prefer any +prayers to them? Piety, like the other virtues, cannot have any +connection with vain show or dissimulation; and without piety, neither +sanctity nor religion can be supported; the total subversion of which +must be attended with great confusion and disturbance in life.</p> + +<p>I do not even know, if we cast off piety towards the Gods, but that +faith, and all the associations of human life, and that most excellent +of all virtues, justice, may perish with it.</p> + +<p>There are other philosophers, and those, too, very great and illustrious +men, who conceive the whole world to be directed and governed by the +will and wisdom of the Gods; nor do they stop here, but conceive +likewise that the Deities <a id="page-211"></a><span class="pgnum">211</span>consult and provide for the preservation of +mankind. For they think that the fruits, and the produce of the earth, +and the seasons, and the variety of weather, and the change of climates, +by which all the productions of the earth are brought to maturity, are +designed by the immortal Gods for the use of man. They instance many +other things, which shall be related in these books; and which would +almost induce us to believe that the immortal Gods had made them all +expressly and solely for the benefit and advantage of men. Against these +opinions Carneades has advanced so much that what he has said should +excite a desire in men who are not naturally slothful to search after +truth; for there is no subject on which the learned as well as the +unlearned differ so strenuously as in this; and since their opinions are +so various, and so repugnant one to another, it is possible that none of +them may be, and absolutely impossible that more than one should be, +right.</p> + +<p>III. Now, in a cause like this, I may be able to pacify well-meaning +opposers, and to confute invidious censurers, so as to induce the latter +to repent of their unreasonable contradiction, and the former to be glad +to learn; for they who admonish one in a friendly spirit should be +instructed, they who attack one like enemies should be repelled. But I +observe that the several books which I have lately published<a id="FNA-74"></a><a href="#FN-74"><sup>74</sup></a> have +occasioned much noise and various discourse about them; some people +wondering what the reason has been why I have applied myself so suddenly +to the study of philosophy, and others desirous of knowing what my +opinion is on such subjects. I likewise perceive that many people wonder +at my following that philosophy<a id="FNA-75"></a><a href="#FN-75"><sup>75</sup></a> chiefly which seems to take away the +light, and to bury and envelop things in a kind of artificial night, and +that I should so unexpectedly have taken up the defence of a school that +has been long neglected and forsaken. But it is a mistake to suppose +that this application to philosophical studies has been sudden on my +part. I have applied <a id="page-212"></a><span class="pgnum">212</span>myself to them from my youth, at no small expense +of time and trouble; and I have been in the habit of philosophizing a +great deal when I least seemed to think about it; for the truth of which +I appeal to my orations, which are filled with quotations from +philosophers, and to my intimacy with those very learned men who +frequented my house and conversed daily with me, particularly Diodorus, +Philo, Antiochus, and Posidonius,<a id="FNA-76"></a><a href="#FN-76"><sup>76</sup></a> under whom I was bred; and if all +the precepts of philosophy are to have reference to the conduct of life, +I am inclined to think that I have advanced, both in public and private +affairs, only such principles as may be supported by reason and +authority.</p> + +<p>IV. But if any one should ask what has induced me, in the decline of +life, to write on these subjects, nothing is more easily answered; for +when I found myself entirely disengaged from business, and the +commonwealth reduced to the necessity of being governed by the direction +and care of one man,<a id="FNA-77"></a><a href="#FN-77"><sup>77</sup></a> I thought it becoming, for the sake of the +public, to instruct my countrymen in philosophy, and that it would be of +importance, and much to the honor and commendation of our city, to have +such great and excellent subjects introduced in the Latin tongue. I the +less repent of my undertaking, since I plainly see that I have excited +in many a desire, not only of learning, but of writing; for we have had +several Romans well grounded in the learning of the Greeks who were +unable to communicate to their countrymen what they had learned, because +they looked upon it as impossible to express that in Latin which they +had received from the Greeks. In this point I think I have succeeded so +well that what I have done is not, even in copiousness of expression, +inferior to that language.</p> + +<p>Another inducement to it was a melancholy disposition of mind, and the +great and heavy oppression of fortune that was upon me; from which, if I +could have found any surer remedy, I would not have sought relief in +this pursuit. But I could procure ease by no means better than by not +only applying myself to books, but by devoting myself <a id="page-213"></a><span class="pgnum">213</span>to the +examination of the whole body of philosophy. And every part and branch +of this is readily discovered when every question is propounded in +writing; for there is such an admirable continuation and series of +things that each seems connected with the other, and all appear linked +together and united.</p> + +<p>V. Now, those men who desire to know my own private opinion on every +particular subject have more curiosity than is necessary. For the force +of reason in disputation is to be sought after rather than authority, +since the authority of the teacher is often a disadvantage to those who +are willing to learn; as they refuse to use their own judgment, and rely +implicitly on him whom they make choice of for a preceptor. Nor could I +ever approve this custom of the Pythagoreans, who, when they affirmed +anything in disputation, and were asked why it was so, used to give this +answer: “He himself has said it;” and this “he himself,” it seems, was +Pythagoras. Such was the force of prejudice and opinion that his +authority was to prevail even without argument or reason.</p> + +<p>They who wonder at my being a follower of this sect in particular may +find a satisfactory answer in my four books of Academical Questions. But +I deny that I have undertaken the protection of what is neglected and +forsaken; for the opinions of men do not die with them, though they may +perhaps want the author’s explanation. This manner of philosophizing, of +disputing all things and assuming nothing certainly, was begun by +Socrates, revived by Arcesilaus, confirmed by Carneades, and has +descended, with all its power, even to the present age; but I am +informed that it is now almost exploded even in Greece. However, I do +not impute that to any fault in the institution of the Academy, but to +the negligence of mankind. If it is difficult to know all the doctrines +of any one sect, how much more is it to know those of every sect! which, +however, must necessarily be known to those who resolve, for the sake of +discovering truth, to dispute for or against all philosophers without +partiality.</p> + +<p>I do not profess myself to be master of this difficult and noble +faculty; but I do assert that I have endeavored to make myself so; and +it is impossible that they who choose <a id="page-214"></a><span class="pgnum">214</span>this manner of philosophizing +should not meet at least with something worthy their pursuit. I have +spoken more fully on this head in another place. But as some are too +slow of apprehension, and some too careless, men stand in perpetual need +of caution. For we are not people who believe that there is nothing +whatever which is true; but we say that some falsehoods are so blended +with all truths, and have so great a resemblance to them, that there is +no certain rule for judging of or assenting to propositions; from which +this maxim also follows, that many things are probable, which, though +they are not evident to the senses, have still so persuasive and +beautiful an aspect that a wise man chooses to direct his conduct by +them.</p> + +<p>VI. Now, to free myself from the reproach of partiality, I propose to +lay before you the opinions of various philosophers concerning the +nature of the Gods, by which means all men may judge which of them are +consistent with truth; and if all agree together, or if any one shall be +found to have discovered what may be absolutely called truth, I will +then give up the Academy as vain and arrogant. So I may cry out, in the +words of Statius, in the Synephebi,</p> + +<blockquote> +<p>Ye Gods, I call upon, require, pray, beseech, entreat, and implore +the attention of my countrymen all, both young and old;</p> +</blockquote> + +<p class="cont">yet not on so trifling an occasion as when the person in the play +complains that,</p> + +<blockquote> +<p>In this city we have discovered a most flagrant iniquity: here is a +professed courtesan, who refuses money from her lover;</p> +</blockquote> + +<p class="cont">but that they may attend, know, and consider what sentiments they ought +to preserve concerning religion, piety, sanctity, ceremonies, faith, +oaths, temples, shrines, and solemn sacrifices; what they ought to think +of the auspices over which I preside;<a id="FNA-78"></a><a href="#FN-78"><sup>78</sup></a> for all these have relation to +the present question. The manifest disagreement among the most learned +on this subject creates doubts in those who imagine they have some +certain knowledge of the subject.</p> + +<p>Which fact I have often taken notice of elsewhere, and <a id="page-215"></a><span class="pgnum">215</span>I did so more +especially at the discussion that was held at my friend C. Cotta’s +concerning the immortal Gods, and which was carried on with the greatest +care, accuracy, and precision; for coming to him at the time of the +Latin holidays,<a id="FNA-79"></a><a href="#FN-79"><sup>79</sup></a> according to his own invitation and message from +him, I found him sitting in his study,<a id="FNA-80"></a><a href="#FN-80"><sup>80</sup></a> and in a discourse with C. +Velleius, the senator, who was then reputed by the Epicureans the ablest +of our countrymen. Q. Lucilius Balbus was likewise there, a great +proficient in the doctrine of the Stoics, and esteemed equal to the most +eminent of the Greeks in that part of knowledge. As soon as Cotta saw +me, You are come, says he, very seasonably; for I am having a dispute +with Velleius on an important subject, which, considering the nature of +your studies, is not improper for you to join in.</p> + +<p>VII. Indeed, says I, I think I am come very seasonably, as you say; for +here are three chiefs of three principal sects met together. If M. +Piso<a id="FNA-81"></a><a href="#FN-81"><sup>81</sup></a> was present, no sect of philosophy that is in any esteem would +want an advocate. If Antiochus’s book, replies Cotta, which he lately +sent to Balbus, says true, you have no occasion to wish for your friend +Piso; for Antiochus is of the opinion that the Stoics do not differ from +the Peripatetics in fact, though they do in words; and I should be glad +to know what you think of that book, Balbus. I? says he. I wonder that +Antiochus, a man of the clearest apprehension, should not see what a +vast difference there is between the Stoics, who distinguish the honest +and the profitable, not only in name, but absolutely in kind, and the +Peripatetics, who blend the honest with the profitable in such a manner +that they differ only in degrees and proportion, and not in kind. This +is not a little difference in words, but a great one in things; <a id="page-216"></a><span class="pgnum">216</span>but of +this hereafter. Now, if you think fit, let us return to what we began +with.</p> + +<p>With all my heart, says Cotta. But that this visitor (looking at me), +who is just come in, may not be ignorant of what we are upon, I will +inform him that we were discoursing on the nature of the Gods; +concerning which, as it is a subject that always appeared very obscure +to me, I prevailed on Velleius to give us the sentiments of Epicurus. +Therefore, continues he, if it is not troublesome, Velleius, repeat what +you have already stated to us. I will, says he, though this new-comer +will be no advocate for me, but for you; for you have both, adds he, +with a smile, learned from the same Philo to be certain of nothing.<a id="FNA-82"></a><a href="#FN-82"><sup>82</sup></a> +What we have learned from him, replied I, Cotta will discover; but I +would not have you think I am come as an assistant to him, but as an +auditor, with an impartial and unbiassed mind, and not bound by any +obligation to defend any particular principle, whether I like or dislike +it.</p> + +<p>VIII. After this, Velleius, with the confidence peculiar to his sect, +dreading nothing so much as to seem to doubt of anything, began as if he +had just then descended from the council of the Gods, and Epicurus’s +intervals of worlds. Do not attend, says he, to these idle and imaginary +tales; nor to the operator and builder of the World, the God of Plato’s +Timæus; nor to the old prophetic dame, the <span class="greek">Πρόνοια</span> of the Stoics, which +the Latins call Providence; nor to that round, that burning, revolving +deity, the World, endowed with sense and understanding; the prodigies +and wonders, not of inquisitive philosophers, but of dreamers!</p> + +<p>For with what eyes of the mind was your Plato able to see that workhouse +of such stupendous toil, in which he makes the world to be modelled and +built by God? What materials, what tools, what bars, what machines, what +servants, were employed in so vast a work? How could the air, fire, +water, and earth pay obedience and submit to the will of the architect? +>From whence arose those five forms,<a id="FNA-83"></a><a href="#FN-83"><sup>83</sup></a> of which the rest were composed, +so aptly contributing to frame the mind and produce the senses? It <a id="page-217"></a><span class="pgnum">217</span>is +tedious to go through all, as they are of such a sort that they look +more like things to be desired than to be discovered.</p> + +<p>But, what is more remarkable, he gives us a world which has been not +only created, but, if I may so say, in a manner formed with hands, and +yet he says it is eternal. Do you conceive him to have the least skill +in natural philosophy who is capable of thinking anything to be +everlasting that had a beginning? For what can possibly ever have been +put together which cannot be dissolved again? Or what is there that had +a beginning which will not have an end? If your Providence, Lucilius, is +the same as Plato’s God, I ask you, as before, who were the assistants, +what were the engines, what was the plan and preparation of the whole +work? If it is not the same, then why did she make the world mortal, and +not everlasting, like Plato’s God?</p> + +<p>IX. But I would demand of you both, why these world-builders started up +so suddenly, and lay dormant for so many ages? For we are not to +conclude that, if there was no world, there were therefore no ages. I do +not now speak of such ages as are finished by a certain number of days +and nights in annual courses; for I acknowledge that those could not be +without the revolution of the world; but there was a certain eternity +from infinite time, not measured by any circumscription of seasons; but +how that was in space we cannot understand, because we cannot possibly +have even the slightest idea of time before time was. I desire, +therefore, to know, Balbus, why this Providence of yours was idle for +such an immense space of time? Did she avoid labor? But that could have +no effect on the Deity; nor could there be any labor, since all nature, +air, fire, earth, and water would obey the divine essence. What was it +that incited the Deity to act the part of an ædile, to illuminate and +decorate the world? If it was in order that God might be the better +accommodated in his habitation, then he must have been dwelling an +infinite length of time before in darkness as in a dungeon. But do we +imagine that he was afterward delighted with that variety with which we +see the heaven and earth adorned? What entertainment could that be to +the Deity? If it was any, he would not have been without it so long.</p> + +<p><a id="page-218"></a><span class="pgnum">218</span>Or were these things made, as you almost assert, by God for the sake of +men? Was it for the wise? If so, then this great design was adopted for +the sake of a very small number. Or for the sake of fools? First of all, +there was no reason why God should consult the advantage of the wicked; +and, further, what could be his object in doing so, since all fools are, +without doubt, the most miserable of men, chiefly because they are +fools? For what can we pronounce more deplorable than folly? Besides, +there are many inconveniences in life which the wise can learn to think +lightly of by dwelling rather on the advantages which they receive; but +which fools are unable to avoid when they are coming, or to bear when +they are come.</p> + +<p>X. They who affirm the world to be an animated and intelligent being +have by no means discovered the nature of the mind, nor are able to +conceive in what form that essence can exist; but of that I shall speak +more hereafter. At present I must express my surprise at the weakness of +those who endeavor to make it out to be not only animated and immortal, +but likewise happy, and round, because Plato says that is the most +beautiful form; whereas I think a cylinder, a square, a cone, or a +pyramid more beautiful. But what life do they attribute to that round +Deity? Truly it is a being whirled about with a celerity to which +nothing can be even conceived by the imagination as equal; nor can I +imagine how a settled mind and happy life can consist in such motion, +the least degree of which would be troublesome to us. Why, therefore, +should it not be considered troublesome also to the Deity? For the earth +itself, as it is part of the world, is part also of the Deity. We see +vast tracts of land barren and uninhabitable; some, because they are +scorched by the too near approach of the sun; others, because they are +bound up with frost and snow, through the great distance which the sun +is from them. Therefore, if the world is a Deity, as these are parts of +the world, some of the Deity’s limbs must be said to be scorched, and +some frozen.</p> + +<p>These are your doctrines, Lucilius; but what those of others are I will +endeavor to ascertain by tracing them back from the earliest of ancient +philosophers. Thales <a id="page-219"></a><span class="pgnum">219</span>the Milesian, who first inquired after such +subjects, asserted water to be the origin of things, and that God was +that mind which formed all things from water. If the Gods can exist +without corporeal sense, and if there can be a mind without a body, why +did he annex a mind to water?</p> + +<p>It was Anaximander’s opinion that the Gods were born; that after a great +length of time they died; and that they are innumerable worlds. But what +conception can we possibly have of a Deity who is not eternal?</p> + +<p>Anaximenes, after him, taught that the air is God, and that he was +generated, and that he is immense, infinite, and always in motion; as if +air, which has no form, could possibly be God; for the Deity must +necessarily be not only of some form or other, but of the most beautiful +form. Besides, is not everything that had a beginning subject to +mortality?</p> + +<p>XI. Anaxagoras, who received his learning from Anaximenes, was the first +who affirmed the system and disposition of all things to be contrived +and perfected by the power and reason of an infinite mind; in which +infinity he did not perceive that there could be no conjunction of sense +and motion, nor any sense in the least degree, where nature herself +could feel no impulse. If he would have this mind to be a sort of +animal, then there must be some more internal principle from whence that +animal should receive its appellation. But what can be more internal +than the mind? Let it, therefore, be clothed with an external body. But +this is not agreeable to his doctrine; but we are utterly unable to +conceive how a pure simple mind can exist without any substance annexed +to it.</p> + +<p>Alcmæon of Crotona, in attributing a divinity to the sun, the moon, and +the rest of the stars, and also to the mind, did not perceive that he +was ascribing immortality to mortal beings.</p> + +<p>Pythagoras, who supposed the Deity to be one soul, mixing with and +pervading all nature, from which our souls are taken, did not consider +that the Deity himself must, in consequence of this doctrine, be maimed +and torn with the rending every human soul from it; nor that, when the +human mind is afflicted (as is the case in many instances), that part of +the Deity must likewise be afflicted, <a id="page-220"></a><span class="pgnum">220</span>which cannot be. If the human +mind were a Deity, how could it be ignorant of any thing? Besides, how +could that Deity, if it is nothing but soul, be mixed with, or infused +into, the world?</p> + +<p>Then Xenophanes, who said that everything in the world which had any +existence, with the addition of intellect, was God, is as liable to +exception as the rest, especially in relation to the infinity of it, in +which there can be nothing sentient, nothing composite.</p> + +<p>Parmenides formed a conceit to himself of something circular like a +crown. (He names it Stephane.) It is an orb of constant light and heat +around the heavens; this he calls God; in which there is no room to +imagine any divine form or sense. And he uttered many other absurdities +on the same subject; for he ascribed a divinity to war, to discord, to +lust, and other passions of the same kind, which are destroyed by +disease, or sleep, or oblivion, or age. The same honor he gives to the +stars; but I shall forbear making any objections to his system here, +having already done it in another place.</p> + +<p>XII. Empedocles, who erred in many things, is most grossly mistaken in +his notion of the Gods. He lays down four natures<a id="FNA-84"></a><a href="#FN-84"><sup>84</sup></a> as divine, from +which he thinks that all things were made. Yet it is evident that they +have a beginning, that they decay, and that they are void of all sense.</p> + +<p>Protagoras did not seem to have any idea of the real nature of the Gods; +for he acknowledged that he was altogether ignorant whether there are or +are not any, or what they are.</p> + +<p>What shall I say of Democritus, who classes our images of objects, and +their orbs, in the number of the Gods; as he does that principle through +which those images appear and have their influence? He deifies likewise +our knowledge and understanding. Is he not involved in a very great +error? And because nothing continues always in the same state, he denies +that anything is everlasting, does he not thereby entirely destroy the +Deity, and make it impossible to form any opinion of him?</p> + +<p><a id="page-221"></a><span class="pgnum">221</span>Diogenes of Apollonia looks upon the air to be a Deity. But what sense +can the air have? or what divine form can be attributed to it?</p> + +<p>It would be tedious to show the uncertainty of Plato’s opinion; for, in +his Timæus, he denies the propriety of asserting that there is one great +father or creator of the world; and, in his book of Laws, he thinks we +ought not to make too strict an inquiry into the nature of the Deity. +And as for his statement when he asserts that God is a being without any +body—what the Greeks call <span class="greek">ἀσώματος</span>—it is certainly quite +unintelligible how that theory can possibly be true; for such a God must +then necessarily be destitute of sense, prudence, and pleasure; all +which things are comprehended in our notion of the Gods. He likewise +asserts in his Timæus, and in his Laws, that the world, the heavens, the +stars, the mind, and those Gods which are delivered down to us from our +ancestors, constitute the Deity. These opinions, taken separately, are +apparently false; and, together, are directly inconsistent with each +other.</p> + +<p>Xenophon has committed almost the same mistakes, but in fewer words. In +those sayings which he has related of Socrates, he introduces him +disputing the lawfulness of inquiring into the form of the Deity, and +makes him assert the sun and the mind to be Deities: he represents him +likewise as affirming the being of one God only, and at another time of +many; which are errors of almost the same kind which I before took +notice of in Plato.</p> + +<p>XIII. Antisthenes, in his book called the Natural Philosopher, says that +there are many national and one natural Deity; but by this saying he +destroys the power and nature of the Gods. Speusippus is not much less +in the wrong; who, following his uncle Plato, says that a certain +incorporeal power governs everything; by which he endeavors to root out +of our minds the knowledge of the Gods.</p> + +<p>Aristotle, in his third book of Philosophy, confounds many things +together, as the rest have done; but he does not differ from his master +Plato. At one time he attributes all divinity to the mind, at another he +asserts that the world is God. Soon afterward he makes some other +essence <a id="page-222"></a><span class="pgnum">222</span>preside over the world, and gives it those faculties by which, +with certain revolutions, he may govern and preserve the motion of it. +Then he asserts the heat of the firmament to be God; not perceiving the +firmament to be part of the world, which in another place he had +described as God. How can that divine sense of the firmament be +preserved in so rapid a motion? And where do the multitude of Gods +dwell, if heaven itself is a Deity? But when this philosopher says that +God is without a body, he makes him an irrational and insensible being. +Besides, how can the world move itself, if it wants a body? Or how, if +it is in perpetual self-motion, can it be easy and happy?</p> + +<p>Xenocrates, his fellow-pupil, does not appear much wiser on this head, +for in his books concerning the nature of the Gods no divine form is +described; but he says the number of them is eight. Five are moving +planets;<a id="FNA-85"></a><a href="#FN-85"><sup>85</sup></a> the sixth is contained in all the fixed stars; which, +dispersed, are so many several members, but, considered together, are +one single Deity; the seventh is the sun; and the eighth the moon. But +in what sense they can possibly be happy is not easy to be understood.</p> + +<p>From the same school of Plato, Heraclides of Pontus stuffed his books +with puerile tales. Sometimes he thinks the world a Deity, at other +times the mind. He attributes divinity likewise to the wandering stars. +He deprives the Deity of sense, and makes his form mutable; and, in the +same book again, he makes earth and heaven Deities.</p> + +<p>The unsteadiness of Theophrastus is equally intolerable. At one time he +attributes a divine prerogative to the mind; at another, to the +firmament; at another, to the stars and celestial constellations.</p> + +<p>Nor is his disciple Strato, who is called the naturalist, any more +worthy to be regarded; for he thinks that the divine power is diffused +through nature, which is the cause of birth, increase, and diminution, +but that it has no sense nor form.</p> + +<p>XIV. Zeno (to come to your sect, Balbus) thinks the law of nature to be +the divinity, and that it has the power <a id="page-223"></a><span class="pgnum">223</span>to force us to what is right, +and to restrain us from what is wrong. How this law can be an animated +being I cannot conceive; but that God is so we would certainly maintain. +The same person says, in another place, that the sky is God; but can we +possibly conceive that God is a being insensible, deaf to our prayers, +our wishes, and our vows, and wholly unconnected with us? In other books +he thinks there is a certain rational essence pervading all nature, +indued with divine efficacy. He attributes the same power to the stars, +to the years, to the months, and to the seasons. In his interpretation +of Hesiod’s Theogony,<a id="FNA-86"></a><a href="#FN-86"><sup>86</sup></a> he entirely destroys the established notions +of the Gods; for he excludes Jupiter, Juno, and Vesta, and those +esteemed divine, from the number of them; but his doctrine is that these +are names which by some kind of allusion are given to mute and inanimate +beings. The sentiments of his disciple Aristo are not less erroneous. He +thought it impossible to conceive the form of the Deity, and asserts +that the Gods are destitute of sense; and he is entirely dubious whether +the Deity is an animated being or not.</p> + +<p>Cleanthes, who next comes under my notice, a disciple of Zeno at the +same time with Aristo, in one place says that the world is God; in +another, he attributes divinity to the mind and spirit of universal +nature; then he asserts that the most remote, the highest, the +all-surrounding, the all-enclosing and embracing heat, which is called +the sky, is most certainly the Deity. In the books he wrote against +pleasure, in which he seems to be raving, he imagines the Gods to have a +certain form and shape; then he ascribes all divinity to the stars; and, +lastly, he thinks nothing more divine than reason. So that this God, +whom we know mentally and in the speculations of our minds, from which +traces we receive our impression, has at last actually no visible form +at all.</p> + +<p>XV. Persæus, another disciple of Zeno, says that they who have made +discoveries advantageous to the life of man should be esteemed as Gods; +and the very things, he says, which are healthful and beneficial have +derived their names from those of the Gods; so that he thinks it not +sufficient to call them the discoveries of Gods, but he urges that they +<a id="page-224"></a><span class="pgnum">224</span>themselves should be deemed divine. What can be more absurd than to +ascribe divine honors to sordid and deformed things; or to place among +the Gods men who are dead and mixed with the dust, to whose memory all +the respect that could be paid would be but mourning for their loss?</p> + +<p>Chrysippus, who is looked upon as the most subtle interpreter of the +dreams of the Stoics, has mustered up a numerous band of unknown Gods; +and so unknown that we are not able to form any idea about them, though +our mind seems capable of framing any image to itself in its thoughts. +For he says that the divine power is placed in reason, and in the spirit +and mind of universal nature; that the world, with a universal effusion +of its spirit, is God; that the superior part of that spirit, which is +the mind and reason, is the great principle of nature, containing and +preserving the chain of all things; that the divinity is the power of +fate, and the necessity of future events. He deifies fire also, and what +I before called the ethereal spirit, and those elements which naturally +proceed from it—water, earth, and air. He attributes divinity to the +sun, moon, stars, and universal space, the grand container of all +things, and to those men likewise who have obtained immortality. He +maintains the sky to be what men call Jupiter; the air, which pervades +the sea, to be Neptune; and the earth, Ceres. In like manner he goes +through the names of the other Deities. He says that Jupiter is that +immutable and eternal law which guides and directs us in our manners; +and this he calls fatal necessity, the everlasting verity of future +events. But none of these are of such a nature as to seem to carry any +indication of divine virtue in them. These are the doctrines contained +in his first book of the Nature of the Gods. In the second, he endeavors +to accommodate the fables of Orpheus, Musæus, Hesiod, and Homer to what +he has advanced in the first, in order that the most ancient poets, who +never dreamed of these things, may seem to have been Stoics. Diogenes +the Babylonian was a follower of the doctrine of Chrysippus; and in that +book which he wrote, entitled “A Treatise concerning Minerva,” he +separates the account of Jupiter’s bringing-forth, and the birth of that +virgin, from the fabulous, and reduces it to a natural construction.</p> + +<p><a id="page-225"></a><span class="pgnum">225</span>XVI. Thus far have I been rather exposing the dreams of dotards than +giving the opinions of philosophers. Not much more absurd than these are +the fables of the poets, who owe all their power of doing harm to the +sweetness of their language; who have represented the Gods as enraged +with anger and inflamed with lust; who have brought before our eyes +their wars, battles, combats, wounds; their hatreds, dissensions, +discords, births, deaths, complaints, and lamentations; their +indulgences in all kinds of intemperance; their adulteries; their +chains; their amours with mortals, and mortals begotten by immortals. To +these idle and ridiculous flights of the poets we may add the prodigious +stories invented by the Magi, and by the Egyptians also, which were of +the same nature, together with the extravagant notions of the multitude +at all times, who, from total ignorance of the truth, are always +fluctuating in uncertainty.</p> + +<p>Now, whoever reflects on the rashness and absurdity of these tenets must +inevitably entertain the highest respect and veneration for Epicurus, +and perhaps even rank him in the number of those beings who are the +subject of this dispute; for he alone first founded the idea of the +existence of the Gods on the impression which nature herself hath made +on the minds of all men. For what nation, what people are there, who +have not, without any learning, a natural idea, or prenotion, of a +Deity? Epicurus calls this <span class="greek">πρόληψις</span>; that is, an antecedent conception +of the fact in the mind, without which nothing can be understood, +inquired after, or discoursed on; the force and advantage of which +reasoning we receive from that celestial volume of Epicurus concerning +the Rule and Judgment of Things.</p> + +<p>XVII. Here, then, you see the foundation of this question clearly laid; +for since it is the constant and universal opinion of mankind, +independent of education, custom, or law, that there are Gods, it must +necessarily follow that this knowledge is implanted in our minds, or, +rather, innate in us. That opinion respecting which there is a general +agreement in universal nature must infallibly be true; therefore it must +be allowed that there are Gods; for in this we have the concurrence, not +only of almost all philosophers, but likewise of the ignorant and +illiterate. It <a id="page-226"></a><span class="pgnum">226</span>must be also confessed that the point is established +that we have naturally this idea, as I said before, or prenotion, of the +existence of the Gods. As new things require new names, so that +prenotion was called <span class="greek">πρόληψις</span> by Epicurus; an appellation never used +before. On the same principle of reasoning, we think that the Gods are +happy and immortal; for that nature which hath assured us that there are +Gods has likewise imprinted in our minds the knowledge of their +immortality and felicity; and if so, what Epicurus hath declared in +these words is true: “That which is eternally happy cannot be burdened +with any labor itself, nor can it impose any labor on another; nor can +it be influenced by resentment or favor: because things which are liable +to such feelings must be weak and frail.” We have said enough to prove +that we should worship the Gods with piety, and without superstition, if +that were the only question.</p> + +<p>For the superior and excellent nature of the Gods requires a pious +adoration from men, because it is possessed of immortality and the most +exalted felicity; for whatever excels has a right to veneration, and all +fear of the power and anger of the Gods should be banished; for we must +understand that anger and affection are inconsistent with the nature of +a happy and immortal being. These apprehensions being removed, no dread +of the superior powers remains. To confirm this opinion, our curiosity +leads us to inquire into the form and life and action of the intellect +and spirit of the Deity.</p> + +<p>XVIII. With regard to his form, we are directed partly by nature and +partly by reason. All men are told by nature that none but a human form +can be ascribed to the Gods; for under what other image did it ever +appear to any one either sleeping or waking? and, without having +recourse to our first notions,<a id="FNA-87"></a><a href="#FN-87"><sup>87</sup></a> reason itself declares the same; for +as it is easy to conceive that the most excellent nature, either because +of its happiness or immortality, should be the most beautiful, what +composition of limbs, what conformation of lineaments, what form, what +aspect, can be more beautiful than the human? Your sect, Lucilius (not +like my friend Cotta, who sometimes says one <a id="page-227"></a><span class="pgnum">227</span>thing and sometimes +another), when they represent the divine art and workmanship in the +human body, are used to describe how very completely each member is +formed, not only for convenience, but also for beauty. Therefore, if the +human form excels that of all other animal beings, as God himself is an +animated being, he must surely be of that form which is the most +beautiful. Besides, the Gods are granted to be perfectly happy; and +nobody can be happy without virtue, nor can virtue exist where reason is +not; and reason can reside in none but the human form; the Gods, +therefore, must be acknowledged to be of human form; yet that form is +not body, but something like body; nor does it contain any blood, but +something like blood. Though these distinctions were more acutely +devised and more artfully expressed by Epicurus than any common capacity +can comprehend; yet, depending on your understanding, I shall be more +brief on the subject than otherwise I should be. Epicurus, who not only +discovered and understood the occult and almost hidden secrets of +nature, but explained them with ease, teaches that the power and nature +of the Gods is not to be discerned by the senses, but by the mind; nor +are they to be considered as bodies of any solidity, or reducible to +number, like those things which, because of their firmness, he calls +<span class="greek">Στερέμνια</span>;<a id="FNA-88"></a><a href="#FN-88"><sup>88</sup></a> but as images, perceived by similitude and transition. As +infinite kinds of those images result from innumerable individuals, and +centre in the Gods, our minds and understanding are directed towards and +fixed with the greatest delight on them, in order to comprehend what +that happy and eternal essence is.</p> + +<p>XIX. Surely the mighty power of the Infinite Being is most worthy our +great and earnest contemplation; the nature of which we must necessarily +understand to be such that everything in it is made to correspond +completely to some other answering part. This is called by Epicurus +<span class="greek">ἰσονομία</span>; that is to say, an equal distribution or even disposition of +things. From hence he draws this inference, <a id="page-228"></a><span class="pgnum">228</span>that, as there is such a +vast multitude of mortals, there cannot be a less number of immortals; +and if those which perish are innumerable, those which are preserved +ought also to be countless. Your sect, Balbus, frequently ask us how the +Gods live, and how they pass their time? Their life is the most happy, +and the most abounding with all kinds of blessings, which can be +conceived. They do nothing. They are embarrassed with no business; nor +do they perform any work. They rejoice in the possession of their own +wisdom and virtue. They are satisfied that they shall ever enjoy the +fulness of eternal pleasures.</p> + +<p>XX. Such a Deity may properly be called happy; but yours is a most +laborious God. For let us suppose the world a Deity—what can be a more +uneasy state than, without the least cessation, to be whirled about the +axle-tree of heaven with a surprising celerity? But nothing can be happy +that is not at ease. Or let us suppose a Deity residing in the world, +who directs and governs it, who preserves the courses of the stars, the +changes of the seasons, and the vicissitudes and orders of things, +surveying the earth and the sea, and accommodating them to the advantage +and necessities of man. Truly this Deity is embarrassed with a very +troublesome and laborious office. We make a happy life to consist in a +tranquillity of mind, a perfect freedom from care, and an exemption from +all employment. The philosopher from whom we received all our knowledge +has taught us that the world was made by nature; that there was no +occasion for a workhouse to frame it in; and that, though you deny the +possibility of such a work without divine skill, it is so easy to her, +that she has made, does make, and will make innumerable worlds. But, +because you do not conceive that nature is able to produce such effects +without some rational aid, you are forced, like the tragic poets, when +you cannot wind up your argument in any other way, to have recourse to a +Deity, whose assistance you would not seek, if you could view that vast +and unbounded magnitude of regions in all parts; where the mind, +extending and spreading itself, travels so far and wide that it can find +no end, no extremity to stop at. In this immensity of breadth, length, +and height, a most boundless company of innumerable atoms <a id="page-229"></a><span class="pgnum">229</span>are +fluttering about, which, notwithstanding the interposition of a void +space, meet and cohere, and continue clinging to one another; and by +this union these modifications and forms of things arise, which, in your +opinions, could not possibly be made without the help of bellows and +anvils. Thus you have imposed on us an eternal master, whom we must +dread day and night. For who can be free from fear of a Deity who +foresees, regards, and takes notice of everything; one who thinks all +things his own; a curious, ever-busy God?</p> + +<p>Hence first arose your <span class="greek">Εἱμαρμένη</span>, as you call it, your fatal necessity; +so that, whatever happens, you affirm that it flows from an eternal +chain and continuance of causes. Of what value is this philosophy, +which, like old women and illiterate men, attributes everything to fate? +Then follows your <span class="greek">μαντικὴ</span>, in Latin called <i>divinatio</i>, divination; +which, if we would listen to you, would plunge us into such superstition +that we should fall down and worship your inspectors into sacrifices, +your augurs, your soothsayers, your prophets, and your fortune-tellers.</p> + +<p>Epicurus having freed us from these terrors and restored us to liberty, +we have no dread of those beings whom we have reason to think entirely +free from all trouble themselves, and who do not impose any on others. +We pay our adoration, indeed, with piety and reverence to that essence +which is above all excellence and perfection. But I fear my zeal for +this doctrine has made me too prolix. However, I could not easily leave +so eminent and important a subject unfinished, though I must confess I +should rather endeavor to hear than speak so long.</p> + +<p>XXI. Cotta, with his usual courtesy, then began. Velleius, says he, were +it not for something which you have advanced, I should have remained +silent; for I have often observed, as I did just now upon hearing you, +that I cannot so easily conceive why a proposition is true as why it is +false. Should you ask me what I take the nature of the Gods to be, I +should perhaps make no answer. But if you should ask whether I think it +to be of that nature which you have described, I should answer that I +was as far as possible from agreeing with you. However, before I enter +on the subject of your discourse and what you <a id="page-230"></a><span class="pgnum">230</span>have advanced upon it, I +will give you my opinion of yourself. Your intimate friend, L. Crassus, +has been often heard by me to say that you were beyond all question +superior to all our learned Romans; and that few Epicureans in Greece +were to be compared to you. But as I knew what a wonderful esteem he had +for you, I imagined that might make him the more lavish in commendation +of you. Now, however, though I do not choose to praise any one when +present, yet I must confess that I think you have delivered your +thoughts clearly on an obscure and very intricate subject; that you are +not only copious in your sentiments, but more elegant in your language +than your sect generally are. When I was at Athens, I went often to hear +Zeno, by the advice of Philo, who used to call him the chief of the +Epicureans; partly, probably, in order to judge more easily how +completely those principles could be refuted after I had heard them +stated by the most learned of the Epicureans. And, indeed, he did not +speak in any ordinary manner; but, like you, with clearness, gravity, +and elegance; yet what frequently gave me great uneasiness when I heard +him, as it did while I attended to you, was to see so excellent a genius +falling into such frivolous (excuse my freedom), not to say foolish, +doctrines. However, I shall not at present offer anything better; for, +as I said before, we can in most subjects, especially in physics, sooner +discover what is not true than what is.</p> + +<p>XXII. If you should ask me what God is, or what his character and nature +are, I should follow the example of Simonides, who, when Hiero the +tyrant proposed the same question to him, desired a day to consider of +it. When he required his answer the next day, Simonides begged two days +more; and as he kept constantly desiring double the number which he had +required before instead of giving his answer, Hiero, with surprise, +asked him his meaning in doing so: “Because,” says he, “the longer I +meditate on it, the more obscure it appears to me.” Simonides, who was +not only a delightful poet, but reputed a wise and learned man in other +branches of knowledge, found, I suppose, so many acute and refined +arguments occurring to him, that he was doubtful which was the truest, +and therefore despaired of discovering any truth.</p> + +<p><a id="page-231"></a><span class="pgnum">231</span>But does your Epicurus (for I had rather contend with him than with +you) say anything that is worthy the name of philosophy, or even of +common-sense?</p> + +<p>In the question concerning the nature of the Gods, his first inquiry is, +whether there are Gods or not. It would be dangerous, I believe, to take +the negative side before a public auditory; but it is very safe in a +discourse of this kind, and in this company. I, who am a priest, and who +think that religions and ceremonies ought sacredly to be maintained, am +certainly desirous to have the existence of the Gods, which is the +principal point in debate, not only fixed in opinion, but proved to a +demonstration; for many notions flow into and disturb the mind which +sometimes seem to convince us that there are none. But see how candidly +I will behave to you: as I shall not touch upon those tenets you hold in +common with other philosophers, consequently I shall not dispute the +existence of the Gods, for that doctrine is agreeable to almost all men, +and to myself in particular; but I am still at liberty to find fault +with the reasons you give for it, which I think are very insufficient.</p> + +<p>XXIII. You have said that the general assent of men of all nations and +all degrees is an argument strong enough to induce us to acknowledge the +being of the Gods. This is not only a weak, but a false, argument; for, +first of all, how do you know the opinions of all nations? I really +believe there are many people so savage that they have no thoughts of a +Deity. What think you of Diagoras, who was called the atheist; and of +Theodorus after him? Did not they plainly deny the very essence of a +Deity? Protagoras of Abdera, whom you just now mentioned, the greatest +sophist of his age, was banished by order of the Athenians from their +city and territories, and his books were publicly burned, because these +words were in the beginning of his treatise concerning the Gods: “I am +unable to arrive at any knowledge whether there are, or are not, any +Gods.” This treatment of him, I imagine, restrained many from professing +their disbelief of a Deity, since the doubt of it only could not escape +punishment. What shall we say of the sacrilegious, the impious, and the +perjured? If Tubulus Lucius, Lupus, or Carbo the son of <a id="page-232"></a><span class="pgnum">232</span>Neptune, as +Lucilius says, had believed that there were Gods, would either of them +have carried his perjuries and impieties to such excess? Your reasoning, +therefore, to confirm your assertion is not so conclusive as you think +it is. But as this is the manner in which other philosophers have argued +on the same subject, I will take no further notice of it at present; I +rather choose to proceed to what is properly your own.</p> + +<p>I allow that there are Gods. Instruct me, then, concerning their origin; +inform me where they are, what sort of body, what mind, they have, and +what is their course of life; for these I am desirous of knowing. You +attribute the most absolute power and efficacy to atoms. Out of them you +pretend that everything is made. But there are no atoms, for there is +nothing without body; every place is occupied by body, therefore there +can be no such thing as a vacuum or an atom.</p> + +<p>XXIV. I advance these principles of the naturalists without knowing +whether they are true or false; yet they are more like truth than those +statements of yours; for they are the absurdities in which Democritus, +or before him Leucippus, used to indulge, saying that there are certain +light corpuscles—some smooth, some rough, some round, some square, some +crooked and bent as bows—which by a fortuitous concourse made heaven +and earth, without the influence of any natural power. This opinion, C. +Velleius, you have brought down to these our times; and you would sooner +be deprived of the greatest advantages of life than of that authority; +for before you were acquainted with those tenets, you thought that you +ought to profess yourself an Epicurean; so that it was necessary that +you should either embrace these absurdities or lose the philosophical +character which you had taken upon you; and what could bribe you to +renounce the Epicurean opinion? Nothing, you say, can prevail on you to +forsake the truth and the sure means of a happy life. But is that the +truth? for I shall not contest your happy life, which you think the +Deity himself does not enjoy unless he languishes in idleness. But where +is truth? Is it in your innumerable worlds, some of which are rising, +some falling, at every moment of time? Or is it in your atomical +corpuscles, <a id="page-233"></a><span class="pgnum">233</span>which form such excellent works without the direction of +any natural power or reason? But I was forgetting my liberality, which I +had promised to exert in your case, and exceeding the bounds which I at +first proposed to myself. Granting, then, everything to be made of +atoms, what advantage is that to your argument? For we are searching +after the nature of the Gods; and allowing them to be made of atoms, +they cannot be eternal, because whatever is made of atoms must have had +a beginning: if so, there were no Gods till there was this beginning; +and if the Gods have had a beginning, they must necessarily have an end, +as you have before contended when you were discussing Plato’s world. +Where, then, is your beatitude and immortality, in which two words you +say that God is expressed, the endeavor to prove which reduces you to +the greatest perplexities? For you said that God had no body, but +something like body; and no blood, but something like blood.</p> + +<p>XXV. It is a frequent practice among you, when you assert anything that +has no resemblance to truth, and wish to avoid reprehension, to advance +something else which is absolutely and utterly impossible, in order that +it may seem to your adversaries better to grant that point which has +been a matter of doubt than to keep on pertinaciously contradicting you +on every point: like Epicurus, who, when he found that if his atoms were +allowed to descend by their own weight, our actions could not be in our +own power, because their motions would be certain and necessary, +invented an expedient, which escaped Democritus, to avoid necessity. He +says that when the atoms descend by their own weight and gravity, they +move a little obliquely. Surely, to make such an assertion as this is +what one ought more to be ashamed of than the acknowledging ourselves +unable to defend the proposition. His practice is the same against the +logicians, who say that in all propositions in which yes or no is +required, one of them must be true; he was afraid that if this were +granted, then, in such a proposition as “Epicurus will be alive or dead +to-morrow,” either one or the other must necessarily be admitted; +therefore he absolutely denied the necessity of yes or no. Can anything +<a id="page-234"></a><span class="pgnum">234</span>show stupidity in a greater degree? Zeno,<a id="FNA-89"></a><a href="#FN-89"><sup>89</sup></a> being pressed by +Arcesilas, who pronounced all things to be false which are perceived by +the senses, said that some things were false, but not all. Epicurus was +afraid that if any one thing seen should be false, nothing could be +true; and therefore he asserted all the senses to be infallible +directors of truth. Nothing can be more rash than this; for by +endeavoring to repel a light stroke, he receives a heavy blow. On the +subject of the nature of the Gods, he falls into the same errors. While +he would avoid the concretion of individual bodies, lest death and +dissolution should be the consequence, he denies that the Gods have +body, but says they have something like body; and says they have no +blood, but something like blood.</p> + +<p>XXVI. It seems an unaccountable thing how one soothsayer can refrain +from laughing when he sees another. It is yet a greater wonder that you +can refrain from laughing among yourselves. It is no body, but something +like body! I could understand this if it were applied to statues made of +wax or clay; but in regard to the Deity, I am not able to discover what +is meant by a quasi-body or quasi-blood. Nor indeed are you, Velleius, +though you will not confess so much. For those precepts are delivered to +you as dictates which Epicurus carelessly blundered out; for he boasted, +as we see in his writings, that he had no instructor, which I could +easily believe without his public declaration of it, for the same reason +that I could believe the master of a very bad edifice if he were to +boast that he had no architect but himself: for there is nothing of the +Academy, nothing of the Lyceum, in his doctrine; nothing but +puerilities. He might have been a pupil of Xenocrates. O ye immortal +Gods, what a teacher was he! And there are those who believe that he +actually was his pupil; but he says otherwise, and I shall give more +credit to his word than to another’s. He confesses that he was a pupil +of a certain disciple of Plato, one Pamphilus, at Samos; for he lived +there when he was young, with his father and his brothers. His father, +Neocles, was a farmer in those parts; <a id="page-235"></a><span class="pgnum">235</span>but as the farm, I suppose, was +not sufficient to maintain him, he turned school-master; yet Epicurus +treats this Platonic philosopher with wonderful contempt, so fearful was +he that it should be thought he had ever had any instruction. But it is +well known he had been a pupil of Nausiphanes, the follower of +Democritus; and since he could not deny it, he loaded him with insults +in abundance. If he never heard a lecture on these Democritean +principles, what lectures did he ever hear? What is there in Epicurus’s +physics that is not taken from Democritus? For though he altered some +things, as what I mentioned before of the oblique motions of the atoms, +yet most of his doctrines are the same; his atoms—his vacuum—his +images—infinity of space—innumerable worlds, their rise and decay—and +almost every part of natural learning that he treats of.</p> + +<p>Now, do you understand what is meant by quasi-body and quasi-blood? For +I not only acknowledge that you are a better judge of it than I am, but +I can bear it without envy. If any sentiments, indeed, are communicated +without obscurity, what is there that Velleius can understand and Cotta +not? I know what body is, and what blood is; but I cannot possibly find +out the meaning of quasi-body and quasi-blood. Not that you +intentionally conceal your principles from me, as Pythagoras did his +from those who were not his disciples; or that you are intentionally +obscure, like Heraclitus. But the truth is (which I may venture to say +in this company), you do not understand them yourself.</p> + +<p>XXVII. This, I perceive, is what you contend for, that the Gods have a +certain figure that has nothing concrete, nothing solid, nothing of +express substance, nothing prominent in it; but that it is pure, smooth, +and transparent. Let us suppose the same with the Venus of Cos, which is +not a body, but the representation of a body; nor is the red, which is +drawn there and mixed with the white, real blood, but a certain +resemblance of blood; so in Epicurus’s Deity there is no real substance, +but the resemblance of substance.</p> + +<p>Let me take for granted that which is perfectly unintelligible; then +tell me what are the lineaments and figures <a id="page-236"></a><span class="pgnum">236</span>of these sketched-out +Deities. Here you have plenty of arguments by which you would show the +Gods to be in human form. The first is, that our minds are so +anticipated and prepossessed, that whenever we think of a Deity the +human shape occurs to us. The next is, that as the divine nature excels +all things, so it ought to be of the most beautiful form, and there is +no form more beautiful than the human; and the third is, that reason +cannot reside in any other shape.</p> + +<p>First, let us consider each argument separately. You seem to me to +assume a principle, despotically I may say, that has no manner of +probability in it. Who was ever so blind, in contemplating these +subjects, as not to see that the Gods were represented in human form, +either by the particular advice of wise men, who thought by those means +the more easily to turn the minds of the ignorant from a depravity of +manners to the worship of the Gods; or through superstition, which was +the cause of their believing that when they were paying adoration to +these images they were approaching the Gods themselves. These conceits +were not a little improved by the poets, painters, and artificers; for +it would not have been very easy to represent the Gods planning and +executing any work in another form, and perhaps this opinion arose from +the idea which mankind have of their own beauty. But do not you, who are +so great an adept in physics, see what a soothing flatterer, what a sort +of procuress, nature is to herself? Do you think there is any creature +on the land or in the sea that is not highly delighted with its own +form? If it were not so, why would not a bull become enamored of a mare, +or a horse of a cow? Do you believe an eagle, a lion, or a dolphin +prefers any shape to its own? If nature, therefore, has instructed us in +the same manner, that nothing is more beautiful than man, what wonder is +it that we, for that reason, should imagine the Gods are of the human +form? Do you suppose if beasts were endowed with reason that every one +would not give the prize of beauty to his own species?</p> + +<p>XXVIII. Yet, by Hercules (I speak as I think)! though I am fond enough +of myself, I dare not say that I excel in beauty that bull which carried +Europa. For the question <a id="page-237"></a><span class="pgnum">237</span>here is not concerning our genius and +elocution, but our species and figure. If we could make and assume to +ourselves any form, would you be unwilling to resemble the sea-triton as +he is painted supported swimming on sea-monsters whose bodies are partly +human? Here I touch on a difficult point; for so great is the force of +nature that there is no man who would not choose to be like a man, nor, +indeed, any ant that would not be like an ant. But like what man? For +how few can pretend to beauty! When I was at Athens, the whole flock of +youths afforded scarcely one. You laugh, I see; but what I tell you is +the truth. Nay, to us who, after the examples of ancient philosophers, +delight in boys, defects are often pleasing. Alcæus was charmed with a +wart on a boy’s knuckle; but a wart is a blemish on the body; yet it +seemed a beauty to him. Q. Catulus, my friend and colleague’s father, +was enamored with your fellow-citizen Roscius, on whom he wrote these +verses:</p> + +<div class="poem"> +<p>As once I stood to hail the rising day,</p> +<p class="L2">Roscius appearing on the left I spied:</p> +<p>Forgive me, Gods, if I presume to say</p> +<p class="L2">The mortal’s beauty with th’ immortal vied.</p> +</div> + +<p class="cont">Roscius more beautiful than a God! yet he was then, as he now is, +squint-eyed. But what signifies that, if his defects were beauties to +Catulus?</p> + +<p>XXIX. I return to the Gods. Can we suppose any of them to be +squint-eyed, or even to have a cast in the eye? Have they any warts? Are +any of them hook-nosed, flap-eared, beetle-browed, or jolt-headed, as +some of us are? Or are they free from imperfections? Let us grant you +that. Are they all alike in the face? For if they are many, then one +must necessarily be more beautiful than another, and then there must be +some Deity not absolutely most beautiful. Or if their faces are all +alike, there would be an Academy<a id="FNA-90"></a><a href="#FN-90"><sup>90</sup></a> in heaven; for if one God does not +differ from another, there is no possibility of knowing or +distinguishing them.</p> + +<p>What if your assertion, Velleius, proves absolutely false, that no form +occurs to us, in our contemplations on the <a id="page-238"></a><span class="pgnum">238</span>Deity, but the human? Will +you, notwithstanding that, persist in the defence of such an absurdity? +Supposing that form occurs to us, as you say it does, and we know +Jupiter, Juno, Minerva, Neptune, Vulcan, Apollo, and the other Deities, +by the countenance which painters and statuaries have given them, and +not only by their countenances, but by their decorations, their age, and +attire; yet the Egyptians, the Syrians, and almost all barbarous +nations,<a id="FNA-91"></a><a href="#FN-91"><sup>91</sup></a> are without such distinctions. You may see a greater regard +paid by them to certain beasts than by us to the most sacred temples and +images of the Gods; for many shrines have been rifled, and images of the +Deities have been carried from their most sacred places by us; but we +never heard that an Egyptian offered any violence to a crocodile, an +ibis, or a cat. What do you think, then? Do not the Egyptians esteem +their sacred bull, their Apis, as a Deity? Yes, by Hercules! as +certainly as you do our protectress Juno, whom you never behold, even in +your dreams, without a goat-skin, a spear, a shield, and broad sandals. +But the Grecian Juno of Argos and the Roman Juno are not represented in +this manner; so that the Grecians, the Lanuvinians, and we, ascribe +different forms to Juno; and our Capitoline Jupiter is not the same with +the Jupiter Ammon of the Africans.</p> + +<p>XXX. Therefore, ought not a natural philosopher—that is, an inquirer +into the secrets of nature—to be ashamed of seeking a testimony to +truth from minds prepossessed by custom? According to the rule you have +laid down, it may be said that Jupiter is always bearded, Apollo always +beardless; that Minerva has gray and Neptune azure eyes; and, indeed, we +must then honor that Vulcan at Athens, made by Alcamenes, whose lameness +through his thin robes appears to be no deformity. Shall we, therefore, +receive a lame Deity because we have such an account of him?</p> + +<p>Consider, likewise, that the Gods go by what names we give them. Now, in +the first place, they have as many names as men have languages; for +Vulcan is not called Vulcan in Italy, Africa, or Spain, as you are +called Velleius in all countries. Besides, the Gods are innumerable, +though the list of their names is of no great length even <a id="page-239"></a><span class="pgnum">239</span>in the +records of our priests. Have they no names? You must necessarily +confess, indeed, they have none; for what occasion is there for +different names if their persons are alike?</p> + +<p>How much more laudable would it be, Velleius, to acknowledge that you do +not know what you do not know than to follow a man whom you must +despise! Do you think the Deity is like either me or you? You do not +really think he is like either of us. What is to be done, then? Shall I +call the sun, the moon, or the sky a Deity? If so, they are consequently +happy. But what pleasures can they enjoy? And they are wise too. But how +can wisdom reside in such shapes? These are your own principles. +Therefore, if they are not of human form, as I have proved, and if you +cannot persuade yourself that they are of any other, why are you +cautious of denying absolutely the being of any Gods? You dare not deny +it—which is very prudent in you, though here you are not afraid of the +people, but of the Gods themselves. I have known Epicureans who +reverence<a id="FNA-92"></a><a href="#FN-92"><sup>92</sup></a> even the least images of the Gods, though I perceive it to +be the opinion of some that Epicurus, through fear of offending against +the Athenian laws, has allowed a Deity in words and destroyed him in +fact; so in those his select and short sentences, which are called by +you <span class="greek">κυρίαι δόξαι</span>,<a id="FNA-93"></a><a href="#FN-93"><sup>93</sup></a> this, I think, is the first: “That being which is +happy and immortal is not burdened with any labor, and does not impose +any on any one else.”</p> + +<p>XXXI. In his statement of this sentence, some think that he avoided +speaking clearly on purpose, though it was manifestly without design. +But they judge ill of a man who had not the least art. It is doubtful +whether he means that there is any being happy and immortal, or that if +there is any being happy, he must likewise be immortal. They do not +consider that he speaks here, indeed, ambiguously; but in many other +places both he and Metrodorus explain themselves as clearly as you have +done. But he believed there are Gods; nor have I ever seen any one <a id="page-240"></a><span class="pgnum">240</span>who +was more exceedingly afraid of what he declared ought to be no objects +of fear, namely, death and the Gods, with the apprehensions of which the +common rank of people are very little affected; but he says that the +minds of all mortals are terrified by them. Many thousands of men commit +robberies in the face of death; others rifle all the temples they can +get into: such as these, no doubt, must be greatly terrified, the one by +the fears of death, and the others by the fear of the Gods.</p> + +<p>But since you dare not (for I am now addressing my discourse to Epicurus +himself) absolutely deny the existence of the Gods, what hinders you +from ascribing a divine nature to the sun, the world, or some eternal +mind? I never, says he, saw wisdom and a rational soul in any but a +human form. What! did you ever observe anything like the sun, the moon, +or the five moving planets? The sun, terminating his course in two +extreme parts of one circle,<a id="FNA-94"></a><a href="#FN-94"><sup>94</sup></a> finishes his annual revolutions. The +moon, receiving her light from the sun, completes the same course in +the space of a month.<a id="FNA-95"></a><a href="#FN-95"><sup>95</sup></a> The five planets in the same circle, some +nearer, others more remote from the earth, begin the same courses +together, and finish them in different spaces of time. Did you ever +observe anything like this, Epicurus? So that, according to you, there +can be neither sun, moon, nor stars, because nothing can exist but what +we have touched or seen.<a id="FNA-96"></a><a href="#FN-96"><sup>96</sup></a> What! have you ever seen the Deity himself? +Why else do you believe there is any? If this doctrine prevails, we must +reject all that history relates or reason discovers; and the people who +inhabit inland countries must not believe there is such a thing as the +sea. This is so narrow a way of thinking that if you had been born in +Seriphus, and never had been from out of that island, where you had +frequently been in the habit of seeing little hares and foxes, you would +not, therefore, believe that there are such beasts as lions and +panthers; <a id="page-241"></a><span class="pgnum">241</span>and if any one should describe an elephant to you, you would +think that he designed to laugh at you.</p> + +<p>XXXII. You indeed, Velleius, have concluded your argument, not after the +manner of your own sect, but of the logicians, to which your people are +utter strangers. You have taken it for granted that the Gods are happy. +I allow it. You say that without virtue no one can be happy. I willingly +concur with you in this also. You likewise say that virtue cannot reside +where reason is not. That I must necessarily allow. You add, moreover, +that reason cannot exist but in a human form. Who, do you think, will +admit that? If it were true, what occasion was there to come so +gradually to it? And to what purpose? You might have answered it on your +own authority. I perceive your gradations from happiness to virtue, and +from virtue to reason; but how do you come from reason to human form? +There, indeed, you do not descend by degrees, but precipitately.</p> + +<p>Nor can I conceive why Epicurus should rather say the Gods are like men +than that men are like the Gods. You ask what is the difference; for, +say you, if this is like that, that is like this. I grant it; but this I +assert, that the Gods could not take their form from men; for the Gods +always existed, and never had a beginning, if they are to exist +eternally; but men had a beginning: therefore that form, of which the +immortal Gods are, must have had existence before mankind; consequently, +the Gods should not be said to be of human form, but our form should be +called divine. However, let this be as you will. I now inquire how this +extraordinary good fortune came about; for you deny that reason had any +share in the formation of things. But still, what was this extraordinary +fortune? Whence proceeded that happy concourse of atoms which gave so +sudden a rise to men in the form of Gods? Are we to suppose the divine +seed fell from heaven upon earth, and that men sprung up in the likeness +of their celestial sires? I wish you would assert it; for I should not +be unwilling to acknowledge my relation to the Gods. But you say nothing +like it; no, our resemblance to the Gods, it seems, was by chance. Must +I now seek for arguments to refute this doctrine seriously? I wish I +could <a id="page-242"></a><span class="pgnum">242</span>as easily discover what is true as I can overthrow what is false.</p> + +<p>XXXIII. You have enumerated with so ready a memory, and so copiously, +the opinions of philosophers, from Thales the Milesian, concerning the +nature of the Gods, that I am surprised to see so much learning in a +Roman. But do you think they were all madmen who thought that a Deity +could by some possibility exist without hands and feet? Does not even +this consideration have weight with you when you consider what is the +use and advantage of limbs in men, and lead you to admit that the Gods +have no need of them? What necessity can there be of feet, without +walking; or of hands, if there is nothing to be grasped? The same may be +asked of the other parts of the body, in which nothing is vain, nothing +useless, nothing superfluous; therefore we may infer that no art can +imitate the skill of nature. Shall the Deity, then, have a tongue, and +not speak—teeth, palate, and jaws, though he will have no use for them? +Shall the members which nature has given to the body for the sake of +generation be useless to the Deity? Nor would the internal parts be less +superfluous than the external. What comeliness is there in the heart, +the lungs, the liver, and the rest of them, abstracted from their use? I +mention these because you place them in the Deity on account of the +beauty of the human form.</p> + +<p>Depending on these dreams, not only Epicurus, Metrodorus, and Hermachus +declaimed against Pythagoras, Plato, and Empedocles, but that little +harlot Leontium presumed to write against Theophrastus: indeed, she had +a neat Attic style; but yet, to think of her arguing against +Theophrastus! So much did the garden of Epicurus<a id="FNA-97"></a><a href="#FN-97"><sup>97</sup></a> abound with these +liberties, and, indeed, you are always complaining against them. Zeno +wrangled. Why need I mention Albutius? Nothing could be more elegant or +humane than Phædrus; yet a sharp expression would disgust the old man. +Epicurus treated Aristotle with great contumely. He foully slandered +Phædo, the disciple of Socrates. He pelted Timocrates, the brother of +his companion Metrodorus, with whole volumes, because he disagreed with +him in some trifling point of philosophy. He <a id="page-243"></a><span class="pgnum">243</span>was ungrateful even to +Democritus, whose follower he was; and his master Nausiphanes, from whom +he learned nothing, had no better treatment from him.</p> + +<p>XXXIV. Zeno gave abusive language not only to those who were then +living, as Apollodorus, Syllus, and the rest, but he called Socrates, +who was the father of philosophy, the Attic buffoon, using the Latin +word <i>Scurra</i>. He never called Chrysippus by any name but Chesippus. And +you yourself a little before, when you were numbering up a senate, as we +may call them, of philosophers, scrupled not to say that the most +eminent men talked like foolish, visionary dotards. Certainly, +therefore, if they have all erred in regard to the nature of the Gods, +it is to be feared there are no such beings. What you deliver on that +head are all whimsical notions, and not worthy the consideration even of +old women. For you do not seem to be in the least aware what a task you +draw on yourselves, if you should prevail on us to grant that the same +form is common to Gods and men. The Deity would then require the same +trouble in dressing, and the same care of the body, that mankind does. +He must walk, run, lie down, lean, sit, hold, speak, and discourse. You +need not be told the consequence of making the Gods male and female.</p> + +<p>Therefore I cannot sufficiently wonder how this chief of yours came to +entertain these strange opinions. But you constantly insist on the +certainty of this tenet, that the Deity is both happy and immortal. +Supposing he is so, would his happiness be less perfect if he had not +two feet? Or cannot that blessedness or beatitude—call it which you +will (they are both harsh terms, but we must mollify them by use)—can +it not, I say, exist in that sun, or in this world, or in some eternal +mind that has not human shape or limbs? All you say against it is, that +you never saw any happiness in the sun or the world. What, then? Did you +ever see any world but this? No, you will say. Why, therefore, do you +presume to assert that there are not only six hundred thousand worlds, +but that they are innumerable? Reason tells you so. Will not reason tell +you likewise that as, in our inquiries into the most excellent nature, +we find none but the divine nature can be happy and eternal, so the same +divine nature surpasses us in +<a id="page-244"></a><span class="pgnum">244</span>excellence of mind; and as in mind, so in body? Why, +therefore, as we are inferior in all other respects, should +we be equal in form? For human virtue approaches +nearer to the divinity than human form.</p> + +<p>XXXV. To return to the subject I was upon. What +can be more childish than to assert that there are no such +creatures as are generated in the Red Sea or in India? +The most curious inquirer cannot arrive at the knowledge +of all those creatures which inhabit the earth, sea, fens, and +rivers; and shall we deny the existence of them because +we never saw them? That similitude which you are so +very fond of is nothing to the purpose. Is not a dog like +a wolf? And, as Ennius says,</p> + +<div class="poem"> +<p>The monkey, filthiest beast, how like to man!</p> +</div> + +<p class="cont">Yet they differ in nature. No beast has more sagacity +than an elephant; yet where can you find any of a larger +size? I am speaking here of beasts. But among men, do +we not see a disparity of manners in persons very much +alike, and a similitude of manners in persons unlike? If +this sort of argument were once to prevail, Velleius, observe +what it would lead to. You have laid it down as +certain that reason cannot possibly reside in any but the +human form. Another may affirm that it can exist in none +but a terrestrial being; in none but a being that is born, +that grows up, and receives instruction, and that consists +of a soul, and an infirm and perishable body; in short, in +none but a mortal man. But if you decline those opinions, +why should a single form disturb you? You perceive +that man is possessed of reason and understanding, with +all the infirmities which I have mentioned interwoven +with his being; abstracted from which, you nevertheless +know God, you say, if the lineaments do but remain. +This is not talking considerately, but at a venture; for +surely you did not think what an encumbrance anything +superfluous or useless is, not only in a man, but a tree. +How troublesome it is to have a finger too much! And +why so? Because neither use nor ornament requires +more than five; but your Deity has not only a finger more +than he wants, but a head, a neck, shoulders, sides, a +paunch, back, hams, hands, feet, thighs, and legs. Are +<a id="page-245"></a><span class="pgnum">245</span>these parts necessary to immortality? Are they conducive +to the existence of the Deity? Is the face itself of +use? One would rather say so of the brain, the heart, +the lights, and the liver; for these are the seats of life. +The features of the face contribute nothing to the preservation +of it.</p> + +<p>XXXVI. You censured those who, beholding those excellent +and stupendous works, the world, and its respective +parts—the heaven, the earth, the seas—and the splendor +with which they are adorned; who, contemplating the +sun, moon, and stars; and who, observing the maturity +and changes of the seasons, and vicissitudes of times, inferred +from thence that there must be some excellent and +eminent essence that originally made, and still moves, directs, +and governs them. Suppose they should mistake in +their conjecture, yet I see what they aim at. But what is +that great and noble work which appears to you to be the +effect of a divine mind, and from which you conclude that +there are Gods? “I have,” say you, “a certain information +of a Deity imprinted in my mind.” Of a bearded +Jupiter, I suppose, and a helmeted Minerva.</p> + +<p>But do you really imagine them to be such? How +much better are the notions of the ignorant vulgar, who +not only believe the Deities have members like ours, but +that they make use of them; and therefore they assign +them a bow and arrows, a spear, a shield, a trident, and +lightning; and though they do not behold the actions of +the Gods, yet they cannot entertain a thought of a Deity +doing nothing. The Egyptians (so much ridiculed) held +no beasts to be sacred, except on account of some advantage +which they had received from them. The ibis, a very +large bird, with strong legs and a horny long beak, destroys +a great number of serpents. These birds keep +Egypt from pestilential diseases by killing and devouring +the flying serpents brought from the deserts of Lybia by +the south-west wind, which prevents the mischief that +may attend their biting while alive, or any infection when +dead. I could speak of the advantage of the ichneumon, +the crocodile, and the cat; but I am unwilling to be tedious; +yet I will conclude with observing that the barbarians +paid divine honors to beasts because of the benefits +<a id="page-246"></a><span class="pgnum">246</span>they received from them; whereas your +Gods not only confer no benefit, but are idle, and do no single act of +any description whatever.</p> + +<p>XXXVII. “They have nothing to do,” your teacher says. Epicurus truly, +like indolent boys, thinks nothing preferable to idleness; yet those +very boys, when they have a holiday, entertain themselves in some +sportive exercise. But we are to suppose the Deity in such an inactive +state that if he should move we may justly fear he would be no longer +happy. This doctrine divests the Gods of motion and operation; besides, +it encourages men to be lazy, as they are by this taught to believe that +the least labor is incompatible even with divine felicity.</p> + +<p>But let it be as you would have it, that the Deity is in the form and +image of a man. Where is his abode? Where is his habitation? Where is +the place where he is to be found? What is his course of life? And what +is it that constitutes the happiness which you assert that he enjoys? +For it seems necessary that a being who is to be happy must use and +enjoy what belongs to him. And with regard to place, even those natures +which are inanimate have each their proper stations assigned to them: so +that the earth is the lowest; then water is next above the earth; the +air is above the water; and fire has the highest situation of all +allotted to it. Some creatures inhabit the earth, some the water, and +some, of an amphibious nature, live in both. There are some, also, which +are thought to be born in fire, and which often appear fluttering in +burning furnaces.</p> + +<p>In the first place, therefore, I ask you, Where is the habitation of +your Deity? Secondly, What motive is it that stirs him from his place, +supposing he ever moves? And, lastly, since it is peculiar to animated +beings to have an inclination to something that is agreeable to their +several natures, what is it that the Deity affects, and to what purpose +does he exert the motion of his mind and reason? In short, how is he +happy? how eternal? Whichever of these points you touch upon, I am +afraid you will come lamely off. For there is never a proper end to +reasoning which proceeds on a false foundation; for you asserted +likewise that the form of the Deity is perceptible by the mind, but <a id="page-247"></a><span class="pgnum">247</span>not +by sense; that it is neither solid, nor invariable in number; that it is +to be discerned by similitude and transition, and that a constant supply +of images is perpetually flowing on from innumerable atoms, on which our +minds are intent; so that we from that conclude that divine nature to be +happy and everlasting.</p> + +<p>XXXVIII. What, in the name of those Deities concerning whom we are now +disputing, is the meaning of all this? For if they exist only in +thought, and have no solidity nor substance, what difference can there +be between thinking of a Hippocentaur and thinking of a Deity? Other +philosophers call every such conformation of the mind a vain motion; but +you term it “the approach and entrance of images into the mind.” Thus, +when I imagine that I behold T. Gracchus haranguing the people in the +Capitol, and collecting their suffrages concerning M. Octavius, I call +that a vain motion of the mind: but you affirm that the images of +Gracchus and Octavius are present, which are only conveyed to my mind +when they have arrived at the Capitol. The case is the same, you say, in +regard to the Deity, with the frequent representation of which the mind +is so affected that from thence it may be clearly understood that the +Gods<a id="FNA-98"></a><a href="#FN-98"><sup>98</sup></a> are happy and eternal.</p> + +<p>Let it be granted that there are images by which the mind is affected, +yet it is only a certain form that occurs; and why must that form be +pronounced happy? why eternal? But what are those images you talk of, +or whence do they proceed? This loose manner of arguing is taken from +Democritus; but he is reproved by many people for it; nor can you derive +any conclusions from it: the whole system is weak and imperfect. For +what can be more improbable than that the images of Homer, Archilochus, +Romulus, Numa, Pythagoras, and Plato should come into my mind, and yet +not in the form in which they existed? How, therefore, can they be those +persons? And whose images are they? Aristotle tells us that there never +was such a person as Orpheus the poet;<a id="FNA-99"></a><a href="#FN-99"><sup>99</sup></a> and it is said that the verse +<a id="page-248"></a><span class="pgnum">248</span>called Orphic verse was the invention of Cercops, a Pythagorean; yet +Orpheus, that is to say, the image of him, as you will have it, often +runs in my head. What is the reason that I entertain one idea of the +figure of the same person, and you another? Why do we image to ourselves +such things as never had any existence, and which never can have, such +as Scyllas and Chimæras? Why do we frame ideas of men, countries, and +cities which we never saw? How is it that the very first moment that I +choose I can form representations of them in my mind? How is it that +they come to me, even in my sleep, without being called or sought after?</p> + +<p>XXXIX. The whole affair, Velleius, is ridiculous. You do not impose +images on our eyes only, but on our minds. Such is the privilege which +you have assumed of talking nonsense with impunity. But there is, you +say, a transition of images flowing on in great crowds in such a way +that out of many some one at least must be perceived! I should be +ashamed of my incapacity to understand this if you, who assert it, could +comprehend it yourselves; for how do you prove that these images are +continued in uninterrupted motion? Or, if uninterrupted, still how do +you prove them to be eternal? There is a constant supply, you say, of +innumerable atoms. But must they, for that reason, be all eternal? To +elude this, you have recourse to equilibration (for so, with your leave, +I will call your <span class="greek">Ἰσονομία</span>),<a id="FNA-100"></a><a href="#FN-100"><sup>100</sup></a> and say that as there is a sort of +nature mortal, so there must also be a sort which is immortal. By the +same rule, as there are men mortal, there are men immortal; and as some +arise from the earth, some must arise from the water also; and as there +are causes which destroy, there must likewise be causes which preserve. +Be it as you say; but let those causes preserve which have existence +themselves. I cannot conceive these your Gods to have any. But how does +all this face of things arise from atomic corpuscles? Were there any +such atoms (as there <a id="page-249"></a><span class="pgnum">249</span>are not), they might perhaps impel one another, +and be jumbled together in their motion; but they could never be able to +impart form, or figure, or color, or animation, so that you by no means +demonstrate the immortality of your Deity.</p> + +<p>XL. Let us now inquire into his happiness. It is certain that without +virtue there can be no happiness; but virtue consists in action: now +your Deity does nothing; therefore he is void of virtue, and +consequently cannot be happy. What sort of life does he lead? He has a +constant supply, you say, of good things, without any intermixture of +bad. What are those good things? Sensual pleasures, no doubt; for you +know no delight of the mind but what arises from the body, and returns +to it. I do not suppose, Velleius, that you are like some of the +Epicureans, who are ashamed of those expressions of Epicurus,<a id="FNA-101"></a><a href="#FN-101"><sup>101</sup></a> in +which he openly avows that he has no idea of any good separate from +wanton and obscene pleasures, which, without a blush, he names +distinctly. What food, therefore, what drink, what variety of music or +flowers, what kind of pleasures of touch, what odors, will you offer to +the Gods to fill them with pleasures? The poets indeed provide them with +banquets of nectar and ambrosia, and a Hebe or a Ganymede to serve up +the cup. But what is it, Epicurus, that you do for them? For I do not +see from whence your Deity should have those things, nor how he could +use them. Therefore the nature of man is better constituted for a happy +life than the nature of the Gods, because men enjoy various kinds of +pleasures; but you look on all those pleasures as superficial which +delight the senses only by a titillation, as Epicurus calls it. Where is +to be the end of this trifling? Even Philo, who followed the Academy, +could not bear to hear the soft and luscious delights of the Epicureans +despised; for with his admirable memory he perfectly remembered and used +to repeat many sentences of Epicurus in the very words in which they +were written. He likewise used to quote many, <a id="page-250"></a><span class="pgnum">250</span>which were more gross, +from Metrodorus, the sage colleague of Epicurus, who blamed his brother +Timocrates because he would not allow that everything which had any +reference to a happy life was to be measured by the belly; nor has he +said this once only, but often. You grant what I say, I perceive; for +you know it to be true. I can produce the books, if you should deny it; +but I am not now reproving you for referring all things to the standard +of pleasure: that is another question. What I am now showing is, that +your Gods are destitute of pleasure; and therefore, according to your +own manner of reasoning, they are not happy.</p> + +<p>XLI. But they are free from pain. Is that sufficient for beings who are +supposed to enjoy all good things and the most supreme felicity? The +Deity, they say, is constantly meditating on his own happiness, for he +has no other idea which can possibly occupy his mind. Consider a little; +reflect what a figure the Deity would make if he were to be idly +thinking of nothing through all eternity but “It is very well with me, +and I am happy;” nor do I see why this happy Deity should not fear being +destroyed, since, without any intermission, he is driven and agitated by +an everlasting incursion of atoms, and since images are constantly +floating off from him. Your Deity, therefore, is neither happy nor +eternal.</p> + +<p>Epicurus, it seems, has written books concerning sanctity and piety +towards the Gods. But how does he speak on these subjects? You would say +that you were listening to Coruncanius or Scævola, the high-priests, and +not to a man who tore up all religion by the roots, and who overthrew +the temples and altars of the immortal Gods; not, indeed, with hands, +like Xerxes, but with arguments; for what reason is there for your +saying that men ought to worship the Gods, when the Gods not only do not +regard men, but are entirely careless of everything, and absolutely do +nothing at all?</p> + +<p>But they are, you say, of so glorious and excellent a nature that a wise +man is induced by their excellence to adore them. Can there be any glory +or excellence in that nature which only contemplates its own happiness, +and neither will do, nor does, nor ever did anything? Besides, <a id="page-251"></a><span class="pgnum">251</span>what +piety is due to a being from whom you receive nothing? Or how can you, +or any one else, be indebted to him who bestows no benefits? For piety +is only justice towards the Gods; but what right have they to it, when +there is no communication whatever between the Gods and men? And +sanctity is the knowledge of how we ought to worship them; but I do not +understand why they are to be worshipped, if we are neither to receive +nor expect any good from them.</p> + +<p>XLII. And why should we worship them from an admiration only of that +nature in which we can behold nothing excellent? and as for that freedom +from superstition, which you are in the habit of boasting of so much, it +is easy to be free from that feeling when you have renounced all belief +in the power of the Gods; unless, indeed, you imagine that Diagoras or +Theodorus, who absolutely denied the being of the Gods, could possibly +be superstitious. I do not suppose that even Protagoras could, who +doubted whether there were Gods or not. The opinions of these +philosophers are not only destructive of superstition, which arises from +a vain fear of the Gods, but of religion also, which consists in a pious +adoration of them.</p> + +<p>What think you of those who have asserted that the whole doctrine +concerning the immortal Gods was the invention of politicians, whose +view was to govern that part of the community by religion which reason +could not influence? Are not their opinions subversive of all religion? +Or what religion did Prodicus the Chian leave to men, who held that +everything beneficial to human life should be numbered among the Gods? +Were not they likewise void of religion who taught that the Deities, at +present the object of our prayers and adoration, were valiant, +illustrious, and mighty men who arose to divinity after death? +Euhemerus, whom our Ennius translated, and followed more than other +authors, has particularly advanced this doctrine, and treated of the +deaths and burials of the Gods; can he, then, be said to have confirmed +religion, or, rather, to have totally subverted it? I shall say nothing +of that sacred and august Eleusina, into whose mysteries the most +distant nations were initiated, <a id="page-252"></a><span class="pgnum">252</span>nor of the solemnities in Samothrace, +or in Lemnos, secretly resorted to by night, and surrounded by thick and +shady groves; which, if they were properly explained, and reduced to +reasonable principles, would rather explain the nature of things than +discover the knowledge of the Gods.</p> + +<p>XLIII. Even that great man Democritus, from whose fountains Epicurus +watered his little garden, seems to me to be very inferior to his usual +acuteness when speaking about the nature of the Gods. For at one time he +thinks that there are images endowed with divinity, inherent in the +universality of things; at another, that the principles and minds +contained in the universe are Gods; then he attributes divinity to +animated images, employing themselves in doing us good or harm; and, +lastly, he speaks of certain images of such vast extent that they +encompass the whole outside of the universe; all which opinions are more +worthy of the country<a id="FNA-102"></a><a href="#FN-102"><sup>102</sup></a> of Democritus than of Democritus himself; for +who can frame in his mind any ideas of such images? who can admire them? +who can think they merit a religious adoration?</p> + +<p>But Epicurus, when he divests the Gods of the power of doing good, +extirpates all religion from the minds of men; for though he says the +divine nature is the best and the most excellent of all natures, he will +not allow it to be susceptible of any benevolence, by which he destroys +the chief and peculiar attribute of the most perfect being. For what is +better and more excellent than goodness and beneficence? To refuse your +Gods that quality is to say that no man is any object of their favor, +and no Gods either; that they neither love nor esteem any one; in short, +that they not only give themselves no trouble about us, but even look on +each other with the greatest indifference.</p> + +<p>XLIV. How much more reasonable is the doctrine of the Stoics, whom you +censure? It is one of their maxims that the wise are friends to the +wise, though unknown to each other; for as nothing is more amiable than +virtue, he who possesses it is worthy our love, to whatever country <a id="page-253"></a><span class="pgnum">253</span>he +belongs. But what evils do your principles bring, when you make good +actions and benevolence the marks of imbecility! For, not to mention the +power and nature of the Gods, you hold that even men, if they had no +need of mutual assistance, would be neither courteous nor beneficent. Is +there no natural charity in the dispositions of good men? The very name +of love, from which friendship is derived, is dear to men;<a id="FNA-103"></a><a href="#FN-103"><sup>103</sup></a> and if +friendship is to centre in our own advantage only, without regard to him +whom we esteem a friend, it cannot be called friendship, but a sort of +traffic for our own profit. Pastures, lands, and herds of cattle are +valued in the same manner on account of the profit we gather from them; +but charity and friendship expect no return. How much more reason have +we to think that the Gods, who want nothing, should love each other, and +employ themselves about us! If it were not so, why should we pray to or +adore them? Why do the priests preside over the altars, and the augurs +over the auspices? What have we to ask of the Gods, and why do we prefer +our vows to them?</p> + +<p>But Epicurus, you say, has written a book concerning sanctity. A +trifling performance by a man whose wit is not so remarkable in it, as +the unrestrained license of writing which he has permitted himself; for +what sanctity can there be if the Gods take no care of human affairs? Or +how can that nature be called animated which neither regards nor +performs anything? Therefore our friend Posidonius has well observed, in +his fifth book of the Nature of the Gods, that Epicurus believed there +were no Gods, and that what he had said about the immortal Gods was only +said from a desire to avoid unpopularity. He could not be so weak as to +imagine that the Deity has only the outward features of a simple mortal, +without any real solidity; that he has all the members of a man, without +the least power to use them—a certain unsubstantial pellucid being, +neither favorable nor beneficial to any one, neither regarding nor doing +anything. There can be no such being in nature; and as Epicurus said +this plainly, he allows <a id="page-254"></a><span class="pgnum">254</span>the Gods in words, and destroys them in fact; +and if the Deity is truly such a being that he shows no favor, no +benevolence to mankind, away with him! For why should I entreat him to +be propitious? He can be propitious to none, since, as you say, all his +favor and benevolence are the effects of imbecility.</p> + + <hr/> + + + + +<h3>BOOK II.</h3> + + +<p>I. <span class="first">When</span> Cotta had thus concluded, Velleius replied: I certainly was +inconsiderate to engage in argument with an Academician who is likewise +a rhetorician. I should not have feared an Academician without +eloquence, nor a rhetorician without that philosophy, however eloquent +he might be; for I am never puzzled by an empty flow of words, nor by +the most subtle reasonings delivered without any grace of oratory. But +you, Cotta, have excelled in both. You only wanted the assembly and the +judges. However, enough of this at present. Now, let us hear what +Lucilius has to say, if it is agreeable to him.</p> + +<p>I had much rather, says Balbus, hear Cotta resume his discourse, and +demonstrate the true Gods with the same eloquence which he made use of +to explode the false; for, on such a subject, the loose, unsettled +doctrine of the Academy does not become a philosopher, a priest, a +Cotta, whose opinions should be, like those we hold, firm and certain. +Epicurus has been more than sufficiently refuted; but I would willingly +hear your own sentiments, Cotta.</p> + +<p>Do you forget, replies Cotta, what I at first said—that it is easier +for me, especially on this point, to explain what opinions those are +which I do not hold, rather than what those are which I do? Nay, even if +I did feel some certainty on any particular point, yet, after having +been so diffuse myself already, I would prefer now hearing you speak in +your turn. I submit, says Balbus, and will be as brief as I possibly +can; for as you have confuted the errors of Epicurus, my part in the +dispute will be the shorter. <a id="page-255"></a><span class="pgnum">255</span>Our sect divide the whole question +concerning the immortal Gods into four parts. First, they prove that +there are Gods; secondly, of what character and nature they are; +thirdly, that the universe is governed by them; and, lastly, that they +exercise a superintendence over human affairs. But in this present +discussion let us confine ourselves to the first two articles, and defer +the third and fourth till another opportunity, as they require more time +to discuss. By no means, says Cotta, for we have time enough on our +hands; besides that, we are now discussing a subject which should be +preferred even to serious business.</p> + +<p>II. The first point, then, says Lucilius, I think needs no discourse to +prove it; for what can be so plain and evident, when we behold the +heavens and contemplate the celestial bodies, as the existence of some +supreme, divine intelligence, by which all these things are governed? +Were it otherwise, Ennius would not, with a universal approbation, have +said,</p> + +<div class="poem"> +<p>Look up to the refulgent heaven above,</p> +<p>Which all men call, unanimously, Jove.</p> +</div> + +<p class="cont">This is Jupiter, the governor of the world, who rules all things with +his nod, and is, as the same Ennius adds,</p> + +<div class="poem"> +<p>——of Gods and men the sire,<a id="FNA-104"></a><a href="#FN-104"><sup>104</sup></a></p> +</div> + +<p class="cont">an omnipresent and omnipotent God. And if any one doubts this, I really +do not understand why the same man may not also doubt whether there is a +sun or not. For what can possibly be more evident than this? And if it +were not a truth universally impressed on the minds of men, the belief +in it would never have been so firm; nor would it have been, as it is, +increased by length of years, nor would it have gathered strength and +stability through every age. And, in truth, we see that other opinions, +being false and groundless, have already fallen into oblivion by lapse +of time. Who now believes in Hippocentaurs and <a id="page-256"></a><span class="pgnum">256</span>Chimæras? Or what old +woman is now to be found so weak and ignorant as to stand in fear of +those infernal monsters which once so terrified mankind? For time +destroys the fictions of error and opinion, while it confirms the +determinations of nature and of truth. And therefore it is that, both +among us and among other nations, sacred institutions and the divine +worship of the Gods have been strengthened and improved from time to +time. And this is not to be imputed to chance or folly, but to the +frequent appearance of the Gods themselves. In the war with the Latins, +when A. Posthumius, the dictator, attacked Octavius Mamilius, the +Tusculan, at Regillus, Castor and Pollux were seen fighting in our army +on horseback; and since that the same offspring of Tyndarus gave notice +of the defeat of Perses; for as P. Vatienus, the grandfather of the +present young man of that name, was coming in the night to Rome from his +government of Reate, two young men on white horses appeared to him, and +told him that King<a id="FNA-105"></a><a href="#FN-105"><sup>105</sup></a> Perses was that day taken prisoner. This news he +carried to the senate, who immediately threw him into prison for +speaking inconsiderately on a state affair; but when it was confirmed by +letters from Paullus, he was recompensed by the senate with land and +immunities.<a id="FNA-106"></a><a href="#FN-106"><sup>106</sup></a> Nor do we forget when the Locrians defeated the people +of Crotone, in a great battle on the banks of the river Sagra, that it +was known the same day at the Olympic Games. The voices of the Fauns +have been often heard, and Deities have appeared in forms so visible +that they have compelled every one who is not senseless, or hardened in +impiety, to confess the presence of the Gods.</p> + +<p>III. What do predictions and foreknowledge of future events indicate, +but that such future events are shown, pointed out, portended, and +foretold to men? From whence they are called omens, signs, portents, +prodigies. But though we should esteem fabulous what is said of +<a id="page-257"></a><span class="pgnum">257</span>Mopsus,<a id="FNA-107"></a><a href="#FN-107"><sup>107</sup></a> Tiresias,<a id="FNA-108"></a><a href="#FN-108"><sup>108</sup></a> Amphiaraus,<a id="FNA-109"></a><a href="#FN-109"><sup>109</sup></a> Calchas,<a id="FNA-110"></a><a href="#FN-110"><sup>110</sup></a> and +Helenus<a id="FNA-111"></a><a href="#FN-111"><sup>111</sup></a> (who would not have been delivered down to us as augurs +even in fable if their art had been despised), may we not be +sufficiently apprised of the power of the Gods by domestic examples? +Will not the temerity of P. Claudius, in the first Punic war, affect us? +who, when the poultry were let out of the coop and would not feed, +ordered them to be thrown into the water, and, joking even upon the +Gods, said, with a sneer, “Let them drink, since they will not eat;” +which piece of ridicule, being followed by a victory over his fleet, +cost him many tears, and brought great calamity on the Roman people. Did +not his colleague Junius, in the same war, lose his fleet in a tempest +by disregarding the auspices? Claudius, therefore, was condemned by the +people, and Junius killed himself. Cœlius says that P. Flaminius, from +his neglect of religion, fell at Thrasimenus; a loss which the public +severely felt. By these instances of calamity we may be assured that +Rome owes her grandeur and success to the conduct of those who were +tenacious of their religious duties; and if we compare ourselves to our +neighbors, we shall find that we are infinitely distinguished above +foreign nations by our zeal for religious ceremonies, though in other +things we may be only equal to them, and in other respects even inferior +to them.</p> + +<p>Ought we to contemn Attius Navius’s staff, with which <a id="page-258"></a><span class="pgnum">258</span>he divided the +regions of the vine to find his sow?<a id="FNA-112"></a><a href="#FN-112"><sup>112</sup></a> I should despise it, if I were +not aware that King Hostilius had carried on most important wars in +deference to his auguries; but by the negligence of our nobility the +discipline of the augury is now omitted, the truth of the auspices +despised, and only a mere form observed; so that the most important +affairs of the commonwealth, even the wars, on which the public safety +depends, are conducted without any auspices; the Peremnia<a id="FNA-113"></a><a href="#FN-113"><sup>113</sup></a> are +discussed; no part of the Acumina<a id="FNA-114"></a><a href="#FN-114"><sup>114</sup></a> performed; no select men are +called to witness to the military testaments;<a id="FNA-115"></a><a href="#FN-115"><sup>115</sup></a> our generals now +begin their wars as soon as they have arranged the Auspicia. The force +of religion was so great among our ancestors that some of their +commanders have, with their faces veiled, and with the solemn, formal +expressions of religion, sacrificed themselves to the immortal Gods to +save their country.<a id="FNA-116"></a><a href="#FN-116"><sup>116</sup></a> I could mention many of the Sibylline +prophecies, and many answers of the haruspices, to confirm those things, +which ought not to be doubted.</p> + +<p>IV. For example: our augurs and the Etrurian haruspices saw the truth of +their art established when P. Scipio and C. Figulus were consuls; for as +Tiberius Gracchus, who was a second time consul, wished to proceed to a +<a id="page-259"></a><span class="pgnum">259</span>fresh election, the first Rogator,<a id="FNA-117"></a><a href="#FN-117"><sup>117</sup></a> as he was collecting the +suffrages, fell down dead on the spot. Gracchus nevertheless went on +with the assembly, but perceiving that this accident had a religious +influence on the people, he brought the affair before the senate. The +senate thought fit to refer it to those who usually took cognizance of +such things. The haruspices were called, and declared that the man who +had acted as Rogator of the assembly had no right to do so; to which, as +I have heard my father say, he replied with great warmth, Have I no +right, who am consul, and augur, and favored by the Auspicia? And shall +you, who are Tuscans and Barbarians, pretend that you have authority +over the Roman Auspicia, and a right to give judgment in matters +respecting the formality of our assemblies? Therefore, he then commanded +them to withdraw; but not long afterward he wrote from his province<a id="FNA-118"></a><a href="#FN-118"><sup>118</sup></a> +to the college of augurs, acknowledging that in reading the books<a id="FNA-119"></a><a href="#FN-119"><sup>119</sup></a> +he remembered that he had illegally chosen a place for his tent in the +gardens of Scipio, and had afterward entered the Pomœrium, in order to +hold a senate, but that in repassing the same Pomœrium he had forgotten +to take the auspices; and that, therefore, the consuls had been created +informally. The augurs laid the case before the senate. The senate +decreed that they should resign their charge, and so they accordingly +abdicated. What greater example need we seek for? The wisest, perhaps +the most excellent of men, chose to confess his fault, which he might +have concealed, rather than leave the public the least atom of religious +guilt; and the consuls chose to quit the highest office in the State, +rather than fill it for a moment in defiance of religion. How great is +the reputation of the augurs!</p> + +<p>And is not the art of the soothsayers divine? And must not every one who +sees what innumerable instances of the same kind there are confess the +existence of the <a id="page-260"></a><span class="pgnum">260</span>Gods? For they who have interpreters must certainly +exist themselves; now, there are interpreters of the Gods; therefore we +must allow there are Gods. But it may be said, perhaps, that all +predictions are not accomplished. We may as well conclude there is no +art of physic, because all sick persons do not recover. The Gods show us +signs of future events; if we are occasionally deceived in the results, +it is not to be imputed to the nature of the Gods, but to the +conjectures of men. All nations agree that there are Gods; the opinion +is innate, and, as it were, engraved in the minds of all men. The only +point in dispute among us is, what they are.</p> + +<p>V. Their existence no one denies. Cleanthes, one of our sect, imputes +the way in which the idea of the Gods is implanted in the minds of men +to four causes. The first is that which I just now mentioned—the +foreknowledge of future things. The second is the great advantages which +we enjoy from the temperature of the air, the fertility of the earth, +and the abundance of various benefits of other kinds. The third cause is +deduced from the terror with which the mind is affected by thunder, +tempests, storms, snow, hail, devastation, pestilence, earthquakes often +attended with hideous noises, showers of stones, and rain like drops of +blood; by rocks and sudden openings of the earth; by monstrous births of +men and beasts; by meteors in the air, and blazing stars, by the Greeks +called <i>cometæ</i>, by us <i>crinitæ</i>, the appearance of which, in the late +Octavian war,<a id="FNA-120"></a><a href="#FN-120"><sup>120</sup></a> were foreboders of great calamities; by two suns, +which, as I have heard my father say, happened in the consulate of +Tuditanus and Aquillius, and in which year also another sun (P. +Africanus) was extinguished. These things terrified mankind, and raised +in them a firm belief of the existence of some celestial and divine +power.</p> + +<p>His fourth cause, and that the strongest, is drawn from the regularity +of the motion and revolution of the heavens, the distinctness, variety, +beauty, and order of the sun, moon, and all the stars, the appearance +only of which is sufficient to convince us they are not the effects of +chance; as when we enter into a house, or school, or court, and observe +the exact order, discipline, and method of it, we cannot suppose <a id="page-261"></a><span class="pgnum">261</span>that +it is so regulated without a cause, but must conclude that there is some +one who commands, and to whom obedience is paid. It is quite impossible +for us to avoid thinking that the wonderful motions, revolutions, and +order of those many and great bodies, no part of which is impaired by +the countless and infinite succession of ages, must be governed and +directed by some supreme intelligent being.</p> + +<p>VI. Chrysippus, indeed, had a very penetrating genius; yet such is the +doctrine which he delivers, that he seems rather to have been instructed +by nature than to owe it to any discovery of his own. “If,” says he, +“there is anything in the universe which no human reason, ability, or +power can make, the being who produced it must certainly be preferable +to man. Now, celestial bodies, and all those things which proceed in any +eternal order, cannot be made by man; the being who made them is +therefore preferable to man. What, then, is that being but a God? If +there be no such thing as a Deity, what is there better than man, since +he only is possessed of reason, the most excellent of all things? But it +is a foolish piece of vanity in man to think there is nothing preferable +to him. There is, therefore, something preferable; consequently, there +is certainly a God.”</p> + +<p>When you behold a large and beautiful house, surely no one can persuade +you it was built for mice and weasels, though you do not see the master; +and would it not, therefore, be most manifest folly to imagine that a +world so magnificently adorned, with such an immense variety of +celestial bodies of such exquisite beauty, and that the vast sizes and +magnitude of the sea and land were intended as the abode of man, and not +as the mansion of the immortal Gods? Do we not also plainly see this, +that all the most elevated regions are the best, and that the earth is +the lowest region, and is surrounded with the grossest air? so that as +we perceive that in some cities and countries the capacities of men are +naturally duller, from the thickness of the climate, so mankind in +general are affected by the heaviness of the air which surrounds the +earth, the grossest region of the world.</p> + +<p>Yet even from this inferior intelligence of man we may <a id="page-262"></a><span class="pgnum">262</span>discover the +existence of some intelligent agent that is divine, and wiser than +ourselves; for, as Socrates says in Xenophon, from whence had man his +portion of understanding? And, indeed, if any one were to push his +inquiries about the moisture and heat which is diffused through the +human body, and the earthy kind of solidity existing in our entrails, +and that soul by which we breathe, and to ask whence we derived them, it +would be plain that we have received one thing from the earth, another +from liquid, another from fire, and another from that air which we +inhale every time that we breathe.</p> + +<p>VII. But where did we find that which excels all these things—I mean +reason, or (if you please, in other terms) the mind, understanding, +thought, prudence; and from whence did we receive it? Shall the world be +possessed of every other perfection, and be destitute of this one, which +is the most important and valuable of all? But certainly there is +nothing better, or more excellent, or more beautiful than the world; and +not only there is nothing better, but we cannot even conceive anything +superior to it; and if reason and wisdom are the greatest of all +perfections, they must necessarily be a part of what we all allow to be +the most excellent.</p> + +<p>Who is not compelled to admit the truth of what I assert by that +agreeable, uniform, and continued agreement of things in the universe? +Could the earth at one season be adorned with flowers, at another be +covered with snow? Or, if such a number of things regulated their own +changes, could the approach and retreat of the sun in the summer and +winter solstices be so regularly known and calculated? Could the flux +and reflux of the sea and the height of the tides be affected by the +increase or wane of the moon? Could the different courses of the stars +be preserved by the uniform movement of the whole heaven? Could these +things subsist, I say, in such a harmony of all the parts of the +universe without the continued influence of a divine spirit?</p> + +<p>If these points are handled in a free and copious manner, as I purpose +to do, they will be less liable to the cavils of the Academics; but the +narrow, confined way in which Zeno reasoned upon them laid them more +open to <a id="page-263"></a><span class="pgnum">263</span>objection; for as running streams are seldom or never tainted, +while standing waters easily grow corrupt, so a fluency of expression +washes away the censures of the caviller, while the narrow limits of a +discourse which is too concise is almost defenceless; for the arguments +which I am enlarging upon are thus briefly laid down by Zeno:</p> + +<p>VIII. “That which reasons is superior to that which does not; nothing is +superior to the world; the world, therefore, reasons.” By the same rule +the world may be proved to be wise, happy, and eternal; for the +possession of all these qualities is superior to the want of them; and +nothing is superior to the world; the inevitable consequence of which +argument is, that the world, therefore, is a Deity. He goes on: “No part +of anything void of sense is capable of perception; some parts of the +world have perception; the world, therefore, has sense.” He proceeds, +and pursues the argument closely. “Nothing,” says he, “that is destitute +itself of life and reason can generate a being possessed of life and +reason; but the world does generate beings possessed of life and reason; +the world, therefore, is not itself destitute of life and reason.”</p> + +<p>He concludes his argument in his usual manner with a simile: “If +well-tuned pipes should spring out of the olive, would you have the +slightest doubt that there was in the olive-tree itself some kind of +skill and knowledge? Or if the plane-tree could produce harmonious +lutes, surely you would infer, on the same principle, that music was +contained in the plane-tree. Why, then, should we not believe the world +is a living and wise being, since it produces living and wise beings out +of itself?”</p> + +<p>IX. But as I have been insensibly led into a length of discourse beyond +my first design (for I said that, as the existence of the Gods was +evident to all, there was no need of any long oration to prove it), I +will demonstrate it by reasons deduced from the nature of things. For it +is a fact that all beings which take nourishment and increase contain in +themselves a power of natural heat, without which they could neither be +nourished nor increase. For everything which is of a warm and fiery +character is agitated and stirred up by its own motion. But that which +is nourished and grows is influenced by a certain regular <a id="page-264"></a><span class="pgnum">264</span>and equable +motion. And as long as this motion remains in us, so long does sense and +life remain; but the moment that it abates and is extinguished, we +ourselves decay and perish.</p> + +<p>By arguments like these, Cleanthes shows how great is the power of heat +in all bodies. He observes that there is no food so gross as not to be +digested in a night and a day; and that even in the excrementitious +parts, which nature rejects, there remains a heat. The veins and +arteries seem, by their continual quivering, to resemble the agitation +of fire; and it has often been observed when the heart of an animal is +just plucked from the body that it palpitates with such visible motion +as to resemble the rapidity of fire. Everything, therefore, that has +life, whether it be animal or vegetable, owes that life to the heat +inherent in it; it is this nature of heat which contains in itself the +vital power which extends throughout the whole world. This will appear +more clearly on a more close explanation of this fiery quality, which +pervades all things.</p> + +<p>Every division, then, of the world (and I shall touch upon the most +considerable) is sustained by heat; and first it may be observed in +earthly substances that fire is produced from stones by striking or +rubbing one against another; that “the warm earth smokes”<a id="FNA-121"></a><a href="#FN-121"><sup>121</sup></a> when just +turned up, and that water is drawn warm from well-springs; and this is +most especially the case in the winter season, because there is a great +quantity of heat contained in the caverns of the earth; and this becomes +more dense in the winter, and on that account confines more closely the +innate heat which is discoverable in the earth.</p> + +<p>X. It would require a long dissertation, and many reasons would require +to be adduced, to show that all the seeds which the earth conceives, and +all those which it contains having been generated from itself, and fixed +in roots and trunks, derive all their origin and increase from the +temperature and regulation of heat. And that even every liquor has a +mixture of heat in it is plainly demonstrated by the effusion of water; +for it would not congeal by cold, nor become solid, as ice or snow, and +return again <a id="page-265"></a><span class="pgnum">265</span>to its natural state, if it were not that, when heat is +applied to it, it again becomes liquefied and dissolved, and so diffuses +itself. Therefore, by northern and other cold winds it is frozen and +hardened, and in turn it dissolves and melts again by heat. The seas +likewise, we find, when agitated by winds, grow warm, so that from this +fact we may understand that there is heat included in that vast body of +water; for we cannot imagine it to be external and adventitious heat, +but such as is stirred up by agitation from the deep recesses of the +seas; and the same thing takes place with respect to our bodies, which +grow warm with motion and exercise.</p> + +<p>And the very air itself, which indeed is the coldest element, is by no +means void of heat; for there is a great quantity, arising from the +exhalations of water, which appears to be a sort of steam occasioned by +its internal heat, like that of boiling liquors. The fourth part of the +universe is entirely fire, and is the source of the salutary and vital +heat which is found in the rest. From hence we may conclude that, as all +parts of the world are sustained by heat, the world itself also has such +a great length of time subsisted from the same cause; and so much the +more, because we ought to understand that that hot and fiery principle +is so diffused over universal nature that there is contained in it a +power and cause of generation and procreation, from which all animate +beings, and all those creatures of the vegetable world, the roots of +which are contained in the earth, must inevitably derive their origin +and their increase.</p> + +<p>XI. It is nature, consequently, that continues and preserves the world, +and that, too, a nature which is not destitute of sense and reason; for +in every essence that is not simple, but composed of several parts, +there must be some predominant quality—as, for instance, the mind in +man, and in beasts something resembling it, from which arise all the +appetites and desires for anything. As for trees, and all the vegetable +produce of the earth, it is thought to be in their roots. I call that +the predominant quality,<a id="FNA-122"></a><a href="#FN-122"><sup>122</sup></a> which <a id="page-266"></a><span class="pgnum">266</span>the Greeks call <span class="greek">ἡγεμονικόν</span>; which +must and ought to be the most excellent quality, wherever it is found. +That, therefore, in which the prevailing quality of all nature resides +must be the most excellent of all things, and most worthy of the power +and pre-eminence over all things.</p> + +<p>Now, we see that there is nothing in being that is not a part of the +universe; and as there are sense and reason in the parts of it, there +must therefore be these qualities, and these, too, in a more energetic +and powerful degree, in that part in which the predominant quality of +the world is found. The world, therefore, must necessarily be possessed +of wisdom; and that element, which embraces all things, must excel in +perfection of reason. The world, therefore, is a God, and the whole +power of the world is contained in that divine element.</p> + +<p>The heat also of the world is more pure, clear, and lively, and, +consequently, better adapted to move the senses than the heat allotted +to us; and it vivifies and preserves all things within the compass of +our knowledge.</p> + +<p>It is absurd, therefore, to say that the world, which is endued with a +perfect, free, pure, spirituous, and active heat, is not sensitive, +since by this heat men and beasts are preserved, and move, and think; +more especially since this heat of the world is itself the sole +principle of agitation, and has no external impulse, but is moved +spontaneously; for what can be more powerful than the world, which moves +and raises that heat by which it subsists?</p> + +<p>XII. For let us listen to Plato, who is regarded as a God among +philosophers. He says that there are two sorts of motion, one innate and +the other external; and that that which is moved spontaneously is more +divine than that which is moved by another power. This self-motion he +places in the mind alone, and concludes that the first principle of +motion is derived from the mind. Therefore, since all motion arises from +the heat of the world, and that heat is not moved by the effect of any +external impulse, but of its own accord, it must necessarily be a mind; +from whence it follows that the world is animated.</p> + +<p>On such reasoning is founded this opinion, that the world is possessed +of understanding, because it certainly has more perfections in itself +than any other nature; for <a id="page-267"></a><span class="pgnum">267</span>as there is no part of our bodies so +considerable as the whole of us, so it is clear that there is no +particular portion of the universe equal in magnitude to the whole of +it; from whence it follows that wisdom must be an attribute of the +world; otherwise man, who is a part of it, and possessed of reason, +would be superior to the entire world.</p> + +<p>And thus, if we proceed from the first rude, unfinished natures to the +most superior and perfect ones, we shall inevitably come at last to the +nature of the Gods. For, in the first place, we observe that those +vegetables which are produced out of the earth are supported by nature, +and she gives them no further supply than is sufficient to preserve them +by nourishing them and making them grow. To beasts she has given sense +and motion, and a faculty which directs them to what is wholesome, and +prompts them to shun what is noxious to them. On man she has conferred a +greater portion of her favor; inasmuch as she has added reason, by which +he is enabled to command his passions, to moderate some, and to subdue +others.</p> + +<p>XIII. In the fourth and highest degree are those beings which are +naturally wise and good, who from the first moment of their existence +are possessed of right and consistent reason, which we must consider +superior to man and deserving to be attributed to a God; that is to say, +to the world, in which it is inevitable that that perfect and complete +reason should be inherent. Nor is it possible that it should be said +with justice that there is any arrangement of things in which there +cannot be something entire and perfect. For as in a vine or in beasts we +see that nature, if not prevented by some superior violence, proceeds by +her own appropriate path to her destined end; and as in painting, +architecture, and the other arts there is a point of perfection which is +attainable, and occasionally attained, so it is even much more necessary +that in universal nature there must be some complete and perfect result +arrived at. Many external accidents may happen to all other natures +which may impede their progress to perfection, but nothing can hinder +universal nature, because she is herself the ruler and governor of all +other natures. That, therefore, must be the fourth and most elevated +degree to which no other power can approach.</p> + +<p><a id="page-268"></a><span class="pgnum">268</span>But this degree is that on which the nature of all things is placed; +and since she is possessed of this, and she presides over all things, +and is subject to no possible impediment, the world must necessarily be +an intelligent and even a wise being. But how marvellously great is the +ignorance of those men who dispute the perfection of that nature which +encircles all things; or who, allowing it to be infinitely perfect, yet +deny it to be, in the first place, animated, then reasonable, and, +lastly, prudent and wise! For how without these qualities could it be +infinitely perfect? If it were like vegetables, or even like beasts, +there would be no more reason for thinking it extremely good than +extremely bad; and if it were possessed of reason, and had not wisdom +from the beginning, the world would be in a worse condition than man; +for man may grow wise, but the world, if it were destitute of wisdom +through an infinite space of time past, could never acquire it. Thus it +would be worse than man. But as that is absurd to imagine, the world +must be esteemed wise from all eternity, and consequently a Deity: since +there is nothing existing that is not defective, except the universe, +which is well provided, and fully complete and perfect in all its +numbers and parts.</p> + +<p>XIV. For Chrysippus says, very acutely, that as the case is made for the +buckler, and the scabbard for the sword, so all things, except the +universe, were made for the sake of something else. As, for instance, +all those crops and fruits which the earth produces were made for the +sake of animals, and animals for man; as, the horse for carrying, the ox +for the plough, the dog for hunting and for a guard. But man himself was +born to contemplate and imitate the world, being in no wise perfect, +but, if I may so express myself, a particle of perfection; but the +world, as it comprehends all, and as nothing exists that is not +contained in it, is entirely perfect. In what, therefore, can it be +defective, since it is perfect? It cannot want understanding and reason, +for they are the most desirable of all qualities. The same Chrysippus +observes also, by the use of similitudes, that everything in its kind, +when arrived at maturity and perfection, is superior to that which is +not—as, a horse to a colt, a dog to a puppy, and a man to a boy—so +whatever <a id="page-269"></a><span class="pgnum">269</span>is best in the whole universe must exist in some complete and +perfect being. But nothing is more perfect than the world, and nothing +better than virtue. Virtue, therefore, is an attribute of the world. But +human nature is not perfect, and nevertheless virtue is produced in it: +with how much greater reason, then, do we conceive it to be inherent in +the world! Therefore the world has virtue, and it is also wise, and +consequently a Deity.</p> + +<p>XV. The divinity of the world being now clearly perceived, we must +acknowledge the same divinity to be likewise in the stars, which are +formed from the lightest and purest part of the ether, without a mixture +of any other matter; and, being altogether hot and transparent, we may +justly say they have life, sense, and understanding. And Cleanthes +thinks that it may be established by the evidence of two of our +senses—feeling and seeing—that they are entirely fiery bodies; for the +heat and brightness of the sun far exceed any other fire, inasmuch as it +enlightens the whole universe, covering such a vast extent of space, and +its power is such that we perceive that it not only warms, but often +even burns: neither of which it could do if it were not of a fiery +quality. Since, then, says he, the sun is a fiery body, and is nourished +by the vapors of the ocean (for no fire can continue without some +sustenance), it must be either like that fire which we use to warm us +and dress our food, or like that which is contained in the bodies of +animals.</p> + +<p>And this fire, which the convenience of life requires, is the devourer +and consumer of everything, and throws into confusion and destroys +whatever it reaches. On the contrary, the corporeal heat is full of +life, and salutary; and vivifies, preserves, cherishes, increases, and +sustains all things, and is productive of sense; therefore, says he, +there can be no doubt which of these fires the sun is like, since it +causes all things in their respective kinds to flourish and arrive to +maturity; and as the fire of the sun is like that which is contained in +the bodies of animated beings, the sun itself must likewise be animated, +and so must the other stars also, which arise out of the celestial ardor +that we call the sky, or firmament.</p> + +<p>As, then, some animals are generated in the earth, some <a id="page-270"></a><span class="pgnum">270</span>in the water, +and some in the air, Aristotle<a id="FNA-123"></a><a href="#FN-123"><sup>123</sup></a> thinks it ridiculous to imagine that +no animal is formed in that part of the universe which is the most +capable to produce them. But the stars are situated in the ethereal +space; and as this is an element the most subtle, whose motion is +continual, and whose force does not decay, it follows, of necessity, +that every animated being which is produced in it must be endowed with +the quickest sense and the swiftest motion. The stars, therefore, being +there generated, it is a natural inference to suppose them endued with +such a degree of sense and understanding as places them in the rank of +Gods.</p> + +<p>XVI. For it may be observed that they who inhabit countries of a pure, +clear air have a quicker apprehension and a readier genius than those +who live in a thick, foggy climate. It is thought likewise that the +nature of a man’s diet has an effect on the mind; therefore it is +probable that the stars are possessed of an excellent understanding, +inasmuch as they are situated in the ethereal part of the universe, and +are nourished by the vapors of the earth and sea, which are purified by +their long passage to the heavens. But the invariable order and regular +motion of the stars plainly manifest their sense and understanding; for +all motion which seems to be conducted with reason and harmony supposes +an intelligent principle, that does not act blindly, or inconsistently, +or at random. And this regularity and consistent course of the stars +from all eternity indicates not any natural order, for it is pregnant +with sound reason, not fortune (for fortune, being a friend to change, +despises consistency). It follows, therefore, that they move +spontaneously by their own sense and divinity.</p> + +<p>Aristotle also deserves high commendation for his observation that +everything that moves is either put in motion by natural impulse, or by +some external force, or of its own accord; and that the sun, and moon, +and all the stars move; but that those things which are moved by natural +impulse are either borne downward by their weight, or upward by their +lightness; neither of which things could be the case with the stars, +because they move in a regular circle and orbit. Nor can it be said that +<a id="page-271"></a><span class="pgnum">271</span>there is some superior force which causes the stars to be moved in a +manner contrary to nature. For what superior force can there be? It +follows, therefore, that their motion must be voluntary. And whoever is +convinced of this must discover not only great ignorance, but great +impiety likewise, if he denies the existence of the Gods; nor is the +difference great whether a man denies their existence, or deprives them +of all design and action; for whatever is wholly inactive seems to me +not to exist at all. Their existence, therefore, appears so plain that I +can scarcely think that man in his senses who denies it.</p> + +<p>XVII. It now remains that we consider what is the character of the Gods. +Nothing is more difficult than to divert our thoughts and judgment from +the information of our corporeal sight, and the view of objects which +our eyes are accustomed to; and it is this difficulty which has had such +an influence on the unlearned, and on philosophers<a id="FNA-124"></a><a href="#FN-124"><sup>124</sup></a> also who +resembled the unlearned multitude, that they have been unable to form +any idea of the immortal Gods except under the clothing of the human +figure; the weakness of which opinion Cotta has so well confuted that I +need not add my thoughts upon it. But as the previous idea which we have +of the Deity comprehends two things—first of all, that he is an +animated being; secondly, that there is nothing in all nature superior +to him—I do not see what can be more consistent with this idea and +preconception than to attribute a mind and divinity to the world,<a id="FNA-125"></a><a href="#FN-125"><sup>125</sup></a> +the most excellent of all beings.</p> + +<p>Epicurus may be as merry with this notion as he pleases; a man not the +best qualified for a joker, as not having the wit and sense of his +country.<a id="FNA-126"></a><a href="#FN-126"><sup>126</sup></a> Let him say that a voluble round Deity is to him +incomprehensible; yet he shall never dissuade me from a principle which +he himself approves, for he is of opinion there are Gods when he allows +that there must be a nature excellently perfect. But it is certain <a id="page-272"></a><span class="pgnum">272</span>that +the world is most excellently perfect: nor is it to be doubted that +whatever has life, sense, reason, and understanding must excel that +which is destitute of these things. It follows, then, that the world has +life, sense, reason, and understanding, and is consequently a Deity. But +this shall soon be made more manifest by the operation of these very +things which the world causes.</p> + +<p>XVIII. In the mean while, Velleius, let me entreat you not to be always +saying that we are utterly destitute of every sort of learning. The +cone, you say, the cylinder, and the pyramid, are more beautiful to you +than the sphere. This is to have different eyes from other men. But +suppose they are more beautiful to the sight only, which does not appear +to me, for I can see nothing more beautiful than that figure which +contains all others, and which has nothing rough in it, nothing +offensive, nothing cut into angles, nothing broken, nothing swelling, +and nothing hollow; yet as there are two forms most esteemed,<a id="FNA-127"></a><a href="#FN-127"><sup>127</sup></a> the +globe in solids (for so the Greek word <span class="greek">σφαῖρα</span>, I think, should be +construed), and the circle, or orb, in planes (in Greek, <span class="greek">κύκλος</span>); and as +they only have an exact similitude of parts in which every extreme is +equally distant from the centre, what can we imagine in nature to be +more just and proper? But if you have never raked into this learned +dust<a id="FNA-128"></a><a href="#FN-128"><sup>128</sup></a> to find out these things, surely, at all events, you natural +philosophers must know that equality of motion and invariable order +could not be preserved in any other figure. Nothing, therefore, can be +more illiterate than to assert, as you are in the habit of doing, that +it is doubtful whether the world is round or not, because it may +possibly be of another shape, and that there are innumerable worlds of +different forms; which Epicurus, if he ever had learned that two and two +are equal to four, would not have said. But while he judges of what is +best by his palate, he does not look up to the “palace of heaven,” as +Ennius calls it.</p> + +<p>XIX. For as there are two sorts of stars,<a id="FNA-129"></a><a href="#FN-129"><sup>129</sup></a> one kind of <a id="page-273"></a><span class="pgnum">273</span>which +measure their journey from east to west by immutable stages, never in +the least varying from their usual course, while the other completes a +double revolution with an equally constant regularity; from each of +these facts we demonstrate the volubility of the world (which could not +possibly take place in any but a globular form) and the circular orbits +of the stars. And first of all the sun, which has the chief rank among +all the stars, is moved in such a manner that it fills the whole earth +with its light, and illuminates alternately one part of the earth, while +it leaves the other in darkness. The shadow of the earth interposing +causes night; and the intervals of night are equal to those of day. And +it is the regular approaches and retreats of the sun from which arise +the regulated degrees of cold and heat. His annual circuit is in three +hundred and sixty-five days, and nearly six hours more.<a id="FNA-130"></a><a href="#FN-130"><sup>130</sup></a> At one time +he bends his course to the north, at another to the south, and thus +produces summer and winter, with the other two seasons, one of which +succeeds the decline of winter, and the other that of summer. And so to +these four changes of the seasons we attribute the origin and cause of +all the productions both of sea and land.</p> + +<p>The moon completes the same course every month which the sun does in a +year. The nearer she approaches to the sun, the dimmer light does she +yield, and when most remote from it she shines with the fullest +brilliancy; nor are her figure and form only changed in her wane, but +her situation likewise, which is sometimes in the north and sometimes in +the south. By this course she has a sort of summer and winter solstices; +and by her influence she contributes to the nourishment and increase of +animated <a id="page-274"></a><span class="pgnum">274</span>beings, and to the ripeness and maturity of all vegetables.</p> + +<p>XX. But most worthy our admiration is the motion of those five stars +which are falsely called wandering stars; for they cannot be said to +wander which keep from all eternity their approaches and retreats, and +have all the rest of their motions, in one regular constant and +established order. What is yet more wonderful in these stars which we +are speaking of is that sometimes they appear, and sometimes they +disappear; sometimes they advance towards the sun, and sometimes they +retreat; sometimes they precede him, and sometimes follow him; sometimes +they move faster, sometimes slower, and sometimes they do not stir in +the least, but for a while stand still. From these unequal motions of +the planets, mathematicians have called that the “great year”<a id="FNA-131"></a><a href="#FN-131"><sup>131</sup></a> in +which the sun, moon, and five wandering stars, having finished their +revolutions, are found in their original situation. In how long a time +this is effected is much disputed, but it must be a certain and definite +period. For the planet Saturn (called by the Greeks <span class="greek">Φαίνον</span>), which is +farthest from the earth, finishes his course in about thirty years; and +in his course there is something very singular, for sometimes he moves +before the sun, sometimes he keeps behind it; at one time lying hidden +in the night, at another again appearing in the morning; and ever +performing the same motions in the same space of time without any +alteration, so as to be for infinite ages regular in these courses. +Beneath this planet, and nearer the earth, is Jupiter, called <span class="greek">Φαέθων</span>, +which passes the same orbit of the twelve signs<a id="FNA-132"></a><a href="#FN-132"><sup>132</sup></a> in twelve years, +and goes through exactly the same variety in its course that the star of +Saturn does. Next to Jupiter is the planet Mars (in Greek, <span class="greek">Πυρόεις</span>), +which finishes its revolution through the same orbit as the two +previously mentioned,<a id="FNA-133"></a><a href="#FN-133"><sup>133</sup></a> in twenty-four months, wanting six days, as I +<a id="page-275"></a><span class="pgnum">275</span>imagine. Below this is Mercury (called by the Greeks <span class="greek">Στίλβων</span>), which +performs the same course in little less than a year, and is never +farther distant from the sun than the space of one sign, whether it +precedes or follows it. The lowest of the five planets, and nearest the +earth, is that of Venus (called in Greek <span class="greek">Φωσφόρος</span>). Before the rising of +the sun, it is called the morning-star, and after the setting, the +evening-star. It has the same revolution through the zodiac, both as to +latitude and longitude, with the other planets, in a year, and never is +more than two<a id="FNA-134"></a><a href="#FN-134"><sup>134</sup></a> signs from the sun, whether it precedes or follows +it.</p> + +<p>XXI. I cannot, therefore, conceive that this constant course of the +planets, this just agreement in such various motions through all +eternity, can be preserved without a mind, reason, and consideration; +and since we may perceive these qualities in the stars, we cannot but +place them in the rank of Gods. Those which are called the fixed stars +have the same indications of reason and prudence. Their motion is daily, +regular, and constant. They do not move with the sky, nor have they an +adhesion to the firmament, as they who are ignorant of natural +philosophy affirm. For the sky, which is thin, transparent, and suffused +with an equal heat, does not seem by its nature to have power to whirl +about the stars, or to be proper to contain them. The fixed stars, +therefore, have their own sphere, separate and free from any conjunction +with the sky. Their perpetual courses, with that admirable and +incredible regularity of theirs, so plainly declare a divine power and +mind to be in them, that he who cannot perceive that they are also +endowed with divine power must be incapable of all perception whatever.</p> + +<p>In the heavens, therefore, there is nothing fortuitous, unadvised, +inconstant, or variable: all there is order, truth, reason, and +constancy; and all the things which are destitute of these qualities are +counterfeit, deceitful, and erroneous, and have their residence about +the earth<a id="FNA-135"></a><a href="#FN-135"><sup>135</sup></a> beneath the moon, the lowest of all the planets. He, +therefore, <a id="page-276"></a><span class="pgnum">276</span>who believes that this admirable order and almost incredible +regularity of the heavenly bodies, by which the preservation and entire +safety of all things is secured, is destitute of intelligence, must be +considered to be himself wholly destitute of all intellect whatever.</p> + +<p>I think, then, I shall not deceive myself in maintaining this dispute +upon the principle of Zeno, who went the farthest in his search after +truth.</p> + +<p>XXII. Zeno, then, defines nature to be “an artificial fire, proceeding +in a regular way to generation;” for he thinks that to create and beget +are especial properties of art, and that whatever may be wrought by the +hands of our artificers is much more skilfully performed by nature, that +is, by this artificial fire, which is the master of all other arts.</p> + +<p>According to this manner of reasoning, every particular nature is +artificial, as it operates agreeably to a certain method peculiar to +itself; but that universal nature which embraces all things is said by +Zeno to be not only artificial, but absolutely the artificer, ever +thinking and providing all things useful and proper; and as every +particular nature owes its rise and increase to its own proper seed, so +universal nature has all her motions voluntary, has affections and +desires (by the Greeks called <span class="greek">ὁρμὰς</span>) productive of actions agreeable to +them, like us, who have sense and understanding to direct us. Such, +then, is the intelligence of the universe; for which reason it may be +properly termed prudence or providence (in Greek, <span class="greek">πρόνοια</span>), since her +chiefest care and employment is to provide all things fit for its +duration, that it may want nothing, and, above all, that it may be +adorned with all perfection of beauty and ornament.</p> + +<p>XXIII. Thus far have I spoken concerning the universe, and also of the +stars; from whence it is apparent that there is almost an infinite +number of Gods, always in action, but without labor or fatigue; for they +are not composed of veins, nerves, and bones; their food and drink are +not such as cause humors too gross or too subtle; nor are their bodies +such as to be subject to the fear of falls or blows, or in danger of +diseases from a weariness of limbs. Epicurus, to secure his Gods from +such accidents, <a id="page-277"></a><span class="pgnum">277</span>has made them only outlines of Deities, void of action; +but our Gods being of the most beautiful form, and situated in the +purest region of the heavens, dispose and rule their course in such a +manner that they seem to contribute to the support and preservation of +all things.</p> + +<p>Besides these, there are many other natures which have with reason been +deified by the wisest Grecians, and by our ancestors, in consideration +of the benefits derived from them; for they were persuaded that whatever +was of great utility to human kind must proceed from divine goodness, +and the name of the Deity was applied to that which the Deity produced, +as when we call corn Ceres, and wine Bacchus; whence that saying of +Terence,<a id="FNA-136"></a><a href="#FN-136"><sup>136</sup></a></p> + +<div class="poem"> +<p>Without Ceres and Bacchus, Venus starves.</p> +</div> + +<p class="cont">And any quality, also, in which there was any singular virtue was +nominated a Deity, such as Faith and Wisdom, which are placed among the +divinities in the Capitol; the last by Æmilius Scaurus, but Faith was +consecrated before by Atilius Calatinus. You see the temple of Virtue +and that of Honor repaired by M. Marcellus, erected formerly, in the +Ligurian war, by Q. Maximus. Need I mention those dedicated to Help, +Safety, Concord, Liberty, and Victory, which have been called Deities, +because their efficacy has been so great that it could not have +proceeded from any but from some divine power? In like manner are the +names of Cupid, Voluptas, and of Lubentine Venus consecrated, though +they were things vicious and not natural, whatever Velleius may think +to the contrary, for they frequently stimulate nature in too violent a +manner. Everything, then, from which any great utility proceeded was +deified; and, indeed, the names I have just now mentioned are +declaratory of the particular virtue of each Deity.</p> + +<p>XXIV. It has been a general custom likewise, that men who have done +important service to the public should be exalted to heaven by fame and +universal consent. Thus Hercules, Castor and Pollux, Æsculapius, and +Liber became Gods (I mean Liber<a id="FNA-137"></a><a href="#FN-137"><sup>137</sup></a> the son of Semele, and not him<a id="FNA-138"></a><a href="#FN-138"><sup>138</sup></a> +whom our ancestors consecrated in such state and <a id="page-278"></a><span class="pgnum">278</span>solemnity with Ceres +and Libera; the difference in which may be seen in our Mysteries.<a id="FNA-139"></a><a href="#FN-139"><sup>139</sup></a> +But because the offsprings of our bodies are called “Liberi” (children), +therefore the offsprings of Ceres are called Liber and Libera +(Libera<a id="FNA-140"></a><a href="#FN-140"><sup>140</sup></a> is the feminine, and Liber the masculine); thus likewise +Romulus, or Quirinus—for they are thought to be the same—became a God.</p> + +<p>They are justly esteemed as Deities, since their souls subsist and enjoy +eternity, from whence they are perfect and immortal beings.</p> + +<p>There is another reason, too, and that founded on natural philosophy, +which has greatly contributed to the number of Deities; namely, the +custom of representing in human form a crowd of Gods who have supplied +the poets with fables, and filled mankind with all sorts of +superstition. Zeno has treated of this subject, but it has been +discussed more at length by Cleanthes and Chrysippus. All Greece was of +opinion that Cœlum was castrated by his son Saturn,<a id="FNA-141"></a><a href="#FN-141"><sup>141</sup></a> and that Saturn +was chained by his son Jupiter. In these impious fables, a physical and +not inelegant meaning is contained; for they would denote that the +celestial, most exalted, and ethereal nature—that is, the fiery nature, +which produces all things by itself—is destitute of that part of the +body which is necessary for the act of generation by conjunction with +another.</p> + +<p>XXV. By Saturn they mean that which comprehends the course and +revolution of times and seasons; the Greek name for which Deity implies +as much, for he is called <a id="page-279"></a><span class="pgnum">279</span><span class="greek">Κρόνος,</span> which is the same with <span class="greek">Χρόνος</span>, that +is, a “space of time.” But he is called Saturn, because he is filled +(<i>saturatur</i>) with years; and he is usually feigned to have devoured his +children, because time, ever insatiable, consumes the rolling years; but +to restrain him from immoderate haste, Jupiter has confined him to the +course of the stars, which are as chains to him. Jupiter (that is, +<i>juvans pater</i>) signifies a “helping father,” whom, by changing the +cases, we call Jove,<a id="FNA-142"></a><a href="#FN-142"><sup>142</sup></a> <i>a juvando</i>. The poets call him “father of +Gods and men;”<a id="FNA-143"></a><a href="#FN-143"><sup>143</sup></a> and our ancestors “the most good, the most great;” +and as there is something more glorious in itself, and more agreeable to +others, to be good (that is, beneficent) than to be great, the title of +“most good” precedes that of “most great.” This, then, is he whom Ennius +means in the following passage, before quoted—</p> + +<div class="poem"> +<p>Look up to the refulgent heaven above,</p> +<p>Which all men call, unanimously, Jove:</p> +</div> + +<p class="cont">which is more plainly expressed than in this other passage<a id="FNA-144"></a><a href="#FN-144"><sup>144</sup></a> of the +same poet—</p> + +<div class="poem"> +<p>On whose account I’ll curse that flood of light,</p> +<p>Whate’er it is above that shines so bright.</p> +</div> + +<p class="cont">Our augurs also mean the same, when, for the “thundering and lightning +heaven,” they say the “thundering and lightning Jove.” Euripides, among +many excellent things, has this:</p> + +<div class="poem"> +<p>The vast, expanded, boundless sky behold,</p> +<p>See it with soft embrace the earth enfold;</p> +<p>This own the chief of Deities above,</p> +<p>And this acknowledge by the name of Jove.</p> +</div> + +<p>XXVI. The air, according to the Stoics, which is between the sea and the +heaven, is consecrated by the name of Juno, and is called the sister and +wife of Jove, because <a id="page-280"></a><span class="pgnum">280</span>it resembles the sky, and is in close conjunction +with it. They have made it feminine, because there is nothing softer. +But I believe it is called Juno, <i>a juvando</i> (from helping).</p> + +<p>To make three separate kingdoms, by fable, there remained yet the water +and the earth. The dominion of the sea is given, therefore, to Neptune, +a brother, as he is called, of Jove; whose name, Neptunus—as <i>Portunus, +a portu</i>, from a port—is derived <i>a nando</i> (from swimming), the first +letters being a little changed. The sovereignty and power over the earth +is the portion of a God, to whom we, as well as the Greeks, have given a +name that denotes riches (in Latin, <i>Dis</i>; in Greek, <span class="greek">Πλούτων</span>), because +all things arise from the earth and return to it. He forced away +Proserpine (in Greek called <span class="greek">Περσεφόνη</span>), by which the poets mean the +“seed of corn,” from whence comes their fiction of Ceres, the mother of +Proserpine, seeking for her daughter, who was hidden from her. She is +called Ceres, which is the same as Geres—<i>a gerendis +frugibus</i><a id="FNA-145"></a><a href="#FN-145"><sup>145</sup></a>—“from bearing fruit,” the first letter of the word being +altered after the manner of the Greeks, for by them she is called +<span class="greek">Δημήτηρ</span>, the same as <span class="greek">Γημήτηρ</span>.<a id="FNA-146"></a><a href="#FN-146"><sup>146</sup></a> Again, he (<i>qui magna vorteret</i>) “who +brings about mighty changes” is called Mavors; and Minerva is so called +because (<i>minueret</i>, or <i>minaretur</i>) she diminishes or menaces.</p> + +<p>XXVII. And as the beginnings and endings of all things are of the +greatest importance, therefore they would have their sacrifices to begin +with Janus.<a id="FNA-147"></a><a href="#FN-147"><sup>147</sup></a> His name is derived <i>ab eundo</i>, from passing; from +whence thorough passages are called <i>jani</i>, and the outward doors of +common houses are called <i>januæ</i>. The name of Vesta is, from the Greeks, +the same with their <span class="greek">Ἑστία</span>. Her province is over altars and hearths; and +in the name of this Goddess, who is the keeper of all things within, +prayers and sacrifices are concluded. The <i>Dii Penates</i>, “household Gods,” +have some affinity with this power, and are so called either from +<i>penus</i>, <a id="page-281"></a><span class="pgnum">281</span>“all kind of human provisions,” or because <i>penitus insident</i> +(they reside within), from which, by the poets, they are called +<i>penetrales</i> also. Apollo, a Greek name, is called <i>Sol</i>, the sun; and +Diana, <i>Luna</i>, the moon. The sun (<i>sol</i>) is so named either because he +is <i>solus</i> (alone), so eminent above all the stars; or because he +obscures all the stars, and appears alone as soon as he rises. <i>Luna</i>, +the moon, is so called <i>a lucendo</i> (from shining); she bears the name +also of Lucina: and as in Greece the women in labor invoke Diana +Lucifera, so here they invoke Juno Lucina. She is likewise called Diana +<i>omnivaga</i>, not <i>a venando</i> (from hunting), but because she is reckoned +one of the seven stars that seem to wander.<a id="FNA-148"></a><a href="#FN-148"><sup>148</sup></a> She is called Diana +because she makes a kind of day of the night;<a id="FNA-149"></a><a href="#FN-149"><sup>149</sup></a> and presides over +births, because the delivery is effected sometimes in seven, or at most +in nine, courses of the moon; which, because they make <i>mensa spatia</i> +(measured spaces), are called <i>menses</i> (months). This occasioned a +pleasant observation of Timæus (as he has many). Having said in his +history that “the same night in which Alexander was born, the temple of +Diana at Ephesus was burned down,” he adds, “It is not in the least to +be wondered at, because Diana, being willing to assist at the labor of +Olympias,<a id="FNA-150"></a><a href="#FN-150"><sup>150</sup></a> was absent from home.” But to this Goddess, because <i>ad +res omnes veniret</i>—“she has an influence upon all things”—we have +given the appellation of Venus,<a id="FNA-151"></a><a href="#FN-151"><sup>151</sup></a> from whom the word <i>venustas</i> +(beauty) is rather derived than Venus from <i>venustas</i>.</p> + +<p>XXVIII. Do you not see, therefore, how, from the productions of nature +and the useful inventions of men, have arisen fictitious and imaginary +Deities, which have been the foundation of false opinions, pernicious +errors, and wretched superstitions? For we know how the different forms +of the Gods—their ages, apparel, ornaments; their <a id="page-282"></a><span class="pgnum">282</span>pedigrees, +marriages, relations, and everything belonging to them—are adapted to +human weakness and represented with our passions; with lust, sorrow, and +anger, according to fabulous history: they have had wars and combats, +not only, as Homer relates, when they have interested themselves in two +different armies, but when they have fought battles in their own defence +against the Titans and giants. These stories, of the greatest weakness +and levity, are related and believed with the most implicit folly.</p> + +<p>But, rejecting these fables with contempt, a Deity is diffused in every +part of nature; in earth under the name of Ceres, in the sea under the +name of Neptune, in other parts under other names. Yet whatever they +are, and whatever characters and dispositions they have, and whatever +name custom has given them, we are bound to worship and adore them. The +best, the chastest, the most sacred and pious worship of the Gods is to +reverence them always with a pure, perfect, and unpolluted mind and +voice; for our ancestors, as well as the philosophers, have separated +superstition from religion. They who prayed whole days and sacrificed, +that their children might survive them (<i>ut superstites essent</i>), were +called superstitious, which word became afterward more general; but they +who diligently perused, and, as we may say, read or practised over +again, all the duties relating to the worship of the Gods, were called +<i>religiosi</i>—religious, from <i>relegendo</i>—“reading over again, or +practising;” as <i>elegantes</i>, elegant, <i>ex eligendo</i>, “from choosing, +making a good choice;” <i>diligentes</i>, diligent, <i>ex diligendo</i>, “from +attending on what we love;” <i>intelligentes</i>, intelligent, from +understanding—for the signification is derived in the same manner. Thus +are the words superstitious and religious understood; the one being a +term of reproach, the other of commendation. I think I have now +sufficiently demonstrated that there are Gods, and what they are.</p> + +<p>XXIX. I am now to show that the world is governed by the providence of +the Gods. This is an important point, which you Academics endeavor to +confound; and, indeed, the whole contest is with you, Cotta; for your +sect, Velleius, know very little of what is said on different subjects +by other schools. You read and have a taste only for <a id="page-283"></a><span class="pgnum">283</span>your own books, +and condemn all others without examination. For instance, when you +mentioned yesterday<a id="FNA-152"></a><a href="#FN-152"><sup>152</sup></a> that prophetic old dame <span class="greek">Πρόνοια</span>, Providence, +invented by the Stoics, you were led into that error by imagining that +Providence was made by them to be a particular Deity that governs the +whole universe, whereas it is only spoken in a short manner; as when it +is said “The commonwealth of Athens is governed by the council,” it is +meant “of the Areopagus;”<a id="FNA-153"></a><a href="#FN-153"><sup>153</sup></a> so when we say “The world is governed by +providence,” we mean “by the providence of the Gods.” To express +ourselves, therefore, more fully and clearly, we say, “The world is +governed by the providence of the Gods.” Be not, therefore, lavish of +your railleries, of which your sect has little to spare: if I may advise +you, do not attempt it. It does not become you, it is not your talent, +nor is it in your power. This is not applied to you in particular who +have the education and politeness of a Roman, but to all your sect in +general, and especially to your leader<a id="FNA-154"></a><a href="#FN-154"><sup>154</sup></a>—a man unpolished, +illiterate, insulting, without wit, without reputation, without +elegance.</p> + +<p>XXX. I assert, then, that the universe, with all its parts, was +originally constituted, and has, without any cessation, been ever +governed by the providence of the Gods. This argument we Stoics commonly +divide into three parts; the first of which is, that the existence of +the Gods being once known, it must follow that the world is governed by +their wisdom; the second, that as everything is under the direction of +an intelligent nature, which has produced that beautiful order in the +world, it is evident that it is formed from animating principles; the +third is deduced from those glorious works which we behold in the +heavens and the earth.</p> + +<p>First, then, we must either deny the existence of the Gods (as +Democritus and Epicurus by their doctrine of images in some sort do), +or, if we acknowledge that there <a id="page-284"></a><span class="pgnum">284</span>are Gods, we must believe they are +employed, and that, too, in something excellent. Now, nothing is so +excellent as the administration of the universe. The universe, +therefore, is governed by the wisdom of the Gods. Otherwise, we must +imagine that there is some cause superior to the Deity, whether it be a +nature inanimate, or a necessity agitated by a mighty force, that +produces those beautiful works which we behold. The nature of the Gods +would then be neither supreme nor excellent, if you subject it to that +necessity or to that nature, by which you would make the heaven, the +earth, and the seas to be governed. But there is nothing superior to the +Deity; the world, therefore, must be governed by him: consequently, the +Deity is under no obedience or subjection to nature, but does himself +rule over all nature. In effect, if we allow the Gods have +understanding, we allow also their providence, which regards the most +important things; for, can they be ignorant of those important things, +and how they are to be conducted and preserved, or do they want power to +sustain and direct them? Ignorance is inconsistent with the nature of +the Gods, and imbecility is repugnant to their majesty. From whence it +follows, as we assert, that the world is governed by the providence of +the Gods.</p> + +<p>XXXI. But supposing, which is incontestable, that there are Gods, they +must be animated, and not only animated, but endowed with +reason—united, as we may say, in a civil agreement and society, and +governing together one universe, as a republic or city. Thus the same +reason, the same verity, the same law, which ordains good and prohibits +evil, exists in the Gods as it does in men. From them, consequently, we +have prudence and understanding, for which reason our ancestors erected +temples to the Mind, Faith, Virtue, and Concord. Shall we not then allow +the Gods to have these perfections, since we worship the sacred and +august images of them? But if understanding, faith, virtue, and concord +reside in human kind, how could they come on earth, unless from heaven? +And if we are possessed of wisdom, reason, and prudence, the Gods must +have the same qualities in a greater degree; and not only have them, but +employ them in the best and greatest works. The universe is the best and +greatest <a id="page-285"></a><span class="pgnum">285</span>work; therefore it must be governed by the wisdom and +providence of the Gods.</p> + +<p>Lastly, as we have sufficiently shown that those glorious and luminous +bodies which we behold are Deities—I mean the sun, the moon, the fixed +and wandering stars, the firmament, and the world itself, and those +other things also which have any singular virtue, and are of any great +utility to human kind—it follows that all things are governed by +providence and a divine mind. But enough has been said on the first +part.</p> + +<p>XXXII. It is now incumbent on me to prove that all things are subjected +to nature, and most beautifully directed by her. But, first of all, it +is proper to explain precisely what that nature is, in order to come to +the more easy understanding of what I would demonstrate. Some think that +nature is a certain irrational power exciting in bodies the necessary +motions. Others, that it is an intelligent power, acting by order and +method, designing some end in every cause, and always aiming at that +end, whose works express such skill as no art, no hand, can imitate; +for, they say, such is the virtue of its seed, that, however small it +is, if it falls into a place proper for its reception, and meets with +matter conducive to its nourishment and increase, it forms and produces +everything in its respective kind; either vegetables, which receive +their nourishment from their roots; or animals, endowed with motion, +sense, appetite, and abilities to beget their likeness.</p> + +<p>Some apply the word nature to everything; as Epicurus does, who +acknowledges no cause, but atoms, a vacuum, and their accidents. But +when we<a id="FNA-155"></a><a href="#FN-155"><sup>155</sup></a> say that nature forms and governs the world, we do not +apply it to a clod of earth, or piece of stone, or anything of that +sort, whose parts have not the necessary cohesion,<a id="FNA-156"></a><a href="#FN-156"><sup>156</sup></a> but to a tree, +in <a id="page-286"></a><span class="pgnum">286</span>which there is not the appearance of chance, but of order and a +resemblance of art.</p> + +<p>XXXIII. But if the art of nature gives life and increase to vegetables, +without doubt it supports the earth itself; for, being impregnated with +seeds, she produces every kind of vegetable, and embracing their roots, +she nourishes and increases them; while, in her turn, she receives her +nourishment from the other elements, and by her exhalations gives proper +sustenance to the air, the sky, and all the superior bodies. If nature +gives vigor and support to the earth, by the same reason she has an +influence over the rest of the world; for as the earth gives nourishment +to vegetables, so the air is the preservation of animals. The air sees +with us, hears with us, and utters sounds with us; without it, there +would be no seeing, hearing, or sounding. It even moves with us; for +wherever we go, whatever motion we make, it seems to retire and give +place to us.</p> + +<p>That which inclines to the centre, that which rises from it to the +surface, and that which rolls about the centre, constitute the universal +world, and make one entire nature; and as there are four sorts of +bodies, the continuance of nature is caused by their reciprocal changes; +for the water arises from the earth, the air from the water, and the +fire from the air; and, reversing this order, the air arises from fire, +the water from the air, and from the water the earth, the lowest of the +four elements, of which all beings are formed. Thus by their continual +motions backward and forward, upward and downward, the conjunction of +the several parts of the universe is preserved; a union which, in the +beauty we now behold it, must be eternal, or at least of a very long +duration, and almost for an infinite space of time; and, whichever it +is, the universe must of consequence be governed by nature. For what art +of navigating fleets, or of marshalling an army, and—to instance the +produce of nature—what vine, what tree, what animated form and +conformation of their members, give us so great an indication of skill +as appears in the universe? Therefore we must either deny that there is +the least trace of an intelligent nature, or acknowledge that the world +is governed by it. But since the universe <a id="page-287"></a><span class="pgnum">287</span>contains all particular +beings, as well as their seeds, can we say that it is not itself +governed by nature? That would be the same as saying that the teeth and +the beard of man are the work of nature, but that the man himself is +not. Thus the effect would be understood to be greater than the cause.</p> + +<p>XXXIV. Now, the universe sows, as I may say, plants, produces, raises, +nourishes, and preserves what nature administers, as members and parts +of itself. If nature, therefore, governs them, she must also govern the +universe. And, lastly, in nature’s administration there is nothing +faulty. She produced the best possible effect out of those elements +which existed. Let any one show how it could have been better. But that +can never be; and whoever attempts to mend it will either make it worse, +or aim at impossibilities.</p> + +<p>But if all the parts of the universe are so constituted that nothing +could be better for use or beauty, let us consider whether this is the +effect of chance, or whether, in such a state they could possibly +cohere, but by the direction of wisdom and divine providence. Nature, +therefore, cannot be void of reason, if art can bring nothing to +perfection without it, and if the works of nature exceed those of art. +How is it consistent with common-sense that when you view an image or a +picture, you imagine it is wrought by art; when you behold afar off a +ship under sail, you judge it is steered by reason and art; when you see +a dial or water-clock,<a id="FNA-157"></a><a href="#FN-157"><sup>157</sup></a> you believe the hours are shown by art, and +not by chance; and yet that you should imagine that the universe, which +contains all arts and the artificers, can be void of reason and +understanding?</p> + +<p>But if that sphere which was lately made by our friend Posidonius, the +regular revolutions of which show the course of the sun, moon, and five +wandering stars, as it is every day and night performed, were carried +into Scythia or Britain, who, in those barbarous countries, would doubt +that that sphere had been made so perfect by the exertion of reason?</p> + +<p>XXXV. Yet these people<a id="FNA-158"></a><a href="#FN-158"><sup>158</sup></a> doubt whether the universe, <a id="page-288"></a><span class="pgnum">288</span>from whence all +things arise and are made, is not the effect of chance, or some +necessity, rather than the work of reason and a divine mind. According +to them, Archimedes shows more knowledge in representing the motions of +the celestial globe than nature does in causing them, though the copy is +so infinitely beneath the original. The shepherd in Attius,<a id="FNA-159"></a><a href="#FN-159"><sup>159</sup></a> who had +never seen a ship, when he perceived from a mountain afar off the divine +vessel of the Argonauts, surprised and frighted at this new object, +expressed himself in this manner:</p> + +<div class="poem"> +<p>What horrid bulk is that before my eyes,</p> +<p>Which o’er the deep with noise and vigor flies?</p> +<p>It turns the whirlpools up, its force so strong,</p> +<p>And drives the billows as it rolls along.</p> +<p>The ocean’s violence it fiercely braves;</p> +<p>Runs furious on, and throws about the waves.</p> +<p>Swiftly impetuous in its course, and loud,</p> +<p>Like the dire bursting of a show’ry cloud;</p> +<p>Or, like a rock, forced by the winds and rain,</p> +<p>Now whirl’d aloft, then plunged into the main.</p> +<p>But hold! perhaps the Earth and Neptune jar,</p> +<p>And fiercely wage an elemental war;</p> +<p>Or Triton with his trident has o’erthrown</p> +<p>His den, and loosen’d from the roots the stone;</p> +<p>The rocky fragment, from the bottom torn,</p> +<p>Is lifted up, and on the surface borne.</p> +</div> + +<p class="cont">At first he is in suspense at the sight of this unknown object; but on +seeing the young mariners, and hearing their singing, he says,</p> + +<div class="poem"> +<p>Like sportive dolphins, with their snouts they roar;<a id="FNA-160"></a><a href="#FN-160"><sup>160</sup></a></p> +</div> + +<p class="cont">and afterward goes on,</p> + +<div class="poem"> +<p>Loud in my ears methinks their voices ring,</p> +<p>As if I heard the God Sylvanus sing.</p> +</div> + +<p>As at first view the shepherd thinks he sees something inanimate and +insensible, but afterward, judging by more <a id="page-289"></a><span class="pgnum">289</span>trustworthy indications, he +begins to figure to himself what it is; so philosophers, if they are +surprised at first at the sight of the universe, ought, when they have +considered the regular, uniform, and immutable motions of it, to +conceive that there is some Being that is not only an inhabitant of this +celestial and divine mansion, but a ruler and a governor, as architect +of this mighty fabric.</p> + +<p>XXXVI. Now, in my opinion, they<a id="FNA-161"></a><a href="#FN-161"><sup>161</sup></a> do not seem to have even the least +suspicion that the heavens and earth afford anything marvellous. For, in +the first place, the earth is situated in the middle part of the +universe, and is surrounded on all sides by the air, which we breathe, +and which is called “aer,”<a id="FNA-162"></a><a href="#FN-162"><sup>162</sup></a> which, indeed, is a Greek word; but by +constant use it is well understood by our countrymen, for, indeed, it is +employed as a Latin word. The air is encompassed by the boundless ether +(sky), which consists of the fires above. This word we borrow also, for +we use <i>æther</i> in Latin as well as <i>aer;</i> though Pacuvius thus expresses +it,</p> + +<div class="poem"> +<p class="L6" style="margin-left: 10ex">—This, of which I speak,</p> +<p>In Latin’s <i>cœlum</i>, <i>æther</i> call’d in Greek.</p> +</div> + +<p class="cont">As though he were not a Greek into whose mouth he puts this sentence; +but he is speaking in Latin, though we listen as if he were speaking +Greek; for, as he says elsewhere,</p> + +<div class="poem"> +<p>His speech discovers him a Grecian born.</p> +</div> + +<p>But to return to more important matters. In the sky innumerable fiery +stars exist, of which the sun is the chief, enlightening all with his +refulgent splendor, and being by many degrees larger than the whole +earth; and this multitude of vast fires are so far from hurting the +earth, and things terrestrial, that they are of benefit to them; +whereas, if they were moved from their stations, we should inevitably be +burned through the want of a proper moderation and temperature of heat.</p> + +<p>XXXVII. Is it possible for any man to behold these things, and yet +imagine that certain solid and individual bodies move by their natural +force and gravitation, and that a world so beautifully adorned was made +by their fortuitous concourse? He who believes this may as well <a id="page-290"></a><span class="pgnum">290</span>believe +that if a great quantity of the one-and-twenty letters, composed either +of gold or any other matter, were thrown upon the ground, they would +fall into such order as legibly to form the Annals of Ennius. I doubt +whether fortune could make a single verse of them. How, therefore, can +these people assert that the world was made by the fortuitous concourse +of atoms, which have no color, no quality—which the Greeks call +<span class="greek">ποιότης</span>, no sense? or that there are innumerable worlds, some rising and +some perishing, in every moment of time? But if a concourse of atoms can +make a world, why not a porch, a temple, a house, a city, which are +works of less labor and difficulty?</p> + +<p>Certainly those men talk so idly and inconsiderately concerning this +lower world that they appear to me never to have contemplated the +wonderful magnificence of the heavens; which is the next topic for our +consideration.</p> + +<p>Well, then, did Aristotle<a id="FNA-163"></a><a href="#FN-163"><sup>163</sup></a> observe: “If there were men whose +habitations had been always underground, in great and commodious houses, +adorned with statues and pictures, furnished with everything which they +who are reputed happy abound with; and if, without stirring from thence, +they should be informed of a certain divine power and majesty, and, +after some time, the earth should open, and they should quit their dark +abode to come to us, where they should immediately behold the earth, the +seas, the heavens; should consider the vast extent of the clouds and +force of the winds; should see the sun, and observe his grandeur and +beauty, and also his generative power, inasmuch as day is occasioned by +the diffusion of his light through the sky; and when night has obscured +the earth, they should contemplate the heavens bespangled and adorned +with stars, the surprising variety of the moon in her increase and wane, +the rising and setting of all the stars, and the inviolable regularity +of their courses; when,” says he, “they should see these things, they +would undoubtedly conclude that there are Gods, and that these are their +mighty works.”</p> + +<p>XXXVIII. Thus far Aristotle. Let us imagine, also, as great darkness as +was formerly occasioned by the irruption of the fires of Mount Ætna, +which are said to have obscured <a id="page-291"></a><span class="pgnum">291</span>the adjacent countries for two days to +such a degree that no man could recognize his fellow; but on the third, +when the sun appeared, they seemed to be risen from the dead. Now, if we +should be suddenly brought from a state of eternal darkness to see the +light, how beautiful would the heavens seem! But our minds have become +used to it from the daily practice and habituation of our eyes, nor do +we take the trouble to search into the principles of what is always in +view; as if the novelty, rather than the importance, of things ought to +excite us to investigate their causes.</p> + +<p>Is he worthy to be called a man who attributes to chance, not to an +intelligent cause, the constant motion of the heavens, the regular +courses of the stars, the agreeable proportion and connection of all +things, conducted with so much reason that our intellect itself is +unable to estimate it rightly? When we see machines move artificially, +as a sphere, a clock, or the like, do we doubt whether they are the +productions of reason? And when we behold the heavens moving with a +prodigious celerity, and causing an annual succession of the different +seasons of the year, which vivify and preserve all things, can we doubt +that this world is directed, I will not say only by reason, but by +reason most excellent and divine? For without troubling ourselves with +too refined a subtlety of discussion, we may use our eyes to contemplate +the beauty of those things which we assert have been arranged by divine +providence.</p> + +<p>XXXIX. First, let us examine the earth, whose situation is in the middle +of the universe,<a id="FNA-164"></a><a href="#FN-164"><sup>164</sup></a> solid, round, and conglobular by its natural +tendency; clothed with flowers, herbs, trees, and fruits; the whole in +multitudes incredible, and with a variety suitable to every taste: let +us consider the ever-cool and running springs, the clear waters of the +rivers, the verdure of their banks, the hollow depths of caves, the +cragginess of rocks, the heights of impending mountains, and the +boundless extent of plains, the hidden veins of gold and silver, and the +infinite quarries of marble.</p> + +<p><a id="page-292"></a><span class="pgnum">292</span>What and how various are the kinds of animals, tame or wild? The +flights and notes of birds? How do the beasts live in the fields and in +the forests? What shall I say of men, who, being appointed, as we may +say, to cultivate the earth, do not suffer its fertility to be choked +with weeds, nor the ferocity of beasts to make it desolate; who, by the +houses and cities which they build, adorn the fields, the isles, and the +shores? If we could view these objects with the naked eye, as we can by +the contemplation of the mind, nobody, at such a sight, would doubt +there was a divine intelligence.</p> + +<p>But how beautiful is the sea! How pleasant to see the extent of it! What +a multitude and variety of islands! How delightful are the coasts! What +numbers and what diversity of inhabitants does it contain; some within +the bosom of it, some floating on the surface, and others by their +shells cleaving to the rocks! While the sea itself, approaching to the +land, sports so closely to its shores that those two elements appear to +be but one.</p> + +<p>Next above the sea is the air, diversified by day and night: when +rarefied, it possesses the higher region; when condensed, it turns into +clouds, and with the waters which it gathers enriches the earth by the +rain. Its agitation produces the winds. It causes heat and cold +according to the different seasons. It sustains birds in their flight; +and, being inhaled, nourishes and preserves all animated beings.</p> + +<p>XL. Add to these, which alone remaineth to be mentioned, the firmament +of heaven, a region the farthest from our abodes, which surrounds and +contains all things. It is likewise called ether, or sky, the extreme +bounds and limits of the universe, in which the stars perform their +appointed courses in a most wonderful manner; among which, the sun, +whose magnitude far surpasses the earth, makes his revolution round it, +and by his rising and setting causes day and night; sometimes coming +near towards the earth, and sometimes going from it, he every year makes +two contrary reversions<a id="FNA-165"></a><a href="#FN-165"><sup>165</sup></a> from the extreme <a id="page-293"></a><span class="pgnum">293</span>point of its course. In +his retreat the earth seems locked up in sadness; in his return it +appears exhilarated with the heavens. The moon, which, as mathematicians +demonstrate, is bigger than half the earth, makes her revolutions +through the same spaces<a id="FNA-166"></a><a href="#FN-166"><sup>166</sup></a> as the sun; but at one time approaching, +and at another receding from, the sun, she diffuses the light which she +has borrowed from him over the whole earth, and has herself also many +various changes in her appearance. When she is found under the sun, and +opposite to it, the brightness of her rays is lost; but when the earth +directly interposes between the moon and sun, the moon is totally +eclipsed. The other wandering stars have their courses round the earth +in the same spaces,<a id="FNA-167"></a><a href="#FN-167"><sup>167</sup></a> and rise and set in the same manner; their +motions are sometimes quick, sometimes slow, and often they stand still. +There is nothing more wonderful, nothing more beautiful. There is a vast +number of fixed stars, distinguished by the names of certain figures, to +which we find they have some resemblance.</p> + +<p>XLI. I will here, says Balbus, looking at me, make use of the verses +which, when you were young, you translated from Aratus,<a id="FNA-168"></a><a href="#FN-168"><sup>168</sup></a> and which, +because they are in Latin, gave me so much delight that I have many of +them still in my memory. As then, we daily see, without any change or +variation,</p> + +<div class="poem"> +<p class="L6" style="margin-left: 25ex">—the rest<a id="FNA-169"></a><a href="#FN-169"><sup>169</sup></a></p> +<p>Swiftly pursue the course to which they’re bound;</p> +<p>And with the heavens the days and nights go round;</p> +</div> + +<p class="cont">the contemplation of which, to a mind desirous of observing the +constancy of nature, is inexhaustible.</p> + +<div class="poem"> +<p>The extreme top of either point is call’d</p> +<p>The pole.<a id="FNA-170"></a><a href="#FN-170"><sup>170</sup></a></p> +</div> + +<p class="cont"><a id="page-294"></a><span class="pgnum">294</span>About this the two <span class="greek">Ἄρκτοι</span> are turned, which never set;</p> + +<div class="poem"> +<p>Of these, the Greeks one Cynosura call,</p> +<p>The other Helice.<a id="FNA-171"></a><a href="#FN-171"><sup>171</sup></a></p> +</div> + +<p class="cont">The brightest stars,<a id="FNA-172"></a><a href="#FN-172"><sup>172</sup></a> indeed, of Helice are discernible all night,</p> + +<div class="poem"> +<p>Which are by us Septentriones call’d.</p> +</div> + +<p class="cont">Cynosura moves about the same pole, with a like number of stars, and +ranged in the same order:</p> + +<div class="poem"> +<p>This<a id="FNA-173"></a><a href="#FN-173"><sup>173</sup></a> the Phœnicians choose to make their guide</p> +<p>When on the ocean in the night they ride.</p> +<p>Adorned with stars of more refulgent light,</p> +<p>The other<a id="FNA-174"></a><a href="#FN-174"><sup>174</sup></a> shines, and first appears at night.</p> +<p>Though this is small, sailors its use have found;</p> +<p>More inward is its course, and short its round.</p> +</div> + +<p>XLII. The aspect of those stars is the more admirable, because,</p> + +<div class="poem"> +<p>The Dragon grim between them bends his way,</p> +<p>As through the winding banks the currents stray,</p> +<p>And up and down in sinuous bending rolls.<a id="FNA-175"></a><a href="#FN-175"><sup>175</sup></a></p> +</div> + +<p class="cont">His whole form is excellent; but the shape of his head and the ardor of +his eyes are most remarkable.</p> + +<div class="poem"> +<p>Various the stars which deck his glittering head;</p> +<p>His temples are with double glory spread;</p> +<p>From his fierce eyes two fervid lights afar</p> +<p>Flash, and his chin shines with one radiant star;</p> +<p>Bow’d is his head; and his round neck he bends,</p> +<p>And to the tail of Helice<a id="FNA-176"></a><a href="#FN-176"><sup>176</sup></a> extends.</p> +</div> + +<p class="cont">The rest of the Dragon’s body we see<a id="FNA-177"></a><a href="#FN-177"><sup>177</sup></a> at every hour in the night.</p> + +<div class="poem"> +<p><a id="page-295"></a><span class="pgnum">295</span>Here<a id="FNA-178"></a><a href="#FN-178"><sup>178</sup></a> suddenly the head a little hides</p> +<p>Itself, where all its parts, which are in sight,</p> +<p>And those unseen in the same place unite.</p> +</div> + +<p class="cont">Near to this head</p> + +<div class="poem"> +<p>Is placed the figure of a man that moves</p> +<p>Weary and sad,</p> +</div> + +<p class="cont">which the Greeks</p> + +<div class="poem"> +<p>Engonasis do call, because he’s borne<a id="FNA-179"></a><a href="#FN-179"><sup>179</sup></a></p> +<p>About with bended knee. Near him is placed</p> +<p>The crown with a refulgent lustre graced.</p> +</div> + +<p class="cont">This indeed is at his back; but Anguitenens (the Snake-holder) is near +his head:<a id="FNA-180"></a><a href="#FN-180"><sup>180</sup></a></p> + +<div class="poem"> +<p>The Greeks him Ophiuchus call, renown’d</p> +<p>The name. He strongly grasps the serpent round</p> +<p>With both his hands; himself the serpent folds</p> +<p>Beneath his breast, and round his middle holds;</p> +<p>Yet gravely he, bright shining in the skies,</p> +<p>Moves on, and treads on Nepa’s<a id="FNA-181"></a><a href="#FN-181"><sup>181</sup></a> breast and eyes.</p> +</div> + +<p class="cont">The Septentriones<a id="FNA-182"></a><a href="#FN-182"><sup>182</sup></a> are followed by—</p> + +<div class="poem"> +<p>Arctophylax,<a id="FNA-183"></a><a href="#FN-183"><sup>183</sup></a> that’s said to be the same</p> +<p>Which we Boötes call, who has the name,</p> +<p>Because he drives the Greater Bear along</p> +<p>Yoked to a wain.</p> +</div> + +<p class="cont">Besides, in Boötes,</p> + +<div class="poem"> +<p>A star of glittering rays about his waist,</p> +<p>Arcturus called, a name renown’d, is placed.<a id="FNA-184"></a><a href="#FN-184"><sup>184</sup></a></p> +</div> + +<p class="cont"><a id="page-296"></a><span class="pgnum">296</span>Beneath which is</p> + +<div class="poem"> +<p>The Virgin of illustrious form, whose hand</p> +<p>Holds a bright spike.</p> +</div> + +<p>XLIII. And truly these signs are so regularly disposed that a divine +wisdom evidently appears in them:</p> + +<div class="poem"> +<p>Beneath the Bear’s<a id="FNA-185"></a><a href="#FN-185"><sup>185</sup></a> head have the Twins their seat,</p> +<p>Under his chest the Crab, beneath his feet</p> +<p>The mighty Lion darts a trembling flame.<a id="FNA-186"></a><a href="#FN-186"><sup>186</sup></a></p> +</div> + +<p class="cont">The Charioteer</p> + +<div class="poem"> +<p>On the left side of Gemini we see,<a id="FNA-187"></a><a href="#FN-187"><sup>187</sup></a></p> +<p>And at his head behold fierce Helice;</p> +<p>On his left shoulder the bright Goat appears.</p> +</div> + +<p class="cont">But to proceed—</p> + +<div class="poem"> +<p>This is indeed a great and glorious star,</p> +<p>On th’ other side the Kids, inferior far,</p> +<p>Yield but a slender light to mortal eyes.</p> +</div> + +<p class="cont">Under his feet</p> + +<div class="poem"> +<p>The horned bull,<a id="FNA-188"></a><a href="#FN-188"><sup>188</sup></a> with sturdy limbs, is placed:</p> +</div> + +<p class="cont">his head is spangled with a number of stars;</p> + +<div class="poem"> +<p>These by the Greeks are called the Hyades,</p> +</div> + +<p class="cont">from raining; for <span class="greek">ὕειν</span> is to rain: therefore they are injudiciously +called <i>Suculæ</i> by our people, as if they had their name from <span class="greek">ὗς</span>, a sow, +and not from <span class="greek">ὕω</span>.</p> + +<p>Behind the Lesser Bear, Cepheus<a id="FNA-189"></a><a href="#FN-189"><sup>189</sup></a> follows with extended hands,</p> + +<div class="poem"> +<p>For close behind the Lesser Bear he comes.</p> +</div> + +<p class="cont"><a id="page-297"></a><span class="pgnum">297</span>Before him goes</p> + +<div class="poem"> +<p>Cassiopea<a id="FNA-190"></a><a href="#FN-190"><sup>190</sup></a> with a faintish light;</p> +<p>But near her moves (fair and illustrious sight!)</p> +<p>Andromeda,<a id="FNA-191"></a><a href="#FN-191"><sup>191</sup></a> who, with an eager pace,</p> +<p>Seems to avoid her parent’s mournful face.<a id="FNA-192"></a><a href="#FN-192"><sup>192</sup></a></p> +<p>With glittering mane the Horse<a id="FNA-193"></a><a href="#FN-193"><sup>193</sup></a> now seems to tread,</p> +<p>So near he comes, on her refulgent head;</p> +<p>With a fair star, that close to him appears,</p> +<p>A double form<a id="FNA-194"></a><a href="#FN-194"><sup>194</sup></a> and but one light he wears;</p> +<p>By which he seems ambitious in the sky</p> +<p>An everlasting knot of stars to tie.</p> +<p>Near him the Ram, with wreathed horns, is placed;</p> +</div> + +<p class="cont">by whom</p> + +<div class="poem"> +<p>The Fishes<a id="FNA-195"></a><a href="#FN-195"><sup>195</sup></a> are; of which one seems to haste</p> +<p>Somewhat before the other, to the blast</p> +<p>Of the north wind exposed.</p> +</div> + +<p>XLIV. Perseus is described as placed at the feet of Andromeda:</p> + +<div class="poem"> +<p>And him the sharp blasts of the north wind beat.</p> +<p>Near his left knee, but dim their light, their seat</p> +<p>The small Pleiades<a id="FNA-196"></a><a href="#FN-196"><sup>196</sup></a> maintain. We find,</p> +<p>Not far from them, the Lyre<a id="FNA-197"></a><a href="#FN-197"><sup>197</sup></a> but slightly join’d.</p> +<p>Next is the winged Bird,<a id="FNA-198"></a><a href="#FN-198"><sup>198</sup></a> that seems to fly</p> +<p>Beneath the spacious covering of the sky.</p> +</div> + +<p class="cont"><a id="page-298"></a><span class="pgnum">298</span>Near the head of the Horse<a id="FNA-199"></a><a href="#FN-199"><sup>199</sup></a> lies the right hand of Aquarius, then +all Aquarius himself.<a id="FNA-200"></a><a href="#FN-200"><sup>200</sup></a></p> + +<div class="poem"> +<p>Then Capricorn, with half the form of beast,</p> +<p>Breathes chill and piercing colds from his strong breast,</p> +<p>And in a spacious circle takes his round;</p> +<p>When him, while in the winter solstice bound,</p> +<p>The sun has visited with constant light,</p> +<p>He turns his course, and shorter makes the night.<a id="FNA-201"></a><a href="#FN-201"><sup>201</sup></a></p> +</div> + +<p class="cont">Not far from hence is seen</p> + +<div class="poem"> +<p>The Scorpion<a id="FNA-202"></a><a href="#FN-202"><sup>202</sup></a> rising lofty from below;</p> +<p>By him the Archer,<a id="FNA-203"></a><a href="#FN-203"><sup>203</sup></a> with his bended bow;</p> +<p>Near him the Bird, with gaudy feathers spread;</p> +<p>And the fierce Eagle<a id="FNA-204"></a><a href="#FN-204"><sup>204</sup></a> hovers o’er his head.</p> +</div> + +<p class="cont">Next comes the Dolphin;<a id="FNA-205"></a><a href="#FN-205"><sup>205</sup></a></p> + +<div class="poem"> +<p>Then bright Orion,<a id="FNA-206"></a><a href="#FN-206"><sup>206</sup></a> who obliquely moves;</p> +</div> + +<p class="cont">he is followed by</p> + +<div class="poem"> +<p>The fervent Dog,<a id="FNA-207"></a><a href="#FN-207"><sup>207</sup></a> bright with refulgent stars:</p> +</div> + +<p class="cont">next the Hare follows<a id="FNA-208"></a><a href="#FN-208"><sup>208</sup></a></p> + +<div class="poem"> +<p>Unwearied in his course. At the Dog’s tail</p> +<p>Argo<a id="FNA-209"></a><a href="#FN-209"><sup>209</sup></a> moves on, and moving seems to sail;</p> +<p>O’er her the Ram and Fishes have their place;<a id="FNA-210"></a><a href="#FN-210"><sup>210</sup></a></p> +<p>The illustrious vessel touches, in her pace,</p> +<p>The river’s banks;<a id="FNA-211"></a><a href="#FN-211"><sup>211</sup></a></p> +</div> + +<p class="cont">which you may see winding and extending itself to a great length.</p> + +<div class="poem"> +<p><a id="page-299"></a><span class="pgnum">299</span>The Fetters<a id="FNA-212"></a><a href="#FN-212"><sup>212</sup></a> at the Fishes’ tails are hung.</p> +<p>By Nepa’s<a id="FNA-213"></a><a href="#FN-213"><sup>213</sup></a> head behold the Altar stand,<a id="FNA-214"></a><a href="#FN-214"><sup>214</sup></a></p> +<p>Which by the breath of southern winds is fann’d;</p> +</div> + +<p class="cont">near which the Centaur<a id="FNA-215"></a><a href="#FN-215"><sup>215</sup></a></p> + +<div class="poem"> +<p>Hastens his mingled parts to join beneath</p> +<p>The Serpent,<a id="FNA-216"></a><a href="#FN-216"><sup>216</sup></a> there extending his right hand,</p> +<p>To where you see the monstrous Scorpion stand,</p> +<p>Which he at the bright Altar fiercely slays.</p> +<p>Here on her lower parts see Hydra<a id="FNA-217"></a><a href="#FN-217"><sup>217</sup></a> raise</p> +<p>Herself;</p> +</div> + +<p class="cont">whose bulk is very far extended.</p> + +<div class="poem"> +<p>Amid the winding of her body’s placed</p> +<p>The shining Goblet;<a id="FNA-218"></a><a href="#FN-218"><sup>218</sup></a> and the glossy Crow<a id="FNA-219"></a><a href="#FN-219"><sup>219</sup></a></p> +<p>Plunges his beak into her parts below.</p> +<p>Antecanis beneath the Twins is seen,</p> +<p>Call’d Procyon by the Greeks.<a id="FNA-220"></a><a href="#FN-220"><sup>220</sup></a></p> +</div> + +<p>Can any one in his senses imagine that this disposition of the stars, +and this heaven so beautifully adorned, could ever have been formed by a +fortuitous concourse of atoms? Or what other nature, being destitute of +intellect and reason, could possibly have produced these effects, which +not only required reason to bring them about, but the very character of +which could not be understood and appreciated without the most strenuous +exertions of well-directed reason?</p> + +<p>XLV. But our admiration is not limited to the objects here described. +What is most wonderful is that the world is so durable, and so perfectly +made for lasting that it is not to be impaired by time; for all its +parts tend equally to the centre, and are bound together by a sort of +chain, which surrounds the elements. This chain is nature, which <a id="page-300"></a><span class="pgnum">300</span>being +diffused through the universe, and performing all things with judgment +and reason, attracts the extremities to the centre.</p> + +<p>If, then, the world is round, and if on that account all its parts, +being of equal dimensions and relative proportions, mutually support and +are supported by one another, it must follow that as all the parts +incline to the centre (for that is the lowest place of a globe) there is +nothing whatever which can put a stop to that propensity in the case of +such great weights. For the same reason, though the sea is higher than +the earth, yet because it has the like tendency, it is collected +everywhere, equally concentres, and never overflows, and is never +wasted.</p> + +<p>The air, which is contiguous, ascends by its lightness, but diffuses +itself through the whole; therefore it is by nature joined and united to +the sea, and at the same time borne by the same power towards the +heaven, by the thinness and heat of which it is so tempered as to be +made proper to supply life and wholesome air for the support of animated +beings. This is encompassed by the highest region of the heavens, which +is called the sky, which is joined to the extremity of the air, but +retains its own heat pure and unmixed.</p> + +<p>XLVI. The stars have their revolutions in the sky, and are continued by +the tendency of all parts towards the centre. Their duration is +perpetuated by their form and figure, for they are round; which form, as +I think has been before observed, is the least liable to injury; and as +they are composed of fire, they are fed by the vapors which are exhaled +by the sun from the earth, the sea, and other waters; but when these +vapors have nourished and refreshed the stars, and the whole sky, they +are sent back to be exhaled again; so that very little is lost or +consumed by the fire of the stars and the flame of the sky. Hence we +Stoics conclude—which Panætius<a id="FNA-221"></a><a href="#FN-221"><sup>221</sup></a> is said to have doubted of—that +the whole world at last would be consumed by a general conflagration, +when, all moisture being exhausted, neither the earth could have any +nourishment, nor the air return again, since water, of which it is +formed, would then be all consumed; so that only fire would subsist; and +<a id="page-301"></a><span class="pgnum">301</span>from this fire, which is an animating power and a Deity, a new world +would arise and be re-established in the same beauty.</p> + +<p>I should be sorry to appear to you to dwell too long upon this subject +of the stars, and more especially upon that of the planets, whose +motions, though different, make a very just agreement. Saturn, the +highest, chills; Mars, placed in the middle, burns; while Jupiter, +interposing, moderates their excess, both of light and heat. The two +planets beneath Mars<a id="FNA-222"></a><a href="#FN-222"><sup>222</sup></a> obey the sun. The sun himself fills the whole +universe with his own genial light; and the moon, illuminated by him, +influences conception, birth, and maturity. And who is there who is not +moved by this union of things, and by this concurrence of nature +agreeing together, as it were, for the safety of the world? And yet I +feel sure that none of these reflections have ever been made by these +men.</p> + +<p>XLVII. Let us proceed from celestial to terrestrial things. What is +there in them which does not prove the principle of an intelligent +nature? First, as to vegetables; they have roots to sustain their stems, +and to draw from the earth a nourishing moisture to support the vital +principle which those roots contain. They are clothed with a rind or +bark, to secure them more thoroughly from heat and cold. The vines we +see take hold on props with their tendrils, as if with hands, and raise +themselves as if they were animated; it is even said that they shun +cabbages and coleworts, as noxious and pestilential to them, and, if +planted by them, will not touch any part.</p> + +<p>But what a vast variety is there of animals! and how wonderfully is +every kind adapted to preserve itself! Some are covered with hides, some +clothed with fleeces, and some guarded with bristles; some are sheltered +with feathers, some with scales; some are armed with horns, and some are +furnished with wings to escape from danger. Nature hath also liberally +and plentifully provided for all animals their proper food. I could +expatiate on the judicious and curious formation and disposition of +their bodies for the reception and digestion of it, for all their +interior parts are so framed and disposed that there is <a id="page-302"></a><span class="pgnum">302</span>nothing +superfluous, nothing that is not necessary for the preservation of life. +Besides, nature has also given these beasts appetite and sense; in order +that by the one they may be excited to procure sufficient sustenance, +and by the other they may distinguish what is noxious from what is +salutary. Some animals seek their food walking, some creeping, some +flying, and some swimming; some take it with their mouth and teeth; some +seize it with their claws, and some with their beaks; some suck, some +graze, some bolt it whole, and some chew it. Some are so low that they +can with ease take such food as is to be found on the ground; but the +taller, as geese, swans, cranes, and camels, are assisted by a length of +neck. To the elephant is given a hand,<a id="FNA-223"></a><a href="#FN-223"><sup>223</sup></a> without which, from his +unwieldiness of body, he would scarce have any means of attaining food.</p> + +<p>XLVIII. But to those beasts which live by preying on others, nature has +given either strength or swiftness. On some animals she has even +bestowed artifice and cunning; as on spiders, some of which weave a sort +of net to entrap and destroy whatever falls into it, others sit on the +watch unobserved to fall on their prey and devour it. The naker—by the +Greeks called <i>Pinna</i>—has a kind of confederacy with the prawn for +procuring food. It has two large shells open, into which when the little +fishes swim, the naker, having notice given by the bite of the prawn, +closes them immediately. Thus, these little animals, though of different +kinds, seek their food in common; in which it is matter of wonder +whether they associate by any agreement, or are naturally joined +together from their beginning.</p> + +<p>There is some cause to admire also the provision of nature in the case +of those aquatic animals which are generated on land, such as +crocodiles, river-tortoises, and a certain kind of serpents, which seek +the water as soon as they are able to drag themselves along. We +frequently put duck-eggs under hens, by which, as by their true mothers, +the ducklings are at first hatched and nourished; but when they see the +water, they forsake them and run to it, as to <a id="page-303"></a><span class="pgnum">303</span>their natural abode: so +strong is the impression of nature in animals for their own +preservation.</p> + +<p>XLIX. I have read that there is a bird called Platalea (the shoveller), +that lives by watching those fowls which dive into the sea for their +prey, and when they return with it, he squeezes their heads with his +beak till they drop it, and then seizes on it himself. It is said +likewise that he is in the habit of filling his stomach with shell-fish, +and when they are digested by the heat which exists in the stomach, they +cast them up, and then pick out what is proper nourishment. The +sea-frogs, they say, are wont to cover themselves with sand, and moving +near the water, the fishes strike at them, as at a bait, and are +themselves taken and devoured by the frogs. Between the kite and the +crow there is a kind of natural war, and wherever the one finds the eggs +of the other, he breaks them.</p> + +<p>But who is there who can avoid being struck with wonder at that which +has been noticed by Aristotle, who has enriched us with so many valuable +remarks? When the cranes<a id="FNA-224"></a><a href="#FN-224"><sup>224</sup></a> pass the sea in search of warmer climes, +they fly in the form of a triangle. By the first angle they repel the +resisting air; on each side, their wings serve as oars to facilitate +their flight; and the basis of their triangle is assisted by the wind in +their stern. Those which are behind rest their necks and heads on those +which precede; and as the leader has not the same relief, because he has +none to lean upon, he at length flies behind that he may also rest, +while one of those which have been eased succeeds him, and through the +whole flight each regularly takes his turn.</p> + +<p>I could produce many instances of this kind; but these may suffice. Let +us now proceed to things more familiar to us. The care of beasts for +their own preservation, their circumspection while feeding, and their +manner of taking rest in their lairs, are generally known, but still +they are greatly to be admired.</p> + +<p>L. Dogs cure themselves by a vomit, the Egyptian ibis by a purge; from +whence physicians have lately—I mean but few ages since—greatly +improved their art. It is reported <a id="page-304"></a><span class="pgnum">304</span>that panthers, which in barbarous +countries are taken with poisoned flesh, have a certain remedy<a id="FNA-225"></a><a href="#FN-225"><sup>225</sup></a> that +preserves them from dying; and that in Crete, the wild goats, when they +are wounded with poisoned arrows, seek for an herb called dittany, +which, when they have tasted, the arrows (they say) drop from their +bodies. It is said also that deer, before they fawn, purge themselves +with a little herb called hartswort.<a id="FNA-226"></a><a href="#FN-226"><sup>226</sup></a> Beasts, when they receive any +hurt, or fear it, have recourse to their natural arms: the bull to his +horns, the boar to his tusks, and the lion to his teeth. Some take to +flight, others hide themselves; the cuttle-fish vomits<a id="FNA-227"></a><a href="#FN-227"><sup>227</sup></a> blood; the +cramp-fish benumbs; and there are many animals that, by their +intolerable stink, oblige their pursuers to retire.</p> + +<p>LI. But that the beauty of the world might be eternal, great care has +been taken by the providence of the Gods to perpetuate the different +kinds of animals, and vegetables, and trees, and all those things which +sink deep into the earth, and are contained in it by their roots and +trunks; in order to which every individual has within itself such +fertile seed that many are generated from one; and in vegetables this +seed is enclosed in the heart of their fruit, but in such abundance that +men may plentifully feed on it, and the earth be always replanted.</p> + +<p>With regard to animals, do we not see how aptly they are formed for the +propagation of their species? Nature for this end created some males and +some females. Their parts are perfectly framed for generation, and they +have a wonderful propensity to copulation. When the seed has fallen on +the matrix, it draws almost all the nourishment to itself, by which the +fœtus is formed; but as soon as it is discharged from thence, if it is +an animal that is nourished by milk, almost all the food of the mother +turns into milk, and the animal, without any direction but by the pure +instinct of nature, immediately hunts for the <a id="page-305"></a><span class="pgnum">305</span>teat, and is there fed +with plenty. What makes it evidently appear that there is nothing in +this fortuitous, but the work of a wise and foreseeing nature, is, that +those females which bring forth many young, as sows and bitches, have +many teats, and those which bear a small number have but few. What +tenderness do beasts show in preserving and raising up their young till +they are able to defend themselves! They say, indeed, that fish, when +they have spawned, leave their eggs; but the water easily supports them, +and produces the young fry in abundance.</p> + +<p>LII. It is said, likewise, that tortoises and crocodiles, when they have +laid their eggs on the land, only cover them with earth, and then leave +them, so that their young are hatched and brought up without assistance; +but fowls and other birds seek for quiet places to lay in, where they +build their nests in the softest manner, for the surest preservation of +their eggs; which, when they have hatched, they defend from the cold by +the warmth of their wings, or screen them from the sultry heat of the +sun. When their young begin to be able to use their wings, they attend +and instruct them; and then their cares are at an end.</p> + +<p>Human art and industry are indeed necessary towards the preservation and +improvement of certain animals and vegetables; for there are several of +both kinds which would perish without that assistance. There are +likewise innumerable facilities (being different in different places) +supplied to man to aid him in his civilization, and in procuring +abundantly what he requires. The Nile waters Egypt, and after having +overflowed and covered it the whole summer, it retires, and leaves the +fields softened and manured for the reception of seed. The Euphrates +fertilizes Mesopotamia, into which, as we may say, it carries yearly new +fields.<a id="FNA-228"></a><a href="#FN-228"><sup>228</sup></a> The Indus, which is the largest of all rivers,<a id="FNA-229"></a><a href="#FN-229"><sup>229</sup></a> not +only improves and cultivates the ground, <a id="page-306"></a><span class="pgnum">306</span>but sows it also; for it is +said to carry with it a great quantity of grain. I could mention many +other countries remarkable for something singular, and many fields, +which are, in their own natures, exceedingly fertile.</p> + +<p>LIII. But how bountiful is nature that has provided for us such an +abundance of various and delicious food; and this varying with the +different seasons, so that we may be constantly pleased with change, and +satisfied with abundance! How seasonable and useful to man, to beasts, +and even to vegetables, are the Etesian winds<a id="FNA-230"></a><a href="#FN-230"><sup>230</sup></a> she has bestowed, +which moderate intemperate heat, and render navigation more sure and +speedy! Many things must be omitted on a subject so copious—and still a +great deal must be said—for it is impossible to relate the great +utility of rivers, the flux and reflux of the sea, the mountains clothed +with grass and trees, the salt-pits remote from the sea-coasts, the +earth replete with salutary medicines, or, in short, the innumerable +designs of nature necessary for sustenance and the enjoyment of life. We +must not forget the vicissitudes of day and night, ordained for the +health of animated beings, giving them a time to labor and a time to +rest. Thus, if we every way examine the universe, it is apparent, from +the greatest reason, that the whole is admirably governed by a divine +providence for the safety and preservation of all beings.</p> + +<p>If it should be asked for whose sake this mighty fabric was raised, +shall we say for trees and other vegetables, which, though destitute of +sense, are supported by nature? That would be absurd. Is it for beasts? +Nothing can be less probable than that the Gods should have taken such +pains for beings void of speech and understanding. For whom, then, will +any one presume to say that the world was made? Undoubtedly for +reasonable beings; these are the Gods and men, who are certainly the +most perfect of all beings, as nothing is equal to reason. It is +therefore credible that the universe, and all things in it, were made +for the Gods and for men.</p> + +<p>But we may yet more easily comprehend that the Gods have taken great +care of the interests and welfare of men, <a id="page-307"></a><span class="pgnum">307</span>if we examine thoroughly into +the structure of the body, and the form and perfection of human nature. +There are three things absolutely necessary for the support of life—to +eat, to drink, and to breathe. For these operations the mouth is most +aptly framed, which, by the assistance of the nostrils, draws in the +more air.</p> + +<p>LIV. The teeth are there placed to divide and grind the food.<a id="FNA-231"></a><a href="#FN-231"><sup>231</sup></a> The +fore-teeth, being sharp and opposite to each other, cut it asunder, and +the hind-teeth (called the grinders) chew it, in which office the tongue +seems to assist. At the root of the tongue is the gullet, which receives +whatever is swallowed: it touches the tonsils on each side, and +terminates at the interior extremity of the palate. When, by the motions +of the tongue, the food is forced into this passage, it descends, and +those parts of the gullet which are below it are dilated, and those +above are contracted. There is another passage, called by physicians the +rough artery,<a id="FNA-232"></a><a href="#FN-232"><sup>232</sup></a> which reaches to the lungs, for the entrance and +return of the air we breathe; and as its orifice is joined to the roots +of the tongue a little above the part to which the gullet is annexed, it +is furnished with a sort of coverlid,<a id="FNA-233"></a><a href="#FN-233"><sup>233</sup></a> lest, by the accidental +falling of any food into it, the respiration should be stopped.</p> + +<p>As the stomach, which is beneath the gullet, receives the meat and +drink, so the lungs and the heart draw in the air from without. The +stomach is wonderfully composed, consisting almost wholly of nerves; it +abounds with membranes and fibres, and detains what it receives, whether +solid or liquid, till it is altered and digested. It sometimes +contracts, sometimes dilates. It blends and mixes the food together, so +that it is easily concocted and digested by its force of heat, and by +the animal spirits is distributed into the other parts of the body.</p> + +<p>LV. As to the lungs, they are of a soft and spongy substance, which +renders them the most commodious for respiration; <a id="page-308"></a><span class="pgnum">308</span>they alternately +dilate and contract to receive and return the air, that what is the +chief animal sustenance may be always fresh. The juice,<a id="FNA-234"></a><a href="#FN-234"><sup>234</sup></a> by which we +are nourished, being separated from the rest of the food, passes the +stomach and intestines to the liver, through open and direct passages, +which lead from the mesentery to the gates of the liver (for so they +call those vessels at the entrance of it). There are other passages from +thence, through which the food has its course when it has passed the +liver. When the bile, and those humors which proceed from the kidneys, +are separated from the food, the remaining part turns to blood, and +flows to those vessels at the entrance of the liver to which all the +passages adjoin. The chyle, being conveyed from this place through them +into the vessel called the hollow vein, is mixed together, and, being +already digested and distilled, passes into the heart; and from the +heart it is communicated through a great number of veins to every part +of the body.</p> + +<p>It is not difficult to describe how the gross remains are detruded by +the motion of the intestines, which contract and dilate; but that must +be declined, as too indelicate for discourse. Let us rather explain that +other wonder of nature, the air, which is drawn into the lungs, receives +heat both by that already in and by the coagitation of the lungs; one +part is turned back by respiration, and the other is received into a +place called the ventricle of the heart.<a id="FNA-235"></a><a href="#FN-235"><sup>235</sup></a> There is another ventricle +like it annexed to the heart, into which the blood flows from the liver +through the hollow vein. Thus by one ventricle the blood is diffused to +the extremities through the veins, and by the other the breath is +communicated through the arteries; and there are such numbers of both +dispersed through the whole body that they manifest a divine art.</p> + +<p>Why need I speak of the bones, those supports of the body, whose joints +are so wonderfully contrived for stability, and to render the limbs +complete with regard to motion and to every action of the body? Or need +I mention <a id="page-309"></a><span class="pgnum">309</span>the nerves, by which the limbs are governed—their many +interweavings, and their proceeding from the heart,<a id="FNA-236"></a><a href="#FN-236"><sup>236</sup></a> from whence, +like the veins and arteries, they have their origin, and are distributed +through the whole corporeal frame?</p> + +<p>LVI. To this skill of nature, and this care of providence, so diligent +and so ingenious, many reflections may be added, which show what +valuable things the Deity has bestowed on man. He has made us of a +stature tall and upright, in order that we might behold the heavens, and +so arrive at the knowledge of the Gods; for men are not simply to dwell +here as inhabitants of the earth, but to be, as it were, spectators of +the heavens and the stars, which is a privilege not granted to any other +kind of animated beings. The senses, which are the interpreters and +messengers of things, are placed in the head, as in a tower, and +wonderfully situated for their proper uses; for the eyes, being in the +highest part, have the office of sentinels, in discovering to us +objects; and the ears are conveniently placed in a high part of the +person, being appointed to receive sound, which naturally ascends. The +nostrils have the like situation, because all scent likewise ascends; +and they have, with great reason, a near vicinity to the mouth, because +they assist us in judging of meat and drink. The taste, which is to +distinguish the quality of what we take; is in that part of the mouth +where nature has laid open a passage for what we eat and drink. But the +touch is equally diffused through the whole body, that we may not +receive any blows, or the too rigid attacks of cold and heat, without +feeling them. And as in building the architect averts from the eyes and +nose of the master those things which must necessarily be offensive, so +has nature removed far from our senses what is of the same kind in the +human body.</p> + +<p>LVII. What artificer but nature, whose direction is incomparable, could +have exhibited so much ingenuity in the formation of the senses? In the +first place, she has covered and invested the eyes with the finest +membranes, which she hath made transparent, that we may see through +<a id="page-310"></a><span class="pgnum">310</span>them, and firm in their texture, to preserve the eyes. She has made +them slippery and movable, that they might avoid what would offend them, +and easily direct the sight wherever they will. The actual organ of +sight, which is called the pupil, is so small that it can easily shun +whatever might be hurtful to it. The eyelids, which are their coverings, +are soft and smooth, that they may not injure the eyes; and are made to +shut at the apprehension of any accident, or to open at pleasure; and +these movements nature has ordained to be made in an instant: they are +fortified with a sort of palisade of hairs, to keep off what may be +noxious to them when open, and to be a fence to their repose when sleep +closes them, and allows them to rest as if they were wrapped up in a +case. Besides, they are commodiously hidden and defended by eminences on +every side; for on the upper part the eyebrows turn aside the +perspiration which falls from the head and forehead; the cheeks beneath +rise a little, so as to protect them on the lower side; and the nose is +placed between them as a wall of separation.</p> + +<p>The hearing is always open, for that is a sense of which we are in need +even while we are sleeping; and the moment that any sound is admitted by +it we are awakened even from sleep. It has a winding passage, lest +anything should slip into it, as it might if it were straight and +simple. Nature also hath taken the same precaution in making there a +viscous humor, that if any little creatures should endeavor to creep in, +they might stick in it as in bird-lime. The ears (by which we mean the +outward part) are made prominent, to cover and preserve the hearing, +lest the sound should be dissipated and escape before the sense is +affected. Their entrances are hard and horny, and their form winding, +because bodies of this kind better return and increase the sound. This +appears in the harp, lute, or horn;<a id="FNA-237"></a><a href="#FN-237"><sup>237</sup></a> and from all tortuous and +enclosed places sounds are returned stronger.</p> + +<p>The nostrils, in like manner, are ever open, because we have a continual +use for them; and their entrances also are rather narrow, lest anything +noxious should enter <a id="page-311"></a><span class="pgnum">311</span>them; and they have always a humidity necessary +for the repelling dust and many other extraneous bodies. The taste, +having the mouth for an enclosure, is admirably situated, both in regard +to the use we make of it and to its security.</p> + +<p>LVIII. Besides, every human sense is much more exquisite than those of +brutes; for our eyes, in those arts which come under their judgment, +distinguish with great nicety; as in painting, sculpture, engraving, and +in the gesture and motion of bodies. They understand the beauty, +proportion, and, as I may so term it, the becomingness of colors and +figures; they distinguish things of greater importance, even virtues and +vices; they know whether a man is angry or calm, cheerful or sad, +courageous or cowardly, bold or timorous.</p> + +<p>The judgment of the ears is not less admirably and scientifically +contrived with regard to vocal and instrumental music. They distinguish +the variety of sounds, the measure, the stops, the different sorts of +voices, the treble and the base, the soft and the harsh, the sharp and +the flat, of which human ears only are capable to judge. There is +likewise great judgment in the smell, the taste, and the touch; to +indulge and gratify which senses more arts have been invented than I +could wish: it is apparent to what excess we have arrived in the +composition of our perfumes, the preparation of our food, and the +enjoyment of corporeal pleasures.</p> + +<p>LIX. Again, he who does not perceive the soul and mind of man, his +reason, prudence, and discernment, to be the work of a divine +providence, seems himself to be destitute of those faculties. While I am +on this subject, Cotta, I wish I had your eloquence: how would you +illustrate so fine a subject! You would show the great extent of the +understanding; how we collect our ideas, and join those which follow to +those which precede; establish principles, draw consequences, define +things separately, and comprehend them with accuracy; from whence you +demonstrate how great is the power of intelligence and knowledge, which +is such that even God himself has no qualities more admirable. How +valuable (though you Academics despise and even deny that we have it) is +our <a id="page-312"></a><span class="pgnum">312</span>knowledge of exterior objects, from the perception of the senses +joined to the application of the mind; by which we see in what relation +one thing stands to another, and by the aid of which we have invented +those arts which are necessary for the support and pleasure of life. How +charming is eloquence! How divine that mistress of the universe, as you +call it! It teaches us what we were ignorant of, and makes us capable of +teaching what we have learned. By this we exhort others; by this we +persuade them; by this we comfort the afflicted; by this we deliver the +affrighted from their fear; by this we moderate excessive joy; by this +we assuage the passions of lust and anger. This it is which bound men by +the chains of right and law, formed the bonds of civil society, and made +us quit a wild and savage life.</p> + +<p>And it will appear incredible, unless you carefully observe the facts, +how complete the work of nature is in giving us the use of speech; for, +first of all, there is an artery from the lungs to the bottom of the +mouth, through which the voice, having its original principle in the +mind, is transmitted. Then the tongue is placed in the mouth, bounded by +the teeth. It softens and modulates the voice, which would otherwise be +confusedly uttered; and, by pushing it to the teeth and other parts of +the mouth, makes the sound distinct and articulate. We Stoics, +therefore, compare the tongue to the bow of an instrument, the teeth to +the strings, and the nostrils to the sounding-board.</p> + +<p>LX. But how commodious are the hands which nature has given to man, and +how beautifully do they minister to many arts! For, such is the +flexibility of the joints, that our fingers are closed and opened +without any difficulty. With their help, the hand is formed for +painting, carving, and engraving; for playing on stringed instruments, +and on the pipe. These are matters of pleasure. There are also works of +necessity, such as tilling the ground, building houses, making cloth and +habits, and working in brass and iron. It is the business of the mind to +invent, the senses to perceive, and the hands to execute; so that if we +have buildings, if we are clothed, if we live in safety, if we have +cities, walls, habitations, and temples, it is to the hands we owe them.</p> + +<p><a id="page-313"></a><span class="pgnum">313</span>By our labor, that is, by our hands, variety and plenty of food are +provided; for, without culture, many fruits, which serve either for +present or future consumption, would not be produced; besides, we feed +on flesh, fish, and fowl, catching some, and bringing up others. We +subdue four-footed beasts for our carriage, whose speed and strength +supply our slowness and inability. On some we put burdens, on others +yokes. We convert the sagacity of the elephant and the quick scent of +the dog to our own advantage. Out of the caverns of the earth we dig +iron, a thing entirely necessary for the cultivation of the ground. We +discover the hidden veins of copper, silver, and gold, advantageous for +our use and beautiful as ornaments. We cut down trees, and use every +kind of wild and cultivated timber, not only to make fire to warm us and +dress our meat, but also for building, that we may have houses to defend +us from the heat and cold. With timber likewise we build ships, which +bring us from all parts every commodity of life. We are the only animals +who, from our knowledge of navigation, can manage what nature has made +the most violent—the sea and the winds. Thus we obtain from the ocean +great numbers of profitable things. We are the absolute masters of what +the earth produces. We enjoy the mountains and the plains. The rivers +and the lakes are ours. We sow the seed, and plant the trees. We +fertilize the earth by overflowing it. We stop, direct, and turn the +rivers: in short, by our hands we endeavor, by our various operations in +this world, to make, as it were, another nature.</p> + +<p>LXI. But what shall I say of human reason? Has it not even entered the +heavens? Man alone of all animals has observed the courses of the stars, +their risings and settings. By man the day, the month, the year, is +determined. He foresees the eclipses of the sun and moon, and foretells +them to futurity, marking their greatness, duration, and precise time. +>From the contemplation of these things the mind extracts the knowledge +of the Gods—a knowledge which produces piety, with which is connected +justice, and all the other virtues; from which arises a life of +felicity, inferior to that of the Gods in no single particular, except +in immortality, which is not absolutely necessary <a id="page-314"></a><span class="pgnum">314</span>to happy living. In +explaining these things, I think that I have sufficiently demonstrated +the superiority of man to other animated beings; from whence we should +infer that neither the form and position of his limbs nor that strength +of mind and understanding could possibly be the effect of chance.</p> + +<p>LXII. I am now to prove, by way of conclusion, that every thing in this +world of use to us was made designedly for us.</p> + +<p>First of all, the universe was made for the Gods and men, and all things +therein were prepared and provided for our service. For the world is the +common habitation or city of the Gods and men; for they are the only +reasonable beings: they alone live by justice and law. As, therefore, it +must be presumed the cities of Athens and Lacedæmon were built for the +Athenians and Lacedæmonians, and as everything there is said to belong +to those people, so everything in the universe may with propriety be +said to belong to the Gods and men, and to them alone.</p> + +<p>In the next place, though the revolutions of the sun, moon, and all the +stars are necessary for the cohesion of the universe, yet may they be +considered also as objects designed for the view and contemplation of +man. There is no sight less apt to satiate the eye, none more beautiful, +or more worthy to employ our reason and penetration. By measuring their +courses we find the different seasons, their durations and vicissitudes, +which, if they are known to men alone, we must believe were made only +for their sake.</p> + +<p>Does the earth bring forth fruit and grain in such excessive abundance +and variety for men or for brutes? The plentiful and exhilarating fruit +of the vine and the olive-tree are entirely useless to beasts. They know +not the time for sowing, tilling, or for reaping in season and gathering +in the fruits of the earth, or for laying up and preserving their +stores. Man alone has the care and advantage of these things.</p> + +<p>LXIII. Thus, as the lute and the pipe were made for those, and those +only, who are capable of playing on them, so it must be allowed that the +produce of the earth was designed for those only who make use of them; +and <a id="page-315"></a><span class="pgnum">315</span>though some beasts may rob us of a small part, it does not follow +that the earth produced it also for them. Men do not store up corn for +mice and ants, but for their wives, their children, and their families. +Beasts, therefore, as I said before, possess it by stealth, but their +masters openly and freely. It is for us, therefore, that nature hath +provided this abundance. Can there be any doubt that this plenty and +variety of fruit, which delight not only the taste, but the smell and +sight, was by nature intended for men only? Beasts are so far from being +partakers of this design, that we see that even they themselves were +made for man; for of what utility would sheep be, unless for their wool, +which, when dressed and woven, serves us for clothing? For they are not +capable of anything, not even of procuring their own food, without the +care and assistance of man. The fidelity of the dog, his affectionate +fawning on his master, his aversion to strangers, his sagacity in +finding game, and his vivacity in pursuit of it, what do these qualities +denote but that he was created for our use? Why need I mention oxen? We +perceive that their backs were not formed for carrying burdens, but +their necks were naturally made for the yoke, and their strong broad +shoulders to draw the plough. In the Golden Age, which poets speak of, +they were so greatly beneficial to the husbandman in tilling the fallow +ground that no violence was ever offered them, and it was even thought a +crime to eat them:</p> + +<div class="poem"> +<p>The Iron Age began the fatal trade</p> +<p>Of blood, and hammer’d the destructive blade;</p> +<p>Then men began to make the ox to bleed,</p> +<p>And on the tamed and docile beast to feed<a id="FNA-238"></a><a href="#FN-238"><sup>238</sup></a>.</p> +</div> + +<p>LXIV. It would take a long time to relate the advantages which we +receive from mules and asses, which undoubtedly were designed for our +use. What is the swine good for but to eat? whose life, Chrysippus says, +was given it but as salt<a id="FNA-239"></a><a href="#FN-239"><sup>239</sup></a> to keep it from putrefying; and as it <a id="page-316"></a><span class="pgnum">316</span>is +proper food for man, nature hath made no animal more fruitful. What a +multitude of birds and fishes are taken by the art and contrivance of +man only, and which are so delicious to our taste that one would be +tempted sometimes to believe that this Providence which watches over us +was an Epicurean! Though we think there are some birds—the alites and +oscines<a id="FNA-240"></a><a href="#FN-240"><sup>240</sup></a>, as our augurs call them—which were made merely to +foretell events.</p> + +<p>The large savage beasts we take by hunting, partly for food, partly to +exercise ourselves in imitation of martial discipline, and to use those +we can tame and instruct, as elephants, or to extract remedies for our +diseases and wounds, as we do from certain roots and herbs, the virtues +of which are known by long use and experience. Represent to yourself the +whole earth and seas as if before your eyes. You will see the vast and +fertile plains, the thick, shady mountains, the immense pasturage for +cattle, and ships sailing over the deep with incredible celerity; nor +are our discoveries only on the face of the earth, but in its secret +recesses there are many useful things, which being made for man, by man +alone are discovered.</p> + +<p>LXV. Another, and in my opinion the strongest, proof that the providence +of the Gods takes care of us is divination, which both of you, perhaps, +will attack; you, Cotta, because Carneades took pleasure in inveighing +against the Stoics; and you, Velleius, because there is nothing Epicurus +ridicules so much as the prediction of events. Yet the truth of +divination appears in many places, on many occasions, often in private, +but particularly in public concerns. We receive many intimations from +the foresight and presages of augurs and auspices; from oracles, +prophecies, dreams, and prodigies; and it often happens that by these +means events have proved happy to men, and imminent dangers have been +avoided. This knowledge, therefore—call it either a kind of transport, +or an art, or a natural faculty—is certainly found only in men, and is +a gift from the immortal Gods. If these proofs, when taken <a id="page-317"></a><span class="pgnum">317</span>separately, +should make no impression upon your mind, yet, when collected together, +they must certainly affect you.</p> + +<p>Besides, the Gods not only provide for mankind universally, but for +particular men. You may bring this universality to gradually a smaller +number, and again you may reduce that smaller number to individuals.</p> + +<p>LXVI. For if the reasons which I have given prove to all of us that the +Gods take care of all men, in every country, in every part of the world +separate from our continent, they take care of those who dwell on the +same land with us, from east to west; and if they regard those who +inhabit this kind of great island, which we call the globe of the earth, +they have the like regard for those who possess the parts of this +island—Europe, Asia, and Africa; and therefore they favor the parts of +these parts, as Rome, Athens, Sparta, and Rhodes; and particular men of +these cities, separate from the whole; as Curius, Fabricius, +Coruncanius, in the war with Pyrrhus; in the first Punic war, Calatinus, +Duillius, Metellus, Lutatius; in the second, Maximus, Marcellus, +Africanus; after these, Paullus, Gracchus, Cato; and in our fathers’ +times, Scipio, Lælius. Rome also and Greece have produced many +illustrious men, who we cannot believe were so without the assistance of +the Deity; which is the reason that the poets, Homer in particular, +joined their chief heroes—Ulysses, Agamemnon, Diomedes, Achilles—to +certain Deities, as companions in their adventures and dangers. Besides, +the frequent appearances of the Gods, as I have before mentioned, +demonstrate their regard for cities and particular men. This is also +apparent indeed from the foreknowledge of events, which we receive +either sleeping or waking. We are likewise forewarned of many things by +the entrails of victims, by presages, and many other means, which have +been long observed with such exactness as to produce an art of +divination.</p> + +<p>There never, therefore, was a great man without divine inspiration. If a +storm should damage the corn or vineyard of a person, or any accident +should deprive him of some conveniences of life, we should not judge +from thence that the Deity hates or neglects him. The Gods take care <a id="page-318"></a><span class="pgnum">318</span>of +great things, and disregard the small. But to truly great men all things +ever happen prosperously; as has been sufficiently asserted and proved +by us Stoics, as well as by Socrates, the prince of philosophers, in his +discourses on the infinite advantages arising from virtue.</p> + +<p>LXVII. This is almost the whole that hath occurred to my mind on the +nature of the Gods, and what I thought proper to advance. Do you, Cotta, +if I may advise, defend the same cause. Remember that in Rome you keep +the first rank; remember that you are Pontifex; and as your school is at +liberty to argue on which side you please<a id="FNA-241"></a><a href="#FN-241"><sup>241</sup></a>, do you rather take mine, +and reason on it with that eloquence which you acquired by your +rhetorical exercises, and which the Academy improved; for it is a +pernicious and impious custom to argue against the Gods, whether it be +done seriously, or only in pretence and out of sport.</p> + +<hr/> + + +<h3>BOOK III.</h3> + + +<p>I. <span class="first">When</span> Balbus had ended this discourse, then Cotta, with a smile, +rejoined, You direct me too late which side to defend; for during the +course of your argument I was revolving in my mind what objections to +make to what you were saying, not so much for the sake of opposition, as +of obliging you to explain what I did not perfectly comprehend; and as +every one may use his own judgment, it is scarcely possible for me to +think in every instance exactly what you wish.</p> + +<p>You have no idea, O Cotta, said Velleius, how impatient I am to hear +what you have to say. For since our friend Balbus was highly delighted +with your discourse against Epicurus, I ought in my turn to be +solicitous to hear what you can say against the Stoics; and I therefore +will give you my best attention, for I believe you are, as usual, well +prepared for the engagement.</p> + +<p>I wish, by Hercules! I were, replies Cotta; for it is more difficult to +dispute with Lucilius than it was with you. <a id="page-319"></a><span class="pgnum">319</span>Why so? says Velleius. +Because, replies Cotta, your Epicurus, in my opinion, does not contend +strongly for the Gods: he only, for the sake of avoiding any +unpopularity or punishment, is afraid to deny their existence; for when +he asserts that the Gods are wholly inactive and regardless of +everything, and that they have limbs like ours, but make no use of them, +he seems to jest with us, and to think it sufficient if he allows that +there are beings of any kind happy and eternal. But with regard to +Balbus, I suppose you observed how many things were said by him, which, +however false they may be, yet have a perfect coherence and connection; +therefore, my design, as I said, in opposing him, is not so much to +confute his principles as to induce him to explain what I do not clearly +understand: for which reason, Balbus, I will give you the choice, either +to answer me every particular as I go on, or permit me to proceed +without interruption. If you want any explanation, replies Balbus, I +would rather you would propose your doubts singly; but if your intention +is rather to confute me than to seek instruction for yourself, it shall +be as you please; I will either answer you immediately on every point, +or stay till you have finished your discourse.</p> + +<p>II. Very well, says Cotta; then let us proceed as our conversation shall +direct. But before I enter on the subject, I have a word to say +concerning myself; for I am greatly influenced by your authority, and +your exhortation at the conclusion of your discourse, when you desired +me to remember that I was Cotta and Pontifex; by which I presume you +intimated that I should defend the sacred rites and religion and +ceremonies which we received from our ancestors. Most undoubtedly I +always have, and always shall defend them, nor shall the arguments +either of the learned or unlearned ever remove the opinions which I have +imbibed from them concerning the worship of the immortal Gods. In +matters of religion I submit to the rules of the high-priests, T. +Coruncanius, P. Scipio, and P. Scævola; not to the sentiments of Zeno, +Cleanthes, or Chrysippus; and I pay a greater regard to what C. Lælius, +one of our augurs and wise men, has written concerning religion, in that +noble oration of his, than to the most eminent of the Stoics: and as the +whole religion of the Romans at <a id="page-320"></a><span class="pgnum">320</span>first consisted in sacrifices and +divination by birds, to which have since been added predictions, if the +interpreters<a id="FNA-242"></a><a href="#FN-242"><sup>242</sup></a> of the Sibylline oracle or the aruspices have foretold +any event from portents and prodigies, I have ever thought that there +was no point of all these holy things which deserved to be despised. I +have been even persuaded that Romulus, by instituting divination, and +Numa, by establishing sacrifices, laid the foundation of Rome, which +undoubtedly would never have risen to such a height of grandeur if the +Gods had not been made propitious by this worship. These, Balbus, are my +sentiments both as a priest and as Cotta. But you must bring me to your +opinion by the force of your reason: for I have a right to demand from +you, as a philosopher, a reason for the religion which you would have me +embrace. But I must believe the religion of our ancestors without any +proof.</p> + +<p>III. What proof, says Balbus, do you require of me? You have proposed, +says Cotta, four articles. First of all, you undertook to prove that +there “are Gods;” secondly, “of what kind and character they are;” +thirdly, that “the universe is governed by them;” lastly, that “they +provide for the welfare of mankind in particular.” Thus, if I remember +rightly, you divided your discourse. Exactly so, replies Balbus; but let +us see what you require.</p> + +<p>Let us examine, says Cotta, every proposition. The first one—that there +are Gods—is never contested but by the most impious of men; nay, though +it can never be rooted out of my mind, yet I believe it on the authority +of our ancestors, and not on the proofs which you have brought. Why do +you expect a proof from me, says Balbus, if you thoroughly believe it? +Because, says Cotta, I come to this discussion as if I had never thought +of the Gods, or heard anything concerning them. Take me as a disciple +wholly ignorant and unbiassed, and prove to me all the points which I +ask.</p> + +<p>Begin, then, replies Balbus. I would first know, says Cotta, why you +have been so long in proving the existence of the Gods, which you said +was a point so very evident to all, that there was no need of any proof? +In that, answers <a id="page-321"></a><span class="pgnum">321</span>Balbus, I have followed your example, whom I have +often observed, when pleading in the Forum, to load the judge with all +the arguments which the nature of your cause would permit. This also is +the practice of philosophers, and I have a right to follow it. Besides, +you may as well ask me why I look upon you with two eyes, since I can +see you with one.</p> + +<p>IV. You shall judge, then, yourself, says Cotta, if this is a very just +comparison; for, when I plead, I do not dwell upon any point agreed to +be self-evident, because long reasoning only serves to confound the +clearest matters; besides, though I might take this method in pleading, +yet I should not make use of it in such a discourse as this, which +requires the nicest distinction. And with regard to your making use of +one eye only when you look on me, there is no reason for it, since +together they have the same view; and since nature, to which you +attribute wisdom, has been pleased to give us two passages by which we +receive light. But the truth is, that it was because you did not think +that the existence of the Gods was so evident as you could wish that you +therefore brought so many proofs. It was sufficient for me to believe it +on the tradition of our ancestors; and since you disregard authorities, +and appeal to reason, permit my reason to defend them against yours. The +proofs on which you found the existence of the Gods tend only to render +a proposition doubtful that, in my opinion, is not so; I have not only +retained in my memory the whole of these proofs, but even the order in +which you proposed them. The first was, that when we lift up our eyes +towards the heavens, we immediately conceive that there is some divinity +that governs those celestial bodies; on which you quoted this passage—</p> + +<div class="poem"> +<p>Look up to the refulgent heaven above,</p> +<p>Which all men call, unanimously, Jove;</p> +</div> + +<p class="cont">intimating that we should invoke that as Jupiter, rather than our +Capitoline Jove<a id="FNA-243"></a><a href="#FN-243"><sup>243</sup></a>, or that it is evident to the whole world that +those bodies are Gods which Velleius and many others do not place even +in the rank of animated beings.</p> + +<p><a id="page-322"></a><span class="pgnum">322</span>Another strong proof, in your opinion, was that the belief of the +existence of the Gods was universal, and that mankind was daily more and +more convinced of it. What! should an affair of such importance be left +to the decision of fools, who, by your sect especially, are called +madmen?</p> + +<p>V. But the Gods have appeared to us, as to Posthumius at the Lake +Regillus, and to Vatienus in the Salarian Way: something you mentioned, +too, I know not what, of a battle of the Locrians at Sagra. Do you +believe that the Tyndaridæ, as you called them; that is, men sprung from +men, and who were buried in Lacedæmon, as we learn from Homer, who lived +in the next age—do you believe, I say, that they appeared to Vatienus +on the road mounted on white horses, without any servant to attend them, +to tell the victory of the Romans to a country fellow rather than to M. +Cato, who was at that time the chief person of the senate? Do you take +that print of a horse’s hoof which is now to be seen on a stone at +Regillus to be made by Castor’s horse? Should you not believe, what is +probable, that the souls of eminent men, such as the Tyndaridæ, are +divine and immortal, rather than that those bodies which had been +reduced to ashes should mount on horses, and fight in an army? If you +say that was possible, you ought to show how it is so, and not amuse us +with fabulous old women’s stories.</p> + +<p>Do you take these for fabulous stories? says Balbus. Is not the temple, +built by Posthumius in honor of Castor and Pollux, to be seen in the +Forum? Is not the decree of the senate concerning Vatienus still +subsisting? As to the affair of Sagra, it is a common proverb among the +Greeks; when they would affirm anything strongly, they say “It is as +certain as what passed at Sagra.” Ought not such authorities to move +you? You oppose me, replies Cotta, with stories, but I ask reasons of +you<a id="FNA-244"></a><a href="#FN-244"><sup>244</sup></a>. * * *</p> + +<p>VI. We are now to speak of predictions. No one can avoid what is to +come, and, indeed, it is commonly useless to know it; for it is a +miserable case to be afflicted to no purpose, and not to have even the +last, the common comfort, <a id="page-323"></a><span class="pgnum">323</span>hope, which, according to your principles, +none can have; for you say that fate governs all things, and call that +fate which has been true from all eternity. What advantage, then, is the +knowledge of futurity to us, or how does it assist us to guard against +impending evils, since it will come inevitably?</p> + +<p>But whence comes that divination? To whom is owing that knowledge from +the entrails of beasts? Who first made observations from the voice of +the crow? Who invented the Lots?<a id="FNA-245"></a><a href="#FN-245"><sup>245</sup></a> Not that I give no credit to these +things, or that I despise Attius Navius’s staff, which you mentioned; +but I ought to be informed how these things are understood by +philosophers, especially as the diviners are often wrong in their +conjectures. But physicians, you say, are likewise often mistaken. What +comparison can there be between divination, of the origin of which we +are ignorant, and physic, which proceeds on principles intelligible to +every one? You believe that the Decii,<a id="FNA-246"></a><a href="#FN-246"><sup>246</sup></a> in devoting themselves to +death, appeased the Gods. How great, then, was the iniquity of the Gods +that they could not be appeased but at the price of such noble blood! +That was the stratagem of generals such as the Greeks call <span class="greek">στρατήγημα</span>, +and it was a stratagem worthy such illustrious leaders, who consulted +the public good even at the expense of their lives: they conceived +rightly, what indeed happened, that if the general rode furiously upon +the enemy, the whole army would follow his example. As to the voice of +the Fauns, I never heard it. If you assure me that you have, I shall +believe you, though I really know not what a Faun is.</p> + +<p>VII. I do not, then, O Balbus, from anything that you have said, +perceive as yet that it is proved that there are Gods. I believe it, +indeed, but not from any arguments of the Stoics. Cleanthes, you have +said, attributes the idea that men have of the Gods to four causes. In +the first place (as I have already sufficiently mentioned), to a +foreknowledge <a id="page-324"></a><span class="pgnum">324</span>of future events; secondly, to tempests, and other shocks +of nature; thirdly, to the utility and plenty of things we enjoy; +fourthly, to the invariable order of the stars and the heavens. The +arguments drawn from foreknowledge I have already answered. With regard +to tempests in the air, the sea, and the earth, I own that many people +are affrighted by them, and imagine that the immortal Gods are the +authors of them.</p> + +<p>But the question is, not whether there are people who believe that there +are Gods, but whether there are Gods or not. As to the two other causes +of Cleanthes, one of which is derived from the great abundance of +desirable things which we enjoy, the other from the invariable order of +the seasons and the heavens, I shall treat on them when I answer your +discourse concerning the providence of the Gods—a point, Balbus, upon +which you have spoken at great length. I shall likewise defer till then +examining the argument which you attribute to Chrysippus, that “if there +is in nature anything which surpasses the power of man to produce, there +must consequently be some being better than man.” I shall also postpone, +till we come to that part of my argument, your comparison of the world +to a fine house, your observations on the proportion and harmony of the +universe, and those smart, short reasons of Zeno which you quote; and I +shall examine at the same time your reasons drawn from natural +philosophy, concerning that fiery force and that vital heat which you +regard as the principle of all things; and I will investigate, in its +proper place, all that you advanced the other day on the existence of +the Gods, and on the sense and understanding which you attributed to the +sun, the moon, and all the stars; and I shall ask you this question over +and over again, By what proofs are you convinced yourself there are +Gods?</p> + +<p>VIII. I thought, says Balbus, that I had brought ample proofs to +establish this point. But such is your manner of opposing, that, when +you seem on the point of interrogating me, and when I am preparing to +answer, you suddenly divert the discourse, and give me no opportunity to +reply to you; and thus those most important points concerning divination +and fate are neglected which we Stoics <a id="page-325"></a><span class="pgnum">325</span>have thoroughly examined, but +which your school has only slightly touched upon. But they are not +thought essential to the question in hand; therefore, if you think +proper, do not confuse them together, that we in this discussion may +come to a clear explanation of the subject of our present inquiry.</p> + +<p>Very well, says Cotta. Since, then, you have divided the whole question +into four parts, and I have said all that I had to say on the first, I +will take the second into consideration; in which, when you attempted to +show what the character of the Gods was, you seemed to me rather to +prove that there are none; for you said that it was the greatest +difficulty to draw our minds from the prepossessions of the eyes; but +that as nothing is more excellent than the Deity, you did not doubt that +the world was God, because there is nothing better in nature than the +world, and so we may reasonably think it animated, or, rather, perceive +it in our minds as clearly as if it were obvious to our eyes.</p> + +<p>Now, in what sense do you say there is nothing better than the world? If +you mean that there is nothing more beautiful, I agree with you; that +there is nothing more adapted to our wants, I likewise agree with you: +but if you mean that nothing is wiser than the world, I am by no means +of your opinion. Not that I find it difficult to conceive anything in my +mind independent of my eyes; on the contrary, the more I separate my +mind from my eyes, the less I am able to comprehend your opinion.</p> + +<p>IX. Nothing is better than the world, you say. Nor is there, indeed, +anything on earth better than the city of Rome; do you think, therefore, +that our city has a mind; that it thinks and reasons; or that this most +beautiful city, being void of sense, is not preferable to an ant, +because an ant has sense, understanding, reason, and memory? You should +consider, Balbus, what ought to be allowed you, and not advance things +because they please you.</p> + +<p>For that old, concise, and, as it seemed to you, acute syllogism of Zeno +has been all which you have so much enlarged upon in handling this +topic: “That which reasons is superior to that which does not; nothing +is superior to the world; therefore the world reasons.” If you would +<a id="page-326"></a><span class="pgnum">326</span>prove also that the world can very well read a book, follow the example +of Zeno, and say, “That which can read is better than that which cannot; +nothing is better than the world; the world therefore can read.” After +the same manner you may prove the world to be an orator, a +mathematician, a musician—that it possesses all sciences, and, in +short, is a philosopher. You have often said that God made all things, +and that no cause can produce an effect unlike itself. From hence it +will follow, not only that the world is animated, and is wise, but also +plays upon the fiddle and the flute, because it produces men who play on +those instruments. Zeno, therefore, the chief of your sect, advances no +argument sufficient to induce us to think that the world reasons, or, +indeed, that it is animated at all, and consequently none to think it a +Deity; though it may be said that there is nothing superior to it, as +there is nothing more beautiful, nothing more useful to us, nothing more +adorned, and nothing more regular in its motions. But if the world, +considered as one great whole, is not God, you should not surely deify, +as you have done, that infinite multitude of stars which only form a +part of it, and which so delight you with the regularity of their +eternal courses; not but that there is something truly wonderful and +incredible in their regularity; but this regularity of motion, Balbus, +may as well be ascribed to a natural as to a divine cause.</p> + +<p>X. What can be more regular than the flux and reflux of the Euripus at +Chalcis, the Sicilian sea, and the violence of the ocean in those +parts<a id="FNA-247"></a><a href="#FN-247"><sup>247</sup></a></p> + +<div class="poem"> +<p class="L6" style="margin-left: 15ex">where the rapid tide</p> +<p>Does Europe from the Libyan coast divide?</p> +</div> + +<p class="cont">The same appears on the Spanish and British coasts. Must we conclude +that some Deity appoints and directs these ebbings and flowings to +certain fixed times? Consider, I pray, if everything which is regular in +its motion is deemed divine, whether it will not follow that tertian and +quartan agues must likewise be so, as their returns have the greatest +regularity. These effects are to be explained by reason; but, because +you are unable to assign any, you have recourse to a Deity as your last +refuge.</p> + +<p><a id="page-327"></a><span class="pgnum">327</span>The arguments of Chrysippus appeared to you of great weight; a +man undoubtedly of great quickness and subtlety (I call those quick who +have a sprightly turn of thought, and those subtle whose minds are +seasoned by use as their hands are by labor): “If,” says he, “there is +anything which is beyond the power of man to produce, the being who +produces it is better than man. Man is unable to make what is in the +world; the being, therefore, that could do it is superior to man. What +being is there but a God superior to man? Therefore there is a God.”</p> + +<p>These arguments are founded on the same erroneous principles as Zeno’s, +for he does not define what is meant by being better or more excellent, +or distinguish between an intelligent cause and a natural cause. +Chrysippus adds, “If there are no Gods, there is nothing better than +man; but we cannot, without the highest arrogance, have this idea of +ourselves.” Let us grant that it is arrogance in man to think himself +better than the world; but to comprehend that he has understanding and +reason, and that in Orion and Canicula there is neither, is no +arrogance, but an indication of good sense. “Since we suppose,” +continues he, “when we see a beautiful house, that it was built for the +master, and not for mice, we should likewise judge that the world is the +mansion of the Gods.” Yes, if I believed that the Gods built the world; +but not if, as I believe, and intend to prove, it is the work of nature.</p> + +<p>XI. Socrates, in Xenophon, asks, “Whence had man his understanding, if +there was none in the world?” And I ask, Whence had we speech, harmony, +singing; unless we think it is the sun conversing with the moon when she +approaches near it, or that the world forms an harmonious concert, as +Pythagoras imagines? This, Balbus, is the effect of nature; not of that +nature which proceeds artificially, as Zeno says, and the character of +which I shall presently examine into, but a nature which, by its own +proper motions and mutations, modifies everything.</p> + +<p>For I readily agree to what you said about the harmony and general +agreement of nature, which you pronounced to be firmly bound and united +together, as it were, by ties of blood; but I do not approve of what you +added, that “it could not possibly be so, unless it were so united by +<a id="page-328"></a><span class="pgnum">328</span>one divine spirit.” On the contrary, the whole subsists by the power of +nature, independently of the Gods, and there is a kind of sympathy (as +the Greeks call it) which joins together all the parts of the universe; +and the greater that is in its own power, the less is it necessary to +have recourse to a divine intelligence.</p> + +<p>XII. But how will you get rid of the objections which Carneades made? +“If,” says he, “there is no body immortal, there is none eternal; but +there is no body immortal, nor even indivisible, or that cannot be +separated and disunited; and as every animal is in its nature passive, +so there is not one which is not subject to the impressions of +extraneous bodies; none, that is to say, which can avoid the necessity +of enduring and suffering: and if every animal is mortal, there is none +immortal; so, likewise, if every animal may be cut up and divided, there +is none indivisible, none eternal, but all are liable to be affected by, +and compelled to submit to, external power. Every animal, therefore, is +necessarily mortal, dissoluble, and divisible.”</p> + +<p>For as there is no wax, no silver, no brass which cannot be converted +into something else, whatever is composed of wax, or silver, or brass +may cease to be what it is. By the same reason, if all the elements are +mutable, every body is mutable.</p> + +<p>Now, according to your doctrine, all the elements are mutable; all +bodies, therefore, are mutable. But if there were any body immortal, +then all bodies would not be mutable. Every body, then, is mortal; for +every body is either water, air, fire, or earth, or composed of the four +elements together, or of some of them. Now, there is not one of all +these elements that does not perish; for earthly bodies are fragile: +water is so soft that the least shock will separate its parts, and fire +and air yield to the least impulse, and are subject to dissolution; +besides, any of these elements perish when converted into another +nature, as when water is formed from earth, the air from water, and the +sky from air, and when they change in the same manner back again. +Therefore, if there is nothing but what is perishable in the composition +of all animals, there is no animal eternal.</p> + +<p>XIII. But, not to insist on these arguments, there is no <a id="page-329"></a><span class="pgnum">329</span>animal to be +found that had not a beginning, and will not have an end; for every +animal being sensitive, they are consequently all sensible of cold and +heat, sweet and bitter; nor can they have pleasing sensations without +being subject to the contrary. As, therefore, they receive pleasure, +they likewise receive pain; and whatever being is subject to pain must +necessarily be subject to death. It must be allowed, therefore, that +every animal is mortal.</p> + +<p>Besides, a being that is not sensible of pleasure or pain cannot have +the essence of an animal; if, then, on the one hand, every animal must +be sensible of pleasure and pain, and if, on the other, every being that +has these sensations cannot be immortal, we may conclude that as there +is no animal insensible, there is none immortal. Besides, there is no +animal without inclination and aversion—an inclination to that which is +agreeable to nature, and an aversion to the contrary: there are in the +case of every animal some things which they covet, and others they +reject. What they reject are repugnant to their nature, and consequently +would destroy them. Every animal, therefore, is inevitably subject to be +destroyed. There are innumerable arguments to prove that whatever is +sensitive is perishable; for cold, heat, pleasure, pain, and all that +affects the sense, when they become excessive, cause destruction. Since, +then, there is no animal that is not sensitive, there is none immortal.</p> + +<p>XIV. The substance of an animal is either simple or compound; simple, if +it is composed only of earth, of fire, of air, or of water (and of such +a sort of being we can form no idea); compound, if it is formed of +different elements, which have each their proper situation, and have a +natural tendency to it—this element tending towards the highest parts, +that towards the lowest, and another towards the middle. This +conjunction may for some time subsist, but not forever; for every +element must return to its first situation. No animal, therefore, is +eternal.</p> + +<p>But your school, Balbus, allows fire only to be the sole active +principle; an opinion which I believe you derive from Heraclitus, whom +some men understand in one sense, some in another: but since he seems +unwilling to be understood, we will pass him by. You Stoics, then, say +that <a id="page-330"></a><span class="pgnum">330</span>fire is the universal principle of all things; that all living +bodies cease to live on the extinction of that heat; and that throughout +all nature whatever is sensible of that heat lives and flourishes. Now, +I cannot conceive that bodies should perish for want of heat, rather +than for want of moisture or air, especially as they even die through +excess of heat; so that the life of animals does not depend more on fire +than on the other elements.</p> + +<p>However, air and water have this quality in common with fire and heat. +But let us see to what this tends. If I am not mistaken, you believe +that in all nature there is nothing but fire, which is self-animated. +Why fire rather than air, of which the life of animals consists, and +which is called from thence <i>anima</i>,<a id="FNA-248"></a><a href="#FN-248"><sup>248</sup></a> the soul? But how is it that +you take it for granted that life is nothing but fire? It seems more +probable that it is a compound of fire and air. But if fire is +self-animated, unmixed with any other element, it must be sensitive, +because it renders our bodies sensitive; and the same objection which I +just now made will arise, that whatever is sensitive must necessarily be +susceptible of pleasure and pain, and whatever is sensible of pain is +likewise subject to the approach of death; therefore you cannot prove +fire to be eternal.</p> + +<p>You Stoics hold that all fire has need of nourishment, without which it +cannot possibly subsist; that the sun, moon, and all the stars are fed +either with fresh or salt waters; and the reason that Cleanthes gives +why the sun is retrograde, and does not go beyond the tropics in the +summer or winter, is that he may not be too far from his sustenance. +This I shall fully examine hereafter; but at present we may conclude +that whatever may cease to be cannot of its own nature be eternal; that +if fire wants sustenance, it will cease to be, and that, therefore, fire +is not of its own nature eternal.</p> + +<p>XV. After all, what kind of a Deity must that be who <a id="page-331"></a><span class="pgnum">331</span>is not graced with +one single virtue, if we should succeed in forming this idea of such a +one? Must we not attribute prudence to a Deity? a virtue which consists +in the knowledge of things good, bad, and indifferent. Yet what need has +a being for the discernment of good and ill who neither has nor can have +any ill? Of what use is reason to him? of what use is understanding? We +men, indeed, find them useful to aid us in finding out things which are +obscure by those which are clear to us; but nothing can be obscure to a +Deity. As to justice, which gives to every one his own, it is not the +concern of the Gods; since that virtue, according to your doctrine, +received its birth from men and from civil society. Temperance consists +in abstinence from corporeal pleasures, and if such abstinence hath a +place in heaven, so also must the pleasures abstained from. Lastly, if +fortitude is ascribed to the Deity, how does it appear? In afflictions, +in labor, in danger? None of these things can affect a God. How, then, +can we conceive this to be a Deity that makes no use of reason, and is +not endowed with any virtue?</p> + +<p>However, when I consider what is advanced by the Stoics, my contempt for +the ignorant multitude vanishes. For these are their divinities. The +Syrians worshipped a fish. The Egyptians consecrated beasts of almost +every kind. The Greeks deified many men; as Alabandus<a id="FNA-249"></a><a href="#FN-249"><sup>249</sup></a> at Alabandæ, +Tenes at Tenedos; and all Greece pay divine honors to Leucothea (who was +before called Ino), to her son Palæmon, to Hercules, to Æsculapius, and +to the Tyndaridæ; our own people to Romulus, and to many others, who, as +citizens newly admitted into the ancient body, they imagine have been +received into heaven.</p> + +<p>These are the Gods of the illiterate.</p> + +<p>XVI. What are the notions of you philosophers? In what respect are they +superior to these ideas? I shall pass them over; for they are certainly +very admirable. Let the world, then, be a Deity, for that, I conceive, +is what you mean by</p> + +<div class="poem"> +<p class="L4">The refulgent heaven above,</p> +<p>Which all men call, unanimously, Jove.</p> +</div> + +<p><a id="page-332"></a><span class="pgnum">332</span>But why are we to add many more Gods? What a multitude of them there +is! At least, it seems so to me; for every constellation, according to +you, is a Deity: to some you give the name of beasts, as the goat, the +scorpion, the bull, the lion; to others the names of inanimate things, +as the ship, the altar, the crown.</p> + +<p>But supposing these were to be allowed, how can the rest be granted, or +even so much as understood? When we call corn Ceres, and wine Bacchus, +we make use of the common manner of speaking; but do you think any one +so mad as to believe that his food is a Deity? With regard to those who, +you say, from having been men became Gods, I should be very willing to +learn of you, either how it was possible formerly, or, if it had ever +been, why is it not so now? I do not conceive, as things are at present, +how Hercules,</p> + +<div class="poem"> +<p>Burn’d with fiery torches on Mount Œta,</p> +</div> + +<p class="cont">as Accius says, should rise, with the flames,</p> + +<div class="poem"> +<p>To the eternal mansions of his father.</p> +</div> + +<p>Besides, Homer also says that Ulysses<a id="FNA-250"></a><a href="#FN-250"><sup>250</sup></a> met him in the shades below, +among the other dead.</p> + +<p>But yet I should be glad to know which Hercules we should chiefly +worship; for they who have searched into those histories, which are but +little known, tell us of several. The most ancient is he who fought with +Apollo about the Tripos of Delphi, and is son of Jupiter and Lisyto; and +of the most ancient Jupiters too, for we find many Jupiters also in the +Grecian chronicles. The second is the Egyptian Hercules, and is believed +to be the son of Nilus, and to be the author of the Phrygian characters. +The third, to whom they offered sacrifices, is one of the <a id="page-333"></a><span class="pgnum">333</span>Idæi +Dactyli.<a id="FNA-251"></a><a href="#FN-251"><sup>251</sup></a> The fourth is the son of Jupiter and Asteria, the sister +of Latona, chiefly honored by the Tyrians, who pretend that +Carthago<a id="FNA-252"></a><a href="#FN-252"><sup>252</sup></a> is his daughter. The fifth, called Belus, is worshipped in +India. The sixth is the son of Alcmena by Jupiter; but by the third +Jupiter, for there are many Jupiters, as you shall soon see.</p> + +<p>XVII. Since this examination has led me so far, I will convince you that +in matters of religion I have learned more from the pontifical rites, +the customs of our ancestors, and the vessels of Numa,<a id="FNA-253"></a><a href="#FN-253"><sup>253</sup></a> which Lælius +mentions in his little Golden Oration, than from all the learning of the +Stoics; for tell me, if I were a disciple of your school, what answer +could I make to these questions? If there are Gods, are nymphs also +Goddesses? If they are Goddesses, are Pans and Satyrs in the same rank? +But they are not; consequently, nymphs are not Goddesses. Yet they have +temples publicly dedicated to them. What do you conclude from thence? +Others who have temples are not therefore Gods. But let us go on. You +call Jupiter and Neptune Gods; their brother Pluto, then, is one; and if +so, those rivers also are Deities which they say flow in the infernal +regions—Acheron, Cocytus, Pyriphlegethon; Charon also, and Cerberus, +are Gods; but that cannot be allowed; nor can Pluto be placed among the +Deities. What, then, will you say of his brothers?</p> + +<p>Thus reasons Carneades; not with any design to destroy the existence of +the Gods (for what would less become a philosopher?), but to convince us +that on that matter the Stoics have said nothing plausible. If, then, +Jupiter and Neptune are Gods, adds he, can that divinity be denied to +their father Saturn, who is principally worshipped throughout the West? +If Saturn is a God, then must his father, Cœlus, be one too, and so must +the parents of Cœlus, which are the Sky and Day, as also their brothers +and sisters, which by ancient genealogists are <a id="page-334"></a><span class="pgnum">334</span>thus named: Love, +Deceit, Fear, Labor, Envy, Fate, Old Age, Death, Darkness, Misery, +Lamentation, Favor, Fraud, Obstinacy, the Destinies, the Hesperides, and +Dreams; all which are the offspring of Erebus and Night. These monstrous +Deities, therefore, must be received, or else those from whom they +sprung must be disallowed.</p> + +<p>XVIII. If you say that Apollo, Vulcan, Mercury, and the rest of that +sort are Gods, can you doubt the divinity of Hercules and Æsculapius, +Bacchus, Castor and Pollux? These are worshipped as much as those, and +even more in some places. Therefore they must be numbered among the +Gods, though on the mother’s side they are only of mortal race. +Aristæus, who is said to have been the son of Apollo, and to have found +out the art of making oil from the olive; Theseus, the son of Neptune; +and the rest whose fathers were Deities, shall they not be placed in the +number of the Gods? But what think you of those whose mothers were +Goddesses? They surely have a better title to divinity; for, in the +civil law, as he is a freeman who is born of a freewoman, so, in the law +of nature, he whose mother is a Goddess must be a God. The isle +Astypalæa religiously honor Achilles; and if he is a Deity, Orpheus and +Rhesus are so, who were born of one of the Muses; unless, perhaps, there +may be a privilege belonging to sea marriages which land marriages have +not. Orpheus and Rhesus are nowhere worshipped; and if they are +therefore not Gods, because they are nowhere worshipped as such, how can +the others be Deities? You, Balbus, seemed to agree with me that the +honors which they received were not from their being regarded as +immortals, but as men richly endued with virtue.</p> + +<p>But if you think Latona a Goddess, how can you avoid admitting Hecate to +be one also, who was the daughter of Asteria, Latona’s sister? Certainly +she is one, if we may judge by the altars erected to her in Greece. And +if Hecate is a Goddess, how can you refuse that rank to the Eumenides? +for they also have a temple at Athens, and, if I understand right, the +Romans have consecrated a grove to them. The Furies, too, whom we look +upon as the inspectors into and scourges of impiety, I suppose, must +have their divinity too. As you hold that there is some divinity +<a id="page-335"></a><span class="pgnum">335</span>presides over every human affair, there is one who presides over the +travail of matrons, whose name, <i>Natio</i>, is derived <i>a nascentibus</i>, +from nativities, and to whom we used to sacrifice in our processions in +the fields of Ardæa; but if she is a Deity, we must likewise acknowledge +all those you mentioned, Honor, Faith, Intellect, Concord; by the same +rule also, Hope, Juno, Moneta,<a id="FNA-254"></a><a href="#FN-254"><sup>254</sup></a> and every idle phantom, every child +of our imagination, are Deities. But as this consequence is quite +inadmissible, do not you either defend the cause from which it flows.</p> + +<p>XIX. What say you to this? If these are Deities, which we worship and +regard as such, why are not Serapis and Isis<a id="FNA-255"></a><a href="#FN-255"><sup>255</sup></a> placed in the same +rank? And if they are admitted, what reason have we to reject the Gods +of the barbarians? Thus we should deify oxen, horses, the ibis, hawks, +asps, crocodiles, fishes, dogs, wolves, cats, and many other beasts. If +we go back to the source of this superstition, we must equally condemn +all the Deities from which they proceed. Shall Ino, whom the Greeks call +Leucothea, and we Matuta, be reputed a Goddess, because she was the +daughter of Cadmus, and shall that title be refused to Circe and +Pasiphae,<a id="FNA-256"></a><a href="#FN-256"><sup>256</sup></a> who had the sun for their father, and Perseis, daughter +of the Ocean, for their mother? It is true, Circe has divine honors paid +her by our colony of Circæum; therefore you call her a Goddess; but what +will you say of Medea, the granddaughter of the Sun and the Ocean, and +daughter of Æetes and Idyia? What will you say of her brother Absyrtus, +whom Pacuvius calls Ægialeus, though the other name is more frequent in +the writings of the ancients? If you did not deify one as well as the +other, what will become of Ino? for all these Deities have the same +origin.</p> + +<p>Shall Amphiaraus and Tryphonius be called Gods? Our publicans, when some +lands in Bœotia were exempted from the tax, as belonging to the immortal +Gods, denied that <a id="page-336"></a><span class="pgnum">336</span>any were immortal who had been men. But if you deify +these, Erechtheus surely is a God, whose temple and priest we have seen +at Athens. And can you, then, refuse to acknowledge also Codrus, and +many others who shed their blood for the preservation of their country? +And if it is not allowable to consider all these men as Gods, then, +certainly, probabilities are not in favor of our acknowledging the +<i>Divinity</i> of those previously mentioned beings from whom these have +proceeded.</p> + +<p>It is easy to observe, likewise, that if in many countries people have +paid divine honors to the memory of those who have signalized their +courage, it was done in order to animate others to practise virtue, and +to expose themselves the more willingly to dangers in their country’s +cause. From this motive the Athenians have deified Erechtheus and his +daughters, and have erected also a temple, called Leocorion, to the +daughters of Leus.<a id="FNA-257"></a><a href="#FN-257"><sup>257</sup></a> Alabandus is more honored in the city which he +founded than any of the more illustrious Deities; from thence +Stratonicus had a pleasant turn—as he had many—when he was troubled +with an impertinent fellow who insisted that Alabandus was a God, but +that Hercules was not; “Very well,” says he, “then let the anger of +Alabandus fall upon me, and that of Hercules upon you.”</p> + +<p>XX. Do you not consider, Balbus, to what lengths your arguments for the +divinity of the heaven and the stars will carry you? You deify the sun +and the moon, which the Greeks take to be Apollo and Diana. If the moon +is a Deity, the morning-star, the other planets, and all the fixed stars +are also Deities; and why shall not the rainbow be placed in that +number? for it is so wonderfully beautiful that it is justly said to be +the daughter of Thaumas.<a id="FNA-258"></a><a href="#FN-258"><sup>258</sup></a> But if you deify the rainbow, what regard +will you pay to the clouds? for the colors which appear in the bow are +only formed of the clouds, one of which is said to have brought forth +the Centaurs; and if you deify the clouds, you cannot pay less regard to +the seasons, which the Roman people have really consecrated. Tempests, +showers, <a id="page-337"></a><span class="pgnum">337</span>storms, and whirlwinds must then be Deities. It is certain, at +least, that our captains used to sacrifice a victim to the waves before +they embarked on any voyage.</p> + +<p>As you deify the earth under the name of Ceres,<a id="FNA-259"></a><a href="#FN-259"><sup>259</sup></a> because, as you +said, she bears fruits (<i>a gerendo</i>), and the ocean under that of +Neptune, rivers and fountains have the same right. Thus we see that +Maso, the conqueror of Corsica, dedicated a temple to a fountain, and +the names of the Tiber, Spino, Almo, Nodinus, and other neighboring +rivers are in the prayers<a id="FNA-260"></a><a href="#FN-260"><sup>260</sup></a> of the augurs. Therefore, either the +number of such Deities will be infinite, or we must admit none of them, +and wholly disapprove of such an endless series of superstition.</p> + +<p>XXI. None of all these assertions, then, are to be admitted. I must +proceed now, Balbus, to answer those who say that, with regard to those +deified mortals, so religiously and devoutly reverenced, the public +opinion should have the force of reality. To begin, then: they who are +called theologists say that there are three Jupiters; the first and +second of whom were born in Arcadia; one of whom was the son of Æther, +and father of Proserpine and Bacchus; the other the son of Cœlus, and +father of Minerva, who is called the Goddess and inventress of war; the +third one born of Saturn in the isle of Crete,<a id="FNA-261"></a><a href="#FN-261"><sup>261</sup></a> where his sepulchre +is shown. The sons of Jupiter (<span class="greek">Διόσκουροι</span>) also, among the Greeks, have +many names; first, the three who at Athens have the title of +Anactes,<a id="FNA-262"></a><a href="#FN-262"><sup>262</sup></a> Tritopatreus, Eubuleus, and Dionysus, sons of the most +ancient king Jupiter and Proserpine; the next are Castor and Pollux, +sons of the third Jupiter and Leda; and, lastly, three others, by some +called Alco,<a id="FNA-263"></a><a href="#FN-263"><sup>263</sup></a> Melampus, and Tmolus, sons of Atreus, the son of +Pelops.</p> + +<p><a id="page-338"></a><span class="pgnum">338</span>As to the Muses, there were at first four—Thelxiope, Aœde, Arche, and +Melete—daughters of the second Jupiter; afterward there were nine, +daughters of the third Jupiter and Mnemosyne; there were also nine +others, having the same appellations, born of Pierus and Antiopa, by the +poets usually called Pierides and Pieriæ. Though <i>Sol</i> (the sun) is so +called, you say, because he is <i>solus</i> (single); yet how many suns do +theologists mention? There is one, the son of Jupiter and grandson of +Æther; another, the son of Hyperion; a third, who, the Egyptians say, +was of the city Heliopolis, sprung from Vulcan, the son of Nilus; a +fourth is said to have been born at Rhodes of Acantho, in the times of +the heroes, and was the grandfather of Jalysus, Camirus, and Lindus; a +fifth, of whom, it is pretended, Aretes and Circe were born at Colchis.</p> + +<p>XXII. There are likewise several Vulcans. The first (who had of Minerva +that Apollo whom the ancient historians call the tutelary God of Athens) +was the son of Cœlus; the second, whom the Egyptians call Opas,<a id="FNA-264"></a><a href="#FN-264"><sup>264</sup></a> and +whom they looked upon as the protector of Egypt, is the son of Nilus; +the third, who is said to have been the master of the forges at Lemnos, +was the son of the third Jupiter and of Juno; the fourth, who possessed +the islands near Sicily called Vulcaniæ,<a id="FNA-265"></a><a href="#FN-265"><sup>265</sup></a> was the son of Menalius. +One Mercury had Cœlus for his father and Dies for his mother; another, +who is said to dwell in a cavern, and is the same as Trophonius, is the +son of Valens and Phoronis. A third, of whom, and of Penelope, Pan was +the offspring, is the son of the third Jupiter and Maia. A fourth, whom +the Egyptians think it a crime to name, is the son of Nilus. A fifth, +whom we call, in their language, Thoth, as with them the first month of +the year is called, is he whom the people of Pheneum<a id="FNA-266"></a><a href="#FN-266"><sup>266</sup></a> worship, and +who is said to have killed Argus, to have fled for it into Egypt, and to +have given laws and learning to the Egyptians. The first of the +Æsculapii, the God of Arcadia, who is said to have invented the probe +and to have been the first person who taught men to use bandages for +wounds, is the son of <a id="page-339"></a><span class="pgnum">339</span>Apollo. The second, who was killed with thunder, +and is said to be buried in Cynosura,<a id="FNA-267"></a><a href="#FN-267"><sup>267</sup></a> is the brother of the second +Mercury. The third, who is said to have found out the art of purging the +stomach, and of drawing teeth, is the son of Arsippus and Arsinoe; and +in Arcadia there is shown his tomb, and the wood which is consecrated to +him, near the river Lusium.</p> + +<p>XXIII. I have already spoken of the most ancient of the Apollos, who is +the son of Vulcan, and tutelar God of Athens. There is another, son of +Corybas, and native of Crete, for which island he is said to have +contended with Jupiter himself. A third, who came from the regions of +the Hyperborei<a id="FNA-268"></a><a href="#FN-268"><sup>268</sup></a> to Delphi, is the son of the third Jupiter and of +Latona. A fourth was of Arcadia, whom the Arcadians called Nomio,<a id="FNA-269"></a><a href="#FN-269"><sup>269</sup></a> +because they regarded him as their legislator. There are likewise many +Dianas. The first, who is thought to be the mother of the winged Cupid, +is the daughter of Jupiter and Proserpine. The second, who is more +known, is daughter of the third Jupiter and of Latona. The third, whom +the Greeks often call by her father’s name, is the daughter of Upis<a id="FNA-270"></a><a href="#FN-270"><sup>270</sup></a> +and Glauce. There are many also of the Dionysi. The first was the son of +Jupiter and Proserpine. The second, who is said to have killed Nysa, was +the son of Nilus. The third, who reigned in Asia, and for whom the +Sabazia<a id="FNA-271"></a><a href="#FN-271"><sup>271</sup></a> were instituted, was the son of Caprius. The fourth, for +whom they celebrate the Orphic festivals, sprung from Jupiter and Luna. +The fifth, who is supposed to have instituted the Trieterides, was the +son of Nysus and Thyone.</p> + +<p>The first Venus, who has a temple at Elis, was the daughter of Cœlus and +Dies. The second arose out of the froth of the sea, and became, by +Mercury, the mother of the second Cupid. The third, the daughter of +Jupiter and Diana, was married to Vulcan, but is said to have had +Anteros by Mars. The fourth was a Syrian, born of Tyro, who is called +Astarte, and is said to have been married to <a id="page-340"></a><span class="pgnum">340</span>Adonis. I have already +mentioned one Minerva, mother of Apollo. Another, who is worshipped at +Sais, a city in Egypt, sprung from Nilus. The third, whom I have also +mentioned, was daughter of Jupiter. The fourth, sprung from Jupiter and +Coryphe, the daughter of the Ocean; the Arcadians call her Coria, and +make her the inventress of chariots. A fifth, whom they paint with wings +at her heels, was daughter of Pallas, and is said to have killed her +father for endeavoring to violate her chastity. The first Cupid is said +to be the son of Mercury and the first Diana; the second, of Mercury and +the second Venus; the third, who is the same as Anteros, of Mars and the +third Venus.</p> + +<p>All these opinions arise from old stories that were spread in Greece; +the belief in which, Balbus, you well know, ought to be stopped, lest +religion should suffer. But you Stoics, so far from refuting them, even +give them authority by the mysterious sense which you pretend to find in +them. Can you, then, think, after this plain refutation, that there is +need to employ more subtle reasonings? But to return from this +digression.</p> + +<p>XXIV. We see that the mind, faith, hope, virtue, honor, victory, health, +concord, and things of such kind, are purely natural, and have nothing +of divinity in them; for either they are inherent in us, as the mind, +faith, hope, virtue, and concord are; or else they are to be desired, as +honor, health, and victory. I know indeed that they are useful to us, +and see that statues have been religiously erected for them; but as to +their divinity, I shall begin to believe it when you have proved it for +certain. Of this kind I may particularly mention Fortune, which is +allowed to be ever inseparable from inconstancy and temerity, which are +certainly qualities unworthy of a divine being.</p> + +<p>But what delight do you take in the explication of fables, and in the +etymology of names?—that Cœlus was castrated by his son, and that +Saturn was bound in chains by his son! By your defence of these and such +like fictions you would make the authors of them appear not only not to +be madmen, but to have been even very wise. But the pains which you take +with your etymologies deserve our pity. That Saturn is so called because +<i>se saturat annis</i>, he is full of years; Mavors, Mars, because <i>magna +<a id="page-341"></a><span class="pgnum">341</span>vortit</i>, he brings about mighty changes; Minerva, because <i>minuit</i>, she +diminishes, or because <i>minatur</i>, she threatens; Venus, because <i>venit +ad omnia</i>, she comes to all; Ceres, <i>a gerendo</i>, from bearing. How +dangerous is this method! for there are many names would puzzle you. +>From what would you derive Vejupiter and Vulcan? Though, indeed, if you +can derive Neptune <i>a nando</i>, from swimming, in which you seem to me to +flounder about yourself more than Neptune, you may easily find the +origin of all names, since it is founded only upon the conformity of +some one letter. Zeno first, and after him Cleanthes and Chrysippus, are +put to the unnecessary trouble of explaining mere fables, and giving +reasons for the several appellations of every Deity; which is really +owning that those whom we call Gods are not the representations of +deities, but natural things, and that to judge otherwise is an error.</p> + +<p>XXV. Yet this error has so much prevailed that even pernicious things +have not only the title of divinity ascribed to them, but have also +sacrifices offered to them; for Fever has a temple on the Palatine hill, +and Orbona another near that of the Lares, and we see on the Esquiline +hill an altar consecrated to Ill-fortune. Let all such errors be +banished from philosophy, if we would advance, in our dispute concerning +the immortal Gods, nothing unworthy of immortal beings. I know myself +what I ought to believe; which is far different from what you have said. +You take Neptune for an intelligence pervading the sea. You have the +same opinion of Ceres with regard to the earth. I cannot, I own, find +out, or in the least conjecture, what that intelligence of the sea or +the earth is. To learn, therefore, the existence of the Gods, and of +what description and character they are, I must apply elsewhere, not to +the Stoics.</p> + +<p>Let us proceed to the two other parts of our dispute: first, “whether +there is a divine providence which governs the world;” and lastly, +“whether that providence particularly regards mankind;” for these are +the remaining propositions of your discourse; and I think that, if you +approve of it, we should examine these more accurately. With all my +heart, says Velleius, for I readily agree to what you have hitherto +said, and expect still greater things from you.</p> + +<p>I am unwilling to interrupt you, says Balbus to Cotta, <a id="page-342"></a><span class="pgnum">342</span>but we shall +take another opportunity, and I shall effectually convince you. But<a id="FNA-272"></a><a href="#FN-272"><sup>272</sup></a> +* * *</p> + +<p class="nodist">XXVI.</p> + +<div class="poem"> +<p>Shall I adore, and bend the suppliant knee,</p> +<p>Who scorn their power and doubt their deity?</p> +</div> + +<p>Does not Niobe here seem to reason, and by that reasoning to bring all +her misfortunes upon herself? But what a subtle expression is the +following!</p> + +<div class="poem"> +<p>On strength of will alone depends success;</p> +</div> + +<p class="cont">a maxim capable of leading us into all that is bad.</p> + +<div class="poem"> +<p>Though I’m confined, his malice yet is vain,</p> +<p>His tortured heart shall answer pain for pain;</p> +<p>His ruin soothe my soul with soft content,</p> +<p>Lighten my chains, and welcome banishment!</p> +</div> + +<p>This, now, is reason; that reason which you say the divine goodness has +denied to the brute creation, kindly to bestow it on men alone. How +great, how immense the favor! Observe the same Medea flying from her +father and her country:</p> + +<div class="poem"> +<p>The guilty wretch from her pursuer flies.</p> +<p>By her own hands the young Absyrtus slain,</p> +<p>His mangled limbs she scatters o’er the plain,</p> +<p>That the fond sire might sink beneath his woe,</p> +<p>And she to parricide her safety owe.</p> +</div> + +<p>Reflection, as well as wickedness, must have been necessary to the +preparation of such a fact; and did he too, who prepared that fatal +repast for his brother, do it without reflection?</p> + +<div class="poem"> +<p>Revenge as great as Atreus’ injury</p> +<p>Shall sink his soul and crown his misery.</p> +</div> + +<p>XXVII. Did not Thyestes himself, not content with having defiled his +brother’s bed (of which Atreus with great justice thus complains,</p> + +<div class="poem"> +<p>When faithless comforts, in the lewd embrace,</p> +<p>With vile adultery stain a royal race,</p> +<p>The blood thus mix’d in fouler currents flows,</p> +<p>Taints the rich soil, and breeds unnumber’d woes)—</p> +</div> + +<p class="cont"><a id="page-343"></a><span class="pgnum">343</span>did he not, I say, by that adultery, aim at the possession of the +crown? Atreus thus continues:</p> + +<div class="poem"> +<p>A lamb, fair gift of heaven, with golden fleece,</p> +<p>Promised in vain to fix my crown in peace;</p> +<p>But base Thyestes, eager for the prey,</p> +<p>Crept to my bed, and stole the gem away.</p> +</div> + +<p>Do you not perceive that Thyestes must have had a share of reason +proportionable to the greatness of his crimes—such crimes as are not +only represented to us on the stage, but such as we see committed, nay, +often exceeded, in the common course of life? The private houses of +individual citizens, the public courts, the senate, the camp, our +allies, our provinces, all agree that reason is the author of all the +ill, as well as of all the good, which is done; that it makes few act +well, and that but seldom, but many act ill, and that frequently; and +that, in short, the Gods would have shown greater benevolence in denying +us any reason at all than in sending us that which is accompanied with +so much mischief; for as wine is seldom wholesome, but often hurtful in +diseases, we think it more prudent to deny it to the patient than to run +the risk of so uncertain a remedy; so I do not know whether it would not +be better for mankind to be deprived of wit, thought, and penetration, +or what we call reason, since it is a thing pernicious to many and very +useful to few, than to have it bestowed upon them with so much +liberality and in such abundance. But if the divine will has really +consulted the good of man in this gift of reason, the good of those men +only was consulted on whom a well-regulated one is bestowed: how few +those are, if any, is very apparent. We cannot admit, therefore, that +the Gods consulted the good of a few only; the conclusion must be that +they consulted the good of none.</p> + +<p>XXVIII. You answer that the ill use which a great part of mankind make +of reason no more takes away the goodness of the Gods, who bestow it as +a present of the greatest benefit to them, than the ill use which +children make of their patrimony diminishes the obligation which they +have to their parents for it. We grant you this; but where is the +similitude? It was far from Deianira’s design to injure Hercules when +she made him a present <a id="page-344"></a><span class="pgnum">344</span>of the shirt dipped in the blood of the +Centaurs. Nor was it a regard to the welfare of Jason of Pheræ that +influenced the man who with his sword opened his imposthume, which the +physicians had in vain attempted to cure. For it has often happened that +people have served a man whom they intended to injure, and have injured +one whom they designed to serve; so that the effect of the gift is by no +means always a proof of the intention of the giver; neither does the +benefit which may accrue from it prove that it came from the hands of a +benefactor. For, in short, what debauchery, what avarice, what crime +among men is there which does not owe its birth to thought and +reflection, that is, to reason? For all opinion is reason: right reason, +if men’s thoughts are conformable to truth; wrong reason, if they are +not. The Gods only give us the mere faculty of reason, if we have any; +the use or abuse of it depends entirely upon ourselves; so that the +comparison is not just between the present of reason given us by the +Gods, and a patrimony left to a son by his father; for, after all, if +the injury of mankind had been the end proposed by the Gods, what could +they have given them more pernicious than reason? for what seed could +there be of injustice, intemperance, and cowardice, if reason were not +laid as the foundation of these vices?</p> + +<p>XXIX. I mentioned just now Medea and Atreus, persons celebrated in +heroic poems, who had used this reason only for the contrivance and +practice of the most flagitious crimes; but even the trifling characters +which appear in comedies supply us with the like instances of this +reasoning faculty; for example, does not he, in the Eunuch, reason with +some subtlety?—</p> + +<div class="poem"> +<p>What, then, must I resolve upon?</p> +<p>She turn’d me out-of-doors; she sends for me back again;</p> +<p>Shall I go? no, not if she were to beg it of me.</p> +</div> + +<p class="cont">Another, in the Twins, making no scruple of opposing a received maxim, +after the manner of the Academics, asserts that when a man is in love +and in want, it is pleasant</p> + +<div class="poem"> +<p>To have a father covetous, crabbed, and passionate,</p> +<p>Who has no love or affection for his children.</p> +</div> + +<p class="cont"><a id="page-345"></a><span class="pgnum">345</span>This unaccountable opinion he strengthens thus:</p> + +<div class="poem"> +<p>You may defraud him of his profits, or forge letters in his name,</p> +<p>Or fright him by your servant into compliance;</p> +<p>And what you take from such an old hunks,</p> +<p>How much more pleasantly do you spend it!</p> +</div> + +<p>On the contrary, he says that an easy, generous father is an +inconvenience to a son in love; for, says he,</p> + +<div class="poem"> +<p>I can’t tell how to abuse so good, so prudent a parent,</p> +<p>Who always foreruns my desires, and meets me purse in hand,</p> +<p>To support me in my pleasures: this easy goodness and generosity</p> +<p>Quite defeat all my frauds, tricks, and stratagems.<a id="FNA-273"></a><a href="#FN-273"><sup>273</sup></a></p> +</div> + +<p>What are these frauds, tricks, and stratagems but the effects of reason? +O excellent gift of the Gods! Without this Phormio could not have said,</p> + +<div class="poem"> +<p>Find me out the old man: I have something hatching for him in my +head.</p> +</div> + +<p>XXX. But let us pass from the stage to the bar. The prætor<a id="FNA-274"></a><a href="#FN-274"><sup>274</sup></a> takes +his seat. To judge whom? The man who set fire to our archives. How +secretly was that villany conducted! Q. Sosius, an illustrious Roman +knight, of the Picene field,<a id="FNA-275"></a><a href="#FN-275"><sup>275</sup></a> confessed the fact. Who else is to be +tried? He who forged the public registers—Alenus, an artful fellow, who +counterfeited the handwriting of the six officers.<a id="FNA-276"></a><a href="#FN-276"><sup>276</sup></a> Let us call to +mind other trials: that on the subject of the gold of Tolosa, or the +conspiracy of Jugurtha. Let us trace back the informations laid against +Tubulus for bribery in his judicial office; and, since that, the +proceedings of the tribune Peduceus concerning the <a id="page-346"></a><span class="pgnum">346</span>incest of the +vestals. Let us reflect upon the trials which daily happen for +assassinations, poisonings, embezzlement of public money, frauds in +wills, against which we have a new law; then that action against the +advisers or assisters of any theft; the many laws concerning frauds in +guardianship, breaches of trust in partnerships and commissions in +trade, and other violations of faith in buying, selling, borrowing, or +lending; the public decree on a private affair by the Lætorian Law;<a id="FNA-277"></a><a href="#FN-277"><sup>277</sup></a> +and, lastly, that scourge of all dishonesty, the law against fraud, +proposed by our friend Aquillius; that sort of fraud, he says, by which +one thing is pretended and another done. Can we, then, think that this +plentiful fountain of evil sprung from the immortal Gods? If they have +given reason to man, they have likewise given him subtlety, for subtlety +is only a deceitful manner of applying reason to do mischief. To them +likewise we must owe deceit, and every other crime, which, without the +help of reason, would neither have been thought of nor committed. As the +old woman wished</p> + +<div class="poem"> +<p>That to the fir which on Mount Pelion grew</p> +<p>The axe had ne’er been laid,<a id="FNA-278"></a><a href="#FN-278"><sup>278</sup></a></p> +</div> + +<p class="cont">so we should wish that the Gods had never bestowed this ability on man, +the abuse of which is so general that the small number of those who make +a good use of it are often oppressed by those who make a bad use of it; +so that it seems to be given rather to help vice than to promote virtue +among us.</p> + +<p>XXXI. This, you insist on it, is the fault of man, and not of the Gods. +But should we not laugh at a physician or pilot, though they are weak +mortals, if they were to lay the blame of their ill success on the +violence of the disease or the fury of the tempest? Had there not been +danger, <a id="page-347"></a><span class="pgnum">347</span>we should say, who would have applied to you? This reasoning +has still greater force against the Deity. The fault, you say, is in +man, if he commits crimes. But why was not man endued with a reason +incapable of producing any crimes? How could the Gods err? When we leave +our effects to our children, it is in hopes that they may be well +bestowed; in which we may be deceived, but how can the Deity be +deceived? As Phœbus when he trusted his chariot to his son Phaëthon, or +as Neptune when he indulged his son Theseus in granting him three +wishes, the consequence of which was the destruction of Hippolitus? +These are poetical fictions; but truth, and not fables, ought to proceed +from philosophers. Yet if those poetical Deities had foreseen that +their indulgence would have proved fatal to their sons, they must have +been thought blamable for it.</p> + +<p>Aristo of Chios used often to say that the philosophers do hurt to such +of their disciples as take their good doctrine in a wrong sense; thus +the lectures of Aristippus might produce debauchees, and those of Zeno +pedants. If this be true, it were better that philosophers should be +silent than that their disciples should be corrupted by a +misapprehension of their master’s meaning; so if reason, which was +bestowed on mankind by the Gods with a good design, tends only to make +men more subtle and fraudulent, it had been better for them never to +have received it. There could be no excuse for a physician who +prescribes wine to a patient, knowing that he will drink it and +immediately expire. Your Providence is no less blamable in giving reason +to man, who, it foresaw, would make a bad use of it. Will you say that +it did not foresee it? Nothing could please me more than such an +acknowledgment. But you dare not. I know what a sublime idea you +entertain of her.</p> + +<p>XXXII. But to conclude. If folly, by the unanimous consent of +philosophers, is allowed to be the greatest of all evils, and if no one +ever attained to true wisdom, we, whom they say the immortal Gods take +care of, are consequently in a state of the utmost misery. For that +nobody is well, or that nobody can be well, is in effect the same thing; +and, in my opinion, that no man is truly wise, or that no <a id="page-348"></a><span class="pgnum">348</span>man can be +truly wise, is likewise the same thing. But I will insist no further on +so self-evident a point. Telamon in one verse decides the question. If, +says he, there is a Divine Providence,</p> + +<div class="poem"> +<p>Good men would be happy, bad men miserable.</p> +</div> + +<p class="cont">But it is not so. If the Gods had regarded mankind, they should have +made them all virtuous; but if they did not regard the welfare of all +mankind, at least they ought to have provided for the happiness of the +virtuous. Why, therefore, was the Carthaginian in Spain suffered to +destroy those best and bravest men, the two Scipios? Why did +Maximus<a id="FNA-279"></a><a href="#FN-279"><sup>279</sup></a> lose his son, the consul? Why did Hannibal kill Marcellus? +Why did Cannæ deprive us of Paulus? Why was the body of Regulus +delivered up to the cruelty of the Carthaginians? Why was not Africanus +protected from violence in his own house? To these, and many more +ancient instances, let us add some of later date. Why is Rutilius, my +uncle, a man of the greatest virtue and learning, now in banishment? Why +was my own friend and companion Drusus assassinated in his own house? +Why was Scævola, the high-priest, that pattern of moderation and +prudence, massacred before the statue of Vesta? Why, before that, were +so many illustrious citizens put to death by Cinna? Why had Marius, the +most perfidious of men, the power to cause the death of Catulus, a man +of the greatest dignity? But there would be no end of enumerating +examples of good men made miserable and wicked men prosperous. Why did +that Marius live to an old age, and die so happily at his own house in +his seventh consulship? Why was that inhuman wretch Cinna permitted to +enjoy so long a reign?</p> + +<p>XXXIII. He, indeed, met with deserved punishment at last. But would it +not have been better that these inhumanities had been prevented than +that the author of them should be punished afterward? Varius, a most +impious wretch, was tortured and put to death. If this was his +punishment for the murdering Drusus by the sword, and Metellus by +poison, would it not have been better to have preserved their lives than +to have their deaths avenged on <a id="page-349"></a><span class="pgnum">349</span>Varius? Dionysius was thirty-eight +years a tyrant over the most opulent and flourishing city; and, before +him, how many years did Pisistratus tyrannize in the very flower of +Greece! Phalaris and Apollodorus met with the fate they deserved, but +not till after they had tortured and put to death multitudes. Many +robbers have been executed; but the number of those who have suffered +for their crimes is short of those whom they have robbed and murdered. +Anaxarchus,<a id="FNA-280"></a><a href="#FN-280"><sup>280</sup></a> a scholar of Democritus, was cut to pieces by command +of the tyrant of Cyprus; and Zeno of Elea<a id="FNA-281"></a><a href="#FN-281"><sup>281</sup></a> ended his life in +tortures. What shall I say of Socrates,<a id="FNA-282"></a><a href="#FN-282"><sup>282</sup></a> whose death, as often as I +read of it in Plato, draws fresh tears from my eyes? If, therefore, the +Gods really see everything that happens to men, you must acknowledge +they make no distinction between the good and the bad.</p> + +<p>XXXIV. Diogenes the Cynic used to say of Harpalus, one of the most +fortunate villains of his time, that the constant prosperity of such a +man was a kind of witness against the Gods. Dionysius, of whom we have +before spoken, after he had pillaged the temple of Proserpine at Locris, +set sail for Syracuse, and, having a fair wind during his voyage, said, +with a smile, “See, my friends, what favorable winds the immortal Gods +bestow upon church-robbers.” Encouraged by this prosperous event, he +proceeded in his impiety. When he landed at Peloponnesus, he went into +the temple of Jupiter Olympius, and disrobed his statue of a golden +mantle of great weight, an ornament which the tyrant Gelo<a id="FNA-283"></a><a href="#FN-283"><sup>283</sup></a> had given +out of the spoils of the Carthaginians, and at the same time, in a +jesting manner, he said “that a golden mantle was too heavy in summer +and too cold in winter;” and then, throwing a woollen cloak over the +statue, added, “This will serve for all seasons.” At another time, he +ordered the golden beard of Æsculapius of Epidaurus to be taken away, +saying that “it <a id="page-350"></a><span class="pgnum">350</span>was absurd for the son to have a beard, when his father +had none.” He likewise robbed the temples of the silver tables, which, +according to the ancient custom of Greece, bore this inscription, “To +the good Gods,” saying “he was willing to make use of their goodness;” +and, without the least scruple, took away the little golden emblems of +victory, the cups and coronets, which were in the stretched-out hands of +the statues, saying “he did not take, but receive them; for it would be +folly not to accept good things from the Gods, to whom we are constantly +praying for favors, when they stretch out their hands towards us.” And, +last of all, all the things which he had thus pillaged from the temples +were, by his order, brought to the market-place and sold by the common +crier; and, after he had received the money for them, he commanded every +purchaser to restore what he had bought, within a limited time, to the +temples from whence they came. Thus to his impiety towards the Gods he +added injustice to man.</p> + +<p>XXXV. Yet neither did Olympian Jove strike him with his thunder, nor did +Æsculapius cause him to die by tedious diseases and a lingering death. +He died in his bed, had funeral honors<a id="FNA-284"></a><a href="#FN-284"><sup>284</sup></a> paid to him, and left his +power, which he had wickedly obtained, as a just and lawful inheritance +to his son.</p> + +<p>It is not without concern that I maintain a doctrine which seems to +authorize evil, and which might probably give a sanction to it, if +conscience, without any divine assistance, did not point out, in the +clearest manner, the difference between virtue and vice. Without +conscience man is contemptible. For as no family or state can be +supposed to be formed with any reason or discipline if there are no +rewards for good actions nor punishment for crimes, so we cannot believe +that a Divine Providence regulates the world if there is no distinction +between the honest and the wicked.</p> + +<p><a id="page-351"></a><span class="pgnum">351</span>But the Gods, you say, neglect trifling things: the little fields or +vineyards of particular men are not worthy their attention; and if +blasts or hail destroy their product, Jupiter does not regard it, nor do +kings extend their care to the lower offices of government. This +argument might have some weight if, in bringing Rutilius as an instance, +I had only complained of the loss of his farm at Formiæ; but I spoke of +a personal misfortune, his banishment.<a id="FNA-285"></a><a href="#FN-285"><sup>285</sup></a></p> + +<p>XXXVI. All men agree that external benefits, such as vineyards, corn, +olives, plenty of fruit and grain, and, in short, every convenience and +property of life, are derived from the Gods; and, indeed, with reason, +since by our virtue we claim applause, and in virtue we justly glory, +which we could have no right to do if it was the gift of the Gods, and +not a personal merit. When we are honored with new dignities, or blessed +with increase of riches; when we are favored by fortune beyond our +expectation, or luckily delivered from any approaching evil, we return +thanks for it to the Gods, and assume no praise to ourselves. But who +ever thanked the Gods that he was a good man? We thank them, indeed, for +riches, health, and honor. For these we invoke the all-good and +all-powerful Jupiter; but not for wisdom, temperance, and justice. No +one ever offered a tenth of his estate to Hercules to be made wise. It +is reported, indeed, of Pythagoras that he sacrificed an ox to the Muses +upon having made some new discovery in geometry;<a id="FNA-286"></a><a href="#FN-286"><sup>286</sup></a> but, for my part, +I cannot believe it, because he refused to sacrifice even to Apollo at +Delos, lest he should defile the altar with blood. But to return. It is +universally agreed that good fortune we must ask of the Gods, but wisdom +must arise from ourselves; and though temples have been consecrated to +the Mind, to Virtue, and to Faith, yet that does not contradict their +being <a id="page-352"></a><span class="pgnum">352</span>inherent in us. In regard to hope, safety, assistance, and +victory, we must rely upon the Gods for them; from whence it follows, as +Diogenes said, that the prosperity of the wicked destroys the idea of a +Divine Providence.</p> + +<p>XXXVII. But good men have sometimes success. They have so; but we +cannot, with any show of reason, attribute that success to the Gods. +Diagoras, who is called the atheist, being at Samothrace, one of his +friends showed him several pictures<a id="FNA-287"></a><a href="#FN-287"><sup>287</sup></a> of people who had endured very +dangerous storms; “See,” says he, “you who deny a providence, how many +have been saved by their prayers to the Gods.” “Ay,” says Diagoras, “I +see those who were saved, but where are those painted who were +shipwrecked?” At another time, he himself was in a storm, when the +sailors, being greatly alarmed, told him they justly deserved that +misfortune for admitting him into their ship; when he, pointing to +others under the like distress, asked them “if they believed Diagoras +was also aboard those ships?” In short, with regard to good or bad +fortune, it matters not what you are, or how you have lived. The Gods, +like kings, regard not everything. What similitude is there between +them? If kings neglect anything, want of knowledge may be pleaded in +their defence; but ignorance cannot be brought as an excuse for the +Gods.</p> + +<p>XXXVIII. Your manner of justifying them is somewhat extraordinary, when +you say that if a wicked man dies without suffering for his crimes, the +Gods inflict a punishment on his children, his children’s children, and +all his posterity. O wonderful equity of the Gods! What city would +endure the maker of a law which should condemn a son or a grandson for a +crime committed by the father or the grandfather?</p> + +<div class="poem"> +<p>Shall Tantalus’ unhappy offspring know</p> +<p>No end, no close, of this long scene of woe?</p> +<p>When will the dire reward of guilt be o’er,</p> +<p>And Myrtilus demand revenge no more?<a id="FNA-288"></a><a href="#FN-288"><sup>288</sup></a></p> +</div> + +<p>Whether the poets have corrupted the Stoics, or the Stoics given +authority to the poets, I cannot easily determine. Both alike are to be +condemned. If those persons <a id="page-353"></a><span class="pgnum">353</span>whose names have been branded in the +satires of Hipponax or Archilochus<a id="FNA-289"></a><a href="#FN-289"><sup>289</sup></a> were driven to despair, it did +not proceed from the Gods, but had its origin in their own minds. When +we see Ægistus and Paris lost in the heat of an impure passion, why are +we to attribute it to a Deity, when the crime, as it were, speaks for +itself? I believe that those who recover from illness are more indebted +to the care of Hippocrates than to the power of Æsculapius; that Sparta +received her laws from Lycurgus<a id="FNA-290"></a><a href="#FN-290"><sup>290</sup></a> rather than from Apollo; that those +eyes of the maritime coast, Corinth and Carthage, were plucked out, the +one by Critolaus, the other by Hasdrubal, without the assistance of any +divine anger, since you yourselves confess that a Deity cannot possibly +be angry on any provocation.</p> + +<p>XXXIX. But could not the Deity have assisted and preserved those eminent +cities? Undoubtedly he could; for, according to your doctrine, his power +is infinite, and without the least labor; and as nothing but the will is +necessary to the motion of our bodies, so the divine will of the Gods, +with the like ease, can create, move, and change all things. This you +hold, not from a mere phantom of superstition, but on natural and +settled principles of reason; for matter, you say, of which all things +are composed and consist, is susceptible of all forms and changes, and +there is nothing which cannot be, or cease to be, in an instant; and +that Divine Providence has the command and disposal of this universal +matter, and consequently can, in any part of the universe, do whatever +she pleases: from whence I conclude that this Providence either knows +not the extent of her power, or neglects human affairs, or cannot judge +what is best for us. Providence, you say, does not extend her care to +particular men; there <a id="page-354"></a><span class="pgnum">354</span>is no wonder in that, since she does not extend +it to cities, or even to nations, or people. If, therefore, she neglects +whole nations, is it not very probable that she neglects all mankind? +But how can you assert that the Gods do not enter into all the little +circumstances of life, and yet hold that they distribute dreams among +men? Since you believe in dreams, it is your part to solve this +difficulty. Besides, you say we ought to call upon the Gods. Those who +call upon the Gods are individuals. Divine Providence, therefore, +regards individuals, which consequently proves that they are more at +leisure than you imagine. Let us suppose the Divine Providence to be +greatly busied; that it causes the revolutions of the heavens, supports +the earth, and rules the seas; why does it suffer so many Gods to be +unemployed? Why is not the superintendence of human affairs given to +some of those idle Deities which you say are innumerable?</p> + +<p>This is the purport of what I had to say concerning “the Nature of the +Gods;” not with a design to destroy their existence, but merely to show +what an obscure point it is, and with what difficulties an explanation +of it is attended.</p> + +<p>XL. Balbus, observing that Cotta had finished his discourse—You have +been very severe, says he, against a Divine Providence, a doctrine +established by the Stoics with piety and wisdom; but, as it grows too +late, I shall defer my answer to another day. Our argument is of the +greatest importance; it concerns our altars,<a id="FNA-291"></a><a href="#FN-291"><sup>291</sup></a> our hearths, our +temples, nay, even the walls of our city, which you priests hold sacred; +you, who by religion defend Rome better than she is defended by her +ramparts. This is a cause which, while I have life, I think I cannot +abandon without impiety.</p> + +<p>There is nothing, replied Cotta, which I desire more than to be +confuted. I have not pretended to decide this point, but to give you my +private sentiments upon it; and am very sensible of your great +superiority in argument. <a id="page-355"></a><span class="pgnum">355</span>No doubt of it, says Velleius; we have much to +fear from one who believes that our dreams are sent from Jupiter, which, +though they are of little weight, are yet of more importance than the +discourse of the Stoics concerning the nature of the Gods. The +conversation ended here, and we parted. Velleius judged that the +arguments of Cotta were truest; but those of Balbus seemed to me to have +the greater probability.<a id="FNA-292"></a><a href="#FN-292"><sup>292</sup></a></p> + + + + +<hr class="front"/> + +<h2><a id="page-357"></a><span class="pgnum">357</span>ON THE COMMONWEALTH.</h2> + +<hr/> + + +<h3>PREFACE BY THE EDITOR.</h3> + + +<p><span class="first">This</span> work was one of Cicero’s earlier treatises, though one of those +which was most admired by his contemporaries, and one of which he +himself was most proud. It was composed 54 <span class="sc">b.c.</span> It was originally in two +books: then it was altered and enlarged into nine, and finally reduced +to six. With the exception of the dream of Scipio, in the last book, the +whole treatise was lost till the year 1822, when the librarian of the +Vatican discovered a portion of them among the palimpsests in that +library. What he discovered is translated here; but it is in a most +imperfect and mutilated state.</p> + +<p>The form selected was that of a dialogue, in imitation of those of +Plato; and the several conferences were supposed to have taken place +during the Latin holidays, 129 <span class="sc">b.c.</span>, in the consulship of Caius +Sempronius, Tuditanus, and Marcus Aquilius. The speakers are Scipio +Africanus the younger, in whose garden the scene is laid; Caius Lælius; +Lucius Furius Philus; Marcus Manilius; Spurius Mummius, the brother of +the taker of Corinth, a Stoic; Quintus Ælius Tubero, a nephew of +Africanus; Publius Rutilius Rufus; Quintus Mucius Scævola, the tutor of +Cicero; and Caius Fannius, who was absent, however, on the second day of +the conference.</p> + +<p>In the first book, the first thirty-three pages are wanting, and there +are chasms amounting to thirty-eight pages more. In this book Scipio +asserts the superiority of an active over a speculative career; and +after analyzing and comparing the monarchical, aristocratic, and +democratic forms of government, gives a preference to the first; +although <a id="page-358"></a><span class="pgnum">358</span>his idea of a perfect constitution would be one compounded of +three kinds in due proportion.</p> + +<p>There are a few chasms in the earlier part of the second book, and the +latter part of it is wholly lost. In it Scipio was led on to give an +account of the rise and progress of the Roman Constitution, from which +he passed on to the examination of the great moral obligations which are +the foundations of all political union.</p> + +<p>Of the remaining books we have only a few disjointed fragments, with the +exception, as has been before mentioned, of the dream of Scipio in the +sixth.</p> + + +<hr/> + +<h3><a id="page-359"></a><span class="pgnum">359</span>INTRODUCTION TO THE FIRST BOOK,</h3> + +<h4>BY THE ORIGINAL TRANSLATOR.</h4> + + +<p class="intro">Cicero introduces his subject by showing that men were not born for the +mere abstract study of philosophy, but that the study of philosophic +truth should always be made as practical as possible, and applicable to +the great interests of philanthropy and patriotism. Cicero endeavors to +show the benefit of mingling the contemplative or philosophic with the +political and active life, according to that maxim of Plato—“Happy is +the nation whose philosophers are kings, and whose kings are +philosophers.”</p> + +<p class="intro">This kind of introduction was the more necessary because many of the +ancient philosophers, too warmly attached to transcendental metaphysics +and sequestered speculations, had affirmed that true philosophers ought +not to interest themselves in the management of public affairs. Thus, as +M. Villemain observes, it was a maxim of the Epicureans, “Sapiens ne +accedat ad rempublicam” (Let no wise man meddle in politics). The +Pythagoreans had enforced the same principle with more gravity. +Aristotle examines the question on both sides, and concludes in favor of +active life. Among Aristotle’s disciples, a writer, singularly elegant +and pure, had maintained the pre-eminence of the contemplative life over +the political or active one, in a work which Cicero cites with +admiration, and to which he seems to have applied for relief whenever he +felt harassed and discouraged in public business. But here this great +man was interested by the subject he discusses, and by the whole course +of his experience and conduct, to refute the dogmas of that +pusillanimous sophistry and selfish indulgence by bringing forward the +most glorious examples and achievements of patriotism. In this strain he +had doubtless commenced his exordium, and in this strain we find him +continuing it at the point in which the palimpsest becomes legible. He +then proceeds to introduce his illustrious interlocutors, and leads them +at first to discourse on the astronomical laws that regulate the +revolutions of our planet. From this, by a very graceful and beautiful +transition, he passes on to the consideration of the best forms of +political constitutions that had prevailed in different nations, and +those modes of government which had produced the greatest benefits in +the commonwealths of antiquity.</p> + +<p class="intro">This first book is, in fact, a splendid epitome of the political science +of the age of Cicero, and probably the most eloquent plea in favor of +mixed monarchy to be found in all literature.</p> + + +<hr/> + +<h3><a id="page-360"></a><span class="pgnum">360</span>BOOK I.</h3> + + +<p>I. [<span class="first">Without</span> the virtue of patriotism], neither Caius Duilius, nor Aulus +Atilius,<a id="FNA-293"></a><a href="#FN-293"><sup>293</sup></a> nor Lucius Metellus, could have delivered Rome by their +courage from the terror of Carthage; nor could the two Scipios, when the +fire of the second Punic War was kindled, have quenched it in their +blood; nor, when it revived in greater force, could either Quintus +Maximus<a id="FNA-294"></a><a href="#FN-294"><sup>294</sup></a> have enervated it, or Marcus Marcellus have crushed it; +nor, when it was repulsed from the gates of our own city, would Scipio +have confined it within the walls of our enemies.</p> + +<p>But Cato, at first a new and unknown man, whom all we who aspire to the +same honors consider as a pattern to lead us on to industry and virtue, +was undoubtedly at liberty to enjoy his repose at Tusculum, a most +salubrious and convenient retreat. But he, mad as some people think him, +though no necessity compelled him, preferred being tossed about amidst +the tempestuous waves of politics, even till extreme old age, to living +with all imaginable luxury in that tranquillity and relaxation. I omit +innumerable men who have separately devoted themselves to the protection +of our Commonwealth; and those whose lives are within the memory of the +present generation I will not mention, lest any one should complain that +I had invidiously forgotten himself or some one of his family. This only +I insist on—that so great is the necessity of this virtue which nature +has implanted in man, and so great is the desire to defend the common +safety of our country, that its energy has continually overcome all the +blandishments of pleasure and repose.</p> + +<p>II. Nor is it sufficient to possess this virtue as if it were some kind +of art, unless we put it in practice. An art, indeed, though not +exercised, may still be retained in knowledge; but virtue consists +wholly in its proper use <a id="page-361"></a><span class="pgnum">361</span>and action. Now, the noblest use of virtue is +the government of the Commonwealth, and the carrying-out in real action, +not in words only, of all those identical theories which those +philosophers discuss at every corner. For nothing is spoken by +philosophers, so far as they speak correctly and honorably, which has +not been discovered and confirmed by those persons who have been the +founders of the laws of states. For whence comes piety, or from whom has +religion been derived? Whence comes law, either that of nations, or that +which is called the civil law? Whence comes justice, faith, equity? +Whence modesty, continence, the horror of baseness, the desire of praise +and renown? Whence fortitude in labors and perils? Doubtless, from those +who have instilled some of these moral principles into men by education, +and confirmed others by custom, and sanctioned others by laws.</p> + +<p>Moreover, it is reported of Xenocrates, one of the sublimest +philosophers, that when some one asked him what his disciples learned, +he replied, “To do that of their own accord which they might be +compelled to do by law.” That citizen, therefore, who obliges all men to +those virtuous actions, by the authority of laws and penalties, to which +the philosophers can scarcely persuade a few by the force of their +eloquence, is certainly to be preferred to the sagest of the doctors who +spend their lives in such discussions. For which of their exquisite +orations is so admirable as to be entitled to be preferred to a +well-constituted government, public justice, and good customs? +Certainly, just as I think that magnificent and imperious cities (as +Ennius says) are superior to castles and villages, so I imagine that +those who regulate such cities by their counsel and authority are far +preferable, with respect to real wisdom, to men who are unacquainted +with any kind of political knowledge. And since we are strongly prompted +to augment the prosperity of the human race, and since we do endeavor by +our counsels and exertions to render the life of man safer and +wealthier, and since we are incited to this blessing by the spur of +nature herself, let us hold on that course which has always been pursued +by all the best men, and not listen for a moment to the signals of those +who sound a retreat so loudly that they <a id="page-362"></a><span class="pgnum">362</span>sometimes call back even those +who have made considerable progress.</p> + +<p>III. These reasons, so certain and so evident, are opposed by those who, +on the other side, argue that the labors which must necessarily be +sustained in maintaining the Commonwealth form but a slight impediment +to the vigilant and industrious, and are only a contemptible obstacle in +such important affairs, and even in common studies, offices, and +employments. They add the peril of life, that base fear of death, which +has ever been opposed by brave men, to whom it appears far more +miserable to die by the decay of nature and old age than to be allowed +an opportunity of gallantly sacrificing that life for their country +which must otherwise be yielded up to nature.</p> + +<p>On this point, however, our antagonists esteem themselves copious and +eloquent when they collect all the calamities of heroic men, and the +injuries inflicted on them by their ungrateful countrymen. For on this +subject they bring forward those notable examples among the Greeks; and +tell us that Miltiades, the vanquisher and conqueror of the Persians, +before even those wounds were healed which he had received in that most +glorious victory, wasted away in the chains of his fellow-citizens that +life which had been preserved from the weapons of the enemy. They cite +Themistocles, expelled and proscribed by the country which he had +rescued, and forced to flee, not to the Grecian ports which he had +preserved, but to the bosom of the barbarous power which he had +defeated. There is, indeed, no deficiency of examples to illustrate the +levity and cruelty of the Athenians to their noblest citizens—examples +which, originating and multiplying among them, are said at different +times to have abounded in our own most august empire. For we are told: +of the exile of Camillus, the disgrace of Ahala, the unpopularity of +Nasica, the expulsion of Lænas,<a id="FNA-295"></a><a href="#FN-295"><sup>295</sup></a> the condemnation of <a id="page-363"></a><span class="pgnum">363</span>Opimius, the +flight of Metellus, the cruel destruction of Caius Marius, the massacre +of our chieftains, and the many atrocious crimes which followed. My own +history is by no means free from such calamities; and I imagine that +when they recollect that by my counsel and perils they were preserved in +life and liberty, they are led by that consideration to bewail my +misfortunes more deeply and affectionately. But I cannot tell why those +who sail over the seas for the sake of knowledge and experience [should +wonder at seeing still greater hazards braved in the service of the +Commonwealth].</p> + +<p>IV. [Since], on my quitting the consulship, I swore in the assembly of +the Roman people, who re-echoed my words, that I had saved the +Commonwealth, I console myself with this remembrance for all my cares, +troubles, and injuries. Although my misfortune had more of honor than +misfortune, and more of glory than disaster; and I derive greater +pleasure from the regrets of good men than sorrow from the exultation of +the worthless. But even if it had happened otherwise, how could I have +complained, as nothing befell me which was either unforeseen, or more +painful than I expected, as a return for my illustrious actions? For I +was one who, though it was in my power to reap more profit from leisure +than most men, on account of the diversified sweetness of my studies, in +which I had lived from boyhood—or, if any public calamity had happened, +to have borne no more than an equal share with the rest of my countrymen +in the misfortune—I nevertheless did not hesitate to oppose myself to +the most formidable tempests and torrents of sedition, for the sake of +saving my countrymen, and at my own proper danger to secure the common +safety of all the rest. For our country did not beget and educate us +with the expectation of receiving no support, as I may call it, from us; +nor for the purpose of consulting nothing but our convenience, to supply +us with a secure refuge for idleness and a tranquil spot for rest; but +rather with a view of turning to her own advantage the nobler portion of +our genius, heart, and counsel; giving us back for our private service +only what she can spare from the public interests.</p> + +<p>V. Those apologies, therefore, in which men take refuge <a id="page-364"></a><span class="pgnum">364</span>as an excuse +for their devoting themselves with more plausibility to mere inactivity +do certainly not deserve to be listened to; when, for instance, they +tell us that those who meddle with public affairs are generally +good-for-nothing men, with whom it is discreditable to be compared, and +miserable and dangerous to contend, especially when the multitude is in +an excited state. On which account it is not the part of a wise man to +take the reins, since he cannot restrain the insane and unregulated +movements of the common people. Nor is it becoming to a man of liberal +birth, say they, thus to contend with such vile and unrefined +antagonists, or to subject one’s self to the lashings of contumely, or +to put one’s self in the way of injuries which ought not to be borne by +a wise man. As if to a virtuous, brave, and magnanimous man there could +be a juster reason for seeking the government than this—to avoid being +subjected to worthless men, and to prevent the Commonwealth from being +torn to pieces by them; when, even if they were then desirous to save +her, they would not have the power.</p> + +<p>VI. But this restriction who can approve, which would interdict the wise +man from taking any share in the government beyond such as the occasion +and necessity may compel him to? As if any greater necessity could +possibly happen to any man than happened to me. In which, how could I +have acted if I had not been consul at the time? and how could I have +been a consul unless I had maintained that course of life from my +childhood which raised me from the order of knights, in which I was +born, to the very highest station? You cannot produce <i>extempore</i>, and +just when you please, the power of assisting a commonwealth, although it +may be severely pressed by dangers, unless you have attained the +position which enables you legally to do so. And what most surprises me +in the discourses of learned men, is to hear those persons who confess +themselves incapable of steering the vessel of the State in smooth seas +(which, indeed, they never learned, and never cared to know) profess +themselves ready to assume the helm amidst the fiercest tempests. For +those men are accustomed to say openly, and indeed to boast greatly, +that they have never learned, and have never taken <a id="page-365"></a><span class="pgnum">365</span>the least pains to +explain, the principles of either establishing or maintaining a +commonwealth; and they look on this practical science as one which +belongs not to men of learning and wisdom, but to those who have made it +their especial study. How, then, can it be reasonable for such men to +promise their assistance to the State, when they shall be compelled to +it by necessity, while they are ignorant how to govern the republic when +no necessity presses upon it, which is a much more easy task? Indeed, +though it were true that the wise man loves not to thrust himself of his +own accord into the administration of public affairs, but that if +circumstances oblige him to it, then he does not refuse the office, yet +I think that this science of civil legislation should in no wise be +neglected by the philosopher, because all resources ought to be ready to +his hand, which he knows not how soon he may be called on to use.</p> + +<p>VII. I have spoken thus at large for this reason, because in this work I +have proposed to myself and undertaken a discussion on the government of +a state; and in order to render it useful, I was bound, in the first +place, to do away with this pusillanimous hesitation to mingle in public +affairs. If there be any, therefore, who are too much influenced by the +authority of the philosophers, let them consider the subject for a +moment, and be guided by the opinions of those men whose authority and +credit are greatest among learned men; whom I look upon, though some of +them have not personally governed any state, as men who have +nevertheless discharged a kind of office in the republic, inasmuch as +they have made many investigations into, and left many writings +concerning, state affairs. As to those whom the Greeks entitle the Seven +Wise Men, I find that they almost all lived in the middle of public +business. Nor, indeed, is there anything in which human virtue can more +closely resemble the divine powers than in establishing new states, or +in preserving those already established.</p> + +<p>VIII. And concerning these affairs, since it has been our good fortune +to achieve something worthy of memorial in the government of our +country, and also to have acquired some facility of explaining the +powers and resources of politics, we can treat of this subject with the +weight of <a id="page-366"></a><span class="pgnum">366</span>personal experience and the habit of instruction and +illustration. Whereas before us many have been skilful in theory, though +no exploits of theirs are recorded; and many others have been men of +consideration in action, but unfamiliar with the arts of exposition. +Nor, indeed, is it at all our intention to establish a new and +self-invented system of government; but our purpose is rather to recall +to memory a discussion of the most illustrious men of their age in our +Commonwealth, which you and I, in our youth, when at Smyrna, heard +mentioned by Publius Rutilius Rufus, who reported to us a conference of +many days in which, in my opinion, there was nothing omitted that could +throw light on political affairs.</p> + +<p>IX. For when, in the year of the consulship of Tuditanus and Aquilius, +Scipio Africanus, the son of Paulus Æmilius, formed the project of +spending the Latin holidays at his country-seat, where his most intimate +friends had promised him frequent visits during this season of +relaxation, on the first morning of the festival, his nephew, Quintus +Tubero, made his appearance; and when Scipio had greeted him heartily +and embraced him—How is it, my dear Tubero, said he, that I see you so +early? For these holidays must afford you a capital opportunity of +pursuing your favorite studies. Ah! replied Tubero, I can study my books +at any time, for they are always disengaged; but it is a great +privilege, my Scipio, to find you at leisure, especially in this +restless period of public affairs. You certainly have found me so, said +Scipio, but, to speak truth, I am rather relaxing from business than +from study. Nay, said Tubero, you must try to relax from your studies +too, for here are several of us, as we have appointed, all ready, if it +suits your convenience, to aid you in getting through this leisure time +of yours. I am very willing to consent, answered Scipio, and we may be +able to compare notes respecting the several topics that interest us.</p> + +<p>X. Be it so, said Tubero; and since you invite me to discussion, and +present the opportunity, let us first examine, before any one else +arrives, what can be the nature of the parhelion, or double sun, which +was mentioned in the senate. Those that affirm they witnessed this +prodigy <a id="page-367"></a><span class="pgnum">367</span>are neither few nor unworthy of credit, so that there is more +reason for investigation than incredulity.<a id="FNA-296"></a><a href="#FN-296"><sup>296</sup></a></p> + +<p>Ah! said Scipio, I wish we had our friend Panætius with us, who is fond +of investigating all things of this kind, but especially all celestial +phenomena. As for my opinion, Tubero, for I always tell you just what I +think, I hardly agree in these subjects with that friend of mine, since, +respecting things of which we can scarcely form a conjecture as to their +character, he is as positive as if he had seen them with his own eyes +and felt them with his own hands. And I cannot but the more admire the +wisdom of Socrates, who discarded all anxiety respecting things of this +kind, and affirmed that these inquiries concerning the secrets of nature +were either above the efforts of human reason, or were absolutely of no +consequence at all to human life.</p> + +<p>But, then, my Africanus, replied Tubero, of what credit is the tradition +which states that Socrates rejected all these physical investigations, +and confined his whole attention to men and manners? For, with respect +to him what better authority can we cite than Plato? in many passages of +whose works Socrates speaks in such a manner that even when he is +discussing morals, and virtues, and even public affairs and politics, he +endeavors to interweave, after the fashion of Pythagoras, the doctrines +of arithmetic, geometry, and harmonic proportions with them.</p> + +<p>That is true, replied Scipio; but you are aware, I believe, that Plato, +after the death of Socrates, was induced to visit Egypt by his love of +science, and that after that he proceeded to Italy and Sicily, from his +desire of understanding the Pythagorean dogmas; that he conversed much +with Archytas of Tarentum and Timæus of Locris; <a id="page-368"></a><span class="pgnum">368</span>that he collected the +works of Philolaus; and that, finding in these places the renown of +Pythagoras flourishing, he addicted himself exceedingly to the disciples +of Pythagoras, and their studies; therefore, as he loved Socrates with +his whole heart, and wished to attribute all great discoveries to him, +he interwove the Socratic elegance and subtlety of eloquence with +somewhat of the obscurity of Pythagoras, and with that notorious gravity +of his diversified arts.</p> + +<p>XI. When Scipio had spoken thus, he suddenly saw Lucius Furius +approaching, and saluting him, and embracing him most affectionately, he +gave him a seat on his own couch. And as soon as Publius Rutilius, the +worthy reporter of the conference to us, had arrived, when we had +saluted him, he placed him by the side of Tubero. Then said Furius, What +is it that you are about? Has our entrance at all interrupted any +conversation of yours? By no means, said Scipio, for you yourself too +are in the habit of investigating carefully the subject which Tubero was +a little before proposing to examine; and our friend Rutilius, even +under the walls of Numantia, was in the habit at times of conversing +with me on questions of the same kind. What, then, was the subject of +your discussion? said Philus. We were talking, said Scipio, of the +double suns that recently appeared, and I wish, Philus, to hear what you +think of them.</p> + +<p>XII. Just as he was speaking, a boy announced that Lælius was coming to +call on him, and that he had already left his house. Then Scipio, +putting on his sandals and robes, immediately went forth from his +chamber, and when he had walked a little time in the portico, he met +Lælius, and welcomed him and those that accompanied him, namely, Spurius +Mummius, to whom he was greatly attached, and C. Fannius and Quintus +Scævola, sons-in-law of Lælius, two very intelligent young men, and now +of the quæstorian age.<a id="FNA-297"></a><a href="#FN-297"><sup>297</sup></a></p> + +<p>When he had saluted them all, he returned through the portico, placing +Lælius in the middle; for there was in their friendship a sort of law of +reciprocal courtesy, so <a id="page-369"></a><span class="pgnum">369</span>that in the camp Lælius paid Scipio almost +divine honors, on account of his eminent renown in war and in private +life; in his turn Scipio reverenced Lælius, even as a father, because he +was older than himself.</p> + +<p>Then after they had exchanged a few words, as they walked up and down, +Scipio, to whom their visit was extremely welcome and agreeable, wished +to assemble them in a sunny corner of the gardens, because it was still +winter; and when they had agreed to this, there came in another friend, +a learned man, much beloved and esteemed by all of them, M. Manilius, +who, after having been most warmly welcomed by Scipio and the rest, +seated himself next to Lælius.</p> + +<p>XIII. Then Philus, commencing the conversation, said: It does not appear +to me that the presence of our new guests need alter the subject of our +discussion, but only that it should induce us to treat it more +philosophically, and in a manner more worthy of our increased audience. +What do you allude to? said Lælius; or what was the discussion we broke +in upon? Scipio was asking me, replied Philus, what I thought of the +parhelion, or mock sun, whose recent apparition was so strongly +attested.</p> + +<p><i>Lælius.</i> Do you say then, my Philus, that we have sufficiently examined +those questions which concern our own houses and the Commonwealth, that +we begin to investigate the celestial mysteries?</p> + +<p>And Philus replied: Do you think, then, that it does not concern our +houses to know what happens in that vast home which is not included in +walls of human fabrication, but which embraces the entire universe—a +home which the Gods share with us, as the common country of all +intelligent beings? Especially when, if we are ignorant of these things, +there are also many great practical truths which result from them, and +which bear directly on the welfare of our race, of which we must be also +ignorant. And here I can speak for myself, as well as for you, Lælius, +and all men who are ambitious of wisdom, that the knowledge and +consideration of the facts of nature are by themselves very delightful.</p> + +<p><i>Lælius.</i> I have no objection to the discussion, especially as it is +holiday-time with us. But cannot we have the <a id="page-370"></a><span class="pgnum">370</span>pleasure of hearing you +resume it, or are we come too late?</p> + +<p><i>Philus</i>. We have not yet commenced the discussion, and since the +question remains entire and unbroken, I shall have the greatest +pleasure, my Lælius, in handing over the argument to you.</p> + +<p><i>Lælius.</i> No, I had much rather hear you, unless, indeed, Manilius +thinks himself able to compromise the suit between the two suns, that +they may possess heaven as joint sovereigns without intruding on each +other’s empire.</p> + +<p>Then Manilius said: Are you going, Lælius, to ridicule a science in +which, in the first place, I myself excel; and, secondly, without which +no one can distinguish what is his own, and what is another’s? But to +return to the point. Let us now at present listen to Philus, who seems +to me to have started a greater question than any of those that have +engaged the attention of either Publius Mucius or myself.</p> + +<p>XIV. Then Philus said: I am not about to bring you anything new, or +anything which has been thought over or discovered by me myself. But I +recollect that Caius Sulpicius Gallus, who was a man of profound +learning, as you are aware, when this same thing was reported to have +taken place in his time, while he was staying in the house of Marcus +Marcellus, who had been his colleague in the consulship, asked to see a +celestial globe which Marcellus’s grandfather had saved after the +capture of Syracuse from that magnificent and opulent city, without +bringing to his own home any other memorial out of so great a booty; +which I had often heard mentioned on account of the great fame of +Archimedes; but its appearance, however, did not seem to me particularly +striking. For that other is more elegant in form, and more generally +known, which was made by the same Archimedes, and deposited by the same +Marcellus in the Temple of Virtue at Rome. But as soon as Gallus had +begun to explain, in a most scientific manner, the principle of this +machine, I felt that the Sicilian geometrician must have possessed a +genius superior to anything we usually conceive to belong to our nature. +For Gallus assured us that that other solid and compact globe was a very +ancient invention, and that the first <a id="page-371"></a><span class="pgnum">371</span>model had been originally made by +Thales of Miletus. That afterward Eudoxus of Cnidus, a disciple of +Plato, had traced on its surface the stars that appear in the sky, and +that many years subsequently, borrowing from Eudoxus this beautiful +design and representation, Aratus had illustrated it in his verses, not +by any science of astronomy, but by the ornament of poetic description. +He added that the figure of the globe, which displayed the motions of +the sun and moon, and the five planets, or wandering stars, could not be +represented by the primitive solid globe; and that in this the invention +of Archimedes was admirable, because he had calculated how a single +revolution should maintain unequal and diversified progressions in +dissimilar motions. In fact, when Gallus moved this globe, we observed +that the moon succeeded the sun by as many turns of the wheel in the +machine as days in the heavens. From whence it resulted that the +progress of the sun was marked as in the heavens, and that the moon +touched the point where she is obscured by the earth’s shadow at the +instant the sun appears opposite.<a id="FNA-298"></a><a href="#FN-298"><sup>298</sup></a> * * *</p> + +<p>XV. * * *<a id="FNA-299"></a><a href="#FN-299"><sup>299</sup></a> I had myself a great affection for this Gallus, and I +know that he was very much beloved and esteemed by my father Paulus. I +recollect that when I was very young, when my father, as consul, +commanded in Macedonia, and we were in the camp, our army was seized +with a pious terror, because suddenly, in a clear night, the bright and +full moon became eclipsed. And Gallus, who was then our lieutenant, the +year before that in which he was elected consul, hesitated not, next +morning, to state in the camp that it was no prodigy, and that the +phenomenon which had then appeared would always appear at certain +periods, when the sun was so placed that he could not affect the moon +with his light.</p> + +<p><a id="page-372"></a><span class="pgnum">372</span>But do you mean, said Tubero, that he dared to speak thus to men almost +entirely uneducated and ignorant?</p> + +<p><i>Scipio.</i> He did, and with great * * * for his opinion was no result of +insolent ostentation, nor was his language unbecoming the dignity of so +wise a man: indeed, he performed a very noble action in thus freeing his +countrymen from the terrors of an idle superstition.</p> + +<p>XVI. And they relate that in a similar way, in the great war in which +the Athenians and Lacedæmonians contended with such violent resentment, +the famous Pericles, the first man of his country in credit, eloquence, +and political genius, observing the Athenians overwhelmed with an +excessive alarm during an eclipse of the sun which caused a sudden +darkness, told them, what he had learned in the school of Anaxagoras, +that these phenomena necessarily happened at precise and regular periods +when the body of the moon was interposed between the sun and the earth, +and that if they happened not before every new moon, still they could +not possibly happen except at the exact time of the new moon. And when +he had proved this truth by his reasonings, he freed the people from +their alarms; for at that period the doctrine was new and unfamiliar +that the sun was accustomed to be eclipsed by the interposition of the +moon, which fact they say that Thales of Miletus was the first to +discover. Afterward my friend Ennius appears to have been acquainted +with the same theory, who, writing about 350<a id="FNA-300"></a><a href="#FN-300"><sup>300</sup></a> years after the +foundation of Rome, says, “In the nones of June the sun was covered by +the moon and night.” The calculations in the astronomical art have +attained such perfection that from that day, thus described to us by +Ennius and recorded in the pontifical registers, the anterior eclipses +of the sun have been computed as far back as the nones of July in the +reign of Romulus, when that eclipse took place, in the obscurity of +which it was affirmed that Virtue bore Romulus to heaven, in spite of +the perishable nature which carried him off by the common fate of +humanity.</p> + +<p><a id="page-373"></a><span class="pgnum">373</span>XVII. Then said Tubero: Do not you think, Scipio, that this +astronomical science, which every day proves so useful, just now +appeared in a different light to you,<a id="FNA-301"></a><a href="#FN-301"><sup>301</sup></a> * * * which the rest may see. +Moreover, who can think anything in human affairs of brilliant +importance who has penetrated this starry empire of the gods? Or who can +think anything connected with mankind long who has learned to estimate +the nature of eternity? or glorious who is aware of the insignificance +of the size of the earth, even in its whole extent, and especially in +the portion which men inhabit? And when we consider that almost +imperceptible point which we ourselves occupy unknown to the majority of +nations, can we still hope that our name and reputation can be widely +circulated? And then our estates and edifices, our cattle, and the +enormous treasures of our gold and silver, can they be esteemed or +denominated as desirable goods by him who observes their perishable +profit, and their contemptible use, and their uncertain domination, +often falling into the possession of the very worst men? How happy, +then, ought we to esteem that man who alone has it in his power, not by +the law of the Romans, but by the privilege of philosophers, to enjoy +all things as his own; not by any civil bond, but by the common right of +nature, which denies that anything can really be possessed by any one +but him who understands its true nature and use; who reckons our +dictatorships and consulships rather in the rank of necessary offices +than desirable employments, and thinks they must be endured rather as +acquittances of our debt to our country than sought for the sake of +emolument or glory—the man, in short, who can apply to himself the +sentence which Cato tells us my ancestor Africanus loved to repeat, +“that he was never so busy as when he did nothing, and never less +solitary than when alone.”</p> + +<p>For who can believe that Dionysius, when after every possible effort he +ravished from his fellow-citizens their liberty, had performed a nobler +work than Archimedes, when, without appearing to be doing anything, he +manufactured the globe which we have just been describing? <a id="page-374"></a><span class="pgnum">374</span>Who does not +see that those men are in reality more solitary who, in the midst of a +crowd, find no one with whom they can converse congenially than those +who, without witnesses, hold communion with themselves, and enter into +the secret counsels of the sagest philosophers, while they delight +themselves in their writings and discoveries? And who would think any +one richer than the man who is in want of nothing which nature requires; +or more powerful than he who has attained all that she has need of; or +happier than he who is free from all mental perturbation; or more secure +in future than he who carries all his property in himself, which is thus +secured from shipwreck? And what power, what magistracy, what royalty, +can be preferred to a wisdom which, looking down on all terrestrial +objects as low and transitory things, incessantly directs its attention +to eternal and immutable verities, and which is persuaded that though +others are called men, none are really so but those who are refined by +the appropriate acts of humanity?</p> + +<p>In this sense an expression of Plato or some other philosopher appears +to me exceedingly elegant, who, when a tempest had driven his ship on an +unknown country and a desolate shore, during the alarms with which their +ignorance of the region inspired his companions, observed, they say, +geometrical figures traced in the sand, on which he immediately told +them to be of good cheer, for he had observed the indications of Man. A +conjecture he deduced, not from the cultivation of the soil which he +beheld, but from the symbols of science. For this reason, Tubero, +learning and learned men, and these your favorite studies, have always +particularly pleased me.</p> + +<p>XVIII. Then Lælius replied: I cannot venture, Scipio, to answer your +arguments, or to [maintain the discussion either against] you, Philus, +or Manilius.<a id="FNA-302"></a><a href="#FN-302"><sup>302</sup></a> * * *</p> + +<p>We had a friend in Tubero’s father’s family, who in these respects may +serve him as a model.</p> + +<blockquote> +<p>Sextus so wise, and ever on his guard.</p> +</blockquote> + +<p>Wise and cautious indeed he was, as Ennius justly describes him—not +because he searched for what he could <a id="page-375"></a><span class="pgnum">375</span>never find, but because he knew +how to answer those who prayed for deliverance from cares and +difficulties. It is he who, reasoning against the astronomical studies +of Gallus, used frequently to repeat these words of Achilles in the +Iphigenia<a id="FNA-303"></a><a href="#FN-303"><sup>303</sup></a>:</p> + +<div class="poem"> +<p>They note the astrologic signs of heaven,</p> +<p>Whene’er the goats or scorpions of great Jove,</p> +<p>Or other monstrous names of brutal forms,</p> +<p>Rise in the zodiac; but not one regards</p> +<p>The sensible facts of earth, on which we tread,</p> +<p>While gazing on the starry prodigies.</p> +</div> + +<p>He used, however, to say (and I have often listened to him with +pleasure) that for his part he thought that Zethus, in the piece of +Pacuvius, was too inimical to learning. He much preferred the +Neoptolemus of Ennius, who professes himself desirous of philosophizing +only in moderation; for that he did not think it right to be wholly +devoted to it. But though the studies of the Greeks have so many charms +for you, there are others, perhaps, nobler and more extensive, which we +may be better able to apply to the service of real life, and even to +political affairs. As to these abstract sciences, their utility, if they +possess any, lies principally in exciting and stimulating the abilities +of youth, so that they more easily acquire more important +accomplishments.</p> + +<p>XIX. Then Tubero said: I do not mean to disagree with you, Lælius; but, +pray, what do you call more important studies?</p> + +<p><i>Lælius.</i> I will tell you frankly, though perhaps you will think lightly +of my opinion, since you appeared so eager in interrogating Scipio +respecting the celestial phenomena; but I happen to think that those +things which are every day before our eyes are more particularly +deserving of our attention. Why should the child of Paulus Æmilius, the +nephew of Æmilius, the descendant of such a noble family and so glorious +a republic, inquire how there can be two suns in heaven, and not ask how +there can be two senates in one Commonwealth, and, as it were, two +distinct peoples? <a id="page-376"></a><span class="pgnum">376</span>For, as you see, the death of Tiberius Gracchus, and +the whole system of his tribuneship, has divided one people into two +parties. But the slanderers and the enemies of Scipio, encouraged by P. +Crassus and Appius Claudius, maintained, after the death of these two +chiefs, a division of nearly half the senate, under the influence of +Metellus and Mucius. Nor would they permit the man<a id="FNA-304"></a><a href="#FN-304"><sup>304</sup></a> who alone could +have been of service to help us out of our difficulties during the +movement of the Latins and their allies towards rebellion, violating all +our treaties in the presence of factious triumvirs, and creating every +day some fresh intrigue, to the disturbance of the worthier and +wealthier citizens. This is the reason, young men, if you will listen to +me, why you should regard this new sun with less alarm; for, whether it +does exist, or whether it does not exist, it is, as you see, quite +harmless to us. As to the manner of its existence, we can know little or +nothing; and even if we obtained the most perfect understanding of it, +this knowledge would make us but little wiser or happier. But that there +should exist a united people and a united senate is a thing which +actually may be brought about, and it will be a great evil if it is not; +and that it does not exist at present we are aware; and we see that if +it can be effected, our lives will be both better and happier.</p> + +<p>XX. Then Mucius said: What, then, do you consider, my Lælius, should be +our best arguments in endeavoring to bring about the object of your +wishes?</p> + +<p><i>Lælius.</i> Those sciences and arts which teach us how we may be most +useful to the State; for I consider that the most glorious office of +wisdom, and the noblest proof and business of virtue. In order, +therefore, that we may consecrate these holidays as much as possible to +conversations which may be profitable to the Commonwealth, let us beg +Scipio to explain to us what in his estimation appears to be the best +form of government. Then let us pass on to other points, the knowledge +of which may lead us, as I hope, to sound political views, and unfold +the causes of the dangers which now threaten us.</p> + +<p>XXI. When Philus, Manilius, and Mummius had all expressed <a id="page-377"></a><span class="pgnum">377</span>their great +approbation of this idea<a id="FNA-305"></a><a href="#FN-305"><sup>305</sup></a> * * * I have ventured [to open our +discussion] in this way, not only because it is but just that on State +politics the chief man in the State should be the principal speaker, but +also because I recollect that you, Scipio, were formerly very much in +the habit of conversing with Panætius and Polybius, two Greeks, +exceedingly learned in political questions, and that you are master of +many arguments by which you prove that by far the best condition of +government is that which our ancestors have handed down to us. And as +you, therefore, are familiar with this subject, if you will explain to +us your views respecting the general principles of a state (I speak for +my friends as well as myself), we shall feel exceedingly obliged to you.</p> + +<p>XXII. Then Scipio said: I must acknowledge that there is no subject of +meditation to which my mind naturally turns with more ardor and +intensity than this very one which Lælius has proposed to us. And, +indeed, as I see that in every profession, every artist who would +distinguish himself, thinks of, and aims at, and labors for no other +object but that of attaining perfection in his art, should not I, whose +main business, according to the example of my father and my ancestors, +is the advancement and right administration of government, be confessing +myself more indolent than any common mechanic if I were to bestow on +this noblest of sciences less attention and labor than they devote to +their insignificant trades? However, I am neither entirely satisfied +with the decisions which the greatest and wisest men of Greece have left +us; nor, on the other hand, do I venture to prefer my own opinions to +theirs. Therefore, I must request you not to consider me either entirely +ignorant of the Grecian literature, nor yet disposed, especially in +political questions, to yield it the pre-eminence over our own; but +rather to regard me as a true-born Roman, not illiberally instructed by +the care of my father, and inflamed with the desire of knowledge, even +from my boyhood, but still even more familiar with domestic precepts and +practices than the literature of books.</p> + +<p>XXIII. On this Philus said: I have no doubt, my Scipio, that no one is +superior to you in natural genius, <a id="page-378"></a><span class="pgnum">378</span>and that you are very far superior +to every one in the practical experience of national government and of +important business. We are also acquainted with the course which your +studies have at all times taken; and if, as you say, you have given so +much attention to this science and art of politics, we cannot be too +much obliged to Lælius for introducing the subject: for I trust that +what we shall hear from you will be far more useful and available than +all the writings put together which the Greeks have written for us.</p> + +<p>Then Scipio replied: You are raising a very high expectation of my +discourse, such as is a most oppressive burden to a man who is required +to discuss grave subjects.</p> + +<p>And Philus said: Although that may be a difficulty, my Scipio, still you +will be sure to conquer it, as you always do; nor is there any danger of +eloquence failing you, when you begin to speak on the affairs of a +commonwealth.</p> + +<p>XXIV. Then Scipio proceeded: I will do what you wish, as far as I can; +and I shall enter into the discussion under favor of that rule which, I +think, should be adopted by all persons in disputations of this kind, if +they wish to avoid being misunderstood; namely, that when men have +agreed respecting the proper name of the matter under discussion, it +should be stated what that name exactly means, and what it legitimately +includes. And when that point is settled, then it is fit to enter on the +discussion; for it will never be possible to arrive at an understanding +of what the character of the subject of the discussion is, unless one +first understands exactly what it is. Since, then, our investigations +relate to a commonwealth, we must first examine what this name properly +signifies.</p> + +<p>And when Lælius had intimated his approbation of this course, Scipio +continued:</p> + +<p>I shall not adopt, said he, in so clear and simple a manner that system +of discussion which goes back to first principles; as learned men often +do in this sort of discussion, so as to go back to the first meeting of +male and female, and then to the first birth and formation of the first +family, and define over and over again what there is in words, and in +how many manners each thing is stated. <a id="page-379"></a><span class="pgnum">379</span>For, as I am speaking to men of +prudence, who have acted with the greatest glory in the Commonwealth, +both in peace and war, I will take care not to allow the subject of the +discussion itself to be clearer than my explanation of it. Nor have I +undertaken this task with the design of examining all its minuter +points, like a school-master; nor will I promise you in the following +discourse not to omit any single particular.</p> + +<p>Then Lælius said: For my part, I am impatient for exactly that kind of +disquisition which you promise us.</p> + +<p>XXV. Well, then, said Africanus, a commonwealth is a constitution of the +entire people. But the people is not every association of men, however +congregated, but the association of the entire number, bound together by +the compact of justice, and the communication of utility. The first +cause of this association is not so much the weakness of man as a +certain spirit of congregation which naturally belongs to him. For the +human race is not a race of isolated individuals, wandering and +solitary; but it is so constituted that even in the affluence of all +things [and without any need of reciprocal assistance, it spontaneously +seeks society].</p> + +<p>XXVI. [It is necessary to presuppose] these original seeds, as it were, +since we cannot discover any primary establishment of the other virtues, +or even of a commonwealth itself. These unions, then, formed by the +principle which I have mentioned, established their headquarters +originally in certain central positions, for the convenience of the +whole population; and having fortified them by natural and artificial +means, they called this collection of houses a city or town, +distinguished by temples and public squares. Every people, therefore, +which consists of such an association of the entire multitude as I have +described, every city which consists of an assemblage of the people, and +every commonwealth which embraces every member of these associations, +must be regulated by a certain authority, in order to be permanent.</p> + +<p>This intelligent authority should always refer itself to that grand +first principle which established the Commonwealth. It must be deposited +in the hands of one supreme person, or intrusted to the administration +of certain delegated <a id="page-380"></a><span class="pgnum">380</span>rulers, or undertaken by the whole multitude. When +the direction of all depends on one person, we call this individual a +king, and this form of political constitution a kingdom. When it is in +the power of privileged delegates, the State is said to be ruled by an +aristocracy; and when the people are all in all, they call it a +democracy, or popular constitution. And if the tie of social affection, +which originally united men in political associations for the sake of +public interest, maintains its force, each of these forms of government +is, I will not say perfect, nor, in my opinion, essentially good, but +tolerable, and such that one may accidentally be better than another: +either a just and wise king, or a selection of the most eminent +citizens, or even the populace itself (though this is the least +commendable form), may, if there be no interference of crime and +cupidity, form a constitution sufficiently secure.</p> + +<p>XXVII. But in a monarchy the other members of the State are often too +much deprived of public counsel and jurisdiction; and under the rule of +an aristocracy the multitude can hardly possess its due share of +liberty, since it is allowed no share in the public deliberation, and no +power. And when all things are carried by a democracy, although it be +just and moderate, yet its very equality is a culpable levelling, +inasmuch as it allows no gradations of rank. Therefore, even if Cyrus, +the King of the Persians, was a most righteous and wise monarch, I +should still think that the interest of the people (for this is, as I +have said before, the same as the Commonwealth) could not be very +effectually promoted when all things depended on the beck and nod of one +individual. And though at present the people of Marseilles, our clients, +are governed with the greatest justice by elected magistrates of the +highest rank, still there is always in this condition of the people a +certain appearance of servitude; and when the Athenians, at a certain +period, having demolished their Areopagus, conducted all public affairs +by the acts and decrees of the democracy alone, their State, as it no +longer contained a distinct gradation of ranks, was no longer able to +retain its original fair appearance.</p> + +<p>XXVIII. I have reasoned thus on the three forms of government, not +looking on them in their disorganized <a id="page-381"></a><span class="pgnum">381</span>and confused conditions, but in +their proper and regular administration. These three particular forms, +however, contained in themselves, from the first, the faults and defects +I have mentioned; but they have also other dangerous vices, for there is +not one of these three forms of government which has not a precipitous +and slippery passage down to some proximate abuse. For, after thinking +of that endurable, or, as you will have it, most amiable king, Cyrus—to +name him in preference to any one else—then, to produce a change in our +minds, we behold the barbarous Phalaris, that model of tyranny, to which +the monarchical authority is easily abused by a facile and natural +inclination. And, in like manner, along-side of the wise aristocracy of +Marseilles, we might exhibit the oligarchical faction of the thirty +tyrants which once existed at Athens. And, not to seek for other +instances, among the same Athenians, we can show you that when unlimited +power was cast into the hands of the people, it inflamed the fury of the +multitude, and aggravated that universal license which ruined their +State.<a id="FNA-306"></a><a href="#FN-306"><sup>306</sup></a> * * *</p> + +<p>XXIX. The worst condition of things sometimes results from a confusion +of those factious tyrannies into which kings, aristocrats, and democrats +are apt to degenerate. For thus, from these diverse elements, there +occasionally arises (as I have said before) a new kind of government. +And wonderful indeed are the revolutions and periodical returns in +natural constitutions of such alternations and vicissitudes, which it is +the part of the wise politician to investigate with the closest +attention. But to calculate their approach, and to join to this +foresight the skill which moderates the course of events, and retains in +a steady hand the reins of that authority which safely conducts the +people through all the dangers to which they expose themselves, is the +work of a most illustrious citizen, and of almost divine genius.</p> + +<p>There is a fourth kind of government, therefore, which, in my opinion, +is preferable to all these: it is that mixed and moderate government +which is composed of the three particular forms which I have already +noticed.</p> + +<p>XXX. <i>Lælius.</i> I am not ignorant, Scipio, that such is <a id="page-382"></a><span class="pgnum">382</span>your opinion, +for I have often heard you say so. But I do not the less desire, if it +is not giving you too much trouble, to hear which you consider the best +of these three forms of commonwealths. For it may be of some use in +considering<a id="FNA-307"></a><a href="#FN-307"><sup>307</sup></a> * * *</p> + +<p>XXXI. * * * And each commonwealth corresponds to the nature and will of +him who governs it. Therefore, in no other constitution than that in +which the people exercise sovereign power has liberty any sure abode, +than which there certainly is no more desirable blessing. And if it be +not equally established for every one, it is not even liberty at all. +And how can there be this character of equality, I do not say under a +monarchy, where slavery is least disguised or doubtful, but even in +those constitutions in which the people are free indeed in words, for +they give their suffrages, they elect officers, they are canvassed and +solicited for magistracies; but yet they only grant those things which +they are obliged to grant whether they will or not, and which are not +really in their free power, though others ask them for them? For they +are not themselves admitted to the government, to the exercise of public +authority, or to offices of select judges, which are permitted to those +only of ancient families and large fortunes. But in a free people, as +among the Rhodians and Athenians, there is no citizen who<a id="FNA-308"></a><a href="#FN-308"><sup>308</sup></a> * * *</p> + +<p>XXXII. * * * No sooner is one man, or several, elevated by wealth and +power, than they say that * * * arise from their pride and arrogance, +when the idle and the timid give way, and bow down to the insolence of +riches. But if the people knew how to maintain its rights, then they say +that nothing could be more glorious and prosperous than democracy; +inasmuch as they themselves would be the sovereign dispensers of laws, +judgments, war, peace, public treaties, and, finally, of the fortune and +life of each individual citizen; and this condition of things is the +only one which, in their opinion, can be really called a commonwealth, +that is to say, a constitution of the people. It is on this principle +that, according to them, a people often vindicates its liberty from the +domination of kings and <a id="page-383"></a><span class="pgnum">383</span>nobles; while, on the other hand, kings are not +sought for among free peoples, nor are the power and wealth of +aristocracies. They deny, moreover, that it is fair to reject this +general constitution of freemen, on account of the vices of the +unbridled populace; but that if the people be united and inclined, and +directs all its efforts to the safety and freedom of the community, +nothing can be stronger or more unchangeable; and they assert that this +necessary union is easily obtained in a republic so constituted that the +good of all classes is the same; while the conflicting interests that +prevail in other constitutions inevitably produce dissensions; +therefore, say they, when the senate had the ascendency, the republic +had no stability; and when kings possess the power, this blessing is +still more rare, since, as Ennius expresses it,</p> + +<div class="poem"> +<p>In kingdoms there’s no faith, and little love. </p> +</div> + +<p>Wherefore, since the law is the bond of civil society, and the justice +of the law equal, by what rule can the association of citizens be held +together, if the condition of the citizens be not equal? For if the +fortunes of men cannot be reduced to this equality—if genius cannot be +equally the property of all—rights, at least, should be equal among +those who are citizens of the same republic. For what is a republic but +an association of rights?<a id="FNA-309"></a><a href="#FN-309"><sup>309</sup></a> * * *</p> + +<p>XXXIII. But as to the other political constitutions, these democratical +advocates do not think they are worthy of being distinguished by the +name which they claim. For why, say they, should we apply the name of +king, the title of Jupiter the Beneficent, and not rather the title of +tyrant, to a man ambitious of sole authority and power, lording it over +a degraded multitude? For a tyrant may be as merciful as a king may be +oppressive; so that the whole difference to the people is, whether they +serve an indulgent master or a cruel one, since serve some one they +must. But how could Sparta, at the period of the boasted superiority of +her political institution, obtain a constant enjoyment of just and +virtuous kings, when they necessarily received an hereditary monarch, +good, bad, or indifferent, because he happened to be of the blood royal? +As to <a id="page-384"></a><span class="pgnum">384</span>aristocrats, Who will endure, say they, that men should +distinguish themselves by such a title, and that not by the voice of the +people, but by their own votes? For how is such a one judged to be best +either in learning, sciences, or arts?<a id="FNA-310"></a><a href="#FN-310"><sup>310</sup></a> * * *</p> + +<p>XXXIV. * * * If it does so by hap-hazard, it will be as easily upset as +a vessel if the pilot were chosen by lot from among the passengers. But +if a people, being free, chooses those to whom it can trust itself—and, +if it desires its own preservation, it will always choose the +noblest—then certainly it is in the counsels of the aristocracy that +the safety of the State consists, especially as nature has not only +appointed that these superior men should excel the inferior sort in high +virtue and courage, but has inspired the people also with the desire of +obedience towards these, their natural lords. But they say this +aristocratical State is destroyed by the depraved opinions of men, who, +through ignorance of virtue (which, as it belongs to few, can be +discerned and appreciated by few), imagine that not only rich and +powerful men, but also those who are nobly born, are necessarily the +best. And so when, through this popular error, the riches, and not the +virtue, of a few men has taken possession of the State, these chiefs +obstinately retain the title of nobles, though they want the essence of +nobility. For riches, fame, and power, without wisdom and a just method +of regulating ourselves and commanding others, are full of discredit and +insolent arrogance; nor is there any kind of government more deformed +than that in which the wealthiest are regarded as the noblest.</p> + +<p>But when virtue governs the Commonwealth, what can be more glorious? +When he who commands the rest is himself enslaved by no lust or passion; +when he himself exhibits all the virtues to which he incites and +educates the citizens; when he imposes no law on the people which he +does not himself observe, but presents his life as a living law to his +fellow-countrymen; if a single individual could thus suffice for all, +there would be no need of more; and if the community could find a chief +ruler thus worthy of all their suffrages, none would require elected +magistrates.</p> + +<p><a id="page-385"></a><span class="pgnum">385</span>It was the difficulty of forming plans which transferred the government +from a king into the hands of many; and the error and temerity of the +people likewise transferred it from the hands of the many into those of +the few. Thus, between the weakness of the monarch and the rashness of +the multitude, the aristocrats have occupied the middle place, than +which nothing can be better arranged; and while they superintend the +public interest, the people necessarily enjoy the greatest possible +prosperity, being free from all care and anxiety, having intrusted their +security to others, who ought sedulously to defend it, and not allow the +people to suspect that their advantage is neglected by their rulers.</p> + +<p>For as to that equality of rights which democracies so loudly boast of, +it can never be maintained; for the people themselves, so dissolute and +so unbridled, are always inclined to flatter a number of demagogues; and +there is in them a very great partiality for certain men and dignities, +so that their equality, so called, becomes most unfair and iniquitous. +For as equal honor is given to the most noble and the most infamous, +some of whom must exist in every State, then the equity which they +eulogize becomes most inequitable—an evil which never can happen in +those states which are governed by aristocracies. These reasonings, my +Lælius, and some others of the same kind, are usually brought forward by +those that so highly extol this form of political constitution.</p> + +<p>XXXV. Then Lælius said: But you have not told us, Scipio, which of these +three forms of government you yourself most approve.</p> + +<p><i>Scipio.</i> You are right to shape your question, which of the three I +most approve, for there is not one of them which I approve at all by +itself, since, as I told you, I prefer that government which is mixed +and composed of all these forms, to any one of them taken separately. +But if I must confine myself to one of these particular forms simply and +exclusively, I must confess I prefer the royal one, and praise that as +the first and best. In this, which I here choose to call the primitive +form of government, I find the title of father attached to that of king, +to express that he watches over the citizens as over his children, and +endeavors <a id="page-386"></a><span class="pgnum">386</span>rather to preserve them in freedom than reduce them to +slavery. So that it is more advantageous for those who are insignificant +in property and capacity to be supported by the care of one excellent +and eminently powerful man. The nobles here present themselves, who +profess that they can do all this in much better style; for they say +that there is much more wisdom in many than in one, and at least as much +faith and equity. And, last of all, come the people, who cry with a loud +voice that they will render obedience neither to the one nor the few; +that even to brute beasts nothing is so dear as liberty; and that all +men who serve either kings or nobles are deprived of it. Thus, the kings +attract us by affection, the nobles by talent, the people by liberty; +and in the comparison it is hard to choose the best.</p> + +<p><i>Lælius.</i> I think so too, but yet it is impossible to despatch the other +branches of the question, if you leave this primary point undetermined.</p> + +<p>XXXVI. <i>Scipio.</i> We must then, I suppose, imitate Aratus, who, when he +prepared himself to treat of great things, thought himself in duty bound +to begin with Jupiter.</p> + +<p><i>Lælius.</i> Wherefore Jupiter? and what is there in this discussion which +resembles that poem?</p> + +<p><i>Scipio.</i> Why, it serves to teach us that we cannot better commence our +investigations than by invoking him whom, with one voice, both learned +and unlearned extol as the universal king of all gods and men.</p> + +<p>How so? said Lælius.</p> + +<p>Do you, then, asked Scipio, believe in nothing which is not before your +eyes? whether these ideas have been established by the chiefs of states +for the benefit of society, that there might be believed to exist one +Universal Monarch in heaven, at whose nod (as Homer expresses it) all +Olympus trembles, and that he might be accounted both king and father of +all creatures; for there is great authority, and there are many +witnesses, if you choose to call all many, who attest that all nations +have unanimously recognized, by the decrees of their chiefs, that +nothing is better than a king, since they think that all the Gods are +governed by the divine power of one sovereign; or if we suspect <a id="page-387"></a><span class="pgnum">387</span>that +this opinion rests on the error of the ignorant, and should be classed +among the fables, let us listen to those universal testimonies of +erudite men, who have, as it were, seen with their eyes those things to +the knowledge of which we can hardly attain by report.</p> + +<p>What men do you mean? said Lælius.</p> + +<p>Those, replied Scipio, who, by the investigation of nature, have arrived +at the opinion that the whole universe [is animated] by a single +Mind<a id="FNA-311"></a><a href="#FN-311"><sup>311</sup></a>. * * *</p> + +<p>XXXVII. But if you please, my Lælius, I will bring forward evidences +which are neither too ancient nor in any respect barbarous.</p> + +<p>Those, said Lælius, are what I want.</p> + +<p><i>Scipio.</i> You are aware that it is now not four centuries since this +city of ours has been without kings.</p> + +<p><i>Lælius.</i> You are correct; it is less than four centuries.</p> + +<p><i>Scipio.</i> Well, then, what are four centuries in the age of a state or +city? is it a long time?</p> + +<p><i>Lælius.</i> It hardly amounts to the age of maturity.</p> + +<p><i>Scipio.</i> You say truly; and yet not four centuries have elapsed since +there was a king in Rome.</p> + +<p><i>Lælius.</i> And he was a proud king.</p> + +<p><i>Scipio.</i> But who was his predecessor?</p> + +<p><i>Lælius.</i> He was an admirably just one; and, indeed, we must bestow the +same praise on all his predecessors as far back as Romulus, who reigned +about six centuries ago.</p> + +<p><i>Scipio.</i> Even he, then, is not very ancient.</p> + +<p><i>Lælius.</i> No; he reigned when Greece was already becoming old.</p> + +<p><i>Scipio.</i> Agreed. Was Romulus, then, think you, king of a barbarous +people?</p> + +<p><i>Lælius.</i> Why, as to that, if we were to follow the example of the +Greeks, who say that all people are either Greeks or barbarians, I am +afraid that we must confess that he was a king of barbarians; but if +this name belongs rather to manners than to languages, then I believe +the Greeks were just as barbarous as the Romans.</p> + +<p>Then Scipio said: But with respect to the present question, we do not so +much need to inquire into the nation as into the disposition. For if +intelligent men, at a period so <a id="page-388"></a><span class="pgnum">388</span>little remote, desired the government +of kings, you will confess that I am producing authorities that are +neither antiquated, rude, nor insignificant.</p> + +<p>XXXVIII. Then Lælius said: I see, Scipio, that you are very sufficiently +provided with authorities; but with me, as with every fair judge, +authorities are worth less than arguments.</p> + +<p>Scipio replied: Then, Lælius, you shall yourself make use of an argument +derived from your own senses.</p> + +<p><i>Lælius.</i> What senses do you mean?</p> + +<p><i>Scipio.</i> The feelings which you experience when at any time you happen +to feel angry with any one.</p> + +<p><i>Lælius.</i> That happens rather oftener than I could wish.</p> + +<p><i>Scipio.</i> Well, then, when you are angry, do you permit your anger to +triumph over your judgment?</p> + +<p>No, by Hercules! said Lælius; I imitate the famous Archytas of Tarentum, +who, when he came to his villa, and found all its arrangements were +contrary to his orders, said to his steward, “Ah! you unlucky scoundrel, +I would flog you to death, if it were not that I am in a rage with you.”</p> + +<p>Capital, said Scipio. Archytas, then, regarded unreasonable anger as a +kind of sedition and rebellion of nature which he sought to appease by +reflection. And so, if we examine avarice, the ambition of power or of +glory, or the lusts of concupiscence and licentiousness, we shall find a +certain conscience in the mind of man, which, like a king, sways by the +force of counsel all the inferior faculties and propensities; and this, +in truth, is the noblest portion of our nature; for when conscience +reigns, it allows no resting-place to lust, violence, or temerity.</p> + +<p><i>Lælius.</i> You have spoken the truth.</p> + +<p><i>Scipio.</i> Well, then, does a mind thus governed and regulated meet your +approbation?</p> + +<p><i>Lælius.</i> More than anything upon earth.</p> + +<p><i>Scipio.</i> Then you would not approve that the evil passions, which are +innumerable, should expel conscience, and that lusts and animal +propensities should assume an ascendency over us?</p> + +<p><i>Lælius.</i> For my part, I can conceive nothing more wretched than a mind +thus degraded, or a man animated by a soul so licentious.</p> + +<p><a id="page-389"></a><span class="pgnum">389</span><i>Scipio.</i> You desire, then, that all the faculties of the mind should +submit to a ruling power, and that conscience should reign over them +all?</p> + +<p><i>Lælius.</i> Certainly, that is my wish.</p> + +<p><i>Scipio.</i> How, then, can you doubt what opinion to form on the subject +of the Commonwealth? in which, if the State is thrown into many hands, +it is very plain that there will be no presiding authority; for if power +be not united, it soon comes to nothing.</p> + +<p>XXXIX. Then Lælius asked: But what difference is there, I should like to +know, between the one and the many, if justice exists equally in many?</p> + +<p>And Scipio said: Since I see, my Lælius, that the authorities I have +adduced have no great influence on you, I must continue to employ you +yourself as my witness in proof of what I am saying.</p> + +<p>In what way, said Lælius, are you going to make me again support your +argument?</p> + +<p><i>Scipio.</i> Why, thus: I recollect, when we were lately at Formiæ, that +you told your servants repeatedly to obey the orders of more than one +master only.</p> + +<p><i>Lælius.</i> To be sure, those of my steward.</p> + +<p><i>Scipio.</i> What do you at home? Do you commit your affairs to the hands +of many persons?</p> + +<p><i>Lælius.</i> No, I trust them to myself alone.</p> + +<p><i>Scipio.</i> Well, in your whole establishment, is there any other master +but yourself?</p> + +<p><i>Lælius.</i> Not one.</p> + +<p><i>Scipio.</i> Then I think you must grant me that, as respects the State, +the government of single individuals, provided they are just, is +superior to any other.</p> + +<p><i>Lælius.</i> You have conducted me to this conclusion, and I entertain very +nearly that opinion.</p> + +<p>XL. And Scipio said: You would still further agree with me, my Lælius, +if, omitting the common comparisons, that one pilot is better fitted to +steer a ship, and a physician to treat an invalid, provided they be +competent men in their respective professions, than many could be, I +should come at once to more illustrious examples.</p> + +<p><i>Lælius.</i> What examples do you mean?</p> + +<p><i>Scipio.</i> Do not you observe that it was the cruelty and <a id="page-390"></a><span class="pgnum">390</span>pride of one +single Tarquin only that made the title of king unpopular among the +Romans?</p> + +<p><i>Lælius.</i> Yes, I acknowledge that.</p> + +<p><i>Scipio.</i> You are also aware of this fact, on which I think I shall +debate in the course of the coming discussion, that after the expulsion +of King Tarquin, the people was transported by a wonderful excess of +liberty. Then innocent men were driven into banishment; then the estates +of many individuals were pillaged, consulships were made annual, public +authorities were overawed by mobs, popular appeals took place in all +cases imaginable; then secessions of the lower orders ensued, and, +lastly, those proceedings which tended to place all powers in the hands +of the populace.</p> + +<p><i>Lælius.</i> I must confess this is all too true.</p> + +<p>All these things now, said Scipio, happened during periods of peace and +tranquillity, for license is wont to prevail when there is little to +fear, as in a calm voyage or a trifling disease. But as we observe the +voyager and the invalid implore the aid of some one competent director, +as soon as the sea grows stormy and the disease alarming, so our nation +in peace and security commands, threatens, resists, appeals from, and +insults its magistrates, but in war obeys them as strictly as kings; for +public safety is, after all, rather more valuable than popular license. +And in the most serious wars, our countrymen have even chosen the entire +command to be deposited in the hands of some single chief, without a +colleague; the very name of which magistrate indicates the absolute +character of his power. For though he is evidently called dictator +because he is appointed (dicitur), yet do we still observe him, my +Lælius, in our sacred books entitled Magister Populi (the master of the +people).</p> + +<p>This is certainly the case, said Lælius.</p> + +<p>Our ancestors, therefore, said Scipio, acted wisely.<a id="FNA-312"></a><a href="#FN-312"><sup>312</sup></a> * * *</p> + +<p>XLI. When the people is deprived of a just king, as Ennius says, after +the death of one of the best of monarchs,</p> + +<div class="poem"> +<p>They hold his memory dear, and, in the warmth</p> +<p>Of their discourse, they cry, O Romulus!</p> +<p>O prince divine, sprung from the might of Mars</p> +<p>To be thy country’s guardian! O our sire!</p> +<p>Be our protector still, O heaven-begot!</p> +</div> + +<p><a id="page-391"></a><span class="pgnum">391</span>Not heroes, nor lords alone, did they call those whom they lawfully +obeyed; nor merely as kings did they proclaim them; but they pronounced +them their country’s guardians, their fathers, and their Gods. Nor, +indeed, without cause, for they added,</p> + +<div class="poem"> +<p>Thou, Prince, hast brought us to the gates of light.</p> +</div> + +<p class="cont">And truly they believed that life and honor and glory had arisen to them +from the justice of their king. The same good-will would doubtless have +remained in their descendants, if the same virtues had been preserved on +the throne; but, as you see, by the injustice of one man the whole of +that kind of constitution fell into ruin.</p> + +<p>I see it indeed, said Lælius, and I long to know the history of these +political revolutions both in our own Commonwealth and in every other.</p> + +<p>XLII. And Scipio said: When I shall have explained my opinion respecting +the form of government which I prefer, I shall be able to speak to you +more accurately respecting the revolutions of states, though I think +that such will not take place so easily in the mixed form of government +which I recommend. With respect, however, to absolute monarchy, it +presents an inherent and invincible tendency to revolution. No sooner +does a king begin to be unjust than this entire form of government is +demolished, and he at once becomes a tyrant, which is the worst of all +governments, and one very closely related to monarchy. If this State +falls into the hands of the nobles, which is the usual course of events, +it becomes an aristocracy, or the second of the three kinds of +constitutions which I have described; for it is, as it were, a +royal—that is to say, a paternal—council of the chief men of the State +consulting for the public benefit. Or if the people by itself has +expelled or slain a tyrant, it is moderate in its conduct as long as it +has sense and wisdom, and while it rejoices in its exploit, and applies +itself to maintaining the constitution which it has established. But if +ever the people has raised its forces against a just king and robbed him +of his throne, or, as has frequently happened, has tasted the blood of +its legitimate nobles, and subjected the whole Commonwealth to its own +license, you can imagine <a id="page-392"></a><span class="pgnum">392</span>no flood or conflagration so terrible, or any +whose violence is harder to appease than this unbridled insolence of the +populace.</p> + +<p>XLIII. Then we see realized that which Plato so vividly describes, if I +can but express it in our language. It is by no means easy to do it +justice in translation: however, I will try.</p> + +<p>When, says Plato, the insatiate jaws of the populace are fired with the +thirst of liberty, and when the people, urged on by evil ministers, +drains in its thirst the cup, not of tempered liberty, but unmitigated +license, then the magistrates and chiefs, if they are not utterly +subservient and remiss, and shameless promoters of the popular +licentiousness, are pursued, incriminated, accused, and cried down under +the title of despots and tyrants. I dare say you recollect the passage.</p> + +<p>Yes, said Lælius, it is familiar to me.</p> + +<p><i>Scipio.</i> Plato thus proceeds: Then those who feel in duty bound to obey +the chiefs of the State are persecuted by the insensate populace, who +call them voluntary slaves. But those who, though invested with +magistracies, wish to be considered on an equality with private +individuals, and those private individuals who labor to abolish all +distinctions between their own class and the magistrates, are extolled +with acclamations and overwhelmed with honors, so that it inevitably +happens in a commonwealth thus revolutionized that liberalism abounds in +all directions, due authority is found wanting even in private families, +and misrule seems to extend even to the animals that witness it. Then +the father fears the son, and the son neglects the father. All modesty +is banished; they become far too liberal for that. No difference is made +between the citizen and the alien; the master dreads and cajoles his +scholars, and the scholars despise their masters. The young men assume +the gravity of sages, and sages must stoop to the follies of children, +lest they should be hated and oppressed by them. The very slaves even +are under but little restraint; wives boast the same rights as their +husbands; dogs, horses, and asses are emancipated in this outrageous +excess of freedom, and run about so violently that they frighten the +passengers from the road. At length <a id="page-393"></a><span class="pgnum">393</span>the termination of all this +infinite licentiousness is, that the minds of the citizens become so +fastidious and effeminate, that when they observe even the slightest +exertion of authority they grow angry and seditious, and thus the laws +begin to be neglected, so that the people are absolutely without any +master at all.</p> + +<p>Then Lælius said: You have very accurately rendered the opinions which +he expressed.</p> + +<p>XLIV. <i>Scipio.</i> Now, to return to the argument of my discourse. It +appears that this extreme license, which is the only liberty in the eyes +of the vulgar, is, according to Plato, such that from it as a sort of +root tyrants naturally arise and spring up. For as the excessive power +of an aristocracy occasions the destruction of the nobles, so this +excessive liberalism of democracies brings after it the slavery of the +people. Thus we find in the weather, the soil, and the animal +constitution the most favorable conditions are sometimes suddenly +converted by their excess into the contrary, and this fact is especially +observable in political governments; and this excessive liberty soon +brings the people collectively and individually to an excessive +servitude. For, as I said, this extreme liberty easily introduces the +reign of tyranny, the severest of all unjust slaveries. In fact, from +the midst of this unbridled and capricious populace, they elect some one +as a leader in opposition to their afflicted and expelled nobles: some +new chief, forsooth, audacious and impure, often insolently persecuting +those who have deserved well of the State, and ready to gratify the +populace at his neighbor’s expense as well as his own. Then, since the +private condition is naturally exposed to fears and alarms, the people +invest him with many powers, and these are continued in his hands. Such +men, like Pisistratus of Athens, will soon find an excuse for +surrounding themselves with body-guards, and they will conclude by +becoming tyrants over the very persons who raised them to dignity. If +such despots perish by the vengeance of the better citizens, as is +generally the case, the constitution is re-established; but if they fall +by the hands of bold insurgents, then the same faction succeeds them, +which is only another species of tyranny. And the same revolution arises +<a id="page-394"></a><span class="pgnum">394</span>from the fair system of aristocracy when any corruption has betrayed +the nobles from the path of rectitude. Thus the power is like the ball +which is flung from hand to hand: it passes from kings to tyrants, from +tyrants to the aristocracy, from them to democracy, and from these back +again to tyrants and to factions; and thus the same kind of government +is seldom long maintained.</p> + +<p>XLV. Since these are the facts of experience, royalty is, in my opinion, +very far preferable to the three other kinds of political constitutions. +But it is itself inferior to that which is composed of an equal mixture +of the three best forms of government, united and modified by one +another. I wish to establish in a commonwealth a royal and pre-eminent +chief. Another portion of power should be deposited in the hands of the +aristocracy, and certain things should be reserved to the judgment and +wish of the multitude. This constitution, in the first place, possesses +that great equality without which men cannot long maintain their +freedom; secondly, it offers a great stability, while the particular +separate and isolated forms easily fall into their contraries; so that a +king is succeeded by a despot, an aristocracy by a faction, a democracy +by a mob and confusion; and all these forms are frequently sacrificed to +new revolutions. In this united and mixed constitution, however, similar +disasters cannot happen without the greatest vices in public men. For +there can be little to occasion revolution in a state in which every +person is firmly established in his appropriate rank, and there are but +few modes of corruption into which we can fall.</p> + +<p>XLVI. But I fear, Lælius, and you, my amiable and learned friends, that +if I were to dwell any longer on this argument, my words would seem +rather like the lessons of a master, and not like the free conversation +of one who is uniting with you in the consideration of truth. I shall +therefore pass on to those things which are familiar to all, and which I +have long studied. And in these matters I believe, I feel, and I affirm +that of all governments there is none which, either in its entire +constitution or the distribution of its parts, or in the discipline of +its manners, is comparable to that which our fathers received from our +earliest ancestors, and which they have handed down to <a id="page-395"></a><span class="pgnum">395</span>us. And since +you wish to hear from me a development of this constitution, with which +you are all acquainted, I shall endeavor to explain its true character +and excellence. Thus keeping my eye fixed on the model of our Roman +Commonwealth, I shall endeavor to accommodate to it all that I have to +say on the best form of government. And by treating the subject in this +way, I think I shall be able to accomplish most satisfactorily the task +which Lælius has imposed on me.</p> + +<p>XLVII. <i>Lælius.</i> It is a task most properly and peculiarly your own, my +Scipio; for who can speak so well as you either on the subject of the +institutions of our ancestors, since you yourself are descended from +most illustrious ancestors, or on that of the best form of a +constitution which, if we possess (though at this moment we do not, +still), when we do possess such a thing, who will be more flourishing in +it than you? or on that of providing counsels for the future, as you, +who, by dispelling two mighty perils from our city, have provided for +its safety forever?</p> + +<hr class="tiny"/> + +<h4>FRAGMENTS.</h4> + + +<p>XLVIII. As our country is the source of the greatest benefits, and is a +parent dearer than those who have given us life, we owe her still warmer +gratitude than belongs to our human relations. * * *</p> + +<p>Nor would Carthage have continued to flourish during six centuries +without wisdom and good institutions. * * *</p> + +<p>In truth, says Cicero, although the reasonings of those men may contain +most abundant fountains of science and virtue; still, if we compare them +with the achievements and complete actions of statesmen, they will seem +not to have been of so much service in the actual business of men as of +amusement for their leisure.</p> + + + +<hr/> + +<h3><a id="page-396"></a><span class="pgnum">396</span>INTRODUCTION TO THE SECOND BOOK,</h3> + +<h4>BY THE ORIGINAL TRANSLATOR.</h4> + + +<p class="intro"><span class="first">In</span> this second book of his Commonwealth, Cicero gives us a spirited and +eloquent review of the history and successive developments of the Roman +constitution. He bestows the warmest praises on its early kings, points +out the great advantages which had resulted from its primitive +monarchical system, and explains how that system had been gradually +broken up. In order to prove the importance of reviving it, he gives a +glowing picture of the evils and disasters that had befallen the Roman +State in consequence of that overcharge of democratic folly and violence +which had gradually gained an alarming preponderance, and describes, +with a kind of prophetic sagacity, the fruit of his political +experience, the subsequent revolutions of the Roman State, which such a +state of things would necessarily bring about.</p> + + +<hr class="tiny"/> + + +<h3>BOOK II.</h3> + + +<p>I. [<span class="first">When</span>, therefore, he observed all his friends kindled with the +de]sire of hearing him, Scipio thus opened the discussion. I will +commence, said Scipio, with a sentiment of old Cato, whom, as you know, +I singularly loved and exceedingly admired, and to whom, in compliance +with the judgment of both my parents, and also by my own desire, I was +entirely devoted during my youth; of whose discourse, indeed, I could +never have enough, so much experience did he possess as a statesman +respecting the republic which he had so long governed, both in peace and +war, with so much success. There was also an admirable propriety in his +style of conversation, in which wit was tempered with gravity; a +wonderful aptitude for acquiring, and at the same time communicating, +information; and his life was in perfect correspondence and unison with +his language. He used to say that the government of Rome was superior to +that of other states for this reason, because in nearly all of them +there had been single individuals, each of whom had regulated their +commonwealth <a id="page-397"></a><span class="pgnum">397</span>according to their own laws and their own ordinances. So +Minos had done in Crete, and Lycurgus in Sparta; and in Athens, which +experienced so many revolutions, first Theseus, then Draco, then Solon, +then Clisthenes, afterward many others; and, lastly, when it was almost +lifeless and quite prostrate, that great and wise man, Demetrius +Phalereus, supported it. But our Roman constitution, on the contrary, +did not spring from the genius of one individual, but from that of many; +and it was established, not in the lifetime of one man, but in the +course of several ages and centuries. For, added he, there never yet +existed any genius so vast and comprehensive as to allow nothing at any +time to escape its attention; and all the geniuses in the world united +in a single mind could never, within the limits of a single life, exert +a foresight sufficiently extensive to embrace and harmonize all, without +the aid of experience and practice.</p> + +<p>Thus, according to Cato’s usual habit, I now ascend in my discourse to +the “origin of the people,” for I like to adopt the expression of Cato. +I shall also more easily execute my proposed task if I thus exhibit to +you our political constitution in its infancy, progress, and maturity, +now so firm and fully established, than if, after the example of +Socrates in the books of Plato, I were to delineate a mere imaginary +republic.</p> + +<p>II. When all had signified their approbation, Scipio resumed: What +commencement of a political constitution can we conceive more brilliant, +or more universally known, than the foundation of Rome by the hand of +Romulus? And he was the son of Mars: for we may grant this much to the +common report existing among men, especially as it is not merely +ancient, but one also which has been wisely maintained by our ancestors, +in order that those who have done great service to communities may enjoy +the reputation of having received from the Gods, not only their genius, +but their very birth.</p> + +<p>It is related, then, that soon after the birth of Romulus and his +brother Remus, Amulius, King of Alba, fearing that they might one day +undermine his authority, ordered that they should be exposed on the +banks of the Tiber; and that in this situation the infant Romulus was +suckled <a id="page-398"></a><span class="pgnum">398</span>by a wild beast; that he was afterward educated by the +shepherds, and brought up in the rough way of living and labors of the +countrymen; and that he acquired, when he grew up, such superiority over +the rest by the vigor of his body and the courage of his soul, that all +the people who at that time inhabited the plains in the midst of which +Rome now stands, tranquilly and willingly submitted to his government. +And when he had made himself the chief of those bands, to come from +fables to facts, he took Alba Longa, a powerful and strong city at that +time, and slew its king, Amulius.</p> + +<p>III. Having acquired this glory, he conceived the design (as they tell +us) of founding a new city and establishing a new state. As respected +the site of his new city, a point which requires the greatest foresight +in him who would lay the foundation of a durable commonwealth, he chose +the most convenient possible position. For he did not advance too near +the sea, which he might easily have done with the forces under his +command, either by entering the territory of the Rutuli and Aborigines, +or by founding his citadel at the mouth of the Tiber, where many years +after Ancus Martius established a colony. But Romulus, with admirable +genius and foresight, observed and perceived that sites very near the +sea are not the most favorable positions for cities which would attain a +durable prosperity and dominion. And this, first, because maritime +cities are always exposed, not only to many attacks, but to perils they +cannot provide against. For the continued land gives notice, by many +indications, not only of any regular approaches, but also of any sudden +surprises of an enemy, and announces them beforehand by the mere sound. +There is no adversary who, on an inland territory, can arrive so swiftly +as to prevent our knowing not only his existence, but his character too, +and where he comes from. But a maritime and naval enemy can fall upon a +town on the sea-coast before any one suspects that he is about to come; +and when he does come, nothing exterior indicates who he is, or whence +he comes, or what he wishes; nor can it even be determined and +distinguished on all occasions whether he is a friend or a foe.</p> + +<p>IV. But maritime cities are likewise naturally exposed <a id="page-399"></a><span class="pgnum">399</span>to corrupt +influences, and revolutions of manners. Their civilization is more or +less adulterated by new languages and customs, and they import not only +foreign merchandise, but foreign fashions, to such a degree that nothing +can continue unalloyed in the national institutions. Those who inhabit +these maritime towns do not remain in their native place, but are urged +afar from their homes by winged hope and speculation. And even when they +do not desert their country in person, still their minds are always +expatiating and voyaging round the world.</p> + +<p>Nor, indeed, was there any cause which more deeply undermined Corinth +and Carthage, and at last overthrew them both, than this wandering and +dispersion of their citizens, whom the passion of commerce and +navigation had induced to abandon the cultivation of their lands and +their attention to military pursuits.</p> + +<p>The proximity of the sea likewise administers to maritime cities a +multitude of pernicious incentives to luxury, which are either acquired +by victory or imported by commerce; and the very agreeableness of their +position nourishes many expensive and deceitful gratifications of the +passions. And what I have spoken of Corinth may be applied, for aught I +know, without incorrectness to the whole of Greece. For the Peloponnesus +itself is almost wholly on the sea-coast; nor, besides the Phliasians, +are there any whose lands do not touch the sea; and beyond the +Peloponnesus, the Ænianes, the Dorians, and the Dolopes are the only +inland people. Why should I speak of the Grecian islands, which, girded +by the waves, seem all afloat, as it were, together with the +institutions and manners of their cities? And these things, I have +before noticed, do not respect ancient Greece only; for which of all +those colonies which have been led from Greece into Asia, Thracia, +Italy, Sicily, and Africa, with the single exception of Magnesia, is +there that is not washed by the sea? Thus it seems as if a sort of +Grecian coast had been annexed to territories of the barbarians. For +among the barbarians themselves none were heretofore a maritime people, +if we except the Carthaginians and Etruscans; one for the sake of +commerce, the other of pillage. And this is one evident reason of the +calamities and revolutions of Greece, <a id="page-400"></a><span class="pgnum">400</span>because she became infected with +the vices which belong to maritime cities, which I just now briefly +enumerated. But yet, notwithstanding these vices, they have one great +advantage, and one which is of universal application, namely, that there +is a great facility for new inhabitants flocking to them. And, again, +that the inhabitants are enabled to export and send abroad the produce +of their native lands to any nation they please, which offers them a +market for their goods.</p> + +<p>V. By what divine wisdom, then, could Romulus embrace all the benefits +that could belong to maritime cities, and at the same time avoid the +dangers to which they are exposed, except, as he did, by building his +city on the bank of an inexhaustible river, whose equal current +discharges itself into the sea by a vast mouth, so that the city could +receive all it wanted from the sea, and discharge its superabundant +commodities by the same channel? And in the same river a communication +is found by which it not only receives from the sea all the productions +necessary to the conveniences and elegances of life, but those also +which are brought from the inland districts. So that Romulus seems to me +to have divined and anticipated that this city would one day become the +centre and abode of a powerful and opulent empire; for there is no other +part of Italy in which a city could be situated so as to be able to +maintain so wide a dominion with so much ease.</p> + +<p>VI. As to the natural fortifications of Rome, who is so negligent and +unobservant as not to have them depicted and deeply stamped on his +memory? Such is the plan and direction of the walls, which, by the +prudence of Romulus and his royal successors, are bounded on all sides +by steep and rugged hills; and the only aperture between the Esquiline +and Quirinal mountains is enclosed by a formidable rampart, and +surrounded by an immense fosse. And as for our fortified citadel, it is +so secured by a precipitous barrier and enclosure of rocks, that, even +in that horrible attack and invasion of the Gauls, it remained +impregnable and inviolable. Moreover, the site which he selected had +also an abundance of fountains, and was healthy, though it was in the +midst of a pestilential region; for there are hills which at once create +a current <a id="page-401"></a><span class="pgnum">401</span>of fresh air, and fling an agreeable shade over the valleys.</p> + +<p>VII. These things he effected with wonderful rapidity, and thus +established the city, which, from his own name Romulus, he determined to +call Rome. And in order to strengthen his new city, he conceived a +design, singular enough, and even a little rude, yet worthy of a great +man, and of a genius which discerned far away in futurity the means of +strengthening his power and his people. The young Sabine females of +honorable birth who had come to Rome, attracted by the public games and +spectacles which Romulus then, for the first time, established as annual +games in the circus, were suddenly carried off at the feast of +Consus<a id="FNA-313"></a><a href="#FN-313"><sup>313</sup></a> by his orders, and were given in marriage to the men of the +noblest families in Rome. And when, on this account, the Sabines had +declared war against Rome, the issue of the battle being doubtful and +undecided, Romulus made an alliance with Tatius, King of the Sabines, at +the intercession of the matrons themselves who had been carried off. By +this compact he admitted the Sabines into the city, gave them a +participation in the religious ceremonies, and divided his power with +their king.</p> + +<p>VIII. But after the death of Tatius, the entire government was again +vested in the hands of Romulus, although, besides making Tatius his own +partner, he had also elected some of the chiefs of the Sabines into the +royal council, who on account of their affectionate regard for the +people were called <i>patres</i>, or fathers. He also divided the people into +three tribes, called after the name of Tatius, and his own name, and +that of Locumo, who had fallen as his ally in the Sabine war; and also +into thirty curiæ, designated by the names of those Sabine virgins, who, +after being carried off at the festivals, generously offered themselves +as the mediators of peace and coalition.</p> + +<p>But though these orders were established in the life of Tatius, yet, +after his death, Romulus reigned with still greater power by the counsel +and authority of the senate.</p> + +<p>IX. In this respect he approved and adopted the principle which Lycurgus +but little before had applied to the government of Lacedæmon; namely, +that the monarchical <a id="page-402"></a><span class="pgnum">402</span>authority and the royal power operate best in the +government of states when to this supreme authority is joined the +influence of the noblest of the citizens.</p> + +<p>Therefore, thus supported, and, as it were, propped up by this council +or senate, Romulus conducted many wars with the neighboring nations in a +most successful manner; and while he refused to take any portion of the +booty to his own palace, he did not cease to enrich the citizens. He +also cherished the greatest respect for that institution of hierarchical +and ecclesiastical ordinances which we still retain to the great benefit +of the Commonwealth; for in the very commencement of his government he +founded the city with religious rites, and in the institution of all +public establishments he was equally careful in attending to these +sacred ceremonials, and associated with himself on these occasions +priests that were selected from each of the tribes. He also enacted that +the nobles should act as patrons and protectors to the inferior +citizens, their natural clients and dependants, in their respective +districts, a measure the utility of which I shall afterward notice.—The +judicial punishments were mostly fines of sheep and oxen; for the +property of the people at that time consisted in their fields and +cattle, and this circumstance has given rise to the expressions which +still designate real and personal wealth. Thus the people were kept in +order rather by mulctations than by bodily inflictions.</p> + +<p>X. After Romulus had thus reigned thirty-seven years, and established +these two great supports of government, the hierarchy and the senate, +having disappeared in a sudden eclipse of the sun, he was thought worthy +of being added to the number of the Gods—an honor which no mortal man +ever was able to attain to but by a glorious pre-eminence of virtue. And +this circumstance was the more to be admired in the case of Romulus +because most of the great men that have been deified were so exalted to +celestial dignities by the people, in periods very little enlightened, +when fiction was easy and ignorance went hand-in-hand with credulity. +But with respect to Romulus we know that he lived less than six +centuries ago, at a time when science and literature were already +advanced, and had got rid of many of the ancient errors that had +<a id="page-403"></a><span class="pgnum">403</span>prevailed among less civilized peoples. For if, as we consider proved +by the Grecian annals, Rome was founded in the seventh Olympiad, the +life of Romulus was contemporary with that period in which Greece +already abounded in poets and musicians—an age when fables, except +those concerning ancient matters, received little credit.</p> + +<p>For, one hundred and eight years after the promulgation of the laws of +Lycurgus, the first Olympiad was established, which indeed, through a +mistake of names, some authors have supposed constituted, by Lycurgus +likewise. And Homer himself, according to the best computation, lived +about thirty years before the time of Lycurgus. We must conclude, +therefore, that Homer flourished very many years before the date of +Romulus. So that, as men had now become learned, and as the times +themselves were not destitute of knowledge, there was not much room left +for the success of mere fictions. Antiquity indeed has received fables +that have at times been sufficiently improbable: but this epoch, which +was already so cultivated, disdaining every fiction that was impossible, +rejected<a id="FNA-314"></a><a href="#FN-314"><sup>314</sup></a> * * * We may therefore, perhaps, attach some credit to +this story of Romulus’s immortality, since human life was at that time +experienced, cultivated, and instructed. And doubtless there was in him +such energy of genius and virtue that it is not altogether impossible to +believe the report of Proculus Julius, the husbandman, of that +glorification having befallen Romulus which for many ages we have denied +to less illustrious men. At all events, Proculus is reported to have +stated in the council, at the instigation of the senators, who wished to +free themselves from all suspicion of having been accessaries to the +death of Romulus, that he had seen him on that hill which is now called +the Quirinal, and that he had commanded him to inform the people that +they should build him a temple on that same hill, and offer him +sacrifices under the name of Quirinus.</p> + +<p>XI. You see, therefore, that the genius of this great man did not merely +establish the constitution of a new people, and then leave them, as it +were, crying in their cradle; but he still continued to superintend +their education <a id="page-404"></a><span class="pgnum">404</span>till they had arrived at an adult and wellnigh a mature +age.</p> + +<p>Then Lælius said: We now see, my Scipio, what you meant when you said +that you would adopt a new method of discussing the science of +government, different from any found in the writings of the Greeks. For +that prime master of philosophy, whom none ever surpassed in eloquence, +I mean Plato, chose an open plain on which to build an imaginary city +after his own taste—a city admirably conceived, as none can deny, but +remote enough from the real life and manners of men. Others, without +proposing to themselves any model or type of government whatever, have +argued on the constitutions and forms of states. You, on the contrary, +appear to be about to unite these two methods; for, as far as you have +gone, you seem to prefer attributing to others your discoveries, rather +than start new theories under your own name and authority, as Socrates +has done in the writings of Plato. Thus, in speaking of the site of +Rome, you refer to a systematic policy, to the acts of Romulus, which +were many of them the result of necessity or chance; and you do not +allow your discourse to run riot over many states, but you fix and +concentrate it on our own Commonwealth. Proceed, then, in the course you +have adopted; for I see that you intend to examine our other kings, in +your pursuit of a perfect republic, as it were.</p> + +<p>XII. Therefore, said Scipio, when that senate of Romulus which was +composed of the nobles, whom the king himself respected so highly that +he designated them <i>patres</i>, or fathers, and their children patricians, +attempted after the death of Romulus to conduct the government without a +king, the people would not suffer it, but, amidst their regret for +Romulus, desisted not from demanding a fresh monarch. The nobles then +prudently resolved to establish an interregnum—a new political form, +unknown to other nations. It was not without its use, however, since, +during the interval which elapsed before the definitive nomination of +the new king, the State was not left without a ruler, nor subjected too +long to the same governor, nor exposed to the fear lest some one, in +consequence of the prolonged enjoyment of power, should become more +unwilling <a id="page-405"></a><span class="pgnum">405</span>to lay it aside, or more powerful if he wished to secure it +permanently for himself. At which time this new nation discovered a +political provision which had escaped the Spartan Lycurgus, who +conceived that the monarch ought not to be elective—if indeed it is +true that this depended on Lycurgus—but that it was better for the +Lacedæmonians to acknowledge as their sovereign the next heir of the +race of Hercules, whoever he might be: but our Romans, rude as they +were, saw the importance of appointing a king, not for his family, but +for his virtue and experience.</p> + +<p>XIII. And fame having recognized these eminent qualities in Numa +Pompilius, the Roman people, without partiality for their own citizens, +committed itself, by the counsel of the senators, to a king of foreign +origin, and summoned this Sabine from the city of Cures to Rome, that he +might reign over them. Numa, although the people had proclaimed him king +in their Comitia Curiata, did nevertheless himself pass a Lex Curiata +respecting his own authority; and observing that the institutions of +Romulus had too much excited the military propensities of the people, he +judged it expedient to recall them from this habit of warfare by other +employments.</p> + +<p>XIV. And, in the first place, he divided severally among the citizens +the lands which Romulus had conquered, and taught them that even without +the aid of pillage and devastation they could, by the cultivation of +their own territories, procure themselves all kinds of commodities. And +he inspired them with the love of peace and tranquillity, in which faith +and justice are likeliest to flourish, and extended the most powerful +protection to the people in the cultivation of their fields and the +enjoyment of their produce. Pompilius likewise having created +hierarchical institutions of the highest class, added two augurs to the +old number. He intrusted the superintendence of the sacred rites to five +pontiffs, selected from the body of the nobles; and by those laws which +we still preserve on our monuments he mitigated, by religious +ceremonials, the minds that had been too long inflamed by military +enthusiasm and enterprise.</p> + +<p>He also established the Flamines and the Salian priests <a id="page-406"></a><span class="pgnum">406</span>and the Vestal +Virgins, and regulated all departments of our ecclesiastical policy with +the most pious care. In the ordinance of sacrifices, he wished that the +ceremonial should be very arduous and the expenditure very light. He +thus appointed many observances, whose knowledge is extremely important, +and whose expense far from burdensome. Thus in religious worship he +added devotion and removed costliness. He was also the first to +introduce markets, games, and the other usual methods of assembling and +uniting men. By these establishments, he inclined to benevolence and +amiability spirits whom the passion for war had rendered savage and +ferocious. Having thus reigned in the greatest peace and concord +thirty-nine years—for in dates we mainly follow our Polybius, than whom +no one ever gave more attention to the investigation of the history of +the times—he departed this life, having corroborated the two grand +principles of political stability, religion and clemency.</p> + +<p>XV. When Scipio had concluded these remarks, Is it not, said Manilius, a +true tradition which is current, that our king Numa was a disciple of +Pythagoras himself, or that at least he was a Pythagorean in his +doctrines? For I have often heard this from my elders, and we know that +it is the popular opinion; but it does not seem to be clearly proved by +the testimony of our public annals.</p> + +<p>Then Scipio replied: The supposition is false, my Manilius; it is not +merely a fiction, but a ridiculous and bungling one too; and we should +not tolerate those statements, even in fiction, relating to facts which +not only did not happen, but which never could have happened. For it was +not till the fourth year of the reign of Tarquinius Superbus that +Pythagoras is ascertained to have come to Sybaris, Crotona, and this +part of Italy. And the sixty-second Olympiad is the common date of the +elevation of Tarquin to the throne, and of the arrival of Pythagoras. +>From which it appears, when we calculate the duration of the reigns of +the kings, that about one hundred and forty years must have elapsed +after the death of Numa before Pythagoras first arrived in Italy. And +this fact, in the minds of men who have carefully studied the annals of +time, has never been at all doubted.</p> + +<p><a id="page-407"></a><span class="pgnum">407</span>O ye immortal Gods! said Manilius, how deep and how inveterate is this +error in the minds of men! However, it costs me no effort to concede +that our Roman sciences were not imported from beyond the seas, but that +they sprung from our own indigenous and domestic virtues.</p> + +<p>XVI. You will become still more convinced of this fact, said Africanus, +when tracing the progress of our Commonwealth as it became gradually +developed to its best and maturest condition. And you will find yet +further occasion to admire the wisdom of our ancestors on this very +account, since you will perceive, that even those things which they +borrowed from foreigners received a much higher improvement among us +than they possessed in the countries from whence they were imported +among us; and you will learn that the Roman people was aggrandized, not +by chance or hazard, but rather by counsel and discipline, to which +fortune indeed was by no means unfavorable.</p> + +<p>XVII. After the death of King Pompilius, the people, after a short +period of interregnum, chose Tullus Hostilius for their king, in the +Comitia Curiata; and Tullus, after Numa’s example, consulted the people +in their curias to procure a sanction for his government. His excellence +chiefly appeared in his military glory and great achievements in war. He +likewise, out of his military spoils, constructed and decorated the +House of Comitia and the Senate-house. He also settled the ceremonies of +the proclamation of hostilities, and consecrated their righteous +institution by the religious sanction of the Fetial priests, so that +every war which was not duly announced and declared might be adjudged +illegal, unjust, and impious. And observe how wisely our kings at that +time perceived that certain rights ought to be allowed to the people, of +which we shall have a good deal to say hereafter. Tullus did not even +assume the ensigns of royalty without the approbation of the people; and +when he appointed twelve lictors, with their axes to go before him<a id="FNA-315"></a><a href="#FN-315"><sup>315</sup></a> * * *</p> + +<p>XVIII. * * * [<i>Manilius</i>.] This Commonwealth of Rome, which you are so +eloquently describing, did not creep towards perfection; it rather flew +at once to the maturity of its grandeur.</p> + +<p><a id="page-408"></a><span class="pgnum">408</span>[<i>Scipio.</i>] After Tullus, Ancus Martius, a descendant of Numa by his +daughter, was appointed king by the people. He also procured the passing +of a law<a id="FNA-316"></a><a href="#FN-316"><sup>316</sup></a> through the Comitia Curiata respecting his government. +This king having conquered the Latins, admitted them to the rights of +citizens of Rome. He added to the city the Aventine and Cælian hills; he +distributed the lands he had taken in war; he bestowed on the public all +the maritime forests he had acquired; and he built the city Ostia, at +the mouth of the Tiber, and colonized it. When he had thus reigned +twenty-three years, he died.</p> + +<p>Then said Lælius: Doubtless this king deserves our praises, but the +Roman history is obscure. We possess, indeed, the name of this monarch’s +mother, but we know nothing of his father.</p> + +<p>It is so, said Scipio; but in those ages little more than the names of +the kings were recorded.</p> + +<p>XIX. For the first time at this period, Rome appears to have become more +learned by the study of foreign literature; for it was no longer a +little rivulet, flowing from Greece towards the walls of our city, but +an overflowing river of Grecian sciences and arts. This is generally +attributed to Demaratus, a Corinthian, the first man of his country in +reputation, honor, and wealth; who, not being able to bear the despotism +of Cypselus, tyrant of Corinth, fled with large treasures, and arrived +at Tarquinii, the most flourishing city in Etruria. There, understanding +that the domination of Cypselus was thoroughly established, he, like a +free and bold-hearted man, renounced his country, and was admitted into +the number of the citizens of Tarquinii, and fixed his residence in that +city. And having married a woman of the city, he instructed his two +sons, according to the method of Greek education, in all kinds of +sciences and arts.<a id="FNA-317"></a><a href="#FN-317"><sup>317</sup></a> * * *</p> + +<p>XX. * * * [One of these sons] was easily admitted to <a id="page-409"></a><span class="pgnum">409</span>the rights of +citizenship at Rome; and on account of his accomplished manners and +learning, he became a favorite of our king Ancus to such a degree that +he was a partner in all his counsels, and was looked upon almost as his +associate in the government. He, besides, possessed wonderful +affability, and was very kind in assistance, support, protection, and +even gifts of money, to the citizens.</p> + +<p>When, therefore, Ancus died, the people by their unanimous suffrages +chose for their king this Lucius Tarquinius (for he had thus transformed +the Greek name of his family, that he might seem in all respects to +imitate the customs of his adopted countrymen). And when he, too, had +procured the passing of a law respecting his authority, he commenced his +reign by doubling the original number of the senators. The ancient +senators he called patricians of the major families (<i>patres majorum +gentium</i>), and he asked their votes first; and those new senators whom +he himself had added, he entitled patricians of minor families. After +this, he established the order of knights, on the plan which we maintain +to this day. He would not, however, change the denomination of the +Tatian, Rhamnensian, and Lucerian orders, though he wished to do so, +because Attus Nævius, an augur of the highest reputation, would not +sanction it. And, indeed, I am aware that the Corinthians were +remarkably attentive to provide for the maintenance and good condition +of their cavalry by taxes levied on the inheritance of widows and +orphans. To the first equestrian orders Lucius also added new ones, +composing a body of three hundred knights. And this number he doubled, +after having conquered the Æquicoli, a large and ferocious people, and +dangerous enemies of the Roman State. Having likewise repulsed from our +walls an invasion of the Sabines, he routed them by the aid of his +cavalry, and subdued them. He also was the first person who instituted +the grand games which are now called the Roman Games. He fulfilled his +vow to build a temple to the all-good and all-powerful Jupiter in the +Capitol—a vow which he made during a battle in the Sabine war—and died +after a reign of thirty-eight years.</p> + +<p>XXI. Then Lælius said: All that you have been relating corroborates the +saying of Cato, that the constitution <a id="page-410"></a><span class="pgnum">410</span>of the Roman Commonwealth is not +the work of one man, or one age; for we can clearly see what a great +progress in excellent and useful institutions was continued under each +successive king. But we are now arrived at the reign of a monarch who +appears to me to have been of all our kings he who had the greatest +foresight in matters of political government.</p> + +<p>So it appears to me, said Scipio; for after Tarquinius Priscus comes +Servius Sulpicius, who was the first who is reported to have reigned +without an order from the people. He is supposed to have been the son of +a female slave at Tarquinii, by one of the soldiers or clients of King +Priscus; and as he was educated among the servants of this prince, and +waiting on him at table, the king soon observed the fire of his genius, +which shone forth even from his childhood, so skilful was he in all his +words and actions. Therefore, Tarquin, whose own children were then very +young, so loved Servius that he was very commonly believed to be his own +son, and he instructed him with the greatest care in all the sciences +with which he was acquainted, according to the most exact discipline of +the Greeks.</p> + +<p>But when Tarquin had perished by the plots of the sons of Ancus, and +Servius (as I have said) had begun to reign, not by the order, but yet +with the good-will and consent, of the citizens—because, as it was +falsely reported that Priscus was recovering from his wounds, Servius, +arrayed in the royal robes, delivered judgment, freed the debtors at his +own expense, and, exhibiting the greatest affability, announced that he +delivered judgment at the command of Priscus—he did not commit himself +to the senate; but, after Priscus was buried, he consulted the people +respecting his authority, and, being authorized by them to assume the +dominion, he procured a law to be passed through the Comitia Curiata, +confirming his government.</p> + +<p>He then, in the first place, avenged the injuries of the Etruscans by +arms. After which<a id="FNA-318"></a><a href="#FN-318"><sup>318</sup></a> * * *</p> + +<p>XXII. * * * he enrolled eighteen centuries of knights of the first +order. Afterward, having created a great number of knights from the +common mass of the people, he <a id="page-411"></a><span class="pgnum">411</span>divided the rest of the people into five +classes, distinguishing between the seniors and the juniors. These he so +constituted as to place the suffrages, not in the hands of the +multitude, but in the power of the men of property. And he took care to +make it a rule of ours, as it ought to be in every government, that the +greatest number should not have the greatest weight. You are well +acquainted with this institution, otherwise I would explain it to you; +but you are familiar with the whole system, and know how the centuries +of knights, with six suffrages, and the first class, comprising eighty +centuries, besides one other century which was allotted to the +artificers, on account of their utility to the State, produce +eighty-nine centuries. If to these there are added twelve centuries—for +that is the number of the centuries of the knights which +remain<a id="FNA-319"></a><a href="#FN-319"><sup>319</sup></a>—the entire force of the State is summed up; and the +arrangement is such that the remaining and far more numerous multitude, +which is distributed through the ninety-six last centuries, is not +deprived of a right of suffrage, which would be an arrogant measure; +nor, on the other hand, permitted to exert too great a preponderance in +the government, which would be dangerous.</p> + +<p>In this arrangement, Servius was very cautious in his choice of terms +and denominations. He called the rich <i>assidui</i>, because they afforded +pecuniary succor<a id="FNA-320"></a><a href="#FN-320"><sup>320</sup></a> to the State. As to those whoso fortune did not +exceed 1500 pence, or those who had nothing but their labor, he called +them <i>proletarii</i> classes, as if the State should expect from them a +hardy progeny<a id="FNA-321"></a><a href="#FN-321"><sup>321</sup></a> and population.</p> + +<p>Even a single one of the ninety-six last centuries contained numerically +more citizens than the entire first class. Thus, no one was excluded +from his right of voting, yet the preponderance of votes was secured to +those who had the deepest stake in the welfare of the State. Moreover, +with reference to the accensi, velati, trumpeters, hornblowers, +proletarii<a id="FNA-322"></a><a href="#FN-322"><sup>322</sup></a> * * *</p> + +<p>XXIII. * * * That that republic is arranged in the best manner which, +being composed in due proportions of those <a id="page-412"></a><span class="pgnum">412</span>three elements, the +monarchical, the aristocratical, and the democratic, does not by +punishment irritate a fierce and savage mind. * * * [A similar +institution prevailed at Carthage], which was sixty-five years more +ancient than Rome, since it was founded thirty-nine years before the +first Olympiad; and that most ancient law-giver Lycurgus made nearly the +same arrangements. Thus the system of regular subordination, and this +mixture of the three principal forms of government, appear to me common +alike to us and them. But there is a peculiar advantage in our +Commonwealth, than which nothing can be more excellent, which I shall +endeavor to describe as accurately as possible, because it is of such a +character that nothing analogous can be discovered in ancient states; +for these political elements which I have noticed were so united in the +constitutions of Rome, of Sparta, and of Carthage, that they were not +counterbalanced by any modifying power. For in a state in which one man +is invested with a perpetual domination, especially of the monarchical +character, although there be a senate in it, as there was in Rome under +the kings, and in Sparta, by the laws of Lycurgus, or even where the +people exercise a sort of jurisdiction, as they used in the days of our +monarchy, the title of king must still be pre-eminent; nor can such a +state avoid being, and being called, a kingdom. And this kind of +government is especially subject to frequent revolutions, because the +fault of a single individual is sufficient to precipitate it into the +most pernicious disasters.</p> + +<p>In itself, however, royalty is not only not a reprehensible form of +government, but I do not know whether it is not far preferable to all +other simple constitutions, if I approved of any simple constitution +whatever. But this preference applies to royalty so long only as it +maintains its appropriate character; and this character provides that +one individual’s perpetual power, and justice, and universal wisdom +should regulate the safety, equality, and tranquillity of the whole +people. But many privileges must be wanting to communities that live +under a king; and, in the first place, liberty, which does not consist +in slavery to a just master, but in slavery to no master at all<a id="FNA-323"></a><a href="#FN-323"><sup>323</sup></a> * * *</p> + +<p><a id="page-413"></a><span class="pgnum">413</span>XXIV. * * * [Let us now pass on to the reign of the seventh and last +king of Rome, Tarquinius Superbus.] And even this unjust and cruel +master had good fortune for his companion for some time in all his +enterprises. For he subdued all Latium; he captured Suessa Pometia, a +powerful and wealthy city, and, becoming possessed of an immense spoil +of gold and silver, he accomplished his father’s vow by the building of +the Capitol. He established colonies, and, faithful to the institutions +of those from whom he sprung, he sent magnificent presents, as tokens of +gratitude for his victories, to Apollo at Delphi.</p> + +<p>XXV. Here begins the revolution of our political system of government, +and I must beg your attention to its natural course and progression. For +the grand point of political science, the object of our discourses, is +to know the march and the deviations of governments, that when we are +acquainted with the particular courses and inclinations of +constitutions, we may be able to restrain them from their fatal +tendencies, or to oppose adequate obstacles to their decline and fall.</p> + +<p>For this Tarquinius Superbus, of whom I am speaking, being first of all +stained with the blood of his admirable predecessor on the throne, could +not be a man of sound conscience and mind; and as he feared himself the +severest punishment for his enormous crime, he sought his protection in +making himself feared. Then, in the glory of his victories and his +treasures, he exulted in insolent pride, and could neither regulate his +own manners nor the passions of the members of his family.</p> + +<p>When, therefore, his eldest son had offered violence to Lucretia, +daughter of Tricipitinus and wife of Collatinus, and this chaste and +noble lady had stabbed herself to death on account of the injury she +could not survive—then a man eminent for his genius and virtue, Lucius +Brutus, dashed from his fellow-citizens this unjust yoke of odious +servitude; and though he was but a private man, he sustained the +government of the entire Commonwealth, and was the first that taught the +people in this State that no one was a private man when the preservation +of our liberties was concerned. Beneath his authority and command our +city rose against tyranny, and, stirred by the recent <a id="page-414"></a><span class="pgnum">414</span>grief of the +father and relatives of Lucretia, and with the recollections of +Tarquin’s haughtiness, and the numberless crimes of himself and his +sons, they pronounced sentence of banishment against him and his +children, and the whole race of the Tarquins.</p> + +<p>XXVI. Do you not observe, then, how the king sometimes degenerates into +the despot, and how, by the fault of one individual, a form of +government originally good is abused to the worst of purposes? Here is a +specimen of that despot over the people whom the Greeks denominate a +tyrant. For, according to them, a king is he who, like a father, +consults the interests of his people, and who preserves those whom he is +set over in the very best condition of life. This indeed is, as I have +said, an excellent form of government, yet still liable, and, as it +were, inclined, to a pernicious abuse. For as soon as a king assumes an +unjust and despotic power, he instantly becomes a tyrant, than which +nothing baser or fouler, than which no imaginable animal can be more +detestable to gods or men; for though in form a man, he surpasses the +most savage monsters in ferocious cruelty. For who can justly call him a +human being, who admits not between himself and his fellow-countrymen, +between himself and the whole human race, any communication of justice, +any association of kindness? But we shall find some fitter occasion of +speaking of the evils of tyranny when the subject itself prompts us to +declare against them who, even in a state already liberated, have +affected these despotic insolencies.</p> + +<p>XXVII. Such is the first origin and rise of a tyrant. For this was the +name by which the Greeks choose to designate an unjust king; and by the +title king our Romans universally understand every man who exercises +over the people a perpetual and undivided domination. Thus Spurius +Cassius, and Marcus Manlius, and Spurius Mælius, are said to have wished +to seize upon the kingly power, and lately [Tiberius Gracchus incurred +the same accusation].<a id="FNA-324"></a><a href="#FN-324"><sup>324</sup></a> * * *</p> + +<p>XXVIII. * * * [Lycurgus, in Sparta, formed, under the name of Elders,] a +small council consisting of twenty-eight members only; to these he +allotted the supreme legislative <a id="page-415"></a><span class="pgnum">415</span>authority, while the king held the +supreme executive authority. Our Romans, emulating his example, and +translating his terms, entitled those whom he had called Elders, +Senators, which, as we have said, was done by Romulus in reference to +the elect patricians. In this constitution, however, the power, the +influence, and name of the king is still pre-eminent. You may +distribute, indeed, some show of power to the people, as Lycurgus and +Romulus did, but you inflame them, with the thirst of liberty by +allowing them even the slightest taste of its sweetness; and still their +hearts will be overcast with alarm lest their king, as often happens, +should become unjust. The prosperity of the people, therefore, can be +little better than fragile, when placed at the disposal of any one +individual, and subjected to his will and caprices.</p> + +<p>XXIX. Thus the first example, prototype, and original of tyranny has +been discovered by us in the history of our own Roman State, religiously +founded by Romulus, without applying to the theoretical Commonwealth +which, according to Plato’s recital, Socrates was accustomed to describe +in his peripatetic dialogues. We have observed Tarquin, not by the +usurpation of any new power, but by the unjust abuse of the power which +he already possessed, overturn the whole system of our monarchical +constitution.</p> + +<p>Let us oppose to this example of the tyrant another, a virtuous +king—wise, experienced, and well informed respecting the true interest +and dignity of the citizens—a guardian, as it were, and superintendent +of the Commonwealth; for that is a proper name for every ruler and +governor of a state. And take you care to recognize such a man when you +meet him, for he is the man who, by counsel and exertion, can best +protect the nation. And as the name of this man has not yet been often +mentioned in our discourse, and as the character of such a man must be +often alluded to in our future conversations, [I shall take an early +opportunity of describing it.]<a id="FNA-325"></a><a href="#FN-325"><sup>325</sup></a> * * *</p> + +<p>XXX. * * * [Plato has chosen to suppose a territory and establishments +of citizens, whose fortunes] were precisely equal. And he has given us a +description of a city, rather to be desired than expected; and he has +made out <a id="page-416"></a><span class="pgnum">416</span>not such a one as can really exist, but one in which the +principles of political affairs may be discerned. But for me, if I can +in any way accomplish it, while I adopt the same general principles as +Plato, I am seeking to reduce them to experience and practice, not in +the shadow and picture of a state, but in a real and actual +Commonwealth, of unrivalled amplitude and power; in order to be able to +point out, with the most graphic precision, the causes of every +political good and social evil.</p> + +<p>For after Rome had flourished more than two hundred and forty years +under her kings and interreges, and after Tarquin was sent into +banishment, the Roman people conceived as much detestation of the name +of king as they had once experienced regret at the death, or rather +disappearance, of Romulus. Therefore, as in the first instance they +could hardly bear the idea of losing a king, so in the latter, after the +expulsion of Tarquin, they could not endure to hear the name of a +king.<a id="FNA-326"></a><a href="#FN-326"><sup>326</sup></a> * * *</p> + +<p>XXXI. * * * Therefore, when that admirable constitution of Romulus had +lasted steadily about two hundred and forty years. * * * The whole of +that law was abolished. In this humor, our ancestors banished +Collatinus, in spite of his innocence, because of the suspicion that +attached to his family, and all the rest of the Tarquins, on account of +the unpopularity of their name. In the same humor, Valerius Publicola +was the first to lower the fasces before the people, when he spoke in +the assembly of the people. He also had the materials of his house +conveyed to the foot of Mount Velia, having observed that the +commencement of his edifice on the summit of this hill, where King +Tullius had once dwelt, excited the suspicions of the people.</p> + +<p>It was the same man, who in this respect pre-eminently deserved the name +of Publicola, who carried in favor of the people the first law received +in the Comitia Centuriata, that no magistrate should sentence to death +or scourging a Roman citizen who appealed from his authority to the +people. And the pontifical books attest that the right of appeal had +existed, even against the decision of the kings. Our augural books +affirm the same thing. And the Twelve <a id="page-417"></a><span class="pgnum">417</span>Tables prove, by a multitude of +laws, that there was a right of appeal from every judgment and penalty. +Besides, the historical fact that the decemviri who compiled the laws +were created with the privilege of judging without appeal, sufficiently +proves that the other magistrates had not the same power. And a consular +law, passed by Lucius Valerius Politus and Marcus Horatius Barbatus, men +justly popular for promoting union and concord, enacted that no +magistrate should thenceforth be appointed with authority to judge +without appeal; and the Portian laws, the work of three citizens of the +name of Portius, as you are aware, added nothing new to this edict but a +penal sanction.</p> + +<p>Therefore Publicola, having promulgated this law in favor of appeal to +the people, immediately ordered the axes to be removed from the fasces, +which the lictors carried before the consuls, and the next day appointed +Spurius Lucretius for his colleague. And as the new consul was the +oldest of the two, Publicola ordered his lictors to pass over to him; +and he was the first to establish the rule, that each of the consuls +should be preceded by the lictors in alternate months, that there should +be no greater appearance of imperial insignia among the free people than +they had witnessed in the days of their kings. Thus, in my opinion, he +proved himself no ordinary man, as, by so granting the people a moderate +degree of liberty, he more easily maintained the authority of the +nobles.</p> + +<p>Nor is it without reason that I have related to you these ancient and +almost obsolete events; but I wished to adduce my instances of men and +circumstances from illustrious persons and times, as it is to such +events that the rest of my discourse will be directed.</p> + +<p>XXXII. At that period, then, the senate preserved the Commonwealth in +such a condition that though the people were really free, yet few acts +were passed by the people, but almost all, on the contrary, by the +authority, customs, and traditions of the senate. And over all the +consuls exercised a power—in time, indeed, only annual, but in nature +and prerogative completely royal.</p> + +<p>The consuls maintained, with the greatest energy, that rule which so +much conduces to the power of our nobles and great men, that the acts of +the commons of the people <a id="page-418"></a><span class="pgnum">418</span>shall not be binding, unless the authority of +the patricians has approved them. About the same period, and scarcely +ten years after the first consuls, we find the appointment of the +dictator in the person of Titus Lartius. And this new kind of +power—namely, the dictatorship—appears exceedingly similar to the +monarchical royalty. All his power, however, was vested in the supreme +authority of the senate, to which the people deferred; and in these +times great exploits were performed in war by brave men invested with +the supreme command, whether dictators or consuls.</p> + +<p>XXXIII. But as the nature of things necessarily brought it to pass that +the people, once freed from its kings, should arrogate to itself more +and more authority, we observe that after a short interval of only +sixteen years, in the consulship of Postumus Cominius and Spurius +Cassius, they attained their object; an event explicable, perhaps, on no +distinct principle, but, nevertheless, in a manner independent of any +distinct principle. For recollect what I said in commencing our +discourse, that if there exists not in the State a just distribution and +subordination of rights, offices, and prerogatives, so as to give +sufficient domination to the chiefs, sufficient authority to the counsel +of the senators, and sufficient liberty to the people, this form of the +government cannot be durable.</p> + +<p>For when the excessive debts of the citizens had thrown the State into +disorder, the people first retired to Mount Sacer, and next occupied +Mount Aventine. And even the rigid discipline of Lycurgus could not +maintain those restraints in the case of the Greeks. For in Sparta +itself, under the reign of Theopompus, the five magistrates whom they +term Ephori, and in Crete ten whom they entitle Cosmi, were established +in opposition to the royal power, just as tribunes were added among us +to counterbalance the consular authority.</p> + +<p>XXXIV. There might have been a method, indeed, by which our ancestors +could have been relieved from the pressure of debt, a method with which +Solon the Athenian, who lived at no very distant period before, was +acquainted, and which our senate did not neglect when, in the +indignation which the odious avarice of one individual excited, <a id="page-419"></a><span class="pgnum">419</span>all the +bonds of the citizens were cancelled, and the right of arrest for a +while suspended. In the same way, when the plebeians were oppressed by +the weight of the expenses occasioned by public misfortunes, a cure and +remedy were sought for the sake of public security. The senate, however, +having forgotten their former decision, gave an advantage to the +democracy; for, by the creation of two tribunes to appease the sedition +of the people, the power and authority of the senate were diminished; +which, however, still remained dignified and august, inasmuch as it was +still composed of the wisest and bravest men, who protected their +country both with their arms and with their counsels; whose authority +was exceedingly strong and flourishing, because in honor they were as +much before their fellow-citizens as they were inferior in +luxuriousness, and, as a general rule, not superior to them in wealth. +And their public virtues were the more agreeable to the people, because +even in private matters they were ready to serve every citizen, by their +exertions, their counsels, and their liberality.</p> + +<p>XXXV. Such was the situation of the Commonwealth when the quæstor +impeached Spurius Cassius of being so much emboldened by the excessive +favor of the people as to endeavor to make himself master of monarchical +power. And, as you have heard, his own father, having said that he had +found that his son was really guilty of this crime, condemned him to +death at the instance of the people. About fifty-four years after the +first consulate, Spurius Tarpeius and Aulus Aternius very much gratified +the people by proposing, in the Comitia Centuriata, the substitution of +fines instead of corporal punishments. Twenty years afterward, Lucius +Papirius and Publius Pinarius, the censors, having by a strict levy of +fines confiscated to the State the entire flocks and herds of many +private individuals, a light tax on the cattle was substituted for the +law of fines in the consulship of Caius Julius and Publius Papirius.</p> + +<p>XXXVI. But, some years previous to this, at a period when the senate +possessed the supreme influence, and the people were submissive and +obedient, a new system was adopted. At that time both the consuls and +tribunes of <a id="page-420"></a><span class="pgnum">420</span>the people abdicated their magistracies, and the decemviri +were appointed, who were invested with great authority, from which there +was no appeal whatever, so as to exercise the chief domination, and to +compile the laws. After having composed, with much wisdom and equity, +the Ten Tables of laws, they nominated as their successors in the +ensuing year other decemviri, whose good faith and justice do not +deserve equal praise. One member of this college, however, merits our +highest commendation. I allude to Caius Julius, who declared respecting +the nobleman Lucius Sestius, in whose chamber a dead body had been +exhumed under his own eyes, that though as decemvir he held the highest +power without appeal, he still required bail, because he was unwilling +to neglect that admirable law which permitted no court but the Comitia +Centuriata to pronounce final sentence on the life of a Roman citizen.</p> + +<p>XXXVII. A third year followed under the authority of the same decemvirs, +and still they were not disposed to appoint their successors. In a +situation of the Commonwealth like this, which, as I have often +repeated, could not be durable, because it had not an equal operation +with respect to all the ranks of the citizens, the whole public power +was lodged in the hands of the chiefs and decemvirs of the highest +nobility, without the counterbalancing authority of the tribunes of the +people, without the sanction of any other magistracies, and without +appeal to the people in the case of a sentence of death or scourging.</p> + +<p>Thus, out of the injustice of these men, there was suddenly produced a +great revolution, which changed the entire condition of the government, +or they added two tables of very tyrannical laws, and though matrimonial +alliances had always been permitted, even with foreigners, they forbade, +by the most abominable and inhuman edict, that any marriages should take +place between the nobles and the commons—an order which was afterward +abrogated by the decree of Canuleius. Besides, they introduced into all +their political measures corruption, cruelty, and avarice. And indeed +the story is well known, and celebrated in many literary compositions, +that a certain Decimus Virginius was obliged, on account of the +libidinous violence of one of these decemvirs, to stab his virgin +daughter <a id="page-421"></a><span class="pgnum">421</span>in the midst of the forum. Then, when he in his desperation +had fled to the Roman army which was encamped on Mount Algidum, the +soldiers abandoned the war in which they were engaged, and took +possession of the Sacred Mount, as they had done before on a similar +occasion, and next invested Mount Aventine in their arms.<a id="FNA-327"></a><a href="#FN-327"><sup>327</sup></a> Our +ancestors knew how to prove most thoroughly, and to retain most wisely. +* * *</p> + +<p>XXXVIII. And when Scipio had spoken in this manner, and all his friends +were awaiting in silence the rest of his discourse, then said Tubero: +Since these men who are older than I, my Scipio, make no fresh demands +on you, I shall take the liberty to tell you what I particularly wish +you would explain in your subsequent remarks.</p> + +<p>Do so, said Scipio, and I shall be glad to hear.</p> + +<p>Then Tubero said: You appear to me to have spoken a panegyric on our +Commonwealth of Rome exclusively, though Lælius requested your views not +only of the government of our own State, but of the policy of states in +general. I have not, therefore, yet sufficiently learned from your +discourse, with respect to that mixed form of government you most +approve, by what discipline, moral and legal, we may be best able to +establish and maintain it.</p> + +<p>XXXIX. Africanus replied: I think that we shall soon find an occasion +better adapted to the discussion you have proposed, respecting the +constitution and conservatism of states. As to the best form of +government, I think on this point I have sufficiently answered the +question of Lælius. For in answering him, I, in the first place, +specifically noticed the three simple forms of government—monarchy, +aristocracy, and democracy; and the three vicious constitutions contrary +to them, into which they often degenerate; and I said that none of these +forms, taken separately, was absolutely good; but I described as +preferable to either of them that mixed government which is composed of +a proper amalgamation of these simple ingredients. If I have since +depicted our own Roman constitution as an example, it was not in order +to define the very best form of government, for that may be understood +without an example; but I wished, in the exhibition of a <a id="page-422"></a><span class="pgnum">422</span>mighty +commonwealth actually in existence, to render distinct and visible what +reason and discourse would vainly attempt to display without the +assistance of experimental illustration. Yet, if you still require me to +describe the best form of government, independent of all particular +examples, we must consult that exactly proportioned and graduated image +of government which nature herself presents to her investigators. Since +you * * * this model of a city and people<a id="FNA-328"></a><a href="#FN-328"><sup>328</sup></a> * * *</p> + +<p>XL. * * * which I also am searching for, and which I am anxious to +arrive at.</p> + +<p><i>Lælius.</i> You mean the model that would be approved by the truly +accomplished politician?</p> + +<p><i>Scipio.</i> The same.</p> + +<p><i>Lælius.</i> You have plenty of fair patterns even now before you, if you +would but begin with yourself.</p> + +<p>Then Scipio said: I wish I could find even one such, even in the entire +senate. For he is really a wise politician who, as we have often seen in +Africa, while seated on a huge and unsightly elephant, can guide and +rule the monster, and turn him whichever way he likes by a slight +admonition, without any actual exertion.</p> + +<p><i>Lælius.</i> I recollect, and when I was your lieutenant I often saw, one +of these drivers.</p> + +<p><i>Scipio.</i> Thus an Indian or Carthaginian regulates one of these huge +animals, and renders him docile and familiar with human manners. But the +genius which resides in the mind of man, by whatever name it may be +called, is required to rein and tame a monster far more multiform and +intractable, whenever it can accomplish it, which indeed is seldom. It +is necessary to hold in with a strong hand that ferocious<a id="FNA-329"></a><a href="#FN-329"><sup>329</sup></a> * * *</p> + +<p>XLI. * * * [beast, denominated the mob, which thirsts after blood] to +such a degree that it can scarcely be sated with the most hideous +massacres of men. * * *</p> + +<div class="unclear"> +<p>But to a man who is greedy, and grasping, and lustful, and fond of + wallowing in voluptuousness.</p> + +<p><a id="page-423"></a><span class="pgnum">423</span>The fourth kind of anxiety is that which is prone to mourning and + melancholy, and which is constantly worrying itself.</p> + +<p class="comment">[<i>The next paragraph, “Esse autem angores,” etc., is wholly + unintelligible without the context.</i>]</p> + +<p>As an unskilful charioteer is dragged from his chariot, covered + with dirt, bruised, and lacerated.</p> + +<p>The excitements of men’s minds are like a chariot, with horses + harnessed to it; in the proper management of which, the chief duty + of the driver consists in knowing his road: and if he keeps the + road, then, however rapidly he proceeds, he will encounter no + obstacles; but if he quits the proper track, then, although he may + be going gently and slowly, he will either be perplexed on rugged + ground, or fall over some steep place, or at least he will be + carried where he has no need to go.<a id="FNA-330"></a><a href="#FN-330"><sup>330</sup></a></p> +</div> + +<p>XLII. * * * can be said.</p> + +<p>Then Lælius said: I now see the sort of politician you require, on whom +you would impose the office and task of government, which is what I +wished to understand.</p> + +<p>He must be an almost unique specimen, said Africanus, for the task which +I set him comprises all others. He must never cease from cultivating and +studying himself, that he may excite others to imitate him, and become, +through the splendor of his talents and enterprises, a living mirror to +his countrymen. For as in flutes and harps, and in all vocal +performances, a certain unison and harmony must be preserved amidst the +distinctive tones, which cannot be broken or violated without offending +experienced ears; and as this concord and delicious harmony is produced +by the exact gradation and modulation of dissimilar notes; even so, by +means of the just apportionment of the highest, middle, and lower +classes, the State is maintained in concord and peace by the harmonic +subordination of its discordant elements: and thus, that which is by +musicians called harmony in song answers and corresponds to what we call +concord in the State—concord, the strongest and loveliest bond of +security in every commonwealth, being always accompanied by justice and +equity.</p> + +<div class="unclear"> + +<p>XLIII. And after this, when Scipio had discussed with considerable +breadth of principle and felicity of illustration the great advantage +that justice is to a state, and the great injury which would arise if it +were <a id="page-424"></a><span class="pgnum">424</span>wanting, Pilus, one of those who were present at the discussion, +took up the matter and demanded that this question should be argued more +carefully, and that something more should be said about justice, on +account of a sentiment that was now obtaining among people in general, +that political affairs could not be wholly carried on without some +disregard of justice.</p> + +</div> + +<p>XLIV. * * * to be full of justice.</p> + +<p>Then Scipio replied: I certainly think so. And I declare to you that I +consider that all I have spoken respecting the government of the State +is worth nothing, and that it will be useless to proceed further, unless +I can prove that it is a false assertion that political business cannot +be conducted without injustice and corruption; and, on the other hand, +establish as a most indisputable fact that without the strictest justice +no government whatever can last long.</p> + +<p>But, with your permission, we have had discussion enough for the day. +The rest—and much remains for our consideration—we will defer till +to-morrow. When they had all agreed to this, the debate of the day was +closed.</p> + + <hr/> + + + + +<h3>INTRODUCTION TO THE THIRD BOOK,</h3> + +<h4>BY THE ORIGINAL TRANSLATOR.</h4> + + +<p class="intro"><span class="first">Cicero</span> here enters on the grand question of Political Justice, and +endeavors to evince throughout the absolute verity of that inestimable +proverb, “Honesty is the best policy,” in all public as well as in all +private affairs. St. Augustine, in his City of God, has given the +following analysis of this magnificent disquisition:</p> + +<p class="intro">“In the third book of Cicero’s Commonwealth” (says he) “the question of +Political Justice is most earnestly discussed. Philus is appointed to +support, as well as he can, the sophistical arguments of those who think +that political government cannot be carried on without the aid of +injustice and chicanery. He denies holding any such opinion himself; +yet, in order to exhibit the truth more vividly through the force of +contrast, he pleads with the utmost ingenuity the cause of injustice +against justice; and endeavors to show, by plausible examples and +specious dialectics, that injustice is as useful to a statesman as +justice would be injurious. Then Lælius, at the general request, takes +up the plea for justice, and maintains with all his eloquence that +nothing could be so ruinous to states as injustice and dishonesty, and +that <a id="page-425"></a><span class="pgnum">425</span>without a supreme justice, no political government could expect a +long duration. This point being sufficiently proved, Scipio returns to +the principal discussion. He reproduces and enforces the short +definition that he had given of a commonwealth—that it consisted in the +welfare of the entire people, by which word ‘people’ he does not mean +the mob, but the community, bound together by the sense of common rights +and mutual benefits. He notices how important such just definitions are +in all debates whatever, and draws this conclusion from the preceding +arguments—that the Commonwealth is the common welfare whenever it is +swayed with justice and wisdom, whether it be subordinated to a king, an +aristocracy, or a democracy. But if the king be unjust, and so becomes a +tyrant; and the aristocracy unjust, which makes them a faction; or the +democrats unjust, and so degenerate into revolutionists and +destructives—then not only the Commonwealth is corrupted, but in fact +annihilated. For it can be no longer the common welfare when a tyrant or +a faction abuse it; and the people itself is no longer the people when +it becomes unjust, since it is no longer a community associated by a +sense of right and utility, according to the definition.”—<i>Aug. Civ. +Dei.</i> 3-21.</p> + +<p class="intro">This book is of the utmost importance to statesmen, as it serves to +neutralize the sophistries of Machiavelli, which are still repeated in +many cabinets.</p> + +<hr class="tiny"/> + + +<h3>BOOK III.</h3> + + +<p>I. * * *<a id="FNA-331"></a><a href="#FN-331"><sup>331</sup></a> Cicero, in the third book of his treatise On a +Commonwealth, says that nature has treated man less like a mother than a +step-dame, for she has cast him into mortal life with a body naked, +fragile, and infirm, and with a mind agitated by troubles, depressed by +fears, broken by labors, and exposed to passions. In this mind, however, +there lies hidden, and, as it were, buried, a certain divine spark of +genius and intellect.</p> + +<p>Though man is born a frail and powerless being, nevertheless he is safe +from all animals destitute of voice; and at the same time those other +animals of greater strength, although they bravely endure the violence +of weather, cannot be safe from man. And the result is, that reason does +more for man than nature does for brutes; since, in the latter, neither +the greatness of their strength nor the firmness of their bodies can +save them from being oppressed by us, and made subject to our power. * * *</p> + +<p><a id="page-426"></a><span class="pgnum">426</span>Plato returned thanks to nature that he had been born a man.</p> + +<p>II. * * * aiding our slowness by carriages, and when it had taught men +to utter the elementary and confused sounds of unpolished expression, +articulated and distinguished them into their proper classes, and, as +their appropriate signs, attached certain words to certain things, and +thus associated, by the most delightful bond of speech, the once divided +races of men.</p> + +<p>And by a similar intelligence, the inflections of the voice, which +appeared infinite, are, by the discovery of a few alphabetic characters, +all designated and expressed; by which we maintain converse with our +absent friends, by which also indications of our wishes and monuments of +past events are preserved. Then came the use of numbers—a thing +necessary to human life, and at the same time immutable and eternal; a +science which first urged us to raise our views to heaven, and not gaze +without an object on the motions of the stars, and the distribution of +days and nights.</p> + +<p>III. * * *<a id="FNA-332"></a><a href="#FN-332"><sup>332</sup></a> [Then appeared the sages of philosophy], whose minds +took a higher flight, and who were able to conceive and to execute +designs worthy of the gifts of the Gods. Wherefore let those men who +have left us sublime essays on the principles of living be regarded as +great men—which indeed they are—as learned men, as masters of truth +and virtue; provided that these principles of civil government, this +system of governing people, whether it be a thing discovered by men who +have lived amidst a variety of political events, or one discussed amidst +their opportunities of literary tranquillity, is remembered to be, as +indeed it is, a thing by no means to be despised, being one which causes +in first-rate minds, as we not unfrequently see, an incredible and +almost divine virtue. And when to these high faculties of soul, received +from nature and expanded by social institutions, a politician adds +learning and extensive information concerning things in general, like +those illustrious personages who conduct the dialogue in the present +treatise, none will refuse to confess the superiority of such persons to +all others; for, in fact, what <a id="page-427"></a><span class="pgnum">427</span>can be more admirable than the study and +practice of the grand affairs of state, united to a literary taste and a +familiarity with the liberal arts? or what can we imagine more perfect +than a Scipio, a Lælius, or a Philus, who, not to omit anything which +belonged to the most perfect excellence of the greatest men, joined to +the examples of our ancestors and the traditions of our countrymen the +foreign philosophy of Socrates?</p> + +<p>Wherefore he who had both the desire and the power to acquaint himself +thoroughly both with the customs and the learning of his ancestors +appears to me to have attained to the very highest glory and honor. But +if we cannot combine both, and are compelled to select one of these two +paths to wisdom—though to some people the tranquil life spent in the +research of literature and arts may appear to be the most happy and +delectable—yet, doubtless, the science of politics is more laudable and +illustrious, for in this political field of exertion our greatest men +have reaped their honors, like the invincible Curius,</p> + +<div class="poem"> +<p>Whom neither gold nor iron could subdue.</p> +</div> + +<p>IV. * * *<a id="FNA-333"></a><a href="#FN-333"><sup>333</sup></a> that wisdom existed still. There existed this general +difference between these two classes, that among the one the development +of the principles of nature is the subject of their study and eloquence, +and among the other national laws and institutions form the principal +topics of investigation.</p> + +<p>In honor of our country, we may assert that she has produced within +herself a great number, I will not say of sages (since philosophy is so +jealous of this name), but of men worthy of the highest celebrity, +because by them the precepts and discoveries of the sages have been +carried out into actual practice. And, moreover, though there have +existed, and still do exist, many great and glorious empires, yet since +the noblest masterpiece of genius in the world is the establishment of a +state and commonwealth which shall be a lasting one, even if we reckon +but a single legislator for each empire, the number of these excellent +men will appear very numerous. To be convinced of this, we have only to +turn our eyes on any nation of Italy, Latium, the <a id="page-428"></a><span class="pgnum">428</span>Sabines, the +Volscians, the Samnites, or the Etrurians, and then direct our attention +to that mighty nation of the Greeks, and then to the Assyrians, +Persians, and Carthaginians, and<a id="FNA-334"></a><a href="#FN-334"><sup>334</sup></a> * * *</p> + +<p>V. * * * [Scipio and his friends having again assembled, Scipio spoke as +follows: In our last conversation, I promised to prove that honesty is +the best policy in all states and commonwealths whatsoever. But if I am +to plead in favor of strict honesty and justice in all public affairs, +no less than in private, I must request Philus, or some one else, to +take up the advocacy of the other side; the truth will then become more +manifest, from the collision of opposite arguments, as we see every day +exemplified at the Bar.]</p> + +<p>And Philus replied: In good truth, you have allotted me a very +creditable cause when you wish me to undertake the defence of vice.</p> + +<p>Perhaps, said Lælius, you are afraid, lest, in reproducing the ordinary +objections made to justice in politics, you should seem to express your +own sentiments; though you are universally respected as an almost unique +example of the ancient probity and good faith; nor is it unknown how +familiar you are with the lawyer-like habit of disputing on both sides +of a question, because you think that this is the best way of getting at +the truth.</p> + +<p>And Philus said: Very well; I obey you, and wilfully, with my eyes open, +I will undertake this dirty business; because, since those who seek for +gold do not flinch at the sight of the mud, so we who are searching for +justice, which is far more precious than gold, are bound to shrink from +no annoyance. And I wish, as I am about to make use of the antagonist +arguments of a foreigner, I might also employ a foreign language. The +pleas, therefore, now to be urged by Lucius Furius Philus are those +[once employed by] the Greek Carneades, a man who was accustomed to +express whatever [served his turn].<a id="FNA-335"></a><a href="#FN-335"><sup>335</sup></a> * * *<a id="FNA-336"></a><a href="#FN-336"><sup>336</sup></a><a id="page-429"></a><span class="pgnum">429</span>Let it be understood, +therefore, that I by no means express my own sentiments, but those of +Carneades, in order that you may refute this philosopher, who was wont +to turn the best causes into joke, through the mere wantonness of wit.</p> + +<div class="unclear"> +<p>VI. He was a philosopher of the Academic School; and if any one is + ignorant of his great power, and eloquence, and acuteness in + arguing, he may learn it from the mention made of him by Cicero or + by Lucilius, when Neptune, discoursing on a very difficult subject, + declares that it cannot be explained, not even if hell were to + restore Carneades himself for the purpose. This philosopher, having + been sent by the Athenians to Rome as an ambassador, discussed the + subject of justice very amply in the hearing of Galba and Cato the + Censor, who were the greatest orators of the day. And the next day + he overturned all his arguments by others of a contrary tendency, + and disparaged justice, which the day before he had extolled; + speaking not indeed with the gravity of a philosopher whose wisdom + ought to be steady, and whose opinions unchangeable, but in a kind + of rhetorical exercise of arguing on each side—a practice which he + was accustomed to adopt, in order to be able to refute others who + were asserting anything. The arguments by which he disparaged + justice are mentioned by Lucius Furius in Cicero; I suppose, since + he was discussing the Commonwealth, in order to introduce a defence + and panegyric of that quality without which he did not think a + commonwealth could be administered. But Carneades, in order to + refute Aristotle and Plato, the advocates of justice, collected in + his first argument everything that was in the habit of being + advanced on behalf of justice, in order afterward to be able to + overturn it, as he did.</p> + +<p>VII. Many philosophers indeed, and especially Plato and Aristotle, + have spoken a great deal of justice, inculcating that virtue, and + extolling it with the highest praise, as giving to every one what + belongs to him, as preserving equity in all things, and urging that + while the other virtues are, as it were, silent and shut up, + justice is the only one which <a id="page-430"></a><span class="pgnum">430</span>is not absorbed in considerations of + self-interest, and which is not secret, but finds its whole field + for exercise out-of-doors, and is desirous of doing good and + serving as many people as possible; as if, forsooth, justice ought + to exist in judges only, and in men invested with a certain + authority, and not in every one! But there is no one, not even a + man of the lowest class, or a beggar, who is destitute of + opportunities of displaying justice. But because these philosophers + knew not what its essence was, or whence it proceeded, or what its + employment was, they attributed that first of all virtues, which is + the common good of all men, to a few only, and asserted that it + aimed at no advantage of its own, but was anxious only for that of + others. So it was well that Carneades, a man of the greatest genius + and acuteness, refuted their assertions, and overthrew that justice + which had no firm foundation; not because he thought justice itself + deserving of blame, but in order to show that those its defenders + had brought forward no trustworthy or strong arguments in its + behalf.</p> + +<p>Justice looks out-of-doors, and is prominent and conspicuous in its + whole essence.</p> + +<p>Which virtue, beyond all others, wholly devotes and dedicates + itself to the advantage of others.</p> +</div> + +<p>VIII. * * * Both to discover and maintain. While the other, Aristotle, +has filled four large volumes with a discussion on abstract justice. For +I did not expect anything grand or magnificent from Chrysippus, who, +after his usual fashion, examines everything rather by the signification +of words than the reality of things. But it was surely worthy of those +heroes of philosophy to ennoble by their genius a virtue so eminently +beneficent and liberal, which everywhere exalts the social interests +above the selfish, and teaches us to love others rather than ourselves. +It was worthy of their genius, we say, to elevate this virtue to a +divine throne, not far from that of Wisdom. And certainly they neither +wanted the will to accomplish this (for what else could be the cause of +their writing on the subject, or what could have been their design?) nor +the genius, in which they excelled all men. But the weakness of their +cause was too great for either their intention or their eloquence to +make it popular. In fact, this justice on which we reason is a civil +right, but no natural one; for if it were natural and universal, then +justice and injustice would be recognized similarly by all men, just as +the heat and cold, sweetness and bitterness.</p> + +<p>IX. Now, if any one, carried in that chariot of winged serpents of which +the poet Pacuvius makes mention, could <a id="page-431"></a><span class="pgnum">431</span>take his flight over all nations +and cities, and accurately observe their proceedings, he would see that +the sense of justice and right varies in different regions. In the first +place, he would behold among the unchangeable people of Egypt, which +preserves in its archives the memory of so many ages and events, a bull +adored as a Deity, under the name of Apis, and a multitude of other +monsters, and all kinds of animals admitted by the same nation into the +number of the Gods.</p> + +<p>In the next place, he would see in Greece, as among ourselves, +magnificent temples consecrated by images in human form, which the +Persians regarded as impious; and it is affirmed that the sole motive of +Xerxes for commanding the conflagration of the Athenian temples was the +belief that it was a superstitious sacrilege to keep confined within +narrow walls the Gods, whose proper home was the entire universe. But +afterward Philip, in his hostile projects against the Persians, and +Alexander, who carried them into execution, alleged this plea for war, +that they were desirous to avenge the temples of Greece, which the +Greeks had thought proper never to rebuild, that this monument of the +impiety of the Persians might always remain before the eyes of their +posterity.</p> + +<p>How many—such as the inhabitants of Taurica along the Euxine Sea; as +the King of Egypt, Busiris; as the Gauls and the Carthaginians—have +thought it exceedingly pious and agreeable to the Gods to sacrifice men! +And, besides, the customs of life are so various that the Cretans and +Ætolians regard robbery as honorable. And the Lacedæmonians say that +their territory extends to all places which they can touch with a lance. +The Athenians had a custom of swearing, by a public proclamation, that +all the lands which produced olives and corn were their own. The Gauls +consider it a base employment to raise corn by agricultural labor, and +go with arms in their hands, and mow down the harvests of neighboring +peoples. But we ourselves, the most equitable of all nations, who, in +order to raise the value of our vines and olives, do not permit the +races beyond the Alps to cultivate either vineyards or oliveyards, are +said in this matter to act with prudence, but not with justice. You see, +then, that wisdom <a id="page-432"></a><span class="pgnum">432</span>and policy are not always the same as equity. And +Lycurgus, that famous inventor of a most admirable jurisprudence and +most wholesome laws, gave the lands of the rich to be cultivated by the +common people, who were reduced to slavery.</p> + +<p>X. If I were to describe the diverse kinds of laws, institutions, +manners, and customs, not only as they vary in the numerous nations, but +as they vary likewise in single cities—in this one of ours, for +example—I could prove that they have had a thousand revolutions. For +instance, that eminent expositor of our laws who sits in the present +company—I mean Manilius—if you were to consult him relative to the +legacies and inheritances of women, he would tell you that the present +law is quite different from that he was accustomed to plead in his +youth, before the Voconian enactment came into force—an edict which was +passed in favor of the interests of the men, but which is evidently full +of injustice with regard to women. For why should a woman be disabled +from inheriting property? Why can a vestal virgin become an heir, while +her mother cannot? And why, admitting that it is necessary to set some +limit to the wealth of women, should Crassus’s daughter, if she be his +only child, inherit thousands without offending the law, while my +daughter can only receive a small share in a bequest.<a id="FNA-337"></a><a href="#FN-337"><sup>337</sup></a> * * *</p> + +<p>XI. * * * [If this justice were natural, innate, and universal, all men +would admit the same] law and right, and the same men would not enact +different laws at different times. If a just man and a virtuous man is +bound to obey the laws, I ask, what laws do you mean? Do you intend all +the laws indifferently? But neither does virtue permit this inconstancy +in moral obligation, nor is such a variation compatible with natural +conscience. The laws are, therefore, based not on our sense of justice, +but on our fear of punishment. There is, therefore, no natural justice; +and hence it follows that men cannot be just by nature.</p> + +<p>Are men, then, to say that variations indeed do exist in the laws, but +that men who are virtuous through natural conscience follow that which +is really justice, and not a mere semblance and disguise, and that it is +the distinguishing <a id="page-433"></a><span class="pgnum">433</span>characteristic of the truly just and virtuous man to +render every one his due rights? Are we, then, to attribute the first of +these characteristics to animals? For not only men of moderate +abilities, but even first-rate sages and philosophers, as Pythagoras and +Empedocles, declare that all kinds of living creatures have a right to +the same justice. They declare that inexpiable penalties impend over +those who have done violence to any animal whatsoever. It is, therefore, +a crime to injure an animal, and the perpetrator of such crime<a id="FNA-338"></a><a href="#FN-338"><sup>338</sup></a> * * *</p> + +<div class="unclear"> +<p>XII. For when he<a id="FNA-339"></a><a href="#FN-339"><sup>339</sup></a> inquired of a pirate by what right he dared + to infest the sea with his little brigantine: “By the same right,” + he replied, “which is your warrant for conquering the world.” * * * </p> +</div> + +<p>Wisdom and prudence instruct us by all means to increase our power, +riches, and estates. For by what means could this same Alexander, that +illustrious general, who extended his empire over all Asia, without +violating the property of other men, have acquired such universal +dominion, enjoyed so many pleasures, such great power, and reigned +without bound or limit?</p> + +<p>But justice commands us to have mercy upon all men, to consult the +interests of the whole human race, to give to every one his due, and +injure no sacred, public, or foreign rights, and to forbear touching +what does not belong to us. What is the result, then? If you obey the +dictates of wisdom, then wealth, power, riches, honors, provinces, and +kingdoms, from all classes, peoples, and nations, are to be aimed at.</p> + +<p>However, as we are discussing public matters, those examples are more +illustrious which refer to what is done publicly. And since the question +between justice and policy applies equally to private and public +affairs, I think it well to speak of the wisdom of the people. I will +not, however, mention other nations, but come at once to our own Roman +people, whom Africanus, in his discourse yesterday, traced from the +cradle, and whose empire now embraces the whole world. Justice is<a id="FNA-340"></a><a href="#FN-340"><sup>340</sup></a> * * *</p> + +<div class="unclear"> +<p><a id="page-434"></a><span class="pgnum">434</span>XIII. How far utility is at variance with justice we may learn from + the Roman people itself, which, declaring war by means of the + fecials, and committing injustice with all legal formality, always + coveting and laying violent hands on the property of others, + acquired the possession of the whole world.</p> + +<p>What is the advantage of one’s own country but the disadvantage of + another state or nation, by extending one’s dominions by + territories evidently wrested from others, increasing one’s power, + improving one’s revenues, etc.? Therefore, whoever has obtained + these advantages for his country—that is to say, whoever has + overthrown cities, subdued nations, and by these means filled the + treasury with money, taken lands, and enriched his + fellow-citizens—such a man is extolled to the skies; is believed + to be endowed with consummate and perfect virtue; and this mistake + is fallen into not only by the populace and the ignorant, but by + philosophers, who even give rules for injustice.</p> +</div> + +<p>XIV. * * * For all those who have the right of life and death over the +people are in fact tyrants; but they prefer being called by the title of +king, which belongs to the all-good Jupiter. But when certain men, by +favor of wealth, birth, or any other means, get possession of the entire +government, it is a faction; but they choose to denominate themselves an +aristocracy. If the people gets the upper hand, and rules everything +after its capricious will, they call it liberty, but it is in fact +license. And when every man is a guard upon his neighbor, and every +class is a guard upon every other class, then because no one trusts in +his own strength, a kind of compact is formed between the great and the +little, from whence arises that mixed kind of government which Scipio +has been commending. Thus justice, according to these facts, is not the +daughter of nature or conscience, but of human imbecility. For when it +becomes necessary to choose between these three predicaments, either to +do wrong without retribution, or to do wrong with retribution, or to do +no wrong at all, it is best to do wrong with impunity; next, neither to +do wrong nor to suffer for it; but nothing is more wretched than to +struggle incessantly between the wrong we inflict and that we receive. +Therefore, he who attains to that first end<a id="FNA-341"></a><a href="#FN-341"><sup>341</sup></a> * * *</p> + +<div class="unclear"> +<p>XV. This was the sum of the argument of Carneades: that men had + established laws among themselves from considerations of advantage, + <a id="page-435"></a><span class="pgnum">435</span>varying them according to their different customs, and altering + them often so as to adapt them to the times; but that there was no + such thing as natural law; that all men and all other animals are + led to their own advantage by the guidance of nature; that there is + no such thing as justice, or, if there be, that it is extreme + folly, since a man would injure himself while consulting the + interests of others. And he added these arguments, that all nations + who were flourishing and dominant, and even the Romans themselves, + who were the masters of the whole world, if they wished to be + just—that is to say, if they restored all that belonged to + others—would have to return to their cottages, and to lie down in + want and misery.</p> +</div> + +<p>Except, perhaps, of the Arcadians and Athenians, who, I presume, +dreading that this great act of retribution might one day arrive, +pretend that they were sprung from the earth, like so many field-mice.</p> + +<p>XVI. In reply to these statements, the following arguments are often +adduced by those who are not unskilful in discussions, and who, in this +question, have all the greater weight of authority, because, when we +inquire, Who is a good man?—understanding by that term a frank and +single-minded man—we have little need of captious casuists, quibblers, +and slanderers. For those men assert that the wise man does not seek +virtue because of the personal gratification which the practice of +justice and beneficence procures him, but rather because the life of the +good man is free from fear, care, solicitude, and peril; while, on the +other hand, the wicked always feel in their souls a certain suspicion, +and always behold before their eyes images of judgment and punishment. +Do not you think, therefore, that there is any benefit, or that there is +any advantage which can be procured by injustice, precious enough to +counterbalance the constant pressure of remorse, and the haunting +consciousness that retribution awaits the sinner, and hangs over his +devoted head.<a id="FNA-342"></a><a href="#FN-342"><sup>342</sup></a> * * *</p> + +<p>XVII. [Our philosophers, therefore, put a case. Suppose, say they, two +men, one of whom is an excellent and admirable person, of high honor and +remarkable integrity; the latter is distinguished by nothing but his +vice and audacity. And suppose that their city has so mistaken their +characters as to imagine the good man to be a scandalous, impious, and +audacious criminal, and to esteem the wicked <a id="page-436"></a><span class="pgnum">436</span>man, on the contrary, as a +pattern of probity and fidelity. On account of this error of their +fellow-citizens, the good man is arrested and tormented, his hands are +cut off, his eyes are plucked out, he is condemned, bound, burned, +exterminated, reduced to want, and to the last appears to all men to be +most deservedly the most miserable of men. On the other hand, the +flagitious wretch is exalted, worshipped, loved by all, and honors, +offices, riches, and emoluments are all conferred on him, and he shall +be reckoned by his fellow-citizens the best and worthiest of mortals, +and in the highest degree deserving of all manner of prosperity. Yet, +for all this, who is so mad as to doubt which of these two men he would +rather be?</p> + +<p>XVIII. What happens among individuals happens also among nations. There +is no state so absurd and ridiculous as not to prefer unjust dominion to +just subordination. I need not go far for examples. During my own +consulship, when you were my fellow-counsellors, we consulted respecting +the treaty of Numantia. No one was ignorant that Quintus Pompey had +signed a treaty, and that Mancinus had done the same. The latter, being +a virtuous man, supported the proposition which I laid before the +people, after the decree of the senate. The former, on the other side, +opposed it vehemently. If modesty, probity, or faith had been regarded, +Mancinus would have carried his point; but in reason, counsel, and +prudence, Pompey surpassed him. Whether<a id="FNA-343"></a><a href="#FN-343"><sup>343</sup></a> * * *</p> + +<p>XIX. If a man should have a faithless slave, or an unwholesome house, +with whose defect he alone was acquainted, and he advertised them for +sale, would he state the fact that his servant was infected with +knavery, and his house with malaria, or would he conceal these +objections from the buyer? If he stated those facts, he would be honest, +no doubt, because he would deceive nobody; but still he would be thought +a fool, because he would either get very little for his property, or +else fail to sell it at all. By concealing these defects, on the other +hand, he will be called a shrewd man—as one who has taken care of his +own interest; but he will be a rogue, notwithstanding, because he will +be deceiving his neighbors. Again, <a id="page-437"></a><span class="pgnum">437</span>let us suppose that one man meets +another, who sells gold and silver, conceiving them to be copper or +lead; shall he hold his peace that he may make a capital bargain, or +correct the mistake, and purchase at a fair rate? He would evidently be +a fool in the world’s opinion if he preferred the latter.</p> + +<p>XX. It is justice, beyond all question, neither to commit murder nor +robbery. What, then, would your just man do, if, in a case of shipwreck, +he saw a weaker man than himself get possession of a plank? Would he not +thrust him off, get hold of the timber himself, and escape by his +exertions, especially as no human witness could be present in the +mid-sea? If he acted like a wise man of the world, he would certainly do +so, for to act in any other way would cost him his life. If, on the +other hand, he prefers death to inflicting unjustifiable injury on his +neighbor, he will be an eminently honorable and just man, but not the +less a fool, because he saved another’s life at the expense of his own. +Again, if in case of a defeat and rout, when the enemy were pressing in +the rear, this just man should find a wounded comrade mounted on a +horse, shall he respect his right at the risk of being killed himself, +or shall he fling him from the horse in order to preserve his own life +from the pursuers? If he does so, he is a wise man, but at the same time +a wicked one; if he does not, he is admirably just, but at the same time +stupid.</p> + +<p>XXI. <i>Scipio.</i> I might reply at great length to these sophistical +objections of Philus, if it were not, my Lælius, that all our friends +are no less anxious than myself to hear you take a leading part in the +present debate, especially as you promised yesterday that you would +plead at large on my side of the argument. If you cannot spare time for +this, at any rate do not desert us; we all ask it of you.</p> + +<p><i>Lælius.</i> This Carneades ought not to be even listened to by our young +men. I think all the while that I am hearing him that he must be a very +impure person; if he be not, as I would fain believe, his discourse is +not less pernicious.</p> + +<p>XXII.<a id="FNA-344"></a><a href="#FN-344"><sup>344</sup></a> True law is right reason conformable to nature, <a id="page-438"></a><span class="pgnum">438</span>universal, +unchangeable, eternal, whose commands urge us to duty, and whose +prohibitions restrain us from evil. Whether it enjoins or forbids, the +good respect its injunctions, and the wicked treat them with +indifference. This law cannot be contradicted by any other law, and is +not liable either to derogation or abrogation. Neither the senate nor +the people can give us any dispensation for not obeying this universal +law of justice. It needs no other expositor and interpreter than our own +conscience. It is not one thing at Rome, and another at Athens; one +thing to-day, and another to-morrow; but in all times and nations this +universal law must forever reign, eternal and imperishable. It is the +sovereign master and emperor of all beings. God himself is its author, +its promulgator, its enforcer. And he who does not obey it flies from +himself, and does violence to the very nature of man. And by so doing he +will endure the severest penalties even if he avoid the other evils +which are usually accounted punishments.</p> + +<div class="unclear"> +<p>XXIII. I am aware that in the third book of Cicero’s treatise on + the Commonwealth (unless I am mistaken) it is argued that no war is + ever undertaken by a well-regulated commonwealth unless it be one + either for the sake of keeping faith, or for safety; and what he + means by a war for safety, and what safety he wishes us to + understand, he points out in another passage, where he says, “But + private men often escape from these penalties, which even the most + stupid persons feel—want, exile, imprisonment, and stripes—by + embracing the opportunity of a speedy death; but to states death + itself is a penalty, though it appears to deliver individuals from + punishment. For a state ought to be established so as to be + eternal: therefore, there is no natural decease for a state, as + there is for a man, in whose case death is not only inevitable, but + often even desirable; but when a state is put an end to, it is + destroyed, extinguished. It is in some degree, to compare small + things with great, as if this whole world were to perish and fall + to pieces.”</p> + +<p>In his treatise on the Commonwealth, Cicero says those wars are + unjust which are undertaken without reason. Again, after a few + sentences, he adds, No war is considered just unless it be formally + announced and declared, and unless it be to obtain restitution of + what has been taken away.</p> + +<p>But our nation, by defending its allies, has now become the master + of all the whole world.</p> + +<p>XXIV. Also, in that same treatise on the Commonwealth, he argues + most strenuously and vigorously in the cause of justice against + injustice. And since, when a little time before the part of + injustice was upheld against justice, and the doctrine was urged + that a republic could not <a id="page-439"></a><span class="pgnum">439</span>prosper and flourish except by + injustice, this was put forward as the strongest argument, that it + was unjust for men to serve other men as their masters; but that + unless a dominant state, such as a great republic, acted on this + injustice, it could not govern its provinces; answer was made on + behalf of justice, that it was just that it should be so, because + slavery is advantageous to such men, and their interests are + consulted by a right course of conduct—that is, by the license of + doing injury being taken from the wicked—and they will fare better + when subjugated, because when not subjugated they fared worse: and + to confirm this reasoning, a noble instance, taken, as it were, + from nature, was added, and it was said, Why, then, does God govern + man, and why does the mind govern the body, and reason govern lust, + and the other vicious parts of the mind?</p> + +<p>XXV. Hear what Tully says more plainly still in the third book of + his treatise on the Commonwealth, when discussing the reasons for + government. Do we not, says he, see that nature herself has given + the power of dominion to everything that is best, to the extreme + advantage of what is subjected to it? Why, then, does God govern + man, and why does the mind govern the body, and reason govern lust + and passion and the other vicious parts of the same mind? Listen + thus far; for presently he adds, But still there are + dissimilarities to be recognized in governing and in obeying. For + as the mind is said to govern the body, and also to govern lust, + still it governs the body as a king governs his subjects, or a + parent his children; but it governs lust as a master governs his + slaves, because it restrains and breaks it. The authority of kings, + of generals, of magistrates, of fathers, and of nations, rules + their subjects and allies as the mind rules bodies; but masters + control their slaves, as the best part of the mind—that is to say, + wisdom—controls the vicious and weak parts of itself, such as + lust, passion, and the other perturbations.</p> + +<p>For there is a kind of unjust slavery when those belong to some one + else who might be their own masters; but when those are slaves who + cannot govern themselves, there is no injury done.</p> + +<p>XXVI. If, says Carneades, you were to know that an asp was lying + hidden anywhere, and that some one who did not know it was going to + sit upon it, whose death would be a gain to you, you would act + wickedly if you did not warn him not to sit down. Still, you would + not be liable to punishment; for who could prove that you had + known? But we are bringing forward too many instances; for it is + plain that unless equity, good faith, and justice proceed from + nature, and if all these things are referred to interest, a good + man cannot be found. And on these topics a great deal is said by + Lælius in our treatise on the Republic.</p> + +<p>If, as we are reminded by you, we have spoken well in that + treatise, when we said that nothing is good excepting what is + honorable, and nothing bad excepting what is disgraceful. * * *</p> + +<p>XXVII. I am glad that you approve of the doctrine that the + affection borne to our children is implanted by nature; indeed, if + it be not, there can be no conection between man and man which has + its origin in nature. And if there be not, then there is an end of + all society in life. May it turn out well, says Carneades, speaking + shamelessly, but still <a id="page-440"></a><span class="pgnum">440</span>more sensibly than my friend Lucius or + Patro: for, as they refer everything to themselves, do they think + that anything is ever done for the sake of another? And when they + say that a man ought to be good, in order to avoid misfortune, not + because it is right by nature, they do not perceive that they are + speaking of a cunning man, not of a good one. But these arguments + are argued, I think, in those books by praising which you have + given me spirits.</p> + +<p>In which I agree that an anxious and hazardous justice is not that + of a wise man.</p> + +<p>XXVIII. And again, in Cicero, that same advocate of justice, + Lælius, says, Virtue is clearly eager for honor, nor has she any + other reward; which, however, she accepts easily, and exacts + without bitterness. And in another place the same Lælius says:</p> +</div> + +<p>When a man is inspired by virtue such as this, what bribes can you offer +him, what treasures, what thrones, what empires? He considers these but +mortal goods, and esteems his own divine. And if the ingratitude of the +people, and the envy of his competitors, or the violence of powerful +enemies, despoil his virtue of its earthly recompense, he still enjoys a +thousand consolations in the approbation of conscience, and sustains +himself by contemplating the beauty of moral rectitude.</p> + +<p>XXIX. * * * This virtue, in order to be true, must be universal. +Tiberius Gracchus continued faithful to his fellow-citizens, but he +violated the rights and treaties guaranteed to our allies and the Latin +peoples. But if this habit of arbitrary violence begins to extend itself +further, and perverts our authority, leading it from right to violence, +so that those who had voluntarily obeyed us are only restrained by fear, +then, although we, during our days, may escape the peril, yet am I +solicitous respecting the safety of our posterity and the immortality of +the Commonwealth itself, which, doubtless, might become perpetual and +invincible if our people would maintain their ancient institutions and +manners.</p> + +<p>XXX. When Lælius had ceased to speak, all those that were present +expressed the extreme pleasure they found in his discourse. But Scipio, +more affected than the rest, and ravished with the delight of sympathy, +exclaimed: You have pleaded, my Lælius, many causes with an eloquence +superior to that of Servius Galba, our colleague, whom you used during +his life to prefer to all others, even to the Attic orators [and never +did I hear you speak with <a id="page-441"></a><span class="pgnum">441</span>more energy than to-day, while pleading the +cause of justice]<a id="FNA-345"></a><a href="#FN-345"><sup>345</sup></a> * * *</p> + +<div class="unclear"> +<p>* * * That two things were wanting to enable him to speak in public + and in the forum, confidence and voice.</p> +</div> + +<p>XXXI. * * * This justice, continued Scipio, is the very foundation of +lawful government in political constitutions. Can we call the State of +Agrigentum a commonwealth, where all men are oppressed by the cruelty of +a single tyrant—where there is no universal bond of right, nor social +consent and fellowship, which should belong to every people, properly so +named? It is the same in Syracuse—that illustrious city which Timæus +calls the greatest of the Grecian towns. It was indeed a most beautiful +city; and its admirable citadel, its canals distributed through all its +districts, its broad streets, its porticoes, its temples, and its walls, +gave Syracuse the appearance of a most flourishing state. But while +Dionysius its tyrant reigned there, nothing of all its wealth belonged +to the people, and the people were nothing better than the slaves of one +master. Thus, wherever I behold a tyrant, I know that the social +constitution must be not merely vicious and corrupt, as I stated +yesterday, but in strict truth no social constitution at all.</p> + +<p>XXXII. <i>Lælius.</i> You have spoken admirably, my Scipio, and I see the +point of your observations.</p> + +<p><i>Scipio.</i> You grant, then, that a state which is entirely in the power +of a faction cannot justly be entitled a political community?</p> + +<p><i>Lælius.</i> That is evident.</p> + +<p><i>Scipio.</i> You judge most correctly. For what was the State of Athens +when, during the great Peloponnesian war, she fell under the unjust +domination of the thirty tyrants? The antique glory of that city, the +imposing aspect of its edifices, its theatre, its gymnasium, its +porticoes, its temples, its citadel, the admirable sculptures of +Phidias, and the magnificent harbor of Piræus—did they constitute it a +commonwealth?</p> + +<p><i>Lælius.</i> Certainly not, because these did not constitute the real +welfare of the community.</p> + +<p><a id="page-442"></a><span class="pgnum">442</span><i>Scipio.</i> And at Rome, when the decemvirs ruled without appeal from +their decisions, in the third year of their power, had not liberty lost +all its securities and all its blessings?</p> + +<p><i>Lælius.</i> Yes; the welfare of the community was no longer consulted, and +the people soon roused themselves, and recovered their appropriate +rights.</p> + +<p>XXXIII. <i>Scipio.</i> I now come to the third, or democratical, form of +government, in which a considerable difficulty presents itself, because +all things are there said to lie at the disposition of the people, and +are carried into execution just as they please. Here the populace +inflict punishments at their pleasure, and act, and seize, and keep +possession, and distribute property, without let or hinderance. Can you +deny, my Lælius, that this is a fair definition of a democracy, where +the people are all in all, and where the people constitute the State?</p> + +<p><i>Lælius.</i> There is no political constitution to which I more absolutely +deny the name of a <i>commonwealth</i> than that in which all things lie in +the power of the multitude. If a commonwealth, which implies the welfare +of the entire community, could not exist in Agrigentum, Syracuse, or +Athens when tyrants reigned over them—if it could not exist in Rome +when under the oligarchy of the decemvirs—neither do I see how this +sacred name of commonwealth can be applied to a democracy and the sway +of the mob; because, in the first place, my Scipio, I build on your own +admirable definition, that there can be no community, properly so +called, unless it be regulated by a combination of rights. And, by this +definition, it appears that a multitude of men may be just as tyrannical +as a single despot; and it is so much the worse, since no monster can be +more barbarous than the mob, which assumes the name and appearance of +the people. Nor is it at all reasonable, since the laws place the +property of madmen in the hands of their sane relations, that we should +do the [very reverse in politics, and throw the property of the sane +into the hands of the mad multitude]<a id="FNA-346"></a><a href="#FN-346"><sup>346</sup></a> * * *</p> + +<p>XXXIV. * * * [It is far more rational] to assert that a wise and +virtuous aristocratical government deserves <a id="page-443"></a><span class="pgnum">443</span>the title of a +commonwealth, as it approaches to the nature of a kingdom.</p> + +<p>And much more so in my opinion, said Mummius. For the unity of power +often exposes a king to become a despot; but when an aristocracy, +consisting of many virtuous men, exercise power, that is the most +fortunate circumstance possible for any state. However this be, I much +prefer royalty to democracy; for that is the third kind of government +which you have remaining, and a most vicious one it is.</p> + +<p>XXXV. Scipio replied: I am well acquainted, my Mummius, with your +decided antipathy to the democratical system. And, although, we may +speak of it with rather more indulgence than you are accustomed to +accord it, I must certainly agree with you, that of all the three +particular forms of government, none is less commendable than democracy.</p> + +<p>I do not agree with you, however, when you would imply that aristocracy +is preferable to royalty. If you suppose that wisdom governs the State, +is it not as well that this wisdom should reside in one monarch as in +many nobles?</p> + +<p>But we are led away by a certain incorrectness of terms in a discussion +like the present. When we pronounce the word “aristocracy,” which, in +Greek, signifies the government of the best men, what can be conceived +more excellent? For what can be thought better than the best? But when, +on the other hand, the title “king” is mentioned, we begin to imagine a +tyrant; as if a king must be necessarily unjust. But we are not speaking +of an unjust king when we are examining the true nature of royal +authority. To this name of king, therefore, do but attach the idea of a +Romulus, a Numa, a Tullus, and perhaps you will be less severe to the +monarchical form of constitution.</p> + +<p><i>Mummius</i>. Have you, then, no commendation at all for any kind of +democratical government?</p> + +<p><i>Scipio.</i> Why, I think some democratical forms less objectionable than +others; and, by way of illustration, I will ask you what you thought of +the government in the isle of Rhodes, where we were lately together; did +it appear to you a legitimate and rational constitution?</p> + +<p><a id="page-444"></a><span class="pgnum">444</span><i>Mummius</i>. It did, and not much liable to abuse.</p> + +<p><i>Scipio.</i> You say truly. But, if you recollect, it was a very +extraordinary experiment. All the inhabitants were alternately senators +and citizens. Some months they spent in their senatorial functions, and +some months they spent in their civil employments. In both they +exercised judicial powers; and in the theatre and the court, the same +men judged all causes, capital and not capital. And they had as much +influence, and were of as much importance as * * *</p> + + <hr class="tiny"/> + + + + +<h4>FRAGMENTS.</h4> + + +<div class="unclear"> +<p>XXXVI. There is therefore some unquiet feeling in individuals, + which either exults in pleasure or is crushed by annoyance.</p> + +<p class="comment">[<i>The next is an incomplete sentence, and, as such, + unintelligible</i>.]</p> + +<p>The Phœnicians were the first who by their commerce, and by the + merchandise which they carried, brought avarice and magnificence + and insatiable degrees of everything into Greece.</p> + +<p>Sardanapalus, the luxurious king of Assyria, of whom Tully, in the + third book of his treatise on the Republic, says, “The notorious + Sardanapalus, far more deformed by his vices than even by his + name.”</p> + +<p>What is the meaning, then, of this absurd acceptation, unless some + one wishes to make the whole of Athos a monument? For what is Athos + or the vast Olympus? * * *</p> + +<p>XXXVII. I will endeavor in the proper place to show it, according + to the definitions of Cicero himself, in which, putting forth + Scipio as the speaker, he has briefly explained what a commonwealth + and what a republic is; adducing also many assertions of his own, + and of those whom he has represented as taking part in that + discussion, to the effect that the State of Rome was not such a + commonwealth, because there has never been genuine justice in it. + However, according to definitions which are more reasonable, it was + a commonwealth in some degree, and it was better regulated by the + more ancient than by the later Romans.</p> + +<p>It is now fitting that I should explain, as briefly and as clearly + as I can, what, in the second book of this work, I promised to + prove, according to the definitions which Cicero, in his books on + the Commonwealth, puts into the mouth of Scipio, arguing that the + Roman State was never a commonwealth; for he briefly defines a + commonwealth as a state of the people; the people as an assembly of + the multitude, united by a common feeling of right, and a community + of interests. What he calls a common feeling of right he explains + by discussion, showing in this way that a commonwealth cannot + proceed without justice. Where, therefore, there is no genuine + justice, there can be no right, for that which is done according to + right is done justly; and what is done unjustly cannot <a id="page-445"></a><span class="pgnum">445</span>be done + according to right, for the unjust regulations of men are not to be + called or thought rights; since they themselves call that right + (<i>jus</i>) which flows from the source of justice: and they say that + that assertion which is often made by some persons of erroneous + sentiments, namely, that that is right which is advantageous to the + most powerful, is false. Wherefore, where there is no true justice + there can be no company of men united by a common feeling of right; + therefore there can be no people (<i>populus</i>), according to that + definition of Scipio or Cicero: and if there be no people, there + can be no state of the people, but only of a mob such as it may be, + which is not worthy of the name of a people. And thus, if a + commonwealth is a state of a people, and if that is not a people + which is not united by a common feeling of right, and if there is + no right where there is no justice, then the undoubted inference + is, that where there is no justice there is no commonwealth. + Moreover, justice is that virtue which gives every one his own.</p> +</div> + +<p>No war can be undertaken by a just and wise state unless for faith or +self-defence. This self-defence of the State is enough to insure its +perpetuity, and this perpetuity is what all patriots desire. Those +afflictions which even the hardiest spirits smart under—poverty, exile, +prison, and torment—private individuals seek to escape from by an +instantaneous death. But for states, the greatest calamity of all is +that of death, which to individuals appears a refuge. A state should be +so constituted as to live forever. For a commonwealth there is no +natural dissolution as there is for a man, to whom death not only +becomes necessary, but often desirable. And when a state once decays and +falls, it is so utterly revolutionized, that, if we may compare great +things with small, it resembles the final wreck of the universe.</p> + +<p>All wars undertaken without a proper motive are unjust. And no war can +be reputed just unless it be duly announced and proclaimed, and if it be +not preceded by a rational demand for restitution.</p> + +<p>Our Roman Commonwealth, by defending its allies, has got possession of +the world.</p> + + + +<hr/> + +<h3><a id="page-446"></a><span class="pgnum">446</span>INTRODUCTION TO THE FOURTH BOOK,</h3> + +<h4>BY THE ORIGINAL TRANSLATOR.</h4> + + +<p class="intro"><span class="first">In</span> this fourth book Cicero treats of morals and education, and the + use and abuse of stage entertainments. We retain nothing of this + important book save a few scattered fragments, the beauty of which + fills us with the greater regret for the passages we have lost.</p> + + <hr class="tiny"/> + + + + +<h3>BOOK IV.</h3> + +<h4>FRAGMENTS.</h4> + + +<div class="unclear"> +<p>I. * * * Since mention has been made of the body and of the mind, I + will endeavor to explain the theory of each as well as the weakness + of my understanding is able to comprehend it—a duty which I think + it the more becoming in me to undertake, because Marcus Tullius, a + man of singular genius, after having attempted to perform it in the + fourth book of his treatise on the Commonwealth, compressed a + subject of wide extent within narrow limits, only touching lightly + on all the principal points. And that there might be no excuse + alleged for his not having followed out this topic, he himself has + assured us that he was not wanting either in inclination or in + anxiety to do so; for, in the first book of his treatise on Laws, + when he was touching briefly on the same subject, he speaks thus: + “This topic Scipio, in my opinion, has sufficiently discussed in + those books which you have read.”</p> + +<p>And the mind itself, which sees the future, remembers the past.</p> + +<p>Well did Marcus Tullius say, In truth, if there is no one who would + not prefer death to being changed into the form of some beast, + although he were still to retain the mind of a man, how much more + wretched is it to have the mind of a beast in the form of a man! To + me this fate appears as much worse than the other as the mind is + superior to the body.</p> + +<p>Tullius says somewhere that he does not think the good of a ram and + of Publius Africanus identical.</p> + +<p>And also by its being interposed, it causes shade and night, which + is adapted both to the numbering of days and to rest from labor.</p> + +<p>And as in the autumn he has opened the earth to receive seeds, in + winter relaxed it that it may digest them, and by the ripening + powers of summer softened some and burned up others.</p> + +<p>When the shepherds use * * * for cattle.</p> + +<p>Cicero, in the fourth book of his Commonwealth, uses the word + “armentum,” and “armentarius,” derived from it.</p> +</div> + +<p><a id="page-447"></a><span class="pgnum">447</span>II. The great law of just and regular subordination is the basis of +political prosperity. There is much advantage in the harmonious +succession of ranks and orders and classes, in which the suffrages of +the knights and the senators have their due weight. Too many have +foolishly desired to destroy this institution, in the vain hope of +receiving some new largess, by a public decree, out of a distribution of +the property of the nobility.</p> + +<p>III. Consider, now, how wisely the other provisions have been adopted, +in order to secure to the citizens the benefits of an honest and happy +life; for that is, indeed, the grand object of all political +association, and that which every government should endeavor to procure +for the people, partly by its institutions, and partly by its laws.</p> + +<p>Consider, in the first place, the national education of the people—a +matter on which the Greeks have expended much labor in vain, and which +is the only point on which Polybius, who settled among us, accuses the +negligence of our institutions. For our countrymen have thought that +education ought not to be fixed, nor regulated by laws, nor be given +publicly and uniformly to all classes of society. For<a id="FNA-347"></a><a href="#FN-347"><sup>347</sup></a> * * *</p> + +<div class="unclear"> +<p>According to Tully, who says that men going to serve in the army + have guardians assigned to them, by whom they are governed the + first year.</p> +</div> + +<p>IV. [In our ancient laws, young men were prohibited from appearing] +naked in the public baths, so far back were the principles of modesty +traced by our ancestors. Among the Greeks, on the contrary, what an +absurd system of training youth is exhibited in their gymnasia! What a +frivolous preparation for the labors and hazards of war! what indecent +spectacles, what impure and licentious amours are permitted! I do not +speak only of the Eleans and Thebans, among whom, in all love affairs, +passion is allowed to run into shameless excesses; but the Spartans, +while they permit every kind of license to their young men, save that of +violation, fence off, by a very slight wall, the very exception on which +they insist, besides other crimes which I will not mention.</p> + +<p><a id="page-448"></a><span class="pgnum">448</span>Then Lælius said: I see, my Scipio, that on the subject of the Greek +institutions, which you censure, you prefer attacking the customs of the +most renowned peoples to contending with your favorite Plato, whose name +you have avoided citing, especially as * * *</p> + +<div class="unclear"> +<p>V. So that Cicero, in his treatise on the Commonwealth, says that + it was a reproach to young men if they had no lovers.</p> + +<p>Not only as at Sparta, where boys learn to steal and plunder.</p> + +<p>And our master Plato, even more than Lycurgus, who would have + everything to be common, so that no one should be able to call + anything his own property.</p> + +<p>I would send him to the same place whither he sends Homer, crowned + with chaplets and anointed with perfumes, banishing him from the + city which he is describing.</p> + +<p>VI. The judgment of the censor inflicts scarcely anything more than + a blush on the man whom he condemns. Therefore as all that + adjudication turns solely on the name (<i>nomen</i>), the punishment is + called ignominy.</p> + +<p>Nor should a prefect be set over women, an officer who is created + among the Greeks; but there should be a censor to teach husbands to + manage their wives.</p> + +<p>So the discipline of modesty has great power. All women abstain + from wine.</p> + +<p>And also if any woman was of bad character, her relations used not + to kiss her.</p> + +<p>So petulance is derived from asking (<i>petendo</i>); wantonness + (<i>procacitas</i>) from <i>procando</i>, that is, from demanding.</p> + +<p>VII. For I do not approve of the same nation being the ruler and + the farmer of lands. But both in private families and in the + affairs of the Commonwealth I look upon economy as a revenue.</p> + +<p>Faith (<i>fides</i>) appears to me to derive its name from that being + done (<i>fit</i>) which is said.</p> + +<p>In a citizen of rank and noble birth, caressing manners, display, + and ambition are marks of levity.</p> + +<p>Examine for a while the books on the Republic, and learn that good + men know no bound or limit in consulting the interests of their + country. See in that treatise with what praises frugality, and + continency, and fidelity to the marriage tie, and chaste, + honorable, and virtuous manners are extolled.</p> + +<p>VIII. I marvel at the elegant choice, not only of the facts, but of + the language. If they dispute (<i>jurgant</i>). It is a contest between + well-wishers, not a quarrel between enemies, that is called a + dispute (<i>jurgium</i>),</p> + +<p>Therefore the law considers that neighbors dispute (<i>jurgare</i>) + rather than quarrel (<i>litigare</i>) with one another.</p> + +<p>The bounds of man’s care and of man’s life are the same; so by the + pontifical law the sanctity of burial * * *</p> + +<p>They put them to death, though innocent, because they had left + those men unburied whom they could not rescue from the sea because + of the violence of the storm.</p> + +<p><a id="page-449"></a><span class="pgnum">449</span>Nor in this discussion have I advocated the cause of the populace, + but of the good.</p> + +<p>For one cannot easily resist a powerful people if one gives them + either no rights at all or very little.</p> + +<p>In which case I wish I could augur first with truth and fidelity * * *</p> + +<p>IX. Cicero saying this in vain, when speaking of poets, “And when + the shouts and approval of the people, as of some great and wise + teacher, has reached them, what darkness do they bring on! what + alarms do they cause! what desires do they excite!”</p> + +<p>Cicero says that if his life were extended to twice its length, he + should not have time to read the lyric poets.</p> + +<p>X. As Scipio says in Cicero, “As they thought the whole histrionic + art, and everything connected with the theatre, discreditable, they + thought fit that all men of that description should not only be + deprived of the honors belonging to the rest of the citizens, but + should also be deprived of their franchise by the sentence of the + censors.”</p> + +<p>And what the ancient Romans thought on this subject Cicero informs + us, in those books which he wrote on the Commonwealth, where Scipio + argues and says * * *</p> +</div> + +<p>Comedies could never (if it had not been authorized by the common +customs of life) have made theatres approve of their scandalous +exhibitions. And the more ancient Greeks provided a certain correction +for the vicious taste of the people, by making a law that it should be +expressly defined by a censorship what subjects comedy should treat, and +how she should treat them.</p> + +<p>Whom has it not attacked? or, rather, whom has it not wounded? and whom +has it spared? In this, no doubt, it sometimes took the right side, and +lashed the popular demagogues and seditious agitators, such as Cleon, +Cleophon, and Hyperbolus. We may tolerate that; though indeed the +censure of the magistrate would, in these cases, have been more +efficacious than the satire of the poet. But when Pericles, who governed +the Athenian Commonwealth for so many years with the highest authority, +both in peace and war, was outraged by verses, and these were acted on +the stage, it was hardly more decent than if, among us, Plautus and +Nævius had attacked Publius and Cnæus, or Cæcilius had ventured to +revile Marcus Cato.</p> + +<p>Our laws of the Twelve Tables, on the contrary—so careful to attach +capital punishment to a very few crimes only—have included in this +class of capital offences the offence of composing or publicly reciting +verses of libel, slander, and defamation, in order to cast dishonor and +infamy <a id="page-450"></a><span class="pgnum">450</span>on a fellow-citizen. And they have decided wisely; for our life +and character should, if suspected, be submitted to the sentence of +judicial tribunals and the legal investigations of our magistrates, and +not to the whims and fancies of poets. Nor should we be exposed to any +charge of disgrace which we cannot meet by legal process, and openly +refute at the bar.</p> + +<p>In our laws, I admire the justice of their expressions, as well as their +decisions. Thus the word <i>pleading</i> signifies rather an amicable suit +between friends than a quarrel between enemies.</p> + +<p>It is not easy to resist a powerful people, if you allow them no rights, +or next to none.</p> + +<div class="unclear"> +<p>The old Romans would not allow any living man to be either praised + or blamed on the stage.</p> + +<p>XI. Cicero says that comedy is an imitation of life; a mirror of + customs, an image of truth.</p> + +<p>Since, as is mentioned in that book on the Commonwealth, not only + did Æschines the Athenian, a man of the greatest eloquence, who, + when a young man, had been an actor of tragedies, concern himself + in public affairs, but the Athenians often sent Aristodemus, who + was also a tragic actor, to Philip as an ambassador, to treat of + the most important affairs of peace and war.</p> +</div> + +<hr/> + + + +<h3>INTRODUCTION TO THE FIFTH BOOK,</h3> + +<h4>BY THE ORIGINAL TRANSLATOR.</h4> + + +<p class="intro"><span class="first">In</span> this fifth book Cicero explains and enforces the duties of + magistrates, and the importance of practical experience to all who + undertake their important functions. Only a few fragments have + survived the wreck of ages and descended to us.</p> + +<hr class="tiny"/> + + +<h3>BOOK V.</h3> + +<h4>FRAGMENTS.</h4> + + +<p>I. <span class="first">Ennius</span> has told us—</p> + +<div class="poem"> +<p>Of men and customs mighty Rome consists;</p> +</div> + +<p class="cont">which verse, both for its precision and its verity, appears to me as if +it had issued from an oracle; for neither the <a id="page-451"></a><span class="pgnum">451</span>men, unless the State had +adopted a certain system of manners—nor the manners, unless they had +been illustrated by the men—could ever have established or maintained +for so many ages so vast a republic, or one of such righteous and +extensive sway.</p> + +<p>Thus, long before our own times, the force of hereditary manners of +itself moulded most eminent men; and admirable citizens, in return, gave +new weight to the ancient customs and institutions of our ancestors. But +our age, on the contrary, having received the Commonwealth as a finished +picture of another century, but one already beginning to fade through +the lapse of years, has not only neglected to renew the colors of the +original painting, but has not even cared to preserve its general form +and prominent lineaments.</p> + +<p>For what now remains of those antique manners, of which the poet said +that our Commonwealth consisted? They have now become so obsolete and +forgotten that they are not only not cultivated, but they are not even +known. And as to the men, what shall I say? For the manners themselves +have only perished through a scarcity of men; of which great misfortune +we are not only called to give an account, but even, as men accused of +capital offences, to a certain degree to plead our own cause in +connection with it. For it is owing to our vices, rather than to any +accident, that we have retained the name of republic when we have long +since lost the reality.</p> + +<p>II. * * * There is no employment so essentially royal as the exposition +of equity, which comprises the true interpretation of all laws. This +justice subjects used generally to expect from their kings. For this +reason, lands, fields, woods, and pastures were reserved as the property +of kings, and cultivated for them, without any labor on their part, in +order that no anxiety on account of their personal interests might +distract their attention from the welfare of the State. Nor was any +private man allowed to be the judge or arbitrator in any suit; but all +disputes were terminated by the royal sentence.</p> + +<p>And of all our Roman monarchs, Numa appears to me to have best preserved +this ancient custom of the kings of Greece. For the others, though they +also discharged this <a id="page-452"></a><span class="pgnum">452</span>duty, were for the main part employed in +conducting military enterprises, and in attending to those rights which +belonged to war. But the long peace of Numa’s reign was the mother of +law and religion in this city. And he was himself the author of those +admirable laws which, as you are aware, are still extant. And this +character is precisely what belongs to the man of whom we are speaking. +* * *</p> + +<p>III. [<i>Scipio.</i> Ought not a farmer] to be acquainted with the nature of +plants and seeds?</p> + +<p><i>Manilius.</i> Certainly, provided he attends to his practical business +also.</p> + +<p><i>Scipio.</i> Do you think that knowledge only fit for a steward?</p> + +<p><i>Manilius.</i> Certainly not, inasmuch as the cultivation of land often +fails for want of agricultural labor.</p> + +<p><i>Scipio.</i> Therefore, as the steward knows the nature of a field, and the +scribe knows penmanship, and as both of them seek, in their respective +sciences, not mere amusement only, but practical utility, so this +statesman of ours should have studied the science of jurisprudence and +legislation; he should have investigated their original sources; but he +should not embarrass himself in debating and arguing, reading and +scribbling. He should rather employ himself in the actual administration +of government, and become a sort of steward of it, being perfectly +conversant with the principles of universal law and equity, without +which no man can be just: not unfamiliar with the civil laws of states; +but he will use them for practical purposes, even as a pilot uses +astronomy, and a physician natural philosophy. For both these men bring +their theoretical science to bear on the practice of their arts; and our +statesman [should do the same with the science of politics, and make it +subservient to the actual interests of philanthropy and patriotism]. * * *</p> + +<p>IV. * * * In states in which good men desire glory and approbation, and +shun disgrace and ignominy. Nor are such men so much alarmed by the +threats and penalties of the law as by that sentiment of shame with +which nature has endowed man, which is nothing else than a certain fear +of deserved censure. The wise director of a government <a id="page-453"></a><span class="pgnum">453</span>strengthens this +natural instinct by the force of public opinion, and perfects it by +education and manners. And thus the citizens are preserved from vice and +corruption rather by honor and shame than by fear of punishment. But +this argument will be better illustrated when we treat of the love of +glory and praise, which we shall discuss on another occasion.</p> + +<p>V. As respects the private life and the manners of the citizens, they +are intimately connected with the laws that constitute just marriages +and legitimate offspring, under the protection of the guardian deities +around the domestic hearths. By these laws, all men should be maintained +in their rights of public and private property. It is only under a good +government like this that men can live happily—for nothing can be more +delightful than a well-constituted state.</p> + +<p>On which account it appears to me a very strange thing what this * * *</p> + +<div class="unclear"> +<p>VI. I therefore consume all my time in considering what is the + power of that man, whom, as you think, we have described carefully + enough in our books. Do you, then, admit our idea of that governor + of a commonwealth to whom we wish to refer everything? For thus, I + imagine, does Scipio speak in the fifth book: “For as a fair voyage + is the object of the master of a ship, the health of his patient + the aim of a physician, and victory that of a general, so the + happiness of his fellow-citizens is the proper study of the ruler + of a commonwealth; that they may be stable in power, rich in + resources, widely known in reputation, and honorable through their + virtue. For a ruler ought to be one who can perfect this, which is + the best and most important employment among mankind.”</p> + +<p>And works in your literature rightly praise that ruler of a country + who consults the welfare of his people more than their + inclinations.</p> + +<p>VII. Tully, in those books which he wrote upon the Commonwealth, + could not conceal his opinions, when he speaks of appointing a + chief of the State, who, he says, must be maintained by glory; and + afterward he relates that his ancestors did many admirable and + noble actions from a desire of glory.</p> + +<p>Tully, in his treatise on the Commonwealth, wrote that the chief of + a state must be maintained by glory, and that a commonwealth would + last as long as honor was paid by every one to the chief.</p> + +<p class="comment">[<i>The next paragraph is unintelligible.</i>]</p> + +<p>Which virtue is called fortitude, which consists of magnanimity, + and a great contempt of death and pain.</p> + +<p>VIII. As Marcellus was fierce, and eager to fight, Maximus prudent + and cautious.</p> + +<p><a id="page-454"></a><span class="pgnum">454</span>Who discovered his violence and unbridled ferocity.</p> + +<p>Which has often happened not only to individuals, but also to most + powerful nations.</p> + +<p>In the whole world.</p> + +<p>Because he inflicted the annoyances of his old age on your + families.</p> + +<p>IX. Cicero, in his treatise on the Commonwealth, says, “As Menelaus + of Lacedæmon had a certain agreeable sweetness of eloquence.” And + in another place he says, “Let him cultivate brevity in speaking.”</p> + +<p>By the evidence of which arts, as Tully says, it is a shame for the + conscience of the judge to be misled. For he says, “And as nothing + in a commonwealth ought to be so uncorrupt as a suffrage and a + sentence, I do not see why the man who perverts them by money is + worthy of punishment, while he who does so by eloquence is even + praised. Indeed, I myself think that he who corrupts the judge by + his speech does more harm than he who does so by money, because no + one can corrupt a sensible man by money, though he may by + speaking.”</p> + +<p>And when Scipio had said this, Mummius praised him greatly, for he + was extravagantly imbued with a hatred of orators.</p> +</div> + + <hr/> + + + + +<h3>INTRODUCTION TO THE SIXTH BOOK.</h3> + + +<p class="intro"><span class="first">In</span> this last book of his Commonwealth, Cicero labors to show that + truly pious philanthropical and patriotic statesmen will not only + be rewarded on earth by the approval of conscience and the applause + of all good citizens, but that they may expect hereafter immortal + glory in new forms of being. To illustrate this, he introduces the + “Dream of Scipio,” in which he explains the resplendent doctrines + of Plato respecting the immortality of the soul with inimitable + dignity and elegance. This Somnium Scipionis, for which we are + indebted to the citation of Macrobius, is the most beautiful thing + of the kind ever written. It has been intensely admired by all + European scholars, and will be still more so. There are two + translations of it in our language; one attached to Oliver’s + edition of Cicero’s Thoughts, the other by Mr. Danby, published in + 1829. Of these we have freely availed ourselves, and as freely we + express our acknowledgments.</p> + + <hr class="tiny"/> + + + + +<h3>BOOK VI.</h3> + +<h4>SCIPIO’S DREAM.</h4> + + +<div class="unclear"> +<p>I. <span class="first">Therefore</span> you rely upon all the prudence of this rule, which has + derived its very name (<i>prudentia</i>) from foreseeing (<i>a + providendo</i>). Wherefore the citizen must so prepare himself as to + be always armed against those things which trouble the constitution + of a state. And that <a id="page-455"></a><span class="pgnum">455</span>dissension of the citizens, when one party + separates from and attacks another, is called sedition.</p> + +<p>And in truth in civil dissensions, as the good are of more + importance than the many, I think that we should regard the weight + of the citizens, and not their number.</p> + +<p>For the lusts, being severe mistresses of the thoughts, command and + compel many an unbridled action. And as they cannot be satisfied or + appeased by any means, they urge those whom they have inflamed with + their allurements to every kind of atrocity.</p> + +<p>II. Which indeed was so much the greater in him because though the + cause of the colleagues was identical, not only was their + unpopularity not equal, but the influence of Gracchus was employed + in mitigating the hatred borne to Claudius.</p> + +<p>Who encountered the number of the chiefs and nobles with these + words, and left behind him that mournful and dignified expression + of his gravity and influence.</p> + +<p>That, as he writes, a thousand men might every day descend into the + forum with cloaks dyed in purple.</p> + +<p class="comment">[<i>The next paragraph is unintelligible.</i>]</p> + +<p>For our ancestors wished marriages to be firmly established.</p> + +<p>There is a speech extant of Lælius with which we are all + acquainted, expressing how pleasing to the immortal gods are the * * * and * * * of the priests.</p> + +<p>III. Cicero, writing about the Commonwealth, in imitation of Plato, + has related the story of the return of Er the Pamphylian to life; + who, as he says, had come to life again after he had been placed on + the funeral pile, and related many secrets about the shades below; + not speaking, like Plato, in a fabulous imitation of truth, but + using a certain reasonable invention of an ingenious dream, + cleverly intimating that these things which were uttered about the + immortality of the soul, and about heaven, are not the inventions + of dreaming philosophers, nor the incredible fables which the + Epicureans ridicule, but the conjectures of wise men. He insinuates + that that Scipio who by the subjugation of Carthage obtained + Africanus as a surname for his family, gave notice to Scipio the + son of Paulus of the treachery which threatened him from his + relations, and the course of fate, because by the necessity of + numbers he was confined in the period of a perfect life, and he + says that he in the fifty-sixth year of his age * * *</p> + +<p>IV. Some of our religion who love Plato, on account of his + admirable kind of eloquence, and of some correct opinions which he + held, say that he had some opinions similar to my own touching the + resurrection of the dead, which subject Tully touches on in his + treatise on the Commonwealth, and says that he was rather jesting + than intending to say that was true. For he asserts that a man + returned to life, and related some stories which harmonized with + the discussions of the Platonists.</p> + +<p>V. In this point the imitation has especially preserved the + likeness of the work, because, as Plato, in the conclusion of his + volume, represents a certain person who had returned to life, which + he appeared to have quitted, as indicating what is the condition of + souls when stripped of the <a id="page-456"></a><span class="pgnum">456</span>body, with the addition of a certain + not unnecessary description of the spheres and stars, an appearance + of circumstances indicating things of the same kind is related by + the Scipio of Cicero, as having been brought before him in sleep.</p> + +<p>VI. Tully is found to have preserved this arrangement with no less + judgment than genius. After, in every condition of the + Commonwealth, whether of leisure or business, he has given the palm + to justice, he has placed the sacred abodes of the immortal souls, + and the secrets of the heavenly regions, on the very summit of his + completed work, indicating whither they must come, or rather + return, who have managed the republic with prudence, justice, + fortitude, and moderation. But that Platonic relater of secrets was + a man of the name of Er, a Pamphylian by nation, a soldier by + profession, who, after he appeared to have died from wounds + received in battle, and twelve days afterward was about to receive + the honors of the funeral pile with the others who were slain at + the same time, suddenly either recovering his life, or else never + having lost it, as if he were giving a public testimony, related to + all men all that he had done or seen in the days that he had thus + passed between life and death. Although Cicero, as if himself + conscious of the truth, grieves that this story has been ridiculed + by the ignorant, still, avoiding giving an example of foolish + reproach, he preferred speaking of the relater as of one awakened + from a swoon rather than restored to life.</p> + +<p>VII. And before we look at the words of the dream we must explain + what kind of persons they are by whom Cicero says that even the + account of Plato was ridiculed, who are not apprehensive that the + same thing may happen to them. Nor by this expression does he wish + the ignorant mob to be understood, but a kind of men who are + ignorant of the truth, though pretending to be philosophers with a + display of learning, who, it was notorious, had read such things, + and were eager to find faults. We will say, therefore, who they are + whom he reports as having levelled light reproaches against so + great a philosopher, and who of them has even left an accusation of + him committed to writing, etc. The whole faction of the Epicureans, + always wandering at an equal distance from truth, and thinking + everything ridiculous which they do not understand, has ridiculed + the sacred volume, and the most venerable mysteries of nature. But + Colotes, who is somewhat celebrated and remarkable for his + loquacity among the pupils of Epicurus, has even recorded in a book + the bitter reproaches which he aims at him. But since the other + arguments which he foolishly urges have no connection with the + dream of which we are now talking, we will pass them over at + present, and attend only to the calumny which will stick both to + Cicero and Plato, unless it is silenced. He says that a fable ought + not to have been invented by a philosopher, since no kind of + falsehood is suitable to professors of truth. For why, says he, if + you wish to give us a notion of heavenly things and to teach us the + nature of souls, did you not do so by a simple and plain + explanation? Why was a character invented, and circumstances, and + strange events, and a scene of cunningly adduced falsehood + arranged, to pollute the very door of the investigation of truth by + a lie? Since these things, though they are said of the Platonic Er, + do also attack the rest of our dreaming Africanus.</p> + +<p><a id="page-457"></a><span class="pgnum">457</span>VIII. This occasion incited Scipio to relate his dream, which he + declares that he had buried in silence for a long time. For when + Lælius was complaining that there were no statues of Nasica erected + in any public place, as a reward for his having slain the tyrant, + Scipio replied in these words: “But although the consciousness + itself of great deeds is to wise men the most ample reward of + virtue, yet that divine nature ought to have, not statues fixed in + lead, nor triumphs with withering laurels, but some more stable and + lasting kinds of rewards.” “What are they?” said Lælius. “Then,” + said Scipio, “suffer me, since we have now been keeping holiday for + three days, * * * etc.” By which preface he came to the relation of + his dream; pointing out that those were the more stable and lasting + kinds of rewards which he himself had seen in heaven reserved for + good governors of commonwealths.</p> +</div> + +<p>IX. When I had arrived in Africa, where I was, as you are aware, +military tribune of the fourth legion under the consul Manilius, there +was nothing of which I was more earnestly desirous than to see King +Masinissa, who, for very just reasons, had been always the especial +friend of our family. When I was introduced to him, the old man embraced +me, shed tears, and then, looking up to heaven, exclaimed—I thank thee, +O supreme Sun, and ye also, ye other celestial beings, that before I +depart from this life I behold in my kingdom, and in this my palace, +Publius Cornelius Scipio, by whose mere name I seem to be reanimated; so +completely and indelibly is the recollection of that best and most +invincible of men, Africanus, imprinted in my mind.</p> + +<p>After this, I inquired of him concerning the affairs of his kingdom. He, +on the other hand, questioned me about the condition of our +Commonwealth, and in this mutual interchange of conversation we passed +the whole of that day.</p> + +<p>X. In the evening we were entertained in a manner worthy the +magnificence of a king, and carried on our discourse for a considerable +part of the night. And during all this time the old man spoke of nothing +but Africanus, all whose actions, and even remarkable sayings, he +remembered distinctly. At last, when we retired to bed, I fell into a +more profound sleep than usual, both because I was fatigued with my +journey, and because I had sat up the greatest part of the night.</p> + +<p>Here I had the following dream, occasioned, as I verily believe, by our +preceding conversation; for it frequently happens that the thoughts and +discourses which have employed us in the daytime produce in our sleep an +effect somewhat similar to that which Ennius writes happened to him +about Homer, of whom, in his waking hours, he used frequently <a id="page-458"></a><span class="pgnum">458</span>to think +and speak.</p> + +<p>Africanus, I thought, appeared to me in that shape, with which I was +better acquainted from his picture than from any personal knowledge of +him. When I perceived it was he, I confess I trembled with +consternation; but he addressed me, saying, Take courage, my Scipio; be +not afraid, and carefully remember what I shall say to you.</p> + +<p>XI. Do you see that city Carthage, which, though brought under the Roman +yoke by me, is now renewing former wars, and cannot live in peace? (and +he pointed to Carthage from a lofty spot, full of stars, and brilliant, +and glittering)—to attack which city you are this day arrived in a +station not much superior to that of a private soldier. Before two +years, however, are elapsed, you shall be consul, and complete its +overthrow; and you shall obtain, by your own merit, the surname of +Africanus, which as yet belongs to you no otherwise than as derived from +me. And when you have destroyed Carthage, and received the honor of a +triumph, and been made censor, and, in quality of ambassador, visited +Egypt, Syria, Asia, and Greece, you shall be elected a second time +consul in your absence, and, by utterly destroying Numantia, put an end +to a most dangerous war.</p> + +<p>But when you have entered the Capitol in your triumphal car, you shall +find the Roman Commonwealth all in a ferment, through the intrigues of +my grandson Tiberius Gracchus.</p> + +<p>XII. It is on this occasion, my dear Africanus, that you show your +country the greatness of your understanding, capacity, and prudence. But +I see that the destiny, however, of that time is, as it were, uncertain; +for when your age shall have accomplished seven times eight revolutions +of the sun, and your fatal hours shall be marked put by the natural +product of these two numbers, each of which is esteemed a perfect one, +but for different reasons, then shall the whole city have recourse to +you alone, and place its hopes in your auspicious name. On you the +senate, <a id="page-459"></a><span class="pgnum">459</span>all good citizens, the allies, the people of Latium, shall cast +their eyes; on you the preservation of the State shall entirely depend. +In a word, <i>if you escape the impious machinations of your relatives</i>, +you will, in quality of dictator, establish order and tranquillity in +the Commonwealth.</p> + +<p>When on this Lælius made an exclamation, and the rest of the company +groaned loudly, Scipio, with a gentle smile, said, I entreat you, do not +wake me out of my dream, but have patience, and hear the rest.</p> + +<p>XIII. Now, in order to encourage you, my dear Africanus, continued the +shade of my ancestor, to defend the State with the greater cheerfulness, +be assured that, for all those who have in any way conduced to the +preservation, defence, and enlargement of their native country, there is +a certain place in heaven where they shall enjoy an eternity of +happiness. For nothing on earth is more agreeable to God, the Supreme +Governor of the universe, than the assemblies and societies of men +united together by laws, which are called states. It is from heaven +their rulers and preservers came, and thither they return.</p> + +<p>XIV. Though at these words I was extremely troubled, not so much at the +fear of death as at the perfidy of my own relations, yet I recollected +myself enough to inquire whether he himself, my father Paulus, and +others whom we look upon as dead, were really living.</p> + +<p>Yes, truly, replied he, they all enjoy life who have escaped from the +chains of the body as from a prison. But as to what you call life on +earth, that is no more than one form of death. But see; here comes your +father Paulus towards you! And as soon as I observed him, my eyes burst +out into a flood of tears; but he took me in his arms, embraced me, and +bade me not weep.</p> + +<p>XV. When my first transports subsided, and I regained the liberty of +speech, I addressed my father thus: Thou best and most venerable of +parents, since this, as I am informed by Africanus, is the only +substantial life, why do I linger on earth, and not rather haste to come +hither where you are?</p> + +<p>That, replied he, is impossible: unless that God, whose temple is all +that vast expanse you behold, shall free you <a id="page-460"></a><span class="pgnum">460</span>from the fetters of the +body, you can have no admission into this place. Mankind have received +their being on this very condition, that they should labor for the +preservation of that globe which is situated, as you see, in the midst +of this temple, and is called earth.</p> + +<p>Men are likewise endowed with a soul, which is a portion of the eternal +fires which you call stars and constellations; and which, being round, +spherical bodies, animated by divine intelligences, perform their cycles +and revolutions with amazing rapidity. It is your duty, therefore, my +Publius, and that of all who have any veneration for the Gods, to +preserve this wonderful union of soul and body; nor without the express +command of Him who gave you a soul should the least thought be +entertained of quitting human life, lest you seem to desert the post +assigned you by God himself.</p> + +<p>But rather follow the examples of your grandfather here, and of me, your +father, in paying a strict regard to justice and piety; which is due in +a great degree to parents and relations, but most of all to our country. +Such a life as this is the true way to heaven, and to the company of +those, who, after having lived on earth and escaped from the body, +inhabit the place which you now behold.</p> + +<p>XVI. This was the shining circle, or zone, whose remarkable brightness +distinguishes it among the constellations, and which, after the Greeks, +you call the Milky Way.</p> + +<p>From thence, as I took a view of the universe, everything appeared +beautiful and admirable; for there those stars are to be seen that are +never visible from our globe, and everything appears of such magnitude +as we could not have imagined. The least of all the stars was that +removed farthest from heaven, and situated next to the earth; I mean our +moon, which shines with a borrowed light. Now, the globes of the stars +far surpass the magnitude of our earth, which at that distance appeared +so exceedingly small that I could not but be sensibly affected on seeing +our whole empire no larger than if we touched the earth, as it were, at +a single point.</p> + +<p>XVII. And as I continued to observe the earth with great attention, How +long, I pray you, said Africanus, <a id="page-461"></a><span class="pgnum">461</span>will your mind be fixed on that +object? why don’t you rather take a view of the magnificent temples +among which you have arrived? The universe is composed of nine circles, +or rather spheres, one of which is the heavenly one, and is exterior to +all the rest, which it embraces; being itself the Supreme God, and +bounding and containing the whole. In it are fixed those stars which +revolve with never-varying courses. Below this are seven other spheres, +which revolve in a contrary direction to that of the heavens. One of +these is occupied by the globe which on earth they call Saturn. Next to +that is the star of Jupiter, so benign and salutary to mankind. The +third in order is that fiery and terrible planet called Mars. Below +this, again, almost in the middle region, is the sun—the leader, +governor, and prince of the other luminaries; the soul of the world, +which it regulates and illumines; being of such vast size that it +pervades and gives light to all places. Then follow Venus and Mercury, +which attend, as it were, on the sun. Lastly, the moon, which shines +only in the reflected beams of the sun, moves in the lowest sphere of +all. Below this, if we except that gift of the Gods, the soul, which has +been given by the liberality of the Gods to the human race, everything +is mortal, and tends to dissolution; but above the moon all is eternal. +For the earth, which is the ninth globe, and occupies the centre, is +immovable, and, being the lowest, all others gravitate towards it.</p> + +<p>XVIII. When I had recovered myself from the astonishment occasioned by +such a wonderful prospect, I thus addressed Africanus: Pray what is this +sound that strikes my ears in so loud and agreeable a manner? To which +he replied: It is that which is called the <i>music of the spheres</i>, being +produced by their motion and impulse; and being formed by unequal +intervals, but such as are divided according to the justest proportion, +it produces, by duly tempering acute with grave sounds, various concerts +of harmony. For it is impossible that motions so great should be +performed without any noise; and it is agreeable to nature that the +extremes on one side should produce sharp, and on the other flat sounds. +For which reason the sphere of the fixed stars, being the highest, and +being <a id="page-462"></a><span class="pgnum">462</span>carried with a more rapid velocity, moves with a shrill and acute +sound; whereas that of the moon, being the lowest, moves with a very +flat one. As to the earth, which makes the ninth sphere, it remains +immovably fixed in the middle or lowest part of the universe. But those +eight revolving circles, in which both Mercury and Venus are moved with +the same celerity, give out sounds that are divided by seven distinct +intervals, which is generally the regulating number of all things.</p> + +<p>This celestial harmony has been imitated by learned musicians both on +stringed instruments and with the voice, whereby they have opened to +themselves a way to return to the celestial regions, as have likewise +many others who have employed their sublime genius while on earth in +cultivating the divine sciences.</p> + +<p>By the amazing noise of this sound the ears of mankind have been in some +degree deafened; and indeed hearing is the dullest of all the human +senses. Thus, the people who dwell near the cataracts of the Nile, which +are called Catadupa<a id="FNA-348"></a><a href="#FN-348"><sup>348</sup></a>, are, by the excessive roar which that river +makes in precipitating itself from those lofty mountains, entirely +deprived of the sense of hearing. And so inconceivably great is this +sound which is produced by the rapid motion of the whole universe, that +the human ear is no more capable of receiving it than the eye is able to +look steadfastly and directly on the sun, whose beams easily dazzle the +strongest sight.</p> + +<p>While I was busied in admiring the scene of wonders, I could not help +casting my eyes every now and then on the earth.</p> + +<p>XIX. On which Africanus said, I perceive that you are still employed in +contemplating the seat and residence of mankind. But if it appears to +you so small, as in fact it really is, despise its vanities, and fix +your attention forever on these heavenly objects. Is it possible that +you should attain any human applause or glory that is worth the +contending for? The earth, you see, is peopled but in a very few places, +and those, too, of small extent; and they appear like so many little +spots of green scattered through vast, uncultivated deserts. And those +who inhabit the <a id="page-463"></a><span class="pgnum">463</span>earth are not only so remote from each other as to be +cut off from all mutual correspondence, but their situation being in +oblique or contrary parts of the globe, or perhaps in those +diametrically opposite to yours, all expectation of universal fame must +fall to the ground.</p> + +<p>XX. You may likewise observe that the same globe of the earth is girt +and surrounded with certain zones, whereof those two that are most +remote from each other, and lie under the opposite poles of heaven, are +congealed with frost; but that one in the middle, which is far the +largest, is scorched with the intense heat of the sun. The other two are +habitable, one towards the south, the inhabitants of which are your +antipodes, with whom you have no connection; the other, towards the +north, is that which you inhabit, whereof a very small part, as you may +see, falls to your share. For the whole extent of what you see is, as it +were, but a little island, narrow at both ends and wide in the middle, +which is surrounded by the sea which on earth you call the great +Atlantic Ocean, and which, notwithstanding this magnificent name, you +see is very insignificant. And even in these cultivated and well-known +countries, has yours, or any of our names, ever passed the heights of +the Caucasus or the currents of the Ganges? In what other parts to the +north or the south, or where the sun rises and sets, will your names +ever be heard? And if we leave these out of the question, how small a +space is there left for your glory to spread itself abroad; and how long +will it remain in the memory of those whose minds are now full of it?</p> + +<p>XXI. Besides all this, if the progeny of any future generation should +wish to transmit to their posterity the praises of any one of us which +they have heard from their forefathers, yet the deluges and combustions +of the earth, which must necessarily happen at their destined periods, +will prevent our obtaining, not only an eternal, but even a durable +glory. And, after all, what does it signify whether those who shall +hereafter be born talk of you, when those who have lived before you, +whose number was perhaps not less, and whose merit certainly greater, +were not so much as acquainted with your name?</p> + +<p>XXII. Especially since not one of those who shall hear <a id="page-464"></a><span class="pgnum">464</span>of us is able to +retain in his memory the transactions of a single year. The bulk of +mankind, indeed, measure their year by the return of the sun, which is +only one star. But when all the stars shall have returned to the place +whence they set out, and after long periods shall again exhibit the same +aspect of the whole heavens, that is what ought properly to be called +the revolution of a year, though I scarcely dare attempt to enumerate +the vast multitude of ages contained in it. For as the sun in old time +was eclipsed, and seemed to be extinguished, at the time when the soul +of Romulus penetrated into these eternal mansions, so, when all the +constellations and stars shall revert to their primary position, and the +sun shall at the same point and time be again eclipsed, then you may +consider that the grand year is completed. Be assured, however, that the +twentieth part of it is not yet elapsed.</p> + +<p>XXIII. Wherefore, if you have no hopes of returning to this place where +great and good men enjoy all that their souls can wish for, of what +value, pray, is all that human glory, which can hardly endure for a +small portion of one year?</p> + +<p>If, then, you wish to elevate your views to the contemplation of this +eternal seat of splendor, you will not be satisfied with the praises of +your fellow-mortals, nor with any human rewards that your exploits can +obtain; but Virtue herself must point out to you the true and only +object worthy of your pursuit. Leave to others to speak of you as they +may, for speak they will. Their discourses will be confined to the +narrow limits of the countries you see, nor will their duration be very +extensive; for they will perish like those who utter them, and will be +no more remembered by their posterity.</p> + +<p>XXIV. When he had ceased to speak in this manner, I said, O Africanus, +if indeed the door of heaven is open to those who have deserved well of +their country, although, indeed, from my childhood I have always +followed yours and my father’s steps, and have not neglected to imitate +your glory, still, I will from henceforth strive to follow them more +closely.</p> + +<p>Follow them, then, said he, and consider your body only, not yourself, +as mortal. For it is not your outward form <a id="page-465"></a><span class="pgnum">465</span>which constitutes your +being, but your mind; not that substance which is palpable to the +senses, but your spiritual nature. <i>Know, then, that you are a God</i>—for +a God it must be, which flourishes, and feels, and recollects, and +foresees, and governs, regulates and moves the body over which it is +set, as the Supreme Ruler does the world which is subject to him. For as +that Eternal Being moves whatever is mortal in this world, so the +immortal mind of man moves the frail body with which it is connected.</p> + +<p>XXV. For whatever is always moving must be eternal; but that which +derives its motion from a power which is foreign to itself, when that +motion ceases must itself lose its animation.</p> + +<p>That alone, then, which moves itself can never cease to be moved, +because it can never desert itself. Moreover, it must be the source, and +origin, and principle of motion in all the rest. There can be nothing +prior to a principle, for all things must originate from it; and it +cannot itself derive its existence from any other source, for if it did +it would no longer be a principle. And if it had no beginning, it can +have no end; for a beginning that is put an end to will neither be +renewed by any other cause, nor will it produce anything else of itself. +All things, therefore, must originate from one source. Thus it follows +that motion must have its source in something which is moved by itself, +and which can neither have a beginning nor an end. Otherwise all the +heavens and all nature must perish, for it is impossible that they can +of themselves acquire any power of producing motion in themselves.</p> + +<p>XXVI. As, therefore, it is plain that what is moved by itself must be +eternal, who will deny that this is the general condition and nature of +minds? For as everything is inanimate which is moved by an impulse +exterior to itself, so what is animated is moved by an interior impulse +of its own; for this is the peculiar nature and power of mind. And if +that alone has the power of self-motion, it can neither have had a +beginning, nor can it have an end.</p> + +<p>Do you, therefore, exercise this mind of yours in the best pursuits. And +the best pursuits are those which consist in promoting the good of your +country. Such employments will speed the flight of your mind to this its +<a id="page-466"></a><span class="pgnum">466</span>proper abode; and its flight will be still more rapid, if, even while +it is enclosed in the body, it will look abroad, and disengage itself as +much as possible from its bodily dwelling, by the contemplation of +things which are external to itself.</p> + +<p>This it should do to the utmost of its power. For the minds of those who +have given themselves up to the pleasures of the body, paying, as it +were, a servile obedience to their lustful impulses, have violated the +laws of God and man; and therefore, when they are separated from their +bodies, flutter continually round the earth on which they lived, and are +not allowed to return to this celestial region till they have been +purified by the revolution of many ages.</p> + +<p>Thus saying, he vanished, and I awoke from my dream.</p> + + <hr class="tiny"/> + + + + +<h4>A FRAGMENT.</h4> + + +<p>And although it is most desirable that fortune should remain forever in +the most brilliant possible condition, nevertheless, the equability of +life excites less interest than those changeable conditions wherein +prosperity suddenly revives out of the most desperate and ruinous +circumstances.</p> + + + + +<h2>THE END.</h2> + +<hr class="front"/> + + +<h2>FOOTNOTES:</h2> + +<div class="FN"><p><a id="FN-1"></a><a href="#FNA-1"><sup>1</sup></a> Archilochus was a native of Paros, and flourished about +714-676 <span class="sc">b.c.</span> His poems were chiefly Iambics of bitter satire. Horace +speaks of him as the inventor of Iambics, and calls himself his pupil.</p> + +<div class="poem"> +<p class="L6" style="margin-left: 14ex;">Parios ego primus Iambos</p> +<p>Ostendi Latio, numeros animosque secutus</p> +<p>Archilochi, non res et agentia verba Lycamben.</p> +<p class="poet">Epist. I. xix. 25.</p> +</div> + +<p class="cont">And in another place he says,</p> + +<div class="poem"> +<p>Archilochum proprio rabies armavit Iambo—A.P. 74.</p> +</div> +</div> + +<div class="FN"><p><a id="FN-2"></a><a href="#FNA-2"><sup>2</sup></a> This was Livius Andronicus: he is supposed to have been a +native of Tarentum, and he was made prisoner by the Romans, during their +wars in Southern Italy; owing to which he became the slave of M. Livius +Salinator. He wrote both comedies and tragedies, of which Cicero (Brutus +18) speaks very contemptuously, as “Livianæ fabulæ non satis dignæ quæ +iterum legantur”—not worth reading a second time. He also wrote a Latin +Odyssey, and some hymns, and died probably about 221 <span class="sc">b.c.</span></p> +</div> + +<div class="FN"><p><a id="FN-3"></a><a href="#FNA-3"><sup>3</sup></a> C. Fabius, surnamed Pictor, painted the temple of Salus, +which the dictator C. Junius Brutus Bubulus dedicated 302 <span class="sc">b.c.</span> The +temple was destroyed by fire in the reign of Claudius. The painting is +highly praised by Dionysius, xvi. 6.</p> +</div> + +<div class="FN"><p><a id="FN-4"></a><a href="#FNA-4"><sup>4</sup></a> For an account of the ancient Greek philosophers, see the +sketch at the end of the Disputations.</p> +</div> + +<div class="FN"><p><a id="FN-5"></a><a href="#FNA-5"><sup>5</sup></a> Isocrates was born at Athens 436 <span class="sc">b.c.</span> He was a pupil of +Gorgias, Prodicus, and Socrates. He opened a school of rhetoric, at +Athens, with great success. He died by his own hand at the age of +ninety-eight.</p> +</div> + +<div class="FN"><p><a id="FN-6"></a><a href="#FNA-6"><sup>6</sup></a> So Horace joins these two classes as inventors of all kinds +of improbable fictions:</p> + +<div class="poem"> +<p class="L6" style="margin-left: 18ex;">Pictoribus atque poetis</p> +<p>Quidlibet audendi semper fuit æqua potestas.—A. P. 9.</p> +</div> + +<p class="cont">Which Roscommon translates:</p> + +<div class="poem"> +<p>Painters and poets have been still allow’d</p> +<p>Their pencil and their fancies unconfined.</p> +</div> +</div> + +<div class="FN"><p><a id="FN-7"></a><a href="#FNA-7"><sup>7</sup></a> Epicharmus was a native of Cos, but lived at Megara, in +Sicily, and when Megara was destroyed, removed to Syracuse, and lived at +the court of Hiero, where he became the first writer of comedies, so +that Horace ascribes the invention of comedy to him, and so does +Theocritus. He lived to a great age.</p> +</div> + +<div class="FN"><p><a id="FN-8"></a><a href="#FNA-8"><sup>8</sup></a> Pherecydes was a native of Scyros, one of the Cyclades; and +is said to have obtained his knowledge from the secret books of the +Phœnicians. He is said also to have been a pupil of Pittacus, the rival +of Thales, and the master of Pythagoras. His doctrine was that there +were three principles (<span class="greek">Ζεὺς</span>, or Æther; <span class="greek">Χθὼν</span>, or Chaos; and <span class="greek">Χρόνος</span>, or +Time) and four elements (Fire, Earth, Air, and Water), from which +everything that exists was formed.—<i>Vide</i> Smith’s Dict. Gr. and Rom. +Biog.</p> +</div> + +<div class="FN"><p><a id="FN-9"></a><a href="#FNA-9"><sup>9</sup></a> Archytas was a native of Tarentum, and is said to have +saved the life of Plato by his influence with the tyrant Dionysius. He +was especially great as a mathematician and geometrician, so that Horace +calls him</p> + +<div class="poem"> +<p>Maris et terra numeroque carentis arenæ</p> +<p>Mensorem.</p> +<p class="poet">Od. i. 28.1.</p> +</div> + +<p>Plato is supposed to have learned some of his views from him, and +Aristotle to have borrowed from him every idea of the Categories.</p> +</div> + +<div class="FN"><p><a id="FN-10"></a><a href="#FNA-10"><sup>10</sup></a> This was not Timæus the historian, but a native of Locri, +who is said also in the De Finibus (c. 29) to have been a teacher of +Plato. There is a treatise extant bearing his name, which is, however, +probably spurious, and only an abridgment of Plato’s dialogue Timæus.</p> +</div> + +<div class="FN"><p><a id="FN-11"></a><a href="#FNA-11"><sup>11</sup></a> Dicæarchus was a native of Messana, in Sicily, though he +lived chiefly in Greece. He was one of the later disciples of Aristotle. +He was a great geographer, politician, historian, and philosopher, and +died about 285 <span class="sc">b.c.</span></p> +</div> + +<div class="FN"><p><a id="FN-12"></a><a href="#FNA-12"><sup>12</sup></a> Aristoxenus was a native of Tarentum, and also a pupil of +Aristotle. We know nothing of his opinions except that he held the soul +to be a <i>harmony</i> of the body; a doctrine which had been already +discussed by Plato in the Phædo, and combated by Aristotle. He was a +great musician, and the chief portions of his works which have come down +to us are fragments of some musical treatises.—Smith’s Dict. Gr. and +Rom. Biog.; to which source I must acknowledge my obligation for nearly +the whole of these biographical notes.</p> +</div> + +<div class="FN"><p><a id="FN-13"></a><a href="#FNA-13"><sup>13</sup></a> The Simonides here meant is the celebrated poet of Ceos, +the perfecter of elegiac poetry among the Greeks. He flourished about +the time of the Persian war. Besides his poetry, he is said to have been +the inventor of some method of aiding the memory. He died at the court +of Hiero, 467 <span class="sc">b.c.</span></p> +</div> + +<div class="FN"><p><a id="FN-14"></a><a href="#FNA-14"><sup>14</sup></a> Theodectes was a native of Phaselis, in Pamphylia, a +distinguished rhetorician and tragic poet, and flourished in the time of +Philip of Macedon. He was a pupil of Isocrates, and lived at Athens, and +died there at the age of forty-one.</p> +</div> + +<div class="FN"><p><a id="FN-15"></a><a href="#FNA-15"><sup>15</sup></a> Cineas was a Thessalian, and (as is said in the text) came +to Rome as ambassador from Pyrrhus after the battle of Heraclea, 280 +<span class="sc">b.c.</span>, and his memory is said to have been so great that on the day after +his arrival he was able to address all the senators and knights by name. +He probably died before Pyrrhus returned to Italy, 276 <span class="sc">b.c.</span></p> +</div> + +<div class="FN"><p><a id="FN-16"></a><a href="#FNA-16"><sup>16</sup></a> Charmadas, called also Charmides, was a fellow-pupil with +Philo, the Larissæan of Clitomachus, the Carthaginian. He is said by +some authors to have founded a fourth academy.</p> +</div> + +<div class="FN"><p><a id="FN-17"></a><a href="#FNA-17"><sup>17</sup></a> Metrodorus was a minister of Mithridates the Great; and +employed by him as supreme judge in Pontus, and afterward as an +ambassador. Cicero speaks of him in other places (De Orat. ii. 88) as a +man of wonderful memory.</p> +</div> + +<div class="FN"><p><a id="FN-18"></a><a href="#FNA-18"><sup>18</sup></a> Quintus Hortensius was eight years older than Cicero; and, +till Cicero’s fame surpassed his, he was accounted the most eloquent of +all the Romans. He was Verres’s counsel in the prosecution conducted +against him by Cicero. Seneca relates that his memory was so great that +he could come out of an auction and repeat the catalogue backward. He +died 50 <span class="sc">b.c.</span></p> +</div> + +<div class="FN"><p><a id="FN-19"></a><a href="#FNA-19"><sup>19</sup></a> This treatise is one which has not come down to us, but +which had been lately composed by Cicero in order to comfort himself for +the loss of his daughter.</p> +</div> + +<div class="FN"><p><a id="FN-20"></a><a href="#FNA-20"><sup>20</sup></a> The epigram is,</p> + +<div class="poem"> +<p><span class="greek">Εἴπας Ἥλιε χαῖρε, Κλεόμβροτος Ὥμβρακιώτης</span></p> +<p class="L2"><span class="greek">ἥλατ’ ἀφ’ ὑψηλοῦ τείχεος εἰς Ἀΐδην,</span></p> +<p><span class="greek">ἄξιον οὐδὲν ἰδὼν θανάτου κακὸν, ἀλλὰ Πλάτωνος</span></p> +<p class="L2"><span class="greek">ἓν τὸ περὶ ψύχης γράμμ’ ἀναλεξάμενος.</span></p> +</div> + +<p>Which may be translated, perhaps,</p> + +<div class="poem"> +<p>Farewell, O sun, Cleombrotus exclaim’d,</p> +<p class="L2">Then plunged from off a height beneath the sea;</p> +<p>Stung by pain, of no disgrace ashamed,</p> +<p class="L2">But moved by Plato’s high philosophy.</p> +</div> +</div> + +<div class="FN"><p><a id="FN-21"></a><a href="#FNA-21"><sup>21</sup></a> This is alluded to by Juvenal:</p> + +<div class="poem"> +<p>Provida Pompeio dederat Campania febres</p> +<p>Optandas: sed multæ urbes et publica vota</p> +<p>Vicerunt. Igitur Fortuna ipsius et Urbis,</p> +<p>Servatum victo caput abstulit.—Sat. x. 283.</p> +</div> +</div> + + +<div class="FN"><p><a id="FN-22"></a><a href="#FNA-22"><sup>22</sup></a> Pompey’s second wife was Julia, the daughter of Julius Cæsar, +she died the year before the death of Crassus, in Parthia. Virgil +speaks of Cæsar and Pompey as relations, using the same expression +(socer) as Cicero:</p> + +<div class="poem"> +<p>Aggeribus socer Alpinis atque arce Monœci</p> +<p>Descendens, gener adversis instructus Eois.—Æn. vi. 830.</p> +</div> +</div> + + +<div class="FN"><p><a id="FN-23"></a><a href="#FNA-23"><sup>23</sup></a> This idea is beautifully expanded by Byron:</p> + +<div class="poem"> +<p>Yet if, as holiest men have deem’d, there be</p> +<p>A land of souls beyond that sable shore</p> +<p>To shame the doctrine of the Sadducee</p> +<p>And sophist, madly vain or dubious lore,</p> +<p>How sweet it were in concert to adore</p> +<p>With those who made our mortal labors light,</p> +<p>To hear each voice we fear’d to hear no more.</p> +<p>Behold each mighty shade reveal’d to sight,</p> +<p>The Bactrian, Samian sage, and all who taught the right!</p> +</div> + +<p class="poet"><i>Childe Harold</i>, ii.</p> +</div> + +<div class="FN"><p><a id="FN-24"></a><a href="#FNA-24"><sup>24</sup></a> The epitaph in the original is:</p> + +<div class="poem"> +<p><span class="greek">Ὦ ξεῖν’ ἀγγεῖλον Λακεδαιμονίοις ὅτι τῇδε</span></p> +<p class="L2"><span class="greek">κείμεθα, τοῐς κείνων πειθόμενοι νομίμοις.</span></p> +</div> +</div> + +<div class="FN"><p><a id="FN-25"></a><a href="#FNA-25"><sup>25</sup></a> This was expressed in the Greek verses,</p> + +<div class="poem"> +<p><span class="greek">Ἀρχὴς μὲν μὴ φῦναι ἐπιχθονίοισιν ἄριστον,</span></p> +<p><span class="greek">φύντα δ’ ὅπως ὤκιστα πύλας Ἀΐδϋο περῆσαι</span></p> +</div> + +<p class="cont">which by some authors are attributed to Homer.</p> +</div> + +<div class="FN"><p><a id="FN-26"></a><a href="#FNA-26"><sup>26</sup></a> This is the first fragment of the Cresphontes.—Ed. Var. +vii., p. 594.</p> + +<div class="poem"> +<p><span class="greek">Ἔδει γὰρ ἡμᾶς σύλλογον ποιουμένους</span></p> +<p><span class="greek">Τὸν φύντα θρηνεῖν, εἰς ὅσ’ ἔρχεται κακά.</span></p> +<p><span class="greek">Τὸν δ’ αὖ θανόντα καὶ πόνων πεπαυμένον</span></p> +<p><span class="greek">χαίροντας εὐφημοῖντας ἐκπέμειν δόμων</span></p> +</div> +</div> + +<div class="FN"><p><a id="FN-27"></a><a href="#FNA-27"><sup>27</sup></a> The Greek verses are quoted by Plutarch:</p> + +<div class="poem"> +<p class="L4"><span class="greek">Ἤπου νήπιε, ἠλίθιοι φρένες ἀνδρῶν</span></p> +<p class="L2"><span class="greek">Εὐθύνοος κεῖται μοιριδίῳ θανάτῳ</span></p> +<p><span class="greek">Οὐκ ἠν γὰρ ζώειν καλὸν αὐτῷ οὔτε γονεῦσι.</span></p> +</div> +</div> + +<div class="FN"><p><a id="FN-28"></a><a href="#FNA-28"><sup>28</sup></a> This refers to the story that when Eumolpus, the son of +Neptune, whose assistance the Eleusinians had called in against the +Athenians, had been slain by the Athenians, an oracle demanded the +sacrifice of one of the daughters of Erechtheus, the King of Athens. And +when one was drawn by lot, the others voluntarily accompanied her to +death.</p> +</div> + +<div class="FN"><p><a id="FN-29"></a><a href="#FNA-29"><sup>29</sup></a> Menœceus was son of Creon, and in the war of the Argives +against Thebes, Teresias declared that the Thebans should conquer if +Menœceus would sacrifice himself for his country; and accordingly he +killed himself outside the gates of Thebes.</p> +</div> + +<div class="FN"><p><a id="FN-30"></a><a href="#FNA-30"><sup>30</sup></a> The Greek is,</p> + +<div class="poem"> +<p><span class="greek">μήδε μοι ἄκλαυστος θάνατος μόλοι, ἀλλὰ φίλοισι</span></p> +<p class="L2"><span class="greek">ποιήσαιμι θανὼν ἄλγεα καὶ στοναχάς.</span></p> +</div> +</div> + +<div class="FN"><p><a id="FN-31"></a><a href="#FNA-31"><sup>31</sup></a> Soph. Trach. 1047.</p> +</div> + +<div class="FN"><p><a id="FN-32"></a><a href="#FNA-32"><sup>32</sup></a> The lines quoted by Cicero here appear to have come from +the Latin play of Prometheus by Accius; the ideas are borrowed, rather +than translated, from the Prometheus of Æschylus.</p> +</div> + +<div class="FN"><p><a id="FN-33"></a><a href="#FNA-33"><sup>33</sup></a> From <i>exerceo</i>.</p> +</div> + +<div class="FN"><p><a id="FN-34"></a><a href="#FNA-34"><sup>34</sup></a> Each soldier carried a stake, to help form a palisade in +front of the camp.</p> +</div> + +<div class="FN"><p><a id="FN-35"></a><a href="#FNA-35"><sup>35</sup></a> Insania—from <i>in</i>, a particle of negative force in +composition, and <i>sanus</i>, healthy, sound.</p> +</div> + +<div class="FN"><p><a id="FN-36"></a><a href="#FNA-36"><sup>36</sup></a> The man who first received this surname was L. Calpurnius +Piso, who was consul, 133 <span class="sc">b.c.</span>, in the Servile War.</p> +</div> + +<div class="FN"><p><a id="FN-37"></a><a href="#FNA-37"><sup>37</sup></a> The Greek is,</p> + +<div class="poem"> +<p><span class="greek">Ἀλλά μοι οἰδάνεται κραδίη χόλῳ ὅπποτ’ ἐκείνου</span></p> +<p><span class="greek">Μνήσομαι ὅς μ’ ἀσύφηλον ἐν Ἀργείοισιν ἔρεξεν.</span>—Il. ix. 642.</p> +</div> + +<p>I have given Pope’s translation in the text.</p> +</div> + +<div class="FN"><p><a id="FN-38"></a><a href="#FNA-38"><sup>38</sup></a> This is from the Theseus:</p> + +<div class="poem"> +<p><span class="greek">Ἐγὼ δὲ τοῦτο παρὰ σοφοῦ τινος μαθὼν</span></p> +<p><span class="greek">εὶς φροντίδας νοῦν συμφοράς τ’ ἐβαλλόμην</span></p> +<p><span class="greek">φυγάς τ’ ἐμαυτῷ προστιθεὶς πάτρας ἐμῆς.</span></p> +<p><span class="greek">θανάτους τ’ ἀώρους, καὶ κακῶν ἄλλας ὁδοὺς</span></p> +<p><span class="greek">ὡς, εἴ τι πάσχοιμ’ ὠν ἐδόξαζόν ποτε</span></p> +<p><span class="greek">Μή μοι νέορτον προσπεσὸν μᾶλλον δάκοι.</span></p> +</div> +</div> + +<div class="FN"><p><a id="FN-39"></a><a href="#FNA-39"><sup>39</sup></a> Ter. Phorm. II. i. 11.</p> +</div> + +<div class="FN"><p><a id="FN-40"></a><a href="#FNA-40"><sup>40</sup></a> This refers to the speech of Agamemnon in Euripides, in +the Iphigenia in Aulis,</p> + +<div class="poem"> +<p class="L6" style="margin-left: 10ex"><span class="greek">Ζηλῶ σε, γέρον,</span></p> +<p><span class="greek">ζηλῶ δ’ ἀνδρῶν ὃς ἀκίνδυνον</span></p> +<p><span class="greek">βίον ἐξεπέρασ’, ἀγνὼς, ἀκλεής.</span>—v. 15.</p> +</div> +</div> + +<div class="FN"><p><a id="FN-41"></a><a href="#FNA-41"><sup>41</sup></a> This is a fragment from the Hypsipyle:</p> + +<div class="poem"> +<p><span class="greek">Εφυ μὲν οὐδεὶς ὅστις οὐ πονεῖ βροτῶν</span></p> +<p><span class="greek">θάπτει τε τέκνα χἄτερ’ αὖ κτᾶται νεὰ,</span></p> +<p><span class="greek">αὐτός τε θνήσκει. καὶ τάδ’ ἄχθονται βροτοὶ</span></p> +<p><span class="greek">εἰς γῆν φέροντες γῆν ἀναγκαίως δ’ ἔχει</span></p> +<p><span class="greek">βίον θερίζειν ὥστε κάρπιμον στάχυν.</span></p> +</div> +</div> + +<div class="FN"><p class="nodist"><a id="FN-42"></a><a href="#FNA-42"><sup>42</sup></a></p> + +<div class="poem"> +<p><span class="greek">Πολλὰς ἐκ κεφαλῆς προθελύμνους ἕλκετο χαίτας.</span>—Il. x. 15.</p> +</div> +</div> + +<div class="FN"><p class="nodist"><a id="FN-43"></a><a href="#FNA-43"><sup>43</sup></a></p> + +<div class="poem"> +<p><span class="greek">Ἤτοι ὁ καππέδιον τὸ Ἀληΐον οἶος ἀλᾶτο</span></p> +<p><span class="greek">ὅν θυμὸν κατεδὼν, πάτον ἀνθρώπων ἀλεείνων.</span>—Il. vi. 201.</p> +</div> +</div> + +<div class="FN"><p><a id="FN-44"></a><a href="#FNA-44"><sup>44</sup></a> This is a translation from Euripides:</p> + +<div class="poem"> +<p><span class="greek">Ὥσθ’ ἵμερος μ’ ὑπῆλθε γῇ τε κ’ οὐρανῷ</span></p> +<p><span class="greek">λέξαι μολούσῃ δεῦρο Μηδείας τύχας.</span>—Med. 57.</p> +</div> +</div> + +<div class="FN"><p class="nodist"><a id="FN-45"></a><a href="#FNA-45"><sup>45</sup></a></p> + +<div class="poem"> +<p><span class="greek">Λίην γὰρ πολλοὶ καὶ ἐπήτριμοι ἤματα πάντα</span></p> +<p><span class="greek">πίπτουσιν, πότε κέν τις ἀναπνεύσειε πόνοιο;</span></p> +<p><span class="greek">ἀλλὰ χρὴ τὸν μὲν καταθαπτέμεν, ὅς κε θάνησι,</span></p> +<p><span class="greek">νηλέα θυμὸν ἔχοντας, ἔπ’ ἤματι δακρυσάντας.—</span></p> +<p class="poet">Hom. Il. xix. 226.</p> +</div> +</div> + +<div class="FN"><p><a id="FN-46"></a><a href="#FNA-46"><sup>46</sup></a> This is one of the fragments of Euripides which we are +unable to assign to any play in particular; it occurs Var. Ed. Tr. Inc. +167.</p> + +<div class="poem"> +<p><span class="greek">Εἰ μεν τόδ’ ἦμαρ πρῶτον ἦν κακουμένῳ</span></p> +<p><span class="greek">καὶ μὴ μακρὰν δὴ διὰ πόνων ἐναυστόλουν</span></p> +<p><span class="greek">εἰκὸς σφαδάζειν ἦν ἂν, ὡς νεόζυγα</span></p> +<p><span class="greek">πῶλον, χάλινον ἀρτίως δεδεγμένον</span></p> +<p><span class="greek">νῦν δ’ ἀμβλύς εἰμι, καὶ κατηρτυκὼς κακῶν.</span></p> +</div> +</div> + +<div class="FN"><p><a id="FN-47"></a><a href="#FNA-47"><sup>47</sup></a> This is only a fragment, preserved by Stobæus:</p> + +<div class="poem"> +<p><span class="greek">Τοὺς δ’ ἂν μεγίστους καὶ σοφωτάτους φρενὶ</span></p> +<p><span class="greek">τοιούσδ’ ἴδοις ἂν, οἶός ἐστι νῦν ὅδε,</span></p> +<p><span class="greek">καλῶς κακῶς πράσσοντι συμπαραινέσαι</span></p> +<p><span class="greek">ὅταν δὲ δαίμων ἀνδρὸς εὐτυχοῦς τὸ πρὶν</span></p> +<p><span class="greek">μάστιγ’ ἐπίσῃ τοῦ βίου παλίντροπον,</span></p> +<p><span class="greek">τὰ πολλὰ φροῦδα καὶ κακῶς εἰρημένα.</span></p> +</div> +</div> + +<div class="FN"><p class="nodist"><a id="FN-48"></a><a href="#FNA-48"><sup>48</sup></a></p> + +<div class="poem"> +<p><span class="greek">Ωκ. Οὐκοῦν Προμηθεῦ τοῦτο γιγνώσκεις ὅτι</span></p> +<p class="L2"><span class="greek">ὀργῆς νοσούσης εἰσὶν ἰατροὶ λόγοι.</span></p> +<p><span class="greek">Πρ. ἐάν τις ἐν καιρῷ γε μαλθάσσῃ κεάρ</span></p> +<p class="L2"><span class="greek">καὶ μὴ σφριγῶντα θυμὸν ἰσχναίνη βιᾳ.—</span></p> +<p class="poet">Æsch. Prom. v. 378.</p> +</div> +</div> + +<div class="FN"><p><a id="FN-49"></a><a href="#FNA-49"><sup>49</sup></a> Cicero alludes here to Il. vii. 211, which is thus +translated by Pope:</p> + +<div class="poem"> +<p>His massy javelin quivering in his hand,</p> +<p>He stood the bulwark of the Grecian band;</p> +<p>Through every Argive heart new transport ran,</p> +<p>All Troy stood trembling at the mighty man:</p> +<p>E’en Hector paused, and with new doubt oppress’d,</p> +<p>Felt his great heart suspended in his breast;</p> +<p>’Twas vain to seek retreat, and vain to fear,</p> +<p>Himself had challenged, and the foe drew near.</p> +</div> + +<p>But Melmoth (Note on the Familiar Letters of Cicero, book ii. Let. 23) +rightly accuses Cicero of having misunderstood Homer, who “by no means +represents Hector as being thus totally dismayed at the approach of his +adversary; and, indeed, it would have been inconsistent with the general +character of that hero to have described him under such circumstances of +terror.”</p> + +<div class="poem"> +<p><span class="greek">Τὸν δὲ καὶ Ἀργεῖοι μέγ’ ἐγήθεον εἰσορόωντες,</span></p> +<p><span class="greek">Τρωὰς δὲ τρόμος αἶνος ὑπήλυθε γυῖα ἕκαστον,</span></p> +<p><span class="greek">Ἕκτορι δ’ αὐτῷ θυμὸς ἐνὶ στήθεσσι πάτασσεν.</span></p> +</div> + +<p>But there is a great difference, as Dr. Clarke remarks, between <span class="greek">θυμὸς ἐνὶ στήθεσσι πάτασσεν</span> and <span class="greek">καρδέη ἔξω στηθέων ἔθρωσκεν</span>, or <span class="greek">τρόμος αἶνος +ὑπήλυθε γυῖα</span>.—<i>The Trojans</i>, says Homer, <i>trembled</i> at the sight of +Ajax, and even Hector himself felt some emotion in his breast.</p> +</div> + +<div class="FN"><p><a id="FN-50"></a><a href="#FNA-50"><sup>50</sup></a> Cicero means Scipio Nasica, who, in the riots consequent +on the reelection of Tiberius Gracchus to the tribunate, 133 <span class="sc">b.c.</span>, +having called in vain on the consul, Mucius Scævola, to save the +republic, attacked Gracchus himself, who was slain in the tumult.</p> +</div> + +<div class="FN"><p><a id="FN-51"></a><a href="#FNA-51"><sup>51</sup></a> <i>Morosus</i> is evidently derived from <i>mores</i>—“<i>Morosus</i>, +<i>mos</i>, stubbornness, self-will, etc.”—Riddle and Arnold, Lat. Dict.</p> +</div> + +<div class="FN"><p><a id="FN-52"></a><a href="#FNA-52"><sup>52</sup></a> In the original they run thus:</p> + +<div class="poem"> +<p><span class="greek">Οὔκ ἐστιν οὐδὲν δεινὸν ὧδ’ εἰπεῖν ἔπος,</span></p> +<p><span class="greek">Οὐδὲ πάθος, οὐδὲ ξυμφορὰ θεήλατος</span></p> +<p><span class="greek">ἧς οὐκ ἂν ἀροιτ’ ἄχθος ἀνθρώπον φύσις.</span></p> +</div> +</div> + +<div class="FN"><p><a id="FN-53"></a><a href="#FNA-53"><sup>53</sup></a> This passage is from the Eunuch of Terence, act i., sc. 1, +14.</p> +</div> + +<div class="FN"><p><a id="FN-54"></a><a href="#FNA-54"><sup>54</sup></a> These verses are from the Atreus of Accius.</p> +</div> + +<div class="FN"><p><a id="FN-55"></a><a href="#FNA-55"><sup>55</sup></a> This was Marcus Atilius Regulus, the story of whose +treatment by the Carthaginians in the first Punic War is well known to +everybody.</p> +</div> + +<div class="FN"><p><a id="FN-56"></a><a href="#FNA-56"><sup>56</sup></a> This was Quintus Servilius Cæpio, who, 105 <span class="sc">b.c.</span>, was +destroyed, with his army, by the Cimbri, it was believed as a judgment +for the covetousness which he had displayed in the plunder of Tolosa.</p> +</div> + +<div class="FN"><p><a id="FN-57"></a><a href="#FNA-57"><sup>57</sup></a> This was Marcus Aquilius, who, in the year 88 <span class="sc">b.c.</span>, was +sent against Mithridates as one of the consular legates; and, being +defeated, was delivered up to the king by the inhabitants of Mitylene. +Mithridates put him to death by pouring molten gold down his throat.</p> +</div> + +<div class="FN"><p><a id="FN-58"></a><a href="#FNA-58"><sup>58</sup></a> This was the elder brother of the triumvir Marcus Crassus, +87 <span class="sc">b.c.</span> He was put to death by Fimbria, who was in command of some of +the troops of Marius.</p> +</div> + +<div class="FN"><p><a id="FN-59"></a><a href="#FNA-59"><sup>59</sup></a> Lucius Cæsar and Caius Cæsar were relations (it is +uncertain in what degree) of the great Cæsar, and were killed by Fimbria +on the same occasion as Octavius.</p> +</div> + +<div class="FN"><p><a id="FN-60"></a><a href="#FNA-60"><sup>60</sup></a> M. Antonius was the grandfather of the triumvir; he was +murdered the same year, 87 <span class="sc">b.c.</span>, by Annius, when Marius and Cinna took +Rome.</p> +</div> + +<div class="FN"><p><a id="FN-61"></a><a href="#FNA-61"><sup>61</sup></a> This story is alluded to by Horace:</p> + +<div class="poem"> +<p>Districtus ensis cui super impiâ</p> +<p>Cervice pendet non Siculæ dapes</p> +<p class="L2">Dulcem elaborabunt saporem,</p> +<p class="L4">Non avium citharæve cantus</p> +<p>Somnum reducent.—iii. 1. 17.</p> +</div> +</div> + +<div class="FN"><p><a id="FN-62"></a><a href="#FNA-62"><sup>62</sup></a> Hieronymus was a Rhodian, and a pupil of Aristotle, +flourishing about 300 <span class="sc">b.c.</span> He is frequently mentioned by Cicero.</p> +</div> + +<div class="FN"><p><a id="FN-63"></a><a href="#FNA-63"><sup>63</sup></a> We know very little of Dinomachus. Some MSS. have +Clitomachus.</p> +</div> + +<div class="FN"><p><a id="FN-64"></a><a href="#FNA-64"><sup>64</sup></a> Callipho was in all probability a pupil of Epicurus, but +we have no certain information about him.</p> +</div> + +<div class="FN"><p><a id="FN-65"></a><a href="#FNA-65"><sup>65</sup></a> Diodorus was a Syrian, and succeeded Critolaus as the head +of the Peripatetic School at Athens.</p> +</div> + +<div class="FN"><p><a id="FN-66"></a><a href="#FNA-66"><sup>66</sup></a> Aristo was a native of Ceos, and a pupil of Lycon, who +succeeded Straton as the head of the Peripatetic School, 270 <span class="sc">b.c.</span> He +afterward himself succeeded Lycon.</p> +</div> + +<div class="FN"><p><a id="FN-67"></a><a href="#FNA-67"><sup>67</sup></a> Pyrrho was a native of Elis, and the originator of the +sceptical theories of some of the ancient philosophers. He was a +contemporary of Alexander.</p> +</div> + +<div class="FN"><p><a id="FN-68"></a><a href="#FNA-68"><sup>68</sup></a> Herillus was a disciple of Zeno of Cittium, and therefore +a Stoic. He did not, however, follow all the opinions of his master: he +held that knowledge was the chief good. Some of the treatises of +Cleanthes were written expressly to confute him.</p> +</div> + +<div class="FN"><p><a id="FN-69"></a><a href="#FNA-69"><sup>69</sup></a> Anacharsis was (Herod., iv., 76) son of Gnurus and brother +of Saulius, King of Thrace. He came to Athens while Solon was occupied +in framing laws for his people; and by the simplicity of his way of +living, and his acute observations on the manners of the Greeks, he +excited such general admiration that he was reckoned by some writers +among the Seven Wise Men of Greece.</p> +</div> + +<div class="FN"><p><a id="FN-70"></a><a href="#FNA-70"><sup>70</sup></a> This was Appius Claudius Cæcus, who was censor 310 <span class="sc">b.c.</span>, +and who, according to Livy, was afflicted with blindness by the Gods for +persuading the Potitii to instruct the public servants in the way of +sacrificing to Hercules. He it was who made the Via Appia.</p> +</div> + +<div class="FN"><p><a id="FN-71"></a><a href="#FNA-71"><sup>71</sup></a> The fact of Homer’s blindness rests on a passage in the +Hymn to Apollo, quoted by Thucydides as a genuine work of Homer, and +which is thus spoken of by one of the most accomplished scholars that +this country or this age has ever produced: “They are indeed beautiful +verses; and if none worse had ever been attributed to Homer, the Prince +of Poets would have had little reason to complain.</p> + +<p>“He has been describing the Delian festival in honor of Apollo and +Diana, and concludes this part of the poem with an address to the women +of that island, to whom it is to be supposed that he had become +familiarly known by his frequent recitations:</p> + +<div class="poem"> +<p><span class="greek">Χαίρετε δ’ ὑμεῖς πᾶσαι, ἐμεῖο δὲ καὶ μετόπισθε</span></p> +<p><span class="greek">μνήσασθ’, ὅπποτέ κέν τις ἐπιχθονίων ἀνθρώπων</span></p> +<p><span class="greek">ἐνθάδ’ ἀνείρηται ξεῖνος ταλαπείριος ἐλθὼν</span></p> +<p><span class="greek">ὦ κοῦραι, τίς δ’ ὕμμιν ἀνὴρ ἥδιστος ἀοιδῶν</span></p> +<p><span class="greek">ἐνθάδε πωλεῖται καὶ τέῳ τέρπεσθε μάλιστα;</span></p> +<p><span class="greek">ὑμεῖς δ’ εὖ μάλα πᾶσαι ὑποκρίνασθε ἀφ’ ἡμῶν,</span></p> +<p><span class="greek">Τυφλὸς ἀνὴρ, οἰκεῖ δὲ Χίῳ ἐνὶ παιπαλοέσσῃ,</span></p> +<p><span class="greek">τοῦ πᾶσαι μετόπισθεν ἀριστεύουσιν ἀοιδαί.</span></p> +</div> + +<div class="poem"> +<p>Virgins, farewell—and oh! remember me</p> +<p>Hereafter, when some stranger from the sea,</p> +<p>A hapless wanderer, may your isle explore,</p> +<p>And ask you, ‘Maids, of all the bards you boast,</p> +<p>Who sings the sweetest, and delights you most?’</p> +<p>Oh! answer all, ‘A blind old man, and poor,</p> +<p>Sweetest he sings, and dwells on Chios’ rocky shore.’”</p> +</div> + +<p class="poet"><i>Coleridge’s Introduction to the Study of the Greek Classic Poets.</i></p> +</div> + +<div class="FN"><p><a id="FN-72"></a><a href="#FNA-72"><sup>72</sup></a> Some read <i>scientiam</i> and some <i>inscientiam;</i> the latter +of which is preferred by some of the best editors and commentators.</p> +</div> + +<div class="FN"><p><a id="FN-73"></a><a href="#FNA-73"><sup>73</sup></a> For a short account of these ancient Greek philosophers, +see the sketch prefixed to the Academics (<i>Classical Library</i>).</p> +</div> + +<div class="FN"><p><a id="FN-74"></a><a href="#FNA-74"><sup>74</sup></a> Cicero wrote his philosophical works in the last three +years of his life. When he wrote this piece, he was in the sixty-third +year of his age, in the year of Rome 709.</p> +</div> + +<div class="FN"><p><a id="FN-75"></a><a href="#FNA-75"><sup>75</sup></a> The Academic.</p> +</div> + +<div class="FN"><p><a id="FN-76"></a><a href="#FNA-76"><sup>76</sup></a> Diodorus and Posidonius were Stoics; Philo and Antiochus +were Academics; but the latter afterward inclined to the doctrine of the +Stoics.</p> +</div> + +<div class="FN"><p><a id="FN-77"></a><a href="#FNA-77"><sup>77</sup></a> Julius Cæsar.</p> +</div> + +<div class="FN"><p><a id="FN-78"></a><a href="#FNA-78"><sup>78</sup></a> Cicero was one of the College of Augurs.</p> +</div> + +<div class="FN"><p><a id="FN-79"></a><a href="#FNA-79"><sup>79</sup></a> The Latinæ Feriæ was originally a festival of the Latins, +altered by Tarquinius Superbus into a Roman one. It was held in the +Alban Mount, in honor of Jupiter Latiaris. This holiday lasted six days: +it was not held at any fixed time; but the consul was never allowed to +take the field till he had held them.—<i>Vide</i> Smith, Dict. Gr. and Rom. +Ant., p. 414.</p> +</div> + +<div class="FN"><p><a id="FN-80"></a><a href="#FNA-80"><sup>80</sup></a> <i>Exhedra</i>, the word used by Cicero, means a study, or +place where disputes were held.</p> +</div> + +<div class="FN"><p><a id="FN-81"></a><a href="#FNA-81"><sup>81</sup></a> M. Piso was a Peripatetic. The four great sects were the +Stoics, the Peripatetics, the Academics, and the Epicureans.</p> +</div> + +<div class="FN"><p><a id="FN-82"></a><a href="#FNA-82"><sup>82</sup></a> It was a prevailing tenet of the Academics that there is +no certain knowledge.</p> +</div> + +<div class="FN"><p><a id="FN-83"></a><a href="#FNA-83"><sup>83</sup></a> The five forms of Plato are these: <span class="greek">οὐσία, ταὐτὸν, ἕτερον, +στάσις, κίνησις.</span></p> +</div> + +<div class="FN"><p><a id="FN-84"></a><a href="#FNA-84"><sup>84</sup></a> The four natures here to be understood are the four +elements—fire, water, air, and earth; which are mentioned as the four +principles of Empedocles by Diogenes Laertius.</p> +</div> + +<div class="FN"><p><a id="FN-85"></a><a href="#FNA-85"><sup>85</sup></a> These five moving stars are Saturn, Jupiter, Mars, +Mercury, and Venus. Their revolutions are considered in the next book.</p> +</div> + +<div class="FN"><p><a id="FN-86"></a><a href="#FNA-86"><sup>86</sup></a> Or, Generation of the Gods.</p> +</div> + +<div class="FN"><p><a id="FN-87"></a><a href="#FNA-87"><sup>87</sup></a> The <span class="greek">πρόληψις</span> of Epicurus, before mentioned, is what he +here means.</p> +</div> + +<div class="FN"><p><a id="FN-88"></a><a href="#FNA-88"><sup>88</sup></a> <span class="greek">Στερέμνια</span> is the word which Epicurus used to distinguish +between those objects which are perceptible to sense, and those which +are imperceptible; as the essence of the Divine Being, and the various +operations of the divine power.</p> +</div> + +<div class="FN"><p><a id="FN-89"></a><a href="#FNA-89"><sup>89</sup></a> Zeno here mentioned is not the same that Cotta spoke of +before. This was the founder of the Stoics. The other was an Epicurean +philosopher whom he had heard at Athens.</p> +</div> + +<div class="FN"><p><a id="FN-90"></a><a href="#FNA-90"><sup>90</sup></a> That is, there would be the same uncertainty in heaven as +is among the Academics.</p> +</div> + +<div class="FN"><p><a id="FN-91"></a><a href="#FNA-91"><sup>91</sup></a> Those nations which were neither Greek nor Roman.</p> +</div> + +<div class="FN"><p><a id="FN-92"></a><a href="#FNA-92"><sup>92</sup></a> <i>Sigilla numerantes</i> is the common reading; but P. +Manucius proposes <i>venerantes</i>, which I choose as the better of the two, +and in which sense I have translated it.</p> +</div> + +<div class="FN"><p><a id="FN-93"></a><a href="#FNA-93"><sup>93</sup></a> Fundamental doctrines.</p> +</div> + +<div class="FN"><p><a id="FN-94"></a><a href="#FNA-94"><sup>94</sup></a> That is, the zodiac.</p> +</div> + +<div class="FN"><p><a id="FN-95"></a><a href="#FNA-95"><sup>95</sup></a> The moon, as well as the sun, is indeed in the zodiac, but +she does not measure the same course in a month. She moves in another +line of the zodiac nearer the earth.</p> +</div> + +<div class="FN"><p><a id="FN-96"></a><a href="#FNA-96"><sup>96</sup></a> According to the doctrines of Epicurus, none of these +bodies themselves are clearly seen, but <i>simulacra ex corporibus +effluentia</i>.</p> +</div> + +<div class="FN"><p><a id="FN-97"></a><a href="#FNA-97"><sup>97</sup></a> Epicurus taught his disciples in a garden.</p> +</div> + +<div class="FN"><p><a id="FN-98"></a><a href="#FNA-98"><sup>98</sup></a> By the word <i>Deus</i>, as often used by our author, we are to +understand all the Gods in that theology then treated of, and not a +single personal Deity.</p> +</div> + +<div class="FN"><p><a id="FN-99"></a><a href="#FNA-99"><sup>99</sup></a> The best commentators on this passage agree that Cicero +does not mean that Aristotle affirmed that there was no such person as +Orpheus, but that there was no such poet, and that the verse called +Orphic was said to be the invention of another. The passage of Aristotle +to which Cicero here alludes has, as Dr. Davis observes, been long +lost.</p> +</div> + +<div class="FN"><p><a id="FN-100"></a><a href="#FNA-100"><sup>100</sup></a> A just proportion between the different sorts of beings.</p> +</div> + +<div class="FN"><p><a id="FN-101"></a><a href="#FNA-101"><sup>101</sup></a> Some give <i>quos non pudeat earum Epicuri vocum;</i> but the +best copies have not <i>non;</i> nor would it be consistent with Cotta to say +<i>quos non pudeat</i>, for he throughout represents Velleius as a perfect +Epicurean in every article.</p> +</div> + +<div class="FN"><p><a id="FN-102"></a><a href="#FNA-102"><sup>102</sup></a> His country was Abdera, the natives of which were +remarkable for their stupidity.</p> +</div> + +<div class="FN"><p><a id="FN-103"></a><a href="#FNA-103"><sup>103</sup></a> This passage will not admit of a translation answerable +to the sense of the original. Cicero says the word <i>amicitia</i> +(friendship) is derived from <i>amor</i> (love or affection).</p> +</div> + +<div class="FN"><p><a id="FN-104"></a><a href="#FNA-104"><sup>104</sup></a> This manner of speaking of Jupiter frequently occurs in +Homer,</p> + +<div class="poem"> +<p>——<span class="greek">πατὴρ ἀνδρῶν τε θεῶν τε,</span></p> +</div> + +<p>and has been used by Virgil and other poets since Ennius.</p> +</div> + +<div class="FN"><p><a id="FN-105"></a><a href="#FNA-105"><sup>105</sup></a> Perses, or Perseus, the last king of Macedonia, was taken +by Cnæus Octavius, the prætor, and brought as prisoner to Paullus +Æmilius, 167 <span class="sc">b.c.</span></p> +</div> + +<div class="FN"><p><a id="FN-106"></a><a href="#FNA-106"><sup>106</sup></a> An exemption from serving in the wars, and from paying +public taxes.</p> +</div> + +<div class="FN"><p><a id="FN-107"></a><a href="#FNA-107"><sup>107</sup></a> Mopsus. There were two soothsayers of this name: the +first was one of the Lapithæ, son of Ampycus and Chloris, called also +the son of Apollo and Hienantis; the other a son of Apollo and Manto, +who is said to have founded Mallus, in Asia Minor, where his oracle +existed as late as the time of Strabo.</p> +</div> + +<div class="FN"><p><a id="FN-108"></a><a href="#FNA-108"><sup>108</sup></a> Tiresias was the great Theban prophet at the time of the +war of the Seven against Thebes.</p> +</div> + +<div class="FN"><p><a id="FN-109"></a><a href="#FNA-109"><sup>109</sup></a> Amphiaraus was King of Argos (he had been one of the +Argonauts also). He was killed after the war of the Seven against +Thebes, which he was compelled to join in by the treachery of his wife +Eriphyle, by the earth opening and swallowing him up as he was fleeing +from Periclymenus.</p> +</div> + +<div class="FN"><p><a id="FN-110"></a><a href="#FNA-110"><sup>110</sup></a> Calchas was the prophet of the Grecian army at the siege +of Troy.</p> +</div> + +<div class="FN"><p><a id="FN-111"></a><a href="#FNA-111"><sup>111</sup></a> Helenus was a son of Priam and Hecuba. He is represented +as a prophet in the Philoctetes of Sophocles. And in the Æneid he is +also represented as king of part of Epirus, and as predicting to Æneas +the dangers and fortunes which awaited him.</p> +</div> + +<div class="FN"><p><a id="FN-112"></a><a href="#FNA-112"><sup>112</sup></a> This short passage would be very obscure to the reader +without an explanation from another of Cicero’s treatises. The +expression here, <i>ad investigandum suem regiones vineæ terminavit</i>, +which is a metaphor too bold, if it was not a sort of augural language, +seems to me to have been the effect of carelessness in our great author; +for Navius did not divide the regions, as he calls them, of the vine to +find his sow, but to find a grape.</p> +</div> + +<div class="FN"><p><a id="FN-113"></a><a href="#FNA-113"><sup>113</sup></a> The Peremnia were a sort of auspices performed just +before the passing a river.</p> +</div> + +<div class="FN"><p><a id="FN-114"></a><a href="#FNA-114"><sup>114</sup></a> The Acumina were a military auspices, and were partly +performed on the point of a spear, from which they were called Acumina.</p> +</div> + +<div class="FN"><p><a id="FN-115"></a><a href="#FNA-115"><sup>115</sup></a> Those were called <i>testamenta in procinctu</i>, which were +made by soldiers just before an engagement, in the presence of men +called as witnesses.</p> +</div> + +<div class="FN"><p><a id="FN-116"></a><a href="#FNA-116"><sup>116</sup></a> This especially refers to the Decii, one of whom devoted +himself for his country in the war with the Latins, 340 <span class="sc">b.c.</span>, and his +son imitated the action in the war with the Samnites, 295 <span class="sc">b.c.</span> Cicero +(Tusc. i. 37) says that his son did the same thing in the war with +Pyrrhus at the battle of Asculum, though in other places (De Off. iii. +4) he speaks of only two Decii as having signalized themselves in this +manner.</p> +</div> + +<div class="FN"><p><a id="FN-117"></a><a href="#FNA-117"><sup>117</sup></a> The Rogator, who collected the votes, and pronounced who +was the person chosen. There were two sorts of Rogators; one was the +officer here mentioned, and the other was the Rogator, or speaker of the +whole assembly.</p> +</div> + +<div class="FN"><p><a id="FN-118"></a><a href="#FNA-118"><sup>118</sup></a> Which was Sardinia, as appears from one of Cicero’s +epistles to his brother Quintus.</p> +</div> + +<div class="FN"><p><a id="FN-119"></a><a href="#FNA-119"><sup>119</sup></a> Their sacred books of ceremonies.</p> +</div> + +<div class="FN"><p><a id="FN-120"></a><a href="#FNA-120"><sup>120</sup></a> The war between Octavius and Cinna, the consuls.</p> +</div> + +<div class="FN"><p><a id="FN-121"></a><a href="#FNA-121"><sup>121</sup></a> This, in the original, is a fragment of an old Latin +verse,</p> + +<div class="poem"> +<p><i>——Terram fumare calentem.</i></p> +</div> +</div> + +<div class="FN"><p><a id="FN-122"></a><a href="#FNA-122"><sup>122</sup></a> The Latin word is <i>principatus</i>, which exactly +corresponds with the Greek word here used by Cicero; by which is to be +understood the superior, the most prevailing excellence in every kind +and species of things through the universe.</p> +</div> + +<div class="FN"><p><a id="FN-123"></a><a href="#FNA-123"><sup>123</sup></a> The passage of Aristotle to which Cicero here refers is +lost.</p> +</div> + +<div class="FN"><p><a id="FN-124"></a><a href="#FNA-124"><sup>124</sup></a> He means the Epicureans.</p> +</div> + +<div class="FN"><p><a id="FN-125"></a><a href="#FNA-125"><sup>125</sup></a> Here the Stoic speaks too plain to be misunderstood. His +world, his <i>mundus</i>, is the universe, and that universe is his great +Deity, <i>in quo sit totius naturæ principatus</i>, in which the superior +excellence of universal nature consists.</p> +</div> + +<div class="FN"><p><a id="FN-126"></a><a href="#FNA-126"><sup>126</sup></a> Athens, the seat of learning and politeness, of which +Balbus will not allow Epicurus to be worthy.</p> +</div> + +<div class="FN"><p><a id="FN-127"></a><a href="#FNA-127"><sup>127</sup></a> This is Pythagoras’s doctrine, as appears in Diogenes +Laertius.</p> +</div> + +<div class="FN"><p><a id="FN-128"></a><a href="#FNA-128"><sup>128</sup></a> He here alludes to mathematical and geometrical +instruments.</p> +</div> + +<div class="FN"><p><a id="FN-129"></a><a href="#FNA-129"><sup>129</sup></a> Balbus here speaks of the fixed stars, and of the motions +of the orbs of the planets. He here alludes, says M. Bonhier, to the +different and diurnal motions of these stars; one sort from east to +west, the other from one tropic to the other: and this is the +construction which our learned and great geometrician and astronomer, +Dr. Halley, made of this passage.</p> +</div> + +<div class="FN"><p><a id="FN-130"></a><a href="#FNA-130"><sup>130</sup></a> This mensuration of the year into three hundred and +sixty-five days and near six hours (by the odd hours and minutes of +which, in every fifth year, the <i>dies intercalaris</i>, or leap-year, is +made) could not but be known, Dr. Halley states, by Hipparchus, as +appears from the remains of that great astronomer of the ancients. We +are inclined to think that Julius Cæsar had divided the year, according +to what we call the Julian year, before Cicero wrote this book; for we +see, in the beginning of it, how pathetically he speaks of Cæsar’s +usurpation.</p> +</div> + +<div class="FN"><p><a id="FN-131"></a><a href="#FNA-131"><sup>131</sup></a> The words of Censorinus, on this occasion, are to the +same effect. The opinions of philosophers concerning this great year are +very different; but the institution of it is ascribed to Democritus.</p> +</div> + +<div class="FN"><p><a id="FN-132"></a><a href="#FNA-132"><sup>132</sup></a> The zodiac.</p> +</div> + +<div class="FN"><p><a id="FN-133"></a><a href="#FNA-133"><sup>133</sup></a> Though Mars is said to hold his orbit in the zodiac with +the rest, and to finish his revolution through the same orbit (that is, +the zodiac) with the other two, yet Balbus means in a different line of +the zodiac.</p> +</div> + +<div class="FN"><p><a id="FN-134"></a><a href="#FNA-134"><sup>134</sup></a> According to late observations, it never goes but a sign +and a half from the sun.</p> +</div> + +<div class="FN"><p><a id="FN-135"></a><a href="#FNA-135"><sup>135</sup></a> These, Dr. Davis says, are “aërial fires;” concerning +which he refers to the second book of Pliny.</p> +</div> + +<div class="FN"><p><a id="FN-136"></a><a href="#FNA-136"><sup>136</sup></a> In the Eunuch of Terence.</p> +</div> + +<div class="FN"><p><a id="FN-137"></a><a href="#FNA-137"><sup>137</sup></a> Bacchus.</p> +</div> + +<div class="FN"><p><a id="FN-138"></a><a href="#FNA-138"><sup>138</sup></a> The son of Ceres.</p> +</div> + +<div class="FN"><p><a id="FN-139"></a><a href="#FNA-139"><sup>139</sup></a> The books of Ceremonies.</p> +</div> + +<div class="FN"><p><a id="FN-140"></a><a href="#FNA-140"><sup>140</sup></a> This Libera is taken for Proserpine, who, with her +brother Liber, was consecrated by the Romans; all which are parts of +nature in prosopopœias. Cicero, therefore, makes Balbus distinguish +between the person Liber, or Bacchus, and the Liber which is a part of +nature in prosopopœia.</p> +</div> + +<div class="FN"><p><a id="FN-141"></a><a href="#FNA-141"><sup>141</sup></a> These allegorical fables are largely related by Hesiod in +his Theogony.</p> + +<p>Horace says exactly the same thing:</p> + +<div class="poem"> +<p>Hâc arte Pollux et vagus Hercules</p> +<p>Enisus arces attigit igneas:</p> +<p class="L2">Quos inter Augustus recumbens</p> +<p class="L4">Purpureo bibit ore nectar.</p> +<p>Hâc te merentem, Bacche pater, tuæ</p> +<p>Vexere tigres indocili jugum</p> +<p class="L2">Collo ferentes: hâc Quirinus</p> +<p class="L4">Martis equis Acheronta fugit.—Hor. iii. 3. 9.</p> +</div> +</div> + +<div class="FN"><p><a id="FN-142"></a><a href="#FNA-142"><sup>142</sup></a> Cicero means by <i>conversis casibus</i>, varying the cases +from the common rule of declension; that is, by departing from the true +grammatical rules of speech; for if we would keep to it, we should +decline the word <i>Jupiter</i>, <i>Jupiteris</i> in the second case, etc.</p> +</div> + +<div class="FN"><p><a id="FN-143"></a><a href="#FNA-143"><sup>143</sup></a> <i>Pater divûmque hominumque.</i></p> +</div> + +<div class="FN"><p><a id="FN-144"></a><a href="#FNA-144"><sup>144</sup></a> The common reading is, <i>planiusque alio loco idem;</i> +which, as Dr. Davis observes, is absurd; therefore, in his note, he +prefers <i>planius quam alia loco idem</i>, from two copies, in which sense I +have translated it.</p> +</div> + +<div class="FN"><p><a id="FN-145"></a><a href="#FNA-145"><sup>145</sup></a> From the verb <i>gero</i>, to bear.</p> +</div> + +<div class="FN"><p><a id="FN-146"></a><a href="#FNA-146"><sup>146</sup></a> That is, “mother earth.”</p> +</div> + +<div class="FN"><p><a id="FN-147"></a><a href="#FNA-147"><sup>147</sup></a> Janus is said to be the first who erected temples in +Italy, and instituted religious rites, and from whom the first month in +the Roman calendar is derived.</p> +</div> + +<div class="FN"><p><a id="FN-148"></a><a href="#FNA-148"><sup>148</sup></a> <i>Stellæ vagantes.</i></p> +</div> + +<div class="FN"><p><a id="FN-149"></a><a href="#FNA-149"><sup>149</sup></a> <i>Noctu quasi diem efficeret.</i> Ben Jonson says the same +thing:</p> + +<div class="poem"> +<p>Thou that mak’st a day of night,</p> +<p>Goddess excellently bright.—<i>Ode to the Moon.</i></p> +</div> +</div> + +<div class="FN"><p><a id="FN-150"></a><a href="#FNA-150"><sup>150</sup></a> Olympias was the mother of Alexander.</p> +</div> + +<div class="FN"><p><a id="FN-151"></a><a href="#FNA-151"><sup>151</sup></a> Venus is here said to be one of the names of Diana, +because <i>ad res omnes veniret;</i> but she is not supposed to be the same +as the mother of Cupid.</p> +</div> + +<div class="FN"><p><a id="FN-152"></a><a href="#FNA-152"><sup>152</sup></a> Here is a mistake, as Fulvius Ursinus observes; for the +discourse seems to be continued in one day, as appears from the +beginning of this book. This may be an inadvertency of Cicero.</p> +</div> + +<div class="FN"><p><a id="FN-153"></a><a href="#FNA-153"><sup>153</sup></a> The senate of Athens was so called from the words <span class="greek">Ἄρειος Πάγος</span>, the Village, some say the Hill, of Mars.</p> +</div> + +<div class="FN"><p><a id="FN-154"></a><a href="#FNA-154"><sup>154</sup></a> Epicurus.</p> +</div> + +<div class="FN"><p><a id="FN-155"></a><a href="#FNA-155"><sup>155</sup></a> The Stoics.</p> +</div> + +<div class="FN"><p><a id="FN-156"></a><a href="#FNA-156"><sup>156</sup></a> By <i>nulla cohærendi natura</i>—if it is the right, as it is +the common reading—Cicero must mean the same as by <i>nulla crescendi +natura</i>, or <i>coalescendi</i>, either of which Lambinus proposes; for, as the +same learned critic well observes, is there not a cohesion of parts in a +clod, or in a piece of stone? Our learned Walker proposes <i>sola +cohærendi natura</i>, which mends the sense very much; and I wish he had +the authority of any copy for it.</p> +</div> + +<div class="FN"><p><a id="FN-157"></a><a href="#FNA-157"><sup>157</sup></a> Nasica Scipio, the censor, is said to have been the first +who made a water-clock in Rome.</p> +</div> + +<div class="FN"><p><a id="FN-158"></a><a href="#FNA-158"><sup>158</sup></a> The Epicureans.</p> +</div> + +<div class="FN"><p><a id="FN-159"></a><a href="#FNA-159"><sup>159</sup></a> An old Latin poet, commended by Quintilian for the +gravity of his sense and his loftiness of style.</p> +</div> + +<div class="FN"><p><a id="FN-160"></a><a href="#FNA-160"><sup>160</sup></a> The shepherd is here supposed to take the stem or beak of +the ship for the mouth, from which the roaring voices of the sailors +came. <i>Rostrum</i> is here a lucky word to put in the mouth of one who +never saw a ship before, as it is used for the beak of a bird, the snout +of a beast or fish, and for the stem of a ship.</p> +</div> + +<div class="FN"><p><a id="FN-161"></a><a href="#FNA-161"><sup>161</sup></a> The Epicureans.</p> +</div> + +<div class="FN"><p><a id="FN-162"></a><a href="#FNA-162"><sup>162</sup></a> Greek, <span class="greek">ἀὴρ</span>; Latin, <i>aer</i>.</p> +</div> + +<div class="FN"><p><a id="FN-163"></a><a href="#FNA-163"><sup>163</sup></a> The treatise of Aristotle, from whence this is taken, is +lost.</p> +</div> + +<div class="FN"><p><a id="FN-164"></a><a href="#FNA-164"><sup>164</sup></a> To the universe the Stoics certainly annexed the idea of +a limited space, otherwise they could not have talked of a middle; for +there can be no middle but of a limited space: infinite space can have +no middle, there being infinite extension from every part.</p> +</div> + +<div class="FN"><p><a id="FN-165"></a><a href="#FNA-165"><sup>165</sup></a> These two contrary reversions are from the tropics of +Cancer and Capricorn. They are the extreme bounds of the sun’s course. +The reader must observe that the astronomical parts of this book are +introduced by the Stoic as proofs of design and reason in the universe; +and, notwithstanding the errors in his planetary system, his intent is +well answered, because all he means is that the regular motions of the +heavenly bodies, and their dependencies, are demonstrations of a divine +mind. The inference proposed to be drawn from his astronomical +observations is as just as if his system was in every part +unexceptionably right: the same may be said of his anatomical +observations.</p> +</div> + +<div class="FN"><p><a id="FN-166"></a><a href="#FNA-166"><sup>166</sup></a> In the zodiac.</p> +</div> + +<div class="FN"><p><a id="FN-167"></a><a href="#FNA-167"><sup>167</sup></a> Ibid.</p> +</div> + +<div class="FN"><p><a id="FN-168"></a><a href="#FNA-168"><sup>168</sup></a> These verses of Cicero are a translation from a Greek +poem of Aratus, called the Phænomena.</p> +</div> + +<div class="FN"><p><a id="FN-169"></a><a href="#FNA-169"><sup>169</sup></a> The fixed stars.</p> +</div> + +<div class="FN"><p><a id="FN-170"></a><a href="#FNA-170"><sup>170</sup></a> The arctic and antarctic poles.</p> +</div> + +<div class="FN"><p><a id="FN-171"></a><a href="#FNA-171"><sup>171</sup></a> The two Arctoi are northern constellations. Cynosura is +what we call the Lesser Bear; Helice, the Greater Bear; in Latin, <i>Ursa +Minor</i> and <i>Ursa Major</i>.</p> +</div> + +<div class="FN"><p><a id="FN-172"></a><a href="#FNA-172"><sup>172</sup></a> These stars in the Greater Bear are vulgarly called the +“Seven Stars,” or the “Northern Wain;” by the Latins, “Septentriones.”</p> +</div> + +<div class="FN"><p><a id="FN-173"></a><a href="#FNA-173"><sup>173</sup></a> The Lesser Bear.</p> +</div> + +<div class="FN"><p><a id="FN-174"></a><a href="#FNA-174"><sup>174</sup></a> The Greater Bear.</p> +</div> + +<div class="FN"><p><a id="FN-175"></a><a href="#FNA-175"><sup>175</sup></a> Exactly agreeable to this and the following description +of the Dragon is the same northern constellation described in the map by +Flamsteed in his Atlas Cœlestis; and all the figures here described by +Aratus nearly agree with the maps of the same constellations in the +Atlas Cœlestis, though they are not all placed precisely alike.</p> +</div> + +<div class="FN"><p><a id="FN-176"></a><a href="#FNA-176"><sup>176</sup></a> The tail of the Greater Bear.</p> +</div> + +<div class="FN"><p><a id="FN-177"></a><a href="#FNA-177"><sup>177</sup></a> That is, in Macedon, where Aratus lived.</p> +</div> + +<div class="FN"><p><a id="FN-178"></a><a href="#FNA-178"><sup>178</sup></a> The true interpretation of this passage is as follows: +Here in Macedon, says Aratus, the head of the Dragon does not entirely +immerge itself in the ocean, but only touches the superficies of it. By +<i>ortus</i> and <i>obitus</i> I doubt not but Cicero meant, agreeable to Aratus, +those parts which arise to view, and those which are removed from +sight.</p> +</div> + +<div class="FN"><p><a id="FN-179"></a><a href="#FNA-179"><sup>179</sup></a> These are two northern constellations. Engonasis, in some +catalogues called Hercules, because he is figured kneeling <span class="greek">ἐν γόνασιν</span> +(on his knees). <span class="greek">Ἐνγόνασιν καλέουσ’</span>, as Aratus says, they call +Engonasis.</p> +</div> + +<div class="FN"><p><a id="FN-180"></a><a href="#FNA-180"><sup>180</sup></a> The crown is placed under the feet of Hercules in the +Atlas Cœlestis; but Ophiuchus (<span class="greek">Ὀφιοῦχος</span>), the Snake-holder, is placed in +the map by Flamsteed as described here by Aratus; and their heads almost +meet.</p> +</div> + +<div class="FN"><p><a id="FN-181"></a><a href="#FNA-181"><sup>181</sup></a> The Scorpion. Ophiuchus, though a northern constellation, +is not far from that part of the zodiac where the Scorpion is, which is +one of the six southern signs.</p> +</div> + +<div class="FN"><p><a id="FN-182"></a><a href="#FNA-182"><sup>182</sup></a> The Wain of seven stars.</p> +</div> + +<div class="FN"><p><a id="FN-183"></a><a href="#FNA-183"><sup>183</sup></a> The Wain-driver. This northern constellation is, in our +present maps, figured with a club in his right hand behind the Greater +Bear.</p> +</div> + +<div class="FN"><p><a id="FN-184"></a><a href="#FNA-184"><sup>184</sup></a> In some modern maps Arcturus, a star of the first +magnitude, is placed in the belt that is round the waist of Boötes. +Cicero says <i>subter præcordia</i>, which is about the waist; and Aratus +says <span class="greek">ὑπὸ ζώνῃ</span>, under the belt.</p> +</div> + +<div class="FN"><p><a id="FN-185"></a><a href="#FNA-185"><sup>185</sup></a> <i>Sub caput Arcti</i>, under the head of the Greater Bear.</p> +</div> + +<div class="FN"><p><a id="FN-186"></a><a href="#FNA-186"><sup>186</sup></a> The Crab is, by the ancients and moderns, placed in the +zodiac, as here, between the Twins and the Lion; and they are all three +northern signs.</p> +</div> + +<div class="FN"><p><a id="FN-187"></a><a href="#FNA-187"><sup>187</sup></a> The Twins are placed in the zodiac with the side of one +to the northern hemisphere, and the side of the other to the southern +hemisphere. Auriga, the Charioteer, is placed in the northern hemisphere +near the zodiac, by the Twins; and at the head of the Charioteer is +Helice, the Greater Bear, placed; and the Goat is a bright star of the +first magnitude placed on the left shoulder of this northern +constellation, and called <i>Capra</i>, the Goat. <i>Hœdi</i>, the Kids, are two +more stars of the same constellation.</p> +</div> + +<div class="FN"><p><a id="FN-188"></a><a href="#FNA-188"><sup>188</sup></a> A constellation; one of the northern signs in the zodiac, +in which the Hyades are placed.</p> +</div> + +<div class="FN"><p><a id="FN-189"></a><a href="#FNA-189"><sup>189</sup></a> One of the feet of Cepheus, a northern constellation, is +under the tail of the Lesser Bear.</p> +</div> + +<div class="FN"><p><a id="FN-190"></a><a href="#FNA-190"><sup>190</sup></a> Grotius, and after him Dr. Davis, and other learned men, +read <i>Cassiepea</i>, after the Greek <span class="greek">Κασσίεπεια</span>, and reject the common +reading, <i>Cassiopea</i>.</p> +</div> + +<div class="FN"><p><a id="FN-191"></a><a href="#FNA-191"><sup>191</sup></a> These northern constellations here mentioned have been +always placed together as one family with Cepheus and Perseus, as they +are in our modern maps.</p> +</div> + +<div class="FN"><p><a id="FN-192"></a><a href="#FNA-192"><sup>192</sup></a> This alludes to the fable of Perseus and Andromeda.</p> +</div> + +<div class="FN"><p><a id="FN-193"></a><a href="#FNA-193"><sup>193</sup></a> Pegasus, who is one of Perseus and Andromeda’s family.</p> +</div> + +<div class="FN"><p><a id="FN-194"></a><a href="#FNA-194"><sup>194</sup></a> That is, with wings.</p> +</div> + +<div class="FN"><p><a id="FN-195"></a><a href="#FNA-195"><sup>195</sup></a> <i>Aries</i>, the Ram, is the first northern sign in the +zodiac; <i>Pisces</i>, the Fishes, the last southern sign; therefore they +must be near one another, as they are in a circle or belt. In +Flamsteed’s Atlas Cœlestis one of the Fishes is near the head of the +Ram, and the other near the Urn of Aquarius.</p> +</div> + +<div class="FN"><p><a id="FN-196"></a><a href="#FNA-196"><sup>196</sup></a> These are called Virgiliæ by Cicero; by Aratus, the +Pleiades, <span class="greek">Πληϊάδες</span>; and they are placed at the neck of the Bull; and one +of Perseus’s feet touches the Bull in the Atlas Cœlestis.</p> +</div> + +<div class="FN"><p><a id="FN-197"></a><a href="#FNA-197"><sup>197</sup></a> This northern constellation is called Fides by Cicero; +but it must be the same with Lyra; because Lyra is placed in our maps as +Fides is here.</p> +</div> + +<div class="FN"><p><a id="FN-198"></a><a href="#FNA-198"><sup>198</sup></a> This is called Ales Avis by Cicero; and I doubt not but +the northern constellation Cygnus is here to be understood, for the +description and place of the Swan in the Atlas Cœlestis are the same +which Ales Avis has here.</p> +</div> + +<div class="FN"><p><a id="FN-199"></a><a href="#FNA-199"><sup>199</sup></a> Pegasus.</p> +</div> + +<div class="FN"><p><a id="FN-200"></a><a href="#FNA-200"><sup>200</sup></a> The Water-bearer, one of the six southern signs in the +zodiac: he is described in our maps pouring water out of an urn, and +leaning with one hand on the tail of Capricorn, another southern sign.</p> +</div> + +<div class="FN"><p><a id="FN-201"></a><a href="#FNA-201"><sup>201</sup></a> When the sun is in Capricorn, the days are at the +shortest; and when in Cancer, at the longest.</p> +</div> + +<div class="FN"><p><a id="FN-202"></a><a href="#FNA-202"><sup>202</sup></a> One of the six southern signs.</p> +</div> + +<div class="FN"><p><a id="FN-203"></a><a href="#FNA-203"><sup>203</sup></a> Sagittarius, another southern sign.</p> +</div> + +<div class="FN"><p><a id="FN-204"></a><a href="#FNA-204"><sup>204</sup></a> A northern constellation.</p> +</div> + +<div class="FN"><p><a id="FN-205"></a><a href="#FNA-205"><sup>205</sup></a> A northern constellation.</p> +</div> + +<div class="FN"><p><a id="FN-206"></a><a href="#FNA-206"><sup>206</sup></a> A southern constellation.</p> +</div> + +<div class="FN"><p><a id="FN-207"></a><a href="#FNA-207"><sup>207</sup></a> This is Canis Major, a southern constellation. Orion and +the Dog are named together by Hesiod, who flourished many hundred years +before Cicero or Aratus.</p> +</div> + +<div class="FN"><p><a id="FN-208"></a><a href="#FNA-208"><sup>208</sup></a> A southern constellation, placed as here in the Atlas +Cœlestis.</p> +</div> + +<div class="FN"><p><a id="FN-209"></a><a href="#FNA-209"><sup>209</sup></a> A southern constellation, so called from the ship Argo, +in which Jason and the rest of the Argonauts sailed on their expedition +to Colchos.</p> +</div> + +<div class="FN"><p><a id="FN-210"></a><a href="#FNA-210"><sup>210</sup></a> The Ram is the first of the northern signs in the zodiac; +and the last southern sign is the Fishes; which two signs, meeting in +the zodiac, cover the constellation called Argo.</p> +</div> + +<div class="FN"><p><a id="FN-211"></a><a href="#FNA-211"><sup>211</sup></a> The river Eridanus, a southern constellation.</p> +</div> + +<div class="FN"><p><a id="FN-212"></a><a href="#FNA-212"><sup>212</sup></a> A southern constellation.</p> +</div> + +<div class="FN"><p><a id="FN-213"></a><a href="#FNA-213"><sup>213</sup></a> This is called the Scorpion in the original of Aratus.</p> +</div> + +<div class="FN"><p><a id="FN-214"></a><a href="#FNA-214"><sup>214</sup></a> A southern constellation.</p> +</div> + +<div class="FN"><p><a id="FN-215"></a><a href="#FNA-215"><sup>215</sup></a> A southern constellation.</p> +</div> + +<div class="FN"><p><a id="FN-216"></a><a href="#FNA-216"><sup>216</sup></a> The Serpent is not mentioned in Cicero’s translation; but +it is in the original of Aratus.</p> +</div> + +<div class="FN"><p><a id="FN-217"></a><a href="#FNA-217"><sup>217</sup></a> A southern constellation.</p> +</div> + +<div class="FN"><p><a id="FN-218"></a><a href="#FNA-218"><sup>218</sup></a> The Goblet, or Cup, a southern constellation.</p> +</div> + +<div class="FN"><p><a id="FN-219"></a><a href="#FNA-219"><sup>219</sup></a> A southern constellation.</p> +</div> + +<div class="FN"><p><a id="FN-220"></a><a href="#FNA-220"><sup>220</sup></a> Antecanis, a southern constellation, is the Little Dog, +and called <i>Antecanis</i> in Latin, and <span class="greek">Προκύων</span> in Greek, because he rises +before the other Dog.</p> +</div> + +<div class="FN"><p><a id="FN-221"></a><a href="#FNA-221"><sup>221</sup></a> Pansætius, a Stoic philosopher.</p> +</div> + +<div class="FN"><p><a id="FN-222"></a><a href="#FNA-222"><sup>222</sup></a> Mercury and Venus.</p> +</div> + +<div class="FN"><p><a id="FN-223"></a><a href="#FNA-223"><sup>223</sup></a> The proboscis of the elephant is frequently called a +hand, because it is as useful to him as one. “They breathe, drink, and +smell, with what may not be improperly called a hand,” says Pliny, bk. +viii. c. 10.—<span class="sc">Davis</span>.</p> +</div> + +<div class="FN"><p><a id="FN-224"></a><a href="#FNA-224"><sup>224</sup></a> The passage of Aristotle’s works to which Cicero here +alludes is entirely lost; but Plutarch gives a similar account.</p> +</div> + +<div class="FN"><p><a id="FN-225"></a><a href="#FNA-225"><sup>225</sup></a> Balbus does not tell us the remedy which the panther +makes use of; but Pliny is not quite so delicate: he says, <i>excrementis +hominis sibi medetur</i>.</p> +</div> + +<div class="FN"><p><a id="FN-226"></a><a href="#FNA-226"><sup>226</sup></a> Aristotle says they purge themselves with this herb after +they fawn. Pliny says both before and after.</p> +</div> + +<div class="FN"><p><a id="FN-227"></a><a href="#FNA-227"><sup>227</sup></a> The cuttle-fish has a bag at its neck, the black blood of +which the Romans used for ink. It was called <i>atramentum</i>.</p> +</div> + +<div class="FN"><p><a id="FN-228"></a><a href="#FNA-228"><sup>228</sup></a> The Euphrates is said to carry into Mesopotamia a large +quantity of citrons, with which it covers the fields.</p> +</div> + +<div class="FN"><p><a id="FN-229"></a><a href="#FNA-229"><sup>229</sup></a> Q. Curtius, and some other authors, say the Ganges is the +largest river in India; but Ammianus Marcellinus concurs with Cicero in +calling the river Indus the largest of all rivers.</p> +</div> + +<div class="FN"><p><a id="FN-230"></a><a href="#FNA-230"><sup>230</sup></a> These Etesian winds return periodically once a year, and +blow at certain seasons, and for a certain time.</p> +</div> + +<div class="FN"><p><a id="FN-231"></a><a href="#FNA-231"><sup>231</sup></a> Some read <i>mollitur</i>, and some <i>molitur;</i> the latter of +which P. Manucius justly prefers, from the verb <i>molo</i>, <i>molis;</i> from +whence, says he, <i>molares dentes</i>, the grinders.</p> +</div> + +<div class="FN"><p><a id="FN-232"></a><a href="#FNA-232"><sup>232</sup></a> The weasand, or windpipe.</p> +</div> + +<div class="FN"><p><a id="FN-233"></a><a href="#FNA-233"><sup>233</sup></a> The epiglottis, which is a cartilaginous flap in the +shape of a tongue, and therefore called so.</p> +</div> + +<div class="FN"><p><a id="FN-234"></a><a href="#FNA-234"><sup>234</sup></a> Cicero is here giving the opinion of the ancients +concerning the passage of the chyle till it is converted to blood.</p> +</div> + +<div class="FN"><p><a id="FN-235"></a><a href="#FNA-235"><sup>235</sup></a> What Cicero here calls the ventricles of the heart are +likewise called auricles, of which there is the right and left.</p> +</div> + +<div class="FN"><p><a id="FN-236"></a><a href="#FNA-236"><sup>236</sup></a> The Stoics and Peripatetics said that the nerves, veins, +and arteries come directly from the heart. According to the anatomy of +the moderns, they come from the brain.</p> +</div> + +<div class="FN"><p><a id="FN-237"></a><a href="#FNA-237"><sup>237</sup></a> The author means all musical instruments, whether string +or wind instruments, which are hollow and tortuous.</p> +</div> + +<div class="FN"><p><a id="FN-238"></a><a href="#FNA-238"><sup>238</sup></a> The Latin version of Cicero is a translation from the +Greek of Aratus.</p> +</div> + +<div class="FN"><p><a id="FN-239"></a><a href="#FNA-239"><sup>239</sup></a> Chrysippus’s meaning is, that the swine is so inactive +and slothful a beast that life seems to be of no use to it but to keep +it from putrefaction, as salt keeps dead flesh.</p> +</div> + +<div class="FN"><p><a id="FN-240"></a><a href="#FNA-240"><sup>240</sup></a> <i>Ales</i>, in the general signification, is any large bird; +and <i>oscinis</i> is any singing bird. But they here mean those birds which +are used in augury: <i>alites</i> are the birds whose flight was observed by +the augurs, and <i>oscines</i> the birds from whose voices they augured.</p> +</div> + +<div class="FN"><p><a id="FN-241"></a><a href="#FNA-241"><sup>241</sup></a> As the Academics doubted everything, it was indifferent +to them which side of a question they took.</p> +</div> + +<div class="FN"><p><a id="FN-242"></a><a href="#FNA-242"><sup>242</sup></a> The keepers and interpreters of the Sibylline oracles +were the Quindecimviri.</p> +</div> + +<div class="FN"><p><a id="FN-243"></a><a href="#FNA-243"><sup>243</sup></a> The popular name of Jupiter in Rome, being looked upon as +defender of the Capitol (in which he was placed), and stayer of the +State.</p> +</div> + +<div class="FN"><p><a id="FN-244"></a><a href="#FNA-244"><sup>244</sup></a> Some passages of the original are here wanting. Cotta +continues speaking against the doctrine of the Stoics.</p> +</div> + +<div class="FN"><p><a id="FN-245"></a><a href="#FNA-245"><sup>245</sup></a> The word <i>sortes</i> is often used for the answers of the +oracles, or, rather, for the rolls in which the answers were written.</p> +</div> + +<div class="FN"><p><a id="FN-246"></a><a href="#FNA-246"><sup>246</sup></a> Three of this eminent family sacrificed themselves for +their country; the father in the Latin war, the son in the Tuscan war, +and the grandson in the war with Pyrrhus.</p> +</div> + +<div class="FN"><p><a id="FN-247"></a><a href="#FNA-247"><sup>247</sup></a> The Straits of Gibraltar.</p> +</div> + +<div class="FN"><p><a id="FN-248"></a><a href="#FNA-248"><sup>248</sup></a> The common reading is, <i>ex quo anima dicitur;</i> but Dr. +Davis and M. Bouhier prefer <i>animal</i>, though they keep <i>anima</i> in the +text, because our author says elsewhere, <i>animum ex anima dictum</i>, Tusc. +I. 1. Cicero is not here to be accused of contradictions, for we are to +consider that he speaks in the characters of other persons; but there +appears to be nothing in these two passages irreconcilable, and probably +<i>anima</i> is the right word here.</p> +</div> + +<div class="FN"><p><a id="FN-249"></a><a href="#FNA-249"><sup>249</sup></a> He is said to have led a colony from Greece into Caria, +in Asia, and to have built a town, and called it after his own name, for +which his countrymen paid him divine honors after his death.</p> +</div> + +<div class="FN"><p><a id="FN-250"></a><a href="#FNA-250"><sup>250</sup></a> Our great author is under a mistake here. Homer does not +say he met Hercules himself, but his <span class="greek">Εἴδωλον</span>, his “visionary likeness;” +and adds that he himself</p> + +<div class="poem"> +<p class="L6" style="margin-left: 15ex"><span class="greek">μετ’ ἀθανάτοισι θεοῖσι</span></p> +<p><span class="greek">τέρπεται ἐν θαλίῃς, καὶ ἔχει καλλίσφυρου Ἥβην,</span></p> +<p><span class="greek">παῖδα Διὸς μεγάλοιο καὶ Ἥρης χρυσοπεδίλου.</span></p> +</div> + +<p>which Pope translates—</p> + +<div class="poem"> +<p>A shadowy form, for high in heaven’s abodes</p> +<p>Himself resides, a God among the Gods;</p> +<p>There, in the bright assemblies of the skies,</p> +<p>He nectar quaffs, and Hebe crowns his joys.</p> +</div> +</div> + +<div class="FN"><p><a id="FN-251"></a><a href="#FNA-251"><sup>251</sup></a> They are said to have been the first workers in iron. +They were called Idæi, because they inhabited about Mount Ida in Crete, +and Dactyli, from <span class="greek">δάκτυλοι</span> (the fingers), their number being five.</p> +</div> + +<div class="FN"><p><a id="FN-252"></a><a href="#FNA-252"><sup>252</sup></a> From whom, some say, the city of that name was called.</p> +</div> + +<div class="FN"><p><a id="FN-253"></a><a href="#FNA-253"><sup>253</sup></a> Capedunculæ seem to have been bowls or cups, with handles +on each side, set apart for the use of the altar.—<span class="sc">Davis</span>.</p> +</div> + +<div class="FN"><p><a id="FN-254"></a><a href="#FNA-254"><sup>254</sup></a> See Cicero de Divinatione, and Ovid. Fast.</p> +</div> + +<div class="FN"><p><a id="FN-255"></a><a href="#FNA-255"><sup>255</sup></a> In the consulship of Piso and Gabinius sacrifices to +Serapis and Isis were prohibited in Rome; but the Roman people afterward +placed them again in the number of their gods. See Tertullian’s Apol. +and his first book Ad Nationes, and Arnobius, lib. 2.—<span class="sc">Davis</span>.</p> +</div> + +<div class="FN"><p><a id="FN-256"></a><a href="#FNA-256"><sup>256</sup></a> In some copies Circe, Pasiphae, and Æa are mentioned +together; but Æa is rejected by the most judicious editors.</p> +</div> + +<div class="FN"><p><a id="FN-257"></a><a href="#FNA-257"><sup>257</sup></a> They were three, and are said to have averted a plague by +offering themselves a sacrifice.</p> +</div> + +<div class="FN"><p><a id="FN-258"></a><a href="#FNA-258"><sup>258</sup></a> So called from the Greek word <span class="greek">θαυμάζω</span>, to wonder.</p> +</div> + +<div class="FN"><p><a id="FN-259"></a><a href="#FNA-259"><sup>259</sup></a> She was first called Geres, from <i>gero</i>, to bear.</p> +</div> + +<div class="FN"><p><a id="FN-260"></a><a href="#FNA-260"><sup>260</sup></a> The word is <i>precatione</i>, which means the books or forms +of prayers used by the augurs.</p> +</div> + +<div class="FN"><p><a id="FN-261"></a><a href="#FNA-261"><sup>261</sup></a> Cotta’s intent here, as well as in other places, is to +show how unphilosophical their civil theology was, and with what +confusions it was embarrassed; which design of the Academic the reader +should carefully keep in view, or he will lose the chain of argument.</p> +</div> + +<div class="FN"><p><a id="FN-262"></a><a href="#FNA-262"><sup>262</sup></a> Anactes, <span class="greek">Ἄνακτες</span>, was a general name for all kings, as we +find in the oldest Greek writers, and particularly in Homer.</p> +</div> + +<div class="FN"><p><a id="FN-263"></a><a href="#FNA-263"><sup>263</sup></a> The common reading is Aleo; but we follow Lambinus and +Davis, who had the authority of the best manuscript copies.</p> +</div> + +<div class="FN"><p><a id="FN-264"></a><a href="#FNA-264"><sup>264</sup></a> Some prefer Phthas to Opas (see Dr. Davis’s edition); but +Opas is the generally received reading.</p> +</div> + +<div class="FN"><p><a id="FN-265"></a><a href="#FNA-265"><sup>265</sup></a> The Lipari Isles.</p> +</div> + +<div class="FN"><p><a id="FN-266"></a><a href="#FNA-266"><sup>266</sup></a> A town in Arcadia.</p> +</div> + +<div class="FN"><p><a id="FN-267"></a><a href="#FNA-267"><sup>267</sup></a> In Arcadia.</p> +</div> + +<div class="FN"><p><a id="FN-268"></a><a href="#FNA-268"><sup>268</sup></a> A northern people.</p> +</div> + +<div class="FN"><p><a id="FN-269"></a><a href="#FNA-269"><sup>269</sup></a> So called from the Greek word <span class="greek">νόμος</span>, <i>lex</i>, a law.</p> +</div> + +<div class="FN"><p><a id="FN-270"></a><a href="#FNA-270"><sup>270</sup></a> He is called <span class="greek">Ὦπις</span> in some old Greek fragments, and <span class="greek">Οὖπις</span> by Callimachus in his hymn on Diana.</p> +</div> + +<div class="FN"><p><a id="FN-271"></a><a href="#FNA-271"><sup>271</sup></a> <span class="greek">Σαβάζίος</span>, Sabazius, is one of the names used for +Bacchus.</p> +</div> + +<div class="FN"><p><a id="FN-272"></a><a href="#FNA-272"><sup>272</sup></a> Here is a wide chasm in the original. What is lost +probably may have contained great part of Cotta’s arguments against the +providence of the Stoics.</p> +</div> + +<div class="FN"><p><a id="FN-273"></a><a href="#FNA-273"><sup>273</sup></a> Here is one expression in the quotation from Cæcilius +that is not commonly met with, which is <i>præstigias præstrinxit;</i> +Lambinus gives <i>præstinxit</i>, for the sake, I suppose, of playing on +words, because it might then be translated, “He has deluded my +delusions, or stratagems;” but <i>præstrinxit</i> is certainly the right +reading.</p> +</div> + +<div class="FN"><p><a id="FN-274"></a><a href="#FNA-274"><sup>274</sup></a> The ancient Romans had a judicial as well as a military +prætor; and he sat, with inferior judges attending him, like one of our +chief-justices. <i>Sessum it prætor</i>, which I doubt not is the right +reading, Lambinus restored from an old copy. The common reading was +<i>sessum ite precor</i>.</p> +</div> + +<div class="FN"><p><a id="FN-275"></a><a href="#FNA-275"><sup>275</sup></a> Picenum was a region of Italy.</p> +</div> + +<div class="FN"><p><a id="FN-276"></a><a href="#FNA-276"><sup>276</sup></a> The <i>sex primi</i> were general receivers of all taxes and +tributes; and they were obliged to make good, out of their own fortunes, +whatever deficiencies were in the public treasury.</p> +</div> + +<div class="FN"><p><a id="FN-277"></a><a href="#FNA-277"><sup>277</sup></a> The Lætorian Law was a security for those under age +against extortioners, etc. By this law all debts contracted under +twenty-five years of age were void.</p> +</div> + +<div class="FN"><p><a id="FN-278"></a><a href="#FNA-278"><sup>278</sup></a> This is from Ennius—</p> + +<div class="poem"> +<p>Utinam ne in nemore Pelio securibus</p> +<p>Cæsa cecidisset abiegna ad terram trabes.</p> +</div> + +<p>Translated from the beginning of the Medea of Euripides—</p> + +<div class="poem"> +<p><span class="greek">Μήδ’ ἐν νάπαισι Πηλίον πεσεῖν ποτε</span></p> +<p><span class="greek">τμηθεῖσα πεύκη.</span></p> +</div> +</div> + +<div class="FN"><p><a id="FN-279"></a><a href="#FNA-279"><sup>279</sup></a> Q. Fabius Maximus, surnamed Cunctator.</p> +</div> + +<div class="FN"><p><a id="FN-280"></a><a href="#FNA-280"><sup>280</sup></a> Diogenes Laertius says he was pounded to death in a stone +mortar by command of Nicocreon, tyrant of Cyprus.</p> +</div> + +<div class="FN"><p><a id="FN-281"></a><a href="#FNA-281"><sup>281</sup></a> Elea, a city of Lucania, in Italy. The manner in which +Zeno was put to death is, according to Diogenes Laertius, uncertain.</p> +</div> + +<div class="FN"><p><a id="FN-282"></a><a href="#FNA-282"><sup>282</sup></a> This great and good man was accused of destroying the +divinity of the Gods of his country. He was condemned, and died by +drinking a glass of poison.</p> +</div> + +<div class="FN"><p><a id="FN-283"></a><a href="#FNA-283"><sup>283</sup></a> Tyrant of Sicily.</p> +</div> + +<div class="FN"><p><a id="FN-284"></a><a href="#FNA-284"><sup>284</sup></a> The common reading is, <i>in tympanidis rogum inlatus est</i>. +This passage has been the occasion of as many different opinions +concerning both the reading and the sense as any passage in the whole +treatise. <i>Tympanum</i> is used for a timbrel or drum, <i>tympanidia</i> a +diminutive of it. Lambinus says <i>tympana</i> “were sticks with which the +tyrant used to beat the condemned.” P. Victorius substitutes +<i>tyrannidis</i> for <i>tympanidis</i>.</p> +</div> + +<div class="FN"><p><a id="FN-285"></a><a href="#FNA-285"><sup>285</sup></a> The original is <i>de amissa salute;</i> which means the +sentence of banishment among the Romans, in which was contained the loss +of goods and estate, and the privileges of a Roman; and in this sense +L’Abbé d’Olivet translates it.</p> +</div> + +<div class="FN"><p><a id="FN-286"></a><a href="#FNA-286"><sup>286</sup></a> The forty-seventh proposition of the first book of Euclid +is unanimously ascribed to him by the ancients. Dr. Wotton, in his +Reflections upon Ancient and Modern Learning, says, “It is indeed a very +noble proposition, the foundation of trigonometry, of universal and +various use in those curious speculations about incommensurable +numbers.”</p> +</div> + +<div class="FN"><p><a id="FN-287"></a><a href="#FNA-287"><sup>287</sup></a> These votive tables, or pictures, were hung up in the +temples.</p> +</div> + +<div class="FN"><p><a id="FN-288"></a><a href="#FNA-288"><sup>288</sup></a> This passage is a fragment from a tragedy of Attius.</p> +</div> + +<div class="FN"><p><a id="FN-289"></a><a href="#FNA-289"><sup>289</sup></a> Hipponax was a poet at Ephesus, and so deformed that +Bupalus drew a picture of him to provoke laughter; for which Hipponax is +said to have written such keen iambics on the painter that he hanged +himself.</p> + +<p>Lycambes had promised Archilochus the poet to marry his daughter to him, +but afterward retracted his promise, and refused her; upon which +Archilochus is said to have published a satire in iambic verse that +provoked him to hang himself.</p> +</div> + +<div class="FN"><p><a id="FN-290"></a><a href="#FNA-290"><sup>290</sup></a> Cicero refers here to an oracle approving of his laws, +and promising Sparta prosperity as long as they were obeyed, which +Lycurgus procured from Delphi.</p> +</div> + +<div class="FN"><p><a id="FN-291"></a><a href="#FNA-291"><sup>291</sup></a> <i>Pro aris et focis</i> is a proverbial expression. The +Romans, when they would say their all was at stake, could not express it +stronger than by saying they contended <i>pro aris et focis</i>, for religion +and their firesides, or, as we express it, for religion and property.</p> +</div> + +<div class="FN"><p><a id="FN-292"></a><a href="#FNA-292"><sup>292</sup></a> Cicero, who was an Academic, gives his opinion according +to the manner of the Academics, who looked upon probability, and a +resemblance of truth, as the utmost they could arrive at.</p> +</div> + +<div class="FN"><p><a id="FN-293"></a><a href="#FNA-293"><sup>293</sup></a> <i>I.e.</i>, Regulus.</p> +</div> + +<div class="FN"><p><a id="FN-294"></a><a href="#FNA-294"><sup>294</sup></a> <i>I.e.</i>, Fabius.</p> +</div> + +<div class="FN"><p><a id="FN-295"></a><a href="#FNA-295"><sup>295</sup></a> It is unnecessary to give an account of the other names +here mentioned; but that of Lænas is probably less known. He was Publius +Popillius Lænas, consul 132 <span class="sc">b.c.</span>, the year after the death of Tiberius +Gracchus, and it became his duty to prosecute the accomplices of +Gracchus, for which he was afterward attacked by Caius Gracchus with +such animosity that he withdrew into voluntary exile. Cicero pays a +tribute to the energy of Opimius in the first Oration against Catiline, +c. iii.</p> +</div> + +<div class="FN"><p><a id="FN-296"></a><a href="#FNA-296"><sup>296</sup></a> This phenomenon of the parhelion, or mock sun, which so +puzzled Cicero’s interlocutors, has been very satisfactorily explained +by modern science. The parhelia are formed by the reflection of the +sunbeams on a cloud properly situated. They usually accompany the +coronæ, or luminous circles, and are placed in the same circumference, +and at the same height. Their colors resemble that of the rainbow; the +red and yellow are towards the side of the sun, and the blue and violet +on the other. There are, however, coronæ sometimes seen without +parhelia, and <i>vice versâ</i>. Parhelia are double, triple, etc., and in +1629, a parhelion of five suns was seen at Rome, and another of six suns +at Arles, 1666.</p> +</div> + +<div class="FN"><p><a id="FN-297"></a><a href="#FNA-297"><sup>297</sup></a> There is a little uncertainty as to what this age was, +but it was probably about twenty-five.</p> +</div> + +<div class="FN"><p><a id="FN-298"></a><a href="#FNA-298"><sup>298</sup></a> Cicero here gives a very exact and correct account of the +planetarium of Archimedes, which is so often noticed by the ancient +astronomers. It no doubt corresponded in a great measure to our modern +planetarium, or orrery, invented by the earl of that name. This +elaborate machine, whose manufacture requires the most exact and +critical science, is of the greatest service to those who study the +revolutions of the stars, for astronomic, astrologic, or meteorologic +purposes.</p> +</div> + +<div class="FN"><p><a id="FN-299"></a><a href="#FNA-299"><sup>299</sup></a> The end of the fourteenth chapter and the first words of +the fifteenth are lost; but it is plain that in the fifteenth it is +Scipio who is speaking.</p> +</div> + +<div class="FN"><p><a id="FN-300"></a><a href="#FNA-300"><sup>300</sup></a> There is evidently some error in the text here, for +Ennius was born 515 <span class="sc">a.u.c.</span>, was a personal friend of the elder +Africanus, and died about 575 <span class="sc">a.u.c.</span>, so that it is plain that we ought +to read in the text 550, not 350.</p> +</div> + +<div class="FN"><p><a id="FN-301"></a><a href="#FNA-301"><sup>301</sup></a> Two pages are lost here. Afterward it is again Scipio who +is speaking.</p> +</div> + +<div class="FN"><p><a id="FN-302"></a><a href="#FNA-302"><sup>302</sup></a> Two pages are lost here.</p> +</div> + +<div class="FN"><p><a id="FN-303"></a><a href="#FNA-303"><sup>303</sup></a> Both Ennius and Nævius wrote tragedies called +“Iphigenia.” Mai thinks the text here corrupt, and expresses some doubt +whether there is a quotation here at all.</p> +</div> + +<div class="FN"><p><a id="FN-304"></a><a href="#FNA-304"><sup>304</sup></a> He means Scipio himself.</p> +</div> + +<div class="FN"><p><a id="FN-305"></a><a href="#FNA-305"><sup>305</sup></a> There is again a hiatus. What follows is spoken by +Lælius.</p> +</div> + +<div class="FN"><p><a id="FN-306"></a><a href="#FNA-306"><sup>306</sup></a> Again two pages are lost.</p> +</div> + +<div class="FN"><p><a id="FN-307"></a><a href="#FNA-307"><sup>307</sup></a> Again two pages are lost. It is evident that Scipio is +speaking again in cap. xxxi.</p> +</div> + +<div class="FN"><p><a id="FN-308"></a><a href="#FNA-308"><sup>308</sup></a> Again two pages are lost.</p> +</div> + +<div class="FN"><p><a id="FN-309"></a><a href="#FNA-309"><sup>309</sup></a> Again two pages are lost.</p> +</div> + +<div class="FN"><p><a id="FN-310"></a><a href="#FNA-310"><sup>310</sup></a> Here four pages are lost.</p> +</div> + +<div class="FN"><p><a id="FN-311"></a><a href="#FNA-311"><sup>311</sup></a> Here four pages are lost.</p> +</div> + +<div class="FN"><p><a id="FN-312"></a><a href="#FNA-312"><sup>312</sup></a> Two pages are missing here.</p> +</div> + +<div class="FN"><p><a id="FN-313"></a><a href="#FNA-313"><sup>313</sup></a> A name of Neptune.</p> +</div> + +<div class="FN"><p><a id="FN-314"></a><a href="#FNA-314"><sup>314</sup></a> About seven lines are lost here, and there is a great +deal of corruption and imperfection in the next few sentences.</p> +</div> + +<div class="FN"><p><a id="FN-315"></a><a href="#FNA-315"><sup>315</sup></a> Two pages are lost here.</p> +</div> + +<div class="FN"><p><a id="FN-316"></a><a href="#FNA-316"><sup>316</sup></a> The <i>Lex Curiata de Imperio</i>, so often mentioned here, +was the same as the <i>Auctoritas Patrum</i>, and was necessary in order to +confer upon the dictator, consuls, and other magistrates the <i>imperium</i>, +or military command: without this they had only a <i>potestas</i>, or civil +authority, and could not meddle with military affairs.</p> +</div> + +<div class="FN"><p><a id="FN-317"></a><a href="#FNA-317"><sup>317</sup></a> Two pages are missing here.</p> +</div> + +<div class="FN"><p><a id="FN-318"></a><a href="#FNA-318"><sup>318</sup></a> Here two pages are missing.</p> +</div> + +<div class="FN"><p><a id="FN-319"></a><a href="#FNA-319"><sup>319</sup></a> I have translated this very corrupt passage according to +Niebuhr’s emendation.</p> +</div> + +<div class="FN"><p><a id="FN-320"></a><a href="#FNA-320"><sup>320</sup></a> Assiduus, ab ære dando.</p> +</div> + +<div class="FN"><p><a id="FN-321"></a><a href="#FNA-321"><sup>321</sup></a> Proletarii, a prole.</p> +</div> + +<div class="FN"><p><a id="FN-322"></a><a href="#FNA-322"><sup>322</sup></a> Here four pages are missing.</p> +</div> + +<div class="FN"><p><a id="FN-323"></a><a href="#FNA-323"><sup>323</sup></a> Two pages are missing here.</p> +</div> + +<div class="FN"><p><a id="FN-324"></a><a href="#FNA-324"><sup>324</sup></a> Two pages are missing here.</p> +</div> + +<div class="FN"><p><a id="FN-325"></a><a href="#FNA-325"><sup>325</sup></a> Here twelve pages are missing.</p> +</div> + +<div class="FN"><p><a id="FN-326"></a><a href="#FNA-326"><sup>326</sup></a> Sixteen pages are missing here.</p> +</div> + +<div class="FN"><p><a id="FN-327"></a><a href="#FNA-327"><sup>327</sup></a> Here eight pages are missing.</p> +</div> + +<div class="FN"><p><a id="FN-328"></a><a href="#FNA-328"><sup>328</sup></a> A great many pages are missing here.</p> +</div> + +<div class="FN"><p><a id="FN-329"></a><a href="#FNA-329"><sup>329</sup></a> Several pages are lost here; the passage in brackets is +found in Nonius under the word “exulto.”</p> +</div> + +<div class="FN"><p><a id="FN-330"></a><a href="#FNA-330"><sup>330</sup></a> This and other chapters printed in smaller type are +generally presumed to be of doubtful authenticity.</p> +</div> + +<div class="FN"><p><a id="FN-331"></a><a href="#FNA-331"><sup>331</sup></a> The beginning of this book is lost. The two first +paragraphs come, the one from St. Augustine, the other from Lactantius.</p> +</div> + +<div class="FN"><p><a id="FN-332"></a><a href="#FNA-332"><sup>332</sup></a> Eight or nine pages are lost here.</p> +</div> + +<div class="FN"><p><a id="FN-333"></a><a href="#FNA-333"><sup>333</sup></a> Here six pages are lost.</p> +</div> + +<div class="FN"><p><a id="FN-334"></a><a href="#FNA-334"><sup>334</sup></a> Here twelve pages are missing.</p> +</div> + +<div class="FN"><p><a id="FN-335"></a><a href="#FNA-335"><sup>335</sup></a> We have been obliged to insert two or three of these +sentences between brackets, which are not found in the original, for the +sake of showing the drift of the arguments of Philus. He himself was +fully convinced that justice and morality were of eternal and immutable +obligation, and that the best interests of all beings lie in their +perpetual development and application. This eternity of Justice is +beautifully illustrated by Montesquieu. “Long,” says he, “before +positive laws were instituted, the moral relations of justice were +absolute and universal. To say that there were no justice or injustice +but that which depends on the injunctions or prohibitions of positive +laws, is to say that the radii which spring from a centre are not equal +till we have formed a circle to illustrate the proposition. We must, +therefore, acknowledge that the relations of equity were antecedent to +the positive laws which corroborated them.” But though Philus was fully +convinced of this, in order to give his friends Scipio and Lælius an +opportunity of proving it, he frankly brings forward every argument for +injustice that sophistry had ever cast in the teeth of reason.—<i>By the +original Translator</i>.</p> +</div> + +<div class="FN"><p><a id="FN-336"></a><a href="#FNA-336"><sup>336</sup></a> Here four pages are missing. The following sentence is +preserved in Nonius.</p> +</div> + +<div class="FN"><p><a id="FN-337"></a><a href="#FNA-337"><sup>337</sup></a> Two pages are missing here.</p> +</div> + +<div class="FN"><p><a id="FN-338"></a><a href="#FNA-338"><sup>338</sup></a> Several pages are missing here.</p> +</div> + +<div class="FN"><p><a id="FN-339"></a><a href="#FNA-339"><sup>339</sup></a> He means Alexander the Great.</p> +</div> + +<div class="FN"><p><a id="FN-340"></a><a href="#FNA-340"><sup>340</sup></a> Six or eight pages are lost here.</p> +</div> + +<div class="FN"><p><a id="FN-341"></a><a href="#FNA-341"><sup>341</sup></a> A great many pages are missing here.</p> +</div> + +<div class="FN"><p><a id="FN-342"></a><a href="#FNA-342"><sup>342</sup></a> Six or eight pages are missing here.</p> +</div> + +<div class="FN"><p><a id="FN-343"></a><a href="#FNA-343"><sup>343</sup></a> Several pages are lost here.</p> +</div> + +<div class="FN"><p><a id="FN-344"></a><a href="#FNA-344"><sup>344</sup></a> This and the following chapters are not the actual words +of Cicero, but quotations by Lactantius and Augustine of what they +affirm that he said.</p> +</div> + +<div class="FN"><p><a id="FN-345"></a><a href="#FNA-345"><sup>345</sup></a> Twelve pages are missing here.</p> +</div> + +<div class="FN"><p><a id="FN-346"></a><a href="#FNA-346"><sup>346</sup></a> Eight pages are missing here.</p> +</div> + +<div class="FN"><p><a id="FN-347"></a><a href="#FNA-347"><sup>347</sup></a> Six or eight pages are missing here.</p> +</div> + +<div class="FN"><p><a id="FN-348"></a><a href="#FNA-348"><sup>348</sup></a> Catadupa, from <span class="greek">κατὰ</span> and <span class="greek">δοῖπος</span>, noise.</p> +</div> + + + + + + + + + + +<pre> + + + + + +End of the Project Gutenberg EBook of Cicero's Tusculan Disputations +by Marcus Tullius Cicero + +*** END OF THIS PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK CICERO'S TUSCULAN DISPUTATIONS *** + +***** This file should be named 14988-h.htm or 14988-h.zip ***** +This and all associated files of various formats will be found in: + https://www.gutenberg.org/1/4/9/8/14988/ + +Produced by Ted Garvin, Hagen von Eitzen and the PG Online Distributed +Proofreading Team. + + +Updated editions will replace the previous one--the old editions +will be renamed. + +Creating the works from public domain print editions means that no +one owns a United States copyright in these works, so the Foundation +(and you!) can copy and distribute it in the United States without +permission and without paying copyright royalties. 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