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diff --git a/16295-h/16295-h.htm b/16295-h/16295-h.htm new file mode 100644 index 0000000..627a998 --- /dev/null +++ b/16295-h/16295-h.htm @@ -0,0 +1,24367 @@ +<!DOCTYPE html PUBLIC "-//W3C//DTD XHTML 1.0 Transitional//EN" + "http://www.w3.org/TR/xhtml1/DTD/xhtml1-transitional.dtd"> +<html xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"> +<head> +<meta name="generator" content= +"HTML Tidy for Windows (vers 1st March 2004), see www.w3.org" /> +<meta http-equiv="Content-Type" content= +"text/html; charset=us-ascii" /> +<title>The Vedanta-Sutras</title> + +<style type="text/css"> + + /*<![CDATA[*/ + <!-- + body {margin-left: 10%; margin-right: 10%;} + p {text-align: justify;} + blockquote {text-align: justify;} + h1,h2,h3,h4,h5,h6 {text-align: center;} + + hr {text-align: center; width: 50%;} + html>body hr {margin-right: 25%; margin-left: 25%; width: 50%;} + hr.full {width: 100%;} + html>body hr.full {margin-right: 0%; margin-left: 0%; width: 100%;} + hr.short {text-align: center; width: 20%;} + html>body hr.short {margin-right: 40%; margin-left: 40%; width: 20%;} + + + .note, .footnote {margin-left: 10%; margin-right: 10%; + font-size: 0.9em;} + + .poem {margin-left:10%; margin-right:10%; + text-align: left;} + .poem .stanza {margin: 1em 0em 1em 0em;} + .poem p {margin: 0; padding-left: 3em; text-indent: -3em;} + .poem p.i2 {margin-left: 2em;} + .poem p.i4 {margin-left: 4em;} + .poem p.i6 {margin-left: 6em;} + .poem p.i8 {margin-left: 8em;} + .poem p.i10 {margin-left: 10em;} + + span.pagenum {position: absolute; left: 1%; right: 91%; + font-size: 8pt;} + --> + /*]]>*/ +</style> +</head> +<body> + + +<pre> + +The Project Gutenberg EBook of The Vedanta-Sutras with the Commentary by +Sankaracarya + +This eBook is for the use of anyone anywhere at no cost and with +almost no restrictions whatsoever. You may copy it, give it away or +re-use it under the terms of the Project Gutenberg License included +with this eBook or online at www.gutenberg.org + + +Title: The Vedanta-Sutras with the Commentary by Sankaracarya + Sacred Books of the East, Volume 1 + +Author: + +Translator: George Thibaut + +Release Date: July 15, 2005 [EBook #16295] + +Language: English + +Character set encoding: ISO-8859-1 + +*** START OF THIS PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK THE VEDANTA-SUTRAS *** + + + + +Produced by Srinivasan Sriram, David King, and the Online +Distributed Proofreading Team + + + + + + +</pre> + +<h1>VEDÂNTA-SÛTRAS</h1> +<h3>With the Commentary by</h3> +<h2>SA@NKARÂCHÂRYA</h2> +<h3>Translated by GEORGE THIBAUT</h3> +<h3>Part I</h3> +<h2>CONTENTS.</h2> +<p><a href="#chap-intro">INTRODUCTION</a></p> +<p><a href="#chap-text">VEDÂNTA-SÛTRAS WITH THE +COMMENTARY BY SA@NKARÂCHÂRYA.</a></p> +<p><a href="#chap-1-1">ADHYÂYA I.</a></p> +<p class="i2"><a href="#chap-1-1">Pâda I.</a></p> +<p class="i2"><a href="#chap-1-2">Pâda II.</a></p> +<p class="i2"><a href="#chap-1-3">Pâda III.</a></p> +<p class="i2"><a href="#chap-1-4">Pâda IV.</a></p> +<p><a href="#chap-2-1">ADHYÂYA II.</a></p> +<p class="i2"><a href="#chap-2-1">Pâda I.</a></p> +<p class="i2"><a href="#chap-2-2">Pâda II.</a></p> +<hr /> +<p>Transliteration of Oriental Alphabets adopted for the +Translations of the Sacred Books of the East.</p> +<p>[Transcriber's Note: The sequence "@n" is used to transcribe the +character "n" with a horizontal line (a "macron") across the +top.]</p> +<span class="pagenum"><a name="pageintro-9" id= +"pageintro-9"></a>{Intro 9}</span> <a name="chap-intro" id= +"chap-intro"></a> +<h2>INTRODUCTION.</h2> +<p>To the sacred literature of the Brahmans, in the strict sense of +the term, i.e. to the Veda, there belongs a certain number of +complementary works without whose assistance the student is, +according to Hindu notions, unable to do more than commit the +sacred texts to memory. In the first place all Vedic texts must, in +order to be understood, be read together with running commentaries +such as Sâya<i>n</i>a's commentaries on the +Sa<i>m</i>hitâs and Brâhma<i>n</i>as, and the +Bhâshyas ascribed to Sa@nkara on the chief Upanishads. But +these commentaries do not by themselves conduce to a full +comprehension of the contents of the sacred texts, since they +confine themselves to explaining the meaning of each detached +passage without investigating its relation to other passages, and +the whole of which they form part; considerations of the latter +kind are at any rate introduced occasionally only. The task of +taking a comprehensive view of the contents of the Vedic writings +as a whole, of systematising what they present in an unsystematical +form, of showing the mutual co-ordination or subordination of +single passages and sections, and of reconciling +contradictions—which, according to the view of the orthodox +commentators, can be apparent only—is allotted to a separate +sâstra or body of doctrine which is termed +Mîmâ<i>m</i>sâ, i.e. the investigation or enquiry +[Greek: kat ezochaen], viz. the enquiry into the connected meaning +of the sacred texts.</p> +<p>Of this Mîmâ<i>m</i>sâ two branches have to be +distinguished, the so-called earlier (pûrva) +Mîmâ<i>m</i>sâ, and the later (uttara) +Mîmâ<i>m</i>sâ. The former undertakes to +systematise the karmakâ<i>nd</i>a, i.e. that entire portion +of the Veda which is concerned with action, pre-eminently +sacrificial action, and which comprises the Sa<i>m</i>hitâs +and the Brâhma<i>n</i>as exclusive of the +Âra<i>n</i>yaka portions; the latter performs the same +<span class="pagenum"><a name="pageintro-10" id= +"pageintro-10"></a>{Intro 10}</span> service with regard to the +so-called j<i>ñ</i>ânaka<i>nd</i>a, i.e. that part of +the Vedic writings which includes the Âra<i>n</i>yaka +portions of the Brâhma<i>n</i>as, and a number of detached +treatises called Upanishads. Its subject is not action but +knowledge, viz. the knowledge of Brahman.</p> +<p>At what period these two <i>s</i>âstras first assumed a +definite form, we are unable to ascertain. Discussions of the +nature of those which constitute the subject-matter of the +Pûrva Mîmâ<i>m</i>sâ must have arisen at a +very early period, and the word Mîmâ<i>m</i>sâ +itself together with its derivatives is already employed in the +Brâhma<i>n</i>as to denote the doubts and discussions +connected with certain contested points of ritual. The want of a +body of definite rules prescribing how to act, i.e. how to perform +the various sacrifices in full accordance with the teaching of the +Veda, was indeed an urgent one, because it was an altogether +practical want, continually pressing itself on the adhvaryus +engaged in ritualistic duties. And the task of establishing such +rules was moreover a comparatively limited and feasible one; for +the members of a certain Vedic sâkhâ or school had to +do no more than to digest thoroughly their own +brâhma<i>n</i>a and sa<i>m</i>hitâ, without being under +any obligation of reconciling with the teaching of their own books +the occasionally conflicting rules implied in the texts of other +sâkhâs. It was assumed that action, as being something +which depends on the will and choice of man, admits of +alternatives, so that a certain sacrifice may be performed in +different ways by members of different Vedic schools, or even by +the followers of one and the same sâkhâ.</p> +<p>The Uttara Mîmâ<i>m</i>sâ-<i>s</i>âstra +may be supposed to have originated considerably later than the +Pûrva Mîmâ<i>m</i>sâ. In the first place, +the texts with which it is concerned doubtless constitute the +latest branch of Vedic literature. And in the second place, the +subject-matter of those texts did not call for a systematical +treatment with equal urgency, as it was in no way connected with +practice; the mental attitude of the authors of the Upanishads, who +in their lucubrations on Brahman and the soul aim at nothing less +than at definiteness and coherence, may have perpetuated itself +through <span class="pagenum"><a name="pageintro-11" id= +"pageintro-11"></a>{Intro 11}</span> many generations without any +great inconvenience resulting therefrom.</p> +<p>But in the long run two causes must have acted with +ever-increasing force, to give an impulse to the systematic working +up of the teaching of the Upanishads also. The followers of the +different Vedic sâkhâs no doubt recognised already at +an early period the truth that, while conflicting statements +regarding the details of a sacrifice can be got over by the +assumption of a vikalpa, i.e. an optional proceeding, it is not so +with regard to such topics as the nature of Brahman, the relation +to it of the human soul, the origin of the physical universe, and +the like. Concerning them, one opinion only can be the true one, +and it therefore becomes absolutely incumbent on those, who look on +the whole body of the Upanishads as revealed truth, to demonstrate +that their teaching forms a consistent whole free from all +contradictions. In addition there supervened the external motive +that, while the karmakâ<i>nd</i>a of the Veda concerned only +the higher castes of brahmanically constituted society, on which it +enjoins certain sacrificial performances connected with certain +rewards, the j<i>ñ</i>ânâkâ<i>nd</i>a, as +propounding a certain theory of the world, towards which any +reflecting person inside or outside the pale of the orthodox +community could not but take up a definite position, must soon have +become the object of criticism on the part of those who held +different views on religious and philosophic things, and hence +stood in need of systematic defence.</p> +<p>At present there exists a vast literature connected with the two +branches of the Mîmâ<i>m</i>sâ. We have, on the +one hand, all those works which constitute the Pûrva +Mîmâ<i>m</i>sâ-<i>s</i>âstra—or as it +is often, shortly but not accurately, termed, the +Mîmâ<i>m</i>sâ-<i>s</i>âstra—and, on +the other hand, all those works which are commonly comprised under +the name Vedânta-<i>s</i>âstra. At the head of this +extensive literature there stand two collections of Sûtras +(i.e. short aphorisms constituting in their totality a complete +body of doctrine upon some subject), whose reputed authors are +Jainini and Bâdarâya<i>n</i>a. There can, however, be +no doubt that the composition of those two <span class= +"pagenum"><a name="pageintro-12" id="pageintro-12"></a>{Intro +12}</span> collections of Sûtras was preceded by a long +series of preparatory literary efforts of which they merely +represent the highly condensed outcome. This is rendered probable +by the analogy of other <i>s</i>âstras, as well as by the +exhaustive thoroughness with which the Sûtras perform their +task of systematizing the teaching of the Veda, and is further +proved by the frequent references which the Sûtras make to +the views of earlier teachers. If we consider merely the preserved +monuments of Indian literature, the Sûtras (of the two +Mîmâ<i>m</i>sâs as well as of other +<i>s</i>âstras) mark the beginning; if we, however, take into +account what once existed, although it is at present irretrievably +lost, we observe that they occupy a strictly central position, +summarising, on the one hand, a series of early literary essays +extending over many generations, and forming, on the other hand, +the head spring of an ever broadening activity of commentators as +well as virtually independent writers, which reaches down to our +days, and may yet have some future before itself.</p> +<p>The general scope of the two +Mîmâ<i>m</i>sâ-sûtras and their relation to +the Veda have been indicated in what precedes. A difference of some +importance between the two has, however, to be noted in this +connexion. The systematisation of the karmakâ<i>nd</i>a of +the Veda led to the elaboration of two classes of works, viz. the +Kalpa-sûtras on the one hand, and the Pûrva +Mîmâ<i>m</i>sâ-sûtras on the other hand. +The former give nothing but a description as concise as possible of +the sacrifices enjoined in the Brâhma<i>n</i>as; while the +latter discuss and establish the general principles which the +author of a Kalpa-sûtra has to follow, if he wishes to render +his rules strictly conformable to the teaching of the Veda. The +j<i>ñ</i>ânakâ<i>nd</i>a of the Veda, on the +other hand, is systematised in a single work, viz. the Uttara +Mîmâ<i>m</i>sâ or Vedânta-sûtras, +which combine the two tasks of concisely stating the teaching of +the Veda, and of argumentatively establishing the special +interpretation of the Veda adopted in the Sûtras. This +difference may be accounted for by two reasons. In the first place, +the contents of the karmakâ<i>nd</i>a, as being of an +entirely practical nature, called for summaries such as the +Kalpa-sûtras, from which all burdensome discussions of +<span class="pagenum"><a name="pageintro-13" id= +"pageintro-13"></a>{Intro 13}</span> method are excluded; while +there was no similar reason for the separation of the two topics in +the case of the purely theoretical science of Brahman. And, in the +second place, the Vedânta-sûtras throughout presuppose +the Pûrva Mîmâ<i>m</i>sâ-sûtras, and +may therefore dispense with the discussion of general principles +and methods already established in the latter.</p> +<p>The time at which the two +Mîmâ<i>m</i>sâ-sûtras were composed we are +at present unable to fix with any certainty; a few remarks on the +subject will, however, be made later on. Their outward form is that +common to all the so-called Sûtras which aims at condensing a +given body of doctrine in a number of concise aphoristic sentences, +and often even mere detached words in lieu of sentences. Besides +the Mîmâ<i>m</i>sâ-sûtras this literary +form is common to the fundamental works on the other philosophic +systems, on the Vedic sacrifices, on domestic ceremonies, on sacred +law, on grammar, and on metres. The two +Mîmâ<i>m</i>sâ-sûtras occupy, however, an +altogether exceptional position in point of style. All Sûtras +aim at conciseness; that is clearly the reason to which this whole +species of literary composition owes its existence. This their aim +they reach by the rigid exclusion of all words which can possibly +be spared, by the careful avoidance of all unnecessary repetitions, +and, as in the case of the grammatical Sûtras, by the +employment of an arbitrarily coined terminology which substitutes +single syllables for entire words or combination of words. At the +same time the manifest intention of the Sûtra writers is to +express themselves with as much clearness as the conciseness +affected by them admits of. The aphorisms are indeed often concise +to excess, but not otherwise intrinsically obscure, the manifest +care of the writers being to retain what is essential in a given +phrase, and to sacrifice only what can be supplied, although +perhaps not without difficulty, and an irksome strain of memory and +reflection. Hence the possibility of understanding without a +commentary a very considerable portion at any rate of the ordinary +Sûtras. Altogether different is the case of the two +Mîmâ<i>m</i>sâ-sûtras. There scarcely one +single Sûtra is <span class="pagenum"><a name="pageintro-14" +id="pageintro-14"></a>{Intro 14}</span> intelligible without a +commentary. The most essential words are habitually dispensed with; +nothing is, for instance, more common than the simple ommission of +the subject or predicate of a sentence. And when here and there a +Sûtra occurs whose words construe without anything having to +be supplied, the phraseology is so eminently vague and obscure that +without the help derived from a commentary we should be unable to +make out to what subject the Sûtra refers. When undertaking +to translate either of the +Mîmâ<i>m</i>sâ-sûtras we therefore depend +altogether on commentaries; and hence the question arises which of +the numerous commentaries extant is to be accepted as a guide to +their right understanding.</p> +<p>The commentary here selected for translation, together with +Bâdarâya<i>n</i>a's Sûtras (to which we shall +henceforth confine our attention to the exclusion of Jaimini's +Pûrva Mîmâ<i>m</i>sâ-sûtras), is the +one composed by the celebrated theologian <i>S</i>a@nkara or, as he +is commonly called, <i>S</i>a@nkarâ<i>k</i>ârya. There +are obvious reasons for this selection. In the first place, the +<i>S</i>a@nkara-bhâshya represents the so-called orthodox +side of Brahminical theology which strictly upholds the Brahman or +highest Self of the Upanishads as something different from, and in +fact immensely superior to, the divine beings such as Vish<i>n</i>u +or Siva, which, for many centuries, have been the chief objects of +popular worship in India. In the second place, the doctrine +advocated by <i>S</i>a@nkara is, from a purely philosophical point +of view and apart from all theological considerations, the most +important and interesting one which has arisen on Indian soil; +neither those forms of the Vedânta which diverge from the +view represented by <i>S</i>a@nkara nor any of the +non-Vedântic systems can be compared with the so-called +orthodox Vedânta in boldness, depth, and subtlety of +speculation. In the third place, <i>S</i>a@nkara's bhâashya +is, as far as we know, the oldest of the extant commentaries, and +relative antiquity is at any rate one of the circumstances which +have to be <span class="pagenum"><a name="pageintro-15" id= +"pageintro-15"></a>{Intro 15}</span> taken into account, although, +it must be admitted, too much weight may easily be attached to it. +The <i>S</i>a@nkara-bhâshya further is the authority most +generally deferred to in India as to the right understanding of the +Vedânta-sûtras, and ever since <i>S</i>a@nkara's time +the majority of the best thinkers of India have been men belonging +to his school. If in addition to all this we take into +consideration the intrinsic merits of <i>S</i>a@nkara's work which, +as a piece of philosophical argumentation and theological +apologetics, undoubtedly occupies a high rank, the preference here +given to it will be easily understood.</p> +<p>But to the European—or, generally, modern—translator +of the Vedânta-sûtras with <i>S</i>a@nkara's commentary +another question will of course suggest itself at once, viz. +whether or not <i>S</i>a@nkara's explanations faithfully render the +intended meaning of the author of the Sûtras. To the Indian +Pandit of <i>S</i>a@nkara's school this question has become an +indifferent one, or, to state the case more accurately, he objects +to it being raised, as he looks on <i>S</i>a@nkara's authority as +standing above doubt and dispute. When pressed to make good his +position he will, moreover, most probably not enter into any +detailed comparison of <i>S</i>a@nkara's comments with the text of +Bâdarâya<i>n</i>a's Sûtras, but will rather +endeavour to show on speculative grounds that <i>S</i>a@nkara's +philosophical view is the only true one, whence it of course +follows that it accurately represents the meaning of +Bâdarâya<i>n</i>a, who himself must necessarily be +assured to have taught the true doctrine. But on the modern +investigator, who neither can consider himself bound by the +authority of a name however great, nor is likely to look to any +Indian system of thought for the satisfaction of his speculative +wants, it is clearly incumbent not to acquiesce from the outset in +the interpretations given of the +Vedânta-sûtras—and the Upanishads—by +<i>S</i>a@nkara and his school, but to submit them, as far as that +can be done, to a critical investigation.</p> +<p>This is a task which would have to be undertaken even if +<i>S</i>a@nkara's views as to the true meaning of the Sûtras +and Upanishads had never been called into doubt on Indian soil, +although in that case it could perhaps hardly be entered +<span class="pagenum"><a name="pageintro-16" id= +"pageintro-16"></a>{Intro 16}</span> upon with much hope of +success; but it becomes much more urgent, and at the same time more +feasible, when we meet in India itself with systems claiming to be +Vedântic and based on interpretations of the Sûtras and +Upanishads more or less differing from those of <i>S</i>a@nkara. +The claims of those systems to be in the possession of the right +understanding of the fundamental authorities of the Vedânta +must at any rate be examined, even if we should finally be +compelled to reject them.</p> +<p>It appears that already at a very early period the +Vedânta-sûtras had come to be looked upon as an +authoritative work, not to be neglected by any who wished to +affiliate their own doctrines to the Veda. At present, at any rate, +there are very few Hindu sects not interested in showing that their +distinctive tenets are countenanced by +Bâdarâya<i>n</i>a's teaching. Owing to this the +commentaries on the Sûtras have in the course of time become +very numerous, and it is at present impossible to give a full and +accurate enumeration even of those actually existing, much less of +those referred to and quoted. Mr. Fitz-Edward Hall, in his +Bibliographical Index, mentions fourteen commentaries, copies of +which had been inspected by himself. Some among these (as, for +instance, Râmânuja's Vedânta-sâra, No. +XXXV) are indeed not commentaries in the strict sense of the word, +but rather systematic expositions of the doctrine supposed to be +propounded in the Sûtras; but, on the other hand, there are +in existence several true commentaries which had not been +accessible to Fitz-Edward Hall. It would hardly be +practical—and certainly not feasible in this place—to +submit all the existing bhâshyas to a critical enquiry at +once. All we can do here is to single out one or a few of the more +important ones, and to compare their interpretations with those +given by <i>S</i>a@nkara, and with the text of the Sûtras +themselves.</p> +<p>The bhâshya, which in this connexion is the first to press +itself upon our attention, is the one composed by the famous +Vaish@nava theologian and philosopher Râmânuja, who is +supposed to have lived in the twelfth century. The +Râmânuja or, as it is often called, the +<i>S</i>rî-bhâshya appears to be <span class= +"pagenum"><a name="pageintro-17" id="pageintro-17"></a>{Intro +17}</span> the oldest commentary extant next to <i>S</i>a@nkara's. +It is further to be noted that the sect of the +Râmânujas occupies a pre-eminent position among the +Vaishnava, sects which themselves, in their totality, may claim to +be considered the most important among all Hindu sects. The +intrinsic value of the <i>S</i>rî-bhâshya moreover +is—as every student acquainted with it will be ready to +acknowledge—a very high one; it strikes one throughout as a +very solid performance due to a writer of extensive learning and +great power of argumentation, and in its polemic parts, directed +chiefly against the school of <i>S</i>a@nkara, it not unfrequently +deserves to be called brilliant even. And in addition to all this +it shows evident traces of being not the mere outcome of +Râmânuja's individual views, but of resting on an old +and weighty tradition.</p> +<p>This latter point is clearly of the greatest importance. If it +could be demonstrated or even rendered probable only that the +oldest bhâshya which we possess, i.e. the +<i>S</i>a@nkara-bhâshya, represents an uninterrupted and +uniform tradition bridging over the interval between +Bâdarâya<i>n</i>a, the reputed author of the +Sûtras, and <i>S</i>a@nkara; and if, on the other hand, it +could be shown that the more modern bhâshyas are not +supported by old tradition, but are nothing more than bold attempts +of clever sectarians to force an old work of generally recognised +authority into the service of their individual tenets; there would +certainly be no reason for us to raise the question whether the +later bhâshyas can help us in making out the true meaning of +the Sûtras. All we should have to do in that case would be to +accept <i>S</i>a@nkara's interpretations as they stand, or at the +utmost to attempt to make out, if at all possible, by a careful +comparison of <i>S</i>a@nkara's bhâshya with the text of the +Sûtras, whether the former in all cases faithfully represents +the purport of the latter.</p> +<p>In the most recent book of note which at all enters into the +question as to how far we have to accept <i>S</i>a@nkara as a guide +to the right understanding of the Sûtras (Mr. A. Gough's +Philosophy of the Upanishads) the view is maintained (pp. 239 ff.) +that <i>S</i>a@nkara is the generally recognised expositor +<span class="pagenum"><a name="pageintro-18" id= +"pageintro-18"></a>{Intro 18}</span> of true Vedânta +doctrine, that that doctrine was handed down by an unbroken series +of teachers intervening between him and the Sûtrakâra, +and that there existed from the beginning only one Vedânta +doctrine, agreeing in all essential points with the doctrine known +to us from <i>S</i>a@nkara's writings. Mr. Gough undertakes to +prove this view, firstly, by a comparison of <i>S</i>a@nkara's +system with the teaching of the Upanishads themselves; and, +secondly, by a comparison of the purport of the +Sûtras—as far as that can be made out independently of +the commentaries—with the interpretations given of them by +<i>S</i>a@nkara. To both these points we shall revert later on. +Meanwhile, I only wish to remark concerning the former point that, +even if we could show with certainty that all the Upanishads +propound one and the same doctrine, there yet remains the +undeniable fact of our being confronted by a considerable number of +essentially differing theories, all of which claim to be founded on +the Upanishads. And with regard to the latter point I have to say +for the present that, as long as we have only <i>S</i>a@nkara's +bhâshya before us, we are naturally inclined to find in the +Sûtras—which, taken by themselves, are for the greater +part unintelligible—the meaning which <i>S</i>a@nkara +ascribes to them; while a reference to other bhâshyas may not +impossibly change our views at once.—Meanwhile, we will +consider the question as to the unbroken uniformity of +Vedântic tradition from another point or view, viz. by +enquiring whether or not the Sûtras themselves, and the +<i>S</i>a@nkara-bhâshya, furnish any indications of there +having existed already at an early time essentially different +Vedântic systems or lines of Vedântic speculation.</p> +<p>Beginning with the Sûtras, we find that they supply ample +evidence to the effect that already at a very early time, viz. the +period antecedent to the final composition of the +Vedânta-sûtras in their present shape, there had arisen +among the chief doctors of the Vedânta differences of +opinion, bearing not only upon minor points of doctrine, but +affecting the most essential parts of the system. In addition to +Bâdarâya<i>n</i>a himself, the reputed author of the +<span class="pagenum"><a name="pageintro-19" id= +"pageintro-19"></a>{Intro 19}</span> Sûtras, the latter quote +opinions ascribed to the following teachers: Âtreya, +Â<i>s</i>marathya, Au<i>d</i>ulomi, +Kârsh<i>n</i>âgini, Kâ<i>s</i>ak<i>ri</i>tsna, +Jaimini, Bâdari. Among the passages where diverging views of +those teachers are recorded and contrasted three are of particular +importance. Firstly, a passage in the fourth pâda of the +fourth adhyâya (Sûtras 5-7), where the opinions of +various teachers concerning the characteristics of the released +soul are given, and where the important discrepancy is noted that, +according to Au<i>d</i>ulomi, its only characteristic is thought +(<i>k</i>aitanya), while Jaimini maintains that it possesses a +number of exalted qualities, and Bâdarâya<i>n</i>a +declares himself in favour of a combination of those two +views.—The second passage occurs in the third pâda of +the fourth adhyâya (Sûtras 7-14), where Jaimini +maintains that the soul of him who possesses the lower knowledge of +Brahman goes after death to the highest Brahman, while +Bâdari—whose opinion is endorsed by +<i>S</i>a@nkara—teaches that it repairs to the lower Brahman +only—Finally, the third and most important passage is met +with in the fourth pâda of the first adhyâya +(Sûtras 20-22), where the question is discussed why in a +certain passage of the Brhadâra<i>n</i>yaka Brahman is +referred to in terms which are strictly applicable to the +individual soul only. In connexion therewith the Sûtras quote +the views of three ancient teachers about the relation in which the +individual soul stands to Brahman. According to +Â<i>s</i>marathya (if we accept the interpretation of his +view given by <i>S</i>a@nkara and <i>S</i>a@nkara's commentators) +the soul stands to Brahman in the bhedâbheda relation, i.e. +it is neither absolutely different nor absolutely non-different +from it, as sparks are from fire. Audulomi, on the other hand, +teaches that the soul is altogether different from Brahman up to +the time when obtaining final release it is merged in it, and +Kâ<i>s</i>ak<i>ri</i>tsna finally upholds the doctrine that +the soul is absolutely non-different from Brahman; which, in, some +way or other presents itself as the individual soul.</p> +<p>That the ancient teachers, the ripest outcome of whose +speculations and discussions is embodied in the +Vedânta-sûtras, disagreed among themselves on points of +vital <span class="pagenum"><a name="pageintro-20" id= +"pageintro-20"></a>{Intro 20}</span> importance is sufficiently +proved by the three passages quoted. The one quoted last is +specially significant as showing that recognised +authorities—deemed worthy of being quoted in the +Sûtras—denied that doctrine on which the whole system +of <i>S</i>a@nkara hinges, viz. the doctrine of the absolute +identity of the individual soul with Brahman.</p> +<p>Turning next to the <i>S</i>a@nkara-bhâshya itself, we +there also meet with indications that the Vedântins were +divided among themselves on important points of dogma. These +indications are indeed not numerous: <i>S</i>a@nkara, does not on +the whole impress one as an author particularly anxious to +strengthen his own case by appeals to ancient authorities, a +peculiarity of his which later writers of hostile tendencies have +not failed to remark and criticise. But yet more than once +<i>S</i>a@nkara also refers to the opinion of 'another,' viz., +commentator of the Sûtras, and in several places +<i>S</i>a@nkara's commentators explain that the 'other' meant is +the V<i>ri</i>ttikâra (about whom more will be said shortly). +Those references as a rule concern minor points of exegesis, and +hence throw little or no light on important differences of dogma; +but there are two remarks of <i>S</i>a@nkara's at any rate which +are of interest in this connexion. The one is made with reference +to Sûtras 7-14 of the third pâda of the fourth +adhyâya; 'some,' he says there, 'declare those Sûtras, +which I look upon as setting forth the siddhânta view, to +state merely the pûrvapaksha;' a difference of opinion which, +as we have seen above, affects the important question as to the +ultimate fate of those who have not reached the knowledge of the +highest Brahman.—And under I, 3, 19 <i>S</i>a@nkara, after +having explained at length that the individual soul as such cannot +claim any reality, but is real only in so far as it is identical +with Brahman, adds the following words, 'apare tu +vâdina<i>h</i> pâramârthikam eva jaiva<i>m</i> +rûpam iti manyante asmadîyâ<i>s</i> <i>k</i>a +ke<i>k</i>it,' i.e. other theorisers again, and among them some of +ours, are of opinion that the individual soul as such is real.' The +term 'ours,' here made use of, can denote only the Aupanishadas or +Vedântins, and it thus appears that <i>S</i>a@nkara himself +<span class="pagenum"><a name="pageintro-21" id= +"pageintro-21"></a>{Intro 21}</span> was willing to class under the +same category himself and philosophers who—as in later times +the Râmânujas and others—looked upon the +individual soul as not due to the fictitious limitations of +Mâyâ, but as real in itself; whatever may be the +relation in which they considered it to stand to the highest +Self.</p> +<p>From what precedes it follows that the Vedântins of the +school to which <i>S</i>a@nkara himself belonged acknowledged the +existence of Vedântic teaching of a type essentially +different from their own. We must now proceed to enquire whether +the Râmânuja system, which likewise claims to be +Vedânta, and to be founded on the Vedânta-sûtras, +has any title to be considered an ancient system and the heir of a +respectable tradition.</p> +<p>It appears that Râmânuja claims—and by Hindu +writers is generally admitted—to follow in his bhâshya +the authority of Bodhâyana, who had composed a v<i>ri</i>tti +on the Sûtras. Thus we read in the beginning of the +<i>S</i>rî-bhâshya (Pandit, New Series, VII, p. 163), +'Bhagavad-bodhâyanak<i>ri</i>tâ<i>m</i> +vistîrnâ<i>m</i> +brahmasûtra-v<i>ri</i>tti<i>m</i> +pûrvâ<i>k</i>âryâ<i>h</i> +sa<i>m</i>kikshipus tanmatânusâre<i>n</i>a +sûtrâksharâ<i>n</i>i vyâkhyâsyante.' +Whether the Bodhâyana to whom that v<i>ri</i>tti is ascribed +is to be identified with the author of the Kalpa-sûtra, and +other works, cannot at present be decided. But that an ancient +v<i>ri</i>tti on the Sûtras connected with Bodhâyana's +name actually existed, there is not any reason to doubt. Short +quotations from it are met with in a few places of the +<i>S</i>rî-bhâshya, and, as we have seen above, +<i>S</i>a@nkara's commentators state that their author's polemical +remarks are directed against the V<i>ri</i>ttikâra. In +addition to Bodhâyana, Râmânuja appeals to quite +a series of ancient +teachers—pûrvâ<i>k</i>âryâs—who +carried on the true tradition as to the teaching of the +Vedânta and the meaning of the Sûtras. In the +Vedârthasa@ngraha—a work composed by +Râmânuja himself—we meet in one place with the +enumeration of the following authorities: Bodhâyana, +<i>T</i>a@nka, Drami<i>d</i>a, Guhadeva, Kapardin, Bharu<i>k</i>i, +and quotations from the writings of some of these are not +unfrequent in the Vedârthasa@ngraha, as well as the +<i>S</i>rî-bhâshya. <span class="pagenum"><a name= +"pageintro-22" id="pageintro-22"></a>{Intro 22}</span> The author +most frequently quoted is Drami<i>d</i>a, who composed the +Drami<i>d</i>a-bhâshya; he is sometimes referred to as the +bhâshyakâra. Another writer repeatedly quoted as the +vâkyakâra is, I am told, to be identified with the +<i>T</i>a@nka mentioned above. I refrain from inserting in this +place the information concerning the relative age of these writers +which may be derived from the oral tradition of the +Râmânuja sect. From another source, however, we receive +an intimation that Drami<i>d</i>â<i>k</i>ârya or +Dravi<i>d</i>â<i>k</i>ârya preceded <i>S</i>a@nkara in +point of time. In his <i>t</i>îkâ on <i>S</i>a@nkara's +bhâshya to the Chândogya Upanishad III, 10, 4, +Ânandagiri remarks that the attempt made by his author to +reconcile the cosmological views of the Upanishad with the teaching +of Sm<i>ri</i>ti on the same point is a reproduction of the +analogous attempt made by the +Dravi<i>d</i>â<i>k</i>ârya.</p> +<p>It thus appears that that special interpretation of the +Vedânta-sûtras with which the +<i>S</i>rî-bhâshya makes us acquainted is not due to +innovating views on the part of Râmânuja, but had +authoritative representatives already at a period anterior to that +of <i>S</i>a@nkara. This latter point, moreover, receives +additional confirmation from the relation in which the so-called +Râmânuja sect stands to earlier sects. What the exact +position of Râmânuja was, and of what nature were the +reforms that rendered him so prominent as to give his name to a new +sect, is not exactly known at present; at the same time it is +generally acknowledged that the Râmânujas are closely +connected with the so-called Bhâgavatas or +Pâ<i>ñk</i>arâtras, who are known to have +existed already at a very early time. This latter point is proved +by evidence of various kinds; for our present purpose it suffices +to point to the fact that, according to the interpretation of the +most authoritative commentators, the last <span class= +"pagenum"><a name="pageintro-23" id="pageintro-23"></a>{Intro +23}</span> Sûtras of the second pâda of the second +adhyâya (Vedânta-sûtras) refer to a distinctive +tenet of the Bhâgavatas—which tenet forms part of the +Râmânuja system also—viz. that the highest being +manifests itself in a fourfold form (vyûha) as +Vâsudeva, Sa@nkarsha<i>n</i>a, Pradyumna, Aniruddha, those +four forms being identical with the highest Self, the individual +soul, the internal organ (manas), and the principle of egoity +(aha@nkâra). Whether those Sûtras embody an approval of +the tenet referred to, as Râmânuja maintains, or are +meant to impugn it, as <i>S</i>a@nkara thinks; so much is certain +that in the opinion of the best commentators the Bhâgavatas, +the direct forerunners of the Râmânujas, are mentioned +in the Sûtras themselves, and hence must not only have +existed, but even reached a considerable degree of importance at +the time when the Sûtras were composed. And considering the +general agreement of the systems of the earlier Bhâgavatas +and the later Râmânujas, we have a full right to +suppose that the two sects were at one also in their mode of +interpreting the Vedânta-sûtras.</p> +<p>The preceding considerations suffice, I am inclined to think, to +show that it will by no means be wasted labour to enquire how +Râmânuja interprets the Sûtras, and wherein he +differs from <i>S</i>a@nkara. This in fact seems clearly to be the +first step we have to take, if we wish to make an attempt at least +of advancing beyond the interpretations of scholiasts to the +meaning of the Sûtras themselves. A full and exhaustive +comparison of the views of the two commentators would indeed far +exceed the limits of the space which can here he devoted to that +task, and will, moreover, be made with greater ease and advantage +when the complete Sanskrit text of the +<i>S</i>rî-bhâshya has been printed, and thus made +available for general reference. But meanwhile it is possible, +and—as said before—even urged upon a translator of the +Sûtras to compare the interpretations, given by the two +bhâshyakâras, of those Sûtras, which, more than +others, touch on the essential points of the Vedânta system. +This <span class="pagenum"><a name="pageintro-24" id= +"pageintro-24"></a>{Intro 24}</span> will best be done in connexion +with a succinct but full review of the topics discussed in the +adhikara<i>n</i>as of the Vedânta-sûtras, according to +<i>S</i>a@nkara; a review which—apart from the side-glances +at Râmânuja's comments—will be useful as a guide +through the Sûtras and the <i>S</i>a@nkara-bhâshya. +Before, however, entering on that task, I think it advisable to +insert short sketches of the philosophical systems of +<i>S</i>a@nkara as well as of Râmânuja, which may be +referred to when, later on discrepancies between the two +commentators will be noted. In these sketches I shall confine +myself to the leading features, and not enter into any details. Of +<i>S</i>a@nkara's system we possess as it is more than one +trustworthy exposition; it may suffice to refer to Deussen's System +of the Vedânta, in which the details of the entire system, as +far as they can be learned from the Sûtra-bhâshya, are +represented fully and faithfully, and to Gough's Philosophy of the +Upanishads which, principally in its second chapter, gives a lucid +sketch of the <i>S</i>a@nkara Vedânta, founded on the +Sûtra-bhâshya, the Upanishad bhâshyas, and some +later writers belonging to <i>S</i>a@nkara's school. With regard to +Râmânuja's philosophy our chief source was, hitherto, +the Râmânuja chapter in the +Sarvadar<i>s</i>a<i>n</i>asa<i>m</i>graha; the short sketch about +to be given is founded altogether on the +<i>S</i>rî-bhâshya itself.</p> +<p>What in <i>S</i>a@nkara's opinion the Upanishads teach, is +shortly as follows.—Whatever is, is in reality one; there +truly exists only one universal being called Brahman or +Paramâtman, the highest Self. This being is of an absolutely +homogeneous nature; it is pure 'Being,' or, which comes to the +same, pure intelligence or thought (<i>k</i>aitanya, <span class= +"pagenum"><a name="pageintro-25" id="pageintro-25"></a>{Intro +25}</span> j<i>ñ</i>âna). Intelligence or thought is +not to be predicated of Brahman as its attribute, but constitutes +its substance, Brahman is not a thinking being, but thought itself. +It is absolutely destitute of qualities; whatever qualities or +attributes are conceivable, can only be denied of it.—But, if +nothing exists but one absolutely simple being, whence the +appearance of the world by which we see ourselves surrounded, and, +in which we ourselves exist as individual beings?—Brahman, +the answer runs, is associated with a certain power called +Mâyâ or avidyâ to which the appearance of this +entire world is due. This power cannot be called 'being' (sat), for +'being' is only Brahman; nor can it be called 'non-being' (asat) in +the strict sense, for it at any rate produces the appearance of +this world. It is in fact a principle of illusion; the undefinable +cause owing to which there seems to exist a material world +comprehending distinct individual existences. Being associated with +this principle of illusion, Brahman is enabled to project the +appearance of the world, in the same way as a magician is enabled +by his incomprehensible magical power to produce illusory +appearances of animate and inanimate beings. Mâyâ thus +constitutes the upâdâna, the material cause of the +world; or—if we wish to call attention to the circumstance +that Mâyâ belongs to Brahman as a <i>s</i>akti—we +may say that the material cause of the world is Brahman in so far +as it is associated with Mâyâ. In this latter quality +Brahman is more properly called Î<i>s</i>vara, the Lord.</p> +<p>Mâyâ, under the guidance of the Lord, modifies +itself by a progressive evolution into all the individual +existences (bheda), distinguished by special names and forms, of +which the world consists; from it there spring in due succession +the different material elements and the whole bodily apparatus +belonging to sentient Beings. In all those apparently, individual +forms of existence the one indivisible Brahman is present, but, +owing to the particular adjuncts into which Mâyâ has +specialised itself, it appears to be broken up—it is broken +up, as it were—into a multiplicity, of intellectual or +sentient principles, the so-called jîvas (individual or +personal souls). What is real in each <span class= +"pagenum"><a name="pageintro-26" id="pageintro-26"></a>{Intro +26}</span> jîva is only the universal Brahman itself; the +whole aggregate of individualising bodily organs and mental +functions, which in our ordinary experience separate and +distinguish one jîva from another, is the offspring of +Mâyâ and as such unreal.</p> +<p>The phenomenal world or world of ordinary experience +(vyavahâra) thus consists of a number of individual souls +engaged in specific cognitions, volitions, and so on, and of the +external material objects with which those cognitions and volitions +are concerned. Neither the specific cognitions nor their objects +are real in the true sense of the word, for both are altogether due +to Mâyâ. But at the same time we have to reject the +idealistic doctrine of certain Bauddha schools according to which +nothing whatever truly exists, but certain trains of cognitional +acts or ideas to which no external objects correspond; for external +things, although not real in the strict sense of the word, enjoy at +any rate as much reality as the specific cognitional acts whose +objects they are.</p> +<p>The non-enlightened soul is unable to look through and beyond +Mâyâ, which, like a veil, hides from it its true +nature. Instead of recognising itself to be Brahman, it blindly +identifies itself with its adjuncts (upâdhi), the fictitious +offspring of Mâyâ, and thus looks for its true Self in +the body, the sense organs, and the internal organ (manas), i.e. +the organ of specific cognition. The soul, which in reality is pure +intelligence, non-active, infinite, thus becomes limited in extent, +as it were, limited in knowledge and power, an agent and enjoyer. +Through its actions it burdens itself with merit and demerit, the +consequences of which it has to bear or enjoy in series of future +embodied existences, the Lord—as a retributor and +dispenser—allotting to each soul that form of embodiment to +which it is entitled by its previous actions. At the end of each of +the great world periods called kalpas the Lord retracts the whole +world, i.e. the whole material world is dissolved and merged into +non-distinct Mâyâ, while the individual souls, free for +the time from actual connexion with upâdhis, lie in deep +slumber as it were. But as the <span class="pagenum"><a name= +"pageintro-27" id="pageintro-27"></a>{Intro 27}</span> consequences +of their former deeds are not yet exhausted, they have again to +enter on embodied existence as soon as the Lord sends forth a new +material world, and the old round of birth, action, death begins +anew to last to all eternity as it has lasted from all +eternity.</p> +<p>The means of escaping from this endless sa<i>ms</i>ára, +the way out of which can never be found by the non-enlightened +soul, are furnished by the Veda. The karmaká<i>nd</i>a +indeed, whose purport it is to enjoin certain actions, cannot lead +to final release; for even the most meritorious works necessarily +lead to new forms of embodied existence. And in the +j<i>ñ</i>ânakâ<i>nd</i>a of the Veda also two +different parts have to be distinguished, viz., firstly, those +chapters and passages which treat of Brahman in so far as related +to the world, and hence characterised by various attributes, i.e. +of Î<i>s</i>vara or the lower Brahman; and, secondly, those +texts which set forth the nature of the highest Brahman +transcending all qualities, and the fundamental identity of the +individual soul with that highest Brahman. Devout meditation on +Brahman as suggested by passages of the former kind does not +directly lead to final emancipation; the pious worshipper passes on +his death into the world of the lower Brahman only, where he +continues to exist as a distinct individual soul—although in +the enjoyment of great power and knowledge—until at last he +reaches the highest knowledge, and, through it, final +release.—That student of the Veda, on the other hand, whose +soul has been enlightened by the texts embodying the higher +knowledge of Brahman, whom passages such as the great saying, 'That +art thou,' have taught that there is no difference between his true +Self and the highest Self, obtains at the moment of death immediate +final release, i.e. he withdraws altogether from the influence of +Mâyâ, and asserts himself in his true nature, which is +nothing else but the absolute highest Brahman.</p> +<p>Thus <i>S</i>a@nkara.—According to Râmânuja, +on the other hand, the teaching of the Upanishads has to be +summarised as follows.—There exists only one all-embracing +being called Brahman or the highest Self of the Lord. This being is +<span class="pagenum"><a name="pageintro-28" id= +"pageintro-28"></a>{Intro 28}</span> not destitute of attributes, +but rather endowed with all imaginable auspicious qualities. It is +not 'intelligence,'—as <i>S</i>a@nkara maintains,—but +intelligence is its chief attribute. The Lord is all-pervading, +all-powerful, all-knowing, all-merciful; his nature is +fundamentally antagonistic to all evil. He contains within himself +whatever exists. While, according to <i>S</i>a@nkara, the only +reality is to be found in the non-qualified homogeneous highest +Brahman which can only be defined as pure 'Being' or pure thought, +all plurality being a mere illusion; Brahman—according to +Râmânuja's view—comprises within itself distinct +elements of plurality which all of them lay claim to absolute +reality of one and the same kind. Whatever is presented to us by +ordinary experience, viz. matter in all its various modifications +and the individual souls of different classes and degrees, are +essential real constituents of Brahman's nature. Matter and souls +(a<i>k</i>it and <i>k</i>it) constitute, according to +Râmânuja's terminology, the body of the Lord; they +stand to him in the same relation of entire dependence and +subserviency in which the matter forming an animal or vegetable +body stands to its soul or animating principle. The Lord pervades +and rules all things which exist—material or +immaterial—as their antaryâmin; the fundamental text +for this special Râmânuja tenet—which in the +writings of the sect is quoted again and again—is the +so-called antaryâmin brâhma<i>n</i>a. (B<i>ri</i>. Up. +III, 7) which says, that within all elements, all sense organs, +and, lastly, within all individual souls, there abides an inward +ruler whose body those elements, sense-organs, and individual souls +constitute.—Matter and souls as forming the body of the Lord +are also called modes of him (prakâra). They are to be looked +upon as his effects, but they have enjoyed the kind of individual +existence which is theirs from all eternity, and will never be +entirely resolved into Brahman. They, however, exist in two +different, periodically alternating, conditions. At some times they +exist in a subtle state in which they do not possess those +qualities by which they are ordinarily known, and there is then no +distinction of individual name and form. Matter in that state is +unevolved (avyakta); the <span class="pagenum"><a name= +"pageintro-29" id="pageintro-29"></a>{Intro 29}</span> individual +souls are not joined to material bodies, and their intelligence is +in a state of contraction, non-manifestation (sa@nko<i>k</i>a). +This is the pralaya state which recurs at the end of each kalpa, +and Brahman is then said to be in its causal condition +(kâra<i>n</i>âvasthâ). To that state all those +scriptural passages refer which speak of Brahman or the Self as +being in the beginning one only, without a second. Brahman then is +indeed not absolutely one, for it contains within itself matter and +souls in a germinal condition; but as in that condition they are so +subtle as not to allow of individual distinctions being made, they +are not counted as something second in addition to +Brahman.—When the pralaya state comes to an end, creation +takes place owing to an act of volition on the Lord's part. Primary +unevolved matter then passes over into its other condition; it +becomes gross and thus acquires all those sensible attributes, +visibility, tangibility, and so on, which are known from ordinary +experience. At the same time the souls enter into connexion with +material bodies corresponding to the degree of merit or demerit +acquired by them in previous forms of existence; their intelligence +at the same time undergoes a certain expansion +(vikâ<i>s</i>a). The Lord, together with matter in its gross +state and the 'expanded' souls, is Brahman in the condition of an +effect (káryâvasthâ). Cause and effect are thus +at the bottom the same; for the effect is nothing but the cause +which has undergone a certain change (pari<i>n</i>âma). Hence +the cause being known, the effect is known likewise.</p> +<p>Owing to the effects of their former actions the individual +souls are implicated in the sa<i>m</i>sâra, the endless cycle +of birth, action, and death, final escape from which is to be +obtained only through the study of the +j<i>ñ</i>ânakâ<i>nd</i>a of the Veda. Compliance +with the injunctions of the karmakâ<i>nd</i>a does not lead +outside the sa<i>m</i>sâra; but he who, assisted by the grace +of the Lord, cognizes—and meditates on—him in the way +prescribed by the Upanishads reaches at his death final +emancipation, i.e. he passes through the different stages of the +path of the gods up to the world of Brahman and there enjoys an +<span class="pagenum"><a name="pageintro-30" id= +"pageintro-30"></a>{Intro 30}</span> everlasting blissful existence +from which there is no return into the sphere of transmigration. +The characteristics of the released soul are similar to those of +Brahman; it participates in all the latter's glorious qualities and +powers, excepting only Brahman's power to emit, rule, and retract +the entire world.</p> +<p>The chief points in which the two systems sketched above agree +on the one hand and diverge on the other may be shortly stated as +follows.—Both systems teach advaita, i.e. non-duality or +monism. There exist not several fundamentally distinct principles, +such as the prak<i>r</i>iti and the purushas of the +Sâ@nkhyas, but there exists only one all-embracing being. +While, however, the advaita taught by <i>S</i>a@nkara is a +rigorous, absolute one, Râmânuja's doctrine has to be +characterised as visish<i>t</i>a advaita, i.e. qualified +non-duality, non-duality with a difference. According to Sankara, +whatever is, is Brahman, and Brahman itself is absolutely +homogeneous, so that all difference and plurality must be illusory. +According to Râmânuja also, whatever is, is Brahman; +but Brahman is not of a homogeneous nature, but contains within +itself elements of plurality owing to which it truly manifests +itself in a diversified world. The world with its variety of +material forms of existence and individual souls is not unreal +Mâyâ, but a real part of Brahman's nature, the body +investing the universal Self. The Brahman of <i>S</i>a@nkara is in +itself impersonal, a homogeneous mass of objectless thought, +transcending all attributes; a personal God it becomes only through +its association with the unreal principle of Mâyâ, so +that—strictly speaking—<i>S</i>a@nkara's personal God, +his Î<i>s</i>vara, is himself something unreal. +Râmânuja's Brahman, on the other hand, is essentially a +personal God, the all-powerful and all-wise ruler of a real world +permeated and animated by his spirit. There is thus no room for the +distinction between a param nirgu<i>n</i>am and an apara<i>m</i> +sagu<i>n</i>am brahma, between Brahman and +Î<i>s</i>vara.—<i>S</i>a@nkara's individual soul is +Brahman in so far as limited by the unreal upâdhis due to +Mâyâ. The individual soul of Râmânuja, on +the other hand, is really individual; it has <span class= +"pagenum"><a name="pageintro-31" id="pageintro-31"></a>{Intro +31}</span> indeed sprung from Brahman and is never outside Brahman, +but nevertheless it enjoys a separate personal existence and will +remain a personality for ever—The release from +sa<i>m</i>sâra means, according to <i>S</i>a@nkara, the +absolute merging of the individual soul in Brahman, due to the +dismissal of the erroneous notion that the soul is distinct from +Brahman; according to Râmânuja it only means the soul's +passing from the troubles of earthly life into a kind of heaven or +paradise where it will remain for ever in undisturbed personal +bliss.—As Râmânuja does not distinguish a higher +and lower Brahman, the distinction of a higher and lower knowledge +is likewise not valid for him; the teaching of the Upanishads is +not twofold but essentially one, and leads the enlightened devotee +to one result only<a id="footnotetag1" name= +"footnotetag1"></a><a href="#footnote1"><sup>1</sup></a>.</p> +<p>I now proceed to give a conspectus of the contents of the +Vedânta-sûtras according to <i>S</i>a@nkara in which at +the same time all the more important points concerning which +Râmânuja disagrees will be noted. We shall here have to +enter into details which to many may appear tedious. But it is only +on a broad substratum of accurately stated details that we can hope +to establish any definite conclusions regarding the comparative +value of the different modes of interpretation which have been +applied to the Sûtras. The line of investigation is an +entirely new one, and for the present nothing can be taken for +granted or known.—In stating the different heads of +discussion (the so-called adhikara<i>n</i>as), each of which +comprises one or more Sûtras, I shall follow the subdivision +into adhikara<i>n</i>as adopted in the +Vyâsâdhika-ra<i>n</i>amâlâ, the text of +which is printed in the second volume of the Bibliotheca Indica +edition of the Sûtras.</p> +<span class="pagenum"><a name="pageintro-32" id= +"pageintro-32"></a>{Intro 32}</span> +<h3>FIRST ADHYÂYA.</h3> +<h4>PÂDA I.</h4> +<p>The first five adhikara<i>n</i>as lay down the fundamental +positions with regard to Brahman. Adhik. I (1)<a id="footnotetag2" +name="footnotetag2"></a><a href="#footnote2"><sup>2</sup></a> +treats of what the study of the Vedânta presupposes. Adhik. +II (2) defines Brahman as that whence the world originates, and so +on. Adhik. III (3) declares that Brahman is the source of the Veda. +Adhik. IV (4) proves Brahman to be the uniform topic of all +Vedânta-texts. Adhik. V (5-11) is engaged in proving by +various arguments that the Brahman, which the Vedânta-texts +represent as the cause of the world, is an intelligent principle, +and cannot be identified with the non-intelligent pradhâna +from which the world springs according to the Sâ@nkhyas.</p> +<p>With the next adhikara<i>n</i>a there begins a series of +discussions of essentially similar character, extending up to the +end of the first adhyâya. The question is throughout whether +certain terms met with in the Upanishads denote Brahman or some +other being, in most cases the jîva, the individual soul. +<i>S</i>a@nkara remarks at the outset that, as the preceding ten +Sûtras had settled the all-important point that all the +Vedânta-texts refer to Brahman, the question now arises why +the enquiry should be continued any further, and thereupon proceeds +to explain that the acknowledged distinction of a higher Brahman +devoid of all qualities and a lower Brahman characterised by +qualities necessitates an investigation whether certain Vedic texts +of primâ facie doubtful import set forth the lower Brahman as +the object of devout meditation, or the higher Brahman as the +object of true knowledge. But that such an investigation is +actually carried on in the remaining portion of the first +adhyâya, appears neither from the wording of the Sûtras +nor even from <i>S</i>a@nkara's own treatment of the Vedic +<span class="pagenum"><a name="pageintro-33" id= +"pageintro-33"></a>{Intro 33}</span> texts referred to in the +Sûtras. In I, 1, 20, for instance, the question is raised +whether the golden man within the sphere of the sun, with golden +hair and beard and lotus-coloured eyes—of whom the +Chândogya Upanishad speaks in 1, 6, 6—is an individual +soul abiding within the sun or the highest Lord. <i>S</i>a@nkara's +answer is that the passage refers to the Lord, who, for the +gratification of his worshippers, manifests himself in a bodily +shape made of Mâyâ. So that according to +<i>S</i>a@nkara himself the alternative lies between the +sagu<i>n</i>a Brahman and some particular individual soul, not +between the sagu<i>n</i>a Brahman and the nirgu<i>n</i>a +Brahman.</p> +<p>Adhik. VI (12-19) raises the question whether the +ânandamaya, mentioned in Taittirîya Upanishad II, 5, is +merely a transmigrating individual soul or the highest Self. +<i>S</i>a@nkara begins by explaining the Sûtras on the latter +supposition—and the text of the Sûtras is certainly in +favour of that interpretation—gives, however, finally the +preference to a different and exceedingly forced explanation +according to which the Sûtras teach that the ânandamaya +is not Brahman, since the Upanishad expressly says that Brahman is +the tail or support of the ânandamaya<a id="footnotetag3" +name="footnotetag3"></a><a href= +"#footnote3"><sup>3</sup></a>.—Râmânuja's +interpretation of Adhikara<i>n</i>a VI, although not agreeing in +all particulars with the former explanation of <i>S</i>a@nkara, yet +is at one with it in the chief point, viz. that the +ânandamaya is Brahman. It further deserves notice that, while +<i>S</i>a@nkara looks on Adhik. VI as the first of a series of +interpretatory discussions, all of which treat the question whether +certain Vedic passages refer to Brahman or not, +Râmânuja separates the adhikara<i>n</i>a from the +subsequent part of the pâda and connects it with what had +preceded. In Adhik. V it had been shown that Brahman cannot be +<span class="pagenum"><a name="pageintro-34" id= +"pageintro-34"></a>{Intro 34}</span> identified with the +pradhâna; Adhik. VI shows that it is different from the +individual soul, and the proof of the fundamental position of the +system is thereby completed<a id="footnotetag4" name= +"footnotetag4"></a><a href= +"#footnote4"><sup>4</sup></a>.—Adhik. VII (20, 21) +demonstrates that the golden person seen within the sun and the +person seen within the eye, mentioned in Ch. Up. I, 6, are not some +individual soul of high eminence, but the supreme +Brahman.—Adhik. VIII (22) teaches that by the ether from +which, according to Ch. Up. I, 9, all beings originate, not the +elemental ether has to be understood but the highest +Brahman.—Adhik. IX (23). The prâ<i>n</i>a also +mentioned in Ch. Up. I, ii, 5 denotes the highest Brahman<a id= +"footnotetag5" name="footnotetag5"></a><a href= +"#footnote5"><sup>5</sup></a>—Adhik. X (24-27) teaches that +the light spoken of in Ch. Up. III, 13, 7 is not the ordinary +physical light but the highest Brahman<a id="footnotetag6" name= +"footnotetag6"></a><a href= +"#footnote6"><sup>6</sup></a>.—Adhik. XI (28-31) decides that +the prâ<i>n</i>a mentioned in Kau. Up. III, 2 is Brahman.</p> +<h4>PÂDA II.</h4> +<p>Adhik. I (1-8) shows that the being which consists of mind, +whose body is breath, &c., mentioned in Ch. Up. III, 14, is not +the individual soul, but Brahman. The Sûtras of this +adhikara<i>n</i>a emphatically dwell on the difference of the +individual soul and the highest Self, whence <i>S</i>a@nkara is +obliged to add an explanation—in his comment on Sûtra +6—to the effect that that difference is to be understood as +not real, but as due to the false limiting adjuncts of the highest +Self.—The comment of Râmânuja throughout closely +follows the words of the Sûtras; on Sûtra 6 it simply +remarks that the difference of the highest Self <span class= +"pagenum"><a name="pageintro-35" id="pageintro-35"></a>{Intro +35}</span> from the individual soul rests thereon that the former +as free from all evil is not subject to the effects of works in the +same way as the soul is<a id="footnotetag7" name= +"footnotetag7"></a><a href= +"#footnote7"><sup>7</sup></a>.—Adhik. II (9, 10) decides that +he to whom the Brahmans and Kshattriyas are but food (Ka<i>th</i>a. +Up. I, 2, 25) is the highest Self.—Adhik. III (11, 12) shows +that the two entered into the cave (Ka<i>th</i>a Up. I, 3, 1) are +Brahman and the individual soul<a id="footnotetag8" name= +"footnotetag8"></a><a href= +"#footnote8"><sup>8</sup></a>.—Adhik. IV (13-17) shows that +the person within the eye mentioned in Ch. Up. IV, 15, 1 is +Brahman.—Adhik. V (18-20) shows that the ruler within +(antarâymin) described in B<i>ri</i>. Up. III, 7, 3 is +Brahman. Sûtra 20 clearly enounces the difference of the +individual soul and the Lord; hence <i>S</i>a@nkara is obliged to +remark that that difference is not real.—Adhik. VI (21-23) +proves that that which cannot be seen, &c, mentioned in +Mu<i>nd</i>aka Up. I, 1, 3 is Brahman.—Adhik. VII (24-32) +shows that the âtman vai<i>s</i>vânara of Ch. Up. V, +11, 6 is Brahman.</p> +<h4>PÂDA III.</h4> +<p>Adhik. I (1-7) proves that that within which the heaven, the +earth, &c. are woven (Mu<i>nd</i>. Up. II, 2, 5) is +Brahman.—Adhik. II (8, 9) shows that the bhûman +referred to in Ch. Up. VII, 23 is Brahman.—Adhik. III (10-12) +teaches that the Imperishable in which, according to B<i>ri</i>. +Up. III, 8, 8, the ether is woven is Brahman.—Adhik. IV (13) +decides that the highest person who is to be meditated upon with +the syllable Om, according to Pra<i>s</i>na Up. V, 5, is not the +<span class="pagenum"><a name="pageintro-36" id= +"pageintro-36"></a>{Intro 36}</span> lower but the higher +Brahman.—According to Râmânuja the two +alternatives are Brahman and Brahmâ +(jîvasamash<i>t</i>irûpoz<i>nd</i>âdhipatis +<i>k</i>aturmukha<i>h</i>).—Adhik. V and VI (comprising, +according to <i>S</i>a@nkara, Sûtras l4-2l) discuss the +question whether the small ether within the lotus of the heart +mentioned in Ch. Up. VIII, 1 is the elemental ether or the +individual soul or Brahman; the last alternative being finally +adopted. In favour of the second alternative the pûrvapakshin +pleads the two passages Ch. Up. VIII, 3, 4 and VIII, 12, 3, about +the serene being (samprasâda); for by the latter the +individual soul only can be understood, and in the chapter, of +which the latter passage forms part, there are ascribed to it the +same qualities (viz. freeness from sin, old age, death, &c.) +that were predicated in VIII, 1, of the small ether within the +heart.—But the reply to this is, that the second passage +refers not to the (ordinary) individual soul but to the soul in +that state where its true nature has become manifest, i.e. in which +it is Brahman; so that the subject of the passage is in reality not +the so-called individual soul but Brahman. And in the former of the +two passages the soul is mentioned not on its own account, but +merely for the purpose of intimating that the highest Self is the +cause through which the individual soul manifests itself in its +true nature.—What Râmânuja understands by the +âvirbhâva of the soul will appear from the remarks on +IV, 4.</p> +<p>The two next Sûtras (22, 23) constitute, according to +<i>S</i>a@nkara, a new adhikara<i>n</i>a (VII), proving that he +'after whom everything shines, by whose light all this is lighted' +(Ka<i>th</i>a Up. II, 5, 15) is not some material luminous body, +but Brahman itself.—According to Râmânuja the two +Sûtras do not start a new topic, but merely furnish some +further arguments strengthening the conclusion arrived at in the +preceding Sûtras.<a id="footnotetag9" name= +"footnotetag9"></a><a href="#footnote9"><sup>9</sup></a></p> +<span class="pagenum"><a name="pageintro-37" id= +"pageintro-37"></a>{Intro 37}</span> +<p>Adhik. VIII (24, 25) decides that the person of the size of a +thumb mentioned in Ka<i>th</i>a Up. II, 4, 12 is not the individual +soul but Brahman.</p> +<p>The two next adhikara<i>n</i>as are of the nature of a +digression. The passage about the a@ngush<i>th</i>amâtra was +explained on the ground that the human heart is of the size of a +span; the question may then be asked whether also such individuals +as belong to other classes than mankind, more particularly the +Gods, are capable of the knowledge of Brahman: a question finally +answered in the affirmative.—This discussion leads in its +turn to several other digressions, among which the most important +one refers to the problem in what relation the different species of +beings stand to the words denoting them (Sûtra 28). In +connexion herewith <i>S</i>a@nkara treats of the nature of words +(<i>s</i>abda), opposing the opinion of the +Mîmâ<i>m</i>saka Upavarsha, according to whom the word +is nothing but the aggregate of its constitutive letters, to the +view of the grammarians who teach that over and above the aggregate +of the letters there exists a super-sensuous entity called +'spho<i>t</i>a,' which is the direct cause of the apprehension of +the sense of a word (Adhik. IX; Sûtras 26-33).</p> +<p>Adhik. X (34-38) explains that <i>S</i>ûdras are +altogether disqualified for Brahmavidyâ.</p> +<p>Sûtra 39 constitutes, according to <i>S</i>a@nkara, a new +adhikara<i>n</i>a (XI), proving that the prâ<i>n</i>a in +which everything trembles, according to <i>K</i>a<i>th</i>a Up. II, +6, 2, is Brahman.—According to Râmânuja the +Sûtra does not introduce a new topic but merely furnishes an +additional reason for the <span class="pagenum"><a name= +"pageintro-38" id="pageintro-38"></a>{Intro 38}</span> decision +arrived at under Sûtras 24, 25, viz. that the +a@ngus<i>th</i>amâtra is Brahman. On this supposition, +Sûtras 24-39 form one adhikara<i>n</i>a in which 26-38 +constitute a mere digression led up to by the mention made of the +heart in 25.—The a@ngus<i>th</i>mâtra is referred to +twice in the Ka<i>th</i>a Upanishad, once in the passage discussed +(II, 4, 12), and once in II, 6, 17 ('the Person not larger than a +thumb'). To determine what is meant by the +a@ngus<i>th</i>mâtra, Râmânuja says, we are +enabled by the passage II, 6, 2, 3, which is intermediate between +the two passages concerning the a@ngus<i>th</i>mâtra, and +which clearly refers to the highest Brahman, of which alone +everything can be said to stand in awe.</p> +<p>The next Sûtra (40) gives rise to a similar difference of +opinion. According to <i>S</i>a@nkara it constitutes by itself a +new adhikara<i>n</i>a (XII), proving that the 'light' (jyotis) +mentioned in Ch. Up. VIII, 12, 3 is the highest +Brahman.—According to Râmânuja the Sûtra +continues the preceding adhikara<i>n</i>a, and strengthens the +conclusion arrived at by a further argument, referring to +Ka<i>th</i>a Up. II, 5, 15—a passage intermediate between the +two passages about the a@ngush<i>th</i>amâtra—which +speaks of a primary light that cannot mean anything but Brahman. +The Sûtra has in that case to be translated as follows: '(The +a@ngush<i>th</i>amâtra is Brahman) because (in a passage +intervening between the two) a light is seen to be mentioned (which +can be Brahman only).'</p> +<p>The three last Sûtras of the pâda are, according to +<i>S</i>a@nkara, to be divided into two adhikara<i>n</i>as (XIII +and XIV), Sûtra 41 deciding that the ether which reveals +names and forms (Ch. Up. VIII, 14) is not the elemental ether but +Brahman; and 42, 43 teaching that the +vij<i>ñ</i>ânamaya, 'he who consists of knowledge,' of +B<i>ri</i>. Up. IV, 3, 7 is not the individual soul but +Brahman.—According to Râmânuja the three +Sûtras make up one single adhikara<i>n</i>a discussing +whether the Chandogya Upanishad passage about the ether refers to +Brahman or to the individual soul in the state of release; the +latter of these two alternatives being suggested by the +circumstance that the released soul is the subject of the passage +immediately preceding ('Shaking off <span class="pagenum"><a name= +"pageintro-39" id="pageintro-39"></a>{Intro 39}</span> all evil as +a horse shakes off his hair,' &c.). Sûtra 41 decides that +'the ether (is Brahman) because the passage designates the nature +of something else,' &c. (i.e. of something other than the +individual soul; other because to the soul the revealing of names +and forms cannot be ascribed, &c.)—But, an objection is +raised, does not more than one scriptural passage show that the +released soul and Brahman are identical, and is not therefore the +ether which reveals names and forms the soul as well as +Brahman?—(The two, Sûtra 42 replies, are different) +'because in the states of deep sleep and departing (the highest +Self) is designated as different' (from the soul)—which point +is proved by the same scriptural passages which <i>S</i>a@nkara +adduces;—and 'because such terms as Lord and the like' cannot +be applied to the individual soul (43). Reference is made to IV, 4, +14, where all jagadvyâpâra is said to belong to the +Lord only, not to the soul even when in the state of release.</p> +<h4>PÂDA IV.</h4> +<p>The last pâda of the first adhyâya is specially +directed against the Sâ@nkhyas.</p> +<p>The first adhikara<i>n</i>a (1-7) discusses the passage +Ka<i>th</i>a Up. I, 3, 10; 11, where mention is made of the Great +and the Undeveloped—both of them terms used with a special +technical sense in the Sâ@nkhya-<i>s</i>âstra, avyakta +being a synonym for pradhâna.—<i>S</i>a@nkara shows by +an exhaustive review of the topics of the Ka<i>th</i>a Upanishad +that the term avyakta has not the special meaning which the +Sâ@nkhyas attribute to it, but denotes the body, more +strictly the subtle body (sûkshma <i>s</i>arîra), but +at the same time the gross body also, in so far as it is viewed as +an effect of the subtle one.</p> +<p>Adhik. II (8-10) demonstrates, according to <i>S</i>a@nkara, +that the tricoloured ajâ spoken of in <i>S</i>ve. Up. IV, 5 +is not the pradhâna of the Sânkhyas, but either that +power of the Lord from which the world springs, or else the primary +causal matter first produced by that power.—What +Râmânuja <span class="pagenum"><a name="pageintro-40" +id="pageintro-40"></a>{Intro 40}</span> in contradistinction from +<i>S</i>a@nkara understands by the primary causal matter, follows +from the short sketch given above of the two systems.</p> +<p>Adhik. III (11-13) shows that the pa<i>ñk</i>a +pa<i>ñk</i>ajanâ<i>h</i> mentioned in B<i>ri</i>. Up. +IV, 4, 17 are not the twenty-five principles of the +Sâ@nkhyas.—Adhik. IV (14, 15) proves that Scripture +does not contradict itself on the all-important point of Brahman, +i.e. a being whose essence is intelligence, being the cause of the +world.</p> +<p>Adhik. V (16-18) is, according to <i>S</i>a@nkara, meant to +prove that 'he who is the maker of those persons, of whom this is +the work,' mentioned in Kau. Up. IV, 19, is not either the vital +air or the individual soul, but Brahman.—The subject of the +adhikara<i>n</i>a is essentially the same in Râmânuja's +view; greater stress is, however, laid on the adhikara<i>n</i>a +being polemical against the Sâ@nkhyas, who wish to turn the +passage into an argument for the pradhâna doctrine.</p> +<p>The same partial difference of view is observable with regard to +the next adhikara<i>n</i>a (VI; Sûtras 19-22) which decides +that the 'Self to be seen, to be heard,' &c. (B<i>ri</i>. Up. +II, 4, 5) is the highest Self, not the individual soul. This latter +passage also is, according to Râmânuja, made the +subject of discussion in order to rebut the Sâ@nkhya who is +anxious to prove that what is there inculcated as the object of +knowledge is not a universal Self but merely the Sâ@nkhya +purusha.</p> +<p>Adhik. VII (23-27) teaches that Brahman is not only the +efficient or operative cause (nimitta) of the world, but its +material cause as well. The world springs from Brahman by way of +modification (pari<i>n</i>âma; Sûtra +26).—Râmânuja views this adhikara<i>n</i>a as +specially directed against the Se<i>s</i>vara-sâ@nkhyas who +indeed admit the existence of a highest Lord, but postulate in +addition an independent pradhâna on which the Lord acts as an +operative cause merely.</p> +<p>Adhik. VIII (28) remarks that the refutation of the +Sâ@nkhya views is applicable to other theories also, such as +the doctrine of the world having originated from atoms.</p> +<span class="pagenum"><a name="pageintro-41" id= +"pageintro-41"></a>{Intro 41}</span> +<p>After this rapid survey of the contents of the first +adhyâya and the succinct indication of the most important +points in which the views of <i>S</i>a@nkara and +Râmânuja diverge, we turn to a short consideration of +two questions which here naturally present themselves, viz., +firstly, which is the principle on which the Vedic passages +referred to in the Sûtras have been selected and arranged; +and, secondly, if, where <i>S</i>a@nkara and Râmânuja +disagree as to the subdivision of the Sûtras into +Adhikara<i>n</i>as, and the determination of the Vedic passages +discussed in the Sûtras, there are to be met with any +indications enabling us to determine which of the two commentators +is right. (The more general question as to how far the Sûtras +favour either <i>S</i>a@nkara's or Râmânuja's general +views cannot be considered at present.)</p> +<p>The Hindu commentators here and there attempt to point out the +reason why the discussion of a certain Vedic passage is immediately +followed by the consideration of a certain other one. Their +explanations—which have occasionally been referred to in the +notes to the translation—rest on the assumption that the +Sûtrakâra in arranging the texts to be commented upon +was guided by technicalities of the +Mîmâ<i>m</i>sâ-system, especially by a regard for +the various so-called means of proof which the +Mîmâ<i>m</i>saka employs for the purpose of determining +the proper meaning and position of scriptural passages. But that +this was the guiding principle, is rendered altogether improbable +by a simple tabular statement of the Vedic passages referred to in +the first adhyâya, such as given by Deussen on page 130; for +from the latter it appears that the order in which the Sûtras +exhibit the scriptural passages follows the order in which those +passages themselves occur in the Upanishads, and it would certainly +be a most strange coincidence if that order enabled us at the same +time to exemplify the various pramâ<i>n</i>as of the +Mîmâ<i>m</i>sâ in their due systematic +succession.</p> +<p>As Deussen's statement shows, most of the passages discussed are +taken from the Chândogya Upanishad, so many indeed that the +whole first adhyâya may be said to consist of a discussion of +all those Chândogya passages of which it <span class= +"pagenum"><a name="pageintro-42" id="pageintro-42"></a>{Intro +42}</span> is doubtful whether they are concerned with Brahman or +not, passages from the other Upanishads being brought in wherever +an opportunity offers. Considering the prominent position assigned +to the Upanishad mentioned, I think it likely that the +Sûtrakâra meant to begin the series of doubtful texts +with the first doubtful passage from the Chândogya, and that +hence the sixth adhikara<i>n</i>a which treats of the +anândamaya mentioned in the Taittirîya Upanishad has, +in agreement with Râmânuja's views, to be separated +from the subsequent adhikara<i>n</i>as, and to be combined with the +preceding ones whose task it is to lay down the fundamental +propositions regarding Brahman's nature.—The remaining +adhikara<i>n</i>as of the first pâda follow the order of +passages in the Chândogya Upanishad, and therefore call for +no remark; with the exception of the last adhikara<i>n</i>a, which +refers to a Kaushîtaki passage, for whose being introduced in +this place I am not able to account.—The first +adhikara<i>n</i>a of the second pâda returns to the +Chândogya Upanishad. The second one treats of a passage in +the Ka<i>th</i>a Upanishad where a being is referred to which eats +everything. The reason why that passage is introduced in this place +seems to be correctly assigned in the +<i>S</i>rî-bhâshya, which remarks that, as in the +preceding Sûtra it had been argued that the highest Self is +not an enjoyer, a doubt arises whether by that being which eats +everything the highest Self can be meant<a id="footnotetag10" name= +"footnotetag10"></a><a href= +"#footnote10"><sup>10</sup></a>—The third adhikara<i>n</i>a +again, whose topic is the 'two entered into the cave' (Ka<i>th</i>a +Up. I, 3, 1), appears, as Râmânuja remarks, to come in +at this place owing to the preceding adhikara<i>n</i>a; for if it +could not be proved that one of the two is the highest Self, a +doubt would attach to the explanation given above of the 'eater' +since the 'two entered into the cave,' and the 'eater' stand under +the same prakara<i>n</i>a, and must therefore be held to refer to +the same matter.—The fourth adhikara<i>n</i>a is again +occupied with a Chândogya passage.—The fifth +adhikara<i>n</i>a, whose topic is the Ruler within +(antaryâmin), manifestly owes its place, as remarked by +Râmânuja also, <span class="pagenum"><a name= +"pageintro-43" id="pageintro-43"></a>{Intro 43}</span> to the fact +that the Vedic passage treated had been employed in the preceding +adhikara<i>n</i>a (I, 2, 14) for the purpose of strengthening the +argument<a id="footnotetag11" name="footnotetag11"></a><a href= +"#footnote11"><sup>11</sup></a>.—The sixth adhikara<i>n</i>a, +again, which discusses 'that which is not seen' (adre<i>s</i>ya; +Mu<i>nd</i>. Up. I, 1, 6), is clearly introduced in this place +because in the preceding adhikara<i>n</i>a it had been said that +ad<i>ri</i>sh<i>t</i>a, &c. denote the highest Self;—The +reasons to which the last adhikara<i>n</i>a of the second +pâda and the first and third adhikara<i>n</i>as of the third +pâda owe their places are not apparent (the second +adhikara<i>n</i>a of the third pâda treats of a +Chândogya passage). The introduction, on the other hand, of +the passage from the Pra<i>s</i>na Upanishad treating of the +akshara. O<i>m</i>kâra is clearly due to the circumstance +that an akshara, of a different nature, had been discussed in the +preceding adhikara<i>n</i>a.—The fifth and sixth +adhikara<i>n</i>as investigate Chândogya passages.—The +two next Sûtras (22, 23) are, as remarked above, considered +by <i>S</i>a@nkara to constitute a new adhikara<i>n</i>a treating +of the 'being after which everything shines' (Mu<i>nd</i>. Up. II, +2, 10); while Râmânuja looks on them as continuing the +sixth adhikara<i>n</i>a. There is one circumstance which renders it +at any rate probable that Râmânuja, and not +<i>S</i>a@nkara, here hits the intention of the author of the +Sûtras. The general rule in the first three pâdas is +that, wherever a new Vedic passage is meant to be introduced, the +subject of the discussion, i.e. that being which in the end is +declared to be Brahman is referred to by means of a special word, +in most cases a nominative form<a id="footnotetag12" name= +"footnotetag12"></a><a href="#footnote12"><sup>12</sup></a>. From +this rule there is in the preceding part of the adhyâya only +one real exception, viz. in I, 2, 1, which possibly may be due to +the fact that there a new pâda begins, and it therefore was +considered superfluous <span class="pagenum"><a name="pageintro-44" +id="pageintro-44"></a>{Intro 44}</span> to indicate the +introduction of a new topic by a special word. The exception +supplied by I, 3, 19 is only an apparent one; for, as remarked +above, Sûtra 19 does not in reality begin a new +adhikara<i>n</i>a. A few exceptions occurring later on will be +noticed in their places.—Now neither Sûtra 22 nor +Sûtra 23 contains any word intimating that a new Vedic +passage is being taken into consideration, and hence it appears +preferable to look upon them, with Râmânuja, as +continuing the topic of the preceding adhikara<i>n</i>a.—This +conclusion receives an additional confirmation from the position of +the next adhikara<i>n</i>a, which treats of the being 'a span long' +mentioned in Ka<i>th</i>a Up. II, 4, 12; for the reason of this +latter passage being considered here is almost certainly the +reference to the alpa<i>s</i>ruti in Sûtra 21, and, if so, +the a@ngush<i>th</i>amátra properly constitutes the subject +of the adhikara<i>n</i>a immediately following on Adhik. V, VI; +which, in its turn, implies that Sûtras 22, 23 do not form an +independent adhikara<i>n</i>a.—The two next +adhikara<i>n</i>as are digressions, and do not refer to special +Vedic passages.—Sûtra 39 forms a new adhikara<i>n</i>a, +according to <i>S</i>a@nkara, but not according to +Râmânuja, whose opinion seems again to be countenanced +by the fact that the Sûtra does not exhibit any word +indicative of a new topic. The same difference of opinion prevails +with regard to Sûtra 40, and it appears from the translation +of the Sûtra given above, according to Râmânuja's +view, that 'jyoti<i>h</i>' need not be taken as a +nominative.—The last two adhikara<i>n</i>as finally refer, +according to Râmânuja, to one Chândogya passage +only, and here also we have to notice that Sûtra 42 does not +comprise any word intimating that a new passage is about to be +discussed.</p> +<p>From all this we seem entitled to draw the following +conclusions. The Vedic passages discussed in the three first +pâdas of the Vedánta-sûtras comprise all the +doubtful—or at any rate all the more important +doubtful—passages from the Chândogya Upanishad. These +passages are arranged in the order in which the text of the +Upanishad exhibits them. Passages from other Upanishads are +discussed as opportunities offer, there being always a special +reason why a certain Chândogya passage is followed by +<span class="pagenum"><a name="pageintro-45" id= +"pageintro-45"></a>{Intro 45}</span> a certain passage from some +other Upanishad. Those reasons can be assigned with sufficient +certainty in a number of cases although not in all, and from among +those passages whose introduction cannot be satisfactorily +accounted for some are eliminated by our following the subdivision +of the Sûtras into adhikara<i>n</i>as adopted by +Râmânuja, a subdivision countenanced by the external +form of the Sûtras.</p> +<p>The fourth pâda of the first adhyâya has to be taken +by itself. It is directed specially and avowedly against +Sâ@nkhya-interpretations of Scripture, not only in its +earlier part which discusses isolated passages, but also—as +is brought out much more clearly in the +<i>S</i>rî-bhâshya than by <i>S</i>a@nkara—in its +latter part which takes a general survey of the entire scriptural +evidence for Brahman being the material as well as the operative +cause of the world.</p> +<p>Deussen (p. 221) thinks that the selection made by the +Sûtrakâra of Vedic passages setting forth the nature of +Brahman is not in all cases an altogether happy one. But this +reproach rests on the assumption that the passages referred to in +the first adhyâya were chosen for the purpose of throwing +light on what Brahman is, and this assumption can hardly be upheld. +The Vedânta-sûtras as well as the Pûrvâ +Mîmâ<i>m</i>sâ-sûtras are throughout +Mîmâ<i>m</i>sâ i.e. critical discussions of such +scriptural passages as on a primâ facie view admit of +different interpretations and therefore necessitate a careful +enquiry into their meaning. Here and there we meet with +Sutrâs which do not directly involve a discussion of the +sense of some particular Vedic passage, but rather make a mere +statement on some important point. But those cases are rare, and it +would be altogether contrary to the general spirit of the +Sutrâs to assume that a whole adhyâya should be devoted +to the task of showing what Brahman is. The latter point is +sufficiently determined in the first five (or six) +adhikara<i>n</i>as; but after we once know what Brahman is we are +at once confronted by a number of Upanishad passages concerning +which it is doubtful whether they refer to Brahman or not. With +their discussion all the remaining adhikara<i>n</i>as of the +<span class="pagenum"><a name="pageintro-46" id= +"pageintro-46"></a>{Intro 46}</span> first adhyâya are +occupied. That the Vedânta-sûtras view it as a +particularly important task to controvert the doctrine of the +Sâ@nkhyas is patent (and has also been fully pointed out by +Deussen, p. 23). The fifth adhikara<i>n</i>a already declares +itself against the doctrine that the world has sprung from a +non-intelligent principle, the pradhâna, and the fourth +pâda of the first adhyâya returns to an express polemic +against Sâ@nkhya interpretations of certain Vedic statements. +It is therefore perhaps not saying too much if we maintain that the +entire first adhyâya is due to the wish, on the part of the +Sûtrakâra, to guard his own doctrine against +Sâ@nkhya attacks. Whatever the attitude of the other +so-called orthodox systems may be towards the Veda, the +Sâ@nkhya system is the only one whose adherents were +anxious—and actually attempted—to prove that their +views are warranted by scriptural passages. The Sâ@nkhya +tendency thus would be to show that all those Vedic texts which the +Vedântin claims as teaching the existence of Brahman, the +intelligent and sole cause of the world, refer either to the +pradhâna or some product of the pradhâna, or else to +the purusha in the Sânkhya sense, i.e. the individual soul. +It consequently became the task of the Vedântin to guard the +Upanishads against misinterpretations of the kind, and this he did +in the first adhyâya of the Vedânta-sûtras, +selecting those passages about whose interpretation doubts were, +for some reason or other, likely to arise. Some of the passages +singled out are certainly obscure, and hence liable to various +interpretations; of others it is less apparent why it was thought +requisite to discuss them at length. But this is hardly a matter in +which we are entitled to find fault with the +Sûtrakára; for no modern scholar, either European or +Hindu, is—or can possibly be—sufficiently at home, on +the one hand, in the religious and philosophical views which +prevailed at the time when the Sûtras may have been composed, +and, on the other hand, in the intricacies of the +Mîmâ<i>m</i>sâ, to judge with confidence which +Vedic passages may give rise to discussions and which not.</p> +<blockquote class="footnote"><a id="footnote1" name= +"footnote1"></a><b>Footnote 1:</b><a href= +"#footnotetag1">(return)</a> +<p>The only 'sectarian' feature of the Srî-bhâshya is, +that identifies Brahman with Vish<i>n</i>u or +Nârâya<i>n</i>a; but this in no way affects the +interpretations put on the Sûtras and Upanishads. +Nârâya<i>n</i>a is in fact nothing but another name of +Brahman.</p> +</blockquote> +<blockquote class="footnote"><a id="footnote2" name= +"footnote2"></a><b>Footnote 2:</b><a href= +"#footnotetag2">(return)</a> +<p>The Roman numerals indicate the number of the adhikara<i>n</i>a; +the figures in parentheses state the Sûtras comprised in each +adhikara<i>n</i>a.</p> +</blockquote> +<blockquote class="footnote"><a id="footnote3" name= +"footnote3"></a><b>Footnote 3:</b><a href= +"#footnotetag3">(return)</a> +<p>Deussen's supposition (pp. 30, 150) that the passage conveying +the second interpretation is an interpolation is liable to two +objections. In the first place, the passage is accepted and +explained by all commentators; in the second place, <i>S</i>a@nkara +in the passage immediately preceding Sûtra 12 quotes the +adhikara<i>n</i>a 'ânandamayo s bhyâsàt' as +giving rise to a discussion whether the param or the aparam brahman +is meant. Now this latter point is not touched upon at all in that +part of the bhâshya which sets forth the former explanation, +but only in the subsequent passage, which refutes the former and +advocates the latter interpretation.</p> +</blockquote> +<blockquote class="footnote"><a id="footnote4" name= +"footnote4"></a><b>Footnote 4:</b><a href= +"#footnotetag4">(return)</a> +<p>Eva<i>m</i> jij<i>ñ</i>anasya brahma<i>nas</i> +<i>ko</i>tanabhogvabhutaga<i>d</i>arupsattvara, +istamomayapradhânâd vyâv<i>ri</i>ttir uktâ, +idânî<i>m</i> karmava<i>s</i>vat +trigu<i>n</i>atmakaprik<i>ri</i>u +sa<i>m</i>sangammittanâmâvidhân +intadukhasagaranimajjaonî<i>s</i>addhâ<i>h</i>. +<i>k</i>i pratya gaumano nyan nikhilaheyapratauîka<i>m</i> +miatimyanandam brahmeti pratipadyate, anandamayo +bhyásât.</p> +</blockquote> +<blockquote class="footnote"><a id="footnote5" name= +"footnote5"></a><b>Footnote 5:</b><a href= +"#footnotetag5">(return)</a> +<p>There is no reason to consider the passage 'atra ke<i>k</i>it' +in <i>S</i>a@nkara's bhashya on Sutra 23 an interpolation as +Deussen does (p. 30). It simply contains a criticism passed by +<i>S</i>a@nkara on other commentators.</p> +</blockquote> +<blockquote class="footnote"><a id="footnote6" name= +"footnote6"></a><b>Footnote 6:</b><a href= +"#footnotetag6">(return)</a> +<p>To the passages on pp. 150 and 153 of the Sanskrit text, which +Deussen thinks to be interpolations, there likewise applies the +remark made in the preceding note.</p> +</blockquote> +<blockquote class="footnote"><a id="footnote7" name= +"footnote7"></a><b>Footnote 7:</b><a href= +"#footnotetag7">(return)</a> +<p>Gîvaysa iva parasyâpi brahma<i>n</i>a<i>h</i> +<i>s</i>arîrantarvaititvam abhyupagata<i>m</i> <i>k</i>et +tadvad eva +<i>s</i>arîrasainbandhaprayuktasukhadukhopabhogapraptir hi +<i>k</i>en na, hetuvai<i>s</i>eshyat, na hi +<i>s</i>arîrântarvartitvam eva +sukhadukhopabhogahetu<i>h</i> api tu +pu<i>n</i>yapàparnpakarmaparavasatva<i>m</i> ta<i>k</i> +<i>K</i>àpahatapâpmana<i>h</i> parahâtmano na +sambhavati.</p> +</blockquote> +<blockquote class="footnote"><a id="footnote8" name= +"footnote8"></a><b>Footnote 8:</b><a href= +"#footnotetag8">(return)</a> +<p>The second interpretation given on pp. 184-5 of the Sanskrit +text (beginning with apara âha) Deussen considers to be an +interpolation, caused by the reference to the Paingi upanishad in +<i>S</i>a@nkara's comment on I, 3, 7 (p. 232). But there is no +reason whatsoever for such an assumption. The passage on p. 232 +shows that <i>S</i>a@nkara considered the explanation of the mantra +given in the Paingi-upanishad worth quoting, and is in fact fully +intelligible only in case of its having been quoted before by +<i>S</i>a@nkara himself.—That the 'apara' quotes the +B<i>ri</i>hadára<i>n</i>yaka not according to the +Ka<i>n</i>va text—to quote from which is <i>S</i>a@nkara's +habit—but from the Madhyandina text, is due just to the +circumstance of his being an 'apara,' i.e. not <i>S</i>a@nkara.</p> +</blockquote> +<blockquote class="footnote"><a id="footnote9" name= +"footnote9"></a><b>Footnote 9:</b><a href= +"#footnotetag9">(return)</a> +<p>Ita<i>s</i> <i>k</i>aitad evam. Anuk<i>ri</i>tes tasya +<i>k</i>a. Tasya daharâkâsasya parabrahma<i>n</i>o +snukârâd ayam +apahatapâpmatvâdigu<i>n</i>ako vimuktabandha<i>h</i> +pratyagâtmâ na daharakâ<i>s</i>a<i>h</i> +tadanukâras tatsâmya<i>m</i> tathâ hi +pratyagâlmanozpi vimuktasya +parabrahmânukâra<i>h</i> srûyate yadâ +pa<i>s</i>ya<i>h</i> pa<i>s</i>yate rukmavar<i>n</i>a<i>m</i> +kartâram î<i>s</i>a<i>m</i> purusha<i>m</i> +brahmayoni<i>m</i> tadâ vidvân pu<i>n</i>yapâpe +vidhûya nira<i>ñg</i>ana<i>h</i> parama<i>m</i> +sâmyam upaitîty atos'nukartâ +prajâpativâkyanirdish<i>t</i>a<i>h</i> +anukârya<i>m</i> para<i>m</i> brahma na +daharâkâ<i>s</i>a<i>h</i>. Api <i>k</i>a smaryate. +Sa<i>m</i>sâri<i>n</i>oszpi +muktâvasthâyâ<i>m</i> +paramasâmyâpattilaksha<i>n</i>a<i>h</i> +parabrahmânukâra<i>h</i> smaryate ida<i>m</i> +j<i>ñ</i>ânam upâsritya, +&c.—Ke<i>k</i>id anuk<i>ri</i>tes tasya <i>k</i>âpi +smaryate iti <i>k</i>a sûtradvayam +adhikara<i>n</i>ântara<i>m</i> tam eva bhântam +anubhâti sarva<i>m</i> tasya bhâsâ sarvam +ida<i>m</i> vibhâtîty asyâ<i>h</i> +<i>s</i>rute<i>h</i> parabrahmaparatvanir<i>n</i>ayâya +prav<i>ri</i>tta<i>m</i> vadanti. Tat tv +ad<i>ris</i>yatvâdigu<i>n</i>ako dharmokte<i>h</i> +dyubhvâdyâyatana<i>m</i> sva<i>s</i>abdâd ity +adhi kara<i>n</i>advayena tasya prakara<i>n</i>asya +brahmavishayatvapratipâdanât +jyoti<i>sk</i>ara<i>n</i>âbhidhânât ity +âdishu parasya brahma<i>n</i>o +bhârûpatvâvagates <i>k</i>a +pûrvapakshânutthânâd ayukta<i>m</i> +sûtrâksharavairûpya<i>k</i> <i>k</i>a.</p> +</blockquote> +<blockquote class="footnote"><a id="footnote10" name= +"footnote10"></a><b>Footnote 10:</b><a href= +"#footnotetag10">(return)</a> +<p>Yadi paramâtmâ na bhoktâ eva<i>m</i> taihi +bhokt <i>i</i>tayâ pratîyamâno jîva eva +syâd ity âsankyâha attâ.</p> +</blockquote> +<blockquote class="footnote"><a id="footnote11" name= +"footnote11"></a><b>Footnote 11:</b><a href= +"#footnotetag11">(return)</a> +<p>Sthânâdivyapade<i>s</i>â<i>k</i> <i>k</i>a ity +atra ya<i>h</i> <i>k</i>akshushi tish<i>th</i>ann ity +âdinâ pratipâdyamâna<i>m</i> +<i>k</i>akshushi sthitiniyamanâdika<i>m</i> paramâtmana +eveti siddha<i>m</i> k<i>ri</i>tvâ akshipurushasya +paramâtmatva<i>m</i> sâdhitam idâni<i>m</i> tad +eva samarthayate antaryâû.</p> +</blockquote> +<blockquote class="footnote"><a id="footnote12" name= +"footnote12"></a><b>Footnote 12:</b><a href= +"#footnotetag12">(return)</a> +<p>Ânandamaya<i>h</i> I, 1, 12; anta<i>h</i> I, i, 20; +âkâ<i>s</i>a<i>h</i> I, 1, 22; prâna<i>h</i> I, +1, 23; jyoti<i>h</i> I, 1, 24; prâna<i>h</i> I, 1, 28; +attâ I, 2, 9; guhâ<i>m</i> pravish<i>t</i>au I, 2, 11; +antara I, 2,13; antaryâmî I, 2, 18; +ad<i>ris</i>yatvâdigu<i>n</i>aka<i>h</i> I, 2, 21; +vai<i>s</i>vânara<i>h</i> I, 2, 24; +dyubhvâdyâyatanam I, 3, 1; bhûmâ I, 3, 8; +aksheram I, 3, 10; sa<i>h</i> I, 3, 13; dahara<i>h</i> I, 3, 14; +pramita<i>h</i> I, 3, 24; (jyoti<i>h</i> 40;) +âkâ<i>s</i>a<i>h</i> I, 3,41.</p> +</blockquote> +<span class="pagenum"><a name="pageintro-47" id= +"pageintro-47"></a>{Intro 47}</span> +<h3>SECOND ADHYÂYA.</h3> +<p>The first adhyâya has proved that all the +Vedânta-texts unanimously teach that there is only one cause +of the world, viz. Brahman, whose nature is intelligence, and that +there exists no scriptural passage which can be used to establish +systems opposed to the Vedânta, more especially the +Sâ@nkhya system. The task of the two first pâdas of the +second adhyâya is to rebut any objections which may be raised +against the Vedânta doctrine on purely speculative grounds, +apart from scriptural authority, and to show, again on purely +speculative grounds, that none of the systems irreconcilable with +the Vedânta can be satisfactorily established.</p> +<h4>PÂDA I.</h4> +<p>Adhikara<i>n</i>a I refutes the Sâ@nkhya objection that +the acceptation of the Vedânta system involves the rejection +of the Sâ@nkhya doctrine which after all constitutes a part +of Sm<i>ri</i>ti, and as such has claims on consideration.—To +accept the Sâ@nkhya-sm<i>ri</i>ti, the Vedântin +replies, would compel us to reject other Sm<i>ri</i>tis, such as +the Manu-sm<i>ri</i>ti, which are opposed to the Sâ@nkhya +doctrine. The conflicting claims of Sm<i>ri</i>tis can be settled +only on the ground of the Veda, and there can be no doubt that the +Veda does not confirm the Sâ@nkhya-sm<i>ri</i>ti, but rather +those Sm<i>ri</i>tis which teach the origination of the world from +an intelligent primary cause.</p> +<p>Adhik. II (3) extends the same line of argumentation to the +Yoga-sm<i>ri</i>ti.</p> +<p>Adhik. III (4-11) shows that Brahman, although of the nature of +intelligence, yet may be the cause of the non-intelligent material +world, and that it is not contaminated by the qualities of the +world when the latter is refunded into Brahman. For ordinary +experience teaches us that like does not always spring from like, +and that the qualities of effected things when the latter are +refunded into their causes—as when golden ornaments, for +instance, are melted <span class="pagenum"><a name="pageintro-48" +id="pageintro-48"></a>{Intro 48}</span> and thereby become simple +gold again—do not continue to exist in those +causes.—Here also the argumentation is specially directed +against the Sâ@nkhyas, who, in order to account for the +materiality and the various imperfections of the world, think it +necessary to assume a causal substance participating in the same +characteristics.</p> +<p>Adhik. IV (12) points out that the line of reasoning followed in +the preceding adhikara<i>n</i>a is valid also against other +theories, such as the atomistic doctrine.</p> +<p>The one Sûtra (13) constituting Adhik. V teaches, +according to <i>S</i>a@nkara, that although the enjoying souls as +well as the objects of fruition are in reality nothing but Brahman, +and on that account identical, yet the two sets may practically be +held apart, just as in ordinary life we hold apart, and distinguish +as separate individual things, the waves, ripples, and foam of the +sea, although at the bottom waves, ripples, and foam are all of +them identical as being neither more nor less than +sea-water.—The <i>S</i>rî-bhâshya gives a totally +different interpretation of the Sûtra, according to which the +latter has nothing whatever to do with the eventual non-distinction +of enjoying souls and objects to be enjoyed. Translated according +to Râmânuja's view, the Sûtra runs as follows: +'If non-distinction (of the Lord and the individual souls) is said +to result from the circumstance of (the Lord himself) becoming an +enjoyer (a soul), we refute this objection by instances from +every-day experience.' That is to say: If it be maintained that +from our doctrine previously expounded, according to which this +world springs from the Lord and constitutes his body, it follows +that the Lord, as an embodied being, is not essentially different +from other souls, and subject to fruition as they are; we reply +that the Lord's having a body does not involve his being subject to +fruition, not any more than in ordinary life a king, although +himself an embodied being, is affected by the experiences of +pleasure and pain which his servants have to undergo.—The +construction which Râmânuja puts on the Sûtra is +not repugnant either to the words of the Sûtra or to the +context in which the latter stands, and that it rests on earlier +authority appears <span class="pagenum"><a name="pageintro-49" id= +"pageintro-49"></a>{Intro 49}</span> from a quotation made by +Râmànuja from the +Drami<i>d</i>abhâshyakâra<a id="footnotetag13" name= +"footnotetag13"></a><a href="#footnote13"><sup>13</sup></a>.</p> +<p>Adhik. VI (14-20) treats of the non-difference of the effect +from the cause; a Vedânta doctrine which is defended by its +adherents against the Vai<i>s</i>eshikas according to whom the +effect is something different from the cause.—The divergent +views of <i>S</i>a@nkara and Râmânuja on this important +point have been sufficiently illustrated in the general sketch of +the two systems.</p> +<p>Adhik. VII (21-23) refutes the objection that, from the Vedic +passages insisting on the identity of the Lord and the individual +soul, it follows that the Lord must be like the individual soul the +cause of evil, and that hence the entire doctrine of an +all-powerful and all-wise Lord being the cause of the world has to +be rejected. For, the Sûtrakîra remarks, the creative +principle of the world is additional to, i.e. other than, the +individual soul, the difference of the two being distinctly +declared by Scripture.—The way in which the three +Sûtras constituting this adhikara<i>n</i>a are treated by +<i>S</i>a@nkara on the one hand and Râmânuja on the +other is characteristic. Râmânuja throughout simply +follows the words of the Sûtras, of which Sûtra 21 +formulates the objection based on such texts as 'Thou art that,' +while Sûtra 22 replies that Brahman is different from the +soul, since that is expressly declared by Scripture. +<i>S</i>a@nkara, on the other hand, sees himself obliged to add +that the difference of the two, plainly maintained in Sûtra +22, is not real, but due to the soul's fictitious limiting +adjuncts.</p> +<p>Adhik. VIII (24, 25) shows that Brahman, although destitute of +material and instruments of action, may yet produce the world, just +as gods by their mere power create <span class="pagenum"><a name= +"pageintro-50" id="pageintro-50"></a>{Intro 50}</span> palaces, +animals, and the like, and as milk by itself turns into curds.</p> +<p>Adhik. IX (26-29) explains that, according to the express +doctrine of Scripture, Brahman does not in its entirety pass over +into the world, and, although emitting the world from itself, yet +remains one and undivided. This is possible, according to +<i>S</i>a@nkara, because the world is unreal; according to +Râmânuja, because the creation is merely the visible +and tangible manifestation of what previously existed in Brahman in +a subtle imperceptible condition.</p> +<p>Adhik. X (30, 31) teaches that Brahman, although destitute of +instruments of action, is enabled to create the world by means of +the manifold powers which it possesses.</p> +<p>Adhik. XI (32, 33) assigns the motive of the creation, or, more +properly expressed, teaches that Brahman, in creating the world, +has no motive in the strict sense of the word, but follows a mere +sportive impulse.</p> +<p>Adhik. XII (34-36) justifies Brahman from the charges of +partiality and cruelty which might be brought against it owing to +the inequality of position and fate of the various animate beings, +and the universal suffering of the world. Brahman, as a creator and +dispenser, acts with a view to the merit and demerit of the +individual souls, and has so acted from all eternity.</p> +<p>Adhik. XIII (37) sums up the preceding argumentation by +declaring that all the qualities of Brahman—omniscience and +so on—are such as to capacitate it for the creation of the +world.</p> +<h4>PÂDA II.</h4> +<p>The task of the second pâda is to refute, by arguments +independent of Vedic passages, the more important philosophical +theories concerning the origin of the world which are opposed to +the Vedânta view.—The first adhikara<i>n</i>a (1-10) is +directed against the Sâ@nkhyas, whose doctrine had already +been touched upon incidentally in several previous places, and aims +at proving that a non-intelligent first cause, such as the +pradhâna of the Sâ@nkhyas, is unable to create and +dispose.—The second adhikara<i>n</i>a (11-17) refutes the +<span class="pagenum"><a name="pageintro-51" id= +"pageintro-51"></a>{Intro 51}</span> Vai<i>s</i>eshika tenet that +the world originates from atoms set in motion by the +ad<i>ri</i>sh<i>t</i>a.—The third and fourth +adhikara<i>n</i>as are directed against various schools of Bauddha +philosophers. Adhik. III (18-27) impugns the view of the so-called +sarvâstitvavâdins, or +bâhyârthavâdins, who maintain the reality of an +external as well as an internal world; Adhik. IV (28-32) is +directed against the vij<i>ñ</i>ânavâdins, +according to whom ideas are the only reality.—The last +Sûtra of this adhikara<i>n</i>a is treated by +Râmânuja as a separate adhikara<i>n</i>a refuting the +view of the Mâdhyamikas, who teach that everything is void, +i.e. that nothing whatever is real.—Adhik. V (33-36) is +directed against the doctrine of the Jainas; Adhik. VI (37-41) +against those philosophical schools which teach that a highest Lord +is not the material but only the operative cause of the world.</p> +<p>The last adhikara<i>n</i>a of the pâda (42-45) refers, +according to the unanimous statement of the commentators, to the +doctrine of the Bhâgavatas or +Pâ<i>ñk</i>arâtras. But <i>S</i>a@nkara and +Râmânuja totally disagree as to the drift of the +Sûtrakâra's opinion regarding that system. According to +the former it is condemned like the systems previously referred to; +according to the latter it is approved of.—Sûtras 42 +and 43, according to both commentators, raise objections against +the system; Sûtra 42 being directed against the doctrine that +from the highest being, called Vâsudeva, there is originated +Sa@nkarsha<i>n</i>a, i.e. the jiva, on the ground that thereby +those scriptural passages would be contradicted which teach the +soul's eternity; and Sûtra 43 impugning the doctrine that +from Sa@nkarsha<i>n</i>a there springs Pradyumna, i.e. the +manas.—The Sûtra on which the difference of +interpretation turns is 44. Literally translated it runs, 'Or, on +account of there being' (or, 'their being') 'knowledge and so on, +there is non-contradiction of that.'—This means, according to +<i>S</i>a@nkara, 'Or, if in consequence of the existence of +knowledge and so on (on the part of Sa@nkarsha<i>n</i>a, &c. +they be taken not as soul, mind, &c. but as Lords of +pre-eminent knowledge, &c.), yet there is non-contradiction of +that (viz. of the objection raised in Sûtra 42 against the +Bhâgavata doctrine).'—According <span class= +"pagenum"><a name="pageintro-52" id="pageintro-52"></a>{Intro +52}</span> to Râmânuja, on the other hand, the +Sûtra has to be explained as follows: 'Or, rather there is +noncontradiction of that (i.e. the Pa<i>ñk</i>arâtra +doctrine) on account of their being knowledge and so on (i.e. on +account of their being Brahman).' Which means: Since +Sa@nkarsha<i>n</i>a and so on are merely forms of manifestation of +Brahman, the Pâ<i>ñk</i>arâtra doctrine, +according to which they spring from Brahman, is not +contradicted.—The form of the Sûtra makes it difficult +for us to decide which of the two interpretations is the right one; +it, however, appears to me that the explanations of the 'vâ' +and of the 'tat,' implied in Râmânuja's comment, are +more natural than those resulting from <i>S</i>a@nkara's +interpretation. Nor would it be an unnatural proceeding to close +the polemical pâda with a defence of that doctrine +which—in spite of objections—has to be viewed as the +true one.</p> +<h4>PÂDA III.</h4> +<p>The third pâda discusses the question whether the +different forms of existence which, in their totality, constitute +the world have an origin or not, i.e. whether they are co-eternal +with Brahman, or issue from it and are refunded into it at stated +intervals.</p> +<p>The first seven adhikara<i>n</i>as treat of the five elementary +substances.—Adhik. I (1-7) teaches that the ether is not +co-eternal with Brahman, but springs from it as its first +effect.—Adhik. II (8) shows that air springs from ether; +Adhik. IV, V, VI (10; 11; 12) that fire springs from air, water +from fire, earth from water.—Adhik. III (9) explains by way +of digression that Brahman, which is not some special entity, but +quite generally 'that which is,' cannot have originated from +anything else.</p> +<p>Adhik. VII (13) demonstrates that the origination of one element +from another is due, not to the latter in itself, but to Brahman +acting in it.</p> +<p>Adhik. VIII (14) teaches that the reabsorption of the elements +into Brahman takes place in the inverse order of their +emission.</p> +<p>Adhik. IX (15) remarks that the indicated order in which +<span class="pagenum"><a name="pageintro-53" id= +"pageintro-53"></a>{Intro 53}</span> the emission and the +reabsorption of the elementary substances take place is not +interfered with by the creation and reabsorption of the organs of +the soul, i.e. the sense organs and the internal organ (manas); for +they also are of elemental nature, and as such created and +retracted together with the elements of which they consist.</p> +<p>The remainder of the pâda is taken up by a discussion of +the nature of the individual soul, the jîva.—Adhik. X +(16) teaches that expressions such as 'Devadatta is born,' +'Devadatta has died,' strictly apply to the body only, and are +transferred to the soul in so far only as it is connected with a +body.</p> +<p>Adhik. XI (17) teaches that the individual soul is, according to +Scripture, permanent, eternal, and therefore not, like the ether +and the other elements, produced from Brahman at the time of +creation.—This Sûtra is of course commented on in a +very different manner by <i>S</i>a@nkara on the one hand and +Râmânuja on the other. According to the former, the +jîva is in reality identical—and as such +co-eternal—with Brahman; what originates is merely the soul's +connexion with its limiting adjuncts, and that connexion is +moreover illusory.—According to Râmânuja, the +jîva is indeed an effect of Brahman, but has existed in +Brahman from all eternity as an individual being and as a mode +(prakâra) of Brahman. So indeed have also the material +elements; yet there is an important distinction owing to which the +elements may be said to originate at the time of creation, while +the same cannot be said of the soul. Previously to creation the +material elements exist in a subtle condition in which they possess +none of the qualities that later on render them the objects of +ordinary experience; hence, when passing over into the gross state +at the time of creation, they may be said to originate. The souls, +on the other hand, possess at all times the same essential +qualities, i.e. they are cognizing agents; only, whenever a new +creation takes place, they associate themselves with bodies, and +their intelligence therewith undergoes a certain expansion or +development (vikâsa); contrasting with the unevolved or +contracted state (sanko<i>k</i>a) <span class="pagenum"><a name= +"pageintro-54" id="pageintro-54"></a>{Intro 54}</span> which +characterised it during the preceding pralaya. But this change is +not a change of essential nature +(svarûpânyathâbhâva) and hence we have to +distinguish the souls as permanent entities from the material +elements which at the time of each creation and reabsorption change +their essential characteristics.</p> +<p>Adhik. XII (18) defines the nature of the individual soul. The +Sûtra declares that the soul is 'j<i>ñ</i>a.' This +means, according to <i>S</i>a@nkara, that intelligence or knowledge +does not, as the Vai<i>s</i>eshikas teach, constitute a mere +attribute of the soul which in itself is essentially +non-intelligent, but is the very essence of the soul. The soul is +not a knower, but knowledge; not intelligent, but +intelligence.—Râmânuja, on the other hand, +explains 'j<i>ñ</i>a' by 'j<i>ñ</i>at<i>ri</i>,' i.e. +knower, knowing agent, and considers the Sûtra to be directed +not only against the Vai<i>s</i>eshikas, but also against those +philosophers who—like the Sâ@nkhyas and the +Vedântins of <i>S</i>a@nkara's school—maintain that the +soul is not a knowing agent, but pure <i>k</i>aitanya.—The +wording of the Sûtra certainly seems to favour +Râmânuja's interpretation; we can hardly imagine that +an author definitely holding the views of <i>S</i>a@nkara should, +when propounding the important dogma of the soul's nature, use the +term j<i>ñ</i>a of which the most obvious interpretation +j<i>ñ</i>ât<i>ri</i>, not +j<i>ñ</i>ânam.</p> +<p>Adhik. XIII (19-32) treats the question whether the individual +soul is a<i>n</i>u, i.e. of very minute size, or omnipresent, +all-pervading (sarvagata, vyâpin). Here, again, we meet with +diametrically opposite views.—In <i>S</i>a@nkara's opinion +the Sûtras 19-38 represent the pûrvapaksha view, +according to which the jîva is a<i>n</i>u, while Sûtra +29 formulates the siddhânta, viz. that the jîva, which +in reality is all-pervading, is spoken of as a<i>n</i>u in some +scriptural passages, because the qualities of the internal +organ—which itself is a<i>n</i>u—constitute the essence +of the individual soul as long as the latter is implicated in the +sa<i>m</i>sâra.—According to Râmânuja, on +the other hand, the first Sûtra of the adhikara<i>n</i>a +gives utterance to the siddhânta view, according to which the +soul is of minute size; the Sûtras 20-25 confirm this view +and refute objections raised against it; while the <span class= +"pagenum"><a name="pageintro-55" id="pageintro-55"></a>{Intro +55}</span> Sûtras 26-29 resume the question already mooted +under Sûtra 18, viz. in what relation the soul as knowing +agent (j<i>ñ</i>ât<i>ri</i>) stands to knowledge +(j<i>ñ</i>âna).—In order to decide between the +conflicting claims of these two interpretations we must enter into +some details.—<i>S</i>a@nkara maintains that Sûtras +19-28 state and enforce a pûrvapaksha view, which is finally +refuted in 29. What here strikes us at the outset, is the unusual +length to which the defence of a mere primâ facie view is +carried; in no other place the Sûtras take so much trouble to +render plausible what is meant to be rejected in the end, and an +unbiassed reader will certainly feel inclined to think that in +19-28 we have to do, not with the preliminary statement of a view +finally to be abandoned, but with an elaborate bonâ fide +attempt to establish and vindicate an essential dogma of the +system. Still it is not altogether impossible that the +pûrvapaksha should here be treated at greater length than +usual, and the decisive point is therefore whether we can, with +<i>S</i>a@nkara, look upon Sûtra 29 as embodying a refutation +of the pûrvapaksha and thus implicitly acknowledging the +doctrine that the individual soul is all-pervading. Now I think +there can be no doubt that <i>S</i>a@nkara's interpretation of the +Sûtra is exceedingly forced. Literally translated (and +leaving out the non-essential word 'prâj<i>ñ</i>avat') +the Sûtra runs as follows: 'But on account of that quality +(or "those qualities;" or else "on account of the quality—or +qualities—of that") being the essence, (there is) that +designation (or "the designation of that").' This <i>S</i>a@nkara +maintains to mean, 'Because the qualities of the buddhi are the +essence of the soul in the sa<i>m</i>sâra state, therefore +the soul itself is sometimes spoken of as a<i>n</i>u.' Now, in the +first place, nothing in the context warrants the explanation of the +first 'tat' by buddhi. And—which is more important—in +the second place, it is more than doubtful whether on +<i>S</i>a@nkara's own system the qualities of the buddhi—such +as pleasure, pain, desire, aversion, &c.—can with any +propriety be said to constitute the essence of the soul even in the +sa<i>m</i>sâra state. The essence of the soul in whatever +state, according to <i>S</i>a@nkara's system, is knowledge or +intelligence; whatever is due to its <span class="pagenum"><a name= +"pageintro-56" id="pageintro-56"></a>{Intro 56}</span> association +with the buddhi is non-essential or, more strictly, unreal, +false.</p> +<p>There are no similar difficulties in the way of +Râmânuja's interpretation of the adhikara<i>n</i>a. He +agrees with <i>S</i>a@nkara in the explanation of Sûtras +19-35, with this difference that he views them as setting forth, +not the pûrvapaksha, but the siddhânta. Sûtras +26-28 also are interpreted in a manner not very different from +<i>S</i>a@nkara's, special stress being laid on the distinction +made by Scripture between knowledge as a mere quality and the soul +as a knowing agent, the substratum of knowledge. This discussion +naturally gives rise to the question how it is that Scripture in +some places makes use of the term vij<i>ñ</i>âna when +meaning the individual soul. The answer is given in Sûtra 29, +'The soul is designated as knowledge because it has that quality +for its essence,' i.e. because knowledge is the essential +characteristic quality of the soul, therefore the term 'knowledge' +is employed here and there to denote the soul itself. This latter +interpretation gives rise to no doubt whatever. It closely follows +the wording of the text and does not necessitate any forced +supplementation. The 'tu' of the Sûtra which, according to +<i>S</i>a@nkara, is meant to discard the pûrvapaksha, serves +on Râmânuja's view to set aside a previously-raised +objection; an altogether legitimate assumption.</p> +<p>Of the three remaining Sûtras of the adhikara<i>n</i>a +(30-32), 30 explains, according to <i>S</i>a@nkara, that the soul +may be called a<i>n</i>u, since, as long as it exists in the +sa<i>m</i>sâra condition, it is connected with the buddhi. +According to Râmânuja the Sûtra teaches that the +soul may be called vij<i>ñ</i>âna because the latter +constitutes its essential quality as long as it +exists.—Sûtra 31 intimates, according to +<i>S</i>a@nkara, that in the states of deep sleep, and so on, the +soul is potentially connected with the buddhi, while in the waking +state that connexion becomes actually manifest. The same +Sûtra, according to Râmânuja, teaches that +j<i>ñ</i>ât<i>ri</i>tva is properly said to constitute +the soul's essential nature, although it is actually manifested in +some states of the soul only.—In Sûtra 32, finally, +<i>S</i>a@nkara sees a statement of the <span class= +"pagenum"><a name="pageintro-57" id="pageintro-57"></a>{Intro +57}</span> doctrine that, unless the soul had the buddhi for its +limiting adjunct, it would either be permanently cognizing or +permanently non-cognizing; while, according to +Râmânuja, the Sûtra means that the soul would +either be permanently cognizing or permanently non-cognizing, if it +were pure knowledge and all-pervading (instead of being +<i>jñ</i>ât<i>ri</i> and a<i>n</i>u, as it is in +reality).—The three Sûtras can be made to fit in with +either interpretation, although it must be noted that none of them +explicitly refers to the soul's connexion with the buddhi.</p> +<p>Adhik. XIV and XV (33-39; 40) refer to the kart<i>ri</i>tva of +the jîva, i.e. the question whether the soul is an agent. +Sûtras 33-39 clearly say that it is such. But as, according +to <i>S</i>a@nkara's system, this cannot be the final +view,—the soul being essentially non-active, and all action +belonging to the world of upâdhis,—he looks upon the +next following Sûtra (40) as constituting an +adhikara<i>n</i>a by itself, and teaching that the soul is an agent +when connected with the instruments of action, buddhi, &c., +while it ceases to be so when dissociated from them, 'just as the +carpenter acts in both ways,' i.e. just as the carpenter works as +long as he wields his instruments, and rests after having laid them +aside.—Râmânuja, perhaps more naturally, does not +separate Sûtra 40 from the preceding Sûtras, but +interprets it as follows: Activity is indeed an essential attribute +of the soul; but therefrom it does not follow that the soul is +always actually active, just as the carpenter, even when furnished +with the requisite instruments, may either work or not work, just +as he pleases.</p> +<p>Adhik. XVI (41, 42) teaches that the soul in its activity is +dependent on the Lord who impels it with a view to its former +actions.</p> +<p>Adhik. XVII (43-53) treats of the relation of the individual +soul to Brahman. Sûtra 43 declares that the individual soul +is a part (a<i>ms</i>a) of Brahman, and the following Sûtras +show how that relation does not involve either that Brahman is +affected by the imperfections, sufferings, &c. of the souls, or +that one soul has to participate in the experiences of other souls. +The two commentators of course take entirely <span class= +"pagenum"><a name="pageintro-58" id="pageintro-58"></a>{Intro +58}</span> different views of the doctrine that the soul is a part +of Brahman. According to Râmânuja the souls are in +reality parts of Brahman<a id="footnotetag14" name= +"footnotetag14"></a><a href="#footnote14"><sup>14</sup></a>; +according to Sa@nkara the 'a<i>ms</i>a' of the Sûtra must be +understood to mean 'a<i>ms</i>a iva,' 'a part as it were;' the one +universal indivisible Brahman having no real parts, but appearing +to be divided owing to its limiting adjuncts.—One Sûtra +(50) in this adhikara<i>n</i>a calls for special notice. According +to Sa@nkara the words 'âbhâsa eva <i>k</i>a' mean '(the +soul is) a mere reflection,' which, as the commentators remark, is +a statement of the so-called pratibimbavâda, i.e. the +doctrine that the so-called individual soul is nothing but the +reflection of the Self in the buddhi; while Sûtra 43 had +propounded the so-called ava<i>kkh</i>edavâda, i.e. the +doctrine that the soul is the highest Self in so far as limited by +its adjuncts.—According to Râmânuja the +âbhâsa of the Sûtra has to be taken in the +<span class="pagenum"><a name="pageintro-59" id= +"pageintro-59"></a>{Intro 59}</span> sense of +hetvâbhâsa, a fallacious argument, and the Sûtra +is explained as being directed against the reasoning of those +Vedântins according to whom the soul is Brahman in so far as +limited by non-real adjuncts<a id="footnotetag15" name= +"footnotetag15"></a><a href="#footnote15"><sup>15</sup></a>.</p> +<h4>PÂDA IV.</h4> +<p>Adhik. I, II, III (1-4; 5-6; 7) teach that the +prâ<i>n</i>as (by which generic name are denoted the +buddhîndriyas, karmen-driyas, and the manas) spring from +Brahman; are eleven in number; and are of minute size +(a<i>n</i>u).</p> +<p>Adhik. IV, V, VI (8; 9-12; 13) inform us also that the mukhya +prâ<i>n</i>a, i.e. the vital air, is produced from Brahman; +that it is a principle distinct from air in general and from the +prâ<i>n</i>as discussed above; and that it is minute +(a<i>n</i>u).</p> +<p>Adhik. VII and VIII (14-16; 17-19) teach that the +prâ<i>n</i>as are superintended and guided in their activity +by special divinities, and that they are independent principles, +not mere modifications of the mukhya prâ<i>n</i>a.</p> +<p>Adhik. IX (20-22) declares that the evolution of names and forms +(the nâmarûpavyâkara<i>n</i>a) is the work, not +of the individual soul, but of the Lord.</p> +<blockquote class="footnote"><a id="footnote13" name= +"footnote13"></a><b>Footnote 13:</b><a href= +"#footnotetag13">(return)</a> +<p>Lokavat, Yathâ loke +râja<i>s</i>âsanânuvartinâ<i>m</i> +<i>k</i>a +râjânugrahanigrahak<i>ri</i>takhadukhayoges'pi na +sa<i>s</i>arîraîvamâtre<i>n</i>a sâsake +râjany api +<i>s</i>âsanânuv<i>ri</i>ttyauv<i>ri</i>ttinimittasukhadukhayor +bhokt<i>ri</i>vaprasa@nga<i>h</i>. Yathâha +Drami<i>d</i>abhâshyakâra<i>h</i> yathâ loke +râjâ pra<i>k</i>uradanda<i>s</i>ûke +ghores'narthasa<i>m</i>ka<i>t</i>es'pi prade<i>s</i>e +vartamânoszpi vyajanâdyavadhûtadeho doshair na +sprisyate abhipretâ<i>ms</i> <i>k</i>a lokân +paripipâlayishati bhogâ<i>ms</i> <i>k</i>a +gandhâdîn avi<i>s</i>vajanopabhogyân +dhârayati tathâsau loke<i>s</i>varo +bhramatsvasâmait<i>h</i>ya<i>k</i>amato doshair na +sp<i>ris</i>yate rakshati <i>k</i>a lokân +brahmalokâdi<i>ms</i> +<i>k</i>âvi<i>s</i>vajanopabhogyân +dhârayatîti.</p> +</blockquote> +<blockquote class="footnote"><a id="footnote14" name= +"footnote14"></a><b>Footnote 14:</b><a href= +"#footnotetag14">(return)</a> +<p>Gîvasya kart<i>ri</i>tva<i>m</i> paramapurushâyattam +ity uktam. Idânîm kim aya<i>m</i> gîva<i>h</i> +parasmâd atyantabhinna<i>h</i> uta param eva brahma +bhrântam uta brahmaivopâdhyava<i>kkh</i>innam atha +brahmâ<i>ms</i>a iti sa<i>m</i>sayyate +<i>s</i>rutivipraticpatte<i>h</i> sa<i>m</i>saya<i>h</i>. Nanu +tadananyam ârambha<i>n</i>a<i>s</i>abdâdibhya<i>h</i> +adhika<i>m</i> tu bhedanirdesâd ity atraivâyam aitho +nir<i>n</i>îta<i>h</i> Satya<i>m</i> sa eva +nânâtvaikatva<i>s</i>rutivipratipattyâ skshipya +jîvasya brahmâ<i>ms</i>atvopapâdanena +vi<i>s</i>eshato nir<i>n</i>îyate. Yâvad dhi +jîvasya brahmâ<i>m</i>satva<i>m</i> na +nir<i>n</i>îtam tâvaj jîvasya +brahmanosnanyatva<i>m</i> brahma<i>n</i>as tasmâd +adhikatvâ<i>m</i> <i>k</i>a na pratitish<i>th</i>ati. +Ki<i>m</i> tâvat prâptam. Atyanta<i>m</i> bhinna iti. +Kuta<i>h</i>. J<i>ñ</i>âj<i>ñ</i>nau dvâv +ityâdibhedanirde<i>s</i>ât. +J<i>ñ</i>âj<i>ñ</i>ayor abheda<i>s</i>rutayas +tv agninâ si<i>ñk</i>ed itivad +viruddhârthapratipâdanâd +aupa<i>k</i>ârikya<i>h</i>, Brahma<i>n</i>os<i>ms</i>o +jîva ity api na sâdhîya<i>h</i>, +ekavastvekade<i>s</i>avâ<i>k</i>î hy +a<i>ms</i>a<i>s</i>sabda<i>h</i>, jîvasya +brahmaikade<i>s</i>atve tadgatâ doshâ brahma<i>n</i>i +bhaveyu<i>h</i>. Na <i>k</i>a brahmakha<i>nd</i>o jîva ity +a<i>ms</i>atvopapatti<i>h</i> kha<i>nd</i>anânarhatvâd +brahma<i>n</i>a<i>h</i> prâguktadoshaprasa@ngâ<i>k</i> +<i>k</i>a, tasmâd atyantabhinnasya tada<i>ms</i>atva<i>m</i> +durupapâdam. Yadvâ bhrânta<i>m</i> brahmaiva +jîva<i>h</i>. Kuta<i>h</i>. Tat tvam asi ayam +âtmâ +brahmetyâdibrahmâtmabhâvopade<i>s</i>ât, +nânâtmatvavâdinyas tu +pratyakshâdisiddhârthânuvâditvâd +ananyathâsiddhâdvaitopade<i>s</i>aparâbhi<i>h</i> +<i>s</i>rutibhi<i>h</i> pratyakshâdaya<i>s</i> <i>k</i>a +avidyântargata<i>h</i> khyâpyante.—Athavâ +brahmaivânâdyupâdhyava<i>kkh</i>inna<i>m</i> +jîva<i>h</i>. Kuta<i>h</i>. Tata eva +brahmâtmabhâvopade<i>s</i>at. Na <i>k</i>âyam +upâdhir bhrântiparikalpita ita vaktu<i>m</i> +sakya<i>m</i> bandhamokshâdivyavasthânupapatter. Ity +eva<i>m</i> prâtptesbhidhîyate. Brahmâ<i>ms</i>a +iti. Kuta<i>h</i>. Nânâvyapade<i>s</i>âd +anyathâ <i>k</i>aikatvena vyapade<i>s</i>âd +ubhayathâ hi vyapade<i>s</i>o d<i>ris</i>yate. +Nâvâvyapade<i>s</i>as tâvat +srash<i>tri</i>tva<i>rig</i>yatva—niyant<i>ri</i>tvaniyâmyatva—sarvaj<i> +ñ</i>atvâj<i>ñ</i>atva—svâdhînatvaparâdhînatva—<i> +s</i>uddhatvâ<i>s</i>uddhatva—kalyâ<i>n</i>agu<i>n</i>âkaratvaviparîtatva—patitva<i> +s</i>eshatvâdibhir d<i>ris</i>yate. Anyathâ +<i>k</i>âbhedena vyapade<i>s</i>os pi tat tvam asi ayam +âtmâ brahmetyâdibhir d<i>ris</i>yate. Api +dâ<i>s</i>akitavâditvam apy adhîyate eke, brahma +dâsâ brahma dâsâ brahmeme kitavâ ity +âtharva<i>n</i>ikâ brahma<i>n</i>o +dâ<i>s</i>akitavâditvam apy adhîyate, +tata<i>s</i> <i>k</i>a sarvajîvavyâpitvena abhedo +vyapadi<i>s</i>yata it artha<i>h</i>. Evam +ubhayavyapade<i>s</i>amukhyatvasiddhaye jîvosya<i>m</i> +brahma<i>n</i>os<i>ms</i>a ity abhyupagantavya<i>h</i>.</p> +</blockquote> +<blockquote class="footnote"><a id="footnote15" name= +"footnote15"></a><b>Footnote 15:</b><a href= +"#footnotetag15">(return)</a> +<p>Nanu bhrântabrahmajîvavâdeszpy +avidyâk<i>ri</i>topâdhibhedâd +bhogavyavasthâdaya upapadyanta ata âha, +âbhâsa eva <i>k</i>a. +Akha<i>nd</i>aikarasaprakâ<i>s</i>amâtratvarûpasya +svarûpatirodhânapûrvakopâdhibhedopapâdanahetur +âbhâsa eva. Prakâ<i>s</i>aikasvarûpasya +prakâ<i>s</i>atirodhâna<i>m</i> +prakâ<i>s</i>anâ<i>s</i>a eveti prâg +evopapâditam. Âbhâsâ eveti vâ +pâ<i>th</i>a<i>h</i>, tathâ sati hetava +âbhâsâ<i>h</i>.</p> +</blockquote> +<h3>THIRD ADHYÂYA.</h3> +<h4>PÂDA I.</h4> +<p>Adhik. I (1-7) teaches that the soul, when passing out of the +body at the time of death, remains invested with the subtle +material elements (bhûtasûkshma) which serve as an +abode to the prâ<i>n</i>as attached to the soul.</p> +<p>Adhik. II (8-11) shows that, when the souls of those who had +enjoyed the reward of their good works in the moon descend to the +earth in order to undergo a new embodiment, there cleaves to them a +remainder (anu<i>s</i>aya) of their <span class="pagenum"><a name= +"pageintro-60" id="pageintro-60"></a>{Intro 60}</span> former deeds +which determines the nature of the new embodiment.</p> +<p>Adhik. III (12-21) discusses the fate after death of those whom +their good works do not entitle to pass up to the moon.</p> +<p>Adhik. IV, V, VI (22; 23; 24-27) teach that the subtle bodies of +the souls descending from the moon through the ether, air, &c., +do not become identical with ether, air, &c., but only like +them; that the entire descent occupies a short time only; and that, +when the souls finally enter into plants and so on, they do not +participate in the life of the latter, but are merely in external +contact with them.</p> +<h4>PÂDA II.</h4> +<p>Adhik. I (1-6) treats of the soul in the dreaming state. +According to <i>S</i>a@nkara the three first Sûtras discuss +the question whether the creative activity ascribed to the soul in +some scriptural passages produces things as real as those by which +the waking soul is surrounded, or not; Sûtra 3 settles the +point by declaring that the creations of the dreaming soul are mere +'Mâyâ,' since they do not fully manifest the character +of real objects. Sûtra 4 adds that dreams, although mere +Mâyâ, yet have a prophetic quality. Sûtras 5 and +6 finally reply to the question why the soul, which after all is a +part of the Lord and as such participates in his excellencies, +should not be able to produce in its dreams a real creation, by the +remark that the soul's knowledge and power are obscured by its +connexion with the gross body.</p> +<p>The considerably diverging interpretation given of this +adhikara<i>n</i>a by Râmânuja has the advantage of more +closely connecting the Sûtras with each other. According to +him the question is not whether the creations of a dream are real +or not, but whether they are the work of the individual soul or of +the Lord acting within the soul. Sûtras 1 and 2 set forth the +pûrvapaksha. The creations of dreams (are the work of the +individual soul); for thus Scripture declares: 'And the followers +of some <i>s</i>âkâs declare (the <span class= +"pagenum"><a name="pageintro-61" id="pageintro-61"></a>{Intro +61}</span> soul to be) a creator,' &c. The third Sûtra +states the siddhânta view: 'But the creations of dreams are +Mâyâ, i.e. are of a wonderful nature (and as such +cannot be effected by the individual soul), since (in this life) +the nature (of the soul) is not fully manifested.' Concerning the +word 'mâyâ,' Râmânuja remarks, +'mâyâ<i>s</i>abdo hy +â<i>sk</i>aryavâ<i>k</i>î janaka<i>s</i>ya kule +jâtâ devamâyeva nirmitâ ityâdishu +tathâ dar<i>s</i>anât.' The three remaining +Sûtras are exhibited in the <i>S</i>rî-bhâshya in +a different order, the fourth Sûtra, according to +<i>S</i>a@nkara, being the sixth according to Râmânuja. +Sûtras 4 and 5 (according to Râmânuja's +numeration) are explained by Râmânuja very much in the +same way as by <i>S</i>a@nkara; but owing to the former's statement +of the subject-matter of the whole adhikara<i>n</i>a they connect +themselves more intimately with the preceding Sûtras than is +possible on <i>S</i>a@nkara's interpretation. In Sûtra 6 +(sû<i>k</i>aka<i>s</i> <i>k</i>â hi) +Râmânuja sees a deduction from the siddhânta of +the adhikara<i>n</i>a, 'Because the images of a dream are produced +by the highest Lord himself, therefore they have prophetic +significance.'</p> +<p>Adhik. II teaches that in the state of deep dreamless sleep the +soul abides within Brahman in the heart.</p> +<p>Adhik. III (9) expounds the reasons entitling us to assume that +the soul awakening from sleep is the same that went to +sleep.—Adhik. IV (9) explains the nature of a swoon.</p> +<p>Adhik. V (11-21) is, according to <i>S</i>a@nkara, taken up with +the question as to the nature of the highest Brahman in which the +individual soul is merged in the state of deep sleep. Sûtra +11 declares that twofold characteristics (viz. absence and presence +of distinctive attributes, nirvi<i>s</i>eshatva and +savi<i>s</i>eshatva) cannot belong to the highest Brahman even +through its stations, i.e. its limiting adjuncts; since all +passages which aim at setting forth Brahman's nature declare it to +be destitute of all distinctive attributes.—The fact, +Sûtra 12 continues, that in many passages Brahman is spoken +of as possessing distinctive attributes is of no relevancy, since +wherever there are mentioned limiting adjuncts, on which all +distinction depends, it is specially stated <span class= +"pagenum"><a name="pageintro-62" id="pageintro-62"></a>{Intro +62}</span> that Brahman in itself is free from all diversity; +and—Sûtra 13 adds—in some places the assumption +of diversity is specially objected to.—That Brahman is devoid +of all form (Sûtra 14), is the pre-eminent meaning of all +Vedânta-texts setting forth Brahman's nature.—That +Brahman is represented as having different forms, as it were, is +due to its connexion with its (unreal) limiting adjuncts; just as +the light of the sun appears straight or crooked, as it were, +according to the nature of the things he illuminates +(15).—The B<i>ri</i>hadâra<i>n</i>yaka expressly +declares that Brahman is one uniform mass of intelligence (16); and +the same is taught in other scriptural passages and in +Sm<i>ri</i>ti (l7).—At the unreality of the apparent +manifoldness of the Self, caused by the limiting adjuncts, aim +those scriptural passages in which the Self is compared to the sun, +which remains one although his reflections on the surface of the +water are many (18).—Nor must the objection be raised that +that comparison is unsuitable, because the Self is not material +like the sun, and there are no real upâdhis separate from it +as the water is from the sun; for the comparison merely means to +indicate that, as the reflected image of the sun participates in +the changes, increase, decrease, &c., which the water undergoes +while the sun himself remains unaffected thereby, so the true Self +is not affected by the attributes of the upâdhis, while, in +so far as it is limited by the latter, it is affected by them as it +were (19, 20).—That the Self is within the upâdhis, +Scripture declares (21).</p> +<p>From the above explanation of this important adhikara<i>n</i>a +the one given in the Srî-bhâshya differs totally. +According to Râmânuja the adhikara<i>n</i>a raises the +question whether the imperfections clinging to the individual soul +(the discussion of which has now come to an end) affect also the +highest Lord who, according to Scripture, abides within the soul as +antaryâmin. 'Notwithstanding the abode (of the highest Self +within the soul) (it is) not (affected by the soul's imperfections) +because everywhere (the highest Self is represented) as having +twofold characteristics (viz. being, on one hand, free from all +evil, apahatapâpman, vijara, vim<i>ri</i>tyu, &c., and, +on the other hand, endowed with all auspicious <span class= +"pagenum"><a name="pageintro-63" id="pageintro-63"></a>{Intro +63}</span> qualities, satyakâma, satyasa<i>m</i>kalpa, +&c.) (11).—Should it be objected that, just as the soul +although essentially free from evil—according to the +Prajâpativâkya in the Chândogya—yet is +liable to imperfections owing to its connexion with a variety of +bodies, so the antaryâmin also is affected by abiding within +bodies; we deny this because in every section of the chapter +referring to the antaryâmin (in the +B<i>ri</i>hadâra<i>n</i>yaka) he is expressly called the +Immortal, the ruler within; which shows him to be free from the +shortcomings of the jiva (12).—Some, moreover, expressly +assert that, although the Lord and the soul are within one body, +the soul only is imperfect, not the Lord (dvâ +supar<i>n</i>â sayujâ sakhâyâ) +(13).—Should it be said that, according to the +Chândogya, Brahman entered together with the souls into the +elements previously to the evolution of names and forms, and hence +participates in the latter, thus becoming implicated in the +sa<i>m</i>sára; we reply that Brahman, although connected +with such and such forms, is in itself devoid of form, since it is +the principal element (agent; pradhâna) in the bringing about +of names and forms (according to 'âkâ<i>s</i>o ha vai +nâmarûpayor nirvahitâ') (14).—But does not +the passage 'satya<i>m</i> j<i>ñ</i>ânam anantam +brahma' teach that Brahman is nothing but light (intelligence) +without any difference, and does not the passage 'neti neti' deny +of it all qualities?—As in order, we reply, not to deprive +passages as the one quoted from the Taittirîya of their +purport, we admit that Brahman's nature is light, so we must also +admit that Brahman is satyasa<i>m</i>kalpa, and so on; for if not, +the passages in which those qualities are asserted would become +purportless (15).—Moreover the Taittirîya passage only +asserts so much, viz. the prakâ<i>s</i>arûpatâ of +Brahman, and does not deny other qualities (l6).—And the +passage 'neti neti' will be discussed later on.—The +ubhayali@ngatva of Brahman in the sense assigned above is asserted +in many places <i>S</i>ruti and Sm<i>ri</i>ti (17).—Because +Brahman although abiding in many places is not touched by their +imperfections, the similes of the reflected sun, of the ether +limited by jars, &c., are applicable to it (18).—Should +it be said that the illustration is not an appropriate one, because +the <span class="pagenum"><a name="pageintro-64" id= +"pageintro-64"></a>{Intro 64}</span> sun is apprehended in the +water erroneously only while the antaryâmin really abides +within all things, and therefore must be viewed as sharing their +defects (19); we reply that what the simile means to negative is +merely that Brahman should, owing to its inherence in many places, +participate in the increase, decrease, and so on, of its abodes. On +this view both similes are appropriate (20).—Analogous +similes we observe to be employed in ordinary life, as when we +compare a man to a lion (21).</p> +<p>Sûtras 22-30 constitute, according to <i>S</i>a@nkara, a +new adhikara<i>n</i>a (VI), whose object it is to show that the +clause 'not so, not so' (neti neti; B<i>ri</i>hadâr) +negatives, not Brahman itself, but only the two forms of Brahman +described in the preceding part of the chapter. Sûtras 23-26 +further dwell on Brahman being in reality devoid of all distinctive +attributes which are altogether due to the upâdhis. The last +four Sûtras return to the question how, Brahman being one +only, the souls are in so many places spoken of as different from +it, and, two explanatory hypotheses having been rejected, the +conclusion is arrived at that all difference is unreal, due to +fictitious limiting adjuncts.</p> +<p>According to Rámânuja, Sûtras 22 ff. continue +the discussion started in Sûtra 11. How, the question is +asked, can the ubhayali@ngatva of Brahman be maintained considering +that the 'not so, not so' of the B<i>ri</i>hadâra<i>n</i>yaka +denies of Brahman all the previously mentioned modes +(prakâra), so that it can only be called that which is +(sanmâtra)?—The reply given in Sûtra 22 is that +'not so, not so' does not deny of Brahman the distinctive qualities +or modes declared previously (for it would be senseless at first to +teach them, and finally to deny them again<a id="footnotetag16" +name="footnotetag16"></a><a href="#footnote16"><sup>16</sup></a>), +but merely denies the prâk<i>ri</i>taitâvattva, the +previously stated limited nature of Brahman, i.e. it denies that +Brahman possesses only the previously mentioned qualifications. +With this agrees, that subsequently to 'neti neti' Scripture itself +enunciates further qualifications of Brahman. That Brahman as +stated <span class="pagenum"><a name="pageintro-65" id= +"pageintro-65"></a>{Intro 65}</span> above is not the object of any +other means of proof but Scripture is confirmed in Sûtra 23, +'Scripture declares Brahman to be the non-manifest.'—And the +intuition (sákshâtkkâra) of Brahman ensues only +upon its sa<i>m</i>râdhana, i.e. upon its being perfectly +pleased by the worshipper's devotion, as Scripture and +Sm<i>ri</i>ti declare (24).—That this interpretation of +'neti' is the right one, is likewise shown by the fact that in the +same way as prakâ<i>s</i>a, luminousness, +j<i>ñ</i>âna, intelligence, &c., so also the +quality of being differentiated by the world +(prapa<i>ñk</i>avsish<i>t</i>atâ) is intuited as +non-different, i.e. as likewise qualifying Brahman; and that +prakâ<i>s</i>a, and so on, characterise Brahman, is known +through repeated practice (on the part of <i>ri</i>shis like +Vâmadeva) in the work of sa<i>m</i>râdhana mentioned +before (25).—For all these reasons Brahman is connected with +the infinite, i.e. the infinite number of auspicious qualities; for +thus the twofold indications (li@nga) met with in Scripture are +fully justified (26).—In what relation, then, does the +a<i>k</i>id vastu, i.e. the non-sentient matter, which, according +to the b<i>ri</i>hadara<i>n</i>yaka, is one of the forms of +Brahman, stand to the latter?—Non-sentient beings might, in +the first place, be viewed as special arrangements +(sa<i>m</i>sthanaviseshâ<i>h</i>) of Brahman, as the coils +are of the body of the snake; for Brahman is designated as both, +i.e. sometimes as one with the world (Brahman is all this, +&c.), sometimes as different from it (Let me enter into those +elements, &c.) (27).—Or, in the second place, the +relation of the two might be viewed as analogous to that of light +and the luminous object which are two and yet one, both being fire +(28).—Or, in the third place, the relation is like that +stated before, i.e. the material world is, like the individual +souls (whose case was discussed in II, 3, 43), a +part—a<i>ms</i>a—of Brahman (29, 30).</p> +<p>Adhik. VII (31-37) explains how some metaphorical expressions, +seemingly implying that there is something different from Brahman, +have to be truly understood.</p> +<p>Adhik. VIII (38-41) teaches that the reward of works is not, as +Jaimini opines, the independent result of the works acting through +the so-called apûrva, but is allotted by the Lord.</p> +<span class="pagenum"><a name="pageintro-66" id= +"pageintro-66"></a>{Intro 66}</span> +<h4>PÂDA III.</h4> +<p>With the third pâda of the second adhyâya a new +section of the work begins, whose task it is to describe how the +individual soul is enabled by meditation on Brahman to obtain final +release. The first point to be determined here is what constitutes +a meditation on Brahman, and, more particularly, in what relation +those parts of the Upanishads stand to each other which enjoin +identical or partly identical meditations. The reader of the +Upanishads cannot fail to observe that the texts of the different +<i>s</i>âkhâs contain many chapters of similar, often +nearly identical, contents, and that in some cases the text of even +one and the same <i>s</i>âkhâ exhibits the same matter +in more or less varied forms. The reason of this clearly is that +the common stock of religious and philosophical ideas which were in +circulation at the time of the composition of the Upanishads found +separate expression in the different priestly communities; hence +the same speculations, legends, &c. reappear in various places +of the sacred Scriptures in more or less differing dress. +Originally, when we may suppose the members of each Vedic school to +have confined themselves to the study of their own sacred texts, +the fact that the texts of other schools contained chapters of +similar contents would hardly appear to call for special note or +comment; not any more than the circumstance that the sacrificial +performances enjoined on the followers of some particular +<i>s</i>âkhâ were found described with greater or +smaller modifications in the books of other +<i>s</i>âkhâs also. But already at a very early period, +at any rate long before the composition of the +Vedânta-sûtras in their present form, the Vedic +theologians must have apprehended the truth that, in whatever +regards sacrificial acts, one <i>s</i>âkhâ may indeed +safely follow its own texts, disregarding the texts of all other +<i>s</i>âkhâs; that, however, all texts which aim at +throwing light on the nature of Brahman and the relation to it of +the human soul must somehow or other be combined into one +consistent systematical whole equally valid for the followers of +all Vedic schools. For, as we have had occasion to remark above, +while acts may be performed <span class="pagenum"><a name= +"pageintro-67" id="pageintro-67"></a>{Intro 67}</span> by different +individuals in different ways, cognition is defined by the nature +of the object cognised, and hence can be one only, unless it ceases +to be true cognition. Hence the attempts, on the one hand, of +discarding by skilful interpretation all contradictions met with in +the sacred text, and, on the other hand, of showing what sections +of the different Upanishads have to be viewed as teaching the same +matter, and therefore must be combined in one meditation. The +latter is the special task of the present pâda.</p> +<p>Adhik. I and II (1-4; 5) are concerned with the question whether +those vidyâs, which are met with in identical or similar form +in more than one sacred text, are to be considered as constituting +several vidyâs, or one vidyâ only. <i>S</i>a@nkara +remarks that the question affects only those vidyâs whose +object is the qualified Brahman; for the knowledge of the +non-qualified Brahman, which is of an absolutely uniform nature, +can of course be one only wherever it is set forth. But things lie +differently in those cases where the object of knowledge is the +sagu<i>n</i>am brahma or some outward manifestation of Brahman; for +the qualities as well as manifestations of Brahman are many. +Anticipating the subject of a later adhikara<i>n</i>a, we may take +for an example the so-called +<i>S</i>â<i>nd</i>ilyavidyâ which is met with in Ch. +Up. III, 14, again—in an abridged form—in B<i>ri</i>. +Up. V, 6, and, moreover, in the tenth book of the +<i>S</i>atapathabráhma<i>n</i>a (X, 6, 3). The three +passages enjoin a meditation on Brahman as possessing certain +attributes, some of which are specified in all the three texts (as, +for instance, manomayatva, bhârûpatva), while others +are peculiar to each separate passage +(prâ<i>n</i>a<i>s</i>arîratva and +satyasa<i>m</i>kalpatva, for instance, being mentioned in the +Chândogya Upanishad and +<i>S</i>atapatha-brâhma<i>n</i>a, but not in the +B<i>ri</i>hadâra<i>n</i>yaka Upanishad, which, on its part, +specifies sarvava<i>s</i>itva, not referred to in the two other +texts). Here, then, there is room for a doubt whether the three +passages refer to one object of knowledge or not. To the devout +Vedântin the question is not a purely theoretical one, but of +immediate practical interest. For if the three texts are to be held +apart, there are three different meditations to be gone through; +if, on the <span class="pagenum"><a name="pageintro-68" id= +"pageintro-68"></a>{Intro 68}</span> other hand, the vidyâ is +one only, all the different qualities of Brahman mentioned in the +three passages have to be combined into one meditation.—The +decision is here, as in all similar cases, in favour of the latter +alternative. A careful examination of the three passages shows that +the object of meditation is one only; hence the meditation also is +one only, comprehending all the attributes mentioned in the three +texts.</p> +<p>Adhik. III (6-8) discusses the case of vidyâs being really +separate, although apparently identical. The examples selected are +the udgîthavidyâs of the Chândogya Upanishad (I, +1-3) and the B<i>ri</i>hadâra<i>n</i>yaka Upanishad (I, 3), +which, although showing certain similarities—such as bearing +the same name and the udgîtha being in both identified with +prâ<i>n</i>a—yet are to be held apart, because the +subject of the Chândogya vidyâ is not the whole +udgîtha but only the sacred syllabic Om, while the +B<i>ri</i>hadâra<i>n</i>yaka Upanishad represents the whole +udgîtha as the object of meditation.</p> +<p>Sûtra 9 constitutes in <i>S</i>a@nkara's view a new +adhikara<i>n</i>a (IV), proving that in the passage, 'Let a man +meditate' (Ch. Up. I, 1, 1), the O<i>m</i>kâra and the +udgîtha stand in the relation of one specifying the other, +the meaning being, 'Let a man meditate on that O<i>m</i>kâra +which,' &c.—According to Râmânuja's +interpretation, which seems to fall in more satisfactorily with the +form and the wording of the Sûtra, the latter merely +furnishes an additional argument for the conclusion arrived at in +the preceding adhikara<i>n</i>a.—Adhik. V (10) determines the +unity of the so-called prâ<i>n</i>a-vidyâs and the +consequent comprehension of the different qualities of the +prâ<i>n</i>a, which are mentioned in the different texts, +within one meditation.</p> +<p>Adhik. VI comprises, according to <i>S</i>a@nkara, the +Sûtras 11-13. The point to be settled is whether in all the +meditations on Brahman all its qualities are to be included or only +those mentioned in the special vidyâ. The decision is that +the essential and unalterable attributes of Brahman, such as bliss +and knowledge, are to be taken into account everywhere, while those +which admit of a more or less (as, for instance, the attribute of +having joy for its head, mentioned <span class="pagenum"><a name= +"pageintro-69" id="pageintro-69"></a>{Intro 69}</span> in the +Taitt. Up.) are confined to special meditations.—Adhik. VII +(14, 15), according to <i>S</i>a@nkara, aims at proving that the +object of Ka<i>th</i>a. Up. III, 10, 11 is one only, viz. to show +that the highest Self is higher than everything, so that the +passage constitutes one vidyâ only.—Adhik. VIII (16, +17) determines, according to <i>S</i>a@nkara, that the Self spoken +of in Ait. Âr. II, 4, 1, 1 is not a lower form of the Self +(the so-called sûtrâtman), but the highest Self; the +discussion of that point in this place being due to the wish to +prove that the attributes of the highest Self have to be +comprehended in the Aitarcyaka meditation.</p> +<p>According to Râmânuja the Sûtras 11-17 +constitute a single adhikara<i>n</i>a whose subject is the same as +that of <i>S</i>a@nkara's sixth adhikar<i>n</i>a. Sûtras +11-13 are, on the whole, explained as by <i>S</i>a@nkara; +Sûtra 12, however, is said to mean, 'Such attributes as +having joy for its head, &c. are not to be viewed as qualities +of Brahman, and therefore not to be included in every meditation; +for if they were admitted as qualities, difference would be +introduced into Brahman's nature, and that would involve a more or +less on Brahman's part.' Sûtras 14-17 continue the discussion +of the passage about the priya<i>s</i>irastva.—If +priya<i>s</i>irastva, &c. are not to be viewed as real +qualities of Brahman, for what purpose does the text mention +them?—'Because,' Sûtra 14 replies, 'there is no other +purpose, Scripture mentions them for the purpose of pious +meditation.'—But how is it known that the Self of delight is +the highest Self? (owing to which you maintain that having limbs, +head, &c. cannot belong to it as attributes.)—'Because,' +Sûtra 15 replies, 'the term "Self" (âtmâ +ânandamaya) is applied to it.'—But in the previous +parts of the chapter the term Self (in âtma pra<i>n</i>amaya, +&c.) is applied to non-Selfs also; how then do you know that in +âtmâ ânandamaya it denotes the real +Self?—'The term Self,' Sûtra 16 replies, 'is employed +here to denote the highest Self as in many other passages +(âtmaâ vâ idam eka, &c.), as we conclude from +the subsequent passage, viz. he wished, May I be many.'—But, +an objection is raised, does not the context show that the term +'Self,' which in all the preceding <span class="pagenum"><a name= +"pageintro-70" id="pageintro-70"></a>{Intro 70}</span> clauses +about the prâ<i>n</i>amaya, &c. denoted something other +than the Self, does the same in ânandamaya âtman, and +is not the context of greater weight than a subsequent +passage?—To this question asked in the former half of 17 +(anvayâd iti <i>k</i>et) the latter half replies, 'Still it +denotes the Self, owing to the affirmatory statement,' i.e. the +fact of the highest Self having been affirmed in a previous passage +also, viz. II, 1, 'From that Self sprang ether.'</p> +<p>Adhik. IX (18) discusses a minor point connected with the +prâ<i>n</i>asa<i>m</i>vâda.—The subject of Adhik. +X (19) has been indicated already above under Adhik. +I.—Adhik. XI (20-22) treats of a case of a contrary nature; +in B<i>ri</i>. Up. V, 5, Brahman is represented first as abiding in +the sphere of the sun, and then as abiding within the eye; we +therefore, in spite of certain counter-indications, have to do with +two separate vidyâs.—Adhik. XII (23) refers to a +similar case; certain attributes of Brahman mentioned in the +Râ<i>n</i>âyanîya-khila have not to be introduced +into the corresponding Chândogya vidyâ, because the +stated difference of Brahman's abode involves difference of +vidyâ.—Adhik. XIII (24) treats of another instance of +two vidyas having to be held apart.</p> +<p>Adhik. XIV (25) decides that certain detached mantras and +brâhma<i>n</i>a passages met with in the beginning of some +Upanishads—as, for instance, a brâhma<i>n</i>a about +the mahâvrata ceremony at the beginning of the +Aitareya-âra<i>n</i>yaka—do, notwithstanding their +position which seems to connect them with the brahmavidyâ, +not belong to the latter, since they show unmistakable signs of +being connected with sacrificial acts.</p> +<p>Adhik. XV (26) treats of the passages stating that the man dying +in the possession of true knowledge shakes off all his good and +evil deeds, and affirms that a statement, made in some of those +passages only, to the effect that the good and evil deeds pass over +to the friends and enemies of the deceased, is valid for all the +passages.</p> +<p>Sûtras 27-30 constitute, according to <i>S</i>a@nkara, two +adhikara<i>n</i>as of which the former (XVI; 27, 28) decides that +the shaking off of the good and evil deeds takes place—not, +as <span class="pagenum"><a name="pageintro-71" id= +"pageintro-71"></a>{Intro 71}</span> the Kaush. Up. states, on the +road to Brahman's world—but at the moment of the soul's +departure from the body; the Kaushitaki statement is therefore not +to be taken literally.—The latter adhikara<i>n</i>a (XVII; +29, 30) treats of the cognate question whether the soul that has +freed itself from its deeds proceeds in all cases on the road of +the gods (as said in the Kaush. Up.), or not. The decision is that +he only whose knowledge does not pass beyond the sagu<i>n</i>am +brahma proceeds on that road, while the soul of him who knows the +nirgu<i>n</i>am brahma becomes one with it without moving to any +other place.</p> +<p>The <i>S</i>rî-bhâshya treats the four Sûtras +as one adhikara<i>n</i>a whose two first Sûtras are explained +as by <i>S</i>a@nkara, while Sûtra 29 raises an objection to +the conclusion arrived at, 'the going (of the soul on the path of +the gods) has a sense only if the soul's freeing itself from its +works takes place in both ways, i.e. partly at the moment of death, +partly on the road to Brahman; for otherwise there would be a +contradiction' (the contradiction being that, if the soul's works +were all shaken off at the moment of death, the subtle body would +likewise perish at that moment, and then the bodiless soul would be +unable to proceed on the path of the gods). To this Sûtra 30 +replies, 'The complete shaking off of the works at the moment of +death is possible, since matters of that kind are observed in +Scripture,' i.e. since scriptural passages show that even he whose +works are entirely annihilated, and who has manifested himself in +his true shape, is yet connected with some kind of body; compare +the passage, 'para<i>m</i> jyotir upasampadya svena +rûpe<i>n</i>abhinishpadyate sa tatra paryeti +krî<i>d</i>an ramamâna<i>h</i> sa svarâ<i>d</i> +bhavati tasya sarveshu lokeshu kâma<i>k</i>âro +bhavati.' That subtle body is not due to karman, but to the soul's +vidyâmâhâtmya.—That the explanation of the +<i>S</i>rî-bhâshya agrees with the text as well as +<i>S</i>a@nkara's, a comparison of the two will show; especially +forced is <i>S</i>a@nkara's explanation of 'arthavattvam +ubhayathâ,' which is said to mean that there is arthavattva +in one case, and non-arthavattva in the other case.</p> +<p>The next Sûtra (31) constitutes an adhikara<i>n</i>a +(XVIII) <span class="pagenum"><a name="pageintro-72" id= +"pageintro-72"></a>{Intro 72}</span> deciding that the road of the +gods is followed not only by those knowing the vidyâs which +specially mention the going on that road, but by all who are +acquainted with the sagu<i>n</i>a-vidyâs of +Brahman.—The explanation given in the +<i>S</i>rî-bhâshya (in which Sûtras 31 and 32 +have exchanged places) is similar, with the difference however that +all who meditate on Brahman—without any reference to the +distinction of nirgu<i>n</i>a and sagu<i>n</i>a—proceed after +death on the road of the gods. (The <i>S</i>rî-bhâshya +reads 'sarveshâm,' i.e. all worshippers, not +'sarvâsâm,' all sagu<i>n</i>a-vidyâs.)</p> +<p>Adhik. XIX (32) decides that, although the general effect of +true knowledge is release from all forms of body, yet even such +beings as have reached perfect knowledge may retain a body for the +purpose of discharging certain offices.—In the +<i>S</i>rî-bhâshya, where the Sûtra follows +immediately on Sûtra 30, the adhikara<i>n</i>a determines, in +close connexion with 30, that, although those who know Brahman as a +rule divest themselves of the gross body—there remaining only +a subtle body which enables them to move—and no longer +experience pleasure and pain, yet certain beings, although having +reached the cognition of Brahman, remain invested with a gross +body, and hence liable to pleasure and pain until they have fully +performed certain duties.</p> +<p>Adhik. XX (33) teaches that the negative attributes of Brahman +mentioned in some vidyâs—such as its being not gross, +not subtle, &c.—are to be included in all meditations on +Brahman.—Adhik. XXI (34) determines that Kâ<i>th</i>a +Up. III, 1, and Mu. Up. III, 1, constitute one vidyâ only, +because both passages refer to the highest Brahman. According to +Râmânuja the Sûtra contains a reply to an +objection raised against the conclusion arrived at in the preceding +Sûtra.—Adhik. XXII (35, 36) maintains that the two +passages, B<i>ri</i>. Up. III, 4 and III, 5, constitute one +vidyâ only, the object of knowledge being in both cases +Brahman viewed as the inner Self of all.—Adhik. XXIII (37) on +the contrary decides that the passage Ait. Âr. II, 2, 4, 6 +constitutes not one but two meditations.—Adhik. XXIV (38) +again determines that the vidyâ of the True contained in +B<i>ri</i>. Up. V, 4, 5, is one only—According to +Râmânuja, <span class="pagenum"><a name="pageintro-73" +id="pageintro-73"></a>{Intro 73}</span> Sûtras 35-38 +constitute one adhikara<i>n</i>a only whose subject is the same as +that of XXII according to <i>S</i>a@nkara.</p> +<p>Adhik. XXV (39) proves that the passages Ch. Up. VIII, 1 and +B<i>ri</i>. Up. IV, 4, 22 cannot constitute one vidyâ, since +the former refers to Brahman as possessing qualities, while the +latter is concerned with Brahman as destitute of +qualities.—Adhik. XXVI (40, 41) treats, according to +<i>S</i>a@nkara, of a minor question connected with Ch. Up. V, 11 +ff.—According to the <i>S</i>rî-bhâshya, +Sûtras 39-41 form one adhikara<i>n</i>a whose first +Sûtra reaches essentially the same conclusion as +<i>S</i>a@nkara under 39. Sûtras 40, 41 thereupon discuss a +general question concerning the meditations on Brahman. The +qualities, an opponent is supposed to remark, which in the two +passages discussed are predicated of Brahman—such as +va<i>s</i>itva, satyakâmatva, &c.—cannot be +considered real (pâramârthika), since other passages +(sa esha neti neti, and the like) declare Brahman to be devoid of +all qualities. Hence those qualities cannot be admitted into +meditations whose purpose is final release.—To this objection +Sûtra 40 replies, '(Those qualities) are not to be left off +(from the meditations on Brahman), since (in the passage under +discussion as well as in other passages) they are stated with +emphasis<a id="footnotetag17" name="footnotetag17"></a><a href= +"#footnote17"><sup>17</sup></a>.'—But, another objection is +raised, Scripture says that he who meditates on Brahman as +satyakâma, &c. obtains a mere perishable reward, viz. the +world of the fathers, and similar results specified in Ch. Up. +VIII, 2; hence, he who is desirous of final release, must not +include those qualities of Brahman in his meditation.—To this +objection Sûtra 41 replies, 'Because that (i.e. the free +roaming in all the worlds, the world of the fathers, &c.) is +stated as proceeding therefrom (i.e. the approach to Brahman which +is final release) in the case of (the soul) which has approached +Brahman;' (therefore a person desirous of release, may include +satyakâmatva, &c. in his meditations.)</p> +<span class="pagenum"><a name="pageintro-74" id= +"pageintro-74"></a>{Intro 74}</span> +<p>Adhik. XXVII (42) decides that those meditations which are +connected with certain matters forming constituent parts of +sacrificial actions, are not to be considered as permanently +requisite parts of the latter.—Adhik. XXVIII (43) teaches +that, in a B<i>ri</i>. Up. passage and a similar Ch. Up. passage, +Vâyu and Prâ<i>n</i>a are not to be identified, but to +be held apart.—Adhik. XXIX (44-52) decides that the +firealtars made of mind, &c., which are mentioned in the +Agnirahasya, do not constitute parts of the sacrificial action (so +that the mental, &c. construction of the altar could optionally +be substituted for the actual one), but merely subjects of +meditations.</p> +<p>Adhik. XXX (53, 54) treats, according to <i>S</i>a@nkara, in the +way of digression, of the question whether to the Self an existence +independent of the body can be assigned, or not (as the +Materialists maintain).—According to the +<i>S</i>rî-bhâshya the adhikara<i>n</i>a does not refer +to this wide question, but is concerned with a point more +immediately connected with the meditations on Brahman, viz. the +question as to the form under which, in those meditations, the Self +of the meditating devotee has to be viewed. The two Sûtras +then have to be translated as follows: 'Some (maintain that the +soul of the devotee has, in meditations, to be viewed as possessing +those attributes only which belong to it in its embodied state, +such as j<i>ñ</i>at<i>ri</i>tva and the like), because the +Self is (at the time of meditation) in the body.'—The next +Sûtra rejects this view, 'This is not so, but the +separatedness (i.e. the pure isolated state in which the Self is at +the time of final release when it is freed from all evil, &c.) +(is to be transferred to the meditating Self), because that will +be<a id="footnotetag18" name="footnotetag18"></a><a href= +"#footnote18"><sup>18</sup></a> the state (of the Self in the +condition of final release).'</p> +<p>Adhik. XXXI (55, 56) decides that meditations connected with +constituent elements of the sacrifice, such as the udgitha, are, in +spite of difference of svara in the udgitha, &c., valid, not +only for that <i>s</i>âkhâ in which the meditation +actually is met with, but for all +<i>s</i>âkhâs.—Adhik. <span class= +"pagenum"><a name="pageintro-75" id="pageintro-75"></a>{Intro +75}</span> XXXII (57) decides that the Vai<i>s</i>vânara Agni +of Ch. Up. V, 11 ff. is to be meditated upon as a whole, not in his +single parts.—Adhik. XXXIII (58) teaches that those +meditations which refer to one subject, but as distinguished by +different qualities, have to be held apart as different +meditations. Thus the daharavidyâ, +<i>S</i>a<i>nd</i>ilyavidyâ, &c. remain separate.</p> +<p>Adhik. XXXIV (59) teaches that those meditations on Brahman for +which the texts assign one and the same fruit are optional, there +being no reason for their being cumulated.—Adhik. XXXV (60) +decides that those meditations, on the other hand, which refer to +special wishes may be cumulated or optionally employed according to +choice.—Adhik. XXXVI (61-66) extends this conclusion to the +meditations connected with constituent elements of action, such as +the udgîtha.</p> +<h4>PÂDA IV.</h4> +<p>Adhik. I (1-17) proves that the knowledge of Brahman is not +kratvartha, i.e. subordinate to action, but +independent.—Adhik. II (18-20) confirms this conclusion by +showing that the state of the pravrâjins is enjoined by the +sacred law, and that for them vidyâ only is prescribed, not +action.—Adhik. III (21, 22) decides that certain clauses +forming part of vidyâs are not mere stutis +(arthavâdas), but themselves enjoin the meditation.—The +legends recorded in the Vedânta-texts are not to be used as +subordinate members of acts, but have the purpose of +glorifying—as arthavâdas—the injunctions with +which they are connected (Adhik. IV, 23, 24).—For all these +reasons the ûrdhvaretasa<i>h</i> require no actions but only +knowledge (Adhik. V, 25).—Nevertheless the actions enjoined +by Scripture, such as sacrifices, conduct of certain kinds, +&c., are required as conducive to the rise of vidyâ in +the mind (Adhik. VI, 26, 27).—Certain relaxations, allowed by +Scripture, of the laws regarding food, are meant only for cases of +extreme need (Adhik. VII, 28-3l).—The +â<i>s</i>ramakarmâ<i>n</i>i are obligatory on him also +who does not strive after mukti (Adhik. VIII, <span class= +"pagenum"><a name="pageintro-76" id="pageintro-76"></a>{Intro +76}</span> 32-35).—Those also who, owing to poverty and so +on, are anâ<i>s</i>rama have claims to vidyâ (Adhik. +IX, 36-39).—An ûrdhvaretas cannot revoke his vow +(Adhik. X, 40).—Expiation of the fall of an ûrdhvaretas +(Adhik. XI, 41, 42).—Exclusion of the fallen +ûrdhvaretas in certain cases (Adhik. XII, 43).—Those +meditations, which are connected with subordinate members of the +sacrifice, are the business of the priest, not of the +yajamâna (Adhik. XIII, 44-46).—B<i>ri</i>. Up. III, 5, +1 enjoins mauna as a third in addition to bâlya and +pâ<i>nd</i>itya (Adhik. XIV, 47-49).—By bâlya is +to be understood a childlike innocent state of mind (Adhik. XV, +50).</p> +<p>Sûtras 51 and 52 discuss, according to +Râmânuja, the question when the vidyâ, which is +the result of the means described in III, 4, arises. Sûtra 51 +treats of that vidyâ whose result is mere exaltation +(abhyudaya), and states that 'it takes place in the present life, +if there is not present an obstacle in the form of a +prabalakarmântara (in which latter case the vidyâ +arises later only), on account of Scripture declaring this (in +various passages).'—Sûtra 52, 'Thus there is also +absence of a definite rule as to (the time of origination of) that +knowledge whose fruit is release, it being averred concerning that +one also that it is in the same condition (i.e. of sometimes having +an obstacle, sometimes not).'—<i>S</i>a@nkara, who treats the +two Sûtras as two adhikara<i>n</i>as, agrees as to the +explanation of 51, while, putting a somewhat forced interpretation +on 52, he makes it out to mean that a more or less is possible only +in the case of the sagu<i>n</i>a-vidyâs.</p> +<blockquote class="footnote"><a id="footnote16" name= +"footnote16"></a><b>Footnote 16:</b><a href= +"#footnotetag16">(return)</a> +<p>All the mentioned modes of Brahman are known from Scripture +only, not from ordinary experience. If the latter were the case, +then, and then only, Scripture might at first refer to them +'anuvâdena,' and finally negative them.</p> +</blockquote> +<blockquote class="footnote"><a id="footnote17" name= +"footnote17"></a><b>Footnote 17:</b><a href= +"#footnotetag17">(return)</a> +<p>Râmânuja has here some strong remarks on the +improbability of qualities emphatically attributed to Brahman, in +more than one passage, having to be set aside in any meditation: +'Na <i>k</i>a mâtâpit<i>ri</i>sahasrebhyo-pi +vatsalatara<i>m</i> sâstra<i>m</i> pratârakavad +apâramârthikau nirasanîyau gu<i>n</i>au +pramâ<i>n</i>ântarâpratipannau +âdare<i>n</i>opadi<i>s</i>ya +sa<i>m</i>sâra<i>k</i>akraparivartanena pûrvam eva +bambhramyamânân mumukshûn bhûyo-pi +bhramayitum alam.'</p> +</blockquote> +<blockquote class="footnote"><a id="footnote18" name= +"footnote18"></a><b>Footnote 18:</b><a href= +"#footnotetag18">(return)</a> +<p>The <i>S</i>rî-bh­âshya as well as several other +commentaries reads tadbhâvabhâvitvât for +<i>S</i>an@kara's tadbhâvâbhâvitvât.</p> +</blockquote> +<h3>FOURTH ADHYÂYA.</h3> +<h4>PÂDA I.</h4> +<p>Adhikara<i>n</i>a I (1, 2).—The meditation on the +Âtman enjoined by Scripture is not an act to be accomplished +once only, but is to be repeated again and again.</p> +<p>Adhik. II (3).—The devotee engaged in meditation on +Brahman is to view it as constituting his own Self.</p> +<span class="pagenum"><a name="pageintro-77" id= +"pageintro-77"></a>{Intro 77}</span> +<p>Adhik. III (4).—To the rule laid down in the preceding +adhikara<i>n</i>a the so-called pratîkopâsanas, i.e. +those meditations in which Brahman is viewed under a symbol or +outward manifestation (as, for instance, mano brahmety +upâsîta) constitute an exception, i.e. the devotee is +not to consider the pratîka as constituting his own Self.</p> +<p>Adhik. IV (5).—In the pratîkopâsanas the +pratîka is to be meditatively viewed as being one with +Brahman, not Brahman as being one with the +pratîka.—Râmânuja takes Sûtra 5 as +simply giving a reason for the decision arrived at under +Sûtra 4, and therefore as not constituting a new +adhikara<i>n</i>a.</p> +<p>Adhik. V (6).—In meditations connected with constitutives +of sacrificial works (as, for instance, ya evâsau tapati tam +udgîtham upâsîta) the idea of the divinity, +&c. is to be transferred to the sacrificial item, not vice +versa. In the example quoted, for instance, the udgîtha is to +be viewed as Âditya, not Âditya as the +udgîtha.</p> +<p>Adhik. VI (7-10).—The devotee is to carry on his +meditations in a sitting posture.—<i>S</i>a@nkara maintains +that this rule does not apply to those meditations whose result is +sa<i>m</i>yagdar<i>s</i>ana; but the Sûtra gives no hint to +that effect.</p> +<p>Adhik. VII (11).—The meditations may be carried on at any +time, and in any place, favourable to concentration of mind.</p> +<p>Adhik. VIII (12).—The meditations are to be continued +until death.—<i>S</i>a@nkara again maintains that those +meditations which lead to sa<i>m</i>yagdar<i>s</i>ana are +excepted.</p> +<p>Adhik. IX (13).—When through those meditations the +knowledge of Brahman has been reached, the vidvân is no +longer affected by the consequences of either past or future evil +deeds.</p> +<p>Adhik. X (14).—Good deeds likewise lose their +efficiency.—The literal translation of the Sûtra is, +'There is likewise non-attachment (to the vidvân) of the +other (i.e. of the deeds other than the evil ones, i.e. of good +deeds), but on the fall (of the body, i.e. when death takes +place).' The last words of the Sûtra, 'but on the fall,' are +separated by <i>S</i>a@nkara from the preceding part of the +Sûtra and interpreted to mean, 'when death takes place (there +results mukti of <span class="pagenum"><a name="pageintro-78" id= +"pageintro-78"></a>{Intro 78}</span> the vidvân, who through +his knowledge has freed himself from the bonds of +works).'—According to Râmânuja the whole +Sûtra simply means, 'There is likewise non-attachment of good +deeds (not at once when knowledge is reached), but on the death of +the vidvân<a id="footnotetag19" name= +"footnotetag19"></a><a href="#footnote19"><sup>19</sup></a>.'</p> +<p>Adhik. XI (15).—The non-operation of works stated in the +two preceding adhikara<i>n</i>as holds good only in the case of +anârabdhakârya works, i.e. those works which have not +yet begun to produce their effects, while it does not extend to the +ârabdhakârya works on which the present existence of +the devotee depends.</p> +<p>Adhik. XII (16, 17).—From the rule enunciated in Adhik. X +are excepted such sacrificial performances as are enjoined +permanently (nitya): so, for instance, the agnihotra, for they +promote the origination of knowledge.</p> +<p>Adhik. XIII (18).—The origination of knowledge is promoted +also by such sacrificial works as are not accompanied with the +knowledge of the upâsanas referring to the different members +of those works.</p> +<p>Adhik. XIV (19).—The ârabdhakârya works have +to be worked out fully by the fruition of their effects; whereupon +the vidvân becomes united with Brahman.—The 'bhoga' of +the Sûtra is, according to <i>S</i>a@nkara, restricted to the +present existence of the devotee, since the complete knowledge +obtained by him destroys the nescience which otherwise would lead +to future embodiments. According to Râmânuja a number +of embodied existences may have to be gone through before the +effects of the ârabdhakârya works are exhausted.</p> +<h4>PÂDA II.</h4> +<p>This and the two remaining pâdas of the fourth +adhyâya describe the fate of the vidvân after death. +According to <i>S</i>a@nkara we have to distinguish the +vidvân who possesses the highest knowledge, viz. that he is +one with the highest <span class="pagenum"><a name="pageintro-79" +id="pageintro-79"></a>{Intro 79}</span> Brahman, and the +vidvân who knows only the lower Brahman, and have to refer +certain Sûtras to the former and others to the latter. +According to Râmânuja the vidvân is one only.</p> +<p>Adhik. I, II, III (1-6).—On the death of the vidvân +(i.e. of him who possesses the lower knowledge, according to +<i>S</i>a@nkara) his senses are merged in the manas, the manas in +the chief vital air (prâ<i>n</i>a), the vital air in the +individual soul (jîva), the soul in the subtle +elements.—According to Râmânuja the combination +(sampatti) of the senses with the manas, &c. is a mere +conjunction (sa<i>m</i>yoga), not a merging (laya).</p> +<p>Adhik. IV (7).—The vidvân (i.e. according to +<i>S</i>a@nkara, he who possesses the lower knowledge) and the +avidvân, i.e. he who does not possess any knowledge of +Brahman, pass through the same stages (i.e. those described +hitherto) up to the entrance of the soul, together with the subtle +elements, and so on into the nâ<i>d</i>îs.—The +vidvân also remains connected with the subtle elements +because he has not yet completely destroyed avidyâ, so that +the immortality which Scripture ascribes to him +(am<i>ri</i>tatva<i>m</i> hi vidvân abhya<i>s</i>nute) is +only a relative one.—Râmânuja quotes the +following text regarding the immortality of the vidvân:</p> +<blockquote> +<p>'Yadâ sarve pramu<i>k</i>yante kâmâ yessya +h<i>ri</i>di sthitâ<i>h</i> atha martyosm<i>ri</i>to bhavaty +atra brahma sama<i>s</i>nute,'</p> +</blockquote> +<p>and explains that the immortality which is here ascribed to the +vidvân as soon as he abandons all desires can only mean the +destruction—mentioned in the preceding pâda—of +all the effects of good and evil works, while the 'reaching of +Brahman' can only refer to the intuition of Brahman vouchsafed to +the meditating devotee.</p> +<p>Adhik. V (8-11) raises; according to <i>S</i>a@nkara, the +question whether the subtle elements of which Scripture says that +they are combined with the highest deity (teja<i>h</i> +parasyâ<i>m</i> devatâyâm) are completely merged +in the latter or not. The answer is that a complete absorption of +the elements takes place only when final emancipation is reached; +that, on the other hand, as long as the sa<i>m</i>sâra state +lasts, the elements, although somehow combined with <span class= +"pagenum"><a name="pageintro-80" id="pageintro-80"></a>{Intro +80}</span> Brahman, remain distinct so as to be able to form new +bodies for the soul.</p> +<p>According to Râmânuja the Sûtras 8-11 do not +constitute a new adhikara<i>n</i>a, but continue the discussion of +the point mooted in 7. The immortality there spoken of does not +imply the separation of the soul from the body, 'because Scripture +declares sa<i>m</i>sâra, i.e. embodiedness up to the reaching +of Brahman' (tasya tâvad eva <i>k</i>ira<i>m</i> yâvan +na vimokshye atha sampatsye) (8).—That the soul after having +departed from the gross body is not disconnected from the subtle +elements, is also proved hereby, that the subtle body accompanies +it, as is observed from authority<a id="footnotetag20" name= +"footnotetag20"></a><a href="#footnote20"><sup>20</sup></a> +(9).—Hence the immortality referred to in the scriptural +passage quoted is not effected by means of the total destruction of +the body (10).</p> +<p>Adhik. VI (12-14) is of special importance.—According to +<i>S</i>a@nkara the Sûtras now turn from the discussion of +the departure of him who possesses the lower knowledge only to the +consideration of what becomes of him who has reached the higher +knowledge. So far it has been taught that in the case of relative +immortality (ensuing on the apara vidyâ) the subtle elements, +together with the senses and so on, depart from the body of the +dying devotee; this implies at the same time that they do not +depart from the body of the dying sage who knows himself to be one +with Brahman.—Against this latter implied doctrine +Sûtra 12 is supposed to formulate an objection. 'If it be +said that the departure of the prâ<i>n</i>as from the body of +the dying sage is denied (viz. in B<i>ri</i>. Up. IV, 4, 5, na +tasya prâ<i>n</i>a utkrâmanti, of him the +prâ<i>n</i>as do not pass out); we reply that in that passage +the genitive "tasya" has the sense of the ablative "tasmât," +so that the sense of the passage is, "from him, i.e. from the +jîva of the dying sage, the prâ<i>n</i>as do not +depart, but remain with it."'—This objection <i>S</i>a@nkara +supposes to be disposed of in Sûtra 13. 'By some there is +given a clear denial of the departure of the prâ<i>n</i>as in +the case of the <span class="pagenum"><a name="pageintro-81" id= +"pageintro-81"></a>{Intro 81}</span> dying sage,' viz. in the +passage B<i>ri</i>. Up. III, 2, 11, where +Yâj<i>ñ</i>avalkya instructs Ârtabhâga +that, when this man dies, the prâ<i>n</i>as do not depart +from it (asmât; the context showing that asmât means +'from it,' viz. from the body, and not 'from him,' viz. the +jîva).—The same view is, moreover, confirmed by +Sm<i>ri</i>ti passages.</p> +<p>According to Râmânuja the three Sûtras forming +<i>S</i>a@nkara's sixth adhikara<i>n</i>a do not constitute a new +adhikara<i>n</i>a at all, and, moreover, have to be combined into +two Sûtras. The topic continuing to be discussed is the +utkrânti of the vidvân. If, Sûtra 12 says, the +utkrânti of the prâ<i>n</i>as is not admitted, on the +ground of the denial supposed to be contained in B<i>ri</i>. Up. +IV, 4, 5; the reply is that the sense of the tasya there is +'<i>s</i>ârîrât' (so that the passage means, +'from him, i.e. the jîva, the prâ<i>n</i>as do not +depart'); for this is clearly shown by the reading of some, viz. +the Mâdhyandinas, who, in their text of the passage, do not +read 'tasya' but 'tasmât.'—With reference to the +instruction given by Yâj<i>ñ</i>avalkya to +Ârtabhâga, it is to be remarked that nothing there +shows the 'ayam purusha' to be the sage who knows +Brahman.—And, finally, there are Sm<i>ri</i>ti passages +declaring that the sage also when dying departs from the body.</p> +<p>Adhik. VII and VIII (15, 16) teach, according to +<i>S</i>a@nkara, that, on the death of him who possesses the higher +knowledge, his prâ<i>n</i>as, elements, &c. are merged in +Brahman, so as to be no longer distinct from it in any way.</p> +<p>According to Râmânuja the two Sûtras continue +the teaching about the prâ<i>n</i>as, bhûtas, &c. +of the vidvân in general, and declare that they are finally +merged in Brahman, not merely in the way of conjunction +(sa<i>m</i>yoga), but completely.<a id="footnotetag21" name= +"footnotetag21"></a><a href="#footnote21"><sup>21</sup></a></p> +<p>Adhik. IX (17).—<i>S</i>a@nkara here returns to the owner +of the aparâ vidyâ, while Râmânuja +continues the description of the utkrânti of his +vidvân.—The jîva of the dying man <span class= +"pagenum"><a name="pageintro-82" id="pageintro-82"></a>{Intro +82}</span> passes into the heart, and thence departs out of the +body by means of the ná<i>d</i>is; the vidvân by means +of the nâ<i>d</i>i called sushum<i>n</i>â, the +avidvân by means of some other nâ<i>d</i>î.</p> +<p>Adhik. X (18, 19).—The departing soul passes up to the sun +by means of a ray of light which exists at night as well as during +day.</p> +<p>Adhik. XI (20, 21).—Also that vidvân who dies during +the dakshi<i>n</i>âyana reaches Brahman.</p> +<h4>PÂDA III.</h4> +<p>Adhik. I, II, III (1-3) reconcile the different accounts given +in the Upanishads as to the stations of the way which leads the +vidvân up to Brahman.</p> +<p>Adhik. IV (4-6)—By the 'stations' we have, however, to +understand not only the subdivisions of the way but also the divine +beings which lead the soul on.</p> +<p>The remaining part of the pâda is by <i>S</i>a@nkara +divided into two adhikara<i>n</i>as. Of these the former one (7-14) +teaches that the Brahman to which the departed soul is led by the +guardians of the path of the gods is not the highest Brahman, but +the effected (kârya) or qualified (<i>s</i>agu<i>n</i>a) +Brahman. This is the opinion propounded in Sûtras 7-11 by +Bâdari, and, finally, accepted by <i>S</i>a@nkara in his +commentary on Sûtra 14. In Sûtras 12-14 Jaimini defends +the opposite view, according to which the soul of the vidvân +goes to the highest Brahman, not to the kâryam brahma. But +Jaimini's view, although set forth in the latter part of the +adhikara<i>n</i>a, is, according to <i>S</i>a@nkara, a mere +pûrvapaksha, while Bâdari's opinion represents the +siddhânta.—The latter of the two adhikara<i>n</i>as (VI +of the whole pâda; 15, 16) records the opinion of +Bâdarâya<i>n</i>a on a collateral question, viz. +whether, or not, all those who worship the effected Brahman are led +to it. The decision is that those only are guided to Brahman who +have not worshipped it under a pratîka form.</p> +<p>According to Râmânuja, Sûtras 7-16 form one +adhikara<i>n</i>a only, in which the views of Bâdari and of +Jaimini represent two pûrvapakshas, while +Bâdarâya<i>n</i>a's opinion is adopted <span class= +"pagenum"><a name="pageintro-83" id="pageintro-83"></a>{Intro +83}</span> as the siddhânta. The question is whether the +guardians of the path lead to Brahman only those who worship the +effected Brahman, i.e. Hira<i>n</i>yagarbha, or those who worship +the highest Brahman, or those who worship the individual soul as +free from Prak<i>ri</i>ti, and having Brahman for its Self (ye +pratyagâtmâna<i>m</i> prak<i>ri</i>tiviyukta<i>m</i> +brahmâtmakam upâsate).—The first view is +maintained by Bâdari in Sûtra 7, 'The guardians lead to +Brahman those who worship the effected Brahman, because going is +possible towards the latter only;' for no movement can take place +towards the highest and as such omnipresent Brahman.—The +explanation of Sûtra 9 is similar to that of <i>S</i>a@nkara; +but more clearly replies to the objection (that, if +Hira<i>n</i>yagarbha were meant in the passage, 'purusho <i>s</i>a +mânava<i>h</i> sa etân brahma gamayati,' the text would +read 'sa etân brahmâ<i>n</i>am gamayati') that +Hira<i>n</i>yagarbha is called Brahman on account of his nearness +to Brahman, i.e. on account of his prathamajatva.—The +explanation of 10, 11 is essentially the same as in +<i>S</i>a@nkara; so also of l2-l4.—The siddhânta view +is established in Sûtra 13, 'It is the opinion of +Bâdarâya<i>n</i>a that it, i.e. the ga<i>n</i>a of the +guardians, leads to Brahman those who do not take their stand on +what is pratîka, i.e. those who worship the highest Brahman, +and those who meditate on the individual Self as dissociated from +prak<i>ri</i>ti, and having Brahman for its Self, but not those who +worship Brahman under pratîkas. For both views—that of +Jaimini as well as that of Bâdari—are faulty.' The +kârya view contradicts such passages as 'asmâ<i>k</i> +charîrât samutthâya para<i>m</i> jyotir +upasampadya,' &c.; the para view, such passages as that in the +pa<i>ñk</i>âgni-vidyâ, which declares that ya +ittha<i>m</i> vidu<i>h</i>, i.e. those who know the +pa<i>ñk</i>âgni-vidyâ, are also led up to +Brahman.</p> +<h4>PÂDA IV.</h4> +<p>Adhik. I (1-3) returns, according to <i>S</i>a@nkara, to the +owner of the parâ vidyâ, and teaches that, when on his +death his soul obtains final release, it does not acquire any new +characteristics, but merely manifests itself in its true +nature.—The explanation given by Râmânuja is +essentially <span class="pagenum"><a name="pageintro-84" id= +"pageintro-84"></a>{Intro 84}</span> the same, but of course refers +to that vidvân whose going to Brahman had been described in +the preceding pâda.</p> +<p>Adhik. II (4) determines that the relation in which the released +soul stands to Brahman is that of avibhâga, non-separation. +This, on <i>S</i>a@nkara's view, means absolute non-separation, +identity.—According to Râmânuja the question to +be considered is whether the released soul views itself as separate +(p<i>ri</i>thagbhûta) from Brahman, or as non-separate +because being a mode of Brahman. The former view is favoured by +those <i>S</i>ruti and Sm<i>ri</i>ti passages which speak of the +soul as being with, or equal to, Brahman; the latter by, such +passages as tat tvam asi and the like.<a id="footnotetag22" name= +"footnotetag22"></a><a href="#footnote22"><sup>22</sup></a></p> +<p>Adhik. III (5-7) discusses the characteristics of the released +soul (i.e. of the truly released soul, according to +<i>S</i>a@nkara). According to Jaimini the released soul, when +manifesting itself in its true nature, possesses all those +qualities which in Ch. Up. VIII, 7, 1 and other places are ascribed +to Brahman, such as apahatapâpmatva, satyasa<i>m</i>kalpatva, +&c., ai<i>s</i>varya.—According to Au<i>d</i>ulomi the +only characteristic of the released soul is +<i>k</i>aitanya.—According to Bâdarâyana the two +views can be combined (<i>S</i>a@nkara remarking that +satyasa<i>m</i>kalpatva, &c. are ascribed to the released soul +vyavahârâpekshayâ).</p> +<p>Adhik. IV (8-9) returns, according to <i>S</i>a@nkara, to the +aparâ vidyâ, and discusses the question whether the +soul of <span class="pagenum"><a name="pageintro-85" id= +"pageintro-85"></a>{Intro 85}</span> the pious effects its desires +by its mere determination, or uses some other means. The former +alternative is accepted—According to Râmânuja the +adhikara<i>n</i>a simply continues the consideration of the state +of the released, begun in the preceding adhikara<i>n</i>a. Of the +released soul it is said in Ch. Up. VIII, 12, 3 that after it has +manifested itself in its true nature it moves about playing and +rejoicing with women, carriages, and so on. The question then +arises whether it effects all this by its mere sa<i>m</i>kalpa (it +having been shown in the preceding adhikara<i>n</i>a that the +released soul is, like the Lord, satyasa<i>m</i>kalpa), or not. The +answer is in favour of the former alternative, on account of the +explicit declaration made in Ch. Up. VIII, 2, 'By his mere will the +fathers come to receive him.'</p> +<p>Adhik. V (10-14) decides that the released are embodied or +disembodied according to their wish and will.</p> +<p>Adhik. VI (11, 12) explains how the soul of the released can +animate several bodies at the same time.—Sûtra 12 +gives, according to <i>S</i>a@nkara, the additional explanation +that those passages which declare the absence of all specific +cognition on the part of the released soul do not refer to the +partly released soul of the devotee, but either to the soul in the +state of deep sleep (svâpyaya = sushupti), or to the fully +released soul of the sage (sampatti = +kaivalya).—Râmânuja explains that the passages +speaking of absence of consciousness refer either to the state of +deep sleep, or to the time of dying (sampatti = mata<i>n</i>am +according to 'vân manasi sampadyate,' &c.).</p> +<p>Adhik. VII (17-21).—The released jîvas participate +in all the perfections and powers of the Lord, with the exception +of the power of creating and sustaining the world. They do not +return to new forms of embodied existence.</p> +<p>After having, in this way, rendered ourselves acquainted with +the contents of the Brahma-sûtras according to the views of +<i>S</i>a@nkara as well as Râmânuja, we have now to +consider the question which of the two modes of interpretation +represents—or at any rate more closely approximates to the +true meaning of the Sûtras. That <span class= +"pagenum"><a name="pageintro-86" id="pageintro-86"></a>{Intro +86}</span> few of the Sûtras are intelligible if taken by +themselves, we have already remarked above; but this does not +exclude the possibility of our deciding with a fair degree of +certainty which of the two interpretations proposed agrees better +with the text, at least in a certain number of cases.</p> +<p>We have to note in the first place that, in spite of very +numerous discrepancies,—of which only the more important ones +have been singled out in the conspectus of contents,—the two +commentators are at one as to the general drift of the Sûtras +and the arrangement of topics. As a rule, the adhikara<i>n</i>as +discuss one or several Vedic passages bearing upon a certain point +of the system, and in the vast majority of cases the two +commentators agree as to which are the special texts referred to. +And, moreover, in a very large number of cases the agreement +extends to the interpretation to be put on those passages and on +the Sûtras. This far-reaching agreement certainly tends to +inspire us with a certain confidence as to the existence of an old +tradition concerning the meaning of the Sûtras on which the +bulk of the interpretations of <i>S</i>a@nkara as well as of +Râmânuja are based.</p> +<p>But at the same time we have seen that, in a not inconsiderable +number of cases, the interpretations of <i>S</i>a@nkara and +Râmânuja diverge more or less widely, and that the +Sûtras affected thereby are, most of them, especially +important because bearing on fundamental points of the +Vedânta system. The question then remains which of the two +interpretations is entitled to preference.</p> +<p>Regarding a small number of Sûtras I have already (in the +conspectus of contents) given it as my opinion that +Râmânuja's explanation appears to be more worthy of +consideration. We meet, in the first place, with a number of cases +in which the two commentators agree as to the literal meaning of a +Sûtra, but where <i>S</i>a@nkara sees himself reduced to the +necessity of supplementing his interpretation by certain additions +and reservations of his own for which the text gives no occasion, +while Râmânuja is able to take the Sûtra as it +stands. To exemplify this remark, I again direct attention to all +those Sûtras which in <span class="pagenum"><a name= +"pageintro-87" id="pageintro-87"></a>{Intro 87}</span> clear terms +represent the individual soul as something different from the +highest soul, and concerning which <i>S</i>a@nkara is each time +obliged to have recourse to the plea of the Sûtra referring, +not to what is true in the strict sense of the word, but only to +what is conventionally looked upon as true. It is, I admit, not +altogether impossible that <i>S</i>a@nkara's interpretation should +represent the real meaning of the Sûtras; that the latter, +indeed, to use the terms employed by Dr. Deussen, should for the +nonce set forth an exoteric doctrine adapted to the common notions +of mankind, which, however, can be rightly understood by him only +to whose mind the esoteric doctrine is all the while present. This +is not impossible, I say; but it is a point which requires +convincing proofs before it can be allowed.—We have had, in +the second place, to note a certain number of adhikara<i>n</i>as +and Sûtras concerning whose interpretation <i>S</i>a@nkara +and Râmânuja disagree altogether; and we have seen that +not unfrequently the explanations given by the latter commentator +appear to be preferable because falling in more easily with the +words of the text. The most striking instance of this is afforded +by the 13th adhikara<i>n</i>a of II, 3, which treats of the size of +the jîva, and where Râmânuja's explanation seems +to be decidedly superior to <i>S</i>a@nkara's, both if we look to +the arrangement of the whole adhikara<i>n</i>a and to the wording +of the single Sûtras. The adhikara<i>n</i>a is, moreover, a +specially important one, because the nature of the view held as to +the size of the individual soul goes far to settle the question +what kind of Vedânta is embodied in +Bâdarâya<i>n</i>a's work.</p> +<p>But it will be requisite not only to dwell on the +interpretations of a few detached Sûtras, but to make the +attempt at least of forming some opinion as to the relation of the +Vedânta-sûtras as a whole to the chief distinguishing +doctrines of <i>S</i>a@nkara as well as Râmânuja. Such +an attempt may possibly lead to very slender positive results; but +in the present state of the enquiry even a merely negative result, +viz. the conclusion that the Sûtras do not teach particular +doctrines found in them by certain commentators, will not be +without its value.</p> +<span class="pagenum"><a name="pageintro-88" id= +"pageintro-88"></a>{Intro 88}</span> +<p>The first question we wish to consider in some detail is whether +the Sûtras in any way favour <i>S</i>a@nkara's doctrine that +we have to distinguish a twofold knowledge of Brahman, a higher +knowledge which leads to the immediate absorption, on death, of the +individual soul in Brahman, and a lower knowledge which raises its +owner merely to an exalted form of individual existence. The +adhyâya first to be considered in this connexion is the +fourth one. According to <i>S</i>a@nkara the three latter +pâdas of that adhyâya are chiefly engaged in describing +the fate of him who dies in the possession of the lower knowledge, +while two sections (IV, 2, 12-14; IV, 4, 1-7) tell us what happens +to him who, before his death, had risen to the knowledge of the +highest Brahman. According to Râmânuja, on the other +hand, the three pâdas, referring throughout to one subject +only, give an uninterrupted account of the successive steps by +which the soul of him who knows the Lord through the Upanishads +passes, at the time of death, out of the gross body which it had +tenanted, ascends to the world of Brahman, and lives there for ever +without returning into the sa<i>m</i>sâra.</p> +<p>On an a priori view of the matter it certainly appears somewhat +strange that the concluding section of the Sûtras should be +almost entirely taken up with describing the fate of him who has +after all acquired an altogether inferior knowledge only, and has +remained shut out from the true sanctuary of Vedântic +knowledge, while the fate of the fully initiated is disposed of in +a few occasional Sûtras. It is, I think, not too much to say +that no unbiassed student of the Sûtras would—before +having allowed himself to be influenced by <i>S</i>a@nkara's +interpretations—imagine for a moment that the solemn words, +'From thence is no return, from thence is no return,' with which +the Sûtras conclude, are meant to describe, not the lasting +condition of him who has reached final release, the highest aim of +man, but merely a stage on the way of that soul which is engaged in +the slow progress of gradual release, a stage which is indeed +greatly superior to any earthly form of existence, but yet itself +belongs to the essentially fictitious sa<i>m</i>sâra, +<span class="pagenum"><a name="pageintro-89" id= +"pageintro-89"></a>{Intro 89}</span> and as such remains infinitely +below the bliss of true mukti. And this à priori +impression—which, although no doubt significant, could hardly +be appealed to as decisive—is confirmed by a detailed +consideration of the two sets of Sûtras which <i>S</i>a@nkara +connects with the knowledge of the higher Brahman. How these +Sûtras are interpreted by <i>S</i>a@nkara and +Râmânuja has been stated above in the conspectus of +contents; the points which render the interpretation given by +Râmânuja more probable are as follows. With regard to +IV, 2, 12-14, we have to note, in the first place, the +circumstance—relevant although not decisive in +itself—that Sûtra 12 does not contain any indication of +a new topic being introduced. In the second place, it can hardly be +doubted that the text of Sûtra 13, 'spash<i>t</i>o hy +ekeshâm,' is more appropriately understood, with +Râmânuja, as furnishing a reason for the opinion +advanced in the preceding Sûtra, than—with +<i>S</i>a@nkara—as embodying the refutation of a previous +statement (in which latter case we should expect not 'hi' but +'tu'). And, in the third place, the 'eke,' i.e. 'some,' referred to +in Sûtra 13 would, on <i>S</i>a@nkara's interpretation, +denote the very same persons to whom the preceding Sûtra had +referred, viz. the followers of the +Kâ<i>n</i>va-<i>s</i>âkhâ (the two Vedic passages +referred to in 12 and 13 being B<i>ri</i>. Up. IV, 4, 5, and III, +2, 11, according to the Kâ<i>n</i>va recension); while it is +the standing practice of the Sûtras to introduce, by means of +the designation 'eke,' members of Vedic <i>s</i>âkhâs, +teachers, &c. other than those alluded to in the preceding +Sûtras. With this practice Râmânuja's +interpretation, on the other hand, fully agrees; for, according to +him, the 'eke' are the Mâdhyandinas, whose reading in +B<i>ri</i>. Up. IV, 4, 5, viz. 'tasmât,' clearly indicates +that the 'tasya' in the corresponding passage of the +Kâ<i>n</i>vas denotes the <i>s</i>ârira, i.e. the +jîva. I think it is not saying too much that +<i>S</i>a@nkara's explanation, according to which the 'eke' would +denote the very same Kâ<i>n</i>vas to whom the preceding +Sûtra had referred—so that the Kâ<i>n</i>vas +would be distinguished from themselves as it were—is +altogether impossible.</p> +<p>The result of this closer consideration of the first set of +<span class="pagenum"><a name="pageintro-90" id= +"pageintro-90"></a>{Intro 90}</span> Sûtras, alleged by +<i>S</i>a@nkara to concern the owner of the higher knowledge of +Brahman, entitles us to view with some distrust <i>S</i>a@nkara's +assertion that another set also—IV, 4, 1-7—has to be +detached from the general topic of the fourth adhyâya, and to +be understood as depicting the condition of those who have obtained +final absolute release. And the Sûtras themselves do not tend +to weaken this preliminary want of confidence. In the first place +their wording also gives no indication whatever of their having to +be separated from what precedes as well as what follows. And, in +the second place, the last Sûtra of the set (7) obliges +<i>S</i>a@nkara to ascribe to his truly released souls qualities +which clearly cannot belong to them; so that he finally is obliged +to make the extraordinary statement that those qualities belong to +them 'vyavahârâpekshayâ,' while yet the purport +of the whole adhikara<i>n</i>a is said to be the description of the +truly released soul for which no vyavahâra exists! Very truly +<i>S</i>a@nkara's commentator here remarks, 'atra ke<i>k</i>in +muhyanti akha<i>n</i>da<i>k</i>inmâtrajânân +muktasyâjñânâbhâvât kuta +âj<i>ñ</i>ânika-dharmayoga<i>h</i>,' and the way +in which thereupon he himself attempts to get over the difficulty +certainly does not improve matters.</p> +<p>In connexion with the two passages discussed, we meet in the +fourth adhyâya with another passage, which indeed has no +direct bearing on the distinction of aparâ and parâ +vidyâ, but may yet be shortly referred to in this place as +another and altogether undoubted instance of <i>S</i>a@nkara's +interpretations not always agreeing with the text of the +Sûtras. The Sûtras 7-16 of the third pâda state +the opinions of three different teachers on the question to which +Brahman the soul of the vidvân repairs on death, +or—according to Râmânuja—the worshippers of +which Brahman repair to (the highest) Brahman. Râmânuja +treats the views of Bâdari and Jaimini as two +pûrvapakshas, and the opinion of +Bâdarâya<i>n</i>a—which is stated last—as +the siddhânta. <i>S</i>a@nkara, on the other hand, detaching +the Sûtras in which Bâdarâya<i>n</i>a's view is +set forth from the preceding part of the adhikara<i>n</i>a (a +proceeding which, although not <span class="pagenum"><a name= +"pageintro-91" id="pageintro-91"></a>{Intro 91}</span> plausible, +yet cannot be said to be altogether illegitimate), maintains that +Bâdari's view, which is expounded first, represents the +siddhânta, while Jaimini's view, set forth subsequently, is +to be considered a mere pûrvapaksha. This, of course, is +altogether inadmissible, it being the invariable practice of the +Vedânta-sûtras as well as the Pûrva +Mîmâ<i>m</i>sâ-sûtras to conclude the +discussion of contested points with the statement of that view +which is to be accepted as the authoritative one. This is so patent +that <i>S</i>a@nkara feels himself called upon to defend his +deviation from the general rule (Commentary on IV, 4, 13), without, +however, bringing forward any arguments but such as are valid only +if <i>S</i>a@nkara's system itself is already accepted.</p> +<p>The previous considerations leave us, I am inclined to think, no +choice but to side with Râmânuja as to the general +subject-matter of the fourth adhyâya of the Sûtras. We +need not accept him as our guide in all particular interpretations, +but we must acknowledge with him that the Sûtras of the +fourth adhyâya describe the ultimate fate of one and the same +vidvân, and do not afford any basis for the distinction of a +higher and lower knowledge of Brahman in <i>S</i>a@nkara's +sense.</p> +<p>If we have not to discriminate between a lower and a higher +knowledge of Brahman, it follows that the distinction of a lower +and a higher Brahman is likewise not valid. But this is not a point +to be decided at once on the negative evidence of the fourth +adhyâya, but regarding which the entire body of the +Vedânta-sûtras has to be consulted. And intimately +connected with this investigation—in fact, one with it from a +certain point of view—is the question whether the +Sûtras afford any evidence of their author having held the +doctrine of Mâyâ, the principle of illusion, by the +association with which the highest Brahman, in itself transcending +all qualities, appears as the lower Brahman or Î<i>s</i>vara. +That Râmânuja denies the distinction of the two +Brahmans and the doctrine of Mâyâ we have seen above; +we shall, however, in the subsequent investigation, pay less +attention to his views and interpretations <span class= +"pagenum"><a name="pageintro-92" id="pageintro-92"></a>{Intro +92}</span> than to the indications furnished by the Sûtras +themselves.</p> +<p>Placing myself at the point of view of a <i>S</i>a@nkara, I am +startled at the outset by the second Sûtra of the first +adhyâya, which undertakes to give a definition of Brahman. +'Brahman is that whence the origination and so on (i.e. the +sustentation and reabsorption) of this world proceed.' What, we +must ask, is this Sûtra meant to define?—That Brahman, +we are inclined to answer, whose cognition the first Sûtra +declares to constitute the task of the entire Vedânta; that +Brahman whose cognition is the only road to final release; that +Brahman in fact which <i>S</i>a@nkara calls the highest.—But, +here we must object to ourselves, the highest Brahman is not +properly defined as that from which the world originates. In later +Vedântic writings, whose authors were clearly conscious of +the distinction of the higher absolute Brahman and the lower +Brahman related to Mâyâ or the world, we meet with +definitions of Brahman of an altogether different type. I need only +remind the reader of the current definition of Brahman as +sa<i>k</i>-<i>k</i>id-ânanda, or, to mention one individual +instance, refer to the introductory <i>s</i>lokas of the +Pa<i>ñk</i>ada<i>s</i>î dilating on the sa<i>m</i>vid +svayam-prabhâ, the self-luminous principle of thought which +in all time, past or future, neither starts into being nor perishes +(P.D. I, 7). 'That from which the world proceeds' can by a +<i>S</i>a@nkara be accepted only as a definition of +Î<i>s</i>vara, of Brahman which by its association with +Mâyâ is enabled to project the false appearance of this +world, and it certainly is as improbable that the Sûtras +should open with a definition of that inferior principle, from +whose cognition there can accrue no permanent benefit, as, +according to a remark made above, it is unlikely that they should +conclude with a description of the state of those who know the +lower Brahman only, and thus are debarred from obtaining true +release. As soon, on the other hand, as we discard the idea of a +twofold Brahman and conceive Brahman as one only, as the +all-enfolding being which sometimes emits the world from its own +substance and sometimes again retracts it into itself, ever +remaining one in all its <span class="pagenum"><a name= +"pageintro-93" id="pageintro-93"></a>{Intro 93}</span> various +manifestations—a conception which need not by any means be +modelled in all its details on the views of the +Râmânujas—the definition of Brahman given in the +second Sûtra becomes altogether unobjectionable.</p> +<p>We next enquire whether the impression left on the mind by the +manner in which Bâdarâya<i>n</i>a defines Brahman, viz. +that he does not distinguish between an absolute Brahman and a +Brahman associated with Mâyâ, is confirmed or weakened +by any other parts of his work. The Sûtras being throughout +far from direct in their enunciations, we shall have to look less +to particular terms and turns of expression than to general lines +of reasoning. What in this connexion seems specially worthy of +being taken into account, is the style of argumentation employed by +the Sûtrakâra against the Sâ@nkhya doctrine, +which maintains that the world has originated, not from an +intelligent being, but from the non-intelligent pradhâna. The +most important Sûtras relative to this point are to be met +with in the first pâda of the second adhyâya. Those +Sûtras are indeed almost unintelligible if taken by +themselves, but the unanimity of the commentators as to their +meaning enables us to use them as steps in our investigation. The +sixth Sûtra of the pâda mentioned replies to the +Sâ@nkhya objection that the non-intelligent world cannot +spring from an intelligent principle, by the remark that 'it is +thus seen,' i.e. it is a matter of common observation that +non-intelligent things are produced from beings endowed with +intelligence; hair and nails, for instance, springing from animals, +and certain insects from dung.—Now, an argumentation of this +kind is altogether out of place from the point of view of the true +<i>S</i>â@nkara. According to the latter the non-intelligent +world does not spring from Brahman in so far as the latter is +intelligence, but in so far as it is associated with +Mâyâ. Mâyâ is the upâdâna of +the material world, and Mâyâ itself is of a +non-intelligent nature, owing to which it is by so many +Vedântic writers identified with the prak<i>ri</i>ti of the +Sâ@nkhyas. Similarly the illustrative instances, adduced +under Sûtra 9 for the purpose of showing that effects when +being reabsorbed into their causal substances <span class= +"pagenum"><a name="pageintro-94" id="pageintro-94"></a>{Intro +94}</span> do not impart to the latter their own qualities, and +that hence the material world also, when being refunded into +Brahman, does not impart to it its own imperfections, are +singularly inappropriate if viewed in connexion with the doctrine +of Mâyâ, according to which the material world is no +more in Brahman at the time of a pralaya than during the period of +its subsistence. According to <i>S</i>â@nkara the world is +not merged in Brahman, but the special forms into which the +upâdâna of the world, i.e. Mâyâ, had +modified itself are merged in non-distinct Mâyâ, whose +relation to Brahman is not changed thereby.—The illustration, +again, given in Sûtra 24 of the mode in which Brahman, by +means of its inherent power, transforms itself into the world +without employing any extraneous instruments of action, +'kshîravad dhi,' 'as milk (of its own accord turns into +curds),' would be strangely chosen indeed if meant to bring nearer +to our understanding the mode in which Brahman projects the +illusive appearance of the world; and also the analogous instance +given in the Sûtra next following, 'as Gods and the like +(create palaces, chariots, &c. by the mere power of their +will)'—which refers to the real creation of real +things—would hardly be in its place if meant to illustrate a +theory which considers unreality to be the true character of the +world. The mere cumulation of the two essentially heterogeneous +illustrative instances (kshîravad dhi; devâdivat), +moreover, seems to show that the writer who had recourse to them +held no very definite theory as to the particular mode in which the +world springs from Brahman, but was merely concerned to render +plausible in some way or other that an intelligent being can give +rise to what is non-intelligent without having recourse to any +extraneous means.<a id="footnotetag23" name= +"footnotetag23"></a><a href="#footnote23"><sup>23</sup></a></p> +<p>That the Mâyâ doctrine was not present to the mind +of the Sûtrakâra, further appears from the latter part +of the fourth pâda of the first adhyâya, where it is +shown that Brahman is not only the operative but also the material +cause of the world. If anywhere, there would have been <span class= +"pagenum"><a name="pageintro-95" id="pageintro-95"></a>{Intro +95}</span> the place to indicate, had such been the author's view, +that Brahman is the material cause of the world through +Mâyâ only, and that the world is unreal; but the +Sûtras do not contain a single word to that effect. +Sûtra 26, on the other hand, exhibits the significant term +'pari<i>n</i>âmât;' Brahman produces the world by means +of a modification of itself. It is well known that later on, when +the terminology of the Vedânta became definitely settled, the +term 'pari<i>n</i>âvada' was used to denote that very theory +to which the followers of <i>S</i>a@nkara are most violently +opposed, viz. the doctrine according to which the world is not a +mere vivarta, i.e. an illusory manifestation of Brahman, but the +effect of Brahman undergoing a real change, may that change be +conceived to take place in the way taught by Râmânuja +or in some other manner.—With regard to the last-quoted +Sûtra, as well as to those touched upon above, the +commentators indeed maintain that whatever terms and modes of +expression are apparently opposed to the vivartavâda are in +reality reconcilable with it; to Sûtra 26, for instance, +Govindânanda remarks that the term 'pari<i>n</i>âma' +only denotes an effect in general (kâryamâtra), without +implying that the effect is real. But in cases of this nature we +are fully entitled to use our own judgment, even if we were not +compelled to do so by the fact that other commentators, such as +Râmânuja, are satisfied to take 'pari<i>n</i>âma' +and similar terms in their generally received sense.</p> +<p>A further section treating of the nature of Brahman is met with +in III, 2, 11 ff. It is, according to <i>S</i>a@nkara's view, of +special importance, as it is alleged to set forth that Brahman is +in itself destitute of all qualities, and is affected with +qualities only through its limiting adjuncts (upâdhis), the +offspring of Mâyâ. I have above (in the conspectus of +contents) given a somewhat detailed abstract of the whole section +as interpreted by <i>S</i>a@nkara on the one hand, and +Râmânuja on the other hand, from which it appears that +the latter's opinion as to the purport of the group of Sûtras +widely diverges from that of <i>S</i>a@nkara. The wording of the +Sûtras is so eminently concise and vague that I find it +impossible to decide which of the two commentators—if +<span class="pagenum"><a name="pageintro-96" id= +"pageintro-96"></a>{Intro 96}</span> indeed either—is to be +accepted as a trustworthy guide; regarding the sense of some +Sûtras <i>S</i>a@nkara's explanation seems to deserve +preference, in the case of others Râmânuja seems to +keep closer to the text. I decidedly prefer, for instance, +Râmânuja's interpretation of Sûtra 22, as far as +the sense of the entire Sûtra is concerned, and more +especially with regard to the term +'prak<i>ri</i>taitâvattvam,' whose proper force is brought +out by Râmânuja's explanation only. So much is certain +that none of the Sûtras decidedly favours the interpretation +proposed by <i>S</i>a@nkara. Whichever commentator we follow, we +greatly miss coherence and strictness of reasoning, and it is thus +by no means improbable that the section is one of +those—perhaps not few in number—in which both +interpreters had less regard to the literal sense of the words and +to tradition than to their desire of forcing +Bâdarâya<i>n</i>a's Sûtras to bear testimony to +the truth of their own philosophic theories.</p> +<p>With special reference to the Mâyâ doctrine one +important Sûtra has yet to be considered, the only one in +which the term 'mâyâ' itself occurs, viz. III, 2, 3. +According to <i>S</i>a@nkara the Sûtra signifies that the +environments of the dreaming soul are not real but mere +Mâyâ, i.e. unsubstantial illusion, because they do not +fully manifest the character of real objects. Râmânuja +(as we have seen in the conspectus) gives a different explanation +of the term 'mâyâ,' but in judging of <i>S</i>a@nkara's +views we may for the time accept <i>S</i>a@nkara's own +interpretation. Now, from the latter it clearly follows that if the +objects seen in dreams are to be called Mâyâ, i.e. +illusion, because not evincing the characteristics of reality, the +objective world surrounding the waking soul must not be called +Mâyâ. But that the world perceived by waking men is +Mâyâ, even in a higher sense than the world presented +to the dreaming consciousness, is an undoubted tenet of the +<i>S</i>â@nkara Vedânta; and the Sûtra therefore +proves either that Bâdarâya<i>n</i>a did not hold the +doctrine of the illusory character of the world, or else that, if +after all he did hold that doctrine, he used the term +'mâyâ' in a sense altogether different from that +<span class="pagenum"><a name="pageintro-97" id= +"pageintro-97"></a>{Intro 97}</span> in which <i>S</i>a@nkara +employs it.—If, on the other hand, we, with +Râmânuja, understand the word 'mâyâ' to +denote a wonderful thing, the Sûtra of course has no bearing +whatever on the doctrine of Mâyâ in its later technical +sense.</p> +<p>We now turn to the question as to the relation of the individual +soul to Brahman. Do the Sûtras indicate anywhere that their +author held <i>S</i>a@nkara's doctrine, according to which the +jîva is in reality identical with Brahman, and separated from +it, as it were, only by a false surmise due to avidyâ, or do +they rather favour the view that the souls, although they have +sprung from Brahman, and constitute elements of its nature, yet +enjoy a kind of individual existence apart from it? This question +is in fact only another aspect of the Mâyâ question, +but yet requires a short separate treatment.</p> +<p>In the conspectus I have given it as my opinion that the +Sûtras in which the size of the individual soul is discussed +can hardly be understood in <i>S</i>a@nkara's sense, and rather +seem to favour the opinion, held among others by +Râmânuja, that the soul is of minute size. We have +further seen that Sûtra 18 of the third pâda of the +second adhyâya, which describes the soul as +'j<i>ñ</i>a,' is more appropriately understood in the sense +assigned to it by Râmânuja; and, again, that the +Sûtras which treat of the soul being an agent, can be +reconciled with <i>S</i>a@nkara's views only if supplemented in a +way which their text does not appear to authorise.—We next +have the important Sûtra II, 3, 43 in which the soul is +distinctly said to be a part (a<i>ms</i>a) of Brahman, and which, +as we have already noticed, can be made to fall in with +<i>S</i>a@nkara's views only if a<i>ms</i>a is explained, +altogether arbitrarily, by 'a<i>ms</i>a iva,' while +Râmânuja is able to take the Sûtra as it +stands.—We also have already referred to Sûtra 50, +'âbhâsa eva <i>k</i>a,' which <i>S</i>a@nkara +interprets as setting forth the so-called pratibimbavâda +according to which the individual Self is merely a reflection of +the highest Self. But almost every Sûtra—and +Sûtra 50 forms no exception—being so obscurely +expressed, that viewed by itself it admits of various, often +totally opposed, interpretations, the only safe method is to keep +in view, in the case of each ambiguous <span class= +"pagenum"><a name="pageintro-98" id="pageintro-98"></a>{Intro +98}</span> aphorism, the general drift and spirit of the whole +work, and that, as we have seen hitherto, is by no means favourable +to the pratibimba doctrine. How indeed could Sûtra 50, if +setting forth that latter doctrine, be reconciled with Sûtra +43, which says distinctly that the soul is a part of Brahman? For +that 43 contains, as <i>S</i>a@nkara and his commentators aver, a +statement of the ava<i>kkh</i>edavâda, can itself be accepted +only if we interpret a<i>ms</i>a by a<i>ms</i>a iva, and to do so +there is really no valid reason whatever. I confess that +Râmânuja's interpretation of the Sûtra (which +however is accepted by several other commentators also) does not +appear to me particularly convincing; and the Sûtras +unfortunately offer us no other passages on the ground of which we +might settle the meaning to be ascribed to the term +âbhâsa, which may mean 'reflection,' but may mean +hetvâbhâsa, i.e. fallacious argument, as well. But as +things stand, this one Sûtra cannot, at any rate, be appealed +to as proving that the pratibimbavâda which, in its turn, +presupposes the mâyâvâda, is the teaching of the +Sûtras.</p> +<p>To the conclusion that the Sûtrakâra did not hold +the doctrine of the absolute identity of the highest and the +individual soul in the sense of <i>S</i>a@nkara, we are further led +by some other indications to be met with here and there in the +Sûtras. In the conspectus of contents we have had occasion to +direct attention to the important Sûtra II, 1, 22, which +distinctly enunciates that the Lord is adhika, i.e. additional to, +or different from, the individual soul, since Scripture declares +the two to be different. Analogously I, 2, 20 lays stress on the +fact that the <i>s</i>ârîra is not the +antaryâmin, because the Mâdhyandinas, as well as the +Kâ<i>n</i>vas, speak of him in their texts as different +(bhedena enam adhîyate), and in 22 the +<i>s</i>ârîra and the pradhâna are referred to as +the two 'others' (itarau) of whom the text predicates distinctive +attributes separating them from the highest Lord. The word 'itara' +(the other one) appears in several other passages (I, 1, 16; I, 3, +16; II, 1, 21) as a kind of technical term denoting the individual +soul in contradistinction from the Lord. The <i>S</i>â@nkaras +indeed maintain that all those passages refer to an unreal +distinction <span class="pagenum"><a name="pageintro-99" id= +"pageintro-99"></a>{Intro 99}</span> due to avidyâ. But this +is just what we should like to see proved, and the proof offered in +no case amounts to more than a reference to the system which +demands that the Sûtras should be thus understood. If we +accept the interpretations of the school of <i>S</i>a@nkara, it +remains altogether unintelligible why the Sûtrakâra +should never hint even at what <i>S</i>a@nkara is anxious again and +again to point out at length, viz. that the greater part of the +work contains a kind of exoteric doctrine only, ever tending to +mislead the student who does not keep in view what its nature is. +If other reasons should make it probable that the +Sûtrakâra was anxious to hide the true doctrine of the +Upanishads as a sort of esoteric teaching, we might be more ready +to accept <i>S</i>a@nkara's mode of interpretation. But no such +reasons are forthcoming; nowhere among the avowed followers of the +<i>S</i>a@nkara system is there any tendency to treat the kernel of +their philosophy as something to be jealously guarded and hidden. +On the contrary, they all, from Gau<i>d</i>apâda down to the +most modern writer, consider it their most important, nay, only +task to inculcate again and again in the clearest and most +unambiguous language that all appearance of multiplicity is a vain +illusion, that the Lord and the individual souls are in reality +one, and that all knowledge but this one knowledge is without true +value.</p> +<p>There remains one more important passage concerning the relation +of the individual soul to the highest Self, a passage which +attracted our attention above, when we were reviewing the evidence +for early divergence of opinion among the teachers of the +Vedânta. I mean I, 4, 20-22, which three Sûtras state +the views of Â<i>s</i>marathya, Au<i>d</i>ulomi, and +Kâ<i>s</i>akr<i>ri</i>tsna as to the reason why, in a certain +passage of the B<i>ri</i>hadâra<i>n</i>yaka, characteristics +of the individual soul are ascribed to the highest Self. The +siddhânta view is enounced in Sûtra 22, 'avasthiter iti +Kâ<i>s</i>ak<i>ri</i>tsna<i>h</i>' i.e. +Kâ<i>s</i>ak<i>ri</i>tsna (accounts for the circumstance +mentioned) on the ground of the 'permanent abiding or abode.' By +this 'permanent abiding' <i>S</i>a@nkara understands the Lord's +abiding as, i.e. existing as—or in the condition of—the +individual soul, and thus sees in the Sûtra an enunciation +<span class="pagenum"><a name="pageintro-100" id= +"pageintro-100"></a>{Intro 100}</span> of his own view that the +individual soul is nothing but the highest Self, +'avik<i>ri</i>ta<i>h</i> parame<i>s</i>varo jîvo +nânya<i>h</i>.' Râmânuja on the other hand, +likewise accepting Kâ<i>s</i>ak<i>ri</i>tsna's opinion as the +siddhânta view, explains 'avasthiti' as the Lord's permanent +abiding within the individual soul, as described in the +antaryâmin-brâhma<i>n</i>a.—We can hardly +maintain that the term 'avasthiti' cannot have the meaning ascribed +to it by Sa@<i>n</i>kara, viz. special state or condition, but so +much must be urged in favour of Râmânuja's +interpretation that in the five other places where avasthiti (or +anavasthiti) is met with in the Sûtras (I, 2, 17; II, 2, 4; +II, 2, 13; II, 3, 24; III, 3, 32) it regularly means permanent +abiding or permanent abode within something.</p> +<p>If, now, I am shortly to sum up the results of the preceding +enquiry as to the teaching of the Sûtras, I must give it as +my opinion that they do not set forth the distinction of a higher +and lower knowledge of Brahman; that they do not acknowledge the +distinction of Brahman and Î<i>s</i>vara in <i>S</i>a@nkara's +sense; that they do not hold the doctrine of the unreality of the +world; and that they do not, with <i>S</i>a@nkara, proclaim the +absolute identity of the individual and the highest Self. I do not +wish to advance for the present beyond these negative results. Upon +Râmânuja's mode of interpretation—although I +accept it without reserve in some important details—I look on +the whole as more useful in providing us with a powerful means of +criticising <i>S</i>a@nkara's explanations than in guiding us +throughout to the right understanding of the text. The author of +the Sûtras may have held views about the nature of Brahman, +the world, and the soul differing from those of <i>S</i>a@nkara, +and yet not agreeing in all points with those of +Râmânuja. If, however, the negative conclusions stated +above should be well founded, it would follow even from them that +the system of Bâdarâya<i>n</i>a had greater affinities +with that of the Bhâgavatas and Râmanuja than with the +one of which the <i>S</i>a@nkara-bhâshya is the classical +exponent.</p> +<p>It appears from the above review of the teaching of the +Sûtras that only a comparatively very small proportion of +them contribute matter enabling us to form a judgment <span class= +"pagenum"><a name="pageintro-101" id="pageintro-101"></a>{Intro +101}</span> as to the nature of the philosophical doctrine +advocated by Bâdarâya<i>n</i>a. The reason of this is +that the greater part of the work is taken up with matters which, +according to <i>S</i>a@nkara's terminology, form part of the +so-called lower knowledge, and throw no light upon philosophical +questions in the stricter sense of the word. This circumstance is +not without significance. In later works belonging to +<i>S</i>a@nkara's school in which the distinction of a higher and +lower vidyâ is clearly recognised, the topics constituting +the latter are treated with great shortness; and rightly so, for +they are unable to accomplish the highest aim of man, i.e. final +release. When we therefore, on the other hand, find that the +subjects of the so-called lower vidyâ are treated very fully +in the Vedânta-sûtras, when we observe, for instance, +the almost tedious length to which the investigation of the unity +of vidyâs (most of which are so-called sagu<i>n</i>a, i.e. +lower vidyâs) is carried in the third adhyâya, or the +fact of almost the whole fourth adhyâya being devoted to the +ultimate fate of the possessor of the lower vidyâ; we +certainly feel ourselves confirmed in our conclusion that what +<i>S</i>a@nkara looked upon as comparatively unimportant formed in +Bâdarâya<i>n</i>a's opinion part of that knowledge +higher than which there is none, and which therefore is entitled to +the fullest and most detailed exposition.</p> +<p>The question as to what kind of system is represented by the +Vedânta-sûtras may be approached in another way also. +While hitherto we have attempted to penetrate to the meaning of the +Sûtras by means of the different commentaries, we might try +the opposite road, and, in the first place, attempt to ascertain +independently of the Sûtras what doctrine is set forth in the +Upanishads, whose teaching the Sûtras doubtless aim at +systematising. If, it might be urged, the Upanishads can be +convincingly shown to embody a certain settled doctrine, we must +consider it at the least highly probable that that very same +doctrine—of whatever special nature it may be—is hidden +in the enigmatical aphorisms of +Bâdarâya<i>n</i>a.<a id="footnotetag24" name= +"footnotetag24"></a><a href="#footnote24"><sup>24</sup></a></p> +<p>I do not, however, consider this line of argumentation +<span class="pagenum"><a name="pageintro-102" id= +"pageintro-102"></a>{Intro 102}</span> a safe one. Even if it could +be shown that the teaching of all the chief Upanishads agrees in +all essential points (a subject to which some attention will be +paid later on), we should not on that account be entitled +unhesitatingly to assume that the Sûtras set forth the same +doctrine. Whatever the true philosophy of the Upanishads may be, +there remains the undeniable fact that there exist and have existed +since very ancient times not one but several essentially differing +systems, all of which lay claim to the distinction of being the +true representatives of the teaching of the Upanishads as well as +of the Sûtras. Let us suppose, for argument's sake, that, for +instance, the doctrine of Mâyâ is distinctly enunciated +in the Upanishads; nevertheless Râmânuja and, for all +we know to the contrary, the whole series of more ancient +commentators on whom he looked as authorities in the interpretation +of the Sûtras, denied that the Upanishads teach +Mâyâ, and it is hence by no means impossible that +Bâdarâya<i>n</i>a should have done the same. The +à priori style of reasoning as to the teaching of the +Sûtras is therefore without much force.</p> +<p>But apart from any intention of arriving thereby at the meaning +of the Sûtras there, of course, remains for us the +all-important question as to the true teaching of the Upanishads, a +question which a translator of the Sûtras and <i>S</i>a@nkara +cannot afford to pass over in silence, especially after reason has +been shown for the conclusion that the Sûtras and the +<i>S</i>a@nkara-bhâshya do not agree concerning most +important points of Vedântic doctrine. The Sûtras as +well as the later commentaries claim, in the first place, to be +nothing more than systematisations of the Upanishads, and for us a +considerable part at least of their value and interest lies in this +their nature. Hence the further question presents itself by whom +the teaching of the Upanishads has been most adequately +systematised, whether by Bâdarâya<i>n</i>a, or +<i>S</i>a@nkara, or Râmânuja, or some other +commentator. This question requires to be kept altogether separate +from the enquiry as to which commentator most faithfully renders +the contents of the Sûtras, and it is by no means impossible +that <i>S</i>a@nkara, for instance, should in <span class= +"pagenum"><a name="pageintro-103" id="pageintro-103"></a>{Intro +103}</span> the end have to be declared a more trustworthy guide +with regard to the teaching of the Upanishads than concerning the +meaning of the Sûtras.</p> +<p>We must remark here at once that, whatever commentator may be +found to deserve preference on the whole, it appears fairly certain +already at the outset that none of the systems which Indian +ingenuity has succeeded in erecting on the basis of the Upanishads +can be accepted in its entirety. The reason for this lies in the +nature of the Upanishads themselves. To the Hindu commentator and +philosopher the Upanishads came down as a body of revealed truth +whose teaching had, somehow or other, to be shown to be thoroughly +consistent and free from contradictions; a system had to be devised +in which a suitable place could be allotted to every one of the +multitudinous statements which they make on the various points of +Vedântic doctrine. But to the European scholar, or in fact to +any one whose mind is not bound by the doctrine of <i>S</i>ruti, it +will certainly appear that all such attempts stand self-condemned. +If anything is evident even on a cursory review of the +Upanishads—and the impression so created is only strengthened +by a more careful investigation—it is that they do not +constitute a systematic whole. They themselves, especially the +older ones, give the most unmistakable indications on that point. +Not only are the doctrines expounded in the different Upanishads +ascribed to different teachers, but even the separate sections of +one and the same Upanishad are assigned to different authorities. +It would be superfluous to quote examples of what a mere look at +the Chândogya Upanishad, for instance, suffices to prove. It +is of course not impossible that even a multitude of teachers +should agree in imparting precisely the same doctrine; but in the +case of the Upanishads that is certainly not antecedently probable. +For, in the first place, the teachers who are credited with the +doctrines of the Upanishads manifestly belonged to different +sections of Brahminical society, to different Vedic +<i>s</i>âkhâs; nay, some of them the tradition makes +out to have been kshattriyas. And, in the second place, the period, +whose <span class="pagenum"><a name="pageintro-104" id= +"pageintro-104"></a>{Intro 104}</span> mental activity is +represented in the Upanishads, was a creative one, and as such +cannot be judged according to the analogy of later periods of +Indian philosophic development. The later philosophic schools as, +for instance, the one of which <i>S</i>a@nkara is the great +representative, were no longer free in their speculations, but +strictly bound by a traditional body of texts considered sacred, +which could not be changed or added to, but merely systematised and +commented upon. Hence the rigorous uniformity of doctrine +characteristic of those schools. But there had been a time when, +what later writers received as a sacred legacy, determining and +confining the whole course of their speculations, first sprang from +the minds of creative thinkers not fettered by the tradition of any +school, but freely following the promptings of their own heads and +hearts. By the absence of school traditions, I do not indeed mean +that the great teachers who appear in the Upanishads were free to +make an entirely new start, and to assign to their speculations any +direction they chose; for nothing can be more certain than that, at +the period as the outcome of whose philosophical activity the +Upanishads have to be considered, there were in circulation certain +broad speculative ideas overshadowing the mind of every member of +Brahminical society. But those ideas were neither very definite nor +worked out in detail, and hence allowed themselves to be handled +and fashioned in different ways by different individuals. With whom +the few leading conceptions traceable in the teaching of all +Upanishads first originated, is a point on which those writings +themselves do not enlighten us, and which we have no other means +for settling; most probably they are to be viewed not as the +creation of any individual mind, but as the gradual outcome of +speculations carried on by generations of Vedic theologians. In the +Upanishads themselves, at any rate, they appear as floating mental +possessions which may be seized and moulded into new forms by any +one who feels within himself the required inspiration. A certain +vague knowledge of Brahman, the great hidden being in which all +this manifold world is one, seems to be <span class= +"pagenum"><a name="pageintro-105" id="pageintro-105"></a>{Intro +105}</span> spread everywhere, and often issues from the most +unexpected sources. <i>S</i>vetaketu receives instruction from his +father Uddâlaka; the proud Gârgya has to become the +pupil of Ajâta<i>s</i>atru, the king of +Kâ<i>s</i>î; Bhujyu Sâhyâyani receives +answers to his questions from a Gandharva possessing a maiden; +Satyakâma learns what Brahman is from the bull of the herd he +is tending, from Agni and from a flamingo; and Upako<i>s</i>ala is +taught by the sacred fires in his teacher's house. All this is of +course legend, not history; but the fact that the philosophic and +theological doctrines of the Upanishads are clothed in this +legendary garb certainly does not strengthen the expectation of +finding in them a rigidly systematic doctrine.</p> +<p>And a closer investigation of the contents of the Upanishads +amply confirms this preliminary impression. If we avail ourselves, +for instance, of M. Paul Régnaud's Matériaux pour +servir à l'Histoire de la Philosophie de l'Inde, in which +the philosophical lucubrations of the different Upanishads are +arranged systematically according to topics, we can see with ease +how, together with a certain uniformity of general leading +conceptions, there runs throughout divergence in details, and very +often not unimportant details. A look, for instance, at the +collection of passages relative to the origination of the world +from the primitive being, suffices to show that the task of +demonstrating that whatever the Upanishads teach on that point can +be made to fit into a homogeneous system is an altogether hopeless +one. The accounts there given of the creation belong, beyond all +doubt to different stages of philosophic and theological +development or else to different sections of priestly society. None +but an Indian commentator would, I suppose, be inclined and +sufficiently courageous to attempt the proof that, for instance, +the legend of the âtman purushavidha, the Self in the shape +of a person which is as large as man and woman together, and then +splits itself into two halves from which cows, horses, asses, +goats, &c. are produced in succession (B<i>ri</i>. Up. I, 1, +4), can be reconciled with the account given of the creation in the +Chândogya Upanishad, where it is said that in the beginning +there existed nothing but the sat, <span class="pagenum"><a name= +"pageintro-106" id="pageintro-106"></a>{Intro 106}</span> 'that +which is,' and that feeling a desire of being many it emitted out +of itself ether, and then all the other elements in due succession. +The former is a primitive cosmogonic myth, which in its details +shows striking analogies with the cosmogonic myths of other +nations; the latter account is fairly developed Vedânta +(although not Vedânta implying the Mâyâ +doctrine). We may admit that both accounts show a certain +fundamental similarity in so far as they derive the manifold world +from one original being; but to go beyond this and to maintain, as +<i>S</i>a@nkara does, that the âtman purushavidha of the +B<i>ri</i>hadâra<i>n</i>yaka is the so-called Virâg of +the latter Vedânta—implying thereby that that section +consciously aims at describing only the activity of one special +form of Î<i>s</i>vara, and not simply the whole process of +creation—is the ingenious shift of an orthodox commentator in +difficulties, but nothing more.</p> +<p>How all those more or less conflicting texts came to be +preserved and handed down to posterity, is not difficult to +understand. As mentioned above, each of the great sections of +Brahminical priesthood had its own sacred texts, and again in each +of those sections there existed more ancient texts which it was +impossible to discard when deeper and more advanced speculations +began in their turn to be embodied in literary compositions, which +in the course of time likewise came to be looked upon as sacred. +When the creative period had reached its termination, and the task +of collecting and arranging was taken in hand, older and newer +pieces were combined into wholes, and thus there arose collections +of such heterogeneous character as the Chândogya and +B<i>ri</i>hadâra<i>n</i>yaka Upanishads. On later +generations, to which the whole body of texts came down as revealed +truth, there consequently devolved the inevitable task of +establishing systems on which no exception could be taken to any of +the texts; but that the task was, strictly speaking, an impossible +one, i.e. one which it was impossible to accomplish fairly and +honestly, there really is no reason to deny.</p> +<p>For a comprehensive criticism of the methods which the different +commentators employ in systematizing the contents <span class= +"pagenum"><a name="pageintro-107" id="pageintro-107"></a>{Intro +107}</span> of the Upanishads there is no room in this place. In +order, however, to illustrate what is meant by the 'impossibility,' +above alluded to, of combining the various doctrines of the +Upanishads into a whole without doing violence to a certain number +of texts, it will be as well to analyse in detail some few at least +of <i>S</i>a@nkara's interpretations, and to render clear the +considerations by which he is guided.</p> +<p>We begin with a case which has already engaged our attention +when discussing the meaning of the Sûtras, viz. the question +concerning the ultimate fate of those who have attained the +knowledge of Brahman. As we have seen, <i>S</i>a@nkara teaches that +the soul of him who has risen to an insight into the nature of the +higher Brahman does not, at the moment of death, pass out of the +body, but is directly merged in Brahman by a process from which all +departing and moving, in fact all considerations of space, are +altogether excluded. The soul of him, on the other hand, who has +not risen above the knowledge of the lower qualified Brahman +departs from the body by means of the artery called +sushum<i>n</i>â, and following the so-called devayâna, +the path of the gods, mounts up to the world of Brahman. A review +of the chief Upanishad texts on which <i>S</i>a@nkara founds this +distinction will show how far it is justified.</p> +<p>In a considerable number of passages the Upanishads contrast the +fate of two classes of men, viz. of those who perform sacrifices +and meritorious works only, and of those who in addition possess a +certain kind of knowledge. Men of the former kind ascend after +death to the moon, where they live for a certain time, and then +return to the earth into new forms of embodiment; persons of the +latter kind proceed on the path of the gods—on which the sun +forms one stage—up to the world of Brahman, from which there +is no return. The chief passages to that effect are Ch. Up. V, 10; +Kaush. Up. I, 2 ff.; Mu<i>nd</i>. Up. I, 2, 9 ff.; B<i>ri</i>. Up. +VI, 2, 15 ff.; Pra<i>s</i>na Up. I, 9 ff.—In other passages +only the latter of the two paths is referred to, cp. Ch. Up. IV, +15; VIII 6, 5; Taitt. Up. I, 6; B<i>ri</i>. Up. IV, 4, 8, 9; V, 10; +Maitr. Up. VI, 30, to mention only the more important ones.</p> +<p>Now an impartial consideration of those passages shows +<span class="pagenum"><a name="pageintro-108" id= +"pageintro-108"></a>{Intro 108}</span> I think, beyond any doubt, +that what is meant there by the knowledge which leads through the +sun to the world of Brahman is the highest knowledge of which the +devotee is capable, and that the world of Brahman to which his +knowledge enables him to proceed denotes the highest state which he +can ever reach, the state of final release, if we choose to call it +by that name.—Ch. Up. V, 10 says, 'Those who know this (viz. +the doctrine of the five fires), and those who in the forest follow +faith and austerities go to light,' &c.—Ch. Up. IV, 15 is +manifestly intended to convey the true knowledge of Brahman; +Upako<i>s</i>ala's teacher himself represents the instruction given +by him as superior to the teaching of the sacred fires.—Ch. +Up. VIII, 6, 5 quotes the old <i>s</i>loka which says that the man +moving upwards by the artery penetrating the crown of the head +reaches the Immortal.—Kaush. Up. I, 2—which gives the +most detailed account of the ascent of the soul—contains no +intimation whatever of the knowledge of Brahman, which leads up to +the Brahman world, being of an inferior nature.—Mu<i>nd</i>. +Up. I, 2, 9 agrees with the Chândogya in saying that 'Those +who practise penance and faith in the forest, tranquil, wise, and +living on alms, depart free from passion, through the sun, to where +that immortal Person dwells whose nature is imperishable,' and +nothing whatever in the context countenances the assumption that +not the highest knowledge and the highest Person are there referred +to.—B<i>ri</i>. Up. IV, 4, 8 quotes old <i>s</i>lokas clearly +referring to the road of the gods ('the small old path'), on which +'sages who know Brahman move on to the svargaloka and thence higher +on as entirely free.—That path was found by Brahman, and on +it goes whoever knows Brahman.'—B<i>ri</i>. Up. VI, 2, 15 is +another version of the Pa<i>ñk</i>âgnividyâ, +with the variation, 'Those who know this, and those who in the +forest worship faith and the True, go to light,' +&c.—Pra<i>s</i>na Up. 1, 10 says, 'Those who have sought +the Self by penance, abstinence, faith, and knowledge gain by the +northern path Âditya, the sun. There is the home of the +spirits, the immortal free from danger, the highest. From thence +they do not return, for it is the end.'—Maitr. Up. VI, 30 +quotes <span class="pagenum"><a name="pageintro-109" id= +"pageintro-109"></a>{Intro 109}</span> <i>s</i>lokas, 'One of them +(the arteries) leads upwards, piercing the solar orb: by it, having +stepped beyond the world of Brahman, they go to the highest +path.'</p> +<p>All these passages are as clear as can be desired. The soul of +the sage who knows Brahman passes out by the sushum<i>n</i>â, +and ascends by the path of the gods to the world of Brahman, there +to remain for ever in some blissful state. But, according to +<i>S</i>a@nkara, all these texts are meant to set forth the result +of a certain inferior knowledge only, of the knowledge of the +conditioned Brahman. Even in a passage apparently so entirely +incapable of more than one interpretation as B<i>ri</i>. Up. VI, 2, +15, the 'True,' which the holy hermits in the forest are said to +worship, is not to be the highest Brahman, but only +Hira<i>n</i>yagarbha!—And why?—Only because the system +so demands it, the system which teaches that those who know the +highest Brahman become on their death one with it, without having +to resort to any other place. The passage on which this latter +tenet is chiefly based is B<i>ri</i>. Up. IV, 4, 6, 7, where, with +the fate of him who at his death has desires, and whose soul +therefore enters a new body after having departed from the old one, +accompanied by all the prâ<i>n</i>as, there is contrasted the +fate of the sage free from all desires. 'But as to the man who does +not desire, who not desiring, freed from desires is satisfied in +his desires, or desires the Self only, the vital spirits of him +(tasya) do not depart—being Brahman he goes to Brahman.'</p> +<p>We have seen above (p. lxxx) that this passage is referred to in +the important Sûtras on whose right interpretation it, in the +first place, depends whether or not we must admit the +Sûtrakâra to have acknowledged the distinction of a +parâ and an aparâ vidyâ. Here the passage +interests us as throwing light on the way in which <i>S</i>a@nkara +systematises. He looks on the preceding part of the chapter as +describing what happens to the souls of all those who do not know +the highest Brahman, inclusive of those who know the lower Brahman +only. They pass out of the old bodies followed by all +prâ<i>n</i>as and enter new bodies. He, on the other hand, +section 6 continues, who knows the true Brahman, does not pass out +of the body, but becomes one with Brahman then <span class= +"pagenum"><a name="pageintro-110" id="pageintro-110"></a>{Intro +110}</span> and there. This interpretation of the purport of the +entire chapter is not impossibly right, although I am rather +inclined to think that the chapter aims at setting forth in its +earlier part the future of him who does not know Brahman at all, +while the latter part of section 6 passes on to him who does know +Brahman (i.e. Brahman pure and simple, the text knowing of no +distinction of the so-called lower and higher Brahman). In +explaining section 6 <i>S</i>a@nkara lays stress upon the clause +'na tasya prâ<i>n</i>a utkrâmanti,' 'his vital spirits +do not pass out,' taking this to signify that the soul with the +vital spirits does not move at all, and thus does not ascend to the +world of Brahman; while the purport of the clause may simply be +that the soul and vital spirits do not go anywhere else, i.e. do +not enter a new body, but are united, somehow or other, with +Brahman. On <i>S</i>a@nkara's interpretation there immediately +arises a new difficulty. In the <i>s</i>lokas, quoted under +sections 8 and 9, the description of the small old path which leads +to the svargaloka and higher on clearly refers—as noticed +already above—to the path through the veins, primarily the +sushum<i>n</i>â, on which, according to so many other +passages, the soul of the wise mounts upwards. But that path is, +according to <i>S</i>a@nkara, followed by him only who has not +risen above the lower knowledge, and yet the <i>s</i>lokas have +manifestly to be connected with what is said in the latter half of +6 about the owner of the parâ vidyâ. Hence +<i>S</i>a@nkara sees himself driven to explain the <i>s</i>lokas in +8 and 9 (of which a faithful translation is given in Professor Max +Müller's version) as follows:</p> +<p>8. 'The subtle old path (i.e. the path of knowledge on which +final release is reached; which path is subtle, i.e. difficult to +know, and old, i.e. to be known from the eternal Veda) has been +obtained and fully reached by me. On it the sages who know Brahman +reach final release (svargaloka<i>s</i>abda<i>h</i> +samnihitaprakara<i>n</i>ât +mokshâbhidhâyaka<i>h</i>).</p> +<p>9. 'On that path they say that there is white or blue or yellow +or green or red (i.e. others maintain that the path to final +release is, in accordance with the colour of the arteries, either +white or blue, &c.; but that is false, for the <span class= +"pagenum"><a name="pageintro-111" id="pageintro-111"></a>{Intro +111}</span> paths through the arteries lead at the best to the +world of Brahman, which itself forms part of the +sa<i>m</i>sâra); that path (i.e. the only path to release, +viz. the path of true knowledge) is found by Brahman, i.e. by such +Brâhma<i>n</i>as as through true knowledge have become like +Brahman,' &c.</p> +<p>A significant instance in truth of the straits to which +thorough-going systematisers of the Upanishads see themselves +reduced occasionally!</p> +<p>But we return to the point which just now chiefly interests us. +Whether <i>S</i>a@nkara's interpretation of the chapter, and +especially of section 6, be right or wrong, so much is certain that +we are not entitled to view all those texts which speak of the soul +going to the world of Brahman as belonging to the so-called lower +knowledge, because a few other passages declare that the sage does +not go to Brahman. The text which declares the sage free from +desires to become one with Brahman could not, without due +discrimination, be used to define and limit the meaning of other +passages met with in the same Upanishad even—for as we have +remarked above the B<i>ri</i>hadâra<i>n</i>yaka contains +pieces manifestly belonging to different stages of +development;—much less does it entitle us to put arbitrary +constructions on passages forming part of other Upanishads. +Historically the disagreement of the various accounts is easy to +understand. The older notion was that the soul of the wise man +proceeds along the path of the gods to Brahman's abode. A +later—and, if we like, more philosophic—conception is +that, as Brahman already is a man's Self, there is no need of any +motion on man's part to reach Brahman. We may even apply to those +two views the terms aparâ and parâ—lower and +higher—knowledge. But we must not allow any commentator to +induce us to believe that what he from his advanced standpoint +looks upon as an inferior kind of cognition, was viewed in the same +light by the authors of the Upanishads.</p> +<p>We turn to another Upanishad text likewise touching upon the +point considered in what precedes, viz. the second +Brâhma<i>n</i>a of the third adhyâya of the +B<i>ri</i>hadâra<i>n</i>yaka. The discussion there first +turns upon the grahas and atigrahas, <span class="pagenum"><a name= +"pageintro-112" id="pageintro-112"></a>{Intro 112}</span> i.e. the +senses and organs and their objects, and Yâjñavalkya +thereupon explains that death, by which everything is overcome, is +itself overcome by water; for death is fire. The colloquy then +turns to what we must consider an altogether new topic, +Ârtabhâga asking, 'When this man (ayam purusha) dies, +do the vital spirits depart from him or not?' and +Yâjñavalkya answering, 'No, they are gathered up in +him; he swells, he is inflated; inflated the dead (body) is +lying.'—Now this is for <i>S</i>a@nkara an important passage, +as we have already seen above (p. lxxxi); for he employs it, in his +comment on Ved.-sûtra IV, 2, 13, for the purpose of proving +that the passage B<i>ri</i>. Up. IV, 4, 6 really means that the +vital spirits do not, at the moment of death, depart from the true +sage. Hence the present passage also must refer to him who +possesses the highest knowledge; hence the 'ayam purusha' must be +'that man,' i.e. the man who possesses the highest knowledge, and +the highest knowledge then must be found in the preceding clause +which says that death itself may be conquered by water. But, as +Râmânuja also remarks, neither does the context favour +the assumption that the highest knowledge is referred to, nor do +the words of section 11 contain any indication that what is meant +is the merging of the Self of the true Sage in Brahman. With the +interpretation given by Râmânuja himself, viz. that the +prâ<i>n</i>as do not depart from the jîva of the dying +man, but accompany it into a new body, I can agree as little +(although he no doubt rightly explains the 'ayam purusha' by 'man' +in general), and am unable to see in the passage anything more than +a crude attempt to account for the fact that a dead body appears +swollen and inflated.—A little further on (section 13) +Ârtabhâga asks what becomes of this man (ayam purusha) +when his speech has entered into the fire, his breath into the air, +his eye into the sun, &c. So much here is clear that we have no +right to understand by the 'ayam purusha' of section 13 anybody +different from the 'ayam purusha' of the two preceding sections; in +spite of this <i>S</i>a@nkara—according to whose system the +organs of the true sage do not enter into the elements, but are +directly <span class="pagenum"><a name="pageintro-113" id= +"pageintro-113"></a>{Intro 113}</span> merged in +Brahman—explains the 'ayam purusha' of section 13 to be the +'asa<i>m</i>yagdar<i>s</i>in,' i.e. the person who has not risen to +the cognition of the highest Brahman. And still a further limiting +interpretation is required by the system. The +asa<i>m</i>yagdar<i>s</i>in also—who as such has to remain in +the sa<i>m</i>sâra—cannot do without the organs, since +his jîva when passing out of the old body into a new one is +invested with the subtle body; hence section 13 cannot be taken as +saying what it clearly does say, viz. that at death the different +organs pass into the different elements, but as merely indicating +that the organs are abandoned by the divinities which, during +lifetime, presided over them!</p> +<p>The whole third adhyâya indeed of the +B<i>ri</i>hadâra<i>n</i>yaka affords ample proof of the +artificial character of <i>S</i>a@nkara's attempts to show that the +teaching of the Upanishads follows a definite system. The eighth +brâhma<i>n</i>a, for instance, is said to convey the doctrine +of the highest non-related Brahman, while the preceding +brâhma<i>n</i>as had treated only of Î<i>s</i>vara in +his various aspects. But, as a matter of fact, +brâhma<i>n</i>a 8, after having, in section 8, represented +Brahman as destitute of all qualities, proceeds, in the next +section, to describe that very same Brahman as the ruler of the +world, 'By the command of that Imperishable sun and moon stand +apart,' &c.; a clear indication that the author of the +Upanishad does not distinguish a higher and lower Brahman +in—<i>S</i>a@nkara's sense.—The preceding +brâhma<i>n</i>a (7) treats of the antaryâmin, i.e. +Brahman viewed as the internal ruler of everything. This, according +to <i>S</i>a@nkara, is the lower form of Brahman called +Î<i>s</i>vara; but we observe that the antaryâmin as +well as the so-called highest Brahman described in section 8 is, at +the termination of the two sections, characterised by means of the +very same terms (7, 23: Unseen but seeing, unheard but hearing, +&c. There is no other seer but he, there is no other hearer but +he, &c.; and 8, 11: That Brahman is unseen but seeing, unheard +but hearing, &c. There is nothing that sees but it, nothing +that hears but it, &c.).—Nothing can be clearer than that +all these sections aim at describing one and the same being, and +know nothing of the distinctions made by the developed <span class= +"pagenum"><a name="pageintro-114" id="pageintro-114"></a>{Intro +114}</span> Vedânta, however valid the latter may be from a +purely philosophic point of view.</p> +<p>We may refer to one more similar instance from the +Chândogya Upanishad. We there meet in III, 14 with one of the +most famous vidyâs describing the nature of Brahman, called +after its reputed author the Sâ<i>nd</i>ilya-vidyâ. +This small vidyâ is decidedly one of the finest and most +characteristic texts; it would be difficult to point out another +passage setting forth with greater force and eloquence and in an +equally short compass the central doctrine of the Upanishads. Yet +this text, which, beyond doubt, gives utterance to the highest +conception of Brahman's nature that Sâ<i>nd</i>ilya's thought +was able to reach, is by <i>S</i>a@nkara and his school again +declared to form part of the lower vidyâ only, because it +represents Brahman as possessing qualities. It is, according to +their terminology, not j<i>ñ</i>âna, i.e. knowledge, +but the injunction of a mere upâsanâ, a devout +meditation on Brahman in so far as possessing certain definite +attributes such as having light for its form, having true thoughts, +and so on. The Râmânujas, on the other hand, quote this +text with preference as clearly describing the nature of their +highest, i.e. their one Brahman. We again allow that +<i>S</i>a@nkara is free to deny that any text which ascribes +qualities to Brahman embodies absolute truth; but we also again +remark that there is no reason whatever for supposing that +Sâ<i>nd</i>ilya, or whoever may have been the author of that +vidyâ, looked upon it as anything else but a statement of the +highest truth accessible to man.</p> +<p>We return to the question as to the true philosophy of the +Upanishads, apart from the systems of the commentators.—From +what precedes it will appear with sufficient distinctness that, if +we understand by philosophy a philosophical system coherent in all +its parts, free from all contradictions and allowing room for all +the different statements made in all the chief Upanishads, a +philosophy of the Upanishads cannot even be spoken of. The various +lucubrations on Brahman, the world, and the human soul of which the +Upanishads consist do not allow themselves to be systematised +simply because they were never meant to <span class= +"pagenum"><a name="pageintro-115" id="pageintro-115"></a>{Intro +115}</span> form a system. <i>S</i>â<i>nd</i>ilya's views as +to the nature of Brahman did not in all details agree with those of +Yâj<i>ñ</i>avalkya, and Uddâlaka differed from +both. In this there is nothing to wonder at, and the burden of +proof rests altogether with those who maintain that a large number +of detached philosophic and theological dissertations, ascribed to +different authors, doubtless belonging to different periods, and +not seldom manifestly contradicting each other, admit of being +combined into a perfectly consistent whole.</p> +<p>The question, however, assumes a different aspect, if we take +the terms 'philosophy' and 'philosophical system,' not in the +strict sense in which <i>S</i>a@nkara and other commentators are +not afraid of taking them, but as implying merely an agreement in +certain fundamental features. In this latter sense we may indeed +undertake to indicate the outlines of a philosophy of the +Upanishads, only keeping in view that precision in details is not +to be aimed at. And here we finally see ourselves driven back +altogether on the texts themselves, and have to acknowledge that +the help we receive from commentators, to whatever school they may +belong, is very inconsiderable. Fortunately it cannot be asserted +that the texts on the whole oppose very serious difficulties to a +right understanding, however obscure the details often are. +Concerning the latter we occasionally depend entirely on the +explanations vouchsafed by the scholiasts, but as far as the +general drift and spirit of the texts are concerned, we are quite +able to judge by ourselves, and are even specially qualified to do +so by having no particular system to advocate.</p> +<p>The point we will first touch upon is the same from which we +started when examining the doctrine of the Sûtras, viz. the +question whether the Upanishads acknowledge a higher and lower +knowledge in <i>S</i>a@nkara's sense, i.e. a knowledge of a higher +and a lower Brahman. Now this we find not to be the case. Knowledge +is in the Upanishads frequently opposed to avîdyâ, by +which latter term we have to understand ignorance as to Brahman, +absence of philosophic knowledge; and, again, in several places we +find the knowledge of the sacrificial part of the Veda with its +supplementary <span class="pagenum"><a name="pageintro-116" id= +"pageintro-116"></a>{Intro 116}</span> disciplines contrasted as +inferior with the knowledge of the Self; to which latter +distinction the Mu<i>nd</i>aka Up. (I, 4) applies the terms +aparâ and parâ vîdyâ. But a formal +recognition of the essential difference of Brahman being viewed, on +the one hand, as possessing distinctive attributes, and, on the +other hand, as devoid of all such attributes is not to be met with +anywhere. Brahman is indeed sometimes described as sagu<i>n</i>a +and sometimes as nirgu<i>n</i>a (to use later terms); but it is +nowhere said that thereon rests a distinction of two different +kinds of knowledge leading to altogether different results. The +knowledge of Brahman is one, under whatever aspects it is viewed; +hence the circumstance (already exemplified above) that in the same +vidyâs it is spoken of as sagu<i>n</i>a as well as +nirgu<i>n</i>a. When the mind of the writer dwells on the fact that +Brahman is that from which all this world originates, and in which +it rests, he naturally applies to it distinctive attributes +pointing at its relation to the world; Brahman, then, is called the +Self and life of all, the inward ruler, the omniscient Lord, and so +on. When, on the other hand, the author follows out the idea that +Brahman may be viewed in itself as the mysterious reality of which +the whole expanse of the world is only an outward manifestation, +then it strikes him that no idea or term derived from sensible +experience can rightly be applied to it, that nothing more may be +predicated of it but that it is neither this nor that. But these +are only two aspects of the cognition of one and the same +entity.</p> +<p>Closely connected with the question as to the double nature of +the Brahman of the Upanishads is the question as to their teaching +Mâyâ.—From Colebrooke downwards the majority of +European writers have inclined towards the opinion that the +doctrine of Mâyâ, i.e. of the unreal illusory character +of the sensible world, does not constitute a feature of the +primitive philosophy of the Upanishads, but was introduced into the +system at some later period, whether by +Bâdarâya<i>n</i>a or <i>S</i>a@nkara or somebody else. +The opposite view, viz. that the doctrine of Mâyâ forms +an integral element of the teaching of the Upanishads, is implied +in them everywhere, and enunciated more or less distinctly in +<span class="pagenum"><a name="pageintro-117" id= +"pageintro-117"></a>{Intro 117}</span> more than one place, has in +recent times been advocated with much force by Mr. Gough in the +ninth chapter of his Philosophy of the Upanishads.</p> +<p>In his Matériaux, &c. M. Paul Régnaud remarks +that 'the doctrine of Mâyâ, although implied in the +teaching of the Upanishads, could hardly become clear and explicit +before the system had reached a stage of development necessitating +a choice between admitting two co-existent eternal principles +(which became the basis of the Sâ@nkhya philosophy), and +accepting the predominance of the intellectual principle, which in +the end necessarily led to the negation of the opposite +principle.'—To the two alternatives here referred to as +possible we, however, have to add a third one, viz. that form of +the Vedânta of which the theory of the Bhâgavatas or +Râmânujas is the most eminent type, and according to +which Brahman carries within its own nature an element from which +the material universe originates; an element which indeed is not an +independent entity like the pradhâna of the Sâ@nkhyas, +but which at the same time is not an unreal Mâyâ but +quite as real as any other part of Brahman's nature. That a +doctrine of this character actually developed itself on the basis +of the Upanishads, is a circumstance which we clearly must not lose +sight of, when attempting to determine what the Upanishads +themselves are teaching concerning the character of the world.</p> +<p>In enquiring whether the Upanishads maintain the +Mâyâ doctrine or not, we must proceed with the same +caution as regards other parts of the system, i.e. we must refrain +from using unhesitatingly, and without careful consideration of the +merits of each individual case, the teaching—direct or +inferred—of any one passage to the end of determining the +drift of the teaching of other passages. We may admit that some +passages, notably of the B<i>ri</i>hadâra<i>n</i>yaka, +contain at any rate the germ of the later developed +Mâyâ doctrine<a id="footnotetag25" name= +"footnotetag25"></a><a href="#footnote25"><sup>25</sup></a>, and +thus render it quite intelligible that a system like +<i>S</i>a@nkara's <span class="pagenum"><a name="pageintro-118" id= +"pageintro-118"></a>{Intro 118}</span> should evolve itself, among +others, out of the Upanishads; but that affords no valid reason for +interpreting Mâyâ into other texts which give a very +satisfactory sense without that doctrine, or are even clearly +repugnant to it. This remark applies in the very first place to all +the accounts of the creation of the physical universe. There, if +anywhere, the illusional character of the world should have been +hinted at, at least, had that theory been held by the authors of +those accounts; but not a word to that effect is met with anywhere. +The most important of those accounts—the one given in the +sixth chapter of the Chândogya Upanishad—forms no +exception. There is absolutely no reason to assume that the +'sending forth' of the elements from the primitive Sat, which is +there described at length, was by the writer of that passage meant +to represent a vivarta rather than a pari<i>n</i>âma that the +process of the origination of the physical universe has to be +conceived as anything else but a real manifestation of real powers +hidden in the primeval Self. The introductory words, addressed to +<i>S</i>vetaketu by Uddâlaka, which are generally appealed to +as intimating the unreal character of the evolution about to be +described, do not, if viewed impartially, intimate any such +thing<a id="footnotetag26" name="footnotetag26"></a><a href= +"#footnote26"><sup>26</sup></a>. For what is capable of being +proved, and manifestly meant to be proved, by the illustrative +instances of the lump of clay and the nugget of gold, through which +there are known all things made of clay and gold? Merely that this +whole world has Brahman for its causal substance, just as clay is +the causal matter of every earthen pot, and gold of every golden +ornament, but not that the process through which any causal +substance becomes an effect is an unreal one. We—including +Uddâlaka—may surely say that all earthen pots are in +reality nothing but earth—the earthen pot being merely a +special modification (vikâra) of clay which has a name of its +own—without thereby committing ourselves to the doctrine that +the change of form, which a lump of clay undergoes when being +fashioned into a pot, is not real but a mere baseless illusion.</p> +<p>In the same light we have to view numerous other passages +<span class="pagenum"><a name="pageintro-119" id= +"pageintro-119"></a>{Intro 119}</span> which set forth the +successive emanations proceeding from the first principle. When, +for instance, we meet in the Ka<i>th</i>a Up. I, 3, 10, in the +serial enumeration of the forms of existence intervening between +the gross material world and the highest Self (the Person), with +the 'avyâk<i>ri</i>ta,' the Undeveloped, immediately below +the purusha; and when again the Mu<i>nd</i>aka Up. II, 1, 2, speaks +of the 'high Imperishable' higher than which is the heavenly +Person; there is no reason whatever to see in that 'Undeveloped' +and that 'high Imperishable' anything but that real element in +Brahman from which, as in the Râmânuja system, the +material universe springs by a process of real development. We must +of course render it quite clear to ourselves in what sense the +terms 'real' and 'unreal' have to be understood. The Upanishads no +doubt teach emphatically that the material world does not owe its +existence to any principle independent from the Lord like the +pradhâna of the Sâ@nkhyas; the world is nothing but a +manifestation of the Lord's wonderful power, and hence is +unsubstantial, if we take the term 'substance' in its strict sense. +And, again, everything material is immeasurably inferior in nature +to the highest spiritual principle from which it has emanated, and +which it now hides from the individual soul. But neither +unsubstantiality nor inferiority of the kind mentioned constitutes +unreality in the sense in which the Mâyâ of +<i>S</i>a@nkara is unreal. According to the latter the whole world +is nothing but an erroneous appearance, as unreal as the snake, for +which a piece of rope is mistaken by the belated traveller, and +disappearing just as the imagined snake does as soon as the light +of true knowledge has risen. But this is certainly not the +impression left on the mind by a comprehensive review of the +Upanishads which dwells on their general scope, and does not +confine itself to the undue urging of what may be implied in some +detached passages. The Upanishads do not call upon us to look upon +the whole world as a baseless illusion to be destroyed by +knowledge; the great error which they admonish us to relinquish is +rather that things have a separate individual existence, and are +not tied together by the bond of being all of them effects +<span class="pagenum"><a name="pageintro-120" id= +"pageintro-120"></a>{Intro 120}</span> of Brahman, or Brahman +itself. They do not say that true knowledge sublates this false +world, as <i>S</i>a@nkara says, but that it enables the sage to +extricate himself from the world—the inferior mûrta +rûpa of Brahman, to use an expression of the +B<i>ri</i>hadâra<i>n</i>yaka—and to become one with +Brahman in its highest form. 'We are to see everything in Brahman, +and Brahman in everything;' the natural meaning of this is, 'we are +to look upon this whole world as a true manifestation of Brahman, +as sprung from it and animated by it.' The +mâyâvâdin has indeed appropriated the above +saying also, and interpreted it so as to fall in with his theory; +but he is able to do so only by perverting its manifest sense. For +him it would be appropriate to say, not that everything we see is +in Brahman, but rather that everything we see is out of Brahman, +viz. as a false appearance spread over it and hiding it from +us.</p> +<p>Stress has been laid<a id="footnotetag27" name= +"footnotetag27"></a><a href="#footnote27"><sup>27</sup></a> upon +certain passages of the B<i>ri</i>hadâra<i>n</i>yaka which +seem to hint at the unreality of this world by qualifying terms, +indicative of duality or plurality of existence, by means of an +added 'iva,' i.e. 'as it were' (yatrânyad iva syât; +yatra dvaitam iva bhavati; âtmâ dhyâyatîva +lelâyatîva). Those passages no doubt readily lend +themselves to Mâyâ interpretations, and it is by no +means impossible that in their author's mind there was something +like an undeveloped Mâyâ doctrine. I must, however, +remark that they, on the other hand, also admit of easy +interpretations not in any way presupposing the theory of the +unreality of the world. If Yâj<i>ñ</i>avalkya refers +to the latter as that 'where there is something else as it were, +where there is duality as it were,' he may simply mean to indicate +that the ordinary opinion, according to which the individual forms +of existence of the world are opposed to each other as altogether +separate, is a mistaken one, all things being one in so far as they +spring from—and are parts of—Brahman. This would in no +way involve duality or plurality being unreal in <i>S</i>a@nkara's +sense, not any more than, for instance, the modes of Spinoza are +unreal because, according to that philosopher, there is only one +universal <span class="pagenum"><a name="pageintro-121" id= +"pageintro-121"></a>{Intro 121}</span> substance. And with regard +to the clause 'the Self thinks as it were' it has to be noted that +according to the commentators the 'as it were' is meant to indicate +that truly not the Self is thinking, but the upadhis, i.e. +especially the manas with which the Self is connected. But whether +these upadhis are the mere offspring of Mâyâ, as +<i>S</i>a@nkara thinks, or real forms of existence, as +Râmânuja teaches, is an altogether different +question.</p> +<p>I do not wish, however, to urge these last observations, and am +ready to admit that not impossibly those iva's indicate that the +thought of the writer who employed them was darkly labouring with a +conception akin to—although much less explicit than—the +Mâyâ of <i>S</i>a@nkara. But what I object to is, that +conclusions drawn from a few passages of, after all, doubtful +import should be employed for introducing the Mâyâ +doctrine into other passages which do not even hint at it, and are +fully intelligible without it.<a id="footnotetag28" name= +"footnotetag28"></a><a href="#footnote28"><sup>28</sup></a></p> +<p>The last important point in the teaching of the Upanishads we +have to touch upon is the relation of the jîvas, the +individual souls to the highest Self. The special views regarding +that point held by <i>S</i>a@nkara and Râmânuja, as +have been stated before. Confronting their theories with the texts +of the Upanishads we must, I think, admit without hesitation, that +<i>S</i>a@nkara's doctrine faithfully represents the prevailing +teaching of the Upanishads in one important point at least, viz. +therein that the soul or Self of the sage—whatever its +original relation to Brahman may be—is in the end completely +merged and indistinguishably lost in the universal Self. A +distinction, repeatedly alluded to before, has indeed to be kept in +view here also. Certain texts of the Upanishads describe the soul's +going upwards, on the path of the gods, to the world of Brahman, +where it dwells for unnumbered years, i.e. for ever. Those texts, +as a type of which we may take, the passage Kaushît. Up. +I—the fundamental text of the Râmânujas +concerning the soul's <span class="pagenum"><a name="pageintro-122" +id="pageintro-122"></a>{Intro 122}</span> fate after +death—belong to an earlier stage of philosophic development; +they manifestly ascribe to the soul a continued individual +existence. But mixed with texts of this class there are others in +which the final absolute identification of the individual Self with +the universal Self is indicated in terms of unmistakable plainness. +'He who knows Brahman and becomes Brahman;' 'he who knows Brahman +becomes all this;' 'as the flowing rivers disappear in the sea +losing their name and form, thus a wise man goes to the divine +person.' And if we look to the whole, to the prevailing spirit of +the Upanishads, we may call the doctrine embodied in passages of +the latter nature the doctrine of the Upanishads. It is, moreover, +supported by the frequently and clearly stated theory of the +individual souls being merged in Brahman in the state of deep +dreamless sleep.</p> +<p>It is much more difficult to indicate the precise teaching of +the Upanishads concerning the original relation of the individual +soul to the highest Self, although there can be no doubt that it +has to be viewed as proceeding from the latter, and somehow forming +a part of it. Negatively we are entitled to say that the doctrine, +according to which the soul is merely brahma bhrântam or +brahma mayopadhikam, is in no way countenanced by the majority of +the passages bearing on the question. If the emission of the +elements, described in the Chândogya and referred to above, +is a real process—of which we saw no reason to +doubt—the jîva âtman with which the highest Self +enters into the emitted elements is equally real, a true part or +emanation of Brahman itself.</p> +<p>After having in this way shortly reviewed the chief elements of +Vedântic doctrine according to the Upanishads, we may briefly +consider <i>S</i>a@nkara's system and mode of +interpretation—with whose details we had frequent +opportunities of finding fault—as a whole. It has been said +before that the task of reducing the teaching of the whole of the +Upanishads to a system consistent and free from contradictions is +an intrinsically impossible one. But the task once being given, we +are quite ready to admit that <i>S</i>a@nkara's system is most +probably the best which can be devised. <span class= +"pagenum"><a name="pageintro-123" id="pageintro-123"></a>{Intro +123}</span> While unable to allow that the Upanishads recognise a +lower and higher knowledge of Brahman, in fact the distinction of a +lower and higher Brahman, we yet acknowledge that the adoption of +that distinction furnishes the interpreter with an instrument of +extraordinary power for reducing to an orderly whole the +heterogeneous material presented by the old theosophic treatises. +This becomes very manifest as soon as we compare <i>S</i>a@nkara's +system with that of Râmânuja. The latter recognises +only one Brahman which is, as we should say, a personal God, and he +therefore lays stress on all those passages of the Upanishads which +ascribe to Brahman the attributes of a personal God, such as +omniscience and omnipotence. Those passages, on the other hand, +whose decided tendency it is to represent Brahman as transcending +all qualities, as one undifferenced mass of impersonal +intelligence, Râmânuja is unable to accept frankly and +fairly, and has to misinterpret them more or less to make them fall +in with his system. The same remark holds good with regard to those +texts which represent the individual soul as finally identifying +itself with Brahman; Râmânuja cannot allow a complete +identification but merely an assimilation carried as far as +possible. <i>S</i>a@nkara, on the other hand, by skilfully ringing +the changes on a higher and a lower doctrine, somehow manages to +find room for whatever the Upanishads have to say. Where the text +speaks of Brahman as transcending all attributes, the highest +doctrine is set forth. Where Brahman is called the All-knowing +ruler of the world, the author means to propound the lower +knowledge of the Lord only. And where the legends about the primary +being and its way of creating the world become somewhat crude and +gross, Hira<i>n</i>yagarbha and Virâj are summoned forth and +charged with the responsibility. Of Virâj Mr. Gough remarks +(p. 55) that in him a place is provided by the poets of the +Upanishads for the purusha of the ancient <i>ri</i>shis, the divine +being out of whom the visible and tangible world proceeded. This is +quite true if only we substitute for the 'poets of the Upanishads' +the framers of the orthodox Vedânta system—for the +Upanishads give no indication whatever <span class= +"pagenum"><a name="pageintro-124" id="pageintro-124"></a>{Intro +124}</span> that by their purusha they understand not the simple +old purusha but the Virâj occupying a definite position in a +highly elaborate system;—but the mere phrase, 'providing a +place' intimates with sufficient clearness the nature of the work +in which systematisers of the Vedântic doctrine are +engaged.</p> +<p><i>S</i>a@nkara's method thus enables him in a certain way to do +justice to different stages of historical development, to recognise +clearly existing differences which other systematisers are intent +on obliterating. And there has yet to be made a further and even +more important admission in favour of his system. It is not only +more pliable, more capable of amalgamating heterogeneous material +than other systems, but its fundamental doctrines are manifestly in +greater harmony with the essential teaching of the Upanishads than +those of other Vedântic systems. Above we were unable to +allow that the distinction made by <i>S</i>a@nkara between Brahman +and Î<i>s</i>vara is known to the Upanishads; but we must now +admit that if, for the purpose of determining the nature of the +highest being, a choice has to be made between those texts which +represent Brahman as nirgu<i>n</i>a, and those which ascribe to it +personal attributes, <i>S</i>a@nkara is right in giving preference +to texts of the former kind. The Brahman of the old Upanishads, +from which the souls spring to enjoy individual consciousness in +their waking state, and into which they sink back temporarily in +the state of deep dreamless sleep and permanently in death, is +certainly not represented adequately by the strictly personal +Î<i>s</i>vara of Râmânuja, who rules the world in +wisdom and mercy. The older Upanishads, at any rate, lay very +little stress upon personal attributes of their highest being, and +hence <i>S</i>a@nkara is right in so far as he assigns to his +hypostatised personal Î<i>s</i>vara<a id="footnotetag29" +name="footnotetag29"></a><a href="#footnote29"><sup>29</sup></a> a +lower place than to his absolute Brahman. That he also faithfully +represents the prevailing spirit of the Upanishads in his theory of +the ultimate fate <span class="pagenum"><a name="pageintro-125" id= +"pageintro-125"></a>{Intro 125}</span> of the soul, we have already +remarked above. And although the Mâyâ doctrine cannot, +in my opinion, be said to form part of the teaching of the +Upanishads, it cannot yet be asserted to contradict it openly, +because the very point which it is meant to elucidate, viz. the +mode in which the physical universe and the multiplicity of +individual souls originate, is left by the Upanishads very much in +the dark. The later growth of the Mâyâ doctrine on the +basis of the Upanishads is therefore quite intelligible, and I +fully agree with Mr. Gough when he says regarding it that there has +been no addition to the system from without but only a development +from within, no graft but only growth. The lines of thought which +finally led to the elaboration of the full-blown Mâyâ +theory may be traced with considerable certainty. In the first +place, deepening speculation on Brahman tended to the notion of +advaita being taken in a more and more strict sense, as implying +not only the exclusion of any second principle external to Brahman, +but also the absence of any elements of duality or plurality in the +nature of the one universal being itself; a tendency agreeing with +the spirit of a certain set of texts from the Upanishads. And as +the fact of the appearance of a manifold world cannot be denied, +the only way open to thoroughly consistent speculation was to deny +at any rate its reality, and to call it a mere illusion due to an +unreal principle, with which Brahman is indeed associated, but +which is unable to break the unity of Brahman's nature just on +account of its own unreality. And, in the second place, a more +thorough following out of the conception that the union with +Brahman is to be reached through true knowledge only, not +unnaturally led to the conclusion that what separates us in our +unenlightened state from Brahman is such as to allow itself to be +completely sublated by an act of knowledge; is, in other words, +nothing else but an erroneous notion, an illusion.—A further +circumstance which may not impossibly have co-operated to further +the development of the theory of the world's unreality will be +referred to later on.<a id="footnotetag30" name= +"footnotetag30"></a><a href="#footnote30"><sup>30</sup></a></p> +<span class="pagenum"><a name="pageintro-126" id= +"pageintro-126"></a>{Intro 126}</span> +<p>We have above been obliged to leave it an open question what +kind of Vedânta is represented by the +Vedânta-sûtras, although reason was shown for the +supposition that in some important points their teaching is more +closely related to the system of Râmânuja than to that +of <i>S</i>a@nkara. If so, the philosophy of <i>S</i>a@nkara would +on the whole stand nearer to the teaching of the Upanishads than +the Sûtras of Bâdarâya<i>n</i>a. This would +indeed be a somewhat unexpected conclusion—for, judging a +priori, we should be more inclined to assume a direct propagation +of the true doctrine of the Upanishads through +Bâdarâya<i>n</i>a to <i>S</i>a@nkara—but a priori +considerations have of course no weight against positive evidence +to the contrary. There are, moreover, other facts in the history of +Indian philosophy and theology which help us better to appreciate +the possibility of Bâdarâya<i>n</i>a's Sûtras +already setting forth a doctrine that lays greater stress on the +personal character of the highest being than is in agreement with +the prevailing tendency of the Upanishads. That the pure doctrine +of those ancient Brahminical treatises underwent at a rather early +period amalgamations with beliefs which most probably had sprung up +in altogether different—priestly or +non-priestly—communities is a well-known circumstance; it +suffices for our purposes to refer to the most eminent of the early +literary monuments in which an amalgamation of the kind mentioned +is observable, viz. the Bhagavadgîtâ. The doctrine of +the Bhagavadgîtâ represents a fusion of the Brahman +theory of the Upanishads with the belief in a personal highest +being—K<i>ri</i>sh<i>n</i>a or Vish<i>n</i>u—which in +many respects approximates very closely to the system of the +Bhâgavatas; the attempts of a certain set of Indian +commentators to explain it as setting forth pure Vedânta, +i.e. the pure doctrine of the Upanishads, may simply be set aside. +But this same Bhagavadgîtâ is quoted in +Bâdarâya<i>n</i>a's Sûtras (at least according to +the unanimous explanations of the most eminent scholiasts of +different schools) as inferior to <i>S</i>ruti only in authority. +The Sûtras, <span class="pagenum"><a name="pageintro-127" id= +"pageintro-127"></a>{Intro 127}</span> moreover, refer in different +places to certain Vedântic portions of the +Mahâbhârata, especially the twelfth book, several of +which represent forms of Vedânta distinctly differing from +<i>S</i>a@nkara's teaching, and closely related to the system of +the Bhâgavatas.</p> +<p>Facts of this nature—from entering into the details of +which we are prevented by want of space—tend to mitigate the +primâ facie strangeness of the assumption that the +Vedânta-sûtras, which occupy an intermediate position +between the Upanishads and <i>S</i>a@nkara, should yet diverge in +their teaching from both. The Vedânta of +Gau<i>d</i>apâda and <i>S</i>a@nkara would in that case mark +a strictly orthodox reaction against all combinations of non-Vedic +elements of belief and doctrine with the teaching of the +Upanishads. But although this form of doctrine has ever since +<i>S</i>a@nkara's time been the one most generally accepted by +Brahminic students of philosophy, it has never had any +wide-reaching influence on the masses of India. It is too little in +sympathy with the wants of the human heart, which, after all, are +not so very different in India from what they are elsewhere. +Comparatively few, even in India, are those who rejoice in the idea +of a universal non-personal essence in which their own +individuality is to be merged and lost for ever, who think it sweet +'to be wrecked on the ocean of the Infinite.'<a id="footnotetag31" +name="footnotetag31"></a><a href="#footnote31"><sup>31</sup></a> +The only forms of Vedântic philosophy which are—and can +at any time have been—really popular, are those in which the +Brahman of the Upanishads has somehow transformed itself into a +being, between which and the devotee there can exist a personal +relation, love and faith on the part of man, justice tempered by +mercy on the part of the divinity. The only religious books of +widespread influence are such as the Râmâyan of +Tulsidâs, which lay no stress on the distinction between an +absolute Brahman inaccessible to all human wants and sympathies, +and a shadowy Lord whose very conception depends on the illusory +principle of Mâyâ, but love to dwell on the delights of +devotion <span class="pagenum"><a name="pageintro-128" id= +"pageintro-128"></a>{Intro 128}</span> to one all-wise and merciful +ruler, who is able and willing to lend a gracious ear to the +supplication of the worshipper.</p> +<hr /> +<p>The present translation of the Vedânta-sûtras does +not aim at rendering that sense which their author may have aimed +at conveying, but strictly follows <i>S</i>a@nkara's +interpretation. The question as to how far the latter agrees with +the views held by Bâdarâya<i>n</i>a has been discussed +above, with the result that for the present it must, on the whole, +be left an open one. In any case it would not be feasible to +combine a translation of <i>S</i>a@nkara's commentary with an +independent version of the Sûtras which it explains. Similar +considerations have determined the method followed in rendering the +passages of the Upanishads referred to in the Sûtras and +discussed at length by <i>S</i>a@nkara. There also the views of the +commentator have to be followed closely; otherwise much of the +comment would appear devoid of meaning. Hence, while of course +following on the whole the critical translation published by +Professor Max Müller in the earlier volumes of this Series, I +had, in a not inconsiderable number of cases, to modify it so as to +render intelligible <i>S</i>a@nkara's explanations and reasonings. +I hope to find space in the introduction to the second volume of +this translation for making some general remarks on the method to +be followed in translating the Upanishads.</p> +<p>I regret that want of space has prevented me from extracting +fuller notes from later scholiasts. The notes given are based, most +of them, on the <i>t</i>îkâs composed by +Ânandagiri and Govindânanda (the former of which is +unpublished as yet, so far as I know), and on the +Bhâmatî.</p> +<p>My best thanks are due to Pa<i>nd</i>its Râma Mi<i>s</i>ra +<i>S</i>âstrin and Ga@ngâdhara <i>S</i>âstrin of +the Benares Sanskrit College, whom I have consulted on several +difficult passages. Greater still are my obligations to +Pa<i>nd</i>it Ke<i>s</i>ava <i>S</i>âstrin, of the same +institution, who most kindly undertook to read a proof of the whole +of the present volume, and whose advice has enabled me to render my +version of more than one passage more definite or correct.</p> +<blockquote class="footnote"><a id="footnote19" name= +"footnote19"></a><b>Footnote 19:</b><a href= +"#footnotetag19">(return)</a> +<p>Nanu vidusho z pi +setikartavyatâkopâsananirv<i>ri</i>ttaye +v<i>ri</i>shyannâdiphalânîsh<i>t</i>âny eva +katha<i>m</i> teshâ<i>m</i> virodhâd +vinâ<i>s</i>a u<i>k</i>yate. Tatrâha pâte tv iti. +<i>S</i>arîrapâte tu teshâ<i>m</i> +vinâ<i>s</i>a<i>h</i> <i>s</i>arîrapâtâd +ûrdhv<i>m</i> tu +vidyânugu<i>n</i>ad<i>ri</i>sh<i>t</i>aphalâni +suk<i>ri</i>tâni na<i>s</i>yantîty artha<i>h</i>.</p> +</blockquote> +<blockquote class="footnote"><a id="footnote20" name= +"footnote20"></a><b>Footnote 20:</b><a href= +"#footnotetag20">(return)</a> +<p>Upalabhyate hi devayânena panthâ ga<i>kkh</i>ato +vidushas tam pratibrûuyât satyam brûyâd iti +<i>k</i>andramasâ sa<i>m</i>vâdava<i>k</i>anena +<i>s</i>arîrasadbhâva<i>h</i>, ata<i>h</i> +sûkshma<i>s</i>arîram anuvartate.</p> +</blockquote> +<blockquote class="footnote"><a id="footnote21" name= +"footnote21"></a><b>Footnote 21:</b><a href= +"#footnotetag21">(return)</a> +<p>When the jîva has passed out of the body and ascends to +the world of Brahman, it remains enveloped by the subtle body until +it reaches the river Vijarâ. There it divests itself of the +subtle body, and the latter is merged in Brahman.</p> +</blockquote> +<blockquote class="footnote"><a id="footnote22" name= +"footnote22"></a><b>Footnote 22:</b><a href= +"#footnotetag22">(return)</a> +<p>Kim aya<i>m</i> para<i>m</i>, yotir upasampanna<i>h</i> +saivabandhavinirmukta<i>h</i> pratyagatma svatmana<i>m</i> +paramâtmana<i>h</i> p<i>rit</i>hagbhutam anubhavati uta +tatprahâratayâ tadavibhaktam iti visnye so, +<i>s</i>nate sarvân kamân saha brahma<i>n</i>â +vipas<i>k</i>itâ pasya<i>h</i> pasyate +rukmavar<i>n</i>a<i>m</i> kartaram ìsa<i>m</i> +purusha<i>m</i> brahmayoni<i>m</i> tadâ vidvin +pu<i>n</i>yapape vidhuya nirañgana<i>h</i> parama<i>m</i> +sâmyam upaiti ida<i>m</i> jñanam upasritya mama +sâdharinyam âgata<i>h</i> sarve, punopajâyante +pralayena vyathanti <i>k</i>etyadysruysm<i>nt</i>ibhyo muktasta +pare<i>n</i>a +sâhityasâmyasádharmyâvagamât +p<i>ri</i>thagbhutam anubhavatîu prâpte u<i>k</i>yate. +Avibhâgeneti. Parasmâd brahmana<i>h</i> svatmanam +avibhâgenânubhavati mukta<i>h</i>. Kuta<i>h</i>. +D<i>ri</i>shtatvât. Para<i>m</i> brahmopasampadya +niv<i>ri</i>ttavidyânrodhanasya yathâtathyena +svâtamano d<i>ri</i>sh<i>ta</i>tvât. Svatmana<i>h</i> +ssvarûpa<i>m</i> hi tat tvam asy ayam âtmâ brahma +aitadâtmyam ida<i>m</i> sarva<i>m</i> sarva<i>m</i> khalv +ida<i>m</i> +brahnetyâdisâmânâdhikara<i>n</i>yanirdesai<i> +h</i> ya âtmani tishtan atmano ntaro yam âtmâ na +veda yastatmâ sarîra<i>m</i> ya âtmânam +antaro yamayati âtmântaryamy am<i>ri</i>tah +anta<i>h</i> pravishta<i>h</i> sâstâ anânâm +ityâdibhis <i>k</i>a paramatmâtmaka<i>m</i> +ta<i>kk</i>harîtatayâ tatprakâtabhûtam iti +pratipâditam avashitei iti kasak<i>ri</i>stnety atrâto +vibhagenaha<i>m</i> brahmâsmîty cvanubhavati</p> +</blockquote> +<blockquote class="footnote"><a id="footnote23" name= +"footnote23"></a><b>Footnote 23:</b><a href= +"#footnotetag23">(return)</a> +<p><i>S</i>a@nkara's favourite illustrative instance of the +magician producing illusive sights is—significantly +enough—not known to the Sûtras.</p> +</blockquote> +<blockquote class="footnote"><a id="footnote24" name= +"footnote24"></a><b>Footnote 24:</b><a href= +"#footnotetag24">(return)</a> +<p>Cp. Gough's Philosophy of the Upanishads, pp. 240 ff.</p> +</blockquote> +<blockquote class="footnote"><a id="footnote25" name= +"footnote25"></a><b>Footnote 25:</b><a href= +"#footnotetag25">(return)</a> +<p>It is well known that, with the exception of the +<i>S</i>vitâsvatara and Maitrâyanîya, none of the +chief Upanishads exhibits the word 'mâyâ.' The term +indeed occurs in one place in the +B<i>ri</i>hadâra<i>n</i>yaka; but that passage is a quotation +from the <i>Ri</i>k Sa<i>m</i>bitâ in which mâyâ +means 'creative power.' Cp. P. Régnaud, La Mâyâ, +in the Revue de l'Histoire des Religions, tome xii, No. 3, +1885.</p> +</blockquote> +<blockquote class="footnote"><a id="footnote26" name= +"footnote26"></a><b>Footnote 26:</b><a href= +"#footnotetag26">(return)</a> +<p>As is demonstrated very satisfactorily by +Râmânuja.</p> +</blockquote> +<blockquote class="footnote"><a id="footnote27" name= +"footnote27"></a><b>Footnote 27:</b><a href= +"#footnotetag27">(return)</a> +<p>Gough, Philosophy of the Upanishads pp. 213 ff.</p> +</blockquote> +<blockquote class="footnote"><a id="footnote28" name= +"footnote28"></a><b>Footnote 28:</b><a href= +"#footnotetag28">(return)</a> +<p>I cannot discuss in this place the Mâyâ passages of +the Svetâsvatara and the Maitrâyanîya Upanishads. +Reasons which want of space prevents me from setting forth in +detail induce me to believe that neither of those two treatises +deserves to be considered by us when wishing to ascertain the true +immixed doctrine of the Upanishads.</p> +</blockquote> +<blockquote class="footnote"><a id="footnote29" name= +"footnote29"></a><b>Footnote 29:</b><a href= +"#footnotetag29">(return)</a> +<p>The Î<i>s</i>vara who allots to the individual souls their +new forms of embodiment in strict accordance with their merit or +demerit cannot be called anything else but a personal God. That +this personal conscious being is at the same time identified with +the totality of the individual souls in the unconscious state of +deep dreamless sleep, is one of those extraordinary contradictions +which thorough-going systematisers of Vedântic doctrine are +apparently unable to avoid altogether.</p> +</blockquote> +<blockquote class="footnote"><a id="footnote30" name= +"footnote30"></a><b>Footnote 30:</b><a href= +"#footnotetag30">(return)</a> +<p>That section of the introduction in which the point referred to +in the text is touched upon will I hope form part of the second +volume of the translation. The same remark applies to a point +concerning which further information had been promised above on +page v.</p> +</blockquote> +<blockquote class="footnote"><a id="footnote31" name= +"footnote31"></a><b>Footnote 31:</b><a href= +"#footnotetag31">(return)</a> +<div class="poem"> +<div class="stanza"> +<p class="i2">Così tra questa</p> +<p class="i2">Immensità s'annega il pensier mio,</p> +<p class="i2">E il naufrago m' e dolce in qnesto mare.</p> +<p class="i2">LEOPARDI.</p> +</div> +</div> +</blockquote> +<span class="pagenum"><a name="page1" id="page1"></a>{1}</span> +<hr class="full" /> +<a name="chap-text" id="chap-text"></a> +<h1>VEDÂNTA-SÛTRAS</h1> +<h3>WITH</h3> +<h2><i>S</i>A@NKARA BHÂSHYA.</h2> +<span class="pagenum"><a name="page3" id="page3"></a>{3}</span> +<h2><i>S</i>A@NKARA'S INTRODUCTION</h2> +<a name="chap-1-1" id="chap-1-1"></a> +<h3>FIRST ADHYÂYA.</h3> +<h4>FIRST PÂDA.</h4> +<center>REVERENCE TO THE AUGUST VÂSUDEVA!</center> +<p>It is a matter not requiring any proof that the object and the +subject<a id="footnotetag32" name="footnotetag32"></a><a href= +"#footnote32"><sup>32</sup></a> whose respective spheres are the +notion of the 'Thou' (the Non-Ego<a id="footnotetag33" name= +"footnotetag33"></a><a href="#footnote33"><sup>33</sup></a>) and +the 'Ego,' and which are opposed to each other as much as darkness +and light are, cannot be identified. All the less can their +respective attributes be identified. Hence it follows that it is +wrong to superimpose<a id="footnotetag34" name= +"footnotetag34"></a><a href="#footnote34"><sup>34</sup></a> upon +the subject—whose Self is intelligence, and which has for its +sphere the notion of the Ego—the object whose sphere is the +notion of the Non-Ego, and the attributes of the object, and +<i>vice versâ</i> to superimpose the subject and the +attributes of the subject on the object. In spite of this it is on +the part of man a natural<a id="footnotetag35" name= +"footnotetag35"></a><a href="#footnote35"><sup>35</sup></a> +procedure—which <span class="pagenum"><a name="page4" id= +"page4"></a>{4}</span> which has its cause in wrong +knowledge—not to distinguish the two entities (object and +subject) and their respective attributes, although they are +absolutely distinct, but to superimpose upon each the +characteristic nature and the attributes of the other, and thus, +coupling the Real and the Unreal<a id="footnotetag36" name= +"footnotetag36"></a><a href="#footnote36"><sup>36</sup></a>, to +make use of expressions such as 'That am I,' 'That is mine.<a id= +"footnotetag37" name="footnotetag37"></a><a href= +"#footnote37"><sup>37</sup></a>'—But what have we to +understand by the term 'superimposition?'—The apparent +presentation, in the form of remembrance, to consciousness of +something previously observed, in some other thing.<a id= +"footnotetag38" name="footnotetag38"></a><a href= +"#footnote38"><sup>38</sup></a></p> +<p>Some indeed define the term 'superimposition' as the +superimposition of the attributes of one thing on another +thing.<a id="footnotetag39" name="footnotetag39"></a><a href= +"#footnote39"><sup>39</sup></a> Others, again, define +superimposition as the error <span class="pagenum"><a name="page5" +id="page5"></a>{5}</span> founded on the non-apprehension of the +difference of that which is superimposed from that on which it is +superimposed.<a id="footnotetag40" name= +"footnotetag40"></a><a href="#footnote40"><sup>40</sup></a> +Others<a id="footnotetag41" name="footnotetag41"></a><a href= +"#footnote41"><sup>41</sup></a>, again, define it as the fictitious +assumption of attributes contrary to the nature of that thing on +which something else is superimposed. But all these definitions +agree in so far as they represent superimposition as the apparent +presentation of the attributes of one thing in another thing. And +therewith agrees also the popular view which is exemplified by +expressions such as the following: 'Mother-of-pearl appears like +silver,' 'The moon although one only appears as if she were +double.' But how is it possible that on the interior Self which +itself is not an object there should be superimposed objects and +their attributes? For every one superimposes an object only on such +other objects as are placed before him (i.e. in contact with his +sense-organs), and you have said before that the interior Self +which is entirely disconnected from the idea of the Thou (the +Non-Ego) is never an object. It is not, we reply, non-object in the +absolute sense. For it is the object of the notion of the Ego<a id= +"footnotetag42" name="footnotetag42"></a><a href= +"#footnote42"><sup>42</sup></a>, and the interior Self is well +known to exist on account of its immediate (intuitive) +presentation.<a id="footnotetag43" name= +"footnotetag43"></a><a href="#footnote43"><sup>43</sup></a> Nor is +it an exceptionless rule that objects <span class= +"pagenum"><a name="page6" id="page6"></a>{6}</span> can be +superimposed only on such other objects as are before us, i.e. in +contact with our sense-organs; for non-discerning men superimpose +on the ether, which is not the object of sensuous perception, +dark-blue colour.</p> +<p>Hence it follows that the assumption of the Non-Self being +superimposed on the interior Self is not unreasonable.</p> +<p>This superimposition thus defined, learned men consider to be +Nescience (avidyâ), and the ascertainment of the true nature +of that which is (the Self) by means of the discrimination of that +(which is superimposed on the Self), they call knowledge +(vidyâ). There being such knowledge (neither the Self nor the +Non-Self) are affected in the least by any blemish or (good) +quality produced by their mutual superimposition<a id= +"footnotetag44" name="footnotetag44"></a><a href= +"#footnote44"><sup>44</sup></a>. The mutual superimposition of the +Self and the Non-Self, which is termed Nescience, is the +presupposition on which there base all the practical +distinctions—those made in ordinary life as well as those +laid down by the Veda—between means of knowledge, objects of +knowledge (and knowing persons), and all scriptural texts, whether +they are concerned with injunctions and prohibitions (of +meritorious and non-meritorious actions), or with final +release<a id="footnotetag45" name="footnotetag45"></a><a href= +"#footnote45"><sup>45</sup></a>.—But how can the means of +right <span class="pagenum"><a name="page7" id= +"page7"></a>{7}</span> knowledge such as perception, inference, +&c., and scriptural texts have for their object that which is +dependent on Nescience<a id="footnotetag46" name= +"footnotetag46"></a><a href= +"#footnote46"><sup>46</sup></a>?—Because, we reply, the means +of right knowledge cannot operate unless there be a knowing +personality, and because the existence of the latter depends on the +erroneous notion that the body, the senses, and so on, are +identical with, or belong to, the Self of the knowing person. For +without the employment of the senses, perception and the other +means of right knowledge cannot operate. And without a basis (i.e. +the body<a id="footnotetag47" name="footnotetag47"></a><a href= +"#footnote47"><sup>47</sup></a>) the senses cannot act. Nor does +anybody act by means of a body on which the nature of the Self is +not superimposed<a id="footnotetag48" name= +"footnotetag48"></a><a href="#footnote48"><sup>48</sup></a>. Nor +can, in the absence of all that<a id="footnotetag49" name= +"footnotetag49"></a><a href="#footnote49"><sup>49</sup></a>, the +Self which, in its own nature is free from all contact, become a +knowing agent. And if there is no knowing agent, the means of right +knowledge cannot operate (as said above). Hence perception and the +other means of right knowledge, and the Vedic texts have for their +object that which is dependent on Nescience. (That human +cognitional activity has for its presupposition the superimposition +described above), follows also from the non-difference in that +respect of men from animals. Animals, when sounds or other sensible +qualities affect their sense of hearing or other senses, recede or +advance according as the idea derived from the sensation is a +comforting or disquieting one. A cow, for instance, when she sees a +man approaching with a raised stick in his hand, thinks that he +wants to beat her, and therefore moves away; while she walks up to +a man who advances with some fresh grass in his hand. Thus men +also—who possess a higher intelligence—run away when +<span class="pagenum"><a name="page8" id="page8"></a>{8}</span> +they see strong fierce-looking fellows drawing near with shouts and +brandishing swords; while they confidently approach persons of +contrary appearance and behaviour. We thus see that men and animals +follow the same course of procedure with reference to the means and +objects of knowledge. Now it is well known that the procedure of +animals bases on the non-distinction (of Self and Non-Self); we +therefore conclude that, as they present the same appearances, men +also—although distinguished by superior +intelligence—proceed with regard to perception and so on, in +the same way as animals do; as long, that is to say, as the mutual +superimposition of Self and Non-Self lasts. With reference again to +that kind of activity which is founded on the Veda (sacrifices and +the like), it is true indeed that the reflecting man who is +qualified to enter on it, does so not without knowing that the Self +has a relation to another world; yet that qualification does not +depend on the knowledge, derivable from the Vedânta-texts, of +the true nature of the Self as free from all wants, raised above +the distinctions of the Brâhma<i>n</i>a and +Kshattriya-classes and so on, transcending transmigratory +existence. For such knowledge is useless and even contradictory to +the claim (on the part of sacrificers, &c. to perform certain +actions and enjoy their fruits). And before such knowledge of the +Self has arisen, the Vedic texts continue in their operation, to +have for their object that which is dependent on Nescience. For +such texts as the following, 'A Brâhma<i>n</i>a is to +sacrifice,' are operative only on the supposition that on the Self +are superimposed particular conditions such as caste, stage of +life, age, outward circumstances, and so on. That by +superimposition we have to understand the notion of something in +some other thing we have already explained. (The superimposition of +the Non-Self will be understood more definitely from the following +examples.) Extra-personal attributes are superimposed on the Self, +if a man considers himself sound and entire, or the contrary, as +long as his wife, children, and so on are sound and entire or not. +Attributes of the body are superimposed on the Self, if a man +<span class="pagenum"><a name="page9" id="page9"></a>{9}</span> +thinks of himself (his Self) as stout, lean, fair, as standing, +walking, or jumping. Attributes of the sense-organs, if he thinks +'I am mute, or deaf, or one-eyed, or blind.' Attributes of the +internal organ when he considers himself subject to desire, +intention, doubt, determination, and so on. Thus the producer of +the notion of the Ego (i.e. the internal organ) is superimposed on +the interior Self, which, in reality, is the witness of all the +modifications of the internal organ, and vice versá the +interior Self, which is the witness of everything, is superimposed +on the internal organ, the senses, and so on. In this way there +goes on this natural beginning—and endless superimposition, +which appears in the form of wrong conception, is the cause of +individual souls appearing as agents and enjoyers (of the results +of their actions), and is observed by every one.</p> +<p>With a view to freeing one's self from that wrong notion which +is the cause of all evil and attaining thereby the knowledge of the +absolute unity of the Self the study of the Vedânta-texts is +begun. That all the Vedânta-texts have the mentioned purport +we shall show in this so-called +<i>S</i>âriraka-mîmâ<i>m</i>sâ.<a id= +"footnotetag50" name="footnotetag50"></a><a href= +"#footnote50"><sup>50</sup></a></p> +<p>Of this Vedânta-mîmâ<i>m</i>sâ about to +be explained by us the first Sûtra is as follows.</p> +<p>1. Then therefore the enquiry into Brahman.</p> +<p>The word 'then' is here to be taken as denoting immediate +consecution; not as indicating the introduction of a new subject to +be entered upon; for the enquiry into Brahman (more literally, the +desire of knowing Brahman) is not of that nature<a id= +"footnotetag51" name="footnotetag51"></a><a href= +"#footnote51"><sup>51</sup></a>. Nor has the word 'then' the sense +<span class="pagenum"><a name="page10" id="page10"></a>{10}</span> +of auspiciousness (or blessing); for a word of that meaning could +not be properly construed as a part of the sentence. The word +'then' rather acts as an auspicious term by being pronounced and +heard merely, while it denotes at the same time something else, +viz. immediate consecution as said above. That the latter is its +meaning follows moreover from the circumstance that the relation in +which the result stands to the previous topic (viewed as the cause +of the result) is non-separate from the relation of immediate +consecution.<a id="footnotetag52" name="footnotetag52"></a><a href= +"#footnote52"><sup>52</sup></a></p> +<p>If, then, the word 'then' intimates immediate consecution it +must be explained on what antecedent the enquiry into Brahman +specially depends; just as the enquiry into active religious duty +(which forms the subject of the Pûrvâ +Mîmâ<i>m</i>sâ) specially depends on the +antecedent reading of the Veda. The reading of the Veda indeed is +the common antecedent (for those who wish to enter on an enquiry +into religious duty as well as for those desirous of knowing +Brahman). The special question with regard to the enquiry into +Brahman is whether it presupposes as its antecedent the +understanding of the acts of religious duty (which is acquired by +means of the Pûrvâ Mîmâ<i>m</i>sâ). +To this question we reply in the negative, because for a man who +has read the Vedânta-parts of the Veda it is possible to +enter on the enquiry into Brahman even before engaging in the +enquiry into religious duty. Nor is it the purport of the word +'then' to indicate order of succession; a purport which it serves +in other passages, as, for instance, in the one enjoining the +cutting off of pieces from the heart and other <span class= +"pagenum"><a name="page11" id="page11"></a>{11}</span> parts of the +sacrificial animal.<a id="footnotetag53" name= +"footnotetag53"></a><a href="#footnote53"><sup>53</sup></a> (For +the intimation of order of succession could be intended only if the +agent in both cases were the same; but this is not the case), +because there is no proof for assuming the enquiry into religious +duty and the enquiry into Brahman to stand in the relation of +principal and subordinate matter or the relation of qualification +(for a certain act) on the part of the person qualified<a id= +"footnotetag54" name="footnotetag54"></a><a href= +"#footnote54"><sup>54</sup></a>; and because the result as well as +the object of the enquiry differs in the two cases. The knowledge +of active religious duty has for its fruit transitory felicity, and +that again depends on the performance of religious acts. The +enquiry into Brahman, on the other hand, has for its fruit eternal +bliss, and does not depend on the performance of any acts. Acts of +religious duty do not yet exist at the time when they are enquired +into, but are something to be accomplished (in the future); for +they depend on the activity of man. In the +Brahma-mîmá<i>m</i>sâ, on the other hand, the +object of enquiry, i.e. Brahman, is something already accomplished +(existent),—for it is eternal,—and does not depend on +human energy. The two enquiries differ moreover in so far as the +operation of their respective fundamental texts is concerned. For +the fundamental texts on which active religious duty depends convey +information to man in so far only as they enjoin on him their own +particular subjects (sacrifices, &c.); while the fundamental +texts about Brahman merely instruct man, without laying on him the +injunction of being instructed, instruction being their immediate +result. The case is analogous to that of the information regarding +objects of sense which ensues as soon as the objects are +approximated to the senses. It therefore is requisite that +something should be <span class="pagenum"><a name="page12" id= +"page12"></a>{12}</span> stated subsequent to which the enquiry +into Brahman is proposed.—Well, then, we maintain that the +antecedent conditions are the discrimination of what is eternal and +what is non-eternal; the renunciation of all desire to enjoy the +fruit (of one's actions) both here and hereafter; the acquirement +of tranquillity, self-restraint, and the other means<a id= +"footnotetag55" name="footnotetag55"></a><a href= +"#footnote55"><sup>55</sup></a>, and the desire of final release. +If these conditions exist, a man may, either before entering on an +enquiry into active religious duty or after that, engage in the +enquiry into Brahman and come to know it; but not otherwise. The +word 'then' therefore intimates that the enquiry into Brahman is +subsequent to the acquisition of the above-mentioned (spiritual) +means.</p> +<p>The word 'therefore' intimates a reason. Because the Veda, while +declaring that the fruit of the agnihotra and similar performances +which are means of happiness is non-eternal (as, for instance. Ch. +Up. VIII, 1, 6, 'As here on earth whatever has been acquired by +action perishes so perishes in the next world whatever is acquired +by acts of religious duty'), teaches at the same time that the +highest aim of man is realised by the knowledge of Brahman (as, for +instance, Taitt. Up. II, 1, 'He who knows Brahman attains the +highest'); therefore the enquiry into Brahman is to be undertaken +subsequently to the acquirement of the mentioned means.</p> +<p>By Brahman is to be understood that the definition of which will +be given in the next Sûtra (I, 1, 2); it is therefore not to +be supposed that the word Brahman may here denote something else, +as, for instance, the brahminical caste. In the Sûtra the +genitive case ('of Brahman;' the literal translation of the +Sûtra being 'then therefore the desire of knowledge of +Brahman') denotes the object, not something generally supplementary +(<i>s</i>esha<a id="footnotetag56" name= +"footnotetag56"></a><a href="#footnote56"><sup>56</sup></a>); for +the desire of knowledge <span class="pagenum"><a name="page13" id= +"page13"></a>{13}</span> demands an object of desire and no other +such object is stated.—But why should not the genitive case +be taken as expressing the general complementary relation (to +express which is its proper office)? Even in that case it might +constitute the object of the desire of knowledge, since the general +relation may base itself on the more particular one.—This +assumption, we reply, would mean that we refuse to take Brahman as +the direct object, and then again indirectly introduce it as the +object; an altogether needless procedure.—Not needless; for +if we explain the words of the Sûtra to mean 'the desire of +knowledge connected with Brahman' we thereby virtually promise that +also all the heads of discussion which bear on Brahman will be +treated.—This reason also, we reply, is not strong enough to +uphold your interpretation. For the statement of some principal +matter already implies all the secondary matters connected +therewith. Hence if Brahman, the most eminent of all objects of +knowledge, is mentioned, this implies already all those objects of +enquiry which the enquiry into Brahman presupposes, and those +objects need therefore not be mentioned, especially in the +Sûtra. Analogously the sentence 'there the king is going' +implicitly means that the king together with his retinue is going +there. Our interpretation (according to which the Sûtra +represents Brahman as the direct object of knowledge) moreover +agrees with Scripture, which directly represents Brahman as the +object of the desire of knowledge; compare, for instance, the +passage, 'That from whence these beings are born, &c., desire +to know that. That is Brahman' (Taitt. Up. III, 1). With passages +of this kind the Sûtra only agrees if the genitive case is +taken to denote the object. Hence we do take it in that sense. The +object of the desire is the knowledge of Brahman up to its complete +comprehension, desires having reference to results<a id= +"footnotetag57" name="footnotetag57"></a><a href= +"#footnote57"><sup>57</sup></a>. Knowledge thus constitutes the +<span class="pagenum"><a name="page14" id="page14"></a>{14}</span> +means by which the complete comprehension of Brahman is desired to +be obtained. For the complete comprehension of Brahman is the +highest end of man, since it destroys the root of all evil such as +Nescience, the seed of the entire Sa<i>m</i>sâra. Hence the +desire of knowing Brahman is to be entertained.</p> +<p>But, it may be asked, is Brahman known or not known (previously +to the enquiry into its nature)? If it is known we need not enter +on an enquiry concerning it; if it is not known we can not enter on +such an enquiry.</p> +<p>We reply that Brahman is known. Brahman, which is all-knowing +and endowed with all powers, whose essential nature is eternal +purity, intelligence, and freedom, exists. For if we consider the +derivation of the word 'Brahman,' from the root b<i>ri</i>h, 'to be +great,' we at once understand that eternal purity, and so on, +belong to Brahman<a id="footnotetag58" name= +"footnotetag58"></a><a href="#footnote58"><sup>58</sup></a>. +Moreover the existence of Brahman is known on the ground of its +being the Self of every one. For every one is conscious of the +existence of (his) Self, and never thinks 'I am not.' If the +existence of the Self were not known, every one would think 'I am +not.' And this Self (of whose existence all are conscious) is +Brahman. But if Brahman is generally known as the Self, there is no +room for an enquiry into it! Not so, we reply; for there is a +conflict of opinions as to its special nature. Unlearned people and +the Lokâyatikas are of opinion that the mere body endowed +with the quality of intelligence is the Self; others that the +organs endowed with intelligence are the Self; others maintain that +the internal organ is the Self; others, again, that the Self is a +mere momentary idea; others, again, that it is the Void. Others, +again (to proceed to the opinion of such as acknowledge the +authority of the Veda), maintain that there is a transmigrating +being different from the body, and so on, which is both agent and +enjoyer (of the fruits of action); others teach <span class= +"pagenum"><a name="page15" id="page15"></a>{15}</span> that that +being is enjoying only, not acting; others believe that in addition +to the individual souls, there is an all-knowing, all-powerful +Lord<a id="footnotetag59" name="footnotetag59"></a><a href= +"#footnote59"><sup>59</sup></a>. Others, finally, (i.e. the +Vedântins) maintain that the Lord is the Self of the enjoyer +(i.e. of the individual soul whose individual existence is apparent +only, the product of Nescience).</p> +<p>Thus there are many various opinions, basing part of them on +sound arguments and scriptural texts, part of them on fallacious +arguments and scriptural texts misunderstood<a id="footnotetag60" +name="footnotetag60"></a><a href="#footnote60"><sup>60</sup></a>. +If therefore a man would embrace some one of these opinions without +previous consideration, he would bar himself from the highest +beatitude and incur grievous loss. For this reason the first +Sûtra proposes, under the designation of an enquiry into +Brahman, a disquisition of the Vedânta-texts, to be carried +on with the help of conformable arguments, and having for its aim +the highest beatitude.</p> +<p>So far it has been said that Brahman is to be enquired into. The +question now arises what the characteristics of that Brahman are, +and the reverend author of the Sûtras therefore propounds the +following aphorism.</p> +<p>2. (Brahman is that) from which the origin, &c. (i.e. the +origin, subsistence, and dissolution) of this (world proceed).</p> +<p>The term, &c. implies subsistence and re-absorption. That +the origin is mentioned first (of the three) depends on the +declaration of Scripture as well as on the natural development of a +substance. Scripture declares the order <span class= +"pagenum"><a name="page16" id="page16"></a>{16}</span> of +succession of origin, subsistence, and dissolution in the passage, +Taitt. Up. III, 1, 'From whence these beings are born,' &c. And +with regard to the second reason stated, it is known that a +substrate of qualities can subsist and be dissolved only after it +has entered, through origination, on the state of existence. The +words 'of this' denote that substrate of qualities which is +presented to us by perception and the other means of right +knowledge; the genitive case indicates it to be connected with +origin, &c. The words 'from which' denote the cause. The full +sense of the Sûtra therefore is: That omniscient omnipotent +cause from which proceed the origin, subsistence, and dissolution +of this world—which world is differentiated by names and +forms, contains many agents and enjoyers, is the abode of the +fruits of actions, these fruits having their definite places, +times, and causes<a id="footnotetag61" name= +"footnotetag61"></a><a href="#footnote61"><sup>61</sup></a>, and +the nature of whose arrangement cannot even be conceived by the +mind,—that cause, we say, is Brahman. Since the other forms +of existence (such as increase, decline, &c.) are included in +origination, subsistence, and dissolution, only the three latter +are referred to in the Sûtra. As the six stages of existence +enumerated by Yâska<a id="footnotetag62" name= +"footnotetag62"></a><a href="#footnote62"><sup>62</sup></a> are +possible only during the period of the world's subsistence, it +might—were they referred to in the Sûtra—be +suspected that what is meant are not the origin, subsistence, and +dissolution (of the world) as dependent on the first cause. To +preclude this suspicion the Sûtra is to be taken as +referring, in addition to the world's origination from Brahman, +only to its subsistence in Brahman, and final dissolution into +Brahman.</p> +<p>The origin, &c. of a world possessing the attributes stated +above cannot possibly proceed from anything else but a Lord +possessing the stated qualities; not either from a non-intelligent +prâdhana<a id="footnotetag63" name= +"footnotetag63"></a><a href="#footnote63"><sup>63</sup></a>, or +from atoms, or from non-being, <span class="pagenum"><a name= +"page17" id="page17"></a>{17}</span> or from a being subject to +transmigration<a id="footnotetag64" name= +"footnotetag64"></a><a href="#footnote64"><sup>64</sup></a>; nor, +again, can it proceed from its own nature (i.e. spontaneously, +without a cause), since we observe that (for the production of +effects) special places, times, and causes have invariably to be +employed.</p> +<p>(Some of) those who maintain a Lord to be the cause of the +world<a id="footnotetag65" name="footnotetag65"></a><a href= +"#footnote65"><sup>65</sup></a>, think that the existence of a Lord +different from mere transmigrating beings can be inferred by means +of the argument stated just now (without recourse being had to +Scripture at all).—But, it might be said, you yourself in the +Sûtra under discussion have merely brought forward the same +argument!—By no means, we reply. The Sûtras (i.e. +literally 'the strings') have merely the purpose of stringing +together the flowers of the Vedânta-passages. In reality the +Vedânta-passages referred to by the Sûtras are +discussed here. For the comprehension of Brahman is effected by the +ascertainment, consequent on discussion, of the sense of the +Vedânta-texts, not either by inference or by the other means +of right knowledge. While, however, the Vedânta-passages +primarily declare the cause of the origin, &c., of the world, +inference also, being an instrument of right knowledge in so far as +it does not contradict the Vedânta-texts, is not to be +excluded as a means of confirming the meaning ascertained. +Scripture itself, moreover, allows argumentation; for the passages, +B<i>ri</i>. Up. II, 4, 5 ('the Self is to be heard, to be +considered'), and Ch. Up. VI, 14, 2 ('as the man, &c., having +been informed, and being able to judge for himself, would arrive at +Gandhâra, in the same way a man who meets with a teacher +obtains knowledge'), declare that human understanding assists +Scripture<a id="footnotetag66" name="footnotetag66"></a><a href= +"#footnote66"><sup>66</sup></a>.</p> +<p>Scriptural text, &c.<a id="footnotetag67" name= +"footnotetag67"></a><a href="#footnote67"><sup>67</sup></a>, are +not, in the enquiry into Brahman, <span class="pagenum"><a name= +"page18" id="page18"></a>{18}</span> the only means of knowledge, +as they are in the enquiry into active duty (i.e. in the +Pûrva Mimâ<i>m</i>sâ), but scriptural texts on +the one hand, and intuition<a id="footnotetag68" name= +"footnotetag68"></a><a href="#footnote68"><sup>68</sup></a>, +&c., on the other hand, are to be had recourse to according to +the occasion: firstly, because intuition is the final result of the +enquiry into Brahman; secondly, because the object of the enquiry +is an existing (accomplished) substance. If the object of the +knowledge of Brahman were something to be accomplished, there would +be no reference to intuition, and text, &c., would be the only +means of knowledge. The origination of something to be accomplished +depends, moreover, on man since any action either of ordinary life, +or dependent on the Veda may either be done or not be done, or be +done in a different way. A man, for instance, may move on either by +means of a horse, or by means of his feet, or by some other means, +or not at all. And again (to quote examples of actions dependent on +the Veda), we meet in Scripture with sentences such as the +following: 'At the atirâtra he takes the sho<i>d</i>asin +cup,' and 'at the atirâtra he does not take the +sho<i>d</i>asin cup;' or, 'he makes the oblation after the sun has +risen,' and, 'he makes the oblation when the sun has not yet +risen.' Just as in the quoted instances, injunctions and +prohibitions, allowances of optional procedure, general rules and +exceptions have their place, so they would have their place with +regard to Brahman also (if the latter were a thing to be +accomplished). But the fact is that no option is possible as to +whether a substance is to be thus or thus, is to be or not to be. +All option depends on the notions of man; but the knowledge of the +real nature of a thing does not depend on the notions of man, but +only on the thing itself. For to think with regard to a post, 'this +is a post or a man, or something else,' is not knowledge of truth; +the two ideas, 'it is a man or something else,' being false, and +only the third idea, 'it <span class="pagenum"><a name="page19" id= +"page19"></a>{19}</span> is a post,' which depends on the thing +itself, falling under the head of true knowledge. Thus true +knowledge of all existing things depends on the things themselves, +and hence the knowledge of Brahman also depends altogether on the +thing, i.e. Brahman itself.—But, it might be said, as Brahman +is an existing substance, it will be the object of the other means +of right knowledge also, and from this it follows that a discussion +of the Vedânta-texts is purposeless.—This we deny; for +as Brahman is not an object of the senses, it has no connection +with those other means of knowledge. For the senses have, according +to their nature, only external things for their objects, not +Brahman. If Brahman were an object of the senses, we might perceive +that the world is connected with Brahman as its effect; but as the +effect only (i.e. the world) is perceived, it is impossible to +decide (through perception) whether it is connected with Brahman or +something else. Therefore the Sûtra under discussion is not +meant to propound inference (as the means of knowing Brahman), but +rather to set forth a Vedânta-text.—Which, then, is the +Vedânta-text which the Sûtra points at as having to be +considered with reference to the characteristics of +Brahman?—It is the passage Taitt. Up. III, 1, 'Bh<i>ri</i>gu +Vâru<i>n</i>i went to his father Varu<i>n</i>a, saying, Sir, +teach me Brahman,' &c., up to 'That from whence these beings +are born, that by which, when born, they live, that into which they +enter at their death, try to know that. That is Brahman.' The +sentence finally determining the sense of this passage is found +III, 6: 'From bliss these beings are born; by bliss, when born, +they live; into bliss they enter at their death.' Other passages +also are to be adduced which declare the cause to be the almighty +Being, whose essential nature is eternal purity, intelligence, and +freedom.</p> +<p>That Brahman is omniscient we have been made to infer from it +being shown that it is the cause of the world. To confirm this +conclusion, the Sûtrakâra continues as follows:</p> +<p>3. (The omniscience of Brahman follows) from its being the +source of Scripture.</p> +<span class="pagenum"><a name="page20" id="page20"></a>{20}</span> +<p>Brahman is the source, i.e. the cause of the great body of +Scripture, consisting of the <i>Ri</i>g-veda and other branches, +which is supported by various disciplines (such as grammar, +nyâya, purâ<i>n</i>a, &c.); which lamp-like +illuminates all things; which is itself all-knowing as it were. For +the origin of a body of Scripture possessing the quality of +omniscience cannot be sought elsewhere but in omniscience itself. +It is generally understood that the man from whom some special body +of doctrine referring to one province of knowledge only originates, +as, for instance, grammar from Pâ<i>n</i>ini possesses a more +extensive knowledge than his work, comprehensive though it be; what +idea, then, shall we have to form of the supreme omniscience and +omnipotence of that great Being, which in sport as it were, easily +as a man sends forth his breath, has produced the vast mass of holy +texts known as the <i>Ri</i>g-veda, &c., the mine of all +knowledge, consisting of manifold branches, the cause of the +distinction of all the different classes and conditions of gods, +animals, and men! See what Scripture says about him, 'The +<i>Ri</i>g-veda, &c., have been breathed forth from that great +Being' (B<i>ri</i>. Up. II, 4, 10).</p> +<p>Or else we may interpret the Sûtra to mean that Scripture +consisting of the <i>Ri</i>g-veda, &c., as described above, is +the source or cause, i.e. the means of right knowledge through +which we understand the nature of Brahman. So that the sense would +be: through Scripture only as a means of knowledge Brahman is known +to be the cause of the origin, &c., of the world. The special +scriptural passage meant has been quoted under the preceding +Sûtra 'from which these beings are born,' &c.—But +as the preceding Sûtra already has pointed out a text showing +that Scripture is the source of Brahman, of what use then is the +present Sûtra?—The words of the preceding Sûtra, +we reply, did not clearly indicate the scriptural passage, and room +was thus left for the suspicion that the origin, &c., of the +world were adduced merely as determining an inference (independent +of Scripture). To obviate this suspicion the Sûtra under +discussion has been propounded.</p> +<p>But, again, how can it be said that Scripture is the means of +knowing Brahman? Since it has been declared that Scripture aims at +action (according to the Pûrva +Mîmâ<i>m</i>sâ <span class="pagenum"><a name= +"page21" id="page21"></a>{21}</span> Sûtra I, 2, 1, 'As the +purport of Scripture is action, those scriptural passages whose +purport is not action are purportless'), the Vedânta-passages +whose purport is not action are purportless. Or else if they are to +have some sense, they must either, by manifesting the agent, the +divinity or the fruit of the action, form supplements to the +passages enjoining actions, or serve the purpose of themselves +enjoining a new class of actions, such as devout meditation and the +like. For the Veda cannot possibly aim at conveying information +regarding the nature of accomplished substances, since the latter +are the objects of perception and the other means of proof (which +give sufficient information about them; while it is the recognised +object of the Veda to give information about what is not known from +other sources). And if it did give such information, it would not +be connected with things to be desired or shunned, and thus be of +no use to man. For this very reason Vedic passages, such as 'he +howled, &c.,' which at first sight appear purposeless, are +shown to have a purpose in so far as they glorify certain actions +(cp. Pû. Mî. Sû. I, 2, 7, 'Because they stand in +syntactical connection with the injunctions, therefore their +purport is to glorify the injunctions'). In the same way mantras +are shown to stand in a certain relation to actions, in so far as +they notify the actions themselves and the means by which they are +accomplished. So, for instance, the mantra, 'For strength thee (I +cut;' which accompanies the cutting of a branch employed in the +dar<i>s</i>apûr<i>n</i>amâsa-sacrifice). In short, no +Vedic passage is seen or can be proved to have a meaning but in so +far as it is related to an action. And injunctions which are +defined as having actions for their objects cannot refer to +accomplished existent things. Hence we maintain that the +Vedânta-texts are mere supplements to those passages which +enjoin actions; notifying the agents, divinities, and results +connected with those actions. Or else, if this be not admitted, on +the ground of its involving the introduction of a subject-matter +foreign to the Vedânta-texts (viz. the subject-matter of the +Karmakâ<i>nd</i>a of the Veda), we must admit (the second of +the two alternatives proposed above viz.) that the <span class= +"pagenum"><a name="page22" id="page22"></a>{22}</span> +Vedânta-texts refer to devout meditation +(upâsanâ) and similar actions which are mentioned in +those very (Vedânta) texts. The result of all of which is +that Scripture is not the source of Brahman.</p> +<p>To this argumentation the Sûtrakâra replies as +follows:</p> +<p>4. But that (Brahman is to be known from Scripture), because it +is connected (with the Vedânta-texts) as their purport.</p> +<p>The word 'but' is meant to rebut the pûrva-paksha (the +primâ facie view as urged above). That all-knowing, +all-powerful Brahman, which is the cause of the origin, +subsistence, and dissolution of the world, is known from the +Vedânta-part of Scripture. How? Because in all the +Vedânta-texts the sentences construe in so far as they have +for their purport, as they intimate that matter (viz. Brahman). +Compare, for instance, 'Being only this was in the beginning, one, +without a second' (Ch. Up. VI, 2, 1); 'In the beginning all this +was Self, one only' (Ait. Âr. II, 4, 1, 1); 'This is the +Brahman without cause and without effect, without anything inside +or outside; this Self is Brahman perceiving everything' +(B<i>ri</i>. Up. II, 5, 19); 'That immortal Brahman is before' (Mu. +Up. II, 2, 11); and similar passages. If the words contained in +these passages have once been determined to refer to Brahman, and +their purport is understood thereby, it would be improper to assume +them to have a different sense; for that would involve the fault of +abandoning the direct statements of the text in favour of mere +assumptions. Nor can we conclude the purport of these passages to +be the intimation of the nature of agents, divinities, &c. +(connected with acts of religious duty); for there are certain +scriptural passages which preclude all actions, actors, and fruits, +as, for instance, B<i>ri</i>. Up. II, 4, 13, 'Then by what should +he see whom?' (which passage intimates that there is neither an +agent, nor an object of action, nor an instrument.) Nor again can +Brahman, though it is of the nature of an accomplished thing, be +the object of perception and the other means of <span class= +"pagenum"><a name="page23" id="page23"></a>{23}</span> knowledge; +for the fact of everything having its Self in Brahman cannot be +grasped without the aid of the scriptural passage 'That art thou' +(Ch. Up. VI, 8, 7). Nor can it rightly be objected that instruction +is purportless if not connected with something either to be striven +after or shunned; for from the mere comprehension of Brahman's +Self, which is not something either to be avoided or endeavoured +after, there results cessation of all pain, and thereby the +attainment of man's highest aim. That passages notifying certain +divinities, and so on, stand in subordinate relation to acts of +devout meditation mentioned in the same chapters may readily be +admitted. But it is impossible that Brahman should stand in an +analogous relation to injunctions of devout meditation, for if the +knowledge of absolute unity has once arisen there exists no longer +anything to be desired or avoided, and thereby the conception of +duality, according to which we distinguish actions, agents, and the +like, is destroyed. If the conception of duality is once uprooted +by the conception of absolute unity, it cannot arise again, and so +no longer be the cause of Brahman being looked upon as the +complementary object of injunctions of devotion. Other parts of the +Veda may have no authority except in so far as they are connected +with injunctions; still it is impossible to impugn on that ground +the authoritativeness of passages conveying the knowledge of the +Self; for such passages have their own result. Nor, finally, can +the authoritativeness of the Veda be proved by inferential +reasoning so that it would be dependent on instances observed +elsewhere. From all which it follows that the Veda possesses +authority as a means of right knowledge of Brahman.</p> +<p>Here others raise the following objection:—Although the +Veda is the means of gaining a right knowledge of Brahman, yet it +intimates Brahman only as the object of certain injunctions, just +as the information which the Veda gives about the sacrificial post, +the âhavanîya-fire and other objects not known from the +practice of common life is merely supplementary to certain +injunctions<a id="footnotetag69" name="footnotetag69"></a><a href= +"#footnote69"><sup>69</sup></a>. Why so? <span class= +"pagenum"><a name="page24" id="page24"></a>{24}</span> Because the +Veda has the purport of either instigating to action or restraining +from it. For men fully acquainted with the object of the Veda have +made the following declaration, 'The purpose of the Veda is seen to +be the injunction of actions' (Bhâshya on Jaimini Sûtra +I, 1, 1); 'Injunction means passages impelling to action' (Bh. on +Jaim. Sû. I, 1, 2); 'Of this (viz. active religious duty) the +knowledge comes from injunction' (part of Jaim. Sû. I, 1, 5); +'The (words) denoting those (things) are to be connected with (the +injunctive verb of the vidhi-passage) whose purport is action' +(Jaim. Sû. I, 1, 25); 'As action is the purport of the Veda, +whatever does not refer to action is purportless' (Jaim. Sû. +I, 2, 1). Therefore the Veda has a purport in so far only as it +rouses the activity of man with regard to some actions and +restrains it with regard to others; other passages (i.e. all those +passages which are not directly injunctive) have a purport only in +so far as they supplement injunctions and prohibitions. Hence the +Vedânta-texts also as likewise belonging to the Veda can have +a meaning in the same way only. And if their aim is injunction, +then just as the agnihotra-oblation and other rites are enjoined as +means for him who is desirous of the heavenly world, so the +knowledge of Brahman is enjoined as a means for him who is desirous +of immortality.—But—somebody might object—it has +been declared that there is a difference in the character of the +objects enquired into, the object of enquiry in the +karma-kâ<i>nd</i>a (that part of the Veda which treats of +active religious duty) being something to be accomplished, viz. +duty, while here the object is the already existent absolutely +accomplished Brahman. From this it follows that the fruit of the +knowledge of Brahman must be of a different nature from the fruit +of the knowledge of duty which depends on the performance of +actions<a id="footnotetag70" name="footnotetag70"></a><a href= +"#footnote70"><sup>70</sup></a>.—We reply that it must not be +such because the <span class="pagenum"><a name="page25" id= +"page25"></a>{25}</span> Vedânta-texts give information about +Brahman only in so far as it is connected with injunctions of +actions. We meet with injunctions of the following kind, 'Verily +the Self is to be seen' (B<i>ri</i>. Up. II, 4, 5); 'The Self which +is free from sin that it is which we must search out, that it is +which we must try to understand' (Ch. Up. VIII, 7, 1); 'Let a man +worship him as Self' (B<i>ri</i>. Up. I, 4, 7); 'Let a man worship +the Self only as his true state' (B<i>ri</i>. Up. I, 4, 15); 'He +who knows Brahman becomes Brahman' (Mu. Up. III, 2, 9). These +injunctions rouse in us the desire to know what that Brahman is. +It, therefore, is the task of the Vedânta-texts to set forth +Brahman's nature, and they perform that task by teaching us that +Brahman is eternal, all-knowing, absolutely self-sufficient, ever +pure, intelligent and free, pure knowledge, absolute bliss. From +the devout meditation on this Brahman there results as its fruit, +final release, which, although not to be discerned in the ordinary +way, is discerned by means of the <i>s</i>âstra. If, on the +other hand, the Vedânta-texts were considered to have no +reference to injunctions of actions, but to contain statements +about mere (accomplished) things, just as if one were saying 'the +earth comprises seven dvipas,' 'that king is marching on,' they +would be purportless, because then they could not possibly be +connected with something to be shunned or endeavoured +after.—Perhaps it will here be objected that sometimes a mere +statement about existent things has a purpose, as, for instance, +the affirmation, 'This is a rope, not a snake,' serves the purpose +of removing the fear engendered by an erroneous opinion, and that +so likewise the Vedânta-passages making statements about the +non-transmigrating Self, have a purport of their own (without +reference to any action), viz. in so far as they remove the +erroneous opinion of the Self being liable to +transmigration.—We reply that this might <span class= +"pagenum"><a name="page26" id="page26"></a>{26}</span> be so if +just as the mere hearing of the true nature of the rope dispels the +fear caused by the imagined snake, so the mere hearing of the true +nature of Brahman would dispel the erroneous notion of one's being +subject to transmigration. But this is not the case; for we observe +that even men to whom the true nature of Brahman has been stated +continue to be affected by pleasure, pain, and the other qualities +attaching to the transmigratory condition. Moreover, we see from +the passage, <i>Bri</i>. Up. II, 4, 5, 'The Self is to be heard, to +be considered, to be reflected upon,' that consideration and +reflection have to follow the mere hearing. From all this it +results that the sâstra can be admitted as a means of knowing +Brahman in so far only as the latter is connected with +injunctions.</p> +<p>To all this, we, the Vedântins, make the following +reply:—The preceding reasoning is not valid, on account of +the different nature of the fruits of actions on the one side, and +of the knowledge of Brahman on the other side. The enquiry into +those actions, whether of body, speech, or mind, which are known +from <i>S</i>ruti and Sm<i>ri</i>ti, and are comprised under the +name 'religious duty' (dharma), is carried on in the Jaimini +Sûtra, which begins with the words 'then therefore the +enquiry into duty;' the opposite of duty also (adharma), such as +doing harm, &c., which is defined in the prohibitory +injunctions, forms an object of enquiry to the end that it may be +avoided. The fruits of duty, which is good, and its opposite, which +is evil, both of which are defined by original Vedic statements, +are generally known to be sensible pleasure and pain, which make +themselves felt to body, speech, and mind only, are produced by the +contact of the organs of sense with the objects, and affect all +animate beings from Brahman down to a tuft of grass. Scripture, +agreeing with observation, states that there are differences in the +degree of pleasure of all embodied creatures from men upward to +Brahman. From those differences it is inferred that there are +differences in the degrees of the merit acquired by actions in +accordance with religious duty; therefrom again are inferred +differences in degree between those qualified to perform +<span class="pagenum"><a name="page27" id="page27"></a>{27}</span> +acts of religious duty. Those latter differences are moreover known +to be affected by the desire of certain results (which entitles the +man so desirous to perform certain religious acts), worldly +possessions, and the like. It is further known from Scripture that +those only who perform sacrifices proceed, in consequence of the +pre-eminence of their knowledge and meditation, on the northern +path (of the sun; Ch. Up. V, 10, 1), while mere minor offerings, +works of public utility and alms, only lead through smoke and the +other stages to the southern path. And that there also (viz. in the +moon which is finally reached by those who have passed along the +southern path) there are degrees of pleasure and the means of +pleasure is understood from the passage 'Having dwelt there till +their works are consumed.' Analogously it is understood that the +different degrees of pleasure which are enjoyed by the embodied +creatures, from man downward to the inmates of hell and to +immovable things, are the mere effects of religious merit as +defined in Vedic injunctions. On the other hand, from the different +degrees of pain endured by higher and lower embodied creatures, +there is inferred difference of degree in its cause, viz. religious +demerit as defined in the prohibitory injunctions, and in its +agents. This difference in the degree of pain and pleasure, which +has for its antecedent embodied existence, and for its cause the +difference of degree of merit and demerit of animated beings, +liable to faults such as ignorance and the like, is well +known—from <i>S</i>ruti, Sm<i>ri</i>ti, and +reasoning—to be non-eternal, of a fleeting, changing nature +(sa<i>m</i>sâra). The following text, for instance, 'As long +as he is in the body he cannot get free from pleasure and pain' +(Ch. Up. VIII, 12, 1), refers to the sa<i>m</i>sâra-state as +described above. From the following passage, on the other hand, +'When he is free from the body then neither pleasure nor pain +touches him,' which denies the touch of pain or pleasure, we learn +that the unembodied state called 'final release' (moksha) is +declared not to be the effect of religious merit as defined by +Vedic injunctions. For if it were the effect of merit it would not +be denied that it is subject to pain and pleasure. Should it be +said <span class="pagenum"><a name="page28" id= +"page28"></a>{28}</span> that the very circumstance of its being an +unembodied state is the effect of merit, we reply that that cannot +be, since Scripture declares that state to be naturally and +originally an unembodied one. 'The wise who knows the Self as +bodiless within the bodies, as unchanging among changing things, as +great and omnipresent does never grieve' (Ka. Up. II, 22); 'He is +without breath, without mind, pure' (Mu. Up. II, 1, 2); 'That +person is not attached to anything' (B<i>ri</i>. Up. IV, 3, +15)<a id="footnotetag71" name="footnotetag71"></a><a href= +"#footnote71"><sup>71</sup></a>. All which passages establish the +fact that so-called release differs from all the fruits of action, +and is an eternally and essentially disembodied state. Among +eternal things, some indeed may be 'eternal, although changing' +(pari<i>n</i>âminitya), viz. those, the idea of whose +identity is not destroyed, although they may undergo changes; such, +for instance, are earth and the other elements in the opinion of +those who maintain the eternity of the world, or the three +gu<i>n</i>as in the opinion of the Sâ@nkhyas. But this +(moksha) is eternal in the true sense, i.e. eternal without +undergoing any changes (kû<i>ta</i>sthanitya), omnipresent as +ether, free from all modifications, absolutely self-sufficient, not +composed of parts, of self-luminous nature. That bodiless entity in +fact, to which merit and demerit with their consequences and +threefold time do not apply, is called release; a definition +agreeing with scriptural passages, such as the following: +'Different from merit and demerit, different from effect and cause, +different from past and future' (Ka. Up. I, 2, 14). It<a id= +"footnotetag72" name="footnotetag72"></a><a href= +"#footnote72"><sup>72</sup></a> (i.e. moksha) is, therefore, the +same as Brahman in the enquiry into which we are at present +engaged. If Brahman were represented as supplementary to certain +actions, and release <span class="pagenum"><a name="page29" id= +"page29"></a>{29}</span> were assumed to be the effect of those +actions, it would be non-eternal, and would have to be considered +merely as something holding a pre-eminent position among the +described non-eternal fruits of actions with their various degrees. +But that release is something eternal is acknowledged by whoever +admits it at all, and the teaching concerning Brahman can therefore +not be merely supplementary to actions.</p> +<p>There are, moreover, a number of scriptural passages which +declare release to follow immediately on the cognition of Brahman, +and which thus preclude the possibility of an effect intervening +between the two; for instance, 'He who knows Brahman becomes +Brahman' (Mu. Up. III, 2, 9); 'All his works perish when He has +been beheld, who is the higher and the lower' (Mu. Up. II, 2, 8); +'He who knows the bliss of Brahman fears nothing' (Taitt. Up. II, +9); 'O Janaka, you have indeed reached fearlessness' (B<i>ri</i>. +Up. IV, 2, 4); 'That Brahman knew its Self only, saying, I am +Brahman. From it all this sprang' (B<i>ri</i>. Up. I, 4, 10); 'What +sorrow, what trouble can there be to him who beholds that unity?' +(Îs. Up. 7.) We must likewise quote the +passage,—B<i>ri</i>. Up. I, 4, 10, ('Seeing this the +<i>Ri</i>shi Vâmadeva understood: I was Manu, I was the +sun,') in order to exclude the idea of any action taking place +between one's seeing Brahman and becoming one with the universal +Self; for that passage is analogous to the following one, 'standing +he sings,' from which we understand that no action due to the same +agent intervenes between the standing and the singing. Other +scriptural passages show that the removal of the obstacles which +lie in the way of release is the only fruit of the knowledge of +Brahman; so, for instance, 'You indeed are our father, you who +carry us from our ignorance to the other shore' (Pr. Up. VI, 8); 'I +have heard from men like you that he who knows the Self overcomes +grief. I am in grief. Do, Sir, help me over this grief of mine' +(Ch. Up. VII, 1, 3); 'To him after his faults had been rubbed out, +the venerable Sanatkumâra showed the other side of darkness' +(Ch. Up. VII, 26, 2). The same is the purport of the Sûtra, +supported by arguments, of (Gautama) Âkârya, 'Final +release <span class="pagenum"><a name="page30" id= +"page30"></a>{30}</span> results from the successive removal of +wrong knowledge, faults, activity, birth, pain, the removal of each +later member of the series depending on the removal of the +preceding member' (Nyây. Sû. I, i, 2); and wrong +knowledge itself is removed by the knowledge of one's Self being +one with the Self of Brahman.</p> +<p>Nor is this knowledge of the Self being one with Brahman a mere +(fanciful) combination<a id="footnotetag73" name= +"footnotetag73"></a><a href="#footnote73"><sup>73</sup></a>, as is +made use of, for instance, in the following passage, 'For the mind +is endless, and the Vi<i>s</i>vedevas are endless, and he thereby +gains the endless world' (B<i>ri</i>. Up. III, 1, 9)<a id= +"footnotetag74" name="footnotetag74"></a><a href= +"#footnote74"><sup>74</sup></a>; nor is it an (in reality +unfounded) ascription (superimposition)<a id="footnotetag75" name= +"footnotetag75"></a><a href="#footnote75"><sup>75</sup></a>, as in +the passages, 'Let him meditate on mind as Brahman,' and +'Âditya is Brahman, this is the doctrine' (Ch. Up. III, 18, +1; 19, 1), where the contemplation as Brahman is superimposed on +the mind, Âditya and so on; nor, again, is it (a figurative +conception of identity) founded on the connection (of the things +viewed as identical) with some special activity, as in the passage, +'Air is indeed the absorber; breath is indeed the absorber<a id= +"footnotetag76" name="footnotetag76"></a><a href= +"#footnote76"><sup>76</sup></a>' (Ch. Up. IV, 3, 1; 3); nor is it a +mere (ceremonial) purification of (the Self constituting a +subordinate member) of an action (viz. the action of seeing, +&c., Brahman), in the same way as, for instance, the act of +looking at the sacrificial <span class="pagenum"><a name="page31" +id="page31"></a>{31}</span> butter<a id="footnotetag77" name= +"footnotetag77"></a><a href="#footnote77"><sup>77</sup></a>. For if +the knowledge of the identity of the Self and Brahman were +understood in the way of combination and the like, violence would +be done thereby to the connection of the words whose object, in +certain passages, it clearly is to intimate the fact of Brahman and +the Self being really identical; so, for instance, in the following +passages, 'That art thou' (Ch. Up. VI, 8, 7); 'I am Brahman' +(B<i>ri</i>. Up. I, 4, 10); 'This Self is Brahman' (B<i>ri</i>. Up. +II, 5, 19). And other texts which declare that the fruit of the +cognition of Brahman is the cessation of Ignorance would be +contradicted thereby; so, for instance, 'The fetter of the heart is +broken, all doubts are solved' (Mu. Up. II, 2, 8). Nor, finally, +would it be possible, in that case, satisfactorily to explain the +passages which speak of the individual Self becoming Brahman: such +as 'He who knows Brahman becomes Brahman' (Mu. Up. III, 2, 9). +Hence the knowledge of the unity of Brahman and the Self cannot be +of the nature of figurative combination and the like. The knowledge +of Brahman does, therefore, not depend on the active energy of man, +but is analogous to the knowledge of those things which are the +objects of perception, inference, and so on, and thus depends on +the object of knowledge only. Of such a Brahman or its knowledge it +is impossible to establish, by reasoning, any connection with +actions.</p> +<p>Nor, again, can we connect Brahman with acts by representing it +as the object of the action of knowing. For that it is not such is +expressly declared in two passages, viz. 'It is different from the +known and again above (i.e. different from) the unknown' (Ken. Up. +I, 3); and 'How should he know him by whom he knows all this?' +(B<i>ri</i>. Up. II, 4, 13.) In the same way Brahman is expressly +declared not to be the object of the act of devout meditation, viz. +in the second half of the verse, Ken. Up. I, 5, whose first half +<span class="pagenum"><a name="page32" id="page32"></a>{32}</span> +declares it not to be an object (of speech, mind, and so on), 'That +which is not proclaimed by speech, by which speech is proclaimed, +that only know to be Brahman, not that on which people devoutly +meditate as this.' If it should be objected that if Brahman is not +an object (of speech, mind, &c.) the sâstra can +impossibly be its source, we refute this objection by the remark +that the aim of the sâstra is to discard all distinctions +fictitiously created by Nescience. The sâstra's purport is +not to represent Brahman definitely as this or that object, its +purpose is rather to show that Brahman as the eternal subject +(pratyagâtman, the inward Self) is never an object, and +thereby to remove the distinction of objects known, knowers, acts +of knowledge, &c., which is fictitiously created by Nescience. +Accordingly the sâstra says, 'By whom it is not thought by +him it is thought, by whom it is thought he does not know it; +unknown by those who know it, it is known by those who do not know +it' (Ken. Up. II, 3); and 'Thou couldst not see the seer of sight, +thou couldst not hear the hearer of hearing, nor perceive the +perceiver of perception, nor know the knower of knowledge' +(B<i>ri</i>. Up. III, 4, 2). As thereby (i.e. by the knowledge +derived from the sâstra) the imagination of the +transitoriness of Release which is due to Nescience is discarded, +and Release is shown to be of the nature of the eternally free +Self, it cannot be charged with the imperfection of non-eternality. +Those, on the other hand, who consider Release to be something to +be effected properly maintain that it depends on the action of +mind, speech, or body. So, likewise, those who consider it to be a +mere modification. Non-eternality of Release is the certain +consequence of these two opinions; for we observe in common life +that things which are modifications, such as sour milk and the +like, and things which are effects, such as jars, &c., are +non-eternal. Nor, again, can it be said that there is a dependance +on action in consequence of (Brahman or Release) being something +which is to be obtained<a id="footnotetag78" name= +"footnotetag78"></a><a href="#footnote78"><sup>78</sup></a>; for as +Brahman constitutes a person's Self it is <span class= +"pagenum"><a name="page33" id="page33"></a>{33}</span> not +something to be attained by that person. And even if Brahman were +altogether different from a person's Self still it would not be +something to be obtained; for as it is omnipresent it is part of +its nature that it is ever present to every one, just as the +(all-pervading) ether is. Nor, again, can it be maintained that +Release is something to be ceremonially purified, and as such +depends on an activity. For ceremonial purification +(sa<i>m</i>skâra) results either from the accretion of some +excellence or from the removal of some blemish. The former +alternative does not apply to Release as it is of the nature of +Brahman, to which no excellence can be added; nor, again, does the +latter alternative apply, since Release is of the nature of +Brahman, which is eternally pure.—But, it might be said, +Release might be a quality of the Self which is merely hidden and +becomes manifest on the Self being purified by some action; just as +the quality of clearness becomes manifest in a mirror when the +mirror is cleaned by means of the action of rubbing.—This +objection is invalid, we reply, because the Self cannot be the +abode of any action. For an action cannot exist without modifying +that in which it abides. But if the Self were modified by an action +its non-eternality would result therefrom, and texts such as the +following, 'unchangeable he is called,' would thus be stultified; +an altogether unacceptable result. Hence it is impossible to assume +that any action should abide in the Self. On the other hand, the +Self cannot be purified by actions abiding in something else as it +stands in no relation to that extraneous something. Nor will it +avail to point out (as a quasi-analogous case) that the embodied +Self (dehin, the individual soul) is purified by certain ritual +actions which abide in the body, such as bathing, rinsing one's +mouth, wearing the sacrificial thread, and the like. For what is +purified by those actions is that Self merely which is joined to +the body, i.e. the Self in so far as it is under the power of +Nescience. For it is a matter of perception <span class= +"pagenum"><a name="page34" id="page34"></a>{34}</span> that bathing +and similar actions stand in the relation of inherence to the body, +and it is therefore only proper to conclude that by such actions +only that something is purified which is joined to the body. If a +person thinks 'I am free from disease,' he predicates health of +that entity only which is connected with and mistakenly identifies +itself with the harmonious condition of matter (i.e. the body) +resulting from appropriate medical treatment applied to the body +(i.e. the 'I' constituting the subject of predication is only the +individual embodied Self). Analogously that I which predicates of +itself, that it is purified by bathing and the like, is only the +individual soul joined to the body. For it is only this latter +principle of egoity (aha<i>m</i>kart<i>ri</i>), the object of the +notion of the ego and the agent in all cognition, which +accomplishes all actions and enjoys their results. Thus the mantras +also declare, 'One of them eats the sweet fruit, the other looks on +without eating' (Mu. Up. III, 1, 1); and 'When he is in union with +the body, the senses, and the mind, then wise people call him the +Enjoyer' (Ka. Up. III, 1, 4). Of Brahman, on the other hand, the +two following passages declare that it is incapable of receiving +any accretion and eternally pure, 'He is the one God, hidden in all +beings, all-pervading, the Self within all beings, watching over +all works, dwelling in all beings, the witness, the perceiver, the +only one; free from qualities' (<i>S</i>v. Up. VI, 11); and 'He +pervaded all, bright, incorporeal, scatheless, without muscles, +pure, untouched by evil' (Î<i>s</i>. Up. 8). But Release is +nothing but being Brahman. Therefore Release is not something to be +purified. And as nobody is able to show any other way in which +Release could be connected with action, it is impossible that it +should stand in any, even the slightest, relation to any action, +excepting knowledge.</p> +<p>But, it will be said here, knowledge itself is an activity of +the mind. By no means, we reply; since the two are of different +nature. An action is that which is enjoined as being independent of +the nature of existing things and dependent on the energy of some +person's mind; compare, for instance, the following passages, 'To +whichever divinity the <span class="pagenum"><a name="page35" id= +"page35"></a>{35}</span> offering is made on that one let him +meditate when about to say vasha<i>t</i>' (Ait. Brâhm. III, +8, 1); and 'Let him meditate in his mind on the sandhyâ.' +Meditation and reflection are indeed mental, but as they depend on +the (meditating, &c.) person they may either be performed or +not be performed or modified. Knowledge, on the other hand, is the +result of the different means of (right) knowledge, and those have +for their objects existing things; knowledge can therefore not be +either made or not made or modified, but depends entirely on +existing things, and not either on Vedic statements or on the mind +of man. Although mental it thus widely differs from meditation and +the like.</p> +<p>The meditation, for instance, on man and woman as fire, which is +founded on Ch. Up. V, 7, 1; 8, 1, 'The fire is man, O Gautama; the +fire is woman, O Gautama,' is on account of its being the result of +a Vedic statement, merely an action and dependent on man; that +conception of fire, on the other hand, which refers to the +well-known (real) fire, is neither dependent on Vedic statements +nor on man, but only on a real thing which is an object of +perception; it is therefore knowledge and not an action. The same +remark applies to all things which are the objects of the different +means of right knowledge. This being thus that knowledge also which +has the existent Brahman for its object is not dependent on Vedic +injunction. Hence, although imperative and similar forms referring +to the knowledge of Brahman are found in the Vedic texts, yet they +are ineffective because they refer to something which cannot be +enjoined, just as the edge of a razor becomes blunt when it is +applied to a stone. For they have for their object something which +can neither be endeavoured after nor avoided.—But what then, +it will be asked, is the purport of those sentences which, at any +rate, have the appearance of injunctions; such as, 'The Self is to +be seen, to be heard about?'—They have the purport, we reply, +of diverting (men) from the objects of natural activity. For when a +man acts intent on external things, and only anxious to attain the +objects of his desire and to eschew the objects of his aversion, +and does not thereby reach the highest aim of man although desirous +of attaining it; such <span class="pagenum"><a name="page36" id= +"page36"></a>{36}</span> texts as the one quoted divert him from +the objects of natural activity and turn the stream of his thoughts +on the inward (the highest) Self. That for him who is engaged in +the enquiry into the Self, the true nature of the Self is nothing +either to be endeavoured after or to be avoided, we learn from +texts such as the following: 'This everything, all is that Self' +(B<i>ri</i>, Up. II, 4, 6); 'But when the Self only is all this, +how should he see another, how should he know another, how should +he know the knower?' (B<i>ri</i>. Up. IV, 5, 15); 'This Self is +Brahman' (B<i>ri</i>. Up. II, 5, 19). That the knowledge of Brahman +refers to something which is not a thing to be done, and therefore +is not concerned either with the pursuit or the avoidance of any +object, is the very thing we admit; for just that constitutes our +glory, that as soon as we comprehend Brahman, all our duties come +to an end and all our work is over. Thus <i>S</i>ruti says, 'If a +man understands the Self, saying, "I am he," what could he wish or +desire that he should pine after the body?' (B<i>ri</i>. Up. IV, 4, +12.) And similarly Sm<i>ri</i>ti declares, 'Having understood this +the understanding man has done with all work, O Bhârata' +(Bha. Gîtâ XV, 20). Therefore Brahman is not +represented as the object of injunctions.</p> +<p>We now proceed to consider the doctrine of those who maintain +that there is no part of the Veda which has the purport of making +statements about mere existent things, and is not either an +injunction or a prohibition, or supplementary to either. This +opinion is erroneous, because the soul (purusha), which is the +subject of the Upanishads, does not constitute a complement to +anything else. Of that soul which is to be comprehended from the +Upanishads only, which is non-transmigratory, Brahman, different in +nature from the four classes of substances<a id="footnotetag79" +name="footnotetag79"></a><a href="#footnote79"><sup>79</sup></a>, +which forms a topic of its own and is not a complement to anything +else; of that <span class="pagenum"><a name="page37" id= +"page37"></a>{37}</span> soul it is impossible to say that it is +not or is not apprehended; for the passage, 'That Self is to be +described by No, no!' (B<i>ri</i>. Up. III, 9, 26) designates it as +the Self, and that the Self is cannot be denied. The possible +objection that there is no reason to maintain that the soul is +known from the Upanishads only, since it is the object of +self-consciousness, is refuted by the fact that the soul of which +the Upanishads treat is merely the witness of that (i.e. of the +object of self-consciousness, viz. the jîvâtman). For +neither from that part of the Veda which enjoins works nor from +reasoning, anybody apprehends that soul which, different from the +agent that is the object of self-consciousness, merely witnesses +it; which is permanent in all (transitory) beings; uniform; one; +eternally unchanging; the Self of everything. Hence it can neither +be denied nor be represented as the mere complement of injunctions; +for of that very person who might deny it it is the Self. And as it +is the Self of all, it can neither be striven after nor avoided. +All perishable things indeed perish, because they are mere +modifications, up to (i.e. exclusive of) the soul. But the soul is +imperishable<a id="footnotetag80" name="footnotetag80"></a><a href= +"#footnote80"><sup>80</sup></a>, as there is no cause why it should +perish; and eternally unchanging, as there is no cause for its +undergoing any modification; hence it is in its essence eternally +pure and free. And from passages, such as 'Beyond the soul there is +nothing; this is the goal, the highest road' (Ka. Up. I, 3, 11), +and 'That soul, taught in the Upanishads, I ask thee' (B<i>ri</i>. +Up. III, 9, 26), it appears that the attribute of resting on the +Upanishads is properly given to the soul, as it constitutes their +chief topic. To say, therefore, that there is no portion of the +Veda referring to existing things, is a mere bold assertion.</p> +<p>With regard to the quotations made of the views of men +acquainted with the purport of the <i>S</i>âstra (who alone +were stated to have declared that the Veda treats of actions) it is +to be understood that they, having to do with the enquiry into +duty, refer to that part of the <i>S</i>âstra which consists +of <span class="pagenum"><a name="page38" id= +"page38"></a>{38}</span> injunctions and prohibitions. With regard +to the other passage quoted ('as action is the purport of the Veda, +whatever does not refer to action is purportless') we remark that +if that passage were taken in an absolutely strict sense (when it +would mean that only those words which denote action have a +meaning), it would follow that all information about existent +things is meaningless<a id="footnotetag81" name= +"footnotetag81"></a><a href="#footnote81"><sup>81</sup></a>. If, on +the other hand, the Veda—in addition to the injunctions of +activity and cessation of activity—does give information +about existent things as being subservient to some action to be +accomplished, why then should it not give information also about +the existent eternally unchangeable Self? For an existent thing, +about which information is given, does not become an act (through +being stated to be subservient to an act).—But, it will be +said, although existent things are not acts, yet, as they are +instrumental to action, the information given about such things is +merely subservient to action.—This, we reply, does not +matter; for although the information may be subservient to action, +the things themselves about which information is given are already +intimated thereby as things which have the power of bringing about +certain actions. Their final end (prayojana) indeed may be +subserviency to some action, but thereby they do not cease to be, +in the information given about them, intimated in +themselves.—Well, and if they are thus intimated, what is +gained thereby for your purpose<a id="footnotetag82" name= +"footnotetag82"></a><a href="#footnote82"><sup>82</sup></a>? We +reply that the information about the Self, which is an existing +thing not comprehended from other sources, is of the same nature +(as the information about other existent things); for by the +comprehension of the Self a stop is put to all false knowledge, +which is the cause of transmigration, and thus a <span class= +"pagenum"><a name="page39" id="page39"></a>{39}</span> purpose is +established which renders the passages relative to Brahman equal to +those passages which give information about things instrumental to +actions. Moreover, there are found (even in that part of the Veda +which treats of actions) such passages as 'a Brâhma<i>n</i>a +is not to be killed,' which teach abstinence from certain actions. +Now abstinence from action is neither action nor instrumental to +action. If, therefore, the tenet that all those passages which do +not express action are devoid of purport were insisted on, it would +follow that all such passages as the one quoted, which teach +abstinence from action, are devoid of purport—a consequence +which is of course unacceptable. Nor, again, can the connexion in +which the word 'not' stands with the action expressed by the verb +'is to be killed'—which action is naturally established<a id= +"footnotetag83" name="footnotetag83"></a><a href= +"#footnote83"><sup>83</sup></a>—be used as a reason for +assuming that 'not' denotes an action non-established +elsewhere<a id="footnotetag84" name="footnotetag84"></a><a href= +"#footnote84"><sup>84</sup></a>, different from the state of mere +passivity implied in the abstinence from the act of killing. For +the peculiar function of the particle 'not' is to intimate the idea +of the non-existence of that with which it is connected, and the +conception of the non-existence (of something to be done) is the +cause of the state of passivity. (Nor can it be objected that, as +soon as that momentary idea has passed away, the state of passivity +will again make room for activity; for) that idea itself passes +away (only after having completely destroyed the natural impulse +prompting to the murder of a Brâhma<i>n</i>a, &c., just +as a fire is extinguished only after having completely consumed its +fuel). Hence we are of opinion that the aim of prohibitory +passages, such as 'a Brâhma<i>n</i>a is not to be killed,' is +a merely passive state, consisting in the abstinence from some +possible action; excepting some special cases, such as the +so-called Prajâpati-vow, &c.<a id="footnotetag85" name= +"footnotetag85"></a><a href="#footnote85"><sup>85</sup></a> Hence +the charge of want of purpose is to be <span class= +"pagenum"><a name="page40" id="page40"></a>{40}</span> considered +as referring (not to the Vedânta-passages, but only) to such +statements about existent things as are of the nature of legends +and the like, and do not serve any purpose of man.</p> +<p>The allegation that a mere statement about an actually existent +thing not connected with an injunction of something to be done, is +purposeless (as, for instance, the statement that the earth +contains seven dvîpas) has already been refuted on the ground +that a purpose is seen to exist in some such statements, as, for +instance, 'this is not a snake, but a rope.'—But how about +the objection raised above that the information about Brahman +cannot be held to have a purpose in the same way as the statement +about a rope has one, because a man even after having heard about +Brahman continues to belong to this transmigratory <span class= +"pagenum"><a name="page41" id="page41"></a>{41}</span> +world?—We reply as follows: It is impossible to show that a +man who has once understood Brahman to be the Self, belongs to the +transmigratory world in the same sense as he did before, because +that would be contrary to the fact of his being Brahman. For we +indeed observe that a person who imagines the body, and so on, to +constitute the Self, is subject to fear and pain, but we have no +right to assume that the same person after having, by means of the +Veda, comprehended Brahman to be the Self, and thus having got over +his former imaginings, will still in the same manner be subject to +pain and fear whose cause is wrong knowledge. In the same way we +see that a rich householder, puffed up by the conceit of his +wealth, is grieved when his possessions are taken from him; but we +do not see that the loss of his wealth equally grieves him after he +has once retired from the world and put off the conceit of his +riches. And, again, we see that a person possessing a pair of +beautiful earrings derives pleasure from the proud conceit of +ownership; but after he has lost the earrings and the conceit +established thereon, the pleasure derived from them vanishes. Thus +<i>S</i>ruti also declares, 'When he is free from the body, then +neither pleasure nor pain touches him' (Ch. Up. VIII, 12, 1). If it +should be objected that the condition of being free from the body +follows on death only, we demur, since the cause of man being +joined to the body is wrong knowledge. For it is not possible to +establish the state of embodiedness upon anything else but wrong +knowledge. And that the state of disembodiedness is eternal on +account of its not having actions for its cause, we have already +explained. The objection again, that embodiedness is caused by the +merit and demerit effected by the Self (and therefore real), we +refute by remarking that as the (reality of the) conjunction of the +Self with the body is itself not established, the circumstance of +merit and demerit being due to the action of the Self is likewise +not established; for (if we should try to get over this difficulty +by representing the Self's embodiedness as caused by merit and +demerit) we should commit the logical fault of making embodiedness +dependent on merit and demerit, <span class="pagenum"><a name= +"page42" id="page42"></a>{42}</span> and again merit and demerit on +embodiedness. And the assumption of an endless retrogressive chain +(of embodied states and merit and demerit) would be no better than +a chain of blind men (who are unable to lead one another). +Moreover, the Self can impossibly become an agent, as it cannot +enter into intimate relation to actions. If it should be said that +the Self may be considered as an agent in the same way as kings and +other great people are (who without acting themselves make others +act) by their mere presence, we deny the appositeness of this +instance; for kings may become agents through their relation to +servants whom they procure by giving them wages, &c., while it +is impossible to imagine anything, analogous to money, which could +be the cause of a connexion between the Self as lord and the body, +and so on (as servants). Wrong imagination, on the other hand, (of +the individual Self, considering itself to be joined to the body,) +is a manifest reason of the connexion of the two (which is not +based on any assumption). This explains also in how far the Self +can be considered as the agent in sacrifices and similar acts<a id= +"footnotetag86" name="footnotetag86"></a><a href= +"#footnote86"><sup>86</sup></a>. Here it is objected that the +Self's imagination as to the body, and so on, belonging to itself +is not false, but is to be understood in a derived (figurative) +sense. This objection we invalidate by the remark that the +distinction of derived and primary senses of words is known to be +applicable only where an actual difference of things is known to +exist. We are, for instance, acquainted with a certain species of +animals having a mane, and so on, which is the exclusive primary +object of the idea and word 'lion,' and we are likewise acquainted +with persons possessing in an eminent degree certain leonine +qualities, such as fierceness, courage, &c.; here, a well +settled difference of objects existing, the idea and the name +'lion' are applied to those persons in a derived or figurative +sense. In those cases, however, where the difference of the objects +is not well established, the transfer of the conception and +<span class="pagenum"><a name="page43" id="page43"></a>{43}</span> +name of the one to the other is not figurative, but simply founded +on error. Such is, for instance, the case of a man who at the time +of twilight does not discern that the object before him is a post, +and applies to it the conception and designation of a man; such is +likewise the case of the conception and designation of silver being +applied to a shell of mother-of-pearl somehow mistaken for silver. +How then can it be maintained that the application of the word and +the conception of the Ego to the body, &c., which application +is due to the non-discrimination of the Self and the Not-Self, is +figurative (rather than simply false)? considering that even +learned men who know the difference of the Self and the Not-Self +confound the words and ideas just as common shepherds and goatherds +do.</p> +<p>As therefore the application of the conception of the Ego to the +body on the part of those who affirm the existence of a Self +different from the body is simply false, not figurative, it follows +that the embodiedness of the Self is (not real but) caused by wrong +conception, and hence that the person who has reached true +knowledge is free from his body even while still alive. The same is +declared in the <i>S</i>ruti passages concerning him who knows +Brahman: 'And as the slough of a snake lies on an ant-hill, dead +and cast away, thus lies this body; but that disembodied immortal +spirit is Brahman only, is only light' (B<i>ri</i>. Up. IV, 4, 7); +and 'With eyes he is without eyes as it were, with ears without +ears as it were, with speech without speech as it were, with a mind +without mind as it were, with vital airs without vital airs as it +were.' Sm<i>ri</i>ti also, in the passage where the characteristic +marks are enumerated of one whose mind is steady (Bha. +Gîtâ II, 54), declares that he who knows is no longer +connected with action of any kind. Therefore the man who has once +comprehended Brahman to be the Self, does not belong to this +transmigratory world as he did before. He, on the other hand, who +still belongs to this transmigratory world as before, has not +comprehended Brahman to be the Self. Thus there remain no unsolved +contradictions.</p> +<p>With reference again to the assertion that Brahman is not +<span class="pagenum"><a name="page44" id="page44"></a>{44}</span> +fully determined in its own nature, but stands in a complementary +relation to injunctions, because the hearing about Brahman is to be +followed by consideration and reflection, we remark that +consideration and reflection are themselves merely subservient to +the comprehension of Brahman. If Brahman, after having been +comprehended, stood in a subordinate relation to some injunctions, +it might be said to be merely supplementary. But this is not the +case, since consideration and reflection no less than hearing are +subservient to comprehension. It follows that the +<i>S</i>âstra cannot be the means of knowing Brahman only in +so far as it is connected with injunctions, and the doctrine that +on account of the uniform meaning of the Vedânta-texts, an +independent Brahman is to be admitted, is thereby fully +established. Hence there is room for beginning the new +<i>S</i>âstra indicated in the first Sûtra, 'Then +therefore the enquiry into Brahman.' If, on the other hand, the +Vedânta-texts were connected with injunctions, a new +<i>S</i>âstra would either not be begun at all, since the +<i>S</i>âstra concerned with injunctions has already been +introduced by means of the first Sûtra of the Pûrva +Mîmâ<i>m</i>sâ, 'Then therefore the enquiry into +duty;' or if it were begun it would be introduced as follows: 'Then +therefore the enquiry into the remaining duties;' just as a new +portion of the Pûrva Mîmâ<i>m</i>sâ +Sûtras is introduced with the words, 'Then therefore the +enquiry into what subserves the purpose of the sacrifice, and what +subserves the purpose of man' (Pû. Mî. Sû. IV, 1, +1). But as the comprehension of the unity of Brahman and the Self +has not been propounded (in the previous <i>S</i>âstra), it +is quite appropriate that a new <i>S</i>âstra, whose subject +is Brahman, should be entered upon. Hence all injunctions and all +other means of knowledge end with the cognition expressed in the +words, 'I am Brahman;' for as soon as there supervenes the +comprehension of the non-dual Self, which is not either something +to be eschewed or something to be appropriated, all objects and +knowing agents vanish, and hence there can no longer be means of +proof. In accordance with this, they (i.e. men knowing Brahman) +have made the following declaration:—'When <span class= +"pagenum"><a name="page45" id="page45"></a>{45}</span> there has +arisen (in a man's mind) the knowledge, "I am that which is, +Brahman is my Self," and when, owing to the sublation of the +conceptions of body, relatives, and the like, the (imagination of) +the figurative and the false Self has come to an end<a id= +"footnotetag87" name="footnotetag87"></a><a href= +"#footnote87"><sup>87</sup></a>; how should then the effect<a id= +"footnotetag88" name="footnotetag88"></a><a href= +"#footnote88"><sup>88</sup></a> (of that wrong imagination) exist +any longer? As long as the knowledge of the Self, which Scripture +tells us to search after, has not arisen, so long the Self is +knowing subject; but that same subject is that which is searched +after, viz. (the highest Self) free from all evil and blemish. Just +as the idea of the Self being the body is assumed as valid (in +ordinary life), so all the ordinary sources of knowledge +(perception and the like) are valid only until the one Self is +ascertained.'</p> +<p>(Herewith the section comprising the four Sûtras is +finished<a id="footnotetag89" name="footnotetag89"></a><a href= +"#footnote89"><sup>89</sup></a>.)</p> +<p>So far it has been declared that the Vedânta-passages, +whose purport is the comprehension of Brahman being the Self, and +which have their object therein, refer exclusively to Brahman +without any reference to actions. And it has further been shown +that Brahman is the omniscient omnipotent cause of the origin, +subsistence, and dissolution of the world. But now the +Sâ@nkhyas and others being of opinion that an existent +substance is to be known through other means of proof (not through +the Veda) infer different causes, such as the pradhâna and +the like, and thereupon interpret the Vedânta-passages as +referring to the latter. All the Vedânta-passages, they +maintain, which treat of the creation of the world distinctly point +out that the cause (of the world) has to be concluded from the +effect by inference; and the cause which is to be inferred is the +connexion of the pradhâna with the souls (purusha). The +followers of Ka<i>n</i>âda again infer from the very same +<span class="pagenum"><a name="page46" id="page46"></a>{46}</span> +passages that the Lord is the efficient cause of the world while +the atoms are its material cause. And thus other argumentators also +taking their stand on passages apparently favouring their views and +on fallacious arguments raise various objections. For this reason +the teacher (Vyâsa)—thoroughly acquainted as he is with +words, passages, and means of proof—proceeds to state as +primâ facie views, and afterwards to refute, all those +opinions founded on deceptive passages and fallacious arguments. +Thereby he at the same time proves indirectly that what the +Vedânta-texts aim at is the comprehension of Brahman.</p> +<p>The Sâ@nkhyas who opine that the non-intelligent +pradhâna consisting of three constituent elements +(gu<i>n</i>a) is the cause of the world argue as follows. The +Vedânta-passages which you have declared to intimate that the +all-knowing all-powerful Brahman is the cause of the world can be +consistently interpreted also on the doctrine of the pradhâna +being the general cause. Omnipotence (more literally: the +possession of all powers) can be ascribed to the pradhâna in +so far as it has all its effects for its objects. All-knowingness +also can be ascribed to it, viz. in the following manner. What you +think to be knowledge is in reality an attribute of the gu<i>n</i>a +of Goodness<a id="footnotetag90" name="footnotetag90"></a><a href= +"#footnote90"><sup>90</sup></a>, according to the Sm<i>ri</i>ti +passage 'from Goodness springs knowledge' (Bha. Gîtâ +XIV, 17). By means of this attribute of Goodness, viz. knowledge, +certain men endowed with organs which are effects (of the +pradhâna) are known as all-knowing Yogins; for omniscience is +acknowledged to be connected with the very highest degree of +'Goodness.' Now to the soul (purusha) which is isolated, destitute +of effected organs, consisting of pure (undifferenced) intelligence +it is quite impossible to ascribe either all-knowingness or limited +knowledge; the pradhâna, on the other hand, because +consisting of the three gu<i>n</i>as, comprises also in its +pradhâna state the element of Goodness which is the cause of +all-knowingness. The Vedânta-passages therefore in +<span class="pagenum"><a name="page47" id="page47"></a>{47}</span> +a derived (figurative) sense ascribe all-knowingness to the +pradhâna, although it is in itself non-intelligent. Moreover +you (the Vedântin) also who assume an all-knowing Brahman can +ascribe to it all-knowingness in so far only as that term means +capacity for all knowledge. For Brahman cannot always be actually +engaged in the cognition of everything; for from this there would +follow the absolute permanency of his cognition, and this would +involve a want of independence on Brahman's part with regard to the +activity of knowing. And if you should propose to consider +Brahman's cognition as non-permanent it would follow that with the +cessation of the cognition Brahman itself would cease. Therefore +all-knowingness is possible only in the sense of capacity for all +knowledge. Moreover you assume that previously to the origination +of the world Brahman is without any instruments of action. But +without the body, the senses, &c. which are the instruments of +knowledge, cognition cannot take place in any being. And further it +must be noted that the pradhâna, as consisting of various +elements, is capable of undergoing modifications, and may therefore +act as a (material) cause like clay and other substances; while the +uncompounded homogeneous Brahman is unable to do so.</p> +<p>To these conclusions he (Vyâsa) replies in the following +Sûtra.</p> +<p>5. On account of seeing (i.e. thinking being attributed in the +Upanishads to the cause of the world; the pradhâna) is not +(to be identified with the cause indicated by the Upanishads; for) +it is not founded on Scripture.</p> +<p>It is impossible to find room in the Vedânta-texts for the +non-intelligent pradhâna, the fiction of the Sâ@nkhyas; +because it is not founded on Scripture. How so? Because the quality +of seeing, i.e. thinking, is in Scripture ascribed to the cause. +For the passage, Ch. Up. VI, 2, (which begins: 'Being only, my +dear, this was in the beginning, one only, without a second,' and +goes on, 'It thought (saw), <span class="pagenum"><a name="page48" +id="page48"></a>{48}</span> may I be many, may I grow forth. It +sent forth fire,') declares that this world differentiated by name +and form, which is there denoted by the word 'this,' was before its +origination identical with the Self of that which is and that the +principle denoted by the term 'the being' (or 'that which is') sent +forth fire and the other elements after having thought. The +following passage also ('Verily in the beginning all this was Self, +one only; there was nothing else blinking whatsoever. He thought, +shall I send forth worlds? He sent forth these worlds,' Ait. +Âr. II, 4, 1, 2) declares the creation to have had thought +for its antecedent. In another passage also (Pr. Up. VI, 3) it is +said of the person of sixteen parts, 'He thought, &c. He sent +forth Prâ<i>n</i>a.' By 'seeing' (i.e. the verb 'seeing' +exhibited in the Sûtra) is not meant that particular verb +only, but any verbs which have a cognate sense; just as the verb +'to sacrifice' is used to denote any kind of offering. Therefore +other passages also whose purport it is to intimate that an +all-knowing Lord is the cause of the world are to be quoted here, +as, for instance, Mu. Up. I, 1, 9, 'From him who perceives all and +who knows all, whose brooding consists of knowledge, from him is +born that Brahman, name and form and food.'</p> +<p>The argumentation of the Sâ@nkhyas that the pradhâna +may be called all-knowing on account of knowledge constituting an +attribute of the gu<i>n</i>a Goodness is inadmissible. For as in +the pradhâna-condition the three gu<i>n</i>as are in a state +of equipoise, knowledge which is a quality of Goodness only is not +possible<a id="footnotetag91" name="footnotetag91"></a><a href= +"#footnote91"><sup>91</sup></a>. Nor can we admit the explanation +that the pradhâna is all-knowing because endowed with the +capacity for all knowledge. For if, in the condition of equipoise +of the gu<i>n</i>as, we term the pradhâna all-knowing with +reference to the power of knowledge residing in Goodness, we must +likewise term it little-knowing, with reference to the power +impeding knowledge which resides in Passion and Darkness.</p> +<span class="pagenum"><a name="page49" id="page49"></a>{49}</span> +<p>Moreover a modification of Goodness which is not connected with +a witnessing (observing) principle (sâkshin) is not called +knowledge, and the non-intelligent pradhâna is destitute of +such a principle. It is therefore impossible to ascribe to the +pradhâna all-knowingness. The case of the Yogins finally does +not apply to the point under consideration; for as they possess +intelligence, they may, owing to an excess of Goodness in their +nature, rise to omniscience<a id="footnotetag92" name= +"footnotetag92"></a><a href= +"#footnote92"><sup>92</sup></a>.—Well then (say those +Sâ@nkhyas who believe in the existence of a Lord) let us +assume that the pradhâna possesses the quality of knowledge +owing to the witnessing principle (the Lord), just as the quality +of burning is imparted to an iron ball by fire.—No, we reply; +for if this were so, it would be more reasonable to assume that +that which is the cause of the pradhâna having the quality of +thought i.e. the all-knowing primary Brahman itself is the cause of +the world.</p> +<p>The objection that to Brahman also all-knowingness in its +primary sense cannot be ascribed because, if the activity of +cognition were permanent, Brahman could not be considered as +independent with regard to it, we refute as follows. In what way, +we ask the Sâ@nkhya, is Brahman's all-knowingness interfered +with by a permanent cognitional activity? To maintain that he, who +possesses eternal knowledge capable to throw light on all objects, +is not all-knowing, is contradictory. If his knowledge were +considered non-permanent, he would know sometimes, and sometimes he +would not know; from which it would follow indeed that he is not +all-knowing. This fault is however avoided if we admit Brahman's +knowledge to be permanent.—But, it may be objected, on this +latter alternative the knower cannot be designated as independent +with reference to the act of knowing.—Why not? we reply; the +sun also, although his heat and light are permanent, is +nevertheless designated as independent <span class= +"pagenum"><a name="page50" id="page50"></a>{50}</span> when we say, +'he burns, he gives light<a id="footnotetag93" name= +"footnotetag93"></a><a href= +"#footnote93"><sup>93</sup></a>.'—But, it will again be +objected, we say that the sun burns or gives light when he stands +in relation to some object to be heated or illuminated; Brahman, on +the other hand, stands, before the creation of the world, in no +relation to any object of knowledge. The cases are therefore not +parallel.—This objection too, we reply, is not valid; for as +a matter of fact we speak of the Sun as an agent, saying 'the sun +shines' even without reference to any object illuminated by him, +and hence Brahman also may be spoken of as an agent, in such +passages as 'it thought,' &c., even without reference to any +object of knowledge. If, however, an object is supposed to be +required ('knowing' being a transitive verb while 'shining' is +intransitive), the texts ascribing thought to Brahman will fit all +the better.—What then is that object to which the knowledge +of the Lord can refer previously to the origin of the +world?—Name and form, we reply, which can be defined neither +as being identical with Brahman nor as different from it, unevolved +but about to be evolved. For if, as the adherents of the +Yoga-<i>s</i>âstra assume, the Yogins have a perceptive +knowledge of the past and the future through the favour of the +Lord; in what terms shall we have to speak of the eternal cognition +of the ever pure Lord himself, whose objects are the creation, +subsistence, and dissolution of the world! The objection that +Brahman, previously to the origin of the world, is not able to +think because it is not connected with a body, &c. does not +apply; for Brahman, whose nature is eternal cognition—as the +sun's nature is eternal luminousness—can <span class= +"pagenum"><a name="page51" id="page51"></a>{51}</span> impossibly +stand in need of any instruments of knowledge. The transmigrating +soul (sa<i>m</i>sârin) indeed, which is under the sway of +Nescience, &c., may require a body in order that knowledge may +arise in it; but not so the Lord, who is free from all impediments +of knowledge. The two following Mantras also declare that the Lord +does not require a body, and that his knowledge is without any +obstructions. 'There is no effect and no instrument known of him, +no one is seen like unto him or better; his high power is revealed +as manifold, as inherent, acting as knowledge and force.' 'Grasping +without hands, hasting without feet, he sees without eyes, he hears +without ears. He knows what can be known, but no one knows him; +they call him the first, the great person' (<i>S</i>v. Up. VI, 8; +III, 19).</p> +<p>But, to raise a new objection, there exists no transmigrating +soul different from the Lord and obstructed by impediments of +knowledge; for <i>S</i>ruti expressly declares that 'there is no +other seer but he; there is no other knower but he' (B<i>ri</i>. +Up. III, 7, 23). How then can it be said that the origination of +knowledge in the transmigrating soul depends on a body, while it +does not do so in the case of the Lord?—True, we reply. There +is in reality no transmigrating soul different from the Lord. Still +the connexion (of the Lord) with limiting adjuncts, consisting of +bodies and so on, is assumed, just as we assume the ether to enter +into connexion with divers limiting adjuncts such as jars, pots, +caves, and the like. And just as in consequence of connexion of the +latter kind such conceptions and terms as 'the hollow (space) of a +jar,' &c. are generally current, although the space inside a +jar is not really different from universal space, and just as in +consequence thereof there generally prevails the false notion that +there are different spaces such as the space of a jar and so on; so +there prevails likewise the false notion that the Lord and the +transmigrating soul are different; a notion due to the +non-discrimination of the (unreal) connexion of the soul with the +limiting conditions, consisting of the body and so on. That the +Self, although in reality the only existence, imparts the quality +of Selfhood to bodies and the like <span class="pagenum"><a name= +"page52" id="page52"></a>{52}</span> which are Not-Self is a matter +of observation, and is due to mere wrong conception, which depends +in its turn on antecedent wrong conception. And the consequence of +the soul thus involving itself in the transmigratory state is that +its thought depends on a body and the like.</p> +<p>The averment that the pradhâna, because consisting of +several elements, can, like clay and similar substances, occupy the +place of a cause while the uncompounded Brahman cannot do so, is +refuted by the fact of the pradhâna not basing on Scripture. +That, moreover, it is possible to establish by argumentation the +causality of Brahman, but not of the pradhâna and similar +principles, the Sûtrakâra will set forth in the second +Adhyâya (II, 1, 4, &c.).</p> +<p>Here the Sâ@nkhya comes forward with a new objection. The +difficulty stated by you, he says, viz. that the non-intelligent +pradhâna cannot be the cause of the world, because thought is +ascribed to the latter in the sacred texts, can be got over in +another way also, viz. on the ground that non-intelligent things +are sometimes figuratively spoken of as intelligent beings. We +observe, for instance, that people say of a river-bank about to +fall, 'the bank is inclined to fall (pipatishati),' and thus speak +of a non-intelligent bank as if it possessed intelligence. So the +pradhâna also, although non-intelligent, may, when about to +create, be figuratively spoken of as thinking. Just as in ordinary +life some intelligent person after having bathed, and dined, and +formed the purpose of driving in the afternoon to his village, +necessarily acts according to his purpose, so the pradhâna +also acts by the necessity of its own nature, when transforming +itself into the so-called great principle and the subsequent forms +of evolution; it may therefore figuratively be spoken of as +intelligent.—But what reason have you for setting aside the +primary meaning of the word 'thought' and for taking it in a +figurative sense?—The observation, the Sâ@nkhya +replies, that fire and water also are figuratively spoken of as +intelligent beings in the two following scriptural passages, 'That +fire thought; that water thought' (Ch. Up. VI, 2, 3; 4). We +therefrom conclude that thought is to be taken in a figurative +sense there <span class="pagenum"><a name="page53" id= +"page53"></a>{53}</span> also where Being (Sat) is the agent, +because it is mentioned in a chapter where (thought) is generally +taken in a figurative sense<a id="footnotetag94" name= +"footnotetag94"></a><a href="#footnote94"><sup>94</sup></a>.</p> +<p>To this argumentation of the Sâdkhya the next Sûtra +replies:</p> +<p>6. If it is said that (the word 'seeing') has a figurative +meaning, we deny that, on account of the word Self (being applied +to the cause of the world).</p> +<p>Your assertion that the term 'Being' denotes the non-intelligent +pradhâna, and that thought is ascribed to it in a figurative +sense only, as it is to fire and water, is untenable. Why so? On +account of the term 'Self.' For the passage Ch. Up. VI, 2, which +begins 'Being only, my dear, this was in the beginning,' after +having related the creation of fire, water, and earth ('it +thought,' &c.; 'it sent forth fire,' &c.), goes +on—denoting the thinking principle of which the whole chapter +treats, and likewise fire, water, and earth, by the +term—'divinities'—as follows, 'That divinity thought: +Let me now enter those three divinities with this living Self +(jîva. âtman) and evolve names and forms.' If we +assumed that in this passage the non-intelligent pradhâna is +figuratively spoken of as thinking, we should also have to assume +that the same pradhâna—as once constituting the +subject-matter of the chapter—is referred to by the term +'that divinity.' But in that case the divinity would not speak of +the jîva as 'Self.' For by the term 'Jîva' we must +understand, according to the received meaning and the etymology of +the word, the intelligent (principle) which rules over the body and +sustains the vital airs. How could such a principle be the Self of +the non-intelligent pradhâna? By 'Self' we understand (a +being's) own nature, and it is clear that the intelligent +Jîva cannot constitute the nature of the non-intelligent +pradhâna. If, on the other hand, we refer the whole chapter +to the intelligent Brahman, to <span class="pagenum"><a name= +"page54" id="page54"></a>{54}</span> which thought in its primary +sense belongs, the use of the word 'Self' with reference to the +Jîva is quite adequate. Then again there is the other +passage, 'That which is that subtle essence, in it all that exists +has its self. It is the true. It is the Self. That art thou, O +<i>S</i>vetaketu' (Ch. Up. VI, 8, 7, &c.). Here the clause 'It +is the Self' designates the Being of which the entire chapter +treats, viz. the subtle Self, by the word 'Self,' and the +concluding clause, 'that art thou, O <i>S</i>vetaketu,' declares +the intelligent <i>S</i>vetaketu to be of the nature of the Self. +Fire and water, on the other hand, are non-intelligent, since they +are objects (of the mind), and since they are declared to be +implicated in the evolution of names and forms. And as at the same +time there is no reason for ascribing to them thought in its +primary sense—while the employment of the word 'Self' +furnishes such a reason with reference to the Sat—the thought +attributed to them must be explained in a figurative sense, like +the inclination of the river-bank. Moreover, the thinking on the +part of fire and water is to be understood as dependent on their +being ruled over by the Sat. On the other hand, the thought of the +Sat is, on account of the word 'Self,' not to be understood in a +figurative sense.<a id="footnotetag95" name= +"footnotetag95"></a><a href="#footnote95"><sup>95</sup></a></p> +<p>Here the Sâ@nkhya comes forward with a new objection. The +word 'Self,' he says, may be applied to the pradhâna, +although unintelligent, because it is sometimes figuratively used +in the sense of 'that which effects all purposes of another;' as, +for instance, a king applies the word 'Self' to some servant who +carries out all the king's intentions, 'Bhadrasena is my (other) +Self.' For the pradhâna, which effects the enjoyment and the +emancipation of the soul, serves the latter in the same way as a +minister serves his king in the affairs of peace and war. Or else, +it may be said, the one word 'Self' may refer to non-intelligent +things as well as to intelligent beings, as we see that such +expressions as 'the Self of the elements,' 'the Self of the +senses,' are made use of, and as the one word 'light' (jyotis) +denotes a certain <span class="pagenum"><a name="page55" id= +"page55"></a>{55}</span> sacrifice (the jyotish<i>t</i>oma) as well +as a flame. How then does it follow from the word 'Self' that the +thinking (ascribed to the cause of the world) is not to be taken in +a figurative sense?</p> +<p>To this last argumentation the Sûtrakâra +replies:</p> +<p>7. (The pradhâna cannot be designated by the term 'Self') +because release is taught of him who takes his stand on that (the +Sat).</p> +<p>The non-intelligent pradhâna cannot be the object of the +term 'Self' because in the passage Ch. Up. VI, 2 ff., where the +subtle Sat which is under discussion is at first referred to in the +sentence, 'That is the Self,' and where the subsequent clause, +'That art thou, O <i>S</i>vetaketu,' declares the intelligent +<i>S</i>vetaketu to have his abode in the Self, a passage +subsequent to the two quoted (viz. 'a man who has a teacher obtains +true knowledge; for him there is only delay as long as he is not +delivered, then he will be perfect') declares final release. For if +the non-intelligent pradhâna were denoted by the term 'Sat' +and did comprehend—by means of the phrase 'That art +thou'—persons desirous of final release who as such are +intelligent, the meaning could only be 'Thou art non-intelligent;' +so that Scripture would virtually make contradictory statements to +the disadvantage of man, and would thus cease to be a means of +right knowledge. But to assume that the faultless +<i>s</i>âstra is not a means of right knowledge, would be +contrary to reason. And if the <i>s</i>âstra, considered as a +means of right knowledge, should point out to a man desirous of +release, but ignorant of the way to it, a non-intelligent Self as +the real Self, he would—comparable to the blind man who had +caught hold of the ox's tail<a id="footnotetag96" name= +"footnotetag96"></a><a href= +"#footnote96"><sup>96</sup></a>—cling to the view of that +being the Self, <span class="pagenum"><a name="page56" id= +"page56"></a>{56}</span> and thus never be able to reach the real +Self different from the false Self pointed out to him; hence he +would be debarred from what constitutes man's good, and would incur +evil. We must therefore conclude that, just as the +<i>s</i>âstra teaches the agnihotra and similar performances +in their true nature as means for those who are desirous of the +heavenly world, so the passage 'that is the Self, that art thou, O +<i>S</i>vetaketu,' teaches the Self in its true nature also. Only +on that condition release for him whose thoughts are true can be +taught by means of the simile in which the person to be released is +compared to the man grasping the heated axe (Ch. Up. VI, 16). For +in the other case, if the doctrine of the Sat constituting the Self +had a secondary meaning only, the cognition founded on the passage +'that art thou' would be of the nature of a fanciful combination +only<a id="footnotetag97" name="footnotetag97"></a><a href= +"#footnote97"><sup>97</sup></a>, like the knowledge derived from +the passage, 'I am the hymn' (Ait. Âr. II, 1, 2, 6), and +would lead to a mere transitory reward; so that the simile quoted +could not convey the doctrine of release. Therefore the word 'Self' +is applied to the subtle Sat not in a merely figurative sense. In +the case of the faithful servant, on the other hand, the word +'Self' can—in such phrases as 'Bhadrasena is my +Self'—be taken in a figurative sense, because the difference +between master and servant is well established by perception. +Moreover, to assume that, because words are sometimes seen to be +used in figurative senses, a figurative sense may be resorted to in +the case of those things also for which words (i.e. Vedic words) +are the only means of knowledge, is altogether indefensible; for an +assumption of that nature would lead to a general want of +confidence. The assertion that the word 'Self' may (primarily) +signify what is non-intelligent as well as what is intelligent, +just as the word 'jyotis' signifies a certain sacrifice as well as +light, is inadmissible, because we have no right to attribute to +words a plurality of meanings. Hence (we rather assume that) the +word 'Self' in its primary meaning refers to what is intelligent +only and is then, by a figurative <span class="pagenum"><a name= +"page57" id="page57"></a>{57}</span> attribution of intelligence, +applied to the elements and the like also; whence such phrases as +'the Self of the elements,' 'the Self of the senses.' And even if +we assume that the word 'Self' primarily signifies both classes of +beings, we are unable to settle in any special case which of the +two meanings the word has, unless we are aided either by the +general heading under which it stands, or some determinative +attributive word. But in the passage under discussion there is +nothing to determine that the word refers to something +non-intelligent, while, on the other hand, the Sat distinguished by +thought forms the general heading, and <i>S</i>vetaketu, i.e. a +being endowed with intelligence, is mentioned in close proximity. +That a non-intelligent Self does not agree with <i>S</i>vetaketu, +who possesses intelligence, we have already shown. All these +circumstances determine the object of the word 'Self' here to be +something intelligent. The word 'jyotis' does moreover not furnish +an appropriate example; for according to common use it has the +settled meaning of 'light' only, and is used in the sense of +sacrifice only on account of the arthavâda assuming a +similarity (of the sacrifice) to light.</p> +<p>A different explanation of the Sûtra is also possible. The +preceding Sûtra may be taken completely to refute all doubts +as to the word 'Self' having a figurative or double sense, and then +the present Sûtra is to be explained as containing an +independent reason, proving that the doctrine of the pradhâna +being the general cause is untenable.</p> +<p>Hence the non-intelligent pradhâna is not denoted by the +word 'Self.' This the teacher now proceeds to prove by an +additional reason.</p> +<p>8. And (the pradhâna cannot be denoted by the word 'Self') +because there is no statement of its having to be set aside.</p> +<p>If the pradhâna which is the Not-Self were denoted by the +term 'Being' (Sat), and if the passage 'That is the Self, that art +thou, O <i>S</i>vetaketu,' referred to the pradhâna; the +teacher whose wish it is to impart instruction about the +<span class="pagenum"><a name="page58" id="page58"></a>{58}</span> +true Brahman would subsequently declare that the pradhâna is +to be set aside (and the true Brahman to be considered); for +otherwise his pupil, having received the instruction about the +pradhâna, might take his stand on the latter, looking upon it +as the Non-Self. In ordinary life a man who wishes to point out to +a friend the (small) star Arundhatî at first directs his +attention to a big neighbouring star, saying 'that is +Arundhatî,' although it is really not so; and thereupon he +withdraws his first statement and points out the real +Arundhatî. Analogously the teacher (if he intended to make +his pupil understand the Self through the Non-Self) would in the +end definitely state that the Self is not of the nature of the +pradhâna. But no such statement is made; for the sixth +Prapâ<i>th</i>aka arrives at a conclusion based on the view +that the Self is nothing but that which is (the Sat).</p> +<p>The word 'and' (in the Sûtra) is meant to notify that the +contradiction of a previous statement (which would be implied in +the rejected interpretation) is an additional reason for the +rejection. Such a contradiction would result even if it were stated +that the pradhâna is to be set aside. For in the beginning of +the Prapâ<i>th</i>aka it is intimated that through the +knowledge of the cause everything becomes known. Compare the +following consecutive sentences, 'Have you ever asked for that +instruction by which we hear what cannot be heard, by which we +perceive what cannot be perceived, by which we know what cannot be +known? What is that instruction? As, my dear, by one clod of clay +all that is made of clay is known, the modification (i.e. the +effect) being a name merely which has its origin in speech, while +the truth is that it is clay merely,' &c. Now if the term 'Sat' +denoted the pradhâna, which is merely the cause of the +aggregate of the objects of enjoyment, its knowledge, whether to be +set aside or not to be set aside, could never lead to the knowledge +of the aggregate of enjoyers (souls), because the latter is not an +effect of the pradhâna. Therefore the pradhâna is not +denoted by the term 'Sat.'—For this the Sûtrakâra +gives a further reason.</p> +<span class="pagenum"><a name="page59" id="page59"></a>{59}</span> +<p>9. On account of (the individual Soul) going to the Self (the +Self cannot be the pradhâna).</p> +<p>With reference to the cause denoted by the word 'Sat,' Scripture +says, 'When a man sleeps here, then, my dear, he becomes united +with the Sat, he is gone to his own (Self). Therefore they say of +him, "he sleeps" (svapiti), because he is gone to his own (svam +apîta).' (Ch. Up. VI, 8, 1.) This passage explains the +well-known verb 'to sleep,' with reference to the soul. The word, +'his own,' denotes the Self which had before been denoted by the +word Sat; to the Self he (the individual soul) goes, i.e. into it +it is resolved, according to the acknowledged sense of api-i, which +means 'to be resolved into.' The individual soul (jîva) is +called awake as long as being connected with the various external +objects by means of the modifications of the mind—which thus +constitute limiting adjuncts of the soul—it apprehends those +external objects, and identifies itself with the gross body, which +is one of those external objects<a id="footnotetag98" name= +"footnotetag98"></a><a href="#footnote98"><sup>98</sup></a>. When, +modified by the impressions which the external objects have left, +it sees dreams, it is denoted by the term 'mind<a id= +"footnotetag99" name="footnotetag99"></a><a href= +"#footnote99"><sup>99</sup></a>.' When, on the cessation of the two +limiting adjuncts (i.e. the subtle and the gross bodies), and the +consequent absence of the modifications due to the adjuncts, it is, +in the state of deep sleep, merged in the Self as it were, then it +is said to be asleep (resolved into the Self). A similar etymology +of the word 'h<i>ri</i>daya' is given by <i>s</i>ruti, 'That Self +abides in the heart. And this is the etymological explanation: he +is in the heart (h<i>ri</i>di ayam).' (Ch. Up. VIII, 3, 3.) The +words a<i>s</i>anâya and udanyâ are similarly +etymologised: 'water is carrying away what has been eaten by him;' +'fire carries away what has been drunk by him' (Ch. Up. VI, 8, 3; +5). Thus the passage quoted above explains the resolution (of the +soul) into the Self, denoted by the term 'Sat,' by means of the +etymology of the word 'sleep.' But the intelligent <span class= +"pagenum"><a name="page60" id="page60"></a>{60}</span> Self can +clearly not resolve itself into the non-intelligent pradhâna. +If, again, it were said that the pradhâna is denoted by the +word 'own,' because belonging to the Self (as being the Self's +own), there would remain the same absurd statement as to an +intelligent entity being resolved into a non-intelligent one. +Moreover another scriptural passage (viz. 'embraced by the +intelligent—praj<i>ñ</i>a—Self he knows nothing +that is without, nothing that is within,' B<i>ri</i>. Up. IV, 3, +21) declares that the soul in the condition of dreamless sleep is +resolved into an intelligent entity. Hence that into which all +intelligent souls are resolved is an intelligent cause of the +world, denoted by the word 'Sat,' and not the +pradhâna.—A further reason for the pradhâna not +being the cause is subjoined.</p> +<p>10. On account of the uniformity of view (of the +Vedânta-texts, Brahman is to be considered the cause).</p> +<p>If, as in the argumentations of the logicians, so in the +Vedânta-texts also, there were set forth different views +concerning the nature of the cause, some of them favouring the +theory of an intelligent Brahman being the cause of the world, +others inclining towards the pradhâna doctrine, and others +again tending in a different direction; then it might perhaps be +possible to interpret such passages as those, which speak of the +cause of the world as thinking, in such a manner as to make them +fall in with the pradhâna theory. But the stated condition is +absent since all the Vedânta-texts uniformly teach that the +cause of the world is the intelligent Brahman. Compare, for +instance, 'As from a burning fire sparks proceed in all directions, +thus from that Self the prâ<i>n</i>as proceed each towards +its place; from the prâ<i>n</i>as the gods, from the gods the +worlds' (Kau. Up. III, 3). And 'from that Self sprang ether' +(Taitt. Up. II, 1). And 'all this springs from the Self' (Ch. Up. +VII, 26, 1). And 'this prâ<i>n</i>a is born from the Self' +(Pr. Up. III, 3); all which passages declare the Self to be the +cause. That the word 'Self' denotes an intelligent being, we have +already shown.</p> +<span class="pagenum"><a name="page61" id="page61"></a>{61}</span> +<p>And that all the Vedânta-texts advocate the same view as +to an intelligent cause of the world, greatly strengthens their +claim to be considered a means of right knowledge, just as the +corresponding claims of the senses are strengthened by their giving +us information of a uniform character regarding colour and the +like. The all-knowing Brahman is therefore to be considered the +cause of the world, 'on account of the uniformity of view (of the +Vedânta-texts).'—A further reason for this conclusion +is advanced.</p> +<p>11. And because it is directly stated in Scripture (therefore +the all-knowing Brahman is the cause of the world).</p> +<p>That the all-knowing Lord is the cause of the world, is also +declared in a text directly referring to him (viz. the all-knowing +one), viz. in the following passage of the mantropanishad of the +<i>S</i>vetâ<i>s</i>vataras (VI, 9) where the word 'he' +refers to the previously mentioned all-knowing Lord, 'He is the +cause, the lord of the lords of the organs, and there is of him +neither parent nor lord.' It is therefore finally settled that the +all-knowing Brahman is the general cause, not the non-intelligent +pradhâna or anything else.</p> +<p>In what precedes we have shown, availing ourselves of +appropriate arguments, that the Vedânta-texts exhibited under +Sûtras I, 1-11, are capable of proving that the all-knowing, +all-powerful Lord is the cause of the origin, subsistence, and +dissolution of the world. And we have explained, by pointing to the +prevailing uniformity of view (I, 10), that all Vedânta-texts +whatever maintain an intelligent cause. The question might +therefore be asked, 'What reason is there for the subsequent part +of the Vedânta-sûtras?' (as the chief point is settled +already.)</p> +<p>To this question we reply as follows: Brahman is apprehended +under two forms; in the first place as qualified by limiting +conditions owing to the multiformity of the evolutions of name and +form (i.e. the multiformity of the created world); in the second +place as being the opposite of this, i.e. free from all limiting +conditions whatever. Compare <span class="pagenum"><a name="page62" +id="page62"></a>{62}</span> the following passages: B<i>ri</i>. Up. +IV, 5, 15, 'For where there is duality as it were, then one sees +the other; but when the Self only is all this, how should he see +another?' Ch. Up. VII, 24, 1, 'Where one sees nothing else, hears +nothing else, understands nothing else, that is the greatest. Where +one sees something else, hears something else, understands +something else, that is the little. The greatest is immortal; the +little is mortal;' Taitt. Up. III, 12, 7, 'The wise one, who having +produced all forms and made all names, sits calling (the things by +their names<a id="footnotetag100" name= +"footnotetag100"></a><a href="#footnote100"><sup>100</sup></a>);' +<i>S</i>v. Up. VI, 19, 'Who is without parts, without actions, +tranquil, without faults, without taint, the highest bridge of +immortality, like a fire that has consumed its fuel;' B<i>ri</i>. +Up. II, 3, 6, 'Not so, not so;' B<i>ri</i>. Up. III, 8, 8, 'It is +neither coarse nor fine, neither short nor long;' and 'defective is +one place, perfect the other.' All these passages, with many +others, declare Brahman to possess a double nature, according as it +is the object either of Knowledge or of Nescience. As long as it is +the object of Nescience, there are applied to it the categories of +devotee, object of devotion, and the like<a id="footnotetag101" +name="footnotetag101"></a><a href= +"#footnote101"><sup>101</sup></a>. The different modes of devotion +lead to different results, some to exaltation, some to gradual +emancipation, some to success in works; those modes are distinct on +account of the distinction of the different qualities and limiting +conditions<a id="footnotetag102" name="footnotetag102"></a><a href= +"#footnote102"><sup>102</sup></a>. And although the one highest +Self only, i.e. the Lord distinguished by those different qualities +constitutes the object of devotion, still the fruits (of devotion) +are distinct, according as the devotion refers to different +qualities. Thus Scripture says, 'According as man worships him, +that he becomes;' and, 'According to what his thought is in this +world, so will he be when he has departed <span class= +"pagenum"><a name="page63" id="page63"></a>{63}</span> this life' +(Ch. Up. III, 14, 1). Sm<i>ri</i>ti also makes an analogous +statement, 'Remembering whatever form of being he leaves this body +in the end, into that form he enters, being impressed with it +through his constant meditation' (Bha. Gîtâ VIII, +6).</p> +<p>Although one and the same Self is hidden in all beings movable +as well as immovable, yet owing to the gradual rise of excellence +of the minds which form the limiting conditions (of the Self), +Scripture declares that the Self, although eternally unchanging and +uniform, reveals itself<a id="footnotetag103" name= +"footnotetag103"></a><a href="#footnote103"><sup>103</sup></a> in a +graduated series of beings, and so appears in forms of various +dignity and power; compare, for instance (Ait. Âr. II, 3, 2, +1), 'He who knows the higher manifestation of the Self in him<a id= +"footnotetag104" name="footnotetag104"></a><a href= +"#footnote104"><sup>104</sup></a>,' &c. Similarly Sm<i>ri</i>ti +remarks, 'Whatever being there is of power, splendour or might, +know it to have sprung from portions of my glory' (Bha. +Gîtâ, X, 41); a passage declaring that wherever there +is an excess of power and so on, there the Lord is to be +worshipped. Accordingly here (i.e. in the Sûtras) also the +teacher will show that the golden person in the disc of the Sun is +the highest Self, on account of an indicating sign, viz. the +circumstance of his being unconnected with any evil (Ved. Sû. +I, 1, 20); the same is to be observed with regard to I, 1, 22 and +other Sûtras. And, again, an enquiry will have to be +undertaken into the meaning of the texts, in order that a settled +conclusion may be reached concerning that knowledge of the Self +which leads to instantaneous release; for although that knowledge +is conveyed by means of various limiting conditions, yet no special +connexion with limiting conditions is intended to be intimated, in +consequence of which there arises a doubt whether it (the +<span class="pagenum"><a name="page64" id="page64"></a>{64}</span> +knowledge) has the higher or the lower Brahman for its object; so, +for instance, in the case of Sûtra I, 1, 12<a id= +"footnotetag105" name="footnotetag105"></a><a href= +"#footnote105"><sup>105</sup></a>. From all this it appears that +the following part of the <i>S</i>âstra has a special object +of its own, viz. to show that the Vedânta-texts teach, on the +one hand, Brahman as connected with limiting conditions and forming +an object of devotion, and on the other hand, as being free from +the connexion with such conditions and constituting an object of +knowledge. The refutation, moreover, of non-intelligent causes +different from Brahman, which in I, 1, 10 was based on the +uniformity of the meaning of the Vedânta-texts, will be +further detailed by the Sûtrakâra, who, while +explaining additional passages relating to Brahman, will preclude +all causes of a nature opposite to that of Brahman.</p> +<p>12. (The Self) consisting of bliss (is the highest Self) on +account of the repetition (of the word 'bliss,' as denoting the +highest Self).</p> +<p>The Taittirîya-upanishad (II, 1-5), after having +enumerated the Self consisting of food, the Self consisting of the +vital airs, the Self consisting of mind, and the Self consisting of +understanding, says, 'Different from this which consists of +understanding is the other inner Self which consists of bliss.' +Here the doubt arises whether the phrase, 'that which consists of +bliss,' denotes the highest Brahman of which it had been said +previously, that 'It is true Being, Knowledge, without end,' or +something different from Brahman, just as the <span class= +"pagenum"><a name="page65" id="page65"></a>{65}</span> Self +consisting of food, &c., is different from it.—The +pûrvapakshin maintains that the Self consisting of bliss is a +secondary (not the principal) Self, and something different from +Brahman; as it forms a link in a series of Selfs, beginning with +the Self consisting of food, which all are not the principal Self. +To the objection that even thus the Self consisting of bliss may be +considered as the primary Self, since it is stated to be the +innermost of all, he replies that this cannot be admitted, because +the Self of bliss is declared to have joy and so on for its limbs, +and because it is said to be embodied. If it were identical with +the primary Self, joy and the like would not touch it; but the text +expressly says 'Joy is its head;' and about its being embodied we +read, 'Of that former one this one is the embodied Self' (Taitt. +Up. II, 6), i.e. of that former Self of Understanding this Self of +bliss is the embodied Self. And of what is embodied, the contact +with joy and pain cannot be prevented. Therefore the Self which +consists of bliss is nothing but the transmigrating Soul.</p> +<p>To this reasoning we make the following reply:—By the Self +consisting of bliss we have to understand the highest Self, 'on +account of repetition.' For the word 'bliss' is repeatedly applied +to the highest Self. So Taitt. Up. II, 7, where, after the clause +'That is flavour'—which refers back to the Self consisting of +bliss, and declares it to be of the nature of flavour—we +read, 'For only after having perceived flavour can any one perceive +delight. Who could breathe, who could breathe forth if that Bliss +existed not in the ether (of the heart)? For he alone causes +blessedness;' and again, II, 8, 'Now this is an examination of +Bliss;' 'He reaches that Self consisting of Bliss;' and again, II, +9, 'He who knows the Bliss of Brahman fears nothing;' and in +addition, 'He understood that Bliss is Brahman' (III, 6). And in +another scriptural passage also (B<i>ri</i>. Up. III, 9, 28), +'Knowledge and bliss is Brahman,' we see the word 'bliss' applied +just to Brahman. As, therefore, the word 'bliss' is repeatedly used +with reference to Brahman, we conclude that the Self consisting of +bliss is Brahman also. The objection that the Self consisting of +bliss can only denote <span class="pagenum"><a name="page66" id= +"page66"></a>{66}</span> the secondary Self (the +Sa<i>m</i>sârin), because it forms a link in a series of +secondary Selfs, beginning with the one consisting of food, is of +no force, for the reason that the Self consisting of bliss is the +innermost of all. The <i>S</i>âstra, wishing to convey +information about the primary Self, adapts itself to common +notions, in so far as it at first refers to the body consisting of +food, which, although not the Self, is by very obtuse people +identified with it; it then proceeds from the body to another Self, +which has the same shape with the preceding one, just as the statue +possesses the form of the mould into which the molten brass had +been poured; then, again, to another one, always at first +representing the Non-Self as the Self, for the purpose of easier +comprehension; and it finally teaches that the innermost Self<a id= +"footnotetag106" name="footnotetag106"></a><a href= +"#footnote106"><sup>106</sup></a>, which consists of bliss, is the +real Self. Just as when a man, desirous of pointing out the star +Arundhatî to another man, at first points to several stars +which are not Arundhatî as being Arundhatî, while only +the star pointed out in the end is the real Arundhatî; so +here also the Self consisting of bliss is the real Self on account +of its being the innermost (i.e. the last). Nor can any weight be +allowed to the objection that the attribution of joy and so on, as +head, &c., cannot possibly refer to the real Self; for this +attribution is due to the immediately preceding limiting condition +(viz. the Self consisting of understanding, the so-called +vij<i>ñ</i>ânakosa), and does not really belong to the +real Self. The possession of a bodily nature also is ascribed to +the Self of bliss, only because it is represented as a link in the +chain of bodies which begins with the Self consisting of food, and +is not ascribed to it in the same direct sense in which it is +predicated of the transmigrating Self. Hence the Self consisting of +bliss is the highest Brahman.</p> +<p>13. If (it be objected that the term ânandamaya, +consisting of bliss, can) not (denote the highest Self) on account +of its being a word denoting a modification <span class= +"pagenum"><a name="page67" id="page67"></a>{67}</span> (or +product); (we declare the objection to be) not (valid) on account +of abundance, (the idea of which may be expressed by the affix +maya.)</p> +<p>Here the pûrvapakshin raises the objection that the word +ânandamaya (consisting of bliss) cannot denote the highest +Self.—Why?—Because the word ânandamaya is +understood to denote something different from the original word +(i.e. the word ânanda without the derivative affix maya), +viz. a modification; according to the received sense of the affix +maya. 'Ânandamaya' therefore denotes a modification, just as +annamaya (consisting of food) and similar words do.</p> +<p>This objection is, however, not valid, because 'maya' is also +used in the sense of abundance, i.e. denotes that where there is +abundance of what the original word expresses. So, for instance, +the phrase 'the sacrifice is annamaya' means 'the sacrifice is +abounding in food' (not 'is some modification or product of food'). +Thus here Brahman also, as abounding in bliss, is called +ânandamaya. That Brahman does abound in bliss follows from +the passage (Taitt. Up. II, 8), where, after the bliss of each of +the different classes of beings, beginning with man, has been +declared to be a hundred times greater than the bliss of the +immediately preceding class, the bliss of Brahman is finally +proclaimed to be absolutely supreme. Maya therefore denotes +abundance.</p> +<p>14. And because he is declared to be the cause of it, (i.e. of +bliss; therefore maya is to be taken as denoting abundance.)</p> +<p>Maya must be understood to denote abundance, for that reason +also that Scripture declares Brahman to be the cause of bliss, 'For +he alone causes bliss' (Taitt. Up. II, 7). For he who causes bliss +must himself abound in bliss; just as we infer in ordinary life, +that a man who enriches others must himself possess abundant +wealth. As, therefore, maya may be taken to mean 'abundant,' the +Self consisting of bliss is the highest Self.</p> +<p>15. Moreover (the ânandamaya is Brahman because) +<span class="pagenum"><a name="page68" id="page68"></a>{68}</span> +the same (Brahman) which had been referred to in the mantra is +sung, (i.e. proclaimed in the Brâhma<i>n</i>a passage as the +ânandamaya.)</p> +<p>The Self, consisting of joy, is the highest Brahman for the +following reason also<a id="footnotetag107" name= +"footnotetag107"></a><a href="#footnote107"><sup>107</sup></a>. On +the introductory words 'he who knows Brahman attains the highest' +(Taitt. Up. II, 1), there follows a mantra proclaiming that +Brahman, which forms the general topic of the chapter, possesses +the qualities of true existence, intelligence, infinity; after that +it is said that from Brahman there sprang at first the ether and +then all other moving and non-moving things, and that, entering +into the beings which it had emitted, Brahman stays in the recess, +inmost of all; thereupon, for its better comprehension, the series +of the different Selfs ('different from this is the inner Self,' +&c.) are enumerated, and then finally the same Brahman which +the mantra had proclaimed, is again proclaimed in the passage under +discussion, 'different from this is the other inner Self, which +consists of bliss.' To assume that a mantra and the +Brâhma<i>n</i>a passage belonging to it have the same sense +is only proper, on account of the absence of contradiction (which +results therefrom); for otherwise we should be driven to the +unwelcome inference that the text drops the topic once started, and +turns to an altogether new subject.</p> +<p>Nor is there mentioned a further inner Self different from the +Self consisting of bliss, as in the case of the Self consisting of +food, &c.<a id="footnotetag108" name= +"footnotetag108"></a><a href="#footnote108"><sup>108</sup></a> On +the same (i.e. the Self consisting of bliss) is founded, 'This same +knowledge of Bh<i>ri</i>gu and Varu<i>n</i>a; he understood that +bliss is Brahman' (Taitt. Up. III, 6). Therefore the Self +consisting of bliss is the highest Self.</p> +<span class="pagenum"><a name="page69" id="page69"></a>{69}</span> +<p>16. (The Self consisting of bliss is the highest Self,) not the +other (i.e. the individual Soul), on account of the impossibility +(of the latter assumption).</p> +<p>And for the following reason also the Self consisting of bliss +is the highest Self only, not the other, i.e. the one which is +other than the Lord, i.e. the transmigrating individual soul. The +personal soul cannot be denoted by the term 'the one consisting of +bliss.' Why? On account of the impossibility. For Scripture says, +with reference to the Self consisting of bliss, 'He wished, may I +be many, may I grow forth. He brooded over himself. After he had +thus brooded, he sent forth whatever there is.' Here, the desire +arising before the origination of a body, &c., the +non-separation of the effects created from the creator, and the +creation of all effects whatever, cannot possibly belong to any +Self different from the highest Self.</p> +<p>17. And on account of the declaration of the difference (of the +two, the ânandamaya cannot be the transmigrating soul).</p> +<p>The Self consisting of bliss cannot be identical with the +transmigrating soul, for that reason also that in the section +treating of the Self of bliss, the individual soul and the Self of +bliss are distinctly represented as different; Taitt. Up. II, 7, +'It (i.e. the Self consisting of bliss) is a flavour; for only +after perceiving a flavour can this (soul) perceive bliss.' For he +who perceives cannot be that which is perceived.—But, it may +be asked, if he who perceives or attains cannot be that which is +perceived or attained, how about the following <i>S</i>ruti- and +Smr<i>ri</i>ti-passages, 'The Self is to be sought;' 'Nothing +higher is known than the attainment of the Self<a id= +"footnotetag109" name="footnotetag109"></a><a href= +"#footnote109"><sup>109</sup></a>?'—This objection, we reply, +is legitimate (from the point of view of absolute truth). Yet we +see that in ordinary life, the Self, which in reality is never +anything <span class="pagenum"><a name="page70" id= +"page70"></a>{70}</span> but the Self, is, owing to +non-comprehension of the truth, identified with the Non-Self, i.e. +the body and so on; whereby it becomes possible to speak of the +Self in so far as it is identified with the body, and so on, as +something not searched for but to be searched for, not heard but to +be heard, not seized but to be seized, not perceived but to be +perceived, not known but to be known, and the like. Scripture, on +the other hand, denies, in such passages as 'there is no other seer +but he' (B<i>ri</i>. Up. III, 7, 23), that there is in reality any +seer or hearer different from the all-knowing highest Lord. (Nor +can it be said that the Lord is unreal because he is identical with +the unreal individual soul; for)<a id="footnotetag110" name= +"footnotetag110"></a><a href="#footnote110"><sup>110</sup></a> the +Lord differs from the soul (vij<i>ñ</i>ânâtman) +which is embodied, acts and enjoys, and is the product of +Nescience, in the same way as the real juggler who stands on the +ground differs from the illusive juggler, who, holding in his hand +a shield and a sword, climbs up to the sky by means of a rope; or +as the free unlimited ether differs from the ether of a jar, which +is determined by its limiting adjunct, (viz. the jar.) With +reference to this fictitious difference of the highest Self and the +individual Self, the two last Sûtras have been +propounded.</p> +<p>18. And on account of desire (being mentioned as belonging to +the ânandamaya) no regard is to be had to what is inferred, +(i.e. to the pradhâna inferred by the Sâ@nkhyas.)</p> +<p>Since in the passage 'he desired, may I be many, may I grow +forth,' which occurs in the chapter treating of the +ânandamaya (Taitt. Up. II, 6), the quality of feeling desire +is mentioned, that which is inferred, i.e. the non-intelligent +pradhâna assumed by the Sâ@nkhyas, cannot be regarded +as being the Self consisting of bliss and the cause of the world. +Although the opinion that the pradhâna is the <span class= +"pagenum"><a name="page71" id="page71"></a>{71}</span> cause of the +world, has already been refuted in the Sûtra I, 1, 5, it is +here, where a favourable opportunity presents itself, refuted for a +second time on the basis of the scriptural passage about the cause +of the world feeling desire, for the purpose of showing the +uniformity of view (of all scriptural passages).</p> +<p>19. And, moreover, it (i.e. Scripture) teaches the joining of +this (i.e. the individual soul) with that, (i.e. the Self +consisting of bliss), on that (being fully known).</p> +<p>And for the following reason also the term, 'the Self consisting +of bliss,' cannot denote either the pradhâna or the +individual soul. Scripture teaches that the individual soul when it +has reached knowledge is joined, i.e. identified, with the Self of +bliss under discussion, i.e. obtains final release. Compare the +following passage (Taitt. Up. II, 7), 'When he finds freedom from +fear, and rest in that which is invisible, incorporeal, undefined, +unsupported, then he has obtained the fearless. For if he makes but +the smallest distinction in it there is fear for him.' That means, +if he sees in that Self consisting of bliss even a small difference +in the form of non-identity, then he finds no release from the fear +of transmigratory existence. But when he, by means of the cognition +of absolute identity, finds absolute rest in the Self consisting of +bliss, then he is freed from the fear of transmigratory existence. +But this (finding absolute rest) is possible only when we +understand by the Self consisting of bliss, the highest Self, and +not either the pradhâna or the individual soul. Hence it is +proved that the Self consisting of bliss is the highest Self.</p> +<p>But, in reality, the following remarks have to be made +concerning the true meaning of the word 'ânandamaya<a id= +"footnotetag111" name="footnotetag111"></a><a href= +"#footnote111"><sup>111</sup></a>.' On what grounds, we ask, can it +be maintained that the <span class="pagenum"><a name="page72" id= +"page72"></a>{72}</span> affix 'maya' after having, in the series +of compounds beginning with annamaya and ending with +vij<i>ñ</i>ânamaya, denoted mere modifications, should +all at once, in the word ânandamaya, which belongs to the +same series, denote abundance, so that ânandamaya would refer +to Brahman? If it should be said that the assumption is made on +account of the governing influence of the Brahman proclaimed in the +mantra (which forms the beginning of the chapter, Taitt. Up. II), +we reply that therefrom it would follow that also the Selfs +consisting of food, breath, &c., denote Brahman (because the +governing influence of the mantra extends to them also).—The +advocate of the former interpretation will here, perhaps, restate +an argument already made use of above, viz. as follows: To assume +that the Selfs consisting of food, and so on, are not Brahman is +quite proper, because after each of them an inner Self is +mentioned. After the Self of bliss, on the other hand, no further +inner Self is mentioned, and hence it must be considered to be +Brahman itself; otherwise we should commit the mistake of dropping +the subject-matter in hand (as which Brahman is pointed out by the +mantra), and taking up a new topic.—But to this we reply +that, although unlike the case of the Selfs consisting of food, +&c., no inner Self is mentioned after the Self consisting of +bliss, still the latter cannot be considered as Brahman, because +with reference to the Self consisting of bliss Scripture declares, +'Joy is its head. Satisfaction is its right arm. Great satisfaction +is its left arm. Bliss is its trunk. Brahman is its tail, its +support.' Now, here the very same Brahman which, in the mantra, had +been introduced as the subject of the discussion, is called the +tail, the support; while the five involucra, extending from the +involucrum of food up to the involucrum of bliss, are merely +introduced for the purpose of setting forth the knowledge of +Brahman. How, then, can it be maintained that our interpretation +implies the needless dropping of the general subject-matter and the +introduction of a new topic?—But, it may again be objected, +Brahman is called the tail, i.e. a member of the Self consisting of +bliss; analogously to those passages in which a tail and +<span class="pagenum"><a name="page73" id="page73"></a>{73}</span> +other members are ascribed to the Selfs consisting of food and so +on. On what grounds, then, can we claim to know that Brahman (which +is spoken of as a mere member, i.e. a subordinate matter) is in +reality the chief matter referred to?—From the fact, we +reply, of Brahman being the general subject-matter of the +chapter.—But, it will again be said, that interpretation also +according to which Brahman is cognised as a mere member of the +ânandamaya does not involve a dropping of the subject-matter, +since the ânandamaya himself is Brahman.—But, we reply, +in that case one and the same Brahman would at first appear as the +whole, viz. as the Self consisting of bliss, and thereupon as a +mere part, viz. as the tail; which is absurd. And as one of the two +alternatives must be preferred, it is certainly appropriate to +refer to Brahman the clause 'Brahman is the tail' which contains +the word 'Brahman,' and not the sentence about the Self of Bliss in +which Brahman is not mentioned. Moreover, Scripture, in +continuation of the phrase, 'Brahman is the tail, the support,' +goes on, 'On this there is also the following <i>s</i>loka: He who +knows the Brahman as non-existing becomes himself non-existing. He +who knows Brahman as existing him we know himself as existing.' As +this <i>s</i>loka, without any reference to the Self of bliss, +states the advantage and disadvantage connected with the knowledge +of the being and non-being of Brahman only, we conclude that the +clause, 'Brahman is the tail, the support,' represents Brahman as +the chief matter (not as a merely subordinate matter). About the +being or non-being of the Self of bliss, on the other hand, a doubt +is not well possible, since the Self of bliss distinguished by joy, +satisfaction, &c., is well known to every one.—But if +Brahman is the principal matter, how can it be designated as the +mere tail of the Self of bliss ('Brahman is the tail, the +support')?—Its being called so, we reply, forms no objection; +for the word tail here denotes that which is of the nature of a +tail, so that we have to understand that the bliss of Brahman is +not a member (in its literal sense), but the support or abode, the +one nest (resting-place) of all worldly bliss. Analogously another +<span class="pagenum"><a name="page74" id="page74"></a>{74}</span> +scriptural passage declares, 'All other creatures live on a small +portion of that bliss' (B<i>ri</i>. Up. IV, 3, 32). Further, if by +the Self consisting of bliss we were to understand Brahman we +should have to assume that the Brahman meant is the Brahman +distinguished by qualities (savi<i>s</i>esha), because it is said +to have joy and the like for its members. But this assumption is +contradicted by a complementary passage (II, 9) which declares that +Brahman is the object neither of mind nor speech, and so shows that +the Brahman meant is the (absolute) Brahman (devoid of qualities), +'From whence all speech, with the mind, turns away unable to reach +it, he who knows the bliss of that Brahman fears nothing.' +Moreover, if we speak of something as 'abounding in bliss<a id= +"footnotetag112" name="footnotetag112"></a><a href= +"#footnote112"><sup>112</sup></a>,' we thereby imply the +co-existence of pain; for the word 'abundance' in its ordinary +sense implies the existence of a small measure of what is opposed +to the thing whereof there is abundance. But the passage so +understood would be in conflict with another passage (Ch. Up. VII, +24), 'Where one sees nothing else, hears nothing else, understands +nothing else, that is the Infinite;' which declares that in the +Infinite, i.e. Brahman, there is nothing whatever different from +it. Moreover, as joy, &c. differ in each individual body, the +Self consisting of bliss also is a different one in each body. +Brahman, on the other hand, does not differ according to bodies; +for the mantra at the beginning of the chapter declares it to be +true Being, knowledge, infinite, and another passage says, 'He is +the one God, hidden in all beings, all-pervading, the Self within +all beings' (<i>S</i>v. Up. VI, 11). Nor, again, does Scripture +exhibit a frequent repetition of the word 'ânandamaya;' for +merely the radical part of the compound (i.e. the word ânanda +without the affix maya) is repeated in all the following passages; +'It is a flavour, for only after seizing flavour can any one seize +bliss. Who could breathe, who could breathe forth, if that bliss +existed not in the ether? For he alone causes blessedness;' 'Now +this is an examination of bliss;' 'He who <span class= +"pagenum"><a name="page75" id="page75"></a>{75}</span> knows the +bliss of that Brahman fears nothing;' 'He understood that bliss is +Brahman.' If it were a settled matter that Brahman is denoted by +the term, 'the Self consisting of bliss,' then we could assume that +in the subsequent passages, where merely the word 'bliss' is +employed, the term 'consisting of bliss' is meant to be repeated; +but that the Self consisting of bliss is not Brahman, we have +already proved by means of the reason of joy being its head, and so +on. Hence, as in another scriptural passage, viz. 'Brahman is +knowledge and bliss' (B<i>ri</i>. Up. III, 9, 28), the mere word +'bliss' denotes Brahman, we must conclude that also in such +passages as, 'If that bliss existed not in the ether,' the word +bliss is used with reference to Brahman, and is not meant to repeat +the term 'consisting of bliss.' The repetition of the full +compound, 'consisting of bliss,' which occurs in the passage, 'He +reaches that Self consisting of bliss' (Taitt. Up. II, 8), does not +refer to Brahman, as it is contained in the enumeration of +Non-Selfs, comprising the Self of food, &c., all of which are +mere effects, and all of which are represented as things to be +reached.—But, it may be said, if the Self consisting of +bliss, which is said to have to be reached, were not +Brahman—just as the Selfs consisting of food, &c. are not +Brahman—then it would not be declared (in the passage +immediately following) that he who knows obtains for his reward +Brahman.—This objection we invalidate by the remark that the +text makes its declaration as to Brahman—which is the tail, +the support—being reached by him who knows, by the very means +of the declaration as to the attainment of the Self of bliss; as +appears from the passage, 'On this there is also this <i>s</i>loka, +from which all speech returns,' &c. With reference, again, to +the passage, 'He desired: may I be many, may I grow forth,' which +is found in proximity to the mention of the Self consisting of +bliss, we remark that it is in reality connected (not with the Self +of bliss but with) Brahman, which is mentioned in the still nearer +passage, 'Brahman is the tail, the support,' and does therefore not +intimate that the Self of bliss is Brahman. And, on account of its +referring to the passage last quoted ('it desired,' &c.), the +later passage <span class="pagenum"><a name="page76" id= +"page76"></a>{76}</span> also, 'That is flavour,' &c., has not +the Self of bliss for its subject.—But, it may be objected, +the (neuter word) Brahman cannot possibly be designated by a +masculine word as you maintain is done in the passage, 'He +desired,' &c.—In reply to this objection we point to the +passage (Taitt. Up. II, 1), 'From that Self sprang ether,' where, +likewise, the masculine word 'Self' can refer to Brahman only, +since the latter is the general topic of the chapter. In the +knowledge of Bh<i>ri</i>gu and Varu<i>n</i>a finally ('he knew that +bliss is Brahman'), the word 'bliss' is rightly understood to +denote Brahman, since we there meet neither with the affix 'maya,' +nor with any statement as to joy being its head, and the like. To +ascribe to Brahman in itself joy, and so on, as its members, is +impossible, unless we have recourse to certain, however minute, +distinctions qualifying Brahman; and that the whole chapter is not +meant to convey a knowledge of the qualified (savi<i>s</i>esha) +Brahman is proved by the passage (quoted above), which declares +that Brahman transcends speech and mind. We therefore must conclude +that the affix maya, in the word ânandamaya, does not denote +abundance, but expresses a mere effect, just as it does in the +words annamaya and the subsequent similar compounds.</p> +<p>The Sûtras are therefore to be explained as follows. There +arises the question whether the passage, 'Brahman is the tail, the +support,' is to be understood as intimating that Brahman is a mere +member of the Self consisting of bliss, or that it is the principal +matter. If it is said that it must be considered as a mere member, +the reply is, 'The Self consisting of bliss on account of the +repetition.' That means: Brahman, which in the passage 'the Self +consisting of bliss,' &c., is spoken of as the tail, the +support, is designated as the principal matter (not as something +subordinate). On account of the repetition; for in the memorial +<i>s</i>loka, 'he becomes himself non-existing,' Brahman alone is +reiterated. 'If not, on account of the word denoting a +modification; not so, on account of abundance.' In this Sûtra +the word 'modification' is meant to convey the sense of member. The +objection that on account of <span class="pagenum"><a name="page77" +id="page77"></a>{77}</span> the word 'tail,' which denotes a mere +member, Brahman cannot be taken as the principal matter must be +refuted. This we do by remarking that there is no difficulty, since +a word denoting a member may be introduced into the passage on +account of prâ<i>k</i>urya<a id="footnotetag113" name= +"footnotetag113"></a><a href="#footnote113"><sup>113</sup></a>. +Prâ<i>k</i>urya here means a phraseology abounding in terms +denoting members. After the different members, beginning with the +head and ending with the tail, of the Selfs, consisting of food, +&c. have been enumerated, there are also mentioned the head and +the other limbs of the Self of bliss, and then it is added, +'Brahman is the tail, the support;' the intention being merely to +introduce some more terms denoting members, not to convey the +meaning of 'member,' (an explanation which is impossible) because +the preceding Sûtra already has proved Brahman (not to be a +member, but) to be the principal matter. 'And because he is +declared to be the cause of it.' That means: Brahman is declared to +be the cause of the entire aggregate of effects, inclusive of the +Self, consisting of bliss, in the following passage, 'He created +all whatever there is' (Taitt. Up. II, 6). And as Brahman is the +cause, it cannot at the same time be called the member, in the +literal sense of the word, of the Self of bliss, which is nothing +but one of Brahman's effects. The other Sûtras also (which +refer to the Self of bliss<a id="footnotetag114" name= +"footnotetag114"></a><a href="#footnote114"><sup>114</sup></a>) are +to be considered, as well as they may, as conveying a knowledge of +Brahman, which (Brahman) is referred to in the passage about the +tail.</p> +<p>20. The one within (the sun and the eye) (is the highest Lord), +on account of his qualities being declared<a id="footnotetag115" +name="footnotetag115"></a><a href= +"#footnote115"><sup>115</sup></a>.</p> +<p>The following passage is found in Scripture (Ch. Up. I, 6, 6 +ff.), 'Now that person bright as gold who is seen within +<span class="pagenum"><a name="page78" id="page78"></a>{78}</span> +the sun, with beard bright as gold and hair bright as gold, bright +as gold altogether to the very tips of his nails, whose eyes are +like blue lotus; his name is Ut, for he has risen (udita) above all +evil. He also who knows this rises above all evil. So much with +reference to the devas.' And further on, with reference to the +body, 'Now the person who is seen in the eye,' &c. Here the +following doubt presents itself. Do these passages point out, as +the object of devotion directed on the sphere of the sun and the +eye, merely some special individual soul, which, by means of a +large measure of knowledge and pious works, has raised itself to a +position of eminence; or do they refer to the eternally perfect +highest Lord?</p> +<p>The pûrvapakshin takes the former view. An individual +soul, he says, is referred to, since Scripture speaks of a definite +shape. To the person in the sun special features are ascribed, such +as the possession of a beard as bright as gold and so on, and the +same features manifestly belong to the person in the eye also, +since they are expressly transferred to it in the passage, 'The +shape of this person is the same as the shape of that person.' +That, on the other hand, no shape can be ascribed to the highest +Lord, follows from the passage (Kau. Up. I, 3, 15), 'That which is +without sound, without touch, without form, without decay.' That an +individual soul is meant follows moreover from the fact that a +definite abode is mentioned, 'He who is in the sun; he who is in +the eye.' About the highest Lord, who has no special abode, but +abides in his own glory, no similar statement can be made; compare, +for instance, the two following passages, 'Where does he rest? In +his own glory?' (Ch. Up. VII, 24, 1); and 'like the ether he is +omnipresent, eternal.' A further argument for our view is supplied +by the fact that the might (of the being in question) is said to be +limited; for the passage, 'He is lord of the worlds beyond that, +and of the wishes of the devas,' indicates the <span class= +"pagenum"><a name="page79" id="page79"></a>{79}</span> limitation +of the might of the person in the sun; and the passage, 'He is lord +of the worlds beneath that and of the wishes of men,' indicates the +limitation of the might of the person in the eye. No limit, on the +other hand, can be admitted of the might of the highest Lord, as +appears from the passage (B<i>ri</i>. Up. IV, 4, 22), 'He is the +Lord of all, the king of all things, the protector of all things. +He is a bank and a boundary so that these worlds may not be +confounded;' which passage intimates that the Lord is free from all +limiting distinctions. For all these reasons the person in the eye +and the sun cannot be the highest Lord.</p> +<p>To this reasoning the Sûtra replies, 'The one within, on +account of his qualities being declared.' The person referred to in +the passages concerning the person within the sun and the person +within the eye is not a transmigrating being, but the highest Lord. +Why? Because his qualities are declared. For the qualities of the +highest Lord are indicated in the text as follows. At first the +name of the person within the sun is mentioned—'his name is +Ut'—and then this name is explained on the ground of that +person being free from all evil, 'He has risen above all evil.' The +same name thus explained is then transferred to the person in the +eye, in the clause, 'the name of the one is the name of the other.' +Now, entire freedom from sin is attributed in Scripture to the +highest Self only; so, for instance (Ch. Up. VIII, 7, 1), 'The Self +which is free from sin,' &c. Then, again, there is the passage, +'He is <i>Ri</i>k, he is Sâman, Uktha, Yajus, Brahman,' which +declares the person in the eye to be the Self of the <i>Ri</i>k, +Sâman, and so on; which is possible only if that person is +the Lord who, as being the cause of all, is to be considered as the +Self of all. Moreover, the text, after having stated in succession +<i>Ri</i>k and Sâman to have earth and fire for their Self +with reference to the Devas, and, again, speech and breath with +reference to the body, continues, '<i>Ri</i>k and Sâman are +his joints,' with reference to the Devas, and 'the joints of the +one are the joints of the other,' with reference to the body. Now +this statement <span class="pagenum"><a name="page80" id= +"page80"></a>{80}</span> also can be made only with regard to that +which is the Self of all. Further, the passage, 'Therefore all who +sing to the Vînâ sing him, and from him also they +obtain wealth,' shows that the being spoken of is the sole topic of +all worldly songs; which again holds true of the highest Lord only. +That absolute command over the objects of worldly desires (as +displayed, for instance, in the bestowal of wealth) entitles us to +infer that the Lord is meant, appears also from the following +passage of the Bhagavad-gîtâ (X, 41), 'Whatever being +there is possessing power, glory, or strength, know it to be +produced from a portion of my energy<a id="footnotetag116" name= +"footnotetag116"></a><a href="#footnote116"><sup>116</sup></a>.' To +the objection that the statements about bodily shape contained in +the clauses, 'With a beard bright as gold,' &c., cannot refer +to the highest Lord, we reply that the highest Lord also may, when +he pleases, assume a bodily shape formed of Mâyâ, in +order to gratify thereby his devout worshippers. Thus Sm<i>ri</i>ti +also says, 'That thou seest me, O Nârada, is the +Mâyâ emitted by me; do not then look on me as endowed +with the qualities of all beings.' We have further to note that +expressions such as, 'That which is without sound, without touch, +without form, without decay,' are made use of where instruction is +given about the nature of the highest Lord in so far as he is +devoid of all qualities; while passages such as the following one, +'He to whom belong all works, all desires, all sweet odours and +tastes' (Ch. Up. III, 14, 2), which represent the highest Lord as +the object of devotion, speak of him, who is the cause of +everything, as possessing some of the qualities of his effects. +Analogously he may be spoken of, in the passage under discussion, +as having a beard bright as gold and so on. With reference to the +objection that the highest Lord cannot be meant because an abode is +spoken of, we remark that, for the purposes of devout meditation, a +special abode may be assigned to Brahman, although it abides in its +own glory only; for as Brahman is, like ether, all-pervading, it +may be viewed as <span class="pagenum"><a name="page81" id= +"page81"></a>{81}</span> being within the Self of all beings. The +statement, finally, about the limitation of Brahman's might, which +depends on the distinction of what belongs to the gods and what to +the body, has likewise reference to devout meditation only. From +all this it follows that the being which Scripture states to be +within the eye and the sun is the highest Lord.</p> +<p>21. And there is another one (i.e. the Lord who is different +from the individual souls animating the sun, &c.), on account +of the declaration of distinction.</p> +<p>There is, moreover, one distinct from the individual souls which +animate the sun and other bodies, viz. the Lord who rules within; +whose distinction (from all individual souls) is proclaimed in the +following scriptural passage, 'He who dwells in the sun and within +the sun, whom the sun does not know, whose body the sun is, and who +rules the sun within; he is thy Self, the ruler within, the +immortal' (B<i>ri</i>. Up. III, 7, 9). Here the expression, 'He +within the sun whom the sun does not know,' clearly indicates that +the Ruler within is distinct from that cognising individual soul +whose body is the sun. With that Ruler within we have to identify +the person within the sun, according to the tenet of the sameness +of purport of all Vedânta-texts. It thus remains a settled +conclusion that the passage under discussion conveys instruction +about the highest Lord.</p> +<p>22. The âkâ<i>s</i>a, i.e. ether (is Brahman) on +account of characteristic marks (of the latter being +mentioned).</p> +<p>In the Chândogya (I, 9) the following passage is met with, +'What is the origin of this world?' 'Ether,' he replied. 'For all +these beings take their rise from the ether only, and return into +the ether. Ether is greater than these, ether is their +rest.'—Here the following doubt arises. Does the word 'ether' +denote the highest Brahman or the elemental ether?—Whence the +doubt?—Because the word is seen to be used in both senses. +Its use in the sense of 'elemental ether' is well established in +ordinary as well as in Vedic speech; <span class="pagenum"><a name= +"page82" id="page82"></a>{82}</span> and, on the other hand, we see +that it is sometimes used to denote Brahman, viz. in cases where we +ascertain, either from some complementary sentence or from the fact +of special qualities being mentioned, that Brahman is meant. So, +for instance, Taitt. Up. II, 7, 'If that bliss existed not in the +ether;' and Ch. Up. VIII, 14, 'That which is called ether is the +revealer of all forms and names; that within which forms and names +are<a id="footnotetag117" name="footnotetag117"></a><a href= +"#footnote117"><sup>117</sup></a> that is Brahman.' Hence the +doubt.—Which sense is then to be adopted in our +case?—The sense of elemental ether, the pûrvapakshin +replies; because this sense belongs to the word more commonly, and +therefore presents itself to the mind more readily. The word +'ether' cannot be taken in both senses equally, because that would +involve a (faulty) attribution of several meanings to one and the +same word. Hence the term 'ether' applies to Brahman in a secondary +(metaphorical) sense only; on account of Brahman being in many of +its attributes, such as all pervadingness and the like, similar to +ether. The rule is, that when the primary sense of a word is +possible, the word must not be taken in a secondary sense. And in +the passage under discussion only the primary sense of the word +'ether' is admissible. Should it be objected that, if we refer the +passage under discussion to the elemental ether, a complementary +passage ('for all these beings take their rise from the ether only, +&c.') cannot be satisfactorily accounted for; we reply that the +elemental ether also may be represented as a cause, viz. of air, +fire, &c. in due succession. For we read in Scripture (Taitt. +Up. II, 1), 'From that Self sprang ether, from ether air, from air +fire, and so on.' The qualities also of being greater and of being +a place of rest may be ascribed to the elemental ether, if we +consider its relations to all other beings. Therefore we conclude +that the word 'ether' here denotes the elemental ether.</p> +<p>To this we reply as follows:—The word ether must here be +taken to denote Brahman, on account of characteristic marks of the +latter being mentioned. For the sentence, <span class= +"pagenum"><a name="page83" id="page83"></a>{83}</span> 'All these +beings take their rise from the ether only,' clearly indicates the +highest Brahman, since all Vedânta-texts agree in definitely +declaring that all beings spring from the highest +Brahman.—But, the opponent may say, we have shown that the +elemental ether also may be represented as the cause, viz. of air, +fire, and the other elements in due succession.—We admit +this. But still there remains the difficulty, that, unless we +understand the word to apply to the fundamental cause of all, viz. +Brahman, the affirmation contained in the word 'only' and the +qualification expressed by the word 'all' (in 'all beings') would +be out of place. Moreover, the clause, 'They return into the +ether,' again points to Brahman, and so likewise the phrase, 'Ether +is greater than these, ether is their rest;' for absolute +superiority in point of greatness Scripture attributes to the +highest Self only; cp. Ch. Up. III, 14, 3, 'Greater than the earth, +greater than the sky, greater than heaven, greater than all these +worlds.' The quality of being a place of rest likewise agrees best +with the highest Brahman, on account of its being the highest +cause. This is confirmed by the following scriptural passage: +'Knowledge and bliss is Brahman, it is the rest of him who gives +gifts' (B<i>ri</i>. Up. III, 9, 28). Moreover, Jaivali finding +fault with the doctrine of <i>S</i>âlâvatya, on account +of (his sâman) having an end (Ch. Up. I, 8, 8), and wishing +to proclaim something that has no end chooses the ether, and then, +having identified the ether with the Udgîtha, concludes, 'He +is the Udgîtha greater than great; he is without end.' Now +this endlessness is a characteristic mark of Brahman. To the remark +that the sense of 'elemental ether' presents itself to the mind +more readily, because it is the better established sense of the +word âkâ<i>s</i>a, we reply, that, although it may +present itself to the mind first, yet it is not to be accepted, +because we see that qualities of Brahman are mentioned in the +complementary sentences. That the word âkâ<i>s</i>a is +also used to denote Brahman has been shown already; cp. such +passages as, 'Ether is the revealer of all names and forms.' We +see, moreover, that various synonyma of âkâ<i>s</i>a +are employed to denote Brahman. So, for instance, <i>Ri</i>k +Sa<i>m</i>h. <span class="pagenum"><a name="page84" id= +"page84"></a>{84}</span> I, 164, 39, 'In which the Vedas are<a id= +"footnotetag118" name="footnotetag118"></a><a href= +"#footnote118"><sup>118</sup></a>, in the Imperishable one (i.e. +Brahman), the highest, the ether (vyoman), on which all gods have +their seat.' And Taitt. Up. III, 6, 'This is the knowledge of +Bh<i>ri</i>gu and Varu<i>n</i>a, founded on the highest ether +(vyoman).' And again, 'Om, ka is Brahman, ether (kha) is Brahman' +(Ch. Up. IV, 10, 5), and 'the old ether' (B<i>ri</i>. Up. V, +1)<a id="footnotetag119" name="footnotetag119"></a><a href= +"#footnote119"><sup>119</sup></a>. And other similar passages. On +account of the force of the complementary passage we are justified +in deciding that the word 'ether,' although occurring in the +beginning of the passage, refers to Brahman. The case is analogous +to that of the sentence, 'Agni (lit. the fire) studies a chapter,' +where the word agni, although occurring in the beginning, is at +once seen to denote a boy<a id="footnotetag120" name= +"footnotetag120"></a><a href="#footnote120"><sup>120</sup></a>. It +is therefore settled that the word 'ether' denotes Brahman.</p> +<p>23. For the same reason breath (is Brahman).</p> +<p>Concerning the udgîtha it is said (Ch. Up. I, 10, 9), +'Prastot<i>ri</i>, that deity which belongs to the prastâva, +&c.,' and, further on (I, 11, 4; 5), 'Which then is that deity? +He said: Breath. For all these beings merge into breath alone, and +from breath they arise. This is the deity belonging to the +prastâva.' With reference to this passage doubt and decision +are to be considered as analogous to those stated under the +preceding Sûtra. For while in some passages—as, for +instance, 'For indeed, my son, mind is fastened to +prâ<i>n</i>a,' Ch. Up. VI, 8, 2; and, 'the prâ<i>n</i>a +of prâ<i>n</i>a,' B<i>ri</i>. Up. IV, 4, 18—the word +'breath' is seen to denote Brahman, its use <span class= +"pagenum"><a name="page85" id="page85"></a>{85}</span> in the sense +of a certain modification of air is better established in common as +well as in Vedic language. Hence there arises a doubt whether in +the passage under discussion the word prâ<i>n</i>a denotes +Brahman or (ordinary) breath. In favour of which meaning have we +then to decide?</p> +<p>Here the pûrvapakshin maintains that the word must be held +to denote the fivefold vital breath, which is a peculiar +modification of wind (or air); because, as has been remarked +already, that sense of the word prâ<i>n</i>a is the better +established one.—But no, an objector will say, just as in the +case of the preceding Sûtra, so here also Brahman is meant, +on account of characteristic marks being mentioned; for here also a +complementary passage gives us to understand that all beings spring +from and merge into prâ<i>n</i>a; a process which can take +place in connexion with the highest Lord only.—This +objection, the pûrvapakshin replies, is futile, since we see +that the beings enter into and proceed from the principal vital air +also. For Scripture makes the following statement (Sat. Br. X, 3, +3, 6), 'When man sleeps, then into breath indeed speech merges, +into breath the eye, into breath the ear, into breath the mind; +when he awakes then they spring again from breath alone.' What the +Veda here states is, moreover, a matter of observation, for during +sleep, while the process of breathing goes on uninterruptedly, the +activity of the sense organs is interrupted and again becomes +manifest at the time of awaking only. And as the sense organs are +the essence of all material beings, the complementary passage which +speaks of the merging and emerging of the beings can be reconciled +with the principal vital air also. Moreover, subsequently to +prâ<i>n</i>a being mentioned as the divinity of the +prastâva the sun and food are designated as the divinities of +the udgitha and the pratibâra. Now as they are not Brahman, +the prâ<i>n</i>a also, by parity of reasoning, cannot be +Brahman.</p> +<p>To this argumentation the author of the Sûtras replies: +For the same reason prâ<i>n</i>a—that means: on account +of the presence of characteristic marks—which constituted the +reason stated in the preceding Sûtra—the word +prâ<i>n</i>a also <span class="pagenum"><a name="page86" id= +"page86"></a>{86}</span> must be held to denote Brahman. For +Scripture says of prâ<i>n</i>a also, that it is connected +with marks characteristic of Brahman. The sentence, 'All these +beings merge into breath alone, and from breath they arise,' which +declares that the origination and retractation of all beings depend +on prâ<i>n</i>a, clearly shows prâ<i>n</i>a to be +Brahman. In reply to the assertion that the origination and +retractation of all beings can be reconciled equally well with the +assumption of prâ<i>n</i>a denoting the chief vital air, +because origination and retractation take place in the state of +waking and of sleep also, we remark that in those two states only +the senses are merged into, and emerge from, the chief vital air, +while, according to the scriptural passage, 'For all these beings, +&c.,' all beings whatever into which a living Self has entered, +together with their senses and bodies, merge and emerge by turns. +And even if the word 'beings' were taken (not in the sense of +animated beings, but) in the sense of material elements in general, +there would be nothing in the way of interpreting the passage as +referring to Brahman.—But, it may be said, that the senses +together with their objects do, during sleep, enter into +prâ<i>n</i>a, and again issue from it at the time of waking, +we distinctly learn from another scriptural passage, viz. Kau. Up. +III, 3, 'When a man being thus asleep sees no dream whatever, he +becomes one with that prâ<i>n</i>a alone. Then speech goes to +him with all names,' &c.—True, we reply, but there also +the word prâ<i>n</i>a denotes (not the vital air) but +Brahman, as we conclude from characteristic marks of Brahman being +mentioned. The objection, again, that the word prâ<i>n</i>a +cannot denote Brahman because it occurs in proximity to the words +'food' and 'sun' (which do not refer to Brahman), is altogether +baseless; for proximity is of no avail against the force of the +complementary passage which intimates that prâ<i>n</i>a is +Brahman. That argument, finally, which rests on the fact that the +word prâ<i>n</i>a commonly denotes the vital air with its +five modifications, is to be refuted in the same way as the +parallel argument which the pûrvapakshin brought forward with +reference to the word 'ether.' From all this it follows that the +prâ<i>n</i>a, which is the deity of the prastâva, is +Brahman.</p> +<span class="pagenum"><a name="page87" id="page87"></a>{87}</span> +<p>Some (commentators)<a id="footnotetag121" name= +"footnotetag121"></a><a href="#footnote121"><sup>121</sup></a> +quote under the present Sûtra the following passages, 'the +prâ<i>n</i>a of prâ<i>n</i>a' (B<i>ri</i>. Up. IV, 4, +18), and 'for to prâ<i>n</i>a mind is fastened' (Ch. Up. VI, +8, 2). But that is wrong since these two passages offer no +opportunity for any discussion, the former on account of the +separation of the words, the latter on account of the general +topic. When we meet with a phrase such as 'the father of the +father' we understand at once that the genitive denotes a father +different from the father denoted by the nominative. Analogously we +infer from the separation of words contained in the phrase, 'the +breath of breath,' that the 'breath of breath' is different from +the ordinary breath (denoted by the genitive 'of breath'). For one +and the same thing cannot, by means of a genitive, be predicated +of—and thus distinguished from—itself. Concerning the +second passage we remark that, if the matter constituting the +general topic of some chapter is referred to in that chapter under +a different name, we yet conclude, from the general topic, that +that special matter is meant. For instance, when we meet in the +section which treats of the jyotish<i>t</i>oma sacrifice with the +passage, 'in every spring he is to offer the jyotis sacrifice,' we +at once understand that the word denotes the jyotish<i>t</i>oma. If +we therefore meet with the clause 'to prâ<i>n</i>a mind is +fastened' in a section of which the highest Brahman is the topic, +we do not for a moment suppose that the word prâ<i>n</i>a +should there denote the ordinary breath which is a mere +modification of air. The two passages thus do not offer any matter +for discussion, and hence do not furnish appropriate instances for +the Sûtra. We have shown, on the other hand, that the passage +about the prâ<i>n</i>a, which is the deity of the +prastâva, allows room for doubt, pûrvapaksha and final +decision.</p> +<p>24. The 'light' (is Brahman), on account of the mention of feet +(in a passage which is connected with the passage about the +light).</p> +<p>Scripture says (Ch. Up. III, 13, 7), 'Now that light which +shines above this heaven, higher than all, higher than everything, +<span class="pagenum"><a name="page88" id="page88"></a>{88}</span> +in the highest worlds beyond which there are no other worlds that +is the same light which is within man.' Here the doubt presents +itself whether the word 'light' denotes the light of the sun and +the like, or the highest Self. Under the preceding Sûtras we +had shown that some words which ordinarily have different meanings +yet in certain passages denote Brahman, since characteristic marks +of the latter are mentioned. Here the question has to be discussed +whether, in connexion with the passage quoted, characteristic marks +of Brahman are mentioned or not.</p> +<p>The pûrvapakshin maintains that the word 'light' denotes +nothing else but the light of the sun and the like, since that is +the ordinary well-established meaning of the term. The common use +of language, he says, teaches us that the two words 'light' and +'darkness' denote mutually opposite things, darkness being the term +for whatever interferes with the function of the sense of sight, +as, for instance, the gloom of the night, while sunshine and +whatever else favours the action of the eye is called light. The +word 'shines' also, which the text exhibits, is known ordinarily to +refer to the sun and similar sources of light; while of Brahman, +which is devoid of colour, it cannot be said, in the primary sense +of the word, that it 'shines.' Further, the word jyotis must here +denote light because it is said to be bounded by the sky ('that +light which shines above this heaven'). For while it is impossible +to consider the sky as being the boundary of Brahman, which is the +Self of all and the source of all things movable or immovable, the +sky may be looked upon as forming the boundary of light, which is a +mere product and as such limited; accordingly the text says, 'the +light beyond heaven.'—But light, although a mere product, is +perceived everywhere; it would therefore be wrong to declare that +it is bounded by the sky!—Well, then, the pûrvapakshin +replies, let us assume that the light meant is the first-born +(original) light which has not yet become tripartite<a id= +"footnotetag122" name="footnotetag122"></a><a href= +"#footnote122"><sup>122</sup></a>. This explanation again cannot be +<span class="pagenum"><a name="page89" id="page89"></a>{89}</span> +admitted, because the non-tripartite light does not serve any +purpose.—But, the pûrvapakshin resumes, Why should its +purpose not be found therein that it is the object of devout +meditation?—That cannot be, we reply; for we see that only +such things are represented as objects of devotion as have some +other independent use of their own; so, for instance, the sun +(which dispels darkness and so on). Moreover the scriptural +passage, 'Let me make each of these three (fire, water, and earth) +tripartite,' does not indicate any difference<a id="footnotetag123" +name="footnotetag123"></a><a href= +"#footnote123"><sup>123</sup></a>. And even of the non-tripartite +light it is not known that the sky constitutes its +boundary.—Well, then (the pûrvapakshin resumes, +dropping the idea of the non-tripartite light), let us assume that +the light of which the text speaks is the tripartite (ordinary) +light. The objection that light is seen to exist also beneath the +sky, viz. in the form of fire and the like, we invalidate by the +remark that there is nothing contrary to reason in assigning a +special locality to fire, although the latter is observed +everywhere; while to assume a special place for Brahman, to which +the idea of place does not apply at all, would be most unsuitable. +Moreover, the clause 'higher than everything, in the highest worlds +beyond which there are no other worlds,' which indicates a +multiplicity of abodes, agrees much better with light, which is a +mere product (than with Brahman). There is moreover that other +clause, also, 'That is the same light which is within man,' in +which the highest light is identified with the gastric fire (the +fire within man). Now such identifications can be made only where +there is a certain similarity of nature; as is seen, for instance, +in the passage, 'Of that person Bhû<i>h</i> is the head, for +the head is one and that syllable is one' (B<i>ri</i>. Up. V, 5, +3). But that the fire within the human body is not Brahman clearly +appears from the passage, 'Of this we have visible and audible +proof' (Ch. Up. III, 13, 7; 8), which declares that <span class= +"pagenum"><a name="page90" id="page90"></a>{90}</span> the fire is +characterised by the noise it makes, and by heat; and likewise from +the following passage, 'Let a man meditate on this as that which is +seen and heard.' The same conclusion may be drawn from the passage, +'He who knows this becomes conspicuous and celebrated,' which +proclaims an inconsiderable reward only, while to the devout +meditation on Brahman a high reward would have to be allotted. Nor +is there mentioned in the entire passage about the light any other +characteristic mark of Brahman, while such marks are set forth in +the passages (discussed above) which refer to prâ<i>n</i>a +and the ether. Nor, again, is Brahman indicated in the preceding +section, 'the Gâyatrî is everything whatsoever exists,' +&c. (III, 12); for that passage makes a statement about the +Gâyatrî metre only. And even if that section did refer +to Brahman, still Brahman would not be recognised in the passage at +present under discussion; for there (in the section referred to) it +is declared in the clause, 'Three feet of it are the Immortal in +heaven'—that heaven constitutes the abode; while in our +passage the words 'the light above heaven' declare heaven to be a +boundary. For all these reasons the word jyotis is here to be taken +in its ordinary meaning, viz. light.</p> +<p>To this we make the following reply. The word jyotis must be +held to denote Brahman. Why? On account of the feet (quarters) +being mentioned. In a preceding passage Brahman had been spoken of +as having four feet (quarters). 'Such is the greatness of it; +greater than it is the Person (purusha). One foot of it are all the +beings, three feet of it are the Immortal in heaven.' That which in +this passage is said to constitute the three-quarter part, immortal +and connected with heaven, of Brahman, which altogether comprises +four quarters; this very same entity we recognise as again referred +to in the passage under discussion, because there also it is said +to be connected with heaven. If therefore we should set it aside in +our interpretation of the passage and assume the latter to refer to +the ordinary light, we should commit the mistake of dropping, +without need, the topic started and introducing <span class= +"pagenum"><a name="page91" id="page91"></a>{91}</span> a new +subject. Brahman, in fact, continues to form the subject-matter, +not only of the passage about the light, but likewise of the +subsequent section, the so-called Sâ<i>nd</i>ilya-vidyâ +(Ch. Up. III, 14). Hence we conclude that in our passage the word +'light' must be held to denote Brahman. The objection (raised +above) that from common use the words 'light' and 'to shine' are +known to denote effected (physical) light is without force; for as +it is known from the general topic of the chapter that Brahman is +meant, those two words do not necessarily denote physical light +only to the exclusion of Brahman<a id="footnotetag124" name= +"footnotetag124"></a><a href="#footnote124"><sup>124</sup></a>, but +may also denote Brahman itself, in so far as it is characterised by +the physical shining light which is its effect. Analogously another +mantra declares, 'that by which the sun shines kindled with heat' +(Taitt. Br. III, 12, 9, 7). Or else we may suppose that the word +jyotis here does not denote at all that light on which the function +of the eye depends. For we see that in other passages it has +altogether different meanings; so, for instance, B<i>ri</i>. Up. +IV, 3, 5, 'With speech only as light man sits,' and Taitt. Sa. I, +6, 3, 3, 'May the mind, the light, accept,' &c. It thus appears +that whatever illuminates (in the different senses of the word) +something else may be spoken of as 'light.' Hence to Brahman also, +whose nature is intelligence, the term 'light' may be applied; for +it gives light to the entire world. Similarly, other scriptural +passages say, 'Him the shining one, everything shines after; by his +light all this is lighted' (Kau. Up. II, 5, 15); and 'Him the gods +worship as the light of lights, as the immortal' (B<i>ri</i>. Up. +IV, 4, 16). Against the further objection that the omnipresent +Brahman cannot be viewed as bounded by heaven we remark that the +assignment, to Brahman, of a special locality is not contrary to +reason because it subserves the purpose of devout meditation. Nor +does it avail anything to say that it is impossible to assign any +place to Brahman because Brahman is out of connexion with all +place. For it is possible to make such <span class= +"pagenum"><a name="page92" id="page92"></a>{92}</span> an +assumption, because Brahman is connected with certain limiting +adjuncts. Accordingly Scripture speaks of different kinds of devout +meditation on Brahman as specially connected with certain +localities, such as the sun, the eye, the heart. For the same +reason it is also possible to attribute to Brahman a multiplicity +of abodes, as is done in the clause (quoted above) 'higher than +all.' The further objection that the light beyond heaven is the +mere physical light because it is identified with the gastric fire, +which itself is a mere effect and is inferred from perceptible +marks such as the heat of the body and a certain sound, is equally +devoid of force; for the gastric fire may be viewed as the outward +appearance (or symbol) of Brahman, just as Brahman's name is a mere +outward symbol. Similarly in the passage, 'Let a man meditate on it +(the gastric light) as seen and heard,' the visibility and +audibility (here implicitly ascribed to Brahman) must be considered +as rendered possible through the gastric fire being the outward +appearance of Brahman. Nor is there any force in the objection that +Brahman cannot be meant because the text mentions an inconsiderable +reward only; for there is no reason compelling us to have recourse +to Brahman for the purpose of such and such a reward only, and not +for the purpose of such and such another reward. Wherever the text +represents the highest Brahman—which is free from all +connexion with distinguishing attributes—as the universal +Self, it is understood that the result of that instruction is one +only, viz. final release. Wherever, on the other hand, Brahman is +taught to be connected with distinguishing attributes or outward +symbols, there, we see, all the various rewards which this world +can offer are spoken of; cp. for instance, B<i>ri</i>. Up. IV, 4, +24, 'This is he who eats all food, the giver of wealth. He who +knows this obtains wealth.' Although in the passage itself which +treats of the light no characteristic mark of Brahman is mentioned, +yet, as the Sûtra intimates, the mark stated in a preceding +passage (viz. the mantra, 'Such is the greatness of it,' &c.) +has to be taken in connexion with the passage about the light as +well. The question how the mere circumstance of Brahman being +<span class="pagenum"><a name="page93" id="page93"></a>{93}</span> +mentioned in a not distant passage can have the power of divorcing +from its natural object and transferring to another object the +direct statement about light implied in the word 'light,' may be +answered without difficulty. The passage under discussion +runs<a id="footnotetag125" name="footnotetag125"></a><a href= +"#footnote125"><sup>125</sup></a>, 'which above this heaven, the +light.' The relative pronoun with which this clause begins +intimates, according to its grammatical force<a id="footnotetag126" +name="footnotetag126"></a><a href= +"#footnote126"><sup>126</sup></a>, the same Brahman which was +mentioned in the previous passage, and which is here recognised (as +being the same which was mentioned before) through its connexion +with heaven; hence the word jyotis also—which stands in +grammatical co-ordination to 'which'—must have Brahman for +its object. From all this it follows that the word 'light' here +denotes Brahman.</p> +<p>25. If it be objected that (Brahman is) not (denoted) on account +of the metre being denoted; (we reply) not so, because thus (i.e. +by means of the metre) the direction of the mind (on Brahman) is +declared; for thus it is seen (in other passages also).</p> +<p>We now address ourselves to the refutation of the assertion +(made in the pûrvapaksha of the preceding Sûtra) that +in the previous passage also Brahman is not referred to, because in +the sentence, 'Gâyatrî is everything whatsoever here +exists,' the metre called Gâyatrî is spoken +of.—How (we ask the pûrvapakshin) can it be maintained +that, on account of the metre being spoken of, Brahman is not +denoted, while yet the mantra 'such is the greatness of it,' +&c., clearly sets forth Brahman with its four +quarters?—You are mistaken (the pûrvapakshin replies). +The sentence, 'Gâyatrî is everything,' starts the +discussion of Gâyatrî. The same Gâyatrî is +thereupon described under the various forms of all beings, earth, +body, heart, speech, breath; to which there refers also the verse, +'that Gâyatrî <span class="pagenum"><a name="page94" +id="page94"></a>{94}</span> has four feet and is sixfold.' After +that we meet with the mantra, 'Such is the greatness of it.' +&c. How then, we ask, should this mantra, which evidently is +quoted with reference to the Gâyatrî (metre) as +described in the preceding clauses, all at once denote Brahman with +its four quarters? Since therefore the metre Gâyatrî is +the subject-matter of the entire chapter, the term 'Brahman' which +occurs in a subsequent passage ('the Brahman which has thus been +described') must also denote the metre. This is analogous to a +previous passage (Ch. Up. III, 11, 3, 'He who thus knows this +Brahma-upanishad'), where the word Brahma-upanishad is explained to +mean Veda-upanishad. As therefore the preceding passage refers (not +to Brahman, but) to the Gâyatrî metre, Brahman does not +constitute the topic of the entire section.</p> +<p>This argumentation, we reply, proves nothing against our +position. 'Because thus direction of the mind is declared,' i.e. +because the Brahma<i>n</i>a passage, 'Gâyatrî indeed is +all this,' intimates that by means of the metre Gâyatrî +the mind is to be directed on Brahman which is connected with that +metre. Of the metre Gâyatrî, which is nothing but a +certain special combination of syllables, it could not possibly be +said that it is the Self of everything. We therefore have to +understand the passage as declaring that Brahman, which, as the +cause of the world, is connected with that product also whose name +is Gâyatrî, is 'all this;' in accordance with that +other passage which directly says, 'All this indeed is Brahman' +(Kh. Up. III, 14, 1). That the effect is in reality not different +from the cause, we shall prove later on, under Sûtra II, 1, +14. Devout meditation on Brahman under the form of certain effects +(of Brahman) is seen to be mentioned in other passages also, so, +for instance, Ait. Âr. III, 2, 3, 12, 'For the +Bahv<i>rik</i>as consider him in the great hymn, the Adhvaryus in +the sacrificial fire, the Chandogas in the Mahâvrata +ceremony.' Although, therefore, the previous passage speaks of the +metre, Brahman is what is meant, and the same Brahman is again +referred to in the passage about the light, whose purport it is to +enjoin another form of devout meditation.</p> +<span class="pagenum"><a name="page95" id="page95"></a>{95}</span> +<p>Another commentator<a id="footnotetag127" name= +"footnotetag127"></a><a href="#footnote127"><sup>127</sup></a> is +of opinion that the term Gâyatrî (does not denote +Brahman in so far as viewed under the form of Gâyatrî, +but) directly denotes Brahman, on account of the equality of +number; for just as the Gâyatrî metre has four feet +consisting of six syllables each, so Brahman also has four feet, +(i.e. quarters.) Similarly we see that in other passages also the +names of metres are used to denote other things which resemble +those metres in certain numerical relations; cp. for instance, Ch. +Up. IV, 3, 8, where it is said at first, 'Now these five and the +other five make ten and that is the K<i>ri</i>ta,' and after that +'these are again the Virâj which eats the food.' If we adopt +this interpretation, Brahman only is spoken of, and the metre is +not referred to at all. In any case Brahman is the subject with +which the previous passage is concerned.</p> +<p>26. And thus also (we must conclude, viz. that Brahman is the +subject of the previous passage), because (thus only) the +declaration as to the beings, &c. being the feet is +possible.</p> +<p>That the previous passage has Brahman for its topic, we must +assume for that reason also that the text designates the beings and +so on as the feet of Gâyatrî. For the text at first +speaks of the beings, the earth, the body, and the heart<a id= +"footnotetag128" name="footnotetag128"></a><a href= +"#footnote128"><sup>128</sup></a>, and then goes on 'that +Gâyatrî has four feet and is sixfold.' For of the mere +metre, without any reference to Brahman, it would be impossible to +say that the beings and so on are its feet. Moreover, if Brahman +were not meant, there would be no room for the verse, 'Such is the +greatness,' &c. For that verse clearly describes Brahman in its +own nature; otherwise it would be impossible to represent the +Gâyatrî as the Self of everything as is done in the +words, 'One foot of it are all the beings; three feet of it are +what is immortal in heaven.' The purusha-sûkta also +(<i>Ri</i>k <span class="pagenum"><a name="page96" id= +"page96"></a>{96}</span> Sa<i>m</i>h. X, 90) exhibits the verse +with sole reference to Brahman. Sm<i>ri</i>ti likewise ascribes to +Brahman a like nature, 'I stand supporting all this world by a +single portion of myself' (Bha. Gîtâ X, 42). Our +interpretation moreover enables us to take the passage, 'that +Brahman indeed which,' &c. (III, 12, 7), in its primary sense, +(i.e. to understand the word Brahman to denote nothing but +Brahman.) And, moreover, the passage, 'these are the five men of +Brahman' (III, 13, 6), is appropriate only if the former passage +about the Gâyatrî is taken as referring to Brahman (for +otherwise the 'Brahman' in 'men of Brahman' would not be connected +with the previous topic). Hence Brahman is to be considered as the +subject-matter of the previous passage also. And the decision that +the same Brahman is referred to in the passage about the light +where it is recognised (to be the same) from its connexion with +heaven, remains unshaken.</p> +<p>27. The objection that (the Brahman of the former passage cannot +be recognised in the latter) on account of the difference of +designation, is not valid because in either (designation) there is +nothing contrary (to the recognition).</p> +<p>The objection that in the former passage ('three feet of it are +what is immortal in heaven'), heaven is designated as the abode, +while in the latter passage ('that light which shines above this +heaven'), heaven is designated as the boundary, and that, on +account of this difference of designation, the subject-matter of +the former passage cannot be recognised in the latter, must +likewise be refuted. This we do by remarking that in either +designation nothing is contrary to the recognition. Just as in +ordinary language a falcon, although in contact with the top of a +tree, is not only said to be on the tree but also above the tree, +so Brahman also, although being in heaven, is here referred to as +being beyond heaven as well.</p> +<p>Another (commentator) explains: just as in ordinary language a +falcon, although not in contact with the top of a <span class= +"pagenum"><a name="page97" id="page97"></a>{97}</span> tree, is not +only said to be above the top of the tree but also on the top of +the tree, so Brahman also, which is in reality beyond heaven, is +(in the former of the two passages) said to be in heaven. Therefore +the Brahman spoken of in the former passage can be recognised in +the latter also, and it remains therefore a settled conclusion that +the word 'light' denotes Brahman.</p> +<p>28. prâ<i>n</i>a (breath) is Brahman, that being +understood from a connected consideration (of the passages +referring to prâ<i>n</i>a).</p> +<p>In the Kaushîtaki-brâhma<i>n</i>a-upanishad there is +recorded a legend of Indra and Pratardana which begins with the +words, 'Pratardana, forsooth, the son of Divodâsa came by +means of fighting and strength to the beloved abode of Indra' (Kau. +Up. III, 1). In this legend we read: 'He said: I am +prâ<i>n</i>a, the intelligent Self +(praj<i>ñ</i>âtman), meditate on me as Life, as +Immortality' (III, 2). And later on (III, 3), 'prâ<i>n</i>a +alone, the intelligent Self, having laid hold of this body, makes +it rise up.' Then, again (III, 8), 'Let no man try to find out what +speech is, let him know the speaker.' And in the end (III, 8), +'That breath indeed is the intelligent Self, bliss, imperishable, +immortal.'—Here the doubt presents itself whether the word +prâ<i>n</i>a denotes merely breath, the modification of air, +or the Self of some divinity, or the individual soul, or the +highest Brahman.—But, it will be said at the outset, the +Sûtra I, 1, 21 already has shown that the word +prâ<i>n</i>a refers to Brahman, and as here also we meet with +characteristic marks of Brahman, viz. the words 'bliss, +imperishable, immortal,' what reason is there for again raising the +same doubt?—We reply: Because there are observed here +characteristic marks of different kinds. For in the legend we meet +not only with marks indicating Brahman, but also with marks +pointing to other beings Thus Indra's words, 'Know me only' (III, +1) point to the Self of a divinity; the words, 'Having laid hold of +this body it makes it rise up,' point to the breath; the words, +'Let no man try to find out what speech is, let him know +<span class="pagenum"><a name="page98" id="page98"></a>{98}</span> +the speaker,' point to the individual soul. There is thus room for +doubt.</p> +<p>If, now, the pûrvapakshin maintains that the term +prâ<i>n</i>a here denotes the well-known modification of air, +i.e. breath, we, on our side, assert that the word +prâ<i>n</i>a must be understood to denote Brahman.—For +what reason?—On account of such being the consecutive meaning +of the passages. For if we examine the connexion of the entire +section which treats of the prâ<i>n</i>a, we observe that all +the single passages can be construed into a whole only if they are +viewed as referring to Brahman. At the beginning of the legend +Pratardana, having been allowed by Indra to choose a boon, mentions +the highest good of man, which he selects for his boon, in the +following words, 'Do you yourself choose that boon for me which you +deem most beneficial for a man.' Now, as later on +prâ<i>n</i>a is declared to be what is most beneficial for +man, what should prâ<i>n</i>a denote but the highest Self? +For apart from the cognition of that Self a man cannot possibly +attain what is most beneficial for him, as many scriptural passages +declare. Compare, for instance, <i>S</i>ve. Up. III, 8, 'A man who +knows him passes over death; there is no other path to go.' Again, +the further passage, 'He who knows me thus by no deed of his is his +life harmed, not by theft, not by bhrû<i>n</i>ahatyâ' +(III, 1), has a meaning only if Brahman is supposed to be the +object of knowledge. For, that subsequently to the cognition of +Brahman all works and their effects entirely cease, is well known +from scriptural passages, such as the following, 'All works perish +when he has been beheld who is the higher and the lower' (Mu. Up. +II, 2, 8). Moreover, prâ<i>n</i>a can be identified with the +intelligent Self only if it is Brahman. For the air which is +non-intelligent can clearly not be the intelligent Self. Those +characteristic marks, again, which are mentioned in the concluding +passage (viz. those intimated by the words 'bliss,' 'imperishable,' +'immortal') can, if taken in their full sense, not be reconciled +with any being except Brahman. There are, moreover, the following +passages, 'He does not increase by a good action, nor decrease by a +bad action. For he makes him whom he wishes <span class= +"pagenum"><a name="page99" id="page99"></a>{99}</span> to lead up +from these worlds do a good deed; and the same makes him whom he +wishes to lead down from these worlds do a bad deed;' and, 'He is +the guardian of the world, he is the king of the world, he is the +Lord of the world' (Kau. Up. III, 8). All this can be properly +understood only if the highest Brahman is acknowledged to be the +subject-matter of the whole chapter, not if the vital air is +substituted in its place. Hence the word prâ<i>n</i>a denotes +Brahman.</p> +<p>29. If it be said that (Brahman is) not (denoted) on account of +the speaker denoting himself; (we reply that this objection is not +valid) because there is in that (chapter) a multitude of references +to the interior Self.</p> +<p>An objection is raised against the assertion that +prâ<i>n</i>a denotes Brahman. The word prâ<i>n</i>a, it +is said, does not denote the highest Brahman, because the speaker +designates himself. The speaker, who is a certain powerful god +called Indra, at first says, in order to reveal himself to +Pratardana, 'Know me only,' and later on, 'I am prâ<i>n</i>a, +the intelligent Self.' How, it is asked, can the +prâ<i>n</i>a, which this latter passage, expressive of +personality as it is, represents as the Self of the speaker, be +Brahman to which, as we know from Scripture, the attribute of being +a speaker cannot be ascribed; compare, for instance, B<i>ri</i>. +Up. III, 8, 8, 'It is without speech, without mind.' Further on, +also, the speaker, i.e. Indra, glorifies himself by enumerating a +number of attributes, all of which depend on personal existence and +can in no way belong to Brahman, 'I slew the three-headed son of +Tvash<i>tri</i>; I delivered the Arunmukhas, the devotees, to the +wolves,' and so on. Indra may be called prâ<i>n</i>a on +account of his strength. Scripture says, 'Strength indeed is +prâ<i>n</i>a,' and Indra is known as the god of strength; and +of any deed of strength people say, 'It is Indra's work.' The +personal Self of a deity may, moreover, be called an intelligent +Self; for the gods, people say, possess unobstructed knowledge. It +thus being a settled matter that some passages convey information +about the personal Self <span class="pagenum"><a name="page100" id= +"page100"></a>{100}</span> of some deity, the other passages +also—as, for instance, the one about what is most beneficial +for man—must be interpreted as well as they may with +reference to the same deity. Hence prâ<i>n</i>a does not +denote Brahman.</p> +<p>This objection we refute by the remark that in that chapter +there are found a multitude of references to the interior Self. For +the passage, 'As long as prâ<i>n</i>a dwells in this body so +long surely there is life,' declares that that prâ<i>n</i>a +only which is the intelligent interior Self—and not some +particular outward deity—has power to bestow and to take back +life. And where the text speaks of the eminence of the +prâ<i>n</i>as as founded on the existence of the +prâ<i>n</i>a, it shows that that prâ<i>n</i>a is meant +which has reference to the Self and is the abode of the +sense-organs.<a id="footnotetag129" name= +"footnotetag129"></a><a href="#footnote129"><sup>129</sup></a></p> +<p>Of the same tendency is the passage, 'prâ<i>n</i>a, the +intelligent Self, alone having laid hold of this body makes it rise +up;' and the passage (which occurs in the passus, 'Let no man try +to find out what speech is,' &c.), 'For as in a car the +circumference of the wheel is set on the spokes and the spokes on +the nave, thus are these objects set on the subjects (the senses) +and the subjects on the prâ<i>n</i>a. And that +prâ<i>n</i>a indeed is the Self of prâ<i>n</i>a, +blessed, imperishable, immortal.' So also the following passage +which, referring to this interior Self, forming as it were the +centre of the peripherical interaction of the objects and senses, +sums up as follows, 'He is my Self, thus let it be known;' a +summing up which is appropriate only if prâ<i>n</i>a is meant +to denote not some outward existence, but the interior Self. And +another scriptural passage declares 'this Self is Brahman, +omniscient'<a id="footnotetag130" name= +"footnotetag130"></a><a href="#footnote130"><sup>130</sup></a> +(B<i>ri</i>. Up. II, 5, 19). We therefore arrive at <span class= +"pagenum"><a name="page101" id="page101"></a>{101}</span> the +conclusion that, on account of the multitude of references to the +interior Self, the chapter contains information regarding Brahman, +not regarding the Self of some deity.—How then can the +circumstance of the speaker (Indra) referring to himself be +explained?</p> +<p>30. The declaration (made by Indra about himself, viz. that he +is one with Brahman) (is possible) through intuition vouched for by +Scripture, as in the case of Vâmadeva.</p> +<p>The individual divine Self called Indra perceiving by means of +<i>ri</i>shi-like intuition<a id="footnotetag131" name= +"footnotetag131"></a><a href= +"#footnote131"><sup>131</sup></a>—the existence of which is +vouched for by Scripture—its own Self to be identical with +the supreme Self, instructs Pratardana (about the highest Self) by +means of the words 'Know me only.'</p> +<p>By intuition of the same kind the <i>ri</i>shi Vâmadeva +reached the knowledge expressed in the words, 'I was Manu and +Sûrya;' in accordance with the passage, 'Whatever deva was +awakened (so as to know Brahman) he indeed became that' +(B<i>ri</i>. Up. I, 4, 10). The assertion made above (in the +pûrvapaksha of the preceding Sûtra) that Indra after +saying, 'Know me only,' glorifies himself by enumerating the +slaying of Tvash<i>tri</i>'s son and other deeds of strength, we +refute as follows. The death of Tvash<i>tri</i>'s son and similar +deeds are referred to, not to the end of glorifying Indra as the +object of knowledge—in which case the sense of the passage +would be, 'Because I accomplished such and such deeds, therefore +know me'—but to the end of glorifying the cognition of the +highest Self. For this reason the text, after having referred to +the slaying of Tvash<i>tri</i>'s son and the like, goes on in the +clause next following to exalt knowledge, 'And not one hair of me +is harmed there. He who knows me thus by no deed of his is his life +harmed.'—(But how does this passage convey praise of +knowledge?)—Because, we reply, its meaning is as follows: +'Although I do such cruel deeds, <span class="pagenum"><a name= +"page102" id="page102"></a>{102}</span> yet not even a hair of mine +is harmed because I am one with Brahman; therefore the life of any +other person also who knows me thus is not harmed by any deed of +his.' And the object of the knowledge (praised by Indra) is nothing +else but Brahman which is set forth in a subsequent passage, 'I am +prâ<i>n</i>a, the intelligent Self.' Therefore the entire +chapter refers to Brahman.</p> +<p>31. If it be said (that Brahman is) not (meant), on account of +characteristic marks of the individual soul and the chief vital air +(being mentioned); we say no, on account of the threefoldness of +devout meditation (which would result from your interpretation); on +account of (the meaning advocated by us) being accepted +(elsewhere); and on account of (characteristic marks of Brahman) +being connected (with the passage under discussion).</p> +<p>Although we admit, the pûrvapakshin resumes, that the +chapter about the prâ<i>n</i>a does not furnish any +instruction regarding some outward deity, since it contains a +multitude of references to the interior Self; still we deny that it +is concerned with Brahman.—For what reason?—Because it +mentions characteristic marks of the individual soul on the one +hand, and of the chief vital air on the other hand. The passage, +'Let no man try to find out what speech is, let him know the +speaker,' mentions a characteristic mark of the individual soul, +and must therefore be held to point out as the object of knowledge +the individual soul which rules and employs the different organs of +action such as speech and so on. On the other hand, we have the +passage, 'But prâ<i>n</i>a alone, the intelligent Self, +having laid hold of this body makes it rise up,' which points to +the chief vital air; for the chief attribute of the vital air is +that it sustains the body. Similarly, we read in the colloquy of +the vital airs (Pra. Up. II, 3), concerning speech and the other +vital airs, 'Then prâ<i>n</i>a (the chief vital air) as the +best said to them: Be not deceived; I alone dividing myself +fivefold support this body and keep it.' Those, again, who in the +<span class="pagenum"><a name="page103" id= +"page103"></a>{103}</span> passage quoted above read 'this one +(masc.), the body<a id="footnotetag132" name= +"footnotetag132"></a><a href="#footnote132"><sup>132</sup></a>' +must give the following explanation, prâ<i>n</i>a having laid +hold of this one, viz. either the individual soul or the aggregate +of the sense organs, makes the body rise up. The individual soul as +well as the chief vital air may justly be designated as the +intelligent Self; for the former is of the nature of intelligence, +and the latter (although non-intelligent in itself) is the abode of +other prâ<i>n</i>as, viz. the sense organs, which are the +instruments of intelligence. Moreover, if the word +prâ<i>n</i>a be taken to denote the individual soul as well +as the chief vital air, the prâ<i>n</i>a and the intelligent +Self may be spoken of in two ways, either as being non-different on +account of their mutual concomitance, or as being different on +account of their (essentially different) individual character; and +in these two different ways they are actually spoken of in the two +following passages, 'What is prâ<i>n</i>a that is +praj<i>ñ</i>â, what is praj<i>ñ</i>â that +is prâ<i>n</i>a;' and, 'For together do these two live in the +body and together do they depart.' If, on the other hand, +prâ<i>n</i>a denoted Brahman, what then could be different +from what? For these reasons prâ<i>n</i>a does not denote +Brahman, but either the individual soul or the chief vital air or +both.</p> +<p>All this argumentation, we reply, is wrong, 'on account of the +threefoldness of devout meditation.' Your interpretation would +involve the assumption of devout meditation of three different +kinds, viz. on the individual soul, on the chief vital air, and on +Brahman. But it is inappropriate to assume that a single sentence +should enjoin three kinds of devout meditation; and that all the +passages about the prâ<i>n</i>a really constitute one single +sentence (one syntactical whole) appears from the beginning and the +concluding part. In the beginning we have the clause 'Know me +only,' followed by 'I am prâ<i>n</i>a, the intelligent Self, +meditate on me as Life, as Immortality;' and in the end we read, +'And that prâ<i>n</i>a indeed is the intelligent Self, +blessed, imperishable, immortal.' The beginning and the concluding +part are thus seen to be similar, and we <span class= +"pagenum"><a name="page104" id="page104"></a>{104}</span> therefore +must conclude that they refer to one and the same matter. Nor can +the characteristic mark of Brahman be so turned as to be applied to +something else; for the ten objects and the ten subjects +(subjective powers)<a id="footnotetag133" name= +"footnotetag133"></a><a href="#footnote133"><sup>133</sup></a> +cannot rest on anything but Brahman. Moreover, prâ<i>n</i>a +must denote Brahman 'on account of (that meaning) being accepted,' +i.e. because in the case of other passages where characteristic +marks of Brahman are mentioned the word prâ<i>n</i>a is taken +in the sense of 'Brahman.' And another reason for assuming the +passage to refer to Brahman is that here also, i.e. in the passage +itself there is 'connexion' with characteristic marks of Brahman, +as, for instance, the reference to what is most beneficial for man. +The assertion that the passage, 'Having laid hold of this body it +makes it rise up,' contains a characteristic mark of the chief +vital air, is untrue; for as the function of the vital air also +ultimately rests on Brahman it can figuratively be ascribed to the +latter. So Scripture also declares, 'No mortal lives by the breath +that goes up and by the breath that goes down. We live by another +in whom these two repose' (Ka. Up. II, 5, 5). Nor does the +indication of the individual soul which you allege to occur in the +passage, 'Let no man try to find out what speech is, let him know +the speaker,' preclude the view of prâ<i>n</i>a denoting +Brahman. For, as the passages, 'I am Brahman,' 'That art thou,' and +others, prove, there is in reality no such thing as an individual +soul absolutely different from Brahman, but Brahman, in so far as +it differentiates itself through the mind (buddhi) and other +limiting conditions, is called individual soul, agent, enjoyer. +Such passages therefore as the one alluded to, (viz. 'let no man +try to find out what speech is, let him know the speaker,') which, +by setting aside all the differences due to limiting conditions, +aim at directing the mind on the internal Self and thus showing +that the <span class="pagenum"><a name="page105" id= +"page105"></a>{105}</span> individual soul is one with Brahman, are +by no means out of place. That the Self which is active in speaking +and the like is Brahman appears from another scriptural passage +also, viz. Ke. Up. I, 5, 'That which is not expressed by speech and +by which speech is expressed that alone know as Brahman, not that +which people here adore.' The remark that the statement about the +difference of prâ<i>n</i>a and praj<i>ñ</i>â +(contained in the passage, 'Together they dwell in this body, +together they depart') does not agree with that interpretation +according to which prâ<i>n</i>a is Brahman, is without force; +for the mind and the vital air which are the respective abodes of +the two powers of cognition and action, and constitute the limiting +conditions of the internal Self may be spoken of as different. The +internal Self, on the other hand, which is limited by those two +adjuncts, is in itself non-differentiated, so that the two may be +identified, as is done in the passage 'prâ<i>n</i>a is +praj<i>ñ</i>â.'</p> +<p>The second part of the Sûtra is explained in a different +manner also<a id="footnotetag134" name= +"footnotetag134"></a><a href="#footnote134"><sup>134</sup></a>, as +follows: Characteristic marks of the individual soul as well as of +the chief vital air are not out of place even in a chapter whose +topic is Brahman. How so? 'On account of the threefoldness of +devout meditation.' The chapter aims at enjoining three kinds of +devout meditation on Brahman, according as Brahman is viewed under +the aspect of prâ<i>n</i>a, under the aspect of +praj<i>ñ</i>â, and in itself. The passages, 'Meditate +(on me) as life, as immortality. Life is prâ<i>n</i>a,' and +'Having laid hold of this body it makes it rise up. Therefore let +man worship it alone as uktha,' refer to the prâ<i>n</i>a +aspect. The introductory passage, 'Now we shall explain how all +things become one in that praj<i>ñ</i>â,' and the +subsequent passages, 'Speech verily milked one portion thereof; the +word is its object placed outside;' and, 'Having by +praj<i>ñ</i>â taken possession of speech he obtains by +speech all words &c.,' refer to the praj<i>ñ</i>â +aspect. The Brahman aspect finally is referred to in the following +passage, 'These ten <span class="pagenum"><a name="page106" id= +"page106"></a>{106}</span> objects have reference to +praj<i>ñ</i>â, the ten subjects have reference to +objects. If there were no objects there would be no subjects; and +if there were no subjects there would be no objects. For on either +side alone nothing could be achieved. But that is not many. For as +in a car the circumference of the wheel is set on the spokes and +the spokes on the nave, thus are these objects set on the subjects +and the subjects on the prâ<i>n</i>a.' Thus we see that the +one meditation on Brahman is here represented as threefold, +according as Brahman is viewed either with reference to two +limiting conditions or in itself. In other passages also we find +that devout meditation on Brahman is made dependent on Brahman +being qualified by limiting adjuncts; so, for instance (Ch. Up. +III, 14, 2), 'He who consists of mind, whose body is +prâ<i>n</i>a.' The hypothesis of Brahman being meditated upon +under three aspects perfectly agrees with the prâ<i>n</i>a +chapter<a id="footnotetag135" name="footnotetag135"></a><a href= +"#footnote135"><sup>135</sup></a>; as, on the one hand, from a +comparison of the introductory and the concluding clauses we infer +that the subject-matter of the whole chapter is one only, and as, +on the other hand, we meet with characteristic marks of +prâ<i>n</i>a, praj<i>ñ</i>â, and Brahman in +turns. It therefore remains a settled conclusion that Brahman is +the topic of the whole chapter.</p> +<p>Notes:</p> +<blockquote class="footnote"><a id="footnote32" name= +"footnote32"></a><b>Footnote 32:</b><a href= +"#footnotetag32">(return)</a> +<p>The subject is the universal Self whose nature is intelligence +(<i>k</i>u); the object comprises whatever is of a non-intelligent +nature, viz. bodies with their sense organs, internal organs, and +the objects of the senses, i.e. the external material world.</p> +</blockquote> +<blockquote class="footnote"><a id="footnote33" name= +"footnote33"></a><b>Footnote 33:</b><a href= +"#footnotetag33">(return)</a> +<p>The object is said to have for its sphere the notion of the +'thou' (yushmat), not the notion of the 'this' or 'that' (idam), in +order better to mark its absolute opposition to the subject or Ego. +Language allows of the co-ordination of the pronouns of the first +and the third person ('It is I,' 'I am he who,' &c.; ete vayam, +ame vayam âsmahe), but not of the co-ordination of the +pronouns of the first and second person.</p> +</blockquote> +<blockquote class="footnote"><a id="footnote34" name= +"footnote34"></a><b>Footnote 34:</b><a href= +"#footnotetag34">(return)</a> +<p>Adhyâsa, literally 'superimposition' in the sense of +(mistaken) ascription or imputation, to something, of an essential +nature or attributes not belonging to it. See later on.</p> +</blockquote> +<blockquote class="footnote"><a id="footnote35" name= +"footnote35"></a><b>Footnote 35:</b><a href= +"#footnotetag35">(return)</a> +<p>Natural, i.e. original, beginningless; for the modes of speech +and action which characterise transmigratory existence have +existed, with the latter, from all eternity.</p> +</blockquote> +<blockquote class="footnote"><a id="footnote36" name= +"footnote36"></a><b>Footnote 36:</b><a href= +"#footnotetag36">(return)</a> +<p>I.e. the intelligent Self which is the only reality and the +non-real objects, viz. body and so on, which are the product of +wrong knowledge.</p> +</blockquote> +<blockquote class="footnote"><a id="footnote37" name= +"footnote37"></a><b>Footnote 37:</b><a href= +"#footnotetag37">(return)</a> +<p>'The body, &c. is my Self;' 'sickness, death, children, +wealth, &c., belong to my Self.'</p> +</blockquote> +<blockquote class="footnote"><a id="footnote38" name= +"footnote38"></a><b>Footnote 38:</b><a href= +"#footnotetag38">(return)</a> +<p>Literally 'in some other place.' The clause 'in the form of +remembrance' is added, the Bhâmatî remarks, in order to +exclude those cases where something previously observed is +recognised in some other thing or place; as when, for instance, the +generic character of a cow which was previously observed in a black +cow again presents itself to consciousness in a grey cow, or when +Devadatta whom we first saw in Pâ<i>t</i>aliputra again +appears before us in Mâhishmatî. These are cases of +recognition where the object previously observed again presents +itself to our senses; while in mere remembrance the object +previously perceived is not in renewed contact with the senses. +Mere remembrance operates in the case of adhyâsa, as when we +mistake mother-of-pearl for silver which is at the time not present +but remembered only.</p> +</blockquote> +<blockquote class="footnote"><a id="footnote39" name= +"footnote39"></a><b>Footnote 39:</b><a href= +"#footnotetag39">(return)</a> +<p>The so-called anyathâkhyâtivâdins maintain +that in the act of adhyâsa the attributes of one thing, +silver for instance, are superimposed on a different thing existing +in a different place, mother-of-pearl for instance (if we take for +our example of adhyâsa the case of some man mistaking a piece +of mother-of-pearl before him for a piece of silver). The +âtmakhyâtivâdins maintain that in adhyâsa +the modification, in the form of silver, of the internal organ and +action which characterise transmigratory existence have existed, +with the latter, from all eternity.</p> +</blockquote> +<blockquote class="footnote"><a id="footnote40" name= +"footnote40"></a><b>Footnote 40:</b><a href= +"#footnotetag40">(return)</a> +<p>This is the definition of the akhyâtivâdins.</p> +</blockquote> +<blockquote class="footnote"><a id="footnote41" name= +"footnote41"></a><b>Footnote 41:</b><a href= +"#footnotetag41">(return)</a> +<p>Some anyathâkhyâtivâdins and the +Mâdhyamikas according to Ânanda Giri.</p> +</blockquote> +<blockquote class="footnote"><a id="footnote42" name= +"footnote42"></a><b>Footnote 42:</b><a href= +"#footnotetag42">(return)</a> +<p>The pratyagâtman is in reality non-object, for it is +svayamprakâ<i>s</i>a, self-luminous, i.e. the subjective +factor in all cognition. But it becomes the object of the idea of +the Ego in so far as it is limited, conditioned by its adjuncts +which are the product of Nescience, viz. the internal organ, the +senses and the subtle and gross bodies, i.e. in so far as it is +jîva, individual or personal soul. Cp. Bhâmatî, +pp. 22, 23: '<i>k</i>idâtmaiva svayamprakâ<i>s</i>oszpi +buddhyâdivishayavi<i>kkh</i>ura<i>n</i>ât +katha<i>mk</i>id asm +upratyayavishayoszha<i>m</i>kârâspada<i>m</i> +jîva iti <i>k</i>a jantur iti <i>k</i>a ksheuajña iti +<i>k</i>âkhyâyate.'</p> +</blockquote> +<blockquote class="footnote"><a id="footnote43" name= +"footnote43"></a><b>Footnote 43:</b><a href= +"#footnotetag43">(return)</a> +<p>Translated according to the Bhâmatî. We deny, the +objector says, the possibility of adhyâsa in the case of the +Self, not on the ground that it is not an object because +self-luminous (for that it may be an object although it is +self-luminous you have shown), but on the ground that it is not an +object because it is not manifested either by itself or by anything +else.—It is known or manifest, the Vedântin replies, on +account of its immediate presentation (aparokshatvât), i.e. +on account of the intuitional knowledge we have of it. Ânanda +Giri construes the above clause in a different way: +asmatpratyayâvishayatveszpy aparokshatvâd +ekântenâvishayatvâbbâvât tasminn +aha@nkârâdyadhyâsa ity artha<i>h</i>. +Aparokshatvam api kai<i>sk</i>id âtmano nesh<i>t</i>am ity +âsa@nkyâha pratyagâtmeti.</p> +</blockquote> +<blockquote class="footnote"><a id="footnote44" name= +"footnote44"></a><b>Footnote 44:</b><a href= +"#footnotetag44">(return)</a> +<p>Tatraiva<i>m</i> sati +evambhûtavastutattvâvadhâra<i>n</i>e sati. +Bhâ. Tasminn adhyâse +uktarîtyâzvidyâvmake sati. Go. Yatrâtmani +buddhyâdau vâ yasya buddhyâder âtmano +vâdhyâsa<i>h</i> tena +buddhyâdi-nâsztmânâ va +k<i>ri</i>tenâsz<i>s</i>anayâdidoshe<i>n</i>a +<i>k</i>aitanyagu<i>n</i>ena +<i>k</i>âtmânâtmâ vâ vastuto na +svalpenâpi yujyate. Ânanda Giri.</p> +</blockquote> +<blockquote class="footnote"><a id="footnote45" name= +"footnote45"></a><b>Footnote 45:</b><a href= +"#footnotetag45">(return)</a> +<p>Whether they belong to the karmakâ<i>nd</i>â, i.e. +that part of the Veda which enjoins active religious duty or the +j<i>ñ</i>ânakâ<i>nd</i>a, i.e. that part of the +Veda which treats of Brahman.</p> +</blockquote> +<blockquote class="footnote"><a id="footnote46" name= +"footnote46"></a><b>Footnote 46:</b><a href= +"#footnotetag46">(return)</a> +<p>It being of course the function of the means of right knowledge +to determine Truth and Reality.</p> +</blockquote> +<blockquote class="footnote"><a id="footnote47" name= +"footnote47"></a><b>Footnote 47:</b><a href= +"#footnotetag47">(return)</a> +<p>The Bhâmatî takes adhish<i>th</i>ânam in the +sense of superintendence, guidance. The senses cannot act unless +guided by a superintending principle, i.e. the individual soul.</p> +</blockquote> +<blockquote class="footnote"><a id="footnote48" name= +"footnote48"></a><b>Footnote 48:</b><a href= +"#footnotetag48">(return)</a> +<p>If activity could proceed from the body itself, non-identified +with the Self, it would take place in deep sleep also.</p> +</blockquote> +<blockquote class="footnote"><a id="footnote49" name= +"footnote49"></a><b>Footnote 49:</b><a href= +"#footnotetag49">(return)</a> +<p>I.e. in the absence of the mutual superimposition of the Self +and the Non-Self and their attributes.</p> +</blockquote> +<blockquote class="footnote"><a id="footnote50" name= +"footnote50"></a><b>Footnote 50:</b><a href= +"#footnotetag50">(return)</a> +<p>The Mîmâ<i>m</i>sâ, i.e. the enquiry whose aim +it is to show that the embodied Self, i.e. the individual or +personal soul is one with Brahman. This +Mîmâ<i>m</i>sâ being an enquiry into the meaning +of the Vedânta-portions of the Veda, it is also called +Vedânta mîmâ<i>m</i>sâ.</p> +</blockquote> +<blockquote class="footnote"><a id="footnote51" name= +"footnote51"></a><b>Footnote 51:</b><a href= +"#footnotetag51">(return)</a> +<p>Nâdhikârârtha iti. Tatra hetur brahmeti. +Asyârtha<i>h</i>, kám ayam atha<i>s</i>abdo +brahmaj<i>ñ</i>âne<i>kkh</i>yâ<i>h</i> kim +vântar<i>n</i>îtavi<i>k</i>ârasya +athave<i>kkh</i>âvi<i>s</i>esha<i>n</i>aj<i>ñ</i>ânasyârambhârtha<i> +h</i>. Nâdya<i>h</i> tasyâ +mîmâ<i>m</i>sâpravartikâyâs +tadapravartyatvâd anârabhyatvât +tasyâ<i>s</i> <i>k</i>ottaratra pratyadhikara<i>n</i>am +apratipâdanât. Na +dvitîyoztha<i>s</i>abdenânantaryoktidvârâ +vi<i>s</i>ish<i>t</i>âdhikâryasamarpa<i>n</i>e +sâdhana<i>k</i>atush<i>t</i>ayâsampannânâ<i> +m</i> brahmadhîtadvi<i>k</i>ârayor anarthitvâd +vi<i>k</i>ârânârambhân na <i>k</i>a +vi<i>k</i>âravidhiva<i>s</i>âd adhikârî +kalpya<i>h</i> prârambhasyâpi tulyatvâd +adhikâri<i>n</i>a<i>s</i> <i>k</i>a +vidhyapekshitopâdhitvân na t<i>ri</i>tîya<i>h</i> +brahmaj<i>ñ</i>ânasyânandasâkshâtkâratvenâdhikâryatve +z pyaprâdhânyâd +atha<i>s</i>abdâsambandhât tasmân +nârambhârthateti. Ânanda Giri.</p> +</blockquote> +<blockquote class="footnote"><a id="footnote52" name= +"footnote52"></a><b>Footnote 52:</b><a href= +"#footnotetag52">(return)</a> +<p>Any relation in which the result, i.e. here the enquiry into +Brahman may stand to some antecedent of which it is the effect may +be comprised under the relation of ânantarya.</p> +</blockquote> +<blockquote class="footnote"><a id="footnote53" name= +"footnote53"></a><b>Footnote 53:</b><a href= +"#footnotetag53">(return)</a> +<p>He cuts off from the heart, then from the tongue, then from the +breast.</p> +</blockquote> +<blockquote class="footnote"><a id="footnote54" name= +"footnote54"></a><b>Footnote 54:</b><a href= +"#footnotetag54">(return)</a> +<p>Where one action is subordinate to another as, for instance, the +offering of the prayâjas is to the +dar<i>s</i>apûr<i>n</i>amâsa-sacrifice, or where one +action qualifies a person for another as, for instance, the +offering of the dar<i>s</i>apûr<i>n</i>amâsa qualifies +a man for the performance of the Soma-sacrifice, there is unity of +the agent, and consequently an intimation of the order of +succession of the actions is in its right place.</p> +</blockquote> +<blockquote class="footnote"><a id="footnote55" name= +"footnote55"></a><b>Footnote 55:</b><a href= +"#footnotetag55">(return)</a> +<p>The 'means' in addition to <i>s</i>ama and dama are +discontinuance of religious ceremonies (uparati), patience in +suffering (titikshâ), attention and concentration of the mind +(samâdhâna), and faith (<i>s</i>raddhâ).</p> +</blockquote> +<blockquote class="footnote"><a id="footnote56" name= +"footnote56"></a><b>Footnote 56:</b><a href= +"#footnotetag56">(return)</a> +<p>According to Pâ<i>n</i>ini II, 3, 50 the sixth (genitive) +case expresses the relation of one thing being generally +supplementary to, or connected with, some other thing.</p> +</blockquote> +<blockquote class="footnote"><a id="footnote57" name= +"footnote57"></a><b>Footnote 57:</b><a href= +"#footnotetag57">(return)</a> +<p>In the case of other transitive verbs, object and result may be +separate; so, for instance, when it is said 'grâma<i>m</i> +ga<i>kkh</i>ati,' the village is the object of the action of going, +and the arrival at the village its result. But in the case of verbs +of desiring object and result coincide.</p> +</blockquote> +<blockquote class="footnote"><a id="footnote58" name= +"footnote58"></a><b>Footnote 58:</b><a href= +"#footnotetag58">(return)</a> +<p>That Brahman exists we know, even before entering on the +Brahma-mîmâ<i>m</i>sâ, from the occurrence of the +word in the Veda, &c., and from the etymology of the word we at +once infer Brahman's chief attributes.</p> +</blockquote> +<blockquote class="footnote"><a id="footnote59" name= +"footnote59"></a><b>Footnote 59:</b><a href= +"#footnotetag59">(return)</a> +<p>The three last opinions are those of the followers of the +Nyâya, the Sâ@nkhya, and the Yoga-philosophy +respectively. The three opinions mentioned first belong to various +materialistic schools; the two subsequent ones to two sects of +Bauddha philosophers.</p> +</blockquote> +<blockquote class="footnote"><a id="footnote60" name= +"footnote60"></a><b>Footnote 60:</b><a href= +"#footnotetag60">(return)</a> +<p>As, for instance, the passages 'this person consists of the +essence of food;' 'the eye, &c. spoke;' 'non-existing this was +in the beginning,' &c.</p> +</blockquote> +<blockquote class="footnote"><a id="footnote61" name= +"footnote61"></a><b>Footnote 61:</b><a href= +"#footnotetag61">(return)</a> +<p>So the compound is to be divided according to Ân. Gi. and +Go.; the Bhâ. proposes another less plausible division.</p> +</blockquote> +<blockquote class="footnote"><a id="footnote62" name= +"footnote62"></a><b>Footnote 62:</b><a href= +"#footnotetag62">(return)</a> +<p>According to Nirukta I, 2 the six +bhâvavikârâ<i>h</i> are: origination, existence, +modification, increase, decrease, destruction.</p> +</blockquote> +<blockquote class="footnote"><a id="footnote63" name= +"footnote63"></a><b>Footnote 63:</b><a href= +"#footnotetag63">(return)</a> +<p>The pradhâna, called also prak<i>ri</i>ti, is the primal +causal matter of the world in the <i>S</i>â@nkhya-system. It +will be fully discussed in later parts of this work. To avoid +ambiguities, the term pradhâna has been left untranslated. +Cp. Sâ@nkhya Kârikâ 3.</p> +</blockquote> +<blockquote class="footnote"><a id="footnote64" name= +"footnote64"></a><b>Footnote 64:</b><a href= +"#footnotetag64">(return)</a> +<p>Ke<i>k</i>it tu hira<i>n</i>yagaroha<i>m</i> +sa<i>m</i>sâri<i>n</i>am evâgamâj jagaddhetum +â<i>k</i>akshate. Ânanada Giri.</p> +</blockquote> +<blockquote class="footnote"><a id="footnote65" name= +"footnote65"></a><b>Footnote 65:</b><a href= +"#footnotetag65">(return)</a> +<p>Viz. the Vai<i>s</i>eshikas.</p> +</blockquote> +<blockquote class="footnote"><a id="footnote66" name= +"footnote66"></a><b>Footnote 66:</b><a href= +"#footnotetag66">(return)</a> +<p>Âtmana<i>h</i> <i>s</i>ruter ity artha<i>h</i>. +Ânanda Giri.</p> +</blockquote> +<blockquote class="footnote"><a id="footnote67" name= +"footnote67"></a><b>Footnote 67:</b><a href= +"#footnotetag67">(return)</a> +<p>Text (or direct statement), suggestive power (linga), +syntactical connection (vâkya), &c., being the means of +proof made use of in the Pûrva +Mîmâ<i>m</i>sâ.</p> +</blockquote> +<blockquote class="footnote"><a id="footnote68" name= +"footnote68"></a><b>Footnote 68:</b><a href= +"#footnotetag68">(return)</a> +<p>The so-called sâkshâtkâra of Brahman. The +&c. comprises inference and so on.</p> +</blockquote> +<blockquote class="footnote"><a id="footnote69" name= +"footnote69"></a><b>Footnote 69:</b><a href= +"#footnotetag69">(return)</a> +<p>So, for instance, the passage 'he carves the sacrificial post +and makes it eight-cornered,' has a purpose only as being +supplementary to the injunction 'he ties the victim to the +sacrificial post.'</p> +</blockquote> +<blockquote class="footnote"><a id="footnote70" name= +"footnote70"></a><b>Footnote 70:</b><a href= +"#footnotetag70">(return)</a> +<p>If the fruits of the two <i>s</i>âstras were not of a +different nature, there would be no reason for the distinction of +two <i>s</i>âstras; if they are of a different nature, it +cannot be said that the knowledge of Brahman is enjoined for the +purpose of final release, in the same way as sacrifices are +enjoined for the purpose of obtaining the heavenly world and the +like.</p> +</blockquote> +<blockquote class="footnote"><a id="footnote71" name= +"footnote71"></a><b>Footnote 71:</b><a href= +"#footnotetag71">(return)</a> +<p>The first passage shows that the Self is not joined to the gross +body; the second that it is not joined to the subtle body; the +third that is independent of either.</p> +</blockquote> +<blockquote class="footnote"><a id="footnote72" name= +"footnote72"></a><b>Footnote 72:</b><a href= +"#footnotetag72">(return)</a> +<p>Ânanda Giri omits 'ata<i>h</i>.' His comment is: +p<i>ri</i>thagjij<i>ñ</i>âsâvishayatvâ<i>k</i> +<i>k</i>a dharmâdyasp<i>ri</i>sh<i>t</i>atva<i>m</i> +brahma<i>n</i>o yuktam ityâha; tad iti; ata<i>h</i> +<i>s</i>abdapâ<i>th</i>e dharmâdyasparse +karmaphalavailaksba<i>n</i>ya<i>m</i> +hetûk<i>ri</i>tam.—The above translation follows +Govindânanda's first explanation. Tat kaivalyam brahmaiva +karmaphalavilaksha<i>n</i>atvâd ity artha<i>h</i>.</p> +</blockquote> +<blockquote class="footnote"><a id="footnote73" name= +"footnote73"></a><b>Footnote 73:</b><a href= +"#footnotetag73">(return)</a> +<p>Sampat. Sampan nâmâlpe vastuny âlambane +sâmânyena kena<i>k</i>in mahato vastuna<i>h</i> +sampâdanam. Ânanda Giri.</p> +</blockquote> +<blockquote class="footnote"><a id="footnote74" name= +"footnote74"></a><b>Footnote 74:</b><a href= +"#footnotetag74">(return)</a> +<p>In which passage the mind, which may be called endless on +account of the infinite number of modifications it undergoes, is +identified with the Vi<i>s</i>vedevas, which thereby constitute the +chief object of the meditation; the fruit of the meditation being +immortality. The identity of the Self with Brahman, on the other +hand, is real, not only meditatively imagined, on account of the +attribute of intelligence being common to both.</p> +</blockquote> +<blockquote class="footnote"><a id="footnote75" name= +"footnote75"></a><b>Footnote 75:</b><a href= +"#footnotetag75">(return)</a> +<p>Adhyâsa<i>h</i> <i>s</i>âstratoitasmi<i>m</i>s +taddhî<i>h</i>. Sampadi sampâdyamânasya +prâdhânyenânudhyânam, adhyâse tu +âlambanasyeti vi<i>s</i>esha<i>h</i>. Ânanda Giri.</p> +</blockquote> +<blockquote class="footnote"><a id="footnote76" name= +"footnote76"></a><b>Footnote 76:</b><a href= +"#footnotetag76">(return)</a> +<p>Air and breath each absorb certain things, and are, therefore, +designated by the same term 'absorber.' Seya<i>m</i> +sa<i>m</i>vargad<i>ri</i>sh<i>t</i>ir vâyau +prâ<i>n</i>e <i>k</i>a +da<i>s</i>â<i>s</i>âgata<i>m</i> jagad dar<i>s</i>ayati +yathâ jîvâtmani +b<i>rim</i>ha<i>n</i>akriyayâ +brahmad<i>ri</i>sh<i>t</i>iram<i>ri</i>tatvâyaphalâyakalpata +iti. Bhâmati.</p> +</blockquote> +<blockquote class="footnote"><a id="footnote77" name= +"footnote77"></a><b>Footnote 77:</b><a href= +"#footnotetag77">(return)</a> +<p>The butter used in the upâ<i>ms</i>uyâja is +ceremonially purified by the wife of the sacrificer looking at it; +so, it might be said, the Self of him who meditates on Brahman (and +who as kart<i>ri</i>—agent—stands in a subordinate +anga-relation to the karman of meditation) is merely purified by +the cognition of its being one with Brahman.</p> +</blockquote> +<blockquote class="footnote"><a id="footnote78" name= +"footnote78"></a><b>Footnote 78:</b><a href= +"#footnotetag78">(return)</a> +<p>An hypothesis which might be proposed for the purpose of +obviating the imputation to moksha of non-eternality which results +from the two preceding hypotheses.</p> +</blockquote> +<blockquote class="footnote"><a id="footnote79" name= +"footnote79"></a><b>Footnote 79:</b><a href= +"#footnotetag79">(return)</a> +<p>Viz. things to be originated (for instance, gha<i>t</i>a<i>m</i> +karoti), things to be obtained (grâma<i>m</i> +ga<i>kkh</i>ati), things to be modified (suvar<i>n</i>a<i>m</i> +ku<i>nd</i>ala<i>m</i> karoti), and things to be ceremonially +purified (vrîhîn prokshati).</p> +</blockquote> +<blockquote class="footnote"><a id="footnote80" name= +"footnote80"></a><b>Footnote 80:</b><a href= +"#footnotetag80">(return)</a> +<p>Whence it follows that it is not something to be avoided like +transitory things.</p> +</blockquote> +<blockquote class="footnote"><a id="footnote81" name= +"footnote81"></a><b>Footnote 81:</b><a href= +"#footnotetag81">(return)</a> +<p>That, for instance, in the passage 'he is to sacrifice with +Soma,' the word 'soma,' which does not denote an action, is devoid +of sense.</p> +</blockquote> +<blockquote class="footnote"><a id="footnote82" name= +"footnote82"></a><b>Footnote 82:</b><a href= +"#footnotetag82">(return)</a> +<p>I.e. for the purpose of showing that the passages conveying +information about Brahman as such are justified. You have (the +objector maintains) proved hitherto only that passages containing +information about existent things are admissible, if those things +have a purpose; but how does all this apply to the information +about Brahman of which no purpose has been established?</p> +</blockquote> +<blockquote class="footnote"><a id="footnote83" name= +"footnote83"></a><b>Footnote 83:</b><a href= +"#footnotetag83">(return)</a> +<p>It is 'naturally established' because it has natural +motives—not dependent on the injunctions of the Veda, viz. +passion and the like.</p> +</blockquote> +<blockquote class="footnote"><a id="footnote84" name= +"footnote84"></a><b>Footnote 84:</b><a href= +"#footnotetag84">(return)</a> +<p>Elsewhere, i.e. outside the Veda.</p> +</blockquote> +<blockquote class="footnote"><a id="footnote85" name= +"footnote85"></a><b>Footnote 85:</b><a href= +"#footnotetag85">(return)</a> +<p>The above discussion of the prohibitory passages of the Veda is +of a very scholastic nature, and various clauses in it are +differently interpreted by the different commentators. +<i>S</i>a@nkara endeavours to fortify his doctrine, that not all +parts of the Veda refer to action by an appeal to prohibitory +passages which do not enjoin action but abstinence from action. The +legitimacy of this appeal might be contested on the ground that a +prohibitory passage also, (as, for instance, 'a +brâhma<i>n</i>a is not to be killed,') can be explained as +enjoining a positive action, viz. some action opposed in nature to +the one forbidden, so that the quoted passage might be interpreted +to mean 'a determination, &c. of not killing a +brâhma<i>n</i>a is to be formed;' just as we understand +something positive by the expression 'a non-brâhma<i>n</i>a,' +viz. some man who is a kshattriya or something else. To this the +answer is that, wherever we can, we must attribute to the word +'not' its primary sense which is the absolute negation of the word +to which it is joined; so that passages where it is joined to words +denoting action must be considered to have for their purport the +entire absence of action. Special cases only are excepted, as the +one alluded to in the text where certain prohibited actions are +enumerated under the heading of vows; for as a vow is considered as +something positive, the non-doing of some particular action must +there be understood as intimating the performance of some action of +an opposite nature. The question as to the various meanings of the +particle 'not' is discussed in all treatises on the +Pûrvâ Mîmâ<i>m</i>sâ; see, for +instance, Arthasamgraha, translation, p. 39 ff.</p> +</blockquote> +<blockquote class="footnote"><a id="footnote86" name= +"footnote86"></a><b>Footnote 86:</b><a href= +"#footnotetag86">(return)</a> +<p>The Self is the agent in a sacrifice, &c. only in so far as +it imagines itself to be joined to a body; which imagination is +finally removed by the cognition of Brahman.</p> +</blockquote> +<blockquote class="footnote"><a id="footnote87" name= +"footnote87"></a><b>Footnote 87:</b><a href= +"#footnotetag87">(return)</a> +<p>The figurative Self, i.e. the imagination that wife, children, +possessions, and the like are a man's Self; the false Self, i.e. +the imagination that the Self acts, suffers, enjoys, &c.</p> +</blockquote> +<blockquote class="footnote"><a id="footnote88" name= +"footnote88"></a><b>Footnote 88:</b><a href= +"#footnotetag88">(return)</a> +<p>I.e. the apparent world with all its distinctions.</p> +</blockquote> +<blockquote class="footnote"><a id="footnote89" name= +"footnote89"></a><b>Footnote 89:</b><a href= +"#footnotetag89">(return)</a> +<p>The words in parentheses are not found in the best +manuscripts.</p> +</blockquote> +<blockquote class="footnote"><a id="footnote90" name= +"footnote90"></a><b>Footnote 90:</b><a href= +"#footnotetag90">(return)</a> +<p>The most exalted of the three constituent elements whose state +of equipoise constitutes the pradhâna.</p> +</blockquote> +<blockquote class="footnote"><a id="footnote91" name= +"footnote91"></a><b>Footnote 91:</b><a href= +"#footnotetag91">(return)</a> +<p>Knowledge can arise only where Goodness is predominant, not +where the three qualities mutually counterbalance one another.</p> +</blockquote> +<blockquote class="footnote"><a id="footnote92" name= +"footnote92"></a><b>Footnote 92:</b><a href= +"#footnotetag92">(return)</a> +<p>The excess of Sattva in the Yogin would not enable him to rise +to omniscience if he did not possess an intelligent principle +independent of Sattva.</p> +</blockquote> +<blockquote class="footnote"><a id="footnote93" name= +"footnote93"></a><b>Footnote 93:</b><a href= +"#footnotetag93">(return)</a> +<p>Ananda Giri comments as follows: paroktânupapatlim +nirasitum p<i>rikkh</i>ati idam iti. +Prak<i>ri</i>tyarthâbhâvât +pratyayârthâbhâvâd vâ brahma<i>n</i>o +sarvaj<i>ñ</i>ateti pra<i>s</i>nam eva praka<i>t</i>ayati +katham iti. Prathama<i>m</i> pratyâha yasyeti. Ukta<i>m</i> +vyatirckadvârâ viyz<i>rin</i>oti anityatve hîti. +Dvitiya<i>m</i> <i>s</i>a@nkate j<i>ñ</i>âneti. Svato +nityasyâpi j<i>ñ</i>ânasya +tattadarthâva<i>kkh</i>innasya kâryatvât tatra +svâtantryam pratyayârtho brahma<i>n</i>a<i>h</i> +sidhyatîty âha.—The knowledge of Brahman is +eternal, and in so far Brahman is not independent with regard to +it, but it is independent with regard to each particular act of +knowledge; the verbal affix in 'jânâti' indicating the +particularity of the act.</p> +</blockquote> +<blockquote class="footnote"><a id="footnote94" name= +"footnote94"></a><b>Footnote 94:</b><a href= +"#footnotetag94">(return)</a> +<p>In the second Kha<i>nd</i>a of the sixth Prapâ<i>th</i>aka +of the Ch. Up. 'aikshata' is twice used in a figurative sense (with +regard to fire and water); it is therefore to be understood +figuratively in the third passage also where it occurs.</p> +</blockquote> +<blockquote class="footnote"><a id="footnote95" name= +"footnote95"></a><b>Footnote 95:</b><a href= +"#footnotetag95">(return)</a> +<p>So that, on this latter explanation, it is unnecessary to assume +a figurative sense of the word 'thinking' in any of the three +passages.</p> +</blockquote> +<blockquote class="footnote"><a id="footnote96" name= +"footnote96"></a><b>Footnote 96:</b><a href= +"#footnotetag96">(return)</a> +<p>A wicked man meets in a forest a blind person who has lost his +way, and implores him to lead him to his village; instead of doing +so the wicked man persuades the blind one to catch hold of the tail +of an ox, which he promises would lead him to his place. The +consequence is that the blind man is, owing to his trustfulness, +led even farther astray, and injured by the bushes, &c., +through which the ox drags him.</p> +</blockquote> +<blockquote class="footnote"><a id="footnote97" name= +"footnote97"></a><b>Footnote 97:</b><a href= +"#footnotetag97">(return)</a> +<p>Cp. above, p. 30.</p> +</blockquote> +<blockquote class="footnote"><a id="footnote98" name= +"footnote98"></a><b>Footnote 98:</b><a href= +"#footnotetag98">(return)</a> +<p>So according to the commentators, not to accept whose guidance +in the translation of scholastic definitions is rather hazardous. A +simpler translation of the clause might however be given.</p> +</blockquote> +<blockquote class="footnote"><a id="footnote99" name= +"footnote99"></a><b>Footnote 99:</b><a href= +"#footnotetag99">(return)</a> +<p>With reference to Ch. Up. VI, 8, 2.</p> +</blockquote> +<blockquote class="footnote"><a id="footnote100" name= +"footnote100"></a><b>Footnote 100:</b><a href= +"#footnotetag100">(return)</a> +<p>The wise one, i.e. the highest Self; which as +jîvâtman is conversant with the names and forms of +individual things.</p> +</blockquote> +<blockquote class="footnote"><a id="footnote101" name= +"footnote101"></a><b>Footnote 101:</b><a href= +"#footnotetag101">(return)</a> +<p>I.e. it is looked upon as the object of the devotion of the +individual souls; while in reality all those souls and Brahman are +one.</p> +</blockquote> +<blockquote class="footnote"><a id="footnote102" name= +"footnote102"></a><b>Footnote 102:</b><a href= +"#footnotetag102">(return)</a> +<p>Qualities, i.e. the attributes under which the Self is meditated +on; limiting conditions, i.e. the localities—such as the +heart and the like—which in pious meditation are ascribed to +the Self.</p> +</blockquote> +<blockquote class="footnote"><a id="footnote103" name= +"footnote103"></a><b>Footnote 103:</b><a href= +"#footnotetag103">(return)</a> +<p>Ânanda Giri reads âvish<i>t</i>asya for +âvishk<i>ri</i>tasya.</p> +</blockquote> +<blockquote class="footnote"><a id="footnote104" name= +"footnote104"></a><b>Footnote 104:</b><a href= +"#footnotetag104">(return)</a> +<p>Cp. the entire passage. All things are manifestations of the +highest Self under certain limiting conditions, but occupying +different places in an ascending scale. In unsentient things, +stones, &c. only the sattâ, the quality of being +manifests itself; in plants, animals, and men the Self manifests +itself through the vital sap; in animals and men there is +understanding; higher thought in man alone.</p> +</blockquote> +<blockquote class="footnote"><a id="footnote105" name= +"footnote105"></a><b>Footnote 105:</b><a href= +"#footnotetag105">(return)</a> +<p>Ânanda Giri on the preceding passage beginning from 'thus +here also:' na kevala<i>m</i> dvaividhyam brahma<i>n</i>a<i>h</i> +<i>s</i>rutism<i>ri</i>tyor eva siddha<i>m</i> ki<i>m</i> tu +sûtrak<i>ri</i>to api matam ity âha, evam iti, +<i>s</i>rutism<i>ri</i>tyor iva prak<i>ri</i>te pi +<i>s</i>âstre dvairûpyam brahma<i>n</i>o bhavati; tatra +sopâdhikabrahmavishayam antastaddharmâdhikara<i>n</i>am +udâharati âdityeti; uktanyâya<i>m</i> +tulyade<i>s</i>eshu prasârayati evam iti; +sopâdhikopade<i>s</i>avan +nirupâdhikopade<i>s</i>a<i>m</i> dar<i>s</i>ayati evam +ityâdinâ, âtmaj<i>ñ</i>@ana<i>m</i> +nir<i>n</i>etavyam iti sambandha<i>h</i>; ayaprasa@ngam âha +pareti; annamayâdyupâdhidvârokasya katham +paravidyâvishayatva<i>m</i> tatrâha +upâdhîti; nir<i>n</i>ayakramam âha vâkyeti, +uktârtham adhikara<i>n</i>a<i>m</i> kvâstîty +âsa@nkyokta<i>m</i> yatheti.</p> +</blockquote> +<blockquote class="footnote"><a id="footnote106" name= +"footnote106"></a><b>Footnote 106:</b><a href= +"#footnotetag106">(return)</a> +<p>After which no other Self is mentioned.</p> +</blockquote> +<blockquote class="footnote"><a id="footnote107" name= +"footnote107"></a><b>Footnote 107:</b><a href= +"#footnotetag107">(return)</a> +<p>The previous proofs were founded on li@nga; the argument which +is now propounded is founded on prakara<i>n</i>a.</p> +</blockquote> +<blockquote class="footnote"><a id="footnote108" name= +"footnote108"></a><b>Footnote 108:</b><a href= +"#footnotetag108">(return)</a> +<p>While, in the case of the Selfs consisting of food and so on, a +further inner Self is duly mentioned each time. It cannot, +therefore, be concluded that the Selfs consisting of food, &c., +are likewise identical with the highest Self referred to in the +mantra.</p> +</blockquote> +<blockquote class="footnote"><a id="footnote109" name= +"footnote109"></a><b>Footnote 109:</b><a href= +"#footnotetag109">(return)</a> +<p>Yadi labdhâ na labdhavya<i>h</i> katha<i>m</i> tarhi +paramâtmano vastutobhinnena jîvâtmanâ +paramâtmâ labhyata ity artha<i>h</i>. +Bhâmatî.</p> +</blockquote> +<blockquote class="footnote"><a id="footnote110" name= +"footnote110"></a><b>Footnote 110:</b><a href= +"#footnotetag110">(return)</a> +<p>Yathâ paramesvarâd bhinno jîvâtmâ +drash<i>t</i>â na bhavaty evam gîvâtmanozpi +drash<i>t</i>ur na bhinna<i>h</i> parame<i>s</i>vara iti, +jîvasyânirvâ<i>k</i>yarve parame<i>s</i>varozpy +anirvâ<i>k</i>ya<i>h</i> syâd ity ata âha +parame<i>s</i>varas tv avidyâkalpitâd iti. Ananda +Giri.</p> +</blockquote> +<blockquote class="footnote"><a id="footnote111" name= +"footnote111"></a><b>Footnote 111:</b><a href= +"#footnotetag111">(return)</a> +<p>The explanation of the ânandamaya given hitherto is here +recalled, and a different one given. The previous explanation is +attributed by Go. Ân. to the v<i>ri</i>ttikâra.</p> +</blockquote> +<blockquote class="footnote"><a id="footnote112" name= +"footnote112"></a><b>Footnote 112:</b><a href= +"#footnotetag112">(return)</a> +<p>In which sense, as shown above, the word ânandamaya must +be taken if understood to denote Brahman.</p> +</blockquote> +<blockquote class="footnote"><a id="footnote113" name= +"footnote113"></a><b>Footnote 113:</b><a href= +"#footnotetag113">(return)</a> +<p>I.e. the word translated hitherto by abundance.</p> +</blockquote> +<blockquote class="footnote"><a id="footnote114" name= +"footnote114"></a><b>Footnote 114:</b><a href= +"#footnotetag114">(return)</a> +<p>See I, 1, 15-19.</p> +</blockquote> +<blockquote class="footnote"><a id="footnote115" name= +"footnote115"></a><b>Footnote 115:</b><a href= +"#footnotetag115">(return)</a> +<p>The preceding adhikara<i>n</i>a had shown that the five Selfs +(consisting of food, mind, and so on), which the Taitt. Up. +enumerates, are introduced merely for the purpose of facilitating +the cognition of Brahman considered as devoid of all qualities; +while that Brahman itself is the real object of knowledge. The +present adhikara<i>n</i>a undertakes to show that the passage about +the golden person represents the savi<i>s</i>esha Brahman as the +object of devout meditation.</p> +</blockquote> +<blockquote class="footnote"><a id="footnote116" name= +"footnote116"></a><b>Footnote 116:</b><a href= +"#footnotetag116">(return)</a> +<p>So that the real giver of the gifts bestowed by princes on poets +and singers is Brahman.</p> +</blockquote> +<blockquote class="footnote"><a id="footnote117" name= +"footnote117"></a><b>Footnote 117:</b><a href= +"#footnotetag117">(return)</a> +<p>Or else 'that which is within forms and names.'</p> +</blockquote> +<blockquote class="footnote"><a id="footnote118" name= +"footnote118"></a><b>Footnote 118:</b><a href= +"#footnotetag118">(return)</a> +<p>Viz. as intimating it. Thus Ân. Gi. and Go. Ân. +against the accent of <i>rik</i>á<i>h</i>. +Sâya<i>n</i>a explains <i>rik</i>á<i>h</i> as +genitive.</p> +</blockquote> +<blockquote class="footnote"><a id="footnote119" name= +"footnote119"></a><b>Footnote 119:</b><a href= +"#footnotetag119">(return)</a> +<p>O<i>m</i>kârasya pratîkatvena +vâ<i>k</i>akatvena lakshakatvena vâ brahmatvam uktam, +om iti, ka<i>m</i> sukha<i>m</i> +tasyârthendriyayogajatva<i>m</i> vârayitu<i>m</i> kham +iti, tasya bhûtâka<i>s</i>atva<i>m</i> vyâseddhum +purâ<i>n</i>am ity uktam. Ân. Gi.</p> +</blockquote> +<blockquote class="footnote"><a id="footnote120" name= +"footnote120"></a><b>Footnote 120:</b><a href= +"#footnotetag120">(return)</a> +<p>The doubt about the meaning of a word is preferably to be +decided by means of a reference to preceding passages; where that +is not possible (the doubtful word occurring at the beginning of +some new chapter) complementary, i.e. subsequent passages have to +be taken into consideration.</p> +</blockquote> +<blockquote class="footnote"><a id="footnote121" name= +"footnote121"></a><b>Footnote 121:</b><a href= +"#footnotetag121">(return)</a> +<p>The v<i>ri</i>ttikâra, the commentators say.</p> +</blockquote> +<blockquote class="footnote"><a id="footnote122" name= +"footnote122"></a><b>Footnote 122:</b><a href= +"#footnotetag122">(return)</a> +<p>I.e. which has not been mixed with water and earth, according to +Ch. Up. VI, 3, 3. Before that mixture took place light was entriely +separated from the other elements, and therefore bounded by the +latter.</p> +</blockquote> +<blockquote class="footnote"><a id="footnote123" name= +"footnote123"></a><b>Footnote 123:</b><a href= +"#footnotetag123">(return)</a> +<p>So as to justify the assumption that such a thing as +non-tripartite light exists at all.</p> +</blockquote> +<blockquote class="footnote"><a id="footnote124" name= +"footnote124"></a><b>Footnote 124:</b><a href= +"#footnotetag124">(return)</a> +<p>Brahma<i>n</i>o vyava<i>kkh</i>idya +teja<i>h</i>samarpakatva<i>m</i> vi<i>s</i>eshakatvam, +tadabhâvozvi<i>s</i>eshakatvam. Ân. Gi.</p> +</blockquote> +<blockquote class="footnote"><a id="footnote125" name= +"footnote125"></a><b>Footnote 125:</b><a href= +"#footnotetag125">(return)</a> +<p>If we strictly follow the order of words in the original.</p> +</blockquote> +<blockquote class="footnote"><a id="footnote126" name= +"footnote126"></a><b>Footnote 126:</b><a href= +"#footnotetag126">(return)</a> +<p>Svasâmarthyena sarvanâmna<i>h</i> +sannihitaparâmar<i>s</i>itvava<i>s</i>ena.</p> +</blockquote> +<blockquote class="footnote"><a id="footnote127" name= +"footnote127"></a><b>Footnote 127:</b><a href= +"#footnotetag127">(return)</a> +<p>The v<i>ri</i>ttikâra according to Go. Ân. in his +<i>t</i>îkâ on the bhâshya to the next +Sûtra.</p> +</blockquote> +<blockquote class="footnote"><a id="footnote128" name= +"footnote128"></a><b>Footnote 128:</b><a href= +"#footnotetag128">(return)</a> +<p>Concerning the difficulty involved in this interpretation, cp. +Deussen, p. 183, note.</p> +</blockquote> +<blockquote class="footnote"><a id="footnote129" name= +"footnote129"></a><b>Footnote 129:</b><a href= +"#footnotetag129">(return)</a> +<p>The text runs, 'astitve <i>k</i>a +prâ<i>n</i>ânâ<i>m</i> ni<i>hs</i>reyasam,' and +Go. Ân. explains 'astitve prâ<i>n</i>asthitau +prâ<i>n</i>ânâ<i>m</i> +indriyâ<i>n</i>âm sthitir ity arthata<i>h</i> +<i>s</i>rutim âha.' He as well as Ân. Gi. quotes as the +text of the scriptural passage referred to 'athâto +ni<i>hs</i>reyasâdânam ity âdi.' But if instead +of 'astitve <i>k</i>a' we read 'asti tv eva,' we get the concluding +clause of Kau. Up. III, 2, as given in Cowell's edition.</p> +</blockquote> +<blockquote class="footnote"><a id="footnote130" name= +"footnote130"></a><b>Footnote 130:</b><a href= +"#footnotetag130">(return)</a> +<p>Whence we know that the interior Self referred to in the Kau. +Up. is Brahman.</p> +</blockquote> +<blockquote class="footnote"><a id="footnote131" name= +"footnote131"></a><b>Footnote 131:</b><a href= +"#footnotetag131">(return)</a> +<p>I.e. spontaneous intuition of supersensible truth, rendered +possible through the knowledge acquired in former existences.</p> +</blockquote> +<blockquote class="footnote"><a id="footnote132" name= +"footnote132"></a><b>Footnote 132:</b><a href= +"#footnotetag132">(return)</a> +<p>Ima<i>m</i> <i>s</i>arîram instead of ida<i>m</i> +<i>s</i>arîram.</p> +</blockquote> +<blockquote class="footnote"><a id="footnote133" name= +"footnote133"></a><b>Footnote 133:</b><a href= +"#footnotetag133">(return)</a> +<p>Pa<i>ñk</i>a <i>s</i>abdâdaya<i>h</i> +pa<i>ñk</i>a p<i>ri</i>thivyâdaya<i>s</i> <i>k</i>a +da<i>s</i>a bhûtamâtrâ<i>h</i> +pa<i>ñk</i>a buddhîndriyâ<i>n</i>i +pa<i>ñk</i>a buddhaya iti da<i>s</i>a +praj<i>ñ</i>âmâtrâ<i>h</i>. Yadvâ +j<i>ñ</i>ânendriyârthâ<i>h</i> +pa<i>ñk</i>a karzmendriyârthâ<i>s</i> <i>ka</i> +pa<i>ñk</i>eti da<i>s</i>a +bhûtamâtrâ<i>h</i> +dvividhânîndriyâ<i>n</i>i +praj<i>ñ</i>âmâtrâ da<i>s</i>eti +bhâva<i>h</i>. Ân. Gi.</p> +</blockquote> +<blockquote class="footnote"><a id="footnote134" name= +"footnote134"></a><b>Footnote 134:</b><a href= +"#footnotetag134">(return)</a> +<p>Viz. by the v<i>ri</i>ttikâra.</p> +</blockquote> +<blockquote class="footnote"><a id="footnote135" name= +"footnote135"></a><b>Footnote 135:</b><a href= +"#footnotetag135">(return)</a> +<p>Ihâpi tad yujyate explaining the 'iha tadyogât' of +the Sûtra.</p> +</blockquote> +<span class="pagenum"><a name="page107" id= +"page107"></a>{107}</span> <a name="chap-1-2" id="chap-1-2"></a> +<h4>SECOND PÂDA.</h4> +<center>REVERENCE TO THE HIGHEST SELF!</center> +<p>In the first pâda Brahman has been shown to be the cause +of the origin, subsistence, and reabsorption of the entire world, +comprising the ether and the other elements. Moreover, of this +Brahman, which is the cause of the entire world, certain qualities +have (implicitly) been declared, such as all-pervadingness, +eternity, omniscience, its being the Self of all, and so on. +Further, by producing reasons showing that some words which are +generally used in a different sense denote Brahman also, we have +been able to determine that some passages about whose sense doubts +are entertained refer to Brahman. Now certain other passages +present themselves which because containing only obscure +indications of Brahman give rise to the doubt whether they refer to +the highest Self or to something else. We therefore begin the +second and third pâdas in order to settle those doubtful +points.</p> +<p>1. (That which consists of mind is Brahman) because there is +taught what is known from everywhere.</p> +<p>Scripture says, 'All this indeed is Brahman, beginning, ending, +and breathing in it; thus knowing let a man meditate with calm +mind. Now man is made of determination (kratu); according to what +his determination is in this world so will he be when he has +departed this life. Let him therefore form this determination: he +who consists of mind, whose body is breath (the subtle body),' +&c. (Ch. Up. III, 14). Concerning this passage the doubt +presents itself whether what is pointed out as the object of +meditation, by means of attributes such as consisting of mind, +&c., is the embodied (individual) soul or the highest +Brahman.</p> +<p>The embodied Self, the pûrvapakshin +says.—Why?—Because the embodied Self as the ruler of +the organs of action is well known to be connected with the mind +and so on, while the highest Brahman is not, as is declared in +several scriptural passages, so, for instance (Mu. Up. II, 1, 2), +<span class="pagenum"><a name="page108" id= +"page108"></a>{108}</span> 'He is without breath, without mind, +pure.'—But, it may be objected, the passage, 'All this indeed +is Brahman,' mentions Brahman directly; how then can you suppose +that the embodied Self forms the object of meditation?—This +objection does not apply, the pûrvapakshin rejoins, because +the passage does not aim at enjoining meditation on Brahman, but +rather at enjoining calmness of mind, the sense being: because +Brahman is all this, tajjalân, let a man meditate with a calm +mind. That is to say: because all this aggregate of effects is +Brahman only, springing from it, ending in it, and breathing in it; +and because, as everything constitutes one Self only, there is no +room for passion; therefore a man is to meditate with a calm mind. +And since the sentence aims at enjoining calmness of mind, it +cannot at the same time enjoin meditation on Brahman<a id= +"footnotetag136" name="footnotetag136"></a><a href= +"#footnote136"><sup>136</sup></a>; but meditation is separately +enjoined in the clause, 'Let him form the determination, i.e. +reflection.' And thereupon the subsequent passage, 'He who consists +of mind, whose body is breath,' &c. states the object of the +meditation in words indicatory of the individual soul. For this +reason we maintain that the meditation spoken of has the individual +soul for its object. The other attributes also subsequently stated +in the text, 'He to whom all works, all desires belong,' &c. +may rightly be held to refer to the individual soul. The +attributes, finally, of being what abides in the heart and of being +extremely minute which are mentioned in the passage, 'He is my Self +within the heart, smaller than a corn of rice, smaller than a corn +of barley,' may be ascribed to the individual soul which has the +size of the point of a goad, but not to the unlimited Brahman. If +it be objected that the immediately following passage, 'greater +than the earth,' &c., cannot refer to something limited, we +reply that smallness and greatness which are mutually opposite +cannot indeed be ascribed to one and the same thing; and that, if +one attribute <span class="pagenum"><a name="page109" id= +"page109"></a>{109}</span> only is to be ascribed to the subject of +the passage, smallness is preferable because it is mentioned first; +while the greatness mentioned later on may be attributed to the +soul in so far as it is one with Brahman. If it is once settled +that the whole passage refers to the individual soul, it follows +that the declaration of Brahman also, contained in the passage, +'That is Brahman' (III, 14, 4), refers to the individual soul<a id= +"footnotetag137" name="footnotetag137"></a><a href= +"#footnote137"><sup>137</sup></a>, as it is clearly connected with +the general topic. Therefore the individual soul is the object of +meditation indicated by the qualities of consisting of mind and so +on.</p> +<p>To all this we reply: The highest Brahman only is what is to be +meditated upon as distinguished by the attributes of consisting of +mind and so on.—Why?—'On account of there being taught +here what is known from everywhere.' What is known from all +Vedânta-passages to be the sense of the word Brahman, viz. +the cause of the world, and what is mentioned here in the beginning +words of the passage, ('all this indeed is Brahman,') the same we +must assume to be taught here as distinguished by certain +qualities, viz. consisting of mind and so on. Thus we avoid the +fault of dropping the subject-matter under discussion and +needlessly introducing a new topic.—But, it may be said, it +has been shown that Brahman is, in the beginning of the passage, +introduced merely for the purpose of intimating the injunction of +calmness of mind, not for the purpose of intimating Brahman +itself.—True, we reply; but the fact nevertheless remains +that, where the qualities of consisting of mind, &c. are spoken +of, Brahman only is proximate (i.e. mentioned not far off so that +it may be concluded to be the thing referred to), while the +individual soul is neither proximate nor intimated by any word +directly pointing to it. The cases of Brahman and the individual +soul are therefore not equal.</p> +<p>2. And because the qualities desired to be expressed are +possible (in Brahman; therefore the passage refers to Brahman).</p> +<span class="pagenum"><a name="page110" id= +"page110"></a>{110}</span> +<p>Although in the Veda which is not the work of man no wish in the +strict sense can be expressed<a id="footnotetag138" name= +"footnotetag138"></a><a href="#footnote138"><sup>138</sup></a>, +there being no speaker, still such phrases as 'desired to be +expressed,' may be figuratively used on account of the result, viz. +(mental) comprehension. For just as in ordinary language we speak +of something which is intimated by a word and is to be received (by +the hearer as the meaning of the word), as 'desired to be +expressed;' so in the Veda also whatever is denoted as that which +is to be received is 'desired to be expressed,' everything else +'not desired to be expressed.' What is to be received as the +meaning of a Vedic sentence, and what not, is inferred from the +general purport of the passage. Those qualities which are here +desired to be expressed, i.e. intimated as qualities to be dwelt on +in meditation, viz. the qualities of having true purposes, &c. +are possible in the highest Brahman; for the quality of having true +purposes may be ascribed to the highest Self which possesses +unimpeded power over the creation, subsistence, and reabsorption of +this world. Similarly the qualities of having true desires and true +purposes are attributed to the highest Self in another passage, +viz. the one beginning, 'The Self which is free from sin' (Ch. Up. +VIII, 7, 1). The clause, 'He whose Self is the ether,' means 'he +whose Self is like the ether;' for Brahman may be said to be like +the ether on account of its omnipresence and other qualities. This +is also expressed by the clause, 'Greater than the earth.' And the +other explanation also, according to which the passage means 'he +whose Self is the ether' is possible, since Brahman which as the +cause of the whole world is the Self of everything is also the Self +of the ether. For the same reasons he is called 'he to whom all +works belong, and so on.' Thus the qualities here intimated as +topics of meditation agree with the nature of Brahman. We further +maintain that the terms 'consisting of mind,' and 'having breath +for its body,' which the pûrvapakshin asserts <span class= +"pagenum"><a name="page111" id="page111"></a>{111}</span> cannot +refer to Brahman, may refer to it. For as Brahman is the Self of +everything, qualities such as consisting of mind and the like, +which belong to the individual soul, belong to Brahman also. +Accordingly <i>S</i>ruti and Sm<i>ri</i>ti say of Brahman, 'Thou +art woman, thou art man; thou art youth, thou art maiden; thou as +an old man totterest along on thy staff; thou art born with thy +face turned everywhere' (<i>S</i>ve. Up. IV, 3), and 'its hands and +feet are everywhere, its eyes and head are everywhere, its ears are +everywhere, it stands encompassing all in the world' (Bha. +Gîtâ III, 13).</p> +<p>The passage (quoted above against our view), 'Without breath, +without mind, pure,' refers to the pure (unrelated) Brahman. The +terms 'consisting of mind; having breath for its body,' on the +other hand, refer to Brahman as distinguished by qualities. Hence, +as the qualities mentioned are possible in Brahman, we conclude +that the highest Brahman only is represented as the object of +meditation.</p> +<p>3. On the other hand, as (those qualities) are not possible (in +it), the embodied (soul is) not (denoted by manomaya, &c.).</p> +<p>The preceding Sûtra has declared that the qualities +mentioned are possible in Brahman; the present Sûtra states +that they are not possible in the embodied Self. Brahman only +possesses, in the manner explained, the qualities of consisting of +mind, and so on; not the embodied individual soul. For qualities +such as expressed in the words, 'He whose purposes are true, whose +Self is the ether, who has no speech, who is not disturbed, who is +greater than the earth,' cannot easily be attributed to the +embodied Self. By the term 'embodied' (<i>s</i>ârîra) +we have to understand 'residing' in a body. If it be objected that +the Lord also resides in the body<a id="footnotetag139" name= +"footnotetag139"></a><a href="#footnote139"><sup>139</sup></a>, we +reply, True, he does reside in the body, but not in the body only; +for <i>s</i>ruti declares him to be all-pervading; compare, 'He is +greater than the earth; greater than the atmosphere, omnipresent +like the ether, eternal.' The individual soul, on the other +<span class="pagenum"><a name="page112" id= +"page112"></a>{112}</span> hand, is in the body only, apart from +which as the abode of fruition it does not exist.</p> +<p>4. And because there is a (separate) denotation of the object of +activity and of the agent.</p> +<p>The attributes of consisting of mind, and so on, cannot belong +to the embodied Self for that reason also, that there is a +(separate) denotation of the object of activity and of the agent. +In the passage, 'When I shall have departed from hence I shall +obtain him' (Ch. Up. III, 14, 4), the word 'him' refers to that +which is the topic of discussion, viz. the Self which is to be +meditated upon as possessing the attributes of consisting of mind, +&c., as the object of an activity, viz. as something to be +obtained; while the words, 'I shall obtain,' represent the +meditating individual Self as the agent, i.e. the obtainer. Now, +wherever it can be helped, we must not assume that one and the same +being is spoken of as the agent and the object of the activity at +the same time. The relation existing between a person meditating +and the thing meditated upon requires, moreover, different +abodes.—And thus for the above reason, also, that which is +characterised by the attributes of consisting of mind, and so on, +cannot be the individual soul.</p> +<p>5. On account of the difference of words.</p> +<p>That which possesses the attributes of consisting of mind, and +so on, cannot be the individual soul, for that reason also that +there is a difference of words.</p> +<p>That is to say, we meet with another scriptural passage of +kindred subject-matter (<i>S</i>at. Brâ. X, 6, 3, 2), 'Like a +rice grain, or a barley grain, or a canary seed or the kernel of a +canary seed, thus that golden person is in the Self.' There one +word, i.e. the locative 'in the Self,' denotes the embodied Self, +and a different word, viz. the nominative 'person,' denotes the +Self distinguished by the qualities of consisting of mind, &c. +We therefrom conclude that the two are different.</p> +<p>6. And on account of Sm<i>ri</i>ti.</p> +<p>Sm<i>ri</i>ti also declares the difference of the embodied Self +<span class="pagenum"><a name="page113" id= +"page113"></a>{113}</span> and the highest Self, viz. Bha. +Gîtâ XVIII, 61, 'The Lord, O Arjuna, is seated in the +heart of all beings, driving round by his magical power all beings +(as if they were) mounted on a machine.'</p> +<p>But what, it may be asked, is that so-called embodied Self +different from the highest Self which is to be set aside according +to the preceding Sûtras? <i>S</i>ruti passages, as well as +Sm<i>ri</i>ti, expressly deny that there is any Self apart from the +highest Self; compare, for instance, B<i>ri</i>. Up. III, 7, 23, +'There is no other seer but he; there is no other hearer but he;' +and Bha. Gîtâ XIII, 2, 'And know me also, O +Bhârata, to be the kshetiaj<i>ñ</i>a in all +kshetras.'</p> +<p>True, we reply, (there is in reality one universal Self only.) +But the highest Self in so far as it is limited by its adjuncts, +viz. the body, the senses, and the mind (mano-buddhi), is, by the +ignorant, spoken of as if it were embodied. Similarly the ether, +although in reality unlimited, appears limited owing to certain +adjuncts, such as jars and other vessels. With regard to this +(unreal limitation of the one Self) the distinction of objects of +activity and of agents may be practically assumed, as long as we +have not learned—from the passage, 'That art thou'—that +the Self is one only. As soon, however, as we grasp the truth that +there is only one universal Self, there is an end to the whole +practical view of the world with its distinction of bondage, final +release, and the like.</p> +<p>7. If it be said that (the passage does) not (refer to Brahman) +on account of the smallness of the abode (mentioned), and on +account of the denotations of that (i.e. of minuteness); we say, +no; because (Brahman) has thus to be contemplated, and because the +case is analogous to that of ether.</p> +<p>On account of the limitation of its abode, which is mentioned in +the clause, 'He is my Self within the heart,' and on account of the +declaration as to its minuteness contained in the direct statement, +'He is smaller than a grain of rice,' &c.; the embodied soul +only, which is of the size of an awl's point, is spoken of in the +passage under discussion, and not <span class="pagenum"><a name= +"page114" id="page114"></a>{114}</span> the highest Self. This +assertion made above (in the pûrvapaksha of Sûtra I, +and restated in the pûrvapaksha of the present Sûtra) +has to be refuted. We therefore maintain that the objection raised +does not invalidate our view of the passage. It is true that a +thing occupying a limited space only cannot in any way be spoken of +as omnipresent; but, on the other hand, that which is omnipresent, +and therefore in all places may, from a certain point of view, be +said to occupy a limited space. Similarly, a prince may be called +the ruler of Ayodhyâ although he is at the same time the +ruler of the whole earth.—But from what point of view can the +omnipresent Lord be said to occupy a limited space and to be +minute?—He may, we reply, be spoken of thus, 'because he is +to be contemplated thus.' The passage under discussion teaches us +to contemplate the Lord as abiding within the lotus of the heart, +characterised by minuteness and similar qualities—which +apprehension of the Lord is rendered possible through a +modification of the mind—just as Hari is contemplated in the +sacred stone called <i>S</i>âlagrâm. Although present +everywhere, the Lord is pleased when meditated upon as dwelling in +the heart. The case is, moreover, to be viewed as analogous to that +of the ether. The ether, although all-pervading, is spoken of as +limited and minute, if considered in its connexion with the eye of +a needle; so Brahman also. But it is an understood matter that the +attributes of limitation of abode and of minuteness depend, in +Brahman's case, entirely on special forms of contemplation, and are +not real. The latter consideration disposes also of the objection, +that if Brahman has its abode in the heart, which heart-abode is a +different one in each body, it would follow that it is affected by +all the imperfections which attach to beings having different +abodes, such as parrots shut up in different cages, viz. want of +unity, being made up of parts, non-permanency, and so on.</p> +<p>8. If it is said that (from the circumstance of Brahman and the +individual soul being one) there follows fruition (on the part of +Brahman); we say, no; on account of the difference of nature (of +the two).</p> +<span class="pagenum"><a name="page115" id= +"page115"></a>{115}</span> +<p>But, it may be said, as Brahman is omnipresent like ether, and +therefore connected with the hearts of all living beings, and as it +is of the nature of intelligence and therefore not different from +the individual soul, it follows that Brahman also has the same +fruition of pleasure, pain, and so on (as the individual soul). The +same result follows from its unity. For in reality there exists no +transmigratory Self different from the highest Self; as appears +from the text, 'There is no other knower but he' (B<i>ri</i>. Up. +III, 7, 23), and similar passages. Hence the highest Self is +subject to the fruition connected with transmigratory +existence.</p> +<p>This is not so, we reply; because there is a difference of +nature. From the circumstance that Brahman is connected with the +hearts of all living beings it does not follow that it is, like the +embodied Self, subject to fruition. For, between the embodied Self +and the highest Self, there is the difference that the former acts +and enjoys, acquires merit and demerit, and is affected by +pleasure, pain, and so on; while the latter is of the opposite +nature, i.e. characterised by being free from all evil and the +like. On account of this difference of the two, the fruition of the +one does not extend to the other. To assume merely on the ground of +the mutual proximity of the two, without considering their +essentially different powers, that a connexion with effects exists +(in Brahman's case also), would be no better than to suppose that +space is on fire (when something in space is on fire). The same +objection and refutation apply to the case of those also who teach +the existence of more than one omnipresent Self. In reply to the +assertion, that because Brahman is one and there are no other Selfs +outside it, Brahman must be subject to fruition since the +individual soul is so, we ask the question: How have you, our wise +opponent, ascertained that there is no other Self? You will reply, +we suppose, from scriptural texts such as, 'That art thou,' 'I am +Brahman,' 'There is no other knower but he,' and so on. Very well, +then, it appears that the truth about scriptural matters is to be +ascertained from Scripture, and that Scripture is not sometimes to +be appealed to, and on other occasions to be disregarded.</p> +<span class="pagenum"><a name="page116" id= +"page116"></a>{116}</span> +<p>Scriptural texts, such as 'that art thou,' teach that Brahman +which is free from all evil is the Self of the embodied soul, and +thus dispel even the opinion that the embodied soul is subject to +fruition; how then should fruition on the part of the embodied soul +involve fruition on the part of Brahman?—Let, then, the unity +of the individual soul and Brahman not be apprehended on the ground +of Scripture.—In that case, we reply, the fruition on the +part of the individual soul has wrong knowledge for its cause, and +Brahman as it truly exists is not touched thereby, not any more +than the ether becomes really dark-blue in consequence of ignorant +people presuming it to be so. For this reason the +Sûtrakâra says<a id="footnotetag140" name= +"footnotetag140"></a><a href="#footnote140"><sup>140</sup></a> 'no, +on account of the difference.' In spite of their unity, fruition on +the part of the soul does not involve fruition on the part of +Brahman; because there is a difference. For there is a difference +between false knowledge and perfect knowledge, fruition being the +figment of false knowledge while the unity (of the Self) is +revealed by perfect knowledge. Now, as the substance revealed by +perfect knowledge cannot be affected by fruition which is nothing +but the figment of false knowledge, it is impossible to assume even +a shadow of fruition on Brahman's part.</p> +<p>9. The eater (is the highest Self) since what is movable and +what is immovable is mentioned (as his food).</p> +<p>We read in the Ka<i>th</i>avallî (I, 2, 25), 'Who then +knows where He is, He to whom the Brahmans and Kshattriyas are but +food, and death itself a condiment?' This passage intimates, by +means of the words 'food' and 'condiment,' that there is some +eater. A doubt then arises whether the eater be Agni or the +individual soul or the highest Self; for no distinguishing +characteristic is stated, and Agni as well as the individual soul +and the highest Self is observed to form, in that Upanishad, the +subjects of questions<a id="footnotetag141" name= +"footnotetag141"></a><a href="#footnote141"><sup>141</sup></a>.</p> +<span class="pagenum"><a name="page117" id= +"page117"></a>{117}</span> +<p>The pûrvapakshin maintains that the eater is Agni, fire +being known from Scripture as well (cp. B<i>ri</i>. Up. I, 4, 6) as +from ordinary life to be the eater of food. Or else the individual +soul may be the eater, according to the passage, 'One of them eats +the sweet fruit' (Mu. Up. III, 1, 1). On the other hand, the eater +cannot be Brahman on account of the passage (which forms the +continuation of the one quoted from the Mu. Up.), 'The other looks +on without eating.'</p> +<p>The eater, we reply, must be the highest Self 'because there is +mentioned what is movable and what is immovable.' For all things +movable and immovable are here to be taken as constituting the +food, while death is the condiment. But nothing beside the highest +Self can be the consumer of all these things in their totality; the +highest Self, however, when reabsorbing the entire aggregate of +effects may be said to eat everything. If it is objected that here +no express mention is made of things movable and things immovable, +and that hence we have no right to use the (alleged) mention made +of them as a reason, we reply that this objection is unfounded; +firstly, because the aggregate of all living beings is seen to be +meant from the circumstance of death being the condiment; and, +secondly, because the Brahmans and Kshattriyas may here, on account +of their pre-eminent position, be viewed as instances only (of all +beings). Concerning the objection that the highest Self cannot be +an eater on account of the passage quoted ('the other looks on +without eating'), we remark that that passage aims at denying the +fruition (on the part of the highest Self) of the results of works, +such fruition being mentioned in immediate proximity, but is not +meant to negative the reabsorption of the world of effects (into +Brahman); for it is well established by all the Vedânta-texts +that Brahman is the cause of the creation, subsistence, and +reabsorption of the world. Therefore the eater can here be Brahman +only.</p> +<p>10. And on account of the topic under discussion. That the +highest Self only can be the eater referred to <span class= +"pagenum"><a name="page118" id="page118"></a>{118}</span> is +moreover evident from the passage (Ka. Up. I, 2, 18), ('The knowing +Self is not born, it dies not'), which shows that the highest Self +is the general topic. And to adhere to the general topic is the +proper proceeding. Further, the clause, 'Who then knows where he +is,' shows that the cognition is connected with difficulties; which +circumstance again points to the highest Self.</p> +<p>11. The 'two entered into the cave' (are the individual soul and +the highest Self), for the two are (intelligent) Selfs (and +therefore of the same nature), as it is seen (that numerals denote +beings of the same nature).</p> +<p>In the same Ka<i>th</i>avallî we read (I, 3, 1), 'There +are the two drinking the reward of their works in the world, (i.e. +the body,) entered into the cave, dwelling on the highest summit. +Those who know Brahman call them shade and light; likewise those +householders who perform the Tri<i>n</i>â<i>k</i>iketa +sacrifice.'</p> +<p>Here the doubt arises whether the mind (buddhi) and the +individual soul are referred to, or the individual soul and the +highest Self. If the mind and the individual soul, then the +individual soul is here spoken of as different from the aggregate +of the organs of action, (i.e. the body,) among which the mind +occupies the first place. And a statement on this point is to be +expected, as a question concerning it is asked in a preceding +passage, viz. I, 1, 20, 'There is that doubt when a man is +dead—some saying he is; others, he is not. This I should like +to know taught by thee; this is the third of my boons.' If, on the +other hand, the passage refers to the individual soul and the +highest Self, then it intimates that the highest Self is different +from the individual soul; and this also requires to be declared +here, on account of the question contained in the passage (I, 2, +14), 'That which thou seest as different from religious duty and +its contrary, from effect and cause, from the past and the future, +tell me that.'</p> +<p>The doubt to which the passage gives rise having thus +<span class="pagenum"><a name="page119" id= +"page119"></a>{119}</span> been stated, a caviller starts the +following objection: neither of the stated views can be +maintained.—Why?—On account of the characteristic mark +implied in the circumstance that the two are said to drink, i.e. to +enjoy, the fruit of their works in the world. For this can apply to +the intelligent individual soul only, not to the non-intelligent +buddhi. And as the dual form 'drinking' (pibantau) shows that both +are drinking, the view of the two being the buddhi and the +individual soul is not tenable. For the same reason the other +opinion also, viz. of the two being the individual soul and the +highest Self, cannot be maintained; for drinking (i.e. the fruition +of reward) cannot be predicated of the highest Self, on account of +the mantra (Mu. Up. III, 1, 1), 'The other looks on without +eating.'</p> +<p>These objections, we reply, are without any force. Just as we +see that in phrases such as 'the men with the umbrella (lit. the +umbrella-men) are walking,' the attribute of being furnished with +an umbrella which properly speaking belongs to one man only is +secondarily ascribed to many, so here two agents are spoken of as +drinking because one of them is really drinking. Or else we may +explain the passage by saying that, while the individual soul only +drinks, the Lord also is said to drink because he makes the soul +drink. On the other hand, we may also assume that the two are the +buddhi and the individual soul, the instrument being figuratively +spoken of as the agent—a figure of speech exemplified by +phrases such as 'the fuel cooks (the food).' And in a chapter whose +topic is the soul no two other beings can well be represented as +enjoying rewards. Hence there is room for the doubt whether the two +are the buddhi and the individual soul, or the individual soul and +the highest Self.</p> +<p>Here the pûrvapakshin maintains that the former of the two +stated views is the right one, because the two beings are qualified +as 'entered into the cave.' Whether we understand by the cave the +body or the heart, in either case the buddhi and the individual +soul may be spoken of as 'entered into the cave.' Nor would it be +appropriate, as long as another interpretation is possible, to +assume <span class="pagenum"><a name="page120" id= +"page120"></a>{120}</span> that a special place is here ascribed to +the omnipresent Brahman. Moreover, the words 'in the world of their +good deeds' show that the two do not pass beyond the sphere of the +results of their good works. But the highest Self is not in the +sphere of the results of either good or bad works; according to the +scriptural passage, 'It does not grow larger by works nor does it +grow smaller.' Further, the words 'shade and light' properly +designate what is intelligent and what is non-intelligent, because +the two are opposed to each other like light and shade. Hence we +conclude that the buddhi and the individual soul are spoken of.</p> +<p>To this we make the following reply:—In the passage under +discussion the individual soul +(vij<i>ñ</i>ânâtman) and the highest Self are +spoken of, because these two, being both intelligent Selfs, are of +the same nature. For we see that in ordinary life also, whenever a +number is mentioned, beings of the same class are understood to be +meant; when, for instance, the order is given, 'Look out for a +second (i.e. a fellow) for this bull,' people look out for a second +bull, not for a horse or a man. So here also, where the mention of +the fruition of rewards enables us to determine that the individual +soul is meant, we understand at once, when a second is required, +that the highest Self has to be understood; for the highest Self is +intelligent, and therefore of the same nature as the +soul.—But has it not been said above that the highest Self +cannot be meant here, on account of the text stating that it is +placed in the cave?—Well, we reply, <i>s</i>ruti as well as +sm<i>ri</i>ti speaks of the highest Self as placed in the cave. +Compare, for instance (Ka. Up. I, 2, 12), 'The Ancient who is +hidden in the cave, who dwells in the abyss;' Taitt. Up. II, 1, 'He +who knows him hidden in the cave, in the highest ether;' and, +'Search for the Self entered into the cave.' That it is not +contrary to reason to assign to the omnipresent Brahman a special +locality, for the purpose of clearer perception, we have already +demonstrated. The attribute of existing in the world of its good +works, which properly belongs to one of the two only, viz. to the +individual soul, may be assigned to both, analogously to the case +of the men, one of whom carries an umbrella. Their being compared +to light <span class="pagenum"><a name="page121" id= +"page121"></a>{121}</span> and shade also is unobjectionable, +because the qualities of belonging and not belonging to this +transmigratory world are opposed to each other, like light and +shade; the quality of belonging to it being due to Nescience, and +the quality of not belonging to it being real. We therefore +understand by the two 'entered into the cave,' the individual soul +and the highest Self.—Another reason for this interpretation +follows.</p> +<p>12. And on account of the distinctive qualities (mentioned).</p> +<p>Moreover, the distinctive qualities mentioned in the text agree +only with the individual Self and the highest Self. For in a +subsequent passage (I, 3, 3), 'Know the Self to be the charioteer, +the body to be the chariot,' which contains the simile of the +chariot, the individual soul is represented as a charioteer driving +on through transmigratory existence and final release, while the +passage (9), 'He reaches the end of his journey, and that is the +highest place of Vish<i>n</i>u,' represents the highest Self as the +goal of the driver's course. And in a preceding passage also, (I, +2, 12, 'The wise, who by means of meditation on his Self, +recognises the Ancient who is difficult to be seen, who has entered +into the dark, who is hidden in the cave, who dwells in the abyss, +as God, he indeed leaves joy and sorrow far behind,') the same two +beings are distinguished as thinker and as object of thought. The +highest Self is, moreover, the general topic. And further, the +clause, 'Those who know Brahman call them,' &c., which brings +forward a special class of speakers, is in its place only if the +highest Self is accepted (as one of the two beings spoken of). It +is therefore evident that the passage under discussion refers to +the individual soul and the highest Self.</p> +<p>The same reasoning applies to the passage (Mu. Up. III, 1, 1), +'Two birds, inseparable friends,' &c. There also the Self is +the general topic, and hence no two ordinary birds can be meant; we +therefore conclude from the characteristic mark of eating, +mentioned in the passage, 'One of them eats the sweet fruit,' that +the individual soul is meant, and from <span class= +"pagenum"><a name="page122" id="page122"></a>{122}</span> the +characteristic marks of abstinence from eating and of intelligence, +implied in the words, 'The other looks on without eating,' that the +highest Self is meant. In a subsequent mantra again the two are +distinguished as the seer and the object of sight. 'Merged into the +same tree (as it were into water) man grieves at his own impotence +(anî<i>s</i>â), bewildered; but when he sees the other +Lord (î<i>s</i>a.) contented and knows his glory, then his +grief passes away.'</p> +<p>Another (commentator) gives a different interpretation of the +mantra, 'Two birds inseparable,' &c. To that mantra, he says, +the final decision of the present head of discussion does not +apply, because it is differently interpreted in the Pai@ngi-rahasya +brâhma<i>n</i>a. According to the latter the being which eats +the sweet fruit is the sattva; the other being which looks on +without eating, the individual soul (j<i>ñ</i>a); so that +the two are the sattva and the individual soul +(kshetraj<i>ñ</i>a). The objection that the word sattva +might denote the individual soul, and the word +kshetraj<i>ñ</i>a, the highest Self, is to be met by the +remark that, in the first place, the words sattva and +kshetraj<i>ñ</i>a have the settled meaning of internal organ +and individual soul, and are in the second place, expressly so +interpreted there, (viz. in the Pai@ngi-rahasya,) 'The sattva is +that by means of which man sees dreams; the embodied one, the seer, +is the kshetraj<i>ñ</i>a; the two are therefore the internal +organ and the individual soul.' Nor does the mantra under +discussion fall under the pûrvapaksha propounded above. For +it does not aim at setting forth the embodied individual soul, in +so far as it is characterised by the attributes connected with the +transmigratory state, such as acting and enjoying; but in so far +rather as it transcends all attributes connected with the +sa<i>m</i>sâra and is of the nature of Brahman, i.e. is pure +intelligence; as is evident from the clause, 'The other looks on +without eating.' That agrees, moreover, with <i>s</i>ruti and +sm<i>ri</i>ti passages, such as, 'That art thou,' and 'Know me also +to be the individual soul' (Bha. Gîtâ XIII, 2). Only on +such an explanation of the passage as the preceding one there is +room for the declaration made in the concluding passage of the +section, 'These two are the sattva and the +kshetraj<i>ñ</i>a; to him indeed <span class= +"pagenum"><a name="page123" id="page123"></a>{123}</span> who knows +this no impurity attaches<a id="footnotetag142" name= +"footnotetag142"></a><a href= +"#footnote142"><sup>142</sup></a>.'—But how can, on the above +interpretation, the non-intelligent sattva (i.e. the internal +organ) be spoken of as an enjoyer, as is actually done in the +clause, 'One of them eats the sweet fruit?'—The whole +passage, we reply, does not aim at setting forth the fact that the +sattva is an enjoyer, but rather the fact that the intelligent +individual soul is not an enjoyer, but is of the nature of Brahman. +To that end<a id="footnotetag143" name= +"footnotetag143"></a><a href="#footnote143"><sup>143</sup></a> the +passage under discussion metaphorically ascribes the attribute of +being an enjoyer to the internal organ, in so far as it is modified +by pleasure, pain, and the like. For all acting and enjoying is at +the bottom based on the non-discrimination (by the soul) of the +respective nature of internal organ and soul: while in reality +neither the internal organ nor the soul either act or enjoy; not +the former, because it is non-intelligent; not the latter, because +it is not capable of any modification. And the internal organ can +be considered as acting and enjoying, all the less as it is a mere +presentment of Nescience. In agreement with what we have here +maintained, Scripture ('For where there is as it were duality there +one sees the other,' &c.; B<i>ri</i>. Up. IV, 5, 15) declares +that the practical assumption of agents, and so on—comparable +to the assumption of the existence of elephants, and the like, seen +in a dream—holds good in the sphere of Nescience only; while +the passage, 'But when the Self only is all this, how should he see +another?' declares that all that practically postulated existence +vanishes for him who has arrived at discriminative knowledge.</p> +<p>13. The person within (the eye) (is Brahman) on account of the +agreement (of the attributes of that person with the nature of +Brahman).</p> +<span class="pagenum"><a name="page124" id= +"page124"></a>{124}</span> +<p>Scripture says, 'He spoke: The person that is seen in the eye +that is the Self. This is the immortal, the fearless, this is +Brahman. Even though they drop melted butter or water on it (the +eye) it runs away on both sides,' &c. (Ch. Up. IV, 15, 1).</p> +<p>The doubt here arises whether this passage refers to the +reflected Self which resides in the eye, or to the individual Self, +or to the Self of some deity which presides over the sense of +sight, or to the Lord.</p> +<p>With reference to this doubt the pûrvapakshin argues as +follows: What is meant (by the person in the eye) is the reflected +Self, i.e. the image of a person (reflected in the eye of another): +for of that it is well known that it is seen, and the clause, 'The +person that is seen in the eye,' refers to it as something well +known. Or else we may appropriately take the passage as referring +to the individual Self. For the individual Self (cognitional Self, +vij<i>ñ</i>ânâtman) which perceives the colours +by means of the eye is, on that account, in proximity to the eye; +and, moreover, the word 'Self' (which occurs in the passage) +favours this interpretation. Or else the passage is to be +understood as referring to the soul animating the sun which assists +the sense of sight; compare the passage (B<i>ri</i>. Up. V, 5, 2), +'He (the person in the sun) rests with his rays in him (the person +in the right eye).' Moreover, qualities such as immortality and the +like (which are ascribed to the subject of the scriptural passage) +may somehow belong to individual deities. The Lord, on the other +hand<a id="footnotetag144" name="footnotetag144"></a><a href= +"#footnote144"><sup>144</sup></a>, cannot be meant, because a +particular locality is spoken of.</p> +<p>Against this we remark that the highest Lord only can be meant +here by the person within the eye.—Why?—'On account of +the agreement.' For the qualities mentioned in the passage accord +with the nature of the highest Lord. The quality of being the Self, +in the first place, belongs to the highest Lord in its primary +(non-figurative or non-derived) sense, as we know from such texts +as 'That <span class="pagenum"><a name="page125" id= +"page125"></a>{125}</span> is the Self,' 'That art thou.' +Immortality and fearlessness again are often ascribed to him in +Scripture. The location in the eye also is in consonance with the +nature of the highest Lord. For just as the highest Lord whom +Scripture declares to be free from all evil is not stained by any +imperfections, so the station of the eye also is declared to be +free from all stain, as we see from the passage, 'Even though they +drop melted butter or water on it it runs away on both sides.' The +statement, moreover, that he possesses the qualities of +sa<i>m</i>yadvâma, &c. can be reconciled with the highest +Lord only (Ch. Up. IV, 15, 2, 'They call him +Sa<i>m</i>yadvâma, for all blessings (vâma) go towards +him (sa<i>m</i>yanti). He is also vâmanî, for he leads +(nayati) all blessings (vâma). He is also +Bhâmanî, for he shines (bhâti) in all worlds'). +Therefore, on account of agreement, the person within the eye is +the highest Lord.</p> +<p>14. And on account of the statement of place, and so on.</p> +<p>But how does the confined locality of the eye agree with Brahman +which is omnipresent like the ether?—To this question we +reply that there would indeed be a want of agreement if that one +locality only were assigned to the Lord. For other localities also, +viz. the earth and so on, are attributed to him in the passage, 'He +who dwells in the earth,' &c. (B<i>ri</i>. Up. III, 7, 3). And +among those the eye also is mentioned, viz. in the clause, 'He who +dwells in the eye,' &c. The phrase 'and so on,' which forms +part of the Sûtra, intimates that not only locality is +assigned to Brahman, although not (really) appropriate to it, but +that also such things as name and form, although not appropriate to +Brahman which is devoid of name and form, are yet seen to be +attributed to it. That, in such passages as 'His name is ut, he +with the golden beard' (Ch. Up. I, 6, 7, 6), Brahman although +devoid of qualities is spoken of, for the purposes of devotion, as +possessing qualities depending on name and form, we have already +shown. And we have, moreover, shown that to attribute to Brahman +<span class="pagenum"><a name="page126" id= +"page126"></a>{126}</span> a definite locality, in spite of his +omnipresence, subserves the purposes of contemplation, and is +therefore not contrary to reason<a id="footnotetag145" name= +"footnotetag145"></a><a href="#footnote145"><sup>145</sup></a>; no +more than to contemplate Vish<i>n</i>u in the sacred +<i>s</i>âlagrâm.</p> +<p>15. And on account of the passage referring to that which is +distinguished by pleasure (i.e. Brahman).</p> +<p>There is, moreover, really no room for dispute whether Brahman +be meant in the passage under discussion or not, because the fact +of Brahman being meant is established 'by the reference to that +which is distinguished by pleasure.' For the same Brahman which is +spoken of as characterised by pleasure in the beginning of the +chapter<a id="footnotetag146" name="footnotetag146"></a><a href= +"#footnote146"><sup>146</sup></a>, viz. in the clauses, 'Breath is +Brahman, Ka is Brahman, Kha is Brahman,' that same Brahman we must +suppose to be referred to in the present passage also, it being +proper to adhere to the subject-matter under discussion; the +clause, 'The teacher will tell you the way<a id="footnotetag147" +name="footnotetag147"></a><a href= +"#footnote147"><sup>147</sup></a>,' merely announcing that the way +will be proclaimed [by the teacher; not that a new subject will be +started].—How then, it may be asked, is it known that +Brahman, as distinguished by pleasure, is spoken of in the +beginning of the passage?—We reply: On hearing the speech of +the fires, viz. 'Breath is Brahman, Ka is Brahman, Kha is Brahman,' +Upako<i>s</i>ala says, 'I understand that breath is Brahman, but I +do not understand that Ka or Kha is Brahman.' Thereupon the fires +reply, 'What is Ka is Kha, what is Kha is Ka.' Now the word Kha +denotes in ordinary language the elemental ether. If therefore the +word Ka which means pleasure were not applied to qualify the sense +of 'Kha,' we should conclude <span class="pagenum"><a name= +"page127" id="page127"></a>{127}</span> that the name Brahman is +here symbolically<a id="footnotetag148" name= +"footnotetag148"></a><a href="#footnote148"><sup>148</sup></a> +given to the mere elemental ether as it is (in other places) given +to mere names and the like. Thus also with regard to the word Ka, +which, in ordinary language, denotes the imperfect pleasure +springing from the contact of the sense-organs with their objects. +If the word Kha were not applied to qualify the sense of Ka we +should conclude that ordinary pleasure is here called Brahman. But +as the two words Ka and Kha (occur together and therefore) qualify +each other, they intimate Brahman whose Self is pleasure. If<a id= +"footnotetag149" name="footnotetag149"></a><a href= +"#footnote149"><sup>149</sup></a> in the passage referred to (viz. +'Breath is Brahman, Ka is Brahman, Kha is Brahman') the second +Brahman (i.e. the word Brahman in the clause 'Ka is Brahman') were +not added, and if the sentence would run 'Ka, Kha is Brahman,' the +word Ka would be employed as a mere qualifying word, and thus +pleasure as being a mere quality would not be represented as a +subject of meditation. To prevent this, both words—Ka as well +as Kha—are joined with the word Brahman ('Ka (is) Brahman, +Kha (is) Brahman'). For the passage wishes to intimate that +pleasure also, although a quality, should be meditated upon as +something in which qualities inhere. It thus appears that at the +beginning of the chapter Brahman, as characterised by pleasure, is +spoken of. After that the Gârhapatya and the other sacred +fires proclaim in turns their own glory, and finally conclude with +the words, 'This is our knowledge, O friend, and the knowledge of +the Self;' wherein they point back to the Brahman spoken of before. +The words, 'The teacher will tell you the way' (which form the last +clause of the concluding passage), merely promise an explanation of +the way, and thus preclude the idea of another topic being started. +The teacher thereupon saying, 'As water does not cling to a lotus +leaf, so no evil deed clings to one who knows it' (which words +intervene between the concluding <span class="pagenum"><a name= +"page128" id="page128"></a>{128}</span> speech of the fires and the +information given by the teacher about the person within the eye) +declares that no evil attacks him who knows the person within the +eye, and thereby shows the latter to be Brahman. It thus appears +that the teacher's intention is to speak about that Brahman which +had formed the topic of the instruction of the fires; to represent +it at first as located in the eye and possessing the qualities of +Sa<i>m</i>yadvâma and the like, and to point out afterwards +that he who thus knows passes on to light and so on. He therefore +begins by saying, 'That person that is seen in the eye that is the +Self.'</p> +<p>16. And on account of the statement of the way of him who has +heard the Upanishads.</p> +<p>The person placed in the eye is the highest lord for the +following reason also. From <i>s</i>ruti as well as sm<i>ri</i>ti +we are acquainted with the way of him who has heard the Upanishads +or the secret knowledge, i.e. who knows Brahman. That way, called +the path of the gods, is described (Pra. Up. I, 10), 'Those who +have sought the Self by penance, abstinence, faith, and knowledge +gain by the northern path the sun. This is the home of the spirits, +the immortal, free from fear, the highest. From thence they do not +return;' and also (Bha. Gîtâ VIII, 24), 'Fire, light, +the bright fortnight, the six months of the northern progress of +the sun, on that way those who know Brahman go, when they have +died, to Brahman.' Now that very same way is seen to be stated, in +our text, for him who knows the person within the eye. For we read +(Ch. Up. IV, 15, 5), 'Now whether people perform obsequies for him +or no he goes to light;' and later on, 'From the sun (he goes) to +the moon, from the moon to lightning. There is a person not human, +he leads them to Brahman. This is the path of the gods, the path +that leads to Brahman. Those who proceed on that path do not return +to the life of man.' From this description of the way which is +known to be the way of him who knows Brahman we ascertain that the +person within the eye is Brahman.</p> +<span class="pagenum"><a name="page129" id= +"page129"></a>{129}</span> +<p>17. (The person within the eye is the highest), not any other +Self; on account of the non-permanency (of the other Selfs) and on +account of the impossibility (of the qualities of the person in the +eye being ascribed to the other Selfs).</p> +<p>To the assertion made in the pûrvapaksha that the person +in the eye is either the reflected Self or the cognitional Self +(the individual soul) or the Self of some deity the following +answer is given.—No other Self such as, for instance, the +reflected Self can be assumed here, on account of +non-permanency.—The reflected Self, in the first place, does +not permanently abide in the eye. For when some person approaches +the eye the reflection of that person is seen in the eye, but when +the person moves away the reflection is seen no longer. The passage +'That person within the eye' must, moreover, be held, on the ground +of proximity, to intimate that the person seen in a man's own eye +is the object of (that man's) devout meditation (and not the +reflected image of his own person which he may see in the eye of +another man). [Let, then, another man approach the devout man, and +let the latter meditate on the image reflected in his own eye, but +seen by the other man only. No, we reply, for] we have no right to +make the (complicated) assumption that the devout man is, at the +time of devotion, to bring close to his eye another man in order to +produce a reflected image in his own eye. Scripture, moreover, +(viz. Ch. Up. VIII, 9, 1, 'It (the reflected Self) perishes as soon +as the body perishes,') declares the non-permanency of the +reflected Self.—And, further, 'on account of impossibility' +(the person in the eye cannot be the reflected Self). For +immortality and the other qualities ascribed to the person in the +eye are not to be perceived in the reflected Self.—Of the +cognitional Self, in the second place, which is in general +connexion with the whole body and all the senses, it can likewise +not be said that it has its permanent station in the eye only. +That, on the other hand, Brahman although all-pervading may, for +the purpose of contemplation, be <span class="pagenum"><a name= +"page130" id="page130"></a>{130}</span> spoken of as connected with +particular places such as the heart and the like, we have seen +already. The cognitional Self shares (with the reflected Self) the +impossibility of having the qualities of immortality and so on +attributed to it. Although the cognitional Self is in reality not +different from the highest Self, still there are fictitiously +ascribed to it (adhyâropita) the effects of nescience, desire +and works, viz, mortality and fear; so that neither immortality nor +fearlessness belongs to it. The qualities of being the +sa<i>m</i>yadvâma, &c. also cannot properly be ascribed +to the cognitional Self, which is not distinguished by lordly power +(ai<i>s</i>varya).—In the third place, although the Self of a +deity (viz. the sun) has its station in the eye—according to +the scriptural passage, 'He rests with his rays in him'—still +Selfhood cannot be ascribed to the sun, on account of his +externality (parâgrûpatva). Immortality, &c. also +cannot be predicated of him, as Scripture speaks of his origin and +his dissolution. For the (so-called) deathlessness of the gods only +means their (comparatively) long existence. And their lordly power +also is based on the highest Lord and does not naturally belong to +them; as the mantra declares, 'From terror of it (Brahman) the wind +blows, from terror the sun rises; from terror of it Agni and Indra, +yea, Death runs as the fifth.'—Hence the person in the eye +must be viewed as the highest Lord only. In the case of this +explanation being adopted the mention (of the person in the eye) as +something well known and established, which is contained in the +words 'is seen' (in the phrase 'the person that is seen in the +eye'), has to be taken as referring to (the mental perception +founded on) the <i>s</i>âstra which belongs to those who +know; and the glorification (of devout meditation) has to be +understood as its purpose.</p> +<p>18. The internal ruler over the devas and so on (is Brahman), +because the attributes of that (Brahman) are designated.</p> +<p>In B<i>ri</i>. Up. III, 7, 1 ff. we read, 'He who within rules +this world and the other world and all beings,' and later on, 'He +who dwells in the earth and within the earth, whom <span class= +"pagenum"><a name="page131" id="page131"></a>{131}</span> the earth +does not know, whose body the earth is, who rules the earth within, +he is thy Self, the ruler within, the immortal,' &c. The entire +chapter (to sum up its contents) speaks of a being, called the +antaryâmin (the internal ruler), who, dwelling within, rules +with reference to the gods, the world, the Veda, the sacrifice, the +beings, the Self.—Here now, owing to the unusualness of the +term (antaryâmin), there arises a doubt whether it denotes +the Self of some deity which presides over the gods and so on, or +some Yogin who has acquired extraordinary powers, such as, for +instance, the capability of making his body subtle, or the highest +Self, or some other being. What alternative then does recommend +itself?</p> +<p>As the term is an unknown one, the pûrvapakshin says, we +must assume that the being denoted by it is also an unknown one, +different from all those mentioned above.—Or else it may be +said that, on the one hand, we have no right to assume something of +an altogether indefinite character, and that, on the other hand, +the term antaryâmin—which is derived from antaryamana +(ruling within)—cannot be called altogether unknown, that +therefore antaryâmin may be assumed to denote some god +presiding over the earth, and so on. Similarly, we read +(B<i>ri</i>. Up. III, 9, 16), 'He whose dwelling is the earth, +whose sight is fire, whose mind is light,' &c. A god of that +kind is capable of ruling the earth, and so on, dwelling within +them, because he is endowed with the organs of action; rulership is +therefore rightly ascribed to him.—Or else the rulership +spoken of may belong to some Yogin whom his extraordinary powers +enable to enter within all things.—The highest Self, on the +other hand, cannot be meant, as it does not possess the organs of +action (which are required for ruling).</p> +<p>To this we make the following reply.—The internal ruler, +of whom Scripture speaks with reference to the gods, must be the +highest Self, cannot be anything else.—Why so?—Because +its qualities are designated in the passage under discussion. The +universal rulership implied in the statement that, dwelling within, +it rules the entire aggregate of created beings, inclusive of the +gods, and so on, is an appropriate <span class="pagenum"><a name= +"page132" id="page132"></a>{132}</span> attribute of the highest +Self, since omnipotence depends on (the omnipotent ruler) being the +cause of all created things.—The qualities of Selfhood and +immortality also, which are mentioned in the passage, 'He is thy +Self, the ruler within, the immortal,' belong in their primary +sense to the highest Self.—Further, the passage, 'He whom the +earth does not know,' which declares that the internal ruler is not +known by the earth-deity, shows him to be different from that +deity; for the deity of the earth knows itself to be the +earth.—The attributes 'unseen,' 'unheard,' also point to the +highest Self, which is devoid of shape and other sensible +qualities.—The objection that the highest Self is destitute +of the organs of action, and hence cannot be a ruler, is without +force, because organs of action may be ascribed to him owing to the +organs of action of those whom he rules.—If it should be +objected that [if we once admit an internal ruler in addition to +the individual soul] we are driven to assume again another and +another ruler ad infinitum; we reply that this is not the case, as +actually there is no other ruler (but the highest Self<a id= +"footnotetag150" name="footnotetag150"></a><a href= +"#footnote150"><sup>150</sup></a>). The objection would be valid +only in the case of a difference of rulers actually +existing.—For all these reasons, the internal ruler is no +other but the highest Self.</p> +<p>19. And (the internal ruler is) not that which the Sm<i>ri</i>ti +assumes, (viz. the pradhâna,) on account of the statement of +qualities not belonging to it.</p> +<p>Good so far, a Sâ@nkhya opponent resumes. The attributes, +however, of not being seen, &c., belong also to the +pradhâna assumed by the Sâ@nkhya-sm<i>ri</i>ti, which +is acknowledged to be devoid of form and other sensible qualities. +For their <span class="pagenum"><a name="page133" id= +"page133"></a>{133}</span> Sm<i>ri</i>ti says, 'Undiscoverable, +unknowable, as if wholly in sleep' (Manu I, 5). To this +pradhâna also the attribute of rulership belongs, as it is +the cause of all effects. Therefore the internal ruler may be +understood to denote the pradhâna. The pradhâna has, +indeed, been set aside already by the Sûtra I, 1, 5, but we +bring it forward again, because we find that attributes belonging +to it, such as not being seen and the like, are mentioned in +Scripture.</p> +<p>To this argumentation the Sûtrakâra replies that the +word 'internal ruler' cannot denote the pradhâna, because +qualities not belonging to the latter are stated. For, although the +pradhâna may be spoken of as not being seen, &c, it +cannot be spoken of as seeing, since the Sâ@nkhyas admit it +to be non-intelligent. But the scriptural passage which forms the +complement to the passage about the internal ruler (B<i>ri</i>. Up. +III, 7, 23) says expressly, 'Unseen but seeing, unheard but +hearing, unperceived but perceiving, unknown but +knowing.'—And Selfhood also cannot belong to the +pradhâna.</p> +<p>Well, then, if the term 'internal ruler' cannot be admitted to +denote the pradhâna, because the latter is neither a Self nor +seeing; let us suppose it to denote the embodied (individual) soul, +which is intelligent, and therefore hears, sees, perceives, knows; +which is internal (pratya<i>ñk</i>), and therefore of the +nature of Self; and which is immortal, because it is able to enjoy +the fruits of its good and evil actions. It is, moreover, a settled +matter that the attributes of not being seen, &c., belong to +the embodied soul, because the agent of an action, such as seeing, +cannot at the same time be the object of the action. This is +declared in scriptural passages also, as, for instance (B<i>ri</i>. +Up. III, 4, 2), 'Thou couldst not see the seer of sight.' The +individual soul is, moreover, capable of inwardly ruling the +complex of the organs of action, as it is the enjoyer. Therefore +the internal ruler is the embodied soul.—To this reasoning +the following Sûtra replies.</p> +<p>20. And the embodied soul (also cannot be understood by the +internal ruler), for both also (i.e. both <span class= +"pagenum"><a name="page134" id="page134"></a>{134}</span> +recensions of the B<i>ri</i>had Âra<i>n</i>yaka) speak of it +as different (from the internal ruler).</p> +<p>The word 'not' (in the Sûtra) has to be supplied from the +preceding Sûtra. Although the attributes of seeing, &c., +belong to the individual soul, still as the soul is limited by its +adjuncts, as the ether is by a jar, it is not capable of dwelling +completely within the earth and the other beings mentioned, and to +rule them. Moreover, the followers of both +<i>s</i>âkhâs, i.e. the Kâ<i>n</i>vas as well as +the Mâdhyandinas, speak in their texts of the individual soul +as different from the internal ruler, viz. as constituting, like +the earth, and so on, his abode and the object of his rule. The +Kâ<i>n</i>vas read (B<i>ri</i>. Up. III, 7, 22), 'He who +dwells in knowledge;' the Mâdhyandinas, 'He who dwells in the +Self.' If the latter reading is adopted, the word 'Self' denotes +the individual soul; if the former, the individual soul is denoted +by the word 'knowledge;' for the individual soul consists of +knowledge. It is therefore a settled matter that some being +different from the individual soul, viz. the lord, is denoted by +the term 'internal ruler.'—But how, it may be asked, is it +possible that there should be within one body two seers, viz. the +lord who rules internally and the individual soul different from +him?—Why—we ask in return—should that be +impossible?—Because, the opponent replies, it is contrary to +scriptural passages, such as, 'There is no other seer but he,' +&c., which deny that there is any seeing, hearing, perceiving, +knowing Self, but the internal ruler under discussion.—May, +we rejoin, that passage not have the purpose of denying the +existence of another ruler?—No, the opponent replies, for +there is no occasion for another ruler (and therefore no occasion +for denying his existence), and the text does not contain any +specification, (but merely denies the existence of any other seer +in general.)</p> +<p>We therefore advance the following final refutation of the +opponent's objection.—The declaration of the difference of +the embodied Self and the internal ruler has its reason in the +limiting adjunct, consisting of the organs of action, presented by +Nescience, and is not absolutely true. For the <span class= +"pagenum"><a name="page135" id="page135"></a>{135}</span> Self +within is one only; two internal Selfs are not possible. But owing +to its limiting adjunct the one Self is practically treated as if +it were two; just as we make a distinction between the ether of the +jar and the universal ether. Hence there is room for those +scriptural passages which set forth the distinction of knower and +object of knowledge, for perception and the other means of proof, +for the intuitive knowledge of the apparent world, and for that +part of Scripture which contains injunctions and prohibitions. In +accordance with this, the scriptural passage, 'Where there is +duality, as it were, there one sees another,' declares that the +whole practical world exists only in the sphere of Nescience; while +the subsequent passage, 'But when the Self only is all this, how +should he see another?' declares that the practical world vanishes +in the sphere of true knowledge.</p> +<p>21. That which possesses the attributes of invisibility and so +on (is Brahman), on account of the declaration of attributes.</p> +<p>Scripture says, 'The higher knowledge is this by which the +Indestructible is apprehended. That which cannot be seen nor +seized, which is without origin and qualities, without eyes and +ears, without hands and feet, the eternal, all-pervading, +omnipresent, infinitesimal, that which is imperishable, that it is +which the wise regard as the source of all beings' (Mu. Up. I, 1, +5; 6).—Here the doubt arises whether the source of all beings +which is spoken of as characterised by invisibility, &c. be the +prâdhana or the embodied soul, or the highest Lord.</p> +<p>We must, the pûrvapakshin says, understand by the source +of all beings the non-intelligent prâdhana because (in the +passage immediately subsequent to the one quoted) only +non-intelligent beings are mentioned as parallel instances. 'As the +spider sends forth and draws in its thread, as plants grow on the +earth, as from the living man hairs spring forth on the head and +the body, thus everything arises here from the +Indestructible.'—But, it <span class="pagenum"><a name= +"page136" id="page136"></a>{136}</span> may be objected, men and +spiders which are here quoted as parallel instances are of +intelligent nature.—No, the pûrvapakshin replies; for +the intelligent being as such is not the source of the threads and +the hair, but everybody knows that the non-intelligent body of the +spider ruled by intelligence is the source of the threads; and so +in the case of man also.—While, moreover, in the case of the +preceding Sûtra, the pradhâna hypothesis could not be +accepted, because, although some qualities mentioned, such as +invisibility and so on, agreed with it, others such as being the +seer and the like did not; we have here to do only with attributes +such as invisibility which agree with the pradhâna, no +attribute of a contrary nature being mentioned.—But the +qualities mentioned in the complementary passage (Mu. Up. I, 1, 9), +'He who knows all and perceives all,' do not agree with the +non-intelligent pradhâna; how, then, can the source of all +beings be interpreted to mean the pradhâna?—To this the +pûrvapakshin replies: The passage, 'The higher knowledge is +that by which the Indestructible is apprehended, that which cannot +be seen,' &c., points, by means of the term 'the +Indestructible,' to the source of all beings characterised by +invisibility and similar attributes. This same 'Indestructible' is +again mentioned later on in the passage, 'It is higher than the +high Imperishable.' Now that which in this latter passage is spoken +of as higher than the Imperishable may possess the qualities of +knowing and perceiving everything, while the pradhâna denoted +by the term 'the Imperishable' is the source of all +beings.—If, however, the word 'source' (yoni) be taken in the +sense of operative cause, we may by 'the source of the beings' +understand the embodied Self also, which, by means of merit and +demerit, is the cause of the origin of the complex of things.</p> +<p>To this we make the following reply.—That which here is +spoken of as the source of all beings, distinguished by such +qualities as invisibility and so on, can be the highest Lord only, +nothing else.—Whereupon is this conclusion founded?—On +the statement of attributes. For the clause, 'He who is +all-knowing, all-perceiving,' clearly states an <span class= +"pagenum"><a name="page137" id="page137"></a>{137}</span> attribute +belonging to the highest Lord only, since the attributes of knowing +all and perceiving all cannot be predicated either of the +non-intelligent pradhâna or the embodied soul whose power of +sight is narrowed by its limiting conditions. To the objection that +the qualities of knowing and perceiving all are, in the passage +under discussion, attributed to that which is higher than the +source of all beings—which latter is denoted by the term 'the +Imperishable'—not to the source itself, we reply that this +explanation is inadmissible because the source of all beings, +which—in the clause, 'From the Indestructible everything here +arises'—is designated as the material cause of all created +beings, is later on spoken of as all-knowing, and again as the +cause of all created beings, viz. in the passage (I, 1, 9), 'From +him who knows all and perceives all, whose brooding consists of +knowledge, from him is born that Brahman, name, form, and food.' As +therefore the Indestructible which forms the general topic of +discussion is, owing to the identity of designation, recognised (as +being referred to in the later passage also), we understand that it +is the same Indestructible to which the attributes of knowing and +perceiving all are ascribed.—We further maintain that also +the passage, 'Higher than the high Imperishable,' does not refer to +any being different from the imperishable source of all beings +which is the general topic of discussion. We conclude this from the +circumstance that the passage, 'He truly told that knowledge of +Brahman through which he knows the imperishable true person,' (I, +2, 13; which passage leads on to the passage about that which is +higher than the Imperishable,) merely declares that the +imperishable source of all beings, distinguished by invisibility +and the like—which formed the subject of the preceding +chapter—will be discussed. The reason why that imperishable +source is called higher than the high Imperishable, we shall +explain under the next Sûtra.—Moreover, two kinds of +knowledge are enjoined there (in the Upanishad), a lower and a +higher one. Of the lower one it is said that it comprises the +<i>Ri</i>g-veda and so on, and then the text continues, 'The higher +knowledge <span class="pagenum"><a name="page138" id= +"page138"></a>{138}</span> is that by which the Indestructible is +apprehended.' Here the Indestructible is declared to be the subject +of the higher knowledge. If we now were to assume that the +Indestructible distinguished by invisibility and like qualities is +something different from the highest Lord, the knowledge referring +to it would not be the higher one. For the distinction of lower and +higher knowledge is made on account of the diversity of their +results, the former leading to mere worldly exaltation, the latter +to absolute bliss; and nobody would assume absolute bliss to result +from the knowledge of the pradhâna.—Moreover, as on the +view we are controverting the highest Self would be assumed to be +something higher than the imperishable source of all beings, three +kinds of knowledge would have to be acknowledged, while the text +expressly speaks of two kinds only.—Further, the reference to +the knowledge of everything being implied in the knowledge of one +thing—which is contained in the passage (I, 1, 3), 'Sir, what +is that through which if it is known everything else becomes +known?'—is possible only if the allusion is to Brahman the +Self of all, and not either to the pradhâna which comprises +only what is non-intelligent or to the enjoyer viewed apart from +the objects of enjoyment.—The text, moreover, by introducing +the knowledge of Brahman as the chief subject—which it does +in the passage (I, 1, 1), 'He told the knowledge of Brahman, the +foundation of all knowledge, to his eldest son Atharvan'—and +by afterwards declaring that out of the two kinds of knowledge, +viz. the lower one and the higher one, the higher one leads to the +comprehension of the Imperishable, shows that the knowledge of the +Imperishable is the knowledge of Brahman. On the other hand, the +term 'knowledge of Brahman' would become meaningless if that +Imperishable which is to be comprehended by means of it were not +Brahman. The lower knowledge of works which comprises the +<i>Ri</i>g-veda, and so on, is mentioned preliminarily to the +knowledge of Brahman for the mere purpose of glorifying the latter; +as appears from the passages in which it (the lower knowledge) is +spoken of slightingly, such as (I, 2, 7), 'But frail <span class= +"pagenum"><a name="page139" id="page139"></a>{139}</span> indeed +are those boats, the sacrifices, the eighteen in which this lower +ceremonial has been told. Fools who praise this as the highest good +are subject again and again to old age and death.' After these +slighting remarks the text declares that he who turns away from the +lower knowledge is prepared for the highest one (I, 2, 12), 'Let a +Bráhama<i>n</i>a after he has examined all these worlds +which are gained by works acquire freedom from all desires. Nothing +that is eternal (not made) can be gained by what is not eternal +(made). Let him in order to understand this take fuel in his hand +and approach a guru who is learned and dwells entirely in +Brahman.'—The remark that, because the earth and other +non-intelligent things are adduced as parallel instances, that also +which is compared to them, viz. the source of all beings must be +non-intelligent, is without foundation, since it is not necessary +that two things of which one is compared to the other should be of +absolutely the same nature. The things, moreover, to which the +source of all beings is compared, viz. the earth and the like, are +material, while nobody would assume the source of all beings to be +material.—For all these reasons the source of all beings, +which possesses the attributes of invisibility and so on, is the +highest Lord.</p> +<p>22. The two others (i.e. the individual soul and the +pradhâna) are not (the source of all beings) because there +are stated distinctive attributes and difference.</p> +<p>The source of all beings is the highest Lord, not either of the +two others, viz. the pradhâna and the individual soul, on +account of the following reason also. In the first place, the text +distinguishes the source of all beings from the embodied soul, as +something of a different nature; compare the passage (II, 1, 2), +'That heavenly person is without body, he is both without and +within, not produced, without breath and without mind, pure.' The +distinctive attributes mentioned here, such as being of a heavenly +nature, and so on, can in no way belong to the individual soul, +<span class="pagenum"><a name="page140" id= +"page140"></a>{140}</span> which erroneously considers itself to be +limited by name and form as presented by Nescience, and erroneously +imputes their attributes to itself. Therefore the passage +manifestly refers to the Person which is the subject of all the +Upanishads.—In the second place, the source of all beings +which forms the general topic is represented in the text as +something different from the pradhâna, viz. in the passage, +'Higher than the high Imperishable.' Here the term 'Imperishable' +means that undeveloped entity which represents the seminal +potentiality of names and forms, contains the fine parts of the +material elements, abides in the Lord, forms his limiting adjunct, +and being itself no effect is high in comparison to all effects; +the whole phrase, 'Higher than the high Imperishable,' which +expresses a difference then clearly shows that the highest Self is +meant here.—We do not on that account assume an independent +entity called pradhâna and say that the source of all beings +is stated separately therefrom; but if a pradhâna is to be +assumed at all (in agreement with the common opinion) and if being +assumed it is assumed of such a nature as not to be opposed to the +statements of Scripture, viz. as the subtle cause of all beings +denoted by the terms 'the Undeveloped' and so on, we have no +objection to such an assumption, and declare that, on account of +the separate statement therefrom, i.e. from that pradhâna, +'the source of all beings' must mean the highest Lord.—A +further argument in favour of the same conclusion is supplied by +the next Sûtra.</p> +<p>23. And on account of its form being mentioned.</p> +<p>Subsequently to the passage, 'Higher than the high +Imperishable,' we meet (in the passage, 'From him is born breath,' +&c.) with a description of the creation of all things, from +breath down to earth, and then with a statement of the form of this +same source of beings as consisting of all created beings, 'Fire is +his head, his eyes the sun and the moon, the quarters his ears, his +speech the Vedas disclosed, the wind his breath, his heart the +universe; from his feet came the earth; he is indeed the inner Self +of all things.' This statement of form can refer only to the +<span class="pagenum"><a name="page141" id= +"page141"></a>{141}</span> highest Lord, and not either to the +embodied soul, which, on account of its small power, cannot be the +cause of all effects, or to the pradhâna, which cannot be the +inner Self of all beings. We therefore conclude that the source of +all beings is the highest Lord, not either of the other +two.—But wherefrom do you conclude that the quoted +declaration of form refers to the source of all beings?—From +the general topic, we reply. The word 'he' (in the clause, 'He is +indeed the inner Self of all things') connects the passage with the +general topic. As the source of all beings constitutes the general +topic, the whole passage, from 'From him is born breath,' up to, +'He is the inner Self of all beings,' refers to that same source. +Similarly, when in ordinary conversation a certain teacher forms +the general topic of the talk, the phrase, 'Study under him; he +knows the Veda and the Vedâ@ngas thoroughly,' as a matter of +course, refers to that same teacher.—But how can a bodily +form be ascribed to the source of all beings which is characterised +by invisibility and similar attributes?—The statement as to +its nature, we reply, is made for the purpose of showing that the +source of all beings is the Self of all beings, not of showing that +it is of a bodily nature. The case is analogous to such passages +as, 'I am food, I am food, I am the eater of food' (Taitt. Up. III, +10, 6).—Others, however, are of opinion<a id="footnotetag151" +name="footnotetag151"></a><a href="#footnote151"><sup>151</sup></a> +that the statement quoted does not refer to the source of all +beings, because that to which it refers is spoken of as something +produced. For, on the one hand, the immediately preceding passage +('From him is born health, mind, and all organs of sense, ether, +air, light, water, and the earth, the support of all') speaks of +the aggregate of beings from air down to earth as something +produced, and, on the other <span class="pagenum"><a name="page142" +id="page142"></a>{142}</span> hand, a passage met with later on +('From him comes Agni, the sun being his fuel,' up to 'All herbs +and juices') expresses itself to the same purpose. How then should +all at once, in the midst of these two passages (which refer to the +creation), a statement be made about the nature of the source of +all beings?—The attribute of being the Self of all beings, +(which above was said to be mentioned in the passage about the +creation, 'Fire is his head,' &c., is not mentioned there but) +is stated only later on in a passage subsequent to that which +refers to the creation, viz. 'The Person is all this, sacrifice,' +&c. (II, 1, 10).—Now, we see that <i>s</i>ruti as well as +sm<i>ri</i>ti speaks of the birth of Prajâpati, whose body is +this threefold world; compare <i>Ri</i>g-veda Sa<i>m</i>h. X, 121, +1, 'Hira<i>n</i>ya-garbha arose in the beginning; he was the one +born Lord of things existing. He established the earth and this +sky; to what God shall we offer our oblation?' where the expression +'arose' means 'he was born.' And in sm<i>ri</i>ti we read, 'He is +the first embodied one, he is called the Person; as the primal +creator of the beings Brahman was evolved in the beginning.' This +Person which is (not the original Brahman but) an effect (like +other created beings) may be called the internal Self of all beings +(as it is called in II, 1, 4), because in the form of the Self of +breath it abides in the Selfs of all beings.—On this latter +explanation (according to which the passage, 'Fire is his head,' +&c., does not describe the nature of the highest Lord, and can +therefore not be referred to in the Sûtra) the declaration as +to the Lord being the 'nature' of all which is contained in the +passage, 'The Person is all this, sacrifice,' &c., must be +taken as the reason for establishing the highest Lord, (i.e. as the +passage which, according to the Sûtra, proves that the source +of all beings is the highest Lord<a id="footnotetag152" name= +"footnotetag152"></a><a href= +"#footnote152"><sup>152</sup></a>.)</p> +<span class="pagenum"><a name="page143" id= +"page143"></a>{143}</span> +<p>24. Vai<i>s</i>vânara (is the highest Lord) on account of +the distinction qualifying the common terms +(Vai<i>s</i>vânara and Self).</p> +<p>(In Ch. Up. V, 11 ff.) a discussion begins with the words, 'What +is our Self, what is Brahman?' and is carried on in the passage, +'You know at present that Vai<i>s</i>vânara Self, tell us +that;' after that it is declared with reference to Heaven, sun, +air, ether, water, and earth, that they are connected with the +qualities of having good light, &c., and, in order to disparage +devout meditation on them singly, that they stand to the +Vai<i>s</i>vânara in the relation of being his head, &c., +merely; and then finally (V, 18) it is said, 'But he who meditates +on the Vai<i>s</i>vânara Self as measured by a span, as +abhivimâna<a id="footnotetag153" name= +"footnotetag153"></a><a href="#footnote153"><sup>153</sup></a>, he +eats food in all worlds, in all beings, in all Selfs. Of that +Vai<i>s</i>vânara Self the head is Sutejas (having good +light), the eye Vi<i>s</i>varûpa (multiform), the breath +P<i>ri</i>thagvartman (moving in various courses), the trunk Bahula +(full), the bladder Rayi (wealth), the feet the earth, the chest +the altar, the hairs the grass on the altar, the heart the +Gârhapatya fire, the mind the Anvâhârya fire, the +mouth the Âhavanîya fire.'—Here the doubt arises +whether by the term 'Vai<i>s</i>vânara' we have to understand +the gastric fire, or the elemental fire, or the divinity presiding +over the latter, or the embodied soul, or the highest +Lord.—But what, it may be asked, gives rise to this +doubt?—The circumstance, we reply, of +'Vai<i>s</i>vânara' being employed as a common term for the +gastric fire, the elemental fire, and the divinity of the latter, +while 'Self' is a term applying to the embodied soul as well as to +the highest Lord. Hence the doubt arises which meaning of the term +is to be accepted and which to be set aside.</p> +<p>Which, then, is the alternative to be +embraced?—Vai<i>s</i>vânara, the pûrvapakshin +maintains, is the gastric fire, because we meet, in some passages, +with the term used in <span class="pagenum"><a name="page144" id= +"page144"></a>{144}</span> that special sense; so, for instance +(B<i>ri</i>. Up. V, 9), 'Agni Vai<i>s</i>vânara is the fire +within man by which the food that is eaten is cooked.'—Or +else the term may denote fire in general, as we see it used in that +sense also; so, for instance (<i>Ri</i>g-veda Sa<i>m</i>h. X, 88, +12), 'For the whole world the gods have made the Agni +Vai<i>s</i>vânara a sign of the days.' Or, in the third +place, the word may denote that divinity whose body is fire. For +passages in which the term has that sense are likewise met with; +compare, for instance, <i>Ri</i>g-veda Sa<i>m</i>h. I, 98, 1, 'May +we be in the favour of Vai<i>s</i>vânara; for he is the king +of the beings, giving pleasure, of ready grace;' this and similar +passages properly applying to a divinity endowed with power and +similar qualities. Perhaps it will be urged against the preceding +explanations, that, as the word Vai<i>s</i>vânara is used in +co-ordination with the term 'Self,' and as the term 'Self' alone is +used in the introductory passage ('What is our Self, what is +Brahman?'), Vai<i>s</i>vânara has to be understood in a +modified sense, so as to be in harmony with the term Self. Well, +then, the pûrvapakshin rejoins, let us suppose that +Vai<i>s</i>vânara is the embodied Self which, as being an +enjoyer, is in close vicinity to the Vai<i>s</i>vânara +fire,<a id="footnotetag154" name="footnotetag154"></a><a href= +"#footnote154"><sup>154</sup></a> (i.e. the fire within the body,) +and with which the qualification expressed by the term, 'Measured +by a span,' well agrees, since it is restricted by its limiting +condition (viz. the body and so on).—In any case it is +evident that the term Vai<i>s</i>vânara does not denote the +highest Lord.</p> +<p>To this we make the following reply.—The word +Vai<i>s</i>vânara denotes the highest Self, on account of the +distinction qualifying the two general terms.—Although the +term 'Self,' as well as the term 'Vai<i>s</i>vânara,' has +various meanings—the latter term denoting three beings while +the former denotes two—yet we observe a distinction from +which we conclude that both terms can here denote the highest Lord +only; viz. in the passage, 'Of that Vai<i>s</i>vânara Self +the head is Sutejas,' &c. For it is clear that that passage +refers to the highest Lord in so far as he is distinguished by +having heaven, and so on, for his head and limbs, and in so far as +<span class="pagenum"><a name="page145" id= +"page145"></a>{145}</span> he has entered into a different state +(viz. into the state of being the Self of the threefold world); +represents him, in fact, for the purpose of meditation, as the +internal Self of everything. As such the absolute Self may be +represented, because it is the cause of everything; for as the +cause virtually contains all the states belonging to its effects, +the heavenly world, and so on, may be spoken of as the members of +the highest Self.—Moreover, the result which Scripture +declares to abide in all worlds—viz. in the passage, 'He eats +food in all worlds, in all beings, in all Selfs'—is possible +only if we take the term Vai<i>s</i>vânara to denote the +highest Self.—The same remark applies to the declaration that +all the sins are burned of him who has that knowledge, 'Thus all +his sins are burned,' &c. (Ch. Up. V, 24, 3).—Moreover, +we meet at the beginning of the chapter with the words 'Self' and +'Brahman;' viz. in the passage, 'What is our Self, what is +Brahman?' Now these are marks of Brahman, and indicate the highest +Lord only. Hence he only can be meant by the term +Vai<i>s</i>vânara.</p> +<p>25. (And) because that which is stated by Sm<i>ri</i>ti (i.e. +the shape of the highest Lord as described by Sm<i>ri</i>ti) is an +inference (i.e. an indicatory mark from which we infer the meaning +of <i>S</i>ruti).</p> +<p>The highest Lord only is Vai<i>s</i>vânara, for that +reason also that Sm<i>ri</i>ti ascribes to the highest Lord only a +shape consisting of the threefold world, the fire constituting his +mouth, the heavenly world his head, &c. So, for instance, in +the following passage, 'He whose mouth is fire, whose head the +heavenly world, whose navel the ether, whose feet the earth, whose +eye the sun, whose ears the regions, reverence to him the Self of +the world.' The shape described here in Sm<i>ri</i>ti allows us to +infer a <i>S</i>ruti passage on which the Sm<i>ri</i>ti rests, and +thus constitutes an inference, i.e. a sign indicatory of the word +'Vai<i>s</i>vânara' denoting the highest Lord. For, although +the quoted Sm<i>ri</i>ti passage contains a glorification<a id= +"footnotetag155" name="footnotetag155"></a><a href= +"#footnote155"><sup>155</sup></a>, <span class="pagenum"><a name= +"page146" id="page146"></a>{146}</span> still even a glorification +in the form in which it there appears is not possible, unless it +has a Vedic passage to rest on.—Other Sm<i>ri</i>ti passages +also may be quoted in connexion with this Sûtra, so, for +instance, the following one, 'He whose head the wise declare to be +the heavenly world, whose navel the ether, whose eyes sun and moon, +whose ears the regions, and whose feet the earth, he is the +inscrutable leader of all beings.'</p> +<p>26. If it be maintained that (Vai<i>s</i>vânara is) not +(the highest Lord) on account of the term (viz. +Vai<i>s</i>vânara, having a settled different meaning), +&c., and on account of his abiding within (which is a +characteristic of the gastric fire); (we say) no, on account of the +perception (of the highest Lord), being taught thus (viz. in the +gastric fire), and on account of the impossibility (of the heavenly +world, &c. being the head, &c. of the gastric fire), and +because they (the Vâjasaneyins) read of him (viz. the +Vai<i>s</i>vânara) as man (which term cannot apply to the +gastric fire).</p> +<p>Here the following objection is +raised.—Vai<i>s</i>vânara cannot be the highest Lord, +on account of the term, &c., and on account of the abiding +within. The term, viz. the term Vai<i>s</i>vânara, cannot be +applied to the highest Lord, because the settled use of language +assigns to it a different sense. Thus, also, with regard to the +term Agni (fire) in the passage (<i>S</i>at. Brâ. X, 6, 1, +11), 'He is the Agni Vai<i>s</i>vânara.' The word '&c.' +(in the Sûtra) hints at the fiction concerning the three +sacred fires, the gârhapatya being represented as the heart, +and so on, of the Vai<i>s</i>vânara Self (Ch. Up. V, 18, +2<a id="footnotetag156" name="footnotetag156"></a><a href= +"#footnote156"><sup>156</sup></a>).—Moreover, the passage, +'Therefore the first food which a man may take is in the place of +homa' (Ch. Up. V, 19, 1), contains a glorification of +(Vai<i>s</i>vânara) being the abode of the oblation to +prâ<i>n</i>a<a id="footnotetag157" name= +"footnotetag157"></a><a href="#footnote157"><sup>157</sup></a>. For +these reasons we have to understand <span class="pagenum"><a name= +"page147" id="page147"></a>{147}</span> by Vai<i>s</i>vânara +the gastric fire.—Moreover, Scripture speaks of the +Vai<i>s</i>vânara as abiding within. 'He knows him abiding +within man;' which again applies to the gastric fire +only.—With reference to the averment that on account of the +specifications contained in the passage, 'His head is Sutejas,' +&c., Vai<i>s</i>vânara is to be explained as the highest +Self, we (the pûrvapakshin) ask: How do you reach the +decision that those specifications, although agreeing with both +interpretations, must be assumed to refer to the highest Lord only, +and not to the gastric fire?—Or else we may assume that the +passage speaks of the elemental fire which abides within and +without; for that that fire is also connected with the heavenly +world, and so on, we understand from the mantra, 'He who with his +light has extended himself over earth and heaven, the two halves of +the world, and the atmosphere' (<i>Ri</i>g-veda Sa<i>m</i>h. X, 88, +3).—Or else the attribute of having the heavenly world, and +so on, for its members may, on account of its power, be attributed +to that divinity which has the elemental fire for its +body.—Therefore Vai<i>s</i>vânara is not the highest +Lord.</p> +<p>To all this we reply as follows.—Your assertions are +unfounded, 'because there is taught the perception in this manner.' +The reasons (adduced in the former part of the Sûtra), viz. +the term, and so on, are not sufficient to make us abandon the +interpretation according to which Vai<i>s</i>vânara is the +highest Lord.—Why?—On account of perception being +taught in this manner, i.e. without the gastric fire being set +aside. For the passages quoted teach the perception of the highest +Lord in the gastric fire, analogously to such passages as 'Let a +man meditate on the mind as Brahman' (Ch. Up. III, 18, 1).—Or +else they teach that the object of perception is the highest Lord, +in so far as he has the gastric fire called Vai<i>s</i>vânara +for his limiting condition; analogously to such passages as 'He who +consists of mind, whose body is breath, whose form is light' (Ch. +Up. III, 14, 2<a id="footnotetag158" name= +"footnotetag158"></a><a href="#footnote158"><sup>158</sup></a>). If +it were the aim of the passages about the Vai<i>s</i>vânara +<span class="pagenum"><a name="page148" id= +"page148"></a>{148}</span> to make statements not concerning the +highest Lord, but merely concerning the gastric fire, there would +be no possibility of specifications such as contained in the +passage 'His head is Sutejas,' &c. That also on the assumption +of Vai<i>s</i>vânara being either the divinity of fire or the +elemental fire no room is to be found for the said specifications, +we shall show under the following Sûtra.—Moreover, if +the mere gastric fire were meant, there would be room only for a +declaration that it abides within man, not that it is man. But, as +a matter of fact, the Vâjasaneyins speak of him—in +their sacred text—as man, 'This Agni Vai<i>s</i>vânara +is man; he who knows this Agni Vai<i>s</i>vânara as man-like, +as abiding within man,' &c. (<i>S</i>at. Brâ. X, 6, 1, +11). The highest Lord, on the other hand, who is the Self of +everything, may be spoken of as well as man, as abiding within +man.—Those who, in the latter part of the Sûtra, read +'man-like' (puru-shavidham) instead of 'man' (purusham), wish to +express the following meaning: If Vai<i>s</i>vânara were +assumed to be the gastric fire only, he might be spoken of as +abiding within man indeed, but not as man-like. But the +Vâjasaneyins do speak of him as man-like, 'He who knows him +as man-like, as abiding within man.'—The meaning of the term +man-like is to be concluded from the context, whence it will be +seen that, with reference to nature, it means that the highest Lord +has the heaven for his head, &c., and is based on the earth; +and with reference to man, that he forms the head, &c., and is +based on the chin (of the devout worshipper<a id="footnotetag159" +name="footnotetag159"></a><a href= +"#footnote159"><sup>159</sup></a>).</p> +<p>27. For the same reasons (the Vai<i>s</i>vânara) cannot be +the divinity (of fire), or the element (of fire).</p> +<p>The averment that the fanciful attribution of members contained +in the passage 'His head is Sutejas,' &c. may apply to the +elemental fire also which from the mantras is seen to be connected +with the heavenly world, &c., or else to the divinity whose +body is fire, on account of its power, is refuted by the following +remark: For the reasons <span class="pagenum"><a name="page149" id= +"page149"></a>{149}</span> already stated Vai<i>s</i>vânara +is neither the divinity nor the element. For to the elemental fire +which is mere heat and light the heavenly world and so on cannot +properly be ascribed as head and so on, because an effect cannot be +the Self of another effect.—Again, the heavenly world cannot +be ascribed as head, &c. to the divinity of fire, in spite of +the power of the latter; for, on the one hand, it is not a cause +(but a mere effect), and on the other hand its power depends on the +highest Lord. Against all these interpretations there lies moreover +the objection founded on the inapplicability of the term +'Self.'</p> +<p>28. Jaimini (declares that there is) no contradiction even on +the assumption of a direct (worship of the highest Lord as +Vai<i>s</i>vânara).</p> +<p>Above (Sûtra 26) it has been said that +Vai<i>s</i>vânara is the highest Lord, to be meditated upon +as having the gastric fire either for his outward manifestation or +for his limiting condition; which interpretation was accepted in +deference to the circumstance that he is spoken of as abiding +within—and so on.—The teacher Jaimini however is of +opinion that it is not necessary to have recourse to the assumption +of an outward manifestation or limiting condition, and that there +is no objection to refer the passage about Vai<i>s</i>vânara +to the direct worship of the highest Lord.—But, if you reject +the interpretation based on the gastric fire, you place yourself in +opposition to the statement that Vai<i>s</i>vânara abides +within, and to the reasons founded on the term, &c. (Sû. +26).—To this we reply that we in no way place ourselves in +opposition to the statement that Vai<i>s</i>vânara abides +within. For the passage, 'He knows him as man-like, as abiding +within man,' does not by any means refer to the gastric fire, the +latter being neither the general topic of discussion nor having +been mentioned by name before.—What then does it refer +to?—It refers to that which forms the subject of discussion, +viz. that similarity to man (of the highest Self) which is +fancifully found in the members of man from the upper part of the +head down to the chin; the text therefore says, 'He knows him as +man-like, <span class="pagenum"><a name="page150" id= +"page150"></a>{150}</span> as abiding within man,' just as we say +of a branch that it abides within the tree<a id="footnotetag160" +name="footnotetag160"></a><a href= +"#footnote160"><sup>160</sup></a>.—Or else we may adopt +another interpretation and say that after the highest Self has been +represented as having the likeness to man as a limiting condition, +with regard to nature as well as to man, the passage last quoted +('He knows him as abiding within man') speaks of the same highest +Self as the mere witness (sâkshin; i.e. as the pure Self, +non-related to the limiting conditions).—The consideration of +the context having thus shown that the highest Self has to be +resorted to for the interpretation of the passage, the term +'Vai<i>s</i>vânara' must denote the highest Self in some way +or other. The word 'Vi<i>s</i>vânara' is to be explained +either as 'he who is all and man (i.e. the individual soul),' or +'he to whom souls belong' (in so far as he is their maker or +ruler), and thus denotes the highest Self which is the Self of all. +And the form 'Vai<i>s</i>vânara' has the same meaning as +'Vi<i>s</i>vânara,' the taddhita-suffix, by which the former +word is derived from the latter, not changing the meaning; just as +in the case of râkshasa (derived from rakshas), and +vâyasa (derived from vayas).—The word 'Agni' also may +denote the highest Self if we adopt the etymology +agni=agra<i>n</i>î, i.e. he who leads in front.—As the +Gârhapatya-fire finally, and as the abode of the oblation to +breath the highest Self may be represented because it is the Self +of all.</p> +<p>But, if it is assumed that Vai<i>s</i>vânara denotes the +highest Self, how can Scripture declare that he is measured by a +span?—On the explanation of this difficulty we now enter.</p> +<p>29. On account of the manifestation, so Â<i>s</i>marathya +opines.</p> +<p>The circumstance of the highest Lord who transcends all measure +being spoken of as measured by a span has for its reason +'manifestation.' The highest Lord manifests <span class= +"pagenum"><a name="page151" id="page151"></a>{151}</span> himself +as measured by a span, i.e. he specially manifests himself for the +benefit of his worshippers in some special places, such as the +heart and the like, where he may be perceived. Hence, according to +the opinion of the teacher Â<i>s</i>marathya, the scriptural +passage which speaks of him who is measured by a span may refer to +the highest Lord.</p> +<p>30. On account of remembrance; so Bâdari opines.</p> +<p>Or else the highest Lord may be called 'measured by a span' +because he is remembered by means of the mind which is seated in +the heart which is measured by a span. Similarly, barley-corns +which are measured by means of prasthas are themselves called +prasthas. It must be admitted that barley-grains themselves have a +certain size which is merely rendered manifest through their being +connected with a prastha measure; while the highest Lord himself +does not possess a size to be rendered manifest by his connexion +with the heart. Still the remembrance (of the Lord by means of the +mind) may be accepted as offering a certain foundation for the +<i>S</i>ruti passage concerning him who is measured by a +span.—Or else<a id="footnotetag161" name= +"footnotetag161"></a><a href="#footnote161"><sup>161</sup></a> the +Sûtra may be interpreted to mean that the Lord, although not +really measured by a span, is to be remembered (meditated upon) as +being of the measure of a span; whereby the passage is furnished +with an appropriate sense.—Thus the passage about him who is +measured by a span may, according to the opinion of the teacher +Bâdari, be referred to the highest Lord, on account of +remembrance.</p> +<p>31. On the ground of imaginative identification (the highest +Lord may be called prâde<i>s</i>amâtra), Jaimini +thinks; for thus (Scripture) declares.</p> +<p>Or else the passage about him who is measured by a span may be +considered to rest on imaginative +combination.—Why?—Because the passage of the +Vâjasaneyibrâhma<i>n</i>a <span class= +"pagenum"><a name="page152" id="page152"></a>{152}</span> which +treats of the same topic identifies heaven, earth, and so +on—which are the members of Vai<i>s</i>vânara viewed as +the Self of the threefold world—with certain parts of the +human frame, viz. the parts comprised between the upper part of the +head and the chin, and thus declares the imaginative identity of +Vai<i>s</i>vânara with something whose measure is a span. +There we read, 'The Gods indeed reached him, knowing him as +measured by a span as it were. Now I will declare them (his +members) to you so as to identify him (the Vai<i>s</i>vânara) +with that whose measure is a span; thus he said. Pointing to the +upper part of the head he said: This is what stands above (i.e. the +heavenly world) as Vai<i>s</i>vânara (i.e. the head of +Vai<i>s</i>vânara<a id="footnotetag162" name= +"footnotetag162"></a><a href="#footnote162"><sup>162</sup></a>). +Pointing to the eyes he said: This is he with good light (i.e. the +sun) as Vai<i>s</i>vânara (i.e. the eye of V.). Pointing to +the nose he said: This is he who moves on manifold paths (i.e. the +air) as Vai<i>s</i>vânara (i.e. the breath of V.). Pointing +to the space (ether) within his mouth he said: This is the full one +(i.e. the ether) as Vai<i>s</i>vânara. Pointing to the saliva +within his mouth he said: This is wealth as Vai<i>s</i>vânara +(i.e. the water in the bladder of V.). Pointing to the chin he +said: This is the base as Vai<i>s</i>vânara (i.e. the feet of +V.).'—Although in the Vâjasaneyi-brâhma<i>n</i>a +the heaven is denoted as that which has the attribute of standing +above and the sun as that which has the attribute of good light, +while in the Chândogya the heaven is spoken of as having good +light and the sun as being multiform; still this difference does +not interfere (with the unity of the vidyâ)<a id= +"footnotetag163" name="footnotetag163"></a><a href= +"#footnote163"><sup>163</sup></a>, because both texts equally use +the term 'measured by a span,' and because all +<i>s</i>âkhâs intimate the same.—The above +explanation of the term 'measured by a span,' which rests on +imaginative identification, the teacher Jaimini considers the most +appropriate one.</p> +<p>32. Moreover they (the Jâbâlas) speak of him +<span class="pagenum"><a name="page153" id= +"page153"></a>{153}</span> (the highest Lord) in that (i.e. the +interstice between the top of the head and the chin which is +measured by a span).</p> +<p>Moreover the Jâbâlas speak in their text of the +highest Lord as being in the interstice between the top of the head +and the chin. 'The unevolved infinite Self abides in the avimukta +(i.e. the non-released soul). Where does that avimukta abide? It +abides in the Vara<i>n</i>â and the Nâsî, in the +middle. What is that Vara<i>n</i>â, what is that +Nâsî?' The text thereupon etymologises the term +Vara<i>n</i>â as that which wards off (vârayati) all +evil done by the senses, and the term Nâsî as that +which destroys (nâ<i>s</i>ayati) all evil done by the senses; +and then continues, 'And what is its place?—The place where +the eyebrows and the nose join. That is the joining place of the +heavenly world (represented by the upper part of the head) and of +the other (i.e. the earthly world represented by the chin).' +(Jâbâla Up. I.)—Thus it appears that the +scriptural statement which ascribes to the highest Lord the measure +of a span is appropriate. That the highest Lord is called +abhivimâna refers to his being the inward Self of all. As +such he is directly measured, i.e. known by all animate beings. Or +else the word may be explained as 'he who is near +everywhere—as the inward Self—and who at the same time +is measureless' (as being infinite). Or else it may denote the +highest Lord as him who, as the cause of the world, measures it +out, i.e. creates it. By all this it is proved that +Vai<i>s</i>vânara is the highest Lord.</p> +<p>Notes:</p> +<blockquote class="footnote"><a id="footnote136" name= +"footnote136"></a><b>Footnote 136:</b><a href= +"#footnotetag136">(return)</a> +<p>The clause 'he is to meditate with a calm mind' if taken as a +gu<i>n</i>avidhi, i.e. as enjoining some secondary matter, viz. +calmness of mind of the meditating person, cannot at the same time +enjoin meditation; for that would involve a so-called split of the +sentence (vâkyabheda).</p> +</blockquote> +<blockquote class="footnote"><a id="footnote137" name= +"footnote137"></a><b>Footnote 137:</b><a href= +"#footnotetag137">(return)</a> +<p>Jîvezpi dehâdib<i>rim</i>hanâj +jyâstvanyâyâd vâ brahmatety artha<i>h</i>. +Ân. Gi.</p> +</blockquote> +<blockquote class="footnote"><a id="footnote138" name= +"footnote138"></a><b>Footnote 138:</b><a href= +"#footnotetag138">(return)</a> +<p>The discussion is brought on by the term 'vivakshita' in the +Sûtra whose meaning is 'expressed, aimed at,' but more +literally 'desired to be expressed.'</p> +</blockquote> +<blockquote class="footnote"><a id="footnote139" name= +"footnote139"></a><b>Footnote 139:</b><a href= +"#footnotetag139">(return)</a> +<p>Because he is vyâpin.</p> +</blockquote> +<blockquote class="footnote"><a id="footnote140" name= +"footnote140"></a><b>Footnote 140:</b><a href= +"#footnotetag140">(return)</a> +<p>Another interpretation of the later part of Sûtra.</p> +</blockquote> +<blockquote class="footnote"><a id="footnote141" name= +"footnote141"></a><b>Footnote 141:</b><a href= +"#footnotetag141">(return)</a> +<p>Cp. Ka<i>th</i>a Up, I, 1, 13; 20; I, 2, 14.</p> +</blockquote> +<blockquote class="footnote"><a id="footnote142" name= +"footnote142"></a><b>Footnote 142:</b><a href= +"#footnotetag142">(return)</a> +<p>Freedom from impurity can result only from the knowledge that +the individual soul is in reality Brahman. The commentators explain +rajas by avidyâ.</p> +</blockquote> +<blockquote class="footnote"><a id="footnote143" name= +"footnote143"></a><b>Footnote 143:</b><a href= +"#footnotetag143">(return)</a> +<p>Tadartham iti, jîvasya brahmasiddhyartham iti yâvat, +<i>k</i>aitanya<i>kh</i>âyâpannâ +dhî<i>h</i>sukhâdinâ pari<i>n</i>amata iti, tatra +purushozpi bhakt<i>ri</i>tvam ivânubhavati na tattvata iti +vaktum adhyâropayati. Ânanda Giri.</p> +</blockquote> +<blockquote class="footnote"><a id="footnote144" name= +"footnote144"></a><b>Footnote 144:</b><a href= +"#footnotetag144">(return)</a> +<p>Who, somebody might say, is to be understood here, because +immortality and similar qualities belong to him not somehow only, +but in their true sense.</p> +</blockquote> +<blockquote class="footnote"><a id="footnote145" name= +"footnote145"></a><b>Footnote 145:</b><a href= +"#footnotetag145">(return)</a> +<p>The <i>t</i>îkâs say that the contents of this last +sentence are hinted at by the word 'and' in the Sûtra.</p> +</blockquote> +<blockquote class="footnote"><a id="footnote146" name= +"footnote146"></a><b>Footnote 146:</b><a href= +"#footnotetag146">(return)</a> +<p>I.e. at the beginning of the instruction which the sacred fires +give to Upako<i>s</i>ala, Ch. Up. IV, 10 ff.</p> +</blockquote> +<blockquote class="footnote"><a id="footnote147" name= +"footnote147"></a><b>Footnote 147:</b><a href= +"#footnotetag147">(return)</a> +<p>Which words conclude the instruction given by the fires, and +introduce the instruction given by the teacher, of which the +passage 'the person that is seen in the eye,' &c. forms a +part.</p> +</blockquote> +<blockquote class="footnote"><a id="footnote148" name= +"footnote148"></a><b>Footnote 148:</b><a href= +"#footnotetag148">(return)</a> +<p> +Â<i>s</i>rayântarapratyayasyâ<i>s</i>rayântare +kshepa<i>h</i> pratîka<i>h</i>, yathâ +brahma<i>s</i>abda<i>h</i> paramâtmavishayo +nâmâdishu kshipyate. Bhâ.</p> +</blockquote> +<blockquote class="footnote"><a id="footnote149" name= +"footnote149"></a><b>Footnote 149:</b><a href= +"#footnotetag149">(return)</a> +<p>The following sentences give the reason why, although there is +only one Brahman, the word Brahman is repeated.</p> +</blockquote> +<blockquote class="footnote"><a id="footnote150" name= +"footnote150"></a><b>Footnote 150:</b><a href= +"#footnotetag150">(return)</a> +<p>According to Scripture, Nira@nku<i>s</i>a<i>m</i> +sarvaniyantritva<i>m</i> <i>s</i>rauta<i>m</i> na <i>k</i>a +tâdri<i>s</i>e sarvaniyantari bhedo na +<i>k</i>ânumâna<i>m</i> <i>s</i>rutibhâditam +uttish<i>th</i>ati. Ânanda Giri. Or else, as Go. Ân. +remarks, we may explain: as the highest Self is not really +different from the individual soul. So also Bhâmatî: Na +<i>h</i>ânavasthâ, na hi niyantrantara<i>m</i> tena +niyamyate ki<i>m</i> tu yo jîvo niyantâ +lokasiddha<i>h</i> sa +paramâtmevopâdhyava<i>kkh</i>edakalpitabheda<i>h</i>.</p> +</blockquote> +<blockquote class="footnote"><a id="footnote151" name= +"footnote151"></a><b>Footnote 151:</b><a href= +"#footnotetag151">(return)</a> +<p>V<i>ri</i>ttik<i>ri</i>dvyâkhyâm dûshayati, +Go. Ân.; ekade<i>s</i>ina<i>m</i> dûshayati, +Ânanda Giri; tad etat +paramatenâkshepasamâdhânâbhyâ<i>m</i> +vyâkhyâya svamatena vyâ<i>k</i>ash<i>t</i>e, +puna<i>h</i> <i>s</i>abdozpi pûrvasmâd +vi<i>s</i>esha<i>m</i> dyotayann asyesh<i>t</i>atâ<i>m</i> +sû<i>k</i>ayati, Bhâmatî.—The statement of +the two former commentators must be understood to mean—in +agreement with the Bhâmatî—that <i>S</i>a@nkara +is now going to refute the preceding explanation by the statement +of his own view. Thus Go. Ân. later on explains 'asmin +pakshe' by 'svapakshe.'</p> +</blockquote> +<blockquote class="footnote"><a id="footnote152" name= +"footnote152"></a><b>Footnote 152:</b><a href= +"#footnotetag152">(return)</a> +<p>The question is to what passage the +'rûpopanyâsât' of the Sûtra +refers.—According to the opinion set forth first it refers to +Mu. Up. II, 1, 4 ff.—But, according to the second view, II, +1, 4 to II, 1, 9, cannot refer to the source of all beings, i.e. +the highest Self, because that entire passage describes the +creation, the inner Self of which is not the highest Self but +Prajâpati, i.e. the Hira<i>n</i>yagarbha or +Sûtrâtman of the later Vedânta, who is himself an +'effect,' and who is called the inner Self, because he is the +breath of life (prâ<i>n</i>a) in everything.—Hence the +Sûtra must be connected with another passage, and that +passage is found in II, 1, 10, where it is said that the Person +(i.e. the highest Self) is all this, &c.</p> +</blockquote> +<blockquote class="footnote"><a id="footnote153" name= +"footnote153"></a><b>Footnote 153:</b><a href= +"#footnotetag153">(return)</a> +<p>About which term see later on.</p> +</blockquote> +<blockquote class="footnote"><a id="footnote154" name= +"footnote154"></a><b>Footnote 154:</b><a href= +"#footnotetag154">(return)</a> +<p>Sârîre laksha<i>n</i>ayâ +vai<i>s</i>vânara<i>s</i>abdopapattim âha tasyeti. +Ân. Gi.</p> +</blockquote> +<blockquote class="footnote"><a id="footnote155" name= +"footnote155"></a><b>Footnote 155:</b><a href= +"#footnotetag155">(return)</a> +<p>And as such might be said not to require a basis for its +statements.</p> +</blockquote> +<blockquote class="footnote"><a id="footnote156" name= +"footnote156"></a><b>Footnote 156:</b><a href= +"#footnotetag156">(return)</a> +<p>Na <i>k</i>a +gârhapatyâdih<i>ri</i>dayâditâ +brahma<i>n</i>a<i>h</i> sambhavinî. Bhâmatî.</p> +</blockquote> +<blockquote class="footnote"><a id="footnote157" name= +"footnote157"></a><b>Footnote 157:</b><a href= +"#footnotetag157">(return)</a> +<p>Na <i>k</i>a +prâ<i>n</i>âhutyadhikara<i>n</i>atâ z nyatra +ja<i>th</i>arâgner yujyate. Bhâmatî.</p> +</blockquote> +<blockquote class="footnote"><a id="footnote158" name= +"footnote158"></a><b>Footnote 158:</b><a href= +"#footnotetag158">(return)</a> +<p>According to the former explanation the gastric fire is to be +looked on as the outward manifestation (pratîka) of the +highest Lord; according to the latter as his limiting +condition.</p> +</blockquote> +<blockquote class="footnote"><a id="footnote159" name= +"footnote159"></a><b>Footnote 159:</b><a href= +"#footnotetag159">(return)</a> +<p>I.e. that he may be fancifully identified with the head and so +on of the devout worshipper.</p> +</blockquote> +<blockquote class="footnote"><a id="footnote160" name= +"footnote160"></a><b>Footnote 160:</b><a href= +"#footnotetag160">(return)</a> +<p>Whereby we mean not that it is inside the tree, but that it +forms a part of the tree.—The Vai<i>s</i>vânara Self is +identified with the different members of the body, and these +members abide within, i.e. form parts of the body.</p> +</blockquote> +<blockquote class="footnote"><a id="footnote161" name= +"footnote161"></a><b>Footnote 161:</b><a href= +"#footnotetag161">(return)</a> +<p>Parimâ<i>n</i>asya +h<i>ri</i>da<i>y</i>advârâropitasya +smaryamâ<i>n</i>e katham âropo vishayavishayitvena +bhedâd ity â<i>s</i>a@nkya vyâkhyântaram +âha prâde<i>s</i>eti. Ânanda Giri.</p> +</blockquote> +<blockquote class="footnote"><a id="footnote162" name= +"footnote162"></a><b>Footnote 162:</b><a href= +"#footnotetag162">(return)</a> +<p>Atra sarvatra vai<i>s</i>vânara<i>s</i>abdas +tada@ngapara<i>h</i>. Go. Ân.</p> +</blockquote> +<blockquote class="footnote"><a id="footnote163" name= +"footnote163"></a><b>Footnote 163:</b><a href= +"#footnotetag163">(return)</a> +<p>Which unity entitles us to use the passage from the <i>S</i>at. +Brâ. for the explanation of the passage from the Ch. Up.</p> +</blockquote> +<span class="pagenum"><a name="page154" id= +"page154"></a>{154}</span> <a name="chap-1-3" id="chap-1-3"></a> +<h4>THIRD PÂDA.</h4> +<center>REVERENCE TO THE HIGHEST SELF!</center> +<p>1. The abode of heaven, earth, and so on (is Brahman), on +account of the term 'own,' i.e. Self.</p> +<p>We read (Mu. Up. II, 2, 5), 'He in whom the heaven, the earth, +and the sky are woven, the mind also with all the vital airs, know +him alone as the Self, and leave off other words! He is the bridge +of the Immortal.'—Here the doubt arises whether the abode +which is intimated by the statement of the heaven and so on being +woven in it is the highest Brahman or something else.</p> +<p>The pûrvapakshin maintains that the abode is something +else, on account of the expression, 'It is the bridge of the +Immortal.' For, he says, it is known from every-day experience that +a bridge presupposes some further bank to which it leads, while it +is impossible to assume something further beyond the highest +Brahman, which in Scripture is called 'endless, without a further +shore' (B<i>ri</i>. Up. II, 4, 12). Now if the abode is supposed to +be something different from Brahman, it must be supposed to be +either the pradhâna known from Sm<i>ri</i>ti, which, as being +the (general) cause, may be called the (general) abode; or the air +known from <i>S</i>ruti, of which it is said (B<i>ri</i>. Up. III, +7, 2, 'Air is that thread, O Gautama. By air as by a thread, O +Gautama, this world and the other world and all beings are strung +together'), that it supports all things; or else the embodied soul +which, as being the enjoyer, may be considered as an abode with +reference to the objects of its fruition.</p> +<p>Against this view we argue with the sûtrakâra as +follows:—'Of the world consisting of heaven, earth, and so +on, which in the quoted passage is spoken of as woven (upon +something), the highest Brahman must be the +abode.'—Why?—On account of the word 'own,' i.e. on +account of the word 'Self.' For we meet with the word 'Self' in the +passage, 'Know him alone as the Self.' This term 'Self' is +<span class="pagenum"><a name="page155" id= +"page155"></a>{155}</span> thoroughly appropriate only if we +understand the highest Self and not anything else.—(To +propound another interpretation of the phrase +'sva<i>s</i>abdât' employed in the Sûtra.) Sometimes +also Brahman is spoken of in <i>S</i>ruti as the general abode by +its own terms (i.e. by terms properly designating Brahman), as, for +instance (Ch. Up. VI. 8, 4), 'All these creatures, my dear, have +their root in the being, their abode in the being, their rest in +the being<a id="footnotetag164" name="footnotetag164"></a><a href= +"#footnote164"><sup>164</sup></a>.'—(Or else we have to +explain 'sva<i>s</i>abdena' as follows), In the passages preceding +and following the passage under discussion Brahman is glorified +with its own names<a id="footnotetag165" name= +"footnotetag165"></a><a href="#footnote165"><sup>165</sup></a>; cp. +Mu. Up. II, 1, 10, 'The Person is all this, sacrifice, penance, +Brahman, the highest Immortal,' and II, 2, 11, 'That immortal +Brahman is before, is behind, Brahman is to the right and left.' +Here, on account of mention being made of an abode and that which +abides, and on account of the co-ordination expressed in the +passage, 'Brahman is all' (Mu. Up. II, 2, 11), a suspicion might +arise that Brahman is of a manifold variegated nature, just as in +the case of a tree consisting of different parts we distinguish +branches, stem, and root. In order to remove this suspicion the +text declares (in the passage under discussion), 'Know him alone as +the Self.' The sense of which is: The Self is not to be known as +manifold, qualified by the universe of effects; you are rather to +dissolve by true knowledge the universe of effects, which is the +mere product of Nescience, and to know that one Self, which is the +general abode, as uniform. Just as when somebody says, 'Bring that +on which Devadatta sits,' the person addressed brings the chair +only (the abode of Devadatta), not Devadatta himself; so the +passage, 'Know him alone as the Self,' teaches that the object to +be known is the one uniform Self which constitutes the general +abode. Similarly another scriptural passage reproves him who +believes in the unreal world of effects, <span class= +"pagenum"><a name="page156" id="page156"></a>{156}</span> 'From +death to death goes he who sees any difference here' (Ka. Up. II, +4, 11). The statement of co-ordination made in the clause 'All is +Brahman' aims at dissolving (the wrong conception of the reality +of) the world, and not in any way at intimating that Brahman is +multiform in nature<a id="footnotetag166" name= +"footnotetag166"></a><a href="#footnote166"><sup>166</sup></a>; for +the uniformity (of Brahman's nature) is expressly stated in other +passages such as the following one, 'As a mass of salt has neither +inside nor outside, but is altogether a mass of taste, thus indeed +has that Self neither inside nor outside, but is altogether a mass +of knowledge' (B<i>ri</i>. Up. IV, 5, 13).—For all these +reasons the abode of heaven, earth, &c. is the highest +Brahman.—Against the objection that on account of the text +speaking of a 'bridge,' and a bridge requiring a further bank, we +have to understand by the abode of heaven and earth something +different from Brahman, we remark that the word 'bridge' is meant +to intimate only that that which is called a bridge supports, not +that it has a further bank. We need not assume by any means that +the bridge meant is like an ordinary bridge made of clay and wood. +For as the word setu (bridge) is derived from the root si, which +means 'to bind,' the idea of holding together, supporting is rather +implied in it than the idea of being connected with something +beyond (a further bank).</p> +<p>According to the opinion of another (commentator) the word +'bridge' does not glorify the abode of heaven, earth, &c., but +rather the knowledge of the Self which is glorified in the +preceding clause, 'Know him alone as the Self,' and the abandonment +of speech advised in the clause, 'leave off other words;' to them, +as being the means of obtaining immortality, the expression 'the +bridge of the immortal' applies<a id="footnotetag167" name= +"footnotetag167"></a><a href="#footnote167"><sup>167</sup></a>. On +that account we have to set aside the assertion that, on account of +the word 'bridge,' something different from Brahman is to be +understood by the abode of heaven, earth, and so on.</p> +<span class="pagenum"><a name="page157" id= +"page157"></a>{157}</span> +<p>2. And on account of its being designated as that to which the +Released have to resort.</p> +<p>By the abode of heaven, earth, and so on, we have to understand +the highest Brahman for that reason also that we find it denoted as +that to which the Released have to resort.—The conception +that the body and other things contained in the sphere of the +Not-self are our Self, constitutes Nescience; from it there spring +desires with regard to whatever promotes the well-being of the body +and so on, and aversions with regard to whatever tends to injure +it; there further arise fear and confusion when we observe anything +threatening to destroy it. All this constitutes an endless series +of the most manifold evils with which we all are acquainted. +Regarding those on the other hand who have freed themselves from +the stains of Nescience desire aversion and so on, it is said that +they have to resort to that, viz. the abode of heaven, earth, +&c. which forms the topic of discussion. For the text, after +having said, 'The fetter of the heart is broken, all doubts are +solved, all his works perish when He has been beheld who is the +higher and the lower' (Mu. Up. II, 2, 8), later on remarks, 'The +wise man freed from name and form goes to the divine Person who is +greater than the great' (Mu. Up. III, 2, 8). That Brahman is that +which is to be resorted to by the released, is known from other +scriptural passages, such as 'When all desires which once entered +his heart are undone then does the mortal become immortal, then he +obtains Brahman' (B<i>ri</i>. Up. IV, 4, 7). Of the pradhâna +and similar entities, on the other hand, it is not known from any +source that they are to be resorted to by the released. Moreover, +the text (in the passage, 'Know him alone as the Self and leave off +other words') declares that the knowledge of the abode of heaven +and earth, &c. is connected with the leaving off of all speech; +a condition which, according to another scriptural passage, +attaches to (the knowledge of) Brahman; cp. B<i>ri</i>. Up. IV, 4, +21, 'Let a wise brâhma<i>n</i>a, after he has discovered him, +practise wisdom. Let him not seek after many words, for that is +mere weariness of the tongue.'—For that <span class= +"pagenum"><a name="page158" id="page158"></a>{158}</span> reason +also the abode of heaven, earth, and so on, is the highest +Brahman.</p> +<p>3. Not (i.e. the abode of heaven, earth, &c. cannot be) that +which is inferred, (i.e. the pradhâna), on account of the +terms not denoting it.</p> +<p>While there has been shown a special reason in favour of Brahman +(being the abode), there is no such special reason in favour of +anything else. Hence he (the sûtrakâra) says that that +which is inferred, i.e. the pradhâna assumed by the +Sâ@nkhya-sm<i>ri</i>ti, is not to be accepted as the abode of +heaven, earth, &c.—Why?—On account of the terms not +denoting it. For the sacred text does not contain any term +intimating the non-intelligent pradhâna, on the ground of +which we might understand the latter to be the general cause or +abode; while such terms as 'he who perceives all and knows all' +(Mu. Up. I, 1, 9) intimate an intelligent being opposed to the +pradhâna in nature.—For the same reason the air also +cannot be accepted as the abode of heaven, earth, and so on.</p> +<p>4. (Nor) also the individual soul +(prâ<i>n</i>abh<i>ri</i>t).</p> +<p>Although to the cognitional (individual) Self the qualities of +Selfhood and intelligence do belong, still omniscience and similar +qualities do not belong to it as its knowledge is limited by its +adjuncts; thus the individual soul also cannot be accepted as the +abode of heaven, earth, &c., for the same reason, i.e. on +account of the terms not denoting it.—Moreover, the attribute +of forming the abode of heaven, earth, and so on, cannot properly +be given to the individual soul because the latter is limited by +certain adjuncts and therefore non-pervading (not +omnipresent)<a id="footnotetag168" name= +"footnotetag168"></a><a href= +"#footnote168"><sup>168</sup></a>.—The special enunciation +(of the individual soul) is caused by what follows<a id= +"footnotetag169" name="footnotetag169"></a><a href= +"#footnote169"><sup>169</sup></a>.—The individual soul is not +to be <span class="pagenum"><a name="page159" id= +"page159"></a>{159}</span> accepted as the abode of heaven, earth, +&c. for the following reason also.</p> +<p>5. On account of the declaration of difference.</p> +<p>The passage 'Know him alone as the Self' moreover implies a +declaration of difference, viz. of the difference of the object of +knowledge and the knower. Here the individual soul as being that +which is desirous of release is the knower, and consequently +Brahman, which is denoted by the word 'self' and represented as the +object of knowledge, is understood to be the abode of heaven, +earth, and so on.—For the following reason also the +individual soul cannot be accepted as the abode of heaven, earth, +&c.</p> +<p>6. On account of the subject-matter.</p> +<p>The highest Self constitutes the subject-matter (of the entire +chapter), as we see from the passage, 'Sir, what is that through +which, when it is known, everything else becomes known?' (Mu. Up. +I, 1, 3) in which the knowledge of everything is declared to be +dependent on the knowledge of one thing. For all this (i.e. the +entire world) becomes known if Brahman the Self of all is known, +not if only the individual soul is known.—Another reason +against the individual soul follows.</p> +<p>7. And on account of the two conditions of standing and eating +(of which the former is characteristic of the highest Lord, the +latter of the individual soul).</p> +<p>With reference to that which is the abode of heaven, earth, and +so on, the text says, 'Two birds, inseparable friends,' &c. +(Mu. Up. III, 1, 1). This passage describes the two states of mere +standing, i.e. mere presence, and of eating, the clause, 'One of +them eats the sweet fruit,' referring to the eating, i.e. the +fruition of the results of works, <span class="pagenum"><a name= +"page160" id="page160"></a>{160}</span> and the clause, 'The other +one looks on without eating,' describing the condition of mere +inactive presence. The two states described, viz. of mere presence +on the one hand and of enjoyment on the other hand, show that the +Lord and the individual soul are referred to. Now there is room for +this statement which represents the Lord as separate from the +individual soul, only if the passage about the abode of heaven and +earth likewise refers to the Lord; for in that case only there +exists a continuity of topic. On any other supposition the second +passage would contain a statement about something not connected +with the general topic, and would therefore be entirely uncalled +for.—But, it may be objected, on your interpretation also the +second passage makes an uncalled-for statement, viz. in so far as +it represents the individual soul as separate from the +Lord.—Not so, we reply. It is nowhere the purpose of +Scripture to make statements regarding the individual soul. From +ordinary experience the individual soul, which in the different +individual bodies is joined to the internal organs and other +limiting adjuncts, is known to every one as agent and enjoyer, and +we therefore must not assume that it is that which Scripture aims +at setting forth. The Lord, on the other hand, about whom ordinary +experience tells us nothing, is to be considered as the special +topic of all scriptural passages, and we therefore cannot assume +that any passage should refer to him merely casually<a id= +"footnotetag170" name="footnotetag170"></a><a href= +"#footnote170"><sup>170</sup></a>.—That <span class= +"pagenum"><a name="page161" id="page161"></a>{161}</span> the +mantra 'two birds,' &c. speaks of the Lord—and the +individual soul we have already shown under I, 2, 11.—And if, +according to the interpretation given in the Pai@ngi-upanishad (and +quoted under I, 2, 11), the verse is understood to refer to the +internal organ (sattva) and the individual soul (not to the +individual soul and the Lord), even then there is no contradiction +(between that interpretation and our present averment that the +individual soul is not the abode of heaven and earth).—How +so?—Here (i.e. in the present Sûtra and the +Sûtras immediately preceding) it is denied that the +individual soul which, owing to its imagined connexion with the +internal organ and other limiting adjuncts, has a separate +existence in separate bodies—its division being analogous to +the division of universal space into limited spaces such as the +spaces within jars and the like—is that which is called the +abode of heaven and earth. That same soul, on the other hand, which +exists in all bodies, if considered apart from the limiting +adjuncts, is nothing else but the highest Self. Just as the spaces +within jars, if considered apart from their limiting conditions, +are merged in universal space, so the individual soul also is +incontestably that which is denoted as the abode of heaven and +earth, since it (the soul) cannot really be separate from the +highest Self. That it is not the abode of heaven and earth, is +therefore said of the individual soul in so far only as it imagines +itself to be connected with the internal organ and so on. Hence it +follows that the highest Self is the abode of heaven, earth, and so +on.—The same conclusion has already been arrived at under I, +2, 21; for in the passage concerning the source of all beings +(which passage is discussed under the Sûtra quoted) we meet +with the clause, 'In which heaven and <span class= +"pagenum"><a name="page162" id="page162"></a>{162}</span> earth and +the sky are woven.' In the present adhikara<i>n</i>a the subject is +resumed for the sake of further elucidation.</p> +<p>8. The bhûman (is Brahman), as the instruction about it is +additional to that about the state of deep sleep (i.e. the vital +air which remains awake even in the state of deep sleep).</p> +<p>We read (Ch. Up. VII, 23; 24), 'That which is much +(bhûman) we must desire to understand.—Sir, I desire to +understand it.—Where one sees nothing else, hears nothing +else, understands nothing else, that is what is much +(bhûman). Where one sees something else, hears something +else, understands something else, that is the Little.'—Here +the doubt arises whether that which is much is the vital air +(prâ<i>n</i>a) or the highest Self.—Whence the +doubt?—The word 'bhûman,' taken by itself, means the +state of being much, according to its derivation as taught by +Pâ<i>n</i>ani, VI, 4, 158. Hence there is felt the want of a +specification showing what constitutes the Self of that muchness. +Here there presents itself at first the approximate passage, 'The +vital air is more than hope' (Ch. Up. VII, 15, 1), from which we +may conclude that the vital air is bhûman.—On the other +hand, we meet at the beginning of the chapter, where the general +topic is stated, with the following passage, 'I have heard from men +like you that he who knows the Self overcomes grief. I am in grief. +Do, Sir, help me over this grief of mine;' from which passage it +would appear that the bhûman is the highest Self.—Hence +there arises a doubt as to which of the two alternatives is to be +embraced, and which is to be set aside.</p> +<p>The pûrvapakshin maintains that the bhûman is the +vital air, since there is found no further series of questions and +answers as to what is more. For while we meet with a series of +questions and answers (such as, 'Sir, is there something which is +more than a name?'—'Speech is more than name.'—'Is +there something which is more than speech?'—'Mind is more +than speech'), which extends from name up to vital air, we do not +meet with a similar question and answer as to what might be more +than vital air (such as, 'Is there something <span class= +"pagenum"><a name="page163" id="page163"></a>{163}</span> which is +more than vital air?'—'Such and such a thing is more than +vital air'). The text rather at first declares at length (in the +passage, 'The vital air is more than hope,' &c.) that the vital +air is more than all the members of the series from name up to +hope; it then acknowledges him who knows the vital air to be an +ativâdin, i.e. one who makes a statement surpassing the +preceding statements (in the passage, 'Thou art an ativâdin. +He may say I am an ativâdin; he need not deny it'); and it +thereupon (in the passage, 'But he in reality is an ativâdin +who declares something beyond by means of the True'<a id= +"footnotetag171" name="footnotetag171"></a><a href= +"#footnote171"><sup>171</sup></a>),—not leaving off, but +rather continuing to refer to the quality of an ativâdin +which is founded on the vital air,—proceeds, by means of the +series beginning with the True, to lead over to the bhûman; +so that we conclude the meaning to be that the vital air is the +bhûman.—But, if the bhûman is interpreted to mean +the vital air, how have we to explain the passage in which the +bhûman is characterised. 'Where one sees nothing else?' +&c.—As, the pûrvapakshin replies, in the state of +deep sleep we observe a cessation of all activity, such as seeing, +&c., on the part of the organs merged in the vital air, the +vital air itself may be characterised by a passage such as, 'Where +one sees nothing else.' Similarly, another scriptural passage (Pra. +Up. IV, 2; 3) describes at first (in the words, 'He does not hear, +he does not see,' &c.) the state of deep sleep as characterised +by the cessation of the activity of all bodily organs, and then by +declaring that in that state the vital air, with its five +modifications, remains awake ('The fires of the prâ<i>n</i>as +are awake in that town'), shows the vital air to occupy the +principal position in the state of deep sleep.—That passage +also, which speaks of the bliss of the bhûman ('The +bhûman is bliss,' Ch. Up. VII, 23), can be reconciled with +our explanation, because Pra. Up. IV, 6 declares bliss to attach to +the state of deep sleep ('Then that god sees no dreams and at that +time that happiness arises in his body').—Again, the +statement, 'The bhûman is immortality' (Ch. Up. VII, 24, 1), +may <span class="pagenum"><a name="page164" id= +"page164"></a>{164}</span> likewise refer to the vital air; for +another scriptural passage says, 'prâ<i>n</i>a is +immortality' (Kau. Up. III, 2).—But how can the view +according to which the bhûman is the vital air be reconciled +with the fact that in the beginning of the chapter the knowledge of +the Self is represented as the general topic ('He who knows the +Self overcomes grief,' &c.)?—By the Self there referred +to, the pûrvapakshin replies, nothing else is meant but the +vital air. For the passage, 'The vital air is father, the vital air +is mother, the vital air is brother, the vital air is sister, the +vital air is teacher, the vital air is brâhma<i>n</i>a' (Ch. +Up. VII, 15, 1), represents the vital air as the Self of +everything. As, moreover, the passage, 'As the spokes of a wheel +rest in the nave, so all this rests in prâ<i>n</i>a,' +declares the prâ<i>n</i>a to be the Self of all—by +means of a comparison with the spokes and the nave of a +wheel—the prâ<i>n</i>a may be conceived under the form +of bhûman, i.e. plenitude.—Bhûman, therefore, +means the vital air.</p> +<p>To this we make the following reply.—Bhûman can mean +the highest Self only, not the vital air.—Why?—'On +account of information being given about it, subsequent to bliss.' +The word 'bliss' (samprasâda) means the state of deep sleep, +as may be concluded, firstly, from the etymology of the word ('In +it he, i.e. man, is altogether +pleased—samprasîdati')—and, secondly, from the +fact of samprasâda being mentioned in the +B<i>ri</i>hadâra<i>n</i>yaka together with the state of dream +and the waking state. And as in the state of deep sleep the vital +air remains awake, the word 'samprasâda' is employed in the +Sûtra to denote the vital air; so that the Sûtra means, +'on account of information being given about the bhûman, +subsequently to (the information given about) the vital air.' If +the bhûman were the vital air itself, it would be a strange +proceeding to make statements about the bhûman in addition to +the statements about the vital air. For in the preceding passages +also we do not meet, for instance, with a statement about name +subsequent to the previous statement about name (i.e. the text does +not say 'name is more than name'), but after something has been +said about name, a new statement is <span class="pagenum"><a name= +"page165" id="page165"></a>{165}</span> made about speech, which is +something different from name (i.e. the text says, 'Speech is more +than name'), and so on up to the statement about vital air, each +subsequent statement referring to something other than the topic of +the preceding one. We therefore conclude that the bhûman +also, the statement about which follows on the statement about the +vital air, is something other than the vital air. But—it may +be objected—we meet here neither with a question, such as, +'Is there something more than vital air?' nor with an answer, such +as, 'That and that is more than vital air.' How, then, can it be +said that the information about the bhûman is given +subsequently to the information about the vital +air?—Moreover, we see that the circumstance of being an +ativâdin, which is exclusively connected with the vital air, +is referred to in the subsequent passage (viz. 'But in reality he +is an ativâdin who makes a statement surpassing (the +preceding statements) by means of the True'). There is thus no +information additional to the information about the vital +air.—To this objection we reply that it is impossible to +maintain that the passage last quoted merely continues the +discussion of the quality of being an ativâdin, as connected +with the knowledge of the vital air; since the clause, 'He who +makes a statement surpassing, &c. by means of the True,' states +a specification.—But, the objector resumes, this very +statement of a specification may be explained as referring to the +vital air. If you ask how, we refer you to an analogous case. If +somebody says, 'This Agnihotrin speaks the truth,' the meaning is +not that the quality of being an Agnihotrin depends on speaking the +truth; that quality rather depends on the (regular performance of +the) agnihotra only, and speaking the truth is mentioned merely as +a special attribute of that special Agnihotrin. So our passage also +('But in reality he is an ativâdin who makes a statement, +&c. by means of the True') does not intimate that the quality +of being an ativâdin depends on speaking the truth, but +merely expresses that speaking the truth is a special attribute of +him who knows the vital air; while the quality of being an +ativâdin must be considered to depend on the knowledge of the +vital air.—This <span class="pagenum"><a name="page166" id= +"page166"></a>{166}</span> objection we rebut by the remark that it +involves an abandonment of the direct meaning of the sacred text. +For from the text, as it stands, we understand that the quality of +being an ativâdin depends on speaking the truth; the sense +being: An ativâdin is he who is an ativâdin by means of +the True. The passage does not in anyway contain a eulogisation of +the knowledge of the vital air. It could be connected with the +latter only on the ground of general subject-matter +(prakara<i>n</i>a)<a id="footnotetag172" name= +"footnotetag172"></a><a href="#footnote172"><sup>172</sup></a>; +which would involve an abandonment of the direct meaning of the +text in favour of prakara<i>n</i>a<a id="footnotetag173" name= +"footnotetag173"></a><a href= +"#footnote173"><sup>173</sup></a>.—Moreover, the particle but +('But in reality he is,' &c.), whose purport is to separate +(what follows) from the subject-matter of what precedes, would not +agree (with the prâ<i>n</i>a explanation). The following +passage also, 'But we must desire to know the True' (VII, 16), +which presupposes a new effort, shows that a new topic is going to +be entered upon.—For these reasons we have to consider the +statement about the ativâdin in the same light as we should +consider the remark—made in a conversation which previously +had turned on the praise of those who study one Veda—that he +who studies the four Vedas is a great brâhma<i>n</i>a; a +remark which we should understand to be laudatory of persons +different from those who study one Veda, i.e. of those who study +all the four Vedas. Nor is there any reason to assume that a new +topic can be introduced in the form of question and answer only; +for that the matter propounded forms a new topic is sufficiently +clear from the circumstance that no connexion can be established +between it and the preceding topic. The succession of topics in the +chapter under discussion is as follows: Nârada at first +listens to the instruction which Sanatkumâra gives him about +various matters, the last of which is prâ<i>n</i>a, and then +becomes silent. Thereupon Sanatkumâra explains to him +spontaneously (without being <span class="pagenum"><a name= +"page167" id="page167"></a>{167}</span> asked) that the quality of +being an ativâdin, if merely based on the knowledge of the +vital air—which knowledge has for its object an unreal +product,—is devoid of substance, and that he only is an +ativâdin who is such by means of the True. By the term 'the +True' there is meant the highest Brahman; for Brahman is the Real, +and it is called the 'True' in another scriptural passage also, +viz. Taitt. Up. II, 1, 'The True, knowledge, infinite is Brahman.' +Nârada, thus enlightened, starts a new line of enquiry +('Might I, Sir, become an ativâdin by the True?') and +Sanatkumâra then leads him, by a series of instrumental +steps, beginning with understanding, up to the knowledge of +bhûman. We therefrom conclude that the bhûman is that +very True whose explanation had been promised in addition to the +(knowledge of the) vital air. We thus see that the instruction +about the bhûman is additional to the instruction about the +vital air, and bhûman must therefore mean the highest Self, +which is different from the vital air. With this interpretation the +initial statement, according to which the enquiry into the Self +forms the general subject-matter, agrees perfectly well. The +assumption, on the other hand (made by the pûrvapakshin), +that by the Self we have here to understand the vital air is +indefensible. For, in the first place, Self-hood does not belong to +the vital air in any non-figurative sense. In the second place, +cessation of grief cannot take place apart from the knowledge of +the highest Self; for, as another scriptural passage declares, +'There is no other path to go' (<i>S</i>vet. Up. VI, 15). Moreover, +after we have read at the outset, 'Do, Sir, lead me over to the +other side of grief' (Ch. Up. VII, 1, 3), we meet with the +following concluding words (VII, 26, 2), 'To him, after his faults +had been rubbed out, the venerable Sanatkumâra showed the +other side of darkness.' The term 'darkness' here denotes +Nescience, the cause of grief, and so on.—Moreover, if the +instruction terminated with the vital air, it would not be said of +the latter that it rests on something else. But the +brâhma<i>n</i>a (Ch. Up. VII, 26, 1) does say, 'The vital air +springs from the Self.' Nor can it be objected against this last +argument that the concluding <span class="pagenum"><a name= +"page168" id="page168"></a>{168}</span> part of the chapter may +refer to the highest Self, while, all the same, the bhûman +(mentioned in an earlier part of the chapter) may be the vital air. +For, from the passage (VII, 24, 1), ('Sir, in what does the +bhûman rest? In its own greatness,' &c.), it appears that +the bhûman forms the continuous topic up to the end of the +chapter.—The quality of being the bhûman—which +quality is plenitude—agrees, moreover, best with the highest +Self, which is the cause of everything.</p> +<p>9. And on account of the agreement of the attributes (mentioned +in the text).</p> +<p>The attributes, moreover, which the sacred text ascribes to the +bhûman agree well with the highest Self. The passage, 'Where +one sees nothing else, hears nothing else, understands nothing +else, that is the bhûman,' gives us to understand that in the +bhûman the ordinary activities of seeing and so on are +absent; and that this is characteristic of the highest Self, we +know from another scriptural passage, viz. 'But when the Self only +is all this, how should he see another?' &c. (B<i>ri</i>. Up. +IV, 5, 15). What is said about the absence of the activities of +seeing and so on in the state of deep sleep (Pra. Up. IV, 2) is +said with the intention of declaring the non-attachedness of the +Self, not of describing the nature of the prâ<i>n</i>a; for +the highest Self (not the vital air) is the topic of that passage. +The bliss also of which Scripture speaks as connected with that +state is mentioned only in order to show that bliss constitutes the +nature of the Self. For Scripture says (B<i>ri</i>. Up. IV, 3, 32), +'This is his highest bliss. All other creatures live on a small +portion of that bliss.'—The passage under discussion also +('The bhûman is bliss. There is no bliss in that which is +little (limited). The bhûman only is bliss') by denying the +reality of bliss on the part of whatever is perishable shows that +Brahman only is bliss as bhûman, i.e. in its +plenitude,—Again, the passage, 'The bhûman is +immortality,' shows that the highest cause is meant; for the +immortality of all effected things is a merely relative one, +<span class="pagenum"><a name="page169" id= +"page169"></a>{169}</span> and another scriptural passage says that +'whatever is different from that (Brahman) is perishable' +(B<i>ri</i>. Up. III, 4, 2).—Similarly, the qualities of +being the True, and of resting in its own greatness, and of being +omnipresent, and of being the Self of everything which the text +mentions (as belonging to the bhûman) can belong to the +highest Self only, not to anything else.—By all this it is +proved that the bhûman is the highest Self.</p> +<p>10. The Imperishable (is Brahman) on account of (its) supporting +(all things) up to ether.</p> +<p>We read (B<i>ri</i>. Up. III, 8, 7; 8). 'In what then is the +ether woven, like warp and woof?—He said: O +Gârgî, the brâhma<i>n</i>as call this the akshara +(the Imperishable). It is neither coarse nor fine,' and so +on.—Here the doubt arises whether the word 'akshara' means +'syllable' or 'the highest Lord.'</p> +<p>The pûrvapakshin maintains that the word 'akshara' means +'syllable' merely, because it has, in such terms as +akshara-samâmnâya, the meaning of 'syllable;' because +we have no right to disregard the settled meaning of a word; and +because another scriptural passage also ('The syllable Om is all +this,' Ch. Up. II, 23, 4) declares a syllable, represented as the +object of devotion, to be the Self of all.</p> +<p>To this we reply that the highest Self only is denoted by the +word 'akshara.'—Why?—Because it (the akshara) is said +to support the entire aggregate of effects, from earth up to ether. +For the sacred text declares at first that the entire aggregate of +effects beginning with earth and differentiated by threefold time +is based on ether, in which it is 'woven like warp and woof;' leads +then (by means of the question, 'In what then is the ether woven, +like warp and woof?') over to the akshara, and, finally, concludes +with the words, 'In that akshara then, O Gârgî, the +ether is woven, like warp and woof.'—Now the attribute of +supporting everything up to ether cannot be ascribed to any being +but Brahman. The text (quoted from the Ch. Up.) says indeed that +the syllable Om is all this, but that statement <span class= +"pagenum"><a name="page170" id="page170"></a>{170}</span> is to be +understood as a mere glorification of the syllable Om considered as +a means to obtain Brahman.—Therefore we take akshara to mean +either 'the Imperishable' or 'that which pervades;' on the ground +of either of which explanations it must be identified with the +highest Brahman.</p> +<p>But—our opponent resumes—while we must admit that +the above reasoning holds good so far that the circumstance of the +akshara supporting all things up to ether is to be accepted as a +proof of all effects depending on a cause, we point out that it may +be employed by those also who declare the pradhâna to be the +general cause. How then does the previous argumentation specially +establish Brahman (to the exclusion of the +pradhâna)?—The reply to this is given in the next +Sûtra.</p> +<p>11. This (supporting can), on account of the command (attributed +to the Imperishable, be the work of the highest Lord only).</p> +<p>The supporting of all things up to ether is the work of the +highest Lord only.—Why?—On account of the +command.—For the sacred text speaks of a command ('By the +command of that akshara, O Gârgî, sun and moon stand +apart!' III, 8, 9), and command can be the work of the highest Lord +only, not of the non-intelligent pradhâna. For +non-intelligent causes such as clay and the like are not capable of +command, with reference to their effects, such as jars and the +like.</p> +<p>12. And on account of (Scripture) separating (the akshara) from +that whose nature is different (from Brahman).</p> +<p>Also on account of the reason stated in this Sûtra Brahman +only is to be considered as the Imperishable, and the supporting of +all things up to ether is to be looked upon as the work of Brahman +only, not of anything else. The meaning of the Sûtra is as +follows. Whatever things other than Brahman might possibly be +thought to be denoted by the term 'akshara,' from the nature of all +those things Scripture separates the akshara spoken of as the +<span class="pagenum"><a name="page171" id= +"page171"></a>{171}</span> support of all things up to ether. The +scriptural passage alluded to is III, 8, 11, 'That akshara, O +Gârgî, is unseen but seeing, unheard but hearing, +unperceived but perceiving, unknown but knowing.' Here the +designation of being unseen, &c. agrees indeed with the +pradhâna also, but not so the designation of seeing, &c., +as the pradhâna is non-intelligent.—Nor can the word +akshara denote the embodied soul with its limiting conditions, for +the passage following on the one quoted declares that there is +nothing different from the Self ('there is nothing that sees but +it, nothing that hears but it, nothing that perceives but it, +nothing that knows but it'); and, moreover, limiting conditions are +expressly denied (of the akshara) in the passage, 'It is without +eyes, without ears, without speech, without mind,' &c. (III, 8, +8). An embodied soul without limiting conditions does not +exist<a id="footnotetag174" name="footnotetag174"></a><a href= +"#footnote174"><sup>174</sup></a>.—It is therefore certain +beyond doubt that the Imperishable is nothing else but the highest +Brahman.</p> +<p>13. On account of his being designated as the object of sight +(the highest Self is meant, and) the same (is meant in the passage +speaking of the meditation on the highest person by means of the +syllable Om).</p> +<p>(In Pra. Up. V, 2) the general topic of discussion is set forth +in the words, 'O Satyakâma, the syllable Om is the highest +and also the other Brahman; therefore he who knows it arrives by +the same means at one of the two.' The text then goes on, 'Again, +he who meditates with this syllable Om of three mâtrâs +on the highest Person,' &c.—Here the doubt presents +itself, whether the object of meditation referred to in the latter +passage is the highest Brahman or the other Brahman; a doubt based +on the former passage, according to which both are under +discussion.</p> +<p>The pûrvapakshin maintains that the other, i.e. the lower +<span class="pagenum"><a name="page172" id= +"page172"></a>{172}</span> Brahman, is referred to, because the +text promises only a reward limited by a certain locality for him +who knows it. For, as the highest Brahman is omnipresent, it would +be inappropriate to assume that he who knows it obtains a fruit +limited by a certain locality. The objection that, if the lower +Brahman were understood, there would be no room for the +qualification, 'the highest person,' is not valid, because the +vital principal (prâ<i>n</i>a) may be called 'higher' with +reference to the body<a id="footnotetag175" name= +"footnotetag175"></a><a href="#footnote175"><sup>175</sup></a>.</p> +<p>To this we make the following reply: What is here taught as the +object of meditation is the highest Brahman +only.—Why?—On account of its being spoken of as the +object of sight. For the person to be meditated upon is, in a +complementary passage, spoken of as the object of the act of +seeing, 'He sees the person dwelling in the castle (of the body; +purusham puri<i>s</i>ayam), higher than that one who is of the +shape of the individual soul, and who is himself higher (than the +senses and their objects).' Now, of an act of meditation an unreal +thing also can be the object, as, for instance, the merely +imaginary object of a wish. But of the act of seeing, real things +only are the objects, as we know from experience; we therefore +conclude, that in the passage last quoted, the highest (only real) +Self which corresponds to the mental act of complete +intuition<a id="footnotetag176" name="footnotetag176"></a><a href= +"#footnote176"><sup>176</sup></a> is spoken of as the object of +sight. This same highest Self we recognise in the passage under +discussion as the object of meditation, in consequence of the term, +'the highest person.'—But—an objection will be +raised—as the object of meditation we have the highest +person, and as the object of sight the person higher than that one +who is himself higher, &c.; how, then, are we to know that +those two are identical?—The two passages, we <span class= +"pagenum"><a name="page173" id="page173"></a>{173}</span> reply, +have in common the terms 'highest' (or 'higher,' para) and +'person.' And it must not by any means be supposed that the term +jîvaghana<a id="footnotetag177" name= +"footnotetag177"></a><a href="#footnote177"><sup>177</sup></a> +refers to that highest person which, considered as the object of +meditation, had previously been introduced as the general topic. +For the consequence of that supposition would be that that highest +person which is the object of sight would be different from that +highest person which is represented as the object of meditation. We +rather have to explain the word jîvaghana as 'He whose +shape<a id="footnotetag178" name="footnotetag178"></a><a href= +"#footnote178"><sup>178</sup></a> is characterised by the +jîvas;' so that what is really meant by that term is that +limited condition of the highest Self which is owing to its +adjuncts, and manifests itself in the form of jîvas, i.e. +individual souls; a condition analogous to the limitation of salt +(in general) by means of the mass of a particular lump of salt. +That limited condition of the Self may itself be called 'higher,' +if viewed with regard to the senses and their objects.</p> +<p>Another (commentator) says that we have to understand by the +word 'jîvaghana' the world of Brahman spoken of in the +preceding sentence ('by the Sâman verses he is led up to the +world of Brahman'), and again in the following sentence (v. 7), +which may be called 'higher,' because it is higher than the other +worlds. That world of Brahman may be called jîvaghana because +all individual souls (jîva) with their organs of action may +be viewed as comprised (sa@nghâta = ghana) within +Hira<i>n</i>yagarbha, who is the Self of all organs, and dwells in +the Brahma-world. We thus understand that he who is higher than +that jîvaghana, i.e. the highest Self, which constitutes the +object of sight, also constitutes the object of meditation. The +qualification, moreover, expressed in the term 'the highest person' +is in its place only if we understand the highest Self to be meant. +For the name, 'the highest person,' can be given only to the +highest Self, higher than which there is nothing. So another +scriptural passage also says, 'Higher than the person there is +nothing—this is the goal, the highest road.' Hence the +<span class="pagenum"><a name="page174" id= +"page174"></a>{174}</span> sacred text, which at first +distinguishes between the higher and the lower Brahman ('the +syllable Om is the higher and the lower Brahman'), and afterwards +speaks of the highest Person to be meditated upon by means of the +syllable Om, gives us to understand that the highest Person is +nothing else but the highest Brahman. That the highest Self +constitutes the object of meditation, is moreover intimated by the +passage declaring that release from evil is the fruit (of +meditation), 'As a snake is freed from its skin, so is he freed +from evil.'—With reference to the objection that a fruit +confined to a certain place is not an appropriate reward for him +who meditates on the highest Self, we finally remark that the +objection is removed, if we understand the passage to refer to +emancipation by degrees. He who meditates on the highest Self by +means of the syllable Om, as consisting of three +mâtrâs, obtains for his (first) reward the world of +Brahman, and after that, gradually, complete intuition.</p> +<p>14. The small (ether) (is Brahman) on account of the subsequent +(arguments).</p> +<p>We read (Ch. Up. VIII, 1, 1), 'There is this city of Brahman, +and in it the palace, the small lotus, and in it that small ether. +Now what exists within that small ether that is to be sought for, +that is to be understood,' &c.—Here the doubt arises +whether the small ether within the small lotus of the heart of +which Scripture speaks, is the elemental ether, or the individual +soul (vij<i>ñ</i>ânâtman), or the highest Self. +This doubt is caused by the words 'ether' and 'city of Brahman.' +For the word 'ether,' in the first place, is known to be used in +the sense of elemental ether as well as of highest Brahman. Hence +the doubt whether the small ether of the text be the elemental +ether or the highest ether, i.e. Brahman. In explanation of the +expression 'city of Brahman,' in the second place, it might be said +either that the individual soul is here called Brahman and the body +Brahman's city, or else that the city of Brahman means the city of +the highest Brahman. Here (i.e. in consequence of this latter +doubt) a further doubt arises as to <span class="pagenum"><a name= +"page175" id="page175"></a>{175}</span> the nature of the small +ether, according as the individual soul or the highest Self is +understood by the Lord of the city.</p> +<p>The pûrvapakshin maintains that by the small ether we have +to understand the elemental ether, since the latter meaning is the +conventional one of the word âkâ<i>s</i>a. The +elemental ether is here called small with reference to its small +abode (the heart).—In the passage, 'As large as this ether +is, so large is that ether within the heart,' it is represented as +constituting at the same time the two terms of a comparison, +because it is possible to make a distinction between the outer and +the inner ether<a id="footnotetag179" name= +"footnotetag179"></a><a href="#footnote179"><sup>179</sup></a>; and +it is said that 'heaven and earth are contained within it,' because +the whole ether, in so far as it is space, is one<a id= +"footnotetag180" name="footnotetag180"></a><a href= +"#footnote180"><sup>180</sup></a>.—Or else, the +pûrvapakshin continues, the 'small one' may be taken to mean +the individual soul, on account of the term, 'the city of Brahman.' +The body is here called the city of Brahman because it is the abode +of the individual soul; for it is acquired by means of the actions +of the soul. On this interpretation we must assume that the +individual soul is here called Brahman metaphorically. The highest +Brahman cannot be meant, because it is not connected with the body +as its lord. The lord of the city, i.e. the soul, is represented as +dwelling in one spot of the city (viz. the heart), just as a real +king resides in one spot of his residence. Moreover, the mind +(manas) constitutes the limiting adjunct of the individual soul, +and the mind chiefly abides in the heart; hence the individual soul +only can be spoken of as dwelling in the heart. Further, the +individual soul only can be spoken of as small, since it is +(elsewhere; <i>S</i>vet. Up. V, 8) compared in size to the point of +a goad. That it is compared (in the passage under discussion) to +the ether must be understood to intimate its non difference from +Brahman.—Nor <span class="pagenum"><a name="page176" id= +"page176"></a>{176}</span> does the scriptural passage say that the +'small' one is to be sought for and to be understood, since in the +clause, 'That which is within that,' &c., it is represented as +a mere distinguishing attribute of something else<a id= +"footnotetag181" name="footnotetag181"></a><a href= +"#footnote181"><sup>181</sup></a>.</p> +<p>To all this we make the following reply:—The small ether +can mean the highest Lord only, not either the elemental ether or +the individual soul.—Why?—On account of the subsequent +reasons, i.e. on account of the reasons implied in the +complementary passage. For there, the text declares at first, with +reference to the small ether, which is enjoined as the object of +sight, 'If they should say to him,' &c.; thereupon follows an +objection, 'What is there that deserves to be sought for or that is +to be understood?' and thereon a final decisive statement, 'Then he +should say: As large as this ether is, so large is that ether +within the heart. Both heaven and earth are contained within it.' +Here the teacher, availing himself of the comparison of the ether +within the heart with the known (universal) ether, precludes the +conception that the ether within the heart is small—which +conception is based on the statement as to the smallness of the +lotus, i.e. the heart—and thereby precludes the possibility +of our understanding by the term 'the small ether,' the elemental +ether. For, although the ordinary use of language gives to the word +'ether' the sense of elemental ether, here the elemental ether +cannot be thought of, because it cannot possibly be compared with +itself.—But, has it not been stated above, that the ether, +although one only, may be compared with itself, in consequence of +an assumed difference between the outer and the inner +ether?—That explanation, we reply, is impossible; for we +cannot admit that a comparison of a thing with itself may be based +upon a merely imaginary difference. And even if we admitted +<span class="pagenum"><a name="page177" id= +"page177"></a>{177}</span> the possibility of such a comparison, +the extent of the outer ether could never be ascribed to the +limited inner ether. Should it be said that to the highest Lord +also the extent of the (outer) ether cannot be ascribed, since +another scriptural passage declares that he is greater than ether +(<i>S</i>a. Brâ, X, 6, 3, 2), we invalidate this objection by +the remark, that the passage (comparing the inner ether with the +outer ether) has the purport of discarding the idea of smallness +(of the inner ether), which is primâ facie established by the +smallness of the lotus of the heart in which it is contained, and +has not the purport of establishing a certain extent (of the inner +ether). If the passage aimed at both, a split of the sentence<a id= +"footnotetag182" name="footnotetag182"></a><a href= +"#footnote182"><sup>182</sup></a> would result.—Nor, if we +allowed the assumptive difference of the inner and the outer ether, +would it be possible to represent that limited portion of the ether +which is enclosed in the lotus of the heart, as containing within +itself heaven, earth, and so on. Nor can we reconcile with the +nature of the elemental ether the qualities of Self-hood, freeness +from sin, and so on, (which are ascribed to the 'small' ether) in +the following passage, 'It is the Self free from sin, free from old +age, from death and grief, from hunger and thirst, of true desires, +of true purposes.'—Although the term 'Self' (occurring in the +passage quoted) may apply to the individual soul, yet other reasons +exclude all idea of the individual soul being meant (by the small +ether). For it would be impossible to dissociate from the +individual soul, which is restricted by limiting conditions and +elsewhere compared to the point of a goad, the attribute of +smallness attaching to it, on account of its being enclosed in the +lotus of the heart.—Let it then be assumed—our opponent +remarks—that the qualities of all-pervadingness, &c. are +ascribed to the individual soul with the intention of intimating +its non-difference from Brahman.—Well, we reply, if you +suppose that the small ether is called all-pervading because it is +one with Brahman, our own supposition, <span class= +"pagenum"><a name="page178" id="page178"></a>{178}</span> viz. that +the all-pervadingness spoken of is directly predicated of Brahman +itself, is the much more simple one.—Concerning the assertion +that the term 'city of Brahman' can only be understood, on the +assumption that the individual soul dwells, like a king, in one +particular spot of the city of which it is the Lord, we remark that +the term is more properly interpreted to mean 'the body in so far +as it is the city of the highest Brahman;' which interpretation +enables us to take the term 'Brahman' in its primary sense<a id= +"footnotetag183" name="footnotetag183"></a><a href= +"#footnote183"><sup>183</sup></a>. The highest Brahman also is +connected with the body, for the latter constitutes an abode for +the perception of Brahman<a id="footnotetag184" name= +"footnotetag184"></a><a href="#footnote184"><sup>184</sup></a>. +Other scriptural passages also express the same meaning, so, for +instance, Pra. Up. V, 5, 'He sees the highest person dwelling in +the city' (purusha = puri<i>s</i>aya), &c., and B<i>ri</i>. Up. +II, 5, 18, 'This person (purusha) is in all cities (bodies) the +dweller within the city (puri<i>s</i>aya).'—Or else (taking +brahmapura to mean jîvapura) we may understand the passage to +teach that Brahman is, in the city of the individual soul, near (to +the devout worshipper), just as Vish<i>n</i>u is near to us in the +Sâlagrâma-stone.—Moreover, the text (VIII, 1, 6) +at first declares the result of works to be perishable ('as here on +earth whatever has been acquired by works perishes, so perishes +whatever is acquired for the next world by good actions,' &c.), +and afterwards declares the imperishableness of the results flowing +from a knowledge of the small ether, which forms the general +subject of discussion ('those who depart from hence after having +discovered the Self and those true desires, for them there is +freedom in all worlds'). From this again it is manifest that the +small ether is the highest Self.—We now turn to the statement +made by the pûrvapakshin,'that the sacred text does not +represent the small ether as that <span class="pagenum"><a name= +"page179" id="page179"></a>{179}</span> which is to be sought for +and to be understood, because it is mentioned as a distinguishing +attribute of something else,' and reply as follows: If the (small) +ether were not that which is to be sought for and to be understood, +the description of the nature of that ether, which is given in the +passage ('as large as this ether is, so large is that ether within +the heart'), would be devoid of purport.—But—the +opponent might say—that descriptive statement also has the +purport of setting forth the nature of the thing abiding within +(the ether); for the text after having raised an objection (in the +passage, 'And if they should say to him: Now with regard to that +city of Brahman and the palace in it, i.e. the small lotus of the +heart, and the small ether within the heart, what is there within +it that deserves to be sought for or that is to be understood?') +declares, when replying to that objection, that heaven, earth, and +so on, are contained within it (the ether), a declaration to which +the comparison with the ether forms a mere introduction.—Your +reasoning, we reply, is faulty. If it were admitted, it would +follow that heaven, earth, &c., which are contained within the +small ether, constitute the objects of search and enquiry. But in +that case the complementary passage would be out of place. For the +text carrying on, as the subject of discussion, the ether that is +the abode of heaven, earth, &c.—by means of the clauses, +'In it all desires are contained,' 'It is the Self free from sin,' +&c., and the passage, 'But those who depart from hence having +discovered the Self, and the true desires' (in which passage the +conjunction 'and' has the purpose of joining the desires to the +Self)—declares that the Self as well, which is the abode of +the desires, as the desires which abide in the Self, are the +objects of knowledge. From this we conclude that in the beginning +of the passage also, the small ether abiding within the lotus of +the heart, together with whatever is contained within it as earth, +true desires, and so on, is represented as the object of knowledge. +And, for the reasons explained, that ether is the highest Lord.</p> +<p>15. (The small ether is Brahman) on account of <span class= +"pagenum"><a name="page180" id="page180"></a>{180}</span> the +action of going (into Brahman) and of the word (brahmaloka); for +thus it is seen (i.e. that the individual souls go into Brahman is +seen elsewhere in Scripture); and (this going of the souls into +Brahman constitutes) an inferential sign (by means of which we may +properly interpret the word 'brahmaloka').</p> +<p>It has been declared (in the preceding Sûtra) that the +small (ether) is the highest Lord, on account of the reasons +contained in the subsequent passages. These subsequent reasons are +now set forth.—For this reason also the small (ether) can be +the highest Lord only, because the passage complementary to the +passage concerning the small (ether) contains a mention of going +and a word, both of which intimate the highest Lord. In the first +place, we read (Ch. Up. VIII, 3, 2), 'All these creatures, day +after day going into that Brahma-world, do not discover it.' This +passage which refers back, by means of the word 'Brahma-world,' to +the small ether which forms the general subject-matter, speaks of +the going to it of the creatures, i.e. the individual souls, +wherefrom we conclude that the small (ether) is Brahman. For this +going of the individual souls into Brahman, which takes place day +after day in the state of deep sleep, is seen, i.e. is met with in +another scriptural passage, viz. Ch. Up. VI, 8, 1, 'He becomes +united with the True,' &c. In ordinary life also we say of a +man who lies in deep sleep, 'he has become Brahman,' 'he is gone +into the state of Brahman.'—In the second place, the word +'Brahma-world,' which is here applied to the small (ether) under +discussion, excludes all thought of the individual soul or the +elemental ether, and thus gives us to understand that the small +(ether) is Brahman.—But could not the word 'Brahma-world' +convey as well the idea of the world of him whose throne is the +lotus<a id="footnotetag185" name="footnotetag185"></a><a href= +"#footnote185"><sup>185</sup></a>?—It might do so indeed, if +we explained the compound 'Brahma-world' as 'the world of Brahman.' +But if we explain it on the ground of the coordination of both +members of the compound—so that <span class= +"pagenum"><a name="page181" id="page181"></a>{181}</span> +'Brahma-world' denotes that world which is Brahman—then it +conveys the idea of the highest Brahman only.—And that daily +going (of the souls) into Brahman (mentioned above) is, moreover, +an inferential sign for explaining the compound 'Brahma-world,' on +the ground of the co-ordination of its two constituent members. For +it would be impossible to assume that all those creatures daily go +into the world of the effected (lower) Brahman; which world is +commonly called the Satyaloka, i.e. the world of the True.</p> +<p>16. And on account of the supporting also (attributed to it), +(the small ether must be the Lord) because that greatness is +observed in him (according to other scriptural passages).</p> +<p>And also on account of the 'supporting' the small ether can be +the highest Lord only.—How?—The text at first +introduces the general subject of discussion in the passage, 'In it +is that small ether;' declares thereupon that the small one is to +be compared with the universal ether, and that everything is +contained in it; subsequently applies to it the term 'Self,' and +states it to possess the qualities of being free from sin, &c.; +and, finally, declares with reference to the same general subject +of discussion, 'That Self is a bank, a limitary support +(vidh<i>ri</i>ti), that these worlds may not be confounded.' As +'support' is here predicated of the Self, we have to understand by +it a supporting agent. Just as a dam stems the spreading water so +that the boundaries of the fields are not confounded, so that Self +acts like a limitary dam in order that these outer and inner +worlds, and all the different castes and â<i>s</i>ramas may +not be confounded. In accordance with this our text declares that +greatness, which is shown in the act of holding asunder, to belong +to the small (ether) which forms the subject of discussion; and +that such greatness is found in the highest Lord only, is seen from +other scriptural passages, such as 'By the command of that +Imperishable, O Gârgî, sun and moon; are held apart' +(B<i>ri</i>. Up. III, 8, 9). Similarly, we read in another passage +also, about whose referring to the highest <span class= +"pagenum"><a name="page182" id="page182"></a>{182}</span> Lord +there is no doubt, 'He is the Lord of all, the king of all things, +the protector of all things. He is a bank and a limitary support, +so that these worlds may not be confounded' (B<i>ri</i>. Up. IV, 4, +22)—Hence, on account of the 'supporting,' also the small +(ether) is nothing else but the highest Lord.</p> +<p>17. And on account of the settled meaning.</p> +<p>The small ether within cannot denote anything but the highest +Lord for this reason also, that the word 'ether' has (among other +meanings) the settled meaning of 'highest Lord.' Compare, for +instance, the sense in which the word 'ether' is used in Ch. Up. +VIII, 14, 'He who is called ether is the revealer of all forms and +names;' and Ch. Up. I, 9, 1, 'All these beings take their rise from +the ether,' &c. On the other hand, we do not meet with any +passage in which the word 'ether' is used in the sense of +'individual soul.'—We have already shown that the word +cannot, in our passage, denote the elemental ether; for, although +the word certainly has that settled meaning, it cannot have it +here, because the elemental ether cannot possibly be compared to +itself, &c. &c.</p> +<p>18. If it be said that the other one (i.e. the individual soul) +(is meant) on account of a reference to it (made in a complementary +passage), (we say) no, on account of the impossibility.</p> +<p>If the small (ether) is to be explained as the highest Lord on +account of a complementary passage, then, the pûrvapakshin +resumes, we point out that another complementary passage contains a +reference to the other one, i.e. to the individual soul: 'Now that +serene being (literally: serenity, complete satisfaction), which +after having risen out from this earthly body and having reached +the highest light, appears in its true form, that is, the Self; +thus he spoke' (Ch. Up. VIII, 3, 4). For there the word 'serenity,' +which is known to denote, in another scriptural passage, the state +of deep sleep, can convey the idea of the individual soul only when +it is in <span class="pagenum"><a name="page183" id= +"page183"></a>{183}</span> that state, not of anything else. The +'rising from the body' also can be predicated of the individual +soul only whose abode the body is; just as air, &c., whose +abode is the ether, are said to arise from the ether. And just as +the word 'ether,' although in ordinary language not denoting the +highest Lord, yet is admitted to denote him in such passages as, +'The ether is the revealer of forms and names,' because it there +occurs in conjunction with qualities of the highest Lord, so it may +likewise denote the individual soul Hence the term 'the small +ether' denotes in the passage under discussion the individual soul, +'on account of the reference to the other.'</p> +<p>Not so, we reply, 'on account of the impossibility.' In the +first place, the individual soul, which imagines itself to be +limited by the internal organ and its other adjuncts, cannot be +compared with the ether. And, in the second place, attributes such +as freedom from evil, and the like, cannot be ascribed to a being +which erroneously transfers to itself the attributes of its +limiting adjuncts. This has already been set forth in the first +Sûtra of the present adhikara<i>n</i>a, and is again +mentioned here in order to remove all doubt as to the soul being +different from the highest Self. That the reference pointed out by +the pûrvapakshin is not to the individual soul will, +moreover, be shown in one of the next Sûtras (I, 3, 21).</p> +<p>19. If it be said that from the subsequent (chapter it appears +that the individual soul is meant), (we point out that what is +there referred to is) rather (the individual soul in so far) as its +true nature has become manifest (i.e. as it is non-different from +Brahman).</p> +<p>The doubt whether, 'on account of the reference to the other,' +the individual soul might not possibly be meant, has been discarded +on the ground of 'impossibility.' But, like a dead man on whom +am<i>ri</i>ta has been sprinkled, that doubt rises again, drawing +new strength from the subsequent chapter which treats of +Prajâpati. For there he (Prajâpati) <span class= +"pagenum"><a name="page184" id="page184"></a>{184}</span> at the +outset declares that the Self, which is free from sin and the like, +is that which is to be searched out, that which we must try to +understand (Ch. Up. VIII, 7, 1); after that he points out that the +seer within the eye, i.e. the individual soul, is the Self ('that +person that is seen in the eye is the Self,' VIII, 7, 3); refers +again and again to the same entity (in the clauses 'I shall explain +him further to you,' VIII, 9, 3; VIII, 10, 4); and (in the +explanations fulfilling the given promises) again explains the +(nature of the) same individual soul in its different states ('He +who moves about happy in dreams is the Self,' VIII, 10, 1; 'When a +man being asleep, reposing, and at perfect rest sees no dreams, +that is the Self,' VIII, 11, 1). The clause attached to both these +explanations (viz. 'That is the immortal, the fearless; that is +Brahman') shows, at the same time, the individual soul to be free +from sin, and the like. After that Prajâpati, having +discovered a shortcoming in the condition of deep sleep (in +consequence of the expostulation of Indra, 'In that way he does not +know himself that he is I, nor does he know these beings,' VIII, +11, 2), enters on a further explanation ('I shall explain him +further to you, and nothing more than this'), begins by blaming the +(soul's) connexion with the body, and finally declares the +individual soul, when it has risen from the body, to be the highest +person. ('Thus does that serene being, arising from this body, +appear in its own form as soon as it has approached the highest +light. That is the highest person.')—From this it appears +that there is a possibility of the qualities of the highest Lord +belonging to the individual soul also, and on that account we +maintain that the term, 'the small ether within it,' refers to the +individual soul.</p> +<p>This position we counter-argue as follows. 'But in so far as its +nature has become manifest.' The particle 'but' (in the +Sûtra) is meant to set aside the view of the +pûrvapakshin, so that the sense of the Sûtra is, 'Not +even on account of the subsequent chapter a doubt as to the small +ether being the individual soul is possible, because there also +that which is meant to be intimated is the individual soul, in so +far only as its (true) nature has become manifest.' The Sûtra +uses the expression 'he whose nature has become manifest,' +<span class="pagenum"><a name="page185" id= +"page185"></a>{185}</span> which qualifies jîva., the +individual soul, with reference to its previous condition<a id= +"footnotetag186" name="footnotetag186"></a><a href= +"#footnote186"><sup>186</sup></a>.—The meaning is as follows. +Prajâpati speaks at first of the seer characterised by the +eye ('That person which is within the eye,' &c.); shows +thereupon, in the passage treating of (the reflection in) the +waterpan, that he (viz. the seer) has not his true Self in the +body; refers to him repeatedly as the subject to be explained (in +the clauses 'I shall explain him further to you'); and having then +spoken of him as subject to the states of dreaming and deep sleep, +finally explains the individual soul in its real nature, i.e. in so +far as it is the highest Brahman, not in so far as it is individual +soul ('As soon as it has approached the highest light it appears in +its own form'). The highest light mentioned, in the passage last +quoted, as what is to be approached, is nothing else but the +highest Brahman, which is distinguished by such attributes as +freeness from sin, and the like. That same highest Brahman +constitutes—as we know from passages such as 'that art +thou'—the real nature of the individual soul, while its +second nature, i.e. that aspect of it which depends on fictitious +limiting conditions, is not its real nature. For as long as the +individual soul does not free itself from Nescience in the form of +duality—which Nescience may be compared to the mistake of him +who in the twilight mistakes a post for a man—and does not +rise to the knowledge of the Self, whose nature is unchangeable, +eternal Cognition—which expresses itself in the form 'I am +Brahman'—so long it remains the individual soul. But when, +discarding the aggregate of body, sense-organs and mind, it +arrives, by means of Scripture, at the knowledge that it is not +itself that aggregate, that it does not form part of transmigratory +existence, but is the True, the Real, the Self, whose nature is +pure intelligence; then <span class="pagenum"><a name="page186" id= +"page186"></a>{186}</span> knowing itseif to be of the nature of +unchangeable, eternal Cognition, it lifts itself above the vain +conceit of being one with this body, and itself becomes the Self, +whose nature is unchanging, eternal Cognition. As is declared in +such scriptural passages as 'He who knows the highest Brahman +becomes even Brahman' (Mu. Up. III, 2, 9). And this is the real +nature of the individual soul by means of which it arises from the +body and appears in its own form.</p> +<p>Here an objection may be raised. How, it is asked, can we speak +of the true nature (svarûpa) of that which is unchanging and +eternal, and then say that 'it appears in its own form (true +nature)?' Of gold and similar substances, whose true nature becomes +hidden, and whose specific qualities are rendered non-apparent by +their contact with some other substance, it may be said that their +true nature is rendered manifest when they are cleaned by the +application of some acid substance; so it may be said, likewise, +that the stars, whose light is during daytime overpowered (by the +superior brilliancy of the sun), become manifest in their true +nature at night when the overpowering (sun) has departed. But it is +impossible to speak of an analogous overpowering of the eternal +light of intelligence by whatever agency, since, like ether, it is +free from all contact, and since, moreover, such an assumption +would be contradicted by what we actually observe. For the +(energies of) seeing, hearing, noticing, cognising constitute the +character of the individual soul, and that character is observed to +exist in full perfection, even in the case of that individual soul +which has not yet risen beyond the body. Every individual soul +carries on the course of its practical existence by means of the +activities of seeing, hearing, cognising; otherwise no practical +existence at all would be possible. If, on the other hand, that +character would realise itself in the case of that soul only which +has risen above the body, the entire aggregate of practical +existence, as it actually presents itself prior to the soul's +rising, would thereby be contradicted. We therefore ask: Wherein +consists that (alleged) rising from the body? Wherein consists that +appearing (of the soul) in its own form?</p> +<p>To this we make the following reply.—Before the rise of +<span class="pagenum"><a name="page187" id= +"page187"></a>{187}</span> discriminative knowledge the nature of +the individual soul, which is (in reality) pure light, is +non-discriminated as it were from its limiting adjuncts consisting +of body, senses, mind, sense-objects and feelings, and appears as +consisting of the energies of seeing and so on. Similarly—to +quote an analogous case from ordinary experience—the true +nature of a pure crystal, i.e. its transparency and whiteness, is, +before the rise of discriminative knowledge (on the part of the +observer), non-discriminated as it were from any limiting adjuncts +of red or blue colour; while, as soon as through some means of true +cognition discriminative knowledge has arisen, it is said to have +now accomplished its true nature, i.e. transparency and whiteness, +although in reality it had already done so before. Thus the +discriminative knowledge, effected by <i>S</i>ruti, on the part of +the individual soul which previously is non-discriminated as it +were from its limiting adjuncts, is (according to the scriptural +passage under discussion) the soul's rising from the body, and the +fruit of that discriminative knowledge is its accomplishment in its +true nature, i.e. the comprehension that its nature is the pure +Self. Thus the embodiedness and the non-embodiedness of the Self +are due merely to discrimination and non-discrimination, in +agreement with the mantra, 'Bodiless within the bodies,' &c. +(Ka. Up. I, 2, 22), and the statement of Sm<i>ri</i>ti as to the +non-difference between embodiedness and non-embodiedness 'Though +dwelling in the body, O Kaunteya, it does not act and is not +tainted' (Bha. Gî. XIII, 31). The individual soul is +therefore called 'That whose true nature is non-manifest' merely on +account of the absence of discriminative knowledge, and it is +called 'That whose nature has become manifest' on account of the +presence of such knowledge. Manifestation and non-manifestation of +its nature of a different kind are not possible, since its nature +is nothing but its nature (i.e. in reality is always the same). +Thus the difference between the individual soul and the highest +Lord is owing to wrong knowledge only, not to any reality, since, +like ether, the highest Self is not in real contact with +anything.</p> +<p>And wherefrom is all this to be known?—From the +instruction <span class="pagenum"><a name="page188" id= +"page188"></a>{188}</span> given by Prajâpati who, after +having referred to the jîva ('the person that is seen in the +eye,' &c.), continues 'This is the immortal, the fearless, this +is Brahman.' If the well-known seer within the eye were different +from Brahman which is characterised as the immortal and fearless, +it would not be co-ordinated (as it actually is) with the immortal, +the fearless, and Brahman. The reflected Self, on the other hand, +is not spoken of as he who is characterised by the eye (the seer +within the eye), for that would render Prajâpati obnoxious to +the reproach of saying deceitful things.—So also, in the +second section, the passage, 'He who moves about happy in dreams,' +&c. does not refer to a being different from the seeing person +within the eye spoken of in the first chapter, (but treats of the +same topic) as appears from the introductory clause, 'I shall +explain him further to you.' Moreover<a id="footnotetag187" name= +"footnotetag187"></a><a href="#footnote187"><sup>187</sup></a>, a +person who is conscious of having seen an elephant in a dream and +of no longer seeing it when awake discards in the waking state the +object which he had seen (in his sleep), but recognises himself +when awake to be the same person who saw something in the +dream.—Thus in the third section also Prajâpati does +indeed declare the absence of all particular cognition in the state +of deep sleep, but does not contest the identity of the cognising +Self ('In that way he does not know himself that he is I, nor all +these beings'). The following clause also, 'He is gone to utter +annihilation,' is meant to intimate only the annihilation of all +specific cognition, not the annihilation of the cogniser. For there +is no destruction of the knowing of the knower as—according +to another scriptural passage (B<i>ri</i>. Up. IV, 3, +30)—that is imperishable.—Thus, again, in the fourth +section the introductory phrase of Prajâpati is, 'I shall +explain him further to you and nothing different from this;' he +thereupon refutes the connexion (of the Self) with the body and +other limiting conditions ('Maghavat, this body is mortal,' +&c.), shows the individual soul—which is there called +'the serene being'—in <span class="pagenum"><a name="page189" +id="page189"></a>{189}</span> the state when it has reached the +nature of Brahman ('It appears in its own form'), and thus proves +the soul to be non-different from the highest Brahman whose +characteristics are immortality and fearlessness.</p> +<p>Some (teachers) however are of opinion that if the highest Self +is meant (in the fourth section) it would be inappropriate to +understand the words 'This (him) I will explain further,' &c., +as referring to the individual soul, and therefore suppose that the +reference is (not to the individual soul forming the topic of the +three preceding sections, but) to the Self possessing the qualities +of freeness from sin, &c., which Self is pointed out at the +beginning of the entire chapter (VII, 1).—Against this +interpretation we remark that, in the first place, it disregards +the direct enunciation of the pronoun (i.e. the 'this' in 'this I +will explain') which rests on something approximate (i.e. refers to +something mentioned not far off), and, in the second place, is +opposed to the word 'further' (or 'again') met with in the text, +since from that interpretation it would follow that what had been +discussed in the preceding sections is not again discussed in the +subsequent section. Moreover, if Prajâpati, after having made +a promise in the clause, 'This I shall explain' (where that clause +occurs for the first time), did previously to the fourth section +explain a different topic in each section, we should have to +conclude that he acted deceitfully.—Hence (our opinion about +the purport of the whole chapter remains valid, viz. that it sets +forth how) the unreal aspect of the individual soul as +such—which is a mere presentation of Nescience, is stained by +all the desires and aversions attached to agents and enjoyers, and +is connected with evils of various kinds—is dissolved by true +knowledge, and how the soul is thus led over into the opposite +state, i.e. into its true state in which it is one with the highest +Lord and distinguished by freedom from sin and similar attributes. +The whole process is similar to that by which an imagined snake +passes over into a rope as soon as the mind of the beholder has +freed itself from its erroneous imagination.</p> +<p>Others again, and among them some of ours +(asmadîyâ<i>s</i> <i>k</i>a. ke<i>k</i>it), are of +opinion that the individual soul as such <span class= +"pagenum"><a name="page190" id="page190"></a>{190}</span> is real. +To the end of refuting all these speculators who obstruct the way +to the complete intuition of the unity of the Self this +<i>s</i>ârîraka-<i>s</i>âstra has been set forth, +whose aim it is to show that there is only one highest Lord ever +unchanging, whose substance is cognition<a id="footnotetag188" +name="footnotetag188"></a><a href= +"#footnote188"><sup>188</sup></a>, and who, by means of Nescience, +manifests himself in various ways, just as a thaumaturg appears in +different shapes by means of his magical power. Besides that Lord +there is no other substance of cognition.—If, now, the +Sûtrakâra raises and refutes the doubt whether a +certain passage which (in reality) refers to the Lord does refer to +the individual soul, as he does in this and the preceding +Sûtras<a id="footnotetag189" name= +"footnotetag189"></a><a href="#footnote189"><sup>189</sup></a>, he +does so for the following purpose. To the highest Self which is +eternally pure, intelligent and free, which is never changing, one +only, not in contact with anything, devoid of form, the opposite +characteristics of the individual soul are erroneously ascribed; +just as ignorant men ascribe blue colour to the colourless ether. +In order to remove this erroneous opinion by means of Vedic +passages tending either to prove the unity of the Self or to +disprove the doctrine of duality—which passages he +strengthens by arguments—he insists on the difference of the +highest Self from the individual soul, does however not mean to +prove thereby that the soul is different from the highest Self, +but, whenever speaking of the soul, refers to its distinction (from +the Self) as forming an item of ordinary thought, due to the power +of Nescience. For thus, he thinks, the Vedic injunctions of works +which are given with a view to the states of acting and enjoying, +natural (to the non-enlightened soul), are not +stultified.—That, however, the absolute unity of the Self is +the real purport of the <i>s</i>âstra's teaching, the +Sûtrakâra declares, for instance, in I, 1, 30<a id= +"footnotetag190" name="footnotetag190"></a><a href= +"#footnote190"><sup>190</sup></a>. The refutation of the reproach +of <span class="pagenum"><a name="page191" id= +"page191"></a>{191}</span> futility raised against the injunctions +of works has already been set forth by us, on the ground of the +distinction between such persons as possess full knowledge, and +such as do not.</p> +<p>20. And the reference (to the individual soul) has a different +meaning.</p> +<p>The alleged reference to the individual soul which has been +pointed out (by the pûrvapakshin) in the passage +complementary to the passage about the small ether ('Now that +serene being,' &c., VIII, 3, 4) teaches, if the small ether is +interpreted to mean the highest Lord, neither the worship of the +individual soul nor any qualification of the subject under +discussion (viz. the small ether), and is therefore devoid of +meaning.—On that account the Sûtra declares that the +reference has another meaning, i.e. that the reference to the +individual soul is not meant to determine the nature of the +individual soul, but rather the nature of the highest Lord. In the +following manner. The individual soul which, in the passage +referred to, is called the serene being, acts in the waking state +as the ruler of the aggregate comprising the body and the +sense-organs; permeates in sleep the na<i>d</i>îs of the +body, and enjoys the dream visions resulting from the impressions +of the waking state; and, finally, desirous of reaching an inner +refuge, rises in the state of deep sleep beyond its imagined +connexion with the gross and the subtle body, reaches the highest +light, i.e. the highest Brahman previously called ether, and thus +divesting itself of the state of specific cognition appears in its +own (true) nature. The highest light which the soul is to reach and +through which it is manifested in its true nature is the Self, free +from sin and so on, which is there represented as the object of +worship.—In this sense the reference to the individual soul +can be admitted by those also who maintain that in reality the +highest Lord is meant.</p> +<p>21. If it be said that on account of the scriptural <span class= +"pagenum"><a name="page192" id="page192"></a>{192}</span> +declaration of the smallness (of the ether) (the Lord cannot be +meant; we reply that) that has been explained (before).</p> +<p>The pûrvapakshin has remarked that the smallness of the +ether stated by Scripture ('In it is that small ether') does not +agree with the highest Lord, that it may however be predicated of +the individual soul which (in another passage) is compared to the +point of a goad. As that remark calls for a refutation we point out +that it has been refuted already, it having been shown—under +I, 2, 7—that a relative smallness may be attributed to the +Lord. The same refutation is—as the Sûtra points +out—to be applied here also.—That smallness is, +moreover, contradicted by that scriptural passage which compares +(the ether within the heart) with the known (universal) ether. ('As +large as is this ether so large is the ether within the +heart.')</p> +<p>22. On account of the acting after (i.e. the shining after), +(that after which sun, moon, &c. are said to shine is the +highest Self), and (because by the light) of him (all this is said +to be lighted).</p> +<p>We read (Mu. Up. II, 2, 10, and Ka. Up. V, 15), 'The sun does +not shine there, nor the moon and the stars, nor these lightnings, +much less this fire. After him when he shines everything shines; by +the light of him all this is lighted.' The question here arises +whether he 'after whom when he shines everything shines, and by +whose light all this is lighted,' is some luminous substance, or +the highest Self (prâj<i>ñ</i>a âtman).</p> +<p>A luminous substance, the pûrvapakshin +maintains.—Why?—Because the passage denies the shining +only of such luminous bodies as the sun and the like. It is known +(from every-day experience) that luminous bodies such as the moon +and the stars do not shine at daytime when the sun, which is itself +a luminous body, is shining. Hence we infer that that thing on +account of which all this, including the moon, the stars, and the +sun himself, does not <span class="pagenum"><a name="page193" id= +"page193"></a>{193}</span> shine is likewise a thing of light. The +'shining after' also is possible only if there is a luminous body +already, for we know from experience that 'acting after' +(imitation) of any kind takes place only when there are more than +one agent of similar nature; one man, for instance, walks after +another man who walks himself. Therefore we consider it settled +that the passage refers to some luminous body.</p> +<p>To this we reply that the highest Self only can be +meant.—Why?—On account of the acting after. The shining +after mentioned in the passage, 'After him when he shines +everything shines,' is possible only if the +prâj<i>ñ</i>a Self, i.e. the highest Self, is +understood. Of that prâj<i>ñ</i>a Self another +scriptural passage says, 'His form is light, his thoughts are true' +(Ch. Up. III, 14, 2). On the other hand, it is not by any means +known that the sun, &c. shines after some other luminous body. +Moreover, on account of the equality of nature of all luminous +bodies such as the sun and the like, there is no need for them of +any other luminous body after which they should shine; for we see +that a lamp, for instance, does not 'shine after' another lamp. Nor +is there any such absolute rule (as the pûrvapakshin +asserted) that acting after is observed only among things of +similar nature. It is rather observed among things of dissimilar +nature also; for a red-hot iron ball acts after, i.e. burns after +the burning fire, and the dust of the ground blows (is blown) after +the blowing wind.—The clause 'on account of the acting after' +(which forms part of the Sûtra) points to the shining after +(mentioned in the scriptural <i>s</i>loka under discussion); the +clause 'and of him' points to the fourth pâda of the same +<i>s</i>loka. The meaning of this latter clause is that the cause +assigned for the light of the sun, &c. (in the passage 'by the +light of him everything is lighted') intimates the +prâj<i>ñ</i>a Self. For of that Self Scripture says, +'Him the gods worship as the light of lights, as immortal time' +(B<i>ri</i>. Up. IV, 4, 16). That, on the other hand, the light of +the sun, the moon, &c, should shine by some other (physical) +light is, in the first place, not known; and, in the second place, +absurd <span class="pagenum"><a name="page194" id= +"page194"></a>{194}</span> as one (physical) light is counteracted +by another.—Or else the cause assigned for the shining does +not apply only to the sun and the other bodies mentioned in the +<i>s</i>loka; but the meaning (of the last pâda) rather +is—as we may conclude from the comprehensive statement 'all +this'—that the manifestation of this entire world consisting +of names and forms, acts, agents and fruits (of action) has for its +cause the existence of the light of Brahman; just as the existence +of the light of the sun is the cause of the manifestation of all +form and colour.—Moreover, the text shows by means of the +word 'there' ('the sun does not shine there,' &c.) that the +passage is to be connected with the general topic, and that topic +is Brahman as appears from Mu. Up. II, 2, 5, 'In whom the heaven, +the earth, and the sky are woven,' &c. The same appears from a +passage subsequent (on the one just quoted and immediately +preceding the passage under discussion). 'In the highest golden +sheath there is the Brahman without passion and without parts; that +is pure, that is the light of lights, that is it which they know +who know the Self.' This passage giving rise to the question, 'How +is it the light of lights?' there is occasion for the reply given +in 'The sun does not shine there,' &c.—In refutation of +the assertion that the shining of luminous bodies such as the sun +and the moon can be denied only in case of there being another +luminous body—as, for instance, the light of the moon and the +stars is denied only when the sun is shining—we point out +that it has been shown that he (the Self) only can be the luminous +being referred to, nothing else. And it is quite possible to deny +the shining of sun, moon, and so on with regard to Brahman; for +whatever is perceived is perceived by the light of Brahman only so +that sun, moon, &c. can be said to shine in it; while Brahman +as self-luminous is not perceived by means of any other light. +Brahman manifests everything else, but is not manifested by +anything else; according to such scriptural passages as, 'By the +Self alone as his light man sits,' &c. (B<i>ri</i>. Up. IV, 3, +6), and 'He is incomprehensible, for he cannot be comprehended +'(B<i>ri</i>. Up. IV, 2, 4).</p> +<span class="pagenum"><a name="page195" id= +"page195"></a>{195}</span> +<p>23. Moreover Sm<i>ri</i>ti also speaks of him (i.e. of the +prâj<i>ñ</i>a Self as being the universal light).</p> +<p>Moreover that aspect of the prâj<i>ñ</i>a Self is +spoken of in Sm<i>ri</i>ti also, viz. in the Bhagavad +Gîtâ (XV, 6, 12), 'Neither the sun, nor the moon, nor +the fire illumines that; having gone into which men do not return, +that is my highest seat.' And 'The light which abiding in the sun +illumines the whole world, and that which is in the moon and that +which is in the fire, all that light know to be mine.'</p> +<p>24. On account of the term, (viz. the term 'lord' applied to it) +the (person) measured (by a thumb) (is the highest Lord).</p> +<p>We read (Ka. Up. II, 4, 12), 'The person of the size of a thumb +stands in the middle of the Self,' &c., and (II, 4, 13), 'That +person, of the size of a thumb, is like a light without smoke, lord +of the past and of the future, he is the same to-day and to-morrow. +This is that.'—The question here arises whether the person of +the size of a thumb mentioned in the text is the cognitional +(individual) Self or the highest Self.</p> +<p>The pûrvapakshin maintains that on account of the +declaration of the person's size the cognitional Self is meant. For +to the highest Self which is of infinite length and breadth +Scripture would not ascribe the measure of a span; of the +cognitional Self, on the other hand, which is connected with +limiting adjuncts, extension of the size of a span may, by means of +some fictitious assumption, be predicated. Sm<i>ri</i>ti also +confirms this, 'Then Yama drew forth, by force, from the body of +Satyavat the person of the size of a thumb tied to Yama's noose and +helpless' (Mahâbh. III, 16763). For as Yama could not pull +out by force the highest Self, the passage is clearly seen to refer +to the transmigrating (individual soul) of the size of a thumb, and +we thence infer that the same Self is meant in the Vedic passage +under discussion.</p> +<p>To this we reply that the person a thumb long can only +<span class="pagenum"><a name="page196" id= +"page196"></a>{196}</span> be the highest Lord.—Why?—On +account of the term 'lord of the past and of the future.' For none +but the highest Lord is the absolute ruler of the past and the +future.—Moreover, the clause 'this is that' connects the +passage with that which had been enquired about, and therefore +forms the topic of discussion. And what had been enquired about is +Brahman, 'That which thou seest as neither this nor that, as +neither effect nor cause, as neither past nor future, tell me that' +(I, 2, 14).—'On account of the term,' i.e. on account of the +direct statement, in the text, of a designation, viz. the term +'Lord,' we understand that the highest Lord is meant<a id= +"footnotetag191" name="footnotetag191"></a><a href= +"#footnote191"><sup>191</sup></a>.—But still the question +remains how a certain extension can be attributed to the +omnipresent highest Self.—The reply to this is given, in the +next Sûtra.</p> +<p>25. But with reference to the heart (the highest Self is said to +be of the size of a span), as men are entitled (to the study of the +Veda).</p> +<p>The measure of a span is ascribed to the highest Lord, although +omnipresent with reference to his abiding within the heart; just as +to ether (space) the measure of a cubit is ascribed with reference +to the joint of a bamboo. For, on the one hand, the measure of a +span cannot be ascribed directly to the highest Self which exceeds +all measure, and, on the other hand, it has been shown that none +but the highest Lord can be meant here, on account of the term +'Lord,' and so on.—But—an objection may be +raised—as the size of the heart varies in the different +classes of living beings it cannot be maintained that the +declaration <span class="pagenum"><a name="page197" id= +"page197"></a>{197}</span> of the highest Self being of the size of +a thumb can be explained with reference to the heart.—To this +objection the second half of the Sûtra replies: On account of +men (only) being entitled. For the <i>s</i>âstra, although +propounded without distinction (i.e. although not itself specifying +what class of beings is to proceed according to its precepts), does +in reality entitle men<a id="footnotetag192" name= +"footnotetag192"></a><a href="#footnote192"><sup>192</sup></a> only +(to act according to its precepts); for men only (of the three +higher castes) are, firstly, capable (of complying with the +precepts of the <i>s</i>âstra); are, secondly, desirous (of +the results of actions enjoined by the <i>s</i>âstra); are, +thirdly, not excluded by prohibitions; and are, fourthly, subject +to the precepts about the upanayana ceremony and so on<a id= +"footnotetag193" name="footnotetag193"></a><a href= +"#footnote193"><sup>193</sup></a>. This point has been explained in +the section treating of the definition of adhikâra +(Pûrva Mîm. S. VI, 1).—Now the human body has +ordinarily a fixed size, and hence the heart also has a fixed size, +viz. the size of a thumb. Hence, as men (only) are entitled to +study and practise the <i>s</i>âstra, the highest Self may, +with reference to its dwelling in the human heart, be spoken of as +being of the size of a thumb.—In reply to the +pûrvapakshin's reasoning that on account of the statement of +size and on account of Sm<i>ri</i>ti we can understand by him who +is of the size of a thumb the transmigrating soul only, we remark +that—analogously to such passages as 'That is the Self,' +'That art thou'—our passage <span class="pagenum"><a name= +"page198" id="page198"></a>{198}</span> teaches that the +transmigrating soul which is of the size of a thumb is (in reality) +Brahman. For the Vedânta-passages have a twofold purport; +some of them aim at setting forth the nature of the highest Self, +some at teaching the unity of the individual soul with the highest +Self. Our passage teaches the unity of the individual soul with the +highest Self, not the size of anything. This point is made clear +further on in the Upanishad, 'The person of the size of a thumb, +the inner Self, is always settled in the heart of men. Let a man +draw that Self forth from his body with steadiness, as one draws +the pith from a reed. Let him know that Self as the Bright, as the +Immortal' (II, 6, 17).</p> +<p>26. Also (beings) above them, (viz. men) (are qualified for the +study and practice of the Veda), on account of the possibility (of +it), according to Bâdarâya<i>n</i>a.</p> +<p>It has been said above that the passage about him who is of the +size of a thumb has reference to the human heart, because men are +entitled to study and act according to the <i>s</i>âstra. +This gives us an occasion for the following discussion.—It is +true that the <i>s</i>âstra entitles men, but, at the same +time, there is no exclusive rule entitling men only to the +knowledge of Brahman; the teacher, Bâdarâya<i>n</i>a, +rather thinks that the <i>s</i>âstra entitles those (classes +of beings) also which are above men, viz. gods, and so on.—On +what account?—On the account of possibility.—For in +their cases also the different causes on which the qualification +depends, such as having certain desires, and so on, may exist. In +the first place, the gods also may have the desire of final +release, caused by the reflection that all effects, objects, and +powers are non-permanent. In the second place, they may be capable +of it as their corporeality appears from mantras, arthavâdas, +itihâsas, purâ<i>n</i>as, and ordinary experience. In +the third place, there is no prohibition (excluding them like +<i>S</i>ûdras). Nor does, in the fourth place, the scriptural +rule about the upanayana-ceremony annul their title; for that +<span class="pagenum"><a name="page199" id= +"page199"></a>{199}</span> ceremony merely subserves the study of +the Veda, and to the gods the Veda is manifest of itself (without +study). That the gods, moreover, for the purpose of acquiring +knowledge, undergo discipleship, and the like, appears from such +scriptural passages as 'One hundred and one years Indra lived as a +disciple with Prajâpati' (Ch. Up. VIII, 11, 3), and +'Bh<i>ri</i>gu Vâru<i>n</i>i went to his father +Varu<i>n</i>a, saying, "Sir, teach me Brahman"' (Taitt. Up. III, +1).—And the reasons which have been given above against gods +and <i>ri</i>shis being entitled to perform religious works (such +as sacrifices), viz. the circumstance of there being no other gods +(to whom the gods could offer sacrifices), and of there being no +other <i>ri</i>shis (who could be invoked during the sacrifice), do +not apply to the case of branches of knowledge. For Indra and the +other gods, when applying themselves to knowledge, have no acts to +perform with a view to Indra, and so on; nor have Bh<i>ri</i>gu and +other <i>ri</i>shis, in the same case, to do anything with the +circumstance of their belonging to the same gotra as Bh<i>ri</i>gu, +&c. What, then, should stand in the way of the gods' and +<i>ri</i>shis' right to acquire knowledge?—Moreover, the +passage about that which is of the size of a thumb remains equally +valid, if the right of the gods, &c. is admitted; it has then +only to be explained in each particular case by a reference to the +particular size of the thumb (of the class of beings spoken +of).</p> +<p>27. If it be said that (the corporeal individuality of the gods +involves) a contradiction to (sacrificial) works; we deny that, on +account of the observation of the assumption (on the part of the +gods) of several (forms).</p> +<p>If the right of the gods, and other beings superior to men, to +the acquisition of knowledge is founded on the assumption of their +corporeality, &c., we shall have to admit, in consequence of +that corporeality, that Indra and the other gods stand in the +relation of subordinate members (a@nga) to sacrificial acts, by +means of their being present in person <span class= +"pagenum"><a name="page200" id="page200"></a>{200}</span> just as +the priests are. But this admission will lead to 'a contradiction +in the sacrificial acts,' because the circumstance of the gods +forming the members of sacrificial acts by means of their personal +presence, is neither actually observed nor possible. For it is not +possible that one and the same Indra should, at the same time, be +present in person at many sacrifices.</p> +<p>To this we reply, that there is no such +contradiction.—Why?—On account of the assumption of +several (forms). For it is possible for one and the same divine +Self to assume several forms at the same time.—How is that +known?—From observation.—For a scriptural passage at +first replies to the question how many gods there are, by the +declaration that there are 'Three and three hundred, three and +three thousand,' and subsequently, on the question who they are, +declares 'They (the 303 and 3003) are only the various powers of +them, in reality there are only thirty-three gods' (B<i>ri</i>. Up. +III, 9, 1, 2); showing thereby that one and the same divine Self +may at the same time appear in many forms. After that it proceeds +to show that these thirty-three gods themselves are in reality +contained in six, five, &c., and, finally, by replying to the +question, 'Who is the one god?' that Breath is the one god, shows +that the gods are all forms of Breath, and that Breath, therefore, +can at the same time appear in many forms.—Sm<i>ri</i>ti also +has a similar statement, 'A Yogin, O hero of the Bharatas, may, by +his power, multiply his Self in many thousand shapes, and in them +walk about on the earth. In some he may enjoy the objects, in +others he may undergo dire penance, and, finally, he may again +retract them all, just as the sun retracts the multitude of his +rays.' If such Sm<i>ri</i>ti passages as the above declare that +even Yogins, who have merely acquired various extraordinary powers, +such as subtlety of body, and the like, may animate several bodies +at the same time, how much more capable of such feats must the gods +be, who naturally possess all supernatural powers. The gods thus +being able to assume several shapes, a god may divide himself into +many forms and enter into relation with many sacrifices at the same +time, remaining all the <span class="pagenum"><a name="page201" id= +"page201"></a>{201}</span> while unseen by others, in consequence +of his power to render himself invisible.</p> +<p>The latter part of the Sûtra may be explained in a +different manner also, viz. as meaning that even beings enjoying +corporeal individuality are seen to enter into mere subordinate +relation to more than one action. Sometimes, indeed, one individual +does not at the same time enter into subordinate relation to +different actions; one brâhma<i>n</i>a, for instance, is not +at the same time entertained by many entertainers. But in other +cases one individual stands in subordinate relation to many actions +at the same time; one brâhma<i>n</i>a, for instance, may +constitute the object of the reverence done to him by many persons +at the same time. Similarly, it is possible that, as the sacrifice +consists in the parting (on the part of the sacrificer with some +offering) with a view (to some divinity), many persons may at the +same time part with their respective offerings, all of them having +in view one and the same individual divinity. The individuality of +the gods does not, therefore, involve any contradiction in +sacrificial works.</p> +<p>28. If it be said (that a contradiction will result) in respect +of the word; we refute this objection on the ground that (the +world) originates from the word, as is shown by perception and +inference.</p> +<p>Let it then be granted that, from the admission of the corporeal +individuality of the gods, no contradiction will result in the case +of sacrificial works. Still a contradiction will result in respect +of the 'word' (<i>s</i>abda).—How?—The +authoritativeness of the Veda has been proved 'from its +independence,' basing on the original (eternal) connection of the +word with its sense ('the thing signified')<a id="footnotetag194" +name="footnotetag194"></a><a href= +"#footnote194"><sup>194</sup></a>. But now, although a divinity +possessing corporeal individuality, such as admitted above, may, by +means of its supernatural powers, be able to enjoy at the same time +the oblations <span class="pagenum"><a name="page202" id= +"page202"></a>{202}</span> which form part of several sacrifices +yet it will, on account of its very individuality, be subject to +birth and death just as we men are, and hence, the eternal +connexion of the eternal word with a non-eternal thing being +destroyed, a contradiction will arise with regard to the +authoritativeness proved to belong to the word of the Veda.</p> +<p>To this we reply that no such contradiction +exists.—Why?—'On account of their origin from it.' For +from that very same word of the Veda the world, with the gods and +other beings, originates.—But—an objection will be +raised—in Sûtra I, 1, 2 ('That whence there is the +origin, &c. of this world') it has been proved that the world +originates from Brahman; how then can it be said here that it +originates from the word? And, moreover, even if the origin of the +world from the word of the Veda be admitted, how is the +contradiction in regard to the word removed thereby, inasmuch as +the Vasus, the Rudras, the Âdityas, the Vi<i>s</i>vedevas, +and the Maruts<a id="footnotetag195" name= +"footnotetag195"></a><a href="#footnote195"><sup>195</sup></a> are +non-eternal beings, because produced; and if they are non-eternal, +what is there to preclude the non-eternality of the Vedic words +Vasu, &c. designating them? For it is known from every-day life +that only when the son of Devadatta is born, the name +Yaj<i>ñ</i>adatta is given to him (lit. made for him)<a id= +"footnotetag196" name="footnotetag196"></a><a href= +"#footnote196"><sup>196</sup></a>. Hence we adhere to our opinion +that a contradiction does arise with regard to the 'word.'</p> +<p>This objection we negative, on the ground that we observe the +eternity of the connexion between such words as cow, and so on, and +the things denoted by them. For, although the individuals of the +(species denoted by the word) cow have an origin, their +species<a id="footnotetag197" name="footnotetag197"></a><a href= +"#footnote197"><sup>197</sup></a> does not have an origin, since of +(the three categories) substances, qualities, and actions the +individuals only originate, not the species. Now it is with the +species that the words are connected, not with the individuals, +which, as being infinite in number, are not capable of entering +into that connexion. Hence, although <span class="pagenum"><a name= +"page203" id="page203"></a>{203}</span> the individuals do not +originate, no contradiction arises in the case of words such as +cow, and the like, since the species are eternal. Similarly, +although individual gods are admitted to originate, there arises no +contradiction in the case of such words as Vasu, and the like, +since the species denoted by them are eternal. And that the gods, +and so on, belong to different species, is to be concluded from the +descriptions of their various personal appearance, such as given in +the mantras, arthavâdas, &c. Terms such as 'Indra' rest +on the connexion (of some particular being) with some particular +place, analogously to terms such as 'army-leader;' hence, whoever +occupies that particular place is called by that particular +name.—The origination of the world from the 'word' is not to +be understood in that sense, that the word constitutes the material +cause of the world, as Brahman does; but while there exist the +everlasting words, whose essence is the power of denotation in +connexion with their eternal sense (i.e. the âk<i>r</i>itis +denoted), the accomplishment of such individual things as are +capable of having those words applied to them is called an +origination from those words.</p> +<p>How then is it known that the world originates from the +word?—'From perception and inference.' Perception here +denotes Scripture which, in order to be authoritative, is +independent (of anything else). 'Inference' denotes Sm<i>r</i>iti +which, in order to be authoritative, depends on something else +(viz. Scripture). These two declare that creation is preceded by +the word. Thus a scriptural passage says, 'At the word these +Prajâpati created the gods; at the words were poured out he +created men; at the word drops he created the fathers; at the words +through the filter he created the Soma cups; at the words the swift +ones he created the stotra; at the words to all he created the +<i>s</i>astra; at the word blessings he created the other beings.' +And another passage says, 'He with his mind united himself with +speech (i.e. the word of the Veda.—B<i>ri</i>. Up. I, 2, 4). +Thus Scripture declares in different places that the word precedes +the creation.—Sm<i>r</i>ti also delivers itself as follows, +'In the beginning <span class="pagenum"><a name="page204" id= +"page204"></a>{204}</span> a divine voice, eternal, without +beginning or end, formed of the Vedas was uttered by +Svayambhû, from which all activities proceeded.' By the +'uttering' of the voice we have here to understand the starting of +the oral tradition (of the Veda), because of a voice without +beginning or end 'uttering' in any other sense cannot be +predicated.—Again, we read, 'In the beginning +Mahe<i>s</i>vara shaped from the words of the Veda the names and +forms of all beings and the procedure of all actions.' And again, +'The several names, actions, and conditions of all things he shaped +in the beginning from the words of the Veda' (Manu I, 21). +Moreover, we all know from observation that any one when setting +about some thing which he wishes to accomplish first remembers the +word denoting the thing, and after that sets to work. We therefore +conclude that before the creation the Vedic words became manifest +in the mind of Prajâpati the creator, and that after that he +created the things conesponding to those words. Scripture also, +where it says (Taitt. Brâ. II, 2, 4, 2) 'uttering bhûr +he created the earth,' &c., shows that the worlds such as the +earth, &c. became manifest, i.e. were created from the words +bhûr, &c. which had become manifest in the mind (of +Prajâpati).</p> +<p>Of what nature then is the 'word' with a view to which it is +said that the world originates from the 'word?'—It is the +spho<i>t</i>a, the pûrvapakshin says.<a id="footnotetag198" +name="footnotetag198"></a><a href="#footnote198"><sup>198</sup></a> +For on the assumption <span class="pagenum"><a name="page205" id= +"page205"></a>{205}</span> that the letters are the word, the +doctrine that the individual gods, and so on, originates from the +eternal words of the Veda could not in any way be proved, since the +letters perish as soon as they are produced (i.e. pronounced). +These perishable letters are moreover apprehended as differing +according to the pronunciation of the individual speaker. For this +reason we are able to determine, merely from the sound of the voice +of some unseen person whom we hear reading, who is reading, whether +Devadatta or Yaj<i>ñ</i>adatta or some other man. And it +cannot be maintained that this apprehension of difference regarding +the letters is an erroneous one; for we do not apprehend anything +else whereby it is refuted. Nor is it reasonable to maintain that +the apprehension of the sense of a word results from the letters. +For it can neither be maintained that each letter by itself +intimates the sense, since that would be too wide an +assumption;<a id="footnotetag199" name= +"footnotetag199"></a><a href="#footnote199"><sup>199</sup></a> nor +that there takes place a simultaneous apprehension of the whole +aggregate of letters; since the letters succeed one another in +time. Nor can we admit the explanation that the last letter of the +word together with the impressions produced by the perception of +the preceding letters is that which makes us apprehend the sense. +For the word makes us apprehend the sense only if it is itself +apprehended in so far as having reference to the mental grasp of +the constant connexion (of the word and the sense), just as smoke +makes us infer the existence of fire only when it is itself +apprehended; but an apprehension of the last letter combined with +the impressions produced by the preceding letters does not actually +take place, because those impressions are not objects of +perception.<a id="footnotetag200" name= +"footnotetag200"></a><a href="#footnote200"><sup>200</sup></a> Nor, +again, can it be maintained that (although those impressions +<span class="pagenum"><a name="page206" id= +"page206"></a>{206}</span> are not objects of perception, yet they +may be inferred from their effects, and that thus) the actual +perception of the last letter combined with the impressions left by +the preceding letters—which impressions are apprehended from +their effects—is that which intimates the sense of the word; +for that effect of the impressions, viz. the remembrance of the +entire word, is itself something consisting of parts which succeed +each other in time.—From all this it follows that the +spho<i>t</i>a is the word. After the apprehending agent, i.e. the +buddhi, has, through the apprehension of the several letters of the +word, received rudimentary impressions, and after those impressions +have been matured through the apprehension of the last letter, the +spho<i>t</i>a presents itself in the buddhi all at once as the +object of one mental act of apprehension.—And it must not be +maintained that that one act of apprehension is merely an act of +remembrance having for its object the letters of the word; for the +letters which are more than one cannot form the object of one act +of apprehension.—As that spho<i>t</i>a is recognised as the +same as often as the word is pronounced, it is eternal; while the +apprehension of difference referred to above has for its object the +letters merely. From this eternal word, which is of the nature of +the spho<i>t</i>a and possesses denotative power, there is produced +the object denoted, i.e. this world which consists of actions, +agents, and results of action.</p> +<p>Against this doctrine the reverend Upavarsha maintains that the +letters only are the word.—But—an objection is +raised—it has been said above that the letters no sooner +produced pass away!—That assertion is not true, we reply; for +they are recognised as the same letters (each time they are +produced anew).—Nor can it be maintained that the recognition +is due to similarity only, as in the case of hairs, for instance; +for the fact of the recognition being a recognition in the strict +sense of the word is not contradicted by any other means of +proof.—Nor, again, can it be said <span class= +"pagenum"><a name="page207" id="page207"></a>{207}</span> that the +recognition has its cause in the species (so that not the same +individual letter would be recognised, but only a letter belonging +to the same species as other letters heard before); for, as a +matter of fact, the same individual letters are recognised. That +the recognition of the letters rests on the species could be +maintained only if whenever the letters are pronounced different +individual letters were apprehended, just as several cows are +apprehended as different individuals belonging to the same species. +But this is actually not the case; for the (same) individual +letters are recognised as often as they are pronounced. If, for +instance, the word cow is pronounced twice, we think not that two +different words have been pronounced, but that the same individual +word has been repeated.—But, our opponent reminds us, it has +been shown above, that the letters are apprehended as different +owing to differences of pronunciation, as appears from the fact +that we apprehend a difference when merely hearing the sound of +Devadatta or Yaj<i>ñ</i>adatta reading.—Although, we +reply, it is a settled matter that the letters are recognised as +the same, yet we admit that there are differences in the +apprehension of the letters; but as the letters are articulated by +means of the conjunction and disjunction (of the breath with the +palate, the teeth, &c.), those differences are rightly ascribed +to the various character of the articulating agents and not to the +intrinsic nature of the letters themselves. Those, moreover, who +maintain that the individual letters are different have, in order +to account for the fact of recognition, to assume species of +letters, and further to admit that the apprehension of difference +is conditioned by external factors. Is it then not much simpler to +assume, as we do, that the apprehension of difference is +conditioned by external factors while the recognition is due to the +intrinsic nature of the letters? And this very fact of recognition +is that mental process which prevents us from looking on the +apprehension of difference as having the letters for its object (so +that the opponent was wrong in denying the existence of such a +process). For how should, for instance, the one syllable ga, when +it is pronounced in <span class="pagenum"><a name="page208" id= +"page208"></a>{208}</span> the same moment by several persons, be +at the same time of different nature, viz. accented with the +udâtta, the anudâtta, and the Svarita and nasal as well +as non-nasal<a id="footnotetag201" name= +"footnotetag201"></a><a href="#footnote201"><sup>201</sup></a>? Or +else<a id="footnotetag202" name="footnotetag202"></a><a href= +"#footnote202"><sup>202</sup></a>—and this is the preferable +explanation—we assume that the difference of apprehension is +caused not by the letters but by the tone (dhvani). By this tone we +have to understand that which enters the ear of a person who is +listening from a distance and not able to distinguish the separate +letters, and which, for a person standing near, affects the letters +with its own distinctions, such as high or low pitch and so on. It +is on this tone that all the distinctions of udâtta, +anudâtta, and so on depend, and not on the intrinsic nature +of the letters; for they are recognised as the same whenever they +are pronounced. On this theory only we gain a basis for the +distinctive apprehension of the udâtta, the anudâtta, +and the like. For on the theory first propounded (but now +rejected), we should have to assume that the distinctions of +udâtta and so on are due to the processes of conjunction and +disjunction described above, since the letters themselves, which +are ever recognised as the same, are not different. But as those +processes of conjunction and disjunction are not matter of +perception, we cannot definitely ascertain in the letters any +differences based on those processes, and hence the apprehension of +the udâtta and so on remains without a basis.—Nor +should it be urged that from the difference of the udâtta and +so on there results also a difference of the letters recognised. +For a difference in one matter does not involve a difference in +some other matter which in itself is free from difference. Nobody, +for instance, thinks that because the individuals <span class= +"pagenum"><a name="page209" id="page209"></a>{209}</span> are +different from each other the species also contains a difference in +itself.</p> +<p>The assumption of the spho<i>t</i>a is further gratuitous, +because the sense of the word may be apprehended from the +letters.—But—our opponent here objects—I do not +assume the existence of the spho<i>t</i>a. I, on the contrary, +actually perceive it; for after the buddhi has been impressed by +the successive apprehension of the letters of the word, the +spho<i>t</i>a all at once presents itself as the object of +cognition.—You are mistaken, we reply. The object of the +cognitional act of which you speak is simply the letters of the +word. That one comprehensive cognition which follows upon the +apprehension of the successive letters of the word has for its +object the entire aggregate of the letters constituting the word, +and not anything else. We conclude this from the circumstance that +in that final comprehensive cognition there are included those +letters only of which a definite given word consists, and not any +other letters. If that cognitional act had for its object the +spho<i>t</i>a—i.e. something different from the letters of +the given word—then those letters would be excluded from it +just as much as the letters of any other word. But as this is not +the case, it follows that that final comprehensive act of cognition +is nothing but an act of remembrance which has the letters of the +word for its object.—Our opponent has asserted above that the +letters of a word being several cannot form the object of one +mental act. But there he is wrong again. The ideas which we have of +a row, for instance, or a wood or an army, or of the numbers ten, +hundred, thousand, and so on, show that also such things as +comprise several unities can become the objects of one and the same +cognitional act. The idea which has for its object the word as one +whole is a derived one, in so far as it depends on the +determination of one sense in many letters<a id="footnotetag203" +name="footnotetag203"></a><a href= +"#footnote203"><sup>203</sup></a>; in the same way as the idea of a +<span class="pagenum"><a name="page210" id= +"page210"></a>{210}</span> wood, an army, and so on. But—our +opponent may here object—if the word were nothing else but +the letters which in their aggregate become the object of one +mental act, such couples of words as jârâ and +râjâ or pika and kapi would not be cognised as +different words; for here the same letters are presented to +consciousness in each of the words constituting one +couple.—There is indeed, we reply, in both cases a +comprehensive consciousness of the same totality of letters; but +just as ants constitute the idea of a row only if they march one +after the other, so the letters also constitute the idea of a +certain word only if they follow each other in a certain order. +Hence it is not contrary to reason that the same letters are +cognised as different words, in consequence of the different order +in which they are arranged.</p> +<p>The hypothesis of him who maintains that the letters are the +word may therefore be finally formulated as follows. The letters of +which a word consists—assisted by a certain order and +number—have, through traditional use, entered into a +connexion with a definite sense. At the time when they are employed +they present themselves as such (i.e. in their definite order and +number) to the buddhi, which, after having apprehended the several +letters in succession, finally comprehends the entire aggregate, +and they thus unerringly intimate to the buddhi their definite +sense. This hypothesis is certainly simpler than the complicated +hypothesis of the grammarians who teach that the spho<i>t</i>a is +the word. For they have to disregard what is given by perception, +and to assume something which is never perceived; the letters +apprehended in a definite order are said to manifest the +spho<i>t</i>a, and the spho<i>t</i>a in its turn is said to +manifest the sense.</p> +<p>Or let it even be admitted that the letters are different ones +each time they are pronounced; yet, as in that case we necessarily +must assume species of letters as the basis of the recognition of +the individual letters, the function of conveying the sense which +we have demonstrated in the case of the (individual) letters has +then to be attributed to the species.</p> +<span class="pagenum"><a name="page211" id= +"page211"></a>{211}</span> +<p>From all this it follows that the theory according to which the +individual gods and so on originate from the eternal words is +unobjectionable.</p> +<p>29. And from this very reason there follows the eternity of the +Veda.</p> +<p>As the eternity of the Veda is founded on the absence of the +remembrance of an agent only, a doubt with regard to it had been +raised owing to the doctrine that the gods and other individuals +have sprung from it. That doubt has been refuted in the preceding +Sûtra.—The present Sûtra now confirms the, +already established, eternity of the Veda. The eternity of the word +of the Veda has to be assumed for this very reason, that the world +with its definite (eternal) species, such as gods and so on, +originates from it.—A mantra also ('By means of the sacrifice +they followed the trace of speech; they found it dwelling in the +<i>ri</i>shis,' <i>Ri</i>g-veda Sa<i>m</i>h. X, 71, 3) shows that +the speech found (by the <i>ri</i>shis) was permanent.—On +this point Vedavyâsa also speaks as follows: 'Formerly the +great <i>ri</i>shis, being allowed to do so by Svayambhû, +obtained, through their penance, the Vedas together with the +itihâsas, which had been hidden at the end of the yuga.'</p> +<p>30. And on account of the equality of names and forms there is +no contradiction (to the eternity of the word of the Veda) in the +renovation (of the world); as is seen from <i>S</i>ruti and +Sm<i>ri</i>ti.</p> +<p>If—the pûrvapakshin resumes—the individual +gods and so on did, like the individual animals, originate and pass +away in an unbroken succession so that there would be no break of +the course of practical existence including denominations, things +denominated and agents denominating; the connexion (between word +and thing) would be eternal, and the objection as to a +contradiction with reference to the word (raised in Sùtra +27) would thereby be refuted. But if, as <i>S</i>ruti and +Sm<i>ri</i>ti declare, the whole threefold <span class= +"pagenum"><a name="page212" id="page212"></a>{212}</span> world +periodically divests itself of name and form, and is entirely +dissolved (at the end of a kalpa), and is after that produced anew; +how can the contradiction be considered to have been removed?</p> +<p>To this we reply: 'On account of the sameness of name and +form.'—Even then the beginninglessness of the world will have +to be admitted (a point which the teacher will prove later on: II, +1, 36). And in the beginningless sa<i>m</i>sâra we have to +look on the (relative) beginning, and the dissolution connected +with a new kalpa in the same light in which we look on the sleeping +and waking states, which, although in them according to Scripture +(a kind of) dissolution and origination take place, do not give +rise to any contradiction, since in the later waking state +(subsequent to the state of sleep) the practical existence is +carried on just as in the former one. That in the sleeping and the +waking states dissolution and origination take place is stated +Kaush. Up. III, 3, 'When a man being asleep sees no dream whatever +he becomes one with that prâ<i>n</i>a alone. Then speech goes +to him with all names, the eye with all forms, the ear with all +sounds, the mind with all thoughts. And when he awakes then, as +from a burning fire, sparks proceed in all directions, thus from +that Self the prâ<i>n</i>as proceed, each towards its place; +from the prâ<i>n</i>as the gods, from the gods the +worlds.'</p> +<p>Well, the pûrvapakshin resumes, it may be that no +contradiction arises in the case of sleep, as during the sleep of +one person the practical existence of other persons suffers no +interruption, and as the sleeping person himself when waking from +sleep may resume the very same form of practical existence which +was his previously to his sleep. The case of a mahâpralaya +(i.e. a general annihilation of the world) is however a different +one, as then the entire current of practical existence is +interrupted, and the form of existence of a previous kalpa can be +resumed in a subsequent kalpa no more than an individual can resume +that form of existence which it enjoyed in a former birth.</p> +<p>This objection, we reply, is not valid. For although a +mahâpralaya does cut short the entire current of practical +<span class="pagenum"><a name="page213" id= +"page213"></a>{213}</span> existence, yet, by the favour of the +highest Lord, the Lords (î<i>s</i>vara), such as +Hira<i>n</i>yagarbha and so on, may continue the same form of +existence which belonged to them in the preceding kalpa. Although +ordinary animated beings do not, as we see, resume that form of +existence which belonged to them in a former birth; still we cannot +judge of the Lords as we do of ordinary beings. For as in the +series of beings which descends from man to blades of grass a +successive diminution of knowledge, power, and so on, is +observed—although they all have the common attribute of being +animated—so in the ascending series extending from man up to +Hira<i>n</i>yagarbha, a gradually increasing manifestation of +knowledge, power, &c. takes place; a circumstance which +<i>S</i>ruti and Sm<i>ri</i>ti mention in many places, and which it +is impossible to deny. On that account it may very well be the case +that the Lords, such as Hira<i>n</i>yagarbha and so on, who in a +past kalpa were distinguished by superior knowledge and power of +action, and who again appear in the present kalpa, do, if favoured +by the highest Lord, continue (in the present kalpa) the same kind +of existence which they enjoyed in the preceding kalpa; just as a +man who rises from sleep continues the same form of existence which +he enjoyed previously to his sleep. Thus Scripture also declares, +'He who first creates Brahman (Hira<i>n</i>yagarbha) and delivers +the Vedas to him, to that God who is the light of his own thoughts, +I, seeking for release, go for refuge' (<i>S</i>vet. Up. VI, 18). +<i>S</i>aunaka and others moreover declare (in the +Anukrama<i>n</i>îs of the Veda) that the ten books (of the +<i>Ri</i>g-veda) were seen by Madhu<i>kkh</i>andas and other +<i>ri</i>shis.<a id="footnotetag204" name= +"footnotetag204"></a><a href="#footnote204"><sup>204</sup></a> And, +similarly, Sm<i>ri</i>ti tells us, for every Veda, of men of +exalted mental vision (<i>ri</i>shis) who 'saw' the subdivisions of +their respective Vedas, such as kâ<i>nd</i>as and so on. +Scripture also declares that the performance of the sacrificial +action by means of the mantra is to be preceded by the knowledge of +the <i>ri</i>shi and so on, 'He who makes another person sacrifice +or read by means of a mantra of which he <span class= +"pagenum"><a name="page214" id="page214"></a>{214}</span> does not +know the <i>ri</i>shi, the metre, the divinity, and the +brâhma<i>n</i>a, runs against a post, falls into a pit<a id= +"footnotetag205" name="footnotetag205"></a><a href= +"#footnote205"><sup>205</sup></a>, &c. &c., therefore one +must know all those matters for each mantra' (Ârsheya +brâhma<i>n</i>a, first section).—Moreover, religious +duty is enjoined and its opposite is forbidden, in order that the +animate beings may obtain pleasure and escape pain. Desire and +aversion have for their objects pleasure and pain, known either +from experience or from Scripture, and do not aim at anything of a +different nature. As therefore each new creation is (nothing but) +the result of the religious merit and demerit (of the animated +beings of the preceding creation), it is produced with a nature +resembling that of the preceding creation. Thus Sm<i>ri</i>ti also +declares, 'To whatever actions certain of these (animated beings) +had turned in a former creation, to the same they turn when created +again and again. Whether those actions were harmful or harmless, +gentle or cruel, right or wrong, true or untrue, influenced by them +they proceed; hence a certain person delights in actions of a +certain kind.'—Moreover, this world when being dissolved (in +a mahâpralaya) is dissolved to that extent only that the +potentiality (<i>s</i>akti) of the world remains, and (when it is +produced again) it is produced from the root of that potentiality; +otherwise we should have to admit an effect without a cause. Nor +have we the right to assume potentialities of different kind (for +the different periods of the world). Hence, although the series of +worlds from the earth upwards, and the series of different classes +of animate beings such as gods, animals, and men, and the different +conditions based on caste, â<i>s</i>rama, religious duty and +fruit (of works), although all these we say are again and again +interrupted and thereupon produced anew; we yet have to understand +that they are, in the beginningless sa<i>m</i>sara, subject to a +certain determinateness analogous to the determinateness governing +the connexion between the senses and their objects. For it is +impossible to imagine that the relation of senses and sense-objects +should be a different one in different creations, so <span class= +"pagenum"><a name="page215" id="page215"></a>{215}</span> that, for +instance, in some new creation a sixth sense and a corresponding +sixth sense-object should manifest themselves. As, therefore, the +phenomenal world is the same in all kalpas and as the Lords are +able to continue their previous forms of existence, there manifest +themselves, in each new creation, individuals bearing the same +names and forms as the individuals of the preceding creations, and, +owing to this equality of names and forms, the admitted periodical +renovations of the world in the form of general pralayas and +general creations do not conflict with the authoritativeness of the +word of the Veda. The permanent identity of names and forms is +declared in <i>S</i>ruti as well as Sm<i>ri</i>ti; compare, for +instance, <i>Ri</i>k. Sa<i>m</i>h. X, 190, 3, 'As formerly the +creator ordered sun and moon, and the sky, and the air, and the +heavenly world;' which passage means that the highest Lord arranged +at the beginning of the present kalpa the entire world with sun and +moon, and so on, just as it had been arranged in the preceding +kalpa. Compare also Taitt. Brâhm. III, 1, 4, 1, 'Agni +desired: May I become the consumer of the food of the gods; for +that end he offered a cake on eight potsherds to Agni and the +K<i>ri</i>ttikâs.' This passage, which forms part of the +injunction of the ish<i>t</i>i to the Nakshatras, declares equality +of name and form connecting the Agni who offered and the Agni to +whom he offered.<a id="footnotetag206" name= +"footnotetag206"></a><a href="#footnote206"><sup>206</sup></a></p> +<p>Sm<i>ri</i>ti also contains similar statements to be quoted +here; so, for instance, 'Whatever were the names of the +<i>ri</i>shis and their powers to see the Vedas, the same the +Unborn one again gives to them when they are produced afresh at the +end of the night (the mahâpralaya). As the various signs of +the seasons return in succession in their due time, thus the same +beings again appear in the different yugas. And of whatever +individuality the gods of the <span class="pagenum"><a name= +"page216" id="page216"></a>{216}</span> past ages were, equal to +them are the present gods in name and form.'</p> +<p>31. On account of the impossibility of (the gods being +qualified) for the madhu-vidyâ, &c., Jaimini (maintains) +the non-qualification (of the gods for the Brahma-vidyâ).</p> +<p>A new objection is raised against the averment that the gods, +&c. also are entitled to the knowledge of Brahman. The teacher, +Jaimini, considers the gods and similar beings not to have any +claim.—Why?—On account of the impossibility, in the +case of the so-called Madhu-vidyâ, &c. If their claim to +the knowledge of Brahman were admitted, we should have to admit +their claim to the madhu-vidyâ ('the knowledge of the honey') +also, because that also is a kind of knowledge not different (from +the knowledge of Brahman). But to admit this latter claim is not +possible; for, according to the passage, 'The Sun is indeed the +honey of the devas' (Ch. Up. III, 1, 1), men are to meditate on the +sun (the god Âditya) under the form of honey, and how, if the +gods themselves are admitted as meditating worshippers, can +Âditya meditate upon another Âditya?—Again, the +text, after having enumerated five kinds of nectar, the red one, +&c. residing in the sun, and after having stated that the five +classes of gods, viz. the Vasus, Rudras, Âdityas, Maruts, and +Sâdhyas, live on one of these nectars each, declares that 'he +who thus knows this nectar becomes one of the Vasus, with Agni at +their head, he sees the nectar and rejoices, &c., and indicates +thereby that those who know the nectars enjoyed by the Vasus, +&c., attain the greatness of the Vasus, &c.' But how should +the Vasus themselves know other Vasus enjoying the nectar, and what +other Vasu-greatness should they desire to attain?—We have +also to compare the passages 'Agni is one foot, Âditya is one +foot, the quarters are one foot' (Ch. Up. III, 18, 2); 'Air is +indeed the absorber' (Ch. Up. IV, 3, 1); 'Âditya is Brahman, +this is the doctrine.' All these passages treat of the meditation +on the Self of certain divinities, for which meditation these +divinities themselves <span class="pagenum"><a name="page217" id= +"page217"></a>{217}</span> are not qualified.—So it is +likewise impossible that the <i>ri</i>shis themselves should be +qualified for meditations connected with <i>ri</i>shis, such as +expressed in passages like B<i>ri</i>. Up. II, 2, 4, 'These two are +the <i>ri</i>shis Gautama and Bharadvâja; the right Gautama, +the left Bharadvâja.'—Another reason for the +non-qualification of the gods is stated in the following +Sûtra.</p> +<p>32. And (the devas, &c. are not qualified) on account of +(the words denoting the devas, &c.) being (used) in the sense +of (sphere of) light.</p> +<p>To that sphere of light, the pûrvapakshin resumes, which +is stationed in the sky, and during its diurnal revolutions +illumines the world, terms such as Âditya, i.e. the names of +devas, are applied, as we know from the use of ordinary language, +and from Vedic complementary passages<a id="footnotetag207" name= +"footnotetag207"></a><a href="#footnote207"><sup>207</sup></a>. But +of a mere sphere of light we cannot understand how it should be +endowed with either a bodily form, consisting of the heart and the +like, or intelligence, or the capability of forming wishes<a id= +"footnotetag208" name="footnotetag208"></a><a href= +"#footnote208"><sup>208</sup></a>. For mere light we know to be, +like earth, entirely devoid of intelligence. The same observation +applies to Agni (fire), and so on. It will perhaps be said that our +objection is not valid, because the personality of the devas is +known from the mantras, arthavâdas, itihâsas, +purâ<i>n</i>as, and from the conceptions of ordinary +life<a id="footnotetag209" name="footnotetag209"></a><a href= +"#footnote209"><sup>209</sup></a>; but we contest the relevancy of +this remark. For the conceptions of ordinary life do not constitute +an independent means of knowledge; we rather say that a thing is +known from ordinary life if it is known by the (acknowledged) means +of knowledge, perception, &c. But none of the recognised means +of knowledge, such as perception and the like, apply to the +<span class="pagenum"><a name="page218" id= +"page218"></a>{218}</span> matter under discussion. Itihâsas +and purâ<i>n</i>as again being of human origin, stand +themselves in need of other means of knowledge on which to base. +The arthavâda passages also, which, as forming syntactical +wholes with the injunctory passages, have merely the purpose of +glorifying (what is enjoined in the latter), cannot be considered +to constitute by themselves reasons for the existence of the +personality, &c. of the devas. The mantras again, which, on the +ground of direct enunciation, &c., are to be employed (at the +different stages of the sacrificial action), have merely the +purpose of denoting things connected with the sacrificial +performance, and do not constitute an independent means of +authoritative knowledge for anything<a id="footnotetag210" name= +"footnotetag210"></a><a href= +"#footnote210"><sup>210</sup></a>.—For these reasons the +devas, and similar beings, are not qualified for the knowledge of +Brahman.</p> +<p>33. Bâdarâya<i>n</i>a, on the other hand, +(maintains) the existence (of qualification for Brahma-vidyâ +on the part of the gods); for there are (passages indicatory of +that).</p> +<p>The expression 'on the other hand' is meant to rebut the +pûrvapaksha. The teacher, Bâdarâya<i>n</i>a, +maintains the existence of the qualification on the part of the +gods, &c. For, although the qualification of the gods cannot be +admitted with reference to the madhu-vidyâ, and similar +topics of knowledge, in which the gods themselves are implicated, +still they may be qualified for the pure knowledge of Brahman, +qualification in general depending on the presence of desire, +capability, &c.<a id="footnotetag211" name= +"footnotetag211"></a><a href="#footnote211"><sup>211</sup></a> Nor +does the impossibility of qualification in certain cases interfere +with the presence of qualification in those other cases where it is +not impossible. To the case of the gods the same reasoning applies +as to the case of men; for among men also, all are not qualified +for everything, brâhma<i>n</i>as, for instance, not for the +râjasûya-sacrifice<a id="footnotetag212" name= +"footnotetag212"></a><a href="#footnote212"><sup>212</sup></a>.</p> +<span class="pagenum"><a name="page219" id= +"page219"></a>{219}</span> +<p>And, with reference to the knowledge of Brahman, Scripture, +moreover, contains express hints notifying that the devas are +qualified; compare, for instance, <i>Br</i>i. Up. I, 4, 10, +'Whatever Deva was awakened (so as to know Brahman) he indeed +became that; and the same with <i>ri</i>shis;' Ch. Up. VIII, 7, 2, +'They said: Well, let us search for that Self by which, if one has +searched it out, all worlds and all desires are obtained. Thus +saying, Indra went forth from the Devas, Viro<i>k</i>ana from the +Asuras.' Similar statements are met with in Sm<i>ri</i>ti, so, for +instance, in the colloquy of the Gandharva and +Yâj<i>ñ</i>avalkya<a id="footnotetag213" name= +"footnotetag213"></a><a href= +"#footnote213"><sup>213</sup></a>.—Against the objection +raised in the preceding Sûtra (32) we argue as follows. Words +like âditya, and so on, which denote devas, although having +reference to light and the like, yet convey the idea of certain +divine Selfs (persons) endowed with intelligence and pre-eminent +power; for they are used in that sense in mantras and +arthavâda passages. For the devas possess, in consequence of +their pre-eminent power, the capability of residing within the +light, and so on, and to assume any form they like. Thus we read in +Scripture, in the arthavâda passage explaining the words 'ram +of Medhâtithi,' which form part of the +Subrahma<i>n</i>ya-formula, that 'Indra, having assumed the shape +of a ram, carried off Medhâtithi, the descendant of +Ka<i>n</i>va' (Sha<i>d</i>v. Br. I, 1). And thus Sm<i>ri</i>ti says +that 'Âditya, having assumed the shape of a man, came to +Kuntî.' Moreover, even in such substances as earth, +intelligent ruling beings must be admitted to reside, for that +appears from such scriptural passages as 'the earth spoke,' 'the +waters spoke,' &c. The non-intelligence of light and the like, +in so far as they are mere material elements, is admitted in the +case of the sun (âditya), &c. also; but—as already +remarked—from the use of the words in mantras and +<span class="pagenum"><a name="page220" id= +"page220"></a>{220}</span> arthavâdas it appears that there +are intelligent beings of divine nature (which animate those +material elements).</p> +<p>We now turn to the objection (raised above by the +pûrvapakshin) that mantras and arthavâdas, as merely +subserving other purposes, have no power of setting forth the +personality of the devas, and remark that not the circumstance of +subordination or non-subordination to some other purpose, but +rather the presence or absence of a certain idea furnishes a reason +for (our assuming) the existence of something. This is exemplified +by the case of a person who, having set out for some other purpose, +(nevertheless) forms the conviction of the existence of leaves, +grass, and the like, which he sees lying on the road.—But, +the pûrvapakshin may here object, the instance quoted by you +is not strictly analogous. In the case of the wanderer, perception, +whose objects the grass and leaves are, is active, and through it +he forms the conception of their existence. In the case of an +arthavâda, on the other hand, which, as forming a syntactical +unity with the corresponding injunctory passage, merely subserves +the purpose of glorifying (the latter), it is impossible to +determine any energy having a special object of its own. For in +general any minor syntactical unity, which is included in a more +comprehensive syntactical unity conveying a certain meaning, does +not possess the power of expressing a separate meaning of its own. +Thus, for instance, we derive, from the combination of the three +words constituting the negative sentence, '(Do) not drink wine,' +one meaning only, i.e. a prohibition of drinking wine, and do not +derive an additional meaning, viz. an order to drink wine, from the +combination of the last two words, 'drink wine.'—To this +objection we reply, that the instance last quoted is not analogous +(to the matter under discussion). The words of the sentence +prohibiting the drinking of wine form only one whole, and on that +account the separate sense which any minor syntactical unity +included in the bigger sentence may possess cannot be accepted. In +the case of injunction and arthavâda, on the other hand, the +words constituting the arthavâda form a separate group of +their own which refers to some accomplished <span class= +"pagenum"><a name="page221" id="page221"></a>{221}</span> +thing<a id="footnotetag214" name="footnotetag214"></a><a href= +"#footnote214"><sup>214</sup></a>, and only subsequently to that, +when it comes to be considered what purpose they subserve, they +enter on the function of glorifying the injunction. Let us examine, +as an illustrative example, the injunctive passage, 'He who is +desirous of prosperity is to offer to Vâyu a white animal.' +All the words contained in this passage are directly connected with +the injunction. This is, however, not the case with the words +constituting the corresponding arthavâda passage, 'For +Vâyu is the swiftest deity; Vâyu he approaches with his +own share; he leads him to prosperity.' The single words of this +arthavâda are not grammatically connected with the single +words of the injunction, but form a subordinate unity of their own, +which contains the praise of Vâyu, and glorify the +injunction, only in so far as they give us to understand that the +action enjoined is connected with a distinguished divinity. If the +matter conveyed by the subordinate (arthavâda) passage can be +known by some other means of knowledge, the arthavâda acts as +a mere anuvâda, i.e. a statement referring to something +(already known)<a id="footnotetag215" name= +"footnotetag215"></a><a href="#footnote215"><sup>215</sup></a>. +When its contents are contradicted by other means of knowledge it +acts as a so-called gu<i>n</i>avâda, i.e. a statement of a +quality<a id="footnotetag216" name="footnotetag216"></a><a href= +"#footnote216"><sup>216</sup></a>. Where, again, neither of the two +mentioned conditions is found, a doubt may arise whether the +arthavâda is to be taken as a gu<i>n</i>avâda on +account of the absence of other means of knowledge, or as an +arthavâda referring to something known (i.e. an +anuvâda) on account of the absence of contradiction by other +means of proof. The latter alternative is, however, to be embraced +by reflecting people.—The same reasoning applies to mantras +also.</p> +<p>There is a further reason for assuming the personality of the +gods. The Vedic injunctions, as enjoining sacrificial offerings to +Indra and the other gods, presuppose certain characteristic shapes +of the individual divinities, because <span class= +"pagenum"><a name="page222" id="page222"></a>{222}</span> without +such the sacrificer could not represent Indra and the other gods to +his mind. And if the divinity were not represented to the mind it +would not be possible to make an offering to it. So Scripture also +says, 'Of that divinity for which the offering is taken he is to +think when about to say vausha<i>t</i>' (Ai. Br. III, 8, 1). Nor is +it possible to consider the essential form (or character) of a +thing to consist in the word only<a id="footnotetag217" name= +"footnotetag217"></a><a href="#footnote217"><sup>217</sup></a>; for +word (denoting) and thing (denoted) are different. He therefore who +admits the authoritativeness of the scriptural word has no right to +deny that the shape of Indra, and the other gods, is such as we +understand it to be from the mantras and +arthavâdas.—Moreover, itihâsas and +purâ<i>n</i>as also—because based on mantra and +arthavâda which possess authoritative power in the manner +described—are capable of setting forth the personality, +&c. of the devas. Itihâsa and purâ<i>n</i>a can, +besides, be considered as based on perception also. For what is not +accessible to our perception may have been within the sphere of +perception of people in ancient times. Sm<i>ri</i>ti also declares +that Vyâsa and others conversed with the gods face to face. A +person maintaining that the people of ancient times were no more +able to converse with the gods than people are at present, would +thereby deny the (incontestable) variety of the world. He might as +well maintain that because there is at present no prince ruling +over the whole earth, there were no such princes in former times; a +position by which the scriptural injunction of the +râjasûya-sacrifice<a id="footnotetag218" name= +"footnotetag218"></a><a href="#footnote218"><sup>218</sup></a> +would be stultified. Or he might maintain that in former times the +spheres of duty of the different castes and â<i>s</i>ramas +were as generally unsettled as they are now, and, on that account, +declare those parts of Scripture which define those different +duties to be purposeless. It is therefore altogether +unobjectionable to assume that the men of ancient times, in +consequence of their eminent religious <span class= +"pagenum"><a name="page223" id="page223"></a>{223}</span> merit, +conversed with the gods face to face. Sm<i>ri</i>ti also declares +that 'from the reading of the Veda there results intercourse with +the favourite divinity' (Yoga Sûtra II, 44). And that Yoga +does, as Sm<i>ri</i>ti declares, lead to the acquirement of +extraordinary powers, such as subtlety of body, and so on, is a +fact which cannot be set aside by a mere arbitrary denial. +Scripture also proclaims the greatness of Yoga, 'When, as earth, +water, light, heat, and ether arise, the fivefold quality of Yoga +takes place, then there is no longer illness, old age, or pain for +him who has obtained a body produced by the fire of Yoga' +(<i>S</i>vet. Up. II, 12). Nor have we the right to measure by our +capabilities the capability of the <i>ri</i>shis who see the +mantras and brâhma<i>n</i>a passages (i.e. the +Veda).—From all this it appears that the itihâsas and +purâ<i>n</i>as have an adequate basis.—And the +conceptions of ordinary life also must not be declared to be +unfounded, if it is at all possible to accept them.</p> +<p>The general result is that we have the right to conceive the +gods as possessing personal existence, on the ground of mantras, +arthavâdas, itihâsas, purâ<i>n</i>as, and +ordinarily prevailing ideas. And as the gods may thus be in the +condition of having desires and so on, they must be considered as +qualified for the knowledge of Brahman. Moreover, the declarations +which Scripture makes concerning gradual emancipation<a id= +"footnotetag219" name="footnotetag219"></a><a href= +"#footnote219"><sup>219</sup></a> agree with this latter +supposition only.</p> +<p>34. Grief of him (i.e. of Jâna<i>s</i>ruti) (arose) on +account of his hearing a disrespectful speech about himself; on +account of the rushing on of that (grief) (Raikva called him +<i>S</i>ûdra); for it (the grief) is pointed at (by +Raikva).</p> +<p>(In the preceding adhikara<i>n</i>a) the exclusiveness of the +claim of men to knowledge has been refuted, and it has been +declared that the gods, &c. also possess such a claim. The +present adhikara<i>n</i>a is entered on for the purpose of removing +the doubt whether, as the exclusiveness of the <span class= +"pagenum"><a name="page224" id="page224"></a>{224}</span> claim of +twice-born men is capable of refutation, the <i>S</i>ûdras +also possess such a claim.</p> +<p>The pûrvapakshin maintains that the <i>S</i>ûdras +also have such a claim, because they may be in the position of +desiring that knowledge, and because they are capable of it; and +because there is no scriptural prohibition (excluding them from +knowledge) analogous to the text, 'Therefore<a id="footnotetag220" +name="footnotetag220"></a><a href="#footnote220"><sup>220</sup></a> +the <i>S</i>ûdra is unfit for sacrificing' (Taitt. +Sa<i>m</i>h. VII, 1, 1, 6). The reason, moreover, which +disqualifies the <i>S</i>ûdras for sacrificial works, viz. +their being without the sacred fires, does not invalidate their +qualification for knowledge, as knowledge can be apprehended by +those also who are without the fires. There is besides an +inferential mark supporting the claim of the <i>S</i>ûdras; +for in the so-called sa<i>m</i>varga-knowledge he (Raikva) refers +to Jâna<i>s</i>ruti Pautrâya<i>n</i>a, who wishes to +learn from him, by the name of <i>S</i>ûdra 'Fie, necklace +and carnage be thine, O <i>S</i>ûdra, together with the cows' +(Ch. Up. IV, 2, 3). Sm<i>ri</i>ti moreover speaks of Vidûra +and others who were born from <i>S</i>ûdra mothers as +possessing eminent knowledge.—Hence the <i>S</i>ûdra +has a claim to the knowledge of Brahman.</p> +<p>To this we reply that the <i>S</i>ûdras have no such +claim, on account of their not studying the Veda. A person who has +studied the Veda and understood its sense is indeed qualified for +Vedic matters; but a <i>S</i>ûdra does not study the Veda, +for such study demands as its antecedent the upanayana-ceremony, +and that ceremony belongs to the three (higher) castes only. The +mere circumstance of being in a condition of desire does not +furnish a reason for qualification, if capability is absent. Mere +temporal capability again does not constitute a reason for +qualification, spiritual capability being required in spiritual +matters. And spiritual capability is (in the case of the +<i>S</i>ûdras) excluded by their being excluded from the +study of the Veda.—The Vedic statement, moreover, that the +<i>S</i>ûdra is unfit for sacrifices intimates, because +<span class="pagenum"><a name="page225" id= +"page225"></a>{225}</span> founded on reasoning, that he is unfit +for knowledge also; for the argumentation is the same in both +cases<a id="footnotetag221" name="footnotetag221"></a><a href= +"#footnote221"><sup>221</sup></a>.—With reference to the +pûrvapakshin's opinion that the fact of the word +'<i>S</i>ûdra' being enounced in the +sa<i>m</i>varga-knowledge constitutes an inferential mark (of the +<i>S</i>ûdra's qualification for knowledge), we remark that +that inferential mark has no force, on account of the absence of +arguments. For the statement of an inferential mark possesses the +power of intimation only in consequence of arguments being adduced; +but no such arguments are brought forward in the passage +quoted.<a id="footnotetag222" name="footnotetag222"></a><a href= +"#footnote222"><sup>222</sup></a> Besides, the word +'<i>S</i>ûdra' which occurs in the +sa<i>m</i>varga-vidyâ would establish a claim on the part of +the <i>S</i>ûdras to that one vidyâ only, not to all +vidyâs. In reality, however, it is powerless, because +occurring in an arthavâda, to establish the +<i>S</i>ûdras' claim to anything.—The word +'<i>S</i>ûdra' can moreover be made to agree with the context +in which it occurs in the following manner. When +Jâna<i>s</i>ruti Pautrâya<i>n</i>a heard himself spoken +of with disrespect by the flamingo ('How can you speak of him, +being what he is, as if he were like Raikva with the car?' IV, 1, +3), grief (su<i>k</i>) arose in his mind, and to that grief the +<i>ri</i>shi Raikva alludes with the word <i>S</i>ûdra, in +order to show thereby his knowledge of what is remote. This +explanation must be accepted because a (real) born +<i>S</i>ûdra is not qualified (for the +sa<i>m</i>varga-vidyâ). If it be asked how the grief +(su<i>k</i>) which had arisen in Jânasruti's mind can be +referred to by means of the word <i>S</i>ûdra, we reply: On +account of the rushing on (âdrava<i>n</i>a) of the grief. For +we may etymologise the word <i>S</i>ûdra by dividing it into +its parts, either as 'he rushed into grief (<i>S</i>u<i>k</i>am +abhidudrâva) or as 'grief rushed on <span class= +"pagenum"><a name="page226" id="page226"></a>{226}</span> him,' or +as 'he in his grief rushed to Raikva;' while on the other hand it +is impossible to accept the word in its ordinary conventional +sense. The circumstance (of the king actually being grieved) is +moreover expressly touched upon in the legend<a id="footnotetag223" +name="footnotetag223"></a><a href= +"#footnote223"><sup>223</sup></a>.</p> +<p>35. And because the kshattriyahood (of Jâna<i>s</i>ruti) +is understood from the inferential mark (supplied by his being +mentioned) later on with <i>K</i>aitraratha (who was a kshattriya +himself).</p> +<p>Jâna<i>s</i>ruti cannot have been a <i>S</i>ûdra by +birth for that reason also that his being a kshattriya is +understood from an inferential sign, viz. his being mentioned +together (in one chapter) with the kshattriya <i>K</i>aitraratha +Abhipratârin. For, later on, i.e. in the passage +complementary to the sa<i>m</i>varga-vidyâ, a kshattriya +<i>K</i>aitrarathi Abhipratârin is glorified, 'Once while +<i>S</i>aunaka Kâpeya and Abhipratârin Kâkshaseni +were being waited on at their meal a religious student begged of +them' (Ch. Up. IV, 3, 5). That this Abhipratârin was a +<i>K</i>aitrarathi (i.e. a descendant of <i>K</i>itraratha) we have +to infer from his connexion with a Kâpeya. For we know (from +<i>S</i>ruti) about the connexion of <i>K</i>itraratha himself with +the Kâpeyas ('the Kâpeyas made <i>K</i>itraratha +perform that sacrifice;' Tâ<i>nd</i>ya. Br. XX, 12, 5), and +as a rule sacrificers of one and the same family employ officiating +priests of one and the same family. Moreover, as we understand from +Scripture ('from him a <i>K</i>aitrarathi descended who was a +prince<a id="footnotetag224" name="footnotetag224"></a><a href= +"#footnote224"><sup>224</sup></a>') that he (<i>K</i>aitraratha) +was a prince, we must <span class="pagenum"><a name="page227" id= +"page227"></a>{227}</span> understand him to have been a +kshattriya. The fact now of Jâna<i>s</i>ruti being praised in +the same vidyâ with the kshattriya Abhipratârin +intimates that the former also was a kshattriya. For as a rule +equals are mentioned together with equals. That +Jâna<i>s</i>ruti was a kshattriya we moreover conclude from +his sending his door-keeper and from other similar signs of power +(mentioned in the text).—Hence the <i>S</i>ûdras are +not qualified (for the knowledge of Brahman).</p> +<p>36. On account of the reference to ceremonial purifications (in +the case of the higher castes) and on account of their absence +being declared (in the case of the <i>S</i>ûdras).</p> +<p>That the <i>S</i>ûdras are not qualified, follows from +that circumstance also that in different places of the vidyâs +such ceremonies as the upanayana and the like are referred to. +Compare, for instance, <i>S</i>at. Br. XI, 5, 3, 13, 'He initiated +him as a pupil;' Ch. Up. VII, 1, 1, 'Teach me, Sir! thus he +approached him;' Pra. Up. I, 1, 'Devoted to Brahman, firm in +Brahman, seeking for the highest Brahman they, carrying fuel in +their hands, approached the venerable Pippalâda, thinking +that he would teach them all that.'—Thus the following +passage also, 'He without having made them undergo the upanayana +(said) to them' (Ch. Up. V, 11, 7), shows that the upanayana is a +well-established ceremony<a id="footnotetag225" name= +"footnotetag225"></a><a href= +"#footnote225"><sup>225</sup></a>.—With reference to the +<i>S</i>ûdras, on the other hand, the absence of ceremonies +is frequently mentioned; so, for instance, Manu X, 4, where they +are spoken of as 'once born' only ('the <i>S</i>ûdra is the +fourth caste, once-born'), and Manu X, 126, 'In the +<i>S</i>ûdra there is not any sin, and he is not fit for any +ceremony.'</p> +<span class="pagenum"><a name="page228" id= +"page228"></a>{228}</span> +<p>37. And on account of (Gautama) proceeding (to initiate +Jâbâla) on the ascertainment of (his) not being that +(i.e. a <i>S</i>ûdra).</p> +<p>The <i>S</i>ûdras are not qualified for that reason also +that Gautama, having ascertained Jâbâla not to be a +<i>S</i>ûdra from his speaking the truth, proceeded to +initiate and instruct him. 'None who is not a brâhma<i>n</i>a +would thus speak out. Go and fetch fuel, friend, I shall initiate +you. You have not swerved from the truth' (Ch. Up. IV, 4, 5); which +scriptural passage furnishes an inferential sign (of the +<i>S</i>ûdras not being capable of initiation).</p> +<p>38. And on account of the prohibition, in Sm<i>ri</i>ti, of (the +<i>S</i>ûdras') hearing and studying (the Veda) and (knowing +and performing) (Vedic) matters.</p> +<p>The <i>S</i>ûdras are not qualified for that reason also +that Sm<i>ri</i>ti prohibits their hearing the Veda, their studying +the Veda, and their understanding and performing Vedic matters. The +prohibition of hearing the Veda is conveyed by the following +passages: 'The ears of him who hears the Veda are to be filled with +(molten) lead and lac,' and 'For a <i>S</i>ûdra is (like) a +cemetery, therefore (the Veda) is not to be read in the vicinity of +a <i>S</i>ûdra.' From this latter passage the prohibition of +studying the Veda results at once; for how should he study +Scripture in whose vicinity it is not even to be read? There is, +moreover, an express prohibition (of the <i>S</i>ûdras +studying the Veda). 'His tongue is to be slit if he pronounces it; +his body is to be cut through if he preserves it.' The prohibitions +of hearing and studying the Veda already imply the prohibition of +the knowledge and performance of Vedic matters; there are, however, +express prohibitions also, such as 'he is not to impart knowledge +to the <i>S</i>ûdra,' and 'to the twice-born belong study, +sacrifice, and the bestowal of gifts.'—From those +<i>S</i>ûdras, however, who, like Vidura and 'the religious +hunter,' acquire knowledge in consequence of the after effects of +former deeds, the fruit of their knowledge cannot be withheld, +<span class="pagenum"><a name="page229" id= +"page229"></a>{229}</span> since knowledge in all cases brings +about its fruit. Sm<i>ri</i>ti, moreover, declares that all the +four castes are qualified for acquiring the knowledge of the +itihâsas and purâ<i>n</i>as; compare the passage, 'He +is to teach the four castes' (Mahâbh.).—It remains, +however, a settled point that they do not possess any such +qualification with regard to the Veda.</p> +<p>39. (The prâ<i>n</i>a is Brahman), on account of the +trembling (predicated of the whole world).</p> +<p>The discussion of qualification for Brahma-knowledge—on +which we entered as an opportunity offered—being finished we +return to our chief topic, i.e. the enquiry into the purport of the +Vedânta-texts.—We read (Ka. Up. II, 6, 2), 'Whatever +there is, the whole world when gone forth trembles in the +prâ<i>n</i>a. It (the prâ<i>n</i>a) is a great terror, +a raised thunderbolt. Those who know it become immortal<a id= +"footnotetag226" name="footnotetag226"></a><a href= +"#footnote226"><sup>226</sup></a>.'—This passage declares +that this whole world trembles, abiding in prâ<i>n</i>a, and +that there is raised something very terrible, called a thunderbolt, +and that through its knowledge immortality is obtained. But as it +is not immediately clear what the prâ<i>n</i>a is, and what +that terrible thunderbolt, a discussion arises.</p> +<p>The pûrvapakshin maintains that, in accordance with the +ordinary meaning of the term, prâ<i>n</i>a denotes the air +with its five modifications, that the word 'thunderbolt' also is to +be taken in its ordinary sense, and that thus the whole passage +contains a glorification of air. For, he says, this whole world +trembles, abiding within air with its five forms—which is +here called prâ<i>n</i>a—and the terrible thunderbolts +also spring from air (or wind) as their cause. For in the air, +people say, when it manifests itself in the form of Parjanya, +lightning, thunder, rain, and thunderbolts manifest +themselves.—Through the knowledge of that air immortality +<span class="pagenum"><a name="page230" id= +"page230"></a>{230}</span> also can be obtained; for another +scriptural passage says, 'Air is everything by itself, and air is +all things together. He who knows this conquers death.'—We +therefore conclude that the same air is to be understood in the +passage under discussion.</p> +<p>To this we make the following reply.—Brahman only can be +meant, on account of what precedes as well as what follows. In the +preceding as well as the subsequent part of the chapter Brahman +only is spoken of; how then can it be supposed that in the +intermediate part all at once the air should be referred to? The +immediately preceding passage runs as follows, 'That only is called +the Bright, that is called Brahman, that alone is called the +Immortal. All worlds are contained in it, and no one goes beyond +it.' That the Brahman there spoken of forms the topic of our +passage also, we conclude, firstly, from proximity; and, secondly, +from the circumstance that in the clause, 'The whole world trembles +in prâ<i>n</i>a' we recognise a quality of Brahman, viz. its +constituting the abode of the whole world. That the word +prâ<i>n</i>a can denote the highest Self also, appears from +such passages as 'the prâ<i>n</i>a of prâ<i>n</i>a' +(B<i>ri</i>. Up. IV, 4, 18). Being the cause of trembling, +moreover, is a quality which properly appertains to the highest +Self only, not to mere air. Thus Scripture says, 'No mortal lives +by the prâ<i>n</i>a and the breath that goes down. We live by +another in whom these two repose' (Ka. Up. II, 5 5). And also in +the passage subsequent to the one under discussion, ('From terror +of it fire burns, from terror the sun burns, from terror Indra and +Vâyu, and Death as the fifth run away,') Brahman, and not the +air, must be supposed to be spoken of, since the subject of that +passage is represented as the cause of fear on the part of the +whole world inclusive of the air itself. Thence we again conclude +that the passage under discussion also refers to Brahman, firstly, +on the ground of proximity; and, secondly, because we recognise a +quality of Brahman, viz. its being the cause of fear, in the words, +'A great terror, a raised thunderbolt.' The word 'thunderbolt' is +here used to denote a cause of fear in general. Thus in ordinary +life also a man strictly <span class="pagenum"><a name="page231" +id="page231"></a>{231}</span> carries out a king's command because +he fearfully considers in his mind, 'A thunderbolt (i.e. the king's +wrath, or threatened punishment) is hanging over my head; it might +fall if I did not carry out his command.' In the same manner this +whole world inclusive of fire, air, sun, and so on, regularly +carries on its manifold functions from fear of Brahman; hence +Brahman as inspiring fear is compared to a thunderbolt. Similarly, +another scriptural passage, whose topic is Brahman, declares, 'From +terror of it the wind blows, from terror the sun rises; from terror +of it Agni and Indra, yea, Death runs as the fifth.'—That +Brahman is what is referred to in our passage, further follows from +the declaration that the fruit of its cognition is immortality. For +that immortality is the fruit of the knowledge of Brahman is known, +for instance, from the mantra, 'A man who knows him only passes +over death, there is no other path to go' (<i>S</i>vet. Up. VI, +15).—That immortality which the pûrvapakshin asserts to +be sometimes represented as the fruit of the knowledge of the air +is a merely relative one; for there (i.e. in the chapter from which +the passage is quoted) at first the highest Self is spoken of, by +means of a new topic being started (B<i>ri</i>. Up. III, 4), and +thereupon the inferior nature of the air and so on is referred to. +('Everything else is evil.')—That in the passage under +discussion the highest Self is meant appears finally from the +general subject-matter; for the question (asked by Na<i>k</i>iketas +in I, 2, 14, 'That which thou seest as neither this nor that, as +neither effect nor cause, as neither past nor future tell me that') +refers to the highest Self.</p> +<p>40. The light (is Brahman), on account of that (Brahman) being +seen (in the scriptural passage).</p> +<p>We read in Scripture, 'Thus does that serene being, arising from +this body, appear in its own form as soon as it has approached the +highest light' (Ch. Up. VIII, 12, 3). Here the doubt arises whether +the word 'light' denotes the (physical) light, which is the object +of sight and dispels darkness, or the highest Brahman.</p> +<span class="pagenum"><a name="page232" id= +"page232"></a>{232}</span> +<p>The pûrvapakshin maintains that the word 'light' denotes +the well-known (physical) light, because that is the conventional +sense of the word. For while it is to be admitted that in another +passage, discussed under I, 1, 24, the word 'light' does, owing to +the general topic of the chapter, divest itself of its ordinary +meaning and denote Brahman, there is in our passage no similar +reason for setting the ordinary meaning aside. Moreover, it is +stated in the chapter treating of the nâ<i>d</i>îs of +the body, that a man going to final release reaches the sun ('When +he departs from this body then he departs upwards by those very +rays;' Ch. Up. VIII, 6, 5). Hence we conclude that the word 'light' +denotes, in our passage, the ordinary light.</p> +<p>To this we make the following reply.—The word 'light' can +denote the highest Brahman only, on account of that being seen. We +see that in the whole chapter Brahman is carried on as the topic of +discussion. For the Self, which is free from sin, &c. is +introduced as the general subject-matter in VIII, 7, 1 ('the Self +which is free from sin'); it is thereupon set forth as that which +is to be searched out and to be understood (VIII, 7, 1); it is +carried on by means of the clauses, 'I shall explain that further +to you' (VIII, 9, 3 ff.); after that freedom from body is said to +belong to it, because it is one with light ('when he is free from +the body then neither pleasure nor pain touches him,' VIII, 12, +1)—and freedom from body is not possible outside +Brahman—and it is finally qualified as 'the highest light, +the highest person' (VIII, 12, 3).—Against the statement, +made by the pûrvapakshin, that Scripture speaks of a man +going to release as reaching the sun, we remark, that the release +there referred to is not the ultimate one, since it is said to be +connected with going and departing upwards. That the ultimate +release has nothing to do with going and departing upwards we shall +show later on.</p> +<p>41. The ether is (Brahman), as it is designated as something +different, &c. (from name and form).</p> +<p>Scripture says, 'He who is called ether, +(âkâ<i>s</i>a) is the revealer of all forms and names. +That within which these <span class="pagenum"><a name="page233" id= +"page233"></a>{233}</span> forms and names are contained is the +Brahman, the Immortal, the Self (Ch. Up. VIII, 14, 1).</p> +<p>There arising a doubt whether that which here is called ether is +the highest Brahman or the ordinary elemental ether, the +pûrvapakshin declares that the latter alternative is to be +embraced, firstly, because it is founded on the conventional +meaning of the word 'ether;' and, secondly, because the +circumstance of revealing names and forms can very well be +reconciled with the elemental ether, as that which affords room +(for all things). Moreover, the passage contains no clear +indicatory mark of Brahman, such as creative power, and the +like.</p> +<p>To this we reply, that the word 'ether' can here denote the +highest Brahman only, because it is designated as a different +thing, &c. For the clause, 'That within which these two are +contained is Brahman,' designates the ether as something different +from names and forms. But, excepting Brahman, there is nothing +whatever different from name and form, since the entire world of +effects is evolved exclusively by names and forms. Moreover, the +complete revealing of names and forms cannot be accomplished by +anything else but Brahman, according to the text which declares +Brahman's creative agency, 'Let me enter (into those beings) with +this living Self (jîva âtman), and evolve names and +forms' (Ch. Up. VI, 3, 2). But—it may be said—from this +very passage it is apparent that the living Self also (i.e. the +individual soul) possesses revealing power with regard to names and +forms.—True, we reply, but what the passage really wishes to +intimate, is the non-difference (of the individual soul from the +highest Self). And the very statement concerning the revealing of +names and forms implies the statement of signs indicatory of +Brahman, viz. creative power and the like.—Moreover, the +terms 'the Brahman, the Immortal, the Self' (VIII, 14) indicate +that Brahman is spoken of.</p> +<p>42. And (on account of the designation) (of the highest Self) as +different (from the individual soul) in the states of deep sleep +and departing.</p> +<span class="pagenum"><a name="page234" id= +"page234"></a>{234}</span> +<p>In the sixth prapâ<i>th</i>aka of the +B<i>ri</i>hadâra<i>n</i>yaka there is given, in reply to the +question, 'Who is that Self?' a lengthy exposition of the nature of +the Self, 'He who is within the heart, among the +prâ<i>n</i>as, the person of light, consisting of knowledge' +(B<i>ri</i>. Up. IV, 3, 7). Here the doubt arises, whether the +passage merely aims at making an additional statement about the +nature of the transmigrating soul (known already from other +sources), or at establishing the nature of the non-transmigrating +Self.</p> +<p>The pûrvapakshin maintains that the passage is concerned +with the nature of the transmigrating soul, on account of the +introductory and concluding statements. For the introductory +statement, 'He among the prâ<i>n</i>as who consists of +knowledge,' contains marks indicatory of the embodied soul, and so +likewise the concluding passage, 'And that great unborn Self is he +who consists of cognition,' &c. (IV, 4, 22). We must therefore +adhere to the same subject-matter in the intermediate passages +also, and look on them as setting forth the same embodied Self, +represented in its different states, viz. the waking state, and so +on.</p> +<p>In reply to this, we maintain that the passage aims only at +giving information about the highest Lord, not at making additional +statements about the embodied soul.—Why?—On account of +the highest Lord being designated as different from the embodied +soul, in the states of deep sleep and of departing from the body. +His difference from the embodied soul in the state of deep sleep is +declared in the following passage, 'This person embraced by the +intelligent (prâj<i>ñ</i>a) Self knows nothing that is +without, nothing that is within.' Here the term, 'the person,' must +mean the embodied soul; for of him it is possible to deny that he +knows, because he, as being the knower, may know what is within and +without. The 'intelligent Self,' on the other hand, is the highest +Lord, because he is never dissociated from intelligence, +i.e.—in his case—all-embracing +knowledge.—Similarly, the passage treating of departure, i.e. +death ('this bodily Self mounted by the intelligent Self moves +along groaning'), refers to the highest Lord as different from the +individual Self. There also we have to understand by the 'embodied +one' the individual <span class="pagenum"><a name="page235" id= +"page235"></a>{235}</span> soul which is the Lord of the body, +while the 'intelligent one' is again the Lord. We thus understand +that 'on account of his being designated as something different, in +the states of deep sleep and departure,' the highest Lord forms the +subject of the passage.—With reference to the +pûrvapakshin's assertion that the entire chapter refers to +the embodied Self, because indicatory marks of the latter are found +in its beginning, middle, and end, we remark that in the first +place the introductory passage ('He among the prâ<i>n</i>as +who consists of cognition') does not aim at setting forth the +character of the transmigrating Self, but rather, while merely +referring to the nature of the transmigrating Self as something +already known, aims at declaring its identity with the highest +Brahman; for it is manifest that the immediately subsequent +passage, 'as if thinking, as if moving'<a id="footnotetag227" name= +"footnotetag227"></a><a href="#footnote227"><sup>227</sup></a>, +aims at discarding the attributes of the transmigrating Self. The +concluding passage again is analogous to the initial one; for the +words, 'And that great unborn Self is he who,' &c., mean: We +have shown that that same cognitional Self, which is observed among +the prâ<i>n</i>as, is the great unborn Self, i.e. the highest +Lord—He, again, who imagines that the passages intervening +(between the two quoted) aim at setting forth the nature of the +transmigrating Self by representing it in the waking state, and so +on, is like a man who setting out towards the east, wants to set +out at the same time towards the west. For in representing the +states of waking, and so on, the passage does not aim at describing +the soul as subject to different states or transmigration, but +rather as free from all particular conditions and transmigration. +This is evident from the circumstance that on Janaka's question, +which is repeated in every section, 'Speak on for the sake of +emancipation,' Yaj<i>ñ</i>avalkya replies each time, 'By all +that he is not affected, for that person is not attached to +anything' (B<i>ri</i>. Up. IV, 3, 14-16). And later on he says (IV, +3, 22), 'He is not followed by <span class="pagenum"><a name= +"page236" id="page236"></a>{236}</span> good, not followed by evil, +for he has then overcome all the sorrows of the heart.' We have, +therefore, to conclude that the chapter exclusively aims at setting +forth the nature of the non-transmigrating Self.</p> +<p>43. And on account of such words as Lord, &c.</p> +<p>That the chapter aims at setting forth the nature of the +non-transmigrating Self, we have to conclude from that circumstance +also that there occur in it terms such as Lord and so on, +intimating the nature of the non-transmigrating Self, and others +excluding the nature of the transmigrating Self. To the first class +belongs, for instance, 'He is the lord of all, the king of all +things, the protector of all things.' To the latter class belongs +the passage, 'He does not become greater by good works, nor smaller +by evil works.'—From all which we conclude that the chapter +refers to the non-transmigrating highest Lord.</p> +<p>Notes:</p> +<blockquote class="footnote"><a id="footnote164" name= +"footnote164"></a><b>Footnote 164:</b><a href= +"#footnotetag164">(return)</a> +<p>From passages of which nature we may infer that in the passage +under discussion also the 'abode' is Brahman.</p> +</blockquote> +<blockquote class="footnote"><a id="footnote165" name= +"footnote165"></a><b>Footnote 165:</b><a href= +"#footnotetag165">(return)</a> +<p>From which circumstance we may conclude that the passage under +discussion also refers to Brahman.</p> +</blockquote> +<blockquote class="footnote"><a id="footnote166" name= +"footnote166"></a><b>Footnote 166:</b><a href= +"#footnotetag166">(return)</a> +<p>Yat sarvam avidyâropita<i>m</i> tat sarva<i>m</i> +paramârthato brahma na tu yad brahma tat sarvam ity +artha<i>h</i>. Bhâmatî.</p> +</blockquote> +<blockquote class="footnote"><a id="footnote167" name= +"footnote167"></a><b>Footnote 167:</b><a href= +"#footnotetag167">(return)</a> +<p>So that the passage would have to be translated, 'That, viz. +knowledge, &c. is the bridge of the Immortal.'</p> +</blockquote> +<blockquote class="footnote"><a id="footnote168" name= +"footnote168"></a><b>Footnote 168:</b><a href= +"#footnotetag168">(return)</a> +<p>Bhogyasya bhokt<i>ris</i>eshatvât tasyâyatanatvam +uktam â<i>s</i>a@nkyâha na <i>k</i>eti, +jîvasyâd<i>ri</i>sh<i>t</i>advârâ +dyubhvâdinimittatvezpi na sâkshât +tadâyatanatvam aupâdhikatvenâvibhutvâd ity +artha<i>h</i>. Ânanda Giri.</p> +</blockquote> +<blockquote class="footnote"><a id="footnote169" name= +"footnote169"></a><b>Footnote 169:</b><a href= +"#footnotetag169">(return)</a> +<p>It would not have been requisite to introduce a special +Sûtra for the individual soul—which, like the air, is +already excluded by the preceding Sûtra—if it were not +for the new argument brought forward in the following Sûtra +which applies to the individual soul only.</p> +</blockquote> +<blockquote class="footnote"><a id="footnote170" name= +"footnote170"></a><b>Footnote 170:</b><a href= +"#footnotetag170">(return)</a> +<p>If the individual soul were meant by the abode of heaven, earth, +&c., the statement regarding Î<i>s</i>vara made in the +passage about the two birds would be altogether abrupt, and on that +ground objectionable. The same difficulty does not present itself +with regard to the abrupt mention of the individual soul which is +well known to everybody, and to which therefore casual allusions +may be made.—I subjoin Ânanda Giri's commentary on the +entire passage: +Jîvasyopâdhyaikyenâvivakshitatvât +tadj<i>ñ</i>ânezpi +sarvaj<i>ñ</i>ânasiddhes +tasyâyatanatvâdyabhâve hetvantara<i>m</i> +vâ<i>k</i>yam ity â<i>s</i>a@nkya sûtre<i>n</i>a +pariharati kuta<i>sk</i>etyâdinâ. Tad +vyâ<i>k</i>ash<i>t</i>e dyubhvâdîti. +Nirde<i>s</i>am eva dar<i>s</i>ayati tayor iti. Vibhaktyartham +âha tâbhyâ<i>m</i> <i>k</i>eti. +Sthitye<i>s</i>varasyâdanâj +jîvasa<i>m</i>grahezpi katham î<i>s</i>varasyaiva +vi<i>s</i>vâyatanatva<i>m</i> tadâha yadîti. +Î<i>s</i>varasyâyanatvenâprak<i>ri</i>tatve +jîvap<i>ri</i>thakkathanânupapattir ity uktam eva +vyatirekadvârâha anyatheti. +Jîvasyâyatanatvenâprak<i>ri</i>tatve +tulyânupapattir iti <i>s</i>a@nkate nanviti. +Tasyaikyârtha<i>m</i> +lokasiddhasyânuvâdatvân naivam ity âha +neti. +Jîvasyâpûrvatvâbhâvenâpratipâdyatvam +eva praka<i>t</i>ayati kshetraj<i>ñ</i>o hîti. +Î<i>s</i>varasyâpi lokavâdisiddhatvâd +apratipâdyatety â<i>s</i>a@nkyâha +î<i>s</i>varas tv iti.</p> +</blockquote> +<blockquote class="footnote"><a id="footnote171" name= +"footnote171"></a><b>Footnote 171:</b><a href= +"#footnotetag171">(return)</a> +<p>As might be the primâ facie conclusion from the particle +'but' introducing the sentence 'but he in reality,' &c.</p> +</blockquote> +<blockquote class="footnote"><a id="footnote172" name= +"footnote172"></a><b>Footnote 172:</b><a href= +"#footnotetag172">(return)</a> +<p>It being maintained that the passage referred to is to be viewed +in connexion with the general subject-matter of the preceding past +of the chapter.</p> +</blockquote> +<blockquote class="footnote"><a id="footnote173" name= +"footnote173"></a><b>Footnote 173:</b><a href= +"#footnotetag173">(return)</a> +<p>And would thus involve a violation of a fundamental principle of +the Mîmâ<i>m</i>sâ.</p> +</blockquote> +<blockquote class="footnote"><a id="footnote174" name= +"footnote174"></a><b>Footnote 174:</b><a href= +"#footnotetag174">(return)</a> +<p>A remark directed against the possible attempt to explain the +passage last quoted as referring to the embodied soul.</p> +</blockquote> +<blockquote class="footnote"><a id="footnote175" name= +"footnote175"></a><b>Footnote 175:</b><a href= +"#footnotetag175">(return)</a> +<p>Pi<i>nd</i>a<i>h</i> sthûlo deha<i>h</i>, +prâ<i>n</i>a<i>h</i> sûtrâtmâ. Ânanda +Giri.-The lower Brahman (hira<i>n</i>yagarbha on +sûtrâtman) is the vital principle (prâ<i>n</i>a) +in all creatures.</p> +</blockquote> +<blockquote class="footnote"><a id="footnote176" name= +"footnote176"></a><b>Footnote 176:</b><a href= +"#footnotetag176">(return)</a> +<p>Sa<i>m</i>yagdar<i>s</i>ana, i.e. complete seeing or intuition; +the same term which in other places—where it is not requisite +to insist on the idea of 'seeing' in contradistinction from +'reflecting' or 'meditating'—is rendered by perfect +knowledge.</p> +</blockquote> +<blockquote class="footnote"><a id="footnote177" name= +"footnote177"></a><b>Footnote 177:</b><a href= +"#footnotetag177">(return)</a> +<p>Translated above by 'of the shape of the individual soul.'</p> +</blockquote> +<blockquote class="footnote"><a id="footnote178" name= +"footnote178"></a><b>Footnote 178:</b><a href= +"#footnotetag178">(return)</a> +<p>Pa<i>n</i>ini III, 3, 77, 'mûrtta<i>m</i> +ghana<i>h</i>.'</p> +</blockquote> +<blockquote class="footnote"><a id="footnote179" name= +"footnote179"></a><b>Footnote 179:</b><a href= +"#footnotetag179">(return)</a> +<p>So that the interpretation of the pûrvapakshin cannot be +objected to on the ground of its involving the comparison of a +thing to itself.</p> +</blockquote> +<blockquote class="footnote"><a id="footnote180" name= +"footnote180"></a><b>Footnote 180:</b><a href= +"#footnotetag180">(return)</a> +<p>So that no objection can be raised on the ground that heaven and +earth cannot be contained in the small ether of the heart.</p> +</blockquote> +<blockquote class="footnote"><a id="footnote181" name= +"footnote181"></a><b>Footnote 181:</b><a href= +"#footnotetag181">(return)</a> +<p>Viz. of that which is within it. Ânanda Giri proposes two +explanations: na <i>k</i>eti, paravi<i>s</i>esha<i>n</i>atvenety +atra paro daharâkâ<i>s</i>a upâdânât +tasminn iti saptamyanta-ta<i>kkh</i>abdasyeti <i>s</i>esha<i>h</i>. +Yadvâ para<i>s</i>abdo s nta<i>h</i>sthavastuvishayas +tadvi<i>s</i>esha<i>n</i>alvena tasminn iti +daharâkâ<i>s</i>asyokter ity artha<i>h</i>. +Ta<i>kkh</i>abdasya samnik<i>ri</i>sh<i>t</i>ânvayayoge +viprak<i>ri</i>sh<i>t</i>ânvayasya jaghanyatvâd +âkâ<i>s</i>ântargata<i>m</i> dhyeyam iti +bhâva<i>h</i>.</p> +</blockquote> +<blockquote class="footnote"><a id="footnote182" name= +"footnote182"></a><b>Footnote 182:</b><a href= +"#footnotetag182">(return)</a> +<p>A vâkyabheda—split of the sentence—takes place +according to the Mîmâm<i>s</i>â when one and the +same sentence contains two new statements which are different.</p> +</blockquote> +<blockquote class="footnote"><a id="footnote183" name= +"footnote183"></a><b>Footnote 183:</b><a href= +"#footnotetag183">(return)</a> +<p>While the explanation of Brahman by jîva would compel us +to assume that the word Brahman secondarily denotes the individual +soul.</p> +</blockquote> +<blockquote class="footnote"><a id="footnote184" name= +"footnote184"></a><b>Footnote 184:</b><a href= +"#footnotetag184">(return)</a> +<p>Upalabdher adhish<i>th</i>ânam brahma<i>n</i>a deha +ishyate. Tenâsâdhâra<i>n</i>atvena deho +brahmapuram bhavet. Bhâmatî.</p> +</blockquote> +<blockquote class="footnote"><a id="footnote185" name= +"footnote185"></a><b>Footnote 185:</b><a href= +"#footnotetag185">(return)</a> +<p>I.e. Brahmâ, the lower Brahman.</p> +</blockquote> +<blockquote class="footnote"><a id="footnote186" name= +"footnote186"></a><b>Footnote 186:</b><a href= +"#footnotetag186">(return)</a> +<p>The masculine 'âvirbhûtasvarûpa<i>h</i>' +qualifies the substantive jîva<i>h</i> which has to be +supplied. Properly speaking the jîva whose true nature has +become manifest, i.e. which has become Brahman, is no longer +jîva; hence the explanatory statement that the term +jîva is used with reference to what the jîva was before +it became Brahman.</p> +</blockquote> +<blockquote class="footnote"><a id="footnote187" name= +"footnote187"></a><b>Footnote 187:</b><a href= +"#footnotetag187">(return)</a> +<p>To state another reason showing that the first and second +chapters of Prajâpati's instruction refer to the same +subject.</p> +</blockquote> +<blockquote class="footnote"><a id="footnote188" name= +"footnote188"></a><b>Footnote 188:</b><a href= +"#footnotetag188">(return)</a> +<p>I.e. of whom cognition is not a mere attribute.</p> +</blockquote> +<blockquote class="footnote"><a id="footnote189" name= +"footnote189"></a><b>Footnote 189:</b><a href= +"#footnotetag189">(return)</a> +<p>Although in reality there is no such thing as an individual +soul.</p> +</blockquote> +<blockquote class="footnote"><a id="footnote190" name= +"footnote190"></a><b>Footnote 190:</b><a href= +"#footnotetag190">(return)</a> +<p>Nanu jîvabrahma<i>n</i>or aikyam na kvâpi +sûtrakâro mukhato vadati kim tu sarvatra bhedam eva, +ato naikyam ish<i>t</i>am tatrâha pratipâdyam tv +iti.</p> +</blockquote> +<blockquote class="footnote"><a id="footnote191" name= +"footnote191"></a><b>Footnote 191:</b><a href= +"#footnotetag191">(return)</a> +<p>This last sentence is directed against the possible objection +that '<i>s</i>abda,' which the Sûtra brings forward as an +argument in favour of the highest Lord being meant, has the sense +of 'sentence' (vâkya), and is therefore of less force than +li@nga, i.e. indicatory or inferential mark which is represented in +our passage by the a@ngush<i>th</i>amâtratâ of the +purusha, and favours the jîva interpretation. <i>S</i>abda, +the text remarks, here means <i>s</i>ruti, i.e. direct enunciation, +and <i>s</i>ruti ranks, as a means of proof, higher than +li@nga.</p> +</blockquote> +<blockquote class="footnote"><a id="footnote192" name= +"footnote192"></a><b>Footnote 192:</b><a href= +"#footnotetag192">(return)</a> +<p>I.e. men belonging to the three upper castes.</p> +</blockquote> +<blockquote class="footnote"><a id="footnote193" name= +"footnote193"></a><b>Footnote 193:</b><a href= +"#footnotetag193">(return)</a> +<p>The first reason excludes animals, gods, and <i>ri</i>shis. Gods +cannot themselves perform sacrifices, the essential feature of +which is the parting, on the part of the sacrificer, with an +offering meant for the gods. <i>Ri</i>shis cannot perform +sacrifices in the course of whose performance the ancestral +<i>ri</i>shis of the sacrificer are invoked.—The second +reason excludes those men whose only desire is emancipation and who +therefore do not care for the perishable fruits of +sacrifices.—The third and fourth reasons exclude the +<i>S</i>ûdras who are indirectly disqualified for +<i>s</i>âstric works because the Veda in different places +gives rules for the three higher castes only, and for whom the +ceremony of the upanayana—indispensable for all who wish to +study the Veda—is not prescribed.—Cp. Pûrva +Mîmâ<i>m</i>sâ Sûtras VI, 1.</p> +</blockquote> +<blockquote class="footnote"><a id="footnote194" name= +"footnote194"></a><b>Footnote 194:</b><a href= +"#footnotetag194">(return)</a> +<p>The reference is to Pûrva Mîmâ<i>m</i>sâ +Sûtras I, 1, 5 (not to I, 2, 21, as stated in Muir's Sanskrit +Texts, III, p. 69).</p> +</blockquote> +<blockquote class="footnote"><a id="footnote195" name= +"footnote195"></a><b>Footnote 195:</b><a href= +"#footnotetag195">(return)</a> +<p>In which classes of beings all the gods are comprised.</p> +</blockquote> +<blockquote class="footnote"><a id="footnote196" name= +"footnote196"></a><b>Footnote 196:</b><a href= +"#footnotetag196">(return)</a> +<p>Which shows that together with the non-eternality of the thing +denoted there goes the non-eternality of the denoting word.</p> +</blockquote> +<blockquote class="footnote"><a id="footnote197" name= +"footnote197"></a><b>Footnote 197:</b><a href= +"#footnotetag197">(return)</a> +<p>Âk<i>ri</i>ti, best translated by [Greek: eidos</p> +</blockquote> +.] +<blockquote class="footnote"><a id="footnote198" name= +"footnote198"></a><b>Footnote 198:</b><a href= +"#footnotetag198">(return)</a> +<p>The pûrvapakshin, i.e. here the grammarian maintains, for +the reasons specified further on, that there exists in the case of +words a supersensuous entity called spho<i>t</i>a which is +manifested by the letters of the word, and, if apprehended by the +mind, itself manifests the sense of the word. The term +spho<i>t</i>a may, according as it is viewed in either of these +lights, be explained as the manifestor or that which is +manifested.—The spho<i>t</i>a is a grammatical fiction, the +word in so far as it is apprehended by us as a whole. That we +cannot identify it with the 'notion' (as Deussen seems inclined to +do, p. 80) follows from its being distinctly called +vâ<i>k</i>aka or abhidhâyaka, and its being represented +as that which causes the conception of the sense of a word +(arthadhîhetu).</p> +</blockquote> +<blockquote class="footnote"><a id="footnote199" name= +"footnote199"></a><b>Footnote 199:</b><a href= +"#footnotetag199">(return)</a> +<p>For that each letter by itself expresses the sense is not +observed; and if it did so, the other letters of the word would +have to be declared useless.</p> +</blockquote> +<blockquote class="footnote"><a id="footnote200" name= +"footnote200"></a><b>Footnote 200:</b><a href= +"#footnotetag200">(return)</a> +<p>In order to enable us to apprehend the sense from the word, +there is required the actual consciousness of the last letter plus +the impressions of the preceding letters; just as smoke enables us +to infer the existence of fire only if we are actually conscious of +the smoke. But that actual consciousness does not take place +because the impressions are not objects of perceptive +consciousness.</p> +</blockquote> +<blockquote class="footnote"><a id="footnote201" name= +"footnote201"></a><b>Footnote 201:</b><a href= +"#footnotetag201">(return)</a> +<p>'How should it be so?' i.e. it cannot be so; and on that account +the differences apprehended do not belong to the letters +themselves, but to the external conditions mentioned above.</p> +</blockquote> +<blockquote class="footnote"><a id="footnote202" name= +"footnote202"></a><b>Footnote 202:</b><a href= +"#footnotetag202">(return)</a> +<p>With 'or else' begins the exposition of the finally accepted +theory as to the cause why the same letters are apprehended as +different. Hitherto the cause had been found in the variety of the +upâdhis of the letters. Now a new distinction is made between +articulated letters and non-articulated tone.</p> +</blockquote> +<blockquote class="footnote"><a id="footnote203" name= +"footnote203"></a><b>Footnote 203:</b><a href= +"#footnotetag203">(return)</a> +<p>I.e. it is not directly one idea, for it has for its object more +than one letter; but it may be called one in a secondary sense +because it is based on the determinative knowledge that the +letters, although more than one, express one sense only.</p> +</blockquote> +<blockquote class="footnote"><a id="footnote204" name= +"footnote204"></a><b>Footnote 204:</b><a href= +"#footnotetag204">(return)</a> +<p>Which circumstance proves that exalted knowledge appertains not +only to Hira<i>n</i>yagarbha, but to many beings.</p> +</blockquote> +<blockquote class="footnote"><a id="footnote205" name= +"footnote205"></a><b>Footnote 205:</b><a href= +"#footnotetag205">(return)</a> +<p>Viz. naraka, the commentaries say.</p> +</blockquote> +<blockquote class="footnote"><a id="footnote206" name= +"footnote206"></a><b>Footnote 206:</b><a href= +"#footnotetag206">(return)</a> +<p>Asmin kalpe sarveshâm prâ<i>n</i>inâm +dâhapâkaprakâ<i>s</i>akârî yozyam +agnir d<i>ris</i>yate sozyam agni<i>h</i> pûrvasmin kalpe +manushya<i>h</i> san devatvapadaprâpaka<i>m</i> +karmânush<i>th</i>âyâsmin kalpa etaj janma +labdhavân ata<i>h</i> pûrvasmin kalpe sa manushyo +bhâvinî<i>m</i> sa<i>m</i>j<i>ñ</i>âm +â<i>sri</i>tyâgnir iti +vyapadi<i>s</i>yate.—Sâya<i>n</i>a on the quoted +passage.</p> +</blockquote> +<blockquote class="footnote"><a id="footnote207" name= +"footnote207"></a><b>Footnote 207:</b><a href= +"#footnotetag207">(return)</a> +<p>As, for instance, 'So long as Âditya rises in the east and +sets in the west' (Ch. Up. III, 6, 4).</p> +</blockquote> +<blockquote class="footnote"><a id="footnote208" name= +"footnote208"></a><b>Footnote 208:</b><a href= +"#footnotetag208">(return)</a> +<p>Whence it follows that the devas are not personal beings, and +therefore not qualified for the knowledge of Brahman.</p> +</blockquote> +<blockquote class="footnote"><a id="footnote209" name= +"footnote209"></a><b>Footnote 209:</b><a href= +"#footnotetag209">(return)</a> +<p>Yama, for instance, being ordinarily represented as a person +with a staff in his hand, Varu<i>n</i>a with a noose, Indra with a +thunderbolt, &c. &c.</p> +</blockquote> +<blockquote class="footnote"><a id="footnote210" name= +"footnote210"></a><b>Footnote 210:</b><a href= +"#footnotetag210">(return)</a> +<p>On the proper function of arthavâda and mantra according +to the Mîmâ<i>m</i>sâ, cp. Arthasa<i>m</i>graha, +Introduction.</p> +</blockquote> +<blockquote class="footnote"><a id="footnote211" name= +"footnote211"></a><b>Footnote 211:</b><a href= +"#footnotetag211">(return)</a> +<p>See above, p. 197.</p> +</blockquote> +<blockquote class="footnote"><a id="footnote212" name= +"footnote212"></a><b>Footnote 212:</b><a href= +"#footnotetag212">(return)</a> +<p>Which can be offered by kshattriyas only.</p> +</blockquote> +<blockquote class="footnote"><a id="footnote213" name= +"footnote213"></a><b>Footnote 213:</b><a href= +"#footnotetag213">(return)</a> +<p><i>S</i>rautali@ngenânumânabâdha<i>m</i> +dar<i>s</i>ayitvâ smârtenâpi +tadbâdha<i>m</i> dar<i>s</i>âyati smârtam iti. +Ki<i>m</i> atra brahma am<i>ri</i>tam ki<i>m</i> svid vedyam +anuttamam, <i>k</i>intayet tatra vai gatvâ gandharvo +mâm ap<i>rikkh</i>ata, Vi<i>s</i>vâvasus tato +râjan vedântaj<i>ñ</i>ânakovida iti +mokshadharme +janakayâj<i>ñ</i>avalkyasa<i>m</i>vâdât +prahlâdâjagarasa<i>m</i>vadâ<i>k</i> +<i>k</i>oktânumânâsiddhir ity artha<i>h</i>.</p> +</blockquote> +<blockquote class="footnote"><a id="footnote214" name= +"footnote214"></a><b>Footnote 214:</b><a href= +"#footnotetag214">(return)</a> +<p>As opposed to an action to be accomplished.</p> +</blockquote> +<blockquote class="footnote"><a id="footnote215" name= +"footnote215"></a><b>Footnote 215:</b><a href= +"#footnotetag215">(return)</a> +<p>Of this nature is, for instance, the arthavâda, 'Fire is a +remedy for cold.'</p> +</blockquote> +<blockquote class="footnote"><a id="footnote216" name= +"footnote216"></a><b>Footnote 216:</b><a href= +"#footnotetag216">(return)</a> +<p>Of this nature is, for instance, the passage 'the sacrificial +post is the sun' (i.e. possesses the qualities of the sun, +luminousness, &c.; a statement contradicted by perception).</p> +</blockquote> +<blockquote class="footnote"><a id="footnote217" name= +"footnote217"></a><b>Footnote 217:</b><a href= +"#footnotetag217">(return)</a> +<p>And therefore to suppose that a divinity is nothing but a +certain word forming part of a mantra.</p> +</blockquote> +<blockquote class="footnote"><a id="footnote218" name= +"footnote218"></a><b>Footnote 218:</b><a href= +"#footnotetag218">(return)</a> +<p>The râjasûya-sacrifice is to be offered by a prince +who wishes to become the ruler of the whole earth.</p> +</blockquote> +<blockquote class="footnote"><a id="footnote219" name= +"footnote219"></a><b>Footnote 219:</b><a href= +"#footnotetag219">(return)</a> +<p>In one of whose stages the being desirous of final emancipation +becomes a deva.</p> +</blockquote> +<blockquote class="footnote"><a id="footnote220" name= +"footnote220"></a><b>Footnote 220:</b><a href= +"#footnotetag220">(return)</a> +<p>The commentaries explain 'therefore' by 'on account of his being +devoid of the three sacred fires.' This explanation does not, +however, agree with the context of the Taitt. Sa<i>m</i>h.</p> +</blockquote> +<blockquote class="footnote"><a id="footnote221" name= +"footnote221"></a><b>Footnote 221:</b><a href= +"#footnotetag221">(return)</a> +<p>The <i>S</i>ûdra not having acquired a knowledge of Vedic +matters in the legitimate way, i.e. through the study of the Veda +under the guidance of a guru, is unfit for sacrifices as well as +for vidyâ.</p> +</blockquote> +<blockquote class="footnote"><a id="footnote222" name= +"footnote222"></a><b>Footnote 222:</b><a href= +"#footnotetag222">(return)</a> +<p>The li@nga contained in the word '<i>S</i>ûdra' has no +proving power as it occurs in an arthavâda-passage which has +no authority if not connected with a corresponding injunctive +passage. In our case the li@nga in the arthavâda-passage is +even directly contradicted by those injunctions which militate +against the <i>S</i>ûdras' qualification for Vedic +matters.</p> +</blockquote> +<blockquote class="footnote"><a id="footnote223" name= +"footnote223"></a><b>Footnote 223:</b><a href= +"#footnotetag223">(return)</a> +<p>Ha<i>m</i>savâkyâd âtmanoznâdara<i>m</i> +<i>s</i>rutvâ jâna<i>s</i>rute<i>h</i> <i>s</i>ug +utpannety etad eva katha<i>m</i> gamyate yenâsau +<i>s</i>ûdra<i>s</i>abdena sâ<i>k</i>yate tatrâha +sp<i>ris</i>yate <i>k</i>eti. Ânanda Giri.</p> +</blockquote> +<blockquote class="footnote"><a id="footnote224" name= +"footnote224"></a><b>Footnote 224:</b><a href= +"#footnotetag224">(return)</a> +<p>I translate this passage as I find it in all MSS. of +<i>S</i>a@nkara consulted by me (noting, however, that some MSS. +read <i>k</i>aitrarathinâmaika<i>h</i>). Ânanda Giri +expressly explains tasmâd by <i>k</i>aitrarathad ity +artha<i>h</i>.—The text of the Tâ<i>nd</i>ya Br. runs: +tasmâ<i>k</i> <i>k</i>aitrarathînâm eka<i>h</i> +kshatrapatir gâyate, and the commentary explains: +tasmât kâra<i>n</i>âd adyâpi +<i>k</i>itrava<i>ms</i>otpannânâ<i>m</i> madhye eka eva +râjâ kshatrapatir balâdhipatir +bhavati.—Grammar does not authorise the form +<i>k</i>ahraratha used in the Sûtra.</p> +</blockquote> +<blockquote class="footnote"><a id="footnote225" name= +"footnote225"></a><b>Footnote 225:</b><a href= +"#footnotetag225">(return)</a> +<p>The king A<i>s</i>vapati receives some brâhma<i>n</i>as as +his pupils without insisting on the upanayana. This express +statement of the upanayana having been omitted in a certain case +shows it to be the general rule.</p> +</blockquote> +<blockquote class="footnote"><a id="footnote226" name= +"footnote226"></a><b>Footnote 226:</b><a href= +"#footnotetag226">(return)</a> +<p>As the words stand in the original they might be translated as +follows (and are so translated by the pûrvapakshin), +'Whatever there is, the whole world trembles in the +prâ<i>n</i>a, there goes forth (from it) a great terror, viz. +the raised thunderbolt.'</p> +</blockquote> +<blockquote class="footnote"><a id="footnote227" name= +"footnote227"></a><b>Footnote 227:</b><a href= +"#footnotetag227">(return)</a> +<p>The stress lies here on the 'as if.' which intimate that the +Self does not really think or move.</p> +</blockquote> +<span class="pagenum"><a name="page237" id= +"page237"></a>{237}</span> <a name="chap-1-4" id="chap-1-4"></a> +<h4>FOURTH PÂDA.</h4> +<center>REVERENCE TO THE HIGHEST SELF!</center> +<p>1. If it be said that some (mention) that which is based on +inference (i.e. the pradhâna); we deny this, because (the +term alluded to) refers to what is contained in the simile of the +body (i.e. the body itself); and (that the text) shows.</p> +<p>In the preceding part of this work—as whose topic there +has been set forth an enquiry into Brahman—we have at first +defined Brahman (I, 1, 2); we have thereupon refuted the objection +that that definition applies to the pradhâna also, by showing +that there is no scriptural authority for the latter (I, 1, 5), and +we have shown in detail that the common purport of all +Vedânta-texts is to set forth the doctrine that Brahman, and +not the pradhâ<i>n</i>a, is the cause of the world. Here, +however, the Sâ@nkhya again raises an objection which he +considers not to have been finally disposed of.</p> +<p>It has not, he says, been satisfactorily proved that there is no +scriptural authority for the pradhâna; for some +<i>s</i>âkhâs contain expressions which seem to convey +the idea of the pradhâna. From this it follows that Kapila +and other supreme <i>ri</i>shis maintain the doctrine of the +pradhâna being the general cause only because it is based on +the Veda.—As long therefore as it has not been proved that +those passages to which the Sâ@nkhyas refer have a different +meaning (i.e. do not allude to the pradhâna), all our +previous argumentation as to the omniscient Brahman being the cause +of the world must be considered as unsettled. We therefore now +begin a new chapter which aims at proving that those passages +actually have a different meaning.</p> +<p>The Sâ@nkhyas maintain that that also which is based on +inference, i.e. the pradhâna, is perceived in the text of +some <i>s</i>âkhâs. We read, for instance, they say, in +the Kâ<i>th</i>aka (I, 3, 11), 'Beyond the Great there is the +Undeveloped, <span class="pagenum"><a name="page238" id= +"page238"></a>{238}</span> beyond the Undeveloped there is the +Person.' There we recognise, named by the same names and enumerated +in the same order, the three entities with which we are acquainted +from the Sâ@nkhya-sm<i>ri</i>ti, viz. the great principle, +the Undeveloped (the pradhâna), and the soul<a id= +"footnotetag228" name="footnotetag228"></a><a href= +"#footnote228"><sup>228</sup></a>. That by the Undeveloped is meant +the pradhâna is to be concluded from the common use of +Sm<i>ri</i>ti and from the etymological interpretation of which the +word admits, the pradhâna being called undeveloped because it +is devoid of sound and other qualities. It cannot therefore be +asserted that there is no scriptural authority for the +pradhâna. And this pradhâna vouched for by Scripture we +declare to be the cause of the world, on the ground of Scripture, +Sm<i>ri</i>ti, and ratiocination.</p> +<p>Your reasoning, we reply, is not valid. The passage from the +Kâ<i>th</i>aka quoted by you intimates by no means the +existence of that great principle and that Undeveloped which are +known from the Sâ@nkhya-sm<i>ri</i>ti. We do not recognise +there the pradhâna of the Sâ@nkhyas, i.e. an +independent general cause consisting of three constituting +elements; we merely recognise the word 'Undeveloped,' which does +not denote any particular determined thing, but may—owing to +its etymological meaning, 'that which is not developed, not +manifest'—denote anything subtle and difficult to +distinguish. The Sâ@nkhyas indeed give to the word a settled +meaning, as they apply it to the pradhâna; but then that +meaning is valid for their system only, and has no force in the +determination of the sense of the Veda. Nor does mere equality of +position prove equality of being, unless the latter be recognised +independently. None but a fool would think a cow to be a horse +because he sees it tied in the usual place of a horse. We, +moreover, conclude, on the strength of the general subject-matter, +that the passage does not refer to the pradhâna the fiction +of the Sâ@nkhyas, 'on account of there being referred +<span class="pagenum"><a name="page239" id= +"page239"></a>{239}</span> to that which is contained in the simile +of the body.' This means that the body which is mentioned in the +simile of the chariot is here referred to as the Undeveloped. We +infer this from the general subject-matter of the passage and from +the circumstance of nothing else remaining.—The immediately +preceding part of the chapter exhibits the simile in which the +Self, the body, and so on, are compared to the lord of a chariot, a +chariot, &c., 'Know the Self to be the lord of the chariot, the +body to be the chariot, the intellect the charioteer, and the mind +the reins. The senses they call the horses, the objects of the +senses their roads. When he (the Self) is in union with the body, +the senses and the mind, then wise people call him the enjoyer.' +The text then goes on to say that he whose senses, &c. are not +well controlled enters into sa<i>m</i>sâra, while he who has +them under control reaches the end of the journey, the highest +place of Vish<i>n</i>u. The question then arises: What is the end +of the journey, the highest place of Vish<i>n</i>u? Whereupon the +text explains that the highest Self which is higher than the +senses, &c., spoken of is the end of the journey, the highest +place of Vish<i>n</i>u. 'Beyond the senses there are the objects, +beyond the objects there is the mind, beyond the mind there is the +intellect, the great Self is beyond the intellect. Beyond the great +there is the Undeveloped, beyond the Undeveloped there is the +Person. Beyond the Person there is nothing—this is the goal, +the highest Road.' In this passage we recognise the senses, &c. +which in the preceding simile had been compared to horses and so +on, and we thus avoid the mistake of abandoning the matter in hand +and taking up a new subject. The senses, the intellect, and the +mind are referred to in both passages under the same names. The +objects (in the second passage) are the objects which are (in the +former passage) designated as the roads of the senses; that the +objects are beyond (higher than) the senses is known from the +scriptural passage representing the senses as grahas, i.e. +graspers, and the objects as atigrahas, i.e. superior to the grahas +(B<i>ri</i> Up. III, 2). The mind (manas) again is superior to the +objects, because the relation of the senses and their objects is +based on the mind. The intellect <span class="pagenum"><a name= +"page240" id="page240"></a>{240}</span> (buddhi) is higher than the +mind, since the objects of enjoyment are conveyed to the soul by +means of the intellect. Higher than the intellect is the great Self +which was represented as the lord of the chariot in the passage, +'Know the Self to be the lord of the chariot.' That the same Self +is referred to in both passages is manifest from the repeated use +of the word 'Self;' that the Self is superior to intelligence is +owing to the circumstance that the enjoyer is naturally superior to +the instrument of enjoyment. The Self is appropriately called great +as it is the master.—Or else the phrase 'the great Self' may +here denote the intellect of the first-born Hira<i>n</i>yagarbha +which is the basis of all intellects; in accordance with the +following Sm<i>ri</i>ti-passage it is called mind, the great one; +reflection, Brahman; the stronghold, intellect; enunciation, the +Lord; highest knowledge, consciousness; thought, remembrance<a id= +"footnotetag229" name="footnotetag229"></a><a href= +"#footnote229"><sup>229</sup></a>, and likewise with the following +scriptural passage, 'He (Hira<i>n</i>ya-garbha) who first creates +Brahman and delivers the Vedas to him' (<i>S</i>vet. Up. VI, 18). +The intellect, which in the former passage had been referred to +under its common name buddhi, is here mentioned separately, since +it may be represented as superior to our human intellects. On this +latter explanation of the term 'the great Self,' we must assume +that the personal Self which in the simile had been compared to the +charioteer is, in the latter passage, included in the highest +person (mentioned last); to which there is no objection, since in +reality the personal Self and the highest Self are +identical.—Thus there remains now the body only which had +before been compared to a chariot. We therefore conclude +<span class="pagenum"><a name="page241" id= +"page241"></a>{241}</span> that the text after having enumerated +the senses and all the other things mentioned before, in order to +point out the highest place, points out by means of the one +remaining word, viz. avyakta, the only thing remaining out of those +which had been mentioned before, viz. the body. The entire passage +aims at conveying the knowledge of the unity of the inward Self and +Brahman, by describing the soul's passing through +sa<i>m</i>sâra and release under the form of a simile in +which the body, &c. of the soul—which is affected by +Nescience and therefore joined to a body, senses, mind, intellect, +objects, sensations, &c.—are compared to a chariot, and +so on.—In accordance with this the subsequent verse states +the difficulty of knowing the highest place of Vish<i>n</i>u ('the +Self is hidden in all beings and does not shine forth, but it is +seen by subtle seers through their sharp and subtle intellect'), +and after that the next verse declares Yoga to be the means of +attaining that cognition. 'A wise man should keep down speech in +the mind, he should keep down the mind in intelligence, +intelligence he should keep down within the great Self, and he +should keep that within the quiet Self.'—That means: The wise +man should restrain the activity of the outer organs such as +speech, &c., and abide within the mind only; he should further +restrain the mind which is intent on doubtful external objects +within intelligence, whose characteristic mark is decision, +recognising that indecision is evil; he should further restrain +intelligence within the great Self, i.e. the individual soul or +else the fundamental intellect; he should finally fix the great +Self on the calm Self, i.e. the highest Self, the highest goal, of +which the whole chapter treats.—If we in this manner review +the general context, we perceive that there is no room for the +pradhâna imagined by the Sânkhyas.</p> +<p>2. But the subtle (body is meant by the term avyakta) on account +of its capability (of being so designated).</p> +<p>It has been asserted, under the preceding Sûtra, that the +term 'the Undeveloped' signifies, on account of the general +<span class="pagenum"><a name="page242" id= +"page242"></a>{242}</span> subject-matter and because the body only +remains, the body and not the pradhâna of the +Sâ@nkhyas.—But here the following doubt arises: How can +the word 'undeveloped' appropriately denote the body which, as a +gross and clearly appearing thing, should rather be called vyakta, +i.e. that which is developed or manifested?</p> +<p>To this doubt the Sûtra replies that what the term avyakta +denotes is the subtle causal body. Anything subtle may be spoken of +as Undeveloped. The gross body indeed cannot directly be termed +'undeveloped,' but the subtle parts of the elements from which the +gross body originates may be called so, and that the term denoting +the causal substance is applied to the effect also is a matter of +common occurrence; compare, for instance, the phrase 'mix the Soma +with cows, i.e. milk' (<i>Ri</i>g-veda. S. IX, 46, 4). Another +scriptural passage also—'now all this was then undeveloped' +(B<i>ri</i>. Up. I, 4, 7)—shows that this, i.e. this +developed world with its distinction of names and forms, is capable +of being termed undeveloped in so far as in a former condition it +was in a merely seminal or potential state, devoid of the later +evolved distinctions of name and form.</p> +<p>3. (Such a previous seminal condition of the world may be +admitted) on account of its dependency on him (the Lord); (for such +an admission is) according to reason.</p> +<p>Here a new objection is raised.—If, the opponent says, in +order to prove the possibility of the body being called undeveloped +you admit that this world in its antecedent seminal condition +before either names or forms are evolved can be called undeveloped, +you virtually concede the doctrine that the pradhâna is the +cause of the world. For we Sâ@nkhyas understand by the term +pradhâna nothing but that antecedent condition of the +world.</p> +<p>Things lie differently, we rejoin. If we admitted some +antecedent state of the world as the independent cause of the +actual world, we should indeed implicitly, admit the <span class= +"pagenum"><a name="page243" id="page243"></a>{243}</span> +pradhâna doctrine. What we admit is, however, only a previous +state dependent on the highest Lord, not an independent state. A +previous stage of the world such as the one assumed by us must +necessarily be admitted, since it is according to sense and reason. +For without it the highest Lord could not be conceived as creator, +as he could not become active if he were destitute of the +potentiality of action. The existence of such a causal potentiality +renders it moreover possible that the released souls should not +enter on new courses of existence, as it is destroyed by perfect +knowledge. For that causal potentiality is of the nature of +Nescience; it is rightly denoted by the term 'undeveloped;' it has +the highest Lord for its substratum; it is of the nature of an +illusion; it is a universal sleep in which are lying the +transmigrating souls destitute for the time of the consciousness of +their individual character.<a id="footnotetag230" name= +"footnotetag230"></a><a href="#footnote230"><sup>230</sup></a> This +undeveloped principle is sometimes denoted by the term +âkâ<i>s</i>a, ether; so, for instance, in the passage, +'In that Imperishable then, O Gârgî, the ether is woven +like warp and woof' (B<i>ri</i>. Up. III, 8, 11). Sometimes, again, +it is denoted by the term akshara, the Imperishable; so, for +instance (Mu. Up. II, 1, 2), 'Higher, than the high Imperishable.' +Sometimes it is spoken of as Mâyâ, illusion; so, for +instance (<i>S</i>ve. Up. IV, 10), 'Know then Prak<i>ri</i>ti is +Mâyâ, and the great Lord he who is affected with +Mâyâ.' For Mâyâ is properly called +undeveloped or non-manifested since it cannot be defined either as +that which is or that which is not.—The statement of the +Kâ<i>th</i>aka that 'the Undeveloped is beyond the Great +<span class="pagenum"><a name="page244" id= +"page244"></a>{244}</span> one' is based on the fact of the Great +one originating from the Undeveloped, if the Great one be the +intellect of Hira<i>n</i>yagarbha. If, on the other hand, we +understand by the Great one the individual soul, the statement is +founded on the fact of the existence of the individual soul +depending on the Undeveloped, i.e. Nescience. For the continued +existence of the individual soul as such is altogether owing to the +relation in which it stands to Nescience. The quality of being +beyond the Great one which in the first place belongs to the +Undeveloped, i.e. Nescience, is attributed to the body which is the +product of Nescience, the cause and the effect being considered as +identical. Although the senses, &c. are no less products of +Nescience, the term 'the Undeveloped' here refers to the body only, +the senses, &c. having already been specially mentioned by +their individual names, and the body alone being left.—Other +interpreters of the two last Sûtras give a somewhat different +explanation<a id="footnotetag231" name= +"footnotetag231"></a><a href="#footnote231"><sup>231</sup></a>.—There +are, they say, two kinds of body, the gross one and the subtle one. +The gross body is the one which is perceived; the nature of the +subtle one will be explained later on. (Ved. Sû. III, 1, 1.) +Both these bodies together were in the simile compared to the +chariot; but here (in the passage under discussion) only the subtle +body is referred to as the Undeveloped, since the subtle body only +is capable of being denoted by that term. And as the soul's passing +through bondage and release depends on the subtle body, the latter +is said to be beyond the soul, like the things (arthavat), i.e. +just as the objects are said to be beyond the senses because the +activity of the latter depends on the objects.—But +how—we ask interpreters—is it possible that the word +'Undeveloped' should refer to the subtle body only, while, +according to your opinion, both bodies had in the simile been +represented as a chariot, and so equally constitute part of the +topic of the chapter, and equally remain (to be mentioned in the +<span class="pagenum"><a name="page245" id= +"page245"></a>{245}</span> passage under discussion)?—If you +should rejoin that you are authorised to settle the meaning of what +the text actually mentions, but not to find fault with what is not +mentioned, and that the word avyakta which occurs in the text can +denote only the subtle body, but not the gross body which is +vyakta, i.e. developed or manifest; we invalidate this rejoinder by +remarking that the determination of the sense depends on the +circumstance of the passages interpreted constituting a syntactical +whole. For if the earlier and the later passage do not form a whole +they convey no sense, since that involves the abandonment of the +subject started and the taking up of a new subject. But syntactical +unity cannot be established unless it be on the ground of there +being a want of a complementary part of speech or sentence. If you +therefore construe the connexion of the passages without having +regard to the fact that the latter passage demands as its +complement that both bodies (which had been spoken of in the former +passage) should be understood as referred to, you destroy all +syntactical unity and so incapacitate yourselves from arriving at +the true meaning of the text. Nor must you think that the second +passage occupies itself with the subtle body only, for that reason +that the latter is not easily distinguished from the Self, while +the gross body is easily so distinguished on account of its readily +perceived loathsomeness. For the passage does not by any means +refer to such a distinction—as we conclude from the +circumstance of there being no verb enjoining it—but has for +its only subject the highest place of Vish<i>n</i>u, which had been +mentioned immediately before. For after having enumerated a series +of things in which the subsequent one is always superior to the one +preceding it, it concludes by saying that nothing is beyond the +Person.—We might, however, accept the interpretation just +discussed without damaging our general argumentation; for whichever +explanation we receive, so much remains clear that the +Kâ<i>th</i>aka passage does not refer to the +pradhâna.</p> +<p>4. And (the pradhâna cannot be meant) because <span class= +"pagenum"><a name="page246" id="page246"></a>{246}</span> there is +no statement as to (the avyakta) being something to be +cognised.</p> +<p>The Sâ@nkhyas, moreover, represent the pradhâna as +something to be cognised in so far as they say that from the +knowledge of the difference of the constitutive elements of the +pradhâna and of the soul there results the desired isolation +of the soul. For without a knowledge of the nature of those +constitutive elements it is impossible to cognise the difference of +the soul from them. And somewhere they teach that the +pradhâna is to be cognised by him who wishes to attain +special powers.—Now in the passage under discussion the +avyakta is not mentioned as an object of knowledge; we there meet +with the mere word avyakta, and there is no sentence intimating +that the avyakta is to be known or meditated upon. And it is +impossible to maintain that a knowledge of things which (knowledge) +is not taught in the text is of any advantage to man.—For +this reason also we maintain that the word avyakta cannot denote +the pradhâna.—Our interpretation, on the other hand, is +unobjectionable, since according to it the passage mentions the +body (not as an object of knowledge, but merely) for the purpose of +throwing light on the highest place of Vish<i>n</i>u, in +continuation of the simile in which the body had been compared to a +chariot.</p> +<p>5. And if you maintain that the text does speak (of the +pradhâna as an object of knowledge) we deny that; for the +intelligent (highest) Self is meant, on account of the general +subject-matter.</p> +<p>Here the Sâ@nkhya raises a new objection, and maintains +that the averment made in the last Sûtra is not proved, since +the text later on speaks of the pradhâna—which had been +referred to as the Undeveloped—as an object of knowledge. 'He +who has perceived that which is without sound, without touch, +without form, without decay, without taste, eternal, without smell, +without beginning, without end, beyond the great and unchangeable, +is freed from the jaws of death' (Ka. Up. II, 3, 15). For here the +text speaks of the pradhâna, <span class="pagenum"><a name= +"page247" id="page247"></a>{247}</span> which is beyond the great, +describing it as possessing the same qualities which the +Sâ@nkhya-sm<i>ri</i>ti ascribes to it, and designating it as +the object of perception. Hence we conclude that the pradhâna +is denoted by the term avyakta.</p> +<p>To this we reply that the passage last quoted does represent as +the object of perception not the pradhâna but the +intelligent, i.e. the highest Self. We conclude this from the +general subject-matter. For that the highest Self continues to form +the subject-matter is clear from the following reasons. In the +first place, it is referred to in the passage, 'Beyond the person +there is nothing, this is the goal, the highest Road;' it has +further to be supplied as the object of knowledge in the passage, +'The Self is hidden in all beings and does not shine forth,' +because it is there spoken of as difficult to know; after that the +restraint of passion, &c. is enjoined as conducive to its +cognition, in the passage, 'A wise man should keep down speech +within the mind;' and, finally, release from the jaws of death is +declared to be the fruit of its knowledge. The Sâ@nkhyas, on +the other hand, do not suppose that a man is freed from the jaws of +death merely by perceiving the pradhâna, but connect that +result rather with the cognition of the intelligent Self.—The +highest Self is, moreover, spoken of in all Vedânta-texts as +possessing just those qualities which are mentioned in the passage +quoted above, viz. absence of sound, and the like. Hence it +follows, that the pradhâna is in the text neither spoken of +as the object of knowledge nor denoted by the term avyakta.</p> +<p>6. And there is question and explanation relative to three +things only (not to the pradhâna).</p> +<p>To the same conclusion we are led by the consideration of the +circumstance that the Ka<i>th</i>avallî-upanishad brings +forward, as subjects of discussion, only three things, viz. the +fire sacrifice, the individual soul, and the highest Self. These +three things only Yama explains, bestowing thereby the boons he had +granted, and to them only the questions of Na<i>k</i>iketas refer. +Nothing else is mentioned or enquired <span class= +"pagenum"><a name="page248" id="page248"></a>{248}</span> about. +The question relative to the fire sacrifice is contained in the +passage (Ka. Up. I, 1, 13), 'Thou knowest, O Death, the fire +sacrifice which leads us to Heaven; tell it to me, who am full of +faith.' The question as to the individual soul is contained in I, +1, 20, 'There is that doubt when a man is dead, some saying, he is; +others, he is not. This I should like to know, taught by thee; this +is the third of my boons.' And the question about the highest Self +is asked in the passage (I, 2, 14), 'That which thou seest as +neither this nor that, as neither effect nor cause, as neither past +nor future, tell me that.'—The corresponding answers are +given in I, 1, 15, 'Yama then told him that fire sacrifice, the +beginning of all the worlds, and what bricks are required for the +altar, and how many;' in the passage met with considerably later on +(II, 5, 6; 7), 'Well then, O Gautama, I shall tell thee this +mystery, the old Brahman and what happens to the Self after +reaching death. Some enter the womb in order to have a body as +organic beings, others go into inorganic matter according to their +work and according to their knowledge;' and in the passage (I, 2, +18), 'The knowing Self is not born nor does it die,' &c.; which +latter passage dilates at length on the highest Self. But there is +no question relative to the pradhâna, and hence no +opportunity for any remarks on it.</p> +<p>Here the Sâ@nkhya advances a new objection. Is, he asks, +the question relative to the Self which is asked in the passage, +'There is that doubt when a man is dead,' &c., again resumed in +the passage, 'That which thou seest as neither this nor that,' +&c, or does the latter passage raise a distinct new question? +If the former, the two questions about the Self coalesce into one, +and there are therefore altogether two questions only, one relative +to the fire sacrifice, the other relative to the Self. In that case +the Sûtra has no right to speak of questions and explanations +relating to three subjects.—If the latter, you do not +consider it a mistake to assume a question in excess of the number +of boons granted, and can therefore not object to us if we assume +an explanation about the pradhâna in excess of the number of +questions asked.</p> +<span class="pagenum"><a name="page249" id= +"page249"></a>{249}</span> +<p>To this we make the following reply.—We by no means assume +a question in excess of the number of boons granted, being +prevented from doing so by the influence of the opening part of +that syntactical whole which constitutes the +Ka<i>th</i>avallî-upanishad. The Upanishad starts with the +topic of the boons granted by Yama, and all the following part of +the Upanishad—which is thrown into the form of a colloquy of +Yama and Na<i>k</i>iketas—carries on that topic up to the +very end. Yama grants to Na<i>k</i>iketas, who had been sent by his +father, three boons. For his first boon Na<i>k</i>iketas chooses +kindness on the part of his father towards him, for his second boon +the knowledge of the fire sacrifice, for his third boon the +knowledge of the Self. That the knowledge of the Self is the third +boon appears from the indication contained in the passage (I, 1, +20), 'There is that doubt—; this is the third of my +boons.'—If we therefore supposed that the passage, 'That +which thou seest as neither this nor that,' &c., raises a new +question, we should thereby assume a question in excess of the +number of boons granted, and thus destroy the connexion of the +entire Upanishad.—But—the Sâ@nkhya will perhaps +interpose—it must needs be admitted that the passage last +quoted does raise a new question, because the subject enquired +about is a new one. For the former question refers to the +individual soul, as we conclude from the doubt expressed in the +words, 'There is that doubt when a man is dead—some saying, +he is; others, he is not.' Now this individual soul, as having +definite attributes, &c., cannot constitute the object of a +question expressed in such terms as, 'This which thou seest as +neither this nor that,' &c.; the highest Self, on the other +hand, may be enquired about in such terms, since it is above all +attributes. The appearance of the two questions is, moreover, seen +to differ; for the former question refers to existence and +non-existence, while the latter is concerned with an entity raised +above all definite attributes, &c. Hence we conclude that the +latter question, in which the former one cannot be recognised, is a +separate question, and does not merely resume the subject of the +former one.—All this argumentation is not valid, we reply, +since we maintain the unity of the highest Self and the +<span class="pagenum"><a name="page250" id= +"page250"></a>{250}</span> individual Self. If the individual Self +were different from the highest Self, we should have to declare +that the two questions are separate independent questions, but the +two are not really different, as we know from other scriptural +passages, such as 'Thou art that.' And in the Upanishad under +discussion also the answer to the question, 'That which thou seest +as neither this nor that,' viz. the passage, 'The knowing Self is +not born, it dies not'—which answer is given in the form of a +denial of the birth and death of the Self-clearly shows that the +embodied Self and the highest Self are non-different. For there is +room for a denial of something only when that something is +possible, and the possibility of birth and death exists in the +embodied Self only, since it is connected with the body, but not in +the highest Self.—There is, moreover, another passage +conveying the same meaning, viz. II, 4, 4, 'The wise when he knows +that that by which he perceives all objects in sleep or in waking, +is the great omnipresent Self, grieves no more.' This passage makes +the cessation of all grief dependent on the knowledge of the +individual Self, in so far as it possesses the qualities of +greatness and omnipresence, and thereby declares that the +individual Self is not different from the highest Self. For that +the cessation of all sorrow is consequent on the knowledge of the +highest Self, is a recognised Vedânta tenet.—There is +another passage also warning men not to look on the individual Self +and the highest Self as different entities, viz. II, 4, 10, 'What +is here the same is there; and what is there the same is here. He +who sees any difference here goes from death to death.'—The +following circumstance, too, is worthy of consideration. When +Na<i>k</i>iketas has asked the question relating to the existence +or non-existence of the soul after death, Yama tries to induce him +to choose another boon, tempting him with the offer of various +objects of desire. But Na<i>k</i>iketas remains firm. Thereupon +Death, dwelling on the distinction of the Good and the Pleasant, +and the distinction of wisdom and ignorance, praises +Na<i>k</i>iketas, 'I believe Na<i>k</i>iketas to be one who desires +knowledge, for even many pleasures did not tear thee away' (I, 2, +4); and later on praises the question <span class= +"pagenum"><a name="page251" id="page251"></a>{251}</span> asked by +Na<i>k</i>iketas, 'The wise who, by means of meditation on his +Self, recognises the Ancient who is difficult to be seen, who has +entered into the dark, who is hidden in the cave, who dwells in the +abyss, as God, he indeed leaves joy and sorrow far behind' (I, 2, +12). Now all this means to intimate that the individual Self and +the highest Self are non-different. For if Na<i>k</i>iketas set +aside the question, by asking which he had earned for himself the +praise of Yama, and after having received that praise asked a new +question, all that praise would have been bestowed on him unduly. +Hence it follows that the question implied in I, 2, 14, 'That which +thou seest as neither this nor that,' merely resumes the topic to +which the question in I, 1, 20 had referred.—Nor is there any +basis to the objection that the two questions differ in form. The +second question, in reality, is concerned with the same distinction +as the first. The first enquires about the existence of the soul +apart from the body, &c.; the second refers to the circumstance +of that soul not being subject to sa<i>m</i>sâra. For as long +as Nescience remains, so long the soul is affected with definite +attributes, &c.; but as soon as Nescience comes to an end, the +soul is one with the highest Self, as is taught by such scriptural +texts as 'Thou art that.' But whether Nescience be active or +inactive, no difference is made thereby in the thing itself (viz. +the soul). A man may, in the dark, mistake a piece of rope lying on +the ground for a snake, and run away from it, frightened and +trembling; thereon another man may tell him, 'Do not be afraid, it +is only a rope, not a snake;' and he may then dismiss the fear +caused by the imagined snake, and stop running. But all the while +the presence and subsequent absence of his erroneous notion, as to +the rope being a snake, make no difference whatever in the rope +itself. Exactly analogous is the case of the individual soul which +is in reality one with the highest soul, although Nescience makes +it appear different. Hence the reply contained in the passage, 'It +is not born, it dies not,' is also to be considered as furnishing +an answer to the question asked in I, 1, 20.—The Sûtra +is to be understood with reference to the distinction of the +individual Self and the highest Self which <span class= +"pagenum"><a name="page252" id="page252"></a>{252}</span> results +from Nescience. Although the question relating to the Self is in +reality one only, yet its former part (I, 1, 20) is seen specially +to refer to the individual Self, since there a doubt is set forth +as to the existence of the soul when, at the time of death, it +frees itself from the body, and since the specific marks of the +sa<i>m</i>sâra-state, such as activity, &c. are not +denied; while the latter part of the question (I, 2, 14), where the +state of being beyond all attributes is spoken of, clearly refers +to the highest Self.—For these reasons the Sûtra is +right in assuming three topics of question and explanation, viz. +the fire sacrifice, the individual soul, and the highest Self. +Those, on the other hand, who assume that the pradhâna +constitutes a fourth subject discussed in the Upanishad, can point +neither to a boon connected with it, nor to a question, nor to an +answer. Hence the pradhâna hypothesis is clearly inferior to +our own.</p> +<p>7. And (the case of the term avyakta) is like that of the term +mahat.</p> +<p>While the Sâ@nkhyas employ the term 'the Great one,' to +denote the first-born entity, which is mere existence<a id= +"footnotetag232" name="footnotetag232"></a><a href= +"#footnote232"><sup>232</sup></a> (? viz. the intellect), the term +has a different meaning in Vedic use. This we see from its being +connected with the Self, &c. in such passages as the following, +'The great Self is beyond the Intellect' (Ka. Up. I, 3, 10); 'The +great omnipresent Self' (Ka. Up. I, 2, 23); 'I know that great +person' (<i>S</i>ve. Up. III, 8). We thence conclude that the word +avyakta also, where it occurs in the Veda, cannot denote the +pradhâna.—The pradhâna is therefore a mere thing +of inference, and not vouched for by Scripture.</p> +<p>8. (It cannot be maintained that ajâ means the +<span class="pagenum"><a name="page253" id= +"page253"></a>{253}</span> pradhâna) because no special +characteristic is stated; as in the case of the cup.</p> +<p>Here the advocate of the pradhâna comes again forward and +maintains that the absence of scriptural authority for the +pradhâna is not yet proved. For, he says, we have the +following mantra (<i>S</i>ve. Up. IV, 5), 'There is one +ajâ<a id="footnotetag233" name="footnotetag233"></a><a href= +"#footnote233"><sup>233</sup></a>, red, white, and black, producing +manifold offspring of the same nature. There is one aja who loves +her and lies by her; there is another who leaves her after having +enjoyed her.'—In this mantra the words 'red,' 'white,' and +'black' denote the three constituent elements of the +pradhâna. Passion is called red on account of its colouring, +i.e. influencing property; Goodness is called white, because it is +of the nature of Light; Darkness is called black on account of its +covering and obscuring property. The state of equipoise of the +three constituent elements, i.e. the pradhâna, is denoted by +the attributes of its parts, and is therefore called +red-white-black. It is further called ajâ, i.e. unborn, +because it is acknowledged to be the fundamental matter out of +which everything springs, not a mere effect.—But has not the +word ajâ the settled meaning of she-goat?—True; but the +ordinary meaning of the word cannot be accepted in this place, +because true knowledge forms the general subject-matter.—That +pradhâna produces many creatures participating in its three +constituent elements. One unborn being loves her and lies by her, +i.e. some souls, deluded by ignorance, approach her, and falsely +imagining that they experience pleasure or pain, or are in a state +of dulness, pass through the course of transmigratory existence. +Other souls, again, which have attained to discriminative +knowledge, lose their attachment to prak<i>ri</i>ti, and leave her +after having enjoyed her, i.e. after she has afforded to them +enjoyment and release.—On the ground of this passage, as +interpreted above, the <span class="pagenum"><a name="page254" id= +"page254"></a>{254}</span> followers of Kapila claim the authority +of Scripture for their pradhâna hypothesis.</p> +<p>To this argumentation we reply, that the quoted mantra by no +means proves the Sâ@nkhya doctrine to be based on Scripture. +That mantra, taken by itself, is not able to give additional +strength to any doctrine. For, by means of some supposition or +other, the terms ajâ, &c. can be reconciled with any +doctrine, and there is no reason for the special assertion that the +Sâ@nkhya doctrine only is meant. The case is analogous to +that of the cup mentioned in the mantra, 'There is a cup having its +mouth below and its bottom above' (B<i>ri</i>. Up. II, 2, 3). Just +as it is impossible to decide on the ground of this mantra taken by +itself what special cup is meant—it being possible to +ascribe, somehow or other, the quality of the mouth being turned +downward to any cup—so here also there is no special quality +stated, so that it is not possible to decide from the mantra itself +whether the pradhâna is meant by the term ajâ, or +something else.—But in connexion with the mantra about the +cup we have a supplementary passage from which we learn what kind +of cup is meant, 'What is called the cup having its mouth below and +its bottom above is this head.'—Whence, however, can we learn +what special being is meant by the ajâ of the +<i>S</i>vetâ<i>s</i>vatara-upanishad?—To this question +the next Sûtra replies.</p> +<p>9. But the (elements) beginning with light (are meant by the +term ajâ); for some read so in their text.</p> +<p>By the term ajâ we have to understand the causal matter of +the four classes of beings, which matter has sprung from the +highest Lord and begins with light, i.e. comprises fire, water, and +earth.—The word 'but' (in the Sûtra) gives emphasis to +the assertion.—This ajâ is to be considered as +comprising three elementary substances, not as consisting of three +gu<i>n</i>as in the Sâ@nkhya sense. We draw this conclusion +from the fact that one <i>s</i>âkhâ, after having +related how fire, water, and earth sprang from the highest Lord, +assigns to them red colour, and so on. 'The red colour of burning +fire <span class="pagenum"><a name="page255" id= +"page255"></a>{255}</span> (agni) is the colour of the elementary +fire (tejas), its white colour is the colour of water, its black +colour the colour of earth,' &c. Now those three +elements—fire, water, and earth—we recognise in the +<i>S</i>vetâ<i>s</i>vatara passage, as the words red, white, +and black are common to both passages, and as these words primarily +denote special colours and can be applied to the Sâ@nkhya +gu<i>n</i>as in a secondary sense only. That passages whose sense +is beyond doubt are to be used for the interpretation of doubtful +passages, is a generally acknowledged rule. As we therefore find +that in the <i>S</i>vetâ<i>s</i>vatara—after the +general topic has been started in I, 1, 'The Brahman-students say, +Is Brahman the cause?'—the text, previous to the passage +under discussion, speaks of a power of the highest Lord which +arranges the whole world ('the Sages devoted to meditation and +concentration have seen the power belonging to God himself, hidden +in its own qualities'); and as further that same power is referred +to in two subsequent complementary passages ('Know then, +Prak<i>ri</i>ti is Mâyâ, and the great Lord he who is +affected with Mâyâ;' 'who being one only rules over +every germ;' IV, 10, 11); it cannot possibly be asserted that the +mantra treating of the ajâ refers to some independent causal +matter called pradhâna. We rather assert, on the ground of +the general subject-matter, that the mantra describes the same +divine power referred to in the other passages, in which names and +forms lie unevolved, and which we assume as the antecedent +condition of that state of the world in which names and forms are +evolved. And that divine power is represented as three-coloured, +because its products, viz. fire, water, and earth, have three +distinct colours.—But how can we maintain, on the ground of +fire, water, and earth having three colours, that the causal matter +is appropriately called a three-coloured ajâ? if we consider, +on the one hand, that the exterior form of the genus ajâ +(i.e. goat) does not inhere in fire, water, and earth; and, on the +other hand, that Scripture teaches fire, water, and earth to have +been produced, so that the word ajâ cannot be taken in the +sense 'non-produced<a id="footnotetag234" name= +"footnotetag234"></a><a href= +"#footnote234"><sup>234</sup></a>.'—To this question the next +Sûtra replies.</p> +<span class="pagenum"><a name="page256" id= +"page256"></a>{256}</span> +<p>10. And on account of the statement of the assumption (of a +metaphor) there is nothing contrary to reason (in ajâ +denoting the causal matter); just as in the case of honey (denoting +the sun) and similar cases.</p> +<p>The word ajâ neither expresses that fire, water, and earth +belong to the goat species, nor is it to be explained as meaning +'unborn;' it rather expresses an assumption, i.e. it intimates the +assumption of the source of all beings (which source comprises +fire, water, and earth), being compared to a she-goat. For as +accidentally some she-goat might be partly red, partly white, +partly black, and might have many young goats resembling her in +colour, and as some he-goat might love her and lie by her, while +some other he-goat might leave her after having enjoyed her; so the +universal causal matter which is tri-coloured, because comprising +fire, water, and earth, produces many inanimate and animate beings +similar to itself, and is enjoyed by the souls fettered by +Nescience, while it is abandoned by those souls which have attained +true knowledge.—Nor must we imagine that the distinction of +individual souls, which is implied in the preceding explanation, +involves that reality of the multiplicity of souls which forms one +of the tenets of other philosophical schools. For the purport of +the passage is to intimate, not the multiplicity of souls, but the +distinction of <span class="pagenum"><a name="page257" id= +"page257"></a>{257}</span> the states of bondage and release. This +latter distinction is explained with reference to the multiplicity +of souls as ordinarily conceived; that multiplicity, however, +depends altogether on limiting adjuncts, and is the unreal product +of wrong knowledge merely; as we know from scriptural passages such +as, 'He is the one God hidden in all beings, all-pervading, the +Self in all beings,' &c.—The words 'like the honey' (in +the Sûtra) mean that just as the sun, although not being +honey, is represented as honey (Ch. Up. III, 1), and speech as a +cow (B<i>ri</i>. Up. V, 8), and the heavenly world, &c. as the +fires (B<i>ri</i>. Up. VI, 2, 9), so here the causal matter, +although not being a she-goat, is metaphorically represented as +one. There is therefore nothing contrary to reason in the +circumstance of the term ajâ being used to denote the +aggregate of fire, water, and earth.</p> +<p>11. (The assertion that there is scriptural authority for the +pradhâna, &c. can) also not (be based) on the mention of +the number (of the Sankhya categories), on account of the diversity +(of the categories) and on account of the excess (over the number +of those categories).</p> +<p>The attempt to base the Sâ@nkhya doctrine on the mantra +speaking of the ajâ having failed, the Sâ@nkhya again +comes forward and points to another mantra: 'He in whom the five +"five-people" and the ether rest, him alone I believe to be the +Self; I who know believe him to be Brahman' (B<i>ri</i>. Up. IV, 4, +17). In this mantra we have one word which expresses the number +five, viz. the five-people, and then another word, viz. five, which +qualifies the former; these two words together therefore convey the +idea of five pentads, i.e. twenty-five. Now as many beings as the +number twenty-five presupposes, just so many categories the +Sânkhya system counts. Cp. Sâ@nkhya Kârikâ, +3: 'The fundamental causal substance (i.e. the pradhâna) is +not an effect. Seven (substances), viz. the Great one (Intellect), +and so on, are causal substances as well as effects. Sixteen are +effects. The soul is neither a causal substance nor an effect.' +<span class="pagenum"><a name="page258" id= +"page258"></a>{258}</span> As therefore the number twenty-five, +which occurs in the scriptural passage quoted, clearly refers to +the twenty-five categories taught in the +Sâ@nkhya-sm<i>ri</i>ti, it follows that the doctrine of the +pradhâna, &c. rests on a scriptural basis.</p> +<p>To this reasoning we make the following reply.—It is +impossible to base the assertion that the pradhâna, &c. +have Scripture in their favour on the reference to their number +which you pretend to find in the text, 'on account of the diversity +of the Sâ@nkhya categories.' The Sâ@nkhya categories +have each their individual difference, and there are no attributes +belonging in common to each pentad on account of which the number +twenty-five could be divided into five times five. For a number of +individually separate things can, in general, not be combined into +smaller groups of two or three, &c. unless there be a special +reason for such combination.—Here the Sâ@nkhya will +perhaps rejoin that the expression five (times) five is used only +to denote the number twenty-five which has five pentads for its +constituent parts; just as the poem says, 'five years and seven +Indra did not rain,' meaning only that there was no rain for twelve +years.—But this explanation also is not tenable. In the first +place, it is liable to the objection that it has recourse to +indirect indication.<a id="footnotetag235" name= +"footnotetag235"></a><a href="#footnote235"><sup>235</sup></a> In +the second place, the second 'five' constitutes a compound with the +word 'people,' the brâhma<i>n</i>a-accent showing that the +two form one word only.<a id="footnotetag236" name= +"footnotetag236"></a><a href="#footnote236"><sup>236</sup></a> To +the same conclusion we are led by another passage also (Taitt. +Sa<i>m</i>h. I, 6, 2, 2, pa<i>ñk</i>ânâ<i>m</i> +tvâ pa<i>ñk</i>ajanânâm, &c.) where +the two terms constitute one word, have one accent and one +case-termination. <span class="pagenum"><a name="page259" id= +"page259"></a>{259}</span> The word thus being a compound there is +neither a repetition of the word 'five,' involving two pentads, nor +does the one five qualify the other, as the mere secondary member +of a compound cannot be qualified by another word.—But as the +people are already denoted to be five by the compound +'five-people,' the effect of the other 'five' qualifying the +compound will be that we understand twenty-five people to be meant; +just as the expression 'five five-bundles' (pa<i>ñk</i>a +pa<i>ñk</i>apulya<i>h</i>) conveys the idea of twenty-five +bundles.—The instance is not an analogous one, we reply. The +word 'pa<i>ñk</i>apûli' denotes a unity (i.e. one +bundle made up of five bundles) and hence when the question arises, +'How many such bundles are there?' it can be qualified by the word +'five,' indicating that there are five such bundles. The word +pa<i>ñk</i>ajanâ<i>h</i>, on the other hand, conveys +at once the idea of distinction (i.e. of five distinct things), so +that there is no room at all for a further desire to know how many +people there are, and hence no room for a further qualification. +And if the word 'five' be taken as a qualifying word it can only +qualify the numeral five (in five-people); the objection against +which assumption has already been stated.—For all these +reasons the expression the five five-people cannot denote the +twenty-five categories of the Sâ@nkhyas.—This is +further not possible 'on account of the excess.' For on the +Sâ@nkhya interpretation there would be an excess over the +number twenty-five, owing to the circumstance of the ether and the +Self being mentioned separately. The Self is spoken of as the abode +in which the five five-people rest, the clause 'Him I believe to be +the Self' being connected with the 'in whom' of the antecedent +clause. Now the Self is the intelligent soul of the Sâ@nkhyas +which is already included in the twenty-five categories, and which +therefore, on their interpretation of the passage, would here be +mentioned once as constituting the abode and once as what rests in +the abode! If, on the other hand, the soul were supposed not to be +compiled in the twenty-five categories, the Sâ@nkhya would +thereby abandon his own doctrine of the categories being +twenty-five. The same <span class="pagenum"><a name="page260" id= +"page260"></a>{260}</span> remarks apply to the separate mention +made of the ether.—How, finally, can the mere circumstance of +a certain number being referred to in the sacred text justify the +assumption that what is meant are the twenty-five Sâ@nkhya +categories of which Scripture speaks in no other place? especially +if we consider that the word jana has not the settled meaning of +category, and that the number may be satisfactorily accounted for +on another interpretation of the passage.</p> +<p>How, then, the Sâ@nkhya will ask, do you interpret the +phrase 'the five five-people?'—On the ground, we reply, of +the rule Pâ<i>n</i>ini II, 1, 50, according to which certain +compounds formed with numerals are mere names. The word +pa<i>ñk</i>ajanâ<i>h</i> thus is not meant to convey +the idea of the number five, but merely to denote certain classes +of beings. Hence the question may present itself, How many such +classes are there? and to this question an answer is given by the +added numeral 'five.' There are certain classes of beings called +five-people, and these classes are five. Analogously we may speak +of the seven seven-<i>ri</i>shis, where again the compound denotes +a class of beings merely, not their number.—Who then are +those five-people?—To this question the next Sûtra +replies.</p> +<p>12. (The pa<i>ñk</i>ajanâ<i>h</i> are) the breath +and so on, (as is seen) from the complementary passage.</p> +<p>The mantra in which the pa<i>ñk</i>ajanâ<i>h</i> +are mentioned is followed by another one in which breath and four +other things are mentioned for the purpose of describing the nature +of Brahman. 'They who know the breath of breath, the eye of the +eye, the ear of the ear, the food of food, the mind of mind<a id= +"footnotetag237" name="footnotetag237"></a><a href= +"#footnote237"><sup>237</sup></a>.' Hence we conclude, on the +ground of proximity, that the five-people are the beings mentioned +in this latter mantra.—But how, the Sâ@nkhya asks, can +the word 'people' be applied to the breath, the eye, the ear, and +so on?—How, we ask in return, can it be <span class= +"pagenum"><a name="page261" id="page261"></a>{261}</span> applied +to your categories? In both cases the common meaning of the word +'people' has to be disregarded; but in favour of our explanation is +the fact that the breath, the eye, and so on, are mentioned in a +complementary passage. The breath, the eye, &c. may be denoted +by the word 'people' because they are connected with people. +Moreover, we find the word 'person,' which means as much as +'people,' applied to the prâ<i>n</i>as in the passage, 'These +are the five persons of Brahman' (Ch. Up. III, 13, 6); and another +passage runs, 'Breath is father, breath is mother,' &c. (Ch. +Up. VII, 15, 1). And, owing to the force of composition, there is +no objection to the compound being taken in its settled +conventional meaning<a id="footnotetag238" name= +"footnotetag238"></a><a href= +"#footnote238"><sup>238</sup></a>.—But how can the +conventional meaning be had recourse to, if there is no previous +use of the word in that meaning?—That may be done, we reply, +just as in the case of udbhid and similar words<a id= +"footnotetag239" name="footnotetag239"></a><a href= +"#footnote239"><sup>239</sup></a>. We often infer that a word of +unknown meaning refers to some known thing because it is used in +connexion with the latter. So, for instance, in the case of the +following words: 'He is to sacrifice with the udbhid; he cuts the +yûpa; he makes the vedi.' Analogously we conclude that the +term pa<i>ñk</i>ajanâ<i>h</i>, which, from the +grammatical rule quoted, is known to be a name, and which therefore +demands a thing of which it is the name, denotes the breath, the +eye, and so on, which are connected with it through their being +mentioned in a complementary passage.—Some commentators +explain the word pa<i>ñk</i>ajanâ<i>h</i> <span class= +"pagenum"><a name="page262" id="page262"></a>{262}</span> to mean +the Gods, the Fathers, the Gandharvas, the Asuras, and the Rakshas. +Others, again, think that the four castes together with the +Nishâdas are meant. Again, some scriptural passage +(<i>Ri</i>g-veda Sa<i>m</i>h. VIII, 53, 7) speaks of the tribe of +'the five-people,' meaning thereby the created beings in general; +and this latter explanation also might be applied to the passage +under discussion. The teacher (the Sûtrakâra), on the +other hand, aiming at showing that the passage does not refer to +the twenty-five categories of the Sâ@nkhyas, declares that on +the ground of the complementary passage breath, &c. have to be +understood.</p> +<p>Well, let it then be granted that the five-people mentioned in +the Mâdhyandina-text are breath, &c. since that text +mentions food also (and so makes up the number five). But how shall +we interpret the Kâ<i>n</i>va-text which does not mention +food (and thus altogether speaks of four things only)?—To +this question the next Sûtra replies.</p> +<p>13. In the case of (the text of) some (the Kâ<i>n</i>vas) +where food is not mentioned, (the number five is made full) by the +light (mentioned in the preceding mantra).</p> +<p>The Kâ<i>n</i>va-text, although not mentioning food, makes +up the full number five, by the light mentioned in the mantra +preceding that in which the five-people are spoken of. That mantra +describes the nature of Brahman by saying, 'Him the gods worship as +the light of lights.'—If it be asked how it is accounted for +that the light mentioned in both texts equally is in one text to be +employed for the explanation of the five-people, and not in the +other text; we reply that the reason lies in the difference of the +requirements. As the Mâdhyandinas meet in one and the same +mantra with breath and four other entities enabling them to +interpret the term, 'the five-people,' they are in no need of the +light mentioned in another mantra. The Kâ<i>n</i>vas, on the +other hand, cannot do without the light. The case is analogous to +that of the Sho<i>d</i>a<i>s</i>in-cup, which, according to +different <span class="pagenum"><a name="page263" id= +"page263"></a>{263}</span> passages, is either to be offered or not +to be offered at the atirâtra-sacrifice.</p> +<p>We have proved herewith that Scripture offers no basis for the +doctrine of the pradhâna. That this doctrine cannot be proved +either by Sm<i>ri</i>ti or by ratiocination will be shown later +on.</p> +<p>14. (Although there is a conflict of the Vedânta-passages +with regard to the things created, such as) ether and so on; (there +is no such conflict with regard to the Lord) on account of his +being represented (in one passage) as described (in other +passages), viz. as the cause (of the world).</p> +<p>In the preceding part of the work the right definition of +Brahman has been established; it has been shown that all the +Vedânta-texts have Brahman for their common topic; and it has +been proved that there is no scriptural authority for the doctrine +of the pradhâna.—But now a new objection presents +itself.</p> +<p>It is not possible—our opponent says—to prove either +that Brahman is the cause of the origin, &c. of the world, or +that all Vedânta-texts refer to Brahman; because we observe +that the Vedânta-texts contradict one another. All the +Vedânta-passages which treat of the creation enumerate its +successive steps in different order, and so in reality speak of +different creations. In one place it is said that from the Self +there sprang the ether (Taitt. Up. II, 1); in another place that +the creation began with fire (Ch. Up. VI, 2, 3); in another place, +again, that the Person created breath and from breath faith (Pr. +Up. VI, 4); in another place, again, that the Self created these +worlds, the water (above the heaven), light, the mortal (earth), +and the water (below the earth) (Ait. Âr. II, 4, 1, 2; 3). +There no order is stated at all. Somewhere else it is said that the +creation originated from the Non-existent. 'In the beginning this +was non-existent; from it was born what exists' (Taitt. Up. II, 7); +and, 'In the beginning this was non-existent; it became existent; +it grew' (Ch. Up. III, 19, 1). In another place, <span class= +"pagenum"><a name="page264" id="page264"></a>{264}</span> again, +the doctrine of the Non-existent being the antecedent of the +creation is impugned, and the Existent mentioned in its stead. +'Others say, in the beginning there was that only which is not; but +how could it be thus, my dear? How could that which is be born of +that which is not?' (Ch. Up. VI, 2, 1; 2.) And in another place, +again, the development of the world is spoken of as having taken +place spontaneously, 'Now all this was then undeveloped. It became +developed by form and name' (B<i>ri</i>. Up. I, 4, 7).—As +therefore manifold discrepancies are observed, and as no option is +possible in the case of an accomplished matter<a id= +"footnotetag240" name="footnotetag240"></a><a href= +"#footnote240"><sup>240</sup></a>, the Vedânta-passages +cannot be accepted as authorities for determining the cause of the +world, but we must rather accept some other cause of the world +resting on the authority of Sm<i>ri</i>ti and Reasoning.</p> +<p>To this we make the following reply.—Although the +Vedânta-passages may be conflicting with regard to the order +of the things created, such as ether and so on, they do not +conflict with regard to the creator, 'on account of his being +represented as described.' That means: such as the creator is +described in any one Vedânta-passage, viz. as all-knowing, +the Lord of all, the Self of all, without a second, so he is +represented in all other Vedânta-passages also. Let us +consider, for instance, the description of Brahman (given in Taitt. +Up. II, 1 ff.). There it is said at first, 'Truth, knowledge, +infinite is Brahman.' Here the word 'knowledge,' and so likewise +the statement, made later on, that Brahman desired (II, 6), +intimate that Brahman is of the nature of intelligence. Further, +the text declares<a id="footnotetag241" name= +"footnotetag241"></a><a href="#footnote241"><sup>241</sup></a> that +the cause of the world is the general Lord, by representing it as +not dependent on anything else. It further applies to the cause of +the world the term 'Self' (II, 1), and it represents it as abiding +within the series of sheaths beginning <span class= +"pagenum"><a name="page265" id="page265"></a>{265}</span> with the +gross body; whereby it affirms it to be the internal Self within +all beings. Again—in the passage, 'May I be many, may I grow +forth'—it tells how the Self became many, and thereby +declares that the creator is non-different from the created +effects. And—in the passage, 'He created all this whatever +there is'—it represents the creator as the Cause of the +entire world, and thereby declares him to have been without a +second previously to the creation. The same characteristics which +in the above passages are predicated of Brahman, viewed as the +Cause of the world, we find to be predicated of it in other +passages also, so, for instance, 'Being only, my dear, was this in +the beginning, one only, without a second. It thought, may I be +many, may I grow forth. It sent forth fire' (Ch. Up. VI, 2, 1; 3), +and 'In the beginning all this was Self, one only; there was +nothing else blinking whatsoever. He thought, shall I send forth +worlds?' (Ait. Âr. II, 4, 1, 1; 2.) The +Vedânta-passages which are concerned with setting forth the +cause of the world are thus in harmony throughout.—On the +other hand, there are found conflicting statements concerning the +world, the creation being in some places said to begin with ether, +in other places with fire, and so on. But, in the first place, it +cannot be said that the conflict of statements concerning the world +affects the statements concerning the cause, i.e. Brahman, in which +all the Vedânta-texts are seen to agree—for that would +be an altogether unfounded generalization;—and, in the second +place, the teacher will reconcile later on (II, 3) those +conflicting passages also which refer to the world. And, to +consider the matter more thoroughly, a conflict of statements +regarding the world would not even matter greatly, since the +creation of the world and similar topics are not at all what +Scripture wishes to teach. For we neither observe nor are told by +Scripture that the welfare of man depends on those matters in any +way; nor have we the right to assume such a thing; because we +conclude from the introductory and concluding clauses that the +passages about the creation and the like form only subordinate +members of passages treating of Brahman. That all the passages +<span class="pagenum"><a name="page266" id= +"page266"></a>{266}</span> setting forth the creation and so on +subserve the purpose of teaching Brahman, Scripture itself +declares; compare Ch. Up. VI, 8, 4, 'As food too is an offshoot, +seek after its root, viz. water. And as water too is an offshoot, +seek after its root, viz. fire. And as fire too is an offshoot, +seek after its root, viz. the True.' We, moreover, understand that +by means of comparisons such as that of the clay (Ch. Up. VI, 1, 4) +the creation is described merely for the purpose of teaching us +that the effect is not really different from the cause. Analogously +it is said by those who know the sacred tradition, 'If creation is +represented by means of (the similes of) clay, iron, sparks, and +other things; that is only a means for making it understood that +(in reality) there is no difference whatever' (Gau<i>d</i>ap. +Kâ. III, 15).—On the other hand, Scripture expressly +states the fruits connected with the knowledge of Brahman, 'He who +knows Brahman obtains the highest' (Taitt. Up. II, 1); 'He who +knows the Self overcomes grief' (Ch. Up. VII, 1, 3); 'A man who +knows him passes over death' (<i>S</i>ve. Up. III, 8). That fruit +is, moreover, apprehended by intuition (pratyaksha), for as soon +as, by means of the doctrine, 'That art thou,' a man has arrived at +the knowledge that the Self is non-transmigrating, its +transmigrating nature vanishes for him.</p> +<p>It remains to dispose of the assertion that passages such as +'Non-being this was in the beginning' contain conflicting +statements about the nature of the cause. This is done in the next +Sûtra.</p> +<p>15. On account of the connexion (with passages treating of +Brahman, the passages speaking of the Non-being do not intimate +absolute Non-existence).</p> +<p>The passage 'Non-being indeed was this in the beginning' (Taitt. +Up. II, 7) does not declare that the cause of the world is the +absolutely Non-existent which is devoid of all Selfhood. For in the +preceding sections of the Upanishad Brahman is distinctly denied to +be the Non-existing, and is defined to be that which is ('He who +knows the Brahman as non-existing becomes himself non-existing. +<span class="pagenum"><a name="page267" id= +"page267"></a>{267}</span> He who knows the Brahman as existing him +we know himself as existing'); it is further, by means of the +series of sheaths, viz. the sheath of food, &c., represented as +the inner Self of everything. This same Brahman is again referred +to in the clause, 'He wished, may I be many;' is declared to have +originated the entire creation; and is finally referred to in the +clause, 'Therefore the wise call it the true.' Thereupon the text +goes on to say, with reference to what has all along been the topic +of discussion, 'On this there is also this <i>s</i>loka, Non-being +indeed was this in the beginning,' &c.—If here the term +'Non-being' denoted the absolutely Non-existent, the whole context +would be broken; for while ostensibly referring to one matter the +passage would in reality treat of a second altogether different +matter. We have therefore to conclude that, while the term 'Being' +ordinarily denotes that which is differentiated by names and forms, +the term 'Non-being' denotes the same substance previous to its +differentiation, i.e. that Brahman is, in a secondary sense of the +word, called Non-being, previously to the origination of the world. +The same interpretation has to be applied to the passage 'Non-being +this was in the beginning' (Ch. Up. III, 19, 1); for that passage +also is connected with another passage which runs, 'It became +being;' whence it is evident that the 'Non-being' of the former +passage cannot mean absolute Non-existence. And in the passage, +'Others say, Non-being this was in the beginning' (Ch. Up. VI, 2, +1), the reference to the opinion of 'others' does not mean that the +doctrine referred, to (according to which the world was originally +absolutely non-existent) is propounded somewhere in the Veda; for +option is possible in the case of actions but not in the case of +substances. The passage has therefore to be looked upon as a +refutation of the tenet of primitive absolute non-existence as +fancifully propounded by some teachers of inferior intelligence; a +refutation undertaken for the purpose of strengthening the doctrine +that this world has sprung from that which is.—The following +passage again, 'Now this was then undeveloped,' &c. +(B<i>ri</i>. Up. I, 4, 7), does not by any means assert that the +evolution of <span class="pagenum"><a name="page268" id= +"page268"></a>{268}</span> the world took place without a ruler; as +we conclude from the circumstance of its being connected with +another passage in which the ruler is represented as entering into +the evolved world of effects, 'He entered thither to the very tips +of the finger-nails' &c. If it were supposed that the evolution +of the world takes place without a ruler, to whom could the +subsequent pronoun 'he' refer (in the passage last quoted) which +manifestly is to be connected with something previously intimated? +And as Scripture declares that the Self, after having entered into +the body, is of the nature of intelligence ('when seeing, eye by +name; when hearing, ear by name; when thinking, mind by name'), it +follows that it is intelligent at the time of its entering +also.—We, moreover, must assume that the world was evolved at +the beginning of the creation in the same way as it is at present +seen to develop itself by names and forms, viz. under the rulership +of an intelligent creator; for we have no right to make assumptions +contrary to what is at present actually observed. Another +scriptural passage also declares that the evolution of the world +took place under the superintendence of a ruler, 'Let me now enter +these beings with this living Self, and let me then evolve names +and forms' (Ch. Up. VI, 3, 2). The intransitive expression 'It +developed itself' (vyâkriyata; it became developed) is to be +viewed as having reference to the ease with which the real agent, +viz. the Lord, brought about that evolution. Analogously it is +said, for instance, that 'the cornfield reaps itself' (i.e. is +reaped with the greatest ease), although there is the reaper +sufficient (to account for the work being done).—Or else we +may look on the form vyâkriyata as having reference to a +necessarily implied agent; as is the case in such phrases as 'the +village is being approached' (where we necessarily have to supply +'by Devadatta or somebody else').</p> +<p>16. (He whose work is this is Brahman), because (the 'work') +denotes the world.</p> +<p>In the Kaushîtaki-brâhma<i>n</i>a, in the dialogue +of Bâlâki and Ajàta<i>s</i>atru, we read, 'O +Bâlâki, he who is the maker of <span class= +"pagenum"><a name="page269" id="page269"></a>{269}</span> those +persons, he of whom this is the work, he alone is to be known' +(Kau. Up. IV, 19). The question here arises whether what is here +inculcated as the object of knowledge is the individual soul or the +chief vital air or the highest Self.</p> +<p>The pûrvapakshin maintains that the vital air is meant. +For, in the first place, he says, the clause 'of whom this is the +work' points to the activity of motion, and that activity rests on +the vital air. In the second place, we meet with the word +'prâ<i>n</i>a' in a complementary passage ('Then he becomes +one with that prâ<i>n</i>a alone'), and that word is well +known to denote the vital air. In the third place, +prâ<i>n</i>a is the maker of all the persons, the person in +the sun, the person in the moon, &c., who in the preceding part +of the dialogue had been enumerated by Bâlâki; for that +the sun and the other divinities are mere differentiations of +prâ<i>n</i>a we know from another scriptural passage, viz. +'Who is that one god (in whom all the other gods are contained)? +prâ<i>n</i>a and he is Brahman, and they call him That' +(B<i>ri</i>. Up. III, 9, 9).—Or else, the pûrvapakshin +continues, the passage under discussion represents the individual +soul as the object of knowledge. For of the soul also it can be +said that 'this is the work,' if we understand by 'this' all +meritorious and non-meritorious actions; and the soul also, in so +far as it is the enjoyer, can be viewed as the maker of the persons +enumerated in so far as they are instrumental to the soul's +fruition. The complementary passage, moreover, contains an +inferential mark of the individual soul. For +Ajâta<i>s</i>atru, in order to instruct Bâlâki +about the 'maker of the persons' who had been proposed as the +object of knowledge, calls a sleeping man by various names and +convinces Bâlâki, by the circumstance that the sleeper +does not hear his shouts, that the prâ<i>n</i>a and so on are +not the enjoyers; he thereupon wakes the sleeping man by pushing +him with his stick, and so makes Bâlâki comprehend that +the being capable of fruition is the individual soul which is +distinct from the prâ<i>n</i>a. A subsequent passage also +contains an inferential mark of the individual soul, viz. 'And as +the master feeds with his people, nay, as his people feed on the +master, thus does this conscious Self feed with <span class= +"pagenum"><a name="page270" id="page270"></a>{270}</span> the other +Selfs, thus those Selfs feed on the conscious Self' (Kau. Up. IV, +20). And as the individual soul is the support of the +prâ<i>n</i>a, it may itself be called +prâ<i>n</i>a.—We thus conclude that the passage under +discussion refers either to the individual soul or to the chief +vital air; but not to the Lord, of whom it contains no inferential +marks whatever.</p> +<p>To this we make the following reply.—The Lord only can be +the maker of the persons enumerated, on account of the force of the +introductory part of the section. Bâlâki begins his +colloquy with Ajâta<i>s</i>atru with the offer, 'Shall I tell +you Brahman?' Thereupon he enumerates some individual souls +residing in the sun, the moon, and so on, which participate in the +sight of the secondary Brahman, and in the end becomes silent. +Ajâta<i>s</i>atru then sets aside Bâlâki's +doctrine as not referring to the chief Brahman—with the +words, 'Vainly did you challenge me, saying, Shall I tell you +Brahman,' &c.—and proposes the maker of all those +individual souls as a new object of knowledge. If now that maker +also were merely a soul participating in the sight of the secondary +Brahman, the introductory statement which speaks of Brahman would +be futile. Hence it follows that the highest Lord himself is +meant.—None, moreover, but the highest Lord is capable of +being the maker of all those persons as he only is absolutely +independent.—Further, the clause 'of whom this is the work' +does not refer either to the activity of motion nor to meritorious +and non-meritorious actions; for neither of those two is the topic +of discussion or has been mentioned previously. Nor can the term +'work' denote the enumerated persons, since the latter are +mentioned separately—in the clause, 'He who is the maker of +those persons'—and as inferential marks (viz. the neuter +gender and the singular number of the word karman, work) contradict +that assumption. Nor, again, can the term 'work' denote either the +activity whose object the persons are, or the result of that +activity, since those two are already implied in the mention of the +agent (in the clause, 'He who is the maker'). Thus there remains no +other alternative than to <span class="pagenum"><a name="page271" +id="page271"></a>{271}</span> take the pronoun 'this' (in 'He of +whom this is the work') as denoting the perceptible world and to +understand the same world—as that which is made—by the +term 'work.'—We may indeed admit that the world also is not +the previous topic of discussion and has not been mentioned before; +still, as no specification is mentioned, we conclude that the term +'work' has to be understood in a general sense, and thus denotes +what first presents itself to the mind, viz. everything which +exists in general. It is, moreover, not true that the world is not +the previous topic of discussion; we are rather entitled to +conclude from the circumstance that the various persons (in the +sun, the moon, &c.) which constitute a part of the world had +been specially mentioned before, that the passage in question is +concerned with the whole world in general. The conjunction 'or' (in +'or he of whom,' &c.) is meant to exclude the idea of limited +makership; so that the whole passage has to be interpreted as +follows, 'He who is the maker of those persons forming a part of +the world, or rather—to do away with this limitation—he +of whom this entire world without any exception is the work.' The +special mention made of the persons having been created has for its +purpose to show that those persons whom Bâlâki had +proclaimed to be Brahman are not Brahman. The passage therefore +sets forth the maker of the world in a double aspect, at first as +the creator of a special part of the world and thereupon as the +creator of the whole remaining part of the world; a way of speaking +analogous to such every-day forms of expression as, 'The wandering +mendicants are to be fed, and then the brâhma<i>n</i>as<a id= +"footnotetag242" name="footnotetag242"></a><a href= +"#footnote242"><sup>242</sup></a>.' And that the maker of the world +is the highest Lord is affirmed in all Vedânta-texts.</p> +<p>17. If it be said that this is not so, on account of the +inferential marks of the individual soul and the chief vital air; +we reply that that has already been explained.</p> +<span class="pagenum"><a name="page272" id= +"page272"></a>{272}</span> +<p>It remains for us to refute the objection that on account of the +inferential marks of the individual soul and the chief vital air, +which are met with in the complementary passage, either the one or +the other must be meant in the passage under discussion, and not +the highest Lord.—We therefore remark that that objection has +already been disposed of under I, 1, 31. There it was shown that +from an interpretation similar to the one here proposed by the +pûrvapakshin there would result a threefold meditation one +having Brahman for its object, a second one directed on the +individual soul, and a third one connected with the chief vital +air. Now the same result would present itself in our case, and that +would be unacceptable as we must infer from the introductory as +well as the concluding clauses, that the passage under discussion +refers to Brahman. With reference to the introductory clause this +has been already proved; that the concluding passage also refers to +Brahman, we infer from the fact of there being stated in it a +pre-eminently high reward, 'Warding off all evil he who knows this +obtains pre-eminence among all beings, sovereignty, +supremacy.'—But if this is so, the sense of the passage under +discussion is already settled by the discussion of the passage +about Pratarda<i>n</i>a (I, 1, 31); why, then, the present +Sûtra?—No, we reply; the sense of our passage is not +yet settled, since under I, 1, 31 it has not been proved that the +clause, 'Or he whose work is this,' refers to Brahman. Hence there +arises again, in connexion with the present passage, a doubt +whether the individual soul and the chief vital air may not be +meant, and that doubt has again to be refuted.—The word +prâ<i>n</i>a occurs, moreover, in the sense of Brahman, so in +the passage, 'The mind settles down on prâ<i>n</i>a' (Ch. Up. +VI, 8, 2).—The inferential marks of the individual soul also +have, on account of the introductory and concluding clauses +referring to Brahman, to be explained so as not to give rise to any +discrepancy.</p> +<p>18. But Jaimini thinks that (the reference to the individual +soul) has another purport, on account of <span class= +"pagenum"><a name="page273" id="page273"></a>{273}</span> the +question and answer; and thus some also (read in their text).</p> +<p>Whether the passage under discussion is concerned with the +individual soul or with Brahman, is, in the opinion of the teacher +Jaimini, no matter for dispute, since the reference to the +individual soul has a different purport, i.e. aims at intimating +Brahman. He founds this his opinion on a question and a reply met +with in the text. After Ajâta<i>s</i>atru has taught +Bâlâki, by waking the sleeping man, that the soul is +different from the vital air, he asks the following question, +'Bâlâki, where did this person here sleep? Where was +he? Whence came he thus back?' This question clearly refers to +something different from the individual soul. And so likewise does +the reply, 'When sleeping he sees no dream, then he becomes one +with that prâ<i>n</i>a alone;' and, 'From that Self all +prâ<i>n</i>as proceed, each towards its place, from the +prâ<i>n</i>as the gods, from the gods the worlds.'—Now +it is the general Vedânta doctrine that at the time of deep +sleep the soul becomes one with the highest Brahman, and that from +the highest Brahman the whole world proceeds, inclusive of +prâ<i>n</i>a, and so on. When Scripture therefore represents +as the object of knowledge that in which there takes place the deep +sleep of the soul, characterised by absence of consciousness and +utter tranquillity, i.e. a state devoid of all those specific +cognitions which are produced by the limiting adjuncts of the soul, +and from which the soul returns when the sleep is broken; we +understand that the highest Self is meant.—Moreover, the +Vâjasaneyi<i>s</i>âkhâ, which likewise contains +the colloquy of Bâlâki and Ajâta<i>s</i>atru, +clearly refers to the individual soul by means of the term, 'the +person consisting of cognition' (vij<i>ñ</i>ânamaya), +and distinguishes from it the highest Self ('Where was then the +person consisting of cognition? and from whence did he thus come +back?' B<i>ri</i>. Up. II, 1, 16); and later on, in the reply to +the above question, declares that 'the person consisting of +cognition lies in the ether within the heart.' Now we know that the +word 'ether' may be used to denote the highest Self, as, for +instance, in <span class="pagenum"><a name="page274" id= +"page274"></a>{274}</span> the passage about the small ether within +the lotus of the heart (Ch. Up. VIII, 1, 1). Further on the +B<i>ri</i>. Up. says, 'All the Selfs came forth from that Self;' by +which statement of the coming forth of all the conditioned Selfs it +intimates that the highest Self is the one general cause.—The +doctrine conveyed by the rousing of the sleeping person, viz. that +the individual soul is different from the vital air, furnishes at +the same time a further argument against the opinion that the +passage under discussion refers to the vital air.</p> +<p>19. (The Self to be seen, to be heard, &c. is the highest +Self) on account of the connected meaning of the sentences.</p> +<p>We read in the B<i>ri</i>hadâra<i>n</i>yaka, in the +Maitreyî-brâhma<i>n</i>a the following passage, +'Verily, a husband is not dear that you may love the husband, +&c. &c.; verily, everything is not dear that you may love +everything; but that you may love the Self therefore everything is +dear. Verily, the Self is to be seen, to be heard, to be perceived, +to be marked, O Maitreyî! When the Self has been seen, heard, +perceived, and known, then all this is known' (B<i>ri</i>. Up. IV, +5, 6).—Here the doubt arises whether that which is +represented as the object to be seen, to be heard, and so on, is +the cognitional Self (the individual soul) or the highest +Self.—But whence the doubt?—Because, we reply, the Self +is, on the one hand, by the mention of dear things such as husband +and so on, indicated as the enjoyer whence it appears that the +passage refers to the individual soul; and because, on the other +hand, the declaration that through the knowledge of the Self +everything becomes known points to the highest Self.</p> +<p>The pûrvapakshin maintains that the passage refers to the +individual soul, on account of the strength of the initial +statement. The text declares at the outset that all the objects of +enjoyment found in this world, such as husband, wife, riches, and +so on, are dear on account of the Self, and thereby gives us to +understand that the enjoying (i.e. the <span class= +"pagenum"><a name="page275" id="page275"></a>{275}</span> +individual) Self is meant; if thereupon it refers to the Self as +the object of sight and so on, what other Self should it mean than +the same individual Self?—A subsequent passage also (viz. +'Thus does this great Being, endless, unlimited, consisting of +nothing but knowledge, rise from out of these elements, and vanish +again after them. When he has departed there is no more +knowledge'), which describes how the great Being under discussion +rises, as the Self of knowledge, from the elements, shows that the +object of sight is no other than the cognitional Self, i.e. the +individual soul. The concluding clause finally, 'How, O beloved, +should he know the knower?' shows, by means of the term 'knower,' +which denotes an agent, that the individual soul is meant. The +declaration that through the cognition of the Self everything +becomes known must therefore not be interpreted in the literal +sense, but must be taken to mean that the world of objects of +enjoyment is known through its relation to the enjoying soul.</p> +<p>To this we make the following reply.—The passage makes a +statement about the highest Self, on account of the connected +meaning of the entire section. If we consider the different +passages in their mutual connexion, we find that they all refer to +the highest Self. After Maitreyî has heard from +Yâj<i>ñ</i>avalkya that there is no hope of +immortality by wealth, she expresses her desire of immortality in +the words, 'What should I do with that by which I do not become +immortal? What my Lord knoweth tell that to me;' and thereupon +Yâj<i>ñ</i>avalkya expounds to her the knowledge of +the Self. Now Scripture as well as Sm<i>ri</i>ti declares that +immortality is not to be reached but through the knowledge of the +highest Self.—The statement further that through the +knowledge of the Self everything becomes known can be taken in its +direct literal sense only if by the Self we understand the highest +cause. And to take it in a non-literal sense (as the +pûrvapakshin proposes) is inadmissible, on account of the +explanation given of that statement in a subsequent passage, viz. +'Whosoever looks for the Brahman class elsewhere than in the Self, +is abandoned by the Brahman class.' Here it is said that whoever +<span class="pagenum"><a name="page276" id= +"page276"></a>{276}</span> erroneously views this world with its +Brahmans and so on, as having an independent existence apart from +the Self, is abandoned by that very world of which he has taken an +erroneous view; whereby the view that there exists any difference +is refuted. And the immediately subsequent clause, 'This everything +is the Self,' gives us to understand that the entire aggregate of +existing things is non-different from the Self; a doctrine further +confirmed by the similes of the drum and so on.—By explaining +further that the Self about which he had been speaking is the cause +of the universe of names, forms, and works ('There has been +breathed forth from this great Being what we have as +<i>Ri</i>gveda,' &c.) Yâj<i>ñ</i>avalkya again +shows that it is the highest Self.—To the same conclusion he +leads us by declaring, in the paragraph which treats of the natural +centres of things, that the Self is the centre of the whole world +with the objects, the senses and the mind, that it has neither +inside nor outside, that it is altogether a mass of +knowledge.—From all this it follows that what the text +represents as the object of sight and so on is the highest +Self.</p> +<p>We now turn to the remark made by the pûrvapakshin that +the passage teaches the individual soul to be the object of sight, +because it is, in the early part of the chapter denoted as +something dear.</p> +<p>20. (The circumstance of the soul being represented as the +object of sight) indicates the fulfilment of the promissory +statement; so Â<i>s</i>marathya thinks.</p> +<p>The fact that the text proclaims as the object of sight that +Self which is denoted as something, dear indicates the fulfilment +of the promise made in the passages, 'When the Self is known all +this is known,' 'All this is that Self.' For if the individual soul +were different from the highest Self, the knowledge of the latter +would not imply the knowledge of the former, and thus the promise +that through the knowledge of one thing everything is to be known +would not be fulfilled. Hence the initial <span class= +"pagenum"><a name="page277" id="page277"></a>{277}</span> statement +aims at representing the individual Self and the highest Self as +non-different for the purpose of fulfilling the promise +made.—This is the opinion of the teacher +Â<i>s</i>marathya<a id="footnotetag243" name= +"footnotetag243"></a><a href="#footnote243"><sup>243</sup></a>.</p> +<p>21. (The initial statement identifies the individual soul and +the highest Self) because the soul when it will depart (from the +body) is such (i.e. one with the highest Self); thus +Au<i>d</i>ulomi thinks.</p> +<p>The individual soul which is inquinated by the contact with its +different limiting adjuncts, viz. body, senses, and mind +(mano-buddhi), attains through the instrumentality of knowledge, +meditation, and so on, a state of complete serenity, and thus +enables itself, when passing at some future time out of the body, +to become one with the highest Self; hence the initial statement in +which it is represented as non-different from the highest Self. +This is the opinion of the teacher Au<i>d</i>ulomi.—Thus +Scripture says, 'That serene being arising from this body appears +in its own form as soon as it has approached the highest light' +(Ch. Up. VIII, 12, 3).—In another place Scripture intimates, +by means of the simile of the rivers, that name and form abide in +the individual soul, 'As <span class="pagenum"><a name="page278" +id="page278"></a>{278}</span> the flowing rivers disappear in the +sea, having lost their name and their form, thus a wise man freed +from name and form goes to the divine Person who is greater than +the great' (Mu. Up. III, 2, 8). I.e. as the rivers losing the names +and forms abiding in them disappear in the sea, so the individual +soul also losing the name and form abiding in it becomes united +with the highest person. That the latter half of the passage has +the meaning here assigned to it, follows from the parallelism which +we must assume to exist between the two members of the +comparison<a id="footnotetag244" name="footnotetag244"></a><a href= +"#footnote244"><sup>244</sup></a>.</p> +<p>22. (The initial statement is made) because (the highest Self) +exists in the condition (of the individual soul); so +Kâ<i>s</i>ak<i>ri</i>tsna thinks.</p> +<p>Because the highest Self exists also in the condition of the +individual soul, therefore, the teacher +Kâ<i>s</i>ak<i>ri</i>tsna thinks, the initial statement which +aims at intimating the non-difference of the two is possible. That +the highest Self only is that which appears as the individual soul, +is evident from the brâhma<i>n</i>a-passage, 'Let me enter +into them with this living Self and evolve names and forms,' and +similar passages. We have also mantras to the same effect, for +instance, 'The wise one who, having produced all forms and made all +names, sits calling the things by their names' (Taitt. Âr. +III, 12, 7)<a id="footnotetag245" name= +"footnotetag245"></a><a href="#footnote245"><sup>245</sup></a>. +<span class="pagenum"><a name="page279" id= +"page279"></a>{279}</span> And where Scripture relates the creation +of fire and the other elements, it does not at the same time relate +a separate creation of the individual soul; we have therefore no +right to look on the soul as a product of the highest Self, +different from the latter.—In the opinion of the teacher +Kâ<i>s</i>ak<i>ri</i>tsna the non-modified highest Lord +himself is the individual soul, not anything else. +Â<i>s</i>marathya, although meaning to say that the soul is +not (absolutely) different from the highest Self, yet intimates by +the expression, 'On account of the fulfilment of the +promise'—which declares a certain mutual +dependence—that there does exist a certain relation of cause +and effect between the highest Self and the individual soul<a id= +"footnotetag246" name="footnotetag246"></a><a href= +"#footnote246"><sup>246</sup></a>. The opinion of Au<i>d</i>ulomi +again clearly implies that the difference and non-difference of the +two depend on difference of condition<a id="footnotetag247" name= +"footnotetag247"></a><a href="#footnote247"><sup>247</sup></a>. Of +these three opinions we conclude that the one held by +Kâ<i>s</i>ak<i>ri</i>tsna accords with Scripture, because it +agrees with what all the Vedânta-texts (so, for instance, the +passage, 'That art thou') aim at inculcating. Only on the opinion +of Kâ<i>s</i>ak<i>ri</i>tsna immortality can be viewed as the +result of the knowledge of the soul; while it would be impossible +to hold the same view if the soul were a modification (product) of +the Self and as such liable to lose its existence by being merged +in its causal substance. For the same reason, name and form cannot +abide in the soul (as was above attempted to prove by means of the +simile of the rivers), but abide in the limiting adjunct and are +ascribed to the soul itself in a figurative sense only. For the +same reason the origin of the souls from the highest Self, of which +Scripture speaks in some places as analogous to the issuing of +sparks from the fire, must be viewed as based only on the limiting +adjuncts of the soul.</p> +<p>The last three Sûtras have further to be interpreted so as +to furnish replies to the second of the pûrvapakshin's +arguments, viz. that the B<i>ri</i>hadâra<i>n</i>yaka passage +represents as <span class="pagenum"><a name="page280" id= +"page280"></a>{280}</span> the object of sight the individual soul, +because it declares that the great Being which is to be seen arises +from out of these elements. 'There is an indication of the +fulfilment of the promise; so Â<i>s</i>marathya thinks.' The +promise is made in the two passages, 'When the Self is known, all +this is known,' and 'All this is that Self.' That the Self is +everything, is proved by the declaration that the whole world of +names, forms, and works springs from one being, and is merged in +one being<a id="footnotetag248" name="footnotetag248"></a><a href= +"#footnote248"><sup>248</sup></a>; and by its being demonstrated, +with the help of the similes of the drum, and so on, that effect +and cause are non-different. The fulfilment of the promise is, +then, finally indicated by the text declaring that that great Being +rises, in the form of the individual soul, from out of these +elements; thus the teacher Â<i>s</i>marathya thinks. For if +the soul and the highest Self are non-different, the promise that +through the knowledge of one everything becomes known is capable of +fulfilment.—'Because the soul when it will depart is such; +thus Au<i>d</i>ulomi thinks.' The statement as to the +non-difference of the soul and the Self (implied in the declaration +that the great Being rises, &c.) is possible, because the soul +when—after having purified itself by knowledge, and so +on—it will depart from the body, is capable of becoming one +with the highest Self. This is Au<i>d</i>ulomi's +opinion.—'Because it exists in the condition of the soul; +thus Kâ<i>s</i>ak<i>ri</i>tsna opines.' Because the highest +Self itself is that which appears as the individual soul, the +statement as to the non-difference of the two is well-founded. This +is the view of the teacher Kâ<i>s</i>ak<i>ri</i>tsna.</p> +<p>But, an objection may be raised, the passage, 'Rising from out +of these elements he vanishes again after them. When he has +departed there is no more knowledge,' intimates the final +destruction of the soul, not its identity with the highest +Self!—By no means, we reply. The passage means to say +<span class="pagenum"><a name="page281" id= +"page281"></a>{281}</span> only that on the soul departing from the +body all specific cognition vanishes, not that the Self is +destroyed. For an objection being raised—in the passage, +'Here thou hast bewildered me, Sir, when thou sayest that having +departed there is no more knowledge'. Scripture itself explains +that what is meant is not the annihilation of the Self, 'I say +nothing that is bewildering. Verily, beloved, that Self is +imperishable, and of an indestructible nature. But there takes +place non-connexion with the mâtrâs.' That means: The +eternally unchanging Self, which is one mass of knowledge, cannot +possibly perish; but by means of true knowledge there is effected +its dissociation from the mâtrâs, i.e. the elements and +the sense organs, which are the product of Nescience. When the +connexion has been solved, specific cognition, which depended on +it, no longer takes place, and thus it can be said, that 'When he +has departed there is no more knowledge.'</p> +<p>The third argument also of the pûrvapakshin, viz. that the +word 'knower'—which occurs in the concluding passage, 'How +should he know the knower?'—denotes an agent, and therefore +refers to the individual soul as the object of sight, is to be +refuted according to the view of +Kâ<i>s</i>ak<i>ri</i>tsna.—Moreover, the text after +having enumerated—in the passage, 'For where there is duality +as it were, there one sees the other,' &c.—all the kinds +of specific cognition which belong to the sphere of Nescience +declares—in the subsequent passage, 'But when the Self only +is all this, how should he see another?'—that in the sphere +of true knowledge all specific cognition such as seeing, and so on, +is absent. And, again, in order to obviate the doubt whether in the +absence of objects the knower might not know himself, +Yâj<i>ñ</i>avalkya goes on, 'How, O beloved, should he +know himself, the knower?' As thus the latter passage evidently +aims at proving the absence of specific cognition, we have to +conclude that the word 'knower' is here used to denote that being +which is knowledge, i.e. the Self.—That the view of +Kâ<i>s</i>ak<i>ri</i>tsna is scriptural, we have already +shown above. And as it is so, all the adherents of the +Vedânta must admit that the difference of the soul and the +highest Self is not <span class="pagenum"><a name="page282" id= +"page282"></a>{282}</span> real, but due to the limiting adjuncts, +viz. the body, and so on, which are the product of name and form as +presented by Nescience. That view receives ample confirmation from +Scripture; compare, for instance, 'Being only, my dear, this was in +the beginning, one, without a second' (Ch. Up. VI, 2, 1); 'The Self +is all this' (Ch. Up. VII, 25, 2); 'Brahman alone is all this' (Mu. +Up. II, 2, 11); 'This everything is that Self' (B<i>ri</i>. Up. II, +4, 6); 'There is no other seer but he' (B<i>ri</i>. Up. III, 7, +23); 'There is nothing that sees but it' (B<i>ri</i>. Up. III, 8, +11).—It is likewise confirmed by Sm<i>ri</i>ti; compare, for +instance, 'Vâsudeva is all this' (Bha. Gî. VII, 19); +'Know me, O Bhârata, to be the soul in all bodies' (Bha. +Gî. XIII, 2); 'He who sees the highest Lord abiding alike +within all creatures' (Bha. Gî. XIII, 27).—The same +conclusion is supported by those passages which deny all +difference; compare, for instance, 'If he thinks, that is one and I +another; he does not know' (B<i>ri</i>. Up. I, 4, 10); 'From death +to death he goes who sees here any diversity' (B<i>ri</i>. Up. IV, +4, 19). And, again, by those passages which negative all change on +the part of the Self; compare, for instance, 'This great unborn +Self, undecaying, undying, immortal, fearless is indeed Brahman' +(B<i>ri</i>. Up. IV, 24).—Moreover, if the doctrine of +general identity were not true, those who are desirous of release +could not be in the possession of irrefutable knowledge, and there +would be no possibility of any matter being well settled; while yet +the knowledge of which the Self is the object is declared to be +irrefutable and to satisfy all desire, and Scripture speaks of +those, 'Who have well ascertained the object of the knowledge of +the Vedânta' (Mu. Up. III, 2, 6). Compare also the passage, +'What trouble, what sorrow can there be to him who has once beheld +that unity?' (I<i>s</i>. Up. 7.)—And Sm<i>ri</i>ti also +represents the mind of him who contemplates the Self as steady +(Bha. Gî. II, 54).</p> +<p>As therefore the individual soul and the highest Self differ in +name only, it being a settled matter that perfect knowledge has for +its object the absolute oneness of the two; it is senseless to +insist (as some do) on a plurality of Selfs, and to maintain that +the individual soul is different from the <span class= +"pagenum"><a name="page283" id="page283"></a>{283}</span> highest +Self, and the highest Self from the individual soul. For the Self +is indeed called by many different names, but it is one only. Nor +does the passage, 'He who knows Brahman which is real, knowledge, +infinite, as hidden in the cave' (Taitt. Up. II, 1), refer to some +one cave (different from the abode of the individual soul)<a id= +"footnotetag249" name="footnotetag249"></a><a href= +"#footnote249"><sup>249</sup></a>. And that nobody else but Brahman +is hidden in the cave we know from a subsequent passage, viz. +'Having sent forth he entered into it' (Taitt. Up. II, 6), +according to which the creator only entered into the created +beings.—Those who insist on the distinction of the individual +and the highest Self oppose themselves to the true sense of the +Vedânta-texts, stand thereby in the way of perfect knowledge, +which is the door to perfect beatitude, and groundlessly assume +release to be something effected, and therefore non-eternal<a id= +"footnotetag250" name="footnotetag250"></a><a href= +"#footnote250"><sup>250</sup></a>. (And if they attempt to show +that moksha, although effected, is eternal) they involve themselves +in a conflict with sound logic.</p> +<p>23. (Brahman is) the material cause also, on account of (this +view) not being in conflict with the promissory statements and the +illustrative instances.</p> +<p>It has been said that, as practical religious duty has to be +enquired into because it is the cause of an increase of happiness, +so Brahman has to be enquired into because it is the cause of +absolute beatitude. And Brahman has been defined as that from which +there proceed the origination, sustentation, and retractation of +this world. Now as this definition comprises alike the relation of +substantial causality in which clay and gold, for instance, stand +to golden ornaments and earthen pots, and the relation of operative +<span class="pagenum"><a name="page284" id= +"page284"></a>{284}</span> causality in which the potter and the +goldsmith stand to the things mentioned; a doubt arises to which of +these two kinds the causality of Brahman belongs.</p> +<p>The pûrvapakshin maintains that Brahman evidently is the +operative cause of the world only, because Scripture declares his +creative energy to be preceded by reflection. Compare, for +instance, Pra. Up. VI, 3; 4: 'He reflected, he created +prâ<i>n</i>a.' For observation shows that the action of +operative causes only, such as potters and the like, is preceded by +reflection, and moreover that the result of some activity is +brought about by the concurrence of several factors<a id= +"footnotetag251" name="footnotetag251"></a><a href= +"#footnote251"><sup>251</sup></a>. It is therefore appropriate that +we should view the prime creator in the same light. The +circumstance of his being known as 'the Lord' furnishes another +argument. For lords such as kings and the son of Vivasvat are known +only as operative causes, and the highest Lord also must on that +account be viewed as an operative cause only.—Further, the +effect of the creator's activity, viz. this world, is seen to +consist of parts, to be non-intelligent and impure; we therefore +must assume that its cause also is of the same nature; for it is a +matter of general observation that cause and effect are alike in +kind. But that Brahman does not resemble the world in nature, we +know from many scriptural passages, such as 'It is without parts, +without actions, tranquil, without fault, without taint' +(<i>Sv</i>e. Up. VI, 19). Hence there remains no other alternative +but to admit that in addition to Brahman there exists a material +cause of the world of impure nature, such as is known from +Sm<i>ri</i>ti<a id="footnotetag252" name= +"footnotetag252"></a><a href="#footnote252"><sup>252</sup></a>, and +to limit the causality of Brahman, as declared by Scripture, to +operative causality.</p> +<p>To this we make the following reply.—Brahman is to be +acknowledged as the material cause as well as the operative cause; +because this latter view does not conflict with the promissory +statements and the illustrative instances. The promissory statement +chiefly meant is the following one, <span class="pagenum"><a name= +"page285" id="page285"></a>{285}</span> 'Have you ever asked for +that instruction by which that which is not heard becomes heard; +that which is not perceived, perceived; that which is not known, +known?' (Ch. Up. VI, 1, 3.) This passage intimates that through the +cognition of one thing everything else, even if (previously) +unknown, becomes known. Now the knowledge of everything is possible +through the cognition of the material cause, since the effect is +non-different from the material cause. On the other hand, effects +are not non-different from their operative causes; for we know from +ordinary experience that the carpenter, for instance, is different +from the house he has built.—The illustrative example +referred to is the one mentioned (Ch. Up. VI, 1, 4), 'My dear, as +by one clod of clay all that is made of clay is known, the +modification (i.e. the effect) being a name merely which has its +origin in speech, while the truth is that it is clay merely;' which +passage again has reference to the material cause. The text adds a +few more illustrative instances of similar nature, 'As by one +nugget of gold all that is made of gold is known; as by one pair of +nail-scissors all that is made of iron is known.'—Similar +promissory statements are made in other places also, for instance, +'What is that through which if it is known everything else becomes +known?' (Mu. Up. I, 1, 3.) An illustrative instance also is given +in the same place, 'As plants grow on the earth' (I, 1, +7).—Compare also the promissory statement in B<i>ri</i>. Up. +IV, 5, 6, 'When the Self has been seen, heard, perceived, and +known, then all this is known;' and the illustrative instance +quoted (IV, 5, 8), 'Now as the sounds of a drum if beaten cannot be +seized externally, but the sound is seized when the drum is seized +or the beater of the drum.'—Similar promissory statements and +illustrative instances which are to be found in all +Vedânta-texts are to be viewed as proving, more or less, that +Brahman is also the material cause of the world. The ablative case +also in the passage, 'That from whence (yata<i>h</i>) these beings +are born,' has to be considered as indicating the material cause of +the beings, according to the grammatical rule, Pâ<i>n</i>. I, +4, 30.—That Brahman is at the same time the operative cause +of the <span class="pagenum"><a name="page286" id= +"page286"></a>{286}</span> world, we have to conclude from the +circumstance that there is no other guiding being. Ordinarily +material causes, indeed, such as lumps of clay and pieces of gold, +are dependent, in order to shape themselves into vessels and +ornaments, on extraneous operative causes such as potters and +goldsmiths; but outside Brahman as material cause there is no other +operative cause to which the material cause could look; for +Scripture says that previously to creation Brahman was one without +a second.—The absence of a guiding principle other than the +material cause can moreover be established by means of the argument +made use of in the Sûtra, viz. accordance with the promissory +statements and the illustrative examples. If there were admitted a +guiding principle different from the material cause, it would +follow that everything cannot be known through one thing, and +thereby the promissory statements as well as the illustrative +instances would be stultified.—The Self is thus the operative +cause, because there is no other ruling principle, and the material +cause because there is no other substance from which the world +could originate.</p> +<p>24. And on account of the statement of reflection (on the part +of the Self).</p> +<p>The fact of the sacred texts declaring that the Self reflected +likewise shows that it is the operative as well as the material +cause. Passages like 'He wished, may I be many, may I grow forth,' +and 'He thought, may I be many, may I grow forth,' show, in the +first place, that the Self is the agent in the independent activity +which is preceded by the Self's reflection; and, in the second +place, that it is the material cause also, since the words 'May I +be many' intimate that the reflective desire of multiplying itself +has the inward Self for its object.</p> +<p>25. And on account of both (i.e. the origin and the dissolution +of the world) being directly declared (to have Brahman for their +material cause).</p> +<p>This Sûtra supplies a further argument for Brahman's +<span class="pagenum"><a name="page287" id= +"page287"></a>{287}</span> being the general material +cause.—Brahman is the material cause of the world for that +reason also that the origination as well as the dissolution of the +world is directly spoken of in the sacred texts as having Brahman +for their material cause, 'All these beings take their rise from +the ether and return into the ether' (Ch. Up. I, 9, 1). That that +from which some other thing springs and into which it returns is +the material cause of that other thing is well known. Thus the +earth, for instance, is the material cause of rice, barley, and the +like.—The word 'directly' (in the Sûtra) notifies that +there is no other material cause, but that all this sprang from the +ether only.—Observation further teaches that effects are not +re-absorbed into anything else but their material causes.</p> +<p>26. (Brahman is the material cause) on account of (the Self) +making itself; (which is possible) owing to modification.</p> +<p>Brahman is the material cause for that reason also that +Scripture—in the passage, 'That made itself its Self' (Taitt. +Up. II, 7)—represents the Self as the object of action as +well as the agent.—But how can the Self which as agent was in +full existence previously to the action be made out to be at the +same time that which is effected by the action?—Owing to +modification, we reply. The Self, although in full existence +previously to the action, modifies itself into something special, +viz. the Self of the effect. Thus we see that causal substances, +such as clay and the like, are, by undergoing the process of +modification, changed into their products.—The word 'itself' +in the passage quoted intimates the absence of any other operative +cause but the Self.</p> +<p>The word 'pari<i>n</i>âmât' (in the Sûtra) may +also be taken as constituting a separate Sûtra by itself, the +sense of which would be: Brahman is the material cause of the world +for that reason also, that the sacred text speaks of Brahman and +its modification into the Self of its effect as co-ordinated, viz. +in the passage, 'It became sat and tyat, defined and undefined' +(Taitt. Up. II, 6).</p> +<span class="pagenum"><a name="page288" id= +"page288"></a>{288}</span> +<p>27. And because Brahman is called the source.</p> +<p>Brahman is the material cause for that reason also that it is +spoken of in the sacred texts as the source (yoni); compare, for +instance, 'The maker, the Lord, the person who has his source in +Brahman' (Mu. Up. III, 1, 3); and 'That which the wise regard as +the source of all beings' (Mu. Up. I, 1, 6). For that the word +'source' denotes the material cause is well known from the use of +ordinary language; the earth, for instance, is called the yoni of +trees and herbs. In some places indeed the word yoni means not +source, but merely place; so, for instance, in the mantra, 'A yoni, +O Indra, was made for you to sit down upon' (<i>Ri</i>k. +Sa<i>m</i>h. I, 104, 1). But that in the passage quoted it means +'source' follows from a complementary passage, 'As the spider sends +forth and draws in its threads,' &c.—It is thus proved +that Brahman is the material cause of the world.—Of the +objection, finally, that in ordinary life the activity of operative +causal agents only, such as potters and the like, is preceded by +reflection, we dispose by the remark that, as the matter in hand is +not one which can be known through inferential reasoning, ordinary +experience cannot be used to settle it. For the knowledge of that +matter we rather depend on Scripture altogether, and hence +Scripture only has to be appealed to. And that Scripture teaches +that the Lord who reflects before creation is at the same time the +material cause, we have already explained. The subject will, +moreover, be discussed more fully later on.</p> +<p>28. Hereby all (the doctrines concerning the origin of the world +which are opposed to the Vedânta) are explained, are +explained.</p> +<p>The doctrine according to which the pradhâna is the cause +of the world has, in the Sûtras beginning with I, 1, 5, been +again and again brought forward and refuted. The chief reason for +the special attention given to that doctrine is that the +Vedânta-texts contain some passages which, to people +deficient in mental penetration, may appear to contain inferential +marks pointing to it. The <span class="pagenum"><a name="page289" +id="page289"></a>{289}</span> doctrine, moreover, stands somewhat +near to the Vedânta doctrine since, like the latter, it +admits the non-difference of cause and effect, and it, moreover, +has been accepted by some of the authors of the +Dharma-sûtras, such as Devala, and so on. For all these +reasons we have taken special trouble to refute the pradhâna +doctrine, without paying much attention to the atomic and other +theories. These latter theories, however, must likewise be refuted, +as they also are opposed to the doctrine of Brahman being the +general cause, and as slow-minded people might think that they also +are referred to in some Vedic passages. Hence the +Sûtrakâra formally extends, in the above Sûtra, +the refutation already accomplished of the pradhâna doctrine +to all similar doctrines which need not be demolished in detail +after their great protagonist, the pradhâna doctrine, has +been so completely disposed of. They also are, firstly, not founded +on any scriptural authority; and are, secondly, directly +contradicted by various Vedic passages.—The repetition of the +phrase 'are explained' is meant to intimate that the end of the +adhyâya has been reached.</p> +<p>Notes:</p> +<blockquote class="footnote"><a id="footnote228" name= +"footnote228"></a><b>Footnote 228:</b><a href= +"#footnotetag228">(return)</a> +<p>The Great one is the technical Sâ@nkhya-term for buddhi, +avyakta is a common designation of pradhâna or +prak<i>ri</i>ti, and purusha is the technical name of the soul. +Compare, for instance, Sâ@nkhya Kâr. 2, 3.</p> +</blockquote> +<blockquote class="footnote"><a id="footnote229" name= +"footnote229"></a><b>Footnote 229:</b><a href= +"#footnotetag229">(return)</a> +<p>Sa<i>m</i>kalpavikalparûpamanana<i>s</i>aktyâ +haira<i>n</i>yagarbhî buddhir manas tasyâ<i>h</i> +vyash<i>t</i>imana<i>h</i>su samash<i>t</i>itayâ +vyâptim âha mahân iti. +Sa<i>m</i>kalpâdi<i>s</i>ktitayâ tarhi +sa<i>m</i>dehâtmatva<i>m</i> tatrâha matir iti. +Mahatvam upapâdayati brahmeti. +Bhogyajâtâdhâratvam âha pûr iti. +Ni<i>sk</i>ayâtmakatvam âha buddhir iti. +Kîrti<i>s</i>aktimattvam âha khyâtir iti. +Niyamana<i>s</i>aktimatvam aha î<i>s</i>vara iti. Loke yat +prak<i>ri</i>sh<i>t</i>a<i>m</i> j<i>ñ</i>ânam +tatosnatirekam âha praj<i>ñ</i>eti. Tatphalam api tato +nârthântaravishayam ity âha sa<i>m</i>vid iti. +<i>K</i>itpradhânatvam âha <i>k</i>itir iti. +J<i>ñ</i>atasarvârtbânusa<i>m</i>dhâna<i>s</i>aktim +âha sm<i>ri</i>tis <i>k</i>eti. Ânanda Giri.</p> +</blockquote> +<blockquote class="footnote"><a id="footnote230" name= +"footnote230"></a><b>Footnote 230:</b><a href= +"#footnotetag230">(return)</a> +<p>Nanu na bîja<i>s</i>aktir vidyayâ dahyate +vastutvâd âtmavan nety âha avidyeti. Ke<i>k</i>it +tu pratijîvam avidya<i>s</i>aktibhedam i<i>kkh</i>anti tan na +avyaktâvyâk<i>ri</i>tâdi<i>s</i>abdâyâs +tasyâ bhedakâbhâvâd ekatvexpi +sva<i>s</i>aktyâ vi<i>k</i>itrakâryakaratvâd ity +âha avyakteti. Na <i>k</i>a tasyâ +jîvâ<i>s</i>rayatva<i>m</i> +jîva<i>s</i>abdavâ<i>k</i>yasya kalpitatvâd +avidyârûpatvât ta<i>kkh</i>abdalakshyasya +brahmâvyatirekâd ity âha parame<i>s</i>vareti. +Mâyâvidyayor bhedâd î<i>s</i>varasya +mâyâ<i>s</i>rayatva<i>m</i> jîvânâm +avidyâ<i>s</i>rayateti vadanta<i>m</i> pratyâha +mâyâmayîti. Yathâ mâyâvino +mâyâ paratantrâ tathaishâpîty +artha<i>h</i>. Pratîtau tasyâ<i>s</i> +<i>k</i>etanâpekshâm âha mahâsuptir iti. +Ânanda Giri.</p> +</blockquote> +<blockquote class="footnote"><a id="footnote231" name= +"footnote231"></a><b>Footnote 231:</b><a href= +"#footnotetag231">(return)</a> +<p>Sûtradvayasya +v<i>ri</i>ttik<i>ri</i>dvyâkhyânam utthâpayati. +Go. Ân. Â<i>k</i>âryade<i>s</i>îyamatam +utthâpayati. Ân. Gi.</p> +</blockquote> +<blockquote class="footnote"><a id="footnote232" name= +"footnote232"></a><b>Footnote 232:</b><a href= +"#footnotetag232">(return)</a> +<p>The commentators give different explanations of the +Sattâmâtra of the text.—Sattâmâtre +sattvapradhânaprak<i>ri</i>ter +âdyapari<i>n</i>âme. Go. +Ân.—Bhogâpavargapurushârthasya +maha<i>kkh</i>abditabuddhikâryatvât +purushâpekshitaphalakâra<i>n</i>a<i>m</i> sad +u<i>k</i>yate tatra bhâvapratyayos'pi svarûpârtho +na sâmânyavâ<i>k</i>î +kâryânumeya<i>m</i> mahan na pratyaksham iti +mâtra<i>s</i>abda<i>h</i>. Ânanda Giri.</p> +</blockquote> +<blockquote class="footnote"><a id="footnote233" name= +"footnote233"></a><b>Footnote 233:</b><a href= +"#footnotetag233">(return)</a> +<p>As the meaning of the word ajâ is going to be discussed, +and as the author of the Sûtras and <i>S</i>a@nkara seem to +disagree as to its meaning (see later on), I prefer to leave the +word untranslated in this place.—<i>S</i>a@nkara +reads—and explains,—in the mantra, +sarûpâ<i>h</i> (not sarûpâm) and +bhuktabhogâm, not bhuktabhogyâm.</p> +</blockquote> +<blockquote class="footnote"><a id="footnote234" name= +"footnote234"></a><b>Footnote 234:</b><a href= +"#footnotetag234">(return)</a> +<p>Here there seems to be a certain discrepancy between the views +of the Sûtra writer and <i>S</i>a@nkara. Govindânanda +notes that according to the Bhâshyak<i>ri</i>t ajâ +means simply mâyâ—which interpretation is based +on prakara<i>n</i>a—while, according to the +Sûtra-k<i>ri</i>t, who explains ajâ on the ground of +the Chândogya-passage treating of the three primary elements, +ajâ denotes the aggregate of those three elements +constituting an avântaraprak<i>ri</i>ti.—On +<i>S</i>a@nkara's explanation the term ajâ presents no +difficulties, for mâyâ is ajâ, i.e. unborn, not +produced. On the explanation of the Sûtra writer, however, +ajâ cannot mean unborn, since the three primary elements are +products. Hence we are thrown back on the rû<i>dh</i>i +signification of ajâ, according to which it means she-goat. +But how can the avântara-prak<i>ri</i>ti be called a +she-goat? To this question the next Sûtra replies.</p> +</blockquote> +<blockquote class="footnote"><a id="footnote235" name= +"footnote235"></a><b>Footnote 235:</b><a href= +"#footnotetag235">(return)</a> +<p>Indication (laksha<i>n</i>â, which consists in this case +in five times five being used instead of twenty-five) is considered +as an objectionable mode of expression, and therefore to be assumed +in interpretation only where a term can in no way be shown to have +a direct meaning.</p> +</blockquote> +<blockquote class="footnote"><a id="footnote236" name= +"footnote236"></a><b>Footnote 236:</b><a href= +"#footnotetag236">(return)</a> +<p>That pa<i>ñk</i>ajanâ<i>h</i> is only one word +appears from its having only one accent, viz. the udâtta on +the last syllable, which udâtta becomes anudâtta +according to the rules laid down in the Bhâshika Sûtra +for the accentuation of the +<i>S</i>atapatha-brâhma<i>n</i>a.</p> +</blockquote> +<blockquote class="footnote"><a id="footnote237" name= +"footnote237"></a><b>Footnote 237:</b><a href= +"#footnotetag237">(return)</a> +<p>So in the Mâdhyandina recension of the Upanishad; the +Kâ<i>n</i>va recension has not the clause 'the food of +food.'</p> +</blockquote> +<blockquote class="footnote"><a id="footnote238" name= +"footnote238"></a><b>Footnote 238:</b><a href= +"#footnotetag238">(return)</a> +<p>This in answer to the Sánkhya who objects to jana when +applied to the prâna, &c. being interpreted with the help +of laksha<i>n</i>â; while if referred to the pradhâna, +&c. it may be explained to have a direct meaning, on the ground +of yaugika interpretation (the pradhâna being jana because it +produces, the mahat &c. being jana because they are produced). +The Vedãntin points out that the compound +pa<i>ñk</i>ajanâ<i>h</i> has its own +rû<i>dh</i>i-meaning, just as a<i>s</i>vakar<i>n</i>a, +literally horse-ear, which conventionally denotes a certain +plant.</p> +</blockquote> +<blockquote class="footnote"><a id="footnote239" name= +"footnote239"></a><b>Footnote 239:</b><a href= +"#footnotetag239">(return)</a> +<p>We infer that udbhid is the name of a sacrifice because it is +mentioned in connexion with the act of sacrificing; we infer that +the yûpa is a wooden post because it is said to be cut, and +so on.</p> +</blockquote> +<blockquote class="footnote"><a id="footnote240" name= +"footnote240"></a><b>Footnote 240:</b><a href= +"#footnotetag240">(return)</a> +<p>Option being possible only in the case of things to be +accomplished, i.e. actions.</p> +</blockquote> +<blockquote class="footnote"><a id="footnote241" name= +"footnote241"></a><b>Footnote 241:</b><a href= +"#footnotetag241">(return)</a> +<p>According to Go. Ân. in the passage, 'That made itself its +Self' (II, 7); according to Ân. Giri in the passage, 'He +created all' (II, 6).</p> +</blockquote> +<blockquote class="footnote"><a id="footnote242" name= +"footnote242"></a><b>Footnote 242:</b><a href= +"#footnotetag242">(return)</a> +<p>By the brâhma<i>n</i>as being meant all those +brâhma<i>n</i>as who are not at the same time wandering +mendicants.</p> +</blockquote> +<blockquote class="footnote"><a id="footnote243" name= +"footnote243"></a><b>Footnote 243:</b><a href= +"#footnotetag243">(return)</a> +<p>The comment of the Bhâmatî on the Sûtra runs +as follows: As the sparks issuing from a fire are not absolutely +different from the fire, because they participate in the nature of +the fire; and, on the other hand, are not absolutely non-different +from the fire, because in that case they could be distinguished +neither from the fire nor from each other; so the individual souls +also—which are effects of Brahman—are neither +absolutely different from Brahman, for that would mean that they +are not of the nature of intelligence; nor absolutely non-different +from Brahman, because in that case they could not be distinguished +from each other, and because, if they were identical with Brahman +and therefore omniscient, it would be useless to give them any +instruction. Hence the individual souls are somehow different from +Brahman and somehow non-different.—The technical name of the +doctrine here represented by Â<i>s</i>marathya is +bhedâbhedavâda.</p> +</blockquote> +<blockquote class="footnote"><a id="footnote244" name= +"footnote244"></a><b>Footnote 244:</b><a href= +"#footnotetag244">(return)</a> +<p>Bhâmatî: The individual soul is absolutely different +from the highest Self; it is inquinated by the contact with its +different limiting adjuncts. But it is spoken of, in the Upanishad, +as non-different from the highest Self because after having +purified itself by means of knowledge and meditation it may pass +out of the body and become one with the highest Self. The text of +the Upanishad thus transfers a future state of non-difference to +that time when difference actually exists. Compare the saying of +the Pâ<i>ñk</i>arâtrikas: 'Up to the moment of +emancipation being reached the soul and the highest Self are +different. But the emancipated soul is no longer different from the +highest Self, since there is no further cause of +difference.'—The technical name of the doctrine advocated by +Au<i>d</i>ulomi is satyabhedavâda.</p> +</blockquote> +<blockquote class="footnote"><a id="footnote245" name= +"footnote245"></a><b>Footnote 245:</b><a href= +"#footnotetag245">(return)</a> +<p>Compare the note to the same mantra as quoted above under I, 1, +11.</p> +</blockquote> +<blockquote class="footnote"><a id="footnote246" name= +"footnote246"></a><b>Footnote 246:</b><a href= +"#footnotetag246">(return)</a> +<p>And not the relation of absolute identity.</p> +</blockquote> +<blockquote class="footnote"><a id="footnote247" name= +"footnote247"></a><b>Footnote 247:</b><a href= +"#footnotetag247">(return)</a> +<p>I.e. upon the state of emancipation and its absence.</p> +</blockquote> +<blockquote class="footnote"><a id="footnote248" name= +"footnote248"></a><b>Footnote 248:</b><a href= +"#footnotetag248">(return)</a> +<p>Upapâdita<i>m</i> <i>k</i>eti, +sarvasyâtmamâtratvam iti <i>s</i>esha<i>h</i>. +Upapâdanaprakâra<i>m</i> sû<i>k</i>ayati eketi. +Sa yathârdrendhanâgner ityâdinaikaprasavatvam, +yathâ sarvâsâm apâm ityâdinâ +<i>k</i>aikapralayatva<i>m</i> sarvasyoktam. Ân. Gi.</p> +</blockquote> +<blockquote class="footnote"><a id="footnote249" name= +"footnote249"></a><b>Footnote 249:</b><a href= +"#footnotetag249">(return)</a> +<p>So according to Go. Ân. and Ân. Gi., although their +interpretations seem not to account sufficiently for the ekâm +of the text.—Kâ<i>mk</i>id evaikâm iti +jîvasthânâd anyâm ity artha<i>h</i>. Go. +Ân.—Jîvabhâvena +pratibimbâdhârâtiriktâm ity artha<i>h</i>. +Ân. Gi.</p> +</blockquote> +<blockquote class="footnote"><a id="footnote250" name= +"footnote250"></a><b>Footnote 250:</b><a href= +"#footnotetag250">(return)</a> +<p>While release, as often remarked, is eternal, it being in fact +not different from the eternally unchanging Brahman.</p> +</blockquote> +<blockquote class="footnote"><a id="footnote251" name= +"footnote251"></a><b>Footnote 251:</b><a href= +"#footnotetag251">(return)</a> +<p>I.e. that the operative cause and the substantial cause are +separate things.</p> +</blockquote> +<blockquote class="footnote"><a id="footnote252" name= +"footnote252"></a><b>Footnote 252:</b><a href= +"#footnotetag252">(return)</a> +<p>Viz. the Sâ@nkhya-sm<i>ri</i>ti.</p> +</blockquote> +<span class="pagenum"><a name="page290" id= +"page290"></a>{290}</span> <a name="chap-2-1" id="chap-2-1"></a> +<h3>SECOND ADHYÂYA.</h3> +<h4>FIRST PÂDA.</h4> +<center>REVERENCE TO THE HIGHEST SELF!</center> +<p>1. If it be objected that (from the doctrine expounded hitherto) +there would result the fault of there being no room for (certain) +Sm<i>ri</i>tis; we do not admit that objection, because (from the +rejection of our doctrine) there would result the fault of want of +room for other Sm<i>ri</i>tis.</p> +<p>It has been shown in the first adhyâya that the omniscient +Lord of all is the cause of the origin of this world in the same +way as clay is the material cause of jars and gold of golden +ornaments; that by his rulership he is the cause of the subsistence +of this world once originated, just as the magician is the cause of +the subsistence of the magical illusion; and that he, lastly, is +the cause of this emitted world being finally reabsorbed into his +essence, just as the four classes of creatures are reabsorbed into +the earth. It has further been proved, by a demonstration of the +connected meaning of all the Vedânta-texts, that the Lord is +the Self of all of us. Moreover, the doctrines of the +pradhâna, and so on, being the cause of this world have been +refuted as not being scriptural.—The purport of the second +adhyâya, which we now begin, is to refute the objections (to +the doctrine established hitherto) which might be founded on +Sm<i>ri</i>ti and Reasoning, and to show that the doctrines of the +pradhâna, &c. have only fallacious arguments to lean +upon, and that the different Vedânta-texts do not contradict +one another with regard to the mode of creation and similar +topics.—The first point is to refute the objections based on +Sm<i>ri</i>ti.</p> +<p>Your doctrine (the pûrvapakshin says) that the omniscient +<span class="pagenum"><a name="page291" id= +"page291"></a>{291}</span> Brahman only is the cause of this world +cannot be maintained, 'because there results from it the fault of +there being no room for (certain) Sm<i>ri</i>tis.' Such +Sm<i>ri</i>tis are the one called Tantra which was composed by a +<i>ri</i>shi and is accepted by authoritative persons, and other +Sm<i>ri</i>tis based on it<a id="footnotetag253" name= +"footnotetag253"></a><a href="#footnote253"><sup>253</sup></a>; for +all of which there would be no room if your interpretation of the +Veda were the true one. For they all teach that the non-intelligent +pradhâna is the independent cause of the world. There is +indeed room (a raison d'être) for Sm<i>ri</i>tis like the +Manu-sm<i>ri</i>ti, which give information about matters connected +with the whole body of religious duty, characterised by +injunction<a id="footnotetag254" name="footnotetag254"></a><a href= +"#footnote254"><sup>254</sup></a> and comprising the agnihotra and +similar performances. They tell us at what time and with what rites +the members of the different castes are to be initiated; how the +Veda has to be studied; in what way the cessation of study has to +take place; how marriage has to be performed, and so on. They +further lay down the manifold religious duties, beneficial to man, +of the four castes and â<i>s</i>ramas<a id="footnotetag255" +name="footnotetag255"></a><a href= +"#footnote255"><sup>255</sup></a>. The Kâpila Sm<i>ri</i>ti, +on the other hand, and similar books are not concerned with things +to be done, but were composed with exclusive reference to perfect +knowledge as the means of final release. If then no room were left +for them in that connexion also, they would be altogether +purposeless; and hence we must explain the Vedânta-texts in +such a manner as not to bring them into conflict with the +Sm<i>ri</i>tis mentioned<a id="footnotetag256" name= +"footnotetag256"></a><a href= +"#footnote256"><sup>256</sup></a>.—But how, somebody may ask +the pûrvapakshin, can the eventual fault of there being left +no room for certain Sm<i>ri</i>tis be used as an objection against +that sense of <i>S</i>ruti which—from various <span class= +"pagenum"><a name="page292" id="page292"></a>{292}</span> reasons +as detailed under I, 1 and ff.—has been ascertained by us to +be the true one, viz. that the omniscient Brahman alone is the +cause of the world?—Our objection, the pûrvapakshin +replies, will perhaps not appear valid to persons of independent +thought; but as most men depend in their reasonings on others, and +are unable to ascertain by themselves the sense of <i>S</i>ruti, +they naturally rely on Sm<i>ri</i>tis, composed by celebrated +authorities, and try to arrive at the sense of <i>S</i>ruti with +their assistance; while, owing to their esteem for the authors of +the Sm<i>ri</i>tis, they have no trust in our explanations. The +knowledge of men like Kapila Sm<i>ri</i>ti declares to have been +<i>ri</i>shi-like and unobstructed, and moreover there is the +following <i>S</i>ruti-passage, 'It is he who, in the beginning, +bears in his thoughts the son, the <i>ri</i>shi, kapila<a id= +"footnotetag257" name="footnotetag257"></a><a href= +"#footnote257"><sup>257</sup></a>, whom he wishes to look on while +he is born' (<i>S</i>ve. Up. V, 2). Hence their opinion cannot be +assumed to be erroneous, and as they moreover strengthen their +position by argumentation, the objection remains valid, and we must +therefore attempt to explain the Vedânta-texts in conformity +with the Sm<i>ri</i>tis.</p> +<p>This objection we dispose of by the remark, 'It is not so +because therefrom would result the fault of want of room for other +Sm<i>ri</i>tis.'—If you object to the doctrine of the Lord +being the cause of the world on the ground that it would render +certain Sm<i>ri</i>tis purposeless, you thereby render purposeless +other Sm<i>ri</i>tis which declare themselves in favour of the said +doctrine. These latter Sm<i>ri</i>ti-texts we will quote in what +follows. In one passage the highest Brahman is introduced as the +subject of discussion, 'That which is subtle and not to be known;' +the text then goes on, 'That is the internal Self of the creatures, +their soul,' and after that remarks 'From that sprang the +Unevolved, consisting of the three gu<i>n</i>as, O best of +brâhma<i>n</i>as.' And in another place it is said that 'the +Unevolved is <span class="pagenum"><a name="page293" id= +"page293"></a>{293}</span> dissolved in the Person devoid of +qualities, O brâhma<i>n</i>a.'—Thus we read also in the +Purâ<i>n</i>a, 'Hear thence this short statement: The ancient +Nârâya<i>n</i>a is all this; he produces the creation +at the due time, and at the time of reabsorption he consumes it +again.' And so in the Bhagavadgîtâ also (VII, 6), 'I am +the origin and the place of reabsorption of the whole world.' And +Âpastamba too says with reference to the highest Self, 'From +him spring all bodies; he is the primary cause, he is eternal, he +is unchangeable' (Dharma Sûtra I, 8, 23, 2). In this way +Sm<i>ri</i>ti, in many places, declares the Lord to be the +efficient as well as the material cause of the world. As the +pûrvapakshin opposes us on the ground of Sm<i>ri</i>ti, we +reply to him on the ground of Sm<i>ri</i>ti only; hence the line of +defence taken up in the Sûtra. Now it has been shown already +that the <i>S</i>ruti-texts aim at conveying the doctrine that the +Lord is the universal cause, and as wherever different +Sm<i>ri</i>tis conflict those maintaining one view must be +accepted, while those which maintain the opposite view must be set +aside, those Sm<i>ri</i>tis which follow <i>S</i>ruti are to be +considered as authoritative, while all others are to be +disregarded; according to the Sûtra met with in the chapter +treating of the means of proof (Mîm. Sûtra I, 3, 3), +'Where there is contradiction (between <i>S</i>ruti and +Sm<i>ri</i>ti) (Sm<i>ri</i>ti) is to be disregarded; in case of +there being no (contradiction) (Sm<i>ri</i>ti is to be recognised) +as there is inference (of Sm<i>ri</i>ti being founded on +<i>S</i>ruti).'—Nor can we assume that some persons are able +to perceive supersensuous matters without <i>S</i>ruti, as there +exists no efficient cause for such perception. Nor, again, can it +be said that such perception may be assumed in the case of Kapila +and others who possessed supernatural powers, and consequently +unobstructed power of cognition. For the possession of supernatural +powers itself depends on the performance of religious duty, and +religious duty is that which is characterised by injunction<a id= +"footnotetag258" name="footnotetag258"></a><a href= +"#footnote258"><sup>258</sup></a>; hence the sense of injunctions +(i.e. of the Veda) <span class="pagenum"><a name="page294" id= +"page294"></a>{294}</span> which is established first must not be +fancifully interpreted in reference to the dicta of men +'established' (i.e. made perfect, and therefore possessing +supernatural powers) afterwards only. Moreover, even if those +'perfect' men were accepted as authorities to be appealed to, +still, as there are many such perfect men, we should have, in all +those cases where the Sm<i>ri</i>tis contradict each other in the +manner described, no other means of final decision than an appeal +to <i>S</i>ruti.—As to men destitute of the power of +independent judgment, we are not justified in assuming that they +will without any reason attach themselves to some particular +Sm<i>ri</i>ti; for if men's inclinations were so altogether +unregulated, truth itself would, owing to the multiformity of human +opinion, become unstable. We must therefore try to lead their +judgment in the right way by pointing out to them the conflict of +the Sm<i>ri</i>tis, and the distinction founded on some of them +following <i>S</i>ruti and others not.—The scriptural passage +which the pûrvapakshin has quoted as proving the eminence of +Kapila's knowledge would not justify us in believing in such +doctrines of Kapila (i.e. of some Kapila) as are contrary to +Scripture; for that passage mentions the bare name of Kapila +(without specifying which Kapila is meant), and we meet in +tradition with another Kapila, viz. the one who burned the sons of +Sagara and had the surname Vâsudeva. That passage, moreover, +serves another purpose, (viz. the establishment of the doctrine of +the highest Self,) and has on that account no force to prove what +is not proved by any other means, (viz. the supereminence of +Kapila's knowledge.) On the other hand, we have a +<i>S</i>ruti-passage which proclaims the excellence of Manu<a id= +"footnotetag259" name="footnotetag259"></a><a href= +"#footnote259"><sup>259</sup></a>, viz. 'Whatever Manu said is +medicine' (Taitt. Sa<i>m</i>h. II, 2, 10, 2). Manu himself, where +he glorifies the seeing of the one Self in everything ('he who +equally sees the Self in all beings and all beings in the Self, he +as a sacrificer to the Self attains self-luminousness,' +<span class="pagenum"><a name="page295" id= +"page295"></a>{295}</span> i.e. becomes Brahman, Manu Sm<i>ri</i>ti +XII, 91), implicitly blames the doctrine of Kapila. For Kapila, by +acknowledging a plurality of Selfs, does not admit the doctrine of +there being one universal Self. In the Mahabhârata also the +question is raised whether there are many persons (souls) or one; +thereupon the opinion of others is mentioned, 'There are many +persons, O King, according to the Sâ@nkhya and Yoga +philosophers;' that opinion is controverted 'just as there is one +place of origin, (viz. the earth,) for many persons, so I will +proclaim to you that universal person raised by his qualities;' +and, finally, it is declared that there is one universal Self, 'He +is the internal Self of me, of thee, and of all other embodied +beings, the internal witness of all, not to be apprehended by any +one. He the all-headed, all-armed, all-footed, all-eyed, all-nosed +one moves through all beings according to his will and liking.' And +Scripture also declares that there is one universal Self, 'When to +a man who understands the Self has become all things, what sorrow, +what trouble can there be to him who once beheld that unity?' +(Î<i>s</i>. Up 7); and other similar passages. All which +proves that the system of Kapila contradicts the Veda, and the +doctrine of Manu who follows the Veda, by its hypothesis of a +plurality of Selfs also, not only by the assumption of an +independent pradhâna. The authoritativeness of the Veda with +regard to the matters stated by it is independent and direct, just +as the light of the sun is the direct means of our knowledge of +form and colour; the authoritativeness of human dicta, on the other +hand, is of an altogether different kind, as it depends on an +extraneous basis (viz. the Veda), and is (not immediate but) +mediated by a chain of teachers and tradition.</p> +<p>Hence the circumstance that the result (of our doctrine) is want +of room for certain Sm<i>ri</i>tis, with regard to matters +contradicted by the Veda, furnishes no valid objection.—An +additional reason for this our opinion is supplied by the following +Sûtra.</p> +<p>2. And on account of the non-perception of the <span class= +"pagenum"><a name="page296" id="page296"></a>{296}</span> others +(i.e. the effects of the pradhâna, according to the +Sâ@nkhya system).</p> +<p>The principles different from the pradhâna, but to be +viewed as its modifications which the (Sâ@nkhya) +Sm<i>ri</i>ti assumes, as, for instance, the great principle, are +perceived neither in the Veda nor in ordinary experience. Now +things of the nature of the elements and the sense organs, which +are well known from the Veda, as well as from experience, may be +referred to in Sm<i>ri</i>ti; but with regard to things which, like +Kapila's great principle, are known neither from the Veda nor from +experience—no more than, for instance, the objects of a sixth +sense—Sm<i>ri</i>ti is altogether impossible. That some +scriptural passages which apparently refer to such things as the +great principle have in reality quite a different meaning has +already been shown under I, 4, 1. But if that part of Sm<i>ri</i>ti +which is concerned with the effects (i.e. the great principle, and +so on) is without authority, the part which refers to the cause +(the pradhâna) will be so likewise. This is what the +Sûtra means to say.—We have thus established a second +reason, proving that the circumstance of there being no room left +for certain Sm<i>ri</i>tis does not constitute a valid objection to +our doctrine.—The weakness of the trust in reasoning +(apparently favouring the Sâ@nkhya doctrine) will be shown +later on under II, 1, 4 ff.</p> +<p>3. Thereby the Yoga (Sm<i>ri</i>ti) is refuted.</p> +<p>This Sûtra extends the application of the preceding +argumentation, and remarks that by the refutation of the +Sâ@nkhya-sm<i>ri</i>ti the Yoga-sm<i>ri</i>ti also is to be +considered as refuted; for the latter also assumes, in opposition +to Scripture, a pradhâna as the independent cause of the +world, and the 'great principle,' &c. as its effects, although +neither the Veda nor common experience favour these +views.—But, if the same reasoning applies to the Yoga also, +the latter system is already disposed of by the previous arguments; +of what use then is it formally to extend them to the Yoga? (as the +Sûtra does.)—We reply that here an additional +<span class="pagenum"><a name="page297" id= +"page297"></a>{297}</span> cause of doubt presents itself, the +practice of Yoga being enjoined in the Veda as a means of obtaining +perfect knowledge; so, for instance, B<i>ri</i>. Up. II, 4, 5, +'(The Self) is to be heard, to be thought, to be meditated +upon<a id="footnotetag260" name="footnotetag260"></a><a href= +"#footnote260"><sup>260</sup></a>.' In the +<i>S</i>vetâ<i>s</i>vatara Upanishad, moreover, we find +various injunctions of Yoga-practice connected with the assumption +of different positions of the body; &c.; so, for instance, +'Holding his body with its three erect parts even,' &c. (II, +8).</p> +<p>Further, we find very many passages in the Veda which (without +expressly enjoining it) point to the Yoga, as, for instance, Ka. +Up. II, 6, 11, 'This, the firm holding back of the senses, is what +is called Yoga;' 'Having received this knowledge and the whole rule +of Yoga' (Ka. Up. II, 6, 18); and so on. And in the +Yoga-<i>s</i>âstra itself the passage, 'Now then Yoga, the +means of the knowledge of truth,' &c. defines the Yoga as a +means of reaching perfect knowledge. As thus one topic of the +<i>s</i>âstra at least (viz. the practice of Yoga) is shown +to be authoritative, the entire Yoga-sm<i>ri</i>ti will have to be +accepted as unobjectionable, just as the Sm<i>ri</i>ti referring to +the ash<i>t</i>akâs<a id="footnotetag261" name= +"footnotetag261"></a><a href= +"#footnote261"><sup>261</sup></a>.—To this we reply that the +formal extension (to the Yoga, of the arguments primarily directed +against the Sâ@nkhya) has the purpose of removing the +additional doubt stated in the above lines; for in spite of a part +of the Yoga-sm<i>ri</i>ti being authoritative, the disagreement +(between Sm<i>ri</i>ti and <i>S</i>ruti) on other topics remains as +shown above.—Although<a id="footnotetag262" name= +"footnotetag262"></a><a href="#footnote262"><sup>262</sup></a> +there are many Sm<i>ri</i>tis treating of the soul, we have singled +out for refutation the Sâ@nkhya and Yoga because they are +widely known as offering the means for accomplishing the highest +<span class="pagenum"><a name="page298" id= +"page298"></a>{298}</span> end of man and have found favour with +many competent persons. Moreover, their position is strengthened by +a Vedic passage referring to them, 'He who has known that cause +which is to be apprehended by Sâ@nkhya and Yoga he is freed +from all fetters' (<i>S</i>ve. Up. VI, 13). (The claims which on +the ground of this last passage might be set up for the +Sâ@nkhya and Yoga-sm<i>ri</i>tis in their entirety) we refute +by the remark that the highest beatitude (the highest aim of man) +is not to be attained by the knowledge of the +Sâ@nkhya-sm<i>ri</i>ti irrespective of the Veda, nor by the +road of Yoga-practice. For Scripture itself declares that there is +no other means of obtaining the highest beatitude but the knowledge +of the unity of the Self which is conveyed by the Veda, 'Over death +passes only the man who knows him; there is no other path to go' +(<i>S</i>ve. Up. III, 8). And the Sâ@nkhya and Yoga-systems +maintain duality, do not discern the unity of the Self. In the +passage quoted ('That cause which is to be apprehended by +Sâ@nkhya and Yoga') the terms 'Sâ@nkhya' and 'Yoga' +denote Vedic knowledge and meditation, as we infer from +proximity<a id="footnotetag263" name="footnotetag263"></a><a href= +"#footnote263"><sup>263</sup></a>. We willingly allow room for +those portions of the two systems which do not contradict the Veda. +In their description of the soul, for instance, as free from all +qualities the Sâ@nkhyas are in harmony with the Veda which +teaches that the person (purusha) is essentially pure; cp. +B<i>ri</i>. Up. IV, 3, 16. 'For that person is not attached to +anything.' The Yoga again in giving rules for the condition of the +wandering religious mendicant admits that state of retirement from +the concerns of life which is known from scriptural passages such +as the following one, 'Then the parivrâjaka with discoloured +(yellow) dress, shaven, without any possessions,' &c. +(Jâbâla Upan. IV).</p> +<p>The above remarks will serve as a reply to the claims of all +argumentative Sm<i>ri</i>tis. If it be said that those +Sm<i>ri</i>tis also assist, by argumentation and proof, the +cognition of truth, we do not object to so much, but we maintain +<span class="pagenum"><a name="page299" id= +"page299"></a>{299}</span> all the same that the truth can be known +from the Vedânta-texts only; as is stated by scriptural +passages such as 'None who does not know the Veda perceives that +great one' (Taitt. Br. III, 12, 9, 7); 'I now ask thee that person +taught in the Upanishads' (B<i>ri</i>. Up, III, 9, 26); and +others.</p> +<p>4. (Brahman can) not (be the cause of the world) on account of +the difference of character of that, (viz. the world); and its +being such, (i.e. different from Brahman) (we learn) from +Scripture.</p> +<p>The objections, founded on Sm<i>ri</i>ti, against the doctrine +of Brahman being the efficient and the material cause of this world +have been refuted; we now proceed to refute those founded on +Reasoning.—But (to raise an objection at the outset) how is +there room for objections founded on Reasoning after the sense of +the sacred texts has once been settled? The sacred texts are +certainly to be considered absolutely authoritative with regard to +Brahman as well as with regard to religious duty +(dharma).—(To this the pûrvapakshin replies), The +analogy between Brahman and dharma would hold good if the matter in +hand were to be known through the holy texts only, and could not be +approached by the other means of right knowledge also. In the case +of religious duties, i.e. things to be done, we indeed entirely +depend on Scripture. But now we are concerned with Brahman which is +an accomplished existing thing, and in the case of accomplished +things there is room for other means of right knowledge also, as, +for instance, the case of earth and the other elements shows. And +just as in the case of several conflicting scriptural passages we +explain all of them in such a manner as to make them accord with +one, so <i>S</i>ruti, if in conflict with other means of right +knowledge, has to be bent so as to accord with the letter. +Moreover, Reasoning, which enables us to infer something not +actually perceived in consequence of its having a certain equality +of attributes with what is actually perceived, stands nearer to +perception than <i>S</i>ruti which conveys its sense by tradition +merely. And the knowledge <span class="pagenum"><a name="page300" +id="page300"></a>{300}</span> of Brahman which discards Nescience +and effects final release terminates in a perception (viz. the +intuition—sâkshâtkâra—of Brahman), +and as such must be assumed to have a seen result (not an unseen +one like dharma)<a id="footnotetag264" name= +"footnotetag264"></a><a href="#footnote264"><sup>264</sup></a>. +Moreover, the scriptural passage, 'He is to be heard, to be +thought,' enjoins thought in addition to hearing, and thereby shows +that Reasoning also is to be resorted to with regard to Brahman. +Hence an objection founded on Reasoning is set forth, 'Not so, on +account of the difference of nature of this (effect).'—The +Vedântic opinion that the intelligent Brahman is the material +cause of this world is untenable because the effect would in that +case be of an altogether different character from the cause. For +this world, which the Vedântin considers as the effect of +Brahman, is perceived to be non-intelligent and impure, +consequently different in character from Brahman; and Brahman again +is declared by the sacred texts to be of a character different from +the world, viz. intelligent and pure. But things of an altogether +different character cannot stand to each other in the relation of +material cause and effect. Such effects, for instance, as golden +ornaments do not have earth for their material cause, nor is +<span class="pagenum"><a name="page301" id= +"page301"></a>{301}</span> gold the material cause of earthen +vessels; but effects of an earthy nature originate from earth and +effects of the nature of gold from gold. In the same manner this +world, which is non-intelligent and comprises pleasure, pain, and +dulness, can only be the effect of a cause itself non-intelligent +and made up of pleasure, pain, and dulness; but not of Brahman +which is of an altogether different character. The difference in +character of this world from Brahman must be understood to be due +to its impurity and its want of intelligence. It is impure because +being itself made up of pleasure, pain, and dulness, it is the +cause of delight, grief, despondency, &c., and because it +comprises in itself abodes of various character such as heaven, +hell, and so on. It is devoid of intelligence because it is +observed to stand to the intelligent principle in the relation of +subserviency, being the instrument of its activity. For the +relation of subserviency of one thing to another is not possible on +the basis of equality; two lamps, for instance, cannot be said to +be subservient to each other (both being equally +luminous).—But, it will be said, an intelligent instrument +also might be subservient to the enjoying soul; just as an +intelligent servant is subservient to his master.—This +analogy, we reply, does not hold good, because in the case of +servant and master also only the non-intelligent element in the +former is subservient to the intelligent master. For a being +endowed with intelligence subserves another intelligent being only +with the non-intelligent part belonging to it, viz. its internal +organ, sense organs, &c.; while in so far as it is intelligent +itself it acts neither for nor against any other being. For the +Sâ@nkhyas are of opinion that the intelligent beings (i.e. +the souls) are incapable of either taking in or giving out +anything<a id="footnotetag265" name="footnotetag265"></a><a href= +"#footnote265"><sup>265</sup></a>, and are non-active. Hence that +only which is devoid of intelligence can be an instrument. +Nor<a id="footnotetag266" name="footnotetag266"></a><a href= +"#footnote266"><sup>266</sup></a> is there anything <span class= +"pagenum"><a name="page302" id="page302"></a>{302}</span> to show +that things like pieces of wood and clods of earth are of an +intelligent nature; on the contrary, the dichotomy of all things +which exist into such as are intelligent and such as are +non-intelligent is well established. This world therefore cannot +have its material cause in Brahman from which it is altogether +different in character.—Here somebody might argue as follows. +Scripture tells us that this world has originated from an +intelligent cause; therefore, starting from the observation that +the attributes of the cause survive in the effect, I assume this +whole world to be intelligent. The absence of manifestation of +intelligence (in this world) is to be ascribed to the particular +nature of the modification<a id="footnotetag267" name= +"footnotetag267"></a><a href="#footnote267"><sup>267</sup></a>. +Just as undoubtedly intelligent beings do not manifest their +intelligence in certain states such as sleep, swoon, &c., so +the intelligence of wood and earth also is not manifest (although +it exists). In consequence of this difference produced by the +manifestation and non-manifestation of intelligence (in the case of +men, animals, &c., on the one side, and wood, stones, &c. +on the other side), and in consequence of form, colour, and the +like being present in the one case and absent in the other, nothing +prevents the instruments of action (earth, wood, &c.) from +standing to the souls in the relation of a subordinate to a +superior thing, although in reality both are equally of an +intelligent nature. And just as such substances as flesh, broth, +pap, and the like may, owing to their individual differences, stand +in the relation of mutual subserviency, although fundamentally they +are all of the same nature, viz. mere modifications of earth, so it +will be in the case under discussion also, without there being done +any violence to the well-known distinction (of beings intelligent +and non-intelligent).—This reasoning—the +pûrvapakshin replies—if valid might remove to a certain +extent that difference of character between <span class= +"pagenum"><a name="page303" id="page303"></a>{303}</span> Brahman +and the world which is due to the circumstance of the one being +intelligent and the other non-intelligent; there would, however, +still remain that other difference which results from the fact that +the one is pure and the other impure. But in reality the +argumentation of the objector does not even remove the first-named +difference; as is declared in the latter part of the Sûtra, +'And its being such we learn from Scripture.' For the assumption of +the intellectuality of the entire world—which is supported +neither by perception nor by inference, &c.—must be +considered as resting on Scripture only in so far as the latter +speaks of the world as having originated from an intelligent cause; +but that scriptural statement itself is contradicted by other texts +which declare the world to be 'of such a nature,' i.e. of a nature +different from that of its material cause. For the scriptural +passage, 'It became that which is knowledge and that which is +devoid of knowledge' (Taitt. Up. II, 6), which teaches that a +certain class of beings is of a non-intelligent nature intimates +thereby that the non-intelligent world is different from the +intelligent Brahman.—But—somebody might again +object—the sacred texts themselves sometimes speak of the +elements and the bodily organs, which are generally considered to +be devoid of intelligence, as intelligent beings. The following +passages, for instance, attribute intelligence to the elements. +'The earth spoke;' 'The waters spoke' (<i>S</i>at. Br. VI, 1, 3, 2; +4); and, again, 'Fire thought;' 'Water thought' (Ch. Up. VI, 2, 3; +4). Other texts attribute intelligence to the bodily organs, 'These +prâ<i>n</i>as when quarrelling together as to who was the +best went to Brahman' (B<i>ri</i>. Up. VI, 1, 7); and, again, 'They +said to Speech: Do thou sing out for us' (B<i>ri</i>. Up. I, 3, +2).—To this objection the pûrvapakshin replies in the +following Sûtra.</p> +<p>5. But (there takes place) denotation of the superintending +(deities), on account of the difference and the connexion.</p> +<p>The word 'but' discards the doubt raised. We are <span class= +"pagenum"><a name="page304" id="page304"></a>{304}</span> not +entitled to base the assumption of the elements and the sense +organs being of an intellectual nature on such passages as 'the +earth spoke,' &c. because 'there takes place denotation of that +which presides.' In the case of actions like speaking, disputing, +and so on, which require intelligence, the scriptural passages +denote not the mere material elements and organs, but rather the +intelligent divinities which preside over earth, &c., on the +one hand, and Speech, &c., on the other hand. And why so? 'On +account of the difference and the connexion.' The difference is the +one previously referred to between the enjoying souls, on the one +hand, and the material elements and organs, on the other hand, +which is founded on the distinction between intelligent and +non-intelligent beings; that difference would not be possible if +all beings were intelligent. Moreover, the Kaushîtakins in +their account of the dispute of the prâ<i>n</i>as make +express use of the word 'divinities' in order to preclude the idea +of the mere material organs being meant, and in order to include +the superintending intelligent beings. They say, 'The deities +contending with each for who was the best;' and, again, 'All these +deities having recognised the pre-eminence in prâ<i>n</i>a' +(Kau. Up. II, 14).—And, secondly, Mantras, Arthavâdas, +Itihâsas, Purâ<i>n</i>as, &c. all declare that +intelligent presiding divinities are connected with everything. +Moreover, such scriptural passages as 'Agni having become Speech +entered into the mouth' (Ait. Âr. II, 4, 2, 4) show that each +bodily organ is connected with its own favouring divinity. And in +the passages supplementary to the quarrel of the +prâ<i>n</i>as we read in one place how, for the purpose of +settling their relative excellence, they went to Prajâpati, +and how they settled their quarrel on the ground of presence and +absence, each of them, as Prajâpati had advised, departing +from the body for some time ('They went to their father +Prajâpati and said,' &c,; Ch. Up. V, 1, 7); and in +another place it is said that they made an offering to +prâ<i>n</i>a (B<i>ri</i>. Up. VI, 1, 13), &c.; all of +them proceedings which are analogous to those of men, &c., and +therefore strengthen the hypothesis that the text refers to the +superintending <span class="pagenum"><a name="page305" id= +"page305"></a>{305}</span> deities. In the case of such passages +as, 'Fire thought,' we must assume that the thought spoken of is +that of the highest deity which is connected with its effects as a +superintending principle.—From all this it follows that this +world is different in nature from Brahman, and hence cannot have it +for its material cause.</p> +<p>To this objection raised by the pûrvapakshin the next +Sûtra replies.</p> +<p>6. But it is seen.</p> +<p>The word 'but' discards the pûrvapaksha.</p> +<p>Your assertion that this world cannot have originated from +Brahman on account of the difference of its character is not +founded on an absolutely true tenet. For we see that from man, who +is acknowledged to be intelligent, non-intelligent things such as +hair and nails originate, and that, on the other hand, from +avowedly non-intelligent matter, such as cow-dung, scorpions and +similar animals are produced.—But—to state an +objection—the real cause of the non-intelligent hair and +nails is the human body which is itself non-intelligent, and the +non-intelligent bodies only of scorpions are the effects of +non-intelligent dung.—Even thus, we reply, there remains a +difference in character (between the cause, for instance, the dung, +and the effect, for instance, the body of the scorpion), in so far +as some non-intelligent matter (the body) is the abode of an +intelligent principle (the scorpion's soul), while other +non-intelligent matter (the dung) is not. Moreover, the difference +of nature—due to the cause passing over into the +effect—between the bodies of men on the one side and hair and +nails on the other side, is, on account of the divergence of +colour, form, &c., very considerable after all. The same remark +holds good with regard to cow-dung and the bodies of scorpions, +&c. If absolute equality were insisted on (in the case of one +thing being the effect of another), the relation of material cause +and effect (which after all requires a distinction of the two) +would be annihilated. If, again, it be remarked that in the case of +men and hair as well as in that of scorpions and <span class= +"pagenum"><a name="page306" id="page306"></a>{306}</span> cow-dung +there is one characteristic feature, at least, which is found in +the effect as well as in the cause, viz. the quality of being of an +earthy nature; we reply that in the case of Brahman and the world +also one characteristic feature, viz. that of existence +(sattâ), is found in ether, &c. (which are the effects) +as well as in Brahman (which is the cause).—He, moreover, who +on the ground of the difference of the attributes tries to +invalidate the doctrine of Brahman being the cause of the world, +must assert that he understands by difference of attributes either +the non-occurrence (in the world) of the entire complex of the +characteristics of Brahman, or the non-occurrence of any (some or +other) characteristic, or the non-occurrence of the characteristic +of intelligence. The first assertion would lead to the negation of +the relation of cause and effect in general, which relation is +based on the fact of there being in the effect something over and +above the cause (for if the two were absolutely identical they +could not be distinguished). The second assertion is open to the +charge of running counter to what is well known; for, as we have +already remarked, the characteristic quality of existence which +belongs to Brahman is found likewise in ether and so on. For the +third assertion the requisite proving instances are wanting; for +what instances could be brought forward against the upholder of +Brahman, in order to prove the general assertion that whatever is +devoid of intelligence is seen not to be an effect of Brahman? (The +upholder of Brahman would simply not admit any such instances) +because he maintains that this entire complex of things has Brahman +for its material cause. And that all such assertions are contrary +to Scripture, is clear, as we have already shown it to be the +purport of Scripture that Brahman is the cause and substance of the +world. It has indeed been maintained by the pûrvapakshin that +the other means of proof also (and not merely sacred tradition) +apply to Brahman, on account of its being an accomplished entity +(not something to be accomplished as religious duties are); but +such an assertion is entirely gratuitous. For Brahman, as being +devoid of form and so on, cannot become an object of <span class= +"pagenum"><a name="page307" id="page307"></a>{307}</span> +perception; and as there are in its case no characteristic marks +(on which conclusions, &c. might be based), inference also and +the other means of proof do not apply to it; but, like religious +duty, it is to be known solely on the ground of holy tradition. +Thus Scripture also declares, 'That doctrine is not to be obtained +by argument, but when it is declared by another then, O dearest! it +is easy to understand' (Ka. Up. I, 2, 9). And again, 'Who in truth +knows it? Who could here proclaim it, whence this creation sprang?' +(<i>Ri</i>g-v. Sa<i>m</i>h. X, 129, 6). These two mantras show that +the cause of this world is not to be known even by divine beings +(î<i>s</i>vara)<a id="footnotetag268" name= +"footnotetag268"></a><a href="#footnote268"><sup>268</sup></a> of +extraordinary power and wisdom.</p> +<p>There are also the following Sm<i>ri</i>ti passages to the same +effect: 'Do not apply reasoning to those things which are +uncognisable<a id="footnotetag269" name= +"footnotetag269"></a><a href="#footnote269"><sup>269</sup></a>;' +'Unevolved he is called, uncognisable, unchangeable;' 'Not the +legions of the gods know my origin, not the great <i>ri</i>shis. +For I myself am in every way the origin of the gods and great +<i>ri</i>shis' (Bha. Gî. X, 2).—And if it has been +maintained above that the scriptural passage enjoining thought (on +Brahman) in addition to mere hearing (of the sacred texts treating +of Brahman) shows that reasoning also is to be allowed its place, +we reply that the passage must not deceitfully be taken as +enjoining bare independent ratiocination, but must be understood to +represent reasoning as a subordinate auxiliary of intuitional +knowledge. By reasoning of the latter type we may, for instance, +arrive at the following conclusions; that because the state of +dream and the waking state exclude each other the Self is not +connected with those states; that, as the soul in the state of deep +sleep leaves the phenomenal world behind and becomes one with that +whose Self is pure Being, it has for its Self pure Being apart from +the phenomenal world; that as the world springs from Brahman it +cannot be separate from Brahman, <span class="pagenum"><a name= +"page308" id="page308"></a>{308}</span> according to the principle +of the non-difference of cause and effect, &c.<a id= +"footnotetag270" name="footnotetag270"></a><a href= +"#footnote270"><sup>270</sup></a> The fallaciousness of mere +reasoning will moreover be demonstrated later on (II, 1, +11).—He<a id="footnotetag271" name= +"footnotetag271"></a><a href="#footnote271"><sup>271</sup></a>, +moreover, who merely on the ground of the sacred tradition about an +intelligent cause of the world would assume this entire world to be +of an intellectual nature would find room for the other scriptural +passage quoted above ('He became knowledge and what is devoid of +knowledge') which teaches a distinction of intellect and +non-intellect; for he could avail himself of the doctrine of +intellect being sometimes manifested and sometimes non-manifested. +His antagonist, on the other hand (i.e. the Sâ@nkhya), would +not be able to make anything of the passage, for it distinctly +teaches that the highest cause constitutes the Self of the entire +world.</p> +<p>If, then, on account of difference of character that which is +intelligent cannot pass over into what is non-intelligent, that +also which is non-intelligent (i.e. in our case, the +non-intelligent pradhâna of the Sâ@nkhyas) cannot pass +over into what is intelligent.—(So much for argument's sake,) +but apart from that, as the argument resting on difference of +character has already been refuted, we must assume an intelligent +cause of the world in agreement with Scripture.</p> +<span class="pagenum"><a name="page309" id= +"page309"></a>{309}</span> +<p>7. If (it is said that the effect is) non-existent (before its +origination); we do not allow that because it is a mere negation +(without an object).</p> +<p>If Brahman, which is intelligent, pure, and devoid of qualities +such as sound, and so on, is supposed to be the cause of an effect +which is of an opposite nature, i.e. non-intelligent, impure, +possessing the qualities of sound, &c., it follows that the +effect has to be considered as non-existing before its actual +origination. But this consequence cannot be acceptable to +you—the Vedântin—who maintain the doctrine of the +effect existing in the cause already.</p> +<p>This objection of yours, we reply, is without any force, on +account of its being a mere negation. If you negative the existence +of the effect previous to its actual origination, your negation is +a mere negation without an object to be negatived. The negation +(implied in 'non-existent') can certainly not have for its object +the existence of the effect previous to its origination, since the +effect must be viewed as 'existent,' through and in the Self of the +cause, before its origination as well as after it; for at the +present moment also this effect does not exist independently, apart +from the cause; according to such scriptural passages as, +'Whosoever looks for anything elsewhere than in the Self is +abandoned by everything' (B<i>ri</i>. Up. II, 4, 6). In so far, on +the other hand, as the effect exists through the Self of the cause, +its existence is the same before the actual beginning of the effect +(as after it).—But Brahman, which is devoid of qualities such +as sound, &c., is the cause of this world (possessing all those +qualities)!—True, but the effect with all its qualities does +not exist without the Self of the cause either now or before the +actual beginning (of the effect); hence it cannot be said that +(according to our doctrine) the effect is non-existing before its +actual beginning.—This point will be elucidated in detail in +the section treating of the non-difference of cause and effect.</p> +<p>8. On account of such consequences at the time <span class= +"pagenum"><a name="page310" id="page310"></a>{310}</span> of +reabsorption (the doctrine maintained hitherto) is +objectionable.</p> +<p>The pûrvapakshin raises further objections.—If an +effect which is distinguished by the qualities of grossness, +consisting of parts, absence of intelligence, limitation, impurity, +&c., is admitted to have Brahman for its cause, it follows that +at the time of reabsorption (of the world into Brahman), the +effect, by entering into the state of non-division from its cause, +inquinates the latter with its properties. As therefore—on +your doctrine—the cause (i.e. Brahman) as well as the effect +is, at the time of reabsorption, characterised by impurity and +similar qualities, the doctrine of the Upanishads, according to +which an omniscient Brahman is the cause of the world, cannot be +upheld.—Another objection to that doctrine is that in +consequence of all distinctions passing at the time of reabsorption +into the state of non-distinction there would be no special causes +left at the time of a new beginning of the world, and consequently +the new world could not arise with all the distinctions of enjoying +souls, objects to be enjoyed and so on (which are actually observed +to exist).—A third objection is that, if we assume the origin +of a new world even after the annihilation of all works, &c. +(which are the causes of a new world arising) of the enjoying souls +which enter into the state of non-difference from the highest +Brahman, we are led to the conclusion that also those (souls) which +have obtained final release again appear in the new world.—If +you finally say, 'Well, let this world remain distinct from the +highest Brahman even at the time of reabsorption,' we reply that in +that case a reabsorption will not take place at all, and that, +moreover, the effect's existing separate from the cause is not +possible.—For all these reasons the Vedânta doctrine is +objectionable.</p> +<p>To this the next Sûtra replies.</p> +<p>9. Not so; as there are parallel instances.</p> +<p>There is nothing objectionable in our system.—The +objection that the effect when being reabsorbed into its +<span class="pagenum"><a name="page311" id= +"page311"></a>{311}</span> cause would inquinate the latter with +its qualities does not damage our position 'because there are +parallel instances,' i.e. because there are instances of effects +not inquinating with their qualities the causes into which they are +reabsorbed. Things, for instance, made of clay, such as pots, +&c., which in their state of separate existence are of various +descriptions, do not, when they are reabsorbed into their original +matter (i.e. clay), impart to the latter their individual +qualities; nor do golden ornaments impart their individual +qualities to their elementary material, i.e. gold, into which they +may finally be reabsorbed. Nor does the fourfold complex of organic +beings which springs from earth impart its qualities to the latter +at the time of reabsorption. You (i.e. the pûrvapakshin), on +the other hand, have not any instances to quote in your favour. For +reabsorption could not take place at all if the effect when passing +back into its causal substance continued to subsist there with all +its individual properties. And<a id="footnotetag272" name= +"footnotetag272"></a><a href="#footnote272"><sup>272</sup></a> that +in spite of the non-difference of cause and effect the effect has +its Self in the cause, but not the cause in the effect, is a point +which we shall render clear later on, under II, 1, 14.</p> +<p>Moreover, the objection that the effect would impart its +qualities to the cause at the time of reabsorption is formulated +too narrowly because, the identity of cause and effect being +admitted, the same would take place during the time of the +subsistence (of the effect, previous to its reabsorption). That the +identity of cause and effect (of Brahman and the world) holds good +indiscriminately with regard to all time (not only the time of +reabsorption), is declared in many scriptural passages, as, for +instance, 'This everything is that Self' (B<i>ri</i>. Up. II, 4, +6); 'The Self is all this' (Ch. Up. VII, 25, 2); 'The immortal +Brahman is this before' (Mu. Up. II, 2, 11); 'All this is Brahman' +(Ch. Up. III, 14, 1).</p> +<p>With regard to the case referred to in the <i>S</i>ruti-passages +we refute the assertion of the cause being affected by the +<span class="pagenum"><a name="page312" id= +"page312"></a>{312}</span> effect and its qualities by showing that +the latter are the mere fallacious superimpositions of nescience, +and the very same argument holds good with reference to +reabsorption also.—We can quote other examples in favour of +our doctrine. As the magician is not at any time affected by the +magical illusion produced by himself, because it is unreal, so the +highest Self is not affected by the world-illusion. And as one +dreaming person is not affected by the illusory visions of his +dream because they do not accompany the waking state and the state +of dreamless sleep; so the one permanent witness of the three +states (viz. the highest Self which is the one unchanging witness +of the creation, subsistence, and reabsorption of the world) is not +touched by the mutually exclusive three states. For that the +highest Self appears in those three states, is a mere illusion, not +more substantial than the snake for which the rope is mistaken in +the twilight. With reference to this point teachers knowing the +true tradition of the Vedânta have made the following +declaration, 'When the individual soul which is held in the bonds +of slumber by the beginningless Mâyâ awakes, then it +knows the eternal, sleepless, dreamless non-duality' +(Gau<i>d</i>ap. Kâr. I, 16).</p> +<p>So far we have shown that—on our doctrine—there is +no danger of the cause being affected at the time of reabsorption +by the qualities of the effect, such as grossness and the +like.—With regard to the second objection, viz. that if we +assume all distinctions to pass (at the time of reabsorption) into +the state of non-distinction there would be no special reason for +the origin of a new world affected with distinctions, we likewise +refer to the 'existence of parallel instances.' For the case is +parallel to that of deep sleep and trance. In those states also the +soul enters into an essential condition of non-distinction; +nevertheless, wrong knowledge being not yet finally overcome, the +old state of distinction re-establishes itself as soon as the soul +awakes from its sleep or trance. Compare the scriptural passage, +'All these creatures when they have become merged in the True, know +not that they are merged in the True. Whatever these creatures are +here, whether a lion, or a <span class="pagenum"><a name="page313" +id="page313"></a>{313}</span> wolf, or a boar, or a worm, or a +midge, or a gnat, or a mosquito, that they become again' (Ch. Up. +VI, 9, 2; 3) For just as during the subsistence of the world the +phenomenon of multifarious distinct existence, based on wrong +knowledge, proceeds unimpeded like the vision of a dream, although +there is only one highest Self devoid of all distinction; so, we +conclude, there remains, even after reabsorption, the power of +distinction (potential distinction) founded on wrong +knowledge.—Herewith the objection that—according to our +doctrine—even the finally released souls would be born again +is already disposed of. They will not be born again because in +their case wrong knowledge has been entirely discarded by perfect +knowledge.—The last alternative finally (which the +pûrvapakshin had represented as open to the Vedântin), +viz. that even at the time of reabsorption the world should remain +distinct from Brahman, precludes itself because it is not admitted +by the Vedântins themselves.—Hence the system founded +on the Upanishads is in every way unobjectionable.</p> +<p>10. And because the objections (raised by the Sâ@nkhya +against the Vedânta doctrine) apply to his view also.</p> +<p>The doctrine of our opponent is liable to the very same +objections which he urges against us, viz. in the following +manner.—The objection that this world cannot have sprung from +Brahman on account of its difference of character applies no less +to the doctrine of the pradhâna being the cause of the world; +for that doctrine also assumes that from a pradhâna devoid of +sound and other qualities a world is produced which possesses those +very qualities. The beginning of an effect different in character +being thus admitted, the Sâ@nkhya is equally driven to the +doctrine that before the actual beginning the effect was +non-existent. And, moreover, it being admitted (by the +Sâ@nkhya also) that at the time of reabsorption the effect +passes back into the state of non-distinction from the cause, the +case of the Sâ@nkhya here also is the same as +ours.—And, further, if <span class="pagenum"><a name= +"page314" id="page314"></a>{314}</span> (as the Sâ@nkhya also +must admit) at the time of reabsorption the differences of all the +special effects are obliterated and pass into a state of general +non-distinction, the special fixed conditions, which previous to +reabsorption were the causes of the different worldly existence of +each soul, can, at the time of a new creation, no longer be +determined, there being no cause for them; and if you assume them +to be determined without a cause, you are driven to the admission +that even the released souls have to re-enter a state of bondage, +there being equal absence of a cause (in the case of the released +and the non-released souls). And if you try to avoid this +conclusion by assuming that at the time of reabsorption some +individual differences pass into the state of non-distinction, +others not, we reply that in that case the latter could not be +considered as effects of the pradhâna<a id="footnotetag273" +name="footnotetag273"></a><a href= +"#footnote273"><sup>273</sup></a>.—It thus appears that all +those difficulties (raised by the Sâ@nkhya) apply to both +views, and cannot therefore be urged against either only. But as +either of the two doctrines must necessarily be accepted, we are +strengthened—by the outcome of the above discussion—in +the opinion that the alleged difficulties are no real +difficulties<a id="footnotetag274" name= +"footnotetag274"></a><a href="#footnote274"><sup>274</sup></a>.</p> +<p>11. If it be said that, in consequence of the ill-foundedness of +reasoning, we must frame our conclusions otherwise; (we reply that) +thus also there would result non-release.</p> +<p>In matters to be known from Scripture mere reasoning is not to +be relied on for the following reason also. As the thoughts of man +are altogether unfettered, reasoning which disregards the holy +texts and rests on individual opinion only has no proper +foundation. We see how arguments, which some clever men had +excogitated with great pains, are shown, by people still more +ingenious, to be fallacious, and how the arguments of the latter +again are refuted in their turn <span class="pagenum"><a name= +"page315" id="page315"></a>{315}</span> by other men; so that, on +account of the diversity of men's opinions, it is impossible to +accept mere reasoning as having a sure foundation. Nor can we get +over this difficulty by accepting as well-founded the reasoning of +some person of recognised mental eminence, may he now be Kapila or +anybody else; since we observe that even men of the most undoubted +mental eminence, such as Kapila, Ka<i>n</i>âda, and other +founders of philosophical schools, have contradicted one +another.</p> +<p>But (our adversary may here be supposed to say), we will fashion +our reasoning otherwise, i.e. in such a manner as not to lay it +open to the charge of having no proper foundation. You cannot, +after all, maintain that no reasoning whatever is well-founded; for +you yourself can found your assertion that reasoning has no +foundation on reasoning only; your assumption being that because +some arguments are seen to be devoid of foundation other arguments +as belonging to the same class are likewise devoid of foundation. +Moreover, if all reasoning were unfounded, the whole course of +practical human life would have to come to an end. For we see that +men act, with a view to obtaining pleasure and avoiding pain in the +future time, on the assumption that the past, the present, and the +future are uniform.—Further, in the case of passages of +Scripture (apparently) contradicting each other, the ascertainment +of the real sense, which depends on a preliminary refutation of the +apparent sense, can be effected only by an accurate definition of +the meaning of sentences, and that involves a process of reasoning. +Thus Manu also expresses himself: 'Perception, inference, and the +<i>s</i>âstra according to the various traditions, this triad +is to be known well by one desiring clearness in regard to +right.—He who applies reasoning not contradicted by the Veda +to the Veda and the (Sm<i>ri</i>ti) doctrine of law, he, and no +other, knows the law' (Manu Sm<i>ri</i>ti XII, 105, 106). And that +'want of foundation', to which you object, really constitutes the +beauty of reasoning, because it enables us to arrive at +unobjectionable arguments by means of the previous refutation of +objectionable arguments<a id="footnotetag275" name= +"footnotetag275"></a><a href="#footnote275"><sup>275</sup></a>. (No +fear that because the <span class="pagenum"><a name="page316" id= +"page316"></a>{316}</span> pûrvapaksha is ill-founded the +siddhânta should be ill-founded too;) for there is no valid +reason to maintain that a man must be stupid because his elder +brother was stupid.—For all these reasons the want of +foundation cannot be used as an argument against reasoning.</p> +<p>Against this argumentation we remark that thus also there +results 'want of release.' For although with regard to some things +reasoning is observed to be well founded, with regard to the matter +in hand there will result 'want of release,' viz. of the reasoning +from this very fault of ill-foundedness. The true nature of the +cause of the world on which final emancipation depends cannot, on +account of its excessive abstruseness, even be thought of without +the help of the holy texts; for, as already remarked, it cannot +become the object of perception, because it does not possess +qualities such as form and the like, and as it is devoid of +characteristic signs, it does not lend itself to inference and the +other means of right knowledge.—Or else (if we adopt another +explanation of the word 'avimoksha') all those who teach the final +release of the soul are agreed that it results from perfect +knowledge. Perfect knowledge has the characteristic mark of +uniformity, because it depends on accomplished actually existing +things; for whatever thing is permanently of one and the same +nature is acknowledged to be a true or real thing, and knowledge +conversant about such is called perfect knowledge; as, for +instance, the knowledge embodied in the proposition, 'fire is hot.' +Now, it is clear that in the case of perfect knowledge a mutual +conflict of men's opinions is impossible. But that cognitions +founded on reasoning do conflict is generally known; for we +continually observe that what one logician endeavours to establish +as perfect knowledge is demolished by another, who, in his turn, is +treated alike by a third. How therefore can knowledge, which is +founded on reasoning, and whose object is not something permanently +uniform, be perfect knowledge?—Nor can it be said that he who +maintains the <span class="pagenum"><a name="page317" id= +"page317"></a>{317}</span> pradhâna to be the cause of the +world (i.e. the Sâ@nkhya) is the best of all reasoners, and +accepted as such by all philosophers; which would enable us to +accept his opinion as perfect knowledge.—Nor can we collect +at a given moment and on a given spot all the logicians of the +past, present, and future time, so as to settle (by their +agreement) that their opinion regarding some uniform object is to +be considered perfect knowledge. The Veda, on the other hand, which +is eternal and the source of knowledge, may be allowed to have for +its object firmly established things, and hence the perfection of +that knowledge which is founded on the Veda cannot be denied by any +of the logicians of the past, present, or future. We have thus +established the perfection of this our knowledge which reposes on +the Upanishads, and as apart from it perfect knowledge is +impossible, its disregard would lead to 'absence of final release' +of the transmigrating souls. Our final position therefore is, that +on the ground of Scripture and of reasoning subordinate to +Scripture, the intelligent Brahman is to be considered the cause +and substance of the world.</p> +<p>12. Thereby those (theories) also which are not accepted by +competent persons are explained.</p> +<p>Hitherto we have refuted those objections against the +Vedânta-texts which, based on reasoning, take their stand on +the doctrine of the pradhâna being the cause of the world; +(which doctrine deserves to be refuted first), because it stands +near to our Vedic system, is supported by somewhat weighty +arguments, and has, to a certain extent, been adopted by some +authorities who follow the Veda.—But now some dull-witted +persons might think that another objection founded on reasoning +might be raised against the Vedânta, viz. on the ground of +the atomic doctrine. The Sûtrakâra, therefore, extends +to the latter objection the refutation of the former, considering +that by the conquest of the most dangerous adversary the conquest +of the minor enemies is already virtually accomplished. Other +doctrines, as, for instance, the atomic doctrine of which no part +has been accepted by <span class="pagenum"><a name="page318" id= +"page318"></a>{318}</span> either Manu or Vyâsa or other +authorities, are to be considered as 'explained,' i.e. refuted by +the same reasons which enabled us to dispose of the pradhâna +doctrine. As the reasons on which the refutation hinges are the +same, there is no room for further doubt. Such common arguments are +the impotence of reasoning to fathom the depth of the +transcendental cause of the world, the ill-foundedness of mere +Reasoning, the impossibility of final release, even in case of the +conclusions being shaped 'otherwise' (see the preceding +Sûtra), the conflict of Scripture and Reasoning, and so +on.</p> +<p>13. If it be said that from the circumstance of (the objects of +enjoyment) passing over into the enjoyer (and vice versâ) +there would result non-distinction (of the two); we reply that +(such distinction) may exist (nevertheless), as ordinary experience +shows.</p> +<p>Another objection, based on reasoning, is raised against the +doctrine of Brahman being the cause of the world.—Although +Scripture is authoritative with regard to its own special +subject-matter (as, for instance, the causality of Brahman), still +it may have to be taken in a secondary sense in those cases where +the subject-matter is taken out of its grasp by other means of +right knowledge; just as mantras and arthavâdas have +occasionally to be explained in a secondary sense (when the +primary, literal sense is rendered impossible by other means of +right knowledge<a id="footnotetag276" name= +"footnotetag276"></a><a href="#footnote276"><sup>276</sup></a>). +Analogously reasoning is to be considered invalid outside its +legitimate sphere; so, for instance, in the case of religious duty +and its opposite<a id="footnotetag277" name= +"footnotetag277"></a><a href= +"#footnote277"><sup>277</sup></a>.—Hence Scripture cannot be +acknowledged to refute what is settled by other means of right +knowledge. And if you ask, 'Where does Scripture oppose itself to +what is thus established?' we give you the following <span class= +"pagenum"><a name="page319" id="page319"></a>{319}</span> instance. +The distinction of enjoyers and objects of enjoyment is well known +from ordinary experience, the enjoyers being intelligent, embodied +souls, while sound and the like are the objects of enjoyment. +Devadatta, for instance, is an enjoyer, the dish (which he eats) an +object of enjoyment. The distinction of the two would be reduced to +non-existence if the enjoyer passed over into the object of +enjoyment, and vice versâ. Now this passing over of one thing +into another would actually result from the doctrine of the world +being non-different from Brahman. But the sublation of a +well-established distinction is objectionable, not only with regard +to the present time when that distinction is observed to exist, but +also with regard to the past and the future, for which it is +inferred. The doctrine of Brahman's causality must therefore be +abandoned, as it would lead to the sublation of the +well-established distinction of enjoyers and objects of +enjoyment.</p> +<p>To the preceding objection we reply, 'It may exist as in +ordinary experience.' Even on our philosophic view the distinction +may exist, as ordinary experience furnishes us with analogous +instances. We see, for instance, that waves, foam, bubbles, and +other modifications of the sea, although they really are not +different from the sea-water, exist, sometimes in the state of +mutual separation, sometimes in the state of conjunction, &c. +From the fact of their being non-different from the sea-water, it +does not follow that they pass over into each other; and, again, +although they do not pass over into each other, still they are not +different from the sea. So it is in the case under discussion also. +The enjoyers and the objects of enjoyment do not pass over into +each other, and yet they are not different from the highest +Brahman. And although the enjoyer is not really an effect of +Brahman, since the unmodified creator himself, in so far as he +enters into the effect, is called the enjoyer (according to the +passage, 'Having created he entered into it,' Taitt. Up. II, 6), +still after Brahman has entered into its effects it passes into a +state of distinction, in consequence of the effect acting as a +limiting adjunct; just as the universal ether is divided by its +contact with jars and other limiting <span class="pagenum"><a name= +"page320" id="page320"></a>{320}</span> adjuncts. The conclusion +is, that the distinction of enjoyers and objects of enjoyment is +possible, although both are non-different from Brahman, their +highest cause, as the analogous instance of the sea and its waves +demonstrates.</p> +<p>14. The non-difference of them (i.e. of cause and effect) +results from such terms as 'origin' and the like.</p> +<p>The<a id="footnotetag278" name="footnotetag278"></a><a href= +"#footnote278"><sup>278</sup></a> refutation contained in the +preceding Sûtra was set forth on the condition of the +practical distinction of enjoyers and objects of enjoyment being +acknowledged. In reality, however, that distinction does not exist +because there is understood to be non-difference (identity) of +cause and effect. The effect is this manifold world consisting of +ether and so on; the cause is the highest Brahman. Of the effect it +is understood that in reality it is non-different from the cause, +i.e. has no existence apart from the cause.—How so?—'On +account of the scriptural word "origin" and others.' The word +'origin' is used in connexion with a simile, in a passage +undertaking to show how through the knowledge of one thing +everthing is known; viz. Ch. Up. VI, 1, 4, 'As, my dear, by one +clod of clay all that is made of clay is known, the modification +(i.e. the effect; the thing made of clay) being a name merely which +has its origin in speech, while the truth is that it is clay +merely; thus,' &c.—The meaning of this passage is that, +if there is known a lump of clay which really and truly is nothing +but clay<a id="footnotetag279" name="footnotetag279"></a><a href= +"#footnote279"><sup>279</sup></a>, there are known thereby likewise +all things made of clay, such as jars, dishes, pails, and so on, +all of which agree in having clay for their true nature. For these +modifications or effects are names only, exist through or originate +from speech only, while in reality there exists no such thing as a +modification. In so far as they are names (individual effects +distinguished by names) they are untrue; in so far <span class= +"pagenum"><a name="page321" id="page321"></a>{321}</span> as they +are clay they are true.—This parallel instance is given with +reference to Brahman; applying the phrase 'having its origin in +speech' to the case illustrated by the instance quoted we +understand that the entire body of effects has no existence apart +from Brahman.—Later on again the text, after having declared +that fire, water, and earth are the effects of Brahman, maintains +that the effects of these three elements have no existence apart +from them, 'Thus has vanished the specific nature of burning fire, +the modification being a mere name which has its origin in speech, +while only the three colours are what is true' (Ch. Up. VI, 4, +1).—Other sacred texts also whose purport it is to intimate +the unity of the Self are to be quoted here, in accordance with the +'and others' of the Sûtra. Such texts are, 'In that all this +has its Self; it is the True, it is the Self, thou art that' (Ch. +Up. VI, 8, 7); 'This everything, all is that Self' (<i>Bri</i>. Up. +II, 4, 6); 'Brahman alone is all this' (Mu. Up. II, 2, 11); 'The +Self is all this' (Ch. Up. VII, 25, 2); 'There is in it no +diversity' (Bri. Up. IV, 4, 25).—On any other assumption it +would not be possible to maintain that by the knowledge of one +thing everything becomes known (as the text quoted above declares). +We therefore must adopt the following view. In the same way as +those parts of ethereal space which are limited by jars and +waterpots are not really different from the universal ethereal +space, and as the water of a mirage is not really different from +the surface of the salty steppe—for the nature of that water +is that it is seen in one moment and has vanished in the next, and +moreover, it is not to be perceived by its own nature (i.e. apart +from the surface of the desert<a id="footnotetag280" name= +"footnotetag280"></a><a href= +"#footnote280"><sup>280</sup></a>)—; so this manifold world +with its objects of enjoyment, enjoyers and so on has no existence +apart from Brahman.—But—it might be +objected—Brahman has in itself elements of manifoldness. As +the tree has many branches, so Brahman possesses many powers +<span class="pagenum"><a name="page322" id= +"page322"></a>{322}</span> and energies dependent on those powers. +Unity and manifoldness are therefore both true. Thus, a tree +considered in itself is one, but it is manifold if viewed as having +branches; so the sea in itself is one, but manifold as having waves +and foam; so the clay in itself is one, but manifold if viewed with +regard to the jars and dishes made of it. On this assumption the +process of final release resulting from right knowledge may be +established in connexion with the element of unity (in Brahman), +while the two processes of common worldly activity and of activity +according to the Veda—which depend on the +karmakâ<i>nd</i>a—may be established in connexion with +the element of manifoldness. And with this view the parallel +instances of clay &c. agree very well.</p> +<p>This theory, we reply, is untenable because in the instance +(quoted in the Upanishad) the phrase 'as clay they are true' +asserts the cause only to be true while the phrase 'having its +origin in speech' declares the unreality of all effects. And with +reference to the matter illustrated by the instance given (viz. the +highest cause, Brahman) we read, 'In that all this has its Self;' +and, again, 'That is true;' whereby it is asserted that only the +one highest cause is true. The following passage again, 'That is +the Self; thou art that, O <i>S</i>vetaketu!' teaches that the +embodied soul (the individual soul) also is Brahman. (And we must +note that) the passage distinctly teaches that the fact of the +embodied soul having its Self in Brahman is self-established, not +to be accomplished by endeavour. This doctrine of the individual +soul having its Self in Brahman, if once accepted as the doctrine +of the Veda, does away with the independent existence of the +individual soul, just as the idea of the rope does away with the +idea of the snake (for which the rope had been mistaken). And if +the doctrine of the independent existence of the individual soul +has to be set aside, then the opinion of the entire phenomenal +world—which is based on the individual soul—having an +independent existence is likewise to be set aside. But only for the +establishment of the latter an element of manifoldness would have +to be assumed in Brahman, in <span class="pagenum"><a name= +"page323" id="page323"></a>{323}</span> addition to the element of +unity.—Scriptural passages also (such as, 'When the Self only +is all this, how should he see another?' B<i>ri</i>. Up. II, 4, 13) +declare that for him who sees that everything has its Self in +Brahman the whole phenomenal world with its actions, agents, and +results of actions is non-existent. Nor can it be said that this +non-existence of the phenomenal world is declared (by Scripture) to +be limited to certain states; for the passage 'Thou art that' shows +that the general fact of Brahman being the Self of all is not +limited by any particular state. Moreover, Scripture, showing by +the instance of the thief (Ch. VI, 16) that the false-minded is +bound while the true-minded is released, declares thereby that +unity is the one true existence while manifoldness is evolved out +of wrong knowledge. For if both were true how could the man who +acquiesces in the reality of this phenomenal world be called +false-minded<a id="footnotetag281" name= +"footnotetag281"></a><a href="#footnote281"><sup>281</sup></a>? +Another scriptural passage ('from death to death goes he who +perceives therein any diversity,' B<i>ri</i>. Up. IV, 4, 19) +declares the same, by blaming those who perceive any +distinction.—Moreover, on the doctrine, which we are at +present impugning, release cannot result from knowledge, because +the doctrine does not acknowledge that some kind of wrong +knowledge, to be removed by perfect knowledge, is the cause of the +phenomenal world. For how can the cognition of unity remove the +cognition of manifoldness if both are true?</p> +<p>Other objections are started.—If we acquiesce in the +doctrine of absolute unity, the ordinary means of right knowledge, +perception, &c., become invalid because the absence of +manifoldness deprives them of their objects; just as the idea of a +man becomes invalid after the right idea of the post (which at +first had been mistaken for a man) has presented itself. Moreover, +all the texts embodying injunctions and prohibitions will lose +their purport if the distinction on which their validity depends +<span class="pagenum"><a name="page324" id= +"page324"></a>{324}</span> does not really exist. And further, the +entire body of doctrine which refers to final release will +collapse, if the distinction of teacher and pupil on which it +depends is not real. And if the doctrine of release is untrue, how +can we maintain the truth of the absolute unity of the Self, which +forms an item of that doctrine?</p> +<p>These objections, we reply, do not damage our position because +the entire complex of phenomenal existence is considered as true as +long as the knowledge of Brahman being the Self of all has not +arisen; just as the phantoms of a dream are considered to be true +until the sleeper wakes. For as long as a person has not reached +the true knowledge of the unity of the Self, so long it does not +enter his mind that the world of effects with its means and objects +of right knowledge and its results of actions is untrue; he rather, +in consequence of his ignorance, looks on mere effects (such as +body, offspring, wealth, &c.) as forming part of and belonging +to his Self, forgetful of Brahman being in reality the Self of all. +Hence, as long as true knowledge does not present itself, there is +no reason why the ordinary course of secular and religious activity +should not hold on undisturbed. The case is analogous to that of a +dreaming man who in his dream sees manifold things, and, up to the +moment of waking, is convinced that his ideas are produced by real +perception without suspecting the perception to be a merely +apparent one.—But how (to restate an objection raised above) +can the Vedânta-texts if untrue convey information about the +true being of Brahman? We certainly do not observe that a man +bitten by a rope-snake (i.e. a snake falsely imagined in a rope) +dies, nor is the water appearing in a mirage used for drinking or +bathing<a id="footnotetag282" name="footnotetag282"></a><a href= +"#footnote282"><sup>282</sup></a>.—This objection, we reply, +is without force (because as a matter of fact we do see real +effects to result from unreal causes), for we observe that death +sometimes takes place from imaginary venom, (when a man imagines +himself to have been bitten by a venomous snake,) <span class= +"pagenum"><a name="page325" id="page325"></a>{325}</span> and +effects (of what is perceived in a dream) such as the bite of a +snake or bathing in a river take place with regard to a dreaming +person.—But, it will be said, these effects themselves are +unreal!—These effects themselves, we reply, are unreal +indeed; but not so the consciousness which the dreaming person has +of them. This consciousness is a real result; for it is not +sublated by the waking consciousness. The man who has risen from +sleep does indeed consider the effects perceived by him in his +dream such as being bitten by a snake, bathing in a river, &c. +to be unreal, but he does not on that account consider the +consciousness he had of them to be unreal likewise.—(We +remark in passing that) by this fact of the consciousness of the +dreaming person not being sublated (by the waking consciousness) +the doctrine of the body being our true Self is to be considered as +refuted<a id="footnotetag283" name="footnotetag283"></a><a href= +"#footnote283"><sup>283</sup></a>.—Scripture also (in the +passage, 'If a man who is engaged in some sacrifice undertaken for +some special wish sees in his dream a woman, he is to infer +therefrom success in his work') declares that by the unreal phantom +of a dream a real result such as prosperity may be obtained. And, +again, another scriptural passage, after having declared that from +the observation of certain unfavourable omens a man is to conclude +that he will not live long, continues 'if somebody sees in his +dream a black man with black teeth and that man kills him,' +intimating thereby that by the unreal dream-phantom a real fact, +viz. death, is notified.—It is, moreover, known from the +experience of persons who carefully observe positive and negative +instances that such and such dreams are auspicious omens, others +the reverse. And (to quote another example that something true can +result from or be known through something untrue) we see that the +knowledge of the real sounds A. &c. is reached by means of the +unreal written letters. Moreover, the reasons which establish the +unity of the <span class="pagenum"><a name="page326" id= +"page326"></a>{326}</span> Self are altogether final, so that +subsequently to them nothing more is required for full +satisfaction<a id="footnotetag284" name= +"footnotetag284"></a><a href="#footnote284"><sup>284</sup></a>. An +injunction as, for instance, 'He is to sacrifice' at once renders +us desirous of knowing what is to be effected, and by what means +and in what manner it is to be effected; but passages such as, +'Thou art that,' 'I am Brahman,' leave nothing to be desired +because the state of consciousness produced by them has for its +object the unity of the universal Self. For as long as something +else remains a desire is possible; but there is nothing else which +could be desired in addition to the absolute unity of Brahman. Nor +can it be maintained that such states of consciousness do not +actually arise; for scriptural passages such as, 'He understood +what he said' (Ch. Up. VII, 18, 2), declare them to occur, and +certain means are enjoined to bring them about, such as the hearing +(of the Veda from a teacher) and the recital of the sacred texts. +Nor, again, can such consciousness be objected to on the ground +either of uselessness or of erroneousness, because, firstly, it is +seen to have for its result the cessation of ignorance, and +because, secondly, there is no other kind of knowledge by which it +could be sublated. And that before the knowledge of the unity of +the Self has been reached the whole real-unreal course of ordinary +life, worldly as well as religious, goes on unimpeded, we have +already explained. When, however, final authority having intimated +the unity of the Self, the entire course of the world which was +founded on the previous distinction is sublated, then there is no +longer any opportunity for assuming a Brahman comprising in itself +various elements.</p> +<p>But—it may be said—(that would not be a mere +assumption, but) Scripture itself, by quoting the parallel +instances of clay and so on, declares itself in favour of a Brahman +<span class="pagenum"><a name="page327" id= +"page327"></a>{327}</span> capable of modification; for we know +from experience that clay and similar things do undergo +modifications.—This objection—we reply—is without +force, because a number of scriptural passages, by denying all +modification of Brahman, teach it to be absolutely changeless +(kû<i>t</i>astha). Such passages are, 'This great unborn +Self; undecaying, undying, immortal, fearless, is indeed Brahman' +(B<i>ri</i>. Up. IV, 4, 25); 'That Self is to be described by No, +no' (B<i>ri</i>. Up. III, 9, 26); 'It is neither coarse nor fine' +(B<i>ri</i>. Up. III, 8, 8). For to the one Brahman the two +qualities of being subject to modification and of being free from +it cannot both be ascribed. And if you say, 'Why should they not be +both predicated of Brahman (the former during the time of the +subsistence of the world, the latter during the period of +reabsorption) just as rest and motion may be predicated (of one +body at different times)?' we remark that the qualification, +'absolutely changeless' (kû<i>t</i>astha), precludes this. +For the changeless Brahman cannot be the substratum of varying +attributes. And that, on account of the negation of all attributes, +Brahman really is eternal and changeless has already been +demonstrated.—Moreover, while the cognition of the unity of +Brahman is the instrument of final release, there is nothing to +show that any independent result is connected with the view of +Brahman, by undergoing a modification, passing over into the form +of this world. Scripture expressly declares that the knowledge of +the changeless Brahman being the universal Self leads to a result; +for in the passage which begins, 'That Self is to be described by +No, no,' we read later on, 'O Janaka, you have indeed reached +fearlessness' (B<i>ri</i>. Up. IV, 2, 4). We have then<a id= +"footnotetag285" name="footnotetag285"></a><a href= +"#footnote285"><sup>285</sup></a> to accept the following +conclusion that, in the sections treating of Brahman, an +independent result belongs only to the knowledge of Brahman as +devoid of all attributes and distinctions, and that hence whatever +is stated as having no special fruit of its own—as, for +instance, the passages about Brahman modifying itself into the form +of this <span class="pagenum"><a name="page328" id= +"page328"></a>{328}</span> world—is merely to be applied as a +means for the cognition of the absolute Brahman, but does not bring +about an independent result; according to the principle that +whatever has no result of its own, but is mentioned in connexion +with something else which has such a result, is subordinate to the +latter<a id="footnotetag286" name="footnotetag286"></a><a href= +"#footnote286"><sup>286</sup></a>. For to maintain that the result +of the knowledge of Brahman undergoing modifications would be that +the Self (of him who knows that) would undergo corresponding +modifications<a id="footnotetag287" name= +"footnotetag287"></a><a href="#footnote287"><sup>287</sup></a> +would be inappropriate, as the state of filial release (which the +soul obtains through the knowledge of Brahman) is eternally +unchanging.</p> +<p>But, it is objected, he who maintains the nature of Brahman to +be changeless thereby contradicts the fundamental tenet according +to which the Lord is the cause of the world, since the doctrine of +absolute unity leaves no room for the distinction of a Ruler and +something ruled.—This objection we ward off by remarking that +omniscience, &c. (i.e. those qualities which belong to Brahman +only in so far as it is related to a world) depend on the evolution +of the germinal principles called name and form, whose essence is +Nescience. The fundamental tenet which we maintain (in accordance +with such scriptural passages as, 'From that Self sprang ether,' +&c.; Taitt. Up. II, 1) is that the creation, sustentation, and +reabsorption of the world proceed from an omniscient, omnipotent +Lord, not from a non-intelligent pradhâna or any other +principle. That tenet we have stated in I, 1, 4, and here we do not +teach anything contrary to it.—But how, the question may be +asked, can you make this last assertion while all the while you +maintain the absolute unity and non-duality of the +Self?—Listen how. Belonging to the Self, as it were, of the +omniscient Lord, there are name and form, the figments of +Nescience, not to be defined either <span class="pagenum"><a name= +"page329" id="page329"></a>{329}</span> as being (i.e. Brahman), +nor as different from it<a id="footnotetag288" name= +"footnotetag288"></a><a href="#footnote288"><sup>288</sup></a>, the +germs of the entire expanse of the phenomenal world, called in +<i>S</i>rutî and Sm<i>ri</i>ti the illusion +(mâyâ), power (<i>s</i>aktî), or nature +(prak<i>ri</i>ti) of the omniscient Lord. Different from them is +the omniscient Lord himself, as we learn from scriptural passages +such as the following, 'He who is called ether is the revealer of +all forms and names; that within which these forms and names are +contained is Brahman' (Ch. Up. VIII, 14, 1); 'Let me evolve names +and forms' (Ch. Up. VI, 3, 2); 'He, the wise one, who having +divided all forms and given all names, sits speaking (with those +names)' (Taitt. Âr. III, 12, 7); 'He who makes the one seed +manifold' (<i>S</i>ve. Up. VI, l2).—Thus the Lord depends (as +Lord) upon the limiting adjuncts of name and form, the products of +Nescience; just as the universal ether depends (as limited ether, +such as the ether of a jar, &c.) upon the limiting adjuncts in +the shape of jars, pots, &c. He (the Lord) stands in the realm +of the phenomenal in the relation of a ruler to the so-called +jîvas (individual souls) or cognitional Selfs +(vij<i>ñ</i>ânâtman), which indeed are one with +his own Self—just as the portions of ether enclosed in jars +and the like are one with the universal ether—but are limited +by aggregates of instruments of action (i.e. bodies) produced from +name and form, the presentations of Nescience. Hence the Lord's +being a Lord, his omniscience, his omnipotence, &c. all depend +on the limitation due to the adjuncts whose Self is Nescience; +while in reality none of these qualities belong to the Self whose +true nature is cleared, by right knowledge, from all adjuncts +whatever. Thus Scripture also says, 'Where one sees nothing else, +hears nothing else, understands nothing else, that is the Infinite' +(Ch. Up. VII, 24, 1); 'But when the Self only has become all this, +how should he see another?' (B<i>ri</i>. Up. II, 4, 13.) In this +manner the Vedânta-texts declare that for him who has reached +the <span class="pagenum"><a name="page330" id= +"page330"></a>{330}</span> state of truth and reality the whole +apparent world does not exist. The Bhagavadgîtâ also +('The Lord is not the cause of actions, or of the capacity of +performing actions, or of the connexion of action and fruit; all +that proceeds according to its own nature. The Lord receives no +one's sin or merit. Knowledge is enveloped by Ignorance; hence all +creatures are deluded;' Bha. Gî. V, 14; 15) declares that in +reality the relation of Ruler and ruled does not exist. That, on +the other hand, all those distinctions are valid, as far as the +phenomenal world is concerned, Scripture as well as the +Bhagavadgîtâ states; compare B<i>ri</i>. Up. IV, 4, 22, +'He is the Lord of all, the king of all things, the protector of +all things; he is a bank and boundary, so that these worlds may not +be confounded;' and Bha. Gî. XVIII, 61, 'The Lord, O Arjuna, +is seated in the region of the heart of all beings, turning round +all beings, (as though) mounted on a machine, by his delusion.' The +Sûtrakâra also asserts the non-difference of cause and +effect only with regard to the state of Reality; while he had, in +the preceding Sûtra, where he looked to the phenomenal world, +compared Brahman to the ocean, &c., that comparison resting on +the assumption of the world of effects not yet having been refuted +(i.e. seen to be unreal).—The view of Brahman as undergoing +modifications will, moreover, be of use in the devout meditations +on the qualified (sagu<i>n</i>a) Brahman.</p> +<p>15. And because only on the existence (of the cause) (the +effect) is observed.</p> +<p>For the following reason also the effect is non-different from +the cause, because only when the cause exists the effect is +observed to exist, not when it does not exist. For instance, only +when the clay exists the jar is observed to exist, and the cloth +only when the threads exist. That it is not a general rule that +when one thing exists another is also observed to exist, appears, +for instance, from the fact, that a horse which is other +(different) from a cow is not observed to exist only when a cow +exists. Nor is the jar observed to exist only when the potter +exists; for in that case non-difference <span class= +"pagenum"><a name="page331" id="page331"></a>{331}</span> does not +exist, although the relation between the two is that of an +operative cause and its effect<a id="footnotetag289" name= +"footnotetag289"></a><a href= +"#footnote289"><sup>289</sup></a>.—But—it may be +objected—even in the case of things other (i.e. +non-identical) we find that the observation of one thing regularly +depends on the existence of another; smoke, for instance, is +observed only when fire exists.—We reply that this is untrue, +because sometimes smoke is observed even after the fire has been +extinguished; as, for instance, in the case of smoke being kept by +herdsmen in jars.—Well, then—the objector will +say—let us add to smoke a certain qualification enabling us +to say that smoke of such and such a kind<a id="footnotetag290" +name="footnotetag290"></a><a href="#footnote290"><sup>290</sup></a> +does not exist unless fire exists.—Even thus, we reply, your +objection is not valid, because we declare that the reason for +assuming the non-difference of cause and effect is the fact of the +internal organ (buddhi) being affected (impressed) by cause and +effect jointly<a id="footnotetag291" name= +"footnotetag291"></a><a href="#footnote291"><sup>291</sup></a>. And +that does not take place in the case of fire and smoke.—Or +else we have to read (in the Sûtra) 'bhâvât,' and +to translate, 'and on account of the existence or observation.' The +non-difference of cause and effect results not only from Scripture +but also from the existence of perception. For the non-difference +of the two is perceived, for instance, in an aggregate of threads, +where we do not perceive a thing called 'cloth,' in addition to the +threads, but merely threads running lengthways and crossways. So +again, in the threads we perceive finer threads (the aggregate +<span class="pagenum"><a name="page332" id= +"page332"></a>{332}</span> of which is identical with the grosser +threads), in them again finer threads, and so on. On the ground of +this our perception we conclude that the finest parts which we can +perceive are ultimately identical with their causes, viz. red, +white, and black (the colours of fire, water, and earth, according +to Ch. Up. VI, 4); those, again, with air, the latter with ether, +and ether with Brahman, which is one and without a second. That all +means of proof lead back to Brahman (as the ultimate cause of the +world; not to pradhâna, &c.), we have already +explained.</p> +<p>16. And on account of that which is posterior (i.e. the effect) +being that which is.</p> +<p>For the following reason also the effect is to be considered as +non-different (from the cause). That which is posterior in time, +i.e. the effect, is declared by Scripture to have, previous to its +actual beginning, its Being in the cause, by the Self of the cause +merely. For in passages like, 'In the beginning, my dear, this was +that only which is' (Ch. Up. VI, 2, 3); and, 'Verily, in the +beginning this was Self, one only' (Ait. Ar. II, 4, 1, 1), the +effect which is denoted by the word 'this' appears in grammatical +co-ordination with (the word denoting) the cause (from which it +appears that both inhere in the same substratum). A thing, on the +other hand, which does not exist in another thing by the Self of +the latter is not produced from that other thing; for instance, oil +is not produced from sand. Hence as there is non-difference before +the production (of the effect), we understand that the effect even +after having been produced continues to be non-different from the +cause. As the cause, i.e. Brahman, is in all time neither more nor +less than that which is, so the effect also, viz. the world, is in +all time only that which is. But that which is is one only; +therefore the effect is non-different from the cause.</p> +<p>17. If it be said that on account of being denoted as that which +is not (the effect does) not (exist before it is actually +produced); (we reply) not so, (because <span class= +"pagenum"><a name="page333" id="page333"></a>{333}</span> the term +'that which is not' denotes) another quality (merely); (as appears) +from the complementary sentence.</p> +<p>But, an objection will be raised, in some places Scripture +speaks of the effect before its production as that which is not; +so, for instance, 'In the beginning this was that only which is +not' (Ch. Up. III, 19, 1); and 'Non-existent<a id="footnotetag292" +name="footnotetag292"></a><a href="#footnote292"><sup>292</sup></a> +indeed this was in the beginning' (Taitt. Up. II, 7). Hence Being +(sattvam) cannot be ascribed to the effect before its +production.</p> +<p>This we deny. For by the Non-existence of the effect previous to +its production is not meant absolute Non-existence, but only a +different quality or state, viz. the state of name and form being +unevolved, which state is different from the state of name and form +being evolved. With reference to the latter state the effect is +called, previous to its production, non-existent although then also +it existed identical with its cause. We conclude this from the +complementary passage, according to the rule that the sense of a +passage whose earlier part is of doubtful meaning is determined by +its complementary part. With reference to the passage. 'In the +beginning this was non-existent only,' we remark that what is there +denoted by the word 'Non-existing' is—in the complementary +passage, 'That became existent'—referred to by the word +'that,' and qualified as 'Existent.'</p> +<p>The word 'was' would, moreover, not apply to the (absolutely) +Non-existing, which cannot be conceived as connected with prior or +posterior time.—Hence with reference to the other passage +also, 'Non-existing indeed,' &c., the complementary part, 'That +made itself its Self,' shows, by the qualification which it +contains, that absolute Non-existence is not meant.—It +follows from all this that the designation of 'Non-existence' +applied to the effect before its production has reference to a +different state of being merely. And as those things which are +distinguished <span class="pagenum"><a name="page334" id= +"page334"></a>{334}</span> by name and form are in ordinary +language called 'existent,' the term 'non-existent' is figuratively +applied to them to denote the state in which they were previously +to their differentiation.</p> +<p>18. From reasoning and from another Vedic passage.</p> +<p>That the effect exists before its origination and is +non-different from the cause, follows from reasoning as well as +from a further scriptural passage.</p> +<p>We at first set forth the argumentation.—Ordinary +experience teaches us that those who wish to produce certain +effects, such as curds, or earthen jars, or golden ornaments, +employ for their purpose certain determined causal substances such +as milk, clay, and gold; those who wish to produce sour milk do not +employ clay, nor do those who intend to make jars employ milk and +so on. But, according to that doctrine which teaches that the +effect is non-existent (before its actual production), all this +should be possible. For if before their actual origination all +effects are equally non-existent in any causal substance, why then +should curds be produced from milk only and not from clay also, and +jars from clay only and not from milk as well?—Let us then +maintain, the asatkâryavâdin rejoins, that there is +indeed an equal non-existence of any effect in any cause, but that +at the same time each causal substance has a certain capacity +reaching beyond itself (ati<i>s</i>aya) for some particular effect +only and not for other effects; that, for instance, milk only, and +not clay, has a certain capacity for curds; and clay only, and not +milk, an analogous capacity for jars.—What, we ask in return, +do you understand by that 'ati<i>s</i>aya?' If you understand by it +the antecedent condition of the effect (before its actual +origination), you abandon your doctrine that the effect does not +exist in the cause, and prove our doctrine according to which it +does so exist. If, on the other hand, you understand by the +ati<i>s</i>aya a certain power of the cause assumed to the end of +accounting for the fact that only one determined effect springs +from the cause, you must admit that the power can <span class= +"pagenum"><a name="page335" id="page335"></a>{335}</span> determine +the particular effect only if it neither is other (than cause and +effect) nor non-existent; for if it were either, it would not be +different from anything else which is either non-existent or other +than cause and effect, (and how then should it alone be able to +produce the particular effect?) Hence it follows that that power is +identical with the Self of the cause, and that the effect is +identical with the Self of that power.—Moreover, as the ideas +of cause and effect on the one hand and of substance and qualities +on the other hand are not separate ones, as, for instance, the +ideas of a horse and a buffalo, it follows that the identity of the +cause and the effect as well as of the substance and its qualities +has to be admitted. Let it then be assumed, the opponent rejoins, +that the cause and the effect, although really different, are not +apprehended as such, because they are connected by the so-called +samavâya connexion<a id="footnotetag293" name= +"footnotetag293"></a><a href= +"#footnote293"><sup>293</sup></a>.—If, we reply, you assume +the samavâya connexion between cause and effect, you have +either to admit that the samavâya itself is joined by a +certain connexion to the two terms which are connected by +samavâya, and then that connexion will again require a new +connexion (joining it to the two terms which it binds together), +and you will thus be compelled to postulate an infinite series of +connexions; or else you will have to maintain that the +samavâya is not joined by any connexion to the terms which it +binds together, and from that will result the dissolution of the +bond which connects the two terms of the samavâya +relation<a id="footnotetag294" name="footnotetag294"></a><a href= +"#footnote294"><sup>294</sup></a>.—Well then, the opponent +rejoins, let us assume that the samavâya connexion as itself +being a connexion may be connected with the terms which it joins +without the help of any further connexion.—Then, we reply, +conjunction (sa<i>m</i>yoga) also must be connected with the two +terms which it joins without the help of the samavâya +<span class="pagenum"><a name="page336" id= +"page336"></a>{336}</span> connexion; for conjunction also is a +kind of connexion<a id="footnotetag295" name= +"footnotetag295"></a><a href= +"#footnote295"><sup>295</sup></a>.—Moreover, as substances, +qualities, and so on are apprehended as standing in the relation of +identity, the assumption of the samavâya relation has really +no purport.</p> +<p>In what manner again do you—who maintain that the cause +and the effect are joined by the samavâya +relation—assume a substance consisting of parts which is an +effect to abide in its causes, i.e. in the material parts of which +it consists? Does it abide in all the parts taken together or in +each particular part?—If you say that it abides in all parts +together, it follows that the whole as such cannot be perceived, as +it is impossible that all the parts should be in contact with the +organs of perception. (And let it not be objected that the whole +may be apprehended through some of the parts only), for manyness +which abides in all its substrates together (i.e. in all the many +things), is not apprehended so long as only some of those +substrates are apprehended.—Let it then be assumed that the +whole abides in all the parts by the mediation of intervening +aggregates of parts<a id="footnotetag296" name= +"footnotetag296"></a><a href= +"#footnote296"><sup>296</sup></a>.—In that case, we reply, we +should have to assume other parts in addition to the primary +originative parts of the whole, in order that by means of those +other parts the whole could abide in the primary parts in the +manner indicated by you. For we see (that one thing which abides in +another abides there by means of parts different from those of that +other thing), that the sword, for instance, pervades the sheath by +means of parts different from the parts of the sheath. But an +assumption of that kind would lead us into a regressus in +infinitum, because in order to explain how the whole abides in +certain <span class="pagenum"><a name="page337" id= +"page337"></a>{337}</span> given parts we should always have to +assume further parts<a id="footnotetag297" name= +"footnotetag297"></a><a href= +"#footnote297"><sup>297</sup></a>.—Well, then, let us +maintain the second alternative, viz. that the whole abides in each +particular part.—That also cannot be admitted; for if the +whole is present in one part it cannot be present in other parts +also; not any more than Devadatta can be present in <i>S</i>rughna +and in Pâ<i>t</i>aliputra on one and the same day. If the +whole were present in more than one part, several wholes would +result, comparable to Devadatta and Yaj<i>ñ</i>adatta, who, +as being two different persons, may live one of them at +<i>S</i>rughna and the other at Pâ<i>t</i>aliputra.—If +the opponent should rejoin that the whole may be fully present in +each part, just as the generic character of the cow is fully +present in each individual cow; we point out that the generic +attributes of the cow are visibly perceived in each individual cow, +but that the whole is not thus perceived in each particular part. +If the whole were fully present in each part, the consequence would +be that the whole would produce its effects indifferently with any +of its parts; a cow, for instance, would give milk from her horns +or her tail. But such things are not seen to take place.</p> +<p>We proceed to consider some further arguments opposed to the +doctrine that the effect does not exist in the cause.—That +doctrine involves the conclusion that the actual origination of an +effect is without an agent and thus devoid of substantial being. +For origination is an action, and as such requires an agent<a id= +"footnotetag298" name="footnotetag298"></a><a href= +"#footnote298"><sup>298</sup></a>, just as the action of walking +does. To speak of an action without an agent would be a +contradiction. <span class="pagenum"><a name="page338" id= +"page338"></a>{338}</span> But if you deny the pre-existence of the +effect in the cause, it would have to be assumed that whenever the +origination of a jar, for instance, is spoken of the agent is not +the jar (which before its origination did not exist) but something +else, and again that when the origination of the two halves of the +jar is spoken of the agent is not the two halves but something +else. From this it would follow that the sentence, 'the jar is +originated' means as much as 'the potter and the other (operative) +causes are originated<a id="footnotetag299" name= +"footnotetag299"></a><a href="#footnote299"><sup>299</sup></a>.' +But as a matter of fact the former sentence is never understood to +mean the latter; and it is, moreover, known that at the time when +the jar originates, the potter, &c. are already in +existence.—Let us then say, the opponent resumes, that +origination is the connexion of the effect with the existence of +its cause and its obtaining existence as a Self.—How, we ask +in reply, can something which has not yet obtained existence enter +into connexion with something else? A connexion is possible of two +existing things only, not of one existing and one non-existing +thing or of two non-existing things. To something non-existing +which on that account is indefinable, it is moreover not possible +to assign a limit as the opponent does when maintaining that the +effect is non-existing before its origination; for experience +teaches us that existing things only such as fields and houses have +limits, but not non-existing things. If somebody should use, for +instance, a phrase such as the following one, 'The son of a barren +woman was king previously to the coronation of +Pûr<i>n</i>avarman' the declaration of a limit in time +implied in that phrase does not in reality determine that the son +of the barren woman, i.e. a mere non-entity, either was or is or +will be king. If the son of a barren woman could become an existing +thing subsequently to the activity of some causal <span class= +"pagenum"><a name="page339" id="page339"></a>{339}</span> agent, in +that case it would be possible also that the non-existing effect +should be something existing, subsequently to the activity of some +causal agent. But we know that the one thing can take place no more +than the other thing; the non-existing effect and the son of the +barren woman are both equally non-entities and can never +be.—But, the asatkâryavâdin here objects, from +your doctrine there follows the result that the activity of causal +agents is altogether purposeless. For if the effect were lying +already fully accomplished in the cause and were non-different from +it, nobody would endeavour to bring it about, no more than anybody +endeavours to bring about the cause which is already fully +accomplished previously to all endeavour. But as a matter of fact +causal agents do endeavour to bring about effects, and it is in +order not to have to condemn their efforts as altogether useless +that we assume the non-existence of the effect previously to its +origination.—Your objection is refuted, we reply, by the +consideration that the endeavour of the causal agent may be looked +upon as having a purpose in so far as it arranges the causal +substance in the form of the effect. That, however, even the form +of the effect (is not something previously non-existing, but) +belongs to the Self of the cause already because what is devoid of +Selfhood cannot be begun at all, we have already shown +above.—Nor does a substance become another substance merely +by appearing under a different aspect. Devadatta may at one time be +seen with his arms and legs closely drawn up to his body, and +another time with his arms and legs stretched out, and yet he +remains the same substantial being, for he is recognised as such. +Thus the persons also by whom we are surrounded, such as fathers, +mothers, brothers, &c., remain the same, although we see them +in continually changing states and attitudes; for they are always +recognised as fathers, mothers, brothers, and so on. If our +opponent objects to this last illustrative example on the ground +that fathers, mothers, and so on remain the same substantial +beings, because the different states in which they appear are not +separated from each other by birth or death, while the effect, for +instance a jar, appears only after <span class="pagenum"><a name= +"page340" id="page340"></a>{340}</span> the cause, for instance the +clay, has undergone destruction as it were (so that the effect may +be looked upon as something altogether different from the cause); +we rebut this objection by remarking that causal substances also +such as milk, for instance, are perceived to exist even after they +have entered into the condition of effects such as curds and the +like (so that we have no right to say that the cause undergoes +destruction). And even in those cases where the continued existence +of the cause is not perceived, as, for instance, in the case of +seeds of the fig-tree from which there spring sprouts and trees, +the term 'birth' (when applied to the sprout) only means that the +causal substance, viz. the seed, becomes visible by becoming a +sprout through the continual accretion of similar particles of +matter; and the term 'death' only means that, through the secession +of those particles, the cause again passes beyond the sphere of +visibility. Nor can it be said that from such separation by birth +and death as described just now it follows that the non-existing +becomes existing, and the existing non-existing; for if that were +so, it would also follow that the unborn child in the mother's womb +and the new-born babe stretched out on the bed are altogether +different beings.</p> +<p>It would further follow that a man is not the same person in +childhood, manhood, and old age, and that terms such as father and +the like are illegitimately used.—The preceding arguments may +also be used to refute the (Bauddha doctrine) of all existence +being momentary only<a id="footnotetag300" name= +"footnotetag300"></a><a href="#footnote300"><sup>300</sup></a>.</p> +<p>The doctrine that the effect is non-existent previously to its +actual origination, moreover, leads to the conclusion that the +activity of the causal agent has no object; for what does not exist +cannot possibly be an object; not any more than the ether can be +cleft by swords and other weapons for striking or cutting. The +object can certainly not be the inherent cause; for that would lead +to the erroneous conclusion that from the activity of the causal +agent, which has for its object the inherent cause, there results +something else <span class="pagenum"><a name="page341" id= +"page341"></a>{341}</span> (viz. the effect). And if (in order to +preclude this erroneous conclusion) the opponent should say that +the effect is (not something different from the cause, but) a +certain relative power (ati<i>s</i>aya) of the inherent cause; he +thereby would simply concede our doctrine, according to which the +effect exists in the cause already.</p> +<p>We maintain, therefore, as our final conclusion, that milk and +other substances are called effects when they are in the state of +curds and so on, and that it is impossible, even within hundreds of +years, ever to bring about an effect which is different from its +cause. The fundamental cause of all appears in the form of this and +that effect, up to the last effect of all, just as an actor appears +in various robes and costumes, and thereby becomes the basis for +all the current notions and terms concerning the phenomenal +world.</p> +<p>The conclusion here established, on the ground of reasoning, +viz. that the effect exists already before its origination, and is +non-different from its cause, results also from a different +scriptural passage. As under the preceding Sûtra a Vedic +passage was instanced which speaks of the non-existing, the +different passage referred to in the present Sûtra is the one +(Ch. Up. VI, 2, 1) which refers to that which is. That passage +begins, 'Being only was this in the beginning, one without a +second,' refers, thereupon, to the doctrine of the Non-existent +being the cause of the world ('Others say, Non-being was this in +the beginning'), raises an objection against that doctrine ('How +could that which is be born of that which is not?'), and, finally, +reaffirms the view first set forth, 'Only Being was this in the +beginning.' The circumstance that in this passage the effect, which +is denoted by the word 'this,' is by Scripture, with reference to +the time previous to its origination, coordinated with the cause +denoted by the term 'Being,' proves that the effect exists +in—and is non-different from—the cause. If it were +before its origination non-existing and after it inhered in its +cause by samavâya, it would be something different from the +cause, and that would virtually imply an abandonment of the promise +made in the passage, 'That instruction by which we hear what is not +heard,' &c. <span class="pagenum"><a name="page342" id= +"page342"></a>{342}</span> (VI, 1, 3). The latter assertion is +ratified, on the other hand, through the comprehension that the +effect exists in—and is not different from-the cause.</p> +<p>19. And like a piece of cloth.</p> +<p>As of a folded piece of cloth we do not know clearly whether it +is a piece of cloth or some other thing, while on its being +unfolded it becomes manifest that the folded thing was a piece of +cloth; and as, so long as it is folded, we perhaps know that it is +a piece of cloth but not of what definite length and width it is, +while on its being unfolded we know these particulars, and at the +same time that the cloth is not different from the folded object; +in the same way an effect, such as a piece of cloth, is +non-manifest as long as it exists in its causes, i.e. the threads, +&c. merely, while it becomes manifest and is clearly +apprehended in consequence of the operations of shuttle, loom, +weaver, and so on.—Applying this instance of the piece of +cloth, first folded and then unfolded, to the general case of cause +and effect, we conclude that the latter is non-different from the +former.</p> +<p>20. And as in the case of the different vital airs.</p> +<p>It is a matter of observation that when the operations of the +different kinds of vital air—such as prâ<i>n</i>a the +ascending vital air, apâna the descending vital air, +&c.—are suspended, in consequence of the breath being +held so that they exist in their causes merely, the only effect +which continues to be accomplished is life, while all other +effects, such as the bending and stretching of the limbs and so on, +are stopped. When, thereupon, the vital airs again begin to act, +those other effects also are brought about, in addition to mere +life.—Nor must the vital airs, on account of their being +divided into classes, be considered as something else than vital +air; for wind (air) constitutes their common character. Thus (i.e. +in the manner illustrated by the instance of the vital airs) the +non-difference of the effect from the cause is to be +conceived.—As, therefore, the whole world is an effect of +Brahman and <span class="pagenum"><a name="page343" id= +"page343"></a>{343}</span> non-different from it, the promise held +out in the scriptural passage that 'What is not heard is heard, +what is not perceived is perceived, what is not known is known' +(Ch. Up. VI, 1, 3) is fulfilled<a id="footnotetag301" name= +"footnotetag301"></a><a href="#footnote301"><sup>301</sup></a>.</p> +<p>21. On account of the other (i.e. the individual soul) being +designated (as non-different from Brahman) there would attach (to +Brahman) various faults, as, for instance, not doing what is +beneficial.</p> +<p>Another objection is raised against the doctrine of an +intelligent cause of the world.—If that doctrine is accepted, +certain faults, as, for instance, doing what is not beneficial, +will attach (to the intelligent cause, i.e. Brahman), 'on account +of the other being designated.' For Scripture declares the other, +i.e. the embodied soul, to be one with Brahman, as is shown by the +passage, 'That is the Self; that art thou, O <i>S</i>vetaketu!' +(Ch. Up. VI, 8, 7.)—Or else (if we interpret 'the other' of +the Sûtra in a different way) Scripture declares the other, +i.e. Brahman, to be the Self of the embodied soul. For the passage, +'Having created that he entered into it,' declares the creator, +i.e. the unmodified Brahman, to constitute the Self of the embodied +soul, in consequence of his entering into his products. The +following passage also, 'Entering (into them) with this living Self +I will evolve names and forms' (Ch. Up. VI, 3, 2), in which the +highest divinity designates the living (soul) by the word 'Self,' +shows that the embodied Self is not different from Brahman. +Therefore the creative power of Brahman belongs to the embodied +Self also, and the latter, being thus an independent agent, might +be expected to produce only what is beneficial to itself, and not +things of a contrary nature, such as birth, death, old age, +disease, and whatever may be the other meshes of the net of +suffering. For we know that no free person will build a prison for +himself, and take up his abode in it. Nor would a being, itself +absolutely stainless, <span class="pagenum"><a name="page344" id= +"page344"></a>{344}</span> look on this altogether unclean body as +forming part of its Self. It would, moreover, free itself, +according to its liking, of the consequences of those of its former +actions which result in pain, and would enjoy the consequences of +those actions only which are rewarded by pleasure. Further, it +would remember that it had created this manifold world; for every +person who has produced some clearly appearing effect remembers +that he has been the cause of it. And as the magician easily +retracts, whenever he likes, the magical illusion which he had +emitted, so the embodied soul also would be able to reabsorb this +world into itself. The fact is, however, that the embodied soul +cannot reabsorb its own body even. As we therefore see that 'what +would be beneficial is not done,' the hypothesis of the world +having proceeded from an intelligent cause is unacceptable.</p> +<p>22. But the separate (Brahman, i.e. the Brahman separate from +the individual souls) (is the creator); (the existence of which +separate Brahman we learn) from the declaration of difference.</p> +<p>The word 'but' discards the pûrvapaksha.—We rather +declare that that omniscient, omnipotent Brahman, whose essence is +eternal pure cognition and freedom, and which is additional to, +i.e. different from the embodied Self, is the creative principle of +the world. The faults specified above, such as doing what is not +beneficial, and the like, do not attach to that Brahman; for as +eternal freedom is its characteristic nature, there is nothing +either beneficial to be done by it or non-beneficial to be avoided +by it. Nor is there any impediment to its knowledge and power; for +it is omniscient and omnipotent. The embodied Self, on the other +hand, is of a different nature, and to it the mentioned faults +adhere. But then we do not declare it to be the creator of the +world, on account of 'the declaration of difference.' For +scriptural passages (such as, 'Verily, the Self is to be seen, to +be heard, to be perceived, to be marked,' B<i>ri</i>. Up. II, 4, 5; +'The Self we must search out, we must try to understand,' Ch. Up. +VIII, 7, 1; 'Then he becomes <span class="pagenum"><a name= +"page345" id="page345"></a>{345}</span> united with the True,' Ch. +Up. VI, 8, 1; 'This embodied Self mounted by the intelligent Self,' +B<i>ri</i>. Up. IV, 3, 35) declare differences founded on the +relations of agent, object, and so on, and thereby show Brahman to +be different from the individual soul.—And if it be objected +that there are other passages declaratory of non-difference (for +instance, 'That art thou'), and that difference and non-difference +cannot co-exist because contradictory, we reply that the +possibility of the co-existence of the two is shown by the parallel +instance of the universal ether and the ether limited by a +jar.—Moreover, as soon as, in consequence of the declaration +of non-difference contained in such passages as 'that art thou,' +the consciousness of non-difference arises in us, the +transmigratory state of the individual soul and the creative +quality of Brahman vanish at once, the whole phenomenon of +plurality, which springs from wrong knowledge, being sublated by +perfect knowledge, and what becomes then of the creation and the +faults of not doing what is beneficial, and the like? For that this +entire apparent world, in which good and evil actions are done, +&c., is a mere illusion, owing to the non-discrimination of +(the Self's) limiting adjuncts, viz. a body, and so on, which +spring from name and form the presentations of Nescience, and does +in reality not exist at all, we have explained more than once. The +illusion is analogous to the mistaken notion we entertain as to the +dying, being born, being hurt, &c. of ourselves (our Selfs; +while in reality the body only dies, is born, &c.). And with +regard to the state in which the appearance of plurality is not yet +sublated, it follows from passages declaratory of such difference +(as, for instance, 'That we must search for,' &c.) that Brahman +is superior to the individual soul; whereby the possibility of +faults adhering to it is excluded.</p> +<p>23. And because the case is analogous to that of stones, &c. +(the objections raised) cannot be established.</p> +<p>As among minerals, which are all mere modifications of earth, +nevertheless great variety is observed, some being <span class= +"pagenum"><a name="page346" id="page346"></a>{346}</span> precious +gems, such as diamonds, lapis lazuli, &c., others, such as +crystals and the like, being of medium value, and others again +stones only fit to be flung at dogs or crows; and as from seeds +which are placed in one and the same ground various plants are seen +to spring, such as sandalwood and cucumbers, which show the +greatest difference in their leaves, blossoms, fruits, fragrancy, +juice, &c.; and as one and the same food produces various +effects, such as blood and hair; so the one Brahman also may +contain in itself the distinction of the individual Selfs and the +highest Self, and may produce various effects. Hence the objections +imagined by others (against the doctrine of Brahman being the cause +of the world) cannot be maintained.—Further<a id= +"footnotetag302" name="footnotetag302"></a><a href= +"#footnote302"><sup>302</sup></a> arguments are furnished by the +fact of all effect having, as Scripture declares, their origin in +speech only, and by the analogous instance of the variety of dream +phantoms (while the dreaming person remains one).</p> +<p>24. If you object on the ground of the observation of the +employment (of instruments); (we say), No; because as milk +(transforms itself, so Brahman does).</p> +<p>Your assertion that the intelligent Brahman alone, without a +second, is the cause of the world cannot be maintained, on account +of the observation of employment (of instruments). For in ordinary +life we see that potters, weavers, and other handicraftsmen produce +jars, cloth, and the like, after having put themselves in +possession of the means thereto by providing themselves with +various implements, such as clay, staffs, wheels, string, &c.; +Brahman, on the other hand, you conceive to be without any help; +how then can it act as a creator without providing itself with +instruments to work with? We therefore maintain that Brahman is not +the cause of the world.</p> +<p>This objection is not valid, because causation is possible +<span class="pagenum"><a name="page347" id= +"page347"></a>{347}</span> in consequence of a peculiar +constitution of the causal substance, as in the case of milk. Just +as milk and water turn into curds and ice respectively, without any +extraneous means, so it is in the case of Brahman also. And if you +object to this analogy for the reason that milk, in order to turn +into curds, does require an extraneous agent, viz. heat, we reply +that milk by itself also undergoes a certain amount of definite +change, and that its turning is merely accelerated by heat. If milk +did not possess that capability of itself, heat could not compel it +to turn; for we see that air or ether, for instance, is not +compelled by the action of heat to turn into sour milk. By the +co-operation of auxiliary means the milk's capability of turning +into sour milk is merely completed. The absolutely complete power +of Brahman, on the other hand, does not require to be supplemented +by any extraneous help. Thus Scripture also declares, 'There is no +effect and no instrument known of him, no one is seen like unto him +or better; his high power is revealed as manifold, as inherent, +acting as force and knowledge' (<i>S</i>ve. Up. VI, 8). Therefore +Brahman, although one only, is, owing to its manifold powers, able +to transform itself into manifold effects; just as milk is.</p> +<p>25. And (the case of Brahman is) like that of gods and other +beings in ordinary experience.</p> +<p>Well, let it be admitted that milk and other non-intelligent +things have the power of turning themselves into sour milk, &c. +without any extraneous means, since it is thus observed. But we +observe, on the other hand, that intelligent agents, as, for +instance, potters, proceed to their several work only after having +provided themselves with a complete set of instruments. How then +can it be supposed that Brahman, which is likewise of an +intelligent nature, should proceed without any auxiliary?</p> +<p>We reply, 'Like gods and others.' As gods, fathers, +<i>ri</i>shis, and other beings of great power, who are all of +intelligent nature, are seen to create many and various objects, +such as palaces, chariots, &c., without availing themselves of +any <span class="pagenum"><a name="page348" id= +"page348"></a>{348}</span> extraneous means, by their mere +intention, which is effective in consequence of those beings' +peculiar power—a fact vouchsafed by mantras, +arthavâdas, itihâsas, and +purâ<i>n</i>as;—and as the spider emits out of itself +the threads of its web; and as the female crane conceives without a +male; and as the lotus wanders from one pond to another without any +means of conveyance; so the intelligent Brahman also may be assumed +to create the world by itself without extraneous means.</p> +<p>Perhaps our opponent will argue against all this in the +following style.—The gods and other beings, whom you have +quoted as parallel instances, are really of a nature different from +that of Brahman. For the material causes operative in the +production of palaces and other material things are the bodies of +the gods, and not their intelligent Selfs. And the web of the +spider is produced from its saliva which, owing to the spider's +devouring small insects, acquires a certain degree of consistency. +And the female crane conceives from hearing the sound of thunder. +And the lotus flower indeed derives from its indwelling intelligent +principle the impulse of movement, but is not able actually to move +in so far as it is a merely intelligent being<a id="footnotetag303" +name="footnotetag303"></a><a href= +"#footnote303"><sup>303</sup></a>; it rather wanders from pond to +pond by means of its non-intelligent body, just as the creeper +climbs up the tree.—Hence all these illustrative examples +cannot be applied to the case of Brahman.</p> +<p>To this we reply, that we meant to show merely that the case of +Brahman is different from that of potters and similar agents. For +while potters, &c., on the one side, and gods, &c., on the +other side, possess the common attribute of intelligence, potters +require for their work extraneous means (i.e. means lying outside +their bodies) and gods do not. Hence Brahman also, although +intelligent, is assumed to require no extraneous means. So much +only we wanted to show by the parallel instance of the gods, +&c. Our intention is to point out that a peculiarly conditioned +capability which <span class="pagenum"><a name="page349" id= +"page349"></a>{349}</span> is observed in some one case (as in that +of the potter) is not necessarily to be assumed in all other cases +also.</p> +<p>26. Either the consequence of the entire (Brahman undergoing +change) has to be accepted, or else a violation of the texts +declaring Brahman to be without parts.</p> +<p>Hitherto we have established so much that Brahman, intelligent, +one, without a second, modifying itself without the employment of +any extraneous means, is the cause of the world.—Now, another +objection is raised for the purpose of throwing additional light on +the point under discussion.—The consequence of the +Vedânta doctrine, it is said, will be that we must assume the +entire Brahman to undergo the change into its effects, because it +is not composed of parts. If Brahman, like earth and other matter, +consisted of parts, we might assume that a part of it undergoes the +change, while the other part remains as it is. But Scripture +distinctly declares Brahman to be devoid of parts. Compare, 'He who +is without parts, without actions, tranquil, without fault, without +taint' (<i>Sv</i>e. Up. VI, 19); 'That heavenly person is without +body, he is both without and within, not produced' (Mu. Up. II, 1, +2); 'That great Being is endless, unlimited, consisting of nothing +but knowledge' (B<i>ri</i>. Up. II, 4, 12); 'He is to be described +by No, no' (B<i>ri</i>. Up. III, 9, 2,6); 'It is neither coarse nor +fine' (B<i>ri</i>. Up. III, 8, 8); all which passages deny the +existence of any distinctions in Brahman.—As, therefore, a +partial modification is impossible, a modification of the entire +Brahman has to be assumed. But that involves a cutting off of +Brahman from its very basis.—Another consequence of the +Vedântic view is that the texts exhorting us to strive 'to +see' Brahman become purposeless; for the effects of Brahman may be +seen without any endeavour, and apart from them no Brahman +exists.—And, finally, the texts declaring Brahman to be +unborn are contradicted thereby.—If, on the other +hand—in order to escape from these difficulties—we +assume Brahman to consist of parts, we thereby do violence to those +texts which declare Brahman not to be made up of parts. +<span class="pagenum"><a name="page350" id= +"page350"></a>{350}</span> Moreover, if Brahman is made up of +parts, it follows that it is non-eternal.—Hence the +Vedântic point of view cannot be maintained in any way.</p> +<p>27. But (this is not so), on account of scriptural passages, and +on account of (Brahman) resting on Scripture (only).</p> +<p>The word 'but' discards the objection.—We deny this and +maintain that our view is not open to any objections.—That +the entire Brahman undergoes change, by no means follows from our +doctrine, 'on account of sacred texts.' For in the same way as +Scripture speaks of the origin of the world from Brahman, it also +speaks of Brahman subsisting apart from its effects. This appears +from the passages indicating the difference of cause and effect +'(That divinity thought) let me enter into these three divinities +with this living Self and evolve names and forms;' and, 'Such is +the greatness of it, greater than it is the Person; one foot of him +are all things, three feet are what is immortal in heaven' (Ch. Up. +III, 12, 6); further, from the passages declaring the unmodified +Brahman to have its abode in the heart, and from those teaching +that (in dreamless sleep) the individual soul is united with the +True. For if the entire Brahman had passed into its effects, the +limitation (of the soul's union with Brahman) to the state of +dreamless sleep which is declared in the passage, 'then it is +united with the True, my dear,' would be out of place; since the +individual soul is always united with the effects of Brahman, and +since an unmodified Brahman does not exist (on that hypothesis). +Moreover, the possibility of Brahman becoming the object of +perception by means of the senses is denied while its effects may +thus be perceived. For these reasons the existence of an unmodified +Brahman has to be admitted.—Nor do we violate those texts +which declare Brahman to be without parts; we rather admit Brahman +to be without parts just because Scripture reveals it. For Brahman +which rests exclusively on the holy texts, and regarding which the +holy texts alone are authoritative—not <span class= +"pagenum"><a name="page351" id="page351"></a>{351}</span> the +senses, and so on—must be accepted such as the texts proclaim +it to be. Now those texts declare, on the one hand, that not the +entire Brahman passes over into its effects, and, on the other +hand, that Brahman is without parts. Even certain ordinary things +such as gems, spells, herbs, and the like possess powers which, +owing to difference of time, place, occasion, and so on, produce +various opposite effects, and nobody unaided by instruction is able +to find out by mere reflection the number of these powers, their +favouring conditions, their objects, their purposes, &c.; how +much more impossible is it to conceive without the aid of Scripture +the true nature of Brahman with its powers unfathomable by thought! +As the Purâ<i>n</i>a says: 'Do not apply reasoning to what is +unthinkable! The mark of the unthinkable is that it is above all +material causes<a id="footnotetag304" name= +"footnotetag304"></a><a href="#footnote304"><sup>304</sup></a>.' +Therefore the cognition of what is supersensuous is based on the +holy texts only.</p> +<p>But—our opponent will say—even the holy texts cannot +make us understand what is contradictory. Brahman, you say, which +is without parts undergoes a change, but not the entire Brahman. If +Brahman is without parts, it does either not change at all or it +changes in its entirety. If, on the other hand, it be said that it +changes partly and persists partly, a break is effected in its +nature, and from that it follows that it consists of parts. It is +true that in matters connected with action (as, for instance, in +the case of the two Vedic injunctions 'at the atirâtra he is +to take the sho<i>d</i>a<i>s</i>in-cup,' and 'at the atirâtra +he is not to take the sho<i>d</i>a<i>s</i>in-cup') any +contradiction which may present itself to the understanding is +removed by the optional adoption of one of the two alternatives +presented as action is dependent on man; but in the case under +discussion the adoption of one of the alternatives does not remove +the contradiction because an existent thing (like Brahman) does not +(like an action which is to be accomplished) depend on man. We are +therefore met here by a real difficulty.</p> +<span class="pagenum"><a name="page352" id= +"page352"></a>{352}</span> +<p>No, we reply, the difficulty is merely an apparent one; as we +maintain that the (alleged) break in Brahman's nature is a mere +figment of Nescience. By a break of that nature a thing is not +really broken up into parts, not any more than the moon is really +multiplied by appearing double to a person of defective vision. By +that element of plurality which is the fiction of Nescience, which +is characterised by name and form, which is evolved as well as +non-evolved, which is not to be defined either as the Existing or +the Non-existing, Brahman becomes the basis of this entire apparent +world with its changes, and so on, while in its true and real +nature it at the same time remains unchanged, lifted above the +phenomenal universe. And as the distinction of names and forms, the +fiction of Nescience, originates entirely from speech only, it does +not militate against the fact of Brahman being without +parts.—Nor have the scriptural passages which speak of +Brahman as undergoing change the purpose of teaching the fact of +change; for such instruction would have no fruit. They rather aim +at imparting instruction about Brahman's Self as raised above this +apparent world; that being an instruction which we know to have a +result of its own. For in the scriptural passage beginning 'He can +only be described by No, no' (which passage conveys instruction +about the absolute Brahman) a result is stated at the end, in the +words 'O Janaka, you have indeed reached fearlessness' (B<i>ri</i>. +Up. IV, 2, 4).—Hence our view does not involve any real +difficulties.</p> +<p>28. For thus it is in the (individual) Self also, and various +(creations exist in gods<a id="footnotetag305" name= +"footnotetag305"></a><a href="#footnote305"><sup>305</sup></a>, +&c.).</p> +<p>Nor is there any reason to find fault with the doctrine that +there can be a manifold creation in the one Self, without +destroying its character. For Scripture teaches us that there +exists a multiform creation in the one Self <span class= +"pagenum"><a name="page353" id="page353"></a>{353}</span> of a +dreaming person, 'There are no chariots in that state, no horses, +no roads, but he himself creates chariots, horses, and roads' +(B<i>ri</i>. Up. IV, 3, 10). In ordinary life too multiform +creations, elephants, horses, and the like are seen to exist in +gods, &c., and magicians without interfering with the unity of +their being. Thus a multiform creation may exist in Brahman also, +one as it is, without divesting it of its character of unity.</p> +<p>29. And because the objection (raised against our view) lies +against his (the opponent's) view likewise.</p> +<p>Those also who maintain that the world has sprung from the +pradhâna implicitly teach that something not made up of +parts, unlimited, devoid of sound and other qualities—viz. +the pradhâna—is the cause of an effect—viz. the +world—which is made up of parts, is limited and is +characterised by the named qualities. Hence it follows from that +doctrine also either that the pradhâna as not consisting of +parts has to undergo a change in its entirety, or else that the +view of its not consisting of parts has to be +abandoned.—But—it might be pleaded in favour of the +Sâ@nkhyas—they do not maintain their pradhâna to +be without parts; for they define it as the state of equilibrium of +the three gu<i>n</i>as, Goodness, Passion, and Darkness, so that +the pradhâna forms a whole containing the three gu<i>n</i>as +as its parts.—We reply that such a partiteness as is here +proposed does not remove the objection in hand because still each +of the three qualities is declared to be in itself without +parts<a id="footnotetag306" name="footnotetag306"></a><a href= +"#footnote306"><sup>306</sup></a>. And each gu<i>n</i>a by itself +assisted merely by the two other gu<i>n</i>as constitutes the +material cause of that part of the world which resembles it in its +nature<a id="footnotetag307" name="footnotetag307"></a><a href= +"#footnote307"><sup>307</sup></a>.—So that the objection lies +against the Sâ@nkhya <span class="pagenum"><a name="page354" +id="page354"></a>{354}</span> view likewise.—Well, then, as +the reasoning (on which the doctrine of the impartiteness of the +pradhâna rests) is not absolutely safe, let us assume that +the pradhâna consists of parts.—If you do that, we +reply, it follows that the pradhâna cannot be eternal, and so +on.—Let it then be said that the various powers of the +pradhâna to which the variety of its effects is pointing are +its parts.—Well, we reply, those various powers are admitted +by us also who see the cause of the world in Brahman.</p> +<p>The same objections lie against the doctrine of the world having +originated from atoms. For on that doctrine one atom when combining +with another must, as it is not made up of parts, enter into the +combination with its whole extent, and as thus no increase of bulk +takes place we do not get beyond the first atom.<a id= +"footnotetag308" name="footnotetag308"></a><a href= +"#footnote308"><sup>308</sup></a> If, on the other hand, you +maintain that the atom enters into the combination with a part +only, you offend against the assumption of the atoms having no +parts.</p> +<p>As therefore all views are equally obnoxious to the objections +raised, the latter cannot be urged against any one view in +particular, and the advocate of Brahman has consequently cleared +his doctrine.</p> +<p>30. And (the highest divinity is) endowed with all (powers) +because that is seen (from Scripture).</p> +<p>We have stated that this multiform world of effects is possible +to Brahman, because, although one only, it is endowed with various +powers.—How then—it may be asked—do you know that +the highest Brahman is endowed with various powers?—He is, we +reply, endowed with all powers, 'because that is seen.' For various +scriptural passages declare that the highest divinity possesses all +powers, 'He to whom all actions, all desires, all odours, all +tastes belong, he who embraces all this, who never speaks, and is +<span class="pagenum"><a name="page355" id= +"page355"></a>{355}</span> never surprised' (Ch. Up. III, 14, 4); +'He who desires what is true and imagines what is true' (Ch. Up. +VIII, 7, 1); 'He who knows all (in its totality), and cognizes all +(in its detail') (Mu. Up. I, 1, 9); 'By the command of that +Imperishable, O Gárgì, sun and moon stand apart' +(B<i>ri</i>. Up. III, 8, 9); and other similar passages.</p> +<p>31. If it be said that (Brahman is devoid of powers) on account +of the absence of organs; (we reply that) this has been explained +(before).</p> +<p>Let this be granted.—Scripture, however, declares the +highest divinity to be without (bodily) organs of action<a id= +"footnotetag309" name="footnotetag309"></a><a href= +"#footnote309"><sup>309</sup></a>; so, for instance, in the +passage, 'It is without eyes, without ears, without speech, without +mind' (B<i>ri</i>. Up. III, 8, 8). Being such, how should it be +able to produce effects, although it may be endowed with all +powers? For we know (from mantras, arthavâdas, &c.) that +the gods and other intelligent beings, though endowed with all +powers, are capable of producing certain effects only because they +are furnished with bodily instruments of action. And, moreover, how +can the divinity, to whom the scriptural passage, 'No, no,' denies +all attributes, be endowed with all powers?</p> +<p>The appropriate reply to this question has been already given +above. The transcendent highest Brahman can be fathomed by means of +Scripture only, not by mere reasoning. Nor are we obliged to assume +that the capacity of one being is exactly like that which is +observed in another. It has likewise been explained above that +although all qualities are denied of Brahman we nevertheless may +consider it to be endowed with powers, if we assume in its nature +an element of plurality, which is the mere figment of Nescience. +Moreover, a scriptural passage ('Grasping without hands, hastening +without feet, he sees without eyes, he hears without ears' +<i>S</i>ve. Up. III, 19) declares that Brahman <span class= +"pagenum"><a name="page356" id="page356"></a>{356}</span> although +devoid of bodily organs, possesses all possible capacities.</p> +<p>32. (Brahman is) not (the creator of the world), on account of +(beings engaging in any action) having a motive.</p> +<p>Another objection is raised against the doctrine of an +intelligent cause of the world.—The intelligent highest Self +cannot be the creator of the sphere of this world, 'on account of +actions having a purpose.'—We know from ordinary experience +that man, who is an intelligent being, begins to act after due +consideration only, and does not engage even in an unimportant +undertaking unless it serves some purpose of his own; much less so +in important business. There is also a scriptural passage +confirming this result of common experience, 'Verily everything is +not dear that you may have everything; but that you may love the +Self therefore everything is dear' (B<i>ri</i>. Up. II, 4, 5). Now +the undertaking of creating the sphere of this world, with all its +various contents, is certainly a weighty one. If, then, on the one +hand, you assume it to serve some purpose of the intelligent +highest Self, you thereby sublate its self-sufficiency vouched for +by Scripture; if, on the other hand, you affirm absence of motive +on its part, you must affirm absence of activity also.—Let us +then assume that just as sometimes an intelligent person when in a +state of frenzy proceeds, owing to his mental aberration, to action +without a motive, so the highest Self also created this world +without any motive.—That, we reply, would contradict the +omniscience of the highest Self, which is vouched for by +Scripture.—Hence the doctrine of the creation proceeding from +an intelligent Being is untenable.</p> +<p>33. But (Brahman's creative activity) is mere sport, such as we +see in ordinary life.</p> +<p>The word 'but' discards the objection raised.—We see in +every-day life that certain doings of princes or other men of high +position who have no unfulfilled desires left have no <span class= +"pagenum"><a name="page357" id="page357"></a>{357}</span> reference +to any extraneous purpose; but proceed from mere sportfulness, as, +for instance, their recreations in places of amusement. We further +see that the process of inhalation and exhalation is going on +without reference to any extraneous purpose, merely following the +law of its own nature. Analogously, the activity of the Lord also +may be supposed to be mere sport, proceeding from his own +nature<a id="footnotetag310" name="footnotetag310"></a><a href= +"#footnote310"><sup>310</sup></a>, without reference to any +purpose. For on the ground neither of reason nor of Scripture can +we construe any other purpose of the Lord. Nor can his nature be +questioned.<a id="footnotetag311" name= +"footnotetag311"></a><a href="#footnote311"><sup>311</sup></a>—Although +the creation of this world appears to us a weighty and difficult +undertaking, it is mere play to the Lord, whose power is unlimited. +And if in ordinary life we might possibly, by close scrutiny, +detect some subtle motive, even for sportful action, we cannot do +so with regard to the actions of the Lord, all whose wishes are +fulfilled, as Scripture says.—Nor can it be said that he +either does not act or acts like a senseless person; for Scripture +affirms the fact of the creation on the one hand, and the Lord's +omniscience on the other hand. And, finally, we must remember that +the scriptural doctrine of creation does not refer to the highest +reality; it refers to the apparent world only, which is +characterised by name and form, the figments of Nescience, and it, +moreover, aims at intimating that Brahman is the Self of +everything.</p> +<p>34. Inequality (of dispensation) and cruelty (the Lord can) not +(be reproached with), on account of <span class="pagenum"><a name= +"page358" id="page358"></a>{358}</span> his regarding (merit and +demerit); for so (Scripture) declares.</p> +<p>In order to strengthen the tenet which we are at present +defending, we follow the procedure of him who shakes a pole planted +in the ground (in order to test whether it is firmly planted), and +raise another objection against the doctrine of the Lord being the +cause of the world.—The Lord, it is said, cannot be the cause +of the world, because, on that hypothesis, the reproach of +inequality of dispensation and cruelty would attach to him. Some +beings, viz. the gods and others, he renders eminently happy; +others, as for instance the animals, eminently unhappy; to some +again, as for instance men, he allots an intermediate position. To +a Lord bringing about such an unequal condition of things, passion +and malice would have to be ascribed, just as to any common person +acting similarly; which attributes would be contrary to the +essential goodness of the Lord affirmed by <i>S</i>ruti and +Sm<i>ri</i>ti. Moreover, as the infliction of pain and the final +destruction of all creatures would form part of his dispensation, +he would have to be taxed with great cruelty, a quality abhorred by +low people even. For these two reasons Brahman cannot be the cause +of the world.</p> +<p>The Lord, we reply, cannot be reproached with inequality of +dispensation and cruelty, "because he is bound by regards." If the +Lord on his own account, without any extraneous regards, produced +this unequal creation, he would expose himself to blame; but the +fact is, that in creating he is bound by certain regards, i.e. he +has to look to merit and demerit. Hence the circumstance of the +creation being unequal is due to the merit and demerit of the +living creatures created, and is not a fault for which the Lord is +to blame. The position of the Lord is to be looked on as analogous +to that of Parjanya, the Giver of rain. For as Parjanya is the +common cause of the production of rice, barley, and other plants, +while the difference between the various species is due to the +various potentialities lying hidden in the respective seeds, so the +Lord is the common cause of the creation of gods, men, &c., +while the differences between these classes of beings <span class= +"pagenum"><a name="page359" id="page359"></a>{359}</span> are due +to the different merit belonging to the individual souls. Hence the +Lord, being bound by regards, cannot be reproached with inequality +of dispensation and cruelty.—And if we are asked how we come +to know that the Lord, in creating this world with its various +conditions, is bound by regards, we reply that Scripture declares +that; compare, for instance, the two following passages, 'For he +(the Lord) makes him, whom he wishes to lead up from these worlds, +do a good deed; and the same makes him, whom he wishes to lead down +from these worlds, do a bad deed' (Kaush. Up. III, 8)<a id= +"footnotetag312" name="footnotetag312"></a><a href= +"#footnote312"><sup>312</sup></a>; and, 'A man becomes good by good +work, bad by bad work' (B<i>ri</i>. Up. III, 2, 13). Sm<i>ri</i>ti +passages also declare the favour of the Lord and its opposite to +depend on the different quality of the works of living beings; so, +for instance, 'I serve men in the way in which they approach me' +(Bha. Gî. IV, 11).</p> +<p>35. If it be objected that it (viz. the Lord's having regard to +merit and demerit) is impossible on account of the non-distinction +(of merit and demerit, previous to the first creation); we refute +the objection on the ground of (the world) being without a +beginning.</p> +<p>But—an objection is raised—the passage, 'Being only +this was in the beginning, one, without a second,' affirms that +before the creation there was no distinction and consequently no +merit on account of which the creation might have become unequal. +And if we assume the Lord to have been guided in his dispensations +by the actions of living beings subsequent to the creation, we +involve ourselves in the circular reasoning that work depends on +diversity of <span class="pagenum"><a name="page360" id= +"page360"></a>{360}</span> condition of life, and diversity of +condition again on work. The Lord may be considered as acting with +regard to religious merit after distinction had once arisen; but as +before that the cause of inequality, viz. merit, did not exist, it +follows that the first creation must have been free, from +inequalities.</p> +<p>This objection we meet by the remark, that the transmigratory +world is without beginning.—The objection would be valid if +the world had a beginning; but as it is without beginning, merit +and inequality are, like seed and sprout, caused as well as causes, +and there is therefore no logical objection to their +operation.—To the question how we know that the world is +without a beginning, the next Sûtra replies.</p> +<p>36. (The beginninglessness of the world) recommends itself to +reason and is seen (from Scripture).</p> +<p>The beginninglessness of the world recommends itself to reason. +For if it had a beginning it would follow that, the world springing +into existence without a cause, the released souls also would again +enter into the circle of transmigratory existence; and further, as +then there would exist no determining cause of the unequal +dispensation of pleasure and pain, we should have to acquire in the +doctrine of rewards and punishments being allotted, without +reference to previous good or bad action. That the Lord is not the +cause of the inequality, has already been remarked. Nor can +Nescience by itself be the cause, and it is of a uniform nature. On +the other hand, Nescience may be the cause of inequality, if it be +considered as having regard to merit accruing from action produced +by the mental impressions or wrath, hatred, and other afflicting +passions<a id="footnotetag313" name="footnotetag313"></a><a href= +"#footnote313"><sup>313</sup></a>. Without merit and demerit nobody +can enter into existence, and again, without a body merit and +demerit cannot be formed; so that—on the doctrine +<span class="pagenum"><a name="page361" id= +"page361"></a>{361}</span> of the world having a beginning—we +are led into a logical see-saw. The opposite doctrine, on the other +hand, explains all matters in a manner analogous to the case of the +seed and sprout, so that no difficulty remains.—Moreover, the +fact of the world being without a beginning, is seen in +<i>S</i>ruti and Sm<i>ri</i>ti. In the first place, we have the +scriptural passage, 'Let me enter with this living Self +(jîva)', &c. (Ch. Up. VI, 3, 2). Here the circumstance of +the embodied Self (the individual soul) being called, previously to +creation, 'the living Self'—a name applying to it in so far +as it is the sustaining principle of the +prâ<i>n</i>as—shows that this phenomenal world is +without a beginning. For if it had a beginning, the +prâ<i>n</i>as would not exist before that beginning, and how +then could the embodied Self be denoted, with reference to the time +of the world's beginning, by a name which depends on the existence +of those prâ<i>n</i>as. Nor can it be said that it is so +designated with a view to its future relation to the +prâ<i>n</i>as; it being a settled principle that a past +relation, as being already existing, is of greater force than a +mere future relation.—Moreover, we have the mantra, 'As the +creator formerly devised (akalpaya) sun and moon (<i>Ri</i>. +Sa<i>m</i>h. X, 190, 3), which intimates the existence of former +Kalpas. Sm<i>ri</i>ti also declares the world to be without a +beginning, 'Neither its form is known here, nor its end, nor its +beginning, nor its support' (Bha. Gî. XV, 3). And the +Purâ<i>n</i>a also declares that there is no measure of the +past and the future Kalpas.</p> +<p>37. And because all the qualities (required in the cause of the +world) are present (in Brahman).</p> +<p>The teacher has now refuted all the objections, such as +difference of character, and the like, which other teachers have +brought forward against what he had established as the real sense +of the Veda, viz. that the intelligent Brahman is the cause and +matter of this world.</p> +<p>Now, before entering on a new chapter, whose chief aim it will +be to refute the (positive) opinions held by other teachers, he +sums up the foregoing chapter, the purport of which <span class= +"pagenum"><a name="page362" id="page362"></a>{362}</span> it was to +show why his view should be accepted.—Because, if that +Brahman is acknowledged as the cause of the world, all attributes +required in the cause (of the world) are seen to be +present—Brahman being all-knowing, all-powerful, and +possessing the great power of Mâyâ,—on that +account this our system, founded on the Upanishads, is not open to +any objections.</p> +<p>Notes:</p> +<blockquote class="footnote"><a id="footnote253" name= +"footnote253"></a><b>Footnote 253:</b><a href= +"#footnotetag253">(return)</a> +<p>The Sm<i>ri</i>ti called Tantra is the +Sâ@nkhya<i>s</i>âstra as taught by Kapila; the +Sm<i>ri</i>ti-writers depending on him are Âsuri, +Pa<i>ñk</i>a<i>s</i>ikha, and others.</p> +</blockquote> +<blockquote class="footnote"><a id="footnote254" name= +"footnote254"></a><b>Footnote 254:</b><a href= +"#footnotetag254">(return)</a> +<p>Mîmâ<i>m</i>sâ Sû. I, 1, 2: +<i>k</i>odanâlaksha<i>n</i>osxrtho dharma<i>h</i>. +Commentary: <i>k</i>odanâ iti kriyâyâ<i>h</i> +pravartaka<i>m</i> va<i>k</i>anam âhu<i>h</i>.</p> +</blockquote> +<blockquote class="footnote"><a id="footnote255" name= +"footnote255"></a><b>Footnote 255:</b><a href= +"#footnotetag255">(return)</a> +<p>Purushârtha; in opposition to the rules referred to in the +preceding sentence which are kratvartha, i.e. the acting according +to which secures the proper performance of certain rites.</p> +</blockquote> +<blockquote class="footnote"><a id="footnote256" name= +"footnote256"></a><b>Footnote 256:</b><a href= +"#footnotetag256">(return)</a> +<p>It having been decided by the Pûrvâ +Mîmâ<i>m</i>sâ already that Sm<i>ri</i>tis +contradicted by <i>S</i>ruti are to be disregarded.</p> +</blockquote> +<blockquote class="footnote"><a id="footnote257" name= +"footnote257"></a><b>Footnote 257:</b><a href= +"#footnotetag257">(return)</a> +<p>On the meaning of 'kapila' in the above passage, compare the +Introduction to the Upanishads, translated by Max Müller, vol. +ii, p. xxxviii ff.—As will be seen later on, <i>S</i>a@nkara, +in this bhâshya, takes the Kapila referred to to be some +<i>ri</i>shi.</p> +</blockquote> +<blockquote class="footnote"><a id="footnote258" name= +"footnote258"></a><b>Footnote 258:</b><a href= +"#footnotetag258">(return)</a> +<p>I.e. religious duty is known only from the injunctive passages +of the Veda.</p> +</blockquote> +<blockquote class="footnote"><a id="footnote259" name= +"footnote259"></a><b>Footnote 259:</b><a href= +"#footnotetag259">(return)</a> +<p>After it has been shown that Kapila the dvaitavâdin is not +mentioned in <i>S</i>ruti, it is now shown that Manu the +sarvâtmavâdin is mentioned there.</p> +</blockquote> +<blockquote class="footnote"><a id="footnote260" name= +"footnote260"></a><b>Footnote 260:</b><a href= +"#footnotetag260">(return)</a> +<p>In which passage the phrase 'to be meditated upon' +(nididhyâsâ) indicates the act of mental concentration +characteristic of the Yoga.</p> +</blockquote> +<blockquote class="footnote"><a id="footnote261" name= +"footnote261"></a><b>Footnote 261:</b><a href= +"#footnotetag261">(return)</a> +<p>The ash<i>t</i>akâs (certain oblations to be made on the +eighth days after the full moons of the seasons hemanta and +<i>s</i>i<i>s</i>ira) furnish the stock illustration for the +doctrine of the Pûrvâ Mim. that Sm<i>ri</i>ti is +authoritative in so far as it is based on <i>S</i>ruti.</p> +</blockquote> +<blockquote class="footnote"><a id="footnote262" name= +"footnote262"></a><b>Footnote 262:</b><a href= +"#footnotetag262">(return)</a> +<p>But why—it will be asked—do you apply yourself to +the refutation of the Sâ@nkhya and Yoga only, and not also to +that of other Sm<i>ri</i>tis conflicting with the Vedânta +views?</p> +</blockquote> +<blockquote class="footnote"><a id="footnote263" name= +"footnote263"></a><b>Footnote 263:</b><a href= +"#footnotetag263">(return)</a> +<p>I.e. from the fact of these terms being employed in a passage +standing close to other passages which refer to Vedic +knowledge.</p> +</blockquote> +<blockquote class="footnote"><a id="footnote264" name= +"footnote264"></a><b>Footnote 264:</b><a href= +"#footnotetag264">(return)</a> +<p>The cognition of Brahman terminates in an act of anubhava; hence +as it has been shown that reasoning is more closely connected with +anubhava than <i>S</i>ruti is, we have the right to apply reasoning +to <i>S</i>ruti.—Ânanda Giri comments on the passage +from anubhavâvasânam as follows: +brahmasâkshâtkârasya mokshopâyatayâ +prâdhânyât tatra <i>s</i>abdâd api +parokshago<i>k</i>arâd +aparokshârthasâdharmyago<i>k</i>aras tarkosxntara@ngam +iti tasyaiva balavatvam ity artha<i>h</i>. +Aitihyamâtre<i>n</i>a +pravâdapâramparyamâtre<i>n</i>a parokshatayeti +yâvat. Anubhavasya prâdhânye +tarkasyoktanyâyena tasminn antara@ngatvâd +âgamasya <i>k</i>a bahira@ngatvâd +antara@ngabahira@ngayor antara@nga<i>m</i> balavad ity +nyâyâd ukta<i>m</i> tarkasya balavattvam. +Anubhavaprâdhânya<i>m</i> tu nâdyâpi +siddham ity â<i>s</i>a@nkyâhânubhaveti. Nanu +Brahmaj<i>ñ</i>âdna<i>m</i> vaidikatvâd +dharmavad ad<i>ri</i>sh<i>t</i>aphalam esh<i>t</i>avya<i>m</i> tat +kutosxsyânubhavâvasânâvidyânivartakatva<i> +m</i> tatrâha moksheti. +Adhish<i>th</i>ânasâkshâtkârasya +<i>s</i>uktyâdj<i>ñ</i>âne +tadavidyâtatkâryanivartakatvad<i>ri</i>sh<i>t</i>e<i>h</i>, +brahmaj<i>ñ</i>ânasyâpi tarkava<i>s</i>âd +asambhâvanâdinirâsadvârâ +sâkshâtkârâvasâyinas +tadavidyâdinivartakatvenaiva muktihetuteti +nâd<i>ri</i>sh<i>t</i>aphalatety artha<i>h</i>.</p> +</blockquote> +<blockquote class="footnote"><a id="footnote265" name= +"footnote265"></a><b>Footnote 265:</b><a href= +"#footnotetag265">(return)</a> +<p>Nirati<i>s</i>ayâ<i>h</i>, +upajanâpâyadharma<i>s</i>ûnyatva<i>m</i> +nirati<i>s</i>ayatvam. Ân. Gi.</p> +</blockquote> +<blockquote class="footnote"><a id="footnote266" name= +"footnote266"></a><b>Footnote 266:</b><a href= +"#footnotetag266">(return)</a> +<p>A sentence replying to the possible objection that the world, as +being the effect of the intelligent Brahman, might itself be +intelligent.</p> +</blockquote> +<blockquote class="footnote"><a id="footnote267" name= +"footnote267"></a><b>Footnote 267:</b><a href= +"#footnotetag267">(return)</a> +<p>In the case of things commonly considered non-intelligent, +intelligence is not influenced by an internal organ, and on that +account remains unperceived; samaste jagati satoszpi +<i>k</i>aitanyasya tatra +tatrânta<i>h</i>kara<i>n</i>apari<i>n</i>âmânuparâgâd +anupalabdhir aviruddhâ. Ân. Gi.</p> +</blockquote> +<blockquote class="footnote"><a id="footnote268" name= +"footnote268"></a><b>Footnote 268:</b><a href= +"#footnotetag268">(return)</a> +<p>On î<i>s</i>vara in the above meaning, compare Deussen, p. +69, note 41.</p> +</blockquote> +<blockquote class="footnote"><a id="footnote269" name= +"footnote269"></a><b>Footnote 269:</b><a href= +"#footnotetag269">(return)</a> +<p>The line 'prak<i>ri</i>tibhya<i>h</i> param,' &c. is wanting +in all MSS. I have consulted.</p> +</blockquote> +<blockquote class="footnote"><a id="footnote270" name= +"footnote270"></a><b>Footnote 270:</b><a href= +"#footnotetag270">(return)</a> +<p>Ânanda Giri on the above passage: +<i>s</i>rutyâkâ@nkshita<i>m</i> tarkam eva +mananavidhivishayam udâharati svapnânteti. +Svapnajâgaritayor mithovyabhi<i>k</i>ârâd +âtmana<i>h</i> svabhâvatas +tadvattvâbhâvâd avasthâ dvayena tasya +svatosxsa<i>m</i>p<i>ri</i>ktatvam ato +jîvasyâvasthâvatvena nâbrahmatvam ity +artha<i>h</i>. Tathâpi +dehâditâdâtmyenâtmano bhâvân na +ni<i>h</i>prapa<i>ñk</i>abrahmatety +â<i>s</i>a@nkyâha sa<i>m</i>prasâde <i>k</i>eti. +Satâ somya tadâ sa<i>m</i>panno bhavatîti +<i>s</i>rute<i>h</i> sushupte +ni<i>h</i>prapa<i>ñk</i>asadâtmatvâvagamâd +âtmanas tathâvidhabrahmatvasiddhir ity artha<i>h</i>. +Dvaitagrâhipratyakshâdivirodhât katham +âtmanosxdvitîyabrahmatvam ity â<i>s</i>a@nkya +tajjatvâdihetunâ +brahmâtiriktavastvabhâvasiddher +adhyakshâdînâm +atatvâvedakaprâmâ<i>n</i>yâd +avirodhâd yuktam âtmano xsvitîyabrahmatvam ity +âha prapa<i>ñk</i>asyeti.</p> +</blockquote> +<blockquote class="footnote"><a id="footnote271" name= +"footnote271"></a><b>Footnote 271:</b><a href= +"#footnotetag271">(return)</a> +<p>Let us finally assume, merely for argument's sake, that a +vailaksha<i>n</i>ya of cause and effect is not admissible, and +enquire whether that assumption can be reconciled more easily with +an intelligent or a non-intelligent cause of the world.</p> +</blockquote> +<blockquote class="footnote"><a id="footnote272" name= +"footnote272"></a><b>Footnote 272:</b><a href= +"#footnotetag272">(return)</a> +<p>Nanu pralayakâle kâryadharmâ<i>s</i> +<i>k</i>en nâvatish<i>th</i>eran na tarhi +kâra<i>n</i>adharmâ api tish<i>th</i>eyus tayor +abhedât tatrâhânanyatveszpîti. Ân. +Gi.</p> +</blockquote> +<blockquote class="footnote"><a id="footnote273" name= +"footnote273"></a><b>Footnote 273:</b><a href= +"#footnotetag273">(return)</a> +<p>For if they are effects of the pradhâna they must as such +be reabsorbed into it at the time of general reabsorption.</p> +</blockquote> +<blockquote class="footnote"><a id="footnote274" name= +"footnote274"></a><b>Footnote 274:</b><a href= +"#footnotetag274">(return)</a> +<p>And that the Vedânta view is preferable because the +nullity of the objections has already been demonstrated in its +case.</p> +</blockquote> +<blockquote class="footnote"><a id="footnote275" name= +"footnote275"></a><b>Footnote 275:</b><a href= +"#footnotetag275">(return)</a> +<p>The whole style of argumentation of the +Mîmâ<i>m</i>sâ would be impossible, if all +reasoning were sound; for then no pûrvapaksha view could be +maintained.</p> +</blockquote> +<blockquote class="footnote"><a id="footnote276" name= +"footnote276"></a><b>Footnote 276:</b><a href= +"#footnotetag276">(return)</a> +<p>The following arthavâda-passage, for instance, 'the +sacrificial post is the sun,' is to be taken in a metaphorical +sense; because perception renders it impossible for us to take it +in its literal meaning.</p> +</blockquote> +<blockquote class="footnote"><a id="footnote277" name= +"footnote277"></a><b>Footnote 277:</b><a href= +"#footnotetag277">(return)</a> +<p>Which are to be known from the Veda only.</p> +</blockquote> +<blockquote class="footnote"><a id="footnote278" name= +"footnote278"></a><b>Footnote 278:</b><a href= +"#footnotetag278">(return)</a> +<p>Pari<i>n</i>âmavâdam avalambyâpâtato +virodha<i>m</i> samadhâya vivartavâdam +â<i>s</i>ritya paramasamâdhânam âha. +Ân. Gi.</p> +</blockquote> +<blockquote class="footnote"><a id="footnote279" name= +"footnote279"></a><b>Footnote 279:</b><a href= +"#footnotetag279">(return)</a> +<p>Ânanda Giri construes differently: etad uktam iti, +paramârthato vij<i>ñ</i>âtam iti +sambandha<i>h</i>.</p> +</blockquote> +<blockquote class="footnote"><a id="footnote280" name= +"footnote280"></a><b>Footnote 280:</b><a href= +"#footnotetag280">(return)</a> +<p>D<i>ri</i>sh<i>t</i>eti kadâ<i>k</i>id +dr<i>ri</i>sh<i>t</i>a<i>m</i> punar nash<i>t</i>am anityam iti +yâvat.—D<i>ri</i>sh<i>t</i>agraha<i>n</i>asû<i>k</i>ita<i> +m</i> pratîtikâlesxpi sattârâhitya<i>m</i> +tatraiva hetvantaram âha svarûpe<i>n</i>eti. Ân. +Gi.</p> +</blockquote> +<blockquote class="footnote"><a id="footnote281" name= +"footnote281"></a><b>Footnote 281:</b><a href= +"#footnotetag281">(return)</a> +<p>In the passage alluded to he is called so by implication, being +compared to the 'false-minded' thief who, knowing himself to be +guilty, undergoes the ordeal of the heated hatchet.</p> +</blockquote> +<blockquote class="footnote"><a id="footnote282" name= +"footnote282"></a><b>Footnote 282:</b><a href= +"#footnotetag282">(return)</a> +<p>I.e. ordinary experience does not teach us that real effects +spring from unreal causes.</p> +</blockquote> +<blockquote class="footnote"><a id="footnote283" name= +"footnote283"></a><b>Footnote 283:</b><a href= +"#footnotetag283">(return)</a> +<p>Svapnajâgraddehayor vyabhi<i>k</i>ârezpi +pratyabhij<i>ñ</i>ânât +tadanugatâtmaikyasiddhe<i>s</i> <i>k</i>aitanyasya <i>k</i>a +dehadharmatve rûtmano dehadvayâtiredkasiddher +dehâtrâtmavâdo na yukta ity artha<i>h</i>. +Ân. Gi.</p> +</blockquote> +<blockquote class="footnote"><a id="footnote284" name= +"footnote284"></a><b>Footnote 284:</b><a href= +"#footnotetag284">(return)</a> +<p>As long as the 'vyavahâra' presents itself to our mind, we +might feel inclined to assume in Brahman an element of manifoldness +whereby to account for the vyavahâra; but as soon as we +arrive at true knowledge, the vyavahâra vanishes, and there +remains no longer any reason for qualifying in any way the absolute +unity of Brahman.</p> +</blockquote> +<blockquote class="footnote"><a id="footnote285" name= +"footnote285"></a><b>Footnote 285:</b><a href= +"#footnotetag285">(return)</a> +<p>Tatreti, +s<i>ri</i>sh<i>t</i>yâdi<i>s</i>rutînâ<i>m</i> +svârthe phatavaikalye satîti yâvat. Ân. +Gi.</p> +</blockquote> +<blockquote class="footnote"><a id="footnote286" name= +"footnote286"></a><b>Footnote 286:</b><a href= +"#footnotetag286">(return)</a> +<p>A Mîmâ<i>m</i>sâ principle. A sacrificial act, +for instance, is independent when a special result is assigned to +it by the sacred texts; an act which is enjoined without such a +specification is merely auxiliary to another act.</p> +</blockquote> +<blockquote class="footnote"><a id="footnote287" name= +"footnote287"></a><b>Footnote 287:</b><a href= +"#footnotetag287">(return)</a> +<p>According to the <i>S</i>rutî 'in whatever mode he +worships him into that mode he passes himself.'</p> +</blockquote> +<blockquote class="footnote"><a id="footnote288" name= +"footnote288"></a><b>Footnote 288:</b><a href= +"#footnotetag288">(return)</a> +<p>Tattvânyatvâbhyâm iti, na hîsvaratvena +te niru<i>k</i>yete ja<i>d</i>âjadayor +abhedâyogât nâpi tatoxnyatvenax niruktim +arhata<i>h</i> svâtantrye<i>n</i>a +sattâsphûrtyasambhavât na hi j<i>ad</i>am +aga<i>d</i>ânapekshya<i>m</i> sattâsphûrtimad +upalakshyate ja<i>d</i>atvabha@ngaprasa@ngât tasmâd +avidyâtmake nâmarûpe ity artha<i>h</i>. Ân. +Gi.</p> +</blockquote> +<blockquote class="footnote"><a id="footnote289" name= +"footnote289"></a><b>Footnote 289:</b><a href= +"#footnotetag289">(return)</a> +<p>So that from the instance of the potter and the jar we cannot +conclude that the relation of clay and the jar is only that of +nimitta and naimittika, not that of non-difference.</p> +</blockquote> +<blockquote class="footnote"><a id="footnote290" name= +"footnote290"></a><b>Footnote 290:</b><a href= +"#footnotetag290">(return)</a> +<p>For instance, smoke extending in a long line whose base is +connected with some object on the surface of the earth.</p> +</blockquote> +<blockquote class="footnote"><a id="footnote291" name= +"footnote291"></a><b>Footnote 291:</b><a href= +"#footnotetag291">(return)</a> +<p>I.e. (as Ân. Gi. explains) because we assume the relation +of cause and effect not merely on the ground of the actual +existence of one thing depending on that upon another, but on the +additional ground of the mental existence, the consciousness of the +one not being possible without the consciousness of the +other.—Tadbhâvânuvidhâyibhâvatvam +tadbhânânuvidhâyibhânatva<i>m</i> +<i>k</i>â kâryasya kâra<i>n</i>ânanyatve +hetur dhûmavi<i>s</i>eshasya +<i>k</i>âgnibhâvânuvidhâyibhâvatvesxpi +na tadbhânânuvidhâyibhânatvam +agnibhânasya +dhûmabhânâdhînatvât.</p> +</blockquote> +<blockquote class="footnote"><a id="footnote292" name= +"footnote292"></a><b>Footnote 292:</b><a href= +"#footnotetag292">(return)</a> +<p>For simplicity's sake, asat will be translated henceforth by +non-existing.</p> +</blockquote> +<blockquote class="footnote"><a id="footnote293" name= +"footnote293"></a><b>Footnote 293:</b><a href= +"#footnotetag293">(return)</a> +<p>Samavâya, commonly translated by inherence or intimate +relation, is, according to the Nyâya, the relation connecting +a whole and its parts, substances, and qualities, &c.</p> +</blockquote> +<blockquote class="footnote"><a id="footnote294" name= +"footnote294"></a><b>Footnote 294:</b><a href= +"#footnotetag294">(return)</a> +<p>Samavâyasya svâtantryapaksha<i>m</i> dûshayati +anabhyupagamyamâne<i>k</i>eti. Samavâyasya +samavâyibhi<i>h</i> sambandho neshyate ki<i>m</i> tu +svâtantryam evety atrâvayavâvayavinor +dravyagu<i>n</i>âdînâ<i>m</i> <i>k</i>a. +viprakarsha<i>h</i> syât +sa<i>m</i>nidhâyakâbhâvâd ity +artha<i>h</i>. Ân. Gi.</p> +</blockquote> +<blockquote class="footnote"><a id="footnote295" name= +"footnote295"></a><b>Footnote 295:</b><a href= +"#footnotetag295">(return)</a> +<p>A conclusion which is in conflict with the Nyâya tenet +that sa<i>m</i>yoga, conjunction, as, for instance, of the jar and +the ground on which it stands, is a quality (gu<i>n</i>a) inherent +in the two conjoined substances by means of the samavaya +relation.</p> +</blockquote> +<blockquote class="footnote"><a id="footnote296" name= +"footnote296"></a><b>Footnote 296:</b><a href= +"#footnotetag296">(return)</a> +<p>So that the whole can be apprehended by us as such if we +apprehend a certain part only; analogously to our apprehending the +whole thread on which a garland of flowers is strung as soon as we +apprehend some few of the flowers.</p> +</blockquote> +<blockquote class="footnote"><a id="footnote297" name= +"footnote297"></a><b>Footnote 297:</b><a href= +"#footnotetag297">(return)</a> +<p>Kalpântaram utthâpayati atheti, tathâ +<i>k</i>a yathâvayavai<i>h</i> sûtra<i>m</i> +kusumâni vyâpnuvat katipayakusumagraha<i>n</i>expi +g<i>r</i>ihyate tathâ katipayavayavagraha<i>n</i>expi bhavaty +avayavino graha<i>n</i>am ity artha<i>h</i>. Tatra kim +ârambhakâvayavair eva teshv avayavî vartteta +ki<i>m</i> vâ tadatiriklâvayavair iti +vikalpyâdyam pratyâha tadâpîti. Yatra yad +varttate tat tadatiriktâvayavair eva tatra +vartamâna<i>m</i> drish<i>l</i>am iti +d<i>ri</i>sh<i>t</i>antagarbha<i>m</i> hetum +â<i>k</i>ash<i>l</i>e ko<i>s</i>eti. Dvitîyam +dûshayati anavastheti. +Kalpitânantâvayavavyavahitatayâ +prak<i>ri</i>tâvayavino dûraviprakarshât +tantunish<i>th</i>atvam pa<i>t</i>asya na syâd iti +bhâva<i>h</i>. An. Gi.</p> +</blockquote> +<blockquote class="footnote"><a id="footnote298" name= +"footnote298"></a><b>Footnote 298:</b><a href= +"#footnotetag298">(return)</a> +<p>I.e. a something in which the action inheres; not a causal +agent.</p> +</blockquote> +<blockquote class="footnote"><a id="footnote299" name= +"footnote299"></a><b>Footnote 299:</b><a href= +"#footnotetag299">(return)</a> +<p>Every action, <i>S</i>a@nkâra says, requires an agent, +i.e. a substrate in which the action takes place. If we deny that +the jar exists in the clay even before it is actually originated, +we lose the substrate for the action of origination, i.e. entering +into existence (for the non-existing jar cannot be the substratum +of any action), and have to assume, for that action, other +substrates, such as the operative causes of the jar.</p> +</blockquote> +<blockquote class="footnote"><a id="footnote300" name= +"footnote300"></a><b>Footnote 300:</b><a href= +"#footnotetag300">(return)</a> +<p>Which doctrine will be fully discussed in the second pâda +of this adhyâya.</p> +</blockquote> +<blockquote class="footnote"><a id="footnote301" name= +"footnote301"></a><b>Footnote 301:</b><a href= +"#footnotetag301">(return)</a> +<p>Because it has been shown that cause and effect are identical; +hence if the cause is known, the effect is known also.</p> +</blockquote> +<blockquote class="footnote"><a id="footnote302" name= +"footnote302"></a><b>Footnote 302:</b><a href= +"#footnotetag302">(return)</a> +<p>Which arguments, the commentators say, are hinted at by the +'and' of the Sûtra.</p> +</blockquote> +<blockquote class="footnote"><a id="footnote303" name= +"footnote303"></a><b>Footnote 303:</b><a href= +"#footnotetag303">(return)</a> +<p>The right reading appears to be 'svayam eva <i>k</i>etanâ' +as found in some MSS. Other MSS. read <i>k</i>etana<i>h</i>.</p> +</blockquote> +<blockquote class="footnote"><a id="footnote304" name= +"footnote304"></a><b>Footnote 304:</b><a href= +"#footnotetag304">(return)</a> +<p>Prak<i>ri</i>tibhya iti, +pratyakshad<i>ri</i>sh<i>t</i>apadârthasvabhâvebhyo yat +para<i>m</i> vilaksha<i>n</i>am +â<i>k</i>âryâdyupade<i>s</i>agamya<i>m</i> tad +a<i>k</i>intyam ity arta<i>h</i> Ân. Gi.</p> +</blockquote> +<blockquote class="footnote"><a id="footnote305" name= +"footnote305"></a><b>Footnote 305:</b><a href= +"#footnotetag305">(return)</a> +<p>This is the way in which <i>S</i>a@nkara divides the +Sûtra; Ân. Gi. remarks to 'lokezspo, &c.: +âtmani <i>k</i>eti vyâkhyâya +vi<i>k</i>itrâ<i>s</i> <i>k</i>a hîti +vyâ<i>k</i>ash<i>t</i>e.'</p> +</blockquote> +<blockquote class="footnote"><a id="footnote306" name= +"footnote306"></a><b>Footnote 306:</b><a href= +"#footnotetag306">(return)</a> +<p>So that if it undergoes modifications it must either change in +its entirety, or else—against the assumption—consist of +parts.</p> +</blockquote> +<blockquote class="footnote"><a id="footnote307" name= +"footnote307"></a><b>Footnote 307:</b><a href= +"#footnotetag307">(return)</a> +<p>The last clause precludes the justificatory remark that the +stated difficulties can be avoided if we assume the three +gu<i>n</i>as in combination only to undergo modification; if this +were so the inequality of the different effects could not be +accounted for.</p> +</blockquote> +<blockquote class="footnote"><a id="footnote308" name= +"footnote308"></a><b>Footnote 308:</b><a href= +"#footnotetag308">(return)</a> +<p>As an atom has no parts it cannot enter into partial contact +with another, and the only way in which the two can combine is +entire interpenetration; in consequence of which the compound of +two atoms would not occupy more space than one atom.</p> +</blockquote> +<blockquote class="footnote"><a id="footnote309" name= +"footnote309"></a><b>Footnote 309:</b><a href= +"#footnotetag309">(return)</a> +<p>The Sûtra is concerned with the body only as far as it is +an instrument; the case of extraneous instruments having already +been disposed of in Sûtra 24.</p> +</blockquote> +<blockquote class="footnote"><a id="footnote310" name= +"footnote310"></a><b>Footnote 310:</b><a href= +"#footnotetag310">(return)</a> +<p>The nature (svabhàva) of the Lord is, the commentators +say, Mâyâ joined with time and karman.</p> +</blockquote> +<blockquote class="footnote"><a id="footnote311" name= +"footnote311"></a><b>Footnote 311:</b><a href= +"#footnotetag311">(return)</a> +<p>This clause is an answer to the objection that the Lord might +remain at rest instead of creating a world useless to himself and +the cause of pain to others. For in consequence of his conjunction +with Mâyâ the creation is unavoidable. Go. Ân. +Avidyâ naturally tends towards effects, without any purpose. +Bhâ.</p> +<p>Ân. Gi. remarks: Nanu lîládâv +asmadâdînâm akasmâd eva niv<i>ri</i>tter +api darsanâd î<i>s</i>varasyâpi +mâyâmayyâm lîlâyâm +tathâ-bhâve vinâpi +sa<i>my</i>agj<i>ñ</i>âna<i>m</i> +sa<i>m</i>sârasamu<i>kkh</i>ittir ili tatrâha na +<i>ke</i>ti. Anirvâ<i>ky</i>â khalv avidyâ +paras<i>yes</i>varasya <i>k</i>a. svabhâvo lîleti +<i>kok</i>yate tatra na +prâtîtikasvabhâvâyâm anupapattir +avataratîty artha<i>h</i>.</p> +</blockquote> +<blockquote class="footnote"><a id="footnote312" name= +"footnote312"></a><b>Footnote 312:</b><a href= +"#footnotetag312">(return)</a> +<p>From this passage we must not—the commentators +say—infer injustice on the part of the Lord; for the previous +merit or demerit of a being determines the specific quality of the +actions which he performs in his present existence, the Lord acting +as the common cause only (as Parjanya does).</p> +</blockquote> +<blockquote class="footnote"><a id="footnote313" name= +"footnote313"></a><b>Footnote 313:</b><a href= +"#footnotetag313">(return)</a> +<p>Râgadveshamohâ râgadayas le <i>k</i>a +purusha<i>m</i> dukhâdibhi<i>h</i> +kli<i>s</i>yantîtá kle<i>s</i>âs +tesb<i>âm</i> kartneapia<i>vi</i>uyanugu<i>rr</i>âs +tâbhir áksbipta<i>m</i> +dharmâdilaksbilaksha<i>n</i>a<i>m</i> kurma +tadapekshâvidyâ. Ân. Gi.</p> +</blockquote> +<span class="pagenum"><a name="page363" id= +"page363"></a>{363}</span> <a name="chap-2-2" id="chap-2-2"></a> +<h4>SECOND PADA.</h4> +<center>REVERENCE TO THE HIGHEST SELF!</center> +<p>1. That which is inferred (by the Sâ@nkhyas, viz. the +pradhâna) cannot be the cause (of the world), on account of +the orderly arrangement (of the world) being impossible (on that +hypothesis).</p> +<p>Although it is the object of this system to define the true +meaning of the Vedânta-texts and not, like the science of +Logic, to establish or refute some tenet by mere ratiocination, +still it is incumbent on thorough students of the Vedânta to +refute the Sâ@nkhya and other systems which are obstacles in +the way of perfect knowledge. For this purpose a new chapter is +begun. (Nor must it be said that the refutation of the other +systems ought to have preceded the establishment of the +Vedânta position; for) as the determination of the sense of +the Vedânta-passages directly subserves perfect knowledge, we +have at first, by means of such a determination, established our +own position, since this is a task more important than the +refutation of the views entertained by others.</p> +<p>Here an opponent might come forward and say that we are indeed +entitled to establish our own position, so as to define perfect +knowledge which is the means of release to those desirous of it, +but that no use is apparent of a refutation of other opinions, a +proceeding productive of nothing but hate and anger.—There is +a use, we reply. For there is some danger of men of inferior +intelligence looking upon the Sâ@nkhya and similar systems as +requisite for perfect knowledge, because those systems have a +weighty appearance, have been adopted by authoritative persons, and +profess to lead to perfect knowledge. Such people might therefore +think that those systems with their abstruse arguments <span class= +"pagenum"><a name="page364" id="page364"></a>{364}</span> were +propounded by omniscient sages, and might on that account have +faith in them. For this reason we must endeavour to demonstrate +their intrinsic worthlessness.</p> +<p>But, it might be said, the Sâ@nkhya and similar systems +have already been impugned in several Sûtras of the first +adhyâya (I, 1, 5, 18; I, 4, 28); why, then, controvert them +again?—The task—we reply—which we are now about +to undertake differs from what we have already accomplished. As the +Sâ@nkhyas and other philosophers also quote, in order to +establish their own positions, the Vedânta-passages and +interpret them in such a manner as to make them agree with their +own systems, we have hitherto endeavoured to show that their +interpretations are altogether fallacious. Now, however, we are +going to refute their arguments in an independent manner, without +any reference to the Vedânta-texts.</p> +<p>The Sâ@nkhyas, to make a beginning with them, argue as +follows.—Just as jars, dishes, and other products which +possess the common quality of consisting of clay are seen to have +for their cause clay in general; so we must suppose that all the +outward and inward (i.e. inanimate and animate) effects which are +endowed with the characteristics of pleasure, pain, and +dulness<a id="footnotetag314" name="footnotetag314"></a><a href= +"#footnote314"><sup>314</sup></a> have for their causes pleasure, +pain, and dulness in general. Pleasure, pain, and dulness in their +generality together constitute the threefold pradhâna. This +pradhâna which is non-intelligent evolves itself +spontaneously into multiform modifications<a id="footnotetag315" +name="footnotetag315"></a><a href= +"#footnote315"><sup>315</sup></a>, in order thus to effect the +purposes (i.e. enjoyment, release, and so on) of the intelligent +soul.—The existence of the pradhâna is to be inferred +from other circumstances also, such as the limitation of all +effects and the like<a id="footnotetag316" name= +"footnotetag316"></a><a href="#footnote316"><sup>316</sup></a>.</p> +<p>Against this doctrine we argue as follows.—If you +Sânkhyas base your theory on parallel instances merely, we +point <span class="pagenum"><a name="page365" id= +"page365"></a>{365}</span> out that a non-intelligent thing which, +without being guided by an intelligent being, spontaneously +produces effects capable of subserving the purposes of some +particular person is nowhere observed in the world. We rather +observe that houses, palaces, couches, pleasure-grounds, and the +like—things which according to circumstances are conducive to +the obtainment of pleasure or the avoidance of pain—are made +by workmen endowed with intelligence. Now look at this entire world +which appears, on the one hand, as external (i.e. inanimate) in the +form of earth and the other elements enabling (the souls) to enjoy +the fruits of their various actions, and, on the other hand, as +animate, in the form of bodies which belong to the different +classes of beings, possess a definite arrangement of organs, and +are therefore capable of constituting the abodes of fruition; look, +we say, at this world, of which the most ingenious workmen cannot +even form a conception in their minds, and then say if a +non-intelligent principle like the pradhâna is able to +fashion it! Other non-intelligent things such as stones and clods +of earth are certainly not seen to possess analogous powers. We +rather must assume that just as clay and similar substances are +seen to fashion themselves into various forms, if worked upon by +potters and the like, so the pradhâna also (when modifying +itself into its effects) is ruled by some intelligent principle. +When endeavouring to determine the nature of the primal cause (of +the world), there is no need for us to take our stand on those +attributes only which form part of the nature of material causes +such as clay, &c., and not on those also which belong to +extraneous agents such as potters, &c.<a id="footnotetag317" +name="footnotetag317"></a><a href="#footnote317"><sup>317</sup></a> +Nor (if remembering this latter point) do we enter into conflict +with any means of right knowledge; we, on the contrary, are in +direct agreement with Scripture which teaches that an intelligent +<span class="pagenum"><a name="page366" id= +"page366"></a>{366}</span> cause exists.—For the reason +detailed in the above, i.e. on account of the impossibility of the +'orderly arrangement' (of the world), a non-intelligent cause of +the world is not to be inferred.—The word 'and' (in the +Sûtra) adds other reasons on account of which the +pradhâna cannot be inferred, viz. 'on account of the +non-possibility of endowment,' &c. For it cannot be +maintained<a id="footnotetag318" name="footnotetag318"></a><a href= +"#footnote318"><sup>318</sup></a> that all outward and inward +effects are 'endowed' with the nature of pleasure, pain, and +dulness, because pleasure, &c. are known as inward (mental) +states, while sound, &c. (i.e. the sense-objects) are known as +being of a different nature (i.e. as outward things), and moreover +as being the operative causes of pleasure, &c.<a id= +"footnotetag319" name="footnotetag319"></a><a href= +"#footnote319"><sup>319</sup></a> And, further, although the +sense-object such as sound and so on is one, yet we observe that +owing to the difference of the mental impressions (produced by it) +differences exist in the effects it produces, one person being +affected by it pleasantly, another painfully, and so on<a id= +"footnotetag320" name="footnotetag320"></a><a href= +"#footnote320"><sup>320</sup></a>.—(Turning to the next +Sâ@nkhya argument which infers the existence of the +pradhâna from the limitation of all effects), we remark that +he who concludes that all inward and outward effects depend on a +conjunction of several things, because they are limited (a +conclusion based on the observation that some limited effects such +as roof and sprout, &c. depend on the conjunction of several +things), is driven to the conclusion that the three constituents of +the pradhâna, viz. Goodness, Passion, and Darkness, likewise +depend on the conjunction of several <span class="pagenum"><a name= +"page367" id="page367"></a>{367}</span> antecedents<a id= +"footnotetag321" name="footnotetag321"></a><a href= +"#footnote321"><sup>321</sup></a>; for they also are limited<a id= +"footnotetag322" name="footnotetag322"></a><a href= +"#footnote322"><sup>322</sup></a>.—Further<a id= +"footnotetag323" name="footnotetag323"></a><a href= +"#footnote323"><sup>323</sup></a>, it is impossible to use the +relation of cause and effect as a reason for assuming that all +effects whatever have a non-intelligent principle for their +antecedent; for we have shown already that that relation exists in +the case of couches and chairs also, over whose production +intelligence presides.</p> +<p>2. And on account of (the impossibility of) activity.</p> +<p>Leaving the arrangement of the world, we now pass on to the +activity by which it is produced.—The three gu<i>n</i>as, +passing out of the state of equipoise and entering into the +condition of mutual subordination and superordination, originate +activities tending towards the production of particular +effects.—Now these activities also cannot be ascribed to a +non-intelligent pradhâna left to itself, as no such activity +is seen in clay and similar substances, or in chariots and the +like. For we observe that clay and the like, and +chariots—which are in their own nature +non-intelligent—enter on activities tending towards +particular effects only when they are acted upon by intelligent +beings such as potters, &c. in the one case, and horses and the +like in the other case. From what is seen we determine what is not +seen. Hence a non-intelligent cause of the world is not to be +inferred because, on that hypothesis, the activity without which +the world cannot be produced would be impossible.</p> +<p>But, the Sâ@nkhya rejoins, we do likewise not observe +activity on the part of mere intelligent beings.—True; we +however see activity on the part of non-intelligent things such as +chariots and the like when they are in conjunction with intelligent +beings.—But, the Sâ@nkhya again objects, we never +actually observe activity on the part of an intelligent +<span class="pagenum"><a name="page368" id= +"page368"></a>{368}</span> being even when in conjunction with a +non-intelligent thing.—Very well; the question then arises: +Does the activity belong to that in which it is actually observed +(as the Sâ@nkhya says), or to that on account of the +conjunction with which it is observed (as the Vedântin +avers)?—We must, the Sâ@nkhya replies, attribute +activity to that in which it is actually seen, since both (i.e. the +activity and its abode) are matter of observation. A mere +intelligent being, on the other hand, is never observed as the +abode of activity while a chariot is. The<a id="footnotetag324" +name="footnotetag324"></a><a href="#footnote324"><sup>324</sup></a> +existence of an intelligent Self joined to a body and so on which +are the abode of activity can be established (by inference) only; +the inference being based on the difference observed between living +bodies and mere non-intelligent things, such as chariots and the +like. For this very reason, viz. that intelligence is observed only +where a body is observed while it is never seen without a body, the +Materialists consider intelligence to be a mere attribute of the +body.—Hence activity belongs only to what is +non-intelligent.</p> +<p>To all this we—the Vedântins—make the +following reply.—We do not mean to say that activity does not +belong to those non-intelligent things in which it is observed; it +does indeed belong to them; but it results from an intelligent +principle, because it exists when the latter is present and does +not exist when the latter is absent. Just as the effects of burning +and shining, which have their abode in wood and similar material, +are indeed not observed when there is mere fire (i.e. are not due +to mere fire; as mere fire, i.e. fire without wood, &c., does +not exist), but at the same time result from fire only as they are +seen when fire is present and are not seen when fire is absent; so, +as the Materialists also admit, only intelligent bodies are +observed <span class="pagenum"><a name="page369" id= +"page369"></a>{369}</span> to be the movers of chariots and other +non-intelligent things. The motive power of intelligence is +therefore incontrovertible.—But—an objection will be +raised—your Self even if joined to a body is incapable of +exercising moving power, for motion cannot be effected by that the +nature of which is pure intelligence.—A thing, we reply, +which is itself devoid of motion may nevertheless move other +things. The magnet is itself devoid of motion, and yet it moves +iron; and colours and the other objects of sense, although +themselves devoid of motion, produce movements in the eyes and the +other organs of sense. So the Lord also who is all-present, the +Self of all, all-knowing and all-powerful may, although himself +unmoving, move the universe.—If it finally be objected that +(on the Vedânta doctrine) there is no room for a moving power +as in consequence of the oneness (aduality) of Brahman no motion +can take place; we reply that such objections have repeatedly been +refuted by our pointing to the fact of the Lord being fictitiously +connected with Mâyâ, which consists of name and form +presented by Nescience.—Hence motion can be reconciled with +the doctrine of an all-knowing first cause; but not with the +doctrine of a non-intelligent first cause.</p> +<p>3. If it be said (that the pradhâna moves) like milk or +water, (we reply that) there also (the motion is due to +intelligence).</p> +<p>Well, the Sâ@nkhya resumes, listen then to the following +instances.—As non-sentient milk flows forth from its own +nature merely for the nourishment of the young animal, and as +non-sentient water, from its own nature, flows along for the +benefit of mankind, so the pradhâna also, although +non-intelligent, may be supposed to move from its own nature merely +for the purpose of effecting the highest end of man.</p> +<p>This argumentation, we reply, is unsound again; for as the +adherents of both doctrines admit that motion is not observed in +the case of merely non-intelligent things such as chariots, +&c., we infer that water and milk also move only because they +are directed by intelligent powers. Scriptural passages, moreover +(such as 'He who dwells in <span class="pagenum"><a name="page370" +id="page370"></a>{370}</span> the water and within the water, who +rules the water within,' B<i>ri</i>. Up. III, 7, 4; and, 'By the +command of that Akshara, O Gârgî, some rivers flow to +the East,' &c., B<i>ri</i>. Up. III, 8, 9), declare that +everything in this world which flows is directed by the Lord. Hence +the instances of milk and water as belonging themselves to that +class of cases which prove our general principle<a id= +"footnotetag325" name="footnotetag325"></a><a href= +"#footnote325"><sup>325</sup></a> cannot be used to show that the +latter is too wide.—Moreover, the cow, which is an +intelligent being and loves her calf, makes her milk flow by her +wish to do so, and the milk is in addition drawn forth by the +sucking of the calf. Nor does water move either with absolute +independence—for its flow depends on the declivity of the +soil and similar circumstances—or independently of an +intelligent principle, for we have shown that the latter is present +in all cases.—If, finally, our opponent should point to +Sûtra II, 1, 24 as contradicting the present Sûtra, we +remark that there we have merely shown on the ground of ordinary +experience that an effect may take place in itself independently of +any external instrumental cause; a conclusion which does not +contradict the doctrine, based on Scripture, that all effects +depend on the Lord.</p> +<p>4. And because (the pradhâna), on account of there +existing nothing beyond it, stands in no relation; (it cannot be +active.)</p> +<p>The three gu<i>n</i>as of the Sâ@nkhyas when in a state of +equipoise form the pradhâna. Beyond the pradhâna there +exists no external principle which could either impel the +pradhâna to activity or restrain it from activity. The soul +(purusha), as we know, is indifferent, neither moves to—nor +restrains from—action. As therefore the pradhâna stands +in no relation, it is impossible to see why it should sometimes +modify itself into the great principle (mahat) and sometimes not. +The activity and non-activity (by turns) of the Lord, <span class= +"pagenum"><a name="page371" id="page371"></a>{371}</span> on the +other hand, are not contrary to reason, on account of his +omniscience and omnipotence, and his being connected with the power +of illusion (mâya).</p> +<p>5. Nor (can it be said that the pradhâna modifies itself +spontaneously) like grass, &c. (which turn into milk); for +(milk) does not exist elsewhere (but in the female animal).</p> +<p>Let this be (the Sâ@nkhya resumes). Just as grass, herbs, +water, &c. independently of any other instrumental cause +transform themselves, by their own nature, into milk; so, we +assume, the pradhâna also transforms itself into the great +principle, and so on. And, if you ask how we know that grass +transforms itself independently of any instrumental cause; we +reply, 'Because no such cause is observed.' For if we did perceive +some such cause, we certainly should apply it to grass, &c. +according to our liking, and thereby produce milk. But as a matter +of fact we do no such thing. Hence the transformation of grass and +the like must be considered to be due to its own nature merely; and +we may infer therefrom that the transformation of the +pradhâna is of the same kind.</p> +<p>To this we make the following reply.—The transformation of +the pradhâna might be ascribed to its own nature merely if we +really could admit that grass modifies itself in the manner stated +by you; but we are unable to admit that, since another instrumental +cause is observed. How? 'Because it does not exist elsewhere.' For +grass becomes milk only when it is eaten by a cow or some other +female animal, not if it is left either uneaten or is eaten by a +bull. If the transformation had no special cause, grass would +become milk even on other conditions than that of entering a cow's +body. Nor would the circumstance of men not being able to produce +milk according to their liking prove that there is no instrumental +cause; for while some effects can be produced by men, others result +from divine action only<a id="footnotetag326" name= +"footnotetag326"></a><a href="#footnote326"><sup>326</sup></a>. The +fact, however, is that men also are able, by <span class= +"pagenum"><a name="page372" id="page372"></a>{372}</span> applying +a means in their power, to produce milk from grass and herbs; for +when they wish to procure a more abundant supply of milk they feed +the cow more plentifully and thus obtain more milk from +her.—For these reasons the spontaneous modification of the +pradhâna cannot be proved from the instance of grass and the +like.</p> +<p>6. Even if we admit (the Sâ@nkhya position refuted in what +precedes, it is invalidated by other objections) on account of the +absence of a purpose (on the part of the pradhâna).</p> +<p>Even if we, accommodating ourselves to your (the +Sâ@nkhya's) belief, should admit what has been disproved in +the preceding Sûtra, viz. that the pradhâna is +spontaneously active, still your opinion would lie open to an +objection 'on account of the absence of a purpose.' For if the +spontaneous activity of the pradhâna has, as you say, no +reference to anything else, it will have no reference not only to +any aiding principle, but also to any purpose or motive, and +consequently your doctrine that the pradhâna is active in +order to effect the purpose of man will become untenable. If you +reply that the pradhâna does not indeed regard any aiding +principle, but does regard a purpose, we remark that in that case +we must distinguish between the different possible purposes, viz. +either enjoyment (on the part of the soul), or final release, or +both. If enjoyment, what enjoyment, we ask, can belong to the soul +which is naturally incapable of any accretion (of pleasure or +pain)<a id="footnotetag327" name="footnotetag327"></a><a href= +"#footnote327"><sup>327</sup></a>? Moreover, there would in that +case be no opportunity for release<a id="footnotetag328" name= +"footnotetag328"></a><a href= +"#footnote328"><sup>328</sup></a>.—If release, then the +activity of the pradhâna would be purposeless, as even +antecedently to it the soul is in the <span class= +"pagenum"><a name="page373" id="page373"></a>{373}</span> state of +release; moreover, there would then be no occasion for the +perception of sounds, &c.<a id="footnotetag329" name= +"footnotetag329"></a><a href= +"#footnote329"><sup>329</sup></a>—If both, then, on account +of the infinite number of the objects of pradhâna to be +enjoyed (by the soul)<a id="footnotetag330" name= +"footnotetag330"></a><a href="#footnote330"><sup>330</sup></a>, +there would be no opportunity for final release. Nor can the +satisfaction of a desire be considered as the purpose of the +activity of the pradhâna; for neither the non-intelligent +pradhâna nor the essentially pure soul can feel any +desire.—If, finally, you should assume the pradhâna to +be active, because otherwise the power of sight (belonging to the +soul on account of its intelligent nature) and the creative power +(belonging to the pradhâna) would be purposeless; it would +follow that, as the creative power of the pradhâna does not +cease at any time any more than the soul's power of sight does, the +apparent world would never come to an end, so that no final release +of the soul could take place<a id="footnotetag331" name= +"footnotetag331"></a><a href= +"#footnote331"><sup>331</sup></a>.—It is, therefore, +impossible to maintain that the pradhâna enters on its +activity for the purposes of the soul.</p> +<p>7. And if you say (that the soul may move the pradhâna) as +the (lame) man (moves the blind one) or as the magnet (moves the +iron); thus also (the difficulty is not overcome).</p> +<p>Well then—the Sâ@nkhya resumes, endeavouring to +defend his position by parallel instances—let us say that, as +some lame man devoid of the power of motion, but possessing the +power of sight, having mounted the back of a blind man who is able +to move but not to see, makes the latter move; or as the magnet not +moving itself, moves the iron, so the soul moves the +pradhâna.—Thus also, we reply, you do not free your +doctrine from all shortcomings; for this your new position involves +an abandonment of your old <span class="pagenum"><a name="page374" +id="page374"></a>{374}</span> position, according to which the +pradhâna is moving of itself, and the (indifferent, inactive) +soul possesses no moving power. And how should the indifferent soul +move the pradhâna? A man, although lame, may make a blind man +move by means of words and the like; but the soul which is devoid +of action and qualities cannot possibly put forth any moving +energy. Nor can it be said that it moves the pradhâna by its +mere proximity as the magnet moves the iron; for from the +permanency of proximity (of soul and pradhâna) a permanency +of motion would follow. The proximity of the magnet, on the other +hand (to the iron), is not permanent, but depends on a certain +activity and the adjustment of the magnet in a certain position; +hence the (lame) man and the magnet do not supply really parallel +instances.—The pradhâna then being non-intelligent and +the soul indifferent, and there being no third principle to connect +them, there can be no connexion of the two. If we attempted to +establish a connexion on the ground of capability (of being seen on +the part of the pradhâna, of seeing on the part of the soul), +the permanency of such capability would imply the impossibility of +final release.—Moreover, here as well as before (in the +preceding Sûtra) the different alternatives connected with +the absence of purpose (on the pradhâna's part) have to be +considered<a id="footnotetag332" name="footnotetag332"></a><a href= +"#footnote332"><sup>332</sup></a>.—The highest Self, on the +other hand (which is the cause of the world, according to the +Vedântins), is characterised by non-activity inherent in its +own nature, and, at the same time, by moving power inherent in +Mâyâ and is thus superior (to the soul of the +Sâ@nkhyas).</p> +<p>8. And, again, (the pradhâna cannot be active) because the +relation of principal (and subordinate matter) is impossible +(between the three gu<i>n</i>as).</p> +<p>For the following reason also activity on the part of the +pradhâna is not possible.—The condition of the +pradhâna <span class="pagenum"><a name="page375" id= +"page375"></a>{375}</span> consists in the three gu<i>n</i>as, viz. +goodness, passion, and darkness, abiding in themselves in a state +of equipoise without standing to one another in the relation of +mutual superiority or inferiority. In that state the gu<i>n</i>as +cannot possibly enter into the relation of mutual subserviency +because thereby they would forfeit their essential characteristic, +viz. absolute independence. And as there exists no extraneous +principle to stir up the gu<i>n</i>as, the production of the great +principle and the other effects—which would acquire for its +operative cause a non-balanced state of the gu<i>n</i>as—is +impossible.</p> +<p>9. And although another inference be made, (the objections +remain in force) on account of the (pradhâna) being devoid of +the power of intelligence.</p> +<p>But—the Sâ@nkhya resumes—we draw another +inference, so as to leave no room for the objection just stated. We +do not acknowledge the gu<i>n</i>as to be characterised by absolute +irrelativity and unchangeableness, since there is no proof for such +an assumption. We rather infer the characteristics of the +gu<i>n</i>as from those of their effects, presuming that their +nature must be such as to render the production of the effects +possible. Now the gu<i>n</i>as are admitted to be of an unsteady +nature; hence the gu<i>n</i>as themselves are able to enter into +the relation of mutual inequality, even while they are in a state +of equipoise.</p> +<p>Even in that case, we reply, the objections stated above which +were founded on the impossibility of an orderly arrangement of the +world, &c., remain in force on account of the pradhâna +being devoid of the power of intelligence. And if (to escape those +objections) the Sâ@nkhya should infer (from the orderly +arrangement of the world, &c.), that the primal cause is +intelligent, he would cease to be an antagonist, since the doctrine +that there is one intelligent cause of this multiform world would +be nothing else but the Vedântic doctrine of +Brahman.—Moreover, if the gu<i>n</i>as were capable of +entering into the relation of mutual inequality even while in the +state of equipoise, one of two <span class="pagenum"><a name= +"page376" id="page376"></a>{376}</span> things would happen; they +would either not be in the condition of inequality on account of +the absence of an operative cause; or else, if they were in that +condition, they would always remain in it; the absence of an +operative cause being a non-changing circumstance. And thus the +doctrine would again be open to the objection stated before<a id= +"footnotetag333" name="footnotetag333"></a><a href= +"#footnote333"><sup>333</sup></a>.</p> +<p>10. And moreover (the Sâ@nkhya doctrine) is objectionable +on account of its contradictions.</p> +<p>The doctrine of the Sâ@nkhyas, moreover, is full of +contradictions. Sometimes they enumerate seven senses, sometimes +eleven<a id="footnotetag334" name="footnotetag334"></a><a href= +"#footnote334"><sup>334</sup></a>. In some places they teach that +the subtle elements of material things proceed from the great +principle, in other places again that they proceed from +self-consciousness. Sometimes they speak of three internal organs, +sometimes of one only<a id="footnotetag335" name= +"footnotetag335"></a><a href="#footnote335"><sup>335</sup></a>. +That their doctrine, moreover, contradicts <i>S</i>ruti, which +teaches that the Lord is the cause of the world, and Sm<i>ri</i>ti, +based on <i>S</i>ruti, is well known.—For these reasons also +the Sâ@nkhya system is objectionable.</p> +<p>Here the Sâ@nkhya again brings a countercharge—The +system of the Vedântins also, he says, must be declared to be +objectionable; for it does not admit that that which suffers and +that which causes suffering<a id="footnotetag336" name= +"footnotetag336"></a><a href="#footnote336"><sup>336</sup></a> are +different classes of things (and thereby renders futile the +well-established distinction of causes of suffering and suffering +beings). For <span class="pagenum"><a name="page377" id= +"page377"></a>{377}</span> those who admit the one Brahman to be +the Self of everything and the cause of the whole world, have to +admit also that the two attributes of being that which causes +suffering and that which suffers belong to the one supreme Self +(not to different classes of beings). If, then, these two +attributes belong to one and the same Self, it never can divest +itself of them, and thus Scripture, which teaches perfect knowledge +for the purpose of the cessation of all suffering, loses all its +meaning. For—to adduce a parallel case—a lamp as long +as it subsists as such is never divested of the two qualities of +giving heat and light. And if the Vedântin should adduce the +case of water with its waves, ripples, foam, &c.<a id= +"footnotetag337" name="footnotetag337"></a><a href= +"#footnote337"><sup>337</sup></a>, we remark that there also the +waves, &c. constitute attributes of the water which remain +permanently, although they by turns manifest themselves, and again +enter into the state of non-manifestation; hence the water is never +really destitute of waves, not any more than the lamp is ever +destitute of heat and light.—That that which causes +suffering, and that which suffers constitute different classes of +things is, moreover, well known from ordinary experience. For (to +consider the matter from a more general point of view) the person +desiring and the thing desired<a id="footnotetag338" name= +"footnotetag338"></a><a href="#footnote338"><sup>338</sup></a> are +understood to be separate existences. If the object of desire were +not essentially different and separate from the person desiring, +the state of being desirous could not be ascribed to the latter, +because the object with reference to which alone he can be called +desiring would already essentially be established in him (belong to +him). The latter state of things exists in the case of a lamp and +its light, for instance. Light essentially belongs to the lamp, and +hence the latter never can stand in want of light; for want or +desire can exist only if the thing wanted or desired is not yet +obtained.</p> +<span class="pagenum"><a name="page378" id= +"page378"></a>{378}</span> +<p>(And just as there could be no desiring person, if the object of +desire and the desiring person were not essentially separate), so +the object of desire also would cease to be an object for the +desiring person, and would be an object for itself only. As a +matter of fact, however, this is not the case; for the two ideas +(and terms), 'object of desire' and 'desiring person,' imply a +relation (are correlative), and a relation exists in two things, +not in one only. Hence the desiring person and the object of desire +are separate.—The same holds good with regard to what is not +desired (object of aversion; anartha) and the non-desiring person +(anarthin).</p> +<p>An object of desire is whatever is of advantage to the desiring +person, an object of aversion whatever is of disadvantage; with +both one person enters into relation by turns. On account of the +comparative paucity of the objects of desire, and the comparative +multitude of the objects of aversion, both may be comprised under +the general term, 'object of aversion.' Now, these objects of +aversion we mean when we use the term 'causes of suffering,' while +by the term 'sufferer' we understand the soul which, being one, +enters into successive relations with both (i.e. the objects of +desire and the objects of aversion). If, then, the causes of +suffering and the sufferer constitute one Self (as the +Vedânta teaches), it follows that final release is +impossible.—But if, on the other hand, the two are assumed to +constitute separate classes, the possibility of release is not +excluded, since the cause of the connexion of the two (viz. wrong +knowledge) may be removed.</p> +<p>All this reasoning—we, the Vedântins, reply—is +futile, because on account of the unity of the Self the relation, +whose two terms are the causes of suffering, and the sufferer +cannot exist (in the Self).—Our doctrine would be liable to +your objection if that which causes suffering and that which +suffers did, while belonging to one and the same Self, stand to +each other in the relation of object and subject. But they do not +stand in that relation just because they are one. If fire, although +it possesses different attributes, such as heat and light, and is +capable of change, does neither burn nor illumine itself since it +is one only; how can the <span class="pagenum"><a name="page379" +id="page379"></a>{379}</span> one unchangeable Brahman enter with +reference to itself into the relation of cause of suffering and +sufferer?—Where then, it may be asked, does the relation +discussed (which after all cannot be denied altogether) +exist?—That, we reply, is not difficult to see<a id= +"footnotetag339" name="footnotetag339"></a><a href= +"#footnote339"><sup>339</sup></a>. The living body which is the +object of the action of burning is the sufferer; the sun, for +instance, is a cause of suffering (burning).—But, the +opponent rejoins, burning is a pain, and as such can affect an +intelligent being only, not the non-intelligent body; for if it +were an affection of the mere body, it would, on the destruction of +the body, cease of itself, so that it would be needless to seek for +means to make it cease.—But it is likewise not observed, we +reply, that a mere intelligent being destitute of a body is burned +and suffers pain.—Nor would you (the Sâ@nkhya) also +assume that the affection called burning belongs to a mere +intelligent being. Nor can you admit<a id="footnotetag340" name= +"footnotetag340"></a><a href="#footnote340"><sup>340</sup></a> a +real connexion of the soul and the body, because through such a +connexion impurity and similar imperfections would attach to the +soul<a id="footnotetag341" name="footnotetag341"></a><a href= +"#footnote341"><sup>341</sup></a>. Nor can suffering itself be said +to suffer. And how then, we ask, can you explain the relation +existing between a sufferer and the causes of suffering? If (as a +last refuge) you should maintain that the sattva-gu<i>n</i>a is +that which suffers, and the gu<i>n</i>a called passion that which +causes suffering, we again object, because the intelligent +principle (the soul) cannot be really connected with these +two<a id="footnotetag342" name="footnotetag342"></a><a href= +"#footnote342"><sup>342</sup></a>. And if you should say that the +soul suffers as it were because it leans towards<a id= +"footnotetag343" name="footnotetag343"></a><a href= +"#footnote343"><sup>343</sup></a> the sattva-gu<i>n</i>a, we point +out that the employment of the phrase, 'as it were,' shows that the +soul does not really suffer.</p> +<span class="pagenum"><a name="page380" id= +"page380"></a>{380}</span> +<p>If it is understood that its suffering is not real, we do not +object to the phrase 'as it were<a id="footnotetag344" name= +"footnotetag344"></a><a href="#footnote344"><sup>344</sup></a>.' +For the amphisbena also does not become venomous because it is 'a +serpent as it were' ('like a serpent'), nor does the serpent lose +its venom because it is 'like an amphisbena.' You must therefore +admit that the relation of causes of suffering and of sufferers is +not real, but the effect of Nescience. And if you admit, that, then +my (the Vedântic) doctrine also is free from objections<a id= +"footnotetag345" name="footnotetag345"></a><a href= +"#footnote345"><sup>345</sup></a>.</p> +<p>But perhaps you (the Sâ@nkhya) will say that, after all, +suffering (on the part of the soul) is real<a id="footnotetag346" +name="footnotetag346"></a><a href= +"#footnote346"><sup>346</sup></a>. In that case, however, the +impossibility of release is all the more undeniable<a id= +"footnotetag347" name="footnotetag347"></a><a href= +"#footnote347"><sup>347</sup></a>, especially as the cause of +suffering (viz. the pradhâna) is admitted to be +eternal.—And if (to get out of this difficulty) you maintain +that, although the potentialities of suffering (on the part of the +soul) and of causing suffering (on the part of the pradhâna) +are eternal, yet suffering, in order to become actual, requires the +conjunction of the two—which conjunction in its turn depends +on a special reason, viz. the non-discrimination of the +pradhâna by the soul—and that hence, when that reason +no longer exists, the conjunction of the two comes to an absolute +termination, whereby the absolute release of the soul becomes +possible; we are again unable to accept your explanation, because +that on which the non-discrimination depends, viz. the gu<i>n</i>a, +called Darkness, is acknowledged by you to be eternal.</p> +<span class="pagenum"><a name="page381" id= +"page381"></a>{381}</span> +<p>And as<a id="footnotetag348" name="footnotetag348"></a><a href= +"#footnote348"><sup>348</sup></a> there is no fixed rule for the +(successive) rising and sinking of the influence of the particular +gu<i>n</i>as, there is also no fixed rule for the termination of +the cause which effects the conjunction of soul and pradhâna +(i.e. non-discrimination); hence the disjunction of the two is +uncertain, and so the Sâ@nkhyas cannot escape the reproach of +absence of final release resulting from their doctrine. To the +Vedântin, on the other hand, the idea of final release being +impossible cannot occur in his dreams even; for the Self he +acknowledges to be one only, and one thing cannot enter into the +relation of subject and object, and Scripture, moreover, declares +that the plurality of effects originates from speech only. For the +phenomenal world, on the other hand, we may admit the relation of +sufferer and suffering just as it is observed, and need neither +object to it nor refute it.</p> +<p>Herewith we have refuted the doctrine which holds the +pradhâna to be the cause of the world. We have now to dispose +of the atomic theory.</p> +<p>We begin by refuting an objection raised by the atomists against +the upholders of Brahman.—The Vai<i>s</i>eshikas argue as +follows: The qualities which inhere in the substance constituting +the cause originate qualities of the same kind in the substance +constituting the effect; we see, for instance, that from white +threads white cloth is produced, but do not observe what is +contrary (viz. white threads resulting in a piece of cloth of a +different colour). Hence, if the intelligent Brahman is assumed as +the cause of the world, we should expect to find intelligence +inherent in the effect also, viz. the world. But this is not the +case, and consequently the intelligent Brahman cannot be the cause +of the world.—This reasoning the Sûtrakâra shows +to be fallacious, on the ground of the system of the +Vai<i>s</i>eshikas themselves.</p> +<p>II. Or (the world may originate from Brahman) <span class= +"pagenum"><a name="page382" id="page382"></a>{382}</span> as the +great and the long originate from the short and the atomic.</p> +<p>The system of the Vai<i>s</i>eshikas is the following:—The +atoms which possess, according to their special kind<a id= +"footnotetag349" name="footnotetag349"></a><a href= +"#footnote349"><sup>349</sup></a>, the qualities of colour, +&c., and which are of spherical form<a id="footnotetag350" +name="footnotetag350"></a><a href= +"#footnote350"><sup>350</sup></a>, subsist during a certain +period<a id="footnotetag351" name="footnotetag351"></a><a href= +"#footnote351"><sup>351</sup></a> without producing any +effects<a id="footnotetag352" name="footnotetag352"></a><a href= +"#footnote352"><sup>352</sup></a>. After that, the unseen principle +(ad<i>ri</i>sh<i>ta</i>), &c.<a id="footnotetag353" name= +"footnotetag353"></a><a href="#footnote353"><sup>353</sup></a>, +acting as operative causes and conjunction constituting the +non-inherent cause<a id="footnotetag354" name= +"footnotetag354"></a><a href="#footnote354"><sup>354</sup></a>, +they produce the entire aggregate of effected things, beginning +with binary atomic compounds. At the same time the qualities of the +causes (i.e. of the simple atoms) produce corresponding qualities +in the effects. Thus, when two atoms produce a binary atomic +compound, the special qualities belonging to the simple atoms, such +as white colour, &c., produce a corresponding white colour in +the binary compound. One special quality, however, of the simple +atoms, viz. atomic sphericity, does not produce corresponding +sphericity in the binary compound; for the forms of extension +belonging to the latter are said to be minuteness (a<i>n</i>utva) +and shortness. And, again, when two binary compounds combining +produce a quaternary atomic compound, the qualities, such as +whiteness, &c., inherent in the binary compounds produce +corresponding qualities in the quaternary compounds; with the +exception, however, of the two qualities of minuteness and +shortness. For it is <span class="pagenum"><a name="page383" id= +"page383"></a>{383}</span> admitted that the forms of extension +belonging to quaternary compounds are not minuteness and shortness, +but bigness (mahattva) and length. The same happens<a id= +"footnotetag355" name="footnotetag355"></a><a href= +"#footnote355"><sup>355</sup></a> when many simple atoms or many +binary compounds or a simple atom and a binary compound combine to +produce new effects.</p> +<p>Well, then, we say, just as from spherical atoms binary +compounds are produced, which are minute and short, and ternary +compounds which are big and long, but not anything spherical; or as +from binary compounds, which are minute and short, ternary +compounds, &c., are produced which are big and long, not minute +and short; so this non-intelligent world may spring from the +intelligent Brahman. This is a doctrine to which you—the +Vai<i>s</i>eshika—cannot, on your own principles, object.</p> +<p>Here the Vai<i>s</i>eshika will perhaps come forward with the +following argumentation<a id="footnotetag356" name= +"footnotetag356"></a><a href="#footnote356"><sup>356</sup></a>. As +effected substances, such as binary compounds and so on, are +engrossed by forms of extension contrary to that of the causal +substances, the forms of extension belonging to the latter, viz. +sphericity and so on, cannot produce similar qualities in the +effects. The world, on the other hand, is not engrossed by any +quality contrary to intelligence owing to which the intelligence +inherent in the cause should not be able to originate a new +intelligence in the effect. For non-intelligence is not a quality +contrary to intelligence, but merely its negation. As thus the case +of sphericity is not an exactly parallel one, intelligence may very +well produce an effect similar to itself.</p> +<p>This argumentation, we rejoin, is not sound. Just as the +qualities of sphericity and so on, although existing in the cause, +do not produce corresponding effects, so it is with <span class= +"pagenum"><a name="page384" id="page384"></a>{384}</span> +intelligence also; so that the two cases are parallel so far. Nor +can the circumstance of the effects being engrossed by a different +form of extension be alleged as the reason of sphericity, &c. +not originating qualities similar to themselves; for the power of +originating effects belongs to sphericity, &c. before another +form of extension begins to exist. For it is admitted that the +substance produced remains for a moment devoid of qualities, and +that thereupon only (i.e. after that moment) its qualities begin to +exist. Nor, again, can it be said that sphericity, &c. +concentrate their activity on originating other forms of +extension<a id="footnotetag357" name="footnotetag357"></a><a href= +"#footnote357"><sup>357</sup></a>, and therefore do not originate +forms of extension belonging to the same class as their own; for it +is admitted that the origin of other forms is due to other causes; +as the Sûtras of Ka<i>n</i>abhuj (Ka<i>n</i>âda) +themselves declare (Vai<i>s</i>. Sût. VII, 1, 9, 'Bigness is +produced from plurality inherent in the causes, from bigness of the +cause and from a kind of accumulation;' VII, 1, 10, 'The contrary +of this (the big) is the minute;' VII, 1, 17, 'Thereby length and +shortness are explained<a id="footnotetag358" name= +"footnotetag358"></a><a href= +"#footnote358"><sup>358</sup></a>').—Nor, again, can it be +said that plurality, &c. inherent in the cause originate (like +effects) in consequence of some peculiar proximity (in which they +are supposed to stand to the effected substance), while sphericity, +&c. (not standing in a like proximity) do not; for when a new +substance or a new quality is originated, <span class= +"pagenum"><a name="page385" id="page385"></a>{385}</span> all the +qualities of the cause stand in the same relation of inherence to +their abode (i.e. the causal substance in which they inhere). For +these reasons the fact of sphericity, &c. not originating like +effects can be explained from the essential nature of sphericity, +&c. only, and the same may therefore be maintained with regard +to intelligence<a id="footnotetag359" name= +"footnotetag359"></a><a href="#footnote359"><sup>359</sup></a>.</p> +<p>Moreover, from that observed fact also, that from conjunction +(sa<i>m</i>yoga) there originate substances, &c. belonging to a +class different (from that to which conjunction itself belongs), it +follows that the doctrine of effects belonging to the same class as +the causes from which they spring is too wide. If you remark +against this last argument that, as we have to do at present with a +substance (viz. Brahman), it is inappropriate to instance a quality +(viz. conjunction) as a parallel case; we point out that at present +we only wish to explain the origination of effects belonging to a +different class in general. Nor is there any reason for the +restriction that substances only are to be adduced as examples for +substances, and qualities only for qualities. Your own +Sûtrakâra adduces a quality as furnishing a parallel +case for a substance (Vai<i>s</i>. Sût. IV, 2, 2, 'On account +of the conjunction of things perceptible and things imperceptible +being imperceptible the body is not composed of five elements'). +Just as the conjunction which inheres in the perceptible earth and +the imperceptible ether is not perceptible, the body also, if it +had for its inherent cause the five elements which are part of them +perceptible, part of them imperceptible, would itself be +imperceptible; but, as a matter of fact, it is perceptible; hence +it is not composed of the five elements. Here conjunction is a +quality and the body a substance.—The origin of effects +different in nature (from the cause) has, moreover, been already +treated of under II, 1; 6.—Well then, this being so, the +matter has been settled there already (why then is it again +discussed here?)-Because, we reply, there we argued <span class= +"pagenum"><a name="page386" id="page386"></a>{386}</span> against +the Sâ@nkhya, and at present we have to do with the +Vai<i>s</i>eshika.—But, already once, before (II, 1, 3) a +line of argument equally applicable to a second case was simply +declared to extend to the latter also; (why then do you not simply +state now that the arguments used to defeat the Sâ@nkhya are +equally valid against the Vai<i>s</i>eshika?)—Because here, +we reply, at the beginning of the examination of the +Vai<i>s</i>eshika system we prefer to discuss the point with +arguments specially adapted to the doctrine of the +Vai<i>s</i>eshikas.</p> +<p>12. In both cases also (in the cases of the +ad<i>ri</i>sh<i>t</i>a inhering either in the atoms or the soul) +action (of the atoms) is not (possible); hence absence of that +(viz. creation and pralaya).</p> +<p>The Sûtrakâra now proceeds to refute the doctrine of +atoms being the cause of the world.—This doctrine arises in +the following manner. We see that all ordinary substances which +consist of parts as, for instance, pieces of cloth originate from +the substances connected with them by the relation of inherence, as +for instance threads, conjunction co-operating (with the parts to +form the whole). We thence draw the general conclusion that +whatever consists of parts has originated from those substances +with which it is connected by the relation of inherence, +conjunction cooperating. That thing now at which the distinction of +whole and parts stops and which marks the limit of division into +minuter parts is the atom.—This whole world, with its +mountains, oceans, and so on, is composed of parts; because it is +composed of parts it has a beginning and an end<a id= +"footnotetag360" name="footnotetag360"></a><a href= +"#footnote360"><sup>360</sup></a>; an effect may not be assumed +without a cause; therefore the atoms are the cause of the world. +Such is Ka<i>n</i>âda's doctrine.—As we observe four +elementary substances consisting of parts, viz. earth, water, fire, +and air (wind), we have to assume four different kinds of atoms. +These atoms marking the limit of subdivision into minuter parts +cannot <span class="pagenum"><a name="page387" id= +"page387"></a>{387}</span> be divided themselves; hence when the +elements are destroyed they can be divided down to atoms only; this +state of atomic division of the elements constitutes the pralaya +(the periodical destruction of the world). After that when the time +for creation comes, motion (karman) springs up in the aerial atoms. +This motion which is due to the unseen principle<a id= +"footnotetag361" name="footnotetag361"></a><a href= +"#footnote361"><sup>361</sup></a> joins the atom in which it +resides to another atom; thus binary compounds, &c. are +produced, and finally the element of air. In a like manner are +produced fire, water, earth, the body with its organs. Thus the +whole world originates from atoms. From the qualities inhering in +the atoms the qualities belonging to the binary compounds are +produced, just as the qualities of the cloth result from the +qualities of the threads.—Such, in short, is the teaching of +the followers of Ka<i>n</i>âda.</p> +<p>This doctrine we controvert in the following manner.—It +must be admitted that the atoms when they are in a state of +isolation require action (motion) to bring about their conjunction; +for we observe that the conjunction of threads and the like is +effected by action. Action again, which is itself an effect, +requires some operative cause by which it is brought about; for +unless some such cause exists, no original motion can take place in +the atoms. If, then, some operative cause is assumed, we may, in +the first place, assume some cause analogous to seen causes, such +as endeavour or impact. But in that case original motion could not +occur at all in the atoms, since causes of that kind are, at the +time, impossible. For in the pralaya state endeavour, which is a +quality of the soul, cannot take place because no body exists then. +For the quality of the soul called endeavour originates when the +soul is connected with the internal organ which abides in the body. +The same reason precludes the assumption of other seen causes such +as impact and the like. For they all are possible only after the +creation of the world has taken place, and cannot therefore be the +<span class="pagenum"><a name="page388" id= +"page388"></a>{388}</span> causes of the original action (by which +the world is produced).—If, in the second place, the unseen +principle is assumed as the cause of the original motion of the +atoms, we ask: Is this unseen principle to be considered as +inhering in the soul or in the atom? In both cases it cannot be the +cause of motion in the atoms, because it is non-intelligent. For, +as we have shown above in our examination of the Sâ@nkhya +system, a non-intelligent thing which is not directed by an +intelligent principle cannot of itself either act or be the cause +of action, and the soul cannot be the guiding principle of the +ad<i>ri</i>sh<i>t</i>a because at the time of pralaya its +intelligence has not yet arisen<a id="footnotetag362" name= +"footnotetag362"></a><a href="#footnote362"><sup>362</sup></a>. If, +on the other hand, the unseen principle is supposed to inhere in +the soul, it cannot be the cause of motion in the atoms, because +there exists no connexion of it with the latter. If you say that +the soul in which the unseen principle inheres is connected with +the atoms, then there would result, from the continuity of +connexion<a id="footnotetag363" name="footnotetag363"></a><a href= +"#footnote363"><sup>363</sup></a>, continuity of action, as there +is no other restricting principle.—Hence, there being no +definite cause of action, original action cannot take place in the +atoms; there being no action, conjunction of the atoms which +depends on action cannot take place; there being no conjunction, +all the effects depending on it, viz. the formation of binary +atomic compounds, &c., cannot originate.</p> +<p>How, moreover, is the conjunction of one atom with another to be +imagined? Is it to be total interpenetration of the two or partial +conjunction? If the former, then no increase of bulk could take +place, and consequently atomic size only would exist; moreover, it +would be contrary to what is observed, as we see that conjunction +takes place between substances having parts (prade<i>s</i>a). If +the latter, it would follow that the atoms are composed of +parts.—Let then the atoms be imagined to consist of +parts.—If so, imagined things being unreal, the conjunction +also of the atoms would be unreal and thus could not be the +non-inherent <span class="pagenum"><a name="page389" id= +"page389"></a>{389}</span> cause of real things. And without +non-inherent causes effected substances such as binary compounds, +&c. could not originate. And just as at the time of the first +creation motion of the atoms leading to their conjunction could not +take place, there being no cause of such motion; thus at the time +of a general pralaya also no action could take place leading to +their separation, since for that occurrence also no definite seen +cause could be alleged. Nor could the unseen principle be adduced +as the cause, since its purport is to effect enjoyment (of reward +and punishment on the part of the soul), not to bring about the +pralaya. There being then no possibility of action to effect either +the conjunction or the separation of the atoms, neither conjunction +nor separation would actually take place, and hence neither +creation nor pralaya of the world.—For these reasons the +doctrine of the atoms being the cause of the world must be +rejected.</p> +<p>13. And because in consequence of samavâya being admitted +a regressus in infinitum results from parity of reasoning.</p> +<p>You (the Vai<i>s</i>eshika) admit that a binary compound which +originates from two atoms, while absolutely different from them, is +connected with them by the relation of inherence; but on that +assumption the doctrine of the atoms being the general cause cannot +be established, 'because parity involves here a retrogressus ad +infinitum.' For just as a binary compound which is absolutely +different from the two constituent atoms is connected with them by +means of the relation of inherence (samavâya), so the +relation of inherence itself being absolutely different from the +two things which it connects, requires another relation of +inherence to connect it with them, there being absolute difference +in both cases. For this second relation of inherence again, a third +relation of inherence would have to be assumed and so on ad +infinitum.—But—the Vai<i>s</i>eshika is supposed to +reply—we are conscious of the so-called samavâya +relation as eternally connected with the things between which it +exists, not as <span class="pagenum"><a name="page390" id= +"page390"></a>{390}</span> either non-connected with them or as +depending on another connexion; we are therefore not obliged to +assume another connexion, and again another, and so on, and thus to +allow ourselves to be driven into a regressus in +infinitum.—Your defence is unavailing, we reply, for it would +involve the admission that conjunction (sa<i>m</i>yoga) also as +being eternally connected with the things which it joins does, like +samavâya, not require another connexion<a id="footnotetag364" +name="footnotetag364"></a><a href= +"#footnote364"><sup>364</sup></a>. If you say that conjunction does +require another connexion because it is a different thing<a id= +"footnotetag365" name="footnotetag365"></a><a href= +"#footnote365"><sup>365</sup></a> we reply that then samavâya +also requires another connexion because it is likewise a different +thing. Nor can you say that conjunction does require another +connexion because it is a quality (gu<i>n</i>a), and samavâya +does not because it is not a quality; for (in spite of this +difference) the reason for another connexion being required is the +same in both cases<a id="footnotetag366" name= +"footnotetag366"></a><a href="#footnote366"><sup>366</sup></a>, and +not that which is technically called 'quality' is the cause (of +another connexion being required)<a id="footnotetag367" name= +"footnotetag367"></a><a href= +"#footnote367"><sup>367</sup></a>.—For these reasons those +who acknowledge samavâya to be a separate existence are +driven into a regressus in infinitum, in consequence of which, the +impossibility of one term involving the impossibility of the entire +series, not even the origination of a binary compound from two +atoms can be accounted for.—For this reason also the atomic +doctrine is inadmissible.</p> +<p>14. And on account of the permanent existence (of activity or +non-activity).</p> +<p>Moreover, the atoms would have to be assumed as either +<span class="pagenum"><a name="page391" id= +"page391"></a>{391}</span> essentially active (moving) or +essentially non-active, or both or neither; there being no fifth +alternative. But none of the four alternatives stated is possible. +If they were essentially active, their activity would be permanent +so that no pralaya could take place. If they were essentially +non-active, their non-activity would be permanent, and no creation +could take place. Their being both is impossible because +self-contradictory. If they were neither, their activity and +non-activity would have to depend on an operative cause, and then +the operative causes such as the ad<i>ri</i>sh<i>t</i>a being in +permanent proximity to the atoms, permanent activity would result; +or else the ad<i>ri</i>sh<i>t</i>a and so on not being taken as +operative causes, the consequence would be permanent non-activity +on the part of the atoms.—For this reason also the atomic +doctrine is untenable.</p> +<p>15. And on account of the atoms having colour, &c., the +reverse (of the Vai<i>s</i>eshika tenet would take place); as thus +it is observed.</p> +<p>Let us suppose, the Vai<i>s</i>eshikas say, all substances +composed of parts to be disintegrated into their parts; a limit +will finally be reached beyond which the process of disintegration +cannot be continued. What constitutes that limit are the atoms, +which are eternal (permanent), belong to four different classes, +possess the qualities of colour, &c., and are the originating +principles of this whole material world with its colour, form, and +other qualities.</p> +<p>This fundamental assumption of the Vai<i>s</i>eshikas we declare +to be groundless because from the circumstance of the atoms having +colour and other qualities there would follow the contrary of +atomic minuteness and permanency, i.e. it would follow that, +compared to the ultimate cause, they are gross and non-permanent. +For ordinary experience teaches that whatever things possess colour +and other qualities are, compared to their cause, gross and +non-permanent. A piece of cloth, for instance, is gross compared to +the threads of which it consists, and non permanent; and the +threads again are non-permanent and gross compared <span class= +"pagenum"><a name="page392" id="page392"></a>{392}</span> to the +filaments of which they are made up. Therefore the atoms also which +the Vai<i>s</i>eshikas admit to have colour, &c. must have +causes compared to which they are gross and non-permanent. Hence +that reason also which Ka<i>n</i>âda gives for the permanence +of the atoms (IV, 1, 1, 'that which exists without having a cause +is permanent') does not apply at all to the atoms because, as we +have shown just now, the atoms are to be considered as having a +cause.—The second reason also which Ka<i>n</i>âda +brings forward for the permanency of the atoms, viz. in IV, 1, 4, +'the special negation implied in the term non-eternal would not be +possible<a id="footnotetag368" name="footnotetag368"></a><a href= +"#footnote368"><sup>368</sup></a>' (if there did not exist +something eternal, viz. the atoms), does not necessarily prove the +permanency of the atoms; for supposing that there exists not any +permanent thing, the formation of a negative compound such as +'non-eternal' is impossible. Nor does the existence of the word +'non-permanent' absolutely presuppose the permanency of atoms; for +there exists (as we Vedântins maintain) another permanent +ultimate Cause, viz. Brahman. Nor can the existence of anything be +established merely on the ground of a word commonly being used in +that sense, since there is room for common use only if word and +matter are well-established by some other means of right +knowledge.—The third reason also given in the Vai<i>s</i>. +Sûtras (IV, 1, 5) for the permanency of the atoms ('and +Nescience') is unavailing. For if we explain that Sûtra to +mean 'the non-perception of those actually existing causes whose +effects are seen is Nescience,' it would follow that the binary +atomic compounds also are permanent<a id="footnotetag369" name= +"footnotetag369"></a><a href="#footnote369"><sup>369</sup></a>. And +if we tried to escape from that difficulty by including (in the +explanation of the Sûtra as given above) the qualification +'there being absence of (originating) substances,' <span class= +"pagenum"><a name="page393" id="page393"></a>{393}</span> then +nothing else but the absence of a cause would furnish the reason +for the permanency of the atoms, and as that reason had already +been mentioned before (in IV, 1, 1) the Sûtra IV, 1, 5 would +be a useless restatement.—Well, then (the Vai<i>s</i>eshika +might say), let us understand by 'Nescience' (in the Sûtra) +the impossibility of conceiving a third reason of the destruction +(of effects), in addition to the division of the causal substance +into its parts, and the destruction of the causal substance; which +impossibility involves the permanency of the atoms<a id= +"footnotetag370" name="footnotetag370"></a><a href= +"#footnote370"><sup>370</sup></a>.—There is no necessity, we +reply, for assuming that a thing when perishing must perish on +account of either of those two reasons. That assumption would +indeed have to be made if it were generally admitted that a new +substance is produced only by the conjunction of several causal +substances. But if it is admitted that a causal substance may +originate a new substance by passing over into a qualified state +after having previously existed free from qualifications, in its +pure generality, it follows that the effected substance may be +destroyed by its solidity being dissolved, just as the hardness of +ghee is dissolved by the action of fire<a id="footnotetag371" name= +"footnotetag371"></a><a href= +"#footnote371"><sup>371</sup></a>.—Thus there would result, +from the circumstance of the atoms having colour, &c., the +opposite of what the Vai<i>s</i>eshikas mean. For this reason also +the atomic doctrine cannot be maintained.</p> +<p>16. And as there are difficulties in both cases.</p> +<p>Earth has the qualities of smell, taste, colour, and touch, and +is gross; water has colour, taste, and touch, and is fine; fire has +colour and touch, and is finer yet; air is finest of all, and has +the quality of touch only. The question now arises whether the +atoms constituting the four elements are to be assumed to possess +the same greater or smaller <span class="pagenum"><a name="page394" +id="page394"></a>{394}</span> number of qualities as the respective +elements.—Either assumption leads to unacceptable +consequences. For if we assume that some kinds of atoms have more +numerous qualities, it follows that their solid size (mûrti) +will be increased thereby, and that implies their being atoms no +longer. That an increase of qualities cannot take place without a +simultaneous increase of size we infer from our observations +concerning effected material bodies.—If, on the other hand, +we assume, in order to save the equality of atoms of all kinds, +that there is no difference in the number of their qualities, we +must either suppose that they have all one quality only; but in +that case we should not perceive touch in fire nor colour and touch +in water, nor taste, colour, and touch in earth, since the +qualities of the effects have for their antecedents the qualities +of the causes. Or else we must suppose all atoms to have all the +four qualities; but in that case we should necessarily perceive +what we actually do not perceive, viz. smell in water, smell and +taste in fire, smell, taste, and colour in air.—Hence on this +account also the atomic doctrine shows itself to be +unacceptable.</p> +<p>17. And as the (atomic theory) is not accepted (by any +authoritative persons) it is to be disregarded altogether.</p> +<p>While the theory of the pradhâna being the cause of the +world has been accepted by some adherents of the Veda—as, for +instance, Manu—with a view to the doctrines of the effect +existing in the cause already, and so on, the atomic doctrine has +not been accepted by any persons of authority in any of its parts, +and therefore is to be disregarded entirely by all those who take +their stand on the Veda.</p> +<p>There are, moreover, other objections to the Vai<i>s</i>eshika +doctrine.—The Vai<i>s</i>eshikas assume six categories, which +constitute the subject-matter of their system, viz. substance, +quality, action, generality, particularity, and inherence. These +six categories they maintain to be absolutely different from each +other, and to have different characteristics; <span class= +"pagenum"><a name="page395" id="page395"></a>{395}</span> just as a +man, a horse, a hare differ from one another. Side by side with +this assumption they make another which contradicts the former one, +viz. that quality, action, &c. have the attribute of depending +on substance. But that is altogether inappropriate; for just as +ordinary things, such as animals, grass, trees, and the like, being +absolutely different from each other do not depend on each other, +so the qualities, &c. also being absolutely different from +substance, cannot depend on the latter. Or else let the qualities, +&c. depend on substance; then it follows that, as they are +present where substance is present, and absent where it is absent, +substance only exists, and, according to its various forms, becomes +the object of different terms and conceptions (such as quality, +action, &c.); just as Devadatta, for instance, according to the +conditions in which he finds himself is the object of various +conceptions and names. But this latter alternative would involve +the acceptation of the Sâ@nkhya doctrine<a id= +"footnotetag372" name="footnotetag372"></a><a href= +"#footnote372"><sup>372</sup></a> and the abandonment of the +Vai<i>s</i>eshika standpoint.—But (the Vai<i>s</i>eshika may +say) smoke also is different from fire and yet it is dependent on +it.—True, we reply; but we ascertain the difference of smoke +and fire from the fact of their being apperceived in separation. +Substance and quality, on the other hand, are not so apperceived; +for when we are conscious of a white blanket, or a red cow, or a +blue lotus, the substance is in each case cognised by means of the +quality; the latter therefore has its Self in the substance. The +same reasoning applies to action, generality, particularity, and +inherence.</p> +<p>If you (the Vai<i>s</i>eshika) say that qualities, actions, +&c. (although not non-different from substances) may yet depend +on the latter because substances and qualities stand in the +relation of one not being able to exist without the other +(ayutasiddhi<a id="footnotetag373" name= +"footnotetag373"></a><a href="#footnote373"><sup>373</sup></a>); we +point out that things which are <span class="pagenum"><a name= +"page396" id="page396"></a>{396}</span> ayutasiddha must either be +non-separate in place, or non-separate in time, or non-separate in +nature, and that none of these alternatives agrees with +Vai<i>s</i>eshika principles. For the first alternative contradicts +your own assumptions according to which the cloth originating from +the threads occupies the place of the threads only, not that of the +cloth, while the qualities of the cloth, such as its white colour, +occupy the place of the cloth only, not that of the threads. So the +Vai<i>s</i>eshika-sûtras say (I, 1, 10), 'Substances +originate another substance and qualities another quality.' The +threads which constitute the causal substance originate the +effected substance, viz. the cloth, and the qualities of the +threads, such as white colour, &c., produce in the cloth new +corresponding qualities. But this doctrine is clearly contradicted +by the assumption of substance and quality being non-separate in +place.—If, in the second place, you explain ayutasiddhatva as +non-separation in time, it follows also that, for instance, the +right and the left horn of a cow would be ayutasiddha.—And +if, finally, you explain it to mean 'non-separation in character,' +it is impossible to make any further distinction between the +substance and the quality, as then quality is conceived as being +identical with substance.</p> +<p>Moreover, the distinction which the Vai<i>s</i>eshikas make +between conjunction (sa<i>m</i>yoga) as being the connexion of +things which can exist separately, and inherence (samavâya) +as being the connexion of things which are incapable of separate +existence is futile, since the cause which exists before the +effect<a id="footnotetag374" name="footnotetag374"></a><a href= +"#footnote374"><sup>374</sup></a> cannot be said to be incapable of +separate existence. Perhaps the Vai<i>s</i>eshika will say that his +definition refers to one of the two terms only, so that +samavâya is the connexion, with the cause, of the effect +which is incapable of separate existence. But this also is of no +avail; for as a connexion requires two terms, the effect as long as +it has not yet entered into being cannot be connected with the +cause. And it would be equally unavailing to say that the effect +enters into the connexion after it has begun to exist; for if the +Vai<i>s</i>eshika admits that the effect <span class= +"pagenum"><a name="page397" id="page397"></a>{397}</span> may exist +previous to its connexion with the cause, it is no longer +ayutasiddha (incapable of separate existence), and thereby the +principle that between effect and cause conjunction and disjunction +do not take place is violated.<a id="footnotetag375" name= +"footnotetag375"></a><a href="#footnote375"><sup>375</sup></a> +And<a id="footnotetag376" name="footnotetag376"></a><a href= +"#footnote376"><sup>376</sup></a> just as conjunction, and not +samavâya, is the connexion in which every effected substance +as soon as it has been produced stands with the all-pervading +substances as ether, &c.—although no motion has taken +place on the part of the effected substance—so also the +connexion of the effect with the cause will be conjunction merely, +not samavâya.</p> +<p>Nor is there any proof for the existence of any connexion, +samavâya or sa<i>m</i>yoga, apart from the things which it +connects. If it should be maintained that sa<i>m</i>yoga and +samavâya have such an existence because we observe that there +are names and ideas of them in addition to the names and ideas of +the things connected, we point out that one and the same thing may +be the subject of several names and ideas if it is considered in +its relations to what lies without it. Devadatta although being one +only forms the object of many different names and notions according +as he is considered in himself or in his relations to others; thus +he is thought and spoken of as man, brâhma<i>n</i>a learned +in the Veda, generous, boy, young man, father, grandson, brother, +son-in-law, &c. So, again, one and the same stroke is, +according to the place it is connected with, spoken of and +conceived as meaning either ten, or hundred, or thousand, &c. +Analogously, two connected things are not only conceived and +denoted as connected things, but in addition constitute the object +of the ideas and terms 'conjunction' or 'inherence' which however +do not prove <span class="pagenum"><a name="page398" id= +"page398"></a>{398}</span> themselves to be separate +entities.—Things standing thus, the non-existence of separate +entities (conjunction, &c.), which entities would have to be +established on the ground of perception, follows from the fact of +their non-perception.—Nor, again<a id="footnotetag377" name= +"footnotetag377"></a><a href="#footnote377"><sup>377</sup></a>, +does the circumstance of the word and idea of connexion having for +its object the things connected involve the connexion's permanent +existence, since we have already shown above that one thing may, on +account of its relations to other things, be conceived and denoted +in different ways.</p> +<p>Further<a id="footnotetag378" name="footnotetag378"></a><a href= +"#footnote378"><sup>378</sup></a>, conjunction cannot take place +between the atoms, the soul, and the internal organ, because they +have no parts; for we observe that conjunction takes place only of +such substances as consist of parts. If the Vai<i>s</i>eshika +should say that parts of the atoms, soul and mind may be assumed +(in order to explain their alleged conjunction), we remark that the +assumption of actually non-existing things would involve the result +that anything might be established; for there is no restrictive +rule that only such and such non-existing things—whether +contradictory to reason or not—should be assumed and not any +other, and assumptions depend on one's choice only and may be +carried to any extent. If we once allow assumptions, there is no +reason why there should not be assumed a further hundred or +thousand things, in addition to the six categories assumed by the +Vai<i>s</i>eshikas. Anybody might then assume anything, and we +could neither stop a compassionate man from assuming that this +transmigratory world which is the cause of so much misery to living +beings is not to be, nor a malicious man from assuming that even +the released souls are to enter on a new cycle of existences.</p> +<span class="pagenum"><a name="page399" id= +"page399"></a>{399}</span> +<p>Further, it is not possible that a binary atomic compound, which +consists of parts, should be connected with the simple indivisible +atoms by an intimate connexion (sa<i>ms</i>lesha) any more than +they can thus be connected with ether; for between ether and earth, +&c. there does not exist that kind of intimate connexion which +exists, for instance, between wood and varnish<a id= +"footnotetag379" name="footnotetag379"></a><a href= +"#footnote379"><sup>379</sup></a>.</p> +<p>Let it then be said (the Vai<i>s</i>eshika resumes) that the +samavâya relation must be assumed, because otherwise the +relation of that which abides and that which forms the +abode—which relation actually exists between the effected +substance and the causal substance—is not +possible.—That would, we reply, involve the vice of mutual +dependence; for only when the separateness of cause and effect is +established, the relation of the abode and that which abides can be +established; and only when the latter relation is established, the +relation of separateness can be established. For the +Vedântins acknowledge neither the separateness of cause and +effect, nor their standing to each other in the relation of abode +and thing abiding, since according to their doctrine the effect is +only a certain state of the cause<a id="footnotetag380" name= +"footnotetag380"></a><a href= +"#footnote380"><sup>380</sup></a>.—Moreover, as the atoms are +limited (not of infinite extension), they must in reality consist +of as many parts as we acknowledge regions of space<a id= +"footnotetag381" name="footnotetag381"></a><a href= +"#footnote381"><sup>381</sup></a>, whether those be six or eight or +ten, and consequently they cannot be permanent; conclusions +contrary to the Vai<i>s</i>eshika doctrine of the indivisibility +and permanency of the atoms.—If the Vai<i>s</i>eshika replies +that those very parts which are owing to the existence of the +different regions of space are his (indestructible) <span class= +"pagenum"><a name="page400" id="page400"></a>{400}</span> atoms; we +deny that because all things whatever, forming a series of +substances of ever-increasing minuteness, are capable of +dissolution, until the highest cause (Brahman) is reached. +Earth—which is, in comparison with a binary compound, the +grossest thing of all—undergoes decomposition; so do the +substances following next which belong to the same class as earth; +so does the binary compound; and so does, finally, the atom which +(although the minutest thing of all) still belongs to the same +general class (i.e. matter) with earth, &c. The objection +(which the Vai<i>s</i>eshika might possibly raise here again) that +things can be decomposed only by the separation of their +parts<a id="footnotetag382" name="footnotetag382"></a><a href= +"#footnote382"><sup>382</sup></a>, we have already disposed of +above, where we pointed out that decomposition may take place in a +manner analogous to the melting of ghee. Just as the hardness of +ghee, gold, and the like, is destroyed in consequence of those +substances being rendered liquid by their contact with fire, no +separation of the parts taking place all the while; so the solid +shape of the atoms also may be decomposed by their passing back +into the indifferenced condition of the highest cause. In the same +way the origination of effects also is brought about not merely in +the way of conjunction of parts; for we see that milk, for +instance, and water originate effects such as sour milk and ice +without there taking place any conjunction of parts.</p> +<p>It thus appears that the atomic doctrine is supported by very +weak arguments only, is opposed to those scriptural passages which +declare the Lord to be the general cause, and is not accepted by +any of the authorities taking their stand on Scripture, such as +Manu and others. Hence it is to be altogether disregarded by +highminded men who have a regard for their own spiritual +welfare.</p> +<p>18. (If there be assumed) the (dyad of) aggregates with its two +causes, (there takes place) non-establishment of those (two +aggregates).</p> +<p>The reasons on account of which the doctrine of the <span class= +"pagenum"><a name="page401" id="page401"></a>{401}</span> +Vai<i>s</i>eshikas cannot be accepted have been stated above. That +doctrine may be called semi-destructive (or semi-nihilistic<a id= +"footnotetag383" name="footnotetag383"></a><a href= +"#footnote383"><sup>383</sup></a>). That the more thorough doctrine +which teaches universal non-permanency is even less worthy of being +taken into consideration, we now proceed to show.</p> +<p>That doctrine is presented in a variety of forms, due either to +the difference of the views (maintained by Buddha at different +times), or else to the difference of capacity on the part of the +disciples (of Buddha). Three principal opinions may, however, be +distinguished; the opinion of those who maintain the reality of +everything (Realists, sarvâstitvavâdin); the opinion of +those who maintain that thought only is real (Idealists, +vij<i>ñ</i>ànavâdin); and the opinion of those +who maintain that everything is void (unreal; Nihilists, +<i>s</i>ûnyavâdin<a id="footnotetag384" name= +"footnotetag384"></a><a href= +"#footnote384"><sup>384</sup></a>).—We first controvert those +<span class="pagenum"><a name="page402" id= +"page402"></a>{402}</span> who maintain that everything, external +as well as internal, is real. What is external is either element +(bhûta) or elementary (bhautika); what is internal is either +mind (<i>k</i>itta) or mental (<i>k</i>aitta). The elements are +earth, water, and so on; elemental are colour, &c. on the one +hand, and the eye and the other sense-organs on the other hand. +Earth and the other three elements arise from the aggregation of +the four different kinds of atoms; the atoms of earth being hard, +those of water viscid, those of fire hot, those of air +mobile.:—The inward world consists of the five so-called +'groups' (skandha), the group of sensation (rûpaskandha), the +group of knowledge (vij<i>ñ</i>ânaskandha), the group +of feeling (vedanâskandha), the group of verbal knowledge +(samj<i>ñ</i>âskandha), and the group of impressions +(sa<i>m</i>skâraskandha)<a id="footnotetag385" name= +"footnotetag385"></a><a href="#footnote385"><sup>385</sup></a>; +which <span class="pagenum"><a name="page403" id= +"page403"></a>{403}</span> taken together constitute the basis of +all personal existence<a id="footnotetag386" name= +"footnotetag386"></a><a href="#footnote386"><sup>386</sup></a>.</p> +<p>With reference to this doctrine we make the following +remarks.—Those two aggregates, constituting two different +classes, and having two different causes which the Bauddhas assume, +viz. the aggregate of the elements and elementary things whose +cause the atoms are, and the aggregate of the five skandhas whose +cause the skandhas are, cannot, on Bauddha principles, be +established, i.e. it cannot be explained how the aggregates are +brought about. For the parts constituting the (material) aggregates +are devoid of intelligence, and the kindling (abhijvalana) of +intelligence depends on an aggregate of atoms having been brought +about previously<a id="footnotetag387" name= +"footnotetag387"></a><a href="#footnote387"><sup>387</sup></a>. And +the Bauddhas do not admit any other permanent intelligent being, +such as either an enjoying soul or a ruling Lord, which could +effect the aggregation of the atoms. Nor can the atoms and skandhas +be assumed to enter on activity on their own account; for that +would imply their never ceasing to be active<a id="footnotetag388" +name="footnotetag388"></a><a href= +"#footnote388"><sup>388</sup></a>. Nor can the cause of aggregation +be looked for in the so-called abode (i.e. the +âlayavij<i>ñ</i>âna-pravâha, the train of +self-cognitions); for the latter must be described either as +different from the single cognitions or as not different from them. +(In the former case it is either permanent, and then it is nothing +else but the permanent soul of the Vedântins; or +non-permanent;) then being admitted to be momentary merely, it +cannot exercise any influence and cannot therefore be the cause of +the motion of the atoms<a id="footnotetag389" name= +"footnotetag389"></a><a href="#footnote389"><sup>389</sup></a>. +<span class="pagenum"><a name="page404" id= +"page404"></a>{404}</span> (And in the latter case we are not +further advanced than before.)—For all these reasons the +formation of aggregates cannot be accounted for. But without +aggregates there would be an end of the stream of mundane existence +which presupposes those aggregates.</p> +<p>19. If it be said that (the formation of aggregates may be +explained) through (Nescience, &c.) standing in the relation of +mutual causality; we say 'No,' because they merely are the +efficient causes of the origin (of the immediately subsequent +links).</p> +<p>Although there exists no permanent intelligent principle of the +nature either of a ruling Lord or an enjoying soul, under whose +influence the formation of aggregates could take place, yet the +course of mundane existence is rendered possible through the mutual +causality<a id="footnotetag390" name="footnotetag390"></a><a href= +"#footnote390"><sup>390</sup></a> of Nescience and so on, so that +we need not look for any other combining principle.</p> +<p>The series beginning with Nescience comprises the following +members: Nescience, impression, knowledge, name and form, the abode +of the six, touch, feeling, desire, activity, birth, species, +decay, death, grief, lamentation, pain, mental affliction, and the +like<a id="footnotetag391" name="footnotetag391"></a><a href= +"#footnote391"><sup>391</sup></a>. All these terms constitute +<span class="pagenum"><a name="page405" id= +"page405"></a>{405}</span> a chain of causes and are as such spoken +of in the Bauddha system, sometimes cursorily, sometimes at length. +They are, moreover, all acknowledged as existing, not by the +Bauddhas only, but by the followers of all systems. And as the +cycles of Nescience, &c. forming uninterrupted chains of causes +and effects revolve unceasingly like water-wheels, the existence of +the aggregates (which constitute bodies and minds) must needs be +assumed, as without such Nescience and so on could not take +place.</p> +<p>This argumentation of the Bauddha we are unable to accept, +because it merely assigns efficient causes for the origination of +the members of the series, but does not intimate an efficient cause +for the formation of the aggregates. If the Bauddha reminds us of +the statement made above that the existence of aggregates must +needs be inferred from the existence of Nescience and so on, we +point out that, if he means thereby that Nescience and so on cannot +exist without aggregates and hence require the existence of such, +it remains to assign an efficient cause for the formation of the +aggregates. But, as we have already shown—when examining the +Vaijeshika doctrine—that the formation of aggregates cannot +be accounted for even on the assumption of permanent atoms and +individual souls in <span class="pagenum"><a name="page406" id= +"page406"></a>{406}</span> which the ad<i>ri</i>sh<i>t</i>a +abides<a id="footnotetag392" name="footnotetag392"></a><a href= +"#footnote392"><sup>392</sup></a>; how much less then are +aggregates possible if there exist only momentary atoms not +connected with enjoying souls and devoid of abodes (i.e. souls), +and that which abides in them (the +ad<i>ri</i>sh<i>t</i>a).—Let us then assume (the Bauddha +says) that Nescience, &c. themselves are the efficient cause of +the aggregate.—But how—we ask—can they be the +cause of that without which—as their abode—they +themselves are not capable of existence? Perhaps you will say that +in the eternal sa<i>m</i>sâra the aggregates succeed one +another in an unbroken chain, and hence also Nescience, and so on, +which abide in those aggregates. But in that case you will have to +assume either that each aggregate necessarily produces another +aggregate of the same kind, or that, without any settled rule, it +may produce either a like or an unlike one. In the former case a +human body could never pass over into that of a god or an animal or +a being of the infernal regions; in the latter case a man might in +an instant be turned into an elephant or a god and again become a +man; either of which consequences would be contrary to your +system.—Moreover, that for the purpose of whose enjoyment the +aggregate is formed is, according to your doctrine, not a permanent +enjoying soul, so that enjoyment subserves itself merely and cannot +be desired by anything else; hence final release also must, +according to you, be considered as subserving itself <span class= +"pagenum"><a name="page407" id="page407"></a>{407}</span> only, and +no being desirous of release can be assumed. If a being desirous of +both were assumed, it would have to be conceived as permanently +existing up to the time of enjoyment and release, and that would be +contrary to your doctrine of general impermanency.—There may +therefore exist a causal relation between the members of the series +consisting of Nescience, &c., but, in the absence of a +permanent enjoying soul, it is impossible to establish on that +ground the existence of aggregates.</p> +<p>20. (Nor can there be a causal relation between Nescience, +&c.), because on the origination of the subsequent (moment) the +preceding one ceases to be.</p> +<p>We have hitherto argued that Nescience, and so on, stand in a +causal relation to each other merely, so that they cannot be made +to account for the existence of aggregates; we are now going to +prove that they cannot even be considered as efficient causes of +the subsequent members of the series to which they belong.</p> +<p>Those who maintain that everything has a momentary existence +only admit that when the thing existing in the second moment<a id= +"footnotetag393" name="footnotetag393"></a><a href= +"#footnote393"><sup>393</sup></a> enters into being the thing +existing in the first moment ceases to be. On this admission it is +impossible to establish between the two things the relation of +cause and effect, since the former momentary existence which ceases +or has ceased to be, and so has entered into the state of +non-existence, cannot be the cause of the later momentary +existence.—Let it then be said that the former momentary +existence when it has reached its full development becomes the +cause of the later momentary existence.—That also is +impossible; for the assumption that a fully developed existence +exerts a further energy, involves the conclusion that it is +connected with a second moment (which contradicts the doctrine of +universal momentariness).—Then let the mere existence of the +antecedent entity constitute its <span class="pagenum"><a name= +"page408" id="page408"></a>{408}</span> causal energy.—That +assumption also is fruitless, because we cannot conceive the +origination of an effect which is not imbued with the nature of the +cause (i.e. in which the nature of the cause does not continue to +exist). And to assume that the nature of the cause does continue to +exist in the effect is impossible (on the Bauddha doctrine), as +that would involve the permanency of the cause, and thus +necessitate the abandonment of the doctrine of general +non-permanency.—Nor can it be admitted that the relation of +cause and effect holds good without the cause somehow giving its +colouring to the effect; for that doctrine might unduly be extended +to all cases<a id="footnotetag394" name= +"footnotetag394"></a><a href= +"#footnote394"><sup>394</sup></a>.—Moreover, the origination +and cessation of things of which the Bauddha speaks must either +constitute a thing's own form or another state of it, or an +altogether different thing. But none of these alternatives agrees +with the general Bauddha principles. If, in the first place, +origination and cessation constituted the form of a thing, it would +follow that the word 'thing' and the words 'origination' and +'cessation' are interchangeable (which is not the case).—Let +then, secondly, the Bauddha says, a certain difference be assumed, +in consequence of which the terms 'origination' and 'cessation' may +denote the initial and final states of that which in the +intermediate state is called thing.—In that case, we reply, +the thing will be connected with three moments, viz. the initial, +the intermediate, and the final one, so that the doctrine of +general momentariness will have to be abandoned.—Let then, as +the third alternative, origination and cessation be altogether +different from the thing, as much as a buffalo is from a +horse.—That too cannot be, we reply; for it would lead to the +conclusion that the thing, because altogether disconnected with +origination and cessation, is everlasting. And the same conclusion +would be led up to, if we understood by the origination and +cessation of a thing merely its perception and non-perception; for +the latter are attributes of the percipient mind only, not of the +thing itself.—Hence <span class="pagenum"><a name="page409" +id="page409"></a>{409}</span> we have again to declare the Bauddha +doctrine to be untenable.</p> +<p>21. On the supposition of there being no (cause: while yet the +effect takes place), there results contradiction of the admitted +principle; otherwise simultaneousness (of cause and effect).</p> +<p>It has been shown that on the doctrine of general +non-permanency, the former momentary existence, as having already +been merged in non-existence, cannot be the cause of the later +one.—Perhaps now the Bauddha will say that an effect may +arise even when there is no cause.—That, we reply, implies +the abandonment of a principle admitted by yourself, viz. that the +mind and the mental modifications originate when in conjunction +with four kinds of causes<a id="footnotetag395" name= +"footnotetag395"></a><a href="#footnote395"><sup>395</sup></a>. +Moreover, if anything could originate without a cause, there would +be nothing to prevent that anything might originate at any +time.—If, on the other hand, you should say that we may +assume the antecedent momentary existence to last until the +succeeding one has been produced, we point out that that would +imply the simultaneousness of cause and effect, and so run counter +to an accepted Bauddha tenet, viz. that all things<a id= +"footnotetag396" name="footnotetag396"></a><a href= +"#footnote396"><sup>396</sup></a> are momentary merely.</p> +<span class="pagenum"><a name="page410" id= +"page410"></a>{410}</span> +<p>22. Cessation dependent on a sublative act of the mind, and +cessation not so dependent cannot be established, there being no +(complete) interruption.</p> +<p>The Bauddhas who maintain that universal destruction is going on +constantly, assume that 'whatever forms an object of knowledge and +is different from the triad is produced (sa<i>m</i>sk<i>ri</i>ta) +and momentary.' To the triad there mentioned they give the names +'cessation dependent on a sublative act of the mind,' 'cessation +not dependent on such an act,' and 'space.' This triad they hold to +be non-substantial, of a merely negative character +(abhâvamâtra), devoid of all positive characteristics. +By 'cessation dependent on a sublative act of the mind,' we have to +understand such destruction of entities as is preceded by an act of +thought<a id="footnotetag397" name="footnotetag397"></a><a href= +"#footnote397"><sup>397</sup></a>; by 'cessation not so dependent' +is meant destruction of the opposite kind<a id="footnotetag398" +name="footnotetag398"></a><a href= +"#footnote398"><sup>398</sup></a>; by 'space' is meant absence in +general of something covering (or occupying space). Out of these +three non-existences 'space' will be refuted later on (Sûtra +24), the two other ones are refuted in the present Sûtra.</p> +<p>Cessation which is dependent on a sublative act of the mind, and +cessation which is not so dependent are both impossible, 'on +account of the absence of interruption.' For both kinds of +cessation must have reference either to the series (of momentary +existences) or to the single members constituting the +series.—The former alternative is impossible, because in all +series (of momentary existences) the members of the series stand in +an unbroken relation of cause and effect so that the series cannot +be interrupted<a id="footnotetag399" name= +"footnotetag399"></a><a href= +"#footnote399"><sup>399</sup></a>.—The latter <span class= +"pagenum"><a name="page411" id="page411"></a>{411}</span> +alternative is likewise inadmissible, for it is impossible to +maintain that any momentary existence should undergo complete +annihilation entirely undefinable and disconnected (with the +previous state of existence), since we observe that a thing is +recognised in the various states through which it may pass and thus +has a connected existence<a id="footnotetag400" name= +"footnotetag400"></a><a href="#footnote400"><sup>400</sup></a>. And +in those cases also where a thing is not clearly recognised (after +having undergone a change) we yet infer, on the ground of actual +observations made in other cases, that one and the same thing +continues to exist without any interruption.—For these +reasons the two kinds of cessation which the Bauddhas assume cannot +be proved.</p> +<p>23. And on account of the objections presenting themselves in +either case.</p> +<p>The cessation of Nescience, &c. which, on the assumption of +the Bauddhas, is included in the two kinds of cessation discussed +hitherto, must take place either in consequence of perfect +knowledge together with its auxiliaries, or else of its own accord. +But the former alternative would imply the abandonment of the +Bauddha doctrine that destruction takes place without a cause, and +the latter alternative would involve the uselessness of the Bauddha +instruction as to the 'path'<a id="footnotetag401" name= +"footnotetag401"></a><a href="#footnote401"><sup>401</sup></a>. As +therefore both alternatives are open to objections, the Bauddha +doctrine must be declared unsatisfactory.</p> +<span class="pagenum"><a name="page412" id= +"page412"></a>{412}</span> +<p>24. And in the case of space also (the doctrine of its being a +non-entity is untenable) on account of its not differing (from the +two other kinds of non-entity).</p> +<p>We have shown so far that of the triad declared by the Bauddhas +to be devoid of all positive characteristics, and therefore +non-definable, two (viz. prati-sa<i>m</i>khyâvirodha and +aprati) cannot be shown to be such; we now proceed to show the same +with regard to space (ether, âkâ<i>s</i>a).</p> +<p>With regard to space also it cannot be maintained that it is +non-definable, since substantiality can be established in the case +of space no less than in the case of the two so-called non-entities +treated of in the preceding Sûtras. That space is a real +thing follows in the first place from certain scriptural passages, +such as 'space sprang from the Self.'—To those, again, who +(like the Bauddhas) disagree with us as to the authoritativeness of +Scripture we point out that the real existence of space is to be +inferred from the quality of sound, since we observe that earth and +other real things are the abodes of smell and the other +qualities.—Moreover, if you declare that space is nothing but +the absence in general of any covering (occupying) body, it would +follow that while one bird is flying—whereby space is +occupied—there would be no room for a second bird wanting to +fly at the same time. And if you should reply that the second bird +may fly there where there is absence of a covering body, we point +out that that something by which the absence of covering bodies is +distinguished must be a positive entity, viz. space in our sense, +and not the mere non-existence of covering bodies<a id= +"footnotetag402" name="footnotetag402"></a><a href= +"#footnote402"><sup>402</sup></a>.—Moreover, the Bauddha +places himself, by his view of space, in opposition to other parts +of his system. For we find, in the Bauddha Scriptures, a series of +questions and answers (beginning, 'On what, O reverend Sir, is the +earth founded?'), in which the following <span class= +"pagenum"><a name="page413" id="page413"></a>{413}</span> question +occurs, 'On what is the air founded?' to which it is replied that +the air is founded on space (ether). Now it is clear that this +statement is appropriate only on the supposition of space being a +positive entity, not a mere negation.—Further, there is a +self-contradiction in the Bauddha statements regarding all the +three kinds of negative entities, it being said, on the one hand, +that they are not positively definable, and, on the other hand, +that they are eternal. Of what is not real neither eternity nor +non-eternity can be predicated, since the distinction of subjects +and predicates of attribution is founded entirely on real things. +Anything with regard to which that distinction holds good we +conclude to be a real thing, such as jars and the like are, not a +mere undefinable negation.</p> +<p>25. And on account of remembrance.</p> +<p>The philosopher who maintains that all things are momentary only +would have to extend that doctrine to the perceiving person +(upalabdh<i>ri</i>) also; that is, however, not possible, on +account of the remembrance which is consequent on the original +perception. That remembrance can take place only if it belongs to +the same person who previously made the perception; for we observe +that what one man has experienced is not remembered by another man. +How, indeed, could there arise the conscious state expressed in the +sentences, 'I saw that thing, and now I see this thing,' if the +seeing person were not in both cases the same? That the +consciousness of recognition takes place only in the case of the +observing and remembering subject being one, is a matter known to +every one; for if there were, in the two cases, different subjects, +the state of consciousness arising in the mind of the remembering +person would be, '<i>I</i> remember; another person made the +observation.' But no such state of consciousness does +arise.—When, on the other hand, such a state of consciousness +does arise, then everybody knows that the person who made the +original observation, and the person who remembers, are different +persons, and then the state of consciousness is expressed as +follows, 'I remember that that other person saw that and +that.'—In <span class="pagenum"><a name="page414" id= +"page414"></a>{414}</span> the case under discussion, however, the +Vainâ<i>s</i>ika himself—whose state of consciousness +is, 'I saw that and that'—knows that there is one thinking +subject only to which the original perception as well as the +remembrance belongs, and does not think of denying that the past +perception belonged to himself, not any more than he denies that +fire is hot and gives light.</p> +<p>As thus one agent is connected with the two moments of +perception and subsequent remembrance, the Vainâ<i>s</i>ika +has necessarily to abandon the doctrine of universal momentariness. +And if he further recognises all his subsequent successive +cognitions, up to his last breath, to belong to one and the same +subject, and in addition cannot but attribute all his past +cognitions, from the moment of his birth, to the same Self, how can +he maintain, without being ashamed of himself, that everything has +a momentary existence only? Should he maintain that the recognition +(of the subject as one and the same) takes place on account of the +similarity (of the different self-cognitions; each, however, being +momentary only), we reply that the cognition of similarity is based +on two things, and that for that reason the advocate of universal +momentariness who denies the existence of one (permanent) subject +able mentally to grasp the two similar things simply talks +deceitful nonsense when asserting that recognition is founded on +similarity. Should he admit, on the other hand, that there is one +mind grasping the similarity of two successive momentary +existences, he would thereby admit that one entity endures for two +moments and thus contradict the tenet of universal +momentariness.—Should it be said that the cognition 'this is +similar to that' is a different (new) cognition, not dependent on +the apperception of the earlier and later momentary existences, we +refute this by the remark that the fact of different +terms—viz. 'this' and 'that'—being used points to the +existence of different things (which the mind grasps in a judgment +of similarity). If the mental act of which similarity is the object +were an altogether new act (not concerned with the two separate +similar entities), the expression 'this is similar to that' +<span class="pagenum"><a name="page415" id= +"page415"></a>{415}</span> would be devoid of meaning; we should in +that case rather speak of 'similarity' only.—Whenever (to add +a general reflexion) something perfectly well known from ordinary +experience is not admitted by philosophers, they may indeed +establish their own view and demolish the contrary opinion by means +of words, but they thereby neither convince others nor even +themselves. Whatever has been ascertained to be such and such must +also be represented as such and such; attempts to represent it as +something else prove nothing but the vain talkativeness of those +who make those attempts. Nor can the hypothesis of mere similarity +being cognised account for ordinary empirical life and thought; for +(in recognising a thing) we are conscious of it being that which we +were formerly conscious of, not of it being merely similar to that. +We admit that sometimes with regard to an external thing a doubt +may arise whether it is that or merely is similar to that; for +mistakes may be made concerning what lies outside our minds. But +the conscious subject never has any doubt whether it is itself or +only similar to itself; it rather is distinctly conscious that it +is one and the same subject which yesterday had a certain sensation +and to-day remembers that sensation.—For this reason also the +doctrine of the Nihilists is to be rejected.</p> +<p>26. (Entity) does not spring from non-entity on account of that +not being observed.</p> +<p>The system of the Vainâ<i>s</i>ikas is objectionable for +this reason also that those who deny the existence of permanent +stable causes are driven to maintain that entity springs from +non-entity. This latter tenet is expressly enunciated by the +Bauddhas where they say, 'On account of the manifestation (of +effects) not without previous destruction (of the cause).' For, +they say, from the decomposed seed only the young plant springs, +spoilt milk only turns into curds, and the lump of clay has ceased +to be a lump when it becomes a jar. If effects did spring from the +unchanged causes, all effects would originate from all causes at +once, <span class="pagenum"><a name="page416" id= +"page416"></a>{416}</span> as then no specification would be +required<a id="footnotetag403" name="footnotetag403"></a><a href= +"#footnote403"><sup>403</sup></a>. Hence, as we see that young +plants, &c. spring from seeds, &c. only after the latter +have been merged in non-existence, we hold that entity springs from +non-entity.</p> +<p>To this Bauddha tenet we reply, '(Entity does) not (spring) from +non-entity, on account of that not being observed.' If entity did +spring from non-entity, the assumption of special causes would be +purportless, since non-entity is in all cases one and the same. For +the non-existence of seeds and the like after they have been +destroyed is of the same kind as the non-existence of horns of +hares and the like, i.e. non-existence is in all cases nothing else +but the absence of all character of reality, and hence there would +be no sense (on the doctrine of origination from non-existence) in +assuming that sprouts are produced from seeds only, curds from milk +only, and so on. And if non-distinguished non-existence were +admitted to have causal efficiency, we should also have to assume +that sprouts, &c. originate from the horns of hares, +&c.—a thing certainly not actually observed.—If, +again, it should be assumed that there are different kinds of +non-existence having special distinctions—just as, for +instance, blueness and the like are special qualities of lotuses +and so on—we point out that in that case the fact of there +being such special distinctions would turn the non-entities into +entities no less real than lotuses and the like. In no case +non-existence would possess causal efficiency, simply because, like +the horn of a hare, it is non-existence merely.—Further, if +existence sprang from non-existence, all effects would be affected +with non-existence; while as a matter of fact they are observed to +be merely positive entities distinguished by their various special +characteristics. Nor<a id="footnotetag404" name= +"footnotetag404"></a><a href="#footnote404"><sup>404</sup></a> does +any one <span class="pagenum"><a name="page417" id= +"page417"></a>{417}</span> think that things of the nature of clay, +such as pots and the like, are the effects of threads and the like; +but everybody knows that things of the nature of clay are the +effects of clay only.—The Bauddha's tenet that nothing can +become a cause as long as it remains unchanged, but has to that end +to undergo destruction, and that thus existence springs from +non-existence only is false; for it is observed that only things of +permanent nature which are always recognised as what they are, such +as gold, &c., are the causes of effects such as golden +ornaments, and so on. In those cases where a destruction of the +peculiar nature of the cause is observed to take place, as in the +case of seeds, for instance, we have to acknowledge as the cause of +the subsequent condition (i.e. the sprout) not the earlier +condition in so far as it is destroyed, but rather those permanent +particles of the seed which are not destroyed (when the seed as a +whole undergoes decomposition).—Hence as we see on the one +hand that no entities ever originate from nonentities such as the +horns of a hare, and on the other hand that entities do originate +from entities such as gold and the like the whole Bauddha doctrine +of existence springing from non-existence has to be +rejected.—We finally point out that, according to the +Bauddhas, all mind and all mental modifications spring from the +four skandhas discussed above and all material aggregates from the +atoms; why then do they stultify this their own doctrine by the +fanciful assumption of entity springing from non-entity and thus +needlessly perplex the mind of every one?</p> +<p>27. And thus (on that doctrine) there would be an accomplishment +(of ends) in the case of non-active people also.</p> +<p>If it were admitted that entity issues from non-entity, lazy +inactive people also would obtain their purposes, since +'non-existence' is a thing to be had without much trouble. Rice +would grow for the husbandman even if he did not cultivate his +field; vessels would shape themselves even if the potter did not +fashion the clay; and the weaver too <span class="pagenum"><a name= +"page418" id="page418"></a>{418}</span> lazy to weave the threads +into a whole, would nevertheless have in the end finished pieces of +cloth just as if he had been weaving. And nobody would have to +exert himself in the least either for going to the heavenly world +or for obtaining final release. All which of course is absurd and +not maintained by anybody.—Thus the doctrine of the +origination of entity from non-entity again shows itself to be +futile.</p> +<p>28. The non-existence (of external things) cannot be maintained, +on account of (our) consciousness (of them).</p> +<p>There having been brought forward, in what precedes, the various +objections which lie against the doctrine of the reality of the +external world (in the Bauddha sense), such as the impossibility of +accounting for the existence of aggregates, &c., we are now +confronted by those Bauddhas who maintain that only cognitions (or +ideas, vij<i>ñ</i>âna) exist.—The doctrine of +the reality of the external world was indeed propounded by Buddha +conforming himself to the mental state of some of his disciples +whom he perceived to be attached to external things; but it does +not represent his own true view according to which cognitions alone +are real.</p> +<p>According to this latter doctrine the process, whose +constituting members are the act of knowledge, the object of +knowledge, and the result of knowledge<a id="footnotetag405" name= +"footnotetag405"></a><a href="#footnote405"><sup>405</sup></a>, is +an altogether internal one, existing in so far only as it is +connected with the mind (buddhi). Even if external things existed, +that process could not take place but in connexion with the mind. +If, the Bauddhas say, you ask how it is known that that entire +process is internal and that no outward things exist apart from +consciousness, we reply that we base our <span class= +"pagenum"><a name="page419" id="page419"></a>{419}</span> doctrine +on the impossibility of external things. For if external things are +admitted, they must be either atoms or aggregates of atoms such as +posts and the like. But atoms cannot be comprehended under the +ideas of posts and the like, it being impossible for cognition to +represent (things as minute as) atoms. Nor, again, can the outward +things be aggregates of atoms such as pillars and the like, because +those aggregates can neither be defined as different nor as +non-different from the atoms<a id="footnotetag406" name= +"footnotetag406"></a><a href= +"#footnote406"><sup>406</sup></a>.—In the same way we can +show that the external things are not universals and so on<a id= +"footnotetag407" name="footnotetag407"></a><a href= +"#footnote407"><sup>407</sup></a>.</p> +<p>Moreover, the cognitions—which are of a uniform nature +only in so far as they are states of consciousness—undergo, +according to their objects, successive modifications, so that there +is presented to the mind now the idea of a post, now the idea of a +wall, now the idea of a jar, and so on. Now this is not possible +without some distinction on the part of the ideas themselves, and +hence we must necessarily admit that the ideas have the same forms +as their objects. But if we make this admission, from which it +follows that the form of the objects is determined by the ideas, +the hypothesis of the existence of external things becomes +altogether gratuitous. From the fact, moreover, of our always being +conscious of the act of knowledge and the object of knowledge +simultaneously it follows that the two are in reality identical. +When we are conscious of the one we are conscious of the other +also; and that would not happen if the two were essentially +distinct, as in that case there would be nothing to prevent our +being conscious of one apart from the other. For this reason also +we maintain that there are no outward things.—</p> +<span class="pagenum"><a name="page420" id= +"page420"></a>{420}</span> +<p>Perception is to be considered as similar to a dream and the +like. The ideas present to our minds during a dream, a magical +illusion, a mirage and so on, appear in the twofold form of subject +and object, although there is all the while no external object; +hence we conclude that the ideas of posts and the like which occur +in our waking state are likewise independent of external objects; +for they also are simply ideas.—If we be asked how, in the +absence of external things, we account for the actual variety of +ideas, we reply that that variety is to be explained from the +impressions left by previous ideas<a id="footnotetag408" name= +"footnotetag408"></a><a href="#footnote408"><sup>408</sup></a>. In +the beginningless sa<i>m</i>sâra ideas and mental impressions +succeed each other as causes and effects, just as the plant springs +from the seed and seeds are again produced from the plant, and +there exists therefore a sufficient reason for the variety of ideas +actually experienced. That the variety of ideas is solely due to +the impressions left on the mind by past ideas follows, moreover, +from the following affirmative and negative judgments: we both (the +Vedântins as well as the Bauddhas) admit that in dreams, +&c. there presents itself a variety of ideas which arise from +mental impressions, without any external object; we (the Bauddhas) +do not admit that any variety of ideas can arise from external +objects, without mental impressions.—Thus we are again led to +conclude that no outward things exist.</p> +<p>To all this we (the Vedântins) make the following +reply.—The non-existence of external things cannot be +maintained because we are conscious of external things. In every +act of perception we are conscious of some external thing +corresponding to the idea, whether it be a post or a wall or a +piece of cloth or a jar, and that of which we are conscious cannot +but exist. Why should we pay attention to the words of a man who, +while conscious of an outward thing through its approximation to +his senses, affirms that he is conscious of no outward thing, and +that no such thing exists, <span class="pagenum"><a name="page421" +id="page421"></a>{421}</span> any more than we listen to a man who +while he is eating and experiencing the feeling of satisfaction +avers that he does not eat and does not feel satisfied?—If +the Bauddha should reply that he does not affirm that he is +conscious of no object but only that he is conscious of no object +apart from the act of consciousness, we answer that he may indeed +make any arbitrary statement he likes, but that he has no arguments +to prove what he says. That the outward thing exists apart from +consciousness, has necessarily to be accepted on the ground of the +nature of consciousness itself. Nobody when perceiving a post or a +wall is conscious of his perception only, but all men are conscious +of posts and walls and the like as objects of their perceptions. +That such is the consciousness of all men, appears also from the +fact that even those who contest the existence of external things +bear witness to their existence when they say that what is an +internal object of cognition appears like something external. For +they practically accept the general consciousness, which testifies +to the existence of an external world, and being at the same time +anxious to refute it they speak of the external things as 'like +something external.' If they did not themselves at the bottom +acknowledge the existence of the external world, how could they use +the expression 'like something external?' No one says, +'Vish<i>n</i>umitra appears like the son of a barren mother.' If we +accept the truth as it is given to us in our consciousness, we must +admit that the object of perception appears to us as something +external, not like something external.—But—the Bauddha +may reply—we conclude that the object of perception is only +like something external because external things are +impossible.—This conclusion we rejoin is improper, since the +possibility or impossibility of things is to be determined only on +the ground of the operation or non-operation of the means of right +knowledge; while on the other hand, the operation and non-operation +of the means of right knowledge are not to be made dependent on +preconceived possibilities or impossibilities. Possible is whatever +is apprehended by perception or some other means of proof; +impossible is what is not so apprehended. Now the external things +are, <span class="pagenum"><a name="page422" id= +"page422"></a>{422}</span> according to their nature, apprehended +by all the instruments of knowledge; how then can you maintain that +they are not possible, on the ground of such idle dilemmas as that +about their difference or non-difference from atoms?—Nor, +again, does the non-existence of objects follow from the fact of +the ideas having the same form as the objects; for if there were no +objects the ideas could not have the forms of the objects, and the +objects are actually apprehended as external.—For the same +reason (i.e. because the distinction of thing and idea is given in +consciousness) the invariable concomitance of idea and thing has to +be considered as proving only that the thing constitutes the means +of the idea, not that the two are identical. Moreover, when we are +conscious first of a pot and then of a piece of cloth, +consciousness remains the same in the two acts while what varies +are merely the distinctive attributes of consciousness; just as +when we see at first a black and then a white cow, the distinction +of the two perceptions is due to the varying blackness and +whiteness while the generic character of the cow remains the same. +The difference of the one permanent factor (from the two—or +more—varying factors) is proved throughout by the two varying +factors, and vice versâ the difference of the latter (from +the permanent factor) by the presence of the one (permanent +factor). Therefore thing and idea are distinct. The same view is to +be held with regard to the perception and the remembrance of a jar; +there also the perception and the remembrance only are distinct +while the jar is one and the same; in the same way as when +conscious of the smell of milk and the taste of milk we are +conscious of the smell and taste as different things but of the +milk itself as one only.</p> +<p>Further, two ideas which occupy different moments of time and +pass away as soon as they have become objects of consciousness +cannot apprehend—or be apprehended by—each other. From +this it follows that certain doctrines forming part of the Bauddha +system cannot be upheld; so the doctrine that ideas are different +from each other; the doctrine that everything is momentary, void, +&c.; the doctrine of the distinction of individuals and +classes; the <span class="pagenum"><a name="page423" id= +"page423"></a>{423}</span> doctrine that a former idea leaves an +impression giving rise to a later idea; the doctrine of the +distinction, owing to the influence of Nescience, of the attributes +of existence and non-existence; the doctrine of bondage and release +(depending on absence and presence of right knowledge)<a id= +"footnotetag409" name="footnotetag409"></a><a href= +"#footnote409"><sup>409</sup></a>.</p> +<p>Further, if you say that we are conscious of the idea, you must +admit that we are also conscious of the external thing. And if you +rejoin that we are conscious of the idea on its own account because +it is of a luminous nature like a lamp, while the external thing is +not so; we reply that by maintaining the idea to be illuminated by +itself you make yourself guilty of an absurdity no less than if you +said that fire burns itself. And at the same time you refuse to +accept the common and altogether rational opinion that we are +conscious of the external thing by means of the idea different from +the thing! Indeed a proof of extraordinary philosophic +insight!—It cannot, moreover, be asserted in any way that the +idea apart from the thing is the object of our consciousness; for +it is absurd to speak of a thing as the object of its own activity. +Possibly you (the Bauddha) will rejoin that, if the idea is to be +apprehended by something different from it, that something also +must be apprehended by something different and so on ad infinitum. +And, moreover, you will perhaps object that as each cognition is of +an essentially illuminating nature like a lamp, the assumption of a +further cognition is uncalled for; for as they are both equally +illuminating the one cannot give light to the other.—But both +these objections are unfounded. As the idea only is apprehended, +and there is consequently no necessity to assume something to +apprehend the Self which witnesses the idea (is conscious of the +idea), there results no regressus ad infinitum. And the witnessing +Self and the idea are of an essentially different nature, and may +therefore stand to each other in the relation of knowing subject +and object known. The existence of the witnessing <span class= +"pagenum"><a name="page424" id="page424"></a>{424}</span> Self is +self-proved and cannot therefore be denied.—Moreover, if you +maintain that the idea, lamplike, manifests itself without standing +in need of a further principle to illuminate it, you maintain +thereby that ideas exist which are not apprehended by any of the +means of knowledge, and which are without a knowing being; which is +no better than to assert that a thousand lamps burning inside some +impenetrable mass of rocks manifest themselves. And if you should +maintain that thereby we admit your doctrine, since it follows from +what we have said that the idea itself implies consciousness; we +reply that, as observation shows, the lamp in order to become +manifest requires some other intellectual agent furnished with +instruments such as the eye, and that therefore the idea also, as +equally being a thing to be illuminated, becomes manifest only +through an ulterior intelligent principle. And if you finally +object that we, when advancing the witnessing Self as self-proved, +merely express in other words the Bauddha tenet that the idea is +self-manifested, we refute you by remarking that your ideas have +the attributes of originating, passing away, being manifold, and so +on (while our Self is one and permanent).—We thus have proved +that an idea, like a lamp, requires an ulterior intelligent +principle to render it manifest.</p> +<p>29. And on account of their difference of nature (the ideas of +the waking state) are not like those of a dream.</p> +<p>We now apply ourselves to the refutation of the averment made by +the Bauddha, that the ideas of posts, and so on, of which we are +conscious in the waking state, may arise in the absence of external +objects, just as the ideas of a dream, both being ideas +alike.—The two sets of ideas, we maintain, cannot be treated +on the same footing, on account of the difference of their +character. They differ as follows.—The things of which we are +conscious in a dream are negated by our waking consciousness. 'I +wrongly thought that I had a meeting with a great man; no such +meeting took place, but my mind was dulled by slumber, and so the +<span class="pagenum"><a name="page425" id= +"page425"></a>{425}</span> false idea arose.' In an analogous +manner the things of which we are conscious when under the +influence of a magic illusion, and the like, are negated by our +ordinary consciousness. Those things, on the other hand, of which +we are conscious in our waking state, such as posts and the like, +are never negated in any state.—Moreover, the visions of a +dream are acts of remembrance, while the visions of the waking +state are acts of immediate consciousness; and the distinction +between remembrance and immediate consciousness is directly +cognised by every one as being founded on the absence or presence +of the object. When, for instance, a man remembers his absent son, +he does not directly perceive him, but merely wishes so to perceive +him. As thus the distinction between the two states is evident to +every one, it is impossible to formulate the inference that waking +consciousness is false because it is mere consciousness, such as +dreaming consciousness; for we certainly cannot allow would-be +philosophers to deny the truth of what is directly evident to +themselves. Just because they feel the absurdity of denying what is +evident to themselves, and are consequently unable to demonstrate +the baselessness of the ideas of the waking state from those ideas +themselves, they attempt to demonstrate it from their having +certain attributes in common with the ideas of the dreaming state. +But if some attribute cannot belong to a thing on account of the +latter's own nature, it cannot belong to it on account of the thing +having certain attributes in common with some other thing. Fire, +which is felt to be hot, cannot be demonstrated to be cold, on the +ground of its having attributes in common with water. And the +difference of nature between the waking and the sleeping state we +have already shown.</p> +<p>30. The existence (of mental impressions) is not possible on the +Bauddha view, on account of the absence of perception (of external +things).</p> +<p>We now proceed to that theory of yours, according to which the +variety of ideas can be explained from the <span class= +"pagenum"><a name="page426" id="page426"></a>{426}</span> variety +of mental impressions, without any reference to external things, +and remark that on your doctrine the existence of mental +impressions is impossible, as you do not admit the perception of +external things. For the variety of mental impressions is caused +altogether by the variety of the things perceived. How, indeed, +could various impressions originate if no external things were +perceived? The hypothesis of a beginningless series of mental +impressions would lead only to a baseless regressus ad infinitum, +sublative of the entire phenomenal world, and would in no way +establish your position.—The same argument, i.e. the one +founded on the impossibility of mental impressions which are not +caused by external things, refutes also the positive and negative +judgments, on the ground of which the denier of an external world +above attempted to show that ideas are caused by mental +impressions, not by external things. We rather have on our side a +positive and a negative judgment whereby to establish our doctrine +of the existence of external things, viz. 'the perception of +external things is admitted to take place also without mental +impressions,' and 'mental impressions are not admitted to originate +independently of the perception of external +things.'—Moreover, an impression is a kind of modification, +and modifications cannot, as experience teaches, take place unless +there is some substratum which is modified. But, according to your +doctrine, such a substratum of impressions does not exist, since +you say that it cannot be cognised through any means of +knowledge.</p> +<p>31. And on account of the momentariness (of the +âlayavij<i>ñ</i>âna, it cannot be the abode of +mental impressions).</p> +<p>If you maintain that the so-called internal cognition +(âlayavij<i>ñ</i>âna<a id="footnotetag410" name= +"footnotetag410"></a><a href="#footnote410"><sup>410</sup></a>) +assumed by you may constitute the abode <span class= +"pagenum"><a name="page427" id="page427"></a>{427}</span> of the +mental impressions, we deny that, because that cognition also being +admittedly momentary, and hence non-permanent, cannot be the abode +of impressions any more than the quasi-external cognitions +(prav<i>ri</i>ttivij<i>ñ</i>âna). For unless there +exists one continuous principle equally connected with the past, +the present, and the future<a id="footnotetag411" name= +"footnotetag411"></a><a href="#footnote411"><sup>411</sup></a>, or +an absolutely unchangeable (Self) which cognises everything, we are +unable to account for remembrance, recognition, and so on, which +are subject to mental impressions dependent on place, time, and +cause. If, on the other hand, you declare your +âlayavij<i>ñ</i>âna to be something permanent, +you thereby abandon your tenet of the +âlayavij<i>ñ</i>âna as well as everything else +being momentary.—Or (to explain the Sûtra in a +different way) as the tenet of general momentariness is +characteristic of the systems of the idealistic as well as the +realistic Bauddhas, we may bring forward against the doctrines of +the former all those arguments dependent on the principle of +general momentariness which we have above urged against the +latter.</p> +<p>We have thus refuted both nihilistic doctrines, viz. the +doctrine which maintains the (momentary) reality of the external +world, and the doctrine which asserts that ideas only exist. The +third variety of Bauddha doctrine, viz. that everything is empty +(i.e. that absolutely nothing exists), is contradicted by all means +of right knowledge, and therefore requires no special refutation. +For this apparent world, whose existence is guaranteed by all the +means of knowledge, cannot be denied, unless some one should find +out some new truth (based on which he could impugn its +existence)—for a general principle is proved by the absence +of contrary instances.</p> +<p>32. And on account of its general deficiency in probability.</p> +<p>No further special discussion is in fact required. From +<span class="pagenum"><a name="page428" id= +"page428"></a>{428}</span> whatever new points of view the Bauddha +system is tested with reference to its probability, it gives way on +all sides, like the walls of a well dug in sandy soil. It has, in +fact, no foundation whatever to rest upon, and hence the attempts +to use it as a guide in the practical concerns of life are mere +folly.—Moreover, Buddha by propounding the three mutually +contradictory systems, teaching respectively the reality of the +external world, the reality of ideas only, and general nothingness, +has himself made it clear either that he was a man given to make +incoherent assertions, or else that hatred of all beings induced +him to propound absurd doctrines by accepting which they would +become thoroughly confused.—So that—and this the +Sûtra means to indicate—Buddha's doctrine has to be +entirely disregarded by all those who have a regard for their own +happiness.</p> +<p>33. On account of the impossibility (of contradictory +attributes) in one thing, (the Jaina doctrine is) not (to be +accepted).</p> +<p>Having disposed of the Bauddha doctrine we now turn to the +system of the Gymnosophists (Jainas).</p> +<p>The Jainas acknowledge seven categories (tattvas), viz. soul +(jîva), non-soul (ajîva), the issuing outward +(âsrava), restraint (sa<i>m</i>vara), destruction (nirjara), +bondage (bandha), and release (moksha)<a id="footnotetag412" name= +"footnotetag412"></a><a href="#footnote412"><sup>412</sup></a>. +Shortly it may be said that they acknowledge two categories, viz. +soul and non-soul, since the five other categories may be subsumed +under these two.—They also set forth a set of categories +different from the two mentioned. They teach that there are five +so-called <span class="pagenum"><a name="page429" id= +"page429"></a>{429}</span> astikâyas ('existing bodies,' i.e. +categories), viz. the categories of soul (jîva), body +(pudgala), merit (dharma), demerit (adharma), and space +(âkâ<i>s</i>a). All these categories they again +subdivide in various fanciful ways<a id="footnotetag413" name= +"footnotetag413"></a><a href= +"#footnote413"><sup>413</sup></a>.—To all things they apply +the following method of reasoning, which they call the +saptabha@ngînaya: somehow it is; somehow it is not; somehow +it is and is not; somehow it is indescribable; somehow it is and is +indescribable; somehow it is not and is indescribable; somehow it +is and is not and is indescribable.</p> +<p>To this unsettling style of reasoning they submit even such +conceptions as that of unity and eternity<a id="footnotetag414" +name="footnotetag414"></a><a href= +"#footnote414"><sup>414</sup></a>.</p> +<p>This doctrine we meet as follows.—Your reasoning, we say, +is inadmissible 'on account of the impossibility in one thing.' +That is to say, it is impossible that contradictory attributes such +as being and non-being should at the same time belong to one and +the same thing; just as observation teaches us that a thing cannot +be hot and cold at the same moment. The seven categories asserted +by you must either be so many and such or not be so many and such; +the third alternative expressed in the words 'they either are such +or not such' results in a cognition of indefinite nature which is +no more a source of true knowledge than doubt is. If you should +plead that the cognition that a thing is of more than one nature is +definite and therefore a source of true knowledge, we deny this. +For the unlimited assertion that all things are of a non-exclusive +nature is itself something, falls as such under the alternative +predications 'somehow it is,' 'somehow it is not,' and so ceases to +be a definite assertion. The same happens to the person making the +assertion and to the result of the assertion; partly they are, +partly they are not. As thus the means of knowledge, the object of +knowledge, the knowing subject, and the act of knowledge are all +alike indefinite, how can the Tîrthakara (Jina) teach with +any claim to authority, and how can his followers act on a doctrine +the matter of which is altogether <span class="pagenum"><a name= +"page430" id="page430"></a>{430}</span> indeterminate? Observation +shows that only when a course of action is known to have a definite +result people set about it without hesitation. Hence a man who +proclaims a doctrine of altogether indefinite contents does not +deserve to be listened to any more than a drunken man or a +madman.—Again, if we apply the Jaina reasoning to their +doctrine of the five categories, we have to say that on one view of +the matter they are five and on another view they are not five; +from which latter point of view it follows that they are either +fewer or more than five. Nor is it logical to declare the +categories to be indescribable. For if they are so, they cannot be +described; but, as a matter of fact, they are described so that to +call them indescribable involves a contradiction. And if you go on +to say that the categories on being described are ascertained to be +such and such, and at the same time are not ascertained to be such +and such, and that the result of their being ascertained is perfect +knowledge or is not perfect knowledge, and that imperfect knowledge +is the opposite of perfect knowledge or is not the opposite; you +certainly talk more like a drunken or insane man than like a sober, +trustworthy person.—If you further maintain that the heavenly +world and final release exist or do not exist and are eternal or +non-eternal, the absence of all determinate knowledge which is +implied in such statements will result in nobody's acting for the +purpose of gaining the heavenly world and final release. And, +moreover, it follows from your doctrine that soul, non-soul, and so +on, whose nature you claim to have ascertained, and which you +describe as having existed from all eternity, relapse all at once +into the condition of absolute indetermination.—As therefore +the two contradictory attributes of being and non-being cannot +belong to any of the categories—being excluding non-being and +vice versâ non-being excluding being—the doctrine of +the Ârhat must be rejected.—The above remarks dispose +likewise of the assertions made by the Jainas as to the +impossibility of deciding whether of one thing there is to be +predicated oneness or plurality, permanency or non-permanency, +separateness or norn-separateness, and so on.—The Jaina +doctrine that <span class="pagenum"><a name="page431" id= +"page431"></a>{431}</span> aggregates are formed from the +atoms—by them called pudgalas—we do not undertake to +refute separately as its refutation is already comprised in that of +the atomistic doctrine given in a previous part of this work.</p> +<p>34. And likewise (there results from the Jaina, doctrine) +non-universality of the Self.</p> +<p>We have hitherto urged against the Jaina doctrine an objection +resulting from the syâdvâda, viz. that one thing cannot +have contradictory attributes. We now turn to the objection that +from their doctrine it would follow that the individual Self is not +universal, i.e. not omnipresent.—The Jainas are of opinion +that the soul has the same size as the body. From this it would +follow that the soul is not of infinite extension, but limited, and +hence non-eternal like jars and similar things. Further, as the +bodies of different classes of creatures are of different size, it +might happen that the soul of a man—which is of the size of +the human body—when entering, in consequence of its former +deeds, on a new state of existence in the body of an elephant would +not be able to fill the whole of it; or else that a human soul +being relegated to the body of an ant would not be able to find +sufficient room in it. The same difficulty would, moreover, arise +with regard to the successive stages of one state of existence, +infancy, youth, and old age.—But why, the Jaina may ask, +should we not look upon the soul as consisting of an infinite +number of parts capable of undergoing compression in a small body +and dilatation in a big one?—Do you, we ask in return, admit +or not admit that those countless particles of the soul may occupy +the same place or not?—If you do not admit it, it follows +that the infinite number of particles cannot be contained in a body +of limited dimensions.—If you do admit it, it follows that, +as then the space occupied by all the particles may be the space of +one particle only, the extension of all the particles together will +remain inconsiderable, and hence the soul be of minute size (not of +the size of the body). You have, moreover, no right to assume that +a body <span class="pagenum"><a name="page432" id= +"page432"></a>{432}</span> of limited size contains an infinite +number of soul particles.</p> +<p>Well the, the Jaina may reply, let us assume that by turns +whenever the soul enters a big body some particles accede to it +while some withdraw from it whenever it enters a small +body.—To this hypothesis the next Sûtra furnishes a +reply.</p> +<p>35. Nor is non-contradiction to be derived from the succession +(of parts acceding to and departing from the soul), on account of +the change, &c. (of the soul).</p> +<p>Nor can the doctrine of the soul having the same size as the +body be satisfactorily established by means of the hypothesis of +the successive accession and withdrawal of particles. For this +hypothesis would involve the soul's undergoing changes and the +like. If the soul is continually being repleted and depleted by the +successive addition and withdrawal of parts, it of course follows +that it undergoes change, and if it is liable to change it follows +that it is non-permanent, like the skin and similar substances. +From that, again, it follows that the Jaina doctrine of bondage and +release is untenable; according to which doctrine 'the soul, which +in the state of bondage is encompassed by the ogdoad of works and +sunk in the ocean of sa<i>m</i>sâra, rises when its bonds are +sundered, as the gourd rises to the surface of the water when it is +freed from the encumbering clay<a id="footnotetag415" name= +"footnotetag415"></a><a href= +"#footnote415"><sup>415</sup></a>.'—Moreover, those particles +which in turns come and depart have the attributes of coming and +going, and cannot, on that account, be of the nature of the Self +any more than the body is. And if it be said that the Self consists +of some permanently remaining parts, we remark that it would be +impossible to determine which are the permanent and which the +temporary parts.—We have further to ask from whence those +particles originate when they accede to the soul, and into what +they are merged when they detach themselves from it. They cannot +spring from the material elements <span class="pagenum"><a name= +"page433" id="page433"></a>{433}</span> and re-enter the elements; +for the soul is immaterial. Nor have we any means to prove the +existence of some other, general or special, reservoir of +soul-particles.—Moreover, on the hypothesis under discussion +the soul would be of indefinite nature, as the size of the +particles acceding and departing is itself indefinite.—On +account of all these and similar difficulties it cannot be +maintained that certain particles by turns attach themselves to, +and detach themselves from, the soul.</p> +<p>The Sûtra may be taken in a different sense also. The +preceding Sûtra has proved that the soul if of the same size +as the body cannot be permanent, as its entering into bigger and +smaller bodies involves its limitation. To this the Gymnosophist +may be supposed to rejoin that although the soul's size +successively changes it may yet be permanent, just as the stream of +water is permanent (although the water continually changes). An +analogous instance would be supplied by the permanency of the +stream of ideas while the individual ideas, as that of a red cloth +and so on, are non-permanent.—To this rejoinder our +Sûtra replies that if the stream is not real we are led back +to the doctrine of a general void, and that, if it is something +real, the difficulties connected with the soul's changing, &c. +present themselves and render the Jaina view impossible.</p> +<p>36. And on account of the permanency of the final (size of the +soul) and the resulting permanency of the two (preceding sizes) +there is no difference (of size, at any time).</p> +<p>Moreover, the Jainas themselves admit the permanency of the +final size of the soul which it has in the state of release. From +this it follows also that its initial size and its intervening +sizes must be permanent<a id="footnotetag416" name= +"footnotetag416"></a><a href="#footnote416"><sup>416</sup></a>, and +that hence <span class="pagenum"><a name="page434" id= +"page434"></a>{434}</span> there is no difference between the three +sizes. But this would involve the conclusion that the different +bodies of the soul have one and the same size, and that the soul +cannot enter into bigger and smaller bodies.—Or else (to +explain the Sûtra in a somewhat different way) from the fact +that the final size of the soul is permanent, it follows that its +size in the two previous conditions also is permanent. Hence the +soul must be considered as being always of the same +size—whether minute or infinite—and not of the varying +size of its bodies.—For this reason also the doctrine of the +Arhat has to be set aside as not in any way more rational than the +doctrine of Buddha.</p> +<p>37. The Lord (cannot be the cause of the world), on account of +the inappropriateness (of that doctrine).</p> +<p>The Sûtrakâra now applies himself to the refutation +of that doctrine, according to which the Lord is the cause of the +world only in so far as he is the general ruler.—But how do +you know that that is the purport of the Sûtra (which speaks +of the Lord 'without any qualification')?—From the +circumstance, we reply, that the teacher himself has proved, in the +previous sections of the work, that the Lord is the material cause +as well as the ruler of the world. Hence, if the present +Sûtra were meant to impugn the doctrine of the Lord in +general, the earlier and later parts of the work would be mutually +contradictory, and the Sûtrakâra would thus be in +conflict with himself. We therefore must assume that the purport of +the present Sûtra is to make an energetic attack on the +doctrine of those who maintain that the Lord is not the material +cause, but merely the ruler, i.e. the operative cause of the world; +a doctrine entirely opposed to the Vedântic tenet of the +unity of Brahman.</p> +<p>The theories about the Lord which are independent of the +Vedânta are of various nature. Some taking their stand on the +Sâ@nkhya and Yoga systems assume that the Lord acts as a mere +operative cause, as the ruler of the <span class="pagenum"><a name= +"page435" id="page435"></a>{435}</span> pradhâna and of the +souls, and that pradhâna, soul, and Lord are of mutually +different nature.—The Máhe<i>s</i>varas +(<i>S</i>aivas) maintain that the five categories, viz. effect, +cause, union, ritual, the end of pain, were taught by the Lord +Pa<i>s</i>upati (<i>S</i>iva) to the end of breaking the bonds of +the animal (i.e. the soul); Pa<i>s</i>upati is, according to them, +the Lord, the operative cause.—Similarly, the +Vai<i>s</i>eshikas and others also teach, according to their +various systems, that the Lord is somehow the operative cause of +the world.</p> +<p>Against all these opinions the Sûtra remarks 'the Lord, on +account of the inappropriateness.' I.e. it is not possible that the +Lord as the ruler of the pradhâna and the soul should be the +cause of the world, on account of the inappropriateness of that +doctrine. For if the Lord is supposed to assign to the various +classes of animate creatures low, intermediate, and high positions, +according to his liking, it follows that he is animated by hatred, +passion, and so on, is hence like one of us, and is no real Lord. +Nor can we get over this difficulty by assuming that he makes his +dispositions with a view to the merit and demerit of the living +beings; for that assumption would lead us to a logical see-saw, the +Lord as well as the works of living beings having to be considered +in turns both as acting and as acted upon. This difficulty is not +removed by the consideration that the works of living beings and +the resulting dispositions made by the Lord form a chain which has +no beginning; for in past time as well as in the present mutual +interdependence of the two took place, so that the beginningless +series is like an endless chain of blind men leading other blind +men. It is, moreover, a tenet set forth by the Naiyâyikas +themselves that 'imperfections have the characteristic of being the +causes of action' (Nyâya Sùtra I, 1, 18). Experience +shows that all agents, whether they be active for their own +purposes or for the purposes of something else, are impelled to +action by some imperfection. And even if it is admitted that an +agent even when acting for some extrinsic purpose is impelled by an +intrinsic motive, your doctrine remains faulty all the same; for +the <span class="pagenum"><a name="page436" id= +"page436"></a>{436}</span> Lord is no longer a Lord, even if he is +actuated by intrinsic motives only (such as the desire of removing +the painful feeling connected with pity).—Your doctrine is +finally inappropriate for that reason also that you maintain the +Lord to be a special kind of soul; for from that it follows that he +must be devoid of all activity.</p> +<p>38. And on account of the impossibility of the connexion (of the +Lord with the souls and the pradhâna).</p> +<p>Against the doctrine which we are at present discussing there +lies the further objection that a Lord distinct from the +pradhâna and the souls cannot be the ruler of the latter +without being connected with them in a certain way. But of what +nature is that connexion to be? It cannot be conjunction +(sa<i>m</i>yoga), because the Lord, as well as the pradhâna +and the souls, is of infinite extent and devoid of parts. Nor can +it be inherence, since it would be impossible to define who should +be the abode and who the abiding thing. Nor is it possible to +assume some other connexion, the special nature of which would have +to be inferred from the effect, because the relation of cause and +effect is just what is not settled as yet<a id="footnotetag417" +name="footnotetag417"></a><a href= +"#footnote417"><sup>417</sup></a>.—How, then, it may be +asked, do you—the Vedântins—establish the +relation of cause and effect (between the Lord and the +world)?—There is, we reply, no difficulty in our case, as the +connexion we assume is that of identity (tâdâtmya). The +adherent of Brahman, moreover, defines the nature of the cause, and +so on, on the basis of Scripture, and is therefore not obliged to +render his tenets throughout conformable to observation. Our +adversary, on the other hand, who defines the nature of the cause +and the like according to instances furnished by experience, +<span class="pagenum"><a name="page437" id= +"page437"></a>{437}</span> may be expected to maintain only such +doctrines as agree with experience. Nor can he put forward the +claim that Scripture, because it is the production of the +omniscient Lord, may be used to confirm his doctrine as well as +that of the Vedântin; for that would involve him in a logical +see-saw, the omniscience of the Lord being established on the +doctrine of Scripture, and the authority of Scripture again being +established on the omniscience of the Lord.—For all these +reasons the Sâ@nkhya-yoga hypothesis about the Lord is devoid +of foundation. Other similar hypotheses which likewise are not +based on the Veda are to be refuted by corresponding arguments.</p> +<p>39. And on account of the impossibility of rulership (on the +part of the Lord).</p> +<p>The Lord of the argumentative philosophers is an untenable +hypothesis, for the following reason also.—Those philosophers +are obliged to assume that by his influence the Lord produces +action in the pradhâna, &c. just as the potter produces +motion in the clay, &c. But this cannot be admitted; for the +pradhâna, which is devoid of colour and other qualities, and +therefore not an object of perception, is on that account of an +altogether different nature from clay and the like, and hence +cannot be looked upon as the object of the Lord's action.</p> +<p>40. If you say that as the organs (are ruled by the soul so the +pradhâna is ruled by the Lord), we deny that on account of +the enjoyment, &c.</p> +<p>Well, the opponent might reply, let us suppose that the Lord +rules the pradhâna in the same way as the soul rules the +organ of sight and the other organs which are devoid of colour, and +so on, and hence not objects of perception.</p> +<p>This analogy also, we reply, proves nothing. For we infer that +the organs are ruled by the soul, from the observed fact that the +soul feels pleasure, pain, and the like (which affect the soul +through the organs). But we do not observe that the Lord +experiences pleasure, pain, &c. caused <span class= +"pagenum"><a name="page438" id="page438"></a>{438}</span> by the +pradhâna. If the analogy between the pradhâna and the +bodily organs were a complete one, it would follow that the Lord is +affected by pleasure and pain no less than the transmigrating souls +are.</p> +<p>Or else the two preceding Sûtras may be explained in a +different way. Ordinary experience teaches us that kings, who are +the rulers of countries, are never without some material abode, +i.e. a body; hence, if we wish to infer the existence of a general +Lord from the analogy of earthly rulers, we must ascribe to him +also some kind of body to serve as the substratum of his organs. +But such a body cannot be ascribed to the Lord, since all bodies +exist only subsequently to the creation, not previously to it. The +Lord, therefore, is not able to act because devoid of a material +substratum; for experience teaches us that action requires a +material substrate.—Let us then arbitrarily assume that the +Lord possesses some kind of body serving as a substratum for his +organs (even previously to creation).—This assumption also +will not do; for if the Lord has a body he is subject to the +sensations of ordinary transmigratory souls, and thus no longer is +the Lord.</p> +<p>41. And (there would follow from that doctrine) either finite +duration or absence of omniscience (on the Lord's part).</p> +<p>The hypothesis of the argumentative philosophers is invalid, for +the following reason also.—They teach that the Lord is +omniscient and of infinite duration, and likewise that the +pradhâna, as well as the individual souls, is of infinite +duration. Now, the omniscient Lord either defines the measure of +the pradhâna, the souls, and himself, or does not define it. +Both alternatives subvert the doctrine under discussion. For, on +the former alternative, the pradhâna, the souls, and the +Lord, being all of them of definite measure, must necessarily be of +finite duration; since ordinary experience teaches that all things +of definite extent, such as jars and the like, at some time cease +to exist. The numerical measure of pradhâna, souls, and Lord +is <span class="pagenum"><a name="page439" id= +"page439"></a>{439}</span> defined by their constituting a triad, +and the individual measure of each of them must likewise be +considered as defined by the Lord (because he is omniscient). The +number of the souls is a high one<a id="footnotetag418" name= +"footnotetag418"></a><a href="#footnote418"><sup>418</sup></a>. +From among this limited number of souls some obtain release from +the sa<i>m</i>sâra, that means their sa<i>m</i>sâra +comes to an end, and their subjection to the samsâra comes to +an end. Gradually all souls obtain release, and so there will +finally be an end of the entire sa<i>m</i>sâra and the +sa<i>m</i>sâra state of all souls. But the pradhâna +which is ruled by the Lord and which modifies itself for the +purposes of the soul is what is meant by sa<i>m</i>sâra. +Hence, when the latter no longer exists, nothing is left for the +Lord to rule, and his omniscience and ruling power have no longer +any objects. But if the pradhâna, the souls, and the Lord, +all have an end, it follows that they also have a beginning, and if +they have a beginning as well as an end, we are driven to the +doctrine of a general void.—Let us then, in order to avoid +these untoward conclusions, maintain the second alternative, i.e. +that the measure of the Lord himself, the pradhâna, and the +souls, is not defined by the Lord.—But that also is +impossible, because it would compel us to abandon a tenet granted +at the outset, viz. that the Lord is omniscient.</p> +<p>For all these reasons the doctrine of the argumentative +philosophers, according to which the Lord is the operative cause of +the world, appears unacceptable.</p> +<p>42. On account of the impossibility of the origination (of the +individual soul from the highest Lord, the doctrine of the +Bhâgavatas cannot be accepted).</p> +<p>We have, in what precedes, refuted the opinion of those who +think that the Lord is not the material cause but only the ruler, +the operative cause of the world. We are now <span class= +"pagenum"><a name="page440" id="page440"></a>{440}</span> going to +refute the doctrine of those according to whom he is the material +as well as the operative cause.—But, it may be objected, in +the previous portions of the present work a Lord of exactly the +same nature, i.e. a Lord who is the material, as well as the +operative, cause of the world, has been ascertained on the basis of +Scripture, and it is a recognised principle that Sm<i>ri</i>ti, in +so far as it agrees with Scripture, is authoritative; why then +should we aim at controverting the doctrine stated?—It is +true, we reply, that a part of the system which we are going to +discuss agrees with the Vedânta system, and hence affords no +matter for controversy; another part of the system, however, is +open to objection, and that part we intend to attack.</p> +<p>The so-called Bhâgavatas are of opinion that the one holy +(bhagavat) Vâsudeva, whose nature is pure knowledge, is what +really exists, and that he, dividing himself fourfold, appears in +four forms (vyûha), as Vâsudeva, Sa@nkarsha<i>n</i>a, +Pradyumna, and Aniruddha. Vâsudeva denotes the highest Self, +Sa@nkarsha<i>n</i>a the individual soul, Pradyumna the mind +(manas), Aniruddha the principle of egoity (aha@nkâra). Of +these four Vâsudeva constitutes the ultimate causal essence, +of which the three others are the effects.—The believer after +having worshipped Vâsudeva for a hundred years by means of +approach to the temple (abhigamana), procuring of things to be +offered (upâdâna), oblation (îjyâ), +recitation of prayers, &c. (svâdhyâya), and devout +meditation (yoga), passes beyond all affliction and reaches the +highest Being.</p> +<p>Concerning this system we remark that we do not intend to +controvert the doctrine that Nârâya<i>n</i>a, who is +higher than the Undeveloped, who is the highest Self, and the Self +of all, reveals himself by dividing himself in multiple ways; for +various scriptural passages, such as 'He is onefold, he is +threefold' (Ch. Up. VII, 26, 2), teach us that the highest Self +appears in manifold forms. Nor do we mean to object to the +inculcation of unceasing concentration of mind on the highest Being +which appears in the Bhâgavata doctrine under the forms of +reverential approach, <span class="pagenum"><a name="page441" id= +"page441"></a>{441}</span> &c.; for that we are to meditate on +the Lord we know full well from Sm<i>ri</i>ti and Scripture. We, +however, must take exception to the doctrine that +Sa@nkarsha<i>n</i>a springs from Vâsudeva, Pradyumna from +Sa@nkarsha<i>n</i>a, Aniruddha from Pradyumna. It is not possible +that from Vâsudeva, i.e. the highest Self, there should +originate Sa@nkarsha<i>n</i>a, i.e. the individual soul; for if +such were the case, there would attach to the soul non-permanency, +and all the other imperfections which belong to things originated. +And thence release, which consists in reaching the highest Being, +could not take place; for the effect is absorbed only by entering +into its cause.—That the soul is not an originated thing, the +teacher will prove later on (II, 3, 17). For this reason the +Bhâgavata hypothesis is unacceptable.</p> +<p>43. And (it is) not (observed that) the instrument is produced +from the agent.</p> +<p>The Bhâgavata hypothesis is to be rejected for that reason +also, that observation never shows us an instrument, such as a +hatchet and the like, to spring from an agent such as Devadatta, or +any other workman. But the Bhâgavatas teach that from an +agent, viz. the individual soul termed Sa@nkarsha<i>n</i>a, there +springs its instrument, viz. the internal organ termed Pradyumna, +and again from this offspring of the agent another instrument, viz. +the aha@nkâra termed Aniruddha. Such doctrines cannot be +settled without observed instances. And we do not meet with any +scriptural passage in their favour.</p> +<p>44. Or (if) in consequence of the existence of knowledge, +&c. (Vâsudeva, &c. be taken as Lords), yet there is +non-exclusion of that (i.e. the objection raised in Sûtra +42).</p> +<p>Let us then—the Bhâgavatas may say—understand +by Sa@nkarsha<i>n</i>a, and so on, not the individual soul, the +mind, &c., but rather Lords, i.e. powerful beings distinguished +by all the qualities characteristic of rulers, such as pre-eminence +of knowledge and ruling capacity, strength, valour, glory. +<span class="pagenum"><a name="page442" id= +"page442"></a>{442}</span> All these are Vâsudevas free from +faults, without a substratum (not sprung from pradhâna), +without any imperfections. Hence the objection urged in Sûtra +42 does not apply.</p> +<p>Even on this interpretation of your doctrine, we reply, the +'non-exclusion of that,' i.e. the non-exclusion of the +impossibility of origination, can be established.—Do you, in +the first place, mean to say that the four individual Lords, +Vâsudeva, and so on, have the same attributes, but do not +constitute one and the same Self?—If so, you commit the fault +of uselessly assuming more than one Lord, while all the work of the +Lord can be done by one. Moreover, you offend thereby against your +own principle, according to which there is only one real essence, +viz. the holy Vâsudeva.—Or do you perhaps mean to say +that from the one highest Being there spring those four forms +possessing equal attributes?—In that case the objection urged +in Sûtra 42 remains valid. For Sa@nkarsha<i>n</i>a cannot be +produced from Vâsudeva, nor Pradyumna from +Sa@nkarsha<i>n</i>a, nor Aniruddha from Pradyumna, since (the +attributes of all of them being the same) there is no supereminence +of any one of them. Observation shows that the relation of cause +and effect requires some superiority on the part of the +cause—as, for instance, in the case of the clay and the jar +(where the cause is more extensive than the effect)—and that +without such superiority the relation is simply impossible. But the +followers of the Pâ<i>ñk</i>arâtra do not +acknowledge any difference founded on superiority of knowledge, +power, &c. between Vâsudeva and the other Lords, but +simply say that they all are forms of Vâsudeva, without any +special distinctions. The forms of Vâsudeva cannot properly +be limited to four, as the whole world, from Brahman down to a +blade of grass, is understood to be a manifestation of the supreme +Being.</p> +<p>45. And on account of contradictions.</p> +<p>Moreover, manifold contradictions are met with in the +Bhâgavata system, with reference to the assumption of +qualities and their bearers. Eminence of knowledge and <span class= +"pagenum"><a name="page443" id="page443"></a>{443}</span> ruling +capacity, strength, valour, and glory are enumerated as qualities, +and then they are in some other place spoken of as Selfs, holy +Vâsudevas, and so on.—Moreover, we meet with passages +contradictory of the Veda. The following passage, for instance, +blames the Veda, 'Not having found the highest bliss in the Vedas +<i>S</i>â<i>nd</i>ilya studied this +<i>s</i>âstra.'—For this reason also the +Bhâgavata doctrine cannot be accepted.</p> +<p>Notes:</p> +<blockquote class="footnote"><a id="footnote314" name= +"footnote314"></a><b>Footnote 314:</b><a href= +"#footnotetag314">(return)</a> +<p>The characteristics of Goodness, Passion, and Darkness, the +three constituent elements (gu<i>n</i>a) of the pradhâna. +Sâ. Kâ. 12, 13.</p> +</blockquote> +<blockquote class="footnote"><a id="footnote315" name= +"footnote315"></a><b>Footnote 315:</b><a href= +"#footnotetag315">(return)</a> +<p>Viz. the great principle (mahat). ahanka a, &c. Sâ. +Kâ. 3.</p> +</blockquote> +<blockquote class="footnote"><a id="footnote316" name= +"footnote316"></a><b>Footnote 316:</b><a href= +"#footnotetag316">(return)</a> +<p>The arguments here referred to are enumerated in the Sâ. +Kâ. 15: Sâ. Sûtras I, 189 ff.</p> +</blockquote> +<blockquote class="footnote"><a id="footnote317" name= +"footnote317"></a><b>Footnote 317:</b><a href= +"#footnotetag317">(return)</a> +<p>If we attempt to infer the nature of the universal cause from +its effects on the ground of parallel instances, as, for instance, +that of an earthen jar whose material cause is clay, we must +remember that the jar has sprung from clay not without the +co-operation of an intelligent being, viz. the potter.</p> +</blockquote> +<blockquote class="footnote"><a id="footnote318" name= +"footnote318"></a><b>Footnote 318:</b><a href= +"#footnotetag318">(return)</a> +<p>As had been asserted above for the purpose of inferring +therefrom, according to the principle of the equality of cause and +effect, the existence of the three constituents of the +pradhâna.</p> +</blockquote> +<blockquote class="footnote"><a id="footnote319" name= +"footnote319"></a><b>Footnote 319:</b><a href= +"#footnotetag319">(return)</a> +<p>And a thing cannot consist of that of which it is the cause.</p> +</blockquote> +<blockquote class="footnote"><a id="footnote320" name= +"footnote320"></a><b>Footnote 320:</b><a href= +"#footnotetag320">(return)</a> +<p>Which differences cannot be reconciled with the Sâ@nkhya +hypothesis of the object itself consisting of either pleasure or +pain, &c.—'If things consisted in themselves of pleasure, +pain, &c., then sandal ointment (which is cooling, and on that +account pleasant in summer) would be pleasant in winter also; for +sandal never is anything but sandal.—And as thistles never +are anything but thistles they ought, on the Sâ@nkhya +hypothesis, to be eaten with enjoyment not only by camels but by +men also.' Bhâ.</p> +</blockquote> +<blockquote class="footnote"><a id="footnote321" name= +"footnote321"></a><b>Footnote 321:</b><a href= +"#footnotetag321">(return)</a> +<p>Sa<i>m</i>sargapûrvakatvaprasa@nga iti +gu<i>n</i>ânâ<i>m</i> +sa<i>m</i>s<i>ri</i>sh<i>t</i>ânekavastuprak<i>ri</i>tikatvaprasaktir +ity artha<i>h</i>. Ân. Gi.</p> +</blockquote> +<blockquote class="footnote"><a id="footnote322" name= +"footnote322"></a><b>Footnote 322:</b><a href= +"#footnotetag322">(return)</a> +<p>For they limit one another.</p> +</blockquote> +<blockquote class="footnote"><a id="footnote323" name= +"footnote323"></a><b>Footnote 323:</b><a href= +"#footnotetag323">(return)</a> +<p>To proceed to the argument 'from the separateness of cause and +effect' (Sâ. Kâ. 15).</p> +</blockquote> +<blockquote class="footnote"><a id="footnote324" name= +"footnote324"></a><b>Footnote 324:</b><a href= +"#footnotetag324">(return)</a> +<p>The next sentences furnish the answer to the question how the +intelligent Self is known at all if it is not the object of +perception.—Pratyakshatvâbhâve katham +âtmasiddhir ity âsa@nkya anumânâd ity +âha, prav<i>ri</i>ttîti. Anumânasiddhasya +<i>k</i>etanasya na pravr<i>i</i>ttyâ<i>s</i>rayateti +dar<i>s</i>ayitum evakâra<i>h</i>. Katham anumânam ity +apekshâyâ<i>m</i> tatprakâra<i>m</i>; +sû<i>k</i>ayati kevaleti. Vailaksha<i>n</i>ya<i>m</i> +prâ<i>n</i>âdimattvam. Ân. Gi.</p> +</blockquote> +<blockquote class="footnote"><a id="footnote325" name= +"footnote325"></a><b>Footnote 325:</b><a href= +"#footnotetag325">(return)</a> +<p>Viz. that whatever moves or acts does so under the influence of +intelligence.—Sâdhyapakshanikshiptatva<i>m</i> +sâdhyavati pakshe pravish<i>t</i>atvam eva ta<i>k</i> +<i>k</i>a sapakshanizkshiptatvasyâpy upalaksha<i>n</i>am, +anpanyâso na vyabhi<i>k</i>ârabhûmin ity +artha<i>h</i>. Ân. Gi.</p> +</blockquote> +<blockquote class="footnote"><a id="footnote326" name= +"footnote326"></a><b>Footnote 326:</b><a href= +"#footnotetag326">(return)</a> +<p>It might be held that for the transformation of grass into milk +no other cause is required than the digestive heat of the cow's +body; but a reflecting person will acknowledge that there also the +omniscient Lord is active. Bhâ.</p> +</blockquote> +<blockquote class="footnote"><a id="footnote327" name= +"footnote327"></a><b>Footnote 327:</b><a href= +"#footnotetag327">(return)</a> +<p>Anâdheyâti<i>s</i>ayasya +sukhadukhaprâptiparihârarûpâti<i>s</i>aya<i> +s</i>ûnyasyety artha<i>h</i>. Ân. Gi.</p> +</blockquote> +<blockquote class="footnote"><a id="footnote328" name= +"footnote328"></a><b>Footnote 328:</b><a href= +"#footnotetag328">(return)</a> +<p>For the soul as being of an entirely inactive nature cannot of +itself aim at release, and the pradhâna aims—ex +hypothesi—only at the soul's undergoing varied +experience.</p> +</blockquote> +<blockquote class="footnote"><a id="footnote329" name= +"footnote329"></a><b>Footnote 329:</b><a href= +"#footnotetag329">(return)</a> +<p>I.e. for the various items constituting enjoyment or +experience.</p> +</blockquote> +<blockquote class="footnote"><a id="footnote330" name= +"footnote330"></a><b>Footnote 330:</b><a href= +"#footnotetag330">(return)</a> +<p>T<i>ri</i>tîyes'pi katipaya<i>s</i>abdâdyupalabdhir +vâ samastatadupalabdhir vâ bhoga iti vikalpyâdye +sarveshâm ekadaiva mukti<i>h</i> syâd iti manvâno +dvitîya<i>m</i> pratyâha ubhayârthateti. +Ân. Gi.</p> +</blockquote> +<blockquote class="footnote"><a id="footnote331" name= +"footnote331"></a><b>Footnote 331:</b><a href= +"#footnotetag331">(return)</a> +<p>The MSS. of Ânanda Giri omit +sa<i>m</i>sârânu<i>kkh</i>edât; the +Bhâmatî's reading is: +Sarga<i>s</i>aktyanu<i>kkh</i>edavad +d<i>ri</i>k<i>s</i>aktyanu<i>kkh</i>edât.</p> +</blockquote> +<blockquote class="footnote"><a id="footnote332" name= +"footnote332"></a><b>Footnote 332:</b><a href= +"#footnotetag332">(return)</a> +<p>On the theory that the soul is the cause of the pradhâna's +activity we again have to ask whether the pradhâna acts for +the soul's enjoyment or for its release, &c.</p> +</blockquote> +<blockquote class="footnote"><a id="footnote333" name= +"footnote333"></a><b>Footnote 333:</b><a href= +"#footnotetag333">(return)</a> +<p>Anantaro dosho +mahadâdikâryotpâdâyoga<i>h</i>. Ân. +Gi.</p> +</blockquote> +<blockquote class="footnote"><a id="footnote334" name= +"footnote334"></a><b>Footnote 334:</b><a href= +"#footnotetag334">(return)</a> +<p>In the former case the five intellectual senses are looked upon +as mere modifications of the sense of touch.</p> +</blockquote> +<blockquote class="footnote"><a id="footnote335" name= +"footnote335"></a><b>Footnote 335:</b><a href= +"#footnotetag335">(return)</a> +<p>Buddhi in the latter case being the generic name for buddhi, +aha@nkâra, and manas.</p> +</blockquote> +<blockquote class="footnote"><a id="footnote336" name= +"footnote336"></a><b>Footnote 336:</b><a href= +"#footnotetag336">(return)</a> +<p>Lit. that which burns and that which is burned, which literal +rendering would perhaps be preferable throughout. As it is, the +context has necessitated its retention in some places.—The +sufferers are the individual souls, the cause of suffering the +world in which the souls live.</p> +</blockquote> +<blockquote class="footnote"><a id="footnote337" name= +"footnote337"></a><b>Footnote 337:</b><a href= +"#footnotetag337">(return)</a> +<p>In the case of the lamp, light and heat are admittedly +essential; hence the Vedântin is supposed to bring forward +the sea with its waves, and so on, as furnishing a case where +attributes pass away while the substance remains.</p> +</blockquote> +<blockquote class="footnote"><a id="footnote338" name= +"footnote338"></a><b>Footnote 338:</b><a href= +"#footnotetag338">(return)</a> +<p>'Artha,' a useful or beneficial thing, an object of desire.</p> +</blockquote> +<blockquote class="footnote"><a id="footnote339" name= +"footnote339"></a><b>Footnote 339:</b><a href= +"#footnotetag339">(return)</a> +<p>In reality neither suffering nor sufferers exist, as the +Vedântin had pointed out in the first sentences of his reply; +but there can of course be no doubt as to who suffers and what +causes suffering in the vyavahârika-state, i.e. the +phenomenal world.</p> +</blockquote> +<blockquote class="footnote"><a id="footnote340" name= +"footnote340"></a><b>Footnote 340:</b><a href= +"#footnotetag340">(return)</a> +<p>In order to explain thereby how the soul can experience +pain.</p> +</blockquote> +<blockquote class="footnote"><a id="footnote341" name= +"footnote341"></a><b>Footnote 341:</b><a href= +"#footnotetag341">(return)</a> +<p>And that would be against the Sâ@nkhya dogma of the soul's +essential purity.</p> +</blockquote> +<blockquote class="footnote"><a id="footnote342" name= +"footnote342"></a><b>Footnote 342:</b><a href= +"#footnotetag342">(return)</a> +<p>So that the fact of suffering which cannot take place apart from +an intelligent principle again remains unexplained.</p> +</blockquote> +<blockquote class="footnote"><a id="footnote343" name= +"footnote343"></a><b>Footnote 343:</b><a href= +"#footnotetag343">(return)</a> +<p>Âtmanas tapte sattve pratibîmitatvâd +yuktâ taptir iti <i>s</i>a@nkate sattveti. An. Gi.</p> +</blockquote> +<blockquote class="footnote"><a id="footnote344" name= +"footnote344"></a><b>Footnote 344:</b><a href= +"#footnotetag344">(return)</a> +<p>For it then indicates no more than a fictitious resemblance.</p> +</blockquote> +<blockquote class="footnote"><a id="footnote345" name= +"footnote345"></a><b>Footnote 345:</b><a href= +"#footnotetag345">(return)</a> +<p>The Sâ@nkhya Pûrvapakshin had objected to the +Vedânta doctrine that, on the latter, we cannot account for +the fact known from ordinary experience that there are beings +suffering pain and things causing suffering.—The +Vedântin in his turn endeavours to show that on the +Sâ@nkhya doctrine also the fact of suffering remains +inexplicable, and is therefore to be considered not real, but +fictitious merely, the product of Nescience.</p> +</blockquote> +<blockquote class="footnote"><a id="footnote346" name= +"footnote346"></a><b>Footnote 346:</b><a href= +"#footnotetag346">(return)</a> +<p>Not only 'suffering as it were,' as it had been called +above.</p> +</blockquote> +<blockquote class="footnote"><a id="footnote347" name= +"footnote347"></a><b>Footnote 347:</b><a href= +"#footnotetag347">(return)</a> +<p>For real suffering cannot be removed by mere distinctive +knowledge on which—according to the Sâ@nkhya +also—release depends.</p> +</blockquote> +<blockquote class="footnote"><a id="footnote348" name= +"footnote348"></a><b>Footnote 348:</b><a href= +"#footnotetag348">(return)</a> +<p>This in answer to the remark that possibly the conjunction of +soul and pradhâna may come to an end when the influence of +Darkness declines, it being overpowered by the knowledge of +Truth.</p> +</blockquote> +<blockquote class="footnote"><a id="footnote349" name= +"footnote349"></a><b>Footnote 349:</b><a href= +"#footnotetag349">(return)</a> +<p>I.e. according as they are atoms of earth, water, fire, or +air.</p> +</blockquote> +<blockquote class="footnote"><a id="footnote350" name= +"footnote350"></a><b>Footnote 350:</b><a href= +"#footnotetag350">(return)</a> +<p>Parima<i>nd</i>ala, spherical is the technical term for the +specific form of extension of the atoms, and, secondarily, for the +atoms themselves. The latter must apparently be imagined as +infinitely small spheres. Cp. Vi<i>s</i>. Sût. VII, 1, +20.</p> +</blockquote> +<blockquote class="footnote"><a id="footnote351" name= +"footnote351"></a><b>Footnote 351:</b><a href= +"#footnotetag351">(return)</a> +<p>Viz. during the period of each pralaya. At that time all the +atoms are isolated and motionless.</p> +</blockquote> +<blockquote class="footnote"><a id="footnote352" name= +"footnote352"></a><b>Footnote 352:</b><a href= +"#footnotetag352">(return)</a> +<p>When the time for a new creation has come.</p> +</blockquote> +<blockquote class="footnote"><a id="footnote353" name= +"footnote353"></a><b>Footnote 353:</b><a href= +"#footnotetag353">(return)</a> +<p>The &c. implies the activity of the Lord.</p> +</blockquote> +<blockquote class="footnote"><a id="footnote354" name= +"footnote354"></a><b>Footnote 354:</b><a href= +"#footnotetag354">(return)</a> +<p>The inherent (material) cause of an atomic compound are the +constituent atoms, the non-inheient cause the conjunction of those +atoms, the operative causes the ad<i>ri</i>sh<i>ta</i> and the +Lord's activity which make them enter into conjunction.</p> +</blockquote> +<blockquote class="footnote"><a id="footnote355" name= +"footnote355"></a><b>Footnote 355:</b><a href= +"#footnotetag355">(return)</a> +<p>I.e. in all cases the special form of extension of the effect +depends not on the special extension of the cause, but on the +number of atoms composing the cause (and thereby the effect).</p> +</blockquote> +<blockquote class="footnote"><a id="footnote356" name= +"footnote356"></a><b>Footnote 356:</b><a href= +"#footnotetag356">(return)</a> +<p>In order to escape the conclusion that the non-acceptance of the +doctrine of Brahman involves the abandonment of a fundamental +Vai<i>s</i>eshika principle.</p> +</blockquote> +<blockquote class="footnote"><a id="footnote357" name= +"footnote357"></a><b>Footnote 357:</b><a href= +"#footnotetag357">(return)</a> +<p>I.e. forms of extension different from sphericity, &c.</p> +</blockquote> +<blockquote class="footnote"><a id="footnote358" name= +"footnote358"></a><b>Footnote 358:</b><a href= +"#footnotetag358">(return)</a> +<p>The first of the three Sûtras quoted comprises, in the +present text of the Vai<i>s</i>eshika-sûtras, only the +following words, 'Kâra<i>n</i>abahutvâ<i>k</i> +<i>k</i>a;' the <i>k</i>a of the Sûtra implying, according to +the commentators, mahattva and pra<i>k</i>aya.—According to +the Vai<i>s</i>eshikas the form of extension called a<i>n</i>u, +minute, has for its cause the dvitva inherent in the material +causes, i.e. the two atoms from which the minute binary atomic +compound originates.—The form of extension called mahat, big, +has different causes, among them bahutva, i.e. the plurality +residing in the material causes of the resulting 'big' thing; the +cause of the mahattva of a ternary atomic compound, for instance, +is the tritva inherent in the three constituent atoms. In other +cases mahattva is due to antecedent mahattva, in others to +pra<i>k</i>aya, i.e. accumulation. See the Upaskâra on +Vai<i>s</i>. Sût. VII, 1, 9; 10.</p> +</blockquote> +<blockquote class="footnote"><a id="footnote359" name= +"footnote359"></a><b>Footnote 359:</b><a href= +"#footnotetag359">(return)</a> +<p>I.e. if the Vai<i>s</i>eshikas have to admit that it is the +nature of sphericity, &c. not to produce like effects, the +Vedântin also may maintain that Brahman produces an unlike +effect, viz. the non-intelligent world.</p> +</blockquote> +<blockquote class="footnote"><a id="footnote360" name= +"footnote360"></a><b>Footnote 360:</b><a href= +"#footnotetag360">(return)</a> +<p>Like other things, let us say a piece of cloth, which consists +of parts.</p> +</blockquote> +<blockquote class="footnote"><a id="footnote361" name= +"footnote361"></a><b>Footnote 361:</b><a href= +"#footnotetag361">(return)</a> +<p>Or, more particularly, to the conjunction of the atoms with the +souls to which merit and demerit +belong.—Ad<i>ri</i>sh<i>t</i>âpeksham +ad<i>ri</i>sh<i>t</i>avatkshetraj<i>ñ</i>asa<i>my</i>ogâpeksham +iti yâvat. Ãn. Gi.</p> +</blockquote> +<blockquote class="footnote"><a id="footnote362" name= +"footnote362"></a><b>Footnote 362:</b><a href= +"#footnotetag362">(return)</a> +<p>According to the Vai<i>s</i>eshikas intelligence is not +essential to the soul, but a mere adventitious quality arising only +when the soul is joined to an internal organ.</p> +</blockquote> +<blockquote class="footnote"><a id="footnote363" name= +"footnote363"></a><b>Footnote 363:</b><a href= +"#footnotetag363">(return)</a> +<p>The soul being all-pervading.</p> +</blockquote> +<blockquote class="footnote"><a id="footnote364" name= +"footnote364"></a><b>Footnote 364:</b><a href= +"#footnotetag364">(return)</a> +<p>Which is inadmissible on Vai<i>s</i>eshika principles, because +sa<i>m</i>yoga as being a quality is connected with the things it +joins by samavâya.</p> +</blockquote> +<blockquote class="footnote"><a id="footnote365" name= +"footnote365"></a><b>Footnote 365:</b><a href= +"#footnotetag365">(return)</a> +<p>Viz. from those things which are united by conjunction. The +argument is that conjunction as an independent third entity +requires another connexion to connect it with the two things +related to each other in the way of conjunction.</p> +</blockquote> +<blockquote class="footnote"><a id="footnote366" name= +"footnote366"></a><b>Footnote 366:</b><a href= +"#footnotetag366">(return)</a> +<p>Viz. the absolute difference of samavâya and +sa<i>m</i>yoga from the terms which they connect.</p> +</blockquote> +<blockquote class="footnote"><a id="footnote367" name= +"footnote367"></a><b>Footnote 367:</b><a href= +"#footnotetag367">(return)</a> +<p>Action (karman), &c. also standing in the samavâya +relation to their substrates.</p> +</blockquote> +<blockquote class="footnote"><a id="footnote368" name= +"footnote368"></a><b>Footnote 368:</b><a href= +"#footnotetag368">(return)</a> +<p>Our Vai<i>s</i>eshika-sûtras read +'pratishedhabhâva<i>h</i>;' but as all MSS. of Sa@nkara have +'pratishedhâbhâva<i>h</i>' I have kept the latter +reading and translated according to Ânandagiri's explanation: +Kâryam anityam iti kârye vireshato nityatvanishedho na +syâd yadi kâra<i>n</i>eszpy anityatvam +atozs<i>n</i>ûnâ<i>m</i> +kâra<i>n</i>ânâ<i>m</i> nityateti +sûtrârtha<i>h</i>.</p> +</blockquote> +<blockquote class="footnote"><a id="footnote369" name= +"footnote369"></a><b>Footnote 369:</b><a href= +"#footnotetag369">(return)</a> +<p>Because they also are not perceptible; the ternary aggregates, +the so-called trasare<i>n</i>us, constituting the minima +perceptibilia.</p> +</blockquote> +<blockquote class="footnote"><a id="footnote370" name= +"footnote370"></a><b>Footnote 370:</b><a href= +"#footnotetag370">(return)</a> +<p>As they have no cause which could either be disintegrated or +destroyed.</p> +</blockquote> +<blockquote class="footnote"><a id="footnote371" name= +"footnote371"></a><b>Footnote 371:</b><a href= +"#footnotetag371">(return)</a> +<p>This according to the Vedânta view. If atoms existed they +might have originated from avidyâ by a mere +pari<i>n</i>âma and might again be dissolved into +avidyâ, without either disintegration or destruction of their +cause taking place.</p> +</blockquote> +<blockquote class="footnote"><a id="footnote372" name= +"footnote372"></a><b>Footnote 372:</b><a href= +"#footnotetag372">(return)</a> +<p>The Sâ@nkhyas looking on everything (except the soul) as +being the pradhâna in various forms.—There is no need +of assuming with Govindânanda that by the Sâ@nkhya of +the text we have to understand the Vedânta.</p> +</blockquote> +<blockquote class="footnote"><a id="footnote373" name= +"footnote373"></a><b>Footnote 373:</b><a href= +"#footnotetag373">(return)</a> +<p>Yayor dvayor madhya ekam avina<i>s</i>yad +aparâ<i>s</i>ritamvâvatish<i>th</i>ate tâv +ayutasiddhau yathâvayavâvayavinau.</p> +</blockquote> +<blockquote class="footnote"><a id="footnote374" name= +"footnote374"></a><b>Footnote 374:</b><a href= +"#footnotetag374">(return)</a> +<p>The connexion of cause and effect is of course +samavâya.</p> +</blockquote> +<blockquote class="footnote"><a id="footnote375" name= +"footnote375"></a><b>Footnote 375:</b><a href= +"#footnotetag375">(return)</a> +<p>If the effect can exist before having entered into connexion +with the cause, the subsequent connexion of the two is no longer +samavâya but sa<i>m</i>yoga; and that contradicts a +fundamental Vai<i>s</i>eshika principle.</p> +</blockquote> +<blockquote class="footnote"><a id="footnote376" name= +"footnote376"></a><b>Footnote 376:</b><a href= +"#footnotetag376">(return)</a> +<p>This clause replies to the objection that only those connexions +which have been produced by previous motion are to be considered +conjunctions.</p> +</blockquote> +<blockquote class="footnote"><a id="footnote377" name= +"footnote377"></a><b>Footnote 377:</b><a href= +"#footnotetag377">(return)</a> +<p>A clause meant to preclude the assumption that the permanent +existence of the things connected involves the permanent existence +of the connexion.</p> +</blockquote> +<blockquote class="footnote"><a id="footnote378" name= +"footnote378"></a><b>Footnote 378:</b><a href= +"#footnotetag378">(return)</a> +<p>It having been shown above that atoms cannot enter into +sa<i>m</i>yoga with each other, it is shown now that sa<i>m</i>yoga +of the soul with the atoms cannot be the cause of the motion of the +latter, and that sa<i>m</i>yoga of soul and manas cannot be the +cause of cognition.</p> +</blockquote> +<blockquote class="footnote"><a id="footnote379" name= +"footnote379"></a><b>Footnote 379:</b><a href= +"#footnotetag379">(return)</a> +<p>Ekasambandhyâkarsha<i>n</i>e yatra +sambandhyantarâkarsha<i>n</i>a<i>m</i> tatra +sa<i>m</i>slesha<i>h</i>, sa tu +sâvayavânâ<i>m</i> +jatukâsh<i>th</i>âdînâ<i>m</i> +d<i>ri</i>sh<i>t</i>o na tu niravayavai<i>h</i> +sâvayâvânâm, ato dvya<i>n</i>ukasya +sâvayavasya niravayavena paramâ<i>n</i>unâ sa +nopapadyate. Brahmavidyâbh.</p> +</blockquote> +<blockquote class="footnote"><a id="footnote380" name= +"footnote380"></a><b>Footnote 380:</b><a href= +"#footnotetag380">(return)</a> +<p>In answer to the question how, in that case, the practically +recognised relation of abode, &c. existing between the cause +and the effect is accounted for.</p> +</blockquote> +<blockquote class="footnote"><a id="footnote381" name= +"footnote381"></a><b>Footnote 381:</b><a href= +"#footnotetag381">(return)</a> +<p>For they must in that case have a northern end, an eastern end, +&c.</p> +</blockquote> +<blockquote class="footnote"><a id="footnote382" name= +"footnote382"></a><b>Footnote 382:</b><a href= +"#footnotetag382">(return)</a> +<p>And that on that account the atoms which he considers as the +ultimate simple constituents of matter cannot be decomposed.</p> +</blockquote> +<blockquote class="footnote"><a id="footnote383" name= +"footnote383"></a><b>Footnote 383:</b><a href= +"#footnotetag383">(return)</a> +<p>Because according to their opinion difference of size +constitutes difference of substance, so that the continuous change +of size in animal bodies, for instance, involves the continual +perishing of old and the continual origination of new +substances.</p> +</blockquote> +<blockquote class="footnote"><a id="footnote384" name= +"footnote384"></a><b>Footnote 384:</b><a href= +"#footnotetag384">(return)</a> +<p>The following notes on Bauddha doctrines are taken exclusively +from the commentaries on the <i>S</i>a@nkarabhâshya, and no +attempt has been made to contrast or reconcile the Brahminical +accounts of Bauddha psychology with the teaching of genuine Bauddha +books. Cp. on the chief sects of the Buddhistic philosophers the +Bauddha chapter of the +Sarvadar<i>s</i>a<i>n</i>asa<i>m</i>graha.—The Nihilists are +the Mádhyamikas; the Idealists are the +Yogâ<i>k</i>âras; the Sautrântikas and the +Vaibháshikas together constitute the class of the +Realists.—I subjoin the account given of those sects in the +Brahmavidyâbhara<i>n</i>a.—Buddhasya hi +mâdhyamika-yogá<i>k</i>âra-sautrântika-vaibhâshikasamj<i> +ñ</i>akâs <i>k</i>atvâra<i>h</i> +<i>s</i>ishyâ<i>h</i>. Tatra buddhena prathama<i>m</i> +yân prati sarva<i>m</i> <i>s</i>ûnyam ity +upadish<i>t</i>a<i>m</i> te màdhyamikâs te hi +guru<i>n</i>â yathokta<i>m</i> tathaiva +<i>s</i>raddhayâ g<i>ri</i>hîtavanta iti +k<i>ri</i>tvâ nâpak<i>ri</i>sh<i>t</i>â<i>h</i> +puna<i>s</i> <i>k</i>a taduktasyârthasya +buddhyanusâre<i>n</i>âkshepasyâk<i>ri</i>tatvân +notk<i>ri</i>sh<i>t</i>abuddhaya iti +mâdhyamikâ<i>h</i>. Anyais tu <i>s</i>ishyair +guru<i>n</i>â sarva<i>s</i>ûnyatva upadish<i>t</i>e +j<i>ñ</i>ânâtiriktasya sarvasya +<i>s</i>ûnyatvam astu nâmeti gurûktir yoga iti +bauddai<i>h</i> paribhâshitopetâ<i>h</i> tad upari +<i>k</i>a j<i>ñ</i>ânasya tu +<i>s</i>ûnyatva<i>m</i> na sa<i>m</i>bhavati tathâtve +jagadândhyaprasa@ngât sûnyasiddher apy +asa<i>m</i>bhavâ<i>k</i> <i>k</i>eti buddhamate +â<i>k</i>âratvena paribhâshita âkshepos'pi +k<i>ri</i>ta iti yogâ<i>k</i>ârâ<i>h</i> +vij<i>ñ</i>ânamâtrâstitvavâdina<i>h</i>. +Tadanataram anyai<i>h</i> <i>s</i>ishyai<i>h</i> +pratîtisiddhasya katha<i>m</i> <i>s</i>ûnyatva<i>m</i> +vaktu<i>m</i> <i>s</i>akyam ato j<i>ñ</i>ânavad +vâhyârthos'pi satya ity ukte tarhi tathaiva sos'stu, +para<i>m</i> tu so s'numeyo na tu pratyaksha ity ukte +tathâ@ngîk<i>ri</i>tyaiva<i>m</i> <i>s</i>ishyamatim +anus<i>ri</i>tya kiyatparyanta<i>m</i> sûtra<i>m</i> +bhavishyatîti tai<i>h</i> p<i>ri</i>sh<i>t</i>am atas te +sautrântikâ<i>h</i>. Anye punar yady aya<i>m</i> +gha<i>t</i>a iti pratîtibalâd vâhyos'rtha upeyate +tarhi tasyâ eva pratîter aparokshatvât sa +katha<i>m</i> parokshos'to vâhyos'rtho na pratyaksha iti +bhâshâ viruddhety âkshipann atas te +vaibhâshikâ<i>h</i>.</p> +</blockquote> +<blockquote class="footnote"><a id="footnote385" name= +"footnote385"></a><b>Footnote 385:</b><a href= +"#footnotetag385">(return)</a> +<p>The rûpaskandha comprises the senses and their objects, +colour, &c.; the sense-organs were above called bhautika, they +here re-appear as <i>k</i>aittika on account of their connexion +with thought. Their objects likewise are classed as <i>k</i>aittika +in so far as they are perceived by the senses.—The +vij<i>ñ</i>ânaskandha comprises the series of +self-cognitions (ahamaham ity +âlayavj<i>ñ</i>ânapravâha<i>h</i>), +according to all commentators; and in addition, according to the +Brahmavidyâbhara<i>n</i>a, the knowledge, determinate and +indeterminate, of external things (savikalpaka<i>m</i> +nirvikalpaka<i>m</i> <i>k</i>a +prav<i>ri</i>ttivij<i>ñ</i>ânasamj<i>ñ</i>itam).—The +vedanâskandha comprises pleasure, pain, &c.—The +samj<i>ñ</i>âskandha comprises the cognition of things +by their names (gaur a<i>s</i>va +ityâdi<i>s</i>abdasamjalpitapratyaya<i>h</i>, Ân. Gi.; +gaur a<i>s</i>va ityeva<i>m</i> +nâmavi<i>s</i>ish<i>t</i>asavikalpaka<i>h</i> +pratyaya<i>h</i>, Go. Ân.; sa<i>m</i>j<i>ñ</i>â +yaj<i>ñ</i>adattâdipadatadullekhî +savikalpapratyayo vâ, dvitîyapakshe +vij<i>ñ</i>ânapadena savikalpapratyayo na +grâhy<i>h</i>, Brahmavidyâbh.). The +sa<i>m</i>skâraskandha comprises passion, aversion, &c., +dharma and adharma.—Compare also the +Bhâmatî.—The vij<i>ñ</i>ânaskandha +is <i>k</i>itta, the other skandhas <i>k</i>aitta.</p> +</blockquote> +<blockquote class="footnote"><a id="footnote386" name= +"footnote386"></a><b>Footnote 386:</b><a href= +"#footnotetag386">(return)</a> +<p>It has to be kept in view that the sarvâstitvavâdins +as well as the other Bauddha sects teach the momentariness +(ksha<i>n</i>ikatva), the eternal flux of everything that exists, +and are on that ground controverted by the upholders of the +permanent Brahman.</p> +</blockquote> +<blockquote class="footnote"><a id="footnote387" name= +"footnote387"></a><b>Footnote 387:</b><a href= +"#footnotetag387">(return)</a> +<p>Mind, on the Bauddha doctrine, presupposes the existence of an +aggregate of atoms, viz. the body.</p> +</blockquote> +<blockquote class="footnote"><a id="footnote388" name= +"footnote388"></a><b>Footnote 388:</b><a href= +"#footnotetag388">(return)</a> +<p>In consequence of which no release could take place.</p> +</blockquote> +<blockquote class="footnote"><a id="footnote389" name= +"footnote389"></a><b>Footnote 389:</b><a href= +"#footnotetag389">(return)</a> +<p>The Brahmavidyâbhara<i>n</i>a explains the last +clause—from ksha<i>n</i>ikatvâ<i>k</i> +<i>k</i>a—somewhat differently: Api <i>k</i>a +paramâ<i>n</i>ûnâm api +ksha<i>n</i>ikatvâbhyupagamân melana<i>m</i> na +sambhavati, paramâ<i>n</i>ûnâ<i>m</i> +melana<i>m</i> paramâ<i>n</i>ukriyâdhînam, +tathâ <i>k</i>a svakriyâ<i>m</i> prati +paramâ<i>n</i>ûnâ<i>m</i> +kâra<i>n</i>atvât kriyâpûraksha<i>n</i>e +paramâ<i>n</i>ubhir bhâvyam kriyâ +<i>s</i>rayatayâ kriyâksha<i>n</i>eszpi teshâm +avasthânam apekshitam eva<i>m</i> melanakshaneszpi, nahi +melanâ<i>s</i>rayasyâbhâve melanarûpâ +prav<i>ri</i>ttir upapadyate, tathâ <i>k</i>a +sthiraparamâ<i>n</i>usâdhyâ +melanarûpâ prav<i>ri</i>tti<i>h</i> katha<i>m</i> +teshâm ksha<i>n</i>ikatve bhavet.—Ânanda Giri +also divides and translates differently from the translation in the +text.</p> +</blockquote> +<blockquote class="footnote"><a id="footnote390" name= +"footnote390"></a><b>Footnote 390:</b><a href= +"#footnotetag390">(return)</a> +<p>The kâra<i>n</i>atvât of <i>S</i>a@nkara explains +the pratyayatvât of the Sûtra; kârya<i>m</i> +praty ayate janakatvena ga<i>kkh</i>ati.</p> +</blockquote> +<blockquote class="footnote"><a id="footnote391" name= +"footnote391"></a><b>Footnote 391:</b><a href= +"#footnotetag391">(return)</a> +<p>The commentators agree on the whole in their explanations of the +terms of this series.—The following is the substance of the +comment of the Brahmavidyâbhara<i>n</i>a: Nescience is the +error of considering that which is momentary, impure, &c. to be +permanent, pure, &c.—Impression (affection, +sa<i>m</i>skâra) comprises desire, aversion, &c., and the +activity caused by them.—Knowledge +(vij<i>ñ</i>âna) is the self-consciousness (aham ity +âlayavij<i>ñ</i>ânasya +v<i>ri</i>ttilâbha<i>h</i>) springing up in the +embryo.—Name and form is the rudimentary flake—or +bubble-like condition of the embryo.—The abode of the six +(sha<i>d</i>âyatana) is the further developed stage of the +embryo in which the latter is the abode of the six +senses.—Touch (spar<i>s</i>a) is the sensations of cold, +warmth, &c. on the embryo's part.—Feeling (vedaná) +the sensations of pleasure and pain resulting +therefrom.—Desire (t<i>ri</i>sh<i>n</i>â) is the wish +to enjoy the pleasurable sensations and to shun the painful +ones.—Activity (upâdâna) is the effort resulting +from desire,—Birth is the passing out from the +uterus.—Species (jâti) is the class of beings to which +the new-born creature belongs.—Decay +(jarâ).—Death (mara<i>n</i>am) is explained as the +condition of the creature when about to die +(mumûrshâ).—Grief (<i>s</i>oka) the frustration +of wishes connected therewith.—Lament (paridevanam) the +lamentations on that account.—Pain (du<i>h</i>kha) is such +pain as caused by the five senses.—Durmanas is mental +affliction.—The 'and the like' implies death, the departure +to another world and the subsequent return from there.</p> +</blockquote> +<blockquote class="footnote"><a id="footnote392" name= +"footnote392"></a><b>Footnote 392:</b><a href= +"#footnotetag392">(return)</a> +<p>Ânanda Giri and Go. Ânanda explain: +Â<i>s</i>râya<i>s</i>rayibhûteshv iti +bhokt<i>ri</i>vi<i>s</i>esha<i>n</i>am +ad<i>ri</i>sh<i>t</i>â<i>s</i>rayeshv ity +artha<i>h</i>.—The Brahrma-vidyâbhara<i>n</i>a says: +Nityeshv â<i>s</i>râya<i>s</i>rayibhûteshv +a<i>n</i>ushv abhyupagamyamâneshu bhokt<i>ri</i>shu <i>k</i>a +satsv ity anvaya<i>h</i>. +Â<i>s</i>râya<i>s</i>rayibhûteshv ity +asyopakâryopakârakabhâvaprâpteshv ity +artha<i>h</i>.—And with regard to the subsequent +â<i>s</i>rayâ<i>s</i>rayi<i>s</i>ûnyeshu: +â<i>s</i>rayâ<i>s</i>rayitva<i>s</i>ûnyeshu, +aya<i>m</i> bhâva<i>h</i>, sthireshu paramâ<i>n</i>ushu +yadanvaye paramâ<i>n</i>ûnâ<i>m</i> +sa<i>m</i>ghâtâpatti<i>h</i> yadvyatireke <i>k</i>a na +tad upakârakam upakâryâ<i>h</i> +paramâ<i>n</i>ava<i>h</i> yena tatk<i>ri</i>to bhoga<i>h</i> +prârthyate sa tatra karteti grahîtu<i>m</i> +<i>s</i>akyate, ksha<i>n</i>ikeshu tu param<i>n</i>ushu +anvayavyatirekagrahasyânekaksha<i>n</i>asâdhyasyâsa<i> +m</i>bhavân nopakâryopakârakabhâvo +nirdhârayitu<i>m</i> <i>s</i>akya<i>h</i>.—Ananda Giri +remarks on the latter: +Ad<i>ri</i>sh<i>t</i>â<i>s</i>rayakârt<i>ri</i>râhityam +âhâ<i>s</i>rayeti. Another reading appears to be +â<i>s</i>ayâ<i>s</i>raya<i>s</i>ûnyeshu.</p> +</blockquote> +<blockquote class="footnote"><a id="footnote393" name= +"footnote393"></a><b>Footnote 393:</b><a href= +"#footnotetag393">(return)</a> +<p>Bauddhânâ<i>m</i> ksha<i>n</i>apadena +gha<i>t</i>âdir eva padârtho vyavahriyate na tu +tadatinkta<i>h</i> ka<i>sk</i>it ksha<i>n</i>o nâma +hâlosti. Brahmâvidyâbh.</p> +</blockquote> +<blockquote class="footnote"><a id="footnote394" name= +"footnote394"></a><b>Footnote 394:</b><a href= +"#footnotetag394">(return)</a> +<p>And whereupon then could be established the difference of mere +efficient causes such as the potter's staff, &c., and material +causes such as clay, &c.?</p> +</blockquote> +<blockquote class="footnote"><a id="footnote395" name= +"footnote395"></a><b>Footnote 395:</b><a href= +"#footnotetag395">(return)</a> +<p>These four causes are the so-called defining cause +(adhipati-pratyaya), the auxiliary cause (sahakâripratyaya), +the immediate cause (samanantarapratyaya), and the substantial +cause (âlambanapratyaya).—I extract the explanation +from the Brahmavidyâbhara<i>n</i>a: Adhipatir indriya<i>m</i> +tad dhi <i>k</i>akshurádirûpam utpannasya +j<i>ñ</i>ânasya +rûpâdivishayatâ<i>m</i> niya<i>kkh</i>ati +niyâmaka<i>s</i> <i>k</i>a lokedhipatir ity u<i>k</i>yate. +Sahakârî âloka<i>h</i>. +Samanantarapratyaya<i>h</i>pûrvaj<i>ñ</i>ânam, +bauddhamate hi ksha<i>n</i>ikaj<i>ñ</i>anasa<i>m</i>tatau +pûrvaj<i>ñ</i>ânam +uttaraj<i>ñ</i>âsya kârana<i>m</i> tad eva +<i>k</i>a mana ity u<i>k</i>yate. Âlambana<i>m</i> +gha<i>t</i>âdi<i>h</i>. Etân hetûn pratîya +prâpya <i>k</i>akshurâdijanyam ity âdi.</p> +</blockquote> +<blockquote class="footnote"><a id="footnote396" name= +"footnote396"></a><b>Footnote 396:</b><a href= +"#footnotetag396">(return)</a> +<p>Sa<i>m</i>skâra iti, tanmate pûrvaksha<i>n</i>a eva +hetubhûta<i>h</i> sa<i>m</i>skâro vâsaneti +<i>k</i>a vyavahriyate kârya<i>m</i> tu tadvishayatayâ +karmavyutpattyâ sa<i>m</i>skâra<i>h</i>, tathâ +<i>k</i>a kâryakâra<i>n</i>âtmaka<i>m</i> +sarva<i>m</i> bhâvarûpa<i>m</i> ksha<i>n</i>ikam iti +pratij<i>ñ</i>ârtha<i>h</i>. +Brahmavidyâbhara<i>n</i>a.</p> +</blockquote> +<blockquote class="footnote"><a id="footnote397" name= +"footnote397"></a><b>Footnote 397:</b><a href= +"#footnotetag397">(return)</a> +<p>As when a man smashes a jar having previously formed the +intention of doing so.</p> +</blockquote> +<blockquote class="footnote"><a id="footnote398" name= +"footnote398"></a><b>Footnote 398:</b><a href= +"#footnotetag398">(return)</a> +<p>I.e. the insensible continual decay of +things.—Viparîta iti pratiksha<i>n</i>a<i>m</i> +gha<i>t</i>âdînâ<i>m</i> yuktyâ +sâdhyamânoku<i>s</i>alair avagantum +a<i>s</i>akya<i>h</i> sûkshmo +vinâ<i>s</i>opratisa<i>m</i>khyânirodha<i>h</i>. +Brahmâv.</p> +</blockquote> +<blockquote class="footnote"><a id="footnote399" name= +"footnote399"></a><b>Footnote 399:</b><a href= +"#footnotetag399">(return)</a> +<p>A series of momentary existences constituting a chain of causes +and effects can never be entirely stopped; for the last momentary +existence must be supposed either to produce its effect or not to +produce it. In the former case the series is continued; the latter +alternative would imply that the last link does not really exist, +since the Bauddhas define the sattâ of a thing as its causal +efficiency (cp. Sarvadar<i>s</i>a<i>n</i>asa<i>m</i>graha). And the +non-existence of the last link would retrogressively lead to the +non-existence of the whole series.</p> +</blockquote> +<blockquote class="footnote"><a id="footnote400" name= +"footnote400"></a><b>Footnote 400:</b><a href= +"#footnotetag400">(return)</a> +<p>Thus clay is recognised as such whether it appears in the form +of a jar, or of the potsherds into which the jar is broken, or of +the powder into which the potsherds are ground.—Analogously +we infer that even things which seem to vanish altogether, such as +a drop of water which has fallen on heated iron, yet continue to +exist in some form.</p> +</blockquote> +<blockquote class="footnote"><a id="footnote401" name= +"footnote401"></a><b>Footnote 401:</b><a href= +"#footnotetag401">(return)</a> +<p>The knowledge that everything is transitory, pain, &c.</p> +</blockquote> +<blockquote class="footnote"><a id="footnote402" name= +"footnote402"></a><b>Footnote 402:</b><a href= +"#footnotetag402">(return)</a> +<p>What does enable us to declare that there is +âvara<i>n</i>âbhâva in one place and not in +another? Space; which therefore is something real.</p> +</blockquote> +<blockquote class="footnote"><a id="footnote403" name= +"footnote403"></a><b>Footnote 403:</b><a href= +"#footnotetag403">(return)</a> +<p>If the cause were able, without having undergone any change, to +produce effects, it would at the same moment produce all the +effects of which it is capable.—Cp. on this point the +Sarvadar<i>s</i>a<i>n</i>asa<i>m</i>graha.</p> +</blockquote> +<blockquote class="footnote"><a id="footnote404" name= +"footnote404"></a><b>Footnote 404:</b><a href= +"#footnotetag404">(return)</a> +<p>This is added to obviate the remark that it is not a general +rule that effects are of the same nature as their causes, and that +therefore, after all, existent things may spring from +non-existence.</p> +</blockquote> +<blockquote class="footnote"><a id="footnote405" name= +"footnote405"></a><b>Footnote 405:</b><a href= +"#footnotetag405">(return)</a> +<p>According to the vij<i>ñ</i>ânavâdin the +cognition specialised by its various contents, such as, for +instance, the idea of blue colour is the object of knowledge; the +cognition in so far as it is consciousness (avabhâsa) is the +result of knowledge; the cognition in so far as it is power is +mâna, knowledge; in so far as it is the abode of that power +it is pramât<i>ri</i>, knowing subject.</p> +</blockquote> +<blockquote class="footnote"><a id="footnote406" name= +"footnote406"></a><b>Footnote 406:</b><a href= +"#footnotetag406">(return)</a> +<p>If they are said to be different from the atoms they can no +longer be considered as composed of atoms; if they are +non-different from atoms they cannot be the cause of the mental +representations of gross non-atomic bodies.</p> +</blockquote> +<blockquote class="footnote"><a id="footnote407" name= +"footnote407"></a><b>Footnote 407:</b><a href= +"#footnotetag407">(return)</a> +<p>Avayavâvayavirûpo vâhyosrtho nâsti +<i>k</i>en mâ bhûd jâtivyaktyâdirûpas +tu syâd ity â<i>s</i>rankyâha evam iti. +Jâtyâdînâ<i>m</i> +vyaktyâdînâm <i>k</i>âtyantabhinnatve +svâtantryaprasa@ngâd atyantâbhinnatve +tadvadevâtadbhâvâd bhinnâbhinnatvasya +viruddhatvâd avayavâvayavibhedavaj +gâtivyaktyâdibhedosxpi nâstîty +artha<i>h</i>.</p> +</blockquote> +<blockquote class="footnote"><a id="footnote408" name= +"footnote408"></a><b>Footnote 408:</b><a href= +"#footnotetag408">(return)</a> +<p>Vâsanâ, above translated by mental impression, +strictly means any member of the infinite series of ideas which +precedes the present actual idea.</p> +</blockquote> +<blockquote class="footnote"><a id="footnote409" name= +"footnote409"></a><b>Footnote 409:</b><a href= +"#footnotetag409">(return)</a> +<p>For all these doctrines depend on the comparison of ideas which +is not possible unless there be a permanent knowing subject in +addition to the transitory ideas.</p> +</blockquote> +<blockquote class="footnote"><a id="footnote410" name= +"footnote410"></a><b>Footnote 410:</b><a href= +"#footnotetag410">(return)</a> +<p>The vij<i>ñ</i>ânaskandha comprises +vij<i>ñ</i>ânas of two different kinds, the +âlayavij<i>ñ</i>âna and the +prav<i>ri</i>ttivij<i>ñ</i>âna. The +âlayavij<i>ñ</i>âna comprises the series of +cognitions or ideas which refer to the ego; the +prav<i>ri</i>ttivij<i>ñ</i>âna comprises those ideas +which refer to apparently external objects, such as colour and the +like. The ideas of the latter class are due to the mental +impressions left by the antecedent ideas of the former class.</p> +</blockquote> +<blockquote class="footnote"><a id="footnote411" name= +"footnote411"></a><b>Footnote 411:</b><a href= +"#footnotetag411">(return)</a> +<p>Viz. in the present case the principle that what presents itself +to consciousness is not non-existent.</p> +</blockquote> +<blockquote class="footnote"><a id="footnote412" name= +"footnote412"></a><b>Footnote 412:</b><a href= +"#footnotetag412">(return)</a> +<p>Soul and non-soul are the enjoying souls and the objects of +their enjoyment; âsrava is the forward movement of the senses +towards their objects; sa<i>m</i>vara is the restraint of the +activity of the senses; nirjara is self-mortification by which sin +is destroyed; the works constitute bondage; and release is the +ascending of the soul, after bondage has ceased, to the highest +regions.—For the details, see Professor Cowell's translation +of the Ârhata chapter of the +Sarvadar<i>s</i>a<i>n</i>asa<i>m</i>graha.</p> +</blockquote> +<blockquote class="footnote"><a id="footnote413" name= +"footnote413"></a><b>Footnote 413:</b><a href= +"#footnotetag413">(return)</a> +<p>Cp. translation of Sarvadar<i>s</i>a<i>n</i>asa<i>m</i>graha, p. +59.</p> +</blockquote> +<blockquote class="footnote"><a id="footnote414" name= +"footnote414"></a><b>Footnote 414:</b><a href= +"#footnotetag414">(return)</a> +<p>And so impugn the doctrine of the one eternal Brahman.</p> +</blockquote> +<blockquote class="footnote"><a id="footnote415" name= +"footnote415"></a><b>Footnote 415:</b><a href= +"#footnotetag415">(return)</a> +<p>Cp. Sarvadar<i>s</i>a<i>n</i>asa<i>m</i>graha translation, p. +58.</p> +</blockquote> +<blockquote class="footnote"><a id="footnote416" name= +"footnote416"></a><b>Footnote 416:</b><a href= +"#footnotetag416">(return)</a> +<p>The inference being that the initial and intervening sizes of +the soul must be permanent because they are sizes of the soul, like +its final size.</p> +</blockquote> +<blockquote class="footnote"><a id="footnote417" name= +"footnote417"></a><b>Footnote 417:</b><a href= +"#footnotetag417">(return)</a> +<p>The special nature of the connexion between the Lord and the +pradhâna and the souls cannot be ascertained from the world +considered as the effect of the pradhâna acted upon by the +Lord; for that the world is the effect of the pradhâna is a +point which the Vedântins do not accept as proved.</p> +</blockquote> +<blockquote class="footnote"><a id="footnote418" name= +"footnote418"></a><b>Footnote 418:</b><a href= +"#footnotetag418">(return)</a> +<p>I.e. a high one, but not an indefinite one; since the omniscient +Lord knows its measure.</p> +</blockquote> +<hr class="full" /> + + + + + + + +<pre> + + + + + +End of the Project Gutenberg EBook of The Vedanta-Sutras with the Commentary +by Sankaracarya + +*** END OF THIS PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK THE VEDANTA-SUTRAS *** + +***** This file should be named 16295-h.htm or 16295-h.zip ***** +This and all associated files of various formats will be found in: + https://www.gutenberg.org/1/6/2/9/16295/ + +Produced by Srinivasan Sriram, David King, and the Online +Distributed Proofreading Team + + +Updated editions will replace the previous one--the old editions +will be renamed. + +Creating the works from public domain print editions means that no +one owns a United States copyright in these works, so the Foundation +(and you!) can copy and distribute it in the United States without +permission and without paying copyright royalties. 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