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diff --git a/1656-0.txt b/1656-0.txt new file mode 100644 index 0000000..39a8116 --- /dev/null +++ b/1656-0.txt @@ -0,0 +1,1818 @@ +The Project Gutenberg EBook of Apology, by Plato + +This eBook is for the use of anyone anywhere in the United States and most +other parts of the world at no cost and with almost no restrictions +whatsoever. You may copy it, give it away or re-use it under the terms of +the Project Gutenberg License included with this eBook or online at +www.gutenberg.org. If you are not located in the United States, you'll have +to check the laws of the country where you are located before using this ebook. + +Title: Apology + Also known as “The Death of Socrates” + +Author: Plato + +Translator: Benjamin Jowett + +Release Date: February, 1999 [EBook #1656] +[Most recently updated: October 4, 2020] + +Language: English + +Character set encoding: UTF-8 + +*** START OF THIS PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK APOLOGY *** + + + + +Produced by Sue Asscher, and David Widger + + + + +Apology + +by Plato + +Translated by Benjamin Jowett + + +Contents + + INTRODUCTION + APOLOGY + + + + +INTRODUCTION. + + +In what relation the “Apology” of Plato stands to the real defence of +Socrates, there are no means of determining. It certainly agrees in +tone and character with the description of Xenophon, who says in the +“Memorabilia” that Socrates might have been acquitted “if in any +moderate degree he would have conciliated the favour of the dicasts;” +and who informs us in another passage, on the testimony of Hermogenes, +the friend of Socrates, that he had no wish to live; and that the +divine sign refused to allow him to prepare a defence, and also that +Socrates himself declared this to be unnecessary, on the ground that +all his life long he had been preparing against that hour. For the +speech breathes throughout a spirit of defiance, “_ut non supplex aut +reus sed magister aut dominus videretur esse judicum_” (Cic. “de Orat.” +i. 54); and the loose and desultory style is an imitation of the +“accustomed manner” in which Socrates spoke in “the _agora_ and among +the tables of the money-changers.” The allusion in the “Crito” (45 B) +may, perhaps, be adduced as a further evidence of the literal accuracy +of some parts (37 C, D). But in the main it must be regarded as the +ideal of Socrates, according to Plato’s conception of him, appearing in +the greatest and most public scene of his life, and in the height of +his triumph, when he is weakest, and yet his mastery over mankind is +greatest, and his habitual irony acquires a new meaning and a sort of +tragic pathos in the face of death. The facts of his life are summed +up, and the features of his character are brought out as if by accident +in the course of the defence. The conversational manner, the seeming +want of arrangement, the ironical simplicity, are found to result in a +perfect work of art, which is the portrait of Socrates. + +Yet some of the topics may have been actually used by Socrates; and the +recollection of his very words may have rung in the ears of his +disciple. The “Apology” of Plato may be compared generally with those +speeches of Thucydides in which he has embodied his conception of the +lofty character and policy of the great Pericles, and which at the same +time furnish a commentary on the situation of affairs from the point of +view of the historian. So in the “Apology” there is an ideal rather +than a literal truth; much is said which was not said, and is only +Plato’s view of the situation. Plato was not, like Xenophon, a +chronicler of facts; he does not appear in any of his writings to have +aimed at literal accuracy. He is not therefore to be supplemented from +the Memorabilia and Symposium of Xenophon, who belongs to an entirely +different class of writers. The Apology of Plato is not the report of +what Socrates said, but an elaborate composition, quite as much so in +fact as one of the Dialogues. And we may perhaps even indulge in the +fancy that the actual defence of Socrates was as much greater than the +Platonic defence as the master was greater than the disciple. But in +any case, some of the words used by him must have been remembered, and +some of the facts recorded must have actually occurred. It is +significant that Plato is said to have been present at the defence +(Apol.), as he is also said to have been absent at the last scene in +the “Phædo”. Is it fanciful to suppose that he meant to give the stamp +of authenticity to the one and not to the other?—especially when we +consider that these two passages are the only ones in which Plato makes +mention of himself. The circumstance that Plato was to be one of his +sureties for the payment of the fine which he proposed has the +appearance of truth. More suspicious is the statement that Socrates +received the first impulse to his favourite calling of cross-examining +the world from the Oracle of Delphi; for he must already have been +famous before Chaerephon went to consult the Oracle (Riddell), and the +story is of a kind which is very likely to have been invented. On the +whole we arrive at the conclusion that the “Apology” is true to the +character of Socrates, but we cannot show that any single sentence in +it was actually spoken by him. It breathes the spirit of Socrates, but +has been cast anew in the mould of Plato. + +There is not much in the other Dialogues which can be compared with the +“Apology”. The same recollection of his master may have been present to +the mind of Plato when depicting the sufferings of the Just in the +“Republic”. The “Crito” may also be regarded as a sort of appendage to +the “Apology”, in which Socrates, who has defied the judges, is +nevertheless represented as scrupulously obedient to the laws. The +idealization of the sufferer is carried still further in the +“Georgias”, in which the thesis is maintained, that “to suffer is +better than to do evil;” and the art of rhetoric is described as only +useful for the purpose of self-accusation. The parallelisms which occur +in the so-called “Apology” of Xenophon are not worth noticing, because +the writing in which they are contained is manifestly spurious. The +statements of the “Memorabilia” respecting the trial and death of +Socrates agree generally with Plato; but they have lost the flavour of +Socratic irony in the narrative of Xenophon. + +The “Apology” or Platonic defence of Socrates is divided into three +parts: 1st. The defence properly so called; 2nd. The shorter address in +mitigation of the penalty; 3rd. The last words of prophetic rebuke and +exhortation. + +The first part commences with an apology for his colloquial style; he +is, as he has always been, the enemy of rhetoric, and knows of no +rhetoric but truth; he will not falsify his character by making a +speech. Then he proceeds to divide his accusers into two classes; +first, there is the nameless accuser—public opinion. All the world from +their earliest years had heard that he was a corrupter of youth, and +had seen him caricatured in the “Clouds” of Aristophanes. Secondly, +there are the professed accusers, who are but the mouth-piece of the +others. The accusations of both might be summed up in a formula. The +first say, “Socrates is an evil-doer and a curious person, searching +into things under the earth and above the heaven; and making the worse +appear the better cause, and teaching all this to others.” The second, +“Socrates is an evil-doer and corrupter of the youth, who does not +receive the gods whom the state receives, but introduces other new +divinities.” These last words appear to have been the actual indictment +(compare Xen. Mem.); and the previous formula, which is a summary of +public opinion, assumes the same legal style. + +The answer begins by clearing up a confusion. In the representations of +the Comic poets, and in the opinion of the multitude, he had been +identified with the teachers of physical science and with the Sophists. +But this was an error. For both of them he professes a respect in the +open court, which contrasts with his manner of speaking about them in +other places. (Compare for Anaxagoras, Phædo, Laws; for the Sophists, +Meno, Republic, Tim., Theaet., Soph., etc.) But at the same time he +shows that he is not one of them. Of natural philosophy he knows +nothing; not that he despises such pursuits, but the fact is that he is +ignorant of them, and never says a word about them. Nor is he paid for +giving instruction—that is another mistaken notion:—he has nothing to +teach. But he commends Evenus for teaching virtue at such a “moderate” +rate as five minæ. Something of the “accustomed irony,” which may +perhaps be expected to sleep in the ear of the multitude, is lurking +here. + +He then goes on to explain the reason why he is in such an evil name. +That had arisen out of a peculiar mission which he had taken upon +himself. The enthusiastic Chaerephon (probably in anticipation of the +answer which he received) had gone to Delphi and asked the oracle if +there was any man wiser than Socrates; and the answer was, that there +was no man wiser. What could be the meaning of this—that he who knew +nothing, and knew that he knew nothing, should be declared by the +oracle to be the wisest of men? Reflecting upon the answer, he +determined to refute it by finding “a wiser;” and first he went to the +politicians, and then to the poets, and then to the craftsmen, but +always with the same result—he found that they knew nothing, or hardly +anything more than himself; and that the little advantage which in some +cases they possessed was more than counter-balanced by their conceit of +knowledge. He knew nothing, and knew that he knew nothing: they knew +little or nothing, and imagined that they knew all things. Thus he had +passed his life as a sort of missionary in detecting the pretended +wisdom of mankind; and this occupation had quite absorbed him and taken +him away both from public and private affairs. Young men of the richer +sort had made a pastime of the same pursuit, “which was not unamusing.” +And hence bitter enmities had arisen; the professors of knowledge had +revenged themselves by calling him a villainous corrupter of youth, and +by repeating the commonplaces about atheism and materialism and +sophistry, which are the stock-accusations against all philosophers +when there is nothing else to be said of them. + +The second accusation he meets by interrogating Meletus, who is present +and can be interrogated. “If he is the corrupter, who is the improver +of the citizens?” (Compare Meno.) “All men everywhere.” But how absurd, +how contrary to analogy is this! How inconceivable too, that he should +make the citizens worse when he has to live with them. This surely +cannot be intentional; and if unintentional, he ought to have been +instructed by Meletus, and not accused in the court. + +But there is another part of the indictment which says that he teaches +men not to receive the gods whom the city receives, and has other new +gods. “Is that the way in which he is supposed to corrupt the youth?” +“Yes, it is.” “Has he only new gods, or none at all?” “None at all.” +“What, not even the sun and moon?” “No; why, he says that the sun is a +stone, and the moon earth.” That, replies Socrates, is the old +confusion about Anaxagoras; the Athenian people are not so ignorant as +to attribute to the influence of Socrates notions which have found +their way into the drama, and may be learned at the theatre. Socrates +undertakes to show that Meletus (rather unjustifiably) has been +compounding a riddle in this part of the indictment: “There are no +gods, but Socrates believes in the existence of the sons of gods, which +is absurd.” + +Leaving Meletus, who has had enough words spent upon him, he returns to +the original accusation. The question may be asked, Why will he persist +in following a profession which leads him to death? Why?—because he +must remain at his post where the god has placed him, as he remained at +Potidaea, and Amphipolis, and Delium, where the generals placed him. +Besides, he is not so overwise as to imagine that he knows whether +death is a good or an evil; and he is certain that desertion of his +duty is an evil. Anytus is quite right in saying that they should never +have indicted him if they meant to let him go. For he will certainly +obey God rather than man; and will continue to preach to all men of all +ages the necessity of virtue and improvement; and if they refuse to +listen to him he will still persevere and reprove them. This is his way +of corrupting the youth, which he will not cease to follow in obedience +to the god, even if a thousand deaths await him. + +He is desirous that they should let him live—not for his own sake, but +for theirs; because he is their heaven-sent friend (and they will never +have such another), or, as he may be ludicrously described, he is the +gadfly who stirs the generous steed into motion. Why then has he never +taken part in public affairs? Because the familiar divine voice has +hindered him; if he had been a public man, and had fought for the +right, as he would certainly have fought against the many, he would not +have lived, and could therefore have done no good. Twice in public +matters he has risked his life for the sake of justice—once at the +trial of the generals; and again in resistance to the tyrannical +commands of the Thirty. + +But, though not a public man, he has passed his days in instructing the +citizens without fee or reward—this was his mission. Whether his +disciples have turned out well or ill, he cannot justly be charged with +the result, for he never promised to teach them anything. They might +come if they liked, and they might stay away if they liked: and they +did come, because they found an amusement in hearing the pretenders to +wisdom detected. If they have been corrupted, their elder relatives (if +not themselves) might surely come into court and witness against him, +and there is an opportunity still for them to appear. But their fathers +and brothers all appear in court (including “this” Plato), to witness +on his behalf; and if their relatives are corrupted, at least they are +uncorrupted; “and they are my witnesses. For they know that I am +speaking the truth, and that Meletus is lying.” + +This is about all that he has to say. He will not entreat the judges to +spare his life; neither will he present a spectacle of weeping +children, although he, too, is not made of “rock or oak.” Some of the +judges themselves may have complied with this practice on similar +occasions, and he trusts that they will not be angry with him for not +following their example. But he feels that such conduct brings +discredit on the name of Athens: he feels too, that the judge has sworn +not to give away justice; and he cannot be guilty of the impiety of +asking the judge to break his oath, when he is himself being tried for +impiety. + +As he expected, and probably intended, he is convicted. And now the +tone of the speech, instead of being more conciliatory, becomes more +lofty and commanding. Anytus proposes death as the penalty: and what +counter-proposition shall he make? He, the benefactor of the Athenian +people, whose whole life has been spent in doing them good, should at +least have the Olympic victor’s reward of maintenance in the Prytaneum. +Or why should he propose any counter-penalty when he does not know +whether death, which Anytus proposes, is a good or an evil? And he is +certain that imprisonment is an evil, exile is an evil. Loss of money +might be an evil, but then he has none to give; perhaps he can make up +a mina. Let that be the penalty, or, if his friends wish, thirty minæ; +for which they will be excellent securities. + + + [_He is condemned to death._] + + +He is an old man already, and the Athenians will gain nothing but +disgrace by depriving him of a few years of life. Perhaps he could have +escaped, if he had chosen to throw down his arms and entreat for his +life. But he does not at all repent of the manner of his defence; he +would rather die in his own fashion than live in theirs. For the +penalty of unrighteousness is swifter than death; that penalty has +already overtaken his accusers as death will soon overtake him. + +And now, as one who is about to die, he will prophesy to them. They +have put him to death in order to escape the necessity of giving an +account of their lives. But his death “will be the seed” of many +disciples who will convince them of their evil ways, and will come +forth to reprove them in harsher terms, because they are younger and +more inconsiderate. + +He would like to say a few words, while there is time, to those who +would have acquitted him. He wishes them to know that the divine sign +never interrupted him in the course of his defence; the reason of +which, as he conjectures, is that the death to which he is going is a +good and not an evil. For either death is a long sleep, the best of +sleeps, or a journey to another world in which the souls of the dead +are gathered together, and in which there may be a hope of seeing the +heroes of old—in which, too, there are just judges; and as all are +immortal, there can be no fear of any one suffering death for his +opinions. + +Nothing evil can happen to the good man either in life or death, and +his own death has been permitted by the gods, because it was better for +him to depart; and therefore he forgives his judges because they have +done him no harm, although they never meant to do him any good. + +He has a last request to make to them—that they will trouble his sons +as he has troubled them, if they appear to prefer riches to virtue, or +to think themselves something when they are nothing. + + +“Few persons will be found to wish that Socrates should have defended +himself otherwise,”—if, as we must add, his defence was that with which +Plato has provided him. But leaving this question, which does not admit +of a precise solution, we may go on to ask what was the impression +which Plato in the “Apology” intended to give of the character and +conduct of his master in the last great scene? Did he intend to +represent him (1) as employing sophistries; (2) as designedly +irritating the judges? Or are these sophistries to be regarded as +belonging to the age in which he lived and to his personal character, +and this apparent haughtiness as flowing from the natural elevation of +his position? + +For example, when he says that it is absurd to suppose that one man is +the corrupter and all the rest of the world the improvers of the youth; +or, when he argues that he never could have corrupted the men with whom +he had to live; or, when he proves his belief in the gods because he +believes in the sons of gods, is he serious or jesting? It may be +observed that these sophisms all occur in his cross-examination of +Meletus, who is easily foiled and mastered in the hands of the great +dialectician. Perhaps he regarded these answers as good enough for his +accuser, of whom he makes very light. Also there is a touch of irony in +them, which takes them out of the category of sophistry. (Compare +Euthyph.) + +That the manner in which he defends himself about the lives of his +disciples is not satisfactory, can hardly be denied. Fresh in the +memory of the Athenians, and detestable as they deserved to be to the +newly restored democracy, were the names of Alcibiades, Critias, +Charmides. It is obviously not a sufficient answer that Socrates had +never professed to teach them anything, and is therefore not justly +chargeable with their crimes. Yet the defence, when taken out of this +ironical form, is doubtless sound: that his teaching had nothing to do +with their evil lives. Here, then, the sophistry is rather in form than +in substance, though we might desire that to such a serious charge +Socrates had given a more serious answer. + +Truly characteristic of Socrates is another point in his answer, which +may also be regarded as sophistical. He says that “if he has corrupted +the youth, he must have corrupted them involuntarily.” But if, as +Socrates argues, all evil is involuntary, then all criminals ought to +be admonished and not punished. In these words the Socratic doctrine of +the involuntariness of evil is clearly intended to be conveyed. Here +again, as in the former instance, the defence of Socrates is untrue +practically, but may be true in some ideal or transcendental sense. The +commonplace reply, that if he had been guilty of corrupting the youth +their relations would surely have witnessed against him, with which he +concludes this part of his defence, is more satisfactory. + +Again, when Socrates argues that he must believe in the gods because he +believes in the sons of gods, we must remember that this is a +refutation not of the original indictment, which is consistent +enough—“Socrates does not receive the gods whom the city receives, and +has other new divinities”—but of the interpretation put upon the words +by Meletus, who has affirmed that he is a downright atheist. To this +Socrates fairly answers, in accordance with the ideas of the time, that +a downright atheist cannot believe in the sons of gods or in divine +things. The notion that demons or lesser divinities are the sons of +gods is not to be regarded as ironical or sceptical. He is arguing “ad +hominem” according to the notions of mythology current in his age. Yet +he abstains from saying that he believed in the gods whom the State +approved. He does not defend himself, as Xenophon has defended him, by +appealing to his practice of religion. Probably he neither wholly +believed, nor disbelieved, in the existence of the popular gods; he had +no means of knowing about them. According to Plato (compare Phædo; +Symp.), as well as Xenophon (Memor.), he was punctual in the +performance of the least religious duties; and he must have believed in +his own oracular sign, of which he seemed to have an internal witness. +But the existence of Apollo or Zeus, or the other gods whom the State +approves, would have appeared to him both uncertain and unimportant in +comparison of the duty of self-examination, and of those principles of +truth and right which he deemed to be the foundation of religion. +(Compare Phaedr.; Euthyph.; Republic.) + +The second question, whether Plato meant to represent Socrates as +braving or irritating his judges, must also be answered in the +negative. His irony, his superiority, his audacity, “regarding not the +person of man,” necessarily flow out of the loftiness of his situation. +He is not acting a part upon a great occasion, but he is what he has +been all his life long, “a king of men.” He would rather not appear +insolent, if he could avoid it (ouch os authadizomenos touto lego). +Neither is he desirous of hastening his own end, for life and death are +simply indifferent to him. But such a defence as would be acceptable to +his judges and might procure an acquittal, it is not in his nature to +make. He will not say or do anything that might pervert the course of +justice; he cannot have his tongue bound even “in the throat of death.” +With his accusers he will only fence and play, as he had fenced with +other “improvers of youth,” answering the Sophist according to his +sophistry all his life long. He is serious when he is speaking of his +own mission, which seems to distinguish him from all other reformers of +mankind, and originates in an accident. The dedication of himself to +the improvement of his fellow-citizens is not so remarkable as the +ironical spirit in which he goes about doing good only in vindication +of the credit of the oracle, and in the vain hope of finding a wiser +man than himself. Yet this singular and almost accidental character of +his mission agrees with the divine sign which, according to our +notions, is equally accidental and irrational, and is nevertheless +accepted by him as the guiding principle of his life. Socrates is +nowhere represented to us as a freethinker or sceptic. There is no +reason to doubt his sincerity when he speculates on the possibility of +seeing and knowing the heroes of the Trojan war in another world. On +the other hand, his hope of immortality is uncertain;—he also conceives +of death as a long sleep (in this respect differing from the Phædo), +and at last falls back on resignation to the divine will, and the +certainty that no evil can happen to the good man either in life or +death. His absolute truthfulness seems to hinder him from asserting +positively more than this; and he makes no attempt to veil his +ignorance in mythology and figures of speech. The gentleness of the +first part of the speech contrasts with the aggravated, almost +threatening, tone of the conclusion. He characteristically remarks that +he will not speak as a rhetorician, that is to say, he will not make a +regular defence such as Lysias or one of the orators might have +composed for him, or, according to some accounts, did compose for him. +But he first procures himself a hearing by conciliatory words. He does +not attack the Sophists; for they were open to the same charges as +himself; they were equally ridiculed by the Comic poets, and almost +equally hateful to Anytus and Meletus. Yet incidentally the antagonism +between Socrates and the Sophists is allowed to appear. He is poor and +they are rich; his profession that he teaches nothing is opposed to +their readiness to teach all things; his talking in the marketplace to +their private instructions; his tarry-at-home life to their wandering +from city to city. The tone which he assumes towards them is one of +real friendliness, but also of concealed irony. Towards Anaxagoras, who +had disappointed him in his hopes of learning about mind and nature, he +shows a less kindly feeling, which is also the feeling of Plato in +other passages (Laws). But Anaxagoras had been dead thirty years, and +was beyond the reach of persecution. + +It has been remarked that the prophecy of a new generation of teachers +who would rebuke and exhort the Athenian people in harsher and more +violent terms was, as far as we know, never fulfilled. No inference can +be drawn from this circumstance as to the probability of the words +attributed to him having been actually uttered. They express the +aspiration of the first martyr of philosophy, that he would leave +behind him many followers, accompanied by the not unnatural feeling +that they would be fiercer and more inconsiderate in their words when +emancipated from his control. + +The above remarks must be understood as applying with any degree of +certainty to the Platonic Socrates only. For, although these or similar +words may have been spoken by Socrates himself, we cannot exclude the +possibility, that like so much else, _e.g._ the wisdom of Critias, the +poem of Solon, the virtues of Charmides, they may have been due only to +the imagination of Plato. The arguments of those who maintain that the +Apology was composed during the process, resting on no evidence, do not +require a serious refutation. Nor are the reasonings of Schleiermacher, +who argues that the Platonic defence is an exact or nearly exact +reproduction of the words of Socrates, partly because Plato would not +have been guilty of the impiety of altering them, and also because many +points of the defence might have been improved and strengthened, at all +more conclusive. (See English Translation.) What effect the death of +Socrates produced on the mind of Plato, we cannot certainly determine; +nor can we say how he would or must have written under the +circumstances. We observe that the enmity of Aristophanes to Socrates +does not prevent Plato from introducing them together in the Symposium +engaged in friendly intercourse. Nor is there any trace in the +Dialogues of an attempt to make Anytus or Meletus personally odious in +the eyes of the Athenian public. + + + + +APOLOGY + + +How you, O Athenians, have been affected by my accusers, I cannot tell; +but I know that they almost made me forget who I was—so persuasively +did they speak; and yet they have hardly uttered a word of truth. But +of the many falsehoods told by them, there was one which quite amazed +me;—I mean when they said that you should be upon your guard and not +allow yourselves to be deceived by the force of my eloquence. To say +this, when they were certain to be detected as soon as I opened my lips +and proved myself to be anything but a great speaker, did indeed appear +to me most shameless—unless by the force of eloquence they mean the +force of truth; for if such is their meaning, I admit that I am +eloquent. But in how different a way from theirs! Well, as I was +saying, they have scarcely spoken the truth at all; but from me you +shall hear the whole truth: not, however, delivered after their manner +in a set oration duly ornamented with words and phrases. No, by heaven! +but I shall use the words and arguments which occur to me at the +moment; for I am confident in the justice of my cause (Or, I am certain +that I am right in taking this course.): at my time of life I ought not +to be appearing before you, O men of Athens, in the character of a +juvenile orator—let no one expect it of me. And I must beg of you to +grant me a favour:—If I defend myself in my accustomed manner, and you +hear me using the words which I have been in the habit of using in the +agora, at the tables of the money-changers, or anywhere else, I would +ask you not to be surprised, and not to interrupt me on this account. +For I am more than seventy years of age, and appearing now for the +first time in a court of law, I am quite a stranger to the language of +the place; and therefore I would have you regard me as if I were really +a stranger, whom you would excuse if he spoke in his native tongue, and +after the fashion of his country:—Am I making an unfair request of you? +Never mind the manner, which may or may not be good; but think only of +the truth of my words, and give heed to that: let the speaker speak +truly and the judge decide justly. + +And first, I have to reply to the older charges and to my first +accusers, and then I will go on to the later ones. For of old I have +had many accusers, who have accused me falsely to you during many +years; and I am more afraid of them than of Anytus and his associates, +who are dangerous, too, in their own way. But far more dangerous are +the others, who began when you were children, and took possession of +your minds with their falsehoods, telling of one Socrates, a wise man, +who speculated about the heaven above, and searched into the earth +beneath, and made the worse appear the better cause. The disseminators +of this tale are the accusers whom I dread; for their hearers are apt +to fancy that such enquirers do not believe in the existence of the +gods. And they are many, and their charges against me are of ancient +date, and they were made by them in the days when you were more +impressible than you are now—in childhood, or it may have been in +youth—and the cause when heard went by default, for there was none to +answer. And hardest of all, I do not know and cannot tell the names of +my accusers; unless in the chance case of a Comic poet. All who from +envy and malice have persuaded you—some of them having first convinced +themselves—all this class of men are most difficult to deal with; for I +cannot have them up here, and cross-examine them, and therefore I must +simply fight with shadows in my own defence, and argue when there is no +one who answers. I will ask you then to assume with me, as I was +saying, that my opponents are of two kinds; one recent, the other +ancient: and I hope that you will see the propriety of my answering the +latter first, for these accusations you heard long before the others, +and much oftener. + +Well, then, I must make my defence, and endeavour to clear away in a +short time, a slander which has lasted a long time. May I succeed, if +to succeed be for my good and yours, or likely to avail me in my cause! +The task is not an easy one; I quite understand the nature of it. And +so leaving the event with God, in obedience to the law I will now make +my defence. + +I will begin at the beginning, and ask what is the accusation which has +given rise to the slander of me, and in fact has encouraged Meletus to +proof this charge against me. Well, what do the slanderers say? They +shall be my prosecutors, and I will sum up their words in an affidavit: +“Socrates is an evil-doer, and a curious person, who searches into +things under the earth and in heaven, and he makes the worse appear the +better cause; and he teaches the aforesaid doctrines to others.” Such +is the nature of the accusation: it is just what you have yourselves +seen in the comedy of Aristophanes (Aristoph., Clouds.), who has +introduced a man whom he calls Socrates, going about and saying that he +walks in air, and talking a deal of nonsense concerning matters of +which I do not pretend to know either much or little—not that I mean to +speak disparagingly of any one who is a student of natural philosophy. +I should be very sorry if Meletus could bring so grave a charge against +me. But the simple truth is, O Athenians, that I have nothing to do +with physical speculations. Very many of those here present are +witnesses to the truth of this, and to them I appeal. Speak then, you +who have heard me, and tell your neighbours whether any of you have +ever known me hold forth in few words or in many upon such +matters...You hear their answer. And from what they say of this part of +the charge you will be able to judge of the truth of the rest. + +As little foundation is there for the report that I am a teacher, and +take money; this accusation has no more truth in it than the other. +Although, if a man were really able to instruct mankind, to receive +money for giving instruction would, in my opinion, be an honour to him. +There is Gorgias of Leontium, and Prodicus of Ceos, and Hippias of +Elis, who go the round of the cities, and are able to persuade the +young men to leave their own citizens by whom they might be taught for +nothing, and come to them whom they not only pay, but are thankful if +they may be allowed to pay them. There is at this time a Parian +philosopher residing in Athens, of whom I have heard; and I came to +hear of him in this way:—I came across a man who has spent a world of +money on the Sophists, Callias, the son of Hipponicus, and knowing that +he had sons, I asked him: “Callias,” I said, “if your two sons were +foals or calves, there would be no difficulty in finding some one to +put over them; we should hire a trainer of horses, or a farmer +probably, who would improve and perfect them in their own proper virtue +and excellence; but as they are human beings, whom are you thinking of +placing over them? Is there any one who understands human and political +virtue? You must have thought about the matter, for you have sons; is +there any one?” “There is,” he said. “Who is he?” said I; “and of what +country? and what does he charge?” “Evenus the Parian,” he replied; “he +is the man, and his charge is five minæ.” Happy is Evenus, I said to +myself, if he really has this wisdom, and teaches at such a moderate +charge. Had I the same, I should have been very proud and conceited; +but the truth is that I have no knowledge of the kind. + +I dare say, Athenians, that some one among you will reply, “Yes, +Socrates, but what is the origin of these accusations which are brought +against you; there must have been something strange which you have been +doing? All these rumours and this talk about you would never have +arisen if you had been like other men: tell us, then, what is the cause +of them, for we should be sorry to judge hastily of you.” Now I regard +this as a fair challenge, and I will endeavour to explain to you the +reason why I am called wise and have such an evil fame. Please to +attend then. And although some of you may think that I am joking, I +declare that I will tell you the entire truth. Men of Athens, this +reputation of mine has come of a certain sort of wisdom which I +possess. If you ask me what kind of wisdom, I reply, wisdom such as may +perhaps be attained by man, for to that extent I am inclined to believe +that I am wise; whereas the persons of whom I was speaking have a +superhuman wisdom which I may fail to describe, because I have it not +myself; and he who says that I have, speaks falsely, and is taking away +my character. And here, O men of Athens, I must beg you not to +interrupt me, even if I seem to say something extravagant. For the word +which I will speak is not mine. I will refer you to a witness who is +worthy of credit; that witness shall be the God of Delphi—he will tell +you about my wisdom, if I have any, and of what sort it is. You must +have known Chaerephon; he was early a friend of mine, and also a friend +of yours, for he shared in the recent exile of the people, and returned +with you. Well, Chaerephon, as you know, was very impetuous in all his +doings, and he went to Delphi and boldly asked the oracle to tell him +whether—as I was saying, I must beg you not to interrupt—he asked the +oracle to tell him whether anyone was wiser than I was, and the Pythian +prophetess answered, that there was no man wiser. Chaerephon is dead +himself; but his brother, who is in court, will confirm the truth of +what I am saying. + +Why do I mention this? Because I am going to explain to you why I have +such an evil name. When I heard the answer, I said to myself, What can +the god mean? and what is the interpretation of his riddle? for I know +that I have no wisdom, small or great. What then can he mean when he +says that I am the wisest of men? And yet he is a god, and cannot lie; +that would be against his nature. After long consideration, I thought +of a method of trying the question. I reflected that if I could only +find a man wiser than myself, then I might go to the god with a +refutation in my hand. I should say to him, “Here is a man who is wiser +than I am; but you said that I was the wisest.” Accordingly I went to +one who had the reputation of wisdom, and observed him—his name I need +not mention; he was a politician whom I selected for examination—and +the result was as follows: When I began to talk with him, I could not +help thinking that he was not really wise, although he was thought wise +by many, and still wiser by himself; and thereupon I tried to explain +to him that he thought himself wise, but was not really wise; and the +consequence was that he hated me, and his enmity was shared by several +who were present and heard me. So I left him, saying to myself, as I +went away: Well, although I do not suppose that either of us knows +anything really beautiful and good, I am better off than he is,—for he +knows nothing, and thinks that he knows; I neither know nor think that +I know. In this latter particular, then, I seem to have slightly the +advantage of him. Then I went to another who had still higher +pretensions to wisdom, and my conclusion was exactly the same. +Whereupon I made another enemy of him, and of many others besides him. + +Then I went to one man after another, being not unconscious of the +enmity which I provoked, and I lamented and feared this: but necessity +was laid upon me,—the word of God, I thought, ought to be considered +first. And I said to myself, Go I must to all who appear to know, and +find out the meaning of the oracle. And I swear to you, Athenians, by +the dog I swear!—for I must tell you the truth—the result of my mission +was just this: I found that the men most in repute were all but the +most foolish; and that others less esteemed were really wiser and +better. I will tell you the tale of my wanderings and of the +“Herculean” labours, as I may call them, which I endured only to find +at last the oracle irrefutable. After the politicians, I went to the +poets; tragic, dithyrambic, and all sorts. And there, I said to myself, +you will be instantly detected; now you will find out that you are more +ignorant than they are. Accordingly, I took them some of the most +elaborate passages in their own writings, and asked what was the +meaning of them—thinking that they would teach me something. Will you +believe me? I am almost ashamed to confess the truth, but I must say +that there is hardly a person present who would not have talked better +about their poetry than they did themselves. Then I knew that not by +wisdom do poets write poetry, but by a sort of genius and inspiration; +they are like diviners or soothsayers who also say many fine things, +but do not understand the meaning of them. The poets appeared to me to +be much in the same case; and I further observed that upon the strength +of their poetry they believed themselves to be the wisest of men in +other things in which they were not wise. So I departed, conceiving +myself to be superior to them for the same reason that I was superior +to the politicians. + +At last I went to the artisans. I was conscious that I knew nothing at +all, as I may say, and I was sure that they knew many fine things; and +here I was not mistaken, for they did know many things of which I was +ignorant, and in this they certainly were wiser than I was. But I +observed that even the good artisans fell into the same error as the +poets;—because they were good workmen they thought that they also knew +all sorts of high matters, and this defect in them overshadowed their +wisdom; and therefore I asked myself on behalf of the oracle, whether I +would like to be as I was, neither having their knowledge nor their +ignorance, or like them in both; and I made answer to myself and to the +oracle that I was better off as I was. + +This inquisition has led to my having many enemies of the worst and +most dangerous kind, and has given occasion also to many calumnies. And +I am called wise, for my hearers always imagine that I myself possess +the wisdom which I find wanting in others: but the truth is, O men of +Athens, that God only is wise; and by his answer he intends to show +that the wisdom of men is worth little or nothing; he is not speaking +of Socrates, he is only using my name by way of illustration, as if he +said, He, O men, is the wisest, who, like Socrates, knows that his +wisdom is in truth worth nothing. And so I go about the world, obedient +to the god, and search and make enquiry into the wisdom of any one, +whether citizen or stranger, who appears to be wise; and if he is not +wise, then in vindication of the oracle I show him that he is not wise; +and my occupation quite absorbs me, and I have no time to give either +to any public matter of interest or to any concern of my own, but I am +in utter poverty by reason of my devotion to the god. + +There is another thing:—young men of the richer classes, who have not +much to do, come about me of their own accord; they like to hear the +pretenders examined, and they often imitate me, and proceed to examine +others; there are plenty of persons, as they quickly discover, who +think that they know something, but really know little or nothing; and +then those who are examined by them instead of being angry with +themselves are angry with me: This confounded Socrates, they say; this +villainous misleader of youth!—and then if somebody asks them, Why, +what evil does he practise or teach? they do not know, and cannot tell; +but in order that they may not appear to be at a loss, they repeat the +ready-made charges which are used against all philosophers about +teaching things up in the clouds and under the earth, and having no +gods, and making the worse appear the better cause; for they do not +like to confess that their pretence of knowledge has been +detected—which is the truth; and as they are numerous and ambitious and +energetic, and are drawn up in battle array and have persuasive +tongues, they have filled your ears with their loud and inveterate +calumnies. And this is the reason why my three accusers, Meletus and +Anytus and Lycon, have set upon me; Meletus, who has a quarrel with me +on behalf of the poets; Anytus, on behalf of the craftsmen and +politicians; Lycon, on behalf of the rhetoricians: and as I said at the +beginning, I cannot expect to get rid of such a mass of calumny all in +a moment. And this, O men of Athens, is the truth and the whole truth; +I have concealed nothing, I have dissembled nothing. And yet, I know +that my plainness of speech makes them hate me, and what is their +hatred but a proof that I am speaking the truth?—Hence has arisen the +prejudice against me; and this is the reason of it, as you will find +out either in this or in any future enquiry. + +I have said enough in my defence against the first class of my +accusers; I turn to the second class. They are headed by Meletus, that +good man and true lover of his country, as he calls himself. Against +these, too, I must try to make a defence:—Let their affidavit be read: +it contains something of this kind: It says that Socrates is a doer of +evil, who corrupts the youth; and who does not believe in the gods of +the state, but has other new divinities of his own. Such is the charge; +and now let us examine the particular counts. He says that I am a doer +of evil, and corrupt the youth; but I say, O men of Athens, that +Meletus is a doer of evil, in that he pretends to be in earnest when he +is only in jest, and is so eager to bring men to trial from a pretended +zeal and interest about matters in which he really never had the +smallest interest. And the truth of this I will endeavour to prove to +you. + +Come hither, Meletus, and let me ask a question of you. You think a +great deal about the improvement of youth? + +Yes, I do. + +Tell the judges, then, who is their improver; for you must know, as you +have taken the pains to discover their corrupter, and are citing and +accusing me before them. Speak, then, and tell the judges who their +improver is.—Observe, Meletus, that you are silent, and have nothing to +say. But is not this rather disgraceful, and a very considerable proof +of what I was saying, that you have no interest in the matter? Speak +up, friend, and tell us who their improver is. + +The laws. + +But that, my good sir, is not my meaning. I want to know who the person +is, who, in the first place, knows the laws. + +The judges, Socrates, who are present in court. + +What, do you mean to say, Meletus, that they are able to instruct and +improve youth? + +Certainly they are. + +What, all of them, or some only and not others? + +All of them. + +By the goddess Here, that is good news! There are plenty of improvers, +then. And what do you say of the audience,—do they improve them? + +Yes, they do. + +And the senators? + +Yes, the senators improve them. + +But perhaps the members of the assembly corrupt them?—or do they too +improve them? + +They improve them. + +Then every Athenian improves and elevates them; all with the exception +of myself; and I alone am their corrupter? Is that what you affirm? + +That is what I stoutly affirm. + +I am very unfortunate if you are right. But suppose I ask you a +question: How about horses? Does one man do them harm and all the world +good? Is not the exact opposite the truth? One man is able to do them +good, or at least not many;—the trainer of horses, that is to say, does +them good, and others who have to do with them rather injure them? Is +not that true, Meletus, of horses, or of any other animals? Most +assuredly it is; whether you and Anytus say yes or no. Happy indeed +would be the condition of youth if they had one corrupter only, and all +the rest of the world were their improvers. But you, Meletus, have +sufficiently shown that you never had a thought about the young: your +carelessness is seen in your not caring about the very things which you +bring against me. + +And now, Meletus, I will ask you another question—by Zeus I will: Which +is better, to live among bad citizens, or among good ones? Answer, +friend, I say; the question is one which may be easily answered. Do not +the good do their neighbours good, and the bad do them evil? + +Certainly. + +And is there anyone who would rather be injured than benefited by those +who live with him? Answer, my good friend, the law requires you to +answer—does any one like to be injured? + +Certainly not. + +And when you accuse me of corrupting and deteriorating the youth, do +you allege that I corrupt them intentionally or unintentionally? + +Intentionally, I say. + +But you have just admitted that the good do their neighbours good, and +the evil do them evil. Now, is that a truth which your superior wisdom +has recognized thus early in life, and am I, at my age, in such +darkness and ignorance as not to know that if a man with whom I have to +live is corrupted by me, I am very likely to be harmed by him; and yet +I corrupt him, and intentionally, too—so you say, although neither I +nor any other human being is ever likely to be convinced by you. But +either I do not corrupt them, or I corrupt them unintentionally; and on +either view of the case you lie. If my offence is unintentional, the +law has no cognizance of unintentional offences: you ought to have +taken me privately, and warned and admonished me; for if I had been +better advised, I should have left off doing what I only did +unintentionally—no doubt I should; but you would have nothing to say to +me and refused to teach me. And now you bring me up in this court, +which is a place not of instruction, but of punishment. + +It will be very clear to you, Athenians, as I was saying, that Meletus +has no care at all, great or small, about the matter. But still I +should like to know, Meletus, in what I am affirmed to corrupt the +young. I suppose you mean, as I infer from your indictment, that I +teach them not to acknowledge the gods which the state acknowledges, +but some other new divinities or spiritual agencies in their stead. +These are the lessons by which I corrupt the youth, as you say. + +Yes, that I say emphatically. + +Then, by the gods, Meletus, of whom we are speaking, tell me and the +court, in somewhat plainer terms, what you mean! for I do not as yet +understand whether you affirm that I teach other men to acknowledge +some gods, and therefore that I do believe in gods, and am not an +entire atheist—this you do not lay to my charge,—but only you say that +they are not the same gods which the city recognizes—the charge is that +they are different gods. Or, do you mean that I am an atheist simply, +and a teacher of atheism? + +I mean the latter—that you are a complete atheist. + +What an extraordinary statement! Why do you think so, Meletus? Do you +mean that I do not believe in the godhead of the sun or moon, like +other men? + +I assure you, judges, that he does not: for he says that the sun is +stone, and the moon earth. + +Friend Meletus, you think that you are accusing Anaxagoras: and you +have but a bad opinion of the judges, if you fancy them illiterate to +such a degree as not to know that these doctrines are found in the +books of Anaxagoras the Clazomenian, which are full of them. And so, +forsooth, the youth are said to be taught them by Socrates, when there +are not unfrequently exhibitions of them at the theatre (Probably in +allusion to Aristophanes who caricatured, and to Euripides who borrowed +the notions of Anaxagoras, as well as to other dramatic poets.) (price +of admission one drachma at the most); and they might pay their money, +and laugh at Socrates if he pretends to father these extraordinary +views. And so, Meletus, you really think that I do not believe in any +god? + +I swear by Zeus that you believe absolutely in none at all. + +Nobody will believe you, Meletus, and I am pretty sure that you do not +believe yourself. I cannot help thinking, men of Athens, that Meletus +is reckless and impudent, and that he has written this indictment in a +spirit of mere wantonness and youthful bravado. Has he not compounded a +riddle, thinking to try me? He said to himself:—I shall see whether the +wise Socrates will discover my facetious contradiction, or whether I +shall be able to deceive him and the rest of them. For he certainly +does appear to me to contradict himself in the indictment as much as if +he said that Socrates is guilty of not believing in the gods, and yet +of believing in them—but this is not like a person who is in earnest. + +I should like you, O men of Athens, to join me in examining what I +conceive to be his inconsistency; and do you, Meletus, answer. And I +must remind the audience of my request that they would not make a +disturbance if I speak in my accustomed manner: + +Did ever man, Meletus, believe in the existence of human things, and +not of human beings?...I wish, men of Athens, that he would answer, and +not be always trying to get up an interruption. Did ever any man +believe in horsemanship, and not in horses? or in flute-playing, and +not in flute-players? No, my friend; I will answer to you and to the +court, as you refuse to answer for yourself. There is no man who ever +did. But now please to answer the next question: Can a man believe in +spiritual and divine agencies, and not in spirits or demigods? + +He cannot. + +How lucky I am to have extracted that answer, by the assistance of the +court! But then you swear in the indictment that I teach and believe in +divine or spiritual agencies (new or old, no matter for that); at any +rate, I believe in spiritual agencies,—so you say and swear in the +affidavit; and yet if I believe in divine beings, how can I help +believing in spirits or demigods;—must I not? To be sure I must; and +therefore I may assume that your silence gives consent. Now what are +spirits or demigods? Are they not either gods or the sons of gods? + +Certainly they are. + +But this is what I call the facetious riddle invented by you: the +demigods or spirits are gods, and you say first that I do not believe +in gods, and then again that I do believe in gods; that is, if I +believe in demigods. For if the demigods are the illegitimate sons of +gods, whether by the nymphs or by any other mothers, of whom they are +said to be the sons—what human being will ever believe that there are +no gods if they are the sons of gods? You might as well affirm the +existence of mules, and deny that of horses and asses. Such nonsense, +Meletus, could only have been intended by you to make trial of me. You +have put this into the indictment because you had nothing real of which +to accuse me. But no one who has a particle of understanding will ever +be convinced by you that the same men can believe in divine and +superhuman things, and yet not believe that there are gods and demigods +and heroes. + +I have said enough in answer to the charge of Meletus: any elaborate +defence is unnecessary, but I know only too well how many are the +enmities which I have incurred, and this is what will be my destruction +if I am destroyed;—not Meletus, nor yet Anytus, but the envy and +detraction of the world, which has been the death of many good men, and +will probably be the death of many more; there is no danger of my being +the last of them. + +Some one will say: And are you not ashamed, Socrates, of a course of +life which is likely to bring you to an untimely end? To him I may +fairly answer: There you are mistaken: a man who is good for anything +ought not to calculate the chance of living or dying; he ought only to +consider whether in doing anything he is doing right or wrong—acting +the part of a good man or of a bad. Whereas, upon your view, the heroes +who fell at Troy were not good for much, and the son of Thetis above +all, who altogether despised danger in comparison with disgrace; and +when he was so eager to slay Hector, his goddess mother said to him, +that if he avenged his companion Patroclus, and slew Hector, he would +die himself—“Fate,” she said, in these or the like words, “waits for +you next after Hector;” he, receiving this warning, utterly despised +danger and death, and instead of fearing them, feared rather to live in +dishonour, and not to avenge his friend. “Let me die forthwith,” he +replies, “and be avenged of my enemy, rather than abide here by the +beaked ships, a laughing-stock and a burden of the earth.” Had Achilles +any thought of death and danger? For wherever a man’s place is, whether +the place which he has chosen or that in which he has been placed by a +commander, there he ought to remain in the hour of danger; he should +not think of death or of anything but of disgrace. And this, O men of +Athens, is a true saying. + +Strange, indeed, would be my conduct, O men of Athens, if I who, when I +was ordered by the generals whom you chose to command me at Potidaea +and Amphipolis and Delium, remained where they placed me, like any +other man, facing death—if now, when, as I conceive and imagine, God +orders me to fulfil the philosopher’s mission of searching into myself +and other men, I were to desert my post through fear of death, or any +other fear; that would indeed be strange, and I might justly be +arraigned in court for denying the existence of the gods, if I +disobeyed the oracle because I was afraid of death, fancying that I was +wise when I was not wise. For the fear of death is indeed the pretence +of wisdom, and not real wisdom, being a pretence of knowing the +unknown; and no one knows whether death, which men in their fear +apprehend to be the greatest evil, may not be the greatest good. Is not +this ignorance of a disgraceful sort, the ignorance which is the +conceit that a man knows what he does not know? And in this respect +only I believe myself to differ from men in general, and may perhaps +claim to be wiser than they are:—that whereas I know but little of the +world below, I do not suppose that I know: but I do know that injustice +and disobedience to a better, whether God or man, is evil and +dishonourable, and I will never fear or avoid a possible good rather +than a certain evil. And therefore if you let me go now, and are not +convinced by Anytus, who said that since I had been prosecuted I must +be put to death; (or if not that I ought never to have been prosecuted +at all); and that if I escape now, your sons will all be utterly ruined +by listening to my words—if you say to me, Socrates, this time we will +not mind Anytus, and you shall be let off, but upon one condition, that +you are not to enquire and speculate in this way any more, and that if +you are caught doing so again you shall die;—if this was the condition +on which you let me go, I should reply: Men of Athens, I honour and +love you; but I shall obey God rather than you, and while I have life +and strength I shall never cease from the practice and teaching of +philosophy, exhorting any one whom I meet and saying to him after my +manner: You, my friend,—a citizen of the great and mighty and wise city +of Athens,—are you not ashamed of heaping up the greatest amount of +money and honour and reputation, and caring so little about wisdom and +truth and the greatest improvement of the soul, which you never regard +or heed at all? And if the person with whom I am arguing, says: Yes, +but I do care; then I do not leave him or let him go at once; but I +proceed to interrogate and examine and cross-examine him, and if I +think that he has no virtue in him, but only says that he has, I +reproach him with undervaluing the greater, and overvaluing the less. +And I shall repeat the same words to every one whom I meet, young and +old, citizen and alien, but especially to the citizens, inasmuch as +they are my brethren. For know that this is the command of God; and I +believe that no greater good has ever happened in the state than my +service to the God. For I do nothing but go about persuading you all, +old and young alike, not to take thought for your persons or your +properties, but first and chiefly to care about the greatest +improvement of the soul. I tell you that virtue is not given by money, +but that from virtue comes money and every other good of man, public as +well as private. This is my teaching, and if this is the doctrine which +corrupts the youth, I am a mischievous person. But if any one says that +this is not my teaching, he is speaking an untruth. Wherefore, O men of +Athens, I say to you, do as Anytus bids or not as Anytus bids, and +either acquit me or not; but whichever you do, understand that I shall +never alter my ways, not even if I have to die many times. + +Men of Athens, do not interrupt, but hear me; there was an +understanding between us that you should hear me to the end: I have +something more to say, at which you may be inclined to cry out; but I +believe that to hear me will be good for you, and therefore I beg that +you will not cry out. I would have you know, that if you kill such an +one as I am, you will injure yourselves more than you will injure me. +Nothing will injure me, not Meletus nor yet Anytus—they cannot, for a +bad man is not permitted to injure a better than himself. I do not deny +that Anytus may, perhaps, kill him, or drive him into exile, or deprive +him of civil rights; and he may imagine, and others may imagine, that +he is inflicting a great injury upon him: but there I do not agree. For +the evil of doing as he is doing—the evil of unjustly taking away the +life of another—is greater far. + +And now, Athenians, I am not going to argue for my own sake, as you may +think, but for yours, that you may not sin against the God by +condemning me, who am his gift to you. For if you kill me you will not +easily find a successor to me, who, if I may use such a ludicrous +figure of speech, am a sort of gadfly, given to the state by God; and +the state is a great and noble steed who is tardy in his motions owing +to his very size, and requires to be stirred into life. I am that +gadfly which God has attached to the state, and all day long and in all +places am always fastening upon you, arousing and persuading and +reproaching you. You will not easily find another like me, and +therefore I would advise you to spare me. I dare say that you may feel +out of temper (like a person who is suddenly awakened from sleep), and +you think that you might easily strike me dead as Anytus advises, and +then you would sleep on for the remainder of your lives, unless God in +his care of you sent you another gadfly. When I say that I am given to +you by God, the proof of my mission is this:—if I had been like other +men, I should not have neglected all my own concerns or patiently seen +the neglect of them during all these years, and have been doing yours, +coming to you individually like a father or elder brother, exhorting +you to regard virtue; such conduct, I say, would be unlike human +nature. If I had gained anything, or if my exhortations had been paid, +there would have been some sense in my doing so; but now, as you will +perceive, not even the impudence of my accusers dares to say that I +have ever exacted or sought pay of any one; of that they have no +witness. And I have a sufficient witness to the truth of what I say—my +poverty. + +Some one may wonder why I go about in private giving advice and busying +myself with the concerns of others, but do not venture to come forward +in public and advise the state. I will tell you why. You have heard me +speak at sundry times and in divers places of an oracle or sign which +comes to me, and is the divinity which Meletus ridicules in the +indictment. This sign, which is a kind of voice, first began to come to +me when I was a child; it always forbids but never commands me to do +anything which I am going to do. This is what deters me from being a +politician. And rightly, as I think. For I am certain, O men of Athens, +that if I had engaged in politics, I should have perished long ago, and +done no good either to you or to myself. And do not be offended at my +telling you the truth: for the truth is, that no man who goes to war +with you or any other multitude, honestly striving against the many +lawless and unrighteous deeds which are done in a state, will save his +life; he who will fight for the right, if he would live even for a +brief space, must have a private station and not a public one. + +I can give you convincing evidence of what I say, not words only, but +what you value far more—actions. Let me relate to you a passage of my +own life which will prove to you that I should never have yielded to +injustice from any fear of death, and that “as I should have refused to +yield” I must have died at once. I will tell you a tale of the courts, +not very interesting perhaps, but nevertheless true. The only office of +state which I ever held, O men of Athens, was that of senator: the +tribe Antiochis, which is my tribe, had the presidency at the trial of +the generals who had not taken up the bodies of the slain after the +battle of Arginusae; and you proposed to try them in a body, contrary +to law, as you all thought afterwards; but at the time I was the only +one of the Prytanes who was opposed to the illegality, and I gave my +vote against you; and when the orators threatened to impeach and arrest +me, and you called and shouted, I made up my mind that I would run the +risk, having law and justice with me, rather than take part in your +injustice because I feared imprisonment and death. This happened in the +days of the democracy. But when the oligarchy of the Thirty was in +power, they sent for me and four others into the rotunda, and bade us +bring Leon the Salaminian from Salamis, as they wanted to put him to +death. This was a specimen of the sort of commands which they were +always giving with the view of implicating as many as possible in their +crimes; and then I showed, not in word only but in deed, that, if I may +be allowed to use such an expression, I cared not a straw for death, +and that my great and only care was lest I should do an unrighteous or +unholy thing. For the strong arm of that oppressive power did not +frighten me into doing wrong; and when we came out of the rotunda the +other four went to Salamis and fetched Leon, but I went quietly home. +For which I might have lost my life, had not the power of the Thirty +shortly afterwards come to an end. And many will witness to my words. + +Now do you really imagine that I could have survived all these years, +if I had led a public life, supposing that like a good man I had always +maintained the right and had made justice, as I ought, the first thing? +No indeed, men of Athens, neither I nor any other man. But I have been +always the same in all my actions, public as well as private, and never +have I yielded any base compliance to those who are slanderously termed +my disciples, or to any other. Not that I have any regular disciples. +But if any one likes to come and hear me while I am pursuing my +mission, whether he be young or old, he is not excluded. Nor do I +converse only with those who pay; but any one, whether he be rich or +poor, may ask and answer me and listen to my words; and whether he +turns out to be a bad man or a good one, neither result can be justly +imputed to me; for I never taught or professed to teach him anything. +And if any one says that he has ever learned or heard anything from me +in private which all the world has not heard, let me tell you that he +is lying. + +But I shall be asked, Why do people delight in continually conversing +with you? I have told you already, Athenians, the whole truth about +this matter: they like to hear the cross-examination of the pretenders +to wisdom; there is amusement in it. Now this duty of cross-examining +other men has been imposed upon me by God; and has been signified to me +by oracles, visions, and in every way in which the will of divine power +was ever intimated to any one. This is true, O Athenians, or, if not +true, would be soon refuted. If I am or have been corrupting the youth, +those of them who are now grown up and have become sensible that I gave +them bad advice in the days of their youth should come forward as +accusers, and take their revenge; or if they do not like to come +themselves, some of their relatives, fathers, brothers, or other +kinsmen, should say what evil their families have suffered at my hands. +Now is their time. Many of them I see in the court. There is Crito, who +is of the same age and of the same deme with myself, and there is +Critobulus his son, whom I also see. Then again there is Lysanias of +Sphettus, who is the father of Aeschines—he is present; and also there +is Antiphon of Cephisus, who is the father of Epigenes; and there are +the brothers of several who have associated with me. There is +Nicostratus the son of Theosdotides, and the brother of Theodotus (now +Theodotus himself is dead, and therefore he, at any rate, will not seek +to stop him); and there is Paralus the son of Demodocus, who had a +brother Theages; and Adeimantus the son of Ariston, whose brother Plato +is present; and Aeantodorus, who is the brother of Apollodorus, whom I +also see. I might mention a great many others, some of whom Meletus +should have produced as witnesses in the course of his speech; and let +him still produce them, if he has forgotten—I will make way for him. +And let him say, if he has any testimony of the sort which he can +produce. Nay, Athenians, the very opposite is the truth. For all these +are ready to witness on behalf of the corrupter, of the injurer of +their kindred, as Meletus and Anytus call me; not the corrupted youth +only—there might have been a motive for that—but their uncorrupted +elder relatives. Why should they too support me with their testimony? +Why, indeed, except for the sake of truth and justice, and because they +know that I am speaking the truth, and that Meletus is a liar. + +Well, Athenians, this and the like of this is all the defence which I +have to offer. Yet a word more. Perhaps there may be some one who is +offended at me, when he calls to mind how he himself on a similar, or +even a less serious occasion, prayed and entreated the judges with many +tears, and how he produced his children in court, which was a moving +spectacle, together with a host of relations and friends; whereas I, +who am probably in danger of my life, will do none of these things. The +contrast may occur to his mind, and he may be set against me, and vote +in anger because he is displeased at me on this account. Now if there +be such a person among you,—mind, I do not say that there is,—to him I +may fairly reply: My friend, I am a man, and like other men, a creature +of flesh and blood, and not “of wood or stone,” as Homer says; and I +have a family, yes, and sons, O Athenians, three in number, one almost +a man, and two others who are still young; and yet I will not bring any +of them hither in order to petition you for an acquittal. And why not? +Not from any self-assertion or want of respect for you. Whether I am or +am not afraid of death is another question, of which I will not now +speak. But, having regard to public opinion, I feel that such conduct +would be discreditable to myself, and to you, and to the whole state. +One who has reached my years, and who has a name for wisdom, ought not +to demean himself. Whether this opinion of me be deserved or not, at +any rate the world has decided that Socrates is in some way superior to +other men. And if those among you who are said to be superior in wisdom +and courage, and any other virtue, demean themselves in this way, how +shameful is their conduct! I have seen men of reputation, when they +have been condemned, behaving in the strangest manner: they seemed to +fancy that they were going to suffer something dreadful if they died, +and that they could be immortal if you only allowed them to live; and I +think that such are a dishonour to the state, and that any stranger +coming in would have said of them that the most eminent men of Athens, +to whom the Athenians themselves give honour and command, are no better +than women. And I say that these things ought not to be done by those +of us who have a reputation; and if they are done, you ought not to +permit them; you ought rather to show that you are far more disposed to +condemn the man who gets up a doleful scene and makes the city +ridiculous, than him who holds his peace. + +But, setting aside the question of public opinion, there seems to be +something wrong in asking a favour of a judge, and thus procuring an +acquittal, instead of informing and convincing him. For his duty is, +not to make a present of justice, but to give judgment; and he has +sworn that he will judge according to the laws, and not according to +his own good pleasure; and we ought not to encourage you, nor should +you allow yourselves to be encouraged, in this habit of perjury—there +can be no piety in that. Do not then require me to do what I consider +dishonourable and impious and wrong, especially now, when I am being +tried for impiety on the indictment of Meletus. For if, O men of +Athens, by force of persuasion and entreaty I could overpower your +oaths, then I should be teaching you to believe that there are no gods, +and in defending should simply convict myself of the charge of not +believing in them. But that is not so—far otherwise. For I do believe +that there are gods, and in a sense higher than that in which any of my +accusers believe in them. And to you and to God I commit my cause, to +be determined by you as is best for you and me. + + +There are many reasons why I am not grieved, O men of Athens, at the +vote of condemnation. I expected it, and am only surprised that the +votes are so nearly equal; for I had thought that the majority against +me would have been far larger; but now, had thirty votes gone over to +the other side, I should have been acquitted. And I may say, I think, +that I have escaped Meletus. I may say more; for without the assistance +of Anytus and Lycon, any one may see that he would not have had a fifth +part of the votes, as the law requires, in which case he would have +incurred a fine of a thousand drachmae. + +And so he proposes death as the penalty. And what shall I propose on my +part, O men of Athens? Clearly that which is my due. And what is my +due? What return shall be made to the man who has never had the wit to +be idle during his whole life; but has been careless of what the many +care for—wealth, and family interests, and military offices, and +speaking in the assembly, and magistracies, and plots, and parties. +Reflecting that I was really too honest a man to be a politician and +live, I did not go where I could do no good to you or to myself; but +where I could do the greatest good privately to every one of you, +thither I went, and sought to persuade every man among you that he must +look to himself, and seek virtue and wisdom before he looks to his +private interests, and look to the state before he looks to the +interests of the state; and that this should be the order which he +observes in all his actions. What shall be done to such an one? +Doubtless some good thing, O men of Athens, if he has his reward; and +the good should be of a kind suitable to him. What would be a reward +suitable to a poor man who is your benefactor, and who desires leisure +that he may instruct you? There can be no reward so fitting as +maintenance in the Prytaneum, O men of Athens, a reward which he +deserves far more than the citizen who has won the prize at Olympia in +the horse or chariot race, whether the chariots were drawn by two +horses or by many. For I am in want, and he has enough; and he only +gives you the appearance of happiness, and I give you the reality. And +if I am to estimate the penalty fairly, I should say that maintenance +in the Prytaneum is the just return. + +Perhaps you think that I am braving you in what I am saying now, as in +what I said before about the tears and prayers. But this is not so. I +speak rather because I am convinced that I never intentionally wronged +any one, although I cannot convince you—the time has been too short; if +there were a law at Athens, as there is in other cities, that a capital +cause should not be decided in one day, then I believe that I should +have convinced you. But I cannot in a moment refute great slanders; +and, as I am convinced that I never wronged another, I will assuredly +not wrong myself. I will not say of myself that I deserve any evil, or +propose any penalty. Why should I? because I am afraid of the penalty +of death which Meletus proposes? When I do not know whether death is a +good or an evil, why should I propose a penalty which would certainly +be an evil? Shall I say imprisonment? And why should I live in prison, +and be the slave of the magistrates of the year—of the Eleven? Or shall +the penalty be a fine, and imprisonment until the fine is paid? There +is the same objection. I should have to lie in prison, for money I have +none, and cannot pay. And if I say exile (and this may possibly be the +penalty which you will affix), I must indeed be blinded by the love of +life, if I am so irrational as to expect that when you, who are my own +citizens, cannot endure my discourses and words, and have found them so +grievous and odious that you will have no more of them, others are +likely to endure me. No indeed, men of Athens, that is not very likely. +And what a life should I lead, at my age, wandering from city to city, +ever changing my place of exile, and always being driven out! For I am +quite sure that wherever I go, there, as here, the young men will flock +to me; and if I drive them away, their elders will drive me out at +their request; and if I let them come, their fathers and friends will +drive me out for their sakes. + +Some one will say: Yes, Socrates, but cannot you hold your tongue, and +then you may go into a foreign city, and no one will interfere with +you? Now I have great difficulty in making you understand my answer to +this. For if I tell you that to do as you say would be a disobedience +to the God, and therefore that I cannot hold my tongue, you will not +believe that I am serious; and if I say again that daily to discourse +about virtue, and of those other things about which you hear me +examining myself and others, is the greatest good of man, and that the +unexamined life is not worth living, you are still less likely to +believe me. Yet I say what is true, although a thing of which it is +hard for me to persuade you. Also, I have never been accustomed to +think that I deserve to suffer any harm. Had I money I might have +estimated the offence at what I was able to pay, and not have been much +the worse. But I have none, and therefore I must ask you to proportion +the fine to my means. Well, perhaps I could afford a mina, and +therefore I propose that penalty: Plato, Crito, Critobulus, and +Apollodorus, my friends here, bid me say thirty minæ, and they will be +the sureties. Let thirty minæ be the penalty; for which sum they will +be ample security to you. + + +Not much time will be gained, O Athenians, in return for the evil name +which you will get from the detractors of the city, who will say that +you killed Socrates, a wise man; for they will call me wise, even +although I am not wise, when they want to reproach you. If you had +waited a little while, your desire would have been fulfilled in the +course of nature. For I am far advanced in years, as you may perceive, +and not far from death. I am speaking now not to all of you, but only +to those who have condemned me to death. And I have another thing to +say to them: you think that I was convicted because I had no words of +the sort which would have procured my acquittal—I mean, if I had +thought fit to leave nothing undone or unsaid. Not so; the deficiency +which led to my conviction was not of words—certainly not. But I had +not the boldness or impudence or inclination to address you as you +would have liked me to do, weeping and wailing and lamenting, and +saying and doing many things which you have been accustomed to hear +from others, and which, as I maintain, are unworthy of me. I thought at +the time that I ought not to do anything common or mean when in danger: +nor do I now repent of the style of my defence; I would rather die +having spoken after my manner, than speak in your manner and live. For +neither in war nor yet at law ought I or any man to use every way of +escaping death. Often in battle there can be no doubt that if a man +will throw away his arms, and fall on his knees before his pursuers, he +may escape death; and in other dangers there are other ways of escaping +death, if a man is willing to say and do anything. The difficulty, my +friends, is not to avoid death, but to avoid unrighteousness; for that +runs faster than death. I am old and move slowly, and the slower runner +has overtaken me, and my accusers are keen and quick, and the faster +runner, who is unrighteousness, has overtaken them. And now I depart +hence condemned by you to suffer the penalty of death,—they too go +their ways condemned by the truth to suffer the penalty of villainy and +wrong; and I must abide by my award—let them abide by theirs. I suppose +that these things may be regarded as fated,—and I think that they are +well. + +And now, O men who have condemned me, I would fain prophesy to you; for +I am about to die, and in the hour of death men are gifted with +prophetic power. And I prophesy to you who are my murderers, that +immediately after my departure punishment far heavier than you have +inflicted on me will surely await you. Me you have killed because you +wanted to escape the accuser, and not to give an account of your lives. +But that will not be as you suppose: far otherwise. For I say that +there will be more accusers of you than there are now; accusers whom +hitherto I have restrained: and as they are younger they will be more +inconsiderate with you, and you will be more offended at them. If you +think that by killing men you can prevent some one from censuring your +evil lives, you are mistaken; that is not a way of escape which is +either possible or honourable; the easiest and the noblest way is not +to be disabling others, but to be improving yourselves. This is the +prophecy which I utter before my departure to the judges who have +condemned me. + +Friends, who would have acquitted me, I would like also to talk with +you about the thing which has come to pass, while the magistrates are +busy, and before I go to the place at which I must die. Stay then a +little, for we may as well talk with one another while there is time. +You are my friends, and I should like to show you the meaning of this +event which has happened to me. O my judges—for you I may truly call +judges—I should like to tell you of a wonderful circumstance. Hitherto +the divine faculty of which the internal oracle is the source has +constantly been in the habit of opposing me even about trifles, if I +was going to make a slip or error in any matter; and now as you see +there has come upon me that which may be thought, and is generally +believed to be, the last and worst evil. But the oracle made no sign of +opposition, either when I was leaving my house in the morning, or when +I was on my way to the court, or while I was speaking, at anything +which I was going to say; and yet I have often been stopped in the +middle of a speech, but now in nothing I either said or did touching +the matter in hand has the oracle opposed me. What do I take to be the +explanation of this silence? I will tell you. It is an intimation that +what has happened to me is a good, and that those of us who think that +death is an evil are in error. For the customary sign would surely have +opposed me had I been going to evil and not to good. + +Let us reflect in another way, and we shall see that there is great +reason to hope that death is a good; for one of two things—either death +is a state of nothingness and utter unconsciousness, or, as men say, +there is a change and migration of the soul from this world to another. +Now if you suppose that there is no consciousness, but a sleep like the +sleep of him who is undisturbed even by dreams, death will be an +unspeakable gain. For if a person were to select the night in which his +sleep was undisturbed even by dreams, and were to compare with this the +other days and nights of his life, and then were to tell us how many +days and nights he had passed in the course of his life better and more +pleasantly than this one, I think that any man, I will not say a +private man, but even the great king will not find many such days or +nights, when compared with the others. Now if death be of such a +nature, I say that to die is gain; for eternity is then only a single +night. But if death is the journey to another place, and there, as men +say, all the dead abide, what good, O my friends and judges, can be +greater than this? If indeed when the pilgrim arrives in the world +below, he is delivered from the professors of justice in this world, +and finds the true judges who are said to give judgment there, Minos +and Rhadamanthus and Aeacus and Triptolemus, and other sons of God who +were righteous in their own life, that pilgrimage will be worth making. +What would not a man give if he might converse with Orpheus and Musaeus +and Hesiod and Homer? Nay, if this be true, let me die again and again. +I myself, too, shall have a wonderful interest in there meeting and +conversing with Palamedes, and Ajax the son of Telamon, and any other +ancient hero who has suffered death through an unjust judgment; and +there will be no small pleasure, as I think, in comparing my own +sufferings with theirs. Above all, I shall then be able to continue my +search into true and false knowledge; as in this world, so also in the +next; and I shall find out who is wise, and who pretends to be wise, +and is not. What would not a man give, O judges, to be able to examine +the leader of the great Trojan expedition; or Odysseus or Sisyphus, or +numberless others, men and women too! What infinite delight would there +be in conversing with them and asking them questions! In another world +they do not put a man to death for asking questions: assuredly not. For +besides being happier than we are, they will be immortal, if what is +said is true. + +Wherefore, O judges, be of good cheer about death, and know of a +certainty, that no evil can happen to a good man, either in life or +after death. He and his are not neglected by the gods; nor has my own +approaching end happened by mere chance. But I see clearly that the +time had arrived when it was better for me to die and be released from +trouble; wherefore the oracle gave no sign. For which reason, also, I +am not angry with my condemners, or with my accusers; they have done me +no harm, although they did not mean to do me any good; and for this I +may gently blame them. + +Still I have a favour to ask of them. When my sons are grown up, I +would ask you, O my friends, to punish them; and I would have you +trouble them, as I have troubled you, if they seem to care about +riches, or anything, more than about virtue; or if they pretend to be +something when they are really nothing,—then reprove them, as I have +reproved you, for not caring about that for which they ought to care, +and thinking that they are something when they are really nothing. And +if you do this, both I and my sons will have received justice at your +hands. + +The hour of departure has arrived, and we go our ways—I to die, and you +to live. 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