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+The Project Gutenberg EBook of Thoughts on Religion, by George John Romanes
+
+This eBook is for the use of anyone anywhere at no cost and with
+almost no restrictions whatsoever.  You may copy it, give it away or
+re-use it under the terms of the Project Gutenberg License included
+with this eBook or online at www.gutenberg.org
+
+
+Title: Thoughts on Religion
+
+Author: George John Romanes
+
+Editor: Charles Gore
+
+Release Date: October 25, 2005 [EBook #16942]
+
+Language: English
+
+Character set encoding: ISO-8859-1
+
+*** START OF THIS PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK THOUGHTS ON RELIGION ***
+
+
+
+
+Produced by Marilynda Fraser-Cunliffe, Martin Pettit and
+the Online Distributed Proofreading Team at
+https://www.pgdp.net
+
+
+
+
+
+
+_Thoughts on Religion_
+
+BY THE LATE
+
+GEORGE JOHN ROMANES
+M.A., LL.D., F.R.S.
+
+EDITED BY
+
+CHARLES GORE, D.D.
+BISHOP OF WORCESTER
+
+Twelfth Impression
+
+LONGMANS, GREEN, AND CO.
+39 PATERNOSTER ROW, LONDON
+AND BOMBAY
+
+1904
+
+
+
+
+CONTENTS
+
+                                                        PAGE
+
+EDITOR'S PREFACE                                           5
+
+
+PART I.
+
+THE INFLUENCE OF SCIENCE UPON RELIGION.
+
+ESSAY I                                                   37
+
+ESSAY II                                                  56
+
+
+PART II.
+
+NOTES FOR A WORK ON A CANDID EXAMINATION OF RELIGION.
+
+INTRODUCTORY NOTE BY THE EDITOR                           91
+
+§ 1. INTRODUCTORY                                         98
+
+§ 2. DEFINITION OF TERMS AND PURPOSE OF THIS TREATISE    104
+
+§ 3. CAUSALITY                                           116
+
+§ 4. FAITH                                               131
+
+§ 5. FAITH IN CHRISTIANITY                               154
+
+CONCLUDING NOTE BY THE EDITOR                            184
+
+
+
+
+PUBLISHER'S NOTE
+
+
+The present edition of Romanes' _Thoughts on Religion_ is issued in
+response to a request which has been made with some frequency of late
+for very cheap reprints of standard religious and theological works.
+
+39 PATERNOSTER ROW,
+     LONDON,
+     _January, 1904._
+
+
+
+
+EDITOR'S PREFACE
+
+
+The late Mr. George John Romanes--the author within the last few years
+of _Darwin and After Darwin_, and of the _Examination of
+Weismannism_--occupied a distinguished place in contemporary biology.
+But his mind was also continuously and increasingly active on the
+problems of metaphysics and theology. And at his death in the early
+summer of this year (1894), he left among his papers some notes, made
+mostly in the previous winter, for a work which he was intending to
+write on the fundamental questions of religion. He had desired that
+these notes should be given to me and that I should do with them as I
+thought best. His literary executors accordingly handed them over to me,
+in company with some unpublished essays, two of which form the first
+part of the present volume.
+
+After reading the notes myself, and obtaining the judgement of others in
+whom I feel confidence upon them, I have no hesitation either in
+publishing by far the greater part of them, or in publishing them with
+the author's name in spite of the fact that the book as originally
+projected was to have been anonymous. From the few words which George
+Romanes said to me on the subject, I have no doubt that he realized that
+the notes if published after his death must be published with his name.
+
+I have said that after reading these notes I feel no doubt that they
+ought to be published. They claim it both by their intrinsic value and
+by the light they throw on the religious thought of a scientific man who
+was not only remarkably able and clear-headed, but also many-sided, as
+few men are, in his capacities, and singularly candid and open-hearted.
+To all these qualities the notes which are now offered to the public
+will bear unmistakeable witness.
+
+With more hesitation it has been decided to print also the unpublished
+essays already referred to. These, as representing an earlier stage of
+thought than is represented in the notes, naturally appear first.
+
+Both Essays and Notes however represent the same tendency of a mind from
+a position of unbelief in the Christian Revelation toward one of belief
+in it. They represent, I say, a tendency of one 'seeking after God if
+haply he might feel after Him and find Him,' and not a position of
+settled orthodoxy. Even the Notes contain in fact many things which
+could not come from a settled believer. This being so it is natural that
+I should say a word as to the way in which I have understood my function
+as an editor. I have decided the question of publishing each Note solely
+by the consideration whether or no it was sufficiently finished to be
+intelligible. I have rigidly excluded any question of my own agreement
+or disagreement with it. In the case of one Note in particular, I doubt
+whether I should have published it, had it not been that my decided
+disagreement with its contents made me fear that I might be prejudiced
+in withholding it.
+
+The Notes, with the papers which precede them, will, I think, be better
+understood if I give some preliminary account of their antecedents, that
+is of Romanes' previous publications on the subject of religion.
+
+In 1873 an essay of George Romanes gained the Burney Prize at Cambridge,
+the subject being _Christian Prayer considered in relation to the belief
+that the Almighty governs the world by general laws_. This was published
+in 1874, with an appendix on _The Physical Efficacy of Prayer_. In this
+essay, written when he was twenty-five years old, Romanes shows the
+characteristic qualities of his mind and style already developed. The
+sympathy with the scientific point of view is there, as might be
+expected perhaps in a Cambridge 'Scholar in Natural Science': the
+logical acumen and love of exact distinctions is there: there too the
+natural piety and spiritual appreciation of the nature of Christian
+prayer--a piety and appreciation which later intellectual habits of
+thought could never eradicate. The essay, as judged by the standard of
+prize compositions, is of remarkable ability, and strictly proceeds
+within the limits of the thesis. On the one side, for the purpose of the
+argument, the existence of a Personal God is assumed[1], and also the
+reality of the Christian Revelation which assures us that we have reason
+to expect real answers, even though conditionally and within restricted
+limits, to prayers for _physical_ goods[2]. On the other side, there is
+taken for granted the belief that general laws pervade the observable
+domain of physical nature. Then the question is considered--how is the
+physical efficacy of prayer which the Christian accepts on the authority
+of revelation compatible with the scientifically known fact that God
+governs the world by general laws? The answer is mainly found in
+emphasizing the limited sphere within which scientific inquiry can be
+conducted and scientific knowledge can obtain. Special divine acts of
+response to prayer, even in the physical sphere, _may_ occur--force
+_may_ be even originated in response to prayer--and still not produce
+any phenomenon such as science must take cognizance of and regard as
+miraculous or contrary to the known order.
+
+On one occasion the Notes refer back to this essay[3], and more
+frequently, as we shall have occasion to notice, they reproduce thoughts
+which had already been expressed in the earlier work but had been
+obscured or repudiated in the interval. I have no grounds for knowing
+whether in the main Romanes remained satisfied with the reasoning and
+conclusion of his earliest essay, granted the theistic hypothesis on
+which it rests[4]. But this hypothesis itself, very shortly after
+publishing this essay, he was led to repudiate. In other words, his mind
+moved rapidly and sharply into a position of reasoned scepticism about
+the existence of God at all. The Burney Essay was published in 1874.
+Already in 1876 at least he had written an anonymous work with a wholly
+sceptical conclusion, entitled 'A Candid Examination of Theism' by
+_Physicus_[5]. As the Notes were written with direct reference to this
+work, some detailed account of its argument seems necessary; and this is
+to be found in the last chapter of the work itself, where the author
+summarizes his arguments and draws his conclusions. I venture therefore
+to reproduce this chapter at length[6].
+
+
+'§ 1. Our analysis is now at an end, and a very few words will here
+suffice to convey an epitomized recollection of the numerous facts and
+conclusions which we have found it necessary to contemplate. We first
+disposed of the conspicuously absurd supposition that the origin of
+things, or the mystery of existence [i.e. the fact that anything exists
+at all], admits of being explained by the theory of Theism in any
+further degree than by the theory of Atheism. Next it was shown that the
+argument "Our heart requires a God" is invalid, seeing that such a
+subjective necessity, even if made out, could not be sufficient to
+prove--or even to render probable--an objective existence. And with
+regard to the further argument that the fact of our theistic aspirations
+points to God as to their explanatory cause, it became necessary to
+observe that the argument could only be admissible after the possibility
+of the operation of natural causes [in the production of our theistic
+aspirations] had been excluded. Similarly the argument from the supposed
+intuitive necessity of individual thought [i.e. the alleged fact that
+men find it impossible to rid themselves of the persuasion that God
+exists] was found to be untenable, first, because, even if the supposed
+necessity were a real one, it would only possess an individual
+applicability; and second, that, as a matter of fact, it is extremely
+improbable that the supposed necessity is a real necessity even for the
+individual who asserts it, while it is absolutely certain that it is not
+such to the vast majority of the race. The argument from the general
+consent of mankind, being so obviously fallacious both as to facts and
+principles, was passed over without comment; while the argument from a
+first cause was found to involve a logical suicide. Lastly, the argument
+that, as human volition is a cause in nature, therefore all causation is
+probably volitional in character, was shown to consist in a stretch of
+inference so outrageous that the argument had to be pronounced
+worthless.
+
+'§ 2. Proceeding next to examine the less superficial arguments in
+favour of Theism, it was first shown that the syllogism, All known minds
+are caused by an unknown mind; our mind is a known mind; therefore our
+mind is caused by an unknown mind,--is a syllogism that is inadmissible
+for two reasons. In the first place, it does not account for mind (in
+the abstract) to refer it to a prior mind for its origin; and therefore,
+although the hypothesis, if admitted, would be _an_ explanation of
+_known_ mind, it is useless as an argument for the existence of the
+unknown mind, the assumption of which forms the basis of that
+explanation. Again, in the next place, if it be said that mind is so far
+an entity _sui generis_ that it must be either self-existing or caused
+by another mind, there is no assignable warrant for the assertion. And
+this is the second objection to the above syllogism; for anything within
+the whole range of the possible may, for aught that we can tell, be
+competent to produce a self-conscious intelligence. Thus an objector to
+the above syllogism need not hold any theory of things at all; but even
+as opposed to the definite theory of materialism, the above syllogism
+has not so valid an argumentative basis to stand upon. We know that what
+we call matter and force are to all appearance eternal, while we have no
+corresponding evidence of a mind that is even apparently eternal.
+Further, within experience mind is invariably associated with highly
+differentiated collocations of matter and distributions of force, and
+many facts go to prove, and none to negative, the conclusion that the
+grade of intelligence invariably depends upon, or at least is associated
+with, a corresponding grade of cerebral development. There is thus both
+a qualitative and a quantitative relation between intelligence and
+cerebral organisation. And if it is said that matter and motion cannot
+produce consciousness because it is inconceivable that they should, we
+have seen at some length that this is no conclusive consideration as
+applied to a subject of a confessedly transcendental nature, and that in
+the present case it is particularly inconclusive, because, as it is
+speculatively certain that the substance of mind must be unknowable, it
+seems _à priori_ probable that, whatever is the cause of the unknowable
+reality, this cause should be more difficult to render into thought in
+that relation than would some other hypothetical substance which is
+imagined as more akin to mind. And if it is said that the _more_
+conceivable cause is the _more_ probable cause, we have seen that it is
+in this case impossible to estimate the validity of the remark. Lastly,
+the statement that the cause must contain actually all that its effects
+can contain, was seen to be inadmissible in logic and contradicted by
+everyday experience; while the argument from the supposed freedom of the
+will and the existence of the moral sense was negatived both deductively
+by the theory of evolution, and inductively by the doctrine of
+utilitarianism.' The theory of the freedom of the will is indeed at this
+stage of thought utterly untenable[7]; the evidence is overwhelming that
+the moral sense is the result of a purely natural evolution[8], and this
+result, arrived at on general grounds, is confirmed with irresistible
+force by the account of our human conscience which is supplied by the
+theory of utilitarianism, a theory based on the widest and most
+unexceptionable of inductions[9]. 'On the whole, then, with regard to
+the argument from the existence of the human mind, we were compelled to
+decide that it is destitute of any assignable weight, there being
+nothing more to lead to the conclusion that our mind has been caused by
+another mind, than to the conclusion that it has been caused by anything
+else whatsoever.
+
+'§ 3. With regard to the argument from Design, it was observed that
+Mill's presentation of it [in his _Essay on Theism_] is merely a
+resuscitation of the argument as presented by Paley, Bell, and Chalmers.
+And indeed we saw that the first-named writer treated this whole subject
+with a feebleness and inaccuracy very surprising in him; for while he
+has failed to assign anything like due weight to the inductive evidence
+of organic evolution, he did not hesitate to rush into a supernatural
+explanation of biological phenomena. Moreover, he has failed signally in
+his _analysis_ of the Design argument, seeing that, in common with all
+previous writers, he failed to observe that it is utterly impossible for
+us to know the relations in which the supposed Designer stands to the
+Designed,--much less to argue from the fact that the Supreme Mind, even
+supposing it to exist, caused the observable products by any particular
+intellectual _process_. In other words, all advocates of the Design
+argument have failed to perceive that, even if we grant nature to be due
+to a creating Mind, still we have no shadow of a right to conclude that
+this Mind can only have exerted its creative power by means of such and
+such cogitative operations. How absurd, therefore, must it be to raise
+the supposed evidence of such cogitative operations into evidences of
+the existence of a creating Mind! If a theist retorts that it is, after
+all, of very little importance whether or not we are able to divine the
+_methods_ of creation, so long as the _facts_ are there to attest that,
+_in some way or other_, the observable phenomena of nature must be due
+to Intelligence of some kind as their ultimate cause, then I am the
+first to endorse this remark. It has always appeared to me one of the
+most unaccountable things in the history of speculation that so many
+competent writers can have insisted upon _Design_ as an argument for
+Theism, when they must all have known perfectly well that they have no
+means of ascertaining the subjective psychology of that Supreme Mind
+whose existence the argument is adduced to demonstrate. The truth is,
+that the argument from teleology must, and can only, rest upon the
+observable _facts_ of nature, without reference to the intellectual
+_processes_ by which these facts may be supposed to have been
+accomplished. But, looking to the "present state of our knowledge," this
+is merely to change the teleological argument in its gross Paleyian
+form, into the argument from the ubiquitous operation of general laws.'
+
+'§ 4. This argument was thus[10] stated in contrast with the argument
+from design. 'The argument from design says, there must be a God,
+because such and such an organic structure must have been due to such
+and such an intellectual _process_. The argument from general laws says,
+There must be a God, because such and such an organic structure must _in
+some way or other have been ultimately due to_ intelligence.' Every
+structure exhibits with more or less of complexity the principle of
+order; it is related to all other things in a universal order. This
+universality of order renders irrational the hypothesis of chance in
+accounting for the universe. 'Let us think of the supreme causality as
+we may, the fact remains that from it there emanates a directive
+influence of uninterrupted consistency, on a scale of stupendous
+magnitude and exact precision worthy of our highest conceptions of
+deity[11].' The argument was developed in the words of Professor Baden
+Powell. 'That which requires reason and thought to understand must be
+itself thought and reason. That which mind alone can investigate or
+express must be itself mind. And if the highest conception attained is
+but partial, then the mind and reason studied is greater than the mind
+and reason of the student. If the more it is studied the more vast and
+complex is the necessary connection in reason disclosed, then the more
+evident is the vast extent and compass of the reason thus partially
+manifested and its reality _as existing in the immutably connected order
+of objects examined_, independently of the mind of the investigator.'
+This argument from the universal _Kosmos_ has the advantage of being
+wholly independent of the method by which things came to be what they
+are. It is unaffected by the acceptance of evolution. Till quite
+recently it seemed irrefutable[12].
+
+'But nevertheless we are constrained to acknowledge that its apparent
+power dwindles to nothing in view of the indisputable fact that, if
+force and matter have been eternal, all and every natural law must have
+resulted by way of necessary consequence.... It does not admit of one
+moment's questioning that it is as certainly true that all the exquisite
+beauty and melodious harmony of nature follows necessarily as inevitably
+from the persistence of force and the primary qualities of matter as it
+is certainly true that force is persistent or that matter is extended or
+impenetrable[13].... It will be remembered that I dwelt at considerable
+length and with much earnestness upon this truth, not only because of
+its enormous importance in its bearing upon our subject, but also
+because no one has hitherto considered it in that relation.' It was also
+pointed out that the coherence and correspondence of the macrocosm of
+the universe with the microcosm of the human mind can be accounted for
+by the fact that the human mind is only one of the products of general
+evolution, its subjective relations necessarily reflecting those
+external relations of which they themselves are the product[14].
+
+'§ 5. The next step, however, was to mitigate the severity of the
+conclusion that was liable to be formed upon the utter and hopeless
+collapse of all the possible arguments in favour of Theism. Having fully
+demonstrated that there is no shadow of a positive argument in support
+of the theistic theory, there arose the danger that some persons might
+erroneously conclude that for this reason the theistic theory must be
+untrue. It therefore became necessary to point out, that although, as
+far as we can see, nature does not require an Intelligent Cause to
+account for any of her phenomena, yet it is possible that, if we could
+see farther, we should see that nature could not be what she is unless
+she had owed her existence to an Intelligent Cause. Or, in other words,
+the probability there is that an Intelligent Cause is unnecessary to
+explain any of the phenomena of nature, is only equal to the probability
+there is that the doctrine of the persistence of force is everywhere and
+eternally true.
+
+'As a final step in our analysis, therefore, we altogether quitted the
+region of experience, and ignoring even the very foundations of science,
+and so all the most certain of relative truths, we carried the
+discussion into the transcendental region of purely formal
+considerations. And here we laid down the canon, "that the value of any
+probability, in its last analysis, is determined by the number, the
+importance, and the definiteness of the relations known, as compared
+with those of the relations unknown;" and, consequently, that in cases
+where the unknown relations are more numerous, more important, or more
+indefinite than are the known relations, the value of our inference
+varies inversely as the difference in these respects between the
+relations compared. From which canon it followed, that as the problem of
+Theism is the most ultimate of all problems, and so contains in its
+unknown relations all that is to man unknown and unknowable, these
+relations must be pronounced the most indefinite of all relations that
+it is possible for man to contemplate; and, consequently, that although
+we have here the entire range of experience from which to argue, we are
+unable to estimate the real value of any argument whatsoever. The
+unknown relations in our attempted induction being wholly indefinite,
+both in respect of their number and importance, as compared with the
+known relations, it is impossible for us to determine any definite
+probability either for or against the being of a God. Therefore,
+although it is true that, so far as human science can penetrate or human
+thought infer, we can perceive no evidence of God, yet we have no right
+on this account to conclude that there is no God. The probability,
+therefore, that nature is devoid of Deity, while it is of the strongest
+kind if regarded scientifically--amounting, in fact, to a scientific
+demonstration,--is nevertheless wholly worthless if regarded logically.
+Although it is as true as is the fundamental basis of all science and of
+all experience that, if there is a God, His existence, considered as a
+cause of the universe, is superfluous, it may nevertheless be true that,
+if there had never been a God, the universe could never have existed.
+
+'Hence these formal considerations proved conclusively that, no matter
+how great the probability of Atheism might appear to be in a relative
+sense, we have no means of estimating such probability in an absolute
+sense. From which position there emerged the possibility of another
+argument in favour of Theism--or rather let us say, of a reappearance of
+the teleological argument in another form. For it may be said, seeing
+that these formal considerations exclude legitimate reasoning either for
+or against Deity in an absolute sense, while they do not exclude such
+reasoning in a relative sense, if there yet remain any theistic
+deductions which may properly be drawn from experience, these may now be
+adduced to balance the atheistic deductions from the persistence of
+force. For although the latter deductions have clearly shown the
+existence of Deity to be superfluous in a scientific sense, the formal
+considerations in question have no less clearly opened up beyond the
+sphere of science a possible _locus_ for the existence of Deity; so that
+if there are any facts supplied by experience for which the atheistic
+deductions appear insufficient to account, we are still free to account
+for them in a relative sense by the hypothesis of Theism. And, it may be
+urged, we do find such an unexplained residuum in the correlation of
+general laws in the production of cosmic harmony. It signifies nothing,
+the argument may run, that we are unable to conceive the methods whereby
+the supposed Mind operates in producing cosmic harmony; nor does it
+signify that its operation must now be relegated to a super-scientific
+province. What does signify is that, taking a general view of nature,
+we find it impossible to conceive of the extent and variety of her
+harmonious processes as other than products of intelligent causation.
+Now this sublimated form of the teleological argument, it will be
+remembered, I denoted a metaphysical teleology, in order sharply to
+distinguish it from all previous forms of that argument, which, in
+contradistinction I denoted scientific teleologies. And the distinction,
+it will be remembered, consisted in this--that while all previous forms
+of teleology, by resting on a basis which was not beyond the possible
+reach of science, laid themselves open to the possibility of scientific
+refutation, the metaphysical system of teleology, by resting on a basis
+which is clearly beyond the possible reach of science, can never be
+susceptible of scientific refutation. And that this metaphysical system
+of teleology does rest on such a basis is indisputable; for while it
+accepts the most ultimate truths of which science can ever be
+cognizant--viz. the persistence of force and the consequently necessary
+genesis of natural law,--it nevertheless maintains that the necessity of
+regarding Mind as the ultimate cause of things is not on this account
+removed; and, therefore, that if science now requires the operation of a
+Supreme Mind to be posited in a super-scientific sphere, then in a
+super-scientific sphere it ought to be posited. No doubt this hypothesis
+at first sight seems gratuitous, seeing that, so far as science can
+penetrate, there is no need of any such hypothesis at all--cosmic
+harmony resulting as a physically necessary consequence from the
+combined action of natural laws, which in turn result as a physically
+necessary consequence of the persistence of force and the primary
+qualities of matter. But although it is thus indisputably true that
+metaphysical teleology is wholly gratuitous if considered
+scientifically, it may not be true that it is wholly gratuitous if
+considered psychologically. In other words, if it is more conceivable
+that Mind should be the ultimate cause of cosmic harmony than that the
+persistence of force should be so, then it is not irrational to accept
+the more conceivable hypothesis in preference to the less conceivable
+one, provided that the choice is made with the diffidence which is
+required by the considerations adduced in Chapter V [especially the
+_Canon of probability_ laid down in the second paragraph of this
+section, § 5].
+
+'I conclude, therefore, that the hypothesis of metaphysical teleology,
+although in a physical sense gratuitous, may be in a psychological sense
+legitimate. But as against the fundamental position on which alone this
+argument can rest--viz. the position that the fundamental postulate of
+Atheism is more _inconceivable_ than is the fundamental postulate of
+Theism--we have seen two important objections to lie.
+
+'For, in the first place, the sense in which the word "inconceivable" is
+here used is that of the impossibility of framing _realizable_ relations
+in the thought; not that of the impossibility of framing _abstract_
+relations in thought. In the same sense, though in a lower degree, it is
+true that the complexity of the human organization and its functions is
+inconceivable; but in this sense the word "inconceivable" has much less
+weight in an argument than it has in its true sense. And, without
+waiting again to dispute (as we did in the case of the speculative
+standing of Materialism) how far even the genuine test of
+inconceivability ought to be allowed to make against an inference which
+there is a body of scientific evidence to substantiate, we went on to
+the second objection against this fundamental position of metaphysical
+teleology. This objection, it will be remembered, was, that it is as
+impossible to conceive of cosmic harmony as an effect of Mind [i.e. Mind
+being what we know it in experience to be], as it is to conceive of it
+as an effect of mindless evolution. The argument from inconceivability,
+therefore, admits of being turned with quite as terrible an effect on
+Theism, as it can possibly be made to exert on Atheism.
+
+'Hence this more refined form of teleology which we are considering, and
+which we saw to be the last of the possible arguments in favour of
+Theism, is met on its own ground by a very crushing opposition: by its
+metaphysical character it has escaped the opposition of physical
+science, only to encounter a new opposition in the region of pure
+psychology to which it fled. As a conclusion to our whole inquiry,
+therefore, it devolved on us to determine the relative magnitudes of
+these opposing forces. And in doing this we first observed that, if the
+supporters of metaphysical teleology objected _à priori_ to the method
+whereby the genesis of natural law was deduced from the datum of the
+persistence of force, in that this method involved an unrestricted use
+of illegitimate symbolic conceptions; then it is no less open to an
+atheist to object _à priori_ to the method whereby a directing Mind was
+inferred from the datum of cosmic harmony, in that this method involved
+the postulation of an unknowable cause,--and this of a character which
+the whole history of human thought has proved the human mind to exhibit
+an overweening tendency to postulate as the cause of natural phenomena.
+On these grounds, therefore, I concluded that, so far as their
+respective standing _à priori_ is concerned, both theories may be
+regarded as about equally suspicious. And similarly with regard to their
+standing _à posteriori_; for as both theories require to embody at least
+one infinite term, they must each alike be pronounced absolutely
+inconceivable. But, finally, if the question were put to me which of the
+two theories I regarded as the more rational, I observed that this is a
+question which no one man can answer for another. For as the test of
+absolute inconceivability is equally destructive of both theories, if a
+man wishes to choose between them, his choice can only be determined by
+what I have designated relative inconceivability--i.e. in accordance
+with the verdict given by his individual sense of probability as
+determined by his previous habit of thought. And forasmuch as the test
+of relative inconceivability may be held in this matter legitimately to
+vary with the character of the mind which applies it, the strictly
+rational probability of the question to which it is applied varies in
+like manner. Or otherwise presented, the only alternative for any man in
+this matter is either to discipline himself into an attitude of pure
+scepticism, and thus to refuse in thought to entertain either a
+probability or an improbability concerning the existence of a God; or
+else to incline in thought towards an affirmation or a negation of God,
+according as his previous habits of thought have rendered such an
+inclination more facile in the one direction than in the other. And
+although, under such circumstances, I should consider that man the more
+rational who carefully suspended his judgement, I conclude that if this
+course is departed from, neither the metaphysical teleologist nor the
+scientific atheist has any perceptible advantage over the other in
+respect of rationality. For as the formal conditions of a metaphysical
+teleology are undoubtedly present on the one hand, and the formal
+conditions of a speculative atheism are as undoubtedly present on the
+other, there is thus in both cases a logical vacuum supplied wherein the
+pendulum of thought is free to swing in whichever direction it may be
+made to swing by the momentum of preconceived ideas.
+
+'§ 6. Such is the outcome of our investigation, and considering the
+abstract nature of the subject, the immense divergence of opinion which
+at the present time is manifested with regard to it, as well as the
+confusing amount of good, bad and indifferent literature on both sides
+of the controversy which is extant;--considering these things, I do not
+think that the result of our inquiry can be justly complained of on the
+score of its lacking precision. At a time like the present, when
+traditional beliefs respecting Theism are so generally accepted, and so
+commonly concluded as a matter of course to have a large and valid basis
+of induction whereon to rest, I cannot but feel that a perusal of this
+short essay, by showing how very concise the scientific _status_ of the
+subject really is, will do more to settle the minds of most readers as
+to the exact standing at the present time of all the probabilities of
+the question, than could a perusal of all the rest of the literature
+upon this subject. And, looking to the present condition of speculative
+philosophy, I regard it as of the utmost importance to have clearly
+shown that the advance of science has now entitled us to assert, without
+the least hesitation, that the hypothesis of Mind in nature is as
+certainly superfluous to account for any of the phenomena of nature, as
+the scientific doctrine of the persistence of force and the
+indestructibility of matter is certainly true.
+
+'On the other hand, if any one is inclined to complain that the logical
+aspect of the question has not proved itself so unequivocally definite
+as has the scientific, I must ask him to consider that, in any matter
+which does not admit of actual demonstration, some margin must of
+necessity be left for variations of individual opinion. And, if he bears
+this consideration in mind, I feel sure that he cannot properly
+complain of my not having done my utmost in this case to define as
+sharply as possible the character and the limits of this margin.
+
+'§ 7. And now, in conclusion, I feel it is desirable to state that any
+antecedent bias with regard to Theism which I individually possess is
+unquestionably on the side of traditional beliefs. It is therefore with
+the utmost sorrow that I find myself compelled to accept the conclusions
+here worked out; and nothing would have induced me to publish them, save
+the strength of my conviction that it is the duty of every member of
+society to give his fellows the benefit of his labours for whatever they
+may be worth. Just as I am confident that truth must in the end be the
+most profitable for the race, so I am persuaded that every individual
+endeavour to attain it, provided only that such endeavour is unbiassed
+and sincere, ought without hesitation to be made the common property of
+all men, no matter in what direction the results of its promulgation may
+appear to tend. And so far as the ruination of individual happiness is
+concerned, no one can have a more lively perception than myself of the
+possibly disastrous tendency of my work. So far as I am individually
+concerned, the result of this analysis has been to show that, whether I
+regard the problem of Theism on the lower plane of strictly relative
+probability, or on the higher plane of purely formal considerations, it
+equally becomes my obvious duty to stifle all belief of the kind which I
+conceive to be the noblest, and to discipline my intellect with regard
+to this matter into an attitude of the purest scepticism. And forasmuch
+as I am far from being able to agree with those who affirm that the
+twilight doctrine of the "new faith" is a desirable substitute for the
+waning splendour of "the old," I am not ashamed to confess that with
+this virtual negation of God the universe to me has lost its soul of
+loveliness; and although from henceforth the precept to "work while it
+is day" will doubtless but gain an intensified force from the terribly
+intensified meaning of the words that "the night cometh when no man can
+work," yet when at times I think, as think at times I must, of the
+appalling contrast between the hallowed glory of that creed which once
+was mine, and the lonely mystery of existence as now I find it,--at such
+times I shall ever feel it impossible to avoid the sharpest pang of
+which my nature is susceptible. For whether it be due to my intelligence
+not being sufficiently advanced to meet the requirements of the age, or
+whether it be due to the memory of those sacred associations which to me
+at least were the sweetest that life has given, I cannot but feel that
+for me, and for others who think as I do, there is a dreadful truth in
+those words of Hamilton,--Philosophy having become a meditation, not
+merely of death, but of annihilation, the precept _know thyself_ has
+become transformed into the terrific oracle to OEdipus--
+
+     "Mayest thou ne'er know the truth of what thou art."'
+
+This analysis will have been at least sufficient to give a clear idea
+of the general argument of the _Candid Examination_ and of its
+melancholy conclusions. What will most strike a somewhat critical reader
+is perhaps (1) the tone of certainty, and (2) the belief in the almost
+exclusive right of the scientific method in the court of reason.
+
+As evidence of (1) I would adduce the following brief quotations:--
+
+     P. xi. 'Possible errors in reasoning apart, the rational position
+     of Theism as here defined must remain without material modification
+     as long as our intelligence remains human.'
+
+     P. 24. 'I am quite unable to understand how any one at the present
+     day, and with the most moderate powers of abstract thinking, can
+     possibly bring himself to embrace the theory of Free-will.'
+
+     P. 64. 'Undoubtedly we have no alternative but to conclude that the
+     hypothesis of mind in nature is now logically proved to be as
+     certainly superfluous as the very basis of all science is certainly
+     true. There can no longer be any more doubt that the existence of a
+     God is wholly unnecessary to explain any of the phenomena of the
+     universe, than there is doubt that if I leave go of my pen it will
+     fall upon the table.'
+
+As evidence of (2) I would adduce from the preface--
+
+     'To my mind, therefore, it is impossible to resist the conclusion
+     that, looking to this undoubted pre-eminence of the scientific
+     methods as ways to truth, whether or not there is a God, the
+     question as to his existence is both more morally and more
+     reverently contemplated if we regard it purely as a problem for
+     methodical analysis to solve, than if we regard it in any other
+     light.'
+
+It is in respect both of (1) and (2) that the change in Romanes' thought
+as exhibited in his later Notes is most conspicuous[15].
+
+At what date George Romanes' mind began to react from the conclusions of
+the _Candid Examination_ I cannot say. But after a period of ten
+years--in his Rede lecture of 1885[16]--we find his frame of mind very
+much changed. This lecture, on _Mind and Motion_, consists of a severe
+criticism of the materialistic account of mind. On the other hand
+'spiritualism'--or the theory which would suppose that mind is the cause
+of motion--is pronounced from the point of view of science not
+impossible indeed but 'unsatisfactory,' and the more probable conclusion
+is found in a 'monism' like Bruno's--according to which mind and motion
+are co-ordinate and probably co-extensive aspects of the same universal
+fact--a monism which may be called Pantheism, but may also be regarded
+as an extension of contracted views of Theism[17]. The position
+represented by this lecture may be seen sufficiently from its
+conclusion:--
+
+
+'If the advance of natural science is now steadily leading us to the
+conclusion that there is no motion without mind, must we not see how the
+independent conclusion of mental science is thus independently
+confirmed--the conclusion, I mean, that there is no being without
+knowing? To me, at least, it does appear that the time has come when we
+may begin, as it were in a dawning light, to see that the study of
+Nature and the study of Mind are meeting upon this greatest of possible
+truths. And if this is the case--if there is no motion without mind, no
+being without knowing--shall we infer, with Clifford, that universal
+being is mindless, or answer with a dogmatic negative that most
+stupendous of questions,--Is there knowledge with the Most High? If
+there is no motion without mind, no being without knowing, may we not
+rather infer, with Bruno, that it is in the medium of mind, and in the
+medium of knowledge, we live, and move, and have our being?
+
+'This, I think, is the direction in which the inference points, if we
+are careful to set out the logical conditions with complete
+impartiality. But the ulterior question remains, whether, so far as
+science is concerned, it is here possible to point any inference at all:
+the whole orbit of human knowledge may be too narrow to afford a
+parallax for measurements so vast. Yet even here, if it be true that the
+voice of science must thus of necessity speak the language of
+agnosticism, at least let us see to it that the language is pure[18];
+let us not tolerate any barbarisms introduced from the side of
+aggressive dogma. So shall we find that this new grammar of thought does
+not admit of any constructions radically opposed to more venerable ways
+of thinking; even if we do not find that the often-quoted words of its
+earliest formulator apply with special force to its latest
+dialects--that if a little knowledge of physiology and a little
+knowledge of psychology dispose men to atheism, a deeper knowledge of
+both, and, still more, a deeper thought upon their relations to one
+another, will lead men back to some form of religion, which if it be
+more vague, may also be more worthy than that of earlier days.'
+
+
+Some time before 1889 three articles were written for the _Nineteenth
+Century_ on the _Influence of Science upon Religion_. They were never
+published, for what reason I am not able to ascertain. But I have
+thought it worth while to print the first two of them as a 'first part'
+of this volume, both because they contain--written in George Romanes'
+own name--an important criticism upon the _Candid Examination_ which he
+had published anonymously, and also because, with their entirely
+sceptical result, they exhibit very clearly a stage in the mental
+history of their author. The antecedents of these papers those who have
+read this Introduction will now be in a position to understand. What
+remains to be said by way of further introduction to the Notes had
+better be reserved till later.
+
+                                                                   C.G.
+
+
+FOOTNOTES:
+
+[1] p. 7.
+
+[2] p. 173.
+
+[3] See p. 110.
+
+[4] But see an interesting note in Romanes' _Mind and Motion and Monism_
+(Longmans, 1895) p. 111.
+
+[5] Published in Trübner's _English and Foreign Philosophical Library_
+in 1878, but written 'several years ago' (preface). 'I have refrained
+from publishing it,' the author explains, 'lest, after having done so, I
+should find that more mature thought had modified the conclusions which
+the author sets forth.'
+
+[6] At times I have sought to make the argument of the chapter more
+intelligible by introducing references to earlier parts of the book or
+explanations in my own words. These latter I have inserted in square
+brackets.
+
+[7] p. 24.
+
+[8] p. 28.
+
+[9] p. 28.
+
+[10] p. 45.
+
+[11] p. 47.
+
+[12] p. 50.
+
+[13] p. 63.
+
+[14] pp. 58 ff.
+
+[15] With reference to the views and arguments of the _Candid
+Examination_, it may be interesting to notice here in detail that George
+Romanes (1) came to attach much more importance to the subjective
+religious needs and intuitions of the human spirit (pp. 131 ff.); (2)
+perceived that the subjective religious consciousness can be regarded
+objectively as a broad human phenomenon (pp. 147 f.); (3) criticized his
+earlier theory of causation and returned _towards_ the theory that all
+causation is volitional (pp. 102, 118); (4) definitely repudiated the
+materialistic account of the origin of mind (pp. 30, 31); (5) returned
+to the use of the expression 'the argument from design,' and therefore
+presumably abandoned his strong objection to it; (6) 'saw through'
+Herbert Spencer's refutation of the wider teleology expressed by Baden
+Powell, and felt the force of the teleology again (p. 72); (7)
+recognized that the scientific objections to the doctrine of the freedom
+of the will are not finally valid (p. 128).
+
+[16] See _Mind and Motion and Monism_, pp. 36 ff.
+
+[17] In some 'Notes' of the Summer of 1893 I find the statement, 'The
+result (of philosophical inquiry) has been that in his millennial
+contemplation and experience man has attained certainty with regard to
+certain aspects of the world problem, no less secure than that which he
+has gained in the domain of physical science, e.g.
+
+Logical priority of mind over matter.
+
+Consequent untenability of materialism.
+
+Relativity of knowledge.
+
+The order of nature, conservation of energy and indestructibility of
+matter within human experience, the principle of evolution and survival
+of the fittest.'
+
+[18] For the meaning of 'pure' agnosticism see below, pp. 107 ff.
+
+
+
+
+PART I.
+
+THE INFLUENCE OF SCIENCE UPON RELIGION.
+
+
+
+
+I.
+
+
+I propose to consider, in a series of three papers, the influence of
+Science upon Religion. In doing this I shall seek to confine myself to
+the strictly rational aspect of the subject, without travelling into any
+matters of sentiment. Moreover, I shall aim at estimating in the first
+instance the kind and degree of influence which has been exerted by
+Science upon Religion in the past, and then go on to estimate the
+probable extent of this influence in the future. The first two papers
+will be devoted to the past and prospective influence of Science upon
+Natural Religion, while the third will be devoted to the past and
+prospective influence of Science upon Revealed Religion[19].
+
+Few subjects have excited so much interest of late years as that which I
+thus mark out for discussion. This can scarcely be considered a matter
+of surprise, seeing that the influence in question is not only very
+direct, but also extremely important from every point of view. For
+generations and for centuries in succession Religion maintained an
+undisputed sway over men's minds--if not always as a practical guide in
+matters of conduct, at least as a regulator of belief. Even among the
+comparatively few who in previous centuries professedly rejected
+Christianity, there can be no doubt that their intellectual conceptions
+were largely determined by it: for Christianity being then the only
+court of appeal with reference to all these conceptions, even the few
+minds which were professedly without its jurisdiction could scarcely
+escape its indirect influence through the minds of others. But as side
+by side with the venerable institution a new court of appeal was
+gradually formed, we cannot wonder that it should have come to be
+regarded in the light of a rival to the old--more especially as the
+searching methods of its inquiry and the certain character of its
+judgements were much more in consonance with the requirements of an age
+disposed to scepticism. And this spirit of rivalry is still further
+fostered by the fact that Science has unquestionably exerted upon
+Religion what Mr. Fiske terms a 'purifying influence.' That is to say,
+not only are the scientific methods of inquiry after truth more
+congenial to sceptical minds than are the religious methods (which may
+broadly be defined as accepting truth on authority), but the results of
+the former have more than once directly contradicted those of the
+latter: science has in several cases incontestably demonstrated that
+religious teaching has been wrong as to matters of fact. Further still,
+the great advance of natural knowledge which has characterized the
+present century, has caused our ideas upon many subjects connected with
+philosophy to undergo a complete metamorphosis. A well-educated man of
+the present day is absolutely precluded from regarding some of the
+Christian dogmas from the same intellectual standpoint as his
+forefathers, even though he may still continue to accept them in some
+other sense. In short, our whole key of thinking or tone of thought
+having been in certain respects changed, we can no longer anticipate
+that in these respects it should continue to harmonize with the
+unalterable system of theology.
+
+Such I conceive to be the ways in which Science has exerted her
+influence upon Religion, and it is needless to dwell upon the potency of
+their united effect. No one can read even a newspaper without perceiving
+how great this effect has been. On the one hand, sceptics are
+triumphantly confident that the light of dawning knowledge has begun
+finally to dispel the darkness of superstition, while religious persons,
+on the other hand, tremble to think what the future, if judged by the
+past, is likely to bring forth. On both sides we have free discussion,
+strong language, and earnest canvassing. Year by year stock is taken,
+and year by year the balance is found to preponderate in favour of
+Science.
+
+This being the state of things of the present time, I think that with
+the experience of the kind and degree of influence which Science has
+exerted upon Religion in the past, we have material enough whereby to
+estimate the probable extent of such influence in the future. This,
+therefore, I shall endeavour to do by seeking to define, on general
+principles, the limits within which it is antecedently possible that the
+influence in question can be exercised. But in order to do this, it is
+necessary to begin by estimating the kind and degree of the influence
+which has been exerted by Science upon Religion in the past.
+
+Thus much premised, we have in the first place to define the essential
+nature both of Science and of Religion: for this is clearly the first
+step in an analysis which has for its object an estimation of the actual
+and possible effects of one of these departments of thought upon the
+other.
+
+Science, then, is essentially a department of thought having exclusive
+reference to the Proximate. More particularly, it is a department of
+thought having for its object the explanation of natural phenomena by
+the discovery of natural (or proximate) causes. In so far as Science
+ventures to trespass beyond this her only legitimate domain, and seeks
+to interpret natural phenomena by the immediate agency of supernatural
+or ultimate causes, in that degree has she ceased to be physical
+science, and become ontological speculation. The truth of this statement
+has now been practically recognized by all scientific workers; and terms
+describing final causes have been banished from their vocabulary in
+astronomy, chemistry, geology, biology, and even in psychology.
+
+Religion, on the other hand, is a department of thought having no less
+exclusive reference to the Ultimate. More particularly, it is a
+department of thought having for its object a self-conscious and
+intelligent Being, which it regards as a Personal God, and the
+fountain-head of all causation. I am, of course, aware that the term
+Religion has been of late years frequently used in senses which this
+definition would not cover; but I conceive that this only shows how
+frequently the term in question has been abused. To call any theory of
+things a Religion which does not present any belief in any form of
+Deity, is to apply the word to the very opposite of that which it has
+hitherto been used to denote. To speak of the Religion of the
+Unknowable, the Religion of Cosmism, the Religion of Humanity, and so
+forth, where the personality of the First Cause is not recognized, is as
+unmeaning as it would be to speak of the love of a triangle, or the
+rationality of the equator. That is to say, if any meaning is to be
+extracted from the terms at all, it is only to be so by using them in
+some metaphorical sense. We may, for instance, say that there is such a
+thing as a Religion of Humanity, because we may begin by deifying
+Humanity in our own estimation, and then go on to worship our ideal. But
+by thus giving Humanity the name of Deity we are not really creating a
+new religion: we are merely using a metaphor, which may or may not be
+successful as a matter of poetic diction, but which most assuredly
+presents no shred of value as a matter of philosophical statement.
+Indeed, in this relation it is worse than valueless: it is misleading.
+Variations or reversals in the meanings of words are not of uncommon
+occurrence in the ordinary growth of languages; but it is not often that
+we find, as in this case, the whole meaning of a term intentionally and
+gratuitously changed by the leaders of philosophical thought. Humanity,
+for example, is an abstract idea of our own making: it is not an object
+any more than the equator is an object. Therefore, if it were possible
+to construct a religion by this curious device of metaphorically
+ascribing to Humanity the attributes of Deity, it ought to be as
+logically possible to construct, let us say, a theory of brotherly
+regard towards the equator, by metaphorically ascribing to it the
+attributes of man. The distinguishing features of any theory which can
+properly be termed a Religion, is that it should refer to the ultimate
+source, or sources, of things: and that it should suppose this source to
+be of an objective, intelligent, and personal nature. To apply the term
+Religion to any other theory is merely to abuse it.
+
+From these definitions, then, it appears that the aims and methods of
+Science are exclusively concerned with the ascertaining and the proof of
+the proximate How of things and processes physical: her problem is, as
+Mill states it, to discover what are the fewest number of (phenomenal)
+data which, being granted, will explain the phenomena of experience. On
+the other hand, Religion is not in any way concerned with causation,
+further than to assume that all things and all processes are ultimately
+due to intelligent personality. Religion is thus, as Mr. Spencer says,
+'an _à priori_ theory of the universe'--to which, however, we must add,
+'and a theory which assumes intelligent personality as the originating
+source of the universe.' Without this needful addition, a religion would
+be in no way logically distinguished from a philosophy.
+
+From these definitions, then, it clearly follows that in their purest
+forms, Science and Religion really have no point of logical contact.
+Only if Science could transcend the conditions of space and time, of
+phenomenal relativity, and of all human limitations, only then could
+Science be in a position to touch the supernatural theory of Religion.
+But obviously, if Science could do this, she would cease to be Science.
+In soaring above the region of phenomena and entering the tenuous aether
+of noumena, her present wings, which we call her methods, would in such
+an atmosphere be no longer of any service for movement. Out of time, out
+of place, and out of phenomenal relation, Science could no longer exist
+as such.
+
+On the other hand, Religion in its purest form is equally incompetent to
+affect Science. For, as we have already seen, Religion as such is not
+concerned with the phenomenal sphere: her theory of ontology cannot have
+any reference to the How of phenomenal causation. Hence it is evident
+that, as in their purest or most ideal forms they move in different
+mental planes, Science and Religion cannot exhibit interference.
+
+Thus far the remarks which I have made apply equally to all forms of
+Religion, as such, whether actual or possible, and in so far as the
+Religion is _pure_. But it is notorious that until quite recently
+Religion did exercise upon Science, not only an influence, but an
+overpowering influence. Belief in divine agency being all but universal,
+while the methods of scientific research had not as yet been distinctly
+formulated, it was in previous generations the usual habit of mind to
+refer any natural phenomenon, the physical causation of which had not
+been ascertained, to the more or less immediate causal action of the
+Deity. But we now see that this habit of mind arose from a failure to
+distinguish between the essentially distinct characters of Science and
+Religion as departments of thought, and therefore that it was only so
+far as the Religion of former times was impure--or mixed with the
+ingredients of thought which belong to Science--that the baleful
+influence in question was exerted. The gradual, successive, and now all
+but total abolition of final causes from the thoughts of scientific men,
+to which allusion has already been made, is merely an expression of the
+fact that scientific men as a body have come fully to recognize the
+fundamental distinction between Science and Religion which I have
+stated.
+
+Or, to put the matter in another way, scientific men as a body--and,
+indeed, all persons whose ideas on such matters are abreast of the
+times--perceive plainly enough that a religious explanation of any
+natural phenomenon is, from a scientific point of view, no explanation
+at all. For a religious explanation consists in referring the observed
+phenomenon to the First Cause--i.e. to merge that particular phenomenon
+in the general or final mystery of things. A scientific explanation, on
+the other hand, consists in referring the observed phenomenon to its
+physical causes, and in no case can such an explanation entertain the
+hypothesis of a final cause without abandoning its character as a
+scientific explanation. For example, if a child brings me a flower and
+asks why it has such a curious form, bright colour, sweet perfume, and
+so on, and if I answer, Because God made it so, I am not really
+answering the child's question: I am merely concealing my ignorance of
+Nature under a guise of piety, and excusing my indolence in the study of
+botany. It was the appreciation of this fact that led Mr. Darwin to
+observe in his _Origin of Species_ that the theory of creation does not
+serve to explain any of the facts with which it is concerned, but merely
+re-states these facts as they are observed to occur. That is to say, by
+thus merging the facts as observed into the final mystery of things, we
+are not even attempting to explain them in any scientific sense: for it
+would be obviously possible to get rid of the necessity of thus
+explaining any natural phenomenon whatsoever by referring it to the
+immediate causal action of the Deity. If any phenomenon were actually
+to occur which did proceed from the immediate causal action of the
+Deity, then _ex hypothesi_, there would be no physical causes to
+investigate, and the occupation of Othello, in the person of a man of
+science, would be gone. Such a phenomenon would be miraculous, and
+therefore from its very nature beyond the reach of scientific
+investigation.
+
+Properly speaking, then, the religious theory of final causes does not
+explain any of the phenomena of Nature: it merely re-states the
+phenomena as observed--or, if we prefer so to say, it is itself an
+ultimate and universal explanation of all possible phenomena taken
+collectively. For it must be admitted that behind all possible
+explanations of a scientific kind, there lies a great inexplicable,
+which just because of its ultimate character, cannot be merged into
+anything further--that is to say, cannot be explained. 'It is what it
+is,' is all that we can say of it: 'I am that I am' is all that it could
+say of itself. And it is in referring phenomena to this inexplicable
+source of physical causation that the theory of Religion essentially
+consists. The theory of Science, on the other hand, consists in the
+assumption that there is always a practically endless chain of physical
+causation to investigate--i.e. an endless series of phenomena to be
+explained. So that, if we define the process of explanation as the
+process of referring observed phenomena to their adequate causes, we may
+say that Religion, by the aid of a general theory of things in the
+postulation of an intelligent First Cause, furnishes to her own
+satisfaction an ultimate explanation of the universe as a whole, and
+therefore is not concerned with any of those proximate explanations or
+discovery of second causes, which form the exclusive subject-matter of
+Science. In other words, we recur to the definitions already stated, to
+the effect that Religion is a department of thought having, as such,
+exclusive reference to the Ultimate, while Science is a department of
+thought having, as such, no less exclusive reference to the Proximate.
+When these two departments of thought overlap, interference results, and
+we find confusion. Therefore it was that when the religious theory of
+final causes intruded upon the field of scientific inquiry, it was
+passing beyond its logical domain; and seeking to arrogate the function
+of explaining this or that phenomenon _in detail_, it ceased to be a
+purely religious theory, while at the same time and for the same reason
+it blocked the way of scientific progress[20].
+
+This remark serves to introduce one of the chief topics with which I
+have to deal--viz. the doctrine of Design in Nature, and thus the whole
+question of Natural Religion in its relation to Natural Science. In
+handling this topic I shall endeavour to take as broad and deep a view
+as I can of the present standing of Natural Religion, without waiting to
+show step by step the ways and means by which it has been brought into
+this position, by the influence of Science.
+
+In the earliest dawn of recorded thought, teleology in some form or
+another has been the most generally accepted theory whereby the order of
+Nature is explained. It is not, however, my object in this paper to
+trace the history of this theory from its first rude beginnings in
+Fetishism to its final development in Theism. I intend to devote myself
+exclusively to the question as to the present standing of this theory,
+and I allude to its past history only in order to examine the statement
+which is frequently made, to the effect that its general prevalence in
+all ages and among all peoples of the world lends to it a certain degree
+of 'antecedent credibility.' With reference to this point, I should say,
+that, whether or not the order of Nature is due to a disposing Mind, the
+hypothesis of mental agency in Nature--or, as the Duke of Argyll terms
+it, the hypothesis of 'anthropopsychism'--must necessarily have been the
+earliest hypothesis. What we find in Nature is the universal prevalence
+of causation, and long before the no less universal equivalency between
+causes and effects--i.e. the universal prevalence of natural law--became
+a matter of even the [vaguest] appreciation, the general fact that
+nothing happens without a cause of some kind was fully recognized.
+Indeed, the recognition of this fact is not only presented by the
+lowest races of the present day, but, as I have myself given evidence to
+show, likewise by animals and infants[21]. And therefore, it appears to
+me probable that those psychologists are right who argue that the idea
+of cause is intuitive, in the same sense that the ideas of space and
+time are intuitive--i.e. the instinctive or [inherited] effect of
+ancestral experience.
+
+Now if it is thus a matter of certainty that the recognition of
+causality in Nature is co-extensive with, and even anterior to, the
+human mind, it appears to me no less certain that the first attempt at
+assigning a cause of this or that observed event in Nature--i.e. the
+first attempts at a rational explanation of the phenomena of
+Nature--must have been of an anthropopsychic kind. No other explanation
+was, as it were, so ready to hand as that of projecting into external
+Nature the agency of volition, which was known to each individual as the
+apparent fountain-head of causal activity so far as he and his
+neighbours were concerned. To reach this most obvious explanation of
+causality in Nature, it did not require that primitive man should know,
+as we know, that the very conception of causality arises out of our
+sense of effort in voluntary action; it only required that this should
+be the fact, and then it must needs follow that when any natural
+phenomenon was thought about at all with reference to its causality, the
+cause inferred should be one of a psychical kind. I need not wait to
+trace the gradual integration of this anthropopsychic hypothesis from
+its earliest and most diffused form of what we may term polypsychism
+(wherein the causes inferred were almost as personally numerous as the
+effects contemplated), through polytheism (wherein many effects of a
+like kind were referred to one deity, who, as it were, took special
+charge over that class), up to monotheism (wherein all causation is
+gathered up into the monopsychism of a single personality): it is enough
+thus briefly to show that from first to last the hypothesis of
+anthropopsychism is a necessary phase of mental evolution under existing
+conditions, and this whether or not the hypothesis is true.
+
+Thus viewed, I do not think that 'the general consent of mankind' is a
+fact of any argumentative weight in favour of the anthropopsychic
+theory--so far, I mean, as the matter of causation is concerned--whether
+this be in fetishism or in the teleology of our own day: the general
+consent of mankind in the larger question of theism (where sundry other
+matters besides causation fail to be considered) does not here concern
+us. Indeed, it appears to me that if we are to go back to the savages
+for any guarantee of our anthropopsychic theory, the pledge which we
+receive is of worse than no value. As well might we conclude that a
+match is a living organism, because this is to the mind of a savage the
+most obvious explanation of its movements, as conclude on precisely
+similar grounds that our belief in teleology derives any real support
+from any of the more primitive phases of anthropopsychism.
+
+It seems to me, therefore, that in seeking to estimate the evidence of
+design in Nature, we must as it were start _de novo_, without reference
+to anterior beliefs upon the subject. The question is essentially one to
+be considered in the light of all the latest knowledge that we possess,
+and by the best faculties of thinking that we (the heirs of all the
+ages) are able to bring to bear upon it. I shall, therefore, only allude
+to the history of anthropopsychism in so far as I may find it necessary
+to do so for the sake of elucidating my argument.
+
+And here it is needful to consider first what Paley called 'the state of
+the argument' before the Darwinian epoch. This is clearly and tersely
+presented by Paley in his classical illustration of finding a watch upon
+a heath--an illustration so well known that I need not here re-state it.
+I will merely observe, therefore, that it conveys, as it were in one's
+watch-pocket, the whole of the argument from design; and that it is not
+in my opinion open to the stricture which was passed upon it by Mill
+where he says,--'The inference would not be from marks of design, but
+because I already know by direct experience that watches are made by
+men.' This appears to me to miss the whole point of Paley's meaning, for
+there would be obviously no argument at all unless he be understood to
+mean that the evidence of design which is supposed to be afforded by
+examination of the watch, is supposed to be afforded by this examination
+only, and not from any of the direct knowledge alluded to by Mill. For
+the purposes of the illustration, it must clearly be assumed that the
+finder of the watch has no previous or direct knowledge touching the
+manufacture of watches. Apart from this curious misunderstanding, Mill
+was at one with Paley upon the whole subject.
+
+Again, it is no real objection to the argument or illustration to say,
+as we often have said, that it does not account for the watchmaker. The
+object of the argument from design is to _prove_ the existence of a
+designer: not to _explain_ that existence. Indeed, it would be suicidal
+to the whole argument in its relation to Theism, if the possibility of
+any such explanation were entertained; for such a possibility could only
+be entertained on the supposition that the being of the Deity admits of
+being explained--i.e. that the Deity is not ultimate.
+
+Lastly, the argument is precisely the same as that which occurs in
+numerous passages of Scripture and in theological writings all over the
+world down to the present time. That is to say, everywhere in organic
+nature we meet with innumerable adaptations of means to ends, which in
+very many cases present a degree of refinement and complexity in
+comparison with which the adaptations of means to ends in a watch are
+but miserable and rudimentary attempts at mechanism. No one can know so
+well as the modern biologist in what an immeasurable degree the
+mechanisms which occur in such profusion in nature surpass, in every
+form of excellence, the highest triumphs of human invention. Hence at
+first sight it does unquestionably appear that we could have no stronger
+or better evidence of purpose than is thus afforded. In the words of
+Paley: 'arrangement, disposition of parts, subserviency of means to an
+end, relation of instruments to a use, imply the presence of
+intelligence and mind.'
+
+But next the question arises, Although such things certainly [may][22]
+imply the presence of mind as their explanatory cause, are we entitled
+to assume that there can be in nature no other cause competent to
+produce these effects? This is a question which never seems to have
+occurred to Paley, Bell, Chalmers, or indeed to any of the natural
+theologians up to the time of Darwin. This, I think, is a remarkable
+fact, because the question is one which, as a mere matter of logical
+form, appears to lie so much upon the surface. But nevertheless the fact
+remains that natural theologians, so far as I know without exception,
+were satisfied to assume as an axiom that mechanism could have no cause
+other than that of a designing mind; and therefore their work was
+restricted to tracing out in detail the number and the excellency of the
+mechanisms which were to be met with in nature. It is, however, obvious
+that the mere accumulation of such cases can have no real, or logical,
+effect upon the argument. The mechanisms which we encounter in nature
+are so amazing in their perfections, that the attentive study of any one
+of them would (as Paley in his illustration virtually, though not
+expressly, contends) be sufficient to carry the whole position, if the
+assumption be conceded that mechanism can only be due to mind. Therefore
+the argument is not really, or logically, strengthened by the mere
+accumulation of any number of special cases of mechanism in nature, all
+as mechanisms similar in kind. Let us now consider this argument.
+
+If we are disposed to wonder why natural theologians prior to the days
+of Darwin were content to assume that mind is the only possible cause of
+mechanism, I think we have a ready answer in the universal prevalence of
+their belief in special creation. For I think it is unquestionable that,
+upon the basis of this belief, the assumption is legitimate. That is to
+say, if we start with the belief that all species of plants and animals
+were originally introduced to the complex conditions of their several
+environments suddenly and ready made (in some such manner as watches are
+turned out from a manufactory), then I think we are reasonably entitled
+to assume that no conceivable cause, other than that of intelligent
+purpose, could possibly be assigned in explanation of the effects. It
+is, of course, needless to observe that in so far as this previous
+belief in special creation was thus allowed to affect the argument from
+design, that argument became an instance of circular reasoning. And it
+is, perhaps, equally needless to observe that the mere fact of
+evolution, as distinguished from special creation--or of the gradual
+development of living mechanisms, as distinguished from their sudden
+and ready-made apparition--would not in any way affect the argument from
+design, unless it could be shown that the process of evolution admits
+the possibility of some other cause which is not admitted by the
+hypothesis of special creation. But this is precisely what is shown by
+the theory of evolution as propounded by Darwin. That is to say, the
+theory of the gradual development of living mechanisms propounded by
+Darwin, is something more than a theory of gradual development as
+distinguished from sudden creation. It is this, but it is also a theory
+of a purely scientific kind which seeks to explain the purely physical
+causes of that development. And this is the point where natural science
+begins to exert her influence upon natural theology--or the point where
+the theory of evolution begins to affect the theory of design. As this
+is a most important part of our subject, and one upon which an
+extraordinary amount of confusion at the present time prevails, I shall
+in my next paper carefully consider it in all its bearings.
+
+FOOTNOTES:
+
+[19] [The third paper is not published because Romanes' views on the
+relation between science and faith in Revealed Religion are better and
+more maturely expressed in the Notes.--ED.]
+
+[20] To avoid misunderstanding I may observe that in the above
+definitions I am considering Religion and Science under the conditions
+in which they actually exist. It is conceivable that under other
+conditions these two departments of thought might not be so sharply
+separated. Thus, for instance, if a Religion were to appear carrying a
+revelation to Science upon matters of physical causation, such a
+Religion (supposing the revelation were found by experiment to be true)
+ought to be held to exercise upon Science a strictly legitimate
+influence.
+
+[21] _Mental Evolution in Animals_, pp. 155-8.
+
+[22] [I have put 'may' in place of 'do' for the sake of argument.--ED.]
+
+
+
+
+II.
+
+
+Suppose the man who found the watch upon a heath to continue his walk
+till he comes down to the sea-shore, and suppose further that he is as
+ignorant of physical geography as he is of watch-making. He soon begins
+to observe a number of adaptations of means to ends, which, if less
+refined and delicate than those that formed the object of his study in
+the watch, are on the other hand much more impressive from the greatly
+larger scale on which they are displayed. First, he observes that there
+is a beautiful basin hollowed out in the land for the reception of a
+bay; that the sides of this basin, which from being near its opening are
+most exposed to the action of large rolling billows, are composed of
+rocky cliffs, evidently in order to prevent the further encroachment of
+the sea, and the consequent destruction of the entire bay; that the
+sides of the basin, which from being successively situated more inland
+are successively less and less exposed to the action of large waves, are
+constituted successively of smaller rocks, passing into shingle, and
+eventually into the finest sand: that as the tides rise and fall with as
+great a regularity as was exhibited by the movements of the watch, the
+stones are carefully separated out from the sand to be arranged in
+sloping layers by themselves, and this always with a most beautiful
+reference to the places round the margin of the basin which are most in
+danger of being damaged by the action of the waves. He would further
+observe, upon closer inspection, that this process of selective
+arrangement goes into matters of the most minute detail. Here, for
+instance, he would observe a mile or two of a particular kind of seaweed
+artistically arranged in one long sinuous line upon the beach; there he
+would see a wonderful deposit of shells; in another place a lovely
+little purple heap of garnet sand, the minute particles of which have
+all been carefully picked out from the surrounding acres of yellow sand.
+Again, he would notice that the streams which come down to the bay are
+all flowing in channels admirably dug out for the purpose; and, being
+led by curiosity to investigate the teleology of these various streams,
+he would find that they serve to supply the water which the sea loses by
+evaporation, and also, by a wonderful piece of adjustment, to furnish
+fresh water to those animals and plants which thrive best in fresh
+water, and yet by their combined action to carry down sufficient mineral
+constituents to give that precise degree of saltness to the sea as a
+whole which is required for the maintenance of pelagic life. Lastly,
+continuing his investigations along this line of inquiry, he would find
+that a thousand different habitats were all thoughtfully adapted to the
+needs of a hundred thousand different forms of life, none of which
+could survive if these habitats were reversed. Now, I think that our
+imaginary inquirer would be a dull man if, as the result of all this
+study, he failed to conclude that the evidence of Design furnished by
+the marine bay was at least as cogent as that which he had previously
+found in his study of the watch.
+
+But there is this great difference between the two cases. Whereas by
+subsequent inquiry he could ascertain as a matter of fact that the watch
+was due to intelligent contrivance, he could make no such discovery with
+reference to the marine bay: in the one case intelligent contrivance as
+a cause is independently demonstrable, while in the other case it can
+only be inferred. What, then, is the value of the inference?
+
+If, after the studies of our imaginary teleologist had been completed,
+he were introduced to the library of the Royal Society, and if he were
+then to spend a year or two in making himself acquainted with the
+leading results of modern science, I fancy that he would end by being
+both a wiser and a sadder man. At least I am certain that in learning
+more he would feel that he is understanding less--that the archaic
+simplicity of his earlier explanations must give place to a matured
+perplexity upon the whole subject. To begin with, he would now find that
+every one of the adjustments of means to ends which excited his
+admiration on the sea-coast were due to physical causes which are
+perfectly well understood. The cliffs stood at the opening of the bay
+because the sea in past ages had encroached upon the coast-line until
+it met with these cliffs, which then opposed its further progress; the
+bay was a depression in the land which happened to be there when the sea
+arrived, and into which the sea consequently flowed; the successive
+occurrence of rocks, shingle, and sand was due to the actions of the
+waves themselves; the segregation of sea-weeds, shells, pebbles, and
+different kinds of sand, was due to their different degrees of specific
+gravity; the fresh-water streams ran in channels because they had
+themselves been the means of excavating them; and the multitudinous
+forms of life were all adapted to their several habitats simply because
+the unsuited forms were not able to live in them. In all these cases,
+therefore, our teleologist in the light of fuller knowledge would be
+compelled to conclude at least this much--that the adaptations which he
+had so greatly admired when he supposed that they were all due to
+contrivance in anticipation of the existing phenomena, cease to furnish
+the same evidence of intelligent design when it is found that no one of
+them was prepared beforehand by any independent or external cause.
+
+He would therefore be led to conclude that if the teleological
+interpretation of the facts were to be saved at all, it could only be so
+by taking a much wider view of the subject than was afforded by the
+particular cases of apparent design which at first appeared so cogent.
+That is to say, he would feel that he must abandon the supposition of
+any _special_ design in the construction of that particular bay, and
+fall back upon the theory of a much more _general_ design in the
+construction of one great scheme of Nature as a whole. In short he would
+require to dislodge his argument from the special adjustments which in
+the first instance appeared to him so suggestive, to those general laws
+of Nature which by their united operation give rise to a cosmos as
+distinguished from a chaos.
+
+Now I have been careful thus to present in all its more important
+details an imaginary argument drawn from inorganic nature, because it
+furnishes a complete analogy to the actual argument which is drawn from
+organic nature. Without any question, the instances of apparent design,
+or of the apparently intentional adaptation of means to ends, which we
+meet with in organic nature, are incomparably more numerous and
+suggestive than anything with which we meet in inorganic nature. But if
+once we find good reason to conclude that the former, like the latter,
+are all due, not to the immediate, special and prospective action of a
+contriving intelligence (as in watch-making or creation), but to the
+agency of secondary or physical causes acting under the influence of
+what we call general laws, then it seems to me that no matter how
+numerous or how wonderful the adaptations of means to ends in organic
+nature may be, they furnish one no other or better evidence of design
+than is furnished by any of the facts of inorganic nature.
+
+For the sake of clearness let us take any special case. Paley says, 'I
+know of no better method of introducing so large a subject than that of
+comparing a single thing with a single thing; an eye, for example, with
+a telescope.' He then goes on to point out the analogies between these
+two pieces of apparatus, and ends by asking, 'How is it possible, under
+circumstances of such close affinity, and under the operation of equal
+evidence, to exclude contrivance in the case of the eye, yet to
+acknowledge the proof of contrivance having been employed, as the
+plainest and clearest of all propositions in the case of the telescope?'
+
+Well, the answer to be made is that only upon the hypothesis of special
+creation can this analogy hold: on the hypothesis of evolution by
+physical causes the evidence in the two cases is _not_ equal. For, upon
+this hypothesis we have the eye beginning, not as a ready-made structure
+prepared beforehand for the purposes of seeing, but as a mere
+differentiation of the ends of nerves in the skin, probably in the first
+instance to enable them better to discriminate changes of temperature.
+Pigment having been laid down in these places the better to secure this
+purpose (I use teleological terms for the sake of brevity), the
+nerve-ending begins to distinguish between light and darkness. The
+better to secure this further purpose, the simplest conceivable form of
+lens begins to appear in the shape of small refractive bodies. Behind
+these sensory cells are developed, forming the earliest indication of a
+retina presenting a single layer. And so on, step by step, till we
+reach the eye of an eagle.
+
+Of course the teleologist will here answer--'The fact of such a gradual
+building up is no argument against design: whether the structure
+appeared on a sudden or was the result of a slow elaboration, the marks
+of design in either case occur in the structure as it stands.' All of
+which is very true; but I am not maintaining that the fact of a gradual
+development _in itself_ does affect the argument from design. I am
+maintaining that it only does so because it reveals the possibility
+(excluded by the hypothesis of sudden or special creation) of the
+structure having been proximately due to the operation of physical
+causes. Thus, for the value of argument, let us assume that natural
+selection has been satisfactorily established as a cause adequate to
+account for all these effects. Given the facts of heredity, variation,
+struggle for existence, and the consequent survival of the fittest, what
+follows? Why that each step in the prolonged and gradual development of
+the eye was brought about by the elimination of all the less adapted
+structures in any given generation, i.e. the selection of all the better
+adapted to perpetuate the improvement by heredity. Will the teleologist
+maintain that this selective process is itself indicative of special
+design? If so, it appears to me that he is logically bound to maintain
+that the long line of seaweed, the shells, the stones and the little
+heap of garnet sand upon the sea-coast are all equally indicative of
+special design. The general laws relating to specific gravity are at
+least of as much importance in the economy of nature as are the general
+laws relating to specific differentiation; and in each illustration
+alike we find the result of the operation of known physical causes to be
+that of selection. If it should be argued in reply that the selection in
+the one case is obviously purposeless, while in the other it is as
+obviously purposive, I answer that this is pure assumption. It is
+perhaps not too much to say that every geological formation on the face
+of the globe is either wholly or in part due to the selective influence
+of specific gravity, and who shall say that the construction of the
+earth's crust is a less important matter in the general scheme of things
+(if there is such a scheme) than is the evolution of an eye? Or who
+shall say that because we see an apparently intentional adaptation of
+means to ends as the result of selection in the case of the eye, there
+is no intention served by the result of selection in the case of the
+sea-weeds, stones, sand, mud? For anything that we can know to the
+contrary, the supposed intelligence may take a greater delight in the
+latter than in the former process.
+
+For the sake of clearness I have assumed that the physical causes with
+which we are already acquainted are sufficient to explain the observed
+phenomena of organic nature. But it clearly makes no difference whether
+or not this assumption is conceded, provided we allow that the observed
+phenomena are all due to physical causes of some kind, be they known or
+unknown. That is to say, in whatever measure we exclude the hypothesis
+of the direct or immediate intervention of the Deity in organic nature
+(miracle), in that measure we are reducing the evidence of design in
+organic nature to precisely the same logical position as that which is
+occupied by the evidence of design in inorganic nature. Hence I conceive
+that Mill has shown a singular want of penetration where, after
+observing with reference to natural selection, 'creative forethought is
+not absolutely the only link by which the origin of the wonderful
+mechanism of the eye may be connected with the fact of sight,' he goes
+on to say, 'leaving this remarkable speculation (i.e. that of natural
+selection) to whatever fate the progress of discovery may have in store
+for it, in the present state of knowledge the adaptations in nature
+afford a large balance of probability in favour of creation by
+intelligence.' I say this passage seems to me to show a singular want of
+penetration, and I say so because it appears to argue that the issue
+lies between the hypothesis of special design and the hypothesis of
+natural selection. But it does not do so. The issue really lies between
+special design and natural causes. Survival of the fittest is one of
+these causes which has been suggested, and shown by a large accumulation
+of evidence to be probably a true cause. But even if it were to be
+disproved as a cause, the real argumentative position of teleology would
+not thereby be effected, unless we were to conclude that there can be no
+other causes of a secondary or physical kind concerned in the
+production of the observed adaptations.
+
+I trust that I have now made it sufficiently clear why I hold that if we
+believe the reign of natural law, or the operation of physical causes,
+to extend throughout organic nature in the same universal manner as we
+believe this in the case of inorganic nature, then we can find no better
+evidence of design in the one province than in the other. The mere fact
+that we meet with more numerous and apparently more complete instances
+of design in the one province than in the other is, _ex hypothesi_,
+merely due to our ignorance of the natural causation in the more
+intricate province. In studying biological phenomena we are all at
+present in the intellectual position of our imaginary teleologist when
+studying the marine bay: we do not know the natural causes which have
+produced the observed results. But if, after having obtained a partial
+key in the theory of natural selection, we trust to the large analogy
+which is afforded by the simpler provinces of Nature, and conclude that
+physical causes are everywhere concerned in the production of organic
+structures, then we have concluded that any evidence of design which
+these structures present is of just the same logical value as that which
+we may attach to the evidence of design in inorganic nature. If it
+should still be urged that the adaptations met with in organic nature
+are from their number and unity much more suggestive of design than
+anything met with in inorganic nature, I must protest that this is to
+change the ground of argument and to evade the only point in dispute.
+No one denies the obvious fact stated: the only question is whether any
+number and any quantity of adaptations in any one department of nature
+afford other or better evidence of design than is afforded by
+adaptations in other departments, when all departments alike are
+supposed to be equally the outcome of physical causation. And this
+question I answer in the negative, because we have no means of
+ascertaining the extent to which the process of natural selection, or
+any other physical cause, is competent to produce adaptations of the
+kind observed.
+
+Thus, to take another instance of apparent design from inorganic nature,
+it has been argued that the constitution of the atmosphere is clearly
+designed for the support of vegetable and animal life. But before this
+conclusion can be established upon the facts, it must be shown that life
+could exist under no other material conditions than those which are
+furnished to it by the elementary constituents of the atmosphere. This,
+however, it is clearly impossible to show. For anything that we can know
+to the contrary, life may actually be existing upon some of the other
+heavenly bodies under totally different conditions as to atmosphere; and
+the fact that on this planet all life has come to be dependent upon the
+gases which occur in our atmosphere, may be due simply to the fact that
+it was only the forms of life which were able to adapt themselves
+(through natural selection or other physical causes) to these particular
+gases which could possibly be expected to occur--just as in matters of
+still smaller detail, it was only those forms of life that were suited
+to their several habitats in the marine bay, which could possibly be
+expected to be found in these several situations. Now, if a set of
+adjustments so numerous and so delicate as those on which the relations
+of every known form of life to the constituent gases of the atmosphere
+are seen to depend, can thus be shown not necessarily to imply the
+action of any disposing intelligence, how is it possible to conclude
+that any less general exhibitions of adjustment imply this, so long as
+every case of adjustment, whether or not ultimately due to design, is
+regarded as proximately due to physical causes?
+
+In view of these considerations, therefore, I think it is perfectly
+clear that if the argument from teleology is to be saved at all, it can
+only be so by shifting it from the narrow basis of special adaptations,
+to the broad area of Nature as a whole. And here I confess that to my
+mind the argument does acquire a weight which, if long and attentively
+considered, deserves to be regarded as enormous. For, although this and
+that particular adjustment in Nature may be seen to be proximately due
+to physical causes, and although we are prepared on the grounds of the
+largest possible analogy to infer that all other such particular cases
+are likewise due to physical causes, the more ultimate question arises,
+How is it that all physical causes conspire, by their united action, to
+the production of a general order of Nature? It is against all analogy
+to suppose that such an end as this can be accomplished by such means
+as those, in the way of mere chance or 'the fortuitous concourse of
+atoms.' We are led by the most fundamental dictates of our reason to
+conclude that there must be some cause for this co-operation of causes.
+I know that from Lucretius' time this has been denied; but it has been
+denied only on grounds of _feeling_. No possible _reason_ can be given
+for the denial which does not run counter to the law of causation
+itself. I am therefore perfectly clear that the only question which,
+from a purely rational point of view, here stands to be answered is
+this--Of what nature are we to suppose the _causa causarum_ to be?
+
+On this point only two hypotheses have ever been advanced, and I think
+it is impossible to conceive that any third one is open. Of these two
+hypotheses the earliest, and of course the most obvious, is that of
+mental purpose. The other hypothesis is one which we owe to the
+far-reaching thought of Mr. Herbert Spencer. In Chapter VII of his
+_First Principles_ he argues that all causation arises immediately out
+of existence as such, or, as he states it, that 'uniformity of law
+inevitably follows from the persistence of force.' For 'if in any two
+cases there is exact likeness not only between those most conspicuous
+antecedents which we distinguish as the causes, but also between those
+accompanying antecedents which we call the conditions, we cannot affirm
+that the effects will differ, without affirming either that some force
+has come into existence or that some force has ceased to exist. If the
+co-operative forces in the one case are equal to those in the other,
+each to each, in distribution and amount; then it is impossible to
+conceive the product of their joint action in the one case as unlike
+that in the other, without conceiving one or more of the forces to have
+increased or diminished in quantity; and this is conceiving that force
+is not persistent.'
+
+Now this interpretation of causality as the immediate outcome of
+existence must be considered first as a theory of causation, and next as
+a theory in relation to Theism. As a theory of causation it has not met
+with the approval of mathematicians, physicists, or logicians, leading
+representatives of all these departments of thought having expressly
+opposed it, while, so far as I am aware, no representative of any one of
+them has spoken in its favour[23]. But with this point I am not at
+present concerned, for even if the theory were admitted to furnish a
+full and complete explanation of causality, it would still fail to
+account for the harmonious relation of causes, or the fact with which we
+are now alone concerned. This distinction is not perceived by the
+anonymous author 'Physicus,' who, in his _Candid Examination of Theism_,
+lays great stress upon Mr. Spencer's theory of causation as subversive
+of Theism, or at least as superseding the necessity of theistic
+hypothesis by furnishing a full explanation of the order of Nature on
+purely physical grounds. But he fails to perceive that even if Mr.
+Spencer's theory were conceded fully to explain all the facts of
+causality, it would in no wise tend to explain the cosmos in which these
+facts occur. It may be true that causation depends upon the 'persistence
+of force': it does not follow that all manifestations of force should on
+this account have been directed to occur as they do occur. For, if we
+follow back any sequence of physical causation, we soon find that it
+spreads out on all sides into a network of physical relations which are
+literally infinite both in space (conditions) and in time (antecedent
+causes). Now, even if we suppose that the persistence of force is a
+sufficient explanation of the occurrence of the particular sequence
+contemplated so far as the exhibition of force is there concerned, we
+are thus as far as ever from explaining the _determination_ of this
+force into the particular channel through which it flows. It may be
+quite true that the resultant is determined as to magnitude and
+direction by the components; but what about the magnitude and direction
+of the components? If it is said that they in turn were determined by
+the outcome of previous systems, how about these systems? And so on till
+we spread away into the infinite network already mentioned. Only if we
+knew the origin of all series of all such systems could we be in a
+position to say that an adequate intelligence might determine beforehand
+by calculation the state of any one part of the universe at any given
+instant of time. But, as the series are infinite both in number and
+extent, this knowledge is clearly out of the question. Moreover, even if
+it could be imagined as possible, it could only be so imagined at the
+expense of supposing an origin of physical causation in time; and this
+amounts to supposing a state of things prior to such causation, and out
+of which it arose. But to suppose this is to suppose some extra-physical
+source of physical causation; and whether this supposition is made with
+reference to a physical event occurring under immediate observation
+(miracle), or to a physical event in past time, or to the origin of all
+physical events, it is alike incompatible with any theory that seeks to
+give a purely physical explanation of the physical universe as a whole.
+It is, in short, the old story about a stream not being able to rise
+above its source. Physical causation cannot be made to supply its own
+explanation, and the mere persistence of force, even if it were conceded
+to account for particular cases of physical sequence, can give no
+account of the ubiquitous and eternal direction of force in the
+construction and maintenance of universal order.
+
+We are thus, as it were, driven upon the theory of Theism as furnishing
+the only nameable explanation of this universal order. That is to say,
+by no logical artifice can we escape from the conclusion that, as far
+as we can see, this universal order must be regarded as due to some one
+integrating principle; and that this, so far as we can see, is most
+probably of the nature of mind. At least it must be allowed that we can
+conceive of it under no other aspect; and that if any particular
+adaptation in organic nature is held to be suggestive of such an agency,
+the sum total of all adaptations in the universe must be held to be
+incomparably more so. I shall not, however, dwell upon this theme since
+it has been well treated by several modern writers, and with special
+cogency by the Rev. Baden Powell. I will merely observe that I do not
+consider it necessary to the display of this argument in favour of
+Theism that we should speak of 'natural laws.' It is enough to take our
+stand upon the [broadest] general fact that Nature is a system, and that
+the order observable in this system is absolutely universal, eternally
+enduring, and infinitely exact; while only upon the supposition of its
+being such is our experience conceived as possible, or our knowledge
+conceived as attainable.
+
+Having thus stated as emphatically as I can that in my opinion no
+explanation of natural order can be either conceived or named other than
+that of intelligence as the supreme directing cause, I shall proceed to
+two other questions which arise immediately out of this conclusion. The
+first of these questions is as to the presumable character of this
+supreme Intelligence so far as any data of inference upon this point are
+supplied by our observation of Nature; and the other question is as to
+the strictly formal cogency of any conclusions either with reference to
+the existence or the character of such an intelligence[24]. I shall
+consider these two points separately.
+
+No sooner have we reached the conclusion that the only hypothesis
+whereby the general order of Nature admits of being in any degree
+accounted for is that it is due to a cause of a mental kind, than we
+confront the fact that this cause must be widely different from anything
+that we know of Mind in ourselves. And we soon discover that this
+difference must be conceived as not merely of degree, however great, but
+of kind. In other words, although we may conclude that the nearest
+analogue of the _causa causarum_ given in experience is the human mind,
+we are bound to acknowledge that in all fundamental points the analogy
+is so remote that it becomes a question whether we are really very much
+nearer the truth by entertaining it. Thus, for instance, as Mr. Spencer
+has pointed out, our only conception of that which we know as Mind in
+ourselves is the conception of a series of states of consciousness. But,
+he continues, 'Put a series of states of consciousness as cause and the
+evolving universe as effect, and then endeavour to see the last as
+flowing from the first. I find it possible to imagine in some dim way a
+series of states of consciousness serving as antecedent to any one of
+the movements I see going on; for my own states of consciousness are
+often indirectly the antecedents to such movements. But how if I attempt
+to think of such a series as antecedent to _all_ actions throughout the
+universe ...? If to account for this infinitude of physical changes
+everywhere going on, "Mind must be conceived as there," "under the guise
+of simple-dynamics," then the reply is, that, to be so conceived, Mind
+must be divested of all attributes by which it is distinguished; and
+that, when thus divested of its distinguishing attributes the conception
+disappears--the word Mind stands for a blank.'
+
+Moreover, 'How is the "originating Mind" to be thought of as having
+states produced by things objective to it, as discriminating among these
+states, and classing them as like and unlike; and as preferring one
+objective result to another?'[25]
+
+Hence, without continuing this line of argument, which it would not be
+difficult to trace through every constituent branch of human psychology,
+we may take it as unquestionable that, if there is a Divine Mind, it
+must differ so essentially from the human mind, that it becomes
+illogical to designate the two by the same name: the attributes of
+eternity and ubiquity are in themselves enough to place such a Mind in a
+category _sui generis_, wholly different from anything which the analogy
+furnished by our own mind enables us even dimly to conceive. And this,
+of course, is no more than theologians admit. God's thoughts are above
+our thoughts, and a God who would be comprehensible to our intelligence
+would be no God at all, they say. Which may be true enough, only we must
+remember that in whatever measure we are thus precluded from
+understanding the Divine Mind, in that measure are we precluded from
+founding any conclusions as to its nature upon analogies furnished by
+the human mind. The theory ceases to be anthropomorphic: it ceases to be
+even 'anthropopsychic': it is affiliated with the conception of mind
+only in virtue of the one fact that it serves to give the best
+provisional account of the order of Nature, by supposing an infinite
+extension of some of the faculties of the human mind, with a concurrent
+obliteration of all the essential conditions under which alone these
+faculties are known to exist. Obviously of such a Mind as this no
+predication is logically possible. If such a Mind exists, it is not
+conceivable as existing, and we are precluded from assigning to it any
+attributes.
+
+Thus much on general grounds. Descending now to matters of more detail,
+let us assume with the natural theologians that such a Mind does exist,
+that it so far resembles the human mind as to be a conscious, personal
+intelligence, and that the care of such a Mind is over all its works.
+Even upon the grounds of this supposition we meet with a number of large
+and general facts which indicate that this Mind ought still to be
+regarded as apparently very unlike its 'image' in the mind of man. I
+will not here dwell upon the argument of seeming waste and purposeless
+action in Nature, because I think that this may be fairly met by the
+ulterior argument already drawn from Nature as a whole--viz. that as a
+whole, Nature is a cosmos, and therefore that what to us appears
+wasteful and purposeless in matters of detail may not be so in relation
+to the scheme of things as a whole. But I am doubtful whether this
+ulterior argument can fairly be adduced to meet the apparent absence in
+Nature of that which in man we term morality. For in the human mind the
+sense of right and wrong--with all its accompanying or constituting
+emotions of love, sympathy, justice, &c.--is so important a factor, that
+however greatly we may imagine the intellectual side of the human mind
+to be extended, we can scarcely imagine that the moral side could ever
+become so apparently eclipsed as to end in the authorship of such a work
+as we find in terrestrial nature. It is useless to hide our eyes to the
+state of matters which meets us here. Most of the instances of special
+design which are relied upon by the natural theologian to prove the
+intelligent nature of the First Cause, have as their end or object the
+infliction of painful death or the escape from remorseless enemies; and
+so far the argument in favour of the intelligent nature of the First
+Cause is an argument against its morality. Again, even if we quit the
+narrower basis on which teleological argument has rested in the past,
+and stand that argument upon the broader ground of Nature as a whole, it
+scarcely becomes less incompatible with any inference to the morality
+of that Cause, seeing that the facts to which I have alluded are not
+merely occasional and, as it were, outweighed by contrary facts of a
+more general kind, but manifestly constitute the leading feature of the
+scheme of organic nature as a whole: or, if this were held to be
+questionable, it could only follow that we are not entitled to infer
+that there is any such scheme at all.
+
+Nature, as red in tooth and claw with ravin, is thus without question a
+large and general fact that must be considered by any theory of
+teleology which can be propounded. I do not think that this aspect of
+the matter could be conveyed in stronger terms than it is by
+'Physicus[26],' whom I shall therefore quote:--
+
+'Supposing the Deity to be, what Professor Flint maintains that he
+is--viz. omnipotent, and there can be no inference more transparent than
+that such wholesale suffering, for whatever ends designed, exhibits an
+incalculably greater deficiency of beneficence in the divine character
+than that which we know in any, the very worst, of human characters. For
+let us pause for one moment to think of what suffering in Nature means.
+Some hundreds of millions of years ago some millions of millions of
+animals must be supposed to have become sentient. Since that time till
+the present, there must have been millions and millions of generations
+of millions and millions of individuals. And throughout all this period
+of incalculable duration, this inconceivable host of sentient organisms
+have been in a state of unceasing battle, dread, ravin, pain. Looking to
+the outcome, we find that more than one half of the species which have
+survived the ceaseless struggle are parasitic in their habits, lower and
+insentient forms of life feasting on higher and sentient forms; we find
+teeth and talons whetted for slaughter, hooks and suckers moulded for
+torment--everywhere a reign of terror, hunger, sickness, with oozing
+blood and quivering limbs, with gasping breath and eyes of innocence
+that dimly close in deaths of cruel torture! Is it said that there are
+compensating enjoyments? I care not to strike the balance; the
+enjoyments I plainly perceive to be as physically necessary as the
+pains, and this whether or not evolution is due to design.... Am I told
+that I am not competent to judge the purposes of the Almighty? I answer
+that if there are _purposes_, I _am_ able to judge of them so far as I
+can see; and if I am expected to judge of His purposes when they appear
+to be beneficent, I am in consistency obliged also to judge of them when
+they appear to be malevolent. And it can be no possible extenuation of
+the latter to point to the "final result" as "order and beauty," so long
+as the means adopted by the "_Omnipotent Designer_" are known to have
+been so [terrible]. All that we could legitimately assert in this case
+would be that, so far as observation can extend, "He cares for animal
+perfection" _to the exclusion of_ "animal enjoyment," and even to the
+_total disregard_ of animal suffering. But to assert this would merely
+be to deny beneficence as an attribute of God[27].'
+
+The reasoning here appears as unassailable as it is obvious. If, as the
+writer goes on to say, we see a rabbit panting in the iron jaws of a
+spring trap, and in consequence abhor the devilish nature of the being
+who, with full powers of realizing what pain means, can deliberately
+employ his whole faculties of invention in contriving a thing so
+hideously cruel; what are we to think of a Being who, with yet higher
+faculties of thought and knowledge, and with an unlimited choice of
+means to secure His ends, has contrived untold thousands of mechanisms
+no less diabolical? In short, so far as Nature can teach us, or
+'observation can extend,' it does appear that the scheme, if it is a
+scheme, is the product of a Mind which differs from the more highly
+evolved type of human mind in that it is immensely more intellectual
+without being nearly so moral. And the same thing is indicated by the
+rough and indiscriminate manner in which justice is allotted--even if it
+can be said to be allotted at all. When we contrast the certainty and
+rigour with which any offence against 'physical law' is punished by
+Nature (no matter though the sin be but one of ignorance), with the
+extreme uncertainty and laxity with which she meets any offence against
+'moral law,' we are constrained to feel that the system of legislation
+(if we may so term it) is conspicuously different from that which would
+have been devised by any intelligence which in any sense could be called
+'anthropopsychic.'
+
+The only answer to these difficulties open to the natural theologian is
+that which is drawn from the constitution of the human mind. It is
+argued that the fact of this mind having so large an ingredient of
+morality in its constitution may be taken as proof that its originating
+source is likewise of a moral character. This argument, however, appears
+to me of a questionable character, seeing that, for anything we can tell
+to the contrary, the moral sense may have been given to, or developed
+in, man simply on account of its utility to the species--just in the
+same way as teeth in the shark or poison in the snake. If so, the
+occurrence of the moral sense in man would merely furnish one other
+instance of the intellectual, as distinguished from the moral, nature of
+God; and there seems to be in itself no reason why we should take any
+other view. The mere fact that to _us_ the moral sense seems such a
+great and holy thing, is doubtless (under any view) owing to its
+importance to the well-being of our species. In itself, or as it appears
+to other possible beings intellectual like ourselves, but existing under
+unlike conditions, the moral sense of man may be regarded as of no more
+significance than the social instincts of bees. More particularly may
+this consideration apply to the case of a Mind existing, according to
+the theological theory of things, wholly beyond the pale of anything
+analogous to those social relations out of which, according to the
+scientific theory of evolution, the moral sense has been developed in
+ourselves[28].
+
+The truth is that in this matter natural theologians begin by assuming
+that the First Cause, if intelligent, _must_ be moral; and then they are
+blinded to the strictly logical weakness of the argument whereby they
+endeavour to sustain their assumption. For aught that we can tell to the
+contrary, it may be quite as 'anthropomorphic' a notion to attribute
+morality to God as it would be to attribute those capacities for
+sensuous enjoyment with which the Greeks endowed their divinities. The
+Deity may be as high above the one as the other--or rather perhaps we
+may say as much external to the one as to the other. Without being
+supra-moral, and still less immoral, He may be un-moral: our ideas of
+morality may have no meaning as applied to Him.
+
+But if we go thus far in one direction, I think, _per contra_, it must
+in consistency be allowed that the argument from the constitution of the
+human mind acquires more weight when it is shifted from the moral sense
+to the religious instincts. For, on the one hand, these instincts are
+not of such obvious use to the species as are those of morality; and,
+on the other hand, while they are unquestionably very general, very
+persistent, and very powerful, they do not appear to serve any 'end' or
+'purpose' in the scheme of things, unless we accept the theory which is
+given of them by those in whom they are most strongly developed. Here I
+think we have an argument of legitimate force, although it does not
+appear that such was the opinion entertained of it by Mill. I think the
+argument is of legitimate force, because if the religious instincts of
+the human race point to no reality as their object, they are out of
+analogy with all other instinctive endowments. Elsewhere in the animal
+kingdom we never meet with such a thing as an instinct pointing
+aimlessly, and therefore the fact of man being, as it is said, 'a
+religious animal'--i.e. presenting a class of feelings of a peculiar
+nature directed to particular ends, and most akin to, if not identical
+with, true instinct--is so far, in my opinion, a legitimate argument in
+favour of the reality of some object towards which the religious side of
+this animal's nature is directed. And I do not think that this argument
+is invalidated by such facts as that widely different intellectual
+conceptions touching the character of this object are entertained by
+different races of mankind; that the force of the religious instincts
+differs greatly in different individuals even of the same race; that
+these instincts admit of being greatly modified by education; that they
+would probably fail to be developed in any individual without at least
+so much education as is required to furnish the needful intellectual
+conceptions on which they are founded; or that we may not improbably
+trace their origin, as Mr. Spencer traces it, to a primitive mode of
+interpreting dreams. For even in view of all these considerations the
+fact remains that these instincts _exist_, and therefore, like all other
+instincts, may be supposed to have a _definite_ meaning, even though,
+like all other instincts, they may be supposed to have had a _natural
+cause_, which both in the individual and in the race requires, as in the
+natural development of all other instincts, the natural conditions for
+its occurrence to be supplied. In a word, if animal instincts generally,
+like organic structures or inorganic systems, are held to betoken
+purpose, the religious nature of man would stand out as an anomaly in
+the general scheme of things if it alone were purposeless. Hence we have
+here what seems to me a valid inference, so far as it goes, to the
+effect that, if the general order of Nature is due to Mind, the
+character of that Mind is such as it is conceived to be by the most
+highly developed form of religion. A conclusion which is no doubt the
+opposite of that which we reached by contemplating the phenomena of
+biology; and a contradiction which can only be overcome by supposing,
+either that Nature conceals God, while man reveals Him, or that Nature
+reveals God while man misrepresents Him.
+
+There is still one other fact of a very wide and general kind presented
+by Nature, which, if the order of Nature is taken to be the expression
+of intelligent purpose, ought in my opinion to be regarded as of great
+weight in furnishing evidence upon the ethical quality of that purpose.
+It is a fact which, so far as I know, has not been considered by any
+other writer; but from its being one of the most general of all the
+facts relating to the sentient creation, and from its admitting of no
+one single exception, I feel that I am not able too strongly to
+emphasize its argumentative importance. This fact is, as I have stated
+it on a former occasion, 'that amid all the millions of mechanisms and
+instincts in the animal kingdom, there is no one instance of a mechanism
+or instinct occurring in one species for the exclusive benefit of
+another species, although there are a few cases in which a mechanism or
+instinct that is of benefit to its possessor has come also to be
+utilized by other species. Now, on the beneficent design theory it is
+impossible to explain why, when all the mechanisms in the same species
+are invariably correlated for the benefit of that species, there should
+never be any such correlation between mechanisms in different species,
+or why the same remark should apply to instincts. For how magnificent a
+display of Divine beneficence would organic nature have afforded, if
+all, or even some, species had been so inter-related as to minister to
+each other's necessities. Organic species might then have been likened
+to a countless multitude of voices all singing in one harmonious psalm
+of praise. But, as it is, we see no vestige of such co-ordination; every
+species is for itself, and for itself alone--an outcome of the always
+and everywhere fiercely raging struggle for life[29].'
+
+The large and general fact thus stated constitutes, in my opinion, the
+strongest of all arguments in favour of Mr. Darwin's theory of natural
+selection, and therefore we can see the probable reason why it is what
+it is, so far as the question of its physical causation is concerned.
+But where the question is, Supposing the physical causation ultimately
+due to Mind, what are we to infer concerning the character of the Mind
+which has adopted this method of causation?--then we again reach the
+answer that, so far as we can judge from a conscientious examination of
+these facts, this Mind does not show that it is of a nature which in man
+we should call moral. Of course behind the physical appearances there
+may be a moral justification, so that from these appearances we are not
+entitled to say more than that from the fact of its having chosen a
+method of physical causation leading to these results, it has presented
+to us the appearance, as before observed, of caring for animal
+perfection to the exclusion of animal enjoyment, and even to the total
+disregard of animal suffering.
+
+In conclusion, it is of importance to insist upon a truth which in
+discussions of this kind is too often disregarded--viz. that all our
+reasonings being of a character relative to our knowledge, our
+inferences are uncertain in a degree proportionate to the extent of our
+ignorance; and that as with reference to the topics which we have been
+considering our ignorance is of immeasurable extent, any conclusions
+that we may have formed are, as Bishop Butler would say, 'infinitely
+precarious.' Or, as I have previously presented this formal aspect of
+the matter while discussing the teleological argument with Professor Asa
+Gray,--'I suppose it will be admitted that the validity of an inference
+depends upon the number, the importance, and the definiteness of the
+things or ratios known, as compared with the number, importance, and
+definiteness of the things or ratios unknown, but inferred. If so, we
+should be logically cautious in drawing inferences from the natural to
+the supernatural: for although we have the entire sphere of experience
+from which to draw an inference, we are unable to gauge the probability
+of the inference when drawn--the unknown ratios being confessedly of
+unknown number, importance, and degree of definiteness: the whole orbit
+of human knowledge is insufficient to obtain a parallax whereby to
+institute the required measurements or to determine the proportion
+between the terms known and the terms unknown. Otherwise phrased, we may
+say--as our knowledge of a part is to our knowledge of a whole, so is
+our inference from that part to the reality of that whole. Who,
+therefore, can say, even upon the hypothesis of Theism, that our
+inferences or "idea of design" would have any meaning if applied to the
+"All-Upholder," whose thoughts are not as our thoughts?'[30] And of
+course, _mutatis mutandis_, the same remarks apply to all inferences
+having a negative tendency.
+
+As an outcome of the whole of this discussion, then, I think it appears
+that the influence of Science upon Natural Religion has been uniformly
+of a destructive character. Step by step it has driven back the apparent
+evidence of direct or special design in Nature, until now this evidence
+resides exclusively in the one great and general fact that Nature as a
+whole is a Cosmos. Further than this it is obviously impossible that the
+destructive influence of Science can extend, because Science can only
+exist upon the basis of this fact. But when we allow that this great and
+universal fact--which but for the effects of unremitting familiarity
+could scarcely fail to be intellectually overwhelming--does betoken
+mental agency in Nature, we immediately find it impossible to determine
+the probable character of such a mind, even supposing that it exists. We
+cannot conceive of it as presenting any one of the qualities which
+essentially characterize what we know as mind in ourselves; and
+therefore the word Mind, as applied to the supposed agency, stands for a
+blank. Further, even if we disregard this difficulty, and assume that in
+some way or other incomprehensible to us a Mind does exist as far
+transcending the human mind as the human mind transcends mechanical
+motion; still we are met by some very large and general facts in Nature
+which seem strongly to indicate that this Mind, if it exists, is either
+deficient in, or wholly destitute of, that class of feelings which in
+man we term moral; while, on the other hand, the religious aspirations
+of man himself may be taken to indicate the opposite conclusion. And,
+lastly, with reference to the whole course of such reasonings, we have
+seen that any degree of measurable probability, as attaching to the
+conclusions, is unattainable. From all which it appears that Natural
+Religion at the present time can only be regarded as a system full of
+intellectual contradictions and moral perplexities; so that if we go to
+her with these greatest of all questions: 'Is there knowledge with the
+Most High?' 'Shall not the Judge of all the earth do right?' the only
+clear answer which we receive is the one that comes back to us from the
+depths of our own heart--'When I thought upon this it was too painful
+for me.'
+
+FOOTNOTES:
+
+[23] A note (of 1893) contains the following: 'Being, considered in the
+abstract, is logically equivalent to Not-Being or Nothing. For if by
+successive stages of abstraction, we divest the conception of Being of
+attribute and relation we reach the conception of that which cannot be,
+i.e. a logical contradiction, or the logical correlative of Being which
+is Nothing. (All this is well expressed in Caird's _Evolution of
+Religion_.) The failure to perceive this fact constitutes a ground
+fallacy in my _Candid Examination of Theism_, where I represent Being as
+being a sufficient explanation of the Order of Nature or the law of
+Causation.'
+
+[24] This promise is only partially fulfilled in the penultimate
+paragraph of the essay.--ED.
+
+[25] _Essays_, vol. iii. p. 246 et seq. The whole passage ought to be
+consulted, being too long to quote here.
+
+[26] In an essay on Prof. Flint's _Theism_, appended to the _Candid
+Examination_.
+
+[27] _A Candid Examination of Theism_, pp. 171-2.
+
+[28] [I have, as Editor, resisted a temptation to intervene in the above
+argument. But I think I may intervene on a matter of fact, and point out
+that 'according to the theological theory of things,' i.e. according to
+the Trinitarian doctrine, God's Nature consists in what is strictly
+'analogous to social relations,' and He not merely exhibits in His
+creation, but Himself _is_ Love. See, on the subject, especially, R.H.
+Hutton's essay on the Incarnation, in his _Theological Essays_
+(Macmillan).--ED.]
+
+[29] _Scientific Evidences of Organic Evolution_, pp. 76-7.
+
+[30] _Nature_, April 5, 1883.
+
+
+
+
+PART II.
+
+
+
+
++Introductory Note by the Editor+.
+
+
+Little more requires to be said by way of introduction to the Notes
+which are all that George Romanes was able to write of a work that was
+to have been entitled _A Candid Examination of Religion_. What little
+does require to be said must be by way of bridging the interval of
+thought which exists between the Essays which have just preceded and the
+Notes which represent more nearly his final phase of mind.
+
+The most anti-theistic feature in the Essays is the stress laid in them
+on the evidence which Nature supplies, or is supposed to supply,
+antagonistic to the belief in the goodness of God.
+
+On this mysterious and perplexing subject George Romanes appears to have
+had more to say but did not live to say it[31]. We may notice however
+that in 1889, in a paper read before the Aristotelian Society, on 'the
+Evidence of Design in Nature[32],' he appears to allow more weight than
+before to the argument that the method of physical development must be
+judged in the light of its result. This paper was part of a _Symposium_.
+Mr. S. Alexander has argued in a previous paper against the hypothesis
+of 'design' in Nature on the ground that 'the fair order of Nature is
+only acquired by a wholesale waste and sacrifice.' This argument was
+developed by pointing to the obvious 'mal-adjustments,' 'aimless
+destructions,' &c., which characterize the processes of Nature. But
+these, Romanes replies, necessarily belong to the process considered as
+one of 'natural selection.' The question is only: Is such a process _per
+se_ incompatible with the hypothesis of design? And he replies in the
+negative.
+
+
+'"The fair order of Nature is only acquired by a wholesale waste and
+sacrifice." Granted. But if the "wholesale waste and sacrifice," as
+antecedent, leads to a "fair order of Nature" as its consequent, how can
+it be said that the "wholesale waste and sacrifice" has been a failure?
+Or how can it be said that, in point of fact, there _has_ been a waste,
+or _has_ been a sacrifice? Clearly such things can only be said when
+our point of view is restricted to the means (i.e. the wholesale
+destruction of the less fit); not when we extend our view to what, even
+within the limits of human observation, is unquestionably the _end_
+(i.e. the causal result in an ever improving world of types). A
+candidate who is plucked in a Civil Service examination because he
+happens to be one of the less fitted to pass, is no doubt an instance of
+failure so far as his own career is concerned; but it does not therefore
+follow that the system of examination is a failure in its final end of
+securing the best men for the Civil Service. And the fact that the
+general outcome of all the individual failures in Nature is that of
+securing what Mr. Alexander calls "the fair order of Nature," is
+assuredly evidence that the _modus operandi_ has not been a failure in
+relation to what, if there be any Design in Nature at all, must be
+regarded as the higher purpose of such Design. Therefore, cases of
+individual or otherwise relative failure cannot be quoted as evidence
+against the hypothesis of there being such Design. The fact that the
+general system of natural causation has for its eventual result "a fair
+order of Nature," cannot of itself be a fact inimical to the hypothesis
+of Design in Nature, even though it be true that such causation entails
+the continual elimination of the less efficient types.
+
+'To the best of my judgement, then, this argument from failure, random
+trial, blind blundering, or in whatever other terminology the argument
+may be presented, is only valid as against the theory of what Mr.
+Alexander alludes to as a "Carpenter-God," i.e. that if there be Design
+in Nature at all, it must everywhere be _special_ Design; so that the
+evidence of it may as well be tested by any given minute fragment of
+Nature--such as one individual organism or class of organisms--as by
+having regard to the whole Cosmos. The evidence of Design in this sense
+I fully allow has been totally destroyed by the proof of natural
+selection. But such destruction has only brought into clearer relief the
+much larger question that rises behind, viz. as before phrased, Is there
+anything about the method of natural causation, considered as a whole,
+that is inimical to the theory of Design in Nature, considered as a
+whole?'
+
+
+It is true that this argument does not bear directly upon the
+_character_ of the God whose 'design' Nature exhibits: but indirectly it
+does[33]. For instance, such an argument as that found above (on p. 79:
+'we see a rabbit, &c.') seems to be only valid on the postulate here
+described as that of the 'Carpenter-God.'
+
+It is also probable that Romanes felt the difficulty arising from the
+cruelty of nature less, as he was led to dwell more on humanity as the
+most important part of nature, and perceived the function of suffering
+in the economy of human life (pp. 142, 154): and also as he became more
+impressed with the positive evidences for Christianity as at once the
+religion of sorrow and the revelation of God as Love (pp. 163, ff.). The
+Christian Faith supplies believers not only with an argument against
+pessimism from general results, but also with such an insight into the
+Divine character and method as enables them at least to bear hopefully
+the awful perplexities which arise from the spectacle of individuals
+suffering.
+
+In the last year or two of his life he read very attentively a great
+number of books on 'Christian Evidences,' from Pascal's _Pensées_
+downwards, and studied carefully the appearance of 'plan' in the
+Biblical Revelation considered as a whole. The _fact_ of this study
+appears in fragmentary remarks, indices and references, which George
+Romanes left behind him in note-books. The _results_ of it will not be
+unapparent in the following Notes, which, I need to remind my readers,
+are, in spite of their small bulk, the sole reason for the existence of
+this volume.
+
+In reading these I can hardly conceive any one not being possessed with
+a profound regret that the author was not allowed to complete his work.
+And it is only fair to ask every reader of the following pages to
+remember that he is reading, in the main, incomplete notes and not
+finished work. This will account for a great deal that may seem sketchy
+and unsatisfactory in the treatment of different points, and also for
+repetitions and traces of inconsistency. But I can hardly think any one
+can read these notes to the end without agreeing with me that if I had
+withheld them from publication, the world would have lost the witness of
+a mind, both able and profoundly sincere, feeling after God and finding
+Him.
+
+                                                                    C.G.
+
+FOOTNOTES:
+
+[31] See below p. 142, and note. I find also the following note of a
+date subsequent to 1889. 'It is a fact that pessimism is illogical,
+simply because we are inadequate judges of the world, and pessimism
+would therefore be opposed to agnosticism. We may know that there is
+something out of joint between the world and ourselves; but we cannot
+know how far this is the fault of the world or of ourselves.'
+
+[32] _Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society_ (Williams & Norgate),
+vol. i. no. 3, pp. 72, 73.
+
+[33] I ought also to mention that Romanes on the Sunday before his death
+expressed to me verbally his entire agreement with the argument of
+Professor Knight's _Aspects of Theism_ (Macmillan, 1893); in which on
+this subject see pp. 184-186, 'A larger good is evolved through the
+winnowing process by which physical nature casts its weaker products
+aside,' &c.
+
+
+
+
+NOTES FOR A WORK ON A CANDID EXAMINATION OF RELIGION.
+
+BY METAPHYSICUS.
+
+
+_Proposed Mottoes_.
+
+     'I quite admit the difficulty of believing that in every man there
+     is an eye of the soul which, when by other pursuits lost and
+     dimmed, is by this purified and re-illumined; and is more precious
+     far than ten thousand bodily eyes, for by this alone is truth seen.
+     Now there are two classes of persons, one class who will agree with
+     you and will take your words as a revelation; another class who
+     have no understanding of them and to whom they will naturally be as
+     idle tales.
+
+     'And you had better decide at once with which of the two you are
+     arguing; or, perhaps, you will say with neither, and that your
+     chief aim in carrying on the argument is your own improvement; at
+     the same time not grudging to either any benefit which they may
+     derive.'--PLATO.
+
+     'If we would reprove with success, and show another his mistake, we
+     must see from what side he views the matter, for on that side it is
+     generally true: and, admitting this truth, show him the side on
+     which it is false.'--PASCAL.
+
+
+
+
+§ 1. INTRODUCTORY.
+
+
+Many years ago I published in Messrs. Trübner's 'Philosophical Series,'
+a short treatise entitled _A Candid Examination of Theism_ by
+'Physicus.' Although the book made some stir at the time, and has since
+exhibited a vitality never anticipated by its author, the secret of its
+authorship has been well preserved[34]. This secret it is my intention,
+if possible, still to preserve; but as it is desirable (on several
+accounts which will become apparent in the following pages) to avow
+identity of authorship, the present essay appears under the same
+pseudonym[35] as its predecessor. The reason why the first essay
+appeared anonymously is truthfully stated in the preface thereof, viz.
+in order that the reasoning should be judged on its own merits, without
+the bias which is apt to arise on the part of a reader from a knowledge
+of the authority--or absence of authority--on the part of a writer. This
+reason, in my opinion, still holds good as regards _A Candid Examination
+of Theism_, and applies in equal measure to the present sequel in _A
+Candid Examination of Religion_.
+
+It will be shown that in many respects the negative conclusions reached
+in the former essay have been greatly modified by the results of maturer
+thought as now presented in the second. Therefore it seems desirable to
+state at the outset that, as far as I am capable of judging, the
+modifications in question have not been due in any measure to influence
+from without. They appear to have been due exclusively to the results of
+my own further thought, as briefly set out in the following pages, with
+no indebtedness to private friends and but little to published
+utterances in the form of books, &c. Nevertheless, no very original
+ideas are here presented. Indeed, I suppose it would nowadays be
+impossible to present any idea touching religion, which has not at some
+time or another been presented previously. Still much may be done in the
+furthering of one's thought by changing points of view, selecting and
+arranging ideas already more or less familiar, so that they may be built
+into new combinations; and this, I think, I have in no small degree
+accomplished as regards the microcosm of my own mind. But I state this
+much only for the sake of adding a confession that, as far as
+introspection can carry one, it does not appear to me that the
+modifications which my views have undergone since the publication of my
+previous _Candid Examination_ are due so much to purely logical
+processes of the intellect, as to the sub-conscious (and therefore more
+or less unanalyzable) influences due to the ripening experience of life.
+The extent to which this is true [i.e. the extent to which experience
+modifies logic][36] is seldom, if ever, realized, although it is
+practically exemplified every day by the sobering caution which
+advancing age exercises upon the mind. Not so much by any above-board
+play of syllogism as by some underhand cheating of consciousness, do the
+accumulating experiences of life and of thought slowly enrich the
+judgement. And this, one need hardly say, is especially true in such
+regions of thought as present the most tenuous media for the progress of
+thought by the comparatively clumsy means of syllogistic locomotion. For
+the further we ascend from the solid ground of verification, the less
+confidence should we place in our wings of speculation, while the more
+do we find the practical wisdom of such intellectual caution, or
+distrust of ratiocination, as can be given only by experience.
+Therefore, most of all is this the case in those departments of thought
+which are furthest from the region of our sensuous life--viz.
+metaphysics and religion. And, as a matter of fact, it is just in these
+departments of thought that we find the rashness of youth most amenable
+to the discipline in question by the experience of age.
+
+However, in spite of this confession, I have no doubt that even in the
+matter of pure and conscious reason further thought has enabled me to
+detect serious errors, or rather oversights, in the very foundations of
+my _Candid Examination of Theism_. I still think, indeed, that from the
+premises there laid down the conclusions result in due logical sequence,
+so that, as a matter of mere ratiocination, I am not likely ever to
+detect any serious flaws, especially as this has not been done by
+anybody else during the many years of its existence. But I now clearly
+perceive two wellnigh fatal oversights which I then committed. The first
+was undue confidence in merely syllogistic conclusions, even when
+derived from sound premises, in regions of such high abstraction. The
+second was, in not being sufficiently careful in examining the
+foundations of my criticism, i.e. the validity of its premises. I will
+here briefly consider these two points separately.
+
+As regards the first point, never was any one more arrogant in his
+claims for pure reason than I was--more arrogant in spirit though not in
+letter, this being due to contact with science; without ever considering
+how opposed to reason itself is the unexpressed assumption of my earlier
+argument as to God Himself, as if His existence were a merely physical
+problem to be solved by man's reason alone, without reference to his
+other and higher faculties[37].
+
+The second point is of still more importance, because so seldom, if
+ever, recognized.
+
+At the time of writing the _Candid Examination_ I perceived clearly how
+the whole question of Theism from the side of reason turned on the
+question as to the nature of natural causation. My theory of natural
+causation obeyed the Law of Parsimony, resolving all into Being as such;
+but, on the other hand, it erred in not considering whether 'higher
+causes' are not 'necessary' to account for spiritual facts--i.e. whether
+the ultimate Being must not be at least as high as the intellectual and
+spiritual nature of man, i.e. higher than anything merely physical or
+mechanical. The supposition that it must does not violate the Law of
+Parsimony.
+
+Pure agnostics ought to investigate the religious consciousness of
+Christians as a phenomenon which may possibly be what Christians
+themselves believe it to be, i.e. of Divine origin. And this may be done
+without entering into any question as to the objective validity of
+Christian dogmas. The metaphysics of Christianity may be all false in
+fact, and yet the spirit of Christianity may be true in substance--i.e.
+it may be the highest 'good gift from above' as yet given to man.
+
+My present object, then, like that of Socrates, is not to impart any
+philosophical system, or even positive knowledge, but a frame of mind,
+what I may term, pure agnosticism, as distinguished from what is
+commonly so called.
+
+FOOTNOTES:
+
+[34] The first edition, which was published in 1878, was rapidly
+exhausted, but, as my object in publishing was solely that of soliciting
+criticism for my own benefit, I arranged with the publishers not to
+issue any further edition. The work has therefore been out of print for
+many years.
+
+[This 'arrangement' was however not actually made, or at least was
+unknown to the present publishing firm of Kegan Paul, Trench, Trübner &
+Co. Thus a new edition of the book was published in 1892, to the
+author's surprise.--ED.]
+
+[35] [Or rather it was intended that it should appear under the
+pseudonym of 'Metaphysicus.'--ED.]
+
+[36] [Words in square brackets have been added by me. But I have not
+introduced the brackets when I have simply inserted single unimportant
+words obviously necessary for the sense.--ED.]
+
+[37] [See p. 29, quotation from Preface of 'Physicus.' The state of mind
+expressed in the above Note is a return to the earlier frame of mind of
+the Burney Essay, e.g. p. 20. That essay was full of the thought that
+Christian evidences are very manifold and largely
+'extra-scientific.'--ED.]
+
+
+
+
+§ 2. DEFINITION OF TERMS AND PURPOSE OF THIS TREATISE.
+
+
+[To understand George Romanes' mind close attention must be paid to the
+following section. Also to the fact, not explicitly noticed by him, that
+he uses the word 'reason' (see p. 112) in a sense closely resembling
+that in which Mr. Kidd has recently used it in his _Social Evolution_.
+He uses it, that is, in a restricted sense as equivalent to _the process
+of scientific ratiocination_. His main position is therefore this:
+Scientific ratiocination cannot find adequate grounds for belief in God.
+But the pure agnostic must recognize that God may have revealed Himself
+by other means than that of scientific ratiocination. As religion is for
+the whole man, so all human faculties may be required to seek after God
+and find Him--emotions and experiences of an extra-'rational' kind. The
+'pure agnostic' must be prepared to welcome evidence of all
+sorts.--ED.]
+
+It is desirable to be clear at the outset as to the meaning which I
+shall throughout attach to certain terms and phrases.
+
+
+_Theism._
+
+It will frequently be said, 'on the theory of Theism,' 'supposing Theism
+true,' &c. By such phrase my meaning will always be equivalent
+to--'supposing, for the sake of argument, that the nearest approach
+which the human mind can make to a true notion of the _ens realissimum_,
+is that of an inconceivably magnified image of itself at its best.'
+
+
+_Christianity._
+
+Similarly, when it is said, 'supposing Christianity true,' what will be
+meant is--'supposing for the sake of argument, that the Christian system
+as a whole, from its earliest dawn in Judaism, to the phase of its
+development at the present time, is the highest revelation of Himself
+which a personal Deity has vouchsafed to mankind.' This I intend to
+signify an attitude of pure agnosticism as regards any particular dogma
+of Christianity--even that of the Incarnation.
+
+Should it be said that by holding in suspense any distinctive dogma of
+Christianity, I am not considering Christianity at all, I reply, Not so;
+I am not writing a theological, but a philosophical treatise, and shall
+consider Christianity merely as one of many religions, though, of
+course, the latest, &c. Thus considered, Christianity takes its place as
+the highest manifestation of evolution in this department of the human
+mind; but I am not concerned even with so important an ecclesiastical
+dogma as that of the Incarnation of God in Christ. As far as this
+treatise has to go, that dogma may or may not be true. The important
+question for us is, Has God spoken through the medium of our religious
+instincts? And although this will necessarily involve the question
+whether or how far in the case of Christianity there is objective
+evidence of His having spoken by the mouth of holy men [of the Old
+Testament] which have been since the world began, such will be the case
+only because it is a question of objective evidence whether or how far
+the religious instincts of these men, or this race of men, have been so
+much superior to those of other men, or races of men, as to have enabled
+them to predict future events of a religious character. And whether or
+not in these latter days God has spoken by His own Son is not a question
+for us, further than to investigate the higher class of religious
+phenomena which unquestionably have been present in the advent and
+person of Jesus. The question whether Jesus was the Son of God, is,
+logically speaking, a question of ontology, which, _quâ_ pure agnostics,
+we are logically forbidden to touch.
+
+But elsewhere I ought to show that, from my point of view as to the
+fundamental question being whether God has spoken at all through the
+religious instincts of mankind, it may very well be that Christ was not
+God, and yet that He gave the highest revelation of God. If the 'first
+Man' was allegorical, why not the 'second'? It is, indeed, an historical
+fact that the 'second Man' existed, but so likewise may the 'first.'
+And, as regards the 'personal claims' of Christ, all that He said is not
+incompatible with His having been Gabriel, and His Holy Ghost,
+Michael[38]. Or He may have been a man deceived as to His own
+personality, and yet the vehicle of highest inspiration.
+
+
+_Religion._
+
+By the term 'religion,' I shall mean any theory of personal agency in
+the universe, belief in which is strong enough in any degree to
+influence conduct. No term has been used more loosely of late years, or
+in a greater variety of meanings. Of course anybody may use it in any
+sense he pleases, provided he defines exactly in what sense he does so.
+The above seems to be most in accordance with traditional usage.
+
+
+_Agnosticism 'pure' and 'impure'._
+
+The modern and highly convenient term 'Agnosticism,' is used in two very
+different senses. By its originator, Professor Huxley, it was coined to
+signify an attitude of reasoned ignorance touching everything that lies
+beyond the sphere of sense-perception--a professed inability to found
+valid belief on any other basis. It is in this its original sense--and
+also, in my opinion, its only philosophically justifiable sense--that I
+shall understand the term. But the other, and perhaps more popular sense
+in which the word is now employed, is as the correlative of Mr. H.
+Spencer's doctrine of the Unknowable.
+
+This latter term is philosophically erroneous, implying important
+negative knowledge that if there be a God we know this much about
+Him--that He _cannot_ reveal Himself to man[39]. _Pure_ agnosticism is
+as defined by Huxley.
+
+Of all the many scientific men whom I have known, the most pure in his
+agnosticism--not only in profession but in spirit and conduct--was
+Darwin. (What he says in his autobiography about Christianity[40] shows
+no profundity of thought in the direction of philosophy or religion. His
+mind was too purely inductive for this. But, on this very account, it is
+the more remarkable that his rejection of Christianity was due, not to
+any _a priori_ bias against the creed on grounds of reason as absurd,
+but solely on the ground of an apparent moral objection _a
+posteriori_[41].) Faraday and many other first-rate originators in
+science were like Darwin.
+
+As an illustration of impure agnosticism take Hume's _a priori_ argument
+against miracles, leading on to the analogous case of the attitude of
+scientific men towards modern spiritualism. Notwithstanding that they
+have the close analogy of mesmerism as an object-lesson to warn them,
+scientific men as a class are here quite as dogmatic as the straightest
+sect of theologians. I may give examples which can cause no offence,
+inasmuch as the men in question have themselves made the facts public,
+viz. ---- refusing to go to [a famous spiritualist]; ---- refusing to
+try ---- in thought-reading[42]. These men all _professed_ to be
+agnostics at the very time when thus so egregiously violating their
+philosophy by their conduct.
+
+Of course I do not mean to say that, even to a pure agnostic, reason
+should not be guided in part by antecedent presumption--e.g. in ordinary
+life, the _prima facie_ case, motive, &c., counts for evidence in a
+court of law--and where there is a strong antecedent improbability a
+proportionately greater weight of evidence _a posteriori_ is needed to
+counterbalance it: so that, e.g. better evidence would be needed to
+convict the Archbishop of Canterbury than a vagabond of pocket-picking.
+And so it is with speculative philosophy. But in both cases our only
+guide is known analogy; therefore, the further we are removed from
+possible experience--i.e. the more remote from experience the sphere
+contemplated--the less value attaches to antecedent presumptions[43].
+_Maximum_ remoteness from possible experience is reached in the sphere
+of the final mystery of things with which religion has to do; so that
+here all presumption has faded away into a vanishing point, and pure
+agnosticism is our only rational attitude. In other words, here we
+should all alike be pure agnostics as far as reason is concerned; and,
+if any of us are to attain to any information, it can only be by means
+of some super-added faculty of our minds. The questions as to whether
+there are any such super-added faculties; if so, whether they ever
+appear to have been acted upon from without; if they have, in what
+manner they have; what is their report; how far they are trustworthy in
+that report, and so on--these are the questions with which this treatise
+is to be mainly concerned.
+
+My own attitude may be here stated. I do not claim any [religious]
+certainty of an intuitive kind myself; but am nevertheless able to
+investigate the abstract logic of the matter. And, although this may
+seem but barren dialectic, it may, I hope, be of practical service if it
+secures a fair hearing to the reports given by the vast majority of
+mankind who unquestionably believe them to emanate from some such
+super-added faculties--numerous and diverse though their religions be.
+Besides, in my youth I published an essay (the _Candid Examination_)
+which excited a good deal of interest at the time, and has been long out
+of print. In that treatise I have since come to see that I was wrong
+touching what I constituted the basal argument for my negative
+conclusion. Therefore I now feel it obligatory on me to publish the
+following results of my maturer thought, from the same stand-point of
+pure reason. Even though I have obtained no further light from the side
+of intuition, I have from that of intellect. So that, if there be in
+truth any such intuition, I occupy with regard to the organ of it the
+same position as that of the blind lecturer on optics. But on this very
+account I cannot be accused of partiality towards it.
+
+It is generally assumed that when a man has clearly perceived
+agnosticism to be the only legitimate attitude of reason to rest in with
+regard to religion (as I will subsequently show that it is), he has
+thereby finished with the matter; he can go no further. The main object
+of this treatise is to show that such is by no means the case. He has
+then only begun his enquiry into the grounds and justification of
+religious belief. For reason is not the only attribute of man, nor is it
+the only faculty which he habitually employs for the ascertainment of
+truth. Moral and spiritual faculties are of no less importance in their
+respective spheres even of everyday life; faith, trust, taste, &c., are
+as needful in ascertaining truth as to character, beauty, &c., as is
+reason. Indeed we may take it that reason is concerned in ascertaining
+truth only where _causation_ is concerned; the appropriate organs for
+its ascertainment where anything else is concerned belong to the moral
+and spiritual region.
+
+
+As Herbert Spencer says, 'men of science may be divided into two
+classes, of which the one, well exemplified by Faraday, keeping their
+religion and their science absolutely separate, are unperplexed by any
+incongruities between them, and the other of which, occupying themselves
+exclusively with the facts of science, never ask what implications they
+have. Be it trilobite or be it double star, their thought about it is
+much like the thought of Peter Bell about the primrose[44].' Now, both
+these classes are logical, since both, as to their religion, adopt an
+attitude of pure agnosticism, not only in theory, but also in practice.
+What, however, have we to say of the third class, which Spencer does
+not mention, although it is, I think, the largest, viz. of those
+scientific men who expressly abstain from drawing a line of division
+between science and religion [and then judge of religion purely on the
+principles and by the method of science[45]]?
+
+
+There are two opposite casts of mind--the mechanical (scientific, &c.)
+and the spiritual (artistic, religious, &c.). These may alternate even
+in the same individual. An 'agnostic' has no hesitation--even though he
+himself keenly experience the latter--that the former only is worthy of
+trust. But a _pure_ agnostic must know better, as he will perceive that
+there is nothing to choose between the two in point of trustworthiness.
+Indeed, if choice has to be made the mystic might claim higher authority
+for his direct intuitions.
+
+
+Mr. Herbert Spencer has well said, in the opening section of his
+Synthetic Philosophy, that wherever human thought appears to be
+radically divided, [there must be truth on both sides and that the]
+'reconciliation' of opposing views is to be found by emphasizing that
+ultimate element of truth which on each side underlies manifold
+differences. More than is generally supposed depends on points of view,
+especially where first principles of a subject are in dispute. Opposite
+sides of the same shield may present wholly different aspects[46].
+Spencer alludes to this with special reference to the conflict between
+science and religion; and it is in this same connexion that I also
+allude to it. For it seems to me, after many years of thought upon the
+subject, that the 'reconciliation' admits of being carried much further
+than it has been by him. For he effects this reconciliation only to the
+extent of showing that religion arises from the recognition of
+fundamental mystery--which it may be proved that science also recognizes
+in all her fundamental ideas. This, however, is after all little more
+than a platitude. That our ultimate scientific ideas (i.e. ultimate
+grounds of experience) are inexplicable, is a proposition which is
+self-evident since the dawn of human thought. My aim is to carry the
+'reconciliation' into much more detail and yet without quitting the
+grounds of pure reason. I intend to take science and religion in their
+present highly developed states as such, and show that on a systematic
+examination of the latter by the methods of the former, the 'conflict'
+between the two may be not merely 'reconciled' as regards the highest
+generalities of each, but entirely abolished in all matters of detail
+which can be regarded as of any great importance.
+
+
+In any methodical enquiry the first object should be to ascertain the
+fundamental principles with which the enquiry is concerned. In actual
+research, however, it is by no means always the case that the enquirer
+knows, or is able at first to ascertain what those principles are. In
+fact, it is often only at the end of a research, that they are
+discovered to be the fundamental principles. Such has been my own
+experience with regard to the subject of the present enquiry. Although
+all my thinking life has been concerned, off and on, in contemplating
+the problem of our religious instincts, the sundry attempts which have
+been made by mankind for securing their gratification, and the important
+question as to their objective justification, it is only in advanced
+years that I have clearly perceived wherein the first principles of such
+a research must consist. And I doubt whether any one has hitherto
+clearly defined this point. The principles in question are the nature of
+causation and the nature of faith.
+
+
+My objects then in this treatise are, mainly, three: 1st, to purify
+agnosticism; 2nd, to consider more fully than heretofore, and from the
+stand-point of pure agnosticism, the nature of natural causation, or,
+more correctly, the relation of what we know on the subject of such
+causation to the question of Theism; and, 3rd, again starting from the
+same stand-point, to consider the religious consciousnesses of men as
+phenomena of experience (i.e. as regarded by us from without), and
+especially in their highest phase of development as exhibited in
+Christianity.
+
+FOOTNOTES:
+
+[38] [I.e. supernatural but not strictly Divine Persons. Surely,
+however, the proposition is not maintainable.--ED.]
+
+[39] [This is another instance of recurrence to an earlier thought; see
+Burney Essay, p. 25, and cf. _Mind and Motion and Monism_, p. 117, note
+1.--ED.]
+
+[40] _Life and Letters of Charles Darwin_, i. 308.
+
+[41] [See further, p. 182.--ED.]
+
+[42] [On the whole I have thought it best to omit the names.--ED.]
+
+[43] [The MS. note here continues: 'Here introduce all that I say on the
+subject in my Burney Prize.' I have not, however, introduced any
+quotation into the text because (1) I think Romanes makes his meaning
+plain in the text as it stands; (2) I cannot find in the essay in
+question any exactly appropriate passage of reasonable length to quote.
+The greater part of the essay is, however, directed to meet the
+scientific objection to the doctrine that prayer is answered in the
+physical region, by showing that this objection consists in an argument
+from the known to the unknown, i.e. from the known sphere of invariable
+physical laws to the unknown sphere of God's relation to all such laws;
+and is, therefore, weak in proportion as the unknown sphere is remote
+from possible experience of a scientific kind, and admits of an
+indefinite number of possibilities, more or less conceivable to our
+imagination, which would or might prevent the scientific argument from
+having legitimate application to the question in hand.--ED.]
+
+[44] _Fortnightly Review_, Feb. 1894.
+
+[45] [Some such phrase is necessary to complete the sentence.--ED.]
+
+[46] _First Principles_, Part I, ch. 1.
+
+
+
+
+§ 3. CAUSALITY.
+
+
+Only because we are so familiar with the great phenomenon of causality
+do we take it for granted, and think that we reach an ultimate
+explanation of anything when we have succeeded in finding the 'cause'
+thereof: when, in point of fact, we have only succeeded in merging it in
+the mystery of mysteries. I often wish we could have come into the
+world, like the young of some other mammals, with all the powers of
+intellect that we shall ever subsequently attain already developed, but
+without any individual experience, and so without any of the blunting
+effects of custom. Could we have done so, surely nothing in the world
+would more acutely excite our intelligent astonishment than the one
+universal fact of causation. That everything which happens should have a
+cause, that this should invariably be proportioned to its effect, so
+that, no matter how complex the interaction of causes, the same
+interaction should always produce the same result; that this rigidly
+exact system of energizing should be found to present all the
+appearances of universality and of eternity, so that, e.g., the motion
+of the solar system in space is being determined by some causes beyond
+human ken, and that we are indebted to billions of cellular unions, each
+involving billions of separate causes, for our hereditary passage from
+an invertebrate ancestry,--that such things should be, would surely
+strike us as the most wonderful fact in this wonderful universe.
+
+Now, although familiarity with this fact has made us forget its wonder
+to the extent of virtually assuming that we know all about it,
+philosophical enquiry shows that, besides empirically knowing it to be a
+fact, we only know one other thing about it, viz.--that our knowledge of
+it is derived from our own activity when we ourselves are causes. No
+result of psychological analysis seems to me more certain than this[47].
+If it were not for our own volitions, we should be ignorant of what we
+can now not doubt, on pain of suicidal scepticism, to be the most
+general fact of nature. Such, at least, seems to me by far the most
+reasonable theory of our idea of causality, and is the one now most
+generally entertained by philosophers of every school.
+
+Now, to the plain man it will always seem that if our very notion of
+causality is derived from our own volition--as our very notion of energy
+is derived from our sense of effort in overcoming resistance by our
+volition--presumably the truest notion we can form of that in which
+causation objectively consists is the notion derived from that known
+mode of existence which alone gives us the notion of causality at all.
+Hence the plain man will always infer that all energy is of the nature
+of will-energy, and all objective causation of the nature of subjective.
+Nor is this inference confined to the plain man; the deepest
+philosophical thinkers have arrived at substantially the same opinion,
+e.g. Hegel, Schopenhauer. So that the direct and most natural
+interpretation of causality in external nature which is drawn by
+primitive thought in savages and young children, seems destined to
+become also the ultimate deliverance of human thought in the highest
+levels of its culture[48].
+
+But, be this as it may, we are not concerned with any such questions of
+abstract philosophical speculation. As pure agnostics they lie beyond
+our sphere. Therefore, I allude to them only for the sake of showing
+that there is nothing either in the science or philosophy of mankind
+inimical to the theory of natural causation being the energizing of a
+will objective to us. And we can plainly see that if such be the case,
+and if that will be self-consistent, its operations, as revealed in
+natural causation, must appear to us when considered _en bloc_ (or not
+piece-meal as by savages), non-volitional, or mechanical.
+
+Of all philosophical theories of causality the most repugnant to reason
+must be those of Hume, Kant and Mill, which while differing from one
+another agree in this--that they attribute the principle of causality to
+a creation of our own minds, or in other words deny that there is
+anything objective in the relation of cause and effect--i.e. in the very
+thing which all physical science is engaged in discovering in particular
+cases of it.
+
+
+The conflict of Science and Religion has always arisen from one common
+ground of agreement, or fundamental postulate of both parties--without
+which, indeed, it would plainly have been impossible that any conflict
+could have arisen, inasmuch as there would then have been no field for
+battle. Every thesis must rest on some hypothesis; therefore, in cases
+where two or more rival theses rest on a common hypothesis, the disputes
+must needs collapse so soon as the common hypothesis is proved
+erroneous. And proportionably, in whatever degree the previously common
+hypothesis is shown to be dubious, in that degree are the disputations
+shown to be possibly unreal. Now, it is one of the main objects of this
+treatise to show that the common hypothesis on which all the disputes
+between Science and Religion have arisen, is highly dubious. And not
+only so, but that quite apart from modern science all the difficulties
+on the side of intellect (or reason) which religious belief has ever
+encountered in the past, or can ever encounter in the future, whether
+in the individual or the race, arise, and arise exclusively, from the
+self-same ground of this highly dubious hypothesis.
+
+The hypothesis, or fundamental postulate, in question is, _If there be a
+personal God, He is not immediately concerned with natural causation_.
+It is assumed that _qua_ 'first cause,' He can in no way be concerned
+with 'second causes,' further than by having started them in the first
+instance as a great machinery of 'natural causation,' working under
+'general laws.' True the theory of Deism, which entertains more or less
+expressly this hypothesis of 'Deus ex machina,' has during the present
+century been more and more superseded by that of Theism, which
+entertains also in some indefinable measure the doctrine of 'immanence';
+as well as by that of Pantheism, which expressly holds this doctrine to
+the exclusion _in toto_ of its rival. But Theism has never yet
+entertained it sufficiently or up to the degree required by the pure
+logic of the case, while Pantheism has but rarely considered the rival
+doctrine of personality--or the possible union of immanence with
+personality.[49]
+
+Now it is the object of this book to go much further than any one has
+hitherto gone in proving the possibility of this union. For I purpose to
+show that, provided only we lay aside all prejudice, sentiment, &c.,
+and follow to its logical termination the guidance of pure reason, there
+are no other conclusions to be reached than these. Namely, (_A_) That if
+there be a personal God, no reason can be assigned why He should not be
+immanent in nature, or why all causation should not be the immediate
+expression of His will. (_B_) That every available reason points to the
+inference that He probably is so. (_C_) That if He is so, and if His
+will is self-consistent, all natural causation must needs appear to us
+'mechanical.' Therefore (_D_) that it is no argument against the divine
+origin of a thing, event, &c., to prove it due to natural causation.
+
+After having dealt briefly with (_A_), (_B_) and (_C_), I would show
+that (_D_) is the most practically important of these four conclusions.
+For the fundamental hypothesis which I began by mentioning is just the
+opposite of this. Whether tacitly or expressly, it has always been
+assumed by both sides in the controversy between Science and Religion,
+that as soon as this that and the other phenomenon has been explained by
+means of natural causation, it has thereupon ceased to be ascribable
+[directly] to God. The distinction between the natural and the
+supernatural has always been regarded by both sides as indisputably
+sound, and this fundamental agreement as to ground of battle has
+furnished the only possible condition to fighting. It has also furnished
+the condition of all the past, and may possibly furnish the condition of
+all the future, discomfitures of religion. True religion is indeed
+learning her lesson that something is wrong in her method of fighting,
+and many of her soldiers are now waking up to the fact that it is here
+that her error lies--as in past times they woke up to see the error of
+denying the movement of the earth, the antiquity of the earth, the
+origin of species by evolution, &c. But no one, even of her captains and
+generals, has so far followed up their advantage to its ultimate
+consequences. And this is what I want to do. The logical advantage is
+clearly on their side; and it is their own fault if they do not gain the
+ultimate victory,--not only as against science, but as against
+intellectual dogmatism in every form. This can be routed all along the
+line. For science is only the organized study of natural causation, and
+the experience of every human being, in so far as it leads to dogmatism
+on purely intellectual grounds, does so on account of entertaining the
+fundamental postulate in question. The influence of custom and want of
+imagination is here very great. But the answer always should be to move
+the ulterior question--what is the nature of natural causation?
+
+Now I propose to push to its full logical conclusion the consequence of
+this answer. For no one, even the most orthodox, has as yet learnt this
+lesson of religion to anything like fullness. God is still grudged His
+own universe, so to speak, as far and as often as He can possibly be. As
+examples we may take the natural growth of Christianity out of previous
+religions; the natural spread of it; the natural conversion of St. Paul,
+or of anybody else. It is still assumed on both sides that there must
+be something inexplicable or miraculous about a phenomenon in order to
+its being divine.
+
+What else have science and religion ever had to fight about save on the
+basis of this common hypothesis, and hence as to whether the causation
+of such and such a phenomenon has been 'natural' or 'super-natural.' For
+even the disputes as to science contradicting scripture, ultimately turn
+on the assumption of inspiration (supposing it genuine) being
+'super-natural' as to its causation. Once grant that it is 'natural' and
+all possible ground of dispute is removed.
+
+I can well understand why infidelity should make the basal assumption in
+question, because its whole case must rest thereon. But surely it is
+time for theists to abandon this assumption.
+
+The assumed distinction between causation as natural and super-natural
+no doubt began in superstition in prehistoric time, and throughout the
+historical period has continued from a vague feeling that the action of
+God must be mysterious, and hence that the province of religion must be
+within the super-sensuous. Now, it is true enough that the finite cannot
+comprehend the infinite, and hence the feeling in question is logically
+sound. But under the influence of this feeling, men have always
+committed the fallacy of concluding that if a phenomenon has been
+explained in terms of natural causation, it has thereby been explained
+_in toto_--forgetting that it has only been explained up to the point
+where such causation is concerned, and that the real question of
+ultimate causation has merely been thus postponed. And assuredly beyond
+this point there is an infinitude of mystery sufficient to satisfy the
+most exacting mystic. For even Herbert Spencer allows that in ultimate
+analysis all natural causation is inexplicable.
+
+Logically regarded the advance of science, far from having weakened
+religion, has immeasurably strengthened it. For it has proved the
+uniformity of natural causation. The so-called natural sphere has
+increased at the expense of the 'super-natural.' Unquestionably. But
+although to lower grades of culture this always seems a fact inimical to
+religion, we may now perceive it is quite the reverse, since it merely
+goes to abolish the primitive or uncultured distinction in question.
+
+It is indeed most extraordinary how long this distinction has held sway,
+or how it is the ablest men of all generations have quietly assumed that
+when once we know the natural causation of any phenomenon, we therefore
+know all about it--or, as it were, have removed it from the sphere of
+mystery altogether, when, in point of fact, we have only merged it in a
+much greater mystery than ever.
+
+But the answer to our astonishment how this distinction has managed to
+survive so long lies in the extraordinary effect of custom, which here
+seems to slay reason altogether; and the more a man busies himself with
+natural causes (e.g. in scientific research) the greater does this
+slavery to custom become, till at last he seems positively unable to
+perceive the real state of the case--regarding any rational thinking
+thereon as chimerical, so that the term 'meta-physical,' even in its
+etymological sense as super-sensuous or beyond physical causation,
+becomes a term of rational reproach. Obviously such a man has written
+himself down, if not an ass, at all events a creature wholly incapable
+of rationally treating any of the highest problems presented either by
+nature or by man.
+
+On any logical theory of Theism there can be no such distinction between
+'natural' and 'supernatural' as is usually drawn, since on that theory
+all causation is but the action of the Divine Will. And if we draw any
+distinction between such action as 'immediate' or 'mediate,' we can only
+mean this as valid in relation to mankind--i.e. in relation to our
+experience. For, obviously, it would be wholly incompatible with pure
+agnosticism to suppose that we are capable of drawing any such
+distinction in relation to the Divine activity itself. Even apart from
+the theory of Theism, pure agnosticism must take it that the real
+distinction is not between natural and supernatural, but between the
+explicable and the inexplicable--meaning by those terms that which is
+and that which is not accountable by such causes as fall within the
+range of human observation. Or, in other words, the distinction is
+really between the observable and the unobservable causal processes of
+the universe.
+
+Although science is essentially engaged in explaining, her work is
+necessarily confined to the sphere of natural causation; beyond that
+sphere (i.e. the sensuous) she can explain nothing. In other words,
+even if she were able to explain the natural causation of everything,
+she would be unable to assign the ultimate _raison d'être_ of anything.
+
+
+It is not my intention to write an essay on the nature of causality, or
+even to attempt a survey of the sundry theories which have been
+propounded on this subject by philosophers. Indeed, to attempt this
+would be little less than to write a history of philosophy itself.
+Nevertheless it is necessary for my purpose to make a few remarks
+touching the main branches of thought upon the matter[50].
+
+_The remarkable nature of the facts._ These are remarkable, since they
+are common to all human experience. Everything that _happens_ has a
+cause. The same happening has always the same cause--or the same
+consequent the same antecedent. It is only familiarity with this great
+fact that prevents universal wonder at it, for, notwithstanding all the
+theories upon it, no one has ever really shown why it is so. That the
+same causes always produce the same effects is a proposition which
+expresses a fundamental fact of our knowledge, but the knowledge of this
+fact is purely empirical; we can show no reason why it should be a fact.
+Doubtless, if it were not a fact, there could be no so-called 'Order of
+Nature,' and consequently no science, no philosophy, or perhaps (if the
+irregularity were sufficiently frequent) no possibility of human
+experience. But although this is easy enough to show, it in no wise
+tends to show why the same causes should always produce the same
+effects.
+
+So manifest is it that our knowledge of the fact in question is only
+empirical, that some of our ablest thinkers, such as Hume and Mill, have
+failed to perceive even so much as the intellectual necessity of looking
+beyond our empirical knowledge of the fact to gain any explanation of
+the fact itself. Therefore they give to the world the wholly vacuous, or
+merely tautological theory of causation--viz. that of constancy of
+sequence within human observation[51].
+
+
+If it be said of my argument touching causality, that it is naturalizing
+or materializing the super-natural or spiritual (as most orthodox
+persons will feel), my reply is that deeper thought will show it to be
+at least as susceptible of the opposite view--viz. that it is subsuming
+the natural into the super-natural, or spiritualizing the material: and
+a pure agnostic, least of all, should have anything to say as against
+either of these alternative points of view. Or we may state the matter
+thus: in as far as pure reason can have anything to say in the matter,
+she ought to incline towards the view of my doctrine spiritualizing the
+material, because it is pretty certain that we could know nothing about
+natural causation--even so much as its existence--but for our own
+volitions.
+
+
+_Free Will_[52].
+
+Having read all that is said to be worth reading on the Free Will
+controversy, it appears to me that the main issues and their logical
+conclusions admit of being summed up in a very few words, thus:--
+
+1. A writer, before he undertakes to deal with this subject at all,
+should be conscious of fully perceiving the fundamental distinction
+between responsibility as merely legal and as also moral; otherwise he
+cannot but miss the very essence of the question in debate. No one
+questions the patent fact of responsibility as legal; the only question
+is touching responsibility as moral. Yet the principal bulk of
+literature on Free Will and Necessity arises from disputants on both
+sides failing to perceive this basal distinction. Even such able writers
+as Spencer, Huxley and Clifford are in this position.
+
+2. The root question is as to whether the will is caused or un-caused.
+For however much this root-question may be obscured by its own abundant
+foliage, the latter can have no existence but that which it derives
+from the former.
+
+3. Consequently, if libertarians grant causality as appertaining to the
+will, however much they may beat about the bush, they are surrendering
+their position all along the line, unless they fall back upon the more
+ultimate question as to the nature of natural causation. Now it can be
+proved that this more ultimate question is [scientifically]
+unanswerable. Therefore both sides may denominate natural causation
+_x_--an unknown quantity.
+
+4. Hence the whole controversy ought to be seen by both sides to resolve
+itself into this--is or is not the will determined by _x_? And, if this
+seems but a barren question to debate, I do not undertake to deny the
+fact. At the same time there is clearly this real issue remaining--viz.
+Is the will self-determining, or is it determined--i.e. _from without_?
+
+5. If determined from without, is there any room for freedom, in the
+sense required for saving the doctrine of moral responsibility? And I
+think the answer to this must be an unconditional negative.
+
+6. But, observe, it is not one and the same thing to ask, Is the will
+entirely determined from without? and Is the will entirely determined by
+natural causation (_x_)? For the unknown quantity _x_ may very well
+include _x'_, if by _x'_ we understand all the unknown ingredients of
+personality.
+
+7. Hence, determinists gain no advantage over their adversaries by any
+possible proof (at present impossible) that all acts of will are due to
+natural causation, unless they can show the nature of the latter, and
+that it is of such a nature as supports their conclusion. For aught we
+at present know, the will may very well be free in the sense required,
+even though all its acts are due to _x_.
+
+8. In particular, for aught we know to the contrary, all may be due to
+_x'_, i.e. all causation may be of the nature of will (as, indeed, many
+systems of philosophy maintain), with the result that every human will
+is of the nature of a First Cause. In support of which possibility it
+may be remarked that most philosophies are led to the theory of a _causa
+causarum_ as regards _x_.
+
+9. To the obvious objection that with a plurality of first causes--each
+the _fons et origo_ of a new and never-ending stream of causality--the
+cosmos must sooner or later become a chaos by cumulative intersection of
+the streams, the answer is to be found in the theory of monism[53].
+
+10. Nevertheless, the ultimate difficulty remains which is depicted in
+my essay on the 'World as an Eject[54].' But this, again, is merged in
+the mystery of Personality, which is only known as an inexplicable, and
+seemingly ultimate, fact.
+
+11. So that the general conclusion of the whole matter must be--pure
+agnosticism.
+
+FOOTNOTES:
+
+[47] [Here it was intended to insert further explanation 'showing that
+mere observation of causality in external nature would not have yielded
+idea of anything further than time and space relations.'--ED.]
+
+[48] [This theory was suggested in the Burney Essay, p. 136, and
+ridiculed in the _Candid Examination_; see above, p. 11. Romanes
+intended at this point to consider at greater length his old views 'on
+causation as due to being _qua_ being.'--ED.]
+
+[49] See, however, Aubrey Moore in _Lux Mundi_, pp. 94-96, and Le Conte,
+_Evolution in its Relation to Religious Thought_, pp. 335, ff. [N.B. The
+references not enclosed in brackets are the author's, not mine.--ED.]
+
+[50] [Nothing more however was written than what follows
+immediately.--ED.]
+
+[51] [The author intended further to show the vacuity of this theory and
+point out how Mill himself appears to perceive it by his introduction
+after the term 'invariably' of the term 'unconditionally'; he refers
+also to Martineau, _Study of Religion_, i. pp. 152, 3.--ED.]
+
+[52] [Romanes' thoughts about Free Will are more lucidly expressed in an
+essay published subsequently to these Notes in _Mind and Motion and
+Monism_, pp. 129 ff.--ED.]
+
+[53] [See above, p. 31.--ED.]
+
+[54] _Contemporary Review_, July 1886. [But the 'ultimate difficulty'
+referred to above would seem to be the relation of manifold dependent
+human wills to the One Ultimate and All-embracing Will.--ED.]
+
+
+
+
+§ 4. FAITH.
+
+
+Faith in its religious sense is distinguished not only from opinion (or
+belief founded on reason alone), in that it contains a spiritual
+element: it is further distinguished from belief founded on the
+affections, by needing an active co-operation of the will. Thus all
+parts of the human mind have to be involved in faith--intellect,
+emotions, will. We 'believe' in the theory of evolution on grounds of
+reason alone; we 'believe' in the affection of our parents, children,
+&c., almost (or it may be exclusively) on what I have called spiritual
+grounds--i.e. on grounds of spiritual experience; for this we need no
+exercise either of reason or of will. But no one can 'believe' in God,
+or _a fortiori_ in Christ, without also a severe effort of will. This I
+hold to be a matter of fact, whether or not there be a God or a Christ.
+
+Observe will is to be distinguished from desire. It matters not what
+psychologists may have to say upon this subject. Whether desire differs
+from will in kind or only in degree--whether will is desire in action,
+so to speak, and desire but incipient will--are questions with which we
+need not trouble ourselves. For it is certain that there are agnostics
+who would greatly prefer being theists, and theists who would give all
+they possess to be Christians, if they could thus secure promotion by
+purchase--i.e. by one single act of will. But yet the desire is not
+strong enough to sustain the will in perpetual action, so as to make the
+continual sacrifices which Christianity entails. Perhaps the hardest of
+these sacrifices to an intelligent man is that of his own intellect. At
+least I am certain that this is so in my own case. I have been so long
+accustomed to constitute my reason my sole judge of truth, that even
+while reason itself tells me it is not unreasonable to expect that the
+heart and the will should be required to join with reason in seeking God
+(for religion is for the _whole_ man), I am too jealous of my reason to
+exercise my will in the direction of my most heart-felt desires. For
+assuredly the strongest desire of my nature is to find that that nature
+is not deceived in its highest aspirations. Yet I cannot bring myself so
+much as to make a venture in the direction of faith. For instance,
+regarded from one point of view it seems reasonable enough that
+Christianity should have enjoined the _doing_ of the doctrine as a
+necessary condition to ascertaining (i.e. 'believing') its truth. But
+from another, and my more habitual point of view, it seems almost an
+affront to reason to make any such 'fool's experiment'--just as to some
+scientific men it seems absurd and childish to expect them to
+investigate the 'superstitious' follies of modern spiritualism. Even the
+simplest act of will in regard to religion--that of prayer--has not been
+performed by me for at least a quarter of a century, simply because it
+has seemed so impossible to pray, as it were, hypothetically, that much
+as I have always desired to be able to pray, I cannot will the attempt.
+To justify myself for what my better judgement has often seen to be
+essentially irrational, I have ever made sundry excuses. The chief of
+them has run thus. Even supposing Christianity true, and even supposing
+that after having so far sacrificed my reason to my desire as to have
+satisfied the supposed conditions to obtaining 'grace,' or direct
+illumination from God,--even then would not my reason turn round and
+revenge herself upon me? For surely even then my habitual scepticism
+would make me say to myself--'this is all very sublime and very
+comforting; but what evidence have you to give me that the whole
+business is anything more than self-delusion? The wish was probably
+father to the thought, and you might much better have performed your
+"act of will" by going in for a course of Indian hemp.' Of course a
+Christian would answer to this that the internal light would not admit
+of such doubt, any more than seeing the sun does--that God knows us well
+enough to prevent that, &c., and also that it is unreasonable not to try
+an experiment lest the result should prove too good to be credible, and
+so on. And I do not dispute that the Christian would be justified in so
+answering, but I only adduce the matter as an illustration of the
+difficulty which is experienced in conforming to all the conditions of
+attaining to Christian faith--even supposing it to be sound. Others have
+doubtless other difficulties, but mine is chiefly, I think, that of an
+undue regard to reason, as against heart and will--undue, I mean, if so
+it be that Christianity is true, and the conditions to faith in it have
+been of divine ordination.
+
+This influence of will on belief, even in matters secular, is the more
+pronounced the further removed these matters may be from demonstration
+(as already remarked); but this is most of all the case where our
+personal interests are affected--whether these be material or
+intellectual, such as credit for consistency, &c. See, for example, how
+closely, in the respects we are considering, political beliefs resemble
+religious. Unless the points of difference are such that truth is
+virtually demonstrable on one side, so that adhesion to the opposite is
+due to _conscious_ sacrifice of integrity to expediency, we always find
+that party-spectacles so colour the view as to leave reason at the mercy
+of will, custom, interest, and all the other circumstances which
+similarly operate on religious beliefs. It seems to make but little
+difference in either case what level of general education, mental power,
+special training, &c., is brought to bear upon the question under
+judgement. From the Premier to the peasant we find the same difference
+of opinion in politics as we do in religion. And in each case the
+explanation is the same. Beliefs are so little dependent on reason alone
+that in such regions of thought--i.e. where personal interests are
+affected and the evidences of truth are not in their nature
+demonstrable--it really seems as if reason ceases to be a judge of
+evidence or guide to truth, and becomes a mere advocate of opinion
+already formed on quite other grounds. Now these other grounds are, as
+we have seen, mainly the accidents of habit or custom, wish being father
+to the thought, &c.
+
+Now this may be all deplorable enough in politics, and in all other
+beliefs secular; but who shall say it is not exactly as it ought to be
+in the matter of beliefs religious? For, unless we beg the question of a
+future life in the negative, we must entertain at least the possibility
+of our being in a state of probation in respect of an honest use not
+only of our reason, but probably still more of those other ingredients
+of human nature which go to determine our beliefs touching this most
+important of all matters.
+
+It is remarkable how even in politics it is the moral and spiritual
+elements of character which lead to success in the long run, even more
+than intellectual ability--supposing, of course, that the latter is not
+below the somewhat high level of our Parliamentary assemblies.
+
+As regards the part that is played by will in the determining of belief,
+one can show how unconsciously large this is even in matters of secular
+interest. Reason is very far indeed from being the sole guide of
+judgement that it is usually taken to be--so far, indeed, that, save in
+matters approaching down-right demonstration (where of course there is
+no room for any other ingredient) it is usually hampered by custom,
+prejudice, dislike, &c., to a degree that would astonish the most sober
+philosopher could he lay bare to himself all the mental processes
+whereby the complex act of assent or dissent is eventually
+determined[55].
+
+As showing how little reason alone has to do with the determining of
+religious belief, let us take the case of mathematicians. This I think
+is the fairest case we can take, seeing that of all intellectual
+pursuits that of mathematical research is the most exact, as well as the
+most exclusive in its demand upon the powers of reason, and hence that,
+as a class, the men who have achieved highest eminence in that pursuit
+may be fairly taken as the fittest representatives of our species in
+respect of the faculty of pure reason. Yet whenever they have turned
+their exceptional powers in this respect upon the problems of religion,
+how suggestively well balanced are their opposite conclusions--so much
+so indeed that we can only conclude that reason counts for very little
+in the complex of mental processes which here determine judgement.
+
+Thus, if we look to the greatest mathematicians in the world's history,
+we find Kepler and Newton as Christians; La Place, on the other hand, an
+infidel. Or, coming to our own times, and confining our attention to the
+principal seat of mathematical study:--when I was at Cambridge, there
+was a galaxy of genius in that department emanating from that place such
+as had never before been equalled. And the curious thing in our present
+connexion is that all the most illustrious names were ranged on the side
+of orthodoxy. Sir W. Thomson, Sir George Stokes, Professors Tait, Adams,
+Clerk-Maxwell, and Cayley--not to mention a number of lesser lights,
+such as Routh, Todhunter, Ferrers, &c.--were all avowed Christians.
+Clifford had only just moved at a bound from the extreme of asceticism
+to that of infidelity--an individual instance which I deem of particular
+interest in the present connexion, as showing the dominating influence
+of a forcedly emotional character even on so powerful an intellectual
+one, for the _rationality_ of the whole structure of Christian belief
+cannot have so reversed its poles within a few months.
+
+Now it would doubtless be easy to find elsewhere than in Cambridge
+mathematicians of the first order who in our own generation are, or have
+been, professedly anti-Christian in their beliefs,--although certainly
+not so great an array of such extraordinary powers. But, be this as it
+may, the case of Cambridge in my own time seems to me of itself enough
+to prove that Christian belief is neither made nor marred by the highest
+powers of reasoning, apart from other and still more potent factors.
+
+
+_Faith and Superstition._
+
+Whether or not Christianity is true, there is a great distinction
+between these two things. For while the main ingredient of Christian
+faith is the moral element, this has no part in superstition. In point
+of fact, the only point of resemblance is that both present the mental
+state called _belief_. It is on this account they are so often
+confounded by anti-Christians, and even by non-Christians; the much more
+important point of difference is not noted, viz. that belief in the one
+case is purely intellectual, while in the other it is chiefly moral.
+_Qua_ purely intellectual, belief may indicate nothing but sheer
+credulity in absence of evidence; but where a moral basis is added, the
+case is clearly different; for even if it appears to be sheer credulity
+to an outsider, that may be because he does not take into account the
+additional evidence supplied by the moral facts.
+
+
+Faith and superstition are often confounded, or even identified. And,
+unquestionably, they are identical up to a certain point--viz. they both
+present the mental state of _belief_. All people can see this; but not
+all people can see further, or define the _differentiae_. These are as
+follows: First, supposing Christianity true, there is the spiritual
+verification. Second, supposing Christianity false, there is still the
+moral ingredient, which _ex hypothesi_ is absent in superstition. In
+other words, both faith and superstition rest on an intellectual basis
+(which may be pure credulity); but faith rests also on a moral, even if
+not likewise on a spiritual. Even in human relations there is a wide
+difference between 'belief' in a scientific theory and 'faith' in a
+personal character. And the difference is in the latter comprising a
+moral element.
+
+'Faith-healing,' therefore, has no real point of resemblance with 'thy
+faith hath saved thee' of the New Testament, unless we sink the personal
+differences between a modern faith-healer and Jesus Christ as objects of
+faith.
+
+Belief is not exclusively founded on objective evidence appealing to
+reason (opinion), but mainly on subjective evidence appealing to some
+altogether different faculty (faith). Now, whether Christians are right
+or wrong in what they believe, I hold it as certain as anything can be
+that the distinction which I have just drawn, and which they all
+implicitly draw for themselves, is logically valid. For no one is
+entitled to deny the possibility of what may be termed an organ of
+spiritual discernment. In fact to do so would be to vacate the position
+of pure agnosticism _in toto_--and this even if there were no objective,
+or strictly scientific, evidences in favour of such an organ, such as we
+have in the lives of the saints, and, in a lower degree, in the
+universality of the religious sentiment. Now, if there be such an organ,
+it follows from preceding paragraphs, that not only will the main
+evidences for Christianity be subjective, but that they ought to be so:
+they ought to be so, I mean, on the Christian supposition of the object
+of Christianity being moral probation, and 'faith' both the test and the
+reward.
+
+From this many practical considerations ensue. E.g. the duty of parents
+to educate their children in what they _believe_ as distinguished from
+what they _know_. This would be unjustifiable if faith were the same as
+opinion. But it is fully justifiable if a man not only knows that he
+believes (opinion) but believes that he knows (faith). Whether or not
+the Christian differs from the 'natural man' in having a spiritual organ
+of cognition, provided he honestly believes such is the case, it would
+be immoral in him not to proceed in accordance with what he thus
+believes to be his knowledge. This obligation is recognized in education
+in every other case. He is morally right even if mentally deluded.
+
+
+Huxley, in _Lay Sermons_, says that faith has been proved a 'cardinal
+sin' by science. Now, this is true enough of credulity, superstition,
+&c., and science has done no end of good in developing our ideas of
+method, evidence, &c. But this is all on the side of intellect. 'Faith'
+is not touched by such facts or considerations. And what a terrible hell
+science would have made of the world, if she had abolished the 'spirit
+of faith' even in human relations. The fact is, Huxley falls into the
+common error of identifying 'faith' with opinion.
+
+
+Supposing Christianity true, it is very reasonable that faith in the
+sense already explained should be constituted the test of divine
+acceptance. If there be such a thing as Christ's winnowing fan, the
+quality of sterling weight for the discovery of which it is adapted
+cannot be conceived as anything other than this moral quality. No one
+could suppose a revelation appealing to the mere intellect of man, since
+acceptance would thus become a mere matter of prudence in subscribing to
+a demonstration made by higher intellects.
+
+It is also a matter of fact that if Christianity is truthful in
+representing this world as a school of moral probation, we cannot
+conceive a system better adapted to this end than is the world, or a
+better schoolmaster than Christianity. This is proved not only by
+general reasoning, but also by the work of Christianity in the world,
+its adaptation to individual needs, &c. Consider also the extraordinary
+diversity of human characters in respect both of morality and
+spirituality though all are living in the same world. Out of the same
+external material or environment such astonishingly diverse products
+arise according to the use made of it. Even human suffering in its worst
+forms can be welcome if justified by faith in such an object. 'Ills have
+no weight, and tears no bitterness,' but are rather to be 'gloried
+in[56].'
+
+It is a further fact that only by means of this theory of probation is
+it possible to give any meaning to the world, i.e. any _raison d'être_
+of human existence.
+
+Supposing Christianity true, every man must stand or fall by the results
+of his own conduct, as developed through his own moral character. (This
+could not be so if the test were intellectual ability.) Yet this does
+not hinder that the exercise of will in the direction of religion should
+need help in order to attain belief. Nor does it hinder that some men
+should need more help and others less. Indeed, it may well be that some
+men are intentionally precluded from receiving any help, so as not to
+increase their responsibility, or receive but little, so as to
+constitute intellectual difficulties a moral trial. But clearly, if such
+things are so, we are inadequate judges.
+
+
+It is a fact that we all feel the intellectual part of man to be
+'higher' than the animal, whatever our theory of his origin. It is a
+fact that we all feel the moral part of man to be 'higher' than the
+intellectual, whatever our theory of either may be. It is also a fact
+that we all similarly feel the spiritual to be 'higher' than the moral,
+whatever our theory of religion may be. It is what we understand by
+man's moral, and still more his spiritual, qualities that go to
+constitute 'character.' And it is astonishing how in all walks of life
+it is character that tells in the long run.
+
+It is a fact that these distinctions are all well marked and universally
+recognized--viz.
+
+           {Animality.
+           {Intellectuality.
+     Human {Morality.
+           {Spirituality.
+
+Morality and spirituality are to be distinguished as two very different
+things. A man may be highly moral in his conduct without being in any
+degree spiritual in his nature, and, though to a lesser extent, vice
+versa. And, objectively, we see the same distinction between morals and
+religion. By spirituality I mean the religious temperament, whether or
+not associated with any particular creed or dogma.
+
+There is no doubt that intellectual pleasures are more satisfying and
+enduring than sensual--or even sensuous. And, to those who have
+experienced them, so it is with spiritual over intellectual, artistic,
+&c. This is an objective fact, abundantly testified to by every one who
+has had experience: and it seems to indicate that the spiritual nature
+of man is the highest part of man--the [culminating] point of his being.
+
+
+It is probably true, as Renan says in his posthumous work, that there
+will always be materialists and spiritualists, inasmuch as it will
+always be observable on the one hand that there is no thought without
+brain, while, on the other hand, instincts of man will always aspire to
+higher beliefs. But this is just what ought to be if religion is true,
+and we are in a state of probation. And is it not probable that the
+materialistic position (discredited even by philosophy) is due simply to
+custom and want of imagination? Else why the inextinguishable instincts?
+
+
+It is much more easy to disbelieve than to believe. This is obvious on
+the side of reason, but it is also true on that of spirit, for to
+disbelieve is in accordance with environment or custom, while to believe
+necessitates a spiritual use of the imagination. For both these
+reasons, very few unbelievers have any justification, either
+intellectual or spiritual, for their own unbelief.
+
+Unbelief is usually due to indolence, often to prejudice, and never a
+thing to be proud of.
+
+
+'Why should it be thought a thing incredible with you that God should
+raise the dead?' Clearly no answer can be given by the pure agnostic.
+But he will naturally say in reply, 'the question rather is, why should
+it be thought credible with you that there is a God, or, if there is,
+that he should raise the dead?' And I think the wise Christian will
+answer, 'I believe in the resurrection of the dead, partly on grounds of
+reason, partly on those of intuition, but chiefly on both combined; so
+to speak, it is my whole character which accepts the whole system of
+which the doctrine of personal immortality forms an essential part.' And
+to this it may be fairly added that the Christian doctrine of the
+resurrection of our bodily form cannot have been arrived at for the
+purpose of meeting modern materialistic objections to the doctrine of
+personal immortality; hence it is certainly a strange doctrine to have
+been propounded at that time, together with its companion, and scarcely
+less distinctive, doctrine of the vileness of the body. Why was it not
+said that the 'soul' alone should survive as a disembodied 'spirit'? Or
+if form were supposed necessary for man as distinguished from God, that
+he was to be an angel? But, be this as it may, the doctrine of the
+resurrection seems to have fully met beforehand the materialistic
+objection to a future life, and so to have raised the ulterior question
+with which this paragraph opens.
+
+
+We have seen in the Introduction that all first principles even of
+scientific facts are known by intuition and not by reason. No one can
+deny this. Now, if there be a God, the fact is certainly of the nature
+of a first principle; for it must be the first of all first principles.
+No one can dispute this. No one can therefore dispute the necessary
+conclusion, that, if there be a God, He is knowable, (if knowable at
+all) by intuition and not by reason.
+
+Indeed a little thought is enough to show that from its very nature as
+such, reason must be incapable of adjudicating on the subject, for it is
+a process of inferring from the known to the unknown.
+
+Or thus. It would be against reason itself to suppose that God, even if
+He exists, can be known by reason; He must be known, if knowable at all,
+by intuition[57].
+
+
+Observe, although God might give an objective revelation of Himself,
+e.g. as Christians believe He has, even this would not give knowledge
+of Him save to those who believe the revelations genuine; and I doubt
+whether it is logically possible for any form of objective revelation of
+itself to compel belief in it. Assuredly one rising from the dead to
+testify thereto would not, nor would letters of fire across the sky do
+so. But, even if it were logically possible, we need not consider the
+abstract possibility, seeing that, as a matter of fact, no such
+demonstrative revelation has been given.
+
+Hence, the only legitimate attitude of pure reason is pure agnosticism.
+No one can deny this. But, it will be said, there is this vast
+difference between our intuitive knowledge of all other first principles
+and that alleged of the 'first of all first principles,' viz. that the
+latter is confessedly _not_ known to all men. Now, assuredly, there is
+here a vast difference. But so there ought to be, if we are here in a
+state of probation, as before explained. And that we are in such a state
+is not only the hypothesis of religion, but the sole rational
+explanation as well as moral justification of our existence as rational
+beings and moral agents[58].
+
+
+It is not necessarily true, as J.S. Mill and all other agnostics think,
+that even if internal intuition be of divine origin, the illumination
+thus furnished can only be of evidential value to the individual subject
+thereof. On the contrary, it may be studied objectively, even if not
+experienced subjectively; and ought to be so studied by a pure agnostic
+desirous of light from any quarter. Even if he does not know it as a
+noumenon he can investigate it as a phenomenon. And, supposing it to be
+of divine origin, as its subjects believe and he has no reason to doubt,
+he may gain much evidence against its being a mere psychological
+illusion from identical reports of it in all ages. Thus, if any large
+section of the race were to see flames issuing from magnets, there would
+be no doubt as to their objective reality.
+
+
+The testimony given by Socrates to the occurrence in himself of an
+internal Voice, having all the definiteness of an auditory
+hallucination, has given rise to much speculation by subsequent
+philosophers.
+
+Many explanations are suggested, but if we remember the critical nature
+of Socrates' own mind, the literal nature of his mode of teaching, and
+the high authority which attaches to Plato's opinion on the subject, the
+probability seems to incline towards the 'Demon' having been, in
+Socrates' own consciousness, an actual auditory sensation. Be this
+however as it may, I suppose there is no question that we may adopt this
+view of the matter at least to the extent of classifying Socrates with
+Luther, Pascal, &c., not to mention all the line of Hebrew and other
+prophets, who agree in speaking of a Divine Voice.
+
+If so, the further question arises whether we are to classify all these
+with lunatics in whom the phenomena of auditory hallucination are
+habitual.
+
+Without doubt this hypothesis is most in accordance with the temper of
+our age, partly because it obeys the law of parsimony, and partly
+because it [negatives] _a priori_ the possibility of revelation.
+
+But if we look at the matter from the point of view of pure agnosticism,
+we are not entitled to adopt so rough and ready an interpretation.
+
+Suppose then that not only Socrates and all great religious reformers
+and founders of religious systems both before and after him were
+similarly stricken with mental disease, but that similar phenomena had
+occurred in the case of all scientific discoverers such as Galileo,
+Newton, Darwin, &c.--supposing all these men to have declared that their
+main ideas had been communicated by subjective sensations as of spoken
+language, so that all the progress of the world's scientific thought had
+resembled that of the world's religious thought, and had been attributed
+by the promoters thereof to direct inspirations of this kind--would it
+be possible to deny that the testimony thus afforded to the fact of
+subjective revelation would have been overwhelming? Or could it any
+longer have been maintained that supposing a revelation to be
+communicated subjectively the fact thereof could only be of any
+evidential value to the recipient himself? To this it will no doubt be
+answered, 'No, but in the case supposed the evidence arises not from the
+fact of their subjective intuition but from that of its objective
+verification in the results of science.' Quite so; but this is exactly
+the test appealed to by the Hebrew prophets--the test of true and lying
+prophets being in the fulfilment or non-fulfilment of their prophecies
+and 'By their fruits ye shall know them.'
+
+Therefore it is as absurd to say that the religious consciousness of
+minds other than our own can be barred antecedently as evidence, as it
+is to say that testimony to the miraculous is similarly barred. The pure
+agnostic must always carefully avoid the 'high _priori_ road.' But, on
+the other hand, he must be all the more assiduous in estimating fairly
+the character, both as to quantity and quality, of evidence _a
+posteriori_. Now this evidence in the present case is twofold, positive
+and negative. It will be convenient to consider the negative first.
+
+The negative evidence is furnished by the nature of man without God. It
+is thoroughly miserable, as is well shown by Pascal, who has devoted the
+whole of the first part of his treatise to this subject. I need not go
+over the ground which he has already so well traversed.
+
+Some men are not conscious of the cause of this misery: this, however,
+does not prevent the fact of their being miserable. For the most part
+they conceal the fact as well as possible from themselves, by occupying
+their minds with society, sport, frivolity of all kinds, or, if
+intellectually disposed, with science, art, literature, business, &c.
+This however is but to fill the starving belly with husks. I know from
+experience the intellectual distractions of scientific research,
+philosophical speculation, and artistic pleasures; but am also well
+aware that even when all are taken together and well sweetened to taste,
+in respect of consequent reputation, means, social position, &c., the
+whole concoction is but as high confectionery to a starving man. He may
+cheat himself for a time--especially if he be a strong man--into the
+belief that he is nourishing himself by denying his natural appetite;
+but soon finds he was made for some altogether different kind of food,
+even though of much less tastefulness as far as the palate is concerned.
+
+Some men indeed never acknowledge this articulately or distinctly even
+to themselves, yet always show it plainly enough to others. Take, e.g.,
+'that last infirmity of noble minds.' I suppose the most exalted and
+least 'carnal' of worldly joys consists in the adequate recognition by
+the world of high achievement by ourselves. Yet it is notorious that--
+
+               "It is by God decreed
+     Fame shall not satisfy the highest need."
+
+It has been my lot to know not a few of the famous men of our
+generation, and I have always observed that this is profoundly true.
+Like all other 'moral' satisfactions, this soon palls by custom, and as
+soon as one end of distinction is reached, another is pined for. There
+is no finality to rest in, while disease and death are always standing
+in the background. Custom may even blind men to their own misery, so far
+as not to make them realize what is wanting; yet the want is there.
+
+I take it then as unquestionably true that this whole negative side of
+the subject proves a vacuum in the soul of man which nothing can fill
+save faith in God.
+
+Now take the positive side. Consider the happiness of religious--and
+chiefly of the highest religious, i.e. Christian--belief. It is a matter
+of fact that besides being most intense, it is most enduring, growing,
+and never staled by custom. In short, according to the universal
+testimony of those who have it, it differs from all other happiness not
+only in degree but in kind. Those who have it can usually testify to
+what they used to be without it. It has no relation to intellectual
+status. It is a thing by itself and supreme.
+
+So much for the individual. But positive evidence does not end here.
+Look at the effects of Christian belief as exercised on human
+society--1st, by individual Christians on the family, &c.; and, 2nd, by
+the Christian Church on the world.
+
+All this may lead on to an argument from the adaptation of Christianity
+to human higher needs. All men must feel these needs more or less in
+proportion as their higher natures, moral and spiritual, are developed.
+Now Christianity is the only religion which is adapted to meet them,
+and, according to those who are alone able to testify, does so most
+abundantly. All these men, of every sect, nationality, &c., agree in
+their account of their subjective experience; so as to this there can be
+no question. The only question is as to whether they are all deceived.
+
+PEU DE CHOSE.
+
+     'La vie est vaine:
+       Un peu d'amour,
+     Un peu de haine ...
+       Et puis--bon jour!
+
+     La vie est brève:
+       Un peu d'espoir,
+     Un peu de rêve ...
+       Et puis--bon soir!'
+
+The above is a terse and true criticism of this life without hope of a
+future one. Is it satisfactory? But Christian faith, as a matter of
+fact, changes it entirely.
+
+     'The night has a thousand eyes,
+       And the day but one;
+     Yet the light of a whole world dies
+       With the setting sun.
+
+     The mind has a thousand eyes,
+       And the heart but one;
+     Yet the light of a whole life dies
+       When love is done.'
+
+Love is known to be all this. How great, then, is Christianity, as being
+the religion of love, and causing men to believe both in the cause of
+love's supremacy and the infinity of God's love to man.
+
+FOOTNOTES:
+
+[55] Cf. Pascal, _Pensées_. 'For we must not mistake ourselves, we have
+as much that is automatic in us as intellectual, and hence it comes that
+the instrument by which persuasion is brought about is not demonstration
+alone. How few things are demonstrated! Proofs can only convince the
+mind; custom makes our strongest proofs and those which we hold most
+firmly, it sways the automaton, which draws the unconscious intellect
+after it.... It is then custom that makes so many men Christians, custom
+that makes them Turks, heathen, artisans, soldiers, &c. Lastly, we must
+resort to custom when once the mind has seen where truth is, in order to
+slake our thirst and steep ourselves in that belief which escapes us at
+every hour, for to have proofs always at hand were too onerous. We must
+acquire a more easy belief, that of custom, which without violence,
+without art, without argument, causes our assent and inclines all our
+powers to this belief, so that our soul naturally falls into it....
+
+'It is not enough to believe only by force of conviction if the
+automaton is inclined to believe the contrary. Both parts of us then
+must be obliged to believe, the intellect by arguments which it is
+enough to have admitted once in our lives, the automaton by custom, and
+by not allowing it to incline in the contrary direction. _Inclina cor
+meum Deus_.' See also Newman's _Grammar of Assent_, chap. vi. and
+Church's _Human Life and its Conditions_, pp. 67-9.
+
+[56] [The author has added, "For suffering in brutes see further on,"
+but nothing further on the subject appears to have been written.--ED.]
+
+[57] [In this connexion I may again notice that two days before his
+death George Romanes expressed his cordial approval of Professor
+Knight's _Aspects of Theism_--a work in which great stress is laid on
+the argument from intuition in different forms.--ED.]
+
+[58] On this subject see Pascal, _Pensées_ (Kegan Paul's trans.) p. 103.
+
+
+
+
+§ 5. FAITH IN CHRISTIANITY.
+
+Christianity comes up for serious investigation in the present treatise,
+because this _Examination of Religion_ [i.e. of the validity of the
+religious consciousness] has to do with the evidences of Theism
+presented by man, and not only by nature _minus_ man. Now of the
+religious consciousness Christianity is unquestionably the highest
+product.
+
+When I wrote the preceding treatise [the _Candid Examination_], I did
+not sufficiently appreciate the immense importance of _human_ nature, as
+distinguished from physical nature, in any enquiry touching Theism. But
+since then I have seriously studied anthropology (including the science
+of comparative religions), psychology and metaphysics, with the result
+of clearly seeing that human nature is the most important part of nature
+as a whole whereby to investigate the theory of Theism. This I ought to
+have anticipated on merely _a priori_ grounds, and no doubt should have
+perceived, had I not been too much immersed in merely physical research.
+
+Moreover, in those days, I took it for granted that Christianity was
+played out, and never considered it at all as having any rational
+bearing on the question of Theism. And, though this was doubtless
+inexcusable, I still think that the rational standing of Christianity
+has materially improved since then. For then it seemed that Christianity
+was destined to succumb as a rational system before the double assault
+of Darwin from without and the negative school of criticism from within.
+Not only the book of organic nature, but likewise its own sacred
+documents, seemed to be declaring against it. But now all this has been
+very materially changed. We have all more or less grown to see that
+Darwinism is like Copernicanism, &c., in this respect[59]; while the
+outcome of the great textual battle[60] is impartially considered a
+signal victory for Christianity. Prior to the new [Biblical] science,
+there was really no rational basis in thoughtful minds, either for the
+date of any one of the New Testament books, or, consequently, for the
+historical truth of any one of the events narrated in them. Gospels,
+Acts and Epistles were all alike shrouded in this uncertainty. Hence the
+validity of the eighteenth-century scepticism. But now all this kind of
+scepticism has been rendered obsolete, and for ever impossible; while
+the certainty of enough of St. Paul's writings for the practical purpose
+of displaying the belief of the apostles has been established, as well
+as the certainty of the publication of the Synoptics within the first
+century. An enormous gain has thus accrued to the objective evidences
+of Christianity. It is most important that the expert investigator
+should be exact, and, as in any other science, the lay public must take
+on authority as trustworthy only what both sides are agreed upon. But,
+as in any other science, experts are apt to lose sight of the importance
+of the main results agreed upon, in their fighting over lesser points
+still in dispute. Now it is enough for us that the Epistles to the
+Romans, Galatians, and Corinthians, have been agreed upon as genuine,
+and that the same is true of the Synoptics so far as concerns the main
+doctrine of Christ Himself.
+
+
+The extraordinary candour of Christ's biographers must not be
+forgotten[61]. Notice also such sentences as 'but some doubted,' and (in
+the account of Pentecost) 'these men are full of new wine[62].' Such
+observations are wonderfully true to human nature; but no less
+wonderfully opposed to any 'accretion' theory.
+
+Observe, when we become honestly pure agnostics the whole scene changes
+by the change in our point of view. We may then read the records
+impartially, or on their own merits, without any antecedent conviction
+that they must be false. It is then an open question whether they are
+not true as history.
+
+There is so much to be said in objective evidence for Christianity that
+were the central doctrines thus testified to anything short of
+miraculous, no one would doubt. But we are not competent judges _a
+priori_ of what a revelation should be. If our agnosticism be _pure_, we
+have no right to pre-judge the case on _prima facie_ grounds.
+
+
+One of the strongest pieces of objective evidence in favour of
+Christianity is not sufficiently enforced by apologists. Indeed, I am
+not aware that I have ever seen it mentioned. It is the absence from the
+biography of Christ of any doctrines which the subsequent growth of
+human knowledge--whether in natural science, ethics, political economy,
+or elsewhere--has had to discount. This negative argument is really
+almost as strong as is the positive one from what Christ did teach. For
+when we consider what a large number of sayings are recorded of--or at
+least attributed to--Him, it becomes most remarkable that in literal
+truth there is no reason why any of His words should ever pass away in
+the sense of becoming obsolete. 'Not even now could it be easy,' says
+John Stuart Mill, 'even for an unbeliever, to find a better translation
+of the rule of virtue from the abstract into the concrete, than to
+endeavour so to live that Christ would approve our life[63].' Contrast
+Jesus Christ in this respect with other thinkers of like antiquity. Even
+Plato, who, though some 400 years B.C. in point of time, was greatly in
+advance of Him in respect of philosophic thought--not only because
+Athens then presented the extraordinary phenomenon which it did of
+genius in all directions never since equalled, but also because he,
+following Socrates, was, so to speak, the greatest representative of
+human reason in the direction of spirituality--even Plato, I say, is
+nowhere in this respect as compared with Christ. Read the dialogues, and
+see how enormous is the contrast with the Gospels in respect of errors
+of all kinds--reaching even to absurdity in respect of reason, and to
+sayings shocking to the moral sense. Yet this is confessedly the highest
+level of human reason on the lines of spirituality, when unaided by
+alleged revelation.
+
+Two things may be said in reply. First, that the Jews (Rabbis) of
+Christ's period had enunciated most of Christ's ethical sayings. But,
+even so far as this is true, the sayings were confessedly extracted or
+deduced from the Old Testament, and so _ex hypothesi_ due to original
+inspiration. Again, it is not very far true, because, as _Ecce Homo_
+says, the ethical sayings of Christ, even when anticipated by Rabbis and
+the Old Testament, were _selected_ by Him.
+
+
+It is a general, if not a universal, rule that those who reject
+Christianity with contempt are those who care not for religion of any
+kind. 'Depart from us' has always been the sentiment of such. On the
+other hand, those in whom the religious sentiment is intact, but who
+have rejected Christianity on intellectual grounds, still almost deify
+Christ. These facts are remarkable.
+
+If we estimate the greatness of a man by the influence which he has
+exerted on mankind, there can be no question, even from the secular
+point of view, that Christ is much the greatest man who has ever lived.
+
+It is on all sides worth considering (blatant ignorance or base
+vulgarity alone excepted) that the revolution effected by Christianity
+in human life is immeasurable and unparalleled by any other movement in
+history; though most nearly approached by that of the Jewish religion,
+of which, however, it is a development, so that it may be regarded as of
+a piece with it. If thus regarded, this whole system of religion is so
+immeasurably in advance of all others, that it may fairly be said, if it
+had not been for the Jews, the human race would not have had any
+religion worth our serious attention as such. The whole of that side of
+human nature would never have been developed in civilized life. And
+although there are numberless individuals who are not conscious of its
+development in themselves, yet even these have been influenced to an
+enormous extent by the atmosphere of religion around them.
+
+But not only is Christianity thus so immeasurably in advance of all
+other religions. It is no less so of every other system of thought that
+has ever been promulgated in regard to all that is moral and spiritual.
+Whether it be true or false, it is certain that neither philosophy,
+science, nor poetry has ever produced results in thought, conduct, or
+beauty in any degree to be compared with it. This I think will be on all
+hands allowed as regards conduct. As regards thought and beauty it may
+be disputed. But, consider, what has all the science or all the
+philosophy of the world done for the thought of mankind to be compared
+with the one doctrine, 'God is love'? Whether or not true, conceive what
+belief in it has been to thousands of millions of our race--i.e. its
+influence on human thought, and thence on human conduct. Thus to admit
+its incomparable influence in conduct is indirectly to admit it as
+regards thought. Again, as regards beauty, the man who fails to see its
+incomparable excellence in this respect merely shows his own deficiency
+in the appreciation of all that is noblest in man. True or not true, the
+entire Story of the Cross, from its commencement in prophetic aspiration
+to its culmination in the Gospel, is by far the most magnificent
+[presentation] in literature. And surely the fact of its having all been
+lived does not detract from its poetic value. Nor does the fact of its
+being capable of appropriation by the individual Christian of to-day as
+still a vital religion detract from its sublimity. Only to a man wholly
+destitute of spiritual perception can it be that Christianity should
+fail to appear the greatest exhibition of the beautiful, the sublime,
+and of all else that appeals to our spiritual nature, which has ever
+been known upon our earth.
+
+Yet this side of its adaptation is turned only towards men of highest
+culture. The most remarkable thing about Christianity is its adaptation
+to all sorts and conditions of men. Are you highly intellectual? There
+is in its problems, historical and philosophical, such worlds of
+material as you may spend your life upon with the same interminable
+interest as is open to the students of natural science. Or are you but a
+peasant in your parish church, with knowledge of little else than your
+Bible? Still are you ...[64]
+
+
+_Regeneration_.
+
+How remarkable is the doctrine of Regeneration _per se_, as it is stated
+in the New Testament[65], and how completely it fits in with the
+non-demonstrative character of Revelation to reason alone, with the
+hypothesis of moral probation, &c. Now this doctrine is one of the
+distinctive notes of Christianity. That is, Christ foretold repeatedly
+and distinctly--as did also His apostles after Him--that while those who
+received the Holy Ghost, who came to the Father through faith in the
+Son, who were born again of the Spirit, (and many other synonymous
+phrases,) would be absolutely certain of Christian truth as it were by
+direct vision or intuition, the carnally minded on the other hand would
+not be affected by any amount of direct evidence, even though one rose
+from the dead--as indeed Christ shortly afterwards did, with fulfilment
+of this prediction. Thus scepticism may be taken by Christians as
+corroborating Christianity.
+
+By all means let us retain our independence of judgement; but this is
+pre-eminently a matter in which pure agnostics must abstain from
+arrogance and consider the facts impartially as unquestionable phenomena
+of experience.
+
+Shortly after the death of Christ, this phenomenon which had been
+foretold by Him occurred, and appears to have done so for the first
+time. It has certainly continued to manifest itself ever since, and has
+been attributed by professed historians to that particular moment in
+time called Pentecost, producing much popular excitement and a large
+number of Christian believers.
+
+But, whether or not we accept this account, it is unquestionable that
+the apostles were filled with faith in the person and office of their
+Master, which is enough to justify His doctrine of regeneration.
+
+
+_Conversions._
+
+St. Augustine after thirty years of age, and other Fathers, bear
+testimony to a sudden, enduring and extraordinary change in themselves,
+called _conversion_[66].
+
+Now this experience has been repeated and testified to by countless
+millions of civilized men and women in all nations and all degrees of
+culture. It signifies not whether the conversion be sudden or gradual,
+though, as a psychological phenomenon, it is more remarkable when sudden
+and there is no symptom of mental aberration otherwise. But even as a
+gradual growth in mature age, its evidential value is not less. (Cf.
+Bunyan, &c.)
+
+In all cases it is not a mere change of belief or opinion; this is by no
+means the point; the point is that it is a modification of character,
+more or less profound.
+
+Seeing what a complex thing is character, this change therefore cannot
+be simple. That it may all be due to so-called natural causes is no
+evidence against its so-called supernatural source, unless we beg the
+whole question of the Divine in Nature. To pure agnostics the evidence
+from conversions and regeneration lies in the bulk of these
+psychological phenomena, shortly after the death of Christ, with their
+continuance ever since, their general similarity all over the world,
+&c., &c.
+
+
+_Christianity and Pain_.
+
+Christianity, from its foundation in Judaism, has throughout been a
+religion of sacrifice and sorrow. It has been a religion of blood and
+tears, and yet of profoundest happiness to its votaries. The apparent
+paradox is due to its depth, and to the union of these seemingly diverse
+roots in Love. It has been throughout and growingly a religion--or
+rather let us say _the_ religion--of Love, with these apparently
+opposite qualities. Probably it is only those whose characters have been
+deepened by experiences gained in this religion itself who are so much
+as capable of intelligently resolving this paradox.
+
+Fakirs hang on hooks, Pagans cut themselves and even their children,
+sacrifice captives, &c., for the sake of propitiating diabolical
+deities. The Jewish and Christian idea of sacrifice is doubtless a
+survival of this idea of God by way of natural causation, yet this is no
+evidence against the completed idea of the Godhead being [such as the
+Christian belief represents it], for supposing the completed idea to be
+true, the earlier ideals would have been due to the earlier
+inspirations, in accordance with the developmental method of Revelation
+hereafter to be discussed[67].
+
+But Christianity, with its roots in Judaism, is, as I have said, _par
+excellence_ the religion of sorrow, because it reaches to truer and
+deeper levels of our spiritual nature, and therefore has capabilities
+both of sorrow and joy which are presumably non-existent except in
+civilized man. I mean the sorrows and the joys of a fully evolved
+spiritual life--such as were attained wonderfully early, historically
+speaking, in the case of the Jews, and are now universally diffused
+throughout Christendom. In short, the sorrows and the joys in question
+are those which arise from the fully developed consciousness of sin
+against a God of Love, as distinguished from propitiation of malignant
+spirits. These joys and sorrows are wholly spiritual, not merely
+physical, and culminate in the cry,'Thou desirest no sacrifice.... The
+sacrifice of God is a troubled spirit[68].'
+
+
+I agree with Pascal[69] that there is virtually nothing to be gained by
+being a theist as distinguished from a Christian. Unitarianism is only
+an affair of the reason--a merely abstract theory of the mind, having
+nothing to do with the heart, or the real needs of mankind. It is only
+when it takes the New Testament, tears out a few of its leaves relating
+to the divinity of Christ, and appropriates all the rest, that its
+system becomes in any degree possible as a basis for personal religion.
+
+If there is a Deity it seems to be in some indefinite degree more
+probable that He should impart a Revelation than that He should not.
+
+
+Women, as a class, are in all countries much more disposed to
+Christianity than men. I think the scientific explanation of this is to
+be found in the causes assigned in my essay on _Mental differences
+between Men and Women_[70]. But, if Christianity be supposed true, there
+would, of course, be a more ultimate explanation of a religious
+kind--as in all other cases where causation is concerned. And, in that
+case I have no doubt that the largest part of the explanation would
+consist in the passions of women being less ardent than those of men,
+and also much more kept under restraint by social conditions of life.
+This applies not only to purity, but likewise to most of the other
+psychological _differentiae_ between the sexes, such as ambition,
+selfishness, pride of power, and so forth. In short, the whole ideal of
+Christian ethics is of a feminine as distinguished from a masculine
+type[71]. Now nothing is so inimical to Christian belief as un-Christian
+conduct. This is especially the case as regards impurity; for whether
+the fact be explained on religious or non-religious grounds, it has more
+to do with unbelief than has the speculative reason. Consequently, woman
+is, for all these reasons, the 'fitter' type for receiving and retaining
+Christian belief.
+
+
+Modern agnosticism is performing this great service to Christian faith;
+it is silencing all rational scepticism of the _a priori_ kind. And this
+it is bound to do more and more the purer it becomes. In every
+generation it must henceforth become more and more recognized by
+logical thinking, that all antecedent objections to Christianity founded
+on reason alone are _ipso facto_ nugatory. Now, all the strongest
+objections to Christianity have ever been those of the antecedent kind;
+hence the effect of modern thinking is that of more and more diminishing
+the purely speculative difficulties, such as that of the Incarnation,
+&c. In other words the force of Butler's argument about our being
+incompetent judges[72] is being more and more increased.
+
+And the logical development of this lies in the view already stated
+about natural causation. For, just as pure agnosticism must allow that
+reason is incompetent to adjudicate _a priori_ for or against Christian
+miracles, including the Incarnation, so it must further allow that, if
+they ever took place, reason can have nothing to say against their being
+all of one piece with causation in general. Hence, so far as reason is
+concerned, pure agnosticism must allow that it is only the event which
+can ultimately prove whether Christianity is true or false. 'If it be of
+God we cannot overthrow it, lest haply we be found even to fight against
+God.' But the individual cannot wait for this empirical determination.
+What then is he to do? The unbiassed answer of pure agnosticism ought
+reasonably to be, in the words of John Hunter, 'Do not think; try.' That
+is, in this case, try the only experiment available--the experiment of
+faith. Do the doctrine, and if Christianity be true, the verification
+will come, not indeed mediately through any course of speculative
+reason, but immediately by spiritual intuition. Only if a man has faith
+enough to make this venture honestly, will he be in a just position for
+deciding the issue. Thus viewed it would seem that the experiment of
+faith is not a 'fool's experiment'; but, on the contrary, so that there
+is enough _prima facie_ evidence to arrest serious attention, such an
+experimental trial would seem to be the rational duty of a pure
+agnostic.
+
+It is a fact that Christian belief is much more due to doing than to
+thinking, as prognosticated by the New Testament. 'If any man will do
+His will, he shall know of the doctrine, whether it be of God' (St. John
+vii. 17). And surely, even on grounds of reason itself, it should be
+allowed that, supposing Christianity to be 'of God,' it _ought_ to
+appeal to the spiritual rather than to the rational side of our nature.
+
+
+Even within the region of pure reason (or the '_prima facie_ case')
+modern science, as directed on the New Testament criticism, has surely
+done more for Christianity than against it. For, after half a century of
+battle over the text by the best scholars, the dates of the Gospels have
+been fixed within the first century, and at least four of St. Paul's
+epistles have had their authenticity proved beyond doubt. Now this is
+enough to destroy all eighteenth-century criticism as to the
+doubtfulness of the historical existence of Christ and His apostles,
+'inventions of priests,' &c., which was the most formidable kind of
+criticism of all. There is no longer any question as to historical
+facts, save the miraculous, which, however, are ruled out by negative
+criticism on merely _a priori_ grounds. This remaining--and, _ex
+hypothesi_, necessary--doubt is of very different importance from the
+other.
+
+Again, the Pauline epistles of proved authenticity are enough for all
+that is wanted to show the belief of Christ's contemporaries.
+
+These are facts of the first order of importance to have proved. Old
+Testament criticism is as yet too immature to consider.
+
+
+_Plan in Revelation_.
+
+The views which I entertained on this subject when an undergraduate
+[i.e. the ordinary orthodox views] were abandoned in presence of the
+theory of Evolution--i.e. the theory of natural causation as probably
+furnishing a scientific explanation [of the religious phenomena of
+Judaism] or, which is the same thing, an explanation in terms of
+ascertainable causes up to some certain point; which however in this
+particular case cannot be determined within wide limits, so that the
+history of Israel will always embody an element of 'mystery' much more
+than any other history.
+
+It was not until twenty-five years later that I saw clearly the full
+implications of my present views on natural causation. As applied to
+this particular case these views show that to a theist, at all events
+(i.e. to any one who on independent grounds has accepted the theory of
+Theism), it ought not to make much difference to the evidential value of
+the Divine Plan of Revelation as exhibited in the Old and New
+Testaments, even if it be granted that the whole has been due to
+so-called natural causes only. I say, 'not much difference,' for that it
+ought to make some difference I do not deny. Take a precisely analogous
+case. The theory of evolution by natural causes is often said to make no
+logical difference in the evidence of plan or design manifested in
+organic nature--it being only a question of _modus operandi_ whether all
+pieces of organic machinery were produced suddenly or by degrees; the
+evidence of design is equally there in either case. Now I have shown
+elsewhere that this is wrong[73]. It may not make much difference to a
+man who is already a theist, for then it is but a question of _modus_,
+but it makes a great difference to the evidence of Theism.
+
+So it is in evidence of plan in proof of a revelation. If there had been
+no alleged revelation up to the present time, and if Christ were now to
+appear suddenly in His first advent in all the power and glory which
+Christians expect for His second, the proof of His revelation would be
+demonstrative. So that, as a mere matter of evidence, a sudden
+revelation might be much more convincing than a gradual one. But it
+would be quite out of analogy with causation in nature[74]. Besides,
+even a gradual revelation might be given easily, which would be of
+demonstrative value--as by making prophecies of historical events,
+scientific discoveries, &c., so clear as to be unmistakeable. But, as
+before shown, a demonstrative revelation has not been made, and there
+may well be good reasons why it should not. Now, if there are such
+reasons (e.g. our state of probation), we can well see that the gradual
+unfolding of a plan of revelation, from earliest dawn of history to the
+end of the world ('I speak as a fool') is much preferable to a sudden
+manifestation sufficiently late in the world's history to be
+historically attested for all subsequent time. For
+
+     1st. Gradual evolution is in analogy with God's other work.
+
+     2nd. It does not leave Him without witness at any time during the
+     historical period.
+
+     3rd. It gives ample scope for persevering research at all
+     times--i.e. a moral test, and not merely an intellectual assent to
+     some one _(ex hypothesi)_ unequivocally attested event in history.
+
+The _appearance_ of plan in revelation is, in fact, certainly remarkable
+enough to arrest serious attention.
+
+If revelation has been of a progressive character, then it follows that
+it must have been so, not only historically, but likewise
+intellectually, morally, and spiritually. For thus only could it be
+always adapted to the advancing conditions of the human race. This
+reflection destroys all those numerous objections against Scripture on
+account of the absurdity or immorality of its statements or precepts,
+unless it can be shown that the modifications suggested by criticism as
+requisite to bring the statements or precepts into harmony with modern
+advancement would have been as well adapted to the requirements of the
+world at the date in question, as were the actual statements or precepts
+before us.
+
+
+Supposing Christianity true, it is certain that the revelation which it
+conveys has been predetermined at least since the dawn of the historical
+period. This is certain because the objective evidences of Christianity
+as a revelation have their origin in that dawn. And these objective
+evidences are throughout [evidence] of a scheme, in which the end can be
+seen from the beginning. And the very methods whereby this scheme is
+itself revealed are such (still supposing that it is a scheme) as
+present remarkable evidences of design. These methods are, broadly
+speaking, miracles, prophecy and the results of the teaching, &c., upon
+mankind. Now one may show that no better methods could conceivably have
+been designed for the purpose of latter-day evidence, combined with
+moral and religious teaching throughout. The mere fact of it being so
+largely incorporated with secular history renders the Christian religion
+unique: so to speak, the world, throughout its entire historical period,
+has been constituted the canvas on which this divine revelation has been
+painted--and painted so gradually that not until the process had been
+going on for a couple of thousand years was it possible to perceive the
+subject thereof.
+
+
+_Christian Dogmas_.
+
+Whether or not Christ was Himself divine would make no difference so far
+as the consideration of Christianity as the highest phase of evolution
+is concerned, or from the purely secular [scientific] point of view.
+From the religious point of view, or that touching the relation of God
+to man, it would of course make a great difference; but the difference
+belongs to the same region of thought as that which applies to all the
+previous moments of evolution. Thus the passage from the non-moral to
+the moral appears, from the secular or scientific point of view, to be
+due, as far as we can see, to mechanical causes in natural selection or
+what not. But, just as in the case of the passage from the non-mental to
+the mental, &c., this passage may have been _ultimately_ due to divine
+volition, and _must have been so due_ on the theory of Theism.
+Therefore, I say, it makes no difference from a secular or scientific
+point of view whether or not Christ was Himself divine; since, in either
+case, the movement which He inaugurated was the proximate or phenomenal
+cause of the observable results.
+
+Thus, even the question of the divinity of Christ ultimately resolves
+itself into the question of all questions--viz. is or is not mechanical
+causation 'the outward and visible form of an inward and spiritual
+grace'? Is it phenomenal or ontological; ultimate or derivative?
+
+Similarly as regards the redemption. Whether or not Christ was really
+divine, in as far as a belief in His divinity has been a necessary cause
+of the moral and religious evolution which has resulted from His life on
+earth, it has equally and so far 'saved His people from their sins';
+that is, of course, it has saved them from their own sense of sin as an
+abiding curse. Whether or not He has effected any corresponding change
+of an objective character in the ontological sphere, again depends on
+the 'question of questions' just stated.
+
+
+_Reasonableness of the Doctrines of the Incarnation and the Trinity._
+
+Pure agnostics and those who search for God in Christianity should have
+nothing to do with metaphysical theology. _That_ is a department of
+enquiry which, _ex hypothesi_, is transcendental, and is only to be
+considered after Christianity has been accepted. The doctrines of the
+Incarnation and the Trinity seemed to me most absurd in my agnostic
+days. But now, as a _pure_ agnostic, I see in them no rational
+difficulty at all. As to the Trinity, the plurality of persons is
+necessarily implied in the companion doctrine of the Incarnation. So
+that at best there is here but one difficulty, since, duality being
+postulated in the doctrine of the Incarnation, there is no further
+difficulty for pure agnosticism in the doctrine of plurality. Now at one
+time it seemed to me impossible that any proposition, verbally
+intelligible as such, could be more violently absurd than that of the
+doctrine [of the Incarnation]. Now I see that this standpoint is wholly
+irrational, due only to the blindness of reason itself promoted by
+[purely] scientific habits of thought. 'But it is opposed to common
+sense.' No doubt, utterly so; but so it _ought_ to be if true. Common
+sense is merely a [rough] register of common experience; but the
+Incarnation, if it ever took place, whatever else it may have been, at
+all events cannot have been a common event. 'But it is derogatory to God
+to become man.' How do you know? Besides, Christ was not an ordinary
+man. Both negative criticism and the historical effects of His life
+prove this; while, if we for a moment adopt the Christian point of view
+for the sake of argument, the whole _raison d'être_ of mankind is bound
+up in Him. Lastly, there are considerations _per contra_, rendering an
+incarnation antecedently probable[75]. On antecedent grounds there
+_must_ be mysteries unintelligible to reason as to the nature of God,
+&c., supposing a revelation to be made at all. Therefore their
+occurrence in Christianity _is_ no proper objection to Christianity.
+Why, again, stumble _a priori_ over the doctrine of the
+Trinity--especially as man himself is a triune being, of body, mind
+(i.e. reason), and spirit (i.e. moral, aesthetic, religious faculties)?
+The unquestionable union of these no less unquestionably distinct orders
+of being in man is known immediately as a fact of experience, but is as
+unintelligible by any process of logic or reason as is the alleged
+triunity of God.
+
+
+_Adam, the Fall, the Origin of Evil_.
+
+These, all taken together as Christian dogmas, are undoubtedly hard hit
+by the scientific proof of evolution (but are the _only_ dogmas which
+can fairly be said to be so), and, as constituting the logical basis of
+the whole plan, they certainly do appear at first sight necessarily to
+involve in their destruction that of the entire superstructure. But the
+question is whether, after all, they have been destroyed for a pure
+agnostic. In other words, whether my principles are not as applicable in
+turning the flank of infidelity here as everywhere else.
+
+First, as regards Adam and Eve, observe, to begin with, that long before
+Darwin the story of man in Paradise was recognized by thoughtful
+theologians as allegorical. Indeed, read with unprejudiced eyes, the
+first chapters of Genesis ought always to have been seen to be a poem as
+distinguished from a history: nor could it ever have been mistaken for
+a history, but for preconceived ideas on the matter of inspiration. But
+to pure agnostics there should be no such preconceived ideas; so that
+nowadays no presumption should be raised against it as inspired, merely
+because it has been proved not to be a history--and this even though we
+cannot see of what it is allegorical. For, supposing it inspired, it has
+certainly done good service in the past and can do so likewise in the
+present, by giving an allegorical, though not a literal, starting-point
+for the Divine Plan of Redemption.
+
+
+_The evidence of Natural and Revealed Religion compared_.
+
+It is often said that evolution of organic forms gives as good evidence
+of design as would their special creation, inasmuch as all the facts of
+adaptation, in which the evidence consists, are there in either case.
+But here it is overlooked that the very question at issue is thus
+begged. The question is, Are these facts of adaptation _per se_
+sufficient evidence of design as their cause? But if it be allowed, as
+it must be, that under hypothesis of evolution by natural causes the
+facts of adaptation belong to the same category as all the other facts
+of nature, no more special argument for design can be founded on these
+facts than on any others in nature. So that the facts of adaptation,
+like all other facts, are only available as arguments for design when
+it is assumed that all natural causation is of a mental character: which
+assumption merely begs the question of design anywhere. Or, in other
+words, on the supposition of their having been due to natural causes,
+the facts of adaptation are only then available as _per se_ good
+evidence of design, when it has already been assumed that, _qua_ due to
+natural causes, they are due to design.
+
+Natural religion resembles Revealed religion in this. Supposing both
+divine, both have been arranged so that, as far as reason can lead us,
+there is only enough evidence of design to arouse serious attention to
+the question of it. In other words, as regards both, the attitude of
+pure reason ought to be that of pure agnosticism. (Observe that the
+inadequacy of teleology, or design in nature, to prove Theism has been
+expressly recognized by all the more intellectual Christians of all
+ages, although such recognition has become more general since Darwin. On
+this point I may refer to Pascal especially[76], and many other
+authors.) This is another striking analogy between Nature and
+Revelation, supposing both to have emanated from the same author--i.e.
+quite as much so as identity of developmental method in both.
+
+_Supposing the hypothesis of design in both to be true_, it follows that
+in both this hypothesis can be alike verified only by the organ of
+immediate intuition--i.e. that other mode of human apprehension which is
+supplementary to the rational. Here again we note the analogy. And if a
+man has this supplementary mode of apprehending the highest truth (by
+hypothesis such), it will be his duty to exercise his spiritual eyesight
+in searching for God in nature as in revelation, when (still on our
+present hypothesis that 'God is, and is the rewarder of them who seek
+Him diligently') he will find that his subjective evidence of God in
+Nature and in Revelation will mutually corroborate one another--so
+yielding additional evidence to his reason.
+
+The teleology of Revelation supplements that of Nature, and so, to the
+spiritually minded man, they logically and mutually corroborate one
+another.
+
+Paley's writings form an excellent illustration of the identity of the
+teleological argument from Nature and from Revelation; though a very
+imperfect illustration of the latter taken by itself, inasmuch as he
+treats only of the New Testament, and even of that very
+partially--ignoring all that went before Christ, and much of what
+happened after the apostles. Yet Paley himself does not seem to have
+observed the similarity of the argument, as developed in his _Natural
+Theology_ and _Evidences of Christianity_ respectively. But no one has
+developed the argument better in both cases. His great defect was in not
+perceiving that this teleological argument, _per se_, is not in either
+case enough to convince, but only to arouse serious attention. Paley
+everywhere represents that such an appeal to reason alone ought to be
+sufficient. He fails to see that if it were, there could be no room for
+faith. In other words, he fails to recognize the spiritual organ in
+man, and its complementary object, grace in God. So far he fails to be a
+Christian. And, whether Theism and Christianity be true or false, it is
+certain that the teleological argument alone _ought_ to result, not in
+conviction, but in agnosticism.
+
+
+The antecedent improbability against a miracle being wrought by a man
+without a moral object is apt to be confused with that of its being done
+by God with an adequate moral object. The former is immeasurably great;
+the latter is only equal to that of the theory of Theism--i.e. _nil_.
+
+
+_Christian Demonology_[77].
+
+It will be said, 'However you may seek to explain away _a priori_
+objections to miracles on _a priori_ grounds, there remains the fact
+that Christ accepted the current superstition in regard to diabolic
+possession. Now the devils damn the doctrine. For you must choose the
+horn of your dilemma, either the current theory was true or it was not.
+If you say true, you must allow that the same theory is true for all
+similar stages of culture, [but not for the later stages,] and therefore
+that the most successful exorcist is Science, albeit Science works not
+by faith in the theory, but by rejection of it. Observe, the diseases
+are so well described by the record, that there is no possibility of
+mistaking them. Hence you must suppose that they were due to devils in
+A.D. 30, and to nervous disorders in A.D. 1894. On the other hand, if
+you choose the other horn, you must accept either the hypothesis of the
+ignorance or that of the mendacity of Christ.'
+
+The answer is, that either hypothesis may be accepted by Christianity.
+For the sake of argument we may exclude the question whether the
+acceptance of the devil theory by Christ was really historical, or
+merely attributed to Him by His biographers after His death. If Christ
+knew that the facts were not due to devils, He may also have known it
+was best to fall in with current theory, rather than to puzzle the
+people with a lecture on pathology. If He did not know, why should He,
+if He had previously 'emptied Himself' of omniscience? In either case,
+if He had denied the current theory, He would have been giving evidence
+of scientific knowledge or of scientific intuition beyond the culture of
+His time, and this, as in countless other cases, was not in accordance
+with His method, which, whether we suppose it divine or human, has
+nowhere proved His divine mission by foreknowledge of natural science.
+
+The particular question of Christ and demonology is but part of a much
+larger one.
+
+
+_Darwin's Difficulty_[78].
+
+The answer to Darwin's objection about so small a proportion of mankind
+having ever heard of Christ, is manifold:--
+
+1. Supposing Christianity true, it is the highest and final revelation;
+i.e. the scheme of revelation has been developmental. Therefore, it
+follows from the very method that the larger proportion of mankind
+should never hear of Christ, i.e. all who live before His advent.
+
+2. But these were not left 'without witness.' They all had their
+religion and their moral sense, each at its appropriate stage of
+development. Therefore 'the times of ignorance God winked at' (Acts
+xvii. 30).
+
+3. Moreover these men were not devoid of benefit from Christ, because it
+is represented that He died for all men--i.e. but for Him [i.e. apart
+from the knowledge of what was to come] God would not have 'winked at
+the times of ignorance.' The efficacy of atonement is represented as
+transcendental, and not dependent on the accident of hearing about the
+Atoner.
+
+4. It is remarkable that of all men Darwin should have been worsted by
+this fallacious argument. For it has received its death-blow from the
+theory of evolution: i.e. if it be true that evolution has been the
+method of natural causation, and if it be true that the method of
+natural causation is due to a Divinity, then it follows that the
+lateness of Christ's appearance on earth must have been designed. For it
+is certain that He could not have appeared at any earlier date without
+having violated the method of evolution. Therefore, on the theory of
+Theism, He _ought_ to have appeared when He did--i.e. at the earliest
+possible moment in history.
+
+So as to the suitability of the moment of Christ's appearance in other
+respects. Even secular historians are agreed as to the suitability of
+the combinations, and deduce the success of His system of morals and
+religion from this fact. So with students of comparative religions.
+
+FOOTNOTES:
+
+[59] [I.e. a theory which comes at first as a shock to the current
+teaching of Christianity, but is finally seen to be in no antagonism to
+its necessary principles.--ED.]
+
+[60] [I.e. the battle in regard to the Christian texts or
+documents.--ED.]
+
+[61] See Gore's _Bampton Lectures_, pp. 74 ff.
+
+[62] Matt, xxviii. 17; Acts ii. 13.
+
+[63] _Three Essays on Theism_, p. 255.
+
+[64] [Note unfinished.--ED.]
+
+[65] [George Romanes began to make a collection of N.T. texts bearing on
+the subject.--ED.]
+
+[66] See Pascal, _Pensées_, p. 245.
+
+[67] [The notes on this subject were often too fragmentary for
+publication.--ED.]
+
+[68] Ps. li.
+
+[69] _Pensées_, pp. 91-93.
+
+[70] See _Nineteenth Century_, May 1887.
+
+[71] [The essay mentioned above should be read in explanation of this
+expression. George Romanes' meaning would be more accurately expressed,
+I think, had he said: 'The ideal of Christian character holds in
+prominence the elements which we regard as characteristically feminine,
+e.g. development of affections, readiness of trust, love of service,
+readiness to suffer, &c.'--ED.]
+
+[72] See _Analogy_, part i. ch. 7; part ii. ch. 3, 4, &c.
+
+[73] See Conclusion of _Darwin and After Darwin_, part I.
+
+[74] I should somewhere show how much better a treatise Butler might
+have written had he known about evolution as the general law of nature.
+
+[75] See Gore's _Bampton Lectures_, lect. ii.
+
+[76] _Pensées_, pp. 205 ff.
+
+[77] [Romanes' line of argument in this note seems to me impossible to
+maintain. The emphasis which Jesus Christ lays on diabolic agency is so
+great that, if it is not a reality, He must be regarded either as
+seriously misled about realities which concern the spiritual life, or
+else as seriously misleading others. And in neither case could He be
+even the perfect Prophet. I think I am justified in explaining my
+disagreement with Romanes' argument at this point particularly.--ED.]
+
+[78] [There is nothing in Darwin's _writings_ which seems to me to
+justify Romanes in attributing this difficulty to him specially. But he
+knew Darwin so intimately and reverenced him so profoundly that he is
+not likely to have been in error on the subject.--ED.]
+
+
+
+
++Concluding Note by the Editor:--+
+
+The intellectual attitude towards Christianity expressed in these notes
+may be described as--(1) 'pure agnosticism' in the region of the
+scientific 'reason,' coupled with (2) a vivid recognition of the
+spiritual necessity of faith and of the legitimacy and value of its
+intuitions; (3) a perception of the positive strength of the historical
+and spiritual evidences of Christianity.
+
+George Romanes came to recognize, as in these written notes so also in
+conversation, that it was 'reasonable to be a Christian believer' before
+the activity or habit of faith had been recovered. His life was cut
+short very soon after this point was reached; but it will surprise no
+one to learn that the writer of these 'Thoughts' returned before his
+death to that full, deliberate communion with the Church of Jesus Christ
+which he had for so many years been conscientiously compelled to forego.
+In his case the 'pure in heart' was after a long period of darkness
+allowed, in a measure before his death, to 'see God.'
+
+    _Fecisti nos ad te, Domine; et inquietum est cor nostrum donec
+    requiescat in te_.
+
+
+OXFORD: HORACE HART
+PRINTER TO THE UNIVERSITY
+
+
+ADVERTISEMENTS
+
+
+The Oxford Library of Practical Theology
+
+     Edited by the Rev. W.C.E. NEWBOLT, M.A., Canon and
+     Chancellor of St. Paul's; and the Rev. DARWELL STONE,
+     M.A., Librarian of the Pusey House, Oxford.
+
+       *       *       *       *       *
+
+_Price 5s. each volume_.
+
++RELIGION+. By the Rev. W.C.E. NEWBOLT, M.A., Canon and Chancellor of
+St. Paul's.                                         [_Fifth Impression_.
+
+     '_The Oxford Library of Practical Theology_ makes a good beginning
+     with Canon Newbolt's volume on religion.... The publishers have
+     spared no pains in making the appearance of the volumes as
+     attractive as possible. The binding, type, and general "get up" of
+     the volume just issued leave nothing to be desired.'--_Guardian_.
+
++HOLY BAPTISM+. By the Rev. DARWELL STONE, M.A., Librarian of the Pusey
+House, Oxford.                                         [_Third Edition_.
+
+     'Few books on Baptism contain more thoughtful and useful
+     instruction on the rite, and we give Mr. Stone's effort our highest
+     approval. It might well be made a text-book for candidates for the
+     diaconate, or at least in theological colleges. As a book for
+     thoughtful laymen it is also certain to find a place.'--_Church
+     Times_.
+
++CONFIRMATION+. By the Right Rev. A.C.A. HALL, D.D., Bishop of Vermont.
+                                                    [_Third Impression_.
+
+     'To the parochial clergy this volume may be warmly commended. They
+     will find it to be a storehouse of material for their instruction,
+     and quite the best treatise that we have on the subject it treats.
+     It is thoroughly practical, and gives exactly the kind of teaching
+     that is wanted.'--_Guardian_.
+
++THE HISTORY OF THE BOOK OF COMMON PRAYER+. By the Rev. LEIGHTON PULLAN,
+M.A., Fellow of St. John Baptist's College, Oxford,    [_Third Edition_.
+
+     'Mr. Pullan's book will no doubt have, as it deserves to have, a
+     large number of readers, and they will gain a great deal from the
+     perusal of it. It may be certainly recommended to the ordinary
+     layman as by far the best book on the subject available.'--_Pilot_.
+
++HOLY MATRIMONY+. By the Rev. W.J. KNOX LITTLE, M.A., Canon of
+Worcester.                                            [_Second Edition_.
+
+     'Canon Knox Little has given us a most exhaustive treatise on Holy
+     Matrimony written in his best and happiest style, and giving ample
+     proofs of wide research and deep study of the various aspects, and
+     the essential characteristics of Christian marriage.... We would
+     strongly advise the clergy to place this work upon their shelves as
+     a book of reference, while it forms a complete manual of
+     instruction to aid them in the preparation of addresses on the
+     subject.'--_Church Bells_.
+
++THE INCARNATION+. By the Rev. H.V.S. ECK, M.A., Rector of Bethnal
+Green.                                                [_Second Edition_.
+
+     'The teaching is sound, and the book may be placed with confidence
+     in the hands of candidates for Orders or of intelligent and
+     educated lay people who desire fuller instruction on the central
+     doctrines of the Faith than can be provided in sermons.'
+     --_Guardian_.
+
++FOREIGN MISSIONS+. By the Right Rev. E.T. CHURTON, D.D., formerly
+Bishop of Nassau.
+
+     'We welcome Bishop Churton's book as an authoritative exposition of
+     the modern High Church view of Missions, It is good for us all to
+     understand it, thereby we shall be saved alike from uninstructed
+     admiration and indiscriminate denunciation.'--_Church Missionary
+     Intelligencer_.
+
++PRAYER+. By the Rev. ARTHUR JOHN WORLLEDGE, M.A., Canon and Chancellor
+of Truro.                                             [_Second Edition_.
+
+     'We do not know of any book about prayer which is equally useful;
+     and we anticipate that it will be a standard work for, at any rate,
+     a considerable time.'--_Pilot_.
+
++SUNDAY+. By the Rev. W.B. TREVELYAN, M.A., Vicar of St. Matthew's,
+Westminster.                                          [_Second Edition_.
+
+     'An extremely useful contribution to a difficult and important
+     subject, and we are confident it will rank high in the series to
+     which it belongs.'--_Guardian_.
+
++THE CHRISTIAN TRADITION+. By the Rev. LEIGHTON PULLAN, M.A., Fellow of
+St. John Baptist's College, Oxford.
+
+     'Mr. Pullan affirms that the critics of orthodox Christianity are
+     now destroying one another's theories much more than they are
+     destroying the Catholic Faith. However that may be, his book should
+     render some assistance in determining what is and what is not "The
+     Faith once delivered to the Saints." It is a worthy addition to the
+     series to which it belongs.'--_Westminster Gazette_.
+
++BOOKS OF DEVOTION+. By the Rev. CHARLES BODINGTON, Canon and Precentor
+of Lichfield.
+
+     'Extremely valuable for its high tone, fidelity to Catholic
+     standards, and powerful advocacy of reality in private devotion. To
+     those who have never studied the subject, it should reveal a mine
+     of devotional wealth, yet to be worked with profit to man and glory
+     to God.'--_Church Times_.
+
++HOLY ORDERS+. By the Rev. A.R. WHITHAM, M.A., Principal of Culham
+College, Abingdon.
+
+     'For the educated layman who wishes to know what the Church is
+     teaching about the ministry, and what the relation of the laity to
+     it really is, this is the best book with which we have met. Young
+     men who are considering whether they will seek ordination will find
+     in it excellent statements on the position and work and
+     responsibilities of the ordained.'--_Pilot_.
+
++THE CHURCH CATECHISM THE CHRISTIAN'S MANUAL+. By the Rev. W.C.E.
+NEWBOLT, M.A., Canon and Chancellor of St. Paul's.
+
+     'We think the book should be in the possession of every teacher who
+     can afford it, and in every Church Library for the benefit of those
+     who cannot.'--_The Reader and Layworker_.
+
++THE HOLY COMMUNION+. By the Rev. DARWELL STONE, M.A., Librarian of the
+Pusey House, Oxford.
+
++RELIGIOUS CEREMONIAL+. By the Rev. WALTER HOWARD FRERE, M.A., of the
+Community of the Resurrection, Examining Chaplain to the Bishop of
+Rochester.                                            [_In preparation_.
+
++THE BIBLE+. By the Rev. DARWELL STONE, M.A., Librarian of the
+Pusey House, Oxford.                                  [_In preparation_.
+
++OLD TESTAMENT CRITICISM+. By the Very Rev. HENRY WACE, D.D., Dean of
+Canterbury.                                           [_In preparation_.
+
++NEW TESTAMENT CRITICISM+. By the Rev. R.J. KNOWLING, D.D., Professor of
+New Testament Exegesis at King's College, London.     [_In preparation_.
+
++THE HOLY TRINITY+. By the Right Rev. L.G. MYLNE, D.D., late Bishop of
+Bombay.                                               [_In preparation_.
+
++THE ANGLICAN CHURCH+. By the Rev. ARTHUR JOHN WORLLEDGE, M.A., Canon
+and Chancellor of Truro.                              [_In preparation_.
+
++THE ATONEMENT+. By the Rev. LEIGHTON PULLAN, M.A., Fellow of St. John
+Baptist's College, Oxford.                            [_In preparation_.
+
++CHURCH HISTORY+. By the Rev. H.N. BATE, M.A., Fellow of Magdalen
+College, Oxford. 2 vols.                              [_In preparation_.
+
++CHURCH WORK+. By the Rev. BERNARD REYNOLDS, M.A., Prebendary of St.
+Paul's.                                               [_In preparation_.
+
++VISITATION OF THE SICK+. By the Rev. E.F. RUSSELL, M.A., of St.
+Alban's, Holborn.                                     [_In preparation_.
+
+
++HANDBOOKS FOR THE CLERGY+
+
+EDITED BY THE REV. ARTHUR W. ROBINSON, B.D.
+
+VICAR OF ALLHALLOWS BARKING BY THE TOWER
+
+
+_Crown 8vo, price 2s. 6d. net each volume_.
+
+     The purpose of the writers of this Series is to present in a clear
+     and attractive way the responsibilities and opportunities of the
+     Clergy of to-day, and to offer such practical guidance, in regard
+     both to aims and to methods, as experience may have shown to be
+     valuable. It is hoped that the Series, while primarily intended for
+     those who are already face to face with the duties and problems of
+     the ministerial office, may be of interest and assistance also to
+     others who are considering the question of entering into Holy
+     Orders.
+
+THIRD IMPRESSION.
+
++THE PERSONAL LIFE OF THE CLERGY+. By the EDITOR.
+
+     'It is a short book, but it covers a wide, field. Every line of it
+     tells, and it is excellent reading. Not the least valuable part of
+     the book are the extremely apt and striking quotations from various
+     writers of eminence, which are placed in the form of notes at the
+     end of the chapters. It is emphatically a book for both clergy and
+     laity to buy and study.'--_Church Times_.
+
+     'We are grateful for a little book which will be of service to many
+     priests, young and old. We need more priests, and such a book may
+     well increase their number by explaining the nature of the life to
+     which a vocation to Holy Orders calls men; but we need still more
+     that priests should realise the life to which they are called and
+     pledged; and this they can hardly fail to do if they listen to Mr.
+     Robinson's prudent and tender counsels.'--_Church Quarterly
+     Review_.
+
+SECOND EDITION.
+
++PATRISTIC STUDY+. By the Rev. H.B. SWETE, D.D., Regius Professor of
+Divinity in the University of Cambridge.
+
+     'The whole of the work which this little volume contains is most
+     admirably done. Sufficient is told about the personal history of
+     the Fathers to make the study of their writings profitable.'
+     --_Church Quarterly Review_.
+
+     'This is an admirable little guide-book to wide study by one who
+     well knows how to guide. It is sound and learned, and crammed full
+     of information, yet pleasant in style and easy to understand.'
+     --_Pall Mall Gazette_.
+
+SECOND IMPRESSION.
+
++THE MINISTRY OF CONVERSION+. By the Rev. A.J. MASON, D.D., Master of
+Pembroke College, Cambridge, and Canon of Canterbury.
+
+     'It will be found most valuable and interesting.'--_Guardian_.
+
+     'Canon Mason has given a manual that should be carefully studied by
+     all, whether clergy or laity, who have in any way to share in the
+     "Ministry of Conversion" by preaching, by parochial organisation,
+     or by personal influence.'--_Scottish Guardian._
+
+THIRD IMPRESSION.
+
++FOREIGN MISSIONS+. By the Right Rev. H.H. MONTGOMERY, D.D., formerly
+Bishop of Tasmania, Secretary of the Society for the Propagation of the
+Gospel in Foreign Parts.
+
+     'Bishop Montgomery's admirable little book.... Into a limited
+     compass he has compressed the very kind of information which gives
+     one an adequate impression of the spirit which pervades a religion,
+     of what is its strength and weakness, what its relation to
+     Christianity, what, the side upon which it must be approached.'
+     _Church Quarterly Review_.
+
+THIRD IMPRESSION.
+
++THE STUDY OF THE GOSPELS+. By the Very Rev. J. ARMITAGE ROBINSON, D.D.,
+Dean of Westminster.
+
+     'Nothing could be more desirable than that the Anglican clergy
+     should be equipped with knowledge of the kind to which this little
+     volume will introduce them, and should regard the questions with
+     which Biblical study abounds in the candid spirit, and with the
+     breadth of view which they see here exemplified.'--_Spectator_.
+
+     'The little book on the Gospels, which the new Dean of Westminster
+     has recently published, is one to be warmly commended alike to
+     clergy and laity. Any intelligent person who takes the trouble to
+     work through this little volume of 150 pages will be rewarded by
+     gaining from it as clear a view of the synoptic problem as is
+     possible without prolonged and independent study of the
+     sources.'--_The Pilot_.
+
++A CHRISTIAN APOLOGETIC+. By the Very Rev. WILFORD L. ROBBINS, Dean of
+the General Theological Seminary, New York; Author of _An Essay toward
+Faith_.
+
+     'We commend this handbook with confidence as a helpful guide to
+     those clergy and teachers who have thoughtful doubters to deal with,
+     and who wish to build safely if they build at all.'--_Church of
+     Ireland Gazette._
+
++PASTORAL VISITATION+. By the Rev. H.E. SAVAGE, M.A., Vicar of South
+Shields, and Hon. Canon of Durham.
+
+     'This is an excellent book.'--_Spectator_.
+
++AUTHORITY IN THE CHURCH+. By the Very Rev. T.B. STRONG, D.D., Dean of
+Christ Church.
+
+     'This is a valuable and timely book, small in bulk, but weighty
+     both in style and substance.... The Dean's essay is an admirable
+     one, and is well calculated to clear men's minds in regard to
+     questions of very far-reaching importance. Its calm tone, and its
+     clear and penetrating thought, are alike characteristic of the
+     author, and give a peculiar distinction to everything he
+     writes.'--_Guardian_.
+
++THE STUDY OF ECCLESIASTICAL HISTORY+. By the Right Rev. W.E. COLLINS,
+D.D., Bishop of Gibraltar.
+
+     'A book which displays the master-mind on every page, and has what
+     many master-minds lack, a sober, practical, common-sense strain
+     about it, which is hardly ever found in those who set out to
+     instruct us in Church History, or Canon Law, or Catholic use.'
+     --_Church Bells_.
+
++LAY WORK AND THE OFFICE OF READER+. By the Right Rev. HUYSHE
+YEATMAN-BIGGS, D.D., Lord Bishop of Southwark.
+
++RELIGION AND SCIENCE+. By the Rev. P.N. WAGGETT, M.A., of the Society
+of St. John the Evangelist, Cowley.
+
++CHURCH MUSIC+. By A. MADELEY RICHARDSON, Mus. Doc., Organist of St.
+Saviour's Collegiate Church, Southwark.
+
++INTEMPERANCE+. By the Right Rev. H.H. PEREIRA, D.D., Bishop of Croydon.
+                                                      [_In preparation_.
+
++SCHOOLS+. By the Rev. W. FOXLEY NORRIS, M.A., Rector of Barnsley, and
+Hon. Canon of Wakefield.                              [_In preparation_.
+
+
+LONGMANS, GREEN, AND CO.
+LONDON, NEW YORK, AND BOMBAY
+
+
+
+
+
+
+End of Project Gutenberg's Thoughts on Religion, by George John Romanes
+
+*** END OF THIS PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK THOUGHTS ON RELIGION ***
+
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+
+<html xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">
+  <head>
+    <meta http-equiv="Content-Type" content="text/html;charset=iso-8859-1" />
+    <title>
+      The Project Gutenberg eBook of THOUGHTS ON RELIGION, by GEORGE JOHN ROMANES.
+    </title>
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+<pre>
+
+The Project Gutenberg EBook of Thoughts on Religion, by George John Romanes
+
+This eBook is for the use of anyone anywhere at no cost and with
+almost no restrictions whatsoever.  You may copy it, give it away or
+re-use it under the terms of the Project Gutenberg License included
+with this eBook or online at www.gutenberg.org
+
+
+Title: Thoughts on Religion
+
+Author: George John Romanes
+
+Editor: Charles Gore
+
+Release Date: October 25, 2005 [EBook #16942]
+
+Language: English
+
+Character set encoding: ISO-8859-1
+
+*** START OF THIS PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK THOUGHTS ON RELIGION ***
+
+
+
+
+Produced by Marilynda Fraser-Cunliffe, Martin Pettit and
+the Online Distributed Proofreading Team at
+https://www.pgdp.net
+
+
+
+
+
+
+</pre>
+
+
+
+
+
+<h1><i>Thoughts on Religion</i></h1>
+
+<h3>BY THE LATE</h3>
+
+<h2>GEORGE JOHN ROMANES</h2>
+
+<h3>M.A., LL.D., F.R.S.</h3>
+
+<h3>EDITED BY</h3>
+
+<h2>CHARLES GORE, D.D.</h2>
+
+<h3>BISHOP OF WORCESTER</h3>
+
+<h3>Twelfth Impression</h3>
+
+<h3>LONGMANS, GREEN, AND CO.<br />
+39 PATERNOSTER ROW, LONDON AND BOMBAY</h3>
+
+<h3>1904</h3>
+
+<hr />
+<h2>CONTENTS</h2>
+
+<div class="index">
+<ul>
+<li><a href="#PUBLISHERS_NOTE"><span class="smcap">Publisher's Note</span></a></li>
+<li><a href="#EDITORS_PREFACE"><span class="smcap">Editor's Preface</span></a></li>
+<li><p class='center'><a href="#PART_I">PART I.</a></p></li>
+<li><p class='center'><a href="#PART_I"><span class="smcap">The Influence of Science upon Religion.</span></a></p></li>
+<li><a href="#I"><span class="smcap">Essay I</span></a></li>
+<li><a href="#II"><span class="smcap">Essay II</span></a></li>
+<li><p class='center'><a href="#PART_II">PART II.</a></p></li>
+<li><p class='center'><a href="#NOTES_FOR_A_WORK"><span class="smcap">Notes for a Work on a Candid Examination of Religion.</span></a></p></li>
+<li><a href="#Introductory_Note_by_the_Editor"><span class="smcap">Introductory Note by the Editor</span></a></li>
+<li><a href="#Introductory">&sect; 1. <span class="smcap">Introductory</span></a></li>
+<li><a href="#Definition_of_Terms_and_Purpose_of_this_Treatise">&sect; 2. <span class="smcap">Definition of Terms and Purpose of this Treatise</span></a></li>
+<li><a href="#Causality">&sect; 3. <span class="smcap">Causality</span></a></li>
+<li><a href="#Faith">&sect; 4. <span class="smcap">Faith</span></a></li>
+<li><a href="#Faith_in_Christianity">&sect; 5. <span class="smcap">Faith in Christianity</span></a></li>
+<li><a href="#Concluding_Note_by_the_Editor"><span class="smcap">Concluding Note by the Editor</span></a></li>
+</ul>
+</div>
+
+<hr />
+<h3><a name="PUBLISHERS_NOTE" id="PUBLISHERS_NOTE"></a>PUBLISHER'S NOTE</h3>
+
+
+<blockquote><p>The present edition of Romanes' <i>Thoughts on Religion</i> is issued in
+response to a request which has been made with some frequency of late
+for very cheap reprints of standard religious and theological works.</p></blockquote>
+
+<div class="poem">
+<div class='stanza'><div>39 <span class="smcap">Paternoster Row</span>,</div>
+<div class='i2'><span class="smcap">London</span>,</div>
+<div class='i4'><i>January, 1904.</i></div></div>
+</div>
+
+<hr />
+<h2><a name="EDITORS_PREFACE" id="EDITORS_PREFACE"></a>EDITOR'S PREFACE</h2>
+
+
+<p>The late Mr. George John Romanes&mdash;the author within the last few years
+of <i>Darwin and After Darwin</i>, and of the <i>Examination of
+Weismannism</i>&mdash;occupied a distinguished place in contemporary biology.
+But his mind was also continuously and increasingly active on the
+problems of metaphysics and theology. And at his death in the early
+summer of this year (1894), he left among his papers some notes, made
+mostly in the previous winter, for a work which he was intending to
+write on the fundamental questions of religion. He had desired that
+these notes should be given to me and that I should do with them as I
+thought best. His literary executors accordingly handed them over to me,
+in company with some unpublished essays, two of which form the first
+part of the present volume.</p>
+
+<p>After reading the notes myself, and obtaining the judgement of others in
+whom I feel confidence upon them, I have no hesitation either in
+publishing by far the greater part of them, or in publishing them with
+the author's name in spite of the fact that the book as originally
+projected was to have been anonymous. From the few words which George
+Romanes said to me on the subject, I have no doubt that he realized that
+the notes if published after his death must be published with his name.</p>
+
+<p>I have said that after reading these notes I feel no doubt that they
+ought to be published. They claim it both by their intrinsic value and
+by the light they throw on the religious thought of a scientific man who
+was not only remarkably able and clear-headed, but also many-sided, as
+few men are, in his capacities, and singularly candid and open-hearted.
+To all these qualities the notes which are now offered to the public
+will bear unmistakeable witness.</p>
+
+<p>With more hesitation it has been decided to print also the unpublished
+essays already referred to. These, as representing an earlier stage of
+thought than is represented in the notes, naturally appear first.</p>
+
+<p>Both Essays and Notes however represent the same tendency of a mind from
+a position of unbelief in the Christian Revelation toward one of belief
+in it. They represent, I say, a tendency of one 'seeking after God if
+haply he might feel after Him and find Him,' and not a position of
+settled orthodoxy. Even the Notes contain in fact many things which
+could not come from a settled believer. This being so it is natural that
+I should say a word as to the way in which I have understood my function
+as an editor. I have decided the question of publishing each Note solely
+by the consideration whether or no it was sufficiently finished to be
+intelligible. I have rigidly excluded any question of my own agreement
+or disagreement with it. In the case of one Note in particular, I doubt
+whether I should have published it, had it not been that my decided
+disagreement with its contents made me fear that I might be prejudiced
+in withholding it.</p>
+
+<p>The Notes, with the papers which precede them, will, I think, be better
+understood if I give some preliminary account of their antecedents, that
+is of Romanes' previous publications on the subject of religion.</p>
+
+<p>In 1873 an essay of George Romanes gained the Burney Prize at Cambridge,
+the subject being <i>Christian Prayer considered in relation to the belief
+that the Almighty governs the world by general laws</i>. This was published
+in 1874, with an appendix on <i>The Physical Efficacy of Prayer</i>. In this
+essay, written when he was twenty-five years old, Romanes shows the
+characteristic qualities of his mind and style already developed. The
+sympathy with the scientific point of view is there, as might be
+expected perhaps in a Cambridge 'Scholar in Natural Science': the
+logical acumen and love of exact distinctions is there: there too the
+natural piety and spiritual appreciation of the nature of Christian
+prayer&mdash;a piety and appreciation which later intellectual habits of
+thought could never eradicate. The essay, as judged by the standard of
+prize compositions, is of remarkable ability, and strictly proceeds
+within the limits of the thesis. On the one side, for the purpose of the
+argument, the existence of a Personal God is assumed<a name="FNanchor_1_1" id="FNanchor_1_1"></a><a href="#Footnote_1_1" class="fnanchor">[1]</a>, and also the
+reality of the Christian Revelation which assures us that we have reason
+to expect real answers, even though conditionally and within restricted
+limits, to prayers for <i>physical</i> goods<a name="FNanchor_2_2" id="FNanchor_2_2"></a><a href="#Footnote_2_2" class="fnanchor">[2]</a>. On the other side, there is
+taken for granted the belief that general laws pervade the observable
+domain of physical nature. Then the question is considered&mdash;how is the
+physical efficacy of prayer which the Christian accepts on the authority
+of revelation compatible with the scientifically known fact that God
+governs the world by general laws? The answer is mainly found in
+emphasizing the limited sphere within which scientific inquiry can be
+conducted and scientific knowledge can obtain. Special divine acts of
+response to prayer, even in the physical sphere, <i>may</i> occur&mdash;force
+<i>may</i> be even originated in response to prayer&mdash;and still not produce
+any phenomenon such as science must take cognizance of and regard as
+miraculous or contrary to the known order.</p>
+
+<p>On one occasion the Notes refer back to this essay<a name="FNanchor_3_3" id="FNanchor_3_3"></a><a href="#Footnote_3_3" class="fnanchor">[3]</a>, and more
+frequently, as we shall have occasion to notice, they reproduce thoughts
+which had already been expressed in the earlier work but had been
+obscured or repudiated in the interval. I have no grounds for knowing
+whether in the main Romanes remained satisfied with the reasoning and
+conclusion of his earliest essay, granted the theistic hypothesis on
+which it rests<a name="FNanchor_4_4" id="FNanchor_4_4"></a><a href="#Footnote_4_4" class="fnanchor">[4]</a>. But this hypothesis itself, very shortly after
+publishing this essay, he was led to repudiate. In other words, his mind
+moved rapidly and sharply into a position of reasoned scepticism about
+the existence of God at all. The Burney Essay was published in 1874.
+Already in 1876 at least he had written an anonymous work with a wholly
+sceptical conclusion, entitled 'A Candid Examination of Theism' by
+<i>Physicus</i><a name="FNanchor_5_5" id="FNanchor_5_5"></a><a href="#Footnote_5_5" class="fnanchor">[5]</a>. As the Notes were written with direct reference to this
+work, some detailed account of its argument seems necessary; and this is
+to be found in the last chapter of the work itself, where the author
+summarizes his arguments and draws his conclusions. I venture therefore
+to reproduce this chapter at length<a name="FNanchor_6_6" id="FNanchor_6_6"></a><a href="#Footnote_6_6" class="fnanchor">[6]</a>.</p>
+
+<p class='tbrk'>'&sect; 1. Our analysis is now at an end, and a very few words will here
+suffice to convey an epitomized recollection of the numerous facts and
+conclusions which we have found it necessary to contemplate. We first
+disposed of the conspicuously absurd supposition that the origin of
+things, or the mystery of existence [i.e. the fact that anything exists
+at all], admits of being explained by the theory of Theism in any
+further degree than by the theory of Atheism. Next it was shown that the
+argument "Our heart requires a God" is invalid, seeing that such a
+subjective necessity, even if made out, could not be sufficient to
+prove&mdash;or even to render probable&mdash;an objective existence. <a name="ridiculed" id="ridiculed"></a>And with
+regard to the further argument that the fact of our theistic aspirations
+points to God as to their explanatory cause, it became necessary to
+observe that the argument could only be admissible after the possibility
+of the operation of natural causes [in the production of our theistic
+aspirations] had been excluded. Similarly the argument from the supposed
+intuitive necessity of individual thought [i.e. the alleged fact that
+men find it impossible to rid themselves of the persuasion that God
+exists] was found to be untenable, first, because, even if the supposed
+necessity were a real one, it would only possess an individual
+applicability; and second, that, as a matter of fact, it is extremely
+improbable that the supposed necessity is a real necessity even for the
+individual who asserts it, while it is absolutely certain that it is not
+such to the vast majority of the race. The argument from the general
+consent of mankind, being so obviously fallacious both as to facts and
+principles, was passed over without comment; while the argument from a
+first cause was found to involve a logical suicide. Lastly, the argument
+that, as human volition is a cause in nature, therefore all causation is
+probably volitional in character, was shown to consist in a stretch of
+inference so outrageous that the argument had to be pronounced
+worthless.</p>
+
+<p>'&sect; 2. Proceeding next to examine the less superficial arguments in
+favour of Theism, it was first shown that the syllogism, All known minds
+are caused by an unknown mind; our mind is a known mind; therefore our
+mind is caused by an unknown mind,&mdash;is a syllogism that is inadmissible
+for two reasons. In the first place, it does not account for mind (in
+the abstract) to refer it to a prior mind for its origin; and therefore,
+although the hypothesis, if admitted, would be <i>an</i> explanation of
+<i>known</i> mind, it is useless as an argument for the existence of the
+unknown mind, the assumption of which forms the basis of that
+explanation. Again, in the next place, if it be said that mind is so far
+an entity <i>sui generis</i> that it must be either self-existing or caused
+by another mind, there is no assignable warrant for the assertion. And
+this is the second objection to the above syllogism; for anything within
+the whole range of the possible may, for aught that we can tell, be
+competent to produce a self-conscious intelligence. Thus an objector to
+the above syllogism need not hold any theory of things at all; but even
+as opposed to the definite theory of materialism, the above syllogism
+has not so valid an argumentative basis to stand upon. We know that what
+we call matter and force are to all appearance eternal, while we have no
+corresponding evidence of a mind that is even apparently eternal.
+Further, within experience mind is invariably associated with highly
+differentiated collocations of matter and distributions of force, and
+many facts go to prove, and none to negative, the conclusion that the
+grade of intelligence invariably depends upon, or at least is associated
+with, a corresponding grade of cerebral development. There is thus both
+a qualitative and a quantitative relation between intelligence and
+cerebral organisation. And if it is said that matter and motion cannot
+produce consciousness because it is inconceivable that they should, we
+have seen at some length that this is no conclusive consideration as
+applied to a subject of a confessedly transcendental nature, and that in
+the present case it is particularly inconclusive, because, as it is
+speculatively certain that the substance of mind must be unknowable, it
+seems <i>&agrave; priori</i> probable that, whatever is the cause of the unknowable
+reality, this cause should be more difficult to render into thought in
+that relation than would some other hypothetical substance which is
+imagined as more akin to mind. And if it is said that the <i>more</i>
+conceivable cause is the <i>more</i> probable cause, we have seen that it is
+in this case impossible to estimate the validity of the remark. Lastly,
+the statement that the cause must contain actually all that its effects
+can contain, was seen to be inadmissible in logic and contradicted by
+everyday experience; while the argument from the supposed freedom of the
+will and the existence of the moral sense was negatived both deductively
+by the theory of evolution, and inductively by the doctrine of
+utilitarianism.' The theory of the freedom of the will is indeed at this
+stage of thought utterly untenable<a name="FNanchor_7_7" id="FNanchor_7_7"></a><a href="#Footnote_7_7" class="fnanchor">[7]</a>; the evidence is overwhelming that
+the moral sense is the result of a purely natural evolution<a name="FNanchor_8_8" id="FNanchor_8_8"></a><a href="#Footnote_8_8" class="fnanchor">[8]</a>, and this
+result, arrived at on general grounds, is confirmed with irresistible
+force by the account of our human conscience which is supplied by the
+theory of utilitarianism, a theory based on the widest and most
+unexceptionable of inductions<a name="FNanchor_9_9" id="FNanchor_9_9"></a><a href="#Footnote_9_9" class="fnanchor">[9]</a>. 'On the whole, then, with regard to
+the argument from the existence of the human mind, we were compelled to
+decide that it is destitute of any assignable weight, there being
+nothing more to lead to the conclusion that our mind has been caused by
+another mind, than to the conclusion that it has been caused by anything
+else whatsoever.</p>
+
+<p>'&sect; 3. With regard to the argument from Design, it was observed that
+Mill's presentation of it [in his <i>Essay on Theism</i>] is merely a
+resuscitation of the argument as presented by Paley, Bell, and Chalmers.
+And indeed we saw that the first-named writer treated this whole subject
+with a feebleness and inaccuracy very surprising in him; for while he
+has failed to assign anything like due weight to the inductive evidence
+of organic evolution, he did not hesitate to rush into a supernatural
+explanation of biological phenomena. Moreover, he has failed signally in
+his <i>analysis</i> of the Design argument, seeing that, in common with all
+previous writers, he failed to observe that it is utterly impossible for
+us to know the relations in which the supposed Designer stands to the
+Designed,&mdash;much less to argue from the fact that the Supreme Mind, even
+supposing it to exist, caused the observable products by any particular
+intellectual <i>process</i>. In other words, all advocates of the Design
+argument have failed to perceive that, even if we grant nature to be due
+to a creating Mind, still we have no shadow of a right to conclude that
+this Mind can only have exerted its creative power by means of such and
+such cogitative operations. How absurd, therefore, must it be to raise
+the supposed evidence of such cogitative operations into evidences of
+the existence of a creating Mind! If a theist retorts that it is, after
+all, of very little importance whether or not we are able to divine the
+<i>methods</i> of creation, so long as the <i>facts</i> are there to attest that,
+<i>in some way or other</i>, the observable phenomena of nature must be due
+to Intelligence of some kind as their ultimate cause, then I am the
+first to endorse this remark. It has always appeared to me one of the
+most unaccountable things in the history of speculation that so many
+competent writers can have insisted upon <i>Design</i> as an argument for
+Theism, when they must all have known perfectly well that they have no
+means of ascertaining the subjective psychology of that Supreme Mind
+whose existence the argument is adduced to demonstrate. The truth is,
+that the argument from teleology must, and can only, rest upon the
+observable <i>facts</i> of nature, without reference to the intellectual
+<i>processes</i> by which these facts may be supposed to have been
+accomplished. But, looking to the "present state of our knowledge," this
+is merely to change the teleological argument in its gross Paleyian
+form, into the argument from the ubiquitous operation of general laws.'</p>
+
+<p>'&sect; 4. This argument was thus<a name="FNanchor_10_10" id="FNanchor_10_10"></a><a href="#Footnote_10_10" class="fnanchor">[10]</a> stated in contrast with the argument
+from design. 'The argument from design says, there must be a God,
+because such and such an organic structure must have been due to such
+and such an intellectual <i>process</i>. The argument from general laws says,
+There must be a God, because such and such an organic structure must <i>in
+some way or other have been ultimately due to</i> intelligence.' Every
+structure exhibits with more or less of complexity the principle of
+order; it is related to all other things in a universal order. This
+universality of order renders irrational the hypothesis of chance in
+accounting for the universe. 'Let us think of the supreme causality as
+we may, the fact remains that from it there emanates a directive
+influence of uninterrupted consistency, on a scale of stupendous
+magnitude and exact precision worthy of our highest conceptions of
+deity<a name="FNanchor_11_11" id="FNanchor_11_11"></a><a href="#Footnote_11_11" class="fnanchor">[11]</a>.' The argument was developed in the words of Professor Baden
+Powell. 'That which requires reason and thought to understand must be
+itself thought and reason. That which mind alone can investigate or
+express must be itself mind. And if the highest conception attained is
+but partial, then the mind and reason studied is greater than the mind
+and reason of the student. If the more it is studied the more vast and
+complex is the necessary connection in reason disclosed, then the more
+evident is the vast extent and compass of the reason thus partially
+manifested and its reality <i>as existing in the immutably connected order
+of objects examined</i>, independently of the mind of the investigator.'
+This argument from the universal <i>Kosmos</i> has the advantage of being
+wholly independent of the method by which things came to be what they
+are. It is unaffected by the acceptance of evolution. Till quite
+recently it seemed irrefutable<a name="FNanchor_12_12" id="FNanchor_12_12"></a><a href="#Footnote_12_12" class="fnanchor">[12]</a>.</p>
+
+<p>'But nevertheless we are constrained to acknowledge that its apparent
+power dwindles to nothing in view of the indisputable fact that, if
+force and matter have been eternal, all and every natural law must have
+resulted by way of necessary consequence.... It does not admit of one
+moment's questioning that it is as certainly true that all the exquisite
+beauty and melodious harmony of nature follows necessarily as inevitably
+from the persistence of force and the primary qualities of matter as it
+is certainly true that force is persistent or that matter is extended or
+impenetrable<a name="FNanchor_13_13" id="FNanchor_13_13"></a><a href="#Footnote_13_13" class="fnanchor">[13]</a>.... It will be remembered that I dwelt at considerable
+length and with much earnestness upon this truth, not only because of
+its enormous importance in its bearing upon our subject, but also
+because no one has hitherto considered it in that relation.' It was also
+pointed out that the coherence and correspondence of the macrocosm of
+the universe with the microcosm of the human mind can be accounted for
+by the fact that the human mind is only one of the products of general
+evolution, its subjective relations necessarily reflecting those
+external relations of which they themselves are the product<a name="FNanchor_14_14" id="FNanchor_14_14"></a><a href="#Footnote_14_14" class="fnanchor">[14]</a>.</p>
+
+<p>'&sect; 5. The next step, however, was to mitigate the severity of the
+conclusion that was liable to be formed upon the utter and hopeless
+collapse of all the possible arguments in favour of Theism. Having fully
+demonstrated that there is no shadow of a positive argument in support
+of the theistic theory, there arose the danger that some persons might
+erroneously conclude that for this reason the theistic theory must be
+untrue. It therefore became necessary to point out, that although, as
+far as we can see, nature does not require an Intelligent Cause to
+account for any of her phenomena, yet it is possible that, if we could
+see farther, we should see that nature could not be what she is unless
+she had owed her existence to an Intelligent Cause. Or, in other words,
+the probability there is that an Intelligent Cause is unnecessary to
+explain any of the phenomena of nature, is only equal to the probability
+there is that the doctrine of the persistence of force is everywhere and
+eternally true.</p>
+
+<p>'As a final step in our analysis, therefore, we altogether quitted the
+region of experience, and ignoring even the very foundations of science,
+and so all the most certain of relative truths, we carried the
+discussion into the transcendental region of purely formal
+considerations. And here we laid down the canon, "that the value of any
+probability, in its last analysis, is determined by the number, the
+importance, and the definiteness of the relations known, as compared
+with those of the relations unknown;" and, consequently, that in cases
+where the unknown relations are more numerous, more important, or more
+indefinite than are the known relations, the value of our inference
+varies inversely as the difference in these respects between the
+relations compared. From which canon it followed, that as the problem of
+Theism is the most ultimate of all problems, and so contains in its
+unknown relations all that is to man unknown and unknowable, these
+relations must be pronounced the most indefinite of all relations that
+it is possible for man to contemplate; and, consequently, that although
+we have here the entire range of experience from which to argue, we are
+unable to estimate the real value of any argument whatsoever. The
+unknown relations in our attempted induction being wholly indefinite,
+both in respect of their number and importance, as compared with the
+known relations, it is impossible for us to determine any definite
+probability either for or against the being of a God. Therefore,
+although it is true that, so far as human science can penetrate or human
+thought infer, we can perceive no evidence of God, yet we have no right
+on this account to conclude that there is no God. The probability,
+therefore, that nature is devoid of Deity, while it is of the strongest
+kind if regarded scientifically&mdash;amounting, in fact, to a scientific
+demonstration,&mdash;is nevertheless wholly worthless if regarded logically.
+Although it is as true as is the fundamental basis of all science and of
+all experience that, if there is a God, His existence, considered as a
+cause of the universe, is superfluous, it may nevertheless be true that,
+if there had never been a God, the universe could never have existed.</p>
+
+<p>'Hence these formal considerations proved conclusively that, no matter
+how great the probability of Atheism might appear to be in a relative
+sense, we have no means of estimating such probability in an absolute
+sense. From which position there emerged the possibility of another
+argument in favour of Theism&mdash;or rather let us say, of a reappearance of
+the teleological argument in another form. For it may be said, seeing
+that these formal considerations exclude legitimate reasoning either for
+or against Deity in an absolute sense, while they do not exclude such
+reasoning in a relative sense, if there yet remain any theistic
+deductions which may properly be drawn from experience, these may now be
+adduced to balance the atheistic deductions from the persistence of
+force. For although the latter deductions have clearly shown the
+existence of Deity to be superfluous in a scientific sense, the formal
+considerations in question have no less clearly opened up beyond the
+sphere of science a possible <i>locus</i> for the existence of Deity; so that
+if there are any facts supplied by experience for which the atheistic
+deductions appear insufficient to account, we are still free to account
+for them in a relative sense by the hypothesis of Theism. And, it may be
+urged, we do find such an unexplained residuum in the correlation of
+general laws in the production of cosmic harmony. It signifies nothing,
+the argument may run, that we are unable to conceive the methods whereby
+the supposed Mind operates in producing cosmic harmony; nor does it
+signify that its operation must now be relegated to a super-scientific
+province. What does signify is that, taking a general view of nature,
+we find it impossible to conceive of the extent and variety of her
+harmonious processes as other than products of intelligent causation.
+Now this sublimated form of the teleological argument, it will be
+remembered, I denoted a metaphysical teleology, in order sharply to
+distinguish it from all previous forms of that argument, which, in
+contradistinction I denoted scientific teleologies. And the distinction,
+it will be remembered, consisted in this&mdash;that while all previous forms
+of teleology, by resting on a basis which was not beyond the possible
+reach of science, laid themselves open to the possibility of scientific
+refutation, the metaphysical system of teleology, by resting on a basis
+which is clearly beyond the possible reach of science, can never be
+susceptible of scientific refutation. And that this metaphysical system
+of teleology does rest on such a basis is indisputable; for while it
+accepts the most ultimate truths of which science can ever be
+cognizant&mdash;viz. the persistence of force and the consequently necessary
+genesis of natural law,&mdash;it nevertheless maintains that the necessity of
+regarding Mind as the ultimate cause of things is not on this account
+removed; and, therefore, that if science now requires the operation of a
+Supreme Mind to be posited in a super-scientific sphere, then in a
+super-scientific sphere it ought to be posited. No doubt this hypothesis
+at first sight seems gratuitous, seeing that, so far as science can
+penetrate, there is no need of any such hypothesis at all&mdash;cosmic
+harmony resulting as a physically necessary consequence from the
+combined action of natural laws, which in turn result as a physically
+necessary consequence of the persistence of force and the primary
+qualities of matter. But although it is thus indisputably true that
+metaphysical teleology is wholly gratuitous if considered
+scientifically, it may not be true that it is wholly gratuitous if
+considered psychologically. In other words, if it is more conceivable
+that Mind should be the ultimate cause of cosmic harmony than that the
+persistence of force should be so, then it is not irrational to accept
+the more conceivable hypothesis in preference to the less conceivable
+one, provided that the choice is made with the diffidence which is
+required by the considerations adduced in Chapter V [especially the
+<i>Canon of probability</i> laid down in the second paragraph of this
+section, &sect; 5].</p>
+
+<p>'I conclude, therefore, that the hypothesis of metaphysical teleology,
+although in a physical sense gratuitous, may be in a psychological sense
+legitimate. But as against the fundamental position on which alone this
+argument can rest&mdash;viz. the position that the fundamental postulate of
+Atheism is more <i>inconceivable</i> than is the fundamental postulate of
+Theism&mdash;we have seen two important objections to lie.</p>
+
+<p>'For, in the first place, the sense in which the word "inconceivable" is
+here used is that of the impossibility of framing <i>realizable</i> relations
+in the thought; not that of the impossibility of framing <i>abstract</i>
+relations in thought. In the same sense, though in a lower degree, it is
+true that the complexity of the human organization and its functions is
+inconceivable; but in this sense the word "inconceivable" has much less
+weight in an argument than it has in its true sense. And, without
+waiting again to dispute (as we did in the case of the speculative
+standing of Materialism) how far even the genuine test of
+inconceivability ought to be allowed to make against an inference which
+there is a body of scientific evidence to substantiate, we went on to
+the second objection against this fundamental position of metaphysical
+teleology. This objection, it will be remembered, was, that it is as
+impossible to conceive of cosmic harmony as an effect of Mind [i.e. Mind
+being what we know it in experience to be], as it is to conceive of it
+as an effect of mindless evolution. The argument from inconceivability,
+therefore, admits of being turned with quite as terrible an effect on
+Theism, as it can possibly be made to exert on Atheism.</p>
+
+<p>'Hence this more refined form of teleology which we are considering, and
+which we saw to be the last of the possible arguments in favour of
+Theism, is met on its own ground by a very crushing opposition: by its
+metaphysical character it has escaped the opposition of physical
+science, only to encounter a new opposition in the region of pure
+psychology to which it fled. As a conclusion to our whole inquiry,
+therefore, it devolved on us to determine the relative magnitudes of
+these opposing forces. And in doing this we first observed that, if the
+supporters of metaphysical teleology objected <i>&agrave; priori</i> to the method
+whereby the genesis of natural law was deduced from the datum of the
+persistence of force, in that this method involved an unrestricted use
+of illegitimate symbolic conceptions; then it is no less open to an
+atheist to object <i>&agrave; priori</i> to the method whereby a directing Mind was
+inferred from the datum of cosmic harmony, in that this method involved
+the postulation of an unknowable cause,&mdash;and this of a character which
+the whole history of human thought has proved the human mind to exhibit
+an overweening tendency to postulate as the cause of natural phenomena.
+On these grounds, therefore, I concluded that, so far as their
+respective standing <i>&agrave; priori</i> is concerned, both theories may be
+regarded as about equally suspicious. And similarly with regard to their
+standing <i>&agrave; posteriori</i>; for as both theories require to embody at least
+one infinite term, they must each alike be pronounced absolutely
+inconceivable. But, finally, if the question were put to me which of the
+two theories I regarded as the more rational, I observed that this is a
+question which no one man can answer for another. For as the test of
+absolute inconceivability is equally destructive of both theories, if a
+man wishes to choose between them, his choice can only be determined by
+what I have designated relative inconceivability&mdash;i.e. in accordance
+with the verdict given by his individual sense of probability as
+determined by his previous habit of thought. And forasmuch as the test
+of relative inconceivability may be held in this matter legitimately to
+vary with the character of the mind which applies it, the strictly
+rational probability of the question to which it is applied varies in
+like manner. Or otherwise presented, the only alternative for any man in
+this matter is either to discipline himself into an attitude of pure
+scepticism, and thus to refuse in thought to entertain either a
+probability or an improbability concerning the existence of a God; or
+else to incline in thought towards an affirmation or a negation of God,
+according as his previous habits of thought have rendered such an
+inclination more facile in the one direction than in the other. And
+although, under such circumstances, I should consider that man the more
+rational who carefully suspended his judgement, I conclude that if this
+course is departed from, neither the metaphysical teleologist nor the
+scientific atheist has any perceptible advantage over the other in
+respect of rationality. For as the formal conditions of a metaphysical
+teleology are undoubtedly present on the one hand, and the formal
+conditions of a speculative atheism are as undoubtedly present on the
+other, there is thus in both cases a logical vacuum supplied wherein the
+pendulum of thought is free to swing in whichever direction it may be
+made to swing by the momentum of preconceived ideas.</p>
+
+<p>'&sect; 6. Such is the outcome of our investigation, and considering the
+abstract nature of the subject, the immense divergence of opinion which
+at the present time is manifested with regard to it, as well as the
+confusing amount of good, bad and indifferent literature on both sides
+of the controversy which is extant;&mdash;considering these things, I do not
+think that the result of our inquiry can be justly complained of on the
+score of its lacking precision. At a time like the present, when
+traditional beliefs respecting Theism are so generally accepted, and so
+commonly concluded as a matter of course to have a large and valid basis
+of induction whereon to rest, I cannot but feel that a perusal of this
+short essay, by showing how very concise the scientific <i>status</i> of the
+subject really is, will do more to settle the minds of most readers as
+to the exact standing at the present time of all the probabilities of
+the question, than could a perusal of all the rest of the literature
+upon this subject. And, looking to the present condition of speculative
+philosophy, I regard it as of the utmost importance to have clearly
+shown that the advance of science has now entitled us to assert, without
+the least hesitation, that the hypothesis of Mind in nature is as
+certainly superfluous to account for any of the phenomena of nature, as
+the scientific doctrine of the persistence of force and the
+indestructibility of matter is certainly true.</p>
+
+<p>'On the other hand, if any one is inclined to complain that the logical
+aspect of the question has not proved itself so unequivocally definite
+as has the scientific, I must ask him to consider that, in any matter
+which does not admit of actual demonstration, some margin must of
+necessity be left for variations of individual opinion. And, if he bears
+this consideration in mind, I feel sure that he cannot properly
+complain of my not having done my utmost in this case to define as
+sharply as possible the character and the limits of this margin.</p>
+
+<p>'&sect; 7. And now, in conclusion, I feel it is desirable to state that any
+antecedent bias with regard to Theism which I individually possess is
+unquestionably on the side of traditional beliefs. It is therefore with
+the utmost sorrow that I find myself compelled to accept the conclusions
+here worked out; and nothing would have induced me to publish them, save
+the strength of my conviction that it is the duty of every member of
+society to give his fellows the benefit of his labours for whatever they
+may be worth. Just as I am confident that truth must in the end be the
+most profitable for the race, so I am persuaded that every individual
+endeavour to attain it, provided only that such endeavour is unbiassed
+and sincere, ought without hesitation to be made the common property of
+all men, no matter in what direction the results of its promulgation may
+appear to tend. And so far as the ruination of individual happiness is
+concerned, no one can have a more lively perception than myself of the
+possibly disastrous tendency of my work. So far as I am individually
+concerned, the result of this analysis has been to show that, whether I
+regard the problem of Theism on the lower plane of strictly relative
+probability, or on the higher plane of purely formal considerations, it
+equally becomes my obvious duty to stifle all belief of the kind which I
+conceive to be the noblest, and to discipline my intellect with regard
+to this matter into an attitude of the purest scepticism. And forasmuch
+as I am far from being able to agree with those who affirm that the
+twilight doctrine of the "new faith" is a desirable substitute for the
+waning splendour of "the old," I am not ashamed to confess that with
+this virtual negation of God the universe to me has lost its soul of
+loveliness; and although from henceforth the precept to "work while it
+is day" will doubtless but gain an intensified force from the terribly
+intensified meaning of the words that "the night cometh when no man can
+work," yet when at times I think, as think at times I must, of the
+appalling contrast between the hallowed glory of that creed which once
+was mine, and the lonely mystery of existence as now I find it,&mdash;at such
+times I shall ever feel it impossible to avoid the sharpest pang of
+which my nature is susceptible. For whether it be due to my intelligence
+not being sufficiently advanced to meet the requirements of the age, or
+whether it be due to the memory of those sacred associations which to me
+at least were the sweetest that life has given, I cannot but feel that
+for me, and for others who think as I do, there is a dreadful truth in
+those words of Hamilton,&mdash;Philosophy having become a meditation, not
+merely of death, but of annihilation, the precept <i>know thyself</i> has
+become transformed into the terrific oracle to &OElig;dipus&mdash;</p>
+
+<blockquote><p>"Mayest thou ne'er know the truth of what thou art."'</p></blockquote>
+
+<p>This analysis will have been at least sufficient to give a clear idea
+of the general argument of the <i>Candid Examination</i> and of its
+melancholy conclusions. What will most strike a somewhat critical reader
+is perhaps (1) the tone of certainty, and (2) the belief in the almost
+exclusive right of the scientific method in the court of reason.</p>
+
+<p>As evidence of (1) I would adduce the following brief quotations:&mdash;</p>
+
+<blockquote><p>P. xi. 'Possible errors in reasoning apart, the rational position
+of Theism as here defined must remain without material modification
+as long as our intelligence remains human.'</p>
+
+<p>P. 24. 'I am quite unable to understand how any one at the present
+day, and with the most moderate powers of abstract thinking, can
+possibly bring himself to embrace the theory of Free-will.'</p>
+
+<p>P. 64. 'Undoubtedly we have no alternative but to conclude that the
+hypothesis of mind in nature is now logically proved to be as
+certainly superfluous as the very basis of all science is certainly
+true. There can no longer be any more doubt that the existence of a
+God is wholly unnecessary to explain any of the phenomena of the
+universe, than there is doubt that if I leave go of my pen it will
+fall upon the table.'</p></blockquote>
+
+<p>As evidence of (2) I would adduce from the preface&mdash;</p>
+
+<blockquote><p>'To my mind, therefore, it is impossible to resist the conclusion
+that, looking to this undoubted pre-eminence of the scientific
+methods as ways to truth, whether or not there is a God, the
+question as to his existence is both more morally and more
+reverently contemplated if we regard it purely as a problem for
+methodical analysis to solve, than if we regard it in any other
+light.'</p></blockquote>
+
+<p>It is in respect both of (1) and (2) that the change in Romanes' thought
+as exhibited in his later Notes is most conspicuous<a name="FNanchor_15_15" id="FNanchor_15_15"></a><a href="#Footnote_15_15" class="fnanchor">[15]</a>.</p>
+
+<p>At what date George Romanes' mind began to react from the conclusions of
+the <i>Candid Examination</i> I cannot say. But after a period of ten
+years&mdash;in his Rede lecture of 1885<a name="FNanchor_16_16" id="FNanchor_16_16"></a><a href="#Footnote_16_16" class="fnanchor">[16]</a>&mdash;we find his frame of mind very
+much changed. This lecture, on <i>Mind and Motion</i>, consists of a severe
+criticism of the materialistic account of mind. <a name="monism" id="monism"></a>On the other hand
+'spiritualism'&mdash;or the theory which would suppose that mind is the cause
+of motion&mdash;is pronounced from the point of view of science not
+impossible indeed but 'unsatisfactory,' and the more probable conclusion
+is found in a 'monism' like Bruno's&mdash;according to which mind and motion
+are co-ordinate and probably co-extensive aspects of the same universal
+fact&mdash;a monism which may be called Pantheism, but may also be regarded
+as an extension of contracted views of Theism<a name="FNanchor_17_17" id="FNanchor_17_17"></a><a href="#Footnote_17_17" class="fnanchor">[17]</a>. The position
+represented by this lecture may be seen sufficiently from its
+conclusion:&mdash;</p>
+
+<hr />
+
+<p>'If the advance of natural science is now steadily leading us to the
+conclusion that there is no motion without mind, must we not see how the
+independent conclusion of mental science is thus independently
+confirmed&mdash;the conclusion, I mean, that there is no being without
+knowing? To me, at least, it does appear that the time has come when we
+may begin, as it were in a dawning light, to see that the study of
+Nature and the study of Mind are meeting upon this greatest of possible
+truths. And if this is the case&mdash;if there is no motion without mind, no
+being without knowing&mdash;shall we infer, with Clifford, that universal
+being is mindless, or answer with a dogmatic negative that most
+stupendous of questions,&mdash;Is there knowledge with the Most High? If
+there is no motion without mind, no being without knowing, may we not
+rather infer, with Bruno, that it is in the medium of mind, and in the
+medium of knowledge, we live, and move, and have our being?</p>
+
+<p>'This, I think, is the direction in which the inference points, if we
+are careful to set out the logical conditions with complete
+impartiality. But the ulterior question remains, whether, so far as
+science is concerned, it is here possible to point any inference at all:
+the whole orbit of human knowledge may be too narrow to afford a
+parallax for measurements so vast. Yet even here, if it be true that the
+voice of science must thus of necessity speak the language of
+agnosticism, at least let us see to it that the language is pure<a name="FNanchor_18_18" id="FNanchor_18_18"></a><a href="#Footnote_18_18" class="fnanchor">[18]</a>;
+let us not tolerate any barbarisms introduced from the side of
+aggressive dogma. So shall we find that this new grammar of thought does
+not admit of any constructions radically opposed to more venerable ways
+of thinking; even if we do not find that the often-quoted words of its
+earliest formulator apply with special force to its latest
+dialects&mdash;that if a little knowledge of physiology and a little
+knowledge of psychology dispose men to atheism, a deeper knowledge of
+both, and, still more, a deeper thought upon their relations to one
+another, will lead men back to some form of religion, which if it be
+more vague, may also be more worthy than that of earlier days.'</p>
+
+<hr />
+
+<p>Some time before 1889 three articles were written for the <i>Nineteenth
+Century</i> on the <i>Influence of Science upon Religion</i>. They were never
+published, for what reason I am not able to ascertain. But I have
+thought it worth while to print the first two of them as a 'first part'
+of this volume, both because they contain&mdash;written in George Romanes'
+own name&mdash;an important criticism upon the <i>Candid Examination</i> which he
+had published anonymously, and also because, with their entirely
+sceptical result, they exhibit very clearly a stage in the mental
+history of their author. The antecedents of these papers those who have
+read this Introduction will now be in a position to understand. What
+remains to be said by way of further introduction to the Notes had
+better be reserved till later.</p>
+
+<p class='right'>C.G.</p>
+
+
+<div class="footnotes"><h3>FOOTNOTES:</h3>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_1_1" id="Footnote_1_1"></a><a href="#FNanchor_1_1"><span class="label">[1]</span></a> p. 7.</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_2_2" id="Footnote_2_2"></a><a href="#FNanchor_2_2"><span class="label">[2]</span></a> p. 173.</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_3_3" id="Footnote_3_3"></a><a href="#FNanchor_3_3"><span class="label">[3]</span></a> See p. 110.</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_4_4" id="Footnote_4_4"></a><a href="#FNanchor_4_4"><span class="label">[4]</span></a> But see an interesting note in Romanes' <i>Mind and Motion
+and Monism</i> (Longmans, 1895) p. 111.</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_5_5" id="Footnote_5_5"></a><a href="#FNanchor_5_5"><span class="label">[5]</span></a> Published in Tr&uuml;bner's <i>English and Foreign Philosophical
+Library</i> in 1878, but written 'several years ago' (preface). 'I have
+refrained from publishing it,' the author explains, 'lest, after having
+done so, I should find that more mature thought had modified the
+conclusions which the author sets forth.'</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_6_6" id="Footnote_6_6"></a><a href="#FNanchor_6_6"><span class="label">[6]</span></a> At times I have sought to make the argument of the chapter
+more intelligible by introducing references to earlier parts of the book
+or explanations in my own words. These latter I have inserted in square
+brackets.</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_7_7" id="Footnote_7_7"></a><a href="#FNanchor_7_7"><span class="label">[7]</span></a> p. 24.</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_8_8" id="Footnote_8_8"></a><a href="#FNanchor_8_8"><span class="label">[8]</span></a> p. 28.</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_9_9" id="Footnote_9_9"></a><a href="#FNanchor_9_9"><span class="label">[9]</span></a> p. 28.</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_10_10" id="Footnote_10_10"></a><a href="#FNanchor_10_10"><span class="label">[10]</span></a> p. 45.</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_11_11" id="Footnote_11_11"></a><a href="#FNanchor_11_11"><span class="label">[11]</span></a> p. 47.</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_12_12" id="Footnote_12_12"></a><a href="#FNanchor_12_12"><span class="label">[12]</span></a> p. 50.</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_13_13" id="Footnote_13_13"></a><a href="#FNanchor_13_13"><span class="label">[13]</span></a> p. 63.</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_14_14" id="Footnote_14_14"></a><a href="#FNanchor_14_14"><span class="label">[14]</span></a> pp. 58 ff.</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_15_15" id="Footnote_15_15"></a><a href="#FNanchor_15_15"><span class="label">[15]</span></a> With reference to the views and arguments of the <i>Candid
+Examination</i>, it may be interesting to notice here in detail that George
+Romanes (1) came to attach much more importance to the subjective
+religious needs and intuitions of the human spirit (pp. 131 ff.); (2)
+perceived that the subjective religious consciousness can be regarded
+objectively as a broad human phenomenon (pp. 147 f.); (3) criticized his
+earlier theory of causation and returned <i>towards</i> the theory that all
+causation is volitional (pp. 102, 118); (4) definitely repudiated the
+materialistic account of the origin of mind (pp. 30, 31); (5) returned
+to the use of the expression 'the argument from design,' and therefore
+presumably abandoned his strong objection to it; (6) 'saw through'
+Herbert Spencer's refutation of the wider teleology expressed by Baden
+Powell, and felt the force of the teleology again (p. 72); (7)
+recognized that the scientific objections to the doctrine of the freedom
+of the will are not finally valid (p. 128).</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_16_16" id="Footnote_16_16"></a><a href="#FNanchor_16_16"><span class="label">[16]</span></a> See <i>Mind and Motion and Monism</i>, pp. 36 ff.</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_17_17" id="Footnote_17_17"></a><a href="#FNanchor_17_17"><span class="label">[17]</span></a> In some 'Notes' of the Summer of 1893 I find the
+statement, 'The result (of philosophical inquiry) has been that in his
+millennial contemplation and experience man has attained certainty with
+regard to certain aspects of the world problem, no less secure than that
+which he has gained in the domain of physical science, e.g.
+</p><p>
+Logical priority of mind over matter.
+</p><p>
+Consequent untenability of materialism.
+</p><p>
+Relativity of knowledge.
+</p><p>
+The order of nature, conservation of energy and indestructibility of
+matter within human experience, the principle of evolution and survival
+of the fittest.'</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_18_18" id="Footnote_18_18"></a><a href="#FNanchor_18_18"><span class="label">[18]</span></a> For the meaning of 'pure' agnosticism see <a href="#pure">below</a>.
+ff.</p></div>
+</div>
+
+
+<hr />
+<h2><a name="PART_I" id="PART_I"></a>PART I.</h2>
+
+<h3>THE INFLUENCE OF SCIENCE UPON RELIGION.</h3>
+
+<h2><a name="I" id="I"></a>I.</h2>
+
+<p>I propose to consider, in a series of three papers, the influence of
+Science upon Religion. In doing this I shall seek to confine myself to
+the strictly rational aspect of the subject, without travelling into any
+matters of sentiment. Moreover, I shall aim at estimating in the first
+instance the kind and degree of influence which has been exerted by
+Science upon Religion in the past, and then go on to estimate the
+probable extent of this influence in the future. The first two papers
+will be devoted to the past and prospective influence of Science upon
+Natural Religion, while the third will be devoted to the past and
+prospective influence of Science upon Revealed Religion<a name="FNanchor_19_19" id="FNanchor_19_19"></a><a href="#Footnote_19_19" class="fnanchor">[19]</a>.</p>
+
+<p>Few subjects have excited so much interest of late years as that which I
+thus mark out for discussion. This can scarcely be considered a matter
+of surprise, seeing that the influence in question is not only very
+direct, but also extremely important from every point of view. For
+generations and for centuries in succession Religion maintained an
+undisputed sway over men's minds&mdash;if not always as a practical guide in
+matters of conduct, at least as a regulator of belief. Even among the
+comparatively few who in previous centuries professedly rejected
+Christianity, there can be no doubt that their intellectual conceptions
+were largely determined by it: for Christianity being then the only
+court of appeal with reference to all these conceptions, even the few
+minds which were professedly without its jurisdiction could scarcely
+escape its indirect influence through the minds of others. But as side
+by side with the venerable institution a new court of appeal was
+gradually formed, we cannot wonder that it should have come to be
+regarded in the light of a rival to the old&mdash;more especially as the
+searching methods of its inquiry and the certain character of its
+judgements were much more in consonance with the requirements of an age
+disposed to scepticism. And this spirit of rivalry is still further
+fostered by the fact that Science has unquestionably exerted upon
+Religion what Mr. Fiske terms a 'purifying influence.' That is to say,
+not only are the scientific methods of inquiry after truth more
+congenial to sceptical minds than are the religious methods (which may
+broadly be defined as accepting truth on authority), but the results of
+the former have more than once directly contradicted those of the
+latter: science has in several cases incontestably demonstrated that
+religious teaching has been wrong as to matters of fact. Further still,
+the great advance of natural knowledge which has characterized the
+present century, has caused our ideas upon many subjects connected with
+philosophy to undergo a complete metamorphosis. A well-educated man of
+the present day is absolutely precluded from regarding some of the
+Christian dogmas from the same intellectual standpoint as his
+forefathers, even though he may still continue to accept them in some
+other sense. In short, our whole key of thinking or tone of thought
+having been in certain respects changed, we can no longer anticipate
+that in these respects it should continue to harmonize with the
+unalterable system of theology.</p>
+
+<p>Such I conceive to be the ways in which Science has exerted her
+influence upon Religion, and it is needless to dwell upon the potency of
+their united effect. No one can read even a newspaper without perceiving
+how great this effect has been. On the one hand, sceptics are
+triumphantly confident that the light of dawning knowledge has begun
+finally to dispel the darkness of superstition, while religious persons,
+on the other hand, tremble to think what the future, if judged by the
+past, is likely to bring forth. On both sides we have free discussion,
+strong language, and earnest canvassing. Year by year stock is taken,
+and year by year the balance is found to preponderate in favour of
+Science.</p>
+
+<p>This being the state of things of the present time, I think that with
+the experience of the kind and degree of influence which Science has
+exerted upon Religion in the past, we have material enough whereby to
+estimate the probable extent of such influence in the future. This,
+therefore, I shall endeavour to do by seeking to define, on general
+principles, the limits within which it is antecedently possible that the
+influence in question can be exercised. But in order to do this, it is
+necessary to begin by estimating the kind and degree of the influence
+which has been exerted by Science upon Religion in the past.</p>
+
+<p>Thus much premised, we have in the first place to define the essential
+nature both of Science and of Religion: for this is clearly the first
+step in an analysis which has for its object an estimation of the actual
+and possible effects of one of these departments of thought upon the
+other.</p>
+
+<p>Science, then, is essentially a department of thought having exclusive
+reference to the Proximate. More particularly, it is a department of
+thought having for its object the explanation of natural phenomena by
+the discovery of natural (or proximate) causes. In so far as Science
+ventures to trespass beyond this her only legitimate domain, and seeks
+to interpret natural phenomena by the immediate agency of supernatural
+or ultimate causes, in that degree has she ceased to be physical
+science, and become ontological speculation. The truth of this statement
+has now been practically recognized by all scientific workers; and terms
+describing final causes have been banished from their vocabulary in
+astronomy, chemistry, geology, biology, and even in psychology.</p>
+
+<p>Religion, on the other hand, is a department of thought having no less
+exclusive reference to the Ultimate. More particularly, it is a
+department of thought having for its object a self-conscious and
+intelligent Being, which it regards as a Personal God, and the
+fountain-head of all causation. I am, of course, aware that the term
+Religion has been of late years frequently used in senses which this
+definition would not cover; but I conceive that this only shows how
+frequently the term in question has been abused. To call any theory of
+things a Religion which does not present any belief in any form of
+Deity, is to apply the word to the very opposite of that which it has
+hitherto been used to denote. To speak of the Religion of the
+Unknowable, the Religion of Cosmism, the Religion of Humanity, and so
+forth, where the personality of the First Cause is not recognized, is as
+unmeaning as it would be to speak of the love of a triangle, or the
+rationality of the equator. That is to say, if any meaning is to be
+extracted from the terms at all, it is only to be so by using them in
+some metaphorical sense. We may, for instance, say that there is such a
+thing as a Religion of Humanity, because we may begin by deifying
+Humanity in our own estimation, and then go on to worship our ideal. But
+by thus giving Humanity the name of Deity we are not really creating a
+new religion: we are merely using a metaphor, which may or may not be
+successful as a matter of poetic diction, but which most assuredly
+presents no shred of value as a matter of philosophical statement.
+Indeed, in this relation it is worse than valueless: it is misleading.
+Variations or reversals in the meanings of words are not of uncommon
+occurrence in the ordinary growth of languages; but it is not often that
+we find, as in this case, the whole meaning of a term intentionally and
+gratuitously changed by the leaders of philosophical thought. Humanity,
+for example, is an abstract idea of our own making: it is not an object
+any more than the equator is an object. Therefore, if it were possible
+to construct a religion by this curious device of metaphorically
+ascribing to Humanity the attributes of Deity, it ought to be as
+logically possible to construct, let us say, a theory of brotherly
+regard towards the equator, by metaphorically ascribing to it the
+attributes of man. The distinguishing features of any theory which can
+properly be termed a Religion, is that it should refer to the ultimate
+source, or sources, of things: and that it should suppose this source to
+be of an objective, intelligent, and personal nature. To apply the term
+Religion to any other theory is merely to abuse it.</p>
+
+<p>From these definitions, then, it appears that the aims and methods of
+Science are exclusively concerned with the ascertaining and the proof of
+the proximate How of things and processes physical: her problem is, as
+Mill states it, to discover what are the fewest number of (phenomenal)
+data which, being granted, will explain the phenomena of experience. On
+the other hand, Religion is not in any way concerned with causation,
+further than to assume that all things and all processes are ultimately
+due to intelligent personality. Religion is thus, as Mr. Spencer says,
+'an <i>&agrave; priori</i> theory of the universe'&mdash;to which, however, we must add,
+'and a theory which assumes intelligent personality as the originating
+source of the universe.' Without this needful addition, a religion would
+be in no way logically distinguished from a philosophy.</p>
+
+<p>From these definitions, then, it clearly follows that in their purest
+forms, Science and Religion really have no point of logical contact.
+Only if Science could transcend the conditions of space and time, of
+phenomenal relativity, and of all human limitations, only then could
+Science be in a position to touch the supernatural theory of Religion.
+But obviously, if Science could do this, she would cease to be Science.
+In soaring above the region of phenomena and entering the tenuous aether
+of noumena, her present wings, which we call her methods, would in such
+an atmosphere be no longer of any service for movement. Out of time, out
+of place, and out of phenomenal relation, Science could no longer exist
+as such.</p>
+
+<p>On the other hand, Religion in its purest form is equally incompetent to
+affect Science. For, as we have already seen, Religion as such is not
+concerned with the phenomenal sphere: her theory of ontology cannot have
+any reference to the How of phenomenal causation. Hence it is evident
+that, as in their purest or most ideal forms they move in different
+mental planes, Science and Religion cannot exhibit interference.</p>
+
+<p>Thus far the remarks which I have made apply equally to all forms of
+Religion, as such, whether actual or possible, and in so far as the
+Religion is <i>pure</i>. But it is notorious that until quite recently
+Religion did exercise upon Science, not only an influence, but an
+overpowering influence. Belief in divine agency being all but universal,
+while the methods of scientific research had not as yet been distinctly
+formulated, it was in previous generations the usual habit of mind to
+refer any natural phenomenon, the physical causation of which had not
+been ascertained, to the more or less immediate causal action of the
+Deity. But we now see that this habit of mind arose from a failure to
+distinguish between the essentially distinct characters of Science and
+Religion as departments of thought, and therefore that it was only so
+far as the Religion of former times was impure&mdash;or mixed with the
+ingredients of thought which belong to Science&mdash;that the baleful
+influence in question was exerted. The gradual, successive, and now all
+but total abolition of final causes from the thoughts of scientific men,
+to which allusion has already been made, is merely an expression of the
+fact that scientific men as a body have come fully to recognize the
+fundamental distinction between Science and Religion which I have
+stated.</p>
+
+<p>Or, to put the matter in another way, scientific men as a body&mdash;and,
+indeed, all persons whose ideas on such matters are abreast of the
+times&mdash;perceive plainly enough that a religious explanation of any
+natural phenomenon is, from a scientific point of view, no explanation
+at all. For a religious explanation consists in referring the observed
+phenomenon to the First Cause&mdash;i.e. to merge that particular phenomenon
+in the general or final mystery of things. A scientific explanation, on
+the other hand, consists in referring the observed phenomenon to its
+physical causes, and in no case can such an explanation entertain the
+hypothesis of a final cause without abandoning its character as a
+scientific explanation. For example, if a child brings me a flower and
+asks why it has such a curious form, bright colour, sweet perfume, and
+so on, and if I answer, Because God made it so, I am not really
+answering the child's question: I am merely concealing my ignorance of
+Nature under a guise of piety, and excusing my indolence in the study of
+botany. It was the appreciation of this fact that led Mr. Darwin to
+observe in his <i>Origin of Species</i> that the theory of creation does not
+serve to explain any of the facts with which it is concerned, but merely
+re-states these facts as they are observed to occur. That is to say, by
+thus merging the facts as observed into the final mystery of things, we
+are not even attempting to explain them in any scientific sense: for it
+would be obviously possible to get rid of the necessity of thus
+explaining any natural phenomenon whatsoever by referring it to the
+immediate causal action of the Deity. If any phenomenon were actually
+to occur which did proceed from the immediate causal action of the
+Deity, then <i>ex hypothesi</i>, there would be no physical causes to
+investigate, and the occupation of Othello, in the person of a man of
+science, would be gone. Such a phenomenon would be miraculous, and
+therefore from its very nature beyond the reach of scientific
+investigation.</p>
+
+<p>Properly speaking, then, the religious theory of final causes does not
+explain any of the phenomena of Nature: it merely re-states the
+phenomena as observed&mdash;or, if we prefer so to say, it is itself an
+ultimate and universal explanation of all possible phenomena taken
+collectively. For it must be admitted that behind all possible
+explanations of a scientific kind, there lies a great inexplicable,
+which just because of its ultimate character, cannot be merged into
+anything further&mdash;that is to say, cannot be explained. 'It is what it
+is,' is all that we can say of it: 'I am that I am' is all that it could
+say of itself. And it is in referring phenomena to this inexplicable
+source of physical causation that the theory of Religion essentially
+consists. The theory of Science, on the other hand, consists in the
+assumption that there is always a practically endless chain of physical
+causation to investigate&mdash;i.e. an endless series of phenomena to be
+explained. So that, if we define the process of explanation as the
+process of referring observed phenomena to their adequate causes, we may
+say that Religion, by the aid of a general theory of things in the
+postulation of an intelligent First Cause, furnishes to her own
+satisfaction an ultimate explanation of the universe as a whole, and
+therefore is not concerned with any of those proximate explanations or
+discovery of second causes, which form the exclusive subject-matter of
+Science. In other words, we recur to the definitions already stated, to
+the effect that Religion is a department of thought having, as such,
+exclusive reference to the Ultimate, while Science is a department of
+thought having, as such, no less exclusive reference to the Proximate.
+When these two departments of thought overlap, interference results, and
+we find confusion. Therefore it was that when the religious theory of
+final causes intruded upon the field of scientific inquiry, it was
+passing beyond its logical domain; and seeking to arrogate the function
+of explaining this or that phenomenon <i>in detail</i>, it ceased to be a
+purely religious theory, while at the same time and for the same reason
+it blocked the way of scientific progress<a name="FNanchor_20_20" id="FNanchor_20_20"></a><a href="#Footnote_20_20" class="fnanchor">[20]</a>.</p>
+
+<p>This remark serves to introduce one of the chief topics with which I
+have to deal&mdash;viz. the doctrine of Design in Nature, and thus the whole
+question of Natural Religion in its relation to Natural Science. In
+handling this topic I shall endeavour to take as broad and deep a view
+as I can of the present standing of Natural Religion, without waiting to
+show step by step the ways and means by which it has been brought into
+this position, by the influence of Science.</p>
+
+<p>In the earliest dawn of recorded thought, teleology in some form or
+another has been the most generally accepted theory whereby the order of
+Nature is explained. It is not, however, my object in this paper to
+trace the history of this theory from its first rude beginnings in
+Fetishism to its final development in Theism. I intend to devote myself
+exclusively to the question as to the present standing of this theory,
+and I allude to its past history only in order to examine the statement
+which is frequently made, to the effect that its general prevalence in
+all ages and among all peoples of the world lends to it a certain degree
+of 'antecedent credibility.' With reference to this point, I should say,
+that, whether or not the order of Nature is due to a disposing Mind, the
+hypothesis of mental agency in Nature&mdash;or, as the Duke of Argyll terms
+it, the hypothesis of 'anthropopsychism'&mdash;must necessarily have been the
+earliest hypothesis. What we find in Nature is the universal prevalence
+of causation, and long before the no less universal equivalency between
+causes and effects&mdash;i.e. the universal prevalence of natural law&mdash;became
+a matter of even the [vaguest] appreciation, the general fact that
+nothing happens without a cause of some kind was fully recognized.
+Indeed, the recognition of this fact is not only presented by the
+lowest races of the present day, but, as I have myself given evidence to
+show, likewise by animals and infants<a name="FNanchor_21_21" id="FNanchor_21_21"></a><a href="#Footnote_21_21" class="fnanchor">[21]</a>. And therefore, it appears to
+me probable that those psychologists are right who argue that the idea
+of cause is intuitive, in the same sense that the ideas of space and
+time are intuitive&mdash;i.e. the instinctive or [inherited] effect of
+ancestral experience.</p>
+
+<p>Now if it is thus a matter of certainty that the recognition of
+causality in Nature is co-extensive with, and even anterior to, the
+human mind, it appears to me no less certain that the first attempt at
+assigning a cause of this or that observed event in Nature&mdash;i.e. the
+first attempts at a rational explanation of the phenomena of
+Nature&mdash;must have been of an anthropopsychic kind. No other explanation
+was, as it were, so ready to hand as that of projecting into external
+Nature the agency of volition, which was known to each individual as the
+apparent fountain-head of causal activity so far as he and his
+neighbours were concerned. To reach this most obvious explanation of
+causality in Nature, it did not require that primitive man should know,
+as we know, that the very conception of causality arises out of our
+sense of effort in voluntary action; it only required that this should
+be the fact, and then it must needs follow that when any natural
+phenomenon was thought about at all with reference to its causality, the
+cause inferred should be one of a psychical kind. I need not wait to
+trace the gradual integration of this anthropopsychic hypothesis from
+its earliest and most diffused form of what we may term polypsychism
+(wherein the causes inferred were almost as personally numerous as the
+effects contemplated), through polytheism (wherein many effects of a
+like kind were referred to one deity, who, as it were, took special
+charge over that class), up to monotheism (wherein all causation is
+gathered up into the monopsychism of a single personality): it is enough
+thus briefly to show that from first to last the hypothesis of
+anthropopsychism is a necessary phase of mental evolution under existing
+conditions, and this whether or not the hypothesis is true.</p>
+
+<p>Thus viewed, I do not think that 'the general consent of mankind' is a
+fact of any argumentative weight in favour of the anthropopsychic
+theory&mdash;so far, I mean, as the matter of causation is concerned&mdash;whether
+this be in fetishism or in the teleology of our own day: the general
+consent of mankind in the larger question of theism (where sundry other
+matters besides causation fail to be considered) does not here concern
+us. Indeed, it appears to me that if we are to go back to the savages
+for any guarantee of our anthropopsychic theory, the pledge which we
+receive is of worse than no value. As well might we conclude that a
+match is a living organism, because this is to the mind of a savage the
+most obvious explanation of its movements, as conclude on precisely
+similar grounds that our belief in teleology derives any real support
+from any of the more primitive phases of anthropopsychism.</p>
+
+<p>It seems to me, therefore, that in seeking to estimate the evidence of
+design in Nature, we must as it were start <i>de novo</i>, without reference
+to anterior beliefs upon the subject. The question is essentially one to
+be considered in the light of all the latest knowledge that we possess,
+and by the best faculties of thinking that we (the heirs of all the
+ages) are able to bring to bear upon it. I shall, therefore, only allude
+to the history of anthropopsychism in so far as I may find it necessary
+to do so for the sake of elucidating my argument.</p>
+
+<p>And here it is needful to consider first what Paley called 'the state of
+the argument' before the Darwinian epoch. This is clearly and tersely
+presented by Paley in his classical illustration of finding a watch upon
+a heath&mdash;an illustration so well known that I need not here re-state it.
+I will merely observe, therefore, that it conveys, as it were in one's
+watch-pocket, the whole of the argument from design; and that it is not
+in my opinion open to the stricture which was passed upon it by Mill
+where he says,&mdash;'The inference would not be from marks of design, but
+because I already know by direct experience that watches are made by
+men.' This appears to me to miss the whole point of Paley's meaning, for
+there would be obviously no argument at all unless he be understood to
+mean that the evidence of design which is supposed to be afforded by
+examination of the watch, is supposed to be afforded by this examination
+only, and not from any of the direct knowledge alluded to by Mill. For
+the purposes of the illustration, it must clearly be assumed that the
+finder of the watch has no previous or direct knowledge touching the
+manufacture of watches. Apart from this curious misunderstanding, Mill
+was at one with Paley upon the whole subject.</p>
+
+<p>Again, it is no real objection to the argument or illustration to say,
+as we often have said, that it does not account for the watchmaker. The
+object of the argument from design is to <i>prove</i> the existence of a
+designer: not to <i>explain</i> that existence. Indeed, it would be suicidal
+to the whole argument in its relation to Theism, if the possibility of
+any such explanation were entertained; for such a possibility could only
+be entertained on the supposition that the being of the Deity admits of
+being explained&mdash;i.e. that the Deity is not ultimate.</p>
+
+<p>Lastly, the argument is precisely the same as that which occurs in
+numerous passages of Scripture and in theological writings all over the
+world down to the present time. That is to say, everywhere in organic
+nature we meet with innumerable adaptations of means to ends, which in
+very many cases present a degree of refinement and complexity in
+comparison with which the adaptations of means to ends in a watch are
+but miserable and rudimentary attempts at mechanism. No one can know so
+well as the modern biologist in what an immeasurable degree the
+mechanisms which occur in such profusion in nature surpass, in every
+form of excellence, the highest triumphs of human invention. Hence at
+first sight it does unquestionably appear that we could have no stronger
+or better evidence of purpose than is thus afforded. In the words of
+Paley: 'arrangement, disposition of parts, subserviency of means to an
+end, relation of instruments to a use, imply the presence of
+intelligence and mind.'</p>
+
+<p>But next the question arises, Although such things certainly [may]<a name="FNanchor_22_22" id="FNanchor_22_22"></a><a href="#Footnote_22_22" class="fnanchor">[22]</a>
+imply the presence of mind as their explanatory cause, are we entitled
+to assume that there can be in nature no other cause competent to
+produce these effects? This is a question which never seems to have
+occurred to Paley, Bell, Chalmers, or indeed to any of the natural
+theologians up to the time of Darwin. This, I think, is a remarkable
+fact, because the question is one which, as a mere matter of logical
+form, appears to lie so much upon the surface. But nevertheless the fact
+remains that natural theologians, so far as I know without exception,
+were satisfied to assume as an axiom that mechanism could have no cause
+other than that of a designing mind; and therefore their work was
+restricted to tracing out in detail the number and the excellency of the
+mechanisms which were to be met with in nature. It is, however, obvious
+that the mere accumulation of such cases can have no real, or logical,
+effect upon the argument. The mechanisms which we encounter in nature
+are so amazing in their perfections, that the attentive study of any one
+of them would (as Paley in his illustration virtually, though not
+expressly, contends) be sufficient to carry the whole position, if the
+assumption be conceded that mechanism can only be due to mind. Therefore
+the argument is not really, or logically, strengthened by the mere
+accumulation of any number of special cases of mechanism in nature, all
+as mechanisms similar in kind. Let us now consider this argument.</p>
+
+<p>If we are disposed to wonder why natural theologians prior to the days
+of Darwin were content to assume that mind is the only possible cause of
+mechanism, I think we have a ready answer in the universal prevalence of
+their belief in special creation. For I think it is unquestionable that,
+upon the basis of this belief, the assumption is legitimate. That is to
+say, if we start with the belief that all species of plants and animals
+were originally introduced to the complex conditions of their several
+environments suddenly and ready made (in some such manner as watches are
+turned out from a manufactory), then I think we are reasonably entitled
+to assume that no conceivable cause, other than that of intelligent
+purpose, could possibly be assigned in explanation of the effects. It
+is, of course, needless to observe that in so far as this previous
+belief in special creation was thus allowed to affect the argument from
+design, that argument became an instance of circular reasoning. And it
+is, perhaps, equally needless to observe that the mere fact of
+evolution, as distinguished from special creation&mdash;or of the gradual
+development of living mechanisms, as distinguished from their sudden
+and ready-made apparition&mdash;would not in any way affect the argument from
+design, unless it could be shown that the process of evolution admits
+the possibility of some other cause which is not admitted by the
+hypothesis of special creation. But this is precisely what is shown by
+the theory of evolution as propounded by Darwin. That is to say, the
+theory of the gradual development of living mechanisms propounded by
+Darwin, is something more than a theory of gradual development as
+distinguished from sudden creation. It is this, but it is also a theory
+of a purely scientific kind which seeks to explain the purely physical
+causes of that development. And this is the point where natural science
+begins to exert her influence upon natural theology&mdash;or the point where
+the theory of evolution begins to affect the theory of design. As this
+is a most important part of our subject, and one upon which an
+extraordinary amount of confusion at the present time prevails, I shall
+in my next paper carefully consider it in all its bearings.</p>
+
+<div class="footnotes"><h3>FOOTNOTES:</h3>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_19_19" id="Footnote_19_19"></a><a href="#FNanchor_19_19"><span class="label">[19]</span></a> [The third paper is not published because Romanes' views
+on the relation between science and faith in Revealed Religion are
+better and more maturely expressed in the Notes.&mdash;<span class="smcap">Ed.</span>]</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_20_20" id="Footnote_20_20"></a><a href="#FNanchor_20_20"><span class="label">[20]</span></a> To avoid misunderstanding I may observe that in the above
+definitions I am considering Religion and Science under the conditions
+in which they actually exist. It is conceivable that under other
+conditions these two departments of thought might not be so sharply
+separated. Thus, for instance, if a Religion were to appear carrying a
+revelation to Science upon matters of physical causation, such a
+Religion (supposing the revelation were found by experiment to be true)
+ought to be held to exercise upon Science a strictly legitimate
+influence.</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_21_21" id="Footnote_21_21"></a><a href="#FNanchor_21_21"><span class="label">[21]</span></a> <i>Mental Evolution in Animals</i>, pp. 155-8.</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_22_22" id="Footnote_22_22"></a><a href="#FNanchor_22_22"><span class="label">[22]</span></a> [I have put 'may' in place of 'do' for the sake of
+argument.&mdash;<span class="smcap">Ed.</span>]</p></div>
+</div>
+
+<hr />
+<h2><a name="II" id="II"></a>II.</h2>
+
+<p>Suppose the man who found the watch upon a heath to continue his walk
+till he comes down to the sea-shore, and suppose further that he is as
+ignorant of physical geography as he is of watch-making. He soon begins
+to observe a number of adaptations of means to ends, which, if less
+refined and delicate than those that formed the object of his study in
+the watch, are on the other hand much more impressive from the greatly
+larger scale on which they are displayed. First, he observes that there
+is a beautiful basin hollowed out in the land for the reception of a
+bay; that the sides of this basin, which from being near its opening are
+most exposed to the action of large rolling billows, are composed of
+rocky cliffs, evidently in order to prevent the further encroachment of
+the sea, and the consequent destruction of the entire bay; that the
+sides of the basin, which from being successively situated more inland
+are successively less and less exposed to the action of large waves, are
+constituted successively of smaller rocks, passing into shingle, and
+eventually into the finest sand: that as the tides rise and fall with as
+great a regularity as was exhibited by the movements of the watch, the
+stones are carefully separated out from the sand to be arranged in
+sloping layers by themselves, and this always with a most beautiful
+reference to the places round the margin of the basin which are most in
+danger of being damaged by the action of the waves. He would further
+observe, upon closer inspection, that this process of selective
+arrangement goes into matters of the most minute detail. Here, for
+instance, he would observe a mile or two of a particular kind of seaweed
+artistically arranged in one long sinuous line upon the beach; there he
+would see a wonderful deposit of shells; in another place a lovely
+little purple heap of garnet sand, the minute particles of which have
+all been carefully picked out from the surrounding acres of yellow sand.
+Again, he would notice that the streams which come down to the bay are
+all flowing in channels admirably dug out for the purpose; and, being
+led by curiosity to investigate the teleology of these various streams,
+he would find that they serve to supply the water which the sea loses by
+evaporation, and also, by a wonderful piece of adjustment, to furnish
+fresh water to those animals and plants which thrive best in fresh
+water, and yet by their combined action to carry down sufficient mineral
+constituents to give that precise degree of saltness to the sea as a
+whole which is required for the maintenance of pelagic life. Lastly,
+continuing his investigations along this line of inquiry, he would find
+that a thousand different habitats were all thoughtfully adapted to the
+needs of a hundred thousand different forms of life, none of which
+could survive if these habitats were reversed. Now, I think that our
+imaginary inquirer would be a dull man if, as the result of all this
+study, he failed to conclude that the evidence of Design furnished by
+the marine bay was at least as cogent as that which he had previously
+found in his study of the watch.</p>
+
+<p>But there is this great difference between the two cases. Whereas by
+subsequent inquiry he could ascertain as a matter of fact that the watch
+was due to intelligent contrivance, he could make no such discovery with
+reference to the marine bay: in the one case intelligent contrivance as
+a cause is independently demonstrable, while in the other case it can
+only be inferred. What, then, is the value of the inference?</p>
+
+<p>If, after the studies of our imaginary teleologist had been completed,
+he were introduced to the library of the Royal Society, and if he were
+then to spend a year or two in making himself acquainted with the
+leading results of modern science, I fancy that he would end by being
+both a wiser and a sadder man. At least I am certain that in learning
+more he would feel that he is understanding less&mdash;that the archaic
+simplicity of his earlier explanations must give place to a matured
+perplexity upon the whole subject. To begin with, he would now find that
+every one of the adjustments of means to ends which excited his
+admiration on the sea-coast were due to physical causes which are
+perfectly well understood. The cliffs stood at the opening of the bay
+because the sea in past ages had encroached upon the coast-line until
+it met with these cliffs, which then opposed its further progress; the
+bay was a depression in the land which happened to be there when the sea
+arrived, and into which the sea consequently flowed; the successive
+occurrence of rocks, shingle, and sand was due to the actions of the
+waves themselves; the segregation of sea-weeds, shells, pebbles, and
+different kinds of sand, was due to their different degrees of specific
+gravity; the fresh-water streams ran in channels because they had
+themselves been the means of excavating them; and the multitudinous
+forms of life were all adapted to their several habitats simply because
+the unsuited forms were not able to live in them. In all these cases,
+therefore, our teleologist in the light of fuller knowledge would be
+compelled to conclude at least this much&mdash;that the adaptations which he
+had so greatly admired when he supposed that they were all due to
+contrivance in anticipation of the existing phenomena, cease to furnish
+the same evidence of intelligent design when it is found that no one of
+them was prepared beforehand by any independent or external cause.</p>
+
+<p>He would therefore be led to conclude that if the teleological
+interpretation of the facts were to be saved at all, it could only be so
+by taking a much wider view of the subject than was afforded by the
+particular cases of apparent design which at first appeared so cogent.
+That is to say, he would feel that he must abandon the supposition of
+any <i>special</i> design in the construction of that particular bay, and
+fall back upon the theory of a much more <i>general</i> design in the
+construction of one great scheme of Nature as a whole. In short he would
+require to dislodge his argument from the special adjustments which in
+the first instance appeared to him so suggestive, to those general laws
+of Nature which by their united operation give rise to a cosmos as
+distinguished from a chaos.</p>
+
+<p>Now I have been careful thus to present in all its more important
+details an imaginary argument drawn from inorganic nature, because it
+furnishes a complete analogy to the actual argument which is drawn from
+organic nature. Without any question, the instances of apparent design,
+or of the apparently intentional adaptation of means to ends, which we
+meet with in organic nature, are incomparably more numerous and
+suggestive than anything with which we meet in inorganic nature. But if
+once we find good reason to conclude that the former, like the latter,
+are all due, not to the immediate, special and prospective action of a
+contriving intelligence (as in watch-making or creation), but to the
+agency of secondary or physical causes acting under the influence of
+what we call general laws, then it seems to me that no matter how
+numerous or how wonderful the adaptations of means to ends in organic
+nature may be, they furnish one no other or better evidence of design
+than is furnished by any of the facts of inorganic nature.</p>
+
+<p>For the sake of clearness let us take any special case. Paley says, 'I
+know of no better method of introducing so large a subject than that of
+comparing a single thing with a single thing; an eye, for example, with
+a telescope.' He then goes on to point out the analogies between these
+two pieces of apparatus, and ends by asking, 'How is it possible, under
+circumstances of such close affinity, and under the operation of equal
+evidence, to exclude contrivance in the case of the eye, yet to
+acknowledge the proof of contrivance having been employed, as the
+plainest and clearest of all propositions in the case of the telescope?'</p>
+
+<p>Well, the answer to be made is that only upon the hypothesis of special
+creation can this analogy hold: on the hypothesis of evolution by
+physical causes the evidence in the two cases is <i>not</i> equal. For, upon
+this hypothesis we have the eye beginning, not as a ready-made structure
+prepared beforehand for the purposes of seeing, but as a mere
+differentiation of the ends of nerves in the skin, probably in the first
+instance to enable them better to discriminate changes of temperature.
+Pigment having been laid down in these places the better to secure this
+purpose (I use teleological terms for the sake of brevity), the
+nerve-ending begins to distinguish between light and darkness. The
+better to secure this further purpose, the simplest conceivable form of
+lens begins to appear in the shape of small refractive bodies. Behind
+these sensory cells are developed, forming the earliest indication of a
+retina presenting a single layer. And so on, step by step, till we
+reach the eye of an eagle.</p>
+
+<p>Of course the teleologist will here answer&mdash;'The fact of such a gradual
+building up is no argument against design: whether the structure
+appeared on a sudden or was the result of a slow elaboration, the marks
+of design in either case occur in the structure as it stands.' All of
+which is very true; but I am not maintaining that the fact of a gradual
+development <i>in itself</i> does affect the argument from design. I am
+maintaining that it only does so because it reveals the possibility
+(excluded by the hypothesis of sudden or special creation) of the
+structure having been proximately due to the operation of physical
+causes. Thus, for the value of argument, let us assume that natural
+selection has been satisfactorily established as a cause adequate to
+account for all these effects. Given the facts of heredity, variation,
+struggle for existence, and the consequent survival of the fittest, what
+follows? Why that each step in the prolonged and gradual development of
+the eye was brought about by the elimination of all the less adapted
+structures in any given generation, i.e. the selection of all the better
+adapted to perpetuate the improvement by heredity. Will the teleologist
+maintain that this selective process is itself indicative of special
+design? If so, it appears to me that he is logically bound to maintain
+that the long line of seaweed, the shells, the stones and the little
+heap of garnet sand upon the sea-coast are all equally indicative of
+special design. The general laws relating to specific gravity are at
+least of as much importance in the economy of nature as are the general
+laws relating to specific differentiation; and in each illustration
+alike we find the result of the operation of known physical causes to be
+that of selection. If it should be argued in reply that the selection in
+the one case is obviously purposeless, while in the other it is as
+obviously purposive, I answer that this is pure assumption. It is
+perhaps not too much to say that every geological formation on the face
+of the globe is either wholly or in part due to the selective influence
+of specific gravity, and who shall say that the construction of the
+earth's crust is a less important matter in the general scheme of things
+(if there is such a scheme) than is the evolution of an eye? Or who
+shall say that because we see an apparently intentional adaptation of
+means to ends as the result of selection in the case of the eye, there
+is no intention served by the result of selection in the case of the
+sea-weeds, stones, sand, mud? For anything that we can know to the
+contrary, the supposed intelligence may take a greater delight in the
+latter than in the former process.</p>
+
+<p>For the sake of clearness I have assumed that the physical causes with
+which we are already acquainted are sufficient to explain the observed
+phenomena of organic nature. But it clearly makes no difference whether
+or not this assumption is conceded, provided we allow that the observed
+phenomena are all due to physical causes of some kind, be they known or
+unknown. That is to say, in whatever measure we exclude the hypothesis
+of the direct or immediate intervention of the Deity in organic nature
+(miracle), in that measure we are reducing the evidence of design in
+organic nature to precisely the same logical position as that which is
+occupied by the evidence of design in inorganic nature. Hence I conceive
+that Mill has shown a singular want of penetration where, after
+observing with reference to natural selection, 'creative forethought is
+not absolutely the only link by which the origin of the wonderful
+mechanism of the eye may be connected with the fact of sight,' he goes
+on to say, 'leaving this remarkable speculation (i.e. that of natural
+selection) to whatever fate the progress of discovery may have in store
+for it, in the present state of knowledge the adaptations in nature
+afford a large balance of probability in favour of creation by
+intelligence.' I say this passage seems to me to show a singular want of
+penetration, and I say so because it appears to argue that the issue
+lies between the hypothesis of special design and the hypothesis of
+natural selection. But it does not do so. The issue really lies between
+special design and natural causes. Survival of the fittest is one of
+these causes which has been suggested, and shown by a large accumulation
+of evidence to be probably a true cause. But even if it were to be
+disproved as a cause, the real argumentative position of teleology would
+not thereby be effected, unless we were to conclude that there can be no
+other causes of a secondary or physical kind concerned in the
+production of the observed adaptations.</p>
+
+<p>I trust that I have now made it sufficiently clear why I hold that if we
+believe the reign of natural law, or the operation of physical causes,
+to extend throughout organic nature in the same universal manner as we
+believe this in the case of inorganic nature, then we can find no better
+evidence of design in the one province than in the other. The mere fact
+that we meet with more numerous and apparently more complete instances
+of design in the one province than in the other is, <i>ex hypothesi</i>,
+merely due to our ignorance of the natural causation in the more
+intricate province. In studying biological phenomena we are all at
+present in the intellectual position of our imaginary teleologist when
+studying the marine bay: we do not know the natural causes which have
+produced the observed results. But if, after having obtained a partial
+key in the theory of natural selection, we trust to the large analogy
+which is afforded by the simpler provinces of Nature, and conclude that
+physical causes are everywhere concerned in the production of organic
+structures, then we have concluded that any evidence of design which
+these structures present is of just the same logical value as that which
+we may attach to the evidence of design in inorganic nature. If it
+should still be urged that the adaptations met with in organic nature
+are from their number and unity much more suggestive of design than
+anything met with in inorganic nature, I must protest that this is to
+change the ground of argument and to evade the only point in dispute.
+No one denies the obvious fact stated: the only question is whether any
+number and any quantity of adaptations in any one department of nature
+afford other or better evidence of design than is afforded by
+adaptations in other departments, when all departments alike are
+supposed to be equally the outcome of physical causation. And this
+question I answer in the negative, because we have no means of
+ascertaining the extent to which the process of natural selection, or
+any other physical cause, is competent to produce adaptations of the
+kind observed.</p>
+
+<p>Thus, to take another instance of apparent design from inorganic nature,
+it has been argued that the constitution of the atmosphere is clearly
+designed for the support of vegetable and animal life. But before this
+conclusion can be established upon the facts, it must be shown that life
+could exist under no other material conditions than those which are
+furnished to it by the elementary constituents of the atmosphere. This,
+however, it is clearly impossible to show. For anything that we can know
+to the contrary, life may actually be existing upon some of the other
+heavenly bodies under totally different conditions as to atmosphere; and
+the fact that on this planet all life has come to be dependent upon the
+gases which occur in our atmosphere, may be due simply to the fact that
+it was only the forms of life which were able to adapt themselves
+(through natural selection or other physical causes) to these particular
+gases which could possibly be expected to occur&mdash;just as in matters of
+still smaller detail, it was only those forms of life that were suited
+to their several habitats in the marine bay, which could possibly be
+expected to be found in these several situations. Now, if a set of
+adjustments so numerous and so delicate as those on which the relations
+of every known form of life to the constituent gases of the atmosphere
+are seen to depend, can thus be shown not necessarily to imply the
+action of any disposing intelligence, how is it possible to conclude
+that any less general exhibitions of adjustment imply this, so long as
+every case of adjustment, whether or not ultimately due to design, is
+regarded as proximately due to physical causes?</p>
+
+<p>In view of these considerations, therefore, I think it is perfectly
+clear that if the argument from teleology is to be saved at all, it can
+only be so by shifting it from the narrow basis of special adaptations,
+to the broad area of Nature as a whole. And here I confess that to my
+mind the argument does acquire a weight which, if long and attentively
+considered, deserves to be regarded as enormous. For, although this and
+that particular adjustment in Nature may be seen to be proximately due
+to physical causes, and although we are prepared on the grounds of the
+largest possible analogy to infer that all other such particular cases
+are likewise due to physical causes, the more ultimate question arises,
+How is it that all physical causes conspire, by their united action, to
+the production of a general order of Nature? It is against all analogy
+to suppose that such an end as this can be accomplished by such means
+as those, in the way of mere chance or 'the fortuitous concourse of
+atoms.' We are led by the most fundamental dictates of our reason to
+conclude that there must be some cause for this co-operation of causes.
+I know that from Lucretius' time this has been denied; but it has been
+denied only on grounds of <i>feeling</i>. No possible <i>reason</i> can be given
+for the denial which does not run counter to the law of causation
+itself. I am therefore perfectly clear that the only question which,
+from a purely rational point of view, here stands to be answered is
+this&mdash;Of what nature are we to suppose the <i>causa causarum</i> to be?</p>
+
+<p>On this point only two hypotheses have ever been advanced, and I think
+it is impossible to conceive that any third one is open. Of these two
+hypotheses the earliest, and of course the most obvious, is that of
+mental purpose. The other hypothesis is one which we owe to the
+far-reaching thought of Mr. Herbert Spencer. In Chapter VII of his
+<i>First Principles</i> he argues that all causation arises immediately out
+of existence as such, or, as he states it, that 'uniformity of law
+inevitably follows from the persistence of force.' For 'if in any two
+cases there is exact likeness not only between those most conspicuous
+antecedents which we distinguish as the causes, but also between those
+accompanying antecedents which we call the conditions, we cannot affirm
+that the effects will differ, without affirming either that some force
+has come into existence or that some force has ceased to exist. If the
+co-operative forces in the one case are equal to those in the other,
+each to each, in distribution and amount; then it is impossible to
+conceive the product of their joint action in the one case as unlike
+that in the other, without conceiving one or more of the forces to have
+increased or diminished in quantity; and this is conceiving that force
+is not persistent.'</p>
+
+<p>Now this interpretation of causality as the immediate outcome of
+existence must be considered first as a theory of causation, and next as
+a theory in relation to Theism. As a theory of causation it has not met
+with the approval of mathematicians, physicists, or logicians, leading
+representatives of all these departments of thought having expressly
+opposed it, while, so far as I am aware, no representative of any one of
+them has spoken in its favour<a name="FNanchor_23_23" id="FNanchor_23_23"></a><a href="#Footnote_23_23" class="fnanchor">[23]</a>. But with this point I am not at
+present concerned, for even if the theory were admitted to furnish a
+full and complete explanation of causality, it would still fail to
+account for the harmonious relation of causes, or the fact with which we
+are now alone concerned. This distinction is not perceived by the
+anonymous author 'Physicus,' who, in his <i>Candid Examination of Theism</i>,
+lays great stress upon Mr. Spencer's theory of causation as subversive
+of Theism, or at least as superseding the necessity of theistic
+hypothesis by furnishing a full explanation of the order of Nature on
+purely physical grounds. But he fails to perceive that even if Mr.
+Spencer's theory were conceded fully to explain all the facts of
+causality, it would in no wise tend to explain the cosmos in which these
+facts occur. It may be true that causation depends upon the 'persistence
+of force': it does not follow that all manifestations of force should on
+this account have been directed to occur as they do occur. For, if we
+follow back any sequence of physical causation, we soon find that it
+spreads out on all sides into a network of physical relations which are
+literally infinite both in space (conditions) and in time (antecedent
+causes). Now, even if we suppose that the persistence of force is a
+sufficient explanation of the occurrence of the particular sequence
+contemplated so far as the exhibition of force is there concerned, we
+are thus as far as ever from explaining the <i>determination</i> of this
+force into the particular channel through which it flows. It may be
+quite true that the resultant is determined as to magnitude and
+direction by the components; but what about the magnitude and direction
+of the components? If it is said that they in turn were determined by
+the outcome of previous systems, how about these systems? And so on till
+we spread away into the infinite network already mentioned. Only if we
+knew the origin of all series of all such systems could we be in a
+position to say that an adequate intelligence might determine beforehand
+by calculation the state of any one part of the universe at any given
+instant of time. But, as the series are infinite both in number and
+extent, this knowledge is clearly out of the question. Moreover, even if
+it could be imagined as possible, it could only be so imagined at the
+expense of supposing an origin of physical causation in time; and this
+amounts to supposing a state of things prior to such causation, and out
+of which it arose. But to suppose this is to suppose some extra-physical
+source of physical causation; and whether this supposition is made with
+reference to a physical event occurring under immediate observation
+(miracle), or to a physical event in past time, or to the origin of all
+physical events, it is alike incompatible with any theory that seeks to
+give a purely physical explanation of the physical universe as a whole.
+It is, in short, the old story about a stream not being able to rise
+above its source. Physical causation cannot be made to supply its own
+explanation, and the mere persistence of force, even if it were conceded
+to account for particular cases of physical sequence, can give no
+account of the ubiquitous and eternal direction of force in the
+construction and maintenance of universal order.</p>
+
+<p>We are thus, as it were, driven upon the theory of Theism as furnishing
+the only nameable explanation of this universal order. That is to say,
+by no logical artifice can we escape from the conclusion that, as far
+as we can see, this universal order must be regarded as due to some one
+integrating principle; and that this, so far as we can see, is most
+probably of the nature of mind. At least it must be allowed that we can
+conceive of it under no other aspect; and that if any particular
+adaptation in organic nature is held to be suggestive of such an agency,
+the sum total of all adaptations in the universe must be held to be
+incomparably more so. I shall not, however, dwell upon this theme since
+it has been well treated by several modern writers, and with special
+cogency by the Rev. Baden Powell. I will merely observe that I do not
+consider it necessary to the display of this argument in favour of
+Theism that we should speak of 'natural laws.' It is enough to take our
+stand upon the [broadest] general fact that Nature is a system, and that
+the order observable in this system is absolutely universal, eternally
+enduring, and infinitely exact; while only upon the supposition of its
+being such is our experience conceived as possible, or our knowledge
+conceived as attainable.</p>
+
+<p>Having thus stated as emphatically as I can that in my opinion no
+explanation of natural order can be either conceived or named other than
+that of intelligence as the supreme directing cause, I shall proceed to
+two other questions which arise immediately out of this conclusion. The
+first of these questions is as to the presumable character of this
+supreme Intelligence so far as any data of inference upon this point are
+supplied by our observation of Nature; and the other question is as to
+the strictly formal cogency of any conclusions either with reference to
+the existence or the character of such an intelligence<a name="FNanchor_24_24" id="FNanchor_24_24"></a><a href="#Footnote_24_24" class="fnanchor">[24]</a>. I shall
+consider these two points separately.</p>
+
+<p>No sooner have we reached the conclusion that the only hypothesis
+whereby the general order of Nature admits of being in any degree
+accounted for is that it is due to a cause of a mental kind, than we
+confront the fact that this cause must be widely different from anything
+that we know of Mind in ourselves. And we soon discover that this
+difference must be conceived as not merely of degree, however great, but
+of kind. In other words, although we may conclude that the nearest
+analogue of the <i>causa causarum</i> given in experience is the human mind,
+we are bound to acknowledge that in all fundamental points the analogy
+is so remote that it becomes a question whether we are really very much
+nearer the truth by entertaining it. Thus, for instance, as Mr. Spencer
+has pointed out, our only conception of that which we know as Mind in
+ourselves is the conception of a series of states of consciousness. But,
+he continues, 'Put a series of states of consciousness as cause and the
+evolving universe as effect, and then endeavour to see the last as
+flowing from the first. I find it possible to imagine in some dim way a
+series of states of consciousness serving as antecedent to any one of
+the movements I see going on; for my own states of consciousness are
+often indirectly the antecedents to such movements. But how if I attempt
+to think of such a series as antecedent to <i>all</i> actions throughout the
+universe ...? If to account for this infinitude of physical changes
+everywhere going on, "Mind must be conceived as there," "under the guise
+of simple-dynamics," then the reply is, that, to be so conceived, Mind
+must be divested of all attributes by which it is distinguished; and
+that, when thus divested of its distinguishing attributes the conception
+disappears&mdash;the word Mind stands for a blank.'</p>
+
+<p>Moreover, 'How is the "originating Mind" to be thought of as having
+states produced by things objective to it, as discriminating among these
+states, and classing them as like and unlike; and as preferring one
+objective result to another?'<a name="FNanchor_25_25" id="FNanchor_25_25"></a><a href="#Footnote_25_25" class="fnanchor">[25]</a></p>
+
+<p>Hence, without continuing this line of argument, which it would not be
+difficult to trace through every constituent branch of human psychology,
+we may take it as unquestionable that, if there is a Divine Mind, it
+must differ so essentially from the human mind, that it becomes
+illogical to designate the two by the same name: the attributes of
+eternity and ubiquity are in themselves enough to place such a Mind in a
+category <i>sui generis</i>, wholly different from anything which the analogy
+furnished by our own mind enables us even dimly to conceive. And this,
+of course, is no more than theologians admit. God's thoughts are above
+our thoughts, and a God who would be comprehensible to our intelligence
+would be no God at all, they say. Which may be true enough, only we must
+remember that in whatever measure we are thus precluded from
+understanding the Divine Mind, in that measure are we precluded from
+founding any conclusions as to its nature upon analogies furnished by
+the human mind. The theory ceases to be anthropomorphic: it ceases to be
+even 'anthropopsychic': it is affiliated with the conception of mind
+only in virtue of the one fact that it serves to give the best
+provisional account of the order of Nature, by supposing an infinite
+extension of some of the faculties of the human mind, with a concurrent
+obliteration of all the essential conditions under which alone these
+faculties are known to exist. Obviously of such a Mind as this no
+predication is logically possible. If such a Mind exists, it is not
+conceivable as existing, and we are precluded from assigning to it any
+attributes.</p>
+
+<p>Thus much on general grounds. Descending now to matters of more detail,
+let us assume with the natural theologians that such a Mind does exist,
+that it so far resembles the human mind as to be a conscious, personal
+intelligence, and that the care of such a Mind is over all its works.
+Even upon the grounds of this supposition we meet with a number of large
+and general facts which indicate that this Mind ought still to be
+regarded as apparently very unlike its 'image' in the mind of man. I
+will not here dwell upon the argument of seeming waste and purposeless
+action in Nature, because I think that this may be fairly met by the
+ulterior argument already drawn from Nature as a whole&mdash;viz. that as a
+whole, Nature is a cosmos, and therefore that what to us appears
+wasteful and purposeless in matters of detail may not be so in relation
+to the scheme of things as a whole. But I am doubtful whether this
+ulterior argument can fairly be adduced to meet the apparent absence in
+Nature of that which in man we term morality. For in the human mind the
+sense of right and wrong&mdash;with all its accompanying or constituting
+emotions of love, sympathy, justice, &amp;c.&mdash;is so important a factor, that
+however greatly we may imagine the intellectual side of the human mind
+to be extended, we can scarcely imagine that the moral side could ever
+become so apparently eclipsed as to end in the authorship of such a work
+as we find in terrestrial nature. It is useless to hide our eyes to the
+state of matters which meets us here. Most of the instances of special
+design which are relied upon by the natural theologian to prove the
+intelligent nature of the First Cause, have as their end or object the
+infliction of painful death or the escape from remorseless enemies; and
+so far the argument in favour of the intelligent nature of the First
+Cause is an argument against its morality. Again, even if we quit the
+narrower basis on which teleological argument has rested in the past,
+and stand that argument upon the broader ground of Nature as a whole, it
+scarcely becomes less incompatible with any inference to the morality
+of that Cause, seeing that the facts to which I have alluded are not
+merely occasional and, as it were, outweighed by contrary facts of a
+more general kind, but manifestly constitute the leading feature of the
+scheme of organic nature as a whole: or, if this were held to be
+questionable, it could only follow that we are not entitled to infer
+that there is any such scheme at all.</p>
+
+<p>Nature, as red in tooth and claw with ravin, is thus without question a
+large and general fact that must be considered by any theory of
+teleology which can be propounded. I do not think that this aspect of
+the matter could be conveyed in stronger terms than it is by
+'Physicus<a name="FNanchor_26_26" id="FNanchor_26_26"></a><a href="#Footnote_26_26" class="fnanchor">[26]</a>,' whom I shall therefore quote:&mdash;</p>
+
+<p>'Supposing the Deity to be, what Professor Flint maintains that he
+is&mdash;viz. omnipotent, and there can be no inference more transparent than
+that such wholesale suffering, for whatever ends designed, exhibits an
+incalculably greater deficiency of beneficence in the divine character
+than that which we know in any, the very worst, of human characters. For
+let us pause for one moment to think of what suffering in Nature means.
+Some hundreds of millions of years ago some millions of millions of
+animals must be supposed to have become sentient. Since that time till
+the present, there must have been millions and millions of generations
+of millions and millions of individuals. And throughout all this period
+of incalculable duration, this inconceivable host of sentient organisms
+have been in a state of unceasing battle, dread, ravin, pain. Looking to
+the outcome, we find that more than one half of the species which have
+survived the ceaseless struggle are parasitic in their habits, lower and
+insentient forms of life feasting on higher and sentient forms; we find
+teeth and talons whetted for slaughter, hooks and suckers moulded for
+torment&mdash;everywhere a reign of terror, hunger, sickness, with oozing
+blood and quivering limbs, with gasping breath and eyes of innocence
+that dimly close in deaths of cruel torture! Is it said that there are
+compensating enjoyments? I care not to strike the balance; the
+enjoyments I plainly perceive to be as physically necessary as the
+pains, and this whether or not evolution is due to design.... Am I told
+that I am not competent to judge the purposes of the Almighty? I answer
+that if there are <i>purposes</i>, I <i>am</i> able to judge of them so far as I
+can see; and if I am expected to judge of His purposes when they appear
+to be beneficent, I am in consistency obliged also to judge of them when
+they appear to be malevolent. And it can be no possible extenuation of
+the latter to point to the "final result" as "order and beauty," so long
+as the means adopted by the "<i>Omnipotent Designer</i>" are known to have
+been so [terrible]. All that we could legitimately assert in this case
+would be that, so far as observation can extend, "He cares for animal
+perfection" <i>to the exclusion of</i> "animal enjoyment," and even to the
+<i>total disregard</i> of animal suffering. But to assert this would merely
+be to deny beneficence as an attribute of God<a name="FNanchor_27_27" id="FNanchor_27_27"></a><a href="#Footnote_27_27" class="fnanchor">[27]</a>.'</p>
+
+<p>The reasoning here appears as unassailable as it is obvious. If, as the
+writer goes on to say, we see a rabbit panting in the iron jaws of a
+spring trap, and in consequence abhor the devilish nature of the being
+who, with full powers of realizing what pain means, can deliberately
+employ his whole faculties of invention in contriving a thing so
+hideously cruel; what are we to think of a Being who, with yet higher
+faculties of thought and knowledge, and with an unlimited choice of
+means to secure His ends, has contrived untold thousands of mechanisms
+no less diabolical? In short, so far as Nature can teach us, or
+'observation can extend,' it does appear that the scheme, if it is a
+scheme, is the product of a Mind which differs from the more highly
+evolved type of human mind in that it is immensely more intellectual
+without being nearly so moral. And the same thing is indicated by the
+rough and indiscriminate manner in which justice is allotted&mdash;even if it
+can be said to be allotted at all. When we contrast the certainty and
+rigour with which any offence against 'physical law' is punished by
+Nature (no matter though the sin be but one of ignorance), with the
+extreme uncertainty and laxity with which she meets any offence against
+'moral law,' we are constrained to feel that the system of legislation
+(if we may so term it) is conspicuously different from that which would
+have been devised by any intelligence which in any sense could be called
+'anthropopsychic.'</p>
+
+<p>The only answer to these difficulties open to the natural theologian is
+that which is drawn from the constitution of the human mind. It is
+argued that the fact of this mind having so large an ingredient of
+morality in its constitution may be taken as proof that its originating
+source is likewise of a moral character. This argument, however, appears
+to me of a questionable character, seeing that, for anything we can tell
+to the contrary, the moral sense may have been given to, or developed
+in, man simply on account of its utility to the species&mdash;just in the
+same way as teeth in the shark or poison in the snake. If so, the
+occurrence of the moral sense in man would merely furnish one other
+instance of the intellectual, as distinguished from the moral, nature of
+God; and there seems to be in itself no reason why we should take any
+other view. The mere fact that to <i>us</i> the moral sense seems such a
+great and holy thing, is doubtless (under any view) owing to its
+importance to the well-being of our species. In itself, or as it appears
+to other possible beings intellectual like ourselves, but existing under
+unlike conditions, the moral sense of man may be regarded as of no more
+significance than the social instincts of bees. More particularly may
+this consideration apply to the case of a Mind existing, according to
+the theological theory of things, wholly beyond the pale of anything
+analogous to those social relations out of which, according to the
+scientific theory of evolution, the moral sense has been developed in
+ourselves<a name="FNanchor_28_28" id="FNanchor_28_28"></a><a href="#Footnote_28_28" class="fnanchor">[28]</a>.</p>
+
+<p>The truth is that in this matter natural theologians begin by assuming
+that the First Cause, if intelligent, <i>must</i> be moral; and then they are
+blinded to the strictly logical weakness of the argument whereby they
+endeavour to sustain their assumption. For aught that we can tell to the
+contrary, it may be quite as 'anthropomorphic' a notion to attribute
+morality to God as it would be to attribute those capacities for
+sensuous enjoyment with which the Greeks endowed their divinities. The
+Deity may be as high above the one as the other&mdash;or rather perhaps we
+may say as much external to the one as to the other. Without being
+supra-moral, and still less immoral, He may be un-moral: our ideas of
+morality may have no meaning as applied to Him.</p>
+
+<p>But if we go thus far in one direction, I think, <i>per contra</i>, it must
+in consistency be allowed that the argument from the constitution of the
+human mind acquires more weight when it is shifted from the moral sense
+to the religious instincts. For, on the one hand, these instincts are
+not of such obvious use to the species as are those of morality; and,
+on the other hand, while they are unquestionably very general, very
+persistent, and very powerful, they do not appear to serve any 'end' or
+'purpose' in the scheme of things, unless we accept the theory which is
+given of them by those in whom they are most strongly developed. Here I
+think we have an argument of legitimate force, although it does not
+appear that such was the opinion entertained of it by Mill. I think the
+argument is of legitimate force, because if the religious instincts of
+the human race point to no reality as their object, they are out of
+analogy with all other instinctive endowments. Elsewhere in the animal
+kingdom we never meet with such a thing as an instinct pointing
+aimlessly, and therefore the fact of man being, as it is said, 'a
+religious animal'&mdash;i.e. presenting a class of feelings of a peculiar
+nature directed to particular ends, and most akin to, if not identical
+with, true instinct&mdash;is so far, in my opinion, a legitimate argument in
+favour of the reality of some object towards which the religious side of
+this animal's nature is directed. And I do not think that this argument
+is invalidated by such facts as that widely different intellectual
+conceptions touching the character of this object are entertained by
+different races of mankind; that the force of the religious instincts
+differs greatly in different individuals even of the same race; that
+these instincts admit of being greatly modified by education; that they
+would probably fail to be developed in any individual without at least
+so much education as is required to furnish the needful intellectual
+conceptions on which they are founded; or that we may not improbably
+trace their origin, as Mr. Spencer traces it, to a primitive mode of
+interpreting dreams. For even in view of all these considerations the
+fact remains that these instincts <i>exist</i>, and therefore, like all other
+instincts, may be supposed to have a <i>definite</i> meaning, even though,
+like all other instincts, they may be supposed to have had a <i>natural
+cause</i>, which both in the individual and in the race requires, as in the
+natural development of all other instincts, the natural conditions for
+its occurrence to be supplied. In a word, if animal instincts generally,
+like organic structures or inorganic systems, are held to betoken
+purpose, the religious nature of man would stand out as an anomaly in
+the general scheme of things if it alone were purposeless. Hence we have
+here what seems to me a valid inference, so far as it goes, to the
+effect that, if the general order of Nature is due to Mind, the
+character of that Mind is such as it is conceived to be by the most
+highly developed form of religion. A conclusion which is no doubt the
+opposite of that which we reached by contemplating the phenomena of
+biology; and a contradiction which can only be overcome by supposing,
+either that Nature conceals God, while man reveals Him, or that Nature
+reveals God while man misrepresents Him.</p>
+
+<p>There is still one other fact of a very wide and general kind presented
+by Nature, which, if the order of Nature is taken to be the expression
+of intelligent purpose, ought in my opinion to be regarded as of great
+weight in furnishing evidence upon the ethical quality of that purpose.
+It is a fact which, so far as I know, has not been considered by any
+other writer; but from its being one of the most general of all the
+facts relating to the sentient creation, and from its admitting of no
+one single exception, I feel that I am not able too strongly to
+emphasize its argumentative importance. This fact is, as I have stated
+it on a former occasion, 'that amid all the millions of mechanisms and
+instincts in the animal kingdom, there is no one instance of a mechanism
+or instinct occurring in one species for the exclusive benefit of
+another species, although there are a few cases in which a mechanism or
+instinct that is of benefit to its possessor has come also to be
+utilized by other species. Now, on the beneficent design theory it is
+impossible to explain why, when all the mechanisms in the same species
+are invariably correlated for the benefit of that species, there should
+never be any such correlation between mechanisms in different species,
+or why the same remark should apply to instincts. For how magnificent a
+display of Divine beneficence would organic nature have afforded, if
+all, or even some, species had been so inter-related as to minister to
+each other's necessities. Organic species might then have been likened
+to a countless multitude of voices all singing in one harmonious psalm
+of praise. But, as it is, we see no vestige of such co-ordination; every
+species is for itself, and for itself alone&mdash;an outcome of the always
+and everywhere fiercely raging struggle for life<a name="FNanchor_29_29" id="FNanchor_29_29"></a><a href="#Footnote_29_29" class="fnanchor">[29]</a>.'</p>
+
+<p>The large and general fact thus stated constitutes, in my opinion, the
+strongest of all arguments in favour of Mr. Darwin's theory of natural
+selection, and therefore we can see the probable reason why it is what
+it is, so far as the question of its physical causation is concerned.
+But where the question is, Supposing the physical causation ultimately
+due to Mind, what are we to infer concerning the character of the Mind
+which has adopted this method of causation?&mdash;then we again reach the
+answer that, so far as we can judge from a conscientious examination of
+these facts, this Mind does not show that it is of a nature which in man
+we should call moral. Of course behind the physical appearances there
+may be a moral justification, so that from these appearances we are not
+entitled to say more than that from the fact of its having chosen a
+method of physical causation leading to these results, it has presented
+to us the appearance, as before observed, of caring for animal
+perfection to the exclusion of animal enjoyment, and even to the total
+disregard of animal suffering.</p>
+
+<p>In conclusion, it is of importance to insist upon a truth which in
+discussions of this kind is too often disregarded&mdash;viz. that all our
+reasonings being of a character relative to our knowledge, our
+inferences are uncertain in a degree proportionate to the extent of our
+ignorance; and that as with reference to the topics which we have been
+considering our ignorance is of immeasurable extent, any conclusions
+that we may have formed are, as Bishop Butler would say, 'infinitely
+precarious.' Or, as I have previously presented this formal aspect of
+the matter while discussing the teleological argument with Professor Asa
+Gray,&mdash;'I suppose it will be admitted that the validity of an inference
+depends upon the number, the importance, and the definiteness of the
+things or ratios known, as compared with the number, importance, and
+definiteness of the things or ratios unknown, but inferred. If so, we
+should be logically cautious in drawing inferences from the natural to
+the supernatural: for although we have the entire sphere of experience
+from which to draw an inference, we are unable to gauge the probability
+of the inference when drawn&mdash;the unknown ratios being confessedly of
+unknown number, importance, and degree of definiteness: the whole orbit
+of human knowledge is insufficient to obtain a parallax whereby to
+institute the required measurements or to determine the proportion
+between the terms known and the terms unknown. Otherwise phrased, we may
+say&mdash;as our knowledge of a part is to our knowledge of a whole, so is
+our inference from that part to the reality of that whole. Who,
+therefore, can say, even upon the hypothesis of Theism, that our
+inferences or "idea of design" would have any meaning if applied to the
+"All-Upholder," whose thoughts are not as our thoughts?'<a name="FNanchor_30_30" id="FNanchor_30_30"></a><a href="#Footnote_30_30" class="fnanchor">[30]</a> And of
+course, <i>mutatis mutandis</i>, the same remarks apply to all inferences
+having a negative tendency.</p>
+
+<p>As an outcome of the whole of this discussion, then, I think it appears
+that the influence of Science upon Natural Religion has been uniformly
+of a destructive character. Step by step it has driven back the apparent
+evidence of direct or special design in Nature, until now this evidence
+resides exclusively in the one great and general fact that Nature as a
+whole is a Cosmos. Further than this it is obviously impossible that the
+destructive influence of Science can extend, because Science can only
+exist upon the basis of this fact. But when we allow that this great and
+universal fact&mdash;which but for the effects of unremitting familiarity
+could scarcely fail to be intellectually overwhelming&mdash;does betoken
+mental agency in Nature, we immediately find it impossible to determine
+the probable character of such a mind, even supposing that it exists. We
+cannot conceive of it as presenting any one of the qualities which
+essentially characterize what we know as mind in ourselves; and
+therefore the word Mind, as applied to the supposed agency, stands for a
+blank. Further, even if we disregard this difficulty, and assume that in
+some way or other incomprehensible to us a Mind does exist as far
+transcending the human mind as the human mind transcends mechanical
+motion; still we are met by some very large and general facts in Nature
+which seem strongly to indicate that this Mind, if it exists, is either
+deficient in, or wholly destitute of, that class of feelings which in
+man we term moral; while, on the other hand, the religious aspirations
+of man himself may be taken to indicate the opposite conclusion. And,
+lastly, with reference to the whole course of such reasonings, we have
+seen that any degree of measurable probability, as attaching to the
+conclusions, is unattainable. From all which it appears that Natural
+Religion at the present time can only be regarded as a system full of
+intellectual contradictions and moral perplexities; so that if we go to
+her with these greatest of all questions: 'Is there knowledge with the
+Most High?' 'Shall not the Judge of all the earth do right?' the only
+clear answer which we receive is the one that comes back to us from the
+depths of our own heart&mdash;'When I thought upon this it was too painful
+for me.'</p>
+
+<div class="footnotes"><h3>FOOTNOTES:</h3>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_23_23" id="Footnote_23_23"></a><a href="#FNanchor_23_23"><span class="label">[23]</span></a> A note (of 1893) contains the following: 'Being,
+considered in the abstract, is logically equivalent to Not-Being or
+Nothing. For if by successive stages of abstraction, we divest the
+conception of Being of attribute and relation we reach the conception of
+that which cannot be, i.e. a logical contradiction, or the logical
+correlative of Being which is Nothing. (All this is well expressed in
+Caird's <i>Evolution of Religion</i>.) The failure to perceive this fact
+constitutes a ground fallacy in my <i>Candid Examination of Theism</i>, where
+I represent Being as being a sufficient explanation of the Order of
+Nature or the law of Causation.'</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_24_24" id="Footnote_24_24"></a><a href="#FNanchor_24_24"><span class="label">[24]</span></a> This promise is only partially fulfilled in the
+penultimate paragraph of the essay.&mdash;<span class="smcap">Ed.</span></p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_25_25" id="Footnote_25_25"></a><a href="#FNanchor_25_25"><span class="label">[25]</span></a> <i>Essays</i>, vol. iii. p. 246 et seq. The whole passage ought
+to be consulted, being too long to quote here.</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_26_26" id="Footnote_26_26"></a><a href="#FNanchor_26_26"><span class="label">[26]</span></a> In an essay on Prof. Flint's <i>Theism</i>, appended to the
+<i>Candid Examination</i>.</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_27_27" id="Footnote_27_27"></a><a href="#FNanchor_27_27"><span class="label">[27]</span></a> <i>A Candid Examination of Theism</i>, pp. 171-2.</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_28_28" id="Footnote_28_28"></a><a href="#FNanchor_28_28"><span class="label">[28]</span></a> [I have, as Editor, resisted a temptation to intervene in
+the above argument. But I think I may intervene on a matter of fact, and
+point out that 'according to the theological theory of things,' i.e.
+according to the Trinitarian doctrine, God's Nature consists in what is
+strictly 'analogous to social relations,' and He not merely exhibits in
+His creation, but Himself <i>is</i> Love. See, on the subject, especially,
+R.H. Hutton's essay on the Incarnation, in his <i>Theological Essays</i>
+(Macmillan).&mdash;<span class="smcap">Ed.</span>]</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_29_29" id="Footnote_29_29"></a><a href="#FNanchor_29_29"><span class="label">[29]</span></a> <i>Scientific Evidences of Organic Evolution</i>, pp. 76-7.</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_30_30" id="Footnote_30_30"></a><a href="#FNanchor_30_30"><span class="label">[30]</span></a> <i>Nature</i>, April 5, 1883.</p></div>
+</div>
+
+<hr />
+<h2><a name="PART_II" id="PART_II"></a>PART II.</h2>
+
+<h2><a name="Introductory_Note_by_the_Editor" id="Introductory_Note_by_the_Editor"></a><b>Introductory Note by the Editor.</b></h2>
+
+<p>Little more requires to be said by way of introduction to the Notes
+which are all that George Romanes was able to write of a work that was
+to have been entitled <i>A Candid Examination of Religion</i>. What little
+does require to be said must be by way of bridging the interval of
+thought which exists between the Essays which have just preceded and the
+Notes which represent more nearly his final phase of mind.</p>
+
+<p>The most anti-theistic feature in the Essays is the stress laid in them
+on the evidence which Nature supplies, or is supposed to supply,
+antagonistic to the belief in the goodness of God.</p>
+
+<p>On this mysterious and perplexing subject George Romanes appears to have
+had more to say but did not live to say it<a name="FNanchor_31_31" id="FNanchor_31_31"></a><a href="#Footnote_31_31" class="fnanchor">[31]</a>. We may notice however
+that in 1889, in a paper read before the Aristotelian Society, on 'the
+Evidence of Design in Nature<a name="FNanchor_32_32" id="FNanchor_32_32"></a><a href="#Footnote_32_32" class="fnanchor">[32]</a>,' he appears to allow more weight than
+before to the argument that the method of physical development must be
+judged in the light of its result. This paper was part of a <i>Symposium</i>.
+Mr. S. Alexander has argued in a previous paper against the hypothesis
+of 'design' in Nature on the ground that 'the fair order of Nature is
+only acquired by a wholesale waste and sacrifice.' This argument was
+developed by pointing to the obvious 'mal-adjustments,' 'aimless
+destructions,' &amp;c., which characterize the processes of Nature. But
+these, Romanes replies, necessarily belong to the process considered as
+one of 'natural selection.' The question is only: Is such a process <i>per
+se</i> incompatible with the hypothesis of design? And he replies in the
+negative.</p>
+
+<p class='tbrk'>'"The fair order of Nature is only acquired by a wholesale waste and
+sacrifice." Granted. But if the "wholesale waste and sacrifice," as
+antecedent, leads to a "fair order of Nature" as its consequent, how can
+it be said that the "wholesale waste and sacrifice" has been a failure?
+Or how can it be said that, in point of fact, there <i>has</i> been a waste,
+or <i>has</i> been a sacrifice? Clearly such things can only be said when
+our point of view is restricted to the means (i.e. the wholesale
+destruction of the less fit); not when we extend our view to what, even
+within the limits of human observation, is unquestionably the <i>end</i>
+(i.e. the causal result in an ever improving world of types). A
+candidate who is plucked in a Civil Service examination because he
+happens to be one of the less fitted to pass, is no doubt an instance of
+failure so far as his own career is concerned; but it does not therefore
+follow that the system of examination is a failure in its final end of
+securing the best men for the Civil Service. And the fact that the
+general outcome of all the individual failures in Nature is that of
+securing what Mr. Alexander calls "the fair order of Nature," is
+assuredly evidence that the <i>modus operandi</i> has not been a failure in
+relation to what, if there be any Design in Nature at all, must be
+regarded as the higher purpose of such Design. Therefore, cases of
+individual or otherwise relative failure cannot be quoted as evidence
+against the hypothesis of there being such Design. The fact that the
+general system of natural causation has for its eventual result "a fair
+order of Nature," cannot of itself be a fact inimical to the hypothesis
+of Design in Nature, even though it be true that such causation entails
+the continual elimination of the less efficient types.</p>
+
+<p>'To the best of my judgement, then, this argument from failure, random
+trial, blind blundering, or in whatever other terminology the argument
+may be presented, is only valid as against the theory of what Mr.
+Alexander alludes to as a "Carpenter-God," i.e. that if there be Design
+in Nature at all, it must everywhere be <i>special</i> Design; so that the
+evidence of it may as well be tested by any given minute fragment of
+Nature&mdash;such as one individual organism or class of organisms&mdash;as by
+having regard to the whole Cosmos. The evidence of Design in this sense
+I fully allow has been totally destroyed by the proof of natural
+selection. But such destruction has only brought into clearer relief the
+much larger question that rises behind, viz. as before phrased, Is there
+anything about the method of natural causation, considered as a whole,
+that is inimical to the theory of Design in Nature, considered as a
+whole?'</p>
+
+<p class='tbrk'>It is true that this argument does not bear directly upon the
+<i>character</i> of the God whose 'design' Nature exhibits: but indirectly it
+does<a name="FNanchor_33_33" id="FNanchor_33_33"></a><a href="#Footnote_33_33" class="fnanchor">[33]</a>. For instance, such an argument as that found above (on p. 79:
+'we see a rabbit, &amp;c.') seems to be only valid on the postulate here
+described as that of the 'Carpenter-God.'</p>
+
+<p>It is also probable that Romanes felt the difficulty arising from the
+cruelty of nature less, as he was led to dwell more on humanity as the
+most important part of nature, and perceived the function of suffering
+in the economy of human life (pp. 142, 154): and also as he became more
+impressed with the positive evidences for Christianity as at once the
+religion of sorrow and the revelation of God as Love (pp. 163, ff.). The
+Christian Faith supplies believers not only with an argument against
+pessimism from general results, but also with such an insight into the
+Divine character and method as enables them at least to bear hopefully
+the awful perplexities which arise from the spectacle of individuals
+suffering.</p>
+
+<p>In the last year or two of his life he read very attentively a great
+number of books on 'Christian Evidences,' from Pascal's <i>Pens&eacute;es</i>
+downwards, and studied carefully the appearance of 'plan' in the
+Biblical Revelation considered as a whole. The <i>fact</i> of this study
+appears in fragmentary remarks, indices and references, which George
+Romanes left behind him in note-books. The <i>results</i> of it will not be
+unapparent in the following Notes, which, I need to remind my readers,
+are, in spite of their small bulk, the sole reason for the existence of
+this volume.</p>
+
+<p>In reading these I can hardly conceive any one not being possessed with
+a profound regret that the author was not allowed to complete his work.
+And it is only fair to ask every reader of the following pages to
+remember that he is reading, in the main, incomplete notes and not
+finished work. This will account for a great deal that may seem sketchy
+and unsatisfactory in the treatment of different points, and also for
+repetitions and traces of inconsistency. But I can hardly think any one
+can read these notes to the end without agreeing with me that if I had
+withheld them from publication, the world would have lost the witness of
+a mind, both able and profoundly sincere, feeling after God and finding
+Him.</p>
+
+<p class='right'>C.G.</p>
+
+<div class="footnotes"><h3>FOOTNOTES:</h3>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_31_31" id="Footnote_31_31"></a><a href="#FNanchor_31_31"><span class="label">[31]</span></a> See <a href="#fact">below</a>, and note. I find also the following note
+of a date subsequent to 1889. 'It is a fact that pessimism is illogical,
+simply because we are inadequate judges of the world, and pessimism
+would therefore be opposed to agnosticism. We may know that there is
+something out of joint between the world and ourselves; but we cannot
+know how far this is the fault of the world or of ourselves.'</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_32_32" id="Footnote_32_32"></a><a href="#FNanchor_32_32"><span class="label">[32]</span></a> <i>Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society</i> (Williams &amp;
+Norgate), vol. i. no. 3, pp. 72, 73.</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_33_33" id="Footnote_33_33"></a><a href="#FNanchor_33_33"><span class="label">[33]</span></a> I ought also to mention that Romanes on the Sunday before
+his death expressed to me verbally his entire agreement with the
+argument of Professor Knight's <i>Aspects of Theism</i> (Macmillan, 1893); in
+which on this subject see pp. 184-186, 'A larger good is evolved through
+the winnowing process by which physical nature casts its weaker products
+aside,' &amp;c.</p></div>
+</div>
+
+<hr />
+<h2><a name="NOTES_FOR_A_WORK" id="NOTES_FOR_A_WORK"></a>NOTES FOR A WORK ON A CANDID EXAMINATION OF RELIGION.</h2>
+
+<h3><span class="smcap">By</span> METAPHYSICUS.</h3>
+
+
+<h3><i>Proposed Mottoes</i>.</h3>
+
+<blockquote><p>'I quite admit the difficulty of believing that in every man there
+is an eye of the soul which, when by other pursuits lost and
+dimmed, is by this purified and re-illumined; and is more precious
+far than ten thousand bodily eyes, for by this alone is truth seen.
+Now there are two classes of persons, one class who will agree with
+you and will take your words as a revelation; another class who
+have no understanding of them and to whom they will naturally be as
+idle tales.</p>
+
+<p>'And you had better decide at once with which of the two you are
+arguing; or, perhaps, you will say with neither, and that your
+chief aim in carrying on the argument is your own improvement; at
+the same time not grudging to either any benefit which they may
+derive.'&mdash;<span class="smcap">Plato.</span></p>
+
+<p>'If we would reprove with success, and show another his mistake, we
+must see from what side he views the matter, for on that side it is
+generally true: and, admitting this truth, show him the side on
+which it is false.'&mdash;<span class="smcap">Pascal.</span></p></blockquote>
+
+<hr />
+<h3><a name="Introductory" id="Introductory"></a>&sect; 1. <span class="smcap">Introductory.</span></h3>
+
+<p>Many years ago I published in Messrs. Tr&uuml;bner's 'Philosophical Series,'
+a short treatise entitled <i>A Candid Examination of Theism</i> by
+'Physicus.' Although the book made some stir at the time, and has since
+exhibited a vitality never anticipated by its author, the secret of its
+authorship has been well preserved<a name="FNanchor_34_34" id="FNanchor_34_34"></a><a href="#Footnote_34_34" class="fnanchor">[34]</a>. This secret it is my intention,
+if possible, still to preserve; but as it is desirable (on several
+accounts which will become apparent in the following pages) to avow
+identity of authorship, the present essay appears under the same
+pseudonym<a name="FNanchor_35_35" id="FNanchor_35_35"></a><a href="#Footnote_35_35" class="fnanchor">[35]</a> as its predecessor. The reason why the first essay
+appeared anonymously is truthfully stated in the preface thereof, viz.
+in order that the reasoning should be judged on its own merits, without
+the bias which is apt to arise on the part of a reader from a knowledge
+of the authority&mdash;or absence of authority&mdash;on the part of a writer. This
+reason, in my opinion, still holds good as regards <i>A Candid Examination
+of Theism</i>, and applies in equal measure to the present sequel in <i>A
+Candid Examination of Religion</i>.</p>
+
+<p>It will be shown that in many respects the negative conclusions reached
+in the former essay have been greatly modified by the results of maturer
+thought as now presented in the second. Therefore it seems desirable to
+state at the outset that, as far as I am capable of judging, the
+modifications in question have not been due in any measure to influence
+from without. They appear to have been due exclusively to the results of
+my own further thought, as briefly set out in the following pages, with
+no indebtedness to private friends and but little to published
+utterances in the form of books, &amp;c. Nevertheless, no very original
+ideas are here presented. Indeed, I suppose it would nowadays be
+impossible to present any idea touching religion, which has not at some
+time or another been presented previously. Still much may be done in the
+furthering of one's thought by changing points of view, selecting and
+arranging ideas already more or less familiar, so that they may be built
+into new combinations; and this, I think, I have in no small degree
+accomplished as regards the microcosm of my own mind. But I state this
+much only for the sake of adding a confession that, as far as
+introspection can carry one, it does not appear to me that the
+modifications which my views have undergone since the publication of my
+previous <i>Candid Examination</i> are due so much to purely logical
+processes of the intellect, as to the sub-conscious (and therefore more
+or less unanalyzable) influences due to the ripening experience of life.
+The extent to which this is true [i.e. the extent to which experience
+modifies logic]<a name="FNanchor_36_36" id="FNanchor_36_36"></a><a href="#Footnote_36_36" class="fnanchor">[36]</a> is seldom, if ever, realized, although it is
+practically exemplified every day by the sobering caution which
+advancing age exercises upon the mind. Not so much by any above-board
+play of syllogism as by some underhand cheating of consciousness, do the
+accumulating experiences of life and of thought slowly enrich the
+judgement. And this, one need hardly say, is especially true in such
+regions of thought as present the most tenuous media for the progress of
+thought by the comparatively clumsy means of syllogistic locomotion. For
+the further we ascend from the solid ground of verification, the less
+confidence should we place in our wings of speculation, while the more
+do we find the practical wisdom of such intellectual caution, or
+distrust of ratiocination, as can be given only by experience.
+Therefore, most of all is this the case in those departments of thought
+which are furthest from the region of our sensuous life&mdash;viz.
+metaphysics and religion. And, as a matter of fact, it is just in these
+departments of thought that we find the rashness of youth most amenable
+to the discipline in question by the experience of age.</p>
+
+<p>However, in spite of this confession, I have no doubt that even in the
+matter of pure and conscious reason further thought has enabled me to
+detect serious errors, or rather oversights, in the very foundations of
+my <i>Candid Examination of Theism</i>. I still think, indeed, that from the
+premises there laid down the conclusions result in due logical sequence,
+so that, as a matter of mere ratiocination, I am not likely ever to
+detect any serious flaws, especially as this has not been done by
+anybody else during the many years of its existence. But I now clearly
+perceive two wellnigh fatal oversights which I then committed. The first
+was undue confidence in merely syllogistic conclusions, even when
+derived from sound premises, in regions of such high abstraction. The
+second was, in not being sufficiently careful in examining the
+foundations of my criticism, i.e. the validity of its premises. I will
+here briefly consider these two points separately.</p>
+
+<p>As regards the first point, never was any one more arrogant in his
+claims for pure reason than I was&mdash;more arrogant in spirit though not in
+letter, this being due to contact with science; without ever considering
+how opposed to reason itself is the unexpressed assumption of my earlier
+argument as to God Himself, as if His existence were a merely physical
+problem to be solved by man's reason alone, without reference to his
+other and higher faculties<a name="FNanchor_37_37" id="FNanchor_37_37"></a><a href="#Footnote_37_37" class="fnanchor">[37]</a>.</p>
+
+<p>The second point is of still more importance, because so seldom, if
+ever, recognized.</p>
+
+<p>At the time of writing the <i>Candid Examination</i> I perceived clearly how
+the whole question of Theism from the side of reason turned on the
+question as to the nature of natural causation. My theory of natural
+causation obeyed the Law of Parsimony, resolving all into Being as such;
+but, on the other hand, it erred in not considering whether 'higher
+causes' are not 'necessary' to account for spiritual facts&mdash;i.e. whether
+the ultimate Being must not be at least as high as the intellectual and
+spiritual nature of man, i.e. higher than anything merely physical or
+mechanical. The supposition that it must does not violate the Law of
+Parsimony.</p>
+
+<p>Pure agnostics ought to investigate the religious consciousness of
+Christians as a phenomenon which may possibly be what Christians
+themselves believe it to be, i.e. of Divine origin. And this may be done
+without entering into any question as to the objective validity of
+Christian dogmas. The metaphysics of Christianity may be all false in
+fact, and yet the spirit of Christianity may be true in substance&mdash;i.e.
+it may be the highest 'good gift from above' as yet given to man.</p>
+
+<p>My present object, then, like that of Socrates, is not to impart any
+philosophical system, or even positive knowledge, but a frame of mind,
+what I may term, pure agnosticism, as distinguished from what is
+commonly so called.</p>
+
+<div class="footnotes"><h3>FOOTNOTES:</h3>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_34_34" id="Footnote_34_34"></a><a href="#FNanchor_34_34"><span class="label">[34]</span></a> The first edition, which was published in 1878, was
+rapidly exhausted, but, as my object in publishing was solely that of
+soliciting criticism for my own benefit, I arranged with the publishers
+not to issue any further edition. The work has therefore been out of
+print for many years.
+</p><p>
+[This 'arrangement' was however not actually made, or at least was
+unknown to the present publishing firm of Kegan Paul, Trench, Tr&uuml;bner &amp;
+Co. Thus a new edition of the book was published in 1892, to the
+author's surprise.&mdash;<span class="smcap">Ed.</span>]</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_35_35" id="Footnote_35_35"></a><a href="#FNanchor_35_35"><span class="label">[35]</span></a> [Or rather it was intended that it should appear under the
+pseudonym of 'Metaphysicus.'&mdash;<span class="smcap">Ed.</span>]</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_36_36" id="Footnote_36_36"></a><a href="#FNanchor_36_36"><span class="label">[36]</span></a> [Words in square brackets have been added by me. But I
+have not introduced the brackets when I have simply inserted single
+unimportant words obviously necessary for the sense.&mdash;<span class="smcap">Ed.</span>]</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_37_37" id="Footnote_37_37"></a><a href="#FNanchor_37_37"><span class="label">[37]</span></a> [See p. 29, quotation from Preface of 'Physicus.' The
+state of mind expressed in the above Note is a return to the earlier
+frame of mind of the Burney Essay, e.g. p. 20. That essay was full of
+the thought that Christian evidences are very manifold and largely
+'extra-scientific.'&mdash;<span class="smcap">Ed.</span>]</p></div>
+</div>
+
+<hr />
+<h3><a name="Definition_of_Terms_and_Purpose_of_this_Treatise" id="Definition_of_Terms_and_Purpose_of_this_Treatise"></a>&sect; 2. <span class="smcap">Definition of Terms and Purpose of this Treatise.</span></h3>
+
+<p>[To understand George Romanes' mind close attention must be paid to the
+following section. Also to the fact, not explicitly noticed by him, that
+he uses the word 'reason' (<a href="#reason">here</a>) in a sense closely resembling
+that in which Mr. Kidd has recently used it in his <i>Social Evolution</i>.
+He uses it, that is, in a restricted sense as equivalent to <i>the process
+of scientific ratiocination</i>. His main position is therefore this:
+Scientific ratiocination cannot find adequate grounds for belief in God.
+But the pure agnostic must recognize that God may have revealed Himself
+by other means than that of scientific ratiocination. As religion is for
+the whole man, so all human faculties may be required to seek after God
+and find Him&mdash;emotions and experiences of an extra-'rational' kind. The
+'pure agnostic' must be prepared to welcome evidence of all
+sorts.&mdash;<span class="smcap">Ed.</span>]</p>
+
+<p>It is desirable to be clear at the outset as to the meaning which I
+shall throughout attach to certain terms and phrases.</p>
+
+
+<h3><i>Theism.</i></h3>
+
+<p>It will frequently be said, 'on the theory of Theism,' 'supposing Theism
+true,' &amp;c. By such phrase my meaning will always be equivalent
+to&mdash;'supposing, for the sake of argument, that the nearest approach
+which the human mind can make to a true notion of the <i>ens realissimum</i>,
+is that of an inconceivably magnified image of itself at its best.'</p>
+
+
+<h3><i>Christianity.</i></h3>
+
+<p>Similarly, when it is said, 'supposing Christianity true,' what will be
+meant is&mdash;'supposing for the sake of argument, that the Christian system
+as a whole, from its earliest dawn in Judaism, to the phase of its
+development at the present time, is the highest revelation of Himself
+which a personal Deity has vouchsafed to mankind.' This I intend to
+signify an attitude of pure agnosticism as regards any particular dogma
+of Christianity&mdash;even that of the Incarnation.</p>
+
+<p>Should it be said that by holding in suspense any distinctive dogma of
+Christianity, I am not considering Christianity at all, I reply, Not so;
+I am not writing a theological, but a philosophical treatise, and shall
+consider Christianity merely as one of many religions, though, of
+course, the latest, &amp;c. Thus considered, Christianity takes its place as
+the highest manifestation of evolution in this department of the human
+mind; but I am not concerned even with so important an ecclesiastical
+dogma as that of the Incarnation of God in Christ. As far as this
+treatise has to go, that dogma may or may not be true. The important
+question for us is, Has God spoken through the medium of our religious
+instincts? And although this will necessarily involve the question
+whether or how far in the case of Christianity there is objective
+evidence of His having spoken by the mouth of holy men [of the Old
+Testament] which have been since the world began, such will be the case
+only because it is a question of objective evidence whether or how far
+the religious instincts of these men, or this race of men, have been so
+much superior to those of other men, or races of men, as to have enabled
+them to predict future events of a religious character. And whether or
+not in these latter days God has spoken by His own Son is not a question
+for us, further than to investigate the higher class of religious
+phenomena which unquestionably have been present in the advent and
+person of Jesus. The question whether Jesus was the Son of God, is,
+logically speaking, a question of ontology, which, <i>qu&acirc;</i> pure agnostics,
+we are logically forbidden to touch.</p>
+
+<p>But elsewhere I ought to show that, from my point of view as to the
+fundamental question being whether God has spoken at all through the
+religious instincts of mankind, it may very well be that Christ was not
+God, and yet that He gave the highest revelation of God. If the 'first
+Man' was allegorical, why not the 'second'? It is, indeed, an historical
+fact that the 'second Man' existed, but so likewise may the 'first.'
+And, as regards the 'personal claims' of Christ, all that He said is not
+incompatible with His having been Gabriel, and His Holy Ghost,
+Michael<a name="FNanchor_38_38" id="FNanchor_38_38"></a><a href="#Footnote_38_38" class="fnanchor">[38]</a>. Or He may have been a man deceived as to His own
+personality, and yet the vehicle of highest inspiration.</p>
+
+
+<h3><i>Religion.</i></h3>
+
+<p>By the term 'religion,' I shall mean any theory of personal agency in
+the universe, belief in which is strong enough in any degree to
+influence conduct. No term has been used more loosely of late years, or
+in a greater variety of meanings. Of course anybody may use it in any
+sense he pleases, provided he defines exactly in what sense he does so.
+The above seems to be most in accordance with traditional usage.</p>
+
+
+<h3><a name="pure" id="pure"></a><i>Agnosticism 'pure' and 'impure'.</i></h3>
+
+<p>The modern and highly convenient term 'Agnosticism,' is used in two very
+different senses. By its originator, Professor Huxley, it was coined to
+signify an attitude of reasoned ignorance touching everything that lies
+beyond the sphere of sense-perception&mdash;a professed inability to found
+valid belief on any other basis. It is in this its original sense&mdash;and
+also, in my opinion, its only philosophically justifiable sense&mdash;that I
+shall understand the term. But the other, and perhaps more popular sense
+in which the word is now employed, is as the correlative of Mr. H.
+Spencer's doctrine of the Unknowable.</p>
+
+<p>This latter term is philosophically erroneous, implying important
+negative knowledge that if there be a God we know this much about
+Him&mdash;that He <i>cannot</i> reveal Himself to man<a name="FNanchor_39_39" id="FNanchor_39_39"></a><a href="#Footnote_39_39" class="fnanchor">[39]</a>. <i>Pure</i> agnosticism is
+as defined by Huxley.</p>
+
+<p>Of all the many scientific men whom I have known, the most pure in his
+agnosticism&mdash;not only in profession but in spirit and conduct&mdash;was
+Darwin. (What he says in his autobiography about Christianity<a name="FNanchor_40_40" id="FNanchor_40_40"></a><a href="#Footnote_40_40" class="fnanchor">[40]</a> shows
+no profundity of thought in the direction of philosophy or religion. His
+mind was too purely inductive for this. But, on this very account, it is
+the more remarkable that his rejection of Christianity was due, not to
+any <i>a priori</i> bias against the creed on grounds of reason as absurd,
+but solely on the ground of an apparent moral objection <i>a
+posteriori</i><a name="FNanchor_41_41" id="FNanchor_41_41"></a><a href="#Footnote_41_41" class="fnanchor">[41]</a>.) Faraday and many other first-rate originators in
+science were like Darwin.</p>
+
+<p>As an illustration of impure agnosticism take Hume's <i>a priori</i> argument
+against miracles, leading on to the analogous case of the attitude of
+scientific men towards modern spiritualism. Notwithstanding that they
+have the close analogy of mesmerism as an object-lesson to warn them,
+scientific men as a class are here quite as dogmatic as the straightest
+sect of theologians. I may give examples which can cause no offence,
+inasmuch as the men in question have themselves made the facts public,
+viz. &mdash;&mdash; refusing to go to [a famous spiritualist]; &mdash;&mdash; refusing to
+try &mdash;&mdash; in thought-reading<a name="FNanchor_42_42" id="FNanchor_42_42"></a><a href="#Footnote_42_42" class="fnanchor">[42]</a>. These men all <i>professed</i> to be
+agnostics at the very time when thus so egregiously violating their
+philosophy by their conduct.</p>
+
+<p>Of course I do not mean to say that, even to a pure agnostic, reason
+should not be guided in part by antecedent presumption&mdash;e.g. in ordinary
+life, the <i>prima facie</i> case, motive, &amp;c., counts for evidence in a
+court of law&mdash;and where there is a strong antecedent improbability a
+proportionately greater weight of evidence <i>a posteriori</i> is needed to
+counterbalance it: so that, e.g. better evidence would be needed to
+convict the Archbishop of Canterbury than a vagabond of pocket-picking.
+And so it is with speculative philosophy. But in both cases our only
+guide is known analogy; therefore, the further we are removed from
+possible experience&mdash;i.e. the more remote from experience the sphere
+contemplated&mdash;the less value attaches to antecedent presumptions<a name="FNanchor_43_43" id="FNanchor_43_43"></a><a href="#Footnote_43_43" class="fnanchor">[43]</a>.
+<i>Maximum</i> remoteness from possible experience is reached in the sphere
+of the final mystery of things with which religion has to do; so that
+here all presumption has faded away into a vanishing point, and pure
+agnosticism is our only rational attitude. In other words, here we
+should all alike be pure agnostics as far as reason is concerned; and,
+if any of us are to attain to any information, it can only be by means
+of some super-added faculty of our minds. The questions as to whether
+there are any such super-added faculties; if so, whether they ever
+appear to have been acted upon from without; if they have, in what
+manner they have; what is their report; how far they are trustworthy in
+that report, and so on&mdash;these are the questions with which this treatise
+is to be mainly concerned.</p>
+
+<p>My own attitude may be here stated. I do not claim any [religious]
+certainty of an intuitive kind myself; but am nevertheless able to
+investigate the abstract logic of the matter. And, although this may
+seem but barren dialectic, it may, I hope, be of practical service if it
+secures a fair hearing to the reports given by the vast majority of
+mankind who unquestionably believe them to emanate from some such
+super-added faculties&mdash;numerous and diverse though their religions be.
+Besides, in my youth I published an essay (the <i>Candid Examination</i>)
+which excited a good deal of interest at the time, and has been long out
+of print. In that treatise I have since come to see that I was wrong
+touching what I constituted the basal argument for my negative
+conclusion. Therefore I now feel it obligatory on me to publish the
+following results of my maturer thought, from the same stand-point of
+pure reason. Even though I have obtained no further light from the side
+of intuition, I have from that of intellect. So that, if there be in
+truth any such intuition, I occupy with regard to the organ of it the
+same position as that of the blind lecturer on optics. But on this very
+account I cannot be accused of partiality towards it.</p>
+
+<p>It is generally assumed that when a man has clearly perceived
+agnosticism to be the only legitimate attitude of reason to rest in with
+regard to religion (as I will subsequently show that it is), he has
+thereby finished with the matter; he can go no further. The main object
+of this treatise is to show that such is by no means the case. He has
+then only begun his enquiry into the grounds and justification of
+religious belief. <a name="reason" id="reason"></a>For reason is not the only attribute of man, nor is it
+the only faculty which he habitually employs for the ascertainment of
+truth. Moral and spiritual faculties are of no less importance in their
+respective spheres even of everyday life; faith, trust, taste, &amp;c., are
+as needful in ascertaining truth as to character, beauty, &amp;c., as is
+reason. Indeed we may take it that reason is concerned in ascertaining
+truth only where <i>causation</i> is concerned; the appropriate organs for
+its ascertainment where anything else is concerned belong to the moral
+and spiritual region.</p>
+
+<p class='tbrk'>As Herbert Spencer says, 'men of science may be divided into two
+classes, of which the one, well exemplified by Faraday, keeping their
+religion and their science absolutely separate, are unperplexed by any
+incongruities between them, and the other of which, occupying themselves
+exclusively with the facts of science, never ask what implications they
+have. Be it trilobite or be it double star, their thought about it is
+much like the thought of Peter Bell about the primrose<a name="FNanchor_44_44" id="FNanchor_44_44"></a><a href="#Footnote_44_44" class="fnanchor">[44]</a>.' Now, both
+these classes are logical, since both, as to their religion, adopt an
+attitude of pure agnosticism, not only in theory, but also in practice.
+What, however, have we to say of the third class, which Spencer does
+not mention, although it is, I think, the largest, viz. of those
+scientific men who expressly abstain from drawing a line of division
+between science and religion [and then judge of religion purely on the
+principles and by the method of science<a name="FNanchor_45_45" id="FNanchor_45_45"></a><a href="#Footnote_45_45" class="fnanchor">[45]</a>]?</p>
+
+<p class='tbrk'>There are two opposite casts of mind&mdash;the mechanical (scientific, &amp;c.)
+and the spiritual (artistic, religious, &amp;c.). These may alternate even
+in the same individual. An 'agnostic' has no hesitation&mdash;even though he
+himself keenly experience the latter&mdash;that the former only is worthy of
+trust. But a <i>pure</i> agnostic must know better, as he will perceive that
+there is nothing to choose between the two in point of trustworthiness.
+Indeed, if choice has to be made the mystic might claim higher authority
+for his direct intuitions.</p>
+
+<p class='tbrk'>Mr. Herbert Spencer has well said, in the opening section of his
+Synthetic Philosophy, that wherever human thought appears to be
+radically divided, [there must be truth on both sides and that the]
+'reconciliation' of opposing views is to be found by emphasizing that
+ultimate element of truth which on each side underlies manifold
+differences. More than is generally supposed depends on points of view,
+especially where first principles of a subject are in dispute. Opposite
+sides of the same shield may present wholly different aspects<a name="FNanchor_46_46" id="FNanchor_46_46"></a><a href="#Footnote_46_46" class="fnanchor">[46]</a>.
+Spencer alludes to this with special reference to the conflict between
+science and religion; and it is in this same connexion that I also
+allude to it. For it seems to me, after many years of thought upon the
+subject, that the 'reconciliation' admits of being carried much further
+than it has been by him. For he effects this reconciliation only to the
+extent of showing that religion arises from the recognition of
+fundamental mystery&mdash;which it may be proved that science also recognizes
+in all her fundamental ideas. This, however, is after all little more
+than a platitude. That our ultimate scientific ideas (i.e. ultimate
+grounds of experience) are inexplicable, is a proposition which is
+self-evident since the dawn of human thought. My aim is to carry the
+'reconciliation' into much more detail and yet without quitting the
+grounds of pure reason. I intend to take science and religion in their
+present highly developed states as such, and show that on a systematic
+examination of the latter by the methods of the former, the 'conflict'
+between the two may be not merely 'reconciled' as regards the highest
+generalities of each, but entirely abolished in all matters of detail
+which can be regarded as of any great importance.</p>
+
+<p class='tbrk'>In any methodical enquiry the first object should be to ascertain the
+fundamental principles with which the enquiry is concerned. In actual
+research, however, it is by no means always the case that the enquirer
+knows, or is able at first to ascertain what those principles are. In
+fact, it is often only at the end of a research, that they are
+discovered to be the fundamental principles. Such has been my own
+experience with regard to the subject of the present enquiry. Although
+all my thinking life has been concerned, off and on, in contemplating
+the problem of our religious instincts, the sundry attempts which have
+been made by mankind for securing their gratification, and the important
+question as to their objective justification, it is only in advanced
+years that I have clearly perceived wherein the first principles of such
+a research must consist. And I doubt whether any one has hitherto
+clearly defined this point. The principles in question are the nature of
+causation and the nature of faith.</p>
+
+<p class='tbrk'>My objects then in this treatise are, mainly, three: 1st, to purify
+agnosticism; 2nd, to consider more fully than heretofore, and from the
+stand-point of pure agnosticism, the nature of natural causation, or,
+more correctly, the relation of what we know on the subject of such
+causation to the question of Theism; and, 3rd, again starting from the
+same stand-point, to consider the religious consciousnesses of men as
+phenomena of experience (i.e. as regarded by us from without), and
+especially in their highest phase of development as exhibited in
+Christianity.</p>
+
+<div class="footnotes"><h3>FOOTNOTES:</h3>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_38_38" id="Footnote_38_38"></a><a href="#FNanchor_38_38"><span class="label">[38]</span></a> [I.e. supernatural but not strictly Divine Persons.
+Surely, however, the proposition is not maintainable.&mdash;<span class="smcap">Ed.</span>]</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_39_39" id="Footnote_39_39"></a><a href="#FNanchor_39_39"><span class="label">[39]</span></a> [This is another instance of recurrence to an earlier
+thought; see Burney Essay, p. 25, and cf. <i>Mind and Motion and Monism</i>,
+p. 117, note 1.&mdash;<span class="smcap">Ed.</span>]</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_40_40" id="Footnote_40_40"></a><a href="#FNanchor_40_40"><span class="label">[40]</span></a> <i>Life and Letters of Charles Darwin</i>, i. 308.</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_41_41" id="Footnote_41_41"></a><a href="#FNanchor_41_41"><span class="label">[41]</span></a> [See further, <a href="#darwin">here</a>.&mdash;<span class="smcap">Ed.</span>]</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_42_42" id="Footnote_42_42"></a><a href="#FNanchor_42_42"><span class="label">[42]</span></a> [On the whole I have thought it best to omit the
+names.&mdash;<span class="smcap">Ed.</span>]</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_43_43" id="Footnote_43_43"></a><a href="#FNanchor_43_43"><span class="label">[43]</span></a> [The MS. note here continues: 'Here introduce all that I
+say on the subject in my Burney Prize.' I have not, however, introduced
+any quotation into the text because (1) I think Romanes makes his
+meaning plain in the text as it stands; (2) I cannot find in the essay
+in question any exactly appropriate passage of reasonable length to
+quote. The greater part of the essay is, however, directed to meet the
+scientific objection to the doctrine that prayer is answered in the
+physical region, by showing that this objection consists in an argument
+from the known to the unknown, i.e. from the known sphere of invariable
+physical laws to the unknown sphere of God's relation to all such laws;
+and is, therefore, weak in proportion as the unknown sphere is remote
+from possible experience of a scientific kind, and admits of an
+indefinite number of possibilities, more or less conceivable to our
+imagination, which would or might prevent the scientific argument from
+having legitimate application to the question in hand.&mdash;<span class="smcap">Ed.</span>]</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_44_44" id="Footnote_44_44"></a><a href="#FNanchor_44_44"><span class="label">[44]</span></a> <i>Fortnightly Review</i>, Feb. 1894.</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_45_45" id="Footnote_45_45"></a><a href="#FNanchor_45_45"><span class="label">[45]</span></a> [Some such phrase is necessary to complete the
+sentence.&mdash;<span class="smcap">Ed.</span>]</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_46_46" id="Footnote_46_46"></a><a href="#FNanchor_46_46"><span class="label">[46]</span></a> <i>First Principles</i>, Part I, ch. 1.</p></div>
+</div>
+
+<hr />
+<h3><a name="Causality" id="Causality"></a>&sect; 3. <span class="smcap">Causality.</span></h3>
+
+<p>Only because we are so familiar with the great phenomenon of causality
+do we take it for granted, and think that we reach an ultimate
+explanation of anything when we have succeeded in finding the 'cause'
+thereof: when, in point of fact, we have only succeeded in merging it in
+the mystery of mysteries. I often wish we could have come into the
+world, like the young of some other mammals, with all the powers of
+intellect that we shall ever subsequently attain already developed, but
+without any individual experience, and so without any of the blunting
+effects of custom. Could we have done so, surely nothing in the world
+would more acutely excite our intelligent astonishment than the one
+universal fact of causation. That everything which happens should have a
+cause, that this should invariably be proportioned to its effect, so
+that, no matter how complex the interaction of causes, the same
+interaction should always produce the same result; that this rigidly
+exact system of energizing should be found to present all the
+appearances of universality and of eternity, so that, e.g., the motion
+of the solar system in space is being determined by some causes beyond
+human ken, and that we are indebted to billions of cellular unions, each
+involving billions of separate causes, for our hereditary passage from
+an invertebrate ancestry,&mdash;that such things should be, would surely
+strike us as the most wonderful fact in this wonderful universe.</p>
+
+<p>Now, although familiarity with this fact has made us forget its wonder
+to the extent of virtually assuming that we know all about it,
+philosophical enquiry shows that, besides empirically knowing it to be a
+fact, we only know one other thing about it, viz.&mdash;that our knowledge of
+it is derived from our own activity when we ourselves are causes. No
+result of psychological analysis seems to me more certain than this<a name="FNanchor_47_47" id="FNanchor_47_47"></a><a href="#Footnote_47_47" class="fnanchor">[47]</a>.
+If it were not for our own volitions, we should be ignorant of what we
+can now not doubt, on pain of suicidal scepticism, to be the most
+general fact of nature. Such, at least, seems to me by far the most
+reasonable theory of our idea of causality, and is the one now most
+generally entertained by philosophers of every school.</p>
+
+<p>Now, to the plain man it will always seem that if our very notion of
+causality is derived from our own volition&mdash;as our very notion of energy
+is derived from our sense of effort in overcoming resistance by our
+volition&mdash;presumably the truest notion we can form of that in which
+causation objectively consists is the notion derived from that known
+mode of existence which alone gives us the notion of causality at all.
+Hence the plain man will always infer that all energy is of the nature
+of will-energy, and all objective causation of the nature of subjective.
+Nor is this inference confined to the plain man; the deepest
+philosophical thinkers have arrived at substantially the same opinion,
+e.g. Hegel, Schopenhauer. So that the direct and most natural
+interpretation of causality in external nature which is drawn by
+primitive thought in savages and young children, seems destined to
+become also the ultimate deliverance of human thought in the highest
+levels of its culture<a name="FNanchor_48_48" id="FNanchor_48_48"></a><a href="#Footnote_48_48" class="fnanchor">[48]</a>.</p>
+
+<p>But, be this as it may, we are not concerned with any such questions of
+abstract philosophical speculation. As pure agnostics they lie beyond
+our sphere. Therefore, I allude to them only for the sake of showing
+that there is nothing either in the science or philosophy of mankind
+inimical to the theory of natural causation being the energizing of a
+will objective to us. And we can plainly see that if such be the case,
+and if that will be self-consistent, its operations, as revealed in
+natural causation, must appear to us when considered <i>en bloc</i> (or not
+piece-meal as by savages), non-volitional, or mechanical.</p>
+
+<p>Of all philosophical theories of causality the most repugnant to reason
+must be those of Hume, Kant and Mill, which while differing from one
+another agree in this&mdash;that they attribute the principle of causality to
+a creation of our own minds, or in other words deny that there is
+anything objective in the relation of cause and effect&mdash;i.e. in the very
+thing which all physical science is engaged in discovering in particular
+cases of it.</p>
+
+<p class='tbrk'>The conflict of Science and Religion has always arisen from one common
+ground of agreement, or fundamental postulate of both parties&mdash;without
+which, indeed, it would plainly have been impossible that any conflict
+could have arisen, inasmuch as there would then have been no field for
+battle. Every thesis must rest on some hypothesis; therefore, in cases
+where two or more rival theses rest on a common hypothesis, the disputes
+must needs collapse so soon as the common hypothesis is proved
+erroneous. And proportionably, in whatever degree the previously common
+hypothesis is shown to be dubious, in that degree are the disputations
+shown to be possibly unreal. Now, it is one of the main objects of this
+treatise to show that the common hypothesis on which all the disputes
+between Science and Religion have arisen, is highly dubious. And not
+only so, but that quite apart from modern science all the difficulties
+on the side of intellect (or reason) which religious belief has ever
+encountered in the past, or can ever encounter in the future, whether
+in the individual or the race, arise, and arise exclusively, from the
+self-same ground of this highly dubious hypothesis.</p>
+
+<p>The hypothesis, or fundamental postulate, in question is, <i>If there be a
+personal God, He is not immediately concerned with natural causation</i>.
+It is assumed that <i>qua</i> 'first cause,' He can in no way be concerned
+with 'second causes,' further than by having started them in the first
+instance as a great machinery of 'natural causation,' working under
+'general laws.' True the theory of Deism, which entertains more or less
+expressly this hypothesis of 'Deus ex machina,' has during the present
+century been more and more superseded by that of Theism, which
+entertains also in some indefinable measure the doctrine of 'immanence';
+as well as by that of Pantheism, which expressly holds this doctrine to
+the exclusion <i>in toto</i> of its rival. But Theism has never yet
+entertained it sufficiently or up to the degree required by the pure
+logic of the case, while Pantheism has but rarely considered the rival
+doctrine of personality&mdash;or the possible union of immanence with
+personality.<a name="FNanchor_49_49" id="FNanchor_49_49"></a><a href="#Footnote_49_49" class="fnanchor">[49]</a></p>
+
+<p>Now it is the object of this book to go much further than any one has
+hitherto gone in proving the possibility of this union. For I purpose to
+show that, provided only we lay aside all prejudice, sentiment, &amp;c.,
+and follow to its logical termination the guidance of pure reason, there
+are no other conclusions to be reached than these. Namely, (<i>A</i>) That if
+there be a personal God, no reason can be assigned why He should not be
+immanent in nature, or why all causation should not be the immediate
+expression of His will. (<i>B</i>) That every available reason points to the
+inference that He probably is so. (<i>C</i>) That if He is so, and if His
+will is self-consistent, all natural causation must needs appear to us
+'mechanical.' Therefore (<i>D</i>) that it is no argument against the divine
+origin of a thing, event, &amp;c., to prove it due to natural causation.</p>
+
+<p>After having dealt briefly with (<i>A</i>), (<i>B</i>) and (<i>C</i>), I would show
+that (<i>D</i>) is the most practically important of these four conclusions.
+For the fundamental hypothesis which I began by mentioning is just the
+opposite of this. Whether tacitly or expressly, it has always been
+assumed by both sides in the controversy between Science and Religion,
+that as soon as this that and the other phenomenon has been explained by
+means of natural causation, it has thereupon ceased to be ascribable
+[directly] to God. The distinction between the natural and the
+supernatural has always been regarded by both sides as indisputably
+sound, and this fundamental agreement as to ground of battle has
+furnished the only possible condition to fighting. It has also furnished
+the condition of all the past, and may possibly furnish the condition of
+all the future, discomfitures of religion. True religion is indeed
+learning her lesson that something is wrong in her method of fighting,
+and many of her soldiers are now waking up to the fact that it is here
+that her error lies&mdash;as in past times they woke up to see the error of
+denying the movement of the earth, the antiquity of the earth, the
+origin of species by evolution, &amp;c. But no one, even of her captains and
+generals, has so far followed up their advantage to its ultimate
+consequences. And this is what I want to do. The logical advantage is
+clearly on their side; and it is their own fault if they do not gain the
+ultimate victory,&mdash;not only as against science, but as against
+intellectual dogmatism in every form. This can be routed all along the
+line. For science is only the organized study of natural causation, and
+the experience of every human being, in so far as it leads to dogmatism
+on purely intellectual grounds, does so on account of entertaining the
+fundamental postulate in question. The influence of custom and want of
+imagination is here very great. But the answer always should be to move
+the ulterior question&mdash;what is the nature of natural causation?</p>
+
+<p>Now I propose to push to its full logical conclusion the consequence of
+this answer. For no one, even the most orthodox, has as yet learnt this
+lesson of religion to anything like fullness. God is still grudged His
+own universe, so to speak, as far and as often as He can possibly be. As
+examples we may take the natural growth of Christianity out of previous
+religions; the natural spread of it; the natural conversion of St. Paul,
+or of anybody else. It is still assumed on both sides that there must
+be something inexplicable or miraculous about a phenomenon in order to
+its being divine.</p>
+
+<p>What else have science and religion ever had to fight about save on the
+basis of this common hypothesis, and hence as to whether the causation
+of such and such a phenomenon has been 'natural' or 'super-natural.' For
+even the disputes as to science contradicting scripture, ultimately turn
+on the assumption of inspiration (supposing it genuine) being
+'super-natural' as to its causation. Once grant that it is 'natural' and
+all possible ground of dispute is removed.</p>
+
+<p>I can well understand why infidelity should make the basal assumption in
+question, because its whole case must rest thereon. But surely it is
+time for theists to abandon this assumption.</p>
+
+<p>The assumed distinction between causation as natural and super-natural
+no doubt began in superstition in prehistoric time, and throughout the
+historical period has continued from a vague feeling that the action of
+God must be mysterious, and hence that the province of religion must be
+within the super-sensuous. Now, it is true enough that the finite cannot
+comprehend the infinite, and hence the feeling in question is logically
+sound. But under the influence of this feeling, men have always
+committed the fallacy of concluding that if a phenomenon has been
+explained in terms of natural causation, it has thereby been explained
+<i>in toto</i>&mdash;forgetting that it has only been explained up to the point
+where such causation is concerned, and that the real question of
+ultimate causation has merely been thus postponed. And assuredly beyond
+this point there is an infinitude of mystery sufficient to satisfy the
+most exacting mystic. For even Herbert Spencer allows that in ultimate
+analysis all natural causation is inexplicable.</p>
+
+<p>Logically regarded the advance of science, far from having weakened
+religion, has immeasurably strengthened it. For it has proved the
+uniformity of natural causation. The so-called natural sphere has
+increased at the expense of the 'super-natural.' Unquestionably. But
+although to lower grades of culture this always seems a fact inimical to
+religion, we may now perceive it is quite the reverse, since it merely
+goes to abolish the primitive or uncultured distinction in question.</p>
+
+<p>It is indeed most extraordinary how long this distinction has held sway,
+or how it is the ablest men of all generations have quietly assumed that
+when once we know the natural causation of any phenomenon, we therefore
+know all about it&mdash;or, as it were, have removed it from the sphere of
+mystery altogether, when, in point of fact, we have only merged it in a
+much greater mystery than ever.</p>
+
+<p>But the answer to our astonishment how this distinction has managed to
+survive so long lies in the extraordinary effect of custom, which here
+seems to slay reason altogether; and the more a man busies himself with
+natural causes (e.g. in scientific research) the greater does this
+slavery to custom become, till at last he seems positively unable to
+perceive the real state of the case&mdash;regarding any rational thinking
+thereon as chimerical, so that the term 'meta-physical,' even in its
+etymological sense as super-sensuous or beyond physical causation,
+becomes a term of rational reproach. Obviously such a man has written
+himself down, if not an ass, at all events a creature wholly incapable
+of rationally treating any of the highest problems presented either by
+nature or by man.</p>
+
+<p>On any logical theory of Theism there can be no such distinction between
+'natural' and 'supernatural' as is usually drawn, since on that theory
+all causation is but the action of the Divine Will. And if we draw any
+distinction between such action as 'immediate' or 'mediate,' we can only
+mean this as valid in relation to mankind&mdash;i.e. in relation to our
+experience. For, obviously, it would be wholly incompatible with pure
+agnosticism to suppose that we are capable of drawing any such
+distinction in relation to the Divine activity itself. Even apart from
+the theory of Theism, pure agnosticism must take it that the real
+distinction is not between natural and supernatural, but between the
+explicable and the inexplicable&mdash;meaning by those terms that which is
+and that which is not accountable by such causes as fall within the
+range of human observation. Or, in other words, the distinction is
+really between the observable and the unobservable causal processes of
+the universe.</p>
+
+<p>Although science is essentially engaged in explaining, her work is
+necessarily confined to the sphere of natural causation; beyond that
+sphere (i.e. the sensuous) she can explain nothing. In other words,
+even if she were able to explain the natural causation of everything,
+she would be unable to assign the ultimate <i>raison d'&ecirc;tre</i> of anything.</p>
+
+<p class='tbrk'>It is not my intention to write an essay on the nature of causality, or
+even to attempt a survey of the sundry theories which have been
+propounded on this subject by philosophers. Indeed, to attempt this
+would be little less than to write a history of philosophy itself.
+Nevertheless it is necessary for my purpose to make a few remarks
+touching the main branches of thought upon the matter<a name="FNanchor_50_50" id="FNanchor_50_50"></a><a href="#Footnote_50_50" class="fnanchor">[50]</a>.</p>
+
+<p><i>The remarkable nature of the facts.</i> These are remarkable, since they
+are common to all human experience. Everything that <i>happens</i> has a
+cause. The same happening has always the same cause&mdash;or the same
+consequent the same antecedent. It is only familiarity with this great
+fact that prevents universal wonder at it, for, notwithstanding all the
+theories upon it, no one has ever really shown why it is so. That the
+same causes always produce the same effects is a proposition which
+expresses a fundamental fact of our knowledge, but the knowledge of this
+fact is purely empirical; we can show no reason why it should be a fact.
+Doubtless, if it were not a fact, there could be no so-called 'Order of
+Nature,' and consequently no science, no philosophy, or perhaps (if the
+irregularity were sufficiently frequent) no possibility of human
+experience. But although this is easy enough to show, it in no wise
+tends to show why the same causes should always produce the same
+effects.</p>
+
+<p>So manifest is it that our knowledge of the fact in question is only
+empirical, that some of our ablest thinkers, such as Hume and Mill, have
+failed to perceive even so much as the intellectual necessity of looking
+beyond our empirical knowledge of the fact to gain any explanation of
+the fact itself. Therefore they give to the world the wholly vacuous, or
+merely tautological theory of causation&mdash;viz. that of constancy of
+sequence within human observation<a name="FNanchor_51_51" id="FNanchor_51_51"></a><a href="#Footnote_51_51" class="fnanchor">[51]</a>.</p>
+
+<p class='tbrk'>If it be said of my argument touching causality, that it is naturalizing
+or materializing the super-natural or spiritual (as most orthodox
+persons will feel), my reply is that deeper thought will show it to be
+at least as susceptible of the opposite view&mdash;viz. that it is subsuming
+the natural into the super-natural, or spiritualizing the material: and
+a pure agnostic, least of all, should have anything to say as against
+either of these alternative points of view. Or we may state the matter
+thus: in as far as pure reason can have anything to say in the matter,
+she ought to incline towards the view of my doctrine spiritualizing the
+material, because it is pretty certain that we could know nothing about
+natural causation&mdash;even so much as its existence&mdash;but for our own
+volitions.</p>
+
+
+<h3><i>Free Will</i><a name="FNanchor_52_52" id="FNanchor_52_52"></a><a href="#Footnote_52_52" class="fnanchor">[52]</a>.</h3>
+
+<p>Having read all that is said to be worth reading on the Free Will
+controversy, it appears to me that the main issues and their logical
+conclusions admit of being summed up in a very few words, thus:&mdash;</p>
+
+<p>1. A writer, before he undertakes to deal with this subject at all,
+should be conscious of fully perceiving the fundamental distinction
+between responsibility as merely legal and as also moral; otherwise he
+cannot but miss the very essence of the question in debate. No one
+questions the patent fact of responsibility as legal; the only question
+is touching responsibility as moral. Yet the principal bulk of
+literature on Free Will and Necessity arises from disputants on both
+sides failing to perceive this basal distinction. Even such able writers
+as Spencer, Huxley and Clifford are in this position.</p>
+
+<p>2. The root question is as to whether the will is caused or un-caused.
+For however much this root-question may be obscured by its own abundant
+foliage, the latter can have no existence but that which it derives
+from the former.</p>
+
+<p>3. Consequently, if libertarians grant causality as appertaining to the
+will, however much they may beat about the bush, they are surrendering
+their position all along the line, unless they fall back upon the more
+ultimate question as to the nature of natural causation. Now it can be
+proved that this more ultimate question is [scientifically]
+unanswerable. Therefore both sides may denominate natural causation
+<i>x</i>&mdash;an unknown quantity.</p>
+
+<p>4. Hence the whole controversy ought to be seen by both sides to resolve
+itself into this&mdash;is or is not the will determined by <i>x</i>? And, if this
+seems but a barren question to debate, I do not undertake to deny the
+fact. At the same time there is clearly this real issue remaining&mdash;viz.
+Is the will self-determining, or is it determined&mdash;i.e. <i>from without</i>?</p>
+
+<p>5. If determined from without, is there any room for freedom, in the
+sense required for saving the doctrine of moral responsibility? And I
+think the answer to this must be an unconditional negative.</p>
+
+<p>6. But, observe, it is not one and the same thing to ask, Is the will
+entirely determined from without? and Is the will entirely determined by
+natural causation (<i>x</i>)? For the unknown quantity <i>x</i> may very well
+include <i>x'</i>, if by <i>x'</i> we understand all the unknown ingredients of
+personality.</p>
+
+<p>7. Hence, determinists gain no advantage over their adversaries by any
+possible proof (at present impossible) that all acts of will are due to
+natural causation, unless they can show the nature of the latter, and
+that it is of such a nature as supports their conclusion. For aught we
+at present know, the will may very well be free in the sense required,
+even though all its acts are due to <i>x</i>.</p>
+
+<p>8. In particular, for aught we know to the contrary, all may be due to
+<i>x'</i>, i.e. all causation may be of the nature of will (as, indeed, many
+systems of philosophy maintain), with the result that every human will
+is of the nature of a First Cause. In support of which possibility it
+may be remarked that most philosophies are led to the theory of a <i>causa
+causarum</i> as regards <i>x</i>.</p>
+
+<p>9. To the obvious objection that with a plurality of first causes&mdash;each
+the <i>fons et origo</i> of a new and never-ending stream of causality&mdash;the
+cosmos must sooner or later become a chaos by cumulative intersection of
+the streams, the answer is to be found in the theory of monism<a name="FNanchor_53_53" id="FNanchor_53_53"></a><a href="#Footnote_53_53" class="fnanchor">[53]</a>.</p>
+
+<p>10. Nevertheless, the ultimate difficulty remains which is depicted in
+my essay on the 'World as an Eject<a name="FNanchor_54_54" id="FNanchor_54_54"></a><a href="#Footnote_54_54" class="fnanchor">[54]</a>.' But this, again, is merged in
+the mystery of Personality, which is only known as an inexplicable, and
+seemingly ultimate, fact.</p>
+
+<p>11. So that the general conclusion of the whole matter must be&mdash;pure
+agnosticism.</p>
+
+<div class="footnotes"><h3>FOOTNOTES:</h3>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_47_47" id="Footnote_47_47"></a><a href="#FNanchor_47_47"><span class="label">[47]</span></a> [Here it was intended to insert further explanation
+'showing that mere observation of causality in external nature would not
+have yielded idea of anything further than time and space
+relations.'&mdash;<span class="smcap">Ed.</span>]</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_48_48" id="Footnote_48_48"></a><a href="#FNanchor_48_48"><span class="label">[48]</span></a> [This theory was suggested in the Burney Essay, p. 136,
+and ridiculed in the <i>Candid Examination</i>; see <a href="#ridiculed">here</a>. Romanes
+intended at this point to consider at greater length his old views 'on
+causation as due to being <i>qua</i> being.'&mdash;<span class="smcap">Ed.</span>]</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_49_49" id="Footnote_49_49"></a><a href="#FNanchor_49_49"><span class="label">[49]</span></a> See, however, Aubrey Moore in <i>Lux Mundi</i>, pp. 94-96, and
+Le Conte, <i>Evolution in its Relation to Religious Thought</i>, pp. 335, ff.
+[N.B. The references not enclosed in brackets are the author's, not
+mine.&mdash;<span class="smcap">Ed.</span>]</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_50_50" id="Footnote_50_50"></a><a href="#FNanchor_50_50"><span class="label">[50]</span></a> [Nothing more however was written than what follows
+immediately.&mdash;<span class="smcap">Ed.</span>]</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_51_51" id="Footnote_51_51"></a><a href="#FNanchor_51_51"><span class="label">[51]</span></a> [The author intended further to show the vacuity of this
+theory and point out how Mill himself appears to perceive it by his
+introduction after the term 'invariably' of the term 'unconditionally';
+he refers also to Martineau, <i>Study of Religion</i>, i. pp. 152,
+3.&mdash;<span class="smcap">Ed.</span>]</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_52_52" id="Footnote_52_52"></a><a href="#FNanchor_52_52"><span class="label">[52]</span></a> [Romanes' thoughts about Free Will are more lucidly
+expressed in an essay published subsequently to these Notes in <i>Mind and
+Motion and Monism</i>, pp. 129 ff.&mdash;<span class="smcap">Ed.</span>]</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_53_53" id="Footnote_53_53"></a><a href="#FNanchor_53_53"><span class="label">[53]</span></a> [See <a href="#monism">here</a>.&mdash;<span class="smcap">Ed.</span>]</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_54_54" id="Footnote_54_54"></a><a href="#FNanchor_54_54"><span class="label">[54]</span></a> <i>Contemporary Review</i>, July 1886. [But the 'ultimate
+difficulty' referred to above would seem to be the relation of manifold
+dependent human wills to the One Ultimate and All-embracing
+Will.&mdash;<span class="smcap">Ed.</span>]</p></div>
+</div>
+
+<hr />
+<h3><a name="Faith" id="Faith"></a>&sect; 4. <span class="smcap">Faith.</span></h3>
+
+<p>Faith in its religious sense is distinguished not only from opinion (or
+belief founded on reason alone), in that it contains a spiritual
+element: it is further distinguished from belief founded on the
+affections, by needing an active co-operation of the will. Thus all
+parts of the human mind have to be involved in faith&mdash;intellect,
+emotions, will. We 'believe' in the theory of evolution on grounds of
+reason alone; we 'believe' in the affection of our parents, children,
+&amp;c., almost (or it may be exclusively) on what I have called spiritual
+grounds&mdash;i.e. on grounds of spiritual experience; for this we need no
+exercise either of reason or of will. But no one can 'believe' in God,
+or <i>a fortiori</i> in Christ, without also a severe effort of will. This I
+hold to be a matter of fact, whether or not there be a God or a Christ.</p>
+
+<p>Observe will is to be distinguished from desire. It matters not what
+psychologists may have to say upon this subject. Whether desire differs
+from will in kind or only in degree&mdash;whether will is desire in action,
+so to speak, and desire but incipient will&mdash;are questions with which we
+need not trouble ourselves. For it is certain that there are agnostics
+who would greatly prefer being theists, and theists who would give all
+they possess to be Christians, if they could thus secure promotion by
+purchase&mdash;i.e. by one single act of will. But yet the desire is not
+strong enough to sustain the will in perpetual action, so as to make the
+continual sacrifices which Christianity entails. Perhaps the hardest of
+these sacrifices to an intelligent man is that of his own intellect. At
+least I am certain that this is so in my own case. I have been so long
+accustomed to constitute my reason my sole judge of truth, that even
+while reason itself tells me it is not unreasonable to expect that the
+heart and the will should be required to join with reason in seeking God
+(for religion is for the <i>whole</i> man), I am too jealous of my reason to
+exercise my will in the direction of my most heart-felt desires. For
+assuredly the strongest desire of my nature is to find that that nature
+is not deceived in its highest aspirations. Yet I cannot bring myself so
+much as to make a venture in the direction of faith. For instance,
+regarded from one point of view it seems reasonable enough that
+Christianity should have enjoined the <i>doing</i> of the doctrine as a
+necessary condition to ascertaining (i.e. 'believing') its truth. But
+from another, and my more habitual point of view, it seems almost an
+affront to reason to make any such 'fool's experiment'&mdash;just as to some
+scientific men it seems absurd and childish to expect them to
+investigate the 'superstitious' follies of modern spiritualism. Even the
+simplest act of will in regard to religion&mdash;that of prayer&mdash;has not been
+performed by me for at least a quarter of a century, simply because it
+has seemed so impossible to pray, as it were, hypothetically, that much
+as I have always desired to be able to pray, I cannot will the attempt.
+To justify myself for what my better judgement has often seen to be
+essentially irrational, I have ever made sundry excuses. The chief of
+them has run thus. Even supposing Christianity true, and even supposing
+that after having so far sacrificed my reason to my desire as to have
+satisfied the supposed conditions to obtaining 'grace,' or direct
+illumination from God,&mdash;even then would not my reason turn round and
+revenge herself upon me? For surely even then my habitual scepticism
+would make me say to myself&mdash;'this is all very sublime and very
+comforting; but what evidence have you to give me that the whole
+business is anything more than self-delusion? The wish was probably
+father to the thought, and you might much better have performed your
+"act of will" by going in for a course of Indian hemp.' Of course a
+Christian would answer to this that the internal light would not admit
+of such doubt, any more than seeing the sun does&mdash;that God knows us well
+enough to prevent that, &amp;c., and also that it is unreasonable not to try
+an experiment lest the result should prove too good to be credible, and
+so on. And I do not dispute that the Christian would be justified in so
+answering, but I only adduce the matter as an illustration of the
+difficulty which is experienced in conforming to all the conditions of
+attaining to Christian faith&mdash;even supposing it to be sound. Others have
+doubtless other difficulties, but mine is chiefly, I think, that of an
+undue regard to reason, as against heart and will&mdash;undue, I mean, if so
+it be that Christianity is true, and the conditions to faith in it have
+been of divine ordination.</p>
+
+<p>This influence of will on belief, even in matters secular, is the more
+pronounced the further removed these matters may be from demonstration
+(as already remarked); but this is most of all the case where our
+personal interests are affected&mdash;whether these be material or
+intellectual, such as credit for consistency, &amp;c. See, for example, how
+closely, in the respects we are considering, political beliefs resemble
+religious. Unless the points of difference are such that truth is
+virtually demonstrable on one side, so that adhesion to the opposite is
+due to <i>conscious</i> sacrifice of integrity to expediency, we always find
+that party-spectacles so colour the view as to leave reason at the mercy
+of will, custom, interest, and all the other circumstances which
+similarly operate on religious beliefs. It seems to make but little
+difference in either case what level of general education, mental power,
+special training, &amp;c., is brought to bear upon the question under
+judgement. From the Premier to the peasant we find the same difference
+of opinion in politics as we do in religion. And in each case the
+explanation is the same. Beliefs are so little dependent on reason alone
+that in such regions of thought&mdash;i.e. where personal interests are
+affected and the evidences of truth are not in their nature
+demonstrable&mdash;it really seems as if reason ceases to be a judge of
+evidence or guide to truth, and becomes a mere advocate of opinion
+already formed on quite other grounds. Now these other grounds are, as
+we have seen, mainly the accidents of habit or custom, wish being father
+to the thought, &amp;c.</p>
+
+<p>Now this may be all deplorable enough in politics, and in all other
+beliefs secular; but who shall say it is not exactly as it ought to be
+in the matter of beliefs religious? For, unless we beg the question of a
+future life in the negative, we must entertain at least the possibility
+of our being in a state of probation in respect of an honest use not
+only of our reason, but probably still more of those other ingredients
+of human nature which go to determine our beliefs touching this most
+important of all matters.</p>
+
+<p>It is remarkable how even in politics it is the moral and spiritual
+elements of character which lead to success in the long run, even more
+than intellectual ability&mdash;supposing, of course, that the latter is not
+below the somewhat high level of our Parliamentary assemblies.</p>
+
+<p>As regards the part that is played by will in the determining of belief,
+one can show how unconsciously large this is even in matters of secular
+interest. Reason is very far indeed from being the sole guide of
+judgement that it is usually taken to be&mdash;so far, indeed, that, save in
+matters approaching down-right demonstration (where of course there is
+no room for any other ingredient) it is usually hampered by custom,
+prejudice, dislike, &amp;c., to a degree that would astonish the most sober
+philosopher could he lay bare to himself all the mental processes
+whereby the complex act of assent or dissent is eventually
+determined<a name="FNanchor_55_55" id="FNanchor_55_55"></a><a href="#Footnote_55_55" class="fnanchor">[55]</a>.</p>
+
+<p>As showing how little reason alone has to do with the determining of
+religious belief, let us take the case of mathematicians. This I think
+is the fairest case we can take, seeing that of all intellectual
+pursuits that of mathematical research is the most exact, as well as the
+most exclusive in its demand upon the powers of reason, and hence that,
+as a class, the men who have achieved highest eminence in that pursuit
+may be fairly taken as the fittest representatives of our species in
+respect of the faculty of pure reason. Yet whenever they have turned
+their exceptional powers in this respect upon the problems of religion,
+how suggestively well balanced are their opposite conclusions&mdash;so much
+so indeed that we can only conclude that reason counts for very little
+in the complex of mental processes which here determine judgement.</p>
+
+<p>Thus, if we look to the greatest mathematicians in the world's history,
+we find Kepler and Newton as Christians; La Place, on the other hand, an
+infidel. Or, coming to our own times, and confining our attention to the
+principal seat of mathematical study:&mdash;when I was at Cambridge, there
+was a galaxy of genius in that department emanating from that place such
+as had never before been equalled. And the curious thing in our present
+connexion is that all the most illustrious names were ranged on the side
+of orthodoxy. Sir W. Thomson, Sir George Stokes, Professors Tait, Adams,
+Clerk-Maxwell, and Cayley&mdash;not to mention a number of lesser lights,
+such as Routh, Todhunter, Ferrers, &amp;c.&mdash;were all avowed Christians.
+Clifford had only just moved at a bound from the extreme of asceticism
+to that of infidelity&mdash;an individual instance which I deem of particular
+interest in the present connexion, as showing the dominating influence
+of a forcedly emotional character even on so powerful an intellectual
+one, for the <i>rationality</i> of the whole structure of Christian belief
+cannot have so reversed its poles within a few months.</p>
+
+<p>Now it would doubtless be easy to find elsewhere than in Cambridge
+mathematicians of the first order who in our own generation are, or have
+been, professedly anti-Christian in their beliefs,&mdash;although certainly
+not so great an array of such extraordinary powers. But, be this as it
+may, the case of Cambridge in my own time seems to me of itself enough
+to prove that Christian belief is neither made nor marred by the highest
+powers of reasoning, apart from other and still more potent factors.</p>
+
+
+<h3><i>Faith and Superstition.</i></h3>
+
+<p>Whether or not Christianity is true, there is a great distinction
+between these two things. For while the main ingredient of Christian
+faith is the moral element, this has no part in superstition. In point
+of fact, the only point of resemblance is that both present the mental
+state called <i>belief</i>. It is on this account they are so often
+confounded by anti-Christians, and even by non-Christians; the much more
+important point of difference is not noted, viz. that belief in the one
+case is purely intellectual, while in the other it is chiefly moral.
+<i>Qua</i> purely intellectual, belief may indicate nothing but sheer
+credulity in absence of evidence; but where a moral basis is added, the
+case is clearly different; for even if it appears to be sheer credulity
+to an outsider, that may be because he does not take into account the
+additional evidence supplied by the moral facts.</p>
+
+<p class='tbrk'>Faith and superstition are often confounded, or even identified. And,
+unquestionably, they are identical up to a certain point&mdash;viz. they both
+present the mental state of <i>belief</i>. All people can see this; but not
+all people can see further, or define the <i>differentiae</i>. These are as
+follows: First, supposing Christianity true, there is the spiritual
+verification. Second, supposing Christianity false, there is still the
+moral ingredient, which <i>ex hypothesi</i> is absent in superstition. In
+other words, both faith and superstition rest on an intellectual basis
+(which may be pure credulity); but faith rests also on a moral, even if
+not likewise on a spiritual. Even in human relations there is a wide
+difference between 'belief' in a scientific theory and 'faith' in a
+personal character. And the difference is in the latter comprising a
+moral element.</p>
+
+<p>'Faith-healing,' therefore, has no real point of resemblance with 'thy
+faith hath saved thee' of the New Testament, unless we sink the personal
+differences between a modern faith-healer and Jesus Christ as objects of
+faith.</p>
+
+<p>Belief is not exclusively founded on objective evidence appealing to
+reason (opinion), but mainly on subjective evidence appealing to some
+altogether different faculty (faith). Now, whether Christians are right
+or wrong in what they believe, I hold it as certain as anything can be
+that the distinction which I have just drawn, and which they all
+implicitly draw for themselves, is logically valid. For no one is
+entitled to deny the possibility of what may be termed an organ of
+spiritual discernment. In fact to do so would be to vacate the position
+of pure agnosticism <i>in toto</i>&mdash;and this even if there were no objective,
+or strictly scientific, evidences in favour of such an organ, such as we
+have in the lives of the saints, and, in a lower degree, in the
+universality of the religious sentiment. Now, if there be such an organ,
+it follows from preceding paragraphs, that not only will the main
+evidences for Christianity be subjective, but that they ought to be so:
+they ought to be so, I mean, on the Christian supposition of the object
+of Christianity being moral probation, and 'faith' both the test and the
+reward.</p>
+
+<p>From this many practical considerations ensue. E.g. the duty of parents
+to educate their children in what they <i>believe</i> as distinguished from
+what they <i>know</i>. This would be unjustifiable if faith were the same as
+opinion. But it is fully justifiable if a man not only knows that he
+believes (opinion) but believes that he knows (faith). Whether or not
+the Christian differs from the 'natural man' in having a spiritual organ
+of cognition, provided he honestly believes such is the case, it would
+be immoral in him not to proceed in accordance with what he thus
+believes to be his knowledge. This obligation is recognized in education
+in every other case. He is morally right even if mentally deluded.</p>
+
+<p class='tbrk'>Huxley, in <i>Lay Sermons</i>, says that faith has been proved a 'cardinal
+sin' by science. Now, this is true enough of credulity, superstition,
+&amp;c., and science has done no end of good in developing our ideas of
+method, evidence, &amp;c. But this is all on the side of intellect. 'Faith'
+is not touched by such facts or considerations. And what a terrible hell
+science would have made of the world, if she had abolished the 'spirit
+of faith' even in human relations. The fact is, Huxley falls into the
+common error of identifying 'faith' with opinion.</p>
+
+<p class='tbrk'>Supposing Christianity true, it is very reasonable that faith in the
+sense already explained should be constituted the test of divine
+acceptance. If there be such a thing as Christ's winnowing fan, the
+quality of sterling weight for the discovery of which it is adapted
+cannot be conceived as anything other than this moral quality. No one
+could suppose a revelation appealing to the mere intellect of man, since
+acceptance would thus become a mere matter of prudence in subscribing to
+a demonstration made by higher intellects.</p>
+
+<p><a name="fact" id="fact"></a>It is also a matter of fact that if Christianity is truthful in
+representing this world as a school of moral probation, we cannot
+conceive a system better adapted to this end than is the world, or a
+better schoolmaster than Christianity. This is proved not only by
+general reasoning, but also by the work of Christianity in the world,
+its adaptation to individual needs, &amp;c. Consider also the extraordinary
+diversity of human characters in respect both of morality and
+spirituality though all are living in the same world. Out of the same
+external material or environment such astonishingly diverse products
+arise according to the use made of it. Even human suffering in its worst
+forms can be welcome if justified by faith in such an object. 'Ills have
+no weight, and tears no bitterness,' but are rather to be 'gloried
+in<a name="FNanchor_56_56" id="FNanchor_56_56"></a><a href="#Footnote_56_56" class="fnanchor">[56]</a>.'</p>
+
+<p>It is a further fact that only by means of this theory of probation is
+it possible to give any meaning to the world, i.e. any <i>raison d'&ecirc;tre</i>
+of human existence.</p>
+
+<p>Supposing Christianity true, every man must stand or fall by the results
+of his own conduct, as developed through his own moral character. (This
+could not be so if the test were intellectual ability.) Yet this does
+not hinder that the exercise of will in the direction of religion should
+need help in order to attain belief. Nor does it hinder that some men
+should need more help and others less. Indeed, it may well be that some
+men are intentionally precluded from receiving any help, so as not to
+increase their responsibility, or receive but little, so as to
+constitute intellectual difficulties a moral trial. But clearly, if such
+things are so, we are inadequate judges.</p>
+
+<p class='tbrk'>It is a fact that we all feel the intellectual part of man to be
+'higher' than the animal, whatever our theory of his origin. It is a
+fact that we all feel the moral part of man to be 'higher' than the
+intellectual, whatever our theory of either may be. It is also a fact
+that we all similarly feel the spiritual to be 'higher' than the moral,
+whatever our theory of religion may be. It is what we understand by
+man's moral, and still more his spiritual, qualities that go to
+constitute 'character.' And it is astonishing how in all walks of life
+it is character that tells in the long run.</p>
+
+<p>It is a fact that these distinctions are all well marked and universally
+recognized&mdash;viz.</p>
+
+<div class="poem">
+<div class='stanza'><div class='i3'>{Animality.</div>
+<div class='i3'>{Intellectuality.</div>
+<div>Human {Morality.</div>
+<div class='i3'>{Spirituality.</div></div>
+</div>
+
+<p>Morality and spirituality are to be distinguished as two very different
+things. A man may be highly moral in his conduct without being in any
+degree spiritual in his nature, and, though to a lesser extent, vice
+versa. And, objectively, we see the same distinction between morals and
+religion. By spirituality I mean the religious temperament, whether or
+not associated with any particular creed or dogma.</p>
+
+<p>There is no doubt that intellectual pleasures are more satisfying and
+enduring than sensual&mdash;or even sensuous. And, to those who have
+experienced them, so it is with spiritual over intellectual, artistic,
+&amp;c. This is an objective fact, abundantly testified to by every one who
+has had experience: and it seems to indicate that the spiritual nature
+of man is the highest part of man&mdash;the [culminating] point of his being.</p>
+
+<p class='tbrk'>It is probably true, as Renan says in his posthumous work, that there
+will always be materialists and spiritualists, inasmuch as it will
+always be observable on the one hand that there is no thought without
+brain, while, on the other hand, instincts of man will always aspire to
+higher beliefs. But this is just what ought to be if religion is true,
+and we are in a state of probation. And is it not probable that the
+materialistic position (discredited even by philosophy) is due simply to
+custom and want of imagination? Else why the inextinguishable instincts?</p>
+
+<p class='tbrk'>It is much more easy to disbelieve than to believe. This is obvious on
+the side of reason, but it is also true on that of spirit, for to
+disbelieve is in accordance with environment or custom, while to believe
+necessitates a spiritual use of the imagination. For both these
+reasons, very few unbelievers have any justification, either
+intellectual or spiritual, for their own unbelief.</p>
+
+<p>Unbelief is usually due to indolence, often to prejudice, and never a
+thing to be proud of.</p>
+
+<p class='tbrk'>'Why should it be thought a thing incredible with you that God should
+raise the dead?' Clearly no answer can be given by the pure agnostic.
+But he will naturally say in reply, 'the question rather is, why should
+it be thought credible with you that there is a God, or, if there is,
+that he should raise the dead?' And I think the wise Christian will
+answer, 'I believe in the resurrection of the dead, partly on grounds of
+reason, partly on those of intuition, but chiefly on both combined; so
+to speak, it is my whole character which accepts the whole system of
+which the doctrine of personal immortality forms an essential part.' And
+to this it may be fairly added that the Christian doctrine of the
+resurrection of our bodily form cannot have been arrived at for the
+purpose of meeting modern materialistic objections to the doctrine of
+personal immortality; hence it is certainly a strange doctrine to have
+been propounded at that time, together with its companion, and scarcely
+less distinctive, doctrine of the vileness of the body. Why was it not
+said that the 'soul' alone should survive as a disembodied 'spirit'? Or
+if form were supposed necessary for man as distinguished from God, that
+he was to be an angel? But, be this as it may, the doctrine of the
+resurrection seems to have fully met beforehand the materialistic
+objection to a future life, and so to have raised the ulterior question
+with which this paragraph opens.</p>
+
+<p class='tbrk'>We have seen in the Introduction that all first principles even of
+scientific facts are known by intuition and not by reason. No one can
+deny this. Now, if there be a God, the fact is certainly of the nature
+of a first principle; for it must be the first of all first principles.
+No one can dispute this. No one can therefore dispute the necessary
+conclusion, that, if there be a God, He is knowable, (if knowable at
+all) by intuition and not by reason.</p>
+
+<p>Indeed a little thought is enough to show that from its very nature as
+such, reason must be incapable of adjudicating on the subject, for it is
+a process of inferring from the known to the unknown.</p>
+
+<p>Or thus. It would be against reason itself to suppose that God, even if
+He exists, can be known by reason; He must be known, if knowable at all,
+by intuition<a name="FNanchor_57_57" id="FNanchor_57_57"></a><a href="#Footnote_57_57" class="fnanchor">[57]</a>.</p>
+
+<p class='tbrk'>Observe, although God might give an objective revelation of Himself,
+e.g. as Christians believe He has, even this would not give knowledge
+of Him save to those who believe the revelations genuine; and I doubt
+whether it is logically possible for any form of objective revelation of
+itself to compel belief in it. Assuredly one rising from the dead to
+testify thereto would not, nor would letters of fire across the sky do
+so. But, even if it were logically possible, we need not consider the
+abstract possibility, seeing that, as a matter of fact, no such
+demonstrative revelation has been given.</p>
+
+<p>Hence, the only legitimate attitude of pure reason is pure agnosticism.
+No one can deny this. But, it will be said, there is this vast
+difference between our intuitive knowledge of all other first principles
+and that alleged of the 'first of all first principles,' viz. that the
+latter is confessedly <i>not</i> known to all men. Now, assuredly, there is
+here a vast difference. But so there ought to be, if we are here in a
+state of probation, as before explained. And that we are in such a state
+is not only the hypothesis of religion, but the sole rational
+explanation as well as moral justification of our existence as rational
+beings and moral agents<a name="FNanchor_58_58" id="FNanchor_58_58"></a><a href="#Footnote_58_58" class="fnanchor">[58]</a>.</p>
+
+<p class='tbrk'>It is not necessarily true, as J.S. Mill and all other agnostics think,
+that even if internal intuition be of divine origin, the illumination
+thus furnished can only be of evidential value to the individual subject
+thereof. On the contrary, it may be studied objectively, even if not
+experienced subjectively; and ought to be so studied by a pure agnostic
+desirous of light from any quarter. Even if he does not know it as a
+noumenon he can investigate it as a phenomenon. And, supposing it to be
+of divine origin, as its subjects believe and he has no reason to doubt,
+he may gain much evidence against its being a mere psychological
+illusion from identical reports of it in all ages. Thus, if any large
+section of the race were to see flames issuing from magnets, there would
+be no doubt as to their objective reality.</p>
+
+<p class='tbrk'>The testimony given by Socrates to the occurrence in himself of an
+internal Voice, having all the definiteness of an auditory
+hallucination, has given rise to much speculation by subsequent
+philosophers.</p>
+
+<p>Many explanations are suggested, but if we remember the critical nature
+of Socrates' own mind, the literal nature of his mode of teaching, and
+the high authority which attaches to Plato's opinion on the subject, the
+probability seems to incline towards the 'Demon' having been, in
+Socrates' own consciousness, an actual auditory sensation. Be this
+however as it may, I suppose there is no question that we may adopt this
+view of the matter at least to the extent of classifying Socrates with
+Luther, Pascal, &amp;c., not to mention all the line of Hebrew and other
+prophets, who agree in speaking of a Divine Voice.</p>
+
+<p>If so, the further question arises whether we are to classify all these
+with lunatics in whom the phenomena of auditory hallucination are
+habitual.</p>
+
+<p>Without doubt this hypothesis is most in accordance with the temper of
+our age, partly because it obeys the law of parsimony, and partly
+because it [negatives] <i>a priori</i> the possibility of revelation.</p>
+
+<p>But if we look at the matter from the point of view of pure agnosticism,
+we are not entitled to adopt so rough and ready an interpretation.</p>
+
+<p>Suppose then that not only Socrates and all great religious reformers
+and founders of religious systems both before and after him were
+similarly stricken with mental disease, but that similar phenomena had
+occurred in the case of all scientific discoverers such as Galileo,
+Newton, Darwin, &amp;c.&mdash;supposing all these men to have declared that their
+main ideas had been communicated by subjective sensations as of spoken
+language, so that all the progress of the world's scientific thought had
+resembled that of the world's religious thought, and had been attributed
+by the promoters thereof to direct inspirations of this kind&mdash;would it
+be possible to deny that the testimony thus afforded to the fact of
+subjective revelation would have been overwhelming? Or could it any
+longer have been maintained that supposing a revelation to be
+communicated subjectively the fact thereof could only be of any
+evidential value to the recipient himself? To this it will no doubt be
+answered, 'No, but in the case supposed the evidence arises not from the
+fact of their subjective intuition but from that of its objective
+verification in the results of science.' Quite so; but this is exactly
+the test appealed to by the Hebrew prophets&mdash;the test of true and lying
+prophets being in the fulfilment or non-fulfilment of their prophecies
+and 'By their fruits ye shall know them.'</p>
+
+<p>Therefore it is as absurd to say that the religious consciousness of
+minds other than our own can be barred antecedently as evidence, as it
+is to say that testimony to the miraculous is similarly barred. The pure
+agnostic must always carefully avoid the 'high <i>priori</i> road.' But, on
+the other hand, he must be all the more assiduous in estimating fairly
+the character, both as to quantity and quality, of evidence <i>a
+posteriori</i>. Now this evidence in the present case is twofold, positive
+and negative. It will be convenient to consider the negative first.</p>
+
+<p>The negative evidence is furnished by the nature of man without God. It
+is thoroughly miserable, as is well shown by Pascal, who has devoted the
+whole of the first part of his treatise to this subject. I need not go
+over the ground which he has already so well traversed.</p>
+
+<p>Some men are not conscious of the cause of this misery: this, however,
+does not prevent the fact of their being miserable. For the most part
+they conceal the fact as well as possible from themselves, by occupying
+their minds with society, sport, frivolity of all kinds, or, if
+intellectually disposed, with science, art, literature, business, &amp;c.
+This however is but to fill the starving belly with husks. I know from
+experience the intellectual distractions of scientific research,
+philosophical speculation, and artistic pleasures; but am also well
+aware that even when all are taken together and well sweetened to taste,
+in respect of consequent reputation, means, social position, &amp;c., the
+whole concoction is but as high confectionery to a starving man. He may
+cheat himself for a time&mdash;especially if he be a strong man&mdash;into the
+belief that he is nourishing himself by denying his natural appetite;
+but soon finds he was made for some altogether different kind of food,
+even though of much less tastefulness as far as the palate is concerned.</p>
+
+<p>Some men indeed never acknowledge this articulately or distinctly even
+to themselves, yet always show it plainly enough to others. Take, e.g.,
+'that last infirmity of noble minds.' I suppose the most exalted and
+least 'carnal' of worldly joys consists in the adequate recognition by
+the world of high achievement by ourselves. Yet it is notorious that&mdash;</p>
+
+<div class="poem">
+<div class='stanza'><div class='i4'>"It is by God decreed</div>
+<div>Fame shall not satisfy the highest need."</div></div>
+</div>
+
+<p>It has been my lot to know not a few of the famous men of our
+generation, and I have always observed that this is profoundly true.
+Like all other 'moral' satisfactions, this soon palls by custom, and as
+soon as one end of distinction is reached, another is pined for. There
+is no finality to rest in, while disease and death are always standing
+in the background. Custom may even blind men to their own misery, so far
+as not to make them realize what is wanting; yet the want is there.</p>
+
+<p>I take it then as unquestionably true that this whole negative side of
+the subject proves a vacuum in the soul of man which nothing can fill
+save faith in God.</p>
+
+<p>Now take the positive side. Consider the happiness of religious&mdash;and
+chiefly of the highest religious, i.e. Christian&mdash;belief. It is a matter
+of fact that besides being most intense, it is most enduring, growing,
+and never staled by custom. In short, according to the universal
+testimony of those who have it, it differs from all other happiness not
+only in degree but in kind. Those who have it can usually testify to
+what they used to be without it. It has no relation to intellectual
+status. It is a thing by itself and supreme.</p>
+
+<p>So much for the individual. But positive evidence does not end here.
+Look at the effects of Christian belief as exercised on human
+society&mdash;1st, by individual Christians on the family, &amp;c.; and, 2nd, by
+the Christian Church on the world.</p>
+
+<p>All this may lead on to an argument from the adaptation of Christianity
+to human higher needs. All men must feel these needs more or less in
+proportion as their higher natures, moral and spiritual, are developed.
+Now Christianity is the only religion which is adapted to meet them,
+and, according to those who are alone able to testify, does so most
+abundantly. All these men, of every sect, nationality, &amp;c., agree in
+their account of their subjective experience; so as to this there can be
+no question. The only question is as to whether they are all deceived.</p>
+
+<p class='center'>PEU DE CHOSE.</p>
+
+<div class="poem">
+<div class='stanza'><div>'La vie est vaine:</div>
+<div class='i2'>Un peu d'amour,</div>
+<div>Un peu de haine ...</div>
+<div class='i2'>Et puis&mdash;bon jour!</div></div>
+
+<div class='stanza'><div>La vie est br&egrave;ve:</div>
+<div class='i2'>Un peu d'espoir,</div>
+<div>Un peu de r&ecirc;ve ...</div>
+<div class='i2'>Et puis&mdash;bon soir!'</div></div>
+</div>
+
+<p>The above is a terse and true criticism of this life without hope of a
+future one. Is it satisfactory? But Christian faith, as a matter of
+fact, changes it entirely.</p>
+
+<div class="poem">
+<div class='stanza'><div>'The night has a thousand eyes,</div>
+<div class='i2'>And the day but one;</div>
+<div>Yet the light of a whole world dies</div>
+<div class='i2'>With the setting sun.</div></div>
+
+<div class='stanza'><div>The mind has a thousand eyes,</div>
+<div class='i2'>And the heart but one;</div>
+<div>Yet the light of a whole life dies</div>
+<div class='i2'>When love is done.'</div></div>
+</div>
+
+<p>Love is known to be all this. How great, then, is Christianity, as being
+the religion of love, and causing men to believe both in the cause of
+love's supremacy and the infinity of God's love to man.</p>
+
+<div class="footnotes"><h3>FOOTNOTES:</h3>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_55_55" id="Footnote_55_55"></a><a href="#FNanchor_55_55"><span class="label">[55]</span></a> Cf. Pascal, <i>Pens&eacute;es</i>. 'For we must not mistake ourselves,
+we have as much that is automatic in us as intellectual, and hence it
+comes that the instrument by which persuasion is brought about is not
+demonstration alone. How few things are demonstrated! Proofs can only
+convince the mind; custom makes our strongest proofs and those which we
+hold most firmly, it sways the automaton, which draws the unconscious
+intellect after it.... It is then custom that makes so many men
+Christians, custom that makes them Turks, heathen, artisans, soldiers,
+&amp;c. Lastly, we must resort to custom when once the mind has seen where
+truth is, in order to slake our thirst and steep ourselves in that
+belief which escapes us at every hour, for to have proofs always at hand
+were too onerous. We must acquire a more easy belief, that of custom,
+which without violence, without art, without argument, causes our assent
+and inclines all our powers to this belief, so that our soul naturally
+falls into it....
+</p><p>
+'It is not enough to believe only by force of conviction if the
+automaton is inclined to believe the contrary. Both parts of us then
+must be obliged to believe, the intellect by arguments which it is
+enough to have admitted once in our lives, the automaton by custom, and
+by not allowing it to incline in the contrary direction. <i>Inclina cor
+meum Deus</i>.' See also Newman's <i>Grammar of Assent</i>, chap. vi. and
+Church's <i>Human Life and its Conditions</i>, pp. 67-9.</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_56_56" id="Footnote_56_56"></a><a href="#FNanchor_56_56"><span class="label">[56]</span></a> [The author has added, "For suffering in brutes see
+further on," but nothing further on the subject appears to have been
+written.&mdash;<span class="smcap">Ed.</span>]</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_57_57" id="Footnote_57_57"></a><a href="#FNanchor_57_57"><span class="label">[57]</span></a> [In this connexion I may again notice that two days before
+his death George Romanes expressed his cordial approval of Professor
+Knight's <i>Aspects of Theism</i>&mdash;a work in which great stress is laid on
+the argument from intuition in different forms.&mdash;<span class="smcap">Ed.</span>]</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_58_58" id="Footnote_58_58"></a><a href="#FNanchor_58_58"><span class="label">[58]</span></a> On this subject see Pascal, <i>Pens&eacute;es</i> (Kegan Paul's
+trans.) p. 103.</p></div>
+</div>
+
+
+<hr />
+<h3><a name="Faith_in_Christianity" id="Faith_in_Christianity"></a>&sect; 5. <span class="smcap">Faith in Christianity</span>.</h3>
+
+<p>Christianity comes up for serious investigation in the present treatise,
+because this <i>Examination of Religion</i> [i.e. of the validity of the
+religious consciousness] has to do with the evidences of Theism
+presented by man, and not only by nature <i>minus</i> man. Now of the
+religious consciousness Christianity is unquestionably the highest
+product.</p>
+
+<p>When I wrote the preceding treatise [the <i>Candid Examination</i>], I did
+not sufficiently appreciate the immense importance of <i>human</i> nature, as
+distinguished from physical nature, in any enquiry touching Theism. But
+since then I have seriously studied anthropology (including the science
+of comparative religions), psychology and metaphysics, with the result
+of clearly seeing that human nature is the most important part of nature
+as a whole whereby to investigate the theory of Theism. This I ought to
+have anticipated on merely <i>a priori</i> grounds, and no doubt should have
+perceived, had I not been too much immersed in merely physical research.</p>
+
+<p>Moreover, in those days, I took it for granted that Christianity was
+played out, and never considered it at all as having any rational
+bearing on the question of Theism. And, though this was doubtless
+inexcusable, I still think that the rational standing of Christianity
+has materially improved since then. For then it seemed that Christianity
+was destined to succumb as a rational system before the double assault
+of Darwin from without and the negative school of criticism from within.
+Not only the book of organic nature, but likewise its own sacred
+documents, seemed to be declaring against it. But now all this has been
+very materially changed. We have all more or less grown to see that
+Darwinism is like Copernicanism, &amp;c., in this respect<a name="FNanchor_59_59" id="FNanchor_59_59"></a><a href="#Footnote_59_59" class="fnanchor">[59]</a>; while the
+outcome of the great textual battle<a name="FNanchor_60_60" id="FNanchor_60_60"></a><a href="#Footnote_60_60" class="fnanchor">[60]</a> is impartially considered a
+signal victory for Christianity. Prior to the new [Biblical] science,
+there was really no rational basis in thoughtful minds, either for the
+date of any one of the New Testament books, or, consequently, for the
+historical truth of any one of the events narrated in them. Gospels,
+Acts and Epistles were all alike shrouded in this uncertainty. Hence the
+validity of the eighteenth-century scepticism. But now all this kind of
+scepticism has been rendered obsolete, and for ever impossible; while
+the certainty of enough of St. Paul's writings for the practical purpose
+of displaying the belief of the apostles has been established, as well
+as the certainty of the publication of the Synoptics within the first
+century. An enormous gain has thus accrued to the objective evidences
+of Christianity. It is most important that the expert investigator
+should be exact, and, as in any other science, the lay public must take
+on authority as trustworthy only what both sides are agreed upon. But,
+as in any other science, experts are apt to lose sight of the importance
+of the main results agreed upon, in their fighting over lesser points
+still in dispute. Now it is enough for us that the Epistles to the
+Romans, Galatians, and Corinthians, have been agreed upon as genuine,
+and that the same is true of the Synoptics so far as concerns the main
+doctrine of Christ Himself.</p>
+
+<p class='tbrk'>The extraordinary candour of Christ's biographers must not be
+forgotten<a name="FNanchor_61_61" id="FNanchor_61_61"></a><a href="#Footnote_61_61" class="fnanchor">[61]</a>. Notice also such sentences as 'but some doubted,' and (in
+the account of Pentecost) 'these men are full of new wine<a name="FNanchor_62_62" id="FNanchor_62_62"></a><a href="#Footnote_62_62" class="fnanchor">[62]</a>.' Such
+observations are wonderfully true to human nature; but no less
+wonderfully opposed to any 'accretion' theory.</p>
+
+<p>Observe, when we become honestly pure agnostics the whole scene changes
+by the change in our point of view. We may then read the records
+impartially, or on their own merits, without any antecedent conviction
+that they must be false. It is then an open question whether they are
+not true as history.</p>
+
+<p>There is so much to be said in objective evidence for Christianity that
+were the central doctrines thus testified to anything short of
+miraculous, no one would doubt. But we are not competent judges <i>a
+priori</i> of what a revelation should be. If our agnosticism be <i>pure</i>, we
+have no right to pre-judge the case on <i>prima facie</i> grounds.</p>
+
+<p class='tbrk'>One of the strongest pieces of objective evidence in favour of
+Christianity is not sufficiently enforced by apologists. Indeed, I am
+not aware that I have ever seen it mentioned. It is the absence from the
+biography of Christ of any doctrines which the subsequent growth of
+human knowledge&mdash;whether in natural science, ethics, political economy,
+or elsewhere&mdash;has had to discount. This negative argument is really
+almost as strong as is the positive one from what Christ did teach. For
+when we consider what a large number of sayings are recorded of&mdash;or at
+least attributed to&mdash;Him, it becomes most remarkable that in literal
+truth there is no reason why any of His words should ever pass away in
+the sense of becoming obsolete. 'Not even now could it be easy,' says
+John Stuart Mill, 'even for an unbeliever, to find a better translation
+of the rule of virtue from the abstract into the concrete, than to
+endeavour so to live that Christ would approve our life<a name="FNanchor_63_63" id="FNanchor_63_63"></a><a href="#Footnote_63_63" class="fnanchor">[63]</a>.' Contrast
+Jesus Christ in this respect with other thinkers of like antiquity. Even
+Plato, who, though some 400 years B.C. in point of time, was greatly in
+advance of Him in respect of philosophic thought&mdash;not only because
+Athens then presented the extraordinary phenomenon which it did of
+genius in all directions never since equalled, but also because he,
+following Socrates, was, so to speak, the greatest representative of
+human reason in the direction of spirituality&mdash;even Plato, I say, is
+nowhere in this respect as compared with Christ. Read the dialogues, and
+see how enormous is the contrast with the Gospels in respect of errors
+of all kinds&mdash;reaching even to absurdity in respect of reason, and to
+sayings shocking to the moral sense. Yet this is confessedly the highest
+level of human reason on the lines of spirituality, when unaided by
+alleged revelation.</p>
+
+<p>Two things may be said in reply. First, that the Jews (Rabbis) of
+Christ's period had enunciated most of Christ's ethical sayings. But,
+even so far as this is true, the sayings were confessedly extracted or
+deduced from the Old Testament, and so <i>ex hypothesi</i> due to original
+inspiration. Again, it is not very far true, because, as <i>Ecce Homo</i>
+says, the ethical sayings of Christ, even when anticipated by Rabbis and
+the Old Testament, were <i>selected</i> by Him.</p>
+
+<p class='tbrk'>It is a general, if not a universal, rule that those who reject
+Christianity with contempt are those who care not for religion of any
+kind. 'Depart from us' has always been the sentiment of such. On the
+other hand, those in whom the religious sentiment is intact, but who
+have rejected Christianity on intellectual grounds, still almost deify
+Christ. These facts are remarkable.</p>
+
+<p>If we estimate the greatness of a man by the influence which he has
+exerted on mankind, there can be no question, even from the secular
+point of view, that Christ is much the greatest man who has ever lived.</p>
+
+<p>It is on all sides worth considering (blatant ignorance or base
+vulgarity alone excepted) that the revolution effected by Christianity
+in human life is immeasurable and unparalleled by any other movement in
+history; though most nearly approached by that of the Jewish religion,
+of which, however, it is a development, so that it may be regarded as of
+a piece with it. If thus regarded, this whole system of religion is so
+immeasurably in advance of all others, that it may fairly be said, if it
+had not been for the Jews, the human race would not have had any
+religion worth our serious attention as such. The whole of that side of
+human nature would never have been developed in civilized life. And
+although there are numberless individuals who are not conscious of its
+development in themselves, yet even these have been influenced to an
+enormous extent by the atmosphere of religion around them.</p>
+
+<p>But not only is Christianity thus so immeasurably in advance of all
+other religions. It is no less so of every other system of thought that
+has ever been promulgated in regard to all that is moral and spiritual.
+Whether it be true or false, it is certain that neither philosophy,
+science, nor poetry has ever produced results in thought, conduct, or
+beauty in any degree to be compared with it. This I think will be on all
+hands allowed as regards conduct. As regards thought and beauty it may
+be disputed. But, consider, what has all the science or all the
+philosophy of the world done for the thought of mankind to be compared
+with the one doctrine, 'God is love'? Whether or not true, conceive what
+belief in it has been to thousands of millions of our race&mdash;i.e. its
+influence on human thought, and thence on human conduct. Thus to admit
+its incomparable influence in conduct is indirectly to admit it as
+regards thought. Again, as regards beauty, the man who fails to see its
+incomparable excellence in this respect merely shows his own deficiency
+in the appreciation of all that is noblest in man. True or not true, the
+entire Story of the Cross, from its commencement in prophetic aspiration
+to its culmination in the Gospel, is by far the most magnificent
+[presentation] in literature. And surely the fact of its having all been
+lived does not detract from its poetic value. Nor does the fact of its
+being capable of appropriation by the individual Christian of to-day as
+still a vital religion detract from its sublimity. Only to a man wholly
+destitute of spiritual perception can it be that Christianity should
+fail to appear the greatest exhibition of the beautiful, the sublime,
+and of all else that appeals to our spiritual nature, which has ever
+been known upon our earth.</p>
+
+<p>Yet this side of its adaptation is turned only towards men of highest
+culture. The most remarkable thing about Christianity is its adaptation
+to all sorts and conditions of men. Are you highly intellectual? There
+is in its problems, historical and philosophical, such worlds of
+material as you may spend your life upon with the same interminable
+interest as is open to the students of natural science. Or are you but a
+peasant in your parish church, with knowledge of little else than your
+Bible? Still are you ...<a name="FNanchor_64_64" id="FNanchor_64_64"></a><a href="#Footnote_64_64" class="fnanchor">[64]</a></p>
+
+
+<h3><i>Regeneration</i>.</h3>
+
+<p>How remarkable is the doctrine of Regeneration <i>per se</i>, as it is stated
+in the New Testament<a name="FNanchor_65_65" id="FNanchor_65_65"></a><a href="#Footnote_65_65" class="fnanchor">[65]</a>, and how completely it fits in with the
+non-demonstrative character of Revelation to reason alone, with the
+hypothesis of moral probation, &amp;c. Now this doctrine is one of the
+distinctive notes of Christianity. That is, Christ foretold repeatedly
+and distinctly&mdash;as did also His apostles after Him&mdash;that while those who
+received the Holy Ghost, who came to the Father through faith in the
+Son, who were born again of the Spirit, (and many other synonymous
+phrases,) would be absolutely certain of Christian truth as it were by
+direct vision or intuition, the carnally minded on the other hand would
+not be affected by any amount of direct evidence, even though one rose
+from the dead&mdash;as indeed Christ shortly afterwards did, with fulfilment
+of this prediction. Thus scepticism may be taken by Christians as
+corroborating Christianity.</p>
+
+<p>By all means let us retain our independence of judgement; but this is
+pre-eminently a matter in which pure agnostics must abstain from
+arrogance and consider the facts impartially as unquestionable phenomena
+of experience.</p>
+
+<p>Shortly after the death of Christ, this phenomenon which had been
+foretold by Him occurred, and appears to have done so for the first
+time. It has certainly continued to manifest itself ever since, and has
+been attributed by professed historians to that particular moment in
+time called Pentecost, producing much popular excitement and a large
+number of Christian believers.</p>
+
+<p>But, whether or not we accept this account, it is unquestionable that
+the apostles were filled with faith in the person and office of their
+Master, which is enough to justify His doctrine of regeneration.</p>
+
+
+<h3><i>Conversions.</i></h3>
+
+<p>St. Augustine after thirty years of age, and other Fathers, bear
+testimony to a sudden, enduring and extraordinary change in themselves,
+called <i>conversion</i><a name="FNanchor_66_66" id="FNanchor_66_66"></a><a href="#Footnote_66_66" class="fnanchor">[66]</a>.</p>
+
+<p>Now this experience has been repeated and testified to by countless
+millions of civilized men and women in all nations and all degrees of
+culture. It signifies not whether the conversion be sudden or gradual,
+though, as a psychological phenomenon, it is more remarkable when sudden
+and there is no symptom of mental aberration otherwise. But even as a
+gradual growth in mature age, its evidential value is not less. (Cf.
+Bunyan, &amp;c.)</p>
+
+<p>In all cases it is not a mere change of belief or opinion; this is by no
+means the point; the point is that it is a modification of character,
+more or less profound.</p>
+
+<p>Seeing what a complex thing is character, this change therefore cannot
+be simple. That it may all be due to so-called natural causes is no
+evidence against its so-called supernatural source, unless we beg the
+whole question of the Divine in Nature. To pure agnostics the evidence
+from conversions and regeneration lies in the bulk of these
+psychological phenomena, shortly after the death of Christ, with their
+continuance ever since, their general similarity all over the world,
+&amp;c., &amp;c.</p>
+
+
+<h3><i>Christianity and Pain</i>.</h3>
+
+<p>Christianity, from its foundation in Judaism, has throughout been a
+religion of sacrifice and sorrow. It has been a religion of blood and
+tears, and yet of profoundest happiness to its votaries. The apparent
+paradox is due to its depth, and to the union of these seemingly diverse
+roots in Love. It has been throughout and growingly a religion&mdash;or
+rather let us say <i>the</i> religion&mdash;of Love, with these apparently
+opposite qualities. Probably it is only those whose characters have been
+deepened by experiences gained in this religion itself who are so much
+as capable of intelligently resolving this paradox.</p>
+
+<p>Fakirs hang on hooks, Pagans cut themselves and even their children,
+sacrifice captives, &amp;c., for the sake of propitiating diabolical
+deities. The Jewish and Christian idea of sacrifice is doubtless a
+survival of this idea of God by way of natural causation, yet this is no
+evidence against the completed idea of the Godhead being [such as the
+Christian belief represents it], for supposing the completed idea to be
+true, the earlier ideals would have been due to the earlier
+inspirations, in accordance with the developmental method of Revelation
+hereafter to be discussed<a name="FNanchor_67_67" id="FNanchor_67_67"></a><a href="#Footnote_67_67" class="fnanchor">[67]</a>.</p>
+
+<p>But Christianity, with its roots in Judaism, is, as I have said, <i>par
+excellence</i> the religion of sorrow, because it reaches to truer and
+deeper levels of our spiritual nature, and therefore has capabilities
+both of sorrow and joy which are presumably non-existent except in
+civilized man. I mean the sorrows and the joys of a fully evolved
+spiritual life&mdash;such as were attained wonderfully early, historically
+speaking, in the case of the Jews, and are now universally diffused
+throughout Christendom. In short, the sorrows and the joys in question
+are those which arise from the fully developed consciousness of sin
+against a God of Love, as distinguished from propitiation of malignant
+spirits. These joys and sorrows are wholly spiritual, not merely
+physical, and culminate in the cry,'Thou desirest no sacrifice.... The
+sacrifice of God is a troubled spirit<a name="FNanchor_68_68" id="FNanchor_68_68"></a><a href="#Footnote_68_68" class="fnanchor">[68]</a>.'</p>
+
+<p class='tbrk'>I agree with Pascal<a name="FNanchor_69_69" id="FNanchor_69_69"></a><a href="#Footnote_69_69" class="fnanchor">[69]</a> that there is virtually nothing to be gained by
+being a theist as distinguished from a Christian. Unitarianism is only
+an affair of the reason&mdash;a merely abstract theory of the mind, having
+nothing to do with the heart, or the real needs of mankind. It is only
+when it takes the New Testament, tears out a few of its leaves relating
+to the divinity of Christ, and appropriates all the rest, that its
+system becomes in any degree possible as a basis for personal religion.</p>
+
+<p>If there is a Deity it seems to be in some indefinite degree more
+probable that He should impart a Revelation than that He should not.</p>
+
+<p class='tbrk'>Women, as a class, are in all countries much more disposed to
+Christianity than men. I think the scientific explanation of this is to
+be found in the causes assigned in my essay on <i>Mental differences
+between Men and Women</i><a name="FNanchor_70_70" id="FNanchor_70_70"></a><a href="#Footnote_70_70" class="fnanchor">[70]</a>. But, if Christianity be supposed true, there
+would, of course, be a more ultimate explanation of a religious
+kind&mdash;as in all other cases where causation is concerned. And, in that
+case I have no doubt that the largest part of the explanation would
+consist in the passions of women being less ardent than those of men,
+and also much more kept under restraint by social conditions of life.
+This applies not only to purity, but likewise to most of the other
+psychological <i>differentiae</i> between the sexes, such as ambition,
+selfishness, pride of power, and so forth. In short, the whole ideal of
+Christian ethics is of a feminine as distinguished from a masculine
+type<a name="FNanchor_71_71" id="FNanchor_71_71"></a><a href="#Footnote_71_71" class="fnanchor">[71]</a>. Now nothing is so inimical to Christian belief as un-Christian
+conduct. This is especially the case as regards impurity; for whether
+the fact be explained on religious or non-religious grounds, it has more
+to do with unbelief than has the speculative reason. Consequently, woman
+is, for all these reasons, the 'fitter' type for receiving and retaining
+Christian belief.</p>
+
+<p class='tbrk'>Modern agnosticism is performing this great service to Christian faith;
+it is silencing all rational scepticism of the <i>a priori</i> kind. And this
+it is bound to do more and more the purer it becomes. In every
+generation it must henceforth become more and more recognized by
+logical thinking, that all antecedent objections to Christianity founded
+on reason alone are <i>ipso facto</i> nugatory. Now, all the strongest
+objections to Christianity have ever been those of the antecedent kind;
+hence the effect of modern thinking is that of more and more diminishing
+the purely speculative difficulties, such as that of the Incarnation,
+&amp;c. In other words the force of Butler's argument about our being
+incompetent judges<a name="FNanchor_72_72" id="FNanchor_72_72"></a><a href="#Footnote_72_72" class="fnanchor">[72]</a> is being more and more increased.</p>
+
+<p>And the logical development of this lies in the view already stated
+about natural causation. For, just as pure agnosticism must allow that
+reason is incompetent to adjudicate <i>a priori</i> for or against Christian
+miracles, including the Incarnation, so it must further allow that, if
+they ever took place, reason can have nothing to say against their being
+all of one piece with causation in general. Hence, so far as reason is
+concerned, pure agnosticism must allow that it is only the event which
+can ultimately prove whether Christianity is true or false. 'If it be of
+God we cannot overthrow it, lest haply we be found even to fight against
+God.' But the individual cannot wait for this empirical determination.
+What then is he to do? The unbiassed answer of pure agnosticism ought
+reasonably to be, in the words of John Hunter, 'Do not think; try.' That
+is, in this case, try the only experiment available&mdash;the experiment of
+faith. Do the doctrine, and if Christianity be true, the verification
+will come, not indeed mediately through any course of speculative
+reason, but immediately by spiritual intuition. Only if a man has faith
+enough to make this venture honestly, will he be in a just position for
+deciding the issue. Thus viewed it would seem that the experiment of
+faith is not a 'fool's experiment'; but, on the contrary, so that there
+is enough <i>prima facie</i> evidence to arrest serious attention, such an
+experimental trial would seem to be the rational duty of a pure
+agnostic.</p>
+
+<p>It is a fact that Christian belief is much more due to doing than to
+thinking, as prognosticated by the New Testament. 'If any man will do
+His will, he shall know of the doctrine, whether it be of God' (St. John
+vii. 17). And surely, even on grounds of reason itself, it should be
+allowed that, supposing Christianity to be 'of God,' it <i>ought</i> to
+appeal to the spiritual rather than to the rational side of our nature.</p>
+
+<p class='tbrk'>Even within the region of pure reason (or the '<i>prima facie</i> case')
+modern science, as directed on the New Testament criticism, has surely
+done more for Christianity than against it. For, after half a century of
+battle over the text by the best scholars, the dates of the Gospels have
+been fixed within the first century, and at least four of St. Paul's
+epistles have had their authenticity proved beyond doubt. Now this is
+enough to destroy all eighteenth-century criticism as to the
+doubtfulness of the historical existence of Christ and His apostles,
+'inventions of priests,' &amp;c., which was the most formidable kind of
+criticism of all. There is no longer any question as to historical
+facts, save the miraculous, which, however, are ruled out by negative
+criticism on merely <i>a priori</i> grounds. This remaining&mdash;and, <i>ex
+hypothesi</i>, necessary&mdash;doubt is of very different importance from the
+other.</p>
+
+<p>Again, the Pauline epistles of proved authenticity are enough for all
+that is wanted to show the belief of Christ's contemporaries.</p>
+
+<p>These are facts of the first order of importance to have proved. Old
+Testament criticism is as yet too immature to consider.</p>
+
+
+<h3><i>Plan in Revelation</i>.</h3>
+
+<p>The views which I entertained on this subject when an undergraduate
+[i.e. the ordinary orthodox views] were abandoned in presence of the
+theory of Evolution&mdash;i.e. the theory of natural causation as probably
+furnishing a scientific explanation [of the religious phenomena of
+Judaism] or, which is the same thing, an explanation in terms of
+ascertainable causes up to some certain point; which however in this
+particular case cannot be determined within wide limits, so that the
+history of Israel will always embody an element of 'mystery' much more
+than any other history.</p>
+
+<p>It was not until twenty-five years later that I saw clearly the full
+implications of my present views on natural causation. As applied to
+this particular case these views show that to a theist, at all events
+(i.e. to any one who on independent grounds has accepted the theory of
+Theism), it ought not to make much difference to the evidential value of
+the Divine Plan of Revelation as exhibited in the Old and New
+Testaments, even if it be granted that the whole has been due to
+so-called natural causes only. I say, 'not much difference,' for that it
+ought to make some difference I do not deny. Take a precisely analogous
+case. The theory of evolution by natural causes is often said to make no
+logical difference in the evidence of plan or design manifested in
+organic nature&mdash;it being only a question of <i>modus operandi</i> whether all
+pieces of organic machinery were produced suddenly or by degrees; the
+evidence of design is equally there in either case. Now I have shown
+elsewhere that this is wrong<a name="FNanchor_73_73" id="FNanchor_73_73"></a><a href="#Footnote_73_73" class="fnanchor">[73]</a>. It may not make much difference to a
+man who is already a theist, for then it is but a question of <i>modus</i>,
+but it makes a great difference to the evidence of Theism.</p>
+
+<p>So it is in evidence of plan in proof of a revelation. If there had been
+no alleged revelation up to the present time, and if Christ were now to
+appear suddenly in His first advent in all the power and glory which
+Christians expect for His second, the proof of His revelation would be
+demonstrative. So that, as a mere matter of evidence, a sudden
+revelation might be much more convincing than a gradual one. But it
+would be quite out of analogy with causation in nature<a name="FNanchor_74_74" id="FNanchor_74_74"></a><a href="#Footnote_74_74" class="fnanchor">[74]</a>. Besides,
+even a gradual revelation might be given easily, which would be of
+demonstrative value&mdash;as by making prophecies of historical events,
+scientific discoveries, &amp;c., so clear as to be unmistakeable. But, as
+before shown, a demonstrative revelation has not been made, and there
+may well be good reasons why it should not. Now, if there are such
+reasons (e.g. our state of probation), we can well see that the gradual
+unfolding of a plan of revelation, from earliest dawn of history to the
+end of the world ('I speak as a fool') is much preferable to a sudden
+manifestation sufficiently late in the world's history to be
+historically attested for all subsequent time. For</p>
+
+<blockquote><p>1st. Gradual evolution is in analogy with God's other work.</p>
+
+<p>2nd. It does not leave Him without witness at any time during the
+historical period.</p>
+
+<p>3rd. It gives ample scope for persevering research at all
+times&mdash;i.e. a moral test, and not merely an intellectual assent to
+some one <i>(ex hypothesi)</i> unequivocally attested event in history.</p></blockquote>
+
+<p>The <i>appearance</i> of plan in revelation is, in fact, certainly remarkable
+enough to arrest serious attention.</p>
+
+<p>If revelation has been of a progressive character, then it follows that
+it must have been so, not only historically, but likewise
+intellectually, morally, and spiritually. For thus only could it be
+always adapted to the advancing conditions of the human race. This
+reflection destroys all those numerous objections against Scripture on
+account of the absurdity or immorality of its statements or precepts,
+unless it can be shown that the modifications suggested by criticism as
+requisite to bring the statements or precepts into harmony with modern
+advancement would have been as well adapted to the requirements of the
+world at the date in question, as were the actual statements or precepts
+before us.</p>
+
+<p class='tbrk'>Supposing Christianity true, it is certain that the revelation which it
+conveys has been predetermined at least since the dawn of the historical
+period. This is certain because the objective evidences of Christianity
+as a revelation have their origin in that dawn. And these objective
+evidences are throughout [evidence] of a scheme, in which the end can be
+seen from the beginning. And the very methods whereby this scheme is
+itself revealed are such (still supposing that it is a scheme) as
+present remarkable evidences of design. These methods are, broadly
+speaking, miracles, prophecy and the results of the teaching, &amp;c., upon
+mankind. Now one may show that no better methods could conceivably have
+been designed for the purpose of latter-day evidence, combined with
+moral and religious teaching throughout. The mere fact of it being so
+largely incorporated with secular history renders the Christian religion
+unique: so to speak, the world, throughout its entire historical period,
+has been constituted the canvas on which this divine revelation has been
+painted&mdash;and painted so gradually that not until the process had been
+going on for a couple of thousand years was it possible to perceive the
+subject thereof.</p>
+
+
+<h3><i>Christian Dogmas</i>.</h3>
+
+<p>Whether or not Christ was Himself divine would make no difference so far
+as the consideration of Christianity as the highest phase of evolution
+is concerned, or from the purely secular [scientific] point of view.
+From the religious point of view, or that touching the relation of God
+to man, it would of course make a great difference; but the difference
+belongs to the same region of thought as that which applies to all the
+previous moments of evolution. Thus the passage from the non-moral to
+the moral appears, from the secular or scientific point of view, to be
+due, as far as we can see, to mechanical causes in natural selection or
+what not. But, just as in the case of the passage from the non-mental to
+the mental, &amp;c., this passage may have been <i>ultimately</i> due to divine
+volition, and <i>must have been so due</i> on the theory of Theism.
+Therefore, I say, it makes no difference from a secular or scientific
+point of view whether or not Christ was Himself divine; since, in either
+case, the movement which He inaugurated was the proximate or phenomenal
+cause of the observable results.</p>
+
+<p>Thus, even the question of the divinity of Christ ultimately resolves
+itself into the question of all questions&mdash;viz. is or is not mechanical
+causation 'the outward and visible form of an inward and spiritual
+grace'? Is it phenomenal or ontological; ultimate or derivative?</p>
+
+<p>Similarly as regards the redemption. Whether or not Christ was really
+divine, in as far as a belief in His divinity has been a necessary cause
+of the moral and religious evolution which has resulted from His life on
+earth, it has equally and so far 'saved His people from their sins';
+that is, of course, it has saved them from their own sense of sin as an
+abiding curse. Whether or not He has effected any corresponding change
+of an objective character in the ontological sphere, again depends on
+the 'question of questions' just stated.</p>
+
+
+<h3><i>Reasonableness of the Doctrines of the Incarnation and the Trinity.</i></h3>
+
+<p>Pure agnostics and those who search for God in Christianity should have
+nothing to do with metaphysical theology. <i>That</i> is a department of
+enquiry which, <i>ex hypothesi</i>, is transcendental, and is only to be
+considered after Christianity has been accepted. The doctrines of the
+Incarnation and the Trinity seemed to me most absurd in my agnostic
+days. But now, as a <i>pure</i> agnostic, I see in them no rational
+difficulty at all. As to the Trinity, the plurality of persons is
+necessarily implied in the companion doctrine of the Incarnation. So
+that at best there is here but one difficulty, since, duality being
+postulated in the doctrine of the Incarnation, there is no further
+difficulty for pure agnosticism in the doctrine of plurality. Now at one
+time it seemed to me impossible that any proposition, verbally
+intelligible as such, could be more violently absurd than that of the
+doctrine [of the Incarnation]. Now I see that this standpoint is wholly
+irrational, due only to the blindness of reason itself promoted by
+[purely] scientific habits of thought. 'But it is opposed to common
+sense.' No doubt, utterly so; but so it <i>ought</i> to be if true. Common
+sense is merely a [rough] register of common experience; but the
+Incarnation, if it ever took place, whatever else it may have been, at
+all events cannot have been a common event. 'But it is derogatory to God
+to become man.' How do you know? Besides, Christ was not an ordinary
+man. Both negative criticism and the historical effects of His life
+prove this; while, if we for a moment adopt the Christian point of view
+for the sake of argument, the whole <i>raison d'&ecirc;tre</i> of mankind is bound
+up in Him. Lastly, there are considerations <i>per contra</i>, rendering an
+incarnation antecedently probable<a name="FNanchor_75_75" id="FNanchor_75_75"></a><a href="#Footnote_75_75" class="fnanchor">[75]</a>. On antecedent grounds there
+<i>must</i> be mysteries unintelligible to reason as to the nature of God,
+&amp;c., supposing a revelation to be made at all. Therefore their
+occurrence in Christianity <i>is</i> no proper objection to Christianity.
+Why, again, stumble <i>a priori</i> over the doctrine of the
+Trinity&mdash;especially as man himself is a triune being, of body, mind
+(i.e. reason), and spirit (i.e. moral, aesthetic, religious faculties)?
+The unquestionable union of these no less unquestionably distinct orders
+of being in man is known immediately as a fact of experience, but is as
+unintelligible by any process of logic or reason as is the alleged
+triunity of God.</p>
+
+
+<h3><i>Adam, the Fall, the Origin of Evil</i>.</h3>
+
+<p>These, all taken together as Christian dogmas, are undoubtedly hard hit
+by the scientific proof of evolution (but are the <i>only</i> dogmas which
+can fairly be said to be so), and, as constituting the logical basis of
+the whole plan, they certainly do appear at first sight necessarily to
+involve in their destruction that of the entire superstructure. But the
+question is whether, after all, they have been destroyed for a pure
+agnostic. In other words, whether my principles are not as applicable in
+turning the flank of infidelity here as everywhere else.</p>
+
+<p>First, as regards Adam and Eve, observe, to begin with, that long before
+Darwin the story of man in Paradise was recognized by thoughtful
+theologians as allegorical. Indeed, read with unprejudiced eyes, the
+first chapters of Genesis ought always to have been seen to be a poem as
+distinguished from a history: nor could it ever have been mistaken for
+a history, but for preconceived ideas on the matter of inspiration. But
+to pure agnostics there should be no such preconceived ideas; so that
+nowadays no presumption should be raised against it as inspired, merely
+because it has been proved not to be a history&mdash;and this even though we
+cannot see of what it is allegorical. For, supposing it inspired, it has
+certainly done good service in the past and can do so likewise in the
+present, by giving an allegorical, though not a literal, starting-point
+for the Divine Plan of Redemption.</p>
+
+
+<h3><i>The evidence of Natural and Revealed Religion compared</i>.</h3>
+
+<p>It is often said that evolution of organic forms gives as good evidence
+of design as would their special creation, inasmuch as all the facts of
+adaptation, in which the evidence consists, are there in either case.
+But here it is overlooked that the very question at issue is thus
+begged. The question is, Are these facts of adaptation <i>per se</i>
+sufficient evidence of design as their cause? But if it be allowed, as
+it must be, that under hypothesis of evolution by natural causes the
+facts of adaptation belong to the same category as all the other facts
+of nature, no more special argument for design can be founded on these
+facts than on any others in nature. So that the facts of adaptation,
+like all other facts, are only available as arguments for design when
+it is assumed that all natural causation is of a mental character: which
+assumption merely begs the question of design anywhere. Or, in other
+words, on the supposition of their having been due to natural causes,
+the facts of adaptation are only then available as <i>per se</i> good
+evidence of design, when it has already been assumed that, <i>qua</i> due to
+natural causes, they are due to design.</p>
+
+<p>Natural religion resembles Revealed religion in this. Supposing both
+divine, both have been arranged so that, as far as reason can lead us,
+there is only enough evidence of design to arouse serious attention to
+the question of it. In other words, as regards both, the attitude of
+pure reason ought to be that of pure agnosticism. (Observe that the
+inadequacy of teleology, or design in nature, to prove Theism has been
+expressly recognized by all the more intellectual Christians of all
+ages, although such recognition has become more general since Darwin. On
+this point I may refer to Pascal especially<a name="FNanchor_76_76" id="FNanchor_76_76"></a><a href="#Footnote_76_76" class="fnanchor">[76]</a>, and many other
+authors.) This is another striking analogy between Nature and
+Revelation, supposing both to have emanated from the same author&mdash;i.e.
+quite as much so as identity of developmental method in both.</p>
+
+<p><i>Supposing the hypothesis of design in both to be true</i>, it follows that
+in both this hypothesis can be alike verified only by the organ of
+immediate intuition&mdash;i.e. that other mode of human apprehension which is
+supplementary to the rational. Here again we note the analogy. And if a
+man has this supplementary mode of apprehending the highest truth (by
+hypothesis such), it will be his duty to exercise his spiritual eyesight
+in searching for God in nature as in revelation, when (still on our
+present hypothesis that 'God is, and is the rewarder of them who seek
+Him diligently') he will find that his subjective evidence of God in
+Nature and in Revelation will mutually corroborate one another&mdash;so
+yielding additional evidence to his reason.</p>
+
+<p>The teleology of Revelation supplements that of Nature, and so, to the
+spiritually minded man, they logically and mutually corroborate one
+another.</p>
+
+<p>Paley's writings form an excellent illustration of the identity of the
+teleological argument from Nature and from Revelation; though a very
+imperfect illustration of the latter taken by itself, inasmuch as he
+treats only of the New Testament, and even of that very
+partially&mdash;ignoring all that went before Christ, and much of what
+happened after the apostles. Yet Paley himself does not seem to have
+observed the similarity of the argument, as developed in his <i>Natural
+Theology</i> and <i>Evidences of Christianity</i> respectively. But no one has
+developed the argument better in both cases. His great defect was in not
+perceiving that this teleological argument, <i>per se</i>, is not in either
+case enough to convince, but only to arouse serious attention. Paley
+everywhere represents that such an appeal to reason alone ought to be
+sufficient. He fails to see that if it were, there could be no room for
+faith. In other words, he fails to recognize the spiritual organ in
+man, and its complementary object, grace in God. So far he fails to be a
+Christian. And, whether Theism and Christianity be true or false, it is
+certain that the teleological argument alone <i>ought</i> to result, not in
+conviction, but in agnosticism.</p>
+
+<p class='tbrk'>The antecedent improbability against a miracle being wrought by a man
+without a moral object is apt to be confused with that of its being done
+by God with an adequate moral object. The former is immeasurably great;
+the latter is only equal to that of the theory of Theism&mdash;i.e. <i>nil</i>.</p>
+
+
+<h3><i>Christian Demonology</i><a name="FNanchor_77_77" id="FNanchor_77_77"></a><a href="#Footnote_77_77" class="fnanchor">[77]</a>.</h3>
+
+<p>It will be said, 'However you may seek to explain away <i>a priori</i>
+objections to miracles on <i>a priori</i> grounds, there remains the fact
+that Christ accepted the current superstition in regard to diabolic
+possession. Now the devils damn the doctrine. For you must choose the
+horn of your dilemma, either the current theory was true or it was not.
+If you say true, you must allow that the same theory is true for all
+similar stages of culture, [but not for the later stages,] and therefore
+that the most successful exorcist is Science, albeit Science works not
+by faith in the theory, but by rejection of it. Observe, the diseases
+are so well described by the record, that there is no possibility of
+mistaking them. Hence you must suppose that they were due to devils in
+A.D. 30, and to nervous disorders in A.D. 1894. On the other hand, if
+you choose the other horn, you must accept either the hypothesis of the
+ignorance or that of the mendacity of Christ.'</p>
+
+<p>The answer is, that either hypothesis may be accepted by Christianity.
+For the sake of argument we may exclude the question whether the
+acceptance of the devil theory by Christ was really historical, or
+merely attributed to Him by His biographers after His death. If Christ
+knew that the facts were not due to devils, He may also have known it
+was best to fall in with current theory, rather than to puzzle the
+people with a lecture on pathology. If He did not know, why should He,
+if He had previously 'emptied Himself' of omniscience? In either case,
+if He had denied the current theory, He would have been giving evidence
+of scientific knowledge or of scientific intuition beyond the culture of
+His time, and this, as in countless other cases, was not in accordance
+with His method, which, whether we suppose it divine or human, has
+nowhere proved His divine mission by foreknowledge of natural science.</p>
+
+<p>The particular question of Christ and demonology is but part of a much
+larger one.</p>
+
+<h3><a name="darwin" id="darwin"></a><i>Darwin's Difficulty</i><a name="FNanchor_78_78" id="FNanchor_78_78"></a><a href="#Footnote_78_78" class="fnanchor">[78]</a>.</h3>
+
+<p>The answer to Darwin's objection about so small a proportion of mankind
+having ever heard of Christ, is manifold:&mdash;</p>
+
+<p>1. Supposing Christianity true, it is the highest and final revelation;
+i.e. the scheme of revelation has been developmental. Therefore, it
+follows from the very method that the larger proportion of mankind
+should never hear of Christ, i.e. all who live before His advent.</p>
+
+<p>2. But these were not left 'without witness.' They all had their
+religion and their moral sense, each at its appropriate stage of
+development. Therefore 'the times of ignorance God winked at' (Acts
+xvii. 30).</p>
+
+<p>3. Moreover these men were not devoid of benefit from Christ, because it
+is represented that He died for all men&mdash;i.e. but for Him [i.e. apart
+from the knowledge of what was to come] God would not have 'winked at
+the times of ignorance.' The efficacy of atonement is represented as
+transcendental, and not dependent on the accident of hearing about the
+Atoner.</p>
+
+<p>4. It is remarkable that of all men Darwin should have been worsted by
+this fallacious argument. For it has received its death-blow from the
+theory of evolution: i.e. if it be true that evolution has been the
+method of natural causation, and if it be true that the method of
+natural causation is due to a Divinity, then it follows that the
+lateness of Christ's appearance on earth must have been designed. For it
+is certain that He could not have appeared at any earlier date without
+having violated the method of evolution. Therefore, on the theory of
+Theism, He <i>ought</i> to have appeared when He did&mdash;i.e. at the earliest
+possible moment in history.</p>
+
+<p>So as to the suitability of the moment of Christ's appearance in other
+respects. Even secular historians are agreed as to the suitability of
+the combinations, and deduce the success of His system of morals and
+religion from this fact. So with students of comparative religions.</p>
+
+<div class="footnotes"><h3>FOOTNOTES:</h3>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_59_59" id="Footnote_59_59"></a><a href="#FNanchor_59_59"><span class="label">[59]</span></a> [I.e. a theory which comes at first as a shock to the
+current teaching of Christianity, but is finally seen to be in no
+antagonism to its necessary principles.&mdash;<span class="smcap">Ed</span>.]</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_60_60" id="Footnote_60_60"></a><a href="#FNanchor_60_60"><span class="label">[60]</span></a> [I.e. the battle in regard to the Christian texts or
+documents.&mdash;<span class="smcap">Ed</span>.]</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_61_61" id="Footnote_61_61"></a><a href="#FNanchor_61_61"><span class="label">[61]</span></a> See Gore's <i>Bampton Lectures</i>, pp. 74 ff.</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_62_62" id="Footnote_62_62"></a><a href="#FNanchor_62_62"><span class="label">[62]</span></a> Matt, xxviii. 17; Acts ii. 13.</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_63_63" id="Footnote_63_63"></a><a href="#FNanchor_63_63"><span class="label">[63]</span></a> <i>Three Essays on Theism</i>, p. 255.</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_64_64" id="Footnote_64_64"></a><a href="#FNanchor_64_64"><span class="label">[64]</span></a> [Note unfinished.&mdash;<span class="smcap">Ed.</span>]</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_65_65" id="Footnote_65_65"></a><a href="#FNanchor_65_65"><span class="label">[65]</span></a> [George Romanes began to make a collection of N.T. texts
+bearing on the subject.&mdash;<span class="smcap">Ed.</span>]</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_66_66" id="Footnote_66_66"></a><a href="#FNanchor_66_66"><span class="label">[66]</span></a> See Pascal, <i>Pens&eacute;es</i>, p. 245.</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_67_67" id="Footnote_67_67"></a><a href="#FNanchor_67_67"><span class="label">[67]</span></a> [The notes on this subject were often too fragmentary for
+publication.&mdash;<span class="smcap">Ed</span>.]</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_68_68" id="Footnote_68_68"></a><a href="#FNanchor_68_68"><span class="label">[68]</span></a> Ps. li.</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_69_69" id="Footnote_69_69"></a><a href="#FNanchor_69_69"><span class="label">[69]</span></a> <i>Pens&eacute;es</i>, pp. 91-93.</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_70_70" id="Footnote_70_70"></a><a href="#FNanchor_70_70"><span class="label">[70]</span></a> See <i>Nineteenth Century</i>, May 1887.</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_71_71" id="Footnote_71_71"></a><a href="#FNanchor_71_71"><span class="label">[71]</span></a> [The essay mentioned above should be read in explanation
+of this expression. George Romanes' meaning would be more accurately
+expressed, I think, had he said: 'The ideal of Christian character holds
+in prominence the elements which we regard as characteristically
+feminine, e.g. development of affections, readiness of trust, love of
+service, readiness to suffer, &amp;c.'&mdash;<span class="smcap">Ed</span>.]</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_72_72" id="Footnote_72_72"></a><a href="#FNanchor_72_72"><span class="label">[72]</span></a> See <i>Analogy</i>, part i. ch. 7; part ii. ch. 3, 4, &amp;c.</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_73_73" id="Footnote_73_73"></a><a href="#FNanchor_73_73"><span class="label">[73]</span></a> See Conclusion of <i>Darwin and After Darwin</i>, part I.</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_74_74" id="Footnote_74_74"></a><a href="#FNanchor_74_74"><span class="label">[74]</span></a> I should somewhere show how much better a treatise Butler
+might have written had he known about evolution as the general law of
+nature.</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_75_75" id="Footnote_75_75"></a><a href="#FNanchor_75_75"><span class="label">[75]</span></a> See Gore's <i>Bampton Lectures</i>, lect. ii.</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_76_76" id="Footnote_76_76"></a><a href="#FNanchor_76_76"><span class="label">[76]</span></a> <i>Pens&eacute;es</i>, pp. 205 ff.</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_77_77" id="Footnote_77_77"></a><a href="#FNanchor_77_77"><span class="label">[77]</span></a> [Romanes' line of argument in this note seems to me
+impossible to maintain. The emphasis which Jesus Christ lays on diabolic
+agency is so great that, if it is not a reality, He must be regarded
+either as seriously misled about realities which concern the spiritual
+life, or else as seriously misleading others. And in neither case could
+He be even the perfect Prophet. I think I am justified in explaining my
+disagreement with Romanes' argument at this point
+particularly.&mdash;<span class="smcap">Ed</span>.]</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_78_78" id="Footnote_78_78"></a><a href="#FNanchor_78_78"><span class="label">[78]</span></a> [There is nothing in Darwin's <i>writings</i> which seems to me
+to justify Romanes in attributing this difficulty to him specially. But
+he knew Darwin so intimately and reverenced him so profoundly that he is
+not likely to have been in error on the subject.&mdash;<span class="smcap">Ed.</span>]</p></div>
+</div>
+
+
+<hr />
+<h2><a name="Concluding_Note_by_the_Editor" id="Concluding_Note_by_the_Editor"></a><b>Concluding Note by the Editor:&mdash;</b></h2>
+
+<p>The intellectual attitude towards Christianity expressed in these notes
+may be described as&mdash;(1) 'pure agnosticism' in the region of the
+scientific 'reason,' coupled with (2) a vivid recognition of the
+spiritual necessity of faith and of the legitimacy and value of its
+intuitions; (3) a perception of the positive strength of the historical
+and spiritual evidences of Christianity.</p>
+
+<p>George Romanes came to recognize, as in these written notes so also in
+conversation, that it was 'reasonable to be a Christian believer' before
+the activity or habit of faith had been recovered. His life was cut
+short very soon after this point was reached; but it will surprise no
+one to learn that the writer of these 'Thoughts' returned before his
+death to that full, deliberate communion with the Church of Jesus Christ
+which he had for so many years been conscientiously compelled to forego.
+In his case the 'pure in heart' was after a long period of darkness
+allowed, in a measure before his death, to 'see God.'</p>
+
+<p><i>Fecisti nos ad te, Domine; et inquietum est cor nostrum donec
+requiescat in te</i>.</p>
+
+<p class='right'>C.G.</p>
+
+
+<hr />
+
+<p class='center'>OXFORD: HORACE HART<br />
+PRINTER TO THE UNIVERSITY</p>
+
+
+
+<hr />
+
+<h3>ADVERTISEMENTS</h3>
+
+<hr />
+
+<h2>The Oxford Library of Practical Theology</h2>
+
+<blockquote><p>Edited by the Rev. <span class="smcap">W.C.E. Newbolt</span>, M.A., Canon and
+Chancellor of St. Paul's; and the Rev. <span class="smcap">Darwell Stone</span>,
+M.A., Librarian of the Pusey House, Oxford.</p></blockquote>
+
+<hr />
+
+<p class='center'><i>Price 5s. each volume</i>.</p>
+
+<p><b>RELIGION</b>. By the Rev. <span class="smcap">W.C.E. Newbolt</span>, M.A., Canon and
+Chancellor of St. Paul's. [<i>Fifth Impression</i>.</p>
+
+<blockquote><p>'<i>The Oxford Library of Practical Theology</i> makes a good beginning
+with Canon Newbolt's volume on religion.... The publishers have
+spared no pains in making the appearance of the volumes as
+attractive as possible. The binding, type, and general "get up" of
+the volume just issued leave nothing to be desired.'&mdash;<i>Guardian</i>.</p></blockquote>
+
+<p><b>HOLY BAPTISM.</b> By the Rev. <span class="smcap">Darwell Stone</span>, M.A., Librarian of
+the Pusey House, Oxford. [<i>Third Edition</i>.</p>
+
+<blockquote><p>'Few books on Baptism contain more thoughtful and useful
+instruction on the rite, and we give Mr. Stone's effort our highest
+approval. It might well be made a text-book for candidates for the
+diaconate, or at least in theological colleges. As a book for
+thoughtful laymen it is also certain to find a place.'&mdash;<i>Church
+Times</i>.</p></blockquote>
+
+<p><b>CONFIRMATION.</b> By the Right Rev. <span class="smcap">A.C.A. Hall</span>, D.D., Bishop of
+Vermont. [<i>Third Impression</i>.</p>
+
+<blockquote><p>'To the parochial clergy this volume may be warmly commended. They
+will find it to be a storehouse of material for their instruction,
+and quite the best treatise that we have on the subject it treats.
+It is thoroughly practical, and gives exactly the kind of teaching
+that is wanted.'&mdash;<i>Guardian</i>.</p></blockquote>
+
+<p><b>THE HISTORY OF THE BOOK OF COMMON PRAYER.</b> By the Rev. <span class="smcap">Leighton
+Pullan</span>, M.A., Fellow of St. John Baptist's College, Oxford, [<i>Third
+Edition</i>.</p>
+
+<blockquote><p>'Mr. Pullan's book will no doubt have, as it deserves to have, a
+large number of readers, and they will gain a great deal from the
+perusal of it. It may be certainly recommended to the ordinary
+layman as by far the best book on the subject available.'&mdash;<i>Pilot</i>.</p></blockquote>
+
+<p><b>HOLY MATRIMONY.</b> By the Rev. <span class="smcap">W.J. Knox Little</span>, M.A., Canon of
+Worcester. [<i>Second Edition</i>.</p>
+
+<blockquote><p>'Canon Knox Little has given us a most exhaustive treatise on Holy
+Matrimony written in his best and happiest style, and giving ample
+proofs of wide research and deep study of the various aspects, and
+the essential characteristics of Christian marriage.... We would
+strongly advise the clergy to place this work upon their shelves as
+a book of reference, while it forms a complete manual of
+instruction to aid them in the preparation of addresses on the
+subject.'&mdash;<i>Church Bells</i>.</p></blockquote>
+
+<p><b>THE INCARNATION.</b> By the Rev. <span class="smcap">H.V.S. Eck</span>, M.A., Rector of
+Bethnal Green. [<i>Second Edition</i>.</p>
+
+<blockquote><p>'The teaching is sound, and the book may be placed with confidence
+in the hands of candidates for Orders or of intelligent and
+educated lay people who desire fuller instruction on the central
+doctrines of the Faith than can be provided in
+sermons.'&mdash;<i>Guardian</i>.</p></blockquote>
+
+<p><b>FOREIGN MISSIONS.</b> By the Right Rev. <span class="smcap">E.T. Churton</span>, D.D.,
+formerly Bishop of Nassau.</p>
+
+<blockquote><p>'We welcome Bishop Churton's book as an authoritative exposition of
+the modern High Church view of Missions, It is good for us all to
+understand it, thereby we shall be saved alike from uninstructed
+admiration and indiscriminate denunciation.'&mdash;<i>Church Missionary
+Intelligencer</i>.</p></blockquote>
+
+<p><b>PRAYER.</b> By the Rev. <span class="smcap">Arthur John Worlledge</span>, M.A., Canon and
+Chancellor of Truro. [<i>Second Edition</i>.</p>
+
+<blockquote><p>'We do not know of any book about prayer which is equally useful;
+and we anticipate that it will be a standard work for, at any rate,
+a considerable time.'&mdash;<i>Pilot</i>.</p></blockquote>
+
+<p><b>SUNDAY</b>. By the Rev. <span class="smcap">W.B. Trevelyan, M.A.,</span> Vicar of St.
+Matthew's, Westminster. [<i>Second Edition</i>.</p>
+
+<blockquote><p>'An extremely useful contribution to a difficult and important
+subject, and we are confident it will rank high in the series to
+which it belongs.'&mdash;<i>Guardian</i>.</p></blockquote>
+
+<p><b>THE CHRISTIAN TRADITION</b>. By the Rev. <span class="smcap">Leighton Pullan</span>, M.A.,
+Fellow of St. John Baptist's College, Oxford.</p>
+
+<blockquote><p>'Mr. Pullan affirms that the critics of orthodox Christianity are
+now destroying one another's theories much more than they are
+destroying the Catholic Faith. However that may be, his book should
+render some assistance in determining what is and what is not "The
+Faith once delivered to the Saints." It is a worthy addition to the
+series to which it belongs.'&mdash;<i>Westminster Gazette</i>.</p></blockquote>
+
+<p><b>BOOKS OF DEVOTION</b>. By the Rev. <span class="smcap">Charles Bodington,</span> Canon and
+Precentor of Lichfield.</p>
+
+<blockquote><p>'Extremely valuable for its high tone, fidelity to Catholic
+standards, and powerful advocacy of reality in private devotion. To
+those who have never studied the subject, it should reveal a mine
+of devotional wealth, yet to be worked with profit to man and glory
+to God.'&mdash;<i>Church Times</i>.</p></blockquote>
+
+<p><b>HOLY ORDERS</b>. By the Rev. <span class="smcap">A.R. Whitham, M.A.</span>, Principal of
+Culham College, Abingdon.</p>
+
+<blockquote><p>'For the educated layman who wishes to know what the Church is
+teaching about the ministry, and what the relation of the laity to
+it really is, this is the best book with which we have met. Young
+men who are considering whether they will seek ordination will find
+in it excellent statements on the position and work and
+responsibilities of the ordained.'&mdash;<i>Pilot</i>.</p></blockquote>
+
+<p><b>THE CHURCH CATECHISM THE CHRISTIAN'S MANUAL</b>. By the Rev. <span class="smcap">W.C.E.
+Newbolt</span>, M.A., Canon and Chancellor of St. Paul's.</p>
+
+<blockquote><p>'We think the book should be in the possession of every teacher who
+can afford it, and in every Church Library for the benefit of those
+who cannot.'&mdash;<i>The Reader and Layworker</i>.</p></blockquote>
+
+<p><b>THE HOLY COMMUNION</b>. By the Rev. <span class="smcap">Darwell Stone,</span> M.A.,
+Librarian of the Pusey House, Oxford.</p>
+
+<p><b>RELIGIOUS CEREMONIAl</b>. By the Rev. <span class="smcap">Walter Howard Frere</span>, M.A.,
+of the Community of the Resurrection, Examining Chaplain to the Bishop
+of Rochester. [<i>In preparation</i>.]</p>
+
+<p><b>THE BIBLE</b>. By the Rev. <span class="smcap">Darwell Stone</span>, M.A., Librarian of the
+Pusey House, Oxford. [<i>In preparation</i>.]</p>
+
+<p><b>OLD TESTAMENT CRITICISM</b>. By the Very Rev. <span class="smcap">Henry Wace</span>, D.D.,
+Dean of Canterbury. [<i>In preparation</i>.]</p>
+
+<p><b>NEW TESTAMENT CRITICISM</b>. By the Rev. <span class="smcap">R.J. Knowling</span>, D.D.,
+Professor of New Testament Exegesis at King's College, London. [<i>In
+preparation</i>.]</p>
+
+<p><b>THE HOLY TRINITY</b>. By the Right Rev. <span class="smcap">L.G. Mylne,</span> D.D., late
+Bishop of Bombay. [<i>In preparation</i>.]</p>
+
+<p><b>THE ANGLICAN CHURCH</b>. By the Rev. <span class="smcap">Arthur John Worlledge,</span> M.A.,
+Canon and Chancellor of Truro. [<i>In preparation</i>.]</p>
+
+<p><b>THE ATONEMENT</b>. By the Rev. <span class="smcap">Leighton Pullan</span>, M.A., Fellow of
+St. John Baptist's College, Oxford. [<i>In preparation</i>.]</p>
+
+<p><b>CHURCH HISTORY</b>. By the Rev. <span class="smcap">H.N. Bate</span>, M.A., Fellow of
+Magdalen College, Oxford. 2 vols. [<i>In preparation</i>.]</p>
+
+<p><b>CHURCH WORK</b>. By the Rev. <span class="smcap">Bernard Reynolds</span>, M.A., Prebendary
+of St. Paul's. [<i>In preparation</i>.]</p>
+
+<p><b>VISITATION OF THE SICK</b>. By the Rev. <span class="smcap">E.F. Russell</span>, M.A., of
+St. Alban's, Holborn. [<i>In preparation</i>.]</p>
+
+<hr />
+
+<h2>HANDBOOKS FOR THE CLERGY</h2>
+
+<h3>EDITED BY THE REV. ARTHUR W. ROBINSON, B.D.</h3>
+
+<p class='center'>VICAR OF ALLHALLOWS BARKING BY THE TOWER</p>
+
+<hr />
+
+<p class='center'><i>Crown 8vo, price 2s. 6d. net each volume</i>.</p>
+
+<blockquote><p>The purpose of the writers of this Series is to present in a clear
+and attractive way the responsibilities and opportunities of the
+Clergy of to-day, and to offer such practical guidance, in regard
+both to aims and to methods, as experience may have shown to be
+valuable. It is hoped that the Series, while primarily intended for
+those who are already face to face with the duties and problems of
+the ministerial office, may be of interest and assistance also to
+others who are considering the question of entering into Holy
+Orders.</p></blockquote>
+
+<p class='center'><span class="smcap">Third Impression.</span></p>
+
+<p><b>THE PERSONAL LIFE OF THE CLERGY</b>. By the <span class="smcap">Editor.</span></p>
+
+<blockquote><p>'It is a short book, but it covers a wide, field. Every line of it
+tells, and it is excellent reading. Not the least valuable part of
+the book are the extremely apt and striking quotations from various
+writers of eminence, which are placed in the form of notes at the
+end of the chapters. It is emphatically a book for both clergy and
+laity to buy and study.'&mdash;<i>Church Times</i>.</p>
+
+<p>'We are grateful for a little book which will be of service to many
+priests, young and old. We need more priests, and such a book may
+well increase their number by explaining the nature of the life to
+which a vocation to Holy Orders calls men; but we need still more
+that priests should realise the life to which they are called and
+pledged; and this they can hardly fail to do if they listen to Mr.
+Robinson's prudent and tender counsels.'&mdash;<i>Church Quarterly
+Review</i>.</p></blockquote>
+
+<p class='center'><span class="smcap">Second Edition.</span></p>
+
+<p><b>PATRISTIC STUDY</b>. By the Rev. <span class="smcap">H.B. Swete</span>, D.D., Regius
+Professor of Divinity in the University of Cambridge.</p>
+
+<blockquote><p>'The whole of the work which this little volume contains is most
+admirably done. Sufficient is told about the personal history of
+the Fathers to make the study of their writings
+profitable.'&mdash;<i>Church Quarterly Review</i>.</p>
+
+<p>'This is an admirable little guide-book to wide study by one who
+well knows how to guide. It is sound and learned, and crammed full
+of information, yet pleasant in style and easy to
+understand.'&mdash;<i>Pall Mall Gazette</i>.</p></blockquote>
+
+<p class='center'><span class="smcap">Second Impression.</span></p>
+
+<p><b>THE MINISTRY OF CONVERSION</b>. By the Rev. <span class="smcap">A.J. Mason</span>, D.D.,
+Master of Pembroke College, Cambridge, and Canon of Canterbury.</p>
+
+<blockquote><p>'It will be found most valuable and interesting.'&mdash;<i>Guardian</i>.</p>
+
+<p>'Canon Mason has given a manual that should be carefully studied by
+all, whether clergy or laity, who have in any way to share in the
+"Ministry of Conversion" by preaching, by parochial organisation,
+or by personal influence.'&mdash;<i>Scottish Guardian.</i></p></blockquote>
+
+<p class='center'><span class="smcap">Third Impression.</span></p>
+
+<p><b>FOREIGN MISSIONS</b>. By the Right Rev. <span class="smcap">H.H. Montgomery</span>, D.D.,
+formerly Bishop of Tasmania, Secretary of the Society for the
+Propagation of the Gospel in Foreign Parts.</p>
+
+<blockquote><p>'Bishop Montgomery's admirable little book.... Into a limited
+compass he has compressed the very kind of information which gives
+one an adequate impression of the spirit which pervades a religion,
+of what is its strength and weakness, what its relation to
+Christianity, what, the side upon which it must be approached.'
+<i>Church Quarterly Review</i>.</p></blockquote>
+
+<p class='center'><span class="smcap">Third Impression.</span></p>
+
+<p><b>THE STUDY OF THE GOSPELS</b>. By the Very Rev. J. <span class="smcap">Armitage
+Robinson</span>, D.D., Dean of Westminster.</p>
+
+<blockquote><p>'Nothing could be more desirable than that the Anglican clergy
+should be equipped with knowledge of the kind to which this little
+volume will introduce them, and should regard the questions with
+which Biblical study abounds in the candid spirit, and with the
+breadth of view which they see here exemplified.'&mdash;<i>Spectator</i>.</p>
+
+<p>'The little book on the Gospels, which the new Dean of Westminster
+has recently published, is one to be warmly commended alike to
+clergy and laity. Any intelligent person who takes the trouble to
+work through this little volume of 150 pages will be rewarded by
+gaining from it as clear a view of the synoptic problem as is
+possible without prolonged and independent study of the
+sources.'&mdash;<i>The Pilot</i>.</p></blockquote>
+
+<p><b>A CHRISTIAN APOLOGETIC.</b> By the Very Rev. <span class="smcap">Wilford L. Robbins</span>,
+Dean of the General Theological Seminary, New York; Author of <i>An Essay
+toward Faith</i>.</p>
+
+<blockquote><p>'We commend this handbook with confidence as a helpful guide to
+those clergy and teachers who have thoughtful doubters to deal
+with, and who wish to build safely if they build at all.'&mdash;<i>Church
+of Ireland Gazette.</i></p></blockquote>
+
+<p><b>PASTORAL VISITATION.</b> By the Rev. <span class="smcap">H.E. Savage</span>, M.A., Vicar of
+South Shields, and Hon. Canon of Durham.</p>
+
+<blockquote><p>'This is an excellent book.'&mdash;<i>Spectator</i>.</p></blockquote>
+
+<p><b>AUTHORITY IN THE CHURCH.</b> By the Very Rev. <span class="smcap">T.B. Strong</span>, D.D.,
+Dean of Christ Church.</p>
+
+<blockquote><p>'This is a valuable and timely book, small in bulk, but weighty
+both in style and substance.... The Dean's essay is an admirable
+one, and is well calculated to clear men's minds in regard to
+questions of very far-reaching importance. Its calm tone, and its
+clear and penetrating thought, are alike characteristic of the
+author, and give a peculiar distinction to everything he
+writes.'&mdash;<i>Guardian</i>.</p></blockquote>
+
+<p><b>THE STUDY OF ECCLESIASTICAL HISTORY.</b> By the Right Rev. <span class="smcap">W.E.
+Collins</span>, D.D., Bishop of Gibraltar.</p>
+
+<blockquote><p>'A book which displays the master-mind on every page, and has what
+many master-minds lack, a sober, practical, common-sense strain
+about it, which is hardly ever found in those who set out to
+instruct us in Church History, or Canon Law, or Catholic
+use.'&mdash;<i>Church Bells</i>.</p></blockquote>
+
+<p><b>LAY WORK AND THE OFFICE OF READER.</b> By the Right Rev. <span class="smcap">Huyshe
+Yeatman-Biggs</span>, D.D., Lord Bishop of Southwark.</p>
+
+<p><b>RELIGION AND SCIENCE.</b> By the Rev. <span class="smcap">P.N. Waggett</span>, M.A., of the
+Society of St. John the Evangelist, Cowley.</p>
+
+<p><b>CHURCH MUSIC.</b> By <span class="smcap">A. Madeley Richardson</span>, Mus. Doc., Organist
+of St. Saviour's Collegiate Church, Southwark.</p>
+
+<p><b>INTEMPERANCE.</b> By the Right Rev. <span class="smcap">H.H. Pereira</span>, D.D., Bishop of
+Croydon. [<i>In preparation</i>.</p>
+
+<p><b>SCHOOLS.</b> By the Rev. <span class="smcap">W. Foxley Norris</span>, M.A., Rector of
+Barnsley, and Hon. Canon of Wakefield. [<i>In preparation</i>.</p>
+
+<p class='center'>LONGMANS, GREEN, AND CO.<br />
+LONDON, NEW YORK, AND BOMBAY</p>
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+<pre>
+
+
+
+
+
+End of Project Gutenberg's Thoughts on Religion, by George John Romanes
+
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+The Project Gutenberg EBook of Thoughts on Religion, by George John Romanes
+
+This eBook is for the use of anyone anywhere at no cost and with
+almost no restrictions whatsoever.  You may copy it, give it away or
+re-use it under the terms of the Project Gutenberg License included
+with this eBook or online at www.gutenberg.org
+
+
+Title: Thoughts on Religion
+
+Author: George John Romanes
+
+Editor: Charles Gore
+
+Release Date: October 25, 2005 [EBook #16942]
+
+Language: English
+
+Character set encoding: ASCII
+
+*** START OF THIS PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK THOUGHTS ON RELIGION ***
+
+
+
+
+Produced by Marilynda Fraser-Cunliffe, Martin Pettit and
+the Online Distributed Proofreading Team at
+https://www.pgdp.net
+
+
+
+
+
+
+_Thoughts on Religion_
+
+BY THE LATE
+
+GEORGE JOHN ROMANES
+M.A., LL.D., F.R.S.
+
+EDITED BY
+
+CHARLES GORE, D.D.
+BISHOP OF WORCESTER
+
+Twelfth Impression
+
+LONGMANS, GREEN, AND CO.
+39 PATERNOSTER ROW, LONDON
+AND BOMBAY
+
+1904
+
+
+
+
+CONTENTS
+
+                                                        PAGE
+
+EDITOR'S PREFACE                                           5
+
+
+PART I.
+
+THE INFLUENCE OF SCIENCE UPON RELIGION.
+
+ESSAY I                                                   37
+
+ESSAY II                                                  56
+
+
+PART II.
+
+NOTES FOR A WORK ON A CANDID EXAMINATION OF RELIGION.
+
+INTRODUCTORY NOTE BY THE EDITOR                           91
+
+Sec. 1. INTRODUCTORY                                         98
+
+Sec. 2. DEFINITION OF TERMS AND PURPOSE OF THIS TREATISE    104
+
+Sec. 3. CAUSALITY                                           116
+
+Sec. 4. FAITH                                               131
+
+Sec. 5. FAITH IN CHRISTIANITY                               154
+
+CONCLUDING NOTE BY THE EDITOR                            184
+
+
+
+
+PUBLISHER'S NOTE
+
+
+The present edition of Romanes' _Thoughts on Religion_ is issued in
+response to a request which has been made with some frequency of late
+for very cheap reprints of standard religious and theological works.
+
+39 PATERNOSTER ROW,
+     LONDON,
+     _January, 1904._
+
+
+
+
+EDITOR'S PREFACE
+
+
+The late Mr. George John Romanes--the author within the last few years
+of _Darwin and After Darwin_, and of the _Examination of
+Weismannism_--occupied a distinguished place in contemporary biology.
+But his mind was also continuously and increasingly active on the
+problems of metaphysics and theology. And at his death in the early
+summer of this year (1894), he left among his papers some notes, made
+mostly in the previous winter, for a work which he was intending to
+write on the fundamental questions of religion. He had desired that
+these notes should be given to me and that I should do with them as I
+thought best. His literary executors accordingly handed them over to me,
+in company with some unpublished essays, two of which form the first
+part of the present volume.
+
+After reading the notes myself, and obtaining the judgement of others in
+whom I feel confidence upon them, I have no hesitation either in
+publishing by far the greater part of them, or in publishing them with
+the author's name in spite of the fact that the book as originally
+projected was to have been anonymous. From the few words which George
+Romanes said to me on the subject, I have no doubt that he realized that
+the notes if published after his death must be published with his name.
+
+I have said that after reading these notes I feel no doubt that they
+ought to be published. They claim it both by their intrinsic value and
+by the light they throw on the religious thought of a scientific man who
+was not only remarkably able and clear-headed, but also many-sided, as
+few men are, in his capacities, and singularly candid and open-hearted.
+To all these qualities the notes which are now offered to the public
+will bear unmistakeable witness.
+
+With more hesitation it has been decided to print also the unpublished
+essays already referred to. These, as representing an earlier stage of
+thought than is represented in the notes, naturally appear first.
+
+Both Essays and Notes however represent the same tendency of a mind from
+a position of unbelief in the Christian Revelation toward one of belief
+in it. They represent, I say, a tendency of one 'seeking after God if
+haply he might feel after Him and find Him,' and not a position of
+settled orthodoxy. Even the Notes contain in fact many things which
+could not come from a settled believer. This being so it is natural that
+I should say a word as to the way in which I have understood my function
+as an editor. I have decided the question of publishing each Note solely
+by the consideration whether or no it was sufficiently finished to be
+intelligible. I have rigidly excluded any question of my own agreement
+or disagreement with it. In the case of one Note in particular, I doubt
+whether I should have published it, had it not been that my decided
+disagreement with its contents made me fear that I might be prejudiced
+in withholding it.
+
+The Notes, with the papers which precede them, will, I think, be better
+understood if I give some preliminary account of their antecedents, that
+is of Romanes' previous publications on the subject of religion.
+
+In 1873 an essay of George Romanes gained the Burney Prize at Cambridge,
+the subject being _Christian Prayer considered in relation to the belief
+that the Almighty governs the world by general laws_. This was published
+in 1874, with an appendix on _The Physical Efficacy of Prayer_. In this
+essay, written when he was twenty-five years old, Romanes shows the
+characteristic qualities of his mind and style already developed. The
+sympathy with the scientific point of view is there, as might be
+expected perhaps in a Cambridge 'Scholar in Natural Science': the
+logical acumen and love of exact distinctions is there: there too the
+natural piety and spiritual appreciation of the nature of Christian
+prayer--a piety and appreciation which later intellectual habits of
+thought could never eradicate. The essay, as judged by the standard of
+prize compositions, is of remarkable ability, and strictly proceeds
+within the limits of the thesis. On the one side, for the purpose of the
+argument, the existence of a Personal God is assumed[1], and also the
+reality of the Christian Revelation which assures us that we have reason
+to expect real answers, even though conditionally and within restricted
+limits, to prayers for _physical_ goods[2]. On the other side, there is
+taken for granted the belief that general laws pervade the observable
+domain of physical nature. Then the question is considered--how is the
+physical efficacy of prayer which the Christian accepts on the authority
+of revelation compatible with the scientifically known fact that God
+governs the world by general laws? The answer is mainly found in
+emphasizing the limited sphere within which scientific inquiry can be
+conducted and scientific knowledge can obtain. Special divine acts of
+response to prayer, even in the physical sphere, _may_ occur--force
+_may_ be even originated in response to prayer--and still not produce
+any phenomenon such as science must take cognizance of and regard as
+miraculous or contrary to the known order.
+
+On one occasion the Notes refer back to this essay[3], and more
+frequently, as we shall have occasion to notice, they reproduce thoughts
+which had already been expressed in the earlier work but had been
+obscured or repudiated in the interval. I have no grounds for knowing
+whether in the main Romanes remained satisfied with the reasoning and
+conclusion of his earliest essay, granted the theistic hypothesis on
+which it rests[4]. But this hypothesis itself, very shortly after
+publishing this essay, he was led to repudiate. In other words, his mind
+moved rapidly and sharply into a position of reasoned scepticism about
+the existence of God at all. The Burney Essay was published in 1874.
+Already in 1876 at least he had written an anonymous work with a wholly
+sceptical conclusion, entitled 'A Candid Examination of Theism' by
+_Physicus_[5]. As the Notes were written with direct reference to this
+work, some detailed account of its argument seems necessary; and this is
+to be found in the last chapter of the work itself, where the author
+summarizes his arguments and draws his conclusions. I venture therefore
+to reproduce this chapter at length[6].
+
+
+'Sec. 1. Our analysis is now at an end, and a very few words will here
+suffice to convey an epitomized recollection of the numerous facts and
+conclusions which we have found it necessary to contemplate. We first
+disposed of the conspicuously absurd supposition that the origin of
+things, or the mystery of existence [i.e. the fact that anything exists
+at all], admits of being explained by the theory of Theism in any
+further degree than by the theory of Atheism. Next it was shown that the
+argument "Our heart requires a God" is invalid, seeing that such a
+subjective necessity, even if made out, could not be sufficient to
+prove--or even to render probable--an objective existence. And with
+regard to the further argument that the fact of our theistic aspirations
+points to God as to their explanatory cause, it became necessary to
+observe that the argument could only be admissible after the possibility
+of the operation of natural causes [in the production of our theistic
+aspirations] had been excluded. Similarly the argument from the supposed
+intuitive necessity of individual thought [i.e. the alleged fact that
+men find it impossible to rid themselves of the persuasion that God
+exists] was found to be untenable, first, because, even if the supposed
+necessity were a real one, it would only possess an individual
+applicability; and second, that, as a matter of fact, it is extremely
+improbable that the supposed necessity is a real necessity even for the
+individual who asserts it, while it is absolutely certain that it is not
+such to the vast majority of the race. The argument from the general
+consent of mankind, being so obviously fallacious both as to facts and
+principles, was passed over without comment; while the argument from a
+first cause was found to involve a logical suicide. Lastly, the argument
+that, as human volition is a cause in nature, therefore all causation is
+probably volitional in character, was shown to consist in a stretch of
+inference so outrageous that the argument had to be pronounced
+worthless.
+
+'Sec. 2. Proceeding next to examine the less superficial arguments in
+favour of Theism, it was first shown that the syllogism, All known minds
+are caused by an unknown mind; our mind is a known mind; therefore our
+mind is caused by an unknown mind,--is a syllogism that is inadmissible
+for two reasons. In the first place, it does not account for mind (in
+the abstract) to refer it to a prior mind for its origin; and therefore,
+although the hypothesis, if admitted, would be _an_ explanation of
+_known_ mind, it is useless as an argument for the existence of the
+unknown mind, the assumption of which forms the basis of that
+explanation. Again, in the next place, if it be said that mind is so far
+an entity _sui generis_ that it must be either self-existing or caused
+by another mind, there is no assignable warrant for the assertion. And
+this is the second objection to the above syllogism; for anything within
+the whole range of the possible may, for aught that we can tell, be
+competent to produce a self-conscious intelligence. Thus an objector to
+the above syllogism need not hold any theory of things at all; but even
+as opposed to the definite theory of materialism, the above syllogism
+has not so valid an argumentative basis to stand upon. We know that what
+we call matter and force are to all appearance eternal, while we have no
+corresponding evidence of a mind that is even apparently eternal.
+Further, within experience mind is invariably associated with highly
+differentiated collocations of matter and distributions of force, and
+many facts go to prove, and none to negative, the conclusion that the
+grade of intelligence invariably depends upon, or at least is associated
+with, a corresponding grade of cerebral development. There is thus both
+a qualitative and a quantitative relation between intelligence and
+cerebral organisation. And if it is said that matter and motion cannot
+produce consciousness because it is inconceivable that they should, we
+have seen at some length that this is no conclusive consideration as
+applied to a subject of a confessedly transcendental nature, and that in
+the present case it is particularly inconclusive, because, as it is
+speculatively certain that the substance of mind must be unknowable, it
+seems _a priori_ probable that, whatever is the cause of the unknowable
+reality, this cause should be more difficult to render into thought in
+that relation than would some other hypothetical substance which is
+imagined as more akin to mind. And if it is said that the _more_
+conceivable cause is the _more_ probable cause, we have seen that it is
+in this case impossible to estimate the validity of the remark. Lastly,
+the statement that the cause must contain actually all that its effects
+can contain, was seen to be inadmissible in logic and contradicted by
+everyday experience; while the argument from the supposed freedom of the
+will and the existence of the moral sense was negatived both deductively
+by the theory of evolution, and inductively by the doctrine of
+utilitarianism.' The theory of the freedom of the will is indeed at this
+stage of thought utterly untenable[7]; the evidence is overwhelming that
+the moral sense is the result of a purely natural evolution[8], and this
+result, arrived at on general grounds, is confirmed with irresistible
+force by the account of our human conscience which is supplied by the
+theory of utilitarianism, a theory based on the widest and most
+unexceptionable of inductions[9]. 'On the whole, then, with regard to
+the argument from the existence of the human mind, we were compelled to
+decide that it is destitute of any assignable weight, there being
+nothing more to lead to the conclusion that our mind has been caused by
+another mind, than to the conclusion that it has been caused by anything
+else whatsoever.
+
+'Sec. 3. With regard to the argument from Design, it was observed that
+Mill's presentation of it [in his _Essay on Theism_] is merely a
+resuscitation of the argument as presented by Paley, Bell, and Chalmers.
+And indeed we saw that the first-named writer treated this whole subject
+with a feebleness and inaccuracy very surprising in him; for while he
+has failed to assign anything like due weight to the inductive evidence
+of organic evolution, he did not hesitate to rush into a supernatural
+explanation of biological phenomena. Moreover, he has failed signally in
+his _analysis_ of the Design argument, seeing that, in common with all
+previous writers, he failed to observe that it is utterly impossible for
+us to know the relations in which the supposed Designer stands to the
+Designed,--much less to argue from the fact that the Supreme Mind, even
+supposing it to exist, caused the observable products by any particular
+intellectual _process_. In other words, all advocates of the Design
+argument have failed to perceive that, even if we grant nature to be due
+to a creating Mind, still we have no shadow of a right to conclude that
+this Mind can only have exerted its creative power by means of such and
+such cogitative operations. How absurd, therefore, must it be to raise
+the supposed evidence of such cogitative operations into evidences of
+the existence of a creating Mind! If a theist retorts that it is, after
+all, of very little importance whether or not we are able to divine the
+_methods_ of creation, so long as the _facts_ are there to attest that,
+_in some way or other_, the observable phenomena of nature must be due
+to Intelligence of some kind as their ultimate cause, then I am the
+first to endorse this remark. It has always appeared to me one of the
+most unaccountable things in the history of speculation that so many
+competent writers can have insisted upon _Design_ as an argument for
+Theism, when they must all have known perfectly well that they have no
+means of ascertaining the subjective psychology of that Supreme Mind
+whose existence the argument is adduced to demonstrate. The truth is,
+that the argument from teleology must, and can only, rest upon the
+observable _facts_ of nature, without reference to the intellectual
+_processes_ by which these facts may be supposed to have been
+accomplished. But, looking to the "present state of our knowledge," this
+is merely to change the teleological argument in its gross Paleyian
+form, into the argument from the ubiquitous operation of general laws.'
+
+'Sec. 4. This argument was thus[10] stated in contrast with the argument
+from design. 'The argument from design says, there must be a God,
+because such and such an organic structure must have been due to such
+and such an intellectual _process_. The argument from general laws says,
+There must be a God, because such and such an organic structure must _in
+some way or other have been ultimately due to_ intelligence.' Every
+structure exhibits with more or less of complexity the principle of
+order; it is related to all other things in a universal order. This
+universality of order renders irrational the hypothesis of chance in
+accounting for the universe. 'Let us think of the supreme causality as
+we may, the fact remains that from it there emanates a directive
+influence of uninterrupted consistency, on a scale of stupendous
+magnitude and exact precision worthy of our highest conceptions of
+deity[11].' The argument was developed in the words of Professor Baden
+Powell. 'That which requires reason and thought to understand must be
+itself thought and reason. That which mind alone can investigate or
+express must be itself mind. And if the highest conception attained is
+but partial, then the mind and reason studied is greater than the mind
+and reason of the student. If the more it is studied the more vast and
+complex is the necessary connection in reason disclosed, then the more
+evident is the vast extent and compass of the reason thus partially
+manifested and its reality _as existing in the immutably connected order
+of objects examined_, independently of the mind of the investigator.'
+This argument from the universal _Kosmos_ has the advantage of being
+wholly independent of the method by which things came to be what they
+are. It is unaffected by the acceptance of evolution. Till quite
+recently it seemed irrefutable[12].
+
+'But nevertheless we are constrained to acknowledge that its apparent
+power dwindles to nothing in view of the indisputable fact that, if
+force and matter have been eternal, all and every natural law must have
+resulted by way of necessary consequence.... It does not admit of one
+moment's questioning that it is as certainly true that all the exquisite
+beauty and melodious harmony of nature follows necessarily as inevitably
+from the persistence of force and the primary qualities of matter as it
+is certainly true that force is persistent or that matter is extended or
+impenetrable[13].... It will be remembered that I dwelt at considerable
+length and with much earnestness upon this truth, not only because of
+its enormous importance in its bearing upon our subject, but also
+because no one has hitherto considered it in that relation.' It was also
+pointed out that the coherence and correspondence of the macrocosm of
+the universe with the microcosm of the human mind can be accounted for
+by the fact that the human mind is only one of the products of general
+evolution, its subjective relations necessarily reflecting those
+external relations of which they themselves are the product[14].
+
+'Sec. 5. The next step, however, was to mitigate the severity of the
+conclusion that was liable to be formed upon the utter and hopeless
+collapse of all the possible arguments in favour of Theism. Having fully
+demonstrated that there is no shadow of a positive argument in support
+of the theistic theory, there arose the danger that some persons might
+erroneously conclude that for this reason the theistic theory must be
+untrue. It therefore became necessary to point out, that although, as
+far as we can see, nature does not require an Intelligent Cause to
+account for any of her phenomena, yet it is possible that, if we could
+see farther, we should see that nature could not be what she is unless
+she had owed her existence to an Intelligent Cause. Or, in other words,
+the probability there is that an Intelligent Cause is unnecessary to
+explain any of the phenomena of nature, is only equal to the probability
+there is that the doctrine of the persistence of force is everywhere and
+eternally true.
+
+'As a final step in our analysis, therefore, we altogether quitted the
+region of experience, and ignoring even the very foundations of science,
+and so all the most certain of relative truths, we carried the
+discussion into the transcendental region of purely formal
+considerations. And here we laid down the canon, "that the value of any
+probability, in its last analysis, is determined by the number, the
+importance, and the definiteness of the relations known, as compared
+with those of the relations unknown;" and, consequently, that in cases
+where the unknown relations are more numerous, more important, or more
+indefinite than are the known relations, the value of our inference
+varies inversely as the difference in these respects between the
+relations compared. From which canon it followed, that as the problem of
+Theism is the most ultimate of all problems, and so contains in its
+unknown relations all that is to man unknown and unknowable, these
+relations must be pronounced the most indefinite of all relations that
+it is possible for man to contemplate; and, consequently, that although
+we have here the entire range of experience from which to argue, we are
+unable to estimate the real value of any argument whatsoever. The
+unknown relations in our attempted induction being wholly indefinite,
+both in respect of their number and importance, as compared with the
+known relations, it is impossible for us to determine any definite
+probability either for or against the being of a God. Therefore,
+although it is true that, so far as human science can penetrate or human
+thought infer, we can perceive no evidence of God, yet we have no right
+on this account to conclude that there is no God. The probability,
+therefore, that nature is devoid of Deity, while it is of the strongest
+kind if regarded scientifically--amounting, in fact, to a scientific
+demonstration,--is nevertheless wholly worthless if regarded logically.
+Although it is as true as is the fundamental basis of all science and of
+all experience that, if there is a God, His existence, considered as a
+cause of the universe, is superfluous, it may nevertheless be true that,
+if there had never been a God, the universe could never have existed.
+
+'Hence these formal considerations proved conclusively that, no matter
+how great the probability of Atheism might appear to be in a relative
+sense, we have no means of estimating such probability in an absolute
+sense. From which position there emerged the possibility of another
+argument in favour of Theism--or rather let us say, of a reappearance of
+the teleological argument in another form. For it may be said, seeing
+that these formal considerations exclude legitimate reasoning either for
+or against Deity in an absolute sense, while they do not exclude such
+reasoning in a relative sense, if there yet remain any theistic
+deductions which may properly be drawn from experience, these may now be
+adduced to balance the atheistic deductions from the persistence of
+force. For although the latter deductions have clearly shown the
+existence of Deity to be superfluous in a scientific sense, the formal
+considerations in question have no less clearly opened up beyond the
+sphere of science a possible _locus_ for the existence of Deity; so that
+if there are any facts supplied by experience for which the atheistic
+deductions appear insufficient to account, we are still free to account
+for them in a relative sense by the hypothesis of Theism. And, it may be
+urged, we do find such an unexplained residuum in the correlation of
+general laws in the production of cosmic harmony. It signifies nothing,
+the argument may run, that we are unable to conceive the methods whereby
+the supposed Mind operates in producing cosmic harmony; nor does it
+signify that its operation must now be relegated to a super-scientific
+province. What does signify is that, taking a general view of nature,
+we find it impossible to conceive of the extent and variety of her
+harmonious processes as other than products of intelligent causation.
+Now this sublimated form of the teleological argument, it will be
+remembered, I denoted a metaphysical teleology, in order sharply to
+distinguish it from all previous forms of that argument, which, in
+contradistinction I denoted scientific teleologies. And the distinction,
+it will be remembered, consisted in this--that while all previous forms
+of teleology, by resting on a basis which was not beyond the possible
+reach of science, laid themselves open to the possibility of scientific
+refutation, the metaphysical system of teleology, by resting on a basis
+which is clearly beyond the possible reach of science, can never be
+susceptible of scientific refutation. And that this metaphysical system
+of teleology does rest on such a basis is indisputable; for while it
+accepts the most ultimate truths of which science can ever be
+cognizant--viz. the persistence of force and the consequently necessary
+genesis of natural law,--it nevertheless maintains that the necessity of
+regarding Mind as the ultimate cause of things is not on this account
+removed; and, therefore, that if science now requires the operation of a
+Supreme Mind to be posited in a super-scientific sphere, then in a
+super-scientific sphere it ought to be posited. No doubt this hypothesis
+at first sight seems gratuitous, seeing that, so far as science can
+penetrate, there is no need of any such hypothesis at all--cosmic
+harmony resulting as a physically necessary consequence from the
+combined action of natural laws, which in turn result as a physically
+necessary consequence of the persistence of force and the primary
+qualities of matter. But although it is thus indisputably true that
+metaphysical teleology is wholly gratuitous if considered
+scientifically, it may not be true that it is wholly gratuitous if
+considered psychologically. In other words, if it is more conceivable
+that Mind should be the ultimate cause of cosmic harmony than that the
+persistence of force should be so, then it is not irrational to accept
+the more conceivable hypothesis in preference to the less conceivable
+one, provided that the choice is made with the diffidence which is
+required by the considerations adduced in Chapter V [especially the
+_Canon of probability_ laid down in the second paragraph of this
+section, Sec. 5].
+
+'I conclude, therefore, that the hypothesis of metaphysical teleology,
+although in a physical sense gratuitous, may be in a psychological sense
+legitimate. But as against the fundamental position on which alone this
+argument can rest--viz. the position that the fundamental postulate of
+Atheism is more _inconceivable_ than is the fundamental postulate of
+Theism--we have seen two important objections to lie.
+
+'For, in the first place, the sense in which the word "inconceivable" is
+here used is that of the impossibility of framing _realizable_ relations
+in the thought; not that of the impossibility of framing _abstract_
+relations in thought. In the same sense, though in a lower degree, it is
+true that the complexity of the human organization and its functions is
+inconceivable; but in this sense the word "inconceivable" has much less
+weight in an argument than it has in its true sense. And, without
+waiting again to dispute (as we did in the case of the speculative
+standing of Materialism) how far even the genuine test of
+inconceivability ought to be allowed to make against an inference which
+there is a body of scientific evidence to substantiate, we went on to
+the second objection against this fundamental position of metaphysical
+teleology. This objection, it will be remembered, was, that it is as
+impossible to conceive of cosmic harmony as an effect of Mind [i.e. Mind
+being what we know it in experience to be], as it is to conceive of it
+as an effect of mindless evolution. The argument from inconceivability,
+therefore, admits of being turned with quite as terrible an effect on
+Theism, as it can possibly be made to exert on Atheism.
+
+'Hence this more refined form of teleology which we are considering, and
+which we saw to be the last of the possible arguments in favour of
+Theism, is met on its own ground by a very crushing opposition: by its
+metaphysical character it has escaped the opposition of physical
+science, only to encounter a new opposition in the region of pure
+psychology to which it fled. As a conclusion to our whole inquiry,
+therefore, it devolved on us to determine the relative magnitudes of
+these opposing forces. And in doing this we first observed that, if the
+supporters of metaphysical teleology objected _a priori_ to the method
+whereby the genesis of natural law was deduced from the datum of the
+persistence of force, in that this method involved an unrestricted use
+of illegitimate symbolic conceptions; then it is no less open to an
+atheist to object _a priori_ to the method whereby a directing Mind was
+inferred from the datum of cosmic harmony, in that this method involved
+the postulation of an unknowable cause,--and this of a character which
+the whole history of human thought has proved the human mind to exhibit
+an overweening tendency to postulate as the cause of natural phenomena.
+On these grounds, therefore, I concluded that, so far as their
+respective standing _a priori_ is concerned, both theories may be
+regarded as about equally suspicious. And similarly with regard to their
+standing _a posteriori_; for as both theories require to embody at least
+one infinite term, they must each alike be pronounced absolutely
+inconceivable. But, finally, if the question were put to me which of the
+two theories I regarded as the more rational, I observed that this is a
+question which no one man can answer for another. For as the test of
+absolute inconceivability is equally destructive of both theories, if a
+man wishes to choose between them, his choice can only be determined by
+what I have designated relative inconceivability--i.e. in accordance
+with the verdict given by his individual sense of probability as
+determined by his previous habit of thought. And forasmuch as the test
+of relative inconceivability may be held in this matter legitimately to
+vary with the character of the mind which applies it, the strictly
+rational probability of the question to which it is applied varies in
+like manner. Or otherwise presented, the only alternative for any man in
+this matter is either to discipline himself into an attitude of pure
+scepticism, and thus to refuse in thought to entertain either a
+probability or an improbability concerning the existence of a God; or
+else to incline in thought towards an affirmation or a negation of God,
+according as his previous habits of thought have rendered such an
+inclination more facile in the one direction than in the other. And
+although, under such circumstances, I should consider that man the more
+rational who carefully suspended his judgement, I conclude that if this
+course is departed from, neither the metaphysical teleologist nor the
+scientific atheist has any perceptible advantage over the other in
+respect of rationality. For as the formal conditions of a metaphysical
+teleology are undoubtedly present on the one hand, and the formal
+conditions of a speculative atheism are as undoubtedly present on the
+other, there is thus in both cases a logical vacuum supplied wherein the
+pendulum of thought is free to swing in whichever direction it may be
+made to swing by the momentum of preconceived ideas.
+
+'Sec. 6. Such is the outcome of our investigation, and considering the
+abstract nature of the subject, the immense divergence of opinion which
+at the present time is manifested with regard to it, as well as the
+confusing amount of good, bad and indifferent literature on both sides
+of the controversy which is extant;--considering these things, I do not
+think that the result of our inquiry can be justly complained of on the
+score of its lacking precision. At a time like the present, when
+traditional beliefs respecting Theism are so generally accepted, and so
+commonly concluded as a matter of course to have a large and valid basis
+of induction whereon to rest, I cannot but feel that a perusal of this
+short essay, by showing how very concise the scientific _status_ of the
+subject really is, will do more to settle the minds of most readers as
+to the exact standing at the present time of all the probabilities of
+the question, than could a perusal of all the rest of the literature
+upon this subject. And, looking to the present condition of speculative
+philosophy, I regard it as of the utmost importance to have clearly
+shown that the advance of science has now entitled us to assert, without
+the least hesitation, that the hypothesis of Mind in nature is as
+certainly superfluous to account for any of the phenomena of nature, as
+the scientific doctrine of the persistence of force and the
+indestructibility of matter is certainly true.
+
+'On the other hand, if any one is inclined to complain that the logical
+aspect of the question has not proved itself so unequivocally definite
+as has the scientific, I must ask him to consider that, in any matter
+which does not admit of actual demonstration, some margin must of
+necessity be left for variations of individual opinion. And, if he bears
+this consideration in mind, I feel sure that he cannot properly
+complain of my not having done my utmost in this case to define as
+sharply as possible the character and the limits of this margin.
+
+'Sec. 7. And now, in conclusion, I feel it is desirable to state that any
+antecedent bias with regard to Theism which I individually possess is
+unquestionably on the side of traditional beliefs. It is therefore with
+the utmost sorrow that I find myself compelled to accept the conclusions
+here worked out; and nothing would have induced me to publish them, save
+the strength of my conviction that it is the duty of every member of
+society to give his fellows the benefit of his labours for whatever they
+may be worth. Just as I am confident that truth must in the end be the
+most profitable for the race, so I am persuaded that every individual
+endeavour to attain it, provided only that such endeavour is unbiassed
+and sincere, ought without hesitation to be made the common property of
+all men, no matter in what direction the results of its promulgation may
+appear to tend. And so far as the ruination of individual happiness is
+concerned, no one can have a more lively perception than myself of the
+possibly disastrous tendency of my work. So far as I am individually
+concerned, the result of this analysis has been to show that, whether I
+regard the problem of Theism on the lower plane of strictly relative
+probability, or on the higher plane of purely formal considerations, it
+equally becomes my obvious duty to stifle all belief of the kind which I
+conceive to be the noblest, and to discipline my intellect with regard
+to this matter into an attitude of the purest scepticism. And forasmuch
+as I am far from being able to agree with those who affirm that the
+twilight doctrine of the "new faith" is a desirable substitute for the
+waning splendour of "the old," I am not ashamed to confess that with
+this virtual negation of God the universe to me has lost its soul of
+loveliness; and although from henceforth the precept to "work while it
+is day" will doubtless but gain an intensified force from the terribly
+intensified meaning of the words that "the night cometh when no man can
+work," yet when at times I think, as think at times I must, of the
+appalling contrast between the hallowed glory of that creed which once
+was mine, and the lonely mystery of existence as now I find it,--at such
+times I shall ever feel it impossible to avoid the sharpest pang of
+which my nature is susceptible. For whether it be due to my intelligence
+not being sufficiently advanced to meet the requirements of the age, or
+whether it be due to the memory of those sacred associations which to me
+at least were the sweetest that life has given, I cannot but feel that
+for me, and for others who think as I do, there is a dreadful truth in
+those words of Hamilton,--Philosophy having become a meditation, not
+merely of death, but of annihilation, the precept _know thyself_ has
+become transformed into the terrific oracle to OEdipus--
+
+     "Mayest thou ne'er know the truth of what thou art."'
+
+This analysis will have been at least sufficient to give a clear idea
+of the general argument of the _Candid Examination_ and of its
+melancholy conclusions. What will most strike a somewhat critical reader
+is perhaps (1) the tone of certainty, and (2) the belief in the almost
+exclusive right of the scientific method in the court of reason.
+
+As evidence of (1) I would adduce the following brief quotations:--
+
+     P. xi. 'Possible errors in reasoning apart, the rational position
+     of Theism as here defined must remain without material modification
+     as long as our intelligence remains human.'
+
+     P. 24. 'I am quite unable to understand how any one at the present
+     day, and with the most moderate powers of abstract thinking, can
+     possibly bring himself to embrace the theory of Free-will.'
+
+     P. 64. 'Undoubtedly we have no alternative but to conclude that the
+     hypothesis of mind in nature is now logically proved to be as
+     certainly superfluous as the very basis of all science is certainly
+     true. There can no longer be any more doubt that the existence of a
+     God is wholly unnecessary to explain any of the phenomena of the
+     universe, than there is doubt that if I leave go of my pen it will
+     fall upon the table.'
+
+As evidence of (2) I would adduce from the preface--
+
+     'To my mind, therefore, it is impossible to resist the conclusion
+     that, looking to this undoubted pre-eminence of the scientific
+     methods as ways to truth, whether or not there is a God, the
+     question as to his existence is both more morally and more
+     reverently contemplated if we regard it purely as a problem for
+     methodical analysis to solve, than if we regard it in any other
+     light.'
+
+It is in respect both of (1) and (2) that the change in Romanes' thought
+as exhibited in his later Notes is most conspicuous[15].
+
+At what date George Romanes' mind began to react from the conclusions of
+the _Candid Examination_ I cannot say. But after a period of ten
+years--in his Rede lecture of 1885[16]--we find his frame of mind very
+much changed. This lecture, on _Mind and Motion_, consists of a severe
+criticism of the materialistic account of mind. On the other hand
+'spiritualism'--or the theory which would suppose that mind is the cause
+of motion--is pronounced from the point of view of science not
+impossible indeed but 'unsatisfactory,' and the more probable conclusion
+is found in a 'monism' like Bruno's--according to which mind and motion
+are co-ordinate and probably co-extensive aspects of the same universal
+fact--a monism which may be called Pantheism, but may also be regarded
+as an extension of contracted views of Theism[17]. The position
+represented by this lecture may be seen sufficiently from its
+conclusion:--
+
+
+'If the advance of natural science is now steadily leading us to the
+conclusion that there is no motion without mind, must we not see how the
+independent conclusion of mental science is thus independently
+confirmed--the conclusion, I mean, that there is no being without
+knowing? To me, at least, it does appear that the time has come when we
+may begin, as it were in a dawning light, to see that the study of
+Nature and the study of Mind are meeting upon this greatest of possible
+truths. And if this is the case--if there is no motion without mind, no
+being without knowing--shall we infer, with Clifford, that universal
+being is mindless, or answer with a dogmatic negative that most
+stupendous of questions,--Is there knowledge with the Most High? If
+there is no motion without mind, no being without knowing, may we not
+rather infer, with Bruno, that it is in the medium of mind, and in the
+medium of knowledge, we live, and move, and have our being?
+
+'This, I think, is the direction in which the inference points, if we
+are careful to set out the logical conditions with complete
+impartiality. But the ulterior question remains, whether, so far as
+science is concerned, it is here possible to point any inference at all:
+the whole orbit of human knowledge may be too narrow to afford a
+parallax for measurements so vast. Yet even here, if it be true that the
+voice of science must thus of necessity speak the language of
+agnosticism, at least let us see to it that the language is pure[18];
+let us not tolerate any barbarisms introduced from the side of
+aggressive dogma. So shall we find that this new grammar of thought does
+not admit of any constructions radically opposed to more venerable ways
+of thinking; even if we do not find that the often-quoted words of its
+earliest formulator apply with special force to its latest
+dialects--that if a little knowledge of physiology and a little
+knowledge of psychology dispose men to atheism, a deeper knowledge of
+both, and, still more, a deeper thought upon their relations to one
+another, will lead men back to some form of religion, which if it be
+more vague, may also be more worthy than that of earlier days.'
+
+
+Some time before 1889 three articles were written for the _Nineteenth
+Century_ on the _Influence of Science upon Religion_. They were never
+published, for what reason I am not able to ascertain. But I have
+thought it worth while to print the first two of them as a 'first part'
+of this volume, both because they contain--written in George Romanes'
+own name--an important criticism upon the _Candid Examination_ which he
+had published anonymously, and also because, with their entirely
+sceptical result, they exhibit very clearly a stage in the mental
+history of their author. The antecedents of these papers those who have
+read this Introduction will now be in a position to understand. What
+remains to be said by way of further introduction to the Notes had
+better be reserved till later.
+
+                                                                   C.G.
+
+
+FOOTNOTES:
+
+[1] p. 7.
+
+[2] p. 173.
+
+[3] See p. 110.
+
+[4] But see an interesting note in Romanes' _Mind and Motion and Monism_
+(Longmans, 1895) p. 111.
+
+[5] Published in Truebner's _English and Foreign Philosophical Library_
+in 1878, but written 'several years ago' (preface). 'I have refrained
+from publishing it,' the author explains, 'lest, after having done so, I
+should find that more mature thought had modified the conclusions which
+the author sets forth.'
+
+[6] At times I have sought to make the argument of the chapter more
+intelligible by introducing references to earlier parts of the book or
+explanations in my own words. These latter I have inserted in square
+brackets.
+
+[7] p. 24.
+
+[8] p. 28.
+
+[9] p. 28.
+
+[10] p. 45.
+
+[11] p. 47.
+
+[12] p. 50.
+
+[13] p. 63.
+
+[14] pp. 58 ff.
+
+[15] With reference to the views and arguments of the _Candid
+Examination_, it may be interesting to notice here in detail that George
+Romanes (1) came to attach much more importance to the subjective
+religious needs and intuitions of the human spirit (pp. 131 ff.); (2)
+perceived that the subjective religious consciousness can be regarded
+objectively as a broad human phenomenon (pp. 147 f.); (3) criticized his
+earlier theory of causation and returned _towards_ the theory that all
+causation is volitional (pp. 102, 118); (4) definitely repudiated the
+materialistic account of the origin of mind (pp. 30, 31); (5) returned
+to the use of the expression 'the argument from design,' and therefore
+presumably abandoned his strong objection to it; (6) 'saw through'
+Herbert Spencer's refutation of the wider teleology expressed by Baden
+Powell, and felt the force of the teleology again (p. 72); (7)
+recognized that the scientific objections to the doctrine of the freedom
+of the will are not finally valid (p. 128).
+
+[16] See _Mind and Motion and Monism_, pp. 36 ff.
+
+[17] In some 'Notes' of the Summer of 1893 I find the statement, 'The
+result (of philosophical inquiry) has been that in his millennial
+contemplation and experience man has attained certainty with regard to
+certain aspects of the world problem, no less secure than that which he
+has gained in the domain of physical science, e.g.
+
+Logical priority of mind over matter.
+
+Consequent untenability of materialism.
+
+Relativity of knowledge.
+
+The order of nature, conservation of energy and indestructibility of
+matter within human experience, the principle of evolution and survival
+of the fittest.'
+
+[18] For the meaning of 'pure' agnosticism see below, pp. 107 ff.
+
+
+
+
+PART I.
+
+THE INFLUENCE OF SCIENCE UPON RELIGION.
+
+
+
+
+I.
+
+
+I propose to consider, in a series of three papers, the influence of
+Science upon Religion. In doing this I shall seek to confine myself to
+the strictly rational aspect of the subject, without travelling into any
+matters of sentiment. Moreover, I shall aim at estimating in the first
+instance the kind and degree of influence which has been exerted by
+Science upon Religion in the past, and then go on to estimate the
+probable extent of this influence in the future. The first two papers
+will be devoted to the past and prospective influence of Science upon
+Natural Religion, while the third will be devoted to the past and
+prospective influence of Science upon Revealed Religion[19].
+
+Few subjects have excited so much interest of late years as that which I
+thus mark out for discussion. This can scarcely be considered a matter
+of surprise, seeing that the influence in question is not only very
+direct, but also extremely important from every point of view. For
+generations and for centuries in succession Religion maintained an
+undisputed sway over men's minds--if not always as a practical guide in
+matters of conduct, at least as a regulator of belief. Even among the
+comparatively few who in previous centuries professedly rejected
+Christianity, there can be no doubt that their intellectual conceptions
+were largely determined by it: for Christianity being then the only
+court of appeal with reference to all these conceptions, even the few
+minds which were professedly without its jurisdiction could scarcely
+escape its indirect influence through the minds of others. But as side
+by side with the venerable institution a new court of appeal was
+gradually formed, we cannot wonder that it should have come to be
+regarded in the light of a rival to the old--more especially as the
+searching methods of its inquiry and the certain character of its
+judgements were much more in consonance with the requirements of an age
+disposed to scepticism. And this spirit of rivalry is still further
+fostered by the fact that Science has unquestionably exerted upon
+Religion what Mr. Fiske terms a 'purifying influence.' That is to say,
+not only are the scientific methods of inquiry after truth more
+congenial to sceptical minds than are the religious methods (which may
+broadly be defined as accepting truth on authority), but the results of
+the former have more than once directly contradicted those of the
+latter: science has in several cases incontestably demonstrated that
+religious teaching has been wrong as to matters of fact. Further still,
+the great advance of natural knowledge which has characterized the
+present century, has caused our ideas upon many subjects connected with
+philosophy to undergo a complete metamorphosis. A well-educated man of
+the present day is absolutely precluded from regarding some of the
+Christian dogmas from the same intellectual standpoint as his
+forefathers, even though he may still continue to accept them in some
+other sense. In short, our whole key of thinking or tone of thought
+having been in certain respects changed, we can no longer anticipate
+that in these respects it should continue to harmonize with the
+unalterable system of theology.
+
+Such I conceive to be the ways in which Science has exerted her
+influence upon Religion, and it is needless to dwell upon the potency of
+their united effect. No one can read even a newspaper without perceiving
+how great this effect has been. On the one hand, sceptics are
+triumphantly confident that the light of dawning knowledge has begun
+finally to dispel the darkness of superstition, while religious persons,
+on the other hand, tremble to think what the future, if judged by the
+past, is likely to bring forth. On both sides we have free discussion,
+strong language, and earnest canvassing. Year by year stock is taken,
+and year by year the balance is found to preponderate in favour of
+Science.
+
+This being the state of things of the present time, I think that with
+the experience of the kind and degree of influence which Science has
+exerted upon Religion in the past, we have material enough whereby to
+estimate the probable extent of such influence in the future. This,
+therefore, I shall endeavour to do by seeking to define, on general
+principles, the limits within which it is antecedently possible that the
+influence in question can be exercised. But in order to do this, it is
+necessary to begin by estimating the kind and degree of the influence
+which has been exerted by Science upon Religion in the past.
+
+Thus much premised, we have in the first place to define the essential
+nature both of Science and of Religion: for this is clearly the first
+step in an analysis which has for its object an estimation of the actual
+and possible effects of one of these departments of thought upon the
+other.
+
+Science, then, is essentially a department of thought having exclusive
+reference to the Proximate. More particularly, it is a department of
+thought having for its object the explanation of natural phenomena by
+the discovery of natural (or proximate) causes. In so far as Science
+ventures to trespass beyond this her only legitimate domain, and seeks
+to interpret natural phenomena by the immediate agency of supernatural
+or ultimate causes, in that degree has she ceased to be physical
+science, and become ontological speculation. The truth of this statement
+has now been practically recognized by all scientific workers; and terms
+describing final causes have been banished from their vocabulary in
+astronomy, chemistry, geology, biology, and even in psychology.
+
+Religion, on the other hand, is a department of thought having no less
+exclusive reference to the Ultimate. More particularly, it is a
+department of thought having for its object a self-conscious and
+intelligent Being, which it regards as a Personal God, and the
+fountain-head of all causation. I am, of course, aware that the term
+Religion has been of late years frequently used in senses which this
+definition would not cover; but I conceive that this only shows how
+frequently the term in question has been abused. To call any theory of
+things a Religion which does not present any belief in any form of
+Deity, is to apply the word to the very opposite of that which it has
+hitherto been used to denote. To speak of the Religion of the
+Unknowable, the Religion of Cosmism, the Religion of Humanity, and so
+forth, where the personality of the First Cause is not recognized, is as
+unmeaning as it would be to speak of the love of a triangle, or the
+rationality of the equator. That is to say, if any meaning is to be
+extracted from the terms at all, it is only to be so by using them in
+some metaphorical sense. We may, for instance, say that there is such a
+thing as a Religion of Humanity, because we may begin by deifying
+Humanity in our own estimation, and then go on to worship our ideal. But
+by thus giving Humanity the name of Deity we are not really creating a
+new religion: we are merely using a metaphor, which may or may not be
+successful as a matter of poetic diction, but which most assuredly
+presents no shred of value as a matter of philosophical statement.
+Indeed, in this relation it is worse than valueless: it is misleading.
+Variations or reversals in the meanings of words are not of uncommon
+occurrence in the ordinary growth of languages; but it is not often that
+we find, as in this case, the whole meaning of a term intentionally and
+gratuitously changed by the leaders of philosophical thought. Humanity,
+for example, is an abstract idea of our own making: it is not an object
+any more than the equator is an object. Therefore, if it were possible
+to construct a religion by this curious device of metaphorically
+ascribing to Humanity the attributes of Deity, it ought to be as
+logically possible to construct, let us say, a theory of brotherly
+regard towards the equator, by metaphorically ascribing to it the
+attributes of man. The distinguishing features of any theory which can
+properly be termed a Religion, is that it should refer to the ultimate
+source, or sources, of things: and that it should suppose this source to
+be of an objective, intelligent, and personal nature. To apply the term
+Religion to any other theory is merely to abuse it.
+
+From these definitions, then, it appears that the aims and methods of
+Science are exclusively concerned with the ascertaining and the proof of
+the proximate How of things and processes physical: her problem is, as
+Mill states it, to discover what are the fewest number of (phenomenal)
+data which, being granted, will explain the phenomena of experience. On
+the other hand, Religion is not in any way concerned with causation,
+further than to assume that all things and all processes are ultimately
+due to intelligent personality. Religion is thus, as Mr. Spencer says,
+'an _a priori_ theory of the universe'--to which, however, we must add,
+'and a theory which assumes intelligent personality as the originating
+source of the universe.' Without this needful addition, a religion would
+be in no way logically distinguished from a philosophy.
+
+From these definitions, then, it clearly follows that in their purest
+forms, Science and Religion really have no point of logical contact.
+Only if Science could transcend the conditions of space and time, of
+phenomenal relativity, and of all human limitations, only then could
+Science be in a position to touch the supernatural theory of Religion.
+But obviously, if Science could do this, she would cease to be Science.
+In soaring above the region of phenomena and entering the tenuous aether
+of noumena, her present wings, which we call her methods, would in such
+an atmosphere be no longer of any service for movement. Out of time, out
+of place, and out of phenomenal relation, Science could no longer exist
+as such.
+
+On the other hand, Religion in its purest form is equally incompetent to
+affect Science. For, as we have already seen, Religion as such is not
+concerned with the phenomenal sphere: her theory of ontology cannot have
+any reference to the How of phenomenal causation. Hence it is evident
+that, as in their purest or most ideal forms they move in different
+mental planes, Science and Religion cannot exhibit interference.
+
+Thus far the remarks which I have made apply equally to all forms of
+Religion, as such, whether actual or possible, and in so far as the
+Religion is _pure_. But it is notorious that until quite recently
+Religion did exercise upon Science, not only an influence, but an
+overpowering influence. Belief in divine agency being all but universal,
+while the methods of scientific research had not as yet been distinctly
+formulated, it was in previous generations the usual habit of mind to
+refer any natural phenomenon, the physical causation of which had not
+been ascertained, to the more or less immediate causal action of the
+Deity. But we now see that this habit of mind arose from a failure to
+distinguish between the essentially distinct characters of Science and
+Religion as departments of thought, and therefore that it was only so
+far as the Religion of former times was impure--or mixed with the
+ingredients of thought which belong to Science--that the baleful
+influence in question was exerted. The gradual, successive, and now all
+but total abolition of final causes from the thoughts of scientific men,
+to which allusion has already been made, is merely an expression of the
+fact that scientific men as a body have come fully to recognize the
+fundamental distinction between Science and Religion which I have
+stated.
+
+Or, to put the matter in another way, scientific men as a body--and,
+indeed, all persons whose ideas on such matters are abreast of the
+times--perceive plainly enough that a religious explanation of any
+natural phenomenon is, from a scientific point of view, no explanation
+at all. For a religious explanation consists in referring the observed
+phenomenon to the First Cause--i.e. to merge that particular phenomenon
+in the general or final mystery of things. A scientific explanation, on
+the other hand, consists in referring the observed phenomenon to its
+physical causes, and in no case can such an explanation entertain the
+hypothesis of a final cause without abandoning its character as a
+scientific explanation. For example, if a child brings me a flower and
+asks why it has such a curious form, bright colour, sweet perfume, and
+so on, and if I answer, Because God made it so, I am not really
+answering the child's question: I am merely concealing my ignorance of
+Nature under a guise of piety, and excusing my indolence in the study of
+botany. It was the appreciation of this fact that led Mr. Darwin to
+observe in his _Origin of Species_ that the theory of creation does not
+serve to explain any of the facts with which it is concerned, but merely
+re-states these facts as they are observed to occur. That is to say, by
+thus merging the facts as observed into the final mystery of things, we
+are not even attempting to explain them in any scientific sense: for it
+would be obviously possible to get rid of the necessity of thus
+explaining any natural phenomenon whatsoever by referring it to the
+immediate causal action of the Deity. If any phenomenon were actually
+to occur which did proceed from the immediate causal action of the
+Deity, then _ex hypothesi_, there would be no physical causes to
+investigate, and the occupation of Othello, in the person of a man of
+science, would be gone. Such a phenomenon would be miraculous, and
+therefore from its very nature beyond the reach of scientific
+investigation.
+
+Properly speaking, then, the religious theory of final causes does not
+explain any of the phenomena of Nature: it merely re-states the
+phenomena as observed--or, if we prefer so to say, it is itself an
+ultimate and universal explanation of all possible phenomena taken
+collectively. For it must be admitted that behind all possible
+explanations of a scientific kind, there lies a great inexplicable,
+which just because of its ultimate character, cannot be merged into
+anything further--that is to say, cannot be explained. 'It is what it
+is,' is all that we can say of it: 'I am that I am' is all that it could
+say of itself. And it is in referring phenomena to this inexplicable
+source of physical causation that the theory of Religion essentially
+consists. The theory of Science, on the other hand, consists in the
+assumption that there is always a practically endless chain of physical
+causation to investigate--i.e. an endless series of phenomena to be
+explained. So that, if we define the process of explanation as the
+process of referring observed phenomena to their adequate causes, we may
+say that Religion, by the aid of a general theory of things in the
+postulation of an intelligent First Cause, furnishes to her own
+satisfaction an ultimate explanation of the universe as a whole, and
+therefore is not concerned with any of those proximate explanations or
+discovery of second causes, which form the exclusive subject-matter of
+Science. In other words, we recur to the definitions already stated, to
+the effect that Religion is a department of thought having, as such,
+exclusive reference to the Ultimate, while Science is a department of
+thought having, as such, no less exclusive reference to the Proximate.
+When these two departments of thought overlap, interference results, and
+we find confusion. Therefore it was that when the religious theory of
+final causes intruded upon the field of scientific inquiry, it was
+passing beyond its logical domain; and seeking to arrogate the function
+of explaining this or that phenomenon _in detail_, it ceased to be a
+purely religious theory, while at the same time and for the same reason
+it blocked the way of scientific progress[20].
+
+This remark serves to introduce one of the chief topics with which I
+have to deal--viz. the doctrine of Design in Nature, and thus the whole
+question of Natural Religion in its relation to Natural Science. In
+handling this topic I shall endeavour to take as broad and deep a view
+as I can of the present standing of Natural Religion, without waiting to
+show step by step the ways and means by which it has been brought into
+this position, by the influence of Science.
+
+In the earliest dawn of recorded thought, teleology in some form or
+another has been the most generally accepted theory whereby the order of
+Nature is explained. It is not, however, my object in this paper to
+trace the history of this theory from its first rude beginnings in
+Fetishism to its final development in Theism. I intend to devote myself
+exclusively to the question as to the present standing of this theory,
+and I allude to its past history only in order to examine the statement
+which is frequently made, to the effect that its general prevalence in
+all ages and among all peoples of the world lends to it a certain degree
+of 'antecedent credibility.' With reference to this point, I should say,
+that, whether or not the order of Nature is due to a disposing Mind, the
+hypothesis of mental agency in Nature--or, as the Duke of Argyll terms
+it, the hypothesis of 'anthropopsychism'--must necessarily have been the
+earliest hypothesis. What we find in Nature is the universal prevalence
+of causation, and long before the no less universal equivalency between
+causes and effects--i.e. the universal prevalence of natural law--became
+a matter of even the [vaguest] appreciation, the general fact that
+nothing happens without a cause of some kind was fully recognized.
+Indeed, the recognition of this fact is not only presented by the
+lowest races of the present day, but, as I have myself given evidence to
+show, likewise by animals and infants[21]. And therefore, it appears to
+me probable that those psychologists are right who argue that the idea
+of cause is intuitive, in the same sense that the ideas of space and
+time are intuitive--i.e. the instinctive or [inherited] effect of
+ancestral experience.
+
+Now if it is thus a matter of certainty that the recognition of
+causality in Nature is co-extensive with, and even anterior to, the
+human mind, it appears to me no less certain that the first attempt at
+assigning a cause of this or that observed event in Nature--i.e. the
+first attempts at a rational explanation of the phenomena of
+Nature--must have been of an anthropopsychic kind. No other explanation
+was, as it were, so ready to hand as that of projecting into external
+Nature the agency of volition, which was known to each individual as the
+apparent fountain-head of causal activity so far as he and his
+neighbours were concerned. To reach this most obvious explanation of
+causality in Nature, it did not require that primitive man should know,
+as we know, that the very conception of causality arises out of our
+sense of effort in voluntary action; it only required that this should
+be the fact, and then it must needs follow that when any natural
+phenomenon was thought about at all with reference to its causality, the
+cause inferred should be one of a psychical kind. I need not wait to
+trace the gradual integration of this anthropopsychic hypothesis from
+its earliest and most diffused form of what we may term polypsychism
+(wherein the causes inferred were almost as personally numerous as the
+effects contemplated), through polytheism (wherein many effects of a
+like kind were referred to one deity, who, as it were, took special
+charge over that class), up to monotheism (wherein all causation is
+gathered up into the monopsychism of a single personality): it is enough
+thus briefly to show that from first to last the hypothesis of
+anthropopsychism is a necessary phase of mental evolution under existing
+conditions, and this whether or not the hypothesis is true.
+
+Thus viewed, I do not think that 'the general consent of mankind' is a
+fact of any argumentative weight in favour of the anthropopsychic
+theory--so far, I mean, as the matter of causation is concerned--whether
+this be in fetishism or in the teleology of our own day: the general
+consent of mankind in the larger question of theism (where sundry other
+matters besides causation fail to be considered) does not here concern
+us. Indeed, it appears to me that if we are to go back to the savages
+for any guarantee of our anthropopsychic theory, the pledge which we
+receive is of worse than no value. As well might we conclude that a
+match is a living organism, because this is to the mind of a savage the
+most obvious explanation of its movements, as conclude on precisely
+similar grounds that our belief in teleology derives any real support
+from any of the more primitive phases of anthropopsychism.
+
+It seems to me, therefore, that in seeking to estimate the evidence of
+design in Nature, we must as it were start _de novo_, without reference
+to anterior beliefs upon the subject. The question is essentially one to
+be considered in the light of all the latest knowledge that we possess,
+and by the best faculties of thinking that we (the heirs of all the
+ages) are able to bring to bear upon it. I shall, therefore, only allude
+to the history of anthropopsychism in so far as I may find it necessary
+to do so for the sake of elucidating my argument.
+
+And here it is needful to consider first what Paley called 'the state of
+the argument' before the Darwinian epoch. This is clearly and tersely
+presented by Paley in his classical illustration of finding a watch upon
+a heath--an illustration so well known that I need not here re-state it.
+I will merely observe, therefore, that it conveys, as it were in one's
+watch-pocket, the whole of the argument from design; and that it is not
+in my opinion open to the stricture which was passed upon it by Mill
+where he says,--'The inference would not be from marks of design, but
+because I already know by direct experience that watches are made by
+men.' This appears to me to miss the whole point of Paley's meaning, for
+there would be obviously no argument at all unless he be understood to
+mean that the evidence of design which is supposed to be afforded by
+examination of the watch, is supposed to be afforded by this examination
+only, and not from any of the direct knowledge alluded to by Mill. For
+the purposes of the illustration, it must clearly be assumed that the
+finder of the watch has no previous or direct knowledge touching the
+manufacture of watches. Apart from this curious misunderstanding, Mill
+was at one with Paley upon the whole subject.
+
+Again, it is no real objection to the argument or illustration to say,
+as we often have said, that it does not account for the watchmaker. The
+object of the argument from design is to _prove_ the existence of a
+designer: not to _explain_ that existence. Indeed, it would be suicidal
+to the whole argument in its relation to Theism, if the possibility of
+any such explanation were entertained; for such a possibility could only
+be entertained on the supposition that the being of the Deity admits of
+being explained--i.e. that the Deity is not ultimate.
+
+Lastly, the argument is precisely the same as that which occurs in
+numerous passages of Scripture and in theological writings all over the
+world down to the present time. That is to say, everywhere in organic
+nature we meet with innumerable adaptations of means to ends, which in
+very many cases present a degree of refinement and complexity in
+comparison with which the adaptations of means to ends in a watch are
+but miserable and rudimentary attempts at mechanism. No one can know so
+well as the modern biologist in what an immeasurable degree the
+mechanisms which occur in such profusion in nature surpass, in every
+form of excellence, the highest triumphs of human invention. Hence at
+first sight it does unquestionably appear that we could have no stronger
+or better evidence of purpose than is thus afforded. In the words of
+Paley: 'arrangement, disposition of parts, subserviency of means to an
+end, relation of instruments to a use, imply the presence of
+intelligence and mind.'
+
+But next the question arises, Although such things certainly [may][22]
+imply the presence of mind as their explanatory cause, are we entitled
+to assume that there can be in nature no other cause competent to
+produce these effects? This is a question which never seems to have
+occurred to Paley, Bell, Chalmers, or indeed to any of the natural
+theologians up to the time of Darwin. This, I think, is a remarkable
+fact, because the question is one which, as a mere matter of logical
+form, appears to lie so much upon the surface. But nevertheless the fact
+remains that natural theologians, so far as I know without exception,
+were satisfied to assume as an axiom that mechanism could have no cause
+other than that of a designing mind; and therefore their work was
+restricted to tracing out in detail the number and the excellency of the
+mechanisms which were to be met with in nature. It is, however, obvious
+that the mere accumulation of such cases can have no real, or logical,
+effect upon the argument. The mechanisms which we encounter in nature
+are so amazing in their perfections, that the attentive study of any one
+of them would (as Paley in his illustration virtually, though not
+expressly, contends) be sufficient to carry the whole position, if the
+assumption be conceded that mechanism can only be due to mind. Therefore
+the argument is not really, or logically, strengthened by the mere
+accumulation of any number of special cases of mechanism in nature, all
+as mechanisms similar in kind. Let us now consider this argument.
+
+If we are disposed to wonder why natural theologians prior to the days
+of Darwin were content to assume that mind is the only possible cause of
+mechanism, I think we have a ready answer in the universal prevalence of
+their belief in special creation. For I think it is unquestionable that,
+upon the basis of this belief, the assumption is legitimate. That is to
+say, if we start with the belief that all species of plants and animals
+were originally introduced to the complex conditions of their several
+environments suddenly and ready made (in some such manner as watches are
+turned out from a manufactory), then I think we are reasonably entitled
+to assume that no conceivable cause, other than that of intelligent
+purpose, could possibly be assigned in explanation of the effects. It
+is, of course, needless to observe that in so far as this previous
+belief in special creation was thus allowed to affect the argument from
+design, that argument became an instance of circular reasoning. And it
+is, perhaps, equally needless to observe that the mere fact of
+evolution, as distinguished from special creation--or of the gradual
+development of living mechanisms, as distinguished from their sudden
+and ready-made apparition--would not in any way affect the argument from
+design, unless it could be shown that the process of evolution admits
+the possibility of some other cause which is not admitted by the
+hypothesis of special creation. But this is precisely what is shown by
+the theory of evolution as propounded by Darwin. That is to say, the
+theory of the gradual development of living mechanisms propounded by
+Darwin, is something more than a theory of gradual development as
+distinguished from sudden creation. It is this, but it is also a theory
+of a purely scientific kind which seeks to explain the purely physical
+causes of that development. And this is the point where natural science
+begins to exert her influence upon natural theology--or the point where
+the theory of evolution begins to affect the theory of design. As this
+is a most important part of our subject, and one upon which an
+extraordinary amount of confusion at the present time prevails, I shall
+in my next paper carefully consider it in all its bearings.
+
+FOOTNOTES:
+
+[19] [The third paper is not published because Romanes' views on the
+relation between science and faith in Revealed Religion are better and
+more maturely expressed in the Notes.--ED.]
+
+[20] To avoid misunderstanding I may observe that in the above
+definitions I am considering Religion and Science under the conditions
+in which they actually exist. It is conceivable that under other
+conditions these two departments of thought might not be so sharply
+separated. Thus, for instance, if a Religion were to appear carrying a
+revelation to Science upon matters of physical causation, such a
+Religion (supposing the revelation were found by experiment to be true)
+ought to be held to exercise upon Science a strictly legitimate
+influence.
+
+[21] _Mental Evolution in Animals_, pp. 155-8.
+
+[22] [I have put 'may' in place of 'do' for the sake of argument.--ED.]
+
+
+
+
+II.
+
+
+Suppose the man who found the watch upon a heath to continue his walk
+till he comes down to the sea-shore, and suppose further that he is as
+ignorant of physical geography as he is of watch-making. He soon begins
+to observe a number of adaptations of means to ends, which, if less
+refined and delicate than those that formed the object of his study in
+the watch, are on the other hand much more impressive from the greatly
+larger scale on which they are displayed. First, he observes that there
+is a beautiful basin hollowed out in the land for the reception of a
+bay; that the sides of this basin, which from being near its opening are
+most exposed to the action of large rolling billows, are composed of
+rocky cliffs, evidently in order to prevent the further encroachment of
+the sea, and the consequent destruction of the entire bay; that the
+sides of the basin, which from being successively situated more inland
+are successively less and less exposed to the action of large waves, are
+constituted successively of smaller rocks, passing into shingle, and
+eventually into the finest sand: that as the tides rise and fall with as
+great a regularity as was exhibited by the movements of the watch, the
+stones are carefully separated out from the sand to be arranged in
+sloping layers by themselves, and this always with a most beautiful
+reference to the places round the margin of the basin which are most in
+danger of being damaged by the action of the waves. He would further
+observe, upon closer inspection, that this process of selective
+arrangement goes into matters of the most minute detail. Here, for
+instance, he would observe a mile or two of a particular kind of seaweed
+artistically arranged in one long sinuous line upon the beach; there he
+would see a wonderful deposit of shells; in another place a lovely
+little purple heap of garnet sand, the minute particles of which have
+all been carefully picked out from the surrounding acres of yellow sand.
+Again, he would notice that the streams which come down to the bay are
+all flowing in channels admirably dug out for the purpose; and, being
+led by curiosity to investigate the teleology of these various streams,
+he would find that they serve to supply the water which the sea loses by
+evaporation, and also, by a wonderful piece of adjustment, to furnish
+fresh water to those animals and plants which thrive best in fresh
+water, and yet by their combined action to carry down sufficient mineral
+constituents to give that precise degree of saltness to the sea as a
+whole which is required for the maintenance of pelagic life. Lastly,
+continuing his investigations along this line of inquiry, he would find
+that a thousand different habitats were all thoughtfully adapted to the
+needs of a hundred thousand different forms of life, none of which
+could survive if these habitats were reversed. Now, I think that our
+imaginary inquirer would be a dull man if, as the result of all this
+study, he failed to conclude that the evidence of Design furnished by
+the marine bay was at least as cogent as that which he had previously
+found in his study of the watch.
+
+But there is this great difference between the two cases. Whereas by
+subsequent inquiry he could ascertain as a matter of fact that the watch
+was due to intelligent contrivance, he could make no such discovery with
+reference to the marine bay: in the one case intelligent contrivance as
+a cause is independently demonstrable, while in the other case it can
+only be inferred. What, then, is the value of the inference?
+
+If, after the studies of our imaginary teleologist had been completed,
+he were introduced to the library of the Royal Society, and if he were
+then to spend a year or two in making himself acquainted with the
+leading results of modern science, I fancy that he would end by being
+both a wiser and a sadder man. At least I am certain that in learning
+more he would feel that he is understanding less--that the archaic
+simplicity of his earlier explanations must give place to a matured
+perplexity upon the whole subject. To begin with, he would now find that
+every one of the adjustments of means to ends which excited his
+admiration on the sea-coast were due to physical causes which are
+perfectly well understood. The cliffs stood at the opening of the bay
+because the sea in past ages had encroached upon the coast-line until
+it met with these cliffs, which then opposed its further progress; the
+bay was a depression in the land which happened to be there when the sea
+arrived, and into which the sea consequently flowed; the successive
+occurrence of rocks, shingle, and sand was due to the actions of the
+waves themselves; the segregation of sea-weeds, shells, pebbles, and
+different kinds of sand, was due to their different degrees of specific
+gravity; the fresh-water streams ran in channels because they had
+themselves been the means of excavating them; and the multitudinous
+forms of life were all adapted to their several habitats simply because
+the unsuited forms were not able to live in them. In all these cases,
+therefore, our teleologist in the light of fuller knowledge would be
+compelled to conclude at least this much--that the adaptations which he
+had so greatly admired when he supposed that they were all due to
+contrivance in anticipation of the existing phenomena, cease to furnish
+the same evidence of intelligent design when it is found that no one of
+them was prepared beforehand by any independent or external cause.
+
+He would therefore be led to conclude that if the teleological
+interpretation of the facts were to be saved at all, it could only be so
+by taking a much wider view of the subject than was afforded by the
+particular cases of apparent design which at first appeared so cogent.
+That is to say, he would feel that he must abandon the supposition of
+any _special_ design in the construction of that particular bay, and
+fall back upon the theory of a much more _general_ design in the
+construction of one great scheme of Nature as a whole. In short he would
+require to dislodge his argument from the special adjustments which in
+the first instance appeared to him so suggestive, to those general laws
+of Nature which by their united operation give rise to a cosmos as
+distinguished from a chaos.
+
+Now I have been careful thus to present in all its more important
+details an imaginary argument drawn from inorganic nature, because it
+furnishes a complete analogy to the actual argument which is drawn from
+organic nature. Without any question, the instances of apparent design,
+or of the apparently intentional adaptation of means to ends, which we
+meet with in organic nature, are incomparably more numerous and
+suggestive than anything with which we meet in inorganic nature. But if
+once we find good reason to conclude that the former, like the latter,
+are all due, not to the immediate, special and prospective action of a
+contriving intelligence (as in watch-making or creation), but to the
+agency of secondary or physical causes acting under the influence of
+what we call general laws, then it seems to me that no matter how
+numerous or how wonderful the adaptations of means to ends in organic
+nature may be, they furnish one no other or better evidence of design
+than is furnished by any of the facts of inorganic nature.
+
+For the sake of clearness let us take any special case. Paley says, 'I
+know of no better method of introducing so large a subject than that of
+comparing a single thing with a single thing; an eye, for example, with
+a telescope.' He then goes on to point out the analogies between these
+two pieces of apparatus, and ends by asking, 'How is it possible, under
+circumstances of such close affinity, and under the operation of equal
+evidence, to exclude contrivance in the case of the eye, yet to
+acknowledge the proof of contrivance having been employed, as the
+plainest and clearest of all propositions in the case of the telescope?'
+
+Well, the answer to be made is that only upon the hypothesis of special
+creation can this analogy hold: on the hypothesis of evolution by
+physical causes the evidence in the two cases is _not_ equal. For, upon
+this hypothesis we have the eye beginning, not as a ready-made structure
+prepared beforehand for the purposes of seeing, but as a mere
+differentiation of the ends of nerves in the skin, probably in the first
+instance to enable them better to discriminate changes of temperature.
+Pigment having been laid down in these places the better to secure this
+purpose (I use teleological terms for the sake of brevity), the
+nerve-ending begins to distinguish between light and darkness. The
+better to secure this further purpose, the simplest conceivable form of
+lens begins to appear in the shape of small refractive bodies. Behind
+these sensory cells are developed, forming the earliest indication of a
+retina presenting a single layer. And so on, step by step, till we
+reach the eye of an eagle.
+
+Of course the teleologist will here answer--'The fact of such a gradual
+building up is no argument against design: whether the structure
+appeared on a sudden or was the result of a slow elaboration, the marks
+of design in either case occur in the structure as it stands.' All of
+which is very true; but I am not maintaining that the fact of a gradual
+development _in itself_ does affect the argument from design. I am
+maintaining that it only does so because it reveals the possibility
+(excluded by the hypothesis of sudden or special creation) of the
+structure having been proximately due to the operation of physical
+causes. Thus, for the value of argument, let us assume that natural
+selection has been satisfactorily established as a cause adequate to
+account for all these effects. Given the facts of heredity, variation,
+struggle for existence, and the consequent survival of the fittest, what
+follows? Why that each step in the prolonged and gradual development of
+the eye was brought about by the elimination of all the less adapted
+structures in any given generation, i.e. the selection of all the better
+adapted to perpetuate the improvement by heredity. Will the teleologist
+maintain that this selective process is itself indicative of special
+design? If so, it appears to me that he is logically bound to maintain
+that the long line of seaweed, the shells, the stones and the little
+heap of garnet sand upon the sea-coast are all equally indicative of
+special design. The general laws relating to specific gravity are at
+least of as much importance in the economy of nature as are the general
+laws relating to specific differentiation; and in each illustration
+alike we find the result of the operation of known physical causes to be
+that of selection. If it should be argued in reply that the selection in
+the one case is obviously purposeless, while in the other it is as
+obviously purposive, I answer that this is pure assumption. It is
+perhaps not too much to say that every geological formation on the face
+of the globe is either wholly or in part due to the selective influence
+of specific gravity, and who shall say that the construction of the
+earth's crust is a less important matter in the general scheme of things
+(if there is such a scheme) than is the evolution of an eye? Or who
+shall say that because we see an apparently intentional adaptation of
+means to ends as the result of selection in the case of the eye, there
+is no intention served by the result of selection in the case of the
+sea-weeds, stones, sand, mud? For anything that we can know to the
+contrary, the supposed intelligence may take a greater delight in the
+latter than in the former process.
+
+For the sake of clearness I have assumed that the physical causes with
+which we are already acquainted are sufficient to explain the observed
+phenomena of organic nature. But it clearly makes no difference whether
+or not this assumption is conceded, provided we allow that the observed
+phenomena are all due to physical causes of some kind, be they known or
+unknown. That is to say, in whatever measure we exclude the hypothesis
+of the direct or immediate intervention of the Deity in organic nature
+(miracle), in that measure we are reducing the evidence of design in
+organic nature to precisely the same logical position as that which is
+occupied by the evidence of design in inorganic nature. Hence I conceive
+that Mill has shown a singular want of penetration where, after
+observing with reference to natural selection, 'creative forethought is
+not absolutely the only link by which the origin of the wonderful
+mechanism of the eye may be connected with the fact of sight,' he goes
+on to say, 'leaving this remarkable speculation (i.e. that of natural
+selection) to whatever fate the progress of discovery may have in store
+for it, in the present state of knowledge the adaptations in nature
+afford a large balance of probability in favour of creation by
+intelligence.' I say this passage seems to me to show a singular want of
+penetration, and I say so because it appears to argue that the issue
+lies between the hypothesis of special design and the hypothesis of
+natural selection. But it does not do so. The issue really lies between
+special design and natural causes. Survival of the fittest is one of
+these causes which has been suggested, and shown by a large accumulation
+of evidence to be probably a true cause. But even if it were to be
+disproved as a cause, the real argumentative position of teleology would
+not thereby be effected, unless we were to conclude that there can be no
+other causes of a secondary or physical kind concerned in the
+production of the observed adaptations.
+
+I trust that I have now made it sufficiently clear why I hold that if we
+believe the reign of natural law, or the operation of physical causes,
+to extend throughout organic nature in the same universal manner as we
+believe this in the case of inorganic nature, then we can find no better
+evidence of design in the one province than in the other. The mere fact
+that we meet with more numerous and apparently more complete instances
+of design in the one province than in the other is, _ex hypothesi_,
+merely due to our ignorance of the natural causation in the more
+intricate province. In studying biological phenomena we are all at
+present in the intellectual position of our imaginary teleologist when
+studying the marine bay: we do not know the natural causes which have
+produced the observed results. But if, after having obtained a partial
+key in the theory of natural selection, we trust to the large analogy
+which is afforded by the simpler provinces of Nature, and conclude that
+physical causes are everywhere concerned in the production of organic
+structures, then we have concluded that any evidence of design which
+these structures present is of just the same logical value as that which
+we may attach to the evidence of design in inorganic nature. If it
+should still be urged that the adaptations met with in organic nature
+are from their number and unity much more suggestive of design than
+anything met with in inorganic nature, I must protest that this is to
+change the ground of argument and to evade the only point in dispute.
+No one denies the obvious fact stated: the only question is whether any
+number and any quantity of adaptations in any one department of nature
+afford other or better evidence of design than is afforded by
+adaptations in other departments, when all departments alike are
+supposed to be equally the outcome of physical causation. And this
+question I answer in the negative, because we have no means of
+ascertaining the extent to which the process of natural selection, or
+any other physical cause, is competent to produce adaptations of the
+kind observed.
+
+Thus, to take another instance of apparent design from inorganic nature,
+it has been argued that the constitution of the atmosphere is clearly
+designed for the support of vegetable and animal life. But before this
+conclusion can be established upon the facts, it must be shown that life
+could exist under no other material conditions than those which are
+furnished to it by the elementary constituents of the atmosphere. This,
+however, it is clearly impossible to show. For anything that we can know
+to the contrary, life may actually be existing upon some of the other
+heavenly bodies under totally different conditions as to atmosphere; and
+the fact that on this planet all life has come to be dependent upon the
+gases which occur in our atmosphere, may be due simply to the fact that
+it was only the forms of life which were able to adapt themselves
+(through natural selection or other physical causes) to these particular
+gases which could possibly be expected to occur--just as in matters of
+still smaller detail, it was only those forms of life that were suited
+to their several habitats in the marine bay, which could possibly be
+expected to be found in these several situations. Now, if a set of
+adjustments so numerous and so delicate as those on which the relations
+of every known form of life to the constituent gases of the atmosphere
+are seen to depend, can thus be shown not necessarily to imply the
+action of any disposing intelligence, how is it possible to conclude
+that any less general exhibitions of adjustment imply this, so long as
+every case of adjustment, whether or not ultimately due to design, is
+regarded as proximately due to physical causes?
+
+In view of these considerations, therefore, I think it is perfectly
+clear that if the argument from teleology is to be saved at all, it can
+only be so by shifting it from the narrow basis of special adaptations,
+to the broad area of Nature as a whole. And here I confess that to my
+mind the argument does acquire a weight which, if long and attentively
+considered, deserves to be regarded as enormous. For, although this and
+that particular adjustment in Nature may be seen to be proximately due
+to physical causes, and although we are prepared on the grounds of the
+largest possible analogy to infer that all other such particular cases
+are likewise due to physical causes, the more ultimate question arises,
+How is it that all physical causes conspire, by their united action, to
+the production of a general order of Nature? It is against all analogy
+to suppose that such an end as this can be accomplished by such means
+as those, in the way of mere chance or 'the fortuitous concourse of
+atoms.' We are led by the most fundamental dictates of our reason to
+conclude that there must be some cause for this co-operation of causes.
+I know that from Lucretius' time this has been denied; but it has been
+denied only on grounds of _feeling_. No possible _reason_ can be given
+for the denial which does not run counter to the law of causation
+itself. I am therefore perfectly clear that the only question which,
+from a purely rational point of view, here stands to be answered is
+this--Of what nature are we to suppose the _causa causarum_ to be?
+
+On this point only two hypotheses have ever been advanced, and I think
+it is impossible to conceive that any third one is open. Of these two
+hypotheses the earliest, and of course the most obvious, is that of
+mental purpose. The other hypothesis is one which we owe to the
+far-reaching thought of Mr. Herbert Spencer. In Chapter VII of his
+_First Principles_ he argues that all causation arises immediately out
+of existence as such, or, as he states it, that 'uniformity of law
+inevitably follows from the persistence of force.' For 'if in any two
+cases there is exact likeness not only between those most conspicuous
+antecedents which we distinguish as the causes, but also between those
+accompanying antecedents which we call the conditions, we cannot affirm
+that the effects will differ, without affirming either that some force
+has come into existence or that some force has ceased to exist. If the
+co-operative forces in the one case are equal to those in the other,
+each to each, in distribution and amount; then it is impossible to
+conceive the product of their joint action in the one case as unlike
+that in the other, without conceiving one or more of the forces to have
+increased or diminished in quantity; and this is conceiving that force
+is not persistent.'
+
+Now this interpretation of causality as the immediate outcome of
+existence must be considered first as a theory of causation, and next as
+a theory in relation to Theism. As a theory of causation it has not met
+with the approval of mathematicians, physicists, or logicians, leading
+representatives of all these departments of thought having expressly
+opposed it, while, so far as I am aware, no representative of any one of
+them has spoken in its favour[23]. But with this point I am not at
+present concerned, for even if the theory were admitted to furnish a
+full and complete explanation of causality, it would still fail to
+account for the harmonious relation of causes, or the fact with which we
+are now alone concerned. This distinction is not perceived by the
+anonymous author 'Physicus,' who, in his _Candid Examination of Theism_,
+lays great stress upon Mr. Spencer's theory of causation as subversive
+of Theism, or at least as superseding the necessity of theistic
+hypothesis by furnishing a full explanation of the order of Nature on
+purely physical grounds. But he fails to perceive that even if Mr.
+Spencer's theory were conceded fully to explain all the facts of
+causality, it would in no wise tend to explain the cosmos in which these
+facts occur. It may be true that causation depends upon the 'persistence
+of force': it does not follow that all manifestations of force should on
+this account have been directed to occur as they do occur. For, if we
+follow back any sequence of physical causation, we soon find that it
+spreads out on all sides into a network of physical relations which are
+literally infinite both in space (conditions) and in time (antecedent
+causes). Now, even if we suppose that the persistence of force is a
+sufficient explanation of the occurrence of the particular sequence
+contemplated so far as the exhibition of force is there concerned, we
+are thus as far as ever from explaining the _determination_ of this
+force into the particular channel through which it flows. It may be
+quite true that the resultant is determined as to magnitude and
+direction by the components; but what about the magnitude and direction
+of the components? If it is said that they in turn were determined by
+the outcome of previous systems, how about these systems? And so on till
+we spread away into the infinite network already mentioned. Only if we
+knew the origin of all series of all such systems could we be in a
+position to say that an adequate intelligence might determine beforehand
+by calculation the state of any one part of the universe at any given
+instant of time. But, as the series are infinite both in number and
+extent, this knowledge is clearly out of the question. Moreover, even if
+it could be imagined as possible, it could only be so imagined at the
+expense of supposing an origin of physical causation in time; and this
+amounts to supposing a state of things prior to such causation, and out
+of which it arose. But to suppose this is to suppose some extra-physical
+source of physical causation; and whether this supposition is made with
+reference to a physical event occurring under immediate observation
+(miracle), or to a physical event in past time, or to the origin of all
+physical events, it is alike incompatible with any theory that seeks to
+give a purely physical explanation of the physical universe as a whole.
+It is, in short, the old story about a stream not being able to rise
+above its source. Physical causation cannot be made to supply its own
+explanation, and the mere persistence of force, even if it were conceded
+to account for particular cases of physical sequence, can give no
+account of the ubiquitous and eternal direction of force in the
+construction and maintenance of universal order.
+
+We are thus, as it were, driven upon the theory of Theism as furnishing
+the only nameable explanation of this universal order. That is to say,
+by no logical artifice can we escape from the conclusion that, as far
+as we can see, this universal order must be regarded as due to some one
+integrating principle; and that this, so far as we can see, is most
+probably of the nature of mind. At least it must be allowed that we can
+conceive of it under no other aspect; and that if any particular
+adaptation in organic nature is held to be suggestive of such an agency,
+the sum total of all adaptations in the universe must be held to be
+incomparably more so. I shall not, however, dwell upon this theme since
+it has been well treated by several modern writers, and with special
+cogency by the Rev. Baden Powell. I will merely observe that I do not
+consider it necessary to the display of this argument in favour of
+Theism that we should speak of 'natural laws.' It is enough to take our
+stand upon the [broadest] general fact that Nature is a system, and that
+the order observable in this system is absolutely universal, eternally
+enduring, and infinitely exact; while only upon the supposition of its
+being such is our experience conceived as possible, or our knowledge
+conceived as attainable.
+
+Having thus stated as emphatically as I can that in my opinion no
+explanation of natural order can be either conceived or named other than
+that of intelligence as the supreme directing cause, I shall proceed to
+two other questions which arise immediately out of this conclusion. The
+first of these questions is as to the presumable character of this
+supreme Intelligence so far as any data of inference upon this point are
+supplied by our observation of Nature; and the other question is as to
+the strictly formal cogency of any conclusions either with reference to
+the existence or the character of such an intelligence[24]. I shall
+consider these two points separately.
+
+No sooner have we reached the conclusion that the only hypothesis
+whereby the general order of Nature admits of being in any degree
+accounted for is that it is due to a cause of a mental kind, than we
+confront the fact that this cause must be widely different from anything
+that we know of Mind in ourselves. And we soon discover that this
+difference must be conceived as not merely of degree, however great, but
+of kind. In other words, although we may conclude that the nearest
+analogue of the _causa causarum_ given in experience is the human mind,
+we are bound to acknowledge that in all fundamental points the analogy
+is so remote that it becomes a question whether we are really very much
+nearer the truth by entertaining it. Thus, for instance, as Mr. Spencer
+has pointed out, our only conception of that which we know as Mind in
+ourselves is the conception of a series of states of consciousness. But,
+he continues, 'Put a series of states of consciousness as cause and the
+evolving universe as effect, and then endeavour to see the last as
+flowing from the first. I find it possible to imagine in some dim way a
+series of states of consciousness serving as antecedent to any one of
+the movements I see going on; for my own states of consciousness are
+often indirectly the antecedents to such movements. But how if I attempt
+to think of such a series as antecedent to _all_ actions throughout the
+universe ...? If to account for this infinitude of physical changes
+everywhere going on, "Mind must be conceived as there," "under the guise
+of simple-dynamics," then the reply is, that, to be so conceived, Mind
+must be divested of all attributes by which it is distinguished; and
+that, when thus divested of its distinguishing attributes the conception
+disappears--the word Mind stands for a blank.'
+
+Moreover, 'How is the "originating Mind" to be thought of as having
+states produced by things objective to it, as discriminating among these
+states, and classing them as like and unlike; and as preferring one
+objective result to another?'[25]
+
+Hence, without continuing this line of argument, which it would not be
+difficult to trace through every constituent branch of human psychology,
+we may take it as unquestionable that, if there is a Divine Mind, it
+must differ so essentially from the human mind, that it becomes
+illogical to designate the two by the same name: the attributes of
+eternity and ubiquity are in themselves enough to place such a Mind in a
+category _sui generis_, wholly different from anything which the analogy
+furnished by our own mind enables us even dimly to conceive. And this,
+of course, is no more than theologians admit. God's thoughts are above
+our thoughts, and a God who would be comprehensible to our intelligence
+would be no God at all, they say. Which may be true enough, only we must
+remember that in whatever measure we are thus precluded from
+understanding the Divine Mind, in that measure are we precluded from
+founding any conclusions as to its nature upon analogies furnished by
+the human mind. The theory ceases to be anthropomorphic: it ceases to be
+even 'anthropopsychic': it is affiliated with the conception of mind
+only in virtue of the one fact that it serves to give the best
+provisional account of the order of Nature, by supposing an infinite
+extension of some of the faculties of the human mind, with a concurrent
+obliteration of all the essential conditions under which alone these
+faculties are known to exist. Obviously of such a Mind as this no
+predication is logically possible. If such a Mind exists, it is not
+conceivable as existing, and we are precluded from assigning to it any
+attributes.
+
+Thus much on general grounds. Descending now to matters of more detail,
+let us assume with the natural theologians that such a Mind does exist,
+that it so far resembles the human mind as to be a conscious, personal
+intelligence, and that the care of such a Mind is over all its works.
+Even upon the grounds of this supposition we meet with a number of large
+and general facts which indicate that this Mind ought still to be
+regarded as apparently very unlike its 'image' in the mind of man. I
+will not here dwell upon the argument of seeming waste and purposeless
+action in Nature, because I think that this may be fairly met by the
+ulterior argument already drawn from Nature as a whole--viz. that as a
+whole, Nature is a cosmos, and therefore that what to us appears
+wasteful and purposeless in matters of detail may not be so in relation
+to the scheme of things as a whole. But I am doubtful whether this
+ulterior argument can fairly be adduced to meet the apparent absence in
+Nature of that which in man we term morality. For in the human mind the
+sense of right and wrong--with all its accompanying or constituting
+emotions of love, sympathy, justice, &c.--is so important a factor, that
+however greatly we may imagine the intellectual side of the human mind
+to be extended, we can scarcely imagine that the moral side could ever
+become so apparently eclipsed as to end in the authorship of such a work
+as we find in terrestrial nature. It is useless to hide our eyes to the
+state of matters which meets us here. Most of the instances of special
+design which are relied upon by the natural theologian to prove the
+intelligent nature of the First Cause, have as their end or object the
+infliction of painful death or the escape from remorseless enemies; and
+so far the argument in favour of the intelligent nature of the First
+Cause is an argument against its morality. Again, even if we quit the
+narrower basis on which teleological argument has rested in the past,
+and stand that argument upon the broader ground of Nature as a whole, it
+scarcely becomes less incompatible with any inference to the morality
+of that Cause, seeing that the facts to which I have alluded are not
+merely occasional and, as it were, outweighed by contrary facts of a
+more general kind, but manifestly constitute the leading feature of the
+scheme of organic nature as a whole: or, if this were held to be
+questionable, it could only follow that we are not entitled to infer
+that there is any such scheme at all.
+
+Nature, as red in tooth and claw with ravin, is thus without question a
+large and general fact that must be considered by any theory of
+teleology which can be propounded. I do not think that this aspect of
+the matter could be conveyed in stronger terms than it is by
+'Physicus[26],' whom I shall therefore quote:--
+
+'Supposing the Deity to be, what Professor Flint maintains that he
+is--viz. omnipotent, and there can be no inference more transparent than
+that such wholesale suffering, for whatever ends designed, exhibits an
+incalculably greater deficiency of beneficence in the divine character
+than that which we know in any, the very worst, of human characters. For
+let us pause for one moment to think of what suffering in Nature means.
+Some hundreds of millions of years ago some millions of millions of
+animals must be supposed to have become sentient. Since that time till
+the present, there must have been millions and millions of generations
+of millions and millions of individuals. And throughout all this period
+of incalculable duration, this inconceivable host of sentient organisms
+have been in a state of unceasing battle, dread, ravin, pain. Looking to
+the outcome, we find that more than one half of the species which have
+survived the ceaseless struggle are parasitic in their habits, lower and
+insentient forms of life feasting on higher and sentient forms; we find
+teeth and talons whetted for slaughter, hooks and suckers moulded for
+torment--everywhere a reign of terror, hunger, sickness, with oozing
+blood and quivering limbs, with gasping breath and eyes of innocence
+that dimly close in deaths of cruel torture! Is it said that there are
+compensating enjoyments? I care not to strike the balance; the
+enjoyments I plainly perceive to be as physically necessary as the
+pains, and this whether or not evolution is due to design.... Am I told
+that I am not competent to judge the purposes of the Almighty? I answer
+that if there are _purposes_, I _am_ able to judge of them so far as I
+can see; and if I am expected to judge of His purposes when they appear
+to be beneficent, I am in consistency obliged also to judge of them when
+they appear to be malevolent. And it can be no possible extenuation of
+the latter to point to the "final result" as "order and beauty," so long
+as the means adopted by the "_Omnipotent Designer_" are known to have
+been so [terrible]. All that we could legitimately assert in this case
+would be that, so far as observation can extend, "He cares for animal
+perfection" _to the exclusion of_ "animal enjoyment," and even to the
+_total disregard_ of animal suffering. But to assert this would merely
+be to deny beneficence as an attribute of God[27].'
+
+The reasoning here appears as unassailable as it is obvious. If, as the
+writer goes on to say, we see a rabbit panting in the iron jaws of a
+spring trap, and in consequence abhor the devilish nature of the being
+who, with full powers of realizing what pain means, can deliberately
+employ his whole faculties of invention in contriving a thing so
+hideously cruel; what are we to think of a Being who, with yet higher
+faculties of thought and knowledge, and with an unlimited choice of
+means to secure His ends, has contrived untold thousands of mechanisms
+no less diabolical? In short, so far as Nature can teach us, or
+'observation can extend,' it does appear that the scheme, if it is a
+scheme, is the product of a Mind which differs from the more highly
+evolved type of human mind in that it is immensely more intellectual
+without being nearly so moral. And the same thing is indicated by the
+rough and indiscriminate manner in which justice is allotted--even if it
+can be said to be allotted at all. When we contrast the certainty and
+rigour with which any offence against 'physical law' is punished by
+Nature (no matter though the sin be but one of ignorance), with the
+extreme uncertainty and laxity with which she meets any offence against
+'moral law,' we are constrained to feel that the system of legislation
+(if we may so term it) is conspicuously different from that which would
+have been devised by any intelligence which in any sense could be called
+'anthropopsychic.'
+
+The only answer to these difficulties open to the natural theologian is
+that which is drawn from the constitution of the human mind. It is
+argued that the fact of this mind having so large an ingredient of
+morality in its constitution may be taken as proof that its originating
+source is likewise of a moral character. This argument, however, appears
+to me of a questionable character, seeing that, for anything we can tell
+to the contrary, the moral sense may have been given to, or developed
+in, man simply on account of its utility to the species--just in the
+same way as teeth in the shark or poison in the snake. If so, the
+occurrence of the moral sense in man would merely furnish one other
+instance of the intellectual, as distinguished from the moral, nature of
+God; and there seems to be in itself no reason why we should take any
+other view. The mere fact that to _us_ the moral sense seems such a
+great and holy thing, is doubtless (under any view) owing to its
+importance to the well-being of our species. In itself, or as it appears
+to other possible beings intellectual like ourselves, but existing under
+unlike conditions, the moral sense of man may be regarded as of no more
+significance than the social instincts of bees. More particularly may
+this consideration apply to the case of a Mind existing, according to
+the theological theory of things, wholly beyond the pale of anything
+analogous to those social relations out of which, according to the
+scientific theory of evolution, the moral sense has been developed in
+ourselves[28].
+
+The truth is that in this matter natural theologians begin by assuming
+that the First Cause, if intelligent, _must_ be moral; and then they are
+blinded to the strictly logical weakness of the argument whereby they
+endeavour to sustain their assumption. For aught that we can tell to the
+contrary, it may be quite as 'anthropomorphic' a notion to attribute
+morality to God as it would be to attribute those capacities for
+sensuous enjoyment with which the Greeks endowed their divinities. The
+Deity may be as high above the one as the other--or rather perhaps we
+may say as much external to the one as to the other. Without being
+supra-moral, and still less immoral, He may be un-moral: our ideas of
+morality may have no meaning as applied to Him.
+
+But if we go thus far in one direction, I think, _per contra_, it must
+in consistency be allowed that the argument from the constitution of the
+human mind acquires more weight when it is shifted from the moral sense
+to the religious instincts. For, on the one hand, these instincts are
+not of such obvious use to the species as are those of morality; and,
+on the other hand, while they are unquestionably very general, very
+persistent, and very powerful, they do not appear to serve any 'end' or
+'purpose' in the scheme of things, unless we accept the theory which is
+given of them by those in whom they are most strongly developed. Here I
+think we have an argument of legitimate force, although it does not
+appear that such was the opinion entertained of it by Mill. I think the
+argument is of legitimate force, because if the religious instincts of
+the human race point to no reality as their object, they are out of
+analogy with all other instinctive endowments. Elsewhere in the animal
+kingdom we never meet with such a thing as an instinct pointing
+aimlessly, and therefore the fact of man being, as it is said, 'a
+religious animal'--i.e. presenting a class of feelings of a peculiar
+nature directed to particular ends, and most akin to, if not identical
+with, true instinct--is so far, in my opinion, a legitimate argument in
+favour of the reality of some object towards which the religious side of
+this animal's nature is directed. And I do not think that this argument
+is invalidated by such facts as that widely different intellectual
+conceptions touching the character of this object are entertained by
+different races of mankind; that the force of the religious instincts
+differs greatly in different individuals even of the same race; that
+these instincts admit of being greatly modified by education; that they
+would probably fail to be developed in any individual without at least
+so much education as is required to furnish the needful intellectual
+conceptions on which they are founded; or that we may not improbably
+trace their origin, as Mr. Spencer traces it, to a primitive mode of
+interpreting dreams. For even in view of all these considerations the
+fact remains that these instincts _exist_, and therefore, like all other
+instincts, may be supposed to have a _definite_ meaning, even though,
+like all other instincts, they may be supposed to have had a _natural
+cause_, which both in the individual and in the race requires, as in the
+natural development of all other instincts, the natural conditions for
+its occurrence to be supplied. In a word, if animal instincts generally,
+like organic structures or inorganic systems, are held to betoken
+purpose, the religious nature of man would stand out as an anomaly in
+the general scheme of things if it alone were purposeless. Hence we have
+here what seems to me a valid inference, so far as it goes, to the
+effect that, if the general order of Nature is due to Mind, the
+character of that Mind is such as it is conceived to be by the most
+highly developed form of religion. A conclusion which is no doubt the
+opposite of that which we reached by contemplating the phenomena of
+biology; and a contradiction which can only be overcome by supposing,
+either that Nature conceals God, while man reveals Him, or that Nature
+reveals God while man misrepresents Him.
+
+There is still one other fact of a very wide and general kind presented
+by Nature, which, if the order of Nature is taken to be the expression
+of intelligent purpose, ought in my opinion to be regarded as of great
+weight in furnishing evidence upon the ethical quality of that purpose.
+It is a fact which, so far as I know, has not been considered by any
+other writer; but from its being one of the most general of all the
+facts relating to the sentient creation, and from its admitting of no
+one single exception, I feel that I am not able too strongly to
+emphasize its argumentative importance. This fact is, as I have stated
+it on a former occasion, 'that amid all the millions of mechanisms and
+instincts in the animal kingdom, there is no one instance of a mechanism
+or instinct occurring in one species for the exclusive benefit of
+another species, although there are a few cases in which a mechanism or
+instinct that is of benefit to its possessor has come also to be
+utilized by other species. Now, on the beneficent design theory it is
+impossible to explain why, when all the mechanisms in the same species
+are invariably correlated for the benefit of that species, there should
+never be any such correlation between mechanisms in different species,
+or why the same remark should apply to instincts. For how magnificent a
+display of Divine beneficence would organic nature have afforded, if
+all, or even some, species had been so inter-related as to minister to
+each other's necessities. Organic species might then have been likened
+to a countless multitude of voices all singing in one harmonious psalm
+of praise. But, as it is, we see no vestige of such co-ordination; every
+species is for itself, and for itself alone--an outcome of the always
+and everywhere fiercely raging struggle for life[29].'
+
+The large and general fact thus stated constitutes, in my opinion, the
+strongest of all arguments in favour of Mr. Darwin's theory of natural
+selection, and therefore we can see the probable reason why it is what
+it is, so far as the question of its physical causation is concerned.
+But where the question is, Supposing the physical causation ultimately
+due to Mind, what are we to infer concerning the character of the Mind
+which has adopted this method of causation?--then we again reach the
+answer that, so far as we can judge from a conscientious examination of
+these facts, this Mind does not show that it is of a nature which in man
+we should call moral. Of course behind the physical appearances there
+may be a moral justification, so that from these appearances we are not
+entitled to say more than that from the fact of its having chosen a
+method of physical causation leading to these results, it has presented
+to us the appearance, as before observed, of caring for animal
+perfection to the exclusion of animal enjoyment, and even to the total
+disregard of animal suffering.
+
+In conclusion, it is of importance to insist upon a truth which in
+discussions of this kind is too often disregarded--viz. that all our
+reasonings being of a character relative to our knowledge, our
+inferences are uncertain in a degree proportionate to the extent of our
+ignorance; and that as with reference to the topics which we have been
+considering our ignorance is of immeasurable extent, any conclusions
+that we may have formed are, as Bishop Butler would say, 'infinitely
+precarious.' Or, as I have previously presented this formal aspect of
+the matter while discussing the teleological argument with Professor Asa
+Gray,--'I suppose it will be admitted that the validity of an inference
+depends upon the number, the importance, and the definiteness of the
+things or ratios known, as compared with the number, importance, and
+definiteness of the things or ratios unknown, but inferred. If so, we
+should be logically cautious in drawing inferences from the natural to
+the supernatural: for although we have the entire sphere of experience
+from which to draw an inference, we are unable to gauge the probability
+of the inference when drawn--the unknown ratios being confessedly of
+unknown number, importance, and degree of definiteness: the whole orbit
+of human knowledge is insufficient to obtain a parallax whereby to
+institute the required measurements or to determine the proportion
+between the terms known and the terms unknown. Otherwise phrased, we may
+say--as our knowledge of a part is to our knowledge of a whole, so is
+our inference from that part to the reality of that whole. Who,
+therefore, can say, even upon the hypothesis of Theism, that our
+inferences or "idea of design" would have any meaning if applied to the
+"All-Upholder," whose thoughts are not as our thoughts?'[30] And of
+course, _mutatis mutandis_, the same remarks apply to all inferences
+having a negative tendency.
+
+As an outcome of the whole of this discussion, then, I think it appears
+that the influence of Science upon Natural Religion has been uniformly
+of a destructive character. Step by step it has driven back the apparent
+evidence of direct or special design in Nature, until now this evidence
+resides exclusively in the one great and general fact that Nature as a
+whole is a Cosmos. Further than this it is obviously impossible that the
+destructive influence of Science can extend, because Science can only
+exist upon the basis of this fact. But when we allow that this great and
+universal fact--which but for the effects of unremitting familiarity
+could scarcely fail to be intellectually overwhelming--does betoken
+mental agency in Nature, we immediately find it impossible to determine
+the probable character of such a mind, even supposing that it exists. We
+cannot conceive of it as presenting any one of the qualities which
+essentially characterize what we know as mind in ourselves; and
+therefore the word Mind, as applied to the supposed agency, stands for a
+blank. Further, even if we disregard this difficulty, and assume that in
+some way or other incomprehensible to us a Mind does exist as far
+transcending the human mind as the human mind transcends mechanical
+motion; still we are met by some very large and general facts in Nature
+which seem strongly to indicate that this Mind, if it exists, is either
+deficient in, or wholly destitute of, that class of feelings which in
+man we term moral; while, on the other hand, the religious aspirations
+of man himself may be taken to indicate the opposite conclusion. And,
+lastly, with reference to the whole course of such reasonings, we have
+seen that any degree of measurable probability, as attaching to the
+conclusions, is unattainable. From all which it appears that Natural
+Religion at the present time can only be regarded as a system full of
+intellectual contradictions and moral perplexities; so that if we go to
+her with these greatest of all questions: 'Is there knowledge with the
+Most High?' 'Shall not the Judge of all the earth do right?' the only
+clear answer which we receive is the one that comes back to us from the
+depths of our own heart--'When I thought upon this it was too painful
+for me.'
+
+FOOTNOTES:
+
+[23] A note (of 1893) contains the following: 'Being, considered in the
+abstract, is logically equivalent to Not-Being or Nothing. For if by
+successive stages of abstraction, we divest the conception of Being of
+attribute and relation we reach the conception of that which cannot be,
+i.e. a logical contradiction, or the logical correlative of Being which
+is Nothing. (All this is well expressed in Caird's _Evolution of
+Religion_.) The failure to perceive this fact constitutes a ground
+fallacy in my _Candid Examination of Theism_, where I represent Being as
+being a sufficient explanation of the Order of Nature or the law of
+Causation.'
+
+[24] This promise is only partially fulfilled in the penultimate
+paragraph of the essay.--ED.
+
+[25] _Essays_, vol. iii. p. 246 et seq. The whole passage ought to be
+consulted, being too long to quote here.
+
+[26] In an essay on Prof. Flint's _Theism_, appended to the _Candid
+Examination_.
+
+[27] _A Candid Examination of Theism_, pp. 171-2.
+
+[28] [I have, as Editor, resisted a temptation to intervene in the above
+argument. But I think I may intervene on a matter of fact, and point out
+that 'according to the theological theory of things,' i.e. according to
+the Trinitarian doctrine, God's Nature consists in what is strictly
+'analogous to social relations,' and He not merely exhibits in His
+creation, but Himself _is_ Love. See, on the subject, especially, R.H.
+Hutton's essay on the Incarnation, in his _Theological Essays_
+(Macmillan).--ED.]
+
+[29] _Scientific Evidences of Organic Evolution_, pp. 76-7.
+
+[30] _Nature_, April 5, 1883.
+
+
+
+
+PART II.
+
+
+
+
++Introductory Note by the Editor+.
+
+
+Little more requires to be said by way of introduction to the Notes
+which are all that George Romanes was able to write of a work that was
+to have been entitled _A Candid Examination of Religion_. What little
+does require to be said must be by way of bridging the interval of
+thought which exists between the Essays which have just preceded and the
+Notes which represent more nearly his final phase of mind.
+
+The most anti-theistic feature in the Essays is the stress laid in them
+on the evidence which Nature supplies, or is supposed to supply,
+antagonistic to the belief in the goodness of God.
+
+On this mysterious and perplexing subject George Romanes appears to have
+had more to say but did not live to say it[31]. We may notice however
+that in 1889, in a paper read before the Aristotelian Society, on 'the
+Evidence of Design in Nature[32],' he appears to allow more weight than
+before to the argument that the method of physical development must be
+judged in the light of its result. This paper was part of a _Symposium_.
+Mr. S. Alexander has argued in a previous paper against the hypothesis
+of 'design' in Nature on the ground that 'the fair order of Nature is
+only acquired by a wholesale waste and sacrifice.' This argument was
+developed by pointing to the obvious 'mal-adjustments,' 'aimless
+destructions,' &c., which characterize the processes of Nature. But
+these, Romanes replies, necessarily belong to the process considered as
+one of 'natural selection.' The question is only: Is such a process _per
+se_ incompatible with the hypothesis of design? And he replies in the
+negative.
+
+
+'"The fair order of Nature is only acquired by a wholesale waste and
+sacrifice." Granted. But if the "wholesale waste and sacrifice," as
+antecedent, leads to a "fair order of Nature" as its consequent, how can
+it be said that the "wholesale waste and sacrifice" has been a failure?
+Or how can it be said that, in point of fact, there _has_ been a waste,
+or _has_ been a sacrifice? Clearly such things can only be said when
+our point of view is restricted to the means (i.e. the wholesale
+destruction of the less fit); not when we extend our view to what, even
+within the limits of human observation, is unquestionably the _end_
+(i.e. the causal result in an ever improving world of types). A
+candidate who is plucked in a Civil Service examination because he
+happens to be one of the less fitted to pass, is no doubt an instance of
+failure so far as his own career is concerned; but it does not therefore
+follow that the system of examination is a failure in its final end of
+securing the best men for the Civil Service. And the fact that the
+general outcome of all the individual failures in Nature is that of
+securing what Mr. Alexander calls "the fair order of Nature," is
+assuredly evidence that the _modus operandi_ has not been a failure in
+relation to what, if there be any Design in Nature at all, must be
+regarded as the higher purpose of such Design. Therefore, cases of
+individual or otherwise relative failure cannot be quoted as evidence
+against the hypothesis of there being such Design. The fact that the
+general system of natural causation has for its eventual result "a fair
+order of Nature," cannot of itself be a fact inimical to the hypothesis
+of Design in Nature, even though it be true that such causation entails
+the continual elimination of the less efficient types.
+
+'To the best of my judgement, then, this argument from failure, random
+trial, blind blundering, or in whatever other terminology the argument
+may be presented, is only valid as against the theory of what Mr.
+Alexander alludes to as a "Carpenter-God," i.e. that if there be Design
+in Nature at all, it must everywhere be _special_ Design; so that the
+evidence of it may as well be tested by any given minute fragment of
+Nature--such as one individual organism or class of organisms--as by
+having regard to the whole Cosmos. The evidence of Design in this sense
+I fully allow has been totally destroyed by the proof of natural
+selection. But such destruction has only brought into clearer relief the
+much larger question that rises behind, viz. as before phrased, Is there
+anything about the method of natural causation, considered as a whole,
+that is inimical to the theory of Design in Nature, considered as a
+whole?'
+
+
+It is true that this argument does not bear directly upon the
+_character_ of the God whose 'design' Nature exhibits: but indirectly it
+does[33]. For instance, such an argument as that found above (on p. 79:
+'we see a rabbit, &c.') seems to be only valid on the postulate here
+described as that of the 'Carpenter-God.'
+
+It is also probable that Romanes felt the difficulty arising from the
+cruelty of nature less, as he was led to dwell more on humanity as the
+most important part of nature, and perceived the function of suffering
+in the economy of human life (pp. 142, 154): and also as he became more
+impressed with the positive evidences for Christianity as at once the
+religion of sorrow and the revelation of God as Love (pp. 163, ff.). The
+Christian Faith supplies believers not only with an argument against
+pessimism from general results, but also with such an insight into the
+Divine character and method as enables them at least to bear hopefully
+the awful perplexities which arise from the spectacle of individuals
+suffering.
+
+In the last year or two of his life he read very attentively a great
+number of books on 'Christian Evidences,' from Pascal's _Pensees_
+downwards, and studied carefully the appearance of 'plan' in the
+Biblical Revelation considered as a whole. The _fact_ of this study
+appears in fragmentary remarks, indices and references, which George
+Romanes left behind him in note-books. The _results_ of it will not be
+unapparent in the following Notes, which, I need to remind my readers,
+are, in spite of their small bulk, the sole reason for the existence of
+this volume.
+
+In reading these I can hardly conceive any one not being possessed with
+a profound regret that the author was not allowed to complete his work.
+And it is only fair to ask every reader of the following pages to
+remember that he is reading, in the main, incomplete notes and not
+finished work. This will account for a great deal that may seem sketchy
+and unsatisfactory in the treatment of different points, and also for
+repetitions and traces of inconsistency. But I can hardly think any one
+can read these notes to the end without agreeing with me that if I had
+withheld them from publication, the world would have lost the witness of
+a mind, both able and profoundly sincere, feeling after God and finding
+Him.
+
+                                                                    C.G.
+
+FOOTNOTES:
+
+[31] See below p. 142, and note. I find also the following note of a
+date subsequent to 1889. 'It is a fact that pessimism is illogical,
+simply because we are inadequate judges of the world, and pessimism
+would therefore be opposed to agnosticism. We may know that there is
+something out of joint between the world and ourselves; but we cannot
+know how far this is the fault of the world or of ourselves.'
+
+[32] _Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society_ (Williams & Norgate),
+vol. i. no. 3, pp. 72, 73.
+
+[33] I ought also to mention that Romanes on the Sunday before his death
+expressed to me verbally his entire agreement with the argument of
+Professor Knight's _Aspects of Theism_ (Macmillan, 1893); in which on
+this subject see pp. 184-186, 'A larger good is evolved through the
+winnowing process by which physical nature casts its weaker products
+aside,' &c.
+
+
+
+
+NOTES FOR A WORK ON A CANDID EXAMINATION OF RELIGION.
+
+BY METAPHYSICUS.
+
+
+_Proposed Mottoes_.
+
+     'I quite admit the difficulty of believing that in every man there
+     is an eye of the soul which, when by other pursuits lost and
+     dimmed, is by this purified and re-illumined; and is more precious
+     far than ten thousand bodily eyes, for by this alone is truth seen.
+     Now there are two classes of persons, one class who will agree with
+     you and will take your words as a revelation; another class who
+     have no understanding of them and to whom they will naturally be as
+     idle tales.
+
+     'And you had better decide at once with which of the two you are
+     arguing; or, perhaps, you will say with neither, and that your
+     chief aim in carrying on the argument is your own improvement; at
+     the same time not grudging to either any benefit which they may
+     derive.'--PLATO.
+
+     'If we would reprove with success, and show another his mistake, we
+     must see from what side he views the matter, for on that side it is
+     generally true: and, admitting this truth, show him the side on
+     which it is false.'--PASCAL.
+
+
+
+
+Sec. 1. INTRODUCTORY.
+
+
+Many years ago I published in Messrs. Truebner's 'Philosophical Series,'
+a short treatise entitled _A Candid Examination of Theism_ by
+'Physicus.' Although the book made some stir at the time, and has since
+exhibited a vitality never anticipated by its author, the secret of its
+authorship has been well preserved[34]. This secret it is my intention,
+if possible, still to preserve; but as it is desirable (on several
+accounts which will become apparent in the following pages) to avow
+identity of authorship, the present essay appears under the same
+pseudonym[35] as its predecessor. The reason why the first essay
+appeared anonymously is truthfully stated in the preface thereof, viz.
+in order that the reasoning should be judged on its own merits, without
+the bias which is apt to arise on the part of a reader from a knowledge
+of the authority--or absence of authority--on the part of a writer. This
+reason, in my opinion, still holds good as regards _A Candid Examination
+of Theism_, and applies in equal measure to the present sequel in _A
+Candid Examination of Religion_.
+
+It will be shown that in many respects the negative conclusions reached
+in the former essay have been greatly modified by the results of maturer
+thought as now presented in the second. Therefore it seems desirable to
+state at the outset that, as far as I am capable of judging, the
+modifications in question have not been due in any measure to influence
+from without. They appear to have been due exclusively to the results of
+my own further thought, as briefly set out in the following pages, with
+no indebtedness to private friends and but little to published
+utterances in the form of books, &c. Nevertheless, no very original
+ideas are here presented. Indeed, I suppose it would nowadays be
+impossible to present any idea touching religion, which has not at some
+time or another been presented previously. Still much may be done in the
+furthering of one's thought by changing points of view, selecting and
+arranging ideas already more or less familiar, so that they may be built
+into new combinations; and this, I think, I have in no small degree
+accomplished as regards the microcosm of my own mind. But I state this
+much only for the sake of adding a confession that, as far as
+introspection can carry one, it does not appear to me that the
+modifications which my views have undergone since the publication of my
+previous _Candid Examination_ are due so much to purely logical
+processes of the intellect, as to the sub-conscious (and therefore more
+or less unanalyzable) influences due to the ripening experience of life.
+The extent to which this is true [i.e. the extent to which experience
+modifies logic][36] is seldom, if ever, realized, although it is
+practically exemplified every day by the sobering caution which
+advancing age exercises upon the mind. Not so much by any above-board
+play of syllogism as by some underhand cheating of consciousness, do the
+accumulating experiences of life and of thought slowly enrich the
+judgement. And this, one need hardly say, is especially true in such
+regions of thought as present the most tenuous media for the progress of
+thought by the comparatively clumsy means of syllogistic locomotion. For
+the further we ascend from the solid ground of verification, the less
+confidence should we place in our wings of speculation, while the more
+do we find the practical wisdom of such intellectual caution, or
+distrust of ratiocination, as can be given only by experience.
+Therefore, most of all is this the case in those departments of thought
+which are furthest from the region of our sensuous life--viz.
+metaphysics and religion. And, as a matter of fact, it is just in these
+departments of thought that we find the rashness of youth most amenable
+to the discipline in question by the experience of age.
+
+However, in spite of this confession, I have no doubt that even in the
+matter of pure and conscious reason further thought has enabled me to
+detect serious errors, or rather oversights, in the very foundations of
+my _Candid Examination of Theism_. I still think, indeed, that from the
+premises there laid down the conclusions result in due logical sequence,
+so that, as a matter of mere ratiocination, I am not likely ever to
+detect any serious flaws, especially as this has not been done by
+anybody else during the many years of its existence. But I now clearly
+perceive two wellnigh fatal oversights which I then committed. The first
+was undue confidence in merely syllogistic conclusions, even when
+derived from sound premises, in regions of such high abstraction. The
+second was, in not being sufficiently careful in examining the
+foundations of my criticism, i.e. the validity of its premises. I will
+here briefly consider these two points separately.
+
+As regards the first point, never was any one more arrogant in his
+claims for pure reason than I was--more arrogant in spirit though not in
+letter, this being due to contact with science; without ever considering
+how opposed to reason itself is the unexpressed assumption of my earlier
+argument as to God Himself, as if His existence were a merely physical
+problem to be solved by man's reason alone, without reference to his
+other and higher faculties[37].
+
+The second point is of still more importance, because so seldom, if
+ever, recognized.
+
+At the time of writing the _Candid Examination_ I perceived clearly how
+the whole question of Theism from the side of reason turned on the
+question as to the nature of natural causation. My theory of natural
+causation obeyed the Law of Parsimony, resolving all into Being as such;
+but, on the other hand, it erred in not considering whether 'higher
+causes' are not 'necessary' to account for spiritual facts--i.e. whether
+the ultimate Being must not be at least as high as the intellectual and
+spiritual nature of man, i.e. higher than anything merely physical or
+mechanical. The supposition that it must does not violate the Law of
+Parsimony.
+
+Pure agnostics ought to investigate the religious consciousness of
+Christians as a phenomenon which may possibly be what Christians
+themselves believe it to be, i.e. of Divine origin. And this may be done
+without entering into any question as to the objective validity of
+Christian dogmas. The metaphysics of Christianity may be all false in
+fact, and yet the spirit of Christianity may be true in substance--i.e.
+it may be the highest 'good gift from above' as yet given to man.
+
+My present object, then, like that of Socrates, is not to impart any
+philosophical system, or even positive knowledge, but a frame of mind,
+what I may term, pure agnosticism, as distinguished from what is
+commonly so called.
+
+FOOTNOTES:
+
+[34] The first edition, which was published in 1878, was rapidly
+exhausted, but, as my object in publishing was solely that of soliciting
+criticism for my own benefit, I arranged with the publishers not to
+issue any further edition. The work has therefore been out of print for
+many years.
+
+[This 'arrangement' was however not actually made, or at least was
+unknown to the present publishing firm of Kegan Paul, Trench, Truebner &
+Co. Thus a new edition of the book was published in 1892, to the
+author's surprise.--ED.]
+
+[35] [Or rather it was intended that it should appear under the
+pseudonym of 'Metaphysicus.'--ED.]
+
+[36] [Words in square brackets have been added by me. But I have not
+introduced the brackets when I have simply inserted single unimportant
+words obviously necessary for the sense.--ED.]
+
+[37] [See p. 29, quotation from Preface of 'Physicus.' The state of mind
+expressed in the above Note is a return to the earlier frame of mind of
+the Burney Essay, e.g. p. 20. That essay was full of the thought that
+Christian evidences are very manifold and largely
+'extra-scientific.'--ED.]
+
+
+
+
+Sec. 2. DEFINITION OF TERMS AND PURPOSE OF THIS TREATISE.
+
+
+[To understand George Romanes' mind close attention must be paid to the
+following section. Also to the fact, not explicitly noticed by him, that
+he uses the word 'reason' (see p. 112) in a sense closely resembling
+that in which Mr. Kidd has recently used it in his _Social Evolution_.
+He uses it, that is, in a restricted sense as equivalent to _the process
+of scientific ratiocination_. His main position is therefore this:
+Scientific ratiocination cannot find adequate grounds for belief in God.
+But the pure agnostic must recognize that God may have revealed Himself
+by other means than that of scientific ratiocination. As religion is for
+the whole man, so all human faculties may be required to seek after God
+and find Him--emotions and experiences of an extra-'rational' kind. The
+'pure agnostic' must be prepared to welcome evidence of all
+sorts.--ED.]
+
+It is desirable to be clear at the outset as to the meaning which I
+shall throughout attach to certain terms and phrases.
+
+
+_Theism._
+
+It will frequently be said, 'on the theory of Theism,' 'supposing Theism
+true,' &c. By such phrase my meaning will always be equivalent
+to--'supposing, for the sake of argument, that the nearest approach
+which the human mind can make to a true notion of the _ens realissimum_,
+is that of an inconceivably magnified image of itself at its best.'
+
+
+_Christianity._
+
+Similarly, when it is said, 'supposing Christianity true,' what will be
+meant is--'supposing for the sake of argument, that the Christian system
+as a whole, from its earliest dawn in Judaism, to the phase of its
+development at the present time, is the highest revelation of Himself
+which a personal Deity has vouchsafed to mankind.' This I intend to
+signify an attitude of pure agnosticism as regards any particular dogma
+of Christianity--even that of the Incarnation.
+
+Should it be said that by holding in suspense any distinctive dogma of
+Christianity, I am not considering Christianity at all, I reply, Not so;
+I am not writing a theological, but a philosophical treatise, and shall
+consider Christianity merely as one of many religions, though, of
+course, the latest, &c. Thus considered, Christianity takes its place as
+the highest manifestation of evolution in this department of the human
+mind; but I am not concerned even with so important an ecclesiastical
+dogma as that of the Incarnation of God in Christ. As far as this
+treatise has to go, that dogma may or may not be true. The important
+question for us is, Has God spoken through the medium of our religious
+instincts? And although this will necessarily involve the question
+whether or how far in the case of Christianity there is objective
+evidence of His having spoken by the mouth of holy men [of the Old
+Testament] which have been since the world began, such will be the case
+only because it is a question of objective evidence whether or how far
+the religious instincts of these men, or this race of men, have been so
+much superior to those of other men, or races of men, as to have enabled
+them to predict future events of a religious character. And whether or
+not in these latter days God has spoken by His own Son is not a question
+for us, further than to investigate the higher class of religious
+phenomena which unquestionably have been present in the advent and
+person of Jesus. The question whether Jesus was the Son of God, is,
+logically speaking, a question of ontology, which, _qua_ pure agnostics,
+we are logically forbidden to touch.
+
+But elsewhere I ought to show that, from my point of view as to the
+fundamental question being whether God has spoken at all through the
+religious instincts of mankind, it may very well be that Christ was not
+God, and yet that He gave the highest revelation of God. If the 'first
+Man' was allegorical, why not the 'second'? It is, indeed, an historical
+fact that the 'second Man' existed, but so likewise may the 'first.'
+And, as regards the 'personal claims' of Christ, all that He said is not
+incompatible with His having been Gabriel, and His Holy Ghost,
+Michael[38]. Or He may have been a man deceived as to His own
+personality, and yet the vehicle of highest inspiration.
+
+
+_Religion._
+
+By the term 'religion,' I shall mean any theory of personal agency in
+the universe, belief in which is strong enough in any degree to
+influence conduct. No term has been used more loosely of late years, or
+in a greater variety of meanings. Of course anybody may use it in any
+sense he pleases, provided he defines exactly in what sense he does so.
+The above seems to be most in accordance with traditional usage.
+
+
+_Agnosticism 'pure' and 'impure'._
+
+The modern and highly convenient term 'Agnosticism,' is used in two very
+different senses. By its originator, Professor Huxley, it was coined to
+signify an attitude of reasoned ignorance touching everything that lies
+beyond the sphere of sense-perception--a professed inability to found
+valid belief on any other basis. It is in this its original sense--and
+also, in my opinion, its only philosophically justifiable sense--that I
+shall understand the term. But the other, and perhaps more popular sense
+in which the word is now employed, is as the correlative of Mr. H.
+Spencer's doctrine of the Unknowable.
+
+This latter term is philosophically erroneous, implying important
+negative knowledge that if there be a God we know this much about
+Him--that He _cannot_ reveal Himself to man[39]. _Pure_ agnosticism is
+as defined by Huxley.
+
+Of all the many scientific men whom I have known, the most pure in his
+agnosticism--not only in profession but in spirit and conduct--was
+Darwin. (What he says in his autobiography about Christianity[40] shows
+no profundity of thought in the direction of philosophy or religion. His
+mind was too purely inductive for this. But, on this very account, it is
+the more remarkable that his rejection of Christianity was due, not to
+any _a priori_ bias against the creed on grounds of reason as absurd,
+but solely on the ground of an apparent moral objection _a
+posteriori_[41].) Faraday and many other first-rate originators in
+science were like Darwin.
+
+As an illustration of impure agnosticism take Hume's _a priori_ argument
+against miracles, leading on to the analogous case of the attitude of
+scientific men towards modern spiritualism. Notwithstanding that they
+have the close analogy of mesmerism as an object-lesson to warn them,
+scientific men as a class are here quite as dogmatic as the straightest
+sect of theologians. I may give examples which can cause no offence,
+inasmuch as the men in question have themselves made the facts public,
+viz. ---- refusing to go to [a famous spiritualist]; ---- refusing to
+try ---- in thought-reading[42]. These men all _professed_ to be
+agnostics at the very time when thus so egregiously violating their
+philosophy by their conduct.
+
+Of course I do not mean to say that, even to a pure agnostic, reason
+should not be guided in part by antecedent presumption--e.g. in ordinary
+life, the _prima facie_ case, motive, &c., counts for evidence in a
+court of law--and where there is a strong antecedent improbability a
+proportionately greater weight of evidence _a posteriori_ is needed to
+counterbalance it: so that, e.g. better evidence would be needed to
+convict the Archbishop of Canterbury than a vagabond of pocket-picking.
+And so it is with speculative philosophy. But in both cases our only
+guide is known analogy; therefore, the further we are removed from
+possible experience--i.e. the more remote from experience the sphere
+contemplated--the less value attaches to antecedent presumptions[43].
+_Maximum_ remoteness from possible experience is reached in the sphere
+of the final mystery of things with which religion has to do; so that
+here all presumption has faded away into a vanishing point, and pure
+agnosticism is our only rational attitude. In other words, here we
+should all alike be pure agnostics as far as reason is concerned; and,
+if any of us are to attain to any information, it can only be by means
+of some super-added faculty of our minds. The questions as to whether
+there are any such super-added faculties; if so, whether they ever
+appear to have been acted upon from without; if they have, in what
+manner they have; what is their report; how far they are trustworthy in
+that report, and so on--these are the questions with which this treatise
+is to be mainly concerned.
+
+My own attitude may be here stated. I do not claim any [religious]
+certainty of an intuitive kind myself; but am nevertheless able to
+investigate the abstract logic of the matter. And, although this may
+seem but barren dialectic, it may, I hope, be of practical service if it
+secures a fair hearing to the reports given by the vast majority of
+mankind who unquestionably believe them to emanate from some such
+super-added faculties--numerous and diverse though their religions be.
+Besides, in my youth I published an essay (the _Candid Examination_)
+which excited a good deal of interest at the time, and has been long out
+of print. In that treatise I have since come to see that I was wrong
+touching what I constituted the basal argument for my negative
+conclusion. Therefore I now feel it obligatory on me to publish the
+following results of my maturer thought, from the same stand-point of
+pure reason. Even though I have obtained no further light from the side
+of intuition, I have from that of intellect. So that, if there be in
+truth any such intuition, I occupy with regard to the organ of it the
+same position as that of the blind lecturer on optics. But on this very
+account I cannot be accused of partiality towards it.
+
+It is generally assumed that when a man has clearly perceived
+agnosticism to be the only legitimate attitude of reason to rest in with
+regard to religion (as I will subsequently show that it is), he has
+thereby finished with the matter; he can go no further. The main object
+of this treatise is to show that such is by no means the case. He has
+then only begun his enquiry into the grounds and justification of
+religious belief. For reason is not the only attribute of man, nor is it
+the only faculty which he habitually employs for the ascertainment of
+truth. Moral and spiritual faculties are of no less importance in their
+respective spheres even of everyday life; faith, trust, taste, &c., are
+as needful in ascertaining truth as to character, beauty, &c., as is
+reason. Indeed we may take it that reason is concerned in ascertaining
+truth only where _causation_ is concerned; the appropriate organs for
+its ascertainment where anything else is concerned belong to the moral
+and spiritual region.
+
+
+As Herbert Spencer says, 'men of science may be divided into two
+classes, of which the one, well exemplified by Faraday, keeping their
+religion and their science absolutely separate, are unperplexed by any
+incongruities between them, and the other of which, occupying themselves
+exclusively with the facts of science, never ask what implications they
+have. Be it trilobite or be it double star, their thought about it is
+much like the thought of Peter Bell about the primrose[44].' Now, both
+these classes are logical, since both, as to their religion, adopt an
+attitude of pure agnosticism, not only in theory, but also in practice.
+What, however, have we to say of the third class, which Spencer does
+not mention, although it is, I think, the largest, viz. of those
+scientific men who expressly abstain from drawing a line of division
+between science and religion [and then judge of religion purely on the
+principles and by the method of science[45]]?
+
+
+There are two opposite casts of mind--the mechanical (scientific, &c.)
+and the spiritual (artistic, religious, &c.). These may alternate even
+in the same individual. An 'agnostic' has no hesitation--even though he
+himself keenly experience the latter--that the former only is worthy of
+trust. But a _pure_ agnostic must know better, as he will perceive that
+there is nothing to choose between the two in point of trustworthiness.
+Indeed, if choice has to be made the mystic might claim higher authority
+for his direct intuitions.
+
+
+Mr. Herbert Spencer has well said, in the opening section of his
+Synthetic Philosophy, that wherever human thought appears to be
+radically divided, [there must be truth on both sides and that the]
+'reconciliation' of opposing views is to be found by emphasizing that
+ultimate element of truth which on each side underlies manifold
+differences. More than is generally supposed depends on points of view,
+especially where first principles of a subject are in dispute. Opposite
+sides of the same shield may present wholly different aspects[46].
+Spencer alludes to this with special reference to the conflict between
+science and religion; and it is in this same connexion that I also
+allude to it. For it seems to me, after many years of thought upon the
+subject, that the 'reconciliation' admits of being carried much further
+than it has been by him. For he effects this reconciliation only to the
+extent of showing that religion arises from the recognition of
+fundamental mystery--which it may be proved that science also recognizes
+in all her fundamental ideas. This, however, is after all little more
+than a platitude. That our ultimate scientific ideas (i.e. ultimate
+grounds of experience) are inexplicable, is a proposition which is
+self-evident since the dawn of human thought. My aim is to carry the
+'reconciliation' into much more detail and yet without quitting the
+grounds of pure reason. I intend to take science and religion in their
+present highly developed states as such, and show that on a systematic
+examination of the latter by the methods of the former, the 'conflict'
+between the two may be not merely 'reconciled' as regards the highest
+generalities of each, but entirely abolished in all matters of detail
+which can be regarded as of any great importance.
+
+
+In any methodical enquiry the first object should be to ascertain the
+fundamental principles with which the enquiry is concerned. In actual
+research, however, it is by no means always the case that the enquirer
+knows, or is able at first to ascertain what those principles are. In
+fact, it is often only at the end of a research, that they are
+discovered to be the fundamental principles. Such has been my own
+experience with regard to the subject of the present enquiry. Although
+all my thinking life has been concerned, off and on, in contemplating
+the problem of our religious instincts, the sundry attempts which have
+been made by mankind for securing their gratification, and the important
+question as to their objective justification, it is only in advanced
+years that I have clearly perceived wherein the first principles of such
+a research must consist. And I doubt whether any one has hitherto
+clearly defined this point. The principles in question are the nature of
+causation and the nature of faith.
+
+
+My objects then in this treatise are, mainly, three: 1st, to purify
+agnosticism; 2nd, to consider more fully than heretofore, and from the
+stand-point of pure agnosticism, the nature of natural causation, or,
+more correctly, the relation of what we know on the subject of such
+causation to the question of Theism; and, 3rd, again starting from the
+same stand-point, to consider the religious consciousnesses of men as
+phenomena of experience (i.e. as regarded by us from without), and
+especially in their highest phase of development as exhibited in
+Christianity.
+
+FOOTNOTES:
+
+[38] [I.e. supernatural but not strictly Divine Persons. Surely,
+however, the proposition is not maintainable.--ED.]
+
+[39] [This is another instance of recurrence to an earlier thought; see
+Burney Essay, p. 25, and cf. _Mind and Motion and Monism_, p. 117, note
+1.--ED.]
+
+[40] _Life and Letters of Charles Darwin_, i. 308.
+
+[41] [See further, p. 182.--ED.]
+
+[42] [On the whole I have thought it best to omit the names.--ED.]
+
+[43] [The MS. note here continues: 'Here introduce all that I say on the
+subject in my Burney Prize.' I have not, however, introduced any
+quotation into the text because (1) I think Romanes makes his meaning
+plain in the text as it stands; (2) I cannot find in the essay in
+question any exactly appropriate passage of reasonable length to quote.
+The greater part of the essay is, however, directed to meet the
+scientific objection to the doctrine that prayer is answered in the
+physical region, by showing that this objection consists in an argument
+from the known to the unknown, i.e. from the known sphere of invariable
+physical laws to the unknown sphere of God's relation to all such laws;
+and is, therefore, weak in proportion as the unknown sphere is remote
+from possible experience of a scientific kind, and admits of an
+indefinite number of possibilities, more or less conceivable to our
+imagination, which would or might prevent the scientific argument from
+having legitimate application to the question in hand.--ED.]
+
+[44] _Fortnightly Review_, Feb. 1894.
+
+[45] [Some such phrase is necessary to complete the sentence.--ED.]
+
+[46] _First Principles_, Part I, ch. 1.
+
+
+
+
+Sec. 3. CAUSALITY.
+
+
+Only because we are so familiar with the great phenomenon of causality
+do we take it for granted, and think that we reach an ultimate
+explanation of anything when we have succeeded in finding the 'cause'
+thereof: when, in point of fact, we have only succeeded in merging it in
+the mystery of mysteries. I often wish we could have come into the
+world, like the young of some other mammals, with all the powers of
+intellect that we shall ever subsequently attain already developed, but
+without any individual experience, and so without any of the blunting
+effects of custom. Could we have done so, surely nothing in the world
+would more acutely excite our intelligent astonishment than the one
+universal fact of causation. That everything which happens should have a
+cause, that this should invariably be proportioned to its effect, so
+that, no matter how complex the interaction of causes, the same
+interaction should always produce the same result; that this rigidly
+exact system of energizing should be found to present all the
+appearances of universality and of eternity, so that, e.g., the motion
+of the solar system in space is being determined by some causes beyond
+human ken, and that we are indebted to billions of cellular unions, each
+involving billions of separate causes, for our hereditary passage from
+an invertebrate ancestry,--that such things should be, would surely
+strike us as the most wonderful fact in this wonderful universe.
+
+Now, although familiarity with this fact has made us forget its wonder
+to the extent of virtually assuming that we know all about it,
+philosophical enquiry shows that, besides empirically knowing it to be a
+fact, we only know one other thing about it, viz.--that our knowledge of
+it is derived from our own activity when we ourselves are causes. No
+result of psychological analysis seems to me more certain than this[47].
+If it were not for our own volitions, we should be ignorant of what we
+can now not doubt, on pain of suicidal scepticism, to be the most
+general fact of nature. Such, at least, seems to me by far the most
+reasonable theory of our idea of causality, and is the one now most
+generally entertained by philosophers of every school.
+
+Now, to the plain man it will always seem that if our very notion of
+causality is derived from our own volition--as our very notion of energy
+is derived from our sense of effort in overcoming resistance by our
+volition--presumably the truest notion we can form of that in which
+causation objectively consists is the notion derived from that known
+mode of existence which alone gives us the notion of causality at all.
+Hence the plain man will always infer that all energy is of the nature
+of will-energy, and all objective causation of the nature of subjective.
+Nor is this inference confined to the plain man; the deepest
+philosophical thinkers have arrived at substantially the same opinion,
+e.g. Hegel, Schopenhauer. So that the direct and most natural
+interpretation of causality in external nature which is drawn by
+primitive thought in savages and young children, seems destined to
+become also the ultimate deliverance of human thought in the highest
+levels of its culture[48].
+
+But, be this as it may, we are not concerned with any such questions of
+abstract philosophical speculation. As pure agnostics they lie beyond
+our sphere. Therefore, I allude to them only for the sake of showing
+that there is nothing either in the science or philosophy of mankind
+inimical to the theory of natural causation being the energizing of a
+will objective to us. And we can plainly see that if such be the case,
+and if that will be self-consistent, its operations, as revealed in
+natural causation, must appear to us when considered _en bloc_ (or not
+piece-meal as by savages), non-volitional, or mechanical.
+
+Of all philosophical theories of causality the most repugnant to reason
+must be those of Hume, Kant and Mill, which while differing from one
+another agree in this--that they attribute the principle of causality to
+a creation of our own minds, or in other words deny that there is
+anything objective in the relation of cause and effect--i.e. in the very
+thing which all physical science is engaged in discovering in particular
+cases of it.
+
+
+The conflict of Science and Religion has always arisen from one common
+ground of agreement, or fundamental postulate of both parties--without
+which, indeed, it would plainly have been impossible that any conflict
+could have arisen, inasmuch as there would then have been no field for
+battle. Every thesis must rest on some hypothesis; therefore, in cases
+where two or more rival theses rest on a common hypothesis, the disputes
+must needs collapse so soon as the common hypothesis is proved
+erroneous. And proportionably, in whatever degree the previously common
+hypothesis is shown to be dubious, in that degree are the disputations
+shown to be possibly unreal. Now, it is one of the main objects of this
+treatise to show that the common hypothesis on which all the disputes
+between Science and Religion have arisen, is highly dubious. And not
+only so, but that quite apart from modern science all the difficulties
+on the side of intellect (or reason) which religious belief has ever
+encountered in the past, or can ever encounter in the future, whether
+in the individual or the race, arise, and arise exclusively, from the
+self-same ground of this highly dubious hypothesis.
+
+The hypothesis, or fundamental postulate, in question is, _If there be a
+personal God, He is not immediately concerned with natural causation_.
+It is assumed that _qua_ 'first cause,' He can in no way be concerned
+with 'second causes,' further than by having started them in the first
+instance as a great machinery of 'natural causation,' working under
+'general laws.' True the theory of Deism, which entertains more or less
+expressly this hypothesis of 'Deus ex machina,' has during the present
+century been more and more superseded by that of Theism, which
+entertains also in some indefinable measure the doctrine of 'immanence';
+as well as by that of Pantheism, which expressly holds this doctrine to
+the exclusion _in toto_ of its rival. But Theism has never yet
+entertained it sufficiently or up to the degree required by the pure
+logic of the case, while Pantheism has but rarely considered the rival
+doctrine of personality--or the possible union of immanence with
+personality.[49]
+
+Now it is the object of this book to go much further than any one has
+hitherto gone in proving the possibility of this union. For I purpose to
+show that, provided only we lay aside all prejudice, sentiment, &c.,
+and follow to its logical termination the guidance of pure reason, there
+are no other conclusions to be reached than these. Namely, (_A_) That if
+there be a personal God, no reason can be assigned why He should not be
+immanent in nature, or why all causation should not be the immediate
+expression of His will. (_B_) That every available reason points to the
+inference that He probably is so. (_C_) That if He is so, and if His
+will is self-consistent, all natural causation must needs appear to us
+'mechanical.' Therefore (_D_) that it is no argument against the divine
+origin of a thing, event, &c., to prove it due to natural causation.
+
+After having dealt briefly with (_A_), (_B_) and (_C_), I would show
+that (_D_) is the most practically important of these four conclusions.
+For the fundamental hypothesis which I began by mentioning is just the
+opposite of this. Whether tacitly or expressly, it has always been
+assumed by both sides in the controversy between Science and Religion,
+that as soon as this that and the other phenomenon has been explained by
+means of natural causation, it has thereupon ceased to be ascribable
+[directly] to God. The distinction between the natural and the
+supernatural has always been regarded by both sides as indisputably
+sound, and this fundamental agreement as to ground of battle has
+furnished the only possible condition to fighting. It has also furnished
+the condition of all the past, and may possibly furnish the condition of
+all the future, discomfitures of religion. True religion is indeed
+learning her lesson that something is wrong in her method of fighting,
+and many of her soldiers are now waking up to the fact that it is here
+that her error lies--as in past times they woke up to see the error of
+denying the movement of the earth, the antiquity of the earth, the
+origin of species by evolution, &c. But no one, even of her captains and
+generals, has so far followed up their advantage to its ultimate
+consequences. And this is what I want to do. The logical advantage is
+clearly on their side; and it is their own fault if they do not gain the
+ultimate victory,--not only as against science, but as against
+intellectual dogmatism in every form. This can be routed all along the
+line. For science is only the organized study of natural causation, and
+the experience of every human being, in so far as it leads to dogmatism
+on purely intellectual grounds, does so on account of entertaining the
+fundamental postulate in question. The influence of custom and want of
+imagination is here very great. But the answer always should be to move
+the ulterior question--what is the nature of natural causation?
+
+Now I propose to push to its full logical conclusion the consequence of
+this answer. For no one, even the most orthodox, has as yet learnt this
+lesson of religion to anything like fullness. God is still grudged His
+own universe, so to speak, as far and as often as He can possibly be. As
+examples we may take the natural growth of Christianity out of previous
+religions; the natural spread of it; the natural conversion of St. Paul,
+or of anybody else. It is still assumed on both sides that there must
+be something inexplicable or miraculous about a phenomenon in order to
+its being divine.
+
+What else have science and religion ever had to fight about save on the
+basis of this common hypothesis, and hence as to whether the causation
+of such and such a phenomenon has been 'natural' or 'super-natural.' For
+even the disputes as to science contradicting scripture, ultimately turn
+on the assumption of inspiration (supposing it genuine) being
+'super-natural' as to its causation. Once grant that it is 'natural' and
+all possible ground of dispute is removed.
+
+I can well understand why infidelity should make the basal assumption in
+question, because its whole case must rest thereon. But surely it is
+time for theists to abandon this assumption.
+
+The assumed distinction between causation as natural and super-natural
+no doubt began in superstition in prehistoric time, and throughout the
+historical period has continued from a vague feeling that the action of
+God must be mysterious, and hence that the province of religion must be
+within the super-sensuous. Now, it is true enough that the finite cannot
+comprehend the infinite, and hence the feeling in question is logically
+sound. But under the influence of this feeling, men have always
+committed the fallacy of concluding that if a phenomenon has been
+explained in terms of natural causation, it has thereby been explained
+_in toto_--forgetting that it has only been explained up to the point
+where such causation is concerned, and that the real question of
+ultimate causation has merely been thus postponed. And assuredly beyond
+this point there is an infinitude of mystery sufficient to satisfy the
+most exacting mystic. For even Herbert Spencer allows that in ultimate
+analysis all natural causation is inexplicable.
+
+Logically regarded the advance of science, far from having weakened
+religion, has immeasurably strengthened it. For it has proved the
+uniformity of natural causation. The so-called natural sphere has
+increased at the expense of the 'super-natural.' Unquestionably. But
+although to lower grades of culture this always seems a fact inimical to
+religion, we may now perceive it is quite the reverse, since it merely
+goes to abolish the primitive or uncultured distinction in question.
+
+It is indeed most extraordinary how long this distinction has held sway,
+or how it is the ablest men of all generations have quietly assumed that
+when once we know the natural causation of any phenomenon, we therefore
+know all about it--or, as it were, have removed it from the sphere of
+mystery altogether, when, in point of fact, we have only merged it in a
+much greater mystery than ever.
+
+But the answer to our astonishment how this distinction has managed to
+survive so long lies in the extraordinary effect of custom, which here
+seems to slay reason altogether; and the more a man busies himself with
+natural causes (e.g. in scientific research) the greater does this
+slavery to custom become, till at last he seems positively unable to
+perceive the real state of the case--regarding any rational thinking
+thereon as chimerical, so that the term 'meta-physical,' even in its
+etymological sense as super-sensuous or beyond physical causation,
+becomes a term of rational reproach. Obviously such a man has written
+himself down, if not an ass, at all events a creature wholly incapable
+of rationally treating any of the highest problems presented either by
+nature or by man.
+
+On any logical theory of Theism there can be no such distinction between
+'natural' and 'supernatural' as is usually drawn, since on that theory
+all causation is but the action of the Divine Will. And if we draw any
+distinction between such action as 'immediate' or 'mediate,' we can only
+mean this as valid in relation to mankind--i.e. in relation to our
+experience. For, obviously, it would be wholly incompatible with pure
+agnosticism to suppose that we are capable of drawing any such
+distinction in relation to the Divine activity itself. Even apart from
+the theory of Theism, pure agnosticism must take it that the real
+distinction is not between natural and supernatural, but between the
+explicable and the inexplicable--meaning by those terms that which is
+and that which is not accountable by such causes as fall within the
+range of human observation. Or, in other words, the distinction is
+really between the observable and the unobservable causal processes of
+the universe.
+
+Although science is essentially engaged in explaining, her work is
+necessarily confined to the sphere of natural causation; beyond that
+sphere (i.e. the sensuous) she can explain nothing. In other words,
+even if she were able to explain the natural causation of everything,
+she would be unable to assign the ultimate _raison d'etre_ of anything.
+
+
+It is not my intention to write an essay on the nature of causality, or
+even to attempt a survey of the sundry theories which have been
+propounded on this subject by philosophers. Indeed, to attempt this
+would be little less than to write a history of philosophy itself.
+Nevertheless it is necessary for my purpose to make a few remarks
+touching the main branches of thought upon the matter[50].
+
+_The remarkable nature of the facts._ These are remarkable, since they
+are common to all human experience. Everything that _happens_ has a
+cause. The same happening has always the same cause--or the same
+consequent the same antecedent. It is only familiarity with this great
+fact that prevents universal wonder at it, for, notwithstanding all the
+theories upon it, no one has ever really shown why it is so. That the
+same causes always produce the same effects is a proposition which
+expresses a fundamental fact of our knowledge, but the knowledge of this
+fact is purely empirical; we can show no reason why it should be a fact.
+Doubtless, if it were not a fact, there could be no so-called 'Order of
+Nature,' and consequently no science, no philosophy, or perhaps (if the
+irregularity were sufficiently frequent) no possibility of human
+experience. But although this is easy enough to show, it in no wise
+tends to show why the same causes should always produce the same
+effects.
+
+So manifest is it that our knowledge of the fact in question is only
+empirical, that some of our ablest thinkers, such as Hume and Mill, have
+failed to perceive even so much as the intellectual necessity of looking
+beyond our empirical knowledge of the fact to gain any explanation of
+the fact itself. Therefore they give to the world the wholly vacuous, or
+merely tautological theory of causation--viz. that of constancy of
+sequence within human observation[51].
+
+
+If it be said of my argument touching causality, that it is naturalizing
+or materializing the super-natural or spiritual (as most orthodox
+persons will feel), my reply is that deeper thought will show it to be
+at least as susceptible of the opposite view--viz. that it is subsuming
+the natural into the super-natural, or spiritualizing the material: and
+a pure agnostic, least of all, should have anything to say as against
+either of these alternative points of view. Or we may state the matter
+thus: in as far as pure reason can have anything to say in the matter,
+she ought to incline towards the view of my doctrine spiritualizing the
+material, because it is pretty certain that we could know nothing about
+natural causation--even so much as its existence--but for our own
+volitions.
+
+
+_Free Will_[52].
+
+Having read all that is said to be worth reading on the Free Will
+controversy, it appears to me that the main issues and their logical
+conclusions admit of being summed up in a very few words, thus:--
+
+1. A writer, before he undertakes to deal with this subject at all,
+should be conscious of fully perceiving the fundamental distinction
+between responsibility as merely legal and as also moral; otherwise he
+cannot but miss the very essence of the question in debate. No one
+questions the patent fact of responsibility as legal; the only question
+is touching responsibility as moral. Yet the principal bulk of
+literature on Free Will and Necessity arises from disputants on both
+sides failing to perceive this basal distinction. Even such able writers
+as Spencer, Huxley and Clifford are in this position.
+
+2. The root question is as to whether the will is caused or un-caused.
+For however much this root-question may be obscured by its own abundant
+foliage, the latter can have no existence but that which it derives
+from the former.
+
+3. Consequently, if libertarians grant causality as appertaining to the
+will, however much they may beat about the bush, they are surrendering
+their position all along the line, unless they fall back upon the more
+ultimate question as to the nature of natural causation. Now it can be
+proved that this more ultimate question is [scientifically]
+unanswerable. Therefore both sides may denominate natural causation
+_x_--an unknown quantity.
+
+4. Hence the whole controversy ought to be seen by both sides to resolve
+itself into this--is or is not the will determined by _x_? And, if this
+seems but a barren question to debate, I do not undertake to deny the
+fact. At the same time there is clearly this real issue remaining--viz.
+Is the will self-determining, or is it determined--i.e. _from without_?
+
+5. If determined from without, is there any room for freedom, in the
+sense required for saving the doctrine of moral responsibility? And I
+think the answer to this must be an unconditional negative.
+
+6. But, observe, it is not one and the same thing to ask, Is the will
+entirely determined from without? and Is the will entirely determined by
+natural causation (_x_)? For the unknown quantity _x_ may very well
+include _x'_, if by _x'_ we understand all the unknown ingredients of
+personality.
+
+7. Hence, determinists gain no advantage over their adversaries by any
+possible proof (at present impossible) that all acts of will are due to
+natural causation, unless they can show the nature of the latter, and
+that it is of such a nature as supports their conclusion. For aught we
+at present know, the will may very well be free in the sense required,
+even though all its acts are due to _x_.
+
+8. In particular, for aught we know to the contrary, all may be due to
+_x'_, i.e. all causation may be of the nature of will (as, indeed, many
+systems of philosophy maintain), with the result that every human will
+is of the nature of a First Cause. In support of which possibility it
+may be remarked that most philosophies are led to the theory of a _causa
+causarum_ as regards _x_.
+
+9. To the obvious objection that with a plurality of first causes--each
+the _fons et origo_ of a new and never-ending stream of causality--the
+cosmos must sooner or later become a chaos by cumulative intersection of
+the streams, the answer is to be found in the theory of monism[53].
+
+10. Nevertheless, the ultimate difficulty remains which is depicted in
+my essay on the 'World as an Eject[54].' But this, again, is merged in
+the mystery of Personality, which is only known as an inexplicable, and
+seemingly ultimate, fact.
+
+11. So that the general conclusion of the whole matter must be--pure
+agnosticism.
+
+FOOTNOTES:
+
+[47] [Here it was intended to insert further explanation 'showing that
+mere observation of causality in external nature would not have yielded
+idea of anything further than time and space relations.'--ED.]
+
+[48] [This theory was suggested in the Burney Essay, p. 136, and
+ridiculed in the _Candid Examination_; see above, p. 11. Romanes
+intended at this point to consider at greater length his old views 'on
+causation as due to being _qua_ being.'--ED.]
+
+[49] See, however, Aubrey Moore in _Lux Mundi_, pp. 94-96, and Le Conte,
+_Evolution in its Relation to Religious Thought_, pp. 335, ff. [N.B. The
+references not enclosed in brackets are the author's, not mine.--ED.]
+
+[50] [Nothing more however was written than what follows
+immediately.--ED.]
+
+[51] [The author intended further to show the vacuity of this theory and
+point out how Mill himself appears to perceive it by his introduction
+after the term 'invariably' of the term 'unconditionally'; he refers
+also to Martineau, _Study of Religion_, i. pp. 152, 3.--ED.]
+
+[52] [Romanes' thoughts about Free Will are more lucidly expressed in an
+essay published subsequently to these Notes in _Mind and Motion and
+Monism_, pp. 129 ff.--ED.]
+
+[53] [See above, p. 31.--ED.]
+
+[54] _Contemporary Review_, July 1886. [But the 'ultimate difficulty'
+referred to above would seem to be the relation of manifold dependent
+human wills to the One Ultimate and All-embracing Will.--ED.]
+
+
+
+
+Sec. 4. FAITH.
+
+
+Faith in its religious sense is distinguished not only from opinion (or
+belief founded on reason alone), in that it contains a spiritual
+element: it is further distinguished from belief founded on the
+affections, by needing an active co-operation of the will. Thus all
+parts of the human mind have to be involved in faith--intellect,
+emotions, will. We 'believe' in the theory of evolution on grounds of
+reason alone; we 'believe' in the affection of our parents, children,
+&c., almost (or it may be exclusively) on what I have called spiritual
+grounds--i.e. on grounds of spiritual experience; for this we need no
+exercise either of reason or of will. But no one can 'believe' in God,
+or _a fortiori_ in Christ, without also a severe effort of will. This I
+hold to be a matter of fact, whether or not there be a God or a Christ.
+
+Observe will is to be distinguished from desire. It matters not what
+psychologists may have to say upon this subject. Whether desire differs
+from will in kind or only in degree--whether will is desire in action,
+so to speak, and desire but incipient will--are questions with which we
+need not trouble ourselves. For it is certain that there are agnostics
+who would greatly prefer being theists, and theists who would give all
+they possess to be Christians, if they could thus secure promotion by
+purchase--i.e. by one single act of will. But yet the desire is not
+strong enough to sustain the will in perpetual action, so as to make the
+continual sacrifices which Christianity entails. Perhaps the hardest of
+these sacrifices to an intelligent man is that of his own intellect. At
+least I am certain that this is so in my own case. I have been so long
+accustomed to constitute my reason my sole judge of truth, that even
+while reason itself tells me it is not unreasonable to expect that the
+heart and the will should be required to join with reason in seeking God
+(for religion is for the _whole_ man), I am too jealous of my reason to
+exercise my will in the direction of my most heart-felt desires. For
+assuredly the strongest desire of my nature is to find that that nature
+is not deceived in its highest aspirations. Yet I cannot bring myself so
+much as to make a venture in the direction of faith. For instance,
+regarded from one point of view it seems reasonable enough that
+Christianity should have enjoined the _doing_ of the doctrine as a
+necessary condition to ascertaining (i.e. 'believing') its truth. But
+from another, and my more habitual point of view, it seems almost an
+affront to reason to make any such 'fool's experiment'--just as to some
+scientific men it seems absurd and childish to expect them to
+investigate the 'superstitious' follies of modern spiritualism. Even the
+simplest act of will in regard to religion--that of prayer--has not been
+performed by me for at least a quarter of a century, simply because it
+has seemed so impossible to pray, as it were, hypothetically, that much
+as I have always desired to be able to pray, I cannot will the attempt.
+To justify myself for what my better judgement has often seen to be
+essentially irrational, I have ever made sundry excuses. The chief of
+them has run thus. Even supposing Christianity true, and even supposing
+that after having so far sacrificed my reason to my desire as to have
+satisfied the supposed conditions to obtaining 'grace,' or direct
+illumination from God,--even then would not my reason turn round and
+revenge herself upon me? For surely even then my habitual scepticism
+would make me say to myself--'this is all very sublime and very
+comforting; but what evidence have you to give me that the whole
+business is anything more than self-delusion? The wish was probably
+father to the thought, and you might much better have performed your
+"act of will" by going in for a course of Indian hemp.' Of course a
+Christian would answer to this that the internal light would not admit
+of such doubt, any more than seeing the sun does--that God knows us well
+enough to prevent that, &c., and also that it is unreasonable not to try
+an experiment lest the result should prove too good to be credible, and
+so on. And I do not dispute that the Christian would be justified in so
+answering, but I only adduce the matter as an illustration of the
+difficulty which is experienced in conforming to all the conditions of
+attaining to Christian faith--even supposing it to be sound. Others have
+doubtless other difficulties, but mine is chiefly, I think, that of an
+undue regard to reason, as against heart and will--undue, I mean, if so
+it be that Christianity is true, and the conditions to faith in it have
+been of divine ordination.
+
+This influence of will on belief, even in matters secular, is the more
+pronounced the further removed these matters may be from demonstration
+(as already remarked); but this is most of all the case where our
+personal interests are affected--whether these be material or
+intellectual, such as credit for consistency, &c. See, for example, how
+closely, in the respects we are considering, political beliefs resemble
+religious. Unless the points of difference are such that truth is
+virtually demonstrable on one side, so that adhesion to the opposite is
+due to _conscious_ sacrifice of integrity to expediency, we always find
+that party-spectacles so colour the view as to leave reason at the mercy
+of will, custom, interest, and all the other circumstances which
+similarly operate on religious beliefs. It seems to make but little
+difference in either case what level of general education, mental power,
+special training, &c., is brought to bear upon the question under
+judgement. From the Premier to the peasant we find the same difference
+of opinion in politics as we do in religion. And in each case the
+explanation is the same. Beliefs are so little dependent on reason alone
+that in such regions of thought--i.e. where personal interests are
+affected and the evidences of truth are not in their nature
+demonstrable--it really seems as if reason ceases to be a judge of
+evidence or guide to truth, and becomes a mere advocate of opinion
+already formed on quite other grounds. Now these other grounds are, as
+we have seen, mainly the accidents of habit or custom, wish being father
+to the thought, &c.
+
+Now this may be all deplorable enough in politics, and in all other
+beliefs secular; but who shall say it is not exactly as it ought to be
+in the matter of beliefs religious? For, unless we beg the question of a
+future life in the negative, we must entertain at least the possibility
+of our being in a state of probation in respect of an honest use not
+only of our reason, but probably still more of those other ingredients
+of human nature which go to determine our beliefs touching this most
+important of all matters.
+
+It is remarkable how even in politics it is the moral and spiritual
+elements of character which lead to success in the long run, even more
+than intellectual ability--supposing, of course, that the latter is not
+below the somewhat high level of our Parliamentary assemblies.
+
+As regards the part that is played by will in the determining of belief,
+one can show how unconsciously large this is even in matters of secular
+interest. Reason is very far indeed from being the sole guide of
+judgement that it is usually taken to be--so far, indeed, that, save in
+matters approaching down-right demonstration (where of course there is
+no room for any other ingredient) it is usually hampered by custom,
+prejudice, dislike, &c., to a degree that would astonish the most sober
+philosopher could he lay bare to himself all the mental processes
+whereby the complex act of assent or dissent is eventually
+determined[55].
+
+As showing how little reason alone has to do with the determining of
+religious belief, let us take the case of mathematicians. This I think
+is the fairest case we can take, seeing that of all intellectual
+pursuits that of mathematical research is the most exact, as well as the
+most exclusive in its demand upon the powers of reason, and hence that,
+as a class, the men who have achieved highest eminence in that pursuit
+may be fairly taken as the fittest representatives of our species in
+respect of the faculty of pure reason. Yet whenever they have turned
+their exceptional powers in this respect upon the problems of religion,
+how suggestively well balanced are their opposite conclusions--so much
+so indeed that we can only conclude that reason counts for very little
+in the complex of mental processes which here determine judgement.
+
+Thus, if we look to the greatest mathematicians in the world's history,
+we find Kepler and Newton as Christians; La Place, on the other hand, an
+infidel. Or, coming to our own times, and confining our attention to the
+principal seat of mathematical study:--when I was at Cambridge, there
+was a galaxy of genius in that department emanating from that place such
+as had never before been equalled. And the curious thing in our present
+connexion is that all the most illustrious names were ranged on the side
+of orthodoxy. Sir W. Thomson, Sir George Stokes, Professors Tait, Adams,
+Clerk-Maxwell, and Cayley--not to mention a number of lesser lights,
+such as Routh, Todhunter, Ferrers, &c.--were all avowed Christians.
+Clifford had only just moved at a bound from the extreme of asceticism
+to that of infidelity--an individual instance which I deem of particular
+interest in the present connexion, as showing the dominating influence
+of a forcedly emotional character even on so powerful an intellectual
+one, for the _rationality_ of the whole structure of Christian belief
+cannot have so reversed its poles within a few months.
+
+Now it would doubtless be easy to find elsewhere than in Cambridge
+mathematicians of the first order who in our own generation are, or have
+been, professedly anti-Christian in their beliefs,--although certainly
+not so great an array of such extraordinary powers. But, be this as it
+may, the case of Cambridge in my own time seems to me of itself enough
+to prove that Christian belief is neither made nor marred by the highest
+powers of reasoning, apart from other and still more potent factors.
+
+
+_Faith and Superstition._
+
+Whether or not Christianity is true, there is a great distinction
+between these two things. For while the main ingredient of Christian
+faith is the moral element, this has no part in superstition. In point
+of fact, the only point of resemblance is that both present the mental
+state called _belief_. It is on this account they are so often
+confounded by anti-Christians, and even by non-Christians; the much more
+important point of difference is not noted, viz. that belief in the one
+case is purely intellectual, while in the other it is chiefly moral.
+_Qua_ purely intellectual, belief may indicate nothing but sheer
+credulity in absence of evidence; but where a moral basis is added, the
+case is clearly different; for even if it appears to be sheer credulity
+to an outsider, that may be because he does not take into account the
+additional evidence supplied by the moral facts.
+
+
+Faith and superstition are often confounded, or even identified. And,
+unquestionably, they are identical up to a certain point--viz. they both
+present the mental state of _belief_. All people can see this; but not
+all people can see further, or define the _differentiae_. These are as
+follows: First, supposing Christianity true, there is the spiritual
+verification. Second, supposing Christianity false, there is still the
+moral ingredient, which _ex hypothesi_ is absent in superstition. In
+other words, both faith and superstition rest on an intellectual basis
+(which may be pure credulity); but faith rests also on a moral, even if
+not likewise on a spiritual. Even in human relations there is a wide
+difference between 'belief' in a scientific theory and 'faith' in a
+personal character. And the difference is in the latter comprising a
+moral element.
+
+'Faith-healing,' therefore, has no real point of resemblance with 'thy
+faith hath saved thee' of the New Testament, unless we sink the personal
+differences between a modern faith-healer and Jesus Christ as objects of
+faith.
+
+Belief is not exclusively founded on objective evidence appealing to
+reason (opinion), but mainly on subjective evidence appealing to some
+altogether different faculty (faith). Now, whether Christians are right
+or wrong in what they believe, I hold it as certain as anything can be
+that the distinction which I have just drawn, and which they all
+implicitly draw for themselves, is logically valid. For no one is
+entitled to deny the possibility of what may be termed an organ of
+spiritual discernment. In fact to do so would be to vacate the position
+of pure agnosticism _in toto_--and this even if there were no objective,
+or strictly scientific, evidences in favour of such an organ, such as we
+have in the lives of the saints, and, in a lower degree, in the
+universality of the religious sentiment. Now, if there be such an organ,
+it follows from preceding paragraphs, that not only will the main
+evidences for Christianity be subjective, but that they ought to be so:
+they ought to be so, I mean, on the Christian supposition of the object
+of Christianity being moral probation, and 'faith' both the test and the
+reward.
+
+From this many practical considerations ensue. E.g. the duty of parents
+to educate their children in what they _believe_ as distinguished from
+what they _know_. This would be unjustifiable if faith were the same as
+opinion. But it is fully justifiable if a man not only knows that he
+believes (opinion) but believes that he knows (faith). Whether or not
+the Christian differs from the 'natural man' in having a spiritual organ
+of cognition, provided he honestly believes such is the case, it would
+be immoral in him not to proceed in accordance with what he thus
+believes to be his knowledge. This obligation is recognized in education
+in every other case. He is morally right even if mentally deluded.
+
+
+Huxley, in _Lay Sermons_, says that faith has been proved a 'cardinal
+sin' by science. Now, this is true enough of credulity, superstition,
+&c., and science has done no end of good in developing our ideas of
+method, evidence, &c. But this is all on the side of intellect. 'Faith'
+is not touched by such facts or considerations. And what a terrible hell
+science would have made of the world, if she had abolished the 'spirit
+of faith' even in human relations. The fact is, Huxley falls into the
+common error of identifying 'faith' with opinion.
+
+
+Supposing Christianity true, it is very reasonable that faith in the
+sense already explained should be constituted the test of divine
+acceptance. If there be such a thing as Christ's winnowing fan, the
+quality of sterling weight for the discovery of which it is adapted
+cannot be conceived as anything other than this moral quality. No one
+could suppose a revelation appealing to the mere intellect of man, since
+acceptance would thus become a mere matter of prudence in subscribing to
+a demonstration made by higher intellects.
+
+It is also a matter of fact that if Christianity is truthful in
+representing this world as a school of moral probation, we cannot
+conceive a system better adapted to this end than is the world, or a
+better schoolmaster than Christianity. This is proved not only by
+general reasoning, but also by the work of Christianity in the world,
+its adaptation to individual needs, &c. Consider also the extraordinary
+diversity of human characters in respect both of morality and
+spirituality though all are living in the same world. Out of the same
+external material or environment such astonishingly diverse products
+arise according to the use made of it. Even human suffering in its worst
+forms can be welcome if justified by faith in such an object. 'Ills have
+no weight, and tears no bitterness,' but are rather to be 'gloried
+in[56].'
+
+It is a further fact that only by means of this theory of probation is
+it possible to give any meaning to the world, i.e. any _raison d'etre_
+of human existence.
+
+Supposing Christianity true, every man must stand or fall by the results
+of his own conduct, as developed through his own moral character. (This
+could not be so if the test were intellectual ability.) Yet this does
+not hinder that the exercise of will in the direction of religion should
+need help in order to attain belief. Nor does it hinder that some men
+should need more help and others less. Indeed, it may well be that some
+men are intentionally precluded from receiving any help, so as not to
+increase their responsibility, or receive but little, so as to
+constitute intellectual difficulties a moral trial. But clearly, if such
+things are so, we are inadequate judges.
+
+
+It is a fact that we all feel the intellectual part of man to be
+'higher' than the animal, whatever our theory of his origin. It is a
+fact that we all feel the moral part of man to be 'higher' than the
+intellectual, whatever our theory of either may be. It is also a fact
+that we all similarly feel the spiritual to be 'higher' than the moral,
+whatever our theory of religion may be. It is what we understand by
+man's moral, and still more his spiritual, qualities that go to
+constitute 'character.' And it is astonishing how in all walks of life
+it is character that tells in the long run.
+
+It is a fact that these distinctions are all well marked and universally
+recognized--viz.
+
+           {Animality.
+           {Intellectuality.
+     Human {Morality.
+           {Spirituality.
+
+Morality and spirituality are to be distinguished as two very different
+things. A man may be highly moral in his conduct without being in any
+degree spiritual in his nature, and, though to a lesser extent, vice
+versa. And, objectively, we see the same distinction between morals and
+religion. By spirituality I mean the religious temperament, whether or
+not associated with any particular creed or dogma.
+
+There is no doubt that intellectual pleasures are more satisfying and
+enduring than sensual--or even sensuous. And, to those who have
+experienced them, so it is with spiritual over intellectual, artistic,
+&c. This is an objective fact, abundantly testified to by every one who
+has had experience: and it seems to indicate that the spiritual nature
+of man is the highest part of man--the [culminating] point of his being.
+
+
+It is probably true, as Renan says in his posthumous work, that there
+will always be materialists and spiritualists, inasmuch as it will
+always be observable on the one hand that there is no thought without
+brain, while, on the other hand, instincts of man will always aspire to
+higher beliefs. But this is just what ought to be if religion is true,
+and we are in a state of probation. And is it not probable that the
+materialistic position (discredited even by philosophy) is due simply to
+custom and want of imagination? Else why the inextinguishable instincts?
+
+
+It is much more easy to disbelieve than to believe. This is obvious on
+the side of reason, but it is also true on that of spirit, for to
+disbelieve is in accordance with environment or custom, while to believe
+necessitates a spiritual use of the imagination. For both these
+reasons, very few unbelievers have any justification, either
+intellectual or spiritual, for their own unbelief.
+
+Unbelief is usually due to indolence, often to prejudice, and never a
+thing to be proud of.
+
+
+'Why should it be thought a thing incredible with you that God should
+raise the dead?' Clearly no answer can be given by the pure agnostic.
+But he will naturally say in reply, 'the question rather is, why should
+it be thought credible with you that there is a God, or, if there is,
+that he should raise the dead?' And I think the wise Christian will
+answer, 'I believe in the resurrection of the dead, partly on grounds of
+reason, partly on those of intuition, but chiefly on both combined; so
+to speak, it is my whole character which accepts the whole system of
+which the doctrine of personal immortality forms an essential part.' And
+to this it may be fairly added that the Christian doctrine of the
+resurrection of our bodily form cannot have been arrived at for the
+purpose of meeting modern materialistic objections to the doctrine of
+personal immortality; hence it is certainly a strange doctrine to have
+been propounded at that time, together with its companion, and scarcely
+less distinctive, doctrine of the vileness of the body. Why was it not
+said that the 'soul' alone should survive as a disembodied 'spirit'? Or
+if form were supposed necessary for man as distinguished from God, that
+he was to be an angel? But, be this as it may, the doctrine of the
+resurrection seems to have fully met beforehand the materialistic
+objection to a future life, and so to have raised the ulterior question
+with which this paragraph opens.
+
+
+We have seen in the Introduction that all first principles even of
+scientific facts are known by intuition and not by reason. No one can
+deny this. Now, if there be a God, the fact is certainly of the nature
+of a first principle; for it must be the first of all first principles.
+No one can dispute this. No one can therefore dispute the necessary
+conclusion, that, if there be a God, He is knowable, (if knowable at
+all) by intuition and not by reason.
+
+Indeed a little thought is enough to show that from its very nature as
+such, reason must be incapable of adjudicating on the subject, for it is
+a process of inferring from the known to the unknown.
+
+Or thus. It would be against reason itself to suppose that God, even if
+He exists, can be known by reason; He must be known, if knowable at all,
+by intuition[57].
+
+
+Observe, although God might give an objective revelation of Himself,
+e.g. as Christians believe He has, even this would not give knowledge
+of Him save to those who believe the revelations genuine; and I doubt
+whether it is logically possible for any form of objective revelation of
+itself to compel belief in it. Assuredly one rising from the dead to
+testify thereto would not, nor would letters of fire across the sky do
+so. But, even if it were logically possible, we need not consider the
+abstract possibility, seeing that, as a matter of fact, no such
+demonstrative revelation has been given.
+
+Hence, the only legitimate attitude of pure reason is pure agnosticism.
+No one can deny this. But, it will be said, there is this vast
+difference between our intuitive knowledge of all other first principles
+and that alleged of the 'first of all first principles,' viz. that the
+latter is confessedly _not_ known to all men. Now, assuredly, there is
+here a vast difference. But so there ought to be, if we are here in a
+state of probation, as before explained. And that we are in such a state
+is not only the hypothesis of religion, but the sole rational
+explanation as well as moral justification of our existence as rational
+beings and moral agents[58].
+
+
+It is not necessarily true, as J.S. Mill and all other agnostics think,
+that even if internal intuition be of divine origin, the illumination
+thus furnished can only be of evidential value to the individual subject
+thereof. On the contrary, it may be studied objectively, even if not
+experienced subjectively; and ought to be so studied by a pure agnostic
+desirous of light from any quarter. Even if he does not know it as a
+noumenon he can investigate it as a phenomenon. And, supposing it to be
+of divine origin, as its subjects believe and he has no reason to doubt,
+he may gain much evidence against its being a mere psychological
+illusion from identical reports of it in all ages. Thus, if any large
+section of the race were to see flames issuing from magnets, there would
+be no doubt as to their objective reality.
+
+
+The testimony given by Socrates to the occurrence in himself of an
+internal Voice, having all the definiteness of an auditory
+hallucination, has given rise to much speculation by subsequent
+philosophers.
+
+Many explanations are suggested, but if we remember the critical nature
+of Socrates' own mind, the literal nature of his mode of teaching, and
+the high authority which attaches to Plato's opinion on the subject, the
+probability seems to incline towards the 'Demon' having been, in
+Socrates' own consciousness, an actual auditory sensation. Be this
+however as it may, I suppose there is no question that we may adopt this
+view of the matter at least to the extent of classifying Socrates with
+Luther, Pascal, &c., not to mention all the line of Hebrew and other
+prophets, who agree in speaking of a Divine Voice.
+
+If so, the further question arises whether we are to classify all these
+with lunatics in whom the phenomena of auditory hallucination are
+habitual.
+
+Without doubt this hypothesis is most in accordance with the temper of
+our age, partly because it obeys the law of parsimony, and partly
+because it [negatives] _a priori_ the possibility of revelation.
+
+But if we look at the matter from the point of view of pure agnosticism,
+we are not entitled to adopt so rough and ready an interpretation.
+
+Suppose then that not only Socrates and all great religious reformers
+and founders of religious systems both before and after him were
+similarly stricken with mental disease, but that similar phenomena had
+occurred in the case of all scientific discoverers such as Galileo,
+Newton, Darwin, &c.--supposing all these men to have declared that their
+main ideas had been communicated by subjective sensations as of spoken
+language, so that all the progress of the world's scientific thought had
+resembled that of the world's religious thought, and had been attributed
+by the promoters thereof to direct inspirations of this kind--would it
+be possible to deny that the testimony thus afforded to the fact of
+subjective revelation would have been overwhelming? Or could it any
+longer have been maintained that supposing a revelation to be
+communicated subjectively the fact thereof could only be of any
+evidential value to the recipient himself? To this it will no doubt be
+answered, 'No, but in the case supposed the evidence arises not from the
+fact of their subjective intuition but from that of its objective
+verification in the results of science.' Quite so; but this is exactly
+the test appealed to by the Hebrew prophets--the test of true and lying
+prophets being in the fulfilment or non-fulfilment of their prophecies
+and 'By their fruits ye shall know them.'
+
+Therefore it is as absurd to say that the religious consciousness of
+minds other than our own can be barred antecedently as evidence, as it
+is to say that testimony to the miraculous is similarly barred. The pure
+agnostic must always carefully avoid the 'high _priori_ road.' But, on
+the other hand, he must be all the more assiduous in estimating fairly
+the character, both as to quantity and quality, of evidence _a
+posteriori_. Now this evidence in the present case is twofold, positive
+and negative. It will be convenient to consider the negative first.
+
+The negative evidence is furnished by the nature of man without God. It
+is thoroughly miserable, as is well shown by Pascal, who has devoted the
+whole of the first part of his treatise to this subject. I need not go
+over the ground which he has already so well traversed.
+
+Some men are not conscious of the cause of this misery: this, however,
+does not prevent the fact of their being miserable. For the most part
+they conceal the fact as well as possible from themselves, by occupying
+their minds with society, sport, frivolity of all kinds, or, if
+intellectually disposed, with science, art, literature, business, &c.
+This however is but to fill the starving belly with husks. I know from
+experience the intellectual distractions of scientific research,
+philosophical speculation, and artistic pleasures; but am also well
+aware that even when all are taken together and well sweetened to taste,
+in respect of consequent reputation, means, social position, &c., the
+whole concoction is but as high confectionery to a starving man. He may
+cheat himself for a time--especially if he be a strong man--into the
+belief that he is nourishing himself by denying his natural appetite;
+but soon finds he was made for some altogether different kind of food,
+even though of much less tastefulness as far as the palate is concerned.
+
+Some men indeed never acknowledge this articulately or distinctly even
+to themselves, yet always show it plainly enough to others. Take, e.g.,
+'that last infirmity of noble minds.' I suppose the most exalted and
+least 'carnal' of worldly joys consists in the adequate recognition by
+the world of high achievement by ourselves. Yet it is notorious that--
+
+               "It is by God decreed
+     Fame shall not satisfy the highest need."
+
+It has been my lot to know not a few of the famous men of our
+generation, and I have always observed that this is profoundly true.
+Like all other 'moral' satisfactions, this soon palls by custom, and as
+soon as one end of distinction is reached, another is pined for. There
+is no finality to rest in, while disease and death are always standing
+in the background. Custom may even blind men to their own misery, so far
+as not to make them realize what is wanting; yet the want is there.
+
+I take it then as unquestionably true that this whole negative side of
+the subject proves a vacuum in the soul of man which nothing can fill
+save faith in God.
+
+Now take the positive side. Consider the happiness of religious--and
+chiefly of the highest religious, i.e. Christian--belief. It is a matter
+of fact that besides being most intense, it is most enduring, growing,
+and never staled by custom. In short, according to the universal
+testimony of those who have it, it differs from all other happiness not
+only in degree but in kind. Those who have it can usually testify to
+what they used to be without it. It has no relation to intellectual
+status. It is a thing by itself and supreme.
+
+So much for the individual. But positive evidence does not end here.
+Look at the effects of Christian belief as exercised on human
+society--1st, by individual Christians on the family, &c.; and, 2nd, by
+the Christian Church on the world.
+
+All this may lead on to an argument from the adaptation of Christianity
+to human higher needs. All men must feel these needs more or less in
+proportion as their higher natures, moral and spiritual, are developed.
+Now Christianity is the only religion which is adapted to meet them,
+and, according to those who are alone able to testify, does so most
+abundantly. All these men, of every sect, nationality, &c., agree in
+their account of their subjective experience; so as to this there can be
+no question. The only question is as to whether they are all deceived.
+
+PEU DE CHOSE.
+
+     'La vie est vaine:
+       Un peu d'amour,
+     Un peu de haine ...
+       Et puis--bon jour!
+
+     La vie est breve:
+       Un peu d'espoir,
+     Un peu de reve ...
+       Et puis--bon soir!'
+
+The above is a terse and true criticism of this life without hope of a
+future one. Is it satisfactory? But Christian faith, as a matter of
+fact, changes it entirely.
+
+     'The night has a thousand eyes,
+       And the day but one;
+     Yet the light of a whole world dies
+       With the setting sun.
+
+     The mind has a thousand eyes,
+       And the heart but one;
+     Yet the light of a whole life dies
+       When love is done.'
+
+Love is known to be all this. How great, then, is Christianity, as being
+the religion of love, and causing men to believe both in the cause of
+love's supremacy and the infinity of God's love to man.
+
+FOOTNOTES:
+
+[55] Cf. Pascal, _Pensees_. 'For we must not mistake ourselves, we have
+as much that is automatic in us as intellectual, and hence it comes that
+the instrument by which persuasion is brought about is not demonstration
+alone. How few things are demonstrated! Proofs can only convince the
+mind; custom makes our strongest proofs and those which we hold most
+firmly, it sways the automaton, which draws the unconscious intellect
+after it.... It is then custom that makes so many men Christians, custom
+that makes them Turks, heathen, artisans, soldiers, &c. Lastly, we must
+resort to custom when once the mind has seen where truth is, in order to
+slake our thirst and steep ourselves in that belief which escapes us at
+every hour, for to have proofs always at hand were too onerous. We must
+acquire a more easy belief, that of custom, which without violence,
+without art, without argument, causes our assent and inclines all our
+powers to this belief, so that our soul naturally falls into it....
+
+'It is not enough to believe only by force of conviction if the
+automaton is inclined to believe the contrary. Both parts of us then
+must be obliged to believe, the intellect by arguments which it is
+enough to have admitted once in our lives, the automaton by custom, and
+by not allowing it to incline in the contrary direction. _Inclina cor
+meum Deus_.' See also Newman's _Grammar of Assent_, chap. vi. and
+Church's _Human Life and its Conditions_, pp. 67-9.
+
+[56] [The author has added, "For suffering in brutes see further on,"
+but nothing further on the subject appears to have been written.--ED.]
+
+[57] [In this connexion I may again notice that two days before his
+death George Romanes expressed his cordial approval of Professor
+Knight's _Aspects of Theism_--a work in which great stress is laid on
+the argument from intuition in different forms.--ED.]
+
+[58] On this subject see Pascal, _Pensees_ (Kegan Paul's trans.) p. 103.
+
+
+
+
+Sec. 5. FAITH IN CHRISTIANITY.
+
+Christianity comes up for serious investigation in the present treatise,
+because this _Examination of Religion_ [i.e. of the validity of the
+religious consciousness] has to do with the evidences of Theism
+presented by man, and not only by nature _minus_ man. Now of the
+religious consciousness Christianity is unquestionably the highest
+product.
+
+When I wrote the preceding treatise [the _Candid Examination_], I did
+not sufficiently appreciate the immense importance of _human_ nature, as
+distinguished from physical nature, in any enquiry touching Theism. But
+since then I have seriously studied anthropology (including the science
+of comparative religions), psychology and metaphysics, with the result
+of clearly seeing that human nature is the most important part of nature
+as a whole whereby to investigate the theory of Theism. This I ought to
+have anticipated on merely _a priori_ grounds, and no doubt should have
+perceived, had I not been too much immersed in merely physical research.
+
+Moreover, in those days, I took it for granted that Christianity was
+played out, and never considered it at all as having any rational
+bearing on the question of Theism. And, though this was doubtless
+inexcusable, I still think that the rational standing of Christianity
+has materially improved since then. For then it seemed that Christianity
+was destined to succumb as a rational system before the double assault
+of Darwin from without and the negative school of criticism from within.
+Not only the book of organic nature, but likewise its own sacred
+documents, seemed to be declaring against it. But now all this has been
+very materially changed. We have all more or less grown to see that
+Darwinism is like Copernicanism, &c., in this respect[59]; while the
+outcome of the great textual battle[60] is impartially considered a
+signal victory for Christianity. Prior to the new [Biblical] science,
+there was really no rational basis in thoughtful minds, either for the
+date of any one of the New Testament books, or, consequently, for the
+historical truth of any one of the events narrated in them. Gospels,
+Acts and Epistles were all alike shrouded in this uncertainty. Hence the
+validity of the eighteenth-century scepticism. But now all this kind of
+scepticism has been rendered obsolete, and for ever impossible; while
+the certainty of enough of St. Paul's writings for the practical purpose
+of displaying the belief of the apostles has been established, as well
+as the certainty of the publication of the Synoptics within the first
+century. An enormous gain has thus accrued to the objective evidences
+of Christianity. It is most important that the expert investigator
+should be exact, and, as in any other science, the lay public must take
+on authority as trustworthy only what both sides are agreed upon. But,
+as in any other science, experts are apt to lose sight of the importance
+of the main results agreed upon, in their fighting over lesser points
+still in dispute. Now it is enough for us that the Epistles to the
+Romans, Galatians, and Corinthians, have been agreed upon as genuine,
+and that the same is true of the Synoptics so far as concerns the main
+doctrine of Christ Himself.
+
+
+The extraordinary candour of Christ's biographers must not be
+forgotten[61]. Notice also such sentences as 'but some doubted,' and (in
+the account of Pentecost) 'these men are full of new wine[62].' Such
+observations are wonderfully true to human nature; but no less
+wonderfully opposed to any 'accretion' theory.
+
+Observe, when we become honestly pure agnostics the whole scene changes
+by the change in our point of view. We may then read the records
+impartially, or on their own merits, without any antecedent conviction
+that they must be false. It is then an open question whether they are
+not true as history.
+
+There is so much to be said in objective evidence for Christianity that
+were the central doctrines thus testified to anything short of
+miraculous, no one would doubt. But we are not competent judges _a
+priori_ of what a revelation should be. If our agnosticism be _pure_, we
+have no right to pre-judge the case on _prima facie_ grounds.
+
+
+One of the strongest pieces of objective evidence in favour of
+Christianity is not sufficiently enforced by apologists. Indeed, I am
+not aware that I have ever seen it mentioned. It is the absence from the
+biography of Christ of any doctrines which the subsequent growth of
+human knowledge--whether in natural science, ethics, political economy,
+or elsewhere--has had to discount. This negative argument is really
+almost as strong as is the positive one from what Christ did teach. For
+when we consider what a large number of sayings are recorded of--or at
+least attributed to--Him, it becomes most remarkable that in literal
+truth there is no reason why any of His words should ever pass away in
+the sense of becoming obsolete. 'Not even now could it be easy,' says
+John Stuart Mill, 'even for an unbeliever, to find a better translation
+of the rule of virtue from the abstract into the concrete, than to
+endeavour so to live that Christ would approve our life[63].' Contrast
+Jesus Christ in this respect with other thinkers of like antiquity. Even
+Plato, who, though some 400 years B.C. in point of time, was greatly in
+advance of Him in respect of philosophic thought--not only because
+Athens then presented the extraordinary phenomenon which it did of
+genius in all directions never since equalled, but also because he,
+following Socrates, was, so to speak, the greatest representative of
+human reason in the direction of spirituality--even Plato, I say, is
+nowhere in this respect as compared with Christ. Read the dialogues, and
+see how enormous is the contrast with the Gospels in respect of errors
+of all kinds--reaching even to absurdity in respect of reason, and to
+sayings shocking to the moral sense. Yet this is confessedly the highest
+level of human reason on the lines of spirituality, when unaided by
+alleged revelation.
+
+Two things may be said in reply. First, that the Jews (Rabbis) of
+Christ's period had enunciated most of Christ's ethical sayings. But,
+even so far as this is true, the sayings were confessedly extracted or
+deduced from the Old Testament, and so _ex hypothesi_ due to original
+inspiration. Again, it is not very far true, because, as _Ecce Homo_
+says, the ethical sayings of Christ, even when anticipated by Rabbis and
+the Old Testament, were _selected_ by Him.
+
+
+It is a general, if not a universal, rule that those who reject
+Christianity with contempt are those who care not for religion of any
+kind. 'Depart from us' has always been the sentiment of such. On the
+other hand, those in whom the religious sentiment is intact, but who
+have rejected Christianity on intellectual grounds, still almost deify
+Christ. These facts are remarkable.
+
+If we estimate the greatness of a man by the influence which he has
+exerted on mankind, there can be no question, even from the secular
+point of view, that Christ is much the greatest man who has ever lived.
+
+It is on all sides worth considering (blatant ignorance or base
+vulgarity alone excepted) that the revolution effected by Christianity
+in human life is immeasurable and unparalleled by any other movement in
+history; though most nearly approached by that of the Jewish religion,
+of which, however, it is a development, so that it may be regarded as of
+a piece with it. If thus regarded, this whole system of religion is so
+immeasurably in advance of all others, that it may fairly be said, if it
+had not been for the Jews, the human race would not have had any
+religion worth our serious attention as such. The whole of that side of
+human nature would never have been developed in civilized life. And
+although there are numberless individuals who are not conscious of its
+development in themselves, yet even these have been influenced to an
+enormous extent by the atmosphere of religion around them.
+
+But not only is Christianity thus so immeasurably in advance of all
+other religions. It is no less so of every other system of thought that
+has ever been promulgated in regard to all that is moral and spiritual.
+Whether it be true or false, it is certain that neither philosophy,
+science, nor poetry has ever produced results in thought, conduct, or
+beauty in any degree to be compared with it. This I think will be on all
+hands allowed as regards conduct. As regards thought and beauty it may
+be disputed. But, consider, what has all the science or all the
+philosophy of the world done for the thought of mankind to be compared
+with the one doctrine, 'God is love'? Whether or not true, conceive what
+belief in it has been to thousands of millions of our race--i.e. its
+influence on human thought, and thence on human conduct. Thus to admit
+its incomparable influence in conduct is indirectly to admit it as
+regards thought. Again, as regards beauty, the man who fails to see its
+incomparable excellence in this respect merely shows his own deficiency
+in the appreciation of all that is noblest in man. True or not true, the
+entire Story of the Cross, from its commencement in prophetic aspiration
+to its culmination in the Gospel, is by far the most magnificent
+[presentation] in literature. And surely the fact of its having all been
+lived does not detract from its poetic value. Nor does the fact of its
+being capable of appropriation by the individual Christian of to-day as
+still a vital religion detract from its sublimity. Only to a man wholly
+destitute of spiritual perception can it be that Christianity should
+fail to appear the greatest exhibition of the beautiful, the sublime,
+and of all else that appeals to our spiritual nature, which has ever
+been known upon our earth.
+
+Yet this side of its adaptation is turned only towards men of highest
+culture. The most remarkable thing about Christianity is its adaptation
+to all sorts and conditions of men. Are you highly intellectual? There
+is in its problems, historical and philosophical, such worlds of
+material as you may spend your life upon with the same interminable
+interest as is open to the students of natural science. Or are you but a
+peasant in your parish church, with knowledge of little else than your
+Bible? Still are you ...[64]
+
+
+_Regeneration_.
+
+How remarkable is the doctrine of Regeneration _per se_, as it is stated
+in the New Testament[65], and how completely it fits in with the
+non-demonstrative character of Revelation to reason alone, with the
+hypothesis of moral probation, &c. Now this doctrine is one of the
+distinctive notes of Christianity. That is, Christ foretold repeatedly
+and distinctly--as did also His apostles after Him--that while those who
+received the Holy Ghost, who came to the Father through faith in the
+Son, who were born again of the Spirit, (and many other synonymous
+phrases,) would be absolutely certain of Christian truth as it were by
+direct vision or intuition, the carnally minded on the other hand would
+not be affected by any amount of direct evidence, even though one rose
+from the dead--as indeed Christ shortly afterwards did, with fulfilment
+of this prediction. Thus scepticism may be taken by Christians as
+corroborating Christianity.
+
+By all means let us retain our independence of judgement; but this is
+pre-eminently a matter in which pure agnostics must abstain from
+arrogance and consider the facts impartially as unquestionable phenomena
+of experience.
+
+Shortly after the death of Christ, this phenomenon which had been
+foretold by Him occurred, and appears to have done so for the first
+time. It has certainly continued to manifest itself ever since, and has
+been attributed by professed historians to that particular moment in
+time called Pentecost, producing much popular excitement and a large
+number of Christian believers.
+
+But, whether or not we accept this account, it is unquestionable that
+the apostles were filled with faith in the person and office of their
+Master, which is enough to justify His doctrine of regeneration.
+
+
+_Conversions._
+
+St. Augustine after thirty years of age, and other Fathers, bear
+testimony to a sudden, enduring and extraordinary change in themselves,
+called _conversion_[66].
+
+Now this experience has been repeated and testified to by countless
+millions of civilized men and women in all nations and all degrees of
+culture. It signifies not whether the conversion be sudden or gradual,
+though, as a psychological phenomenon, it is more remarkable when sudden
+and there is no symptom of mental aberration otherwise. But even as a
+gradual growth in mature age, its evidential value is not less. (Cf.
+Bunyan, &c.)
+
+In all cases it is not a mere change of belief or opinion; this is by no
+means the point; the point is that it is a modification of character,
+more or less profound.
+
+Seeing what a complex thing is character, this change therefore cannot
+be simple. That it may all be due to so-called natural causes is no
+evidence against its so-called supernatural source, unless we beg the
+whole question of the Divine in Nature. To pure agnostics the evidence
+from conversions and regeneration lies in the bulk of these
+psychological phenomena, shortly after the death of Christ, with their
+continuance ever since, their general similarity all over the world,
+&c., &c.
+
+
+_Christianity and Pain_.
+
+Christianity, from its foundation in Judaism, has throughout been a
+religion of sacrifice and sorrow. It has been a religion of blood and
+tears, and yet of profoundest happiness to its votaries. The apparent
+paradox is due to its depth, and to the union of these seemingly diverse
+roots in Love. It has been throughout and growingly a religion--or
+rather let us say _the_ religion--of Love, with these apparently
+opposite qualities. Probably it is only those whose characters have been
+deepened by experiences gained in this religion itself who are so much
+as capable of intelligently resolving this paradox.
+
+Fakirs hang on hooks, Pagans cut themselves and even their children,
+sacrifice captives, &c., for the sake of propitiating diabolical
+deities. The Jewish and Christian idea of sacrifice is doubtless a
+survival of this idea of God by way of natural causation, yet this is no
+evidence against the completed idea of the Godhead being [such as the
+Christian belief represents it], for supposing the completed idea to be
+true, the earlier ideals would have been due to the earlier
+inspirations, in accordance with the developmental method of Revelation
+hereafter to be discussed[67].
+
+But Christianity, with its roots in Judaism, is, as I have said, _par
+excellence_ the religion of sorrow, because it reaches to truer and
+deeper levels of our spiritual nature, and therefore has capabilities
+both of sorrow and joy which are presumably non-existent except in
+civilized man. I mean the sorrows and the joys of a fully evolved
+spiritual life--such as were attained wonderfully early, historically
+speaking, in the case of the Jews, and are now universally diffused
+throughout Christendom. In short, the sorrows and the joys in question
+are those which arise from the fully developed consciousness of sin
+against a God of Love, as distinguished from propitiation of malignant
+spirits. These joys and sorrows are wholly spiritual, not merely
+physical, and culminate in the cry,'Thou desirest no sacrifice.... The
+sacrifice of God is a troubled spirit[68].'
+
+
+I agree with Pascal[69] that there is virtually nothing to be gained by
+being a theist as distinguished from a Christian. Unitarianism is only
+an affair of the reason--a merely abstract theory of the mind, having
+nothing to do with the heart, or the real needs of mankind. It is only
+when it takes the New Testament, tears out a few of its leaves relating
+to the divinity of Christ, and appropriates all the rest, that its
+system becomes in any degree possible as a basis for personal religion.
+
+If there is a Deity it seems to be in some indefinite degree more
+probable that He should impart a Revelation than that He should not.
+
+
+Women, as a class, are in all countries much more disposed to
+Christianity than men. I think the scientific explanation of this is to
+be found in the causes assigned in my essay on _Mental differences
+between Men and Women_[70]. But, if Christianity be supposed true, there
+would, of course, be a more ultimate explanation of a religious
+kind--as in all other cases where causation is concerned. And, in that
+case I have no doubt that the largest part of the explanation would
+consist in the passions of women being less ardent than those of men,
+and also much more kept under restraint by social conditions of life.
+This applies not only to purity, but likewise to most of the other
+psychological _differentiae_ between the sexes, such as ambition,
+selfishness, pride of power, and so forth. In short, the whole ideal of
+Christian ethics is of a feminine as distinguished from a masculine
+type[71]. Now nothing is so inimical to Christian belief as un-Christian
+conduct. This is especially the case as regards impurity; for whether
+the fact be explained on religious or non-religious grounds, it has more
+to do with unbelief than has the speculative reason. Consequently, woman
+is, for all these reasons, the 'fitter' type for receiving and retaining
+Christian belief.
+
+
+Modern agnosticism is performing this great service to Christian faith;
+it is silencing all rational scepticism of the _a priori_ kind. And this
+it is bound to do more and more the purer it becomes. In every
+generation it must henceforth become more and more recognized by
+logical thinking, that all antecedent objections to Christianity founded
+on reason alone are _ipso facto_ nugatory. Now, all the strongest
+objections to Christianity have ever been those of the antecedent kind;
+hence the effect of modern thinking is that of more and more diminishing
+the purely speculative difficulties, such as that of the Incarnation,
+&c. In other words the force of Butler's argument about our being
+incompetent judges[72] is being more and more increased.
+
+And the logical development of this lies in the view already stated
+about natural causation. For, just as pure agnosticism must allow that
+reason is incompetent to adjudicate _a priori_ for or against Christian
+miracles, including the Incarnation, so it must further allow that, if
+they ever took place, reason can have nothing to say against their being
+all of one piece with causation in general. Hence, so far as reason is
+concerned, pure agnosticism must allow that it is only the event which
+can ultimately prove whether Christianity is true or false. 'If it be of
+God we cannot overthrow it, lest haply we be found even to fight against
+God.' But the individual cannot wait for this empirical determination.
+What then is he to do? The unbiassed answer of pure agnosticism ought
+reasonably to be, in the words of John Hunter, 'Do not think; try.' That
+is, in this case, try the only experiment available--the experiment of
+faith. Do the doctrine, and if Christianity be true, the verification
+will come, not indeed mediately through any course of speculative
+reason, but immediately by spiritual intuition. Only if a man has faith
+enough to make this venture honestly, will he be in a just position for
+deciding the issue. Thus viewed it would seem that the experiment of
+faith is not a 'fool's experiment'; but, on the contrary, so that there
+is enough _prima facie_ evidence to arrest serious attention, such an
+experimental trial would seem to be the rational duty of a pure
+agnostic.
+
+It is a fact that Christian belief is much more due to doing than to
+thinking, as prognosticated by the New Testament. 'If any man will do
+His will, he shall know of the doctrine, whether it be of God' (St. John
+vii. 17). And surely, even on grounds of reason itself, it should be
+allowed that, supposing Christianity to be 'of God,' it _ought_ to
+appeal to the spiritual rather than to the rational side of our nature.
+
+
+Even within the region of pure reason (or the '_prima facie_ case')
+modern science, as directed on the New Testament criticism, has surely
+done more for Christianity than against it. For, after half a century of
+battle over the text by the best scholars, the dates of the Gospels have
+been fixed within the first century, and at least four of St. Paul's
+epistles have had their authenticity proved beyond doubt. Now this is
+enough to destroy all eighteenth-century criticism as to the
+doubtfulness of the historical existence of Christ and His apostles,
+'inventions of priests,' &c., which was the most formidable kind of
+criticism of all. There is no longer any question as to historical
+facts, save the miraculous, which, however, are ruled out by negative
+criticism on merely _a priori_ grounds. This remaining--and, _ex
+hypothesi_, necessary--doubt is of very different importance from the
+other.
+
+Again, the Pauline epistles of proved authenticity are enough for all
+that is wanted to show the belief of Christ's contemporaries.
+
+These are facts of the first order of importance to have proved. Old
+Testament criticism is as yet too immature to consider.
+
+
+_Plan in Revelation_.
+
+The views which I entertained on this subject when an undergraduate
+[i.e. the ordinary orthodox views] were abandoned in presence of the
+theory of Evolution--i.e. the theory of natural causation as probably
+furnishing a scientific explanation [of the religious phenomena of
+Judaism] or, which is the same thing, an explanation in terms of
+ascertainable causes up to some certain point; which however in this
+particular case cannot be determined within wide limits, so that the
+history of Israel will always embody an element of 'mystery' much more
+than any other history.
+
+It was not until twenty-five years later that I saw clearly the full
+implications of my present views on natural causation. As applied to
+this particular case these views show that to a theist, at all events
+(i.e. to any one who on independent grounds has accepted the theory of
+Theism), it ought not to make much difference to the evidential value of
+the Divine Plan of Revelation as exhibited in the Old and New
+Testaments, even if it be granted that the whole has been due to
+so-called natural causes only. I say, 'not much difference,' for that it
+ought to make some difference I do not deny. Take a precisely analogous
+case. The theory of evolution by natural causes is often said to make no
+logical difference in the evidence of plan or design manifested in
+organic nature--it being only a question of _modus operandi_ whether all
+pieces of organic machinery were produced suddenly or by degrees; the
+evidence of design is equally there in either case. Now I have shown
+elsewhere that this is wrong[73]. It may not make much difference to a
+man who is already a theist, for then it is but a question of _modus_,
+but it makes a great difference to the evidence of Theism.
+
+So it is in evidence of plan in proof of a revelation. If there had been
+no alleged revelation up to the present time, and if Christ were now to
+appear suddenly in His first advent in all the power and glory which
+Christians expect for His second, the proof of His revelation would be
+demonstrative. So that, as a mere matter of evidence, a sudden
+revelation might be much more convincing than a gradual one. But it
+would be quite out of analogy with causation in nature[74]. Besides,
+even a gradual revelation might be given easily, which would be of
+demonstrative value--as by making prophecies of historical events,
+scientific discoveries, &c., so clear as to be unmistakeable. But, as
+before shown, a demonstrative revelation has not been made, and there
+may well be good reasons why it should not. Now, if there are such
+reasons (e.g. our state of probation), we can well see that the gradual
+unfolding of a plan of revelation, from earliest dawn of history to the
+end of the world ('I speak as a fool') is much preferable to a sudden
+manifestation sufficiently late in the world's history to be
+historically attested for all subsequent time. For
+
+     1st. Gradual evolution is in analogy with God's other work.
+
+     2nd. It does not leave Him without witness at any time during the
+     historical period.
+
+     3rd. It gives ample scope for persevering research at all
+     times--i.e. a moral test, and not merely an intellectual assent to
+     some one _(ex hypothesi)_ unequivocally attested event in history.
+
+The _appearance_ of plan in revelation is, in fact, certainly remarkable
+enough to arrest serious attention.
+
+If revelation has been of a progressive character, then it follows that
+it must have been so, not only historically, but likewise
+intellectually, morally, and spiritually. For thus only could it be
+always adapted to the advancing conditions of the human race. This
+reflection destroys all those numerous objections against Scripture on
+account of the absurdity or immorality of its statements or precepts,
+unless it can be shown that the modifications suggested by criticism as
+requisite to bring the statements or precepts into harmony with modern
+advancement would have been as well adapted to the requirements of the
+world at the date in question, as were the actual statements or precepts
+before us.
+
+
+Supposing Christianity true, it is certain that the revelation which it
+conveys has been predetermined at least since the dawn of the historical
+period. This is certain because the objective evidences of Christianity
+as a revelation have their origin in that dawn. And these objective
+evidences are throughout [evidence] of a scheme, in which the end can be
+seen from the beginning. And the very methods whereby this scheme is
+itself revealed are such (still supposing that it is a scheme) as
+present remarkable evidences of design. These methods are, broadly
+speaking, miracles, prophecy and the results of the teaching, &c., upon
+mankind. Now one may show that no better methods could conceivably have
+been designed for the purpose of latter-day evidence, combined with
+moral and religious teaching throughout. The mere fact of it being so
+largely incorporated with secular history renders the Christian religion
+unique: so to speak, the world, throughout its entire historical period,
+has been constituted the canvas on which this divine revelation has been
+painted--and painted so gradually that not until the process had been
+going on for a couple of thousand years was it possible to perceive the
+subject thereof.
+
+
+_Christian Dogmas_.
+
+Whether or not Christ was Himself divine would make no difference so far
+as the consideration of Christianity as the highest phase of evolution
+is concerned, or from the purely secular [scientific] point of view.
+From the religious point of view, or that touching the relation of God
+to man, it would of course make a great difference; but the difference
+belongs to the same region of thought as that which applies to all the
+previous moments of evolution. Thus the passage from the non-moral to
+the moral appears, from the secular or scientific point of view, to be
+due, as far as we can see, to mechanical causes in natural selection or
+what not. But, just as in the case of the passage from the non-mental to
+the mental, &c., this passage may have been _ultimately_ due to divine
+volition, and _must have been so due_ on the theory of Theism.
+Therefore, I say, it makes no difference from a secular or scientific
+point of view whether or not Christ was Himself divine; since, in either
+case, the movement which He inaugurated was the proximate or phenomenal
+cause of the observable results.
+
+Thus, even the question of the divinity of Christ ultimately resolves
+itself into the question of all questions--viz. is or is not mechanical
+causation 'the outward and visible form of an inward and spiritual
+grace'? Is it phenomenal or ontological; ultimate or derivative?
+
+Similarly as regards the redemption. Whether or not Christ was really
+divine, in as far as a belief in His divinity has been a necessary cause
+of the moral and religious evolution which has resulted from His life on
+earth, it has equally and so far 'saved His people from their sins';
+that is, of course, it has saved them from their own sense of sin as an
+abiding curse. Whether or not He has effected any corresponding change
+of an objective character in the ontological sphere, again depends on
+the 'question of questions' just stated.
+
+
+_Reasonableness of the Doctrines of the Incarnation and the Trinity._
+
+Pure agnostics and those who search for God in Christianity should have
+nothing to do with metaphysical theology. _That_ is a department of
+enquiry which, _ex hypothesi_, is transcendental, and is only to be
+considered after Christianity has been accepted. The doctrines of the
+Incarnation and the Trinity seemed to me most absurd in my agnostic
+days. But now, as a _pure_ agnostic, I see in them no rational
+difficulty at all. As to the Trinity, the plurality of persons is
+necessarily implied in the companion doctrine of the Incarnation. So
+that at best there is here but one difficulty, since, duality being
+postulated in the doctrine of the Incarnation, there is no further
+difficulty for pure agnosticism in the doctrine of plurality. Now at one
+time it seemed to me impossible that any proposition, verbally
+intelligible as such, could be more violently absurd than that of the
+doctrine [of the Incarnation]. Now I see that this standpoint is wholly
+irrational, due only to the blindness of reason itself promoted by
+[purely] scientific habits of thought. 'But it is opposed to common
+sense.' No doubt, utterly so; but so it _ought_ to be if true. Common
+sense is merely a [rough] register of common experience; but the
+Incarnation, if it ever took place, whatever else it may have been, at
+all events cannot have been a common event. 'But it is derogatory to God
+to become man.' How do you know? Besides, Christ was not an ordinary
+man. Both negative criticism and the historical effects of His life
+prove this; while, if we for a moment adopt the Christian point of view
+for the sake of argument, the whole _raison d'etre_ of mankind is bound
+up in Him. Lastly, there are considerations _per contra_, rendering an
+incarnation antecedently probable[75]. On antecedent grounds there
+_must_ be mysteries unintelligible to reason as to the nature of God,
+&c., supposing a revelation to be made at all. Therefore their
+occurrence in Christianity _is_ no proper objection to Christianity.
+Why, again, stumble _a priori_ over the doctrine of the
+Trinity--especially as man himself is a triune being, of body, mind
+(i.e. reason), and spirit (i.e. moral, aesthetic, religious faculties)?
+The unquestionable union of these no less unquestionably distinct orders
+of being in man is known immediately as a fact of experience, but is as
+unintelligible by any process of logic or reason as is the alleged
+triunity of God.
+
+
+_Adam, the Fall, the Origin of Evil_.
+
+These, all taken together as Christian dogmas, are undoubtedly hard hit
+by the scientific proof of evolution (but are the _only_ dogmas which
+can fairly be said to be so), and, as constituting the logical basis of
+the whole plan, they certainly do appear at first sight necessarily to
+involve in their destruction that of the entire superstructure. But the
+question is whether, after all, they have been destroyed for a pure
+agnostic. In other words, whether my principles are not as applicable in
+turning the flank of infidelity here as everywhere else.
+
+First, as regards Adam and Eve, observe, to begin with, that long before
+Darwin the story of man in Paradise was recognized by thoughtful
+theologians as allegorical. Indeed, read with unprejudiced eyes, the
+first chapters of Genesis ought always to have been seen to be a poem as
+distinguished from a history: nor could it ever have been mistaken for
+a history, but for preconceived ideas on the matter of inspiration. But
+to pure agnostics there should be no such preconceived ideas; so that
+nowadays no presumption should be raised against it as inspired, merely
+because it has been proved not to be a history--and this even though we
+cannot see of what it is allegorical. For, supposing it inspired, it has
+certainly done good service in the past and can do so likewise in the
+present, by giving an allegorical, though not a literal, starting-point
+for the Divine Plan of Redemption.
+
+
+_The evidence of Natural and Revealed Religion compared_.
+
+It is often said that evolution of organic forms gives as good evidence
+of design as would their special creation, inasmuch as all the facts of
+adaptation, in which the evidence consists, are there in either case.
+But here it is overlooked that the very question at issue is thus
+begged. The question is, Are these facts of adaptation _per se_
+sufficient evidence of design as their cause? But if it be allowed, as
+it must be, that under hypothesis of evolution by natural causes the
+facts of adaptation belong to the same category as all the other facts
+of nature, no more special argument for design can be founded on these
+facts than on any others in nature. So that the facts of adaptation,
+like all other facts, are only available as arguments for design when
+it is assumed that all natural causation is of a mental character: which
+assumption merely begs the question of design anywhere. Or, in other
+words, on the supposition of their having been due to natural causes,
+the facts of adaptation are only then available as _per se_ good
+evidence of design, when it has already been assumed that, _qua_ due to
+natural causes, they are due to design.
+
+Natural religion resembles Revealed religion in this. Supposing both
+divine, both have been arranged so that, as far as reason can lead us,
+there is only enough evidence of design to arouse serious attention to
+the question of it. In other words, as regards both, the attitude of
+pure reason ought to be that of pure agnosticism. (Observe that the
+inadequacy of teleology, or design in nature, to prove Theism has been
+expressly recognized by all the more intellectual Christians of all
+ages, although such recognition has become more general since Darwin. On
+this point I may refer to Pascal especially[76], and many other
+authors.) This is another striking analogy between Nature and
+Revelation, supposing both to have emanated from the same author--i.e.
+quite as much so as identity of developmental method in both.
+
+_Supposing the hypothesis of design in both to be true_, it follows that
+in both this hypothesis can be alike verified only by the organ of
+immediate intuition--i.e. that other mode of human apprehension which is
+supplementary to the rational. Here again we note the analogy. And if a
+man has this supplementary mode of apprehending the highest truth (by
+hypothesis such), it will be his duty to exercise his spiritual eyesight
+in searching for God in nature as in revelation, when (still on our
+present hypothesis that 'God is, and is the rewarder of them who seek
+Him diligently') he will find that his subjective evidence of God in
+Nature and in Revelation will mutually corroborate one another--so
+yielding additional evidence to his reason.
+
+The teleology of Revelation supplements that of Nature, and so, to the
+spiritually minded man, they logically and mutually corroborate one
+another.
+
+Paley's writings form an excellent illustration of the identity of the
+teleological argument from Nature and from Revelation; though a very
+imperfect illustration of the latter taken by itself, inasmuch as he
+treats only of the New Testament, and even of that very
+partially--ignoring all that went before Christ, and much of what
+happened after the apostles. Yet Paley himself does not seem to have
+observed the similarity of the argument, as developed in his _Natural
+Theology_ and _Evidences of Christianity_ respectively. But no one has
+developed the argument better in both cases. His great defect was in not
+perceiving that this teleological argument, _per se_, is not in either
+case enough to convince, but only to arouse serious attention. Paley
+everywhere represents that such an appeal to reason alone ought to be
+sufficient. He fails to see that if it were, there could be no room for
+faith. In other words, he fails to recognize the spiritual organ in
+man, and its complementary object, grace in God. So far he fails to be a
+Christian. And, whether Theism and Christianity be true or false, it is
+certain that the teleological argument alone _ought_ to result, not in
+conviction, but in agnosticism.
+
+
+The antecedent improbability against a miracle being wrought by a man
+without a moral object is apt to be confused with that of its being done
+by God with an adequate moral object. The former is immeasurably great;
+the latter is only equal to that of the theory of Theism--i.e. _nil_.
+
+
+_Christian Demonology_[77].
+
+It will be said, 'However you may seek to explain away _a priori_
+objections to miracles on _a priori_ grounds, there remains the fact
+that Christ accepted the current superstition in regard to diabolic
+possession. Now the devils damn the doctrine. For you must choose the
+horn of your dilemma, either the current theory was true or it was not.
+If you say true, you must allow that the same theory is true for all
+similar stages of culture, [but not for the later stages,] and therefore
+that the most successful exorcist is Science, albeit Science works not
+by faith in the theory, but by rejection of it. Observe, the diseases
+are so well described by the record, that there is no possibility of
+mistaking them. Hence you must suppose that they were due to devils in
+A.D. 30, and to nervous disorders in A.D. 1894. On the other hand, if
+you choose the other horn, you must accept either the hypothesis of the
+ignorance or that of the mendacity of Christ.'
+
+The answer is, that either hypothesis may be accepted by Christianity.
+For the sake of argument we may exclude the question whether the
+acceptance of the devil theory by Christ was really historical, or
+merely attributed to Him by His biographers after His death. If Christ
+knew that the facts were not due to devils, He may also have known it
+was best to fall in with current theory, rather than to puzzle the
+people with a lecture on pathology. If He did not know, why should He,
+if He had previously 'emptied Himself' of omniscience? In either case,
+if He had denied the current theory, He would have been giving evidence
+of scientific knowledge or of scientific intuition beyond the culture of
+His time, and this, as in countless other cases, was not in accordance
+with His method, which, whether we suppose it divine or human, has
+nowhere proved His divine mission by foreknowledge of natural science.
+
+The particular question of Christ and demonology is but part of a much
+larger one.
+
+
+_Darwin's Difficulty_[78].
+
+The answer to Darwin's objection about so small a proportion of mankind
+having ever heard of Christ, is manifold:--
+
+1. Supposing Christianity true, it is the highest and final revelation;
+i.e. the scheme of revelation has been developmental. Therefore, it
+follows from the very method that the larger proportion of mankind
+should never hear of Christ, i.e. all who live before His advent.
+
+2. But these were not left 'without witness.' They all had their
+religion and their moral sense, each at its appropriate stage of
+development. Therefore 'the times of ignorance God winked at' (Acts
+xvii. 30).
+
+3. Moreover these men were not devoid of benefit from Christ, because it
+is represented that He died for all men--i.e. but for Him [i.e. apart
+from the knowledge of what was to come] God would not have 'winked at
+the times of ignorance.' The efficacy of atonement is represented as
+transcendental, and not dependent on the accident of hearing about the
+Atoner.
+
+4. It is remarkable that of all men Darwin should have been worsted by
+this fallacious argument. For it has received its death-blow from the
+theory of evolution: i.e. if it be true that evolution has been the
+method of natural causation, and if it be true that the method of
+natural causation is due to a Divinity, then it follows that the
+lateness of Christ's appearance on earth must have been designed. For it
+is certain that He could not have appeared at any earlier date without
+having violated the method of evolution. Therefore, on the theory of
+Theism, He _ought_ to have appeared when He did--i.e. at the earliest
+possible moment in history.
+
+So as to the suitability of the moment of Christ's appearance in other
+respects. Even secular historians are agreed as to the suitability of
+the combinations, and deduce the success of His system of morals and
+religion from this fact. So with students of comparative religions.
+
+FOOTNOTES:
+
+[59] [I.e. a theory which comes at first as a shock to the current
+teaching of Christianity, but is finally seen to be in no antagonism to
+its necessary principles.--ED.]
+
+[60] [I.e. the battle in regard to the Christian texts or
+documents.--ED.]
+
+[61] See Gore's _Bampton Lectures_, pp. 74 ff.
+
+[62] Matt, xxviii. 17; Acts ii. 13.
+
+[63] _Three Essays on Theism_, p. 255.
+
+[64] [Note unfinished.--ED.]
+
+[65] [George Romanes began to make a collection of N.T. texts bearing on
+the subject.--ED.]
+
+[66] See Pascal, _Pensees_, p. 245.
+
+[67] [The notes on this subject were often too fragmentary for
+publication.--ED.]
+
+[68] Ps. li.
+
+[69] _Pensees_, pp. 91-93.
+
+[70] See _Nineteenth Century_, May 1887.
+
+[71] [The essay mentioned above should be read in explanation of this
+expression. George Romanes' meaning would be more accurately expressed,
+I think, had he said: 'The ideal of Christian character holds in
+prominence the elements which we regard as characteristically feminine,
+e.g. development of affections, readiness of trust, love of service,
+readiness to suffer, &c.'--ED.]
+
+[72] See _Analogy_, part i. ch. 7; part ii. ch. 3, 4, &c.
+
+[73] See Conclusion of _Darwin and After Darwin_, part I.
+
+[74] I should somewhere show how much better a treatise Butler might
+have written had he known about evolution as the general law of nature.
+
+[75] See Gore's _Bampton Lectures_, lect. ii.
+
+[76] _Pensees_, pp. 205 ff.
+
+[77] [Romanes' line of argument in this note seems to me impossible to
+maintain. The emphasis which Jesus Christ lays on diabolic agency is so
+great that, if it is not a reality, He must be regarded either as
+seriously misled about realities which concern the spiritual life, or
+else as seriously misleading others. And in neither case could He be
+even the perfect Prophet. I think I am justified in explaining my
+disagreement with Romanes' argument at this point particularly.--ED.]
+
+[78] [There is nothing in Darwin's _writings_ which seems to me to
+justify Romanes in attributing this difficulty to him specially. But he
+knew Darwin so intimately and reverenced him so profoundly that he is
+not likely to have been in error on the subject.--ED.]
+
+
+
+
++Concluding Note by the Editor:--+
+
+The intellectual attitude towards Christianity expressed in these notes
+may be described as--(1) 'pure agnosticism' in the region of the
+scientific 'reason,' coupled with (2) a vivid recognition of the
+spiritual necessity of faith and of the legitimacy and value of its
+intuitions; (3) a perception of the positive strength of the historical
+and spiritual evidences of Christianity.
+
+George Romanes came to recognize, as in these written notes so also in
+conversation, that it was 'reasonable to be a Christian believer' before
+the activity or habit of faith had been recovered. His life was cut
+short very soon after this point was reached; but it will surprise no
+one to learn that the writer of these 'Thoughts' returned before his
+death to that full, deliberate communion with the Church of Jesus Christ
+which he had for so many years been conscientiously compelled to forego.
+In his case the 'pure in heart' was after a long period of darkness
+allowed, in a measure before his death, to 'see God.'
+
+    _Fecisti nos ad te, Domine; et inquietum est cor nostrum donec
+    requiescat in te_.
+
+
+OXFORD: HORACE HART
+PRINTER TO THE UNIVERSITY
+
+
+ADVERTISEMENTS
+
+
+The Oxford Library of Practical Theology
+
+     Edited by the Rev. W.C.E. NEWBOLT, M.A., Canon and
+     Chancellor of St. Paul's; and the Rev. DARWELL STONE,
+     M.A., Librarian of the Pusey House, Oxford.
+
+       *       *       *       *       *
+
+_Price 5s. each volume_.
+
++RELIGION+. By the Rev. W.C.E. NEWBOLT, M.A., Canon and Chancellor of
+St. Paul's.                                         [_Fifth Impression_.
+
+     '_The Oxford Library of Practical Theology_ makes a good beginning
+     with Canon Newbolt's volume on religion.... The publishers have
+     spared no pains in making the appearance of the volumes as
+     attractive as possible. The binding, type, and general "get up" of
+     the volume just issued leave nothing to be desired.'--_Guardian_.
+
++HOLY BAPTISM+. By the Rev. DARWELL STONE, M.A., Librarian of the Pusey
+House, Oxford.                                         [_Third Edition_.
+
+     'Few books on Baptism contain more thoughtful and useful
+     instruction on the rite, and we give Mr. Stone's effort our highest
+     approval. It might well be made a text-book for candidates for the
+     diaconate, or at least in theological colleges. As a book for
+     thoughtful laymen it is also certain to find a place.'--_Church
+     Times_.
+
++CONFIRMATION+. By the Right Rev. A.C.A. HALL, D.D., Bishop of Vermont.
+                                                    [_Third Impression_.
+
+     'To the parochial clergy this volume may be warmly commended. They
+     will find it to be a storehouse of material for their instruction,
+     and quite the best treatise that we have on the subject it treats.
+     It is thoroughly practical, and gives exactly the kind of teaching
+     that is wanted.'--_Guardian_.
+
++THE HISTORY OF THE BOOK OF COMMON PRAYER+. By the Rev. LEIGHTON PULLAN,
+M.A., Fellow of St. John Baptist's College, Oxford,    [_Third Edition_.
+
+     'Mr. Pullan's book will no doubt have, as it deserves to have, a
+     large number of readers, and they will gain a great deal from the
+     perusal of it. It may be certainly recommended to the ordinary
+     layman as by far the best book on the subject available.'--_Pilot_.
+
++HOLY MATRIMONY+. By the Rev. W.J. KNOX LITTLE, M.A., Canon of
+Worcester.                                            [_Second Edition_.
+
+     'Canon Knox Little has given us a most exhaustive treatise on Holy
+     Matrimony written in his best and happiest style, and giving ample
+     proofs of wide research and deep study of the various aspects, and
+     the essential characteristics of Christian marriage.... We would
+     strongly advise the clergy to place this work upon their shelves as
+     a book of reference, while it forms a complete manual of
+     instruction to aid them in the preparation of addresses on the
+     subject.'--_Church Bells_.
+
++THE INCARNATION+. By the Rev. H.V.S. ECK, M.A., Rector of Bethnal
+Green.                                                [_Second Edition_.
+
+     'The teaching is sound, and the book may be placed with confidence
+     in the hands of candidates for Orders or of intelligent and
+     educated lay people who desire fuller instruction on the central
+     doctrines of the Faith than can be provided in sermons.'
+     --_Guardian_.
+
++FOREIGN MISSIONS+. By the Right Rev. E.T. CHURTON, D.D., formerly
+Bishop of Nassau.
+
+     'We welcome Bishop Churton's book as an authoritative exposition of
+     the modern High Church view of Missions, It is good for us all to
+     understand it, thereby we shall be saved alike from uninstructed
+     admiration and indiscriminate denunciation.'--_Church Missionary
+     Intelligencer_.
+
++PRAYER+. By the Rev. ARTHUR JOHN WORLLEDGE, M.A., Canon and Chancellor
+of Truro.                                             [_Second Edition_.
+
+     'We do not know of any book about prayer which is equally useful;
+     and we anticipate that it will be a standard work for, at any rate,
+     a considerable time.'--_Pilot_.
+
++SUNDAY+. By the Rev. W.B. TREVELYAN, M.A., Vicar of St. Matthew's,
+Westminster.                                          [_Second Edition_.
+
+     'An extremely useful contribution to a difficult and important
+     subject, and we are confident it will rank high in the series to
+     which it belongs.'--_Guardian_.
+
++THE CHRISTIAN TRADITION+. By the Rev. LEIGHTON PULLAN, M.A., Fellow of
+St. John Baptist's College, Oxford.
+
+     'Mr. Pullan affirms that the critics of orthodox Christianity are
+     now destroying one another's theories much more than they are
+     destroying the Catholic Faith. However that may be, his book should
+     render some assistance in determining what is and what is not "The
+     Faith once delivered to the Saints." It is a worthy addition to the
+     series to which it belongs.'--_Westminster Gazette_.
+
++BOOKS OF DEVOTION+. By the Rev. CHARLES BODINGTON, Canon and Precentor
+of Lichfield.
+
+     'Extremely valuable for its high tone, fidelity to Catholic
+     standards, and powerful advocacy of reality in private devotion. To
+     those who have never studied the subject, it should reveal a mine
+     of devotional wealth, yet to be worked with profit to man and glory
+     to God.'--_Church Times_.
+
++HOLY ORDERS+. By the Rev. A.R. WHITHAM, M.A., Principal of Culham
+College, Abingdon.
+
+     'For the educated layman who wishes to know what the Church is
+     teaching about the ministry, and what the relation of the laity to
+     it really is, this is the best book with which we have met. Young
+     men who are considering whether they will seek ordination will find
+     in it excellent statements on the position and work and
+     responsibilities of the ordained.'--_Pilot_.
+
++THE CHURCH CATECHISM THE CHRISTIAN'S MANUAL+. By the Rev. W.C.E.
+NEWBOLT, M.A., Canon and Chancellor of St. Paul's.
+
+     'We think the book should be in the possession of every teacher who
+     can afford it, and in every Church Library for the benefit of those
+     who cannot.'--_The Reader and Layworker_.
+
++THE HOLY COMMUNION+. By the Rev. DARWELL STONE, M.A., Librarian of the
+Pusey House, Oxford.
+
++RELIGIOUS CEREMONIAL+. By the Rev. WALTER HOWARD FRERE, M.A., of the
+Community of the Resurrection, Examining Chaplain to the Bishop of
+Rochester.                                            [_In preparation_.
+
++THE BIBLE+. By the Rev. DARWELL STONE, M.A., Librarian of the
+Pusey House, Oxford.                                  [_In preparation_.
+
++OLD TESTAMENT CRITICISM+. By the Very Rev. HENRY WACE, D.D., Dean of
+Canterbury.                                           [_In preparation_.
+
++NEW TESTAMENT CRITICISM+. By the Rev. R.J. KNOWLING, D.D., Professor of
+New Testament Exegesis at King's College, London.     [_In preparation_.
+
++THE HOLY TRINITY+. By the Right Rev. L.G. MYLNE, D.D., late Bishop of
+Bombay.                                               [_In preparation_.
+
++THE ANGLICAN CHURCH+. By the Rev. ARTHUR JOHN WORLLEDGE, M.A., Canon
+and Chancellor of Truro.                              [_In preparation_.
+
++THE ATONEMENT+. By the Rev. LEIGHTON PULLAN, M.A., Fellow of St. John
+Baptist's College, Oxford.                            [_In preparation_.
+
++CHURCH HISTORY+. By the Rev. H.N. BATE, M.A., Fellow of Magdalen
+College, Oxford. 2 vols.                              [_In preparation_.
+
++CHURCH WORK+. By the Rev. BERNARD REYNOLDS, M.A., Prebendary of St.
+Paul's.                                               [_In preparation_.
+
++VISITATION OF THE SICK+. By the Rev. E.F. RUSSELL, M.A., of St.
+Alban's, Holborn.                                     [_In preparation_.
+
+
++HANDBOOKS FOR THE CLERGY+
+
+EDITED BY THE REV. ARTHUR W. ROBINSON, B.D.
+
+VICAR OF ALLHALLOWS BARKING BY THE TOWER
+
+
+_Crown 8vo, price 2s. 6d. net each volume_.
+
+     The purpose of the writers of this Series is to present in a clear
+     and attractive way the responsibilities and opportunities of the
+     Clergy of to-day, and to offer such practical guidance, in regard
+     both to aims and to methods, as experience may have shown to be
+     valuable. It is hoped that the Series, while primarily intended for
+     those who are already face to face with the duties and problems of
+     the ministerial office, may be of interest and assistance also to
+     others who are considering the question of entering into Holy
+     Orders.
+
+THIRD IMPRESSION.
+
++THE PERSONAL LIFE OF THE CLERGY+. By the EDITOR.
+
+     'It is a short book, but it covers a wide, field. Every line of it
+     tells, and it is excellent reading. Not the least valuable part of
+     the book are the extremely apt and striking quotations from various
+     writers of eminence, which are placed in the form of notes at the
+     end of the chapters. It is emphatically a book for both clergy and
+     laity to buy and study.'--_Church Times_.
+
+     'We are grateful for a little book which will be of service to many
+     priests, young and old. We need more priests, and such a book may
+     well increase their number by explaining the nature of the life to
+     which a vocation to Holy Orders calls men; but we need still more
+     that priests should realise the life to which they are called and
+     pledged; and this they can hardly fail to do if they listen to Mr.
+     Robinson's prudent and tender counsels.'--_Church Quarterly
+     Review_.
+
+SECOND EDITION.
+
++PATRISTIC STUDY+. By the Rev. H.B. SWETE, D.D., Regius Professor of
+Divinity in the University of Cambridge.
+
+     'The whole of the work which this little volume contains is most
+     admirably done. Sufficient is told about the personal history of
+     the Fathers to make the study of their writings profitable.'
+     --_Church Quarterly Review_.
+
+     'This is an admirable little guide-book to wide study by one who
+     well knows how to guide. It is sound and learned, and crammed full
+     of information, yet pleasant in style and easy to understand.'
+     --_Pall Mall Gazette_.
+
+SECOND IMPRESSION.
+
++THE MINISTRY OF CONVERSION+. By the Rev. A.J. MASON, D.D., Master of
+Pembroke College, Cambridge, and Canon of Canterbury.
+
+     'It will be found most valuable and interesting.'--_Guardian_.
+
+     'Canon Mason has given a manual that should be carefully studied by
+     all, whether clergy or laity, who have in any way to share in the
+     "Ministry of Conversion" by preaching, by parochial organisation,
+     or by personal influence.'--_Scottish Guardian._
+
+THIRD IMPRESSION.
+
++FOREIGN MISSIONS+. By the Right Rev. H.H. MONTGOMERY, D.D., formerly
+Bishop of Tasmania, Secretary of the Society for the Propagation of the
+Gospel in Foreign Parts.
+
+     'Bishop Montgomery's admirable little book.... Into a limited
+     compass he has compressed the very kind of information which gives
+     one an adequate impression of the spirit which pervades a religion,
+     of what is its strength and weakness, what its relation to
+     Christianity, what, the side upon which it must be approached.'
+     _Church Quarterly Review_.
+
+THIRD IMPRESSION.
+
++THE STUDY OF THE GOSPELS+. By the Very Rev. J. ARMITAGE ROBINSON, D.D.,
+Dean of Westminster.
+
+     'Nothing could be more desirable than that the Anglican clergy
+     should be equipped with knowledge of the kind to which this little
+     volume will introduce them, and should regard the questions with
+     which Biblical study abounds in the candid spirit, and with the
+     breadth of view which they see here exemplified.'--_Spectator_.
+
+     'The little book on the Gospels, which the new Dean of Westminster
+     has recently published, is one to be warmly commended alike to
+     clergy and laity. Any intelligent person who takes the trouble to
+     work through this little volume of 150 pages will be rewarded by
+     gaining from it as clear a view of the synoptic problem as is
+     possible without prolonged and independent study of the
+     sources.'--_The Pilot_.
+
++A CHRISTIAN APOLOGETIC+. By the Very Rev. WILFORD L. ROBBINS, Dean of
+the General Theological Seminary, New York; Author of _An Essay toward
+Faith_.
+
+     'We commend this handbook with confidence as a helpful guide to
+     those clergy and teachers who have thoughtful doubters to deal with,
+     and who wish to build safely if they build at all.'--_Church of
+     Ireland Gazette._
+
++PASTORAL VISITATION+. By the Rev. H.E. SAVAGE, M.A., Vicar of South
+Shields, and Hon. Canon of Durham.
+
+     'This is an excellent book.'--_Spectator_.
+
++AUTHORITY IN THE CHURCH+. By the Very Rev. T.B. STRONG, D.D., Dean of
+Christ Church.
+
+     'This is a valuable and timely book, small in bulk, but weighty
+     both in style and substance.... The Dean's essay is an admirable
+     one, and is well calculated to clear men's minds in regard to
+     questions of very far-reaching importance. Its calm tone, and its
+     clear and penetrating thought, are alike characteristic of the
+     author, and give a peculiar distinction to everything he
+     writes.'--_Guardian_.
+
++THE STUDY OF ECCLESIASTICAL HISTORY+. By the Right Rev. W.E. COLLINS,
+D.D., Bishop of Gibraltar.
+
+     'A book which displays the master-mind on every page, and has what
+     many master-minds lack, a sober, practical, common-sense strain
+     about it, which is hardly ever found in those who set out to
+     instruct us in Church History, or Canon Law, or Catholic use.'
+     --_Church Bells_.
+
++LAY WORK AND THE OFFICE OF READER+. By the Right Rev. HUYSHE
+YEATMAN-BIGGS, D.D., Lord Bishop of Southwark.
+
++RELIGION AND SCIENCE+. By the Rev. P.N. WAGGETT, M.A., of the Society
+of St. John the Evangelist, Cowley.
+
++CHURCH MUSIC+. By A. MADELEY RICHARDSON, Mus. Doc., Organist of St.
+Saviour's Collegiate Church, Southwark.
+
++INTEMPERANCE+. By the Right Rev. H.H. PEREIRA, D.D., Bishop of Croydon.
+                                                      [_In preparation_.
+
++SCHOOLS+. By the Rev. W. FOXLEY NORRIS, M.A., Rector of Barnsley, and
+Hon. Canon of Wakefield.                              [_In preparation_.
+
+
+LONGMANS, GREEN, AND CO.
+LONDON, NEW YORK, AND BOMBAY
+
+
+
+
+
+
+End of Project Gutenberg's Thoughts on Religion, by George John Romanes
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