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diff --git a/old/17547-8.txt b/old/17547-8.txt new file mode 100644 index 0000000..59ced02 --- /dev/null +++ b/old/17547-8.txt @@ -0,0 +1,10859 @@ +The Project Gutenberg eBook, The Navy as a Fighting Machine, by Bradley A. +Fiske + + +This eBook is for the use of anyone anywhere at no cost and with +almost no restrictions whatsoever. You may copy it, give it away or +re-use it under the terms of the Project Gutenberg License included +with this eBook or online at www.gutenberg.org + + + + + +Title: The Navy as a Fighting Machine + + +Author: Bradley A. Fiske + + + +Release Date: January 18, 2006 [eBook #17547] + +Language: English + +Character set encoding: ISO-8859-1 + + +***START OF THE PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK THE NAVY AS A FIGHTING MACHINE*** + + +E-text prepared by Robert J. Hall + + + +Note: Project Gutenberg also has an HTML version of this + file which includes the original illustrations. + See 17547-h.htm or 17547-h.zip: + (https://www.gutenberg.org/dirs/1/7/5/4/17547/17547-h/17547-h.htm) + or + (https://www.gutenberg.org/dirs/1/7/5/4/17547/17547-h.zip) + + + + + +THE NAVY AS A FIGHTING MACHINE + +by + +REAR ADMIRAL BRADLEY A. FISKE +U. S. Navy + +Former Aid for Operations of the Fleet; President of the U. S. +Naval Institute; Gold Medallist of the U. S. Naval Institute and +The Franklin Institute of Pennsylvania + +Author of "Electricity in Theory and Practice," "War Time in Manila," +Etc. + +With Map + + + + + + + +PREFACE + +What is the navy for? + +Of what parts should it be composed? + +What principles should be followed in designing, preparing, and +operating it in order to get the maximum return for the money expended? + +To answer these questions clearly and without technical language +is the object of the book. + + BRADLEY A. FISKE. + + U. S. NAVAL WAR COLLEGE, +NEWPORT, R. I., September 3, 1916. + + + + +CONTENTS + + PART I + + GENERAL CONSIDERATIONS + + CHAPTER + I. WAR AND THE NATIONS + II. NAVAL A, B, C + III. NAVAL POWER + IV. NAVAL PREPAREDNESS + V. NAVAL DEFENSE + VI. NAVAL POLICY + + PART II + + NAVAL STRATEGY + + VII. GENERAL PRINCIPLES + VIII. DESIGNING THE MACHINE + IX. PREPARING THE ACTIVE FLEET + X. RESERVES AND SHORE STATIONS + XI. NAVAL BASES + XII. OPERATING THE MACHINE + + STRATEGIC MAP OF THE ATLANTIC AND PACIFIC OCEANS + + *** Chapters III and VII were published originally in _The U. S. + Naval Institute_; chapters I, II, IV, V, and VII in _The North + American Review_. + + + + +PART I + +GENERAL CONSIDERATIONS + + + + +CHAPTER I + +WAR AND THE NATIONS + +Because the question is widely discussed, whether peace throughout +the world may be attained by the friendly co-operation of many +nations, and because a nation's attitude toward this question may +determine its future prosperity or ruin, it may be well to note +what has been the trend of the nations hitherto, and whether any +forces exist that may reasonably be expected to change that trend. +We may then be able to induce from facts the law which that trend +obeys, and make a reasonable deduction as to whether or not the +world is moving toward peace. If we do this we shall follow the +inductive method of modern science, and avoid the error (with its +perilous results) of first assuming the law and then deducing +conclusions from it. + +Men have always been divided into organizations, the first organization +being the family. As time went on families were formed into tribes, +for self-protection. The underlying cause for the organization was +always a desire for strength; sometimes for defense, sometimes +for offense, usually for both. + +At times tribes joined in alliance with other tribes to attain a +common end, the alliance being brought about by peaceful agreement, +and usually ceasing after the end had been attained, or missed, or +when tribal jealousies forbade further common effort. Sometimes +tribes joined to form one larger tribe; the union being either +forced on a weaker by a stronger tribe, or caused by a desire to +secure a strength greater and more lasting than mere alliance can +insure. + +In the same way, and apparently according to similar laws, sovereign +states or nations were formed from tribes; and in later years, by +the union of separate states. The states or nations have become +larger and larger as time has gone on; greater numbers, not only +of people but of peoples, living in the same general localities +and having hereditary ties, joining to form a nation. + +Though the forms of government of these states or nations are numerous, +and though the conceptions of people as to the purposes and functions +of the state vary greatly, we find that one characteristic of a +state has always prevailed among all the states and nations of the +world--the existence of an armed military force, placed under the +control of its government; the purpose of this armed force being +to enable the government not only to carry on its administration +of internal matters, but also to exert itself externally against +the armed force of another state. + +This armed force has been a prominent factor in the life of every +sovereign state and independent tribe, from history's beginning, +and is no less a factor now. No instance can be found of a sovereign +state without its appropriate armed force, to guard its sovereignty, +and preserve that freedom from external control, without which +freedom it ceases to exist as a sovereign state. + +The armed force has always been a matter of very great expense. It +has always required the anxious care of the government and the people. +The men comprising it have always been subjected to restraint and +discipline, compelled to undergo hardships and dangers greater than +those of civil life, and developed by a training highly specialized +and exacting. + +The armed force in every state has had not only continuous existence +always, but continuous, potential readiness, if not continuous +employment; and the greatest changes in the mutual relations of +nations have been brought about by the victory of the armed force +of one state over the armed force of another state. This does not +mean that the fundamental causes of the changes have been physical, +for they have been psychological, and have been so profound and so +complex as to defy analysis; but it does mean that the actual and +immediate instrument producing the changes has been physical force; +that physical force and physical courage acting in conjunction, +of which conjunction war is the ultimate expression, have always +been the most potent instruments in the dealings of nations with +each other. + +Is there any change toward peaceful methods now? + +No, on the contrary; war is recognized as the most potent method +still; the prominence of military matters is greater than ever +before; at no time in the past has interest in war been so keen +as at the present, or the expenditure of blood and money been so +prodigal; at no time before has war so thoroughly engaged the intellect +and energy of mankind. + +In other words, the trend of the nations has been toward a clearer +recognition of the efficacy of military power, and an increasing +use of the instrumentality of war. + +This does not mean that the trend of the nations has been regular; +for, on the contrary, it has been spasmodic. If one hundred photographs +of the map of Europe could be taken, each photograph representing +in colors the various countries as they appeared upon the map at +one hundred different times, and if those hundred photographs could +be put on films and shown as a moving-picture on a screen, the +result would resemble the shifting colored pieces in a kaleidoscope. +Boundaries advanced and receded, then advanced again; tribes and +nations moved their homes from place to place; empires, kingdoms, +principalities, duchies, and republics flourished brilliantly for a +while, and then went out; many peoples struggled for an autonomous +existence, but hardly a dozen acquired enough territory or mustered +a sufficiently numerous population to warrant their being called +"great nations." Of those that were great nations, only three have +endured as great nations for eight hundred years; and the three +that have so endured are the three greatest in Europe now--the +French, the British, and the German. + +Some of the ancient empires continued for long periods. The history +of practical, laborious, and patient China is fairly complete and +clear for more than two thousand years before our era; and of dreamy, +philosophic India for almost as long, though in far less authentic +form. Egypt existed as a nation, highly military, artistic, and +industrious, as her monuments show, for perhaps four thousand years; +when she was forced by the barbarians of Persia into a condition +of dependence, from which she has never yet emerged. The time of +her greatness in the arts and sciences of peace was the time of her +greatest military power; and her decline in the arts and sciences +of peace accompanied her decline in those of war. Assyria, with +her two capitals, Babylon and Nineveh, flourished splendidly for +about six centuries, and was then subdued by the Persians under +Cyrus, after the usual decline. The little kingdom of the Hebrews, +hardy and warlike under Saul and David, luxurious and effeminate +under Solomon, lasted but little more than a hundred years. Persia, +rising rapidly by military means from the barbarian state, lived +a brilliant life of conquest, cultivated but little those arts of +peace that hold in check the passions of a successful military +nation, yielded rapidly to the seductions of luxury, and fell abruptly +before the Macedonian Alexander, lasting less than two hundred +and fifty years. Macedonia, trained under Philip, rose to great +military power under Alexander, conquered in twelve years the ten +most wealthy and populous countries of the world--nearly the whole +known world; but fell to pieces almost instantly when Alexander +died. The cities of Greece enjoyed a rare pre-eminence both in +the arts and sciences of peace and in military power, but only +for about one hundred and fifty years: falling at last before the +superior military force of Macedon, after neglecting the practice +of the military arts, and devoting themselves to art, learning, +and philosophy. Rome as a great nation lasted about five hundred +years; and the last three centuries of her life after the death +of Commodus, about 192 A. D., illustrate curiously the fact that, +even if a people be immoral, cruel, and base in many ways, their +existence as an independent state may be continued long, if military +requirements be understood, and if the military forces be preserved +from the influence of the effeminacy of the nation as a whole. In +Rome, the army was able to maintain a condition of considerable +manliness, relatively to the people at large, and thus preserve +internal order and keep the barbarians at bay for nearly three +hundred years; and at the same time exert a powerful and frequently +deciding influence in the government. But the effeminacy of the +people, especially of those in the higher ranks, made them the +creatures of the army that protected them. In some cases, the Emperor +himself was selected by the army, or by the Pretorian Guard in Rome; +and sometimes the guard removed an Emperor of whom it disapproved +by the simple expedient of killing him. + +After the fall of the Western Empire in 476, when Rome was taken by +Odoacer, a condition of confusion, approaching anarchy, prevailed +throughout Europe, until Charlemagne founded his empire, about 800 +A. D., except that Constantinople was able to stand up against all +outside assaults and hold the Eastern Empire together. Charlemagne's +empire united under one government nearly all of what is now France, +Germany, Austria, Italy, Belgium, and Holland. The means employed by +Charlemagne to found his empire were wholly military, though means +other than military were instituted to preserve it. He endeavored +by just government, wise laws, and the encouragement of religion +and of education of all kinds to form a united people. The time +was not ripe, however; and Charlemagne's empire fell apart soon +after Charlemagne expired. + +The rapid rise and spread of the Mohammedan religion was made possible +by the enthusiasm with which Mahomet imbued his followers, but the +actual founding of the Arabian Empire was due wholly to military +conquest, achieved by the fanatic Mussulmans who lived after him. +After a little more than a hundred years, the empire was divided +into two caliphates. Brilliant and luxurious courts were thereafter +held by caliphs at Bagdad and Cordova, with results similar to +those in Egypt, Persia, Assyria, and Rome; the people becoming +effeminate, employed warriors to protect them, and the warriors +became their masters. Then, effeminacy spreading even to the warriors, +strength to resist internal disorders as well as external assaults +gradually faded, and both caliphates fell. + +From the death of Charlemagne until the fall of Constantinople, in +1453, the three principal nations of Europe were those of France, +Germany, and England. Until that time, and dating from a time shortly +before the fall of Rome, Europe was in perpetual turmoil--owing +not only to conflicts between nations, but to conflicts between +the Church of Rome and the civil power of the Kings and Emperors, +to conflicts among the feudal lords, and to conflicts between the +sovereigns and the feudal lords. The power of the Roman Church was +beneficent in checking a too arrogant and military tendency, and +was the main factor in preventing an utter lapse back to barbarism. + +The end of the Middle Ages and the beginning of what are usually +called "Modern Times" found only four great countries in the +world--France, Germany, Spain, and England. Of these Spain dropped +out in the latter part of the sixteenth century. The other three +countries still stand, though none of them lies within exactly +the same boundaries as when modern times began; and Austria, which +was a part of Germany then, is now--with Hungary--a separate state +and nation. + +This very brief survey of history shows that every great nation +has started from a small beginning and risen sometimes gradually, +sometimes rapidly to greatness; and then fallen, sometimes gradually, +sometimes rapidly, to mediocrity, dependence, or extinction; that +the instrument which has effected the rise has always been military +power, usually exerted by armies on the land, sometimes by navies +on the sea; and that the instrument which has effected the actual +fall has always been the military power of an adversary. In other +words, _the immediate instrument that has decided the rise and +the fall of nations has been military power_. + +That this should have been so need not surprise us, since nations +have always been composed of human beings, influenced by the same +hopes and fears and governed by the same laws of human nature. And +as the most potent influence that could be brought to bear upon +a man was a threat against his life, and as it was the province of +military power to threaten life, it was unavoidable that military +power should be the most potent influence that could be brought +to bear upon a nation. + +The history of the world has been in the main a history of war +and a narrative of wars. No matter how far back we go, the same +horrible but stimulating story meets our eyes. In ancient days, +when every weapon was rude, and manipulated by one man only, the +injury a single weapon could do was small, the time required for +preparation was but brief, and the time required for recuperation +after war was also brief. At that time, military power was almost +the sole element in the longevity of a tribe, or clan, or nation; +and the warriors were the most important men among the people. +But as civilization increased, the life not only of individuals +but of nations became more complex, and warriors had to dispute +with statesmen, diplomatists, poets, historians, and artists of +various types, the title to pre-eminence. Yet even in savage tribes +and even in the conduct of savage wars, the value of wisdom and +cunning was perceived, and the stimulating aid of the poet and +the orator was secured. The relative value of men of war and men +of peace depended during each period on the conditions prevailing +then--in war, warriors held the stage; in peace, statesmen and +artists had their day. + +Naturally, during periods when war was the normal condition, the +warrior was the normal pillar of the state. In how great a proportion +of the time that history describes, war was the normal condition +and peace the abnormal, few realize now in our country, because +of the aloofness of the present generation from even the memory +of war. Our last great war ended in 1865; and since then only the +light and transient touch of the Spanish War has been laid upon +us. Even that war ended seventeen years ago and since then only +the distant rumblings of battles in foreign lands have been borne +across the ocean to our ears. + +These rumblings have disturbed us very little. Feeling secure behind +the 3,000-mile barrier of the ocean, we have lent an almost incredulous +ear to the story that they tell and the menace that they bear; +though the story of the influence of successful and unsuccessful +wars upon the rise and fall of nations is told so harshly and so +loudly that, in order not to hear it, one must tightly stop his +ears. + +That war has not been the only factor, however, in the longevity of +nations is obviously true; and it is also true that nations which +have developed the warlike arts alone have never even approximated +greatness. In all complex matters, in all processes of nature and +human nature, many elements are present, and many factors combine +to produce a given result. Man is a very complex individual, and +the more highly he is developed the more complex he becomes. A +savage is mainly an animal; but the civilized and highly educated +man is an animal on whose elemental nature have been superposed +very highly organized mental, moral, and spiritual natures. Yet +even a savage of the most primitive or warlike character has an +instinctive desire for rest and softness and beauty, and loves +a primitive music; and even the most highly refined and educated +gentleman raises his head a little higher, and draws his breath a +little deeper, when war draws near. Thus in the breast of every man +are two opposing forces; one urging him to the action and excitement +of war, the other to the comparative inaction and tranquillity of +peace. On the side that urges war, we see hate, ambition, courage, +energy, and strength; on the side that urges peace we see love, +contentment, cowardice, indolence, and weakness. We see arrayed for +war the forceful faults and virtues; for peace the gentle faults +and virtues. Both the forceful and the gentle qualities tend to +longevity in certain ways and tend to its prevention in other ways; +but history clearly shows that the _forceful qualities have tended +more to the longevity of nations than the gentle_. If ever two +nations, or two tribes, have found themselves contiguous, one forceful +and the other not, the forceful one has usually, if not always, +obtained the mastery over the other, and therefore has outlived +it. If any cow and any lion have found themselves alone together, +the lion has outlived the cow. + +It is true that the mere fact of being a lion has not insured long +life, and that the mere fact of being a cow has not precluded it; +and some warlike tribes and nations have not lived so long as tribes +and nations of softer fibre. This seems to have been due, however, +either to the environments in which the two have lived, or to the +fact that the softer nation has had available some forces that +the other did not have. The native Indians of North America were +more warlike than the colonists from Europe that landed on their +shores; but the Indians were armed with spears and arrows, and +the colonists with guns. + +Now, those guns were the product of the arts of peace; no nation +that had pursued a warlike life exclusively could have produced them +or invented the powder that discharged them. This fact indicates what +a thousand other facts of history also indicate, that civilization +and the peaceful arts contribute to the longevity of nations--not only +by promoting personal comfort, and by removing causes of internal +strife, and thus enabling large bodies of people to dwell together +happily, but also by increasing their military power. Every nation +which has achieved greatness has cultivated assiduously both the +arts of peace and the arts of war. Every nation which has long +maintained that greatness has done so by maintaining the policy +by which she acquired it. _Every nation that has attained and then +lost greatness, has lost it by losing the proper balance between the +military and the peaceful arts; never by exalting unduly the military, +but always by neglecting them, and thereby becoming vulnerable to +attack_. + +In other words, the history of every great nation that has declined +shows three periods, the rise, the table-land of greatness, and +the decline. During the rise, the military arts hold sway; on the +table-land, the arts of peace and war are fairly balanced; during +the decline the peaceful arts hold sway. _Facilis descensus Averni_. +The rise is accomplished by expending energy, for which accomplishment +the possession of energy is the first necessity; the height of +the table-land attained represents the amount of energy expended; +the length of time that the nation maintains itself upon this +table-land, before starting on the inevitable descent therefrom, +represents her staying power and constitutes her longevity as a +great nation. + +How long shall any nation stay upon the table-land? As long as +she continues to adapt her life wisely to her environment; as long +as she continues to be as wise as she was while climbing up; for +while climbing, she had not only to exert force, she had also to +guide the force with wisdom. So we see that, in the ascent, a nation +has to use both force and wisdom; on the table-land, wisdom; in +the decline, neither. Among the nations of antiquity one might +suppose that, because of the slowness of transportation and +communication, and the feebleness of weapons compared with those +of modern days, much longer periods of time would be required for +the rise of any nation, and also a longer period before her descent +began. Yet the vast empire of Alexander lasted hardly a day after +he expired, and the Grecian cities maintained their greatness but +a century and a half; while Great Britain, France, and Germany +have been great nations for nearly a thousand years. + +Why have they endured longer than the others? + +The answer is hard to find; because many causes, and some of them +obscure, have contributed to the result. But, as we observe the +kind of constitution and the mode of life of long-lived people, +in order to ascertain what kind of constitution and mode of life +conduce to longevity in people, so perhaps we may logically do +the same with nations. + +Observing the constitution and mode of life of the British, French, +and German nations, we are struck at once with the fact that those +peoples have been by constitution active, ambitious, intelligent, +and brave; and that they have observed in their national life a +skilfully balanced relation between the arts of peace and the arts +of war; neglecting neither and allowing neither to wax great at the +expense of the other. In all those countries the _first_ aim has +been protection from both external attack and internal disorder. +Protection from external attack has been gained by military force +and highly trained diplomacy; protection from internal disorder +has been gained _first_ by military force, and _second_ by wise +laws, just courts, and the encouragement of religion and of those +arts and sciences that lead to comfort and happiness in living. + +China may attract the attention of some as an instance of longevity; +but is China a nation in the usual meaning of the word? Certainly, +she is not a great nation. It is true that no other nation has +actually conquered her of late; but this has been largely by reason +of her remoteness from the active world, and because other nations +imposed their will upon her, without meeting any resistance that +required the use of war to overcome. And even China has not lived +a wholly peaceful life, despite the non-military character of her +people. Her whole history was one of wars, like that of other nations, +until the middle of the fourteenth century of our era. Since then, +she has had four wars, in all of which she has been whipped: one in +the seventeenth century when the country was successfully invaded, +and the native dynasty was overthrown by the Tartars of Manchuria; +one in 1840, when Great Britain compelled her to cede Hong-Kong +and to open five ports to foreign commerce, through which ports +opium could be introduced; one in 1860, with Great Britain and +France, that resulted in the capture of Pekin; and one with Japan +in 1894. Since that time (as well as before) China has been the +scene of revolutions and wide-spread disturbances, so that, even +though a peace-loving and non-resisting nation, peace has not reigned +within her borders. The last dynasty was overthrown in 1912. Since +then a feeble republic has dragged on a precarious existence, +interrupted by the very short reign of Yuan Shih K'ai. + +This brief consideration of the trend of people up to the present +time seems to show that, owing to the nature of man himself, especially +to the nature of large "crowds" of men, the direction in which +nations have been moving hitherto has not been toward increasing +the prevalence of peace, but rather toward increasing the methods, +instruments, and areas of war; furthermore, that this direction of +movement has been necessary, in order to achieve and to maintain +prosperity in any nation. + +This being the case, what forces exist that may reasonably be expected +to change that trend? + +Three main forces are usually mentioned: Civilization, Commerce, +Christianity. + +Before considering these it may be well to note Newton's first law +of motion, that every body will continue in a state of rest or of +uniform motion in a straight line unless acted on by some external +force; for though this law was affirmed of material bodies, yet its +applicability to large groups of men is striking and suggestive. +Not only do human beings have the physical attributes of weight and +inertia like other material bodies, but their mental organism, +while of a higher order than the physical, is as powerfully affected +by external forces. And though it is true that psychology has not +yet secured her Newton, and that no one has yet formulated a law +that expresses exactly the action of the minds and spirits of men +under the influence of certain mental and moral stimuli or forces, +yet we know that our minds and spirits are influenced by fear, +hope, ambition, hate, and so forth, in ways that are fairly well +understood and toward results that often can be predicted in advance. + +Our whole theory of government and our laws of business and every-day +life are founded on the belief that men are the same to-day as +they were yesterday, and that they will be the same to-morrow. The +whole science of psychology is based on the observed and recorded +actions of the human organism under the influence of certain external +stimuli or forces, and starts from the assumption that this organism +has definite and permanent characteristics. If this is not so--if +the behavior of men in the past has not been governed by actual +laws which will also govern their behavior in the future--then +our laws of government are built on error, and the teachings of +psychology are foolish. + +This does not mean that any man will necessarily act in the same +way to-morrow as he did yesterday, when subjected to the influence +of the same threat, inducement, or temptation; because, without +grappling the thorny question of free will, we realize that a man's +action is never the result of only one stimulus and motive, but +is the resultant of many; and we have no reason to expect that +he will act in the same way when subjected to the same stimulus, +unless we know that the internal and external conditions pertaining +to him are also the same. Furthermore, even if we cannot predict what +a certain individual will do, when exposed to a certain external +influence, because of some differences in his mental and physical +condition, on one occasion in comparison with another, yet when we +consider large groups of men, we know that individual peculiarities, +permanent and temporary, balance each other in great measure; that +the average condition of a group of men is less changeable than +that of one man, and that the degree of permanency of condition +increases with the number of men in the group. From this we may +reasonably conclude that, if we know the character of a man--or a +group of men--and if we know also the line of action which he--or +they-have followed in the past, we shall be able to predict his--or +their--line of action in the future with considerable accuracy; +and that the accuracy will increase with the number of men in the +group, and the length of time during which they have followed the +known line of action. Le Bon says: "Every race carries in its mental +constitution the laws of its destiny." + +Therefore, the line of action that the entire human race has followed +during the centuries of the past is a good index--or at least the +best index that we have--to its line of action during the centuries +of the future. + +Now, men have been on this earth for many years; and history and +psychology teach us that in their intercourse with each other, +their conduct has been caused by a combination of many forces, +among which are certain powerful forces that tend to create strife. +The strongest by far of these forces is the _ego_ in man himself, +a quality divinely implanted which makes a man in a measure +self-protecting. This ego prompts a man not only to seek pleasure +and avoid trouble for himself, but also to gain superiority, and, +if possible, the mastery over his fellow men. Men being placed in +life in close juxtaposition to each other, the struggles of each +man to advance his own interests produce rivalries, jealousies, +and conflicts. + +Similarly with nations. Nations have been composed for the most +part of people having an heredity more or less common to them all, +so that they are bound together as great clans. From this it has +resulted that nations have been jealous of each other and have +combated each other. They have been doing this since history began, +and are doing it as much as ever now. + +In fact, mankind have been in existence for so many centuries, +and their physical, moral, mental, and spiritual characteristics +were so evidently implanted in them by the Almighty, that it seems +difficult to see how any one, except the Almighty himself, can +change these characteristics and their resulting conduct. It is +a common saying that a man cannot lift himself over the fence by +his boot straps, though he can jump over the fence, if it is not +too high. This saying recognizes the fact that "a material system +can do no work on itself"; but needs external aid. When a man pulls +upward on his boot straps, the upward force that he exerts is exactly +balanced by the downward reaction exerted by his boot straps; but +when he jumps, the downward thrust of his legs causes an equal +reaction of the earth, which exerts a direct force upward upon +the man; and it is this external force that moves him over the +fence. It is this external force, the reaction of the earth or +air or water, which moves every animal that walks, or bird that +flies, or fish that swims. It is the will of the Almighty, acting +through the various stimuli of nature, that causes the desire to +walk, and all the emotions and actions of men. If He shall cause +any new force to act on men, their line of conduct will surely +change. But if He does not--how can it change, or be changed; how +can the human race turn about, by means of its own power only, and +move in a direction the reverse from that in which it has been +moving throughout all the centuries of the past? + +These considerations seem to indicate that nations, regarded in +their relation toward each other, will go on in the direction in +which they have been going unless acted upon by some external force. + +Will civilization, commerce, or Christianity impart that force? + +Inasmuch as civilization is merely a condition in which men live, and +an expression of their history, character and aims, it is difficult +to see how it could of itself act as an external force, or cause an +external force to act. "Institutions and laws," says Le Bon, again, +"are the outward manifestation of our character, the expression of +its needs. Being its outcome, institutions and laws cannot change +this character." + +Even if the civilization of a given nation may have been brought +about in some degree by forces external to that nation, yet it is +clear that we must regard that civilization rather as the result of +those forces than as a force itself. Besides, civilization has never +yet made the relations of nations with each other more unselfish, +civilized nations now and in the past, despite their veneer of +courtesy, being fully as jealous of each other as the most savage +tribes. That this should be so seems natural; because civilization +has resulted mainly from the attempts of individuals and groups to +enhance the pleasures and diminish the ills of life, and therefore +cannot tend to unselfishness in either individuals or nations. +Civilization in the past has not operated to soften the relations +of nations with each other, so why should it do so now? Is not +modern civilization, with its attendant complexities, rivalries, +and jealousies, provocative of quarrels rather than the reverse? In +what respect is modern civilization better than past civilization, +except in material conveniences due to material improvements in the +mechanic arts? Are we any more artistic, strong, or beautiful than +the Greeks in their palmy days? Are we braver than the Spartans, +more honest than the Chinese, more spiritual than the Hindoos, +more religious than the Puritans? Is not the superior civilization +of the present day a mechanical civilization pure and simple? And +has not the invention of electrical and mechanical appliances, +with the resulting insuring of communication and transportation, +and the improvements in instruments of destruction, advantaged +the great nations more than the weaker ones, and increased the +temptation to great nations to use force rather than decreased +it? Do not civilization's improvements in weapons of destruction +augment the effectiveness of warlike methods, as compared with +the peaceful methods of argument and persuasion? + +Diplomacy is an agency of civilization that was invented to avoid +war, to enable nations to accommodate themselves to each other +without going to war; but, practically, diplomacy seems to have +caused almost as many wars as it has averted. And even if it be +granted that the influence of diplomacy has been in the main for +peace rather than for war, we know that diplomacy has been in use +for centuries, that its resources are well understood, and that +they have all been tried out many times; and therefore we ought +to realize clearly that diplomacy cannot introduce any new force +into international politics now, or exert, an influence for peace +that will be more potent in the future than the influence that +it has exerted in the past. + +These considerations seem to show that we cannot reasonably expect +civilization to divert nations from the path they have followed +hitherto. + +Can commerce impart the external force necessary to divert nations +from that path? + +Since commerce bears exactly the same relation to nations now as +in times past, and since it is an agency within mankind itself, it +is difficult to see how it can act as an external force, or cause +an external force to be applied. Of course, commercial interests +are often opposed to national interests, and improvements in speed +and sureness of communication and transportation increase the size +and power of commercial organizations. But the same factors increase +the power of governments and the solidarity of nations. At no time +in the past has there been more national feeling in nations than +now. Even the loosely held provinces of China are forming a Chinese +nation. Despite the fundamental commercialism of the age, national +spirit is growing more intense, the present war being the main +intensifying cause. It is true that the interests of commerce are +in many ways antagonistic to those of war. But, on the other hand, +of all the causes that occasion war the economic causes are the +greatest. For no thing will men fight more savagely than for money; +for no thing have men fought more savagely than for money; and the +greater the rivalry, the more the man's life becomes devoted to +it, and the more fiercely he will fight to get or keep it. Surely +of all the means by which we hope to avoid war, the most hopeless +by far is commerce. + +The greatest of all hopes is in Christianity, because of its inculcation +of love and kindliness, its obvious influence on the individual +in cultivating unselfishness and other peaceful virtues, and the +fact that it is an inspiration from on high, and therefore a force +external to mankind. But let us look the facts solemnly in the +face that the Christian religion has now been in effect for nearly +two thousand years; that the nations now warring are Christian +nations, in the very foremost rank of Christendom; that never in +history has there been so much bloodshed in such wide-spread areas +and so much hate, and that we see no signs that Christianity is +employing any influence that she has not been employing for nearly +two thousand years. + +If we look for the influence of Christianity, we can find it in +the daily lives of people, in the family, in business, in politics, +and in military bodies; everywhere, in fact, in Christian countries, +so long as we keep inside of any organization the members of which +feel bound together. This we must all admit, even the heathen know +it; but where do we see any evidence of the sweetening effect of +Christianity in the dealings of one organization with another with +which it has no special bonds of friendship? Christianity is invoked +in every warring nation now to stimulate the patriotic spirit of +the nation and intensify the hate of the crowd against the enemy; +and even if we think that such invoking is a perversion of religious +influence to unrighteous ends, we must admit the fact that the +Christian religion itself is at this moment being made to exert +a powerful influence--not toward peace but toward war! And this +should not amaze us; for where does the Bible say or intimate that +love among nations will ever be brought about? The Saviour said: +"I bring not peace but a sword." So what reasonable hope does even +Christianity give us that war between nations will cease? And even if +it did give reasonable hope, let us realize that between reasonable +hope and reasonable expectation there is a great gulf fixed. + +Therefore, we seem forced to the conclusion that the world will move +in the future in the same direction as in the past; that nations +will become larger and larger and fewer and fewer, the immediate +instrument of international changes being war; and that certain +nations will become very powerful and nearly dominate the earth +in turn, as Persia, Greece, Rome, Spain, France, and Great Britain +have done--and as some other country soon may do. + +Fortunately, or perhaps unfortunately, a certain law of decadence +seems to have prevailed, because of which every nation, after acquiring +great power, has in turn succumbed to the enervating effects which +seem inseparable from it, and become the victim of some newer nation +that has made strenuous preparations for long years, in secret, +and finally pounced upon her as a lion on its prey. + +Were it not for this tendency to decadence, we should expect that +the nations of the earth would ultimately be divided into two great +nations, and that these would contend for the mastery in a world-wide +struggle. + +But if the present rate of invention and development continues, +improvements in the mechanic arts will probably cause such increase +in the power of weapons of destruction, and in the swiftness and +sureness of transportation and communication, that some _monster +of efficiency_ will have time to acquire world mastery before her +period of decadence sets in. + +In this event, wars will be of a magnitude besides which the present +struggle will seem pygmy; and will rage over the surface of the +earth, for the gaining and retaining of the mastery of the world. + + + + +CHAPTER II + +NAVAL A, B, C + +In order to realize what principles govern the use of navies, let +us first consider what navies have to do and get history's data +as to what navies in the past have done. It would obviously be +impossible to recount here all the doings of navies. But neither +is it necessary; for the reason that, throughout the long periods +of time in which history records them, their activities have nearly +always been the same. + +In all cases in which navies have been used for war there was the +preliminary dispute, often long-continued, between two peoples or +their rulers, and at last the decision of the dispute by force. In +all cases the decision went to the side that could exert the most +force at the critical times and places. The fact that the causes +of war have been civil, and not military, demands consideration, for +the reason that some people, confusing cause and effect, incline +to the belief that armies and navies are the cause of war, and that +they are to be blamed for its horrors. History clearly declares +the contrary, and shows that the only rôle of armies and navies +has been to wage wars, and, by waging, to finish them. + +It may be well here, in order to clear away a possible preconception +by the reader, to try and dispel the illusion that army and navy +officers are eager for war, in order that they may get promotion. +This idea has been exploited by people opposed to the development +of the army and navy, and has been received with so much credulity +that it seriously handicaps the endeavors of officers to get an +unbiassed hearing. But surely the foolishness of such an idea would +promptly disappear from the brain of any one if he would remind +himself that simply because a man joins the army or navy he does +not cease to be a human being, with the same emotions of fear as +other men, the same sensitiveness to pain, the same dread of death, +and the same horror of leaving his family unsupported after his +death. It is true that men in armies and navies are educated to +dare death if need be; but the present writer has been through +two wars, has been well acquainted with army and navy officers for +forty-five years, and knows positively that, barring exceptions, +they do not desire war at all. + +Without going into an obviously impossible discussion of all naval +wars, it may be instructive to consider briefly the four naval +wars in which the United States has engaged. + +The first was the War of the American Revolution. This war is +instructive to those who contend that the United States is so far +from Europe as to be safe from attack by a European fleet; because +the intervening distance was frequently traversed then by British +and French fleets of frail, slow, sailing ships, which were vital +factors in the war. Without the British war-ships, the British +could not have landed and supported their troops. Without the French +war-ships the French could not have landed and supported their +troops, who, under Rochambeau, were also under Washington, and +gave him the assistance that he wofully needed, to achieve by arms +our independence. + +The War of 1812 is instructive from the fact that, though the actions +of our naval ships produced little material effect, the skill, +daring, and success with which they were fought convinced Europeans +of the high character and consequent noble destiny of the American +people. The British were so superior in sea strength, however, +that they were able to send their fleet across the ocean and land +a force on the shores of Chesapeake Bay. This force marched to +Washington, attacked the city, and burned the Capitol and other +public buildings, with little inconvenience to itself. + +The War of the Rebellion is instructive because it shows how two +earnest peoples, each believing themselves right, can be forced, +by the very sincerity of their convictions, to wage war against +each other; and because it shows how unpreparedness for war, with +its accompanying ignorance of the best way in which to wage it, +causes undue duration of a war and therefore needless suffering. +If the North had not closed its eyes so resolutely to the fact +of the coming struggle, it would have noted beforehand that the +main weakness of the Confederacy lay in its dependence on revenue +from cotton and its inability to provide a navy that could prevent +a blockade of its coasts; and the North would have early instituted +a blockade so tight that the Confederacy would have been forced +to yield much sooner than it did. The North would have made naval +operations the main effort, instead of the auxiliary effort; and +would have substituted for much of the protracted and bloody warfare +of the land the quickly decisive and comparatively merciful warfare +of the sea. + +In the Spanish War the friction between the United States and Spain +was altogether about Cuba. No serious thought of the invasion of +either country was entertained, no invasion was attempted, and +the only land engagements were some minor engagements in Cuba and +the Philippines. The critical operations were purely naval. In the +first of these, Commodore Dewey's squadron destroyed the entire +Far Eastern squadron of the Spanish in Manila Bay; in the second, +Admiral Sampson's squadron destroyed the entire Atlantic squadron of +the Spanish near Santiago de Cuba. The two naval victories compelled +Spain to make terms of peace practically as the United States wished. +Attention is invited to the fact that this war was not a war of +conquest, was not a war of aggression, was not a war of invasion, +was not a war carried on by either side for any base purpose; but +was in its intention and its results for the benefit of mankind. + +The Russo-Japanese War was due to conflicting national policies. +While each side accused the other of selfish ends, it is not apparent +to a disinterested observer that either was unduly selfish in its +policy, or was doing more than every country ought to advance the +interests and promote the welfare of its people. Russia naturally +had a great deal of interest in Manchuria, and felt that she had +a right to expand through the uncivilized regions of Manchuria, +especially since she needed a satisfactory outlet to the sea. In +other words, the interests of Russia were in the line of its expanding +to the eastward. But Japan's interests were precisely the reverse of +Russia's--that is, Japan's interests demanded that Russia should not +do those things that Russia wanted to do. Japan felt that Russia's +movement toward the East was bringing her entirely too close to +Japan. Russia was too powerful a country, and too aggressive, to +be trusted so close. Japan had the same feeling toward Russia that +any man might have on seeing another man, heavily armed, gradually +coming closer to him in the night. Japan especially wished that +Russia should have no foothold in Corea, feeling, as she expressed +it, that the point of Corea under Russian power would be a dagger +directed at the heart of Japan. This feeling about Corea was the +same feeling that every country has about land near her; it has +a marked resemblance to the feeling that the United States has +embodied in Monroe Doctrine. + +After several years of negotiation in which Japan and Russia endeavored +to secure their respective aims by diplomacy, diplomacy was finally +abandoned and the sword taken up instead. Japan, _because of the +superior foresight of her statesmen_, was the first to realize +that diplomacy must fail, was the first to realize that she must +prepare for war, was the first to begin adequate preparation for +war, was the first to complete preparation for war, was the first +to strike, and in consequence was the victor. Yet Russia was a +very much larger, richer, more populous country than Japan. + +Russia sent large forces of soldiers to Manchuria by the trans-Siberian +railroad, and Japan sent large forces there by transports across the +Sea of Japan. Japan could not prevent the passage of soldiers by +the railroad, but Russia could prevent the passage of transports +across the Japan Sea, provided her fleet could overcome the Japanese +fleet and get command of the sea. Russia had a considerable fleet +in the Far East; but she had so underestimated the naval ability +of the Japanese, that the Russian fleet proved unequal to the task; +and the Japanese gradually reduced it to almost nothing, with very +little loss to themselves. + +Russia then sent out another fleet. The Japanese met this fleet on +the 27th of May, 1904, near the Island of Tsushima, between Corea +and Japan. The battle was decided in about an hour. The Japanese +sank practically all the Russian ships before the battle was entirely +finished, with comparatively small loss to Japan. This battle was +carried on 12,000 miles by sea route from Saint Petersburg. No +invasion of Russia or Japan was contemplated, or attempted, and +yet the naval battle decided the issue of the war completely, and +was followed by a treaty of peace very shortly afterward. + +These wars show us, as do all wars in which navies have engaged, +that the function of a navy is not only to defend the coast in +the sense of preventing an enemy from landing on it, but also to +exert force far distant from the coast. The study of war has taught +its students for many centuries that a merely passive defense will +finally be broken down, and that the most effective defense is +the "offensive-defensive." + +Perhaps the clearest case of a correct offensive-defensive is Nelson's +defense of England, which he carried on in the Mediterranean, in +the West Indies, and wherever the enemy fleet might be, finally +defeating Napoleon's plan for invading England--not by waiting off +the coast of England, but by attacking and crippling Napoleon's +fleet off the Spanish coast near Trafalgar. + +The idea held by many people that the defense of a country can +be effected by simply preventing the invasion of its coasts, is a +little like the notion of uneducated people that a disease can be +cured by suppressing its symptoms. For even a successful defense +of a coast against invasion by a hostile force cannot remove the +inimical influence to a country's commerce and welfare which that +hostile force exerts, any more than palliatives can cure dyspepsia. +Every intelligent physician knows that the only way to cure a disease +is to remove its cause; and every intelligent military or naval man +knows that history teaches that the only way in which a country +can defend itself successfully against an enemy is to defeat the +armed force of that enemy--be it a force of soldiers on the land, or +a force of war-ships on the sea. In naval parlance, "our objective +is the enemy's fleet." + +If the duty of a navy be merely to prevent the actual invasion +of its country's coasts, a great mistake has been made by Great +Britain, France, and other countries in spending so much money +on their navies, and in giving so much attention to the education +and training of their officers and enlisted men. To prevent actual +invasion would be comparatively an easy task, one that could be +performed by rows of forts along the coast, supplemented by mines +and submarines. If that is the only kind of defense required, navies +are hardly needed. The army in each country could man the forts +and operate the mines, and a special corps of the army could even +operate the submarines, which (if their only office is to prevent +actual invasion) need hardly leave the "three-mile limit" that +skirts the coasts. If the people of any country do not care to have +dealings outside; if the nation is willing to be in the position +of a man who is safe so long as he stays in the house, but is afraid +to go outdoors, the problem of national defense is easy. + +But if the people desire to prevent interference with what our +Constitution calls "the general welfare," the problem becomes +exceedingly complex and exceedingly grave--more complex and grave +than any other problem that they have. If they desire that their +ships shall be free to sail the seas, and their citizens to carry +on business and to travel in other lands; and if they desire that +their merchants shall be able to export their wares and their farmers +their grain, also that the people shall be able to import the things +they wish from foreign countries, then they must be able to exert +actual physical force on the ocean at any point where vessels carrying +their exports and imports may be threatened. Naval ships are the +only means for doing this. + +The possibility that an armed force sent to a given point at sea +might have to fight an enemy force, brought about first the sending of +more than one vessel, and later--as the mechanic arts progressed--the +increasing of the size of individual vessels, and later still the +development of novel types. + +There are two main reasons for building a small number of large +ships rather than a large number of small ships. The first reason +is that large ships are much more steady, reliable, safe, and fast +than small ships. The second reason is that, when designed for +any given speed, the large ships have more space available for +whatever is to be carried; one 15-knot ship of 20,000 tons normal +displacement, for instance, has about one and a half times as much +space available for cargo, guns, and what-not, as four 15-knot +ships of 5,000 tons each. These two reasons apply to merchant ships +as well as naval ships. A third reason applies to naval vessels +only, and is that a few large ships can be handled much better +together than a large number of small ships, and embody that +"concentration of force" which it is the endeavor of strategy and +tactics to secure. A fourth reason is the obvious one that large +ships can carry larger guns than small ships. + +The distinctly military (naval) purpose for which a war-ship is +designed necessitates, first, that in addition to her ability to +go rapidly and surely from place to place, she be able to exert +physical force against an enemy ship or fort, and, second, that +she have protection against the fire of guns and torpedoes from +enemy ships and forts, against bombs dropped from aircraft, and +against mines. + +This means that a man-of-war, intended to exert the maximum of +physical force against an enemy and to be able to withstand the +maximum of punishment, must have guns and torpedoes for offense, +and must have armor and cellular division of the hull for defense; +the armor to keep out the enemy's shells, and the cellular division +of the hull to prevent the admission of more water than can fill +one water-tight compartment in case the ship is hit. + +It must be admitted here that, at the present moment, torpedoes +hold such large charges of explosive that the cellular division of +ships does not adequately protect them. This means that a contest +has been going on between torpedo-makers and naval constructors like +the contest between armor-makers and gunmakers, and that just now the +torpedo-makers are in the lead. For this reason a battleship needs +other protection than that imparted by its cellular subdivision. +This is given by its "torpedo defense battery" of minor guns of +about 5-inch calibre. + +By reason of the great vulnerability of all ships to attack below +the water-line, the torpedo was invented and developed. In its +original form, the torpedo was motionless in the water, either +anchored to the ground, or floating on the surface, and was in +fact what now is called a "mine." But forty-eight years ago an +Englishman named Whitehead invented the automobile, auto-steering, +torpedo, which still bears his name. This torpedo is used in all +the navies, and is launched on its mission from battleships, battle +cruisers, destroyers, submarines, and other craft of various kinds. + +Most torpedoes are to be found in destroyers--long, fast, frail +vessels, averaging about 700 tons displacement, that are intended to +dash at enemy ships at night, or under other favorable conditions, +launch their torpedoes, and hurry away. The torpedo is "a weapon +of opportunity." It has had a long, slow fight for its existence; +but its success during the present war has established it firmly +in naval warfare. + +The submarine has followed the destroyer, and some people think +will supplant it; though its relatively slow speed prevents those +dashes that are the destroyer's rôle. The submarine is, however, +a kind of destroyer that is submersible, in which the necessities +of submersibility preclude great speed. The submarine was designed +to accomplish a clear and definite purpose--a secret under-water +attack on an enemy's ship in the vicinity. It has succeeded so well +in its limited mission that some intelligent people declare that +we need submarines only--ignoring the fact that, even if submarines +could successfully prevent actual invasion, they could not carry +on operations at a distance from their base of supplies. It is +true that submarines may be made so large that they can steam at +great speed from place to place, as capital ships steam now, carry +large supplies of fuel and food, house their crews hygienically, +and need no "mother ship" or tender. But if submarines achieve +such size, they will be more expensive to build and run than +battleships--and will be, in fact, submersible battleships. In +other words, the submarine cannot displace the battleship, but may +be developed and evolved into a new and highly specialized type +of battleship. + +The necessity for operating at long distances from a base carries +with it the necessity for supplying more fuel than even a battleship +can carry; and this means that colliers must be provided. In most +countries, the merchant service is so large that colliers can be +taken from it, but in the United States no adequate merchant marine +exists, and so it is found necessary to build navy colliers and +have them in the fleet. The necessity for continuously supplying +food and ammunition to the fleet necessitates supply ships and +ammunition ships; but the problem of supplying food and ammunition +is not so difficult as that of supplying fuel, for the reason that +they are consumed more slowly. + +In order to take care of the sick and wounded, and prevent them from +hampering the activities of the well, hospital ships are needed. +Hospital ships should, of course, be designed for that purpose +before being constructed; but usually hospital ships were originally +passenger ships, and were adapted to hospital uses later. + +The menace of the destroyer--owing to the sea-worthiness which this +type has now achieved, and to the great range which the torpedo +has acquired--has brought about the necessity of providing external +protection to the battleships; and this is supplied by a "screen" +of cruisers and destroyers, whose duty is to keep enemy destroyers +and (so far as is practicable) the submarines at a safe distance. + +We now see why a fleet must be composed of various types of vessels. +At the present moment, the battleship is the primary, or paramount +type, the others secondary, because the battleship is the type +that can exert the most force, stand the hardest punishment, steam +the farthest in all kinds of weather, and in general, serve her +country the best. + +Of course, "battleship" is merely a name, and some think not a +very good name, to indicate a ship that can take the part in battle +that used to be taken by the "ship of the line." The reason for +its primacy is fundamental: its displacement or total weight--the +same reason that assured the primacy of the ship of the line. For +displacement rules the waves; if "Britannia rules the waves," it +is simply because Britannia has more displacement than any other +Power. + +The fleet needs to have a means of knowing where the enemy is, how +many ships he has, what is their character, the direction in which +they are steaming, and their speed. To accomplish this purpose, +"scouts" are needed--fast ships, that can steam far in all kinds +of weather and send wireless messages across great distances. So +far as their scout duties go, such vessels need no guns whatever, +and no torpedoes; but because the enemy will see the scout as soon +as the scout sees the enemy, and because the enemy will try to +drive away the scout by gun and torpedo fire, the scouts must be +armed. And this necessity is reinforced by the necessity of driving +off an enemy's scouts. + +In foreign navies the need for getting information in defiance +of an enemy's attempts to prevent it, and to drive off the armed +scouts of an enemy, has been one of the prime reasons for developing +"battle cruisers," that combine the speed of the destroyer with +the long steaming radius of the battleship, a battery almost as +strong, and a very considerable protection by armor. + +The aeroplane and the air-ship are recent accessions to the list of +fighting craft. Their rôle in naval warfare cannot yet be defined, +because the machines themselves have not yet reached an advanced +stage of development, and their probable performance cannot be +forecast. There is no doubt, however, in the minds of naval men +that the rôle of aircraft is to be important and distinguished. + + + + +CHAPTER III + +NAVAL POWER + +Mahan proved that sea power has exercised a determining influence on +history. He proved that sea power has been necessary for commercial +success in peace and military success in war. He proved that, while +many wars have culminated with the victory of some army, the victory +of some navy had been the previous essential. He proved that the +immediate cause of success had often resulted inevitably from another +cause, less apparent because more profound; that the operations of +the navy had previously brought affairs up to the "mate in four +moves," and that the final victory of the army was the resulting +"checkmate." + +Before Mahan proved his doctrine, it was felt in a general way +that sea power was necessary to the prosperity and security of +a nation. Mahan was not the first to have this idea, for it had +been in the minds of some men, and in the policy of one nation, +for more than a century. Neither was Mahan the first to put forth +the idea in writing; but he was the first to make an absolute +demonstration of the truth. Newton was not the first man to know, +or to say, that things near the earth tend to fall to the earth; but +he was the first to formulate and prove the doctrine of universal +gravitation. In the same way, all through history, we find that +a few master minds have been able to group what had theretofore +seemed unrelated phenomena, and deduce from them certain laws. +In this way they substituted reasoning for speculation, fact for +fancy, wisdom for opportunism, and became the guides of the human +race. + +The effect of the acceptance of Mahan's doctrine was felt at once. +Realizing that the influence of sea power was a fact, comprehending +Great Britain's secret, after Mahan had disclosed it, certain other +great nations of the world, especially Germany, immediately started +with confidence and vigor upon the increase of their own sea power, +and pushed it to a degree before unparalleled; with a result that +must have been amazing to the man who, more than any other, was +responsible for it. + +Since the words "sea power," or their translation, is a recognized +phrase the world over, and since the power of sea power is greater +than ever before, and is still increasing, it may be profitable +to consider sea power as an entity, and to inquire what are its +leading characteristics, and in what it mainly consists. + +There is no trouble in defining what the sea is, but there is a +good deal of trouble in defining what power is. If we look in a +dictionary, we shall find a good many definitions of power; so +many as to show that there are many different kinds of power, and +that when we read of "power," it is necessary to know what kind of +power is meant. Clearly "sea power" means power on the sea. But +what kind of power? There are two large classes into which power +may be divided, passive and active. Certainly we seem justified, +at the start, in declaring that the power meant by Mahan was not +passive, but active. Should this be granted, we cannot be far from +right if we go a step further, and declare that sea power means +ability to do something on the sea. + +If we ask what the something is that sea power has ability to do, +we at once perceive that sea power may be divided into two parts, +commercial power and naval power. + +The power exerted by commercial sea power is clearly that exerted by +the merchant service, and is mainly the power of acquiring money. It +is true that the merchant service has the power of rendering certain +services in war, especially the power of providing auxiliary vessels, +and of furnishing men accustomed to the sea; but as time goes on the +power contributable by the merchant service must steadily decrease, +because of the relatively increasing power of the naval service, and +the rapidly increasing difference between the characteristics of +ships and men suitable for the merchant service and those suitable +for the naval service. + +But even in the past, while the importance of the merchant service was +considerable in the ways just outlined, it may perhaps be questioned +whether it formed an element of _sea power_, in the sense in which +Mahan discussed sea power. The power of every country depends on all +the sources of its wealth: on its agriculture, on its manufacturing +activities, and even more directly on the money derived from exports. +But these sources of wealth and all sources of wealth, including +the merchant service, can hardly be said to be elements of power +themselves, but rather to be elements for whose protection power +is required. + +In fact, apart from its usefulness in furnishing auxiliaries, it +seems certain that the merchant service has been an element of +_weakness_. The need for navies arose from the weakness of merchant +ships and the corresponding necessity for assuring them safe voyages +and proper treatment even in time of peace; while in time of war +they have always been an anxious care, and have needed and received +the protection of fighting ships that have been taken away from +the fleet to act as convoys. + +If commercial sea power was not the power meant by Mahan, then he +must have meant naval power. And if one reads the pages of history +with patient discrimination, the conviction must grow on him that +what really constituted the sea power which had so great an influence +on history, was _naval_ power; not the power of simply ships upon +the sea, but the power of a navy composed of ships able to fight, +manned by men trained to fight, under the command of captains skilled +to fight, and led by admirals determined to fight. Trafalgar was +not won by the merchant service; nor Mobile, Manila, or Tsushima. + +If sea power be essentially naval power, it may be interesting to +inquire: In what does naval power consist and what are its principal +characteristics? + +If one looks at a fleet of war-ships on the sea, he will be impressed +consciously or unconsciously with the idea of power. If he is impressed +consciously, he will see that the fleet represents power in the +broadest sense--power active and power passive; power to do and +power to endure; power to exert force and power to resist it. + +If he goes further and analyzes the reasons for this impression +of power, he will see that it is not merely a mental suggestion, +but a realization of the actual existence of tremendous mechanical +power, under complete direction and control. + +In mechanics we get a definition of power, which, like all definitions +in mechanics, is clear, definite, and correct. In mechanics, power +is the rate at which mechanical work is performed. It is ability +to do something in a certain definite time. + +Now this definition gives us a clear idea of the way in which a +navy directly represents power, because the power which a navy +exerts is, primarily, mechanical; and any other power which it +exerts is secondary and derived wholly from its mechanical power. +The power of a gun is due wholly to the mechanical energy of its +projectile, which enables it to penetrate a resisting body; and +the power of a moving ship is due wholly to the mechanical energy +of the burning coal within its furnaces. + +It may be objected that it is not reasonable to consider a ship's +energy of motion as an element of naval power, in the mechanical +sense in which we have been using the word "power," for the reason +that it could be exerted only by the use of her ram, an infrequent +use. To this it may be answered that energy is energy, no matter +to what purpose it is applied; that a given projectile going at +a given speed has a certain energy, whether it strikes its target +or misses it; and that a battleship going at a certain speed must +necessarily have a certain definite energy, no matter whether it +is devoted to ramming another ship or to carrying itself and its +contents from one place to another. + +Besides the mechanical power exerted by the mere motion of the +ship, and often superior to it, there is the power of her guns and +torpedoes. + +Perhaps the most important single invention ever made was the invention +of gunpowder. Why? Because it put into the hands of man a tremendous +force, compressed into a very small volume, which he could use +instantaneously or refrain from using at his will. Its first use +was in war; and in war has been its main employment ever since. +War gives the best field for the activity of gunpowder, because +in war, we always wish to exert a great force at a definite point +at a given instant; usually in order to _penetrate_ the bodies of +men, or some defensive work that protects them. Gunpowder is the +principal agent used in war up to the present date. It is used +by both armies and navies, but navies use it in larger masses, +fired in more powerful guns. + +Of course this does not mean that it would be impossible to send +a lot of powder to a fort, more than a fleet could carry, and fire +it; but it does mean that history shows that forts have rarely +been called upon to fire much powder, that their lives have been +serene, and that most of the powder fired on shore has been fired +by infantry using muskets--though a good deal has been fired by +field and siege artillery. + +Leaving forts out of consideration and searching for something +else in which to use gunpowder on a large scale, we come to +siege-pieces, field-pieces, and muskets. Disregarding siege-pieces +and field-pieces, for the reason that the great variety of types +makes it difficult to compare them with navy guns, we come to muskets. + +Now the musket is an extremely formidable weapon, and has, perhaps, +been the greatest single contributor to the victory of civilization +over barbarism, and order over anarchy, that has ever existed up to +the present time. But the enormous advances in engineering, including +ordnance, during the last fifty years, have reduced enormously the +relative value of the musket. Remembering that energy, or the ability +to do work, is expressed by the formula: E=1/2 MV^2, remembering +that the projectile of the modern 12-inch gun starts at about 2,900 +f. s. velocity and weighs 867 pounds, while the bullet of a musket +weighs only 150 grains and starts with a velocity of 2,700 feet +per second, we see that the energy of the 12-inch projectile is +about 47,000 times that of the bullet on leaving the muzzle. But +after the bullet has gone, say 5,000 yards, its energy has fallen +to zero, while the energy of the 12-inch projectile is nearly the +same as when it started. + +While it would be truthful, therefore, to say that the energy of +the 12-inch gun within 5,000 yards is greater than that of 47,000 +muskets, it would also be truthful to say that outside of 5,000 +yards, millions of muskets would not be equal to one 12-inch gun. + +Not only is the 12-inch gun a weapon incomparably great, compared +with the musket, but when placed in a naval ship, it possesses a +portability which, while not an attribute of the gun itself, is +an attribute of the combination of gun and ship, and a distinct +attribute of naval power. A 12-inch gun placed in a fort may be +just as good as a like gun placed in a ship, but it has no power +to exert its power usefully unless some enemy comes where the gun +can hit it. And when one searches the annals of history for the +records of whatever fighting forts have done, he finds that they +have been able to do very little. But a 12-inch gun placed in a +man-of-war can be taken where it is needed, and recent history +shows that naval 12-inch guns, modern though they are, have already +done effective work in war. + +Not only are 12-inch guns powerful and portable, but modern mechanical +science has succeeded in so placing them in our ships that they can +be handled with a precision, quickness, and delicacy that have +no superior in any other branch of engineering. While granting +the difficulty of an exact comparison, I feel no hesitation in +affirming that the greatest triumph of the engineering art in handling +heavy masses is to be found in the turret of a battleship. Here +again, and even inside of 5,000 yards, we find the superiority +of the great gun over the musket, as evidenced by its accuracy in +use. No soldier can fire his musket, even on a steady platform, +himself and target stationary, and the range known perfectly, as +accurately as a gun-pointer can fire a 12-inch gun; and if gun +and target be moving, and the wind be blowing, and the range only +approximately known, as is always the case in practice, the advantage +of the big gun in accuracy becomes incomparable. + +But it is not only the big projectile itself which has energy, for +this projectile carries a large charge of high explosive, which +exploding some miles away from where it started, exerts a power +inherent in itself, that was exhibited with frightful effect at +the battles of Tsushima and the Skagerak. + +This brings us to the auto-torpedo, a weapon recently perfected; +in fact not perfected yet. Here is another power that science has +put into the hands of naval men in addition to those she had already +put there. The auto-torpedo, launched in security from below the +water-line of the battleship, or from a destroyer or submarine, +can be directed in a straight line over a distance and with a speed +that are constantly increasing with the improvement of the weapon. +At the present moment, a speed of 27 knots over 10,000 yards can +be depended on, with a probability that on striking an enemy's +ship below the water-line it will disable that ship, if not sink +her. There seems no doubt that, in a very few years, the systematic +experiments now being applied to the development of the torpedo +will result in a weapon which can hardly be called inferior to +the 12-inch or even 16-inch gun and will probably surpass it. + +_Controllability_.--If one watches a fleet of ships moving on the +sea, he gets an impression of tremendous power. But if he watches +Niagara, or a thunder-storm, he also gets an impression of tremendous +power. But the tremendous power of Niagara, or the thunder-storm, +is a power that belongs to Niagara or the thunder-storm, and not to +man. Man cannot control the power of Niagara or the thunder-storm; +but he can control the power of a fleet. + +Speaking, then, from the standpoint of the human being, one may say +that the fleet has the element of controllability, while Niagara +and the thunder-storm have not. One man can make the fleet go faster +or slower or stop; he can increase its power of motion or decrease +it at his will; he can reduce it to zero. He cannot do so with +the forces of nature. + +_Directability_.--Not only can one man control the power of the +fleet, he can also direct it; that is, can turn it to the right +or the left as much as he wishes. But one man cannot change the +direction of motion of Niagara or the lightning-bolt. + +_Power, Controllability, and Directability_.--We may say, then, +that a fleet combines the three elements of mechanical power, +controllability, and directability. + +_The Unit of Military Power_.--This is an enormous power that has +come into the hands of the naval nations; but it has come so newly +that we do not appreciate it yet. One reason why we do not and cannot +appreciate it correctly is that no units have been established by +which to measure it. + +To supply this deficiency, the author begs leave to point out that, +since the military power of every nation has until recently been +its army, of which the unit has been the soldier, whose power has +rested wholly in his musket, the musket has actually been the unit +of military power. In all history, the statement of the number of +men in each army has been put forward by historians as giving the +most accurate idea of their fighting value; and in modern times, +nearly all of these men have been armed with muskets only. + +It has been said already that the main reason why the invention +of gunpowder was so important was that it put into the hands of +man a tremendous mechanical power compressed into a very small +space, which man could use or not use at his will. This idea may +be expressed by saying that gunpowder combines power and great +controllability. But it was soon discovered that this gunpowder, +put into a tube with a bullet in front of it, could discharge that +bullet in any given direction. A musket was the result, and it +combined the three requisites of a weapon--mechanical power, +controllability, and directability. + +While the loaded gun is perhaps the clearest example of the combination +of the three factors we are speaking of, the moving ship supplies +the next best example. It has very much greater mechanical power; +and in proportion to its mass, almost as much controllability and +directability. + +The control and direction of a moving ship are very wonderful things; +but the very ease with which they are exercised makes us overlook +the magnitude of the achievement and the perfection of the means +employed. It may seem absurd to speak of one man controlling and +directing a great ship, but that is pretty nearly what happens +sometimes; for sometimes the man at the wheel is the only man on +board doing anything at all; and he is absolutely directing the +entire ship. At such times (doubtless they are rare and short) +the man at the wheel on board, say the _Vaterland_, is directing +unassisted by any human being a mass of 65,000 tons, which is going +through the water at a speed of 24 knots, or 27 miles, an hour, +nearly as fast as the average passenger-train. In fact, it would +be very easy to arrange on board the _Vaterland_ that this should +actually happen; that everybody should take a rest for a few minutes, +coal-passers, water-tenders, oilers, engineers, and the people +on deck. And while such an act might have no particular value, +_per se_, and prove nothing important, yet, nevertheless, a brief +reflection on the possibility may be interesting, and lead us to +see clearly into the essential nature of what is here called +"directability." The man at the wheel on board the _Vaterland_, +so long as the fires burn and the oil continues to lubricate the +engines, has a power in his hands that is almost inconceivable. +The ship that he is handling weighs more than the 870,000 men that +comprise the standing army of Germany. + +Now can anybody imagine the entire standing army of Germany being +carried along at 27 miles an hour and turned almost instantly to the +right or left by one man? The standing army of Germany is supposed +to be the most directable organization in the world; but could +the Emperor of Germany move that army at a speed of 27 miles an +hour and turn it as a whole (not its separate units) through 90 +degrees in three minutes? + +The _Vaterland_ being a merchant ship and not fully representing naval +power, perhaps it might be better to take, say, the _Pennsylvania_. +The weight is about half that of the _Vaterland_, that is, it is +nearly twice the weight of the men of the British standing army; +and the usual speed is about, say, 15 knots. But in addition to +all the power of the ship, as a ship, or an energy greater than +that of 275,000 muskets, she has the power of all the guns, twelve +14-inch guns, and twenty-two 5-inch guns, whose projectiles, not +including the torpedoes fired from four torpedo-tubes, have an +energy at the muzzle equal to 750,000 muskets, seven-eighths of +all the muskets in the German standing army. Now any one who has +seen a battleship at battle practice knows that all the various +tremendous forces are under excellent direction and control. And +while it cannot be strictly said that they are absolutely under +the direction and control of the captain, while it must be admitted +that no one man can really direct so many rapidly moving things, +yet it is certainly well within the truth to say that the ship +and all it contains are very much more under the control of her +captain than the German standing army is under the control of the +Kaiser. The captain, acting through the helmsman, chief engineer, +gunnery officer, and executive officer, can get very excellent +information as to what is going on, and can have his orders carried +out with very little delay; but the mere space occupied by an army +of 870,000 men, and the unavoidable dispersion of its units prevent +any such exact control. + +In other words, the captain of the _Pennsylvania_ wields a weapon +more mechanically powerful than all the muskets of the German standing +army: and his control of it is more absolute than is the Kaiser's +control of that army. + +_Mechanism vs. Men_.--Now what is the essential reason for the +efficient direction exercised by the helmsman of the _Pennsylvania_, +and the relative impotency of generals? Is it not that the helmsman +acts through the medium of mechanism, while the generals act through +the medium of men? A ship is not only made of rigid metal, but all +her parts are fastened together with the utmost rigidity; while +the parts of an army are men, who are held together by no means +whatever except that which discipline gives, and the men themselves +are far from rigid. In the nature of things it is impossible that +an army should be directed as perfectly as a ship. The rudder of a +ship is a mechanical appliance that can be depended upon to control +the direction of the ship absolutely, while an army has no such +a thing as a rudder, or anything to take its place. Again, the +rudder is only a few hundred feet from the helmsman, and the +communication between them, including the steering-engine itself, +is a strong reliable mechanism that has no counterpart in the army. + +The control of the main engines of a ship is almost as absolute +as the control of the rudder; and the main engines are not only +much more powerful than the legs of soldiers, but they act together +in much greater harmony. + +_Inherent Power of a Battleship_.--Possibly the declaration may be +accepted now that a battleship of 30,000 tons, such as the navies +are building now, with, say, twelve 14-inch guns is a greater example +of power, under the absolute direction and control than anything +else existing; and that the main reason is the concentration of +a tremendous amount of mechanical energy in a very small space, +all made available by certain properties of water. Nothing like +a ship can be made to run on shore; but if an automobile could +be constructed, carrying twelve 14-inch guns, twenty-two 5-inch +guns, and four torpedo-tubes, of the size of the _Pennsylvania_, +and with her armor, able to run over the land in any direction at +20 knots, propelled by engines of 31,000 horse-power, it could +whip an army of a million men just as quickly as it could get hold +of its component parts. Such a machine could start at one end of +an army and go through to the other like a mowing-machine through +a field of wheat; and knock down all the buildings in New York +afterward, smash all the cars, break down all the bridges, and sink +all the shipping. + +_Inherent Power of a Fleet_.--An idea of the power exertable by a +fleet of modern ships may be derived from the following comparison. + +When Sherman made his wonderful march to the sea from Atlanta to +Savannah, he made a march whose details are historically known, +which was unopposed, which was over a flat country, in good weather, +and without the aid of railroad-trains. It was a march, pure and +simple; and inasmuch as men are the same now as they were then, it +gives excellent data of the way in which purely military or army +power can move from one place to another, _while still preserving +its character and exercising its functions_. Similarly, when Admiral +Schroeder, in November, 1910, went from the east coast of the United +States to the English Channel, his march was unopposed, its details +are known, and it gave an excellent illustration of how naval power +can move from one place to another, _while still preserving its +character and exercising its functions_. + +Now General Sherman was a man of world-wide fame, and so were some +of his generals, and Sherman's fame will last for centuries. Compared +with Sherman, Admiral Schroeder was obscure; and compared with +Sherman's officers, Admiral Schroeder's were obscure. Sherman's +soldiers, privates and all, were made glorious for the rest of +their lives by having been in Sherman's march to the sea, while +Admiral Schroeder's sailors achieved no glory at all. So, the next +paragraph is not intended to detract in the slightest from Sherman +and his army, but simply to point out the change in conditions +that mechanical progress has brought about. + +The statement of comparison is simply that when General Sherman +marched from Atlanta to the sea his army composed 62,000 men, and +it took him twenty-five days to go about 230 land miles or 200 sea +miles; and when Admiral Schroeder went from our coast to Europe he +had 16 ships, and he made the trip of more than 3,000 sea miles in +less than fourteen days. Disregarding twenty-eight 5-inch guns, two +hundred and fifty-two 3-inch guns, and a lot of smaller guns, and +disregarding all the torpedoes, Admiral Schroeder took eighty-four +12-inch guns, ninety-six 8-inch guns, eighty-eight 7-inch guns, +and forty-eight 6-inch guns, _all mounted and available_; which, +assuming the power of the modern musket as a unit, equalled more +than 5,000,000 modern muskets. + +Such an enormous transfer of absolute, definite, available power +would be impossible on land, simply because no means has been devised +to accomplish it. Such a transfer on land would be the transfer +of ninety times as many soldiers as Sherman had (even supposing +they had modern muskets) over fifteen times the distance and at +thirty times the speed; and as the work done in going from one +place to another varies practically as the square of the speed, a +transfer on land equivalent in magnitude and speed to Schroeder's +would be a performance 90 x 15 x 30^2= 1,215,000 times as great +as Sherman's. + +This may seem absurd, and perhaps it is; but why? The comparison +is not between the qualities of the men or between the results +achieved. Great results often are brought about by very small forces, +as when some state of equilibrium is disturbed, and vice versa. The +comparison attempted is simply between the _power_ of a certain +army and the power of a certain fleet. And while it is true that, +for some purposes, such as overcoming small resistance, great power +may not be as efficacious as feeble power or even gentleness, yet, +nevertheless, it must be clear that, for the overcoming of _great_ +resistance quickly great power must be applied. + +The existence of a certain power is quite independent of the +desirability of using it. The existence of the power is all the +writer wishes to insist upon at present; the question of its employment +will be considered later. + +Not only is the power of a fleet immeasurably greater than that of +an army, but it must always be so, from the very nature of things. +The speed of an army, _while exercising the functions of an army_, +and the power of a musket, while exercising its functions as a +weapon of one soldier, cannot change much from what they were when +Sherman went marching through Georgia. But, thanks to mechanical +science, there is no limit in sight to the power to which a fleet +may attain. + +The power of a navy is of recent growth, but it is increasing and +is going to continue to increase. Every advance of civilization will +advance the navy. Every new discovery and invention will directly +or indirectly serve it. The navy, more than any other thing, will +give opportunity for mechanism and to mechanism. Far beyond any +possible imagination of to-day, it will become the highest expression +of the Genius of Mechanism, and the embodiment of its spirit. + +The amount of money now being spent by the United States on its +navy is so great that the expenditure can be justified only on +the basis that great naval power is essential to the country. + +Is it essential, and if so, why? + +_Primary Use for a Navy_.--To answer this wisely, it may be well +to remind ourselves that the principal object of all the vocations +of men is directly or indirectly the acquiring of money. Money, of +course, is not wealth; but it is a thing which can be so easily +exchanged for wealth, that it is the thing which most people work +for. Of course, at bottom, the most important work is the getting +of food out of the ground; but inasmuch as people like to congregate +together in cities, the thing taken out of the ground in one place +must be transported to other places; and inasmuch as every person +wants every kind of thing that he can get, a tremendous system of +interchange, through the medium of money, has been brought about, +which is called "trade." For the protection of property and life, and +in order that trade may exist at all, an enormous amount of human +machinery is employed which we call "government." This government +is based on innumerable laws, but these laws would be of no avail +unless they were carried out; and every nation in the world has +found that employment of a great deal of force is necessary in +order that they shall be carried out. This force is mainly exercised +by the police of the cities; but many instances have occurred in +the history of every country where the authority of the police +has had to be supported by the army of the national government. +There is no nation in the world, and there never has been one, +in which the enforcement of the necessary laws for the protection +of the lives, property, and trade of the people has not depended +ultimately on the army; and the reason why the army could enforce +the laws was simply the fact that the army had the power to inflict +suffering and death. + +As long as a maritime country carried on trade within its own borders +exclusively, as long as it lived within itself, so long as its +people did not go to countries oversea, a navy was not necessary. +But when a maritime country is not contented to live within its +own borders, then a navy becomes essential to guard its people +and their possessions on the highways of the sea; to enforce, not +municipal or national law, as an army does, but international law. + +Now the desire of the people of a country to extend their trade +beyond the seas seems in some ways not always a conscious desire, +not a deliberate intent, but to be an effort of self-protection, +or largely an effort of expansion; for getting room or employment. +As the people of a country become civilized, labor-saving devices +multiply; and where one man by means of a machine can do the work +of a hundred, ninety-nine men may be thrown out of employment; out +of a hundred men who till the soil, only one man may be selected +and ninety-nine men have to seek other employment. Where shall it +be gotten? Evidently it must be gotten in some employment which +may be called "artificial," such as working in a shop of some kind, +or doing some manufacturing work. But so long as a people live +unto themselves only, each nation can practically make and use all +the machinery needed within its borders, and still not employ all +the idle hands; and when the population becomes dense, employment +must be sought in making goods to sell beyond the sea. The return +comes back, sometimes in money, sometimes in the products of the +soil and the mine and the manufactures of foreign lands. + +In this way every nation becomes like a great business firm. It +exports (that is, sells,) certain things, and it imports (that +is, buys,) certain things; and if it sells more than it buys it is +making money; if it buys more than it sells it is spending money. +This is usually expressed by saying that the "balance of trade" +is in its favor or against it. + +In a country like the United States, or any other great nation, the +amount of exporting and importing, of buying and selling almost every +conceivable article under the sun, is carried on in the millions and +millions of dollars; and so perfect has the organization for doing +this business become in every great country, that the products of +the most distant countries can be bought in almost every village; +and any important event in any country produces a perceptible effect +wherever the mail and telegraph go. + +The organization for effecting this in every country is so excellent +and so wonderful, that it is like a machine. + +In fact, it is a machine, and with all the faults of a machine. +Now one of the faults of a machine, a fault which increases in +importance with the complexity of the machine, is the enormous +disturbance which may be produced by a cause seemingly trivial. +That such is the case with the machine which the commerce of every +great nation comprises, every-day experience confirms. So long +as the steamers come and go with scheduled regularity, so long +will the money come in at the proper intervals and be distributed +through the various channels; so long will the people live the +lives to which they are habituated; so long will order reign. + +But suppose the coming and going of all the steamers were suddenly +stopped by a blockade. While it may be true that, in a country like +the United States, no foreign trade is really necessary; while it +may be true that the people of the United States would be just as +happy, though not so rich, if they had no foreign trade--yet the +sudden stoppage of foreign trade would not bring about a condition +such as would have existed if we had never had any foreign trade, +but would bring about a chaotic condition which cannot fitly be +described by a feebler word than "horrible." The whole machinery of +every-day life would be disabled. Hundreds of thousands of people +would be thrown out of employment, and the whole momentum of the +rapidly moving enormous mass of American daily life would receive +a violent shock which would strain to its elastic limit every part +of the entire machine. + +It would take a large book to describe what would ensue from the +sudden stoppage of the trade of the United States with countries +over the sea. Such a book would besides be largely imaginative; +because in our history such a condition has never yet arisen. Although +wars have happened in the past in which there has been a blockade +of our coast more or less complete, peace has been declared before +the suffering produced had become very acute; and furthermore the +conditions of furious trade which now exist have never existed +before. Disasters would ensue, apart from the actual loss of money, +owing simply to the sudden change. In a railroad-train standing +still or moving at a uniform speed, the passengers are comfortable; +but if that same train is suddenly brought to rest when going at a +high speed, say by collision, the consequences are horrible in the +extreme, and the horror is caused _simply by the suddenness of the +change_. The same is true all through nature and human nature. Any +sudden change in the velocity of any mass has its exact counterpart +in any sudden change in the conditions of living of any man or +woman, or any sudden change in the conditions under which any +organization must carry on its business. The difficulty is not with +individuals only, or with the organizations themselves, and does +not rest solely on the personal inability of people to accommodate +themselves to the losing of certain conveniences or luxuries; but it +is an inertia which resists even the strenuous efforts of individuals +and organizations to meet new situations promptly, and to grapple +effectively with new problems. + +Every organization, no matter how small, is conducted according +to some system, and that system is based upon certain more or less +permanent conditions, which, if suddenly changed, make the system +inapplicable. The larger the organization and the more complex it +is, the more will it be deranged by any change of external conditions +and the longer time will it take to adapt itself to them. + +The sudden stoppage of our sea trade, including our coasting trade, +by even a partial blockade of our ports, would change practically +all the conditions under which we live. There is hardly a single +organization in the country which would not be affected by it. +And, as every organization would know that every other organization +would be affected, but to a degree which could not possibly be +determined, because there would be no precedent, it cannot be an +exaggeration to declare that the blockading of our principal ports +would, entirely apart from direct loss of money and other commodities, +produce a state of confusion, out of which order could not possibly +be evolved except by the raising of the blockade. + +In addition to the confusion brought about, there would, of course, +be the direct loss of money and non-receipt of imported things; +but what would probably be the very worst thing of all would be +the numbers of men thrown out of employment by the loss of foreign +markets. _So long as a country can keep its people in employment, +so long the people will live in comparative order_. But when there +are many unemployed men in a country, not only do their families +lose the means of subsistence, but the very fact of the men being +unemployed leads them into mischief. Should the ports of any great +commercial nation be suddenly closed, the greatest danger to the +country would not be from the enemy outside, but from the unemployed +people inside, unless the government gave them employment, by enlisting +them in an enormous, improvised army. + +It will be seen, therefore, that the blockading of the principal +ports of any purely commercial country would be a disaster so great +that there could not be a greater one except actual invasion. Another +disaster might be the total destruction of its fleet by the enemy's +fleet; but the only _direct_ result of this would be that the people +of the country would have fewer ships to support and fewer men +to pay. The loss of the fleet and the men would not _per se_ be +any loss whatever to the country, but rather a gain. The loss of +the fleet, however, would make it possible for the enemy's fleet +to blockade our ports later, and thus bring about the horrors of +which we have spoken. + +While it is true that an absolute blockade of any port might be +practically impossible at the present day, while it is true that +submarines and torpedo-boats might compel blockading ships to keep +at such distance from ports that many loopholes of escape would be +open to blockade runners, yet it may be pointed out that even a +partial blockade, even a blockade that made it risky for vessels +to try to break it, would have a very deleterious effect upon the +prosperity of the country and of every man, woman, and child within +it. A blockade like this was that maintained during the greater +part of the Civil War by the Northern States against the Southern +States. This blockade, while not perfect, while it was such as to +permit many vessels to pass both ways, was nevertheless so effective +that it made it impossible for the Southern States to be prosperous, +or to have any reasonable hope of ever being prosperous. And while +it would be an exaggeration to state that the navy itself, unaided +by the army, could have brought the South to terms; while it would +be an exaggeration to state that all the land battles fought in the +Civil War were unnecessary, that all the bloodshed and all the ruin +of harvests and of homesteads were unnecessary, nevertheless it does +seem that so long as the navy maintained the blockade which it did +maintain, the people of the South would have been prevented from +achieving enough prosperity to carry on an independent government; +so that their revolt would have failed. The South, not being able +to raise the blockade by means of their navy, might have tried to +do so by sending an army into the Northern States, to whip the +Northerners on their own ground; but this would clearly have been +impossible. + +The sentences above are not written with the intention of minimizing +the services rendered by the army in the Civil War, or of detracting +from the glory of the gallant officers and men who composed it, or +of subtracting one jot or tittle from a grateful appreciation of +their hardships and bloodshed; neither do they dare to question +the wisdom of the statesmen who directed that the war should be +fought mainly by the army. Their sole intention is to point out +that, if a meagre naval force could produce so great an effect +against a country _mainly agricultural_, a very powerful naval +force, blockading effectively the principal ports of a _manufacturing +country_, would have an effect so great that it can hardly be estimated. + +It is plainly to be seen that the effect of a blockade against a +purely commercial country by a modern navy would be incomparably +greater now than it was fifty years ago, for two very important +reasons. One reason is that the progress of modern engineering +has made navies very much more powerful than they were fifty years +ago; and the other reason is that the same cause has made countries +very much more vulnerable to blockade, because it has made so many +millions of people dependent upon manufacturing industries and the +export of manufactured things, and forced them to live an artificial +life. While the United States, for instance, does not depend for +its daily bread on the regular coming of wheat from over the sea, +yet millions of its people do depend, though indirectly, upon the +money from the export of manufactured things; for with countries, +as with people, habits are formed both of system and of mode of +life, which it is dangerous suddenly to break; so that a country +soon becomes as dependent upon outside commerce as a man does upon +outside air, and a people suddenly deprived of a vigorous outside +commerce would seem to be smothered almost like a man deprived +of outside air. + +A rough idea of the possible effect of a blockade of our coast may +be gathered from the fact that our exports last year were valued +at more than $2,000,000,000; which means that goods to this amount +were sold, for which a return was received, either in money or +its equivalent, most of it, ultimately, as wages for labor. Of +course no blockade could stop all of this; but it does not seem +impossible that it could stop half of it, if our fleet were destroyed +by the enemy. Supposing that this half were divided equally among +all the people in the United States, it would mean that each man, +woman, and child would lose about $10 in one year. If the loss +could be so divided up, perhaps no very great calamity would ensue. +But, of course, no such division could be made, with the result +that a great many people, especially poor people, earning wages +by the day, would lose more than they could stand. Suppose, for +instance, that a number of people earning about $900 a year, by +employment in export enterprises, were the people upon whom the +actual loss eventually fell by their being thrown out of employment. +This would mean that more than a million people--men, women, and +children--would be actually deprived of the means of living. It +seems clear that such a thing would be a national disaster, for +any loss of money to one man always means a loss of money or its +equivalent to other men besides. For instance: suppose A owes $20 +to B, B owes $20 to C, C owes $20 to D, D owes $20 to E, E owes +$20 to F, F owes $20 to G, G owes $20 to H, H owes $20 to I, and +I to J. If A is able to pay B, and does so, then B pays C, and so +on, and everybody is happy. But suppose that A for some reason, +say a blockade, fails to receive some money that he expected; then +A cannot pay B, B cannot pay C, and so on; with the result, that +not only does J lose his $20, but nine men are put in debt $20 +which they cannot pay; with the further result that A is dunned by +H, B is dunned by C, and so on, producing a condition of distress +which would seem to be out of all proportion to a mere lack of $20, +but which would, nevertheless, be the actual result. So in this +country of 100,000,000 people, the sudden loss of $1,000,000,000 +a year would produce a distress seemingly out of all proportion +to that sum of money, because the individual loss of every loser +would be felt by everybody else. + +Since to a great manufacturing nation, like ours, the greatest +danger from outside (except actual invasion) would seem to be the +sudden stoppage of her oversea trade by blockade, we seem warranted +in concluding that, since _the only possible means of preventing +a blockade is a navy_, the primary use for our navy is to prevent +blockade. + +This does not mean that a fleet's place is on its own coast, because +a blockade might be better prevented by having the fleet elsewhere; +in fact it is quite certain that its place is not on the coast as +a rule, but at whatever point is the best with relation to the +enemy's fleet, until the enemy's fleet is destroyed. In fact, since +the defensive and the offensive are so inseparably connected that +it is hard sometimes to tell where one begins and the other ends, +the best position for our fleet might be on the enemy's coast. It +may be objected that the coast of the United States is so long +that it would be impossible to blockade it. Perhaps, but that is +not necessary: it would suffice to blockade Boston, Newport, New +York, the Delaware, the Chesapeake, and the Gulf, say with forty +ships. And we must remember that blockade running would be much more +difficult now than in the Civil War, because of the increased power +and accuracy of modern gunnery and the advent of the search-light, +wireless telegraph, and aeroplane. + +It may also be objected that the blockading of even a defenseless +coast would cost the blockading country a good deal of money, by +reason of the loss of trade with that country. True; but war is +always expensive, and the blockade would be very much more expensive +to the blockaded country; and though it might hold out a long while, +it would be compelled to yield in the end, not only because of the +blockade itself but because of the pressure of neutral countries; +and the longer it held out, the greater the indemnity it would +have to pay. The expense of blockading would therefore be merely +a profitable investment. + +The author is aware that actual invasion of a country from the +sea would be a greater disaster than blockade, and that defense +against invasion has often been urged in Great Britain as a reason +for a great navy; so that the primary reason for a navy might be +said to be defense against invasion. But why should an enemy take +the trouble to invade us? Blockade is easier and cheaper, and can +accomplish almost everything that an enemy desires, especially +if it be enlivened by the occasional dropping of thousand-pound +shells into Wall Street and the navy-yard. + +While, however, the _primary_ use of naval power seems to be to +prevent blockade, a navy, like any other weapon, may be put to +any other uses which circumstances indicate. For instance, the +Northerners in the Civil War used the navy not to prevent blockade, +but to make blockade; the Japanese used the navy to cover the +transportation of their armies to Manchuria and Corea; and Great +Britain has always used her navy to protect her trade routes. + +A general statement of the various uses of a navy has been put into +the phrase "command of the sea." + +Of course, the probability of getting "command of the sea," or +of desiring to get it is dependent on the existence of a state +of war, and there are some who believe that the probability of +our becoming involved in a war with a great naval nation is too +slight to warrant the expense of money and labor needed to prepare +the necessary naval power. So it may be well to consider what is +the degree of probability. + +This degree of probability cannot be determined as accurately as +the probabilities of fire, death, or other things against which +insurance companies insure us; for the reason that wars have been +much less frequent than fires, deaths, etc., while the causes that +make and prevent them are much more numerous and obscure. It seems +clear, however, that, as between two countries of equal wealth, +the probability of war varies with the disparity between their +navies, and unless other nations are involved, is practically zero, +when their navies are equal in power; and that, other factors being +equal, the _greatest probability of war is between two countries, +of which one is the more wealthy and the other the more powerful_. + +In reckoning the probability of war, we must realize that _the most +pregnant cause of war is the combination of conflicting interests +with disparity in power_. And we must also realize that it is not +enough to consider the situation as it is now: that it is necessary +to look at least ten years ahead, because it would take the United +States that length of time to prepare a navy powerful enough to +fight our possible foes with reasonable assurance of success. + +Ten years, however, is not really far enough ahead to look, for +the simple reason that, while we could get a great many ships ready +in ten years, we could not get the entire navy ready as will be +explained later. If, for instance, some change in policies or in +interests should make war with Great Britain probable within ten +years, we could not possibly build a navy that could prevent our +being beaten, and blockaded, and forced to pay an enormous indemnity. + +Is there _no_ probability of this? Perhaps there is no great +probability; but there certainly is a possibility. In fact, it +might be a very wise act for Great Britain, seeing us gradually +surpassing her, to go to war with us before it is too late, and +crush us. It has often been said that Great Britain could not afford +to go to war with us, because so many of her commercial interests +would suffer. Of course, they would suffer for a while; but so do +the commercial interests of competing railroads when they begin +to cut rates. Cutting rates is war--commercial war: but it is often +carried on, nevertheless, and at tremendous cost. + +Just now, Great Britain does not wish to crush us; but it is certain +that she can. It is certain that the richest country in the world +lies defenseless against the most powerful; and that we could not +alter this condition in ten years, even if we started to build +an adequate navy now. + +Yet even if the degree of probability of war with Great Britain, +within say ten years, seems so small that we need not consider her, +are there no other great Powers with whom the degree of probability +of war is great enough to make it wise for us to consider them? + +Before answering this question, let us realize clearly that one +of the strongest reasons that leads a country to abstain from war, +even to seek relief from wrongs, actual or imagined, is a doubt +of success; and that that reason disappears if another country, +sufficiently powerful to assure success, is ready to help her, +either by joining openly with her, or by seeking war herself at +the same time with the same country. As we all know, cases like +this have happened in the past. Great Britain knows it; and the +main secret of her wealth is that she has always been strong enough +to fight any two countries. + +It is plain that a coalition of two countries against us is possible +now. The United States is regarded with feelings of extreme irritation +by the two most warlike nations in the world, one on our eastern side +and the other on the western. War with either one would call for +all the energies of the country, and the issue would be doubtful. +But if either country should consider itself compelled to declare +war, the other, if free at the time, might see her opportunity to +declare war simultaneously. The result would be the same as if +we fought Great Britain, except that our Pacific coast would be +blockaded besides the Atlantic, and we should have to pay indemnity +to two countries instead of to one country. + +A coalition between these two countries would be an ideal arrangement, +because it would enable each country to force us to grant the conditions +it desires, and secure a large indemnity besides. + +Would Great Britain interfere in our behalf? This can be answered +by the man so wise that he knows what the international situation +and the commercial situation will be ten years hence. Let him speak. + + +WILL THE IMPORTANCE OF NAVAL POWER INCREASE OR DECREASE? + +It is clear that the importance to a country of a navy varies with +two things--the value of that country's foreign trade and the +probability of war. + +It is also clear that, other things being equal, the probability +of a country becoming involved in war varies as the value of her +foreign trade; because the causes of friction and the money at +stake vary in that proportion. + +Therefore, _the importance to a country of her navy varies as the +square of the value of her foreign trade_. + +In order to answer the question, therefore, we must first consider +whether foreign trade--sea trade--is going to increase or decrease. + +As to the United States alone, the value of our exports is about +ten times what it was fifty years ago, and it promises to increase. +But the United States is only one country, and perhaps her increase +in foreign trade has been due to conditions past or passing. So +what is the outlook for the future, both for the United States +and other countries? Will other countries seek foreign trade? + +Yes. The recent commercial progress of Germany, Argentina, and +Japan, shows the growing recognition by civilized and enterprising +countries of the benefits of foreign trade, and of the facilities +for attaining it which are now given by the advent of large, swift, +modern steamers; steamers which are becoming larger and swifter +and safer every year, more and more adapted for ocean trade. For +not only have the writings of Mahan brought about an increase in +the sea power of every great country; but this increase has so +aroused the attention of the engineering professions that the +improvement of ships, engines, and other sea material has gone ahead +faster than all the other engineering arts. + +The reason why the engineering arts that are connected with the +sea have gone ahead more rapidly than any other arts is simply +that they are given wider opportunity and a greater scope. It is +inherent in the very nature of things that it is easier to transport +things by water than by land; that water transportation lends itself +in a higher degree to the exercise of engineering skill, to the +attainment of great results. + +The underlying reason for this difference seems to be that it is +not possible to make any vehicle to travel on land appreciably +larger than the present automobile, unless it run on rails; whereas +the floating power of water is such that vehicles can be made, and +are made, as large as 65,000 tons. The _Mauretania_, of 45,000 +tons displacement, has been running for eight years, larger vessels +are even now running and vessels larger still will undoubtedly +be run; for the larger the ships, the less they cost per ton of +carrying power, the faster they go, and the safer they are. + +Sea commerce thus gives to engineers, scientists, and inventors, +as well as to commercial men, that gift of the gods--opportunity. +The number of ships that now traverse the ocean and the larger +bodies of water communicating with it aggregate millions of tons, +and their number and individual tonnage are constantly increasing. +These vessels cruise among all the important seaports of the world, +and form a system of intercommunication almost as complete as the +system of railroads in the United States. They bring distant ports +of the world very close together, and make possible that ready +interchange of material products, and that facility of personal +intercourse which it is one of the aims of civilization to bring +about. From a commercial point of view, London is nearer to New +York than San Francisco, and more intimately allied with her. + +The evident result of all this is to make the people of the world +one large community, in which, though many nationalities are numbered, +many tongues are spoken, many degrees of civilization and wealth +are found, yet, of all, the main instincts are the same: the same +passions, the same appetites, the same desire for personal advantage. + +Not only does this admirable system of intercommunication bring all +parts of the world very closely together, but it tends to produce +in all a certain similarity in those characteristics and habits +of thought that pertain to the material things of life. We are +all imitative, and therefore we tend to imitate each other; but +the inferior is more apt to imitate the superior than vice versa. +Particularly are we prone to imitate those actions and qualities +by which others have attained material success. So it is to be +expected, it is already a fact, that the methods whereby a few +great nations attained success are already being imitated by other +nations. Japan has imitated so well that in some ways she has already +surpassed her models. + +With such an example before her, should we be surprised that China +has also become inoculated with the virus of commercial and political +ambitions? It cannot be many years before she will be in the running +with the rest of us, with 400,000,000 of people to do the work; +people of intelligence, patience, endurance, and docility; people +with everything to gain and nothing to lose; with the secret of +how to succeed already taught by other nations, which she can learn +from an open book. + +If Japan has learned our secret and mastered it in fifty years, +will China not be able to do it in less than fifty years? + +Before we answer this question, let us realize clearly that China +is much nearer to us in civilization than Japan was fifty years +ago; that China has Japan's example to guide her, and also that +any degree of civilization which was acquired by us in say one +hundred years will not require half that time for another nation +merely to learn. The same is true of all branches of knowledge; the +knowledge of the laws of nature which it took Newton many years to +acquire may now be mastered by any college student in two months. +And let us not forget, besides, that almost the only difficult +element of civilization which other people need to acquire, in order +to enter into that world-wide competition which is characteristic of +the time we live in, is "engineering" broadly considered. Doubtless +there are other things to learn besides; but it is not apparent +that any other things have contributed largely to the so-called +new civilization of Japan. Perhaps Japan has advanced enough in +Christianity to account for her advance in material power, but +if so she keeps very quiet about it. It may be, also, that the +relations of the government to the governed people of Japan are +on a higher plane than they used to be, but on a plane not yet so +high as in our own country; but has any one ever seen this claimed +or even stated? It may be that the people of Japan are more kindly, +brave, courteous, and patriotic than they were, and that their +improvement has been due to their imitating us in these matters; +but this is not the belief of many who have been in Japan. One +thing, however, is absolutely sure; and that is that Japan's advance +has been simultaneous with her acquirement of the engineering arts, +especially as applied to military and naval matters and the merchant +marine. + +But even supposing that China does not take part in the world-wide +race for wealth, we cannot shut our eyes to the fact that Great +Britain, Germany, France, Italy, Japan, Argentina, and the United +States, besides others like Sweden, Norway, Belgium, Holland, Spain, +and Portugal, are in the race already; and that several in South +America bid fair to enter soon. Not only do we see many contestants, +whose numbers and ardor are increasing, but we see, also, the cause +of this increasing. The cause is not only a clearer appreciation +of the benefits to be derived from commerce across the water under +conditions that exist now; it is also a growing appreciation of the +possibilities of commerce under conditions that will exist later +with countries whose resources are almost entirely undeveloped. For +four hundred years, we of the United States, have been developing +the land within our borders, and the task has been enormous. At +one time it promised to be the work of centuries; and with the +mechanical appliances of even one hundred years ago, it would have +taken a thousand years to do what we have already done. Mechanical +appliances of all kinds, especially of transportation and agriculture, +have made possible what would, otherwise, have been impossible; +and mechanical appliances will do the same things in Tierra del +Fuego and Zululand. + +Mechanism, working on land and sea, is opening up the resources +of the world. And now, another allied art, that of chemistry, more +especially biology, is in process of removing one of the remaining +obstacles to full development, by making active life possible, and +even pleasant, in the tropics. It is predicted by some enthusiasts +that, in the near future, it will be healthier and pleasanter to live +in the tropics, and even do hard work there, than in the temperate +zone. When this day comes, and it may be soon, the development of +the riches of lands within the tropics will begin in earnest, and +wealth undreamed of now be realized. + +The opening of the undeveloped countries means a continuing increase +of wealth to the nations that take advantage of the opportunity, +and a corresponding backsliding to those nations that fail. It +means over all the ocean an increasing number of steamers. It means +the continuing increase of manufacturing in manufacturing countries, +and the increasing enjoyment in them of the good things of all the +world. It means in the undeveloped countries an increasing use +of the conveniences and luxuries of civilization and an increasing +possession of money or its equivalent. It means, throughout all +the world, an increase of what we call "Wealth." + +In discussing a subject so great as sea trade, while it may be +considered presumptuous to look fifty years ahead, it can hardly +be denied that we ought at least to try to look that far ahead. +To look fifty years ahead, is, after all, not taking in a greater +interval of time than fifty years back; and it certainly seems +reasonable to conclude that, if a certain line of progress has +been going on for fifty years in a perfectly straight line, and +with a vigor which is increasing very fast and shows no sign of +change, the same general line of progress will probably keep up +for another fifty years. If we try to realize what this means, we +shall probably fail completely and become dazed by the prospect. +We cannot possibly picture accurately or even clearly to ourselves +any definite conditions of fifty years hence; but we certainly are +warranted in concluding that by the end of fifty years, practically +all of the countries of the world, including Africa, will be open +to trade from one end to the other; that the volume of trade will +be at least ten times as great as it is now; that the means of +communication over the water and through the air will be very much +better than now; and that there will be scores of appliances, methods, +and processes in general use of which we have, as yet, no inkling, +and cannot even imagine. + +Now let us call to mind the accepted proverb that "Competition is +the life of trade," and this will make us see that, accompanying +this stupendous trade, extending over, and into, every corner of +the world, there will be stupendous competition, involving in a +vast and complicated net, every red-blooded nation of the earth. + +We seem safe in concluding, therefore, that the importance of naval +power will increase. + +A great deal is said and written nowadays about the ability of +arbitration to make wars unnecessary, and a good deal also about +the possibility of an agreement among the nations, whereby armaments +may be limited to forces adequate to insure that every nation shall +be compelled to abide by the decision of the others in any disputed +case. + +In view of the number, the earnestness, and the prominence of many +of the men interested in this cause; in view of the number of +arbitration treaties that have been already signed; in view of the +fact that arbitration among nations will simply establish a law +among them like the law in any civilized country; in view of the +fact that individuals in their dealings with each other sometimes +surrender certain of their claims, and even rights, for the common +good; in view of the fact that nations, like all business firms, +like to cut down expenses, and in further view of the fact that +a navy is not directly, but only indirectly, a contributor to a +nation's prosperity, it seems probable that arbitration will be +more and more used among the nations, and that armaments may be +limited by agreement. It is clear, however, that the practical +difficulties in the way of making the absolute agreement required +are enormous, and that the most enthusiastic advocates of the plan +do not expect that the actual limitation of armaments will become +a fact for many years. + +After the necessary preliminaries shall have been arranged, and +the conference takes place which shall settle what armament each +nation may have, it is plain that it will be to the interest of +each nation to keep down the armament of every other nation, and to +be allowed as much as possible itself. In this way, the operation +of making the agreement will be somewhat like the forming of a +trust among several companies, and the advantage will lie with that +nation which is the most powerful. + +For this reason it would seem a part of wisdom for each country +to enter the conference with as large a navy as possible. + +Therefore, the probability of an approaching agreement among the +nations as to limitation of armaments, instead of being a reason +for abating our exertions toward establishing a powerful navy, +is really a conclusive reason for redoubling them. + +This brings us to the important question, "how powerful should our +navy be?" + +This may seem a question impossible to answer. Of course it is +impossible to answer it in terms of ships and guns; but an approximate +estimate may be reached by considering the case of a man playing +poker who holds a royal straight flush. Such a man would be a fool +if he did not back his hand to the limit and get all the benefit +possible from it. So will the United States, if she fails to back +her hand to the limit, recognizing the fact that in the grand game +now going on for the stakes of the commercial supremacy of the world, +she holds the best hand. She has the largest and most numerous +seaports, the most enterprising and inventive people, and the most +wealth with which to force to success all the various necessary +undertakings. + +This does not mean that the United States ought, as a matter either +of ethics or of policy, to build a great navy in order to take +unjust advantage of weaker nations; but it does mean that she ought +to build a navy great enough to save her from being shorn of her +wealth and glory by simple force, as France was shorn in 1871. + +It is often said that the reason for Great Britain's having so +powerful a navy is that she is so situated geographically that, +without a powerful navy to protect her trade, the people would +starve. + +While this statement may be true, the inference usually drawn is +fallacious: the inference that if Great Britain were not so situated, +she would not have so great a navy. + +Why would she not? It is certain that that "tight little island" +has attained a world-wide power, and a wealth per capita greater +than those of any other country; that her power and wealth, as +compared with her home area, are so much greater than those of +any other country as to stagger the understanding; that she could +not have done what she has done without her navy; that she has +never hesitated to use her navy to assist her trade, and yet that +she has never used her navy to keep her people from starving. + +In fact, the insistence on the anti-starvation theory is absurd. +Has any country ever fought until the people as a mass were starving? +Has starving anything to do with the matter? Does not a nation +give up fighting just as soon as it sees that further fighting +would do more harm than good? A general or an admiral, in charge +of a detached force, must fight sometimes even at tremendous loss +and after all hope of local success has fled, in order to hold a +position, the long holding of which is essential to the success +of the whole strategic plan; but what country keeps up a war until +its people are about to starve? Did Spain do so in our last war? Did +Russia fear that Japan would force the people of her vast territory +into starvation? + +No--starvation has nothing to do with the case. If some discovery +were made by which Great Britain could grow enough to support all +her people, she would keep her great navy nevertheless--simply +because she has found it to be a good investment. + +The anti-starvation theory--the theory that one does things simply +to keep from starving--does apply to some tropical savages, but +not to the Anglo-Saxon. Long after starvation has been provided +against, long after wealth has been secured, we still toil on. What +are we toiling for? The same thing that Great Britain maintains +her navy for--wealth and power. + +The real reason for Great Britain's having a powerful navy applies +with exact equality to the United States. Now that Great Britain +has proved how great a navy is best for her, we can see at once +how great a navy is best for us. That is--since Great Britain and +the United States are the wealthiest countries in the world, and +since the probability of war between any two countries is least +when their navies are equal in power--the maximum good would be +attained by making the United States navy exactly equal to the +British navy. + + + + +CHAPTER IV + +NAVAL PREPAREDNESS + +In a preceding chapter I endeavored to show why it is that the +necessities of the naval defense of a country have caused the gradual +development of different types of vessels, each having its distinctive +work. If those different types operated in separate localities they +would lose that mutual support which it is the aim of organization +to secure, and each separate group could be destroyed in turn by +the combined groups of an enemy. For this reason, the types or +groups are combined in one large fleet, and an admiral is placed +in command. + +The command of a fleet is the highest effort of the naval art. Its +success in time of war demands in the admiral himself a high order +of mind and nerve and body; and it demands in all the personnel, +from the highest to the lowest, such a measure of trained ability +and character that each shall be able to discharge with skill and +courage the duties of his station. + +In order that the material fleet shall be efficient as a whole, +each material unit must be efficient as a unit. Each ship must +be materially sound; each pump, valve, cylinder, gun, carriage, +torpedo, and individual appliance, no matter how small, must be +in condition to perform its expected task. The complexity of a +fleet baffles any mental effort, by even those most familiar with +it, to grasp it fully. Each dreadnaught, battle cruiser, destroyer, +submarine, collier, tender, hospital ship, scout, supply ship, and +what-not, is a machine in itself, and is filled with scores--in +some cases, hundreds--of highly specialized machines, operated +by steam, oil, air, electricity, and water. A superdreadnaught +is a machine which, including the machines inside of her, costs +$15,000,000; a battle cruiser more. + +The personnel is nearly as complicated as the material. Not only +are there all the various ranks of commissioned officers in the +line, medical corps, pay corps, marine corps, etc., but there are +ten kinds of warrant officers besides; while in the enlisted personnel +there are ninety-one different "ratings" in the navy, and thirteen +in the marine corps, besides temporary ratings, such as gun-pointer, +gun-trainer, gun-captain, etc. Each rank and rating carries its +rigidly prescribed duties, as well as its distinctive uniform and +pay. That such a multitudinous host of types and individuals, both +material and personnel, can be actually combined in one unit fleet, +and that fleet operated as a mobile directable organism by its +admiral, is a high achievement of the human intellect. + +How is it done? + +By discipline, by training, by knowledge, by energy, by devotion, +by will; by the exercise of those mental, moral, and spiritual +faculties that may be grouped under the one term "mind": the same +power that co-ordinates and controls a still more complex machine, +the organism of the human body. + +Despite its relative crudeness, a fleet possesses, more fully than +any other fruit of man's endeavor, the characteristics of an organism, +defined by Webster as "an individual constituted to carry on the +activities of life by means of parts or organs more or less separate +in function, but mutually dependent." And though it must be true +that no fleet can approximate the perfection of nature's organisms, +nevertheless there is an analogy which may help us to see how a +complex fleet of complex vessels has been slowly evolved from the +simple galley fleets of earlier days; how its various parts may +be mutually dependent yet severally independent; and how all must +be made to work as one vast unit, and directed as one vast unit +by the controlling mind toward "the end in view." + +The common idea is that an army consists of a number of soldiers, +and a navy of a number of ships. This idea is due to a failure +to realize that soldiers and ships are merely instruments, and +that they are useless instruments unless directed by a trained +intelligence: that the first essential in an army and the first +essential in a navy is mind, which first correctly estimates the +situation, then makes wise plans to meet it, then carries out those +plans; which organizes the men and designs the ships, and then +directs the physical power exertable by the men and the ships toward +"the end in view." + +Owing to the enormous mechanical power made available in ships +by the floating properties of water, machinery is more used by +navies than by armies; but this does not mean that machinery can +take the place of men more successfully in navies than in armies, +except in the sense that navies can use more mechanical power. +The abundant use of machines and instruments in navies does not +mean that machinery and instruments can take the place of trained +intelligence--but exactly the reverse. Under the guidance of trained +intelligence, a machine or instrument can perform wonders. But +it is not the machinery that does the wonders; it is the trained +intelligence that devised the instrument or machine, and the trained +intelligence that operates it. Let the trained intelligence err, +or sleep, and note the results that follow. The _Titanic_, a mass +of 40,000 tons, moving through the water at 20 knots an hour, a +marvel of the science and skill of man, crashes into an iceberg, +because the trained intelligence directing her errs--and is reduced +at once to an inert mass of iron and brass. The mighty fleet of +Russia meets the Japanese fleet in Tsushima Straits; and because +the trained intelligence that directed its movements seriously +erred, in an engagement decided in less than an hour, is stripped of +its power and glory, and transformed into a disorganized aggregation +of separate ships--some sunk, some sinking, some in flight. The +Japanese fleet, on the other hand, because it is directed with +an intelligence more highly trained than that which directs the +Russian fleet, and because, in consequence, the officers and enlisted +men perform their various duties not only in the actual battle, +but in preparation for it, with a skill greater than that used in +the Russian fleet, suffers but little damage in the fight--though +the advantage in number and size of ships is slightly with the +Russians. As a consequence of that battle, the war between Russia +and Japan was decided in favor of Japan, and terms of peace were +soon agreed upon. Russia lost practically all the ships that took +part in the battle, and several thousand of her officers and +sailors--and _she lost the whole object for which she went to war_. + +The difference between the Russian and Japanese fleets that gave +the victory to the Japanese was a difference in trained intelligence +and in the relative degrees of preparedness which that difference +caused. + +During the actual battle, the intelligence was that of the officers +and men in the respective fleets, in managing the two fleets, the +ships themselves, and the guns, engines, and machines of all kinds that +those ships contained. It is this factor--trained intelligence--that +has decided most of the battles of history, and the course that +nations thereafter followed. Battles have usually been fought between +forces not very different in point of numbers and material, for the +reason that a force which knew itself to be weaker than another +would not fight unless compelled to fight; and in cases where two +forces of widely differing strength have fought, the situation has +usually been brought about directly by a superior intelligence. In +fact, one of the most frequent and important endeavors of strategy +and tactics--used triumphantly by Napoleon--has always been such +a handling of one's forces as to be superior to the enemy at the +point of contact--to "get the mostest men there the firstest," as +General Forrest is said to have expressed it. + +The effect of superior-trained intelligence is greatest "at the top," +but it can accomplish little unless a fine intelligence permeates the +whole. A fine intelligence at the top will so direct the men below, +will so select men for the various posts, and will so co-ordinate +their efforts, that the organization will resemble a veritable +organism: all the various organs fulfilling separately yet accurately +their allotted functions; all the fire-control parties, all the +gun crews, all the torpedo crews, all the engineer forces properly +organized and drilled; all the hulls of the vessels, all the guns, +all the torpedoes, all the multifarious engines, machines, and +instruments in good material condition and correctly adjusted for +use. + +But it is not only in the actual battle that fine intelligence is +required; it is required long before the battle and far distant +from the scene--in the "admiralty" at home. The Japanese fleet set +out fully manned with a highly trained, enthusiastic, and confident +personnel; the Russian fleet set out manned with a poorly trained +and discouraged personnel, only too well aware of their defects. +The issue at Tsushima was decided before the respective fleets +left their respective homes--though that issue was not then known +to mortals. The battle emphasized, but did not prove, what had +been proved a hundred times before: the paramount importance of +preparedness; that _when two forces fight--the actual battle merely +secures the decision as to the relative values of two completed +machines, and their degrees of preparedness for use_. + +Preparedness of material is not, of course, so important as preparedness +of personnel, because if the personnel is prepared, they will inevitably +prepare the material. And the preparedness must pervade all grades: +for while it is true that the preparedness of those in high command +is more important than the preparedness of those in minor posts, +yet there is no post so lowly that its good or its ill performance +will not be a factor in the net result. An unskilful oiler may +cause a hot bearing that will slow down a battleship, and put out +of order the column of a squadron; a signalman's mistake may throw +a fleet into confusion. + +Perfect preparedness of personnel and material is essential because +events follow each other so rapidly in war that no preparation can +be made after it has begun. To fight is the most intense work a +man can do; and a war is nothing but a fight. No matter how great +or how small a war may be, no war can lose the essential qualities +of a fight, or (save in the treatment of prisoners) be more brutal or +less brutal when fought between two little savage tribes, than when +fought between two colossal groups of Christian nations, civilized to +the highest point. War is the acme of the endeavor of man. Each side +determines that it will win at all costs and at all hazards; that +nobody's comfort, happiness, or safety shall receive the slightest +consideration; that everybody's strength and courage must be worked +to the limit by night as well as by day, and that there must be +no rest and no yielding to any softening influence whatever; that +the whole strength and mind of the nation, and of every individual +in it, must be devoted, and must be sacrificed, if need be, to +the cause at stake. + +In war, a navy's primary duty has usually been to protect the coast +and trade routes of its country; and in order to do this, it has had +to be able to oppose to an attacking fleet a defending fleet more +militarily effective. If it were less effective, even if no invasion +were attempted, the attacking fleet could cripple or destroy the +defending fleet and then institute a blockade. In modern times an +effective blockade, or at least a hostile patrol of trade routes, +could be held hundreds of miles from the coast, where the menace +of submarines would be negligible; and this blockade would stop +practically all import and export trade. This would compel the +country to live exclusively on its own resources, and renounce +intercourse with the outside world. Some countries could exist +a long time under these conditions. But they would exist merely, +and the condition of mere existence would never end until they +sued for peace; because, even if new warships were constructed +with which to beat off the enemy, each new and untrained ship would +be sunk or captured shortly after putting out to sea as, on June +1, 1813, in Massachusetts Bay, the American frigate _Chesapeake_ +was captured and nearly half her crew were killed and wounded in +fifteen minutes by a ship almost identical in the material qualities +of size and armament--the better-trained British frigate _Shannon_. + +For these reasons, every nation that has acquired and has long +retained prosperity, has realized that every country liable to +be attacked by any navy must either be defended by some powerful +country, or else must keep a navy ready to repel the attack +successfully. To do this, the defending navy must be ready when the +attack comes; because if not ready then, it will never have time +to get ready. In regard to our own country, much stress is laid by +some intelligent people--who forget the _Chesapeake_ and _Shannon_--on +the 3,000 miles of water stretching between the United States and +Europe. This 3,000 miles is, of course, a factor of importance, +but it is not a prohibition, because it can be traversed with great +surety and quickness--with much greater surety and quickness, for +instance, than the 12,000 miles traversed by the Russian fleet, +in 1904, in steaming from Russia to Japan. + +The 3,000 miles that separate the United States from Europe can +be traversed by a fleet more powerful than ours in from two to +three weeks; and the fleet would probably arrive on our shores in +good condition, and manned by full crews of well-trained officers +and men, habituated to their duties by recent practice and thoroughly +ready to fight, as the _Shannon_ was. We could not meet this fleet +successfully unless we met it with a fleet more militarily effective; +and we could not do this unless we had in the regular service and +the reserve a personnel of officers and men sufficiently numerous +to man immediately all the vessels that would be needed, and to +man in addition all the shore stations, which would have to be +expanded to a war basis. The officers and enlisted men, of course, +would have to be at least as well trained as the corresponding +personnel in the attacking fleet, and have as recent and thorough +practice in their respective duties; for otherwise, no matter how +brave and devoted they might be, the fate of the American fleet +would be the fate of the _Chesapeake_. + +In order to be ready when war breaks, the first essential is a +plan for preparation. Preparation is divided naturally into two +parts: first, preparation of sufficient material and personnel; +second, preparation of plans for the conduct of the war after it has +begun. These two parts are both considered in what are technically +called "War Plans." + +Preparation for war has always been known to be essential. Lack +of preparation has never been due to lack of knowledge, but always +to neglect. The difference between the wise and the foolish virgins +was not a difference in knowledge but a difference in character. +The difference between Alexander's little army and the tremendous +army of Darius was not so much in numbers as in preparedness. Trained +under Philip of Macedon for many years, organized for conquest +and aggression, prepared to meet any situation that might arise, +Philip's army carried Philip's son from victory to victory, and +made him the master of the world. Cćsar was great in peace as well +as war, but it was by Cćsar's army that Cćsar's greatness was +established; and it was a thoroughness of preparation unknown before +that made Cćsar's army great. Napoleon's successes were built on +the splendid preparation of a mind transcendently fitted to grasp +both principles and details, and on the comparatively unprepared +state of his opponents. + +The Great Elector began in 1640 a course of laborious and scientific +preparation which committed all Prussia, as well as the army, to +acquiring what now we call "efficiency." As this plan developed, +especially under the Elector's grandson King Frederick William, +the next King found himself, as Alexander had done, the chief of +an army more highly prepared for war than any other. By means of +that army he made himself Frederick the Great, and raised Prussia +from a minor position to the first rank of European Powers. Pursuing +Frederick William's system of progressive preparation, Prussia +continued her prosperous course till William I defeated Austria, +then France, and founded the German Empire. This does not mean that +the only result of developing national efficiency to its highest +point is to secure success in war--in fact, we know that it is not. +But it does mean that the same quality--efficiency--which tends +to prosperity in peace tends also to victory in war. + +Preparing for war was a simple thing in the olden days compared +with preparing now, for the reason that the implements of war are +much more numerous and complicated than they used to be, especially +in navies. A navy is not ready unless all preparations and plans +have been made, tested, and kept up to date, to insure that all +of the vessels of every kind and all the shore stations will be +in material condition, fully equipped and manned by a sufficient +and efficient personnel of officers and crews, in time to meet +the enemy on advantageous terms, and unless the central authority +has already decided what it will do, when any probable emergency +shall arise. This was the condition of the German army in 1870. +This was also the condition of the British navy, when war broke +out in August, 1914; the British navy was ready; and therefore it +was able to assume command of the sea at once, drive its enemy's +commerce from the ocean, and imprison its fleets in sheltered ports. + +In all countries the peace establishment of the army and navy is +smaller than the war establishment, for reasons of economy, upon +the assumption that there will be enough time after war is declared +to get on a war basis before the enemy can strike. But since 1870, +all the military nations have realized that the vital struggle of +a war takes place _before_ a shot is fired; that _the factors that +decide which nation shall be the victor and which the vanquished are +determined before the war begins_; that they are simply "functions" +of preparedness. Germany was ready not only for war but for victory, +because her troops were so much better trained, organized, and equipped +than those of France, and her war plans so much more complete, +that she was able to lay France prostrate, before the enormous +resources of that country in men and material could rally in her +defense. + +The relative conditions in which two opposing forces will enter a +war, and their relative performances afterward, will depend upon +the relative excellence of the war plans made for them, and the +thoroughness with which the plans are tested before war breaks. So +it is not difficult to see why all the great armies have patterned +after Germany, and organized special bodies of officers for the +preparation and execution of War plans; and why it is that they +endeavor to secure for that peculiar duty the most thorough and +industrious of their officers. Owing to the nature of war itself, +the principles of warfare apply in their essentials to navies as well +as to armies; and so the navies have patterned after the armies and +made plans whereby they can get ready to fight in fleet organization +on the ocean with the greatest possible effectiveness in the shortest +possible time. + +During peace times every navy is maintained on a "peace basis"; +only such ships and other material being kept in full commission, +and only such a number of officers and enlisted men being actively +employed, as the appropriations allotted by the government permit. +Those ships and other material that are not actually in commission +are maintained in reserve, a condition of partial readiness, of +which several degrees are recognized, in which a reduced number of +officers and men are kept on board, and the various structures and +apparatus are kept in as high a degree of readiness as circumstances +will permit. In order to man in time of war these vessels in reserve, +and insure a sufficient personnel in the active fleet, a "naval +reserve" is organized in each country, composed of officers and men +who have had experience in the regular navy. They are compelled to +undergo a specific amount of training each year, to keep themselves +in readiness at all times to answer the call for active service on +short notice, and to maintain such communication with the government +as will make it easy to locate any man at any moment. + +The act of getting ready, the passing from a state of peace to +a state of readiness for fighting, is called "mobilization." +Mobilization plans are an important element in war plans, but the +details of any mobilization plan are of such a confidential nature +that it would not be proper to discuss them in public print. There +can be no impropriety, however, in making the general statement +that in all navies the endeavor is made to keep the mobilization +plans continually up to date, and to have them prepared in such +detail that every officer and enlisted man in active service, the +retired list, the naval reserve, and the naval militia, will become +instantly available for a predetermined duty, and that every shore +station and every necessary vessel will be ready to take part. The +plans prescribe methods in very great detail whereby the ships +and other vessels in reserve can be quickly put into commission +with full crews of officers and men, all their various equipments, +fuel, and ammunition put on board, and the vessels themselves sent +out to sea to join the fleet. In addition, plans are made whereby +certain auxiliaries can be fitted out at once and put into +commission--such as supply ships, ammunition ships, transports, +colliers, mine ships, hospital ships, etc. The mass of detailed +plans, orders, and instructions is stupendous and bewildering. +Years of study, trial, and rectification are required to get them +into such condition that the plans can be put into immediate and +effective use when war breaks out. The work must be done, however, +and with the utmost thoroughness, _before_ war breaks out; otherwise +it will never be done, if an active enemy is about, because he +will strike at once--and then it will be too late. + +In most of the great naval countries the work of mobilizing the +fleet is comparatively easy, for the reason that the coast-line +is short and is not far from any part of the interior, enabling +reserves to live in fairly close touch with the coast and with +naval affairs, and so near the coast that they can get quickly to +any port. But the conditions in the United States are more difficult +than those in any other country, because of the enormous stretch of +our coast, the great average distance from any place in our country +to the coast, the difficulty of getting a naval reserve that could +be of practical use (owing to the ease with which young men can +make a comfortable living on land), and the perilous slowness of the +nation as a whole to realize the necessity for preparedness. + +As an offset to this, we have the 3,000 miles of ocean between +us and Europe, and the 5,000 miles between us and Asia; and on +account of this we may to a certain extent discount the danger of +attack and the preparedness required to meet it. But our discount +should be reasonable and reasoned out, and certainly not excessive. +Fortunately the problem of how much time we should allow for mobilizing +and joining the fleet is easy, as a moment's thought will show us +that it must be simply the two weeks needed for a fleet to come +from Europe to America; for we must realize that the report of the +sailing of the hostile fleet would be the first news we should +get of any hostile preparation or intent. + +The general situation in which every isolated naval nation stands +regarding other nations is not complicated, but very plain. Each +nation has, as possible opponents in its policy, certain countries. +The naval forces of those countries and the time in which they can +be made ready are known with sufficient accuracy for practical +purposes. If any isolated naval nation wishes to carry out a policy +which any of those countries will forcibly oppose she must either +build a navy equal to that of the other country, or else be prepared +to abandon any attempt to force her policies. Stating the question +in another way, she can carry out only such policies as do not +require for their enforcement a navy stronger than she has. + +It is true that diplomacy and the jealousies of foreign powers +unite to make possible the averting of war during long periods of +time. Diplomacy averted war with Germany for forty-three years, but +it could not continue to avert war eternally. War finally broke out +with a violence unparalleled in history, and possessing a magnitude +proportional to the duration of the preceding peace. "Long coming long +last, short notice soon past" is a sailor's maxim about storms; and +it seems not inapplicable to wars. Certain it is that the frequent +wars of savage tribes are far less terrible than the infrequent +wars of enlightened powers. + +This indicates that, even though a nation may be able to avert +war for a long time, war will come some day, in a form which the +present war foreshadows; and it suggests the possibility that the +longer the war is averted, the more tremendous it will be, the +greater the relative unpreparedness of a slothful nation, and the +sharper her punishment when war finally breaks upon her. + + + + +CHAPTER V + +NAVAL DEFENSE + +There has never been a time since Cain slew Abel when men have +not been compelled to devote a considerable part of their energies +to self-defense. In the early ages, before large organizations +existed or the mechanic arts had made much progress, defense was +mostly defense of life itself. As time went on, and people amassed +goods and chattels, and organized in groups and tribes, it came +to include the defense of property--not only the property of +individuals, but also of the tribe and the land it occupied. Still +later, defense carne to include good name or reputation, when it +was realized that the reputation, even of an organization, could +not be destroyed without doing it an injury. + +At the present day, owing to the complexity of nations and other +organizations, and to the long time during which many of them have +existed, the question of defense has become extremely difficult. The +places in which defense has been brought to its highest excellence +are the large cities of the civilized countries; for there we see that +defense of the life, property, and reputation of every individual +has been carefully provided for. This has been made possible by +the intimate intermingling of the people, the absence of racial +rivalries, and the fact that the interests of all are identical +in the matter of defense of life, property, and reputation; since, +no matter how bad any individual may be, he wishes that others +shall be good, in order that he himself may be safe. + +The defense of reputation has two aspects: the practical and the +sentimental. The practical aspect regards the defense of that element +of reputation which affects ability to "make a living"; while the +sentimental aspect is concerned with the purely personal reputation +of the individual, or with the reputation of an organization or a +nation. The sentimental aspect is much more important, especially +in enlightened nations, than is realized by some who have not thought +much about it; for there is, fortunately, in every decent man a +craving for the esteem and even the affection of his fellow men; +and a knowledge that, no matter how wealthy or powerful he may +be, he cannot be happy if he knows that he is despised. + +The fact that individuals organize to acquire the strength of united +effort brings about, among organizations, a spirit of competition +like that among individuals. It is more intense, however, because +no man alone can get up the enthusiasms that ten men acting together +can get up, and ten men cannot get up as much as a thousand. The +longer any organization is maintained, the sharper this spirit +of rivalry grows to be, owing to the feeling of clanship that +propinquity and material interests evoke. Its acme is found in those +organizations called nations, that have lived together, nourished from +the same soil, for generations; where the same loves and jealousies +and hates that they now feel were felt by their fathers and their +grandfathers and great-grandfathers for centuries back. Among a +people possessing the potentialities of national solidarity and +greatness this feeling waxes, into a self-sacrificing devotion +to the nation and to the land that bore them. + +That there should be such a thing is sometimes deplored; because +patriotism, like all human qualities, has its bad side and its +unfortunate effects. If it were not for patriotism there would +probably be no war, and the greatest suffering that the world endures +would thus be obviated. But if it were not for patriotism there +would be no competition among nations; and in any one nation there +would be no national spirit, no endeavor on the part of every man +to do his part toward making her strong, efficient, and of good +repute or toward making the people individually prosperous and +happy. In the same way, on a smaller scale, many people deplore +the necessity of competition among organizations, saying that it +is ruthless and selfish; that it stamps out the individual; that +it makes every man a mere cog in a money-getting machine; that it +brings about strife, hatred, jealousies, and sometimes murders; +that, if it were not for competition, all men would live together +in peace. + +This may be so; but if it were not for competition there would +probably be little of that strenuous, endeavor without which no +effective progress in advancing the welfare of men has ever yet +been made. Of course, it may be that what we call "progress" has +really not advanced the welfare of men; that the savage in Samoa is +as happy as the millionaire in New York; that knowledge itself is not +an unmixed benefit; and if we accept this view, we may logically declare +that competition, progress, and patriotism are all disadvantages. +But who will go so far? It seems to be a fact that we cannot get +something for nothing: that every plus has its minus, every joy +its pain; that if men succeed in passing beyond the savage state, +and in overcoming the forces of nature, so that they can live in +houses with every modern luxury and convenience, they must pay for +it by a condition of competition that causes personal jealousies +among individuals, commercial wars among organizations, physical +wars among nations. + +Yet the instinctive desire of every one is for peace and comfort, +for the maximum of good with the minimum of exertion; and therefore +the normal person dislikes to see interjected into human life the +abominable confusion of war. From this it comes about that every +nation, even if it consciously brings about a war, always endeavors +to make it appear that the other party is the aggressor. For this +reason in every country the army and navy are said to be for the +"defense" of the country. No nation, no matter how aggressive its +policy may secretly be, openly declares that it intends to provoke +aggression. This does not mean that any nation ever deliberately +raises an army and navy for aggression, and then consciously deceives +the world in regard to its intention; for men are so constituted as +to feel more or less unconsciously that their interests and desires +are proper and those of their opponent wrong; and every nation is +so firmly persuaded of the righteousness of its own policies as +to feel that any country which exhibits antagonism toward these +policies is trying to provoke a fight. + +Now these policies, especially after a nation has adhered to them +for long, seem vital in her eyes, and they usually are so. To Great +Britain, whose major policy is that she must be mistress of the +seas, it is vital that she should be. Her people are surrounded +by the ocean, and unless they are willing simply to eke out an +agricultural existence, it is essential that she should be able +to manufacture articles, send them out in ships to all parts of +the world, and receive in return money and the products of other +lands. In order that she may be able to do this, she must feel +sure that no power on earth can restrain the peaceful sailing to +and fro of her exporting and importing ships. This assurance can be +had only through physical force; it can be exerted only by a navy. +Germany has been gradually coming into the same position, and the +same clear comprehension, owing to the increase of her population, +the growth of their desire for wealth, and their realization of +the control by Great Britain and the United States of large areas +of the surface of the earth. Germany's determination to break down, +at least in part, that overpowering command of the sea which Great +Britain wields has been the result. The ensuing rapid growth and +excellence of Germany's navy and merchant marine brought Germany +and England into sharp competition. Military and naval men have +seen for years that these competing nations would have to go to +war some day in "self-defense." + +In the minds of some people the idea of what constitutes "defense" +is rather hazy, and "defense" is deemed almost synonymous with +"resistance." Perhaps the clearest idea of what constitutes "defense" +is given in a sentence in Webster's Dictionary, that reads: "The +inmates of a fortress are _defended_ by its guns, _protected_ by +its walls, and _guarded_ against surprise by sentries." + +The distinction is important, and the partially aggressive character +of defense it indicates is exemplified in all walks of human and +brute life. Any animal, no matter how peaceably inclined, will +turn on his aggressor--unless, indeed, he runs away. No one ever +saw any brute oppose a merely passive resistance to attack. Every +man recognizes in himself an instinct to hit back if he is hit. If +it be an instinct, it must have been implanted in us for a reason; +and the reason is not hard to find in the universal law of +self-protection, which cannot be satisfied with the ineffectual +method of mere parrying or resisting. + +Naval defense, like military defense, therefore, is not passive +defense only, but contains an element of "offense" as well. When +the defense contains in large measure the element of offense, it is +said in military parlance to be "offensive-defensive"; and the most +effective defensive is this offensive-defensive. When a defending +force throws off its defensive attitude entirely and advances boldly +to attack, it is said to have "assumed the offensive"; but even this +assumption, especially if it be temporary--as when a beleaguered +garrison makes a sortie--does not rob the situation of its defensive +character. + +For these reasons the dividing line between offense and defense +is very vague; and it is made more vague through a realization by +all military people that the offense has certain decided advantages +over the defense (unless the defense has the advantage of position); +so that when strained relations between two nations come, each +is so fearful that the other will take the offensive first, when +the two nations are near each other, that it is apt to take the +offensive first--in real _self-defense!_ A striking illustration +is the action of certain European Powers in the latter part of +July, 1914. + +In addition to the sincere convictions of either party, there is +also apt to be considerable yielding to the temptation to persuade +the world that the other party is the aggressor, merely to get the +sympathy that usually goes to the innocent victim--the support +of what Bismarck called "the imponderables." Few wars have been +frankly "offensive," like the conquests of Alexander, Cćsar, and +Pizarro, at least in modern times; each side has usually claimed +(and often sincerely believed) that its action was demanded in +self-defense and that its cause was just. + +To some in the United States naval defense means merely defense +against invasion. This notion is of recent growth, and certainly was +not held by the framers of our Constitution. Section 8 of Article +I defines the powers of Congress; and although eight of the eighteen +paragraphs deal exclusively with measures of defense on sea and land, +only one of those paragraphs (the fifteenth) deals with invasion. +The, first paragraph reads: + +The Congress shall have power to lay and collect taxes, duties, +imposts, and excises, _to pay the debts and provide for the common +defense and general welfare of the United States_; but all duties, +imposts, and excises shall be uniform throughout the United States. + +The juxtaposition of the words "common defense" and "general welfare" +in this admirably written paragraph could hardly have been accidental, +or have been due to any other cause than a juxtaposition of those +ideas in the minds of the Constitution's framers. And what more +natural connection can there be between any two ideas than between +those of common defense and general welfare, since the general +welfare of no country has ever continued long unless it was defended. +Now the general welfare of every maritime power has always been +intimately concerned with its sea-borne commerce. It is only by +means of sea-borne commerce, for instance, that Americans can live +in the way Americans wish to live. "General welfare" means more +than mere existence. A mere existence is the life a savage lives. +Furthermore, the general welfare of a country requires the safety +of its exported and imported goods while on the sea, and includes +the right of its citizens to travel with safety in every land, +to buy and sell in foreign ports, to feel a proper measure of +self-respect and national respect wherever they may go, and to +command from the people of the lands they visit a proper recognition +of their claims to justice. + +Naval defense may, therefore, be said to consist of three parts: + +1st--Defense of the coast against bombardment and invasion. + +2d--Defense of the trade routes traversed by ships carrying the +exports and imports of the country. + +3d--Defense of the national policy, including defense of the nation's +reputation, honor, and prestige. + +Of these, defense of the coast against bombardment and invasion is +the easiest, and defense of the national policy the most difficult; +because in preventing bombardment and invasion the defender has the +strategical advantage of being nearer home than the adversary; +while in the defense of a country's policy, a naval force may have +to "assume the offensive," and go even to the far distant coasts +of the enemy--as the Russian fleet went to Tsushima, where it met +its death. + +In that part of naval defense which is concerned with trade routes, +the strategical advantage must go, in general, to that side which +is the nearer to the locality where the decisive battle may occur. + +In laying down a policy of naval defense, however, it is not necessary +to consider these three parts separately, because no nation can +ever tell whether in the distant future its naval defense will +have to be used directly for any one of the three, or for all. +In general terms, it may be stated that in nearly all naval wars +the fleet has been used more for the defense of the nation's policy +than for the actual defense of the coasts or the trade routes. This +does not mean that there has never been a bombardment or invasion, +or that the defense of trade routes may not have been the cause of +the war itself; but it does mean that in actual wars bombardment +or invasion has been rare, the capture of merchant vessels has +played a minor part, and the deciding events have been battles +between two fleets, that were often far from the land of either. + +Owing to the fact that within modern times most of the important +countries of the world have been those of continental Europe, with +frontiers contiguous, and in fact identical, the defense of a country +has been largely committed to the army, and most of the wars have +been on land. The country standing in exception to this has been +Great Britain, whose isolated and insular situation demanded a +defense that was strictly naval. The tremendous advance in recent +times of the engineering arts, by which ships became larger and +faster, and able to carry more powerful and accurate guns than ever +before, has enhanced the value of naval power and enabled Great +Britain to reach all over the surface of the earth, and become more +powerful than any continental nation. Thus she has made out of the +very weakness of her position a paramount tower of strength. + +Naval defense was taken up systematically in Great Britain in the +eighth century by King Offa, to whom is credited the maxim, "He +who would be secure on land must be supreme at sea"; but it must +have dropped to a low ebb by 1066, for William of Normandy landed +in England unopposed. Since that time Great Britain's naval defense, +committed to her navy, has increased steadily in effectiveness and +power, keeping pace with the increase in the national interests +it defended, and utilizing all the growing resources of wealth +and science which the world afforded. Until the present crisis, +Great Britain's naval defense did its most important work during +Napoleon's time, when Great Britain's standing, like the standing +of every other European nation, was subjected to a strain that +it could hardly bear. So keenly, however, did the nation and the +nation's great leader, Pitt, realize the situation that the most +strenuous measures were adopted to keep the navy up, press-gangs +even visiting the houses of subjects of the King, taking men out and +putting them by force on board his Majesty's ships. But the British +navy, even more than the British army, brought Great Britain safe +out of the Napoleonic danger, and made the British the paramount +nation of the world. + +Since then Great Britain has waxed more and more powerful, her +avowed policy being that her navy should be equal to any other two; +realizing that her aloofness in point of national characteristics +and policy from all other nations made it possible that a coalition +of at least two great nations might be pitted against her at a +time when she could not get an ally. Accompanying the growth of +the British navy has been the establishment of British foreign +trade, British colonies, and British bases from which the navy +could work, and the general making of a network of British commerce +and British power over the surface of the earth. No other nation +has ever dominated so large a part of the surface of the globe as +has Great Britain during the last two centuries; and she has done +it by means of her naval power. This naval power has been, in the +language of Great Britain, for the "imperial defense"; not for coast +defense alone, but for the defense of all the imperial interests, +commercial and political, and even the imperial prestige. And this +defense of prestige, it may here be remarked, is not a vainglorious +defense, not an exhibition of a swaggering, swashbuckling spirit, but +a recognition of the fact that the minds of men are so constituted +that the prestige of an individual, an organization, or a nation +has a practical value and is an actual force. No government that +appreciates its responsibilities will willingly risk the prestige of +the nation which it governs, because it knows that any weakening +of it will be followed by a weakening of influence and a consequent +increase of difficulty in attaining some "end in view." + +The greatness of the British navy, compared with that of the British +army and the other elements of Great Britain's government, has taken +on magnified dimensions during the last half century. So long as +war-ships used sails as their principal motive power, so long were +they forced to employ methods of construction and equipment that +forbade the efficient employment of high-power guns, the attainment +of great speed, and the use of instruments of precision; so long, +in other words, was their military effectiveness prevented from +increasing greatly. But when the British navy decided to abandon +sail power altogether and propel their ships by steam, a new phase +was entered upon, in which every resource of the engineering arts +and the physical sciences was called into requisition; and now, +on board a dreadnaught, battle cruiser, destroyer, or submarine, +can be found the highest examples of mechanical and electrical art +and science. Every material resource which the brain and wealth +of man can compass is enlisted in her naval defense; and in order +to take advantage of the rapidity and certainty of movement they +afford for operating fleets and ships, there has been a great advance +in methods of operation, or, in military parlance, "staff work." +To assist this work, the radio, the cable, and even the humble +typewriter have contributed their essential share, with the result +that to Great Britain's naval defense there has been devoted an +extraordinary degree of efficiency, continuous effort, a more varied +activity, and a larger expenditure of money than to any other object +of man's activity. + +The United States navy, to which is committed the naval defense +of the United States, has followed the same lines as the British; +and its task, while in some ways easier, is in other ways more +difficult. Perhaps the chief reason why the naval defense of Great +Britain is so difficult is the extreme closeness of her borders +to the borders of her possible foes--for the English Channel is +only twenty-three miles across from Dover to Calais. And yet the +very narrowness of the Channel there lends a certain element of +assistance to the defender of either coast against an enemy like +Germany, because it enables the defender, by simply protecting that +narrow area, to prevent an enemy from passing to the sea or from it, +except by going around the British Isles. But while it is interesting +thus to compare the tasks of two navies by comparing the lengths +of coast line, populations, wealth, and areas of their countries, +or their distances from possible antagonists, such comparisons are +really misleading; for the reason that all nations are on a par +in regard to the paramount element of national defense, which is +defense of national policy. It was as important to Belgium as it +was to Germany to maintain the national policy, and the army of +Belgium was approximately as strong as that of Germany in proportion +to her wealth, area, and population; but nevertheless the Belgium +army was routed, and Belgium was conquered by the German army. + +Much has been written to prove that the sole reason for the possession +of the paramount navy by Great Britain is that the soil of Great +Britain cannot support her people. In an essay, entitled "Naval +Power," which I contributed to the _United States Naval Institute_ +in 1911, the fallacy of this was shown; and it was pointed out that +even if Great Britain grew more than enough to feed her people, +life could be made unendurable to the 60,000,000 living there (or to +the people in any civilized and isolated country) by an effective +blockading fleet. _The question of how great a navy any country needs +depends, not on the size, but on the policies of that country, and +on the navies of the countries that may oppose those policies_. The +navy that a country needs is a navy that can defend its policies, +both offensively and defensively. If, for instance, the United States +does not wish to enforce any policy that Great Britain would oppose, +or to oppose any policy that Great Britain would enforce, then we +may leave her navy out of consideration. But if we decide that we +must maintain a certain policy which a certain country may oppose, +then we must have a navy at least equal to hers; because we do not +know whether we should have to meet that navy near our coast, or +near hers, or far away from both. For the reason, furthermore, that +a war with a European Power might occur at a period of strained +relations with some Asiatic Power, we must realize the temptation +to that Asiatic Power to seize the opportunity and attack us on +the Pacific side, knowing that we should need all our navy on the +Atlantic side. This seems to mean that in order to have an effective +naval defense (since we are precluded by our policy from having +European allies and no South American country could give us any +effective naval help) we must have on each ocean a fleet as strong +as that of any nation on that ocean against whose wishes we may +have to enforce a policy--or against whose policy we may have to +oppose resistance. + +The essential requirement of any defense is that it shall be adequate; +because an inadequate defense will be broken down, while the attack +will retain a large proportion of its original strength. In the +_United States Naval Institute_, in 1905, the present writer showed, +by means of a series of tables, how, when two forces fight, the +force which is originally the more powerful will become gradually +more powerful, relatively to the weaker, as the fight goes on. That, +for instance, if two forces start with the relative powers of 10 and +8, the weaker force will be reduced so much more rapidly than the +stronger that when it has been reduced to zero the stronger force +will have a value of 5.69. The values mentioned indicated the actual +fighting strength--strength made up of all the factors--material, +physical, and psychic--that constituted it. Of course, none of +these factors can ever be accurately compared; but nevertheless +the tables seemed to prove that in a contest between two forces +whose total strengths are as 10 and 8 one force will be reduced +to zero, while the other will be reduced not quite one-half. + +One of the lessons drawn was "the folly of ineffectual resistance." +Doubtless a clearer lesson would have been "the folly of ineffectual +preparedness"; because, when the decision as to resistance or +non-resistance is forced upon a nation, the matter is so urgent, +the military, political, and international conditions so complex, +and the excitement probably so intense, that a wise decision is +very difficult to reach; whereas the question of what constitutes +effectual preparedness is simple, and needs merely to be approached +with calm nerves and an open mind. + +Inasmuch as the psychic element in defense is the strongest single +element, it is apparent that if the decision is reached to prepare +an effectual defense the nation must be absolutely united, and +must appreciate at its full value the debilitating influence of +opposition to the measure; for, no matter how much money a nation +may expend, no matter how many lives it may sacrifice, its defense +cannot have an efficiency proportional to the effort if a considerable +number of its citizens are permitted to oppose it. + +In our own country there has been so much talking and writing recently +about defense, that there is danger of the question coming to be +considered academic; though no question is more practical, no question +is more urgent. + +_Defense must defend_. + + + + +CHAPTER VI + +NAVAL POLICY + +Every country that has a satisfactory navy has acquired it as the +result of a far-seeing naval policy, not of opportunism or of chance. +The country has first studied the question thoroughly, then decided +what it ought to do, then decided how to do it. + +Naval policy has to deal with three elements: material, personnel, +and operations, which, though separate, are mutually dependent. A +clear comprehension of their actual relations and relative weights +can be obtained only by thorough study; but without that comprehension +no wise naval policy can be formulated, and therefore no satisfactory +navy can be established. + +The most obvious thing about a navy is its material: the ponderous +battleships, the picturesque destroyers, the submarines, the intricate +engines of multifarious types, the radio, the signal-flags, the +torpedo that costs $8,000, the gun that can sink a ship 10 miles +away. + +The United States navy ever since its beginning in 1775 has excelled +in its material; the ships have always been good, and in many cases +they have surpassed those of similar kind in other navies. This +has been due to the strong common sense of the American people, +their engineering skill, and their inventive genius. The first +war-ship to move under steam was the American ship _Demologos_, +sometimes called the _Fulton the First_, constructed in 1813; the +first electric torpedoes were American; the first submarine to do +effective work in war was American; the first turret ship, the +_Monitor_, was American; the first warship to use a screw propeller +was the _Princeton_, an American; the naval telescope-sight was +American. American ships now are not only well constructed, but all +their equipments are of the best; and to-day the American battleship +is the finest and most powerful vessel of her class in the world. + +Our personnel, too, has always been good. The American seaman has +always excelled, and so has the American gunner. No ships have +ever been better handled than the American ships; no naval battles +in history have been conducted with more skill and daring than +those of American ships; no exploits in history surpass those of +Cushing, Hobson, and Decatur. + +In operations, however, in the handling of the navy as a whole, +we have never excelled; though no better individual fleet leaders +shine in the pages of all history than Farragut and Dewey. The +strategical operating of our material and personnel has not been +in accordance with carefully laid plans, but has been left largely +to the inspiration of the commander on the spot, both in peace +and in war. Material has suffered from lack of a naval policy, +but only quantitatively, because material is a subject that the +people understand. Personnel has suffered more, because the people +fail to realize the amount of training needed to make a personnel +competent to perform their tasks successfully, in competition with +the highly trained men of other navies. But operations have suffered +incomparably more than material and personnel; because naturally +the people do not comprehend the supreme importance of being ready, +when war breaks out, to operate the material and personnel skilfully +against an active enemy, in accordance with well-prepared strategic +plans; nor do they realize how difficult and long would be the task +of preparing and testing out those plans. Therefore, they fail to +provide the necessary administrative machinery.[*] + +[Footnote *: Since this was written, the Congress has so enlarged +the scope of the Office of Chief of Naval Operations as to make +it a General Staff.] + +In fact, the kind and amount of machinery needed to conduct operations +skilfully and quickly cannot be decided wisely until the country +adopts some naval policy; and in naval policy the United States +must be admitted to have lagged behind almost every other civilized +country. Spurred as we were to exertion by the coming of the +Revolutionary War, we constructed hastily, though with skill, the +splendid ships that did service in that war. But after the war, +interest in the navy waned; and if it had not been for the enormous +tribute demanded by the pirates of the Barbary coast from our +government, and a realization of the fact that not only was it +cheaper to build ships and fight the pirates than to pay the tribute, +but paying the tribute was a disgraceful act, our navy would have +run down even more than it did. Yet even with this warning, 1812 +found our navy in a desperate condition. Rallying to the emergency, +though too late to accomplish much practical result, we built a number +of excellent ships, against the votes of many highly influential +men in Congress. These ships did gallant service, and redeemed +the reputation of Americans from the oft-repeated charge of being +cowards and merely commercial men, though they were too few to +prevent the blockade which British squadrons maintained on our +Atlantic coast. After the war, the navy was again allowed to +deteriorate; and although our ships were excellent, and the officers +and men were excellent, and although the war with Mexico supplied +some stimulation, the War of the Rebellion caught us in a very +bad predicament. The country rose to this emergency too slowly, +as before; but the enemy were even less prepared than we, so that +during the four years of the Civil War we were able to construct, +man, and buy several hundred ships of various kinds; with the result +that, at the end of the war, our navy, if not quite so powerful as +Great Britain's, was at least very close to it, and with a recent +experience in actual war which the British navy did not possess. + +After that war, the same story was repeated. The people convinced +themselves that they would never again be forced to go to war; that +they had seen the folly of it, and the misery of it, and would +devote themselves thereafter to the delightful pursuits of peace. +Gradually the fighting ships of the ironclad class were allowed +to go to pieces; gradually even the larger ships of the wooden +sailing class fell into disrepair; gradually the idea of war faded +from the minds even of naval officers; gradually squadrons and +fleets, as such, were broken up, and our ships were to be found +scattered singly over all the seas, and swinging idly at their +anchors in pleasant ports. + +Fortunately, Admiral Luce and a very few other officers had learned +the salient lessons of war during the Rebellion, and sturdily stood up +against the decadent tendency of the times. Against much opposition, +Luce succeeded in founding the Naval War College at Newport, where +the study of war as an art in itself was to be prosecuted, and in +enlisting Captain Mahan in the work. In a few years Mahan gave to +the world that epochal book, "The Influence of Sea Power upon History" +(embodying his lectures before the War College), which stirred the +nations of Europe to such a realization of the significance of +naval history, and such a comprehension of the efficacy of naval +power, that they entered upon a determined competition for acquiring +naval power, which continues to this day. + +Meanwhile, a little before 1880, the people became aroused to the +fact that though the country was growing richer, their navy was +becoming weaker, while the navies of certain European countries +were becoming stronger. So they began in 1880 the construction of +what was then called "the new navy." The construction of the new +ships was undertaken upon the lines of the ships then building abroad, +which were in startling contrast with the useless old-fashioned +American ships which then were flying our flag. + +The construction of the material of the navy has progressed since +then, but spasmodically. At every session of Congress tremendous +efforts have been made by people desiring an adequate navy, and +tremendous resistance has been made by people who believed that we +required no navy, or at least only a little navy. The country at +large has taken a bystander's interest in the contest, not knowing +much about the pros and cons, but feeling in an indolent fashion +that we needed some navy, though not much. The result has been, not +a reasonable policy, but a succession of unreasonable compromises +between the aims of the extremists on both sides. + +Great Britain, on the other hand, has always regarded the navy +question as one of the most difficult and important before the +country, and has adopted, and for centuries has maintained, a definite +naval policy. This does not mean that she has followed a rigid +naval policy; for a naval policy, to be efficient, must be able +to accommodate itself quickly to rapid changes in international +situations, and to meet sudden dangers from even unexpected quarters--as +the comparatively recent experience of Great Britain shows. At the +beginning of this century the British navy was at the height of +its splendor and self-confidence. Britannia ruled the waves, and +Britannia's ships and squadrons enforced Britannia's policies in +every sea. The next most powerful navy was that of France; but +it was not nearly so large, and seemed to be no more efficient, +in proportion to its size. Owing to Britain's wise and continuing +policy, and the excellence of the British sailor and his ships, +the British navy proudly and almost tranquilly held virtual command +of all the seas. + +But shortly after this century began, British officers discerned a +new and disturbing element gradually developing on the horizon. The +first thing which roused their attention to it was the unexpected +attack of the Japanese torpedo-boats on the Russian squadron in +Port Arthur. No war had been declared, and the Russian squadron +was riding peacefully at anchor. The suddenness of the attack, and +the distinct though incomplete success which it achieved, startled +the British into a realization of the fact that there had been +introduced into warfare on the sea methods and tactics requiring _a +higher order of preparation_ than had ever before been known; that +the scientific methods which the Germans employed so effectively on +land in 1870 had been adapted by the Japanese to naval warfare, and +would necessitate the introduction into naval policies of _speedier +methods_ than had hitherto been needed. + +Another event which had happened shortly before showed that naval +policies would have to be modified, if they were to utilize recent +advances in scientific methods. This event was the unprecedented +success at target practice of H. M. S. _Terrible_, commanded by +Captain Sir Percy Scott, which proved that by a long and strenuous +training and the adoption of instruments of precision, it was possible +to attain a skill in naval gunnery never attained before. Up to this +moment the British navy had almost despised gunnery. Inheriting the +traditions brought down from Howe, Rodney, and Nelson, permeated with +the ideals of the "blue-water school," proud of being British seamen, +proud of the pure white of their ships, enamoured of the stimulating +breeziness of the quarterdeck and bridge, imbued with almost a +contempt for such mathematical sciences as were not directly used +in practical navigation, British naval officers exalted seamanship +as the acme of their art, and took little interest in gunnery. +All the battles of the past had been won by dash and seamanship +and dogged persistence. Ships had always fought close alongside +each other. No science had ever won any naval battle of the past, +so why should they bother with science now--and why should they +bother with target practice, except just enough to insure that the +battery was in order, and that the men were not afraid of their +guns? Besides, target practice dirtied the ship--a sacrilege to +the British naval officer. + +But the events of the war between Japan and Russia, especially +the naval battles of Port Arthur, August 10, 1904, and the Sea +of Japan, May 27, 1905, riveted their attention on the fact that +something more than seamanship and navigation and clean ships would +be needed, if the British navy was to maintain its proud supremacy +on the sea; for in these battles, overwhelming victories were won +purely by superior skill in gunnery, strategy, and tactics. + +To these causes of awakening was added one still greater, but of +like import--the rapid rise of the German navy from a position +of comparative unimportance to one which threatened the British +navy itself. The fact became gradually evident to British officers +that the German navy was proceeding along the same lines as had +proceeded the German army. Realizing the efficiency of the German +Government, noting the public declarations of the German Emperor, +observing the excellence of the German ships, the skill of the +German naval officers, and the extraordinary energy which the German +people were devoting to the improvement of the German navy--the +British navy took alarm. + +So did the other navies. + +Beginning about 1904, Great Britain set to work with energy to +reform her naval policy. Roused to action by the sense of coming +danger, she augmented the size and number of vessels of all types; +increased the personnel of all classes, regular and reserve; scrapped +all obsolete craft; built (secretly) the epochal _Dreadnaught_, +and modernized in all particulars the British navy. In every great +movement one man always stands pre-eminent. The man in this case was +Admiral Sir John Fisher, first sea lord of the admiralty, afterward +Lord Fisher. Fisher brought about vital changes in the organization, +methods, and even the spirit of the navy. He depleted the overgrown +foreign squadrons, concentrated the British force in powerful fleets +near home, established the War College, inculcated the study of +strategy and tactics, appointed Sir Percy Scott as inspector of +target practice, put the whole weight of his influence on the side +of gunnery and efficiency, placed officers in high command who had +the military idea as distinguished from the idea of the "blue-water +school," and imbued the entire service with the avowed idea that +they must get ready to fight to the death, not the French navy, +with its easy-going methods, but the German navy, allied perhaps +with some other. At the admiralty he introduced methods analogous to +those of the General Staff, to maintain the navy ready for instant +service at all times, to prepare and keep up to date mobilization +plans in the utmost detail, and to arrange plans for the conduct +of war in such wise that after a war should break out, all the +various probable situations would have been studied out in advance. + +The work required at the admiralty, and still more in the fleet--night +and day and in all weathers--taxed mental and physical endurance to +the limit; but the result was complete success; for when war broke +out on the 1st of August, 1914, the British navy was absolutely +ready. Many complaints have appeared in print about the unreadiness +of Great Britain; but no one who knows anything of the facts supposes +that these criticisms include Great Britain's navy. + +The United States navy in the early part of this century occupied, +relatively to others, a very ill-defined position; but the increased +interest taken in it by our people after the Spanish War, combined +with the destruction of the flower of the Russian fleet in the +Russo-Japanese War, and the crushing blow inflicted on the French +navy by the maladministration of Camille Pelletan, resulted in +placing our navy, about three years ago, in a position second only +to Great Britain's--a position which it recently has lost. Owing +to a common origin and language, our navy has always followed the +British navy, though at a somewhat respectful distance; and while +it is true that in point of mechanical inventions we are ahead, in +seamanship, navigation, and engineering on a par, and in gunnery +and tactics not far behind, yet we must admit that in policy and +in policy's first cousin, strategy, we are very far in the rear. + +There are many reasons why this should be, the first being that +the British navy has nearly always lived under more stimulating +conditions than we, because the probability of war has seemed greater, +and because the United States has underestimated what reasonable +probability there has been, and failed to realize how tremendously +difficult would be the task of getting ready for it. Owing to the +present war, our people have gradually come to see that they must +get more ships and other material; but they realize this as only a +measure of urgency, and not as a matter of policy. If the emergency +passes us by in safety, the people may see in this fact only a +confirmation of their notion that war can be postponed _ad infinitum_, +and may therefore fail to take due precautions for the future. If +so, when we at last become involved in a sudden war, we shall be +as unprepared as now; and, relatively to some aggressive nation +which, foreseeing this, may purposely prepare itself, we shall +be more unprepared. + +A curious phase of the navy question in our country is the fact +that very few people, even the most extreme partisans for or against +a large navy, have ever studied it as a problem and endeavored +to arrive at a correct solution. Few have realized that it is a +problem, in the strictest sense of the word; and that unless one +approaches it as such his conclusions cannot be correct except +by accident. + +In Germany, on the other hand, and equally in Japan, the question +has been taken up as a concrete problem, just as definite as a +problem in engineering. They have used for solving it the method +called "The Estimate of the Situation," originated by the German +General Staff, which is now adopted in all the armies and navies of +civilized countries for the solution of military problems. Previous +to the adoption of this method the general procedure had been such +as is now common in civil life, when a number of people forming +a group desire to make a decision as to what they will do in any +given contingency. The usual procedure is for some one to suggest +that a certain thing be done, then for somebody else to suggest +that something else be done, and so on; and then finally for the +group to make a decision which is virtually a compromise. This +procedure is faulty, and the decisions resulting are apt to be +unwise; because it is quite possible that some very important factors +may be overlooked, and equally possible that some other factors +be given undue weight. Furthermore, a measure advocated by a man +who has the persuasive and emotional abilities of the orator is +more apt to be favorably considered than a measure advocated by +a man not possessing those abilities. + +In the "Estimate of the Situation" method, on the other hand, the +orator has no opportunity, because the procedure is simply an accurate +process of reasoning. It is divided into four parts. The first +part consists of a careful study of the "mission," ending in a +clear determination of what the "mission" really is--that is, _what +is the thing which it is desired to do?_ The second part consists +of a careful study, and eventually a clear comprehension, of the +difficulties in the way; the third part consists of a careful study, +and eventually a clear comprehension, of what facilities are available +with which to overcome the difficulties; the fourth part consists +of a careful study of the mission, difficulties and facilities, in +their mutual relations, and a "decision" as to what should therefore +be done. + +Military and naval people are so thoroughly convinced of the value +of this method that they always employ it when making important +decisions, writing down the various factors and the successive +steps in regular order and in complete detail. + +In this country, while naval and military people use this method +in their comparatively minor problems, the country at large does +not use it in deciding the major problem--that is, in deciding +how much navy they want, and of what composition. They do not take +even the first step toward formulating a naval policy, because +they do not study the "mission" of the navy--that is, _they do not +study the international and national situations and their bearing +on the need for a navy_. Yet until they do this they will not be +in a sufficiently informed condition of mind to determine what +the "mission" is--that is, what they wish the navy to be able to +do--because, before they can formulate the mission they must resolve +what foreign navy or navies that mission must include. If they +decide that the mission of the navy is to guard our coast and trade +routes against the hostile efforts of Liberia the resulting naval +policy will be simple and inexpensive; while if they conclude that +the mission of our navy is to guard our coast and trade routes +against the hostile acts of _any_ navy the resulting naval policy +will be so difficult and costly as to tax the brain and wealth of +the country to a degree that will depend on _the length of time +that will elapse before the date at which the navy must be ready +to fulfil that mission_. + +This factor reminds us of another factor: _the minimum time in which +the navy can get ready to fulfil a given mission_ (for instance, +to protect us against any navy); and we cannot decide the mission +correctly without taking this factor into account. For example, +it would be foolish to decide that the mission of our navy is to +protect us _now_ against any navy, including the greatest, when +it would take us at least twenty years to develop and train a navy +to accomplish that task; and it would be equally foolish to decide +that the mission is to protect us against any navy _except_ the +greatest, because such a decision could rest on no other ground +than present improbability of conflict with the greatest navy, +or improbability for the very few years ahead (say two or three) +which we poor mortals can forecast. + +This reasoning seems to indicate that the first step in formulating +a naval policy for the United States is to realize that any conclusion +as to which navies should be included in the mission of our navy +must not exclude any navy about whose peaceful conduct toward us +we can entertain a reasonable doubt, _during the period of time +which we would require to get ready to meet her_. For instance, +inasmuch as it would take us at least twenty years to get ready +to protect ourselves against the hostile efforts of the British +navy, we cannot exclude even that navy from a consideration of the +mission of our own, unless we entertain no doubt of the peaceful +attitude of that navy toward us for at least that twenty years. + +Clearly, the problem is not only very important but very +difficult--perhaps the most difficult single problem before the +country; and for this reason, naval officers have long marvelled +that the leading minds of the country do not undertake it. Perhaps +one reason is that they do not know how difficult it is: that they +do not realize the extraordinary complexity of modern ships and +engines, and the trained skill required to handle them; that they +do not realize what Great Britain now realizes, that we must prepare +for one of the most stupendous struggles ever carried on; that we +must have a personnel both of officers and enlisted men trained +to the highest point, because they will have to meet officers and +enlisted men trained to the highest point; that the training must +be such that the skill produced can be exercised by night and day, +in cold and heat, in storm and calm, under circumstances of the +utmost possible difficulty and danger; that, while it takes four +years to build a ship and get her into the fleet as an effective +unit, it takes much longer to train an enlisted petty officer as +he should be trained, and a lifetime to train officers of the upper +grades. Perhaps also our leading minds do not realize the intellectual +requirements of the higher realms of the naval art, or comprehend +what the examples of Alexander, Cćsar, Napoleon, Nelson, and Farragut +prove: that, _in the real crises of a nation's life her most valuable +asset is the trained skill in strategy that directs the movements +of her forces_. + +Further than this, they may not realize that the greater the danger +which they must avert, the earlier they must begin to prepare for +it, because the more work in preparation will have to be performed; +and yet realization of this truth is absolutely vital, as is also +realization of the fact that we have no military power as our ally, +and therefore must be ready to meet alone a hostile attack (though +perhaps in the far-distant future) from _any_ foreign power. To +see that this is true it is merely necessary to note the facts of +history, and observe how nations that have long been on terms of +friendship have suddenly found themselves at war with each other; +and how countries which have always been hostile have found themselves +fighting side by side. In the present war, Great Britain is allied +with the two countries toward which, more than toward any other, +she has been hostile; and she is fighting the country to which, +more than any other, she is bound by ties of consanguinity and +common interests. The history of war is so filled with alternations +of peace and war between every pair of contiguous countries as to +suggest the thought that the mere fact of two countries having +interests that are common is a reason why their respective shares +in those interests may conflict; that countries which have no common +interests have nothing to fight about; that it is only for things +in which two nations are interested, and which both desire, that +those two nations fight. + +If our estimate of the situation should lead us to the decision +that we must prepare our navy in such a way that, say twenty years +hence, it will be able to protect the country against any enemy, +we shall then instinctively adopt a policy. The fact of having +ahead of us a definite, difficult thing to do, will at once take us +out of the region of guesswork, and force us into logical methods. +We shall realize the problem in its entirety; we shall see the +relation of one part to another, and of all the parts to the whole; +we shall realize that the deepest study of the wisest men must be +devoted to it, as it is in all maritime countries except our own. +The very difficulties of the problem, the very scope and greatness +of it, the fact that national failure or national success will +hinge on the way we solve it, will call into action the profoundest +minds in all the nation. We shall realize that, more than any other +problem before the country, this problem is urgent; because in no +other problem have we so much lost time to make up for, and in +no other work of the government are we so far behind the great +nations that we may have to contend against. + +Great Britain was startled into a correct estimate of the situation +ten years ago, and at once directed perhaps the best of her ability +to meet it. Certain it is that no other department of the British +Government is in such good condition as the navy; in no other department +has the problem been so thoroughly understood, and so conscientiously +worked out, or the success been so triumphant. + +The underlying reason for this is not so much the individual courage +and ability of the officers and men, or even their skill in handling +their ships and squadrons, as the fact that Great Britain has followed +a definite naval policy; so that the British nation has had a perfectly +clear realization of what it wishes the navy to do, and the navy +has had a perfectly clear realization of how to do it. + +The United States has not yet made a correct estimate of the naval +situation; she has not yet reached the point that Great Britain +reached ten years ago. Great Britain apprehended the danger, and +took action before it was too late. Shall the United States take +action now or wait until it is too late? + + + + +PART II + +NAVAL STRATEGY + + + + +CHAPTER VII + +GENERAL PRINCIPLES + +Strategy is difficult of definition; but though many definitions +have been made, and though they do not agree together very well, +yet all agree that strategy is concerned with the preparation of +military forces for war and for operating them in war--while tactics +is the immediate instrument for handling them in battle. Strategy +thinks out a situation beforehand, and decides what preparations +as to material, personnel, and operations should be made. + +Many books have been written on strategy, meaning strategy as applied +to armies, but very few books have been written on naval strategy. +The obvious reasons are that armies in the past have been much +larger and more important than navies; that naval men have only +recently had the appliances on board ship for writing on an extensive +scale; and that the nature of their occupation has been such that +continuous application of the kind needed for thinking out principles +and expounding them in books, has only recently been possible. + +Most of the few existing books on naval strategy deal with it +historically, by describing and explaining the naval campaigns +of the past and such land campaigns as illustrate principles that +apply to sea and land alike. Perhaps the best books are those of +Darrieus and Mahan. + +Until about fifty years ago, it was only by experience in actual +war, supplemented by laborious study of the campaigns of the great +commanders, and the reading of books on strategy which pointed +out and expounded the principles involved in them, that one could +arrive at any clear idea of strategy. + +But wars have fortunately been so infrequent, the information about +them has often been so conflicting, and so many results have been +due to chance, that, in default of experience, the mere reading +of books did not lead to very satisfactory results, except in the +case of geniuses; and therefore war problems and war games were +devised, in which the various factors of material and personnel +were represented, and made as true to life as possible. + +The _tactical_ games resulting, which naval strategists now play, +employ models of the various craft used in war, such as battleships, +submarines, etc., and are governed by rules that regulate the movements +of those craft on a sort of big chess-board, several feet square, that +represents an area of water several miles square. The _strategic_ +games and problems are based on principles similar to those on which +the tactical games are based, in the sense that actual operations are +carried on in miniature; but naturally, the strategical operations +cover several hundred miles, and sometimes thousands. The aim of +both the tactical and the strategic games is to determine as closely +as possible the laws that decide victory or defeat; and therefore, +for any country, the material, personnel and operations it should +employ. Naturally the results obtained are not quite so convincing +as those of actual war or battle; but they are more convincing +than can be attained in any other way, as yet devised, especially +as many of the operations of the game-board that turn out well in +games are tried out afterward by the fleet in peace maneuvers. +War games and problems may be compared to the drawings that an +architect makes of a house which some one wants to build; the plans +and drawings are not so realistic as a real house, but they are +better than anything else; and, like the war games, they can be +altered and realtered until the best result seems to have been +attained, considering the amount of money allowed and other practical +conditions. + +The idea of devising war games and war problems seems to have originated +with Von Moltke; certainly it was first put in practice by his +direction. Shortly after he became chief of the General Staff of +the Prussian army in 1857, he set to work to carry out the ideas +which he had had in mind for several years, while occupying minor +posts, but which he had not had the power to enforce. It seems to +have become clear to his mind that, if a chess-player acquired +skill, not only by playing actual games and by studying actual +games played by masters, but also by working out hypothetical chess +problems, it ought to be possible to devise a system whereby army +officers could supplement their necessarily meagre experience of +actual war, and their necessarily limited opportunities for studying +with full knowledge the actual campaigns of great strategists, +by working out hypothetical, tactical, and strategic problems. +Von Moltke succeeded in devising such a system and in putting it +into successful operation. Hypothetical problems were prepared, +in which enemy forces were confronted with each other under given +circumstances of weather, terrain, and distances, each force with +its objective known only to itself: for instance, you are in command +of such and such a force at such and such a place; you have received +orders to accomplish such and such a purpose; you receive information +that the enemy, comprising such and such troops, was at a certain +time at a certain place, and marching in a certain direction. What +do you do? + +Classes of army officers were formed, and compelled to work out +the problems exactly as boys at school were compelled to work out +problems in arithmetic. The skill of individual officers in solving +the problems was noted and recorded; and the problems themselves, +as time went on and experience was gained, were made more and more +to conform to probable situations in future wars with Austria, +France, and other countries, actual maps being used, and the exact +nature and magnitude of every factor in each problem being precisely +stated. + +By such work, the pupils (officers) acquired the same kind of skill +in solving strategic and tactical problems that a boy acquires in +solving problems in arithmetic--a skill in handling the instruments +employed. Now the skill acquired in solving any kind of problem, +like the skill developed in any art, such as baseball, fencing, or +piano-playing, does not give a man skill merely in doing a thing +identically like a thing he has done before: such a skill would +be useless, for the reason that identical conditions almost never +recur, and identical problems are never presented. Similar conditions +often recur, however, and similar problems are often presented; +and familiarity with any class of conditions or problems imparts +skill in meeting any condition or any problem that comes within +that class. If, for instance, a man memorizes the sums made by +adding together any two of the digits, he is equipped to master +any problem of addition; and if he will practise at adding numbers +together, he will gradually acquire a certain ability of mind whereby +he can add together a long row of figures placed in a sequence +he never saw before, and having a sum he never attained before. +Or a pianist, having acquired the mastery of the technic of the +keyboard and the ability to read music, can sit down before a piano +he never sat at before and play off instantly a piece of music he +never saw before. + +Doubtless Moltke had ideas of this kind in mind when his plans +for educating strategists and tacticians by problems on paper and +by games were ridiculed by the unimaginative, and resisted by the +indolent; and certainly no man was ever proved right more gloriously +than Moltke. In the war with Austria in 1866, the Prussian army +defeated the Austrian at Sadowa or Königgrätz in nineteen days after +the declaration of war. In the war with France in 1870, the Prussian +army routed the French and received the surrender of Napoleon III +in seven weeks and two days, not because of superior courage or +experience in war, but by more scientific strategy. As Henderson +says: "Even the French generals of divisions and brigades had had +more actual experience (in war) than those who led the German army +corps. Compared with the German rank and file, a great part of +their non-commissioned officers and men were veterans, and veterans +who had seen much service. Their chief officers were practically +familiar with the methods of moving, supplying, and maneuvering +large masses of troops; their marshals were valiant and successful +soldiers. And yet the history of modern warfare records no defeats +so swift and complete as those of Königgrätz and Sedan. The great +host of Austria was shattered in seven weeks; the French Imperial +army was destroyed in seven weeks and three days; and to all intents +and purposes the resistance they had offered was not much more +effective than that of a respectable militia. But both the Austrian +and the French armies were organized and trained under the old +system. Courage, experience, and professional pride they possessed +in abundance. Man for man, in all virile qualities, neither officers +nor men were inferior to their foes. But one thing their generals +lacked, and that was education for war. Strategy was almost a sealed +book to them." Also, "Moltke committed no mistake. Long before war +had been declared every possible precaution had been made. And +these included much more than arrangements for rapid mobilization, +the assembly of superior numbers completely organized, and the +establishment of magazines. The enemy's numbers, armaments, readiness, +and efficiency had been submitted to a most searching examination. +Every possible movement that might be made, however unlikely, had +been foreseen; every possible danger that might arise, however +remote, discussed and guarded against"; also, "That the Prussian +system should be imitated, and her army deprived of its monopoly +of high efficiency, was naturally inevitable. Every European state +has to-day its college, its intelligence department, its schools of +instruction, and its course of field maneuvers and field firing." + +Strategy may be divided into two parts, war strategy and preparation +strategy; and of these two, preparation strategy is by far the +more important. + +War strategy deals with the laying out of plans of campaign after +war has begun, and the handling of forces until they come into +contact with the enemy, when tactics takes those forces in its +charge. It deals with actual situations, arranges for the provisioning, +fuelling, and moving of actual forces, contests the field against an +actual enemy, the size and power of which are fairly well known--and +the intentions of which are sometimes known and sometimes not. +The work of the strategist in war is arduous, pressing, definite, +and exciting; and results are apt to follow decisions quickly. +He plays the greatest and oldest game the world has ever known, +with the most elaborate instruments, and for the largest stakes. +In most wars, the antagonists have been so nearly equal in point +of personnel and material that the result has seemed to be decided +by the relative degrees of skill of the strategists on both sides. +This has been the verdict of history; and victorious commanders +in all times and in all lands have achieved rarer glories, and +been crowned with higher honors, than any other men. + +Preparation strategy deals with the laying out of plans for +supposititious wars and the handling of supposititious forces against +supposititious enemies; and arranges for the construction, equipment, +mobilization, provisioning, fuelling, and moving of supposititious +fleets and armies. War strategy is vivid, stimulating and resultful; +preparation strategy is dull, plodding, and--for the strategist +himself--apparently resultless. Yet war strategy is merely the +child of preparation strategy. The weapons that war strategy uses, +preparation strategy put into its hands. The fundamental plans, the +strength and composition of the forces, the training of officers +and men, the collection of the necessary material of all kinds, +the arrangements for supplies and munitions of all sorts--the very +principles on which war strategy conducts its operations--are the +fruit of the tedious work of preparation strategy. Alexander reaps +the benefit of the preliminary labors of his father, Philip; William +is made German Emperor by the toil of Moltke. + +The work of laying out a supposititious campaign, involving +supposititious operations against a supposititious enemy, requires +of the strategist a thorough estimate of the situation, including +a careful estimate of the forces of the enemy, in material and +personnel, and of the strategy that will probably govern his +operations--whether he will act on the defensive, or assume the +offensive; if he is to act on the defensive, how and where will he +base his forces, how far will he operate away from his own shores? And +if he is to act on the offensive, what direction will his operations +take; will he secure an advance base; and if so, where? And as the +character of the enemy's operations will depend on the personnel +of the enemy General Staff and of the high commanders afloat, who +comprise the personnel, and what are their characteristics? + +To decide these questions correctly requires considerable acquaintance +with the enemy country, its navy and its policy, a full knowledge +of the strategy, personnel, and material of that navy, and a sound +conception of strategy itself. But to decide the questions correctly +is essential, because the decision will form the basis of the future +plans. + +Naturally, as the plan is entirely supposititious and is to take +effect at some indefinite time in the future, all the factors that +will be in existence at that time cannot be foretold exactly, and +therefore must be estimated. This will necessitate several alternate +hypotheses; and a war plan including mobilization and operations +must be made out, based on each hypothesis. For instance, on the +hypothesis that the enemy will take the offensive, one set of plans +will have to be prepared on the basis that we shall also take the +offensive, and another on the basis that circumstances may be such at +that time as to make it wise for us to resort to the defensive; while +on the hypothesis that the enemy is to remain on the defensive, a set +of plans very different from the other two as to both mobilization +and operations must be devised. + +Each set of the plans just suggested may also have to be divided +into two or more parts. On the basis that the enemy will remain +on the defensive, for instance, the circumstances when the hour +for action comes, such as the fact of his being quite unprepared, +may indicate the advisability of an attack on him as sudden as it +can be made; while, on the other hand, circumstances such as the +fact of his being thoroughly prepared may render it necessary for +us to send a larger force than we could get ready quickly, especially +if the enemy coast be far away, and may therefore indicate the +advisability of deliberate movements, and even a protracted delay +before starting. + +But no matter what plan is to be followed, a detailed plan for every +probable contingency must be prepared; and it must be elaborated +in such detail that it can be put into operation instantly when +the fateful instant comes; because the enemy will put his plans +into operation at the same time we do, and the one whose plans +are executed first will take a long step toward victory. + +Not only must the plans provide some means whereby the plans themselves +shall get into full operation instantly when war breaks; other plans +must also provide that all the acts which those plans contemplate +must be performed. Not only must the plans provide that all the +prearranged orders for putting the _Kearsarge_ into full commission +shall be instantly sent by mail, telegraph, and telephone to the +proper officials, but other plans must also provide means whereby +the officers and men shall actually march on board the _Kearsarge_, +her ensign and commission pennant be displayed, all the fuel, +ammunition, provisions, and equipment be on board and the _Kearsarge_ +sail at once, and join the commander-in-chief at sea. + +Doubtless the most complicated and comprehensive plans are those for +sending a large expedition on an offensive mission to a far-distant +coast, especially if that coast be guarded by an efficient navy, +if it have outlying islands that would afford good bases for her +destroyers and submarines, and if there are not good harbors which +our fleet could seize as advance bases, from which to prosecute +its future operations. The complexity of the task of planning such +an expedition, taking due account, but not exaggerated account, +of all the factors, favorable and adverse, is appalling; but the +task must be undertaken and accomplished. The most tedious part +is the logistics--the arrangements for supplying the fleet on the +way and in the distant theatre of operations with the necessary +provisions, equipment, and ammunition and, above all, the fuel. +The average superdreadnaught consumes about 460 tons of coal per +day at full speed, and about 108 tons at 10 knots; and coal or +other fuel for all the dreadnaughts, battle cruisers, cruisers of +various classes, scouts, destroyers, submarines, ships, aircraft +of different kinds, hospital ships, ammunition ships, transports, +and the fuel ships themselves, must be provided by means that _must +not fail_. + +While the work of planning an offensive movement to a distant coast +is the most tedious and complex, the work of planning a defensive +measure against a sudden attack on the coast needs the most +concentration of effort; for whatever the plans require to be done +must be done at once. This necessitates that the orders to be issued +must be as few as possible; that they be as concise and clear as +possible; that the things to be done be as few and as simple as +possible, and that all possible foresight be exercised to prevent +any confusion or misunderstanding, or any necessity on the part +of any one for requesting more instructions. + +When the fateful instant comes, the final command to mobilize puts +into execution whichever of the plans already made is to be followed; +and for this reason it is clear that the various plans must be +kept separate from each other, and each set of plans must include +all the various orders that must be signed for carrying it into +effect, including the particular word or phrase that directs the +execution of that particular set of plans. + +It is the story that the final order to the British navy in the +early part of August, 1914, was the word "Go." All the units went +immediately, understandingly, unitedly; and the greatest machine +the world has ever known was almost instantly in operation at full +speed. No such stupendous feat, physically considered, had ever +been done before. The mobilization of the Prussian army in 1870 and +of the German army about August 1, 1914, were as great performances +mentally and strategically, but not physically, by reason of the +relative feebleness of the forces set in motion. This relative +feebleness was due, of course, to the insignificance of muskets +compared to navy guns, of railway-trains compared to battleships, +etc.--an insignificance far from being neutralized by the greater +number of the units, for one 14-inch shell has an energy equal +to that of about 60,000 muskets, and no army contains anything +approximating the powerfulness of a battleship. + +Not only, however, must the strategist make plans in peace for +preparations that culminate in mobilization, and simply insure +that the navy shall be ready in material and personnel when war +breaks; he must also make plans for operating the navy strategically +afterward, along each of the various lines of direction that the +war may take. In other words, the work of preparation strategy +in making war plans may be divided into two parts--mobilization +and operation. + +The plans of mobilization deal naturally with all the activities +concerned, material and personnel, and endeavor to arrange a passing +from a state of peace to a state of war in the quickest possible time, +and with the least chance of errors and omissions. A considerable +degree of imagination is required, an almost infinite patience, and +a perfect willingness to work indefinitely without any reasonable +expectation of getting tangible results. A more hopeless task can +hardly be given any man or body of men than that of working out +plans, general and detailed, day after day, for contingencies that +will probably never happen, and to guard against dangers that will +probably never come; preparing tables, diagrams, and schedules +which are almost certainly doomed to rest forever in the sepulchre +of the confidential files. + +Yet this work is basic. Perhaps it is for that reason, that it is +obscure and dull; basic work is apt to be so. The spectacular success +of an individual in any walk of life is often but the crowning of +the unrecognized, and often utterly unknown work--of other men. + +Strategy is not a science only; it is an art as well; and although +the art cannot be practised in its perfection until after the science +is well comprehended, yet the art of strategy was born before the +science was. This is true of all those departments of man's activity +that are divided into sciences and arts, such as music, surgery, +government, navigation, gunnery, painting, sculpture, and the rest; +because the fundamental facts--say of music--cannot even attract +attention until some music has been produced by the art of some +musician, crude though that art may be; and the art cannot advance +very far until scientific methods have been applied, and the principles +that govern the production of good music have been found. The unskilled +navigators of the distant past pushed their frail craft only short +distances from the land, guided by art and not by science; for no +science of navigation then existed. But the knowledge gradually gained, +passing first from adept to pupil by word of mouth, and afterward +recorded on the written and then the printed page, resulted first +in the realization of the fact that various apparently unrelated +phenomena were based on the same underlying principles; and resulted +later in the perception, and still later in the definite expression, +of those underlying principles. Using these principles, the navigator +expanded the limits of his art. Soon we see Columbus, superbly bold, +crossing the unknown ocean; and Magellan piercing the southern +tip of the American continent by the straits that now bear his +name. + +But of all the arts and sciences, the art and science that are +the oldest and the most important; that have caused the greatest +expenditure of labor, blood, and money; that have been the immediate +instruments of more changes and greater changes in the history of +the world than any other, are the art and the science of strategy. + +Until the time of Moltke the art of strategy, like most arts, was +more in evidence than the science. In fact, science of any kind is +a comparatively recent product, owing largely to the more exact +operations of the mind brought about by the birth of the science of +measurement, and the ensuing birth and development of the mechanic +arts. Before Moltke's time campaigns were won by wise preparation and +skilful execution, as they are now; but the strategical skill was +acquired by a general or admiral almost wholly by his own exertions +in war, and by studying the campaigns of the great commanders, +and reflecting upon them with an intensity that so embedded their +lessons in his subjective mind that they became a part of him, and +actions in conformity with those lessons became afterward almost +automatic. Alexander and Napoleon are perhaps the best illustrations +of this passionate grasping of military principles; for though +both had been educated from childhood in military matters, the +science of strategy was almost non-existent in concrete form, and +both men were far too young to have been able to devote much time +or labor to it. But each was a genius of the highest type, and +reached decisions at once immediate and wise, not by inspiration, +but by mental efforts of a pertinacity and concentratedness impossible +to ordinary men. + +It was because Von Moltke realized this, realized the folly of +depending on ability to get geniuses on demand, and realized further +the value of ascertaining the principles of strategy, and then +expressing them so clearly that ordinary men could grasp and use +them, that he conceived and carried into execution his plan; whereby +not only actual battles could be analyzed, and the causes of victory +and defeat in each battle laid bare to students, but also hypothetical +wars and battles could be fought by means of problems given. + +The first result of a course of study of such wars and battles, and +practice with such problems, was a skill in decision a little like +that developed in any competitive game, say tennis, whist, chess, +poker, boxing, and the like--whereby any action of your adversary +brings an instantaneous and almost automatic reply from you, that you +could not have made so skilfully and quickly before you had practised +at the game; and yet the exact move of your adversary, under the +same conditions, you had never seen before. Of course, this skill +was a development, not of the science, but of the art, as mere skill +always is; but as skill developed, the best methods for obtaining +skill were noted; and the principles governing the attainment of +success gradually unveiled themselves, and were formulated into +a science. + +Naturally, strategy is not an exact science like mathematics, physics, +or engineering--at least not now. Whether it ever will be cannot be +foretold. The reason that strategy (like medicine and most other +sciences concerning human beings) is not an exact science is simply +because it involves too many unknown quantities--quantities of +which our knowledge is too vague to permit of our applying exact +methods to them, in the way in which we apply exact methods to the +comparatively well-known quantities and elements in the so-called +"exact sciences." But a science may be a science even if it is +not an exact science; we may know certain important principles +sufficiently well to use them scientifically, even if we do not +know them with sufficient exactness to permit us to use them as +confidently as we should like. We may know, for instance, that it +is folly to divide a military force in the presence of an active +enemy into such small forces, and at such distances apart, as to +let the enemy defeat each small force, one after the other, even +if we do not know exactly how far it would be safe to separate +two forces of a given size, in the presence of an enemy of a given +power. It is well to know a fact in general terms, even if we do +not know it in precise terms: it is well to know in general terms +that we must not take prussic acid, even if we do not know exactly +how much is needed to kill. + +So the studies and problems instituted by Von Moltke, and copied +in all the armies and navies of the world, have brought about a +science of strategy which is real, even though not exact, and which +dwells in the mind of each trained strategist, as the high tribunal +to which all his questions are referred and by whose decisions he +is guided; just as the principles of medicine are the guide alike +of the humblest and the most illustrious practitioner, wherever +the beneficent art of medicine is practised. + +It is clear that, in order to be skilful in strategy (in fact, +in any intellectual art), not only must a man have its scientific +principles firmly imprinted on his mind, but he must make its practice +so thoroughly familiar to his mental muscles that he can use strategy +as a _trained_ soldier uses his musket--automatically. Inasmuch as +any man requires years of study and practice--say, of chess--in +order to play chess well enough to compete successfully with +professional chess-players, it seems to follow that any man must +require years of study and practice of the more complicated game +of strategy, in order to play strategy well enough to compete +successfully with professional strategists. The game of chess looks +easy to a beginner; in fact, the kind of game that he thinks chess +to be is easy. But after he has learned the moves, he finds the +intricacies of the game developing more rapidly than he can master +them, and discovers that chess is a game which some men spend their +lifetime studying. The full realization of this fact, however, does +not come to him until after defeats by better players have forced +into his consciousness the almost infinite number of combinations +possible, the difficulty of deciding on the correct move at any +juncture, and the consequences that follow after wrong moves. + +So with strategy. The ease and certainty with which orders can be +transmitted and received, the precision with which large forces +can be quickly despatched from place to place, and the tremendous +power exertable by those forces, tend to blind the mind to the +fact that transferring any force to any place is merely making a +"move," and that the other player can make moves, too. If a man +were never to be pitted in strategy against another player, either +in games or in actual war, the "infinite variety" of strategy would +never be disclosed to his intelligence; and after learning how +to make the moves, he might feel willing to tackle any one. +Illustrations of this tendency by people of great self-confidence +are numerous in history, and have not been missing even in the +present war, though none have been reported in this country as +occurring on the Teuton side. There has always been a tendency +on the part of a ruling class to seize opportunities for military +glory, and the ambition has often been disproportioned to the +accompanying ability and knowledge--sometimes on the part of a +King, prince, or man of high nobility, sometimes on the part of +a minister, sometimes on the part of an army or navy man, who has +been indebted to political or social influence for his place. But +within the past fifty years, especially since the establishment +of the General Staff in Prussia and the studies of Von Moltke, +the overshadowing importance of strategy has been understood, the +necessity of comprehending its principles and practising its technic +has been appreciated, and attempts to practise strategy by persons +inexpert in strategy have been deprecated. + +The game of strategy, while resembling in many ways the game of +chess, differs from it, of course, in the obvious element of personal +danger. It also differs from it in an equally important but less +obvious way--its relation to the instruments employed; for in chess +those instruments (pieces) are of a number and character fixed by +the rules of the game; whereas in strategy the number and character +of the instruments (ships, etc.) employed are determined by strategy +itself, assisted by engineering. Germany realizes this, and therefore +has established and followed a system whereby the character of +the various material and personnel units of the navy, and even +the number of them (under the restrictions of the money alloted), +are decided by a body of men who are highly trained in strategy +and engineering. + +There is an intimate connection between policy and strategy, and +therefore between naval policy and naval strategy; and while it +is difficult to draw the line exactly which separates policy and +strategy, it may be said in general that policy is the concern of +the government, and strategy is the concern of the navy and army, +to be employed by them to carry out the policy. + +As naval policy and naval strategy are so intimately connected in +their essence, it is apparent that the naval policy of a country +and its naval strategy should be intimately connected in fact; for +the policy cannot be properly carried out if the strategy that tries +to execute it is not good, or if the policy requires more naval force +or skill than the navy can bring to bear; and the strategy cannot be +good if it is called upon to execute a policy impossible to execute, +or if the exact end in view of the policy is not distinctly known. +Some of the greatest mistakes that have been made by governments have +been made because of a lack of co-ordination between the government +and its navy, so that the policy and the strategy could not work +together. We see an illustration of this throughout the history +of France, whose civil and naval authorities have not worked +harmoniously together, whose naval strategy has apparently been +opportunistic and short-sighted, and whose navy in consequence +has not been so successful as the large sums of money spent upon +it might lead one to expect. + +Across the English Channel we see a totally different state of +things. In Great Britain the development of the navy has been going +on for more than twelve hundred years, ever since King Offa declared +that "he who would be secure at home must be supreme at sea." For +about eight hundred years thereafter the development was carried +on energetically, but in an opportunistic fashion, following the +requirements of the hour. In 1632, however, the Board of Admiralty +was established; and with occasional interruptions, especially +prior to 1708, the board has continued in existence ever since. +A coherent policy of development has thereby been assured, and a +wisdom of strategy established which more than any other single +factor has made Great Britain the mistress of the seas, and almost +the mistress of the world. + +The wisdom of her strategy has been due largely to the fact of +the close touch maintained between the civil government, including +Parliament, and the navy; for by its very constitution the Board +of Admiralty includes some of the highest officers of Parliament, +the cabinet, and the navy. Its presiding officer is a member of +the cabinet, and also member of Parliament; four of the officers +are naval officers, high in rank, character, and attainments; and +the junior civil lord is a civilian versed in naval matters. All +the orders for great movements of the fleets and ships are directed +by this board and signed by its secretary, the board, by a fiction +of the law, being considered an individual replacing the lord high +admiral--which it did, in 1632. The board is supposed to meet every +day with all the members present, the vote of each member carrying +as much weight as that of any other member. Naturally, the first +lord of the admiralty being a cabinet officer and a member of +Parliament, has a far greater influence on broad questions than +any other member; and the first sea lord being the person of the +most experience in naval matters, has the most weight on strictly +naval questions. Theoretically, however, neither of these gentlemen +can carry a measure opposed to the others; and any member, even +a junior, has equal opportunity with the others to bring up and +discuss any question and to attempt to procure its passage by the +full board; but in 1869 the first lord at that time, Mr. Childers, +brought about a change whereby the first lord was made personally +responsible to the government. This vastly increased the power +of the first lord, relatively to the others. + +Two other navies, the German and the Japanese, which with the British, +are the most efficient navies in the world, have systems somewhat +different from the British. In Germany and Japan the Emperor is +the head of the navy, and there is no civilian between him and +it. In Germany there is no minister of marine, unless the Emperor +himself may be said to be the minister, which he practically is; +and the navy is divided into three parts, each under an admiral. +The three parts are the General Staff, which deals with war plans +and fundamental questions; the naval cabinet, which deals with +matters of personnel; and the administrative section, which has +to do with questions of material, including money, and the getting +of money from Parliament. In Japan the minister of marine is by +law a naval officer, and under him is a chief of staff, also a +naval officer. The minister of marine has the direction of the +navy as a whole, but the ideas of the chief of staff are supposed +to be carried out in matters that are strictly naval. The Japanese +naval officer has a higher regard for the office of chief of staff +than for that of minister of marine, because it is given for +professional excellence only. + +It might seem at first sight that in Germany and Japan there would +be danger of a lack of co-ordination between the civil and the +naval authorities, and a tendency for the navy to become unduly +self-assertive. Of course, one reason why there is no such danger +is that the governments of those countries are controlled by men +who, though civilians, have great knowledge of international affairs, +and of military and naval subjects; another reason is that the navy +is so vital a matter, accurate knowledge about it is so general, +and interest in it so wide-spread and intense, that there is no +great gulf fixed between naval people and civilians. Still another +reason is the fact that in each country the Emperor is trained in +military and naval duties as well as in civil duties, and therefore +can effect in his own person the co-ordination of the civil and +the naval authority: that is, of policy and strategy. + +Such automatic and complete co-ordination is desirable not only in +preventing the unnatural barrier between the civil and the military +authority which exists in some countries such as ours, but in lightening +the labors and enlightening the deliberations of the strategists. +If, for instance, a bold policy is to be enforced, and a large +sum of money allotted for material and personnel, the strategists +will be led to recommendations different from those to which they +would be led if a cautious policy were to be pursued, and a small +sum of money to be allotted. + +Germany did not turn her eyes seriously toward the navy until the +Emperor William II read Mahan's book, "The Influence of Sea Power +upon History." Previous to that epochal event, Germany had relied +on her army to protect her interests and enforce her rights, being +led thereto by the facts of her history and the shortness of her +coast-line. But the strategically trained mind of William grasped +at once the situation laid bare by Mahan; and his military training +led him to quick decision and prompt action. The necessary machinery +was soon set in motion, with the amazing result that in twenty +years the German navy became the second in power and perhaps the +first in efficiency in the world. + +Was this feat accomplished by prodigal expenditures in building vessels +and other material of all kinds, and enlisting and commissioning a +large number of officers and men? No, the expense was less than +that of building our navy, even if a liberal allowance be made for +the relative cheapness of things in Germany; and the mere enlisting +and commissioning of officers and men was the simplest part of the +undertaking. + +How was it accomplished? In the simplest way imaginable: by following +Moltke's plan of solving hypothetical war problems, and adapting the +military war game (_Kriegspiel_) to naval forces; playing numberless +war games, and deciding from those games the naval strategy best +adapted to Germany's needs--not only in matters of general principle, +not only as to tactics, training, education, co-operation with the +army, and the size of fleet required to carry out the policy of +the nation--but also as to the composition of the fleet, relative +proportions of vessels of the various types, and the characteristics +of each type. Nothing was left to chance; nothing was decided by +guessing; no one man's dictum was accepted. The whole problem was +attacked in its entirety, and a general solution found; and after +this, the various divisions and subdivisions of the problem were +attacked and solved, in obedience to the same principles, in accordance +with the results obtained at _Kriegspiel_. + +If a very large and complicated engine of new pattern is to be +built by any engineering company, no casting of the smallest kind +is made until general plans have been outlined, detailed plans +prepared from these, and then "working plans" made for the workmen. +From the working plans, the workmen construct the various parts; +sometimes in number several hundred. Finally, the whole intricate +machine is put together, and the motive power applied. Then all +the parts, great and small, begin their allotted tasks, each part +perfectly adapted to its work, not too large and not too small; +all working together in apparent confusion, but in obedience to +law--fulfilling exactly the will of the designing engineer. So, +the vast and new machine of the German navy was designed in the +drafting-room of the _Kriegspiel_; and though it has been gradually +strengthened and enlarged since then, each strengthening piece and +each addition has been designed in accordance with the original +plan, and has therefore harmonized with the original machine. Thus +the navy has expanded smoothly, symmetrically, purposefully. No +other result was to be expected: the strategy having been correct, +the result was correct also. + +Perhaps one contributing factor to the success of the German navy +has been her staff of officers highly trained in strategy by +_Kriegspiel_, that insures not only sound advice in general, but +also insures that at any time, night or day, a body of competent +officers shall be ready at the admiralty to decide what action +should be taken, whenever any new situation is reported. This factor +is most important; because in naval and military operations, even +in time of peace, but especially in war, events follow each other +so rapidly, and momentous crises develop so suddenly, that the +demand for action that shall be both wise and instantaneous is +imperative. The chess-player can linger long over his decisions, +because his opponent cannot make his next move meanwhile; but in +warfare no such rule or condition can exist. In war, time is as +vital a factor as any other: and the strategist, who, like Napoleon, +can think faster and decide more quickly and accurately than his +antagonist is, _ceteris paribus_, sure to win; and even if _ceteris_ +are not quite _paribus_, his superior quickness and correctness +will overcome great handicaps in material and personnel, as the +lives of all the great strategists in history, especially Alexander +and Napoleon, prove convincingly. To bring a preponderating force +to bear at a given point ahead of the enemy--to move the maximum +of force with the maximum of celerity--has always been the aim +of strategy: and probably it always will be, for the science of +strategy rests on principles, and principles never change. + +Thus while we see in Great Britain's navy an example of the effect +of a strategy continuous and wise, conducted for three hundred years, +we see in the Japanese and German navies equally good examples of a +strategy equally wise, but of brief duration, which started with +the example of the British navy, and took advantage of it. + +The German and Japanese navies did not follow the British navy +slavishly, however; for the national military character of their +people required the introduction and control of more military and +precise methods than those of the primarily sailor navy of Great +Britain. We see, therefore, a curious similarity between the German +and Japanese navies, and very clear evidence in each of the engrafting +of purely military ideals on maritime ideas. And we see not only +this, we see the reaction on the British navy itself of the ideals +of the German and the Japanese, and a decided change during the +last ten years from the principles of "the blue-water school"; +as evidenced mainly by the institution of a Naval War College, +including a war staff, the employment at the admiralty of General +Staff methods, though without the name; and the introduction into +naval methods, especially naval gunnery, of mathematical procedures. + +Previous to the Japanese-Russian War, ten years ago, the strategy +of the British navy may be characterized as physical rather than +mental, depending on a superior number of ships and men; those +ships and men being of a very high grade individually, and bound +together by a discipline at once strict and sympathetic. All the +personnel from the highest admiral to the humblest sailor prided +themselves on being "British seamen," comrades of the sea, on whom +their country placed her ultimate reliance. Maneuvers on a large +scale were held, target practice was carried on with regularity--and +navy ships carried the banner of Saint George over every sea, and +displayed it in every port. Tactics and seamanship filled the busy +days with drills of many kinds; but strategy, though not quite +forgotten, did not command so large a portion of the officers' +time and study as it did in Germany and Japan. The rapid success +of the Germans and Japanese, however, in building up their navies, +as instanced by the evident efficiency of the German fleet almost +under the nose of England, and the triumph of the Japanese fleet in +Tsushima Strait startled the British navy out of her conservatism, +and caused her to proceed at full speed toward the modernization +of her strategy. With the quick decision followed by quick action +that characterizes the seaman everywhere, the British instituted +a series of reforms, and prosecuted their efforts with such wisdom +and such vigor, that, in the brief space of ten years, the British +navy has been almost revolutionized. As in all such movements, +the principal delay was in bringing about the necessary mental +changes; the mental changes having been accomplished, the material +changes followed automatically. + +The change whereby the German and Japanese navies became preceptors +to their preceptor is like changes that occur in every-day life, and +is one of many illustrations of how a young and vigorous individual +or organization, endowed with proper energy and mentality, can +appropriate whatever is valuable for its purposes from its elders, +and reject whatever those elders have had fastened on them by +circumstances or tradition, and develop a superior existence. It +is a little like the advantage which a comparatively new city like +Washington has over an old city like Boston, in being started after +it was planned, instead of being started haphazard, without being +planned at all. + +The United States navy was started not like the city of Washington, +but like the city of Boston. It was modelled on the British navy; +but since the United States has never taken an interest in its +navy at all comparable with that taken by Great Britain in its +navy, and since our navy has been built up by successive impulses +from Congress and not in accordance with a basic plan, the lack of +harmoniousness among its various parts reminds one of Boston rather +than of Washington. Owing to the engineering and inventive genius of +our people and the information we got from Europe, inferiority has +not occurred in the units of the material: in fact, in some ways +our material is perhaps the best of all. Neither has inferiority +been evidenced in the personnel, as individuals; for the excellent +physique and the mental alertness of the American have shown themselves +in the navy as well as in other walks of life. + +In strategy, however, it must be admitted that we have little reason +to be proud. We do very well in the elementary parts of the naval +profession. In navigation, seamanship, gunnery, and that part of +international law that concerns the navy we are as good as any. +But of the higher branches, especially of strategy, we have little +clear conception. How can we have? Strategy is one of the most +complex arts the world contains; the masters in that art have borne +such names as Alexander, Cćsar, Nelson, and Napoleon. Naval strategy +is naval chess, in which battleships and other craft take the place +of queens and other pieces. But it is a more complicated game than +chess, for the reason that not only are there more kinds of "pieces," +but the element of time exerts a powerful influence in strategy while +it does not even exist in chess. The time element has the effect not +only of complicating every situation, but also of compelling intense +concentration of mind, in order to make decisions quickly; and often +it forces decisions without adequate time for consideration, under +circumstances of the utmost excitement, discomfort, and personal +peril. + +One dislikes intensely to criticise his own country, even to himself. +But when a naval officer is studying--as he should continually do--what +must be done, in order to protect his country from attack by some +foreign foe, it would be criminal folly for him to estimate the +situation otherwise than honestly; and to do this, it is necessary +to try to see where his country is weak and where strong, relatively +to the possible foes in question. If we do this, and compare the +strategical methods employed by--say Germany and us--we are forced +to admit that the German methods are better adapted to producing +economically a navy fitted to contend successfully in war against +an enemy. In Germany the development of the navy has been strictly +along the lines of a method carefully devised beforehand; in our +country no method whatever is apparent, at least no logical method. +Congress, and Congress alone, decides what vessels and other craft +shall be built, how many officers and men shall wear the uniform. +It is true that they consult the report of the secretary of the +navy, and ask the opinions of some naval officers; and it is true +that the secretary of the navy gets the opinions of certain naval +officers including the General Board, before making his report. +But both the secretary and Congress estimate the situation from +their own points of view, and place their own value on the advice +of naval officers. And the advice of these naval officers is not +so valuable, possibly, as it might be; for the reason that it is +really irresponsible, since the advisers themselves know that it +will not be taken very seriously. The difference between the advice +of men held responsible for the results of following their advice, +and the advice of men not so held responsible, is well recognized, +and is discussed fully in the reports of the Moody and the Swift +Boards on the organization of the Navy Department. Furthermore, +our officers do not have the machinery of the _Kriegspiel_ to help +them. It is true that at the Naval War College, a war-game apparatus +is installed and that war games are played, and war problems solved; +but the officers there are very properly engaged in the regular +work of a war college, in educating officers in the principles +of warfare, and have little time for other work. It is also true +that the war games and problems there do lead occasionally to +recommendations by the War College to the General Board as to various +matters; but the connection between the conclusions of the War +College and the decisions of Congress via the General Board and +the secretary of the navy is so fragile and discontinuous, that +it may truthfully be said that the influence of the war games at +our War College has but a faint resemblance to the determining +force of the _Kriegspiel_ in Berlin. + +It is often said that Germany is an empire and the United States +a republic, and that _therefore_ the military methods of Germany +cannot be employed here. The inference is not necessarily correct, +however, as is shown by the excellence of the army of France; for, +France, although a republic, insists that military strategy only +shall control and direct the army. The American Congress can do +the same with the American navy. Whether Congress shall so decide +or not, the decision will undoubtedly be wise; and we of the navy +will do our utmost to make the navy all it should be. In this +connection, it should be noted that: + +1. Germany has been following a certain strategic system regarding +the navy; we a system different from that of any other navy, which +has been used now for about one hundred and forty years. Both systems +have been in operation for a time sufficiently long to warrant our +comparing them, by comparing the results they have achieved. + +2. The German navy has been in existence a much shorter time than +the American navy, belongs to a much less populous and wealthy +country, and yet is not only about 30 per cent larger in material, +and more than 100 per cent larger in trained personnel, but if +we judge by maneuvers carried on in both peace and war, is much +better in organization, morale, and capacity for doing naval work +upon the ocean. We do not, of course, know what Germany has been +doing since the war began on August 1, 1914; but all accounts show +that Germany, like all the other belligerent Powers, has been adding +units of material and personnel to her navy much more rapidly than +they have been destroyed; as well as perfecting her strategy, under +the influence of the war's stimulus. Leaving out of consideration, +however, what she may have been doing since the war began, and +neglecting any unauthenticated accounts of her status before it +started, we know positively that in 1913 the maneuvers of the German +fleet were executed by a force of 21 battleships, 3 battle cruisers, +5 small cruisers, 6 flotillas of destroyers (that is 66 seagoing +torpedo vessels), 11 submarines, an airship, a number of aeroplanes +and special service ships, and 22 mine-sweepers--all in one fleet, +all under one admiral, and maneuvered as a unit. _This was nearly +three years ago, and we have never come anywhere near such a +performance_. In January, 1916, the United States Atlantic fleet, +capable as to both material and personnel of going to sea and +maneuvering together, consisted of 15 battleships and 23 destroyers, +2 mine-depot ships, and 1 mine-training ship, and 4 tugs fitted +as mine-sweepers--with no submarines, no aircraft of any kind, no +scouts (unless the _Chester_ be so considered, which was cruising +alone off the coast of Liberia, and the _Birmingham_, which was +flag-ship to the destroyer flotilla). This was the only fleet that +we had ready to fight in January, 1916; because, although more +battleships could have been put into commission, this could have +been done only by putting out of commission certain smaller vessels, +such as cruisers and gunboats; and the battleships would have had +to be put into commission very hurriedly, filled up with men fresh +from other ships, and no more ready to fight in the fleet against +an enemy (whose ships were fully manned with well-trained officers +and men, accustomed to the details of their respective ships, and +acquainted with each other) than the _Chesapeake_ was ready to +fight the _Shannon_. + +3. In case our system is not so good as that of--say Germany--or +of any other country having a system equally excellent, we shall +_never_ be able to contend successfully against that navy, under +equal strategic conditions, unless we have an excess over her in +numbers of personnel and material sufficient to counteract our +inferiority in efficiency. + +The efficiency of a navy or an army is exactly what the strategic +system makes it. Eleven thousand Greeks under Miltiades, highly +efficient and thoroughly trained, defeated 100,000 Persians at +Marathon. A Greek fleet under Themistocies defeated and almost +destroyed a much larger Persian fleet at Salamis. With an army +of less than 35,000 men, but highly trained by Philip of Macedon, +his father, Alexander, in only twelve years conquered ten of the +most wealthy and populous countries of the world. Cćsar, Alaric, +Attila, Charlemagne, and all the great military men from the greatest +antiquity down to the present moment have trained and organized +bodies of soldiers and sailors, under systems suited to the times, +and then waged successful war on peoples less militarily efficient. +Cortez conquered Mexico, and Pizarro conquered Peru; the British, +French, and Spanish subdued the Indians of North America, and during +the latter half of the nineteenth century nearly all the land in +the world that was "unoccupied" by Europeans or their descendants +was taken in possession by European Powers. Great Britain is now +mistress of about one-quarter of the land and the population of +the globe. Russia, France, Germany, and the United States govern +most of the remainder. + +These results were brought about almost solely by the exercise +of military force:--and of this force, physical courage was not a +determining element, because it was just as evident in the conquered +as in the conquerors. The determining element was strategy that +(under the behest of policy) prepared the military and naval forces +in material and personnel before they were used, and directed their +operations, while they were being used. + +Of all the single factors that have actually and directly made the +history of the world, the most important factor has been strategy. + + + + +CHAPTER VIII + +DESIGNING THE MACHINE + +The most important element connected with a navy is the strategy which +directs it, in accordance with which all its plans are laid--plans for +preparation before war and plans for operations during war. Strategy +is to a navy what mind is to a man. It determines its character, +its composition, its aims; and so far as external conditions will +permit, the results which it accomplishes. + +It is possible for certain features connected with a navy to be +good, even if the strategy directing it be faulty; or for those +features to be faulty, even if the strategy directing it be good. +Experience has shown, however, that, in any organization the influence +of the men at the top, and the effect of the policy they adopt, is +so great that the whole organization will in the main be good or +bad according to the kind of men that control it, and the methods +they employ. The better the discipline of the organization, the more +completely the quality of the management will influence the whole, +and the more essential it becomes that good methods be employed. Good +discipline means concentration of the effort of the organization; +and the more concentrated any effort is, the more necessary that +it be directed aright. The simplest illustration of this is seen +in naval gunnery; for there the effect of good fire-control is +to limit the dispersion of the various shots fired, relatively +to each other; to make a number of shots fired simultaneously to +bunch closely together, that is to concentrate; getting away from +the shotgun effect, and approximating the effect of a single shot. +Obviously, if the fire-control and the skill of the gunners are +so great that the shots fall very close together, the chance of +hitting the target is less than if the shots did not fall close +together, if the range at which the guns are fired is incorrect. +A mathematical formula showing the most effective dispersion for +a given error in range was published in the _Naval Institute_ by +Lieutenant-Commander B. A. Long, U. S. N., in December, 1912. + +So, we see that if the strategy directing a navy is incorrect, +we can accomplish little by improving the discipline, and may do +harm; when unwise orders have been given in the past, those orders +have sometimes been disobeyed with beneficial effect. Neither would +it avail much to improve the details of the material or personnel, +or to spend much money; for there is no benefit to be derived from +building fine ships, if they are to be captured by the enemy. If +the Russian fleet sent to Tsushima had been weaker than it was, +the loss to Russia would have been less. + +Inasmuch as strategy, however, includes all the means taken to make +a navy effective, it is obvious that a good strategical direction +will be more likely to result in good discipline and good material +than would a poor strategy. But this is not necessarily so, for +the reason that a strategy may be in the main faulty, and yet be +good in certain ways--especially in attention to details, for which +a high degree of mentality is not required. In the same way, an +individual who is short-sighted and imperfectly educated may be +a most excellent and useful member of society, provided he is not +permitted to use power in matters beyond his vision. An illustration +of how an incorrect point of view does not necessarily injure, but +may even benefit in details is shown by certain militia regiments, +which are able to surpass some regiments of the regular army in +many details of the drill, and in general precision of movement. + +In fact, a very wise strategical direction has as one of its most +important functions the division of study and labor among various +lines of action, and in deciding which lines are important and +which not: and for this reason may--and often does--limit labor, +and therefore perfection of result, along lines which a less wise +strategy would not limit. Illustrations of the casting aside of +rigid and difficult forms of drill during the past fifty years in +armies, and the substitution of more easy methods are numerous. This +does not indicate, however, that a wise strategy may not encourage +rigid forms of drill, for the army which is directed with the greatest +strategical skill is the German, and no army has more precise methods, +not only of procedure, but of drill. The Prussian army of Frederick +William which Frederick the Great inherited was not more rigidly +drilled in some particulars than the German army of to-day, fought +by Frederick the Great's great-great-great-grandnephew, William +II. + +So we see that a wise and far-sighted strategy does not necessarily +either frown on or encourage attention to details; it merely regulates +it, deciding in each case and for each purpose what degree of attention +to detail is best. + +The most obvious work of naval strategy, and therefore the work +that impresses people most, is in directing naval forces against +an enemy in war. But it is clear that before this can be done +effectively strategy must first have made plans of preparation +in time of peace; and it is equally clear that, previous to this, +strategy must first determine the units of the force and their +relation to each other: it must, in other words, design the machine. + +Evidently, therefore, _the work of strategy is three-fold: first, +to design the machine; second, to prepare it for war; and, third, +to direct its operations during war_. + +A navy being a machine composed of human and material parts, it is +clear that the work of designing it correctly should take account +of all the parts at the outset; and not only this--the whole design +should be completed before any parts are made and put together +if the best results are to be obtained. This is the practice in +making material machines in manufacturing establishments--and no +other practice there could be successfully pursued. It is the outcome +of the experience of tens of thousands of men for many years--and +the result of the expenditure of tons of money. + +This remark as to manufacturing establishments does not include +the development of new ideas, for which experimentation or original +research is needed; because it is sometimes necessary, when venturing +into untrodden fields, to test out by mere trial and error certain +parts or features before determining enough of their details to +warrant incorporating them in the drawing of the whole machine. +Similarly, some experiments must be made in the methods, organization, +and material of the naval machine; but in this, case, as in the +case of manufacturing establishments, the experimental work, no +matter how promising or alluring, must be recognized as of unproved +and doubtful value; and no scheme, plan, or doctrine must be +incorporated in the naval machine, or allowed to pose as otherwise +than experimental, until successful trials shall have put it beyond +the experimental stage. + +The naval machine consists obviously of two parts, the personnel +and the material; these two parts being independent, and yet mutually +dependent, like the parts of any other organism. Obviously, the +parts are mutually dependent not only in the quantitative sense +that the more numerous the material parts the more numerous must +be the personnel to operate them, but also in the qualitative sense +that the various kinds of material determine the various kinds +of personnel that must be provided to operate them with success. +Gunners are needed to handle guns, and engineers to handle engines. + +In this respect, personnel follows material. In the galley days only +two kinds of personnel were needed--sailors to handle the galleys +(most of these being men merely to pull on oars)--and soldiers to +fight, when the galleys got alongside of the enemy. Ship organization +remained in a condition of great simplicity until our Civil War; for +the main effort was to handle the ships by means of their sails, +the handling of the simple battery being a very easy matter. Every +ship was much like every other ship, except in size; and in every +ship the organization was simple and based mostly on the necessities +of handling the ship by sails. + +The first important change from this condition followed the departure +of the Confederate ironclad _Virginia_ (_Merrimac_) carrying 10 +guns and 300 men from the Norfolk Navy Yard on the 8th of March, +1862, and her sinking hardly two hours afterward the Union sloop of +war _Cumberland_, carrying 24 guns and 376 men; and then destroying +by fire the Union frigate _Congress_, carrying 50 guns and 434 men. +The second step was taken on the following day, when the Union +_Monitor_, 2 guns and 49 men, defeated the _Merrimac_. These two +actions on two successive days are the most memorable naval actions +in history from the standpoint of naval construction and naval +ordnance, and perhaps of naval strategy; because they instituted +a new era--the era of mechanism in naval war. + +The next step was the successful attack by the Confederate "fish-torpedo +boat" _David_, on the Union ironclad _Housatonic_ in Charleston +harbor on February 17, 1864; and the next was the sinking of the +Confederate ironclad _Albemarle_ by a spar torpedo carried on a +little steam-launch commanded by Lieutenant W. B. Cushing, U. S. +N., on October 27, 1864. + +These four epochal events in our Civil War demonstrated the +possibilities of mechanism in naval warfare, and led the way to +the use of the highly specialized and scientific instruments that +have played so important a part in the present war. During the +half-century that has intervened since the _Monitor_ and _Merrimac_ +ushered in the modern era, since the five brave crews of the _David_ +lost their lives, and since Cushing made his amazing victory, a +contest between the sailor and the scientist has been going on, +as to which shall be deemed the ultimate master of the sea. As in +many contests, the decision has gone unqualifiedly to neither; for +he who sails the sea and braves its tempests, must be in heart and +character a sailor--and yet he who fights the scientific war-craft of +the present day cannot be merely a sailor, like him of the olden kind, +but must be what the _New York Times_, a few years ago, laughingly +declared to be a combination quite unthinkable, "a scientific person +and a sailor." + +Each year since the fateful 8th of March, 1862, has seen some addition +to the fighting machinery of navies. Some appliances have been +developed gradually from their first beginnings, and are to-day +substantially what they were at first--but of course improved; among +these are the turret, the automobile torpedo, the telescope-sight, +the submarine, and the gyrocompass. Many other appliances found +favor for a while and then, having demonstrated the value of what +they attempted and did perform, were gradually supplemented by +improved devices, doing the same thing, but in better ways; in +this class are many forms of interior-communication apparatus, +especially electrical. Still other appliances are adaptations to +ship and naval life of devices used in civil life--such as the +telephone, electric light, and radio. + +Each of these appliances has required for its successful use the +educating of men to use it, and frequently the creation and organization +of entirely new branches of the service; an illustration is the radio +corps in each of our large ships. At the present time the attitude +of officers and of the department itself is so much more favorable +to new appliances that a clear probability of a new device being +valuable is a sufficient stimulus to bring about the education +of men to use it; but a very few years ago many devices were lost +to us because they were considered "not adapted naval use." Now +we endeavor to adapt them. + +The present complexity of our material is therefore reflected in +the complexity of the organization of our personnel; and as it +is the demands of material that regulate the kind of personnel, +and as a machine must be designed and built before men can learn +to use it, it follows that our personnel must lag behind our +material--that our material as material must be better than our +personnel as personnel. + +It may be answered that all our material is first invented, then +designed, and then constructed by men; that men create our material +appliances (though not the matter of which they are composed), that +the created cannot be better than the creator; and that therefore +it is impossible for our material to be better than our personnel. +But to this objection it may be pointed out that only a very small +proportion of our personnel are employed in creating; that most +of them are engaged merely in using the material with whatever +degree of skill they possess, and that, if a man uses an instrument +with perfect skill, he then succeeds merely in getting out of that +instrument all that there is in it. A soldier's musket, for instance, +is a very perfect tool--very accurate, very powerful, very rapid; +and no marksman in the world is so skilful that he can shoot the +musket with all the accuracy and speed of which the gun itself +is capable. + +This indicates that the personnel of a navy is harder to handle +than the material, and that therefore the most effort is required +to be expended on the personnel. The strength of any system depends +on the strength of its weakest part; in any organism, human or +material, effort is best expended on the weak points rather than +on the strong. + +Recognition of this principle is easy, but carrying out the principle +in practice is most difficult. One reason is the difficulty of +seeing always where the weak spot is; but a greater difficulty is +due to the fact that the principle as above stated must be modified +by the consideration that things which are important need attention +more than things that are unimportant. A weak point in any organism +deserves attention more than a strong point of the same order of +importance, or than a strong point in the same class; but not, +necessarily more than a strong point of a higher order of importance, +or a strong point in another class. It may be more beneficial, +for instance, to drill an ineffective turret crew than to try to +reduce friction in a training gear already nearly frictionless; +or it may be more beneficial to overcome the faults of a mediocre +gun-pointer than to develop still more highly the skill already +great of another gun-pointer; but, on the other hand, it may be +less beneficial to drill boat crews at boat-sailing, even if they +need it, than to drill them at landing as armed forces on the beach, +though they may do that pretty well; or it may be better not to +have boat drill at all and to get under way for fleet drill, even +though the ships are very expert at it. + +It is true that in any endeavor where many things are to be done, +as in a navy, it is important that nothing be neglected; and yet, +under the superintendence of any one, there are some things the +doing of which requires priority over other things. The allotting +of the scientifically correct amount of time, energy, and attention +to each of the various things claiming one's attention is one of +the most difficult, and yet one of the most important problems +before any man. It requires an accurate sense of proportion. + +Naturally the problem increases in complexity and importance the +higher the position, and the greater the number of elements +involved--being more difficult and important for instance in the +office of the commander-in-chief of a fleet, whose time and attention +have to be divided among multitudinous matters, than in that of +captain of a single ship. For this reason, _the higher one is in +position, the more imperative it is that he understand all elements +involved, and estimate properly their various weights_. The success +or non-success of a man in high authority depends largely on how +his sense of proportion leads him to allot his time. + +But a matter fully as important as the allotment of time and attention +to the consideration of various matters by the various members of +the personnel is the allotment of money for the various items, +especially of the material; for, after all, every navy department +or admiralty must arrange its demands for ships, guns, men, etc., +with reference to the total amount of money which the nation will +allot. For this purpose, only one good means of solution has thus +far been devised--the game-board. + +The game-board, naturally, tries out only the units that maneuver +on the ocean; it does not try out the mechanism inside those units, +because they can be tried out best by engineering methods. The +province of the game-board is merely to try out on a very small +scale, under proper conventions or agreements, things that could not +be tried out otherwise, except at great expense, and very slowly; +to afford a medium, half-way between actual trials with big ships +and mere unaided reasoning, for arriving at correct conclusions. +When the game-board is not used, people conferring on naval problems +can do so only by forming pictures in their own minds, endeavoring +to describe those pictures to the others (in which endeavor they +rarely perfectly succeed) while at the same time, trying to see the +pictures that are in the minds of the others--and then comparing +all the pictures. The difficulty of doing this is shown by a little +paragraph in "The Autocrat of the Breakfast Table," in which Dr. +Holmes points out that when John and Thomas are talking, there +are really six persons present--the real John, the person John +thinks himself to be, the person Thomas thinks him to be, the real +Thomas, the person Thomas thinks himself to be, and the person John +thinks him to be. The conditions surrounding John and Thomas are +those of the simplest kind, and the conversation between them of +the most uncomplicated character. But when--not two people but--say +a dozen or more, are considering highly complicated questions, such +as the House Naval Committee discuss when officers are called to +testify before them, no two of the twenty congressmen can form the +same mental picture when an officer uses the word--say "fleet." +The reason is simply that very few of the congressmen hearing that +word have ever seen a fleet; none of them know exactly what it is, +and every one forms a picture which is partly the result of all +his previous education and experience; which are different from +the previous education and experience of every other congressman +on the committee. Furthermore, no one of the officers uses words +exactly as the other officers do; and the English language is too +vague (or rather the usual interpretation put on words is too vague) +to assure us that even ordinary words are mutually understood. For +instance, the question is asked: "Do you consider it probable that +such or such a thing would happen?" Now what does the questioner +mean by "probable," and what does the officer think he means? +Mathematically, the meaning of "probable" is that there is more +than 50 per cent of chance that the thing would happen; but who +in ordinary conversation uses that word in that way? That this is +not an academic point is shown by the fact that if the answer is +"no" the usual inference from the answer is that there is no need +for guarding against the contingency. Yet such an inference, if +the word "probable" were used correctly by both the questioner and +the answerer, would be utterly unjustified, because the necessity +for taking precautions against a danger depends not so much on its +probability or improbability, as on the degree of its probability; +and to an equal degree on the greatness of the danger that impends. +If the occurrence of a small mishap has a probability say of even +75 per cent, there may be little necessity of guarding against +it; while if the danger of total destruction has a probability +as low as even 1 per cent, we should guard against it sedulously. + +The more complicated the question, the more elements involved, the +more difficult it is to settle it wisely by mere discussion. The +effort of the imagination of each person must be directed not so +much to getting a correct mental picture of what the words employed +describe, as to getting a correct picture of what the person using +the words desires them to describe. Any person who has had experience +in discussions of this character knows what an effort this is, even +if he is talking with persons whom he has known for years, and +with whose mental and lingual characteristics he is well acquainted: +and he also knows how much more difficult it is when he is talking +with persons whom he knows but slightly. + +It may here be pointed out how greatly the imaginations of men +differ, and how little account is taken of this difference in every-day +life. In poetry and fiction imagination is recognized; and it is +also recognized to some extent in painting, inventing, and, in +general, in "the arts." But in ordinary life, the difference among +men in imagination is almost never noticed. Yet a French proverb +is "point d'imagination, point de grand general"; and Napoleon +indicated a danger from untrained imagination in his celebrated +warning to his generals not to make "pictures" to themselves of +difficulties and disasters. + +The difference in imagination among men is shown clearly by the +difference--and often the differences--between inventors and engineers, +and the scarcity of men who are both inventors and engineers. Ericsson +repudiated the suggestion that he was an inventor, and stoutly and +always declared he was an engineer. This was at a time, not very +long ago, when it was hardly respectable to be an inventor; when, +even though men admitted that some inventors had done valuable work, +the work was supposed to be largely a chance shot of a more or less +crazy man. Yet Ericsson was an inventor--though he was an engineer. +So were Sir William Thompson (afterward Lord Kelvin), Helmholtz, +Westinghouse, and a very few others; so are Edison and Sperry. +Many inventors, however, live in their imaginations mainly--some +almost wholly. Like Pegasus, they do not like to be fastened to a +plough or anything else material. Facts, figures, and blue-prints +fill their souls with loathing, and bright generalities delight them. +The engineer, on the other hand, is a man of brass and iron and +logarithms; in imagination he is blind, in flexibility he resembles +reinforced concrete. He is the antipodes of the inventor; he despises +the inventor, and the inventor hates him. Fortunately, however, +there is a little bit of the inventor in most engineers, and a +trace of the engineer in most inventors; while in some inventors +there is a good deal of the engineer. And once in a while we meet +a man who carries both natures in his brain. That man does marvels. + +Despite the great gulf normally fixed, however, between the engineer +and the inventor, most of the definite progress of the world for +the past one hundred years has been done by the co-ordination of +the two; a co-ordination accomplished by "the man of business." + +Now the inventor and engineer type do not exist only in the world +of engineering and mechanics, though it is in that world that they +are the most clearly recognized; for they exist in all walks of +life. In literature, inventors write novels; in business life, +they project railroads; in strategy, they map out new lines of +effort. In literature, the engineer writes cyclopćdias; in business, +he makes the projected railroads a success; in strategy, he works +out logistics and does the quantitative work. + +In that part of strategy of which we are now thinking--the designing +of the naval machine--the inventor and the engineer clearly have +two separate lines of work: one line the conceiving, and the other +line the constructing, of strategic and tactical methods, and of +material instruments to carry out those methods. Clearly, these +two lines of work while independent are mutually dependent; and, +if properly carried out are mutually assistant. The coworking of +the inventor and the engineer is a little like that coworking of +theory and practice, which has been the principal factor in bringing +about the present amazing condition of human society commonly called +"Modern Civilization." + +The shortcomings of human speech are most evident in discussing +complicated matters; and for this reason speech is supplemented +in the engineering arts by drawings of different kinds. No man +ever lived who could describe a complicated machine accurately to +a listener, unless that machine differed but little from a machine +with which the listener was acquainted. But hand a drawing of even +a very complicated machine to a man who knows its language--and +the whole nature of the object is laid bare to him; not only its +general plan and purpose, but its details, with all their dimensions +and even the approximate weights. So, when the forces representing +a complicated naval situation are placed upon the game-board, all +the elements of the problem appear clearly and correctly to each +person; the imagination has little work to do, and the chance for +misunderstanding is almost negligible. Of course, this does not mean +that the game-board can decide questions with absolute finality. It +cannot do this; but that is only because conditions are represented +with only approximate realism, because the rules of the game may +not be quite correct, and because sufficient correct data cannot be +procured. The difficulties of securing absolute realism are of course +insuperable, and the difficulties of getting absolutely correct data +are very great. The more, however, this work is prosecuted, the more +clearly its difficulties will be indicated, and therefore the more +effectively the remedies can be provided. The more the game-board +is used both on ship and shore, the more ease will be found in +getting correct data for it, and the more correctly conclusions +can then be deduced. + +These remarks, while intended for tactical games, seem to apply to +strategical games as well; for both the tactical and the strategical +games are simply endeavors to represent actual or probable situations +and occurrences in miniature, by arbitrary symbols, in accordance +with well-understood conventions. + +War games and war problems have not yet been accepted by some; +for some regard them as games pure and simple and as academic, +theoretical, and unpractical. It may be admitted that they are +academic and theoretical; but so is the science of gunnery, and so +is the science of navigation. In some ways, however, the lessons +of the game-board are better guides to future work than "practical" +and actual happenings of single battles: for in single battles +everything is possible, and some things happen that were highly +improbable and were really the result of accident. After nearly every +recent war there has been a strong move made toward the adoption +of some weapon, or some method, that has attained success in that +war. For instance, after our Civil War, many monitors were built, +and the spar torpedo was installed in all our ships; after the +battle of Lissa, the ram was exploited as the great weapon of the +future; the Japanese War established the heavily armed and armored +battleships on a secure foundation; and the early days of the present +war caused a great rush toward the submarine. Yet, in most cases, +the success was a single success or a very few successes, and was +a little like the throw of a die, in the sense that the result was +caused in great measure by accident; that is, by causes beyond +the control of man, or by conditions that would probably not recur. + +The game calls our attention to the influence of chance in war, +and to the desirability of our recognizing that influence and +endeavoring to eliminate it, when reasoning out the desirability or +undesirability of a certain weapon or a certain method. Of course, +every thoughtful person realizes that few effects in life are due +to one cause only, and that most effects are due to a combination +of many causes; so that, if any weapon or method succeeds or fails, +it is illogical to infer from that one fact that the weapon or +method is good or bad. A common illustration is the well-known +fact that a marksman may hit the target when his aim is too high +or too low, provided that he has erroneously set his sight enough +too low or too high to compensate; whereas if he had made only one +error instead of two, he would have missed. "Two wrongs cannot +make a right," but two errors can compensate each other, and often +do. The theory of the Probability of Errors recognizes this. In +fact, if it were not true that some errors are plus and some minus, +all errors in gunnery (in fact in everything) would be additive +to each other, and we should live in a world of error. + +The partial advantage of the game-board over the occurrences of +actual war, for the purpose of studying strategy, lies largely in +its ability to permit a number of trials very quickly; the trials +starting either with identical situations, or with certain changes in +conditions. Of course, the game-board has the tremendous disadvantage +that it presents only a picture, and does not show a real performance; +but the more it is used, and the more fleets and game-boards work +together, the more accurate the picture will become, and the more +correctly we shall learn to read it. + +One limitation of the game-board is that it can represent weather +conditions only imperfectly--and this is a serious limitation that +mayor may not be remedied as time goes on. The theory of the game-board +is in fact in advance of the mechanism, and is waiting for some +bright inventive genius for the remedy. Until this happens, the +imagination must do the best it can, and the effect of a certain +kind of weather under the other conditions prevailing will have +to be agreed upon by the contestants. + +The term "war game" is perhaps unfortunate, for the reason that +it does not convey a true idea of what a "war game" is. The term +conveys the idea of a competitive exercise, carried on for sport; +whereas the idea underlying the exercise is of the most serious +kind, and has no element of sport about it, except the element that +competition gives. A war game may be simply a game of sport--and +sometimes it is so played; but the intention is to determine some +doubtful point of strategy or tactics, and the competitive element +is simply to impart realism, and to stimulate interest. When two +officers, or two bodies of officers, find themselves on different +sides of a certain question, they sometimes "put it on the game-board," +to see which side is right. + +This statement applies most obviously to tactical games; but it +applies to strategic games as well; for both are inventions designed +to represent in miniature the movements of two opposing forces. The +main difference between strategic and tactical games is the difference +in size. Naturally, the actual means employed are different, but +only so different as the relative areas of movement necessitate. +In the strategic games, the opposing forces are far apart, and do +not see each other; in the tactical games, they operate within +each other's range of vision. + +War games when played for the purpose of determining the value +of types of craft and vessels of all kinds, may take on almost +an infinite variety of forms; for the combinations of craft of +different kinds and sizes, and in different numbers, considered +in connection with the various possible combinations of weather, +climate, and possible enemy forces, are so numerous as to defy +computation. + +In practice, however, and in a definite problem, the number of +factors can be kept down by assuming average conditions of weather, +using the fairly well-known enemy force that would appear in practice, +and playing games in which the only important variable is the kind +of vessel in question. For instance, in the endeavor to ascertain +the value of the battle cruiser, games can be played in which battle +cruisers are only on one side, or in which they are more numerous, +or faster or more powerful on one side than on the other. Naturally, +the games cannot be as valuable practically as they otherwise would +be, unless they consider the amount of money available. For instance, +if games are played to ascertain the most effective number and +kinds of craft for which to ask appropriations from Congress at +next session, the solution, unless a money limit were fixed, would +be impossible. In other words, the amount of money to be expended +must be one of the known or assumed factors in the problem. + +As this amount can never be known, it must be assumed; and, in +order that the whole value of the games may not be lost, in case +the amount assumed were incorrect, it is necessary to assume a +number of possible sums, the upper limit being above the probable +amount to be received, and the lower limit below it, and then work +out the answer to the problem, under each assumption. + +Of course, this procedure would be laborious, but most procedures +are that bring about the best results. Suppose that such a procedure +were followed for, say, a year, and that a number of plans, all +worked out, were presented to Congress when it met: plan No. 1, +for instance, consisting of such and such craft showing (according +to the results of the games) the best programme, if $100,000,000 +were to be appropriated for the increase of the navy; plan No. 2, if +$90,000,000 were to be appropriated; plan No. 3, if $80,000,000 were +to be appropriated, and so on. Each plan being concisely and clearly +stated, and accompanied by drawings, sketches, and descriptions, +Congress could easily and quickly decide which plan it would adopt. + +This scheme would have the obvious advantage over the present scheme +that the professional questions would be decided by professional +men, while the financial question would be decided by Congress, +which alone has the power to decide it. At present, the laymen +on the House Naval Committee spend laborious days interrogating +singly, and on different days, various naval officers, who naturally +do not always agree. Finally, the House Naval Committee decides on +a programme and recommends it to the House. The House discusses +it most seriously (the professional points more seriously than +the financial point), and decides on something. Then the Senate +Committee, using the House decision as a basis, recommends something +to the Senate, and the Senate then decides on something more or +less like what the Senate Committee recommends. Then the whole +question is decided by a Conference Committee of three senators and +three members of the House. It is to be noted that this committee +decides not only how much money the country shall spend on the +navy, but also what kinds of vessels navy officers shall use to +fight in the country's defense; how many officers there shall be, +and how they shall be divided among the various grades! + +Attention is requested here to the _ease_ with which a decision +can be made, _provided one does not take into account all of the +factors of a problem, or if he is not thoroughly acquainted with +them_; and attention is also requested to the _impossibility_ of +making a _wise_ decision (except by chance) unless one understands +_all_ the factors, takes _all_ into consideration, and then combines +them _all_, assigning to each its proper weight. From one point of +view, every problem in life is like a problem in mathematics; for +if all the factors are added, subtracted, multiplied, and divided +correctly (that is, if they are combined correctly), and if correct +values are assigned to them, the correct answer is inevitable. In +most of the problems of life, however, certainly in the problems +of strategy, we do not know all of the factors, and cannot assign +them their exactly proper weights; and therefore we rarely get +the absolutely correct answer. The best that any man can do is to +estimate the factors as accurately as he can, judge as correctly +as he can their interaction on each other, and then make his own +conclusion or decision. + +When a man can do this well in the ordinary affairs of life, he +is said to be "a man of good judgment"; when he can do it well +in a certain line of work--say investments in real estate--he is +said to have good judgment in real estate. The use of the word +"judgment" here is excellent, because it expresses the act of a +judge, who listens patiently to all the evidence in a case and +then gives his decision. And the act of the judge, and the act +of any man in coming carefully to any decision, consist mainly +in estimating the relative values of all the factors, and their +relations to each other ("sizing them up" is the expressive slang), +and then perceiving with more or less correctness what the answer +is. Some men do not have good judgment; some men highly educated, +brilliant, and well-meaning, seem never to get quite the correct +answer to any problem in life. They are said to be unsuccessful +and no one knows why. Perhaps they lack that instinctive sense +of proportion that some men have--a sense as real as an "ear for +music"; or perhaps they lack a willingness or a capability to think +about a situation with sufficient intentness to force a clear picture +of the situation with all its various features upon the mental +retina. + +The ability to make a mental picture, be it of a machine, of any +group of material objects, such as the various units of a fleet +organized as such, or of any other situation, varies with different +men; but like every other kind of ability, it can be strengthened +by practice, and assisted by appropriate means. In the engineering +arts, the practice is gotten by observing and remembering actual +machines; and the assistance is given by drawings of different kinds. +In strategy, the practice is given by observing and remembering the +movements of actual fleets; and the assistance by means of drawings +of different kinds, and by war problems, and the game-board. The +game-board represents a number of successive pictures, and is not +very different in principle from moving-pictures. In fact, the +suggestion has been made repeatedly for several years and is now +in process of development that the various situations in tactical +games might advantageously be photographed on films and afterward +projected in rapid succession on a screen. + +One of the curious limitations of the naval game board, both in +tactical and strategic games, is that it takes no account of personnel; +that it assumes that all the various units are manned by crews +that are adequate both in numbers and in training. Of course, it +would be impracticable to test say the relative values of kinds +of vessels, unless all the factors of the problem were the same, +except the two factors that were competing. Therefore the limitation +mentioned is not mentioned as a criticism, but simply to point +out that the game-board, in common with most of the other means +of discussion in naval matters, has gradually led people to think +of naval matters in terms of material units only. That such an +unfortunate state of affairs has come to pass can be verified by +reading almost any paper, even professional, that speaks about +navies; for one will be confronted at once with the statement that +such and such a navy consists of such and such ships, etc. Since +when has a navy consisted of brass and iron? Since when has the mind +and character of man taken a place subordinate to matter? At what +time did the change occur whereby the instrument employed dominated +the human being who employed it? That this is not an academic point, +or an unimportant thing to bear in mind is evidenced by countless +facts in history. In order not to tire the reader, mention will be +made of only one fact, the well-known fight between the American +frigate _Chesapeake_, and the British frigate _Shannon_ to which +I have already referred. These two ships were almost identical +in size and in the number and kinds of guns, and in the number +of officers and crew, and the battle was fought on June 1, 1813, +in Massachusetts Bay, under circumstances of weather and other +conditions that gave no advantage to either. If material and numbers +of personnel were the only factors in the fight, the fight would +have continued very long and ended in a draw. Did these things +occur? No, the _Chesapeake_ was captured in a little less than +fifteen minutes after the first gun was fired, and nearly half her +crew were killed or wounded! + +It would be tiresome to recount all the battles both on sea and +land, in which smaller forces defeated forces numerically greater; +but it may not be possible by any other means to force the fact +on the attention--even sometimes of naval officers--that material +vessels, guns, etc., are merely instruments, and that the work +gotten out of any instrument depends not only on the instrument +itself, but on the skill with which it is employed. Usually, when +thinking or speaking of the power of any instrument (or means or +method or organization) we mean the power of which it is capable; +that is, the result which it can produce, _if used with_ 100 _per +cent of skill_. Possibly, we are subconsciously aware that we assume +perfect skill; but whether we are or not, we have become so accustomed +to the tacit acceptance of the phrase, "other things being equal," +that we have come to forget that other things may not be equal at +all; and that they certainly will not be on the day of trial, if +we forget or undervalue those other things, while our antagonist +does not. + +Let us always remember, then, that the effective work gotten out +of any means or instrument is the product of the maximum capability +of the means or instrument and the skill with which it is used; +that, for instance, if two fleets fight, which are numerically +equal in material and personnel, but in which the skill of the +personnel of the A fleet is twice as great as the skill of the +personnel of the B fleet, the A fleet will be twice as powerful +as the B fleet. + +It may be objected that it would be absurd to assume the skill +of the personnel in one fleet as twice as great as that of the +personnel in the other fleet, but it can easily be shown that even +so great a disproportion is not impossible, provided the skill in +one fleet is very great. The value of superior skill naturally +becomes important where the difficulties are great. A very simple +illustration is in firing a gun; for even if the skill of one marksman +be greater than that of another, it will be unimportant, if the +target is so large and so close that even the inferior marksman +can hit it at each shot. The probability of hitting a target--so +far as overs and shorts are concerned (or deviations to the left +and right)--varies with the fraction _a/y_, where _a_ is the half +height (or width) of the target, and _y_ is the mean error. The +greater the size of the target, and the less the mean error, the +greater the probability of hitting. The size of the two targets +being fixed, therefore, the smaller the mean error the greater +the probability of hitting. The probability of hitting, however +(as can be seen by the formula), does not increase greatly with +the decrease of error, except in cases where _a/y_ is small, where +the mean error is large relatively to the width or height of the +target. For instance, if _a/y_ is .1 in one case, and .2 in another +case, the probability is practically double in the second case; +whereas, if _a/y_ is 1 in one case, and 2 in another, the probability +increases only 55 per cent; while if it is 2 in one case and 4 in +the other, the probability of hitting increases only 12 per cent. + +This means that if two antagonists engage, the more skilful should, +and doubtless will, engage under difficult conditions, where _y_ +is considerable relatively to _a_; for instance, at long range. +Suppose that he engages at such a range that he can make 10 per +cent of hits--that is, make 90 per cent of misses; and that his +misses relatively to the enemy's is as 90 to 95--so that the enemy +makes 95 per cent of misses. This does not seem to be (in fact it +is not) an extreme case: and yet _A_ will hit _B_ twice as often +as _B_ will hit _A_. In other words, the effective skill of _A_ +will be twice that of _B_. + +This illustrates the effect of training--because all that training +in handling any instrument can do is to attain as closely as possible +to the maximum output of the instrument; and as the maximum output +is attained only when the instrument is handled exactly as it should +be handled, and as every departure is therefore an error in handling, +we see that the effect of training is merely to diminish errors. + +That this illustration, drawn from gunnery, is applicable in general +terms to strategy seems clear, for the reason that in every strategical +situation, no matter how simple or how complex, there is, and can be +only one _best_ thing to do; so that the statement of any strategic +situation, if followed by a question as to what is the best thing +to do, becomes a problem, to which the answer is--_the best thing +to do_. Of course, in most strategic problems, there are so many +factors almost unknown, and so many factors only imperfectly known, +that we can rarely ascertain mathematically what is the best thing +to do. Nevertheless, there must be a best thing to do, even if we +never ascertain exactly what it is. Now in arriving at the decision +as to the best thing to do, one estimates the weight of each factor +and its bearing on the whole. If one estimates each factor correctly, +that is, if he makes no errors in any estimate, and if he makes no +error in summing up, he will make an absolutely correct decision; +and any departure from correctness in decision can result from +no other cause than from errors in his various estimates and in +their final summation. In other words, skill in strategy is to +be attained by the same process as is skill in other arts: by +eliminating errors. + +So, when we take the decisions of the game-board and the war problem, +we must not allow ourselves to forget that there has been a tacit +assumption that the numbers and the skill of the personnel have +been equal on the two sides; and we must supplement our decision +as to the best material to be employed by another decision as to +how we shall see to it that the assumption of equality of personnel +shall be realized in fact--or rather that it shall be realized in +fact that our personnel shall get the maximum of effectiveness +out of the material. + +In designing the machine, therefore, we are confronted with the +curious fact that, in general, we must design the various material +parts before designing the personnel parts that are to operate +them. + +The most obvious characteristic of the personnel parts is that +the number of personnel parts shall be sufficient to operate the +material parts. + +To ascertain the number of personnel parts, the only means is actual +trial; though naturally, if we have previously ascertained the +number of men needed to operate any kind of mechanism, say a certain +kind and size of gun, we can estimate quite accurately the number +needed to operate a similar gun, even if it differ somewhat from +the other gun. After the gun is tried, however, we may have to +change our original estimate, not only because the estimate may +have been in error, but because the requirement of operating the +gun may have changed. For instance, the requirements of fire-control +have within very recent years compelled the addition of a considerable +number of men to the complements of battleships. + +Now the need of supplying enough men to operate successfully any +instrument or mechanism is absolute, for the reasons that the number +of things to be done is fixed, and that an insufficient number of +men in the ratio for instance of 9 to 8 may mean a falling off in +the output of the machine much greater than in the ratio of 9 to +8. A simple illustration may be taken from the baseball game; for +it is obvious that the output of a baseball team, in competition with +other teams, would fall off in a much greater ratio than of 9 to +8, by leaving out one member of the nine. Another illustration, or +rather an analogy, may be found in machinery made of rigid metal--say +a steam-engine; for the omission of almost any part in an engine +would entirely stop its operation. + +Not only, however, must we see that the number of personnel parts +is sufficient, we must see that they are correctly divided among +the various material parts; otherwise there will be too many in +one place and too few in another; and while it is better to have +too many men than too few, too many men prevent the attainment +of the maximum effect. + +The effect of having too few men, however, is not merely in limiting +the effectiveness of the output of the machine; for, if carried +to a considerable degree, it prevents due care of the material +parts themselves, and causes those material parts to deteriorate. +This deterioration may take the form of actual wasting away as +by rust; but even if the deterioration does not advance so far +as actual wastage, it may easily, and often does, advance to the +stage where, although not evidenced by visible rust or by any other +indication, so long as the mechanism is not operated at its normal +rate, it declares itself very clearly as soon as the mechanism is +tried in service. For this reason, all mechanicians realize that +it is better for every mechanism not to lie idle, but to be used +considerably, though, of course, without being forced unduly. + +Not only also must the personnel be sufficient in number and correctly +divided, it must be organized in such manner that the personnel +itself will have the characteristics of a machine, in the sense +that each unit will be so placed relatively to the hope of reward +and the fear of punishment, that he will do his allotted tasks +industriously; that he will have the place in the organization +for which his character and abilities fit him, and that he will +be given such duties and exercises as will fit him more and more +for his position, and more and more for advancement to positions +higher. + +Not only this, we must exercise foresight in the endeavor that +the material parts and the personnel parts shall be ready at the +same time, so that neither will have to wait for the other; and to +insure the immediate availability when war breaks out, of sufficient +trained personnel to man and fight effectively all the material +units that we shall need to use. This raises the question: "What +units shall we need?" The government itself must, of course, decide +this matter; but it may be pointed out that if in any considerable +war every unit we possess should not be utilized, the navy could +not do as effective work as it otherwise could do. In the present +war, the belligerents have not only utilized all the units that +they had, they have built very many more, using the utmost possible +diligence and despatch. In case we should be drawn into war with +any considerable naval nation, all history and all reasoning show +that we must do the same. Few considerable wars have been waged +except with the greatest energy on each side; for each side knows +that the scale may be turned by a trifling preponderance on one +side; and that if the scale once be turned, it will be practically +impossible ever to restore the balance. Every advantage gained makes +one side relatively weaker to the other than it was before, and +increases the chance that the same side will gain another advantage; +gains and losses are cumulative in their effect. For this reason, +it is essential, if we are to wage war successfully, that we start +right, and send each unit immediately out to service, manned with +a highly trained and skilful personnel; because that is what our +foe will do. + +The Germans meet the difficulty of keeping their personnel abreast +of their material very wisely. They utilize the winter months, +when naval operations are almost impossible, for reorganizing and +rearranging their personnel; so that when spring comes, they are +ready in all their ships to start the spring drilling on a systematic +plan. The crews being already organized, and the scheme of drills +well understood, the work of getting the recruits versed in their +relatively simple tasks and the more experienced men skilled in +their new positions is quickly accomplished, and the fleet is soon +ready for the spring maneuvers. + +The fundamental requirement of any organization of men is that it +shall approach as closely as possible the characteristics of an +organism, in which all the parts, though independent, are mutually +dependent, each part doing its appropriate work without interfering +with any other, but on the contrary assisting it. The most complex +organization in the world is that of a navy, due primarily to the +great variety of mechanisms in it, and secondarily to the great +variety of trained bodies of men for handling those mechanisms. +This variety extends from the highest posts to the lowest; and +to make such varied organizations work together to a common end +is one of the greatest achievements of civilized man. How it is +accomplished is not clear at first view. It is not hard to see how +a company of soldiers, drawn up in line, can be made to move as +one body by order of the captain. But how in a battleship carrying +a thousand men does the coal-passer in the fire-room do as the +captain on the bridge desires? It may be objected that he does +not--that the captain has no wishes regarding the doings of any +coal-passer--that all the captain is concerned with is the doings +of the ship as a whole. True, in a way; and yet if the various +coal-passers, firemen, quartermasters, _et al_., do not do as the +captain wishes, the ship as a whole will not. The secret of the success +achieved seems to lie in the knitting together of all the personnel +parts by invisible wires of common understanding, analogous to the +visible wires that connect the helmsman with the steering-engine. +In the case of any small body of men, say the force in one fire-room, +the connecting wire joining each man to the petty officer in charge +of that fire-room is almost visible, because the petty officer is +familiar, by experience, with the work of each man; for he has +done that work himself, knows just how it should be done, and knows +how to instruct each man. But the more complicated the organization +is, the more invisible are the communicating wires that tie the +men together, and yet the more important it is that those wires +shall tie them; it is even more important, for instance, that the +wires connecting the chief engineer with all his force shall operate +than that the wires in any one fire-room shall operate. And yet not +only are there more wires, but the wires themselves that connect +the chief engineer to all the men below him, are longer and more +subject to derangement, than the wires that connect the petty officer +of one fire-room to the individuals under him. + +The chief engineer, of course, is not tied directly to his coal-passers, +but to men close to himself; close not only in actual distance, but +in experience, knowledge, and sympathy; men who speak the same +languages as he does, who understand what he means when he speaks, +and who speak to him in ways he understands. These men immediately +under him are similarly tied to their immediate subordinates by wires +of knowledge, experience, and sympathy--these to their immediate +subordinates, and so on. + +The same statement applies to the captain in his relations with +the chief engineer. The captain may not be an experienced engineer +himself; but he is familiar enough with engineering, with its +difficulties, its possibilities, and its aims, to converse with +the chief engineer in language which both clearly understand. + +The same principles seem to apply throughout the whole range of +the personnel: so that, no matter how large the organization of +any navy may be, there is--there must be, if good work is to be +done--a network of invisible wires, uniting all together, by a +strong yet flexible bond of sympathy. + +And has the material of the navy no connection with this bond? +Who knows! Brass and steel are said to be lifeless matter. But +does any naval man believe this wholly? Does any man feel that +those battleships, and cruisers, and destroyers, and submarines +are lifeless which he himself--with his own eyes--has seen darting +swiftly, precisely, powerfully on perfect lines and curves, changing +their relative positions through complicated maneuvers without +accident or mistake? Can we really believe that they take no part +and feel no pride in those magnificent pageants on the ocean? From +the earliest times, men have personified ships, calling a ship "he" +or "she," and giving ships the names of people, and of states; +and is not a ship with its crew a living thing, as much as the +body of a man? The body of a man is in part composed of bones and +muscles, and other parts, as truly things of matter as are the +hull and engines of a ship. It is only the spirit of life that +makes a man alive, and permits the members of his body, like the +members of a ship, to perform their appointed tasks. + +But even if this notion seems fanciful and absurd, we must admit +that as surely as the mind and brain and nerves and the material +elements of a man must be designed and made to work in harmony +together, so surely must all the parts of any ship, and all the +parts of any navy, parts of material and parts of personnel, be +designed and made to work in harmony together; obedient to the +controlling mind, and sympathetically indoctrinated with the wish +and the will to do as that mind desires. + + + + +CHAPTER IX + +PREPARING THE ACTIVE FLEET + +John Clerk, of Eldin, Scotland, never went to sea, and yet he devised +a scheme of naval tactics, by following which the British Admiral +Rodney gained his victory over the French fleet between Dominica +and Guadeloupe in April, 1782. Clerk devised his system by the +simple plan of thinking intently about naval actions in the large, +disregarding such details as guns, rigging, masts, and weather, and +concentrating on the movements of the fleets themselves, and the +doings of the units of which those fleets were made. He assisted +his mental processes by little models of ships, which he carried in +his pockets, and which he could, and did, arrange on any convenient +table, when he desired to study a problem, or to make a convert. + +He was enabled by this simple and inexpensive device to see the +special problems of fleet tactics more clearly than he could have +done by observing battles on board of any ships; for his attention +in the ships would have been distracted by the exciting events +occurring, by the noise and danger, and by the impossibility of +seeing the whole because of the nearness of some of the parts. +The amazing result was that he formed a clearer concept of naval +tactics than any admiral of his time, finally overcame the natural +prejudice of the British navy, and actually induced Rodney to stake +on the suggestion of a non-military civilian his own reputation +and the issue of a great sea fight. Furthermore, the issue was +crowned with success. + +Nothing could be simpler than Clerk's method. It was, of course, +applied to tactics, but similar methods are now applied to strategy; +for strategy and tactics, as already pointed out, are based on +similar principles, and differ mainly in the fact that strategy +is larger, covers more space, occupies more time, and involves +a greater number of quantities. + +Most of the books on naval strategy go into the subject historically, +and analyze naval campaigns, and also describe those measures of +foresight whereby nations, notably Great Britain, have established +bases all over the world and built up great naval establishments. +These books lay bare the reasons for the large successes that good +naval strategy has attained, both in peace and war, and constitute +nearly all there is of the science of naval strategy. + +These books and this method of treating naval strategy are valuable +beyond measure; but officers find considerable difficulty sometimes +in applying the principles set forth to present problems, because +of the paucity of data, the remoteness in time and distance of +many of the episodes described, and the consequent difficulty of +making due allowance for them. Now, no study of naval strategy can +be thoroughly satisfactory to a naval officer unless it assists +him practically to decide what should be done in order to make the +naval forces of his country, including himself, better in whatever +will conduce to victory in the next war. Therefore, at the various +war colleges, although the student is given books on strategy to +study, the major part of the training is given by the applicatory +method, an extension of Clerk's, in which the student applies his +own skill to solving war problems, makes his own estimate of the +situation, solves each problem in his own way (his solution being +afterward criticised by the staff), and then takes part in the +games in which the solutions presented are tried out. This procedure +recognizes the fact that in any human art and science--say medicine, +music, or navigation--it is the art and not the science by which +one gets results; that the science is merely the foundation on +which the art reposes, and that it is by practice of the art and +not by knowledge of the science that skill is gained. + +This does not mean, of course, that we do not need as much knowledge +of the science of naval strategy as we can get; for the reason that +the naval profession is a growing profession, which necessitates +that we keep the application of the principles of its strategy +abreast of the improvements of the times, especially in mechanisms; +which necessitates, in turn, that we know what those principles +are. + +The applicatory method bears somewhat the same relation to the +method of studying books and hearing lectures that exercises in +practical navigation bear to the study of the theory. There is +one difference, however, as applied to strategy and navigation, +which is that the science of navigation is clearly stated in precise +rules and formulć, and the problems in practical navigation are +solved by assigning values to quantities like _a, b, c, d_, etc., +in the formulć, and working out the results by mathematics; whereas +in strategy, no exact science exists, there are no formulć, and even +the number of assured facts and principles is small. For this reason +the art of strategy is more extensive and significant relatively +to its science than is the art of navigation to its science. + +It is a defect of the historical system that it tends to make men do +as people in the past have done--to make them work by rule. Clerk's +method took no note of what had been done before, but confined +itself to working out what should be done at the moment (that is, +by what we now call the "applicatory method"), taking account of +conditions as they are. By combining the two methods, as all war +colleges do now, officers get the good results of both. + +In the studies and exercises at the war colleges, note is taken +of the great events that have gone by, and of the great problems +now presented; by studying the historical events, and by solving +war problems of the present, a certain knowledge of the science +of naval strategy, and a certain skill in the art are gained. The +studies and the problems naturally are of war situations. + +Yet every war situation was the result of measures taken in time +of peace. If these measures had been unwise on the part of one +side--say Blue--in the design of certain craft, or the adoption, +or failure of adoption, of certain plans, then Blue's strategic +situation in the war would be more unfavorable than it would have +been if the measures had been wise. + +This proves that it is not only in war that strategy should be +consulted; that strategy should be made to perform important services +in peace as well; that strategic considerations should be the guide +to all measures great and small, that not only the major operations +in war, but also the minor preparations in peace, should be conducted +in accordance with the principles of strategy, and conform to its +requirements. By this means, and by this means only, does a system +of preparation seem possible in which all shall prepare with the +same end in view, and in which, therefore, the best results will +be secured in the least time and with the least labor. + +The naval machine having been designed, the various parts having +been furnished by the administrative agencies directing personnel +and material, and the consumable stores having been provided by the +agencies of supply (all under the guidance and control of strategy, +and in accordance with the calculations of logistics), the next +step is the same as that with any other machine--to prepare the +machine to do its work. + +The work that strategy has to do in accomplishing the preparation +is only in planning; but this planning is not limited to general +planning, for it extends to planning every procedure of training +and administration, no matter how great or how small. It plans the +mobilization of the navy as a whole, the exercises of the fleet, +the training of officers and men to insure that the plans for +mobilization and fleet exercises shall be efficiently carried out, +the exercises of the various craft, and of the various mechanisms +of all kinds in those craft, and even the drills of the officers +and men, that insure that the various craft and mechanisms shall +be handled well. This does not mean that strategy concerns itself +directly with the training of mess cooks and coal-passers; and +it may be admitted that such training is only under strategy's +general guidance. It may be admitted, also, that a considerable +part of the training of men in using mechanisms is caused by the +requirements of the mechanism itself; that practically the same +training is needed for a water-tender in the merchant service as +for a water-tender in the navy. Nevertheless, we must either declare +that the training of mechanicians in the nary has no relation to the +demands of preparation of the navy for war, or else admit that the +training comes under the broad dominion of strategy. To admit this +does not mean at all that the training of a naval radio electrician is +not directed in its details almost wholly by electrical engineering +requirements; it merely means that the training must be such as to +fulfil the requirements of strategy, for otherwise it would have +no value. No matter how well trained a man might be in radio work, +his work would be useless for naval purposes, if not made useful +by being adapted to naval requirements. The fact that strategy +controls the training of radio electricians through the medium of +electrical means is only one illustration of another important +fact, which is that in all its operations strategy directs the +methods by which results are to be attained, and utilizes whatever +means, even technical means, are the most effective and appropriate. + +The naval machine having been designed as to both personnel and +material, strategy has nothing to do with the material in preparing +the machine for use, because the material parts are already prepared, +and it is the work of engineering to keep those material parts in +a state of continual preparedness. + +It must be noted, however, that the naval machine differs from +most material machines in that its various parts, material as well +as personnel, are continually being replaced by newer parts, and +added to by parts of novel kinds. Strategy must be consulted, of +course, in designing the characteristics of the newer and the novel +parts; but this work properly belongs in the designing stage, and +not in the preparation stage. + +Strategy's work, therefore, in preparing the naval machine for +work consists wholly in preparing the personnel. This preparing +may be divided into two parts--preparing the existing fleet already +mobilized and preparing the rest of the navy. + +_Preparing the Fleet_.--The fleet itself is always ready. This +does not mean that, in time of profound peace, every ship in the +fleet has all its men on board, its chain hove short, and its engines +ready to turn over at a moment's notice; but it does mean that this +condition is always approximated in whatever degree the necessities +of the moment exact. Normally, it is not necessary to keep all the +men on board; but whenever, or if ever, it becomes so necessary, +the men can be kept on board and everything made ready for instant +use. It is perfectly correct, therefore, to say that, so far as it +may be necessary, a fleet in active commission is always ready. + +_Training_.--Before this state of readiness can be attained, however, +a great deal of training has to be carried out; and this training +must naturally be designed and prosecuted solely to attain this +end. Unless this end be held constantly in view, and unless the +methods of training be adapted to attain it, the training cannot +possibly be effective. To go from any point to another point, one +must proceed in the correct direction. If he proceeds in another +direction, he will miss the point. + +The training of the fleet naturally must be in doing the things +which the fleet would have to do in war. To decide what things +these will probably be, resort must be had to the teachings of +history, especially the most recent history, and to the teachings +of the war problem, the chart maneuver, and the game-board. + +The part of the personnel which it is the most important to train +is, of course, the commander-in-chief himself; and no reason is +apparent for supposing that his training should be conducted on +principles different from those that control the training of every +other person in the fleet. Men being the same in general, their +qualities differing only in degree, it is logical to conclude that, +if a gun-pointer or coxswain is best trained by being made first +to understand the principles that underlie the correct performance +of his work, and then by being given a good deal of practice in +performing it, a commander-in-chief, or a captain, engineer, or +gunner, can be best trained under a similar plan. Knowledge and +practice have always been the most effective means of acquiring +skill, and probably will continue to be the best for some time +to come. + +Owing to the fact that navies have been in existence for many years, +the general qualifications of efficient naval officers are fairly +well known; and they have always been the same in the most important +particulars, though the recent coming of scientific apparatus has +made available and valuable certain types of men not especially +valuable before this scientific apparatus appeared. + +In all navies, and equally in all armies, the qualification that +has been the most important has been character. To insure, or rather +to do the utmost toward insuring, proper character in its officers, +all countries for many years have educated certain young men of +the country to be officers in the army and navy, and they have +educated young men for no other service. If knowledge were the +prime requirement, special training for young men would not be +needed; the various educational institutions could supply young +men highly educated; and if the government were to take each year +a certain number of graduates who could pass certain examinations, +the educational institutions would be glad to educate young men to +pass them. In securing young men of proper education and physique, +little difficulty would be found. Special schools could even give +sufficient instruction in military and maritime subjects to enable +young men to become useful in minor positions on shipboard and in +camp, after a brief experience there. In fact, for some of the +positions in the army and navy, such as those in the medical corps +and others, military or naval training is not needed, or exacted. + +The truth of these remarks is not so obvious now as it was some +years ago, and it has never been so obvious in navies as in armies; +because education in the use of the numerous special appliances +used in ships could be given less readily by private instruction +than in the use of the simpler appliances used in armies. But even +now, and even in the navy, the course given at Annapolis is usually +termed a "training" rather than an education. + +Yet even education, educators tell us, is more a matter of training +than a matter of imparting knowledge. This indicates that even +for the duties of civil life, the paramount aim of educators is +so to train the characters of young men as to fit them for good +citizenship. + +We may assume, therefore, that the primary aim of governments in +preparing young men for the army and navy is to develop character +along the line needed for useful work in those services. + +What is that line? + +Probably nine officers in ten would answer this question with the +words, "the line of duty." This does not mean that officers are +the only people who should be trained to follow the line of duty; +but it does mean that, in military and naval schools, the training +is more devoted to this than in other schools, except, of course, +those schools that train young men for the priesthood or other +departments of the religious life. The analogy between the clerical +and the military professions in this regard has been pointed out many +times; but perhaps the closeness with which the medical profession +approximates both in its adherence to the line of duty has not been +appreciated as fully as it should be. + +_Duty_.--The reason for the predominance of the idea of duty over +any other in naval training is due, of course, to a realization +of the fact that more can be accomplished by officers having a +strict sense of duty though otherwise lacking, than by officers +having any or all the other qualifications, but lacking the sense +of duty. As an extreme instance of the doubtful value of highly +trained officers who lack the sense of duty, we need but to point +to those traitors who, in the past, have turned their powers in +the hour of need against the cause they were engaged to fight for. + +One cannot pursue the path of duty when that path becomes difficult +or disagreeable unless the sense of duty is so strong as to resist +the temptation to leave the path. To train a man to be strong in +this way, we train his character. + +There are several ways in which a man is tempted to leave the line +of duty; of these perhaps the most important are danger, sloth, +and love of pleasure. No human being is perfectly strong along +any of these lines; and some are most tempted by danger, some by +sloth, and some by love of pleasure. + +Sloth and the love of pleasure do not act as hinderances to efficiency +in the naval profession any more than they do in other callings. +There is no profession, business, or vocation, in which a man's +efficiency does not depend largely on his power of resistance to the +allurement of sloth and pleasure. In all walks of life, including +the usual routine of the naval life, these two factors are the +main stumbling-blocks to the success of any man. That is, they +are the main stumbling-blocks that training can remove or lessen; +the main stumbling-blocks in the way of his attaining that degree +of efficiency for which his mental and physical abilities themselves +would fit him. Natural abilities are not here considered; we are +considering merely what training can do to develop men as they +are for the naval life. + +_Courage_.--Danger is the special influence to divert a man from +duty's line that is distinctive of the army and the navy; and therefore +to secure ability to overcome this influence is the distinct effort +of military training. To train a young man for the army, the training +naturally is directed toward minimizing the influence of one class +of dangers; while to train a young man for the navy, the training +must be directed toward minimizing the influence of another class. +Of course training toward courage in any line develops courage in +other lines; but nevertheless a naval training does not enable +a man to ride a plunging cavalry horse with equanimity; nor does +training as a cavalryman wholly fit a man to brave the dangers +of the deep in a submarine. + +Thirty years ago, the present writer showed Commander Royal Bird +Bradford, U. S. N., the wonders of the U. S. S. _Atlanta_, the +first ship of what Americans then called "The New Navy." When I +showed Bradford the conning-tower, I remarked that many captains +who had visited the _Atlanta_ had said that they would not go into +the conning-tower in battle. To this Bradford replied: "The captain +who would not go into the conning-tower in battle would be very +brave, but he'd be a d----d fool." + +The obvious truth of this remark, the intimate connection which +it suggested between courage and folly, and the fact often noted +in life that to be brave is often to be foolish, contrasted with +the fact that in all history the virtue of courage in men has been +more lauded than any other virtue, suggests that a brief inquiry +into the nature and influence of courage may be interesting. + +The definitions of courage found in the dictionary are most +unsatisfactory, except that they say that the word "courage" comes +from the Latin "cor," the heart; showing that it is deemed a moral +quality, rather than physical or mental. + +Yet the deeds of courage that history and fiction tell, have been +deeds of what we call "physical courage," in which heroes and heroines +have braved death and physical suffering. Far in the background +are deeds of "moral courage," though many wise men have told us +that "moral courage" is a quality higher than "physical courage," +and more important. + +It is a little difficult to make a clear picture of courage that +is physical, as distinguished from courage that is moral; or moral +as distinguished from physical. Courage seems to be a quality so +clearly marked as to be hardly qualifiable by any adjective except +an adjective indicating degree--such as "great" or "little"; but if +any other adjective may be applied to it, the adjective "moral" seems +to be the only one. For courage, no matter how or why displayed, is +from its very essence, moral. Strictly speaking, how can there be +any courage except moral courage? If a man braves death or physical +suffering, the quality that enables him to brave it is certainly +not physical; certainly it does not pertain to the physical body. +The "first law of nature" impels him to escape or yield; and it +impels him with a powerful force. If this force be not successfully +resisted, the man will yield. + +Now the act of resisting a temptation to escape a physical danger is +due to a more or less conscious desire to preserve one's self-respect +and the respect of one's fellow men; and therefore, the best way in +which to train a man to be brave is to cultivate his self-respect +and a desire to have the respect of his fellow men; and to foster +the idea that he will lose both if he acts in a cowardly way. + +Naturally, some men are more apt to be cowards as regards physical +dangers than are others; and men differ greatly in this way. Men +of rugged physique, dull imagination, and sluggish nerves are not +so prone to fear of physical danger, especially danger far ahead +in the future, as are men of delicate physique, keen imagination, +and highly strung nervous system; and yet men of the latter class +sometimes surpass men of the former class when the danger actually +arrives--they seem to have prepared themselves for it, when men +of the former class seem in a measure to be taken by surprise. + +It is the attainment of physical courage, or courage to defy a +threat of physical injury, that military training aims at. That it +has done so successfully in the past, the history of the valiant +deeds of sailors and soldiers bears superabundant witness. This +courage has been brought out because it was essential. Courage is +to a man what strength is to structural materials. No matter how +physically strong and mentally equipped a man may be; no matter +how perfectly designed and constructed an engine may be, neither +the man nor the engine will "stand up to the work," unless the +courage in the one case, and the strength of the materials in the +other case, are adequate to the stress. + +While perfect courage would enable a man to approach certain death +with equanimity, all that is usually demanded of a man is that he +shall dare to risk death, if need be. To do this successfully, a +great assistance is a knowledge that even if things look bad, the +danger is not so great as it appears. Therefore, training confronts +men frequently with situations that look dangerous, but which skill +and coolness can avert. In this way, the pupil becomes familiar +with the face of danger, and learns that it is not so terrible as +it seems. Nothing else makes a man so brave regarding a certain +danger as to have met that danger successfully before. This statement +must be qualified with the remark that in some cases a danger, +although passed successfully, has been known to do a harm to the +nervous system from which it never has recovered. This is especially +the case if it was accompanied with a great and sudden noise and +the evidence of great injury to others. In cases like this, the +shock probably comes too abruptly to enable the man to prepare +himself to receive it. The efficacy of a little preparation, even +preparation lasting but a few seconds, is worthy of remark. Two +theories connecting fear and trembling may be noted here: one that a +person trembles because he fears; the other, and later, that trembling +is automatic, and that a person fears _because he trembles_. + +But the influence of fear is not only to tempt a man to turn his +back on duty and seek safety in flight, for it affects him in many +degrees short of this. Sometimes, in fact usually, it prevents the +accurate operation of the mind in greater or less degree. Here +again training comes to the rescue, by so habituating a man to +do his work in a certain way (loading a gun for instance) that +he will do it automatically, and yet correctly, when his mind is +almost paralyzed for a time. A very few men are so constituted +that danger is a stimulus to not only their physical but their +mental functions; so that they never think quite so quickly and +so clearly as when in great danger. Such men are born commanders. + +Discussion of such an abstract thing as courage may seem out of +place in a discussion of "Naval Strategy"; but while it is true +that naval strategy is largely concerned with mental operations, +while courage is a moral or spiritual quality, yet strategy concerns +itself with the securing of all means to victory, and of these means +courage is more important than any other one thing. One plan or +one system of training may be better than another; but they differ +only in degree, and if one plan fails another may be substituted; +but if courage be found lacking, there is no substitute on earth. +Now, if courage is to be inculcated by some system of training, +surely it is not amiss to devote a few minutes to an analysis of +the nature of courage, to seek what light we can get as to the +best methods of training to employ. + +_Responsibility_.--There is one form of courage which most men +are never called upon to use, and that is willingness to take +responsibility. Most men are never confronted with a situation +requiring them to take it. To naval men, however, the necessity +comes often, even to naval men in the lower grades; for they are +often confronted with situations in which they can accept or evade +responsibility. That courage is needed, no one can doubt who has +had experience. To accept responsibility, however, is not always +best either for the individual or for the cause; often it were +better to lay the responsibility on higher authority, by asking for +instructions. But the same remark is true of all uses of courage; +it is not always best to be brave, either for the individual or for +the cause. Both the individual and the cause can often be better +served by Prudence than by her big brother Courage. When, however, +the conditions require courage in any form, such as willingness to +accept responsibility, the man in charge of the situation at the +moment must use courage, or--fail. In such cases the decision rests +with the man himself. He cannot shift it to another's shoulders, +even if he would. Even if he decides and acts on the advice of +others, the responsibility remains with him. + +_From the Top Down, or from the Bottom Up?_--There are two directions +in which to approach the subject of training the personnel--from +the top down, and from the bottom up. The latter is the easier +way; is it the better? + +The latter is the easier way, because it is quicker and requires +less knowledge. In training a turret crew in this way, for instance, +one does not have to consider much outside of the turret itself. +The ammunition can be sent up and down, and the guns can be loaded, +pointed, and fired with just as much quickness and accuracy as is +humanly practicable, without much reference to the ship itself, +the fleet, or the navy. In fact, knowledge of outside requirements +hinders in some ways rather than advances training of this kind. +Knowledge, for instance, of the requirements of actual battle is a +distinct brake on many of the activities of mere target practice. + +But while it is easier to train in this way all the various bodies +of men that must be trained, it is obvious that by training them +wholly without reference to the requirements of the fleet as a +whole, the best result that we could expect would be a number of +bodies of men, each body well trained as a unit, but the combined +units not trained at all as component elements of the whole. The +result would be a little like what one would expect from the efforts +of an orchestra at playing a selection which the whole orchestra +had never played before together, but of which each member of the +orchestra had previously learned his part, and played it according +to his own ideas, without consulting the orchestra leader. + +By approaching the subject from the other direction, however, that +is, from the top, the training of each organization within the +fleet is arranged with reference to the work of the fleet as a +whole, the various features of the drills of each organization +being indicated by the conditions developed by that work. If this +plan be carried out, a longer time will be required to drill the +various bodies of men; but when it has been accomplished, those bodies +will be drilled, not only as separate bodies, but as sympathetic +elements of the whole. + +Of course the desirability of drilling separate divisions of a +fleet, ana separate ships, turret crews, fire-control parties, +and what-not, in accordance with the requirements of fleet work +does not prevent them from drilling by themselves as often as they +wish--any more than the necessity of drilling in the orchestra +prevents a trombone player from practising on his instrument as +much as the police will let him. + +Thus the fact of keeping a fleet together does more than merely +give opportunity for acquiring skill in handling the fleet itself, +and in handling the various ships so that they will work together +as parts of the fleet machine; because it shows each of the various +smaller units within the ships themselves how to direct its training. + +For this reason, the idea so often suggested of keeping the fleet +normally broken up into smaller parts, those parts close enough +together to unite before an enemy could strike, is most objectionable. +It is impossible to keep the fleet together all the time, because of +needed repairs, needed relaxation, and the necessity for individual +drills that enable a captain or division commander to strengthen his +weak points; but nevertheless since the "mission" of training is +to attain fighting efficiency in the fleet as a whole, rather than +to attain fighting efficiency in the various parts; and since it +can be attained only by drilling the fleet as a whole, the decision +to keep the fleet united as much as practicable seems inevitably to +follow. Besides, the statement cannot be successfully controverted +that difficult things are usually not so well done as easy things, +that drills of large organizations are more difficult than drills +of small organizations, and that in every fleet the drills that +are done the worst are the drills of the fleet as a whole. How +could anything else be expected, when one considers how much more +often, for instance, a turret crew is exercised at loading than +the fleet is exercised at the difficult movement of changing the +"line of bearing"? + +The older officers remember that for many years we carried on drills +at what we called "fleet tactics," though we knew they were only +tactical drills. They were excellent in the same sense as that in +which the drill of the manual of arms was excellent, or the squad +exercises given to recruits. They were necessary; but beyond the +elementary purpose of training in ship handling in fleet movements, +they had no "end in view"; they were planned with a limited horizon, +they were planned from the bottom. + +_General Staff_.--In order to direct the drills of a fleet toward +some worthy end, that end itself must be clearly seen; and in order +that it may be clearly seen, it first must be discovered. The end +does not exist as a bright mark in the sky, but as the answer to a +difficult problem; it cannot be found by guessing or by speculating +or by groping in the dark. Strategy says that the best way in which +to find it is by the "estimate of the situation" method. + +Owing to the fact that the commander-in-chief and all his personnel +are, by the nature of the conditions surrounding them, on executive +duty, the working out of the end in view of any extensive drills +seems the task of the Navy Department; while the task of attaining +it seems to belong to the commander-in-chief. Owing to the present +stage of electrical progress, the Navy Department has better means of +ascertaining the whole naval situation than has the commander-in-chief, +and if officers (General Staff) be stationed at the department +to receive and digest all the information received, and decide +on the best procedure in each contingency as it arises, the Navy +Department can then give the commander-in-chief the information he +requires and general instructions how to proceed. + +This does not mean that the department would "interfere" with the +commander-in-chief, but simply that it would assist him. The area +of discretion of the commander-in-chief should not be invaded; for +if it be invaded, not only may orders be given without knowledge +of certain facts in the commander-in-chief's possession, but the +commander-in-chief will have his difficulties increased by the very +people who are trying to help him. He may be forced into disobeying +orders, a most disturbing thing to have to do; and he will surely +be placed in a position of continuous doubt as to what is expected +of him. + +Of course, it must be realized that the difficulties of co-operating +with a commander-in-chief at sea, by means of even the most expert +General Staff, are of the highest order. It is hard to imagine any +task more difficult. It must be accomplished, however, or else +there will be danger all the time that the commander-in-chief will +act as he would not act if he had all the information that the +department had. This suggests at once that the proper office of +the department is merely to give the commander-in-chief information +and let him act on his own judgment. True in a measure; but the +commander-in-chief must be given some instructions, even if they +be general, for the reason that the commander-in-chief is merely +an instrument for enforcing a certain policy. Clearly, he must +know what the policy is, what the department desires; and the mere +statement of the department's desires is of itself an order. If +it is admitted that the commander-in-chief is to carry out the +orders of the department, it remains merely to decide in how great +detail those orders ought to be. + +No general answer can be given to the question: "In what detail +shall the orders be?" The general statement can be made, however, +that the instructions should be confined as closely as practicable +to a statement of the department's desires, and that this statement +should be as clear as possible. If, for instance, the only desire +of the department is that the enemy's fleet shall be defeated, no +amplification of this statement is required. But if the department +should desire, for reasons best known to itself, that the enemy +should be defeated by the use of a certain method, then that should +be stated also. Maybe it would not be wise for the department to +state the method the employment of which is desired; maybe the +commander-in-chief would be the best judge of the method to be +employed. But maybe circumstances of governmental policy dictate +the employment of a certain method, even if militarily it is not +the best; and maybe also the department might prefer that method +by reason of information recently received, which it does not have +time to communicate in full. + +Now, if it is desirable for the department to give the +commander-in-chief instructions, running the risk of invading his +"area of discretion," and of doing other disadvantageous things, +it is obvious that the department should be thoroughly equipped +for doing it successfully. This means that the department should +be provided not only with the most efficient radio apparatus that +can be secured, manned, of course, by the most skilful operators, +but also with a body of officers capable of handling that particular +part of the Navy Department's work which is the concentrated essence +of all its work, the actual handling of the naval forces. The usual +name given to such a body of officers is "General Staff." + +Such bodies of officers have been developed in navies in recent +years, by a desire to take advantage of electrical appliances which +greatly increase the accuracy and rapidity of communication over +long distances. In days not long ago, before communication by radio +was developed, commanders on the spot were in possession of much +more information about events in their vicinity, compared with +the Navy Department, than they are now; and the difficulties and +uncertainties of communication made it necessary to leave much more +to their discretion and initiative. The President of the United +States can now by telephone talk to the commander-in-chief, when +he is in home waters, and every day sees some improvement in this +line. This facility of communication carries with it, of course, +the danger of "interfering," one of the most frequent causes of +trouble in the past, in conducting the operations of both armies +and fleets--a danger very real, very insidious, and very important. +The very ease with which interference can be made, the trained +instinct of the subordinate to follow the wishes of his superior +if he can, the temptation to the superior to wield personally some +military power and get some military glory, conspire to bring about +interference. This is only an illustration, however, of the well-known +fact that every power can be used for evil as well as for good, +and is not a valid argument against developing to the utmost the +communication between the department and the fleet. It is, however, +a very valid argument against developing it unless there be developed +simultaneously some means like a "safety device" for preventing +or at least discouraging its misuse. + +The means devised is the General Staff; and in some countries like +Germany it seems to work so well that (unless our information is +incorrect) the Emperor himself does not interfere. He gives the +machine a certain problem to work out, and he accepts the answer +as the answer which has a greater probability of being correct +than any answer he could get by other means. + +_Training of the Staff_.--Now, if there is to be at the Navy Department +a body of men who will work out and recommend what instructions +should be given to the commander-in-chief, it seems obvious that +that body of men should be thoroughly trained. In the German army +the training of men to do this work (General Staff work) is given +only to officers specially selected. Certain young officers who +promise well are sent to the war college. Those who show aptitude +and industry are then put tentatively into the General Staff. Those +who show marked fitness in their tentative employment are then put +into the General Staff, which is as truly a special corps as is +our construction corps. How closely this system is followed with +the General Staff in the German navy, the present writer does not +know exactly; but his information is that the system in the navy +is copied (though with certain modifications) after the system in +the army. + +How can the General Staff at the Navy Department be trained? In the +same way as that in which officers at the war college are trained: +by study and by solving war problems by tactical and strategical +games. The training would naturally be more extended, as it would +be a postgraduate course. + +There is a difference to be noted between games like war games in +which the mental powers are trained, and games like billiards, in +which the nerves and muscles receive practically all the training; +and the difference refers mainly to the memory. Games of cards are +a little like war games; and many books on games of cards have +been written, expounding the principles on which they rest and +giving rules to follow. These books may be said to embody a science +of card-playing. + +No such book on naval strategy has appeared; and the obvious reason +is that only a few rules of naval strategy have been formulated. +Staff training, therefore, cannot be given wholly by studying books; +but possibly the scheme suggested to the department by the writer, +when he was Aid for Operations, may be developed into a sort of +illustrative literature, which can assist the memory. + +By this scheme, a body of officers at the Navy Department would +occupy their time wholly in studying war problems by devising and +playing strategical and tactical games ashore and afloat. After +each problem had been solved to the satisfaction of the staff, each +distinctive situation in the approved solution would be photographed +in as small a space as practicable, preferably on a moving-picture +film. In the solution of problem 99; for instance, there might be +50 situations and therefore 50 photographs. These photographs, +shown in appropriate succession, would furnish information analogous +to the information imparted to a chess student by the statement of +the successive moves in those games of chess that one sees sometimes +in books on chess and in newspapers. Now if the film photographs +were so arranged that the moves in the approved solution of, say, +problem 99 could be thrown on a screen, as slowly and as quickly +as desired, and if the film records of a few hundred such games +could be conveniently arranged, a very wide range of situations that +would probably come up in war would be portrayed; and the moves +made in handling those situations would form valuable precedents +for action, whenever situations approximating them should come up +in war. + +It must be borne in mind that in actual life, our only real guide +to wise action in any contingency that may arise is a memory, more +or less consciously realized, of how a similar contingency has +been met, successfully or unsuccessfully, in the past. Perhaps +most of us do not realize that it is not so much experience that +guides us as our memory of experiences. Therefore in the training +of both officers and enlisted men in strategy, tactics, seamanship, +gunnery, engineering, and the rest, the memory of how they, or +some one else, did this well and that badly (even if the memory +be hardly conscious) is the immediate agency for bringing about +improvement. + +Imagine now a strategical system of training for the navy, in which +a body of highly trained officers at the department will continuously +regulate the exercises of the fleet, guided by the revelations of +the _Kriegspiel:_ the commander-in-chief will direct the activities +of the main divisions of the fleet, carrying out the department's +scheme; the commander of each division will regulate the activities +of the units of his command in accordance with the fleet scheme; +the officer in command of each unit of each division will regulate +the activities of each unit in his ship, destroyer, submarine, +or other craft in accordance with the division scheme; and every +suborganization, in every ship, destroyer, or other craft will +regulate likewise the activities of its members; so that the navy +will resemble a vast and efficient organism, all the parts leagued +together by a common understanding and a common purpose; mutually +dependent, mutually assisting, sympathetically obedient to the +controlling mind that directs them toward the "end in view." + +It must be obvious, however, that in order that the navy shall +be like an organism, its brain (the General Staff) must not be a +thing apart, but must be of it, and bound to every part by ties +of sympathy and understanding. It would be possible to have a staff +excellent in many ways, and yet so out of touch with the fleet +and its practical requirements that co-ordination between the two +would not exist. Analogous conditions are sometimes seen in people +suffering from a certain class of nervous ailments; the mind seems +unimpaired, but co-ordination between the brain and certain muscles +is almost wholly lacking. + +To prevent such a condition, therefore, the staff must be kept in +touch with the fleet; and it must also permit the fleet to keep +in touch with the staff, by arranging that, accompanying the system +of training, there shall be a system of education which will insure +that the general plan will be understood throughout the fleet; and +that the means undertaken to execute it will be made sufficiently +clear to enable each person to receive the assistance of his own +intelligence. No man can do his best work in the dark. Darkness is +of itself depressing; while light, if not too intense, stimulates +the activities of every living thing. + +This does not mean that every mess attendant in the fleet should +be put into possession of the war plans of the commander-in-chief, +that he should be given any more information than he can assimilate +and digest, or than he needs, to do his work the best. Just how +much information to impart, and just how much to withhold are +quantitative questions, which can be decided wisely by only those +persons who know what their quantitative values are. This is an +important matter, and should be dealt with as such by the staff +itself. To get the maximum work out of every man is the aim of +training; to get the maximum work that shall be effective in attaining +the end in view, training must be directed by strategy, because +strategy alone has a clear knowledge of what is the end in view. + +_Stimuli_.--Some men are so slothful that exertion of any kind is +abhorrent to them; but these men are few, and are very few indeed +among a lot of healthy and normal men such as fill a navy. An office +boy, lazy beyond belief in the work he is engaged to do, will go +through the most violent exertions at a baseball game; and a darky +who prefers a soft resting-place in the shade of an umbrageous +tree to laboring in the fields will be stirred to wild enthusiasm +by a game of "craps." + +Now why are the office boy and the darky stimulated by these games? +By the elements of competition, chance, and possible danger they +bring out and the excitement thereby engendered. Training, therefore +introduces these elements into drills as much as it can. Competition +alone does not suffice, otherwise all men would play chess; competition +and chance combined are not enough, or gentlemen would not need +the danger of losing money to make card games interesting; but +any game that brings in all three elements will rouse the utmost +interest and activity of which a man is capable. Games involving +these three elements are known by many names; one name is "poker," +another name is "business," and another name is "politics." There +are many other games besides, but the greatest of all is strategy. + +Now in the endeavor to prepare a fleet by training, no lack of +means for exciting interest will be found; in fact no other training +offers so many and so great a variety of means for introducing +the elements of competition, chance, and danger. The problem is +how best to employ them. + +To do this successfully, it must be realized, of course, that the +greatest single factor in exciting interest is the personal factor, +since comparatively few men can get much interested in a matter +that is impersonal; a boy is more interested in watching a baseball +game in which he knows some of the players than in watching a game +between teams neither of which he has ever seen; and the men in +any ship are more interested in the competition between their ship +and some other than between any other two; feeling that _esprit de +corps_ by reason of which every individual in every organization +personifies the organization as a living thing of which he himself +is part. + +_Strategic Problems_.--The training of the fleet, then, can best be +done under the direction of a trained staff, that staff generously +employing all the resources of competition, chance, and danger. The +obvious way to do this is to give out to the fleet for solution a +continual succession of strategic problems, which the entire fleet +will be engaged in solving, and which will be the starting-point +for all the drills of the fleet and in the fleet. (Some officers +prefer the word "maneuver" to "problem.") + +The arranging of a continual series of war problems, or maneuvers +to be worked out in the fleet by "games," will call for an amount +of strategical skill second only to the skill needed for operations +in war, will deal with similar factors and be founded on similar +principles. + +Naturally, the war problems, before being sent to the fleet for +solving, would be solved first by the staff, using strategical +and tactical games, and other appropriate means; and inasmuch as +the scheme of education and training is for the benefit of the +staff itself, as well as for the benefit of the fleet, certain +members of the staff would go out with the fleet to note in what +ways, each problem sent down was defective, in what ways good--and +in what ways it could be modified with benefit. The successive +situations and solutions, made first by the staff and subsequently +by the fleet, can then be photographed and made part of the history +of war problems, for the library of the staff. + +In laying out the war problems, the staff will be guided naturally +by the ends in view--first to work out solutions of strategic, +logistic, and tactical situations in future wars, and second to +give opportunity to the various divisions, ships, turret crews, +engineers' forces, etc., for drills that will train them to meet +probable contingencies in future wars. + +This double end will not be so difficult of attainment as might at +first sight seem, for the reason that the solution of any problem +which represents a situation actually probable will automatically +provide all the minor situations necessary to drill the various +bodies; and the more inherently probable a situation is, the more +probable will be the situations in which the various flag-officers, +captains, quartermasters, engineers' forces, turret crews, etc., +will find themselves. + +Of course, the prime difficulty in devising realistic problems is +the fact that in war our whole fleet would be employed together +against an enemy fleet; and as the staff cannot supply an enemy +fleet, it must either imagine an enemy fleet, divert a small part +of our fleet to represent an enemy fleet, or else divide our fleet +into two approximately equal parts, one "red," and one "blue." + +_First Scheme_.--The first scheme has its usefulness in working +out the actual handling of the fleet as a whole; and considering +the purposes of strategy only, is the most important, though, of +course, "contacts" with the enemy cannot be simulated. From the +standpoint of fleet tactical drill, and the standpoint of that part +of strategy which arranges for handling large tactical situations +with success, it is useful, since it provides for the tactical +handling of the entire fleet. This certainly is important; for if +the personnel are to be so trained that the actual fleet shall be +handled with maximum effectiveness in battle, training in handling +that actual fleet must frequently be had; the fleet is a machine, +and no machine is complete if any of its parts is lacking. + +It may be objected that it is not necessary for the staff at the +department to devise such training, because drills of the entire +fleet can be devised and carried out by the commander-in-chief; +in fact that that is what he is for. This, of course, is partly +true; and it is not the idea of the author that the staff in the +department should interfere with any scheme of drills that the +commander-in-chief desires to devise and carry out; but it is his +idea that the staff should arrange problems to be worked out by +the fleet, in which the tactical handling of the fleet should be +subordinate to, and carried out for, a strategic purpose. + +A very simple drill would be the mere transfer of the fleet to a +distant point, when in supposititious danger from an enemy, employing +by day and night the scouting and screening operations that such a +trip would demand. Another drill would be the massing of previously +separated forces at a given place and time; still another would be +the despatching of certain parts of the fleet to certain points at +certain times. The problems need not be quite so simple as these, +however; for they can include all the operations of a fleet under +its commander-in-chief up to actual contact; the commander-in-chief +being given only such information as the approximate position, +speed, and course of the enemy at a given time, with orders to +intercept him with his whole force; or he may be given information +that the enemy has divided his force, that certain parts were at +certain places going in certain directions at certain speeds at +certain times, and he may be directed to intercept those supposititious +parts; that is, to get such parts of his fleet as he may think best +to certain places at certain times. + +Of the strategic value to the staff of the practical solutions of +this class of problems by the fleet, there can be little question; +and the records made if kept up to date, would give data in future +wars for future staffs, of what the whole fleet, and parts of it +acting with the fleet, can reasonably be expected to accomplish, +especially from the standpoint of logistics. And it has the advantage +of dealing with only one thing; the actual handling of the actual +fleet, uncomplicated by other matters, such as interference by an +enemy. For the reason, however, that it leaves out of consideration +the effects of scouting and of contacts with the enemy, it is +incomplete. + +_Second Scheme_.--To remedy this incompleteness, resort may be +had to the device of detaching a few vessels from the fleet and +making each represent a force of the enemy; one destroyer, for +instance, to represent a division, four destroyers four divisions, +etc. This scheme has the advantage that all the capital ships can +be handled together, and that, say three-quarters of the destroyers +can be handled without much artificiality on the assumption that +four-fourths are so handled; while for merely strategic purposes +four destroyers, properly separated, can represent four divisions +of destroyers very truthfully. This scheme is useful not only +strategically but tactically; for the reasons that the contacts +made are actual and visible, and that all the personnel on each +side are put to doing things much like those they would do in war. +The scheme is extremely flexible besides; for the number of ways +in which the fleet can be divided is very great, and the number +of operations that can be simulated with considerable accuracy +is therefore very great also. The training given to the personnel +of the fleet is obviously more varied, interesting, and valuable, +than in the first scheme; and the records of the solutions (games +played) will form instructive documents in the offices of the staff, +concerning situations which the first scheme could not bring out. +These records, naturally, will not be so simple as those under the +first scheme, because many factors will enter in, some of which +will bring up debatable points. For when actual contact occurs, +but only "constructive" hits by torpedo and gun are made, much +room for difference of opinion will occur, and many decisions will +be disputed. + +To decide disputed questions must, of course, rest with the staff; +but those questions must be decided, and if correct deductions +from the games are to be made, the decisions must be correct. To +achieve correctness in decision the members of the staff must be +highly trained. To devise and develop a good scheme of staff training, +several years may be required. + +_Third Scheme_.--The third kind of game is that in which the fleet +is divided into two parts, fairly equal in each of the various +elements, battleships, battle cruisers, destroyers, submarines, +aircraft, etc. This scheme gives opportunity for more realistic +situations than the other two, since each side operates and sees +vessels and formations similar to those that it would operate and +see in war; and it gives opportunity for games which combine both +strategical and tactical operations and situations to a greater +degree than do the other two schemes. Its only weakness is the +fact that the entire fleet is not operated as a unit; not even a +large fraction, but only about one-half. Like each of the other +two schemes, however, it has its distinctive field of usefulness. + +Its main advantage is its realism--the fact that two powerful naval +forces, each composed of all the elements of a naval force, seek +each other out; or else one evades and the other seeks; and then +finally they fight a fairly realistic battle; or else one successfully +evades the other; or else minor actions occur between detachments, +and no major result occurs; just as happens in war. + +Strategically, this scheme is less valuable than the other two; +tactically, more so. For the experience and the records of the +staff this scheme is less valuable than the other two, but for the +training of the fleet it is more so. + +Of course, the division of games for staff and fleet training into +three general schemes is arbitrary, and not wholly correct; for +no such division really exists, and in practice it would not be +observed. The thought of the writer is merely to point out that, +in a general way, the schemes may be divided into three classes, +and to show the convenience of doing so--or at least of recognizing +that there are three general kinds of games, and that each kind +has its advantages and likewise its disadvantages. + +In our navy, only three strategic problems or maneuvers, devised +at the department, have been worked out at sea--one in May, and +one in October, 1915, and one in August, 1916: all belonged in +the second category. They were devised by the General Board and +the War College, as we had no staff. The solving of the problems +by the commander-in-chief aroused the greatest interest not only +in the fleet, but in the Navy Department, in fact, throughout the +entire navy, and to a surprising degree throughout the country, +especially among the people on the Atlantic coast. Discussions +of the utmost value were aroused and carried on, and a degree of +co-operation between the department, the War College, and the fleet, +never attained before, was realized. If a routine could be devised +whereby such problems could be solved by practical games, say once +a month, and the results analyzed and recorded in moving-picture +form by the staff in Washington, we could see our way in a few +years' time to a degree of efficiency in strategy which now we +cannot even picture. It would automatically indoctrinate the navy +and produce a sympathetic understanding and a common aim, which +would permeate the personnel and make the navy a veritable organism. +It would attain the utmost attainable by any method now known. + +Attention is respectfully invited to the fact that at the present +time naval strategy is mainly an art; that it will probably continue +so for many years; that whether a science of naval strategy will +ever be formulated need not now concern us deeply, and that the +art of naval strategy, like every other art, needs practice for +its successful use. Naval strategy is so vague a term that most +of us have got to looking on it as some mystic art, requiring a +peculiar and unusual quality of mind to master; but there are many +things to indicate that a high degree of skill in it can be attained +by the same means as can a high degree of skill in playing--say +golf: by hard work; and not only by hard work, but by doing the +same thing--or similar things--repeatedly. Now most of us realize +that any largely manual art, such as the technic of the piano, +needs frequent repetition of muscular actions, in order to train +the muscles; but few of us realize how fully this is true of mental +arts, such as working arithmetical or strategical problems, though +we know how easy it is to "get rusty" in navigation. Our mental +muscles and whatever nerves co-ordinate them with our minds seem to +need fully as much practice for their skilful use as do our physical +muscles; and so to attain skill in strategy, we must practise at +it. This means that all hands must practise at it--not only the +staff in their secret sanctuary, not only the commander-in-chief, +not only the division commanders, but, in their respective parts, +the captains, the lieutenants, the ensigns, the warrant officers, +the petty officers, and the youngest recruits. To get this practice, +the department, through the staff, must furnish the ideas, and the +commander-in-chief the tools. Then, day after day, month after +month, and year after year, in port and at sea, by night and by +day, the ideas assisted by the tools will be supplying a continuous +stimulus to the minds of all. This stimulus, properly directed +through the appropriate channels and devoted to wise purposes, +will reach the mess attendant, the coal-passer, and the recruit, +as well as those in positions more responsible (though not more +honorable); and as the harmony of operation of the whole increases, +as skill in each task increases, and as a perception of the strategic +_why_ for the performance of each task increases, the knowledge +will be borne in on all that in useful occupation is to be found +the truest happiness; that only uninterested work at any task is +drudgery; that interest in work brings skill, that skill brings +pleasure in exerting it; and that the greater the number of men +engaged together, and the more wise the system under which they +work, the greater will be the happiness of each man, and the higher +the efficiency of the whole. + + + + +CHAPTER X + +RESERVES AND SHORE STATIONS + +In the preceding chapter it was pointed out that the work of preparing +the naval machine for use could be divided into two parts: preparing +the existing fleet and preparing the rest of the navy. + +The "rest of the navy" consists of the Navy Department itself, +the naval stations, the reserve ships and men, and also the ships +and men that must be brought in from civil life. As the department +is the agency for preparing the naval stations, the reserves, and +the men and ships brought in from civil life, it is clear that the +work of preparing the department will automatically prepare the +others. The work of preparing any Navy Department necessitates the +preparation and execution of plans, whereby the department itself +and all the rest of the navy will be able to pass instantly from a +peace footing to a war footing; will be able to pass instantly +from a status of leisurely handling and supplying the existing +fleet by means of the offices, bureaus, and naval stations, to +the status of handling with the greatest possible despatch a force +which will be not only much larger, but also much less disciplined +and coherent. + +In time of peace a Navy Department which is properly administered +for times of peace, as most Navy Departments are, can, by means of +its bureaus, naval stations, offices, etc., handle the existing +fleet, and also these bureaus, naval stations, offices, etc., by +labors which for the most part are matters of routine. The department +opens for business at a certain time in the morning and closes at +a certain time in the afternoon. During office hours the various +officials and their clerks fill a few busy hours with not very +strenuous labor, and then depart, leaving their cares behind them. +The naval stations are conducted on similar principles; and even +the doings of the fleet become in a measure matters of routine. +All the ordinary business of life tends to routine, in order that +men may so arrange their time, that they may have regular hours +for work, recreation, and sleep, and be able to make engagements +for the future. + +But when war breaks out, all routine is instantly abolished. The +element of surprise, which each side strives to interject into +its operations, is inherently a foe to routine. In a routine life, +expected things occur--it is the office of routine to arrange that +expected things shall occur, and at expected times; in a routine +life one is always prepared to see a certain thing happen at a +certain time. Surprise breaks in on all this, and makes unexpected +things occur, and therefore finds men unprepared. It is the office +of surprise to catch men unprepared. + +Appreciating this, and appreciating the value of starting a war +by achieving some great success, and of preventing the enemy from +so doing, military countries in recent years have advanced more and +more their preparations for war, even in time of the profoundest +peace, in order that, when war breaks out, they may be prepared +either to take the offensive at once, or to repel an offensive at +once. With whatever forces a nation expects or desires to fight +in a war, no matter whether it will begin on the offensive or begin +on the defensive, the value to the nation of those forces will +depend on how soon they are gotten ready. In a navy, the active +fleet may be considered always ready; but the personnel and the +craft of various kinds that must be added to it cannot be added +to it as quickly as is desirable--because it is desirable that +they should be added immediately, which is impossible. + +It is not in the nature of things that they should get ready as +quickly as a fleet that has been kept ready always; but it is essential +that the handicap to the operations of the active fleet, due to the +tardiness of its additions, should be kept as small as possible. +In other words, whatever additions are to be made to the active +fleet should be made as quickly as possible. + +When the additions are made to the fleet (reserve ships and men, +ships and men from civil life, etc.) it is clear that those ships +and men should at that time be ready for effective work. If the +ships are not in condition for effective work by reason of being +out of order, or by reason of the ships from civil life not having +been altered to suit their new requirements, or by reason of the men +not being thoroughly drilled for their new tasks, considerable time +will have to be lost by the necessity of getting the ships and the +men into proper condition--or else warlike operations will have to be +entered into while unprepared, and the classic _Chesapeake-Shannon_ +tragedy re-enacted. + +Therefore, the endeavor must be strongly made to have ready always +all the ships and men that are to be added to the fleet; the ships +equipped for their duties in the fleet, and the men drilled for +their future tasks. + +The matter of getting ready the navy ships that are in reserve +is largely a matter of getting the men to man them, as the ships +themselves are kept in repair, and so in a state of readiness, +materially speaking. At least this is the theory; and the successful +application of the theory, when tested in practice, depends greatly +on how large a proportion of the full complements has been kept +on board, and on the amount and nature of the cruising which the +vessels in reserve have done. The ideal conditions cannot be reached, +unless the full complements have been kept on board, and the ships +required to make frequent cruises. Of course, such a condition is +never met in reserve ships; there would be no reason for putting +ships in reserve if they were to be so handled. The more closely, +however, a ship is kept in that condition of readiness, the more +quickly she can be made absolutely ready in her material condition. + +Unless one realizes how and why ships deteriorate in material, +it is surprising to see how many faults develop, when ships in +reserve, that are apparently in good condition, are put into active +service. Trouble is not found, of course, with the stationary parts, +like the bottoms, and sides, and decks, so much as with the moving +parts, especially the parts that have to move and be steam and +gas tight at the same time--the parts found mainly in the steam +engineering and ordnance departments. Defects in the moving parts, +especially in the joints, are not apt to be found out until they +are moved, and often not until they are moved under the pressure +and with the speeds required in service. + +Now "in service" usually means in service in time of peace; but the +service for which those ships are kept in reserve is war service, +and the requirements of war service are much more rigorous than +those of peace service. Objection may be made to this statement +by remarking that engines turn around and guns are fired just the +same in war as in peace, and that therefore the requirements are +identical. True in a measure; but vessels and guns are apt to be +forced more in war than in peace; and even if they were not, vessels +in time of peace are gotten ready with a considerable degree of +deliberation, are manned by well-trained men, and are sent to sea +under circumstances which permit of gradually working up to full +service requirements. But when reserve vessels are mobilized and +sent into service for war, everything is done with the utmost haste; +and the men, being hurriedly put on board, cannot possibly be as +well trained and as ready to do skilful work as men sent on board +in peace time; and when reserve vessels get to sea they may be +required immediately to perform the most exacting service. + +For all these reasons, it is highly desirable--it is essential +to adequate preparation--that vessels should be kept in a state +of material readiness that is practically perfect. Every vessel on +board of which defects in material develop after she shall have been +put into service, when war breaks out, will be a liability instead +of an asset. She will be able to render no effective service, and +she will require the expenditure of energy by officers and men, +and possibly the assistance of other vessels, when their services +are needed for other work. + +But the problem of how to keep reserve vessels in a state of material +readiness is easier than the problem of how to keep the reserve +men in a state of personnel readiness, which will insure their +reporting on board of the reserve ships quickly enough and with +adequate training. This problem is so difficult, and its solution +is so important, that in Great Britain, France, Germany, Japan, and +doubtless other navies, men are compelled to go into the reserves, +and to remain in for several years after completing their periods +of service in the regular navy. In this way, no breaking away from +the navy occurs until after reserve service has been completed, +and every man who enlists remains in the navy and is subject to +its discipline until his reserve period has been passed. Thus the +question of the reserve is a question that has been answered in +those countries, and is therefore no longer a question in them. If +battleship _A_ in any of those countries is to be mobilized, the +government knows just who are to go on board and when; and knows +that every man has recently served in the regular navy, has been +kept in training ever since he left it, and that he is competent to +perform the duties of his allotted station in battleship _A_. + +The problem of getting into service the ships that are to be gotten +from the merchant service is more difficult, and is perhaps of more +importance; that is, it is more important to get into the service +some vessels from the merchant service than some reserve ships; more +important, for instance, to get colliers to serve the fleet with +coal than to commission some antiquated cruisers. Naturally, the +number and kinds of ships that need to be provided will depend on +the nature of the war--whether, for instance, a very large force +is to be sent to the other side of the world, to meet a powerful +fleet there, or whether a sudden attack on our Atlantic coast is +to be repelled. The difference, however, is largely numerical; so +that if the plans provide for a sufficient number to take part +in the distant expedition, it will be easy to get the appropriate +number to meet a coast attack. + +To receive an attack upon the coast, however, provision must be +made for vessels and men not needed on an expedition across the +seas--that is, for vessels and men that will defend the coast itself +from raids and similar expeditions. + +The work of preparing all that part of the naval machine which +in time of peace is separate from the active fleet is purely one +of logistics; it is that part of the preparation which calculates +what ways and means are needed, and then supplies those ways and +means. Logistics, having been told by strategy what strategy plans +to do, calculates how many and what kinds of vessels, men, guns, +torpedoes, fuel, food, hospital service, ammunition, etc., are +needed to make possible the fulfilling of those plans; and then +proceeds to provide what it has calculated must be provided. + +This does not mean that strategy should hold itself aloof from +logistics and make arbitrary demands upon it; for such a procedure +would result in making demands that logistics could not supply; or, +through an underestimate of what logistics can supply, in refraining +from demanding as much as could be supplied. Logistics, of course, +does provide what strategy wants, in so far as it can; but in order +that satisfactory results may be obtained, the fullest co-operation +between strategy and logistics is essential; and to this end frequent +conferences are required between the officers representing both. + +The logistic work of expanding the naval forces to a war basis +may evidently be divided into two parts: the adding of vessels +and other craft appropriately equipped and manned to the active +fleet, and the establishment of a coast-defense force, which will +be distributed along the coast and divided among the most important +commercial and strategic centres. + +_Adding to the Fleet_.--Naturally, the additions to the fleet will +depend on the service for which the fleet is intended; that is, on +the plans of strategy. If the navy were to be gotten ready for a +definite undertaking, then the additions to carry out that undertaking +could be calculated and prepared; and of course this condition +does come up immediately before any war occurs. But in addition to +these preparations which are to be made at the last moment (many +of which cannot be made until the last moment), the staff must +prepare in the leisure of profound peace for several different +contingencies. Inasmuch as many of the additions will be needed, +no matter with what country the war may come; and inasmuch as the +same general kind of additions will be made, it is clear that there +must underlie all the various plans one general plan, to which +modifications must be made to adapt it to special conditions. And +as, no matter whether we are to take the offensive or the defensive, +no matter whether the fleet is to go far away or stay near our +coast, the matter of additions to it is mainly a matter of degree +(whether for instance ten extra colliers are needed or a hundred), +it seems clear that the general plan should be the one demanding +the greatest additions, so that the modifications to adapt it to +special cases would consist merely in making subtractions from it. +To carry out this plan, strategy must make a sufficiently grave +estimate of the situation; and logistics must make calculations to +supply the most difficult demands that the estimate of the situation +indicates as reasonable, and then arrange the means to provide what +the calculations show. If one has provided a little more than is +necessary, it is much easier to leave out something later than it +is to add more, if one has not provided enough; and one's natural +indolence then acts on the side of safety, since it tends to persuade +one not to leave off too much; whereas in the opposite case, it +tends to assure him that it is not really necessary to take the +trouble to provide what it might be hard to get. + +_The Estimate of the Situation.--In no field of strategical work +is an accurate estimate of the situation more clearly necessary +than when it is to form the basis for the precise calculations +of logistics_. General strategical plans require a vividness of +imagination and a boldness of conception that find no field for +exercise in logistics; and tactics requires a quickness of decision +and a forcefulness of execution that neither strategy nor logistics +need; but neither strategy nor tactics calls for the mathematical +exactness that logistics must have, or be of no avail. Yet there +will be no use in working out the mathematically correct means to +produce certain result, if the real nature of the desired result +is underrated; there will be no use in working out laboriously how +many ships and tons of coal and oil are needed, if the estimate +of the situation, to meet which those ships and coal and oil are +needed, is inadequate. + +The first step, therefore, in providing for the expansion of the +navy for war, is to estimate the situation correctly. The greatest +difficulty in doing this arises from a species of moral cowardice, +which tempts a man to underestimate its dangers, and therefore the +means required to meet them. _Probably no single cause of defeat +in war has been so pregnant with disaster as this failure to make +a sufficiently grave estimate of the situation_. Sometimes the +failure seems due more to carelessness than to cowardice; Napoleon's +disastrous underestimate of the difficulties of his projected Russian +campaign seems more due to carelessness than to cowardice; but this +may be due to a difficulty of associating cowardice with Napoleon. +But is it not equally difficult to associate carelessness with +Napoleon? What professional calculator, what lawyer's clerk was +ever more careful than Napoleon was, when dealing with problems of +war? Who was ever more attentive to details, who more industrious, +who more untiring? And yet Napoleon's plans for his Russian campaign +were inadequate to an amazing degree, and the inadequacy was the +cause of his disaster. But whether the cause was carelessness or +moral cowardice on his part, the fact remains that he did not estimate +the situation with sufficient care, and make due plans to meet it. + +This unwillingness to look a difficult situation in the face one +can see frequently in daily life. Great difficulties seem to appall +some people. They hate so much to believe a disaster possible, they +fear so much to let themselves or others realize that a danger +is impending, they are so afraid that other people will think them +"nervous," and they shrink so from recommending measures that would +cause great exertions or great expenditures, that they are very +prone to believe and say that there is no especial danger, and +that whatever danger there may be, can be obviated by measures that +are easy and cheap to carry out. + +If we yield to this feeling, we are guilty of moral cowardice, +and we vitiate all the results of all our labors. We _must_ make +a correct estimate of the situation--or rather we must estimate +the situation to be as grave as it is--or our preparations will +be of no avail. If we estimate the situation too gravely, we may +spend more money and time on our preparations than is quite needed, +and our preparations may be more than adequate. It may be that the +preparations which Prussia made before 1870 for war with France +were more than adequate. In fact, it looks as if they were, in +view of the extreme quickness with which she conquered France. But +does any military writer condemn Prussia for having made assurance +too sure? + +_The Value of Superadequate Preparation_.--No, on the contrary. +The very reasons that make adequate preparation valuable make +superadequate preparation even more valuable. The reason is very +clear, as is shown by the table on page 284 illustrating the progressive +wasting of fighting forces, which the writer published in the _U. +S. Naval Institute_ in an essay called "American Naval Policy," +in April, 1905.[*] + +[Footnote *: I have recently been informed that Lieutenant (now +Commander) J. V. Chase, U. S. N., arrived at practically the same +results in 1902 by an application of the calculus; and that he +submitted them to the U. S. Naval War College in a paper headed, +"Sea Fights: A Mathematical Investigation of the Effect of Superiority +of Force in."--B. A. F.] + + TABLE I + ---------------------------------------------------------------------------- +| |Col.|Col.|Col.|Col.|Col.|Col.|Col.|Col.|Col.|Col.| +| | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 | 8 | 9 | 10 | +|----------------------------------------------------------------------------| +|Value of offensive power A|1000|1000|1000|1000|1000|1000|1000|1000|1000|1000| +| at beginning B|1000| 900| 800| 700| 600| 500| 400| 300| 200| 100| +|Damage done in 1st A| 100| 100| 100| 100| 100| 100| 100| 100| 100| 100| +| period B| 100| 90| 80| 70| 60| 50| 40| 30| 20| 10| +|Value of offensive power A| 900| 910| 920| 930| 940| 950| 960| 970| 980| 990| +| at end of 1st period B| 900| 800| 700| 600| 500| 400| 300| 200| 100| 0| +|Damage done in 2nd A| 90| 91| 92| 93| 94| 95| 96| 97| 98| | +| period B| 90| 80| 70| 60| 50| 40| 30| 20| 10| | +|Value of offensive power A| 810| 830| 850| 870| 890| 910| 930| 950| 970| | +| at end of 2nd period B| 810| 709| 608| 507| 406| 305| 204| 103| 2| | +|Damage done in 3rd A| 81| 83| 85| 87| 89| 91| 93| 95| | | +| period B| 81| 71| 61| 51| 41| 31| 20| 10| | | +|Value of offensive power A| 729| 759| 789| 819| 849| 879| 910| 940| | | +| at end of 3rd period B| 729| 626| 523| 420| 317| 214| 111| 8| | | +|Damage done in 4th A| 73| 76| 79| 82| 85| 88| 91| | | | +| period B| 73| 63| 52| 42| 32| 21| 11| | | | +|Value of offensive power A| 656| 696| 737| 777| 817| 858| 899| | | | +| at end of 4th period B| 656| 550| 444| 338| 232| 126| 20| | | | +|Damage done in 5th A| 65| 70| 74| 78| 82| 86| | | | | +| period B| 65| 55| 44| 34| 23| 13| | | | | +|Value of offensive power A| 591| 641| 693| 743| 794| 845| | | | | +| at end of 5th period B| 591| 480| 370| 260| 150| 40| | | | | +|Damage done in 6th A| 59| 64| 69| 74| 79| 85| | | | | +| period B| 59| 48| 37| 26| 15| 4| | | | | +|Value of offensive power A| 532| 593| 656| 717| 779| | | | | | +| at end of 6th period B| 532| 416| 301| 186| 71| | | | | | +|Damage done in 7th A| 53| 59| 66| 72| 78| | | | | | +| period B| 53| 42| 30| 19| 7| | | | | | +|Value of offensive power A| 479| 551| 626| 698| 772| | | | | | +| at end of 7th period B| 479| 357| 235| 114| 0| | | | | | +|Damage done in 8th A| 48| 55| 63| 70| | | | | | | +| period B| 48| 36| 24| 11| | | | | | | +|Value of offensive power A| 431| 515| 602| 687| | | | | | | +| at end of 8th period B| 431| 302| 172| 44| | | | | | | +|Damage done in 9th A| 43| 52| 60| 69| | | | | | | +| period B| 43| 30| 17| 4| | | | | | | +|Value of offensive power A| 388| 485| 585| 683| | | | | | | +| at end of 9th period B| 388| 250| 112| 0| | | | | | | +|Damage done in 10th A| 39| 49| 59| | | | | | | | +| period B| 39| 25| 11| | | | | | | | +|Value of offensive power A| 349| 460| 574| | | | | | | | +| at end of 10th period B| 349| 201| 53| | | | | | | | +|Damage done in 11th A| 35| 46| 57| | | | | | | | +| period B| 35| 20| 5| | | | | | | | +|Value of offensive power A| 314| 440| 569| | | | | | | | +| at end of 11th period B| 314| 155| 0| | | | | | | | +|Damage done in 12th A| 31| 44| | | | | | | | | +| period B| 31| 16| | | | | | | | | +|Value of offensive power A| 283| 426| | | | | | | | | +| at end of 12th period B| 283| 111| | | | | | | | | +| | |etc.| | | | | | | | | +|Total damage done by A| 717| 789| 800| 700| 600| 500| 400| 300| 200| 100| +| B| 717| 574| 431| 317| 228| 159| 101| 60| 30| 10| + ---------------------------------------------------------------------------- + +These tables grew out of an attempt to ascertain how the values of +two contending forces change as the fight goes on. The offensive +power of the stronger force is placed in the beginning at 1,000 +in each case, and the offensive power of the weaker force at 900, +800, 700, 600, 500, 400, 300, 200, and 100. These values are, of +course, wholly arbitrary, and some may say imaginary; but, as they +are intended merely to show the comparative strength of the two +forces, they are a logical measure, because numerical; there is +always some numerical factor that expresses the comparative value of +two contending forces, even though we never know what that numerical +factor is. Two forces with offensive powers of 1,000 and 900 +respectively may mean 1,000 men opposed to 900 men of equal average +individual fighting value, commanded by officers of equal fighting +ability; or it may mean 10 ships opposed to 9 like ships, manned +by officers and men of equal numbers and ability; or it may mean +two forces of equal strength, as regards number of men, ships, +and guns, but commanded by officers whose relative ability is as +1,000 to 900. It may be objected here that it is ridiculous so +to compare officers, because the ability of officers cannot be +so mathematically tabulated. This, of course, is true; but the +fact that we are unable so to compare officers is no reason for +supposing that the abilities of officers, especially officers of +high position, do not affect quantitatively the fighting value +of the forces they command; and the intention in mentioning this +factor is simply to show that the relative values of the forces, as +indicated in these tables, are supposed to include all the factors +that go to make them up. + +Another convention, made in these tables, is that every fighting +force is able to inflict a damage in a given time that is proportional +to the force itself; that a force of 1,000, for instance, can do +twice as much damage in a given time as a force of 500 can; also +that a force can do an amount of damage under given conditions +that is proportional to the time in which it is at work; that it +can do twice as much damage in two hours, for instance, as in one +hour, _provided the conditions for doing damage remain the same_. +Another convention follows from these two conventions, and it is +that there is a period of time in which a given force can destroy a +force equal, say, to one-tenth of itself under certain conditions; +that there is some period of time, for instance, in which, under +given conditions, 1,000 men can disable 100 men, or 10 ships disable +1 ship, or 10 guns silence 1 gun. In the conflicts supposed to be +indicated in these tables, this period is the one used. It will +be plain that it is not necessary to know how long this period +is, and also that it depends upon the conditions of the fight. + +In Table I, it is supposed that the chance of hitting and the +penetrability are the same to each contestant. In other words, +it is assumed that the _effective targets_ presented by the two +forces are alike in the sense that, if the two targets are hit +at the same instant by like projectiles, equal injuries will be +done. In other words, if each contestant at a given instant fires, +say a 12-inch shell, the injury done to one will be the same as +that done to the other; not proportionately but quantitatively. +For instance, if one force has 10 ships and the other has 9 like +ships, all the ships being so far apart that a shot aimed at one +ship will probably not hit another, the conditions supposed in Table +I, column 2, are satisfied; the chances of hitting are identical +for both contestants, and so is the damage done at every hit. Table +I supposes that the chance of hitting and damaging does not change +until the target is destroyed. + +As the desire of the author is now to show the advantage of having +a superadequate force, the following table has been calculated to +show the effect of forces of different size in fighting an enemy +of known and therefore constant size: + + TABLE II + ----------------------------------------------------------------------- +| |Col. 1|Col. 2|Col. 3| +|--------------------------------------------------|------|------|------| +|Value of offensive power at beginning. A | 1100 | 1500 | 2000 | +| B | 1000 | 1000 | 1000 | +|Damage done in 1st period by A | 110 | 150 | 200 | +| B | 100 | 100 | 100 | +|Value of offensive power at end of 1st period A | 1000 | 1400 | 1900 | +| B | 890 | 850 | 800 | +|Damage done in 2nd period by A | 100 | 140 | 190 | +| B | 89 | 85 | 80 | +|Value of offensive power at end of 2nd period A | 911 | 1315 | 1820 | +| B | 790 | 710 | 610 | +|Damage done in 3rd period by A | 91 | 131 | 182 | +| B | 79 | 71 | 61 | +|Value of offensive power at end of 3rd period A | 832 | 1244 | 1759 | +| B | 699 | 579 | 422 | +|Damage done in 4th period by A | 83 | 124 | 176 | +| B | 70 | 58 | 43 | +|Value of offensive power at end of 4th period A | 762 | 1186 | 1716 | +| B | 616 | 455 | 252 | +|Damage done in 5th period by A | 76 | 119 | 172 | +| B | 62 | 46 | 25 | +|Value of offensive power at end of 5th period A | 700 | 1140 | 1691 | +| B | 540 | 336 | 80 | +|Damage done in 6th period by A | 70 | 114 | 169 | +| B | 54 | 34 | 8 | +|Value of offensive power at end of 6th period A | 646 | 1106 | 1683 | +| B | 470 | 222 | 0 | +|Damage done in 7th period by A | 65 | 110 | | +| B | 47 | 22 | | +|Value of offensive power at end of 7th period A | 599 | 1084 | | +| B | 405 | 112 | | +|Damage done in 8th period by A | 60 | 108 | | +| B | 41 | 11 | | +|Value of offensive power at end of 8th period A | 558 | 1073 | | +| B | 345 | 4 | | +|Damage done in 9th period by A | 56 | 4 | | +| B | 35 | 0 | | +|Value of offensive power at end of 9th period A | 523 | 1073 | | +| B | 289 | 0 | | +|Damage done in 10th period by A | 53 | | | +| B | 29 | | | +|Value of offensive power at end of 10th period A | 494 | | | +| B | 236 | | | +|Damage done in 11th period by A | 49 | | | +| B | 24 | | | +|Value of offensive power at end of 11th period A | 470 | | | +| B | 187 | | | +| | | | | +|Value of offensive power at end of 16th period A | 422 | | | +| B | 0 | | | + ----------------------------------------------------------------------- + +It will be noted that if our force is superior to the enemy's in +the ratio of 1,100 to 1,000, the fight will last longer than if +it is superior in the ratio of 1,500 to 1,000, in the proportion +of 16 to 9; and that if it is superior in the ratio of 1,100 to +1,000 the fight will last longer than if it is superior in the +ratio of 2 to 1, in the proportion of 16 to 6. We also see that we +should, after reducing the enemy to 0, have forces represented by +422, 1,073, and 1,683, respectively, and suffer losses represented +by 678, 427, and 317, respectively. + +Now the difference in fighting forces cannot be measured in units +of material and personnel only, though they furnish the most accurate +general guide. Two other factors of great importance enter, the +factors of skill and morale. Skill is perhaps more of an active +agent, and morale is perhaps more of a passive agent, like the +endurance of man or the strength of material; and yet in some battles +morale has been a more important factor in attaining victory than +even skill. It is not vital to this discussion which is the more +important; but it is vital to realize clearly that skill and morale +are not to be forgotten, when we calculate how many and what kinds +of material and personnel units we must provide for a war; and +inasmuch as we cannot weigh morale and skill, or even be sure in +most cases as to which side will possess them in the superior degree, +we are forced in prudence to assume that the enemy may possess +them in a superior degree, and that therefore we should secure +superadequacy in units of personnel and material; not so much to +win victory with the minimum of loss to ourselves, as simply to +avert disaster. + +The present war shows us that the factors of skill and morale, +while independent of each other, are closely linked together, and +react upon each other. Nothing establishes a good morale more than +does the knowledge of exceeding skill; and nothing promotes skill +more than does an enthusiastic and firm morale. + +But superadequateness of preparation has a value greater than in +merely insuring victory with minimum loss to ourselves, in case +war comes, because it exerts the most potent of all influences in +preventing war, since it warns an enemy against attacking. At the +present day, the laws of victory and defeat are so well understood, +and the miseries resulting from defeat are so thoroughly realized, +that no civilized country will voluntarily go to war, except for +extraneous reasons, if it realizes that the chances of success +are small. And as the cumulative consequences of defeats are also +realized, and as no country is apt to assume that the morale and +skill of its forces are measurably greater than those of a probable +antagonist, no country and no alliance is apt to provoke war with +a nation whose armed forces are superior in number of units of +personnel and material; unless, of course, the nation is markedly +inferior in morale and skill, as the Persians were to the legions +of Alexander. + +It is often insisted that superadequacy in armed force tends to +war instead of peace, by inducing a country to make war itself; +that the very principles which deter a weak country from attacking +a strong country tend to make a strong country attack a weak one. +There is some truth in this, of course, and history shows many +cases of strong countries deliberately attacking weak ones for the +purpose of conquest. + +Analysis of wars, however, in which strong countries have done +this, shows that as a rule, the "strong" country was one which was +strong in a military sense only; and that the "weak" country was +a country which was weak only militarily, but which was potentially +strong in that it was possessed of wealth in land and goods. Most +of the great conquests of history were made by such "strong" over +such "weak" countries. Such were notably those wars by which Persia, +Assyria, Egypt, Greece, Rome, and Spain gained their pre-eminence; +and such were the wars by which they later fell. Such were the +wars of Ghenghis Khan, Tamerlane, Mahomet, and Napoleon; such were +the wars by which most tribes grew to be great nations, and by +which as nations they subsequently fell. No greater cause of war +has ever existed than a disproportion between countries or tribes +of such a character that one was rich and weak, while the other +was strong and poor. Nations are much like individuals--and not +very good individuals. Highwaymen who are poor and strong organize +and drill for the purpose of attacking people who are rich and +weak; and while one would shrink from declaring that nations which +are poor and strong do the same, it may nevertheless be stated +that they have often been accused of doing so, and that some wars +are explainable on that ground and on none other. + +The wars of Cćsar in Gaul and Britain do not seem to fall in this +category, and yet they really do; for Rome was poor in Julius Cćsar's +day; and while Gaul and Britain were not rich in goods, they were +rich in land, and Rome craved land. + +Of course, there have been wars which were not due to deliberate +attacks by poor and strong countries on rich and weak countries; +wars like our wars of the Revolution, and with Mexico, our War +of the Rebellion, and our Spanish War, and many others in which +various nations have engaged. The causes of many wars have been +so numerous and so complex that the true cause is hard to state; +but it may be stated in general that wars in which countries that +were both rich and strong, as Great Britain and France are now, +have deliberately initiated an aggressive war are few and far apart. +The reason seems to be that countries which are rich tend to become +not militaristic and aggressive, but effeminate and pacific. The +access of luxury, the refinements of living that the useful and +the delightful arts produce, and the influence of women, tend to +wean men from the hardships of military life, and to engender a +distaste for the confusion, bloodshed, and "horrors" of war. For +this reason, the rich countries have shown little tendency to +aggression, but a very considerable tendency to invite aggression. +Physical fighting among nations bears some resemblance to physical +fighting among men, in that rich nations and rich men are apt to +abstain from it, unless they are attacked; or unless they think +they are attacked, or will be. The fact of being rich has the double +influence of removing a great inducement to go to war, and of causing +a distaste for it. + +For all of the reasons given above, it would seem advisable when +making an "estimate of the situation," in preparation for war, +to estimate it as gravely as reasonable probability will permit. +The tendency of human nature is to estimate it too lightly; but +in matters of possible war, "madness lies that way." + +This seems to mean that in preparing plans for additions to the +fleet for war, we should estimate for the worst condition that +is reasonably probable. In the United States, this means that we +should estimate for a sudden attack by a powerful fleet on our +Atlantic coast; and, as such an attack would occasion a tremendous +temptation to any foe in Asia to make a simultaneous attack in +the Pacific, we must estimate also for sending a large fleet at +the same time on a cruise across the Pacific Ocean. + +This clearly means that our estimate must include putting into +the Atlantic and Pacific all the naval vessels that we have, fully +manned with fully drilled crews; and adding besides all the vessels +from civil life that will be needed. The vessels taken from civil +life will be mostly from the merchant service, and will be for +such auxiliary duties as those of hospital ships, supply ships, +fuel ships, and ammunition ships, with some to do duty as scouts. + +For the purposes of the United States, therefore, the office of +naval strategy in planning additions to our fleet for war, is to +make a grave estimate of the naval requirements in both the Atlantic +and the Pacific; to divide the total actual and prospective naval +force between the Atlantic and the Pacific in such a way as shall +seem the wisest; to assign duties in general to each force; and +then to turn over to logistics the task of making the quantitative +calculations, and of performing the various acts, which will be +necessary to carry out the decisions made. + +Objection may be made to the phrase just used--"to divide the total +force," because it is an axiom with some that one must never divide +his total force; and the idea of dividing our fleet, by assigning +part to the Atlantic and part to the Pacific, has been condemned +by many officers, the present writer among them. + +This is an illustration of how frequently phrases are used to express +briefly ideas which could not be expressed fully without careful +qualifications and explanations that would necessitate many words; +and it shows how carefully one must be on his guard, lest he put +technical phrases to unintended uses, and attach incorrect meanings +to them. As a brief technical statement, we may say, "never divide +your force"; but when we say this, we make a condensed statement +of a principle, and expect it to be regarded as such, and not as +a full statement. The full statement would be: "In the presence of +an active enemy, do not so divide your force that the enemy could +attack each division in detail with a superior force." Napoleon +was a past master in the art of overwhelming separate portions of +an enemy's force, and he understood better than any one else of +his time the value of concentration. And yet a favorite plan of +his was to detach a small part of his force, to hold a superior +force of the enemy in check for--say a day--while he whipped another +force of the enemy with his main body. He then turned and chastised +the part which had been held in check by the small detachment, and +prevented from coming to the relief of the force that he attacked +first. + +When we say, then, that strategy directs how our naval force should +be divided between the Atlantic and the Pacific, this does not +mean that strategy should so divide it that both divisions would +be confronted with forces larger than themselves. It may mean, +however, that strategy, in order that the force in one ocean shall +be sufficient, may be compelled to reduce the force in the other +ocean almost to zero. + +Some may say that, unless we are sure that our force--say in the +Atlantic--is superadequate, we ought to reduce the force in the +Pacific to actual zero. Maybe contingencies might arise for which +such a division would be the wisest; but usually such a condition +exists that one force is so large that the addition to it of certain +small units would increase the force only microscopically; whereas +those small units would be of material value elsewhere--say in +protecting harbors from the raids of small cruisers. Practically +speaking, therefore, strategy would divide our naval force into +Atlantic and Pacific fleets, but those fleets might be very unequal +in size, owing to the vastly greater commercial and national interests +on our Atlantic coast, and the greater remoteness of probable enemies +on our Pacific coast. + +In estimating the work to be done by the U. S. Atlantic fleet, three +general objects suggest themselves: + +1. To repel an attack made directly on our Atlantic continental +coast. + +2. To repel an expedition striving to establish a base in the Caribbean, +preliminary to an attack on our Atlantic continental coast or on +the Panama Canal. + +3. To make an expedition to a distant point, to prevent the occupation +of territory by a foreign government in the south Atlantic or the +Pacific. + +_First Object_.--To repel an attack made directly on the Atlantic +coast, the plan must provide for getting the needed additions to +the fleet with the utmost despatch. Owing to the keen appreciation +by European nations of the value of secrecy and despatch, any attack +contemplated by one of them on our Atlantic coast would be prepared +behind the curtain, and nothing about its preparation would be +allowed to be reported to the outside world until after the attacking +force had actually sailed. For the force to reach our shores, not +more than two weeks would be needed, even if the fleet stopped at +mid-Atlantic islands to lay in fuel. It is very doubtful if the +fact of stopping there would be allowed to be reported, as the +commander-in-chief could easily take steps to prevent it. It is +possible that merchant steamers might meet the fleet, and report +the fact by radio, but it is not at all certain. A great proportion +of the steamers met would willingly obey an order not to report +it, or even to have their radio apparatus deranged; either because +of national sympathy, or because the captain was "insulted with +a very considerable bribe." The probability, therefore, would be +that we should hear of the departure of the fleet from Europe, and +then hear nothing more about it until it was met by our scouts. + +This reasoning shows that to carry out the plans of strategy, logistics +would have to provide plans and means to execute those plans, whereby +our existing fleet, plus all the additions which strategy demanded, +would be waiting at whatever points on the ocean strategy might +indicate, before the coming enemy would reach those points. In +other words, logistics must make and execute such plans that all +the fleet which strategy demands will be at the selected points +in less than two weeks from the time the enemy leaves the shores +of Europe. + +Of course, the conditions will not necessarily be such that strategy +will demand that all our reserve ships, especially the oldest ships, +shall go out to sea with the active fleet, ready to engage in battle. +Maybe some of them will be found to be so slow and equipped with +such short-range guns, that they would be an embarrassment to the +commander-in-chief, instead of an assistance. Unless it is clear, +however, that any ship, especially a battleship, _would be an +embarrassment_, her place is clearly with the fighting fleet. The +issue of the battle cannot be known in advance; and as everything +will depend upon that issue, no effort and no instrument should be +spared that can assist in gaining victory. And even if the older +ships might not be of material assistance in the early stages of +a battle, they would do no harm because they could be kept out +of the way, if need be. In case either side gains a conclusive +victory at once, the older ships will do neither good nor harm; +but in case a decisive result is not at once attained, and both +sides are severely damaged, the old ships, held in reserve, may +then come in fresh and whole, like the reserve in land engagements, +and add a fighting force which at that time will be most important +and may be decisive. + +Probably some of the ships will be too old, however, to fill places +of any value in the active fleet. These should be fully manned and +equipped, however, for there will be many fields of usefulness +for them. One field will be in assisting the land defenses, in +protecting the mouths of harbors and mine-fields, in defending +submarine bases, and acting as station ships in the coast-defense +system. + +_Second Object_.--To repel an enemy expedition, striving to establish +a base in the Caribbean, preparation would have to be made for +as prompt a mobilization as possible; for although the threat of +invasion of our coast would not carry with it the idea of such +early execution as would a direct attack on New York, yet the actual +establishment of a base so near our shores would give such advantages +to a hostile nation for a future invasion, that measures to prevent +it should be undertaken with the utmost possible thoroughness and +despatch; because the operation of establishing a base involves +many elements of difficulty that an active defender can hinder +by aeroplane attacks, etc.; whereas, after a base has once been +established and equipped with appropriate defenses, attacks upon +it are much less productive of results. + +The endeavor to establish a base and the opposing effort to prevent +it, will offer many opportunities for excellent work on both sides. +Practically all the elements of naval force will be engaged, and +events on the largest possible scale may be expected. The operations +will naturally be more extended both in time and distance than +in the case of a direct attack upon our coast, and therefore the +task of logistics will be greater. Actual battle between large +forces; minor engagements among aircraft, scouts, submarines, and +destroyers; attacks on the train of the invader--even conflicts +on shore--will be among the probabilities. + +_Third Object_.--To send a large expedition to carry out naval +operations in far distant waters--in the south Atlantic, for instance, +to prevent the extension of a monarchical government in South America, +or in the western Pacific to defend our possessions there--calls +for plans involving more logistical calculation and execution, +but permitting a more leisurely procedure. The distances to be +traversed are so great, the lack of bases is so distinct and so +difficult to remedy, and the impossibility of arriving in time +to prevent the seizing of land by any hostile expedition is so +evident, that they combine to necessitate great thoroughness of +preparation and only such a measure of despatch as can be secured +without endangering thoroughness. Whether the projected expedition +shall include troops, the conditions at the time must dictate. +Troops with their transports will much complicate and increase the +difficulties of the problem, and they may or may not be needed. +The critical results can be accomplished by naval operations only; +since nothing can be accomplished if the naval part of the expedition +fails to secure the command of the sea; and the troops cannot be +landed until it has been secured, unless the fact of securing it +can safely be relied on in advance. For these reasons, the troops +may be held back until the command of the sea has been secured, +and then sent out as an independent enterprise. This would seem the +more prudent procedure in most cases, since one successful night +attack on a group of transports by an active enemy might destroy +it altogether. + +But whether a military expedition should accompany the fleet, or +follow a few hundred miles behind, or delay starting until command +of the sea has been achieved, it is obvious that the logistic +calculations and executive measures for sending a modern fleet to +a very distant place, and sustaining it there for an indefinite +period, must be of the highest order of difficulty. The difficulty +will be reduced in cases where there is a great probability of +being able to secure a base which would be able to receive large +numbers of deep-draft ships in protected waters, to repair ships +of all classes that might be wounded in battle, and to store and +supply great quantities of ammunition, food, and fuel. + +No expedition of such magnitude has ever yet been made--though some +of the expeditions of ancient times, such as the naval expedition +of Persia against Greece, B. C. 480, and the despatch of the Spanish +Armada in more recent days, may have been as difficult, considering +the meagreness of the material and engineering resources of those +epochs. + +But even if no military force accompanies the expedition, the enormous +quantities of fuel, supplies, ammunition, medical stores, etc., that +will be required, especially fuel; the world-wide interest that +will be centred on the expedition; the international importance +attaching to it; and the unspeakable necessity that the plans shall +underestimate no difficulty and overlook no factor, point with a +long and steady finger at the necessity of attacking this problem +promptly and very seriously, and of detailing the officers and +constructing the administrative machinery needed to make the +calculations and to execute the measures that the calculations show +to be required. + +_Static Defense of the Coast_.--But besides the mobile fleet which +is a nation's principal concern, strategy requires that for certain +points on the coast, where large national and commercial interests +are centred, arrangements shall be made for what may be termed a +"static defense," by vessels, mine-fields, submarines, aircraft, +etc., assigned as permanent parts of the defense of these points, +analogous to forts on the land. The naval activities of this species +of defense will centre on the mine-fields which it is a great part of +their duty to defend. To guard these, and to get timely information +of the coming of any hostile force or raiding expedition, strategy +says we must get our eyes and ears well out from the land. To do +this, water craft and aircraft of various kinds are needed; and +they must be not only sufficiently numerous over each area to scout +the waters thoroughly, but they must be adapted to their purpose, +manned by adequate and skilful crews, and organized so as to act +effectively together. + +The work of this patrol system is not to be restricted, however, +to getting and transmitting information. Certain of the craft must +be armed sufficiently to drive off hostile craft, trying to drag +or countermine the defensive mine-fields; some must be able to +add to the defensive mine-fields by planting mines, and some must +be able to pilot friendly ships through the defensive mine-fields; +others still must be able to countermine, drag, and sweep for any +offensive mines that the enemy may plant. + +Vessels for this patrol work do not have to be very large; in fact, +for much of the work in the mine-fields, it were better if they +were small, by reason of the ability of small vessels to turn in +restricted spaces. + +It would seem that for the patrol service, the vessels of the Revenue +Marine and Lighthouse Service (coast guard) are ideally adapted; +but, of course, there are only a few in total. These would have to +be supplemented by small craft of many kinds, such as tugs, fast +motor-boats, fishing-boats, and trawlers. To find men competent +to man such vessels and do the kind of work required would not be +so difficult as to get men competent to man the more distinctive +fighting ships. Good merchant sailors, fishermen, and tugboat men +would fit into the work with considerable ease, and in quite a +short time. Strategy declares, however, that a coast guard may +be needed a very short time after war breaks out; and that the +vessels and the men, with all the necessary equipment and all the +necessary organization and training, should be put into actual +operation beforehand. + +Not only the fleet, however, but all the bureaus and offices of +the Navy Department, all the navy-yards, and an the radio stations, +recruiting stations, hydrographic offices, training stations, and +agencies for securing information from foreign countries, will have +to pass instantly from a peace basis to a war basis. To do these +things quickly and correctly many preliminaries must be arranged; +but if the General Staff prepares good plans beforehand, arranges +measures which will insure that the plans shall be promptly carried +out, and holds a few mobilization drills to test them, the various +bureaus and offices in the department can do the rest. If the fires +have all been lighted, the engine gotten ready, and the boilers +filled in time, the engineer may open the throttle confidently, +when the critical time arrives, for the engine will surely do its +part. + +But if the proper plans have not been made and executed, the sudden +outbreak of war, in which any country becomes involved with a powerful +naval country, will create confusion on a scale larger than any +that the world has ever seen, and compared with which pandemonium +would be a Quaker meeting. A realization of facts will come to that +country, and especially to the naval authorities, that will overwhelm +them with the consciousness of their inability to meet the crisis +marching toward them with swift but unhurried tread--confident, +determined, unescapable. Fear of national danger and the sense +of shame, hopelessness and helplessness will combine to produce +psychological effects so keen that even panic will be possible. +Officers in high places at sea and on shore will send telegrams of +inquiry and suggestion; civilians in public and private station +will do the same. No fitting answers can be given, because there +will be no time for reflection and deliberation. The fact that it +would be impossible to get the various additions to the fleet and +the patrol services ready in time, and the consciousness that it +would be useless to do any less, will tend to bring on a desperate +resolve to accept the situation and let the enemy do his worst. +The actual result, however, will probably be like the result of +similar situations in the past; that is, some course of action +will be hastily decided on, not in the reasoned-out belief that +it can accomplish much, but with the feeling that action of any +kind will relieve the nervous tension of the public by giving an +outlet for mental and physical exertion and will, besides, lend +itself to self-encouragement, and create a feeling that proper +and effective measures are being taken. + +Such conditions, though on a much smaller scale, are familiar to +naval officers and are suggested by the supposititious order "somebody +do something"; and we frequently see people placed in situations in +which they do not know what to do, and so they do--not nothing, +but anything; though it would often be wiser to do nothing than +to do the thing they do do. Many of the inane remarks that people +make are due to their finding themselves in situations in which +they do not know what to say, but in which they feel impelled to +say "something." + +Now what kind of "something" would be done under the stimulus of +the outbreak of a war for which a country had not laid its plans? +Can any worse situation be imagined--except the situation that +would follow when the enemy arrived? The parable of the wise and +foolish virgins suggests the situation, both in the foolishness of +the unpreparedness and in the despair when the consequent disaster +is seen approaching. + +In nearly all navies and armies, until the recent enormous increase +in all kinds of material took place, the work of getting a navy +ready for war in personnel and material was comparatively simple. +This does not mean that it was easier then than now; because the +facilities for construction, transportation, communication, and +accounting were much less than now; but it does mean that the actual +number of articles to be handled was much less, and the number +of kinds of articles was also much less; and it also means that +the various mechanical improvements, while they have facilitated +construction, transportation, communication, and accounting, have +done so for every nation; so that none of the competing navies +have had their labors expedited or made less. On the contrary, +the very means devised and developed for expediting work is of +the nature of an instrument; and in order to use that instrument +successfully, one has to study it and practise with it; so that +the necessity for studying and practising with the instrument has +added a new and difficult procedure to those before existing. + +Fifty years ago the various mechanisms of naval warfare were few, +and those few simple. In our Navy Department the work of supplying +those mechanisms was divided among several bureaus, and each bureau +was given the duty and the accompanying power of supplying its +particular quota. The rapid multiplication, during the past fifty +years, of new mechanisms, and new kinds of mechanisms; the increased +expense of those mechanisms compared with that of former mechanisms; +the increased size and power of vessels, guns, and engines; the +increased size and complexity of the utilities in navy-yards for +handling them; the necessity for providing and using means and +methods for despatching the resulting "business" speedily, and +for guarding against mistakes in handling the multiplicity of +details--the increase, in brief, in the number, size, and kinds +of things that have to be done in preparation, has brought about +not only more labor in doing those things by the various bureaus +assigned to do them, but has brought about even more imperiously +the demand for means whereby the central authority shall be assured +that each bureau is doing its work. And it has brought about more +imperiously still a demand that a clear conception shall be formed +first of what must be done, and second of the maximum time that +can be allowed for doing it. + +Clearly, the forming of a correct conception should not be expected +of men not trained to form it; clearly, for instance, mere knowledge +of electricity and mere skill in using electrical instruments cannot +enable a man to devise radio apparatus for naval use; a certain +amount of knowledge of purely naval and nautical matters is needed +in addition. Clearly, the concept as to the kind of performance +to be required of radio apparatus is not to be expected of a mere +technician, but is to be expected of a strategist--and equally +the ability to design, construct, and supply the apparatus is not +to be expected of a strategist, but it is to be expected of a +technician. + +A like remark may be made concerning any mechanism--say a gun, a +torpedo, or an instrument, or a vessel of any kind. The strategist, +by studying the requirements of probable war, concludes that a +certain kind of thing is needed; and the technician supplies it, +or does so to the best of his ability. + +The statement thus far made indicates a division of work into two +sharply defined departments; and, theoretically, such a division +does exist. This does not mean, however, that the strategist and the +technician should work independently of each other. Such a procedure +would result in the strategist demanding things the technician could +not supply, and in the technician supplying things the strategist +did not want, under a mistaken impression as to what the strategist +wanted. The fullest and most intimate understanding and co-operation +must exist between the strategist and the technician, as it must +equally between the architect and the builder of a house. + +From an appreciation of such facts as these, every great Navy +Department, except that of the United States, has developed a General +Staff, which studies what should be done to prepare for passing +from a state of peace to a state of war; which informs the minister +at the head of the department what things should be done, and is +given power to provide that the various bureaus and offices shall +be able to do them when war breaks. This is the scheme which all +the navy departments, except the American, have devised, to meet +the sudden and violent shock of the outbreak of a modern war. _No +other means has yet been devised_, and no other means is even +forecasted. + +The means is extremely simple in principle, but complex beyond +the reach of an ordinary imagination in detail. It consists simply +in writing down a digest of all the various things that are to be +done, dividing the task of doing them among the various bureaus +and offices that are authorized by law to do them, and then seeing +that the bureaus shall be able to do them in the time allowed. + +The best way of ascertaining if the bureaus are able to do them is +to mobilize--to put into commission and send out to sea all the craft +that will be needed, fully equipped with a trained personnel and with +a well-conditioned material; and then direct the commander-in-chief +to solve a definite strategic problem--say to defend the coast +against a hypothetical enemy fleet--the solution including tactical +games by day and night. + +Before attempting the solution of a strategic problem by an entire +naval force, however, it is usual to hold mobilization exercises +of a character less complete, in the same way that any course of +training begins with drills that are easy and progresses to drills +that are difficult. The simplest of all the preparative drills--if +drills they correctly can be called--is the periodical reporting, +once a month, or once a quarter, by each bureau and office, of its +state of readiness; the report to be in such detail as experience +shows to be the best. + +In the days when each bureau's preparation consisted of comparatively +few things to do, the chief of that bureau could be relied on to do +the things required to be done by his bureau; and his oral assurance +to the secretary that--say all the ships had enough ammunition, +or that adequate provision had been made for coal, or that there +were enough enlisted men--would fulfil all requirements. But in the +past fifty years, the requirements have increased a hundredfold, +while the human mind has remained just as it was. So it has seemed +necessary to institute a system of periodical preparation reports, +to examine them carefully, and to use all possible vigilance, lest +any item be forgotten or any work done by two bureaus that ought +to be done by only one. + +Who should examine the reports? Naturally the same persons as decide +what should be done. The same studies and deliberations that fit +a person to decide what is needed, fit him to inspect the product +that is offered to supply the need; not only to see if it comes +up to the specifications, but also to decide whether or not any +observed omission is really important; to decide whether, in view of +certain practical difficulties, the specifications may be modified; +and also to decide whether certain improvements suggested by any +bureau should or should not be adopted. + +This procedure may seem to put the strategy officers "over" the +technical officers, to put a lieutenant-commander on the General +Staff "over" a rear admiral who is chief of bureau; but such an +idea seems hardly justified. In any well-designed organization +relative degrees of official superiority are functions of rank, and +of nothing else; superiority in rank must, of course, be recognized, +for the reason that when on duty together the junior must obey +the senior. But even this superiority is purely official; it is a +matter of position, and not a matter of honor. All the honor that +is connected with any position is not by reason of the position +itself, but by reason of the honorable service which a man must +have rendered in order to attain it, and which he must continue +to render in order to maintain it. So, in a Navy Department, the +General Staff officers cannot be "over" the bureau officers, unless +by law or regulation certain of the staff are made to rank over +certain bureau officers. A procedure like this would seem to be +unnecessary, except in the case of the chief of staff himself, +who might, for the purpose of prompt administration, be placed by +law over the bureau chiefs. + +The importance of the question, however, does not rest on a personal +basis, but a national basis. It makes no difference to the nation +whether Smith is put above Jones, or Jones above Smith; and in +all discussions of national matters it is essential to bear in +mind clearly not only that national questions must not be obscured +by the interjection of the personal element, but also that great +vigilance is needed to prevent it. For the reason that questions of +the salaries of government officials have been settled in advance, +questions of personal prestige and authority are more apt to intrude +themselves among them than among men in civil life, whose main +object is to "make a living"--and as good a living as they can. +In the long struggle that has gone on in the United States Navy +Department between the advocates and the opponents of a General +Staff, the personal element has clouded the question--perhaps more +than any other element. Not only in the department itself, but in +Congress, the question of how much personal "power" the General +Staff would have has been discussed interminably--as though the +personal element were of any importance whatever. + +Such an attitude toward "power" is not remarkable when held by +civilians, but it is remarkable when held by men who have had a +military or naval training. Of course, there is an instinct in +all men to crave power; but it is not recognized as an instinct +wholly worthy. It is associated in most men's minds with a desire +for material possessions, such as money or political position, and +not with such aspirations as a desire for honor. In other words, +a strong desire for wealth or power, while natural and pardonable, +is considered a little sordid; while a desire for honor, or for +opportunity to do good service, is held to be commendable. So, when +public officials, either military or civilian, condemn a measure +because it will give somebody "power," the reason given seems to +be incomplete, unless a further reason is given which states the +harm that would be done by conferring the "power." + +Military and naval men exercise "power" from the beginning of their +careers until their careers are closed; and they exercise it under +the sane and restraining influence of responsibility; without which +influence, the exercise of power is unjustifiable, and under which +influence the exercise of power is a burden--and oftentimes a heavy +one. That men trained as military men are trained, should aspire to +power for power's own sake, is a little hard to understand--unless +it be confessed that the person desiring the power appreciates +its pleasing features more than its responsibilities, and regards +its duties more lightly than its glories. Few men, even those who +shoulder responsibility the most courageously, desire responsibility +for its own sake--and so the fact of a man ardently desiring "power" +seems a good reason for withholding power from him. + +And what is "power," in the sense in which officials, both military +and civilian, use the word? Is it ability to do good service, or is +it ability to bestow favors in order that favors may be received, +to give orders to others coupled with authority to enforce obedience, +or to take revenge for injuries received or fancied? Of course, +"power" is ability to do all these things, good and bad. But if +a man desires power simply to do good service, and if he holds +a highly conscientious view of the accompanying duties and +responsibilities, will he crave "power" as much as some men seem +to do? + +It seems fundamental, then, that any strategic plan for preparing +the Navy Department for war should be framed with a strong endeavor to +leave out the personal element, and should regard national usefulness +only. If this be done successfully, and if good selections be made +of the personnel to do it, it will be found that the members of +the personnel will think no more about their "power" than does an +officer of the deck while handling a battleship in fleet formation +during his four hours on the bridge. + +In preparing the department for war, one would be in danger of +being overwhelmed by the enormousness and the complexity of the +task, unless he bore in mind continuously that _it is only when we +get into details that any matter becomes complex_; and therefore +that if we can get a clear idea of the whole subject, the principles +that underlie it, and the major divisions into which it naturally is +divided, we can then make those divisions and afterward subdivide +those divisions, and later divide the subdivisions; so that the +whole subject will seem to fall apart as a fowl does under the +hands of a skilful carver. The divisions and subdivisions of the +subject having been made, the remaining task, while onerous, will +be largely a matter of copying and of filling in blank forms. + +As all navy departments have means regulated by law such that the +actual executive work of recruiting, constructing, and supplying the +necessary personnel and material shall be done by certain bureaus +and offices, strategy does not need executive power, except for +forcing the bureaus and offices to do the necessary work--should +such forcing become necessary. Strategy being the art of being +a general (_strategos_), one cannot conceive of it as bereft of +executive power, since we cannot conceive of a general exercising +generalship without having executive power. It is true that strategy +occupies itself mainly with planning--but so does a general; and +it is also true that strategy itself does not make the soldiers +march, but neither does a general; it is the colonels and captains +and corporals who make the soldiers march. The general plans the +campaign and arranges the marches, the halts, the bivouacs, provisions, +ammunition, etc., through his logistical officers, and they give +the executive officers general instructions as to how to carry +out the general's plans. + +Strategy without executive functions would be like a mind that could +think, but was imprisoned in a body which was paralyzed. + +Of course, strategy should have executive functions for the purposes +of strategy only; under the guidance of policy and to execute policy's +behests. Policy is the employer, and strategy the employee. + + + + +CHAPTER XI + +NAVAL BASES + +The nature of naval operations necessitates the expenditure of +fuel, ammunition, and supplies; wear and tear of machinery; fatigue +of personnel; and a gradual fouling of the bottoms of the ships. +In case actual battles mark the operations, the expenditure of +stored-up energy of all kinds is very great indeed, and includes not +only damage done to personnel and material by the various agencies +of destruction, but actual loss of vessels. + +To furnish the means of supplying and replenishing the stored-up +energy required for naval operations is the office of naval bases. + +A naval base capable of doing this for a large fleet must be a +very great establishment. In such a naval base, one must be able +to build, dock, and repair vessels of all kinds, and the mechanisms +needed in those vessels; anchor a large fleet in safety behind adequate +military and naval protection; supply enough fuel, ammunition, +and supplies for all purposes, and accommodate large reserves of +material and personnel. Inasmuch as a naval base is purely a means +for expending energy for military purposes, and has no other cause +for its existence, it is clear that it cannot be self-supporting. +For this reason it is highly desirable that a naval base shall be +near a great city, especially if that city be a large commercial +and manufacturing centre. + +It is true that many large naval bases, such as Malta and Gibraltar +are not near great cities; and it is true that most large naval +bases have no facilities for building ships. But it is also true +that few large naval bases fulfil all the requirements of a perfect +naval base; in fact it is true that none do. + +The most obvious requirement of a naval base is a large sheet of +sheltered water, in which colliers and oil-carriers may lie and +give coal and oil to fighting craft, and in which those fighting +craft may lie tranquilly at anchor, and carry on the simple and yet +necessary repairs and adjustments to machinery that every cruising +vessel needs at intervals. Without the ability to fuel and repair, +no fleet could continue long at work, any more than a man could do +so, without food and the repairs which nature carries on in sleep. +The coming of oil fuel and the consequent ease of fuelling, the +practicability even of fuelling in moderate weather when actually +at sea, subtract partially one of the reasons for naval bases; but +they leave the other reasons still existent, especially the reasons +connected with machinery repairs. The principal repair, and the one +most difficult to furnish, is that given by docking in suitable +docks. The size and expense of docks capable of carrying dreadnaughts +and battle cruisers are so great, and their vulnerability to fire +from ships and from aircraft is so extreme, that the matter of +dry-docks is perhaps the most troublesome single matter connected +with a naval base. + +The necessity of anchorage areas for submarines is a requirement of +naval bases that has only recently been felt; and the present war +shows a still newer requirement in suitable grounds for aircraft. +The speed of aircraft, however, is so great that little delay or +embarrassment would result if the camp for aircraft were not at the +base itself. Instead of the camp being on Culebra, for instance, +it might well be on Porto Rico. The extreme delicacy of aircraft, +however, and the necessity for quick attention in case of injuries, +especially injuries to the engine, demand a suitable base even +more imperiously than do ships and other rugged things. + +That the vessels anchored in the base should be protected from +the fire of ships at sea and from guns on neighboring shores is +clear. Therefore, even if a base be hidden from the sea and far +from it as is the harbor of Santiago, it must be protected by guns, +or mines, or both; the guns being nearer to the enemy than are the +ships in the waters of the base. An island having high bluffs, +where large guns can be installed, and approached by gradually +shoaling waters in which mines can be anchored, with deeper water +outside in which submarines can operate, is desirable from this +point of view. + +Ability to store and protect large quantities of provisions is +essential, and especially in the case of ammunition and high explosives. +For storing the latter, a hilly terrain has advantages, since tunnels +can be run horizontally into hills, where explosives can lie safe +from attack, even attack from aircraft dropping bombs above them. + +Naturally, the country that has led the world in the matter of +naval bases is Great Britain; and the world at large has hardly +yet risen to a realization of the enduring work that she has been +quietly doing for two hundred years, in establishing and fortifying +commodious resting-places for her war-ships and merchant ships in +all the seas. While other nations have been devoting themselves +to arranging and developing the interiors of their countries, Great +Britain has searched all the oceans, has explored all the coasts, +has established colonies and trading stations everywhere, and formed +a network of intimate commercial relations which covers the world +and radiates from London. To protect her commercial stations and +her merchant ships from unfair dealings in time of peace, and from +capture in time of war, and to threaten all rivals with defeat +should they resort to war, Great Britain has built up the greatest +navy in the world. And as this navy pervades the world, and as her +merchant ships dot every sea and display Great Britain's ensign +in every port, Great Britain has not failed to provide for their +safety and support a series of naval stations that belt the globe. + +Bases are of many kinds, and may be divided into many classes. +An evident ground for division is that of locality in relation +to the home country. Looked at from this point of view, we may +divide naval bases into two classes, home bases and distant bases. + +_Home Bases_.--A home base is, as its name implies, a base situated +in the home country. The most usual type of the home naval base is +the navy-yard, though few navy-yards can meet all the requirements +of a naval base. The New York navy-yard, for instance, which is our +most important yard, lacks three of the most vital attributes of +a naval base, in that it has no means for receiving and protecting +a large fleet, it cannot be approached by large ships except at +high tide, and it could not receive a seriously injured battleship +at any time, because the channel leading to it is too shallow. + +Home bases that approach perfection were evidenced after the battle +off the Skagerak; for the wounded ships of both sides took refuge +after the battle in protected bases, where they were repaired and +refitted, and resupplied with fighting men and fuel. These bases +seem to have been so located, so protected, and so equipped, as +to do exactly what bases are desired to do; they were "bases of +operations" in the best sense. The fleets of the opposing sides +started from those bases as nearly ready as human means and foresight +could devise, returned to them for refreshment after the operations +had been concluded, and, during the operations, were based upon those +bases. If the bases of either fleet had been improperly located, +or inadequately protected or equipped, that fleet would not have +been so completely ready for battle as, in fact, it was; and it +could not have gone to its base for shelter and repairs so quickly +and so surely as, in fact, it did. Many illustrations can be found +in history of the necessity for naval bases; but the illustration +given by this battle of May 31 is of itself so perfect and convincing, +that it seems hardly necessary or even desirable to bring forward +any others. + +The fact of the nearness to each other of the bases of the two +contending fleets--the nearness of Germany and Great Britain in +other words--coupled with the nearness of the battle itself to +the bases, and the fact that both fleets retired shortly afterward +to the bases, bring out in clear relief the efficacy of bases; but +nevertheless their efficacy would have been even more strongly +shown if the battle had been near to the bases of the more powerful +fleet, but far from the bases of the other fleet--as was the case +at the battle, near Tsushima, in the Japan Sea. + +Of course the weaker fleet in the North Sea battle would not have +been drawn into battle under such conditions, because it would +not have had a safe refuge to retreat to. It was the proximity of +an adequate naval base, that could be approached through protected +waters only, which justified the weaker fleet in dashing out and +taking advantage of what seemed to be an opportunity. Similarly, +if the Russian fleet in the Japan Sea had had a base near by, from +which it had issued ready in all ways, and to which it could have +retired as soon as the battle began to go against it, the Russian +disaster might not have occurred, and full command of the sea by +the Japanese might have been prevented. But there being no base +or harbor of refuge, disaster succeeded disaster in a cumulative +fashion, and the Russian fleet was annihilated in deep water. + +If a naval base were lacking to the more powerful fleet, as was +the case in the battle of Manila, the effect would in many cases +be but slight--as at Manila. If, however, the more powerful fleet +were badly injured, the absence of a base would be keenly felt and +might entail disaster in the future, even though the more powerful +fleet were actually victorious. The Japanese fleet was practically +victorious at the battle of August 10, near Port Arthur; but if it +had not been able to refit and repair at a naval base, it would +have met the Russian fleet later with much less probability of +success. + +Mahan states that the three main requirements in a naval base are +position, resources, and strength; and of these he considers that +position is the most important; largely because resources and strength +can be artificially supplied, while position is the gift of nature, +and cannot be moved or changed. + +Mahan's arguments seem to suggest that the bases he had in mind +were bases distant from home, not home bases; since reference is +continually made by him to the distance and direction of bases +from important strategic points of actual or possible enemies. + +His arguments do not seem to apply with equal force to home bases, +for the reason that home bases are intended primarily as bases +from which operations are to start; secondarily as bases to which +fleets may return, and only remotely as bases during operations; +whereas, distant bases are intended as points from which operations +may continually be carried on, during the actual prosecution of +a war. The position of a home base, for instance, as referred to +any enemy's coasts or bases, is relatively unimportant, compared +with its ability to fit out a fleet; while, on the other hand, the +position of distant bases, such as Hong-Kong, Malta, or Gibraltar, +relatively to the coasts of an enemy, is vital in the extreme. It +is the positions of these three bases that make them so valuable +to their holders; placed at points of less strategic value, the +importance of those bases would be strategically less. + +Home bases are valuable mainly by reason of their resources. This +does not mean that position is an unimportant factor; it does not +mean, for instance, that a naval base would be valuable if situated +in the Adirondack Mountains, no matter how great resources it might +have. It does mean, however, that the "position" that is important +for a home base is the position that the base holds relatively to +large home commercial centres and to the open sea. New York, for +instance, could be made an excellent naval base, mainly because of +the enormous resources that it has and its nearness to the ocean. +Philadelphia, likewise, could be made valuable, though Philadelphia's +position relatively to deep water is far from good. "Position," +as used in this sense, is different from the "position" meant by +Mahan, who used the word in its strategic sense. The position of +Philadelphia relatively to deep water could be changed by simply +deepening the channel of the Delaware; but no human power could +change the strategic position of Malta or Gibraltar. + +Yet for even home bases, position, resources, and strength must +be combined to get a satisfactory result; the "position" not being +related to foreign naval bases, however, but to large industrial +establishments, mainly in order that working men of various classes +may be secured when needed. The requirements of work on naval craft +are so discontinuous that steady employment can be provided for +comparatively few men only; so that a sort of reservoir is needed, +close at hand, which can be drawn up when men are needed, and into +which men can be put back, whenever the need for them has ceased. +And the same commercial and industrial conditions that assure a +supply of skilled workers, assure a supply of provisions and all +kinds of material as well. + +_Distant Bases_.--Distant bases have two fields of usefulness which +are distinct, though one implies the other; one field being merely +that of supplying a fleet and offering a refuge in distress, and +the other field being that of contributing thereby to offensive and +defensive operations. No matter in which light we regard a distant +naval base, it is clear that position, resources, and strength +must be the principal factors; but as soon as we concentrate our +attention on the operations that may be based upon it, we come to +realize how strong a factor position, that is strategic position, +is. The base itself is an inert collection of inert materials; +these materials can be useful to the operations of a fleet that +bases on it; but if the fleet is operating in the Pacific, a base +in the Atlantic is not immediately valuable to it, no matter what +strength and resources the base may have. + +The functions of a home base are therefore those that the name +"home" implies; to start the fleet out on its mission, to receive +it on its return, and to offer rest, refuge, and succor in times +of accident and distress. + +The functions of a distant base concern more nearly the operations of +a prolonged campaign. A distant base is more difficult to construct as +a rule; largely because the fact of its distance renders engineering +operations difficult and because the very excellence of its position +as an outpost makes it vulnerable to direct attack and often to +a concentration of attacks coming from different directions. + +If naval operations are to be conducted at considerable distance +from home, say in the Caribbean Sea, distant bases are necessary, +since without them, the fleet will operate under a serious handicap. +Under some conditions, a fleet operating in the Caribbean without +a base there, against an enemy that had established a satisfactory +base, might have its normal fighting efficiency reduced 50 per cent, +or even more. A fleet is not a motionless fort, whose strength +lies only in its ability to fire guns and withstand punishment; a +fleet is a very live personality, whose ability to fight well--like +a pugilist's--depends largely on its ability to move quickly and +accurately, and to think quickly and accurately. The best pugilists +are not usually the strongest men, though physical strength is +an important factor; the best pugilists are men who are quick as +well as strong, who see an advantage or a danger quickly, and whose +eyes, nerves, and muscles act together swiftly and harmoniously. A +modern fleet, filled with high-grade machinery of all kinds, manned +by highly trained men to operate it, and commanded by officers fit +to be intrusted with such responsibilities, is a highly developed +and sensitive organism--and, like all highly developed and sensitive +organisms, exists in a state of what may be called "unstable +equilibrium." As pointed out in previous pages, the high skill +needed to perform well any very difficult task can be gained only +by great practice in overcoming difficulties and eliminating errors +of many kinds; and when the difficulties are manifold and great, a +comparatively small increase or decrease in the overcoming of them +makes a great difference in the results attained. An interesting +though possibly not very correct analogy is to be seen in the case of +a polished surface; for we readily note that the more highly polished +the surface is, the more easily it is sullied. Another analogy may +be found in the performance of a great pianist or violinist; for +a very small failure in his skill for even an instant will produce +a painful feeling that could not be produced by a much greater +failure in an ordinary performer. Another analogy is to be found in +the case of a ship that is going at the upper limit of her speed; +for a very minor failure of any part of her machinery will produce +a much greater slowing than it would if her speed were slower. + +Perhaps apologies are in order for dwelling so long on what may seem +to some an academic question, but it does not seem to the writer +to be academic at all. Certainly, the "condition" of a pugilist, or +a fleet, about to fight, is not an academic consideration; and if +it is not, no matter which affects this condition can rightfully be +considered academic. The whole usefulness of bases is due to their +ability to put fleets into good fighting condition and to maintain +them in it; and it seems a very proper and useful thing to note that +the more highly trained a fleet is, and the more highly organized +the various appliances the fleet contains, the more difference +results from a falling off in the condition of its personnel and +material. + +This shows the advantage of having a base as close to the place +where a fight is going to happen as may be possible. This does +not mean, of course, that a fleet should remain for long periods +within its base; because a fleet, like any other practiser of any +art, needs constant practice. It merely means that the closer the +base is to the scene of the operations or the actual battle, the +better "tuned up" the personnel and material will be. It also means +that this consideration is of the highest practical importance. + +_Advanced Bases_.--The extreme desirability of having a base near +the scene of operations, even if the base be only temporarily held, +has led to the use of what are called "advanced bases." An excellent +and modern illustration of an advanced base is the base which the +Japanese established at the Elliot Islands about sixty miles from +Port Arthur, which the Japanese were besieging. The Russian fleet +could issue from their base at Port Arthur whenever the Russians +wished, and return to it at will. While inside, until the Japanese +had landed and attacked them from the land side, the Russians could +make their preparations in security and leisure, and then go out. +The Japanese fleet, on the other hand, until they had established +their base, were forced to remain under way at sea, and to accept +action at the will of the Russians; so that, although Port Arthur +was besieged, the advantages of the offensive, to some extent, +resided with the Russians. The establishment of the base did not, +of course, change the situation wholly; but it permitted a very +considerable relaxation of vigilance and mental strain on the part +of the Japanese, and a considerable easement of the motive power +of their ships. Naturally, the Japanese made arrangements whereby +their heavy ships could remain in comparative tranquillity near +the base, while destroyers and scouts of various kinds kept touch +with Port Arthur, and notified the base by wireless of any probable +sortie by the Russian fleet. + +The temporary advanced base at the Elliot Islands was, as temporary +advanced bases always must be, quite incomplete in every way as +compared with the permanent bases at home. It fulfilled its mission, +however, and was in fact as good a base as really was required. +The strategic ability of the Japanese was indicated quite early +in the war by the promptness and skill with which they established +this base. + +Of course, all advanced bases are distant bases, but the words +usually imply temporariness, as does in fact the word "advance." +An instance of an advanced base that has been far from temporary +is the island of Jamaica, and another is the island of Bermuda; +another is Malta, and still another is Gibraltar. These bases form +stepping-stones, by which Great Britain's navy may go by easy stages +from one position to another, stopping at a base when desired, or +going beyond it without stopping, secure in the knowledge that +the base is "under her lee" in case of accident or distress. + +Viewed from the standpoint of operations in an actual war, the +strategic value of a certain position for a base is important, +no matter whether the operations are offensive or defensive; and +the same factors that make a position good for defensive operations +make it good for offensive operations also. For instance, if we +wish to send a fleet on a hostile expedition to a distant point, +it is well to have a base on a salient as far out as practicable +from the coast, in order that the fleet may be able to start, full +of fuel and supplies, from a place near the distant point; and +equally, if we are to receive an attack upon the coast, it is well +to have a base far out, in order to embarrass the transit of the +enemy toward our coast, by the threat--first against his flank, +and later against his rear and his communications. Naval bases +looked at from this point of view resemble those forts that European +nations place along their frontiers. + +It is true that any base placed at a salient has the weakness of +all salients, in that fire can be concentrated on it from several +directions; and a naval base has the added disadvantage of a more +difficult withdrawal, if attacked by an overwhelming force, and a +longer line of communications that has to be protected. But this +weakness all distant bases have, from the fact that they are distant; +and, naturally, the more distant they are, the more difficult it is to +support them, because the longer are their lines of communications. + +Distant naval bases, therefore, are vulnerable in a high degree; +they are vulnerable both to direct attack and to an attack on their +lines of communications; and the factors that help a base in one +way injure it in another. If a naval base is placed on a rock, +or a rugged little island that holds nothing else, and on which +a hostile army could not land, it is very safe from land attack; +whereas, if it is placed on a large and fertile island, on which +an invading army could easily land, it is extremely vulnerable +to land attack. But, on the other hand, the naval base on the +inaccessible island could be starved out by simply breaking its +lines of communications, while the naval base on the large and +fertile island might be able to survive indefinitely, even though +the communications were wholly ruptured. + +The establishment of any permanent distant naval base is a matter +of great expense, even if the natural conditions are favorable. +But favorable conditions have rarely existed; and the expense of +establishing such bases as Malta, Gibraltar, and Heligoland has +been tremendous. An important consideration has been the fact that, +unless the base were made so strong that it could not be taken, +it might be better not to attempt to fortify it, on the theory +that it would be better to let a poor naval base fall into the +hands of the enemy than a good one. To this reasoning, the answer +is usually made that no base can be made absolutely impregnable, +and that sufficient defense will be provided if it makes the task +and cost of capturing the base greater than the base is worth. +This means simply that the more valuable the base is, the more +money should be spent in defending it; and that _it is worse than +useless to defend it by any means that is obviously too small, +in proportion to its value_. + +It often happens that the places that have the best position are +weak in strength and resources; a notable instance is Gibraltar, +another is Culebra, and the most notable of all is Guam. None of +these places is fortunate in either resources or natural strength, +though Gibraltar was strong for the artillery of the time when +the base was established there. In fact, it is hard to think of +any place that combines in itself the three advantages of a fine +strategical position, large resources, and great strength. The +three attributes seem almost incompatible; for how can a base far +distant from its home be well placed with reference to attacking +the lines of communication of any enemy intending to attack the +home coast, and yet have its own lines of communications safe? How +can it have a sheet of water, just deep enough but not too deep +to anchor a large fleet in, with all of its auxiliaries extensive +enough to accommodate all the vessels and far enough from the sea +to be safe from gun-fire, and yet be on an island so small and +so rugged, that an enemy could not land troops near the base and +capture it from the land side, as the Japanese captured Port Arthur? +The natural strategic advantages of a large and sheltered sheet +of water seem to entail the disadvantages of a large island, or +a continent. + +There seems only one way in which to solve the problem of where +and how to establish a permanent naval base at a distant point, and +that is the way in which the world's preceptor--Great Britain--has +solved it; and the solution is to select a place that has already the +advantage of position, and then add to it the artificial advantages +of resources and military strength. + +This brief statement makes the matter seem a little too simple; +and so it will have to be modified by adding that the mere fact +of a place having a fine position is not quite sufficient, because +the place must be of such a character that it is capable of having +resources and strength added to it; a sharp pinnacle rock in the +middle of the Mediterranean, for instance, might have a fine strategic +position, and yet be unavailable as a naval base. Even here, however, +we must pause to note that energy and will could do much toward +making even a pinnacle rock a naval base; for we see the gigantic +fortress of Heligoland erected on what was little but a shoal; +and we see the diminutive water areas of Malta and Gibraltar made +to hold in safety the war-ships of the greatest navy in the world. + +Despite the paramount importance of strategic position, we must not +forget that a naval base should have sufficient military strength +to be able to hold out for a long time against hostile operations, +as many bases, notably Gibraltar and Port Arthur, have done, without +the assistance of the fleet. The German base at Kiao-chau held out +for more than two months in 1914, without any external aid. During +all the time of siege, even if surrender is ultimately to occur, +the enemy's forces are prevented from being utilized elsewhere. +This condition was clearly shown during the siege of Port Arthur, +because the large force of Japanese troops required to conduct +the siege were urgently needed in Manchuria--to which region they +were sent as soon as Port Arthur fell. + +From this point of view, naval bases again look much like fortresses +on the land; fortresses like Metz and Strasburg, that had to be +subdued before an enemy could safely pass them. + +_Strategic Position of Distant Bases_.--Since the strategic position +of an outlying naval base is the principal factor that goes to +make its value, it may be well to consider what elements make a +strategic position good. + +To make the problem clear, let us take a concrete case, that of +our own country, and consider what elements would constitute a good +strategic position for a naval base of the United States, leaving +out of consideration for the moment any questions of resources and +military strength. + +In the case of a war with a nation that had only one naval home +base, it is clear that the best position for our distant base would +be one as close to the enemy's base as possible; because, if placed +there, our fleet, if it were the more powerful, could do more to +injure the enemy's fleet, or prevent its going out, than if placed +at any point more distant from the enemy's base; and if it were +less powerful, it could do more to cut the enemy's communications, +because it could attack them at or near their source. + +A poor position would be one far away from both countries, and +far away from the line joining them. In the case of a war between +this country and Norway, for instance, a very poor position for a +naval base would be a spot near--say Juan Fernandez--in the south +Pacific. + +In case the enemy country has two home bases of equal importance, +the best position for our base clearly would be one equidistant +from them, and as near to each as practicable. If the distance +from our base to a point half-way between the two bases is shorter +than is the distance to it from either base, then a fleet at our +base could probably prevent the junction of two forces issuing +from those two bases--assuming, of course, that we had a proper +system of scouting. Our fleet would be able to operate on what +are often called "interior lines"--a technical expression that has +great efficacy in confusing a simple matter. It is also assumed +that our fleet is considerably stronger than either of the two +separated enemy forces; otherwise our case would be hopeless. + +If the two home bases of the enemy are unequal in importance, it +would seem that our base should be nearer to the important base +than to the other. More strictly speaking, it should be nearer +to the base from which the larger force may be expected to come +out. + +If the enemy country have three or more bases, from which parts of +a fleet may be expected to come out, the question seems a little +more complex; but nevertheless, since the first duty of our fleet +would probably be to prevent junctions or a junction, of the separated +parts of the enemy's fleet, the best position for our home base +would be at a point about equally distant from them all, and as +close to them as possible. In the wars between Great Britain and +France in the early part of the nineteenth century, the base of the +British fleet for operations on the western and northern coasts of +France was as close to the enemy home bases as practicable--though +the base was England itself. For operations on France's southern +coast, the base was at Gibraltar, or some Mediterranean island. + +That any country should be able to hold a distant base close to +the home base of a possible naval enemy might seem impossible, +if we did not know that Great Britain holds Bermuda and Jamaica +near to our own coast, and Hong-Kong actually inside of China, +all far away from Britain; besides Malta and Gibraltar in the +Mediterranean, nearer to the coasts of sometime enemies than to +her own. That the United States should own a base far from her own +coasts, and near those of other countries, might seem improbable, +were it not for the fact that Guam is such a base, and is so situated. +It is true that Guam is not strictly a naval base, because it is +not so equipped or fortified; but we are thinking now of position +only. + +In case the enemy country has several home bases, and it is impossible +to have our distant base so near to them as to prevent the junction +of parts of a fleet issuing from them, the value of the base is +less than it otherwise would be. + +In this case, which is the one in which our country is actually +concerned, because of its great distance from other countries, its +value becomes merely the usual value attaching to a naval base; +and the fact that the entire enemy fleet can operate as a unit, that +it can divide into separate forces at will near its own shores, +or send out detachments to prey on the long line of communications +stretching from our distant base to that base's home, necessitates +that the base be fortified in the strongest possible way, and provided +with large amounts of supplies. Its principal function in war would +be to shorten the long trip that our vessels would have to make +without refreshment, and therefore the length of their lines of +communications, and to enable our vessels to arrive in enemy's waters +in better condition of readiness for battle than would otherwise +be the case. + +We have thus far considered the best position for an advanced naval +base, in the case of operations against one country only. + +It seems clear that, if we are to consider operations against two +countries separately, and at different times, we should be led +to conclude that the case of each country should be decided +individually; in the case of wars with Norway and Portugal, for +instance, the best places for our two bases would be as close to +the home bases of those countries as possible; and even in the +case of fighting two simultaneously, the conclusion would be the +same, if the two countries were in widely different directions +from us--as are Switzerland and China. If we consider the case +of war against two contiguous countries simultaneously, however, +it would seem better to have one base, situated similarly toward +the home bases of the two countries as toward two different home +bases in one country--since the two countries would be, in effect, +allies; and their fleets would act in reality like separated portions +of one fleet. + +As the United States possesses no island on the Atlantic side which +is nearer to foreign countries than to our own, and as our interests +for the immediate future lie mostly on the Atlantic side, it may +be well now to apply the general principles just considered to +the question of where is a naval base most urgently needed under +actual conditions. + +Imagining a war between us and some one European naval Power, and +imagining a war also between us and two or three allied European +naval Powers, and realizing the length of our Atlantic and Gulf +coasts, extending from Maine to Panama, a glance at the map shows +us that, apart from the home naval bases on our continental coasts, +the position on American soil which is the closest to European +bases is on the little island of Culebra, which occupies a salient +in the northeastern end of the Caribbean Sea.[*] + +[Footnote *: The acquisition by the United States of the island +of Saint Thomas, about 20 miles east of Culebra, if accomplished, +will extend the salient just so much farther toward Europe.] + +The only reason an enemy would have for entering the Caribbean +would be an intention to attack the Panama Canal region, or an +intention to establish an advanced base, from which he could conduct +more or less deliberate siege of our Atlantic coast and cities. In +either case, our fleet would be seriously handicapped if it had no +adequate base in the Caribbean; because its line of communications +north would be exposed to the enemy's operations at all times; +and seriously wounded American ships would have little chance of +getting repairs; little chance even of making successfully the long +trip to Norfolk or New York. + +In case the enemy fleet should start from Europe fully prepared in +every way, we should be in ignorance of its intended destination; +and as the enemy fleet would be stronger than ours (otherwise it +would not start) it would doubtless be able to destroy our undefended +station at Guantanamo, seize some suitable place in the West Indies, +say the Bay of Samana, and then establish a base there, unless we +had first seized and fortified all suitable localities; and the +United States would then find itself in the anomalous position +of being confronted near its own coasts with an enemy fleet well +based for war, while her own fleet would not be based at all. Not +only would the enemy fleet be superior in power, but it would possess +the strategical advantage, though far from its own shores. The +situation, therefore, about a month after the foreign fleet left +Europe, would be that the Caribbean Sea would contain a hostile +fleet which was not only superior to ours in power, but was securely +resting on a base; while ours had no base south of Norfolk, the +other side of Hatteras. Our fleet would be in a position similar +to that of the Russian fleet when it rushed to its destruction +in Tsushirna Straits, though not in so great a degree; because +it would have had more recent docking and refitting in our home +ports, and the personnel would be fresher. + +In case, however, we had a naval base strongly fortified and thoroughly +equipped, at a salient in the Caribbean region, say at Culebra, and +if our fleet were based upon it, a hostile fleet, even if it were +considerably superior to our own, would hesitate to pass it and +enter the Caribbean, by reason of the continuous threat that the +fleet would exert on its communications. Even if the hostile fleet +should pass Culebra, and establish a base farther on, an American +force based on Culebra would continue to exert this threat on the +communications between the hostile base and its mother country. + +An American base--say at Guantanamo--would be very effective in +embarrassing hostile operations _west_ of Guantanamo, because it +would be on the flank of the line of communications extending from +Europe; but it would be comparatively ineffective in embarrassing +operations east of it, since the hostile line of communications +would be protected from it by the interposition of its own main +body; this interposition necessitating the despatch of defending +forces around that main body. The coming hostile force would push +before it all resistance, and leave the sea free for the passage +of its auxiliaries and supplies. A defending force, operating from +Guantanamo, in endeavoring to prevent a hostile fleet from establishing +a base to the _eastward_ of it, would act much less effectively +than a force operating from Culebra. Not only would the force from +Guantanamo have to pass around the main body to attack the train; +it would again have to pass around the main body to get back to +Guantanamo; whereas a force operating from Culebra could make a +direct attack upon the enemy's train, and then a direct retreat +to Culebra. + +This comparison assumes, as has been said, that the matter of resources +and strength are not in question; that is, that they are equal in +our two supposition bases. But, as in practice they would not be +equal, the practical point to consider is how much strength and +resources can compensate for inferiority of position, and how much +position must be insisted on. + +Of course, no correct quantitative answer can be given, except +by accident. The problem, unfortunately, cannot be solved by +mathematics, for the simple reason that no quantitative values can +be assigned to the various factors, and because no mathematical +formula now exists that expresses their relations to each other. It +may be pointed out, however, that if a position be good, strength +and resources can be artificially supplied; and that the cost of +doing this, even on a tremendous scale, is relatively small compared +to the cost of the fleet which the base will support, and in distress +protect. In other words, we may be able to form an estimate of +the relative values of bases, say at Guantanamo and Culebra, even +if we cannot ascribe arithmetical values to each, and compare +arithmetically those arithmetical values. If, for instance, we see +that a fleet costing $500,000,000, would, if it operated from a +base at Culebra, be 10 per cent more effective than if it operated +from Guantanamo, and that it would cost $20,000,000 more to make a +strong base there than to make an equally strong one at Guantanamo, +we should conclude that, since 10 per cent of $500,000,000 is +$50,000,000, it would be wise to spend that $20,000,000, even if +we had to forego the building of one battlesbip. + +We should come to the same conclusion, if we realized that no matter +what their comparative values might be, a base at one place would +not meet our necessities, and a base at the other place would. If +a base at Guantanamo would not meet our necessities in case of +an invasion of the Caribbean by a naval fleet superior to ours, +then it seems idle to discuss the value of Guantanamo relative to +some other place, no matter how good the position of Guantanamo +may be, and no matter how nearly it may approximate to adequacy. +There is no real usefulness in having a naval base anywhere, unless +that naval base can accomplish the purpose for which it is desired. +A naval base is desired for purposes of war, and for no other purpose +whatever; and to decide on a position for a base without keeping +this fact clearly in view, is to act on an underestimate of the +situation, the folly of which has been pointed out in previous +pages. + +We may conclude, then, that in deciding on the place for a distant +permanent naval base, on which the operations of a whole fleet +are to base for war, we should select the best site available, +even if military strength and resources may have to be added to +it artificially--unless in the case of any site considered the +difficulties of adding them are insuperable. + +The last sentence may seem like shirking the whole question, because +it does not state what "insuperable" means; so it may be well to add +that in modern days few engineering difficulties are insuperable, as +the existence of the fortress at Heligoland shows. If the submarine +and the mine did not exist, the difficulties would be greater than +they actually are; because guns alone, no matter how carefully mounted +and protected, could hardly be expected to keep off indefinitely the +attack of a heavy fleet, or even to save from injury the fighting +and auxiliary vessels anchored in its waters. But the submarine +and mine combine to keep fighting ships at distances greater than +those over which ship's guns can fire, and reduce the amount of +fortification required on shore. + +One of the principal sources of expense in establishing bases at +some points would be that of dredging out harbors sufficiently +extensive, while harbors sufficiently extensive are provided already +by nature in such localities as Samana. But, as pointed out before, +harbors on large islands can be taken from the land side, as was +Port Arthur; and adequate protection from land attack is, in many +cases, almost impossible if the enemy has command of the sea, as +a superior hostile fleet would have in the Caribbean; while the +hills and waters of Culebra and Vieques Sound could long defy not +only actual invasion, but any fleet attack. + +This brings us face to face with the fact that it may be less expensive +to establish and protect a naval base situated on a little island, +even if an artificial harbor has to be constructed, than to establish +and protect a base on a large island, even if the base on the large +island has a large natural harbor and can be more easily defended +against bombardment from the sea. It would be cheaper, for instance, +to protect a base on Culebra than one at Guantanamo, or even Samana, +if the enemy commanded the sea; and cheaper to protect a base on the +forbidding rocks of Polillo or Guam than on the large and fertile +island of Luzon, with its extensive gulfs and bays, in many of +which a fleet in command of the sea could land its force; because +protecting a base on a large island would require covering a very +large area, and perhaps a long extent of coast. + +Aircraft may exercise an important influence on the choice of the +position of a base, perhaps in the direction of choosing a base on +a large island rather than on a small one; since the great speed of +aircraft tends to lessen the importance of having the base out a great +distance from home--so far as purposes of scouting are concerned. +It seems probable also that aircraft will soon be recognized as +inherently adapted to preventing the landing of hostile troops, +by dropping bombs on the troops, while they are in process of +disembarkation, while proceeding in small boats to the shore, and +while in the act of landing on the beach, with their guns, ammunition, +supplies, horses, and impedimenta of various kinds. + +_Co-operating Bases_.--Discussion of the relative values of positions +for bases, say in the Caribbean, should not blind our eyes to the +fact, however, that no nation is prevented from establishing as +many bases as it needs, wherever its flag may float; that the United +States, for instance, is not debarred from establishing permanent +naval bases at both Guantanamo and Culebra, should such a procedure +seem desirable. The fact that each locality has advantages that the +other does not have, suggests the idea that two bases, placed in +those localities, would form a powerful combination. In fact, the +great value of the position of Culebra being its distance toward the +enemy, which necessitates a great distance away from our continental +coast, and a long line of communications from that coast suggest +an intermediate base as a support and stepping-stone. Analogous +cases are seen in all the countries of Europe, in the fortresses +that are behind their boundary-lines--the fortresses existing less +as individuals than as supporting members of a comprehensive scheme. + +Two bases, one at Guantanamo and one at Culebra, would in time +of war in the Caribbean, add a value to our fleet that might make +the difference between defeat and victory. The effective work that +a fleet can do is a function of the material condition of the ships +themselves, and of the physical and mental condition of the personnel +that man them. Fighting is the most strenuous work that men can do; +it calls for the last ounce of strength, the last effort of the +intellect, the last struggle of the will; it searches out every +physical imperfection in men, in ships, in engines, in joints, in +valves. Surprise has sometimes been expressed at the quickness +with which the Japanese defeated the Russians at Tsushima; but would +any one express surprise if a pugilist, fresh from rest, quickly +defeated another pugilist who, exhausted from long travelling, +staggered hopelessly into the ring? And how would the betting be +before a football match, if it were known that one of the teams +would enjoy a rest of twenty-four hours before the game, whereas +the other team would walk from the railroad to the ball grounds +after a trip across the continent? + +These analogies may seem forced--but are they? A living animal +requires hours of rest and refreshment, in order that the tissues +expended in action may be repaired by the internal mechanism of +the body, and the food consumed be supplied from some external +source. A fleet is in exactly the same category, even when operating +in times of peace: and in time of war it needs, in addition, a +station in which injuries may be repaired--a station analogous to +that of the hospital for wounded men. + +In the Caribbean it would seem necessary to successful operations, +therefore, to have two bases, one say at Guantanamo and one at +Culebra; the one at Culebra to be the principal base, and the one +at Guantanamo the auxiliary. Culebra, by reason of the great work to +be accomplished, and the engineering difficulties to be encountered, +cannot be gotten ready for several years. Reliance, meanwhile, +will have to be placed on Guantanamo; and as the coming of any +war is not usually very long foretold, the urgency of fortifying +Guantanamo stands out in clear relief. + +The mutual relations of Guantanamo and Culebra are much like the +mutual relations of Pearl Harbor in Hawaii and Guam--and so are +the joint relations of each pair to the mother country. Culebra +and Guam are the potential bases of the United States farthest away +from the coast in the Atlantic and the Pacific respectively; and +the nearest to countries in Europe and Asia with any one of which, +of course, war will be always possible, and sometimes probable. +Each is a small and rugged island, admitting of tremendous military +strengthening by guns, fortifications, mines, and submarines, but +connected to the motherland by a long line of communications. The +line of communications of Culebra would, of course, be safer than +that of Guam, because it is shorter than would be the line of an +enemy attacking it; whereas, the line of communications of Guam +would be longer. Guantanamo and Pearl Harbor are both stations about +half-way from the home country to Culebra and Guam respectively; and +though greater danger to our vital and commercial interests exists +in the Atlantic than in the Pacific, Pearl Harbor has been fortified, +and Guantanamo has not--and neither has Culebra. This sentence is +not intended as a criticism of the government for fortifying Pearl +Harbor. The Hawaiian Islands occupy the most valuable strategic +position in the Pacific, and Pearl Harbor is the most important +strategic place in the Hawaiian Islands; and it ought to have been +strengthened many years ago, and to a greater degree even than is +contemplated now. But the sentence is intended as a protest against +our continued inertness in failing to establish any suitable naval +bases whatever, especially in the Caribbean. + +_Distant Base in the Philippines_.--The difficulty of finding suitable +positions for bases is exemplified in the Philippines, for no suitable +island is to be found there, except some that are within the archipelago +itself; and these are so placed that, to reach them, our fleet +would have to go through long reaches of water, ideally suited for +destroyer and submarine attack. A possible exception is the island +of Polillo, twenty miles east of the eastern coast of Luzon; and in +many ways Polillo seems ideal. The practical difficulties are so +great, however, the status of the islands in our national policy is +so ill defined, and the futility of strengthening it, unless Guam +be adequately strengthened also, is so apparent, that the question +has been hardly even mooted. Polillo made impregnable, with Guam +defenseless, supported by an undefended line of communications +several thousand miles long to the main country, would in case +of war with an active Asiatic power be reduced to the zero of +effectiveness in whatever was the length of time in which its +accumulated stores would be exhausted. + +This sentence may be modified by saying that the time might be +lengthened by the occasional arrival of supply ships and colliers +that might come by way of the Mediterranean, or the Cape of Good +Hope, or any other route which approached the Philippines from +the southward; and it is possible that, in the unfortunate event +of a war between us and some Asiatic power, our relations with +European countries might be such as to make the use by us of such +routes feasible and safe. In view, however, of the conditions of +island possession in the Pacific as they actually are, and because +of the rapid and abrupt changes that characterize international +relations, the probability of being able to use such routes seems +too small to receive grave consideration. + +_Other Bases in the Pacific_.--The Pacific Ocean is so vast, and +the interests of the United States there will some day be so great, +that the question of establishing naval bases, in addition to bases at +Pearl Harbor, the Philippines, and Guam, will soon demand attention. +The localities that are the most obvious are the Panama Canal Zone +and the Samoan Islands in the south, and the Aleutian Islands in +the north. A moderately far-seeing policy regarding the Pacific, +and a moderately far-seeing strategy for carrying out the policy, +would dictate the establishment and adequate protection of bases in +both the southern and the northern regions; so that our fleet could +operate without undue handicap over the long distances required. +The same principles that govern the selection of positions and +the establishment of bases in the Atlantic apply in the Pacific; +the same requirements that a base shall be near where the fleet +will conduct its operations--no matter whether those operations +be offensive or defensive, no matter whether they concern direct +attack or a threat against communications. + + * * * * * + +In view of the great value of naval bases, one may be pardoned +perhaps for a feeling of surprise that the United States has no real +naval base, home or distant. Our large navy-yards are our nearest +approximation to real bases. The yards at Norfolk and Bremerton seem +to combine the three factors of position, strength, and resources +better than do any other stations; though both are surpassed in +resources by New York, Philadelphia, and Boston. Bremerton has +the greatest natural military strength of all our stations; in +fact, it is naturally very strong indeed, because of the length +and nature of the waterway leading to it from the sea and the ease +with which it could be denied. Norfolk is fortunate in its nearness +to Chesapeake Bay and Lynn Haven Roads, and the ease with which the +entrance to the Chesapeake from seaward could be defended; but the +fact that it is only 18 miles from the Atlantic coast-line makes it +more vulnerable than Bremerton to the attack of troops landed by +an enemy fleet. The yard at Mare Island, near San Francisco, is +faultily placed as regards deep water; but dredging could rectify +this. The Panama Canal Zone has great facilities for repairs, docking, +and supplies; but it must be adequately fortified in order to be +a trustworthy base in the case of operations in its vicinity. + +New York, by reason of its enormous wealth of every kind, its steamer +terminals, and its excessively vulnerable position, within gunshot +of ships out in the deep water (a position without parallel in +the large cities of the world) must, of course, be protected. The +cheapest way to protect it is to do so locally, by means of +fortifications, and other shore defenses. The only other means +would be by a fleet permanently kept near New York, a measure that +would be expensive beyond reason. + +In case the enemy should inform us that he would reach the vicinity +of New York at a certain time, and in case he should fulfil his +promise, the fact that New York was properly strengthened would +not be very important; since our fleet would go there, and the +whole war would be settled by one "stand-up fight." But wars are +not so conducted and never have been. From the oldest times till +now, and even among savage tribes, finesse has always been employed, +in addition to actual force--more perhaps by the weaker than by +the stronger side, but very considerably also by the stronger. A +coming enemy would endeavor to keep his objective a close secret, +and even to mislead us; so that our fleet would have to take a +position out at sea, perhaps far away, which would leave our bases +open to attack by the enemy fleet or at least exposed to raids. + +The most effective local defense of a naval base is a combination +of mine-fields and heavy guns, which also give protection to which +the wounded vessels can retire, as the German vessels did after +the North Sea battle. Unless such protection be provided, swift +destroyers can complete the work that guns began, as the Japanese +destroyers did, after the artillery battle at Tsushima. + +In addition to their value in defending navy-yards from raids, +and in giving wounded ships a refuge, the military strengthening +of home bases, if such home bases are wisely placed near large +commercial centres, prevents actual destruction of those commercial +centres themselves, in case an attack is made upon them, either +in the absence of the defending fleet, or after that fleet may +have been destroyed. The line of engineering advance during recent +years, although it has greatly increased the offensive power of +war-ships, has increased even more greatly the defensive power of +land works. For this reason, it is perfectly possible to defend +successfully almost any land position against attack by ships; +and it is so easy, that not to do so, is, in the case of large +commercial centres, a neglectfulness of the extremest character. + +One important reason, therefore, for placing a permanent home base +near a large commercial centre is the fact that the fortification +of one is also the fortification of the other. + +Assuming that New York is to be defended locally, we can state at +once that the New York naval station can easily be made to be a +permanent naval base of the highest order, and of the most efficient +type. In fact, it can be made into a naval base better than any other +now in the world, because of the large sheets of water tributary +to it in New York Bay, Hudson River, and Long Island Sound; the +proximity of the sea; the untold resources in money, supplies, +and men that it could on demand produce, and the ease with which +it could be defended. To make such a base, it would be necessary +to fortify the vicinity of Coney Island and the entrances from +the ocean to the Lower Bay, and Long Island Sound; to deepen the +channel to the navy-yard, and to make clear and safe the waterway +from the East River to Long Island Sound. It would be necessary +also to enlarge the navy-yard; and to this end, to buy back the land +adjoining it, which the government most unwisely sold to private +parties about twenty-five years ago. + +Owing to the position of Block Island, relatively to the lines +of communication of a hostile force coming from Europe to attack +our eastern coast, and because of the sheltered waters held within +it, suitable for small craft, the advisability of establishing a +small naval base there is apparent. With a suitable base there +and another on Martha's Vineyard, and the present canal from +Massachusetts Bay to Buzzards Bay sufficiently enlarged, the whole +coast from Boston to New York, including Narragansett Bay, could +be made to form one naval base which would have three exits. Our +own ships could pass from one point to another, and concentrate +at will near Sandy Hook, Block Island, or Massachusetts Bay; and, +which is equally important, the establishment of an enemy base +near New York would be made almost, if not quite, impossible. + +In case of an attack on our eastern coast, made directly from Europe, +which could be accomplished easily during the calm months of the +summer, the degree of efficiency shown by the bases at Norfolk, +Philadelphia, New York, and Boston would influence vitally the +condition in which our fleet would go to battle. Owing to the +traditional policy, or rather lack of policy, of the United States, +and the consequent unreadiness of our preparations, we may reasonably +assume that war will find us in such a condition that the utmost +haste will be necessary to get our whole naval force out to sea +in time to prevent the enemy from making an actual bombardment of +our shores. We have no reason to suppose that the ships actually +cruising in our active fleet will not be ready; we have every reason +to believe that they will be ready. But it is inconceivable that we +should not try to oppose such an attack with all the naval force +that we could muster; which means that we should try to send out +many ships from our home bases to join the active fleet at sea. + +The ease with which the passage of an enemy's fleet up the Delaware +or Chesapeake could be prevented, in case any means of national +defense whatever be attempted, compared with the difficulty of +defending New York, and combined with the greater damage that an +enemy could inflict on New York, mark the vicinity of New York as +the probable objective of any determined naval attack upon our +coast; no matter whether that attack be made directly from Europe, +or indirectly from Europe by way of the Caribbean. To meet such +an attack, various parts of the fleet would have to issue from +their bases; even parts of the active fleet would probably have +had to go to their home ports for some needed repairs or supplies. +The first thought of an attacking fleet would naturally be to prevent +our ships from getting out, as it was the thought of Nelson and +other British commanders to prevent the issuing of forces from +the ports of France. But in view of the great distance from Europe +to our coast, and the impossibility of preventing the knowledge +reaching us of the departure of the fleet (unless indeed all the +powers of Europe combined to prevent it), it seems probable that +no such issuing could be prevented, and that a very considerable +American force would have time to take its station out at sea, +prepared to meet the coming foe. + +The home bases if properly prepared would exert a powerful effect +on a battle near them by equipping the fleet adequately and promptly, +and also by preventing a possible defeat from becoming a disaster, +by receiving wounded ships before they sank. The wounded ships +of the enemy, on the other hand, would have no base near by, and +only those inconsiderably injured could probably be gotten home. + + + + +CHAPTER XII + +OPERATING THE MACHINE + +The naval machine, including the various vessels of all kinds, +the bases and the personnel, having been designed, put together, +and prepared for its appointed task of conducting war, and the +appointed task having at last been laid upon it, how shall the +machine be operated--how shall it be made successfully to perform +its task? + +In order to answer this correctly, we must first see clearly what +is its task. + +_War_.--War may be said to be the act of two nations or two sets +of nations, by means of which each tries to get its way by physical +force. The peaceful methods of diplomacy having been exhausted, +arguments and threats having been tried in vain, both parties resort +to the oldest and yet the latest court; the same court as that to +which resort the lions of the desert, the big and little fishes +of the sea, the fowls of the air, and even the blades of grass +that battle for the sunshine. + +The vastness of the issue decided by war, the fact that from its +decision there is no appeal, the greatness of the forces that nations +can produce, the length of experience of war extending through +8,000 wars, and during more than three thousand years of recorded +history, the enormous literature of the subject, and the fact that +more brain power, energy, and character have been devoted to war +than to any other fruit of man's endeavor--combine to give to the +conduct of war an importance that no other subject can possess. + +The thing that each side brings forward against the other side is +force; "that which moves or tends to move matter." In all ages, it +has been directed primarily against the physical bodies of individual +men, threatening each individual man with suffering and death. It +appeals to the primal instinct of men, self-preservation, and is +the _ultima ratio regum_, the last argument of kings--and not only +of kings, but of all other living things as well. + +The first feeling aroused by the threat against life, or physical +well-being, is fear; and, therefore, the first force with which +to oppose the threat is a force of the same spiritual nature as +fear, but opposite in direction. This force is called in the English +language "courage." Without courage every man and every nation +would be at the mercy of every man or nation that made a threat +against it. The inherent necessity for courage is thus apparent; +and the reason is therefore apparent, for the fact that in every +nation and tribe physical courage has been esteemed the greatest +virtue in a man. In Latin, we know, the word _virtus_ meant courage, +and also virtue--showing that the Romans held the two qualities +to be identical or similar. + +In discussing the operations of war, little is usually said of +courage. The reason, however, is not that its value is unrecognized, +but that its existence is assumed; in the same way as that in which +all the other faculties among the men are assumed, such as physical +health, ability to march, etc. Movements to inspire fear, however, +actions to break down the morale, are of frequent use; because, +if the morale of the opposing side is broken down, its power of +resistance is destroyed. + +In the operations, therefore, of two contending parties, force is +opposed by force. If the forces on both sides could be concentrated +at a single point, and exerted in opposite directions, the result +would be decided in an instant. Such an arrangement has never yet +been brought about; though fairly close approximations have been +made, when two parties have selected two champions who have fought +for them--the victory going by agreement to the side whose champion +became the victor. + +Barring such rare occasions, contests in war have usually been +between two forces spread over considerable areas of land or water; +and the contest has usually been decided by the defeat of one of +the two. If in any individual combat, all the forces possessed +by both sides had been engaged, and if either force had been +annihilated, the entire war between the two parties would have +been decided. This was nearly the case in the naval battle off +Tsushima between the Russian and Japanese fleets--and the treaty +of peace was signed soon after. Usually, however, neither party to +the quarrel has had all its forces on the field in any one battle, +and neither force in the battle has been annihilated. Usually, +only partial forces have been engaged, and only partial victories +have been won; with the result that wars between contending nations +have usually consisted of a series of battles, with intervals of +rest between. + +If two opposing forces in any battle were exactly equal in fighting +power, neither side in any battle would gain a victory, the two +sides would inflict identical amounts of damage on each other, and +the two sides would end the battle still equal in force. At rare +intervals, such conditions have been approximated; but usually one +side has had more fighting power than the other, and has inflicted +more damage of various kinds than it has received, with the result +that it attained an advantage more or less important over the other, +and with the further result that the original disproportion between +the two forces was increased. The increase may not necessarily +have been due to a greater number of killed and wounded or even +to a greater loss of material, such as guns or ships; there may +have been no increase in inequality in either of these ways, for +the increase in inequality may have consisted in the fact that +the weaker force was driven to a position less advantageous to it +for conducting operations in the future. But whatever the nature +of the advantage gained by the stronger side, the result has been +that the weaker side has come out of the battle relatively weaker +than it was before. + +For this reason, it is highly desirable to each side to win each +battle. This does not mean that the loss of any one battle by either +party to a war means that the party losing that battle will necessarily +lose the war; for many battles may be fought by such small portions +of the whole nations' forces, or be lost by such small margins that +the loss of one battle, or even several battles, may be retrieved; +in fact, in few wars have the victories been all on one side. It +does mean, however, that each lost battle is a backward step; and +that for this reason the effort must be that no battle shall be +lost. + +_Strategy and Tactics_.--Now, to win battles, two things combine, +strategy and tactics. The strategy of each side tries to arrange +matters so that the forces on its side shall enter each battle +with the greatest chance of victory; tactics tries to handle the +forces with which it enters a battle in such a way that its side +shall gain the victory. Strategy prepares for battles; tactics +fights them. + +The tactics of any battle must be in the hands of the +commanders-in-chief on both sides. Any other arrangement is +inconceivable; but the strategy controlling the series of battles +in any war cannot now be committed to them solely; though it was +usually committed to them until lately. In the days when Alexander +went to war, or even when Napoleon and Nelson went to war, twenty-one +centuries later, no telegraph by sea and land made swift communication +possible; and the commanders on the spot were the only ones in +possession of enough information about the contending forces to +decide what measures should be taken. Even in those days, however, +the capitals of the countries engaged in war, by reason of their +knowledge of what was passing in the way of policy, exerted an +influence on the strategy of the forces on both sea and land; Cćsar, +for instance, was embarrassed in many of his operations by the Roman +Senate, and it was for this reason that he crossed the Rubicon +and passed from Gaul into Italy. When William I and Napoleon III +went to war in 1870, however, Von Moltke had foreseen the effects +of the telegraph and of rapid-mail communications, in giving to the +headquarters of the army information of a much greater scope and +reliability than had previously been the case, and had established +a General Staff which had elaborated plans whereby not only would the +commanders-in-chief in the field have the assistance of information +compiled at headquarters, but whereby the general nature of the +operations of a war, especially those operations at the outset on +which the future conduct of the war would largely depend, would +be decided and laid down in advance and during times of peace. The +reason for the rapid victory of the Prussians over the French in +1870 was that the Prussians were better prepared in almost every +way; especially in the most important thing--the war plans. + +Now, these war plans could not, of course, be of such a kind that +they would foresee every contingency and prescribe the conduct +to be followed, so that a commander in the field could turn to +page 221 of volume 755, and get directions as to what he ought to +do; nor could they furnish the chief of staff, Von Moltke, with +printed recommendations which he should offer to the King. In other +words, the war plans could be only plans and, like all plans for +future action, could be only tentative, and capable of being modified +by events as they should come to pass. They were only plans of +preparation, not plans of operation. + +Yet there were plans of preparation for operations; plans prepared in +accordance with the principles of strategy, and based on information +as to the enemy's resources, skill, point of view, and probable +intentions. They formed the general guide for future operations. + +Since 1870, the invention and practical development of the wireless +telegraph, and especially its development for use over very great +distances, has modified the relations of commanders on the spot +to home headquarters, and especially of naval commanders to their +navy departments. The wireless telegraph, under circumstances in +which it operates successfully, annihilates distance so far as +communication is concerned, though it does not annihilate distance +so far as transportation is concerned. It improves the sending and +receiving of news and instructions, both for the commander at sea +and for his department at home; but it does it more effectively +for the department than for the man at sea, because of the superior +facilities for large and numerous apparatus that shore stations +have, and their greater freedom from interruptions of all kinds. + +This condition tends to place the strategical handling of all the +naval machine, including the active fleet itself, more in the hands +of the department or admiralty, and less in the hands of the +commander-in-chief: and this tendency is confirmed by the superior +means for discussion and reflection, and for trial by war games, +that exist in admiralties, compared with those that exist in ships. + +The general result is to limit the commander-in-chief more and +more in strategical matters: to confine his work more and more to +tactics. + +Such a condition seems reasonable in many ways. The government +decides on a policy, and tells the Navy Department to carry it +out, employing the executive offices and bureaus to that end, under +the guidance of strategy. Strategy devotes itself during peace to +designing and preparing the naval machine, and in war to operating +it, utilizing both in war and peace the bureaus and offices and +the fleet itself. And in the same way as that in which the bureaus +and offices perform the calculations and executive functions of +logistics, for furnishing the necessary material of all kinds, the +fleet performs those of tactics. From this point of view, strategy +plans and guides all the acts of navies, delegating one part of +the practical work needed to carry out those plans to logistics, +and the other part to tactics. + +Operating the naval machine in war means practically operating +the active fleet in such a way as to cause victories to occur, to +cause the fleet to enter each battle under as favorable conditions +as practicable, and to operate the other activities of the navy in +such a way that the fleet will be efficiently and promptly supplied +with all its needs. Strategy employs tactics and logistics to bring +these things to pass; but this does not mean that strategy stands +apart and simply gives logistics and tactics tasks to do. The three +agencies are too mutually dependent for any such procedure and +require for their successful working, both individually and together, +the most thorough mutual understanding and support. + +_Flanking, T-ing, etc._--It being a fact that no nation can put +a force upon the sea that is concentrated at one point; it being +a fact that every naval force must be spread over a considerable +area and made up of various parts, and that the efficacy of the +various parts in exerting force upon a definite enemy depends on +the unity of action of the various parts, it results that the most +effective way in which to attack any naval force is not to attack +all the parts at once, thus enabling all to reply, but to attack +the force in such a way that all the parts cannot reply. If we +attack a ship for instance, that can fire 10 guns on a broadside +and only 4 guns ahead, it is clear that we can do better by attacking +from ahead than from either side. Similarly, if 10 ships are in a +column, steaming one behind the other, each ship being able to +fire 10 guns from either side and only 4 ahead, the 10 ships can +fire 100 guns on either side and only 4 ahead; and therefore it +would be better to attack the column from ahead (to "T" it), than +to attack it from either side. + +It is curious to note how widely this simple illustration can be +made to apply to both strategy and tactics; how the effort of each +is to dispose our force so toward the enemy's force that we can +use our weapons more effectively than he can use his. An extreme +illustration might be made by imagining 1,000 soldiers standing +in line and unable to face except to the front; in which case it +is clear that, no matter how perfectly they might be armed, or +how quickly and accurately they could fire, one man standing on +the flank, or behind them, could kill one soldier after the other, +until all the 1,000 were killed, and be in no danger himself. + +In case of attacking a ship or a column of ships from ahead, or +of attacking a line of soldiers on the flank, the effectiveness of +the method of attack lies in the fact that a number of the weapons +that are present in the force attacked cannot be used in reply. + +[Illustration: Fig. 1] + +_Concentration and Isolation_.--The value of "concentration" is +often insisted on, but the author desires to call attention to +a misunderstanding on this point, to which he called attention +in an essay in 1905. To the author, it seems that concentration +is a means and not an end, and that the end is what he called +"isolation" in the essay. If a man concentrates his mind on any +subject, the advantage he gains is that he prevents other subjects +from obstructing the application of his mental powers to that subject; +he pushes to one side and isolates all other subjects. In this +particular activity it does not matter whether we call his act +"concentration" or "isolation" because the whole operation goes +on inside of his own skull, and concentration on one subject +automatically produces isolation or elimination of all others. +But when concentration is attempted on external objects, the case +is very different, for concentration may not produce isolation +at all. For instance, if 4 ships in column _A_ concentrate their +fire on the leading ship in column _B_, the other 3 ships in column +_B_ are not isolated, and can fire on the ships of column _A_, +even more effectively than if column _A_ was not concentrated on +the leading ship of _B_, because they are undisturbed by being +fired at. If, however, the 4 ships of _A_ "flank" or "T" the ships +of column _B_, as shown in Fig. 2, and concentrate on the leader of +B, they thereby isolate the other ships, and practically nullify +their ability to fire at _A_. + +[Illustration: Fig. 2] + +This effect is approximated by an approximate "T-ing" or "flanking," +such as is shown in Fig. 3; because the average distance from the +ships of _A_ to the leading ship in _B_ is less than the average +distance from the ships in _B_ to any ship in _A_; and because the +direction of fire from each ship in _A_ is more nearly abeam than +is the direction of fire from the ships of _B_. These positions +are very difficult to gain, even if _A_'s speed is considerably +greater than _B's_; since all _B_ has to do to prevent it is to +head to the right, unless shoals or other dangers such as enemy +battleships, _C_, are on that side, co-operating with _A_. + +[Illustration: Fig. 3] + +An interesting position is that shown in Fig. 4, which may be assumed +by _A_, either for flight, or to get the advantage in torpedo fire. +The advantage is that the _A_ ships are running away from torpedoes +fired by _B_, while _B_ is running into torpedoes fired by _A_. +This advantage is not great if the distance between _A_ and _B_ +is so little that _B's_ torpedoes can reach _A_. But if _A_ is +able to make this distance equal to the entire range over which +_B's_ torpedoes can run, or near it, _B's_ torpedoes cannot reach +_A_ at all. + +[Illustration: Fig. 4] + +A similar advantage, though in a modified degree, is that shown +as possessed by _A_ in Fig. 5. Due to the direction of movement +of the _A_ and _B_ fleets, it is easier for _A's_ torpedoes to +reach _B_, than for _B's_ torpedoes to reach _A_. + +[Illustration: Fig. 5] + +Positions of advantage are usually gained by superior speed. One +of the main reasons for the development of the battle cruiser has +been the fact that her high speed and great offensive power enable +her to gain positions of advantage and utilize them. The _A_ positions +shown in the figures are attainable by battle cruisers against +battleships, and are very effective. + +A procedure analogous to that of flanking is one in which part +of a force is attacked when it is separated from the rest of the +force, and cannot be supported by it--in that some of the weapons of +one force cannot be used. The effect is similar in the two cases, but +the events leading up to the two conditions may be quite different. + +In the former case, that of being flanked, or T'd, the force caught +at a disadvantage was together, and was able to operate effectively +as one force against a force located in a given direction; but +was attacked by a force located in another direction; while in +the latter case, the force was divided, and one part was caught, +while distant from and entirely unsupported by the other part. The +former condition is more likely to result from tactical operations, +and the latter from strategical operations--and yet, especially in +land operations, the flanking of one force may be brought about +by the carefully planned strategical combinations of the other +force; and catching one part of the enemy's force unsupported by +the other parts may take place during the tactical maneuvers of +an actual or a simulated battle. + +In naval operations, the catching of separated parts of an enemy's +force is a more frequent attempt and accomplishment than is that +of getting a position where a column of ships can be attacked from +ahead or astern. It seldom happens, with the great number of vessels +of all kinds which compose a modern fleet, that it is practicable +to keep the various parts together, or that it would be desirable +to do so. The closest approximation to keeping a large naval force +together, is keeping them in column; because in that formation, the +ships can be made simply to "follow the leader" without signal, and +act like one long, flexible body. But the vessels of a modern fleet +would make a column many miles long--a column of 20 battleships alone +would be 5 miles long, and the addition of the various cruisers, +destroyers, and other vessels, would make a column so long that +it would be unwieldy; and if its ends were attacked, the other +vessels could not come to their relief. Besides, the duties of +battleships, battle cruisers, scouts, destroyers, and submarines, +are distinct--with the result that, as in land operations, bodies +of the various types operate separately and apart from those of +other types. + +Not only, also, do the various types operate separately, but often +the necessities of a case demand that a certain number--say of +battleships--be sent away from the main body on some mission; or +that a certain number of destroyers be sent away from the main +body of destroyers. + +Any such diversion entails a danger that is sometimes great, and +sometimes small; but such diversions and risks cannot be avoided, +and should not be avoided when they are necessary, any more than a +man should avoid going out of doors, though that act always entails +some danger. Suppose, for instance, that in the operations of a +war carried on in the Caribbean, the Navy Department should get +trustworthy information that the enemy had detailed 3 battle cruisers +to speed north and bombard New York. The department would probably +have to detach a force from the fleet and send it north, to prevent +the bombardment. Yet not only would the force so sent be in danger +until it returned of an attack by a superior force, but the main body +from which it was detached would be thereby weakened; furthermore, the +information might have been incorrect--it might have been originated +and given out by the enemy, in the hope that it would cause such a +diversion of force. + +Every operation in war entails a risk more or less great; and if +no risks were to be taken, it would be better not to go to war. +It is true that some wars have been undertaken in which the +preponderance of force was so great that there was very little +doubt of the actual outcome, and very little risk taken by one of +the two parties. Such wars, however, have been very few; and they +were hardly wars in the usual sense, any more than the beating of +a little boy by a big boy could properly be called a "fight." + +Reference may again be made here to Table I on next page, which +shows the way in which fights between unequal forces proceed, and +the advantage of fighting the separated parts of an enemy rather +than the united force. We can see this clearly if we note that, if +two forces each aggregating 1,000 were in each other's vicinity, +and if the entire force _A_ was able to engage half of _B_, or +500, it would whip half of _B_, and have 841 remaining, with which +to engage the other half (500) of _B_. Reference to the end of +the third period in this table shows also that if a force of 789 +engages a force of 523, it will have 569 left, after the other +has been reduced to zero. So, a force of 1,000 that engages two +forces of 500 separately, will have more than 500 left, after the +others have both been reduced to zero: whereas, if it engages both, +when they are united, both sides will be gradually reduced to zero, +remaining equal all the time. + + TABLE I + ---------------------------------------------------------------------------- +| |Col.|Col.|Col.|Col.|Col.|Col.|Col.|Col.|Col.|Col.| +| | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 | 8 | 9 | 10 | +|----------------------------------------------------------------------------| +|Value of offensive power A|1000|1000|1000|1000|1000|1000|1000|1000|1000|1000| +| at beginning B|1000| 900| 800| 700| 600| 500| 400| 300| 200| 100| +|Damage done in 1st A| 100| 100| 100| 100| 100| 100| 100| 100| 100| 100| +| period B| 100| 90| 80| 70| 60| 50| 40| 30| 20| 10| +|Value of offensive power A| 900| 910| 920| 930| 940| 950| 960| 970| 980| 990| +| at end of 1st period B| 900| 800| 700| 600| 500| 400| 300| 200| 100| 0| +|Damage done in 2nd A| 90| 91| 92| 93| 94| 95| 96| 97| 98| | +| period B| 90| 80| 70| 60| 50| 40| 30| 20| 10| | +|Value of offensive power A| 810| 830| 850| 870| 890| 910| 930| 950| 970| | +| at end of 2nd period B| 810| 709| 608| 507| 406| 305| 204| 103| 2| | +|Damage done in 3rd A| 81| 83| 85| 87| 89| 91| 93| 95| | | +| period B| 81| 71| 61| 51| 41| 31| 20| 10| | | +|Value of offensive power A| 729| 759| 789| 819| 849| 879| 910| 940| | | +| at end of 3rd period B| 729| 626| 523| 420| 317| 214| 111| 8| | | +|Damage done in 4th A| 73| 76| 79| 82| 85| 88| 91| | | | +| period B| 73| 63| 52| 42| 32| 21| 11| | | | +|Value of offensive power A| 656| 696| 737| 777| 817| 858| 899| | | | +| at end of 4th period B| 656| 550| 444| 338| 232| 126| 20| | | | +|Damage done in 5th A| 65| 70| 74| 78| 82| 86| | | | | +| period B| 65| 55| 44| 34| 23| 13| | | | | +|Value of offensive power A| 591| 641| 693| 743| 794| 845| | | | | +| at end of 5th period B| 591| 480| 370| 260| 150| 40| | | | | +|Damage done in 6th A| 59| 64| 69| 74| 79| 85| | | | | +| period B| 59| 48| 37| 26| 15| 4| | | | | +|Value of offensive power A| 532| 593| 656| 717| 779| 841| | | | | +| at end of 6th period B| 532| 416| 301| 186| 71| 0| | | | | +|Damage done in 7th A| 53| 59| 66| 72| 78| | | | | | +| period B| 53| 42| 30| 19| 7| | | | | | +|Value of offensive power A| 479| 551| 626| 698| 772| | | | | | +| at end of 7th period B| 479| 357| 235| 114| 0| | | | | | +|Damage done in 8th A| 48| 55| 63| 70| | | | | | | +| period B| 48| 36| 24| 11| | | | | | | +|Value of offensive power A| 431| 515| 602| 687| | | | | | | +| at end of 8th period B| 431| 302| 172| 44| | | | | | | +|Damage done in 9th A| 43| 52| 60| 69| | | | | | | +| period B| 43| 30| 17| 4| | | | | | | +|Value of offensive power A| 388| 485| 585| 683| | | | | | | +| at end of 9th period B| 388| 250| 112| 0| | | | | | | +|Damage done in 10th A| 39| 49| 59| | | | | | | | +| period B| 39| 25| 11| | | | | | | | +|Value of offensive power A| 349| 460| 574| | | | | | | | +| at end of 10th period B| 349| 201| 53| | | | | | | | +|Damage done in 11th A| 35| 46| 57| | | | | | | | +| period B| 35| 20| 5| | | | | | | | +|Value of offensive power A| 314| 440| 569| | | | | | | | +| at end of 11th period B| 314| 155| 0| | | | | | | | +|Damage done in 12th A| 31| 44| | | | | | | | | +| period B| 31| 16| | | | | | | | | +|Value of offensive power A| 283| 426| | | | | | | | | +| at end of 12th period B| 283| 111| | | | | | | | | +| | |etc.| | | | | | | | | +|Total damage done by A| 717| 789| 800| 700| 600| 500| 400| 300| 200| 100| +| B| 717| 574| 431| 317| 228| 159| 101| 60| 30| 10| + ---------------------------------------------------------------------------- + +It is interesting to note how this simple fact is the key to most +of the operations of strategy and tactics; how--the mechanical +tools in the way of ships and guns and torpedoes having been +supplied--the key to their successful use is simply to take advantage +of all opportunities of isolating one part of the enemy's force +from the rest, and then attacking one of the parts with a force +superior to it. Opportunities lacking, one must, of course, try +to create opportunities by inducing the enemy to detach some part +of his force, under circumstances such that you can attack it, +or the weakened main body, with a superior force. Naturally, one +must try to prevent a similar procedure by the enemy. + +This does not mean that the sole effort of naval operations is +finesse in either strategy or tactics; sometimes the sole effort +is to force a pitched battle by the side that feels superior, and +to avoid a pitched battle by the side that feels inferior. Before +the actual inferiority or superiority has been ascertained, however, +the strategy of each commander is to bring about a situation in +which his force shall have the advantage. The advantage having +been gained and recognized (or an advantage existing and being +recognized), strategy insists on forcing a battle, for the reason +that _every contest weakens the loser more than it does the winner_. + +This does not mean that it is always wise to engage a weaker force +that is temporarily separated from its main body. It is readily +understandable, for instance, that it would be unwise in two cases: + +1. A case in which the weaker force were so little weaker, and +were part of a force so much larger than the total of the smaller +force, that the gain as between the two forces actually engaged +would not be great enough to compensate for the loss entailed. +For instance, a reference to Table I shows that an _A_ force of +1,000 engaging a _B_ force of 800 would have 569 left when _B_ was +reduced to zero. This is impressive: but if the _B_ force of 800 +were part of a total _B_ force of 2,000, in other words if there +were an _A_ force of 1,200 near at hand, _B_ would have 569 left +with which to oppose 1,200, a proportion a little less advantageous +than the proportion he started with--1,000 to 2,000. + +2. A case by which the _B_ force may have divided with the express +purpose of luring _A_ to attack; arrangements having been made +whereby the inferior _B_ force would simply hold the _A_ force +until the whole _B_ force could come to its assistance; arrangements +having been also made that this would be accomplished before the +detached part of _B_ should get very badly damaged. + +Attention is invited to Table III, which is a continuation of Table +I. It represents what would happen if a force of 1,000 should fight +separately two forces, one of 800 and the other of 200. In column +1, _A_ is supposed to have engaged the 200 first, and so to have +become reduced to 970, and to engage 800 afterward. In column 2, +_A_ is supposed to have engaged 800 first, thereby becoming reduced +to 569, and then to engage the 200 force. The table indicates that +it makes no difference whether _A_ engages the stronger or the +weaker force first. + +Column 3 shows that a force of 841, the part remaining after a +force of 1,000 had annihilated a force of 500, would have 653 left +after annihilating a second force of 500. Taken in connection with +columns 1 and 2, this indicates that it is easier to defeat two +separated _equal_ forces than two separated _unequal_ forces of the +same aggregate value; that the weakest way in which to divide a force +is into _equal_ parts. This fact is mathematically demonstrated by +Mr. F. W. Lanchester in a recent book called "Air Craft in Warfare." + + TABLE III + ------------------------------------------------------------------- +| |Col. 1|Col. 2|Col. 3| +|---------------------------------------------|------|------|------| +|Value of offensive at beginning A| 970 | 569 | 841 | +| B| 800 | 200 | 500 | +|Damage done in 1st period by A| 97 | 57 | 84 | +| B| 80 | 20 | 50 | +|Value of offensive power at end 1st period A| 890 | 549 | 791 | +| B| 703 | 143 | 416 | +|Damage done in 2d period by A| 89 | 55 | 79 | +| B| 70 | 14 | 42 | +|Value of offensive power at end 2d period A| 820 | 535 | 749 | +| B| 614 | 88 | 337 | +|Damage done in 3d period by A| 82 | 54 | 75 | +| B| 61 | 0 | 34 | +|Value of offensive power at end 3d period A| 759 | 526 | 715 | +| B| 532 | 32 | 262 | +|Damage done in 4th period by A| 76 | 53 | 72 | +| B| 53 | 3 | 26 | +|Value of offensive power at end 4th period A| 706 | 523 | 689 | +| B| 456 | 0 | 190 | +|Damage done in 5th period by A| 71 | | 69 | +| B| 46 | | 10 | +|Value of offensive power at end 5th period A| 660 | | 670 | +| B| 385 | | 121 | +|Damage done in 6th period by A| 66 | | 67 | +| B| 39 | | 12 | +|Value of offensive power at end 6th period A| 621 | | 658 | +| B| 319 | | 54 | +|Damage done in 7th period by A| 62 | | 66 | +| B| 32 | | 5 | +|Value of offensive power at end 7th period A| 589 | | 653 | +| B| 257 | | 0 | +|Damage done in 8th period by A| 59 | | | +| B| 26 | | | +|Value of offensive power at end 8th period A| 563 | | | +| B| 198 | | | +|Damage done in 9th period by A| 56 | | | +| B| 20 | | | +|Value of offensive power at end 9th period A| 543 | | | +| B| 142 | | | +|Damage done in 10th period by A| 54 | | | +| B| 14 | | | +|Value of offensive power at end 10th period A| 529 | | | +| B| 88 | | | +|Damage done in 11th period by A| 53 | | | +| B| 9 | | | +|Value of offensive power at end 11th period A| 520 | | | +| B| 35 | | | +|Damage done in 12th period by A| 52 | | | +| B| 4 | | | +|Value of offensive power at end 12th period A| 516 | | | +| B| 0 | | | + ------------------------------------------------------------------ + +The main advantage of superior speed in naval operations is the +ability it gives to secure tactical positions of advantage, and +to make desirable strategic dispositions; ability, for instance, +to T or flank an enemy force, and to prevent the enemy from T-ing +or flanking; also to catch separated parts of an enemy fleet before +they can unite, while retaining the ability to divide one's own +force without undue risk. For these purposes, speed is an element +of the highest value; but the high price that it costs in gun power +or armor protection--or both--and the fact that speed cannot always +be counted on by reason of possible engine breakdowns and foul +bottoms, result in giving to war-ships a lower speed than otherwise +they would have. + +Owing to the fact that, for any given horse-power put into a ship, +the speed attainable increases with her length; and owing to the +further fact that the weight that any ship can carry increases +more rapidly than the displacement (weight of the ship complete), +the best combination of gun power, armor protection, and speed is +attainable in the largest ship. In other words, the larger the +ship, the more power it can carry in proportion to its size, and +the more quickly that power can be placed where it can do the most +good. + +_Strategic Operations_.--These may be divided into two classes, +offensive and defensive. The two classes are distinct; and yet there +is no sharp dividing-line between them any more than there is between +two contiguous colors in the spectrum. Defensive operations of the +kind described by a popular interpretation of the word "defense" would +be operations limited to warding off or escaping the enemy's attack, +and would be just as efficacious as the passive warding off of the +blows of fists. Such a defense can never succeed, for the reason +that the recipient is reduced progressively in power of resistance +as the attacks follow each other, while the attacker remains in +unimpaired vigor, except for the gently depressing influence of +fatigue. Reference to Table I will render this point clear, if we +make the progressive reductions of the power of one contestant, +and no reductions of the power of the other contestant. + +Defensive operations, therefore, include "hitting back"; that is, +a certain measure of offensive operations, intended to weaken the +ability of the enemy to do damage. In fact, no operations are more +aggressively offensive, or more productive of damage to the enemy's +personnel and material, than operations that are carried on in order +to defend something. No animal is so aggressively belligerent as +a female "defending" her young. + +Offensive and defensive operations are nevertheless quite different, +especially in two particulars, one being the use of the initiative +or attack, and the other the distance to the home. In offensive +operations, the attack is made; in defensive operations, the attack +is resisted; and even if the resistance takes an aggressive character, +and drives the original attacker back to the place he started from, yet +the side which has made the original attack has carried on offensive +operations, and the other side defensive. Offensive operations are, +as a rule, carried on farther from home than defensive operations. If +_A_ is carrying on offensive operations against _B_, _A_ is usually +farther away from his home than _B_ is from his home. We see from +this that the offensive has the advantage of the initiative, of +making an attack for which the enemy may be unprepared, and has +the disadvantage of being far from its home bases; whereas the +defensive has the disadvantage of not knowing when or where or +whence an attack is to come, and the advantage of the support of +various kinds given by home bases. In other words, the offensive +has the advantage except in so far as it is impaired by unfavorable +conditions. + +For this reason, every military nation at the outset of war desires +to be able to assume the offensive; and only refrains from the +offensive from motives of prudence or because, in a particular +case, the distance between the adversaries is so great, that the +lack of bases would be of greater weight than the advantage of the +initiative--or because the situations of the contending parties would +be such that the side accepting the defensive rôle and staying near +home, might be able to carry on aggressive attacks better than could +the other. An illustration of a mistake in taking the offensive, +and the wisdom of the other side in accepting the defensive, may be +seen in Napoleon's expedition against Russia; for the Russians were +able to repel his attack completely, and then to assume a terrible +offensive against his retreating, disorganized, and starving army. +Another illustration was the expedition made by a weak Spanish fleet +under Cervera to the Caribbean in 1898. Another illustration was +that of the Russians in the war of 1904; the practical disadvantages +under which the Russian fleet operated at Tsushima were too great +to be balanced by the advantage of the attack; especially as the +situation was such that the Japanese were able to foretell with +enough accuracy for practical purposes the place where the attack +would be delivered, and the time. + +Operations on the sea, like operations on the land, consist in +opposing force to force, in making thrusts and making parries. +If two men or two ships contend in a duel, or if two parallel +columns--say of ten ships each--are drawn up abreast each other, +the result will depend mainly on the hitting and enduring powers of +the combatants; the conditions of the "stand-up fight" are realized, +and there is little opportunity for strategy to exert itself. + +But if any country--say the United States--finds herself involved +in war with--say a powerful naval Power or Powers of Europe, and the +realization of the fact comes with the suddenness that characterized +the coming of war in August, 1914, and we hear the same day that +a fleet of battleships, battle cruisers, destroyers, submarines, +aircraft, and auxiliaries has left the enemy's country, followed +by a fleet of transports carrying troops--there will be immediate +need for strategy of the most skilful kind; and this need will +continue until either the United States or her enemy has been made +to acknowledge herself beaten, and to sue for peace. + +As such a war will be mainly naval, and as naval wars are characterized +by great concentration of force, by each side getting practically +all its naval force into the contest, by each side staking its +all on the issue of perhaps a single battle (as the Russians and +Japanese did at Tsushima) one fleet or the other will be practically +annihilated, and its country will be exposed naked to the enemy. + +The first effort on hearing of the departure of the hostile fleet +will be, of course, to get our fleet out to sea, reinforced as much +as practicable, by our reserve ships; and to get the coast-guard +on their patrol stations. As we should not know the destination +of the enemy, we should either have to assume a destination and +send our fleet to that place (leaving the other places undefended) +or else send our fleet out to sea to some position from which it +would despatch scouts in different directions to intercept the +enemy, in order that our fleet might meet it and prevent its farther +advance. + +Of course, the latter procedure could not be carried out reasonably, +unless we had a great enough number of trained scouts to make the +interception of the enemy fleet probable; because otherwise the +probabilities would be that an enemy having the battle cruisers +and scouts that European navies have, would succeed in evading +our fleet and landing a force upon our shores; and it could not +be carried out reasonably either, if we knew that our fleet was +markedly inferior to the coming fleet; because to send out our +fleet to meet a much more powerful one in actual battle would be +to commit national suicide by the most expeditious method. + +In case the departure of the enemy fleet occurred in the stormy +months of the winter, we might feel warranted in guessing that its +immediate destination was the Caribbean; yet if our fleet were in +the Caribbean at the time, and if our coast lacked shore defenses as +at present, we might argue that the enemy would take the opportunity +to make a direct descent upon our coast, seize a base--say on the +eastern end of Long Island--and march directly on New York. It +would be very difficult to plan the development of a line of scouts +in such a way that the scouts would intercept an attack directed +at some unknown point between Boston and the West Indies, perhaps +in the southern part of the West Indies--say Margarita Island. +In fact, it would be impossible; with the result that, unless we +intercepted it by simple good luck, the enemy would succeed in +landing a force on our eastern coast, or else in the seizing of +a base in the West Indies or the southern part of the Caribbean +Sea. + +Either one of these acts, successfully performed by an enemy, would +give him an advantage; that is, it would make his position relatively +to ours better than it was before. It would have the same effect, +therefore, as winning a battle; in fact it would constitute the +winning of a battle--not a physical battle but a strategic battle. + +It may be objected that, unless we knew our fleet to be more powerful +it would be wiser and more comfortable for all concerned to withdraw +our ships to the shelter of their bases, and let the enemy do his +worst--on the theory that he could not do anything else so ruinous +to us as to sink our fleet. + +There is of course considerable reasonableness in this point of +view; and strategy declares the unwisdom of engaging in battles +that are sure to be lost. It must be remembered, however, that the +coming fleet will operate at a considerable strategic disadvantage, +owing to the necessity for guarding the "train" of auxiliary ships +that will come with it, holding fuel and supplies of various kinds; +that this handicap will offset a considerable advantage in offensive +strength; and that the handicap will be still greater if the enemy +fleet have near it a flotilla of transports carrying troops. It +must be remembered also that in all probability, we should not +have detailed information as to the number of vessels coming, and +should not really know whether it was superior to ours or not: +though we should be justified in assuming that the coming fleet +believed itself to be superior to ours in actual fighting power. +Absence of trustworthy information on such points is usual in warfare, +and is one of the elements that is the most difficult to handle. +The Navy Department would be more able to form a correct estimate +on this point than the commander-in-chief until such time as our +scouts might come into absolute contact with the enemy's main body; +but, until then, all that the department and fleet would know would +be that a large hostile force had left Europe. They would not know +its size or destination. + +Clearly, the first thing we should need would be information. To +get this after war has broken out, the only means is scouts. + +_Scouting and Screening_.--Scouts are needed by every navy; but +they are most needed by a navy that has a very long coast-line to +protect. If the great commercial centres and the positions that +an enemy would desire for advanced bases along the coast, have +local defenses adequate to keep off a hostile fleet for, say, two +weeks, the urgency of scouts is not quite so absolute; since, even +if the hostile fleet evades our scouts and our fleet, and reaches +our shores, our fleet will have two weeks in which to get to the +place attacked. But if the coast is not only long but also unguarded +by shore defenses, the urgency is of the highest order. + +If we knew our fleet to be the weaker, but if we did not believe it +to be so much the weaker as to force it to seek safety in flight, +our natural plan would be that of Napoleon's in Italy in 1797--to +keep our force together, and to hurl it against detached parts +of the enemy's force, whenever possible. This plan might not be +difficult of execution, if the enemy were accompanied by his train +of auxiliary and supply ships; since such ships are vulnerable to +almost any kind of attack, have almost no means of defense whatever, +and therefore require that a part of the fighting force of the +main body be detached to guard them. Whether the enemy would have +his train quite close to him, or a day's steaming behind, say 240 +miles, we should not, of course, know. + +How could we ascertain? + +If the enemy came along with no scouts ahead, and if we happened +to have some scouts located along his line of advance, these scouts +faster than his ships, and so heavily armed as not to fear to venture +near, our scouts might proceed along the flank of the enemy in +daylight, pass along his rear, go entirely around him, and then +report to our commander-in-chief by wireless telegraph exactly what +craft of all kinds comprised the force, what formation they were +in, the direction in which they were steaming, and the speed. Such +information would be highly appreciated by our commander-in-chief, +as it would enable him to decide what he had better do. If, for +instance, the scouts reported that the enemy fleet were steaming +at a speed of 10 knots an hour, and that the train was proceeding +behind the fighting fleet without any guards of any kind around +them, our commander-in-chief might decide to keep just out of sight +until after dark, and then rush in with all his force of heavy +ships and torpedo craft, and destroy the train entirely. + +But suppose the enemy fleet should advance with a "screen" consisting +of a line 10 miles long of, say, 50 destroyers, 50 miles ahead of +the main body; followed by a line of, say, 10 battle cruisers, +25 miles behind the destroyers; and with destroyers and battle +cruisers on each flank--say, 20 miles distant from the main body. +How could our scouts find out anything whatever about the size, +composition, and formation of the enemy--even of his speed and +direction of advance? The purpose of the "screen" is to prevent our +ascertaining these things; and each individual part of the screen +will do its best to carry out that purpose. All the vessels of the +screen and of the main body will be equipped with wireless-telegraph +apparatus and a secret code, by means of which instant communication +will be continuously held, the purport of which cannot be understood +by our ships. Any endeavor of any of our scouts to "penetrate the +screen" will be instantly met by the screen itself, out of sight of +the enemy's main body; and the screen cannot be penetrated in the +daytime, unless we can defeat those members of the screen that try +to hold us off. Now, inasmuch as all the considerable naval Powers +of Europe have many battle cruisers, and we have no battle cruisers +whatever, and no scouts of any kind, except three inefficient ones +(the _Birmingham_, _Chester_, and _Salem_) the degree of success +that we should have penetrating the screen in the daytime can be +estimated by any lawyer, merchant, or schoolboy. + +The Laws of successful scouting and of the use of "search curves" +have been worked out mathematically, and they are used to find +an enemy of which one has certain information; but they are also +used by the enemy to avoid being found, and they aid the enemy that +is sought almost as much as they aid the seeker. And the sought +has the advantage that the use of force, if force can be employed, +breaks up the application of the mathematics of the seeker. + +It is true that two main bodies of two fleets may stumble against +each other in the night-time, or in a fog or heavy mist. To prevent +this possible occurrence, or to prevent a night attack by destroyers, +no sure means has yet been found except examination before dark of +a very large area around the fleet that is sought; but the area +is too great for a search rigid enough to give complete security, +and will probably be so until swift aircraft can scout over long +distances at sea. Accepting for the minute the convention that +the main body of each side goes at the cruising speed of 10 knots, +and that darkness lasts 12 hours, each side will go 120 miles in +darkness; and if the two main bodies happen to be going directly +toward each other they will approach 240 miles in the darkness of +one night. Therefore, a coming fleet, in order to feel entirely +safe, would in daylight have to inspect by its scouts a circle +of 120 miles radius. To insure safety against destroyer attack, +the area would have to be much greater on account of the greater +speed of destroyers. + +[Illustration] + +Unless our defending fleet knew with reasonable sureness, however, +the location, speed, and direction of motion of the coming fleet, +so that it could make its dispositions for attack, it would hardly +desire to meet the enemy at night, unless it were confident that +it would meet the train and not the main fleet or the destroyers. +Night attacks, both on sea and land, are desirable, if the attacker +can inflict surprise on the attacked, and not be surprised himself. +In the darkness a flotilla of destroyers may make an attack on +the various vulnerable colliers and supply vessels of a fleet, +or even on the main body, and achieve a marked success, because +that is the rôle they are trained to play. But the tremendous power +and accuracy of battleships cannot be utilized or made available +in darkness; and therefore a commander-in-chief, anxious to defeat +by superior skill a coming fleet larger than his own, would hardly +throw away all chance of using skill by risking his main body in a +night encounter. Every operation planned by strategy is supposed +to result from the "decision" which follows the estimate of the +situation; even if in some simple or urgent cases, the decision +is not laboriously worked out, but is almost unconscious and even +automatic. Now, it is hardly conceivable that any estimate of the +situation would be followed by a decision to go ahead and trust to +luck, except in very desperate circumstances. In such circumstances, +when hope is almost gone, a desperate blow, even in the dark, may +save a situation--as a lucky hand at cards may redeem a gambler's +fortune at even the last moment. But strategy is opposed to taking +desperate measures; and pugilists and even gamblers recognize the +fact that when a man becomes "desperate," his judgment is bad, +and his chances of success are almost zero. + +While it is possible, therefore, that the main bodies of hostile +fleets may come together in the night, we may assume that it will +not be as part of any planned operations, and therefore not within +the scope of this discussion; and that any combat which may result +will be one in which strategy will play no part, and in which even +tactics will yield first place to chance. + +But while our defending fleet will have to base most of its decisions +on guesses, the coming fleet, on the other hand, having accepted +the strategical disadvantage of leaving its base far in rear, will +advance with all the advantage of the offensive, especially in +knowing where it intends to go and what it desires to do. Coming +over on a definite mission it will have been able to know what +preparations to make; and as the naval Powers of Europe understand +the need of co-ordination between policy and strategy, the fleet +will doubtless have had time to make those preparations; it will +not have started, in fact, and war will not have been declared, +until all those preparations have been made. + +We may assume that the coming fleet will come across with all possible +precautions for protecting itself against detection by the defender's +scouts, and therefore against an unexpected attack, by night or by +day. It cannot receive an unexpected attack unless surprised; and +how can it be surprised, if it has more scouts, faster scouts, and +more powerfully armed scouts than the defending fleet has? + +The possession of the more powerful scouts, however, will be valuable +to the enemy, not only for forming a screen as a protection against +enemy scouts, but also for scouting and thereby getting information +for itself. A numerous squadron of scouts of different kinds, sent +out ahead and on each flank would see any of our scouts that saw +them; and the scouts that were the more powerful would force the +weaker scouts back to the arms of their own main body, toward which +the more powerful scouts would, of course, advance. The weaker +scouts, therefore, would have no value whatever as a screen, save +in retarding the advance of the stronger scouts, and in delaying +their getting information. + +If the coming fleet is more powerful than the defending fleet, and +has a more numerous and powerful scouting force, it will, therefore, +be able to push back the defending fleet, whether an actual battle +occurs or not; and it will be able to bring over, also, a large +invading force in transports if its fighting superiority be great +enough. Furthermore, if we have not fortified and protected the +places which the enemy would wish to seize and use as advanced naval +bases, the enemy will be able to seize them, and will doubtless +do so. + +Of course, this is so obvious as to seem hardly worth declaring; +and yet some people hesitate even to admit it, and thereby they +assume a passive condition of moral cowardice; for they know that +a strong force has always overcome a weaker force that opposed +it in war; and that it always will do so, until force ceases to +be force. They know that force is that which moves, or tends to +move, matter; and that the greater the force, the more surely it +will move matter, or anything that opposes it. + +If, however, we establish naval bases near our valuable commercial +and strategic ports, both on our coast and in the Caribbean, and if +we fortify them so that an enemy could not take them quickly, the +condition of the enemy fleet will be much less happy; because it +will have to remain out on the ocean, where fuelling and repairing +are very difficult, and where it will be exposed, day and night, +especially at night, to attack by destroyers and submarines; and +in case necessity demands the occasional division of the force, +it must beware of attacks on the separated portions of the fleet. +The condition of a large fleet under way on an enemy's coast is one +requiring much patience and endurance, and one in which the number +of vessels is liable to be continuously reduced by the guerilla +warfare of the defenders. + +In the case of our attempting offensive operations against the +distant coast of an enemy, we would be in the same position as a +foreign enemy would be in when attacking our coast, in that our +chances of success would be excellent if our fleet were considerably +superior to the defending fleet in fighting power, and in the number +and strength of scouts, and if the enemy coast possessed numerous +undefended bays and islands which we could seize as bases. But even +if the superiority of our fleet in fighting power and scouts was +considerably greater than the enemy's our ultimate success would +be doubtful, if the enemy's coast and islands were so protected +by guns and mines and submarines that we could not get a base near +the scene of operations. It is true that the British were able to +maintain blockades of the French coast during many weary months +without any base nearer than England--a place far away to ships +whose only motive power was sails; but destroyers and submarines +and mines did not then exist, and these agencies are much more +valuable to the defender than to the blockader who has no base at +hand. + +Our operations without a base on a distant enemy coast would be +apt to degenerate into warding off a continual series of more or +less minor attacks by the minor craft of the defender. The commander +of our fleet would be constrained to keep his fighting force pretty +close together, thus restricting his initiative; lest the entire +enemy fleet catch a detached part out of supporting distance of +the main body, and annihilate it with little loss to themselves. +We could probably shut off most of the enemy's sea-borne commerce; +and the war would become one of endurance between our fleet, on +the one hand, and the economic forces and the morale of the enemy +country on the other hand. + +In the case of operations carried on far away from the bases of both +fleets, operations like those that the French and British carried on +in the West Indies, the commanders-in-chief will naturally be much +less directed by the admiralties at home than will a commander-in-chief +operating near home; and the strategical advantage, as affected +by the proximity of bases, and by the possession of the better +chance for the initiative, will be reduced to its minimum. + +Of course, the victory will go to the more powerful force; but +so many factors go to make up power, that it may be difficult to +determine which is the more powerful, until after victory itself +shall have decided it. Supposing the skill to be equal on both +sides, the victory will go to the side that possesses the most +numerous and powerful vessels of all kinds. But unless there is a +very great disproportion, it may be difficult to determine which +side has the more powerful ships, even though we may know which +side has the more numerous. It is extremely difficult to compare +even two single war-ships because we do not know the relative values +of their factors. Suppose two ships, for instance, to be equal +in all ways, except that one ship has ten 14-inch guns, and the +other has twelve 12-inch guns of higher initial velocity. Which is +the more powerful ship? Suppose one ship has more armor, another +more speed. Formulć designed to assign numerical values to fighting +ships have been laboriously worked out, notably by Constructor Otto +Kretschmer of the German navy; but the results cannot be accepted +as anything except very able approximations. Furthermore, if ship +_A_ could whip ship _B_ under some conditions, _B_ could whip _A_ +under other conditions. An extreme illustration would be battleship +_A_ engaged with submarine _B_ at close quarters; _B_ being on +the surface in one case, and submerged in the other case. + +_Aircraft_.--The influence of aircraft on naval operations is to +be very great indeed, but in directions and by amounts that it +would not be wise to attempt to predict. The most obvious influence +will be in distant scouting, for which the great speed of aircraft +will make them peculiarly adapted, as was demonstrated in the battle +near the Skagerak. It is the belief of the author, however, that +the time is close at hand when aeroplanes and dirigibles of large +size will be capable of offensive operations of the highest order, +including the launching of automobile torpedoes of the Whitehead +type. + +_Skill_.--The question of skill bears a relation to the question +of the material power directed by it that is very vital, but very +elusive. If, for instance, ship _C_, firing ten 12-inch guns on a +side, fights ship _D_, firing five like guns on a side, the advantage +would seem to be with _C_; but it would not be if each gun on _D_ +made three hits, while each gun on _C_ made one hit; a relative +performance not at all impossible or unprecedented. Similarily, +if the head of the admiralty of the _E_ fleet were a very skilful +strategist, and the head of the admiralty of the _F_ fleet were +not, and if the various admirals, captains, lieutenants, engineers, +and gunners of the _E_ fleet were highly skilled, and those of +the _F_ fleet were not, the _E_ fleet might be victorious, even +if materially it were much the smaller in material and personnel. +In case the head of the admiralty of the _E_ fleet were the more +skilful, while the officers of the _F_ fleet were, on the average, +more skilful than those of the _E_ fleet, it would be impossible +to weigh the difference between them; but as a rough statement, +it may be said that if the head of the admiralty of either fleet +is more skilful than the other, his officers will probably be more +skilful than the officers of the other; so pervasive is the influence +of the chief. + +The effectiveness of modern ships and guns and engines and torpedoes, +when used with perfect skill, is so great that we tend unconsciously +to assume the perfect skill, and think of naval power in terms +of material units only. Yet daily life is full of reminders that +when two men or two bodies of men contend, the result depends in +large though varying measure on their relative degrees of skill. + +Whenever one thinks of using skill, he includes in his thought +the thing in the handling of which the skill is employed. One can +hardly conceive of using skill except in handling something of the +general nature of an instrument, even if the skill is employed in +handling something which is not usually called an instrument. For +instance, if a man handles an organization with the intent thereby +to produce a certain result, the organization is the instrument +whereby he attempts to produce the result. + +If a man exercises perfect skill, he achieves with his instrument +100 per cent of its possible effect. If he exercises imperfect +skill, he achieves a smaller percentage of its possible effect. + +To analyze the effectiveness of skill, let us coin the phrase, +"effective skill," and agree that, if a man produces 100 per cent of +the possible, his effective skill is 100 per cent, and, in general, +that a man's effective skill in using any instrument is expressed by +the percentage he achieves of what the instrument can accomplish; +that, for instance, if a gun is fired at a given range under given +conditions, and 10 per cent hits are made in a given time, then +the effective skill employed is 10 per cent. + +From this standpoint we see that imperfect skill is largely concerned +with errors. If a man uses, say, a gun, with perfect skill, he +commits no error in handling the gun; and the smaller the sum total +of errors which he commits in handling the gun, the greater his +effective skill and the greater the number of hits. + +The word "errors," as here used, does not simply mean errors of +commission, but means errors of omission as well. If a man, in +firing a gun, fails to press the button or trigger when his sights +are on, he makes an error just as truly as the man does who presses +the button or trigger when the sights are not on. + +Suppose that, in firing a gun, under given conditions of range, +etc., the effective skill employed is 10 per cent. This means that +10 per cent of hits are made. But it means another thing equally +important--it means that 90 per cent of misses are made. To what +are these misses due? Clearly they are due to errors made, not +necessarily by the man who fires the gun, but by all the people +concerned. If the correct sight-bar range were given to the gun, +and if the gun were correctly laid and the pointer pressed the +button at precisely the right instant, the shot would hit the target, +practically speaking. But, in actual practice, the range-finder +makes an error, the spotter makes an error, the plotting-room makes +an error, the sight-setter makes an error, and the gun-pointer +makes an error. The sum total of all of these errors results in +90 per cent of misses. + +Suppose that by careful training these errors are reduced in the +relation of 9 to 8, so that instead of there being 90 per cent +of misses there are only 80 per cent. This does not seem a very +difficult thing for training to accomplish, but note the result: the +hits are increased from 10 per cent to 20 per cent. In other words, +by a decrease in errors in the relation of 9 to 8, the effective +skill and the hits are doubled. + +Conversely, if the errors increased in the ratio of 9 to 10, the +misses would increase from 90 per cent to 100 per cent, and the +hits would be reduced from 10 per cent to 0. + +Suppose now that the conditions are so very difficult that only +1 per cent of hits is made, or 99 per cent of misses, and that by +training the misses are reduced from 99 per cent to 98 per cent. +Clearly, by a decrease of errors of hardly more than 1 per cent +the effective skill and the hits are doubled. + +Conversely, if the errors increased in the ratio of 99 to 100, +the misses would increase from 99 per cent to 100 per cent, and +the hits would be reduced from 1 per cent to 0. + +But suppose that the conditions are so easy that 90 per cent of +hits are made and only 10 per cent of misses. Clearly, if the errors +were divided by 10, so that only 1 per cent of misses was made, +instead of 10 per cent, the number of hits would increase only +9 per cent, from 90 per cent to 99 per cent. + +Of course, this is merely an arithmetical way of expressing the +ancient truths that skill becomes more and more important as the +difficulties of handling an instrument increase; and that, no matter +how effective an instrument may be when used with perfect skill, +the actual result obtained in practice is only the product of its +possible performance and the effective skill with which it is used. + +Applying this idea to naval matters, we see why the very maximum +of skill is required in our war mechanisms and war organizations, +in their almost infinite variety and complexity. The war mechanisms +and war organizations of the military nations are capable of enormous +results, but only when they are used with enormous skill. There +are no other instruments or organizations that need so much skill +to handle them, because of the difficulties attending their use +and the issues at stake. Their development has been a process long +and painful. On no other things has so much money been spent; to +perfect no other things have so many lives been sacrificed; on +no other things, excepting possibly religion, have so many books +been written; to no other things has the strenuous exertion of so +many minds been devoted; in operating no other things has such +a combination of talent and genius and power of will and spirit +been employed. + +A battleship is an instrument requiring skill to handle well, considered +both as a mechanism and as an organization. Its effective handling +calls for skill not only on the part of the captain, but on the +part of all hands. The finest dreadnaught is ineffective if manned +by an ineffective crew. The number and complexity of the mechanisms +on board are so great as to stagger the imagination; and the +circumstances of modern warfare are so difficult that, as between +two forces evenly matched as to material, a comparatively slight +advantage in errors made will turn the scale in favor of the more +skilful. A difference in errors, for instance, in the relation of +9 to 8, under the conditions mentioned above, between two fleets +having an equal number of similar ships, would give one side twice +as many hits as the other in any given length of time. + +In March, 1905, the writer published an essay in the _Proceedings +of the U. S. Naval Institute_ called "American Naval Policy," in +which the effect of initial superiority in gun-fire was shown in +tables. One table showed that an initial advantage of only 10 per +cent secured an overwhelming victory by an accumulative effect. +Now a difference of 10 per cent in hits, under conditions in which +the hits were about 10 per cent of the maximum, would mean, roughly +speaking, the difference between 10 hits and 9 hits in a given +length of time, or a difference between 90 misses and 91 misses; +a difference in errors made of a little more than 1 per cent. + +The conclusion to be drawn is too obvious to be stated. Perhaps +the conclusion is not broadly new; but possibly the idea is new +that so small a difference in errors made will, under conditions +of sufficient difficulty, produce such a tremendous difference +in results. + +Now, a division is more complex and more difficult to handle perfectly +than is a battleship; a squadron more so than a division; a fleet +more so than a squadron; a navy more so than a fleet. + +_Necessity for Knowledge of the Naval Machine_.--There is no machine +or tool so simple that knowledge of it is not needed in order to +use it skilfully. This does not mean that intimate knowledge of +the details of construction of a machine is necessary in order to +operate it; it does not mean, for instance, that a sharp-shooter +must have a profound knowledge of the metallurgy of the metal of +which his gun is mainly made, or of the laws of chemistry and physics +that apply to powder, or of the laws of ballistics that govern +the flight of the bullet to its target. But it does mean that any +skilful handler of any machine must know how to use it; that a +sharpshooter, for instance, must know how to use his machine--the +gun. + +Of course, a sharpshooter's skill is exercised in operating under +very limited conditions, the conditions of shooting; and it does not +include necessarily the maintenance of his gun in good condition. +The operating of some machines, however, includes the maintenance +of those machines; and a simple illustration is that of operating +an automobile. An automobile is constructed to be operated at +considerable distances from home; and a man whose knowledge and +skill were limited to steering, stopping, starting, and backing +the car--who had no knowledge of its details of construction and +could not repair a trifling injury--would have very little value +as a chauffeur. + +A like remark might truthfully be made about the operation of any +complex machine; and the more complex the machine, the more aptly +the remark would apply. The chief engineer of any electric plant, +of any municipal water-works, of any railroad, of any steamship +must have the most profound and intimate knowledge of the details +of construction and the method of operation of the machine committed +to his charge. Recognition of this fact by the engineering profession +is so complete and perfect as to be almost unconscious; and no man +whose reasoning faculties had been trained by the exact methods +of engineering could forget it for a moment. The whole structure +of that noble science rests on facts that have been demonstrated +to be facts, and the art rests on actions springing from those +facts; and neither the science nor the art would now exist, if +machines created by engineering skill had been committed to the +charge of men unskilled. + +It is obvious that the more complicated in construction any machine +is, the more time and study are needed to understand it fully; and +that the more complicated its method of operation is, the more +practice is needed in order to attain skill in operating it. + +The more simple the method of operation, the more closely a machine +approaches automatism; but even automatic machines are automatic +only in so far as their internal mechanisms are concerned; and +the fact of their being automatic does not eliminate the necessity +for skill in using them. An automatic gun, for instance, no matter +how perfectly automatically it discharges bullets, may be fired +at an advancing enemy skilfully or unskilfully, effectively or +ineffectively. + +In operating some machines, such as a soldier's rifle, or a billiard +cue, the number of mental, nervous, and muscular operations is +apparently very few; yet every physician knows that the number is +very great indeed, and the operations extremely complex--complex +beyond the knowledge of the psychologist, physicist, chemist, and +biologist. The operation of more complex mechanisms, such as +automobiles, seems to be more difficult, because the operator has +more different kinds of things to do. Yet that it is really more +difficult may be doubted for two reasons; one being that each single +operation is of a more simple nature, and the other reason being +that we know that a much higher degree of skill is possessed by +a great billiardist than by an automobile chauffeur. Of course, +the reason of this may be that competition among billiardists has +been much more keen than among chauffeurs; but even if this be +true, it reminds us that _the difficulty of operating any machine +depends on the degree of skill exacted_. It also reminds us that, +if a machine is to be operated in competition with another machine, +the skill of the operator should be as great as it can be made. + +The steaming competitions that have been carried on in our navy +for several years are examples on a large scale of competitive +trials of skill in operating machines. These machines are very +powerful, very complex, very important; and that supreme skill +shall be used in operating them is very important too. For this +reason, every man in the engineering department of every ship, +from the chief engineer himself to the youngest coal-passer, is +made to pass an examination of some kind, in order that no man +may be put into any position for which he is unfit, and no man +advanced to any position until he has shown himself qualified for +it, both by performance in the grade from which he seeks to rise, +and by passing a professional examination as to the duties in the +grade to which he desires to rise. + +The same principles apply to all machines; and the common sense +of mankind appreciates them, even if the machines are of the human +type. A captain of a company of soldiers, in all armies and in all +times, has been trained to handle a specific human machine; so has +the captain of a football team, so has the rector of a church. The +training that each person receives gives him such a subconscious sense +of the weights and uses of the various parts of the machine, that he +handles them almost automatically--and not only automatically but +instantly. The captain on the bridge, when an emergency confronts +him, gives the appropriate order instantly. + +Now the word "machine" conveys to the minds of most of us the image +of an engine made of metal, the parts of which are moved by some +force, such as the expansive force of steam. But machines were in +use long before the steam-engine came, and one of the earliest +known to man was man himself--the most perfect machine known to +him now, and one of the most complicated and misused; for who of +us does not know of some human machine of the most excellent type, +that has been ruined by the ignorance or negligence of the man +to whose care it was committed? + +A machine is in its essence an aggregation of many parts, so related +to each other and to some external influence, that the parts can +be made to operate together, to attain some desired end or object. +From this point of view, which the author believes to be correct, +a baseball team is a machine, so is a political party, so is any +organization. + +Before the days of civilization, machines were few in type; but +as civilization progressed, the necessity for organizations of +many kinds grew up, and organizations of many kinds appeared. Then +the necessity for knowledge of how to operate those organizations +brought about certain professions, first that of the military, +second that of the priesthood, and later those of the law, medicine, +engineering, etc. As time has gone on, the preparation required +for these professions, especially the progressive professions, +has become increasingly difficult and increasingly demanded; and +the members of the professions have become increasingly strict +in their requirements of candidates for membership. + +Now the profession that is the most strict of all, that demands the +greatest variety of qualifications, and the earliest apprenticeship, +is the military. The military profession serves on both the land +and the sea, in armies and navies; and while both the land and +the sea branches are exacting in their demands, the sea or naval +branch is the more exacting of the two; by reason of the fact that +the naval profession is the more esoteric, the more apart from the +others, the more peculiar. In all the naval countries, suitable +youths are taken in hand by their governments, and initiated into +the "mysteries" of the naval profession--mysteries that would always +remain mysteries to them, if their initiation were begun too late in +life. Many instances are known of men who obtained great excellence in +professions which they entered late in life; but not one instance in +the case of a man who entered the naval profession late in life. And +though some civilian heads of navies have shown great mental capacity, +and after--say three years'--incumbency have shown a comprehension +of naval matters greater than might have been expected, none has +made a record of performance like those of the naval ministers +of Germany and Japan; or of Admiral Barham, as first lord of the +admiralty, or Sir John Fisher as first sea lord, in England. + +A navy is so evidently a machine that the expression "naval machine" +has often been applied to it. It is a machine that, both in peace and +in war, must be handled by one man, no matter how many assistants +he may have. If a machine cannot be made to obey the will of one +man, it is not one machine. If two men are needed, at least two +machines are to be operated; if three men are needed there are at +least three machines, etc. One fleet is handled by one man, called +the commander-in-chief. If there are two commanders-in-chief, there +are two fleets; and these two fleets may act in conjunction, in +opposition, or without reference to each other. + +The fact of a machine being operated by one man does not, however, +prevent the machine from comprising several machines, operated +by several men. A vessel of war, for instance, is operated as a +unit by one man; the words "vessel of war," meaning not only the +inert hull, but all the parts of personnel and material that make a +vessel of war. The captain does not handle each individual machine +or man; but he operates the mechanism and the personnel, by means +of which all the machines and men are made to perform their tasks. + +Now the naval machine is composed of many machines, but the machines +that have to be "operated" in war, using the word "operated" in +the usual military sense, are only the active fleet, the bureaus +and offices and the bases; including in the bases any navy-yards +within them. Using the word "operated" still more technically, +the only thing to be operated in war is the fleet: but the head +of the Navy Department must also so direct the logistical efforts +of the bureaus and offices and bases, that the fleet shall be given +the material in fuel, supplies, and ammunition with which to conduct +those operations. Like the chief engineer of a ship, he must both +operate and maintain the machine. + +The fleet itself is a complex machine, even in time of peace. In +war time it is more so, for the reason that many additions are +made to the fleet when war breaks out; and these additions, being +largely of craft and men held in reserve, or brought in hurriedly +from civil life, cannot be so efficient or so reliable as are the +parts of the fleet that existed in time of peace. + +The active fleet consists of battleships, battle cruisers, cruisers +of various speeds and sizes, destroyers, submarines, and aircraft. +The fleet is under the immediate command of its commander-in-chief, +just as the New York naval station is under the command of its +commandant; but the commander-in-chief of the fleet is just as +strictly under the command of the head of the admiralty or Navy +Department as is the commandant. The commander-in-chief is the +principal part of the naval machine that is operated in war; and +the ultimate success of the naval machine in war depends largely +on the amount and degree of understanding that exists between the +commander-in-chief and the head of the Navy Department. That goodwill +and kindly feeling should exist between them may be assumed, since +both have the same object in view; but that real understanding +should exist between them is more difficult to assume, especially +if they have been trained in different schools and have not known +each other until late in life. In the latter case, misunderstandings +are apt to arise, as time goes on; and if they do, the most cordial +good feeling may change into mutual distrust and suspicion, and +even hatred. To see that such things have happened in the past, +we do not have to look further back in history than the records of +our own Civil War, especially the records of the mutual relations +of the head of the War Department and some generals. That a situation +equally grave did not exist between the head of the Navy Department +and any of the admirals may be attributed to the fact that the +number of naval defeats was less than the number of defeats on land, +to the lesser number of persons in the navy, and to the smaller +number of operations. Perhaps a still greater reason was the greater +confidence shown by civilians in their ability to handle troops, +compared with their confidence in their ability to handle fleets. + +Even between the Navy Department and the officers, however, mutual +respect and understanding can hardly be said to have existed. This +did not prevent the ultimate triumph of the Union navy; but that +could hardly have been prevented by any means, since the Union +navy was so much superior to the Confederate. + +_Co-operation between the Navy Department and the Fleet_.--In any +war with a powerful navy, into which the U. S. navy may enter, +the question of co-operation between the department and the fleet +will be the most important factor in the portentous situation that +will face us. We shall be confronted with the necessity of handling +the most complex and powerful machine known to man with the utmost +possible skill; and any lack of understanding between the fleet +and the department, and any slowness of apprehension or of action +by the department, may cause a national disaster. One of the most +important dangers to be guarded against will be loss of time. In +naval operations the speed of movement of the forces is so great +that crises develop and pass with a rapidity unexampled formerly; +so that delays of any kind, or due to any causes, must be prevented +if that be possible. If a swordsman directs a thrust at the heart, +the thrust must be parried--_in time_. + +[Illustration: STRATEGIC MAP OF THE ATLANTIC AND PACIFIC OCEANS.] + + + +***END OF THE PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK THE NAVY AS A FIGHTING MACHINE*** + + +******* This file should be named 17547-8.txt or 17547-8.zip ******* + + +This and all associated files of various formats will be found in: +https://www.gutenberg.org/dirs/1/7/5/4/17547 + + + +Updated editions will replace the previous one--the old editions +will be renamed. + +Creating the works from public domain print editions means that no +one owns a United States copyright in these works, so the Foundation +(and you!) can copy and distribute it in the United States without +permission and without paying copyright royalties. Special rules, +set forth in the General Terms of Use part of this license, apply to +copying and distributing Project Gutenberg-tm electronic works to +protect the PROJECT GUTENBERG-tm concept and trademark. 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Thus, we do not necessarily +keep eBooks in compliance with any particular paper edition. + +Most people start at our Web site which has the main PG search facility: + + https://www.gutenberg.org + +This Web site includes information about Project Gutenberg-tm, +including how to make donations to the Project Gutenberg Literary +Archive Foundation, how to help produce our new eBooks, and how to +subscribe to our email newsletter to hear about new eBooks. + diff --git a/old/17547-8.zip b/old/17547-8.zip Binary files differnew file mode 100644 index 0000000..1b58cd2 --- /dev/null +++ b/old/17547-8.zip diff --git a/old/17547.txt b/old/17547.txt new file mode 100644 index 0000000..6390fb8 --- /dev/null +++ b/old/17547.txt @@ -0,0 +1,10859 @@ +The Project Gutenberg eBook, The Navy as a Fighting Machine, by Bradley A. +Fiske + + +This eBook is for the use of anyone anywhere at no cost and with +almost no restrictions whatsoever. You may copy it, give it away or +re-use it under the terms of the Project Gutenberg License included +with this eBook or online at www.gutenberg.org + + + + + +Title: The Navy as a Fighting Machine + + +Author: Bradley A. Fiske + + + +Release Date: January 18, 2006 [eBook #17547] + +Language: English + +Character set encoding: ISO-646-US (US-ASCII) + + +***START OF THE PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK THE NAVY AS A FIGHTING MACHINE*** + + +E-text prepared by Robert J. Hall + + + +Note: Project Gutenberg also has an HTML version of this + file which includes the original illustrations. + See 17547-h.htm or 17547-h.zip: + (https://www.gutenberg.org/dirs/1/7/5/4/17547/17547-h/17547-h.htm) + or + (https://www.gutenberg.org/dirs/1/7/5/4/17547/17547-h.zip) + + + + + +THE NAVY AS A FIGHTING MACHINE + +by + +REAR ADMIRAL BRADLEY A. FISKE +U. S. Navy + +Former Aid for Operations of the Fleet; President of the U. S. +Naval Institute; Gold Medallist of the U. S. Naval Institute and +The Franklin Institute of Pennsylvania + +Author of "Electricity in Theory and Practice," "War Time in Manila," +Etc. + +With Map + + + + + + + +PREFACE + +What is the navy for? + +Of what parts should it be composed? + +What principles should be followed in designing, preparing, and +operating it in order to get the maximum return for the money expended? + +To answer these questions clearly and without technical language +is the object of the book. + + BRADLEY A. FISKE. + + U. S. NAVAL WAR COLLEGE, +NEWPORT, R. I., September 3, 1916. + + + + +CONTENTS + + PART I + + GENERAL CONSIDERATIONS + + CHAPTER + I. WAR AND THE NATIONS + II. NAVAL A, B, C + III. NAVAL POWER + IV. NAVAL PREPAREDNESS + V. NAVAL DEFENSE + VI. NAVAL POLICY + + PART II + + NAVAL STRATEGY + + VII. GENERAL PRINCIPLES + VIII. DESIGNING THE MACHINE + IX. PREPARING THE ACTIVE FLEET + X. RESERVES AND SHORE STATIONS + XI. NAVAL BASES + XII. OPERATING THE MACHINE + + STRATEGIC MAP OF THE ATLANTIC AND PACIFIC OCEANS + + *** Chapters III and VII were published originally in _The U. S. + Naval Institute_; chapters I, II, IV, V, and VII in _The North + American Review_. + + + + +PART I + +GENERAL CONSIDERATIONS + + + + +CHAPTER I + +WAR AND THE NATIONS + +Because the question is widely discussed, whether peace throughout +the world may be attained by the friendly co-operation of many +nations, and because a nation's attitude toward this question may +determine its future prosperity or ruin, it may be well to note +what has been the trend of the nations hitherto, and whether any +forces exist that may reasonably be expected to change that trend. +We may then be able to induce from facts the law which that trend +obeys, and make a reasonable deduction as to whether or not the +world is moving toward peace. If we do this we shall follow the +inductive method of modern science, and avoid the error (with its +perilous results) of first assuming the law and then deducing +conclusions from it. + +Men have always been divided into organizations, the first organization +being the family. As time went on families were formed into tribes, +for self-protection. The underlying cause for the organization was +always a desire for strength; sometimes for defense, sometimes +for offense, usually for both. + +At times tribes joined in alliance with other tribes to attain a +common end, the alliance being brought about by peaceful agreement, +and usually ceasing after the end had been attained, or missed, or +when tribal jealousies forbade further common effort. Sometimes +tribes joined to form one larger tribe; the union being either +forced on a weaker by a stronger tribe, or caused by a desire to +secure a strength greater and more lasting than mere alliance can +insure. + +In the same way, and apparently according to similar laws, sovereign +states or nations were formed from tribes; and in later years, by +the union of separate states. The states or nations have become +larger and larger as time has gone on; greater numbers, not only +of people but of peoples, living in the same general localities +and having hereditary ties, joining to form a nation. + +Though the forms of government of these states or nations are numerous, +and though the conceptions of people as to the purposes and functions +of the state vary greatly, we find that one characteristic of a +state has always prevailed among all the states and nations of the +world--the existence of an armed military force, placed under the +control of its government; the purpose of this armed force being +to enable the government not only to carry on its administration +of internal matters, but also to exert itself externally against +the armed force of another state. + +This armed force has been a prominent factor in the life of every +sovereign state and independent tribe, from history's beginning, +and is no less a factor now. No instance can be found of a sovereign +state without its appropriate armed force, to guard its sovereignty, +and preserve that freedom from external control, without which +freedom it ceases to exist as a sovereign state. + +The armed force has always been a matter of very great expense. It +has always required the anxious care of the government and the people. +The men comprising it have always been subjected to restraint and +discipline, compelled to undergo hardships and dangers greater than +those of civil life, and developed by a training highly specialized +and exacting. + +The armed force in every state has had not only continuous existence +always, but continuous, potential readiness, if not continuous +employment; and the greatest changes in the mutual relations of +nations have been brought about by the victory of the armed force +of one state over the armed force of another state. This does not +mean that the fundamental causes of the changes have been physical, +for they have been psychological, and have been so profound and so +complex as to defy analysis; but it does mean that the actual and +immediate instrument producing the changes has been physical force; +that physical force and physical courage acting in conjunction, +of which conjunction war is the ultimate expression, have always +been the most potent instruments in the dealings of nations with +each other. + +Is there any change toward peaceful methods now? + +No, on the contrary; war is recognized as the most potent method +still; the prominence of military matters is greater than ever +before; at no time in the past has interest in war been so keen +as at the present, or the expenditure of blood and money been so +prodigal; at no time before has war so thoroughly engaged the intellect +and energy of mankind. + +In other words, the trend of the nations has been toward a clearer +recognition of the efficacy of military power, and an increasing +use of the instrumentality of war. + +This does not mean that the trend of the nations has been regular; +for, on the contrary, it has been spasmodic. If one hundred photographs +of the map of Europe could be taken, each photograph representing +in colors the various countries as they appeared upon the map at +one hundred different times, and if those hundred photographs could +be put on films and shown as a moving-picture on a screen, the +result would resemble the shifting colored pieces in a kaleidoscope. +Boundaries advanced and receded, then advanced again; tribes and +nations moved their homes from place to place; empires, kingdoms, +principalities, duchies, and republics flourished brilliantly for a +while, and then went out; many peoples struggled for an autonomous +existence, but hardly a dozen acquired enough territory or mustered +a sufficiently numerous population to warrant their being called +"great nations." Of those that were great nations, only three have +endured as great nations for eight hundred years; and the three +that have so endured are the three greatest in Europe now--the +French, the British, and the German. + +Some of the ancient empires continued for long periods. The history +of practical, laborious, and patient China is fairly complete and +clear for more than two thousand years before our era; and of dreamy, +philosophic India for almost as long, though in far less authentic +form. Egypt existed as a nation, highly military, artistic, and +industrious, as her monuments show, for perhaps four thousand years; +when she was forced by the barbarians of Persia into a condition +of dependence, from which she has never yet emerged. The time of +her greatness in the arts and sciences of peace was the time of her +greatest military power; and her decline in the arts and sciences +of peace accompanied her decline in those of war. Assyria, with +her two capitals, Babylon and Nineveh, flourished splendidly for +about six centuries, and was then subdued by the Persians under +Cyrus, after the usual decline. The little kingdom of the Hebrews, +hardy and warlike under Saul and David, luxurious and effeminate +under Solomon, lasted but little more than a hundred years. Persia, +rising rapidly by military means from the barbarian state, lived +a brilliant life of conquest, cultivated but little those arts of +peace that hold in check the passions of a successful military +nation, yielded rapidly to the seductions of luxury, and fell abruptly +before the Macedonian Alexander, lasting less than two hundred +and fifty years. Macedonia, trained under Philip, rose to great +military power under Alexander, conquered in twelve years the ten +most wealthy and populous countries of the world--nearly the whole +known world; but fell to pieces almost instantly when Alexander +died. The cities of Greece enjoyed a rare pre-eminence both in +the arts and sciences of peace and in military power, but only +for about one hundred and fifty years: falling at last before the +superior military force of Macedon, after neglecting the practice +of the military arts, and devoting themselves to art, learning, +and philosophy. Rome as a great nation lasted about five hundred +years; and the last three centuries of her life after the death +of Commodus, about 192 A. D., illustrate curiously the fact that, +even if a people be immoral, cruel, and base in many ways, their +existence as an independent state may be continued long, if military +requirements be understood, and if the military forces be preserved +from the influence of the effeminacy of the nation as a whole. In +Rome, the army was able to maintain a condition of considerable +manliness, relatively to the people at large, and thus preserve +internal order and keep the barbarians at bay for nearly three +hundred years; and at the same time exert a powerful and frequently +deciding influence in the government. But the effeminacy of the +people, especially of those in the higher ranks, made them the +creatures of the army that protected them. In some cases, the Emperor +himself was selected by the army, or by the Pretorian Guard in Rome; +and sometimes the guard removed an Emperor of whom it disapproved +by the simple expedient of killing him. + +After the fall of the Western Empire in 476, when Rome was taken by +Odoacer, a condition of confusion, approaching anarchy, prevailed +throughout Europe, until Charlemagne founded his empire, about 800 +A. D., except that Constantinople was able to stand up against all +outside assaults and hold the Eastern Empire together. Charlemagne's +empire united under one government nearly all of what is now France, +Germany, Austria, Italy, Belgium, and Holland. The means employed by +Charlemagne to found his empire were wholly military, though means +other than military were instituted to preserve it. He endeavored +by just government, wise laws, and the encouragement of religion +and of education of all kinds to form a united people. The time +was not ripe, however; and Charlemagne's empire fell apart soon +after Charlemagne expired. + +The rapid rise and spread of the Mohammedan religion was made possible +by the enthusiasm with which Mahomet imbued his followers, but the +actual founding of the Arabian Empire was due wholly to military +conquest, achieved by the fanatic Mussulmans who lived after him. +After a little more than a hundred years, the empire was divided +into two caliphates. Brilliant and luxurious courts were thereafter +held by caliphs at Bagdad and Cordova, with results similar to +those in Egypt, Persia, Assyria, and Rome; the people becoming +effeminate, employed warriors to protect them, and the warriors +became their masters. Then, effeminacy spreading even to the warriors, +strength to resist internal disorders as well as external assaults +gradually faded, and both caliphates fell. + +From the death of Charlemagne until the fall of Constantinople, in +1453, the three principal nations of Europe were those of France, +Germany, and England. Until that time, and dating from a time shortly +before the fall of Rome, Europe was in perpetual turmoil--owing +not only to conflicts between nations, but to conflicts between +the Church of Rome and the civil power of the Kings and Emperors, +to conflicts among the feudal lords, and to conflicts between the +sovereigns and the feudal lords. The power of the Roman Church was +beneficent in checking a too arrogant and military tendency, and +was the main factor in preventing an utter lapse back to barbarism. + +The end of the Middle Ages and the beginning of what are usually +called "Modern Times" found only four great countries in the +world--France, Germany, Spain, and England. Of these Spain dropped +out in the latter part of the sixteenth century. The other three +countries still stand, though none of them lies within exactly +the same boundaries as when modern times began; and Austria, which +was a part of Germany then, is now--with Hungary--a separate state +and nation. + +This very brief survey of history shows that every great nation +has started from a small beginning and risen sometimes gradually, +sometimes rapidly to greatness; and then fallen, sometimes gradually, +sometimes rapidly, to mediocrity, dependence, or extinction; that +the instrument which has effected the rise has always been military +power, usually exerted by armies on the land, sometimes by navies +on the sea; and that the instrument which has effected the actual +fall has always been the military power of an adversary. In other +words, _the immediate instrument that has decided the rise and +the fall of nations has been military power_. + +That this should have been so need not surprise us, since nations +have always been composed of human beings, influenced by the same +hopes and fears and governed by the same laws of human nature. And +as the most potent influence that could be brought to bear upon +a man was a threat against his life, and as it was the province of +military power to threaten life, it was unavoidable that military +power should be the most potent influence that could be brought +to bear upon a nation. + +The history of the world has been in the main a history of war +and a narrative of wars. No matter how far back we go, the same +horrible but stimulating story meets our eyes. In ancient days, +when every weapon was rude, and manipulated by one man only, the +injury a single weapon could do was small, the time required for +preparation was but brief, and the time required for recuperation +after war was also brief. At that time, military power was almost +the sole element in the longevity of a tribe, or clan, or nation; +and the warriors were the most important men among the people. +But as civilization increased, the life not only of individuals +but of nations became more complex, and warriors had to dispute +with statesmen, diplomatists, poets, historians, and artists of +various types, the title to pre-eminence. Yet even in savage tribes +and even in the conduct of savage wars, the value of wisdom and +cunning was perceived, and the stimulating aid of the poet and +the orator was secured. The relative value of men of war and men +of peace depended during each period on the conditions prevailing +then--in war, warriors held the stage; in peace, statesmen and +artists had their day. + +Naturally, during periods when war was the normal condition, the +warrior was the normal pillar of the state. In how great a proportion +of the time that history describes, war was the normal condition +and peace the abnormal, few realize now in our country, because +of the aloofness of the present generation from even the memory +of war. Our last great war ended in 1865; and since then only the +light and transient touch of the Spanish War has been laid upon +us. Even that war ended seventeen years ago and since then only +the distant rumblings of battles in foreign lands have been borne +across the ocean to our ears. + +These rumblings have disturbed us very little. Feeling secure behind +the 3,000-mile barrier of the ocean, we have lent an almost incredulous +ear to the story that they tell and the menace that they bear; +though the story of the influence of successful and unsuccessful +wars upon the rise and fall of nations is told so harshly and so +loudly that, in order not to hear it, one must tightly stop his +ears. + +That war has not been the only factor, however, in the longevity of +nations is obviously true; and it is also true that nations which +have developed the warlike arts alone have never even approximated +greatness. In all complex matters, in all processes of nature and +human nature, many elements are present, and many factors combine +to produce a given result. Man is a very complex individual, and +the more highly he is developed the more complex he becomes. A +savage is mainly an animal; but the civilized and highly educated +man is an animal on whose elemental nature have been superposed +very highly organized mental, moral, and spiritual natures. Yet +even a savage of the most primitive or warlike character has an +instinctive desire for rest and softness and beauty, and loves +a primitive music; and even the most highly refined and educated +gentleman raises his head a little higher, and draws his breath a +little deeper, when war draws near. Thus in the breast of every man +are two opposing forces; one urging him to the action and excitement +of war, the other to the comparative inaction and tranquillity of +peace. On the side that urges war, we see hate, ambition, courage, +energy, and strength; on the side that urges peace we see love, +contentment, cowardice, indolence, and weakness. We see arrayed for +war the forceful faults and virtues; for peace the gentle faults +and virtues. Both the forceful and the gentle qualities tend to +longevity in certain ways and tend to its prevention in other ways; +but history clearly shows that the _forceful qualities have tended +more to the longevity of nations than the gentle_. If ever two +nations, or two tribes, have found themselves contiguous, one forceful +and the other not, the forceful one has usually, if not always, +obtained the mastery over the other, and therefore has outlived +it. If any cow and any lion have found themselves alone together, +the lion has outlived the cow. + +It is true that the mere fact of being a lion has not insured long +life, and that the mere fact of being a cow has not precluded it; +and some warlike tribes and nations have not lived so long as tribes +and nations of softer fibre. This seems to have been due, however, +either to the environments in which the two have lived, or to the +fact that the softer nation has had available some forces that +the other did not have. The native Indians of North America were +more warlike than the colonists from Europe that landed on their +shores; but the Indians were armed with spears and arrows, and +the colonists with guns. + +Now, those guns were the product of the arts of peace; no nation +that had pursued a warlike life exclusively could have produced them +or invented the powder that discharged them. This fact indicates what +a thousand other facts of history also indicate, that civilization +and the peaceful arts contribute to the longevity of nations--not only +by promoting personal comfort, and by removing causes of internal +strife, and thus enabling large bodies of people to dwell together +happily, but also by increasing their military power. Every nation +which has achieved greatness has cultivated assiduously both the +arts of peace and the arts of war. Every nation which has long +maintained that greatness has done so by maintaining the policy +by which she acquired it. _Every nation that has attained and then +lost greatness, has lost it by losing the proper balance between the +military and the peaceful arts; never by exalting unduly the military, +but always by neglecting them, and thereby becoming vulnerable to +attack_. + +In other words, the history of every great nation that has declined +shows three periods, the rise, the table-land of greatness, and +the decline. During the rise, the military arts hold sway; on the +table-land, the arts of peace and war are fairly balanced; during +the decline the peaceful arts hold sway. _Facilis descensus Averni_. +The rise is accomplished by expending energy, for which accomplishment +the possession of energy is the first necessity; the height of +the table-land attained represents the amount of energy expended; +the length of time that the nation maintains itself upon this +table-land, before starting on the inevitable descent therefrom, +represents her staying power and constitutes her longevity as a +great nation. + +How long shall any nation stay upon the table-land? As long as +she continues to adapt her life wisely to her environment; as long +as she continues to be as wise as she was while climbing up; for +while climbing, she had not only to exert force, she had also to +guide the force with wisdom. So we see that, in the ascent, a nation +has to use both force and wisdom; on the table-land, wisdom; in +the decline, neither. Among the nations of antiquity one might +suppose that, because of the slowness of transportation and +communication, and the feebleness of weapons compared with those +of modern days, much longer periods of time would be required for +the rise of any nation, and also a longer period before her descent +began. Yet the vast empire of Alexander lasted hardly a day after +he expired, and the Grecian cities maintained their greatness but +a century and a half; while Great Britain, France, and Germany +have been great nations for nearly a thousand years. + +Why have they endured longer than the others? + +The answer is hard to find; because many causes, and some of them +obscure, have contributed to the result. But, as we observe the +kind of constitution and the mode of life of long-lived people, +in order to ascertain what kind of constitution and mode of life +conduce to longevity in people, so perhaps we may logically do +the same with nations. + +Observing the constitution and mode of life of the British, French, +and German nations, we are struck at once with the fact that those +peoples have been by constitution active, ambitious, intelligent, +and brave; and that they have observed in their national life a +skilfully balanced relation between the arts of peace and the arts +of war; neglecting neither and allowing neither to wax great at the +expense of the other. In all those countries the _first_ aim has +been protection from both external attack and internal disorder. +Protection from external attack has been gained by military force +and highly trained diplomacy; protection from internal disorder +has been gained _first_ by military force, and _second_ by wise +laws, just courts, and the encouragement of religion and of those +arts and sciences that lead to comfort and happiness in living. + +China may attract the attention of some as an instance of longevity; +but is China a nation in the usual meaning of the word? Certainly, +she is not a great nation. It is true that no other nation has +actually conquered her of late; but this has been largely by reason +of her remoteness from the active world, and because other nations +imposed their will upon her, without meeting any resistance that +required the use of war to overcome. And even China has not lived +a wholly peaceful life, despite the non-military character of her +people. Her whole history was one of wars, like that of other nations, +until the middle of the fourteenth century of our era. Since then, +she has had four wars, in all of which she has been whipped: one in +the seventeenth century when the country was successfully invaded, +and the native dynasty was overthrown by the Tartars of Manchuria; +one in 1840, when Great Britain compelled her to cede Hong-Kong +and to open five ports to foreign commerce, through which ports +opium could be introduced; one in 1860, with Great Britain and +France, that resulted in the capture of Pekin; and one with Japan +in 1894. Since that time (as well as before) China has been the +scene of revolutions and wide-spread disturbances, so that, even +though a peace-loving and non-resisting nation, peace has not reigned +within her borders. The last dynasty was overthrown in 1912. Since +then a feeble republic has dragged on a precarious existence, +interrupted by the very short reign of Yuan Shih K'ai. + +This brief consideration of the trend of people up to the present +time seems to show that, owing to the nature of man himself, especially +to the nature of large "crowds" of men, the direction in which +nations have been moving hitherto has not been toward increasing +the prevalence of peace, but rather toward increasing the methods, +instruments, and areas of war; furthermore, that this direction of +movement has been necessary, in order to achieve and to maintain +prosperity in any nation. + +This being the case, what forces exist that may reasonably be expected +to change that trend? + +Three main forces are usually mentioned: Civilization, Commerce, +Christianity. + +Before considering these it may be well to note Newton's first law +of motion, that every body will continue in a state of rest or of +uniform motion in a straight line unless acted on by some external +force; for though this law was affirmed of material bodies, yet its +applicability to large groups of men is striking and suggestive. +Not only do human beings have the physical attributes of weight and +inertia like other material bodies, but their mental organism, +while of a higher order than the physical, is as powerfully affected +by external forces. And though it is true that psychology has not +yet secured her Newton, and that no one has yet formulated a law +that expresses exactly the action of the minds and spirits of men +under the influence of certain mental and moral stimuli or forces, +yet we know that our minds and spirits are influenced by fear, +hope, ambition, hate, and so forth, in ways that are fairly well +understood and toward results that often can be predicted in advance. + +Our whole theory of government and our laws of business and every-day +life are founded on the belief that men are the same to-day as +they were yesterday, and that they will be the same to-morrow. The +whole science of psychology is based on the observed and recorded +actions of the human organism under the influence of certain external +stimuli or forces, and starts from the assumption that this organism +has definite and permanent characteristics. If this is not so--if +the behavior of men in the past has not been governed by actual +laws which will also govern their behavior in the future--then +our laws of government are built on error, and the teachings of +psychology are foolish. + +This does not mean that any man will necessarily act in the same +way to-morrow as he did yesterday, when subjected to the influence +of the same threat, inducement, or temptation; because, without +grappling the thorny question of free will, we realize that a man's +action is never the result of only one stimulus and motive, but +is the resultant of many; and we have no reason to expect that +he will act in the same way when subjected to the same stimulus, +unless we know that the internal and external conditions pertaining +to him are also the same. Furthermore, even if we cannot predict what +a certain individual will do, when exposed to a certain external +influence, because of some differences in his mental and physical +condition, on one occasion in comparison with another, yet when we +consider large groups of men, we know that individual peculiarities, +permanent and temporary, balance each other in great measure; that +the average condition of a group of men is less changeable than +that of one man, and that the degree of permanency of condition +increases with the number of men in the group. From this we may +reasonably conclude that, if we know the character of a man--or a +group of men--and if we know also the line of action which he--or +they-have followed in the past, we shall be able to predict his--or +their--line of action in the future with considerable accuracy; +and that the accuracy will increase with the number of men in the +group, and the length of time during which they have followed the +known line of action. Le Bon says: "Every race carries in its mental +constitution the laws of its destiny." + +Therefore, the line of action that the entire human race has followed +during the centuries of the past is a good index--or at least the +best index that we have--to its line of action during the centuries +of the future. + +Now, men have been on this earth for many years; and history and +psychology teach us that in their intercourse with each other, +their conduct has been caused by a combination of many forces, +among which are certain powerful forces that tend to create strife. +The strongest by far of these forces is the _ego_ in man himself, +a quality divinely implanted which makes a man in a measure +self-protecting. This ego prompts a man not only to seek pleasure +and avoid trouble for himself, but also to gain superiority, and, +if possible, the mastery over his fellow men. Men being placed in +life in close juxtaposition to each other, the struggles of each +man to advance his own interests produce rivalries, jealousies, +and conflicts. + +Similarly with nations. Nations have been composed for the most +part of people having an heredity more or less common to them all, +so that they are bound together as great clans. From this it has +resulted that nations have been jealous of each other and have +combated each other. They have been doing this since history began, +and are doing it as much as ever now. + +In fact, mankind have been in existence for so many centuries, +and their physical, moral, mental, and spiritual characteristics +were so evidently implanted in them by the Almighty, that it seems +difficult to see how any one, except the Almighty himself, can +change these characteristics and their resulting conduct. It is +a common saying that a man cannot lift himself over the fence by +his boot straps, though he can jump over the fence, if it is not +too high. This saying recognizes the fact that "a material system +can do no work on itself"; but needs external aid. When a man pulls +upward on his boot straps, the upward force that he exerts is exactly +balanced by the downward reaction exerted by his boot straps; but +when he jumps, the downward thrust of his legs causes an equal +reaction of the earth, which exerts a direct force upward upon +the man; and it is this external force that moves him over the +fence. It is this external force, the reaction of the earth or +air or water, which moves every animal that walks, or bird that +flies, or fish that swims. It is the will of the Almighty, acting +through the various stimuli of nature, that causes the desire to +walk, and all the emotions and actions of men. If He shall cause +any new force to act on men, their line of conduct will surely +change. But if He does not--how can it change, or be changed; how +can the human race turn about, by means of its own power only, and +move in a direction the reverse from that in which it has been +moving throughout all the centuries of the past? + +These considerations seem to indicate that nations, regarded in +their relation toward each other, will go on in the direction in +which they have been going unless acted upon by some external force. + +Will civilization, commerce, or Christianity impart that force? + +Inasmuch as civilization is merely a condition in which men live, and +an expression of their history, character and aims, it is difficult +to see how it could of itself act as an external force, or cause an +external force to act. "Institutions and laws," says Le Bon, again, +"are the outward manifestation of our character, the expression of +its needs. Being its outcome, institutions and laws cannot change +this character." + +Even if the civilization of a given nation may have been brought +about in some degree by forces external to that nation, yet it is +clear that we must regard that civilization rather as the result of +those forces than as a force itself. Besides, civilization has never +yet made the relations of nations with each other more unselfish, +civilized nations now and in the past, despite their veneer of +courtesy, being fully as jealous of each other as the most savage +tribes. That this should be so seems natural; because civilization +has resulted mainly from the attempts of individuals and groups to +enhance the pleasures and diminish the ills of life, and therefore +cannot tend to unselfishness in either individuals or nations. +Civilization in the past has not operated to soften the relations +of nations with each other, so why should it do so now? Is not +modern civilization, with its attendant complexities, rivalries, +and jealousies, provocative of quarrels rather than the reverse? In +what respect is modern civilization better than past civilization, +except in material conveniences due to material improvements in the +mechanic arts? Are we any more artistic, strong, or beautiful than +the Greeks in their palmy days? Are we braver than the Spartans, +more honest than the Chinese, more spiritual than the Hindoos, +more religious than the Puritans? Is not the superior civilization +of the present day a mechanical civilization pure and simple? And +has not the invention of electrical and mechanical appliances, +with the resulting insuring of communication and transportation, +and the improvements in instruments of destruction, advantaged +the great nations more than the weaker ones, and increased the +temptation to great nations to use force rather than decreased +it? Do not civilization's improvements in weapons of destruction +augment the effectiveness of warlike methods, as compared with +the peaceful methods of argument and persuasion? + +Diplomacy is an agency of civilization that was invented to avoid +war, to enable nations to accommodate themselves to each other +without going to war; but, practically, diplomacy seems to have +caused almost as many wars as it has averted. And even if it be +granted that the influence of diplomacy has been in the main for +peace rather than for war, we know that diplomacy has been in use +for centuries, that its resources are well understood, and that +they have all been tried out many times; and therefore we ought +to realize clearly that diplomacy cannot introduce any new force +into international politics now, or exert, an influence for peace +that will be more potent in the future than the influence that +it has exerted in the past. + +These considerations seem to show that we cannot reasonably expect +civilization to divert nations from the path they have followed +hitherto. + +Can commerce impart the external force necessary to divert nations +from that path? + +Since commerce bears exactly the same relation to nations now as +in times past, and since it is an agency within mankind itself, it +is difficult to see how it can act as an external force, or cause +an external force to be applied. Of course, commercial interests +are often opposed to national interests, and improvements in speed +and sureness of communication and transportation increase the size +and power of commercial organizations. But the same factors increase +the power of governments and the solidarity of nations. At no time +in the past has there been more national feeling in nations than +now. Even the loosely held provinces of China are forming a Chinese +nation. Despite the fundamental commercialism of the age, national +spirit is growing more intense, the present war being the main +intensifying cause. It is true that the interests of commerce are +in many ways antagonistic to those of war. But, on the other hand, +of all the causes that occasion war the economic causes are the +greatest. For no thing will men fight more savagely than for money; +for no thing have men fought more savagely than for money; and the +greater the rivalry, the more the man's life becomes devoted to +it, and the more fiercely he will fight to get or keep it. Surely +of all the means by which we hope to avoid war, the most hopeless +by far is commerce. + +The greatest of all hopes is in Christianity, because of its inculcation +of love and kindliness, its obvious influence on the individual +in cultivating unselfishness and other peaceful virtues, and the +fact that it is an inspiration from on high, and therefore a force +external to mankind. But let us look the facts solemnly in the +face that the Christian religion has now been in effect for nearly +two thousand years; that the nations now warring are Christian +nations, in the very foremost rank of Christendom; that never in +history has there been so much bloodshed in such wide-spread areas +and so much hate, and that we see no signs that Christianity is +employing any influence that she has not been employing for nearly +two thousand years. + +If we look for the influence of Christianity, we can find it in +the daily lives of people, in the family, in business, in politics, +and in military bodies; everywhere, in fact, in Christian countries, +so long as we keep inside of any organization the members of which +feel bound together. This we must all admit, even the heathen know +it; but where do we see any evidence of the sweetening effect of +Christianity in the dealings of one organization with another with +which it has no special bonds of friendship? Christianity is invoked +in every warring nation now to stimulate the patriotic spirit of +the nation and intensify the hate of the crowd against the enemy; +and even if we think that such invoking is a perversion of religious +influence to unrighteous ends, we must admit the fact that the +Christian religion itself is at this moment being made to exert +a powerful influence--not toward peace but toward war! And this +should not amaze us; for where does the Bible say or intimate that +love among nations will ever be brought about? The Saviour said: +"I bring not peace but a sword." So what reasonable hope does even +Christianity give us that war between nations will cease? And even if +it did give reasonable hope, let us realize that between reasonable +hope and reasonable expectation there is a great gulf fixed. + +Therefore, we seem forced to the conclusion that the world will move +in the future in the same direction as in the past; that nations +will become larger and larger and fewer and fewer, the immediate +instrument of international changes being war; and that certain +nations will become very powerful and nearly dominate the earth +in turn, as Persia, Greece, Rome, Spain, France, and Great Britain +have done--and as some other country soon may do. + +Fortunately, or perhaps unfortunately, a certain law of decadence +seems to have prevailed, because of which every nation, after acquiring +great power, has in turn succumbed to the enervating effects which +seem inseparable from it, and become the victim of some newer nation +that has made strenuous preparations for long years, in secret, +and finally pounced upon her as a lion on its prey. + +Were it not for this tendency to decadence, we should expect that +the nations of the earth would ultimately be divided into two great +nations, and that these would contend for the mastery in a world-wide +struggle. + +But if the present rate of invention and development continues, +improvements in the mechanic arts will probably cause such increase +in the power of weapons of destruction, and in the swiftness and +sureness of transportation and communication, that some _monster +of efficiency_ will have time to acquire world mastery before her +period of decadence sets in. + +In this event, wars will be of a magnitude besides which the present +struggle will seem pygmy; and will rage over the surface of the +earth, for the gaining and retaining of the mastery of the world. + + + + +CHAPTER II + +NAVAL A, B, C + +In order to realize what principles govern the use of navies, let +us first consider what navies have to do and get history's data +as to what navies in the past have done. It would obviously be +impossible to recount here all the doings of navies. But neither +is it necessary; for the reason that, throughout the long periods +of time in which history records them, their activities have nearly +always been the same. + +In all cases in which navies have been used for war there was the +preliminary dispute, often long-continued, between two peoples or +their rulers, and at last the decision of the dispute by force. In +all cases the decision went to the side that could exert the most +force at the critical times and places. The fact that the causes +of war have been civil, and not military, demands consideration, for +the reason that some people, confusing cause and effect, incline +to the belief that armies and navies are the cause of war, and that +they are to be blamed for its horrors. History clearly declares +the contrary, and shows that the only role of armies and navies +has been to wage wars, and, by waging, to finish them. + +It may be well here, in order to clear away a possible preconception +by the reader, to try and dispel the illusion that army and navy +officers are eager for war, in order that they may get promotion. +This idea has been exploited by people opposed to the development +of the army and navy, and has been received with so much credulity +that it seriously handicaps the endeavors of officers to get an +unbiassed hearing. But surely the foolishness of such an idea would +promptly disappear from the brain of any one if he would remind +himself that simply because a man joins the army or navy he does +not cease to be a human being, with the same emotions of fear as +other men, the same sensitiveness to pain, the same dread of death, +and the same horror of leaving his family unsupported after his +death. It is true that men in armies and navies are educated to +dare death if need be; but the present writer has been through +two wars, has been well acquainted with army and navy officers for +forty-five years, and knows positively that, barring exceptions, +they do not desire war at all. + +Without going into an obviously impossible discussion of all naval +wars, it may be instructive to consider briefly the four naval +wars in which the United States has engaged. + +The first was the War of the American Revolution. This war is +instructive to those who contend that the United States is so far +from Europe as to be safe from attack by a European fleet; because +the intervening distance was frequently traversed then by British +and French fleets of frail, slow, sailing ships, which were vital +factors in the war. Without the British war-ships, the British +could not have landed and supported their troops. Without the French +war-ships the French could not have landed and supported their +troops, who, under Rochambeau, were also under Washington, and +gave him the assistance that he wofully needed, to achieve by arms +our independence. + +The War of 1812 is instructive from the fact that, though the actions +of our naval ships produced little material effect, the skill, +daring, and success with which they were fought convinced Europeans +of the high character and consequent noble destiny of the American +people. The British were so superior in sea strength, however, +that they were able to send their fleet across the ocean and land +a force on the shores of Chesapeake Bay. This force marched to +Washington, attacked the city, and burned the Capitol and other +public buildings, with little inconvenience to itself. + +The War of the Rebellion is instructive because it shows how two +earnest peoples, each believing themselves right, can be forced, +by the very sincerity of their convictions, to wage war against +each other; and because it shows how unpreparedness for war, with +its accompanying ignorance of the best way in which to wage it, +causes undue duration of a war and therefore needless suffering. +If the North had not closed its eyes so resolutely to the fact +of the coming struggle, it would have noted beforehand that the +main weakness of the Confederacy lay in its dependence on revenue +from cotton and its inability to provide a navy that could prevent +a blockade of its coasts; and the North would have early instituted +a blockade so tight that the Confederacy would have been forced +to yield much sooner than it did. The North would have made naval +operations the main effort, instead of the auxiliary effort; and +would have substituted for much of the protracted and bloody warfare +of the land the quickly decisive and comparatively merciful warfare +of the sea. + +In the Spanish War the friction between the United States and Spain +was altogether about Cuba. No serious thought of the invasion of +either country was entertained, no invasion was attempted, and +the only land engagements were some minor engagements in Cuba and +the Philippines. The critical operations were purely naval. In the +first of these, Commodore Dewey's squadron destroyed the entire +Far Eastern squadron of the Spanish in Manila Bay; in the second, +Admiral Sampson's squadron destroyed the entire Atlantic squadron of +the Spanish near Santiago de Cuba. The two naval victories compelled +Spain to make terms of peace practically as the United States wished. +Attention is invited to the fact that this war was not a war of +conquest, was not a war of aggression, was not a war of invasion, +was not a war carried on by either side for any base purpose; but +was in its intention and its results for the benefit of mankind. + +The Russo-Japanese War was due to conflicting national policies. +While each side accused the other of selfish ends, it is not apparent +to a disinterested observer that either was unduly selfish in its +policy, or was doing more than every country ought to advance the +interests and promote the welfare of its people. Russia naturally +had a great deal of interest in Manchuria, and felt that she had +a right to expand through the uncivilized regions of Manchuria, +especially since she needed a satisfactory outlet to the sea. In +other words, the interests of Russia were in the line of its expanding +to the eastward. But Japan's interests were precisely the reverse of +Russia's--that is, Japan's interests demanded that Russia should not +do those things that Russia wanted to do. Japan felt that Russia's +movement toward the East was bringing her entirely too close to +Japan. Russia was too powerful a country, and too aggressive, to +be trusted so close. Japan had the same feeling toward Russia that +any man might have on seeing another man, heavily armed, gradually +coming closer to him in the night. Japan especially wished that +Russia should have no foothold in Corea, feeling, as she expressed +it, that the point of Corea under Russian power would be a dagger +directed at the heart of Japan. This feeling about Corea was the +same feeling that every country has about land near her; it has +a marked resemblance to the feeling that the United States has +embodied in Monroe Doctrine. + +After several years of negotiation in which Japan and Russia endeavored +to secure their respective aims by diplomacy, diplomacy was finally +abandoned and the sword taken up instead. Japan, _because of the +superior foresight of her statesmen_, was the first to realize +that diplomacy must fail, was the first to realize that she must +prepare for war, was the first to begin adequate preparation for +war, was the first to complete preparation for war, was the first +to strike, and in consequence was the victor. Yet Russia was a +very much larger, richer, more populous country than Japan. + +Russia sent large forces of soldiers to Manchuria by the trans-Siberian +railroad, and Japan sent large forces there by transports across the +Sea of Japan. Japan could not prevent the passage of soldiers by +the railroad, but Russia could prevent the passage of transports +across the Japan Sea, provided her fleet could overcome the Japanese +fleet and get command of the sea. Russia had a considerable fleet +in the Far East; but she had so underestimated the naval ability +of the Japanese, that the Russian fleet proved unequal to the task; +and the Japanese gradually reduced it to almost nothing, with very +little loss to themselves. + +Russia then sent out another fleet. The Japanese met this fleet on +the 27th of May, 1904, near the Island of Tsushima, between Corea +and Japan. The battle was decided in about an hour. The Japanese +sank practically all the Russian ships before the battle was entirely +finished, with comparatively small loss to Japan. This battle was +carried on 12,000 miles by sea route from Saint Petersburg. No +invasion of Russia or Japan was contemplated, or attempted, and +yet the naval battle decided the issue of the war completely, and +was followed by a treaty of peace very shortly afterward. + +These wars show us, as do all wars in which navies have engaged, +that the function of a navy is not only to defend the coast in +the sense of preventing an enemy from landing on it, but also to +exert force far distant from the coast. The study of war has taught +its students for many centuries that a merely passive defense will +finally be broken down, and that the most effective defense is +the "offensive-defensive." + +Perhaps the clearest case of a correct offensive-defensive is Nelson's +defense of England, which he carried on in the Mediterranean, in +the West Indies, and wherever the enemy fleet might be, finally +defeating Napoleon's plan for invading England--not by waiting off +the coast of England, but by attacking and crippling Napoleon's +fleet off the Spanish coast near Trafalgar. + +The idea held by many people that the defense of a country can +be effected by simply preventing the invasion of its coasts, is a +little like the notion of uneducated people that a disease can be +cured by suppressing its symptoms. For even a successful defense +of a coast against invasion by a hostile force cannot remove the +inimical influence to a country's commerce and welfare which that +hostile force exerts, any more than palliatives can cure dyspepsia. +Every intelligent physician knows that the only way to cure a disease +is to remove its cause; and every intelligent military or naval man +knows that history teaches that the only way in which a country +can defend itself successfully against an enemy is to defeat the +armed force of that enemy--be it a force of soldiers on the land, or +a force of war-ships on the sea. In naval parlance, "our objective +is the enemy's fleet." + +If the duty of a navy be merely to prevent the actual invasion +of its country's coasts, a great mistake has been made by Great +Britain, France, and other countries in spending so much money +on their navies, and in giving so much attention to the education +and training of their officers and enlisted men. To prevent actual +invasion would be comparatively an easy task, one that could be +performed by rows of forts along the coast, supplemented by mines +and submarines. If that is the only kind of defense required, navies +are hardly needed. The army in each country could man the forts +and operate the mines, and a special corps of the army could even +operate the submarines, which (if their only office is to prevent +actual invasion) need hardly leave the "three-mile limit" that +skirts the coasts. If the people of any country do not care to have +dealings outside; if the nation is willing to be in the position +of a man who is safe so long as he stays in the house, but is afraid +to go outdoors, the problem of national defense is easy. + +But if the people desire to prevent interference with what our +Constitution calls "the general welfare," the problem becomes +exceedingly complex and exceedingly grave--more complex and grave +than any other problem that they have. If they desire that their +ships shall be free to sail the seas, and their citizens to carry +on business and to travel in other lands; and if they desire that +their merchants shall be able to export their wares and their farmers +their grain, also that the people shall be able to import the things +they wish from foreign countries, then they must be able to exert +actual physical force on the ocean at any point where vessels carrying +their exports and imports may be threatened. Naval ships are the +only means for doing this. + +The possibility that an armed force sent to a given point at sea +might have to fight an enemy force, brought about first the sending of +more than one vessel, and later--as the mechanic arts progressed--the +increasing of the size of individual vessels, and later still the +development of novel types. + +There are two main reasons for building a small number of large +ships rather than a large number of small ships. The first reason +is that large ships are much more steady, reliable, safe, and fast +than small ships. The second reason is that, when designed for +any given speed, the large ships have more space available for +whatever is to be carried; one 15-knot ship of 20,000 tons normal +displacement, for instance, has about one and a half times as much +space available for cargo, guns, and what-not, as four 15-knot +ships of 5,000 tons each. These two reasons apply to merchant ships +as well as naval ships. A third reason applies to naval vessels +only, and is that a few large ships can be handled much better +together than a large number of small ships, and embody that +"concentration of force" which it is the endeavor of strategy and +tactics to secure. A fourth reason is the obvious one that large +ships can carry larger guns than small ships. + +The distinctly military (naval) purpose for which a war-ship is +designed necessitates, first, that in addition to her ability to +go rapidly and surely from place to place, she be able to exert +physical force against an enemy ship or fort, and, second, that +she have protection against the fire of guns and torpedoes from +enemy ships and forts, against bombs dropped from aircraft, and +against mines. + +This means that a man-of-war, intended to exert the maximum of +physical force against an enemy and to be able to withstand the +maximum of punishment, must have guns and torpedoes for offense, +and must have armor and cellular division of the hull for defense; +the armor to keep out the enemy's shells, and the cellular division +of the hull to prevent the admission of more water than can fill +one water-tight compartment in case the ship is hit. + +It must be admitted here that, at the present moment, torpedoes +hold such large charges of explosive that the cellular division of +ships does not adequately protect them. This means that a contest +has been going on between torpedo-makers and naval constructors like +the contest between armor-makers and gunmakers, and that just now the +torpedo-makers are in the lead. For this reason a battleship needs +other protection than that imparted by its cellular subdivision. +This is given by its "torpedo defense battery" of minor guns of +about 5-inch calibre. + +By reason of the great vulnerability of all ships to attack below +the water-line, the torpedo was invented and developed. In its +original form, the torpedo was motionless in the water, either +anchored to the ground, or floating on the surface, and was in +fact what now is called a "mine." But forty-eight years ago an +Englishman named Whitehead invented the automobile, auto-steering, +torpedo, which still bears his name. This torpedo is used in all +the navies, and is launched on its mission from battleships, battle +cruisers, destroyers, submarines, and other craft of various kinds. + +Most torpedoes are to be found in destroyers--long, fast, frail +vessels, averaging about 700 tons displacement, that are intended to +dash at enemy ships at night, or under other favorable conditions, +launch their torpedoes, and hurry away. The torpedo is "a weapon +of opportunity." It has had a long, slow fight for its existence; +but its success during the present war has established it firmly +in naval warfare. + +The submarine has followed the destroyer, and some people think +will supplant it; though its relatively slow speed prevents those +dashes that are the destroyer's role. The submarine is, however, +a kind of destroyer that is submersible, in which the necessities +of submersibility preclude great speed. The submarine was designed +to accomplish a clear and definite purpose--a secret under-water +attack on an enemy's ship in the vicinity. It has succeeded so well +in its limited mission that some intelligent people declare that +we need submarines only--ignoring the fact that, even if submarines +could successfully prevent actual invasion, they could not carry +on operations at a distance from their base of supplies. It is +true that submarines may be made so large that they can steam at +great speed from place to place, as capital ships steam now, carry +large supplies of fuel and food, house their crews hygienically, +and need no "mother ship" or tender. But if submarines achieve +such size, they will be more expensive to build and run than +battleships--and will be, in fact, submersible battleships. In +other words, the submarine cannot displace the battleship, but may +be developed and evolved into a new and highly specialized type +of battleship. + +The necessity for operating at long distances from a base carries +with it the necessity for supplying more fuel than even a battleship +can carry; and this means that colliers must be provided. In most +countries, the merchant service is so large that colliers can be +taken from it, but in the United States no adequate merchant marine +exists, and so it is found necessary to build navy colliers and +have them in the fleet. The necessity for continuously supplying +food and ammunition to the fleet necessitates supply ships and +ammunition ships; but the problem of supplying food and ammunition +is not so difficult as that of supplying fuel, for the reason that +they are consumed more slowly. + +In order to take care of the sick and wounded, and prevent them from +hampering the activities of the well, hospital ships are needed. +Hospital ships should, of course, be designed for that purpose +before being constructed; but usually hospital ships were originally +passenger ships, and were adapted to hospital uses later. + +The menace of the destroyer--owing to the sea-worthiness which this +type has now achieved, and to the great range which the torpedo +has acquired--has brought about the necessity of providing external +protection to the battleships; and this is supplied by a "screen" +of cruisers and destroyers, whose duty is to keep enemy destroyers +and (so far as is practicable) the submarines at a safe distance. + +We now see why a fleet must be composed of various types of vessels. +At the present moment, the battleship is the primary, or paramount +type, the others secondary, because the battleship is the type +that can exert the most force, stand the hardest punishment, steam +the farthest in all kinds of weather, and in general, serve her +country the best. + +Of course, "battleship" is merely a name, and some think not a +very good name, to indicate a ship that can take the part in battle +that used to be taken by the "ship of the line." The reason for +its primacy is fundamental: its displacement or total weight--the +same reason that assured the primacy of the ship of the line. For +displacement rules the waves; if "Britannia rules the waves," it +is simply because Britannia has more displacement than any other +Power. + +The fleet needs to have a means of knowing where the enemy is, how +many ships he has, what is their character, the direction in which +they are steaming, and their speed. To accomplish this purpose, +"scouts" are needed--fast ships, that can steam far in all kinds +of weather and send wireless messages across great distances. So +far as their scout duties go, such vessels need no guns whatever, +and no torpedoes; but because the enemy will see the scout as soon +as the scout sees the enemy, and because the enemy will try to +drive away the scout by gun and torpedo fire, the scouts must be +armed. And this necessity is reinforced by the necessity of driving +off an enemy's scouts. + +In foreign navies the need for getting information in defiance +of an enemy's attempts to prevent it, and to drive off the armed +scouts of an enemy, has been one of the prime reasons for developing +"battle cruisers," that combine the speed of the destroyer with +the long steaming radius of the battleship, a battery almost as +strong, and a very considerable protection by armor. + +The aeroplane and the air-ship are recent accessions to the list of +fighting craft. Their role in naval warfare cannot yet be defined, +because the machines themselves have not yet reached an advanced +stage of development, and their probable performance cannot be +forecast. There is no doubt, however, in the minds of naval men +that the role of aircraft is to be important and distinguished. + + + + +CHAPTER III + +NAVAL POWER + +Mahan proved that sea power has exercised a determining influence on +history. He proved that sea power has been necessary for commercial +success in peace and military success in war. He proved that, while +many wars have culminated with the victory of some army, the victory +of some navy had been the previous essential. He proved that the +immediate cause of success had often resulted inevitably from another +cause, less apparent because more profound; that the operations of +the navy had previously brought affairs up to the "mate in four +moves," and that the final victory of the army was the resulting +"checkmate." + +Before Mahan proved his doctrine, it was felt in a general way +that sea power was necessary to the prosperity and security of +a nation. Mahan was not the first to have this idea, for it had +been in the minds of some men, and in the policy of one nation, +for more than a century. Neither was Mahan the first to put forth +the idea in writing; but he was the first to make an absolute +demonstration of the truth. Newton was not the first man to know, +or to say, that things near the earth tend to fall to the earth; but +he was the first to formulate and prove the doctrine of universal +gravitation. In the same way, all through history, we find that +a few master minds have been able to group what had theretofore +seemed unrelated phenomena, and deduce from them certain laws. +In this way they substituted reasoning for speculation, fact for +fancy, wisdom for opportunism, and became the guides of the human +race. + +The effect of the acceptance of Mahan's doctrine was felt at once. +Realizing that the influence of sea power was a fact, comprehending +Great Britain's secret, after Mahan had disclosed it, certain other +great nations of the world, especially Germany, immediately started +with confidence and vigor upon the increase of their own sea power, +and pushed it to a degree before unparalleled; with a result that +must have been amazing to the man who, more than any other, was +responsible for it. + +Since the words "sea power," or their translation, is a recognized +phrase the world over, and since the power of sea power is greater +than ever before, and is still increasing, it may be profitable +to consider sea power as an entity, and to inquire what are its +leading characteristics, and in what it mainly consists. + +There is no trouble in defining what the sea is, but there is a +good deal of trouble in defining what power is. If we look in a +dictionary, we shall find a good many definitions of power; so +many as to show that there are many different kinds of power, and +that when we read of "power," it is necessary to know what kind of +power is meant. Clearly "sea power" means power on the sea. But +what kind of power? There are two large classes into which power +may be divided, passive and active. Certainly we seem justified, +at the start, in declaring that the power meant by Mahan was not +passive, but active. Should this be granted, we cannot be far from +right if we go a step further, and declare that sea power means +ability to do something on the sea. + +If we ask what the something is that sea power has ability to do, +we at once perceive that sea power may be divided into two parts, +commercial power and naval power. + +The power exerted by commercial sea power is clearly that exerted by +the merchant service, and is mainly the power of acquiring money. It +is true that the merchant service has the power of rendering certain +services in war, especially the power of providing auxiliary vessels, +and of furnishing men accustomed to the sea; but as time goes on the +power contributable by the merchant service must steadily decrease, +because of the relatively increasing power of the naval service, and +the rapidly increasing difference between the characteristics of +ships and men suitable for the merchant service and those suitable +for the naval service. + +But even in the past, while the importance of the merchant service was +considerable in the ways just outlined, it may perhaps be questioned +whether it formed an element of _sea power_, in the sense in which +Mahan discussed sea power. The power of every country depends on all +the sources of its wealth: on its agriculture, on its manufacturing +activities, and even more directly on the money derived from exports. +But these sources of wealth and all sources of wealth, including +the merchant service, can hardly be said to be elements of power +themselves, but rather to be elements for whose protection power +is required. + +In fact, apart from its usefulness in furnishing auxiliaries, it +seems certain that the merchant service has been an element of +_weakness_. The need for navies arose from the weakness of merchant +ships and the corresponding necessity for assuring them safe voyages +and proper treatment even in time of peace; while in time of war +they have always been an anxious care, and have needed and received +the protection of fighting ships that have been taken away from +the fleet to act as convoys. + +If commercial sea power was not the power meant by Mahan, then he +must have meant naval power. And if one reads the pages of history +with patient discrimination, the conviction must grow on him that +what really constituted the sea power which had so great an influence +on history, was _naval_ power; not the power of simply ships upon +the sea, but the power of a navy composed of ships able to fight, +manned by men trained to fight, under the command of captains skilled +to fight, and led by admirals determined to fight. Trafalgar was +not won by the merchant service; nor Mobile, Manila, or Tsushima. + +If sea power be essentially naval power, it may be interesting to +inquire: In what does naval power consist and what are its principal +characteristics? + +If one looks at a fleet of war-ships on the sea, he will be impressed +consciously or unconsciously with the idea of power. If he is impressed +consciously, he will see that the fleet represents power in the +broadest sense--power active and power passive; power to do and +power to endure; power to exert force and power to resist it. + +If he goes further and analyzes the reasons for this impression +of power, he will see that it is not merely a mental suggestion, +but a realization of the actual existence of tremendous mechanical +power, under complete direction and control. + +In mechanics we get a definition of power, which, like all definitions +in mechanics, is clear, definite, and correct. In mechanics, power +is the rate at which mechanical work is performed. It is ability +to do something in a certain definite time. + +Now this definition gives us a clear idea of the way in which a +navy directly represents power, because the power which a navy +exerts is, primarily, mechanical; and any other power which it +exerts is secondary and derived wholly from its mechanical power. +The power of a gun is due wholly to the mechanical energy of its +projectile, which enables it to penetrate a resisting body; and +the power of a moving ship is due wholly to the mechanical energy +of the burning coal within its furnaces. + +It may be objected that it is not reasonable to consider a ship's +energy of motion as an element of naval power, in the mechanical +sense in which we have been using the word "power," for the reason +that it could be exerted only by the use of her ram, an infrequent +use. To this it may be answered that energy is energy, no matter +to what purpose it is applied; that a given projectile going at +a given speed has a certain energy, whether it strikes its target +or misses it; and that a battleship going at a certain speed must +necessarily have a certain definite energy, no matter whether it +is devoted to ramming another ship or to carrying itself and its +contents from one place to another. + +Besides the mechanical power exerted by the mere motion of the +ship, and often superior to it, there is the power of her guns and +torpedoes. + +Perhaps the most important single invention ever made was the invention +of gunpowder. Why? Because it put into the hands of man a tremendous +force, compressed into a very small volume, which he could use +instantaneously or refrain from using at his will. Its first use +was in war; and in war has been its main employment ever since. +War gives the best field for the activity of gunpowder, because +in war, we always wish to exert a great force at a definite point +at a given instant; usually in order to _penetrate_ the bodies of +men, or some defensive work that protects them. Gunpowder is the +principal agent used in war up to the present date. It is used +by both armies and navies, but navies use it in larger masses, +fired in more powerful guns. + +Of course this does not mean that it would be impossible to send +a lot of powder to a fort, more than a fleet could carry, and fire +it; but it does mean that history shows that forts have rarely +been called upon to fire much powder, that their lives have been +serene, and that most of the powder fired on shore has been fired +by infantry using muskets--though a good deal has been fired by +field and siege artillery. + +Leaving forts out of consideration and searching for something +else in which to use gunpowder on a large scale, we come to +siege-pieces, field-pieces, and muskets. Disregarding siege-pieces +and field-pieces, for the reason that the great variety of types +makes it difficult to compare them with navy guns, we come to muskets. + +Now the musket is an extremely formidable weapon, and has, perhaps, +been the greatest single contributor to the victory of civilization +over barbarism, and order over anarchy, that has ever existed up to +the present time. But the enormous advances in engineering, including +ordnance, during the last fifty years, have reduced enormously the +relative value of the musket. Remembering that energy, or the ability +to do work, is expressed by the formula: E=1/2 MV^2, remembering +that the projectile of the modern 12-inch gun starts at about 2,900 +f. s. velocity and weighs 867 pounds, while the bullet of a musket +weighs only 150 grains and starts with a velocity of 2,700 feet +per second, we see that the energy of the 12-inch projectile is +about 47,000 times that of the bullet on leaving the muzzle. But +after the bullet has gone, say 5,000 yards, its energy has fallen +to zero, while the energy of the 12-inch projectile is nearly the +same as when it started. + +While it would be truthful, therefore, to say that the energy of +the 12-inch gun within 5,000 yards is greater than that of 47,000 +muskets, it would also be truthful to say that outside of 5,000 +yards, millions of muskets would not be equal to one 12-inch gun. + +Not only is the 12-inch gun a weapon incomparably great, compared +with the musket, but when placed in a naval ship, it possesses a +portability which, while not an attribute of the gun itself, is +an attribute of the combination of gun and ship, and a distinct +attribute of naval power. A 12-inch gun placed in a fort may be +just as good as a like gun placed in a ship, but it has no power +to exert its power usefully unless some enemy comes where the gun +can hit it. And when one searches the annals of history for the +records of whatever fighting forts have done, he finds that they +have been able to do very little. But a 12-inch gun placed in a +man-of-war can be taken where it is needed, and recent history +shows that naval 12-inch guns, modern though they are, have already +done effective work in war. + +Not only are 12-inch guns powerful and portable, but modern mechanical +science has succeeded in so placing them in our ships that they can +be handled with a precision, quickness, and delicacy that have +no superior in any other branch of engineering. While granting +the difficulty of an exact comparison, I feel no hesitation in +affirming that the greatest triumph of the engineering art in handling +heavy masses is to be found in the turret of a battleship. Here +again, and even inside of 5,000 yards, we find the superiority +of the great gun over the musket, as evidenced by its accuracy in +use. No soldier can fire his musket, even on a steady platform, +himself and target stationary, and the range known perfectly, as +accurately as a gun-pointer can fire a 12-inch gun; and if gun +and target be moving, and the wind be blowing, and the range only +approximately known, as is always the case in practice, the advantage +of the big gun in accuracy becomes incomparable. + +But it is not only the big projectile itself which has energy, for +this projectile carries a large charge of high explosive, which +exploding some miles away from where it started, exerts a power +inherent in itself, that was exhibited with frightful effect at +the battles of Tsushima and the Skagerak. + +This brings us to the auto-torpedo, a weapon recently perfected; +in fact not perfected yet. Here is another power that science has +put into the hands of naval men in addition to those she had already +put there. The auto-torpedo, launched in security from below the +water-line of the battleship, or from a destroyer or submarine, +can be directed in a straight line over a distance and with a speed +that are constantly increasing with the improvement of the weapon. +At the present moment, a speed of 27 knots over 10,000 yards can +be depended on, with a probability that on striking an enemy's +ship below the water-line it will disable that ship, if not sink +her. There seems no doubt that, in a very few years, the systematic +experiments now being applied to the development of the torpedo +will result in a weapon which can hardly be called inferior to +the 12-inch or even 16-inch gun and will probably surpass it. + +_Controllability_.--If one watches a fleet of ships moving on the +sea, he gets an impression of tremendous power. But if he watches +Niagara, or a thunder-storm, he also gets an impression of tremendous +power. But the tremendous power of Niagara, or the thunder-storm, +is a power that belongs to Niagara or the thunder-storm, and not to +man. Man cannot control the power of Niagara or the thunder-storm; +but he can control the power of a fleet. + +Speaking, then, from the standpoint of the human being, one may say +that the fleet has the element of controllability, while Niagara +and the thunder-storm have not. One man can make the fleet go faster +or slower or stop; he can increase its power of motion or decrease +it at his will; he can reduce it to zero. He cannot do so with +the forces of nature. + +_Directability_.--Not only can one man control the power of the +fleet, he can also direct it; that is, can turn it to the right +or the left as much as he wishes. But one man cannot change the +direction of motion of Niagara or the lightning-bolt. + +_Power, Controllability, and Directability_.--We may say, then, +that a fleet combines the three elements of mechanical power, +controllability, and directability. + +_The Unit of Military Power_.--This is an enormous power that has +come into the hands of the naval nations; but it has come so newly +that we do not appreciate it yet. One reason why we do not and cannot +appreciate it correctly is that no units have been established by +which to measure it. + +To supply this deficiency, the author begs leave to point out that, +since the military power of every nation has until recently been +its army, of which the unit has been the soldier, whose power has +rested wholly in his musket, the musket has actually been the unit +of military power. In all history, the statement of the number of +men in each army has been put forward by historians as giving the +most accurate idea of their fighting value; and in modern times, +nearly all of these men have been armed with muskets only. + +It has been said already that the main reason why the invention +of gunpowder was so important was that it put into the hands of +man a tremendous mechanical power compressed into a very small +space, which man could use or not use at his will. This idea may +be expressed by saying that gunpowder combines power and great +controllability. But it was soon discovered that this gunpowder, +put into a tube with a bullet in front of it, could discharge that +bullet in any given direction. A musket was the result, and it +combined the three requisites of a weapon--mechanical power, +controllability, and directability. + +While the loaded gun is perhaps the clearest example of the combination +of the three factors we are speaking of, the moving ship supplies +the next best example. It has very much greater mechanical power; +and in proportion to its mass, almost as much controllability and +directability. + +The control and direction of a moving ship are very wonderful things; +but the very ease with which they are exercised makes us overlook +the magnitude of the achievement and the perfection of the means +employed. It may seem absurd to speak of one man controlling and +directing a great ship, but that is pretty nearly what happens +sometimes; for sometimes the man at the wheel is the only man on +board doing anything at all; and he is absolutely directing the +entire ship. At such times (doubtless they are rare and short) +the man at the wheel on board, say the _Vaterland_, is directing +unassisted by any human being a mass of 65,000 tons, which is going +through the water at a speed of 24 knots, or 27 miles, an hour, +nearly as fast as the average passenger-train. In fact, it would +be very easy to arrange on board the _Vaterland_ that this should +actually happen; that everybody should take a rest for a few minutes, +coal-passers, water-tenders, oilers, engineers, and the people +on deck. And while such an act might have no particular value, +_per se_, and prove nothing important, yet, nevertheless, a brief +reflection on the possibility may be interesting, and lead us to +see clearly into the essential nature of what is here called +"directability." The man at the wheel on board the _Vaterland_, +so long as the fires burn and the oil continues to lubricate the +engines, has a power in his hands that is almost inconceivable. +The ship that he is handling weighs more than the 870,000 men that +comprise the standing army of Germany. + +Now can anybody imagine the entire standing army of Germany being +carried along at 27 miles an hour and turned almost instantly to the +right or left by one man? The standing army of Germany is supposed +to be the most directable organization in the world; but could +the Emperor of Germany move that army at a speed of 27 miles an +hour and turn it as a whole (not its separate units) through 90 +degrees in three minutes? + +The _Vaterland_ being a merchant ship and not fully representing naval +power, perhaps it might be better to take, say, the _Pennsylvania_. +The weight is about half that of the _Vaterland_, that is, it is +nearly twice the weight of the men of the British standing army; +and the usual speed is about, say, 15 knots. But in addition to +all the power of the ship, as a ship, or an energy greater than +that of 275,000 muskets, she has the power of all the guns, twelve +14-inch guns, and twenty-two 5-inch guns, whose projectiles, not +including the torpedoes fired from four torpedo-tubes, have an +energy at the muzzle equal to 750,000 muskets, seven-eighths of +all the muskets in the German standing army. Now any one who has +seen a battleship at battle practice knows that all the various +tremendous forces are under excellent direction and control. And +while it cannot be strictly said that they are absolutely under +the direction and control of the captain, while it must be admitted +that no one man can really direct so many rapidly moving things, +yet it is certainly well within the truth to say that the ship +and all it contains are very much more under the control of her +captain than the German standing army is under the control of the +Kaiser. The captain, acting through the helmsman, chief engineer, +gunnery officer, and executive officer, can get very excellent +information as to what is going on, and can have his orders carried +out with very little delay; but the mere space occupied by an army +of 870,000 men, and the unavoidable dispersion of its units prevent +any such exact control. + +In other words, the captain of the _Pennsylvania_ wields a weapon +more mechanically powerful than all the muskets of the German standing +army: and his control of it is more absolute than is the Kaiser's +control of that army. + +_Mechanism vs. Men_.--Now what is the essential reason for the +efficient direction exercised by the helmsman of the _Pennsylvania_, +and the relative impotency of generals? Is it not that the helmsman +acts through the medium of mechanism, while the generals act through +the medium of men? A ship is not only made of rigid metal, but all +her parts are fastened together with the utmost rigidity; while +the parts of an army are men, who are held together by no means +whatever except that which discipline gives, and the men themselves +are far from rigid. In the nature of things it is impossible that +an army should be directed as perfectly as a ship. The rudder of a +ship is a mechanical appliance that can be depended upon to control +the direction of the ship absolutely, while an army has no such +a thing as a rudder, or anything to take its place. Again, the +rudder is only a few hundred feet from the helmsman, and the +communication between them, including the steering-engine itself, +is a strong reliable mechanism that has no counterpart in the army. + +The control of the main engines of a ship is almost as absolute +as the control of the rudder; and the main engines are not only +much more powerful than the legs of soldiers, but they act together +in much greater harmony. + +_Inherent Power of a Battleship_.--Possibly the declaration may be +accepted now that a battleship of 30,000 tons, such as the navies +are building now, with, say, twelve 14-inch guns is a greater example +of power, under the absolute direction and control than anything +else existing; and that the main reason is the concentration of +a tremendous amount of mechanical energy in a very small space, +all made available by certain properties of water. Nothing like +a ship can be made to run on shore; but if an automobile could +be constructed, carrying twelve 14-inch guns, twenty-two 5-inch +guns, and four torpedo-tubes, of the size of the _Pennsylvania_, +and with her armor, able to run over the land in any direction at +20 knots, propelled by engines of 31,000 horse-power, it could +whip an army of a million men just as quickly as it could get hold +of its component parts. Such a machine could start at one end of +an army and go through to the other like a mowing-machine through +a field of wheat; and knock down all the buildings in New York +afterward, smash all the cars, break down all the bridges, and sink +all the shipping. + +_Inherent Power of a Fleet_.--An idea of the power exertable by a +fleet of modern ships may be derived from the following comparison. + +When Sherman made his wonderful march to the sea from Atlanta to +Savannah, he made a march whose details are historically known, +which was unopposed, which was over a flat country, in good weather, +and without the aid of railroad-trains. It was a march, pure and +simple; and inasmuch as men are the same now as they were then, it +gives excellent data of the way in which purely military or army +power can move from one place to another, _while still preserving +its character and exercising its functions_. Similarly, when Admiral +Schroeder, in November, 1910, went from the east coast of the United +States to the English Channel, his march was unopposed, its details +are known, and it gave an excellent illustration of how naval power +can move from one place to another, _while still preserving its +character and exercising its functions_. + +Now General Sherman was a man of world-wide fame, and so were some +of his generals, and Sherman's fame will last for centuries. Compared +with Sherman, Admiral Schroeder was obscure; and compared with +Sherman's officers, Admiral Schroeder's were obscure. Sherman's +soldiers, privates and all, were made glorious for the rest of +their lives by having been in Sherman's march to the sea, while +Admiral Schroeder's sailors achieved no glory at all. So, the next +paragraph is not intended to detract in the slightest from Sherman +and his army, but simply to point out the change in conditions +that mechanical progress has brought about. + +The statement of comparison is simply that when General Sherman +marched from Atlanta to the sea his army composed 62,000 men, and +it took him twenty-five days to go about 230 land miles or 200 sea +miles; and when Admiral Schroeder went from our coast to Europe he +had 16 ships, and he made the trip of more than 3,000 sea miles in +less than fourteen days. Disregarding twenty-eight 5-inch guns, two +hundred and fifty-two 3-inch guns, and a lot of smaller guns, and +disregarding all the torpedoes, Admiral Schroeder took eighty-four +12-inch guns, ninety-six 8-inch guns, eighty-eight 7-inch guns, +and forty-eight 6-inch guns, _all mounted and available_; which, +assuming the power of the modern musket as a unit, equalled more +than 5,000,000 modern muskets. + +Such an enormous transfer of absolute, definite, available power +would be impossible on land, simply because no means has been devised +to accomplish it. Such a transfer on land would be the transfer +of ninety times as many soldiers as Sherman had (even supposing +they had modern muskets) over fifteen times the distance and at +thirty times the speed; and as the work done in going from one +place to another varies practically as the square of the speed, a +transfer on land equivalent in magnitude and speed to Schroeder's +would be a performance 90 x 15 x 30^2= 1,215,000 times as great +as Sherman's. + +This may seem absurd, and perhaps it is; but why? The comparison +is not between the qualities of the men or between the results +achieved. Great results often are brought about by very small forces, +as when some state of equilibrium is disturbed, and vice versa. The +comparison attempted is simply between the _power_ of a certain +army and the power of a certain fleet. And while it is true that, +for some purposes, such as overcoming small resistance, great power +may not be as efficacious as feeble power or even gentleness, yet, +nevertheless, it must be clear that, for the overcoming of _great_ +resistance quickly great power must be applied. + +The existence of a certain power is quite independent of the +desirability of using it. The existence of the power is all the +writer wishes to insist upon at present; the question of its employment +will be considered later. + +Not only is the power of a fleet immeasurably greater than that of +an army, but it must always be so, from the very nature of things. +The speed of an army, _while exercising the functions of an army_, +and the power of a musket, while exercising its functions as a +weapon of one soldier, cannot change much from what they were when +Sherman went marching through Georgia. But, thanks to mechanical +science, there is no limit in sight to the power to which a fleet +may attain. + +The power of a navy is of recent growth, but it is increasing and +is going to continue to increase. Every advance of civilization will +advance the navy. Every new discovery and invention will directly +or indirectly serve it. The navy, more than any other thing, will +give opportunity for mechanism and to mechanism. Far beyond any +possible imagination of to-day, it will become the highest expression +of the Genius of Mechanism, and the embodiment of its spirit. + +The amount of money now being spent by the United States on its +navy is so great that the expenditure can be justified only on +the basis that great naval power is essential to the country. + +Is it essential, and if so, why? + +_Primary Use for a Navy_.--To answer this wisely, it may be well +to remind ourselves that the principal object of all the vocations +of men is directly or indirectly the acquiring of money. Money, of +course, is not wealth; but it is a thing which can be so easily +exchanged for wealth, that it is the thing which most people work +for. Of course, at bottom, the most important work is the getting +of food out of the ground; but inasmuch as people like to congregate +together in cities, the thing taken out of the ground in one place +must be transported to other places; and inasmuch as every person +wants every kind of thing that he can get, a tremendous system of +interchange, through the medium of money, has been brought about, +which is called "trade." For the protection of property and life, and +in order that trade may exist at all, an enormous amount of human +machinery is employed which we call "government." This government +is based on innumerable laws, but these laws would be of no avail +unless they were carried out; and every nation in the world has +found that employment of a great deal of force is necessary in +order that they shall be carried out. This force is mainly exercised +by the police of the cities; but many instances have occurred in +the history of every country where the authority of the police +has had to be supported by the army of the national government. +There is no nation in the world, and there never has been one, +in which the enforcement of the necessary laws for the protection +of the lives, property, and trade of the people has not depended +ultimately on the army; and the reason why the army could enforce +the laws was simply the fact that the army had the power to inflict +suffering and death. + +As long as a maritime country carried on trade within its own borders +exclusively, as long as it lived within itself, so long as its +people did not go to countries oversea, a navy was not necessary. +But when a maritime country is not contented to live within its +own borders, then a navy becomes essential to guard its people +and their possessions on the highways of the sea; to enforce, not +municipal or national law, as an army does, but international law. + +Now the desire of the people of a country to extend their trade +beyond the seas seems in some ways not always a conscious desire, +not a deliberate intent, but to be an effort of self-protection, +or largely an effort of expansion; for getting room or employment. +As the people of a country become civilized, labor-saving devices +multiply; and where one man by means of a machine can do the work +of a hundred, ninety-nine men may be thrown out of employment; out +of a hundred men who till the soil, only one man may be selected +and ninety-nine men have to seek other employment. Where shall it +be gotten? Evidently it must be gotten in some employment which +may be called "artificial," such as working in a shop of some kind, +or doing some manufacturing work. But so long as a people live +unto themselves only, each nation can practically make and use all +the machinery needed within its borders, and still not employ all +the idle hands; and when the population becomes dense, employment +must be sought in making goods to sell beyond the sea. The return +comes back, sometimes in money, sometimes in the products of the +soil and the mine and the manufactures of foreign lands. + +In this way every nation becomes like a great business firm. It +exports (that is, sells,) certain things, and it imports (that +is, buys,) certain things; and if it sells more than it buys it is +making money; if it buys more than it sells it is spending money. +This is usually expressed by saying that the "balance of trade" +is in its favor or against it. + +In a country like the United States, or any other great nation, the +amount of exporting and importing, of buying and selling almost every +conceivable article under the sun, is carried on in the millions and +millions of dollars; and so perfect has the organization for doing +this business become in every great country, that the products of +the most distant countries can be bought in almost every village; +and any important event in any country produces a perceptible effect +wherever the mail and telegraph go. + +The organization for effecting this in every country is so excellent +and so wonderful, that it is like a machine. + +In fact, it is a machine, and with all the faults of a machine. +Now one of the faults of a machine, a fault which increases in +importance with the complexity of the machine, is the enormous +disturbance which may be produced by a cause seemingly trivial. +That such is the case with the machine which the commerce of every +great nation comprises, every-day experience confirms. So long +as the steamers come and go with scheduled regularity, so long +will the money come in at the proper intervals and be distributed +through the various channels; so long will the people live the +lives to which they are habituated; so long will order reign. + +But suppose the coming and going of all the steamers were suddenly +stopped by a blockade. While it may be true that, in a country like +the United States, no foreign trade is really necessary; while it +may be true that the people of the United States would be just as +happy, though not so rich, if they had no foreign trade--yet the +sudden stoppage of foreign trade would not bring about a condition +such as would have existed if we had never had any foreign trade, +but would bring about a chaotic condition which cannot fitly be +described by a feebler word than "horrible." The whole machinery of +every-day life would be disabled. Hundreds of thousands of people +would be thrown out of employment, and the whole momentum of the +rapidly moving enormous mass of American daily life would receive +a violent shock which would strain to its elastic limit every part +of the entire machine. + +It would take a large book to describe what would ensue from the +sudden stoppage of the trade of the United States with countries +over the sea. Such a book would besides be largely imaginative; +because in our history such a condition has never yet arisen. Although +wars have happened in the past in which there has been a blockade +of our coast more or less complete, peace has been declared before +the suffering produced had become very acute; and furthermore the +conditions of furious trade which now exist have never existed +before. Disasters would ensue, apart from the actual loss of money, +owing simply to the sudden change. In a railroad-train standing +still or moving at a uniform speed, the passengers are comfortable; +but if that same train is suddenly brought to rest when going at a +high speed, say by collision, the consequences are horrible in the +extreme, and the horror is caused _simply by the suddenness of the +change_. The same is true all through nature and human nature. Any +sudden change in the velocity of any mass has its exact counterpart +in any sudden change in the conditions of living of any man or +woman, or any sudden change in the conditions under which any +organization must carry on its business. The difficulty is not with +individuals only, or with the organizations themselves, and does +not rest solely on the personal inability of people to accommodate +themselves to the losing of certain conveniences or luxuries; but it +is an inertia which resists even the strenuous efforts of individuals +and organizations to meet new situations promptly, and to grapple +effectively with new problems. + +Every organization, no matter how small, is conducted according +to some system, and that system is based upon certain more or less +permanent conditions, which, if suddenly changed, make the system +inapplicable. The larger the organization and the more complex it +is, the more will it be deranged by any change of external conditions +and the longer time will it take to adapt itself to them. + +The sudden stoppage of our sea trade, including our coasting trade, +by even a partial blockade of our ports, would change practically +all the conditions under which we live. There is hardly a single +organization in the country which would not be affected by it. +And, as every organization would know that every other organization +would be affected, but to a degree which could not possibly be +determined, because there would be no precedent, it cannot be an +exaggeration to declare that the blockading of our principal ports +would, entirely apart from direct loss of money and other commodities, +produce a state of confusion, out of which order could not possibly +be evolved except by the raising of the blockade. + +In addition to the confusion brought about, there would, of course, +be the direct loss of money and non-receipt of imported things; +but what would probably be the very worst thing of all would be +the numbers of men thrown out of employment by the loss of foreign +markets. _So long as a country can keep its people in employment, +so long the people will live in comparative order_. But when there +are many unemployed men in a country, not only do their families +lose the means of subsistence, but the very fact of the men being +unemployed leads them into mischief. Should the ports of any great +commercial nation be suddenly closed, the greatest danger to the +country would not be from the enemy outside, but from the unemployed +people inside, unless the government gave them employment, by enlisting +them in an enormous, improvised army. + +It will be seen, therefore, that the blockading of the principal +ports of any purely commercial country would be a disaster so great +that there could not be a greater one except actual invasion. Another +disaster might be the total destruction of its fleet by the enemy's +fleet; but the only _direct_ result of this would be that the people +of the country would have fewer ships to support and fewer men +to pay. The loss of the fleet and the men would not _per se_ be +any loss whatever to the country, but rather a gain. The loss of +the fleet, however, would make it possible for the enemy's fleet +to blockade our ports later, and thus bring about the horrors of +which we have spoken. + +While it is true that an absolute blockade of any port might be +practically impossible at the present day, while it is true that +submarines and torpedo-boats might compel blockading ships to keep +at such distance from ports that many loopholes of escape would be +open to blockade runners, yet it may be pointed out that even a +partial blockade, even a blockade that made it risky for vessels +to try to break it, would have a very deleterious effect upon the +prosperity of the country and of every man, woman, and child within +it. A blockade like this was that maintained during the greater +part of the Civil War by the Northern States against the Southern +States. This blockade, while not perfect, while it was such as to +permit many vessels to pass both ways, was nevertheless so effective +that it made it impossible for the Southern States to be prosperous, +or to have any reasonable hope of ever being prosperous. And while +it would be an exaggeration to state that the navy itself, unaided +by the army, could have brought the South to terms; while it would +be an exaggeration to state that all the land battles fought in the +Civil War were unnecessary, that all the bloodshed and all the ruin +of harvests and of homesteads were unnecessary, nevertheless it does +seem that so long as the navy maintained the blockade which it did +maintain, the people of the South would have been prevented from +achieving enough prosperity to carry on an independent government; +so that their revolt would have failed. The South, not being able +to raise the blockade by means of their navy, might have tried to +do so by sending an army into the Northern States, to whip the +Northerners on their own ground; but this would clearly have been +impossible. + +The sentences above are not written with the intention of minimizing +the services rendered by the army in the Civil War, or of detracting +from the glory of the gallant officers and men who composed it, or +of subtracting one jot or tittle from a grateful appreciation of +their hardships and bloodshed; neither do they dare to question +the wisdom of the statesmen who directed that the war should be +fought mainly by the army. Their sole intention is to point out +that, if a meagre naval force could produce so great an effect +against a country _mainly agricultural_, a very powerful naval +force, blockading effectively the principal ports of a _manufacturing +country_, would have an effect so great that it can hardly be estimated. + +It is plainly to be seen that the effect of a blockade against a +purely commercial country by a modern navy would be incomparably +greater now than it was fifty years ago, for two very important +reasons. One reason is that the progress of modern engineering +has made navies very much more powerful than they were fifty years +ago; and the other reason is that the same cause has made countries +very much more vulnerable to blockade, because it has made so many +millions of people dependent upon manufacturing industries and the +export of manufactured things, and forced them to live an artificial +life. While the United States, for instance, does not depend for +its daily bread on the regular coming of wheat from over the sea, +yet millions of its people do depend, though indirectly, upon the +money from the export of manufactured things; for with countries, +as with people, habits are formed both of system and of mode of +life, which it is dangerous suddenly to break; so that a country +soon becomes as dependent upon outside commerce as a man does upon +outside air, and a people suddenly deprived of a vigorous outside +commerce would seem to be smothered almost like a man deprived +of outside air. + +A rough idea of the possible effect of a blockade of our coast may +be gathered from the fact that our exports last year were valued +at more than $2,000,000,000; which means that goods to this amount +were sold, for which a return was received, either in money or +its equivalent, most of it, ultimately, as wages for labor. Of +course no blockade could stop all of this; but it does not seem +impossible that it could stop half of it, if our fleet were destroyed +by the enemy. Supposing that this half were divided equally among +all the people in the United States, it would mean that each man, +woman, and child would lose about $10 in one year. If the loss +could be so divided up, perhaps no very great calamity would ensue. +But, of course, no such division could be made, with the result +that a great many people, especially poor people, earning wages +by the day, would lose more than they could stand. Suppose, for +instance, that a number of people earning about $900 a year, by +employment in export enterprises, were the people upon whom the +actual loss eventually fell by their being thrown out of employment. +This would mean that more than a million people--men, women, and +children--would be actually deprived of the means of living. It +seems clear that such a thing would be a national disaster, for +any loss of money to one man always means a loss of money or its +equivalent to other men besides. For instance: suppose A owes $20 +to B, B owes $20 to C, C owes $20 to D, D owes $20 to E, E owes +$20 to F, F owes $20 to G, G owes $20 to H, H owes $20 to I, and +I to J. If A is able to pay B, and does so, then B pays C, and so +on, and everybody is happy. But suppose that A for some reason, +say a blockade, fails to receive some money that he expected; then +A cannot pay B, B cannot pay C, and so on; with the result, that +not only does J lose his $20, but nine men are put in debt $20 +which they cannot pay; with the further result that A is dunned by +H, B is dunned by C, and so on, producing a condition of distress +which would seem to be out of all proportion to a mere lack of $20, +but which would, nevertheless, be the actual result. So in this +country of 100,000,000 people, the sudden loss of $1,000,000,000 +a year would produce a distress seemingly out of all proportion +to that sum of money, because the individual loss of every loser +would be felt by everybody else. + +Since to a great manufacturing nation, like ours, the greatest +danger from outside (except actual invasion) would seem to be the +sudden stoppage of her oversea trade by blockade, we seem warranted +in concluding that, since _the only possible means of preventing +a blockade is a navy_, the primary use for our navy is to prevent +blockade. + +This does not mean that a fleet's place is on its own coast, because +a blockade might be better prevented by having the fleet elsewhere; +in fact it is quite certain that its place is not on the coast as +a rule, but at whatever point is the best with relation to the +enemy's fleet, until the enemy's fleet is destroyed. In fact, since +the defensive and the offensive are so inseparably connected that +it is hard sometimes to tell where one begins and the other ends, +the best position for our fleet might be on the enemy's coast. It +may be objected that the coast of the United States is so long +that it would be impossible to blockade it. Perhaps, but that is +not necessary: it would suffice to blockade Boston, Newport, New +York, the Delaware, the Chesapeake, and the Gulf, say with forty +ships. And we must remember that blockade running would be much more +difficult now than in the Civil War, because of the increased power +and accuracy of modern gunnery and the advent of the search-light, +wireless telegraph, and aeroplane. + +It may also be objected that the blockading of even a defenseless +coast would cost the blockading country a good deal of money, by +reason of the loss of trade with that country. True; but war is +always expensive, and the blockade would be very much more expensive +to the blockaded country; and though it might hold out a long while, +it would be compelled to yield in the end, not only because of the +blockade itself but because of the pressure of neutral countries; +and the longer it held out, the greater the indemnity it would +have to pay. The expense of blockading would therefore be merely +a profitable investment. + +The author is aware that actual invasion of a country from the +sea would be a greater disaster than blockade, and that defense +against invasion has often been urged in Great Britain as a reason +for a great navy; so that the primary reason for a navy might be +said to be defense against invasion. But why should an enemy take +the trouble to invade us? Blockade is easier and cheaper, and can +accomplish almost everything that an enemy desires, especially +if it be enlivened by the occasional dropping of thousand-pound +shells into Wall Street and the navy-yard. + +While, however, the _primary_ use of naval power seems to be to +prevent blockade, a navy, like any other weapon, may be put to +any other uses which circumstances indicate. For instance, the +Northerners in the Civil War used the navy not to prevent blockade, +but to make blockade; the Japanese used the navy to cover the +transportation of their armies to Manchuria and Corea; and Great +Britain has always used her navy to protect her trade routes. + +A general statement of the various uses of a navy has been put into +the phrase "command of the sea." + +Of course, the probability of getting "command of the sea," or +of desiring to get it is dependent on the existence of a state +of war, and there are some who believe that the probability of +our becoming involved in a war with a great naval nation is too +slight to warrant the expense of money and labor needed to prepare +the necessary naval power. So it may be well to consider what is +the degree of probability. + +This degree of probability cannot be determined as accurately as +the probabilities of fire, death, or other things against which +insurance companies insure us; for the reason that wars have been +much less frequent than fires, deaths, etc., while the causes that +make and prevent them are much more numerous and obscure. It seems +clear, however, that, as between two countries of equal wealth, +the probability of war varies with the disparity between their +navies, and unless other nations are involved, is practically zero, +when their navies are equal in power; and that, other factors being +equal, the _greatest probability of war is between two countries, +of which one is the more wealthy and the other the more powerful_. + +In reckoning the probability of war, we must realize that _the most +pregnant cause of war is the combination of conflicting interests +with disparity in power_. And we must also realize that it is not +enough to consider the situation as it is now: that it is necessary +to look at least ten years ahead, because it would take the United +States that length of time to prepare a navy powerful enough to +fight our possible foes with reasonable assurance of success. + +Ten years, however, is not really far enough ahead to look, for +the simple reason that, while we could get a great many ships ready +in ten years, we could not get the entire navy ready as will be +explained later. If, for instance, some change in policies or in +interests should make war with Great Britain probable within ten +years, we could not possibly build a navy that could prevent our +being beaten, and blockaded, and forced to pay an enormous indemnity. + +Is there _no_ probability of this? Perhaps there is no great +probability; but there certainly is a possibility. In fact, it +might be a very wise act for Great Britain, seeing us gradually +surpassing her, to go to war with us before it is too late, and +crush us. It has often been said that Great Britain could not afford +to go to war with us, because so many of her commercial interests +would suffer. Of course, they would suffer for a while; but so do +the commercial interests of competing railroads when they begin +to cut rates. Cutting rates is war--commercial war: but it is often +carried on, nevertheless, and at tremendous cost. + +Just now, Great Britain does not wish to crush us; but it is certain +that she can. It is certain that the richest country in the world +lies defenseless against the most powerful; and that we could not +alter this condition in ten years, even if we started to build +an adequate navy now. + +Yet even if the degree of probability of war with Great Britain, +within say ten years, seems so small that we need not consider her, +are there no other great Powers with whom the degree of probability +of war is great enough to make it wise for us to consider them? + +Before answering this question, let us realize clearly that one +of the strongest reasons that leads a country to abstain from war, +even to seek relief from wrongs, actual or imagined, is a doubt +of success; and that that reason disappears if another country, +sufficiently powerful to assure success, is ready to help her, +either by joining openly with her, or by seeking war herself at +the same time with the same country. As we all know, cases like +this have happened in the past. Great Britain knows it; and the +main secret of her wealth is that she has always been strong enough +to fight any two countries. + +It is plain that a coalition of two countries against us is possible +now. The United States is regarded with feelings of extreme irritation +by the two most warlike nations in the world, one on our eastern side +and the other on the western. War with either one would call for +all the energies of the country, and the issue would be doubtful. +But if either country should consider itself compelled to declare +war, the other, if free at the time, might see her opportunity to +declare war simultaneously. The result would be the same as if +we fought Great Britain, except that our Pacific coast would be +blockaded besides the Atlantic, and we should have to pay indemnity +to two countries instead of to one country. + +A coalition between these two countries would be an ideal arrangement, +because it would enable each country to force us to grant the conditions +it desires, and secure a large indemnity besides. + +Would Great Britain interfere in our behalf? This can be answered +by the man so wise that he knows what the international situation +and the commercial situation will be ten years hence. Let him speak. + + +WILL THE IMPORTANCE OF NAVAL POWER INCREASE OR DECREASE? + +It is clear that the importance to a country of a navy varies with +two things--the value of that country's foreign trade and the +probability of war. + +It is also clear that, other things being equal, the probability +of a country becoming involved in war varies as the value of her +foreign trade; because the causes of friction and the money at +stake vary in that proportion. + +Therefore, _the importance to a country of her navy varies as the +square of the value of her foreign trade_. + +In order to answer the question, therefore, we must first consider +whether foreign trade--sea trade--is going to increase or decrease. + +As to the United States alone, the value of our exports is about +ten times what it was fifty years ago, and it promises to increase. +But the United States is only one country, and perhaps her increase +in foreign trade has been due to conditions past or passing. So +what is the outlook for the future, both for the United States +and other countries? Will other countries seek foreign trade? + +Yes. The recent commercial progress of Germany, Argentina, and +Japan, shows the growing recognition by civilized and enterprising +countries of the benefits of foreign trade, and of the facilities +for attaining it which are now given by the advent of large, swift, +modern steamers; steamers which are becoming larger and swifter +and safer every year, more and more adapted for ocean trade. For +not only have the writings of Mahan brought about an increase in +the sea power of every great country; but this increase has so +aroused the attention of the engineering professions that the +improvement of ships, engines, and other sea material has gone ahead +faster than all the other engineering arts. + +The reason why the engineering arts that are connected with the +sea have gone ahead more rapidly than any other arts is simply +that they are given wider opportunity and a greater scope. It is +inherent in the very nature of things that it is easier to transport +things by water than by land; that water transportation lends itself +in a higher degree to the exercise of engineering skill, to the +attainment of great results. + +The underlying reason for this difference seems to be that it is +not possible to make any vehicle to travel on land appreciably +larger than the present automobile, unless it run on rails; whereas +the floating power of water is such that vehicles can be made, and +are made, as large as 65,000 tons. The _Mauretania_, of 45,000 +tons displacement, has been running for eight years, larger vessels +are even now running and vessels larger still will undoubtedly +be run; for the larger the ships, the less they cost per ton of +carrying power, the faster they go, and the safer they are. + +Sea commerce thus gives to engineers, scientists, and inventors, +as well as to commercial men, that gift of the gods--opportunity. +The number of ships that now traverse the ocean and the larger +bodies of water communicating with it aggregate millions of tons, +and their number and individual tonnage are constantly increasing. +These vessels cruise among all the important seaports of the world, +and form a system of intercommunication almost as complete as the +system of railroads in the United States. They bring distant ports +of the world very close together, and make possible that ready +interchange of material products, and that facility of personal +intercourse which it is one of the aims of civilization to bring +about. From a commercial point of view, London is nearer to New +York than San Francisco, and more intimately allied with her. + +The evident result of all this is to make the people of the world +one large community, in which, though many nationalities are numbered, +many tongues are spoken, many degrees of civilization and wealth +are found, yet, of all, the main instincts are the same: the same +passions, the same appetites, the same desire for personal advantage. + +Not only does this admirable system of intercommunication bring all +parts of the world very closely together, but it tends to produce +in all a certain similarity in those characteristics and habits +of thought that pertain to the material things of life. We are +all imitative, and therefore we tend to imitate each other; but +the inferior is more apt to imitate the superior than vice versa. +Particularly are we prone to imitate those actions and qualities +by which others have attained material success. So it is to be +expected, it is already a fact, that the methods whereby a few +great nations attained success are already being imitated by other +nations. Japan has imitated so well that in some ways she has already +surpassed her models. + +With such an example before her, should we be surprised that China +has also become inoculated with the virus of commercial and political +ambitions? It cannot be many years before she will be in the running +with the rest of us, with 400,000,000 of people to do the work; +people of intelligence, patience, endurance, and docility; people +with everything to gain and nothing to lose; with the secret of +how to succeed already taught by other nations, which she can learn +from an open book. + +If Japan has learned our secret and mastered it in fifty years, +will China not be able to do it in less than fifty years? + +Before we answer this question, let us realize clearly that China +is much nearer to us in civilization than Japan was fifty years +ago; that China has Japan's example to guide her, and also that +any degree of civilization which was acquired by us in say one +hundred years will not require half that time for another nation +merely to learn. The same is true of all branches of knowledge; the +knowledge of the laws of nature which it took Newton many years to +acquire may now be mastered by any college student in two months. +And let us not forget, besides, that almost the only difficult +element of civilization which other people need to acquire, in order +to enter into that world-wide competition which is characteristic of +the time we live in, is "engineering" broadly considered. Doubtless +there are other things to learn besides; but it is not apparent +that any other things have contributed largely to the so-called +new civilization of Japan. Perhaps Japan has advanced enough in +Christianity to account for her advance in material power, but +if so she keeps very quiet about it. It may be, also, that the +relations of the government to the governed people of Japan are +on a higher plane than they used to be, but on a plane not yet so +high as in our own country; but has any one ever seen this claimed +or even stated? It may be that the people of Japan are more kindly, +brave, courteous, and patriotic than they were, and that their +improvement has been due to their imitating us in these matters; +but this is not the belief of many who have been in Japan. One +thing, however, is absolutely sure; and that is that Japan's advance +has been simultaneous with her acquirement of the engineering arts, +especially as applied to military and naval matters and the merchant +marine. + +But even supposing that China does not take part in the world-wide +race for wealth, we cannot shut our eyes to the fact that Great +Britain, Germany, France, Italy, Japan, Argentina, and the United +States, besides others like Sweden, Norway, Belgium, Holland, Spain, +and Portugal, are in the race already; and that several in South +America bid fair to enter soon. Not only do we see many contestants, +whose numbers and ardor are increasing, but we see, also, the cause +of this increasing. The cause is not only a clearer appreciation +of the benefits to be derived from commerce across the water under +conditions that exist now; it is also a growing appreciation of the +possibilities of commerce under conditions that will exist later +with countries whose resources are almost entirely undeveloped. For +four hundred years, we of the United States, have been developing +the land within our borders, and the task has been enormous. At +one time it promised to be the work of centuries; and with the +mechanical appliances of even one hundred years ago, it would have +taken a thousand years to do what we have already done. Mechanical +appliances of all kinds, especially of transportation and agriculture, +have made possible what would, otherwise, have been impossible; +and mechanical appliances will do the same things in Tierra del +Fuego and Zululand. + +Mechanism, working on land and sea, is opening up the resources +of the world. And now, another allied art, that of chemistry, more +especially biology, is in process of removing one of the remaining +obstacles to full development, by making active life possible, and +even pleasant, in the tropics. It is predicted by some enthusiasts +that, in the near future, it will be healthier and pleasanter to live +in the tropics, and even do hard work there, than in the temperate +zone. When this day comes, and it may be soon, the development of +the riches of lands within the tropics will begin in earnest, and +wealth undreamed of now be realized. + +The opening of the undeveloped countries means a continuing increase +of wealth to the nations that take advantage of the opportunity, +and a corresponding backsliding to those nations that fail. It +means over all the ocean an increasing number of steamers. It means +the continuing increase of manufacturing in manufacturing countries, +and the increasing enjoyment in them of the good things of all the +world. It means in the undeveloped countries an increasing use +of the conveniences and luxuries of civilization and an increasing +possession of money or its equivalent. It means, throughout all +the world, an increase of what we call "Wealth." + +In discussing a subject so great as sea trade, while it may be +considered presumptuous to look fifty years ahead, it can hardly +be denied that we ought at least to try to look that far ahead. +To look fifty years ahead, is, after all, not taking in a greater +interval of time than fifty years back; and it certainly seems +reasonable to conclude that, if a certain line of progress has +been going on for fifty years in a perfectly straight line, and +with a vigor which is increasing very fast and shows no sign of +change, the same general line of progress will probably keep up +for another fifty years. If we try to realize what this means, we +shall probably fail completely and become dazed by the prospect. +We cannot possibly picture accurately or even clearly to ourselves +any definite conditions of fifty years hence; but we certainly are +warranted in concluding that by the end of fifty years, practically +all of the countries of the world, including Africa, will be open +to trade from one end to the other; that the volume of trade will +be at least ten times as great as it is now; that the means of +communication over the water and through the air will be very much +better than now; and that there will be scores of appliances, methods, +and processes in general use of which we have, as yet, no inkling, +and cannot even imagine. + +Now let us call to mind the accepted proverb that "Competition is +the life of trade," and this will make us see that, accompanying +this stupendous trade, extending over, and into, every corner of +the world, there will be stupendous competition, involving in a +vast and complicated net, every red-blooded nation of the earth. + +We seem safe in concluding, therefore, that the importance of naval +power will increase. + +A great deal is said and written nowadays about the ability of +arbitration to make wars unnecessary, and a good deal also about +the possibility of an agreement among the nations, whereby armaments +may be limited to forces adequate to insure that every nation shall +be compelled to abide by the decision of the others in any disputed +case. + +In view of the number, the earnestness, and the prominence of many +of the men interested in this cause; in view of the number of +arbitration treaties that have been already signed; in view of the +fact that arbitration among nations will simply establish a law +among them like the law in any civilized country; in view of the +fact that individuals in their dealings with each other sometimes +surrender certain of their claims, and even rights, for the common +good; in view of the fact that nations, like all business firms, +like to cut down expenses, and in further view of the fact that +a navy is not directly, but only indirectly, a contributor to a +nation's prosperity, it seems probable that arbitration will be +more and more used among the nations, and that armaments may be +limited by agreement. It is clear, however, that the practical +difficulties in the way of making the absolute agreement required +are enormous, and that the most enthusiastic advocates of the plan +do not expect that the actual limitation of armaments will become +a fact for many years. + +After the necessary preliminaries shall have been arranged, and +the conference takes place which shall settle what armament each +nation may have, it is plain that it will be to the interest of +each nation to keep down the armament of every other nation, and to +be allowed as much as possible itself. In this way, the operation +of making the agreement will be somewhat like the forming of a +trust among several companies, and the advantage will lie with that +nation which is the most powerful. + +For this reason it would seem a part of wisdom for each country +to enter the conference with as large a navy as possible. + +Therefore, the probability of an approaching agreement among the +nations as to limitation of armaments, instead of being a reason +for abating our exertions toward establishing a powerful navy, +is really a conclusive reason for redoubling them. + +This brings us to the important question, "how powerful should our +navy be?" + +This may seem a question impossible to answer. Of course it is +impossible to answer it in terms of ships and guns; but an approximate +estimate may be reached by considering the case of a man playing +poker who holds a royal straight flush. Such a man would be a fool +if he did not back his hand to the limit and get all the benefit +possible from it. So will the United States, if she fails to back +her hand to the limit, recognizing the fact that in the grand game +now going on for the stakes of the commercial supremacy of the world, +she holds the best hand. She has the largest and most numerous +seaports, the most enterprising and inventive people, and the most +wealth with which to force to success all the various necessary +undertakings. + +This does not mean that the United States ought, as a matter either +of ethics or of policy, to build a great navy in order to take +unjust advantage of weaker nations; but it does mean that she ought +to build a navy great enough to save her from being shorn of her +wealth and glory by simple force, as France was shorn in 1871. + +It is often said that the reason for Great Britain's having so +powerful a navy is that she is so situated geographically that, +without a powerful navy to protect her trade, the people would +starve. + +While this statement may be true, the inference usually drawn is +fallacious: the inference that if Great Britain were not so situated, +she would not have so great a navy. + +Why would she not? It is certain that that "tight little island" +has attained a world-wide power, and a wealth per capita greater +than those of any other country; that her power and wealth, as +compared with her home area, are so much greater than those of +any other country as to stagger the understanding; that she could +not have done what she has done without her navy; that she has +never hesitated to use her navy to assist her trade, and yet that +she has never used her navy to keep her people from starving. + +In fact, the insistence on the anti-starvation theory is absurd. +Has any country ever fought until the people as a mass were starving? +Has starving anything to do with the matter? Does not a nation +give up fighting just as soon as it sees that further fighting +would do more harm than good? A general or an admiral, in charge +of a detached force, must fight sometimes even at tremendous loss +and after all hope of local success has fled, in order to hold a +position, the long holding of which is essential to the success +of the whole strategic plan; but what country keeps up a war until +its people are about to starve? Did Spain do so in our last war? Did +Russia fear that Japan would force the people of her vast territory +into starvation? + +No--starvation has nothing to do with the case. If some discovery +were made by which Great Britain could grow enough to support all +her people, she would keep her great navy nevertheless--simply +because she has found it to be a good investment. + +The anti-starvation theory--the theory that one does things simply +to keep from starving--does apply to some tropical savages, but +not to the Anglo-Saxon. Long after starvation has been provided +against, long after wealth has been secured, we still toil on. What +are we toiling for? The same thing that Great Britain maintains +her navy for--wealth and power. + +The real reason for Great Britain's having a powerful navy applies +with exact equality to the United States. Now that Great Britain +has proved how great a navy is best for her, we can see at once +how great a navy is best for us. That is--since Great Britain and +the United States are the wealthiest countries in the world, and +since the probability of war between any two countries is least +when their navies are equal in power--the maximum good would be +attained by making the United States navy exactly equal to the +British navy. + + + + +CHAPTER IV + +NAVAL PREPAREDNESS + +In a preceding chapter I endeavored to show why it is that the +necessities of the naval defense of a country have caused the gradual +development of different types of vessels, each having its distinctive +work. If those different types operated in separate localities they +would lose that mutual support which it is the aim of organization +to secure, and each separate group could be destroyed in turn by +the combined groups of an enemy. For this reason, the types or +groups are combined in one large fleet, and an admiral is placed +in command. + +The command of a fleet is the highest effort of the naval art. Its +success in time of war demands in the admiral himself a high order +of mind and nerve and body; and it demands in all the personnel, +from the highest to the lowest, such a measure of trained ability +and character that each shall be able to discharge with skill and +courage the duties of his station. + +In order that the material fleet shall be efficient as a whole, +each material unit must be efficient as a unit. Each ship must +be materially sound; each pump, valve, cylinder, gun, carriage, +torpedo, and individual appliance, no matter how small, must be +in condition to perform its expected task. The complexity of a +fleet baffles any mental effort, by even those most familiar with +it, to grasp it fully. Each dreadnaught, battle cruiser, destroyer, +submarine, collier, tender, hospital ship, scout, supply ship, and +what-not, is a machine in itself, and is filled with scores--in +some cases, hundreds--of highly specialized machines, operated +by steam, oil, air, electricity, and water. A superdreadnaught +is a machine which, including the machines inside of her, costs +$15,000,000; a battle cruiser more. + +The personnel is nearly as complicated as the material. Not only +are there all the various ranks of commissioned officers in the +line, medical corps, pay corps, marine corps, etc., but there are +ten kinds of warrant officers besides; while in the enlisted personnel +there are ninety-one different "ratings" in the navy, and thirteen +in the marine corps, besides temporary ratings, such as gun-pointer, +gun-trainer, gun-captain, etc. Each rank and rating carries its +rigidly prescribed duties, as well as its distinctive uniform and +pay. That such a multitudinous host of types and individuals, both +material and personnel, can be actually combined in one unit fleet, +and that fleet operated as a mobile directable organism by its +admiral, is a high achievement of the human intellect. + +How is it done? + +By discipline, by training, by knowledge, by energy, by devotion, +by will; by the exercise of those mental, moral, and spiritual +faculties that may be grouped under the one term "mind": the same +power that co-ordinates and controls a still more complex machine, +the organism of the human body. + +Despite its relative crudeness, a fleet possesses, more fully than +any other fruit of man's endeavor, the characteristics of an organism, +defined by Webster as "an individual constituted to carry on the +activities of life by means of parts or organs more or less separate +in function, but mutually dependent." And though it must be true +that no fleet can approximate the perfection of nature's organisms, +nevertheless there is an analogy which may help us to see how a +complex fleet of complex vessels has been slowly evolved from the +simple galley fleets of earlier days; how its various parts may +be mutually dependent yet severally independent; and how all must +be made to work as one vast unit, and directed as one vast unit +by the controlling mind toward "the end in view." + +The common idea is that an army consists of a number of soldiers, +and a navy of a number of ships. This idea is due to a failure +to realize that soldiers and ships are merely instruments, and +that they are useless instruments unless directed by a trained +intelligence: that the first essential in an army and the first +essential in a navy is mind, which first correctly estimates the +situation, then makes wise plans to meet it, then carries out those +plans; which organizes the men and designs the ships, and then +directs the physical power exertable by the men and the ships toward +"the end in view." + +Owing to the enormous mechanical power made available in ships +by the floating properties of water, machinery is more used by +navies than by armies; but this does not mean that machinery can +take the place of men more successfully in navies than in armies, +except in the sense that navies can use more mechanical power. +The abundant use of machines and instruments in navies does not +mean that machinery and instruments can take the place of trained +intelligence--but exactly the reverse. Under the guidance of trained +intelligence, a machine or instrument can perform wonders. But +it is not the machinery that does the wonders; it is the trained +intelligence that devised the instrument or machine, and the trained +intelligence that operates it. Let the trained intelligence err, +or sleep, and note the results that follow. The _Titanic_, a mass +of 40,000 tons, moving through the water at 20 knots an hour, a +marvel of the science and skill of man, crashes into an iceberg, +because the trained intelligence directing her errs--and is reduced +at once to an inert mass of iron and brass. The mighty fleet of +Russia meets the Japanese fleet in Tsushima Straits; and because +the trained intelligence that directed its movements seriously +erred, in an engagement decided in less than an hour, is stripped of +its power and glory, and transformed into a disorganized aggregation +of separate ships--some sunk, some sinking, some in flight. The +Japanese fleet, on the other hand, because it is directed with +an intelligence more highly trained than that which directs the +Russian fleet, and because, in consequence, the officers and enlisted +men perform their various duties not only in the actual battle, +but in preparation for it, with a skill greater than that used in +the Russian fleet, suffers but little damage in the fight--though +the advantage in number and size of ships is slightly with the +Russians. As a consequence of that battle, the war between Russia +and Japan was decided in favor of Japan, and terms of peace were +soon agreed upon. Russia lost practically all the ships that took +part in the battle, and several thousand of her officers and +sailors--and _she lost the whole object for which she went to war_. + +The difference between the Russian and Japanese fleets that gave +the victory to the Japanese was a difference in trained intelligence +and in the relative degrees of preparedness which that difference +caused. + +During the actual battle, the intelligence was that of the officers +and men in the respective fleets, in managing the two fleets, the +ships themselves, and the guns, engines, and machines of all kinds that +those ships contained. It is this factor--trained intelligence--that +has decided most of the battles of history, and the course that +nations thereafter followed. Battles have usually been fought between +forces not very different in point of numbers and material, for the +reason that a force which knew itself to be weaker than another +would not fight unless compelled to fight; and in cases where two +forces of widely differing strength have fought, the situation has +usually been brought about directly by a superior intelligence. In +fact, one of the most frequent and important endeavors of strategy +and tactics--used triumphantly by Napoleon--has always been such +a handling of one's forces as to be superior to the enemy at the +point of contact--to "get the mostest men there the firstest," as +General Forrest is said to have expressed it. + +The effect of superior-trained intelligence is greatest "at the top," +but it can accomplish little unless a fine intelligence permeates the +whole. A fine intelligence at the top will so direct the men below, +will so select men for the various posts, and will so co-ordinate +their efforts, that the organization will resemble a veritable +organism: all the various organs fulfilling separately yet accurately +their allotted functions; all the fire-control parties, all the +gun crews, all the torpedo crews, all the engineer forces properly +organized and drilled; all the hulls of the vessels, all the guns, +all the torpedoes, all the multifarious engines, machines, and +instruments in good material condition and correctly adjusted for +use. + +But it is not only in the actual battle that fine intelligence is +required; it is required long before the battle and far distant +from the scene--in the "admiralty" at home. The Japanese fleet set +out fully manned with a highly trained, enthusiastic, and confident +personnel; the Russian fleet set out manned with a poorly trained +and discouraged personnel, only too well aware of their defects. +The issue at Tsushima was decided before the respective fleets +left their respective homes--though that issue was not then known +to mortals. The battle emphasized, but did not prove, what had +been proved a hundred times before: the paramount importance of +preparedness; that _when two forces fight--the actual battle merely +secures the decision as to the relative values of two completed +machines, and their degrees of preparedness for use_. + +Preparedness of material is not, of course, so important as preparedness +of personnel, because if the personnel is prepared, they will inevitably +prepare the material. And the preparedness must pervade all grades: +for while it is true that the preparedness of those in high command +is more important than the preparedness of those in minor posts, +yet there is no post so lowly that its good or its ill performance +will not be a factor in the net result. An unskilful oiler may +cause a hot bearing that will slow down a battleship, and put out +of order the column of a squadron; a signalman's mistake may throw +a fleet into confusion. + +Perfect preparedness of personnel and material is essential because +events follow each other so rapidly in war that no preparation can +be made after it has begun. To fight is the most intense work a +man can do; and a war is nothing but a fight. No matter how great +or how small a war may be, no war can lose the essential qualities +of a fight, or (save in the treatment of prisoners) be more brutal or +less brutal when fought between two little savage tribes, than when +fought between two colossal groups of Christian nations, civilized to +the highest point. War is the acme of the endeavor of man. Each side +determines that it will win at all costs and at all hazards; that +nobody's comfort, happiness, or safety shall receive the slightest +consideration; that everybody's strength and courage must be worked +to the limit by night as well as by day, and that there must be +no rest and no yielding to any softening influence whatever; that +the whole strength and mind of the nation, and of every individual +in it, must be devoted, and must be sacrificed, if need be, to +the cause at stake. + +In war, a navy's primary duty has usually been to protect the coast +and trade routes of its country; and in order to do this, it has had +to be able to oppose to an attacking fleet a defending fleet more +militarily effective. If it were less effective, even if no invasion +were attempted, the attacking fleet could cripple or destroy the +defending fleet and then institute a blockade. In modern times an +effective blockade, or at least a hostile patrol of trade routes, +could be held hundreds of miles from the coast, where the menace +of submarines would be negligible; and this blockade would stop +practically all import and export trade. This would compel the +country to live exclusively on its own resources, and renounce +intercourse with the outside world. Some countries could exist +a long time under these conditions. But they would exist merely, +and the condition of mere existence would never end until they +sued for peace; because, even if new warships were constructed +with which to beat off the enemy, each new and untrained ship would +be sunk or captured shortly after putting out to sea as, on June +1, 1813, in Massachusetts Bay, the American frigate _Chesapeake_ +was captured and nearly half her crew were killed and wounded in +fifteen minutes by a ship almost identical in the material qualities +of size and armament--the better-trained British frigate _Shannon_. + +For these reasons, every nation that has acquired and has long +retained prosperity, has realized that every country liable to +be attacked by any navy must either be defended by some powerful +country, or else must keep a navy ready to repel the attack +successfully. To do this, the defending navy must be ready when the +attack comes; because if not ready then, it will never have time +to get ready. In regard to our own country, much stress is laid by +some intelligent people--who forget the _Chesapeake_ and _Shannon_--on +the 3,000 miles of water stretching between the United States and +Europe. This 3,000 miles is, of course, a factor of importance, +but it is not a prohibition, because it can be traversed with great +surety and quickness--with much greater surety and quickness, for +instance, than the 12,000 miles traversed by the Russian fleet, +in 1904, in steaming from Russia to Japan. + +The 3,000 miles that separate the United States from Europe can +be traversed by a fleet more powerful than ours in from two to +three weeks; and the fleet would probably arrive on our shores in +good condition, and manned by full crews of well-trained officers +and men, habituated to their duties by recent practice and thoroughly +ready to fight, as the _Shannon_ was. We could not meet this fleet +successfully unless we met it with a fleet more militarily effective; +and we could not do this unless we had in the regular service and +the reserve a personnel of officers and men sufficiently numerous +to man immediately all the vessels that would be needed, and to +man in addition all the shore stations, which would have to be +expanded to a war basis. The officers and enlisted men, of course, +would have to be at least as well trained as the corresponding +personnel in the attacking fleet, and have as recent and thorough +practice in their respective duties; for otherwise, no matter how +brave and devoted they might be, the fate of the American fleet +would be the fate of the _Chesapeake_. + +In order to be ready when war breaks, the first essential is a +plan for preparation. Preparation is divided naturally into two +parts: first, preparation of sufficient material and personnel; +second, preparation of plans for the conduct of the war after it has +begun. These two parts are both considered in what are technically +called "War Plans." + +Preparation for war has always been known to be essential. Lack +of preparation has never been due to lack of knowledge, but always +to neglect. The difference between the wise and the foolish virgins +was not a difference in knowledge but a difference in character. +The difference between Alexander's little army and the tremendous +army of Darius was not so much in numbers as in preparedness. Trained +under Philip of Macedon for many years, organized for conquest +and aggression, prepared to meet any situation that might arise, +Philip's army carried Philip's son from victory to victory, and +made him the master of the world. Caesar was great in peace as well +as war, but it was by Caesar's army that Caesar's greatness was +established; and it was a thoroughness of preparation unknown before +that made Caesar's army great. Napoleon's successes were built on +the splendid preparation of a mind transcendently fitted to grasp +both principles and details, and on the comparatively unprepared +state of his opponents. + +The Great Elector began in 1640 a course of laborious and scientific +preparation which committed all Prussia, as well as the army, to +acquiring what now we call "efficiency." As this plan developed, +especially under the Elector's grandson King Frederick William, +the next King found himself, as Alexander had done, the chief of +an army more highly prepared for war than any other. By means of +that army he made himself Frederick the Great, and raised Prussia +from a minor position to the first rank of European Powers. Pursuing +Frederick William's system of progressive preparation, Prussia +continued her prosperous course till William I defeated Austria, +then France, and founded the German Empire. This does not mean that +the only result of developing national efficiency to its highest +point is to secure success in war--in fact, we know that it is not. +But it does mean that the same quality--efficiency--which tends +to prosperity in peace tends also to victory in war. + +Preparing for war was a simple thing in the olden days compared +with preparing now, for the reason that the implements of war are +much more numerous and complicated than they used to be, especially +in navies. A navy is not ready unless all preparations and plans +have been made, tested, and kept up to date, to insure that all +of the vessels of every kind and all the shore stations will be +in material condition, fully equipped and manned by a sufficient +and efficient personnel of officers and crews, in time to meet +the enemy on advantageous terms, and unless the central authority +has already decided what it will do, when any probable emergency +shall arise. This was the condition of the German army in 1870. +This was also the condition of the British navy, when war broke +out in August, 1914; the British navy was ready; and therefore it +was able to assume command of the sea at once, drive its enemy's +commerce from the ocean, and imprison its fleets in sheltered ports. + +In all countries the peace establishment of the army and navy is +smaller than the war establishment, for reasons of economy, upon +the assumption that there will be enough time after war is declared +to get on a war basis before the enemy can strike. But since 1870, +all the military nations have realized that the vital struggle of +a war takes place _before_ a shot is fired; that _the factors that +decide which nation shall be the victor and which the vanquished are +determined before the war begins_; that they are simply "functions" +of preparedness. Germany was ready not only for war but for victory, +because her troops were so much better trained, organized, and equipped +than those of France, and her war plans so much more complete, +that she was able to lay France prostrate, before the enormous +resources of that country in men and material could rally in her +defense. + +The relative conditions in which two opposing forces will enter a +war, and their relative performances afterward, will depend upon +the relative excellence of the war plans made for them, and the +thoroughness with which the plans are tested before war breaks. So +it is not difficult to see why all the great armies have patterned +after Germany, and organized special bodies of officers for the +preparation and execution of War plans; and why it is that they +endeavor to secure for that peculiar duty the most thorough and +industrious of their officers. Owing to the nature of war itself, +the principles of warfare apply in their essentials to navies as well +as to armies; and so the navies have patterned after the armies and +made plans whereby they can get ready to fight in fleet organization +on the ocean with the greatest possible effectiveness in the shortest +possible time. + +During peace times every navy is maintained on a "peace basis"; +only such ships and other material being kept in full commission, +and only such a number of officers and enlisted men being actively +employed, as the appropriations allotted by the government permit. +Those ships and other material that are not actually in commission +are maintained in reserve, a condition of partial readiness, of +which several degrees are recognized, in which a reduced number of +officers and men are kept on board, and the various structures and +apparatus are kept in as high a degree of readiness as circumstances +will permit. In order to man in time of war these vessels in reserve, +and insure a sufficient personnel in the active fleet, a "naval +reserve" is organized in each country, composed of officers and men +who have had experience in the regular navy. They are compelled to +undergo a specific amount of training each year, to keep themselves +in readiness at all times to answer the call for active service on +short notice, and to maintain such communication with the government +as will make it easy to locate any man at any moment. + +The act of getting ready, the passing from a state of peace to +a state of readiness for fighting, is called "mobilization." +Mobilization plans are an important element in war plans, but the +details of any mobilization plan are of such a confidential nature +that it would not be proper to discuss them in public print. There +can be no impropriety, however, in making the general statement +that in all navies the endeavor is made to keep the mobilization +plans continually up to date, and to have them prepared in such +detail that every officer and enlisted man in active service, the +retired list, the naval reserve, and the naval militia, will become +instantly available for a predetermined duty, and that every shore +station and every necessary vessel will be ready to take part. The +plans prescribe methods in very great detail whereby the ships +and other vessels in reserve can be quickly put into commission +with full crews of officers and men, all their various equipments, +fuel, and ammunition put on board, and the vessels themselves sent +out to sea to join the fleet. In addition, plans are made whereby +certain auxiliaries can be fitted out at once and put into +commission--such as supply ships, ammunition ships, transports, +colliers, mine ships, hospital ships, etc. The mass of detailed +plans, orders, and instructions is stupendous and bewildering. +Years of study, trial, and rectification are required to get them +into such condition that the plans can be put into immediate and +effective use when war breaks out. The work must be done, however, +and with the utmost thoroughness, _before_ war breaks out; otherwise +it will never be done, if an active enemy is about, because he +will strike at once--and then it will be too late. + +In most of the great naval countries the work of mobilizing the +fleet is comparatively easy, for the reason that the coast-line +is short and is not far from any part of the interior, enabling +reserves to live in fairly close touch with the coast and with +naval affairs, and so near the coast that they can get quickly to +any port. But the conditions in the United States are more difficult +than those in any other country, because of the enormous stretch of +our coast, the great average distance from any place in our country +to the coast, the difficulty of getting a naval reserve that could +be of practical use (owing to the ease with which young men can +make a comfortable living on land), and the perilous slowness of the +nation as a whole to realize the necessity for preparedness. + +As an offset to this, we have the 3,000 miles of ocean between +us and Europe, and the 5,000 miles between us and Asia; and on +account of this we may to a certain extent discount the danger of +attack and the preparedness required to meet it. But our discount +should be reasonable and reasoned out, and certainly not excessive. +Fortunately the problem of how much time we should allow for mobilizing +and joining the fleet is easy, as a moment's thought will show us +that it must be simply the two weeks needed for a fleet to come +from Europe to America; for we must realize that the report of the +sailing of the hostile fleet would be the first news we should +get of any hostile preparation or intent. + +The general situation in which every isolated naval nation stands +regarding other nations is not complicated, but very plain. Each +nation has, as possible opponents in its policy, certain countries. +The naval forces of those countries and the time in which they can +be made ready are known with sufficient accuracy for practical +purposes. If any isolated naval nation wishes to carry out a policy +which any of those countries will forcibly oppose she must either +build a navy equal to that of the other country, or else be prepared +to abandon any attempt to force her policies. Stating the question +in another way, she can carry out only such policies as do not +require for their enforcement a navy stronger than she has. + +It is true that diplomacy and the jealousies of foreign powers +unite to make possible the averting of war during long periods of +time. Diplomacy averted war with Germany for forty-three years, but +it could not continue to avert war eternally. War finally broke out +with a violence unparalleled in history, and possessing a magnitude +proportional to the duration of the preceding peace. "Long coming long +last, short notice soon past" is a sailor's maxim about storms; and +it seems not inapplicable to wars. Certain it is that the frequent +wars of savage tribes are far less terrible than the infrequent +wars of enlightened powers. + +This indicates that, even though a nation may be able to avert +war for a long time, war will come some day, in a form which the +present war foreshadows; and it suggests the possibility that the +longer the war is averted, the more tremendous it will be, the +greater the relative unpreparedness of a slothful nation, and the +sharper her punishment when war finally breaks upon her. + + + + +CHAPTER V + +NAVAL DEFENSE + +There has never been a time since Cain slew Abel when men have +not been compelled to devote a considerable part of their energies +to self-defense. In the early ages, before large organizations +existed or the mechanic arts had made much progress, defense was +mostly defense of life itself. As time went on, and people amassed +goods and chattels, and organized in groups and tribes, it came +to include the defense of property--not only the property of +individuals, but also of the tribe and the land it occupied. Still +later, defense carne to include good name or reputation, when it +was realized that the reputation, even of an organization, could +not be destroyed without doing it an injury. + +At the present day, owing to the complexity of nations and other +organizations, and to the long time during which many of them have +existed, the question of defense has become extremely difficult. The +places in which defense has been brought to its highest excellence +are the large cities of the civilized countries; for there we see that +defense of the life, property, and reputation of every individual +has been carefully provided for. This has been made possible by +the intimate intermingling of the people, the absence of racial +rivalries, and the fact that the interests of all are identical +in the matter of defense of life, property, and reputation; since, +no matter how bad any individual may be, he wishes that others +shall be good, in order that he himself may be safe. + +The defense of reputation has two aspects: the practical and the +sentimental. The practical aspect regards the defense of that element +of reputation which affects ability to "make a living"; while the +sentimental aspect is concerned with the purely personal reputation +of the individual, or with the reputation of an organization or a +nation. The sentimental aspect is much more important, especially +in enlightened nations, than is realized by some who have not thought +much about it; for there is, fortunately, in every decent man a +craving for the esteem and even the affection of his fellow men; +and a knowledge that, no matter how wealthy or powerful he may +be, he cannot be happy if he knows that he is despised. + +The fact that individuals organize to acquire the strength of united +effort brings about, among organizations, a spirit of competition +like that among individuals. It is more intense, however, because +no man alone can get up the enthusiasms that ten men acting together +can get up, and ten men cannot get up as much as a thousand. The +longer any organization is maintained, the sharper this spirit +of rivalry grows to be, owing to the feeling of clanship that +propinquity and material interests evoke. Its acme is found in those +organizations called nations, that have lived together, nourished from +the same soil, for generations; where the same loves and jealousies +and hates that they now feel were felt by their fathers and their +grandfathers and great-grandfathers for centuries back. Among a +people possessing the potentialities of national solidarity and +greatness this feeling waxes, into a self-sacrificing devotion +to the nation and to the land that bore them. + +That there should be such a thing is sometimes deplored; because +patriotism, like all human qualities, has its bad side and its +unfortunate effects. If it were not for patriotism there would +probably be no war, and the greatest suffering that the world endures +would thus be obviated. But if it were not for patriotism there +would be no competition among nations; and in any one nation there +would be no national spirit, no endeavor on the part of every man +to do his part toward making her strong, efficient, and of good +repute or toward making the people individually prosperous and +happy. In the same way, on a smaller scale, many people deplore +the necessity of competition among organizations, saying that it +is ruthless and selfish; that it stamps out the individual; that +it makes every man a mere cog in a money-getting machine; that it +brings about strife, hatred, jealousies, and sometimes murders; +that, if it were not for competition, all men would live together +in peace. + +This may be so; but if it were not for competition there would +probably be little of that strenuous, endeavor without which no +effective progress in advancing the welfare of men has ever yet +been made. Of course, it may be that what we call "progress" has +really not advanced the welfare of men; that the savage in Samoa is +as happy as the millionaire in New York; that knowledge itself is not +an unmixed benefit; and if we accept this view, we may logically declare +that competition, progress, and patriotism are all disadvantages. +But who will go so far? It seems to be a fact that we cannot get +something for nothing: that every plus has its minus, every joy +its pain; that if men succeed in passing beyond the savage state, +and in overcoming the forces of nature, so that they can live in +houses with every modern luxury and convenience, they must pay for +it by a condition of competition that causes personal jealousies +among individuals, commercial wars among organizations, physical +wars among nations. + +Yet the instinctive desire of every one is for peace and comfort, +for the maximum of good with the minimum of exertion; and therefore +the normal person dislikes to see interjected into human life the +abominable confusion of war. From this it comes about that every +nation, even if it consciously brings about a war, always endeavors +to make it appear that the other party is the aggressor. For this +reason in every country the army and navy are said to be for the +"defense" of the country. No nation, no matter how aggressive its +policy may secretly be, openly declares that it intends to provoke +aggression. This does not mean that any nation ever deliberately +raises an army and navy for aggression, and then consciously deceives +the world in regard to its intention; for men are so constituted as +to feel more or less unconsciously that their interests and desires +are proper and those of their opponent wrong; and every nation is +so firmly persuaded of the righteousness of its own policies as +to feel that any country which exhibits antagonism toward these +policies is trying to provoke a fight. + +Now these policies, especially after a nation has adhered to them +for long, seem vital in her eyes, and they usually are so. To Great +Britain, whose major policy is that she must be mistress of the +seas, it is vital that she should be. Her people are surrounded +by the ocean, and unless they are willing simply to eke out an +agricultural existence, it is essential that she should be able +to manufacture articles, send them out in ships to all parts of +the world, and receive in return money and the products of other +lands. In order that she may be able to do this, she must feel +sure that no power on earth can restrain the peaceful sailing to +and fro of her exporting and importing ships. This assurance can be +had only through physical force; it can be exerted only by a navy. +Germany has been gradually coming into the same position, and the +same clear comprehension, owing to the increase of her population, +the growth of their desire for wealth, and their realization of +the control by Great Britain and the United States of large areas +of the surface of the earth. Germany's determination to break down, +at least in part, that overpowering command of the sea which Great +Britain wields has been the result. The ensuing rapid growth and +excellence of Germany's navy and merchant marine brought Germany +and England into sharp competition. Military and naval men have +seen for years that these competing nations would have to go to +war some day in "self-defense." + +In the minds of some people the idea of what constitutes "defense" +is rather hazy, and "defense" is deemed almost synonymous with +"resistance." Perhaps the clearest idea of what constitutes "defense" +is given in a sentence in Webster's Dictionary, that reads: "The +inmates of a fortress are _defended_ by its guns, _protected_ by +its walls, and _guarded_ against surprise by sentries." + +The distinction is important, and the partially aggressive character +of defense it indicates is exemplified in all walks of human and +brute life. Any animal, no matter how peaceably inclined, will +turn on his aggressor--unless, indeed, he runs away. No one ever +saw any brute oppose a merely passive resistance to attack. Every +man recognizes in himself an instinct to hit back if he is hit. If +it be an instinct, it must have been implanted in us for a reason; +and the reason is not hard to find in the universal law of +self-protection, which cannot be satisfied with the ineffectual +method of mere parrying or resisting. + +Naval defense, like military defense, therefore, is not passive +defense only, but contains an element of "offense" as well. When +the defense contains in large measure the element of offense, it is +said in military parlance to be "offensive-defensive"; and the most +effective defensive is this offensive-defensive. When a defending +force throws off its defensive attitude entirely and advances boldly +to attack, it is said to have "assumed the offensive"; but even this +assumption, especially if it be temporary--as when a beleaguered +garrison makes a sortie--does not rob the situation of its defensive +character. + +For these reasons the dividing line between offense and defense +is very vague; and it is made more vague through a realization by +all military people that the offense has certain decided advantages +over the defense (unless the defense has the advantage of position); +so that when strained relations between two nations come, each +is so fearful that the other will take the offensive first, when +the two nations are near each other, that it is apt to take the +offensive first--in real _self-defense!_ A striking illustration +is the action of certain European Powers in the latter part of +July, 1914. + +In addition to the sincere convictions of either party, there is +also apt to be considerable yielding to the temptation to persuade +the world that the other party is the aggressor, merely to get the +sympathy that usually goes to the innocent victim--the support +of what Bismarck called "the imponderables." Few wars have been +frankly "offensive," like the conquests of Alexander, Caesar, and +Pizarro, at least in modern times; each side has usually claimed +(and often sincerely believed) that its action was demanded in +self-defense and that its cause was just. + +To some in the United States naval defense means merely defense +against invasion. This notion is of recent growth, and certainly was +not held by the framers of our Constitution. Section 8 of Article +I defines the powers of Congress; and although eight of the eighteen +paragraphs deal exclusively with measures of defense on sea and land, +only one of those paragraphs (the fifteenth) deals with invasion. +The, first paragraph reads: + +The Congress shall have power to lay and collect taxes, duties, +imposts, and excises, _to pay the debts and provide for the common +defense and general welfare of the United States_; but all duties, +imposts, and excises shall be uniform throughout the United States. + +The juxtaposition of the words "common defense" and "general welfare" +in this admirably written paragraph could hardly have been accidental, +or have been due to any other cause than a juxtaposition of those +ideas in the minds of the Constitution's framers. And what more +natural connection can there be between any two ideas than between +those of common defense and general welfare, since the general +welfare of no country has ever continued long unless it was defended. +Now the general welfare of every maritime power has always been +intimately concerned with its sea-borne commerce. It is only by +means of sea-borne commerce, for instance, that Americans can live +in the way Americans wish to live. "General welfare" means more +than mere existence. A mere existence is the life a savage lives. +Furthermore, the general welfare of a country requires the safety +of its exported and imported goods while on the sea, and includes +the right of its citizens to travel with safety in every land, +to buy and sell in foreign ports, to feel a proper measure of +self-respect and national respect wherever they may go, and to +command from the people of the lands they visit a proper recognition +of their claims to justice. + +Naval defense may, therefore, be said to consist of three parts: + +1st--Defense of the coast against bombardment and invasion. + +2d--Defense of the trade routes traversed by ships carrying the +exports and imports of the country. + +3d--Defense of the national policy, including defense of the nation's +reputation, honor, and prestige. + +Of these, defense of the coast against bombardment and invasion is +the easiest, and defense of the national policy the most difficult; +because in preventing bombardment and invasion the defender has the +strategical advantage of being nearer home than the adversary; +while in the defense of a country's policy, a naval force may have +to "assume the offensive," and go even to the far distant coasts +of the enemy--as the Russian fleet went to Tsushima, where it met +its death. + +In that part of naval defense which is concerned with trade routes, +the strategical advantage must go, in general, to that side which +is the nearer to the locality where the decisive battle may occur. + +In laying down a policy of naval defense, however, it is not necessary +to consider these three parts separately, because no nation can +ever tell whether in the distant future its naval defense will +have to be used directly for any one of the three, or for all. +In general terms, it may be stated that in nearly all naval wars +the fleet has been used more for the defense of the nation's policy +than for the actual defense of the coasts or the trade routes. This +does not mean that there has never been a bombardment or invasion, +or that the defense of trade routes may not have been the cause of +the war itself; but it does mean that in actual wars bombardment +or invasion has been rare, the capture of merchant vessels has +played a minor part, and the deciding events have been battles +between two fleets, that were often far from the land of either. + +Owing to the fact that within modern times most of the important +countries of the world have been those of continental Europe, with +frontiers contiguous, and in fact identical, the defense of a country +has been largely committed to the army, and most of the wars have +been on land. The country standing in exception to this has been +Great Britain, whose isolated and insular situation demanded a +defense that was strictly naval. The tremendous advance in recent +times of the engineering arts, by which ships became larger and +faster, and able to carry more powerful and accurate guns than ever +before, has enhanced the value of naval power and enabled Great +Britain to reach all over the surface of the earth, and become more +powerful than any continental nation. Thus she has made out of the +very weakness of her position a paramount tower of strength. + +Naval defense was taken up systematically in Great Britain in the +eighth century by King Offa, to whom is credited the maxim, "He +who would be secure on land must be supreme at sea"; but it must +have dropped to a low ebb by 1066, for William of Normandy landed +in England unopposed. Since that time Great Britain's naval defense, +committed to her navy, has increased steadily in effectiveness and +power, keeping pace with the increase in the national interests +it defended, and utilizing all the growing resources of wealth +and science which the world afforded. Until the present crisis, +Great Britain's naval defense did its most important work during +Napoleon's time, when Great Britain's standing, like the standing +of every other European nation, was subjected to a strain that +it could hardly bear. So keenly, however, did the nation and the +nation's great leader, Pitt, realize the situation that the most +strenuous measures were adopted to keep the navy up, press-gangs +even visiting the houses of subjects of the King, taking men out and +putting them by force on board his Majesty's ships. But the British +navy, even more than the British army, brought Great Britain safe +out of the Napoleonic danger, and made the British the paramount +nation of the world. + +Since then Great Britain has waxed more and more powerful, her +avowed policy being that her navy should be equal to any other two; +realizing that her aloofness in point of national characteristics +and policy from all other nations made it possible that a coalition +of at least two great nations might be pitted against her at a +time when she could not get an ally. Accompanying the growth of +the British navy has been the establishment of British foreign +trade, British colonies, and British bases from which the navy +could work, and the general making of a network of British commerce +and British power over the surface of the earth. No other nation +has ever dominated so large a part of the surface of the globe as +has Great Britain during the last two centuries; and she has done +it by means of her naval power. This naval power has been, in the +language of Great Britain, for the "imperial defense"; not for coast +defense alone, but for the defense of all the imperial interests, +commercial and political, and even the imperial prestige. And this +defense of prestige, it may here be remarked, is not a vainglorious +defense, not an exhibition of a swaggering, swashbuckling spirit, but +a recognition of the fact that the minds of men are so constituted +that the prestige of an individual, an organization, or a nation +has a practical value and is an actual force. No government that +appreciates its responsibilities will willingly risk the prestige of +the nation which it governs, because it knows that any weakening +of it will be followed by a weakening of influence and a consequent +increase of difficulty in attaining some "end in view." + +The greatness of the British navy, compared with that of the British +army and the other elements of Great Britain's government, has taken +on magnified dimensions during the last half century. So long as +war-ships used sails as their principal motive power, so long were +they forced to employ methods of construction and equipment that +forbade the efficient employment of high-power guns, the attainment +of great speed, and the use of instruments of precision; so long, +in other words, was their military effectiveness prevented from +increasing greatly. But when the British navy decided to abandon +sail power altogether and propel their ships by steam, a new phase +was entered upon, in which every resource of the engineering arts +and the physical sciences was called into requisition; and now, +on board a dreadnaught, battle cruiser, destroyer, or submarine, +can be found the highest examples of mechanical and electrical art +and science. Every material resource which the brain and wealth +of man can compass is enlisted in her naval defense; and in order +to take advantage of the rapidity and certainty of movement they +afford for operating fleets and ships, there has been a great advance +in methods of operation, or, in military parlance, "staff work." +To assist this work, the radio, the cable, and even the humble +typewriter have contributed their essential share, with the result +that to Great Britain's naval defense there has been devoted an +extraordinary degree of efficiency, continuous effort, a more varied +activity, and a larger expenditure of money than to any other object +of man's activity. + +The United States navy, to which is committed the naval defense +of the United States, has followed the same lines as the British; +and its task, while in some ways easier, is in other ways more +difficult. Perhaps the chief reason why the naval defense of Great +Britain is so difficult is the extreme closeness of her borders +to the borders of her possible foes--for the English Channel is +only twenty-three miles across from Dover to Calais. And yet the +very narrowness of the Channel there lends a certain element of +assistance to the defender of either coast against an enemy like +Germany, because it enables the defender, by simply protecting that +narrow area, to prevent an enemy from passing to the sea or from it, +except by going around the British Isles. But while it is interesting +thus to compare the tasks of two navies by comparing the lengths +of coast line, populations, wealth, and areas of their countries, +or their distances from possible antagonists, such comparisons are +really misleading; for the reason that all nations are on a par +in regard to the paramount element of national defense, which is +defense of national policy. It was as important to Belgium as it +was to Germany to maintain the national policy, and the army of +Belgium was approximately as strong as that of Germany in proportion +to her wealth, area, and population; but nevertheless the Belgium +army was routed, and Belgium was conquered by the German army. + +Much has been written to prove that the sole reason for the possession +of the paramount navy by Great Britain is that the soil of Great +Britain cannot support her people. In an essay, entitled "Naval +Power," which I contributed to the _United States Naval Institute_ +in 1911, the fallacy of this was shown; and it was pointed out that +even if Great Britain grew more than enough to feed her people, +life could be made unendurable to the 60,000,000 living there (or to +the people in any civilized and isolated country) by an effective +blockading fleet. _The question of how great a navy any country needs +depends, not on the size, but on the policies of that country, and +on the navies of the countries that may oppose those policies_. The +navy that a country needs is a navy that can defend its policies, +both offensively and defensively. If, for instance, the United States +does not wish to enforce any policy that Great Britain would oppose, +or to oppose any policy that Great Britain would enforce, then we +may leave her navy out of consideration. But if we decide that we +must maintain a certain policy which a certain country may oppose, +then we must have a navy at least equal to hers; because we do not +know whether we should have to meet that navy near our coast, or +near hers, or far away from both. For the reason, furthermore, that +a war with a European Power might occur at a period of strained +relations with some Asiatic Power, we must realize the temptation +to that Asiatic Power to seize the opportunity and attack us on +the Pacific side, knowing that we should need all our navy on the +Atlantic side. This seems to mean that in order to have an effective +naval defense (since we are precluded by our policy from having +European allies and no South American country could give us any +effective naval help) we must have on each ocean a fleet as strong +as that of any nation on that ocean against whose wishes we may +have to enforce a policy--or against whose policy we may have to +oppose resistance. + +The essential requirement of any defense is that it shall be adequate; +because an inadequate defense will be broken down, while the attack +will retain a large proportion of its original strength. In the +_United States Naval Institute_, in 1905, the present writer showed, +by means of a series of tables, how, when two forces fight, the +force which is originally the more powerful will become gradually +more powerful, relatively to the weaker, as the fight goes on. That, +for instance, if two forces start with the relative powers of 10 and +8, the weaker force will be reduced so much more rapidly than the +stronger that when it has been reduced to zero the stronger force +will have a value of 5.69. The values mentioned indicated the actual +fighting strength--strength made up of all the factors--material, +physical, and psychic--that constituted it. Of course, none of +these factors can ever be accurately compared; but nevertheless +the tables seemed to prove that in a contest between two forces +whose total strengths are as 10 and 8 one force will be reduced +to zero, while the other will be reduced not quite one-half. + +One of the lessons drawn was "the folly of ineffectual resistance." +Doubtless a clearer lesson would have been "the folly of ineffectual +preparedness"; because, when the decision as to resistance or +non-resistance is forced upon a nation, the matter is so urgent, +the military, political, and international conditions so complex, +and the excitement probably so intense, that a wise decision is +very difficult to reach; whereas the question of what constitutes +effectual preparedness is simple, and needs merely to be approached +with calm nerves and an open mind. + +Inasmuch as the psychic element in defense is the strongest single +element, it is apparent that if the decision is reached to prepare +an effectual defense the nation must be absolutely united, and +must appreciate at its full value the debilitating influence of +opposition to the measure; for, no matter how much money a nation +may expend, no matter how many lives it may sacrifice, its defense +cannot have an efficiency proportional to the effort if a considerable +number of its citizens are permitted to oppose it. + +In our own country there has been so much talking and writing recently +about defense, that there is danger of the question coming to be +considered academic; though no question is more practical, no question +is more urgent. + +_Defense must defend_. + + + + +CHAPTER VI + +NAVAL POLICY + +Every country that has a satisfactory navy has acquired it as the +result of a far-seeing naval policy, not of opportunism or of chance. +The country has first studied the question thoroughly, then decided +what it ought to do, then decided how to do it. + +Naval policy has to deal with three elements: material, personnel, +and operations, which, though separate, are mutually dependent. A +clear comprehension of their actual relations and relative weights +can be obtained only by thorough study; but without that comprehension +no wise naval policy can be formulated, and therefore no satisfactory +navy can be established. + +The most obvious thing about a navy is its material: the ponderous +battleships, the picturesque destroyers, the submarines, the intricate +engines of multifarious types, the radio, the signal-flags, the +torpedo that costs $8,000, the gun that can sink a ship 10 miles +away. + +The United States navy ever since its beginning in 1775 has excelled +in its material; the ships have always been good, and in many cases +they have surpassed those of similar kind in other navies. This +has been due to the strong common sense of the American people, +their engineering skill, and their inventive genius. The first +war-ship to move under steam was the American ship _Demologos_, +sometimes called the _Fulton the First_, constructed in 1813; the +first electric torpedoes were American; the first submarine to do +effective work in war was American; the first turret ship, the +_Monitor_, was American; the first warship to use a screw propeller +was the _Princeton_, an American; the naval telescope-sight was +American. American ships now are not only well constructed, but all +their equipments are of the best; and to-day the American battleship +is the finest and most powerful vessel of her class in the world. + +Our personnel, too, has always been good. The American seaman has +always excelled, and so has the American gunner. No ships have +ever been better handled than the American ships; no naval battles +in history have been conducted with more skill and daring than +those of American ships; no exploits in history surpass those of +Cushing, Hobson, and Decatur. + +In operations, however, in the handling of the navy as a whole, +we have never excelled; though no better individual fleet leaders +shine in the pages of all history than Farragut and Dewey. The +strategical operating of our material and personnel has not been +in accordance with carefully laid plans, but has been left largely +to the inspiration of the commander on the spot, both in peace +and in war. Material has suffered from lack of a naval policy, +but only quantitatively, because material is a subject that the +people understand. Personnel has suffered more, because the people +fail to realize the amount of training needed to make a personnel +competent to perform their tasks successfully, in competition with +the highly trained men of other navies. But operations have suffered +incomparably more than material and personnel; because naturally +the people do not comprehend the supreme importance of being ready, +when war breaks out, to operate the material and personnel skilfully +against an active enemy, in accordance with well-prepared strategic +plans; nor do they realize how difficult and long would be the task +of preparing and testing out those plans. Therefore, they fail to +provide the necessary administrative machinery.[*] + +[Footnote *: Since this was written, the Congress has so enlarged +the scope of the Office of Chief of Naval Operations as to make +it a General Staff.] + +In fact, the kind and amount of machinery needed to conduct operations +skilfully and quickly cannot be decided wisely until the country +adopts some naval policy; and in naval policy the United States +must be admitted to have lagged behind almost every other civilized +country. Spurred as we were to exertion by the coming of the +Revolutionary War, we constructed hastily, though with skill, the +splendid ships that did service in that war. But after the war, +interest in the navy waned; and if it had not been for the enormous +tribute demanded by the pirates of the Barbary coast from our +government, and a realization of the fact that not only was it +cheaper to build ships and fight the pirates than to pay the tribute, +but paying the tribute was a disgraceful act, our navy would have +run down even more than it did. Yet even with this warning, 1812 +found our navy in a desperate condition. Rallying to the emergency, +though too late to accomplish much practical result, we built a number +of excellent ships, against the votes of many highly influential +men in Congress. These ships did gallant service, and redeemed +the reputation of Americans from the oft-repeated charge of being +cowards and merely commercial men, though they were too few to +prevent the blockade which British squadrons maintained on our +Atlantic coast. After the war, the navy was again allowed to +deteriorate; and although our ships were excellent, and the officers +and men were excellent, and although the war with Mexico supplied +some stimulation, the War of the Rebellion caught us in a very +bad predicament. The country rose to this emergency too slowly, +as before; but the enemy were even less prepared than we, so that +during the four years of the Civil War we were able to construct, +man, and buy several hundred ships of various kinds; with the result +that, at the end of the war, our navy, if not quite so powerful as +Great Britain's, was at least very close to it, and with a recent +experience in actual war which the British navy did not possess. + +After that war, the same story was repeated. The people convinced +themselves that they would never again be forced to go to war; that +they had seen the folly of it, and the misery of it, and would +devote themselves thereafter to the delightful pursuits of peace. +Gradually the fighting ships of the ironclad class were allowed +to go to pieces; gradually even the larger ships of the wooden +sailing class fell into disrepair; gradually the idea of war faded +from the minds even of naval officers; gradually squadrons and +fleets, as such, were broken up, and our ships were to be found +scattered singly over all the seas, and swinging idly at their +anchors in pleasant ports. + +Fortunately, Admiral Luce and a very few other officers had learned +the salient lessons of war during the Rebellion, and sturdily stood up +against the decadent tendency of the times. Against much opposition, +Luce succeeded in founding the Naval War College at Newport, where +the study of war as an art in itself was to be prosecuted, and in +enlisting Captain Mahan in the work. In a few years Mahan gave to +the world that epochal book, "The Influence of Sea Power upon History" +(embodying his lectures before the War College), which stirred the +nations of Europe to such a realization of the significance of +naval history, and such a comprehension of the efficacy of naval +power, that they entered upon a determined competition for acquiring +naval power, which continues to this day. + +Meanwhile, a little before 1880, the people became aroused to the +fact that though the country was growing richer, their navy was +becoming weaker, while the navies of certain European countries +were becoming stronger. So they began in 1880 the construction of +what was then called "the new navy." The construction of the new +ships was undertaken upon the lines of the ships then building abroad, +which were in startling contrast with the useless old-fashioned +American ships which then were flying our flag. + +The construction of the material of the navy has progressed since +then, but spasmodically. At every session of Congress tremendous +efforts have been made by people desiring an adequate navy, and +tremendous resistance has been made by people who believed that we +required no navy, or at least only a little navy. The country at +large has taken a bystander's interest in the contest, not knowing +much about the pros and cons, but feeling in an indolent fashion +that we needed some navy, though not much. The result has been, not +a reasonable policy, but a succession of unreasonable compromises +between the aims of the extremists on both sides. + +Great Britain, on the other hand, has always regarded the navy +question as one of the most difficult and important before the +country, and has adopted, and for centuries has maintained, a definite +naval policy. This does not mean that she has followed a rigid +naval policy; for a naval policy, to be efficient, must be able +to accommodate itself quickly to rapid changes in international +situations, and to meet sudden dangers from even unexpected quarters--as +the comparatively recent experience of Great Britain shows. At the +beginning of this century the British navy was at the height of +its splendor and self-confidence. Britannia ruled the waves, and +Britannia's ships and squadrons enforced Britannia's policies in +every sea. The next most powerful navy was that of France; but +it was not nearly so large, and seemed to be no more efficient, +in proportion to its size. Owing to Britain's wise and continuing +policy, and the excellence of the British sailor and his ships, +the British navy proudly and almost tranquilly held virtual command +of all the seas. + +But shortly after this century began, British officers discerned a +new and disturbing element gradually developing on the horizon. The +first thing which roused their attention to it was the unexpected +attack of the Japanese torpedo-boats on the Russian squadron in +Port Arthur. No war had been declared, and the Russian squadron +was riding peacefully at anchor. The suddenness of the attack, and +the distinct though incomplete success which it achieved, startled +the British into a realization of the fact that there had been +introduced into warfare on the sea methods and tactics requiring _a +higher order of preparation_ than had ever before been known; that +the scientific methods which the Germans employed so effectively on +land in 1870 had been adapted by the Japanese to naval warfare, and +would necessitate the introduction into naval policies of _speedier +methods_ than had hitherto been needed. + +Another event which had happened shortly before showed that naval +policies would have to be modified, if they were to utilize recent +advances in scientific methods. This event was the unprecedented +success at target practice of H. M. S. _Terrible_, commanded by +Captain Sir Percy Scott, which proved that by a long and strenuous +training and the adoption of instruments of precision, it was possible +to attain a skill in naval gunnery never attained before. Up to this +moment the British navy had almost despised gunnery. Inheriting the +traditions brought down from Howe, Rodney, and Nelson, permeated with +the ideals of the "blue-water school," proud of being British seamen, +proud of the pure white of their ships, enamoured of the stimulating +breeziness of the quarterdeck and bridge, imbued with almost a +contempt for such mathematical sciences as were not directly used +in practical navigation, British naval officers exalted seamanship +as the acme of their art, and took little interest in gunnery. +All the battles of the past had been won by dash and seamanship +and dogged persistence. Ships had always fought close alongside +each other. No science had ever won any naval battle of the past, +so why should they bother with science now--and why should they +bother with target practice, except just enough to insure that the +battery was in order, and that the men were not afraid of their +guns? Besides, target practice dirtied the ship--a sacrilege to +the British naval officer. + +But the events of the war between Japan and Russia, especially +the naval battles of Port Arthur, August 10, 1904, and the Sea +of Japan, May 27, 1905, riveted their attention on the fact that +something more than seamanship and navigation and clean ships would +be needed, if the British navy was to maintain its proud supremacy +on the sea; for in these battles, overwhelming victories were won +purely by superior skill in gunnery, strategy, and tactics. + +To these causes of awakening was added one still greater, but of +like import--the rapid rise of the German navy from a position +of comparative unimportance to one which threatened the British +navy itself. The fact became gradually evident to British officers +that the German navy was proceeding along the same lines as had +proceeded the German army. Realizing the efficiency of the German +Government, noting the public declarations of the German Emperor, +observing the excellence of the German ships, the skill of the +German naval officers, and the extraordinary energy which the German +people were devoting to the improvement of the German navy--the +British navy took alarm. + +So did the other navies. + +Beginning about 1904, Great Britain set to work with energy to +reform her naval policy. Roused to action by the sense of coming +danger, she augmented the size and number of vessels of all types; +increased the personnel of all classes, regular and reserve; scrapped +all obsolete craft; built (secretly) the epochal _Dreadnaught_, +and modernized in all particulars the British navy. In every great +movement one man always stands pre-eminent. The man in this case was +Admiral Sir John Fisher, first sea lord of the admiralty, afterward +Lord Fisher. Fisher brought about vital changes in the organization, +methods, and even the spirit of the navy. He depleted the overgrown +foreign squadrons, concentrated the British force in powerful fleets +near home, established the War College, inculcated the study of +strategy and tactics, appointed Sir Percy Scott as inspector of +target practice, put the whole weight of his influence on the side +of gunnery and efficiency, placed officers in high command who had +the military idea as distinguished from the idea of the "blue-water +school," and imbued the entire service with the avowed idea that +they must get ready to fight to the death, not the French navy, +with its easy-going methods, but the German navy, allied perhaps +with some other. At the admiralty he introduced methods analogous to +those of the General Staff, to maintain the navy ready for instant +service at all times, to prepare and keep up to date mobilization +plans in the utmost detail, and to arrange plans for the conduct +of war in such wise that after a war should break out, all the +various probable situations would have been studied out in advance. + +The work required at the admiralty, and still more in the fleet--night +and day and in all weathers--taxed mental and physical endurance to +the limit; but the result was complete success; for when war broke +out on the 1st of August, 1914, the British navy was absolutely +ready. Many complaints have appeared in print about the unreadiness +of Great Britain; but no one who knows anything of the facts supposes +that these criticisms include Great Britain's navy. + +The United States navy in the early part of this century occupied, +relatively to others, a very ill-defined position; but the increased +interest taken in it by our people after the Spanish War, combined +with the destruction of the flower of the Russian fleet in the +Russo-Japanese War, and the crushing blow inflicted on the French +navy by the maladministration of Camille Pelletan, resulted in +placing our navy, about three years ago, in a position second only +to Great Britain's--a position which it recently has lost. Owing +to a common origin and language, our navy has always followed the +British navy, though at a somewhat respectful distance; and while +it is true that in point of mechanical inventions we are ahead, in +seamanship, navigation, and engineering on a par, and in gunnery +and tactics not far behind, yet we must admit that in policy and +in policy's first cousin, strategy, we are very far in the rear. + +There are many reasons why this should be, the first being that +the British navy has nearly always lived under more stimulating +conditions than we, because the probability of war has seemed greater, +and because the United States has underestimated what reasonable +probability there has been, and failed to realize how tremendously +difficult would be the task of getting ready for it. Owing to the +present war, our people have gradually come to see that they must +get more ships and other material; but they realize this as only a +measure of urgency, and not as a matter of policy. If the emergency +passes us by in safety, the people may see in this fact only a +confirmation of their notion that war can be postponed _ad infinitum_, +and may therefore fail to take due precautions for the future. If +so, when we at last become involved in a sudden war, we shall be +as unprepared as now; and, relatively to some aggressive nation +which, foreseeing this, may purposely prepare itself, we shall +be more unprepared. + +A curious phase of the navy question in our country is the fact +that very few people, even the most extreme partisans for or against +a large navy, have ever studied it as a problem and endeavored +to arrive at a correct solution. Few have realized that it is a +problem, in the strictest sense of the word; and that unless one +approaches it as such his conclusions cannot be correct except +by accident. + +In Germany, on the other hand, and equally in Japan, the question +has been taken up as a concrete problem, just as definite as a +problem in engineering. They have used for solving it the method +called "The Estimate of the Situation," originated by the German +General Staff, which is now adopted in all the armies and navies of +civilized countries for the solution of military problems. Previous +to the adoption of this method the general procedure had been such +as is now common in civil life, when a number of people forming +a group desire to make a decision as to what they will do in any +given contingency. The usual procedure is for some one to suggest +that a certain thing be done, then for somebody else to suggest +that something else be done, and so on; and then finally for the +group to make a decision which is virtually a compromise. This +procedure is faulty, and the decisions resulting are apt to be +unwise; because it is quite possible that some very important factors +may be overlooked, and equally possible that some other factors +be given undue weight. Furthermore, a measure advocated by a man +who has the persuasive and emotional abilities of the orator is +more apt to be favorably considered than a measure advocated by +a man not possessing those abilities. + +In the "Estimate of the Situation" method, on the other hand, the +orator has no opportunity, because the procedure is simply an accurate +process of reasoning. It is divided into four parts. The first +part consists of a careful study of the "mission," ending in a +clear determination of what the "mission" really is--that is, _what +is the thing which it is desired to do?_ The second part consists +of a careful study, and eventually a clear comprehension, of the +difficulties in the way; the third part consists of a careful study, +and eventually a clear comprehension, of what facilities are available +with which to overcome the difficulties; the fourth part consists +of a careful study of the mission, difficulties and facilities, in +their mutual relations, and a "decision" as to what should therefore +be done. + +Military and naval people are so thoroughly convinced of the value +of this method that they always employ it when making important +decisions, writing down the various factors and the successive +steps in regular order and in complete detail. + +In this country, while naval and military people use this method +in their comparatively minor problems, the country at large does +not use it in deciding the major problem--that is, in deciding +how much navy they want, and of what composition. They do not take +even the first step toward formulating a naval policy, because +they do not study the "mission" of the navy--that is, _they do not +study the international and national situations and their bearing +on the need for a navy_. Yet until they do this they will not be +in a sufficiently informed condition of mind to determine what +the "mission" is--that is, what they wish the navy to be able to +do--because, before they can formulate the mission they must resolve +what foreign navy or navies that mission must include. If they +decide that the mission of the navy is to guard our coast and trade +routes against the hostile efforts of Liberia the resulting naval +policy will be simple and inexpensive; while if they conclude that +the mission of our navy is to guard our coast and trade routes +against the hostile acts of _any_ navy the resulting naval policy +will be so difficult and costly as to tax the brain and wealth of +the country to a degree that will depend on _the length of time +that will elapse before the date at which the navy must be ready +to fulfil that mission_. + +This factor reminds us of another factor: _the minimum time in which +the navy can get ready to fulfil a given mission_ (for instance, +to protect us against any navy); and we cannot decide the mission +correctly without taking this factor into account. For example, +it would be foolish to decide that the mission of our navy is to +protect us _now_ against any navy, including the greatest, when +it would take us at least twenty years to develop and train a navy +to accomplish that task; and it would be equally foolish to decide +that the mission is to protect us against any navy _except_ the +greatest, because such a decision could rest on no other ground +than present improbability of conflict with the greatest navy, +or improbability for the very few years ahead (say two or three) +which we poor mortals can forecast. + +This reasoning seems to indicate that the first step in formulating +a naval policy for the United States is to realize that any conclusion +as to which navies should be included in the mission of our navy +must not exclude any navy about whose peaceful conduct toward us +we can entertain a reasonable doubt, _during the period of time +which we would require to get ready to meet her_. For instance, +inasmuch as it would take us at least twenty years to get ready +to protect ourselves against the hostile efforts of the British +navy, we cannot exclude even that navy from a consideration of the +mission of our own, unless we entertain no doubt of the peaceful +attitude of that navy toward us for at least that twenty years. + +Clearly, the problem is not only very important but very +difficult--perhaps the most difficult single problem before the +country; and for this reason, naval officers have long marvelled +that the leading minds of the country do not undertake it. Perhaps +one reason is that they do not know how difficult it is: that they +do not realize the extraordinary complexity of modern ships and +engines, and the trained skill required to handle them; that they +do not realize what Great Britain now realizes, that we must prepare +for one of the most stupendous struggles ever carried on; that we +must have a personnel both of officers and enlisted men trained +to the highest point, because they will have to meet officers and +enlisted men trained to the highest point; that the training must +be such that the skill produced can be exercised by night and day, +in cold and heat, in storm and calm, under circumstances of the +utmost possible difficulty and danger; that, while it takes four +years to build a ship and get her into the fleet as an effective +unit, it takes much longer to train an enlisted petty officer as +he should be trained, and a lifetime to train officers of the upper +grades. Perhaps also our leading minds do not realize the intellectual +requirements of the higher realms of the naval art, or comprehend +what the examples of Alexander, Caesar, Napoleon, Nelson, and Farragut +prove: that, _in the real crises of a nation's life her most valuable +asset is the trained skill in strategy that directs the movements +of her forces_. + +Further than this, they may not realize that the greater the danger +which they must avert, the earlier they must begin to prepare for +it, because the more work in preparation will have to be performed; +and yet realization of this truth is absolutely vital, as is also +realization of the fact that we have no military power as our ally, +and therefore must be ready to meet alone a hostile attack (though +perhaps in the far-distant future) from _any_ foreign power. To +see that this is true it is merely necessary to note the facts of +history, and observe how nations that have long been on terms of +friendship have suddenly found themselves at war with each other; +and how countries which have always been hostile have found themselves +fighting side by side. In the present war, Great Britain is allied +with the two countries toward which, more than toward any other, +she has been hostile; and she is fighting the country to which, +more than any other, she is bound by ties of consanguinity and +common interests. The history of war is so filled with alternations +of peace and war between every pair of contiguous countries as to +suggest the thought that the mere fact of two countries having +interests that are common is a reason why their respective shares +in those interests may conflict; that countries which have no common +interests have nothing to fight about; that it is only for things +in which two nations are interested, and which both desire, that +those two nations fight. + +If our estimate of the situation should lead us to the decision +that we must prepare our navy in such a way that, say twenty years +hence, it will be able to protect the country against any enemy, +we shall then instinctively adopt a policy. The fact of having +ahead of us a definite, difficult thing to do, will at once take us +out of the region of guesswork, and force us into logical methods. +We shall realize the problem in its entirety; we shall see the +relation of one part to another, and of all the parts to the whole; +we shall realize that the deepest study of the wisest men must be +devoted to it, as it is in all maritime countries except our own. +The very difficulties of the problem, the very scope and greatness +of it, the fact that national failure or national success will +hinge on the way we solve it, will call into action the profoundest +minds in all the nation. We shall realize that, more than any other +problem before the country, this problem is urgent; because in no +other problem have we so much lost time to make up for, and in +no other work of the government are we so far behind the great +nations that we may have to contend against. + +Great Britain was startled into a correct estimate of the situation +ten years ago, and at once directed perhaps the best of her ability +to meet it. Certain it is that no other department of the British +Government is in such good condition as the navy; in no other department +has the problem been so thoroughly understood, and so conscientiously +worked out, or the success been so triumphant. + +The underlying reason for this is not so much the individual courage +and ability of the officers and men, or even their skill in handling +their ships and squadrons, as the fact that Great Britain has followed +a definite naval policy; so that the British nation has had a perfectly +clear realization of what it wishes the navy to do, and the navy +has had a perfectly clear realization of how to do it. + +The United States has not yet made a correct estimate of the naval +situation; she has not yet reached the point that Great Britain +reached ten years ago. Great Britain apprehended the danger, and +took action before it was too late. Shall the United States take +action now or wait until it is too late? + + + + +PART II + +NAVAL STRATEGY + + + + +CHAPTER VII + +GENERAL PRINCIPLES + +Strategy is difficult of definition; but though many definitions +have been made, and though they do not agree together very well, +yet all agree that strategy is concerned with the preparation of +military forces for war and for operating them in war--while tactics +is the immediate instrument for handling them in battle. Strategy +thinks out a situation beforehand, and decides what preparations +as to material, personnel, and operations should be made. + +Many books have been written on strategy, meaning strategy as applied +to armies, but very few books have been written on naval strategy. +The obvious reasons are that armies in the past have been much +larger and more important than navies; that naval men have only +recently had the appliances on board ship for writing on an extensive +scale; and that the nature of their occupation has been such that +continuous application of the kind needed for thinking out principles +and expounding them in books, has only recently been possible. + +Most of the few existing books on naval strategy deal with it +historically, by describing and explaining the naval campaigns +of the past and such land campaigns as illustrate principles that +apply to sea and land alike. Perhaps the best books are those of +Darrieus and Mahan. + +Until about fifty years ago, it was only by experience in actual +war, supplemented by laborious study of the campaigns of the great +commanders, and the reading of books on strategy which pointed +out and expounded the principles involved in them, that one could +arrive at any clear idea of strategy. + +But wars have fortunately been so infrequent, the information about +them has often been so conflicting, and so many results have been +due to chance, that, in default of experience, the mere reading +of books did not lead to very satisfactory results, except in the +case of geniuses; and therefore war problems and war games were +devised, in which the various factors of material and personnel +were represented, and made as true to life as possible. + +The _tactical_ games resulting, which naval strategists now play, +employ models of the various craft used in war, such as battleships, +submarines, etc., and are governed by rules that regulate the movements +of those craft on a sort of big chess-board, several feet square, that +represents an area of water several miles square. The _strategic_ +games and problems are based on principles similar to those on which +the tactical games are based, in the sense that actual operations are +carried on in miniature; but naturally, the strategical operations +cover several hundred miles, and sometimes thousands. The aim of +both the tactical and the strategic games is to determine as closely +as possible the laws that decide victory or defeat; and therefore, +for any country, the material, personnel and operations it should +employ. Naturally the results obtained are not quite so convincing +as those of actual war or battle; but they are more convincing +than can be attained in any other way, as yet devised, especially +as many of the operations of the game-board that turn out well in +games are tried out afterward by the fleet in peace maneuvers. +War games and problems may be compared to the drawings that an +architect makes of a house which some one wants to build; the plans +and drawings are not so realistic as a real house, but they are +better than anything else; and, like the war games, they can be +altered and realtered until the best result seems to have been +attained, considering the amount of money allowed and other practical +conditions. + +The idea of devising war games and war problems seems to have originated +with Von Moltke; certainly it was first put in practice by his +direction. Shortly after he became chief of the General Staff of +the Prussian army in 1857, he set to work to carry out the ideas +which he had had in mind for several years, while occupying minor +posts, but which he had not had the power to enforce. It seems to +have become clear to his mind that, if a chess-player acquired +skill, not only by playing actual games and by studying actual +games played by masters, but also by working out hypothetical chess +problems, it ought to be possible to devise a system whereby army +officers could supplement their necessarily meagre experience of +actual war, and their necessarily limited opportunities for studying +with full knowledge the actual campaigns of great strategists, +by working out hypothetical, tactical, and strategic problems. +Von Moltke succeeded in devising such a system and in putting it +into successful operation. Hypothetical problems were prepared, +in which enemy forces were confronted with each other under given +circumstances of weather, terrain, and distances, each force with +its objective known only to itself: for instance, you are in command +of such and such a force at such and such a place; you have received +orders to accomplish such and such a purpose; you receive information +that the enemy, comprising such and such troops, was at a certain +time at a certain place, and marching in a certain direction. What +do you do? + +Classes of army officers were formed, and compelled to work out +the problems exactly as boys at school were compelled to work out +problems in arithmetic. The skill of individual officers in solving +the problems was noted and recorded; and the problems themselves, +as time went on and experience was gained, were made more and more +to conform to probable situations in future wars with Austria, +France, and other countries, actual maps being used, and the exact +nature and magnitude of every factor in each problem being precisely +stated. + +By such work, the pupils (officers) acquired the same kind of skill +in solving strategic and tactical problems that a boy acquires in +solving problems in arithmetic--a skill in handling the instruments +employed. Now the skill acquired in solving any kind of problem, +like the skill developed in any art, such as baseball, fencing, or +piano-playing, does not give a man skill merely in doing a thing +identically like a thing he has done before: such a skill would +be useless, for the reason that identical conditions almost never +recur, and identical problems are never presented. Similar conditions +often recur, however, and similar problems are often presented; +and familiarity with any class of conditions or problems imparts +skill in meeting any condition or any problem that comes within +that class. If, for instance, a man memorizes the sums made by +adding together any two of the digits, he is equipped to master +any problem of addition; and if he will practise at adding numbers +together, he will gradually acquire a certain ability of mind whereby +he can add together a long row of figures placed in a sequence +he never saw before, and having a sum he never attained before. +Or a pianist, having acquired the mastery of the technic of the +keyboard and the ability to read music, can sit down before a piano +he never sat at before and play off instantly a piece of music he +never saw before. + +Doubtless Moltke had ideas of this kind in mind when his plans +for educating strategists and tacticians by problems on paper and +by games were ridiculed by the unimaginative, and resisted by the +indolent; and certainly no man was ever proved right more gloriously +than Moltke. In the war with Austria in 1866, the Prussian army +defeated the Austrian at Sadowa or Koeniggraetz in nineteen days after +the declaration of war. In the war with France in 1870, the Prussian +army routed the French and received the surrender of Napoleon III +in seven weeks and two days, not because of superior courage or +experience in war, but by more scientific strategy. As Henderson +says: "Even the French generals of divisions and brigades had had +more actual experience (in war) than those who led the German army +corps. Compared with the German rank and file, a great part of +their non-commissioned officers and men were veterans, and veterans +who had seen much service. Their chief officers were practically +familiar with the methods of moving, supplying, and maneuvering +large masses of troops; their marshals were valiant and successful +soldiers. And yet the history of modern warfare records no defeats +so swift and complete as those of Koeniggraetz and Sedan. The great +host of Austria was shattered in seven weeks; the French Imperial +army was destroyed in seven weeks and three days; and to all intents +and purposes the resistance they had offered was not much more +effective than that of a respectable militia. But both the Austrian +and the French armies were organized and trained under the old +system. Courage, experience, and professional pride they possessed +in abundance. Man for man, in all virile qualities, neither officers +nor men were inferior to their foes. But one thing their generals +lacked, and that was education for war. Strategy was almost a sealed +book to them." Also, "Moltke committed no mistake. Long before war +had been declared every possible precaution had been made. And +these included much more than arrangements for rapid mobilization, +the assembly of superior numbers completely organized, and the +establishment of magazines. The enemy's numbers, armaments, readiness, +and efficiency had been submitted to a most searching examination. +Every possible movement that might be made, however unlikely, had +been foreseen; every possible danger that might arise, however +remote, discussed and guarded against"; also, "That the Prussian +system should be imitated, and her army deprived of its monopoly +of high efficiency, was naturally inevitable. Every European state +has to-day its college, its intelligence department, its schools of +instruction, and its course of field maneuvers and field firing." + +Strategy may be divided into two parts, war strategy and preparation +strategy; and of these two, preparation strategy is by far the +more important. + +War strategy deals with the laying out of plans of campaign after +war has begun, and the handling of forces until they come into +contact with the enemy, when tactics takes those forces in its +charge. It deals with actual situations, arranges for the provisioning, +fuelling, and moving of actual forces, contests the field against an +actual enemy, the size and power of which are fairly well known--and +the intentions of which are sometimes known and sometimes not. +The work of the strategist in war is arduous, pressing, definite, +and exciting; and results are apt to follow decisions quickly. +He plays the greatest and oldest game the world has ever known, +with the most elaborate instruments, and for the largest stakes. +In most wars, the antagonists have been so nearly equal in point +of personnel and material that the result has seemed to be decided +by the relative degrees of skill of the strategists on both sides. +This has been the verdict of history; and victorious commanders +in all times and in all lands have achieved rarer glories, and +been crowned with higher honors, than any other men. + +Preparation strategy deals with the laying out of plans for +supposititious wars and the handling of supposititious forces against +supposititious enemies; and arranges for the construction, equipment, +mobilization, provisioning, fuelling, and moving of supposititious +fleets and armies. War strategy is vivid, stimulating and resultful; +preparation strategy is dull, plodding, and--for the strategist +himself--apparently resultless. Yet war strategy is merely the +child of preparation strategy. The weapons that war strategy uses, +preparation strategy put into its hands. The fundamental plans, the +strength and composition of the forces, the training of officers +and men, the collection of the necessary material of all kinds, +the arrangements for supplies and munitions of all sorts--the very +principles on which war strategy conducts its operations--are the +fruit of the tedious work of preparation strategy. Alexander reaps +the benefit of the preliminary labors of his father, Philip; William +is made German Emperor by the toil of Moltke. + +The work of laying out a supposititious campaign, involving +supposititious operations against a supposititious enemy, requires +of the strategist a thorough estimate of the situation, including +a careful estimate of the forces of the enemy, in material and +personnel, and of the strategy that will probably govern his +operations--whether he will act on the defensive, or assume the +offensive; if he is to act on the defensive, how and where will he +base his forces, how far will he operate away from his own shores? And +if he is to act on the offensive, what direction will his operations +take; will he secure an advance base; and if so, where? And as the +character of the enemy's operations will depend on the personnel +of the enemy General Staff and of the high commanders afloat, who +comprise the personnel, and what are their characteristics? + +To decide these questions correctly requires considerable acquaintance +with the enemy country, its navy and its policy, a full knowledge +of the strategy, personnel, and material of that navy, and a sound +conception of strategy itself. But to decide the questions correctly +is essential, because the decision will form the basis of the future +plans. + +Naturally, as the plan is entirely supposititious and is to take +effect at some indefinite time in the future, all the factors that +will be in existence at that time cannot be foretold exactly, and +therefore must be estimated. This will necessitate several alternate +hypotheses; and a war plan including mobilization and operations +must be made out, based on each hypothesis. For instance, on the +hypothesis that the enemy will take the offensive, one set of plans +will have to be prepared on the basis that we shall also take the +offensive, and another on the basis that circumstances may be such at +that time as to make it wise for us to resort to the defensive; while +on the hypothesis that the enemy is to remain on the defensive, a set +of plans very different from the other two as to both mobilization +and operations must be devised. + +Each set of the plans just suggested may also have to be divided +into two or more parts. On the basis that the enemy will remain +on the defensive, for instance, the circumstances when the hour +for action comes, such as the fact of his being quite unprepared, +may indicate the advisability of an attack on him as sudden as it +can be made; while, on the other hand, circumstances such as the +fact of his being thoroughly prepared may render it necessary for +us to send a larger force than we could get ready quickly, especially +if the enemy coast be far away, and may therefore indicate the +advisability of deliberate movements, and even a protracted delay +before starting. + +But no matter what plan is to be followed, a detailed plan for every +probable contingency must be prepared; and it must be elaborated +in such detail that it can be put into operation instantly when +the fateful instant comes; because the enemy will put his plans +into operation at the same time we do, and the one whose plans +are executed first will take a long step toward victory. + +Not only must the plans provide some means whereby the plans themselves +shall get into full operation instantly when war breaks; other plans +must also provide that all the acts which those plans contemplate +must be performed. Not only must the plans provide that all the +prearranged orders for putting the _Kearsarge_ into full commission +shall be instantly sent by mail, telegraph, and telephone to the +proper officials, but other plans must also provide means whereby +the officers and men shall actually march on board the _Kearsarge_, +her ensign and commission pennant be displayed, all the fuel, +ammunition, provisions, and equipment be on board and the _Kearsarge_ +sail at once, and join the commander-in-chief at sea. + +Doubtless the most complicated and comprehensive plans are those for +sending a large expedition on an offensive mission to a far-distant +coast, especially if that coast be guarded by an efficient navy, +if it have outlying islands that would afford good bases for her +destroyers and submarines, and if there are not good harbors which +our fleet could seize as advance bases, from which to prosecute +its future operations. The complexity of the task of planning such +an expedition, taking due account, but not exaggerated account, +of all the factors, favorable and adverse, is appalling; but the +task must be undertaken and accomplished. The most tedious part +is the logistics--the arrangements for supplying the fleet on the +way and in the distant theatre of operations with the necessary +provisions, equipment, and ammunition and, above all, the fuel. +The average superdreadnaught consumes about 460 tons of coal per +day at full speed, and about 108 tons at 10 knots; and coal or +other fuel for all the dreadnaughts, battle cruisers, cruisers of +various classes, scouts, destroyers, submarines, ships, aircraft +of different kinds, hospital ships, ammunition ships, transports, +and the fuel ships themselves, must be provided by means that _must +not fail_. + +While the work of planning an offensive movement to a distant coast +is the most tedious and complex, the work of planning a defensive +measure against a sudden attack on the coast needs the most +concentration of effort; for whatever the plans require to be done +must be done at once. This necessitates that the orders to be issued +must be as few as possible; that they be as concise and clear as +possible; that the things to be done be as few and as simple as +possible, and that all possible foresight be exercised to prevent +any confusion or misunderstanding, or any necessity on the part +of any one for requesting more instructions. + +When the fateful instant comes, the final command to mobilize puts +into execution whichever of the plans already made is to be followed; +and for this reason it is clear that the various plans must be +kept separate from each other, and each set of plans must include +all the various orders that must be signed for carrying it into +effect, including the particular word or phrase that directs the +execution of that particular set of plans. + +It is the story that the final order to the British navy in the +early part of August, 1914, was the word "Go." All the units went +immediately, understandingly, unitedly; and the greatest machine +the world has ever known was almost instantly in operation at full +speed. No such stupendous feat, physically considered, had ever +been done before. The mobilization of the Prussian army in 1870 and +of the German army about August 1, 1914, were as great performances +mentally and strategically, but not physically, by reason of the +relative feebleness of the forces set in motion. This relative +feebleness was due, of course, to the insignificance of muskets +compared to navy guns, of railway-trains compared to battleships, +etc.--an insignificance far from being neutralized by the greater +number of the units, for one 14-inch shell has an energy equal +to that of about 60,000 muskets, and no army contains anything +approximating the powerfulness of a battleship. + +Not only, however, must the strategist make plans in peace for +preparations that culminate in mobilization, and simply insure +that the navy shall be ready in material and personnel when war +breaks; he must also make plans for operating the navy strategically +afterward, along each of the various lines of direction that the +war may take. In other words, the work of preparation strategy +in making war plans may be divided into two parts--mobilization +and operation. + +The plans of mobilization deal naturally with all the activities +concerned, material and personnel, and endeavor to arrange a passing +from a state of peace to a state of war in the quickest possible time, +and with the least chance of errors and omissions. A considerable +degree of imagination is required, an almost infinite patience, and +a perfect willingness to work indefinitely without any reasonable +expectation of getting tangible results. A more hopeless task can +hardly be given any man or body of men than that of working out +plans, general and detailed, day after day, for contingencies that +will probably never happen, and to guard against dangers that will +probably never come; preparing tables, diagrams, and schedules +which are almost certainly doomed to rest forever in the sepulchre +of the confidential files. + +Yet this work is basic. Perhaps it is for that reason, that it is +obscure and dull; basic work is apt to be so. The spectacular success +of an individual in any walk of life is often but the crowning of +the unrecognized, and often utterly unknown work--of other men. + +Strategy is not a science only; it is an art as well; and although +the art cannot be practised in its perfection until after the science +is well comprehended, yet the art of strategy was born before the +science was. This is true of all those departments of man's activity +that are divided into sciences and arts, such as music, surgery, +government, navigation, gunnery, painting, sculpture, and the rest; +because the fundamental facts--say of music--cannot even attract +attention until some music has been produced by the art of some +musician, crude though that art may be; and the art cannot advance +very far until scientific methods have been applied, and the principles +that govern the production of good music have been found. The unskilled +navigators of the distant past pushed their frail craft only short +distances from the land, guided by art and not by science; for no +science of navigation then existed. But the knowledge gradually gained, +passing first from adept to pupil by word of mouth, and afterward +recorded on the written and then the printed page, resulted first +in the realization of the fact that various apparently unrelated +phenomena were based on the same underlying principles; and resulted +later in the perception, and still later in the definite expression, +of those underlying principles. Using these principles, the navigator +expanded the limits of his art. Soon we see Columbus, superbly bold, +crossing the unknown ocean; and Magellan piercing the southern +tip of the American continent by the straits that now bear his +name. + +But of all the arts and sciences, the art and science that are +the oldest and the most important; that have caused the greatest +expenditure of labor, blood, and money; that have been the immediate +instruments of more changes and greater changes in the history of +the world than any other, are the art and the science of strategy. + +Until the time of Moltke the art of strategy, like most arts, was +more in evidence than the science. In fact, science of any kind is +a comparatively recent product, owing largely to the more exact +operations of the mind brought about by the birth of the science of +measurement, and the ensuing birth and development of the mechanic +arts. Before Moltke's time campaigns were won by wise preparation and +skilful execution, as they are now; but the strategical skill was +acquired by a general or admiral almost wholly by his own exertions +in war, and by studying the campaigns of the great commanders, +and reflecting upon them with an intensity that so embedded their +lessons in his subjective mind that they became a part of him, and +actions in conformity with those lessons became afterward almost +automatic. Alexander and Napoleon are perhaps the best illustrations +of this passionate grasping of military principles; for though +both had been educated from childhood in military matters, the +science of strategy was almost non-existent in concrete form, and +both men were far too young to have been able to devote much time +or labor to it. But each was a genius of the highest type, and +reached decisions at once immediate and wise, not by inspiration, +but by mental efforts of a pertinacity and concentratedness impossible +to ordinary men. + +It was because Von Moltke realized this, realized the folly of +depending on ability to get geniuses on demand, and realized further +the value of ascertaining the principles of strategy, and then +expressing them so clearly that ordinary men could grasp and use +them, that he conceived and carried into execution his plan; whereby +not only actual battles could be analyzed, and the causes of victory +and defeat in each battle laid bare to students, but also hypothetical +wars and battles could be fought by means of problems given. + +The first result of a course of study of such wars and battles, and +practice with such problems, was a skill in decision a little like +that developed in any competitive game, say tennis, whist, chess, +poker, boxing, and the like--whereby any action of your adversary +brings an instantaneous and almost automatic reply from you, that you +could not have made so skilfully and quickly before you had practised +at the game; and yet the exact move of your adversary, under the +same conditions, you had never seen before. Of course, this skill +was a development, not of the science, but of the art, as mere skill +always is; but as skill developed, the best methods for obtaining +skill were noted; and the principles governing the attainment of +success gradually unveiled themselves, and were formulated into +a science. + +Naturally, strategy is not an exact science like mathematics, physics, +or engineering--at least not now. Whether it ever will be cannot be +foretold. The reason that strategy (like medicine and most other +sciences concerning human beings) is not an exact science is simply +because it involves too many unknown quantities--quantities of +which our knowledge is too vague to permit of our applying exact +methods to them, in the way in which we apply exact methods to the +comparatively well-known quantities and elements in the so-called +"exact sciences." But a science may be a science even if it is +not an exact science; we may know certain important principles +sufficiently well to use them scientifically, even if we do not +know them with sufficient exactness to permit us to use them as +confidently as we should like. We may know, for instance, that it +is folly to divide a military force in the presence of an active +enemy into such small forces, and at such distances apart, as to +let the enemy defeat each small force, one after the other, even +if we do not know exactly how far it would be safe to separate +two forces of a given size, in the presence of an enemy of a given +power. It is well to know a fact in general terms, even if we do +not know it in precise terms: it is well to know in general terms +that we must not take prussic acid, even if we do not know exactly +how much is needed to kill. + +So the studies and problems instituted by Von Moltke, and copied +in all the armies and navies of the world, have brought about a +science of strategy which is real, even though not exact, and which +dwells in the mind of each trained strategist, as the high tribunal +to which all his questions are referred and by whose decisions he +is guided; just as the principles of medicine are the guide alike +of the humblest and the most illustrious practitioner, wherever +the beneficent art of medicine is practised. + +It is clear that, in order to be skilful in strategy (in fact, +in any intellectual art), not only must a man have its scientific +principles firmly imprinted on his mind, but he must make its practice +so thoroughly familiar to his mental muscles that he can use strategy +as a _trained_ soldier uses his musket--automatically. Inasmuch as +any man requires years of study and practice--say, of chess--in +order to play chess well enough to compete successfully with +professional chess-players, it seems to follow that any man must +require years of study and practice of the more complicated game +of strategy, in order to play strategy well enough to compete +successfully with professional strategists. The game of chess looks +easy to a beginner; in fact, the kind of game that he thinks chess +to be is easy. But after he has learned the moves, he finds the +intricacies of the game developing more rapidly than he can master +them, and discovers that chess is a game which some men spend their +lifetime studying. The full realization of this fact, however, does +not come to him until after defeats by better players have forced +into his consciousness the almost infinite number of combinations +possible, the difficulty of deciding on the correct move at any +juncture, and the consequences that follow after wrong moves. + +So with strategy. The ease and certainty with which orders can be +transmitted and received, the precision with which large forces +can be quickly despatched from place to place, and the tremendous +power exertable by those forces, tend to blind the mind to the +fact that transferring any force to any place is merely making a +"move," and that the other player can make moves, too. If a man +were never to be pitted in strategy against another player, either +in games or in actual war, the "infinite variety" of strategy would +never be disclosed to his intelligence; and after learning how +to make the moves, he might feel willing to tackle any one. +Illustrations of this tendency by people of great self-confidence +are numerous in history, and have not been missing even in the +present war, though none have been reported in this country as +occurring on the Teuton side. There has always been a tendency +on the part of a ruling class to seize opportunities for military +glory, and the ambition has often been disproportioned to the +accompanying ability and knowledge--sometimes on the part of a +King, prince, or man of high nobility, sometimes on the part of +a minister, sometimes on the part of an army or navy man, who has +been indebted to political or social influence for his place. But +within the past fifty years, especially since the establishment +of the General Staff in Prussia and the studies of Von Moltke, +the overshadowing importance of strategy has been understood, the +necessity of comprehending its principles and practising its technic +has been appreciated, and attempts to practise strategy by persons +inexpert in strategy have been deprecated. + +The game of strategy, while resembling in many ways the game of +chess, differs from it, of course, in the obvious element of personal +danger. It also differs from it in an equally important but less +obvious way--its relation to the instruments employed; for in chess +those instruments (pieces) are of a number and character fixed by +the rules of the game; whereas in strategy the number and character +of the instruments (ships, etc.) employed are determined by strategy +itself, assisted by engineering. Germany realizes this, and therefore +has established and followed a system whereby the character of +the various material and personnel units of the navy, and even +the number of them (under the restrictions of the money alloted), +are decided by a body of men who are highly trained in strategy +and engineering. + +There is an intimate connection between policy and strategy, and +therefore between naval policy and naval strategy; and while it +is difficult to draw the line exactly which separates policy and +strategy, it may be said in general that policy is the concern of +the government, and strategy is the concern of the navy and army, +to be employed by them to carry out the policy. + +As naval policy and naval strategy are so intimately connected in +their essence, it is apparent that the naval policy of a country +and its naval strategy should be intimately connected in fact; for +the policy cannot be properly carried out if the strategy that tries +to execute it is not good, or if the policy requires more naval force +or skill than the navy can bring to bear; and the strategy cannot be +good if it is called upon to execute a policy impossible to execute, +or if the exact end in view of the policy is not distinctly known. +Some of the greatest mistakes that have been made by governments have +been made because of a lack of co-ordination between the government +and its navy, so that the policy and the strategy could not work +together. We see an illustration of this throughout the history +of France, whose civil and naval authorities have not worked +harmoniously together, whose naval strategy has apparently been +opportunistic and short-sighted, and whose navy in consequence +has not been so successful as the large sums of money spent upon +it might lead one to expect. + +Across the English Channel we see a totally different state of +things. In Great Britain the development of the navy has been going +on for more than twelve hundred years, ever since King Offa declared +that "he who would be secure at home must be supreme at sea." For +about eight hundred years thereafter the development was carried +on energetically, but in an opportunistic fashion, following the +requirements of the hour. In 1632, however, the Board of Admiralty +was established; and with occasional interruptions, especially +prior to 1708, the board has continued in existence ever since. +A coherent policy of development has thereby been assured, and a +wisdom of strategy established which more than any other single +factor has made Great Britain the mistress of the seas, and almost +the mistress of the world. + +The wisdom of her strategy has been due largely to the fact of +the close touch maintained between the civil government, including +Parliament, and the navy; for by its very constitution the Board +of Admiralty includes some of the highest officers of Parliament, +the cabinet, and the navy. Its presiding officer is a member of +the cabinet, and also member of Parliament; four of the officers +are naval officers, high in rank, character, and attainments; and +the junior civil lord is a civilian versed in naval matters. All +the orders for great movements of the fleets and ships are directed +by this board and signed by its secretary, the board, by a fiction +of the law, being considered an individual replacing the lord high +admiral--which it did, in 1632. The board is supposed to meet every +day with all the members present, the vote of each member carrying +as much weight as that of any other member. Naturally, the first +lord of the admiralty being a cabinet officer and a member of +Parliament, has a far greater influence on broad questions than +any other member; and the first sea lord being the person of the +most experience in naval matters, has the most weight on strictly +naval questions. Theoretically, however, neither of these gentlemen +can carry a measure opposed to the others; and any member, even +a junior, has equal opportunity with the others to bring up and +discuss any question and to attempt to procure its passage by the +full board; but in 1869 the first lord at that time, Mr. Childers, +brought about a change whereby the first lord was made personally +responsible to the government. This vastly increased the power +of the first lord, relatively to the others. + +Two other navies, the German and the Japanese, which with the British, +are the most efficient navies in the world, have systems somewhat +different from the British. In Germany and Japan the Emperor is +the head of the navy, and there is no civilian between him and +it. In Germany there is no minister of marine, unless the Emperor +himself may be said to be the minister, which he practically is; +and the navy is divided into three parts, each under an admiral. +The three parts are the General Staff, which deals with war plans +and fundamental questions; the naval cabinet, which deals with +matters of personnel; and the administrative section, which has +to do with questions of material, including money, and the getting +of money from Parliament. In Japan the minister of marine is by +law a naval officer, and under him is a chief of staff, also a +naval officer. The minister of marine has the direction of the +navy as a whole, but the ideas of the chief of staff are supposed +to be carried out in matters that are strictly naval. The Japanese +naval officer has a higher regard for the office of chief of staff +than for that of minister of marine, because it is given for +professional excellence only. + +It might seem at first sight that in Germany and Japan there would +be danger of a lack of co-ordination between the civil and the +naval authorities, and a tendency for the navy to become unduly +self-assertive. Of course, one reason why there is no such danger +is that the governments of those countries are controlled by men +who, though civilians, have great knowledge of international affairs, +and of military and naval subjects; another reason is that the navy +is so vital a matter, accurate knowledge about it is so general, +and interest in it so wide-spread and intense, that there is no +great gulf fixed between naval people and civilians. Still another +reason is the fact that in each country the Emperor is trained in +military and naval duties as well as in civil duties, and therefore +can effect in his own person the co-ordination of the civil and +the naval authority: that is, of policy and strategy. + +Such automatic and complete co-ordination is desirable not only in +preventing the unnatural barrier between the civil and the military +authority which exists in some countries such as ours, but in lightening +the labors and enlightening the deliberations of the strategists. +If, for instance, a bold policy is to be enforced, and a large +sum of money allotted for material and personnel, the strategists +will be led to recommendations different from those to which they +would be led if a cautious policy were to be pursued, and a small +sum of money to be allotted. + +Germany did not turn her eyes seriously toward the navy until the +Emperor William II read Mahan's book, "The Influence of Sea Power +upon History." Previous to that epochal event, Germany had relied +on her army to protect her interests and enforce her rights, being +led thereto by the facts of her history and the shortness of her +coast-line. But the strategically trained mind of William grasped +at once the situation laid bare by Mahan; and his military training +led him to quick decision and prompt action. The necessary machinery +was soon set in motion, with the amazing result that in twenty +years the German navy became the second in power and perhaps the +first in efficiency in the world. + +Was this feat accomplished by prodigal expenditures in building vessels +and other material of all kinds, and enlisting and commissioning a +large number of officers and men? No, the expense was less than +that of building our navy, even if a liberal allowance be made for +the relative cheapness of things in Germany; and the mere enlisting +and commissioning of officers and men was the simplest part of the +undertaking. + +How was it accomplished? In the simplest way imaginable: by following +Moltke's plan of solving hypothetical war problems, and adapting the +military war game (_Kriegspiel_) to naval forces; playing numberless +war games, and deciding from those games the naval strategy best +adapted to Germany's needs--not only in matters of general principle, +not only as to tactics, training, education, co-operation with the +army, and the size of fleet required to carry out the policy of +the nation--but also as to the composition of the fleet, relative +proportions of vessels of the various types, and the characteristics +of each type. Nothing was left to chance; nothing was decided by +guessing; no one man's dictum was accepted. The whole problem was +attacked in its entirety, and a general solution found; and after +this, the various divisions and subdivisions of the problem were +attacked and solved, in obedience to the same principles, in accordance +with the results obtained at _Kriegspiel_. + +If a very large and complicated engine of new pattern is to be +built by any engineering company, no casting of the smallest kind +is made until general plans have been outlined, detailed plans +prepared from these, and then "working plans" made for the workmen. +From the working plans, the workmen construct the various parts; +sometimes in number several hundred. Finally, the whole intricate +machine is put together, and the motive power applied. Then all +the parts, great and small, begin their allotted tasks, each part +perfectly adapted to its work, not too large and not too small; +all working together in apparent confusion, but in obedience to +law--fulfilling exactly the will of the designing engineer. So, +the vast and new machine of the German navy was designed in the +drafting-room of the _Kriegspiel_; and though it has been gradually +strengthened and enlarged since then, each strengthening piece and +each addition has been designed in accordance with the original +plan, and has therefore harmonized with the original machine. Thus +the navy has expanded smoothly, symmetrically, purposefully. No +other result was to be expected: the strategy having been correct, +the result was correct also. + +Perhaps one contributing factor to the success of the German navy +has been her staff of officers highly trained in strategy by +_Kriegspiel_, that insures not only sound advice in general, but +also insures that at any time, night or day, a body of competent +officers shall be ready at the admiralty to decide what action +should be taken, whenever any new situation is reported. This factor +is most important; because in naval and military operations, even +in time of peace, but especially in war, events follow each other +so rapidly, and momentous crises develop so suddenly, that the +demand for action that shall be both wise and instantaneous is +imperative. The chess-player can linger long over his decisions, +because his opponent cannot make his next move meanwhile; but in +warfare no such rule or condition can exist. In war, time is as +vital a factor as any other: and the strategist, who, like Napoleon, +can think faster and decide more quickly and accurately than his +antagonist is, _ceteris paribus_, sure to win; and even if _ceteris_ +are not quite _paribus_, his superior quickness and correctness +will overcome great handicaps in material and personnel, as the +lives of all the great strategists in history, especially Alexander +and Napoleon, prove convincingly. To bring a preponderating force +to bear at a given point ahead of the enemy--to move the maximum +of force with the maximum of celerity--has always been the aim +of strategy: and probably it always will be, for the science of +strategy rests on principles, and principles never change. + +Thus while we see in Great Britain's navy an example of the effect +of a strategy continuous and wise, conducted for three hundred years, +we see in the Japanese and German navies equally good examples of a +strategy equally wise, but of brief duration, which started with +the example of the British navy, and took advantage of it. + +The German and Japanese navies did not follow the British navy +slavishly, however; for the national military character of their +people required the introduction and control of more military and +precise methods than those of the primarily sailor navy of Great +Britain. We see, therefore, a curious similarity between the German +and Japanese navies, and very clear evidence in each of the engrafting +of purely military ideals on maritime ideas. And we see not only +this, we see the reaction on the British navy itself of the ideals +of the German and the Japanese, and a decided change during the +last ten years from the principles of "the blue-water school"; +as evidenced mainly by the institution of a Naval War College, +including a war staff, the employment at the admiralty of General +Staff methods, though without the name; and the introduction into +naval methods, especially naval gunnery, of mathematical procedures. + +Previous to the Japanese-Russian War, ten years ago, the strategy +of the British navy may be characterized as physical rather than +mental, depending on a superior number of ships and men; those +ships and men being of a very high grade individually, and bound +together by a discipline at once strict and sympathetic. All the +personnel from the highest admiral to the humblest sailor prided +themselves on being "British seamen," comrades of the sea, on whom +their country placed her ultimate reliance. Maneuvers on a large +scale were held, target practice was carried on with regularity--and +navy ships carried the banner of Saint George over every sea, and +displayed it in every port. Tactics and seamanship filled the busy +days with drills of many kinds; but strategy, though not quite +forgotten, did not command so large a portion of the officers' +time and study as it did in Germany and Japan. The rapid success +of the Germans and Japanese, however, in building up their navies, +as instanced by the evident efficiency of the German fleet almost +under the nose of England, and the triumph of the Japanese fleet in +Tsushima Strait startled the British navy out of her conservatism, +and caused her to proceed at full speed toward the modernization +of her strategy. With the quick decision followed by quick action +that characterizes the seaman everywhere, the British instituted +a series of reforms, and prosecuted their efforts with such wisdom +and such vigor, that, in the brief space of ten years, the British +navy has been almost revolutionized. As in all such movements, +the principal delay was in bringing about the necessary mental +changes; the mental changes having been accomplished, the material +changes followed automatically. + +The change whereby the German and Japanese navies became preceptors +to their preceptor is like changes that occur in every-day life, and +is one of many illustrations of how a young and vigorous individual +or organization, endowed with proper energy and mentality, can +appropriate whatever is valuable for its purposes from its elders, +and reject whatever those elders have had fastened on them by +circumstances or tradition, and develop a superior existence. It +is a little like the advantage which a comparatively new city like +Washington has over an old city like Boston, in being started after +it was planned, instead of being started haphazard, without being +planned at all. + +The United States navy was started not like the city of Washington, +but like the city of Boston. It was modelled on the British navy; +but since the United States has never taken an interest in its +navy at all comparable with that taken by Great Britain in its +navy, and since our navy has been built up by successive impulses +from Congress and not in accordance with a basic plan, the lack of +harmoniousness among its various parts reminds one of Boston rather +than of Washington. Owing to the engineering and inventive genius of +our people and the information we got from Europe, inferiority has +not occurred in the units of the material: in fact, in some ways +our material is perhaps the best of all. Neither has inferiority +been evidenced in the personnel, as individuals; for the excellent +physique and the mental alertness of the American have shown themselves +in the navy as well as in other walks of life. + +In strategy, however, it must be admitted that we have little reason +to be proud. We do very well in the elementary parts of the naval +profession. In navigation, seamanship, gunnery, and that part of +international law that concerns the navy we are as good as any. +But of the higher branches, especially of strategy, we have little +clear conception. How can we have? Strategy is one of the most +complex arts the world contains; the masters in that art have borne +such names as Alexander, Caesar, Nelson, and Napoleon. Naval strategy +is naval chess, in which battleships and other craft take the place +of queens and other pieces. But it is a more complicated game than +chess, for the reason that not only are there more kinds of "pieces," +but the element of time exerts a powerful influence in strategy while +it does not even exist in chess. The time element has the effect not +only of complicating every situation, but also of compelling intense +concentration of mind, in order to make decisions quickly; and often +it forces decisions without adequate time for consideration, under +circumstances of the utmost excitement, discomfort, and personal +peril. + +One dislikes intensely to criticise his own country, even to himself. +But when a naval officer is studying--as he should continually do--what +must be done, in order to protect his country from attack by some +foreign foe, it would be criminal folly for him to estimate the +situation otherwise than honestly; and to do this, it is necessary +to try to see where his country is weak and where strong, relatively +to the possible foes in question. If we do this, and compare the +strategical methods employed by--say Germany and us--we are forced +to admit that the German methods are better adapted to producing +economically a navy fitted to contend successfully in war against +an enemy. In Germany the development of the navy has been strictly +along the lines of a method carefully devised beforehand; in our +country no method whatever is apparent, at least no logical method. +Congress, and Congress alone, decides what vessels and other craft +shall be built, how many officers and men shall wear the uniform. +It is true that they consult the report of the secretary of the +navy, and ask the opinions of some naval officers; and it is true +that the secretary of the navy gets the opinions of certain naval +officers including the General Board, before making his report. +But both the secretary and Congress estimate the situation from +their own points of view, and place their own value on the advice +of naval officers. And the advice of these naval officers is not +so valuable, possibly, as it might be; for the reason that it is +really irresponsible, since the advisers themselves know that it +will not be taken very seriously. The difference between the advice +of men held responsible for the results of following their advice, +and the advice of men not so held responsible, is well recognized, +and is discussed fully in the reports of the Moody and the Swift +Boards on the organization of the Navy Department. Furthermore, +our officers do not have the machinery of the _Kriegspiel_ to help +them. It is true that at the Naval War College, a war-game apparatus +is installed and that war games are played, and war problems solved; +but the officers there are very properly engaged in the regular +work of a war college, in educating officers in the principles +of warfare, and have little time for other work. It is also true +that the war games and problems there do lead occasionally to +recommendations by the War College to the General Board as to various +matters; but the connection between the conclusions of the War +College and the decisions of Congress via the General Board and +the secretary of the navy is so fragile and discontinuous, that +it may truthfully be said that the influence of the war games at +our War College has but a faint resemblance to the determining +force of the _Kriegspiel_ in Berlin. + +It is often said that Germany is an empire and the United States +a republic, and that _therefore_ the military methods of Germany +cannot be employed here. The inference is not necessarily correct, +however, as is shown by the excellence of the army of France; for, +France, although a republic, insists that military strategy only +shall control and direct the army. The American Congress can do +the same with the American navy. Whether Congress shall so decide +or not, the decision will undoubtedly be wise; and we of the navy +will do our utmost to make the navy all it should be. In this +connection, it should be noted that: + +1. Germany has been following a certain strategic system regarding +the navy; we a system different from that of any other navy, which +has been used now for about one hundred and forty years. Both systems +have been in operation for a time sufficiently long to warrant our +comparing them, by comparing the results they have achieved. + +2. The German navy has been in existence a much shorter time than +the American navy, belongs to a much less populous and wealthy +country, and yet is not only about 30 per cent larger in material, +and more than 100 per cent larger in trained personnel, but if +we judge by maneuvers carried on in both peace and war, is much +better in organization, morale, and capacity for doing naval work +upon the ocean. We do not, of course, know what Germany has been +doing since the war began on August 1, 1914; but all accounts show +that Germany, like all the other belligerent Powers, has been adding +units of material and personnel to her navy much more rapidly than +they have been destroyed; as well as perfecting her strategy, under +the influence of the war's stimulus. Leaving out of consideration, +however, what she may have been doing since the war began, and +neglecting any unauthenticated accounts of her status before it +started, we know positively that in 1913 the maneuvers of the German +fleet were executed by a force of 21 battleships, 3 battle cruisers, +5 small cruisers, 6 flotillas of destroyers (that is 66 seagoing +torpedo vessels), 11 submarines, an airship, a number of aeroplanes +and special service ships, and 22 mine-sweepers--all in one fleet, +all under one admiral, and maneuvered as a unit. _This was nearly +three years ago, and we have never come anywhere near such a +performance_. In January, 1916, the United States Atlantic fleet, +capable as to both material and personnel of going to sea and +maneuvering together, consisted of 15 battleships and 23 destroyers, +2 mine-depot ships, and 1 mine-training ship, and 4 tugs fitted +as mine-sweepers--with no submarines, no aircraft of any kind, no +scouts (unless the _Chester_ be so considered, which was cruising +alone off the coast of Liberia, and the _Birmingham_, which was +flag-ship to the destroyer flotilla). This was the only fleet that +we had ready to fight in January, 1916; because, although more +battleships could have been put into commission, this could have +been done only by putting out of commission certain smaller vessels, +such as cruisers and gunboats; and the battleships would have had +to be put into commission very hurriedly, filled up with men fresh +from other ships, and no more ready to fight in the fleet against +an enemy (whose ships were fully manned with well-trained officers +and men, accustomed to the details of their respective ships, and +acquainted with each other) than the _Chesapeake_ was ready to +fight the _Shannon_. + +3. In case our system is not so good as that of--say Germany--or +of any other country having a system equally excellent, we shall +_never_ be able to contend successfully against that navy, under +equal strategic conditions, unless we have an excess over her in +numbers of personnel and material sufficient to counteract our +inferiority in efficiency. + +The efficiency of a navy or an army is exactly what the strategic +system makes it. Eleven thousand Greeks under Miltiades, highly +efficient and thoroughly trained, defeated 100,000 Persians at +Marathon. A Greek fleet under Themistocies defeated and almost +destroyed a much larger Persian fleet at Salamis. With an army +of less than 35,000 men, but highly trained by Philip of Macedon, +his father, Alexander, in only twelve years conquered ten of the +most wealthy and populous countries of the world. Caesar, Alaric, +Attila, Charlemagne, and all the great military men from the greatest +antiquity down to the present moment have trained and organized +bodies of soldiers and sailors, under systems suited to the times, +and then waged successful war on peoples less militarily efficient. +Cortez conquered Mexico, and Pizarro conquered Peru; the British, +French, and Spanish subdued the Indians of North America, and during +the latter half of the nineteenth century nearly all the land in +the world that was "unoccupied" by Europeans or their descendants +was taken in possession by European Powers. Great Britain is now +mistress of about one-quarter of the land and the population of +the globe. Russia, France, Germany, and the United States govern +most of the remainder. + +These results were brought about almost solely by the exercise +of military force:--and of this force, physical courage was not a +determining element, because it was just as evident in the conquered +as in the conquerors. The determining element was strategy that +(under the behest of policy) prepared the military and naval forces +in material and personnel before they were used, and directed their +operations, while they were being used. + +Of all the single factors that have actually and directly made the +history of the world, the most important factor has been strategy. + + + + +CHAPTER VIII + +DESIGNING THE MACHINE + +The most important element connected with a navy is the strategy which +directs it, in accordance with which all its plans are laid--plans for +preparation before war and plans for operations during war. Strategy +is to a navy what mind is to a man. It determines its character, +its composition, its aims; and so far as external conditions will +permit, the results which it accomplishes. + +It is possible for certain features connected with a navy to be +good, even if the strategy directing it be faulty; or for those +features to be faulty, even if the strategy directing it be good. +Experience has shown, however, that, in any organization the influence +of the men at the top, and the effect of the policy they adopt, is +so great that the whole organization will in the main be good or +bad according to the kind of men that control it, and the methods +they employ. The better the discipline of the organization, the more +completely the quality of the management will influence the whole, +and the more essential it becomes that good methods be employed. Good +discipline means concentration of the effort of the organization; +and the more concentrated any effort is, the more necessary that +it be directed aright. The simplest illustration of this is seen +in naval gunnery; for there the effect of good fire-control is +to limit the dispersion of the various shots fired, relatively +to each other; to make a number of shots fired simultaneously to +bunch closely together, that is to concentrate; getting away from +the shotgun effect, and approximating the effect of a single shot. +Obviously, if the fire-control and the skill of the gunners are +so great that the shots fall very close together, the chance of +hitting the target is less than if the shots did not fall close +together, if the range at which the guns are fired is incorrect. +A mathematical formula showing the most effective dispersion for +a given error in range was published in the _Naval Institute_ by +Lieutenant-Commander B. A. Long, U. S. N., in December, 1912. + +So, we see that if the strategy directing a navy is incorrect, +we can accomplish little by improving the discipline, and may do +harm; when unwise orders have been given in the past, those orders +have sometimes been disobeyed with beneficial effect. Neither would +it avail much to improve the details of the material or personnel, +or to spend much money; for there is no benefit to be derived from +building fine ships, if they are to be captured by the enemy. If +the Russian fleet sent to Tsushima had been weaker than it was, +the loss to Russia would have been less. + +Inasmuch as strategy, however, includes all the means taken to make +a navy effective, it is obvious that a good strategical direction +will be more likely to result in good discipline and good material +than would a poor strategy. But this is not necessarily so, for +the reason that a strategy may be in the main faulty, and yet be +good in certain ways--especially in attention to details, for which +a high degree of mentality is not required. In the same way, an +individual who is short-sighted and imperfectly educated may be +a most excellent and useful member of society, provided he is not +permitted to use power in matters beyond his vision. An illustration +of how an incorrect point of view does not necessarily injure, but +may even benefit in details is shown by certain militia regiments, +which are able to surpass some regiments of the regular army in +many details of the drill, and in general precision of movement. + +In fact, a very wise strategical direction has as one of its most +important functions the division of study and labor among various +lines of action, and in deciding which lines are important and +which not: and for this reason may--and often does--limit labor, +and therefore perfection of result, along lines which a less wise +strategy would not limit. Illustrations of the casting aside of +rigid and difficult forms of drill during the past fifty years in +armies, and the substitution of more easy methods are numerous. This +does not indicate, however, that a wise strategy may not encourage +rigid forms of drill, for the army which is directed with the greatest +strategical skill is the German, and no army has more precise methods, +not only of procedure, but of drill. The Prussian army of Frederick +William which Frederick the Great inherited was not more rigidly +drilled in some particulars than the German army of to-day, fought +by Frederick the Great's great-great-great-grandnephew, William +II. + +So we see that a wise and far-sighted strategy does not necessarily +either frown on or encourage attention to details; it merely regulates +it, deciding in each case and for each purpose what degree of attention +to detail is best. + +The most obvious work of naval strategy, and therefore the work +that impresses people most, is in directing naval forces against +an enemy in war. But it is clear that before this can be done +effectively strategy must first have made plans of preparation +in time of peace; and it is equally clear that, previous to this, +strategy must first determine the units of the force and their +relation to each other: it must, in other words, design the machine. + +Evidently, therefore, _the work of strategy is three-fold: first, +to design the machine; second, to prepare it for war; and, third, +to direct its operations during war_. + +A navy being a machine composed of human and material parts, it is +clear that the work of designing it correctly should take account +of all the parts at the outset; and not only this--the whole design +should be completed before any parts are made and put together +if the best results are to be obtained. This is the practice in +making material machines in manufacturing establishments--and no +other practice there could be successfully pursued. It is the outcome +of the experience of tens of thousands of men for many years--and +the result of the expenditure of tons of money. + +This remark as to manufacturing establishments does not include +the development of new ideas, for which experimentation or original +research is needed; because it is sometimes necessary, when venturing +into untrodden fields, to test out by mere trial and error certain +parts or features before determining enough of their details to +warrant incorporating them in the drawing of the whole machine. +Similarly, some experiments must be made in the methods, organization, +and material of the naval machine; but in this, case, as in the +case of manufacturing establishments, the experimental work, no +matter how promising or alluring, must be recognized as of unproved +and doubtful value; and no scheme, plan, or doctrine must be +incorporated in the naval machine, or allowed to pose as otherwise +than experimental, until successful trials shall have put it beyond +the experimental stage. + +The naval machine consists obviously of two parts, the personnel +and the material; these two parts being independent, and yet mutually +dependent, like the parts of any other organism. Obviously, the +parts are mutually dependent not only in the quantitative sense +that the more numerous the material parts the more numerous must +be the personnel to operate them, but also in the qualitative sense +that the various kinds of material determine the various kinds +of personnel that must be provided to operate them with success. +Gunners are needed to handle guns, and engineers to handle engines. + +In this respect, personnel follows material. In the galley days only +two kinds of personnel were needed--sailors to handle the galleys +(most of these being men merely to pull on oars)--and soldiers to +fight, when the galleys got alongside of the enemy. Ship organization +remained in a condition of great simplicity until our Civil War; for +the main effort was to handle the ships by means of their sails, +the handling of the simple battery being a very easy matter. Every +ship was much like every other ship, except in size; and in every +ship the organization was simple and based mostly on the necessities +of handling the ship by sails. + +The first important change from this condition followed the departure +of the Confederate ironclad _Virginia_ (_Merrimac_) carrying 10 +guns and 300 men from the Norfolk Navy Yard on the 8th of March, +1862, and her sinking hardly two hours afterward the Union sloop of +war _Cumberland_, carrying 24 guns and 376 men; and then destroying +by fire the Union frigate _Congress_, carrying 50 guns and 434 men. +The second step was taken on the following day, when the Union +_Monitor_, 2 guns and 49 men, defeated the _Merrimac_. These two +actions on two successive days are the most memorable naval actions +in history from the standpoint of naval construction and naval +ordnance, and perhaps of naval strategy; because they instituted +a new era--the era of mechanism in naval war. + +The next step was the successful attack by the Confederate "fish-torpedo +boat" _David_, on the Union ironclad _Housatonic_ in Charleston +harbor on February 17, 1864; and the next was the sinking of the +Confederate ironclad _Albemarle_ by a spar torpedo carried on a +little steam-launch commanded by Lieutenant W. B. Cushing, U. S. +N., on October 27, 1864. + +These four epochal events in our Civil War demonstrated the +possibilities of mechanism in naval warfare, and led the way to +the use of the highly specialized and scientific instruments that +have played so important a part in the present war. During the +half-century that has intervened since the _Monitor_ and _Merrimac_ +ushered in the modern era, since the five brave crews of the _David_ +lost their lives, and since Cushing made his amazing victory, a +contest between the sailor and the scientist has been going on, +as to which shall be deemed the ultimate master of the sea. As in +many contests, the decision has gone unqualifiedly to neither; for +he who sails the sea and braves its tempests, must be in heart and +character a sailor--and yet he who fights the scientific war-craft of +the present day cannot be merely a sailor, like him of the olden kind, +but must be what the _New York Times_, a few years ago, laughingly +declared to be a combination quite unthinkable, "a scientific person +and a sailor." + +Each year since the fateful 8th of March, 1862, has seen some addition +to the fighting machinery of navies. Some appliances have been +developed gradually from their first beginnings, and are to-day +substantially what they were at first--but of course improved; among +these are the turret, the automobile torpedo, the telescope-sight, +the submarine, and the gyrocompass. Many other appliances found +favor for a while and then, having demonstrated the value of what +they attempted and did perform, were gradually supplemented by +improved devices, doing the same thing, but in better ways; in +this class are many forms of interior-communication apparatus, +especially electrical. Still other appliances are adaptations to +ship and naval life of devices used in civil life--such as the +telephone, electric light, and radio. + +Each of these appliances has required for its successful use the +educating of men to use it, and frequently the creation and organization +of entirely new branches of the service; an illustration is the radio +corps in each of our large ships. At the present time the attitude +of officers and of the department itself is so much more favorable +to new appliances that a clear probability of a new device being +valuable is a sufficient stimulus to bring about the education +of men to use it; but a very few years ago many devices were lost +to us because they were considered "not adapted naval use." Now +we endeavor to adapt them. + +The present complexity of our material is therefore reflected in +the complexity of the organization of our personnel; and as it +is the demands of material that regulate the kind of personnel, +and as a machine must be designed and built before men can learn +to use it, it follows that our personnel must lag behind our +material--that our material as material must be better than our +personnel as personnel. + +It may be answered that all our material is first invented, then +designed, and then constructed by men; that men create our material +appliances (though not the matter of which they are composed), that +the created cannot be better than the creator; and that therefore +it is impossible for our material to be better than our personnel. +But to this objection it may be pointed out that only a very small +proportion of our personnel are employed in creating; that most +of them are engaged merely in using the material with whatever +degree of skill they possess, and that, if a man uses an instrument +with perfect skill, he then succeeds merely in getting out of that +instrument all that there is in it. A soldier's musket, for instance, +is a very perfect tool--very accurate, very powerful, very rapid; +and no marksman in the world is so skilful that he can shoot the +musket with all the accuracy and speed of which the gun itself +is capable. + +This indicates that the personnel of a navy is harder to handle +than the material, and that therefore the most effort is required +to be expended on the personnel. The strength of any system depends +on the strength of its weakest part; in any organism, human or +material, effort is best expended on the weak points rather than +on the strong. + +Recognition of this principle is easy, but carrying out the principle +in practice is most difficult. One reason is the difficulty of +seeing always where the weak spot is; but a greater difficulty is +due to the fact that the principle as above stated must be modified +by the consideration that things which are important need attention +more than things that are unimportant. A weak point in any organism +deserves attention more than a strong point of the same order of +importance, or than a strong point in the same class; but not, +necessarily more than a strong point of a higher order of importance, +or a strong point in another class. It may be more beneficial, +for instance, to drill an ineffective turret crew than to try to +reduce friction in a training gear already nearly frictionless; +or it may be more beneficial to overcome the faults of a mediocre +gun-pointer than to develop still more highly the skill already +great of another gun-pointer; but, on the other hand, it may be +less beneficial to drill boat crews at boat-sailing, even if they +need it, than to drill them at landing as armed forces on the beach, +though they may do that pretty well; or it may be better not to +have boat drill at all and to get under way for fleet drill, even +though the ships are very expert at it. + +It is true that in any endeavor where many things are to be done, +as in a navy, it is important that nothing be neglected; and yet, +under the superintendence of any one, there are some things the +doing of which requires priority over other things. The allotting +of the scientifically correct amount of time, energy, and attention +to each of the various things claiming one's attention is one of +the most difficult, and yet one of the most important problems +before any man. It requires an accurate sense of proportion. + +Naturally the problem increases in complexity and importance the +higher the position, and the greater the number of elements +involved--being more difficult and important for instance in the +office of the commander-in-chief of a fleet, whose time and attention +have to be divided among multitudinous matters, than in that of +captain of a single ship. For this reason, _the higher one is in +position, the more imperative it is that he understand all elements +involved, and estimate properly their various weights_. The success +or non-success of a man in high authority depends largely on how +his sense of proportion leads him to allot his time. + +But a matter fully as important as the allotment of time and attention +to the consideration of various matters by the various members of +the personnel is the allotment of money for the various items, +especially of the material; for, after all, every navy department +or admiralty must arrange its demands for ships, guns, men, etc., +with reference to the total amount of money which the nation will +allot. For this purpose, only one good means of solution has thus +far been devised--the game-board. + +The game-board, naturally, tries out only the units that maneuver +on the ocean; it does not try out the mechanism inside those units, +because they can be tried out best by engineering methods. The +province of the game-board is merely to try out on a very small +scale, under proper conventions or agreements, things that could not +be tried out otherwise, except at great expense, and very slowly; +to afford a medium, half-way between actual trials with big ships +and mere unaided reasoning, for arriving at correct conclusions. +When the game-board is not used, people conferring on naval problems +can do so only by forming pictures in their own minds, endeavoring +to describe those pictures to the others (in which endeavor they +rarely perfectly succeed) while at the same time, trying to see the +pictures that are in the minds of the others--and then comparing +all the pictures. The difficulty of doing this is shown by a little +paragraph in "The Autocrat of the Breakfast Table," in which Dr. +Holmes points out that when John and Thomas are talking, there +are really six persons present--the real John, the person John +thinks himself to be, the person Thomas thinks him to be, the real +Thomas, the person Thomas thinks himself to be, and the person John +thinks him to be. The conditions surrounding John and Thomas are +those of the simplest kind, and the conversation between them of +the most uncomplicated character. But when--not two people but--say +a dozen or more, are considering highly complicated questions, such +as the House Naval Committee discuss when officers are called to +testify before them, no two of the twenty congressmen can form the +same mental picture when an officer uses the word--say "fleet." +The reason is simply that very few of the congressmen hearing that +word have ever seen a fleet; none of them know exactly what it is, +and every one forms a picture which is partly the result of all +his previous education and experience; which are different from +the previous education and experience of every other congressman +on the committee. Furthermore, no one of the officers uses words +exactly as the other officers do; and the English language is too +vague (or rather the usual interpretation put on words is too vague) +to assure us that even ordinary words are mutually understood. For +instance, the question is asked: "Do you consider it probable that +such or such a thing would happen?" Now what does the questioner +mean by "probable," and what does the officer think he means? +Mathematically, the meaning of "probable" is that there is more +than 50 per cent of chance that the thing would happen; but who +in ordinary conversation uses that word in that way? That this is +not an academic point is shown by the fact that if the answer is +"no" the usual inference from the answer is that there is no need +for guarding against the contingency. Yet such an inference, if +the word "probable" were used correctly by both the questioner and +the answerer, would be utterly unjustified, because the necessity +for taking precautions against a danger depends not so much on its +probability or improbability, as on the degree of its probability; +and to an equal degree on the greatness of the danger that impends. +If the occurrence of a small mishap has a probability say of even +75 per cent, there may be little necessity of guarding against +it; while if the danger of total destruction has a probability +as low as even 1 per cent, we should guard against it sedulously. + +The more complicated the question, the more elements involved, the +more difficult it is to settle it wisely by mere discussion. The +effort of the imagination of each person must be directed not so +much to getting a correct mental picture of what the words employed +describe, as to getting a correct picture of what the person using +the words desires them to describe. Any person who has had experience +in discussions of this character knows what an effort this is, even +if he is talking with persons whom he has known for years, and +with whose mental and lingual characteristics he is well acquainted: +and he also knows how much more difficult it is when he is talking +with persons whom he knows but slightly. + +It may here be pointed out how greatly the imaginations of men +differ, and how little account is taken of this difference in every-day +life. In poetry and fiction imagination is recognized; and it is +also recognized to some extent in painting, inventing, and, in +general, in "the arts." But in ordinary life, the difference among +men in imagination is almost never noticed. Yet a French proverb +is "point d'imagination, point de grand general"; and Napoleon +indicated a danger from untrained imagination in his celebrated +warning to his generals not to make "pictures" to themselves of +difficulties and disasters. + +The difference in imagination among men is shown clearly by the +difference--and often the differences--between inventors and engineers, +and the scarcity of men who are both inventors and engineers. Ericsson +repudiated the suggestion that he was an inventor, and stoutly and +always declared he was an engineer. This was at a time, not very +long ago, when it was hardly respectable to be an inventor; when, +even though men admitted that some inventors had done valuable work, +the work was supposed to be largely a chance shot of a more or less +crazy man. Yet Ericsson was an inventor--though he was an engineer. +So were Sir William Thompson (afterward Lord Kelvin), Helmholtz, +Westinghouse, and a very few others; so are Edison and Sperry. +Many inventors, however, live in their imaginations mainly--some +almost wholly. Like Pegasus, they do not like to be fastened to a +plough or anything else material. Facts, figures, and blue-prints +fill their souls with loathing, and bright generalities delight them. +The engineer, on the other hand, is a man of brass and iron and +logarithms; in imagination he is blind, in flexibility he resembles +reinforced concrete. He is the antipodes of the inventor; he despises +the inventor, and the inventor hates him. Fortunately, however, +there is a little bit of the inventor in most engineers, and a +trace of the engineer in most inventors; while in some inventors +there is a good deal of the engineer. And once in a while we meet +a man who carries both natures in his brain. That man does marvels. + +Despite the great gulf normally fixed, however, between the engineer +and the inventor, most of the definite progress of the world for +the past one hundred years has been done by the co-ordination of +the two; a co-ordination accomplished by "the man of business." + +Now the inventor and engineer type do not exist only in the world +of engineering and mechanics, though it is in that world that they +are the most clearly recognized; for they exist in all walks of +life. In literature, inventors write novels; in business life, +they project railroads; in strategy, they map out new lines of +effort. In literature, the engineer writes cyclopaedias; in business, +he makes the projected railroads a success; in strategy, he works +out logistics and does the quantitative work. + +In that part of strategy of which we are now thinking--the designing +of the naval machine--the inventor and the engineer clearly have +two separate lines of work: one line the conceiving, and the other +line the constructing, of strategic and tactical methods, and of +material instruments to carry out those methods. Clearly, these +two lines of work while independent are mutually dependent; and, +if properly carried out are mutually assistant. The coworking of +the inventor and the engineer is a little like that coworking of +theory and practice, which has been the principal factor in bringing +about the present amazing condition of human society commonly called +"Modern Civilization." + +The shortcomings of human speech are most evident in discussing +complicated matters; and for this reason speech is supplemented +in the engineering arts by drawings of different kinds. No man +ever lived who could describe a complicated machine accurately to +a listener, unless that machine differed but little from a machine +with which the listener was acquainted. But hand a drawing of even +a very complicated machine to a man who knows its language--and +the whole nature of the object is laid bare to him; not only its +general plan and purpose, but its details, with all their dimensions +and even the approximate weights. So, when the forces representing +a complicated naval situation are placed upon the game-board, all +the elements of the problem appear clearly and correctly to each +person; the imagination has little work to do, and the chance for +misunderstanding is almost negligible. Of course, this does not mean +that the game-board can decide questions with absolute finality. It +cannot do this; but that is only because conditions are represented +with only approximate realism, because the rules of the game may +not be quite correct, and because sufficient correct data cannot be +procured. The difficulties of securing absolute realism are of course +insuperable, and the difficulties of getting absolutely correct data +are very great. The more, however, this work is prosecuted, the more +clearly its difficulties will be indicated, and therefore the more +effectively the remedies can be provided. The more the game-board +is used both on ship and shore, the more ease will be found in +getting correct data for it, and the more correctly conclusions +can then be deduced. + +These remarks, while intended for tactical games, seem to apply to +strategical games as well; for both the tactical and the strategical +games are simply endeavors to represent actual or probable situations +and occurrences in miniature, by arbitrary symbols, in accordance +with well-understood conventions. + +War games and war problems have not yet been accepted by some; +for some regard them as games pure and simple and as academic, +theoretical, and unpractical. It may be admitted that they are +academic and theoretical; but so is the science of gunnery, and so +is the science of navigation. In some ways, however, the lessons +of the game-board are better guides to future work than "practical" +and actual happenings of single battles: for in single battles +everything is possible, and some things happen that were highly +improbable and were really the result of accident. After nearly every +recent war there has been a strong move made toward the adoption +of some weapon, or some method, that has attained success in that +war. For instance, after our Civil War, many monitors were built, +and the spar torpedo was installed in all our ships; after the +battle of Lissa, the ram was exploited as the great weapon of the +future; the Japanese War established the heavily armed and armored +battleships on a secure foundation; and the early days of the present +war caused a great rush toward the submarine. Yet, in most cases, +the success was a single success or a very few successes, and was +a little like the throw of a die, in the sense that the result was +caused in great measure by accident; that is, by causes beyond +the control of man, or by conditions that would probably not recur. + +The game calls our attention to the influence of chance in war, +and to the desirability of our recognizing that influence and +endeavoring to eliminate it, when reasoning out the desirability or +undesirability of a certain weapon or a certain method. Of course, +every thoughtful person realizes that few effects in life are due +to one cause only, and that most effects are due to a combination +of many causes; so that, if any weapon or method succeeds or fails, +it is illogical to infer from that one fact that the weapon or +method is good or bad. A common illustration is the well-known +fact that a marksman may hit the target when his aim is too high +or too low, provided that he has erroneously set his sight enough +too low or too high to compensate; whereas if he had made only one +error instead of two, he would have missed. "Two wrongs cannot +make a right," but two errors can compensate each other, and often +do. The theory of the Probability of Errors recognizes this. In +fact, if it were not true that some errors are plus and some minus, +all errors in gunnery (in fact in everything) would be additive +to each other, and we should live in a world of error. + +The partial advantage of the game-board over the occurrences of +actual war, for the purpose of studying strategy, lies largely in +its ability to permit a number of trials very quickly; the trials +starting either with identical situations, or with certain changes in +conditions. Of course, the game-board has the tremendous disadvantage +that it presents only a picture, and does not show a real performance; +but the more it is used, and the more fleets and game-boards work +together, the more accurate the picture will become, and the more +correctly we shall learn to read it. + +One limitation of the game-board is that it can represent weather +conditions only imperfectly--and this is a serious limitation that +mayor may not be remedied as time goes on. The theory of the game-board +is in fact in advance of the mechanism, and is waiting for some +bright inventive genius for the remedy. Until this happens, the +imagination must do the best it can, and the effect of a certain +kind of weather under the other conditions prevailing will have +to be agreed upon by the contestants. + +The term "war game" is perhaps unfortunate, for the reason that +it does not convey a true idea of what a "war game" is. The term +conveys the idea of a competitive exercise, carried on for sport; +whereas the idea underlying the exercise is of the most serious +kind, and has no element of sport about it, except the element that +competition gives. A war game may be simply a game of sport--and +sometimes it is so played; but the intention is to determine some +doubtful point of strategy or tactics, and the competitive element +is simply to impart realism, and to stimulate interest. When two +officers, or two bodies of officers, find themselves on different +sides of a certain question, they sometimes "put it on the game-board," +to see which side is right. + +This statement applies most obviously to tactical games; but it +applies to strategic games as well; for both are inventions designed +to represent in miniature the movements of two opposing forces. The +main difference between strategic and tactical games is the difference +in size. Naturally, the actual means employed are different, but +only so different as the relative areas of movement necessitate. +In the strategic games, the opposing forces are far apart, and do +not see each other; in the tactical games, they operate within +each other's range of vision. + +War games when played for the purpose of determining the value +of types of craft and vessels of all kinds, may take on almost +an infinite variety of forms; for the combinations of craft of +different kinds and sizes, and in different numbers, considered +in connection with the various possible combinations of weather, +climate, and possible enemy forces, are so numerous as to defy +computation. + +In practice, however, and in a definite problem, the number of +factors can be kept down by assuming average conditions of weather, +using the fairly well-known enemy force that would appear in practice, +and playing games in which the only important variable is the kind +of vessel in question. For instance, in the endeavor to ascertain +the value of the battle cruiser, games can be played in which battle +cruisers are only on one side, or in which they are more numerous, +or faster or more powerful on one side than on the other. Naturally, +the games cannot be as valuable practically as they otherwise would +be, unless they consider the amount of money available. For instance, +if games are played to ascertain the most effective number and +kinds of craft for which to ask appropriations from Congress at +next session, the solution, unless a money limit were fixed, would +be impossible. In other words, the amount of money to be expended +must be one of the known or assumed factors in the problem. + +As this amount can never be known, it must be assumed; and, in +order that the whole value of the games may not be lost, in case +the amount assumed were incorrect, it is necessary to assume a +number of possible sums, the upper limit being above the probable +amount to be received, and the lower limit below it, and then work +out the answer to the problem, under each assumption. + +Of course, this procedure would be laborious, but most procedures +are that bring about the best results. Suppose that such a procedure +were followed for, say, a year, and that a number of plans, all +worked out, were presented to Congress when it met: plan No. 1, +for instance, consisting of such and such craft showing (according +to the results of the games) the best programme, if $100,000,000 +were to be appropriated for the increase of the navy; plan No. 2, if +$90,000,000 were to be appropriated; plan No. 3, if $80,000,000 were +to be appropriated, and so on. Each plan being concisely and clearly +stated, and accompanied by drawings, sketches, and descriptions, +Congress could easily and quickly decide which plan it would adopt. + +This scheme would have the obvious advantage over the present scheme +that the professional questions would be decided by professional +men, while the financial question would be decided by Congress, +which alone has the power to decide it. At present, the laymen +on the House Naval Committee spend laborious days interrogating +singly, and on different days, various naval officers, who naturally +do not always agree. Finally, the House Naval Committee decides on +a programme and recommends it to the House. The House discusses +it most seriously (the professional points more seriously than +the financial point), and decides on something. Then the Senate +Committee, using the House decision as a basis, recommends something +to the Senate, and the Senate then decides on something more or +less like what the Senate Committee recommends. Then the whole +question is decided by a Conference Committee of three senators and +three members of the House. It is to be noted that this committee +decides not only how much money the country shall spend on the +navy, but also what kinds of vessels navy officers shall use to +fight in the country's defense; how many officers there shall be, +and how they shall be divided among the various grades! + +Attention is requested here to the _ease_ with which a decision +can be made, _provided one does not take into account all of the +factors of a problem, or if he is not thoroughly acquainted with +them_; and attention is also requested to the _impossibility_ of +making a _wise_ decision (except by chance) unless one understands +_all_ the factors, takes _all_ into consideration, and then combines +them _all_, assigning to each its proper weight. From one point of +view, every problem in life is like a problem in mathematics; for +if all the factors are added, subtracted, multiplied, and divided +correctly (that is, if they are combined correctly), and if correct +values are assigned to them, the correct answer is inevitable. In +most of the problems of life, however, certainly in the problems +of strategy, we do not know all of the factors, and cannot assign +them their exactly proper weights; and therefore we rarely get +the absolutely correct answer. The best that any man can do is to +estimate the factors as accurately as he can, judge as correctly +as he can their interaction on each other, and then make his own +conclusion or decision. + +When a man can do this well in the ordinary affairs of life, he +is said to be "a man of good judgment"; when he can do it well +in a certain line of work--say investments in real estate--he is +said to have good judgment in real estate. The use of the word +"judgment" here is excellent, because it expresses the act of a +judge, who listens patiently to all the evidence in a case and +then gives his decision. And the act of the judge, and the act +of any man in coming carefully to any decision, consist mainly +in estimating the relative values of all the factors, and their +relations to each other ("sizing them up" is the expressive slang), +and then perceiving with more or less correctness what the answer +is. Some men do not have good judgment; some men highly educated, +brilliant, and well-meaning, seem never to get quite the correct +answer to any problem in life. They are said to be unsuccessful +and no one knows why. Perhaps they lack that instinctive sense +of proportion that some men have--a sense as real as an "ear for +music"; or perhaps they lack a willingness or a capability to think +about a situation with sufficient intentness to force a clear picture +of the situation with all its various features upon the mental +retina. + +The ability to make a mental picture, be it of a machine, of any +group of material objects, such as the various units of a fleet +organized as such, or of any other situation, varies with different +men; but like every other kind of ability, it can be strengthened +by practice, and assisted by appropriate means. In the engineering +arts, the practice is gotten by observing and remembering actual +machines; and the assistance is given by drawings of different kinds. +In strategy, the practice is given by observing and remembering the +movements of actual fleets; and the assistance by means of drawings +of different kinds, and by war problems, and the game-board. The +game-board represents a number of successive pictures, and is not +very different in principle from moving-pictures. In fact, the +suggestion has been made repeatedly for several years and is now +in process of development that the various situations in tactical +games might advantageously be photographed on films and afterward +projected in rapid succession on a screen. + +One of the curious limitations of the naval game board, both in +tactical and strategic games, is that it takes no account of personnel; +that it assumes that all the various units are manned by crews +that are adequate both in numbers and in training. Of course, it +would be impracticable to test say the relative values of kinds +of vessels, unless all the factors of the problem were the same, +except the two factors that were competing. Therefore the limitation +mentioned is not mentioned as a criticism, but simply to point +out that the game-board, in common with most of the other means +of discussion in naval matters, has gradually led people to think +of naval matters in terms of material units only. That such an +unfortunate state of affairs has come to pass can be verified by +reading almost any paper, even professional, that speaks about +navies; for one will be confronted at once with the statement that +such and such a navy consists of such and such ships, etc. Since +when has a navy consisted of brass and iron? Since when has the mind +and character of man taken a place subordinate to matter? At what +time did the change occur whereby the instrument employed dominated +the human being who employed it? That this is not an academic point, +or an unimportant thing to bear in mind is evidenced by countless +facts in history. In order not to tire the reader, mention will be +made of only one fact, the well-known fight between the American +frigate _Chesapeake_, and the British frigate _Shannon_ to which +I have already referred. These two ships were almost identical +in size and in the number and kinds of guns, and in the number +of officers and crew, and the battle was fought on June 1, 1813, +in Massachusetts Bay, under circumstances of weather and other +conditions that gave no advantage to either. If material and numbers +of personnel were the only factors in the fight, the fight would +have continued very long and ended in a draw. Did these things +occur? No, the _Chesapeake_ was captured in a little less than +fifteen minutes after the first gun was fired, and nearly half her +crew were killed or wounded! + +It would be tiresome to recount all the battles both on sea and +land, in which smaller forces defeated forces numerically greater; +but it may not be possible by any other means to force the fact +on the attention--even sometimes of naval officers--that material +vessels, guns, etc., are merely instruments, and that the work +gotten out of any instrument depends not only on the instrument +itself, but on the skill with which it is employed. Usually, when +thinking or speaking of the power of any instrument (or means or +method or organization) we mean the power of which it is capable; +that is, the result which it can produce, _if used with_ 100 _per +cent of skill_. Possibly, we are subconsciously aware that we assume +perfect skill; but whether we are or not, we have become so accustomed +to the tacit acceptance of the phrase, "other things being equal," +that we have come to forget that other things may not be equal at +all; and that they certainly will not be on the day of trial, if +we forget or undervalue those other things, while our antagonist +does not. + +Let us always remember, then, that the effective work gotten out +of any means or instrument is the product of the maximum capability +of the means or instrument and the skill with which it is used; +that, for instance, if two fleets fight, which are numerically +equal in material and personnel, but in which the skill of the +personnel of the A fleet is twice as great as the skill of the +personnel of the B fleet, the A fleet will be twice as powerful +as the B fleet. + +It may be objected that it would be absurd to assume the skill +of the personnel in one fleet as twice as great as that of the +personnel in the other fleet, but it can easily be shown that even +so great a disproportion is not impossible, provided the skill in +one fleet is very great. The value of superior skill naturally +becomes important where the difficulties are great. A very simple +illustration is in firing a gun; for even if the skill of one marksman +be greater than that of another, it will be unimportant, if the +target is so large and so close that even the inferior marksman +can hit it at each shot. The probability of hitting a target--so +far as overs and shorts are concerned (or deviations to the left +and right)--varies with the fraction _a/y_, where _a_ is the half +height (or width) of the target, and _y_ is the mean error. The +greater the size of the target, and the less the mean error, the +greater the probability of hitting. The size of the two targets +being fixed, therefore, the smaller the mean error the greater +the probability of hitting. The probability of hitting, however +(as can be seen by the formula), does not increase greatly with +the decrease of error, except in cases where _a/y_ is small, where +the mean error is large relatively to the width or height of the +target. For instance, if _a/y_ is .1 in one case, and .2 in another +case, the probability is practically double in the second case; +whereas, if _a/y_ is 1 in one case, and 2 in another, the probability +increases only 55 per cent; while if it is 2 in one case and 4 in +the other, the probability of hitting increases only 12 per cent. + +This means that if two antagonists engage, the more skilful should, +and doubtless will, engage under difficult conditions, where _y_ +is considerable relatively to _a_; for instance, at long range. +Suppose that he engages at such a range that he can make 10 per +cent of hits--that is, make 90 per cent of misses; and that his +misses relatively to the enemy's is as 90 to 95--so that the enemy +makes 95 per cent of misses. This does not seem to be (in fact it +is not) an extreme case: and yet _A_ will hit _B_ twice as often +as _B_ will hit _A_. In other words, the effective skill of _A_ +will be twice that of _B_. + +This illustrates the effect of training--because all that training +in handling any instrument can do is to attain as closely as possible +to the maximum output of the instrument; and as the maximum output +is attained only when the instrument is handled exactly as it should +be handled, and as every departure is therefore an error in handling, +we see that the effect of training is merely to diminish errors. + +That this illustration, drawn from gunnery, is applicable in general +terms to strategy seems clear, for the reason that in every strategical +situation, no matter how simple or how complex, there is, and can be +only one _best_ thing to do; so that the statement of any strategic +situation, if followed by a question as to what is the best thing +to do, becomes a problem, to which the answer is--_the best thing +to do_. Of course, in most strategic problems, there are so many +factors almost unknown, and so many factors only imperfectly known, +that we can rarely ascertain mathematically what is the best thing +to do. Nevertheless, there must be a best thing to do, even if we +never ascertain exactly what it is. Now in arriving at the decision +as to the best thing to do, one estimates the weight of each factor +and its bearing on the whole. If one estimates each factor correctly, +that is, if he makes no errors in any estimate, and if he makes no +error in summing up, he will make an absolutely correct decision; +and any departure from correctness in decision can result from +no other cause than from errors in his various estimates and in +their final summation. In other words, skill in strategy is to +be attained by the same process as is skill in other arts: by +eliminating errors. + +So, when we take the decisions of the game-board and the war problem, +we must not allow ourselves to forget that there has been a tacit +assumption that the numbers and the skill of the personnel have +been equal on the two sides; and we must supplement our decision +as to the best material to be employed by another decision as to +how we shall see to it that the assumption of equality of personnel +shall be realized in fact--or rather that it shall be realized in +fact that our personnel shall get the maximum of effectiveness +out of the material. + +In designing the machine, therefore, we are confronted with the +curious fact that, in general, we must design the various material +parts before designing the personnel parts that are to operate +them. + +The most obvious characteristic of the personnel parts is that +the number of personnel parts shall be sufficient to operate the +material parts. + +To ascertain the number of personnel parts, the only means is actual +trial; though naturally, if we have previously ascertained the +number of men needed to operate any kind of mechanism, say a certain +kind and size of gun, we can estimate quite accurately the number +needed to operate a similar gun, even if it differ somewhat from +the other gun. After the gun is tried, however, we may have to +change our original estimate, not only because the estimate may +have been in error, but because the requirement of operating the +gun may have changed. For instance, the requirements of fire-control +have within very recent years compelled the addition of a considerable +number of men to the complements of battleships. + +Now the need of supplying enough men to operate successfully any +instrument or mechanism is absolute, for the reasons that the number +of things to be done is fixed, and that an insufficient number of +men in the ratio for instance of 9 to 8 may mean a falling off in +the output of the machine much greater than in the ratio of 9 to +8. A simple illustration may be taken from the baseball game; for +it is obvious that the output of a baseball team, in competition with +other teams, would fall off in a much greater ratio than of 9 to +8, by leaving out one member of the nine. Another illustration, or +rather an analogy, may be found in machinery made of rigid metal--say +a steam-engine; for the omission of almost any part in an engine +would entirely stop its operation. + +Not only, however, must we see that the number of personnel parts +is sufficient, we must see that they are correctly divided among +the various material parts; otherwise there will be too many in +one place and too few in another; and while it is better to have +too many men than too few, too many men prevent the attainment +of the maximum effect. + +The effect of having too few men, however, is not merely in limiting +the effectiveness of the output of the machine; for, if carried +to a considerable degree, it prevents due care of the material +parts themselves, and causes those material parts to deteriorate. +This deterioration may take the form of actual wasting away as +by rust; but even if the deterioration does not advance so far +as actual wastage, it may easily, and often does, advance to the +stage where, although not evidenced by visible rust or by any other +indication, so long as the mechanism is not operated at its normal +rate, it declares itself very clearly as soon as the mechanism is +tried in service. For this reason, all mechanicians realize that +it is better for every mechanism not to lie idle, but to be used +considerably, though, of course, without being forced unduly. + +Not only also must the personnel be sufficient in number and correctly +divided, it must be organized in such manner that the personnel +itself will have the characteristics of a machine, in the sense +that each unit will be so placed relatively to the hope of reward +and the fear of punishment, that he will do his allotted tasks +industriously; that he will have the place in the organization +for which his character and abilities fit him, and that he will +be given such duties and exercises as will fit him more and more +for his position, and more and more for advancement to positions +higher. + +Not only this, we must exercise foresight in the endeavor that +the material parts and the personnel parts shall be ready at the +same time, so that neither will have to wait for the other; and to +insure the immediate availability when war breaks out, of sufficient +trained personnel to man and fight effectively all the material +units that we shall need to use. This raises the question: "What +units shall we need?" The government itself must, of course, decide +this matter; but it may be pointed out that if in any considerable +war every unit we possess should not be utilized, the navy could +not do as effective work as it otherwise could do. In the present +war, the belligerents have not only utilized all the units that +they had, they have built very many more, using the utmost possible +diligence and despatch. In case we should be drawn into war with +any considerable naval nation, all history and all reasoning show +that we must do the same. Few considerable wars have been waged +except with the greatest energy on each side; for each side knows +that the scale may be turned by a trifling preponderance on one +side; and that if the scale once be turned, it will be practically +impossible ever to restore the balance. Every advantage gained makes +one side relatively weaker to the other than it was before, and +increases the chance that the same side will gain another advantage; +gains and losses are cumulative in their effect. For this reason, +it is essential, if we are to wage war successfully, that we start +right, and send each unit immediately out to service, manned with +a highly trained and skilful personnel; because that is what our +foe will do. + +The Germans meet the difficulty of keeping their personnel abreast +of their material very wisely. They utilize the winter months, +when naval operations are almost impossible, for reorganizing and +rearranging their personnel; so that when spring comes, they are +ready in all their ships to start the spring drilling on a systematic +plan. The crews being already organized, and the scheme of drills +well understood, the work of getting the recruits versed in their +relatively simple tasks and the more experienced men skilled in +their new positions is quickly accomplished, and the fleet is soon +ready for the spring maneuvers. + +The fundamental requirement of any organization of men is that it +shall approach as closely as possible the characteristics of an +organism, in which all the parts, though independent, are mutually +dependent, each part doing its appropriate work without interfering +with any other, but on the contrary assisting it. The most complex +organization in the world is that of a navy, due primarily to the +great variety of mechanisms in it, and secondarily to the great +variety of trained bodies of men for handling those mechanisms. +This variety extends from the highest posts to the lowest; and +to make such varied organizations work together to a common end +is one of the greatest achievements of civilized man. How it is +accomplished is not clear at first view. It is not hard to see how +a company of soldiers, drawn up in line, can be made to move as +one body by order of the captain. But how in a battleship carrying +a thousand men does the coal-passer in the fire-room do as the +captain on the bridge desires? It may be objected that he does +not--that the captain has no wishes regarding the doings of any +coal-passer--that all the captain is concerned with is the doings +of the ship as a whole. True, in a way; and yet if the various +coal-passers, firemen, quartermasters, _et al_., do not do as the +captain wishes, the ship as a whole will not. The secret of the success +achieved seems to lie in the knitting together of all the personnel +parts by invisible wires of common understanding, analogous to the +visible wires that connect the helmsman with the steering-engine. +In the case of any small body of men, say the force in one fire-room, +the connecting wire joining each man to the petty officer in charge +of that fire-room is almost visible, because the petty officer is +familiar, by experience, with the work of each man; for he has +done that work himself, knows just how it should be done, and knows +how to instruct each man. But the more complicated the organization +is, the more invisible are the communicating wires that tie the +men together, and yet the more important it is that those wires +shall tie them; it is even more important, for instance, that the +wires connecting the chief engineer with all his force shall operate +than that the wires in any one fire-room shall operate. And yet not +only are there more wires, but the wires themselves that connect +the chief engineer to all the men below him, are longer and more +subject to derangement, than the wires that connect the petty officer +of one fire-room to the individuals under him. + +The chief engineer, of course, is not tied directly to his coal-passers, +but to men close to himself; close not only in actual distance, but +in experience, knowledge, and sympathy; men who speak the same +languages as he does, who understand what he means when he speaks, +and who speak to him in ways he understands. These men immediately +under him are similarly tied to their immediate subordinates by wires +of knowledge, experience, and sympathy--these to their immediate +subordinates, and so on. + +The same statement applies to the captain in his relations with +the chief engineer. The captain may not be an experienced engineer +himself; but he is familiar enough with engineering, with its +difficulties, its possibilities, and its aims, to converse with +the chief engineer in language which both clearly understand. + +The same principles seem to apply throughout the whole range of +the personnel: so that, no matter how large the organization of +any navy may be, there is--there must be, if good work is to be +done--a network of invisible wires, uniting all together, by a +strong yet flexible bond of sympathy. + +And has the material of the navy no connection with this bond? +Who knows! Brass and steel are said to be lifeless matter. But +does any naval man believe this wholly? Does any man feel that +those battleships, and cruisers, and destroyers, and submarines +are lifeless which he himself--with his own eyes--has seen darting +swiftly, precisely, powerfully on perfect lines and curves, changing +their relative positions through complicated maneuvers without +accident or mistake? Can we really believe that they take no part +and feel no pride in those magnificent pageants on the ocean? From +the earliest times, men have personified ships, calling a ship "he" +or "she," and giving ships the names of people, and of states; +and is not a ship with its crew a living thing, as much as the +body of a man? The body of a man is in part composed of bones and +muscles, and other parts, as truly things of matter as are the +hull and engines of a ship. It is only the spirit of life that +makes a man alive, and permits the members of his body, like the +members of a ship, to perform their appointed tasks. + +But even if this notion seems fanciful and absurd, we must admit +that as surely as the mind and brain and nerves and the material +elements of a man must be designed and made to work in harmony +together, so surely must all the parts of any ship, and all the +parts of any navy, parts of material and parts of personnel, be +designed and made to work in harmony together; obedient to the +controlling mind, and sympathetically indoctrinated with the wish +and the will to do as that mind desires. + + + + +CHAPTER IX + +PREPARING THE ACTIVE FLEET + +John Clerk, of Eldin, Scotland, never went to sea, and yet he devised +a scheme of naval tactics, by following which the British Admiral +Rodney gained his victory over the French fleet between Dominica +and Guadeloupe in April, 1782. Clerk devised his system by the +simple plan of thinking intently about naval actions in the large, +disregarding such details as guns, rigging, masts, and weather, and +concentrating on the movements of the fleets themselves, and the +doings of the units of which those fleets were made. He assisted +his mental processes by little models of ships, which he carried in +his pockets, and which he could, and did, arrange on any convenient +table, when he desired to study a problem, or to make a convert. + +He was enabled by this simple and inexpensive device to see the +special problems of fleet tactics more clearly than he could have +done by observing battles on board of any ships; for his attention +in the ships would have been distracted by the exciting events +occurring, by the noise and danger, and by the impossibility of +seeing the whole because of the nearness of some of the parts. +The amazing result was that he formed a clearer concept of naval +tactics than any admiral of his time, finally overcame the natural +prejudice of the British navy, and actually induced Rodney to stake +on the suggestion of a non-military civilian his own reputation +and the issue of a great sea fight. Furthermore, the issue was +crowned with success. + +Nothing could be simpler than Clerk's method. It was, of course, +applied to tactics, but similar methods are now applied to strategy; +for strategy and tactics, as already pointed out, are based on +similar principles, and differ mainly in the fact that strategy +is larger, covers more space, occupies more time, and involves +a greater number of quantities. + +Most of the books on naval strategy go into the subject historically, +and analyze naval campaigns, and also describe those measures of +foresight whereby nations, notably Great Britain, have established +bases all over the world and built up great naval establishments. +These books lay bare the reasons for the large successes that good +naval strategy has attained, both in peace and war, and constitute +nearly all there is of the science of naval strategy. + +These books and this method of treating naval strategy are valuable +beyond measure; but officers find considerable difficulty sometimes +in applying the principles set forth to present problems, because +of the paucity of data, the remoteness in time and distance of +many of the episodes described, and the consequent difficulty of +making due allowance for them. Now, no study of naval strategy can +be thoroughly satisfactory to a naval officer unless it assists +him practically to decide what should be done in order to make the +naval forces of his country, including himself, better in whatever +will conduce to victory in the next war. Therefore, at the various +war colleges, although the student is given books on strategy to +study, the major part of the training is given by the applicatory +method, an extension of Clerk's, in which the student applies his +own skill to solving war problems, makes his own estimate of the +situation, solves each problem in his own way (his solution being +afterward criticised by the staff), and then takes part in the +games in which the solutions presented are tried out. This procedure +recognizes the fact that in any human art and science--say medicine, +music, or navigation--it is the art and not the science by which +one gets results; that the science is merely the foundation on +which the art reposes, and that it is by practice of the art and +not by knowledge of the science that skill is gained. + +This does not mean, of course, that we do not need as much knowledge +of the science of naval strategy as we can get; for the reason that +the naval profession is a growing profession, which necessitates +that we keep the application of the principles of its strategy +abreast of the improvements of the times, especially in mechanisms; +which necessitates, in turn, that we know what those principles +are. + +The applicatory method bears somewhat the same relation to the +method of studying books and hearing lectures that exercises in +practical navigation bear to the study of the theory. There is +one difference, however, as applied to strategy and navigation, +which is that the science of navigation is clearly stated in precise +rules and formulae, and the problems in practical navigation are +solved by assigning values to quantities like _a, b, c, d_, etc., +in the formulae, and working out the results by mathematics; whereas +in strategy, no exact science exists, there are no formulae, and even +the number of assured facts and principles is small. For this reason +the art of strategy is more extensive and significant relatively +to its science than is the art of navigation to its science. + +It is a defect of the historical system that it tends to make men do +as people in the past have done--to make them work by rule. Clerk's +method took no note of what had been done before, but confined +itself to working out what should be done at the moment (that is, +by what we now call the "applicatory method"), taking account of +conditions as they are. By combining the two methods, as all war +colleges do now, officers get the good results of both. + +In the studies and exercises at the war colleges, note is taken +of the great events that have gone by, and of the great problems +now presented; by studying the historical events, and by solving +war problems of the present, a certain knowledge of the science +of naval strategy, and a certain skill in the art are gained. The +studies and the problems naturally are of war situations. + +Yet every war situation was the result of measures taken in time +of peace. If these measures had been unwise on the part of one +side--say Blue--in the design of certain craft, or the adoption, +or failure of adoption, of certain plans, then Blue's strategic +situation in the war would be more unfavorable than it would have +been if the measures had been wise. + +This proves that it is not only in war that strategy should be +consulted; that strategy should be made to perform important services +in peace as well; that strategic considerations should be the guide +to all measures great and small, that not only the major operations +in war, but also the minor preparations in peace, should be conducted +in accordance with the principles of strategy, and conform to its +requirements. By this means, and by this means only, does a system +of preparation seem possible in which all shall prepare with the +same end in view, and in which, therefore, the best results will +be secured in the least time and with the least labor. + +The naval machine having been designed, the various parts having +been furnished by the administrative agencies directing personnel +and material, and the consumable stores having been provided by the +agencies of supply (all under the guidance and control of strategy, +and in accordance with the calculations of logistics), the next +step is the same as that with any other machine--to prepare the +machine to do its work. + +The work that strategy has to do in accomplishing the preparation +is only in planning; but this planning is not limited to general +planning, for it extends to planning every procedure of training +and administration, no matter how great or how small. It plans the +mobilization of the navy as a whole, the exercises of the fleet, +the training of officers and men to insure that the plans for +mobilization and fleet exercises shall be efficiently carried out, +the exercises of the various craft, and of the various mechanisms +of all kinds in those craft, and even the drills of the officers +and men, that insure that the various craft and mechanisms shall +be handled well. This does not mean that strategy concerns itself +directly with the training of mess cooks and coal-passers; and +it may be admitted that such training is only under strategy's +general guidance. It may be admitted, also, that a considerable +part of the training of men in using mechanisms is caused by the +requirements of the mechanism itself; that practically the same +training is needed for a water-tender in the merchant service as +for a water-tender in the navy. Nevertheless, we must either declare +that the training of mechanicians in the nary has no relation to the +demands of preparation of the navy for war, or else admit that the +training comes under the broad dominion of strategy. To admit this +does not mean at all that the training of a naval radio electrician is +not directed in its details almost wholly by electrical engineering +requirements; it merely means that the training must be such as to +fulfil the requirements of strategy, for otherwise it would have +no value. No matter how well trained a man might be in radio work, +his work would be useless for naval purposes, if not made useful +by being adapted to naval requirements. The fact that strategy +controls the training of radio electricians through the medium of +electrical means is only one illustration of another important +fact, which is that in all its operations strategy directs the +methods by which results are to be attained, and utilizes whatever +means, even technical means, are the most effective and appropriate. + +The naval machine having been designed as to both personnel and +material, strategy has nothing to do with the material in preparing +the machine for use, because the material parts are already prepared, +and it is the work of engineering to keep those material parts in +a state of continual preparedness. + +It must be noted, however, that the naval machine differs from +most material machines in that its various parts, material as well +as personnel, are continually being replaced by newer parts, and +added to by parts of novel kinds. Strategy must be consulted, of +course, in designing the characteristics of the newer and the novel +parts; but this work properly belongs in the designing stage, and +not in the preparation stage. + +Strategy's work, therefore, in preparing the naval machine for +work consists wholly in preparing the personnel. This preparing +may be divided into two parts--preparing the existing fleet already +mobilized and preparing the rest of the navy. + +_Preparing the Fleet_.--The fleet itself is always ready. This +does not mean that, in time of profound peace, every ship in the +fleet has all its men on board, its chain hove short, and its engines +ready to turn over at a moment's notice; but it does mean that this +condition is always approximated in whatever degree the necessities +of the moment exact. Normally, it is not necessary to keep all the +men on board; but whenever, or if ever, it becomes so necessary, +the men can be kept on board and everything made ready for instant +use. It is perfectly correct, therefore, to say that, so far as it +may be necessary, a fleet in active commission is always ready. + +_Training_.--Before this state of readiness can be attained, however, +a great deal of training has to be carried out; and this training +must naturally be designed and prosecuted solely to attain this +end. Unless this end be held constantly in view, and unless the +methods of training be adapted to attain it, the training cannot +possibly be effective. To go from any point to another point, one +must proceed in the correct direction. If he proceeds in another +direction, he will miss the point. + +The training of the fleet naturally must be in doing the things +which the fleet would have to do in war. To decide what things +these will probably be, resort must be had to the teachings of +history, especially the most recent history, and to the teachings +of the war problem, the chart maneuver, and the game-board. + +The part of the personnel which it is the most important to train +is, of course, the commander-in-chief himself; and no reason is +apparent for supposing that his training should be conducted on +principles different from those that control the training of every +other person in the fleet. Men being the same in general, their +qualities differing only in degree, it is logical to conclude that, +if a gun-pointer or coxswain is best trained by being made first +to understand the principles that underlie the correct performance +of his work, and then by being given a good deal of practice in +performing it, a commander-in-chief, or a captain, engineer, or +gunner, can be best trained under a similar plan. Knowledge and +practice have always been the most effective means of acquiring +skill, and probably will continue to be the best for some time +to come. + +Owing to the fact that navies have been in existence for many years, +the general qualifications of efficient naval officers are fairly +well known; and they have always been the same in the most important +particulars, though the recent coming of scientific apparatus has +made available and valuable certain types of men not especially +valuable before this scientific apparatus appeared. + +In all navies, and equally in all armies, the qualification that +has been the most important has been character. To insure, or rather +to do the utmost toward insuring, proper character in its officers, +all countries for many years have educated certain young men of +the country to be officers in the army and navy, and they have +educated young men for no other service. If knowledge were the +prime requirement, special training for young men would not be +needed; the various educational institutions could supply young +men highly educated; and if the government were to take each year +a certain number of graduates who could pass certain examinations, +the educational institutions would be glad to educate young men to +pass them. In securing young men of proper education and physique, +little difficulty would be found. Special schools could even give +sufficient instruction in military and maritime subjects to enable +young men to become useful in minor positions on shipboard and in +camp, after a brief experience there. In fact, for some of the +positions in the army and navy, such as those in the medical corps +and others, military or naval training is not needed, or exacted. + +The truth of these remarks is not so obvious now as it was some +years ago, and it has never been so obvious in navies as in armies; +because education in the use of the numerous special appliances +used in ships could be given less readily by private instruction +than in the use of the simpler appliances used in armies. But even +now, and even in the navy, the course given at Annapolis is usually +termed a "training" rather than an education. + +Yet even education, educators tell us, is more a matter of training +than a matter of imparting knowledge. This indicates that even +for the duties of civil life, the paramount aim of educators is +so to train the characters of young men as to fit them for good +citizenship. + +We may assume, therefore, that the primary aim of governments in +preparing young men for the army and navy is to develop character +along the line needed for useful work in those services. + +What is that line? + +Probably nine officers in ten would answer this question with the +words, "the line of duty." This does not mean that officers are +the only people who should be trained to follow the line of duty; +but it does mean that, in military and naval schools, the training +is more devoted to this than in other schools, except, of course, +those schools that train young men for the priesthood or other +departments of the religious life. The analogy between the clerical +and the military professions in this regard has been pointed out many +times; but perhaps the closeness with which the medical profession +approximates both in its adherence to the line of duty has not been +appreciated as fully as it should be. + +_Duty_.--The reason for the predominance of the idea of duty over +any other in naval training is due, of course, to a realization +of the fact that more can be accomplished by officers having a +strict sense of duty though otherwise lacking, than by officers +having any or all the other qualifications, but lacking the sense +of duty. As an extreme instance of the doubtful value of highly +trained officers who lack the sense of duty, we need but to point +to those traitors who, in the past, have turned their powers in +the hour of need against the cause they were engaged to fight for. + +One cannot pursue the path of duty when that path becomes difficult +or disagreeable unless the sense of duty is so strong as to resist +the temptation to leave the path. To train a man to be strong in +this way, we train his character. + +There are several ways in which a man is tempted to leave the line +of duty; of these perhaps the most important are danger, sloth, +and love of pleasure. No human being is perfectly strong along +any of these lines; and some are most tempted by danger, some by +sloth, and some by love of pleasure. + +Sloth and the love of pleasure do not act as hinderances to efficiency +in the naval profession any more than they do in other callings. +There is no profession, business, or vocation, in which a man's +efficiency does not depend largely on his power of resistance to the +allurement of sloth and pleasure. In all walks of life, including +the usual routine of the naval life, these two factors are the +main stumbling-blocks to the success of any man. That is, they +are the main stumbling-blocks that training can remove or lessen; +the main stumbling-blocks in the way of his attaining that degree +of efficiency for which his mental and physical abilities themselves +would fit him. Natural abilities are not here considered; we are +considering merely what training can do to develop men as they +are for the naval life. + +_Courage_.--Danger is the special influence to divert a man from +duty's line that is distinctive of the army and the navy; and therefore +to secure ability to overcome this influence is the distinct effort +of military training. To train a young man for the army, the training +naturally is directed toward minimizing the influence of one class +of dangers; while to train a young man for the navy, the training +must be directed toward minimizing the influence of another class. +Of course training toward courage in any line develops courage in +other lines; but nevertheless a naval training does not enable +a man to ride a plunging cavalry horse with equanimity; nor does +training as a cavalryman wholly fit a man to brave the dangers +of the deep in a submarine. + +Thirty years ago, the present writer showed Commander Royal Bird +Bradford, U. S. N., the wonders of the U. S. S. _Atlanta_, the +first ship of what Americans then called "The New Navy." When I +showed Bradford the conning-tower, I remarked that many captains +who had visited the _Atlanta_ had said that they would not go into +the conning-tower in battle. To this Bradford replied: "The captain +who would not go into the conning-tower in battle would be very +brave, but he'd be a d----d fool." + +The obvious truth of this remark, the intimate connection which +it suggested between courage and folly, and the fact often noted +in life that to be brave is often to be foolish, contrasted with +the fact that in all history the virtue of courage in men has been +more lauded than any other virtue, suggests that a brief inquiry +into the nature and influence of courage may be interesting. + +The definitions of courage found in the dictionary are most +unsatisfactory, except that they say that the word "courage" comes +from the Latin "cor," the heart; showing that it is deemed a moral +quality, rather than physical or mental. + +Yet the deeds of courage that history and fiction tell, have been +deeds of what we call "physical courage," in which heroes and heroines +have braved death and physical suffering. Far in the background +are deeds of "moral courage," though many wise men have told us +that "moral courage" is a quality higher than "physical courage," +and more important. + +It is a little difficult to make a clear picture of courage that +is physical, as distinguished from courage that is moral; or moral +as distinguished from physical. Courage seems to be a quality so +clearly marked as to be hardly qualifiable by any adjective except +an adjective indicating degree--such as "great" or "little"; but if +any other adjective may be applied to it, the adjective "moral" seems +to be the only one. For courage, no matter how or why displayed, is +from its very essence, moral. Strictly speaking, how can there be +any courage except moral courage? If a man braves death or physical +suffering, the quality that enables him to brave it is certainly +not physical; certainly it does not pertain to the physical body. +The "first law of nature" impels him to escape or yield; and it +impels him with a powerful force. If this force be not successfully +resisted, the man will yield. + +Now the act of resisting a temptation to escape a physical danger is +due to a more or less conscious desire to preserve one's self-respect +and the respect of one's fellow men; and therefore, the best way in +which to train a man to be brave is to cultivate his self-respect +and a desire to have the respect of his fellow men; and to foster +the idea that he will lose both if he acts in a cowardly way. + +Naturally, some men are more apt to be cowards as regards physical +dangers than are others; and men differ greatly in this way. Men +of rugged physique, dull imagination, and sluggish nerves are not +so prone to fear of physical danger, especially danger far ahead +in the future, as are men of delicate physique, keen imagination, +and highly strung nervous system; and yet men of the latter class +sometimes surpass men of the former class when the danger actually +arrives--they seem to have prepared themselves for it, when men +of the former class seem in a measure to be taken by surprise. + +It is the attainment of physical courage, or courage to defy a +threat of physical injury, that military training aims at. That it +has done so successfully in the past, the history of the valiant +deeds of sailors and soldiers bears superabundant witness. This +courage has been brought out because it was essential. Courage is +to a man what strength is to structural materials. No matter how +physically strong and mentally equipped a man may be; no matter +how perfectly designed and constructed an engine may be, neither +the man nor the engine will "stand up to the work," unless the +courage in the one case, and the strength of the materials in the +other case, are adequate to the stress. + +While perfect courage would enable a man to approach certain death +with equanimity, all that is usually demanded of a man is that he +shall dare to risk death, if need be. To do this successfully, a +great assistance is a knowledge that even if things look bad, the +danger is not so great as it appears. Therefore, training confronts +men frequently with situations that look dangerous, but which skill +and coolness can avert. In this way, the pupil becomes familiar +with the face of danger, and learns that it is not so terrible as +it seems. Nothing else makes a man so brave regarding a certain +danger as to have met that danger successfully before. This statement +must be qualified with the remark that in some cases a danger, +although passed successfully, has been known to do a harm to the +nervous system from which it never has recovered. This is especially +the case if it was accompanied with a great and sudden noise and +the evidence of great injury to others. In cases like this, the +shock probably comes too abruptly to enable the man to prepare +himself to receive it. The efficacy of a little preparation, even +preparation lasting but a few seconds, is worthy of remark. Two +theories connecting fear and trembling may be noted here: one that a +person trembles because he fears; the other, and later, that trembling +is automatic, and that a person fears _because he trembles_. + +But the influence of fear is not only to tempt a man to turn his +back on duty and seek safety in flight, for it affects him in many +degrees short of this. Sometimes, in fact usually, it prevents the +accurate operation of the mind in greater or less degree. Here +again training comes to the rescue, by so habituating a man to +do his work in a certain way (loading a gun for instance) that +he will do it automatically, and yet correctly, when his mind is +almost paralyzed for a time. A very few men are so constituted +that danger is a stimulus to not only their physical but their +mental functions; so that they never think quite so quickly and +so clearly as when in great danger. Such men are born commanders. + +Discussion of such an abstract thing as courage may seem out of +place in a discussion of "Naval Strategy"; but while it is true +that naval strategy is largely concerned with mental operations, +while courage is a moral or spiritual quality, yet strategy concerns +itself with the securing of all means to victory, and of these means +courage is more important than any other one thing. One plan or +one system of training may be better than another; but they differ +only in degree, and if one plan fails another may be substituted; +but if courage be found lacking, there is no substitute on earth. +Now, if courage is to be inculcated by some system of training, +surely it is not amiss to devote a few minutes to an analysis of +the nature of courage, to seek what light we can get as to the +best methods of training to employ. + +_Responsibility_.--There is one form of courage which most men +are never called upon to use, and that is willingness to take +responsibility. Most men are never confronted with a situation +requiring them to take it. To naval men, however, the necessity +comes often, even to naval men in the lower grades; for they are +often confronted with situations in which they can accept or evade +responsibility. That courage is needed, no one can doubt who has +had experience. To accept responsibility, however, is not always +best either for the individual or for the cause; often it were +better to lay the responsibility on higher authority, by asking for +instructions. But the same remark is true of all uses of courage; +it is not always best to be brave, either for the individual or for +the cause. Both the individual and the cause can often be better +served by Prudence than by her big brother Courage. When, however, +the conditions require courage in any form, such as willingness to +accept responsibility, the man in charge of the situation at the +moment must use courage, or--fail. In such cases the decision rests +with the man himself. He cannot shift it to another's shoulders, +even if he would. Even if he decides and acts on the advice of +others, the responsibility remains with him. + +_From the Top Down, or from the Bottom Up?_--There are two directions +in which to approach the subject of training the personnel--from +the top down, and from the bottom up. The latter is the easier +way; is it the better? + +The latter is the easier way, because it is quicker and requires +less knowledge. In training a turret crew in this way, for instance, +one does not have to consider much outside of the turret itself. +The ammunition can be sent up and down, and the guns can be loaded, +pointed, and fired with just as much quickness and accuracy as is +humanly practicable, without much reference to the ship itself, +the fleet, or the navy. In fact, knowledge of outside requirements +hinders in some ways rather than advances training of this kind. +Knowledge, for instance, of the requirements of actual battle is a +distinct brake on many of the activities of mere target practice. + +But while it is easier to train in this way all the various bodies +of men that must be trained, it is obvious that by training them +wholly without reference to the requirements of the fleet as a +whole, the best result that we could expect would be a number of +bodies of men, each body well trained as a unit, but the combined +units not trained at all as component elements of the whole. The +result would be a little like what one would expect from the efforts +of an orchestra at playing a selection which the whole orchestra +had never played before together, but of which each member of the +orchestra had previously learned his part, and played it according +to his own ideas, without consulting the orchestra leader. + +By approaching the subject from the other direction, however, that +is, from the top, the training of each organization within the +fleet is arranged with reference to the work of the fleet as a +whole, the various features of the drills of each organization +being indicated by the conditions developed by that work. If this +plan be carried out, a longer time will be required to drill the +various bodies of men; but when it has been accomplished, those bodies +will be drilled, not only as separate bodies, but as sympathetic +elements of the whole. + +Of course the desirability of drilling separate divisions of a +fleet, ana separate ships, turret crews, fire-control parties, +and what-not, in accordance with the requirements of fleet work +does not prevent them from drilling by themselves as often as they +wish--any more than the necessity of drilling in the orchestra +prevents a trombone player from practising on his instrument as +much as the police will let him. + +Thus the fact of keeping a fleet together does more than merely +give opportunity for acquiring skill in handling the fleet itself, +and in handling the various ships so that they will work together +as parts of the fleet machine; because it shows each of the various +smaller units within the ships themselves how to direct its training. + +For this reason, the idea so often suggested of keeping the fleet +normally broken up into smaller parts, those parts close enough +together to unite before an enemy could strike, is most objectionable. +It is impossible to keep the fleet together all the time, because of +needed repairs, needed relaxation, and the necessity for individual +drills that enable a captain or division commander to strengthen his +weak points; but nevertheless since the "mission" of training is +to attain fighting efficiency in the fleet as a whole, rather than +to attain fighting efficiency in the various parts; and since it +can be attained only by drilling the fleet as a whole, the decision +to keep the fleet united as much as practicable seems inevitably to +follow. Besides, the statement cannot be successfully controverted +that difficult things are usually not so well done as easy things, +that drills of large organizations are more difficult than drills +of small organizations, and that in every fleet the drills that +are done the worst are the drills of the fleet as a whole. How +could anything else be expected, when one considers how much more +often, for instance, a turret crew is exercised at loading than +the fleet is exercised at the difficult movement of changing the +"line of bearing"? + +The older officers remember that for many years we carried on drills +at what we called "fleet tactics," though we knew they were only +tactical drills. They were excellent in the same sense as that in +which the drill of the manual of arms was excellent, or the squad +exercises given to recruits. They were necessary; but beyond the +elementary purpose of training in ship handling in fleet movements, +they had no "end in view"; they were planned with a limited horizon, +they were planned from the bottom. + +_General Staff_.--In order to direct the drills of a fleet toward +some worthy end, that end itself must be clearly seen; and in order +that it may be clearly seen, it first must be discovered. The end +does not exist as a bright mark in the sky, but as the answer to a +difficult problem; it cannot be found by guessing or by speculating +or by groping in the dark. Strategy says that the best way in which +to find it is by the "estimate of the situation" method. + +Owing to the fact that the commander-in-chief and all his personnel +are, by the nature of the conditions surrounding them, on executive +duty, the working out of the end in view of any extensive drills +seems the task of the Navy Department; while the task of attaining +it seems to belong to the commander-in-chief. Owing to the present +stage of electrical progress, the Navy Department has better means of +ascertaining the whole naval situation than has the commander-in-chief, +and if officers (General Staff) be stationed at the department +to receive and digest all the information received, and decide +on the best procedure in each contingency as it arises, the Navy +Department can then give the commander-in-chief the information he +requires and general instructions how to proceed. + +This does not mean that the department would "interfere" with the +commander-in-chief, but simply that it would assist him. The area +of discretion of the commander-in-chief should not be invaded; for +if it be invaded, not only may orders be given without knowledge +of certain facts in the commander-in-chief's possession, but the +commander-in-chief will have his difficulties increased by the very +people who are trying to help him. He may be forced into disobeying +orders, a most disturbing thing to have to do; and he will surely +be placed in a position of continuous doubt as to what is expected +of him. + +Of course, it must be realized that the difficulties of co-operating +with a commander-in-chief at sea, by means of even the most expert +General Staff, are of the highest order. It is hard to imagine any +task more difficult. It must be accomplished, however, or else +there will be danger all the time that the commander-in-chief will +act as he would not act if he had all the information that the +department had. This suggests at once that the proper office of +the department is merely to give the commander-in-chief information +and let him act on his own judgment. True in a measure; but the +commander-in-chief must be given some instructions, even if they +be general, for the reason that the commander-in-chief is merely +an instrument for enforcing a certain policy. Clearly, he must +know what the policy is, what the department desires; and the mere +statement of the department's desires is of itself an order. If +it is admitted that the commander-in-chief is to carry out the +orders of the department, it remains merely to decide in how great +detail those orders ought to be. + +No general answer can be given to the question: "In what detail +shall the orders be?" The general statement can be made, however, +that the instructions should be confined as closely as practicable +to a statement of the department's desires, and that this statement +should be as clear as possible. If, for instance, the only desire +of the department is that the enemy's fleet shall be defeated, no +amplification of this statement is required. But if the department +should desire, for reasons best known to itself, that the enemy +should be defeated by the use of a certain method, then that should +be stated also. Maybe it would not be wise for the department to +state the method the employment of which is desired; maybe the +commander-in-chief would be the best judge of the method to be +employed. But maybe circumstances of governmental policy dictate +the employment of a certain method, even if militarily it is not +the best; and maybe also the department might prefer that method +by reason of information recently received, which it does not have +time to communicate in full. + +Now, if it is desirable for the department to give the +commander-in-chief instructions, running the risk of invading his +"area of discretion," and of doing other disadvantageous things, +it is obvious that the department should be thoroughly equipped +for doing it successfully. This means that the department should +be provided not only with the most efficient radio apparatus that +can be secured, manned, of course, by the most skilful operators, +but also with a body of officers capable of handling that particular +part of the Navy Department's work which is the concentrated essence +of all its work, the actual handling of the naval forces. The usual +name given to such a body of officers is "General Staff." + +Such bodies of officers have been developed in navies in recent +years, by a desire to take advantage of electrical appliances which +greatly increase the accuracy and rapidity of communication over +long distances. In days not long ago, before communication by radio +was developed, commanders on the spot were in possession of much +more information about events in their vicinity, compared with +the Navy Department, than they are now; and the difficulties and +uncertainties of communication made it necessary to leave much more +to their discretion and initiative. The President of the United +States can now by telephone talk to the commander-in-chief, when +he is in home waters, and every day sees some improvement in this +line. This facility of communication carries with it, of course, +the danger of "interfering," one of the most frequent causes of +trouble in the past, in conducting the operations of both armies +and fleets--a danger very real, very insidious, and very important. +The very ease with which interference can be made, the trained +instinct of the subordinate to follow the wishes of his superior +if he can, the temptation to the superior to wield personally some +military power and get some military glory, conspire to bring about +interference. This is only an illustration, however, of the well-known +fact that every power can be used for evil as well as for good, +and is not a valid argument against developing to the utmost the +communication between the department and the fleet. It is, however, +a very valid argument against developing it unless there be developed +simultaneously some means like a "safety device" for preventing +or at least discouraging its misuse. + +The means devised is the General Staff; and in some countries like +Germany it seems to work so well that (unless our information is +incorrect) the Emperor himself does not interfere. He gives the +machine a certain problem to work out, and he accepts the answer +as the answer which has a greater probability of being correct +than any answer he could get by other means. + +_Training of the Staff_.--Now, if there is to be at the Navy Department +a body of men who will work out and recommend what instructions +should be given to the commander-in-chief, it seems obvious that +that body of men should be thoroughly trained. In the German army +the training of men to do this work (General Staff work) is given +only to officers specially selected. Certain young officers who +promise well are sent to the war college. Those who show aptitude +and industry are then put tentatively into the General Staff. Those +who show marked fitness in their tentative employment are then put +into the General Staff, which is as truly a special corps as is +our construction corps. How closely this system is followed with +the General Staff in the German navy, the present writer does not +know exactly; but his information is that the system in the navy +is copied (though with certain modifications) after the system in +the army. + +How can the General Staff at the Navy Department be trained? In the +same way as that in which officers at the war college are trained: +by study and by solving war problems by tactical and strategical +games. The training would naturally be more extended, as it would +be a postgraduate course. + +There is a difference to be noted between games like war games in +which the mental powers are trained, and games like billiards, in +which the nerves and muscles receive practically all the training; +and the difference refers mainly to the memory. Games of cards are +a little like war games; and many books on games of cards have +been written, expounding the principles on which they rest and +giving rules to follow. These books may be said to embody a science +of card-playing. + +No such book on naval strategy has appeared; and the obvious reason +is that only a few rules of naval strategy have been formulated. +Staff training, therefore, cannot be given wholly by studying books; +but possibly the scheme suggested to the department by the writer, +when he was Aid for Operations, may be developed into a sort of +illustrative literature, which can assist the memory. + +By this scheme, a body of officers at the Navy Department would +occupy their time wholly in studying war problems by devising and +playing strategical and tactical games ashore and afloat. After +each problem had been solved to the satisfaction of the staff, each +distinctive situation in the approved solution would be photographed +in as small a space as practicable, preferably on a moving-picture +film. In the solution of problem 99; for instance, there might be +50 situations and therefore 50 photographs. These photographs, +shown in appropriate succession, would furnish information analogous +to the information imparted to a chess student by the statement of +the successive moves in those games of chess that one sees sometimes +in books on chess and in newspapers. Now if the film photographs +were so arranged that the moves in the approved solution of, say, +problem 99 could be thrown on a screen, as slowly and as quickly +as desired, and if the film records of a few hundred such games +could be conveniently arranged, a very wide range of situations that +would probably come up in war would be portrayed; and the moves +made in handling those situations would form valuable precedents +for action, whenever situations approximating them should come up +in war. + +It must be borne in mind that in actual life, our only real guide +to wise action in any contingency that may arise is a memory, more +or less consciously realized, of how a similar contingency has +been met, successfully or unsuccessfully, in the past. Perhaps +most of us do not realize that it is not so much experience that +guides us as our memory of experiences. Therefore in the training +of both officers and enlisted men in strategy, tactics, seamanship, +gunnery, engineering, and the rest, the memory of how they, or +some one else, did this well and that badly (even if the memory +be hardly conscious) is the immediate agency for bringing about +improvement. + +Imagine now a strategical system of training for the navy, in which +a body of highly trained officers at the department will continuously +regulate the exercises of the fleet, guided by the revelations of +the _Kriegspiel:_ the commander-in-chief will direct the activities +of the main divisions of the fleet, carrying out the department's +scheme; the commander of each division will regulate the activities +of the units of his command in accordance with the fleet scheme; +the officer in command of each unit of each division will regulate +the activities of each unit in his ship, destroyer, submarine, +or other craft in accordance with the division scheme; and every +suborganization, in every ship, destroyer, or other craft will +regulate likewise the activities of its members; so that the navy +will resemble a vast and efficient organism, all the parts leagued +together by a common understanding and a common purpose; mutually +dependent, mutually assisting, sympathetically obedient to the +controlling mind that directs them toward the "end in view." + +It must be obvious, however, that in order that the navy shall +be like an organism, its brain (the General Staff) must not be a +thing apart, but must be of it, and bound to every part by ties +of sympathy and understanding. It would be possible to have a staff +excellent in many ways, and yet so out of touch with the fleet +and its practical requirements that co-ordination between the two +would not exist. Analogous conditions are sometimes seen in people +suffering from a certain class of nervous ailments; the mind seems +unimpaired, but co-ordination between the brain and certain muscles +is almost wholly lacking. + +To prevent such a condition, therefore, the staff must be kept in +touch with the fleet; and it must also permit the fleet to keep +in touch with the staff, by arranging that, accompanying the system +of training, there shall be a system of education which will insure +that the general plan will be understood throughout the fleet; and +that the means undertaken to execute it will be made sufficiently +clear to enable each person to receive the assistance of his own +intelligence. No man can do his best work in the dark. Darkness is +of itself depressing; while light, if not too intense, stimulates +the activities of every living thing. + +This does not mean that every mess attendant in the fleet should +be put into possession of the war plans of the commander-in-chief, +that he should be given any more information than he can assimilate +and digest, or than he needs, to do his work the best. Just how +much information to impart, and just how much to withhold are +quantitative questions, which can be decided wisely by only those +persons who know what their quantitative values are. This is an +important matter, and should be dealt with as such by the staff +itself. To get the maximum work out of every man is the aim of +training; to get the maximum work that shall be effective in attaining +the end in view, training must be directed by strategy, because +strategy alone has a clear knowledge of what is the end in view. + +_Stimuli_.--Some men are so slothful that exertion of any kind is +abhorrent to them; but these men are few, and are very few indeed +among a lot of healthy and normal men such as fill a navy. An office +boy, lazy beyond belief in the work he is engaged to do, will go +through the most violent exertions at a baseball game; and a darky +who prefers a soft resting-place in the shade of an umbrageous +tree to laboring in the fields will be stirred to wild enthusiasm +by a game of "craps." + +Now why are the office boy and the darky stimulated by these games? +By the elements of competition, chance, and possible danger they +bring out and the excitement thereby engendered. Training, therefore +introduces these elements into drills as much as it can. Competition +alone does not suffice, otherwise all men would play chess; competition +and chance combined are not enough, or gentlemen would not need +the danger of losing money to make card games interesting; but +any game that brings in all three elements will rouse the utmost +interest and activity of which a man is capable. Games involving +these three elements are known by many names; one name is "poker," +another name is "business," and another name is "politics." There +are many other games besides, but the greatest of all is strategy. + +Now in the endeavor to prepare a fleet by training, no lack of +means for exciting interest will be found; in fact no other training +offers so many and so great a variety of means for introducing +the elements of competition, chance, and danger. The problem is +how best to employ them. + +To do this successfully, it must be realized, of course, that the +greatest single factor in exciting interest is the personal factor, +since comparatively few men can get much interested in a matter +that is impersonal; a boy is more interested in watching a baseball +game in which he knows some of the players than in watching a game +between teams neither of which he has ever seen; and the men in +any ship are more interested in the competition between their ship +and some other than between any other two; feeling that _esprit de +corps_ by reason of which every individual in every organization +personifies the organization as a living thing of which he himself +is part. + +_Strategic Problems_.--The training of the fleet, then, can best be +done under the direction of a trained staff, that staff generously +employing all the resources of competition, chance, and danger. The +obvious way to do this is to give out to the fleet for solution a +continual succession of strategic problems, which the entire fleet +will be engaged in solving, and which will be the starting-point +for all the drills of the fleet and in the fleet. (Some officers +prefer the word "maneuver" to "problem.") + +The arranging of a continual series of war problems, or maneuvers +to be worked out in the fleet by "games," will call for an amount +of strategical skill second only to the skill needed for operations +in war, will deal with similar factors and be founded on similar +principles. + +Naturally, the war problems, before being sent to the fleet for +solving, would be solved first by the staff, using strategical +and tactical games, and other appropriate means; and inasmuch as +the scheme of education and training is for the benefit of the +staff itself, as well as for the benefit of the fleet, certain +members of the staff would go out with the fleet to note in what +ways, each problem sent down was defective, in what ways good--and +in what ways it could be modified with benefit. The successive +situations and solutions, made first by the staff and subsequently +by the fleet, can then be photographed and made part of the history +of war problems, for the library of the staff. + +In laying out the war problems, the staff will be guided naturally +by the ends in view--first to work out solutions of strategic, +logistic, and tactical situations in future wars, and second to +give opportunity to the various divisions, ships, turret crews, +engineers' forces, etc., for drills that will train them to meet +probable contingencies in future wars. + +This double end will not be so difficult of attainment as might at +first sight seem, for the reason that the solution of any problem +which represents a situation actually probable will automatically +provide all the minor situations necessary to drill the various +bodies; and the more inherently probable a situation is, the more +probable will be the situations in which the various flag-officers, +captains, quartermasters, engineers' forces, turret crews, etc., +will find themselves. + +Of course, the prime difficulty in devising realistic problems is +the fact that in war our whole fleet would be employed together +against an enemy fleet; and as the staff cannot supply an enemy +fleet, it must either imagine an enemy fleet, divert a small part +of our fleet to represent an enemy fleet, or else divide our fleet +into two approximately equal parts, one "red," and one "blue." + +_First Scheme_.--The first scheme has its usefulness in working +out the actual handling of the fleet as a whole; and considering +the purposes of strategy only, is the most important, though, of +course, "contacts" with the enemy cannot be simulated. From the +standpoint of fleet tactical drill, and the standpoint of that part +of strategy which arranges for handling large tactical situations +with success, it is useful, since it provides for the tactical +handling of the entire fleet. This certainly is important; for if +the personnel are to be so trained that the actual fleet shall be +handled with maximum effectiveness in battle, training in handling +that actual fleet must frequently be had; the fleet is a machine, +and no machine is complete if any of its parts is lacking. + +It may be objected that it is not necessary for the staff at the +department to devise such training, because drills of the entire +fleet can be devised and carried out by the commander-in-chief; +in fact that that is what he is for. This, of course, is partly +true; and it is not the idea of the author that the staff in the +department should interfere with any scheme of drills that the +commander-in-chief desires to devise and carry out; but it is his +idea that the staff should arrange problems to be worked out by +the fleet, in which the tactical handling of the fleet should be +subordinate to, and carried out for, a strategic purpose. + +A very simple drill would be the mere transfer of the fleet to a +distant point, when in supposititious danger from an enemy, employing +by day and night the scouting and screening operations that such a +trip would demand. Another drill would be the massing of previously +separated forces at a given place and time; still another would be +the despatching of certain parts of the fleet to certain points at +certain times. The problems need not be quite so simple as these, +however; for they can include all the operations of a fleet under +its commander-in-chief up to actual contact; the commander-in-chief +being given only such information as the approximate position, +speed, and course of the enemy at a given time, with orders to +intercept him with his whole force; or he may be given information +that the enemy has divided his force, that certain parts were at +certain places going in certain directions at certain speeds at +certain times, and he may be directed to intercept those supposititious +parts; that is, to get such parts of his fleet as he may think best +to certain places at certain times. + +Of the strategic value to the staff of the practical solutions of +this class of problems by the fleet, there can be little question; +and the records made if kept up to date, would give data in future +wars for future staffs, of what the whole fleet, and parts of it +acting with the fleet, can reasonably be expected to accomplish, +especially from the standpoint of logistics. And it has the advantage +of dealing with only one thing; the actual handling of the actual +fleet, uncomplicated by other matters, such as interference by an +enemy. For the reason, however, that it leaves out of consideration +the effects of scouting and of contacts with the enemy, it is +incomplete. + +_Second Scheme_.--To remedy this incompleteness, resort may be +had to the device of detaching a few vessels from the fleet and +making each represent a force of the enemy; one destroyer, for +instance, to represent a division, four destroyers four divisions, +etc. This scheme has the advantage that all the capital ships can +be handled together, and that, say three-quarters of the destroyers +can be handled without much artificiality on the assumption that +four-fourths are so handled; while for merely strategic purposes +four destroyers, properly separated, can represent four divisions +of destroyers very truthfully. This scheme is useful not only +strategically but tactically; for the reasons that the contacts +made are actual and visible, and that all the personnel on each +side are put to doing things much like those they would do in war. +The scheme is extremely flexible besides; for the number of ways +in which the fleet can be divided is very great, and the number +of operations that can be simulated with considerable accuracy +is therefore very great also. The training given to the personnel +of the fleet is obviously more varied, interesting, and valuable, +than in the first scheme; and the records of the solutions (games +played) will form instructive documents in the offices of the staff, +concerning situations which the first scheme could not bring out. +These records, naturally, will not be so simple as those under the +first scheme, because many factors will enter in, some of which +will bring up debatable points. For when actual contact occurs, +but only "constructive" hits by torpedo and gun are made, much +room for difference of opinion will occur, and many decisions will +be disputed. + +To decide disputed questions must, of course, rest with the staff; +but those questions must be decided, and if correct deductions +from the games are to be made, the decisions must be correct. To +achieve correctness in decision the members of the staff must be +highly trained. To devise and develop a good scheme of staff training, +several years may be required. + +_Third Scheme_.--The third kind of game is that in which the fleet +is divided into two parts, fairly equal in each of the various +elements, battleships, battle cruisers, destroyers, submarines, +aircraft, etc. This scheme gives opportunity for more realistic +situations than the other two, since each side operates and sees +vessels and formations similar to those that it would operate and +see in war; and it gives opportunity for games which combine both +strategical and tactical operations and situations to a greater +degree than do the other two schemes. Its only weakness is the +fact that the entire fleet is not operated as a unit; not even a +large fraction, but only about one-half. Like each of the other +two schemes, however, it has its distinctive field of usefulness. + +Its main advantage is its realism--the fact that two powerful naval +forces, each composed of all the elements of a naval force, seek +each other out; or else one evades and the other seeks; and then +finally they fight a fairly realistic battle; or else one successfully +evades the other; or else minor actions occur between detachments, +and no major result occurs; just as happens in war. + +Strategically, this scheme is less valuable than the other two; +tactically, more so. For the experience and the records of the +staff this scheme is less valuable than the other two, but for the +training of the fleet it is more so. + +Of course, the division of games for staff and fleet training into +three general schemes is arbitrary, and not wholly correct; for +no such division really exists, and in practice it would not be +observed. The thought of the writer is merely to point out that, +in a general way, the schemes may be divided into three classes, +and to show the convenience of doing so--or at least of recognizing +that there are three general kinds of games, and that each kind +has its advantages and likewise its disadvantages. + +In our navy, only three strategic problems or maneuvers, devised +at the department, have been worked out at sea--one in May, and +one in October, 1915, and one in August, 1916: all belonged in +the second category. They were devised by the General Board and +the War College, as we had no staff. The solving of the problems +by the commander-in-chief aroused the greatest interest not only +in the fleet, but in the Navy Department, in fact, throughout the +entire navy, and to a surprising degree throughout the country, +especially among the people on the Atlantic coast. Discussions +of the utmost value were aroused and carried on, and a degree of +co-operation between the department, the War College, and the fleet, +never attained before, was realized. If a routine could be devised +whereby such problems could be solved by practical games, say once +a month, and the results analyzed and recorded in moving-picture +form by the staff in Washington, we could see our way in a few +years' time to a degree of efficiency in strategy which now we +cannot even picture. It would automatically indoctrinate the navy +and produce a sympathetic understanding and a common aim, which +would permeate the personnel and make the navy a veritable organism. +It would attain the utmost attainable by any method now known. + +Attention is respectfully invited to the fact that at the present +time naval strategy is mainly an art; that it will probably continue +so for many years; that whether a science of naval strategy will +ever be formulated need not now concern us deeply, and that the +art of naval strategy, like every other art, needs practice for +its successful use. Naval strategy is so vague a term that most +of us have got to looking on it as some mystic art, requiring a +peculiar and unusual quality of mind to master; but there are many +things to indicate that a high degree of skill in it can be attained +by the same means as can a high degree of skill in playing--say +golf: by hard work; and not only by hard work, but by doing the +same thing--or similar things--repeatedly. Now most of us realize +that any largely manual art, such as the technic of the piano, +needs frequent repetition of muscular actions, in order to train +the muscles; but few of us realize how fully this is true of mental +arts, such as working arithmetical or strategical problems, though +we know how easy it is to "get rusty" in navigation. Our mental +muscles and whatever nerves co-ordinate them with our minds seem to +need fully as much practice for their skilful use as do our physical +muscles; and so to attain skill in strategy, we must practise at +it. This means that all hands must practise at it--not only the +staff in their secret sanctuary, not only the commander-in-chief, +not only the division commanders, but, in their respective parts, +the captains, the lieutenants, the ensigns, the warrant officers, +the petty officers, and the youngest recruits. To get this practice, +the department, through the staff, must furnish the ideas, and the +commander-in-chief the tools. Then, day after day, month after +month, and year after year, in port and at sea, by night and by +day, the ideas assisted by the tools will be supplying a continuous +stimulus to the minds of all. This stimulus, properly directed +through the appropriate channels and devoted to wise purposes, +will reach the mess attendant, the coal-passer, and the recruit, +as well as those in positions more responsible (though not more +honorable); and as the harmony of operation of the whole increases, +as skill in each task increases, and as a perception of the strategic +_why_ for the performance of each task increases, the knowledge +will be borne in on all that in useful occupation is to be found +the truest happiness; that only uninterested work at any task is +drudgery; that interest in work brings skill, that skill brings +pleasure in exerting it; and that the greater the number of men +engaged together, and the more wise the system under which they +work, the greater will be the happiness of each man, and the higher +the efficiency of the whole. + + + + +CHAPTER X + +RESERVES AND SHORE STATIONS + +In the preceding chapter it was pointed out that the work of preparing +the naval machine for use could be divided into two parts: preparing +the existing fleet and preparing the rest of the navy. + +The "rest of the navy" consists of the Navy Department itself, +the naval stations, the reserve ships and men, and also the ships +and men that must be brought in from civil life. As the department +is the agency for preparing the naval stations, the reserves, and +the men and ships brought in from civil life, it is clear that the +work of preparing the department will automatically prepare the +others. The work of preparing any Navy Department necessitates the +preparation and execution of plans, whereby the department itself +and all the rest of the navy will be able to pass instantly from a +peace footing to a war footing; will be able to pass instantly +from a status of leisurely handling and supplying the existing +fleet by means of the offices, bureaus, and naval stations, to +the status of handling with the greatest possible despatch a force +which will be not only much larger, but also much less disciplined +and coherent. + +In time of peace a Navy Department which is properly administered +for times of peace, as most Navy Departments are, can, by means of +its bureaus, naval stations, offices, etc., handle the existing +fleet, and also these bureaus, naval stations, offices, etc., by +labors which for the most part are matters of routine. The department +opens for business at a certain time in the morning and closes at +a certain time in the afternoon. During office hours the various +officials and their clerks fill a few busy hours with not very +strenuous labor, and then depart, leaving their cares behind them. +The naval stations are conducted on similar principles; and even +the doings of the fleet become in a measure matters of routine. +All the ordinary business of life tends to routine, in order that +men may so arrange their time, that they may have regular hours +for work, recreation, and sleep, and be able to make engagements +for the future. + +But when war breaks out, all routine is instantly abolished. The +element of surprise, which each side strives to interject into +its operations, is inherently a foe to routine. In a routine life, +expected things occur--it is the office of routine to arrange that +expected things shall occur, and at expected times; in a routine +life one is always prepared to see a certain thing happen at a +certain time. Surprise breaks in on all this, and makes unexpected +things occur, and therefore finds men unprepared. It is the office +of surprise to catch men unprepared. + +Appreciating this, and appreciating the value of starting a war +by achieving some great success, and of preventing the enemy from +so doing, military countries in recent years have advanced more and +more their preparations for war, even in time of the profoundest +peace, in order that, when war breaks out, they may be prepared +either to take the offensive at once, or to repel an offensive at +once. With whatever forces a nation expects or desires to fight +in a war, no matter whether it will begin on the offensive or begin +on the defensive, the value to the nation of those forces will +depend on how soon they are gotten ready. In a navy, the active +fleet may be considered always ready; but the personnel and the +craft of various kinds that must be added to it cannot be added +to it as quickly as is desirable--because it is desirable that +they should be added immediately, which is impossible. + +It is not in the nature of things that they should get ready as +quickly as a fleet that has been kept ready always; but it is essential +that the handicap to the operations of the active fleet, due to the +tardiness of its additions, should be kept as small as possible. +In other words, whatever additions are to be made to the active +fleet should be made as quickly as possible. + +When the additions are made to the fleet (reserve ships and men, +ships and men from civil life, etc.) it is clear that those ships +and men should at that time be ready for effective work. If the +ships are not in condition for effective work by reason of being +out of order, or by reason of the ships from civil life not having +been altered to suit their new requirements, or by reason of the men +not being thoroughly drilled for their new tasks, considerable time +will have to be lost by the necessity of getting the ships and the +men into proper condition--or else warlike operations will have to be +entered into while unprepared, and the classic _Chesapeake-Shannon_ +tragedy re-enacted. + +Therefore, the endeavor must be strongly made to have ready always +all the ships and men that are to be added to the fleet; the ships +equipped for their duties in the fleet, and the men drilled for +their future tasks. + +The matter of getting ready the navy ships that are in reserve +is largely a matter of getting the men to man them, as the ships +themselves are kept in repair, and so in a state of readiness, +materially speaking. At least this is the theory; and the successful +application of the theory, when tested in practice, depends greatly +on how large a proportion of the full complements has been kept +on board, and on the amount and nature of the cruising which the +vessels in reserve have done. The ideal conditions cannot be reached, +unless the full complements have been kept on board, and the ships +required to make frequent cruises. Of course, such a condition is +never met in reserve ships; there would be no reason for putting +ships in reserve if they were to be so handled. The more closely, +however, a ship is kept in that condition of readiness, the more +quickly she can be made absolutely ready in her material condition. + +Unless one realizes how and why ships deteriorate in material, +it is surprising to see how many faults develop, when ships in +reserve, that are apparently in good condition, are put into active +service. Trouble is not found, of course, with the stationary parts, +like the bottoms, and sides, and decks, so much as with the moving +parts, especially the parts that have to move and be steam and +gas tight at the same time--the parts found mainly in the steam +engineering and ordnance departments. Defects in the moving parts, +especially in the joints, are not apt to be found out until they +are moved, and often not until they are moved under the pressure +and with the speeds required in service. + +Now "in service" usually means in service in time of peace; but the +service for which those ships are kept in reserve is war service, +and the requirements of war service are much more rigorous than +those of peace service. Objection may be made to this statement +by remarking that engines turn around and guns are fired just the +same in war as in peace, and that therefore the requirements are +identical. True in a measure; but vessels and guns are apt to be +forced more in war than in peace; and even if they were not, vessels +in time of peace are gotten ready with a considerable degree of +deliberation, are manned by well-trained men, and are sent to sea +under circumstances which permit of gradually working up to full +service requirements. But when reserve vessels are mobilized and +sent into service for war, everything is done with the utmost haste; +and the men, being hurriedly put on board, cannot possibly be as +well trained and as ready to do skilful work as men sent on board +in peace time; and when reserve vessels get to sea they may be +required immediately to perform the most exacting service. + +For all these reasons, it is highly desirable--it is essential +to adequate preparation--that vessels should be kept in a state +of material readiness that is practically perfect. Every vessel on +board of which defects in material develop after she shall have been +put into service, when war breaks out, will be a liability instead +of an asset. She will be able to render no effective service, and +she will require the expenditure of energy by officers and men, +and possibly the assistance of other vessels, when their services +are needed for other work. + +But the problem of how to keep reserve vessels in a state of material +readiness is easier than the problem of how to keep the reserve +men in a state of personnel readiness, which will insure their +reporting on board of the reserve ships quickly enough and with +adequate training. This problem is so difficult, and its solution +is so important, that in Great Britain, France, Germany, Japan, and +doubtless other navies, men are compelled to go into the reserves, +and to remain in for several years after completing their periods +of service in the regular navy. In this way, no breaking away from +the navy occurs until after reserve service has been completed, +and every man who enlists remains in the navy and is subject to +its discipline until his reserve period has been passed. Thus the +question of the reserve is a question that has been answered in +those countries, and is therefore no longer a question in them. If +battleship _A_ in any of those countries is to be mobilized, the +government knows just who are to go on board and when; and knows +that every man has recently served in the regular navy, has been +kept in training ever since he left it, and that he is competent to +perform the duties of his allotted station in battleship _A_. + +The problem of getting into service the ships that are to be gotten +from the merchant service is more difficult, and is perhaps of more +importance; that is, it is more important to get into the service +some vessels from the merchant service than some reserve ships; more +important, for instance, to get colliers to serve the fleet with +coal than to commission some antiquated cruisers. Naturally, the +number and kinds of ships that need to be provided will depend on +the nature of the war--whether, for instance, a very large force +is to be sent to the other side of the world, to meet a powerful +fleet there, or whether a sudden attack on our Atlantic coast is +to be repelled. The difference, however, is largely numerical; so +that if the plans provide for a sufficient number to take part +in the distant expedition, it will be easy to get the appropriate +number to meet a coast attack. + +To receive an attack upon the coast, however, provision must be +made for vessels and men not needed on an expedition across the +seas--that is, for vessels and men that will defend the coast itself +from raids and similar expeditions. + +The work of preparing all that part of the naval machine which +in time of peace is separate from the active fleet is purely one +of logistics; it is that part of the preparation which calculates +what ways and means are needed, and then supplies those ways and +means. Logistics, having been told by strategy what strategy plans +to do, calculates how many and what kinds of vessels, men, guns, +torpedoes, fuel, food, hospital service, ammunition, etc., are +needed to make possible the fulfilling of those plans; and then +proceeds to provide what it has calculated must be provided. + +This does not mean that strategy should hold itself aloof from +logistics and make arbitrary demands upon it; for such a procedure +would result in making demands that logistics could not supply; or, +through an underestimate of what logistics can supply, in refraining +from demanding as much as could be supplied. Logistics, of course, +does provide what strategy wants, in so far as it can; but in order +that satisfactory results may be obtained, the fullest co-operation +between strategy and logistics is essential; and to this end frequent +conferences are required between the officers representing both. + +The logistic work of expanding the naval forces to a war basis +may evidently be divided into two parts: the adding of vessels +and other craft appropriately equipped and manned to the active +fleet, and the establishment of a coast-defense force, which will +be distributed along the coast and divided among the most important +commercial and strategic centres. + +_Adding to the Fleet_.--Naturally, the additions to the fleet will +depend on the service for which the fleet is intended; that is, on +the plans of strategy. If the navy were to be gotten ready for a +definite undertaking, then the additions to carry out that undertaking +could be calculated and prepared; and of course this condition +does come up immediately before any war occurs. But in addition to +these preparations which are to be made at the last moment (many +of which cannot be made until the last moment), the staff must +prepare in the leisure of profound peace for several different +contingencies. Inasmuch as many of the additions will be needed, +no matter with what country the war may come; and inasmuch as the +same general kind of additions will be made, it is clear that there +must underlie all the various plans one general plan, to which +modifications must be made to adapt it to special conditions. And +as, no matter whether we are to take the offensive or the defensive, +no matter whether the fleet is to go far away or stay near our +coast, the matter of additions to it is mainly a matter of degree +(whether for instance ten extra colliers are needed or a hundred), +it seems clear that the general plan should be the one demanding +the greatest additions, so that the modifications to adapt it to +special cases would consist merely in making subtractions from it. +To carry out this plan, strategy must make a sufficiently grave +estimate of the situation; and logistics must make calculations to +supply the most difficult demands that the estimate of the situation +indicates as reasonable, and then arrange the means to provide what +the calculations show. If one has provided a little more than is +necessary, it is much easier to leave out something later than it +is to add more, if one has not provided enough; and one's natural +indolence then acts on the side of safety, since it tends to persuade +one not to leave off too much; whereas in the opposite case, it +tends to assure him that it is not really necessary to take the +trouble to provide what it might be hard to get. + +_The Estimate of the Situation.--In no field of strategical work +is an accurate estimate of the situation more clearly necessary +than when it is to form the basis for the precise calculations +of logistics_. General strategical plans require a vividness of +imagination and a boldness of conception that find no field for +exercise in logistics; and tactics requires a quickness of decision +and a forcefulness of execution that neither strategy nor logistics +need; but neither strategy nor tactics calls for the mathematical +exactness that logistics must have, or be of no avail. Yet there +will be no use in working out the mathematically correct means to +produce certain result, if the real nature of the desired result +is underrated; there will be no use in working out laboriously how +many ships and tons of coal and oil are needed, if the estimate +of the situation, to meet which those ships and coal and oil are +needed, is inadequate. + +The first step, therefore, in providing for the expansion of the +navy for war, is to estimate the situation correctly. The greatest +difficulty in doing this arises from a species of moral cowardice, +which tempts a man to underestimate its dangers, and therefore the +means required to meet them. _Probably no single cause of defeat +in war has been so pregnant with disaster as this failure to make +a sufficiently grave estimate of the situation_. Sometimes the +failure seems due more to carelessness than to cowardice; Napoleon's +disastrous underestimate of the difficulties of his projected Russian +campaign seems more due to carelessness than to cowardice; but this +may be due to a difficulty of associating cowardice with Napoleon. +But is it not equally difficult to associate carelessness with +Napoleon? What professional calculator, what lawyer's clerk was +ever more careful than Napoleon was, when dealing with problems of +war? Who was ever more attentive to details, who more industrious, +who more untiring? And yet Napoleon's plans for his Russian campaign +were inadequate to an amazing degree, and the inadequacy was the +cause of his disaster. But whether the cause was carelessness or +moral cowardice on his part, the fact remains that he did not estimate +the situation with sufficient care, and make due plans to meet it. + +This unwillingness to look a difficult situation in the face one +can see frequently in daily life. Great difficulties seem to appall +some people. They hate so much to believe a disaster possible, they +fear so much to let themselves or others realize that a danger +is impending, they are so afraid that other people will think them +"nervous," and they shrink so from recommending measures that would +cause great exertions or great expenditures, that they are very +prone to believe and say that there is no especial danger, and +that whatever danger there may be, can be obviated by measures that +are easy and cheap to carry out. + +If we yield to this feeling, we are guilty of moral cowardice, +and we vitiate all the results of all our labors. We _must_ make +a correct estimate of the situation--or rather we must estimate +the situation to be as grave as it is--or our preparations will +be of no avail. If we estimate the situation too gravely, we may +spend more money and time on our preparations than is quite needed, +and our preparations may be more than adequate. It may be that the +preparations which Prussia made before 1870 for war with France +were more than adequate. In fact, it looks as if they were, in +view of the extreme quickness with which she conquered France. But +does any military writer condemn Prussia for having made assurance +too sure? + +_The Value of Superadequate Preparation_.--No, on the contrary. +The very reasons that make adequate preparation valuable make +superadequate preparation even more valuable. The reason is very +clear, as is shown by the table on page 284 illustrating the progressive +wasting of fighting forces, which the writer published in the _U. +S. Naval Institute_ in an essay called "American Naval Policy," +in April, 1905.[*] + +[Footnote *: I have recently been informed that Lieutenant (now +Commander) J. V. Chase, U. S. N., arrived at practically the same +results in 1902 by an application of the calculus; and that he +submitted them to the U. S. Naval War College in a paper headed, +"Sea Fights: A Mathematical Investigation of the Effect of Superiority +of Force in."--B. A. F.] + + TABLE I + ---------------------------------------------------------------------------- +| |Col.|Col.|Col.|Col.|Col.|Col.|Col.|Col.|Col.|Col.| +| | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 | 8 | 9 | 10 | +|----------------------------------------------------------------------------| +|Value of offensive power A|1000|1000|1000|1000|1000|1000|1000|1000|1000|1000| +| at beginning B|1000| 900| 800| 700| 600| 500| 400| 300| 200| 100| +|Damage done in 1st A| 100| 100| 100| 100| 100| 100| 100| 100| 100| 100| +| period B| 100| 90| 80| 70| 60| 50| 40| 30| 20| 10| +|Value of offensive power A| 900| 910| 920| 930| 940| 950| 960| 970| 980| 990| +| at end of 1st period B| 900| 800| 700| 600| 500| 400| 300| 200| 100| 0| +|Damage done in 2nd A| 90| 91| 92| 93| 94| 95| 96| 97| 98| | +| period B| 90| 80| 70| 60| 50| 40| 30| 20| 10| | +|Value of offensive power A| 810| 830| 850| 870| 890| 910| 930| 950| 970| | +| at end of 2nd period B| 810| 709| 608| 507| 406| 305| 204| 103| 2| | +|Damage done in 3rd A| 81| 83| 85| 87| 89| 91| 93| 95| | | +| period B| 81| 71| 61| 51| 41| 31| 20| 10| | | +|Value of offensive power A| 729| 759| 789| 819| 849| 879| 910| 940| | | +| at end of 3rd period B| 729| 626| 523| 420| 317| 214| 111| 8| | | +|Damage done in 4th A| 73| 76| 79| 82| 85| 88| 91| | | | +| period B| 73| 63| 52| 42| 32| 21| 11| | | | +|Value of offensive power A| 656| 696| 737| 777| 817| 858| 899| | | | +| at end of 4th period B| 656| 550| 444| 338| 232| 126| 20| | | | +|Damage done in 5th A| 65| 70| 74| 78| 82| 86| | | | | +| period B| 65| 55| 44| 34| 23| 13| | | | | +|Value of offensive power A| 591| 641| 693| 743| 794| 845| | | | | +| at end of 5th period B| 591| 480| 370| 260| 150| 40| | | | | +|Damage done in 6th A| 59| 64| 69| 74| 79| 85| | | | | +| period B| 59| 48| 37| 26| 15| 4| | | | | +|Value of offensive power A| 532| 593| 656| 717| 779| | | | | | +| at end of 6th period B| 532| 416| 301| 186| 71| | | | | | +|Damage done in 7th A| 53| 59| 66| 72| 78| | | | | | +| period B| 53| 42| 30| 19| 7| | | | | | +|Value of offensive power A| 479| 551| 626| 698| 772| | | | | | +| at end of 7th period B| 479| 357| 235| 114| 0| | | | | | +|Damage done in 8th A| 48| 55| 63| 70| | | | | | | +| period B| 48| 36| 24| 11| | | | | | | +|Value of offensive power A| 431| 515| 602| 687| | | | | | | +| at end of 8th period B| 431| 302| 172| 44| | | | | | | +|Damage done in 9th A| 43| 52| 60| 69| | | | | | | +| period B| 43| 30| 17| 4| | | | | | | +|Value of offensive power A| 388| 485| 585| 683| | | | | | | +| at end of 9th period B| 388| 250| 112| 0| | | | | | | +|Damage done in 10th A| 39| 49| 59| | | | | | | | +| period B| 39| 25| 11| | | | | | | | +|Value of offensive power A| 349| 460| 574| | | | | | | | +| at end of 10th period B| 349| 201| 53| | | | | | | | +|Damage done in 11th A| 35| 46| 57| | | | | | | | +| period B| 35| 20| 5| | | | | | | | +|Value of offensive power A| 314| 440| 569| | | | | | | | +| at end of 11th period B| 314| 155| 0| | | | | | | | +|Damage done in 12th A| 31| 44| | | | | | | | | +| period B| 31| 16| | | | | | | | | +|Value of offensive power A| 283| 426| | | | | | | | | +| at end of 12th period B| 283| 111| | | | | | | | | +| | |etc.| | | | | | | | | +|Total damage done by A| 717| 789| 800| 700| 600| 500| 400| 300| 200| 100| +| B| 717| 574| 431| 317| 228| 159| 101| 60| 30| 10| + ---------------------------------------------------------------------------- + +These tables grew out of an attempt to ascertain how the values of +two contending forces change as the fight goes on. The offensive +power of the stronger force is placed in the beginning at 1,000 +in each case, and the offensive power of the weaker force at 900, +800, 700, 600, 500, 400, 300, 200, and 100. These values are, of +course, wholly arbitrary, and some may say imaginary; but, as they +are intended merely to show the comparative strength of the two +forces, they are a logical measure, because numerical; there is +always some numerical factor that expresses the comparative value of +two contending forces, even though we never know what that numerical +factor is. Two forces with offensive powers of 1,000 and 900 +respectively may mean 1,000 men opposed to 900 men of equal average +individual fighting value, commanded by officers of equal fighting +ability; or it may mean 10 ships opposed to 9 like ships, manned +by officers and men of equal numbers and ability; or it may mean +two forces of equal strength, as regards number of men, ships, +and guns, but commanded by officers whose relative ability is as +1,000 to 900. It may be objected here that it is ridiculous so +to compare officers, because the ability of officers cannot be +so mathematically tabulated. This, of course, is true; but the +fact that we are unable so to compare officers is no reason for +supposing that the abilities of officers, especially officers of +high position, do not affect quantitatively the fighting value +of the forces they command; and the intention in mentioning this +factor is simply to show that the relative values of the forces, as +indicated in these tables, are supposed to include all the factors +that go to make them up. + +Another convention, made in these tables, is that every fighting +force is able to inflict a damage in a given time that is proportional +to the force itself; that a force of 1,000, for instance, can do +twice as much damage in a given time as a force of 500 can; also +that a force can do an amount of damage under given conditions +that is proportional to the time in which it is at work; that it +can do twice as much damage in two hours, for instance, as in one +hour, _provided the conditions for doing damage remain the same_. +Another convention follows from these two conventions, and it is +that there is a period of time in which a given force can destroy a +force equal, say, to one-tenth of itself under certain conditions; +that there is some period of time, for instance, in which, under +given conditions, 1,000 men can disable 100 men, or 10 ships disable +1 ship, or 10 guns silence 1 gun. In the conflicts supposed to be +indicated in these tables, this period is the one used. It will +be plain that it is not necessary to know how long this period +is, and also that it depends upon the conditions of the fight. + +In Table I, it is supposed that the chance of hitting and the +penetrability are the same to each contestant. In other words, +it is assumed that the _effective targets_ presented by the two +forces are alike in the sense that, if the two targets are hit +at the same instant by like projectiles, equal injuries will be +done. In other words, if each contestant at a given instant fires, +say a 12-inch shell, the injury done to one will be the same as +that done to the other; not proportionately but quantitatively. +For instance, if one force has 10 ships and the other has 9 like +ships, all the ships being so far apart that a shot aimed at one +ship will probably not hit another, the conditions supposed in Table +I, column 2, are satisfied; the chances of hitting are identical +for both contestants, and so is the damage done at every hit. Table +I supposes that the chance of hitting and damaging does not change +until the target is destroyed. + +As the desire of the author is now to show the advantage of having +a superadequate force, the following table has been calculated to +show the effect of forces of different size in fighting an enemy +of known and therefore constant size: + + TABLE II + ----------------------------------------------------------------------- +| |Col. 1|Col. 2|Col. 3| +|--------------------------------------------------|------|------|------| +|Value of offensive power at beginning. A | 1100 | 1500 | 2000 | +| B | 1000 | 1000 | 1000 | +|Damage done in 1st period by A | 110 | 150 | 200 | +| B | 100 | 100 | 100 | +|Value of offensive power at end of 1st period A | 1000 | 1400 | 1900 | +| B | 890 | 850 | 800 | +|Damage done in 2nd period by A | 100 | 140 | 190 | +| B | 89 | 85 | 80 | +|Value of offensive power at end of 2nd period A | 911 | 1315 | 1820 | +| B | 790 | 710 | 610 | +|Damage done in 3rd period by A | 91 | 131 | 182 | +| B | 79 | 71 | 61 | +|Value of offensive power at end of 3rd period A | 832 | 1244 | 1759 | +| B | 699 | 579 | 422 | +|Damage done in 4th period by A | 83 | 124 | 176 | +| B | 70 | 58 | 43 | +|Value of offensive power at end of 4th period A | 762 | 1186 | 1716 | +| B | 616 | 455 | 252 | +|Damage done in 5th period by A | 76 | 119 | 172 | +| B | 62 | 46 | 25 | +|Value of offensive power at end of 5th period A | 700 | 1140 | 1691 | +| B | 540 | 336 | 80 | +|Damage done in 6th period by A | 70 | 114 | 169 | +| B | 54 | 34 | 8 | +|Value of offensive power at end of 6th period A | 646 | 1106 | 1683 | +| B | 470 | 222 | 0 | +|Damage done in 7th period by A | 65 | 110 | | +| B | 47 | 22 | | +|Value of offensive power at end of 7th period A | 599 | 1084 | | +| B | 405 | 112 | | +|Damage done in 8th period by A | 60 | 108 | | +| B | 41 | 11 | | +|Value of offensive power at end of 8th period A | 558 | 1073 | | +| B | 345 | 4 | | +|Damage done in 9th period by A | 56 | 4 | | +| B | 35 | 0 | | +|Value of offensive power at end of 9th period A | 523 | 1073 | | +| B | 289 | 0 | | +|Damage done in 10th period by A | 53 | | | +| B | 29 | | | +|Value of offensive power at end of 10th period A | 494 | | | +| B | 236 | | | +|Damage done in 11th period by A | 49 | | | +| B | 24 | | | +|Value of offensive power at end of 11th period A | 470 | | | +| B | 187 | | | +| | | | | +|Value of offensive power at end of 16th period A | 422 | | | +| B | 0 | | | + ----------------------------------------------------------------------- + +It will be noted that if our force is superior to the enemy's in +the ratio of 1,100 to 1,000, the fight will last longer than if +it is superior in the ratio of 1,500 to 1,000, in the proportion +of 16 to 9; and that if it is superior in the ratio of 1,100 to +1,000 the fight will last longer than if it is superior in the +ratio of 2 to 1, in the proportion of 16 to 6. We also see that we +should, after reducing the enemy to 0, have forces represented by +422, 1,073, and 1,683, respectively, and suffer losses represented +by 678, 427, and 317, respectively. + +Now the difference in fighting forces cannot be measured in units +of material and personnel only, though they furnish the most accurate +general guide. Two other factors of great importance enter, the +factors of skill and morale. Skill is perhaps more of an active +agent, and morale is perhaps more of a passive agent, like the +endurance of man or the strength of material; and yet in some battles +morale has been a more important factor in attaining victory than +even skill. It is not vital to this discussion which is the more +important; but it is vital to realize clearly that skill and morale +are not to be forgotten, when we calculate how many and what kinds +of material and personnel units we must provide for a war; and +inasmuch as we cannot weigh morale and skill, or even be sure in +most cases as to which side will possess them in the superior degree, +we are forced in prudence to assume that the enemy may possess +them in a superior degree, and that therefore we should secure +superadequacy in units of personnel and material; not so much to +win victory with the minimum of loss to ourselves, as simply to +avert disaster. + +The present war shows us that the factors of skill and morale, +while independent of each other, are closely linked together, and +react upon each other. Nothing establishes a good morale more than +does the knowledge of exceeding skill; and nothing promotes skill +more than does an enthusiastic and firm morale. + +But superadequateness of preparation has a value greater than in +merely insuring victory with minimum loss to ourselves, in case +war comes, because it exerts the most potent of all influences in +preventing war, since it warns an enemy against attacking. At the +present day, the laws of victory and defeat are so well understood, +and the miseries resulting from defeat are so thoroughly realized, +that no civilized country will voluntarily go to war, except for +extraneous reasons, if it realizes that the chances of success +are small. And as the cumulative consequences of defeats are also +realized, and as no country is apt to assume that the morale and +skill of its forces are measurably greater than those of a probable +antagonist, no country and no alliance is apt to provoke war with +a nation whose armed forces are superior in number of units of +personnel and material; unless, of course, the nation is markedly +inferior in morale and skill, as the Persians were to the legions +of Alexander. + +It is often insisted that superadequacy in armed force tends to +war instead of peace, by inducing a country to make war itself; +that the very principles which deter a weak country from attacking +a strong country tend to make a strong country attack a weak one. +There is some truth in this, of course, and history shows many +cases of strong countries deliberately attacking weak ones for the +purpose of conquest. + +Analysis of wars, however, in which strong countries have done +this, shows that as a rule, the "strong" country was one which was +strong in a military sense only; and that the "weak" country was +a country which was weak only militarily, but which was potentially +strong in that it was possessed of wealth in land and goods. Most +of the great conquests of history were made by such "strong" over +such "weak" countries. Such were notably those wars by which Persia, +Assyria, Egypt, Greece, Rome, and Spain gained their pre-eminence; +and such were the wars by which they later fell. Such were the +wars of Ghenghis Khan, Tamerlane, Mahomet, and Napoleon; such were +the wars by which most tribes grew to be great nations, and by +which as nations they subsequently fell. No greater cause of war +has ever existed than a disproportion between countries or tribes +of such a character that one was rich and weak, while the other +was strong and poor. Nations are much like individuals--and not +very good individuals. Highwaymen who are poor and strong organize +and drill for the purpose of attacking people who are rich and +weak; and while one would shrink from declaring that nations which +are poor and strong do the same, it may nevertheless be stated +that they have often been accused of doing so, and that some wars +are explainable on that ground and on none other. + +The wars of Caesar in Gaul and Britain do not seem to fall in this +category, and yet they really do; for Rome was poor in Julius Caesar's +day; and while Gaul and Britain were not rich in goods, they were +rich in land, and Rome craved land. + +Of course, there have been wars which were not due to deliberate +attacks by poor and strong countries on rich and weak countries; +wars like our wars of the Revolution, and with Mexico, our War +of the Rebellion, and our Spanish War, and many others in which +various nations have engaged. The causes of many wars have been +so numerous and so complex that the true cause is hard to state; +but it may be stated in general that wars in which countries that +were both rich and strong, as Great Britain and France are now, +have deliberately initiated an aggressive war are few and far apart. +The reason seems to be that countries which are rich tend to become +not militaristic and aggressive, but effeminate and pacific. The +access of luxury, the refinements of living that the useful and +the delightful arts produce, and the influence of women, tend to +wean men from the hardships of military life, and to engender a +distaste for the confusion, bloodshed, and "horrors" of war. For +this reason, the rich countries have shown little tendency to +aggression, but a very considerable tendency to invite aggression. +Physical fighting among nations bears some resemblance to physical +fighting among men, in that rich nations and rich men are apt to +abstain from it, unless they are attacked; or unless they think +they are attacked, or will be. The fact of being rich has the double +influence of removing a great inducement to go to war, and of causing +a distaste for it. + +For all of the reasons given above, it would seem advisable when +making an "estimate of the situation," in preparation for war, +to estimate it as gravely as reasonable probability will permit. +The tendency of human nature is to estimate it too lightly; but +in matters of possible war, "madness lies that way." + +This seems to mean that in preparing plans for additions to the +fleet for war, we should estimate for the worst condition that +is reasonably probable. In the United States, this means that we +should estimate for a sudden attack by a powerful fleet on our +Atlantic coast; and, as such an attack would occasion a tremendous +temptation to any foe in Asia to make a simultaneous attack in +the Pacific, we must estimate also for sending a large fleet at +the same time on a cruise across the Pacific Ocean. + +This clearly means that our estimate must include putting into +the Atlantic and Pacific all the naval vessels that we have, fully +manned with fully drilled crews; and adding besides all the vessels +from civil life that will be needed. The vessels taken from civil +life will be mostly from the merchant service, and will be for +such auxiliary duties as those of hospital ships, supply ships, +fuel ships, and ammunition ships, with some to do duty as scouts. + +For the purposes of the United States, therefore, the office of +naval strategy in planning additions to our fleet for war, is to +make a grave estimate of the naval requirements in both the Atlantic +and the Pacific; to divide the total actual and prospective naval +force between the Atlantic and the Pacific in such a way as shall +seem the wisest; to assign duties in general to each force; and +then to turn over to logistics the task of making the quantitative +calculations, and of performing the various acts, which will be +necessary to carry out the decisions made. + +Objection may be made to the phrase just used--"to divide the total +force," because it is an axiom with some that one must never divide +his total force; and the idea of dividing our fleet, by assigning +part to the Atlantic and part to the Pacific, has been condemned +by many officers, the present writer among them. + +This is an illustration of how frequently phrases are used to express +briefly ideas which could not be expressed fully without careful +qualifications and explanations that would necessitate many words; +and it shows how carefully one must be on his guard, lest he put +technical phrases to unintended uses, and attach incorrect meanings +to them. As a brief technical statement, we may say, "never divide +your force"; but when we say this, we make a condensed statement +of a principle, and expect it to be regarded as such, and not as +a full statement. The full statement would be: "In the presence of +an active enemy, do not so divide your force that the enemy could +attack each division in detail with a superior force." Napoleon +was a past master in the art of overwhelming separate portions of +an enemy's force, and he understood better than any one else of +his time the value of concentration. And yet a favorite plan of +his was to detach a small part of his force, to hold a superior +force of the enemy in check for--say a day--while he whipped another +force of the enemy with his main body. He then turned and chastised +the part which had been held in check by the small detachment, and +prevented from coming to the relief of the force that he attacked +first. + +When we say, then, that strategy directs how our naval force should +be divided between the Atlantic and the Pacific, this does not +mean that strategy should so divide it that both divisions would +be confronted with forces larger than themselves. It may mean, +however, that strategy, in order that the force in one ocean shall +be sufficient, may be compelled to reduce the force in the other +ocean almost to zero. + +Some may say that, unless we are sure that our force--say in the +Atlantic--is superadequate, we ought to reduce the force in the +Pacific to actual zero. Maybe contingencies might arise for which +such a division would be the wisest; but usually such a condition +exists that one force is so large that the addition to it of certain +small units would increase the force only microscopically; whereas +those small units would be of material value elsewhere--say in +protecting harbors from the raids of small cruisers. Practically +speaking, therefore, strategy would divide our naval force into +Atlantic and Pacific fleets, but those fleets might be very unequal +in size, owing to the vastly greater commercial and national interests +on our Atlantic coast, and the greater remoteness of probable enemies +on our Pacific coast. + +In estimating the work to be done by the U. S. Atlantic fleet, three +general objects suggest themselves: + +1. To repel an attack made directly on our Atlantic continental +coast. + +2. To repel an expedition striving to establish a base in the Caribbean, +preliminary to an attack on our Atlantic continental coast or on +the Panama Canal. + +3. To make an expedition to a distant point, to prevent the occupation +of territory by a foreign government in the south Atlantic or the +Pacific. + +_First Object_.--To repel an attack made directly on the Atlantic +coast, the plan must provide for getting the needed additions to +the fleet with the utmost despatch. Owing to the keen appreciation +by European nations of the value of secrecy and despatch, any attack +contemplated by one of them on our Atlantic coast would be prepared +behind the curtain, and nothing about its preparation would be +allowed to be reported to the outside world until after the attacking +force had actually sailed. For the force to reach our shores, not +more than two weeks would be needed, even if the fleet stopped at +mid-Atlantic islands to lay in fuel. It is very doubtful if the +fact of stopping there would be allowed to be reported, as the +commander-in-chief could easily take steps to prevent it. It is +possible that merchant steamers might meet the fleet, and report +the fact by radio, but it is not at all certain. A great proportion +of the steamers met would willingly obey an order not to report +it, or even to have their radio apparatus deranged; either because +of national sympathy, or because the captain was "insulted with +a very considerable bribe." The probability, therefore, would be +that we should hear of the departure of the fleet from Europe, and +then hear nothing more about it until it was met by our scouts. + +This reasoning shows that to carry out the plans of strategy, logistics +would have to provide plans and means to execute those plans, whereby +our existing fleet, plus all the additions which strategy demanded, +would be waiting at whatever points on the ocean strategy might +indicate, before the coming enemy would reach those points. In +other words, logistics must make and execute such plans that all +the fleet which strategy demands will be at the selected points +in less than two weeks from the time the enemy leaves the shores +of Europe. + +Of course, the conditions will not necessarily be such that strategy +will demand that all our reserve ships, especially the oldest ships, +shall go out to sea with the active fleet, ready to engage in battle. +Maybe some of them will be found to be so slow and equipped with +such short-range guns, that they would be an embarrassment to the +commander-in-chief, instead of an assistance. Unless it is clear, +however, that any ship, especially a battleship, _would be an +embarrassment_, her place is clearly with the fighting fleet. The +issue of the battle cannot be known in advance; and as everything +will depend upon that issue, no effort and no instrument should be +spared that can assist in gaining victory. And even if the older +ships might not be of material assistance in the early stages of +a battle, they would do no harm because they could be kept out +of the way, if need be. In case either side gains a conclusive +victory at once, the older ships will do neither good nor harm; +but in case a decisive result is not at once attained, and both +sides are severely damaged, the old ships, held in reserve, may +then come in fresh and whole, like the reserve in land engagements, +and add a fighting force which at that time will be most important +and may be decisive. + +Probably some of the ships will be too old, however, to fill places +of any value in the active fleet. These should be fully manned and +equipped, however, for there will be many fields of usefulness +for them. One field will be in assisting the land defenses, in +protecting the mouths of harbors and mine-fields, in defending +submarine bases, and acting as station ships in the coast-defense +system. + +_Second Object_.--To repel an enemy expedition, striving to establish +a base in the Caribbean, preparation would have to be made for +as prompt a mobilization as possible; for although the threat of +invasion of our coast would not carry with it the idea of such +early execution as would a direct attack on New York, yet the actual +establishment of a base so near our shores would give such advantages +to a hostile nation for a future invasion, that measures to prevent +it should be undertaken with the utmost possible thoroughness and +despatch; because the operation of establishing a base involves +many elements of difficulty that an active defender can hinder +by aeroplane attacks, etc.; whereas, after a base has once been +established and equipped with appropriate defenses, attacks upon +it are much less productive of results. + +The endeavor to establish a base and the opposing effort to prevent +it, will offer many opportunities for excellent work on both sides. +Practically all the elements of naval force will be engaged, and +events on the largest possible scale may be expected. The operations +will naturally be more extended both in time and distance than +in the case of a direct attack upon our coast, and therefore the +task of logistics will be greater. Actual battle between large +forces; minor engagements among aircraft, scouts, submarines, and +destroyers; attacks on the train of the invader--even conflicts +on shore--will be among the probabilities. + +_Third Object_.--To send a large expedition to carry out naval +operations in far distant waters--in the south Atlantic, for instance, +to prevent the extension of a monarchical government in South America, +or in the western Pacific to defend our possessions there--calls +for plans involving more logistical calculation and execution, +but permitting a more leisurely procedure. The distances to be +traversed are so great, the lack of bases is so distinct and so +difficult to remedy, and the impossibility of arriving in time +to prevent the seizing of land by any hostile expedition is so +evident, that they combine to necessitate great thoroughness of +preparation and only such a measure of despatch as can be secured +without endangering thoroughness. Whether the projected expedition +shall include troops, the conditions at the time must dictate. +Troops with their transports will much complicate and increase the +difficulties of the problem, and they may or may not be needed. +The critical results can be accomplished by naval operations only; +since nothing can be accomplished if the naval part of the expedition +fails to secure the command of the sea; and the troops cannot be +landed until it has been secured, unless the fact of securing it +can safely be relied on in advance. For these reasons, the troops +may be held back until the command of the sea has been secured, +and then sent out as an independent enterprise. This would seem the +more prudent procedure in most cases, since one successful night +attack on a group of transports by an active enemy might destroy +it altogether. + +But whether a military expedition should accompany the fleet, or +follow a few hundred miles behind, or delay starting until command +of the sea has been achieved, it is obvious that the logistic +calculations and executive measures for sending a modern fleet to +a very distant place, and sustaining it there for an indefinite +period, must be of the highest order of difficulty. The difficulty +will be reduced in cases where there is a great probability of +being able to secure a base which would be able to receive large +numbers of deep-draft ships in protected waters, to repair ships +of all classes that might be wounded in battle, and to store and +supply great quantities of ammunition, food, and fuel. + +No expedition of such magnitude has ever yet been made--though some +of the expeditions of ancient times, such as the naval expedition +of Persia against Greece, B. C. 480, and the despatch of the Spanish +Armada in more recent days, may have been as difficult, considering +the meagreness of the material and engineering resources of those +epochs. + +But even if no military force accompanies the expedition, the enormous +quantities of fuel, supplies, ammunition, medical stores, etc., that +will be required, especially fuel; the world-wide interest that +will be centred on the expedition; the international importance +attaching to it; and the unspeakable necessity that the plans shall +underestimate no difficulty and overlook no factor, point with a +long and steady finger at the necessity of attacking this problem +promptly and very seriously, and of detailing the officers and +constructing the administrative machinery needed to make the +calculations and to execute the measures that the calculations show +to be required. + +_Static Defense of the Coast_.--But besides the mobile fleet which +is a nation's principal concern, strategy requires that for certain +points on the coast, where large national and commercial interests +are centred, arrangements shall be made for what may be termed a +"static defense," by vessels, mine-fields, submarines, aircraft, +etc., assigned as permanent parts of the defense of these points, +analogous to forts on the land. The naval activities of this species +of defense will centre on the mine-fields which it is a great part of +their duty to defend. To guard these, and to get timely information +of the coming of any hostile force or raiding expedition, strategy +says we must get our eyes and ears well out from the land. To do +this, water craft and aircraft of various kinds are needed; and +they must be not only sufficiently numerous over each area to scout +the waters thoroughly, but they must be adapted to their purpose, +manned by adequate and skilful crews, and organized so as to act +effectively together. + +The work of this patrol system is not to be restricted, however, +to getting and transmitting information. Certain of the craft must +be armed sufficiently to drive off hostile craft, trying to drag +or countermine the defensive mine-fields; some must be able to +add to the defensive mine-fields by planting mines, and some must +be able to pilot friendly ships through the defensive mine-fields; +others still must be able to countermine, drag, and sweep for any +offensive mines that the enemy may plant. + +Vessels for this patrol work do not have to be very large; in fact, +for much of the work in the mine-fields, it were better if they +were small, by reason of the ability of small vessels to turn in +restricted spaces. + +It would seem that for the patrol service, the vessels of the Revenue +Marine and Lighthouse Service (coast guard) are ideally adapted; +but, of course, there are only a few in total. These would have to +be supplemented by small craft of many kinds, such as tugs, fast +motor-boats, fishing-boats, and trawlers. To find men competent +to man such vessels and do the kind of work required would not be +so difficult as to get men competent to man the more distinctive +fighting ships. Good merchant sailors, fishermen, and tugboat men +would fit into the work with considerable ease, and in quite a +short time. Strategy declares, however, that a coast guard may +be needed a very short time after war breaks out; and that the +vessels and the men, with all the necessary equipment and all the +necessary organization and training, should be put into actual +operation beforehand. + +Not only the fleet, however, but all the bureaus and offices of +the Navy Department, all the navy-yards, and an the radio stations, +recruiting stations, hydrographic offices, training stations, and +agencies for securing information from foreign countries, will have +to pass instantly from a peace basis to a war basis. To do these +things quickly and correctly many preliminaries must be arranged; +but if the General Staff prepares good plans beforehand, arranges +measures which will insure that the plans shall be promptly carried +out, and holds a few mobilization drills to test them, the various +bureaus and offices in the department can do the rest. If the fires +have all been lighted, the engine gotten ready, and the boilers +filled in time, the engineer may open the throttle confidently, +when the critical time arrives, for the engine will surely do its +part. + +But if the proper plans have not been made and executed, the sudden +outbreak of war, in which any country becomes involved with a powerful +naval country, will create confusion on a scale larger than any +that the world has ever seen, and compared with which pandemonium +would be a Quaker meeting. A realization of facts will come to that +country, and especially to the naval authorities, that will overwhelm +them with the consciousness of their inability to meet the crisis +marching toward them with swift but unhurried tread--confident, +determined, unescapable. Fear of national danger and the sense +of shame, hopelessness and helplessness will combine to produce +psychological effects so keen that even panic will be possible. +Officers in high places at sea and on shore will send telegrams of +inquiry and suggestion; civilians in public and private station +will do the same. No fitting answers can be given, because there +will be no time for reflection and deliberation. The fact that it +would be impossible to get the various additions to the fleet and +the patrol services ready in time, and the consciousness that it +would be useless to do any less, will tend to bring on a desperate +resolve to accept the situation and let the enemy do his worst. +The actual result, however, will probably be like the result of +similar situations in the past; that is, some course of action +will be hastily decided on, not in the reasoned-out belief that +it can accomplish much, but with the feeling that action of any +kind will relieve the nervous tension of the public by giving an +outlet for mental and physical exertion and will, besides, lend +itself to self-encouragement, and create a feeling that proper +and effective measures are being taken. + +Such conditions, though on a much smaller scale, are familiar to +naval officers and are suggested by the supposititious order "somebody +do something"; and we frequently see people placed in situations in +which they do not know what to do, and so they do--not nothing, +but anything; though it would often be wiser to do nothing than +to do the thing they do do. Many of the inane remarks that people +make are due to their finding themselves in situations in which +they do not know what to say, but in which they feel impelled to +say "something." + +Now what kind of "something" would be done under the stimulus of +the outbreak of a war for which a country had not laid its plans? +Can any worse situation be imagined--except the situation that +would follow when the enemy arrived? The parable of the wise and +foolish virgins suggests the situation, both in the foolishness of +the unpreparedness and in the despair when the consequent disaster +is seen approaching. + +In nearly all navies and armies, until the recent enormous increase +in all kinds of material took place, the work of getting a navy +ready for war in personnel and material was comparatively simple. +This does not mean that it was easier then than now; because the +facilities for construction, transportation, communication, and +accounting were much less than now; but it does mean that the actual +number of articles to be handled was much less, and the number +of kinds of articles was also much less; and it also means that +the various mechanical improvements, while they have facilitated +construction, transportation, communication, and accounting, have +done so for every nation; so that none of the competing navies +have had their labors expedited or made less. On the contrary, +the very means devised and developed for expediting work is of +the nature of an instrument; and in order to use that instrument +successfully, one has to study it and practise with it; so that +the necessity for studying and practising with the instrument has +added a new and difficult procedure to those before existing. + +Fifty years ago the various mechanisms of naval warfare were few, +and those few simple. In our Navy Department the work of supplying +those mechanisms was divided among several bureaus, and each bureau +was given the duty and the accompanying power of supplying its +particular quota. The rapid multiplication, during the past fifty +years, of new mechanisms, and new kinds of mechanisms; the increased +expense of those mechanisms compared with that of former mechanisms; +the increased size and power of vessels, guns, and engines; the +increased size and complexity of the utilities in navy-yards for +handling them; the necessity for providing and using means and +methods for despatching the resulting "business" speedily, and +for guarding against mistakes in handling the multiplicity of +details--the increase, in brief, in the number, size, and kinds +of things that have to be done in preparation, has brought about +not only more labor in doing those things by the various bureaus +assigned to do them, but has brought about even more imperiously +the demand for means whereby the central authority shall be assured +that each bureau is doing its work. And it has brought about more +imperiously still a demand that a clear conception shall be formed +first of what must be done, and second of the maximum time that +can be allowed for doing it. + +Clearly, the forming of a correct conception should not be expected +of men not trained to form it; clearly, for instance, mere knowledge +of electricity and mere skill in using electrical instruments cannot +enable a man to devise radio apparatus for naval use; a certain +amount of knowledge of purely naval and nautical matters is needed +in addition. Clearly, the concept as to the kind of performance +to be required of radio apparatus is not to be expected of a mere +technician, but is to be expected of a strategist--and equally +the ability to design, construct, and supply the apparatus is not +to be expected of a strategist, but it is to be expected of a +technician. + +A like remark may be made concerning any mechanism--say a gun, a +torpedo, or an instrument, or a vessel of any kind. The strategist, +by studying the requirements of probable war, concludes that a +certain kind of thing is needed; and the technician supplies it, +or does so to the best of his ability. + +The statement thus far made indicates a division of work into two +sharply defined departments; and, theoretically, such a division +does exist. This does not mean, however, that the strategist and the +technician should work independently of each other. Such a procedure +would result in the strategist demanding things the technician could +not supply, and in the technician supplying things the strategist +did not want, under a mistaken impression as to what the strategist +wanted. The fullest and most intimate understanding and co-operation +must exist between the strategist and the technician, as it must +equally between the architect and the builder of a house. + +From an appreciation of such facts as these, every great Navy +Department, except that of the United States, has developed a General +Staff, which studies what should be done to prepare for passing +from a state of peace to a state of war; which informs the minister +at the head of the department what things should be done, and is +given power to provide that the various bureaus and offices shall +be able to do them when war breaks. This is the scheme which all +the navy departments, except the American, have devised, to meet +the sudden and violent shock of the outbreak of a modern war. _No +other means has yet been devised_, and no other means is even +forecasted. + +The means is extremely simple in principle, but complex beyond +the reach of an ordinary imagination in detail. It consists simply +in writing down a digest of all the various things that are to be +done, dividing the task of doing them among the various bureaus +and offices that are authorized by law to do them, and then seeing +that the bureaus shall be able to do them in the time allowed. + +The best way of ascertaining if the bureaus are able to do them is +to mobilize--to put into commission and send out to sea all the craft +that will be needed, fully equipped with a trained personnel and with +a well-conditioned material; and then direct the commander-in-chief +to solve a definite strategic problem--say to defend the coast +against a hypothetical enemy fleet--the solution including tactical +games by day and night. + +Before attempting the solution of a strategic problem by an entire +naval force, however, it is usual to hold mobilization exercises +of a character less complete, in the same way that any course of +training begins with drills that are easy and progresses to drills +that are difficult. The simplest of all the preparative drills--if +drills they correctly can be called--is the periodical reporting, +once a month, or once a quarter, by each bureau and office, of its +state of readiness; the report to be in such detail as experience +shows to be the best. + +In the days when each bureau's preparation consisted of comparatively +few things to do, the chief of that bureau could be relied on to do +the things required to be done by his bureau; and his oral assurance +to the secretary that--say all the ships had enough ammunition, +or that adequate provision had been made for coal, or that there +were enough enlisted men--would fulfil all requirements. But in the +past fifty years, the requirements have increased a hundredfold, +while the human mind has remained just as it was. So it has seemed +necessary to institute a system of periodical preparation reports, +to examine them carefully, and to use all possible vigilance, lest +any item be forgotten or any work done by two bureaus that ought +to be done by only one. + +Who should examine the reports? Naturally the same persons as decide +what should be done. The same studies and deliberations that fit +a person to decide what is needed, fit him to inspect the product +that is offered to supply the need; not only to see if it comes +up to the specifications, but also to decide whether or not any +observed omission is really important; to decide whether, in view of +certain practical difficulties, the specifications may be modified; +and also to decide whether certain improvements suggested by any +bureau should or should not be adopted. + +This procedure may seem to put the strategy officers "over" the +technical officers, to put a lieutenant-commander on the General +Staff "over" a rear admiral who is chief of bureau; but such an +idea seems hardly justified. In any well-designed organization +relative degrees of official superiority are functions of rank, and +of nothing else; superiority in rank must, of course, be recognized, +for the reason that when on duty together the junior must obey +the senior. But even this superiority is purely official; it is a +matter of position, and not a matter of honor. All the honor that +is connected with any position is not by reason of the position +itself, but by reason of the honorable service which a man must +have rendered in order to attain it, and which he must continue +to render in order to maintain it. So, in a Navy Department, the +General Staff officers cannot be "over" the bureau officers, unless +by law or regulation certain of the staff are made to rank over +certain bureau officers. A procedure like this would seem to be +unnecessary, except in the case of the chief of staff himself, +who might, for the purpose of prompt administration, be placed by +law over the bureau chiefs. + +The importance of the question, however, does not rest on a personal +basis, but a national basis. It makes no difference to the nation +whether Smith is put above Jones, or Jones above Smith; and in +all discussions of national matters it is essential to bear in +mind clearly not only that national questions must not be obscured +by the interjection of the personal element, but also that great +vigilance is needed to prevent it. For the reason that questions of +the salaries of government officials have been settled in advance, +questions of personal prestige and authority are more apt to intrude +themselves among them than among men in civil life, whose main +object is to "make a living"--and as good a living as they can. +In the long struggle that has gone on in the United States Navy +Department between the advocates and the opponents of a General +Staff, the personal element has clouded the question--perhaps more +than any other element. Not only in the department itself, but in +Congress, the question of how much personal "power" the General +Staff would have has been discussed interminably--as though the +personal element were of any importance whatever. + +Such an attitude toward "power" is not remarkable when held by +civilians, but it is remarkable when held by men who have had a +military or naval training. Of course, there is an instinct in +all men to crave power; but it is not recognized as an instinct +wholly worthy. It is associated in most men's minds with a desire +for material possessions, such as money or political position, and +not with such aspirations as a desire for honor. In other words, +a strong desire for wealth or power, while natural and pardonable, +is considered a little sordid; while a desire for honor, or for +opportunity to do good service, is held to be commendable. So, when +public officials, either military or civilian, condemn a measure +because it will give somebody "power," the reason given seems to +be incomplete, unless a further reason is given which states the +harm that would be done by conferring the "power." + +Military and naval men exercise "power" from the beginning of their +careers until their careers are closed; and they exercise it under +the sane and restraining influence of responsibility; without which +influence, the exercise of power is unjustifiable, and under which +influence the exercise of power is a burden--and oftentimes a heavy +one. That men trained as military men are trained, should aspire to +power for power's own sake, is a little hard to understand--unless +it be confessed that the person desiring the power appreciates +its pleasing features more than its responsibilities, and regards +its duties more lightly than its glories. Few men, even those who +shoulder responsibility the most courageously, desire responsibility +for its own sake--and so the fact of a man ardently desiring "power" +seems a good reason for withholding power from him. + +And what is "power," in the sense in which officials, both military +and civilian, use the word? Is it ability to do good service, or is +it ability to bestow favors in order that favors may be received, +to give orders to others coupled with authority to enforce obedience, +or to take revenge for injuries received or fancied? Of course, +"power" is ability to do all these things, good and bad. But if +a man desires power simply to do good service, and if he holds +a highly conscientious view of the accompanying duties and +responsibilities, will he crave "power" as much as some men seem +to do? + +It seems fundamental, then, that any strategic plan for preparing +the Navy Department for war should be framed with a strong endeavor to +leave out the personal element, and should regard national usefulness +only. If this be done successfully, and if good selections be made +of the personnel to do it, it will be found that the members of +the personnel will think no more about their "power" than does an +officer of the deck while handling a battleship in fleet formation +during his four hours on the bridge. + +In preparing the department for war, one would be in danger of +being overwhelmed by the enormousness and the complexity of the +task, unless he bore in mind continuously that _it is only when we +get into details that any matter becomes complex_; and therefore +that if we can get a clear idea of the whole subject, the principles +that underlie it, and the major divisions into which it naturally is +divided, we can then make those divisions and afterward subdivide +those divisions, and later divide the subdivisions; so that the +whole subject will seem to fall apart as a fowl does under the +hands of a skilful carver. The divisions and subdivisions of the +subject having been made, the remaining task, while onerous, will +be largely a matter of copying and of filling in blank forms. + +As all navy departments have means regulated by law such that the +actual executive work of recruiting, constructing, and supplying the +necessary personnel and material shall be done by certain bureaus +and offices, strategy does not need executive power, except for +forcing the bureaus and offices to do the necessary work--should +such forcing become necessary. Strategy being the art of being +a general (_strategos_), one cannot conceive of it as bereft of +executive power, since we cannot conceive of a general exercising +generalship without having executive power. It is true that strategy +occupies itself mainly with planning--but so does a general; and +it is also true that strategy itself does not make the soldiers +march, but neither does a general; it is the colonels and captains +and corporals who make the soldiers march. The general plans the +campaign and arranges the marches, the halts, the bivouacs, provisions, +ammunition, etc., through his logistical officers, and they give +the executive officers general instructions as to how to carry +out the general's plans. + +Strategy without executive functions would be like a mind that could +think, but was imprisoned in a body which was paralyzed. + +Of course, strategy should have executive functions for the purposes +of strategy only; under the guidance of policy and to execute policy's +behests. Policy is the employer, and strategy the employee. + + + + +CHAPTER XI + +NAVAL BASES + +The nature of naval operations necessitates the expenditure of +fuel, ammunition, and supplies; wear and tear of machinery; fatigue +of personnel; and a gradual fouling of the bottoms of the ships. +In case actual battles mark the operations, the expenditure of +stored-up energy of all kinds is very great indeed, and includes not +only damage done to personnel and material by the various agencies +of destruction, but actual loss of vessels. + +To furnish the means of supplying and replenishing the stored-up +energy required for naval operations is the office of naval bases. + +A naval base capable of doing this for a large fleet must be a +very great establishment. In such a naval base, one must be able +to build, dock, and repair vessels of all kinds, and the mechanisms +needed in those vessels; anchor a large fleet in safety behind adequate +military and naval protection; supply enough fuel, ammunition, +and supplies for all purposes, and accommodate large reserves of +material and personnel. Inasmuch as a naval base is purely a means +for expending energy for military purposes, and has no other cause +for its existence, it is clear that it cannot be self-supporting. +For this reason it is highly desirable that a naval base shall be +near a great city, especially if that city be a large commercial +and manufacturing centre. + +It is true that many large naval bases, such as Malta and Gibraltar +are not near great cities; and it is true that most large naval +bases have no facilities for building ships. But it is also true +that few large naval bases fulfil all the requirements of a perfect +naval base; in fact it is true that none do. + +The most obvious requirement of a naval base is a large sheet of +sheltered water, in which colliers and oil-carriers may lie and +give coal and oil to fighting craft, and in which those fighting +craft may lie tranquilly at anchor, and carry on the simple and yet +necessary repairs and adjustments to machinery that every cruising +vessel needs at intervals. Without the ability to fuel and repair, +no fleet could continue long at work, any more than a man could do +so, without food and the repairs which nature carries on in sleep. +The coming of oil fuel and the consequent ease of fuelling, the +practicability even of fuelling in moderate weather when actually +at sea, subtract partially one of the reasons for naval bases; but +they leave the other reasons still existent, especially the reasons +connected with machinery repairs. The principal repair, and the one +most difficult to furnish, is that given by docking in suitable +docks. The size and expense of docks capable of carrying dreadnaughts +and battle cruisers are so great, and their vulnerability to fire +from ships and from aircraft is so extreme, that the matter of +dry-docks is perhaps the most troublesome single matter connected +with a naval base. + +The necessity of anchorage areas for submarines is a requirement of +naval bases that has only recently been felt; and the present war +shows a still newer requirement in suitable grounds for aircraft. +The speed of aircraft, however, is so great that little delay or +embarrassment would result if the camp for aircraft were not at the +base itself. Instead of the camp being on Culebra, for instance, +it might well be on Porto Rico. The extreme delicacy of aircraft, +however, and the necessity for quick attention in case of injuries, +especially injuries to the engine, demand a suitable base even +more imperiously than do ships and other rugged things. + +That the vessels anchored in the base should be protected from +the fire of ships at sea and from guns on neighboring shores is +clear. Therefore, even if a base be hidden from the sea and far +from it as is the harbor of Santiago, it must be protected by guns, +or mines, or both; the guns being nearer to the enemy than are the +ships in the waters of the base. An island having high bluffs, +where large guns can be installed, and approached by gradually +shoaling waters in which mines can be anchored, with deeper water +outside in which submarines can operate, is desirable from this +point of view. + +Ability to store and protect large quantities of provisions is +essential, and especially in the case of ammunition and high explosives. +For storing the latter, a hilly terrain has advantages, since tunnels +can be run horizontally into hills, where explosives can lie safe +from attack, even attack from aircraft dropping bombs above them. + +Naturally, the country that has led the world in the matter of +naval bases is Great Britain; and the world at large has hardly +yet risen to a realization of the enduring work that she has been +quietly doing for two hundred years, in establishing and fortifying +commodious resting-places for her war-ships and merchant ships in +all the seas. While other nations have been devoting themselves +to arranging and developing the interiors of their countries, Great +Britain has searched all the oceans, has explored all the coasts, +has established colonies and trading stations everywhere, and formed +a network of intimate commercial relations which covers the world +and radiates from London. To protect her commercial stations and +her merchant ships from unfair dealings in time of peace, and from +capture in time of war, and to threaten all rivals with defeat +should they resort to war, Great Britain has built up the greatest +navy in the world. And as this navy pervades the world, and as her +merchant ships dot every sea and display Great Britain's ensign +in every port, Great Britain has not failed to provide for their +safety and support a series of naval stations that belt the globe. + +Bases are of many kinds, and may be divided into many classes. +An evident ground for division is that of locality in relation +to the home country. Looked at from this point of view, we may +divide naval bases into two classes, home bases and distant bases. + +_Home Bases_.--A home base is, as its name implies, a base situated +in the home country. The most usual type of the home naval base is +the navy-yard, though few navy-yards can meet all the requirements +of a naval base. The New York navy-yard, for instance, which is our +most important yard, lacks three of the most vital attributes of +a naval base, in that it has no means for receiving and protecting +a large fleet, it cannot be approached by large ships except at +high tide, and it could not receive a seriously injured battleship +at any time, because the channel leading to it is too shallow. + +Home bases that approach perfection were evidenced after the battle +off the Skagerak; for the wounded ships of both sides took refuge +after the battle in protected bases, where they were repaired and +refitted, and resupplied with fighting men and fuel. These bases +seem to have been so located, so protected, and so equipped, as +to do exactly what bases are desired to do; they were "bases of +operations" in the best sense. The fleets of the opposing sides +started from those bases as nearly ready as human means and foresight +could devise, returned to them for refreshment after the operations +had been concluded, and, during the operations, were based upon those +bases. If the bases of either fleet had been improperly located, +or inadequately protected or equipped, that fleet would not have +been so completely ready for battle as, in fact, it was; and it +could not have gone to its base for shelter and repairs so quickly +and so surely as, in fact, it did. Many illustrations can be found +in history of the necessity for naval bases; but the illustration +given by this battle of May 31 is of itself so perfect and convincing, +that it seems hardly necessary or even desirable to bring forward +any others. + +The fact of the nearness to each other of the bases of the two +contending fleets--the nearness of Germany and Great Britain in +other words--coupled with the nearness of the battle itself to +the bases, and the fact that both fleets retired shortly afterward +to the bases, bring out in clear relief the efficacy of bases; but +nevertheless their efficacy would have been even more strongly +shown if the battle had been near to the bases of the more powerful +fleet, but far from the bases of the other fleet--as was the case +at the battle, near Tsushima, in the Japan Sea. + +Of course the weaker fleet in the North Sea battle would not have +been drawn into battle under such conditions, because it would +not have had a safe refuge to retreat to. It was the proximity of +an adequate naval base, that could be approached through protected +waters only, which justified the weaker fleet in dashing out and +taking advantage of what seemed to be an opportunity. Similarly, +if the Russian fleet in the Japan Sea had had a base near by, from +which it had issued ready in all ways, and to which it could have +retired as soon as the battle began to go against it, the Russian +disaster might not have occurred, and full command of the sea by +the Japanese might have been prevented. But there being no base +or harbor of refuge, disaster succeeded disaster in a cumulative +fashion, and the Russian fleet was annihilated in deep water. + +If a naval base were lacking to the more powerful fleet, as was +the case in the battle of Manila, the effect would in many cases +be but slight--as at Manila. If, however, the more powerful fleet +were badly injured, the absence of a base would be keenly felt and +might entail disaster in the future, even though the more powerful +fleet were actually victorious. The Japanese fleet was practically +victorious at the battle of August 10, near Port Arthur; but if it +had not been able to refit and repair at a naval base, it would +have met the Russian fleet later with much less probability of +success. + +Mahan states that the three main requirements in a naval base are +position, resources, and strength; and of these he considers that +position is the most important; largely because resources and strength +can be artificially supplied, while position is the gift of nature, +and cannot be moved or changed. + +Mahan's arguments seem to suggest that the bases he had in mind +were bases distant from home, not home bases; since reference is +continually made by him to the distance and direction of bases +from important strategic points of actual or possible enemies. + +His arguments do not seem to apply with equal force to home bases, +for the reason that home bases are intended primarily as bases +from which operations are to start; secondarily as bases to which +fleets may return, and only remotely as bases during operations; +whereas, distant bases are intended as points from which operations +may continually be carried on, during the actual prosecution of +a war. The position of a home base, for instance, as referred to +any enemy's coasts or bases, is relatively unimportant, compared +with its ability to fit out a fleet; while, on the other hand, the +position of distant bases, such as Hong-Kong, Malta, or Gibraltar, +relatively to the coasts of an enemy, is vital in the extreme. It +is the positions of these three bases that make them so valuable +to their holders; placed at points of less strategic value, the +importance of those bases would be strategically less. + +Home bases are valuable mainly by reason of their resources. This +does not mean that position is an unimportant factor; it does not +mean, for instance, that a naval base would be valuable if situated +in the Adirondack Mountains, no matter how great resources it might +have. It does mean, however, that the "position" that is important +for a home base is the position that the base holds relatively to +large home commercial centres and to the open sea. New York, for +instance, could be made an excellent naval base, mainly because of +the enormous resources that it has and its nearness to the ocean. +Philadelphia, likewise, could be made valuable, though Philadelphia's +position relatively to deep water is far from good. "Position," +as used in this sense, is different from the "position" meant by +Mahan, who used the word in its strategic sense. The position of +Philadelphia relatively to deep water could be changed by simply +deepening the channel of the Delaware; but no human power could +change the strategic position of Malta or Gibraltar. + +Yet for even home bases, position, resources, and strength must +be combined to get a satisfactory result; the "position" not being +related to foreign naval bases, however, but to large industrial +establishments, mainly in order that working men of various classes +may be secured when needed. The requirements of work on naval craft +are so discontinuous that steady employment can be provided for +comparatively few men only; so that a sort of reservoir is needed, +close at hand, which can be drawn up when men are needed, and into +which men can be put back, whenever the need for them has ceased. +And the same commercial and industrial conditions that assure a +supply of skilled workers, assure a supply of provisions and all +kinds of material as well. + +_Distant Bases_.--Distant bases have two fields of usefulness which +are distinct, though one implies the other; one field being merely +that of supplying a fleet and offering a refuge in distress, and +the other field being that of contributing thereby to offensive and +defensive operations. No matter in which light we regard a distant +naval base, it is clear that position, resources, and strength +must be the principal factors; but as soon as we concentrate our +attention on the operations that may be based upon it, we come to +realize how strong a factor position, that is strategic position, +is. The base itself is an inert collection of inert materials; +these materials can be useful to the operations of a fleet that +bases on it; but if the fleet is operating in the Pacific, a base +in the Atlantic is not immediately valuable to it, no matter what +strength and resources the base may have. + +The functions of a home base are therefore those that the name +"home" implies; to start the fleet out on its mission, to receive +it on its return, and to offer rest, refuge, and succor in times +of accident and distress. + +The functions of a distant base concern more nearly the operations of +a prolonged campaign. A distant base is more difficult to construct as +a rule; largely because the fact of its distance renders engineering +operations difficult and because the very excellence of its position +as an outpost makes it vulnerable to direct attack and often to +a concentration of attacks coming from different directions. + +If naval operations are to be conducted at considerable distance +from home, say in the Caribbean Sea, distant bases are necessary, +since without them, the fleet will operate under a serious handicap. +Under some conditions, a fleet operating in the Caribbean without +a base there, against an enemy that had established a satisfactory +base, might have its normal fighting efficiency reduced 50 per cent, +or even more. A fleet is not a motionless fort, whose strength +lies only in its ability to fire guns and withstand punishment; a +fleet is a very live personality, whose ability to fight well--like +a pugilist's--depends largely on its ability to move quickly and +accurately, and to think quickly and accurately. The best pugilists +are not usually the strongest men, though physical strength is +an important factor; the best pugilists are men who are quick as +well as strong, who see an advantage or a danger quickly, and whose +eyes, nerves, and muscles act together swiftly and harmoniously. A +modern fleet, filled with high-grade machinery of all kinds, manned +by highly trained men to operate it, and commanded by officers fit +to be intrusted with such responsibilities, is a highly developed +and sensitive organism--and, like all highly developed and sensitive +organisms, exists in a state of what may be called "unstable +equilibrium." As pointed out in previous pages, the high skill +needed to perform well any very difficult task can be gained only +by great practice in overcoming difficulties and eliminating errors +of many kinds; and when the difficulties are manifold and great, a +comparatively small increase or decrease in the overcoming of them +makes a great difference in the results attained. An interesting +though possibly not very correct analogy is to be seen in the case of +a polished surface; for we readily note that the more highly polished +the surface is, the more easily it is sullied. Another analogy may +be found in the performance of a great pianist or violinist; for +a very small failure in his skill for even an instant will produce +a painful feeling that could not be produced by a much greater +failure in an ordinary performer. Another analogy is to be found in +the case of a ship that is going at the upper limit of her speed; +for a very minor failure of any part of her machinery will produce +a much greater slowing than it would if her speed were slower. + +Perhaps apologies are in order for dwelling so long on what may seem +to some an academic question, but it does not seem to the writer +to be academic at all. Certainly, the "condition" of a pugilist, or +a fleet, about to fight, is not an academic consideration; and if +it is not, no matter which affects this condition can rightfully be +considered academic. The whole usefulness of bases is due to their +ability to put fleets into good fighting condition and to maintain +them in it; and it seems a very proper and useful thing to note that +the more highly trained a fleet is, and the more highly organized +the various appliances the fleet contains, the more difference +results from a falling off in the condition of its personnel and +material. + +This shows the advantage of having a base as close to the place +where a fight is going to happen as may be possible. This does +not mean, of course, that a fleet should remain for long periods +within its base; because a fleet, like any other practiser of any +art, needs constant practice. It merely means that the closer the +base is to the scene of the operations or the actual battle, the +better "tuned up" the personnel and material will be. It also means +that this consideration is of the highest practical importance. + +_Advanced Bases_.--The extreme desirability of having a base near +the scene of operations, even if the base be only temporarily held, +has led to the use of what are called "advanced bases." An excellent +and modern illustration of an advanced base is the base which the +Japanese established at the Elliot Islands about sixty miles from +Port Arthur, which the Japanese were besieging. The Russian fleet +could issue from their base at Port Arthur whenever the Russians +wished, and return to it at will. While inside, until the Japanese +had landed and attacked them from the land side, the Russians could +make their preparations in security and leisure, and then go out. +The Japanese fleet, on the other hand, until they had established +their base, were forced to remain under way at sea, and to accept +action at the will of the Russians; so that, although Port Arthur +was besieged, the advantages of the offensive, to some extent, +resided with the Russians. The establishment of the base did not, +of course, change the situation wholly; but it permitted a very +considerable relaxation of vigilance and mental strain on the part +of the Japanese, and a considerable easement of the motive power +of their ships. Naturally, the Japanese made arrangements whereby +their heavy ships could remain in comparative tranquillity near +the base, while destroyers and scouts of various kinds kept touch +with Port Arthur, and notified the base by wireless of any probable +sortie by the Russian fleet. + +The temporary advanced base at the Elliot Islands was, as temporary +advanced bases always must be, quite incomplete in every way as +compared with the permanent bases at home. It fulfilled its mission, +however, and was in fact as good a base as really was required. +The strategic ability of the Japanese was indicated quite early +in the war by the promptness and skill with which they established +this base. + +Of course, all advanced bases are distant bases, but the words +usually imply temporariness, as does in fact the word "advance." +An instance of an advanced base that has been far from temporary +is the island of Jamaica, and another is the island of Bermuda; +another is Malta, and still another is Gibraltar. These bases form +stepping-stones, by which Great Britain's navy may go by easy stages +from one position to another, stopping at a base when desired, or +going beyond it without stopping, secure in the knowledge that +the base is "under her lee" in case of accident or distress. + +Viewed from the standpoint of operations in an actual war, the +strategic value of a certain position for a base is important, +no matter whether the operations are offensive or defensive; and +the same factors that make a position good for defensive operations +make it good for offensive operations also. For instance, if we +wish to send a fleet on a hostile expedition to a distant point, +it is well to have a base on a salient as far out as practicable +from the coast, in order that the fleet may be able to start, full +of fuel and supplies, from a place near the distant point; and +equally, if we are to receive an attack upon the coast, it is well +to have a base far out, in order to embarrass the transit of the +enemy toward our coast, by the threat--first against his flank, +and later against his rear and his communications. Naval bases +looked at from this point of view resemble those forts that European +nations place along their frontiers. + +It is true that any base placed at a salient has the weakness of +all salients, in that fire can be concentrated on it from several +directions; and a naval base has the added disadvantage of a more +difficult withdrawal, if attacked by an overwhelming force, and a +longer line of communications that has to be protected. But this +weakness all distant bases have, from the fact that they are distant; +and, naturally, the more distant they are, the more difficult it is to +support them, because the longer are their lines of communications. + +Distant naval bases, therefore, are vulnerable in a high degree; +they are vulnerable both to direct attack and to an attack on their +lines of communications; and the factors that help a base in one +way injure it in another. If a naval base is placed on a rock, +or a rugged little island that holds nothing else, and on which +a hostile army could not land, it is very safe from land attack; +whereas, if it is placed on a large and fertile island, on which +an invading army could easily land, it is extremely vulnerable +to land attack. But, on the other hand, the naval base on the +inaccessible island could be starved out by simply breaking its +lines of communications, while the naval base on the large and +fertile island might be able to survive indefinitely, even though +the communications were wholly ruptured. + +The establishment of any permanent distant naval base is a matter +of great expense, even if the natural conditions are favorable. +But favorable conditions have rarely existed; and the expense of +establishing such bases as Malta, Gibraltar, and Heligoland has +been tremendous. An important consideration has been the fact that, +unless the base were made so strong that it could not be taken, +it might be better not to attempt to fortify it, on the theory +that it would be better to let a poor naval base fall into the +hands of the enemy than a good one. To this reasoning, the answer +is usually made that no base can be made absolutely impregnable, +and that sufficient defense will be provided if it makes the task +and cost of capturing the base greater than the base is worth. +This means simply that the more valuable the base is, the more +money should be spent in defending it; and that _it is worse than +useless to defend it by any means that is obviously too small, +in proportion to its value_. + +It often happens that the places that have the best position are +weak in strength and resources; a notable instance is Gibraltar, +another is Culebra, and the most notable of all is Guam. None of +these places is fortunate in either resources or natural strength, +though Gibraltar was strong for the artillery of the time when +the base was established there. In fact, it is hard to think of +any place that combines in itself the three advantages of a fine +strategical position, large resources, and great strength. The +three attributes seem almost incompatible; for how can a base far +distant from its home be well placed with reference to attacking +the lines of communication of any enemy intending to attack the +home coast, and yet have its own lines of communications safe? How +can it have a sheet of water, just deep enough but not too deep +to anchor a large fleet in, with all of its auxiliaries extensive +enough to accommodate all the vessels and far enough from the sea +to be safe from gun-fire, and yet be on an island so small and +so rugged, that an enemy could not land troops near the base and +capture it from the land side, as the Japanese captured Port Arthur? +The natural strategic advantages of a large and sheltered sheet +of water seem to entail the disadvantages of a large island, or +a continent. + +There seems only one way in which to solve the problem of where +and how to establish a permanent naval base at a distant point, and +that is the way in which the world's preceptor--Great Britain--has +solved it; and the solution is to select a place that has already the +advantage of position, and then add to it the artificial advantages +of resources and military strength. + +This brief statement makes the matter seem a little too simple; +and so it will have to be modified by adding that the mere fact +of a place having a fine position is not quite sufficient, because +the place must be of such a character that it is capable of having +resources and strength added to it; a sharp pinnacle rock in the +middle of the Mediterranean, for instance, might have a fine strategic +position, and yet be unavailable as a naval base. Even here, however, +we must pause to note that energy and will could do much toward +making even a pinnacle rock a naval base; for we see the gigantic +fortress of Heligoland erected on what was little but a shoal; +and we see the diminutive water areas of Malta and Gibraltar made +to hold in safety the war-ships of the greatest navy in the world. + +Despite the paramount importance of strategic position, we must not +forget that a naval base should have sufficient military strength +to be able to hold out for a long time against hostile operations, +as many bases, notably Gibraltar and Port Arthur, have done, without +the assistance of the fleet. The German base at Kiao-chau held out +for more than two months in 1914, without any external aid. During +all the time of siege, even if surrender is ultimately to occur, +the enemy's forces are prevented from being utilized elsewhere. +This condition was clearly shown during the siege of Port Arthur, +because the large force of Japanese troops required to conduct +the siege were urgently needed in Manchuria--to which region they +were sent as soon as Port Arthur fell. + +From this point of view, naval bases again look much like fortresses +on the land; fortresses like Metz and Strasburg, that had to be +subdued before an enemy could safely pass them. + +_Strategic Position of Distant Bases_.--Since the strategic position +of an outlying naval base is the principal factor that goes to +make its value, it may be well to consider what elements make a +strategic position good. + +To make the problem clear, let us take a concrete case, that of +our own country, and consider what elements would constitute a good +strategic position for a naval base of the United States, leaving +out of consideration for the moment any questions of resources and +military strength. + +In the case of a war with a nation that had only one naval home +base, it is clear that the best position for our distant base would +be one as close to the enemy's base as possible; because, if placed +there, our fleet, if it were the more powerful, could do more to +injure the enemy's fleet, or prevent its going out, than if placed +at any point more distant from the enemy's base; and if it were +less powerful, it could do more to cut the enemy's communications, +because it could attack them at or near their source. + +A poor position would be one far away from both countries, and +far away from the line joining them. In the case of a war between +this country and Norway, for instance, a very poor position for a +naval base would be a spot near--say Juan Fernandez--in the south +Pacific. + +In case the enemy country has two home bases of equal importance, +the best position for our base clearly would be one equidistant +from them, and as near to each as practicable. If the distance +from our base to a point half-way between the two bases is shorter +than is the distance to it from either base, then a fleet at our +base could probably prevent the junction of two forces issuing +from those two bases--assuming, of course, that we had a proper +system of scouting. Our fleet would be able to operate on what +are often called "interior lines"--a technical expression that has +great efficacy in confusing a simple matter. It is also assumed +that our fleet is considerably stronger than either of the two +separated enemy forces; otherwise our case would be hopeless. + +If the two home bases of the enemy are unequal in importance, it +would seem that our base should be nearer to the important base +than to the other. More strictly speaking, it should be nearer +to the base from which the larger force may be expected to come +out. + +If the enemy country have three or more bases, from which parts of +a fleet may be expected to come out, the question seems a little +more complex; but nevertheless, since the first duty of our fleet +would probably be to prevent junctions or a junction, of the separated +parts of the enemy's fleet, the best position for our home base +would be at a point about equally distant from them all, and as +close to them as possible. In the wars between Great Britain and +France in the early part of the nineteenth century, the base of the +British fleet for operations on the western and northern coasts of +France was as close to the enemy home bases as practicable--though +the base was England itself. For operations on France's southern +coast, the base was at Gibraltar, or some Mediterranean island. + +That any country should be able to hold a distant base close to +the home base of a possible naval enemy might seem impossible, +if we did not know that Great Britain holds Bermuda and Jamaica +near to our own coast, and Hong-Kong actually inside of China, +all far away from Britain; besides Malta and Gibraltar in the +Mediterranean, nearer to the coasts of sometime enemies than to +her own. That the United States should own a base far from her own +coasts, and near those of other countries, might seem improbable, +were it not for the fact that Guam is such a base, and is so situated. +It is true that Guam is not strictly a naval base, because it is +not so equipped or fortified; but we are thinking now of position +only. + +In case the enemy country has several home bases, and it is impossible +to have our distant base so near to them as to prevent the junction +of parts of a fleet issuing from them, the value of the base is +less than it otherwise would be. + +In this case, which is the one in which our country is actually +concerned, because of its great distance from other countries, its +value becomes merely the usual value attaching to a naval base; +and the fact that the entire enemy fleet can operate as a unit, that +it can divide into separate forces at will near its own shores, +or send out detachments to prey on the long line of communications +stretching from our distant base to that base's home, necessitates +that the base be fortified in the strongest possible way, and provided +with large amounts of supplies. Its principal function in war would +be to shorten the long trip that our vessels would have to make +without refreshment, and therefore the length of their lines of +communications, and to enable our vessels to arrive in enemy's waters +in better condition of readiness for battle than would otherwise +be the case. + +We have thus far considered the best position for an advanced naval +base, in the case of operations against one country only. + +It seems clear that, if we are to consider operations against two +countries separately, and at different times, we should be led +to conclude that the case of each country should be decided +individually; in the case of wars with Norway and Portugal, for +instance, the best places for our two bases would be as close to +the home bases of those countries as possible; and even in the +case of fighting two simultaneously, the conclusion would be the +same, if the two countries were in widely different directions +from us--as are Switzerland and China. If we consider the case +of war against two contiguous countries simultaneously, however, +it would seem better to have one base, situated similarly toward +the home bases of the two countries as toward two different home +bases in one country--since the two countries would be, in effect, +allies; and their fleets would act in reality like separated portions +of one fleet. + +As the United States possesses no island on the Atlantic side which +is nearer to foreign countries than to our own, and as our interests +for the immediate future lie mostly on the Atlantic side, it may +be well now to apply the general principles just considered to +the question of where is a naval base most urgently needed under +actual conditions. + +Imagining a war between us and some one European naval Power, and +imagining a war also between us and two or three allied European +naval Powers, and realizing the length of our Atlantic and Gulf +coasts, extending from Maine to Panama, a glance at the map shows +us that, apart from the home naval bases on our continental coasts, +the position on American soil which is the closest to European +bases is on the little island of Culebra, which occupies a salient +in the northeastern end of the Caribbean Sea.[*] + +[Footnote *: The acquisition by the United States of the island +of Saint Thomas, about 20 miles east of Culebra, if accomplished, +will extend the salient just so much farther toward Europe.] + +The only reason an enemy would have for entering the Caribbean +would be an intention to attack the Panama Canal region, or an +intention to establish an advanced base, from which he could conduct +more or less deliberate siege of our Atlantic coast and cities. In +either case, our fleet would be seriously handicapped if it had no +adequate base in the Caribbean; because its line of communications +north would be exposed to the enemy's operations at all times; +and seriously wounded American ships would have little chance of +getting repairs; little chance even of making successfully the long +trip to Norfolk or New York. + +In case the enemy fleet should start from Europe fully prepared in +every way, we should be in ignorance of its intended destination; +and as the enemy fleet would be stronger than ours (otherwise it +would not start) it would doubtless be able to destroy our undefended +station at Guantanamo, seize some suitable place in the West Indies, +say the Bay of Samana, and then establish a base there, unless we +had first seized and fortified all suitable localities; and the +United States would then find itself in the anomalous position +of being confronted near its own coasts with an enemy fleet well +based for war, while her own fleet would not be based at all. Not +only would the enemy fleet be superior in power, but it would possess +the strategical advantage, though far from its own shores. The +situation, therefore, about a month after the foreign fleet left +Europe, would be that the Caribbean Sea would contain a hostile +fleet which was not only superior to ours in power, but was securely +resting on a base; while ours had no base south of Norfolk, the +other side of Hatteras. Our fleet would be in a position similar +to that of the Russian fleet when it rushed to its destruction +in Tsushirna Straits, though not in so great a degree; because +it would have had more recent docking and refitting in our home +ports, and the personnel would be fresher. + +In case, however, we had a naval base strongly fortified and thoroughly +equipped, at a salient in the Caribbean region, say at Culebra, and +if our fleet were based upon it, a hostile fleet, even if it were +considerably superior to our own, would hesitate to pass it and +enter the Caribbean, by reason of the continuous threat that the +fleet would exert on its communications. Even if the hostile fleet +should pass Culebra, and establish a base farther on, an American +force based on Culebra would continue to exert this threat on the +communications between the hostile base and its mother country. + +An American base--say at Guantanamo--would be very effective in +embarrassing hostile operations _west_ of Guantanamo, because it +would be on the flank of the line of communications extending from +Europe; but it would be comparatively ineffective in embarrassing +operations east of it, since the hostile line of communications +would be protected from it by the interposition of its own main +body; this interposition necessitating the despatch of defending +forces around that main body. The coming hostile force would push +before it all resistance, and leave the sea free for the passage +of its auxiliaries and supplies. A defending force, operating from +Guantanamo, in endeavoring to prevent a hostile fleet from establishing +a base to the _eastward_ of it, would act much less effectively +than a force operating from Culebra. Not only would the force from +Guantanamo have to pass around the main body to attack the train; +it would again have to pass around the main body to get back to +Guantanamo; whereas a force operating from Culebra could make a +direct attack upon the enemy's train, and then a direct retreat +to Culebra. + +This comparison assumes, as has been said, that the matter of resources +and strength are not in question; that is, that they are equal in +our two supposition bases. But, as in practice they would not be +equal, the practical point to consider is how much strength and +resources can compensate for inferiority of position, and how much +position must be insisted on. + +Of course, no correct quantitative answer can be given, except +by accident. The problem, unfortunately, cannot be solved by +mathematics, for the simple reason that no quantitative values can +be assigned to the various factors, and because no mathematical +formula now exists that expresses their relations to each other. It +may be pointed out, however, that if a position be good, strength +and resources can be artificially supplied; and that the cost of +doing this, even on a tremendous scale, is relatively small compared +to the cost of the fleet which the base will support, and in distress +protect. In other words, we may be able to form an estimate of +the relative values of bases, say at Guantanamo and Culebra, even +if we cannot ascribe arithmetical values to each, and compare +arithmetically those arithmetical values. If, for instance, we see +that a fleet costing $500,000,000, would, if it operated from a +base at Culebra, be 10 per cent more effective than if it operated +from Guantanamo, and that it would cost $20,000,000 more to make a +strong base there than to make an equally strong one at Guantanamo, +we should conclude that, since 10 per cent of $500,000,000 is +$50,000,000, it would be wise to spend that $20,000,000, even if +we had to forego the building of one battlesbip. + +We should come to the same conclusion, if we realized that no matter +what their comparative values might be, a base at one place would +not meet our necessities, and a base at the other place would. If +a base at Guantanamo would not meet our necessities in case of +an invasion of the Caribbean by a naval fleet superior to ours, +then it seems idle to discuss the value of Guantanamo relative to +some other place, no matter how good the position of Guantanamo +may be, and no matter how nearly it may approximate to adequacy. +There is no real usefulness in having a naval base anywhere, unless +that naval base can accomplish the purpose for which it is desired. +A naval base is desired for purposes of war, and for no other purpose +whatever; and to decide on a position for a base without keeping +this fact clearly in view, is to act on an underestimate of the +situation, the folly of which has been pointed out in previous +pages. + +We may conclude, then, that in deciding on the place for a distant +permanent naval base, on which the operations of a whole fleet +are to base for war, we should select the best site available, +even if military strength and resources may have to be added to +it artificially--unless in the case of any site considered the +difficulties of adding them are insuperable. + +The last sentence may seem like shirking the whole question, because +it does not state what "insuperable" means; so it may be well to add +that in modern days few engineering difficulties are insuperable, as +the existence of the fortress at Heligoland shows. If the submarine +and the mine did not exist, the difficulties would be greater than +they actually are; because guns alone, no matter how carefully mounted +and protected, could hardly be expected to keep off indefinitely the +attack of a heavy fleet, or even to save from injury the fighting +and auxiliary vessels anchored in its waters. But the submarine +and mine combine to keep fighting ships at distances greater than +those over which ship's guns can fire, and reduce the amount of +fortification required on shore. + +One of the principal sources of expense in establishing bases at +some points would be that of dredging out harbors sufficiently +extensive, while harbors sufficiently extensive are provided already +by nature in such localities as Samana. But, as pointed out before, +harbors on large islands can be taken from the land side, as was +Port Arthur; and adequate protection from land attack is, in many +cases, almost impossible if the enemy has command of the sea, as +a superior hostile fleet would have in the Caribbean; while the +hills and waters of Culebra and Vieques Sound could long defy not +only actual invasion, but any fleet attack. + +This brings us face to face with the fact that it may be less expensive +to establish and protect a naval base situated on a little island, +even if an artificial harbor has to be constructed, than to establish +and protect a base on a large island, even if the base on the large +island has a large natural harbor and can be more easily defended +against bombardment from the sea. It would be cheaper, for instance, +to protect a base on Culebra than one at Guantanamo, or even Samana, +if the enemy commanded the sea; and cheaper to protect a base on the +forbidding rocks of Polillo or Guam than on the large and fertile +island of Luzon, with its extensive gulfs and bays, in many of +which a fleet in command of the sea could land its force; because +protecting a base on a large island would require covering a very +large area, and perhaps a long extent of coast. + +Aircraft may exercise an important influence on the choice of the +position of a base, perhaps in the direction of choosing a base on +a large island rather than on a small one; since the great speed of +aircraft tends to lessen the importance of having the base out a great +distance from home--so far as purposes of scouting are concerned. +It seems probable also that aircraft will soon be recognized as +inherently adapted to preventing the landing of hostile troops, +by dropping bombs on the troops, while they are in process of +disembarkation, while proceeding in small boats to the shore, and +while in the act of landing on the beach, with their guns, ammunition, +supplies, horses, and impedimenta of various kinds. + +_Co-operating Bases_.--Discussion of the relative values of positions +for bases, say in the Caribbean, should not blind our eyes to the +fact, however, that no nation is prevented from establishing as +many bases as it needs, wherever its flag may float; that the United +States, for instance, is not debarred from establishing permanent +naval bases at both Guantanamo and Culebra, should such a procedure +seem desirable. The fact that each locality has advantages that the +other does not have, suggests the idea that two bases, placed in +those localities, would form a powerful combination. In fact, the +great value of the position of Culebra being its distance toward the +enemy, which necessitates a great distance away from our continental +coast, and a long line of communications from that coast suggest +an intermediate base as a support and stepping-stone. Analogous +cases are seen in all the countries of Europe, in the fortresses +that are behind their boundary-lines--the fortresses existing less +as individuals than as supporting members of a comprehensive scheme. + +Two bases, one at Guantanamo and one at Culebra, would in time +of war in the Caribbean, add a value to our fleet that might make +the difference between defeat and victory. The effective work that +a fleet can do is a function of the material condition of the ships +themselves, and of the physical and mental condition of the personnel +that man them. Fighting is the most strenuous work that men can do; +it calls for the last ounce of strength, the last effort of the +intellect, the last struggle of the will; it searches out every +physical imperfection in men, in ships, in engines, in joints, in +valves. Surprise has sometimes been expressed at the quickness +with which the Japanese defeated the Russians at Tsushima; but would +any one express surprise if a pugilist, fresh from rest, quickly +defeated another pugilist who, exhausted from long travelling, +staggered hopelessly into the ring? And how would the betting be +before a football match, if it were known that one of the teams +would enjoy a rest of twenty-four hours before the game, whereas +the other team would walk from the railroad to the ball grounds +after a trip across the continent? + +These analogies may seem forced--but are they? A living animal +requires hours of rest and refreshment, in order that the tissues +expended in action may be repaired by the internal mechanism of +the body, and the food consumed be supplied from some external +source. A fleet is in exactly the same category, even when operating +in times of peace: and in time of war it needs, in addition, a +station in which injuries may be repaired--a station analogous to +that of the hospital for wounded men. + +In the Caribbean it would seem necessary to successful operations, +therefore, to have two bases, one say at Guantanamo and one at +Culebra; the one at Culebra to be the principal base, and the one +at Guantanamo the auxiliary. Culebra, by reason of the great work to +be accomplished, and the engineering difficulties to be encountered, +cannot be gotten ready for several years. Reliance, meanwhile, +will have to be placed on Guantanamo; and as the coming of any +war is not usually very long foretold, the urgency of fortifying +Guantanamo stands out in clear relief. + +The mutual relations of Guantanamo and Culebra are much like the +mutual relations of Pearl Harbor in Hawaii and Guam--and so are +the joint relations of each pair to the mother country. Culebra +and Guam are the potential bases of the United States farthest away +from the coast in the Atlantic and the Pacific respectively; and +the nearest to countries in Europe and Asia with any one of which, +of course, war will be always possible, and sometimes probable. +Each is a small and rugged island, admitting of tremendous military +strengthening by guns, fortifications, mines, and submarines, but +connected to the motherland by a long line of communications. The +line of communications of Culebra would, of course, be safer than +that of Guam, because it is shorter than would be the line of an +enemy attacking it; whereas, the line of communications of Guam +would be longer. Guantanamo and Pearl Harbor are both stations about +half-way from the home country to Culebra and Guam respectively; and +though greater danger to our vital and commercial interests exists +in the Atlantic than in the Pacific, Pearl Harbor has been fortified, +and Guantanamo has not--and neither has Culebra. This sentence is +not intended as a criticism of the government for fortifying Pearl +Harbor. The Hawaiian Islands occupy the most valuable strategic +position in the Pacific, and Pearl Harbor is the most important +strategic place in the Hawaiian Islands; and it ought to have been +strengthened many years ago, and to a greater degree even than is +contemplated now. But the sentence is intended as a protest against +our continued inertness in failing to establish any suitable naval +bases whatever, especially in the Caribbean. + +_Distant Base in the Philippines_.--The difficulty of finding suitable +positions for bases is exemplified in the Philippines, for no suitable +island is to be found there, except some that are within the archipelago +itself; and these are so placed that, to reach them, our fleet +would have to go through long reaches of water, ideally suited for +destroyer and submarine attack. A possible exception is the island +of Polillo, twenty miles east of the eastern coast of Luzon; and in +many ways Polillo seems ideal. The practical difficulties are so +great, however, the status of the islands in our national policy is +so ill defined, and the futility of strengthening it, unless Guam +be adequately strengthened also, is so apparent, that the question +has been hardly even mooted. Polillo made impregnable, with Guam +defenseless, supported by an undefended line of communications +several thousand miles long to the main country, would in case +of war with an active Asiatic power be reduced to the zero of +effectiveness in whatever was the length of time in which its +accumulated stores would be exhausted. + +This sentence may be modified by saying that the time might be +lengthened by the occasional arrival of supply ships and colliers +that might come by way of the Mediterranean, or the Cape of Good +Hope, or any other route which approached the Philippines from +the southward; and it is possible that, in the unfortunate event +of a war between us and some Asiatic power, our relations with +European countries might be such as to make the use by us of such +routes feasible and safe. In view, however, of the conditions of +island possession in the Pacific as they actually are, and because +of the rapid and abrupt changes that characterize international +relations, the probability of being able to use such routes seems +too small to receive grave consideration. + +_Other Bases in the Pacific_.--The Pacific Ocean is so vast, and +the interests of the United States there will some day be so great, +that the question of establishing naval bases, in addition to bases at +Pearl Harbor, the Philippines, and Guam, will soon demand attention. +The localities that are the most obvious are the Panama Canal Zone +and the Samoan Islands in the south, and the Aleutian Islands in +the north. A moderately far-seeing policy regarding the Pacific, +and a moderately far-seeing strategy for carrying out the policy, +would dictate the establishment and adequate protection of bases in +both the southern and the northern regions; so that our fleet could +operate without undue handicap over the long distances required. +The same principles that govern the selection of positions and +the establishment of bases in the Atlantic apply in the Pacific; +the same requirements that a base shall be near where the fleet +will conduct its operations--no matter whether those operations +be offensive or defensive, no matter whether they concern direct +attack or a threat against communications. + + * * * * * + +In view of the great value of naval bases, one may be pardoned +perhaps for a feeling of surprise that the United States has no real +naval base, home or distant. Our large navy-yards are our nearest +approximation to real bases. The yards at Norfolk and Bremerton seem +to combine the three factors of position, strength, and resources +better than do any other stations; though both are surpassed in +resources by New York, Philadelphia, and Boston. Bremerton has +the greatest natural military strength of all our stations; in +fact, it is naturally very strong indeed, because of the length +and nature of the waterway leading to it from the sea and the ease +with which it could be denied. Norfolk is fortunate in its nearness +to Chesapeake Bay and Lynn Haven Roads, and the ease with which the +entrance to the Chesapeake from seaward could be defended; but the +fact that it is only 18 miles from the Atlantic coast-line makes it +more vulnerable than Bremerton to the attack of troops landed by +an enemy fleet. The yard at Mare Island, near San Francisco, is +faultily placed as regards deep water; but dredging could rectify +this. The Panama Canal Zone has great facilities for repairs, docking, +and supplies; but it must be adequately fortified in order to be +a trustworthy base in the case of operations in its vicinity. + +New York, by reason of its enormous wealth of every kind, its steamer +terminals, and its excessively vulnerable position, within gunshot +of ships out in the deep water (a position without parallel in +the large cities of the world) must, of course, be protected. The +cheapest way to protect it is to do so locally, by means of +fortifications, and other shore defenses. The only other means +would be by a fleet permanently kept near New York, a measure that +would be expensive beyond reason. + +In case the enemy should inform us that he would reach the vicinity +of New York at a certain time, and in case he should fulfil his +promise, the fact that New York was properly strengthened would +not be very important; since our fleet would go there, and the +whole war would be settled by one "stand-up fight." But wars are +not so conducted and never have been. From the oldest times till +now, and even among savage tribes, finesse has always been employed, +in addition to actual force--more perhaps by the weaker than by +the stronger side, but very considerably also by the stronger. A +coming enemy would endeavor to keep his objective a close secret, +and even to mislead us; so that our fleet would have to take a +position out at sea, perhaps far away, which would leave our bases +open to attack by the enemy fleet or at least exposed to raids. + +The most effective local defense of a naval base is a combination +of mine-fields and heavy guns, which also give protection to which +the wounded vessels can retire, as the German vessels did after +the North Sea battle. Unless such protection be provided, swift +destroyers can complete the work that guns began, as the Japanese +destroyers did, after the artillery battle at Tsushima. + +In addition to their value in defending navy-yards from raids, +and in giving wounded ships a refuge, the military strengthening +of home bases, if such home bases are wisely placed near large +commercial centres, prevents actual destruction of those commercial +centres themselves, in case an attack is made upon them, either +in the absence of the defending fleet, or after that fleet may +have been destroyed. The line of engineering advance during recent +years, although it has greatly increased the offensive power of +war-ships, has increased even more greatly the defensive power of +land works. For this reason, it is perfectly possible to defend +successfully almost any land position against attack by ships; +and it is so easy, that not to do so, is, in the case of large +commercial centres, a neglectfulness of the extremest character. + +One important reason, therefore, for placing a permanent home base +near a large commercial centre is the fact that the fortification +of one is also the fortification of the other. + +Assuming that New York is to be defended locally, we can state at +once that the New York naval station can easily be made to be a +permanent naval base of the highest order, and of the most efficient +type. In fact, it can be made into a naval base better than any other +now in the world, because of the large sheets of water tributary +to it in New York Bay, Hudson River, and Long Island Sound; the +proximity of the sea; the untold resources in money, supplies, +and men that it could on demand produce, and the ease with which +it could be defended. To make such a base, it would be necessary +to fortify the vicinity of Coney Island and the entrances from +the ocean to the Lower Bay, and Long Island Sound; to deepen the +channel to the navy-yard, and to make clear and safe the waterway +from the East River to Long Island Sound. It would be necessary +also to enlarge the navy-yard; and to this end, to buy back the land +adjoining it, which the government most unwisely sold to private +parties about twenty-five years ago. + +Owing to the position of Block Island, relatively to the lines +of communication of a hostile force coming from Europe to attack +our eastern coast, and because of the sheltered waters held within +it, suitable for small craft, the advisability of establishing a +small naval base there is apparent. With a suitable base there +and another on Martha's Vineyard, and the present canal from +Massachusetts Bay to Buzzards Bay sufficiently enlarged, the whole +coast from Boston to New York, including Narragansett Bay, could +be made to form one naval base which would have three exits. Our +own ships could pass from one point to another, and concentrate +at will near Sandy Hook, Block Island, or Massachusetts Bay; and, +which is equally important, the establishment of an enemy base +near New York would be made almost, if not quite, impossible. + +In case of an attack on our eastern coast, made directly from Europe, +which could be accomplished easily during the calm months of the +summer, the degree of efficiency shown by the bases at Norfolk, +Philadelphia, New York, and Boston would influence vitally the +condition in which our fleet would go to battle. Owing to the +traditional policy, or rather lack of policy, of the United States, +and the consequent unreadiness of our preparations, we may reasonably +assume that war will find us in such a condition that the utmost +haste will be necessary to get our whole naval force out to sea +in time to prevent the enemy from making an actual bombardment of +our shores. We have no reason to suppose that the ships actually +cruising in our active fleet will not be ready; we have every reason +to believe that they will be ready. But it is inconceivable that we +should not try to oppose such an attack with all the naval force +that we could muster; which means that we should try to send out +many ships from our home bases to join the active fleet at sea. + +The ease with which the passage of an enemy's fleet up the Delaware +or Chesapeake could be prevented, in case any means of national +defense whatever be attempted, compared with the difficulty of +defending New York, and combined with the greater damage that an +enemy could inflict on New York, mark the vicinity of New York as +the probable objective of any determined naval attack upon our +coast; no matter whether that attack be made directly from Europe, +or indirectly from Europe by way of the Caribbean. To meet such +an attack, various parts of the fleet would have to issue from +their bases; even parts of the active fleet would probably have +had to go to their home ports for some needed repairs or supplies. +The first thought of an attacking fleet would naturally be to prevent +our ships from getting out, as it was the thought of Nelson and +other British commanders to prevent the issuing of forces from +the ports of France. But in view of the great distance from Europe +to our coast, and the impossibility of preventing the knowledge +reaching us of the departure of the fleet (unless indeed all the +powers of Europe combined to prevent it), it seems probable that +no such issuing could be prevented, and that a very considerable +American force would have time to take its station out at sea, +prepared to meet the coming foe. + +The home bases if properly prepared would exert a powerful effect +on a battle near them by equipping the fleet adequately and promptly, +and also by preventing a possible defeat from becoming a disaster, +by receiving wounded ships before they sank. The wounded ships +of the enemy, on the other hand, would have no base near by, and +only those inconsiderably injured could probably be gotten home. + + + + +CHAPTER XII + +OPERATING THE MACHINE + +The naval machine, including the various vessels of all kinds, +the bases and the personnel, having been designed, put together, +and prepared for its appointed task of conducting war, and the +appointed task having at last been laid upon it, how shall the +machine be operated--how shall it be made successfully to perform +its task? + +In order to answer this correctly, we must first see clearly what +is its task. + +_War_.--War may be said to be the act of two nations or two sets +of nations, by means of which each tries to get its way by physical +force. The peaceful methods of diplomacy having been exhausted, +arguments and threats having been tried in vain, both parties resort +to the oldest and yet the latest court; the same court as that to +which resort the lions of the desert, the big and little fishes +of the sea, the fowls of the air, and even the blades of grass +that battle for the sunshine. + +The vastness of the issue decided by war, the fact that from its +decision there is no appeal, the greatness of the forces that nations +can produce, the length of experience of war extending through +8,000 wars, and during more than three thousand years of recorded +history, the enormous literature of the subject, and the fact that +more brain power, energy, and character have been devoted to war +than to any other fruit of man's endeavor--combine to give to the +conduct of war an importance that no other subject can possess. + +The thing that each side brings forward against the other side is +force; "that which moves or tends to move matter." In all ages, it +has been directed primarily against the physical bodies of individual +men, threatening each individual man with suffering and death. It +appeals to the primal instinct of men, self-preservation, and is +the _ultima ratio regum_, the last argument of kings--and not only +of kings, but of all other living things as well. + +The first feeling aroused by the threat against life, or physical +well-being, is fear; and, therefore, the first force with which +to oppose the threat is a force of the same spiritual nature as +fear, but opposite in direction. This force is called in the English +language "courage." Without courage every man and every nation +would be at the mercy of every man or nation that made a threat +against it. The inherent necessity for courage is thus apparent; +and the reason is therefore apparent, for the fact that in every +nation and tribe physical courage has been esteemed the greatest +virtue in a man. In Latin, we know, the word _virtus_ meant courage, +and also virtue--showing that the Romans held the two qualities +to be identical or similar. + +In discussing the operations of war, little is usually said of +courage. The reason, however, is not that its value is unrecognized, +but that its existence is assumed; in the same way as that in which +all the other faculties among the men are assumed, such as physical +health, ability to march, etc. Movements to inspire fear, however, +actions to break down the morale, are of frequent use; because, +if the morale of the opposing side is broken down, its power of +resistance is destroyed. + +In the operations, therefore, of two contending parties, force is +opposed by force. If the forces on both sides could be concentrated +at a single point, and exerted in opposite directions, the result +would be decided in an instant. Such an arrangement has never yet +been brought about; though fairly close approximations have been +made, when two parties have selected two champions who have fought +for them--the victory going by agreement to the side whose champion +became the victor. + +Barring such rare occasions, contests in war have usually been +between two forces spread over considerable areas of land or water; +and the contest has usually been decided by the defeat of one of +the two. If in any individual combat, all the forces possessed +by both sides had been engaged, and if either force had been +annihilated, the entire war between the two parties would have +been decided. This was nearly the case in the naval battle off +Tsushima between the Russian and Japanese fleets--and the treaty +of peace was signed soon after. Usually, however, neither party to +the quarrel has had all its forces on the field in any one battle, +and neither force in the battle has been annihilated. Usually, +only partial forces have been engaged, and only partial victories +have been won; with the result that wars between contending nations +have usually consisted of a series of battles, with intervals of +rest between. + +If two opposing forces in any battle were exactly equal in fighting +power, neither side in any battle would gain a victory, the two +sides would inflict identical amounts of damage on each other, and +the two sides would end the battle still equal in force. At rare +intervals, such conditions have been approximated; but usually one +side has had more fighting power than the other, and has inflicted +more damage of various kinds than it has received, with the result +that it attained an advantage more or less important over the other, +and with the further result that the original disproportion between +the two forces was increased. The increase may not necessarily +have been due to a greater number of killed and wounded or even +to a greater loss of material, such as guns or ships; there may +have been no increase in inequality in either of these ways, for +the increase in inequality may have consisted in the fact that +the weaker force was driven to a position less advantageous to it +for conducting operations in the future. But whatever the nature +of the advantage gained by the stronger side, the result has been +that the weaker side has come out of the battle relatively weaker +than it was before. + +For this reason, it is highly desirable to each side to win each +battle. This does not mean that the loss of any one battle by either +party to a war means that the party losing that battle will necessarily +lose the war; for many battles may be fought by such small portions +of the whole nations' forces, or be lost by such small margins that +the loss of one battle, or even several battles, may be retrieved; +in fact, in few wars have the victories been all on one side. It +does mean, however, that each lost battle is a backward step; and +that for this reason the effort must be that no battle shall be +lost. + +_Strategy and Tactics_.--Now, to win battles, two things combine, +strategy and tactics. The strategy of each side tries to arrange +matters so that the forces on its side shall enter each battle +with the greatest chance of victory; tactics tries to handle the +forces with which it enters a battle in such a way that its side +shall gain the victory. Strategy prepares for battles; tactics +fights them. + +The tactics of any battle must be in the hands of the +commanders-in-chief on both sides. Any other arrangement is +inconceivable; but the strategy controlling the series of battles +in any war cannot now be committed to them solely; though it was +usually committed to them until lately. In the days when Alexander +went to war, or even when Napoleon and Nelson went to war, twenty-one +centuries later, no telegraph by sea and land made swift communication +possible; and the commanders on the spot were the only ones in +possession of enough information about the contending forces to +decide what measures should be taken. Even in those days, however, +the capitals of the countries engaged in war, by reason of their +knowledge of what was passing in the way of policy, exerted an +influence on the strategy of the forces on both sea and land; Caesar, +for instance, was embarrassed in many of his operations by the Roman +Senate, and it was for this reason that he crossed the Rubicon +and passed from Gaul into Italy. When William I and Napoleon III +went to war in 1870, however, Von Moltke had foreseen the effects +of the telegraph and of rapid-mail communications, in giving to the +headquarters of the army information of a much greater scope and +reliability than had previously been the case, and had established +a General Staff which had elaborated plans whereby not only would the +commanders-in-chief in the field have the assistance of information +compiled at headquarters, but whereby the general nature of the +operations of a war, especially those operations at the outset on +which the future conduct of the war would largely depend, would +be decided and laid down in advance and during times of peace. The +reason for the rapid victory of the Prussians over the French in +1870 was that the Prussians were better prepared in almost every +way; especially in the most important thing--the war plans. + +Now, these war plans could not, of course, be of such a kind that +they would foresee every contingency and prescribe the conduct +to be followed, so that a commander in the field could turn to +page 221 of volume 755, and get directions as to what he ought to +do; nor could they furnish the chief of staff, Von Moltke, with +printed recommendations which he should offer to the King. In other +words, the war plans could be only plans and, like all plans for +future action, could be only tentative, and capable of being modified +by events as they should come to pass. They were only plans of +preparation, not plans of operation. + +Yet there were plans of preparation for operations; plans prepared in +accordance with the principles of strategy, and based on information +as to the enemy's resources, skill, point of view, and probable +intentions. They formed the general guide for future operations. + +Since 1870, the invention and practical development of the wireless +telegraph, and especially its development for use over very great +distances, has modified the relations of commanders on the spot +to home headquarters, and especially of naval commanders to their +navy departments. The wireless telegraph, under circumstances in +which it operates successfully, annihilates distance so far as +communication is concerned, though it does not annihilate distance +so far as transportation is concerned. It improves the sending and +receiving of news and instructions, both for the commander at sea +and for his department at home; but it does it more effectively +for the department than for the man at sea, because of the superior +facilities for large and numerous apparatus that shore stations +have, and their greater freedom from interruptions of all kinds. + +This condition tends to place the strategical handling of all the +naval machine, including the active fleet itself, more in the hands +of the department or admiralty, and less in the hands of the +commander-in-chief: and this tendency is confirmed by the superior +means for discussion and reflection, and for trial by war games, +that exist in admiralties, compared with those that exist in ships. + +The general result is to limit the commander-in-chief more and +more in strategical matters: to confine his work more and more to +tactics. + +Such a condition seems reasonable in many ways. The government +decides on a policy, and tells the Navy Department to carry it +out, employing the executive offices and bureaus to that end, under +the guidance of strategy. Strategy devotes itself during peace to +designing and preparing the naval machine, and in war to operating +it, utilizing both in war and peace the bureaus and offices and +the fleet itself. And in the same way as that in which the bureaus +and offices perform the calculations and executive functions of +logistics, for furnishing the necessary material of all kinds, the +fleet performs those of tactics. From this point of view, strategy +plans and guides all the acts of navies, delegating one part of +the practical work needed to carry out those plans to logistics, +and the other part to tactics. + +Operating the naval machine in war means practically operating +the active fleet in such a way as to cause victories to occur, to +cause the fleet to enter each battle under as favorable conditions +as practicable, and to operate the other activities of the navy in +such a way that the fleet will be efficiently and promptly supplied +with all its needs. Strategy employs tactics and logistics to bring +these things to pass; but this does not mean that strategy stands +apart and simply gives logistics and tactics tasks to do. The three +agencies are too mutually dependent for any such procedure and +require for their successful working, both individually and together, +the most thorough mutual understanding and support. + +_Flanking, T-ing, etc._--It being a fact that no nation can put +a force upon the sea that is concentrated at one point; it being +a fact that every naval force must be spread over a considerable +area and made up of various parts, and that the efficacy of the +various parts in exerting force upon a definite enemy depends on +the unity of action of the various parts, it results that the most +effective way in which to attack any naval force is not to attack +all the parts at once, thus enabling all to reply, but to attack +the force in such a way that all the parts cannot reply. If we +attack a ship for instance, that can fire 10 guns on a broadside +and only 4 guns ahead, it is clear that we can do better by attacking +from ahead than from either side. Similarly, if 10 ships are in a +column, steaming one behind the other, each ship being able to +fire 10 guns from either side and only 4 ahead, the 10 ships can +fire 100 guns on either side and only 4 ahead; and therefore it +would be better to attack the column from ahead (to "T" it), than +to attack it from either side. + +It is curious to note how widely this simple illustration can be +made to apply to both strategy and tactics; how the effort of each +is to dispose our force so toward the enemy's force that we can +use our weapons more effectively than he can use his. An extreme +illustration might be made by imagining 1,000 soldiers standing +in line and unable to face except to the front; in which case it +is clear that, no matter how perfectly they might be armed, or +how quickly and accurately they could fire, one man standing on +the flank, or behind them, could kill one soldier after the other, +until all the 1,000 were killed, and be in no danger himself. + +In case of attacking a ship or a column of ships from ahead, or +of attacking a line of soldiers on the flank, the effectiveness of +the method of attack lies in the fact that a number of the weapons +that are present in the force attacked cannot be used in reply. + +[Illustration: Fig. 1] + +_Concentration and Isolation_.--The value of "concentration" is +often insisted on, but the author desires to call attention to +a misunderstanding on this point, to which he called attention +in an essay in 1905. To the author, it seems that concentration +is a means and not an end, and that the end is what he called +"isolation" in the essay. If a man concentrates his mind on any +subject, the advantage he gains is that he prevents other subjects +from obstructing the application of his mental powers to that subject; +he pushes to one side and isolates all other subjects. In this +particular activity it does not matter whether we call his act +"concentration" or "isolation" because the whole operation goes +on inside of his own skull, and concentration on one subject +automatically produces isolation or elimination of all others. +But when concentration is attempted on external objects, the case +is very different, for concentration may not produce isolation +at all. For instance, if 4 ships in column _A_ concentrate their +fire on the leading ship in column _B_, the other 3 ships in column +_B_ are not isolated, and can fire on the ships of column _A_, +even more effectively than if column _A_ was not concentrated on +the leading ship of _B_, because they are undisturbed by being +fired at. If, however, the 4 ships of _A_ "flank" or "T" the ships +of column _B_, as shown in Fig. 2, and concentrate on the leader of +B, they thereby isolate the other ships, and practically nullify +their ability to fire at _A_. + +[Illustration: Fig. 2] + +This effect is approximated by an approximate "T-ing" or "flanking," +such as is shown in Fig. 3; because the average distance from the +ships of _A_ to the leading ship in _B_ is less than the average +distance from the ships in _B_ to any ship in _A_; and because the +direction of fire from each ship in _A_ is more nearly abeam than +is the direction of fire from the ships of _B_. These positions +are very difficult to gain, even if _A_'s speed is considerably +greater than _B's_; since all _B_ has to do to prevent it is to +head to the right, unless shoals or other dangers such as enemy +battleships, _C_, are on that side, co-operating with _A_. + +[Illustration: Fig. 3] + +An interesting position is that shown in Fig. 4, which may be assumed +by _A_, either for flight, or to get the advantage in torpedo fire. +The advantage is that the _A_ ships are running away from torpedoes +fired by _B_, while _B_ is running into torpedoes fired by _A_. +This advantage is not great if the distance between _A_ and _B_ +is so little that _B's_ torpedoes can reach _A_. But if _A_ is +able to make this distance equal to the entire range over which +_B's_ torpedoes can run, or near it, _B's_ torpedoes cannot reach +_A_ at all. + +[Illustration: Fig. 4] + +A similar advantage, though in a modified degree, is that shown +as possessed by _A_ in Fig. 5. Due to the direction of movement +of the _A_ and _B_ fleets, it is easier for _A's_ torpedoes to +reach _B_, than for _B's_ torpedoes to reach _A_. + +[Illustration: Fig. 5] + +Positions of advantage are usually gained by superior speed. One +of the main reasons for the development of the battle cruiser has +been the fact that her high speed and great offensive power enable +her to gain positions of advantage and utilize them. The _A_ positions +shown in the figures are attainable by battle cruisers against +battleships, and are very effective. + +A procedure analogous to that of flanking is one in which part +of a force is attacked when it is separated from the rest of the +force, and cannot be supported by it--in that some of the weapons of +one force cannot be used. The effect is similar in the two cases, but +the events leading up to the two conditions may be quite different. + +In the former case, that of being flanked, or T'd, the force caught +at a disadvantage was together, and was able to operate effectively +as one force against a force located in a given direction; but +was attacked by a force located in another direction; while in +the latter case, the force was divided, and one part was caught, +while distant from and entirely unsupported by the other part. The +former condition is more likely to result from tactical operations, +and the latter from strategical operations--and yet, especially in +land operations, the flanking of one force may be brought about +by the carefully planned strategical combinations of the other +force; and catching one part of the enemy's force unsupported by +the other parts may take place during the tactical maneuvers of +an actual or a simulated battle. + +In naval operations, the catching of separated parts of an enemy's +force is a more frequent attempt and accomplishment than is that +of getting a position where a column of ships can be attacked from +ahead or astern. It seldom happens, with the great number of vessels +of all kinds which compose a modern fleet, that it is practicable +to keep the various parts together, or that it would be desirable +to do so. The closest approximation to keeping a large naval force +together, is keeping them in column; because in that formation, the +ships can be made simply to "follow the leader" without signal, and +act like one long, flexible body. But the vessels of a modern fleet +would make a column many miles long--a column of 20 battleships alone +would be 5 miles long, and the addition of the various cruisers, +destroyers, and other vessels, would make a column so long that +it would be unwieldy; and if its ends were attacked, the other +vessels could not come to their relief. Besides, the duties of +battleships, battle cruisers, scouts, destroyers, and submarines, +are distinct--with the result that, as in land operations, bodies +of the various types operate separately and apart from those of +other types. + +Not only, also, do the various types operate separately, but often +the necessities of a case demand that a certain number--say of +battleships--be sent away from the main body on some mission; or +that a certain number of destroyers be sent away from the main +body of destroyers. + +Any such diversion entails a danger that is sometimes great, and +sometimes small; but such diversions and risks cannot be avoided, +and should not be avoided when they are necessary, any more than a +man should avoid going out of doors, though that act always entails +some danger. Suppose, for instance, that in the operations of a +war carried on in the Caribbean, the Navy Department should get +trustworthy information that the enemy had detailed 3 battle cruisers +to speed north and bombard New York. The department would probably +have to detach a force from the fleet and send it north, to prevent +the bombardment. Yet not only would the force so sent be in danger +until it returned of an attack by a superior force, but the main body +from which it was detached would be thereby weakened; furthermore, the +information might have been incorrect--it might have been originated +and given out by the enemy, in the hope that it would cause such a +diversion of force. + +Every operation in war entails a risk more or less great; and if +no risks were to be taken, it would be better not to go to war. +It is true that some wars have been undertaken in which the +preponderance of force was so great that there was very little +doubt of the actual outcome, and very little risk taken by one of +the two parties. Such wars, however, have been very few; and they +were hardly wars in the usual sense, any more than the beating of +a little boy by a big boy could properly be called a "fight." + +Reference may again be made here to Table I on next page, which +shows the way in which fights between unequal forces proceed, and +the advantage of fighting the separated parts of an enemy rather +than the united force. We can see this clearly if we note that, if +two forces each aggregating 1,000 were in each other's vicinity, +and if the entire force _A_ was able to engage half of _B_, or +500, it would whip half of _B_, and have 841 remaining, with which +to engage the other half (500) of _B_. Reference to the end of +the third period in this table shows also that if a force of 789 +engages a force of 523, it will have 569 left, after the other +has been reduced to zero. So, a force of 1,000 that engages two +forces of 500 separately, will have more than 500 left, after the +others have both been reduced to zero: whereas, if it engages both, +when they are united, both sides will be gradually reduced to zero, +remaining equal all the time. + + TABLE I + ---------------------------------------------------------------------------- +| |Col.|Col.|Col.|Col.|Col.|Col.|Col.|Col.|Col.|Col.| +| | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 | 8 | 9 | 10 | +|----------------------------------------------------------------------------| +|Value of offensive power A|1000|1000|1000|1000|1000|1000|1000|1000|1000|1000| +| at beginning B|1000| 900| 800| 700| 600| 500| 400| 300| 200| 100| +|Damage done in 1st A| 100| 100| 100| 100| 100| 100| 100| 100| 100| 100| +| period B| 100| 90| 80| 70| 60| 50| 40| 30| 20| 10| +|Value of offensive power A| 900| 910| 920| 930| 940| 950| 960| 970| 980| 990| +| at end of 1st period B| 900| 800| 700| 600| 500| 400| 300| 200| 100| 0| +|Damage done in 2nd A| 90| 91| 92| 93| 94| 95| 96| 97| 98| | +| period B| 90| 80| 70| 60| 50| 40| 30| 20| 10| | +|Value of offensive power A| 810| 830| 850| 870| 890| 910| 930| 950| 970| | +| at end of 2nd period B| 810| 709| 608| 507| 406| 305| 204| 103| 2| | +|Damage done in 3rd A| 81| 83| 85| 87| 89| 91| 93| 95| | | +| period B| 81| 71| 61| 51| 41| 31| 20| 10| | | +|Value of offensive power A| 729| 759| 789| 819| 849| 879| 910| 940| | | +| at end of 3rd period B| 729| 626| 523| 420| 317| 214| 111| 8| | | +|Damage done in 4th A| 73| 76| 79| 82| 85| 88| 91| | | | +| period B| 73| 63| 52| 42| 32| 21| 11| | | | +|Value of offensive power A| 656| 696| 737| 777| 817| 858| 899| | | | +| at end of 4th period B| 656| 550| 444| 338| 232| 126| 20| | | | +|Damage done in 5th A| 65| 70| 74| 78| 82| 86| | | | | +| period B| 65| 55| 44| 34| 23| 13| | | | | +|Value of offensive power A| 591| 641| 693| 743| 794| 845| | | | | +| at end of 5th period B| 591| 480| 370| 260| 150| 40| | | | | +|Damage done in 6th A| 59| 64| 69| 74| 79| 85| | | | | +| period B| 59| 48| 37| 26| 15| 4| | | | | +|Value of offensive power A| 532| 593| 656| 717| 779| 841| | | | | +| at end of 6th period B| 532| 416| 301| 186| 71| 0| | | | | +|Damage done in 7th A| 53| 59| 66| 72| 78| | | | | | +| period B| 53| 42| 30| 19| 7| | | | | | +|Value of offensive power A| 479| 551| 626| 698| 772| | | | | | +| at end of 7th period B| 479| 357| 235| 114| 0| | | | | | +|Damage done in 8th A| 48| 55| 63| 70| | | | | | | +| period B| 48| 36| 24| 11| | | | | | | +|Value of offensive power A| 431| 515| 602| 687| | | | | | | +| at end of 8th period B| 431| 302| 172| 44| | | | | | | +|Damage done in 9th A| 43| 52| 60| 69| | | | | | | +| period B| 43| 30| 17| 4| | | | | | | +|Value of offensive power A| 388| 485| 585| 683| | | | | | | +| at end of 9th period B| 388| 250| 112| 0| | | | | | | +|Damage done in 10th A| 39| 49| 59| | | | | | | | +| period B| 39| 25| 11| | | | | | | | +|Value of offensive power A| 349| 460| 574| | | | | | | | +| at end of 10th period B| 349| 201| 53| | | | | | | | +|Damage done in 11th A| 35| 46| 57| | | | | | | | +| period B| 35| 20| 5| | | | | | | | +|Value of offensive power A| 314| 440| 569| | | | | | | | +| at end of 11th period B| 314| 155| 0| | | | | | | | +|Damage done in 12th A| 31| 44| | | | | | | | | +| period B| 31| 16| | | | | | | | | +|Value of offensive power A| 283| 426| | | | | | | | | +| at end of 12th period B| 283| 111| | | | | | | | | +| | |etc.| | | | | | | | | +|Total damage done by A| 717| 789| 800| 700| 600| 500| 400| 300| 200| 100| +| B| 717| 574| 431| 317| 228| 159| 101| 60| 30| 10| + ---------------------------------------------------------------------------- + +It is interesting to note how this simple fact is the key to most +of the operations of strategy and tactics; how--the mechanical +tools in the way of ships and guns and torpedoes having been +supplied--the key to their successful use is simply to take advantage +of all opportunities of isolating one part of the enemy's force +from the rest, and then attacking one of the parts with a force +superior to it. Opportunities lacking, one must, of course, try +to create opportunities by inducing the enemy to detach some part +of his force, under circumstances such that you can attack it, +or the weakened main body, with a superior force. Naturally, one +must try to prevent a similar procedure by the enemy. + +This does not mean that the sole effort of naval operations is +finesse in either strategy or tactics; sometimes the sole effort +is to force a pitched battle by the side that feels superior, and +to avoid a pitched battle by the side that feels inferior. Before +the actual inferiority or superiority has been ascertained, however, +the strategy of each commander is to bring about a situation in +which his force shall have the advantage. The advantage having +been gained and recognized (or an advantage existing and being +recognized), strategy insists on forcing a battle, for the reason +that _every contest weakens the loser more than it does the winner_. + +This does not mean that it is always wise to engage a weaker force +that is temporarily separated from its main body. It is readily +understandable, for instance, that it would be unwise in two cases: + +1. A case in which the weaker force were so little weaker, and +were part of a force so much larger than the total of the smaller +force, that the gain as between the two forces actually engaged +would not be great enough to compensate for the loss entailed. +For instance, a reference to Table I shows that an _A_ force of +1,000 engaging a _B_ force of 800 would have 569 left when _B_ was +reduced to zero. This is impressive: but if the _B_ force of 800 +were part of a total _B_ force of 2,000, in other words if there +were an _A_ force of 1,200 near at hand, _B_ would have 569 left +with which to oppose 1,200, a proportion a little less advantageous +than the proportion he started with--1,000 to 2,000. + +2. A case by which the _B_ force may have divided with the express +purpose of luring _A_ to attack; arrangements having been made +whereby the inferior _B_ force would simply hold the _A_ force +until the whole _B_ force could come to its assistance; arrangements +having been also made that this would be accomplished before the +detached part of _B_ should get very badly damaged. + +Attention is invited to Table III, which is a continuation of Table +I. It represents what would happen if a force of 1,000 should fight +separately two forces, one of 800 and the other of 200. In column +1, _A_ is supposed to have engaged the 200 first, and so to have +become reduced to 970, and to engage 800 afterward. In column 2, +_A_ is supposed to have engaged 800 first, thereby becoming reduced +to 569, and then to engage the 200 force. The table indicates that +it makes no difference whether _A_ engages the stronger or the +weaker force first. + +Column 3 shows that a force of 841, the part remaining after a +force of 1,000 had annihilated a force of 500, would have 653 left +after annihilating a second force of 500. Taken in connection with +columns 1 and 2, this indicates that it is easier to defeat two +separated _equal_ forces than two separated _unequal_ forces of the +same aggregate value; that the weakest way in which to divide a force +is into _equal_ parts. This fact is mathematically demonstrated by +Mr. F. W. Lanchester in a recent book called "Air Craft in Warfare." + + TABLE III + ------------------------------------------------------------------- +| |Col. 1|Col. 2|Col. 3| +|---------------------------------------------|------|------|------| +|Value of offensive at beginning A| 970 | 569 | 841 | +| B| 800 | 200 | 500 | +|Damage done in 1st period by A| 97 | 57 | 84 | +| B| 80 | 20 | 50 | +|Value of offensive power at end 1st period A| 890 | 549 | 791 | +| B| 703 | 143 | 416 | +|Damage done in 2d period by A| 89 | 55 | 79 | +| B| 70 | 14 | 42 | +|Value of offensive power at end 2d period A| 820 | 535 | 749 | +| B| 614 | 88 | 337 | +|Damage done in 3d period by A| 82 | 54 | 75 | +| B| 61 | 0 | 34 | +|Value of offensive power at end 3d period A| 759 | 526 | 715 | +| B| 532 | 32 | 262 | +|Damage done in 4th period by A| 76 | 53 | 72 | +| B| 53 | 3 | 26 | +|Value of offensive power at end 4th period A| 706 | 523 | 689 | +| B| 456 | 0 | 190 | +|Damage done in 5th period by A| 71 | | 69 | +| B| 46 | | 10 | +|Value of offensive power at end 5th period A| 660 | | 670 | +| B| 385 | | 121 | +|Damage done in 6th period by A| 66 | | 67 | +| B| 39 | | 12 | +|Value of offensive power at end 6th period A| 621 | | 658 | +| B| 319 | | 54 | +|Damage done in 7th period by A| 62 | | 66 | +| B| 32 | | 5 | +|Value of offensive power at end 7th period A| 589 | | 653 | +| B| 257 | | 0 | +|Damage done in 8th period by A| 59 | | | +| B| 26 | | | +|Value of offensive power at end 8th period A| 563 | | | +| B| 198 | | | +|Damage done in 9th period by A| 56 | | | +| B| 20 | | | +|Value of offensive power at end 9th period A| 543 | | | +| B| 142 | | | +|Damage done in 10th period by A| 54 | | | +| B| 14 | | | +|Value of offensive power at end 10th period A| 529 | | | +| B| 88 | | | +|Damage done in 11th period by A| 53 | | | +| B| 9 | | | +|Value of offensive power at end 11th period A| 520 | | | +| B| 35 | | | +|Damage done in 12th period by A| 52 | | | +| B| 4 | | | +|Value of offensive power at end 12th period A| 516 | | | +| B| 0 | | | + ------------------------------------------------------------------ + +The main advantage of superior speed in naval operations is the +ability it gives to secure tactical positions of advantage, and +to make desirable strategic dispositions; ability, for instance, +to T or flank an enemy force, and to prevent the enemy from T-ing +or flanking; also to catch separated parts of an enemy fleet before +they can unite, while retaining the ability to divide one's own +force without undue risk. For these purposes, speed is an element +of the highest value; but the high price that it costs in gun power +or armor protection--or both--and the fact that speed cannot always +be counted on by reason of possible engine breakdowns and foul +bottoms, result in giving to war-ships a lower speed than otherwise +they would have. + +Owing to the fact that, for any given horse-power put into a ship, +the speed attainable increases with her length; and owing to the +further fact that the weight that any ship can carry increases +more rapidly than the displacement (weight of the ship complete), +the best combination of gun power, armor protection, and speed is +attainable in the largest ship. In other words, the larger the +ship, the more power it can carry in proportion to its size, and +the more quickly that power can be placed where it can do the most +good. + +_Strategic Operations_.--These may be divided into two classes, +offensive and defensive. The two classes are distinct; and yet there +is no sharp dividing-line between them any more than there is between +two contiguous colors in the spectrum. Defensive operations of the +kind described by a popular interpretation of the word "defense" would +be operations limited to warding off or escaping the enemy's attack, +and would be just as efficacious as the passive warding off of the +blows of fists. Such a defense can never succeed, for the reason +that the recipient is reduced progressively in power of resistance +as the attacks follow each other, while the attacker remains in +unimpaired vigor, except for the gently depressing influence of +fatigue. Reference to Table I will render this point clear, if we +make the progressive reductions of the power of one contestant, +and no reductions of the power of the other contestant. + +Defensive operations, therefore, include "hitting back"; that is, +a certain measure of offensive operations, intended to weaken the +ability of the enemy to do damage. In fact, no operations are more +aggressively offensive, or more productive of damage to the enemy's +personnel and material, than operations that are carried on in order +to defend something. No animal is so aggressively belligerent as +a female "defending" her young. + +Offensive and defensive operations are nevertheless quite different, +especially in two particulars, one being the use of the initiative +or attack, and the other the distance to the home. In offensive +operations, the attack is made; in defensive operations, the attack +is resisted; and even if the resistance takes an aggressive character, +and drives the original attacker back to the place he started from, yet +the side which has made the original attack has carried on offensive +operations, and the other side defensive. Offensive operations are, +as a rule, carried on farther from home than defensive operations. If +_A_ is carrying on offensive operations against _B_, _A_ is usually +farther away from his home than _B_ is from his home. We see from +this that the offensive has the advantage of the initiative, of +making an attack for which the enemy may be unprepared, and has +the disadvantage of being far from its home bases; whereas the +defensive has the disadvantage of not knowing when or where or +whence an attack is to come, and the advantage of the support of +various kinds given by home bases. In other words, the offensive +has the advantage except in so far as it is impaired by unfavorable +conditions. + +For this reason, every military nation at the outset of war desires +to be able to assume the offensive; and only refrains from the +offensive from motives of prudence or because, in a particular +case, the distance between the adversaries is so great, that the +lack of bases would be of greater weight than the advantage of the +initiative--or because the situations of the contending parties would +be such that the side accepting the defensive role and staying near +home, might be able to carry on aggressive attacks better than could +the other. An illustration of a mistake in taking the offensive, +and the wisdom of the other side in accepting the defensive, may be +seen in Napoleon's expedition against Russia; for the Russians were +able to repel his attack completely, and then to assume a terrible +offensive against his retreating, disorganized, and starving army. +Another illustration was the expedition made by a weak Spanish fleet +under Cervera to the Caribbean in 1898. Another illustration was +that of the Russians in the war of 1904; the practical disadvantages +under which the Russian fleet operated at Tsushima were too great +to be balanced by the advantage of the attack; especially as the +situation was such that the Japanese were able to foretell with +enough accuracy for practical purposes the place where the attack +would be delivered, and the time. + +Operations on the sea, like operations on the land, consist in +opposing force to force, in making thrusts and making parries. +If two men or two ships contend in a duel, or if two parallel +columns--say of ten ships each--are drawn up abreast each other, +the result will depend mainly on the hitting and enduring powers of +the combatants; the conditions of the "stand-up fight" are realized, +and there is little opportunity for strategy to exert itself. + +But if any country--say the United States--finds herself involved +in war with--say a powerful naval Power or Powers of Europe, and the +realization of the fact comes with the suddenness that characterized +the coming of war in August, 1914, and we hear the same day that +a fleet of battleships, battle cruisers, destroyers, submarines, +aircraft, and auxiliaries has left the enemy's country, followed +by a fleet of transports carrying troops--there will be immediate +need for strategy of the most skilful kind; and this need will +continue until either the United States or her enemy has been made +to acknowledge herself beaten, and to sue for peace. + +As such a war will be mainly naval, and as naval wars are characterized +by great concentration of force, by each side getting practically +all its naval force into the contest, by each side staking its +all on the issue of perhaps a single battle (as the Russians and +Japanese did at Tsushima) one fleet or the other will be practically +annihilated, and its country will be exposed naked to the enemy. + +The first effort on hearing of the departure of the hostile fleet +will be, of course, to get our fleet out to sea, reinforced as much +as practicable, by our reserve ships; and to get the coast-guard +on their patrol stations. As we should not know the destination +of the enemy, we should either have to assume a destination and +send our fleet to that place (leaving the other places undefended) +or else send our fleet out to sea to some position from which it +would despatch scouts in different directions to intercept the +enemy, in order that our fleet might meet it and prevent its farther +advance. + +Of course, the latter procedure could not be carried out reasonably, +unless we had a great enough number of trained scouts to make the +interception of the enemy fleet probable; because otherwise the +probabilities would be that an enemy having the battle cruisers +and scouts that European navies have, would succeed in evading +our fleet and landing a force upon our shores; and it could not +be carried out reasonably either, if we knew that our fleet was +markedly inferior to the coming fleet; because to send out our +fleet to meet a much more powerful one in actual battle would be +to commit national suicide by the most expeditious method. + +In case the departure of the enemy fleet occurred in the stormy +months of the winter, we might feel warranted in guessing that its +immediate destination was the Caribbean; yet if our fleet were in +the Caribbean at the time, and if our coast lacked shore defenses as +at present, we might argue that the enemy would take the opportunity +to make a direct descent upon our coast, seize a base--say on the +eastern end of Long Island--and march directly on New York. It +would be very difficult to plan the development of a line of scouts +in such a way that the scouts would intercept an attack directed +at some unknown point between Boston and the West Indies, perhaps +in the southern part of the West Indies--say Margarita Island. +In fact, it would be impossible; with the result that, unless we +intercepted it by simple good luck, the enemy would succeed in +landing a force on our eastern coast, or else in the seizing of +a base in the West Indies or the southern part of the Caribbean +Sea. + +Either one of these acts, successfully performed by an enemy, would +give him an advantage; that is, it would make his position relatively +to ours better than it was before. It would have the same effect, +therefore, as winning a battle; in fact it would constitute the +winning of a battle--not a physical battle but a strategic battle. + +It may be objected that, unless we knew our fleet to be more powerful +it would be wiser and more comfortable for all concerned to withdraw +our ships to the shelter of their bases, and let the enemy do his +worst--on the theory that he could not do anything else so ruinous +to us as to sink our fleet. + +There is of course considerable reasonableness in this point of +view; and strategy declares the unwisdom of engaging in battles +that are sure to be lost. It must be remembered, however, that the +coming fleet will operate at a considerable strategic disadvantage, +owing to the necessity for guarding the "train" of auxiliary ships +that will come with it, holding fuel and supplies of various kinds; +that this handicap will offset a considerable advantage in offensive +strength; and that the handicap will be still greater if the enemy +fleet have near it a flotilla of transports carrying troops. It +must be remembered also that in all probability, we should not +have detailed information as to the number of vessels coming, and +should not really know whether it was superior to ours or not: +though we should be justified in assuming that the coming fleet +believed itself to be superior to ours in actual fighting power. +Absence of trustworthy information on such points is usual in warfare, +and is one of the elements that is the most difficult to handle. +The Navy Department would be more able to form a correct estimate +on this point than the commander-in-chief until such time as our +scouts might come into absolute contact with the enemy's main body; +but, until then, all that the department and fleet would know would +be that a large hostile force had left Europe. They would not know +its size or destination. + +Clearly, the first thing we should need would be information. To +get this after war has broken out, the only means is scouts. + +_Scouting and Screening_.--Scouts are needed by every navy; but +they are most needed by a navy that has a very long coast-line to +protect. If the great commercial centres and the positions that +an enemy would desire for advanced bases along the coast, have +local defenses adequate to keep off a hostile fleet for, say, two +weeks, the urgency of scouts is not quite so absolute; since, even +if the hostile fleet evades our scouts and our fleet, and reaches +our shores, our fleet will have two weeks in which to get to the +place attacked. But if the coast is not only long but also unguarded +by shore defenses, the urgency is of the highest order. + +If we knew our fleet to be the weaker, but if we did not believe it +to be so much the weaker as to force it to seek safety in flight, +our natural plan would be that of Napoleon's in Italy in 1797--to +keep our force together, and to hurl it against detached parts +of the enemy's force, whenever possible. This plan might not be +difficult of execution, if the enemy were accompanied by his train +of auxiliary and supply ships; since such ships are vulnerable to +almost any kind of attack, have almost no means of defense whatever, +and therefore require that a part of the fighting force of the +main body be detached to guard them. Whether the enemy would have +his train quite close to him, or a day's steaming behind, say 240 +miles, we should not, of course, know. + +How could we ascertain? + +If the enemy came along with no scouts ahead, and if we happened +to have some scouts located along his line of advance, these scouts +faster than his ships, and so heavily armed as not to fear to venture +near, our scouts might proceed along the flank of the enemy in +daylight, pass along his rear, go entirely around him, and then +report to our commander-in-chief by wireless telegraph exactly what +craft of all kinds comprised the force, what formation they were +in, the direction in which they were steaming, and the speed. Such +information would be highly appreciated by our commander-in-chief, +as it would enable him to decide what he had better do. If, for +instance, the scouts reported that the enemy fleet were steaming +at a speed of 10 knots an hour, and that the train was proceeding +behind the fighting fleet without any guards of any kind around +them, our commander-in-chief might decide to keep just out of sight +until after dark, and then rush in with all his force of heavy +ships and torpedo craft, and destroy the train entirely. + +But suppose the enemy fleet should advance with a "screen" consisting +of a line 10 miles long of, say, 50 destroyers, 50 miles ahead of +the main body; followed by a line of, say, 10 battle cruisers, +25 miles behind the destroyers; and with destroyers and battle +cruisers on each flank--say, 20 miles distant from the main body. +How could our scouts find out anything whatever about the size, +composition, and formation of the enemy--even of his speed and +direction of advance? The purpose of the "screen" is to prevent our +ascertaining these things; and each individual part of the screen +will do its best to carry out that purpose. All the vessels of the +screen and of the main body will be equipped with wireless-telegraph +apparatus and a secret code, by means of which instant communication +will be continuously held, the purport of which cannot be understood +by our ships. Any endeavor of any of our scouts to "penetrate the +screen" will be instantly met by the screen itself, out of sight of +the enemy's main body; and the screen cannot be penetrated in the +daytime, unless we can defeat those members of the screen that try +to hold us off. Now, inasmuch as all the considerable naval Powers +of Europe have many battle cruisers, and we have no battle cruisers +whatever, and no scouts of any kind, except three inefficient ones +(the _Birmingham_, _Chester_, and _Salem_) the degree of success +that we should have penetrating the screen in the daytime can be +estimated by any lawyer, merchant, or schoolboy. + +The Laws of successful scouting and of the use of "search curves" +have been worked out mathematically, and they are used to find +an enemy of which one has certain information; but they are also +used by the enemy to avoid being found, and they aid the enemy that +is sought almost as much as they aid the seeker. And the sought +has the advantage that the use of force, if force can be employed, +breaks up the application of the mathematics of the seeker. + +It is true that two main bodies of two fleets may stumble against +each other in the night-time, or in a fog or heavy mist. To prevent +this possible occurrence, or to prevent a night attack by destroyers, +no sure means has yet been found except examination before dark of +a very large area around the fleet that is sought; but the area +is too great for a search rigid enough to give complete security, +and will probably be so until swift aircraft can scout over long +distances at sea. Accepting for the minute the convention that +the main body of each side goes at the cruising speed of 10 knots, +and that darkness lasts 12 hours, each side will go 120 miles in +darkness; and if the two main bodies happen to be going directly +toward each other they will approach 240 miles in the darkness of +one night. Therefore, a coming fleet, in order to feel entirely +safe, would in daylight have to inspect by its scouts a circle +of 120 miles radius. To insure safety against destroyer attack, +the area would have to be much greater on account of the greater +speed of destroyers. + +[Illustration] + +Unless our defending fleet knew with reasonable sureness, however, +the location, speed, and direction of motion of the coming fleet, +so that it could make its dispositions for attack, it would hardly +desire to meet the enemy at night, unless it were confident that +it would meet the train and not the main fleet or the destroyers. +Night attacks, both on sea and land, are desirable, if the attacker +can inflict surprise on the attacked, and not be surprised himself. +In the darkness a flotilla of destroyers may make an attack on +the various vulnerable colliers and supply vessels of a fleet, +or even on the main body, and achieve a marked success, because +that is the role they are trained to play. But the tremendous power +and accuracy of battleships cannot be utilized or made available +in darkness; and therefore a commander-in-chief, anxious to defeat +by superior skill a coming fleet larger than his own, would hardly +throw away all chance of using skill by risking his main body in a +night encounter. Every operation planned by strategy is supposed +to result from the "decision" which follows the estimate of the +situation; even if in some simple or urgent cases, the decision +is not laboriously worked out, but is almost unconscious and even +automatic. Now, it is hardly conceivable that any estimate of the +situation would be followed by a decision to go ahead and trust to +luck, except in very desperate circumstances. In such circumstances, +when hope is almost gone, a desperate blow, even in the dark, may +save a situation--as a lucky hand at cards may redeem a gambler's +fortune at even the last moment. But strategy is opposed to taking +desperate measures; and pugilists and even gamblers recognize the +fact that when a man becomes "desperate," his judgment is bad, +and his chances of success are almost zero. + +While it is possible, therefore, that the main bodies of hostile +fleets may come together in the night, we may assume that it will +not be as part of any planned operations, and therefore not within +the scope of this discussion; and that any combat which may result +will be one in which strategy will play no part, and in which even +tactics will yield first place to chance. + +But while our defending fleet will have to base most of its decisions +on guesses, the coming fleet, on the other hand, having accepted +the strategical disadvantage of leaving its base far in rear, will +advance with all the advantage of the offensive, especially in +knowing where it intends to go and what it desires to do. Coming +over on a definite mission it will have been able to know what +preparations to make; and as the naval Powers of Europe understand +the need of co-ordination between policy and strategy, the fleet +will doubtless have had time to make those preparations; it will +not have started, in fact, and war will not have been declared, +until all those preparations have been made. + +We may assume that the coming fleet will come across with all possible +precautions for protecting itself against detection by the defender's +scouts, and therefore against an unexpected attack, by night or by +day. It cannot receive an unexpected attack unless surprised; and +how can it be surprised, if it has more scouts, faster scouts, and +more powerfully armed scouts than the defending fleet has? + +The possession of the more powerful scouts, however, will be valuable +to the enemy, not only for forming a screen as a protection against +enemy scouts, but also for scouting and thereby getting information +for itself. A numerous squadron of scouts of different kinds, sent +out ahead and on each flank would see any of our scouts that saw +them; and the scouts that were the more powerful would force the +weaker scouts back to the arms of their own main body, toward which +the more powerful scouts would, of course, advance. The weaker +scouts, therefore, would have no value whatever as a screen, save +in retarding the advance of the stronger scouts, and in delaying +their getting information. + +If the coming fleet is more powerful than the defending fleet, and +has a more numerous and powerful scouting force, it will, therefore, +be able to push back the defending fleet, whether an actual battle +occurs or not; and it will be able to bring over, also, a large +invading force in transports if its fighting superiority be great +enough. Furthermore, if we have not fortified and protected the +places which the enemy would wish to seize and use as advanced naval +bases, the enemy will be able to seize them, and will doubtless +do so. + +Of course, this is so obvious as to seem hardly worth declaring; +and yet some people hesitate even to admit it, and thereby they +assume a passive condition of moral cowardice; for they know that +a strong force has always overcome a weaker force that opposed +it in war; and that it always will do so, until force ceases to +be force. They know that force is that which moves, or tends to +move, matter; and that the greater the force, the more surely it +will move matter, or anything that opposes it. + +If, however, we establish naval bases near our valuable commercial +and strategic ports, both on our coast and in the Caribbean, and if +we fortify them so that an enemy could not take them quickly, the +condition of the enemy fleet will be much less happy; because it +will have to remain out on the ocean, where fuelling and repairing +are very difficult, and where it will be exposed, day and night, +especially at night, to attack by destroyers and submarines; and +in case necessity demands the occasional division of the force, +it must beware of attacks on the separated portions of the fleet. +The condition of a large fleet under way on an enemy's coast is one +requiring much patience and endurance, and one in which the number +of vessels is liable to be continuously reduced by the guerilla +warfare of the defenders. + +In the case of our attempting offensive operations against the +distant coast of an enemy, we would be in the same position as a +foreign enemy would be in when attacking our coast, in that our +chances of success would be excellent if our fleet were considerably +superior to the defending fleet in fighting power, and in the number +and strength of scouts, and if the enemy coast possessed numerous +undefended bays and islands which we could seize as bases. But even +if the superiority of our fleet in fighting power and scouts was +considerably greater than the enemy's our ultimate success would +be doubtful, if the enemy's coast and islands were so protected +by guns and mines and submarines that we could not get a base near +the scene of operations. It is true that the British were able to +maintain blockades of the French coast during many weary months +without any base nearer than England--a place far away to ships +whose only motive power was sails; but destroyers and submarines +and mines did not then exist, and these agencies are much more +valuable to the defender than to the blockader who has no base at +hand. + +Our operations without a base on a distant enemy coast would be +apt to degenerate into warding off a continual series of more or +less minor attacks by the minor craft of the defender. The commander +of our fleet would be constrained to keep his fighting force pretty +close together, thus restricting his initiative; lest the entire +enemy fleet catch a detached part out of supporting distance of +the main body, and annihilate it with little loss to themselves. +We could probably shut off most of the enemy's sea-borne commerce; +and the war would become one of endurance between our fleet, on +the one hand, and the economic forces and the morale of the enemy +country on the other hand. + +In the case of operations carried on far away from the bases of both +fleets, operations like those that the French and British carried on +in the West Indies, the commanders-in-chief will naturally be much +less directed by the admiralties at home than will a commander-in-chief +operating near home; and the strategical advantage, as affected +by the proximity of bases, and by the possession of the better +chance for the initiative, will be reduced to its minimum. + +Of course, the victory will go to the more powerful force; but +so many factors go to make up power, that it may be difficult to +determine which is the more powerful, until after victory itself +shall have decided it. Supposing the skill to be equal on both +sides, the victory will go to the side that possesses the most +numerous and powerful vessels of all kinds. But unless there is a +very great disproportion, it may be difficult to determine which +side has the more powerful ships, even though we may know which +side has the more numerous. It is extremely difficult to compare +even two single war-ships because we do not know the relative values +of their factors. Suppose two ships, for instance, to be equal +in all ways, except that one ship has ten 14-inch guns, and the +other has twelve 12-inch guns of higher initial velocity. Which is +the more powerful ship? Suppose one ship has more armor, another +more speed. Formulae designed to assign numerical values to fighting +ships have been laboriously worked out, notably by Constructor Otto +Kretschmer of the German navy; but the results cannot be accepted +as anything except very able approximations. Furthermore, if ship +_A_ could whip ship _B_ under some conditions, _B_ could whip _A_ +under other conditions. An extreme illustration would be battleship +_A_ engaged with submarine _B_ at close quarters; _B_ being on +the surface in one case, and submerged in the other case. + +_Aircraft_.--The influence of aircraft on naval operations is to +be very great indeed, but in directions and by amounts that it +would not be wise to attempt to predict. The most obvious influence +will be in distant scouting, for which the great speed of aircraft +will make them peculiarly adapted, as was demonstrated in the battle +near the Skagerak. It is the belief of the author, however, that +the time is close at hand when aeroplanes and dirigibles of large +size will be capable of offensive operations of the highest order, +including the launching of automobile torpedoes of the Whitehead +type. + +_Skill_.--The question of skill bears a relation to the question +of the material power directed by it that is very vital, but very +elusive. If, for instance, ship _C_, firing ten 12-inch guns on a +side, fights ship _D_, firing five like guns on a side, the advantage +would seem to be with _C_; but it would not be if each gun on _D_ +made three hits, while each gun on _C_ made one hit; a relative +performance not at all impossible or unprecedented. Similarily, +if the head of the admiralty of the _E_ fleet were a very skilful +strategist, and the head of the admiralty of the _F_ fleet were +not, and if the various admirals, captains, lieutenants, engineers, +and gunners of the _E_ fleet were highly skilled, and those of +the _F_ fleet were not, the _E_ fleet might be victorious, even +if materially it were much the smaller in material and personnel. +In case the head of the admiralty of the _E_ fleet were the more +skilful, while the officers of the _F_ fleet were, on the average, +more skilful than those of the _E_ fleet, it would be impossible +to weigh the difference between them; but as a rough statement, +it may be said that if the head of the admiralty of either fleet +is more skilful than the other, his officers will probably be more +skilful than the officers of the other; so pervasive is the influence +of the chief. + +The effectiveness of modern ships and guns and engines and torpedoes, +when used with perfect skill, is so great that we tend unconsciously +to assume the perfect skill, and think of naval power in terms +of material units only. Yet daily life is full of reminders that +when two men or two bodies of men contend, the result depends in +large though varying measure on their relative degrees of skill. + +Whenever one thinks of using skill, he includes in his thought +the thing in the handling of which the skill is employed. One can +hardly conceive of using skill except in handling something of the +general nature of an instrument, even if the skill is employed in +handling something which is not usually called an instrument. For +instance, if a man handles an organization with the intent thereby +to produce a certain result, the organization is the instrument +whereby he attempts to produce the result. + +If a man exercises perfect skill, he achieves with his instrument +100 per cent of its possible effect. If he exercises imperfect +skill, he achieves a smaller percentage of its possible effect. + +To analyze the effectiveness of skill, let us coin the phrase, +"effective skill," and agree that, if a man produces 100 per cent of +the possible, his effective skill is 100 per cent, and, in general, +that a man's effective skill in using any instrument is expressed by +the percentage he achieves of what the instrument can accomplish; +that, for instance, if a gun is fired at a given range under given +conditions, and 10 per cent hits are made in a given time, then +the effective skill employed is 10 per cent. + +From this standpoint we see that imperfect skill is largely concerned +with errors. If a man uses, say, a gun, with perfect skill, he +commits no error in handling the gun; and the smaller the sum total +of errors which he commits in handling the gun, the greater his +effective skill and the greater the number of hits. + +The word "errors," as here used, does not simply mean errors of +commission, but means errors of omission as well. If a man, in +firing a gun, fails to press the button or trigger when his sights +are on, he makes an error just as truly as the man does who presses +the button or trigger when the sights are not on. + +Suppose that, in firing a gun, under given conditions of range, +etc., the effective skill employed is 10 per cent. This means that +10 per cent of hits are made. But it means another thing equally +important--it means that 90 per cent of misses are made. To what +are these misses due? Clearly they are due to errors made, not +necessarily by the man who fires the gun, but by all the people +concerned. If the correct sight-bar range were given to the gun, +and if the gun were correctly laid and the pointer pressed the +button at precisely the right instant, the shot would hit the target, +practically speaking. But, in actual practice, the range-finder +makes an error, the spotter makes an error, the plotting-room makes +an error, the sight-setter makes an error, and the gun-pointer +makes an error. The sum total of all of these errors results in +90 per cent of misses. + +Suppose that by careful training these errors are reduced in the +relation of 9 to 8, so that instead of there being 90 per cent +of misses there are only 80 per cent. This does not seem a very +difficult thing for training to accomplish, but note the result: the +hits are increased from 10 per cent to 20 per cent. In other words, +by a decrease in errors in the relation of 9 to 8, the effective +skill and the hits are doubled. + +Conversely, if the errors increased in the ratio of 9 to 10, the +misses would increase from 90 per cent to 100 per cent, and the +hits would be reduced from 10 per cent to 0. + +Suppose now that the conditions are so very difficult that only +1 per cent of hits is made, or 99 per cent of misses, and that by +training the misses are reduced from 99 per cent to 98 per cent. +Clearly, by a decrease of errors of hardly more than 1 per cent +the effective skill and the hits are doubled. + +Conversely, if the errors increased in the ratio of 99 to 100, +the misses would increase from 99 per cent to 100 per cent, and +the hits would be reduced from 1 per cent to 0. + +But suppose that the conditions are so easy that 90 per cent of +hits are made and only 10 per cent of misses. Clearly, if the errors +were divided by 10, so that only 1 per cent of misses was made, +instead of 10 per cent, the number of hits would increase only +9 per cent, from 90 per cent to 99 per cent. + +Of course, this is merely an arithmetical way of expressing the +ancient truths that skill becomes more and more important as the +difficulties of handling an instrument increase; and that, no matter +how effective an instrument may be when used with perfect skill, +the actual result obtained in practice is only the product of its +possible performance and the effective skill with which it is used. + +Applying this idea to naval matters, we see why the very maximum +of skill is required in our war mechanisms and war organizations, +in their almost infinite variety and complexity. The war mechanisms +and war organizations of the military nations are capable of enormous +results, but only when they are used with enormous skill. There +are no other instruments or organizations that need so much skill +to handle them, because of the difficulties attending their use +and the issues at stake. Their development has been a process long +and painful. On no other things has so much money been spent; to +perfect no other things have so many lives been sacrificed; on +no other things, excepting possibly religion, have so many books +been written; to no other things has the strenuous exertion of so +many minds been devoted; in operating no other things has such +a combination of talent and genius and power of will and spirit +been employed. + +A battleship is an instrument requiring skill to handle well, considered +both as a mechanism and as an organization. Its effective handling +calls for skill not only on the part of the captain, but on the +part of all hands. The finest dreadnaught is ineffective if manned +by an ineffective crew. The number and complexity of the mechanisms +on board are so great as to stagger the imagination; and the +circumstances of modern warfare are so difficult that, as between +two forces evenly matched as to material, a comparatively slight +advantage in errors made will turn the scale in favor of the more +skilful. A difference in errors, for instance, in the relation of +9 to 8, under the conditions mentioned above, between two fleets +having an equal number of similar ships, would give one side twice +as many hits as the other in any given length of time. + +In March, 1905, the writer published an essay in the _Proceedings +of the U. S. Naval Institute_ called "American Naval Policy," in +which the effect of initial superiority in gun-fire was shown in +tables. One table showed that an initial advantage of only 10 per +cent secured an overwhelming victory by an accumulative effect. +Now a difference of 10 per cent in hits, under conditions in which +the hits were about 10 per cent of the maximum, would mean, roughly +speaking, the difference between 10 hits and 9 hits in a given +length of time, or a difference between 90 misses and 91 misses; +a difference in errors made of a little more than 1 per cent. + +The conclusion to be drawn is too obvious to be stated. Perhaps +the conclusion is not broadly new; but possibly the idea is new +that so small a difference in errors made will, under conditions +of sufficient difficulty, produce such a tremendous difference +in results. + +Now, a division is more complex and more difficult to handle perfectly +than is a battleship; a squadron more so than a division; a fleet +more so than a squadron; a navy more so than a fleet. + +_Necessity for Knowledge of the Naval Machine_.--There is no machine +or tool so simple that knowledge of it is not needed in order to +use it skilfully. This does not mean that intimate knowledge of +the details of construction of a machine is necessary in order to +operate it; it does not mean, for instance, that a sharp-shooter +must have a profound knowledge of the metallurgy of the metal of +which his gun is mainly made, or of the laws of chemistry and physics +that apply to powder, or of the laws of ballistics that govern +the flight of the bullet to its target. But it does mean that any +skilful handler of any machine must know how to use it; that a +sharpshooter, for instance, must know how to use his machine--the +gun. + +Of course, a sharpshooter's skill is exercised in operating under +very limited conditions, the conditions of shooting; and it does not +include necessarily the maintenance of his gun in good condition. +The operating of some machines, however, includes the maintenance +of those machines; and a simple illustration is that of operating +an automobile. An automobile is constructed to be operated at +considerable distances from home; and a man whose knowledge and +skill were limited to steering, stopping, starting, and backing +the car--who had no knowledge of its details of construction and +could not repair a trifling injury--would have very little value +as a chauffeur. + +A like remark might truthfully be made about the operation of any +complex machine; and the more complex the machine, the more aptly +the remark would apply. The chief engineer of any electric plant, +of any municipal water-works, of any railroad, of any steamship +must have the most profound and intimate knowledge of the details +of construction and the method of operation of the machine committed +to his charge. Recognition of this fact by the engineering profession +is so complete and perfect as to be almost unconscious; and no man +whose reasoning faculties had been trained by the exact methods +of engineering could forget it for a moment. The whole structure +of that noble science rests on facts that have been demonstrated +to be facts, and the art rests on actions springing from those +facts; and neither the science nor the art would now exist, if +machines created by engineering skill had been committed to the +charge of men unskilled. + +It is obvious that the more complicated in construction any machine +is, the more time and study are needed to understand it fully; and +that the more complicated its method of operation is, the more +practice is needed in order to attain skill in operating it. + +The more simple the method of operation, the more closely a machine +approaches automatism; but even automatic machines are automatic +only in so far as their internal mechanisms are concerned; and +the fact of their being automatic does not eliminate the necessity +for skill in using them. An automatic gun, for instance, no matter +how perfectly automatically it discharges bullets, may be fired +at an advancing enemy skilfully or unskilfully, effectively or +ineffectively. + +In operating some machines, such as a soldier's rifle, or a billiard +cue, the number of mental, nervous, and muscular operations is +apparently very few; yet every physician knows that the number is +very great indeed, and the operations extremely complex--complex +beyond the knowledge of the psychologist, physicist, chemist, and +biologist. The operation of more complex mechanisms, such as +automobiles, seems to be more difficult, because the operator has +more different kinds of things to do. Yet that it is really more +difficult may be doubted for two reasons; one being that each single +operation is of a more simple nature, and the other reason being +that we know that a much higher degree of skill is possessed by +a great billiardist than by an automobile chauffeur. Of course, +the reason of this may be that competition among billiardists has +been much more keen than among chauffeurs; but even if this be +true, it reminds us that _the difficulty of operating any machine +depends on the degree of skill exacted_. It also reminds us that, +if a machine is to be operated in competition with another machine, +the skill of the operator should be as great as it can be made. + +The steaming competitions that have been carried on in our navy +for several years are examples on a large scale of competitive +trials of skill in operating machines. These machines are very +powerful, very complex, very important; and that supreme skill +shall be used in operating them is very important too. For this +reason, every man in the engineering department of every ship, +from the chief engineer himself to the youngest coal-passer, is +made to pass an examination of some kind, in order that no man +may be put into any position for which he is unfit, and no man +advanced to any position until he has shown himself qualified for +it, both by performance in the grade from which he seeks to rise, +and by passing a professional examination as to the duties in the +grade to which he desires to rise. + +The same principles apply to all machines; and the common sense +of mankind appreciates them, even if the machines are of the human +type. A captain of a company of soldiers, in all armies and in all +times, has been trained to handle a specific human machine; so has +the captain of a football team, so has the rector of a church. The +training that each person receives gives him such a subconscious sense +of the weights and uses of the various parts of the machine, that he +handles them almost automatically--and not only automatically but +instantly. The captain on the bridge, when an emergency confronts +him, gives the appropriate order instantly. + +Now the word "machine" conveys to the minds of most of us the image +of an engine made of metal, the parts of which are moved by some +force, such as the expansive force of steam. But machines were in +use long before the steam-engine came, and one of the earliest +known to man was man himself--the most perfect machine known to +him now, and one of the most complicated and misused; for who of +us does not know of some human machine of the most excellent type, +that has been ruined by the ignorance or negligence of the man +to whose care it was committed? + +A machine is in its essence an aggregation of many parts, so related +to each other and to some external influence, that the parts can +be made to operate together, to attain some desired end or object. +From this point of view, which the author believes to be correct, +a baseball team is a machine, so is a political party, so is any +organization. + +Before the days of civilization, machines were few in type; but +as civilization progressed, the necessity for organizations of +many kinds grew up, and organizations of many kinds appeared. Then +the necessity for knowledge of how to operate those organizations +brought about certain professions, first that of the military, +second that of the priesthood, and later those of the law, medicine, +engineering, etc. As time has gone on, the preparation required +for these professions, especially the progressive professions, +has become increasingly difficult and increasingly demanded; and +the members of the professions have become increasingly strict +in their requirements of candidates for membership. + +Now the profession that is the most strict of all, that demands the +greatest variety of qualifications, and the earliest apprenticeship, +is the military. The military profession serves on both the land +and the sea, in armies and navies; and while both the land and +the sea branches are exacting in their demands, the sea or naval +branch is the more exacting of the two; by reason of the fact that +the naval profession is the more esoteric, the more apart from the +others, the more peculiar. In all the naval countries, suitable +youths are taken in hand by their governments, and initiated into +the "mysteries" of the naval profession--mysteries that would always +remain mysteries to them, if their initiation were begun too late in +life. Many instances are known of men who obtained great excellence in +professions which they entered late in life; but not one instance in +the case of a man who entered the naval profession late in life. And +though some civilian heads of navies have shown great mental capacity, +and after--say three years'--incumbency have shown a comprehension +of naval matters greater than might have been expected, none has +made a record of performance like those of the naval ministers +of Germany and Japan; or of Admiral Barham, as first lord of the +admiralty, or Sir John Fisher as first sea lord, in England. + +A navy is so evidently a machine that the expression "naval machine" +has often been applied to it. It is a machine that, both in peace and +in war, must be handled by one man, no matter how many assistants +he may have. If a machine cannot be made to obey the will of one +man, it is not one machine. If two men are needed, at least two +machines are to be operated; if three men are needed there are at +least three machines, etc. One fleet is handled by one man, called +the commander-in-chief. If there are two commanders-in-chief, there +are two fleets; and these two fleets may act in conjunction, in +opposition, or without reference to each other. + +The fact of a machine being operated by one man does not, however, +prevent the machine from comprising several machines, operated +by several men. A vessel of war, for instance, is operated as a +unit by one man; the words "vessel of war," meaning not only the +inert hull, but all the parts of personnel and material that make a +vessel of war. The captain does not handle each individual machine +or man; but he operates the mechanism and the personnel, by means +of which all the machines and men are made to perform their tasks. + +Now the naval machine is composed of many machines, but the machines +that have to be "operated" in war, using the word "operated" in +the usual military sense, are only the active fleet, the bureaus +and offices and the bases; including in the bases any navy-yards +within them. Using the word "operated" still more technically, +the only thing to be operated in war is the fleet: but the head +of the Navy Department must also so direct the logistical efforts +of the bureaus and offices and bases, that the fleet shall be given +the material in fuel, supplies, and ammunition with which to conduct +those operations. Like the chief engineer of a ship, he must both +operate and maintain the machine. + +The fleet itself is a complex machine, even in time of peace. In +war time it is more so, for the reason that many additions are +made to the fleet when war breaks out; and these additions, being +largely of craft and men held in reserve, or brought in hurriedly +from civil life, cannot be so efficient or so reliable as are the +parts of the fleet that existed in time of peace. + +The active fleet consists of battleships, battle cruisers, cruisers +of various speeds and sizes, destroyers, submarines, and aircraft. +The fleet is under the immediate command of its commander-in-chief, +just as the New York naval station is under the command of its +commandant; but the commander-in-chief of the fleet is just as +strictly under the command of the head of the admiralty or Navy +Department as is the commandant. The commander-in-chief is the +principal part of the naval machine that is operated in war; and +the ultimate success of the naval machine in war depends largely +on the amount and degree of understanding that exists between the +commander-in-chief and the head of the Navy Department. That goodwill +and kindly feeling should exist between them may be assumed, since +both have the same object in view; but that real understanding +should exist between them is more difficult to assume, especially +if they have been trained in different schools and have not known +each other until late in life. In the latter case, misunderstandings +are apt to arise, as time goes on; and if they do, the most cordial +good feeling may change into mutual distrust and suspicion, and +even hatred. To see that such things have happened in the past, +we do not have to look further back in history than the records of +our own Civil War, especially the records of the mutual relations +of the head of the War Department and some generals. That a situation +equally grave did not exist between the head of the Navy Department +and any of the admirals may be attributed to the fact that the +number of naval defeats was less than the number of defeats on land, +to the lesser number of persons in the navy, and to the smaller +number of operations. Perhaps a still greater reason was the greater +confidence shown by civilians in their ability to handle troops, +compared with their confidence in their ability to handle fleets. + +Even between the Navy Department and the officers, however, mutual +respect and understanding can hardly be said to have existed. This +did not prevent the ultimate triumph of the Union navy; but that +could hardly have been prevented by any means, since the Union +navy was so much superior to the Confederate. + +_Co-operation between the Navy Department and the Fleet_.--In any +war with a powerful navy, into which the U. S. navy may enter, +the question of co-operation between the department and the fleet +will be the most important factor in the portentous situation that +will face us. We shall be confronted with the necessity of handling +the most complex and powerful machine known to man with the utmost +possible skill; and any lack of understanding between the fleet +and the department, and any slowness of apprehension or of action +by the department, may cause a national disaster. One of the most +important dangers to be guarded against will be loss of time. In +naval operations the speed of movement of the forces is so great +that crises develop and pass with a rapidity unexampled formerly; +so that delays of any kind, or due to any causes, must be prevented +if that be possible. If a swordsman directs a thrust at the heart, +the thrust must be parried--_in time_. + +[Illustration: STRATEGIC MAP OF THE ATLANTIC AND PACIFIC OCEANS.] + + + +***END OF THE PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK THE NAVY AS A FIGHTING MACHINE*** + + +******* This file should be named 17547.txt or 17547.zip ******* + + +This and all associated files of various formats will be found in: +https://www.gutenberg.org/dirs/1/7/5/4/17547 + + + +Updated editions will replace the previous one--the old editions +will be renamed. + +Creating the works from public domain print editions means that no +one owns a United States copyright in these works, so the Foundation +(and you!) can copy and distribute it in the United States without +permission and without paying copyright royalties. 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