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diff --git a/17556.txt b/17556.txt new file mode 100644 index 0000000..1cecd66 --- /dev/null +++ b/17556.txt @@ -0,0 +1,6281 @@ +The Project Gutenberg EBook of Sextus Empiricus and Greek Scepticism, by +Mary Mills Patrick + +This eBook is for the use of anyone anywhere at no cost and with +almost no restrictions whatsoever. You may copy it, give it away or +re-use it under the terms of the Project Gutenberg License included +with this eBook or online at www.gutenberg.org + + +Title: Sextus Empiricus and Greek Scepticism + +Author: Mary Mills Patrick + +Release Date: January 20, 2006 [EBook #17556] + +Language: English + +Character set encoding: ASCII + +*** START OF THIS PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK SEXTUS EMPIRICUS AND GREEK *** + + + + +Produced by Turgut Dincer, Ted Garvin and the Online +Distributed Proofreading Team at http://www.pgdp.net + + + + + + + + + +SEXTUS EMPIRICUS +AND +GREEK SCEPTICISM + + +_A Thesis accepted for the Degree of Doctor of_ +_Philosophy in the University of Bern_ +_Switzerland, November_ 1897 + +by + +MARY MILLS PATRICK + +PRESIDENT OF THE AMERICAN COLLEGE, CONSTANTINOPLE +TURKEY + + +_This Thesis is accompanied by a Translation from the Greek_ +_of the First Book of the "Pyrrhonic Sketches_" +_by Sextus Empiricus_ + + +CAMBRIDGE + +DEIGHTON BELL & CO. + +LONDON GEORGE BELL & SONS + +1899 + +CAMBRIDGE + +PRINTED BY JONATHAN PALMER + +ALEXANDRA STREET + + + + +PREFACE + + +The following treatise on Sextus Empiricus and Greek Scepticism +has been prepared to supply a need much felt in the English +language by students of Greek philosophy. For while other +schools of Greek philosophy have been exhaustively and +critically discussed by English scholars, there are few sources +of information available to the student who wishes to make +himself familiar with the teachings of Pyrrhonism. The aim has +been, accordingly, to give a concise presentation of Pyrrhonism +in relation to its historical development and the Scepticism of +the Academy, with critical references to the French and German +works existing on the subject. The time and manner of the +connection of Sextus Empiricus with the Pyrrhonean School has +also been discussed. + +As the First Book of the _Hypotyposes_, or Pyrrhonic Sketches by +Sextus Empiricus, contains the substance of the teachings of +Pyrrhonism, it has been hoped that a translation of it into +English might prove a useful contribution to the literature on +Pyrrhonism, and this translation has been added to the critical +part of the work. + +In making this translation, and in the general study of the +works of Sextus, the Greek text of Immanuel Bekker, Berlin, +1842, has been used, with frequent consultation of the text of +J.A. Fabricius, 1718, which was taken directly from the existing +manuscripts of the works of Sextus. The divisions into chapters, +with the headings of the chapters in the translation, is the +same as Fabricius gives from the manuscripts, although not used +by Bekker, and the numbers of the paragraphs are the same as +those given by both Fabricius and Bekker. References to Diogenes +Laertius and other ancient works have been carefully verified. + +The principal modern authors consulted are the following: + +Ritter, _Geschichte der Philosophie_, II. Auf., Hamburg, + 1836-38. + +Zeller, _Philosophie der Griechen_, III. Auf., Leipzig, + 1879-89. + +Lewes, _History of Philosophy_, Vol. I., London, 1866. + +Ueberweg, _History of Philosophy_, IV. ed., translated by + Morris, 1871. + +Brochard, _Les Sceptiques Grecs_, Paris, 1877. + +Brochard, _Pyrrhon et le Scepticism Primitive_, No. 5, Ribot's + _Revue Phil._, Paris, 1885. + +Saisset, _Le Scepticism Aenesideme-Pascal-Kant_, Paris, 1867. + +Chaignet, _Histoire de la Psychologie des Grecs_, Paris, + 1887-90. + +Haas, _Leben des Sextus Empiricus_, Burghausen, 1882. + +Natorp, _Forschungen zur Geschichte des Erkenntnisproblems bei + den Alten_, Berlin, 1884. + +Hirzel, _Untersuchungen zu Cicero's philosophischen Schriften_, + Leipzig, 1877-83. + +Pappenheim, _Erlaeuterung zu des Sextus Empiricus Pyrrhoneischen + Grundzuegen_, Heidelberg, 1882. + +Pappenheim, _Die Tropen der Greichischen Skeptiker_, Berlin, + 1885. + +Pappenheim, _Lebensverhaeltnisse des Sextus Empiricus_, Berlin, + 1887. + +Pappenheim, _Der angebliche Heraclitismus des Skeptikers + Ainesidemos_, Berlin, 1887. + +Pappenheim, _Der Sitz der Schule der Griechischen Skeptiker, + Archiv fuer Geschichte der Philosophie_, I. 1, S. 47, 1887. + +Maccoll, _The Greek Sceptics from Pyrrho to Sextus_, London, + 1869. + +My grateful acknowledgments are due to Dr. Ludwig Stein, +Professor of Philosophy in the University of Bern, for valuable +assistance in relation to the plan of the work and advice in +regard to the best authorities to be consulted. Thanks are also +due to Dr. Louisos Iliou, of Robert College, Constantinople, for +kind suggestions concerning the translation. + + + + +CONTENTS + + + + +CHAPTER I. + +THE HISTORICAL RELATIONS OF SEXTUS EMPIRICUS ... 1 + +Introductory paragraph.--The name of Sextus Empiricus. +His profession.--The time when he lived.--The place of +his birth.--The seat of the Sceptical School while Sextus +was at its head.--The character of the writings of Sextus +Empiricus. + + +CHAPTER II. + +THE POSITION AND AIM OF PYRRHONIC SCEPTICISM ... 23 + +The subject-matter of the Hypotyposes.--The origin of +Pyrrhonism.--The nomenclature of Pyrrhonism.--Its +criterion.--Its aim.--[Greek: epoche] and [Greek: ataraxia].--The +standpoint of Pyrrhonism. + + +CHAPTER III. + +THE SCEPTICAL TROPES ... 31 + +Origin of the name.--The ten Tropes of [Greek: epoche].--The +First Trope.--The Second Trope.--The Third Trope.--The Fourth +Trope.--The Fifth Trope.--The Sixth Trope.--The Seventh +Trope.--The Eighth Trope.--The Ninth Trope.--The Tenth +Trope.--The five Tropes of Agrippa.--The two Tropes.--The Tropes +of Aenesidemus against Aetiology. + + +CHAPTER IV. + +AENESIDEMUS AND THE PHILOSOPHY OF HERACLITUS ... 63 + +Statement of the problem.--The theory of Pappenheim.--The theory +of Brochard.--Zeller's theory.--The theory of Ritter and +Saisset.--The theory of Hirzel and Natorp.--Critical examination +of the subject. + + +CHAPTER V. + +CRITICAL EXAMINATION OF PYRRHONISM ... 81 + +Pyrrhonism and Pyrrho.--Pyrrhonism and the Academy. Strength and +weakness of Pyrrhonism. + + * * * * * + +THE FIRST BOOK OF THE PYRRHONIC SKETCHES BY SEXTUS +EMPIRICUS, TRANSLATED FROM THE GREEK ... 101 + + + + +CHAPTER I. + + +_The Historical Relations of Sextus Empiricus._ + +Interest has revived in the works of Sextus Empiricus in recent +times, especially, one may say, since the date of Herbart. There +is much in the writings of Sextus that finds a parallel in the +methods of modern philosophy. There is a common starting-point +in the study of the power and limitations of human thought. +There is a common desire to investigate the phenomena of +sense-perception, and the genetic relations of man to the lower +animals, and a common interest in the theory of human knowledge. + +While, however, some of the pages of Sextus' works would form a +possible introduction to certain lines of modern philosophical +thought, we cannot carry the analogy farther, for Pyrrhonism as +a whole lacked the essential element of all philosophical +progress, which is a belief in the possibility of finding and +establishing the truth in the subjects investigated. + +Before beginning a critical study of the writings of Sextus +Empiricus, and the light which they throw on the development of +Greek Scepticism, it is necessary to make ourselves somewhat +familiar with the environment in which he lived and wrote. We +shall thus be able to comprehend more fully the standpoint from +which he regarded philosophical questions. + +Let us accordingly attempt to give some details of his life, +including his profession, the time when he lived, the place of +his birth, the country in which he taught, and the general aim +and character of his works. Here, however, we encounter great +difficulties, for although we possess most of the writings of +Sextus well preserved, the evidence which they provide on the +points mentioned is very slight. He does not give us +biographical details in regard to himself, nor does he refer to +his contemporaries in a way to afford any exact knowledge of +them. His name even furnishes us with a problem impossible of +solution. He is called [Greek: Sextos ho empeirikos] by Diogenes +Laertius[1]: [Greek: Herodotou de diekouse Sextos ho empeirikos +hou kai ta deka ton skeptikon kai alla kallista' Sextou de +diekouse Satorninos ho Kythenas, empeirikos kai autos]. Although +in this passage Diogenes speaks of Sextus the second time +without the surname, we cannot understand the meaning otherwise +than that Diogenes considered Sextus a physician of the +Empirical School. Other evidence also is not wanting that Sextus +bore this surname. Fabricius, in his edition of the works of +Sextus, quotes from the _Tabella de Sectis Medicorum_ of +Lambecius the statement that Sextus was called Empiricus because +of his position in medicine.[2] + +Pseudo-Galen also refers to him as one of the directors of the +Empirical School, and calls him [Greek: Sextos ho +empeirikos].[3] His name is often found in the manuscripts +written with the surname, as for example at the end of _Logic +II_.[4] In other places it is found written without the surname, +as Fabricius testifies, where Sextus is mentioned as a Sceptic +in connection with Pyrrho. + + [1] Diog. Laert. IX. 12, 116. + + [2] Fabricius _Testimonia_, p. 2. + + [3] Pseudo-Galen _Isag._ 4; Fabricius _Testimonia_, p. 2. + + [4] Bekker _Math._ VIII. 481. + +The Sceptical School was long closely connected with the +Empirical School of medicine, and the later Pyrrhoneans, when +they were physicians, as was often the case, belonged for the +most part to this school. Menedotus of Nicomedia is the first +Sceptic, however, who is formally spoken of as an Empirical +physician,[1] and his contemporary Theodas of Laodicea was also +an Empirical physician. The date of Menedotus and Theodas is +difficult to fix, but Brochard and Hass agree that it was about +150 A.D.[2] After the time of these two physicians, who were +also each in turn at the head of the Sceptical School,[3] there +seems to have been a definite alliance between Pyrrhonism and +Empiricism in medicine, and we have every reason to believe that +this alliance existed until the time of Sextus. + + [1] Diog. IX. 12, 115. + + [2] Brochard _Op. cit. Livre_ IV. p. 311. + + [3] Diog. IX. 12, 116. + +The difficulty in regard to the name arises from Sextus' own +testimony. In the first book of the _Hypotyposes_ he takes +strong ground against the identity of Pyrrhonism and Empiricism +in medicine. Although he introduces his objections with the +admission that "some say that they are the same," in recognition +of the close union that had existed between them, he goes on to +say that "Empiricism is neither Scepticism itself, nor would it +suit the Sceptic to take that sect upon himself",[1] for the +reason that Empiricism maintains dogmatically the impossibility +of knowledge, but he would prefer to belong to the Methodical +School, which was the only medical school worthy of the Sceptic. +"For this alone of all the medical sects, does not proceed +rashly it seems to me, in regard to unknown things, and does not +presume to say whether they are comprehensible or not, but it is +guided by phenomena.[2] It will thus be seen that the Methodical +School of medicine has a certain relationship to Scepticism +which is closer than that of the other medical sects."[3] + + [1] _Hyp_. I. 236. + + [2] _Hyp_. I. 237. + + [3] _Hyp_. I. 241. + +We know from the testimony of Sextus himself that he was a +physician. In one case he uses the first person for himself as a +physician,[1] and in another he speaks of Asclepius as "the +founder of our science,"[2] and all his illustrations show a +breadth and variety of medical knowledge that only a physician +could possess. He published a medical work which he refers to +once as [Greek: iatrika hupomnemata],[3] and again as [Greek: +empeirika hupomnemata][4] These passages probably refer to the +same work,[5] which, unfortunately for the solution of the +difficult question that we have in hand, is lost, and nothing is +known of its contents. + +In apparent contradiction to his statement in _Hypotyposes_ I., +that Scepticism and Empiricism are opposed to each other, in +that Empiricism denies the possibility of knowledge, and +Scepticism makes no dogmatic statements of any kind, Sextus +classes the Sceptics and Empiricists together in another +instance, as regarding knowledge as impossible[6] [Greek: all oi +men phasin auta me katalambanesthai, hoster hoi apo tes +empeirias iatroi kai hoi apo tes skepseos phiolosophoi]. In +another case, on the contrary, he contrasts the Sceptics sharply +with the Empiricists in regard to the [Greek: apodeixeis].[7] +[Greek: hoi de empeirikoi anairousin, hoi de skeptikoi en epoche +tauten ephylaxan]. + + [1] _Hyp_. ii. 238. + + [2] _Adv. Math_. A. 260. + + [3] _Adv. Math_. vii. 202. + + [4] _Adv. Math_. A. 61. + + [5] Zeller _Op. cit._. iii. 43. + + [6] _Adv. Math._ viii. 191. + + [7] _Adv. Math._ VIII. 328. + +Pappenheim thinks that Sextus belonged to the Methodical School, +both from his strong expression in favor of that school in +_Hyp_. I. 236, as above, and also because many of his +medical opinions, as found in his works, agree with the +teachings of the Methodical School, more nearly than with those +of the Empiricists. Pappenheim also claims that we find no +inconsistency with this view in the passage given where Sextus +classes the Sceptics with the Empiricists, but considers that +statement an instance of carelessness in expressing himself, on +the part of Sextus.[1] + + [1] _Lebensverhaeltnisse des Sex. Em._ 36. + +The position of Pappenheim is assailable for the reason that in +dealing with any problem regarding an author on the basis of +internal evidence, we have no right to consider one of his +statements worthy of weight, and another one unworthy, on the +supposition that he expressed himself carelessly in the second +instance. Rather must we attempt to find his true standpoint by +fairly meeting all the difficulties offered in apparently +conflicting passages. This has been attempted by Zeller, +Brochard, Natorp and others, with the general result that all +things considered they think without doubt that Sextus belonged +to the Empirical School.[1] His other references are too strong +to allow his fidelity to it to be doubted. He is called one of +the leaders of Empiricism by Pseudo-Galen, and his only medical +work bore the title [Greek: empeirika hupomnemata.] The opinion +of the writers above referred to is that the passage which we +have quoted from the _Hypotyposes_ does not necessarily mean +that Sextus was not an Empiricist, but as he was more of a +Sceptic than a physician, he gave preference to those doctrines +that were most consistent with Scepticism, and accordingly +claimed that it was not absolutely necessary that a Sceptic +physician should be an Empiricist. Natorp considers that the +different standpoint from which Sextus judges the Empirical and +Methodical Schools in his different works is accounted for on +the supposition that he was an Empiricist, but disagreed with +that school on the one point only.[2] Natorp points out that +Sextus does not speak more favourably of the medical stand of +the Methodical School, but only compares the way in which both +schools regarded the question of the possibility of knowledge, +and thinks that Sextus could have been an Empiricist as a +physician notwithstanding his condemnation of the attitude of +the Empirical School in relation to the theory of knowledge. +This difference between the two schools was a small one, and on +a subtle and unimportant point; in fact, a difference in +philosophical theory, and not in medical practice. + + [1] Brochard _Op. cit. Livre_ IV. 317; Zeller _Op. cit_. + III. 15; Natorp _Op. cit._ p. 155. + + [2] Natorp _Op. cit_. 157. + +While we would agree with the authors above referred to, that +Sextus very probably recognized the bond between the Empirical +School of medicine and Pyrrhonism, yet to make his possible +connection with that school the explanation of his name, gives +him more prominence as a physician than is consistent with what +we know of his career. The long continued union of Empiricism +and Scepticism would naturally support the view that Sextus was, +at least during the earlier part of his life, a physician of +that school, and yet it may be that he was not named Empiricus +for that reason. There is one instance in ancient writings where +Empiricus is known as a simple proper name.[1] It may have been +a proper name in Sextus' case, or there are many other ways in +which it could have originated, as those who have studied the +origin of names will readily grant, perhaps indeed, from the +title of the above-named work, [Greek: empeirika hupomnemata.] +The chief argument for this view of the case is that there were +other leaders of the Sceptical School, for whom we can claim far +greater influence as Empiricists than for Sextus, and for whom +the surname Empiricus would have been more appropriate, if it +was given in consequence of prominence in the Empirical School. +Sextus is known to the world as a Sceptic, and not as a +physician. He was classed in later times with Pyrrho, and his +philosophical works survived, while his medical writings did +not, but are chiefly known from his own mention of them. +Moreover, the passage which we have quoted from the +_Hypotyposes_ is too strong to allow us easily to believe that +Sextus remained all his life a member of the Empirical School. +He could hardly have said, "Nor would it suit the Sceptic to +take that sect upon himself," if he at the same time belonged to +it. His other references to the Empirical School, of a more +favorable character, can be easily explained on the ground of +the long continued connection which had existed between the two +schools. It is quite possible to suppose that Sextus was an +Empiricist a part of his life, and afterwards found the +Methodical School more to his liking, and such a change would +not in any way have affected his stand as a physician. + + [1] Pappenheim _Leb. Ver. Sex. Em_. 6. + +In regard to the exact time when Sextus Empiricus lived, we gain +very little knowledge from internal evidence, and outside +sources of information are equally uncertain. Diogenes Laertius +must have been a generation younger than Sextus, as he mentions +the disciple of Sextus, Saturninus, as an Empirical +physician.[1] The time of Diogenes is usually estimated as the +first half of the third century A.D.,[2] therefore Sextus cannot +be brought forward later than the beginning of the century. +Sextus, however, directs his writings entirely against the +Dogmatics, by whom he distinctly states that he means the +Stoics,[3] and the influence of the Stoics began to decline in +the beginning of the third century A.D. A fact often used as a +help in fixing the date of Sextus is his mention of Basilides +the Stoic,[4] [Greek: alla kai oi stoikoi, os oi peri ton +Basileiden]. This Basilides was supposed to be identical with +one of the teachers of Marcus Aurelius.[5] This is accepted by +Zeller in the second edition of his _History of Philosophy_, but +not in the third for the reason that Sextus, in all the work +from which this reference is taken, _i.e. Math_. VII.-XI., +mentions no one besides Aenesidemus, who lived later than the +middle of the last century B.C.[6] The Basilides referred to by +Sextus may be one mentioned in a list of twenty Stoics, in a +fragment of Diogenes Laertius, recently published in Berlin by +Val Rose.[7] Too much importance has, however, been given to the +relation of the mention of Basilides the Stoic to the question +of the date of Sextus. Even if the Basilides referred to by +Sextus is granted to have been the teacher of Marcus Aurelius, +it only serves to show that Sextus lived either at the same time +with Marcus Aurelius or after him, which is a conclusion that we +must in any case reach for other reasons. + + [1] Diog. IX. 12, 116. + + [2] Ueberweg _Hist. of Phil._ p. 21. + + [3] Hyp. I. 65. + + [4] _Adv. Math_. VII. 258. + + [5] Fabricius _Vita Sexti._ + + [6] Zeller _Op. cit_. III. 8. + + [7] Brochard _Op. cit_. IV. 315. + +The fact that has caused the greatest uncertainty in regard to +the date of Sextus is that Claudius Galen in his works mentions +several Sceptics who were also physicians of the Empirical +School,[1] and often speaks of Herodotus, supposed to be +identical with the teacher of Sextus given by Diogenes +Laertius,[2] but makes no reference whatever to Sextus. As +Galen's time passes the limit of the second century A.D., we +must either infer that Sextus was not the well-known physician +that he was stated to be by Pseudo-Galen, and consequently not +known to Galen, or that Galen wrote before Sextus became +prominent as a Sceptic. This silence on the part of Galen in +regard to Sextus increases the doubt, caused by Sextus' own +criticism of the Empirical School of medicine, as to his having +been an Empiricist. The question is made more complicated, as it +is difficult to fix the identity of the Herodotus so often +referred to by Galen.[3] As Galen died about 200 A.D. at the age +of seventy,[4] we should fix the date of Sextus early in the +third century, and that of Diogenes perhaps a little later than +the middle, were it not that early in the third century the +Stoics began to decline in influence, and could hardly have +excited the warmth of animosity displayed by Sextus. We must +then suppose that Sextus wrote at the very latter part of the +second century, and either that Galen did not know him, or that +Galen's books were published before Sextus became prominent +either as a physician or as a Sceptic. The fact that he may have +been better known as the latter than as the former does not +sufficiently account for Galen's silence, as other Sceptics are +mentioned by him of less importance than Sextus, and the latter, +even if not as great a physician as Pseudo-Galen asserts, was +certainly both a Sceptic and a physician, and must have belonged +to one of the two medical schools so thoroughly discussed by +Galen--either the Empirical or the Methodical. Therefore, if +Sextus were a contemporary of Galen, he was so far removed from +the circle of Galen's acquaintances as to have made no +impression upon him, either as a Sceptic or a physician, a +supposition that is very improbable. We must then fix the date +of Sextus late in the second century, and conclude that the +climax of his public career was reached after Galen had finished +those of his writings which are still extant. + + [1] Zeller, III. 7. + + [2] Diog. XI. 12, 116. + + [3] Pappenheim _Lebens. Ver. Sex. Em._ 30. + + [4] Zeller _Grundriss der Ges. der Phil._ p. 260. + +Sextus has a Latin name, but he was a Greek; we know this from +his own statement.[1] We also know that he must have been a +Greek from the beauty and facility of his style, and from his +acquaintance with Greek dialects. The place of his birth can +only, however, be conjectured, from arguments indirectly derived +from his writings. His constant references throughout his works +to the minute customs of different nations ought to give us a +clue to the solution of this question, but strange to say they +do not give us a decided one. Of these references a large +number, however, relate to the customs of Libya, showing a +minute knowledge in regard to the political and religious +customs of this land that he displays in regard to no other +country except Egypt.[2] Fabricius thinks Libya was not his +birth place because of a reference which he makes to it in the +_Hypotyposes_--[Greek: Thrakon de kai Gaitoulon (Libyon de +ethnos touto)].[3] This conclusion is, however, entirely +unfounded, as the explanation of Sextus simply shows that the +people whom he was then addressing were not familiar with the +nations of Libya. Suidas speaks of two men called Sextus, one +from Chaeronea and one from Libya, both of whom he calls +Sceptics, and to one of whom he attributes Sextus' books. All +authorities agree in asserting that great confusion exists in +the works of Suidas; and Fabricius, Zeller, and Pappenheim place +no weight upon this testimony of Suidas.[4] Haas, however, +contends[5] that it is unreasonable to suppose that this +confusion could go as far as to attribute the writings of Sextus +Empiricus to Sextus of Chaeronea, and also make the latter a +Sceptic, and he considers it far more reasonable to accept the +testimony of Suidas, as it coincides so well with the internal +evidence of Sextus' writings in regard to his native land. It is +nevertheless evident, from his familiarity with the customs, +language, and laws of Athens, Alexandria and Rome, that he must +have resided at some time in each of these cities. + + [1] _Adv. Math._ A. 246; _Hyp._ I. 152; _Hyp._ III. 211, + 214. + + [2] Haas _Op. cit._ p. 10. + + [3] _Hyp._ III. 213. + + [4] Pappenheim _Lebens. Ver. Sex. Em._ 5, 22; Zeller _Op. + cit._ III. 39; Fabricius _Vita de Sextus_. + + [5] Haas _Op. cit_. p. 6. + +Of all the problems connected with the historical details of the +life of Sextus, the one that is the most difficult of solution, +and also the most important for our present purpose of making a +critical study of his teaching, is to fix the seat of the +Sceptical School during the time that he was in charge of it. +The _Hypotyposes_ are lectures delivered in public in that +period of his life. Where then were they delivered? We know that +the Sceptical School must have had a long continued existence as +a definite philosophical movement, although some have contended +otherwise. The fact of its existence as an organized direction +of thought, is demonstrated by its formulated teachings, and the +list given by Diogenes Laertius of its principal leaders,[1] and +by references from the writings of Sextus. In the first book of +_Hypotyposes_ he refers to Scepticism as a distinct system of +philosophy, [Greek: kai taen diakrisin taes skepseos apo ton +parakeimenon autae philosophion].[2] He speaks also of the older +Sceptics,[3] and the later Sceptics.[4] + +Pyrrho, the founder of the school, taught in Elis, his native +village; but even as early as the time of Timon, his immediate +follower, his teachings were somewhat known in Alexandria, where +Timon for a while resided.[5] The immediate disciples of Timon, +as given by Diogenes, were not men known in Greece or mentioned +in Greek writings. Then we have the well-known testimony of +Aristocles the Peripatetic in regard to Aenesidemus, that he +taught Pyrrhonism in Alexandria[6]--[Greek: echthes kai proaen +en Alexandreia tae kat' Aigypton Ainaesidaemos tis anazopyrein +aerxato ton huthlon touton]. + + [1] Diog. XI. 12, 115, 116. + + [2] _Hyp_. I. 5. + + [3] _Hyp_. I. 36. + + [4] _Hyp_. I. 164. + + [5] Chaignet _Op. cit._ 45. + + [6] Aristocles of Euseb. _Praep. Ev._ XIV. E. 446. + +This was after the dogmatic tendency of the Academy under +Antiochus and his followers had driven Pyrrhonism from the +partial union with the Academy, which it had experienced after +the breaking up of the school under the immediate successors of +Timon. Aenesidemus taught about the time of our era in +Alexandria, and established the school there anew; and his +followers are spoken of in a way that presupposes their +continuing in the same place. There is every reason to think +that the connection of Sextus with Alexandria was an intimate +one, not only because Alexandria had been for so long a time the +seat of Pyrrhonism, but also from internal evidence from his +writings and their subsequent historical influence; and yet the +_Hypotyposes_ could not have been delivered in Alexandria, as he +often refers to that place in comparison with the place where he +was then speaking. He says, furthermore, that he teaches in the +same place where his master taught.[1] [Greek: Blepon te hoti +entha ho huphaegaetaes ho emos dielegeto, entautha ego nun +dialegomai]. Therefore the school must have been removed from +Alexandria, in or before the time of the teacher of Sextus, to +some other centre. The _Hypotyposes_ are from beginning to end a +direct attack on the Dogmatics; therefore Sextus must have +taught either in some city where the dogmatic philosophy was +strong, or in some rival philosophical centre. The _Hypotyposes_ +show also that the writer had access to some large library. +Alexandria, Rome and Athens are the three places the most +probable for selection for such a purpose. For whatever reason +the seat of the school was removed from Alexandria by the master +of Sextus, or by himself, from the place where it had so long +been united with the Empirical School of medicine, Athens would +seem the most suitable city for its recontinuance, in the land +where Pyrrhonism first had its birth. Sextus, however, in one +instance, in referring to things invisible because of their +outward relations, says in illustration, "as the city of Athens +is invisible to us at present."[2] In other places also he +contrasts the Athenians with the people whom he is addressing, +equally with the Alexandrians, thus putting Athens as well as +Alexandria out of the question. + + [1] _Hyp._ III. 120. + + [2] _Hyp._ II. 98. + +Of the different writers on Sextus Empiricus, those who have +treated this part of the subject most critically are Haas and +Pappenheim. We will therefore consider, somewhat at length, the +results presented by these two authors. Haas thinks that the +_Hypotyposes_ were delivered in Rome for the following reasons. +Sextus' lectures must have been given in some centre of +philosophical schools and of learning. He never opposes Roman +relations to those of the place where he is speaking, as he does +in regard to Athens and Alexandria. He uses the name "Romans" +only three times,[1] once comparing them to the Rhodians, once +to the Persians, and once in general to other nations.[2] In the +first two of these references, the expression "among the Romans" +in the first part of the antithesis is followed by the +expression, "among us," in the second part, which Haas +understands to be synonymous. The third reference is in regard +to a Roman law, and the use of the word 'Roman' does not at all +show that Sextus was not then in Rome. The character of the laws +referred to by Sextus as [Greek: par' haemin] shows that they +were always Roman laws, and his definition of law[3] is +especially a definition of Roman law. This argument might, it +would seem, apply to any part of the Roman Empire, but Haas +claims that the whole relation of law to custom as treated of by +Sextus, and all his statements of customs forbidden at that time +by law, point to Rome as the place of his residence. Further, +Haas considers the Herodotus mentioned by Galen[4] as a +prominent physician in Rome, to have been the predecessor and +master of Sextus, in whose place Sextus says that he is +teaching.[5] Haas also thinks that Sextus' refutation of the +identity of Pyrrhonism with Empiricism evidently refers to a +paragraph in Galen's _Subfiguratio Empirica_,[6] which would be +natural if the _Hypotyposes_ were written shortly after Galen's +_Sub. Em._, and in the same place. Further, Hippolytus, who +wrote in or near Rome very soon after the time of Sextus, +apparently used the _Hypotyposes_, which would be more natural +if he wrote in the same place. According to Haas, every thing in +internal evidence, and outward testimony, points to Rome as +having been the city where Sextus occupied his position as the +head of the Sceptical School. + + [1] Haas _Op. cit._ p. 15. + + [2] _Hyp._ I. 149, 152; III. 211. + + [3] _Hyp._ I. 146. + + [4] Galen _de puls._ IV. 11; Bd. VIII. 751. + + [5] _Hyp_. III. 120. + + [6] Galen _Sub. Em._ 123 B-126 D. (Basileae, 1542). + +Coming now to the position of Pappenheim on this subject, we +find that he takes very decided ground against the seat of the +Sceptical School having been in Rome, even for a short time, in +his latest publication regarding it.[1] This opinion is the +result of late study on the part of Pappenheim, for in his work +on the _Lebensverhaeltnisse des Sextus Empiricus_ Berlin 1875, he +says, "Dass Herodotus in Rom lebte sagt Galen. Vermuthlich auch +Sextus." His reasons given in the later article for not +connecting the Sceptical School at all with Rome are as follows. +He finds no proof of the influence of Scepticism in Rome, as +Cicero remarks that Pyrrhonism is extinct,[2] and he also gives +weight to the well-known sarcastic saying of Seneca, _Quis est +qui tradat praecepta Pyrrhonis!_[3] While Haas claims that +Sextus would naturally seek one of the centres of dogmatism, in +order most effectively to combat it, Pappenheim, on the +contrary, contends that it would have been foolishness on the +part of Sextus to think of starting the Sceptical School in +Rome, where Stoicism was the favored philosophy of the Roman +Emperors; and when either for the possible reason of strife +between the Empirical and Methodical Schools, or for some other +cause, the Pyrrhonean School was removed from Alexandria, +Pappenheim claims that all testimony points to the conclusion +that it was founded in some city of the East. The name of Sextus +is never known in Roman literature, but in the East, on the +contrary, literature speaks for centuries of Sextus and Pyrrho. +The _Hypotyposes_, especially, were well-known in the East, and +references to Sextus are found there in philosophical and +religious dogmatic writings. The Emperor Julian makes use of the +works of Sextus, and he is frequently quoted by the Church +Fathers of the Eastern Church.[4] Pappenheim accordingly +concludes that the seat of Pyrrhonism after the school was +removed from Alexandria, was in some unknown city of the East. + + [1] Pappenheim _Sitz der Skeptischen Schule. Archiv fuer + Geschichte der Phil._ 1888. + + [2] Cicero _De Orat._ III. 17, 62. + + [3] Seneca _nat. qu._ VII. 32. 2. + + [4] Fabricius _de Sexto Empirico Testimonia_. + +In estimating the weight of these arguments, we must accept with +Pappenheim the close connection of Pyrrhonism with Alexandria, +and the subsequent influence which it exerted upon the +literature of the East. All historical relations tend to fix the +permanent seat of Pyrrhonism, after its separation from the +Academy, in Alexandria. There is nothing to point to its removal +from Alexandria before the time of Menodotus, who is the teacher +of Herodotus,[1] and for many reasons to be considered the real +teacher of Sextus. It was Menodotus who perfected the Empirical +doctrines, and who brought about an official union between +Scepticism and Empiricism, and who gave Pyrrhonism in great +measure, the _eclat_ that it enjoyed in Alexandria, and who +appears to have been the most powerful influence in the school, +from the time of Aenesidemus to that of Sextus. Furthermore, +Sextus' familiarity with Alexandrian customs bears the imprint +of original knowledge, and he cannot, as Zeller implies, be +accepted as simply quoting. One could hardly agree with +Zeller,[2] that the familiarity shown by Sextus with the customs +of both Alexandria and Rome in the _Hypotyposes_ does not +necessarily show that he ever lived in either of those places, +because a large part of his works are compilations from other +books; but on the contrary, the careful reader of Sextus' works +must find in all of them much evidence of personal knowledge of +Alexandria, Athens and Rome. + + [1] Diog. IX. 12, 116. + + [2] Zeller _Op. cit._ III. p. 39. + +A part of Sextus' books also may have been written in +Alexandria. [Greek: Pros phusikous] could have been written in +Alexandria.[1] If these were also lectures, then Sextus taught +in Alexandria as well as elsewhere. The history of Eastern +literature for the centuries immediately following the time of +Sextus, showing as it does in so many instances the influence of +Pyrrhonism, and a knowledge of the _Hypotyposes_, furnishes us +with an incontestable proof that the school could not have been +for a long time removed from the East, and the absence of such +knowledge in Roman literature is also a strong argument against +its long continuance in that city. It would seem, however, from +all the data at command, that during the years that the +Sceptical School was removed from Alexandria, its head quarters +were in Rome, and that the Pyrrhonean _Hypotyposes_ were +delivered in Rome. Let us briefly consider the arguments in +favour of such a hypothesis. Scepticism was not unknown in Rome. +Pappenheim quotes the remark of Cicero that Pyrrhonism was long +since dead, and the sarcasm of Seneca, _Quis est qui tradat +praecepta Pyrrhonis?_ as an argument against the knowledge of +Pyrrhonism in Rome. We must remember, however, that in Cicero's +time Aenesidemus had not yet separated himself from the Academy; +or if we consider the Lucius Tubero to whom Aenesidemus +dedicated his works, as the same Lucius Tubero who was the +friend of Cicero in his youth, and accordingly fix the date of +Aenesidemus about 50 B.C.,[2] even then Aenesidemus' work in +Alexandria was too late to have necessarily been known to +Cicero, whose remark must have been referred to the old school +of Scepticism. Should we grant, however, that the statements of +Cicero and Seneca prove that in their time Pyrrhonism was +extinct in Rome, they certainly do not show that after their +death it could not have again revived, for the _Hypotyposes_ +were delivered more than a century after the death of Seneca. +There are very few writers in Aenesidemus' own time who showed +any influence of his teachings.[3] This influence was felt +later, as Pyrrhonism became better known. That Pyrrhonism +received some attention in Rome before the time of Sextus is +nevertheless demonstrated by the teachings of Favorinus there. +Although Favorinus was known as an Academician, the title of his +principal work was [Greek: tous philosophoumenous auto ton +logon, hon aristoi hoi Purrhoneioi].[4] Suidas calls Favorinus a +great author and learned in all science and philosophy,[5] and +Favorinus made Rome the centre of his teaching and writing. His +date is fixed by Zeller at 80-150 A.D., therefore Pyrrhonism was +known in Rome shortly before the time of Sextus. + + [1] Pappenheim _Sitz der Skeptischen Schule; Archiv fuer + Geschichte der Phil._, 1888; _Adv. Math._ X. 15, 95. + + [2] Zeller _Op. cit._ III. 10. + + [3] Zeller _Op. cit._ p. 63. + + [4] Zeller _Op. cit._ p. 67. + + [5] Brochard _Op. cit._ 329. + +The whole tone of the _Hypotyposes_, with the constant +references to the Stoics as living present opponents, shows that +these lectures must have been delivered in one of the centres of +Stoicism. As Alexandria and Athens are out of the question, all +testimony points to Rome as having been the seat of the +Pyrrhonean School, for at least a part of the time that Sextus +was at its head. We would then accept the teacher of Sextus, in +whose place he says he taught, as the Herodotus so often +referred to by Galen[1] who lived in Rome. Sextus' frequent +references to Asclepiades, whom he mentions ten different times +by name in his works,[2] speak in favour of Rome in the matter +under discussion, as Asclepiades made that city one of the +centres of medical culture. On the other hand, the fact that +there is no trace of the _Hypotyposes_ in later Roman +literature, with the one exception of the works of Hippolytus, +as opposed to the wide-spread knowledge of them shown in the +East for centuries, is incontestable historical proof that the +Sceptical School could not long have had its seat at Rome. From +the two passages given above from Sextus' work against physics, +he must either have written that book in Alexandria, it would +seem, or have quoted those passages from some other work. May we +not then conclude, that Sextus was at the head of the school in +Rome for a short time, where it may have been removed +temporarily, on account of the difficulty with the Empiricists, +implied in _Hyp_. I. 236-241, or in order to be better able to +attack the Stoics, but that he also taught in Alexandria, where +the real home of the school was certainly found? There it +probably came to an end about fifty years after the time of +Sextus, and from that centre the Sceptical works of Sextus had +their wide-spread influence in the East. + + [1] Galen VIII. 751. + + [2] Bekker _Index_. + +The books of Sextus Empiricus furnish us with the best and +fullest presentation of ancient Scepticism which has been +preserved to modern times, and give Sextus the position of one +of the greatest men of the Sceptical School. His works which are +still extant are the _Pyrrhonean Hypotyposes_ in three volumes, +and the two works comprising eleven books which have been united +in later times under the title of [Greek: pros mathematikous], +one of which is directed against the sciences in general, and +the other against the dogmatic philosophers. The six books +composing the first of these are written respectively against +grammarians, rhetoricians, geometricians, arithmeticians, +astronomers and musicians. The five books of the latter consist +of two against the logicians, two against physics, and one +against systems of morals. If the last short work of the first +book directed against the arithmeticians is combined with the +one preceding against the geometricians, as it well could be, +the two works together would be divided into ten different +parts; there is evidence to show that in ancient times such a +division was made.[1] There were two other works of Sextus which +are now lost, the medical work before referred to, and a book +entitled [Greek: peri psuches]. The character of the extant +works of Sextus is similar, as they are all directed either +against science or against the dogmatics, and they all present +the negative side of Pyrrhonism. The vast array of arguments +comprising the subject-matter, often repeated in the same and +different forms, are evidently taken largely from the Sceptical +works which Sextus had resource to, and are, in fact, a summing +up of all the wisdom of the Sceptical School. The style of these +books is fluent, and the Greek reminds one of Plutarch and +Thucydides, and although Sextus does not claim originality, but +presents in all cases the arguments of the Sceptic, yet the +illustrations and the form in which the arguments are presented, +often bear the marks of his own thought, and are characterized +here and there by a wealth of humor that has not been +sufficiently noticed in the critical works on Sextus. Of all the +authors who have reviewed Sextus, Brochard is the only one who +seems to have understood and appreciated his humorous side. + +We shall now proceed to the consideration of the general +position and aim of Pyrrhonism. + +[1] Diog. IX. 12, 116. + + + + +CHAPTER II. + + +_The Position and Aim of Pyrrhonism_. + +The first volume of the _Pyrrhonean Hypotyposes_ gives the most +complete statement found in any of the works of Sextus Empiricus +of the teachings of Pyrrhonism and its relation to other schools +of philosophy. The chief source of the subject-matter presented +is a work of the same name by Aenesidemus,[1] either directly +used by Sextus, or through the writings of those who followed +Aenesidemus. The comprehensive title [Greek: Purrhoneioi +hupotuposeis] was very probably used in general to designate +courses of lectures given by the leaders of the Sceptical +School. + +In the opening chapters of the _Hypotyposes_ Sextus undertakes +to define the position and aim of Pyrrhonism.[2] In introducing +his subject he treats briefly of the differences between +philosophical schools, dividing them into three classes; those +which claim that they have found the truth, like the schools of +Aristotle and Epicurus and the Stoics; those which deny the +possibility of finding it, like that of the Academicians; and +those that still seek it, like the Sceptical School. The +accusation against the Academicians, that they denied the +possibility of finding the truth, was one that the Sceptics were +very fond of making. We shall discuss the justice of it later, +simply remarking here, that to affirm the "incomprehensibility +of the unknown," was a form of expression that the Pyrrhonists +themselves were sometimes betrayed into, notwithstanding their +careful avoidance of dogmatic statements.[3] + + [1] Diog. IX. 11, 78. + + [2] _Hyp._ I. 3, 4. + + [3] _Adv. Math._ VIII. 191. + +After defining the three kinds of philosophy as the Dogmatic, +the Academic and the Sceptic, Sextus reminds his hearers that he +does not speak dogmatically in anything that he says, but that +he intends simply to present the Sceptical arguments +historically, and as they appear to him. He characterizes his +treatment of the subject as general rather than critical, +including a statement of the character of Scepticism, its idea, +its principles, its manner of reasoning, its criterion and aim, +and a presentation of the Tropes, or aspects of doubt, and the +Sceptical formulae and the distinction between Scepticism and +the related schools of philosophy.[1] + +The result of all the gradual changes which the development of +thought had brought about in the outward relations of the +Sceptical School, was to increase the earnestness of the claim +of the Sceptics to be simply followers of Pyrrho, the great +founder of the movement. In discussing the names given to the +Sceptics, Sextus gives precedence very decidedly to the title +"Pyrrhonean," because Pyrrho appears the best representative of +Scepticism, and more prominent than all who before him occupied +themselves with it.[2] + +It was a question much discussed among philosophers in ancient +times, whether Pyrrhonism should be considered a philosophical +sect or not. Thus we find that Hippobotus in his work entitled +[Greek: peri haireseon], written shortly before our era, does +not include Pyrrhonism among the other sects.[3] Diogenes +himself, after some hesitation remarking that many do not +consider it a sect, finally decides to call it so.[4] + + [1] _Hyp._ I. 5, 6. + + [2] _Hyp._ I. 7. + + [3] Diog. _Pro._ 19. + + [4] Diog. _Pro._ 20. + +Sextus in discussing this subject calls Scepticism an [Greek: +agoge], or a movement, rather than a [Greek: hairesis], saying +that Scepticism is not a sect, if that word implies a systematic +arrangement of dogmas, for the Sceptic has no dogmas. If, +however, a sect may mean simply the following of a certain +system of reasoning according to what appears to be true, then +Scepticism is a sect.[1] From a quotation given later on by +Sextus from Aenesidemus, we know that the latter used the term +[Greek: agoge].[2] Sextus gives also the other titles, so well +known as having been applied to Scepticism, namely, [Greek: +zetetike], [Greek: ephektike], and [Greek: aporetike].[3] The +[Greek: dunamis][4] of Scepticism is to oppose the things of +sense and intellect in every possible way to each other, and +through the equal weight of things opposed, or [Greek: +isostheneia], to reach first the state of suspension of +judgement, and afterwards ataraxia, or "repose and tranquillity +of soul."[5] The purpose of Scepticism is then the hope of +ataraxia, and its origin was in the troubled state of mind +induced by the inequality of things, and uncertainty in regard +to the truth. Therefore, says Sextus, men of the greatest talent +began the Sceptical system by placing in opposition to every +argument an equal one, thus leading to a philosophical system +without a dogma, for the Sceptic claims that he has no dogma.[6] +The Sceptic is never supposed to state a decided opinion, but +only to say what appears to him. Even the Sceptical formulae, +such as "Nothing more,"[7] or "I decide nothing,"[8] or "All is +false," include themselves with other things. The only +statements that the Sceptic can make, are in regard to his own +sensations. He cannot deny that he is warm or cold or hungry. + + [1] _Hyp._ I. 15, 17. + + [2] _Hyp._ I. 210. + + [3] _Hyp._ I. 7; Diog. IX. 11, 70. + + [4] _Hyp._ I. 8. + + [5] _Hyp._ I. 10. + + [6] _Hyp._ I. 12. + + [7] _Hyp._ I. 14. + + [8] _Hyp._ I. 14. + +Sextus replies to the charge that the Sceptics deny phenomena by +refuting it.[1] The Sceptic does not deny phenomena, because +they are the only criteria by which he can regulate his actions. +"We call the criterion of the Sceptical School the phenomenon, +meaning by this name the idea of it."[2] Phenomena are the only +things which the Sceptic does not deny, and he guides his life +by them. They are, however, subjective. Sextus distinctly +affirms that sensations are the phenomena,[3] and that they lie +in susceptibility and voluntary feeling, and that they +constitute the appearances of objects.[4] We see from this that +Sextus makes the only reality to consist in subjective +experience, but he does not follow this to its logical +conclusion, and doubt the existence of anything outside of mind. +He rather takes for granted that there is a something unknown +outside, about which the Sceptic can make no assertions. +Phenomena are the criteria according to which the Sceptic orders +his daily life, as he cannot be entirely inactive, and they +affect life in four different ways. They constitute the guidance +of nature, the impulse of feeling; they give rise to the +traditions of customs and laws, and make the teaching of the +arts important.[5] According to the tradition of laws and +customs, piety is a good in daily life, but it is not in itself +an abstract good. The Sceptic of Sextus' time also inculcated +the teaching of the arts, as indeed must be the case with +professing physicians, as most of the leading Sceptics were. +Sextus says, "We are not without energy in the arts which we +undertake."[6] This was a positive tendency which no philosophy, +however negative, could escape, and the Sceptic tried to avoid +inconsistency in this respect, by separating his philosophy from +his theory of life. His philosophy controlled his opinions, and +his life was governed by phenomena. + + [1] _Hyp._ I. 19. + + [2] _Hyp._ I. 19. + + [3] _Hyp._ I. 22; Diog. IX. 11, 105. + + [4] _Hyp._ I. 22. + + [5] _Hyp._ I. 23. + + [6] _Hyp._ I. 24. + +The aim of Pyrrhonism was ataraxia in those things which pertain +to opinion, and moderation in the things which life imposes.[1] +In other words, we find here the same natural desire of the +human being to rise above and beyond the limitations which pain +and passion impose, which is expressed in other forms, and under +other names, in other schools of philosophy. The method, +however, by which ataraxia or peace of mind could be reached, +was peculiar to the Sceptic. It is a state of psychological +equilibrium, which results from the equality of the weight of +different arguments that are opposed to each other, and the +consequent impossibility of affirming in regard to either one, +that it is correct.[2] The discovery of ataraxia was, in the +first instance, apparently accidental, for while the Sceptic +withheld his opinion, unable to decide what things were true, +and what things were false, ataraxia fortunately followed.[3] +After he had begun to philosophize, with a desire to +discriminate in regard to ideas, and to separate the true from +the false[4] during the time of [Greek: epoche], or suspension +of judgement, ataraxia followed as if by chance, as the shadow +follows the body.[5] + + [1] _Hyp._ I. 25. + + [2] _Hyp._ I. 26. + + [3] _Hyp._ I. 26. + + [4] Diog. IX. 11, 107. + + [5] _Hyp._ I. 29. + +The Sceptic in seeking ataraxia in the things of opinion, does +not entirely escape from suffering from his sensations. He is +not wholly undisturbed, for he is sometimes cold and hungry, and +so on.[1] He claims, nevertheless, that he suffers less than the +dogmatist, who is beset with two kinds of suffering, one from +the feelings themselves, and also from the conviction that they +are by nature an evil.[2] To the Sceptic nothing is in itself +either an evil or a good, and so he thinks that "he escapes from +difficulties easier."[3] For instance, he who considers riches a +good in themselves, is unhappy in the loss of them, and in +possession of them is in fear of losing them, while the Sceptic, +remembering the Sceptical saying "No more," is untroubled in +whatever condition he may be found, as the loss of riches is no +more an evil than the possession of them is a good.[4] For he +who considers anything good or bad by nature is always troubled, +and when that which seemed good is not present with him, he +thinks that he is tortured by that which is by nature bad, and +follows after what he thinks to be good. Having acquired it, +however, he is not at rest, for his reason tells him that a +sudden change may deprive him of this thing that he considers a +good.[5] The Sceptic, however, endeavours neither to avoid nor +seek anything eagerly.[6] + + [1] _Hyp._ I. 30. + + [2] _Hyp._ I. 30. + + [3] _Hyp._ I. 30; Diog. IX. 11, 61. + + [4] _Adv. Math._ XI. 146-160. + + [5] _Hyp._ I. 27. + + [6] _Hyp._ I. 28. + +Ataraxia came to the Sceptic as success in painting the foam on +a horse's mouth came to Apelles the painter. After many attempts +to do this, and many failures, he gave up in despair, and threw +the sponge at the picture that he had used to wipe the colors +from the painting with. As soon as it touched the picture it +produced a representation of the foam.[1] Thus the Sceptics were +never able to attain to ataraxia by examining the anomaly +between the phenomena and the things of thought, but it came to +them of its own accord just when they despaired of finding it. + +The intellectual preparation for producing ataraxia, consists in +placing arguments in opposition to each other, both in regard to +phenomena, and to things of the intellect. By placing the +phenomenal in opposition to the phenomenal, the intellectual to +the intellectual, and the phenomenal to the intellectual, and +_vice versa_, the present to the present, past, and future, one +will find that no argument exists that is incontrovertible. It +is not necessary to accept any statement whatever as true, and +consequently a state of [Greek: epoche] may always be +maintained.[2] Although ataraxia concerns things of the opinion, +and must be preceded by the intellectual process described +above, it is not itself a function of the intellect, or any +subtle kind of reasoning, but seems to be rather a unique form +of moral perfection, leading to happiness, or is itself +happiness. + + [1] _Hyp._ I. 28, 29. + + [2] _Hyp._ I. 32-35. + +It was the aim of Scepticism to know nothing, and to assert +nothing in regard to any subject, but at the same time not to +affirm that knowledge on all subjects is impossible, and +consequently to have the attitude of still seeking. The +standpoint of Pyrrhonism was materialistic. We find from the +teachings of Sextus that he affirmed the non-existence of the +soul,[1] or the ego, and denied absolute existence +altogether.[2] The introductory statements of Diogenes regarding +Pyrrhonism would agree with this standpoint.[3] + +There is no criterion of truth in Scepticism. We cannot prove +that the phenomena represent objects, or find out what the +relation of phenomena to objects is. There is no criterion to +tell us which one is true of all the different representations +of the same object, and of all the varieties of sensation that +arise through the many phases of relativity of the conditions +which control the character of the phenomena. + +Every effort to find the truth can deal only with phenomena, and +absolute reality can never be known. + + [1] _Adv. Math._ VII. 55; _Hyp._ II. 32. + + [2] _Adv. Math._ XI. 140. + + [3] Diog. IX. 11, 61. + + + + +CHAPTER III. + + +_The Sceptical Tropes_. + +The exposition of the Tropes of Pyrrhonism constitutes +historically and philosophically the most important part of the +writings of Sextus Empiricus. These Tropes represent the sum +total of the wisdom of the older Sceptical School, and were held +in high respect for centuries, not only by the Pyrrhoneans, but +also by many outside the narrow limits of that School. In the +first book of the _Hypotyposes_ Sextus gives two classes of +Tropes, those of [Greek: epoche] and the eight Tropes of +Aenesidemus against Aetiology. + +The Tropes of [Greek: epoche] are arranged in groups of ten, +five and two, according to the period of the Sceptical School to +which they belong; the first of these groups is historically the +most important, or the Ten Tropes of [Greek: epoche], as these +are far more closely connected with the general development of +Scepticism, than the later ones. By the name [Greek: tropos] or +Trope, the Sceptic understood a manner of thought, or form of +argument, or standpoint of judgement. It was a term common in +Greek philosophy, used in this sense, from the time of +Aristotle.[1] The Stoics, however, used the word with a +different meaning from that attributed to it by the Sceptics.[2] +Stephanus and Fabricius translate it by the Latin word +_modus_[3] and [Greek: tropos] also is often used +interchangeably with the word [Greek: logos] by Sextus, Diogenes +Laertius, and others; sometimes also as synonymous with [Greek: +topos],[4] and [Greek: typos] is found in the oldest edition of +Sextus.[5] Diogenes defines the word as the standpoint, or +manner of argument, by which the Sceptics arrived at the +condition of doubt, in consequence of the equality of +probabilities, and he calls the Tropes, the ten Tropes of +doubt.[6] All writers on Pyrrhonism after the time of +Aenesidemus give the Tropes the principal place in their +treatment of the subject. Sextus occupies two thirds of the +first book of the _Hypotyposes_ in stating and discussing them; +and about one fourth of his presentation of Scepticism is +devoted to the Tropes by Diogenes. In addition to these two +authors, Aristocles the Peripatetic refers to them in his attack +on Scepticism.[7] Favorinus wrote a book entitled _Pyrrhonean +Tropes_, and Plutarch one called _The Ten ([Greek: topoi]) Topes +of Pyrrho_.[8] Both of these latter works are lost. + + [1] Pappenheim _Erlauterung Pyrrh. Grundzugen_, p. 35. + + [2] Diog I. 76; _Adv. Math._ VIII. 227. + + [3] Fabricius, Cap. XIV. 7. + + [4] _Hyp._ I. 36. + + [5] Fabricius on _Hyp._ I. 36; Cap. XIV. G. + + [6] Diog. IX. 11, 79-108. + + [7] Aristocles _Euseb. praep. ev._ X. 14, 18. + + [8] Fabricius on _Hyp._ I. 36. + +All authorities unite in attributing to Aenesidemus the work of +systematizing and presenting to the world the ten Tropes of +[Greek: epoche]. He was the first to conceive the project of +opposing an organized philosophical system of Pyrrhonism to the +dogmatism of his contemporaries.[1] Moreover, the fact that +Diogenes introduces the Tropes into his life of Pyrrho, does not +necessarily imply that he considered Pyrrho their author, for +Diogenes invariably combines the teachings of the followers of a +movement with those of the founders themselves; he gives these +Tropes after speaking of Aenesidemus' work entitled _Pyrrhonean +Hypotyposes_, and apparently quotes from this book, in giving at +least a part of his presentation of Pyrrhonism, either directly +or through, the works of others. Nietzsche proposes a correction +of the text of Diogenes IX. 11, 79, which would make him quote the +Tropes from a book by Theodosius,[2] author of a commentary on +the works of Theodas. No writer of antiquity claims for the +Tropes an older source than the books of Aenesidemus, to whom +Aristocles also attributes them.[3] They are not mentioned in +Diogenes' life of Timon, the immediate disciple of Pyrrho. +Cicero has no knowledge of them, and does not refer to them in +his discussion of Scepticism. + + [1] Compare Saisset _Op. cit._ p. 78. + + [2] Brochard _Op. cit._ 254, Note 4. + + [3] Aristocles _Eus. praep. ev._ XIV. 18. 8. + +Aenesidemus was undoubtedly the first to formulate these Tropes, +but many things tend to show that they resulted, in reality, +from the gradual classification of the results of the teachings +of Pyrrho, in the subsequent development of thought from his own +time to that of Aenesidemus. The ideas contained in the Tropes +were not original with Aenesidemus, but are more closely +connected with the thought of earlier times. The decidedly +empirical character of the Tropes proves this connection, for +the eight Tropes of Aetiology, which were original with +Aenesidemus, bear a far stronger dialectic stamp, thus showing a +more decided dialectic influence of the Academy than is found in +the Tropes of [Greek: epoche]. Many of the illustrations given +of the Tropes also, testify to a time of greater antiquity than +that of Aenesidemus. The name Trope was well known in ancient +times, and the number ten reminds us of the ten opposing +principles of Pythagoras, and the ten categories of Aristotle, +the fourth of which was the same as the eighth Trope. The +terminology, however, with very few exceptions, points to a +later period than that of Pyrrho. Zeller points out a number of +expressions in both Diogenes' and Sextus' exposition of the +Tropes, which could not date back farther than the time of +Aenesidemus.[1] One of the most striking features of the whole +presentation of the Tropes, especially as given by Sextus, is +their mosaic character, stamping them not as the work of one +person, but as a growth, and also an agglutinous growth, lacking +very decidedly the symmetry of thought that the work of one mind +would have shown. + + [1] Zeller _Op. cit._ p. 25. + +At the time of the separation of Pyrrhonism from the Academy, no +other force was as strong in giving life to the school as the +systematic treatment by Aenesidemus of the Ten Tropes of [Greek: +epoche]. The reason of this is evident. It was not that the +ideas of the Sceptical Tropes were original with Aenesidemus, +but because a definite statement of belief is always a far more +powerful influence than principles which are vaguely understood +and accepted. There is always, however, the danger to the +Sceptic, in making a statement even of the principles of +Scepticism, that the psychological result would be a dogmatic +tendency of mind, as we shall see later was the case, even with +Aenesidemus himself. That the Sceptical School could not escape +the accusation of dogmatizing, from the Dogmatics, even in +stating the grounds of their Scepticism, we know from +Diogenes.[1] To avoid this dogmatic tendency of the ten Tropes, +Sextus makes the frequent assertion that he does not affirm +things to be absolutely true, but states them as they appear to +him, and that they may be otherwise from what he has said.[2] + + [1] Diog. IX. 11, 102. + + [2] _Hyp._ I. 4, 24. + +Sextus tells us that "Certain Tropes, ten in number, for +producing the state of [Greek: epoche] have been handed down +from the older Sceptics."[1] He refers to them in another work +as the "Tropes of Aenesidemus."[2] There is no evidence that the +substance of these Tropes was changed after the time of +Aenesidemus, although many of the illustrations given by Sextus +must have been of a later date, added during the two centuries +that elapsed between the time of Aenesidemus and Sextus. In +giving these Tropes Sextus does not claim to offer a systematic +methodical classification, and closes his list of them, in their +original concise form, with the remark, "We make this order +ourselves."[3] The order is given differently by Diogenes, and +also by Favorinus.[4] The Trope which Sextus gives as the tenth +is the fifth given by Diogenes, the seventh by Sextus is the +eighth given by Diogenes, the fifth by Sextus, the seventh by +Diogenes, the tenth by Diogenes, the eighth by Sextus. Diogenes +says that the one he gives as the ninth Favorinus calls the +eighth, and Sextus and Aenesidemus the tenth. This statement +does not correspond with the list of the Tropes which Sextus +gives, proving that Diogenes took some other text than that of +Sextus as his authority.[5] The difference in the order of the +Tropes shows, also, that the order was not considered a matter +of great importance. There is a marked contrast in the spirit of +the two presentations of the Tropes given by Sextus and +Diogenes. The former gives them not only as an orator, but as +one who feels that he is defending his own cause, and the school +of which he is the leader, against mortal enemies, while +Diogenes relates them as an historian. + + [1] _Hyp._ I. 36. + + [2] _Adv. Math._ VII. 345. + + [3] _Hyp._ I. 38. + + [4] Diog. IX. 11, 87. + + [5] Diog. IX. 11, 87. + +Pappenheim tries to prove[1] that Aenesidemus originally gave +only nine Tropes in his _Pyrrhonean Hypotyposes_, as Aristocles +mentions only nine in referring to the Tropes of Aenesidemus, +and that the tenth was added later. Had this been the case, +however, the fact would surely have been mentioned either by +Diogenes or Sextus, who both refer to the ten Tropes of +Aenesidemus. + +The Tropes claim to prove that the character of phenomena is so +relative and changeable, that certain knowledge cannot be based +upon them, and as we have shown, there is no other criterion of +knowledge for the Sceptic than phenomena.[2] All of the Tropes, +except the tenth, are connected with sense-perception, and +relate to the difference of the results obtained through the +senses under different circumstances. They may be divided into +two classes, _i.e._, those based upon differences of our +physical organism, and those based upon external differences. To +the first class belong the first, second, third and fourth; to +the second class, the fifth, sixth, seventh and eighth, and also +the ninth. The eighth, or that of relation, is applied +objectively both by Sextus and Diogenes in their treatment of +the Tropes, and is not used for objects of thought alone, but +principally to show the relation of outward objects to each +other. The tenth is the only one which has a moral significance, +and it has also a higher subjective value than the others; it +takes its arguments from an entirely different sphere of +thought, and deals with metaphysical and religious +contradictions in opinion, and with the question of good and +evil. That this Trope is one of the oldest, we know from its +distinct mention in connection with the foundation theories of +Pyrrho, by Diogenes.[3] In treating of the subjective reasons +for doubt as to the character of external reality, the Sceptics +were very near the denial of all outward reality, a point, +however, which they never quite reached. + + [1] Pappenheim, _Die Tropen der Griechen_, p. 23. + + [2] _Hyp._ I. 22. + + [3] Diog. IX. 11, 61. + +There is evidently much of Sextus' own thought mixed with the +illustrations of the Tropes, but it is impossible to separate +the original parts from the material that was the common +property of the Sceptical School. Many of these illustrations +show, however, perfect familiarity with the scientific and +medical teachings of the time. Before entering upon his +exposition of the Tropes, Sextus gives them in the short concise +form in which they must first have existed[1]-- + + (i) Based upon the variety of animals. + + (ii) Based upon the differences between men. + + (iii) Based upon differences in the constitution of + the sense organs. + + (iv) Based upon circumstances. + + (v) Based upon position, distance and place. + + (vi) Based upon mixtures. + + (vii) Based upon the quantities and constitutions + of objects. + +(viii) Relation. + + (ix) Based upon frequency or rarity of occurences. + + (x) Based upon systems, customs and laws, + mythical beliefs, and dogmatic opinions. + + [1] _Hyp._ I. 36-38. + +Although Sextus is careful not to dogmatise regarding the +arrangement of the Tropes, yet there is in his classification of +them a regular gradation, from the arguments based upon +differences in animals to those in man, first considering the +latter in relation to the physical constitution, and then to +circumstances outside of us, and finally the treatment of +metaphysical and moral differences. + +_The First Trope_.[1] That the same mental representations are +not found in different animals, may be inferred from their +differences in constitution resulting from their different +origins, and from the variety in their organs of sense. Sextus +takes up the five senses in order, giving illustrations to prove +the relative results of the mental representations in all of +them, as for example the subjectivity of color[2] and sound.[3] +All knowledge of objects through the senses is relative and not +absolute. Sextus does not, accordingly, confine the +impossibility of certain knowledge to the qualities that Locke +regards as secondary, but includes also the primary ones in this +statement.[4] The form and shape of objects as they appear to us +may be changed by pressure on the eyeball. Furthermore, the +character of reflections in mirrors depend entirely on their +shape, as the images in concave mirrors are very different from +those in convex ones; and so in the same way as the eyes of +animals are of different shapes, and supplied with different +fluids, the ideas of dogs, fishes, men and grasshoppers must be +very different.[5] + + [1] _Hyp._. I. 40-61. + + [2] _Hyp._. I. 44-46. + + [3] _Hyp._. I. 50. + + [4] _Hyp._. I. 47. + + [5] _Hyp._. I. 49. + +In discussing the mental representations of animals of different +grades of intelligence, Sextus shows a very good comprehension +of the philogenetic development of the organs of sense, and +draws the final conclusion that external objects are regarded +differently by animals, according to their difference in +constitution.[1] These differences in the ideas which different +animals have of the same objects are demonstrated by their +different tastes, as the things desired by some are fatal to +others.[2] The practical illustrations given of this result show +a familiarity with natural history, and cognizance of the tastes +and habits of many animals,[3] but were probably few of them +original with Sextus, unless perhaps in their application; that +this train of reasoning was the common property of the Sceptic +School, we know from the fact that Diogenes begins his +exposition of the first Trope in a way similar to that of +Sextus.[4] His illustrations are, however, few and meagre +compared with those of Sextus, and the scientific facts used by +both of them may mostly be found in other authors of antiquity +given in a similar way.[5] The logical result of the reasoning +used to explain the first Trope, is that we cannot compare the +ideas of the animals with each other, nor with our own; nor can +we prove that our ideas are more trustworthy than those of the +animals.[6] As therefore an examination of ideas is impossible, +any decided opinion about their trustworthiness is also +impossible, and this Trope leads to the suspension of judgment +regarding external objects, or to [Greek: epoche.][7] + + [1] _Hyp._. I. 54. + + [2] _Hyp._. I. 55. + + [3] _Hyp._. I. 55-59. + + [4] Diog. IX. 11, 79-80. + + [5] Pappenheim _Erlauterung Pyrr. Grundzuege Par_. 41. + + [6] _Hyp_. I. 59. + + [7] _Hyp_. I. 61. + +After reaching this conclusion, Sextus introduces a long chapter +to prove that animals can reason. There is no reference to this +in Diogenes, but there is other testimony to show that it was a +favourite line of argument with the Sceptics.[1] Sextus, +however, says that his course of reasoning is different from +that of most of the Sceptics on the subject,[2] as they usually +applied their arguments to all animals, while he selected only +one, namely the dog.[3] This chapter is full of sarcastic +attacks on the Dogmatics, and contains the special allusion to +the Stoics as the greatest opponents of the Sceptics, which has +been before referred to.[4] + +Sextus claims with a greater freedom of diction than in some +apparently less original chapters, and with a wealth of special +illustrations, that the dog is superior to man in acuteness of +perception,[5] that he has the power of choice, and possesses an +art, that of hunting,[6] and, also, is not deprived of +virtue,[7] as the true nature of virtue is to show justice to +all, which the dog does by guarding loyally those who are kind +to him, and keeping off those who do evil.[8] The reasoning +power of this animal is proved by the story taken from +Chrysippus, of the dog that came to a meeting of three roads in +following a scent. After seeking the scent in vain in two of the +roads, he takes the third road without scenting it as a result +of a quick process of thought, which proves that he shares in +the famous dialectic of Chrysippus,[9] the five forms of [Greek: +_anapodeiktoi logoi_,] of which the dog chooses the fifth. +Either _A_ or _B_ or _C_, not _A_ or _B,_ therefore _C_. + + [1] _Hyp_. I. 238. + + [2] Compare Brochard _Op. cit._ 256. + + [3] _Hyp_. I. 62-63. + + [4] _Hyp_. I. 65. + + [5] _Hyp_. I. 64. + + [6] _Hyp_. I. 66. + + [7] _Hyp_. I. 67. + + [8] _Hyp_. I. 67. + + [9] _Hyp_. I. 69; _Hyp_. II. 166; Diog. VII. 1, 79. + +The dog and other irrational animals may also possess spoken +language, as the only proof that we have to the contrary, is the +fact that we cannot understand the sounds that they make.[1] We +have an example in this chapter of the humor of Sextus, who +after enlarging on the perfect character of the dog, remarks, +"For which reason it seems to me some philosophers have honoured +themselves with the name of this animal,"[2] thus making a +sarcastic allusion to the Cynics, especially Antisthenes.[3] + + [1] _Hyp_. I. 74. + + [2] _Hyp_. I. 72. + + [3] Diog. VI. 1, 13. + +_The Second Trope_. Passing on to the second Trope, Sextus aims +to prove that even if we leave the differences of the mental +images of animals out of the discussion, there is not a +sufficient unanimity in the mental images of human beings to +allow us to base any assertions upon them in regard to the +character of external objects.[1] He had previously announced +that he intended to oppose the phenomenal to the intellectual +"in any way whatever,"[2] so he begins here by referring to the +two parts of which man is said to be composed, the soul and the +body, and proceeds to discuss the differences among men in +sense-perception and in opinion.[3] Most of the illustrations +given of differences in sense-perception are medical ones; of +the more general of these I will note the only two which are +also given by Diogenes in his exposition of this Trope,[4] viz., +Demophon, Alexander's table waiter, who shivered in the sun, and +Andron the Argive, who was so free from thirst that he travelled +through the desert of Libya without seeking a drink. Some have +reasoned from the presence of the first of these illustrations +in the exposition of the Tropes, that a part of this material at +least goes back to the time of Pyrrho, as Pyrrho from his +intimacy with Alexander, when he accompanied him to India, had +abundant opportunities to observe the peculiarities of his +servant Demophon.[5] The illustration of Andron the Argive is +taken from Aristotle, according to Diogenes.[6] + + [1] _Hyp_. I. 79. + + [2] _Hyp._ I. 8. + + [3] _Hyp._ I. 80. + + [4] Diog. IX. 11, 80-81. + + [5] Compare _Pyrrhon et le Scepticism primitive, Revue + phil._, Paris 1885, No. 5; Victor Brochard, p. 521. + + [6] Diog. IX. 11, 81. + +Passing on to differences of opinion, we have another example of +the sarcastic humor of Sextus, as he refers to the [Greek: +physiognomonike sophia][1] as the authority for believing that +the body is a type of the soul. As the bodies of men differ, so +the souls also probably differ. The differences of mind among +men is not referred to by Diogenes, except in the general +statement that they choose different professions; while Sextus +elaborates this point, speaking of the great differences in +opposing schools of philosophy, and in the objects of choice and +avoidance, and sources of pleasure for different men.[2] The +poets well understand this marked difference in human desires, +as Homer says, + + "One man enjoys this, another enjoys that." + +Sextus also quotes the beautiful lines of Pindar,[3] + + "One delights in getting honours and crowns through + stormfooted horses, + Others in passing life in rooms rich in gold, + Another safe travelling enjoys, in a swift ship, + on a wave of the sea." + + [1] _Hyp._ I. 85. + + [2] _Hyp._ I. 87-89. + + [3] _Hyp._ I. 86. + +_The Third Trope_. The third Trope limits the argument to the +sense-perceptions of one man, a Dogmatic, if preferred, or to +one whom the Dogmatics consider wise,[1] and states that as the +ideas given by the different sense organs differ radically in a +way that does not admit of their being compared with each other, +they furnish no reliable testimony regarding the nature of +objects.[2] "Each of the phenomena perceived by us seems to +present itself in many forms, as the apple, smooth, fragrant +brown and sweet." The apple was evidently the ordinary example +given for this Trope, for Diogenes uses the same, but in a much +more condensed form, and not with equal understanding of the +results to be deduced from it.[3] The consequence of the +incompatibility of the mental representations produced through +the several sense organs by the apple, may be the acceptance of +either of the three following propositions: (i) That only those +qualities exist in the apple which we perceive. (ii) That more +than these exist. (iii) That even those perceived do not +exist.[4] Accordingly, any experience which can give rise to +such different views regarding outward objects, cannot be relied +upon as a testimony concerning them. + + [1] _Hyp._ I. 90. + + [2] _Hyp._ I. 94. + + [3] Diog. IX. 11 81. + + [4] _Hyp._ I. 99. + +The non-homogeneous nature of the mental images connected with +the different sense organs, as presented by Sextus, reminds us +of the discussion of the same subject by Berkeley in his _Theory +of Vision_. + +Sextus says that a man born with less than the usual number of +senses, would form altogether different ideas of the external +world than those who have the usual number, and as our ideas of +objects depend on our mental images, a greater number of sense +organs would give us still different ideas of outward +reality.[1] The strong argument of the Stoics against such +reasoning as this, was their doctrine of pre-established harmony +between nature and the soul, so that when a representation is +produced in us of a real object, a [Greek: kataleptike +phantasia],[2] by this representation the soul grasps a real +existence. There is a [Greek: logos] in us which is of the same +kind, [Greek: syngenos], or in relation to all nature. This +argument of pre-established harmony between the faculties of the +soul and the objects of nature, is the one that has been used in +all ages to combat philosophical teaching that denies that we +apprehend the external world as it is. It was used against Kant +by his opponents, who thought in this way to refute his +teachings.[3] The Sceptics could not, of course, accept a theory +of nature that included the soul and the external world in one +harmonious whole, but Sextus in his discussion of the third +Trope does not refute this argument as fully as he does later in +his work against logic.[4] He simply states here that +philosophers themselves cannot agree as to what nature is, and +furthermore, that a philosopher himself is a part of the +discord, and to be judged, rather than being capable of judging, +and that no conclusion can be reached by those who are +themselves an element of the uncertainty.[5] + + [1] _Hyp._ I. 96-97. + + [2] _Adv. Math._ VII. 93. + + [3] Ueberweg _Op. cit._ 195. + + [4] _Adv. Math._ VII. 354. + + [5] _Hyp._ I. 98-99. + +_The Fourth Trope_. This Trope limits the argument to each +separate sense, and the effect is considered of the condition of +body and mind upon sense-perception in relation to the several +sense-organs.[1] The physical states which modify +sense-perception are health and illness, sleeping and waking, +youth and age, hunger and satiety, drunkenness and sobriety. All +of these conditions of the body entirely change the character of +the mental images, producing different judgments of the color, +taste, and temperature of objects, and of the character of +sounds. A man who is asleep is in a different world from one +awake, the existence of both worlds being relative to the +condition of waking and sleeping.[2] + +The subjective states which Sextus mentions here as modifying +the character of the mental representations are hating or +loving, courage or fear, sorrow or joy, and sanity or +insanity.[3] No man is ever twice in exactly the same condition +of body or mind, and never able to review the differences of his +ideas as a sum total, for those of the present moment only are +subject to careful inspection.[4] Furthermore, no one is free +from the influence of all conditions of body or mind, so that he +can be unbiassed to judge his ideas, and no criterion can be +established that can be shown to be true, but on the contrary, +whatever course is pursued on the subject, both the criterion +and the proof will be thrown into the _circulus in probando_, +for the truth of each rests on the other.[5] + + [1] _Hyp._ I. 100. + + [2] _Hyp._ I. 104. + + [3] _Hyp._ I. 100. + + [4] _Hyp._ I. 112. + + [5] _Hyp._ I. 117. + +Diogenes gives in part the same illustrations of this Trope, but +in a much more condensed form. The marked characteristic of this +train of reasoning is the attempt to prove that abnormal +conditions are also natural. In referring at first to the +opposing states of body and mind, which so change the character +of sense-perception, Sextus classifies them according to the +popular usage as [Greek: kata physin] and [Greek: para physin]. +This distinction was an important one, even with Aristotle, and +was especially developed by the Stoics[1] in a broader sense +than referring merely to health and sickness. The Stoics, +however, considered only normal conditions as being according to +nature. Sextus, on the contrary, declares that abnormal states +are also conditions according to nature,[2] and just as those +who are in health are in a state that is natural to those who +are in health, so also those not in health are in a state that +is natural to those not in health, and in some respects +according to nature. Existence, then, and non-existence are not +absolute, but relative, and the world of sleep as really exists +for those who are asleep as the things that exist in waking +exist, although they do not exist in sleep.[3] One mental +representation, therefore, cannot be judged by another, which is +also in a state of relation to existing physical and mental +conditions. Diogenes states this principle even more decidedly +in his exposition of this Trope. "The insane are not in a +condition opposed to nature; why they more than we? For we also +see the sun as if it were stationary."[4] Furthermore, in +different periods of life ideas differ. Children are fond of +balls and hoops, while those in their prime prefer other things, +and the aged still others.[5] The wisdom contained in this Trope +in reference to the relative value of the things most sought +after is not original with Sextus, but is found in the more +earnest ethical teachings of older writers. Sextus does not, +however, draw any moral conclusions from this reasoning, but +only uses it as an argument for [Greek: epoche]. + + [1] Diog. VII. 1, 86. + + [2] _Hyp._ I. 103. + + [3] _Hyp._ I. 104. + + [4] Diog. IX. 11, 82. + + [5] _Hyp._ I. 106. + +_The Fifth Trope_. This Trope leaves the discussion of the +dependence of the ideas upon the physical nature, and takes up +the influence of the environment upon them. It makes the +difference in ideas depend upon the position, distance, and +place of objects, thus taking apparently their real existence +for granted. Things change their form and shape according to the +distance from which they are observed, and the position in which +they stand.[1] + +The same light or tone alters decidedly in different +surroundings. Perspective in paintings depends on the angle at +which the picture is suspended.[2] With Diogenes this Trope is +the seventh,[3] and his exposition of it is similar, but as +usual, shorter. Both Sextus and Diogenes give the +illustration[4] of the neck of the dove differing in color in +different degrees of inclination, an illustration used by +Protagoras also to prove the relativity of perception by the +senses. "The black neck of the dove in the shade appears black, +but in the light sunny and purple."[5] Since, then, all +phenomena are regarded in a certain place, and from a certain +distance, and according to a certain position, each of which +relations makes a great difference with the mental images, we +shall be obliged also by this Trope to come to the reserving of +the opinion.[6] + + [1] _Hyp._ I. 118. + + [2] _Hyp._ I. 120. + + [3] Diog. IX. 11, 85. + + [4] _Hyp._ I. 120; Diog. IX. 11, 86. + + [5] _Schol. zu Arist._ 60, 18, ed. Brandis; Pappen. _Er. + Pyrr. Grundzuege_, p. 54. + + [6] _Hyp._ I. 121. + +_The Sixth Trope_. This Trope leads to [Greek: epoche] regarding +the nature of objects, because no object can ever be presented +to the organs of sense directly, but must always be perceived +through some medium, or in some mixture.[1] This mixture may be +an outward one, connected with the temperature, or the rarity of +the air, or the water[2] surrounding an object, or it may be a +mixture resulting from the different humors of the +sense-organs.[3] A man with the jaundice, for example, sees +colors differently from one who is in health. The illustration +of the jaundice is a favorite one with the Sceptics. Diogenes +uses it several times in his presentation of Scepticism, and it +occurs in Sextus' writings in all, as an illustration, in eight +different places.[4] The condition of the organ of the [Greek: +hegemonikon], or the ruling faculty, may also cause mixtures. +Pappenheim thinks that we have here Kant's idea of _a priori_, +only on a materialistic foundation.[5] A careful consideration +of the passage, however, shows us that Sextus' thought is more +in harmony with the discoveries of modern psychiatry than with +the philosophy of Kant. If the sentence, [Greek: isos de kai +aute (he dianoia) epimixian tina idian poieitai pros ta hypo ton +aistheseon anangellomena],[6] stood alone, without further +explanation, it might well refer to _a priori_ laws of thought, +but the explanation which follows beginning with "because" makes +that impossible.[7] "Because in each of the places where the +Dogmatics think that the ruling faculty is, we see present +certain humors, which are the cause of mixtures." Sextus does +not advance any opinion as to the place of the ruling faculty in +the body, which is, according to the Stoics, the principal part +of the soul, where ideas, desires, and reasoning originate,[8] +but simply refers to the two theories of the Dogmatics, which +claim on the one hand that it is in the brain, and on the other +that it is in the heart.[9] This subject he deals with more +fully in his work against logic.[10] As, however, he bases his +argument, in discussing possible intellectual mixtures in +illustration of the sixth Trope, entirely on the condition of +the organ of the intellect, it is evident that his theory of the +soul was a materialistic one. + + [1] _Hyp._ I. 124. + + [2] _Hyp._ I. 125. + + [3] _Hyp._ I. 126. + + [4] See Index to Bekker's edition of Sextus. + + [5] Papp. _Er. Pyr. Gr._ p. 55. + + [6] _Hyp._ I. 128. + + [7] _Hyp._ I. 128. + + [8] Diog. VII. 1, 159. + + [9] _Hyp._ I. 128. + + [10] _Adv. Math._ VII. 313. + +_The Seventh Trope_. This Trope, based upon the quantities and +compositions of objects, is illustrated by examples of different +kinds of food, drink, and medicine, showing the different +effects according to the quantity taken, as the harmfulness and +the usefulness of most things depend on their quantity. Things +act differently upon the senses if applied in small or large +quantities, as filings of metal or horn, and separate grains of +sand have a different color and touch from the same taken in the +form of a solid.[1] The result is that ideas vary according to +the composition of the object, and this Trope also brings to +confusion the existence of outward objects, and leads us to +reserve our opinion in regard to them.[2] This Trope is +illustrated by Diogenes with exceeding brevity.[3] + + [1] _Hyp._ I. 129-131. + + [2] _Hyp._ I. 134. + + [3] Diog. IX. 11, 86. + +_The Eighth Trope_. The Trope based upon relation contains, as +Sextus rightly remarks, the substance of the other nine,[1] for +the general statement of the relativity of knowledge includes +the other statements made. The prominence which Sextus gave this +Trope in his introduction to the ten Tropes leads one to expect +here new illustrations and added[2] arguments for [Greek: +epoche]. We find, however, neither of these, but simply a +statement that all things are in relation in one of two ways, +either directly, or as being a part of a difference. These two +kinds of relation are given by Protagoras, and might have been +used to good purpose in the introduction to the Tropes, or at +the end, to prove that all the others were really subordinate to +the eighth. The reasoning is, however simply applied to the +relation of objects to each other, and nothing is added that is +not found elsewhere where as an argument for [Greek: epoche].[3] +This Trope is the tenth by Diogenes, and he strengthens his +reasoning in regard to it, by a statement that Sextus does not +directly make, _i.e._, that everything is in relation to the +understanding.[4] + + [1] _Hyp._ I. 39. + + [2] _Hyp._ I. 135-140. + + [3] _Hyp._ I. 135-140. + + [4] Diog. IX. 11, 88. + +_The Ninth Trope_. This is based upon the frequency and rarity +of events, and refers to some of the phenomena of nature, such +as the rising of the sun, and the sea, as no longer a source of +astonishment, while a comet or an earthquake are wonders to +those not accustomed to them.[1] The value of objects also +depends on their rarity, as for example the value of gold.[2] +Furthermore, things may be valuable at one time, and at another +not so, according to the frequency and rarity of the +occurrence.[3] Therefore this Trope also leads to [Greek: +epoche]. Diogenes gives only two illustrations to this Trope, +that of the sun and the earthquake.[4] + + [1] _Hyp._ I. 141-142. + + [2] _Hyp._ I. 143. + + [3] _Hyp._ I. 144. + + [4] Diog. IX. 11, 87. + +_The Tenth Trope_. We have already remarked on the difference in +the character of the tenth Trope, dealing as it does, not with +the ideas of objects, like the other nine Tropes, but with +philosophical and religious opinions, and questions of right and +wrong. It was the well-known aim of the Sceptics to submit to +the laws and customs of the land where they were found, and to +conform to certain moral teachings and religious ceremonies; +this they did without either affirming or denying the truth of +the principles upon which these teachings were based,[1] and +also without any passion or strong feeling in regard to them,[2] +as nothing in itself can be proved to be good or evil. The tenth +Trope accordingly, brings forward contradictions in customs, +laws, and the beliefs of different lands, to show that they are +also changeable and relative, and not of absolute worth. The +foundation-thought of this Trope is given twice by Diogenes, +once as we have before stated in his introduction[3] to the life +of Pyrrho, and also as one of the Tropes.[4] As it is apparently +one of the oldest of the Tropes, it would naturally be much used +in discussing with the Stoics, whose philosophy had such a wide +ethical significance, and must also have held an important place +in the Sceptical School in all metaphysical and philosophical +discussions. The definition[5] in the beginning of Sextus' +exposition of this Trope Fabricius thinks was taken from +Aristotle, of schools, laws, customs, mythical beliefs and +dogmatic opinions,[6] and the definition which Diogenes gives of +law in his life of Plato[7] is similar. Pappenheim, however, +thinks they were taken from the Stoics, perhaps from +Chrysippus.[8] The argument is based upon the differences in +development of thought, as affecting the standpoint of judgment +in philosophy, in morals, and religion, the results of which we +find in the widely opposing schools of philosophy, in the +variety in religious belief, and in the laws and customs of +different countries. Therefore the decisions reached in the +world of thought leave us equally in doubt regarding the +absolute value of any standards, with those obtained through +sense-perception, and the universal conflict of opinion +regarding all questions of philosophy and ethics leads us also +according to this Trope to the reserving of the opinion.[9] This +Trope is the fifth as given by Diogenes, who placed it directly +after the first four which relate more especially to human +development,[10] while Sextus uses it as the final one, perhaps +thinking that an argument based upon the higher powers of man +deserves the last place, or is the summation of the other +arguments. + + [1] _Hyp._ I. 24. + + [2] _Hyp._ III. 235. + + [3] Diog. IX. 11, 61. + + [4] Diog. IX. 11, 83. + + [5] _Hyp._ I. 145-147. + + [6] Fabricius, Cap. IV. H. + + [7] Diog. III. 86. + + [8] Pappenheim _Gr. Pyrr. Grundzuege_, p. 50. + + [9] _Hyp._ I. 163. + + [10] Diog. IX. 11, 83. + +Following the exposition of the ten Tropes of the older +Sceptics, Sextus gives the five Tropes which he attributes to +the "later Sceptics."[1] Sextus nowhere mentions the author of +these Tropes. Diogenes, however, attributes them to Agrippa, a +man of whom we know nothing except his mention of him. He was +evidently one of the followers of Aenesidemus, and a scholar of +influence in the Sceptical School, who must have himself had +disciples, as Diogenes says, [Greek: hoi peri Agrippan][2] add +to these tropes other five tropes, using the plural verb. +Another Sceptic, also mentioned by Diogenes, and a man unknown +from other sources, named some of his books after Agrippa.[3] +Agrippa is not given by Diogenes in the list of the leaders of +the Sceptical School, but[4] his influence in the development of +the thought of the School must have been great, as the +transition from the ten Tropes of the "older Sceptics" to the +five attributed to Agrippa is a marked one, and shows the +entrance into the school of a logical power before unknown in +it. The latter are not a reduction of the Tropes of Aenesidemus, +but are written from an entirely different standpoint. The ten +Tropes are empirical, and aim to furnish objective proofs of the +foundation theories of Pyrrhonism, while the five are rather +rules of thought leading to logical proof, and are dialectic in +their character. We find this distinction illustrated by the +different way in which the Trope of relativity is treated in the +two groups. In the first it points to an objective relativity, +but with Agrippa to a general subjective logical principle. The +originality of the Tropes of Agrippa does not lie in their +substance matter, but in their formulation and use in the +Sceptical School. These methods of proof were, of course, not +new, but were well known to Aristotle, and were used by the +Sceptical Academy, and probably also by Timon,[5] while the +[Greek: pros ti] goes back at least to Protagoras. The five +Tropes are as follows. + + (i) The one based upon discord. + (ii) The _regressus in infinitum_. +(iii) Relation. + (iv) The hypothetical. + (v) The _circulus in probando_. + +Two of these are taken from the old list, the first and the +third, and Sextus says that the five Tropes are intended to +supplement the ten Tropes, and to show the audacity of the +Dogmatics in a variety of ways.[6] The order of these Tropes is +the same with Diogenes as with Sextus, but the definitions of +them differ sufficiently to show that the two authors took their +material from different sources. According to the first one +everything in question is either sensible or intellectual, and +in attempting to judge it either in life, practically, or "among +philosophers," a position is developed from which it is +impossible to reach a conclusion.[7] According to the second, +every proof requires another proof, and so on to infinity, and +there is no standpoint from which to begin the reasoning.[8] +According to the third, all perceptions are relative, as the +object is colored by the condition of the judge, and the +influence of other things around it.[9] According to the fourth, +it is impossible to escape from the _regressus in infinitum_ by +making a hypothesis the starting point, as the Dogmatics attempt +to do.[10] And the fifth, or the _circulus in probando_, arises +when that which should be the proof needs to be sustained by the +thing to be proved. + + [1] _Hyp._ I. 164. + + [2] Diog. IX. 11, 88. + + [3] Diog. IX. 11, 106. + + [4] Diog. IX. 12, 115-116. + + [5] Compare Natorp. _Op. cit._ p. 302. + + [6] _Hyp._ I. 177. + + [7] _Hyp._ I. 165. + + [8] _Hyp._ I. 166. + + [9] _Hyp._ I. 167. + + [10] _Hyp._ I. 168. + +Sextus claims that all things can be included in these Tropes, +whether sensible or intellectual.[1] For whether, as some say, +only the things of sense are true, or as others claim, only +those of the understanding, or as still others contend, some +things both of sense and understanding are true, a discord must +arise that is impossible to be judged, for it cannot be judged +by the sensible, nor by the intellectual, for the things of the +intellect themselves require a proof; accordingly, the result of +all reasoning must be either hypothetical, or fall into the +_regressus in infinitum_ or the _circulus in probando_.[2] The +reference above to some who say that only the things of sense +are true, is to Epicurus and Protagoras; to some that only the +things of thought are true, to Democritus and Plato; and to +those that claimed some of both to be true, to the Stoics and +the Peripatetics.[3] The three new Tropes added by Agrippa have +nothing to do with sense-perception, but bear entirely upon the +possibility of reasoning, as demanded by the science of logic, +in contrast to the earlier ones which related almost entirely, +with the exception of the tenth, to material objects. Sextus +claims that these five Tropes also lead to the suspension of +judgment,[4] but their logical result is rather the dogmatic +denial of all possibility of knowledge, showing as Hirzel has +well demonstrated, far more the influence of the New Academy +than the spirit of the Sceptical School.[5] It was the +standpoint of the older Sceptics, that although the search for +the truth had not yet succeeded, yet they were still seekers, +and Sextus claims to be faithful to this old aim of the +Pyrrhonists. He calls himself a seeker,[6] and in reproaching +the New Academy for affirming that knowledge is impossible, +Sextus says, "Moreover, we say that our ideas are equal as +regards trustworthiness and untrustworthiness."[7] The ten +Tropes claim to establish doubt only in regard to a knowledge of +the truth, but the five Tropes of Agrippa aim to logically prove +the impossibility of knowledge. It is very strange that Sextus +does not see this decided contrast in the attitude of the two +sets of Tropes, and expresses his approval of those of Agrippa, +and makes more frequent use of the fifth of these, [Greek: ho +diallelos], in his subsequent reasoning than of any other +argument.[8] + + [1] _Hyp._ I. 169. + + [2] _Hyp._ I. 170-171. + + [3] _Adv. Math._ VIII. 185-186; VIII. 56; VII. 369. + + [4] _Hyp._ I. 177. + + [5] Hirzel _Op. cit._ p. 131. + + [6] _Hyp._ I. 3, 7. + + [7] _Hyp._ I. 227. + + [8] See Index of Bekker's edition of Sextus' works. + +We find here in the Sceptical School, shortly after the time of +Aenesidemus, the same tendency to dogmatic teaching that--so far +as the dim and shadowy history of the last years of the New +Academy can be unravelled, and the separation of Pyrrhonism can +be understood, at the time that the Academy passed over into +eclecticism--was one of the causes of that separation. + +It is true that the Tropes of Agrippa show great progress in the +development of thought. They furnish an organisation of the +School far superior to what went before, placing the reasoning +on the firm basis of the laws of logic, and simplifying the +amount of material to be used. In a certain sense Saisset is +correct in saying that Agrippa contributed more than any other +in completing the organisation of Scepticism,[1] but it is not +correct when we consider the true spirit of Scepticism with +which the Tropes of Agrippa were not in harmony. It was through +the very progress shown in the production of these Tropes that +the school finally lost the strength of its position. + +Not content with having reduced the number of the Tropes from +ten to five, others tried to limit the number still further to +two.[2] Sextus gives us no hint of the authorship of the two +Tropes. Ritter attributes them to Menodotus and his followers, +and Zeller agrees with that opinion,[3] while Saisset thinks +that Agrippa was also the author of these,[4] which is a strange +theory to propound, as some of the material of the five is +repeated in the two, and the same man could certainly not appear +as an advocate of five, and at the same time of two Tropes. + + [1] Saisset _Op. cit._ p. 237. + + [2] _Hyp._ I. 178. + + [3] Zeller III. 38; Ritter IV. 277. + + [4] Saisset _Op. cit._ p. 231. + +The two Tropes are founded on the principle that anything must +be known through itself or through something else. It cannot be +known through itself, because of the discord existing between +all things of the senses and intellect, nor can it be known +through something else, as then either the _regressus in +infinitum_ or the _circulus in probando_ follow.[1] Diogenes +Laertius does not refer to these two Tropes. + +In regard to all these Tropes of the suspension of judgment, +Sextus has well remarked in his introduction to them, that they +are included in the eighth, or that of relation.[2] + + [1] _Hyp._ I. 178-179. + + [2] _Hyp._ I. 39. + +_The Tropes of Aetiology_. The eight Tropes against causality +belong chronologically before the five Tropes of Agrippa, in the +history of the development of sceptical thought. They have a +much closer connection with the spirit of Scepticism than the +Tropes of Agrippa, including, as they do, the fundamental +thought of Pyrrhonism, _i.e._, that the phenomena do not reveal +the unknown. + +The Sceptics did not deny the phenomena, but they denied that +the phenomena are signs capable of being interpreted, or of +revealing the reality of causes. It is impossible by a research +of the signs to find out the unknown, or the explanation of +things, as the Stoics and Epicureans claim. The theory of +Aenesidemus which lies at the foundation of his eight Tropes +against aetiology, is given to us by Photius as follows:[1] +"There are no visible signs of the unknown, and those who +believe in its existence are the victims of a vain illusion." +This statement of Aenesidemus is confirmed by a fuller +explanation of it given later on by Sextus.[2] If phenomena are +not signs of the unknown there is no causality, and a refutation +of causality is a proof of the impossibility of science, as all +science is the science of causes, the power of studying causes +from effects, or as Sextus calls them, phenomena. + +It is very noticeable to any one who reads the refutation of +causality by Aenesidemus, as given by Sextus,[3] that there is +no reference to the strongest argument of modern Scepticism, +since the time of Hume, against causality, namely that the +origin of the idea of causality cannot be so accounted for as to +justify our relying upon it as a form of cognition.[4] + + [1] _Myriob._ 170 B. 12. + + [2] _Adv. Math._ VIII. 207. + + [3] _Hyp._ I. 180-186. + + [4] Ueberweg _Op. cit._ p. 217. + +The eight Tropes are directed against the possibility of +knowledge of nature, which Aenesidemus contested against in all +his Tropes, the ten as well as the eight.[1] They are written +from a materialistic standpoint. These Tropes are given with +illustrations by Fabricius as follows: + +I. Since aetiology in general refers to things that are unseen, +it does not give testimony that is incontestable in regard to +phenomena. For example, the Pythagoreans explain the distance of +the planets by a musical proportion. + +II. From many equally plausible reasons which might be given for +the same thing, one only is arbitrarily chosen, as some explain +the inundation of the Nile by a fall of snow at its source, +while there could be other causes, as rain, or wind, or the +action of the sun. + +III. Things take place in an orderly manner, but the causes +presented do not show any order, as for example, the motion of +the stars is explained by their mutual pressure, which does not +take into account the order that reigns among them. + +IV. The unseen things are supposed to take place in the same way +as phenomena, as vision is explained in the same way as the +appearance of images in a dark room. + +V. Most philosophers present theories of aetiology which agree +with their own individual hypotheses about the elements, but not +with common and accepted ideas, as to explain the world by atoms +like Epicurus, by homoeomeriae like Anaxagoras, or by matter and +form like Aristotle. + +VI. Theories are accepted which agree with individual +hypotheses, and others equally probable are passed by, as +Aristotle's explanation of comets, that they are a collection of +vapors near the earth, because that coincided with his theory of +the universe. + +VII. Theories of aetiology are presented which conflict not only +with individual hypotheses, but also with phenomena, as to admit +like Epicurus an inclination or desire of the soul, which was +incompatible with the necessity which he advocated. + +VIII. The inscrutable is explained by things equally +inscrutable, as the rising of sap in plants is explained by the +attraction of a sponge for water, a fact contested by some.[2] + + [1] _Hyp._ I. 98. + + [2] _Hyp._ I. 180-186; Fabricius, Cap. XVII. 180 z. + +Diogenes does not mention these Tropes in this form, but he +gives a _resume_ of the general arguments of the Sceptics +against aetiology,[1] which has less in common with the eight +Tropes of Aenesidemus, than with the presentation of the subject +by Sextus later,[2] when he multiplies his proofs exceedingly to +show [Greek: meden einai aition]. Although the Tropes of +Aenesidemus have a dialectic rather than an objective character, +it would not seem that he made the distinction, which is so +prominent with Sextus, between the signs [Greek: hypomnestika] +and [Greek: endeiktika],[3] especially as Diogenes sums up his +argument on the subject with the general assertion, [Greek: +Semeion ouk einai],[4] and proceeds to introduce the logical +consequence of the denial of aetiology. The summing up of the +Tropes of Aenesidemus is given as follows, in the _Hypotyposes_, +by Sextus:--"A cause in harmony with all the sects of +philosophy, and with Scepticism, and with phenomena, is perhaps +not possible, for the phenomena and the unknown altogether +disagree."[5] + +It is interesting to remark in connection with the seventh of +these Tropes, that Aenesidemus asserts that causality has only a +subjective value, which from his materialistic standpoint was an +argument against its real existence, and the same argument is +used by Kant to prove that causality is a necessary condition of +thought.[6] + +Chaignet characterises the Tropes of Aenesidemus as false and +sophistical,[7] but as Maccoll has well said, they are +remarkable for their judicious and strong criticism, and are +directed against the false method of observing facts through the +light of preconceived opinion.[8] They have, however, a stronger +critical side than sceptical, and show the positive tendency of +the thought of Aenesidemus. + + [1] Diog. IX. 11, 96-98. + + [2] _Hyp._ III. 24-28. + + [3] _Adv. Math._ VIII. 151. + + [4] Diog. IX. 11, 96. + + [5] _Hyp._ I. 185. + + [6] Compare Maccoll _Op. cit._ p. 77. + + [7] Chaignet _Op. cit._ 507. + + [8] Maccoll _Op. cit._ p. 88. + + + + +CHAPTER IV. + + +_Aenesidemus and the Philosophy of Heraclitus._ + +A paragraph in the First Book of the _Hypotyposes_ which has +given rise to much speculation and many different theories, is +the comparison which Sextus makes of Scepticism with the +philosophy of Heraclitus.[1] In this paragraph the statement is +made that Aenesidemus and his followers, [Greek: hoi peri ton +Ainesidemon], said that Scepticism is the path to the philosophy +of Heraclitus, because the doctrine that contradictory +predicates appear to be applicable to the same thing, leads the +way to the one that contradictory predicates are in reality +applicable to the same thing.[2] [Greek: hoi peri ton +Ainesidemon elegon hodon einai ten skeptiken agogen epi ten +Herakleiteion philosophian, dioti proegeitai tou tanantia peri +to auto hyparchein to tanantia peri to auto phainesthai]. As the +Sceptics say that contradictory predicates appear to be +applicable to the same thing, the Heraclitans come from this to +the more positive doctrine that they are in reality so.[3] + + [1] _Hyp._ I. 210. + + [2] _Hyp._ I. 210. + + [3] _Hyp._ I. 210. + +This connection which Aenesidemus is said to have affirmed +between Scepticism and the philosophy of Heraclitus is earnestly +combated by Sextus, who declares that the fact that +contradictory predicates appear to be applicable to the same +thing is not a dogma of the Sceptics, but a fact which presents +itself to all men, and not to the Sceptics only. No one for +instance, whether he be a Sceptic or not, would dare to say that +honey does not taste sweet to those in health, and bitter to +those who have the jaundice, so that Heraclitus begins from a +preconception common to all men, as to us also, and perhaps to +the other schools of philosophy as well.[1] As the statement +concerning the appearance of contradictory predicates in regard +to the same thing is not an exclusively sceptical one, then +Scepticism is no more a path to the philosophy of Heraclitus +than to other schools of philosophy, or to life, as all use +common subject matter. "But we are afraid that the Sceptical +School not only does not help towards the knowledge of the +philosophy of Heraclitus, but even hinders that result. Since +the Sceptic accuses Heraclitus of having rashly dogmatised, +presenting on the one hand the doctrine of 'conflagration' and +on the other that 'contradictory predicates are in reality +applicable to the same thing.'"[2] "It is absurd, then, to say +that this conflicting school is a path to the sect with which it +conflicts. It is therefore absurd to say that the Sceptical +School is a path to the philosophy of Heraclitus."[3] + + [1] _Hyp._ I. 211. + + [2] _Hyp._ I. 212. + + [3] _Hyp._ I. 212. + +This is not the only place in the writings of Sextus which +states that Aenesidemus at some time of his life was an advocate +of the doctrines of Heraclitus. In no instance, however, where +Sextus refers to this remarkable fact, does he offer any +explanation of it, or express any bitterness against +Aenesidemus, whom he always speaks of with respect as a leader +of the Sceptical School. We are thus furnished with one of the +most difficult problems of ancient Scepticism, the problem of +reconciling the apparent advocacy of Aenesidemus of the +teachings of Heraclitus with his position in the Sceptical +School. + +A comparison with each other of the references made by Sextus +and other writers to the teachings of Aenesidemus, and a +consideration of the result, gives us two pictures of +Aenesidemus which conflict most decidedly with each other. We +have on the one hand, the man who was the first to give +Pyrrhonism a position as an influential school, and the first to +collect and present to the world the results of preceding +Sceptical thought. He was the compiler of the ten Tropes of +[Greek: epoche], and perhaps in part their author, and the +author of the eight Tropes against aetiology.[1] He develops his +Scepticism from the standpoint that neither the senses nor the +intellect can give us any certain knowledge of reality.[2] He +denied the possibility of studying phenomena as signs of the +unknown.[3] He denied all possibility of truth, and the reality +of motion, origin and decay. There was according to his teaching +no pleasure or happiness, and no wisdom or supreme good. He +denied the possibility of finding out the nature of things, or +of proving the existence of the gods, and finally he declared +that no ethical aim is possible. + + [1] _Hyp._ I. 180. + + [2] Photius 170, B. 12. + + [3] _Adv. Math._ VIII. 40. + +The picture on the other hand, presented to us by Sextus and +Tertullian, is that of a man with a system of beliefs and +dogmas, which lead, he says, to the philosophy of Heraclitus. In +strange contradiction to his assertion of the impossibility of +all knowledge, he advocates a theory that the original substance +is air,[1] which is most certainly a dogma, although indeed a +deviation from the teachings of Heraclitus, of which Sextus +seemed unconscious, as he says, [Greek: to te on kata ton +Herakleiton aer estin, hos physin ho Ainesidemos]. Aenesidemus +dogmatised also regarding number and time and unity of the +original world-stuff.[2] He seems to have dogmatised further +about motion,[3] and about the soul.[4] + +If Sextus' language is taken according to its apparent meaning, +we find ourselves here in the presence of a system of beliefs +which would be naturally held by a follower of the +Stoic-Heraclitan physics,[5] and absolutely inexplicable from +the standpoint of a man who advocated so radical a Scepticism as +Aenesidemus. Sextus in the passage that we first quoted,[6] +expresses great indignation against the idea that Scepticism +could form the path to the philosophy of Heraclitus, but he does +not express surprise or indignation against Aenesidemus +personally, or offer any explanation of the apparent +contradiction; and while his writings abound in references to +him as a respected leader of the Sceptical School, he sometimes +seems to include him with the Dogmatics, mentioning him with the +[Greek: dogmatikon philosophon].[7] In fact, the task of +presenting any consistent history of the development of thought +through which Aenesidemus passed is such a puzzling one, that +Brochard brilliantly remarks that possibly the best attitude to +take towards it would be to follow the advice of Aenesidemus +himself, and suspend one's judgment altogether regarding it. Is +it possible to suppose that so sharp and subtle a thinker as +Aenesidemus held at the same time such opposing opinions? + + [1] _Adv. Math._ X. 233. + + [2] _Adv. Math._ IX. 337; X. 216. + + [3] _Adv. Math._ X. 38. + + [4] _Adv. Math._ VII. 349. + + [5] Compare Zeller _Op. cit._ III. p. 33. + + [6] _Hyp._ I. 210-212. + + [7] _Adv. Math._ VIII. 8; X. 215. + +The conjecture that he was first a Heraclitan Stoic, and later a +Sceptic, which might be possible, does not offer any explanation +of Sextus' statement, that he regarded Scepticism as a path to +the philosophy of Heraclitus. Nor would it be logical to think +that after establishing the Sceptical School in renewed +influence and power, he reverted to the Heraclitan theories as +they were modified by the Stoics. These same theories were the +cause of his separation from the Academy, for his chief +accusation against the Academy was that it was adopting the +dogmatism of the Stoics.[1] The matter is complicated by the +fact that Tertullian also attributes to Aenesidemus +anthropological and physical teachings that agree with the +Stoical Heraclitan doctrines. It is not strange that in view of +these contradictory assertions in regard to the same man, some +have suggested the possibility that they referred to two +different men of the same name, a supposition, however, that no +one has been able to authoritatively vindicate. + +Let us consider briefly some of the explanations which have been +attempted of the apparent heresy of Aenesidemus towards the +Sceptical School. We will begin with the most ingenious, that of +Pappenheim.[2] + +Pappenheim claims that Sextus was not referring to Aenesidemus +himself in these statements which he joins with his name. In the +most important of these, the one quoted from the +_Hypotyposes_,[3] which represents Aenesidemus as claiming that +Scepticism is the path to the philosophy of Heraclitus, the +expression used is [Greek: hoi peri ton Ainesidemon], and in +many of the other places where Sextus refers to the dogmatic +statements of Aenesidemus, the expression is either [Greek: hoi +peri ton Ainesidemon], or [Greek: Ainesidemos kath' +Herakleiton], while when Sextus quotes Aenesidemus to sustain +Scepticism, he uses his name alone. + + [1] Compare Zeller _Op. cit._ III. p. 16. + + [2] _Die angebliche Heraclitismus des Skeptikers + Ainesidemos_, Berlin 1889. + + [3] _Hyp._ I. 210-212. + +Pappenheim thinks that Sextus' conflict was not with the dead +Aenesidemus, who had lived two centuries before him, but with +his own contemporaries. He also seeks to prove that Sextus could +not have gained his knowledge of these sayings of Aenesidemus +from any of Aenesidemus' own writings, as neither by the +ancients, nor by later writers, was any book spoken of which +could well have contained them. Neither Aristocles nor Diogenes +mentions any such book. + +Pappenheim also makes much of the argument that Sextus in no +instance seems conscious of inconsistency on the part of +Aenesidemus, even when most earnestly combating his alleged +teachings, but in referring to him personally he always speaks +of him with great respect. + +Pappenheim suggests, accordingly, that the polemic of Sextus was +against contemporaries, those who accepted the philosophy of +Heraclitus in consequence of, or in some connection with, the +teachings of Aenesidemus. He entirely ignores the fact that +there is no trace of any such school or sect in history, calling +themselves followers of "Aenesidemus according to Heraclitus," +but still thinks it possible that such a movement existed in +Alexandria at the time of Sextus, where so many different sects +were found. Sextus use Aenesidemus' name in four different +ways:--alone, [Greek: hoi peri ton Ainesidemon], [Greek: +Ainesidemos kath' Herakleiton], and in one instance [Greek: hoi +peri ton Ainesidemon kath' Herakleiton].[1] + + [1] _Adv. Math._ VIII. 8. + +Pappenheim advances the theory that some of these contemporaries +against whom Sextus directed his arguments had written a book +entitled [Greek: Ainesidemos kath' Herakleiton], to prove the +harmony between Aenesidemus and Heraclitus, and that it was from +this book that Sextus quoted the dogmatic statements which he +introduced with that formula. He claims, further, that the +passage quoted from _Hypotyposes I._ even, is directed +against contemporaries, who founded their system of proofs of +the harmony between Aenesidemus and Heraclitus on the connection +of the celebrated formula which was such a favourite with the +Sceptics: "Contrary predicates appear to apply to the same +thing," with the apparent deduction from this, that "Contrary +predicates in reality apply to the same thing." Sextus wishes, +according to Pappenheim, to prove to these contemporaries that +they had misunderstood Aenesidemus, and Sextus does not report +Aenesidemus to be a Dogmatic, nor to have taught the doctrines +of Heraclitus; neither has he misunderstood Aenesidemus, nor +consequently misrepresented him; but on the contrary, these +dogmatic quotations have nothing to do with Aenesidemus, but +refer altogether to contemporaries who pretended to be Sceptics +while they accepted the teachings of Heraclitus. Sextus +naturally warmly combats this tendency, as he wishes to preserve +Pyrrhonism pure. + +Brochard advocates a change of opinion on the part of +Aenesidemus as an explanation of the difficulty in question.[1] +He starts from the supposition, the reasonableness of which we +shall consider later, that Aenesidemus had passed through one +change of opinion already when he severed his connection with +the New Academy; and to the two phases of his life, which such a +change has already made us familiar with, he adds a third. +Aenesidemus would not be the first who has accepted different +beliefs at different periods of his life, and Brochard claims +that such a development in the opinions of Aenesidemus is +logical. He does not accuse Aenesidemus of having, as might seem +from the perusal of Sextus, suddenly changed his basis, but +rather of having gradually come to accept much in the teachings +of Heraclitus. Aenesidemus modifies his Scepticism only to the +extent of pretending to know something of absolute reality. The +Sceptic says, "Contradictory predicates are apparently +applicable to the same thing," and Aenesidemus accepts the +Heraclitan result--"Contradictory predicates are in reality +applicable to the same thing." From Sextus' report, Aenesidemus +would seem to have renounced his position as a Sceptic in saying +that Scepticism is the path to the philosophy of Heraclitus. He +does not, however, renounce Scepticism, but he finds it +incomplete. In deliberating concerning the appearance of +contradictory predicates in regard to the same object, he would +naturally ask, "Whence come these contradictory appearances?" +After having doubted all things, he wished to know wherefore he +doubts. The system of Heraclitus offers a solution, and he +accepts it. Contradictory predicates produce equilibrium in the +soul because they are an expression of reality. + + [1] Brochard _Op. cit._ 272. + +As a Sceptic he claims that knowledge is impossible, and he does +not find that the statement of Heraclitus disproves this, but +rather that it supports his theory. He had denied the existence +of science. He still does so, but now he knows why he denies it. +Brochard asks why it is any more impossible that Aenesidemus +should have been a follower of Heraclitus than that Protagoras +was so, as Protagoras was after all a Sceptic. In conclusion, +Brochard claims that the dogmatic theories attributed to +Aenesidemus relate to the doctrine of the truth of contradictory +predicates, which seemed to him a logical explanation of the +foundation theories of Scepticism. It is right to call him a +Sceptic, for he was so, and that sincerely; and he deserves his +rank as one of the chiefs of the Sceptical School. + +Coming now to the opinion of Zeller,[1] we find that he +advocates a misconception of Aenesidemus on the part of Sextus. +The whole difficulty is removed, Zeller thinks, by the simple +fact that Sextus had not understood Aenesidemus; and as +Tertullian and Sextus agree in this misconception of the views +of Aenesidemus, they must have been misled by consulting a +common author in regard to Aenesidemus, who confused what +Aenesidemus said of Heraclitus with his own opinion. Zeller +maintains that the expression so often repeated by +Sextus--[Greek: Ainesidemos kath' Herakleiton]--shows that some +one of Aenesidemus' books contained a report of Heraclitus' +doctrines, as Aenesidemus was in the habit of quoting as many +authorities as possible to sustain his Scepticism. To justify +his quotations from Heraclitus, he had possibly given a short +abstract of Heraclitus' teachings; and the misconception +advocated by Zeller and found both in Tertullian and Sextus, +refers rather to the spirit than to the words quoted from +Aenesidemus, and is a misconception due to some earlier author, +who had given a false impression of the meaning of Aenesidemus +in quoting what Aenesidemus wrote about Heraclitus. That is to +say, Heraclitus was classed by Aenesidemus only among those who +prepared the way for Scepticism, just as Diogenes[2] mentions +many philosophers in that way; and that Soranus[3] and Sextus +both had the same misunderstanding can only be explained by a +mistake on the part of the authority whom they consulted. + + [1] Zeller _Op. cit._ III, pp. 31-35; _Grundriss der + Geschichte der Griechischen Phil._ p. 263. + + [2] Diog. Laert. IX. 11, 71-74. + + [3] Tertullian. + +This explanation, however, makes Sextus a very stupid man. +Aenesidemus' books were well known, and Sextus would most +certainly take the trouble to read them. His reputation as an +historian would not sustain such an accusation, as Diogenes +calls his books [Greek: ta deka ton skeptikon kai alla +kallista].[1] Furthermore, that Sextus used Aenesidemus' own +books we know from the direct quotation from them in regard to +Plato,[2] which he combines with the ideas of Menodotus[3] and +his own. + + [1] Diog. IX. 12, 116. + + [2] _Hyp._ I. 222. + + [3] Following the Greek of Bekker. + +Sextus' references to Aenesidemus in connection with Heraclitus +are very numerous, and it is absurd to suppose that he would +have trusted entirely to some one who reported him for authority +on such a subject. Even were it possible that Sextus did not +refer directly to the works of Aenesidemus, which we do not +admit, even then, there had been many writers in the Sceptical +School since the time of Aenesidemus, and they certainly could +not all have misrepresented him. We must remember that Sextus +was at the head of the School, and had access to all of its +literature. His honor would not allow of such a mistake, and if +he had indeed made it, his contemporaries must surely have +discovered it before Diogenes characterised his books as [Greek: +kallista]. Whatever may be said against the accuracy of Sextus +as a general historian of philosophy, especially in regard to +the older schools, he cannot certainly be accused of ignorance +respecting the school of which he was at that time the head. + +The opinion of Ritter on this subject is that Aenesidemus must +have been a Dogmatic.[1] Saisset contends[2] that Aenesidemus +really passed from the philosophy of Heraclitus to that of +Pyrrho, and made the statement that Scepticism is the path to +the philosophy of Heraclitus to defend his change of view, +although in his case the change had been just the opposite to +the one he defends. Saisset propounds as a law in the history of +philosophy a fact which he claims to be true, that Scepticism +always follows sensationalism, for which he gives two examples, +Pyrrho, who was first a disciple of Democritus, and Hume, who +was a disciple of Locke It is not necessary to discuss the +absurdity of such a law, which someone has well remarked would +involve an _a priori_ construction of history. There is no +apparent reason for Saisset's conjecture in regard to +Aenesidemus, for it is exactly the opposite of what Sextus has +reported. Strange to say, Saisset himself remarks in another +place that we owe religious respect to any text, and that it +should be the first law of criticism to render this.[3] Such +respect to the text of Sextus, as he himself advocates, puts +Saisset's explanation of the subject under discussion out of the +question. + + [1] Ritter, _Op. cit._ p. 280. Book IV. + + [2] Saisset, _Op. cit._ p. 206. + + [3] Saisset _Op. cit._ p. 206. + +Hirzel and Natorp do not find such a marked contradiction in the +two views presented of the theories of Aenesidemus, nor do they +think that Sextus has misrepresented them. They rather maintain, +that in declaring the coexistence of contradictory predicates +regarding the same object, Aenesidemus does not cease to be a +Sceptic, for he did not believe that the predicates are +applicable in a dogmatic sense of the word, but are only +applicable in appearance, that is, applicable to phenomena. The +Heraclitism of Aenesidemus would be then only in appearance, as +he understood the statement, that "Contradictory predicates are +in reality applicable to the same thing," only in the phenomenal +sense.[1] Hirzel says in addition, that contradictory predicates +are in reality applicable to those phenomena which are the same +for all, and consequently true, for Aenesidemus considered those +phenomena true that are the same for all.[2] As Protagoras, the +disciple of Heraclitus, declared the relative character of +sensations, that things exist only for us, and that their nature +depends on our perception of them; so, in the phenomenal sense, +Aenesidemus accepts the apparent fact that contradictory +predicates in reality apply to the same thing. + + [1] Natorp _Op. cit._ 115, 122. + + [2] _Adv. Math._ VIII. 8; Hirzel _Op. cit._ p. 95. + +This explanation entirely overlooks the fact that we have to do +with the word [Greek: huparchein], in the statement that +contradictory predicates in reality apply to the same thing; +while in the passage quoted where Aenesidemus declares common +phenomena to be true ones, we have the word [Greek: alethe], so +that this explanation of the difficulty would advocate a very +strange use of the word [Greek: huparchein]. + +All of these different views of the possible solution of this +perplexing problem are worthy of respect, as the opinion of men +who have given much thought to this and other closely Belated +subjects. While we may not altogether agree with any one of +them, they nevertheless furnish many suggestions, which are very +valuable in helping to construct a theory on the subject that +shall satisfactorily explain the difficulties, and present a +consistent view of the attitude of Aenesidemus. + +First, in regard to the Greek expression [Greek: hoi peri] in +connection with proper names, upon which Pappenheim bases so +much of his argument. All Greek scholars would agree that the +expression does not apply usually only to the disciples of any +teacher, but [Greek: hoi peri ton Ainesidemon], for instance, +includes Aenesidemus with his followers, and is literally +translated, "Aenesidemus and his followers." It is noticeable, +however, in the writings of Sextus that he uses the expression +[Greek: hoi peri] often for the name of the founder of a school +alone, as Pappenheim himself admits.[1] We find examples of this +in the mention of Plato and Democritus and Arcesilaus, as +[Greek: hoi peri ton Platona kai Demokriton][2] and [Greek: hoi +peri ton Arkesilaon],[3] and accordingly we have no right to +infer that his use of the name Aenesidemus in this way has an +exceptional significance. It may mean Aenesidemus alone, or it +may signify Aenesidemus in connection with his followers. + + [1] Pappenheim _Op. cit._ p. 21. + + [2] _Adv. Math._ VIII. 6. + + [3] _Adv. Math._ VII. 150. + +In reply to Zeller's position, that Sextus and Tertullian have +misunderstood Aenesidemus, and quote from some common author who +misrepresents him, we would admit that such a misunderstanding +might be possible where Sextus gives long explanations of +Heraclitus' teachings, beginning with quoting Aenesidemus, and +continuing in such a way that it is not always possible to +distinguish just the part that is attributed to Aenesidemus; but +such a misunderstanding certainly cannot be asserted in regard +to the direct statement that Aenesidemus regarded Scepticism as +the path to the philosophy of Heraclitus, for the reasons +previously given. Neither would we agree with Brochard, whose +solution of the difficulty is on the whole the most logical, +_i.e._, that Aenesidemus had necessarily already passed through +two phases of philosophical belief. It is possible to admit a +gradual evolution of thought in Aenesidemus without supposing in +either case a change of basis. His withdrawal from the Academy +is an argument against, rather than in favor of a change on his +part, and was caused by the well-known change in the attitude of +the Academy. + +Many of the teachings of the Sceptical School were taken +directly from the Academy, belonging to those doctrines +advocated in the Academy before the eclectic dogmatic tendency +introduced by Antiochus. In fact, Sextus himself claims a close +relation between the Middle Academy and Pyrrhonism.[1] +Aenesidemus, although he was a Sceptic, belonged to the Academy, +and on leaving it became, as it were, a pioneer in Pyrrhonism, +and cannot be judged in the same way as we should judge a +Sceptic of Sextus' time. + +It seems a self-evident fact that during the two centuries which +elapsed between the time of Aenesidemus and Sextus, the +standpoint of judgment in the Sceptical School had greatly +changed. An example illustrating this change we find in a +comparison of the presentation of Scepticism by Diogenes with +that of Sextus. The author Whom Diogenes follows, probably one +of the Sceptical writers, considers Xenophanes, Zeno, and +Democritus, Sceptics, and also Plato,[2] while Sextus, in regard +to all of these men, opposes the idea that they were +Sceptics.[3] Diogenes also calls Heraclitus a Sceptic, and even +Homer,[4] and quotes sceptical sayings from the Seven Wise +Men;[5] he includes in the list of Sceptics, Archilochus, +Euripides, Empedocles, and Hippocrates,[6] and, furthermore, +says that Theodosius, probably one of the younger Sceptics, +objected to the name 'Pyrrhonean' on the ground that Pyrrho was +not the first Sceptic.[7] + + [1] _Hyp._ I. 232. + + [2] Diog. IX. 11, 17-72. + + [3] _Hyp._ I. 213-214; I. 223-225. + + [4] Diog. IX. 11, 71. + + [5] Diog. IX. 11, 71. + + [6] Diog. IX. 11, 71-73. + + [7] Diog. IX. 11. 70. + +We have given the testimony from many sources to the effect that +before the time of Sextus the Empirical School of Medicine was +considered identical with Scepticism, although not so by Sextus +himself. From all of these things we may infer a narrowing of +the limits of Pyrrhonism in the time of Sextus. + +Let us accept with Brochard the development of thought seen in +Aenesidemus from the beginning to the end of his career, without +agreeing with him that Aenesidemus ever consciously changed his +basis. He was a Sceptic in the Academy. He left the Academy on +that account, and he remained a Sceptic to the end, in so far as +a man can be a Sceptic, and take the positive stand that +Aenesidemus did. + +Two things might account for his apparent dogmatism-- + + (i) The eclectic spirit of his time. + +(ii) The psychological effect upon himself of this + careful systemisation of the Sceptical teachings. + +Let us consider the first of these causes. Aenesidemus, although +not the first of the later Sceptics, was apparently the first to +separate himself from the Academy. He was the founder of a new +movement, the attempt to revive the older Scepticism as taught +by Pyrrho and Timon, and separate it from the dogmatic teachings +of the Stoics which were so greatly affecting the Scepticism of +the New Academy. It was the spirit of his time to seek to +sustain all philosophical teaching by the authority of as many +as possible of the older philosophers, and he could hardly +escape the tendency which his training in the Academy had +unconsciously given him. Therefore we find him trying to prove +that the philosophy of Heraclitus follows from Scepticism. It is +not necessary either to explain the matter, as both Hirzel and +Natorp so ingeniously attempt to do, by claiming that the truth +of contradictory predicates which Aenesidemus accepted from +Heraclitus referred only to phenomena. The history of philosophy +gives us abundant proof of the impossibility of absolute +Scepticism, and Aenesidemus furnishes us with one example of +many of this impossibility, and of the dogmatism that must exist +in connection with all thought. In the case of Aenesidemus, who +evidently gave the best efforts of his life to establish the +Sceptical School, the dogmatism was probably unconscious. That +he remained to the end a Sceptic is shown by the fact that he +was known as such to posterity. Nowhere do we find a change of +basis referred to in regard to him, and Sextus, in refuting the +mistakes which he attributes to Aenesidemus, does it, as it +were, to point out something of which Aenesidemus had been +unconscious. + +Let us consider here the second cause of Aenesidemus' Dogmatism, +the psychological effect upon himself of formulating Sceptical +beliefs. The work that he did for the Sceptical School was a +positive one. It occupied years of his life, and stamped itself +upon his mental development. In formulating Scepticism, and in +advocating it against the many enemies of the School, and amidst +all the excitement of the disruption from the Academy, and of +establishing a new School, it was inevitable that his mind +should take a dogmatic tendency. He remained a Sceptic as he had +always been, but must have grown dogmatic in his attitude +towards the Sceptical formulae, and was thus able to adopt some +of the teachings of Heraclitus, unconscious of their +inconsistency. + +Where should we find a modern writer who is consistent in all +his statements? Could we read the works of Aenesidemus, we might +better understand the connection between the apparently +contradictory ideas in his teaching, but the inconsistencies in +statement would probably remain. It is necessary to remember the +position of Aenesidemus in breaking away from the Academy and in +founding a new school, the full significance of which he could +not foresee. There must necessarily be some crudeness in pioneer +work, and some failure to see the bearing of all its parts, and +a compiler like Sextus could point out the inconsistencies which +the two centuries since the time of Aenesidemus had made plain. +Aenesidemus was too positive a character to admit of absolute +Sceptical consistency. He was nevertheless the greatest thinker +the Sceptical School had known since the age of Pyrrho, its +founder. In claiming a union between Pyrrhonism and the +philosophy of Heraclitus, he recognised also the pre-Socratic +tendency of the Sceptical School. The name of Socrates was all +powerful in the Academy, but Aenesidemus comprehended the fact +that the true spirit of Pyrrhonism was of earlier origin than +the Academic Scepsis. + + + + +CHAPTER V. + + +_Critical Examination of Pyrrhonism_. + +The distinct philosophical movement of which Pyrrho was the +author bore his name for five centuries after his death. It had +an acknowledged existence as a philosophical tendency, if indeed +not a sect, for a great part of that time. Yet, when we +carefully analyse the relation of Pyrrhonism, as presented to us +by Sextus, to the teachings of Pyrrho himself, in so far as they +can be known, we find many things in Pyrrhonism for which Pyrrho +was not responsible. + +The foundation elements of the movement, the spirit of Empirical +doubt that lay underneath and caused its development in certain +directions rather than others, are due to Pyrrho. The methods of +the school, however, were very foreign to anything found in the +life or teachings of Pyrrho. Pyrrho was eminently a moralist. He +was also to a great degree an ascetic, and he lived his +philosophy, giving it thus a positive side wanting in the +Pyrrhonism presented to us by Sextus. Timon represents him as +desiring to escape from the tedious philosophical discussions of +his time-- + + [Greek: + o geron o Purrhon, pos e pothen ekdusin heures + latreies doxon te kenophrosunes te sophiston;] + +and again he speaks of his modest and tranquil life-- + + [Greek: + touto moi, o Purrhon, himeiretai etor akousai + pos pot' aner et' ageis panta meth' hesuchies + mounos d'anthropoisi theou tropon hegemoneueis + ..... pheista meth' hesuchies + aiei aphrontistos kai akinetos kata tauta + me prosech' indalmois hedulogou sophies.][1] + +Pyrrho wished more than anything else to live in peace, and his +dislike of the Sophists[2] may well have made him try to avoid +dialectic; while, on the contrary, in the Pyrrhonean School of +later times discussion was one of the principal methods of +contest, at least after the time of Agrippa. Pyrrhonism seems to +have been originally a theory of life, like the philosophy of +Socrates, to whom Pyrrho is often compared,[3] and Pyrrho, like +Socrates, lived his philosophy. Our knowledge of Pyrrho is +gained from Aristocles, Sextus Empiricus, and Diogenes, and from +the Academic traditions given by Cicero. Diogenes gives us +details of his life which he attributes to Antigonus of +Carystius, who lived about the time of Pyrrho.[4] Pyrrho was a +disciple and admirer of Democritus,[5] some of whose teachings +bore a lasting influence over the subsequent development of +Pyrrhonism. He accompanied Alexander the Great to India, where +he remained as a member of his suite for some time, and the +philosophical ideas of India were not without influence on his +teachings. Oriental philosophy was not unknown in Greece long +before the time of Pyrrho, but his personal contact with the +Magi and the Gymnosophists of the far East, apparently impressed +upon his mind teachings for which he was not unprepared by his +previous study and natural disposition. In his indifference to +worldly goods we find a strong trace of the Buddhistic teaching +regarding the vanity of human life. He showed also a similar +hopelessness in regard to the possibility of finding a +satisfactory philosophy, or absolute truth. He evidently +returned from India with the conviction that truth was not to be +attained.[6] + + [1] Diog. IX. 11, 65. Given from Mullach's edition of + Timon by Brochard, _Pyrrhon et le Scepticism primitive_, + p. 525. + + [2] Diog. IX. 11, 69. + + [3] Lewes _Op. cit._ p. 460. + + [4] Diog. IX. 11, 62. + + [5] Diog. IX. 11, 67. + + [6] Compare Maccoll _Op. cit._ + +After the death of Alexander and Pyrrho's return to Greece, he +lived quietly with his sister at Elis, and Diogenes says that he +was consistent in his life, asserting and denying nothing, but +in everything withholding his opinion, as nothing in itself is +good or shameful, just or unjust.[1] He was not a victim of +false pride, but sold animals in the market place, and, if +necessary, washed the utensils himself.[2] He lived in equality +of spirit, and practised his teachings with serenity. If one +went out while he was talking he paid no attention, but went +calmly on with his remarks.[3] He liked to live alone, and to +travel alone, and on one occasion, being knocked about in a +vessel by a storm at sea, he did not lose his imperturbability, +but pointed to a swine calmly eating on board, and said that the +wise man should have as much calmness of soul as that. He +endured difficult surgical operations with indifference,[4] and +when his friend Anaxarchus was once unfortunate enough to fall +into a morass, he went calmly by without stopping to help him, +for which consistency of conduct Anaxarchus afterwards praised +him. There are two instances given by Diogenes when he lost +control of himself; once in getting angry with his sister, and +once in trying to save himself when chased by a dog. When +accused of inconsistency, he said it was difficult to entirely +give up one's humanity.[5] He was greatly venerated by the +people among whom he lived, who made him high priest, and on his +account exempted all philosophers from taxation,[6] and after +his death erected a statue to his memory. These facts testify to +his moral character, and also to fulfil the functions of high +priest a certain amount of dogmatism must have been necessary. + + [1] Diog. IX. 11, 61, 62. + + [2] Diog. IX. 11, 66. + + [3] Diog. IX. 11, 63. + + [4] Diog. IX. 11, 67. + + [5] Diog. IX. 11, 66. + + [6] Diog. IX. 11, 64. + +According to Diogenes, "We cannot know," said Pyrrho, "what +things are in themselves, either by sensation or by judgment, +and, as we cannot distinguish the true from the false, therefore +we should live impassively, and without an opinion." The term +[Greek: epoche], so characteristic of Pyrrhonism, goes back, +according to Diogenes, to the time of Pyrrho.[1] Nothing is, in +itself, one thing more than another, but all experience is +related to phenomena, and no knowledge is possible through the +senses.[2] Pyrrho's aim was [Greek: ataraxia] and his life +furnished a marked example of the spirit of indifference, for +which the expression [Greek: apatheia] is better suited than the +later one, [Greek: ataraxia]. The description of his life with +his sister confirms this, where the term [Greek: adiaphoria] is +used to describe his conduct.[3] He founded his Scepticism on +the equivalence of opposing arguments.[4] + + [1] Diog. IX. 11, 61. + + [2] Diog. IX. 11, 61-62. + + [3] Diog. IX. 11. 66. + + [4] Diog. IX. 11. 106. + +The picture given of Pyrrho by Cicero is entirely different from +that of Diogenes, and contrasts decidedly with it.[1] Cicero +knows Pyrrho as a severe moralist, not as a Sceptic. Both +authors attribute to Pyrrho the doctrine of indifference and +apathy, but, according to Cicero, Pyrrho taught of virtue, +honesty, and the _summum bonum_, while Diogenes plainly tells us +that he considered nothing as good in itself, "and of all things +nothing as true."[2] Cicero does not once allude to Pyrrhonean +doubt. We see on the one hand, in Cicero's idea of Pyrrho, the +influence of the Academy, perhaps even of Antiochus himself,[3] +which probably colored the representations given of Pyrrho; but, +on the other hand, there is much in Diogenes' account of +Pyrrho's life and teachings, and in the writings of Timon, which +shows us the positive side of Pyrrho. Pyrrho, in denying the +possibility of all knowledge, made that rather a motive for +indifference in the relations of life, than the foundation +thought of a philosophical system. His teaching has a decided +ethical side, showing in that respect the strong influence of +Democritus over him, who, like Pyrrho, made happiness to consist +in a state of feeling.[4] The one motive of all of Pyrrho's +teaching is a positive one, the desire for happiness. + + [1] _De orat._ III, 62. + + [2] Diog. IX. 11, 61. + + [3] Compare Natorp _Op. cit._ p. 71. + + [4] Zeller _Grundriss der Griechischen Phil._ p. 70. + +The essence of Pyrrhonism as given by Timon is as follows:[1] +Man desires to be happy. To realise his desire he must consider +three things: + + (i) What is the nature of things? + + (ii) How should man conduct himself in relation to + them? + +(iii) What is the result to him of this relation? + +The nature of things is unknown. Our relation to them must be +one of suspension of judgment, without activity, desire, or +belief,--that is, an entirely negative relation. The result is +that state of having no opinion, called [Greek: epoche], which +is followed in turn by [Greek: ataraxia]. + + [1] Aristocles _ap. Eusebium Praep. Ev._ XIV. 18. + +[1]The problem of philosophy is here proposed very nearly in the +terms of Kant, but not with the positive motive, like that of +the great philosopher of Germany, of evolving a system to +present the truth. Yet the importance of these questions shows +the originality of Pyrrho. The earnestness of Pyrrho is further +shown by an example given by Diogenes. Once on being found +talking to himself alone, he said, when asked the reason, that +he was meditating how to become a good man ([Greek: +chrestos]),[2] thus showing an entirely different spirit from +anything found in Sextus' books. The explanation of his life and +teachings is to be found largely in his own disposition. Such an +attitude of indifference must belong to a placid nature, and +cannot be entirely the result of a philosophical system, and, +while it can be aimed at, it can never be perfectly imitated. +One of his disciples recognised this, and said that it was +necessary to have the disposition of Pyrrho in order to hold his +doctrines.[3] Diogenes tells us that he was the first to advance +any formulae of Scepticism,[4] but they must have been very +elementary, as Pyrrho himself wrote nothing. We find no trace of +formulated Tropes in Pyrrho's teachings, yet it is probable that +he indicated some of the contradictions in sensation, and +possibly the Tropes in some rudimentary form. Of the large +number of sceptical formulae, or [Greek: phonai], the three +which seem to have the oldest connection with Scepticism are the +[Greek: antilogia], the [Greek: ouden horizo], and the [Greek: +ou mallon].[5] We know from Diogenes that Protagoras is the +authority for saying that in regard to everything there are two +opposing arguments.[6] The saying "to determine nothing" is +quoted from Timon's _Python_ by Diogenes,[7] and the other two +mentioned are also attributed to him by Aristocles.[8] We have +also in the [Greek: ou mallon] a direct connection with +Democritus, although the difference in the meaning which he +attributed to it is shown by Sextus.[9] So while the expression +is the same, the explanation of it given by Pyrrho must have +been different. It would seem probable that Pyrrho used all of +these three sayings, from the account of Diogenes, and that even +then they gave rise to the accusation of the Dogmatics, that +simply by possessing such sayings the Sceptics dogmatised,[10] +for the refutation of this used by Sextus occurs in the old +account of the sayings, namely, that these formulae include also +themselves in the meaning, as a cathartic removes itself +together with other harmful objects.[11] + + [1] Compare Maccoll _Op. cit._ p. 21. + + [2] Diog. IX. 11, 64. + + [3] Diog. IX. 11, 70, 64. + + [4] Diog. IX. 11, 69; IX. 11, 61. + + [5] _Hyp._ I. 202; Diog. IX. 8, 51; _Photius_ Bekker's ed. + 280 H. + + [6] _Photius_ Bekker's ed. 280 H. + + [7] _Hyp._ I. 197; Diog. IX. 11, 76. + + [8] _Aristocles ap. Eusebium, Praep. Ev._ XIV. 18. + + [9] _Hyp._ I. 213. + + [10] Diog. IX. 11, 68-76. + + [11] Diog. IX. 11, 76; _Hyp._ I. 206. + +In comparing the later Pyrrhonism with the teachings of Pyrrho, +we would sharply contrast the moral attitude of the two. With +Pyrrho equilibrium of soul was a means to be applied to his +positive theory of life; with the later Pyrrhoneans it was the +end to be attained. We would attribute, however, the empirical +tendency shown during the whole history of Pyrrhonism to Pyrrho +as its originator. He was an empirical philosopher, and the +result of his influence in this respect, as seen in the +subsequent development of the school, stands in marked contrast +to the dialectic spirit of the Academic Scepsis. The empiricism +of the school is shown in its scientific lore, in the fact that +so many of the Sceptics were physicians, and in the character of +the ten Tropes of [Greek: epoche]. We may safely affirm that +the foundation principles of Pyrrhonism are due to Pyrrho, and +the originality which gave the school its power. The elaborated +arguments, however, and the details of its formulae belong to +later times. + +Coming now to the relation of Pyrrhonism to the Academy, the +connection between the two is difficult to exactly determine, +between the time of Pyrrho and that of Aenesidemus. Scepticism +in the Academy was, however, never absolutely identical with +Pyrrhonism, although at certain periods of the history of the +Academy the difference was slight. We can trace throughout the +evolution of doubt, as shown to us in Pyrrhonism, and in +Academic Scepticism, the different results which followed the +difference in origin of the two movements, and these differences +followed according to general laws of development of thought. +Arcesilaus, who introduced doubt into the Academy, claimed to +return to the dialectic of Socrates, and suppressing the +lectures,[1] which were the method of teaching in the later +schools of philosophy, introduced discussions instead, as being +more decidedly a Socratic method. Although, according to Sextus, +he was the one leader of the Academy whose Scepticism most +nearly approached that of Pyrrhonism,[2] yet underneath his +whole teaching lay that dialectic principle so thoroughly in +opposition to the empiricism of Pyrrho. The belief of Socrates +and Plato in the existence of absolute truth never entirely lost +its influence over the Academy, but was like a hidden germ, +destined to reappear after Scepticism had passed away. It +finally led the Academy back to Dogmatism, and prepared the way +for the Eclecticism with which it disappeared from history. + + [1] Compare Maccoll _Op. cit._ p. 36. + + [2] _Hyp_. I. 232. + +The history of Pyrrhonism and that of Academic Scepticism were +for a time contemporaneous. The immediate follower of Pyrrho, +Timon, called by Sextus the "prophet of Pyrrho,"[1] was a +contemporary of Arcesilaus. That he did not consider the +Scepticism of the Academy identical with Pyrrhonism is proved +from the fact that he did not himself join the Academy, but was, +on the contrary, far from doing so. That he regarded Arcesilaus +as a Dogmatic is evident from his writings.[2] One day, on +seeing the chief of the Academy approaching, he cried out, "What +are you doing here among us who are free?"[3] After the death of +Timon, the Pyrrhonean School had no representative till the time +of Ptolemy of Cyrene,[4] and Greek Scepticism was represented by +the Academy. That Pyrrho had a strong influence over Arcesilaus, +the founder of the Middle Academy, is evident[5]; but there was +also never a time when the Academy entirely broke away from all +the teachings of Plato, even in their deepest doubt.[6] It is +true that Arcesilaus removed, nominally as well as in spirit, +some of the dialogues of Plato from the Academy, but only those +that bore a dogmatic character, while those that presented a +more decided Socratic mode of questioning without reaching any +decided result, men regarded as authority for Scepticism. + + [1] _Adv. Math._ I. 53. + + [2] Diog. IV. 6, 33, 34. + + [3] Diog. IX. 12, 114. + + [4] Diog. IX. 12, 115. + + [5] Diog. IV. 6, 33. + + [6] Diog. IV. 6, 32. + +Sextus does not deny that Arcesilaus was almost a Pyrrhonean, +but he claims that his Pyrrhonism was only apparent, and not +real, and was used as a cloak to hide his loyalty to the +teachings of Plato.[1] As Ariston said of him,[2] "Plato before, +Pyrrho behind, Diodorus in the middle." Sextus also +characterises the method of Arcesilaus as dialectic,[3] and we +know from Cicero that it was his pride to pretend to return to +the dialectic of Socrates. + +It is interesting to note that Sextus, in his refutation of the +position that the Academy is the same as Pyrrhonism, takes up +the entire development of Academic thought from the time of +Plato till that of Antiochus, and does not limit the argument to +Scepticism under Arcesilaus. The claim made by some that the two +schools were the same, is stated by him,[4] and the word 'some' +probably refers to members of both schools at different periods +of their history. Sextus recognises three Academies, although he +remarks that some make even a further division, calling that of +Philo and Charmides, the fourth, and that of Antiochus and his +followers, the fifth. + + [1] _Hyp._ I. 234. + + [2] Diog. IV. 6, 33. + + [3] _Hyp._ I. 234. + + [4] _Hyp._ I. 220. + +That many in the Academy, and even outside of it, regarded Plato +as a Sceptic, and an authority for subsequent Scepticism, we +find both from Sextus and Diogenes.[1] As Lewes justly remarks, +one could well find authority for Scepticism in the works of +Plato, as indeed the Academicians did, but not when the sum +total of his teachings was considered. The spirit of Plato's +teachings was dogmatic, as Sextus most decidedly recognises, and +as Aenesidemus and Menodotus[2] recognised before him.[3] Sextus +himself shows us that Plato's idealism and ethical teachings can +have nothing in common with Scepticism, for if he accepts the +desirability of the virtuous life, and the existence of +Providence, he dogmatises; and if he even regards them as +probable, he gives preference to one set of ideas over another, +and departs from the sceptical character. Sextus characterises +the sceptical side of Plato's writings as mental gymnastics,[4] +which do not authorise his being called a Sceptic, and affirms +that Plato is not a Sceptic, since he prefers some unknown +things to others in trustworthiness. The ethical difference +underlying the teachings of the Academy and Pyrrhonism, Sextus +was very quick to see, and although it is very probable that the +part of the _Hypotyposes_ which defines the difference between +the Academy and Pyrrhonism may be largely quoted from the +introduction to Aenesidemus' works, yet Sextus certainly gives +these statements the strong stamp of his approval. He condemns +the Academy because of the theory that good and evil exist, or +if this cannot be decidedly proved, yet that it is more probable +that what is called good exists than the contrary.[5] + + [1] _Hyp._ I. 221; Diog. IX. 11, 72. + + [2] Bekker's edition of _Hyp._ I. 222. + + [3] _Hyp._ I. 222. + + [4] _Hyp._ I. 223. + + [5] _Hyp_. I. 226. + +The whole Academic teaching of probabilities contradicted the +standpoint of the Sceptics--that our ideas are equal as regards +trustworthiness and untrustworthiness,[1] for the Academicians +declared that some ideas are probable and some improbable, and +they make a difference even in those ideas that they call +probable. + +Sextus claims that there are three fundamental grounds of +difference between Pyrrhonism and the Academy. The first is the +doctrine of probability which the Academicians accept in regard +to the superior trustworthiness of some ideas over others.[2] +The second is the different way in which the two schools follow +their teachers. The Pyrrhoneans follow without striving or +strong effort, or even strong inclination, as a child follows +his teacher, while the Academicians follow with sympathy and +assent, as Carneades and Clitomachus affirm.[3] The third +difference is in the aim, for the Academicians follow what is +probable in life. The Sceptics follow nothing, but live +according to laws, customs, and natural feelings +undogmatically.[4] + +The difference between the later teaching of the Academy and +Pyrrhonism is evident, and Sextus treats of it briefly, as not +requiring discussion,[5] as Philo taught that the nature of +facts is incomprehensible, and Antiochus transferred the Stoa to +the Academy. It is therefore evident, from the comparison which +we have made, that we do not find in the Academy, with which +Scepticism after the death of Timon was so long united, the +exact continuance of Pyrrhonism. The philosophical enmity of the +two contemporaries, Timon and Arcesilaus, the Academician who +had most in common with Pyrrhonism, is an expression of the +fundamental incompatibility between the two schools. + + [1] _Hyp_. I. 227. + + [2] _Hyp_. I. 229. + + [3] _Hyp_. I. 230. + + [4] _Hyp_. I. 231. + + [5] _Hyp_. I. 235. + +During all the chequered history of the Academy the dormant +idealism was there, underlying the outward development. Although +during the time of Arcesilaus and Carneades the difference was +so slight as to seem a mere matter of form of expression, yet +the different foundations on which the two schools stood was +always recognisable. On the one hand there was the germ of +idealism which was destined to awake to a new life, and on the +other, the attempt at absolute negation which was to result in +the final extinction of Pyrrhonism. We find in both, it is true, +especially in the time of Arcesilaus, the aim of [Greek: +epoche].[1] Both placed great weight on [Greek: isostheneia], or +the equal value of opposing arguments.[2] The foundation of the +[Greek: epoche] was, however, different in the two cases. +Arcesilaus founded his on dialectic, while Pyrrho's was +empirical. + + [1] _Hyp._ I. 232. + + [2] Diog. IX. 73; _Hyp._ II. 130; III. 65. + +The Pyrrhonean believed that ideas give us no knowledge of the +outer world; the Academic Sceptic believed that we cannot +distinguish between true and false ideas, so such knowledge is +impossible. The Pyrrhonean denied that truth could exist in +ideas because of their contradictory nature, and consequently +the existence of all truth, [Greek: meden einai te aletheia epi +panton].[1] The Academic Sceptic granted that the truth was +possibly contained in ideas, but affirmed that it could never be +known to us. The Pyrrhoneans prided themselves on still being +seekers, for although ordinary ideas are too contradictory to +give knowledge of the outer world, they did not deny that such +knowledge might be possible, but simply suspended the judgment +regarding it. To the Pyrrhonean the result corresponded to the +method. All ideas thus far known revealed nothing of the truth, +therefore he still sought. The Academician tried logically to +prove that the truth is impossible to find. It is the relation +of the dialectician to the empiricist, and the two varieties of +Scepticism are explained by their difference in origin. In +Pyrrhonism there was no constructive element. In the Academic +Scepsis such an element was found throughout all its history in +the theory of Probability. Arcesilaus himself laid great stress +upon this doctrine, which Sextus carefully shows us[2] is +utterly inconsistent with Pyrrhonism. Arcesilaus plainly teaches +that, having suspended one's judgment in regard to matters of +knowledge, one should control his choices, his refusals, and his +actions by the probable.[3] + + [1] Diog. IX. 11, 61. + + [2] _Hyp._ I. 229. + + [3] Compare Maccoll _Op. cit._ 39. + +After Antiochus introduced Eclecticism into the Academy, +Pyrrhonism was the only representative of Greek Scepticism, and +it flourished for over two centuries after our era, and then +also disappeared, no more to exist as a regular philosophical +school. + +Having considered at length the essence of Pyrrhonism as +presented by Sextus Empiricus, it now remains to briefly note +the characteristics that formed its strength and weakness, and +the causes of its final downfall. Herbart says that every +philosopher is a Sceptic in the beginning, but every Sceptic +remains always in the beginning. This remark may well be applied +to Pyrrhonism. We find in its teachings many fundamental +philosophical truths which might have formed the beginning of +great philosophical progress, but which were never developed to +any positive results. The teachings of Pyrrhonism were some of +them well fitted to prepare the way to idealism. The great idea +of the relativity of _Vorstellungen_ is made very prominent by +the ten Tropes of [Greek: epoche]. Aenesidemus, in his eight +Tropes against aetiology, shows the absurdity of the doctrine of +causality when upheld on materialistic grounds. That was to him +final, [Greek: epei ouk estai aition.] He could not divine that +although the result which he presented was logical, it only led +to a higher truth. It was reserved for the greatest of modern +philosophers to reveal to the world that causality is a +condition, and a necessary condition, of thought. When +Aenesidemus proved by his seventh Trope that causality is +subjective, he regarded it as fatal to the doctrine; yet this +conclusion was a marked step in advance in critical philosophy, +although Aenesidemus could not himself see it in all its +bearings. The great difference between Aenesidemus and Kant is +the difference between the materialist and the believer in +subjective reality. Both agreed in the unknown nature of the +_Ding an sich_, but this was to the Pyrrhonist the end of all +his philosophy; to Kant, however, the beginning. + +Pyrrhonism has rendered, notwithstanding its points of fatal +weakness, marked service to the world in science, philosophy, +ethics, and religion. It quickened scientific thought by +emphasising empirical methods of investigation, and by +criticising all results founded without sufficient data upon +false hypotheses. If, instead of denying the possibility of all +science because of the want of a criterion of the truth of +phenomena, the Pyrrhonists had comprehended the possibility of a +science of phenomena, they might have led the world in +scientific progress.[1] Their service to philosophy lay in the +stimulus to thought that their frequent attacks on dogmatic +beliefs occasioned. Pyrrhonism brought together all the most +prominent theories of the old schools of philosophy to test +their weakness and expose their contradictions, and this very +process of criticism often demonstrated the power of the truth +which they contained. + +Sextus Empiricus was often charged by the Church Fathers with +corrupting religious belief, and yet the greatest service which +Pyrrhonism has rendered the world was in religious and ethical +lines. This service did not, naturally, consist in destroying +belief in absolute truth, as the Sceptic professed to do, but in +preparing the way to find it. The bold attacks of Scepticism on +all truth led men to investigate ethical and religious +teachings, to examine the grounds of their belief, and to put in +practical use the right of reason and free discussion. + +Scepticism was the antecedent of freedom of conscience and +rational criticism,[2] and the absolute right of scientific +thought. The Sceptics, however, reaped none of the benefits of +their own system. They remained, as it were, always on the +threshold of possible progress. With the keys to great +discoveries in their hands, the doors of philosophical and +scientific advancement were for ever closed to them by the +limitations of their own system. The inherent weakness of +Pyrrhonism lay in its psychological inconsistency and in its +negative character. I think that we may safely say that +Pyrrhonism was the most consistent system of Scepticism ever +offered to the world, and yet it proves most decidedly that +complete Scepticism is psychologically impossible. A man may +give up his belief in one set of ideas, and, if they are ideas +that are popularly accepted, he will be called a Sceptic, as was +the case with Hume. He must, however, replace these ideas by +others equally positive, and then he is no longer a Sceptic, but +a Dogmatic, for he believes in something. + + [1] Compare Lewes _Op. cit._ p. 463. + + [2] Compare Chaignet _Op. cit._ p. 460. + +We have shown that the greatest thinkers of Pyrrhonism, Pyrrho, +Aenesidemus, and Agrippa, were not examples of absolute +Scepticism, and although Sextus Empiricus realised what +consistency demanded in this respect, and affirmed on almost +every page that he was asserting nothing, yet there is not a +paragraph of his books in which he does not, after all, +dogmatise on some subject. Complete Scepticism is contrary to +the fundamental laws of language, as all use of verbs involves +some affirmation. The Pyrrhonists realised this, and therefore +some of them wrote nothing, like Pyrrho, their leader, and +others advocated [Greek: aphasia][1] as one of the doctrines of +their system. + + [1] _Hyp._ I. 192. + +The very aim of Pyrrhonism was an inconsistent one. [Greek: +Ataraxia] was only another name for happiness, and in one +instance, even, is given as [Greek: hedone], and thus, in spite +of themselves, the Sceptics introduced a theory of happiness. +Pyrrho, like others of his time, sought the highest good, and +thought that he had found it in [Greek: ataraxia], the peace of +mind that appears in other systems of philosophy in other forms. +The difference of aim between the Pyrrhonists, Stoics, and +Epicureans was more apparent than real. To them all philosophy +was a path to lead to happiness. The method of Pyrrhonism was, +however, negative. Its strength consisted in its attacks on +Dogmatism, and not in any positive aim of its own, for its +positive side could not be recognised according to its own +doctrines. Therefore there was no real development in +Pyrrhonism, for a negative thought cannot be developed. + +We find, accordingly, from the time of Pyrrho to Sextus, no +growth in breadth of philosophical outlook, only improvement in +methods. Philosophical activity can never have doubt as its aim, +as that would form, as we have shown, a psychological +contradiction. The true essence of Pyrrhonism was passivity, but +passivity can never lead to progress. Much of the polemical work +of Pyrrhonism prepared the way for scientific progress by +providing a vast store of scientific data, but progress was to +the Pyrrhonists impossible. They sounded their own scientific +death-knell by declaring the impossibility of science, and +putting an end to all theories. + +The life of all scientific and philosophic progress is in the +attempt to find the hidden truth. To the Sceptic there was no +truth, and there could be no progress. As progress is a law in +the evolution of the human race, so Scepticism as a philosophy +could never be a permanent growth, any more than asceticism in +religion can be a lasting influence. Both of them are only +outgrowths. As the foundation principles of Scepticism were +opposed to anything like real growth, it was a system that could +never originate anything. Pyrrho taught from the beginning that +the Sceptic must live according to law and custom; not, however, +because one law or custom is better than another in itself, but +simply for the sake of peace. This basis of action was itself a +death-blow to all reform in social or political life. It was a +selfish, negative way of seeking what was, after all, a positive +thing, the [Greek: ataraxia] that the Sceptic desired. Life with +the Pyrrhonist was phenomenal, and not phenomenal simply in +regard to the outer world, but also subjectively, and no +absolute knowledge of the subjective life or of personal +existence was possible. + +The cause of the downfall of Pyrrhonism lay in the fact that it +had nothing to offer to humanity in the place of what it had +destroyed. It made no appeal to human sympathies, and ignored +all the highest motives to human action. The especial +materialistic standpoint from which Pyrrhonism judged all that +pertains to knowledge and life shut out the ideal, and all +possibility of absolute truth. It was an expression of the +philosophic decadence of the age when it flourished, and +although it possessed some philosophic worth, yet it bore in +itself the causes of its decay. + + + + +PYRRHONIC SKETCHES + +BY + +SEXTUS EMPIRICUS. + + +BOOK I. + + + + +CHAPTER I. + + +_The Principal Differences between Philosophers._ + +It is probable that those who seek after anything whatever, will 1 +either find it as they continue the search, will deny that it +can be found and confess it to be out of reach, or will go on +seeking it. Some have said, accordingly, in regard to the things +sought in philosophy, that they have found the truth, while 2 +others have declared it impossible to find, and still others +continue to seek it. Those who think that they have found it are +those who are especially called Dogmatics, as for example, the +Schools of Aristotle and Epicurus, the Stoics and some others. +Those who have declared it impossible to find are Clitomachus, 3 +Carneades, with their respective followers, and other +Academicians. Those who still seek it are the Sceptics. It +appears therefore, reasonable to conclude that the three 4 +principal kinds of philosophy are the Dogmatic, the Academic, +and the Sceptic. Others may suitably treat of the other Schools, +but as for the Sceptical School, we shall now give an outline of +it, remarking in advance that in respect to nothing that will be +said do we speak positively, that it must be absolutely so, but +we shall state each thing historically as it now appears to us. + + + + +CHAPTER II. + + +_Ways of Treating Scepticism._ + +One way of treating the Sceptical philosophy is called 5 +general, and the other special. The general method is that by +which we set forth the character of Scepticism, declaring what +its idea is, what its principles are, its mode of reasoning, its +criterion, and its aim. It presents also, the aspects of doubt, +[Greek: hoi tropoi tes epoches], and the way in which we should +understand the Sceptical formulae, and the distinction between +Scepticism and the related Schools of philosophy. The special +method, on the contrary, is that by which we 6 speak against 6 +each part of so-called philosophy. Let us then treat Scepticism +at first in the general way, beginning our delineation with the +nomenclature of the Sceptical School. + + + + +CHAPTER III. + + +_The Nomenclature of Scepticism._ + +The Sceptical School is also called the "Seeking School," from 7 +its spirit of research and examination; the "Suspending School," +from the condition of mind in which one is left after the +search, in regard to the things that he has examined; and the +"Doubting School," either because, as some say, the Sceptics +doubt and are seeking in regard to everything, or because they +never know whether to deny or affirm. It is also called the +Pyrrhonean School, because Pyrrho appears to us the best +representative of Scepticism, and is more prominent than all who +before him occupied themselves with it. + + + + +CHAPTER IV. + + +_What is Scepticism?_ + +The [Greek: dynamis] of the Sceptical School is to place the 8 +phenomenal in opposition to the intellectual "in any way +whatever," and thus through the equilibrium of the reasons and +things ([Greek: isostheneia ton logon]) opposed to each other, +to reach, first the state of suspension of judgment, [Greek: +epoche] and afterwards that of imperturbability, [Greek: +ataraxia]. We do not use the word [Greek: dynamis] in any 9 +unusual sense, but simply, meaning the force of the system. By +the phenomenal, we understand the sensible, hence we place the +intellectual in opposition to it. The phrase "in any way +whatever," may refer to the word [Greek: dynamis] in order that +we may understand that word in a simple sense as we said, or it +may refer to the placing the phenomenal and intellectual in +opposition. For we place these in opposition to each other in a +variety of ways, the phenomenal to the phenomenal, and the +intellectual to the intellectual, or reciprocally, and we say +"in any way whatever," in order that all methods of opposition +may be included. Or "in any way whatever" may refer to the +phenomenal and the intellectual, so that we need not ask how +does the phenomenal appear, or how are the thoughts conceived, +but that we may understand these things in a simple sense. By +"reasons opposed to each other," we do not by any means 10 +understand that they deny or affirm anything, but simply that +they offset each other. By equilibrium, we mean equality in +regard to trustworthiness and untrustworthiness, so that of the +reasons that are placed in opposition to each other, one should +not excel another in trustworthiness. [Greek: epoche] is a +holding back of the opinion, in consequence of which we neither +deny nor affirm anything. [Greek: ataraxia] is repose and +tranquillity of soul. We shall explain how [Greek: ataraxia] +accompanies [Greek: epoche] when we speak of the aim. + + + + +CHAPTER V. + + +_The Sceptic._ + +What is meant by a Pyrrhonean philosopher can be understood from 11 +the idea of the Sceptical School. He is a Pyrrhonean, namely, +who identifies himself with this system. + + + + +CHAPTER VI. + + +_The Origin of Scepticism._ + +Scepticism arose in the beginning from the hope of attaining 12 +[Greek: ataraxia]; for men of the greatest talent were perplexed +by the contradiction of things, and being at a loss what to +believe, began to question what things are true, and what false, +hoping to attain [Greek: ataraxia] as a result of the decision. +The fundamental principle of the Sceptical system is especially +this, namely, to oppose every argument by one of equal weight, +for it seems to us that in this way we finally reach the +position where we have no dogmas. + + + + +CHAPTER VII. + + +_Does the Sceptic Dogmatise?_ + +We say that the Sceptic does not dogmatise. We do not say 13 +this, meaning by the word dogma the popular assent to certain +things rather than others (for the Sceptic does assent to +feelings that are a necessary result of sensation, as for +example, when he is warm or cold, he cannot say that he thinks +he is not warm or cold), but we say this, meaning by dogma the +acceptance of any opinion in regard to the unknown things +investigated by science. For the Pyrrhonean assents to nothing +that is unknown. Furthermore, he does not dogmatise even when 14 +he utters the Sceptical formulae in regard to things that are +unknown, such as "Nothing more," or "I decide nothing," or any +of the others about which we shall speak later. For the one who +dogmatises regards the thing about which he is said to +dogmatise, as existing in itself; the Sceptic does not however +regard these formulae as having an absolute existence, for he +assumes that the saying "All is false," includes itself with +other things as false, and likewise the saying "Nothing is +true"; in the same way "Nothing more," states that together with +other things it itself is nothing more, and cancels itself +therefore, as well as other things. We say the same also in +regard to the other Sceptical expressions. In short, if he who 15 +dogmatises, assumes as existing in itself that about which he +dogmatises, the Sceptic, on the contrary, expresses his sayings +in such a way that they are understood to be themselves +included, and it cannot be said that he dogmatises in saying +these things. The principal thing in uttering these formulae is +that he says what appears to him, and communicates his own +feelings in an unprejudiced way, without asserting anything in +regard to external objects. + + + + +CHAPTER VIII. + + +_Is Scepticism a Sect?_ + +We respond in a similar way if we are asked whether 16 +Scepticism is a sect or not. If the word sect is defined as +meaning a body of persons who hold dogmas which are in +conformity with each other, and also with phenomena, and dogma +means an assent to anything that is unknown, then we reply that +we have no sect. If, however, one means by sect, a school 17 +which follows a certain line of reasoning based on phenomena, +and that reasoning shows how it is possible to apparently live +rightly, not understanding "rightly" as referring to virtue +only, but in a broader sense; if, also, it leads one to be able +to suspend the judgment, then we reply that we have a sect. For +we follow a certain kind of reasoning which is based upon +phenomena, and which shows us how to live according to the +habits, laws, and teachings of the fatherland, and our own +feelings. + + + + +CHAPTER IX. + + +_Does the Sceptic Study Natural Science?_ + +We reply similarly also to the question whether the Sceptic 18 +should study natural science. For we do not study natural +science in order to express ourselves with confidence regarding +any of the dogmas that it teaches, but we take it up in order to +be able to meet every argument by one of equal weight, and also +for the sake of [Greek: ataraxia]. In the same way we study the +logical and ethical part of so-called philosophy. + + + + +CHAPTER X. + + +_Do the Sceptics deny Phenomena?_ + +Those who say that the Sceptics deny phenomena appear to me to 19 +be in ignorance of our teachings. For as we said before, we do +not deny the sensations which we think we have, and which lead +us to assent involuntarily to them, and these are the phenomena. +When, however, we ask whether the object is such as it appears +to be, while we concede that it appears so and so, we question, +not the phenomenon, but in regard to that which is asserted of +the phenomenon, and that is different from doubting the +phenomenon itself. For example, it appears to us that honey is +sweet. This we concede, for we experience sweetness through 20 +sensation. We doubt, however, whether it is sweet by reason of +its essence, which is not a question of the phenomenon, but of +that which is asserted of the phenomenon. Should we, however, +argue directly against the phenomena, it is not with the +intention of denying their existence, but to show the rashness +of the Dogmatics. For if reasoning is such a deceiver that it +well nigh snatches away the phenomena from before your eyes, how +should we not distrust it in regard to things that are unknown, +so as not to rashly follow it? + + + + +CHAPTER XI. + + +_The Criterion of Scepticism._ + +It is evident that we pay careful attention to phenomena from 21 +what we say about the criterion of the Sceptical School. The +word criterion is used in two ways. First, it is understood as a +proof of existence or non-existence, in regard to which we shall +speak in the opposing argument. Secondly, when it refers to +action, meaning the criterion to which we give heed in life, in +doing some things and refraining from doing others, and it is +about this that we shall now speak. We say, consequently, that +the criterion of the Sceptical School is the phenomenon, and in +calling it so, we mean the idea of it. It cannot be doubted, 22 +as it is based upon susceptibility and involuntary feeling. +Hence no one doubts, perhaps, that an object appears so and so, +but one questions if it is as it appears. Therefore, as we +cannot be entirely inactive as regards the observances of daily +life, we live by giving heed to phenomena, and in an +unprejudiced way. But this observance of what pertains to the 23 +daily life, appears to be of four different kinds. Sometimes it +is directed by the guidance of nature, sometimes by the +necessity of the feelings, sometimes by the tradition of laws +and of customs, and sometimes by the teaching of the arts. It is +directed by the guidance of nature, for by nature we are 24 +capable of sensation and thought; by the necessity of the +feelings, for hunger leads us to food, and thirst to drink; by +the traditions of laws and customs, for according to them we +consider piety a good in daily life, and impiety an evil; by the +teaching of the arts, for we are not inactive in the arts we +undertake. We say all these things, however, without expressing +a decided opinion. + + + + +CHAPTER XII. + + +_What is the aim of Scepticism?_ + +It follows naturally in order to treat of the aim of the 25 +Sceptical School. An aim is that for which as an end all things +are done or thought, itself depending on nothing, or in other +words, it is the ultimatum of things to be desired. We say, +then, that the aim of the Sceptic is [Greek: ataraxia] in those +things which pertain to the opinion, and moderation in the +things that life imposes. For as soon as he began to 26 +philosophise he wished to discriminate between ideas, and to +understand which are true and which are false, in order to +attain [Greek: ataraxia]. He met, however, with contradictions +of equal weight, and, being unable to judge, he withheld his +opinion; and while his judgment was in suspension [Greek: +ataraxia] followed, as if by chance, in regard to matters of +opinion. For he who is of the opinion that anything is either 27 +good or bad by nature is always troubled, and when he does not +possess those things that seem to him good he thinks that he is +tortured by the things which are by nature bad, and pursues +those that he thinks to be good. Having acquired them, however, +he falls into greater perturbation, because he is excited beyond +reason and without measure from fear of a change, and he does +everything in his power to retain the things that seem to him +good. But he who is undecided, on the contrary, regarding 28 +things that are good and bad by nature, neither seeks nor avoids +anything eagerly, and is therefore in a state of [Greek: +ataraxia]. For that which is related of Apelles the painter +happened to the Sceptic. It is said that as he was once painting +a horse he wished to represent the foam of his mouth in the +picture, but he could not succeed in doing so, and he gave it up +and threw the sponge at the picture with which he had wiped the +colors from the painting. As soon, however, as it touched the +picture it produced a good copy of the foam. The Sceptics +likewise hoped to gain [Greek: ataraxia] by forming judgments 29 +in regard to the anomaly between phenomena and the things of +thought, but they were unable to do this, and so they suspended +their judgment; and while their judgment was in suspension +[Greek: ataraxia] followed, as if by chance, as the shadow +follows a body. Nevertheless, we do not consider the Sceptic +wholly undisturbed, but he is disturbed by some things that are +inevitable. We confess that sometimes he is cold and thirsty, +and that he suffers in such ways. But in these things even the +ignorant are beset in two ways, from the feelings themselves, 30 +and not less also from the fact that they think these conditions +are bad by nature. The Sceptic, however, escapes more easily, as +he rejects the opinion that anything is in itself bad by nature. +Therefore we say that the aim of the Sceptic is [Greek: +ataraxia] in matters of opinion, and moderation of feeling in +those things that are inevitable. Some notable Sceptics have +added also suspension of judgment in investigation. + + + + +CHAPTER XIII. + + +_The General Method of Scepticism._ + +Since we have said that [Greek: ataraxia] follows the suspension 31 +of judgment in regard to everything, it behooves us to +explain how the suspension of judgment takes place. Speaking in +general it takes place through placing things in opposition to +each other. We either place phenomena in opposition to +phenomena, or the intellectual in opposition to the +intellectual, or reciprocally. For example, we place 32 +phenomena in opposition to phenomena when we say that this tower +appears round from a distance but square near by; the +intellectual in opposition to the intellectual, when to the one +who from the order of the heavens builds a tower of reasoning to +prove that a providence exists, we oppose the fact that +adversity often falls to the good and prosperity to the evil, +and that therefore we draw the conclusion that there is no +providence. The intellectual is placed in opposition to 33 +phenomena, as when Anaxagoras opposed the fact that snow is +white, by saying that snow is frozen water, and, as water is +black, snow must also be black. Likewise we sometimes place the +present in opposition to the present, similarly to the +above-mentioned cases, and sometimes also the present in +opposition to the past or the future. As for example, when +someone proposes an argument to us that we cannot refute, we say +to him, "Before the founder of the sect to which you belong 34 +was born, the argument which you propose in accordance with it +had not appeared as a valid argument, but was dormant in nature, +so in the same way it is possible that its refutation also +exists in nature, but has not yet appeared to us, so that it is +not at all necessary for us to agree with an argument that now +seems to be strong." In order to make it clearer to us what 35 +we mean by these oppositions, I will proceed to give the Tropes +([Greek: tropoi]), through which the suspension of judgment is +produced, without asserting anything about their meaning or +their number, because they may be unsound, or there may be more +than I shall enumerate. + + + + +CHAPTER XIV. + + +_The Ten Tropes._ + +Certain Tropes were commonly handed down by the older Sceptics, 36 +by means of which [Greek: epoche] seems to take place. +They are ten in number, and are called synonymously [Greek: +logoi] and [Greek: tropoi]. They are these: The first is based +upon the differences in animals; the second upon the differences +in men; the third upon the difference in the constitution of the +organs of sense; the fourth upon circumstances; the fifth upon +position, distance, and place; the sixth upon mixtures; the +seventh upon the quantity and constitution of objects; the +eighth upon relation; the ninth upon frequency or rarity of 37 +occurences; the tenth upon systems, customs, laws, mythical +beliefs, and dogmatic opinions. We make this order ourselves. 38 +These Tropes come under three general heads: the standpoint +of the judge, the standpoint of the thing judged, and the +standpoint of both together. Under the standpoint of the judge +come the first four, for the judge is either an animal, or a +man, or a sense, and exists under certain circumstances. Under +the standpoint of that which is judged, come the seventh and the +tenth. Under the one composed of both together, come the fifth +and the sixth, the eighth and the ninth. Again, these three +divisions are included under the Trope of relation, because 39 +that is the most general one; it includes the three special +divisions, and these in turn include the ten. We say these +things in regard to their probable number, and we proceed in the +following chapter to speak of their meaning. + + +THE FIRST TROPE. + +The first Trope, we said, is the one based upon the 40 +differences in animals, and according to this Trope, different +animals do not get the same ideas of the same objects through +the senses. This we conclude from the different origin of the +animals, and also from the difference in the constitution of +their bodies. In regard to the difference in origin, some +animals originate without mixture of the sexes, while others +originate through sexual intercourse. Of those which 41 +originate without intercourse of the sexes, some come from fire, +as the little animals which appear in the chimneys, others from +stagnant water, as musquitoes, others from fermented wine, as +the stinging ants, others from the earth, others from the mud, +like the frogs, others from slime, as the worms, others from +donkeys, as the beetles, others from cabbage, as caterpillars, +others from fruit, as the gall insect from the wild figs, others +from putrified animals, as bees from bulls, and wasps from +horses. Again, of those originating from intercourse of the 42 +sexes, some come from animals of the same kind, as in most +cases, and others from those of different kinds, as mules. +Again, of animals in general, some are born alive, as men, +others from eggs, as birds, and others are born a lump of flesh, +as bears. It is probable therefore, that the inequalities and 43 +differences in origin cause great antipathies in the animals, +and the result is incompatibility, discord, and conflict between +the sensations of the different animals. Again, the differences +in the principal parts of the body, especially in those 44 +fitted by nature to judge and to perceive, may cause the +greatest differences in their ideas of objects, according to the +differences in the animals themselves. As for example, those who +have the jaundice call that yellow which appears to us white, +and those who have bloodshot eyes call it blood-red. +Accordingly, as some animals have yellow eyes, and others +blood-shot ones, and still others whitish ones, and others eyes +of other colors, it is probable, I think, that they have a +different perception of colors. Furthermore, when we look +steadily at the sun for a long time, and then look down at a 45 +book, the letters seem to us gold colored, and dance around. Now +some animals have by nature a lustre in their eyes, and these +emit a fine and sparkling light so that they see at night, and +we may reasonably suppose that external things do not appear the +same to them as to us. Jugglers by lightly rubbing the wick 46 +of the lamp with metal rust, or with the dark yellow fluid of +the sepia, make those who are present appear now copper-colored +and now black, according to the amount of the mixture used; if +this be so it is much more reasonable to suppose that because of +the mixture of different fluids in the eyes of animals, their +ideas of objects would be different. Furthermore, when we 47 +press the eye on the side, the figures, forms and sizes of +things seen appear elongated and narrow. It is therefore +probable that such animals as have the pupil oblique and long, +as goats, cats, and similar animals, have ideas different from +those of the animals which have a round pupil. Mirrors according +to their different construction, sometimes show the external 48 +object smaller than reality, as concave ones, and sometimes long +and narrow, as the convex ones do; others show the head of the +one looking into it down, and the feet up. As some of the +vessels around the eye fall entirely outside the eye, on 49 +account of their protuberance, while others are more sunken, and +still others are placed in an even surface, it is probable that +for this reason also the ideas vary, and dogs, fishes, lions, +men, and grasshoppers do not see the same things, either of the +same size, or of similar form, but according to the impression +on the organ of sight of each animal respectively. The same +thing is true in regard to the other senses; for how can it 50 +be said that shell-fish, birds of prey, animals covered with +spines, those with feathers and those with scales would be +affected in the same way by the sense of touch? and how can the +sense of hearing perceive alike in animals which have the +narrowest auditory passages, and in those that are furnished +with the widest, or in those with hairy ears and those with +smooth ones? For we, even, hear differently when we partially +stop up the ears, from what we do when we use them naturally. +The sense of smell also varies according to differences in 51 +animals, since even our sense of smell is affected when we have +taken cold and the phlegm is too abundant, and also when parts +around our head are flooded with too much blood, for we then +avoid odors that seem agreeable to others, and feel as if we +were injured by them. Since also some of the animals are moist +by nature and full of secretions, and others are very full of +blood, and still others have either yellow or black bile +prevalent and abundant, it is reasonable because of this to +think that odorous things appear different to each one of them. +And it is the same in regard to things of taste, as some 52 +animals have the tongue rough and dry and others very moist. We +too, when we have a dry tongue in fever, think that whatever we +take is gritty, bad tasting, or bitter; and this we experience +because of the varying degrees of the humors that are said to be +in us. Since, then, different animals have different organs for +taste, and a greater or less amount of the various humors, it +can well be that they form different ideas of the same objects +as regards their taste. For just as the same food on being 53 +absorbed becomes in some places veins, in other places arteries, +and in other places bones, nerves, or other tissues, showing +different power according to the difference of the parts +receiving it; just as the same water absorbed by the trees +becomes in some places bark, in other places branches, and in +other places fruit, perhaps a fig or a pomegranate, or something +else; just as the breath of the musician, one and the same 54 +when blown into the flute, becomes sometimes a high tone and +sometimes a low one, and the same pressure of the hand upon the +lyre sometimes causes a deep tone and sometimes a high tone, so +it is natural to suppose that external objects are regarded +differently according to the different constitution of the +animals which perceive them. We may see this more clearly in 55 +the things that are sought for and avoided by animals. For +example, myrrh appears very agreeable to men and intolerable to +beetles and bees. Oil also, which is useful to men, destroys +wasps and bees if sprinkled on them; and sea-water, while it is +unpleasant and poisonous to men if they drink it, is most +agreeable and sweet to fishes. Swine also prefer to wash in vile +filth rather than in pure clean water. Furthermore, some 56 +animals eat grass and some eat herbs; some live in the woods, +others eat seeds; some are carnivorous, and others lactivorous; +some enjoy putrified food, and others fresh food; some raw food +and others that which is prepared by cooking; and in general +that which is agreeable to some is disagreeable and fatal to +others, and should be avoided by them. Thus hemlock makes the 57 +quail fat, and henbane the hogs, and these, as it is known, +enjoy eating lizards; deer also eat poisonous animals, and +swallows, the cantharidae. Moreover, ants and flying ants, when +swallowed by men, cause discomfort and colic; but the bear, on +the contrary, whatever sickness he may have, becomes stronger by +devouring them. The viper is benumbed if one twig of the oak 58 +touches it, as is also the bat by a leaf of the plane-tree. The +elephant flees before the ram, and the lion before the cock, and +seals from the rattling of beans that are being pounded, and the +tiger from the sound of the drum. Many other examples could be +given, but that we may not seem to dwell longer than is +necessary on this subject, we conclude by saying that since the +same things are pleasant to some and unpleasant to others, and +the pleasure and displeasure depend on the ideas, it must be +that different animals have different ideas of objects. And +since the same things appear different according to the 59 +difference in the animals, it will be possible for us to say how +the external object appears to us, but as to how it is in +reality we shall suspend our judgment. For we cannot ourselves +judge between our own ideas and those of other animals, being +ourselves involved in the difference, and therefore much more in +need of being judged than being ourselves able to judge. And +furthermore, we cannot give the preference to our own mental 60 +representations over those of other animals, either without +evidence or with evidence, for besides the fact that perhaps +there is no evidence, as we shall show, the evidence so called +will be either manifest to us or not. If it is not manifest to +us, then we cannot accept it with conviction; if it is manifest +to us, since the question is in regard to what is manifest to +animals, and we use as evidence that which is manifest to us who +are animals, then it is to be questioned if it is true as it is +manifest to us. It is absurd, however, to try to base the 61 +questionable on the questionable, because the same thing is to +be believed and not to be believed, which is certainly +impossible. The evidence is to be believed in so far as it will +furnish a proof, and disbelieved in so far as it is itself to be +proved. We shall therefore have no evidence according to which +we can give preference to our own ideas over those of so-called +irrational animals. Since therefore ideas differ according to +the difference in animals, and it is impossible to judge them, +it is necessary to suspend the judgment in regard to external +objects. + + +_Have the So-called Irrational Animals Reason_? + +We continue the comparison of the so-called irrational animals 62 +with man, although it is needless to do so, for in truth we do +not refuse to hold up to ridicule the conceited and bragging +Dogmatics, after having given the practical arguments. Now most 63 +of our number were accustomed to compare all the irrational +animals together with man, but because the Dogmatics playing +upon words say that the comparison is unequal, we carry our +ridicule farther, although it is most superfluous to do so, and +fix the discussion on one animal, as the dog, if it suits you, +which seems to be the most contemptible animal; for we shall +even then find that animals, about which we are speaking, are +not inferior to us in respect to the trustworthiness of their +perceptions. Now the Dogmatics grant that this animal is 64 +superior to us in sense perception, for he perceives better +through smell than we, as by this sense he tracks wild animals +that he cannot see, and he sees them quicker with his eyes than +we do, and he perceives them more acutely by hearing. Let us +also consider reasoning, which is of two kinds, reasoning in 65 +thought and in speech. Let us look first to that of thought. +This kind of reasoning, judging from the teachings of those +Dogmatics who are now our greatest opponents, those of the Stoa, +seems to fluctuate between the following things: the choice of +the familiar, and avoidance of the alien; the knowledge of the +arts that lead to this choice; and the comprehension of those +virtues that belong to the individual nature, as regards the +feelings. The dog then, upon whom it was decided to fix the +argument as an example, makes a choice of things suitable to 66 +him, and avoids those that are harmful, for he hunts for food, +but draws back when the whip is lifted up; he possesses also an +art by which he procures the things that are suitable for him, +the art of hunting. He is not also without virtue; since the 67 +true nature of justice is to give to every one according to his +merit, as the dog wags his tail to those who belong to the +family, and to those who behave well to him, guards them, and +keeps off strangers and evil doers, he is surely not without +justice. Now if he has this virtue, since the virtues follow 68 +each other in turn, he has the other virtues also, which the +wise men say, most men do not possess. We see the dog also brave +in warding off attacks, and sagacious, as Homer testified when +he represented Odysseus as unrecognised by all in his house, and +recognised only by Argos, because the dog was not deceived by +the physical change in the man, and had not lost the [Greek: +phantasia kataleptike] which he proved that he had kept better +than the men had. But according to Chrysippus even, who most 69 +attacked the irrational animals, the dog takes a part in the +dialectic about which so much is said. At any rate, the man +above referred to said that the dog follows the fifth of the +several non-apodictic syllogisms, for when he comes to a meeting +of three roads, after seeking the scent in the two roads, +through which his prey has not passed, he presses forward +quickly in the third without scenting it. For the dog reasons in +this way, potentially said the man of olden time; the animal +passed through this, or this, or this; it was neither through +this nor this, therefore it was through this. The dog also +understands his own sufferings and mitigates them. As soon as 70 +a sharp stick is thrust into him, he sets out to remove it, by +rubbing his foot on the ground, as also with his teeth; and if +ever he has a wound anywhere, for the reason that uncleansed +wounds are difficult to cure, and those that are cleansed are +easily cured, he gently wipes off the collected matter; and 71 +he observes the Hippocratic advice exceedingly well, for since +quiet is a relief for the foot, if he has ever a wound in the +foot, he lifts it up, and keeps it undisturbed as much as +possible. When he is troubled by disturbing humours, he eats +grass, with which he vomits up that which was unfitting, and +recovers. Since therefore it has been shown that the animal 72 +that we fixed the argument upon for the sake of an example, +chooses that which is suitable for him, and avoids what is +harmful, and that he has an art by which he provides what is +suitable, and that he comprehends his own sufferings and +mitigates them, and that he is not without virtue, things in +which perfection of reasoning in thought consists, so according +to this it would seem that the dog has reached perfection. It is +for this reason, it appears to me, that some philosophers have +honoured themselves with the name of this animal. In regard to +reasoning in speech, it is not necessary at present to bring 73 +the matter in question. For some of the Dogmatics, even, have +put this aside, as opposing the acquisition of virtue, for which +reason they practiced silence when studying. Besides, let it be +supposed that a man is dumb, no one would say that he is +consequently irrational. However, aside from this, we see after +all, that animals, about which we are speaking, do produce human +sounds, as the jay and some others. Aside from this also, even +if we do not understand the sounds of the so-called irrational 74 +irrational animals, it is not at all unlikely that they +converse, and that we do not understand their conversation. For +when we hear the language of foreigners, we do not understand +but it all seems like one sound to us. Furthermore, we hear dogs +giving out one kind of sound when they are resisting someone, 75 +and another sound when they howl, and another when they are +beaten, and a different kind when they wag their tails, and +generally speaking, if one examines into this, he will find a +great difference in the sounds of this and other animals under +different circumstances; so that in all likelihood, it may be +said that the so-called irrational animals partake also in +spoken language. If then, they are not inferior to men in the 76 +accuracy of their perceptions, nor in reasoning in thought, nor +in reasoning by speech, as it is superfluous to say, then they +are not more untrustworthy than we are, it seems to me, in +regard to their ideas. Perhaps it would be possible to prove +this, should we direct the argument to each of the irrational 77 +animals in turn. As for example, who would not say that the +birds are distinguished for shrewdness, and make use of +articulate speech? for they not only know the present but the +future, and this they augur to those that are able to understand +it, audibly as well as in other ways. I have made this +comparison superfluously, as I pointed out above, as I think 78 +I had sufficiently shown before, that we cannot consider our own +ideas superior to those of the irrational animals. In short, if +the irrational animals are not more untrustworthy than we in +regard to the judgment of their ideas, and the ideas are +different according to the difference in the animals, I shall be +able to say how each object appears to me, but in regard to what +it is by nature I shall be obliged to suspend my judgment. + + +THE SECOND TROPE. + +Such is the first Trope of [Greek: epoche]. The second, we said 79 +above, is based upon the differences in men. For even if one +assent to the hypothesis that men are more trustworthy than the +irrational animals, we shall find that doubt arises as soon as +we consider our own differences. For since man is said to be +composed of two things, soul and body, we differ from each other +in respect to both of these things; for example, as regards the +body, we differ both in form and personal peculiarities. For the 80 +body of a Scythian differs from the body of an Indian in +form, the difference resulting, it is said, from the different +control of the humors. According to different control of the +humors, differences in ideas arise also, as we represented under +the first Trope. For this reason there is certainly a great +difference among men in the choice and avoidance of external +things. The Indians delight in different things from our own +people, and the enjoyment of different things is a sign that +different ideas are received of the external objects. We differ 81 +in personal peculiarities, as some digest beef better than +the little fish from rocky places, and some are affected with +purging by the weak wine of Lesbos. There was, they say, an old +woman in Attica who could drink thirty drachmas of hemlock +without danger, and Lysis took four drachmas of opium unhurt, +and Demophon, Alexander's table waiter, shivered when he was 82 +in the sun or in a hot bath, and felt warm in the shade; +Athenagoras also, from Argos, did not suffer harm if stung by +scorpions and venomous spiders; the so-called Psylli were not +injured when bitten by snakes or by the aspis, and the +Tentyrites among the Egyptians are not harmed by the crocodiles +around them; those also of the Ethiopians who live on the 83 +Hydaspes river, opposite Meroe, eat scorpions and serpents, and +similar things without danger; Rufinus in Chalcis could drink +hellebore without vomiting or purging, and he enjoyed and +digested it as something to which he was accustomed; Chrysermos, +the Herophilian, ran the risk of stomach-ache if he ever took 84 +pepper, and Soterichus, the surgeon, was seized by purging if he +perceived the odor of roasting shad; Andron, the Argive, was so +free from thirst that he could travel even through the waterless +Libya without looking for a drink; Tiberius, the emperor, saw in +the dark, and Aristotle tells the story of a certain Thracian, +who thought that he saw the figure of a man always going before +him as a guide. While therefore such a difference exists in men 85 +in regard to the body, and we must be satisfied with +referring to a few only of the many examples given by the +Dogmatics, it is probable that men also differ from each other +in respect to the soul itself, for the body is a kind of type of +the soul, as the physiognomical craft also shows. The best +example of the numerous and infinite differences of opinion +among men is the contradiction in the sayings of the Dogmatics, +not only about other things, but about what it is well to seek +and to avoid. The poets have also fittingly spoken about 86 +this, for Pindar said-- + + "One delights in getting honors and crowns through + storm-footed horses, + Another in passing life in rooms rich in gold, + Another still, safe travelling enjoys, in a swift ship, + on a wave of the sea." + +And the poet says-- + + "One man enjoys this, another enjoys that." + +The tragedies also abound in such expressions, for instance, +it is said-- + + "If to all, the same were good and wise, + Quarrels and disputes among men would not have been." + +And again-- + + "It is awful indeed, that the same thing some mortals + should please, + And by others be hated." + +Since therefore the choice and the avoidance of things, 87 +depends on the pleasure and displeasure which they give, and the +pleasure and displeasure have their seat in perception and +ideas, when some choose the things that others avoid, it is +logical for us to conclude that they are not acted upon +similarly by the same things, for otherwise they would have +chosen or avoided alike. Now if the same things act upon +different men differently, on account of the difference in the +men, for this cause also suspension of the judgment may +reasonably be introduced, and we may perhaps say how each object +appears to us, and what its individual differences are, but we +shall not be able to declare what it is as to the nature of its +essence. For we must either believe all men or some men; but 88 +to believe all is to undertake an impossibility, and to accept +things that are in opposition to each other. If we believe some +only, let someone tell us with whom to agree, for the Platonist +would say with Plato, the Epicurean with Epicurus, and others +would advise in a corresponding manner; and so as they disagree, +with no one to decide, they bring us round again to the +suspension of judgment. Furthermore, he who tells us to agree 89 +with the majority proposes something childish, as no one could +go to all men and find out what pleases the majority, for it is +possible that in some nations which we do not know the things +which to us are rare are common to the majority, and those +things which happen commonly to us are rare. As for example, it +might happen that the majority should not suffer when bitten by +venomous spiders, or that they should seldom feel pain, or have +other personal peculiarities similar to those spoken of above. +It is necessary therefore to suspend the judgment on account of +the differences in men. + + +THE THIRD TROPE. + +While, however, the Dogmatics are conceited enough to think 90 +that they should be preferred to other men in the judgement of +things, we know that their claim is absurd, for they themselves +form a part of the disagreement; and if they give themselves +preference in this way in the judgment of phenomena, they beg +the question before they begin the judgment, as they trust the +judgment to themselves. Nevertheless, in order that we should 91 +reach the result of the suspension of judgment by limiting +the argument to one man, one who for example they deem to be +wise, let us take up the third Trope. This is the one that is +based upon differences in perception. That the perceptions 92 +differ from each other is evident. For example, paintings seem +to have hollows and prominences to the sense of sight, but not +to the sense of touch, and honey to the tongue of some people +appears pleasant, but unpleasant to the eyes; therefore it is +impossible to say whether it is really pleasant or unpleasant. +In regard to myrrh it is the same, for it delights the sense of +smell, but disgusts the sense of taste. Also in regard to 93 +euphorbium, since it is harmful to the eyes and harmless to +all the rest of the body, we are not able to say whether it is +really harmless to bodies or not, as far as its own nature is +concerned. Rain-water, too, is useful to the eyes, but it makes +the trachea and the lungs rough, just as oil does, although it +soothes the skin; and the sea-torpedo placed on the extremities +makes them numb, but is harmless when placed on the rest of the +body. Wherefore we cannot say what each of these things is by +nature. It is possible only to say how it appears each time. We 94 +could cite more examples than these, but in order not to +spend too long in laying out the plan of this book we shall +simply say the following: Each of the phenomena perceived by us +seems to present itself in many forms, as the apple, smooth, +fragrant, sweet, yellow. Now it is not known whether it has in +reality only those qualities which appear to us, or if it has +only one quality, but appears different on account of the +different constitution of the sense organs, or if it has more +qualities than appear to us, but some of them do not affect us. +That it has only one quality might be concluded from what we 95 +have said about the food distributed in bodies, and the water +distributed in trees, and the breath in the flute and syrinx, +and in similar instruments; for it is possible that the apple +also has only one quality, but appears different on account of +the difference in the sense organs by which it is perceived. On 96 +the other hand, that the apple has more qualities than those +that appear to us, can be argued in this way: Let us imagine +someone born with the sense of touch, of smell, and of taste, +but neither hearing nor seeing. He will then assume that neither +anything visible nor anything audible exists at all, but only +the three kinds of qualities which he can apprehend. It is 97 +possible then that as we have only the five senses, we apprehend +only those qualities of the apple which we are able to grasp, +but it may be supposed that other qualities exist which would +affect other sense organs if we possessed them; as it is, we do +not feel the sensations which would be felt through them. But 98 +nature, one will say, has brought the senses into harmony +with the objects to be perceived. What kind of nature? Among the +Dogmatics a great difference of opinion reigns about the real +existence of nature anyway; for he who decides whether there is +a nature or not, if he is an uneducated man, would be according +to them untrustworthy; if he is a philosopher, he is a part of +the disagreement, and is himself to be judged, but is not a +judge. In short, if it is possible that only those qualities 99 +exist in the apple which we seem to perceive, or that more than +these are there, or that not even those which we perceive exist, +it will be unknown to us what kind of a thing the apple is. The +same argument holds for other objects of perception. If, +however, the senses do not comprehend the external world, the +intellect cannot comprehend it either, so that for this reason +also it will appear that the suspension of judgment follows in +regard to external objects. + + +THE FOURTH TROPE. + +In order to attain to [Greek: epoche] by fixing the argument on 100 +each separate sense, or even by putting aside the senses +altogether, we take up the fourth Trope of [Greek: epoche]. This +is the one based upon circumstances, and by circumstances we +mean conditions. This Trope comes under consideration, we may +say, with regard to conditions that are according to nature, or +contrary to nature; such as waking or sleeping, the age of life, +moving or keeping still, hating or loving, need or satiety, +drunkenness or sobriety, predispositions, being courageous or +afraid, sorrowing or rejoicing. For example, things appear 101 +different as they are according to nature, or contrary to it; as +for instance, the insane and those inspired by a god, think that +they hear gods, while we do not; in like manner they often say +that they perceive the odor of storax or frankincense, or the +like, and many other things which we do not perceive. Water, +also, that seems lukewarm to us, if poured over places that are +inflamed, will feel hot, and a garment that appears +orange-coloured to those that have blood-shot eyes, would not +look so to me, and the same honey appears sweet to me, but +bitter to those who have the jaundice. If one should say 102 +that those who are not in a natural state have unusual ideas of +objects, because of the intermingling of certain humors, then +one must also say, that it may be that objects which are really +what they seem to be to those who are in an unnatural condition, +appear different to those who are in health, for even those who +are in health have humors that are mixed with each other. For to 103 +give to one kind of fluid a power to change objects, and not +to another kind, is a fiction of the mind; for just as those who +are in health are in a condition that is natural to those who +are in health, and contrary to the nature of those who are not +in health, so also those who are not in health, are in a +condition contrary to the nature of those in health, but natural +to those not in health, and we must therefore believe that they +also are in some respect in a natural condition. Furthermore, 104 +in sleep or in waking, the ideas are different, because we +do not see things in the same way when we are awake as we do in +sleep; neither do we see them in the same way in sleep as we do +when awake, so that the existence or non-existence of these +things is not absolute, but relative, that is in relation to a +sleeping or waking condition. It is therefore probable that we +see those things in sleep which in a waking condition do not +exist, but they are not altogether non-existent, for they exist +in sleep, just as those things which exist when we are awake, +exist, although they do not exist in sleep. Furthermore, things 105 +present themselves differently according to the age of life, +for the same air seems cold to the aged, but temperate to those +in their prime, and the same color appears dim to those who are +old, and bright to those in their prime, and likewise the same +tone seems faint to the former, and audible to the latter. +People in different ages are also differently disposed 106 +towards things to be chosen or avoided; children, for example, +are very fond of balls and hoops, while those in their prime +prefer other things, and the old still others, from which it +follows that the ideas in regard to the same objects differ in +different periods of life. Furthermore, things appear different 107 +in a condition of motion and rest, since that which we see at +rest when we are still, seems to move when we are sailing +by it. There are also differences which depend on liking or 108 +disliking, as some detest swine flesh exceedingly, but others +eat it with pleasure. As Menander said-- + + "O how his face appears + Since he became such a man! What a creature! + Doing no injustice would make us also beautiful." + +Many also that love ugly women consider them very beautiful +Furthermore, there are differences which depend on hunger or 109 +satiety, as the same food seems agreeable to those who are +hungry, and disagreeable to those who are satisfied. There are +also differences depending on drunkenness and sobriety, as that +which we consider ugly when we are sober does not appear ugly to +us when we are drunk. Again, there are differences depending 110 +on predispositions, as the same wine appears sourish to those +who have previously eaten dates or dried figs, but agreeable to +those who have taken nuts or chickpeas; the vestibule of the +bath warms those who enter from without, but cools those who go +out, if they rest in it. Furthermore, there are differences 111 +depending on being afraid or courageous, as the same thing +seems fearful and terrible to the coward, but in no wise so to +him who is brave. There are differences, also, depending on +being sad or joyful, as the same things are unpleasant to the +sad, but pleasant to the joyful. Since therefore the 112 +anomalies depending on conditions are so great, and since men +are in different conditions at different times, it is perhaps +easy to say how each object appears to each man, but not so of +what kind it is, because the anomaly is not of a kind to be +judged. For he who would pass judgment upon this is either in +some one of the conditions mentioned above, or is in absolutely +no condition whatever; but to say that he is in no condition at +all, as, for example, that he is neither in health nor in +illness, that he is neither moving nor quiet, that he is not of +any age, and also that he is free from the other conditions, is +wholly absurd. But if he judges the ideas while he is in any 113 +condition whatever, he is a part of the contradiction, and, +besides, he is no genuine critic of external objects, because he +is confused by the condition in which he finds himself. +Therefore neither can the one who is awake compare the ideas of +those who are asleep with those who are awake, nor can he who is +in health compare the ideas of the sick with those of the well; +for we believe more in the things that are present, and +affecting us at present, than in the things not present. In 114 +another way, the anomaly in such ideas is impossible to be +judged, for whoever prefers one idea to another, and one +condition to another, does this either without a criterion and a +proof, or with a criterion and a proof; but he can do this +neither without them, for he would then be untrustworthy, nor +with them; for if he judges ideas, he judges them wholly by a +criterion, and he will say that this criterion is either true or +false. But if it is false, he will be untrustworthy; if, on 115 +the contrary, he says that it is true, he will say that the +criterion is true either without proof or with proof. If without +proof, he will be untrustworthy; if he says that it is true with +proof, it is certainly necessary that the proof be true, or he +will be untrustworthy. Now will he say that the proof which he +has accepted for the accrediting of the criterion is true, +having judged it, or without having judged it? If he says so 116 +without judging it, he will be untrustworthy; if he has judged +it, it is evident that he will say that he has judged according +to some criterion, and we must seek a proof for this criterion, +and for that proof a criterion. For the proof always needs a +criterion to establish it, and the criterion needs a proof that +it may be shown to be true; and a proof can neither be sound +without a pre-existing criterion that is true, nor a criterion +true without a proof that is shown beforehand to be trustworthy. +And so both the criterion and the proof are thrown into the 117 +_circulus in probando_, by which it is found that they are both +of them untrustworthy, for as each looks for proof from the +other, each is as untrustworthy as the other. Since then one +cannot prefer one idea to another, either without a proof and a +criterion or with them, the ideas that differ according to +different conditions cannot be judged, so that the suspension of +judgment in regard to the nature of external objects follows +through this Trope also. + + +THE FIFTH TROPE. + +The fifth Trope is that based upon position, distance, and 118 +place, for, according to each of these, the same things appear +different, as for example, the same arcade seen from either end +appears curtailed, but from the middle it looks symmetrical on +every side; and the same ship appears small and motionless from +afar, and large and in motion near by, and the same tower +appears round from a distance, but square near by. So much for +distance. Now in reference to place, we say that the light 119 +of the lamp appears dim in the sun, but bright in the dark; and +the same rudder appears broken in the sea, but straight out of +it; and the egg in the bird is soft, but in the air hard; and +the lyngurion is a fluid in the lynx, but is hard in the air; +and the coral is soft in the sea, but hard in the air; and a +tone of voice appears different produced by a syrinx, and by a +flute, and different simply in the air. Also in reference to 120 +position, the same picture leaned back appears smooth, and +leaned forward a little seems to have hollows and protuberances, +and the necks of doves appear different in color according to +the difference in inclination. Since then all phenomena are 121 +seen in relation to place, distance, and position, each of which +relation makes a great difference with the idea, as we have +mentioned, we shall be obliged by this Trope also to come to the +suspension of judgment. For he who wishes to give preference to +certain ones of these ideas will attempt the impossible. For if 122 +he simply makes the decision without proof he will be +untrustworthy. If, however, he wishes to make use of a proof, +should he say that the proof is false, he contradicts himself, +but if he declares the proof to be true, proof of its proof will +be demanded of him, and another proof for that, which proof also +must be true, and so on to the _regressus in infinitum_. It is +impossible, however, to present proofs _in infinitum_, so 123 +that one will not be able to prove that one idea is to be +preferred to another. Since then one cannot either without proof +or with proof judge the ideas in question, the suspension of +judgment results, and how each thing appears according to this +or that position, or this or that distance, or this or that +place, we perhaps are able to say, but what it really is it is +impossible to declare, for the reasons which we have mentioned. + + +THE SIXTH TROPE. + +The sixth Trope is the one based upon mixtures, according to 124 +which we conclude that since no object presents itself alone, +but always together with something else, it is perhaps possible +to say of what nature the mixture is, of the thing itself, and +of that with which it is seen, but of what sort the external +object really is we shall not be able to say. Now it is evident, +I think, that nothing from without is known to us by itself, but +always with something else, and that because of this fact it +appears different. The color of our skin, for example, is 125 +different seen in warm air from what it is in cold, and we +could not say what our color really is, only what it is when +viewed under each of these conditions. The same sound appears +different in rare air from what it is in dense, and aromas are +more overpowering in the warm bath and in the sun than they are +in the cold air, and a body surrounded by water is light, but by +air heavy. Leaving aside, however, outer mixtures, our eyes 126 +have inside of them coatings and humors. Since then visible +things are not seen without these, they will not be accurately +comprehended, for it is the mixture that we perceive, and for +this reason those who have the jaundice see everything yellow, +and those with bloodshot eyes bloody. Since the same sound +appears different in broad open places from what it does in +narrow and winding ones, and different in pure air and in +impure, it is probable that we do not perceive the tones +unmixed; for the ears have narrow winding passages filled with +vaporous secretions, which it is said gather from places around +the head. Since also there are substances present in the 127 +nostrils and in the seat of the sense of taste, we perceive the +things smelled and the things tasted in connection with them, +and not unmixed. So that because of mixture the senses do not +perceive accurately what the external objects are. The intellect 128 +even does not do this, chiefly because its guides, the +senses, make mistakes, and perhaps it itself adds a certain +special mixture to those messages communicated by the senses; +for in each place where the Dogmatics think that the ruling +faculty is situated, we see that certain humors are present, +whether one would locate it in the region of the brain, in the +region of the heart, or somewhere else. Since therefore +according to this Trope also, we see that we cannot say anything +regarding the nature of external objects, we are obliged to +suspend our judgment. + + +THE SEVENTH TROPE. + +The seventh Trope is the one which, as we said, is based 129 +upon the quantity and constitution of objects, constitution +commonly meaning composition. And it is evident that we are +obliged to suspend our judgment according to this Trope also in +regard to the nature of things. As for example, filings from the +horn of the goat appear white when they are seen separately and +without being put together; put together, however, in the form +of a horn, they look black. And the parts of silver, the filings +that is, by themselves appear black, but as a whole appear +white; and parts of the Taenarus stone look white when ground, +but in the whole stone appear yellow; grains of sand 130 +scattered apart from each other appear to be rough, but put +together in a heap, they produce a soft feeling; hellebore taken +fine and downy, causes choking, but it no longer does so when +taken coarse; wine also taken moderately strengthens us, but 131 +when taken in excess relaxes the body; food similarly, has a +different effect according to the quantity, at least, it often +disturbs the body when too much is taken, causing dyspepsia and +discharge. We shall be able here also to say of what kind 132 +the cutting from the horn is, and what many cuttings put +together are, of what kind a filing of silver is, and what many +of them put together are, of what kind the tiny Taenarus stone, +and what one composed of many small ones is, and in regard to +the grains of sand, and the hellebore, and the wine, and the +food, what they are in relation, but no longer the nature of the +thing by itself, because of the anomaly in the ideas which we +have of things, according to the way in which they are put +together. In general it appears that useful things become 133 +harmful when an intemperate use is made of them, and things that +seem harmful when taken in excess, are not injurious in a small +quantity. What we see in the effect of medicines witnesses +especially to this fact, as an exact mixture of simple remedies +makes a compound which is helpful, but sometimes when a very +small inclination of the balance is overlooked, the medicine is +not only not helpful, but very harmful, and often poisonous. So 134 +the argument based upon the quantity and constitution of +objects, puts in confusion the existence of external objects. +Therefore this Trope naturally leads us to suspend our judgment, +as we are not able to declare exactly the nature of external +objects. + + +THE EIGHTH TROPE. + +The eighth Trope is the one based upon relation, from which 135 +we conclude to suspend our judgment as to what things are +absolutely, in their nature, since every thing is in relation to +something else. And we must bear in mind that we use the word +_is_ incorrectly, in place of _appears_, meaning to say, every +thing _appears_ to be in relation. This is said, however, with +two meanings: first, that every thing is in relation to the one +who judges, for the external object, _i.e._ the thing judged, +appears to be in relation to the judge; the other way is that +every thing is in relation to the things considered together +with it, as the relation of the right hand to the left. But we 136 +came to the conclusion above, that every thing is in relation +to something, as for example, to the one judging; each thing +appears in relation to this or that animal, and this or that +man, and this or that sense, and in certain circumstances; +as regards things considered together, also, each thing appears +in relation to this or that mixture, and this or that Trope, and +this or that composition, quantity and place. And in another way +it is possible to conclude that every thing is in relation 137 +to something, as follows: does the being in difference differ +from the being in relation, or not? If it does not differ, then +it is the same as relation; if it does differ, since every thing +which differs is in some relation, for it is said to be in +relation to that from which it differs, those things which are +in a difference are in a relation to something. Now according 138 +to the Dogmatics, some beings belong to the highest genera, +others to the lowest species, and others to both genera +and species at the same time; all of these are in relation to +something, therefore every thing is in relation to something. +Furthermore, among things, some things are manifest, and others +are hidden, as the Dogmatics themselves say, and the things that +make themselves known to us are the phenomena, and the things +that are made known to us by the phenomena are the hidden +things, for according to the Dogmatics, the phenomena are the +outward appearance of the unknown; then that which makes known, +and that which is made known, are in relation to something; +every thing, therefore, is in relation to something. In 139 +addition to this, some things are similar to each other, and +others are dissimilar, some are equal, and others are unequal. +Now these things are in relation to something, therefore every +thing is in relation to something, and whoever says that every +thing is not in relation to something, himself establishes the +fact that every thing is in relation to something, for even in +saying that every thing is not in relation to something, he 140 +proves it in reference to us, and not in general, by his +objections to us. In short, as we have shown that every thing is +in relation to something, it is then evident that we shall not +be able to say exactly what each object is by nature, but what +it appears to be like in relation to something else. It follows +from this, that we must suspend our judgment regarding the +nature of things. + + +THE NINTH TROPE. + +In regard to the Trope based on the frequency and rarity of 141 +events, which we call the ninth of the series, we give the +following explanation: The sun is certainly a much more +astonishing thing than a comet, but because we see the sun +continually and the comet rarely we are so much astonished at +the comet that it even seems an omen, while we are not at all +astonished at the sun. If, however, we should imagine the sun +appearing at rare intervals, and at rare intervals setting, in +the first instance suddenly lighting up all things, and in the +second casting everything into shade, we should see great +astonishment at the sight. An earthquake, too, does not trouble 142 +those who experience it for the first time in the same manner +as those who have become accustomed to it. How great the +astonishment of a man who beholds the sea for the first time! +And the beauty of the human body, seen suddenly for the first +time, moves us more than if we are accustomed to seeing it. That +which is rare seems valuable, while things that are familiar 143 +and easily obtained seem by no means so. If, for example, we +should imagine water as rare, of how much greater value would it +seem than all other valuable things! or if we imagine gold as +simply thrown about on the ground in large quantities like +stones, to whom do we think it would be valuable, or by whom +would it be hoarded, as it is now? Since then the same things +according to the frequency or rarity that they are met with seem +to be now valuable and now not so, we conclude that it may be +that we shall be able to say what kind of a thing each of 144 +them appears to be according to the frequency or rarity with +which it occurs, but we are not able to say what each external +object is absolutely. Therefore, according to this Trope also, +we suspend our judgment regarding these things. + + +THE TENTH TROPE. + +The tenth Trope is the one principally connected with 145 +morals, relating to schools, customs, laws, mythical beliefs, +and dogmatic opinions. Now a school is a choice of a manner of +life, or of something held by one or many, as for example the +school of Diogenes or the Laconians. A law is a written 146 +contract among citizens, the transgressor of which is punished. +A custom or habit, for there is no difference, is a common +acceptance of a certain thing by many, the deviator from which +is in no wise punished. For example, it is a law not to commit +adultery, and it is a custom with us [Greek: to me demosia +gynaiki mignusthai]. A mythical belief is a tradition 147 +regarding things which never took place, but were invented, as +among others, the tales about Cronus, for many are led to +believe them. A dogmatic opinion is the acceptance of something +that seems to be established by a course of reasoning, or by +some proof, as for example, that atoms are elements of things, +and that they are either homogeneous, or infinitesimal, or of +some other description. Now we place each of these things +sometimes in opposition to itself, and sometimes in opposition +to each one of the others. For example, we place a custom in 148 +opposition to a custom thus: some of the Ethiopians tattoo +new-born children, but we do not, and the Persians think it is +seemly to have a garment of many colors and reaching to the +feet, but we think it not so. The Indians [Greek: tais gynaixi +deomosia mignyntai] but most of the other nations consider it a +shame. We place a law in opposition to a law in this way: 149 +among the Romans he who renounces his paternal inheritance does +not pay his father's debts, but among the Rhodians he pays them +in any case; and among the Tauri in Scythia it was a law to +offer strangers in sacrifice to Artemis, but with us it is +forbidden to kill a man near a temple. We place a school in 150 +opposition to a school when we oppose the school of Diogenes to +that of Aristippus, or that of the Laconians to that of the +Italians. We place a mythical belief in opposition to a mythical +belief, as by some traditions Jupiter is said to be the father +of men and gods, and by others Oceanus, as we say-- + + "Oceanus father of the gods, and Tethys the mother." + +We place dogmatic opinions in opposition to each other, when 151 +we say that some declare that there is only one element, but +others that they are infinite in number, and some that the soul +is mortal, others that it is immortal; and some say that our +affairs are directed by the providence of the gods, but others +that there is no providence. We place custom in opposition 152 +to other things, as for example to a law, when we say that among +the Persians it is the custom to practice [Greek: arrenomixiai], +but among the Romans it is forbidden by law to do it; by us +adultery is forbidden, but among the Massagetae indifference in +this respect is allowed by custom, as Eudoxos of Cnidus relates +in the first part of his book of travels; among us it is +forbidden [Greek: metrasi mignusthai], but among the Persians it +is the custom by preference to marry so; the Egyptians marry +sisters also, which among us is forbidden by law. Further, 153 +we place a custom in opposition to a school, when we say that +most men [Greek: anachorountes mignuontai tais heauton gunaixin, +ho de Krates te Hipparchia demosia], and Diogenes went around +with one shoulder bare, but we go around with our customary +clothes. We place a custom in opposition to a mythical 154 +belief, as when the myths say that Cronus ate his own children, +while with us it is the custom to take care of our children; and +among us it is the custom to venerate the gods as good, and not +liable to evil, but they are described by the poets as being +wounded, and also as being jealous of each other. We place a +custom in opposition to a dogmatic opinion when we say that 155 +it is a custom with us to seek good things from the gods, but +that Epicurus says that the divine pays no heed to us; +Aristippus also held it to be a matter of indifference to wear a +woman's robe, but we consider it shameful. We place a school in +opposition to a law, as according to the law it is not allowed 156 +to beat a free and noble born man, but the wrestlers and +boxers strike each other according to the teaching of their +manner of life, and although murder is forbidden, the gladiators +kill each other for the same reason. We place a mythical 157 +belief in opposition to a school when we say that, although the +myths say of Hercules that in company with Omphale-- + + "He carded wool, and bore servitude," + +and did things that not even an ordinary good man would have +done, yet Hercules' theory of life was noble. We place a 158 +mythical belief in opposition to a dogmatic opinion when we +say that athletes seeking after glory as a good, enter for its +sake upon a laborious profession, but many philosophers, on the +other hand, teach that glory is worthless. We place law in +opposition to mythical belief when we say the poets 159 +represent the gods as working adultery and sin, but among us the +law forbids those things. We place law in opposition to dogmatic +opinion when we say that the followers of Chrysippus hold 160 +that it is a matter of indifference to marry one's mother or +sister, but the law forbids these things. We place a mythical +belief in opposition to a dogmatic opinion when we say that 161 +the poets represent Jupiter as descending and holding +intercourse with mortal women, but the Dogmatics think this was +impossible; also that the poet says that Jupiter, on account 162 +of his sorrow for Sarpedon, rained drops of blood upon the +earth, but it is a dogma of the philosophers that the divine is +exempt from suffering; and they deny the myth of the +horse-centaurs, giving us the horse-centaur as an example of +non-existence. Now we could give many other examples of each 163 +of the antitheses mentioned above, but for a brief argument, +these are sufficient. Since, however, such anomaly of things is +shown by this Trope also, we shall not be able to say what +objects are by nature, but only what each thing appears to be +like, according to this or that school, or this or that law, or +this or that custom, or according to each of the other +conditions. Therefore, by this Trope also, we must suspend our +judgment in regard to the nature of external objects. Thus we +arrive at [Greek: epoche] through the ten Tropes. + + + + +CHAPTER XV. + + +_The Five Tropes._ + +The later Sceptics, however, teach the following five Tropes 164 +of [Greek: epoche]: first, the one based upon contradiction; +second, the _regressus in infinitum_; third, relation; fourth, +the hypothetical; fifth, the _circulus in probando_. The one 165 +based upon contradiction is the one from which we find, that in +reference to the thing put before us for investigation, a +position has been developed which is impossible to be judged, +either practically, or theoretically, and therefore, as we are +not able to either accept or reject anything, we end in +suspending the judgment. The one based upon the _regressus 166 +in infinitum_ is that in which we say that the proof brought +forward for the thing set before us calls for another proof, and +that one another, and so on to infinity, so that, not having +anything from which to begin the reasoning, the suspension of +judgment follows. The one based upon relation, as we have 167 +said before, is that one in which the object appears of this +kind or that kind, as related to the judge and to the things +regarded together with it, but we suspend our judgment as to +what it is in reality. The one based upon hypothesis is 168 +illustrated by the Dogmatics, when in the _regressus in +infinitum_ they begin from something that they do not found on +reason, but which they simply take for granted without proof. +The Trope, _circulus in probando_, arises when the thing 169 +which ought to prove the thing sought for, needs to be sustained +by the thing sought for, and as we are unable to take the one +for the proof of the other, we suspend our judgment in regard to +both. Now we shall briefly show that it is possible to refer +every thing under investigation to one or another of these +Tropes, as follows: the thing before us is either sensible or +intellectual; difference of opinion exists, however, as to what +it is in itself, for some say that only the things of sense 170 +are true, others, only those belonging to the understanding, and +others say that some things of sense, and some of thought, are +true. Now, will it be said that this difference of opinion can +be judged or cannot be judged? If it cannot be judged, then we +have the result necessarily of suspension of judgment, because +it is impossible to express opinion in regard to things about +which a difference of opinion exists which cannot be judged. If +it can be judged, then we ask how it is to be judged? For 171 +example, the sensible, for we shall limit the argument first to +this--Is it to be judged by sensible or by intellectual +standards? For if it is to be judged by a sensible one, since we +are in doubt about the sensible, that will also need something +else to sustain it; and if that proof is also something +sensible, something else will again be necessary to prove it, +and so on _in infinitum_. If, on the contrary, the sensible must +be judged by something intellectual, as there is disagreement 172 +in regard to the intellectual, this intellectual thing will +require also judgment and proof. Now, how is it to be proved? +If by something intellectual, it will likewise be thrown +into _infinitum_; if by something sensible, as the intellectual +has been taken for the proof of the sensible, and the sensible +has been taken for that of the intellectual, the _circulus in +probando_ is introduced. If, however, in order to escape 173 +from this, the one who is speaking to us expects us to take +something for granted which has not been proved, in order to +prove what follows, the hypothetical Trope is introduced, which +provides no way of escape. For if the one who makes the +hypothesis is worthy of confidence, we should in every case be +no less worthy of confidence in making a contrary hypothesis. If +the one who makes the assumption assumes something true, he +makes it suspicious by using it as a hypothesis, and not as an +established fact; if it is false, the foundation of the +reasoning is unsound. If a hypothesis is any help towards a 174 +trustworthy result, let the thing in question itself be assumed, +and not something else, by which, forsooth, one would establish +the thing under discussion. If it is absurd to assume the thing +questioned, it is also absurd to assume that upon which it +rests. That all things belonging to the senses are also in 175 +relation to something else is evident, because they are in +relation to those who perceive them. It is clear then, that +whatever thing of sense is brought before us, it may be easily +referred to one of the five Tropes. And we come to a similar +conclusion in regard to intellectual things. For if it should be +said that there is a difference of opinion regarding them which +cannot be judged, it will be granted that we must suspend the +judgment concerning it. In case the difference of opinion 176 +can be judged, if it is judged through anything intellectual, we +fall into the _regressus in infinitum_, and if through anything +sensible into the _circulus in probando_; for, as the sensible +is again subject to difference of opinion, and cannot be judged +by the sensible on account of the _regressus in infinitum_, it +will have need of the intellectual, just as the intellectual has +need of the sensible. But he who accepts anything which is +hypothetical again is absurd. Intellectual things stand also 177 +in relation, because the form in which they are expressed +depends on the mind of the thinker, and, if they were in reality +exactly as they are described, there would not have been any +difference of opinion about them. Therefore the intellectual +also is brought under the five Tropes, and consequently it is +necessary to suspend the judgment altogether with regard to +every thing that is brought before us. Such are the five Tropes +taught by the later Sceptics. They set them forth, not to throw +out the ten Tropes, but in order to put to shame the audacity of +the Dogmatics in a variety of ways, by these Tropes as well as +by those. + + + + +CHAPTER XVI. + + +_The Two Tropes._ + +Two other Tropes of [Greek: epoche] are also taught. For as it 178 +appears that everything that is comprehended is either +comprehended through itself or through something else, it is +thought that this fact introduces doubt in regard to all things. +And that nothing can be understood through itself is evident, it +is said, from the disagreement which exists altogether among the +physicists in regard to sensible and intellectual things. I +mean, of course, a disagreement which cannot be judged, as we +are not able to use a sensible or an intellectual criterion in +judging it, for everything that we would take has a part in the +disagreement, and is untrustworthy. Nor is it conceded that +anything can be comprehended through something else; for if 179 +a thing is comprehended through something, that must always in +turn be comprehended through something else, and the _regressus +in infinitum_ or the _circulus in probando_ follow. If, on the +contrary, a thing is comprehended through something that one +wishes to use as if it had been comprehended through itself, +this is opposed to the fact that nothing can be comprehended +through itself, according to what we have said. We do not know +how that which contradicts itself can be comprehended, either +through itself or through something else, as no criterion of the +truth or of comprehension appears, and signs without proof would +be rejected, as we shall see in the next book. So much will +suffice for the present about suspension of judgment. + + + + +CHAPTER XVII. + + +_What are the Tropes for the overturning of Aetiology?_ + +In the same manner as we teach the Tropes of [Greek: epoche], 180 +some set forth Tropes through which we oppose the Dogmatics, +by expressing doubt in regard to the aetiology of which they are +especially proud. So Aenesidemus teaches eight Tropes, by which +he thinks that he can prove all the dogmatic aetiology useless. +The first of these Tropes, he said, relates to the character 181 +of aetiology in general, which does not give incontestable +testimony in regard to phenomena, because it treats of unseen +things. The second Trope states that although abundant resources +exist by which to investigate the cause of a thing in question, +some Dogmatics investigate it in one way only. The third Trope 182 +states that the Dogmatics assign causes which do not show +any order for things which have taken place in an orderly +manner. The fourth Trope states that the Dogmatics, accepting +phenomena as they take place, think that they also understand +how unseen things take place, although perhaps the unseen things +have taken place in the same way as the phenomena, and perhaps +in some other way peculiar to themselves. The fifth Trope states 183 +that they all, so to speak, assign causes according to their +own hypotheses about the elements, but not according to any +commonly accepted methods. The sixth states that they often +explain things investigated according to their own hypotheses, +but ignore opposing hypotheses which have equal probability. The +seventh states that they often give reasons for things that 184 +not only conflict with phenomena, but also with their own +hypotheses. The eighth states that although that which seems +manifest, and that which is to be investigated, are often +equally inscrutable, they build up a theory from the one about +the other, although both are equally inscrutable. It is not +impossible, Aenesidemus said also, that some Dogmatics 185 +should fail in their theories of causality from other +combinations of reasons deducible from the Tropes given above. +Perhaps also the five Tropes of [Greek: epoche] are sufficient +to refute aetiology, for he who proposes a cause will propose +one which is either in harmony with all the sects of philosophy, +with Scepticism, and with phenomena, or one that is not. +Perhaps, however, it is not possible that a cause should be in +harmony with them, for phenomena and unknown things altogether +disagree with each other. If it is not in harmony with them, the +reason of this will also be demanded of the one who proposed 186 +it; and if he accepts a phenomenon as the cause of a phenomenon, +or something unknown as the cause of the unknown, he will be +thrown into the _regressus in infinitum_; if he uses one cause +to account for another one, into the _circulus in probando_; but +if he stops anywhere, he will either say that the cause that he +proposes holds good so far as regards the things that have been +said, and introduce relation, abolishing an absolute standpoint; +or if he accepts anything by hypothesis, he will be attacked by +us. Therefore it is perhaps possible to put the temerity of the +Dogmatics to shame in aetiology by these Tropes. + + + + +CHAPTER XVIII. + + +_The Sceptical Formulae._ + +When we use any one of these Tropes, or the Tropes of 187 +[Greek: epoche], we employ with them certain formulae which show +the Sceptical method and our own feeling, as for instance, the +sayings, "No more," "One must determine nothing," and certain +others. It is fitting therefore to treat of these in this place. +Let us begin with "No more." + + + + +CHAPTER XIX. + + +_The Formula "No more."_ + +We sometimes express this as I have given it, and sometimes 188 +thus, "Nothing more." For we do not accept the "No more," as +some understand it, for the examination of the special, and +"Nothing more" for that of the general, but we use "No more" and +"Nothing more" without any difference, and we shall at present +treat of them as one and the same expression. Now this formula +is defective, for as when we say a double one we really mean a +double garment, and when we say a broad one we really mean a +broad road; so when we say "No more" we mean really no more than +this, or in every way the same. But some of the Sceptics use 189 +instead of the interrogation "No?" the interrogation "What, this +rather than this?" using the word "what" in the sense of "what +is the reason," so that the formula means, "What is the reason +for this rather than for this?" It is a customary thing, +however, to use an interrogation instead of a statement, as "Who +of the mortals does not know the wife of Jupiter?" and also to +use a statement instead of an interrogation, as "I seek where +Dion dwells," and "I ask why one should admire a poet." The word +"what" is also used instead of "what for" by Menander--"(For) +what did I remain behind?" The formula "Not more this than this" +expresses our own condition of mind, and signifies that 190 +because of the equality of the things that are opposed to each +other we finally attain to a state of equilibrium of soul. We +mean by equality that equality which appears to us as probable, +by things placed in opposition to each other we mean simply +things which conflict with each other, and by a state of +equilibrium we mean a state in which we do not assent to one +thing more than to another. Even if the formula "Nothing 191 +more" seems to express assent or denial, we do not use it so, +but we use it loosely, and not with accuracy, either instead of +an interrogation or instead of saying, "I do not know to which +of these I would assent, and to which I would not." What lies +before us is to express what appears to us, but we are +indifferent to the words by which we express it. This must be +understood, however, that we use the formula "Nothing more" +without affirming in regard to it that it is wholly sure and +true, but we present it as it appears to us. + + + + +CHAPTER XX. + + +_Aphasia._ + +We explain Aphasia as follows: The word [Greek: phasis] is used 192 +in two ways, having a general and a special signification. +According to the general signification, it expresses affirmation +or negation, as "It is day" or "It is not day"; according to the +special signification, it expresses an affirmation only, and +negations are not called [Greek: phaseis]. Now Aphasia is the +opposite of [Greek: phasis] in its general signification, which, +as we said, comprises both affirmation and negation. It follows +that Aphasia is a condition of mind, according to which we say +that we neither affirm nor deny anything. It is evident from +this that we do not understand by Aphasia something that 193 +inevitably results from the nature of things, but we mean that +we now find ourselves in the condition of mind expressed by it +in regard to the things that are under investigation. It is +necessary to remember that we do not say that we affirm or deny +any of those things that are dogmatically stated in regard to +the unknown, for we yield assent only to those things which +affect our feelings and oblige us to assent to them. + + + + +CHAPTER XXI. + + +_"Perhaps," and "It is possible," and "It may be."_ + +The formulae "Perhaps," and "Perhaps not," and "It is 194 +possible," and "It is not possible," and "It may be," and "It +may not be," we use instead of "Perhaps it is," and "Perhaps it +is not," and "It is possible that it is," and "It is possible +that it is not," and "It may be that it is," and "It may be that +it is not." That is, we use the formula "It is not possible" for +the sake of brevity, instead of saying "It is not possible to +be," and "It may not be" instead of "It may not be that it is," +and "Perhaps not" instead of "Perhaps it is not." Again, we do +not here dispute about words, neither do we question if the 195 +formulae mean these things absolutely, but we use them loosely, +as I said before. Yet I think it is evident that these formulae +express Aphasia. For certainly the formula "Perhaps it is" +really includes that which seems to contradict it, _i.e._ the +formula "Perhaps it is not," because it does not affirm in in +regard to anything that it is really so. It is the same also in +regard to the others. + + + + +CHAPTER XXII. + + +[Greek: epoche] _or the Suspension of Judgment._ + +When I say that I suspend my judgment, I mean that I cannot 196 +say which of those things presented should be believed, and +which should not be believed, showing that things appear equal +to me in respect to trustworthiness and untrustworthiness. Now +we do not affirm that they are equal, but we state what appears +to us in regard to them at the time when they present themselves +to us. [Greek: epoche] means the holding back of the opinion, so +as neither to affirm nor deny anything because of the equality +of the things in question. + + + + +CHAPTER XXIII. + + +_The Formula "I determine Nothing."_ + +In regard to the formula "I determine nothing," we say the 197 +following: By "determine" we mean, not simply to speak, but to +give assent to an affirmation with regard to some unknown thing. +For it will soon be found that the Sceptic determines nothing, +not even the formula "I determine nothing," for this formula is +not a dogmatic opinion, that is an assent to something unknown, +but an expression declaring what our condition of mind is. When, +for example, the Sceptic says, "I determine nothing," he means +this: "According to my present feeling I can assert or deny +nothing dogmatically regarding the things under investigation," +and in saying this he expresses what appears to him in reference +to the things under discussion. He does not express himself +positively, but he states what he feels. + + + + +CHAPTER XXIV. + + +_The Formula "Every thing is Undetermined."_ + +The expression "Indetermination" furthermore shows a state 198 +of mind in which we neither deny nor affirm positively anything +regarding things that are investigated in a dogmatic way, that +is the things that are unknown. When then the Sceptic says +"Every thing is undetermined," he uses "is undetermined," in the +sense of "it appears undetermined to him." The words "every +thing" do not mean all existences, but those that he has +examined of the unknown things that are investigated by the +Dogmatists. By "undetermined," he means that there is no +preference in the things that are placed in opposition to each +other, or that they simply conflict with each other in respect +to trustworthiness or untrustworthiness. And as the one who 199 +says "I am walking" really means "It is I that am walking," so +he who says "Every thing is undetermined" means at the same +time, according to our teachings, "as far as I am concerned," or +"as it appears to me," as if he were saying "As far as I have +examined the things that are under investigation in a dogmatic +manner, it appears to me that no one of them excels the one +which conflicts with it in trustworthiness or +untrustworthiness." + + + + +CHAPTER XXV. + + +_The Formula "Every thing is Incomprehensible."_ + +We treat the formula "Every thing is incomprehensible" in 200 +the same way. For "every thing" we interpret in the same way as +above, and we supply the words "to me" so that what we say is +this: "As far as I have inspected the unknown things which are +dogmatically examined, it appears to me that every thing is +incomprehensible." This is not, however, to affirm that the +things which are examined by the Dogmatists are of such a nature +as to be necessarily incomprehensible, but one expresses his own +feeling in saying "I see that I have not thus far comprehended +any of those things because of the equilibrium of the things +that are placed in opposition to each other." Whence it seems to +me that every thing that has been brought forward to dispute our +formulae has fallen wide of the mark. + + + + +CHAPTER XXVI. + + +_The Formulae "I do not comprehend" and "I do not +understand."_ + +The formulae "I do not comprehend" and "I do not understand" 201 +show a condition of mind in which the Sceptic stands aloof for +the present from asserting or denying anything in regard to the +unknown things under investigation, as is evident from what we +said before about the other formulae. + + + + +CHAPTER XXVII. + + +_The Formula "To place an equal Statement in opposition +to every Statement."_ + +Furthermore, when we say "Every statement may have an equal 202 +statement placed in opposition to it," by "every," we mean all +the statements that we have examined; we do not use the word +"statement" simply, but for a statement which seeks to prove +something dogmatically about things that are unknown, and not at +all one that shows a process of reasoning from premises and +conclusions, but something which is put together in any sort of +way. We use the word "equal" in reference to trustworthiness or +untrustworthiness. "Is placed in opposition" we use instead of +the common expression "to conflict with," and we supply "as it +appears to me." When therefore one says, "It seems to me 203 +that every statement which I have examined, which proves +something dogmatically, may have another statement placed in +opposition to it which also proves something dogmatically, and +which is equal to it in trustworthiness and untrustworthiness," +this is not asserted dogmatically, but is an expression of human +feeling as it appears to the one who feels it. Some Sceptics 204 +express the formula as follows: "Every statement should have an +equal one placed in opposition to it," demanding it +authoritatively thus: "Let us place in opposition to every +statement that proves something dogmatically another conflicting +statement which also seeks to prove something dogmatically, and +is equal to it in trustworthiness and untrustworthiness." +Naturally this is directed to the Sceptics, but the infinitive +should be used instead of the imperative, that is, "to oppose" +instead of "let us oppose." This formula is recommended to the 205 +Sceptic, lest he should be deceived by the Dogmatists and +give up his investigations, and rashly fail of the [Greek: +ataraxia] which is thought to accompany [Greek: epoche] in +regard to everything, as we have explained above. + + + + +CHAPTER XXVIII. + + +_General Observations on the Formulae of the Sceptics._ + +We have treated of a sufficient number of these formulae for 206 +an outline, especially since what we have said about those +mentioned applies also to others that we have omitted. In regard +to all the Sceptical formulae, it must be understood in advance +that we do not affirm them to be absolutely true, because we say +that they can even refute themselves, since they are themselves +included in those things to which they refer, just as cathartic +medicines not only purge the body of humors, but carry off +themselves with the humors. We say then that we use these 207 +formulae, not as literally making known the things for which +they are used, but loosely, and if one wishes, inaccurately. It +is not fitting for the Sceptic to dispute about words, +especially as it contributes to our purpose to say that these +formulae have no absolute meaning; their meaning is a relative +one, that is, relative to the Sceptics. Besides, it is to be 208 +remembered that we do not say them about all things in general, +but about the unknown, and things that are dogmatically +investigated, and that we say what appears to us, and that we do +not express ourselves decidedly about the nature of external +objects. By this means I think that every sophism brought +against the Sceptical formulae can be overturned. We have now 209 +shown the character of Scepticism by examining its idea, its +parts, its criterion and aim, and also the Tropes of [Greek: +epoche], and by treating of the Sceptical formulae. We think it +therefore appropriate to enter briefly into the distinction +between Scepticism and the nearly related schools of philosophy +in order to more clearly understand the Sceptical School. We +will begin with the philosophy of Heraclitus. + + + + +CHAPTER XXIX. + + +_In what does the Sceptical School differ from the Philosophy +of Heraclitus?_ + +Now that this school differs from ours is evident, for 210 +Heraclitus expresses himself about many unknown things +dogmatically, which we do not, as has been said. Aenesidemus and +his followers said that the Sceptical School is the way to the +philosophy of Heraclitus. They gave as a reason for this that +the statement that contradictory predicates appear to be +applicable to the same thing, leads the way to the statement +that contradictory predicates are in reality applicable to the +same thing; and as the Sceptics say that contradictory +predicates appear to be applicable to the same thing, the +Heraclitans proceed from this to the doctrine that such +predicates are in reality applicable. We reply to this that the +statement that contradictory predicates appear to be applicable +to the same thing is not a dogma of the Sceptics, but is a fact +that presents itself not only to the Sceptics, but to other +philosophers, and to all men. No one, for instance, would 211 +venture to say that honey does not taste sweet to those in +health, and bitter to those who have the jaundice, so that the +Heraclitans start from a preconception common to all men, as do +we also, and perhaps the other schools of philosophy likewise. +If, however, they had attributed the origin of the statement +that contradictory predicates are present in the same thing to +any of the Sceptical teachings, as, for example, to the formula +"Every thing is incomprehensible," or "I determine nothing," or +any of the other similar ones, it may be that which they say +would follow; but since they start from that which is a common +experience, not only to us, but to other philosophers, and in +life, why should one say that our school is a path to the +philosophy of Heraclitus more than any of the other schools of +philosophy, or than life itself, as we all make use of the same +subject matter? On the other hand, the Sceptical School may not 212 +only fail to help towards the knowledge of the philosophy of +Heraclitus, but may even hinder it! For the Sceptic attacks all +the dogmas of Heraclitus as having been rashly given, and +opposes on the one hand the doctrine of conflagration, and on +the other, the doctrine that contradictory predicates in reality +apply to the same thing, and in regard to every dogma of +Heraclitus he scorns his dogmatic rashness, and then, in the +manner that I have before referred to, adduces the formulae "I +do not understand" and "I determine nothing," which conflict +with the Heraclitan doctrines. It is absurd to say that this +conflicting school is a path to the very sect with which it +conflicts. It is then absurd to say that the Sceptical School is +a path to the philosophy of Heraclitus. + + + + +CHAPTER XXX. + + +_In what does the Sceptical School differ from the Philosophy +of Democritus?_ + +The philosophy of Democritus is also said to have community 213 +with Scepticism, because it seems to use the same matter that we +do. For, from the fact that honey seems sweet to some and bitter +to others, Democritus reasons, it is said, that honey is neither +sweet nor bitter, and therefore he accords with the formula "No +more," which is a formula of the Sceptics. But the Sceptics and +the Democritans use the formula "No more" differently from each +other, for they emphasise the negation in the expression, but +we, the not knowing whether both of the phenomena exist or +neither one, and so we differ in this respect. The distinction, +however, becomes most evident when Democritus says that 214 +atoms and empty space are real, for by real he means existing in +reality. Now, although he begins with the anomaly in phenomena, +yet, since he says that atoms and empty space really exist, it +is superfluous, I think, even to say that he differs from us. + + + + +CHAPTER XXXI. + + +_In what does Scepticism differ from the Cyrenaic Philosophy?_ + +Some say that the Cyrenaic School is the same as the 215 +Sceptical, because that school also claims to comprehend only +conditions of mind. It differs, however, from it, because, while +the former makes pleasure and the gentle motion of the flesh its +aim, we make [Greek: ataraxia] ours, and this is opposed to the +aim of their school. For whether pleasure is present or not, +confusion awaits him who maintains that pleasure is an aim, as I +have shown in what I said about the aim. And then, in addition, +we suspend our judgment as far as the reasoning with regard to +external objects is concerned, but the Cyrenaics pronounce the +nature of these inscrutable. + + + + +CHAPTER XXXII. + + +_In what does Scepticism differ from the Philosophy of +Protagoras?_ + +Protagoras makes man the measure of all things, of things 216 +that are that they are, and things that are not that they are +not, meaning by measure, criterion, and by things, events, that +is to say really, man is the criterion for all events, of things +that are that they are, and of things that are not that they are +not. And for that reason he accepts only the phenomena that +appear to each man, and thus he introduces relation. Therefore 217 +he seems to have community with the Pyrrhoneans. He differs, +however, from them, and we shall see the difference after we +have somewhat explained how things seemed to Protagoras. He +says, for example, that matter is fluid, and as it flows, +additions are constantly made in the place of that which is +carried away; the perceptions also are arranged anew and +changed, according to the age and according to other conditions +of the body. He says also, that the reasons of all phenomena 218 +are present in matter, so that matter can be all that it appears +to be to all men as far as its power is concerned. Men, however, +apprehend differently at different times, according to the +different conditions that they are in; for he that is in a +natural condition will apprehend those qualities in matter that +can appear to those who are in a natural condition, while on 219 +the contrary, those who are in an unnatural condition will +apprehend those qualities that can appear to the abnormal. +Furthermore, the same reasoning would hold true in regard to +differences in age, to sleeping and waking, and each of the +other different conditions. Therefore man becomes the criterion +of things that are, for all things that appear to men exist for +men, and those things that do not appear to any one among men do +not exist. We see that he dogmatises in saying that matter is +fluid, and also in saying that the reasons for all phenomena +have their foundation in matter, while these things are unknown, +and to us are things regarding which we suspend our judgment. + + + + +CHAPTER XXXIII. + + +_In what does Scepticism differ from the Academic +Philosophy?_ + +Some say further that the Academic philosophy is the same as 220 +Scepticism, therefore it seems appropriate to me to treat of +that also. There have been, as the most say, three +Academies--the most ancient one, that of Plato and his +followers; the second and middle one, that of Arcesilaus and his +followers, Arcesilaus being the pupil of Polemo; the third and +new Academy, that of Carneades and Clitomachus and their +followers; some add also a fourth, that of Philo and Charmides, +and their followers; and some count even a fifth, that of +Antiochus and his followers. Beginning then from the old +Academy, let us consider the difference between the schools of +philosophy mentioned. Now some have said that Plato was a 221 +Dogmatic, others that he was a Sceptic, and others that he was +in some things a Sceptic and in some things a Dogmatic. For in +the fencing dialogues, where Socrates is introduced as either +making sport of someone or contending against the Sophists, +Plato has, they say, a fencing and sceptical character, but he +is dogmatic when he expresses himself seriously, either through +Socrates or Timaeus or any such person. In regard to those 222 +who say that he is a Dogmatic, or a Dogmatic in some things and +a Sceptic in others, it would be superfluous, it seems to me, to +speak now, for they themselves grant that he is different from +us. The question as to whether he was really a Sceptic or not we +treat more fully in the Memoranda, but here we state briefly +that according to Menodotus and Aenesidemus (for these +especially defended this position) Plato dogmatises when he +expresses himself regarding ideas, and regarding the existence +of Providence, and when he states that the virtuous life is more +to be chosen than the one of vice. If he assents to these things +as true, he dogmatises; or even if he accepts them as more +probable than otherwise he departs from the sceptical character, +since he gives a preference to one thing above another in +trustworthiness or untrustworthiness; for how foreign this is to +us is evident from what we have said before. Even if when he 223 +performs mental gymnastics, as they say, he expresses some +things sceptically, he is not because of this a Sceptic. For he +who dogmatises about one thing, or, in short, gives preference +to one mental image over another in trustworthiness or +untrustworthiness in respect to anything that is unknown, is a +Dogmatic in character, as Timon shows by what he said of +Xenophanes. For after having praised Xenophanes in many 224 +things, and even after having dedicated his Satires to him, he +made him mourn and say-- + + "Would that I also might gain that mind profound, + Able to look both ways. In a treacherous path have + I been decoyed, + And still in old age am with all wisdom unwed. + For wherever I turned my view + All things were resolved into unity; all things, alway + From all sources drawn, were merged into nature the same." + +Timon calls him somewhat, but not entirely, free from +vanity, when he said-- + + "Xenophanes somewhat free from vanity, mocker of + Homeric deceit, + Far from men he conceived a god, on all sides equal, + Above pain, a being spiritualised, or intellect." + +In saying that he was somewhat free from vanity, he meant that +he was in some things free from vanity. He called him a mocker +of the Homeric deceit because he had scoffed at the deceit in +Homer. Xenophanes also dogmatised, contrary to the assumptions 225 +of other men, that all things are one, and that God is grown +together with all things, that He is spherical, insensible, +unchangeable, and reasonable, whence the difference of +Xenophanes from us is easily proved. In short, from what has +been said, it is evident that although Plato expresses doubt +about some things, so long as he has expressed himself in +certain places in regard to the existence of unknown things, or +as preferring some things to others in trustworthiness, he +cannot be, it seems to me, a Sceptic. Those of the New Academy, +although they say that all things are incomprehensible, 226 +differ from the Sceptics, perhaps even in saying that all things +are incomprehensible (for they assert decidedly in regard to +this, but the Sceptic thinks it possible that some things may be +comprehended), but they differ evidently still further from us +in their judgment of good and evil. For the Academicians say +that there is such a thing as good and evil, not as we say it, +but more with the conviction that that which they call good +exists than that it does not; and likewise in regard to the +evil, while we do not say anything is good or evil with the +conviction that it is probably so, but we live our lives in an +unprejudiced way in order not to be inactive. Moreover, we say +that our ideas are equal to each other in trustworthiness 227 +and untrustworthiness, as far as their nature goes, while they +say that some are probable and others improbable. They make a +difference also between the improbable ones, for they believe +that some of them are only probable, others probable and +undisputed, still others probable, undisputed, and tested. As +for example, when a coiled rope is lying in a somewhat dark +room, he who comes in suddenly gets only a probable idea of it, +and thinks that it is a serpent; but it appears to be a rope 228 +to him who has looked carefully around, and found out that it +does not move, and that it is of such a color, and so on, +according to an idea which is probable and undisputed. The +tested idea is like this: It is said that Hercules led Alcestis +after she was dead back again from Hades and showed her to +Admetus, and he received an idea that was probable and +undisputed regarding Alcestis. As, however, he knew that she was +dead, his mind drew back from belief and inclined to disbelief. +Now those belonging to the New Academy prefer the idea which 229 +is probable and undisputed to the simply probable one. To both +of these, however, they prefer that which is probable, +undisputed, and tested. If, however, both those of the Academy +and the Sceptics say that they believe certain things, there is +an evident difference between the two schools of philosophy even +in this; for "to believe" is used in a different sense, 230 +meaning, on the one hand, not to resist, but simply to accept +without strong inclination and approval, as the child is said to +believe the teacher; on the other hand, "to believe" is used to +signify assenting to something with choice, and, as it were, +with the sympathy that accompanies strong will, as the prodigal +follows the one who chooses to live a luxurious life. Therefore, +since Carneades, Clitomachus, and their followers say that they +are strongly inclined to believe that a thing is probable, and +we simply allow that it may be so without assent, we differ 231 +from them, I think, in this way. We differ from the New Academy +likewise in things concerning the aim; for while the men who say +that they govern themselves according to that School avail +themselves of the idea of the probable in life, we live +according to the laws and customs, and our natural feelings, in +an unprejudiced way. We could say more regarding the distinction +between the two schools if we did not aim at brevity. +Nevertheless, Arcesilaus, who as we said was the leader and 232 +chief of the Middle Academy, seems to me to have very much in +common with the Pyrrhonean teachings, so that his school and +ours are almost one. For neither does one find that he expressed +an opinion about the existence or non-existence of anything, nor +does he prefer one thing to another as regards trustworthiness +or untrustworthiness; he suspends his judgment regarding all +things, and the aim of his philosophy is [Greek: epoche], which +is accompanied by [Greek: ataraxia], and this agrees with what +we have said. But he calls the particular instances of 233 +[Greek: epoche] _bona_, and the particular instances of assent +_mala_. The difference is that we say these things according to +what appears to us, and not affirmatively, while he says them as +if speaking of realities, that is, he says that [Greek: epoche] +is in itself good, and assent an evil. If we are to believe also +the things that are said about him, he appeared at first 234 +sight to be a Pyrrhonean, but he was in truth a Dogmatic, for he +used to test his companions by the method of doubt to see +whether they were gifted enough to take in Plato's dogmas, so +that he appeared to be a Sceptic, but at the same time he +communicated the doctrines of Plato to those of his companions +who were gifted. Hence Ariston also said about him-- + + "Plato in front, Pyrrhon behind, Diodorus in the middle," + +because he availed himself of the dialectic of Diodorus, but was 235 +wholly a Platonist. Now Philo and his followers say that as +far as the Stoic criterion is concerned, that is to say the +[Greek: phantasia kataleptike], things are incomprehensible, but +as far as the nature of things is concerned, they are +comprehensible. Antiochus, however, transferred the Stoa to the +Academy, so that it was even said of him that he taught the +Stoic philosophy in the Academy, because he tried to show that +the Stoic doctrines are found in Plato. The difference, +therefore, between the Sceptical School and the Fourth and Fifth +Academy is evident. + + + + +CHAPTER XXXIV. + + +_Is Empiricism in Medicine the same as Scepticism?_ + +Some say that the medical sect called Empiricism is the same 236 +as Scepticism. Yet the fact must be recognised, that even if +Empiricism does maintain the impossibility of knowledge, it is +neither Scepticism itself, nor would it suit the Sceptic to take +that sect upon himself. He could rather, it seems to me, belong +to the so-called Methodic School. For this alone, of all the +medical sects, does not seem to proceed rashly in regard to 237 +unknown things, and does not presume to say whether they are +comprehensible or not, but is guided by phenomena, and receives +from them the same help which they seem to give to the Sceptical +system. For we have said in what has gone before, that the +every-day life which the Sceptic lives is of four parts, +depending on the guidance of nature, on the necessity of the +feelings, on the traditions of laws and customs, and on the +teaching of the arts. Now as by necessity of the feelings 238 +the Sceptic is led by thirst to drink, and by hunger to food, +and to supply similar needs in the same way, so also the +physician of the Methodic School is led by the feelings to find +suitable remedies; in constipation he produces a relaxation, as +one takes refuge in the sun from the shrinking on account of +intense cold; he is led by a flux to the stopping of it, as +those in a hot bath who are dripping from a profuse perspiration +and are relaxed, hasten to check it by going into the cold air. +Moreover, it is evident that the Methodic physician forces those +things which are of a foreign nature to adapt themselves to +their own nature, as even the dog tries to get a sharp stick out +that is thrust into him. In order, however, that I should 239 +not overstep the outline character of this work by discussing +details, I think that all the things that the Methodics have +thus said can be classified as referring to the necessity of the +feelings that are natural or those that are unnatural. Besides +this, it is common to both schools to have no dogmas, and to use +words loosely. For as the Sceptic uses the formula "I 240 +determine nothing," and "I understand nothing," as we said +above, so the Methodic also uses the expressions "Community," +and "To go through," and other similar ones without over much +care. In a similar way he uses the word "Indication" +undogmatically, meaning that the symptoms of the patient either +natural or unnatural, indicate the remedies that would be +suitable, as we said in speaking of thirst, hunger, and other +things. It will thus be seen that the Methodic School of 241 +medicine has a certain relationship to Scepticism which is +closer than that of the other medical sects, speaking +comparatively if not absolutely from these and similar tokens. +Having said so much in reference to the schools that seem to +closely resemble Scepticism, we conclude the general +consideration of Scepticism and the First Book of the Sketches. + + + + + + +End of the Project Gutenberg EBook of Sextus Empiricus and Greek Scepticism, by +Mary Mills Patrick + +*** END OF THIS PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK SEXTUS EMPIRICUS AND GREEK *** + +***** This file should be named 17556.txt or 17556.zip ***** +This and all associated files of various formats will be found in: + http://www.gutenberg.org/1/7/5/5/17556/ + +Produced by Turgut Dincer, Ted Garvin and the Online +Distributed Proofreading Team at http://www.pgdp.net + + +Updated editions will replace the previous one--the old editions +will be renamed. + +Creating the works from public domain print editions means that no +one owns a United States copyright in these works, so the Foundation +(and you!) can copy and distribute it in the United States without +permission and without paying copyright royalties. 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