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+The Project Gutenberg EBook of An Assessment of the Consequences and
+Preparations for a Catastrophic California Earthquake: Findings and Actions Taken, by Various
+
+This eBook is for the use of anyone anywhere at no cost and with
+almost no restrictions whatsoever. You may copy it, give it away or
+re-use it under the terms of the Project Gutenberg License included
+with this eBook or online at www.gutenberg.org
+
+
+Title: An Assessment of the Consequences and Preparations for a Catastrophic California Earthquake: Findings and Actions Taken
+ Prepared By Federal Emergency Management Agency
+
+Author: Various
+
+Release Date: June 7, 2006 [EBook #18527]
+
+Language: English
+
+Character set encoding: ASCII
+
+*** START OF THIS PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK CALIFORNIA EARTHQUAKE ***
+
+
+
+
+Produced by Jeannie Howse and the Online Distributed
+Proofreading Team at http://www.pgdp.net
+
+
+
+
+
+
+ * * * * *
+
+ +-----------------------------------------------------------------+
+ | Transcriber's Note: |
+ | |
+ | In this document, _italics_ are represented as underscores, |
+ | =bold text= is marked with equals signs, and bullets are |
+ | represented as " |
+ | |
+ | One of the tables in this document is very wide (80 characters) |
+ | |
+ +-----------------------------------------------------------------+
+
+ * * * * *
+
+
+
+
+AN ASSESSMENT OF THE CONSEQUENCES
+AND PREPARATIONS FOR A CATASTROPHIC
+CALIFORNIA EARTHQUAKE:
+FINDINGS AND ACTIONS TAKEN
+
+
+PREPARED BY
+FEDERAL EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT AGENCY
+FROM ANALYSES CARRIED OUT BY THE
+NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
+ad hoc COMMITTEE ON ASSESSMENT OF
+CONSEQUENCES AND PREPARATIONS FOR
+A MAJOR CALIFORNIA EARTHQUAKE
+
+
+
+[Illustration: fema symbol
+federal emergency
+management agency]
+
+Washington, D.C. 20472
+November 1980
+
+
+
+
+TABLE OF CONTENTS
+
+
+ Page
+
+CHAPTER:
+
+ I. Executive Summary of Findings, Issues, and Actions 1
+
+ II. Geologic Earthquake Scenarios 15
+
+III. Assessment of Losses for Selected Potential
+ California Earthquakes 21
+
+ IV. An Assessment of the Current State of Readiness
+ Capability of Federal, State, and Local
+ Governments for Earthquake Response 27
+
+ V. An Assessment of the Social Impacts 35
+
+
+ANNEX:
+
+ 1. Copies of Correspondence Between President
+ Carter and Governor Brown 37
+
+ 2. Current California and Federal Earthquake
+ Response Planning 43
+
+ 3. California Assembly Bill No. 2202 53
+
+
+ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS 57
+
+
+
+
+CHAPTER I
+
+EXECUTIVE SUMMARY OF FINDINGS, ISSUES, AND ACTIONS
+
+
+A. BACKGROUND
+
+After viewing the destruction wrought by the eruption of Mt. St.
+Helens in Washington State in May 1980, President Carter became
+concerned about the impacts of a similar event of low probability but
+high damage potential, namely a catastrophic earthquake in California,
+and the state of readiness to cope with the impacts of such an event.
+
+As a result of the President's concern, an _ad hoc_ committee of the
+National Security Council was formed to conduct a government review of
+the consequences of, and preparation for such an event. In addition to
+the Federal Emergency Management Agency, the Committee included
+representatives from the Office of Science and Technology Policy, the
+United States Geological Survey of the Department of the Interior, the
+Department of Defense, the Department of Transportation, and the
+National Communications System, at the Federal level; State of
+California agencies and California local governments at the State and
+local levels; and consultants from the private sector. During the
+summer of 1980, the participants in this review prepared working papers
+on relevant issues and problem areas for the consideration of the _ad
+hoc_ committee. Pertinent facts, conclusions and recommendations were
+reviewed with the Governor of the State of California. The President
+reviewed the _ad hoc_ committee's findings and approved the
+recommendations for Federal action. This report summarizes the results
+of the assessment and notes these actions.
+
+A number of Federal legislative and administrative actions have been
+taken to bring about, in the near future, an increased capability to
+respond to such an event. The Earthquake Hazards Reduction Act of 1977
+(P.L. 95-124) authorizes a coordinated and structured program to
+identify earthquake risks and prepare to lessen or mitigate their
+impacts by a variety of means. The coordination of this program, the
+National Earthquake Hazards Reduction Program (NEHRP), is the
+responsibility of the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA),
+which is charged with focusing Federal efforts to respond to
+emergencies of all types and lessen their impacts before they occur.
+The NEHRP has six high-priority thrusts:
+
+ " Overall coordination of Federal departments and agencies'
+ programs
+
+ " Maintenance of a comprehensive program of research and
+ development for earthquake prediction and hazards
+ mitigation
+
+ " Leadership and support of the Federal Interagency
+ Committee on Seismic Safety in Construction as it develops
+ seismic design and construction standards for use in
+ Federal projects
+
+ " Development of response plans and assistance to State and
+ local governments in the preparation of their plans
+
+ " Analysis of the ability of financial institutions to
+ perform their functions after a creditable prediction of
+ an earthquake as well as after an event, together with an
+ exploration of the feasibility of using these institutions
+ to foster hazard reduction
+
+ " An examination of the appropriate role of insurance in
+ mitigating the impacts of earthquakes.
+
+More recently, a cooperative Federal, State, local, and private-sector
+effort was initiated to prepare for responding to a credible
+large-magnitude earthquake, or its prediction, in Southern California.
+
+
+B. SUMMARY
+
+The review provided the overall assessment that the Nation is
+essentially unprepared for the catastrophic earthquake (with a
+probability greater than 50 percent) that must be expected in
+California in the next three decades. While current response plans and
+preparedness measures may be adequate for moderate earthquakes,
+Federal, State, and local officials agree that preparations are
+woefully inadequate to cope with the damage and casualties from a
+catastrophic earthquake, and with the disruptions in communications,
+social fabric, and governmental structure that may follow. Because of
+the large concentration of population and industry, the impacts of
+such an earthquake would surpass those of any natural disaster thus
+far experienced by the Nation. Indeed, the United States has not
+suffered any disaster of this magnitude on its own territory since the
+Civil War.
+
+The basis for this overall assessment is summarized below and
+discussed in more detail in the subsequent chapters of this report.
+
+
+C. LIKELIHOOD OF FUTURE EARTHQUAKES
+
+Earth scientists unanimously agree on the inevitability of major
+earthquakes in California. The gradual movement of the Pacific Plate
+relative to the North American Plate leads to the inexorable
+concentration of strain along the San Andreas and related fault
+systems. While some of this strain is released by moderate and smaller
+earthquakes and by slippage without earthquakes, geologic studies
+indicate that the vast bulk of the strain is released through the
+occurrence of major earthquakes--that is, earthquakes with Richter
+magnitudes of 7.0 and larger and capable of widespread damage in a
+developed region. Along the Southern San Andreas fault, some 30 miles
+from Los Angeles, for example, geologists can demonstrate that at
+least eight major earthquakes have occurred in the past 1,200 years
+with an average spacing in time of 140 years, plus or minus 30 years.
+The last such event occurred in 1857. Based on these statistics and
+other geophysical observations, geologists estimate that the
+probability for the recurrence of a similar earthquake is currently as
+large as 2 to 5 percent per year and greater than 50 percent in the
+next 30 years. Geologic evidence also indicates other faults capable
+of generating major earthquakes in other locations near urban centers
+in California, including San Francisco-Oakland, the immediate Los
+Angeles region, and San Diego. Seven potential events have been
+postulated for purposes of this review and are discussed in chapter
+II. The current estimated probability for a major earthquake in these
+other locations is smaller, but significant. The aggregate probability
+for a catastrophic earthquake in the whole of California in the next
+three decades is well in excess of 50 percent.
+
+
+D. CASUALTIES AND PROPERTY DAMAGE
+
+Casualties and property damage estimates for four of the most likely
+catastrophic earthquakes in California were prepared to form a basis
+for emergency preparedness and response. Chapter III gives details on
+these estimates. Deaths and injuries would occur principally because
+of the failure of man-made structures, particularly older, multistory,
+and unreinforced brick masonry buildings built before the adoption of
+earthquake-resistant building codes. Experience has shown that some
+modern multistory buildings--constructed as recently as the late
+1960's but not adequately designed or erected to meet the current
+understanding of requirements for seismic resistance--are also subject
+to failure. Strong ground shaking, which is the primary cause of
+damage during earthquakes, often extends over vast areas. For example,
+in an earthquake similar to that which occurred in 1857, strong ground
+shaking (above the threshold for causing damage) would extend in a
+broad strip along the Southern San Andreas fault, about 250 miles long
+and 100 miles wide, and include almost all of the Los Angeles-San
+Bernardino metropolitan area, and all of Ventura, Santa Barbara, San
+Luis Obispo, and Kern counties.
+
+For the most probable catastrophic earthquake--a Richter magnitude 8+
+earthquake similar to that of 1857, which occurred along the Southern
+San Andreas fault--estimates of fatalities range from about 3,000, if
+the earthquake were to occur at 2:30 a.m. when the population is
+relatively safe at home, to more than 13,000, if the earthquake were to
+occur at 4:30 p.m. on a weekday, when much of the population is either
+in office buildings or on the streets. Injuries serious enough to
+require hospitalization under normal circumstances are estimated to be
+about four times as great as fatalities. For the less likely prospect
+of a Richter magnitude 7.5 earthquake on the Newport-Inglewood fault in
+the immediate Los Angeles area, fatalities are estimated to be about
+4,000 to 23,000, at the same respective times. Such an earthquake,
+despite its smaller magnitude, would be more destructive because of its
+relative proximity to the most heavily developed regions; however, the
+probability of this event is estimated to be only about 0.1 percent per
+year. Smaller magnitude--and consequently less damaging--earthquakes
+are anticipated with greater frequency on a number of fault systems in
+California.
+
+In either of these earthquakes, casualties could surpass the previous
+single greatest loss of life in the United States due to a natural
+disaster, which was about 6,000 persons killed when a hurricane and
+storm surge struck the Galveston area of the Texas coast in 1900. The
+highest loss of life due to earthquakes in the United States occurred
+in San Francisco in 1906, when 700 people were killed. By way of
+comparison (in spite of the vast differences in building design and
+practices and socioeconomic systems) the devastating 1976 Tangshan
+earthquake in China caused fatalities ranging from the official
+Chinese Government figure of 242,000 to unofficial estimates as high
+as 700,000. Fortunately, building practices in the United States
+preclude such a massive loss of life.
+
+Property losses are expected to be higher than in any past earthquake
+in the United States. For example, San Francisco in 1906, and
+Anchorage in 1964, were both much less developed than today when they
+were hit by earthquakes. And the San Fernando earthquake in 1971, was
+only a moderate shock that struck on the fringe of a large urban area.
+Each of these three earthquakes caused damage estimated at about $0.5
+billion in the then current dollars. Estimates of property damage for
+the most probable catastrophic earthquake on the Southern San Andreas
+(Richter magnitude 8+) and for the less probable but more damaging one
+(Richter magnitude 7.5) on the Newport-Inglewood fault, are about $15
+billion and $70 billion respectively. By comparison, tropical storm
+Agnes caused the largest economic loss due to a natural disaster in
+the United States to date but it amounted to only $3.5 billion (in
+1972 dollars).
+
+It should be noted, however, that substantial uncertainty exists in
+casualty and property damage estimates because they are based on
+experience with only moderate earthquakes in the United States (such
+as the 1971 San Fernando earthquake) and experience in other countries
+where buildings are generally less resistant to damage. The
+uncertainty is so large that the estimated impacts could be off by a
+factor of two or three, either too high or too low. Even if these
+lowest estimates prevail, however, the assessment about preparedness
+and the capability to respond to the disasters discussed in this
+report would be substantially unchanged.
+
+Assuming a catastrophic earthquake, a variety of secondary problems
+could also be expected. Search and rescue operations--requiring heavy
+equipment to move debris--would be needed to free people trapped in
+collapsed buildings. It is likely that injuries, particularly those
+immediately after the event, could overwhelm medical capabilities,
+necessitating a system of allocating medical resources to those who
+could be helped the most. Numerous local fires must be expected;
+nevertheless, a conflagration such as that which followed the Tokyo
+earthquake of 1923, or the San Francisco earthquake of 1906, is
+improbable, unless a "Santa Ana type" wind pattern is in effect. Since
+the near failure of a dam in the San Fernando, California, earthquake
+of 1971 (which was a moderate event), substantial progress has been
+made in California to reduce the hazard from dams, in some cases
+through reconstruction. For planning purposes, however, experts
+believe that the failure of at least one dam should be anticipated
+during a catastrophic earthquake in either the Los Angeles or San
+Francisco regions.
+
+Experience in past earthquakes, particularly the 1971 San Fernando
+earthquake, has demonstrated the potential vulnerability of commercial
+telephone service to earthquakes, including the possibility of damage
+to switching facilities from ground shaking and rupture of underground
+cables that cross faults. This is especially serious because
+immediately following earthquakes, public demand for telephone
+services increases drastically. This increased demand overloads the
+capability of the system, even if it had not been damaged, and
+therefore management action to reduce the availability of service to
+non-priority users and to accommodate emergency calls is mandatory.
+Radio-based communication systems, particularly those not requiring
+commercial power, are relatively safe from damage, although some must
+be anticipated. The redundancy of existing communication systems,
+including those designed for emergency use, means that some capability
+for communicating with the affected region from the outside would
+almost surely exist. Restoration of service by the commercial carriers
+should begin within 24 to 72 hours as a result of maintenance and
+management actions; however, total restoration of service would take
+significantly longer.
+
+While numerous agencies have the capability for emergency
+communication within themselves, non-telephonic communication among
+entities and agencies in the affected area is minimal. This is true
+for Federal, State, and local agencies. This weakness has been pointed
+out repeatedly by earthquake response exercises, and the problem is
+raised by almost every emergency preparedness official at every level
+of government. Consequently, a major problem for resolution is the
+operational integration of communications systems and networks among
+the relevant Federal, State, and local agencies.
+
+Because of their network-like character, most systems for
+transportation and water and power generation and distribution, as a
+whole, are resistant to failure, despite potentially severe local
+damage. These systems would suffer serious local outages, particularly
+in the first several days after the event, but would resume service
+over a few weeks to months. The principal difficulty would be the
+greatly increased need for these systems in the first few days after
+the event, when lifesaving activities would be paramount.
+
+Portions of the San Francisco Bay Area and of the Los Angeles Area
+contain substantial concentrations of manufacturing capacity for
+guided missiles and space vehicles, semiconductors, aircraft parts,
+electronic computing equipment, and airframes. Their specific
+vulnerability to the postulated earthquakes was not analyzed. In the
+event of major damage, however, the long-term impacts may be mitigated
+somewhat by such measures as the use of underutilized capacity located
+elsewhere, substitution of capacity from other industries, imports,
+use of other products, and drawing-down of inventories.
+
+Since we have not recently experienced a catastrophic earthquake in
+the United States, there are many unknowns which must be estimated
+with best judgment. This is true particularly for the response of
+individuals as well as governmental and other institutions. Popular
+assumptions of post-disaster behavior include antisocial behavior and
+the need for martial law, the breakdown of government institutions,
+and the requirement for the quick assertion of outside leadership and
+control. Practical experience and field studies of disasters, however,
+indicate that these assumptions are not necessarily correct. On the
+contrary, the impacts of the disaster commonly produce a sense of
+solidarity and cooperativeness among the survivors. Nonetheless, the
+perception remains among emergency response officials that there will
+be an increased need for law enforcement following the event.
+
+Another major unknown involves whether a medium or short-term warning
+of the event would be possible and how such a warning could be
+utilized most effectively. The technology for earthquake prediction is
+in an early stage of development and, therefore it is problematical
+that researchers will succeed in issuing a short-term warning before a
+catastrophic earthquake, should the event occur in the next few
+years. Yet as research progresses, scientifically-based,
+intermediate-term warnings are possible, but subject to a high degree
+of uncertainty. Consequently, response preparations must be made for
+both an earthquake without warning, and one with a short-or
+intermediate-term warning, possibly with a significant level of
+uncertainty.
+
+
+E. CAPABILITY FOR RESPONSE
+
+Planning for response to a large-scale disaster is a complicated
+process encompassing many variables such as population densities and
+distribution characteristics; land-use patterns and construction
+techniques; geographical configurations; vulnerability of
+transportation; communications and other lifeline systems; complex
+response operations; long-term physical, social, and economic recovery
+policies. These factors, together with the realization that an
+earthquake has the potential for being the greatest single-event
+catastrophe in California, make it incumbent upon the State to
+maintain as high a level of emergency readiness as is practicable, and
+to provide guidance and assistance to local jurisdictions desiring to
+plan and prepare for such events. Annex 2 reviews the general nature
+of preparedness planning and the basic characteristics of California
+and Federal Government plans.
+
+Federal, State, and local emergency response capabilities are judged
+to be adequate for moderate earthquakes--those that are most likely to
+occur frequently in California and cause property damage in the range
+of $1 billion. Such an event, however, would severely tax existing
+resources and provide a major test of management relationships among
+different governmental levels. Federal, State, and local officials,
+however, are quick to point out serious shortcomings in their ability
+to respond to a catastrophic earthquake. An analysis of the
+preparedness posture of 60 local governments, 34 California State
+organizations, and 17 Federal agencies, carried out by the California
+Office of Emergency Services (OES) and FEMA, indicates that response
+to such an earthquake would become disorganized and largely
+ineffective. Many governmental units have generalized earthquake
+response plans, some have tailored earthquake plans, and several plans
+are regularly exercised. The coordination of these plans among
+jurisdictions, agencies, and levels of government, however, is
+inadequate. In addition, the potential for prediction is not
+incorporated; long-term recovery issues are not considered; and
+communications problems are significant, as discussed above. Overall,
+Federal preparedness is deficient at this time. Early reaction to a
+catastrophic event would likely be characterized by delays,
+ineffective response, and ineffectively coordinated delivery of
+support.
+
+FEMA Region IX (San Francisco) has drafted an Earthquake Response Plan
+for the San Francisco Bay area. Annex 2 gives an overview of this
+draft plan. This is a site-specific plan for response to potential
+catastrophic earthquake occurrences. The emergency response portion
+relies upon a decentralized approach which provides for Federal
+disaster support activities to be assigned to selected Federal
+agencies by mission assignment letters. No specific plans have been
+prepared in this detail for other seismic risk areas, although it is
+expected that the Bay Area plan could be easily adapted to other
+areas. The Department of Defense and the Department of Transportation
+are developing detailed earthquake plans that would ensure a
+well-organized and adequate response to mission assignments for a
+major earthquake. The plans of other agencies need further
+development.
+
+Very significant capabilities to assist in emergency response exist
+within the California National Guard, California Highway Patrol, the
+Departments of Health Services and Transportation, and the U.S.
+Department of Defense. Capabilities exist for such lifesaving
+activities as _aerial reconnaissance, search and rescue, emergency
+medical services, emergency construction and repair, communications,
+and emergency housing and food_. Current estimates by both Federal and
+State officials, however, indicate that at least 6 to 8 hours would be
+required before personnel and equipment can be mobilized and begin
+initial deployment to the affected area. During the period before the
+arrival of significant outside assistance critical to the saving of
+lives (especially of those trapped in collapsed buildings), the public
+would be forced to rely largely upon its own resources for search and
+rescue, first aid, and general lifesaving actions. The current level
+of public preparation for this critical phase of response can be
+described as only minimal. Much of the current state of preparedness
+arises from past programs aimed at a wide spectrum of emergencies,
+particularly civil defense against nuclear attack. New or strengthened
+programs are needed to enhance public preparedness.
+
+FEMA has recently entered into a cooperative effort with California
+State and local governments to prepare an integrated prototype
+preparedness plan to respond to a catastrophic earthquake in Southern
+California or to a prediction of such an event. The plan's completion,
+in late 1981, promises to improve substantially the state of readiness
+to respond to the prediction and the occurrence of an earthquake in
+that area and to provide a model which could be applied to other
+earthquake-prone regions of California and the rest of the country.
+
+
+F. FINDINGS, ISSUES, AND ACTIONS
+
+The _ad hoc_ committee responsible for this review developed several
+significant findings related to the implications of major earthquakes
+in California and our capabilities to respond to them. It then
+identified major relevant issues raised by these findings and caused a
+number of actions to be taken. A brief discussion of the results of
+its review follows.
+
+
+1. Leadership
+
+=Finding=: _Effective leadership at all governmental levels is the
+single most important factor needed to improve this Nation's
+preparedness for a catastrophic earthquake in California._ The problem
+of emergency preparedness is severely complicated because
+responsibilities for preparation and response cut across normal lines
+of authority. Further complication arises from the large areal extent
+of the impacts expected from a major earthquake, affecting literally
+dozens of government entities. The emergency services coordinator at
+any level of government is effective only to the extent he or she is
+backed by the political leadership at that level. This is especially
+true when preparedness activities must be done, for the most part,
+within existing resources. City and county officials must increasingly
+accept their share of the responsibility for preparedness, but
+commitment by State or Federal leaders is also essential. The general
+tendency among elected officials and the public is to ignore the
+existing hazard problem. Experience, however, teaches that effective
+response mechanisms must be in place before the disaster; they cannot
+be developed in the time of crisis. Overcoming this apathy and
+developing the organizational arrangements among Federal, State, and
+local government and volunteer agencies--together with the private
+sector and the general public will require, above all, leadership.
+
+ =Issue=: The leadership role of the Federal Government in
+ preparing for a catastrophic earthquake in California and
+ how this leadership role is to be exerted require
+ clarification.
+
+ =Action=: The President has communicated with the
+ Governor of California to indicate the results of this
+ review, to express concern about the need for cooperative
+ leadership to prepare for the event, and to offer to
+ increase the Federal effort with the State of California
+ and local governments in the cooperative undertaking to
+ prepare for a catastrophic earthquake. He stressed that
+ the Federal role is to supplement the effort and
+ resources of the State, and that commitment of
+ significant Federal resources would be contingent upon
+ the application of significant State resources. In his
+ response to the President's communications, the Governor
+ of California underscored the State's readiness to
+ participate in this cooperative effort and announced his
+ signing into law a measure that would provide substantial
+ State resources (see annex 1). A summary of the new law
+ (A.B. 2202) is contained in annex 3.
+
+
+2. Management of Preparedness and Response Activities
+
+=Finding=: _Preparedness must be developed as a partnership between
+Federal, State, and local governments with improvements needed at all
+levels_, as none have the resources or authorities to solve the
+problem alone.
+
+ =Issue=: Since the Nation faces a very probable earthquake
+ in California sometime during the next 30 years, FEMA
+ should provide the necessary leadership, management, and
+ coordination required to strengthen planning and
+ preparedness within the Federal Government, as delegated
+ under the National Earthquake Hazards Reduction Program of
+ 1977 and the Disaster Relief Act of 1974. In this effort,
+ FEMA requires the support and assistance of numerous other
+ Federal agencies.
+
+ =Actions=: FEMA is taking steps to:
+
+ " Strengthen significantly its management, research,
+ application, and coordination functions, as delegated
+ under the National Earthquake Hazards Reduction Program
+ and Disaster Relief Act.
+
+ " Lead other agencies in the development of a
+ comprehensive preparedness strategy detailing specific
+ objectives and assignments, and periodically monitor
+ accomplishments in meeting assigned responsibilities.
+
+ Departments and agencies with appropriate capabilities
+ will provide needed support to FEMA in strengthening
+ Federal preparedness and hazard mitigation programs.
+
+ =Issue=: A major deficiency that has been identified is the
+ potential for delay following a catastrophic earthquake in
+ processing a request for a Presidential declaration of a
+ major disaster, and the subsequent initiation of full-scale
+ Federal support for lifesaving actions. The first few hours
+ are critical in saving the lives of people trapped in
+ collapsed buildings; consequently, this is when Federal
+ support is needed most. Decisions on post-event recovery
+ aspects of Federal assistance can be deferred until
+ lifesaving operations are underway and sufficient
+ information about damage is in hand.
+
+ =Action=: FEMA will develop and negotiate, before the
+ event, an agreement with the State of California which
+ will enable the President to declare a major disaster and
+ initiate full-scale Federal support for lifesaving and
+ humanitarian action within minutes of a catastrophic
+ earthquake. The agreement will defer resolution of issues
+ relating to longer-term restoration and recovery and
+ similar questions with large budgetary implications until
+ adequate damage estimates are available. The Executive
+ Branch will thus be able to arrive at an informed
+ decision.
+
+ =Issue=: Significant improvements in the Federal, State,
+ and local capability for coordination of operational
+ response to a catastrophic earthquake are needed.
+
+ =Actions=: FEMA and other appropriate Federal agencies will
+ increase their efforts, in a partnership with appropriate
+ State and local agencies and volunteer and private-sector
+ organizations, to:
+
+ " Complete development and agreement on fully integrated
+ earthquake response plans for both the San Francisco
+ and Los Angeles regions, including provision for
+ predicted as well as unpredicted earthquakes, building
+ upon the existing draft plan for San Francisco.
+
+ " Establish a small FEMA staff in California dedicated to
+ the coordination of earthquake preparedness planning and
+ implementation.
+
+ " Develop improved mechanisms for the coordination of
+ medical and mortuary activities following a catastrophic
+ earthquake.
+
+ " Identify and document the critical requirements for
+ emergency communications--particularly non-telephonic
+ communications--among Federal, State, and local
+ agencies. Shortfalls between critical requirements and
+ current capabilities, as well as remedial actions or
+ recommended solutions for each will be identified in
+ accordance with the "National Plan for Communications
+ Support in Emergencies and Major Disasters." This
+ review will include consideration of using existing
+ satellite communications or a dedicated system, should
+ it be found necessary.
+
+ " Cooperatively conduct practice response exercises with
+ State and local officials that will prepare officials
+ and the public for conditions that might be encountered
+ in a catastrophic earthquake and that would reveal
+ deficiencies in planning.
+
+ =Issue=: Improving the current inadequate preparedness of
+ the public for a catastrophic earthquake requires a
+ substantial increase in public information and public
+ awareness. Although public information is primarily a
+ State, local, and private-sector responsibility, the
+ Federal Government has a role as well. Because citizens
+ will have no choice but to rely largely upon their own
+ resources in the first several hours immediately following
+ a catastrophic earthquake, it is important that certain
+ basic knowledge about lifesaving measures be very widely
+ disseminated.
+
+ =Action=: FEMA will stimulate and work with the State of
+ California and other appropriate groups to develop and
+ publicize earthquake awareness, hazard mitigation
+ techniques, specific post-earthquake actions to be taken,
+ including first aid, and other pertinent information.
+
+ =Issue=: The possibility of a credible,
+ scientifically-based prediction of a catastrophic
+ earthquake poses serious challenges to government and our
+ society. The current level of scientific understanding of
+ earthquake prediction and the available resources are such
+ that present instrumentation efforts are directed toward
+ research rather than maintaining extensive monitoring
+ networks for real-time prediction. The transition from
+ research to fully operational capability will require
+ additional scientific understanding as well as resources.
+ Earthquake predictions are possible, perhaps likely,
+ however, from the current research effort. Even with a
+ significant level of uncertainty, any scientifically
+ credible prediction that indicates a catastrophic
+ earthquake is expected within about 1 year or less, will
+ require very difficult and consequential decisions on the
+ part of elected officials at all levels of government.
+ Decisions may include such possibilities as the
+ mobilization of National Guard and U.S. Department of
+ Defense resources prior to the event, the imposition of
+ special procedures or drills at potentially hazardous
+ facilities, such as nuclear reactors or dams, the
+ condemnation or evacuation of particularly unsafe buildings
+ with the subsequent need for temporary housing, and the
+ provisions of special protection of fragile inventories. If
+ the prediction is correct and appropriate actions are
+ taken, thousands of lives can be saved and significant
+ economic losses can be avoided. The costs of responding to
+ a prediction may be substantial, however, and the
+ commitment of resources undoubtedly will have to be made in
+ the face of considerable uncertainty and even reluctance.
+ Indeed, the possibility of an inaccurate prediction must be
+ faced squarely.
+
+ =Actions=: FEMA, in conjunction with other appropriate
+ Federal agencies, State and local governments, and
+ volunteer and private-sector organizations, will increase
+ its actions to develop procedures for responding to a
+ credible, scientific earthquake prediction, including:
+
+ " Identification of constructive and prudent actions to
+ be taken
+
+ " Analysis of the costs and benefits of various
+ alternative actions
+
+ " Identification of roles and responsibilities in deciding
+ which actions should be implemented and by whom
+
+ " Criteria for evaluating circumstances when the provision
+ of Federal assistance would be appropriate
+
+ The U.S. Geological Survey of the Department of the
+ Interior will:
+
+ " Maintain a sound and well-balanced program of research
+ in earthquake prediction and hazard assessment based
+ upon a carefully considered strategic plan
+
+ " Work with State and local officials and FEMA to develop
+ improved mechanisms for the transmission of earthquake
+ predictions and related information, and to plan for the
+ utilization of the capability for earthquake prediction
+
+
+3. Resources
+
+=Finding=: While leadership and management are essential ingredients to
+achieve an adequate earthquake preparedness posture, _the availability
+of adequate staffing and resources at all levels of government
+determines the efficacy of agency programs and initiatives_. In many
+agencies, earthquake preparedness has been accorded a low priority in
+their programs. This is a manifestation of a more general problem of
+minimal agency resource allocation to emergency preparedness. The
+results of the actions that have been indicated will be limited unless
+additional resources are made available.
+
+ =Issue=: Additional resources should be provided as
+ necessary to accelerate the earthquake hazard mitigation
+ and preparedness activities under the National Earthquake
+ Hazards Reduction Program.
+
+ =Action=: FEMA has reassessed its priorities and is
+ allocating resources to increase the staffing, funding,
+ and management attention and direction for earthquake
+ hazards mitigation, including preparations for a
+ catastrophic earthquake in California. This includes an
+ increase of staff resources in FEMA Region IX for
+ Federal, State, and local coordination of planning,
+ preparedness, and mitigation. Resource needs that cannot
+ be fully met by the reassessment and reallocation for
+ Fiscal Year 1981 should be identified and justified along
+ with needs for Fiscal Year 1982 in the course of the
+ budget submissions for Fiscal Year 1982. To facilitate an
+ adequate and balanced response by other Federal agencies,
+ FEMA will provide timely guidance to other agencies on
+ specific priorities for this effort in relation to other
+ major preparedness goals. The Office of Management and
+ Budget and the Office of Science and Technology Policy
+ will work together to develop a cross-agency ranking of
+ budgetary resources for earthquake preparedness for
+ Fiscal Year 1982.
+
+
+
+
+CHAPTER II
+
+GEOLOGIC EARTHQUAKE SCENARIOS
+
+
+A. MAJOR EVENTS
+
+For purposes of assessing the consequences of a major California
+earthquake, scenarios for seven large earthquakes were developed. The
+scenarios depict expectable earthquakes that could severely impact on
+the major population centers of California. In each case they are
+representative of only one possible magnitude of earthquake that could
+occur on the indicated fault system. On each fault system there is a
+greater probability of one or more damaging earthquakes of somewhat
+smaller magnitude than the postulated event. The postulated
+earthquakes are listed in the following table.
+
+
+TABLE 1
+
+MAJOR CALIFORNIA EARTHQUAKES
+
+-------------------------------------------------------------------------
+ Current
+ Annual Likelihood
+ Probability of
+ of Occurrence
+ Richter Occurrence in Next
+Region Fault System Magnitude[1] (Percent) 20-30 Years
+-------------------------------------------------------------------------
+
+Los Angeles- Southern
+San Bernardino San Andreas 8.3 2-5 High
+
+San Francisco Northern
+Bay Area San Andreas 8.3 1 Moderate
+
+San Francisco
+Bay Area Hayward 7.4 1 Moderate
+
+Los Angeles Newport- Moderate
+ Inglewood 7.5 0.1 -Low
+
+San Diego Rose Canyon 7.0 0.01 Low
+
+Riverside Moderate-
+San Bernardino Cucamonga 6.8 0.1 Low
+
+Los Angeles Santa Monica 6.7 0.01 Low
+-------------------------------------------------------------------------
+ [1] This is the estimated largest magnitude earthquake expected
+ at a reasonable level of probability. The main shock can be
+ expected to be followed by large aftershocks over a period of
+ weeks or longer. Each large aftershock would be capable of
+ producing additional significant damage and hampering disaster
+ assistance operations.
+-------------------------------------------------------------------------
+
+These earthquake scenarios represent the largest magnitude events
+estimated on the basis of a variety of geologic assumptions. The
+appropriateness of these assumptions depends on the intent of the
+analysis and the state of geologic knowledge. Therefore, the resulting
+estimates may not be appropriate for other purposes, such as the
+development of seismic design criteria for a specific site. The
+development of such criteria commonly requires detailed analyses of
+the site and its immediate geologic environment beyond the scope of
+this report. Consequently, detailed site analyses may require
+modification of the conclusions reached in this report, particularly
+fault systems other than the San Andreas and Hayward faults.
+
+
+B. GEOLOGIC EVIDENCE
+
+Some of the possible earthquakes listed are repeat occurrences of
+historical events, others are not, but geologic evidence indicates
+that earthquakes occurred on these faults before settlement of the
+region. Based on available data, the postulated earthquake magnitudes
+would be the largest events that could be expected at a reasonable
+level of probability. They represent a selection of events useful for
+planning purposes, but are by no means the only such events likely to
+occur either on these or other fault systems.
+
+The historic record of seismicity in California is too short to
+determine confidently how often large earthquakes reoccur. Information
+on past earthquakes must be gleaned from the geologic record and
+therefore, presents a picture of past seismicity that is incomplete
+and not yet fully deciphered. Current knowledge about the recurrence
+of large earthquakes on specific faults is rudimentary. The
+probabilities of occurrence shown above are order-of-magnitude
+estimates and subject to considerable uncertainty, especially for the
+less probable events.
+
+
+C. DESCRIPTION OF EVENTS
+
+Following are brief descriptions of postulated events. Figure 1 gives
+their geographic location.
+
+
+ 1. Los Angeles-San Bernardino/Southern San Andreas Fault
+ (Magnitude 8.3)
+
+ For the past several thousand years, great earthquakes have been
+occurring over a 300 km length of the San Andreas fault approximately
+every 100 to 200 years, 140 years on the average. The last such event
+took place in 1857. The probability of occurrence of this earthquake
+is estimated to be currently as large as 2 to 5 percent per year and
+greater than 50 percent in the next 30 years. The fault skirts the
+edge of the Los Angeles-San Bernardino metropolitan region, thus most
+of the urbanized area lies further than 20 miles from the source of
+strong shaking. Because of the distance, shaking would be more
+hazardous for large structures than for one- to two-story houses. The
+long duration of shaking could trigger numerous slides on steep
+slopes and cause liquefaction in isolated areas.
+
+
+ 2. San Francisco Bay Area/Northern San Andreas Fault
+ (Magnitude 8.3)
+
+ A repeat occurrence of the 1906 earthquake, in which the San
+Andreas fault broke over 400 km of its length, would cause severe
+damage to structures throughout the Bay Area and adjacent regions. The
+extensive urban development on lowlands and landfill around San
+Francisco Bay would be especially hard hit and liquefaction in many of
+these areas would intensify the damage to structures erected on them.
+
+
+ 3. San Francisco Bay Area/Hayward Fault (Magnitude 7.4)
+
+ The last large events to occur on this fault were in 1836 and
+1868. Should a major earthquake occur, severe ground shaking and
+liquefaction is expected to cause damage throughout the entire
+circum-bay area nearly as severe as that resulting from a 1906-type
+earthquake on the San Andreas fault. This earthquake would be of
+particular concern because of the many dams located along or near the
+fault.
+
+
+ 4. Los Angeles/Newport-Inglewood Fault (Magnitude 7.5)
+
+ This earthquake would be a serious threat to the nearby,
+densely-populated areas of Los Angeles. Shaking would cause extensive
+structural damage throughout the Los Angeles Basin and liquefaction
+near the coast would add still more destruction.
+
+
+ 5. San Diego Area/Rose Canyon Fault (Magnitude 7.0)
+
+ This fault--a segment of an active zone of faults extending from
+the Newport-Inglewood fault to Northern Mexico--would present the
+greatest earthquake risk to the San Diego area. Severe damage due to
+shaking and liquefaction could be expected in the coastal areas.
+Because of unstable sea-bed sediments in the offshore area, local
+tsunamis (tidal waves) are possible.
+
+
+ 6. Los Angeles/Santa Monica Fault (Magnitude 6.7 and 7.0) and
+ Riverside/San Bernardino/Cucamonga Fault (Magnitude 6.8)
+
+ These faults are part of a system of east-west tending faults
+bordering the northern edge of the Los Angeles basin. This fault
+system caused the 1971 San Fernando earthquake and is geologically
+similar to the system that generated the large 1952 Kern County
+earthquake. Although smaller in magnitude than the earthquakes
+previously described, these postulated events are potentially quite
+dangerous because of their vicinity to high population densities in
+Southern California.
+
+
+D. EARTHQUAKE EFFECTS
+
+Detailed maps were prepared for each event showing qualitative
+estimates of ground shaking intensity resulting from each earthquake.
+These estimates are indicative of the general severity of damage to
+ordinary structures. Empirical formulae providing quantitative
+estimates of peak ground motion at various distances from the
+postulated earthquakes were developed for use in the effects of
+severe ground shaking on individual structures or critical
+facilities. No estimates were made of localized effects, such as
+ground failures related to liquefaction (the complete failure or loss
+of strength, of a saturated soil due to shaking), landslides, and
+fault rupture. These effects can be far more destructive than ground
+shaking alone.
+
+[Illustration: Figure 1. Geographic Locations of Selected Regional
+Events]
+
+
+
+
+CHAPTER III
+
+ASSESSMENT OF LOSSES FOR SELECTED POTENTIAL CALIFORNIA EARTHQUAKES
+
+
+A. INTRODUCTION
+
+As part of a program that FEMA and its predecessor agencies have had
+underway for a number of years, property loss and casualty estimates
+were prepared in 1972 and 1973 for a number of potential maximum
+credible earthquakes that could impact on the San Francisco and the
+Los Angeles areas--North San Andreas (Richter magnitude 8.3), Hayward
+(Richter magnitude 7.4), South San Andreas (Richter magnitude 8.3),
+and Newport-Inglewood (Richter magnitude 7.5). These estimates have
+now been updated as part of the current assessment.
+
+Estimates of property loss and casualties are based on the expected
+type and distribution of damage for each postulated earthquake as
+determined by the size and location of the earthquake and the
+distribution and character of the buildings and structures within the
+affected area. Methodologies for estimates of this type are
+approximate at best. Consequently, the figures shown below may vary
+upward or downward by as much as a factor of two or three. This degree
+of uncertainty does not affect the validity of the conclusions of this
+report, however, since there are greater uncertainties in all other
+aspects of emergency response planning.
+
+
+B. PROPERTY LOSS ESTIMATES
+
+The property loss estimates were obtained by first estimating the
+total replacement dollar value of buildings and their contents,
+multiplying them by percentage loss factors (inferred from the
+anticipated strength of shaking in each county), and then summing to
+obtain the aggregate loss. Included in the estimates are private as
+well as Federal, State, and local government buildings, insured and
+uninsured. Excluded from consideration is the replacement value of
+transportation and communication facilities, dams, utility
+installations, and special purpose structures (e.g., convention
+centers and sports arenas). Also excluded is the potential damage
+resulting from a major dam failure or the indirect dollar losses due
+to such factors as higher unemployment, lower tax revenue, reduced
+productivity, and stoppage of industrial production. Experience
+indicates that indirect losses could be approximately equal to the
+dollar amounts lost in buildings and their contents. The property loss
+estimates for four postulated earthquakes on the faults listed below
+are as follows.
+
+
+TABLE 2
+
+ESTIMATES OF PROPERTY LOSSES FOR REPRESENTATIVE EARTHQUAKES[1]
+
+--------------------------------------------------------------------------
+ Loss to Loss of
+ Building Contents Total Loss
+Fault ($ in Billions) ($ in Billions) ($ in Billions)
+--------------------------------------------------------------------------
+Northern San Andreas 25 13 38
+Hayward 29 15 44
+Newport-Inglewood 45 24 69
+Southern San Andreas 11 6 17
+----------
+ [1] Uncertain by a possible factor of two to three.
+--------------------------------------------------------------------------
+
+
+C. CASUALTY ESTIMATES
+
+Deaths and injuries in these earthquakes principally would occur from
+failures of man-made structures, particularly older, multistory, and
+unreinforced brick masonry buildings built before the institution of
+earthquake-resistant building codes. Experience has shown that some
+modern multistory buildings--constructed as recently as the late
+1960's, but not adequately designed or constructed to meet the current
+understanding of requirements for seismic resistance--are also subject
+to failure. Consequently, the number of fatalities will be strongly
+influenced by the number of persons within high-occupancy buildings,
+capable of collapsing, or by failure of other critical facilities such
+as dams. Additional imponderables are the degree of saturation of the
+ground at the time of the event and the possibility of weather
+conditions conducive to the spread of fire. A conflagration such as
+occurred in the 1906 San Francisco earthquake, is not considered
+likely to occur in any of the analyzed events, however, because of
+improvements in fire resistance of construction and firefighting
+techniques. Nonetheless, numerous smaller fires must be anticipated in
+any of the analyzed events and a "Santa Ana type" wind could cause
+serious problems.
+
+An additional element of uncertainty in estimating casualties from
+earthquake stems from not knowing where most of the population will be
+at the time of the earthquake. In the early morning (i.e., 2:30 a.m.)
+most people are at home, by far the safest environment during a
+seismic emergency. At 2:00 in the afternoon, on the other hand, the
+majority of people are at their places of employment and therefore
+vulnerable to collapse of office buildings. Around 4:30 p.m. many more
+people are in the streets and thus subject to injury due to falling
+debris or failures of transportation systems. Consequently, depending
+on the time of day, wide variations in the number of casualties can be
+expected.
+
+Following are estimates of dead and injured (requiring
+hospitalization) for each of the four representative faults and for
+the three time periods just discussed.
+
+TABLE 3
+
+ESTIMATES OF CASUALTIES[1]
+
+-------------------------------------------------------------------
+Fault Time Dead Hospitalized[2]
+-------------------------------------------------------------------
+Northern San Andreas 2:30 a.m. 3,000 12,000
+ 2:00 p.m. 10,000 37,000
+ 4:30 p.m. 11,000 44,000
+
+Hayward 2:30 a.m. 3,000 13,000
+ 2:00 p.m. 8,000 30,000
+ 4:30 p.m. 7,000 27,000
+
+Southern San Andreas 2:30 a.m. 3,000 12,000
+ 2:00 p.m. 12,000 50,000
+ 4:30 p.m. 14,000 55,000
+
+Newport-Inglewood 2:30 a.m. 4,000 18,000
+ 2:00 p.m. 21,000 83,000
+ 4:30 p.m. 23,000 91,000
+----------
+ [1] Uncertain by a possible factor of two to three.
+
+ [2] Injuries not requiring hospitalization are estimated to be
+ from 15 to 30 times the number of deaths.
+-------------------------------------------------------------------
+
+
+D. OVERVIEW OF OTHER TYPES OF DAMAGE
+
+For this assessment, estimates of damage to substantial numbers of
+different type facilities essential to the immediate response
+capability were updated. Earthquakes associated with the same four
+major fault systems identified earlier in this chapter were used as a
+basis for these estimates. The types of facilities analyzed included
+_hospitals_, _medical supply storages_, _blood banks_, and _custodial
+care homes_, together with their essential services and personnel
+resources. Although newer hospitals in California are being built
+according to substantially improved seismic safety standards and
+practices, older hospital facilities can be expected to be poorly
+resistant to earthquakes.
+
+Among residential buildings, single family homes are expected to
+suffer structural damage and loss of contents. Damage to multifamily
+dwellings--particularly older buildings--would, in all likelihood, be
+more extensive. Analysis of expected damage indicates that temporary
+housing for as many as 200,000 families might be needed--a requirement
+calling for careful planning and exceptional management skills.
+
+Schools are judged to be among the safest facilities exposed to the
+earthquakes. Since passage of the Field Act in 1933, after the Long
+Beach earthquake, school buildings in California have been
+continuously improved to withstand seismic hazards.
+
+As a result of continuing and substantial upgrading of design and
+construction practices in the past 10 years, dams and reservoirs can
+be expected to show an improved performance in an earthquake.
+Nonetheless, on a contingency basis, one dam failure might be assumed
+for each planning effort.
+
+Realizing the fact that 84 key communications facilities, earth
+stations, Department of Defense voice and data switches, commercial
+transoceanic cable heads, Federal Telecommunications System switches,
+and major direct distance dial switches are located within 55 miles of
+either Los Angeles or San Francisco, damage must be expected to occur.
+With this realization, priorities have been assigned to all critical
+circuits transiting the key facilities, based on established criteria
+of criticality of service continuity. _National warning systems
+circuitry, command and control circuits, and circuits supporting
+diplomatic negotiations_ (of which a high concentration exists in
+California) are examples of those circuits carrying high-restoration
+priority.
+
+In the civil sector there would be 24 to 72 hours of minimal
+communications, with a possible blackout of telephonic communications
+in the area immediately following an earthquake. The commercial
+carriers would institute network control procedures to regain control
+of the situation as fast as possible.
+
+The impact on transportation facilities in any of the four
+hypothesized earthquakes could be massive. Since the magnitude and
+severity is unprecedented in recent years, conclusions regarding
+losses must be accepted as tentative. As in the case of hospitals,
+however, the lessons learned in earthquakes during the past 10 years
+are being incorporated in the design and construction of new
+facilities.
+
+In general, all major transportation modes would be
+affected--_highways_, _streets_, _overpasses and bridges_, _mass
+transit systems_, _railroads_, _airports_, _pipelines_, and _ocean
+terminals_, although major variances in losses are expected among the
+modes. From a purely structural standpoint, the more rigid or elevated
+systems (such as railroads and pipelines) which cross major faults on
+an east-west axis would incur the heaviest damage, with initial losses
+approaching 100 percent. Other major systems (such as highways,
+airports, and pile-supported piers at water terminals) have better
+survivability characteristics and therefore would fare much better,
+with damage generally in the moderate range of 15 to 30 percent. These
+transportation facility loss estimates are stated in terms of
+immediate post-quake effects. They do not reflect the impact of
+priority emergency recovery efforts and expedient alternatives that
+are available, some within hours, to aid in restoration of
+transportation capacity. In addition, transportation systems generally
+have an inherently significant degree of redundancy and flexibility.
+Consequently, an unquantified but significant movement capability in
+all transport modes is expected to survive. Finally, these loss
+estimates do not take into account the question of availability of
+essential supporting resources, particularly petroleum fuels,
+electricity, and communications. In the initial response phase, these
+could prove to be the most limiting factors in the capability of the
+transportation system.
+
+Business and industry would be affected by damage to office buildings,
+plants, and other support facilities. Although the 1971 San Fernando
+earthquake occurred on the margin of a largely suburban area,
+industrial facilities incurred significant damage. For example,
+several buildings of the kind commonly used for light industry or
+warehouses suffered from collapsed roofs or walls. Generally, building
+codes do not apply to special industrial facilities, and the ability
+of these structures to resist earthquake shaking will depend largely
+on the foresight of the design engineer. For example, a major
+electrical power switching yard and a water filtration plant were
+seriously damaged in the 1971 San Fernando earthquake.
+
+About 10 percent of the population and industrial resources of the
+Nation are located in California. Over 85 percent of these resources
+(or about 8.5 percent of the Nation's total) are located in the 21
+California counties that are subject to the possibility of damage from
+a major earthquake. Much of the aerospace and electronics industry is
+centered in California. For example, about 56 percent of the guided
+missiles and space vehicles, 40 percent of the semiconductors, 25
+percent of the electronic computer equipment, and approximately 21
+percent of the optical instruments and lenses manufactured in the
+Nation are manufactured in these 21 counties. The probability that all
+these counties would be affected by one earthquake is extremely
+remote; yet the significant concentration of key industries remains a
+concern. For example, about 25 percent of the Nation's semiconductors
+are manufactured in Santa Clara County, an area along the Northern San
+Andres fault that suffered very heavy damage in the 1906 San Francisco
+earthquake. Estimates of damage to these industrial facilities and the
+resulting loss of production have not been made. Similarly, the
+resulting impact of possible damage to national production has not
+been adequately analyzed.
+
+Federally regulated financial institutions were generically analyzed
+to determine their ability to continue to promote essential services
+in the event of a major earthquake like those that have been
+postulated for this assessment. The conclusion reached thus far is
+that large-magnitude earthquakes pose no significant or unanticipated
+problems of solvency and liquidity for such institutions. The Federal
+Reserve System and other regulatory entities have procedures in place
+that are designed--and have been tested--specifically to provide for
+the continued operation of financial institutions immediately
+following an earthquake or other emergency.
+
+
+
+
+CHAPTER IV
+
+AN ASSESSMENT OF THE CURRENT STATE OF READINESS CAPABILITY OF FEDERAL,
+STATE, AND LOCAL GOVERNMENTS FOR EARTHQUAKE RESPONSE
+
+
+A. INTRODUCTION
+
+An earthquake of catastrophic magnitude, with or without credible
+warning, happens suddenly. The potential for disaster, however, does
+not occur suddenly. The degree of preparedness and commitment to
+comprehensive planning and mitigation programs for the inevitable
+event will largely determine the degree of hardship to be experienced
+through loss of life, human suffering, property destruction, and the
+other related economic, social, and psychological aspects of
+disruption to day-to-day community activities. The impacts can be
+reduced substantially from current expected levels through the
+development and implementation of improved and more widely practiced
+earthquake hazards reduction measures. These include _coordinated
+emergency preparedness plans and procedures_, _earthquake prediction
+and warning systems_, _improved construction techniques_, and
+_effective public education and information programs_.
+
+The State of California Office of Emergency Services (OES) and FEMA
+conducted an analysis of the readiness capability for potential
+catastrophic earthquakes in California at the Federal, State, and
+local government levels. The planning of 22 counties and 38 cities, of
+34 State agencies, and of 17 Federal organizations were reviewed with
+the following objectives: (a) identify opportunities for improvement;
+(b) provide a basis for making decisions that would strengthen program
+direction and planning efforts; and (c) specify resource needs and
+potential legislative initiatives. Annex 2 summarizes current Federal
+and California earthquake planning.
+
+The environment in which preparedness planning in California occurs is
+characterized by the following observations of public expectations and
+attitudes:
+
+ " There is widespread public support for government
+ action.
+
+ " Most people have some ideas as to what government should
+ be doing.
+
+ " There is understanding of the need for hazard reduction
+ as well as emergency response planning.
+
+ " People are willing, in the abstract, to have government
+ funds spent for hazard mitigation.
+
+ " The public is not very satisfied with what government
+ officials have done.
+
+ " Public officials perceive that current preparedness
+ plans and response are inadequate at best.
+
+As discussed below, the review indicates that all is not well in
+earthquake plans and preparedness. Current plans and preparedness are
+judged to be adequate for the "moderate" earthquakes most likely to
+occur frequently in California. By moderate it is meant an event
+causing property damage on the order of $1 to $2 billion. Such an
+event, however, will severely tax existing resources and provide a
+major test of management relationship among different governmental
+jurisdictions and levels. For a catastrophic earthquake, current plans
+and preparedness are clearly inadequate, leading to a high likelihood
+that Federal, State, and local response activities would become
+disorganized and largely fail to perform effectively for an extended
+period of time.
+
+
+B. STATE AND LOCAL RESPONSE
+
+Although there are widely differing approaches, local emergency
+planning in California generally consists of a basic plan and a series
+of contingency plans. The basic plan establishes the authority, sets
+forth references, addresses hazard vulnerability, states the planning
+assumptions, establishes an emergency services organization, assigns
+tasks, formulates a mutual aid system, and directs the development of
+specific support annexes. For those hazards identified in the basic
+plan, a separate contingency plan is then developed to address the
+unique nature of the hazardous event. The contingency plan contains
+service support plans for each of the functional operations, including
+detailed standard operating procedures. The planning efforts of local
+jurisdictions are coordinated with adjacent jurisdictions and the
+California OES for consistency.
+
+A plan is not considered complete without the support annexes which
+make the plan operational. The survey undertaken for this assessment
+disclosed that approximately 93 percent of the jurisdictions examined
+have existing, basic plans; 50 percent have completed annexes; 28
+percent of the basic plans addressed an earthquake hazard
+vulnerability; 35 percent have planned for earthquake contingency; and
+only 1 percent (one city) has a plan to respond to an earthquake
+prediction.
+
+At the State level, the California OES, as an integral part of the
+Governor's Office, functions as his immediate staff and coordinating
+organization in carrying out the State's emergency responsibilities.
+Specific emergency assignments have been made to 34 State agencies by
+the OES Director through a series of Administrative Orders. During
+emergencies the activities of these agencies and departments are
+coordinated by the California OES.
+
+The State OES is also responsible for maintaining and updating the
+California Emergency Plan (CEP) and associated readiness plans. As in
+the case of local plans, the basic document is supported by
+operational annexes as listed below:
+
+ CONTINGENCY MUTUAL AID
+
+ Earthquake Fire and Rescue
+ Earthquake Prediction Law Enforcement
+ Oil Spill Medical
+ Nuclear Blackmail Utilities
+ Reactor Accident Military Support
+ Radioactive Material Incident
+ Flood
+
+
+ SUPPORTING SYSTEMS EMERGENCY RESOURCES
+ MANAGEMENT
+
+ Warning Construction and Housing
+ Emergency Broadcast System Economic Stabilization
+ Emergency Public Information Food
+ Intelligence Operations Health
+ Radiological Defense Industrial Production
+ Manpower
+ Petroleum
+ Telecommunications
+ Transportation
+ Utilities
+
+Based on this planning concept, the review assessed quantitatively the
+preparedness activities of the 34 State agencies that have
+preparedness responsibilities in accordance with the CEP. The
+quantitative data are listed in the following table.
+
+
+TABLE 4
+
+QUANTITATIVE ASSESSMENT OF STATE PREPAREDNESS ACTIVITIES
+
+-----------------------------------------------------------------
+ Number of Percent of
+ Preparedness Element Agencies 34 Agencies
+-----------------------------------------------------------------
+Existence of Plan 22 65
+Conduct of Exercises 27 79
+Public Education Activities 10 29
+Public Information Activities 9 26
+Operational Capability 32 94
+-----------------------------------------------------------------
+
+The quality of the plans, activities, and operational capabilities
+were then evaluated on a scale of 1 (expected to fail/inadequate) to 5
+(expected to succeed well/adequate). The qualitative results are shown
+below.
+
+
+TABLE 5
+
+QUALITATIVE ASSESSMENT OF STATE PREPAREDNESS ACTIVITIES
+
+----------------------------------------------------------
+ Preparedness Element Capability Rating
+----------------------------------------------------------
+ Planning 2.67
+ Exercises 2.64
+ Public Education 1.44
+ Public Information 1.50
+ Operational Capability 2.91
+----------------------------------------------------------
+
+It should be emphasized that these ratings apply to the State's
+_present_ level of planning and preparedness for response to a major
+destructive earthquake (magnitude 8), not a moderate (San
+Fernando-type) event.
+
+
+C. FEDERAL RESPONSE
+
+At the Federal level the principal capability to respond to a
+catastrophic earthquake in California resides in FEMA, the agency
+responsible by law to coordinate Federal activities in all
+emergencies. FEMA has developed a basic plan for supplemental Federal
+assistance for a major earthquake in the San Francisco Bay area. This
+plan, however, covers only the emergency phase of response (first few
+days of efforts to save lives and protect property). In addition, FEMA
+is participating in a broader effort concentrating in Southern
+California. This cooperative effort is getting under way with State
+and local governments, other Federal departments, voluntary agencies,
+practicing professions, business and commercial interests, labor,
+educators, and researchers. It is expected to develop an effective
+program to respond to an earthquake or a credible earthquake
+prediction in that part of the State. The emphasis is being placed on
+_public safety, reduction of property damage, self-help on the part of
+individuals, socioeconomic impacts, improved response and long-range
+recovery planning, mitigation activities, and public participation for
+both the post-prediction and immediate post-earthquake periods_. This
+pilot effort is expected to be usable in other highly seismic areas of
+California as well as in other States.
+
+In the event of a catastrophic earthquake, a substantial number of
+Federal agencies would provide support to and be coordinated by FEMA.
+Illustrative are the following:
+
+
+ 1. Department of Defense (DOD)
+
+ Initially, local military commanders may provide necessary
+support to save lives, alleviate suffering, or mitigate property
+damage. Normally, additional DOD resources would not be committed
+until a presidential declaration of an emergency or major disaster.
+When this occurs, the Secretary of the Army is DOD Executive Agent for
+military support. The Commander, Sixth U.S. Army, at the Presidio, San
+Francisco, has been further delegated authority to coordinate disaster
+relief operations in the western portion of the United States.
+Extensive planning and coordination have taken place between the Sixth
+U.S. Army and FEMA Region IX. DOD emergency functions include: _damage
+survey_, _search and rescue_, _emergency medical care_,
+_identification and disposition of dead_, _emergency debris
+clearance_, _emergency roads and bridge construction_, _airfield
+repair_, and _identification and demolition of unsafe structures_.
+Specific units have been identified to respond to an earthquake in any
+of the major population centers of California. For example, at this
+time the following units would be prepared for commitment within 8
+hours after a disaster is declared by the President:
+
+ " Six medical units with a 1,320 bed capacity
+
+ " Seven helicopter units with 90 utility helicopters and
+ 36 medium helicopters
+
+ " One Infantry brigade of 1,500 personnel
+
+ " Two engineer units with 78 pieces of heavy equipment
+
+ " Two transportation units with 124 cargo trucks and
+ trailers
+
+These as well as additional DOD assets could be made available,
+contingent on defense priorities.
+
+
+ 2. The National Communication System
+
+ This Agency's plan, the "National Plan for Communications Support
+in Emergencies and Major Disasters," provides for planning and using
+national telecommunications assets and resources during presidentially
+declared emergencies and major disasters. The plan, which has been
+exercised repeatedly in past disasters, provides the management
+structure and the communications staff to support FEMA. Restoration
+priorities have been assigned to all critical circuits.
+
+
+ 3. Department of Transportation (DOT)
+
+ DOT has established an Office of Emergency Transportation. This
+office has developed and maintains comprehensive emergency plans and
+procedural manuals for natural disasters and other civil crises. It
+constantly monitors the civil transportation system for indications of
+potential adverse impacts from all hazards. It conducts scheduled
+periodic training and readiness exercises for DOT emergency personnel
+and maintains quick response cells and emergency operating facilities
+at DOT headquarters and in the field to provide an immediate reaction
+capability. The system has been activated several times in the recent
+past (e.g., Three Mile Island, 1979 Energy/Fuel Crisis, Independent
+Truckers' Strike, and the Mt. St. Helens eruption).
+
+
+D. CONSIDERATIONS FOR IMPROVING RESPONSE CAPABILITY
+
+Earthquake prediction has not been incorporated into existing plans.
+Response to predictions in the current environment, if given, would be
+_ad hoc_. The State of California has only a rudimentary plan and the
+Federal Government none. The City of Los Angeles has examined the
+problem extensively, but only considers its own jurisdiction and has
+not produced an actionable plan. Current planning for the recovery
+period is incomplete, uncoordinated, and not functional. State and
+local governments have done little to plan for the recovery period
+when, following the emergency lifesaving phase, efforts and resources
+are concentrated on restoring the functioning of the community. They
+presume that the Federal Government will "step in" after a
+presidential declaration. The Federal Government has an untested draft
+plan for the San Francisco area that is not fully coordinated with the
+State plans. Current Federal plans are geared to the provision of
+assistance on the order of a few hundred million dollars. Thus, there
+is little confidence that they would function under the requirements
+for tens-of-billions-of-dollars and concomitant service demands.
+
+Both Federal and State agencies need to commit the financial resources
+and assignment of personnel to maintain and enhance earthquake plans
+and preparedness. Earthquake preparedness, although responding to high
+damage expectation, is still based upon a relatively low probability
+occurrence. When it is in competition with pressing social needs for a
+portion of limited resources, social needs tend to prevail at all
+levels of government. Without a clear commitment, future development
+of earthquake preparedness, as in the past, is problematic and its
+implementation is in considerable doubt. The Federal earthquake
+preparedness effort needs to focus on a high state of readiness.
+
+History in the area of natural hazard mitigation suggests that
+assignment of responsibility, even by the President, when not followed
+by leadership and regular oversight over the allocation of financial
+resources, seldom leads to programs which can be expected to function.
+The same weakness is evidenced at the State and local government
+levels with few exceptions. The stresses likely to occur in emergency
+response programs after a catastrophic earthquake will be such that
+effective response will require a cooperative, integrated effort among
+different jurisdictions and levels of government.
+
+Experience in other areas of planning and preparedness, particularly
+for civil defense, indicates that damage to existing programs occurs
+when the Federal Government raises expectations of the public and of
+other levels of government and then fails to follow through with
+implementation and funding. It is better to maintain the _status quo_
+with minor changes at the margin than to announce substantial program
+initiatives and not meet their requirements.
+
+
+
+
+CHAPTER V
+
+AN ASSESSMENT OF THE SOCIAL IMPACTS
+
+
+Often, it is assumed that disasters leave masses of the population in
+the impacted areas dazed and helpless and unable to cope with the new
+conditions, or that those not so immobilized panic or display
+antisocial behavior. Another common assumption is that local
+communities and organizations are rendered ineffective to handle the
+many problems, leading to further disorganization, loss of morale, and
+requiring the quick assertion of "strong" outside leadership and
+control.
+
+Practical experience and field studies of disasters indicate that
+these assumptions are not necessarily correct. The widespread sharing
+of danger, loss, and deprivation produces an intimate cooperativeness
+among the survivors, which overcomes social isolation and provides a
+channel for very close communication and expression and a major source
+of physical and emotional support and reassurance. This capacity seems
+to account for the resiliency of personality and social organization
+in dealing with threat and danger. It is also at the base of the
+ability of social life to regenerate.
+
+In addition, a good case can be made in that community systems
+experiencing impact may be more efficient and rational than they are
+in "normal" circumstances. Normal (pre-disaster) community life
+traditionally operates at a low level of effectiveness and efficiency.
+Activities are directed toward a very diffuse set of goals, just as
+human resources within the community are inadequately utilized. Upon
+disaster impact, certain community goals--care for victims and the
+restoration of essential services--develop a high priority while
+others are ignored or held in abeyance. Thus, the entire range of
+community resources, even taking into account "losses," can be
+allocated to the accomplishment of the more critical goals. Also,
+human resources are better utilized. Many women, older persons,
+younger persons, and members of minorities now become "productive;"
+the "labor" market after impact is open to those underutilized
+resources. In effect, then, disasters create the conditions for the
+more efficient utilization of material resources and the more
+effective mobilization of human resources.
+
+To accomplish this, certain modifications have to occur in the normal
+community structure, since the usual decision-making structures are
+designed for a different range and type of problem. Outsiders see this
+restructuring process as disorganized, chaotic, and creating the
+necessity for the imposition of some strong outside authority. On the
+contrary, this restructuring process is functional and adaptive. Its
+consequences are seen in communities and societies that rebound
+dramatically from the disruption and destruction to levels of
+integration, productivity, and growth capacity far beyond the
+pre-disaster state.
+
+In summary, the picture drawn points to the capacity of individuals
+and institutions to deal with difficult problems created by disaster
+impact. It also points to the adaptive capacity of social organization
+within communities to deal with unique and dramatic problems. These
+findings are not an argument against planning nor against "outside"
+assistance, but they should condition both the nature of planning and
+the direction of assistance.
+
+
+
+
+ANNEX 1
+
+LETTERS OF CORRESPONDENCE
+
+
+
+
+THE WHITE HOUSE
+
+WASHINGTON
+
+
+ September 19, 1980
+
+ To Governor Jerry Brown
+
+As you know, following my trip to view the destructive impacts of the
+volcanic eruption of Mt. St. Helens in the State of Washington, I
+directed that an assessment be undertaken of the consequences and
+state of preparedness for a major earthquake in California. This
+review, chaired by my Science and Technology Advisor, Frank Press, is
+now complete. We are grateful for the assistance provided by your
+staff and the other State, and local officials in this effort.
+
+Although current response plans are generally adequate for moderate
+earthquakes, Federal, State, and local officials agree that additional
+preparation is required to cope with a major earthquake. Prudence
+requires, therefore, that we take steps to improve our preparedness.
+
+While the primary responsibility for preparedness rests with the State
+of California, its local governments and its people, the magnitude of
+human suffering and loss of life that might occur and the importance
+of California to the rest of the Nation require increased Federal
+attention to this important issue. Accordingly, I have directed that
+the Federal government increase its work with you to supplement your
+efforts. The Federal efforts will be led by the Federal Emergency
+Management Agency and include the Department of Defense and other
+Departments and agencies as appropriate.
+
+As a Nation, we must reduce the adverse impacts of a catastrophic
+earthquake to the extent humanly possible by increasing our
+preparedness for this potential eventuality.
+
+ Sincerely,
+
+ [signed] Jimmy Carter
+
+ The Honorable Edmund G. Brown, Jr.
+ Governor of California
+ Sacramento, California 95814
+
+
+ September 26, 1980
+
+ The Honorable Jimmy Carter
+ The President
+ The White House
+ Washington, D.C. 20500
+
+ Dear Mr. President:
+
+Let me take this opportunity to review our conversations over the last
+few months regarding increased seismic activity in California.
+
+When we met in Oakland on July 4 I raised the issue of seismic
+hazards. I was concerned then with the steady increase in seismic
+activity in California since 1978. Sharing my concern, you directed
+that the National Security Council join with my staff and certain
+local experts to conduct a quick study on the potential for a great
+earthquake in California.
+
+As you know, significant theoretical and public policy research had
+already been completed by our Seismic Safety Commission, State
+Geologist, Earthquake Prediction Evaluation Council and the Office of
+Emergency Services. Together with the U.S. Geological Survey and the
+Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), they had clearly been
+keeping abreast of the state of the art of earthquake prediction.
+Indeed, combined state and federal efforts, founded on major
+theoretical advances in American, Russian and Chinese seismic and
+geological theory since the early 1970s, had shifted the language of
+earthquake prediction in California from "if" to "when"!
+
+In light of my personal interest in this subject, I have signed into
+law Assemblyman Frank Vicencia's AB 2202, a jointly funded
+state-federal project to design a comprehensive earthquake
+prediction-response plan. It is the state's intention to prepare a
+plan for the greater Los Angeles area as quickly as feasible. In my
+view, such a fullscale prediction-response program had become possible
+only after the research findings of both physical and policy
+scientists during the past five years. It is my conviction that such a
+plan is now timely--neither too early nor too late.
+
+In this context, your recognition of this issue in our conversation of
+September 22 in Los Angeles was a welcome personal reinforcement of
+our state and local efforts. I am also grateful for the September 3
+briefing in Sacramento by Mr. John Macy, Director of FEMA, regarding
+the latest U.S. Geological Survey interpretations of anomalies around
+California's system of geological faults. As soon as we have received
+the final FEMA report on the details of those anomalies, I will ask
+the state geologist to evaluate the report, confer with colleagues in
+the Geological Survey and have all state and local officials fully
+briefed.
+
+At that time, I would be grateful for an early opportunity to meet
+with you and explore next steps. I am confident that a heightened
+state of awareness among my fellow Californians will so deploy the
+resources of the state, plus available federal supplementary
+assistance, as to minimize the loss of life and property in the event
+of a great earthquake.
+
+ Sincerely,
+
+ /s/
+
+ Edmund G. Brown, Jr.
+ Governor
+
+
+
+
+ANNEX 2
+
+CURRENT CALIFORNIA AND FEDERAL EARTHQUAKE RESPONSE PLANNING
+
+
+A. NATURE OF EMERGENCY PLANNING
+
+An emergency, as used in this report, is defined as an unexpected,
+sudden or out-of-the-ordinary event or series of events adversely
+affecting lives and property which, because of its magnitude, cannot
+be handled by normal governmental processes. Emergency response
+planning is the process that addresses preparedness for and response
+to an emergency.
+
+Emergency response planning is an evolutionary, ongoing process and is
+prerequisite to all other emergency readiness activities. It is a
+comprehensive process that identifies the potential hazardous events,
+and the vulnerability to such hazards, estimates expected losses, and
+assesses impacts of such events. The development of written plans is
+followed by placement of capabilities to implement the response plan
+and by the conduct of periodic tests and exercises. The most difficult
+task in the development of an emergency plan is to anticipate as many
+of the problems and complications resulting from a given disaster
+situation as possible and to provide a basis for response to those not
+anticipated.
+
+The objective of emergency planning is to create the capacity for
+government to:
+
+ " Save the maximum number of lives in the event of an
+ emergency
+
+ " Minimize injuries and protect property
+
+ " Preserve the functions of civil government
+
+ " Maintain and support economic and social activities
+ essential for response and the eventual long-term
+ recovery from the disaster
+
+Emergency planning is a logical and necessary pre-emergency activity
+for governmental (and other organizational) entities likely to be
+affected by a disaster's occurrence. To be successful, such planning
+must be accomplished within the framework of the day-to-day
+governmental structure and activity but at the same time provide for
+response to the extraordinary circumstances and requirements inherent
+in disaster situations.
+
+Emergency plans include the preparation of guidelines, policy
+directives, and procedures to be utilized in preparing for and
+conducting disaster operations, training, and test exercises. They
+should also contain clear statements of authorities, responsibilities,
+organizational relationships, and operating procedures necessary for
+the accomplishment of disaster response and recovery activities.
+Further, they should address the four elements of mitigation,
+preparedness, response, and recovery (immediate and long-term).
+
+Once plans are established they must be periodically updated as
+conditions change. Updating may become necessary for a number of
+reasons: increased scientific, technical, and managerial knowledge;
+feedback from evaluation of exercises; better understanding of
+vulnerability; shifts in population and economic activities;
+construction of new critical facilities; and changes in personnel,
+organization, and legislation.
+
+Emergency planning is a shared responsibility at all levels--in this
+case from the Federal through the State and local jurisdictional
+levels. It should include business, industry, research and scientific
+institutions, practicing professions, and the individuals. By
+involving all functions of government, the planning process enhances
+the capability for implementing the plans through the realistic
+consideration of available capabilities and elimination of conflicts
+and inconsistencies of roles and task assignments.
+
+Further, by being a part of the planning decision-making process and
+having identified the needs and areas of consideration, individuals,
+organizations, and officials responsible for emergency operations are
+better able to relate to the expected impact and the operational
+environment. The written plans also serve valuable purposes for
+training and familiarization of new organizations, individuals, and
+public officials. Experience has shown repeatedly that when emergency
+operations are conducted in accordance with existing plans, reaction
+time is reduced and coordination improved, with fewer casualties, less
+property damage, and a higher surviving socioeconomic capability to
+undertake recovery. Other benefits that accrue from planning include
+the enhancement of hazard awareness.
+
+
+B. CALIFORNIA EMERGENCY PLANNING RESPONSE
+
+The State of California emergency response planning is a series of
+related documents, each of which serve a specific purpose. (See
+figures 1 and 2.)
+
+The basic plan of a jurisdiction (item (1) in figures 1 and 2) is the
+foundation of this planning process. It is an essential administrative
+(rather than operational) document, and as such it:
+
+ " Provides the basis (including legal authority) for and
+ the objectives of emergency planning and operations
+
+ " Outlines contingencies (emergency situations) to be
+ planned and prepared for and establishes the general
+ principles and policies (concepts of operations) to be
+ applied to each
+
+ " Describes the emergency organization in terms of who is
+ responsible for what actions
+
+ " Defines interjurisdictional and interservice
+ relationships and the direction and control structure to
+ make assignments and resolve conflicts
+
+ " Contains or refers to information of common interest
+ about supporting facilities, such as the Emergency
+ Operations Center and warning and communications systems
+
+ " Provides the planning basis for other supporting
+ documents which are more operationally oriented
+
+The basic plan is supported by a Direction and Control annex and by
+functional annexes (see (2) and (3) respectively in figures 1 and 2).
+The Direction and Control annex details how overall responses to an
+emergency will be managed and coordinated. Functional annexes (for
+both staff and services) are designed to address the extraordinary
+requirements created by emergencies. They identify the specific needs,
+the organizational resources available to meet those needs, and the
+scheme or "concept of operations" for their application. It should be
+noted that, because of unique requirements, annexes often do not
+reflect normal departmental structure. An annex becomes a departmental
+plan only when an agency represents the sole resource for meeting the
+stated need and when satisfying that need is the only task assigned to
+that agency by the basic plan.
+
+The second major portion of the California State planning structure
+consists of specific contingency plans (see (4) in figures 1 and 2).
+One such plan is prepared for each extraordinary emergency or
+disaster, likely to occur, detailing the probable effects of the
+emergency on the jurisdiction and the actions to be taken in
+offsetting these effects. It is also called a "response plan" since it
+describes the operations to be undertaken to deal with catastrophic
+situations. Contingency plans include service support plans and
+checklists (see (5) and (6) respectively in figures 1 and 2). Each
+involved element of the emergency organization details its response
+actions in Service Support Plans and itemizes functions appropriate to
+the specific contingency. The contingency plans, service support
+plans, and related checklists and standard operating procedures
+constitute the "operational" portions of the overall emergency plan.
+They address internal procedures to accomplish stated objectives and
+document, in advance, the specific organizational elements that will
+respond to each type of disaster or "need," with identification of
+procedures and resources.
+
+The third major part of California's overall State plan is a
+compendium of information and resources needed to cope with
+emergencies (see (7) in figures 1 and 2). This includes references
+describing the control structure (Emergency Operations Center
+locations, communications, key facilities, personnel lists, and
+equipment source listings).
+
+
+C. FEDERAL EARTHQUAKE RESPONSE PLANNING
+
+Most Federal agencies operating within the State have a generic
+emergency response plan that establishes their internal procedures for
+responding to disasters. Certain agencies such as the Corps of
+Engineers and the Federal Highway Administration, which provide
+services and support that are used on a regular and fairly extensive
+basis in disaster, tend to have more highly developed disaster
+response plans. Some of them even have rather basic earthquake
+response segments included in their basic plans. Thus, for moderate
+earthquakes these plans are relatively effective and the Federal
+response can be expected to be at least adequate. Few Federal
+agencies, however, have developed any specific plan that is adequate
+to respond to the demands of a catastrophic event causing property
+damage exceeding the $2 billion range. Of 24 Federal agencies whose
+earthquake planning status were recently evaluated by FEMA Region IX,
+only the Sixth U.S. Army was determined to have developed a
+comprehensive capability that is in acceptable detail, has been
+exercised, and appears to be operationally adequate and reliable.
+Other Federal agencies are now beginning to perceive the need to
+improve their planning and response capability following the expected
+event, and are gradually responding to this need.
+
+Providing impetus to this expanded planning activity has been the
+emergence of the FEMA Region IX Earthquake Response Plan for the San
+Francisco Bay Area. This is a site-specific FEMA plan based on a 1974
+draft that provided for a full range of Federal assistance during the
+emergency lifesaving phase following the earthquake. Although this
+plan never proceeded beyond the draft stage (because of evolving FEMA
+disaster field operations policy), it served as the basic guide for
+the development of the Sixth U.S. Army Plan, and has remained a core
+document for identifying expected Federal agency activities for
+earthquake recovery in the San Francisco Bay area. In 1979, the
+emergency response portion of the 1974 FEMA Region IX draft was
+restructured. The conduct of the post-event response program was
+shifted from being a centrally directed FEMA activity under the
+operational control of the Regional Director to a decentralized
+operation which provides for functional disaster support activities to
+be assigned by the Regional Director to certain Federal agencies by
+Mission Assignment Letters. Table 1 indicates functional task
+assignment areas. Those with the designation "Emergency Support
+Function (ESF)," have been assigned to other Federal agencies. Table 2
+reviews the principal and support agency assignments for each of the
+ESF functions.
+
+On the basis of these anticipated mission assignments, the tasked
+Federal agencies participated in the development of operational
+annexes in the 1979 version of the San Francisco Earthquake Response
+Plan. Upon completion of the annexes, all agencies were then required
+to develop the necessary agency support plans and standard operating
+procedures for accomplishing the mission assignment tasks.
+Additionally, those Federal agencies designated in the plan as
+principal agencies were tasked with the responsibility of organizing
+and coordinating the activities of Federal agencies designated as
+support.
+
+The rationale for this approach was to identify the various functional
+areas of disaster response for which a Federal activity could
+reasonably be expected to maintain after the occurrence of the event.
+With the functional areas identified, the range of Federal agency
+talent was evaluated and Federal response capabilities matched to
+expected functional demands. By the development of a matrix (figure
+2), a total of 16 functional response areas (such as transportation,
+mass care, and debris removal) were identified, and 20 Federal
+agencies, plus volunteer organizations such as the American National
+Red Cross, were designated as having appropriate disaster response
+capabilities. Subsequently, all agencies were rated on their
+capability for functioning in a principal or a support capacity. These
+agencies were then provided specific FEMA Region IX Mission
+Assignments or tasking statements which, when triggered by a
+Presidential disaster declaration, provide the legal basis for
+delivering the authorized assistance in response to State and local
+government needs.
+
+The end result of this approach has been to create a much more
+effective and reliable capability to respond to the needs of an
+earthquake disaster by those Federal agencies from which a significant
+response would be required.
+
+ +----------+
+ |Basic Plan| .
+ | (1) | .
+ +----------+ .
+ | | | .
+ | | | . +-----------------+
+ | | +----------------------------|Contingency Plans|
+ | | . | (4) |
+ | | . +-----------------+
+ | | Administrative . Operational |
+ | +-------------+ . |
+ | |Direction and| . |
+ | |Control Annex| . |
+ | | (2) | . |
+ | +-------------+ . |
+ +------+------+ . |
+ | | . |
++-------+ +-------+ . +-----------------------+
+| Staff | |Service| . | Service Support Plans |
+|Annexes| |Annexes|----------------------| (5) |
+| (3) | | (3) | . | Response Checklists |
++-------+ +-------+ . | and SOP's (6) |
+ . +-----------------------+
+ . |
+ . |
+ . |
+ +--------------------+
+ |Resources Compendium|
+ | (7) |
+ +--------------------+
+
+[Illustration: =Figure 1: Emergency Plans
+(Description of and Relationship Between Plan Components)=]
+
+
++-------------------------+ +-------------------------+
+| BASIC PLAN (1) | | |
+| |-+ | |-+
+| Authorities | | | RESOURCES MANUAL(S) | |
+| Policies | |-+ | (7) | |-+
+| Responsibilities | | | | | | |
+| System Interfaces | | |-+ | | | |-+
+| | | | | | | | | |
++-------------------------+ | | |-+ +-------------------------+ | | |-+
+ |Direction and Control (2) | | | | |Communication Capabilities| | | |
+ +--------------------------+ | | |-+ +--------------------------+ | | |-+
+ |Public Safety (3) | | | | |Law Enforcement/Fire | | | |
+ +---------------------------+ | | | +---------------------------+ | | |
+ |People Care (3) | | | |Medical-Health/Welfare | | |
+ +----------------------------+ | | +----------------------------+ | |
+ |System Restoration (3) | | |Engineering/Utilities | |
+ +-----------------------------+ | +-----------------------------+ |
+ |Resource Management (3) | |Transportation, etc. |
+ +------------------------------+ +------------------------------+
+
+
+
+ +----------------+ +----------------+
+ | | | |
+ | | | |
+ | EARTHQUAKE |-+ | FLOOD |-+
+ | Response Plan | | | Response Plan | |
+ | (4) | | | (4) | |
+ | | | | | |
+ | | |-+ | | |-+
+ +----------------+ | | +----------------+ | |
+ | | | | | |
+ | D & C Checklist | | | D & C Checklist | |
+ +-----------------+ | +-----------------+ |
+ |Svcs. Sup. | |Svcs. Sup. |
+ | Plans (5) | | Plans (5) |
+ |Checklists & | |Checklists & |
+ | SOP's (6) | | SOP's (6) |
+ +-----------------+ +-----------------+
+
+
+ +----------------+ +----------------+
+ | | | WAR |
+ | |-+ | |-+
+ | WAR | | | | |
+ | Response Plan | | | Response Plan | |
+ | (4) | | | (4) | |
+ | In-Place | | | Crisis | |
+ | Protection | |-+ | Relocation | |-+
+ +----------------+ | | +----------------+ | |
+ | | | | | |
+ | D & C Checklist | | | D & C Checklist | |
+ +-----------------+ | +-----------------+ |
+ |Svcs. Sup. | | Svcs. Sup. |
+ | Plans (5) | | Plans (5) |
+ |Checklists & | | Checklists & |
+ | SOP's (6) | | SOP's (6) |
+ +-----------------+ +-----------------+
+
+[Illustration: =Figure 2: Emergency Planning Format
+(A Partial Illustration of the Component Parts of a Jurisdictional
+Emergency Plan)=]
+
+
+TABLE 1
+
+FEDERAL EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT AGENCY REGION IX EARTHQUAKE RESPONSE AND
+ASSISTANCE TASKS
+
+(San Francisco Bay Area)
+
+
+ANNEXES TO BASIC PLAN
+
+ Disaster Field Activities
+ Disaster Field Location
+ Mission Assignments
+ Emergency Transportation (ESF-1)[1]
+ Communication (ESF-2)
+ Emergency Debris Clearance (ESF-3)
+ Fire Fighting (ESF-4)
+ Emergency Roads, Airfields, and Bridges (ESF-5)
+ Emergency Demolition (ESF-6)
+ Administrative Logistical Support (ESF-7)
+ Emergency Medical Care (ESF-8)
+ Search and Rescue (ESF-9)
+ Identification and Disposal of Dead (ESF-10)
+ Warnings of Risks and Hazards (ESF-11)
+ Emergency Distribution of Medicine (ESF-12)
+ Emergency Distribution of Food (ESF-13)
+ Emergency Distribution of Consumable Supplies (ESF-14)
+ Emergency Shelter & Mass Care (ESF-15)
+ Damage Reconnaissance (ESF-16)
+ Isoseismal Analysis
+ Authorities Referral
+ Administration
+
+ [1] Emergency Support Functions (ESF) are cross-referenced by
+ number in table 2.
+
+
+TABLE 2
+
+EMERGENCY SUPPORT FUNCTIONS
+
+
+KEY:
+ a: Emergency Transportation
+ b: Emergency Communications
+ c: Emergency Debris Clearance
+ d: Fire Fighting
+ e: Emerg. Roads, Air Fields & Bridges
+ f: Emergency Demolition
+ g: Logistical Support
+ h: Emergency Medical Care
+ i: Search and Rescue
+ j: Identif. & Disposal of Dead
+ k: Warnings of Risks & Hazards
+ l: Emergency Dist. of Medicine
+ m: Emergency Dist. of Food
+ n: Emergency Dist. of Consum. Supplies
+ o: Emerg. Shelter, Feed, & Mass Care
+ p: Damage Reconnaissance
++--------------+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+
+|ESF | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 | 8 | 9 | 10| 11| 12| 13| 14| 15| 16|
++--------------+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+
+|ANNEX |(D)|(E)|(F)|(G)|(H)|(I)|(J)|(K)|(L)|(M)|(N)|(O)|(P)|(Q)|(R)|(S)|
++--------------+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+
+| FEDERAL | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
+| AGENCIES | a | b | c | d | e | f | g | h | i | j | k | l | m | n | o | p |
++--------------+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+
+|DOT - FAA | S | | | | | | | | S | | | | | | | S |
++--------------+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+
+|DOT - FHWA | S | | | | S | | | | | | | | | | | S |
++--------------+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+
+|DOT - FRA | S | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | S |
++--------------+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+
+|DOT - RETCO-9 | P | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
++--------------+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+
+|DOT - UMTA | S | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | S |
++--------------+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+
+|DOT - USCC | S | S | | S | | S | | | S | | | | | | | S |
++--------------+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+
+|DOD - 6th USA | S | S | S | S | S | S | S | P | P | P | | S | S | S | S | P |
++--------------+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+
+|DOD - COE | | S | P | S | P | P | | | | | | | | | | |
++--------------+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+
+|ICC | S | | | | | | | | | | | | S | S | | |
++--------------+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+
+|DA - USFS | | S | | P | S | | | | S | | | | | | S | S |
++--------------+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+
+|DA - FNS | | | | | | | | | | | | | P | | | |
++--------------+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+
+|DOC - MARAD | S | | | | | S | | S | | | | | | | | |
++--------------+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+
+|NCS | | P | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
++--------------+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+
+|AYRC | | | | | | | | S | | | | S | | | P | |
++--------------+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+
+|Volunteer | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
+| Agencies | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | S | |
+| (Various) | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
++--------------+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+
+|HEW | | | | | | | S | | | | | P | | | S | |
++--------------+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+
+|US ATTY | | | | | | | | | | S | | | | | | |
++--------------+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+
+|DOL - OSHA | | | S | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
++--------------+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+
+|USPS | S | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
++--------------+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+
+|FBI | | | | | | | | | | S | | | | | | |
++--------------+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+
+|VA | | | | | | | | S | | S | | S | S | | S | |
++--------------+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+
+|GSA | S | S | | | | S | P | | | | | S | | P | | |
++------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+P - Principal Agencies
+S - Support Agencies
+
+
+
+
+ANNEX 3
+
+ASSEMBLY BILL NO. 2202
+
+
+The Governor of California signed into law Assembly Bill 2202 on
+September 25, 1980, which, among others, provides for State
+participation in a joint Federal, State, and local program to prepare
+a comprehensive program for responding to a major earthquake
+prediction. This action was initiated in January 1980 through the
+actions of the Assembly Committee on Government Organization, Frank
+Vicencia, Chairman. Inclusions of specific funds for preparedness was
+included following a subcommittee on Emergency Planning and Disaster
+Relief hearing on possible earthquake prediction on April 22, 1980.
+The text of the Law follows:
+
+ Assembly Bill No. 2202
+
+ CHAPTER 1046
+
+ An act to amend Section 8897 of, to amend and
+ renumber Section 8898 of, and to add Section
+ 8895.1 to, the Government Code, relating to the
+ Seismic Safety Commission, making an appropriation
+ therefor, and declaring the urgency thereof, to
+ take effect immediately.
+
+ [Approved by Governor September 25, 1980. Filed
+ with Secretary of State September 26, 1980.]
+
+
+ LEGISLATIVE COUNSEL'S DIGEST
+
+ AB 2202, Vicencia. Seismic Safety Commission.
+
+ The Seismic Safety Commission Act, which will
+ self-repeal, effective January 1, 1986,
+ establishes the Seismic Safety Commission, and
+ confers upon it various powers and duties relating
+ to earthquake hazard reduction. The California
+ Emergency Services Act confers various related
+ powers and duties upon the Governor, the Director
+ and the Department of Emergency Services, and the
+ California Emergency Council.
+
+ This bill would amend the Seismic Safety
+ Commission Act by: changing the basic subject of
+ the powers and duties of the commission to
+ earthquake hazard mitigation and making certain
+ corresponding changes in its powers and duties;
+ including within commission responsibilities,
+ scheduling on its agenda as required, a report on
+ disaster mitigation issues from the Office of
+ Emergency Services and defining, for such
+ purposes, "disaster" as all natural hazards which
+ could have an impact on public safety; and
+ authorizing the commission to exercise various
+ specified powers in relation to other disasters,
+ as so defined, in connection with issues or items
+ reported or discussed with the Office of Emergency
+ Services at any commission meeting.
+
+ This bill would also require the commission to
+ initiate, as specified, a comprehensive program to
+ prepare the state for responding to a major
+ earthquake prediction, as specified.
+
+ This bill would appropriate $750,000 for the
+ purposes of this act.
+
+ This act would take effect immediately as an
+ urgency statute.
+
+ Appropriation: yes.
+
+
+ _The people of the State of California do enact
+ as follows:_
+
+ SECTION 1. Section 8895.1 is added to the
+ Government Code, to read:
+
+ 8895.1. The commission shall initiate, with the
+ assistance and participation of other state,
+ federal, and local government agencies, a
+ comprehensive program to prepare the state for
+ responding to a major earthquake prediction. The
+ program should be implemented in order to result
+ in specific tools or products to be used by
+ governments in responding to an earthquake
+ prediction, such as educational materials for
+ citizens. This program may be implemented on a
+ prototypical basis in one area of the state
+ affected by earthquake predictions, provided that
+ it is useful for application in other areas of the
+ state upon its completion.
+
+ SEC. 2. Section 8897 of the Government Code is
+ amended to read:
+
+ 8897. The commission is responsible for all of
+ the following in connection with earthquake hazard
+ mitigation:
+
+ (a) Setting goals and priorities in the public
+ and private sectors.
+
+ (b) Requesting appropriate state agencies to
+ devise criteria to promote earthquake and disaster
+ safety.
+
+ (c) Scheduling a report on disaster mitigation
+ issues from the Office of Emergency Services, on
+ the commission agenda as required. For the
+ purposes of this subdivision, the term disaster
+ refers to all natural hazards which could have
+ impact on public safety.
+
+ (d) Recommending program changes to state
+ agencies, local agencies, and the private sector
+ where such changes would improve earthquake
+ hazards and reduction.
+
+ (e) Reviewing the recovery and reconstruction
+ efforts after damaging earthquakes.
+
+ (f) Gathering, analyzing, and disseminating
+ information.
+
+ (g) Encouraging research.
+
+ (h) Sponsoring training to help improve the
+ competence of specialized enforcement and other
+ technical personnel.
+
+ (i) Helping to coordinate the earthquake safety
+ activities of government at all levels.
+
+ (j) Establishing and maintaining necessary
+ working relationships with any boards,
+ commissions, departments, and agencies, or other
+ public or private organizations.
+
+ SEC. 3. Section 8898 of the Government Code is
+ amended and renumbered to read:
+
+ 8897.1. To implement the foregoing
+ responsibilities, the commission may do any of the
+ following:
+
+ (a) Review state budgets and review grant
+ proposals, other than those grant proposals
+ submitted by institutions of postsecondary
+ education to the federal government, for
+ earthquake related activities and to advise the
+ Governor and Legislature thereon.
+
+ (b) Review legislative proposals, related to
+ earthquake safety to advise the Governor and
+ Legislature concerning such proposals, and to
+ propose needed legislation.
+
+ (c) Recommend the addition, deletion, or
+ changing of state agency standards when, in the
+ commission's view, the existing situation creates
+ undue hazards or when new developments would
+ promote earthquake hazard mitigation, and conduct
+ public hearings as deemed necessary on the
+ subjects.
+
+ (d) In the conduct of any hearing,
+ investigation, inquiry, or study which is ordered
+ or undertaken in any part of the state, to
+ administer oaths and issue subpoenas for the
+ attendance of witnesses and the production of
+ papers, records, reports, books, maps, accounts,
+ documents, and testimony.
+
+ (e) In addition, the commission may perform any
+ of the functions contained in subdivisions (a) to
+ (d), inclusive, in relation to other disasters, as
+ defined in subdivision (c) of Section 8897, in
+ connection with issues or items reported or
+ discussed with the Office of Emergency Services at
+ any commission meeting.
+
+ SEC. 4. The sum of seven hundred fifty thousand
+ dollars ($750,000) is hereby appropriated from the
+ General Fund to the Seismic Safety Commission for
+ carrying out the provisions of Section 8895.1 of
+ the Government Code as added by this act,
+ contingent upon receipt of matching federal funds.
+
+ SEC. 5. This act is an urgency statute necessary
+ for the immediate preservation of the public
+ peace, health, or safety within the meaning of
+ Article IV of the Constitution and shall go into
+ immediate effect. The facts constituting such
+ necessity are:
+
+ In order to protect the public safety against
+ earthquakes, including the imminent possibility of
+ major earthquake predictions being made within the
+ next 12 months, it is necessary that this act take
+ effect immediately.
+
+
+
+
+ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
+
+
+=National Security Council Ad Hoc Committee on Assessment of
+Consequences and Preparation for a Major California Earthquake=
+
+_Dr. Frank Press_, Chairperson, President's Science Advisor
+_Clifton Alexander, Jr._, Secretary of the Army
+ _Roderick Renick_, Department of Defense
+_Cecil Andres_, Secretary of the Department of Interior
+ _H.W. Menard_, Department of Interior (USGS)
+_W. Bowman Cutter_, Executive Associate Director for Budget, Office of
+ Management and Budget
+_Lynn Daft_, Associate Director for Domestic Policy Staff, White House
+_Peter Hamilton_, Special Assistant to the Secretary of the Department
+ of Defense
+_Ted Hodkowski_, Intergovernmental Assistant to the President, White
+ House
+_John W. Macy, Jr._, Director, Federal Emergency Management Agency
+ _Richard Green_, Federal Emergency Management Agency
+ _Frank Camm_, Federal Emergency Management Agency
+_William Odom_, Military Assistant, National Security Council, White
+ House
+_Robert P. Pirie, Jr._, Assistant Secretary for Manpower, Reserve
+ Affairs and Logistics, Department of Defense
+
+
+=Working Group Members=
+
+_Philip Smith_, Chairperson, Office of Science and Technology Policy
+_Clarence G. Collins_, Department of Transportation
+_Richard DiConti_, National Communications System
+_Joseph Mullinix_, Office of Management and Budget
+_Chris Shoemaker_, National Security Council
+_Charles C. Thiel_, Federal Emergency Management Agency
+_Stephen Travis_, Domestic Policy Staff
+_Robert L. Wesson_, Office of Science and Technology Policy
+
+=Selected Contributors=
+
+_Richard E. Adams_, State of California, OES Region V
+_James Alexander_, State of California, OES Region I
+_William Anderson_, National Science Foundation
+_Ralph Archuleta_, United States Geological Survey
+_Roger D. Borcherdt_, United States Geological Survey
+_Robert D. Brown, Jr._, United States Geological Survey
+_James Brown_, George Washington University
+_Richard J. Buzka_, United States Geological Survey
+_Maria D. Castain_, United States Geological Survey
+_Lloyd Cluff_, Woodward-Clyde Consultants
+_John Crawford_, Federal Emergency Management Agency
+_Alex Cunningham_, State of California, OES
+_Donna Darling_, State of California, OES Region II
+_Gardner Davis_, State of California, OES Region VI
+_Henry Degenkolb_, H.J. Degenkolb & Associates
+_Joseph Domingues_, Federal Emergency Management Agency, Region IX
+_Russell Dynes_, American Sociological Association
+_Raymond R. Eis_, United States Geological Survey
+_Susan Elkins_, Federal Emergency Management Agency, Region IX
+_Jack F. Evernden_, United States Geological Survey
+_Charles Fritz_, National Academy of Sciences
+_Thomas E. Fumal_, United States Geological Survey
+_James T. Haigwood_, State of California, OES Region I
+_Jane Victoria Hindmarsh_, State of California, OES
+_Connie E. Hooper_, Federal Emergency Management Agency
+_William B. Joyner_, United States Geological Survey
+_Harry King_, State of California, OES Region II
+_Henry Lagorio_, University of California
+_Richard P. Liechti_, United States Geological Survey
+_Terry Meade_, Federal Emergency Management Agency, Region IX
+_Ugo Morelli_, Federal Emergency Management Agency
+_William Myers_, Federal Emergency Management Agency
+_Robert A. Page_, United States Geological Survey
+_Daniel J. Ponti_, United States Geological Survey
+_H. Roger Pulley_, State of California, OES
+_F. Joseph Russo_, Federal Emergency Management Agency
+_Louis Schwalb_, Federal Emergency Management Agency
+_Wanda H. Seiders_, United States Geological Survey
+_Paul A. Spudich_, United States Geological Survey
+_Frank Steindl_, Oklahoma State University
+_Karl Steinbrugge_, Private Consultant
+_Christopher Stephens_, United States Geological Survey
+_Robert Stevens_, Federal Emergency Management Agency, Region IX
+_John Sucich_, Federal Emergency Management Agency
+_Hurst Sutton_, Private Consultant
+_Richard Traub_, State of California, OES Region I
+_Monica L. Turner_, United States Geological Survey
+_Robert E. Wallace_, United States Geological Survey
+_Kay M. Walz_, United States Geological Survey
+_William W. Ward_, State of California, OES Region II
+_Robert R. Wilson_, Federal Emergency Management Agency
+_Robert P. Yerkes_, United States Geological Survey
+_Mark D. Zoback_, United States Geological Survey
+
+
+ * * * * *
+
+
+
+
+
+
+End of the Project Gutenberg EBook of An Assessment of the Consequences and
+Preparations for a Catastrophic California Earthquake: Findings and Actions Taken, by Various
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