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diff --git a/18527.txt b/18527.txt new file mode 100644 index 0000000..7427c4a --- /dev/null +++ b/18527.txt @@ -0,0 +1,2872 @@ +The Project Gutenberg EBook of An Assessment of the Consequences and +Preparations for a Catastrophic California Earthquake: Findings and Actions Taken, by Various + +This eBook is for the use of anyone anywhere at no cost and with +almost no restrictions whatsoever. You may copy it, give it away or +re-use it under the terms of the Project Gutenberg License included +with this eBook or online at www.gutenberg.org + + +Title: An Assessment of the Consequences and Preparations for a Catastrophic California Earthquake: Findings and Actions Taken + Prepared By Federal Emergency Management Agency + +Author: Various + +Release Date: June 7, 2006 [EBook #18527] + +Language: English + +Character set encoding: ASCII + +*** START OF THIS PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK CALIFORNIA EARTHQUAKE *** + + + + +Produced by Jeannie Howse and the Online Distributed +Proofreading Team at http://www.pgdp.net + + + + + + + * * * * * + + +-----------------------------------------------------------------+ + | Transcriber's Note: | + | | + | In this document, _italics_ are represented as underscores, | + | =bold text= is marked with equals signs, and bullets are | + | represented as " | + | | + | One of the tables in this document is very wide (80 characters) | + | | + +-----------------------------------------------------------------+ + + * * * * * + + + + +AN ASSESSMENT OF THE CONSEQUENCES +AND PREPARATIONS FOR A CATASTROPHIC +CALIFORNIA EARTHQUAKE: +FINDINGS AND ACTIONS TAKEN + + +PREPARED BY +FEDERAL EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT AGENCY +FROM ANALYSES CARRIED OUT BY THE +NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL +ad hoc COMMITTEE ON ASSESSMENT OF +CONSEQUENCES AND PREPARATIONS FOR +A MAJOR CALIFORNIA EARTHQUAKE + + + +[Illustration: fema symbol +federal emergency +management agency] + +Washington, D.C. 20472 +November 1980 + + + + +TABLE OF CONTENTS + + + Page + +CHAPTER: + + I. Executive Summary of Findings, Issues, and Actions 1 + + II. Geologic Earthquake Scenarios 15 + +III. Assessment of Losses for Selected Potential + California Earthquakes 21 + + IV. An Assessment of the Current State of Readiness + Capability of Federal, State, and Local + Governments for Earthquake Response 27 + + V. An Assessment of the Social Impacts 35 + + +ANNEX: + + 1. Copies of Correspondence Between President + Carter and Governor Brown 37 + + 2. Current California and Federal Earthquake + Response Planning 43 + + 3. California Assembly Bill No. 2202 53 + + +ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS 57 + + + + +CHAPTER I + +EXECUTIVE SUMMARY OF FINDINGS, ISSUES, AND ACTIONS + + +A. BACKGROUND + +After viewing the destruction wrought by the eruption of Mt. St. +Helens in Washington State in May 1980, President Carter became +concerned about the impacts of a similar event of low probability but +high damage potential, namely a catastrophic earthquake in California, +and the state of readiness to cope with the impacts of such an event. + +As a result of the President's concern, an _ad hoc_ committee of the +National Security Council was formed to conduct a government review of +the consequences of, and preparation for such an event. In addition to +the Federal Emergency Management Agency, the Committee included +representatives from the Office of Science and Technology Policy, the +United States Geological Survey of the Department of the Interior, the +Department of Defense, the Department of Transportation, and the +National Communications System, at the Federal level; State of +California agencies and California local governments at the State and +local levels; and consultants from the private sector. During the +summer of 1980, the participants in this review prepared working papers +on relevant issues and problem areas for the consideration of the _ad +hoc_ committee. Pertinent facts, conclusions and recommendations were +reviewed with the Governor of the State of California. The President +reviewed the _ad hoc_ committee's findings and approved the +recommendations for Federal action. This report summarizes the results +of the assessment and notes these actions. + +A number of Federal legislative and administrative actions have been +taken to bring about, in the near future, an increased capability to +respond to such an event. The Earthquake Hazards Reduction Act of 1977 +(P.L. 95-124) authorizes a coordinated and structured program to +identify earthquake risks and prepare to lessen or mitigate their +impacts by a variety of means. The coordination of this program, the +National Earthquake Hazards Reduction Program (NEHRP), is the +responsibility of the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), +which is charged with focusing Federal efforts to respond to +emergencies of all types and lessen their impacts before they occur. +The NEHRP has six high-priority thrusts: + + " Overall coordination of Federal departments and agencies' + programs + + " Maintenance of a comprehensive program of research and + development for earthquake prediction and hazards + mitigation + + " Leadership and support of the Federal Interagency + Committee on Seismic Safety in Construction as it develops + seismic design and construction standards for use in + Federal projects + + " Development of response plans and assistance to State and + local governments in the preparation of their plans + + " Analysis of the ability of financial institutions to + perform their functions after a creditable prediction of + an earthquake as well as after an event, together with an + exploration of the feasibility of using these institutions + to foster hazard reduction + + " An examination of the appropriate role of insurance in + mitigating the impacts of earthquakes. + +More recently, a cooperative Federal, State, local, and private-sector +effort was initiated to prepare for responding to a credible +large-magnitude earthquake, or its prediction, in Southern California. + + +B. SUMMARY + +The review provided the overall assessment that the Nation is +essentially unprepared for the catastrophic earthquake (with a +probability greater than 50 percent) that must be expected in +California in the next three decades. While current response plans and +preparedness measures may be adequate for moderate earthquakes, +Federal, State, and local officials agree that preparations are +woefully inadequate to cope with the damage and casualties from a +catastrophic earthquake, and with the disruptions in communications, +social fabric, and governmental structure that may follow. Because of +the large concentration of population and industry, the impacts of +such an earthquake would surpass those of any natural disaster thus +far experienced by the Nation. Indeed, the United States has not +suffered any disaster of this magnitude on its own territory since the +Civil War. + +The basis for this overall assessment is summarized below and +discussed in more detail in the subsequent chapters of this report. + + +C. LIKELIHOOD OF FUTURE EARTHQUAKES + +Earth scientists unanimously agree on the inevitability of major +earthquakes in California. The gradual movement of the Pacific Plate +relative to the North American Plate leads to the inexorable +concentration of strain along the San Andreas and related fault +systems. While some of this strain is released by moderate and smaller +earthquakes and by slippage without earthquakes, geologic studies +indicate that the vast bulk of the strain is released through the +occurrence of major earthquakes--that is, earthquakes with Richter +magnitudes of 7.0 and larger and capable of widespread damage in a +developed region. Along the Southern San Andreas fault, some 30 miles +from Los Angeles, for example, geologists can demonstrate that at +least eight major earthquakes have occurred in the past 1,200 years +with an average spacing in time of 140 years, plus or minus 30 years. +The last such event occurred in 1857. Based on these statistics and +other geophysical observations, geologists estimate that the +probability for the recurrence of a similar earthquake is currently as +large as 2 to 5 percent per year and greater than 50 percent in the +next 30 years. Geologic evidence also indicates other faults capable +of generating major earthquakes in other locations near urban centers +in California, including San Francisco-Oakland, the immediate Los +Angeles region, and San Diego. Seven potential events have been +postulated for purposes of this review and are discussed in chapter +II. The current estimated probability for a major earthquake in these +other locations is smaller, but significant. The aggregate probability +for a catastrophic earthquake in the whole of California in the next +three decades is well in excess of 50 percent. + + +D. CASUALTIES AND PROPERTY DAMAGE + +Casualties and property damage estimates for four of the most likely +catastrophic earthquakes in California were prepared to form a basis +for emergency preparedness and response. Chapter III gives details on +these estimates. Deaths and injuries would occur principally because +of the failure of man-made structures, particularly older, multistory, +and unreinforced brick masonry buildings built before the adoption of +earthquake-resistant building codes. Experience has shown that some +modern multistory buildings--constructed as recently as the late +1960's but not adequately designed or erected to meet the current +understanding of requirements for seismic resistance--are also subject +to failure. Strong ground shaking, which is the primary cause of +damage during earthquakes, often extends over vast areas. For example, +in an earthquake similar to that which occurred in 1857, strong ground +shaking (above the threshold for causing damage) would extend in a +broad strip along the Southern San Andreas fault, about 250 miles long +and 100 miles wide, and include almost all of the Los Angeles-San +Bernardino metropolitan area, and all of Ventura, Santa Barbara, San +Luis Obispo, and Kern counties. + +For the most probable catastrophic earthquake--a Richter magnitude 8+ +earthquake similar to that of 1857, which occurred along the Southern +San Andreas fault--estimates of fatalities range from about 3,000, if +the earthquake were to occur at 2:30 a.m. when the population is +relatively safe at home, to more than 13,000, if the earthquake were to +occur at 4:30 p.m. on a weekday, when much of the population is either +in office buildings or on the streets. Injuries serious enough to +require hospitalization under normal circumstances are estimated to be +about four times as great as fatalities. For the less likely prospect +of a Richter magnitude 7.5 earthquake on the Newport-Inglewood fault in +the immediate Los Angeles area, fatalities are estimated to be about +4,000 to 23,000, at the same respective times. Such an earthquake, +despite its smaller magnitude, would be more destructive because of its +relative proximity to the most heavily developed regions; however, the +probability of this event is estimated to be only about 0.1 percent per +year. Smaller magnitude--and consequently less damaging--earthquakes +are anticipated with greater frequency on a number of fault systems in +California. + +In either of these earthquakes, casualties could surpass the previous +single greatest loss of life in the United States due to a natural +disaster, which was about 6,000 persons killed when a hurricane and +storm surge struck the Galveston area of the Texas coast in 1900. The +highest loss of life due to earthquakes in the United States occurred +in San Francisco in 1906, when 700 people were killed. By way of +comparison (in spite of the vast differences in building design and +practices and socioeconomic systems) the devastating 1976 Tangshan +earthquake in China caused fatalities ranging from the official +Chinese Government figure of 242,000 to unofficial estimates as high +as 700,000. Fortunately, building practices in the United States +preclude such a massive loss of life. + +Property losses are expected to be higher than in any past earthquake +in the United States. For example, San Francisco in 1906, and +Anchorage in 1964, were both much less developed than today when they +were hit by earthquakes. And the San Fernando earthquake in 1971, was +only a moderate shock that struck on the fringe of a large urban area. +Each of these three earthquakes caused damage estimated at about $0.5 +billion in the then current dollars. Estimates of property damage for +the most probable catastrophic earthquake on the Southern San Andreas +(Richter magnitude 8+) and for the less probable but more damaging one +(Richter magnitude 7.5) on the Newport-Inglewood fault, are about $15 +billion and $70 billion respectively. By comparison, tropical storm +Agnes caused the largest economic loss due to a natural disaster in +the United States to date but it amounted to only $3.5 billion (in +1972 dollars). + +It should be noted, however, that substantial uncertainty exists in +casualty and property damage estimates because they are based on +experience with only moderate earthquakes in the United States (such +as the 1971 San Fernando earthquake) and experience in other countries +where buildings are generally less resistant to damage. The +uncertainty is so large that the estimated impacts could be off by a +factor of two or three, either too high or too low. Even if these +lowest estimates prevail, however, the assessment about preparedness +and the capability to respond to the disasters discussed in this +report would be substantially unchanged. + +Assuming a catastrophic earthquake, a variety of secondary problems +could also be expected. Search and rescue operations--requiring heavy +equipment to move debris--would be needed to free people trapped in +collapsed buildings. It is likely that injuries, particularly those +immediately after the event, could overwhelm medical capabilities, +necessitating a system of allocating medical resources to those who +could be helped the most. Numerous local fires must be expected; +nevertheless, a conflagration such as that which followed the Tokyo +earthquake of 1923, or the San Francisco earthquake of 1906, is +improbable, unless a "Santa Ana type" wind pattern is in effect. Since +the near failure of a dam in the San Fernando, California, earthquake +of 1971 (which was a moderate event), substantial progress has been +made in California to reduce the hazard from dams, in some cases +through reconstruction. For planning purposes, however, experts +believe that the failure of at least one dam should be anticipated +during a catastrophic earthquake in either the Los Angeles or San +Francisco regions. + +Experience in past earthquakes, particularly the 1971 San Fernando +earthquake, has demonstrated the potential vulnerability of commercial +telephone service to earthquakes, including the possibility of damage +to switching facilities from ground shaking and rupture of underground +cables that cross faults. This is especially serious because +immediately following earthquakes, public demand for telephone +services increases drastically. This increased demand overloads the +capability of the system, even if it had not been damaged, and +therefore management action to reduce the availability of service to +non-priority users and to accommodate emergency calls is mandatory. +Radio-based communication systems, particularly those not requiring +commercial power, are relatively safe from damage, although some must +be anticipated. The redundancy of existing communication systems, +including those designed for emergency use, means that some capability +for communicating with the affected region from the outside would +almost surely exist. Restoration of service by the commercial carriers +should begin within 24 to 72 hours as a result of maintenance and +management actions; however, total restoration of service would take +significantly longer. + +While numerous agencies have the capability for emergency +communication within themselves, non-telephonic communication among +entities and agencies in the affected area is minimal. This is true +for Federal, State, and local agencies. This weakness has been pointed +out repeatedly by earthquake response exercises, and the problem is +raised by almost every emergency preparedness official at every level +of government. Consequently, a major problem for resolution is the +operational integration of communications systems and networks among +the relevant Federal, State, and local agencies. + +Because of their network-like character, most systems for +transportation and water and power generation and distribution, as a +whole, are resistant to failure, despite potentially severe local +damage. These systems would suffer serious local outages, particularly +in the first several days after the event, but would resume service +over a few weeks to months. The principal difficulty would be the +greatly increased need for these systems in the first few days after +the event, when lifesaving activities would be paramount. + +Portions of the San Francisco Bay Area and of the Los Angeles Area +contain substantial concentrations of manufacturing capacity for +guided missiles and space vehicles, semiconductors, aircraft parts, +electronic computing equipment, and airframes. Their specific +vulnerability to the postulated earthquakes was not analyzed. In the +event of major damage, however, the long-term impacts may be mitigated +somewhat by such measures as the use of underutilized capacity located +elsewhere, substitution of capacity from other industries, imports, +use of other products, and drawing-down of inventories. + +Since we have not recently experienced a catastrophic earthquake in +the United States, there are many unknowns which must be estimated +with best judgment. This is true particularly for the response of +individuals as well as governmental and other institutions. Popular +assumptions of post-disaster behavior include antisocial behavior and +the need for martial law, the breakdown of government institutions, +and the requirement for the quick assertion of outside leadership and +control. Practical experience and field studies of disasters, however, +indicate that these assumptions are not necessarily correct. On the +contrary, the impacts of the disaster commonly produce a sense of +solidarity and cooperativeness among the survivors. Nonetheless, the +perception remains among emergency response officials that there will +be an increased need for law enforcement following the event. + +Another major unknown involves whether a medium or short-term warning +of the event would be possible and how such a warning could be +utilized most effectively. The technology for earthquake prediction is +in an early stage of development and, therefore it is problematical +that researchers will succeed in issuing a short-term warning before a +catastrophic earthquake, should the event occur in the next few +years. Yet as research progresses, scientifically-based, +intermediate-term warnings are possible, but subject to a high degree +of uncertainty. Consequently, response preparations must be made for +both an earthquake without warning, and one with a short-or +intermediate-term warning, possibly with a significant level of +uncertainty. + + +E. CAPABILITY FOR RESPONSE + +Planning for response to a large-scale disaster is a complicated +process encompassing many variables such as population densities and +distribution characteristics; land-use patterns and construction +techniques; geographical configurations; vulnerability of +transportation; communications and other lifeline systems; complex +response operations; long-term physical, social, and economic recovery +policies. These factors, together with the realization that an +earthquake has the potential for being the greatest single-event +catastrophe in California, make it incumbent upon the State to +maintain as high a level of emergency readiness as is practicable, and +to provide guidance and assistance to local jurisdictions desiring to +plan and prepare for such events. Annex 2 reviews the general nature +of preparedness planning and the basic characteristics of California +and Federal Government plans. + +Federal, State, and local emergency response capabilities are judged +to be adequate for moderate earthquakes--those that are most likely to +occur frequently in California and cause property damage in the range +of $1 billion. Such an event, however, would severely tax existing +resources and provide a major test of management relationships among +different governmental levels. Federal, State, and local officials, +however, are quick to point out serious shortcomings in their ability +to respond to a catastrophic earthquake. An analysis of the +preparedness posture of 60 local governments, 34 California State +organizations, and 17 Federal agencies, carried out by the California +Office of Emergency Services (OES) and FEMA, indicates that response +to such an earthquake would become disorganized and largely +ineffective. Many governmental units have generalized earthquake +response plans, some have tailored earthquake plans, and several plans +are regularly exercised. The coordination of these plans among +jurisdictions, agencies, and levels of government, however, is +inadequate. In addition, the potential for prediction is not +incorporated; long-term recovery issues are not considered; and +communications problems are significant, as discussed above. Overall, +Federal preparedness is deficient at this time. Early reaction to a +catastrophic event would likely be characterized by delays, +ineffective response, and ineffectively coordinated delivery of +support. + +FEMA Region IX (San Francisco) has drafted an Earthquake Response Plan +for the San Francisco Bay area. Annex 2 gives an overview of this +draft plan. This is a site-specific plan for response to potential +catastrophic earthquake occurrences. The emergency response portion +relies upon a decentralized approach which provides for Federal +disaster support activities to be assigned to selected Federal +agencies by mission assignment letters. No specific plans have been +prepared in this detail for other seismic risk areas, although it is +expected that the Bay Area plan could be easily adapted to other +areas. The Department of Defense and the Department of Transportation +are developing detailed earthquake plans that would ensure a +well-organized and adequate response to mission assignments for a +major earthquake. The plans of other agencies need further +development. + +Very significant capabilities to assist in emergency response exist +within the California National Guard, California Highway Patrol, the +Departments of Health Services and Transportation, and the U.S. +Department of Defense. Capabilities exist for such lifesaving +activities as _aerial reconnaissance, search and rescue, emergency +medical services, emergency construction and repair, communications, +and emergency housing and food_. Current estimates by both Federal and +State officials, however, indicate that at least 6 to 8 hours would be +required before personnel and equipment can be mobilized and begin +initial deployment to the affected area. During the period before the +arrival of significant outside assistance critical to the saving of +lives (especially of those trapped in collapsed buildings), the public +would be forced to rely largely upon its own resources for search and +rescue, first aid, and general lifesaving actions. The current level +of public preparation for this critical phase of response can be +described as only minimal. Much of the current state of preparedness +arises from past programs aimed at a wide spectrum of emergencies, +particularly civil defense against nuclear attack. New or strengthened +programs are needed to enhance public preparedness. + +FEMA has recently entered into a cooperative effort with California +State and local governments to prepare an integrated prototype +preparedness plan to respond to a catastrophic earthquake in Southern +California or to a prediction of such an event. The plan's completion, +in late 1981, promises to improve substantially the state of readiness +to respond to the prediction and the occurrence of an earthquake in +that area and to provide a model which could be applied to other +earthquake-prone regions of California and the rest of the country. + + +F. FINDINGS, ISSUES, AND ACTIONS + +The _ad hoc_ committee responsible for this review developed several +significant findings related to the implications of major earthquakes +in California and our capabilities to respond to them. It then +identified major relevant issues raised by these findings and caused a +number of actions to be taken. A brief discussion of the results of +its review follows. + + +1. Leadership + +=Finding=: _Effective leadership at all governmental levels is the +single most important factor needed to improve this Nation's +preparedness for a catastrophic earthquake in California._ The problem +of emergency preparedness is severely complicated because +responsibilities for preparation and response cut across normal lines +of authority. Further complication arises from the large areal extent +of the impacts expected from a major earthquake, affecting literally +dozens of government entities. The emergency services coordinator at +any level of government is effective only to the extent he or she is +backed by the political leadership at that level. This is especially +true when preparedness activities must be done, for the most part, +within existing resources. City and county officials must increasingly +accept their share of the responsibility for preparedness, but +commitment by State or Federal leaders is also essential. The general +tendency among elected officials and the public is to ignore the +existing hazard problem. Experience, however, teaches that effective +response mechanisms must be in place before the disaster; they cannot +be developed in the time of crisis. Overcoming this apathy and +developing the organizational arrangements among Federal, State, and +local government and volunteer agencies--together with the private +sector and the general public will require, above all, leadership. + + =Issue=: The leadership role of the Federal Government in + preparing for a catastrophic earthquake in California and + how this leadership role is to be exerted require + clarification. + + =Action=: The President has communicated with the + Governor of California to indicate the results of this + review, to express concern about the need for cooperative + leadership to prepare for the event, and to offer to + increase the Federal effort with the State of California + and local governments in the cooperative undertaking to + prepare for a catastrophic earthquake. He stressed that + the Federal role is to supplement the effort and + resources of the State, and that commitment of + significant Federal resources would be contingent upon + the application of significant State resources. In his + response to the President's communications, the Governor + of California underscored the State's readiness to + participate in this cooperative effort and announced his + signing into law a measure that would provide substantial + State resources (see annex 1). A summary of the new law + (A.B. 2202) is contained in annex 3. + + +2. Management of Preparedness and Response Activities + +=Finding=: _Preparedness must be developed as a partnership between +Federal, State, and local governments with improvements needed at all +levels_, as none have the resources or authorities to solve the +problem alone. + + =Issue=: Since the Nation faces a very probable earthquake + in California sometime during the next 30 years, FEMA + should provide the necessary leadership, management, and + coordination required to strengthen planning and + preparedness within the Federal Government, as delegated + under the National Earthquake Hazards Reduction Program of + 1977 and the Disaster Relief Act of 1974. In this effort, + FEMA requires the support and assistance of numerous other + Federal agencies. + + =Actions=: FEMA is taking steps to: + + " Strengthen significantly its management, research, + application, and coordination functions, as delegated + under the National Earthquake Hazards Reduction Program + and Disaster Relief Act. + + " Lead other agencies in the development of a + comprehensive preparedness strategy detailing specific + objectives and assignments, and periodically monitor + accomplishments in meeting assigned responsibilities. + + Departments and agencies with appropriate capabilities + will provide needed support to FEMA in strengthening + Federal preparedness and hazard mitigation programs. + + =Issue=: A major deficiency that has been identified is the + potential for delay following a catastrophic earthquake in + processing a request for a Presidential declaration of a + major disaster, and the subsequent initiation of full-scale + Federal support for lifesaving actions. The first few hours + are critical in saving the lives of people trapped in + collapsed buildings; consequently, this is when Federal + support is needed most. Decisions on post-event recovery + aspects of Federal assistance can be deferred until + lifesaving operations are underway and sufficient + information about damage is in hand. + + =Action=: FEMA will develop and negotiate, before the + event, an agreement with the State of California which + will enable the President to declare a major disaster and + initiate full-scale Federal support for lifesaving and + humanitarian action within minutes of a catastrophic + earthquake. The agreement will defer resolution of issues + relating to longer-term restoration and recovery and + similar questions with large budgetary implications until + adequate damage estimates are available. The Executive + Branch will thus be able to arrive at an informed + decision. + + =Issue=: Significant improvements in the Federal, State, + and local capability for coordination of operational + response to a catastrophic earthquake are needed. + + =Actions=: FEMA and other appropriate Federal agencies will + increase their efforts, in a partnership with appropriate + State and local agencies and volunteer and private-sector + organizations, to: + + " Complete development and agreement on fully integrated + earthquake response plans for both the San Francisco + and Los Angeles regions, including provision for + predicted as well as unpredicted earthquakes, building + upon the existing draft plan for San Francisco. + + " Establish a small FEMA staff in California dedicated to + the coordination of earthquake preparedness planning and + implementation. + + " Develop improved mechanisms for the coordination of + medical and mortuary activities following a catastrophic + earthquake. + + " Identify and document the critical requirements for + emergency communications--particularly non-telephonic + communications--among Federal, State, and local + agencies. Shortfalls between critical requirements and + current capabilities, as well as remedial actions or + recommended solutions for each will be identified in + accordance with the "National Plan for Communications + Support in Emergencies and Major Disasters." This + review will include consideration of using existing + satellite communications or a dedicated system, should + it be found necessary. + + " Cooperatively conduct practice response exercises with + State and local officials that will prepare officials + and the public for conditions that might be encountered + in a catastrophic earthquake and that would reveal + deficiencies in planning. + + =Issue=: Improving the current inadequate preparedness of + the public for a catastrophic earthquake requires a + substantial increase in public information and public + awareness. Although public information is primarily a + State, local, and private-sector responsibility, the + Federal Government has a role as well. Because citizens + will have no choice but to rely largely upon their own + resources in the first several hours immediately following + a catastrophic earthquake, it is important that certain + basic knowledge about lifesaving measures be very widely + disseminated. + + =Action=: FEMA will stimulate and work with the State of + California and other appropriate groups to develop and + publicize earthquake awareness, hazard mitigation + techniques, specific post-earthquake actions to be taken, + including first aid, and other pertinent information. + + =Issue=: The possibility of a credible, + scientifically-based prediction of a catastrophic + earthquake poses serious challenges to government and our + society. The current level of scientific understanding of + earthquake prediction and the available resources are such + that present instrumentation efforts are directed toward + research rather than maintaining extensive monitoring + networks for real-time prediction. The transition from + research to fully operational capability will require + additional scientific understanding as well as resources. + Earthquake predictions are possible, perhaps likely, + however, from the current research effort. Even with a + significant level of uncertainty, any scientifically + credible prediction that indicates a catastrophic + earthquake is expected within about 1 year or less, will + require very difficult and consequential decisions on the + part of elected officials at all levels of government. + Decisions may include such possibilities as the + mobilization of National Guard and U.S. Department of + Defense resources prior to the event, the imposition of + special procedures or drills at potentially hazardous + facilities, such as nuclear reactors or dams, the + condemnation or evacuation of particularly unsafe buildings + with the subsequent need for temporary housing, and the + provisions of special protection of fragile inventories. If + the prediction is correct and appropriate actions are + taken, thousands of lives can be saved and significant + economic losses can be avoided. The costs of responding to + a prediction may be substantial, however, and the + commitment of resources undoubtedly will have to be made in + the face of considerable uncertainty and even reluctance. + Indeed, the possibility of an inaccurate prediction must be + faced squarely. + + =Actions=: FEMA, in conjunction with other appropriate + Federal agencies, State and local governments, and + volunteer and private-sector organizations, will increase + its actions to develop procedures for responding to a + credible, scientific earthquake prediction, including: + + " Identification of constructive and prudent actions to + be taken + + " Analysis of the costs and benefits of various + alternative actions + + " Identification of roles and responsibilities in deciding + which actions should be implemented and by whom + + " Criteria for evaluating circumstances when the provision + of Federal assistance would be appropriate + + The U.S. Geological Survey of the Department of the + Interior will: + + " Maintain a sound and well-balanced program of research + in earthquake prediction and hazard assessment based + upon a carefully considered strategic plan + + " Work with State and local officials and FEMA to develop + improved mechanisms for the transmission of earthquake + predictions and related information, and to plan for the + utilization of the capability for earthquake prediction + + +3. Resources + +=Finding=: While leadership and management are essential ingredients to +achieve an adequate earthquake preparedness posture, _the availability +of adequate staffing and resources at all levels of government +determines the efficacy of agency programs and initiatives_. In many +agencies, earthquake preparedness has been accorded a low priority in +their programs. This is a manifestation of a more general problem of +minimal agency resource allocation to emergency preparedness. The +results of the actions that have been indicated will be limited unless +additional resources are made available. + + =Issue=: Additional resources should be provided as + necessary to accelerate the earthquake hazard mitigation + and preparedness activities under the National Earthquake + Hazards Reduction Program. + + =Action=: FEMA has reassessed its priorities and is + allocating resources to increase the staffing, funding, + and management attention and direction for earthquake + hazards mitigation, including preparations for a + catastrophic earthquake in California. This includes an + increase of staff resources in FEMA Region IX for + Federal, State, and local coordination of planning, + preparedness, and mitigation. Resource needs that cannot + be fully met by the reassessment and reallocation for + Fiscal Year 1981 should be identified and justified along + with needs for Fiscal Year 1982 in the course of the + budget submissions for Fiscal Year 1982. To facilitate an + adequate and balanced response by other Federal agencies, + FEMA will provide timely guidance to other agencies on + specific priorities for this effort in relation to other + major preparedness goals. The Office of Management and + Budget and the Office of Science and Technology Policy + will work together to develop a cross-agency ranking of + budgetary resources for earthquake preparedness for + Fiscal Year 1982. + + + + +CHAPTER II + +GEOLOGIC EARTHQUAKE SCENARIOS + + +A. MAJOR EVENTS + +For purposes of assessing the consequences of a major California +earthquake, scenarios for seven large earthquakes were developed. The +scenarios depict expectable earthquakes that could severely impact on +the major population centers of California. In each case they are +representative of only one possible magnitude of earthquake that could +occur on the indicated fault system. On each fault system there is a +greater probability of one or more damaging earthquakes of somewhat +smaller magnitude than the postulated event. The postulated +earthquakes are listed in the following table. + + +TABLE 1 + +MAJOR CALIFORNIA EARTHQUAKES + +------------------------------------------------------------------------- + Current + Annual Likelihood + Probability of + of Occurrence + Richter Occurrence in Next +Region Fault System Magnitude[1] (Percent) 20-30 Years +------------------------------------------------------------------------- + +Los Angeles- Southern +San Bernardino San Andreas 8.3 2-5 High + +San Francisco Northern +Bay Area San Andreas 8.3 1 Moderate + +San Francisco +Bay Area Hayward 7.4 1 Moderate + +Los Angeles Newport- Moderate + Inglewood 7.5 0.1 -Low + +San Diego Rose Canyon 7.0 0.01 Low + +Riverside Moderate- +San Bernardino Cucamonga 6.8 0.1 Low + +Los Angeles Santa Monica 6.7 0.01 Low +------------------------------------------------------------------------- + [1] This is the estimated largest magnitude earthquake expected + at a reasonable level of probability. The main shock can be + expected to be followed by large aftershocks over a period of + weeks or longer. Each large aftershock would be capable of + producing additional significant damage and hampering disaster + assistance operations. +------------------------------------------------------------------------- + +These earthquake scenarios represent the largest magnitude events +estimated on the basis of a variety of geologic assumptions. The +appropriateness of these assumptions depends on the intent of the +analysis and the state of geologic knowledge. Therefore, the resulting +estimates may not be appropriate for other purposes, such as the +development of seismic design criteria for a specific site. The +development of such criteria commonly requires detailed analyses of +the site and its immediate geologic environment beyond the scope of +this report. Consequently, detailed site analyses may require +modification of the conclusions reached in this report, particularly +fault systems other than the San Andreas and Hayward faults. + + +B. GEOLOGIC EVIDENCE + +Some of the possible earthquakes listed are repeat occurrences of +historical events, others are not, but geologic evidence indicates +that earthquakes occurred on these faults before settlement of the +region. Based on available data, the postulated earthquake magnitudes +would be the largest events that could be expected at a reasonable +level of probability. They represent a selection of events useful for +planning purposes, but are by no means the only such events likely to +occur either on these or other fault systems. + +The historic record of seismicity in California is too short to +determine confidently how often large earthquakes reoccur. Information +on past earthquakes must be gleaned from the geologic record and +therefore, presents a picture of past seismicity that is incomplete +and not yet fully deciphered. Current knowledge about the recurrence +of large earthquakes on specific faults is rudimentary. The +probabilities of occurrence shown above are order-of-magnitude +estimates and subject to considerable uncertainty, especially for the +less probable events. + + +C. DESCRIPTION OF EVENTS + +Following are brief descriptions of postulated events. Figure 1 gives +their geographic location. + + + 1. Los Angeles-San Bernardino/Southern San Andreas Fault + (Magnitude 8.3) + + For the past several thousand years, great earthquakes have been +occurring over a 300 km length of the San Andreas fault approximately +every 100 to 200 years, 140 years on the average. The last such event +took place in 1857. The probability of occurrence of this earthquake +is estimated to be currently as large as 2 to 5 percent per year and +greater than 50 percent in the next 30 years. The fault skirts the +edge of the Los Angeles-San Bernardino metropolitan region, thus most +of the urbanized area lies further than 20 miles from the source of +strong shaking. Because of the distance, shaking would be more +hazardous for large structures than for one- to two-story houses. The +long duration of shaking could trigger numerous slides on steep +slopes and cause liquefaction in isolated areas. + + + 2. San Francisco Bay Area/Northern San Andreas Fault + (Magnitude 8.3) + + A repeat occurrence of the 1906 earthquake, in which the San +Andreas fault broke over 400 km of its length, would cause severe +damage to structures throughout the Bay Area and adjacent regions. The +extensive urban development on lowlands and landfill around San +Francisco Bay would be especially hard hit and liquefaction in many of +these areas would intensify the damage to structures erected on them. + + + 3. San Francisco Bay Area/Hayward Fault (Magnitude 7.4) + + The last large events to occur on this fault were in 1836 and +1868. Should a major earthquake occur, severe ground shaking and +liquefaction is expected to cause damage throughout the entire +circum-bay area nearly as severe as that resulting from a 1906-type +earthquake on the San Andreas fault. This earthquake would be of +particular concern because of the many dams located along or near the +fault. + + + 4. Los Angeles/Newport-Inglewood Fault (Magnitude 7.5) + + This earthquake would be a serious threat to the nearby, +densely-populated areas of Los Angeles. Shaking would cause extensive +structural damage throughout the Los Angeles Basin and liquefaction +near the coast would add still more destruction. + + + 5. San Diego Area/Rose Canyon Fault (Magnitude 7.0) + + This fault--a segment of an active zone of faults extending from +the Newport-Inglewood fault to Northern Mexico--would present the +greatest earthquake risk to the San Diego area. Severe damage due to +shaking and liquefaction could be expected in the coastal areas. +Because of unstable sea-bed sediments in the offshore area, local +tsunamis (tidal waves) are possible. + + + 6. Los Angeles/Santa Monica Fault (Magnitude 6.7 and 7.0) and + Riverside/San Bernardino/Cucamonga Fault (Magnitude 6.8) + + These faults are part of a system of east-west tending faults +bordering the northern edge of the Los Angeles basin. This fault +system caused the 1971 San Fernando earthquake and is geologically +similar to the system that generated the large 1952 Kern County +earthquake. Although smaller in magnitude than the earthquakes +previously described, these postulated events are potentially quite +dangerous because of their vicinity to high population densities in +Southern California. + + +D. EARTHQUAKE EFFECTS + +Detailed maps were prepared for each event showing qualitative +estimates of ground shaking intensity resulting from each earthquake. +These estimates are indicative of the general severity of damage to +ordinary structures. Empirical formulae providing quantitative +estimates of peak ground motion at various distances from the +postulated earthquakes were developed for use in the effects of +severe ground shaking on individual structures or critical +facilities. No estimates were made of localized effects, such as +ground failures related to liquefaction (the complete failure or loss +of strength, of a saturated soil due to shaking), landslides, and +fault rupture. These effects can be far more destructive than ground +shaking alone. + +[Illustration: Figure 1. Geographic Locations of Selected Regional +Events] + + + + +CHAPTER III + +ASSESSMENT OF LOSSES FOR SELECTED POTENTIAL CALIFORNIA EARTHQUAKES + + +A. INTRODUCTION + +As part of a program that FEMA and its predecessor agencies have had +underway for a number of years, property loss and casualty estimates +were prepared in 1972 and 1973 for a number of potential maximum +credible earthquakes that could impact on the San Francisco and the +Los Angeles areas--North San Andreas (Richter magnitude 8.3), Hayward +(Richter magnitude 7.4), South San Andreas (Richter magnitude 8.3), +and Newport-Inglewood (Richter magnitude 7.5). These estimates have +now been updated as part of the current assessment. + +Estimates of property loss and casualties are based on the expected +type and distribution of damage for each postulated earthquake as +determined by the size and location of the earthquake and the +distribution and character of the buildings and structures within the +affected area. Methodologies for estimates of this type are +approximate at best. Consequently, the figures shown below may vary +upward or downward by as much as a factor of two or three. This degree +of uncertainty does not affect the validity of the conclusions of this +report, however, since there are greater uncertainties in all other +aspects of emergency response planning. + + +B. PROPERTY LOSS ESTIMATES + +The property loss estimates were obtained by first estimating the +total replacement dollar value of buildings and their contents, +multiplying them by percentage loss factors (inferred from the +anticipated strength of shaking in each county), and then summing to +obtain the aggregate loss. Included in the estimates are private as +well as Federal, State, and local government buildings, insured and +uninsured. Excluded from consideration is the replacement value of +transportation and communication facilities, dams, utility +installations, and special purpose structures (e.g., convention +centers and sports arenas). Also excluded is the potential damage +resulting from a major dam failure or the indirect dollar losses due +to such factors as higher unemployment, lower tax revenue, reduced +productivity, and stoppage of industrial production. Experience +indicates that indirect losses could be approximately equal to the +dollar amounts lost in buildings and their contents. The property loss +estimates for four postulated earthquakes on the faults listed below +are as follows. + + +TABLE 2 + +ESTIMATES OF PROPERTY LOSSES FOR REPRESENTATIVE EARTHQUAKES[1] + +-------------------------------------------------------------------------- + Loss to Loss of + Building Contents Total Loss +Fault ($ in Billions) ($ in Billions) ($ in Billions) +-------------------------------------------------------------------------- +Northern San Andreas 25 13 38 +Hayward 29 15 44 +Newport-Inglewood 45 24 69 +Southern San Andreas 11 6 17 +---------- + [1] Uncertain by a possible factor of two to three. +-------------------------------------------------------------------------- + + +C. CASUALTY ESTIMATES + +Deaths and injuries in these earthquakes principally would occur from +failures of man-made structures, particularly older, multistory, and +unreinforced brick masonry buildings built before the institution of +earthquake-resistant building codes. Experience has shown that some +modern multistory buildings--constructed as recently as the late +1960's, but not adequately designed or constructed to meet the current +understanding of requirements for seismic resistance--are also subject +to failure. Consequently, the number of fatalities will be strongly +influenced by the number of persons within high-occupancy buildings, +capable of collapsing, or by failure of other critical facilities such +as dams. Additional imponderables are the degree of saturation of the +ground at the time of the event and the possibility of weather +conditions conducive to the spread of fire. A conflagration such as +occurred in the 1906 San Francisco earthquake, is not considered +likely to occur in any of the analyzed events, however, because of +improvements in fire resistance of construction and firefighting +techniques. Nonetheless, numerous smaller fires must be anticipated in +any of the analyzed events and a "Santa Ana type" wind could cause +serious problems. + +An additional element of uncertainty in estimating casualties from +earthquake stems from not knowing where most of the population will be +at the time of the earthquake. In the early morning (i.e., 2:30 a.m.) +most people are at home, by far the safest environment during a +seismic emergency. At 2:00 in the afternoon, on the other hand, the +majority of people are at their places of employment and therefore +vulnerable to collapse of office buildings. Around 4:30 p.m. many more +people are in the streets and thus subject to injury due to falling +debris or failures of transportation systems. Consequently, depending +on the time of day, wide variations in the number of casualties can be +expected. + +Following are estimates of dead and injured (requiring +hospitalization) for each of the four representative faults and for +the three time periods just discussed. + +TABLE 3 + +ESTIMATES OF CASUALTIES[1] + +------------------------------------------------------------------- +Fault Time Dead Hospitalized[2] +------------------------------------------------------------------- +Northern San Andreas 2:30 a.m. 3,000 12,000 + 2:00 p.m. 10,000 37,000 + 4:30 p.m. 11,000 44,000 + +Hayward 2:30 a.m. 3,000 13,000 + 2:00 p.m. 8,000 30,000 + 4:30 p.m. 7,000 27,000 + +Southern San Andreas 2:30 a.m. 3,000 12,000 + 2:00 p.m. 12,000 50,000 + 4:30 p.m. 14,000 55,000 + +Newport-Inglewood 2:30 a.m. 4,000 18,000 + 2:00 p.m. 21,000 83,000 + 4:30 p.m. 23,000 91,000 +---------- + [1] Uncertain by a possible factor of two to three. + + [2] Injuries not requiring hospitalization are estimated to be + from 15 to 30 times the number of deaths. +------------------------------------------------------------------- + + +D. OVERVIEW OF OTHER TYPES OF DAMAGE + +For this assessment, estimates of damage to substantial numbers of +different type facilities essential to the immediate response +capability were updated. Earthquakes associated with the same four +major fault systems identified earlier in this chapter were used as a +basis for these estimates. The types of facilities analyzed included +_hospitals_, _medical supply storages_, _blood banks_, and _custodial +care homes_, together with their essential services and personnel +resources. Although newer hospitals in California are being built +according to substantially improved seismic safety standards and +practices, older hospital facilities can be expected to be poorly +resistant to earthquakes. + +Among residential buildings, single family homes are expected to +suffer structural damage and loss of contents. Damage to multifamily +dwellings--particularly older buildings--would, in all likelihood, be +more extensive. Analysis of expected damage indicates that temporary +housing for as many as 200,000 families might be needed--a requirement +calling for careful planning and exceptional management skills. + +Schools are judged to be among the safest facilities exposed to the +earthquakes. Since passage of the Field Act in 1933, after the Long +Beach earthquake, school buildings in California have been +continuously improved to withstand seismic hazards. + +As a result of continuing and substantial upgrading of design and +construction practices in the past 10 years, dams and reservoirs can +be expected to show an improved performance in an earthquake. +Nonetheless, on a contingency basis, one dam failure might be assumed +for each planning effort. + +Realizing the fact that 84 key communications facilities, earth +stations, Department of Defense voice and data switches, commercial +transoceanic cable heads, Federal Telecommunications System switches, +and major direct distance dial switches are located within 55 miles of +either Los Angeles or San Francisco, damage must be expected to occur. +With this realization, priorities have been assigned to all critical +circuits transiting the key facilities, based on established criteria +of criticality of service continuity. _National warning systems +circuitry, command and control circuits, and circuits supporting +diplomatic negotiations_ (of which a high concentration exists in +California) are examples of those circuits carrying high-restoration +priority. + +In the civil sector there would be 24 to 72 hours of minimal +communications, with a possible blackout of telephonic communications +in the area immediately following an earthquake. The commercial +carriers would institute network control procedures to regain control +of the situation as fast as possible. + +The impact on transportation facilities in any of the four +hypothesized earthquakes could be massive. Since the magnitude and +severity is unprecedented in recent years, conclusions regarding +losses must be accepted as tentative. As in the case of hospitals, +however, the lessons learned in earthquakes during the past 10 years +are being incorporated in the design and construction of new +facilities. + +In general, all major transportation modes would be +affected--_highways_, _streets_, _overpasses and bridges_, _mass +transit systems_, _railroads_, _airports_, _pipelines_, and _ocean +terminals_, although major variances in losses are expected among the +modes. From a purely structural standpoint, the more rigid or elevated +systems (such as railroads and pipelines) which cross major faults on +an east-west axis would incur the heaviest damage, with initial losses +approaching 100 percent. Other major systems (such as highways, +airports, and pile-supported piers at water terminals) have better +survivability characteristics and therefore would fare much better, +with damage generally in the moderate range of 15 to 30 percent. These +transportation facility loss estimates are stated in terms of +immediate post-quake effects. They do not reflect the impact of +priority emergency recovery efforts and expedient alternatives that +are available, some within hours, to aid in restoration of +transportation capacity. In addition, transportation systems generally +have an inherently significant degree of redundancy and flexibility. +Consequently, an unquantified but significant movement capability in +all transport modes is expected to survive. Finally, these loss +estimates do not take into account the question of availability of +essential supporting resources, particularly petroleum fuels, +electricity, and communications. In the initial response phase, these +could prove to be the most limiting factors in the capability of the +transportation system. + +Business and industry would be affected by damage to office buildings, +plants, and other support facilities. Although the 1971 San Fernando +earthquake occurred on the margin of a largely suburban area, +industrial facilities incurred significant damage. For example, +several buildings of the kind commonly used for light industry or +warehouses suffered from collapsed roofs or walls. Generally, building +codes do not apply to special industrial facilities, and the ability +of these structures to resist earthquake shaking will depend largely +on the foresight of the design engineer. For example, a major +electrical power switching yard and a water filtration plant were +seriously damaged in the 1971 San Fernando earthquake. + +About 10 percent of the population and industrial resources of the +Nation are located in California. Over 85 percent of these resources +(or about 8.5 percent of the Nation's total) are located in the 21 +California counties that are subject to the possibility of damage from +a major earthquake. Much of the aerospace and electronics industry is +centered in California. For example, about 56 percent of the guided +missiles and space vehicles, 40 percent of the semiconductors, 25 +percent of the electronic computer equipment, and approximately 21 +percent of the optical instruments and lenses manufactured in the +Nation are manufactured in these 21 counties. The probability that all +these counties would be affected by one earthquake is extremely +remote; yet the significant concentration of key industries remains a +concern. For example, about 25 percent of the Nation's semiconductors +are manufactured in Santa Clara County, an area along the Northern San +Andres fault that suffered very heavy damage in the 1906 San Francisco +earthquake. Estimates of damage to these industrial facilities and the +resulting loss of production have not been made. Similarly, the +resulting impact of possible damage to national production has not +been adequately analyzed. + +Federally regulated financial institutions were generically analyzed +to determine their ability to continue to promote essential services +in the event of a major earthquake like those that have been +postulated for this assessment. The conclusion reached thus far is +that large-magnitude earthquakes pose no significant or unanticipated +problems of solvency and liquidity for such institutions. The Federal +Reserve System and other regulatory entities have procedures in place +that are designed--and have been tested--specifically to provide for +the continued operation of financial institutions immediately +following an earthquake or other emergency. + + + + +CHAPTER IV + +AN ASSESSMENT OF THE CURRENT STATE OF READINESS CAPABILITY OF FEDERAL, +STATE, AND LOCAL GOVERNMENTS FOR EARTHQUAKE RESPONSE + + +A. INTRODUCTION + +An earthquake of catastrophic magnitude, with or without credible +warning, happens suddenly. The potential for disaster, however, does +not occur suddenly. The degree of preparedness and commitment to +comprehensive planning and mitigation programs for the inevitable +event will largely determine the degree of hardship to be experienced +through loss of life, human suffering, property destruction, and the +other related economic, social, and psychological aspects of +disruption to day-to-day community activities. The impacts can be +reduced substantially from current expected levels through the +development and implementation of improved and more widely practiced +earthquake hazards reduction measures. These include _coordinated +emergency preparedness plans and procedures_, _earthquake prediction +and warning systems_, _improved construction techniques_, and +_effective public education and information programs_. + +The State of California Office of Emergency Services (OES) and FEMA +conducted an analysis of the readiness capability for potential +catastrophic earthquakes in California at the Federal, State, and +local government levels. The planning of 22 counties and 38 cities, of +34 State agencies, and of 17 Federal organizations were reviewed with +the following objectives: (a) identify opportunities for improvement; +(b) provide a basis for making decisions that would strengthen program +direction and planning efforts; and (c) specify resource needs and +potential legislative initiatives. Annex 2 summarizes current Federal +and California earthquake planning. + +The environment in which preparedness planning in California occurs is +characterized by the following observations of public expectations and +attitudes: + + " There is widespread public support for government + action. + + " Most people have some ideas as to what government should + be doing. + + " There is understanding of the need for hazard reduction + as well as emergency response planning. + + " People are willing, in the abstract, to have government + funds spent for hazard mitigation. + + " The public is not very satisfied with what government + officials have done. + + " Public officials perceive that current preparedness + plans and response are inadequate at best. + +As discussed below, the review indicates that all is not well in +earthquake plans and preparedness. Current plans and preparedness are +judged to be adequate for the "moderate" earthquakes most likely to +occur frequently in California. By moderate it is meant an event +causing property damage on the order of $1 to $2 billion. Such an +event, however, will severely tax existing resources and provide a +major test of management relationship among different governmental +jurisdictions and levels. For a catastrophic earthquake, current plans +and preparedness are clearly inadequate, leading to a high likelihood +that Federal, State, and local response activities would become +disorganized and largely fail to perform effectively for an extended +period of time. + + +B. STATE AND LOCAL RESPONSE + +Although there are widely differing approaches, local emergency +planning in California generally consists of a basic plan and a series +of contingency plans. The basic plan establishes the authority, sets +forth references, addresses hazard vulnerability, states the planning +assumptions, establishes an emergency services organization, assigns +tasks, formulates a mutual aid system, and directs the development of +specific support annexes. For those hazards identified in the basic +plan, a separate contingency plan is then developed to address the +unique nature of the hazardous event. The contingency plan contains +service support plans for each of the functional operations, including +detailed standard operating procedures. The planning efforts of local +jurisdictions are coordinated with adjacent jurisdictions and the +California OES for consistency. + +A plan is not considered complete without the support annexes which +make the plan operational. The survey undertaken for this assessment +disclosed that approximately 93 percent of the jurisdictions examined +have existing, basic plans; 50 percent have completed annexes; 28 +percent of the basic plans addressed an earthquake hazard +vulnerability; 35 percent have planned for earthquake contingency; and +only 1 percent (one city) has a plan to respond to an earthquake +prediction. + +At the State level, the California OES, as an integral part of the +Governor's Office, functions as his immediate staff and coordinating +organization in carrying out the State's emergency responsibilities. +Specific emergency assignments have been made to 34 State agencies by +the OES Director through a series of Administrative Orders. During +emergencies the activities of these agencies and departments are +coordinated by the California OES. + +The State OES is also responsible for maintaining and updating the +California Emergency Plan (CEP) and associated readiness plans. As in +the case of local plans, the basic document is supported by +operational annexes as listed below: + + CONTINGENCY MUTUAL AID + + Earthquake Fire and Rescue + Earthquake Prediction Law Enforcement + Oil Spill Medical + Nuclear Blackmail Utilities + Reactor Accident Military Support + Radioactive Material Incident + Flood + + + SUPPORTING SYSTEMS EMERGENCY RESOURCES + MANAGEMENT + + Warning Construction and Housing + Emergency Broadcast System Economic Stabilization + Emergency Public Information Food + Intelligence Operations Health + Radiological Defense Industrial Production + Manpower + Petroleum + Telecommunications + Transportation + Utilities + +Based on this planning concept, the review assessed quantitatively the +preparedness activities of the 34 State agencies that have +preparedness responsibilities in accordance with the CEP. The +quantitative data are listed in the following table. + + +TABLE 4 + +QUANTITATIVE ASSESSMENT OF STATE PREPAREDNESS ACTIVITIES + +----------------------------------------------------------------- + Number of Percent of + Preparedness Element Agencies 34 Agencies +----------------------------------------------------------------- +Existence of Plan 22 65 +Conduct of Exercises 27 79 +Public Education Activities 10 29 +Public Information Activities 9 26 +Operational Capability 32 94 +----------------------------------------------------------------- + +The quality of the plans, activities, and operational capabilities +were then evaluated on a scale of 1 (expected to fail/inadequate) to 5 +(expected to succeed well/adequate). The qualitative results are shown +below. + + +TABLE 5 + +QUALITATIVE ASSESSMENT OF STATE PREPAREDNESS ACTIVITIES + +---------------------------------------------------------- + Preparedness Element Capability Rating +---------------------------------------------------------- + Planning 2.67 + Exercises 2.64 + Public Education 1.44 + Public Information 1.50 + Operational Capability 2.91 +---------------------------------------------------------- + +It should be emphasized that these ratings apply to the State's +_present_ level of planning and preparedness for response to a major +destructive earthquake (magnitude 8), not a moderate (San +Fernando-type) event. + + +C. FEDERAL RESPONSE + +At the Federal level the principal capability to respond to a +catastrophic earthquake in California resides in FEMA, the agency +responsible by law to coordinate Federal activities in all +emergencies. FEMA has developed a basic plan for supplemental Federal +assistance for a major earthquake in the San Francisco Bay area. This +plan, however, covers only the emergency phase of response (first few +days of efforts to save lives and protect property). In addition, FEMA +is participating in a broader effort concentrating in Southern +California. This cooperative effort is getting under way with State +and local governments, other Federal departments, voluntary agencies, +practicing professions, business and commercial interests, labor, +educators, and researchers. It is expected to develop an effective +program to respond to an earthquake or a credible earthquake +prediction in that part of the State. The emphasis is being placed on +_public safety, reduction of property damage, self-help on the part of +individuals, socioeconomic impacts, improved response and long-range +recovery planning, mitigation activities, and public participation for +both the post-prediction and immediate post-earthquake periods_. This +pilot effort is expected to be usable in other highly seismic areas of +California as well as in other States. + +In the event of a catastrophic earthquake, a substantial number of +Federal agencies would provide support to and be coordinated by FEMA. +Illustrative are the following: + + + 1. Department of Defense (DOD) + + Initially, local military commanders may provide necessary +support to save lives, alleviate suffering, or mitigate property +damage. Normally, additional DOD resources would not be committed +until a presidential declaration of an emergency or major disaster. +When this occurs, the Secretary of the Army is DOD Executive Agent for +military support. The Commander, Sixth U.S. Army, at the Presidio, San +Francisco, has been further delegated authority to coordinate disaster +relief operations in the western portion of the United States. +Extensive planning and coordination have taken place between the Sixth +U.S. Army and FEMA Region IX. DOD emergency functions include: _damage +survey_, _search and rescue_, _emergency medical care_, +_identification and disposition of dead_, _emergency debris +clearance_, _emergency roads and bridge construction_, _airfield +repair_, and _identification and demolition of unsafe structures_. +Specific units have been identified to respond to an earthquake in any +of the major population centers of California. For example, at this +time the following units would be prepared for commitment within 8 +hours after a disaster is declared by the President: + + " Six medical units with a 1,320 bed capacity + + " Seven helicopter units with 90 utility helicopters and + 36 medium helicopters + + " One Infantry brigade of 1,500 personnel + + " Two engineer units with 78 pieces of heavy equipment + + " Two transportation units with 124 cargo trucks and + trailers + +These as well as additional DOD assets could be made available, +contingent on defense priorities. + + + 2. The National Communication System + + This Agency's plan, the "National Plan for Communications Support +in Emergencies and Major Disasters," provides for planning and using +national telecommunications assets and resources during presidentially +declared emergencies and major disasters. The plan, which has been +exercised repeatedly in past disasters, provides the management +structure and the communications staff to support FEMA. Restoration +priorities have been assigned to all critical circuits. + + + 3. Department of Transportation (DOT) + + DOT has established an Office of Emergency Transportation. This +office has developed and maintains comprehensive emergency plans and +procedural manuals for natural disasters and other civil crises. It +constantly monitors the civil transportation system for indications of +potential adverse impacts from all hazards. It conducts scheduled +periodic training and readiness exercises for DOT emergency personnel +and maintains quick response cells and emergency operating facilities +at DOT headquarters and in the field to provide an immediate reaction +capability. The system has been activated several times in the recent +past (e.g., Three Mile Island, 1979 Energy/Fuel Crisis, Independent +Truckers' Strike, and the Mt. St. Helens eruption). + + +D. CONSIDERATIONS FOR IMPROVING RESPONSE CAPABILITY + +Earthquake prediction has not been incorporated into existing plans. +Response to predictions in the current environment, if given, would be +_ad hoc_. The State of California has only a rudimentary plan and the +Federal Government none. The City of Los Angeles has examined the +problem extensively, but only considers its own jurisdiction and has +not produced an actionable plan. Current planning for the recovery +period is incomplete, uncoordinated, and not functional. State and +local governments have done little to plan for the recovery period +when, following the emergency lifesaving phase, efforts and resources +are concentrated on restoring the functioning of the community. They +presume that the Federal Government will "step in" after a +presidential declaration. The Federal Government has an untested draft +plan for the San Francisco area that is not fully coordinated with the +State plans. Current Federal plans are geared to the provision of +assistance on the order of a few hundred million dollars. Thus, there +is little confidence that they would function under the requirements +for tens-of-billions-of-dollars and concomitant service demands. + +Both Federal and State agencies need to commit the financial resources +and assignment of personnel to maintain and enhance earthquake plans +and preparedness. Earthquake preparedness, although responding to high +damage expectation, is still based upon a relatively low probability +occurrence. When it is in competition with pressing social needs for a +portion of limited resources, social needs tend to prevail at all +levels of government. Without a clear commitment, future development +of earthquake preparedness, as in the past, is problematic and its +implementation is in considerable doubt. The Federal earthquake +preparedness effort needs to focus on a high state of readiness. + +History in the area of natural hazard mitigation suggests that +assignment of responsibility, even by the President, when not followed +by leadership and regular oversight over the allocation of financial +resources, seldom leads to programs which can be expected to function. +The same weakness is evidenced at the State and local government +levels with few exceptions. The stresses likely to occur in emergency +response programs after a catastrophic earthquake will be such that +effective response will require a cooperative, integrated effort among +different jurisdictions and levels of government. + +Experience in other areas of planning and preparedness, particularly +for civil defense, indicates that damage to existing programs occurs +when the Federal Government raises expectations of the public and of +other levels of government and then fails to follow through with +implementation and funding. It is better to maintain the _status quo_ +with minor changes at the margin than to announce substantial program +initiatives and not meet their requirements. + + + + +CHAPTER V + +AN ASSESSMENT OF THE SOCIAL IMPACTS + + +Often, it is assumed that disasters leave masses of the population in +the impacted areas dazed and helpless and unable to cope with the new +conditions, or that those not so immobilized panic or display +antisocial behavior. Another common assumption is that local +communities and organizations are rendered ineffective to handle the +many problems, leading to further disorganization, loss of morale, and +requiring the quick assertion of "strong" outside leadership and +control. + +Practical experience and field studies of disasters indicate that +these assumptions are not necessarily correct. The widespread sharing +of danger, loss, and deprivation produces an intimate cooperativeness +among the survivors, which overcomes social isolation and provides a +channel for very close communication and expression and a major source +of physical and emotional support and reassurance. This capacity seems +to account for the resiliency of personality and social organization +in dealing with threat and danger. It is also at the base of the +ability of social life to regenerate. + +In addition, a good case can be made in that community systems +experiencing impact may be more efficient and rational than they are +in "normal" circumstances. Normal (pre-disaster) community life +traditionally operates at a low level of effectiveness and efficiency. +Activities are directed toward a very diffuse set of goals, just as +human resources within the community are inadequately utilized. Upon +disaster impact, certain community goals--care for victims and the +restoration of essential services--develop a high priority while +others are ignored or held in abeyance. Thus, the entire range of +community resources, even taking into account "losses," can be +allocated to the accomplishment of the more critical goals. Also, +human resources are better utilized. Many women, older persons, +younger persons, and members of minorities now become "productive;" +the "labor" market after impact is open to those underutilized +resources. In effect, then, disasters create the conditions for the +more efficient utilization of material resources and the more +effective mobilization of human resources. + +To accomplish this, certain modifications have to occur in the normal +community structure, since the usual decision-making structures are +designed for a different range and type of problem. Outsiders see this +restructuring process as disorganized, chaotic, and creating the +necessity for the imposition of some strong outside authority. On the +contrary, this restructuring process is functional and adaptive. Its +consequences are seen in communities and societies that rebound +dramatically from the disruption and destruction to levels of +integration, productivity, and growth capacity far beyond the +pre-disaster state. + +In summary, the picture drawn points to the capacity of individuals +and institutions to deal with difficult problems created by disaster +impact. It also points to the adaptive capacity of social organization +within communities to deal with unique and dramatic problems. These +findings are not an argument against planning nor against "outside" +assistance, but they should condition both the nature of planning and +the direction of assistance. + + + + +ANNEX 1 + +LETTERS OF CORRESPONDENCE + + + + +THE WHITE HOUSE + +WASHINGTON + + + September 19, 1980 + + To Governor Jerry Brown + +As you know, following my trip to view the destructive impacts of the +volcanic eruption of Mt. St. Helens in the State of Washington, I +directed that an assessment be undertaken of the consequences and +state of preparedness for a major earthquake in California. This +review, chaired by my Science and Technology Advisor, Frank Press, is +now complete. We are grateful for the assistance provided by your +staff and the other State, and local officials in this effort. + +Although current response plans are generally adequate for moderate +earthquakes, Federal, State, and local officials agree that additional +preparation is required to cope with a major earthquake. Prudence +requires, therefore, that we take steps to improve our preparedness. + +While the primary responsibility for preparedness rests with the State +of California, its local governments and its people, the magnitude of +human suffering and loss of life that might occur and the importance +of California to the rest of the Nation require increased Federal +attention to this important issue. Accordingly, I have directed that +the Federal government increase its work with you to supplement your +efforts. The Federal efforts will be led by the Federal Emergency +Management Agency and include the Department of Defense and other +Departments and agencies as appropriate. + +As a Nation, we must reduce the adverse impacts of a catastrophic +earthquake to the extent humanly possible by increasing our +preparedness for this potential eventuality. + + Sincerely, + + [signed] Jimmy Carter + + The Honorable Edmund G. Brown, Jr. + Governor of California + Sacramento, California 95814 + + + September 26, 1980 + + The Honorable Jimmy Carter + The President + The White House + Washington, D.C. 20500 + + Dear Mr. President: + +Let me take this opportunity to review our conversations over the last +few months regarding increased seismic activity in California. + +When we met in Oakland on July 4 I raised the issue of seismic +hazards. I was concerned then with the steady increase in seismic +activity in California since 1978. Sharing my concern, you directed +that the National Security Council join with my staff and certain +local experts to conduct a quick study on the potential for a great +earthquake in California. + +As you know, significant theoretical and public policy research had +already been completed by our Seismic Safety Commission, State +Geologist, Earthquake Prediction Evaluation Council and the Office of +Emergency Services. Together with the U.S. Geological Survey and the +Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), they had clearly been +keeping abreast of the state of the art of earthquake prediction. +Indeed, combined state and federal efforts, founded on major +theoretical advances in American, Russian and Chinese seismic and +geological theory since the early 1970s, had shifted the language of +earthquake prediction in California from "if" to "when"! + +In light of my personal interest in this subject, I have signed into +law Assemblyman Frank Vicencia's AB 2202, a jointly funded +state-federal project to design a comprehensive earthquake +prediction-response plan. It is the state's intention to prepare a +plan for the greater Los Angeles area as quickly as feasible. In my +view, such a fullscale prediction-response program had become possible +only after the research findings of both physical and policy +scientists during the past five years. It is my conviction that such a +plan is now timely--neither too early nor too late. + +In this context, your recognition of this issue in our conversation of +September 22 in Los Angeles was a welcome personal reinforcement of +our state and local efforts. I am also grateful for the September 3 +briefing in Sacramento by Mr. John Macy, Director of FEMA, regarding +the latest U.S. Geological Survey interpretations of anomalies around +California's system of geological faults. As soon as we have received +the final FEMA report on the details of those anomalies, I will ask +the state geologist to evaluate the report, confer with colleagues in +the Geological Survey and have all state and local officials fully +briefed. + +At that time, I would be grateful for an early opportunity to meet +with you and explore next steps. I am confident that a heightened +state of awareness among my fellow Californians will so deploy the +resources of the state, plus available federal supplementary +assistance, as to minimize the loss of life and property in the event +of a great earthquake. + + Sincerely, + + /s/ + + Edmund G. Brown, Jr. + Governor + + + + +ANNEX 2 + +CURRENT CALIFORNIA AND FEDERAL EARTHQUAKE RESPONSE PLANNING + + +A. NATURE OF EMERGENCY PLANNING + +An emergency, as used in this report, is defined as an unexpected, +sudden or out-of-the-ordinary event or series of events adversely +affecting lives and property which, because of its magnitude, cannot +be handled by normal governmental processes. Emergency response +planning is the process that addresses preparedness for and response +to an emergency. + +Emergency response planning is an evolutionary, ongoing process and is +prerequisite to all other emergency readiness activities. It is a +comprehensive process that identifies the potential hazardous events, +and the vulnerability to such hazards, estimates expected losses, and +assesses impacts of such events. The development of written plans is +followed by placement of capabilities to implement the response plan +and by the conduct of periodic tests and exercises. The most difficult +task in the development of an emergency plan is to anticipate as many +of the problems and complications resulting from a given disaster +situation as possible and to provide a basis for response to those not +anticipated. + +The objective of emergency planning is to create the capacity for +government to: + + " Save the maximum number of lives in the event of an + emergency + + " Minimize injuries and protect property + + " Preserve the functions of civil government + + " Maintain and support economic and social activities + essential for response and the eventual long-term + recovery from the disaster + +Emergency planning is a logical and necessary pre-emergency activity +for governmental (and other organizational) entities likely to be +affected by a disaster's occurrence. To be successful, such planning +must be accomplished within the framework of the day-to-day +governmental structure and activity but at the same time provide for +response to the extraordinary circumstances and requirements inherent +in disaster situations. + +Emergency plans include the preparation of guidelines, policy +directives, and procedures to be utilized in preparing for and +conducting disaster operations, training, and test exercises. They +should also contain clear statements of authorities, responsibilities, +organizational relationships, and operating procedures necessary for +the accomplishment of disaster response and recovery activities. +Further, they should address the four elements of mitigation, +preparedness, response, and recovery (immediate and long-term). + +Once plans are established they must be periodically updated as +conditions change. Updating may become necessary for a number of +reasons: increased scientific, technical, and managerial knowledge; +feedback from evaluation of exercises; better understanding of +vulnerability; shifts in population and economic activities; +construction of new critical facilities; and changes in personnel, +organization, and legislation. + +Emergency planning is a shared responsibility at all levels--in this +case from the Federal through the State and local jurisdictional +levels. It should include business, industry, research and scientific +institutions, practicing professions, and the individuals. By +involving all functions of government, the planning process enhances +the capability for implementing the plans through the realistic +consideration of available capabilities and elimination of conflicts +and inconsistencies of roles and task assignments. + +Further, by being a part of the planning decision-making process and +having identified the needs and areas of consideration, individuals, +organizations, and officials responsible for emergency operations are +better able to relate to the expected impact and the operational +environment. The written plans also serve valuable purposes for +training and familiarization of new organizations, individuals, and +public officials. Experience has shown repeatedly that when emergency +operations are conducted in accordance with existing plans, reaction +time is reduced and coordination improved, with fewer casualties, less +property damage, and a higher surviving socioeconomic capability to +undertake recovery. Other benefits that accrue from planning include +the enhancement of hazard awareness. + + +B. CALIFORNIA EMERGENCY PLANNING RESPONSE + +The State of California emergency response planning is a series of +related documents, each of which serve a specific purpose. (See +figures 1 and 2.) + +The basic plan of a jurisdiction (item (1) in figures 1 and 2) is the +foundation of this planning process. It is an essential administrative +(rather than operational) document, and as such it: + + " Provides the basis (including legal authority) for and + the objectives of emergency planning and operations + + " Outlines contingencies (emergency situations) to be + planned and prepared for and establishes the general + principles and policies (concepts of operations) to be + applied to each + + " Describes the emergency organization in terms of who is + responsible for what actions + + " Defines interjurisdictional and interservice + relationships and the direction and control structure to + make assignments and resolve conflicts + + " Contains or refers to information of common interest + about supporting facilities, such as the Emergency + Operations Center and warning and communications systems + + " Provides the planning basis for other supporting + documents which are more operationally oriented + +The basic plan is supported by a Direction and Control annex and by +functional annexes (see (2) and (3) respectively in figures 1 and 2). +The Direction and Control annex details how overall responses to an +emergency will be managed and coordinated. Functional annexes (for +both staff and services) are designed to address the extraordinary +requirements created by emergencies. They identify the specific needs, +the organizational resources available to meet those needs, and the +scheme or "concept of operations" for their application. It should be +noted that, because of unique requirements, annexes often do not +reflect normal departmental structure. An annex becomes a departmental +plan only when an agency represents the sole resource for meeting the +stated need and when satisfying that need is the only task assigned to +that agency by the basic plan. + +The second major portion of the California State planning structure +consists of specific contingency plans (see (4) in figures 1 and 2). +One such plan is prepared for each extraordinary emergency or +disaster, likely to occur, detailing the probable effects of the +emergency on the jurisdiction and the actions to be taken in +offsetting these effects. It is also called a "response plan" since it +describes the operations to be undertaken to deal with catastrophic +situations. Contingency plans include service support plans and +checklists (see (5) and (6) respectively in figures 1 and 2). Each +involved element of the emergency organization details its response +actions in Service Support Plans and itemizes functions appropriate to +the specific contingency. The contingency plans, service support +plans, and related checklists and standard operating procedures +constitute the "operational" portions of the overall emergency plan. +They address internal procedures to accomplish stated objectives and +document, in advance, the specific organizational elements that will +respond to each type of disaster or "need," with identification of +procedures and resources. + +The third major part of California's overall State plan is a +compendium of information and resources needed to cope with +emergencies (see (7) in figures 1 and 2). This includes references +describing the control structure (Emergency Operations Center +locations, communications, key facilities, personnel lists, and +equipment source listings). + + +C. FEDERAL EARTHQUAKE RESPONSE PLANNING + +Most Federal agencies operating within the State have a generic +emergency response plan that establishes their internal procedures for +responding to disasters. Certain agencies such as the Corps of +Engineers and the Federal Highway Administration, which provide +services and support that are used on a regular and fairly extensive +basis in disaster, tend to have more highly developed disaster +response plans. Some of them even have rather basic earthquake +response segments included in their basic plans. Thus, for moderate +earthquakes these plans are relatively effective and the Federal +response can be expected to be at least adequate. Few Federal +agencies, however, have developed any specific plan that is adequate +to respond to the demands of a catastrophic event causing property +damage exceeding the $2 billion range. Of 24 Federal agencies whose +earthquake planning status were recently evaluated by FEMA Region IX, +only the Sixth U.S. Army was determined to have developed a +comprehensive capability that is in acceptable detail, has been +exercised, and appears to be operationally adequate and reliable. +Other Federal agencies are now beginning to perceive the need to +improve their planning and response capability following the expected +event, and are gradually responding to this need. + +Providing impetus to this expanded planning activity has been the +emergence of the FEMA Region IX Earthquake Response Plan for the San +Francisco Bay Area. This is a site-specific FEMA plan based on a 1974 +draft that provided for a full range of Federal assistance during the +emergency lifesaving phase following the earthquake. Although this +plan never proceeded beyond the draft stage (because of evolving FEMA +disaster field operations policy), it served as the basic guide for +the development of the Sixth U.S. Army Plan, and has remained a core +document for identifying expected Federal agency activities for +earthquake recovery in the San Francisco Bay area. In 1979, the +emergency response portion of the 1974 FEMA Region IX draft was +restructured. The conduct of the post-event response program was +shifted from being a centrally directed FEMA activity under the +operational control of the Regional Director to a decentralized +operation which provides for functional disaster support activities to +be assigned by the Regional Director to certain Federal agencies by +Mission Assignment Letters. Table 1 indicates functional task +assignment areas. Those with the designation "Emergency Support +Function (ESF)," have been assigned to other Federal agencies. Table 2 +reviews the principal and support agency assignments for each of the +ESF functions. + +On the basis of these anticipated mission assignments, the tasked +Federal agencies participated in the development of operational +annexes in the 1979 version of the San Francisco Earthquake Response +Plan. Upon completion of the annexes, all agencies were then required +to develop the necessary agency support plans and standard operating +procedures for accomplishing the mission assignment tasks. +Additionally, those Federal agencies designated in the plan as +principal agencies were tasked with the responsibility of organizing +and coordinating the activities of Federal agencies designated as +support. + +The rationale for this approach was to identify the various functional +areas of disaster response for which a Federal activity could +reasonably be expected to maintain after the occurrence of the event. +With the functional areas identified, the range of Federal agency +talent was evaluated and Federal response capabilities matched to +expected functional demands. By the development of a matrix (figure +2), a total of 16 functional response areas (such as transportation, +mass care, and debris removal) were identified, and 20 Federal +agencies, plus volunteer organizations such as the American National +Red Cross, were designated as having appropriate disaster response +capabilities. Subsequently, all agencies were rated on their +capability for functioning in a principal or a support capacity. These +agencies were then provided specific FEMA Region IX Mission +Assignments or tasking statements which, when triggered by a +Presidential disaster declaration, provide the legal basis for +delivering the authorized assistance in response to State and local +government needs. + +The end result of this approach has been to create a much more +effective and reliable capability to respond to the needs of an +earthquake disaster by those Federal agencies from which a significant +response would be required. + + +----------+ + |Basic Plan| . + | (1) | . + +----------+ . + | | | . + | | | . +-----------------+ + | | +----------------------------|Contingency Plans| + | | . | (4) | + | | . +-----------------+ + | | Administrative . Operational | + | +-------------+ . | + | |Direction and| . | + | |Control Annex| . | + | | (2) | . | + | +-------------+ . | + +------+------+ . | + | | . | ++-------+ +-------+ . +-----------------------+ +| Staff | |Service| . | Service Support Plans | +|Annexes| |Annexes|----------------------| (5) | +| (3) | | (3) | . | Response Checklists | ++-------+ +-------+ . | and SOP's (6) | + . +-----------------------+ + . | + . | + . | + +--------------------+ + |Resources Compendium| + | (7) | + +--------------------+ + +[Illustration: =Figure 1: Emergency Plans +(Description of and Relationship Between Plan Components)=] + + ++-------------------------+ +-------------------------+ +| BASIC PLAN (1) | | | +| |-+ | |-+ +| Authorities | | | RESOURCES MANUAL(S) | | +| Policies | |-+ | (7) | |-+ +| Responsibilities | | | | | | | +| System Interfaces | | |-+ | | | |-+ +| | | | | | | | | | ++-------------------------+ | | |-+ +-------------------------+ | | |-+ + |Direction and Control (2) | | | | |Communication Capabilities| | | | + +--------------------------+ | | |-+ +--------------------------+ | | |-+ + |Public Safety (3) | | | | |Law Enforcement/Fire | | | | + +---------------------------+ | | | +---------------------------+ | | | + |People Care (3) | | | |Medical-Health/Welfare | | | + +----------------------------+ | | +----------------------------+ | | + |System Restoration (3) | | |Engineering/Utilities | | + +-----------------------------+ | +-----------------------------+ | + |Resource Management (3) | |Transportation, etc. | + +------------------------------+ +------------------------------+ + + + + +----------------+ +----------------+ + | | | | + | | | | + | EARTHQUAKE |-+ | FLOOD |-+ + | Response Plan | | | Response Plan | | + | (4) | | | (4) | | + | | | | | | + | | |-+ | | |-+ + +----------------+ | | +----------------+ | | + | | | | | | + | D & C Checklist | | | D & C Checklist | | + +-----------------+ | +-----------------+ | + |Svcs. Sup. | |Svcs. Sup. | + | Plans (5) | | Plans (5) | + |Checklists & | |Checklists & | + | SOP's (6) | | SOP's (6) | + +-----------------+ +-----------------+ + + + +----------------+ +----------------+ + | | | WAR | + | |-+ | |-+ + | WAR | | | | | + | Response Plan | | | Response Plan | | + | (4) | | | (4) | | + | In-Place | | | Crisis | | + | Protection | |-+ | Relocation | |-+ + +----------------+ | | +----------------+ | | + | | | | | | + | D & C Checklist | | | D & C Checklist | | + +-----------------+ | +-----------------+ | + |Svcs. Sup. | | Svcs. Sup. | + | Plans (5) | | Plans (5) | + |Checklists & | | Checklists & | + | SOP's (6) | | SOP's (6) | + +-----------------+ +-----------------+ + +[Illustration: =Figure 2: Emergency Planning Format +(A Partial Illustration of the Component Parts of a Jurisdictional +Emergency Plan)=] + + +TABLE 1 + +FEDERAL EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT AGENCY REGION IX EARTHQUAKE RESPONSE AND +ASSISTANCE TASKS + +(San Francisco Bay Area) + + +ANNEXES TO BASIC PLAN + + Disaster Field Activities + Disaster Field Location + Mission Assignments + Emergency Transportation (ESF-1)[1] + Communication (ESF-2) + Emergency Debris Clearance (ESF-3) + Fire Fighting (ESF-4) + Emergency Roads, Airfields, and Bridges (ESF-5) + Emergency Demolition (ESF-6) + Administrative Logistical Support (ESF-7) + Emergency Medical Care (ESF-8) + Search and Rescue (ESF-9) + Identification and Disposal of Dead (ESF-10) + Warnings of Risks and Hazards (ESF-11) + Emergency Distribution of Medicine (ESF-12) + Emergency Distribution of Food (ESF-13) + Emergency Distribution of Consumable Supplies (ESF-14) + Emergency Shelter & Mass Care (ESF-15) + Damage Reconnaissance (ESF-16) + Isoseismal Analysis + Authorities Referral + Administration + + [1] Emergency Support Functions (ESF) are cross-referenced by + number in table 2. + + +TABLE 2 + +EMERGENCY SUPPORT FUNCTIONS + + +KEY: + a: Emergency Transportation + b: Emergency Communications + c: Emergency Debris Clearance + d: Fire Fighting + e: Emerg. Roads, Air Fields & Bridges + f: Emergency Demolition + g: Logistical Support + h: Emergency Medical Care + i: Search and Rescue + j: Identif. & Disposal of Dead + k: Warnings of Risks & Hazards + l: Emergency Dist. of Medicine + m: Emergency Dist. of Food + n: Emergency Dist. of Consum. Supplies + o: Emerg. Shelter, Feed, & Mass Care + p: Damage Reconnaissance ++--------------+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+ +|ESF | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 | 8 | 9 | 10| 11| 12| 13| 14| 15| 16| ++--------------+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+ +|ANNEX |(D)|(E)|(F)|(G)|(H)|(I)|(J)|(K)|(L)|(M)|(N)|(O)|(P)|(Q)|(R)|(S)| ++--------------+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+ +| FEDERAL | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | +| AGENCIES | a | b | c | d | e | f | g | h | i | j | k | l | m | n | o | p | ++--------------+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+ +|DOT - FAA | S | | | | | | | | S | | | | | | | S | ++--------------+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+ +|DOT - FHWA | S | | | | S | | | | | | | | | | | S | ++--------------+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+ +|DOT - FRA | S | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | S | ++--------------+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+ +|DOT - RETCO-9 | P | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | ++--------------+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+ +|DOT - UMTA | S | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | S | ++--------------+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+ +|DOT - USCC | S | S | | S | | S | | | S | | | | | | | S | ++--------------+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+ +|DOD - 6th USA | S | S | S | S | S | S | S | P | P | P | | S | S | S | S | P | ++--------------+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+ +|DOD - COE | | S | P | S | P | P | | | | | | | | | | | ++--------------+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+ +|ICC | S | | | | | | | | | | | | S | S | | | ++--------------+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+ +|DA - USFS | | S | | P | S | | | | S | | | | | | S | S | ++--------------+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+ +|DA - FNS | | | | | | | | | | | | | P | | | | ++--------------+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+ +|DOC - MARAD | S | | | | | S | | S | | | | | | | | | ++--------------+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+ +|NCS | | P | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | ++--------------+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+ +|AYRC | | | | | | | | S | | | | S | | | P | | ++--------------+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+ +|Volunteer | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | +| Agencies | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | S | | +| (Various) | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | ++--------------+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+ +|HEW | | | | | | | S | | | | | P | | | S | | ++--------------+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+ +|US ATTY | | | | | | | | | | S | | | | | | | ++--------------+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+ +|DOL - OSHA | | | S | | | | | | | | | | | | | | ++--------------+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+ +|USPS | S | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | ++--------------+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+ +|FBI | | | | | | | | | | S | | | | | | | ++--------------+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+ +|VA | | | | | | | | S | | S | | S | S | | S | | ++--------------+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+ +|GSA | S | S | | | | S | P | | | | | S | | P | | | ++------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ +P - Principal Agencies +S - Support Agencies + + + + +ANNEX 3 + +ASSEMBLY BILL NO. 2202 + + +The Governor of California signed into law Assembly Bill 2202 on +September 25, 1980, which, among others, provides for State +participation in a joint Federal, State, and local program to prepare +a comprehensive program for responding to a major earthquake +prediction. This action was initiated in January 1980 through the +actions of the Assembly Committee on Government Organization, Frank +Vicencia, Chairman. Inclusions of specific funds for preparedness was +included following a subcommittee on Emergency Planning and Disaster +Relief hearing on possible earthquake prediction on April 22, 1980. +The text of the Law follows: + + Assembly Bill No. 2202 + + CHAPTER 1046 + + An act to amend Section 8897 of, to amend and + renumber Section 8898 of, and to add Section + 8895.1 to, the Government Code, relating to the + Seismic Safety Commission, making an appropriation + therefor, and declaring the urgency thereof, to + take effect immediately. + + [Approved by Governor September 25, 1980. Filed + with Secretary of State September 26, 1980.] + + + LEGISLATIVE COUNSEL'S DIGEST + + AB 2202, Vicencia. Seismic Safety Commission. + + The Seismic Safety Commission Act, which will + self-repeal, effective January 1, 1986, + establishes the Seismic Safety Commission, and + confers upon it various powers and duties relating + to earthquake hazard reduction. The California + Emergency Services Act confers various related + powers and duties upon the Governor, the Director + and the Department of Emergency Services, and the + California Emergency Council. + + This bill would amend the Seismic Safety + Commission Act by: changing the basic subject of + the powers and duties of the commission to + earthquake hazard mitigation and making certain + corresponding changes in its powers and duties; + including within commission responsibilities, + scheduling on its agenda as required, a report on + disaster mitigation issues from the Office of + Emergency Services and defining, for such + purposes, "disaster" as all natural hazards which + could have an impact on public safety; and + authorizing the commission to exercise various + specified powers in relation to other disasters, + as so defined, in connection with issues or items + reported or discussed with the Office of Emergency + Services at any commission meeting. + + This bill would also require the commission to + initiate, as specified, a comprehensive program to + prepare the state for responding to a major + earthquake prediction, as specified. + + This bill would appropriate $750,000 for the + purposes of this act. + + This act would take effect immediately as an + urgency statute. + + Appropriation: yes. + + + _The people of the State of California do enact + as follows:_ + + SECTION 1. Section 8895.1 is added to the + Government Code, to read: + + 8895.1. The commission shall initiate, with the + assistance and participation of other state, + federal, and local government agencies, a + comprehensive program to prepare the state for + responding to a major earthquake prediction. The + program should be implemented in order to result + in specific tools or products to be used by + governments in responding to an earthquake + prediction, such as educational materials for + citizens. This program may be implemented on a + prototypical basis in one area of the state + affected by earthquake predictions, provided that + it is useful for application in other areas of the + state upon its completion. + + SEC. 2. Section 8897 of the Government Code is + amended to read: + + 8897. The commission is responsible for all of + the following in connection with earthquake hazard + mitigation: + + (a) Setting goals and priorities in the public + and private sectors. + + (b) Requesting appropriate state agencies to + devise criteria to promote earthquake and disaster + safety. + + (c) Scheduling a report on disaster mitigation + issues from the Office of Emergency Services, on + the commission agenda as required. For the + purposes of this subdivision, the term disaster + refers to all natural hazards which could have + impact on public safety. + + (d) Recommending program changes to state + agencies, local agencies, and the private sector + where such changes would improve earthquake + hazards and reduction. + + (e) Reviewing the recovery and reconstruction + efforts after damaging earthquakes. + + (f) Gathering, analyzing, and disseminating + information. + + (g) Encouraging research. + + (h) Sponsoring training to help improve the + competence of specialized enforcement and other + technical personnel. + + (i) Helping to coordinate the earthquake safety + activities of government at all levels. + + (j) Establishing and maintaining necessary + working relationships with any boards, + commissions, departments, and agencies, or other + public or private organizations. + + SEC. 3. Section 8898 of the Government Code is + amended and renumbered to read: + + 8897.1. To implement the foregoing + responsibilities, the commission may do any of the + following: + + (a) Review state budgets and review grant + proposals, other than those grant proposals + submitted by institutions of postsecondary + education to the federal government, for + earthquake related activities and to advise the + Governor and Legislature thereon. + + (b) Review legislative proposals, related to + earthquake safety to advise the Governor and + Legislature concerning such proposals, and to + propose needed legislation. + + (c) Recommend the addition, deletion, or + changing of state agency standards when, in the + commission's view, the existing situation creates + undue hazards or when new developments would + promote earthquake hazard mitigation, and conduct + public hearings as deemed necessary on the + subjects. + + (d) In the conduct of any hearing, + investigation, inquiry, or study which is ordered + or undertaken in any part of the state, to + administer oaths and issue subpoenas for the + attendance of witnesses and the production of + papers, records, reports, books, maps, accounts, + documents, and testimony. + + (e) In addition, the commission may perform any + of the functions contained in subdivisions (a) to + (d), inclusive, in relation to other disasters, as + defined in subdivision (c) of Section 8897, in + connection with issues or items reported or + discussed with the Office of Emergency Services at + any commission meeting. + + SEC. 4. The sum of seven hundred fifty thousand + dollars ($750,000) is hereby appropriated from the + General Fund to the Seismic Safety Commission for + carrying out the provisions of Section 8895.1 of + the Government Code as added by this act, + contingent upon receipt of matching federal funds. + + SEC. 5. This act is an urgency statute necessary + for the immediate preservation of the public + peace, health, or safety within the meaning of + Article IV of the Constitution and shall go into + immediate effect. The facts constituting such + necessity are: + + In order to protect the public safety against + earthquakes, including the imminent possibility of + major earthquake predictions being made within the + next 12 months, it is necessary that this act take + effect immediately. + + + + +ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS + + +=National Security Council Ad Hoc Committee on Assessment of +Consequences and Preparation for a Major California Earthquake= + +_Dr. Frank Press_, Chairperson, President's Science Advisor +_Clifton Alexander, Jr._, Secretary of the Army + _Roderick Renick_, Department of Defense +_Cecil Andres_, Secretary of the Department of Interior + _H.W. Menard_, Department of Interior (USGS) +_W. Bowman Cutter_, Executive Associate Director for Budget, Office of + Management and Budget +_Lynn Daft_, Associate Director for Domestic Policy Staff, White House +_Peter Hamilton_, Special Assistant to the Secretary of the Department + of Defense +_Ted Hodkowski_, Intergovernmental Assistant to the President, White + House +_John W. Macy, Jr._, Director, Federal Emergency Management Agency + _Richard Green_, Federal Emergency Management Agency + _Frank Camm_, Federal Emergency Management Agency +_William Odom_, Military Assistant, National Security Council, White + House +_Robert P. Pirie, Jr._, Assistant Secretary for Manpower, Reserve + Affairs and Logistics, Department of Defense + + +=Working Group Members= + +_Philip Smith_, Chairperson, Office of Science and Technology Policy +_Clarence G. Collins_, Department of Transportation +_Richard DiConti_, National Communications System +_Joseph Mullinix_, Office of Management and Budget +_Chris Shoemaker_, National Security Council +_Charles C. Thiel_, Federal Emergency Management Agency +_Stephen Travis_, Domestic Policy Staff +_Robert L. Wesson_, Office of Science and Technology Policy + +=Selected Contributors= + +_Richard E. Adams_, State of California, OES Region V +_James Alexander_, State of California, OES Region I +_William Anderson_, National Science Foundation +_Ralph Archuleta_, United States Geological Survey +_Roger D. Borcherdt_, United States Geological Survey +_Robert D. Brown, Jr._, United States Geological Survey +_James Brown_, George Washington University +_Richard J. Buzka_, United States Geological Survey +_Maria D. Castain_, United States Geological Survey +_Lloyd Cluff_, Woodward-Clyde Consultants +_John Crawford_, Federal Emergency Management Agency +_Alex Cunningham_, State of California, OES +_Donna Darling_, State of California, OES Region II +_Gardner Davis_, State of California, OES Region VI +_Henry Degenkolb_, H.J. Degenkolb & Associates +_Joseph Domingues_, Federal Emergency Management Agency, Region IX +_Russell Dynes_, American Sociological Association +_Raymond R. Eis_, United States Geological Survey +_Susan Elkins_, Federal Emergency Management Agency, Region IX +_Jack F. Evernden_, United States Geological Survey +_Charles Fritz_, National Academy of Sciences +_Thomas E. Fumal_, United States Geological Survey +_James T. Haigwood_, State of California, OES Region I +_Jane Victoria Hindmarsh_, State of California, OES +_Connie E. Hooper_, Federal Emergency Management Agency +_William B. Joyner_, United States Geological Survey +_Harry King_, State of California, OES Region II +_Henry Lagorio_, University of California +_Richard P. Liechti_, United States Geological Survey +_Terry Meade_, Federal Emergency Management Agency, Region IX +_Ugo Morelli_, Federal Emergency Management Agency +_William Myers_, Federal Emergency Management Agency +_Robert A. Page_, United States Geological Survey +_Daniel J. Ponti_, United States Geological Survey +_H. Roger Pulley_, State of California, OES +_F. Joseph Russo_, Federal Emergency Management Agency +_Louis Schwalb_, Federal Emergency Management Agency +_Wanda H. Seiders_, United States Geological Survey +_Paul A. Spudich_, United States Geological Survey +_Frank Steindl_, Oklahoma State University +_Karl Steinbrugge_, Private Consultant +_Christopher Stephens_, United States Geological Survey +_Robert Stevens_, Federal Emergency Management Agency, Region IX +_John Sucich_, Federal Emergency Management Agency +_Hurst Sutton_, Private Consultant +_Richard Traub_, State of California, OES Region I +_Monica L. Turner_, United States Geological Survey +_Robert E. Wallace_, United States Geological Survey +_Kay M. Walz_, United States Geological Survey +_William W. Ward_, State of California, OES Region II +_Robert R. Wilson_, Federal Emergency Management Agency +_Robert P. Yerkes_, United States Geological Survey +_Mark D. Zoback_, United States Geological Survey + + + * * * * * + + + + + + +End of the Project Gutenberg EBook of An Assessment of the Consequences and +Preparations for a Catastrophic California Earthquake: Findings and Actions Taken, by Various + +*** END OF THIS PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK CALIFORNIA EARTHQUAKE *** + +***** This file should be named 18527.txt or 18527.zip ***** +This and all associated files of various formats will be found in: + http://www.gutenberg.org/1/8/5/2/18527/ + +Produced by Jeannie Howse and the Online Distributed +Proofreading Team at http://www.pgdp.net + + +Updated editions will replace the previous one--the old editions +will be renamed. + +Creating the works from public domain print editions means that no +one owns a United States copyright in these works, so the Foundation +(and you!) can copy and distribute it in the United States without +permission and without paying copyright royalties. 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